Please begin Chapter XII comments here:
Chapter I, Chapter II, Chapter II supplement, Chapter III, Chapter IV, Chapter V, Chapter VI, Chapter VII, Chapter VIII , Chapter IX, Chapter X and Chapter XI.
© Copyright 2015 John Dougherty, All rights Reserved. Written For: Investigative MEDIA
Apparently JD has started a new chapter. Chapter XIII.
http://www.investigativemedia.com/yarnell-hill-fire-chapter-xiii/
I’ve been hassling with Photoshop issues the past few days, while editing two days worth of photos I took two weeks ago at the Valles Caldera in New Mexico. And moving the stuff out of my mom’s apartment by Friday. So a bit in and out. And slow on my email.
So I guess we need to transport our on-going conversations to the new chapter.
I see in the Prescott Dailey Courier that they have extended the Hearing to another 30 days for the 2 parities to get more information and then reconvene.
Sounds like they are still in some dead lock over the issues. More legal mumbo jumbo.
The article is here…
The Prescott Daily Courier
Article: Attorneys seek more time to resolve Yarnell Hill Fire case
Published 3/9/2015 5:40:00 PM – by The Associated Press
http://dcourier.com/main.asp?SectionID=1&SubSectionID=1087&ArticleID=142740
From the article…
————————————————————————
PRESCOTT – Attorneys in a lawsuit stemming from the deaths of 19 firefighters in Arizona say they need more time to try to negotiate a settlement with the state.
They asked a federal judge Monday, March 9, to put the case on hold for another 30 days. They say substantial progress has been made toward resolving the wrongful-death case.
U.S. District Judge John Tuchi had granted a previous request for a stay so that the two sides could participate in mediation. He asked for an update Monday.
Attorneys for the firefighters’ families say any settlement also could include Arizona’s workplace safety agency.
The state Forestry Division is contesting citations and fines imposed by the agency for the June 2013 deaths of 19 members of the Granite Mountain Hotshots. A July 8 hearing is scheduled in that case.
————————————————————————
I think this more than likely has EVERYTHING to do with Brendan McDonough blowing off his under-oath deposition for the SECOND time.
I will bet a dollar to a sawbuck that the Arizona Forestry lawyers really, really do NOT want to have to walk into ANY ‘settlement’ situation where there’s a good chance the opposition knows what Brendan McDonough actually knows… but THEY do NOT.
That really is a ‘nightmare scenario’ for attorneys and they will seek to avoid it as much as they can… for as LONG as they can… until they can get McDonough in a room ( under-oath ) and find out for themselves what he REALLY knows.
There are still these ‘rumors’ that Brendan has, somehow, told what he knows to a ‘select’ (small) group of people… including some ‘Prescott Oficials’ ( Darrell Willis? John Paladini? ) and (perhaps) some select family members.
So there is every chance that the lawyers for the “wrongful death” plaintiffs have the same knowledge.
I don’t think the attorneys want to even ‘get in the room’ with those other attorneys if there’s even the slightest chance that is true.
There is still also this mysterious ‘other video’ that only few people have seen.
Rinse and repeat for that.
The Arizona Forestry Attorneys do NOT want to ‘get into the room’ with anyone who might have seen/heard this mysterious ‘other video’… when THEY have NOT.
We shall see.
I wonder WHY Brendan McDonough backed out of his under-oath deposition for the SECOND time? If he really does want to FINALLY ‘tell the whole truth’ and ‘get this off his chest’… I would think he would have WANTED to go through with it.
Maybe his new criminal attorney ( David Shapiro ) of Prescott is actually advising Brendan now that regardless of how anxious he is to get something ‘off his chest’… that even Brendan should ‘hold out’ and wait for the results of the ‘Mediation’.
If ALL the legal actions get settled… ( Wrongful Death, AZF vs. ADOSH ) then maybe Shapiro is still telling Brendan he could get what he originally wanted. It all ‘goes away’ and Brendan never has to fully tell the truth about what he knows.
OR… maybe it’s a lot more mundane than that.
Shapiro’s case load was the reason Brendan had to ‘back out’ of his originally scheduled under-oath deposition back on November 26, 2014.
Maybe Shapiro’s scheduled was the culprit once again… and Shapiro was once again the one who couldn’t ‘make’ the scheduled February 26, 2015 deposition.
I DO find it more than odd that it is OBVIOUS the Prescott Daily Courier is following all of this very closely ( and they have direct/fast access to ALL court documents being filed )… but there has never been ANY mention in ANY article that according to those SAME court documents they depend on for information… the KEY witness in the Incident has already said he never told “the whole truth” and now he wants to “get that off his chest”.
I would think the fact that the Arizona Attorney General’s office ( legal counsel for Arizona Forestry ) was SO convinced this is a FACT that they legally ( and publicly ) requested Administrative Law Judge Michael A. Mosesso to issue a no-shit SUBPOENA to FORCE Brendan to testify about what they are SURE he has already told at least ‘Some Prescott City Officials’ ( Willis? Paladini? Both? ).
Once that ‘request for subpoena’ was filed… I would have thought that was a ‘news worthy’ even in this continuing drama.
But no one has ‘printed’ a word about that… or the now additional drama that the same reason the Arizona State Attorney General’s lawyers WANTED that subpoena to be issued has actually come true.
Brendan ‘blew off’ the scheduled under-oath deposition.
For the SECOND time.
At some point… this little ‘drama within the the drama’ is GOING to rise to being MSM ‘newsworthy’ all by itself.
Another article appeared in the Prescott Daily Courier this morning…
The Prescott Daily Courier
PREPARING for BATTLE
Wildfire academy draws 800 firefighters to Prescott this week
Published 3/9/2015 9:49:00 PM by Joanna Dodder Nellans
http://dcourier.com/main.asp?SectionID=1&SubSectionID=1&ArticleID=142764
From the article…
————————————————————————-
More than 800 wildland firefighters and instructors are converging on Prescott this week for the 13th annual Arizona Wildfire and Incident Management Academy.
This year it is getting somewhat back to normal, without numerous special events honoring the (Granite Mountain) hotshots.
Last year the (Granite Mountain) hotshots were given the academy’s Herb McElwee Loyalty Award for volunteering many hours at the academy. Another Yarnell Hill hero,
Central Yavapai Fire District Training Officer Gary Cordes, received the academy’s Firefighter of the Year award for helping to rescue Yarnell residents.
————————————————————————-
The THEME for this year’s academy is…
“Successes in Leadership.”
Whoops… I messed up the ‘cut and paste’ above and split a paragraph
in the wrong place.
That last paragraph from the article above should have read like this…
Another Yarnell Hill hero, Central Yavapai Fire District Training Officer Gary Cordes, received the academy’s Firefighter of the Year award for helping to rescue Yarnell residents.
My bet is they want to go to Court and put it on record.
Deposition can be messy and may not get all the facts a
defense and state attorney could get with cross.
The Family’s may want it in court proceedings records.
Just some Thoughts???????????
Reply to Bob Powers post on March 10, 2015 at 8:27 am
>> Bob Powers said…
>>
>> I see in the Prescott Dailey Courier that they have extended the Hearing to
>> another 30 days for the 2 parities to get more information and then reconvene.
>>
>> Sounds like they are still in some dead lock over the issues.
>> More legal mumbo jumbo.
That article is still HERE…
The Prescott Daily Courier
Article: Attorneys seek more time to resolve Yarnell Hill Fire case
Published 3/9/2015 5:40:00 PM – by The Associated Press
http://dcourier.com/main.asp?SectionID=1&SubSectionID=1087&ArticleID=142740
…and now it has some PUBLIC comments on it.
The very FIRST comment was the following, and it mentions THIS
ongoing discussion here at InvestigativeMEDIA…
——————————————————————————-
Noel Breen · Top Commenter
It’s great to see that this matter might be resolved without a protracted legal battle. On the other hand a settlement without some real accounting of what happened in Yarnell would be a shame. The award winning journalist John Dougherty and others have done a masterful job in adding to this needed public record. It’s a must read for those seeking the truth. http://www.investigativemedia.com/
——————————————————————————-
Thirtymile fire: Did any of you ever pay attention to the explanation of why the Thirtymile fire moved the way that it did (e.g. the fire behavior) in the minutes leading up to the burn over and tragedies?
My impression is that looking at that fire behavior might be interesting to some of you. (It certainly was to me.)
Yep, read teh 24 hour report, the 72 hour, teh final report, as well as the book.
Again, it reads back to the same common mistakes that usually occur in all death related fires.
Lack of situational awareness, based on terrain, fire weather, fire behaviour potential and poor communications from the Incident command group.
Those people should never been given teh assignment up at the head of the draw, based on the fire behaviour potential, terrain (timbered canyon) with no anchor points or escape routes.
Similar factors to the Mann Gulch, StormKing, Esperanza, Need I name more???
Rocksteady had said “The next morning, I fired up my computer, gathered weather forecasts and weather readings from the internet from the Weather Channel or some such site, opened up my behaviour prediction software, entered some data (real readings from the local area , made a few assumptions (about 10, 100 hr fuels) and generated some rates of spread predictions. Then I took and changed the wind speed ONLY at 10 mph incriments. I reported all of this info on IM about how many chains per hour teh little black box was predicting spread. It took me no more than 15 minutes..” I think this underscores the fact that, counter to what “some people” keep trying to assert, the weather wasn’t unusual and in fact the fire behavior that resulted, given the weather, wasn’t unusual.
One extension of this point, imo, that bears keeping in mind is that, with that easily available, easily generated set of inputs and outputs, you can then easily model a slow bushwhack and see, on a simple Excel spreadsheet, how common burnovers would be if people routinely engaged in prolonged bushwhacks through dense brush in these situations. The rare event here isn’t the weather and isn’t the behavior of the fire. The rare event was entirely under volitional human control.
I completely agree.
And still.
I have to say, in all honesty.
I really really am waiting, with some baited breath, for the day/days I discover, via Google or whatever, some of the more refined analyses that I think are in the works, of the Yarnell fire.
As much as I write about how relatively predictable, on the larger scale, this fire was……….and enough so that it should have been self-evident that anybody in charge of anybody else on this fire should have been pulling their forces SAFELY off of it WAY before they did………..
Every time I watch the Air 2 Air videos, I am stunned. I don’t even have words to describe it, beyond, yeah, a rotating, lifting-way-up-high and then bending-over, flashing, horrifically beautiful, fascinating, tornado-like, potentially double-columned, incredibly powerful 3ish-hour-long (which is not all that long compared to some of the stuff I’ve seen) dynamo.
I just have to add credit where credit is due.
Marti:
I wouldn’t wait with baited breath for the so called experts to explain anything.
You yourself have the tools and the cognition and the ability to figure out what
happened at Yarnell.
It all begins with the stars and stripes. Take a good look at the 72 second Youtube video:
“Yarnell Hills Fire Video Sund 1245pm”
which was uploaded the day of the tragedy.
The beginning of the video shows the little white house with utility pole out front and the shed along side. You can pick the house out in the Google Earth imagery; and you can pick the flagpole off in the street view. Once you know approximately where the flagpole is, you can go back to the Google Earth nadir view (straight down) to locate where the pole’s shadow pierces the earth. Likewise for the utility pole. So you can develop exactly where the videographer was standing, and establish an azimuth view vector for the camera, etc.
The flag of course indicates the speed and direction of the surface wind; at the flag’s height; at the location of the flagpole.
The wind direction is attained in a pretty straightforward fashion, after a simple geometric layout, because the flag moves directly toward the observer. Then use your wind reading skills (Beaufort scale) to estimate the wind speed from how the flag waves and stands.
It’s pretty crucial to get the speed right; so relax and take your time; experiment if you have to. Take a week, take a month; or don’t even try. This is not an inquisition. If possible, post your numbers back online whenever and I will be very happy to compare and respond, and relate several different ways to verify your observation.
Reading this flag right is the first step of many towards explaining what happened to Granite four hours later. Observations don’t mean anything unless they can be verified; independent of time and space. I think that defines “science”. And so to begin, hopefully your science about some stars and stripes can verify mine. Thank you; Billy.
Billy Jack…
Please confirm. You are talking about THIS public YouTube video… correct?
http://m.youtube.com/watch?v=VgIi4kT5aLs
I had seen this video before, and had put it in my Yarnell playlist.
It shows how hard the fire (under the wind from the southwest) is burning towards Peeples Valley at 12:45 PM. Which is, also, why Peeples Valley was being evacuated at that time. Even though, as it later turned out, since the predicted thunderstorm had its predicted influence on the fire, Peeples Valley was spared.
That’s around the time B3 was flying their recon and realizing that thunderstorms would arrive in that afternoon and push the fire uphill and towards the southwest, i.e. towards Yarnell,
Any kind of analysis of that video still doesn’t, in my humble opinion, preclude the need, I believe, for major modeling by professional Fire-Weather-Behavior folks of the fire, as the thunderstorm influence (including the outflow winds) hit it and, essentially, transformed it into a rotating — and perhaps double — column.
Especially for those of us who live in Arizona and New Mexico and who are facing, potentially, more of the same kinds of things.
Unless I’m missing what the Original Poster is trying to say.
And remember this video was shot just 15 minutes after Darrel Willis finally pulled his crew off of the hopeless and costly (including the use of a VLAT DC-10) operation to “save” the Double A Bar Ranch.
Good point ( about the COST ).
There are actually 2 things we STILL don’t know about this whole ‘massive’ ( and eventually pointless ) effort to protect the ‘Double-Bar-A’ Ranch.
1) WHO actually decided it WAS ‘worth the effort’… when SPGS/DIVS Darrell Willis himself had already scouted it out in the wee hours of Sunday Morning and decided it was officially ‘not defensible’.?
2) How MUCH did that that WHOLE wasted effort really COST… in the end. ( 2 DOC crews / Engines / Sprinkler Systems / Burnoffs / SEAT drops / VLAT drops / etc., etc.
It ALMOST cost a number of LIVES as well.
WHO really thought any of that was ‘worth it’… or had any real chance at success?
I doubt from what we have seen there was any real evaluation of protection of structures the ranch was I futile effort to attempt to save it for what ever reason.
Locals looking for protection,
The fire department making a valiant effort to save a expensive peace of property to look good.
Local politics.
It happens far to often and puts Fire Fighters at risk.
We have all learned this fire team did not evaluate the situation and use the resources they had to Suppress the Fire and keep the Fire fighters out of harms way.
Protecting what hey had the ability to. This is a classic example of Urban interface where many of the structures were at high risk because the were not defensible and yet the Local Fire department would not Give up on it. Spending time and resources where there was no ability to accomplish an objective.
You say two DOC crews. Am I missing something here?
Regardless.
We have just previously discussed how the “build a line across the bowl above Yarnell” strategy was doomed from the start because there weren’t enough resources put on it to accomplish it.
Especially give the fact that a whole IHC that was ordered didn’t make it.
So a whole DOC crew is committed to this (given the fire behavior, weather, and circumstances) impossible task, another whole DOC crew is committed to working at the ICP helping check people in and such.
They were fighting this fire by the seats of their pants.
From the get-go.
Marti, sent you an email…
Reply to Marti Reed post on
March 10, 2015 at 9:00 am
>> Marti said…
>>
>> You say two DOC crews.
>> Am I missing something here?
There has always been evidence that BOTH the Yuma and the Globe DOC crews were assigned to protect the Double-Bar-A Ranch.
One of the primary pieces of evidence on that comes from that same ADOSH document where we hear Sergeant Paulson ( with the ASPC-Globe DOC Crew ) testifying that he definitely heard “Air Attack” talking to “Granite Mountain” and ASKING them…
“WHAT are you doing”
“WHERE are you GOING?”.
The same document says that Paulson’s Globe DOC Crew was right there at the Double-Bar-A Ranch along with the Yuma DOC Crew.
NOTE: This particular ADOSH document has never been officially attributed to any particular ADOSH investigator ( it wasn’t SIGNED by anyone ) but it definitely appears to be a first-person account coming directly from ADOSH lead investigator Marshall Krotenberg.
That ADOSH document is here…
/ ADOSH Dropbox / ADOSH Notes and Emails / L3419 Notes redacted.pdf
On page 9 of that ADOSH document…
——————————————-
On September 5, 2013 I interviewed over the telephone Sergeant Joe Barreras and Correctional Officer II Leo Vasquez (ASPC-Lewis), Sergeant Chad Blackwell (ASPC-Yuma), Sergeant Parker (ASPC Florence), Sergeant Paulson (ASPC-Globe) and Arizona State Forestry Division Crew Coordinator Jake Guadiana
(ASPC-Lewis). I discussed the Yarnell Hill Fire incident and the crew assignments on June 30, 2013. Four members of the Lewis hand crew along with Officer Vasquez, Crew Coordinator Jake Guadiana and one BLM helitack employee were helicoptered to the top of the ridge on Saturday June 29, 2013 to try to establish an anchor point on the fire. Another 6 firefighters including ICT-4 Trainer Justin Smith were flown to the top of the ridge later in the day for a total of 13 firefighters.
(ASPC-Lewis) Crew was unsuccessful in establishing an anchor point and the fire grew throughout the night primarily on the north and east side of the fire. The (ASPC-Lewis) Crew was removed from the ridge on Sunday morning and ordered to bed down at the ICP. The remainder of the Lewis and Yuma crew was sent to the ICP at Model Creek School.
BOTH the Globe and Yuma (DOC) Crews were assigned to provide structure protection around the Double Bar A Ranch, Peeples Valley and the Model Creek School.
Sergeant Blackwell (ASPC-Yuma) stated that his crew was assigned to protect the Double Bar A Ranch structure which was three to four structures, however it may have been up to seven structures. Sergeant Blackwell (ASPC-Yuma) stated that he heard the “yelling” about shelter deployment over the tactical or command channel by the Granite Mountain Hotshots.
Sergeant Paulson (ASPC-Globe) stated that during the day he heard air attack communicating with the Granite Mountain Hotshots and questioning what they were doing and where they were going in addition to the shelter deployment over the radio.
——————————————–
Reply to Billy Jack post on March 7, 2015 at 6:41 pm
>> Billy Jack said…
>>
>> Take a good look at the 72 second Youtube video:
>> “Yarnell Hills Fire Video Sund 1245pm”
>> which was uploaded the day of the tragedy.
YouTube Video Title: Yarnell Hills Fire Video Sund 1245pm
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VgIi4kT5aLs&app=desktop
This video was taken from up on a hill in Peeples Valley, from
the porch of a house at 120 Peeples Valley Road.
>> Billy Jack also said…
>>
>> The beginning of the video shows the little white house with
>> utility pole out front and the shed along side. You can pick the
>> house out in the Google Earth imagery; and you can pick the
>> flagpole off in the street view. Once you know approximately
>> where the flagpole is, you can go back to the Google Earth
>> nadir view (straight down) to locate where the pole’s shadow
>> pierces the earth. Likewise for the utility pole. So you can
>> develop exactly where the videographer was standing, and
>> establish an azimuth view vector for the camera, etc.
The BASE of the flagpole itself seen in the video is exactly here…
( Decimal Latitude, Longitude ).
34.283298, -112.749475
The VIDEO itself appears to have been shot by someone standing exactly here, on the front porch of the house just north of the one that owns the flagpole…
34.283532, -112.749358
The address of the house with the porch where the VIDEO appears to have been shot is 120 Peeples Valley Road.
If you just cut-and-paste either of the Decimal Latitude/Longitude lines above, complete with the ‘comma’, into the search bar of Google Maps a GREEN ARROW will appear on the resulting map showing those exact location(s).
The TIME this video was shot ( looking south / southwest from 120 Peeples Valley Road ) appears to, indeed, have been exactly 12:45 PM on Sunday, June 30, 2013.
As Marti already pointed out… this would have been EXACTLY the time that Rusty Warbis and Paul Lenmark in Aircraft ‘Bravo 3’ had just taken over the “Air Attack” position from Rory Collins who had already left the Yarnell airspace to go refuel.
12:45 PM would also be exactly the time that ‘Bravo 3’ had taken its first ‘spin’ around the whole fire and Warbis and Lenmark could immediately tell that the fire was GOING to be going INTO Yarnell… THAT day… during THAT burn cycle. That is when they also said they saw ‘Granite Mountain’ and thought what they were doing was so pointless and they were so (quote) “out of the game” already that they felt SOMEONE had to do SOMETHING to try and protect Yarnell. They had also already noticed that the Blue Ridge Hotshots were all sitting around their Crew Carriers and NOT engaging at all.
So that’s when Warbis and Lenmark decided to start laying that huge retardant line right into the unburned fuel all the way from the anchor point area EAST, through the hills, and over towards Highway 89.
Even THEY knew that wasn’t an ideal thing to be doing given the fire conditions and the fuel type… but that’s how strongly they felt that no one appeared to be doing ANYTHING to protect Yarnell from what was GOING to happen later that afternoon… and they needed to do SOMETHING.
WTKTT I had a question haven’t been able to dig it out yet ——-
Was the FBAN Part of the short team or was Kimball one of Bea Days team????
FBAN Byron Kimball was definitely part of the original
“Type 2 Short” team order that was placed at 10:49 PM
Saturday night… right after Roy Hall and FMO David Geyer
had both agreed a SHORT team would be adequate
for Yarnell.
* From the “J- Resource Orders.pdf” document…
The resource order for the “Type 2 Short” team is order
number O-16.
Byron Kimball was part of that resource order ( which was placed at 10:49 PM on Saturday night ) and Kimball’s order
number is O-16.6.
* From Byron Kimball’s ADOSH interview…
Byron Kimball became a certified FBAN in 2008.
He got to the ICP at the Model Creek School at exactly
8:00 AM on Sunday, June 30, 2013. He was told IC Roy Hall
was there already but was down at the Yarnell Hill Fire
station still finishing that 7:00 AM briefing with Shumate,
Abel, Marsh, Musser, Fernandez, others. Kimball went
down to YFD and caught the last part of that meeting.
Marsh had already left by then and was almost finished
hiking out to the anchor point by then.
Kimball never got to meet with Marsh that morning and Marsh never received any standard “Fire Behavior” briefing from any FBAN that day. Marsh was in too much of a hurry to get out to that ridge that morning and he was NOT required to attend the major briefing at the ICP where FBAN Kimball actually made his official “Fire Behavior” presentation that morning.
Kimball also told ADOSH he did NOT do any standard “fire spread” modeling for the area that day. He had his laptop with all the right software on it… but told ADOSH he didn’t have TIME to do that stuff before his 9:00 AM “Expected Fire Behavior” presentation at the ICP… and then no one ever ASKED him to do that kind of stuff for the entire rest of the day… so he didn’t.
Followup…
Even though Kimball told ADOSH he never had the TIME that morning to do any standard “fire spread” modeling for the area ( either on paper OR with his laptop )… he also told ADOSH his actual 9:00AM “Expected Fire Behavior” was comprehensive and he was, in fact, STRESSING all of the following…
1) EXTREME fire and fuel conditions present and EXTREME FIRE BEHAVIOR can/should be expected.
2) HIGH likelihood of afternoon ‘monsoon’ style thunderstorm activity with the also typical and EXPECTED ‘outflow winds’ and ‘outflow boundaries’.
3) HIGH likelihood of fireline direction reversals if ‘outflow winds’ arrived in the area.
But DIVSA Eric Marsh heard NONE of that.
DIVSA Marsh was allowed to SKIP that critical
briefing at the ICP so he could get a head start
on his long hike out to the ridge ( which turned
out to be not even necessary since BLM chopper
N14HX would end up spending the morning
flying multiple shuttle flights to remove the
Lewis DOC crew from the exact anchor point
that Marsh was hiking to ).
What a Waist——–That information should have gone out to every one on the fire especially a crew out on a mountain.
Another failure of the overhead here that was crucial and no one took the
responsibility.
This team was a total disaster and the State needed to be Fined By ADOSH.
It’s almost like everyone involved from the top to the bottom thought it was just another piece of shit scrub brush fire.
I don’t know about ‘top to bottom’… but what you just said is a close match to something FBAN Byron Kimball himself said in his ADOSH interview regarding his own ‘initial impression’ AS he was driving down Highway 89 to find Roy Hall down in Yarnell after having just checked in at the ICP at exactly 8:00 AM.
I wish I was near a desktop PC and I could be posting direct from Kimball’s ADOSH interview… but I’ve been stuck on airplanes all day and still only have this ‘dumbphone’ to work with.
Kimball told ADOSH he was just thinking “Southern California brush fire with same fuel type and some hills in the mix”… or something like that.
As the day progressed… he realized with each passing hour how WRONG his initial impression had been.
If you haven’t already done so… you need to read the full transcript of FBAN Byron Kimball’s ADOSH interview.
He was a a ‘Chatty Kathy’ and once he got talking even the ADOSH investigators had a hard time slowing him down.
He made no bones about the fact that, to him, one of the hardest parts of the FBAN job was having to constantly ‘dumb down’ and ‘simplify’ the data so that IC and OPS and DIVS level people could understand it.
He said one of his more successful ‘dumb down’ explanations with regards to moisture content was his own “Home Depot Lumber” story.
Something along the lines of…
“Ya know how ya buy those kiln-dried 2x4s from Home Depot?… Well… they still have about 4 to 8 percent moisture content in ’em. The timber you’ll be dealing with out there today has LESS than 2 percent moisture content… so keep that image in your head”.
“just another piece of shit scrub brush fire”
The difference between Yarnell and Sedona.
And PS. I found some VERY interesting things about Hazard Trees yesterday, which I’ll post when I have time.
Definitely a case of “Houston, we have a PROBLEM….”
Someone ELSE was also NOT THERE to hear that critical 9:00 AM “Expected Fire Behavior” briefing from FBAN Byron Kimball.
The same man who would later set all THREE critical ‘trigger points’ for the evacuation of an entire TOWN and ALL of the firefighters assigned to protect it.
Structure Protection guy Gary Cordes.
Not only did Cordes (apparently) NOT consult with ANYONE about exactly where those critical ‘trigger points’ should be before just designating them on his own… the on-duty on-salary official FBAN in Yarnell that Sunday wasn’t even made AWARE that Cordes had done that.
After the incident… Cordes’ mantra with regards to those woefully inadequate ‘trigger points’ was just “The fire behavior exceeded our expectations”…
…but nobody ever asked Cordes what he meant by the use of the plural “OUR expectations”.
If he really did NOT consult with ANYONE else ( including the on-duty FBAN ) before choosing those ‘trigger points’ all on his own… then what Cordes really meant was that the outperformed HIS expectations.
This would be the same guy who thought the Boulder Springs Ranch cleared area was 20 to 30 acres ( TEN TIMES its actual size ), and that a single dozer blade wide ring around the GM Supt and Chase trucks would be an adequate ‘Safety Zone’ to protect them… and also ultimately the ONLY guy in Yarnell who knew EXACTLY where Granite Mountain was headed… and was convinced they had (quote) “Plenty of time to get there”.
Add all that together ( trigger point selection and all ) and it really wasn’t a stellar ‘situational awareness’ or ‘decision making’ day for Gary Cordes.
My brain is spinning———
Marsh talked with ops and was on the phone you would think some one would have briefed him on the predictions.
Even him and Frisby had a get together meeting you would think Frisby would have discussed the predicted Fire Behavior.
Marsh had ample opportunity to talk to the FBAN during the day
As a DIVS he should have at least checked with him.
There are a lot of loose ends here That were never covered by SAIR
just not wanting to point fingers and lay blame what a mess.
All of those assumptions ( that the Field OPS1 and at least the BR SUPT ) would been there to hear the FBAN’s official “Expected Fire Behavior” report would be NORMAL assumptions to make… but as we know all too well now… there was very little happening that Sunday that was NORMAL.
Hang on to your hat.
There is NO actual proof-positve evidence that either Field OPS1 Abel OR anyone from Blue Ridge was actually present in that Model Creek School gymnasium for that 9:00 AM briefing… or that they ACTUALLY heard the FBAN’s “Expected Fire Behavior” part of that briefing.
In OPS1 Abel’s ADOSH interview he reports that he DID drive back up to the ICP following the Yarnell Fire Station briefing… but NOWHERE in that ADOSH interview does he confirm he actually ATTENDED that 9:00 AM briefing. On the contrary. Abel seems to say he felt he was ‘already fully briefed’ because of the YFD meeting and even though he returned to the ICP he was already doing other things like assigning resources and arranging for he and Musser to fly their first recon in DPS chopper Ranger 58, which they did the moment the 9:00 AM briefing ended.
Blue Ridge Captain True heart Brown says specifically that they received NO BRIEFING at all that morning.
Roy Hall ended up playing ‘facilitator’ for that briefing since he had NO Plans Chief there… but his own recollections to ADOSH are pretty useless. He knows there was no official sign-in for that meeting and other than himself, Russ Shumate, Planning OPS Musser and FBAN Kimball… Roy Hall really doesn’t remember who the hell was really in that meeting… or not.
The ‘holes in the swiss cheese’ were already piling up even that early in the morning.
Later in the day one of the Blue Ridge Hotshots in his Unit Log said he made the ‘swiss cheese’ remark to BR Captain Brown and Captain Brown’s reply was…”Forget the holes… what we NEED first is a piece of cheese”.
That’s how BAD the perception of management was that Sunday even by the men working the fire.
If as we were discussing earlier about the BR crew sitting around most of the day. I now understand why they were not going to get to far committed in the total Chinese Fire Drill make excesses and stay out of trouble with out looking like your not doing the Job stand by for burn out crew Etc.
Frisby had to be talking with Marsh over the total mess going on Marsh’s assignment was not going to get done and every thing in the Next division was messed up.
Marshes Idea to pull off the line may have been building all day and when he decided to do it. The Timing was just to late. Buy the time he made the decision it was almost to late but he pushed it to get the crew to a place they could be picked up.
Something in the form of bull headedness????????
A very possible conclusion. My Thoughts again
Just digging holes and searching. .
Fire Drill make excuses. —should have said
When I wrote, somewhat downstream, about FBAN Kimball thinking of the “claim the ridges, let the fire come to you” strategy, the other “slide” I had in my head was that totally BS incapable-of-being-even-remotely-completed (given the resources they had, including the ones that didn’t show up) non-strategy of putting that line across that middle bowl.
It was, supposedly, all about protecting Yarnell in case the fire reversed direction and burned toward Yarnell (and thus the “plan” to backburn it that night), and yet,
even given Kimball’s et als warning about the fire actually DOING EXACTLY THAT, everybody was all “It exceeded our expectations!!!!!”
And yeah, you betcha that’s why Blue Ridge apparently decided not to waste their time and energy and risk-kharma to pretend to invest in that, as you so perfectly put it,
“Chinese Fire Drill.”
Of course, they were also, apparently, sharp enough to realize that with all those holes in all that non-existent Swiss Cheese, they didn’t even need to go thru all the hassle of formally “turning down” the assignment.
They could just hang out, zip around on a UTV, go thru the motions of staging a last-minute line-cutting charade and……..
GET PAID FOR IT!
They definitely were the smartest kids on the block that day.
Too bad they got, ultimately, screwed over, also, that day. Thanks USFS!!!
Here are some things that ( thanks to the piss-poor investigations and the heavy BLACK PEN of the US Forestry Service ) we still do NOT know…
1) WHY was Blue Ridge not actually put right to work ‘improving’ that east-west two track?
Could it be that since everyone knew the ONLY chance in hell that ‘plan’ had in protecting anything is if they DID, in fact, get the chance to ‘burn it off’ later that evening… that the decision was made once the DOZER pushed that two-track that it was now ‘adequate’ enough for the possible late-evening burnoff… and that’s why Blue Ridge didn’t NEED to slug out there an ‘improve it’?
Is THAT why the entire Blue Ridge crew ended up sitting on their asses most of the day?
Was it DECIDED ( Marsh? Cordes? Frisby? All of them? ) that ‘improving’ it beyond the dozer pushing just wasn’t necessary since that was all that was needed for the ‘burnoff’ later… and if THAT didn’t get to happen there was no use in doing any ‘improvements’.
In other words… as BAD as this plan was… everyone still knew the ONLY value it had was if they COULD do those extensive burnoffs later that evening.
Those ‘Dozer pushes’ by themselves were NEVER going to be valid ‘firebreaks’ and provide any real protection to Yarnell at all… and everyone KNEW THAT.
2) WHAT did Marsh and Frisby REALLY talk about for a half-hour up on that ridge?
All we have ever been told is that they discussed the piss-poor briefings, the tone-guard problems… and then Marsh asked for cubies and Gatorade and oh… by the way… can my guy who isn’t feeling well today go down with you and sit on that mound?
There HAD to be MUCH MORE to that conversation between Marsh and Frisby than we have been told.
They may have HONESTLY discussed this ‘burn off all the way from ridge to town’ plan themselves and they MAY have agreed it was basically a JOKE… and THAT is why Frisby still didn’t put his men to work on it after he came down from that face-to-face.
3) The ultimate question, then. If it was COMMON KNOWLEDGE amongst the people working on the plan that it was a JOKE and stood little chance of accomplishing anything… then WHY were they just allowed to keep working on it? Just to have ‘something to do’ an stay ‘on the clock’?
Byron Kimball ADOSH Interview Transcript:
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/20inrene9tcx74a/AAD6iq9l_7hgXkxs-3cDwXLSa/ADOSH%20Yarnell%20Hill%20Investigation/AZ%20Forestry%20Division/Employee%20Interviews%20By%20ADOSH/Transcripts/Byron%20Kimball%20Interview%208-15-13.pdf?dl=0
Audio (well worth listening to):
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/20inrene9tcx74a/AAA-tZ2IuBR_fnE4SoXD8cxaa/ADOSH%20Yarnell%20Hill%20Investigation/AZ%20Forestry%20Division/Employee%20Interviews%20By%20ADOSH/Audio/Byron%20Kimball%208-15-13.WMA?dl=0
I sat and listened to the Kimball interview this morning.
He states he is not much of a numbers guy (he uses flame height and chains per hour in his example.
However, he delves into the nunnery, flame height 4 feet, direct attack unsupported; 4 to 8 feet, direct attack, with machine or air support; 8 to 11, extreme.
He talks about updating OPS when he got the weather updates, but later on (as he watches a vlat drop) he says flame height of 8 to 10 feet and pushing hard.
I found it interesting that he did not state that he contacted OPS to tell them he was observing “extreme fire behaviour” by his definition, rather than by prediction.
Any others catch that?
Reply to rocksteady post on March 8, 2015 at 11:58 am
>> rocksteady said…
>>
>> I sat and listened to the Kimball interview this morning.
>>
>> I found it interesting that he did not state that he
>> contacted OPS to tell them he was observing
>> “extreme fire behaviour” by his definition, rather
>> than by prediction.
>>
>> Any others catch that?
Yes.
I think I stated this somewhere before… but MY impression of his entire recounting of his time on Sunday, June 30, 2013 is that THEY ( Fire Management ) were treating him as just the WEATHER GUY… and he was ACCEPTING that role.
You yourself said that each FBAN has how own ‘style’.
You also said that YOU see yourself as fundamentally a ‘Safety Officer’ and when YOU start seeing that sort of thing… YOU would definitely make sure ‘Fire Management’ ( and resources ) are AWARE of the changing conditions.
It doesn’t sound like FBAN Byron Kimball saw his ‘role’ the same way. The only time he was interacting with ‘Fire Management’ all day following the 9:00 AM briefing was if he had some WEATHER to report.
I get the impression he was just thinking ( with regards to change in Fire Behavoir ‘out there’ in the bowls ) was along the lines of “Well… If I can see it… they must be able to see it, too”.
That was NOT the case on the SOUTH side of the fire.
Cordes, et al, were taken by SURPRISE as the fire charged through the ‘trigger points’ far faster than Cordes had ‘expected’ it too.
They ( Cordes, et al ) were NOT aware of how quickly the fire started to change DIRECTION and SPEED ‘out there’ in that middle bowl.
Personally… I ‘hear ya’ when you say that each FBAN has his/her own ‘style’… but it does seem like the FBAN that was in Yarnell that day was ‘dropping the ball’ and NOT making sure ALL resources on the fire were fully aware that the worst-case fire-spread scenario imaginable was now IN PROGRESS ( no predictions needed ).
Maybe FBAN Kimball wasn’t even aware ( himself ) that there were actually NO SAFETY OFFICERS there in Yarnell until later in the afternoon. One of them ( Marty Cole ) only arrived literally minutes before the deployment.
I think Kimball was doing a lot of ‘assuming’ that people WERE being notified about things he, himself, was observing… and that it wasn’t his place to jump on the radio and play ‘Safety Officer’.
Since his attention to the radio was spotty ( he never heard a lot of things because he was out of his truck taking pictures )… maybe he also was just assuming that certain WARNINGS were being delivered to the resources and he just didn’t hear them.
There is a HUGE ‘Lesson Learned’ right here somewhere regarding FBANs and their interaction with management ( and resources ).
Thanks for recounting this, WTKTT!
You have a MUCH better memory than I do!!!!! As in, AWESOME!
I differ with your interpretations a bit. Of course I’m looking at/listening to the actual files, so there’s that.
He never said anything like the worst part of the job was having to “dumb things down.” He didn’t even initiate that term. I don’t think it bothered him, because, just as he described the courses he had to take to learn how to “translate” the science to different kinds of audiences, that’s just a part of the job.
Which it always is. And that analogy about the Home Depot wood, I’ve seen it LOTS of times. Because it just works really well.
I used to write “for-the-public” articles for Lowell Observatory. You get used to doing that kind of translating. LIke how I tried to describe the “east flank of the fire” in such a way that debunked the mistake that the fire was west of where Granite Mountain was working.
One of the things I found really interesting was how, in his connecting what he was observing at Yarnell with the California brush thing (and also with his “previous fire” experience–which, apparently was on the Silver Fire on the Gila in New Mexico (with, apparently that same essential team), was his saying how, in that kind of fuel and topography, you take the ridges and let the fire come to you.
Which I had heard before, but had forgotten about. And which is how Sciacca successfully fought the Slide Fire. And which, obviously, was not what was happening on the Yarnell Fire.
Also somewhere, not in this particular thread, but down below somewhere, you said, I think, something about FBAN Kimball not even using his radio.
That’s not the case. He had it on, and seems to have been listening, for the most part, although he missed the como about the deployment. He just didn’t initiate talking on it a lot, because he didn’t want to (I’m paraphrasing here) unnecessarily add to the noise, and because he didn’t think he needed to in terms of his own self-orientation.
So just sitting here quickly thinking (we’re moving my mom’s furniture etc out of her apartment today, so haven’t had much time).
He wasn’t as engaged in getting feedback from the crews as he could have been. But he was paying attention. And definitely observing as much as he could from the various places he put himself.
And he definitely understood the SERIOUSNESS of the implications of those two NWS warnings. I think it was the crews who fell short on that one. I guess he didn’t think he needed to hold their hands on that one.
Whose mistake is that?
And it does seem to me that it was Cordes, in particular, who was being completely oblivious the most as to the fact that there was an FBAN on that fire and that, given the kinds of decisions he was making, Cordes should have been communicating with Kendall FOR SURE.
I don’t get a sense that the fire “exceeded” FBAN Byron Kendall’s expectations.
I mean, as he said, he was on the Esperanza Fire. That may very well have been his keystone “slide” for “exceeding expectations.”
The Yarnell Fire did pretty much exactly what Kendall said, from the get-go, it was capable of doing and quite likely to do.
OMG Just realized I’ve been writing Kendall instead of Kimball. DOH. Too much coffee.
Sorry!
Marti… thank you for the ‘reality check’ on FBAN Byron Kimball’s ADOSH interview.
You are right. I was mis-remembering what he said about his radio usage. “He didn’t say he turns his radio OFF when he’s not involved with Operations. He said he “Stays OFF it” when he’s not directly involved.
He also said he was frequently “out of his truck” and assumes, himself, that THAT is why he didn’t hear any of the MAYDAY or deployment traffic.
FWIW I also mis-remembered his percentages in his “Home Depot” analysis. More like 10 to 12 percent moisture content in the kiln-dried lumber you buy… whereas the moisture content in the ‘dead fuels’ in Yarnell, under the current conditions was probably no more than 4 percent… by his estimation. Any way you cut it… that’s DRY.
You are ALSO right about the ‘dumb down’ part of the FBAN job. It actually wasn’t Kimball himself who used that ‘dumb down’ phrase in the interview. It was actually ADOSH investigator Barry Hicks. Kimball sort of agreed that yes… definitely part of the job and as FBAN you have to get USED to usually being the ONLY one in the management team who ‘speaks the language’… but Kimball said he was ‘used to it’
I agree that if you read all of Kimball’s interview… it would be hard to say that the fire exceeded HIS expectations. He knew what COULD happen there that day and DID talk about it during his “Expected Fire Behavior” part of the 9:00 AM briefing.
I also left one name off the list of people that Roy Hall definitely recalls being in that 9:00 AM briefing. Hall also definitely remembers SPGS Darrell Willis being there. Willis was actually the one giving the full situational report because IC Russ Shumate was burned out at that point.
So SPGS Willis was REQUIRED to be at that briefing… but SPGS Cordes was NOT… and did NOT hear Kimball’s “Expected Fire Behavior” presentation.
By 9:00 AM… SPGS Cordes had already taken Marsh out to the top of the Sesame Clearing area and shown him that two-track leading west to the old-grader… and Cordes remained out there to deal with the dozer as it was arriving.
Well, I’m totally willing to forgive you, because what you DID remember was way beyond my capabilities!!!!
And that’s an interview that I think everybody really needs to listen to, to get the nuances in his voice.
Regarding Willis. In my mind, even HE wasn’t apparently, paying all that much attention to Kimball. As a matter of fact, he really mystifies me a lot. I really still don’t understand that costly failed “last stand” at the Double A Bar Ranch, all things considered.
And, unless I’m wrong, which I could be on this, it seems that burn-out on Model Creek Road was designed to protect structures to the north of what was, even as they were burning it, a fire that was “standing up” (surprise surprise) as it was turning around, just as Kimball had predicted a high possibility that morning. Given the storm patterns they had been seeing ALL WEEK.
And Gary Cordes. What can I even say.
He’s got all these crews either working or “working” all day on a strategy that doesn’t have even remotely enough resources to even begin to complete, and that strategy is BASED on the assumption that the fire’s EVENTUALLY gonna reverse direction and head toward Yarnell….
………because that’s what even HE was expecting.
But he doesn’t need to be even thinking about even consulting with the Fire Behavior Analyst about the possibility of that reversal actually happening that day???? And he’s saying the fire “exceeded our expetations”??????
And you’re right. Who is the “our” in Cordes’ head. Everybody but the professional person whose opinion he/they should have been consulting regarding “expectations?”
Sheesh. Is all I can say.
PS Expect an email.
**
** UPDATE ON YARNELL MEMORIAL BOARD’S
** LAST MEETING ON FEB 27, 2015.
6 hours ago… Prescott Daily Courier article appeared regarding last public meeting of the Yarnell Memorial Board on Feb 27. Brendan McDonough appears to have been at that meeting the day AFTER his previously scheduled under-oath deposition failed to take place ( for the SECOND time ). Board now has State Park’s official written permission to proceed with purchasing the desired 250 acres that includes the deployment site… but no landowners are currently willing to give up any land to create any PUBLIC access to the site.
http://dcourier.com/main.asp?SectionID=1&SubSectionID=1&ArticleID=142501&TM=54354.63
I’m thinking this could devolve into something of a nasty mess, to be honest.
I think the idea that the small group of widows who wanted to buy the land themselves and ONLY allow access to who THEY want has gone to the back burner… but there is still a chance they could just show up at the required PUBLIC AUCTION for the parcel and attempt to out-bid Arizona State Parks.
Article says that PUBLIC AUCTION could now happen as early as June.
I think any number of people on that Board could still give crap whether “the PUBLIC” is EVER allowed to access the site… but according to the article at least one member of the Board keeps informing them on reality and reminding them that no matter WHAT they decide… they will NOT be able to prevent members of “the PUBLIC” from visiting that site.
Oddly enough… the one Board member who keeps reminding the others of this REALITY is Darrell Willis.
Next big decision is WHAT the memorial will eventually look like. Some people still think actual life-size BRONZE statues of ALL of the deceased placed in some kind of standing/walking configuration out there would be the way to go.
Personally… I think that would be WAAAY ‘over the top’ and the net effect nothing but kinda CREEPY.
Others think just simple white wooden crosses where each man died… but that means they have to ‘get that right’ once and for all and use the YCSO FAROb3D imaging to accomplish that.
Others think just ONE cross for all… somewhere there.
Obviously, at some point, they will also have to consider incorporating that now-famous Boulder that is just south of the deployment area which was well photographed just because it has some cracks in it that APPEAR to resemble a Christian cross. Do they try and ‘incorpoate’ that now well-known feature into whatever they are going to do… or do they just ‘leave it alone’ and ‘not go there’.
There’s also the flagpole donated by Arizona Utilities Company ( same company that also paid for ALL the Hotshot funerals ). Does it STAY?… or does it GO?
There was already some discussion at a previous meeting about removing it back to Yarnell itself… but nothing was actually decided.
Interesting thoughts.
Actually, what was inside my head when I wrote my comment was from reading the three comments on the article. Went back there today and didn’t see any more comments so……we’ll see.
But, anyway. About how, apparently, some folks have their panties all in a bunch about how
“We don’t want all that HORRIBLE MASSIVE TRAFFIC coming through our quiet peaceful out of the way little town (that we never actually cared about enough to even mitigate) and our property (ditto)!”
I mean, like REALLY????
This is while they’re all in agony about the loss in tax and business revenue related to all the people who fled Yarnell–because of the fire–not coming back.
And as if there’s gonna be six quadrillion people dashing madly and relentlessly to Yarnell to crowd the Memorial Site.
And I’m not even remotely surprised.
What I want to experience when I eventually go visit the site commemorating these wildland fire-fighters, with all their strengths and weaknesses, brilliance and human fallibility, over whom I have shed way more tears than over my own mother (am I sick or what?), is something both natural, symbolic, and with even a little room for creatively whimsical.
And, yeah, when I read the idea of the bronze life-size sculptures, I was kinda like, hmmmmmmmmm, I think I need to think about that…….
I really like the Storm King Trail. I’d LOVE to go there. Everything I have seen/read regarding it comes across as being so grounded, sobering, human, humble, and, thus, inspirational (with beer). And, thus, for the people who go there, so POWERFUL.
It’s just really simple. Simple crosses with trees. Upon which people who visit put their own “memorials.” And, thus, they each get “personalized” uniquely. That’s it.
And that’s what “happens” there. That connection. That’s all that’s necessary. And it IS necessary. And well-deserved. Warts and all. As in…….
Namaste.
I just want to be able to walk in there, and look around in that place, and walk over to where Chris MacKenzie died, and say, “Thank you, Chris, for leading me, through your camera, and, thus, your images, and, thus, your eyes, to this place, and to your story, and to your agony, and to your love, and to your beauty, and to this story, and to this quest for the truth, and through this long, winding, rocky journey of learning the way of wildfire and the way of those who have the courage to engage it and teach us about it, on behalf of the rest of us who are still living.”
And I think that’s probably basically what most of the folks who want this memorial to happen just basically want.
And I’m sitting here writing this stuff on my daughter’s laptop, at our “family” house (which has been almost empty until now), de-mobilized by a really painful knee, completely in a bubble, while my daughter and her millenial friends (one of whom is a field biologist who is starting to get interested in wildfire) are hauling in the furniture we just hauled out of my mom’s apartment, from a U-Haul.
While thinking about a Yarnell cyberfriend who I just learned was recently seriously injured in a bad accident.
After spending all day yesterday researching fatalities and injuries from “hazard trees.”
And the citizens of Yarnell are complaining about traffic?
Reply to Marti Reed post on March 7, 2015 at 2:11 pm
>> Marti said…
>>
>> This is while they’re all in agony about the loss in tax and
>> business revenue related to all the people who fled
>> Yarnell–because of the fire–not coming back.
I think what bothers the remaining residents of Yarnell most is that they don’t like the idea of having the tragic incidicent of June 30, 2013 be all that Yarnell is KNOWN for… and have it become the PRIMARY reason people are ‘visiting’ Yarnell ( and contributing to the town’s economy ).
I think there are SOME people there who still haven’t grasped the full reality that this in a HISTORIC place now ( for a specific reason ) and it was a story that went “around the world”.
There are probably also SOME people still there who just wish everyone would ‘move on’ and ( what? ) forget that it ever happened, or something.
Not a chance. It’s HISTORY now… and it’s not going away.
>> Marti also said…
>>
>> And as if there’s gonna be six quadrillion people dashing
>> madly and relentlessly to Yarnell to crowd the Memorial Site.
Well… there IS the ‘reality’ that there WILL be ( every year ) some kind of ‘anniversary’ event… probably for many, many years to come. It IS going to happen… whether they like it or not.
As for CONSTANT throngs of people visiting the area just to visit the GM site… probably not. But you count on the ‘anniversary’ stuff, fer sure.
>> Marti also said…
>>
>> What I want to experience when I eventually go visit the site
>> commemorating these wildland fire-fighters, with all their
>> strengths and weaknesses, brilliance and human fallibility,
>> over whom I have shed way more tears than over my own
>> mother (am I sick or what?),
No. That’s not unusual. Don’t beat yourself up about it. My father was the best man I’d ever met walking around on this small planet but I also never shed any tears over his death. He was killed by Hurricane Andrew. It even surprised me for quite some time… but I have come to understand why. Mourning has its place… but a life well lived can/should be celebrated, too.
“No on here gets out alive”
Jim Morrison
“Five to One” on the album Waiting for the Sun (1968)
>> Marti also said…
>>
>> is something both natural, symbolic, and with even a
>> little room for creatively whimsical.
If they are going to do life-size bronze statues of all the men… they should recreate ( full size ) that ‘pyramid’ from that famous photo.
Now THAT would be really something.
Here is what I think ( me, personally ) should happen.
I don’t know about the details of what should actually be there at the place where they died… but as for the new ‘Arizona State Park’ that is going to be created… here is what should happen.
Arizona State Parks should ‘cut to the chase’ and actually just PURCHASE the entire Boulder Springs Ranch and have it function as the ‘Visitor’s Center’ for this new Arizona State Park.
Before you reach down to grab your jaw off the floor… let me explain.
It would be the PERFECT “Visitor’s Center’ for a State Park like this.
Plenty of parking, plenty of facilities to accommodate the PUBLIC traffic and any ‘anniversary’ commemorations that WILL be taking place over the years… absolutely IDEAL access from Glen Ilah’.
It would be ‘turn-key’ ready to handle everything a ‘Visitor’s Center’ should be for a site like that… right down to the electronic gate that can be closed when the Park is not open.
Access to the deployment site itself would/could then be on the SAME DOZER PUSH that was actually used to take the men out. That would be a poignant walk to make all by itself as people walk to/from the site and back to the Visitor’s Center.
And here is the PRACTICAL part of all this for the State of Arizona.
Lee and DJ Helm are already among the 160+ Plaintiffs in the ‘Property Damage’ lawsuits filed against Arizona Forestry and the State of Arizona.
Lee and DJ Helm are claiming anywhere from 6 to 7 million dollars in damages.
That is obviously just a ‘target amount’ and any settlement would usuall be just some fraction of that amount…
…but it’s a PERFECT opportunity for the State of Arizona ( and the Arizona State Parks Division ) to play a little “Let’s Make A Deal” here with the owners of that Boulder Springs Ranch.
The Arizona State lawyers would be perfectly within legal bounds to simply make the Helms’ an OFFER.
They could say… “If you agree to deed the property to Arizona State Parks… not only will we give you EVERYTHING you are ASKING for ( the full amount )… if it isn’t the ‘fair value’ of the property we will also fix the deal so you walk away with ‘fair value’ PLUS 30 percent”.
In other words… “Make them an offer they can’t refuse”.
I don’t know what the ACTUAL value of that spread really is… but if it really is just in the 6 to 7 million dollar range… that is POCKET CHANGE compared to what The State of Arizona is probably going to have to pay out to these 160+ Plaintiffs, anyway. That final amount could be in the HUNDREDS OF MILLIONS… so whatever additional POCKET CHANGE it takes for Arizona State Parks to come out of that carnage with a deed to the Boulder Springs Ranch would be a GOOD thing.
I am entirely SERIOUS about this.
I can think of no better place for a ‘Visitor’s Center’ for this new Arizona State Park… and it’s doable even without mentioning the ’eminent domain’ pathways that could also be pursued.
I would even go so far as to say that this new ‘Visitor’s Center’ is big enough… and accommodating enough… to actually be a satellite branch of the actual “Arizona Widlfire Academy” based in Prescott.
There could be regular AWA CLASSES held there… and what better way to honor those men who died…. in THAT location… one terrible day.
So I really am serious about this.
Anything worth doing… is worth doing RIGHT… and the money involved to make THIS vision happen really is just POCKET CHANGE compared to what’s going to be changing hands when all the dust clears.
If such an offer IS made to Lee and DJ Helms… I think they would consider it. They must ALREADY know that whatever ‘privacy’ they cherished about that place is now gone forever… and that there WILL eventually be ‘access’ to that site passing right along their own property lines even if they try to prevent it.
If the State of Arizona offers them a ”sweet deal’ in response to their own suit for damages… I think they will take it.
Thumbs up. Brilliant.
Including the juniper tree.
And yes, about it ain’t gonna be going away.
And the Helmses are smart enough to know that.
The KEY here is the fact that Lee and DJ Helm ARE, in fact, suing Arizona Forestry and the State of Arizona for 6 to 7 million dollars.
That leaves PLENTY of room for “Let’s Make A Deal” and the State of Arizona Parks Division ending up with a DEED to the property.
It could be a WIN-WIN for everyone involved.
Lee and DJ Helm get to ‘move on’… happily… and Arizona Parks Division ends up with the PERFECT ‘Visitor’s Center’ for their new State Park.
By the time they do all the purchasing of ‘Rights of Way’ for decent public access to the site all the way from town ( but still no good facilities )… they will probably have to spend at least half as much as it would take to just acquire the whole turn-key ready-to-go Boulder Springs Ranch itself.
So they should just “go for it” and do the PERFECT thing.
And yes. Thinking about this as I go into total escape mode and watch a class (I go to school online) on “Family Portraits,” thus thinking about Balance and such.
I wouldn’t be surprised, all things considered, if, in fact, the Helmses don’t have this in the backs of their minds as they object to The Plan. I mean really.
Why would anybody really want to continue living there (knowing that what’s happening isn’t going to go away) if they could get a buyout that could easily finance another Place in a much less awful place??
And, as for Yarnell (remember I’m watching, ahem, Family Portraits) what they really outta do, in order to BALANCE out this portrait, is make themselves an awesome example of a community embracing their ecological reality (which is not going to go away either) and becoming not only a Firewise Community, but an awesome and creative Firewise Community, and really making a very big deal out of that.
It’s like, yes, we’ve gone through this horrible thing, and we’re scarred by it (as is the wildland fire-fighting community), but we’re not going to be defeated by it.
And here’s how WE learn and practice OUR Lessons Learned, thus embracing our future.
That’s how, and why, you create Balance in a Family Portrait.
“The Helms get to ‘move on’ happily” and “Why would anybody want to continue living there knowing (knowing what’s happening isn’t going to away) if they could get a buyout that could easily finance a place in another place in a much less aweful place” And as for Yarnell in order to BALANCE out the family portrait you need to get on board and become Firewise and really make a big deal out of it so you can say ‘we’ve been through a horrible thing and were scarred by it (as is the Wildland fire community) but we’re not going to be defeated by it and here’s how WE learn and practice OUR lessons learned, thus embracing the future” And that is how we create a family portrait……..
Wow….wow….wow….The Helm’s were RESPONSIBLE home owners that protected their property BEFORE this event and now you want to kick them out of their home so they can go on because you are never going to give them peace of mind and they will forever have to worry about you folks illegally accessing their land as many have since this tragic day to get to the site…..this is non-sense….This is there home please have some respect and think about them….and all of these stupid allegations about the bulldoze line is proof that our firefighters were protecting there home and some how this played into there death….that is pure crap. Those bulldozer lines were created to retrieve the bodies of these fallen heroes. The Helm’s immediately opened there property to Fire investigators the moment they learned about this tragic news and they selflessly provided there home to investigators to retrieve these fallen firefighters, don’t get me wrong they were more than happy to do it and they did it out of the kindness of there hearts but ever since all I have read is all these stupid conspiracy theories. . I apologize if I am sounding a little harsh but I am just tired of reading things like this that sound like you are making a joke out of fire protection. If you truly want to honor the lives of the Granite Mountain Hotshots then why don’t you do something constructive and make Firewise preparedness a top priority instead of wanting to do it so you can make it look good in family portraits. The Granite Mountain Hotshots priority when they weren’t fighting Wildland fires was creating defensable spaces to protect properties. Why don’t you honor them by actually doing something productive. Embrace the Helm’s lead and put your time and energy into making Yarnell a REAL Firewise community to ensure this tragedy will never happen again. ….The Helm’s have invested so much in your community because this is where they chose to live, don’t you think YOU have done enough to this poor family who have become victims of the harassing, law breaking public that constantly trespass and trash his property since this tragedy occurred and now you are publically vowing to continue because you know there ranch is the most ‘convenient’ route for you to reach the memorial site….shame on you all for never considering all that this family has already given. They have become a victim of this tragedy too because of you….if your intentions are to truly honor these men then do it but the answer is not to convince yourself by continuing to make this families life miserable for YOUR convince…..damn you do everything right and your still treated disrepectively….sorta like that saying No Good Dead Goes Unpunished….
**
** DR. TOM ZIMMERMAN ( AND MIKE DUDLEY ) ACTUALLY
** INTERVIEWED JOY COLLURA?
NOTE: This actually starts out as a Reply to Marti’s post below regarding the ‘other’ writings of this Dr. Tom Zimmerman guy… but it also contains an interesting reference to ‘Zimmerman’ and ‘Dudley’ and the SAIT that appeared back in Chapter SEVEN of this ongoing discussion.
>> Marti said…
>>
>> When I googled and read some of Zimmerman’s most recent things, the sense I got
>> was that he was emphasizing how wildland firefighting in the 21st Century has to
>> change, given climate change, fuels loading, increasingly “extreme” fire behavior,
>> increased danger to fire-fighters (and thence increasingly pulling them OFF fires,
>> especially during times of increased intensity, for safety reasons), etc etc etc, and
>> that communities have to take increasing responsibility (including financial)
>> for their own self-protection.
>>
>> Which are all points I TOTALLY AGREE WITH.
Yes. Dr. Tom Zimmerman is considered one of the LEADING PROPONENTS of these new theories including ‘managing fires’ rather than ‘fighting them’.
He is considered by some to be the ‘touchstone’ for these new theories about Wildland Firefighting and how it needs to change its ways in the coming years.
Example: He blames the old “10:00 AM” rule for a LOT of BAD things.
He LOVES to write ( and lecture ) on all this and any quick Google search for “Tom Zimmerman Wildfire” will produce bagoodles of articles.
>> Marti also said…
>>
>> Which led me to think that it might be possible that AZ Department of Forestry might
>> be retaining him as an “expert witness”/consultant in order to help them frame THAT
>> message as a defense to the Homeowners Lawsuits.
>>
>> Which I think is not unjustifiable, to a certain extent. I mean, really, the Yarnell folks
>> obviously were not taking seriously the warnings and the subsequent grants to help
>> them do at least SOME mitigation. As are, neither the residents of Payson, currently.
You might be EXACTLY right.
It sounds like you also stumbled across the article he was contracted to write for Montana’s “ENOUGH IS ENOUGH” campaign following the Yarnell Hill Tragedy.
This “ENOUGH IS ENOUGH” campaign was launched as a self-appointed “Lessons we can Learn from Yarnell” intiative… but make no mistake… the LESSONS had nothing to do with Granite Mountain or the decisions THEY were making in Yarnell.
The ENTIRE approach of this “ENOUGH IS ENOUGH” campaign ( which Zimmerman contributed to ) was ALL about how people aren’t doing enough to protect their property in the Wildland Urban Interface and THIS is what represents the greatest threat to Wildland Firefighters.
In other words… it’s THEIR fault ( the people that don’t protect their homes ).
The HOME page for this “ENOUGH IS ENOUGH” campaign ( created and sponsored by the ‘FireSafe Montana’ organization ) is here…
http://firesafemt.org/enough-is-enough-campaign/
The link to the article that Zimmerman wrote for this “ENOUGH IS ENOUGH” campaign is at the bottom of this webpage with the title…
** Can We Prepare and Live with Fire?
** By Tom Zimmerman, President of the International Association of Wildland Fire
From the “ENOUGH IS ENOUGH” home page ( link above )…
———————————————————————————-
Enough is Enough Campaign
“Enough is Enough” is a campaign that focuses on the many issues of wildland fire in the urban interface. The title of this campaign originates from one of our founding board members reaction to the sobering tragedy of the Yarnell Fire. As you will quickly see, this project is not singly about that incident. The focus is of a much wider scope of “Why, we are…. where we are, at this time, and the conditions of our forests and wildand fuels.”
The “Enough is Enough” campaign will mostly be editorial pieces, public service announcements, and news articles from a diverse collaboration of concerned experts from forestry, fire ecology, wildland fire, fire behavior, large fire management, social aspects of wildland fire, and fire policy development.
Wildland fire is more of a challenge today than it was thirty or even ten years ago. Some would argue that is so because the Wildland Urban Interface is growing larger. Some would say it’s inevitable because the climate is warming. Others argue it’s because of severely restricted management on federal forest lands that has led to unreasonable forest encroachment.
We may not be successful in getting answers to all the questions that are out there, but we want to move the conversation forward…. Because “Enough is Enough!”
———————————————————————————-
** DR. TOM ZIMMERMAN ACTUALLY INTERVIEWED JOY COLLURA?
Even before I saw on page 113 of the SAIR report that he HAD been hired ( as a private consultant ) to the SAIT… I thought I had seen that name somewhere before.
Sure enough… Joy Collura herself posted his name back in Chapter SEVEN of this ongoing discussion. The date was June 26, 2014… just a few days before the first ‘anniversary’ of the tragedy.
CONTEXT: At that point… Chapter SEVEN was actively discussing Mike Dudley’s June 20, 2014 speech to that roomful of Utah firefighters. Joy Collura posted an additional YouTube link to Dudley’s speech, and also then said that she, herself, had had her own ‘contact’ with SAIT Co-Lead Mike Dudley.
Joy Collura then posted two EMAILS.with original dates of August 13, 2013.
One was her contacting Dudley asking why the SAIT had not bothered to interview either her or Tex ( Sonny ) Gilligan yet.
Mike Dudley actually REPLIED to Joy’s email and Joy reprinted that email as well.
Dudley’s REPLY said they ( the SAIT ) WOULD like to talk with her and Mr. Gilligan… and would even like to have a teleconference call with them.
Dudley’s email response to Joy said that ( in addition to some others ) the participants in the teleconference would be himself ( Dudley ) and someone named Dr. Tom Zimmerman.
Here is that exact posting from Joy Collura back in Chapter SEVEN…
Joy was answering a message post about the Dudley VIDEO
that had come from Mr. Bob Powers…
—————————————————————————-
On June 26, 2014 at 4:50 pm, Joy A. Collura said…
Bob Powers—you are too funny…
You sound like the email I got from Sonny.
I had to educate Sonny as I will you too—
The speaker in that video led the SAIR investigation- his name is Mike Dudley.
I thought it was a decent video but it did not teach these firefighting community
the proper assessment to the YHF was all—
I sent him (Mike Dudley) an email Sent: Sunday, August 11, 2013 7:50 PM
(Content of email:)
We were at the fire line and curious to know why you all have not contacted us as
witness’ as well as for the footage you can see on my hiking partner’s hiking page
in comment wall she has a lot of photos from that day-
not from highway or home backyard but there where the Hotshots were-
we had meter readings at 43mph not 80-90 like Willis states
and we know for fact that area did not have 10 ft chaparral but maybe wide
intertwined and realistic it was 6ft max and the saddest part was the low altitude
hovering/observing aircrafts that were not putting out any fires yet we did see indeed
much fanning of the fire-
We have much detail to that morning and afternoon- )
And he ( Mike Dudley ) replied Tue, Aug 13, 2013 at 6:35 AM
(Content of his email:)
** START OF MIKE DUDLEY’S EMAIL TO JOY
Good morning Tex and Joy,
Thanks for making contact with me. We had been alerted to your presence that day by the reporter from the Prescott paper and she gave us the pictures that were used in the article.
However, we did not get a contact number to reach you.
We would like to interview you and your hiking partner as to what you encountered and your observations. More importantly, what route you took to leave the area.
Then phone conference 8/13/13 2:04 PM – 2:48 PM – Washington
Tim Foley ( t1foley (at ) hotmail.com,
incident meteorologist Brent Wachter,
Richa Wilson (rwilson (at) fs.fed.us), and
Wildland Fire Leadership- retired US Forestry-
Tom Zimmerman (his link),
Mike Dudley ( Tue, Aug 13, 2013 at 6:35 AM )
USDA Forest Service
mdudley (at) fs.fed.us
801-540-4881
I’d like to schedule a time to call you tomorrow if possible. Please let me know what time works for you.
Thank you.
Mike Dudley
USDA Forest Service
[email protected]
801-540-4881
** END OF MIKE DUDLEY’S EMAIL TO JOY
That was our dealings with that speaker. I just wish because he is so at ease and comfortable and easy to listen to that he said a little more on the golden rules being broken and the cardinal rules too that were broken because that is unfair to the men and women listening to him. See how I use to say Jim Karels backing up the SAIRS did a great disservice — I now think this kind of speaking does too.
—————————————————————————-
So there was Mike Dudley, on August 13, 2013, replying to Joy Collura’s email, askiing for a possible teleconference, and (apparently) listing the people ( from the SAIT ) that would be participatiing in that teleconference.
Dr. Tom Zimmerman was right there on the list.
I want to post this to the top, as it kind of summarizes what I believe is the gist of what I think has been most of the long and winding conversation today:
Bob Powers says
MARCH 5, 2015 AT 11:34 AM
You are right also the big problem we are finding on Yarnell was the team. a short team slapped to gather with missing parts that do not train to gather or work as a unit is a bad situation which on call teams were suppose to fix. Even short teams should be called from a on call type 2 team. that way the short team can fill needed members as the situation dictates. Having division bosses that are not use to a team concept just adds to the confusion. The FBAN should be in contact with the divisions. providing updated input. More evidence of a poorly managed fire.
Reply
Marti Reed says
MARCH 5, 2015 AT 7:58 PM
I totally agree with you.
Reply
Marti Reed says
MARCH 5, 2015 AT 8:19 PM
Which is why I repeatedly say that, in looking for the factors that set the stage for the demise of the Granite Mountain 19, I REALLY REALLY REALLY hope the responsible investigators will look as far UP as they look DOWN.
I have pretty much accepted the most likely probability that some combination of Eric Marsh’s and Jesse Steed’s FAULTY decision-making will prove to have been the proximate cause of the deaths of the GM 19.
And I, honestly, all things considered, find that really really PAINFUL. Like I’ve said, I’ve wept more tears over this than I have over my own mother’s death. It’s just so AWFUL.
But, that being the case.
The MANAGEMENT of this whole fire, from the absolute get-go was (and needs to be RECOGNIZED as) equally NEGLIGENT.
Which is why, at this point, I am, to be honest, mystified as to why Elizabeth isn’t, in her search for reasons to absolve Eric Marsh, looking in the direction of this whole realm.
I really do believe that if this fire hadn’t been so negligently mismanaged from the top down, the Granite Mountain Hotshots would still be alive today.
Complete with all the “bad habits with good outcomes” that some of those who know them have whispered to others, and that show up, periodically, as do those of a whole lot of other Wildland Firefighters.
Reply
On a smartphone a the moment ( or, as some now call then, a ‘stupidphone’ ) so have to keep this short. Just 2 quick points.
1) Agree about “Death from ABOVE” and any analysis needs to look just as far UP the chain as down. It could NOT have been good to have an IC ( Roy Hall ) who was that TOTALLY DISENGAGED from the fire he was hired to fight and so TOTALLY PREOCCUPIED with just making the paperwork ‘look good’. On a certain level… I still can’t believe what a FREE RIDE this IC Roy Hall has always been getting with regards to EVERYTHING that went wrong here. It was, ultimately, HIS fire…. and he’s been treated like he was some kind of impartial ‘UN Observer’ that day, or something. In charge… but NOT really responsible for ANYTHING.
2) I think this entire deal where Arizona just calls up a bunch of RETIRED guys and throws them together to PRETEND to be a no-shit Type 2 team ( long or short ) has to stop.
What you get is this hodge-podge of RETIRED guys who may ( or may NOT ) know how to work with each other… and spend too much precious time figuring OUT how to do that.
There is a REASON that you bring in TEAMS. That implies you going to get people who already KNOW how to hit the ground running and KNOW how to work REALLY WELL together and not have to ‘ramp up’ to get there.
The dis-jointed, haphazard management that day had EVERYTHING to do with what was going to happen in the afternoon.
Example: I just got done below answering Rocksteady in that discussion about the FBAN position… and pointed out the fact that there is NO EVIDENCE in FBAN Byron Kimball’s ADOSH testimony that anyone was EVER asking him to make ANY predictions about what the fire might actually DO that day. They were treating him ( and he was just ACCEPTING the role ) as just “the weather guy”… and even then only to just pass on NWS announcements over the radio.
There is NO EVIDENCE that he ever even MET SPGS1 Gary Cordes that day… who was the one who personally set those THREE crucial ‘trigger points’ for Yarnell.
Not even one bit of evidence to prove that this Structure Protection guy ever even consulted with the on-site on-salary FBAN before he set 3 crucial trigger points for an entire TOWN on the SOUTH end of the fire.
FBAN Byron Kimball wasn’t even AWARE he had done that.
Then Gary Cordes’ mantra following the incident was simply “The fire exceeded our expectations”.
Really? WHOSE expectations? There is NO EVIDENCE that the ‘Type 2 Short’ team FBAN was even ‘in the loop’ when those ‘expectations’ were formed or when those crucial trigger points were set by just a Structure Protection guy on the south side of the fire.
What if Cordes had been REQUIRED to at least check with the on-site, on-salary FBAN about those ‘trigger points”? Maybe the FBAN would have understood how inadequate they might become and would have made OTHER recommendations.
And if just THAT one thing had happened… a LOT of other things would have then been happening in a completely different timeframe that day… including actions and events directly related to the Granite Mountain tragedy.
So yes… there very much was a “Death from ABOVE” component to the fatalities in Yarnell that day that hasn’t been fully vetted yet. No question.
Okay… sorry… that wasn’t as ‘quick’ a response as I planned and that’s more hunt-and-peck typing on a ‘stupidphone’ than I ever intend to do again.
One quick followup…
Imagine this scenario.
If the “Incident Commander” had been paying attention… what would he have said if he learned that some Structure Protection guy on the south end of the fire had willy-nilly set all THREE of the critical ‘trigger points’ for an entire TOWN… and ALL the firefighters working there to ‘protect it’… WITHOUT having either ever MET or CONSULTED with the on-site on-salary ‘Type 2 Team’ FBAN?
Maybe even Roy Hall wouldn’t have cared… but I think any number of other “Incident Commanders” would have responded with a healthy WTF… and then would at least have had the Team’s own FBAN take a look at the ‘trigger points’.
Actually, to be perfectly honest………….
I’d be totally OK with absolving Roy Hall of most of his sins…….
all things considered………
IF and ONLY if…….
a LASER BEAM was focused on PHOENIX..
I don’t know WHO in Phoenix, but SOMEONE.
This has been increasingly bugging me for months.
I’ll write my relatively long LIST of what that LASER BEAM needs to focus on tomorrow morning, when it’s not time for me to fall asleep like I’m doing right now.
And, thanks, WTKTT, for responding and underscoring my points. Even with a dumbphone.
Reply to rocksteady post on March 3, 2015 at 12:47 pm
NOTE: ‘rocksteady’ is a certified “Fire Behavior Analyst’ ( FBAN )
( EMPHASIS added below is mine )
>> rocksteady said…
>>
>> I look at my job as being a SAFETY OFFICER, specializing in weather AND
>> fire behaviour, looking out for FIRE FIGHTER SAFETY.
>> No one else in the ICS structure is specifically designated to cover
>> this, so I take it very seriously.
This was a VERY important statement that just ‘flew by’ with all kinds of relevant implications in the “Lessons to Learn” category… and I didn’t want it to get “lost in the weeds”.
Marti even raised the obvious question again down below when she pointed out that other then letting FBAN Byron Kimball come on the radio and just regurgitate some National Weather Service bulletings… there isn’t much evidence that ANYONE in management was either closely consulting with FBAN Kimball that day OR ( even if they were ) taking him very seriously.
There weren’t even any ACTUAL ‘Safety Officers’ there in Yarnell until much later in the day and one of them only arrived just minutes before 19 firefighters were going to have to deploy because they made poor ‘risk management’ decisions.
I’m with Mari on this one.
It is PUZZLING what the ICS management really thinks the FBAN position is even FOR.
Just keep track of the weather and let them talk on the radio every now and then?
The other ‘disturbing’ thing that has always been on my mind while studying this whole ICS management structure thingy is emphasized by the second part of the comment…
>> No one else in the ICS structure is specifically designated to cover
>> this, so I take it very seriously.
That really does seem to be the case… both here in Canda and the USA ( and probably anywhere this ICS system is in use? ).
Think about it.
The ICS system has to include a ‘Fire Behavior Analyst” ( who may or may not even be being taken seriously and just viewed as a ‘weather man’ )… because (apparently) the other people who get hired to actually RUN a fire don’t seem to be required to fully understand “Fire Behavior”?
That just seems like quite an ANOMALY to me.
It’s not like the people who rise to the levels of ‘Incident Commanders’ and ‘Operations Level Supervisors’ and even ‘Division Supervisors’ are being paid to hang drywall.
They are ALL there to FIGHT FIRE.
But they allowed to be ‘red-carded’ to these positions WITHOUT demonstrating a pretty damn good knowledge of how FIRE even BEHAVES?
They have to rely on just some ONE other person to have enough of a grasp about FIRE BEHAVIOR for them to even FIGHT the FIRE?
There just seems to be something very, very ‘out of whack’ about that.
That’s almost like saying there is no requirement for airline pilots to look out their window and have a fully understanding of the weather they can see out ahead of them… and the ‘system’ is designed to allow them to just call someone up into the cockpit to tell them what that ‘weather’ means to them and the passengers.
Bad analogy maybe… but my thinking really is along those lines.
WHY are there not more stringent requirements for people getting red-carded as ICs, OPS, and DIVS to demonstrate a full grasp and wide range of understanding of FIRE BEHAVIOR when it is their JOB to FIGHT FIRE ( and tell others how to go about it ).
Is it an ‘educational level’ thing?
Is it because the people filling those ICS positions don’t normally have the ability to ACHIEVE FBAN status… so they had to drop that requirement for those positions and just make sure there’s at least one guy on the team who DOES really understand ‘FIRE BEHAVIOR’?
Apologies Typo above. I misspelled Marti’s name.
Should have been this…
>> I’m with Marti on this one.
>> It is PUZZLING what the ICS management really thinks the FBAN position is even FOR.
No prob. I can makez typoz two!
WTKTT — Maybe I can help here———-
Many Forest and District FMO’s have a back ground in FBAN as the put together Burn plans for their District and Forest. Complicated plans sometimes take a Specialist in FBAN.
I am saying most have gone to training on Fire Behavior Annalists. as part of their training packet.
Most if not all OPS and IC”s have had that training.
FBAN is also a intricate part of the PLANNING SECTION as is the Safety Officer.
In type 1 and 2 teams the FBAN works with the Planning Section Chief for the Shift plans
and during the Shift keeps up with the weather.
So I am saying the overhead on the fire especially the OPS and IC have a good background in FBAN. It is not a step child position. Again this fire was very strange and out of wak with the norm.
No plans or update of plans for the day shift on Yarnell???????
Reply to Bob Powers post on March 5, 2015 at 3:32 pm
>> Bob Powers said…
>>
>> So I am saying the overhead on the fire especially the OPS
>> and IC have a good background in FBAN.
Copy that… and thank you for replying.
Yes… I would imagine that whether or not you are REQUIRED to have extensive “Fire Behavior” Training ( under MANY types of conditions and circumstances )… if you do NOT have a good grasp on that OR you lack the ability to fully understand what your ‘actual’ FBANs are telling you… that you wouldn’t last long in those IC / OPS positions ( or end up just not getting hired much )…
…but my thoughts lately have been more along the lines of…
What are these people REQUIRED to know, or be able to understand, before they get red-card-punched for IC / OPS / DIV, etc.
I have been looking and looking at the OFFICIAL ‘qualifications’ and ‘prerequisites’ for these positions in the OFFICIAL NWCG documents… and to be honest… I’m not seeing much.
The document I am studying is the following…
A Publication of the National Wildfire Coordinating Group ( NWCG )
National Incident Management System
Wildland Fire Qualifications System Guide
Updated: October, 2014
http://www.nwcg.gov/pms/docs/pms310-1.pdf
I’m not ready to say for sure and certain that extensive ‘fire behavior’ studies or knowledge is NOT present somewhere in the ‘ladder climb’ to the IC / OPS and DIVS positions… because ( as you know ) the ‘prerequisites’ are like a ‘pyramid’ that has to be studied very carefully…
…but after at least 3 passes at this document I am still scratching my head.
It does NOT appear that demonstrating any kind of REAL grasp on ‘fire behavior’ in all different kinds of fuel types and under all different types of conditions really is any kind of REQUIRED knowledge for some of these higher level ICS management positions.
That’s all I’m saying.
I would ASSUME it is ( a full blown REQUIREMENT )… but so far I’m not seeing the actual PROOF that it is… even in the NWCG documents themselves.
More on this later. It’s a complicated ‘qualifications’ document and I’ve only been through it about 3 times so far.
The Climb to those positions starts at the FF level each ascending position requires certain training and assignments as you advance every thing is connected as you move higher and higher in the fire organization.
Some courses may not be fire position specific but are part of you job training
to function both on and off fires.
My old Boss and Type 1 IC who was in charge of a large part of the Yellow Stone Fires with his team Started as a FF Crew Boss Sector boss Hot shot superintendent and worked his way to Forest FMO He had a breadth of knowledge by going to many training class and on the ground knowledge
to achieve the IC level. Most good IC’s are that level of a Fireman.
So look from the beginning to end for their training There are week and strong qualifications not all will ever meet the Strong Qualifications. It is up to the Regions who select their teams to select the BEST.
Reply to Bob Powers post on March 5, 2015 at 10:16 pm
>> Bob Powers wrote…
>>
>> The Climb to those positions starts at the FF level each
>> ascending position requires certain training and assignments
>> as you advance every thing is connected as you move higher
>> and higher in the fire organization.
Yes. It’s obviously a PYRAMID. That’s why even the NWCG Qualifications document needs to be studied carefully ( which is what I’m in the process of doing ).
>> Bob Powers also said…
>>
>> Some courses may not be fire position specific but are
>> part of you job training to function both on and off fires.
Yes… you can see that at both the TOP and BOTTOM of the
‘pecking order’. Low level FFX are obviously NOT required to be any kind of ‘fire behavior’ experts just to get out on the line and get to work… but at the same time… it doesn’t LOOK like the people at the TOP ( other than actual FBANs ) are required to know much about it, either.
Whatever is REQUIRED as you ‘climb’ has to be somewhere in the middle of the pecking order… but I honestly haven’t found exactly WHERE that is, yet. At least not in the official NwCG Qualifications document.
>> Bob Powers also said…
>>
>> Most good IC’s are that level of a Fireman.
I’m sure they are. Like you said ( and I agreed with )… if you haven’t picked up some pretty good ‘fire behavior’ training skills along the ladder-climb… you probably don’t last long ( or get hired much ) as an IC.
>> Bob Powers also said…
>>
>> So look from the beginning to end for their training
That’s what I’m doing… but to be clear… my quest at the moment is not to know where any particular ‘fireman’ accumulated his ‘fire behavior’ training or knowledge… my quest at the moment is to identify WHERE in the NWCG Qualifications Document it is actually CODIFED that that kind of GOOD subset of FBAN training is REQUIRED before you can even achieve the ‘next level’.
In all honesty… unless someone is actually on the FBAN track and actually trying to add THAT rating to their red-card… I’m not exactly seeing WHERE that point actually IS in the ‘climb up the ladder’.
>> Bob Powers…
>>
>> There are week and strong qualifications not all will ever
>> meet the Strong Qualifications. It is up to the Regions
>> who select their teams to select the BEST.
And there are also obviously the MAINTAIN CURRENCY requirements for each and every position.
As far as I can tell ( so far ) there may have been some point in the pre-DIVS, pre-OPS, pre-IC pecking order where you had to take some significant subset of the same courses someone on an actual FBAN track would… but there is definitely NO REQUIREMENT at the DIVS or OPS or IC level to stay CURRENT on that.
According to what I’m seeing already in the NWCG Qualifications document… the only people who are REQUIRED to not treat ‘Fire Behavior” training as a ‘one-shot-deal’ thing are the ones actually trying to meet the ‘RETAIN CURRENCY’ requirements for actual FBAN or LTAN ratings.
In other words… even if a DIVS or an OPS or an IC ‘picked up’ some subset of the actual FBAN course requirements somewhere along the way… there is NO requirement at those position levels to ever stay CURRENT on those quals. It’s a one-shot-deal for DIVS, OPS and IC levels.
That still strikes me as kind of strange.
Still researching this… but THANK YOU for the input.
You may not find what you are looking for in this new age it may be only a working knowledge of certain fire positions as wild land fire has become more job specific and people are no longer being certified in special categories. Air Attack, FBAN, Finance, Safety Officer, Planning,
All have specific training and background qualifications. So working knowledge may be all the training you get anymore.
There are general FBAN books that can help provide estimates of spread based on the fuels wind and topography. For specifics and professional predictions you rely on the well trained and certified.
like rocksteady in todays drought driven fires…..
The IC/OPS do understand fire behaviour, they just do not go through the significant training and mentoring that an FBAN does (computer modelling, etc).
As I said down below, FBANs are technical specilasts. An IC does not need to know how to manage an air tanker fleet, he delegates that to an air group supervisor (another technical specialist type role.
The IC/OPS have to take the information provided from the FBAN and utilizie it in the execution of their operational plan. SOme IC/OPS take that seriously, some blow it off, like you say, “You are a weatherman”…. (Which we arent, but) and an attitude of “that prediction will never happen”…
Reply to rocksteady post on March 5, 2015 at 3:35 pm
>> rocksteady said…
>>
>> The IC/OPS do understand fire behaviour, they just do not go
>> through the significant training and mentoring that an FBAN
>> does (computer modelling, etc).
Copy… and thanks… but there is a SIGNIFICANT difference between what qualifies as SIGNIFICANT TRAINING… and just sort of “knowing a little bit about it”.
Yes… the NWCG quals for FBAN ( and LTAN ) are WELL defined in the NWCG Qualifications Standards documents. Heavy stuff required for THOSE ratings.
The actual REQUIREMENTS for other crucial ‘FIRE FIGHTING’ positions like IC, OPS, DIVS?… not so much.
The document I am studying is the following…
A Publication of the National Wildfire Coordinating Group ( NWCG )
National Incident Management System
Wildland Fire Qualifications System Guide
Updated: October, 2014
http://www.nwcg.gov/pms/docs/pms310-1.pdf
What I am looking for is the PROOF that IC / OPS / DIVS all MUST have a certain level ( or subset ) of FBAN training in order to be qualified for THOSE jobs.
So far… I’m NOT seeing it.
I’ve only been through that document about 3 times and it’s complicated ( quals are on a pyramid scale )… but I’m going to keep looking at that document.
>> rocksteady also said…
>>
>> The IC/OPS have to take the information provided from the FBAN
>> and utilizie it in the execution of their operational plan.
In the case of Yarnell… not only was there NO actual ‘operational plan’ ( IAP ) in place on Sunday, June 30, 2013… there is also NO evidence that FBAN Byron Kimball was actively involved that day with anything other than relaying NWS weather reports as they became available.
I have just finished re-reading ADOSH’s interview with FBAN Byron Kimball.
At NO TIME in his interview does he say that ANYONE ever really ASKED him anything about what the fire might do.
Roy let him do the ‘Fire Behavior Analysis’ part of the 9:00 AM briefing at the ICP that morning… and Kimball DID ‘announce’ to those present ( which wasn’t even that many people at that early hour that day ) the usual extreme-fire-conditions-present and watch-out-if-fire-is-below-you and watch-out-for-outbursts-from-possible-thunderstorms, yada, yada… standard kit stuff…
…but then FBAN Byron Kimball apparently just roamed around the area for the rest of the day taking pictures and not really interacting much with ANYONE.
There was the occasional cellphone call to OPS Abel and he says later on he stuck his head in IC Roy Hall’s office later that day… but Hall was totally preoccupied with evacuating the actual ICP at that time….
…but NOT ONCE does FBAN Byron Kimball say he had ANY conversations with ANYONE actually ‘running’ the fire about “Fire Behavior” itself.
He really was just “the weather guy” that day.
No one was even ASKING him what he thought the FIRE might do.
Not even SPGS Gary Cordes… who is the one who set those THREE different ‘trigger points’ for the fire coming into Yarnell.
Cordes didn’t even make it to the 9:00 AM ICP briefing that morning when Kimball WAS doing his FBAN presentation.
There is NO evidence that Cordes EVER consulted with FBAN Kimball about setting these critical ‘trigger points’ on the SOUTH end of the fire.
Matter of fact… there is NO EVIDENCE that FBAN Byron Kimball and SPGS1 Gary Cordes ever even MET that day… or had even ONE conversation about ANYTHING, much less about the FIRE and what it was EXPECTED to do at any time that day.
According to FBAN Byron Kimball’s ADOSH testimony… FBAN Kimball was not even AWARE that some Structure Protection guy had willy-nilly set THREE different geographical ( and CRUCIAL ) “trigger points” in relation to an entire TOWN on the SOUTH end of the fire… WITHOUT bothering to even consult with the licensed FBAN ( Kimball ) who was there working the fire.
Kimball didn’t even hear any of the radio traffic about any of these trigger points being met… nor did he even hear any deployment traffic because ( in his own words ) he said he turns his radio OFF when he’s out ‘taking cool fire behavior pictures’ as he was doing most of that day.
>> rocksteady also said…
>>
>> Some IC/OPS take that seriously, some blow it off, like you say, “You
>> are a weatherman”…. (Which we arent, but) and an attitude of “that
>> prediction will never happen”…
‘
Again… as far as Yarnell and June 30, 2013 goes… there is NO EVIDENCE that the on-site on-salary FBAN ( Byron Kimball ) was even MAKING any ‘predictions’ at all… nor was anyone in fire command even ASKING him to.
A lot of this goes back to FBAN Kimball himself, however.
They were TREATING him as just the “weather guy”… but he was ACCEPTING that limited role that day and not even TRYING to advise anyone what the fire might or might not do. He just waited until he got ‘weather updates’… then stopped taking pictures,, turned his radio back on and made ‘weather announcements’.
First of all, no disrespect is meant to Mr. Kimball. As I said previously every FBAN has their own style and I am not about to criticize Kimball without knowing the exact details of how he operates and what he did that day.
I watched the news coverage of the deployment at home and I did not sleep that night. I kept asking myself “How in the world could this ever happen??”
The next morning, I fired up my computer, gathered weather forecasts and weather readings from the internet from the Weather Channel or some such site, opened up my behaviour prediction software, entered some data (real readings from the local area , made a few assumptions (about 10, 100 hr fuels) and generated some rates of spread predictions. Then I took and changed the wind speed ONLY at 10 mph incriments. I reported all of this info on IM about how many chains per hour teh little black box was predicting spread. It took me no more than 15 minutes.
IN A PERFECT WORLD, an FBAN should have his finger on the pulse of behaviour, all day. For example… Generate a forecast in teh morning, when the weather service broadcast the thundercell warning, jump back on the computer, recalculate the rates of spread, do up an UPDATED behaviour advisory, take it directly to the OPS/IC and DEMAND that it gets disseminated to all crews on the fireline. During and after the event, gather intel (radio/cell/one on one discussions) to validate that prediction.
Sometimes you have to be an aggressive FBAN to get your point across to the OPS/IC. Under normal fire beahviour, FBAN just sort of sits in the shadows, doing morning briefings, behaviour prediction and then wanders around the fireline taking pictures, taking weather readings and measuring rates of spread and fuel moisture contents….
The morning after the event, I watch CNN and they said the forecast for Yarnell that day was 100+ F, single digit rh and winds of 15 to 20 mph. Without even opening the software, I said “Oh shit, they are gonna have a tough day…” At those sort of numbers you do not have to be an FBAN to figure out its gonna be a bad day, even a first year fire fighter should have had enough training to put them on alert, if not the first year, the Crew Boss/Sup or Asst Sup should have had red flags waving like the 4th of JUly.
At those sort of numbers, the chances of direct attack being successful are super slim. Going indirect and burning off is the only high probability tactic. IMHO.
Once again, I am not criticizing Mr. Kimball. He has his style, may not be the same as mine. I am unsure if the FBAN position (roles and responsibilities) is taught the exact same way in Canada as it is in the US.
rocksteady… thanks again for yet another VERY informative and relevant reply.
I assure you… FBAN Byron Kimball did NO fire-spread models for Yarnell on Sunday even though he had his computer ( a laptop ) with him.
He, himself, told ADOSH investigators he never did.
Kimball told ADOSH he didn’t have TIME to do that prior to the 9:00 AM meeting at the ICP when he gave his “Fire Behavior” presentation.. even though his presentation DID emphasize the possibility of afternoon thunderstorms, likely strong outflow winds, and also very likely sudden fire line reversals.
He went about his own business taking measurements and pictures most of the rest of the day and never fired up his laptop to do any predictive modeling until (apparently) sometime around 10 PM Sunday NIGHT… hours AFTER the deployment.
I will post those relevant lines from his ADOSH testimony when I can… but I’m on a ‘dumbphone’ again and don’t have those PDF files with me right now.
Go to Wildfire Today, scroll down toe the 5th article.
500 flee fire in South Africa
Look at the Twitter picture. What does that tell you?
To me…firefighters make mistakes internationally and make the same mistakes.
If the South African WFF’s were in chaparral, they too would be dead..
Reply to rocksteady post on March 5, 2015 at 1:29 pm
>> rocksteady said…
>>
>> Go to Wildfire Today, scroll down toe the 5th article.
>> 500 flee fire in South Africa
>> Look at the Twitter picture. What does that tell you?
>> To me…firefighters make mistakes internationally and make the same mistakes.
>> If the South African WFF’s were in chaparral, they too would be dead..
The direct link to the Wildfire Today page with this article and photo is…
http://wildfiretoday.com/
That photo is just crazy. Is that one guy’s pant leg actually already ON FIRE?
Looks like it.
And just like here in the USA… you can have a picture of Firefighters standing waist-deep in flames and you will STILL get people commenting on the photo about what HEROES they are…
Here is the exact CAPTION for that Twitter photo showing these men on the verge of burning to death because they weren’t frickin’ paying attention to their circumstances.
Mr. A
@Just_Ahwa
S/O to the brave men & women battling with the fire on the mountain.
U guys are the real superheroes. #CapeTownFire
>> rocksteady
>> To me…firefighters make mistakes internationally and make the same mistakes.
I guess the “Normalization of Deviance” means the same thing in ANY language… and it knows no borders. “Stupid is as stupid does” is a pretty universal concept as well.
Also… look at the third picture down from the top on that ‘WildFire Today’ page of the FF walking along using his drip torch.
His Nomex shirt sleeves are FULLY rolled down. No skin showing.
Unlike that picture of Robert Caldwell that Christopher Mackenzie took the morning of June 30, 2013. Caldwell is holding his (lghted) drip-torch with his sleeves rolled UP and his bare forearm showing.
Reply to rocksteady post on March 5, 2015 at 1:29 pm
>> rocksteady said…
>>
>> Go to Wildfire Today, scroll down toe the 5th article.
>> 500 flee fire in South Africa
>> Look at the Twitter picture. What does that tell you?
Here is a DIRECT link to a full-size verions of the ‘Twitter’ picture itself
sitting on the WildFire Today server…
http://wildfiretoday.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/FirefightersAndFlames.jpg
Photo caption should really be…
SEE THIS?… DON’T EVER, EVER DO THIS! NOT EVER!
Regarding the 10 and the 18 and LCES:
Bob Powers said “the 10 and 18 will keep you out of any bad situation….”
This is not true. Uber-extreme fire behavior is not yet 100% predictable with certainty and precision, such that it is possible to accord with the 10 and 18 and LCES and *STILL* end up in a bad situation. If you doubt me, listen to former Hotshot Superintendent Kenny Jordan at 8:45 into the below-linked video:
https://vimeo.com/102706656
As was just explained to you down below… the analogy of the “Rules of the Road” apply.
NO set of established “Motor Vehicle Operation Rules” or “Rules of the Road” can predict all the things that might happen OR be guaranteed to prevent an ‘accident’….
…but if you do NOT follow these RULES… and you end up killing someone… you WILL be charged with ‘manslaughter’.
You have been NEGLIGENT in your responsibilites as the Operator of a Vehicle.
Everyone here knows that a big part of your agenda and EVERY post you make is an attempt to NORMALIZE all the decision making that took place in Yarnell on June 30, 2013.
That’s because you also KNOW what the legal definition of NEGLIGENCE is.
Give it up, counselor.
You’re not fooling anyone ( not HERE, anyway ).
Elizabeth– Kenny was the first to admit he stayed to long to make sure his crew got out.
Also he said he moved down from his regular spot that was his SZ to another rock below him which put him way closer to the Heated air. Even with all of this he used his Fire shelter in a SZ and survived.
The 10 and 18 were not violated what is your point. ??????
The 10 and 18 served me for 33 years how dare you as a non Fire Fighter tell me they don’t work. I know 100’s of people that would tell you that you are full of BULL SHIT they followed the 10 and 18 for their entire carriers and never I REPEAT NEVER WERE COUGHT IN A BURN OVER OR LOST 1 FF TO INJURY OR DEATH.
From HS Super. to Crew Boss, STLDR, DIVS, and yes to fully qualified IC’s with type 1 Teams. !0 and 18’s were part of every shift briefing and emphasized every shift. The Teams still do that today ……………
Any one who says different is full of shit—————-
Bob, I never said they don’t work! Go back and re-read what I said before you spew lies about me again.
You want to call me a Lier then prove I am Wrong
other wise go to hell————–
You uber-extreme is also full of shit. no such condition————
Bob, you said to me ” how dare you as a non Fire Fighter tell me they don’t work.” I NEVER told you that the 10 and the 18 and LCES do not work. I said that it is possible to follow them to the letter and STILL end up in a bad situation. So you DID lie. You lied about what I “[told] you.” I NEVER told you that they do not work. That is a LIE.
My point was that it is possible to follow them and STILL get in a bad situation.
Stand down EN, this is a discussion board, not a criminal trial with someone on the stand…
You are kidding, right? The guy told me to “go to hell.” Are you going to chastize him or just me? 😉
No you are an Idiot go to hell– follow the rules and stay safe what bad situations where???
If you follow the rules you will not get into bad situations show me the fires and what happened and Ill bet the person did not follow a rule or more than on rule.
Other wise TROLLLLLLLL
That was the point of mentioning Kenny, Bob. 😉
And what did I say Kenny Said he maid two mistakes.
1. He waited to long to retreat to the safety zone.
2. He moved down the rock from a higher spot
and ended up closer to the radiated funneled heat and had to deploy.
He in fact followed the procedures just pushed the enveloped to far. A large difference from
following the 1o and still getting into trouble.
Had he stuck to his plan he would have been in the SZ with the crew. He made the decision not to follow that plan.
Bob said the 10 and 18 will keep you out of a bad situation, you said NO based on Kenny’s interview.
Even though Kenny was cleared of the 10 and 18 investigation, it does not mean that he did not just meet the benchmark for each…
In “uber-fires” it is even more critical that the 10, 18, sitautional awareness, communications, planning, lookouts, escape routes, safety zones etc are followed, maybe even to a higher standard, due to the fire behaviour.
Rocksteady, we do not disagree – I agree with your point. My only point was that, given how unpredictable uber-extreme fire behavior can be, it is possible to follow the 10 and 18 and LCES and STILL end up in a bad situation. Apparently something MORE than the 10 and 18 and LCES is needed, but I have no idea what that is because I am not a WFF! 🙂
Bob said: “Bob Powers said “the 10 and 18 will keep you out of any bad situation….”
I responded by saying: “This is not true. Uber-extreme fire behavior is not yet 100% predictable with certainty and precision, such that it is possible to accord with the 10 and 18 and LCES and *STILL* end up in a bad situation. If you doubt me, listen to former Hotshot Superintendent Kenny Jordan at 8:45 into the below-linked video:”
Elizabeth
Get over it you are wrong and trying to fit another analogy into the GM decision process. Human factors create a non reliance on safety do to may factors.
TO THE REST OF YOU
My conclusion and training of Fire fighters for many years has been if you Memorize the 10 Standard orders use them ALL the time they become mentally imprinted on your mind and when
Human factors happen because of many things including Fatigue you will always fall back to the imprinted SAFETY——-
SIMPLE BUT WORKS
The 10 and 18 are not just a US of A safety for Wild land Fire Fighters
Other countries have adopted them why because they cover the safety needs of every Wild Land Fire Fighter.
Proven over the years to work in any corner of the world.
The 18 has also been adopted.
Don’t believe me Elizabeth check it out??????????
Sorry EN, I call bullshit!
Just because Kenny (no disrespect to him) got checked off on all 10 and 18 does not mean that he did his job to the best abilities of risk management.
He stated they were on top of the ledge, big column of black smoke, looked over the edgeand saw fire on HIS side of the line and he said “I did not expect that”….. Lets analyze that. So, he is an experienced WFF, on top of a steep ridge (knows how fire can run up hill) peeks over and does not expect to see fire on his side of the line… WHY NOT???? Analyzing current and predicted fire behaviour, as well as situational awareness (top of slope) he would have realized that if something started in the bottom it would run like a jet to the top.
From the information he gave prior to the point where he talked about being checked off, lets analyze that….
21 days straight, working 16 hours a day, released, driving for R&R, reassigned. 24 hour shift, 30 minutes sleep, another 24, another 30 minutes sleep..
You think maybe prolonged fatigue had impaired his thought process??? I BET YOU It DID. If he was on day 1 after a 3 day rest period, he may have been more hesitant to engage or would have used a different tactic…
Again, no disrespect to Mr. Jordan….
Rocksteady, I’m not sharing my own personal view – I don’t have one, because I know nothing about the fire or the shelter deployment. Rather, Kenny says in his interview that there was an investigation and he was out of work for roughly 400 days (?) while the investigation of his shelter deployment was done. The investigator ultimately concluded – presumably after investigating over the course of those hundreds of days – that Kenny was not acting in violation of the 10 and the 18.
I guess you are saying that the investigation was B.S. or the investigator was B.S.? To be clear, I am no fan of many investigations, but I would not have thought that the investigator would err on the side of NOT pointing the finger at Kenny. My impression from guys like Bob and Fred is that USFS investigators are viewed as throwing guys like Kenny under the bus….. So, if the investigator found in favor of Kenny, that sort of suggests something, I would think. Maybe I am completely wrong on this, though.
Maybe at the time of that investigation they did not find people responsible for who knows what reason. “Old Boys Club”??? “Sweeping it under teh carpet”???
If it was so cut and dry that he had not violated the 10 and 18, it would not have taken 400+ days. No?
I would like to see an epilogue of this interview, with Kenny being asked one question….
“With hindsight being 20/20, how would you have done things differently?”
This epilogue would provide teh learnables from an experienced WFF who got caught in a life thretening situation and should be able to identify to the whole community what went wrong, more then likely in a thought process or decision making event.
ELIZABETH—-Where dose Kenny say any thing about being laid off for 400 Days –I find nothing on that nor would it be common in the FS on any investigation. There are Federal rules protecting Employees. be fore any kind of reprimand can be initiated.
He did not say laid off in teh video, he said he was off work, so I would assume “off with pay”., pending outcome of teh investigation..
He says he “was off the crew for 400 days.”
Seems Like a Long time and probably was assigned another job
but the Feds have rules and I have not seen any one laid off or reassigned because they deployed a shelter?
To be laid off with out pay you have to be found negligent and have a hearing sounds like a long investigation for this.
I believe there is a mandatory 30 day reply period on and actions
and rebuttals. There is absolutely no reason for a 400 day investigation??????????.
I’m willing to bet he wasn’t denied pay. I doubt they could get away with that.
Still, it IS kind of a weird story.
You said:
“There is absolutely no reason for a 400 day investigation??????????.”
Rocksteady said:
“If it was so cut and dry that he had not violated the 10 and 18, it would not have taken 400+ days. No?”
Interesting, for sure.
You said:
“I would like to see an epilogue of this interview, with Kenny being asked one question….
“With hindsight being 20/20, how would you have done things differently?”
This epilogue would provide teh learnables from an experienced WFF who got caught in a life thretening situation and should be able to identify to the whole community what went wrong, more then likely in a thought process or decision making event.”
I think that, in a way, he DOES do this in the third video in the series, “Shelter Deployment Take-Away.”
It’s a continuation of his reflecting on his shelter deployment. He talks about how fire-fighters need to get really fit, get really sober, and THEN, “break the cool barrier,” i.e. not being so caught up in trying “to impress your peers,” and, instead, “do what you’re supposed to do.”
So, given that this was called “Take-Away,” from his deployment experience, he might be hinting that, maybe in his own mind, doing “what you’re supposed to do” wasn’t exactly what he was doing in relationship to his entrapment?
From there, he goes directly into Yarnell. And says he thinks the “number one cause” was they were “trying to impress….trying to prove yourself……gut feeling, no proof.”
So that appears to be his message from his deployment experience directly to his thoughts about Granite Mountain.
Not exactly what EN seems to be trying to make it be.
And by the way, if you haven’t caught all of my comments regarding this, we already went round and round about all of this three months ago.
And she’s using Ken, as if she somehow has him as some kind of bright shiny token in her back pocket, to try to prove her not-what-he-is-saying point.
She thinks it’s a game.
She thinks it’s a broken record.
It’s not.
Ken on Elizabeth’s blog went on to say a lot about the 10 and 18 and why they should always be followed. He was not impressed with her blog either. Since he been on there it has gone dead.
Yep.
Been there, done that, three months ago.
She thinks it’s a game.
The Smokey Generation: Ken Jordan Interviewed April, 2014
Second video is Shelter Deployment.
Third video is Shelter Deployment Take-Away, in which he reflects on Granite Mountain and the Yarnell Hill Fire.
http://thesmokeygeneration.com/?page_id=361
Marti, when you claim that I am playing “a game” or “games,” what exactly do you mean, and why are you saying such a horrible thing about me (particularly after I have been so nice to you personally)? Meaning, I try hard not to criticize you, even when I am not a fan of something that you have posted here. Why is it that you do not give me the same courtesy?
This is the Nice person game you are my friend I would never say bad things. Sorry to hear about this or that. Feed Me–Feed Me–Feed Me??????????????
Gamming
Yep.
I never *HAVE* said anything bad about you, Marti! I have been nothing but nice to you.
Becuz:
“Been there, done that, three months ago.”
So maybe I should say, instead:
She thinks it’s a broken record.
Becuz that’s, all things considered, better than saying:
“Oh goodie! Let’s have another long drawn out argument in which we beat another already beaten to death, three months ago, idea just so this lawyer person can practice her courtroom skills. That’s relevant!”
No idea why, but that link just spools for me.
When I go to the Smokey Generation, I can see all of Kens videos but can not get them to play….
Maybe its my browser? I don’t know…
May try it on my smartphone at home after work.
“Elizabeth says
MARCH 5, 2015 AT 1:27 PM
Rocksteady, I’m not sharing my own personal view – I don’t have one, ”
Not having a personal opinion is not possible for a human.
Positioning oneself as not having a personal opinion is a common cover for people who are trying to make their opinions “invisible,” so they can try to make their opinions look like some kind of “objective truth.”
.It used to be SOP in scientific and academic circles. until it became obvious that that wasn’t possible.
Anyone with any significant experience in academia knows that.
I am speaking as someone who has a personal opinion about all of this because I’ve been there, done that, and had to push MIGHTILY against it, in both science and academia.
Which is another reason why I say:
She thinks it’s a game.
EN seems to be conflating several different issues.
Predicting rare or extreme events: It’s not needed to be able to predict “uber-extreme” fire behavior with precision to keep a margin of safety.
Risk management standards and organizational behavior: Whether the 10 and 18 might need reforming to produce a true safety culture is not directly related to whether fire behavior is or may be extreme or not, or predictable or not.
Surprise/rare events: The conditions the day of the YHF did not develop in a manner markedly different from what weather forecast and conditions would have suggested. The fire was rare insofar as it had been decades since the last similar fire on those specific hills, but that’s like saying hurricanes are rare in Florida because it might have been decades since a direct hit on some specific stretch of coastline there. The fatalities were a huge statistical outlier, but not because the fire was that different from many other fires. IF it were the normal practice to take crews on prolonged bushwhacks through dense fuels whose canopy was at ground-level, while high winds are blowing a fire their direction, with the only possible escape being back uphill, there would be many similar burnovers.
Reply to SR post on March 5, 2015 at 2:38 pm
>> SR said…
>>
>> EN seems to be conflating several different issues.
>>
>> Predicting rare or extreme events: It’s not needed to be able
>> to predict “uber-extreme” fire behavior with precision to
>> keep a margin of safety.
Of course not… and even if you LACK the ability to practice your own profession and be able to make good, safe risk-management decisions… you still need to just heed the advice of others who DO know what they are telling you.
Even if the Granite Mountain Hotshots had been from Siberia… they were TOLD exactly what to EXPECT that day… and they were WARNED that very morning at the ICP to ‘watch out for’ EXACTLY what eventually happened to them.
Local hiker / bow-hunter Rick McKenzie WARNED them that very morning while they were grabbing breakfast at the ICP what could easily happen to them if they weren’t ‘on their guard’ in that terrain… under the conditions present that day.
From…
http://www.mensjournal.com/magazine/the-last-battle-of-the-granite-mountain-hotshots-20130911?page=6
———————————————
Down at Incident Command, the rest of the crew was having breakfast before setting out. A Yarnell man named Rick McKenzie approached with some advice. Rick’s family had been in Yavapai County for 150 years, since his great-grandfather moved from Nova Scotia to prospect for gold on Yarnell Hill. He bow-hunted in these mountains, and he knew the terrain well. He went up to one of the Hotshots, a squad boss named Travis Carter.
“Y’all be careful up on that mountain,” Rick told him. “That brush is so thick that you can’t even crawl through it. And that manzanita burns hot. If the fire comes down off the mountain, man, watch out. It’ll blow up.”
“Thanks,” Travis said, nodding. “We appreciate that.”
———————————————
DIRECT WARNING given to Granite Mountain THAT very morning…
“That manzanita burns hot. If the fire comes down off the mountain, man, watch out. It’ll blow up.”
Good catch. I remember that. Thanks!
Allow me to try again to explain at least part of what has been motivating some of my recent comments or questions:
According to every single fire scientist and/or senior WFF who has worked in the SW on big-ish transition fires comparable to the YHF (particularly during the monsoon season or just before) with whom I have spoken, there is no way that is 100% reliable to predict with 100% certainty (or even 99% certainty):
1. Which bad fires are going to “erupt” VERSUS which bad fires are NOT going to erupt and are instead going to just remain as just plain vanilla “extreme” or bad fires without any “eruption” or “blow-up,”
2. WHEN exactly (within a ten or 15 or 20 minute window) a fire is going to blow up, if it is going to blow up at all,
3. exactly WHICH direction the fire is going to travel when and if it DOES blow up and how FAST it is going to travel in that direction… whatever direction it is.
Presumably this uncertainty and unpredictability is why various posters on this BB are saying that GM should have sat down in the black and waited things out.
But, as we can see from the videos and the GPS, among other things, between roughly 3:50 p.m. and 4:38 p.m., folks on the YHF were NOT sitting down and waiting things out (but rather they were ultimately moving in order to restage and reconsider their options), so is that a cultural thing or is that just the nature of the beast when working on transition fires in the SW in storm season in the late spring/summer?
You are correct Liz, there ios no 100% way to predict, too many variables…
Critical thresholds could be one or many of the following:
Wind speed
Temperature
relative humidity
fuel moisture
fuel type and configuration
drought effect
overnight recovery of rh or lack thereof
terrain and topography
Because of so many factors, the crews SHOULD be practicing avoidance of entrapment and situational awareness, doing significant intel gathering, prior to making decisions during aggressive fire conditions….As we can see, by NOT doing all of the things I listed in this paragraph, the impacts can be significant. Risk management is REAL, not just a theory..
Reply to rocksteady post on March 5, 2015 at 9:26 am
>> rocksteady said…
>>
>> The crews SHOULD be practicing avoidance of entrapment and
>> situational awareness, doing significant intel gathering, prior to
>> making decisions during aggressive fire conditions….
Yes…. but it is not just a SHOULD… it’s a MUST.
It’s called following the established RULES of your profession… especially since the lives and the safety of others entrusted to your care is ALWAYS involved.
To do anything less is called NEGLIGENCE.
>> rocksteady also said…
>>
>> As we can see, by NOT doing all of the things I listed in this
>> paragraph, the impacts can be significant.
Since 2012, Dr. Tom Zimmerman has been the President of the International Association of Wildland Fire (IAWF).
He was a PAID consultant for Arizona Forestry’s SAIT investigation.
He is an ONGOING consultant with Arizona Forestry regarding the Yarnell Incident and the inevitable litigation(s).
He may even be considered by Arizona Forestry to be one their ‘expert witnesses’ regarding the Yarnell incident if push comes to shove.
He, himself, has stated in a PUBLIC “National Public Radio” interview that it is a KNOWN FACT that Granite Mountain was NOT “actively engaged” on their (fully functional) radios and cellphones that day gathering the correct amount of INFORMATION / INTEL they needed to make ‘safe’ risk-management decisions that day.
Montana Public Radio
Recording Title: Sally Mauk talks with fire expert Tom Zimmerman
about the new challenges facing wildland firefighting
Published online on February 20, 2014
The radio interview is 11 minutes long
http://mtpr.org/post/facing-our-new-fire-realities-major-challenge-american-west
Dr. Tom Zimmermann said ( ON THE AIR and PUBLICLY )…
——————————————————————————-
When we say… they were OUT of communication… that’s NOT TRUE.
They were on top of a mountain
They had coverage.
They HAD radio coverage.
They WERE in communication.
They WERE NOT actively ENGAGED on the radio.
They HAD communications right up to the point that they entered
their passage down to the deployment site.
——————————————————————————-
>> rocksteady also said…
>>
>> Risk management is REAL, not just a theory..
…and ( as stated above ) a REQUIREMENT. It is NOT OPTIONAL.
Do it in a poor and/or negligent fashion… and NOT in accordance with the established rules of your profession… and people entrusted to your care could DIE.
And that isn’t just for Wildland Firefighting, either.
There are HUNDREDS ( THOUSANDS ) of professions whereby… if you are negligent in your risk management practices… people entrusted your care could ( and often DO ) DIE.
Elizabeth—Who ever you are speaking to is either full of BS or you are not paying attention to what they are saying as you don’t pay attention here.
#1. Depends on severial things that interact on a fire in those conditions continual monitoring
by FBAN and weather predictions can provide the data necessary to safely fight the fire.
You are never granted 100% accuracy. In those cases it is better to go direct and stay away from any indirect attack. Blow ups happen biased on severial things that interact with the fire.
If you are looking for 100% you will never get it in mother nature. Plan accordingly.
#2 There are indicators but if you are asking for pin point accuracy that’s a high threshold.
See # 1
# 3 is a little easer to predict depending on the location of the fire, topography, wind weather and location of fire on slope fuel bead and active flame front. All well with in a Fire Fighters knowledge and a FBAN.
All these questions are in fact critical during extreme fire activity drought and late season fires. It is very much part of a educated Fireman’s knowledge.
and here I go again———in these conditions the tools you have for safety the 10 and 18 will keep you out of any bad situation always protect your self and crews from the POSSIBILITY of a change in the Fire activity. LCES, and safety ZONES stay close to the Black and Go direct.
If critical fire activity happens then you are always in a position to counter it with a solid safety plan………….Continued contact with your supervisors, Weather and close observation of the main fire activity. Ask questions get answers keep informed that is you job.
Fire Behaviour Prediction is a combination of Art AND Science..
Science is easy, algorithms, data input, outputs yada yada
Art is the hardest. Tweeking the science outputs to reflect what is really happening. Based on observations, local knowledge, experience…
Scroll down to my ramblings on what I do as an FBAN to try to understand…
Rocksteady, does fire behavior ever outperform or underperform what you predicted? Presumably “yes,” right?
You asked that question once before what are you digging for.
WHAT PART OF– IT IS NOT AN EXACT SICENCE– DO YOU NOT UNDESTAND?????
WE ARE NOT TALKING HUGE VARIABLES HERE.
Like Rates of Spread doubling or tripling.
Under preforming is always good because you are prepared for the worst.
She is CONSTANTLY ‘phishing’ for any ‘wiggle-room’ to just try and NORMALIZE some/all of the decision making that took place on June 30, 2013.
That’s because she knows what NEGLIGENCE means.
Bingo.
It is Fire Behaviour Prediction,not fire behaviour perfection……
Too many variables to achieve perfection every day on every fire.
I would rather it OVER predicts rather than under, as teh crews will stay safe if they follow the guidance
Exact same thing if you’re warning 600 hot air balloon pilots, even if upper management doesn’t particularly appreciate that forecast.
Regarding FBANs. Thank you for your description of how you work that job.
As I was watching some related videos yesterday, I heard FBANs repeatedly say how much they depend not only on meteorological services, but also on FEEDBACK from actual folks fighting the actual fire, in order to build up a relatively accurate picture inside their heads as to what’s going on.
Which makes sense, of course.
Those comments raised a red flag in my brain regarding Yarnell.
I’m not seeing, anywhere, FBAN Bryan Kimball being notified in that kind of relatively specific way by ANYONE on the fire.
Bravo 3, especially, didn’t communicate to him their 12:30 PM perception and warning that the fire would reverse direction THAT AFTERNOON. He may as well have never even been there. It seems to me that SHOULD have exactly been the kind of communication that was needed in order for the IMT/IC/OPS to RETHINK their strategy.
In their convos with each other about the winds etc Eric was seeing from his relatively awesome position, neither he nor Todd Abel conversed with FBAN Byron, who was, at the time, driving around taking pictures on the other side of the fire.
Gary Cordes never communicated with him while watching his trigger points being hit faster than he could react to them, in so far as to what that might mean regarding crews that were out there and such, much less his “Plan” to put a line in between Glen Isla and Boulder Springs Ranch. Or any other critical thing, for that matter.
Again, Byron Kimball might as well not have even been there that day, as far as people fighting the fire actually giving him any “feedback” or consulting with him.
It seems that, to my mind, there should have been MUCH more communication going on with him. Otherwise, what’s the point????????
What do you think, Rocksteady?
You are right also the big problem we are finding on Yarnell was the team.
a short team slapped to gather with missing parts that do not train to gather or work as a unit is a bad situation which on call teams were suppose to fix.
Even short teams should be called from a on call type 2 team.
that way the short team can fill needed members as the situation dictates.
Having division bosses that are not use to a team concept just adds to the confusion. The FBAN should be in contact with the divisions. providing updated input. More evidence of a poorly managed fire.
I totally agree with you.
Which is why I repeatedly say that, in looking for the factors that set the stage for the demise of the Granite Mountain 19, I REALLY REALLY REALLY hope the responsible investigators will look as far UP as they look DOWN.
I have pretty much accepted the most likely probability that some combination of Eric Marsh’s and Jesse Steed’s FAULTY decision-making will prove to have been the proximate cause of the deaths of the GM 19.
And I, honestly, all things considered, find that really really PAINFUL. Like I’ve said, I’ve wept more tears over this than I have over my own mother’s death. It’s just so AWFUL.
But, that being the case.
The MANAGEMENT of this whole fire, from the absolute get-go was (and needs to be RECOGNIZED as) equally NEGLIGENT.
Which is why, at this point, I am, to be honest, mystified as to why Elizabeth isn’t, in her search for reasons to absolve Eric Marsh, looking in the direction of this whole realm.
I really do believe that if this fire hadn’t been so negligently mismanaged from the top down, the Granite Mountain Hotshots would still be alive today.
Complete with all the “bad habits with good outcomes” that some of those who know them have whispered to others, and that show up, periodically, as do those of a whole lot of other Wildland Firefighters.
Marti, you mention me in your above post. I am happy to give you my explanation in response, if you actually want it. In return, however, you will have to agree to stop with your snark toward me (unless, of course, I snark at you first in the future – to that end, again, I am pretty sure I have never even once snarked at you, unless I did it and did not realize it and you never called me out on it such that I remain ignorant of it).
Like I said, that is a day in the life of ME!! Not all FBANs follow the same tactic, and I am not saying that how I roll is the silver bullet and all FBANs should do as I do..
Thanks for that. From my experience working with my dad, he was the same way.
As the Weather Wizard for the Balloon Fiesta, his FIRST concern was the safety of the pilots and crews. So we would grab the NWS forecasts, look at the maps, run weather balloons, calculate the winds aloft, deliver the briefings, and then he would either fly or stay on the field and pay close attention to what was happening, and then talk with the pilots afterwards. It was all about the information loop.
Pilots loved him to fly with them because, as they would say, “he could just see the winds.” And he flew enough to always be learning about the flying and the weather.
And speaking of flying, after WWII, when he was the Air Force Meteorologist at Clark Field, in the Phillipines, he actually flew typhoons in order to figure out how to “do the math” to create the Rules for flying SAFELY into and out of hurricanes, and those Rules are still in force to this day.
He always was in “conversation” with whoever he was doing weather with/for in order to continue learning about how weather and whatever are interacting with each other.
Hey Marti, you are a photographer, I believe?
Do you have a website??
Le sigh…………..
I’ve been gonna make a website for a year now. But…….Yarnell……bad fall………..burnout………mom……………… Maybe this year????
I have a Flickr site that I haven’t posted on since way back forever, but you can see the kind of stuff I generally still do. It’s here:
https://www.flickr.com/photos/home-gypsy/
If it gives you any grief, just click continue.
I’ve also, on again off again, posted quite a bit of my photography on Facebook. Just look at my albums.
I’m here:
https://www.facebook.com/marti.reed.14?ref=profile
As a matter of fact, since I had recently posted something about Kristen Honig’s Photo of the Thompson Ridge fire, I was intending to post some of my photos I took two weeks ago with my awesome new camera of the burn scars at Valles Caldera.
So, maybe I’ll do that!!!
If it were possible to predict exactly when something happens, then the margin of safety could be cut pretty slim indeed. Of course, GM still would have had to have utilized maps and done a better job routefinding to be able to utilize a slim margin.
All the variables were in place on the YHF to suggest that this could be a very bad fire. Even in the morning. By the afternoon, even more so, and as has been repeatedly pointed out to EN. GM’s own observations, the weather forecast, observed weather, all bore this out. As a backdrop, let’s remember that the fuel was dry dense chaparral that, when it burns, nearly always burns hot. And that the same chaparral Is almost by definition a bear to bushwhack through.
Dry air. High temps. Dry dense fuel. High winds. Observed fire behavior.
We all actually perform similar risk management all the time when we drive. Not even NASA can predict precisely when another vehicle might swerve or brake unexpectedly or have it’s driver suffer and epileptic seizure. If we COULD know these things, we could otherwise follow incredibly closely even at highway speeds. As it is, we are expected to maintain a safe distance from cars in front, etc. etc. People who do not do these things and instead tailgate, zip in and out of lanes without signaling, travel 30 mph+ faster than other traffic, etc. get cited for reckless driving, not because those drivers WANT something bad to happen, but because they don’t maintain sufficient margins of safety.
Exactly!
That was the exact metaphor I was considering posting.
SR— as you said slim margins are not an option in wild land fire.
Your plan and options must be safety ordinated to almost 100% or do not do it.
That’s when you get into discussions with analysts over the 10 standard orders can you follow them and fight fire? The answer in my book is yes experience has taught me that it is possible. And works______________ .
Reply to SR post on March 5, 2015 at 10:42 am
>> SR said…
>>
>> People who do not do these things and instead tailgate, zip in and
>> out of lanes without signaling, travel 30 mph+ faster than other
>> traffic, etc. get cited for reckless driving, not because those drivers
>> WANT something bad to happen, but because they don’t maintain
>> sufficient margins of safety.
That’s a perfect ( and inescapable ) analogy for the ‘risk management’ RULE and procedures of hundreds ( if not thousands ) of professions…
…and in the cited example… if you do NOT follow these “Rules of the Road”… and you end up KILLING someone… you have been GROSSLY NEGLIGENT in your responsibilities and you WILL be charged with ‘manslaughter’.
The analogy just becomes geometric if you start mentioning people whose aherence to the “Rules of the Road” always invloves the safety of other entrusted to their care while “On the Road”… like bus drivers, etc.
It’s not even about YOU at that point.
It is even MORE important then to follow EVERY established “Rule of the Road” and make SURE you have mitigated every chance of death or injury to the people who have been ENTRUSTED to YOUR CARE.
Reply to Elizabeth (counselor) post on March 5, 2015 at 8:45 am
>> counselor said…
>>
>> Allow me to try again to explain at least part of what has been motivating
>> some of my recent comments or questions:
For God’s sake.
ASKED and ANSWERED, counselor. Ad infinitum.
I’m not even going to reprint anything else from above… because it’s the SAME THING you have said OVER and OVER and OVER.
You are NOT looking for ANSWERS here. You are just someone who is looking for AFFIRMATION of your ‘theories’ and your ‘agenda’.
That’s why you keep pretending that the only reason you are NOT getting the AFFIRMATION you seek is because maybe you didn’t explain yourself right.
EVERYONE GETS IT.
We got it the FIRST time.
Part of your agenda is to do everything you can to NORMALIZE the decisions that were made in Yarnell on June 30, 2013… because you also KNOW what the legal definition of NEGLIGENCE is.
How MANY times are you going to keep repeating the SAME actions and expect DIFFERENT results?
One definition for mental illness…
“Doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results.”
Albert Einstein
Many, many obviously knowledgeable, experienced, and respected authorities have tried and tried to tell you that there was very little that was NORMAL about a lot of the decisions that were made in Yarnell on June 30, 2013.
Why don’t you just realize that they are NEVER going to ‘agree’ with you that ‘everything was NORMAL that day’… and take your arguments to a court room ( or a book ) or something… where you *might* be able to get someone to believe your bullshit?
Referring to the comments of some of the overhead and crew during the FLA of a ‘Hazard Tree” incident on the Freezeout Ridge Fire in September of 2014
rocksteady said on MARCH 4, 2015 AT 10:40 AM
“in my opinion a fairly lax attitude towards a known hazard.
Is this how Hotshots think about hazards, depending on previous risk mental files? Or do the do a thorough risk assessment every time they come onto a new fire/division/line/stagjng area.
Would it not be better to ensure safety by doing a indepth assessment of the work area, rather than “blowing it off” like their comments seem to indicate…”
Given that I think this incident relates to our overall topic of conversation, this comment sparked some memories inside my head regarding having read, somewhere, someone writing about how 2014 was a REALLY bad year for “hazard tree” incidents and, therefore,
“Houston, we have a PROBLEM!”
(The following series of pieces of my narrative I will follow by all the links in subsequent replies so as to not screw the entire thing up).
I couldn’t find that article, but I did find something I had noted earlier on Facebook — a graphic on the Lessons Learned Facebook page, that showed that half of 2014’s “16 different” “Hit by Tree Incidents” were “No saw involved.”
So, searching to try to find some more data about that number, I found the National Wildlife Coordinating Center’s Risk Management Committee’s Safety Gram 2014 — Fatalities, Entrapments and Serious Accident Summary for 2014.
It showed 10 “Tree Strike” injuries, including 2 experienced by “contractors.” It didn’t show any fatalities. It noted that as a “non-fatal trend.”
Then I found the “Fiscal Year 2014 Wildland Fire Management Report.” issued January 12, 2015, by the Department of the Interior and USDA Forest Service, which show its numbers (it says these are subject to possible revision).
The “Fatal and Non-fatal Serious Accidents” part begins on Page 12 (19 in my digital reader.) The following are some items from it:
“In FY 2014, nine wildland firefighter fatalities in the line of duty were reported across the United States. The 10-year average stands at 17 fatal accidents a year. Of the nine fatal accidents during FY 2014, one Federal (Forest Service) wildland firefighter was involved. ”
Noted Non-fatal Accident Trends:
• Nine hazard tree related accidents were reported, all of which resulted in hospitalization of the nine firefighters involved (7 Federal; 2 state/other)
• In FY 2014, the number of non-fatal serious accidents (all agencies) increased nearly five-fold
• Federal non-fatal serious accidents nearly doubled from 2013 to 2014
Footnote 12: Fatalities and non-fatal serious accidents for 2014 are reported according to fiscal year—October 1, 2013 through September 30, 2014, rather than calendar year (January 1 to December 31) as has been reported in past reports
The Pie Chart on Page 14 (21 in Reader) shows 1 Fatality via Hazard Tree.
The next graph on that page shows Non-Fatal Accident Comparison, All Agencies (2013-2014). In 2013 there was one Hazard Tree accident, in 2014 there were nine.
Also, that same graph shows that in 2013 there was 1 non-fatal Burnover, and in 2014 there were 25. The whole chart shows that, except for Aviation, last year was a pretty hairy year for Non-Fatal Accidents.
Note: I’m still trying to make total sense of these categories. But this is a good starting point, at least for now. There are more charts in this document, but this is all I’m writing for now.
So the next thing I discovered was the National Wildfire Coordinating Group’s/Committe’s Hazard Tree Safety website, which I am guessing started up after, as I recall, 2007 was considered a disturbing year for Hazard Tree incidents, which didn’t even come close to last year’s numbers.
Apparently, not everybody has been all A-OK with the kind of thinking that led to the various statements made during the Freezeout Ridge Fire FLA. Unfortunately, it doesn’t look like they’ve posted much of anything since their big interest in the topic in 2008. Apparently, what ever push they made then worked, at least until last year, according to the numbers.
One thing I found in particular was their “Job Hazard Analysis” document down towards the bottom of the “Forest Service” collection under “Qualification Requirements by Agency.” Most of the documents above this one have to do with chainsaws, felling, etc. But THIS one has to do with everything regarding the possible dangers associated with Hazard Trees on any kind of site.
This came the closest to what rocksteady was saying about “doing a indepth assessment of the work area” of anything I’ve found so far, and it does, indeed, require a fairly in-depth assessment of the site — the kind of assessment that doesn’t even remotely equate to how the folks quoted in the FLA seemed to have been assessing that site.
In particular, regarding to this Job Hazard Analysis (JHA):
“The intent of this JHA is to serve as a template for field units to prepare local hazard tree JHAs that would be included with activity based JHAs for chain saw/cross cut saw operations, fire suppression, prescribed fire operations and other wildland fire related work activities. JHAs are most effective when they are project specific and are prepared at the local level by personnel who will be implementing the project. As a result, this example JHA should be modified as necessary to meet the specific work conditions and requirements of the local unit.
This JHA only identifies the hazards and safe actions associated with working in the vicinity of potential hazard trees and specific hazard trees that have been identified. It does not analyze the other hazards associated with the work activity.”
And, more specifically, under the Activity/Sequence of Job Steps, Locating Fireline, it says:
“1. Utilize the most qualified personnel on scene to scout and flag fireline.
2. Locate fireline in areas with the least amount of potential hazard trees, as long as other fireline safety risks are not increased to an unacceptable level.
3. Perform an initial size-up of potential hazard trees from a safe distance as determined by an assessment of on site conditions such as steepness of slope, number and density of trees in vicinity and potential for “domino effect”, stability of trees, wind conditions and other applicable variables. [Follow agency policy if the agency has established more stringent requirements. Forest Service employees should refer to the Health & Safety Code Handbook.] Approach trees as warranted to conduct additional assessment.
4. Insure LCES is in place when conducting the assessment in close proximity to potential hazard trees. Assess potential hazard trees to determine if a live tree or snag should be identified as a hazardous tree. Refer to assessment techniques in the attachment at end of this JHA.
5. Flag or otherwise mark all identified hazard trees.”
It’s looking like, after 2014, the wildfire fighting community is going to have to find and dust off this memorandum in order to do something about their historically lousy year, in the realm of being as lax as they appeared to have been before their dangerously casual approach to that site on which one of their fire-fighters would have been probably killed by one of the relatively many “Hazard Trees” that hit someone last year, if it hadn’t been for the awesome emergency response they put together — which the FLA then most conveniently focused on.
Oh, and I just remembered, I read a couple of gritty related posts on the Lessons Learned Facebook page by the Crew Superintendent who turned down that assignment. So there’s that, also.
So I will proceed to post the links:
Wildland Fire Lessons Learned — 2014 Hit by Tree Breakdown (posted February 26 on Facebook) (Says “16 different “Hit by Tree incidents reported in 2014:):
https://www.facebook.com/191166156834/photos/a.10151094017311835.433990.191166156834/10152655734896835/?type=1&fref=nf
National Wildfire Coordinating Group Risk Management Safety Gram 2014 — Fatalities, Entrapments and Seriousl Accident Summary for 2014:
http://www.nwcg.gov/branches/pre/rmc/safety-grams/sg_2014_d.pdf
Fiscal Year 2014 Wildland Fire Management Report, Issued January 12, 2015, by the Department of the Interior and USDA Forest Service:
http://www.doi.gov/pmb/owf/upload/2016_01_12_FY-2014-WFM-Annual-Rpt_Final2.pdf
National Wildfire Coordinating Committee Hazard Tree Safety website:
http://www.nwcg.gov/branches/pre/rmc/htsc/index.html
“The intent of the Hazard Tree Subcommittee (HTSC) is to provide and promote the application of an effective risk management process when working in hazard tree environments and conducting chain saw operations. The HTSC will provide products to assist in the identification and mitigation of risk factors and decision-making ability in the hazard tree environment.”
National Wildfire Coordinating Group Hazard Tree Safety: Hazard Tree Subcommittee: Policy & Qualifications Requirements:
Check, especially, given this conversation, the Link to the Job Hazard Analysis, which is a .doc:
http://www.nwcg.gov/branches/pre/rmc/htsc/policy_guides.html
From Wildland Fire Lessons Learned Center Facebook page:
“I’ve been in worse, and sent people into worse. I will in the future. This is where we work. This area is normal.”
Read the report: http://bit.ly/FreezeoutRidgeFLA
In our business, getting hit by a tree is _________.”
Which includes the comment:
Jody Prummer: I was the one who turned the assignment down prior to the type 2 IMT arrival. I couldn’t see a way to mitigate the snag hazard. Instead of talking trash to each other we should ask ourselves how we perceive risk differently. How does one see the assignment risk one way and another sees it just the opposite.
https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=10152665241351835
Oh, and I forgot to add in my narrative that one of the recommendations of the FLA was a call for a meta-study of falling accidents.
Welcome to 2015. We shall see!
And another PS. The Lessons Learned Center issues an annual “Incident Review Report.” It’s a very helpful report.
I spent too much time today trying to find the one for 2014, in order to see how/if it linked (I would assume) to their graphic and their Facebook post. I couldn’t find it. So I still don’t know where their 16 number comes from.
Their previous Reports have been published in February. I guess they haven’t published the 2014 one just yet. So I’m still not sure where their numbers in their Facebook post are coming from, exactly.
I’m guessing, since they say that half the 16 “Hit by Tree Incidents” were “No saw involved,” that gives eight, which roughly corresponds to the nine non-fatality “Hazard Tree” incidents reported by the USFS/BLM. which kinda sorta corresponds to the 8 + 2 “contractor” “Hazard Tree” incidents reported by the National Wildfire Coordinating Group.
So it’s possible the other eight “Hit by Tree” incidents Lessons Learned says were not “No saw involved” incidents, that might have put them in another category by USFS/BLM and the NWCG.
I haven’t had time, at this point, to go looking for the fatality by “Hit by Tree” being documented by USFS/BLM.
Another day, another dollar.
So, all in all, the exact numbers are a bit muddy at this point, but the TREND is SERIOUS.
And, I confess, I did jumble up a little bit my DOI/BLM terms. The Forest Service/Department of the Interior document is not confined to BLM. But when I read DOI I tend to instinctively equate that with BLM, But that’s not accurate. DOI includes other wildfire-related agencies, including BIA/Bureau of Indian Affairs and USFW/US Fish and Wildlife.
So, if we really want to know exactly what is going on with this whole “Hit by Tree” thing, which seems to be seriously increasing, we may have to parse some of these things a bit more.
But I’m getting braindead.
Nevertheless, the POINT of all of this whole thing, imho, leads back to what rocksteady was seeing when he recommended that we look at the ‘Hazard Tree” incident on the Freezeout Ridge Fire Incident in September of 2014.
In particular, how the participants so casually described the field on which that near-fatality incident occurred.
Is the casual way in which, relative to Canadians (who carry no fire shelters and, thus, must systemically/culturally take their own safety more SERIOUSLY, and thus, may also analyze “hazardous tree” work also more SERIOUSLY), the participants described that scenario that led to that 2014 near-fatality “Hazard Tree” incident (and maybe a bunch of others in 2014) possibly related to the relative difference between how Canadians fight fire and how the US fire-fighers fight fire in, possibly, PROFOUNDLY different ways??
Even though I need to go to bed, I’m sitting here experiencing a pretty strong cognitive dissonance right now, after looking at last year’s stats.
Many more non-fatal fire-shelter deployments than “normal.” and hugely more seriously dangerous “Hazardous Tree” hits than “normal,” Both with some aviation-related “miracles” that saved a bunch of those people.
I’m just not sure what to think of all of this, to be perfectly honest.
Here in BC we have had a formal Danger Tree Assessment program (I am an instructor).
It began because we had a “danger tree incident”, a initial attack crew member was struck by a green unburned tree at a pump site and was left paralyzed from the waist down. We were put on notice from workers comp. The following year, we had a fire warden walking a fireguard, who got struck (no significant injuries) and then workers comp got pissy. They MANDATED that we come up with an assessment program to keep our employees safe on the fireline.
The initial program evolved but was way too cautious (way too much felling of trees to “err on the side of caution”. We found we were putting our fallers at risk, rather than just crew members, we also found we were doing too much fuel loading, before suppression could begin, so we actually had fires increase in intensity and escape before we could even try to put tehm out.
It evolved from there.
The process is fairly simple. A certified DTA MUST assess the worksite prior to any work beginning. This includes an overall site assessment overview, looking at teh whole stand to look for indicators that could lead to danger trees (pine beetle, windthrow, shallow soils, etc).
Once that is done the DTA does a specific tree inspection of each “ssuspect tree” to determine if it is safe or dangerous..
The decision is based on a handbook that takes into account disturbance level (hand tools and hose vs heli bucketing vs heavy equipment), it takes into account species (they decay at different rates), as well as what the burning conditions are (not so much temp/rh but long term burning…
Danger trees are felled prior to any ground crews entering.
All information is gathered on field cards and is given to plans (on a major incident) and it is one of the first thing workers comp looks for when they show up on site.
Most hotshot type crews will have 10 DTA personnel and all fallers must have it before tehy can become certified fallers. It is a bit of extra work prior to beginiing suppression, however productivity is not the concern, safety is.
Not sayuing it is the silver bullet, as we still do have some danger tree incidents every year, but at least we are now showing due diligence for workers comp.
When we travel out of our jurisdiction, we take the process/policy with us. When we import others, who do not have such a program, we use our crews (call them DTA/falling teams for lack of a better term) to secure the area before work begins.
I do know when I worked with a USFS Type 1 team from Cali back in 2009 (?) they were very interested in the program. I believe they may have actually taken one of the handbooks home with them 😉
Very interesting, thank you!!!
Interesting that it is Workers Comp that is kind of the Anchor Point for that.
I think it’s going to be quite interesting to observe what happens in response to what happened last year. What you wrote helps create kind of a framework in my head for watching that process a little bit more critically.
MArti, last year, using our DTA process we noted, as the season progressed, how many more danger trees were encountered due to the extended drought and burning conditions. Most susceptible, surpisingly, were green Spruce. The deep burning conditions were showing little indication on the stem of the tree of any failure potential, but the root systems were completely burned off. Stumps looked like the picture in the Freezeout FLA. STUBS, not full length roots.
As this anomoly was discovered it received wide distribution to all areas of the province as a heads up. It was discussed on briefing (teleconference) to all Fire Bases.
Copy.
**
** SO WHO IS DR. TOM ZIMMERMAN… AND WHAT HAS BEEN
** HIS ONGOING INVOLVEMENT WITH ARIZONA FORESTRY?
**
** ADOSH WANTS TO KNOW.
In that document that appeared in the “Arizona Forestry vs. ADOSH” ALJ Hearing file about a week ago… we see Arizona Forestry and ADOSH in the midst of the ‘Discovery’ process whereby they are BOTH entitled to see what ‘evidence’ the other side possesses as they move towards the eventual HEARING in front of ALJ Judge Michael Mosesso.
Arizona Forestry was ‘objecting’ to pretty much ALL of Arizona Forestry’s “Requests for Production of Documents/Evidence”… but one section in particular focused on a mysterious Arizona Forestry ‘consultant’ by the name of Dr. Tom Zimmerman.
ADOSH obviously wants to know THEMSELVES the nature of the relationship, the level of his involvement ( and the FEES being paid ) as a possible ‘consultant’ to AZF… and here is their exact “Request for Production”7 issued to AZF for that information…
NOTE: It is not clear in the “Request for Production” document itself how ADOSH became AWARE of this Dr. Tom Zimmerman guy and his possible ‘(paid?) relationship’ with Arizona Forestry… but obviously they DO (already) know about him.
—————————————————————————
ADOSH – REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 9
Produce all documents received from or sent to Dr. Tom Zimmerman by the Arizona State Forestry Division and all communications between the Arizona State Forestry Division and Dr. Tom Zimmerman including but not limited to those regarding his fee arrangement with Arizona State Forestry Division, hours billed, and compensation paid.
—————————————————————————
Arizona Forestry’s ( ASFD’s ) official ‘response’ to ADOSH on this “Request for Production” was simply the following…
————————————————————————–
ASFD has sent Mr. Zimmerman the SAIT report, the ADOSH Citations, Inspection Worksheets, Inspection Narrative, and the Wildland Fire Associates Report, all of which have been produced.
—————————————————————————
So Arizona Forestry was/is pretty much REFUSING to detail WHAT their relationship with Dr. Tom Zimmerman is/was… but they are ‘acknowledging’ that they HAVE sent him their own report as well as all the ADOSH / WFA related citations, reports and documents.
It’s pretty easy to assume, then, that Arizona Forestry is/was asking Zimmerman to take a look at ALL of this material and (perhaps) provide them with some (ongoing?) ‘advice’ on how to fight the ADOSH citations.
NOTE: Dr. Tom Zimmerman was never (apparently) involved in the original SAIT investigation. He is not listed anywhere as having been a ‘member’ of that ‘Team’ in any way.
So WHO is Dr. Tom Zimmerman, really?
Since 2012, he has been the President of the International Association of Wildland Fire (IAWF).
From the International Association of Wildland Fire website’s “Board of Directors” page…
http://www.iawfonline.org/board.php
——————————————————————————–
Tom Zimmerman, President (board member since 2012)
Retired Program Manager
Wildland Fire Management Research, Development, and Application Program, Rocky Mountain Research Station, U.S. Forest Service
Tom has worked at multiple federal land management agencies, including the Bureau of Land Management, National Park Service, and US Forest Service.
His permanent assignments include positions as Forester, Fire Control Officer, Fire Management Officer, State Fire Management Planning Specialist, Regional Fire Management Officer, Fire Technology Specialist, Fire Science and Ecological Applications Program Leader, Regional Director of Fire and Aviation Management, and Wildland Fire Management RD&A Program Manager. Tom has conducted training in the United States, China, Canada, and India, and presented papers, either in person or virtually, at conferences in the United States, Canada, Italy, South Africa, and Cyprus Wildland fire and emergency response constituted a major focus area and Tom has over 30 years of involvement in incident management team operations including service as an Incident Commander and Area Commander on wildland fire incidents and all hazard emergency responses across the country.
—————————————————————————–
NOTE: This position… “Regional Director of Fire and Aviation Management”, puts him into the same circle of management as Mike Dudley, the Co-Lead of the original SAIT investigation team… but Dr. Tom Zimmerman was NOT officially listed as being involved with the SAIT investigation. Not even as a ‘consultant’. The relationship that ADOSH wants to know about is (apparently) something that was developed between AZF and Zimmerman AFTER the ADOSH citations came out and AZF decided to contest them.
Followup…
** DR. TOM ZIMMERMAN SAYS GRANITE MOUNTAIN
** WAS FAILING TO COMMUNICATE PROPERLY
Regardless of his current/past ‘relationship’ with Arizona Forestry… and WHY Arizona Forestry admits to specifically sending him BOTH their own reports AND all of the ADOSH /WFA reports/citations… it’s obvious that Dr. Tom Zimmerman is not under any kind of ‘gag’ order to not talk about the Yarnell Incident.
He has done so in PUBLIC… in a ‘National Public Radio’ ON-AIR interview.
And while he is obviously a ‘company man’ ( and talks like one )… and he does sort of ‘echo’ the assumption the SAIR report was pushing that they had enough information to be making decisions… it also can’t be said that he is exactly ‘towing the line’ of the findings of the original SAIT investigation.
Quite the opposite, really.
Zimmerman has refuted ( in PUBLIC ) some of the findings of SAIT.
In February of 2014, International Association of Wildland Fire (IAWF) President Dr. Tom Zimmerman sat down for a radio interview with the official Montana National Public Radio Network (MTPR).
The SUBJECT of that radio interview with MTPR’s news director Sally Mauk was…
“Facing our new fire realities a major challenge in the American West”
The MPTR article about this interview… with a complete playable RECORDING of the entire interview… is here…
Montana Public Radio
Recording Title: Sally Mauk talks with fire expert Tom Zimmerman
about the new challenges facing wildland firefighting
Published online on February 20, 2014
The radio interview is 11 minutes long
http://mtpr.org/post/facing-our-new-fire-realities-major-challenge-american-west
From the article on this page…
———————————————-
In over three decades of fighting fire, studying fire and crafting fire management policy, Tom Zimmerman has seen a lot of changes in fire behavior and control. Zimmerman has worked with fire for the Bureau of Land Management, the National Park Service, the U.S Forest Service – and most recently, at the National Interagency Fire Center in Boise.
He is currently president of the International Association of Wildland Fire. He’s in Missoula ( Montana ) to lecture about wildland fire management, and took time to sit down in our studios with News Director Sally Mauk, to talk about what we’ve learned about fire over the last 30 years.
————————————————
The interviewer, MPTR News Director Sally Maulk, is a former Wilderness Ranger and is no stranger to reporting about forest fires…
——————————————————
Sally Mauk
MPTR News Director Emeritus
Retired in 2014 but still a presence at MTPR, Sally Mauk is a University of Kansas graduate and former Wilderness Ranger who has reported on everything from the legislature to forest fires. She also taught broadcast writing and reporting in the University of Montana journalism school.
——————————————————–
Amazingly enough… even with her Wilderness Ranger background and experience reporting about forest fires… interviewer Sally Mauk was absolutely convinced that the ONLY reason the Granite Mountain Hotshots died was because they radios were malfunctioning and they were UNABLE to communicate ( with ANYONE ).
Pretty much the same bullshit that was WIDELY reported by the Mainstream Media after the Arizona Forestry’s SAIR report came out.
Dr. Tom Zimmerman CORRECTED her… ON THE AIR.
He told her FLAT-OUT ( ON THE AIR ) that while there had been some frequency and tone guard issues earlier in the day… Granite Mountain was having NO SIGNIFICANT RADIO PROBLEMS that day and that they WERE ‘in communication’ with others right up until the point where they began their (his quote) “passage down to the deployment site”.
He assured her that the real PROBLEM that afternoon was that Granite Mountain was simply NOT ‘actively engaged’ on the radio.
They were CHOOSING to NOT communicate ‘clearly and effectively’ that day.
IAWF President Dr. Zimmerman also goes on to admit ( ON THE AIR ) that the cause of this terrible incident mostly involves the HUMAN FACTORS issue(s)… and one of the “Lessons Learned” going forward HAS to be “better training” in those areas.
Here is a transcript of that complete section of the radio interview where Sally Maulk segued from a discussion about technology and fire management right into her question(s) about Yarnell…
At +4:00 into the radio interview recording at the web link above…
———————————————————————————————-
Sally Maulk: You mentioned the enourmous change and improvements in technology and how we use technology in terms of fire management… I mean… that’s just been revolutionary in the last few years and ever more so… but… it’s also a challenge, isn’t it, when we’re in remote areas, which is where fire often burns, and the technology is not accessible in some cases.
Tom Zimmerman: Ya know… a lot of the electronic technology that we need to access via Internet or our cellphones or things like that may not be accessible in remote areas, but we do have a lot of… uh… tools that are usable on handheld devices whether they’re tablets, smartphones or portable or laptop computers that if we can have generators or battery power then we can access that kind of tools. It may not be the full range of tools available to us but there’s always a subset available.
——————-
NOTE: Here at +4:50 into the recording… interviewer Sally Maulk segues from the ‘technology’ discussion to ask Zimmerman about Yarnell. Astonishingly, she is actually under the FALSE impression that Granite Mountain was UNABLE to communicate with anyone and THAT is the reason they all died…
——————–
Sally Maulk: I think the contrast that sticks out most in my mind is this past summer in the Yarnell Hill tragedy. I mean… here we have satellites, we have smartphones, we have ALL these things… and then we have a Hotshot crew out there that is out of radio contact. That is OUT of communication with who they need to be in communication with.
Tom Zimmerman: The Yarnell Hill fire led us to a tragedy that is fairly unique in our history in… in that… uh… we lost an ENTIRE crew. And… uh…
Sally Maulk: Nineteen of twenty.
Tom Zimmerman: Nineteen of twenty… but nineteen people who were in one contiguous area working together… and… and so there were NO survivors or eyewitnesses to what happened and what they did… so will never have the answers to all the questions that… that… and all the decisions and all the information they had available to them. Ya know… we… we can only assume, and we uh… we can… uh…it APPEARS readily apparent from what they did and what… how they acted that they… the information they had available to them they thought… uh… enabled them to take safe actions and put them in a safe position… until such time as that information was so sparse about the changing conditions they didn’t realize what was happening.
Now… when… when we say we have all the technology… satellites, uh… cellphone coverage, radio communications and they were OUT of communication… that’s NOT TRUE.
They… they were on top of a mountain and they had coverage.
They HAD radio coverage.
They… they WERE in communication.
They were NOT actively ENGAGED on the radio.
So… uh… they… they had cellphones and they had cell coverage. They had radios that WERE working. I mean… uh… we always have problems with radios and there were… there were frequency…
Sally Mauk: …and cellphones.
Tom Zimmerman: …there were frequency problems with the radios but they HAD communications right up to the point that they… they entered their… their… their passage down to the deployment site.
Sally Maulk: But one of the takeaways, as noted from that tragedy, is that we can’t ASSUME that because we have all these tools that they’re going to bail us out always. We still have that HUMAN factor that is so crucial.
Tom Zimmerman: Uh… that’s very… very good point. Uh… the human factors… the human involvement… the human dimensions of fire management are very, very important… and… uh… that… that continues to grow in our awareness of that… and continues to grow in training. We have leadership training. We have human factor training. We have… you know… combine the safety training and our… our… uh… just our general training that… uh… all accomodates that and is consistent with that.
( END OF ANY DISCUSSION OF YARNELL )
( INTERVIEW CONTINUES FOR ANOTHER 5 MINUTES ).
—————————————————————————————–
Good information—I believe he is hired as the big Fire witness for the State Fire
I remember him from way back not personally but he is a very sharp Fireman
Type 1 IC and Regional FMO. If it has any thing to do with wildland Fire he has a trunk load of info. This could get real interesting————–
Reply to Bob Powers post March 4, 2015 at 10:20 pm
>> Bob Powers said…
>>
>> I believe he is hired as the big Fire witness for the State Fire.
Just based on his own PUBLIC comments during this PUBLIC radio interview… Arizona State Forestry would be nuts to let this guy get anywhere near a witness stand.
First he ‘tows the SAIR line’ and says…
————————————————–
We can only assume, and we uh… we can… uh…it APPEARS readily apparent from what they did and what… how they acted that they… the INFORMATION they had available to them they thought… uh… enabled them to take safe actions and put them in a safe position.
————————————————–
QUOTE: “The INFORMATION they had available to them”.
Then ( literally ) 6 seconds later and ( literally ) in the ‘same breath’ he says…
————————————————–
When we say… they were OUT of communication… that’s NOT TRUE.
They were on top of a mountain
They had coverage.
They HAD radio coverage.
They WERE in communication.
They WERE NOT actively ENGAGED on the radio.
They HAD communications right up to the point that they entered
their passage down to the deployment site.
—————————————————-
So what kind of ‘mental gymnastics’ is this guy performing in his own brain that allows him to assert that it was all about INFORMATION… and ( in his opinion ) they did the best they could with what INFORMATION they HAD… but then also assert ( in the same breath ) that the reason they didn’t have the RIGHT information to stay alive was simply their OWN fault for not ‘actively engaging’ on the RADIO.
He asserts (publicly) that they DID have every capability and opportunity to ‘communicate’ and have ALL the RIGHT INFORMATION to make the RIGHT DECISIONS… they just weren’t bothering to actually DO that.
If this (supposed) ‘expert witness’ gets put on a ‘witness stand’… he’s going to get torn to pieces during cross-examination.
He is basically admitting he believes they were NEGLIGENT in not having/obtaining the right information to make the decisions they did… but once they DECIDED to BE ‘NEGLIGENT’… ( and MIS-INFORMED ) they did the best they could, anyway.
Holy cow.
PS: Notice that even though he ADMITS they were not ‘actively engaged’ on the (working) radios… he doesn’t go anywhere NEAR the fact that they also CHOSE to not have a Lookout for that blind stroll through explosive green fuel within a mile of an active, spotting fire.
He is still ( apparently ) ready to perform even more mental gymnastics and just chock THAT up to “a safe decision based on the information they had”.
Yikes.
That is exactly what they want a professional witness with a great resume.
Support to the SAIR and its findings. They always hire some one as a expert witness.
Copy that. I just don’t see how they could think any ‘testimony’ from this guy along the lines of “they did the best they could with the INFORMATION available to them” is going to ( as they say ) “stand up under cross-examination” when there he is admitting in public that they had every chance in the world to obtain ALL the INFORMATION / INTEL they needed to make good, ‘safe’ decisions… but they were NOT ( by their own choosing ) “actively engaged on the RADIO” and doing that very thing.
It still amounts to NEGLIGENCE on the part of the 2 who were responsible for the safety of the other 17.
HUGE CORRECTION for the original post above.
>> WTKTT said…
>>
>> NOTE: Dr. Tom Zimmerman was never (apparently) involved in the
>> original SAIT investigation. He is not listed anywhere.
That is NOT CORRECT. My bad.
Dr. Tom Zimmerman IS listed as a ‘consultant’ in the original SAIR report… but it is on page 113 of the SAIR in a section that is a reprint of a ‘graphic’ and was not ‘searchable’ via text search tools for PDF files.
I can’t even ‘cut-and-paste’ his entry from the SAIR for the same reason.
It’s in a GRAPHICS section… and not a TEXT section.
Here is the handwritten copy of his name being mentioned at the bottom of page 113 of the SAIR document…
NOTE: Page 113 is actual SAIR document page number. PDF file page number is 119.
“Dr. Tom Zimmerman, Senior Wildland Fire Management Specialist, Tom Zimmerman Consulting”
Notice that he was hired by the Arizona Forestry SAIT team as ‘private consultant’… via Zimmerman’s OWN ‘Consulting Firm’ that bears his name… and NOT hired in his official capacity as the President of the International Association of Wildland Fire (IAWF)… a position he has (supposedly) held since 2012 and was CURRENTLY still holding at the time the SAIT hired him as a consultant.
Arizona Forestry has maintained ( in legal exchanges in ALJ Hearing file documents ) that none of the SAIT members were ever ’employees’ of Arizona Forestry.
So what ADOSH is really asking about now is exactly what CONTINUING relationship Arizona Forestry has had with Zimmerman SINCE the SAIT investigation.
Arizona Forestry is admitting they HAVE sent Dr. Tom Zimmerman their own SAIT report… AND they have sent him all the ADOSH citations and reports.
That means there HAS been some kind of CONTINUING ‘consulting’ relationship with Zimmerman SINCE the SAIT investigation… and ADOSH wants all documents ( and fee schedules ) and correspondence related to that CONTINUING relationship.
Just a little note. For what it’s worth.
When I googled and read some of Zimmerman’s most recent things, the sense I got was that he was emphasizing how wildland firefighting in the 21st Century has to change, given climate change, fuels loading, increasingly “extreme” fire behavior, increased danger to fire-fighters (and thence increasingly pulling them OFF fires, especially during times of increased intensity, for safety reasons), etc etc etc, and that communities have to take increasing responsibility (including financial) for their own self-protection.
Which are all points I TOTALLY AGREE WITH.
Which led me to think that it might be possible that AZ Department of Forestry might be retaining him as an “expert witness”/consultant in order to help them frame THAT message as a defense to the Homeowners Lawsuits.
Which I think is not unjustifiable, to a certain extent. I mean, really, the Yarnell folks obviously were not taking seriously the warnings and the subsequent grants to help them do at least SOME mitigation. As are, neither the residents of Payson, currently.
Where it isn’t justifiable, in my humble opinions, is in the realm of AzDF’s mismanagement of the fire (including the INITIAL ATTACK, which we picked apart, in detail, in January), and their assignment of a Type 2 Short Team, which set the stage for most of the disastrous nature of everything that happened on Sunday.
Including the almost incomprehensible and, in my mind NEGLIGENT procrastination around ordering an evacuation of Yarnell/Glen Isla, which really DID lead to the insanity and, thus, emotionally COSTLY botched evacuation of Glen Isla in particular and Yarnell in general.
And, since there is no “mediation” on the table around THAT set of seriously expensive lawsuits, it would definitely make sense for ADF to be retaining someone like Zimmerman to help craft a “defense” to those charges.
And it makes even way more sense to me NOW that, given his contradictory statements regarding Granite Mountain, that THAT might not be the realm in which they are interested in retaining him.
I also, however, currently find it quite CURIOUS that ADF is, seemingly, so resistant to disclose their financial relationship to him. I mean REALLY??
I can’t comprehend ANYTHING in their retaining of him that would seem to be problematic.
And, I would also think HE would not want that to appear “problematic.”
Unless…………………………..what?
It’s really too bad we don’t have a legal eagle that really cares about helping us uncover the TRUTH working with us on these mysteries.
And, again, thanks to you, WTKTT, for digging this stuff up and posting it here, even tho it might not be the most EXCITING stuff to discuss. But maybe that’s a good thing, all things considered………
Reply to Elizabeth (counselor) post on March 4, 2015 at 6:35 am
>> counselor said…
>>
>> Joy made clear that there was a way down
When? Where?
Once again… you talk out of the side of your mouth as it SUITS you and you make statements without providing links and/or cutting/pasting from the evidence record.
>> counselor also said…
>>
>> whether you want to call it a path or a game trail.
You still persist with your bullshit.
That fuel-choked drainage where even the SAIT was just GUESSING they ‘went down’ was NEITHER a ‘path’ NOR a ‘game trail’. You keep having to rewrite the evidence to fit your agenda so that every decision that was made could be construed as ‘reasonable’.
>> counselor also said…
>>
>> Plus, the pictures make that clear.
WHICH pictures? Make WHAT clear?
If you are talking about Joy’s ground level photos… therre is NOTHING in them that suggests there was any visible/discernible PATH or GAME TRAIL there.
Quite the opposite. Joy’s pictures indicate nothing but that someone would have to be half-crazy to think heading through that entanglement under time-sensitive conditions was even a SANE thing to be doing.
>> counselor also said…
>>
>> Geesh, WTKTT, you act like Fred, like an obsessed dog with a bone,
>> desperate to establish that GM somehow knowingly killed themselves.
Once again.. you are TOTALLY full of shit.
I am not ( nor have I ever been ) ‘desperate’ to ‘establish’ anything.
YOU are the one who is ‘desperate’ to ‘establish’ that every single decision that was made that day could be construed as ‘reasonable’ and you keep deperately trying to twerk and jerk the existing evidence to fit your agenda and your SAIT-like pre-determined narrative.
Everything you need to know or understand about me is in the handle I use to participate in this PUBLIC discussion. I just want to know the TRUTH about what actually happened.
You STILL did your ‘selective response’ dance and didn’t answer the question I asked you.
WHY are you unable to admit that… with a simple preponderance of the existing evidence… it appears POSSIBLE that the 2 men who were leading those others WERE, in fact, perfectly AWARE they were taking a BIG risk that day… but they went ahead and played ‘Ranger Danger’ ( as they were used to doing? ) and they did it anyway.
And their poor / reckless decision making got themselves killed along with the 17 others they were responsible for.
It is still perfectly POSSIBLE that is EXACTLY what happened… and no attempts on your part to rewrite the ( current ) evidence record are going to remove that possibility.
Crickets. As usual.
WTK said
All the SAIT could do was GUESS how they actually descended into the canyon.
I have always assumed (possibly inaccurately?) that the SAIT got the route off of a GPS GM were known to have had with them
Also
I would also hope that is where they got the 1604 move out time.
But, who knows?
Re: GPS
There has never been ANY indication what happened to the Granite Mountain GPS unit ( that you, yourself first spotted on Caldwell’s pack strap in that photo of him using his drip torch with his sleeves rolled UP ).
It just VANISHED.
Brendan McDonough testified that GM normally carried at least FOUR of those puppies… but NONE of them ever turned up ANYWHERE in the evidence record… not even the one we KNOW was ‘out there’ that day.
It is possible that the ‘squiggly line’ in the SAIR report diagram ( which is simply still assumed to be their guess at the path they took… but that, itself, was never even stated in their own report ) was actually recorded via some SAIT person walking down with a GPS unit.
But there has NEVER been any real PROOF about exactly WHERE and HOW those men descended from the two-track.
Even the SAIT’s own ‘guess’ about where they left the two-track remains a few hundred feet SHORT of where Tex (Sonny) Gilligan says he found the roll of burned-up pink tape/flagging.
Re: 1604 move-out time.
Again… the SAIT itself has NEVER said where they were coming up with some of these things. It has always been assumed they were taking that time from the Wade Parker photo that was texted to the Network.
But they were ALSO assuming that is when Parker TOOK the photo.
That is NOT ( nor ever has been ) the case. We proved that here in this ongoing discussion.
The LAST known picture which proves the men were still AT the ‘rest spot’ was one of MacKenzie’s cellphone pictures taken at 1555.
It is still possible they ‘gaggled up’ to leave at 1555 and that is why all the picture taking abruptly stopped at THAT time ( and not 1604 ).
It is also still perfectly possible that Wade Parker texted the photo that he ACTUALLY took circa 1550 out to the Network at 1604 WHILE they were already hiking south towards the box canyon.
Unless Brendan heard things to ‘fill in the blanks’ there… OR Caldwell’s GPS Unit actually surfaces one day… that is likely the best we’ll ever be able to do there.
They left the ‘rest spot’ sometime between 1555 and 1605.
Followup…
>> WTKTT said…
>>
>> “They left the ‘rest spot’ sometime between 1555 and 1605”
It very well might turn out that they left that ‘rest spot’ on the EARLY side of that 10 minute windows and not the later ( 1605 ) side.
Mike Dudley said that MULTIPLE people reported to the SAIT hearing an ‘argument’ between Marsh and Steed about “which way to go”.
That means it could have been ALL about whether to drop into the canyon, or not… and all that ‘arguing’ took place with Steed/Crew already standing at or near the eventual ‘Descent Point’.
So they might have actually LEFT the ‘rest spot’ AND arrived at the ‘Descent Point’ much earlier than the SAIT thinks.
If they actually left circa 1556 and still achieved the same travel rate the SIR says they did for that first ‘leg’ of the trip ( 15 minutes ) then that would put them at the ‘Descent Point’ as early as 1611 ( 4:11 PM ) and not 4:20 PM.
Maybe they DID actually only start their ‘Descent’ circa 4:20 PM as the SAIR claims… but maybe that’s where the ‘missing’ 8-9 minutes got spent was with Marsh and Steed ‘arguing’ about whether they should drop off that two-track or not after Steed/Crew were already standing up there looking at the target destination ( Boulder Springs Ranch ).
I still believe that NEITHER Marsh NOR Steed really had any frickin’ idea that the high-ridge two-track they were on actually DID continue on towards the vicinity of the BSR ( eventually ).
It’s perfectly possible the (alleged) ‘argument’ between Marsh and Steed only had TWO options in it.
Either we agree to drop into this canyon… or we go BACK to the safe black.
Marsh was then somehow able to convince Jesse that ‘Option 1’ was safe… or he got tired of ‘discussing’ it an just went ahead and frickin’ ORDERED Jesse to bring those men down into that canyon.
**
** AZF vs. ADOSH online HEARING file UPDATED again just YESTERDAY.
**
** Contains ‘announcement’ that Brendan McDonough’s pre-scheduled February 26, 2015
** under-oath deposition did NOT actually take place. NO reason given and NO indication
** of a new date for Brendan’s deposition.
The “Arizona Forestry versus ADOSH” Administrative Law Judge ( ALJ ) Hearing file was updated again just yesterday… March 2, 2015.
A NEW document was uploaded there and here is the direct link to it…
https://docs.google.com/file/d/0B6N47Z5CNR-CYmxSQkgyX2w3T2M/edit?pli=1
From the TOP of the PDF file down… here is what it contains…
1) Judge Mosesso GRANTS ADOSH’s request for more time to respond to Arizona Forestry’s recently filed ‘Motion for Sanctions’.
As usual… Judge Mosesso minces no words and just informs Arizona Forestry he is granting ADOSH request…
——————————————————————————
Dear Counsel: ( for Arizona Forestry )
Complainant ( ADOSH ) has requested additional time to respond to Respondent’s ( Arizona Forestry’s ) February 25, 2015 Motion for Sanctions. The request is granted. A response may be filed on March 20, 2015.
Sincerely;
MICHAEL A MOSESSO
Vice Chief Administrative Law Judge
——————————————————————————–
2) Copy of ADOSH’s actual letter to Judge Mosesso asking for more time to respond to Arizona Forestry’s Feb 25 ‘Motion for Sanction’.
It is in THIS letter sent to Judge Moseso on February 27, 2015 that we learn the February 26 under-oath deposition of Brendan McDonough did NOT take place. No reason is given in the letter and no mention of any ‘re-scheudling’ of Brendan’s under-oath deposition. Just notification to Judge Moseso that it did NOT happen ( as scheduled ) on February 26, 2015.
The actual letter from ADOSH to Judge Moseso sent Feb 27…
—————————————————————————————
Dear Judge Moseso:
Mediation is set in this matter for March 2 and 3, 2015. Meanwhile, we are in receipt of State Forestry’s February 25, 2015 “Motion for Sanctions”.State Forestry’s motion should be denied as meritless and frivolous. If this matter does NOT settle at next week’s mediation, ADOSH will file a substantive brief responding to it.
We are also writing to let you know that Mr. Selden’s ( Attorney for Arizona Forestry ) scheduled February 26, 2015 deposition of Brendan McDonough did NOT take place.
Thank you for your consideration in this matter.
Very truly yours,
Valli Goss
Attorney for ADOSH
——————————————————————————————
3) Respondent’s ( Arizona Forestry’s ) MOTION for SANCTIONS for ADOSH’s repeated and prolonged violations of the Tribunal’s orders.
This is just a copy of the MOTION that Arizona Forestry filed on February 25, 2015 ( the day before Brendan’s scheduled deposition ) asking Judge Moseso to beat the crap out of ADOSH for a number of things Arizona Forestry contends ADOSH has been ‘dragging its feet’ over during this always contentious ‘Discovery’ and ‘Exchange of Documents’ process.
In a nutshell… here is what Arizona Forestry is pissed off about…
I. ADOSH taking too long to supply a privilege log. In this context, the ‘privilege log’ is just a list of ALL documents that AZF thinks ADOSH has that haven’t been provided to them yet as part of ‘Discovery’ process. ADOSH has been bitching about the SAME THING in the opposite direction and accusing AZF of also withholding a full ‘privilege log’ as part of the two-way discovery process… but ADOSH is not filing any ‘Motions for Sanction’ about it.
II. Judge told ADOSH to supply privelege log once or twice already so Moseso should now play ‘whack a mole’ with ADOSH.
III. Arizona Forestry would like Judge Mosesso to not just play ‘whack a mole’ with ADOSH… but to actually DISMISS THE CASE ( as in… find in favor of Arizona Forestry and just DISMISS the ADOSH citations over this whole ‘privilege log’ frap ).
Yea… like that’ll happen.
4) EXHIBIT 1 – ADOSH’s letter to AZF detailing what they HAVE provided… and what ELSE will be provided soon.
** THE MIKE DUDLEY UTAH SPEECH IS NOW IMPORTANT EVIDENCE…
One interesting thind on the ‘list’ is the obvious fact that ADOSH now considers all the “shooting his mouth off” that SAIT Co-Lead Mike Dudley did on June 20, 2014 in Utah to be an important part of the ‘evidence record’ in this whole Yarnell thing… and they even
had their OWN transcript done of it which obviously includes the
part where Dudley was saying that MULTIPLE people reported
to the SAIT that they heard Marsh and Steed having an ‘argument’.
** ADOSH HAS USDA EMPLOYEE ( BLUE RIDGE ) LOGS WITH LESS REDACTIONS?
One of the other interesting things on this ‘list’ is the fact that ADOSH seems to have already provided AZF with documents of transcripts from USDA employees ( as in Blue Ridge Hotshots? ) that have LESS redactions in them now.
NAMES mentioned in this letter…
Steven Hattenbach – An attorney in the OGC ( Office of General Counsel ) for the USDA… based in Phoenix. U.S. Forestry is under the USDA’s jusrisdiciton.
Jeff M. Smith – Apparently the same “Jeff M. Smith” who is part of the “National Center for Media Forensics” lab at the University of Colorado, in Denver. They do ‘Forensic Audio Analysis’ and this Jeff M. Smith is mentioned in the letter in that context.
Christopher Anderson – Attorney for ADOSH and the one sending this letter to Arizona Forestry (AZF) about materials being provided to them as part of this normal ‘Discovery’ process.
From ADOSH attorney Chris Anderson’s letter to AZF…
—————————————————————————————–
Attached is a DVD disc containing disclosure materials. The DVD contains a video presentation by Mike Dudley ( of of the SAIT members ) to a group of Utah firefighters, a transcript of Dudley’s presentation, correspondence with Jeff M. Smith including video recordings sent to Mr. Smith, and the returned audio portions of the videos both unchanged and enhanced after he had removed the background noise, and email correspondences with Steven Hattenbach of the USDA which includes three documents that he has provided to ADOSH.
ONE of the THREE documents provided by Mr. Hattenbach consists of notes/logs by USDA employees of the Yarnell Hill Fire. These logs contain FEWER REDACTIONS than the SAME logs provided to ADOSH by the State Forestry Division which I believe were obtained by the SAIT group. The disc also includes non-privileged correspondence and emails of which I ( ADOSH attorney Christopher Anderson ) was a party.
—————————————————————————————–
5) EXHIBIT 2 – Copy of a ‘Notice of Service’ for ‘privilege log’ from AZF to ADOSH.
6) EXHIBIT 3 – Findings and order for privilege log sent from AZF to ADOSH
7) EXHIBIT 4 – Email from ADOSH to AZF telling them lawyer Christopher Anderson was in India and asking for more time to fulfill a particular ‘Discovery’ request.
8) EXHIBIT 5 – Letter from ADOSH to Arizona Forestry basically making the same kind of “Haven’t heard from you” complaint regarding the while ‘Discovery’ process and exchange of information.
9) A reproduction of the same ( LONG ) ‘Request for Production of Documents’ sent from ADOSH to Arizona Forestry that was also added to the previous ALJ Hearing file in the Feb 23 online update.
10) On page 58… yet another reproduction of the letter sent by Judge Moseso to Arizona Forestry DENYING their request to issue subpoena to Brendan McDonough to testify on Feb 26, 2015.
11) REST OF THIS NEW DOCUMENT is just more ‘reproductions’ from the previous ALJ file that contains all the back-and-forth that went on about Brendan’s scheduled deposition and shows ( again ) Arizona Forestry telling Judge Mosesso that the reason he should SUBPOENA Brendan to appear on February 26 is because Arizona Forestry has received ‘reliable information’ from ‘Prescott City officials’ that the NEW information Brendan has would be critical to obtain BEFORE Arizona Foresty has to enter into ‘Mediation’ with the WRONGFUL DEATH lawsuit plaintiffs on March 2 and 3, 2015.
Judge Moseso ended up denying that request for subpoena, and now we learn Brendan never did the Feb 26 deposition… so Arizona Forestry (apparently) had to enter into ‘Mediation’ yesterday and today WITHOUT knowing “Everything Brendan knows”.
Followup… there is no telling when we might hear what went down in the March 2 and 3 mediation sessions between Arizona Forestry and all the WRONGFUL DEATH plaintiffs… but it was interesting to read in the ALJ Hearing File posted yesterday that ADOSH has every expectation that just these TWO March 2 and 3 mediation sessions could produce a full-blown SETTLEMENT… which would ALSO then (supposedly) terminate the entire challenge from Arizona Forestry of the ADOSH citations.
ADOSH indicates this is their expectation by telling Jude Mosesso that they aren’t even going to bother to file a full brief/response to this bullshit “Motion for Sanctions” that Arizona Forestry filed on Feb. 25 until ADOSH “sees what happens” with the March 2 and 3 mediation sessions.
If the whole thing just “goes away”… then ADOSH’s laywers certainly don’t need to waste any time or energy composing this ‘response’ to the bullshit “Motion for Sanction”.
The other think worth noting is that since Brendan has now BLOWN OFF his pre-scheduled ‘under-oath’ deposition for the SECOND time ( first time he blew-it-off was back on November 25, 2014… the night before it was supposed to happen )… it can be assumed that Arizona Forestry met their own worst nightmare yesterday and had to walk into that first March 2 mediation session with the WRONGFUL DEATH plaintiffs WITHOUT actually knowing everything Brendan McDonough knows.
I would NOT want to have been any of the attorneys from the Arizona Attorney General’s office representing Arizona Forestry that had to walk into THAT meeting.
Picture this…
There are still RUMORS that SOME of the ‘family members’ ( including some involved in the WRONGFUL DEATH suits ) have ALREADY heard what Brendan ‘knows’ that he has has always been ‘withholding’ from investigators… and that some of them have also already seen/heard the content of this other mysterious VIDEO that has never seen the light of day.
Imagine being one of Arizona Forestry’s lawyers having to look across the table at these family members and they ( the lawyers ) have NO IDEA who is staring at them from across the other side of the table and they know MUCH more about what actually happened out there that day than the lawyers do.
That’s a ‘lawyer-poker-game-lightning-round’ I would NOT want to have to go through.
Because don’t forget…
…if Arizona Forestry does NOT come out of this mediation process with a SETTLEMENT of the WRONGFUL DEATH suits… then they are going to go to TRIAL… and there is every chance the plaintiffs already know more about what actually happened than ANY of the Arizona Forestry lawyers do.
That’s when Arizona Forestry will HAVE to issue SUBPOENA for Brendan as a witness… and learn for themselves what Brendan REALLY knows.
And the beat goes on…
Thanks, WTKTT!
Go to the lessons learned site and look up the latest FLA, Freezeout Ridge report.
Now read the quotes on page 20 or 31
Pretty enlightening..
Cant post link…
Reply to rocksteady post on March 3, 2015 at 2:53 pm
>> rocksteady said…
>>
>> Go to the lessons learned site and look up the
>> latest FLA, Freezeout Ridge report.
>>
>> Now read the quotes on page 20 or 31
>>
>> Pretty enlightening..
Are you talking about the following on page 31…
“Risk doesn’t start or stop when resources ENGAGE… it is ONGOING ALL THE TIME.”
Wildland Fire Lessons Learned Center
Motto: A LESSON is LEARNED when we CHANGE OUR BEHAVIOR
Freezeout Ridge Fire Snag Incident (2014)
State: Idaho
Incident Type: Hit by Tree
Incident Tag/Keyword: Hand Crews, Helicopters, Medevac, Short Haul
Incident Date: 9/21/2014
PDF Document size: 13 megabytes
Freezeout Ridge Fire
Tree Strike and Emergency Longline Extraction
September 21, 2014
Facilitated Learning Analysis
Page 31
———————————————————————-
Also, note the themes of how risk is continuous and inescapable. In the Hotshot quotes, risk starts when they get a resource order. They are already in the middle of risk right now; it is not as though the risk starts when they bring the crew in to work on the ground. You will see a similar theme later, when we see how aircraft are used to check the fire in this area. The point there is: even after you remove ground troops, the risk continues. Now it’s being held by aerial resources. This changes the character of the risk involved. The risk changes, but it doesn’t go away. This same theme shows up in the broader discussion of risk involved with a monitoring strategy: if the fire makes it past the burn scars then there would be a much larger, more complex and harder to control fire, which could mean much more risk to firefighters and the public. The point is risk doesn’t start and stop when resources engage; it is ongoing all the time (risk is continuous).
———————————————————————–
>> rocksteady also said…
>>
>> Cant post link…
This should work…
http://www.wildfirelessons.net/orphans/viewincident?DocumentKey=1d7babd0-7a5e-4177-90b8-a6a08cda5536
Yep… that link posted above DOES work.
Great document and very relevant. Thanks for finding/posting about it.
Look at the last 3 paragraphs on page 31, they are also on page 20 in blue parentheses.
I see them… but remind me again what I’m supposed to be noticing. What is/was the actual point you were making with this?
in my opinion a fairly lax attitude towards a known hazard.
Is this how Hotshots think about hazards, depending on previous risk mental files? Or do the do a thorough risk assessment every time they come onto a new fire/division/line/stagjng area.
Would it not be better to ensure safety by doing a indepth assessment of the work area, rather than “blowing it off” like their comments seem to indicate…
**
** YARNELL MEMORIAL BOARD NOW CLEARED
** TO BUY DEPLOYMENT SITE BUT NO ADJACENT
** LANDOWNERS WILLING TO GRANT PUBLIC ACCESS
About 6 hours ago… Prescott Daily Courier article appeared regarding last public meeting of the Yarnell Memorial Board on Feb 27. Brendan McDonough appears to have been at that meeting the day AFTER his previously scheduled under-oath deposition failed to take place ( for the SECOND time ). Board now has State Park’s official written permission to proceed with purchasing the desired 250 acres that includes the deployment site… but no landowners are currently willing to give up any land to create any PUBLIC access to the site.
http://dcourier.com/main.asp?SectionID=1&SubSectionID=1&ArticleID=142501&TM=54354.63
This comment about Feb 27 meeting was supposed to show up as a new parent comment up at the top. I have no idea how it ended up HERE. Will try posting it again.
Thanks for this conversation, both Rocksteady and WTKTT. I have been following it, and reading the FLA, etc, and it sparked a bit of a search for more information today. I will write the results in a fairly long, complicated post at the top.
FYI, Brendan McDonough was not deposed on February 26. I have no idea if the deposition has been rescheduled. I doubt it.
What was the reason THIS time?
Testing… testing… 1… 2… 3… 1… 2… 3…
Ah, ok… I thought maybe the channel was down.
Still waiting for a reply.
Do you know WHY Brendan did NOT appear ( for the second time now ) for a scheduled under-oath deposition?
“I have no idea… my sources aren’t that good. I just know it didn’t happen” is an acceptable response.
Never mind, counselor.
As usual… you refuse to quote obvious sources when you easily could.
It’s obvious that you only learned this by reading the online ALJ Hearing File… which just updated yesterday.
In ADOSH’s letter to Judge Mosesso they inform the Judge that the pre-scheduled under-oath deposition with Brendan McDonough did NOT take place… but no REASON is given.
From online ALJ Hearing file posted March 2, 2015 at…
https://docs.google.com/file/d/0B6N47Z5CNR-CYmxSQkgyX2w3T2M/edit?pli=1
The actual letter from ADOSH to Judge Moseso sent Feb 27…
—————————————————————————————
Dear Judge Moseso:
Mediation is set in this matter for March 2 and 3, 2015. Meanwhile, we are in receipt of State Forestry’s February 25, 2015 “Motion for Sanctions”.State Forestry’s motion should be denied as meritless and frivolous. If this matter does NOT settle at next week’s mediation, ADOSH will file a substantive brief responding to it.
We are also writing to let you know that Mr. Selden’s ( Attorney for Arizona Forestry ) scheduled February 26, 2015 deposition of Brendan McDonough did NOT take place.
Thank you for your consideration in this matter.
Very truly yours,
Valli Goss
Attorney for ADOSH
——————————————————————————————
See a longer posting about this NEW ALJ Hearing file up above.
She thinks it’s a game.
Rocksteady, you said down below: “How long should have GM sat safe in the black?
Easy answer Until They Could Move Safely to Their Next Target without Risk of Being Entrapped…
How to figure when that is EASY ANSWER Once they have had enough time to observe fire behaviour, gather Intel from other sources (AA/bucket ships/sir tankers ) predict the timing of their next move, then decide on the chance of success.”
At roughly 3:27-ish p.m., the NWS warned to expect winds out of the NE to arrive within the half hour. In response, folks on the YHF (or the FBAN) told the NWS that those winds had ALREADY started arriving and impacting the fire behavior. Indeed, in that same time frame (roughly 3:30 or 3:35 or so), Brendan left his lookout point due to the fire turning from a NORTH-moving fire to an EAST-moving fire. Rory Collins (Air Attack) noticed this same 3:30-ish or 3:35 etc. “heckuva wind shift,” too, which is why he told B33 to bring the incoming VLAT to provide support on the east side of the fire (as opposed to the north). Indeed, this is why the retardant line was lost, which is something of which the air-study folks learned at 3:42 p.m.
So, some time around 3:25-ish or before, the winds started changing, which changed the fire from a NORTH head fire to an EAST head fire.
AA told GM or Marsh (presumably the latter) before AA left the fire at 3:58-ish p.m. that there was likely an hour or two before the newly-directed fire made it to Yarnell. Gary Cordes, who was in charge of structure protection on the east side of the fire similarly thought he would have an hour or so once his trigger points were reached (rather than the barely 15 minutes or so he appears to instead have had).
It seems that GM or Marsh paid attention and watched the fire from that 3:30-ish alleged wind shift to perhaps at least 4 p.m. before deciding to move. Were there other sources of intel they should have considered (other than looking at the sky, which presumably they also did, which showed no incoming clouds from the NE and which showed no column movement that would portend a 90 degree dramatic turn from a head fire to the east to a head fire to the south)?
I am asking sincerely. I am trying to think through what GM was seeing versus what they SHOULD have been looking at….
As always, thanks!
Let me put it this way…. You can make your own conclusion.
They were on a fire that was showing agressive fire behaviour. The wind shifted, pushing the fire East. AA said it would take a couple hours to hit Yarnell. They had been observing fire behaviour from the lunch spot. Their route of travel to the BSR was going to be in the green….
Would you, if you were a WFF, based on all of your training and experience, be williing to risk your neck to get to the BSR under the premise of “Geez, I hope this wind stays blowing the same way” or “Wonder if the fire will change direction due to terrain or fuels once the wind subsides”…
IN AGGRESSIVE FIRE BEHAVIOUR (I did no t say extreme, that came later) a crew MUST evaluate all of the factors involved (wind, weather , terrain, fuels,etc etc) BEFORE committing to a mission, and then they sure as hell better have a Plan B, C and D in case it goes Sideways…
They KNEW McD was no longer their lookout, so who took over?? Air Attack? SPGS? Blue Ridge? If you don’t know for sure, its a NO-GO. Instead, “You stay safe and Hunker”…
GM did not need a “red flag Warning” or a Fire Behaviour forecast. to tell them what teh fire was going to do, they sat and had lunch and watched it happen….. So an experienced crew had lunch and watched the fire evolve and then decided they would give it a try…Not a very good decision….
Would an experienced crew, on their home turf (weather/fuels etc) not have discussed “How many times does the wind stay like this for hours on end boys?” or “Remember that time on the Whatever fire, when the wind blew like this and then came back just as hard 20 minutes later, after the cell passed”…
To make an informed decision….. You have to gather informed observations….
Thank you, Rocksteady. THANK YOU.
And, regarding your second post, where you kind of mention mental files – references to prior fires – this much I will say regarding Eric Marsh: He likely had far, far fewer mental files than most superintendents, because he had been on a hotshot crew far, far less time than most other superintendents as of 2013. Meaning, a guy like Curtis Heaton, who became a Hotshot Superintendent, had to cut his teeth under someone like Tony Sciacca, and likely serve as an ASSISTANT SUPT. for a number of years before becoming a Supt. This means that a guy like Heaton had years of standing with Sciacca to look at bad fire behavior and discuss “SCIACCA’s” mental files (from other fires) while Heaton developed his own. Every Hotshot Sup. from 2000 and beyond of whom I am aware *OTHER* than Marsh had that mentoring type of experience – they served on a Hotshot crew as the Assistant or some such, such that they got to have the back-and-forth with the Supt. about the Supt.’s mental files from other fires versus what they were seeing that day, on that fire. Marsh never had that. He never served as the second-in-command for someone who had really deep files, like Paul Musser, Marty Rose, Tony Sciacca, Kenny Jordan, Brit Rosso, or the other hotshot guys who are known to have been stellar mentors, in part because they had this deep pool of files and they knew how to talk their mentees through them. Even Greg Smith, for example, who was the Supt. of Ironwood – the other municipality-run Hotshot crew – had served at the elbow of at least a couple of these long-time Hotshot sups such that he got the benefit of their mental files and he watched them closely (fire after fire) do exactly the type of analogizing you suggest, such that he could adopt it as his own. Marsh never had the chance to work as the second-in-command to a long-in-the-tooth guy like Musser or Jordan who had deep, deep, deep reserves of prior fires to draw from and discuss with Marsh to expand his base of “remember when this fire did that…..”
I hope this makes sense. Trying to explain this without spending hours typing this post might not produce the most coherent or accurate post. Apologies in advance.
A crew sup does not have to have a huge mental file database to make good decisions.
There are a lot of experienced, pretty smart people on teh crews that have no desire to become a sup, so they are content to be a sawyer or a crew member
Dig into their mental files (that is intel gathering)
If not a lot of experience, fall back to your training to assist in making a decision (fire weather, fire behaviour, shelter avoidance, basic firefighting)
If none of this helps you make a good decision, fall back on to the old faithful, tried and true…………………………….
Wait for it!!!
Wait!!!
THE 10 AND 18, they came about because others made bad decisions. They are there so you do not make their mistakes again…
Rocksteady, you said “here are a lot of experienced, pretty smart people on teh crews that have no desire to become a sup, so they are content to be a sawyer or a crew member. Dig into their mental files (that is intel gathering)”
My impression is that Granite Mountain did not have that type of a bench (so to speak). Meaning, they had not existed as a Type 1 crew for a long time, so they did not have the deepest bench. To be clear, obviously they had smart people who had been with the crew for a while. But, at least compared to the data I am pulling regarding other AZ crews like Flagstaff or Payson, they did not have the deepest bench – they just hadn’t been around that long.
As to your comment about the 10 and the 18, I have two responsive comments:
1. The 10 are rules of ENGAGEMENT, right? GM was arguably dis-engaging or at least moving to restate. This is the point that Todd Foster brought up elsewhere.
2. Dare I ask what of the 10 and the 18 you believe that GM violated? I believe – as apparently does Kenny Jordan and the WFF investigator who looked into Kenny’s deployment – that it is possible to follow “the rules” and still end up in a bad, bad situation. I take it you disagree? 🙂
Current and predicted Fire Behaviour”
If you don’t know for sure, you stay on the safe decision, not a risky x-country trek.
They ASSUMED the fire and weather would stay in the same directionl they reached the BSR….
THEY WERE WRONG…
Yes. Unfortunately DEAD WRONG. The ‘wrongful death’ suits will decide where the boundary might be between sheer arrogance and stupidity and sheer culpable negligence.
I think it’s pretty absurd that ‘counselor’ is off on yet another weird tangent to the effect that someone who had started his own Wildfire Training Academy somehow hadn’t had his hand held long enough to be expected to know how to keep the 18 men he was in charge of alive that day.
It has nothing to do with ‘mental files’. It has all to do with bad decision making and sheer negligence.
I am going to say this one more time ——
WHENYOU ARE ON A FIRE ON A MOUNTAIN YOU ARE ENGAGED UNTILL YOU ARE BACK IN FIRE CAMP.
WALKING—WORKING—-RESTING—LUNCH BREAK—-
TO AND FROM THE FIRE LINE. ON ROADS AND TRAILES SHORT CUTS AND WITH FUEL BETWEEN YOU AND THE FIRE..
AT ALL TIMES THE FIRE CAN EAT YOUR LUNCH—
THAT IS THE 10 AND 18—Granit Mountain violated severial of the 1o and ignored severial of the 18 I have been through this before.
Look it up Elizabeth your on another campaign to take us off track. You are wrong and GM was dead wrong………..
Rocksteady said: “”Current and predicted Fire Behaviour” If you don’t know for sure, you stay on the safe decision, not a risky x-country trek.”
I have to image GM didn’t see the trek as risky, right? I mean, for the majority of the trek, they were all their own lookouts – they were up high. Then, the last part of the trek was down a game trail that, if Bob Powers is to be believed, Eric Marsh had just traversed. It should have been a quick move – that last part of the move, that is.
When you are moving to re-stage or out scouting, don’t you sometimes have to go through the green, and don’t you therefore by definition end up having to assume – at least for a very very short window of time – that the fire is not going to explode faster than you can get out of the way, change from an east head fire into a SOUTH head fire, and cover 3/4 of a mile in a matter of minutes to end up on top of you?
This was the point that the poster named “WFF” brought up (maybe to Bob Powers?) roughly a year ago, as I recall. My understanding is that that poster was a guy who worked on fires in the SW or AZ, but maybe I am misremembering.
According to Brett Butler, “Most entrapments occurred enroute to a Safety Zone.”
Marti, BRILLIANT CATCH! (I don’t know if it is true – Bret’s data, that is – but it is a stellar point on your part.)
It’s THE point that everybody but you is trying to make.
Everyone other than me is trying to make the point that entrapments occur on the way to a safety zone? Everyone is trying to make that point? How did I miss it? Whose posts am I not seeing?
It was true on South Canyon and Yarnell.
The Cal Fire last year.
Again when you stretch the distance to a SZ you start playing Russian roulette.
An SZ a mile or more is way to far a SZ a half mile can be to far depending on the fuel type.
Grass Sage And Light brush you better be really close 100 yards or less———–
You said, “Everyone other than me is trying to make the point that entrapments occur on the way to a safety zone?”
That’s the entire thing we are talking about.
You said, “How did I miss it? Whose posts am I not seeing?”
That’s what we keep being frustrated by.
As in every post that expresses something like, “How can you keep missing what everybody keeps saying??????”
Reply to Elizabeth (counselor)
post on March 3, 2015 at 3:53 pm
>> counselor said…
>>
>> Rocksteady said: “”Current and predicted
>> Fire Behaviour” If you don’t know for sure,
>> you stay on the safe decision, not a risky
>> x-country trek.”
>>:
>> I have to image GM didn’t see the trek
>> as risky, right?
WRONG. You do NOT ( and SHOULD not ) “have to image” it that way.
Maybe those are the neural pathways that just seem to be unable to fire in your dense brain.
WHY can you not simply ‘image’ ( your word? ) a scenario where these men WERE aware of ‘risk’ and they DID realize they were ‘taking a chance’…
…but they just went ahead and played “Ranger Danger” ( as they were used to doing? ) and the 2 men willing to ‘risk it all’ just led all those others to their deaths?
It is POSSIBLE that is EXACTLY what happened and, indeed, what a ‘preponderance’ of the evidence’ is actually indicating.
The 2 men in charge KNEW it was risky.
They did it anyway… and killed themselves and the other 17 they were responsible for.
WHY do you have such a problem with that?
Reply to Elizabeth (counselor) post on
March 3, 2015 at 3:53 pm
>> counselor said…
>>
>> …the last part of the trek
>> was down a game trail.
Bzzzzt… More of your ‘delusions’ and attempts to rewrite the evidence to suit your own agenda.
There is NO EVIDENCE there were ANY identifiable ‘game trails’ there for them to use.
The SAIT investigation was so amateur-hour and incompetent that there has never been any proof provided as to WHAT exact ‘route’ they took for ( as you are describing it ) “the last part of the trek”.
All the SAIT could do was GUESS how they actually descended into the canyon.
PLEASE STOP with your incessant…
“It’s not what you don’t know that scares us,
it’s what you know fer sure that just ain’t so”
It’s REALLY annoying.
Joy made clear that there was a way down, whether you want to call it a path or a game trail. Plus, the pictures make that clear.
Geesh, WTKTT, you act like Fred, like an obsessed dog with a bone, desperate to establish that GM somehow knowingly killed themselves. Indeed, I think “suicide” was the word actually used when Fred Schoeffler gave John Dougherty “anonymous” quotes to use in JD’s most recent article.
Elizabeth you misquote Joy and Sonny—
They said their were game trails they also said in the Canyon the brush was so thick that moving thru the game trails was very slow going and not something most hikers would do.
Let me also say you have never been in thick brush following a game trail you do not have any idea what they are.
Deer 4 ft tall 18 inches wide do not break open a very large trail in 1o ft brush. Rabbits, raccoons. squirrels small animals do not leave very large paths.
So back to deer a 6 ft person working thru a 4 ft high opening really- really slow going cutting an opening high enough and wide enough for a person other wise you a crawling on hands and knees. Not to mention running into rocks bolder size you have to go around or over.
I am suspecting a New York Lawyer has never been in any thing like that in as well 104 Deg. Temp. As has been stated before it is very slow going.
Yes Elizabeth, sometimes we do have to travel in the green from A to B, but it should be done with intelliegence gathering such as I laid out above. Terrain, current and predicted weather and fire behaviour, fuels, and the big one “NEED”… is it really necessary to short cut through flashy fuels, already showing indications of aggressive and potentially explosive fire behaviour?
Its all about risk vs. reward. Is there a HIGH probability of success or a 50/50. If it is not 95% chance of succees, I would say No-Go.
I can not fathom that experienced WFF on their own turf (fuels, terrain, weather, etc) would make such a risky decision without an outside, supervisory influence. Again back to the theory of push vs. pull.
I know it may be difficult for you Elizabeth, but your Lawyer brain is ruling your comments. If someone posts a comment, they are doing it at face value (as far as I can see) they are not attempting to be untruthful or evade answering the question, so there is no need for you to “rephrase” the question, hoping to get a different answer.
Look at a post and analyze it with your Lawyer lens, then reread it as a “face value” lens. I am sure you will see the difference.
I am in noo way trying to offend you, I hope you don’t take it that way, I am just suggesting that you look at the posts with a different perspective. Give it a try and see if there is a difference.
Some of the posts I look at from my FBAN lens, others from a WFF, others from a supervisor, still others from a Canadian-who-has-never-fought-fire-in-the-US-or teh-Chapparal-fuel-type. I rely on others, who have been there, done that to help paint a picture of the specific comment. They are my technical specialists.. A valuable source of information and knowledge, based on many years of experience.
Again, EN, no offence intended.
TWO THINGS
Marsh had reached a Division Supervisor level this as well has a lot of requirements of Fire assignments from Crew Boss to Strike teem leader. 20 years in Fire should have given Marsh a world of knowledge
—If he was paying attention— Severial years as Superintendent with a minimum of 30 Fire a year as well. He had the exposure— did he pay attention to the on the ground in your face Fire behavior????
We still have the possibility becoming more prevalent that he was below the crew in the Canyon and could not see the Fire activity.
And Steed could not get it across to Marsh that the Fire was changing with the winds and the activity was increasing.
One was not listening to the other.
So if Steed was ordered to bring the crew down to the Ranch
Then Steed did as he was told. Seems very plausible to me.
Also something we have dodged around here is If the GMHS did not have Shelters would they have made the move they did.
The Exposure and risk was high– was the Shelter being relied on to much by GM??????
Basing that on some prior statements of deployment sites– VS– SZ
Exactly, regarding the fire shelters, imho.
Flows right into what RockSteady is saying.
Marsh had lived and worked in the area for a number of years, in an outdoor role. I assure you that house painters and fishing and hunting guides in that area would have had pretty good mental files as to what the weather might do, and even what the fire might do. Rocksteady is also correct that, if EM felt a lack of insight in this regard, and didn’t trust the weather forecast, what he himself had seen and could see, and reports of others in this regard, certainly asking the crew their opinion would have been easy.
Likewise for the decision to bushwhack. I think many people want to gloss over how difficult dense chaparral is to bushwhack through. While GM may have had limited experience in actually bushwhacking as a crew through chaparral, the majority of the crew should have had enough experience doing so at some time in their lives to know that they were being asked to do something that would be long, tedious, arduous, and slow even without a fire present.
In understandable attempts to excuse some aspects of the decision to bushwhack, this is glossed over. I compare it to attempts to say that the BSR would have REASONABLY looked much closer to Marsh and Steed than it was when the bushwhack was being contemplated. Really? They had never been in a position on a ridge where a structure down below looked closer than it was? They had no access to maps and no knowledge of the local area? Same goes for deciding to go through that brush. Many people reading this may never have tried to walk (and crawl) through chaparral, so may wonder what the big deal is. Consider that the tree canopy is basically at ground level — which is why chaparral has a stand-replacement crown fire regime — and think what moving through dense holly or oleander in the backyard is like if you’re trying to prune it.
Just pointing out ( once again… ad nauseum ) that most of “counselor’s” psuedo-narrative above is completely wrong and just continues to epitomize the following Mark Twain quote…
“It ain’t what she doesn’t know that’s scary.
It’s what she knows fer SURE that just ain’t so.”
Just more ‘agenda’ in plain view here.
Reader(s) beware.
What is wrong, specifically, WTKTT?
Just read down in this very same chapter
You are literally a DELUSIONAL brick wall.
Doesn’t matter how many times you are shown facts… you continue to just believe whatever you want and pursue your own agenda(s).
You will continue to slip in every little reference to EAST anywhere you can because your delusions NEED the ‘narrative’ to read that way.
As for watching the weather for a half-hour… you need that, too, to support your narrative… even though I already disproved your attempt to rewrite reality on just THAT topic down below in this same chapter.
You really are a ‘piece a work’, counselor… and you are NOT fooling anyone.
Are you saying the fire was not marching east?
And are you saying that 3:25-ish p.m. until 4:05-ish p.m. does not equal a half hour?
If that is not what you are saying, then I honestly am confused.
OK I had to answer this——-
No the fire was not marching east—
No it is not equal to a half hour/or 30 min.
addition says 40 min almost 3/4 of an hour/or 2/3 of an hour.
You are confused but we have all figured that out———-
LOL!! We’re piggy=backing!
Bob, you missed the point. Fred Schoeffler or WTKTT indicated that GM was not observing the fire behavior for anywhere near 30 minutes, but, rather, for some amount of time far less than 30 minutes. I was making the point, in response, that it appears from my calculations (roughly 3:25 until roughly 4:05-ish) that GM was observing the weather behavior before moving for at LEAST 30 minutes (and likely, as you point out, MORE than 30 minutes).
Indeed, you, Bob Powers, are suggesting that they were watching it for at least 40 minutes after the appearance of the winds, to gauge the impacts that the winds were having so that they could try to better anticipate the fire behavior. 🙂
Reply to Elizabeth (counselor) post on
March 5, 2015 at 8:32 am
>> counselor said…
>>
>> …it appears from my calculations (roughly
>> 3:25 until roughly 4:05-ish) that GM was
>> observing the weather behavior before
>> moving for at LEAST 30 minutes
The debate is not over the MATH.
4:05 PM minus 3:25 PM is, in fact, 40 minutes.
What you refuse to say is WHY you are setting
a START time of 3:25 PM for your carte-blanche
statement “GM ( the whole group ) was observing
the weather”.
On WHAT are you basing THAT assumption?
What you are ultimately still trying to push is YOUR theory that Marsh or Steed ( indeed… you are trying to lump ALL 19 men into the generic ‘GM’ reference ) somehow saw the wind shift… and then COLLECTIVELY ( ALL of them ) thought that event was OVER and it was now SAFE to proceed towards the Boulder Springs Ranch.
So WHAT are you really basing your 3:25 PM “GM collectively STARTED direct observations of the weather” time on?
What EVIDENCE?
The fire was NOT “marching east.”
The fire, under the influence of a thunderstorm, was rotating clockwise and reversing direction until it headed toward the southwest, as the prevailing winds shifted from being out of the southwest to being out of the northeast.
At around 3:15, the east flank of the fire became active and started burning/heading toward the east, now pushed by westerly winds, threatening Sickles Road. A number of tanker and chopper drops protected the structures there. I don’t know the exact times of this push, but by the time Cordes and Musser met on 89 around 3:50 the fire’s head was now bearing down to the south and jumping Cordes’ trigger points faster than he could keep up with them, while it continued rotating clockwise.
By 4-ish, when it is said that Granite Mountain left their photo-ops spot, the now active south fire head was beginning to roll over the ridge and heading into the Youth Camp/Shrine Road Area.
The fire continued rotating clockwise, until the flaming front was heading southwest as it hit Glen Isla, the Boulder Springs Ranch, and the bottom of the bowl Granite Mountain then was forced to deploy in.
At no time after about 3:30, was the fire “marching east, despite whatever you are seeing that is, apparently, causing you to keep saying that.
PS There are Moore photos of, among a number of things, a SEAT drop over the Sickles Road area at 3:23 PM.
IS IT GROUNDHOG DAY??????????????
LOLOLOLOLOL!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Apparently.
And I keep promising myself and the Universe not to continuing getting sucked into it.
Ah…………………..the power of a……..
VACUUM.
So I ponder, after probably 30 years of teaching Middle High “Sunday School.”
What do you do with the one kid in the class who continues to ask irrelevant questions because he/she continues to ignore what is being said in the class?????
Actually, in all those years, I never ever had any kid in any class who relentlessly did this as much as Elizabeth.
This is not meant as snark. I’m genuinely mystified.
Is it Law School that does this to people? I just don’t get it.
I’ve over the years had many friends who were lawyers who weren’t anywhere near this ……… blindered.
At 4 PM the fire was NOT a “head fire to the east.’
It quit being that around 3;30 PM, when the air show finished dropping water and retardant over that Sickles Road area and, for some inexplicable reason, turned their focus toward the Model Creek Road area, where they continued to focus until after the T911 split drop at around 4:13 PM (which probably saved several houses, according to the aerial photographs, however……..).
By then the fire had spent about 45 minutes rotating clockwise, pushing to the southeast and then the south. It wasn’t until 4:33 (when the fire was beginning to push to the southwest) that they finally started putting a line in where it COUNTED, over Yarnell itself, and we know what happened after that.
This bit you seem to have in your mouth that keeps telling you to keep over-focusing on the “fire pushing to the east” is making it, apparently, impossible for you to hear what everybody is saying here about the ACTUAL dynamics and directions and winds that were actually happening on the actual fire.
The fire was ROTATING clockwise from burning to the northeast to the southwest, and it’s various “flaming fronts” essentially reflected that ROTATION. All the way around. Every little bit of it.
Except, of course, for topographically-influenced micro-variations, which we have discussed ad nauseum already, and which you ALSO seem to have some inability to grasp.
Ooooops. I made a typo.
When I wrote:
“This bit you seem to have in your mouth that keeps telling you to keep over-focusing on the ‘fire pushing to the east'”
I REALLY meant to write:
“This bit you seem to have in your mouth that keeps telling you to keep over-focusing on the ‘fire pushing to the east’ thingy.”
Because it really is
a
thingy.
Elizabeth/Logical Phallacy,
You stated: “Indeed, this is why the retardant line was lost, which is something of which the air-study folks learned at 3:42 p.m.”
WRONG again! The retardant line was lost for several reasons, least of which was your reason. First, it was not reinforced and worked by hand with Fireline. Second, it was decadent, heavy, drought stressed, and more so it was going to burn even with retardant. Third, it’s RETARDANT and only retards or slows the fire, NOT extinguish it. Fourth, the fire will eventually eat through it and/or slam through it with a good head of steam. And I even more…..
The only one who continue to NOT get it is YOU!
Marti Reed asked the question about how we fight fire in Canada vs. the US of A.
From my observations, some things pop out right away.
1) We do not have structural/wildland crews. We have wildland crews and Fire Departments with some wildland training (basic)..
2) Our wildland crews are restricted by policy as to what they can and can not do. We do not fight vehicle fires nor house fires. PERIOD. We are not trained or outfitted for these situations.
3) We will set up structure protection on homes, in advance of a fire, but will never put a crew in a subdivision with hoselays to protect homes when the fire front comes in. For structure protection, I mean sprinklers on roofs..thats all.
4) There is no expectation from the public that we will go into those situations. If they expect that, we set them straight. I feel thaat because it is such a common occurrence on US news networks, that the public has expectations of teh crews to risk their safety to save homes. That has to stop.
5) We preach avoidance, again, again and again. Our employees have teh ability to refuse unsafe work, both in the union contract and under workers compensation regulation.
6) We do not tolerate “hero tactics” on fires, rather they are chastized for being so irresponsible.
7) We do not reprimand for a crew “backing out because they felt unsafe.
8) We do install safety zones, as common practice, but “tactical withdrawls” are encouraged over utilizing teh safety zones.
9) Fire behaviour advisories are a top priority from an incident level, as well as from a dispatch centre, when no IMT’s are engaged. We assess fire behaviour potential on a daily basis and communicate it out to all crews located in that location, if the numbers show potetntial for “challenging” behaviour.
10) We rely more on Airtankers and helicopters to fight the leading edge of a fire rather than crews with hoses.(Of course that depends on teh fire behaviour)
Have to stop, having a tough time with the site today, type a whole line and wait 5 minutes for it to show on the screen. Will try later..
Rebooted the beast, see if it works better.
11) As cold and unfriendly as it sounds, we (employees and government) do not take it very personal that someones home or property burns down. There is responsibility to homeowners, who live in the Urban INterface to do FireSmart (FireWise in the US), as well as have appropriate insurance.
12) In most areas, there is a structural fire department, who are restircted within their “chart area” to respond to fires (be it house or forest). Most are a couple mile radius outside of the municipal boundaries. They will not attend, as they legally have no authority or workers compensation coverage if they leave their chart, UNLESS we request tehm to attend on our behalf, until we can get a wff crew there. There is no County type fire departments. Maybe a small volunteer department for an isolated small community.
13) SAFETY is number 1…. We WILL NOT threaten the lives of our WFF’s in order to save trees or structures etc. Within reason of course, as it is an inherently risky job to do.
It seems to be working better, so I can respond easier, if need be.. 🙂
rocksteady… THANK YOU for taking the time to do that.
VERY informative.
Important question for you, though.
How does the whole MEDIA thing come into play here?
I mean… up there where you are… is the MEDIA any kind of absolute DRIVING force behind a lot of decision making as it is down here in the good ‘ol USA?
Do you see the kind of management decision making based on MEDIA influence happening the way it constantly seems to in this ‘neck of the woods’?
We don’t see nearly as much media influence.
The go getter reporters that sneak into fires are escorted out by police. We will escort them into a fire with Information Officer, If they request, but that depends on the fire behaviour and IF the IC approves it.
Secondly, when we have a large fire, we institute a NOTAM (notice to airman) it restricts aircraft (planes and helis) to stay away (5 nautical mile radius, I believe) and obove 5000′ above ground level…
Violating a NOTAM is punishable by losing your pilots licence.
I do not see the airspace restricted as much in the US (watching California fires and the Eye-In-The-SKY news helis bombing around.)
just like any media round the world, they are always trying to get the “scoop” on the dirt, but we utilize our Information Officers to provide the details, or if they are not available, an IC will do a well written Press Release, not ad hoc interviews..
Thank you. That’s also VERY informative.
Down here… it’s hard to tell WHO is setting policy anymore.
The people with the cameras… or the people trying to do the jobs they are paid and/or elected to do.
We have had media attempt to stir the pot… Like when we did not renew the contract with the MARS bomber.
It was professionally done, outlining the limitations of the aircraft, as well as costs etc and the public (most of tehm ) have dropped the subject.
Most people saw it as the silver bullet of fire fighting, but once we showed the facts about using different aircraft, that were more veratile, more cost effective and could deliver teh same gallons per hour, they decided to hop off the bandwagon.
Another issue I see in the US is your political system.. In Canada, we have the Prime Minister, he runs teh country, but does not meddle in provicial affairs. Each Province has a premier, who usually does not meddle in fires. You folks have Congressman, Governors etc that all seem to have the power to stir the shit…
rocksteady—
Can you expand on the Fire Shelter decision and direction you are under in Canada?
Quite a jump from where the US is?????
The decision was made when, in the US you folks went from a gen 1 to a gen 2 shelter.
Internationally we were going to be on back order for several years. WE knew that the gen 1 sucked and it was no use in packing.
Collectively, all provinces decided (through teh CIFFC – Canadian Interagency Forest Fire Coordination centre) that shelters were only needed to be used on jurisdictions where they were mandatory. None of our provinces went that route, they all agreed shelters were not the answer.
Other factors were the price, they were outrageous, as well, In Canada we had very little historical use of fire shelters ever having to be deployed. We were already practicing avoidance.
A briefing note was done from CIFFC, that fire shelters were no longer required in Canada and that the savings would be put into avoidance training. We spent many many hours/days training everyone for situations that shouted WATCH OUT…. (You guys have that too, but some people take it as “guidance” rather than a rule… No offense intended)
We also put more money into upgrading our weather station technology, so that it was more accurate, we spent money on better software to predict fire behaviour. In BC we hired Meteorologists who worked directly for us, not for their previous employer, Environment Canada. We sent these Mets to fire course, so that they got the jist of why their forecasts are so important.
We developed safe work directives, like I stated WAY down below, where, when the fire reached a specific criteria, teh crew had to have a lookout and 2 escape routes. Every time we had a “tactical withdrawl” it was investigated by a higher level team to ensure that the right decision was made (no punitive discipline) as well as learn from them, exactly what made the people nervous in this particular case.
We sent more personnel to the S-590 Fire Behaviour Specialist training, as well as provided them shadow time with fully certified, experienced FBANS.
Part of the main reason we stopped using, is they found that people had an overconfident of security having it on their belts…. “We can try this tactic, it may not work, but we can jump in our shelters and it will all be good”….
Since we stopped, I have seen a greater intelligence level of our crew personnel with respect to fire behaviour. Every crew has a Field Weather Kit (Anemometer, sling psychromter, as well as a paper copy of the fire behaviour software tables, in their hands).
We still will wear shelters when we come to the US for deployments, but thats because it is your policy.
I guess us laid back Canadains are not as aggressive towards fire fighting as teh US, we would rather run away and try again tomorrow.
NO OFFFENCE here, but it appears that the US mentaility is like the MArines, charging teh machine gun nest on teh beaches of Iwo Jima…. Us Canucks are too passive for that 🙂
Having spent the first part of my carrier Fighting fire with out a shelter probably forged a different out look on them and Fire we of the early 60’s spent more time staying away from close encounters of the burn over type.
When I started in 1961 we were in kaki shirts the Brown ones and Cotton Levies.
we got the treated orange shirts in 1964 and Fire retardant paints in 1968 fir shelters depending on funding in 1966 or 1967. I believe we got the Nomax Yellow shirts in 1972 or 73 along with the new Paints.
That’s why many of my generation did not put our self in a position of ever having to deploy a shelter.
It makes me wonder if Canada is not on to something here. You talk to many of the 60 and 70 Fire fighters and they will tell you they had no trust in the Potato Bakers.
Back to old school always bring the black with you trust the black. Indirect line means always build SZ as you build line and keep them close.
A SZ a mile away was worthless and no longer a SZ.
the 10 and 18 were orders and rules—-PERIOD
Bob Powers, now you are getting it… We did not abandon shelters without a lot of thought, discussion, and foreward thinking. It has served us well, not saying it is the right decision for all agencies…
For some reason, when I go to the very bottom of the page, to start a new topic , it bogs big time and will not let me type worth a darn.
SO, I will attempt here to reiterate my previous post which magically dissappeared into cyber pergatory.
FIRE BEHAVIOUR ANALYST (FBAN)
Probably one of the most misunderstood positions within and outside the fire organization.
The FBAN , due to being called a technical specialist, reports to the Plans Section Chief, however most discussion and interaction is with the OPS and IC.
The FBAN role is to gather intel from many sources (IC/OPS?Meteorologists/ even teh weather network) to predict what the fire beahviour will be for a given operational period.
The FBAN takes a weather forecast from a Met, ties that into teh software modelling for that fuel type and genrates outputs of what the fire behaviour could be. Rates of spread, fire intensities, fire type (surface vs. crown), anomolies that foreshadow extreme fire behaviour, as well as safety practices that should be instituted based on the prediction (safe zones, direct, indirect, etc)
All of this information is summed up in a Fire Behaviour Forecast, which is published within the IAP for the incident every day. To show its importance, usually we put it on page 2, right after the incident objectives. The IAP has all of tehinfo, as well we will discuss and answer questions at the morning briefing.
An FBAn also gathers intel (feedback) from other sources, crews, div sups, air attack, helicopter pilots, etc.
A typical day in my life as an FBAN, I will start at 18:00 and show you a day. Around 18:00 is when I like to have the weather forecast from teh MET, I take that info and put it into the software, along with other known criteria (fuel moisture content, fuel type, etc) and generate teh FB Forecast. This goes to plans (who does not like to be up all night photocopying) so that it is in the IAP.
Bunk down for the night around sunset (if fire behaviour is benign), usually up around sun up. Quick call to teh MET to see if the prediction is still valid or if a different weather pattern is now predicted. If its the same, its a green light, its a go. If its a slight change I will rerun teh numbers in the software to see if there is a significant change in forecasted behaviour. If not, let it ride. If there is a significant change, I will notify OPS/IC/Divs suups etc…
Once that is all done, I like to get out onthe fireline, to observe reral fire behaviour, rahter than just the predicted from a computer. This can either be a heli (preferred) or truck. By making observations and taking measurements, I hcan validate if my forecast is correct, or if I am under/over estimating behaviour. I will do weather readings (rh/wind/temp etc) as well as fuel moisture readings from various areas of teh fire to see if the weather station and weather forecast are representative of ALL areas of the incident.
Back into the IAP, conversation with teh MET, telling him what I found/saw as compared to teh forecast. Tweeking of teh next weather forecast may or may not be required.
Take the next forecast, run teh numbers , generate the following days FB forecast and send to Plans.
Lots of conversations in camp about fire behaviour (cause no one talks about anything else in a fire camp) with div sups, fire fighters, line locaters etc gathering intel as to what they really saw.
This is my typical day, some FBANs prefer to spend the day in front of the computer looking at satellite loops, infrared moisture, DOppler, etc… I prefer to be on the line. I want to make it clear, most of us do not try to interpret satellite loops and millibar charts, we rely on a MET.
I will look back at teh days weather readings for the most representative weatehr station to see how it compares to teh MET prediction, as well as look for anomolies in wind speed, direction etc that could be of concern for firefighter safety.
I look at my job as being a safety officer, specializing in weather and fire behaviour, looking out for fire fighter safety. No one else in teh ICS structure is specifically designated to cover this, so I take it very seriously.
Yes, I can predict within reason how far and how fast the fire will progress in a certain direction, however to me that is second, behind fire fighter safety. If teh run will take X miles at X rate of speed, who cares? as long as no one is in front of it. Houses can be rebuilt, trees replanted, fire fighters can not be reborn. If I see where a fire will make a run towards structures or other values, I do identify this to OPS and IC, but my main concern is FF safety.
There ya go, questions?? Fire at will!!!
And another thing I want to say.
Thank you WTKTT for posting about the legal disputing going on between Arizona Department of Forestry and ADOSH at this time right before/during the Mediation with the families regarding the Wrongful Death Lawsuits.
I really appreciate it.
I have been seriously searching for ANY coverage of this whole dance by ANY of the regional mainstream media. And have found NOTHING.
For The Record.
Marti,
I posted something on your Santiago Fire thread below if you’re interested.
WARNING: DO NOT GIVE ELIZABETH/LOGICAL PHALLACY YOUR EMAIL BECAUSE SHE WILL USE IT AGAINST YOU. YOU WILL BE SORRY YOU DID BECAUSE SHE WILL DEFINITELY STALK YOU.
Thanks! And, yes I saw that. I’m just having to not do a lot of commenting right now, cuz……….stuff to do………
But I’m READING!
Reply to Marti Reed post on March 3, 2015 at 1:09 am
>> Marti said…
>>
>> I have been seriously searching for ANY coverage of this whole
>> dance by ANY of the regional mainstream media. And have
>> found NOTHING.
The American MEDIA is NOT going to just report that the key witness for a tragedy involving the deaths of 19 firefighters is suddenly admitting he knows more than he EVER told investigators… unless they can ALSO report exactly what the NEW information is.
And that is ( currently ) problematic.
It’s very difficult to say whether any transcript from this under-oath testimony that Brendan McDonough just (supposedly) gave will ever see the light of day.
It MAY become clear in some further updates to online “Arizona Forestry vs. ADOSH” ALJ hearing file whether this McDonough deposition actually DID take place ( or not ), but the actual CONTENT of the deposition could easily remain ‘hidden from view’.
Maybe forever.
Arizona Forestry still might fight ANY attempts on ANYONE’s part to obtain a transcript of the interview. They could easily try to say that the CONTENT of that deposition might be as “distrubing to the families of the fallen” as they have already claimed in legal actions over the YCSO FARO-3D photos taken at the deployment site.
If the families SETTLE the ‘wrongful death’ suits… I am SURE that Arizona Forestry will put ‘stipulations’ in there that some of the information presented during the settlement must NEVER be discussed in public by ANY of the plaintiffs or their families.
So if there are never any more depositions from Brendan other than the one that (supposedly) just took place for ONLY the ‘Arizona Forestry vs. ADOSH’ proceeding… there is still no guarantee that any ‘Arizona Open Records’ request and/or FOIA/FOIL request will ever be able to obtain a transcript of it.
We shall see.
It still (truly) remains a Shakespearean-level tragedy ‘in-progress’.
“Truth is truth, To the end of reckoning.”
William Shakespeare — Measure for Measure — Act V, Scene I
Thx WTK! Quick note while grabbing pizza slice.
I’m doing kind of a “here’s looking at YOU AZCentral/AZRepublic!”
They have done some pretty good “under the hood” reporting regarding the investigations (or lack thereof).
I think what you say about them waiting until they have some kind of actual NEWs until they report this piece of ‘”under the hood” stuff is probably the explanation.
Which makes me think they DO have someone “watching” these legal dances going on. And will probably be the FIRST entity to FOIA the proceedings. That’s pretty much been the case all along.
Reply to Marti Reed post on March 3, 2015 at 1:33 pm
>> Marti said…
>>
>> Which makes me think they DO have someone “watching” these
>> legal dances going on.
Of course they do. They ( themselves ) would be ‘negligent’ in their own duties and responsibilities if they were NOT doing that.
>> Marti also said…
>>
>> And will probably be the FIRST entity to FOIA the proceedings.
If you are talking about the Prescott Daily Courier… I’m not so sure about that. A lot of local politics going on there. It’s a SMALL TOWN with a SMALL TOWN mentality and all the usual ‘good old boy’ networking going on.
I’d be more inclined to think the Phoenix MSM might be the first to really go after the material. They have the same vested interests but not the same small-town good-old-boy networking going on.
We shall see.
This entire ‘Shakespearean’ level drama has become just as much about whether the MEDIA is ‘doing the right thing’ as it has always been about whether the agencies that send men out fight fires is ‘doing the right thing’ following such a tragic ( and perhaps easily avoidable in the future ) incident.
**
** SETTING THE RECORD STRAIGHT
**
** ACTUAL TRANSCRIPTS OF WHAT U.S. FORESTRY ON-SALARY
** METEOROLOGIST DR. BRIAN POTTER SAID ( AND DID NOT SAY )
** ABOUT THE YARNELL HILL FIRE IN HIS FEB/2015 WEBINAR.
A lot of ‘real estate’ got burned up the other day on this topic so I thought I would just show everyone what this U.S. Forestry on-salary Meteorologist guy ( Dr. Brian Potter ) ACTUALLY said about the Yarnell Hill Fire in that recent WEBINAR of his at the Wildland Firefighter’s Lessons Learned website.
Actually… it’s more what he did NOT say ( or would admit to ) that matters here.
>> On March 1, 2015 at 1:12 pm, Elizabeth ( counselor ) said…
>>
>> Fred/RTS suggested below that the way to figure out if a dangerous downburst
>> is likely to arrive is to wait and see if you get virga.
>> On March 1, 2015 at 2:30 pm, WTKTT responded…
>>
>> He (RTS) said no such thing.
>>
>> YOU are the one putting the word ‘virga’. into his mouth… which is just a continual
>> demonstration that you don’t have the faintest idea what you are talking about on
>> this topic nor do you have the skills/ability to really understand it.
>>
>> VIRGA is rain that EVAPORATES before reaching the ground.
>>
>> If you are standing on the ground ‘feeling raindrops’… then it is NOT VIRGA.
The firefighters in Harper Canyon FELT raindrops. ACTUAL raindrops.
That was their WARNING and Captain Darby Starr himself said that was what convinced HIM they all needed to do a full retreat from Harper Canyon.
That means it was NOT VIRGA and ( consequently ) does NOT meet even Dr. Brian Potter’s own definition of conditions necessary for ‘downburst potential’, as stated in his own WEBINAR.
>> On March 1, 2015 at 4:41 pm, Elizabeth (counselor) responded…
>>
>> Thanks for your correction. Fred Schoeffler aka Robert the Second
>> did not say virga. Dr. Brian Potter did.
And so he ( Potter ) did… at exactly +27:25 in this same ‘webinar’ that you have led on us on your wild goose chase through already.
It seems pretty obvious that wasn’t just a ‘Brain Fart’ and you were TRYING to put that word VIRGA into ( someone’s? / anyone’s? ) mouth… perhaps because it would have supported YOUR ‘agenda’ and other ‘statements’ in Potter’s ‘webinar’… but that is neither here nor there, really.
Let’s just look at what this Potter guy ACTUALLY said ( or didn’t say ) regarding Yarnell…
* Wildland Fire Lessons Learned Center – WEBINARS – February / 2015
Column / Plume Dynamics
Synthesis of Knowledge of Extreme Fire Behavior
Brian Potter
Research Meteorologist
Pacific Wildland Fire Sciences Lab
USDA Forest Service
This ‘webinar’ was 1 hour and 15 minutes and 16 seconds long and the recording is HERE…
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=552Spr6Rhbo&feature=youtu.be
To set the record straight… U.S. Forestry on-salary Meteorologist Dr. Brian Potter DID mention ‘Yarnell’ during this webinar… but only ONE time… and in passing… and with some pretty serious CAVEATS implied.
Here is the SLIDE that was on the screen when he mentioned ‘Yarnell’ just that ONE time… and the actual transcript of everything he said while that SLIDE was showing…
————————————————————————————-
+34:50
Slide being shown: Summary – Plumes and EFB ( Extreme Fire Behavior )
Text showing on this slide…
– Plume vs. Wind: theoretical and unproven in the field
– Adverse Wind Profiles: not well supported, but heavily used.
– Instability: connection is there, but just how it manifests is unclear.
– Downbursts: definite killers
– Plume Collapse: dangerous terminology
Potter: So… in summary then… plumes and extreme fire behavior (EFB)
Plume domination versus wind driven.
It’s a… scientifically it’s a theoretical concept and a… and a theoretical set of equations but they are unproven and difficult to prove in the field.
Adverse wind profiles are not well supported by the evidence and the cases where they have been looked at after their original publication, and yet the term and the idea are heavily referenced.
Instability? There is a connection there between instability and fire behavior. It… it… is known to tie to… to turbulence at the very least but just how the instability manifests to affect the fire is a bit unclear. I would somewhat argue VERY unclear.
Downbursts? Downbursts are definitely killers. Uhm… Dude Fire. Yarnell Hill is attributed to downburst activity. Uh… I don’t remember the name but there was a fire in Florida where a downburst from a thunderstorm quite a distance away, the outflow pushed the fire flank and fanned it up, and killed some firefighters.
Plume collapse? I consider plume collapse to be dangerous terminology because it evokes such a strong image and yet it is not quite what would be worrisome about fire behavior.
So what I just described is basically, sounds like I’m throwing all of this out the window in terms of what it can do for you in fire behavior, but I’m not.
————————————————————————————-
So first we hear Potter say this…
* Downbursts are definitely killers.
Then he presumes to cite THREE examples…
* EXAMPLE 1
* “Uhm… Dude Fire.”
See below. He calls this the ONE and ONLY documented case as per a 1998 study.
* EXAMPLE 2
* “Yarnell Hill is attributed to downburst activity.”
That’s all he says… and he ONLY uses the word ‘attributed’.
He gives absolutely NO indication where he is even ‘getting that’ from ( which official study? ) or if he even really ‘ascribes’ to the theory himself.
“Attributed” in this context just means “Maybe it happened. Maybe it didn’t. Some people seem to think it *might* have… but I’m not saying I am one of them”.
Actually… see below where he admits this is in NO WAY DOCUMENTED yet, by anyone.
* EXAMPLE 3
* “Uh… I don’t remember the name but there was a fire in Florida where a downburst
* from a thunderstorm quite a distance away, the outflow pushed the fire flank and
* fanned it up, and killed some firefighters.”
Pay close attention to this THIRD possible example HE is citing for what HE calls things that meet his OWN (personal) definition “downburst related fatalities”.
Not only can this distinguished on-salary U.S. Forestry Meteorologist not even remember the NAME of the frickin’ fire he is using as one of how OWN ‘examples’… his own description of what happened in no way resembles his OWN definition of a ‘downburst’ and you could actually just substitute the word “Yarnell” for “Florida” in that paragraph and have the same description of what happened on June 30, 2013 as appeared already in the original Yarnell SAIR report.
Potter’s third example of a ‘downburst fatality’ is actually just a description of EXACTLY what is ALREADY KNOWN to have happened in Yarnell.
No ‘news’ there at all.
There was a STRONG OUTFLOW from a thunderstorm “quite a distance away” from Yarnell itself ( caused by one or more REMOTE, not LOCAL downdraft/downburst event(s) ).
This STRONG OUTFLOW BOUNDARY was totally predicted and totally known to be coming towards Yarnell. Winds up to 50 mph PREDICTED. FBAN Byron Kimball made the announcement over TAC channel 1 as early as 1530 ( 3:30 PM ) in Yarnell.
It arrived ( exactly as predicted ) and ( just as Potter describes ) (quote) “the OUTFLOW PUSHED the FIRE FLANK, and FANNED IT UP, and KILLED SOME FIREFIGHTERS”.
As it turns out… even though the above is the only time this Potter guy mentions Yarnell by name… he came CLOSE to mentioning it about SEVEN minutes earlier in his presentation.
He had a SLIDE to show about the ‘Dude’ fire… and that is where we hear this US Forestry Meteorologist admit that the Dude fire is still considered the ONLY DOCUMENTED case where his own definition of ‘downbursts’ could have resulted in fatalities on a fire.
He does try to ‘suggest’, however, that some OTHER cases MIGHT someday ( PERHAPS ) be DOCUMENTED as such and be included in the category… but that day has NOT arrived yet.
————————————————————————————–
+27:52
Next slide shown: Dude Fire
Potter: The ONE case that was DOCUMENTED with a downburst leading to fatalities… well… I shouldn’t say that actually because we now have more than one case where we believe that downbursts were involved in fatalities… unfortunately we have a fair number. This was the first one, though. It was the Dude Fire in June, 1990, near Payson, Arizona, and it was documented by Goens and Andrews in a 1998 paper.
—————————————————————————————-
So right after Potter says the “Dude” fire is STILL the FIRST and ONLY DOCUMENTED case… he then says…
“We now have more than ONE case where we BELIEVE that downbursts were involved in fatalities”.
Keyword: BELIEVE ( as in… we are NOT SURE ).
So even here, at +27:52 into his presentation, Dr. Potter is speaking for both himself and (seemingly) his entire ‘fire-behavior analysis’ profession and is NOT ready to admit that HIS definition of a ‘downburst’ is either DOCUMENTED yet with regards to Yarnell… OR was actually even involved in the Yarnell Hill Fire at all.
He ( and others ) seem to SUSPECT that might have happened… but obviously there isn’t enough proof one way or the other to say for sure and certain that was the case… OR enough proof to start speaking the name ‘Yarnell’ in the same breath as the ‘Dude’ fire.
So SEVEN minutes later… when he DID finally mention “Yarnell” ( by name ) and ONLY used the word “attributed”… he was just reflecting this earlier opinion he expressed at +27:52.
So this is all any lawyer would get out this Dr. Potter guy if he were to be called as some kind of ‘expert witness’. regarding the Yarnell Hill Fire.
Someone who THINKS that MAYBE Yarnell MIGHT, PERHAPS, SOMEDAY be actually added to the list of fires that had ‘downburst/downdraft event’ related fatalities… and actually officially DOCUMENTED that way in meteorological circles as an equivalent of the “Dude” fire…
…but that day has NOT arrived… not even in HIS ‘fire behavior study’ circles…
and maybe never will.
NOTE: This Potter guy’s ‘presentation’ part of the WEBINAR was only 39 minutes long and the rest of the WEBINAR was a 36 minute Q/A session.
Not ONCE during that 36 minute Q/A session did anyone mention Yarnell or ask this Potter guy any questions about it.
Thanks for the wrap!!!
I had actually signed up for this webinar, but, as they say, “Life is what happens to you while you’re busy making other plans,” and I didn’t have time to even watch it until this morning, before I read what you had to say, so I could hear it first hand. And I WILL re-watch it. Because I want to learn, not push my own agenda.
Apparently, it took eight years to “finish” analyzing the Dude Fire. Yarnell Hill MIGHT happen QUICKER. I can’t wait to see what they actually come up with.
“Not ONCE during that 36 minute Q/A session did anyone mention Yarnell or ask this Potter guy any questions about it.”
Including the real Fred. Apparently he’s smart enough to realize it’s too soon for anything DEFINITIVE to be said about it.
I hope this also, however, puts to rest some of the DUALISTIC THINKING that goes on here about fire-weather behavior.
I decided to quit writing about that, because I’ve done it ad nauseum and, apparently, the chief dualistic thinker here hasn’t chosen to learn anything from that. From either myself or Brian Potter.
Great webinar, though.
My two biggest takeaways:
There’s no firewall between plume-dominated and wind-dominated. They’re two parts of a dynamic system. That’s what I was seeing, and trying to articulate, and it helped to hear him talk about that.
And…….. Columns don’t “collapse” even though humans keep using that terminology. What we see in Yarnell is not a “column collapse.” I did not know that.
However, he DID say, “Downbursts require a strong, tilted column.” We DO see that, in spades, at the time before, during, and after the deployment. Plus that rotation.
Thus, at this point, I would be willing to bet serious money, that, when the bridge finally gets crossed, Yarnell will end up in that collection that started with the analysis of the Dude Fire..
But I’m still a STUDENT, not a MASTER, of fire-weather behavior. So I’m ALWAYS willing to be proven wrong.
Again, thanks for this write-up.
Yes… it’s perfectly obvious this particular US Forestry Meteorologist wishes the phrases ‘plume dominated fire’ and ‘plume collapse’ had NEVER been introduced into the terminology at all. In his opinion… NOT really as big a factor as ANYONE ever likes to think NOR ever that big an ‘influence’ on what the fire is DOING RIGHT NOW or can be EXPECTED TO DO… which is the most important thing for professional FFs on the GROUND to understand.
There are OTHER things that will kill you just as dead if you don’t recognize the ‘signs’ before it happens.
Speaking of ‘things that will kill you just as dead if you don’t recognize the potential staring you in the face’…
…he DOES talk a bit about SPOTTING… and all the LEVELS of it that can exist.
His points about MID-LEVEL spotting and how important it is to recognize when THAT phenomena is taking place ( and get the HELL out of the way ) were short but informative.
MID-LEVEL spotting conditions is the stuff that can throw the fire right in your direction even if you THINK you are a ‘safe distance’ from the fire or you have TIME to ‘cut in front of it’, or something.
There is every indication this MID-LEVEL spotting was ALREADY fully active in Yarnell BEFORE Granite Mountain ever took one step off that high-ridge two-track.
Even Gary Cordes testified that before/during the ‘trigger points’ being met… the fire WAS ‘spotting’ up to a HALF-MILE ahead of itself.
There could still be every chance a full ( real ) investigation of this fire will prove it was this very MID-LEVEL intense spotting that ultimately killed those men in that box canyon.
But to say it was ‘unexpected’ would still be absurd.
ANY column like that is GOING to be doing that… and to not KNOW that and stay WELL out of the way is to not know your own business.
You said “ANY column like that is GOING to be doing that… and to not KNOW that and stay WELL out of the way is to not know your own business.”
How far is “WELL out of the way”? Seriously. How far? 1000 feet? 4000 feet? Four miles?
Go research MID-LEVEL ( and even UPPER-LEVEL ) spotting… and then get back to me if you still feel you have any questions.
You emphasize above the fact that Potter is a USFS employee. My impression is that the USDA has made clear to the USFS employees to keep their traps largely shut about Yarnell. Plus, folks with terminal degrees who do credible research tend not to talk out their assholes. Therefore, if Potter said something about a downburst and Yarnell, I tend to think that (a) he had a basis for saying it and (b) he felt strongly enough that it merited saying that he was willing to risk the ire of the USFS.
Marti, you mentioned that you finally watched Potter’s webinar – good for you. You would be well served to also watch Brett Butler’s webinar. Pay particular attention to Larry Sutton’s questions at the end of the webinar. He hits on the point I keep trying to make here. To that end, Volumes I or II of the Extreme Fire Behavior compendium that Potter referenced are both good reads. 🙂 Hope this helps.
And then their are people who tend to always talk out their ASSHOLES.
As in the above Councilor———-.
Geez Bob, you just had to go there 🙂
I just have to, all things considered, say:
😉
That’s supposed to be a wink.
It works on my iPad.
You said:
“…Brett Butler’s webinar. Pay particular attention to Larry Sutton’s questions at the end of the webinar. He hits on the point I keep trying to make here.”
Exactly which point does Larry Sutton hit on that you keep trying to make here?
He asks questions or makes his comments at roughly 1:04-ish into the webinar. Should be self-explanatory.
Marti – just went back and re-listened. Larry’s comment about the inability (at present) to reliably and narrowly predict “worst case fire behavior” and his later comment/question at 1:11 into the webinar: Presumably Larry is making a point to Dr. Butler about where more and better research is needed, no?
I’m just going to leave this conversation exactly where it’s at.
For all to see.
I take it you didn’t get the relevance of Larry Sutton’s comments/questions and how they support my points about the nascent state of fire science (particularly regarding extreme fire behavior)?
I should have said “relatively nascent.” Cue Fred to jump all over me on that…. 🙂
She thinks it’s a game.
WTF????
Wrote up a huge detailed post about the FBAN position, how we do what we do, what resources we use..
Hit teh post comment button and it said “Awaiting moderators approval”
Hope it gets posted cause I can remember all of the things I wrote..
If it wasn’t because it had more than 1 ‘hyperlink’ in the message ( email addresses also count as links )… then the most likely reason would be just 1 mis-placed or mis-typed character in either the NAME or EMAIL address being used to post the message.
I’ve done this myself more than a few times.
The message usually appears within a reasonable amount of time.
I sure hope so…. Thanks for the intel 🙂
I’ve been having trouble posting today, too. Even with being careful.
Pro-tip: even tho it’s a huge hassle, copy your post before posting it. Then you can at least try again without having to re-write it.
Update to rocksteady and Marti ( since you have both discovered the same problem ).
Bottom line is that the Wildland Fire Lessons Learned webpages are screwed up. If you RIGHT CLICK those PDF files they keep listing on their pages and do a ‘Copy Link Location’… the URL that gets copied to your clipboard is improperly ‘escaped’ and WordPress will CHOKE on it and toss your message.
Their server also isn’t setting the MIME type right for those PDF files.
Best bet at this ‘Lessons Learned’ site is to ONLY post the URL to the pages that have the links to the PDF files… and then let someone just go to that page in their Browser and click the link themselves.
Browsers are better able to handle these kind of ‘messed up’ URLs than WordPress is.
My post had no links..
So we have been talking quite a bit about the role of the FBAN (Fire Behaviour Analyst).
It is not a well known or understood position. The FBAN falls under the Plans Section Chief portfolio, as FBANs are designated as “Technical Specialists”. However, on day to day duties, they spend a lot of time interacting with OPS and IC in an advisement capacity.
The role, as basic as I can say it, is that the FBAN gathers intel from MEteorologists, other waether sources (yes, even the Weather Channel), from fireline staff making behaviour observations on the line, and takes all of this intel and creates a fire behaviour advisory for the incident.
It is a prediction of what the fire behaviour, rate of spread and intensities COULD look like for the following operational period. We do not interpret weather data, like satellite loops etc, that should all be covered by the Meteorologist.
Here is a day in the life of me, as an FBAN. Starting around 18:00, because plans wants all of their advisories in at a decent hour so that they can produce the IAP (Incident Action Plan) for the morning briefing. I will gather a spot weather forecast from the local meteorologist, usually it describes predicted wind, temperature, relative humidty, probability of precipitation (and possible amounts), as well as any other potential weatehr events (lightning, wind, thunder cells, ).
I then take this information from the MET and run it through a software program that takes the weather info and ties it to identified fuel types, with outputs of rate of spread, intensity and fire type(ground versus crown fire). This information is all compiled into the Fire Behaviour Advisory, which is in the IAP, as well as discussed at the morning briefing.
I then bunk down for the night. Up at whatever time I need to be in order to have a buffer before the morning briefing and start of operational period. I get on the computer, look at overnight data from weather stations, looking for trends or anomolies which could be important during the day. Usually that is followed up by a phone call to the MET to confirm the prediction for weather the night before, is still valid for this morning and day. If there is changes, I rerun the software, to see what difference it may make in fire behaviour. If it is not significant in change, I usually just let it ride.
I then usually have discussions with OPS and IC as to what the day will bring, as well as talk to them about the tactics they plan to use (direct/indirect, etc) and the chances of success for that tactic. This is where tehre would be very frank discussions about what could happen if a thundercell moved in like Yarnell. I would have the modelling based on the intense winds, projecting how fast the fire will travel, as well as direction and fire behaviour. This is where OPS and IC are informed of any significant predictions that could cause the fire to go ballistic. At this point the IC and OPS should be discussing the trigger points for evac, valuesa t risk, where to position resources, what other reources may be required (Ie. airtankers or seats)
Then after confirming that the upper ICS command has a good understanding of the day, I usually head to the fireline. Sometimes by air, other times by ground vehicle.
When I am out there I observe the fire behaviour (flame length, flame height, rates of spread, fuel types etc) Using my various field tools, I take weather , wind, relative humidities, fuel moisture content readings etc to confirm that the weather station data and weather forecast from the MET are accurate or possibly off by a few digits.
I like to stay in the field during the peak of the burning period, so if it goes squirrelly, I can make first hand observations as to what the fire is doing. I will have numerous conversaations with the MET during the day, excahnging intel. Near 18:00 I head back to the IAP, where hopefully my MET forecast for the next day is waiting for me, run the software, issue the FBAdvisory and repeat for the next 14 days if need be.
THIS IS HOW I ROLL!!!! Not all FBANs follow this type of schedule. Fire BEhaviour is an art and a science, some personeel like to be more in tune with the science (weather readings, sattelite loops, wind tepigrams from airport weather stations), other sprefer to be in the field observing real time fire… That is me.
Some times an FBAN has to be silent and let things play out, other times be very vocal when something bad is looming. I take my role as an FBAN similar to a safety officer, I predict what can hurt the crews, give them advice as to how to stay safe, as I am the only one on the incident with the sole duty of fire behaviour. I act as their safety officer, specializing in fire behaviour and fuels analysis.
I hope this gives you some insight as to the role and responsibility of a FBAN on a typical fire complex.
One thing that I never got to yesterday that I wanted to input here.
Hot shot Crews and Overtime.
First there are now over 100 Hot shot crews compared to 50 in my time.
While true there are as many less contract crews as back in the 80’s so a trade off of funded trained Type 1 crews and less type 2 crews today.
Talking with My Sawtooth Hot Shots this year a new hours worked was added to there Overtime.
They are required to take forced comp time off in a Pay period if their overtime is over 20 hours
and there is work time left in the Pay period. So the crews are not making tie Over time they use to.
A lot of this is due to the new funding of fires with regular designated funding. this also adds to their non paid forced days off in a 14 day work period. and cutting shifts to 12 hours.
So to say the crews take assignments to get more over time is no longer the case. The Federal government has found ways to limit over time.
With less type 2 crews the feds are also turning to the Military for Fire Fighters in the past 20 years.
To confuse you further there are other pay things a fire fighter gets on top of time and a half over 8 hrs. hazard pay 25% till the fire is controlled, Sunday Differential for scheduled Sundays worked 25%, double time on holidays. Just a note most fire people are scheduled to work on Sundays and so many get the differential unless you are on forced days off or comp time it is a work related pay.
So sorry if you think a Fire Fighter makes a lot of money any more– its good but it ant like it use to be—————
Which brings up the question how was the GM grew being paid?
we know they were a contracted crew.
Were they being paid by the city the same as a federal employee / crew?
I do not believe we ever did a complete breakdown on that.
AD employees and crews are paid a flat rate no matter how many hours they work.
called pick up fire fighters under different pay scales.
Reply to Bob Powers post on March 2, 2015 at 12:56 pm
>> Bob Powers asked…
>>
>> Were they being paid by the city the same as a federal employee / crew?
Not really. Slightly LESS.
The MSM ( Mainstream Media ) was ( obviously ) sort of ‘all over this’ end of things following the incident and there are a number of articles about it.
The numbers I’m quoting are from the following Prescott Daily Courier article…
The Prescott Daily Courier
Article Title: Hotshots earned, cost city millions: Payouts from fighting fires in other states helped offset operating costs.
8/31/2013 – By Cindy Barks
http://dcourier.com/main.asp?SectionID=1&SubSectionID=1&ArticleID=122741
The AVERAGE hourly pay rate ( to the men themselves ) was about $12 per hour regular time, and $20 per hour for overtime. Management and Crew bosses made slightly more ( $14 to $17 per hour ) and the bottom level crewmen slightly less ( $10 per hour ).
The City of Prescott was able to charge other agencies $39.95 per hour for each crewmember when they were ‘jobbed out’ to fires.
The PROBLEM with Granite Mountain, though, is that being owned/operated by a municipality they had their ‘feet in the fire’ ( so to speak ) with the bean-counters and penny-pinchers moreso than other Federal/State/Districty operated Type 1 IHC organizations.
On paper… Granite Mountain was costing the City a lot of money.
On paper… Their income’ was never actually covering their expenses
The closest they came to even just ‘breaking even’ was 2011 but they were still $6,975 dollars ‘short’ that year.
Shortages from other years ranged between $98,664 (2007) to $206,460 (2009), and in 2012 the ‘loss’ to the City of Prescott clocked in at $62,253.
On a certain level this is all just ‘funny money’ since we are talking about ‘agency reimbursements’ and whatnot and there are also ‘grants’ involved in a given year, so some people ( like Darrell Willis himself ) have always been contesting the assumption that GM was ‘losing money’ every year.
According to Willis… GM was ‘on track’ for a GOOD year in 2013.
The actual reimbursements for the past fiscal year, according to Wildland Division Chief Darrell Willis: $1,590,415. Based on the $1,349,859 in expected expenses, the actual revenue numbers would put the Hotshots about $240,000 in the black for 2013… if things had continued going along the way they were.
Regardless… there was the PERCEPTION on the part of the City of Prescott bean-counters and penny-pinchers that GM was ‘costing’ the City a loto of money…. and there was no doubt there was a lot of PRESSURE coming from the City of Prescott for Granite Mountain to ‘make money’.. or at LEAST try to ‘break even’ at alll times and not be COSTING the City a lot of money each year.
As far as Sunday, June 30, 2013 goes… even Darrell Willis has stated to the MSM that his own (supposed) last conversation with Eric Marsh at 6:00 AM on Sunday morning contained some information from Marsh that the (quote) “men were excited to be working their day off so they could make some good overtime money”.
I still don’t think for one moment that was any REAL kind of motivational factor that day. Most of the men didn’t MIND making that $20 per hour rate for once… but they also could have ‘taken it or left it’ and wouldn’t have been upset if Marsh hadn’t taken the work assignment that day.
They were TIRED… and in need of REST… and it was a SUNDAY.
I also still don’t think anything can be read into the fact that Brendan McDonough himself should probably have NOT been put on the roster that day and because he was… this might mean Marsh was ‘desperate’ to get the contract.
Brendan was still not fully well… and I think the evidence shows that the heat was getting to him in Yarnell that day which probably has more to do with why he was picked as ‘lookout’ than anything else. He just wasn’t feeling well that day.
But I believe it’s also always been established that GM had ‘alternates’ they could turn to if they had to. So even if Brendan was declared “still not fit for duty” that Sunday… I think Marsh could have just tapped any one of these ‘alternates’ to take his place and still would have accepted the contract for Yarnell.
Call me cynical. But.
In my humble opinion, the Granite Mountain Hotshots were getting screwed by the City of Prescott big time.
Do you think I am mistaken by assuming those various financial equations you have described conveniently erase all the fuels mitigation they were doing off-season? And maybe, just possibly maybe, that’s why those calculations just conveniently don’t include that “asset” the GM Hotshots were providing as part of the reason the crew was, according to the City, consistently operating in “the red”?
I believe that to be the case, and, as I DO read the comments (as painful as that can be) in every related Daily Courier article, I see that “erasure” all the time.
It would be interesting (and a lot more fair and educational) to see a cost/benefit analysis of all of those “reds vs blacks” that actually includes an honest valuation of the work they were doing for the City of Prescott (which was, at least partially being funded by some of those grants), something I have YET to see anybody, including the Daily Courier publish.
Marti,
Not cynical but right on. The program provided a benefit to the community during their “non fire” time. That is where the cost to the district would come in. Seems like a reasonable cost to take a proactive approach to reducing the fire threat to your community and having a trained type 1 crew a available.
Copy that… but see the sort of “reader’s digest” version just below of what was going down in Prescott.
The question actually DID come onto the table ( after some supposed 5 and 6 figure shortfalls showed up ) of what BENEFIT this whole “Type 1 IHC” thing really was for the City of Prescott itself.
What City Officials had NOT realized about HOSTING a Type 1 Hotshot operation is that they are now, in fact, a NATIONAL Resource and not just your own little local ‘Hotshots’ anymore.
There WERE many times during the fire seasion when Granite Mountain wasn’t even THERE ( not even in Arizona ).
Some bean-counters in Prescott started looking ‘sideways’ at that ( especially as the operating expenses rose above the multi-million dollar mark ) and really started making noises about “What good is this doing for US? ( The City of Prescott )”.
The whole off-season-clear-stuff-away-from-houses stuff where it all began just started getting lost in the noise and multi-million dollar operating expenses.
Some of the Funding for crews on a yearly basis causes a lot of additional dollars not planed on.
Training
Equipment new and replacement costs.
Trucks/trailers/utv’s,
The fire money would not have been sufficient for these reoccurring charges and original costs.
They also had year around employees that had to be financed out side Fire suppression.
It dose not surprise me they were overspending.
I don’t know what a Hot Shot budgeted yearly cost is today
but it was really high back when I worked and they have increased the pay grades science then as well as Full and PT appointments.
The ‘financial aspects’ of this entire ‘Municipally based’ Type 1 Hotshot operation ( that started OUT as just a simple ‘Fuels Abatement’ project ) are pretty complicated and there is ( still ) a lot of conflicting information flying around about it.
But I believe the ‘laymans’ version of the story goes something like…
1) The only way it all got started ( the simple fuels abatement project ) in the first place was because some Federal grant money showed up. The City of Prescott itself was never really ‘onboard’ with the idea of totally funding such a project all by itself.
2) Things were OK for a while… but then the grant money dried up.
3) Rather than disband… Duane Steinbring and Eric Marsh conceived the plan to try and make the whole operation ‘pay for itself’ by becoming a Type 2 crew that could ‘job out’ and make its own money.
4) They sold that idea to the City of Prescott… but the implied PROMISE was that it would, in fact, be at least a ‘break even’ operation.
5) They weren’t making enough money at the Type 2 level so it was decided to try and ‘ramp up’ and reach the ‘Type 1’ level. That wasn’t all about the money… it was also the DREAM of some people already involved ( Marsh, Steinbrink, etc. ).
6) They achieved the Type 1 Status.
7) Not long after that… as they were now away from Prescott all the time ‘making money’ on National level fires… the City of Prescott started seeing the greater expenditures and budget ( +millions dollars ) and it really fell onto the ‘bean counters’ radar. Also… someone on the City level started scratching their head and asking the question “If these guys are GONE for most of the fire season… then what is the good of us maintaining this outfit? What GOOD is that doing for Prescott?
8) This all turned into some pretty close ‘scrutiny’ of the whole operation and when some years produced 5 and 6 figure shortfalls between actual ‘expenditures’ versus actual ‘income’… the City bean-counters naturally started asking more “What good is this doing us?” questions.
What I think I’m trying to say is that somewhere along the way ( as the budgets/salaries/equipment/etc. ) crossed the multi-million dollar mark for what was started out as just basically a glorified landscaping operation… the whole “Fuel Abatement” benefits just got lost in the noise and just wasn’t even being factored into the equation anymore.
All the bean-counters saw was a multi-million dollar budget to support an operation that wasn’t even near Prescott for a lot of the year… but Prescott still had to end up ‘footing the bill’ for any shortfalls between expenditures and income.
That’s what happens when a CITY ends up sponsoring a NATIONAL level resource.
At some point… someone says… “If these guys aren’t even HERE for most of the fire season… then what GOOD is that doing for US”?
It was a ‘fine political line’ that Darrell Willis and Eric Marsh had to walk.
They had to stay ‘good enough’ and ‘certified enough’ to go out on the National level stuff and make the high dollars… but still try to be around Prescott enough to make the City think the whole thing was doing something for PRESCOTT, too.
HUGE CAVEAT for the post above.
That really is just sort of a “Reader’s Digest” version of what was going down.
It’s actually MUCH more complicated than that.
Example: Even though the City of Prescott was ( supposedly ) able to ‘bill’ for $39.95 per hour for every hour GM worked… there are still conflicting reports about where THAT money was actually going. Some MSM articles quote Prescott officials as saying that $39.95 per hour bill rate wasn’t even covering the City’s costs for each of the FFs when you added up all the FICA and SS and Worker’s Compensation Insurance, yada, yada, yada.
At the same time… just taking all the billable hours and whacking away at a calculator at $39.95 per hour was telling others that it SHOULD have been a ‘money making operation’.
So yea… it’s complicated.
I think it came down to what ‘set of books’ were being looked at.
GM’s set of books was telling one story… but people on the City side said THEIR ‘set of books’ was telling them something else.
I absolutely understand the politics. Behind managing a program like this. I hada very similar program with two type 2 IA crews ( three for several years), and e dry budget cycle the program would be scrutinized for the “cost” to the district. Basically told that the program had to be break even with. no cost to the district, even though the district benefitted from the resource. I totally understand the struggles the program experienced with the bean counters!
In Darrell Willis’ second interview with ADOSH he got into a lot of the ‘organizational’ and ‘financial’ issues with Granite Mountain, and even explains the PRESSURE he and Eric Marsh felt they were under.
This is where Willis’ confirmed to ADOSH that the entire Granite Mountain operation WAS being run by the City under a ‘cost-effective’ business model and they DID have to basically constantly show that monies earned could offset expenditures.
The ‘summertime’ ( fire season ) revenue DID have to offset the costs for the wintertime ‘Fuel abatement’ projects(s).
From Darrell Willis’ second ADOSH interview
on October 10, 2013
Q2 = Marshal Krotenber, Lead ADOSH investigator.
A = Darrell Willis, Prescott Wildland Division Chief
——————————————————–
1609 A: So to bring this new culture of wildland firefighting in, it would – you gotta kinda – I was – I came from the – from the suppression side to the wildland side. So I could – I was accepted on the other side. And I was trying to help Eric become accepted in the culture on the fire department side. Um, and – and it’s pretty – it’s pretty s- uh, different because our program is a cost recovery program and a grant-driven program.
Cost-recovery meaning that we’ve built this model that when we do firefighting in the summertime, it kinda offsets some of the costs that we have in the wintertime.
And so it’s important to have that there. But the – it’s more the financing of the – the system, understanding that and helping explain that to fire department and city officials.
———————————————————
The following is now the point in the interview where ADOSH lead investigator Marshall Krotenberg was going over the controversey whereby Granite Mountain was claiming a certain number of ‘full time’ personnel to keep their Type 1 status… but the City of Prescott had already reduced some of those full-time positions ( on their set of books ) to ‘seasonal with no benefits’.
Willis basically explains that this WAS a huge point of consternation between he and Marsh… but that it was all part of the ‘politics’ and part of that ‘fine line’ they had to walk between trying to be hosted by a bean-counting Municipality and doing what was necessary to KEEP the Type 1 status so they could make the ‘high dollars’ during the fire season and maintain their ‘cost-effective’ business model throughout the full year.
This is also where Willis admits that they HAD heard rumors that the City of Prescott was lookinig at trashing the whole ‘Type 1 IHC Hotshot’ thing… and they ( and the program ) were being ‘watched’ very closely, right up until the day of the tragedy on June 30, 2013…
There WAS a lot of PRESSURE there on Eric Marsh.
From Darrell Willis’ second ADOSH interview
on October 10, 2013
Q2 = Marshal Krotenber, Lead ADOSH investigator
A = Darrell Willis, Prescott Wildland Division Chief
——————————————————–
1695 Q2: Right. So it sounds like, I mean, if I can just – at least as far as that last part goes, there was a – sort of a – it was a – a bigger planning and budgeting issue that affected that group and how…
A: Right.
Q2: …many positions were full time versus seasonal and…
A: Mm-hm.
Q2: …trying to meet that – that number to – to qualify so that you can obtain the revenue during the summer. Can you continue that plan, that business plan?
A: Well, that…and the financial downturn. And you gotta take this even into the whole City governance at the time and what’s happening today. There were quote “rumors,” and there were – that they were gonna try – that they, City Hall, was gonna try to get rid of the wildland crew, that we didn’t need it, that it wasn’t, um, cost effective. They actually did an audit in April of this year, found that it was okay. But you as an employee, everybody as an employee, when you hear these things happening, you’re just like, “They’re trying to get rid of us. They’re trying to get rid of us. They don’t understand this.” And so that’s kinda what was – what was going on.
——————————————————
Ok this is the THIRD time I’ve posted this comment, after twice watching it disappear into some kind of black hole on this website. My log-in settings have been the same all day.
Apparently, links to the pages on the Lessons Learned site are screwing things up here big time and I don’t know why. So, anyway I’ll post what I’m trying to link to AGAIN and try to figure out how to post the link on another comment. Here goes:
So this is the SECOND TIME I have had to re-post something today, and my log-in settings haven’t changed all day. Grrr. Anyway.
Travis Dotson, the Fire Management Specialist at the , Wildland Fire Lessons Learned Center, wrote an honest and, I think, relevant piece, regarding OVERTIME for the Winter 2015 issue of “Two More Chains.”
Ground Truths
The Ultimate Persuader
…
“A couple of volunteers make their way down to the edge, which takes several hours, and start to assess. What do you think they find? Exactly what you’d expect, it’s a long ragged edge that requires way more work than we have the capacity to provide (remember there’s eight of us). Now, of course we can go down there and pull cord and dull edges, but we’re certainly not going to put the entire flank to bed. It’s been made clear more ground resources are not an option. The Duty Officer just wants us to do something if we can since we’re there, otherwise they’ll pull us out and wait to see if the fire forces them to go big D.
Decisions, Decisions
So what do we do? Should we get down in there or not? More importantly, how do we decide? On the surface it may seem pretty straight forward. The basic risk management model would come out like this: The risk (mangled bro) is not worth the gain (partially secure line = unsecure flank = nothing). Using that logic, it sounds like a quick trip to the bottom of the list.
So I’m sitting on this ridge throwing rocks into the snow patch discussing options with seven other dirtballs. You’ve all been there:
“Dude, this is why we exist—to do this kind of work.”
“Yeah, I’ve done this exact assignment plenty of times.”
“What are we really going to accomplish by going down there?”
“Who gives a rip? We do stupid crap all the time!”
“What’s the plan if someone gets hurt?”
“Same as it ever is. Stop the bleeding and call for help.”
“You heard the D.O. If we don’t go we’re getting demombed [sic].”
“Man, that’s a lot of Oats and H to turn our backs on.”
Overtime
Bam, there it is. The main reason most of us are here: The ultimate persuader.
How do we measure the success of the season? What’s the first thing we ask each other about assignments? What do we compulsively keep track of?
Overtime.
I love it. I want more. It motivates me. I’ll do things that don’t make sense to accumulate it. I’d prefer ripping off entire hillsides and dumping pumpkins for 16s, but I certainly won’t question mopping another 100 feet in just to suck up every scrap hour possible.
…
If we really want folks to make decisions based more on risk than money, sign blank CTRs (order one less air tanker to offset the cost). Otherwise, when you’re hearing the story in the Emergency Room, don’t judge us for choosing to “get down in there.””
And, to be honest, I had to look it up on Wildandfire dot com’s “Wildland Fire Acronyms” to discover that a CTR is a “Crew Time Report, filled out daily and submitted to the Time Unit on large fires.”
I’m hearing here a clear and common plea that We The People pay firefighters (be they city, state, federal, whatever) adequately for the services they provide. Which relates to my comment regarding the GM Hotshots and the City of Prescott.
I think it’s a fair warning.
If the link I’m about to post doesn’t show up, just google “two more chains” “winter 2015” and you’ll find it.
Nope. I can’t link it. That also happened with their page containing all kinds of stuff regarding the Salt Fire down below.
Testing…
http://www.wildfirelessons.net/viewdocument?DocumentKey=ae1ab29c-d453-428f-9be7-1ece11ef8633
Okay… that link above works fine.
Here is all I did to post it into the message above…
1) I Googled “two more chains” “winter 2015″.
2) It showed up as the second result in search results.
3) I clicked it that search result link.
4) The correct Wildland Lessons Learned page appeared.
5) I highlighted the URL showing in Browser address bar.
6) I ‘copied’ the highlighted URL to clipboard.
7) I clicked ‘Reply’ above.
8) I typed the word “Testing…”
9) I pasted the URL into the message.
10) I clicked ‘Post Comment’.
11) It showed up ( and works ) no problem.
Only think I can think of is that WordPress will NOT allow blocks of HTML to be inserted into messages. That’s why you can’t add IMAGES to your posts or do any EMBED statements. The message will be simply ‘tossed’ by WordPress if it finds any funky HTML directives in it.
So maybe somehow the links you are trying to ‘paste’ into the messages have some ‘hidden’ HTML commands associated with them… or something.
Try this trick…
Before you ‘paste’ a URL you may have copied to your clipboard into a mesage… just ‘paste’ it first into some generic TEXT editor and see what appears.
If it’s not a ‘clean’ URL… and has some HTML or Javascript crap associated with it… it’s not going to work in these WordPress posts.
WTKTT Thanks for posting the link.
I did exactly the same thing you did. I don’t know what is not working for me.
But that’s OK. I don’t want to draw attention away from people just going there and reading that. So THANKS!
The whole issue is definitely worth reading. Very provocative. His stuff is great!
And thanks for the tip re pasting to text edit to see what happens.
This has really cost me a lot of time that I didn’t have today.
Update… I think I figured out the problem.
At the Wildland Lessons Learned site… if you RIGHT CLICK and do a ‘Copy Link Location’ on one of those actual PDF file links they have on their pages… you will get a screwed up URL that isn’t going to pass muster with the WordPress message filters that will be applied to your post.
They are doing TWO things wrong at that website…
1) They are improperly ‘escaping’ the characters in the URL itself that you ‘copy’ to your clipboard. WordPress will ‘choke’ on that improper URL formatting.
2) They have not set the MIME TYPE correctly on that Server for the proper delivery of these documents. If WordPress does a ‘quick hit’ check on the URL while filtering your message… the whole kit and kabootle will fail and your message will get ‘tossed’.
Best bet if you are trying to link to anything at this screwed up Wildland Fire Lessons Learned website is to just find the PAGE that has the links to the document… post THAT here into WordPress… and let the user click the actual document links with their own Browser.
Browsers have better ability to handle screwed up URLS than WordPress does.
I did exactly that. It still didn’t work. But whatever………..
**
** GM HAD THE NOAA WEATHER CHANNEL ON THEIR RADIOS
NOTE: This has been ‘brought up’ from down below in a thread that ran out of room.
Reply to Robert the Second (RTS) post on March 1, 2015 at 10:00 am
>> RTS said…
>>
>> On BOTH fires ( Yarnell and South Canyon), the resources on these fires had (or
>> should have had) the ‘NOAA Weather Channel’ in their radios (162.550 and local
>> variations) programmed into their handheld and/or vehicle radios. This is common
>> knowledge and Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) in the wildland fire world.
>> These frequencies are touted as ‘The Voice of NOAA’s National Weather Service.’
http://www.nws.noaa.gov/nwr/resources/NWR_Brochure_NOAA_PA_94062.pdf
>> The fact that the GMHS and those on the South Canyon Fire chose to ignore the
>> readily available means to know the forecast weather falls on them – NOT on
>> the NWS meteorologists. The first Fire Order is “Recognize current weather
>> conditions and obtain forecasts.” the NOAA weather channel is one of the key
>> means that WFF use to do this
Whether they ( Marsh/Steed/Crew ) were paying ANY attention to the NOAA Weather Channel remains a mystery… but there is CONFIRMATION ( from Brendan McDonough ) that they DID normally have that channel punched into all the GM radios.
At the following point in Brendan’s first ADOSH interview, ADOSH investigator Barry Hicks is going over with Brendan what he was actually doing for most of the afternoon down there at his lookout mound position.
Brendan verified that he did, in fact, have the standard (public) NOAA Weather Channel punched into his radio and he WAS hearing about the weather that way. He describes listening to the exact ‘computerized voice’ that is used by the NOAA Weather Channel reporting the ‘local’ weather.
PDF Page 18 of Brendan’s first ADOSH interview on August 20, 2013
Q1 = Barry Hicks, ADOSH investigator
A = Brendan McDonough
——————————————————————————————-
760 Q1: Were you noticing any – did you notice any change in the winds
761 as the day progressed, ah, either direction or strength, um, or?
762
763 A: I’d say we had winds between five and ten. Consistently out of south,
764 southwest and they didn’t shift until moments after the weather came over the
765 radio.
766
767 Q1: You mean when they – they announced the thunderstorms building – how did
768 they – how did they say that over the radio?
769
770 A: It’s almost like a computer voice. What the weather is in the local areas.
———————————————————————————————
Notice that Brendan also told ADOSH the winds began shifting down there in that ‘middle bowl’ just MINUTES after the 1530 broadcast on TAC from FBAN Byron Kimball
Not ‘within the half hour’. The winds that would ‘turn’ the fire were basically ALREADY arriving even as that “within the half hour” announcement was being made on TAC.
“they ( the winds ) didn’t shift until moments after the weather came over the radio.”.
The “weather that came over the radio” that Brendan is referring to there is the actual 1530 ‘announcement’ on the TAC channels from FBAN Byron Kimball.
Apparently… even Kimball’s announcement was well ‘behind the ball’ that day.
Indeed… those wind shifts were ALREADY dramatic and were causing the fire to spin 180 degrees and come SOUTH back at Brendan’s position… and are what almost caused Brendan to lose his own life that day… well BEFORE the predicted ‘half-hour’ timeframe announced in the 1530 TAC channel weather update from Kimball.
When Brendan told Steed that the fire had reversed to the SOUTH and was now coming right at him… and he needed to abandon his position ( circa 1535 / 3:35 PM )… Brendan also says Steed came right back with…
“We can SEE what is happening. Do what you need to do.”
So as early as 1535 / 3:35 PM there is absolute confirmation from Steed that they could SEE the fireline in their area ( and near Brendan ) had REVERSED 180 degrees and was now headed SOUTH… right at Brendan’s lookout mound.
Even if we didn’t have the MacKenzie photos to verify that is exactly what was happening ( and that GM could SEE IT )… that report from Brendan would be CONFIRMATION that as early as 1535 / 3:35 PM Jesse Steed himself could SEE it… and he KNEW the tail fire had now turned into a HEAD fire heading SOUTH ( not EAST ).
WTKTT,
Thanks. Good stuff here. I figured that the GMHS would have the NOAA weather channel in their radios. Thanks for verifying that. Like Marti said – (paraphrasing here) it’s not the meteorologists that failed, it’s the WFF that failed to heed the warnings and then mitigate accordingly.
I have said before that the GMHS with Steed in charge, sitting in their perfectly good black SZ could/should have WARNED Brendan McDonough LONG BEFORE he was to hit his trigger point and warned him to get a move on and/or call Frisby to scoop him once the fire chewed through the indirect retardant line. Any and all air support MUST be backed up with ground forces or else it is USELESS.
I’ve also always thought it was pretty interesting ( and revealing? ) that here we have the following (paraphrased) exchange between lookout McDonough and his Captain Steed…
McDonough: Hey Jesse… fire has REVERSED direction and its now heading SOUTH and coming right AT me… I need to get OUT of here.
Steed: Yea. I know. I can SEE that. Do what you need to do.
And then that’s IT.
No other reported radio como such as either McDonough OR Steed IMMEDIATELY attempting to contact anyone in Blue Ridge to even BEGIN arranging for a ‘rescue’ for Brendan.
Zero. Zip. Nada.
Brendan just casually starts walking down from the lookout mound and ( by his own admission ) checking out possible places to deploy.
Steed just ( apparently ) went about his business. No other concerns or attempts to help Brendan.
It was only AFTER Brendan’s ‘walk’ down from the lookout mound that it even occurred to HIM that he better start seeing if someone in Blue Ridge was even available to come get him or not.
But still NO sense of ‘urgency’ being reported on anyone’s part.
There is ( and has always been ) something really STRANGE about how that was going down… considering Brendan’s life really WAS on the line the moment that fire turned and started heading his way.
The time that was LOST with neither Brendan nor Steed even lifting a finger to contact Blue Ridge *might* have actually become the difference between life and death that day for Brendan himself… given even just a slight speed-up of the circumstances.
Example:It is known that Frisby and Brown were ‘bombing around’ that entire area all day in the BR Polaris Ranger… sometimes all the way back to Highway 89 and/or the Youth Camp.
What if Frisby had NOT been ‘accidentally’ on his way out west for that strange ‘second face-to-face’ with Marsh requested at that seemingly BAD time for ANYONE to be trying to get UP onto that ridge considering what the fire was NOW doing.
What if Frisby had been all the way ‘in town’ with the Ranger when it became important for Brendan to be rescued?
What if the Polaris Ranger had developed mechanical problems and wasn’t even AVAILABLE around that time?
It really seems like if THAT was the only real planned ‘evacuation’ for Brendan that no one ( Brendna, Steed, no one ) didn’t immediately get on the radio with Frisby the MOMENT Brendan realized he was ‘under threat’ and had to leave that mound.
It seems like the SANE thing to have done at that exact moment was to damn well VERIFY that the someone from Blue Ridge WAS ‘available’ to get out there ASAP, meet Brendan coming down, and get him the hell out of there.
It didn’t happen.
It was all very ‘casual’… and no sense of ‘urgency’ at all.
Brendan says when he finally even got around to realizing he better call Blue Ridge ( because Steed had also made no attempts to do so )… he was about to press ‘transmit’ and here comes Frisby on the Ranger still thinking he had time to make it all the way to talk with Marsh, at Marsh’s request about ( something? we still don’t know what ).
What if it hadn’t just ( accidentally ) happened that way.
What would Brendan REALLY have done, at that point?
Take off RUNNING to the EAST?
Try to get back UP to where everyone else was?
Go ahead and get in his shake and bake by the old-grader?
No one ever actually ever asked him that question OR attempted to verify with Brendan himself the “what if Frisby hadn’t accidentally appeared or had been actually unavailable at that time?”
I just do not and have not understood why a supervisor would hang one of their crew out like that and have no concern for their welfare?
So my question is Did Steed already know Marsh had called Frisby
and Frisby was in route so he was playing with McDonough which is not very cool either
Just my thought as a possibility if not which we may never know
Not a good supervisor decision and concern with your look out. .
Reply to Bob Powers post on March 2, 2015 at 10:06 am
>> Bob Powers said…
>>
>> My question is Did Steed already know Marsh
>> had called Frisby and Frisby was in route?
If Captain Jesse Steed had been monitoring the TAC channels in the 1635 timeframe ( and there is no evidence he was NOT ) then yes… he would have HEARD DIVSA Marsh asking BR SUPT Frisby to come back up there for another face-to-face meeting… and Steed would have ALSO heard Frisby’s immediate response of (quote) “I’ll head up that way”.
However… as with most things to do with this incident… one good answer just leads to another whole set of ‘questions’ that then, in turn, deserve answers.
For example…
1) Regardless of what Steed might have overheard ( on TAC channel )… did Brendan ALSO hear it? Brendan’s priority channel was the GM intra-crew and not TAC.
2) Did NEITHER Jesse NOR Brendan hear this because that’s when they were both on the GM intra-crew talking to each other about the 1530 weather report.
3) Brendan ( via his own testimony ) seemed to be clueless about Frisby being anywhere near him and seemed to be as surprised as he could be when he finally decided he better press TRANSMIT and try and call Blue Ridge… and here comes Frisby on the UTV right in front of him before Brendan even had a chance to make the transmit.
4) If Steed WAS aware that Frisby was ‘headed that way’… why is there no record of Captain Steed then making any attempt to contact Frisby and TELL him of the developing situation with Brendan and TELL Frisby to be sure and stop there to get him. If Frisby had been just seconds ahead that day… he would have blown right past the old-grader and would have never even realized Brendan was still just about to come walking out of the bushes there. Frisby would have ( most likely ) just continued on up for the face-to-face and Brendan would still have been ‘stuck’ down there to face his own impending emergency by himself.
There is NO RECORD of ANYONE advising Frisby he better STOP at the old-grader to get Brendan… even if people knew he was already on his way out there.
Not DIVSA Marsh, not GMIHCS Steed, not Brendan.
No one.
It was still a COMPLETE ACCIDENT that Frisby happened to have spotted Brendan just after he emerged from those bushes there near the old-grader… and that accidental meet-up is probably what saved Brendan’s life.
That is still very, very strange.
Apologies. Bad TIME related typo above.
I typed 1635 instead of 1535.
The request from DIVSA Marsh to BR SUPT Frisby that he come up for that second face to face was in the 3:35 PM timeframe ( and obviously NOT the 4:35 PM timeframe ).
Sentence above should have read like this…
If Captain Jesse Steed had been monitoring the TAC channels in the 1535 timeframe ( and there is no evidence he was NOT ) then yes… he would have HEARD DIVSA Marsh asking BR SUPT Frisby to come back up there for another face-to-face meeting… and Steed would have ALSO heard Frisby’s immediate response of (quote) “I’ll head up that way”.
WTKTT,
This is one of the most telling scenes of the entire YH Fire/GMHS debacle for me as an indication of the lax attitude the GMHS had to fire behavior and safety in general.
A good, responsible WFF supervisor, having a far superior view of the fire and situational awareness, would have quickly informed his lookout of the situation and the need to mitigate matters. It was NOT done in this case.
Instead, this entire situation was left in the hands of a third year Crewman. McDonough’s ‘hillbilly’ comment to DOSH investigators regarding Fire Order #10 – “Fight fire aggressively having provide for safety first” – indicates to me the unsafe attitude of the GMHS with this comment.
Exactly.
Steed: “I know. I can SEE ( the problem ). Do what you have to do”.
That’s it. That is ALL the concern that Captain Jesse Steed was showing for one of his men who he could now SEE with his own eyes was in a bad situation.
“Just do what you have to do”.
What the F**K is that supposed to mean?
The fact that Captain Steed did NOT, himself, IMMEDIATELY press ‘transmit’ on his OWN radio and IMMEDIATELY make DAMN sure someone from Blue Ridge WAS ‘available’ to come and rescue Brendan is just… well… I don’t know what to call it.
Unbelievable.
If Brendan had died… THIS would be the ‘mystery’ that everyone would be talking about and trying to solve. HOW could his own Captain have been so unconcerned about his safety to NOT make that IMMEDIATE radio call to Blue Ridge.
WTKTT,
Exactly back at you. It clearly indicates early-on their unsafe attitude to all things that really mattered.
BAD DECISIONS WITH PRIOR GOOD OUTCOMES again and again and again and …
Check out the Upper Lyons RX burn Fire Shelter Deployment link I posted for the incredible attitude of management approving and condoning fire shelter usage INSTEAD OF following the Basic WFF Rules and AVOIDING DEPLOYMENTS. The FLA Team Leaders/Members are Deputy Directors in both the US Forest Service and the Bureau of Land Management. Pretty disturbing if you ask me.
I have tried numerous times to post the link for the above but to no avail; the webserver will not post it.
Just search from “Upper Lyons RX Shelter Deployment (2014)” on the Wikdland Fire LLC site
This should work…
Willdand Fire Lessons Learned Center
Motto: A Lesson is learned when we CHANGE our BEHAVIOR
Upper Lyons RX Shelter Deployment (2014)
State: California
Incident Type: Entrapment
Incident Tag/Keyword: Entrapment, Hand Crews, Prescribed Fire
Incident Type: Entrapment
Incident Date: 10/13/2014
http://www.wildfirelessons.net/orphans/viewincident?DocumentKey=a9af475e-be26-44d8-bb5d-7b70aea85138
You still have to love the Title Banner MOTTO at the Wildland Fire Lessons Learned Center…
“A Lesson is learned when we CHANGE our BEHAVIOR”.
This was one of the few places where the SAIR was subtly critical. If memory serves (I can’t access it right now) the SAIR notes that Steed received the news re McDonough “calmly” and, in context, I think the usage is similar to a report noting “Mr. Smith was contacted in the restaurant and told his car outside was on fire, and received the news fairly calmly without inquiring further.” This does relate directly to possible immunity for PFD in the lawsuits, because if there were a known history of this type of thing, without intervention — a very big if of course — even if the indifference is coming from a good place intentions-wise, it’s still problematic.
Copy that.
The way the SAIR described it is even more bizarre than your recollection above.
The SAIR says the GM Captain Steed’s only response to Brendan telling him the fire had changed direction 180 degrees and was now headed SOUTH and right at him… and he now HAD to get OUT of there was…
Jesse Steed: “Okay. Cool”.
OKAY, COOL?
One of your own crewmembers that you are responsible for tells you their life is basically now in danger and your only verbal reaction is “Okay. Cool”?
What is WRONG with THAT picture?
Here is that exact section of the official Arizona Forestry sponsored SAIT report…
—————————————————–
He ( GM Lookout ) calls GM Capt and says the fire has hit his trigger point and he is moving towards the open area at the old grader.
GM Capt calmly replies, “Okay, cool.”
GM Lookout hikes toward the grader. As he hikes, he identifies options including an alternative lookout spot further up the road, a POSSIBLE SHELTER DEPLOYMENT SITE near the grader, and a little clearing just down from his original lookout spot where he could DEPLOY HIS SHELTER if the FIRE CAUGHT HIM.
At this same time, BR Supt is driving back in his UTV to meet DIVS A for a face-to-face meeting.
As GM Lookout reaches the grader, he reaches for his radio to call BR Supt and ask for a ride, when he sees BR Supt driving around the corner.
About then, GM Capt calls GM Lookout and says, “I’ve got eyes on you and the fire, and it’s making a good push.”
————————————————
So look at even the SAIT’s own official report about what Steed said just minutes after he said “Okay, cool” to Brendan.
Steed is only now supposedly calling Brendan back and essentially WARNING him that he can SEE that the fire is “making a good push” right AT him…
…but the SAIT still failed to report what in the hell ( if any ) instructions from Steed FOLLOWED that warning.
The SAIT says that Steed was now definitely telling Brendan he was in “trouble”… and that Steed could actually SEE that… but Steed is still not offering his crewmember any advice on what to do next?
That’s what the SAIT itself would have us believe.
Thanks for that and in particular for the exact verbiage!
In terms of the context of “calmly” in that situation, I’m not suggesting that Steed should have sounded agitated or otherwise anxious. But, there’s a difference between “Ok, cool,” and “Ok, we have [in essence a near-incident] to see to a safe escape.” A pattern of simply being confident that all will work out is bound sooner or later to end badly. Based on the facts known now, I’d infer that imo no one on GM knew exactly the anticipated speed of the fire at that point, how long it would take McDonough to exercise any escape options, or, as shown by McDonough walking around and evaluating things on the fly there, what his true options were. Leaving this to the judgment of a less-experienced crew member who is known to not be feeling well adds to the risk of a negative outcome. It did work out, because of a factor beyond GM’s direct control, but before the lookout got picked up there was a lot of readily available information that it seems wasn’t accessed or utilized. With implications for decision-making on other fires and also later in the day at Yarnell.
Thanks for this. I’ve never actually even explored the NOAA mobile weather thing.
I get some kind of weather notification on my iPad (I can’t remember what the app is) if something’s happening in my neck of the woods. And I follow a bunch of local meteorologists on Twitter (people here in Burque are weather-obsessed).
And I have the Real-Time Lightning Map app on my computer and my iPad, which is awesome (I watched the Carlton Complex blow up in real time under all the lightning, thinking OMG-uh-oh!!!!).
During hard-core thunderstorms here I have the radio on, so I hear the static. And the Lightning Map then almost immediately shows the location of the lightning strike, and then I hear the thunder roll in.
But I’ve never checked out the NOAA thing, so I don’t know what it actually does. Maybe I’ll fiddle around with it tomorrow. We have a major winter storm continuing to roll in.
And, PS, I agree with all the comments regarding the apparent casualness regarding Brendan’s situation. I had not really thought about it, but, all things considered, yes, it does seem really…………strange.
Not that anything that surfaces regarding this fire that appears strange…..at this point……..actually………surprises me, anymore.
Marti,
Download this FREE ‘Weatherbug’ app and check it out. A very cool app I discovered at a weather conference. VERY accurate for lightning and even their 10-day forecast was fairly accurate as well.
http://www.downtoad.com/landing/bing2/weatherbug/index.php?kw=%2Bweather%20%2Bbug
Calvin,
I think it was you that requested a YouTube clip showing crews in a SZ as the fire burned around them, This one will have to suffice until I find the precise one I’ve been searching for.
This is a video clip of the August 13, 2007 Cascade Complex on the Boise NF in central Idaho. This is video of the fire actually burning AROUND the Fire Camp. The IMT and the ensuing highly biased Investigative Report used the euphemism of a “Burn Around” – a first – to cover for the IMT’s incompetence. Numerous Crews and Overhead had told the IMT that the Fire Camp was in direct alignment when the numerous fires surrounding the Fire Camp grew together on several occasions, but to no avail. These fires eventually did grow together and align with the Cascade Complex Fire Camp just as the Crews and Overhead had accurately predicted. The Fire Camp in this case was in essence a SZ and a quite large one at that, so you’ll get the idea as you watch it.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RLJYigWchf0
Someone even had T-shirts made of the event and the IC was quick to stop the sale of them as quickly as he could to quell any further embarrassment to him and his IMT for NOT heeding the accurate and timely warnings.
This is a link for the Cascade Complex Accident Prevention Analysis Report. A typical wordy title to justify their incompetence and a whopping 120 pages worth of blather! http://www.wildlandfire.com/docs/2007/Cascade-Complex-APA.pdf
The thing that, actually, made me think the MOST about this (aside from the drama of it all) was the fact that, for a long time after this, how many people were seriously experiencing respiratory problems from having been in this.
Which, upon thinking about it, didn’t surprise me.
Which then made me wonder about the health/respiratory effects wildland fire fighters experience as a consequence of all the smoke exposure they are exposed to on a regular basis.
I mean, as in the Aaron videos of “cough cough” being there in the Shrine Road area, etc……
And the Swartz photos at the Ranch House Restaurant parking lot where you can barely see anything because of all the smoke as that fire column was just laying totally down over Yarnell.
I was talking to my daughter’s father yesterday after my mom’s memorial. He lives in Flagstaff. We were talking about the Slide Fire. About how when the inversions happened, everybody in Sedona got choked out, and when they lifted, everybody in Flagstaff got choked out.
And I keep thinking……….what happens to the fire fighters, who are constantly exposed to all this smoke?????
Does it affect you? I can’t imagine how it couldn’t.
Wow. Thanks for finding/sharing that.
I don’t care how safe those ( I count DOZENS? ) of FFs thought they were… I’ll bet that row of port-a-potties there in front of the dumpster got ‘well used’ that afternoon.
Notice how that as the fire envelopes the site… you really can’t tell WHAT direction the original prevailing winds were. The fire is ‘twisting and turning’ of its own accord and the wind ( and the fire ) looks like it is encroaching the site from ALL directions.
This goes back to a thread somewhere way down below ( in this chapter ) regarding the SAIR diagrams of the boides at the deployment site… and which way they were FACING.
It still seems very likely that in the last moments of their lives… it was not at all that clear WHICH direction some of the firefighters should have their FEET pointing as they went into shelter. By the time they were getting into shelters… the fire might have also been encroaching that entire deployment area and ‘coming at them’ from ALL directions… so putting your “feet towards the fire” might have been totally relative to WHERE they were actually trying to deploy within that small area.
** SURROUNDED BY FIRE
On the right hand ‘other videos’ menu for the above video is another one called ‘Surrounded by Fire’. The ‘black’, in this case, is an abandoned parking lot.
What actually happened ( by their own admission in the video ) is that they were trying to do burnouts along a road and one of them got away from them, jumped the road, joined up with an already active leg of the fire… and they next they knew they were ‘Surrounded by Fire’ and had to ‘ride it out’ in their ‘safety zone’.
Same sort of DRAMATIC footage as the video above.
Surrounded by Fire
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sVY2uU3jMH4
YouTube ABOUT information for this video…
Uploaded on Apr 12, 2007
This was shot a couple of years ago at the southern California wildfires. I was there for 6 days covering the fire. The first day we got the best shots. we were so close that we got trapped in a parking lot until the fire burned around us.
WTKTT,
Good one. Check this one out again since I posted this way back when …
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tKfsFkb_9fI
This is a video clip of a Canadian NWT experimental fire showing fire behavior and how rapidly and intensely it burns. Watch the timer in the bottom left. You would be dead in less than 20 seconds! They were testing PPE, fire shelters, building materials and more. There are a whole series of these out there somewhere.
THIS is the type of INTENSE fire behavior that the GHMS experienced on 30 June 2013. NO FIRE SHELTER IN USE TODAY OR DESIGNED IN THE FUTURE CAN WITHSTAND THIS TYPE OF FIRE BEHAVIOR. That’s why we follow the WFF Rules.
So getting out once before each fire season to ‘roll around’ in the ‘green’ (fake) fire shelters is one thing…
…but is it NOT also part of the training for these men who are meant to actually USE these things to actually WATCH these videos you are posting?
Are you old enough to remember the movie called “Mechanized Death”?
When I was learning to drive… it was REQUIRED that we watch it.
The whole point of the movie was to show you… once and for all.. the LIMITATIONS of the vehicle you will soon be driving and how it in no way is any guarantee you will survive an accident. So don’t even ‘go there’.
Seems to me there should be something similar in the WFF world.
Something that shows these men who are supposed to decide to get into these things EXACTLY what conditions are NOT survivable… so don’t even think about trying it. Do something ELSE ( like NEVER get into a circumstance that isn’t going to be survivable… for starters ).
I would think if any of those men had actually ever seen the video you just posted… even just ONCE… then they would have understood that RUNNING was the ONLY thing that represented ANY chance to stay alive that day.
Something tells me there are a LOT of WFFs out there carrying these things on the bottom of their packs who are still totally CLUELESS about its limitations and under what circumstances it is NEVER going to work.
That’s an identifiable issue with an easy solution.
Better TRAINING… with more TRUTHFUL information.
WTKTT,
Yes I am old enough to remember the movie called “Mechanized Death.” Very sobering and very disturbing and very real. Nothing at all wrong about being a realist in these situations, especially in the WFF world.
We trained ‘realistically’ and that was sometimes ‘offensive’ to some of our supervisors who asked us “Who do you think you are anyway?” because THEY had never seen they type of fire behavior we had, therefore it did NOT exist in THEIR minds.
Check this out – ‘The Lyons RX Burn Shelter Deployment FLA.’ Most disturbing.
OMG! A 6’4″ 310 pound Nature Conservancy behemoth was on a Training Exercise (TREX) and deployed a fire shelter on a RX Burn within 2 hours of ignition, spotting over 4/ to 5′ WIDE handline. Wait until you see the fuels and fire behavior photos the behemoth took before deploying. WTF! He stated the fire shelter “WAS ROOMY.” How nice.
The FLA comments are very disturbing: “This firefighter did just what managers and supervisors expect all personnel to do when entrapped: ‘Follow your training and use your fire shelter without hesitation.’ This firefighter is alive today because the firefighter did not delay in deciding to deploy the fire shelter.”
The FLA Team NOWHERE in the FLA does it refer to KNOWING AND FOLLOWING THE TEN STANDARD FIRE ORDERS, KNOWING AND APPLYING THE WATCH OUT SITUATIONS,AND KNOWING, HEEDING, AND MITIGATING ANY OF LCES. The FLA only talks about how the shelter saved their life and more meaningless blather supporting the use of fire shelters instead of ‘THE RULES.’ WTF!
The Crown Fire Initiation project in teh NWT was designed to give Fire Behaviour type people and researchers an insight into how a fire develops in this particular fuel type.
We call it the C-2 Fuel Model (coniferous, type 2) which is mainly composed of mature Black Spruce. Mature black spruce in the Northern Boreal Forests is famous for it sability to go from benign to extreme, due to teh fact that the spruce usually have limbs all the way to the ground (canopy base height), as well they are very resinous, igniting and becoming volatile very quickly.
The basics of the fire developing here is probably SIMILAR in nature to what GM experienced, however because tehy were in a different fuel type (chapparal) the fire would be a bit different. THe spruce are 50 ft tall, the chapparal was only 10 to 15, maybe 20 ft. As I am not familiar with teh chaparral I can not confirm that the fire behaviour depicted in the video is identical to the YHF behaviour.
Taken at face value, you can see how the fire develops, climbs the ladder fuels, becomes a fully involved crown fire. The residence time (how long it hangs around in one spot, has been documented to be approximately 1 minute. Residence time in chaparral, I have no clue.
The other part of the NWT experiments was to test teh theory of “defensible space”, how much firesmarting/fuel management needs to be done around a structure to help ensure it survives.
The resul;ts show that most structures (wood siding) can survive a fire like the video shows if there is a 100 ft fuel break. WFF’s are not as fire hardy as a wooden structure, so they set up the PPE to determine how it is impacted by the fire.
If you google the Cown Fire Initiation modelling expweriment, there may be more videos. I have not checked.
So, to sum up. The fire in the video MAY be similar to what GM experienced, but is not an absolute, true 100% depiction of what tehy faced. Don’t just look at the video and assume that is what GM were trapped in.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FYup7cYKE3w
Rocksteady,
Thanks for this NWT Experiment video. This is a very good overview of the entire project with some good segments of fire behavior and it also shows some of the limitations of PPE and the fire shelters.
Your comments above about the ‘Intense Fire’ video I posted are noted. I merely showed it for those who had NO fire experience and NO idea of the potential fire intensity. It was merely for the purpose of indicating what goes on ‘inside a fire. Thanks again.
I was just making sure that people with no fire experience don’t take the leap that every forest fire is like this. Depends on fuels, weatehr etc etc…
Yeah, this connects to the video I posted down below from the Salt Fire, of what was happening when the Safety Officer and the Dozer Operator and two others (it’s too complicated for me to have it all planted in my brain) were still in the parking area that wasn’t a Safety Zone, after all, were scrambling around to survive.
Everything is burning, the smoke is so dense they can’t even see who or what is even still in the area where they are, and even when the Ops guy backs up into that area to lead them to the recently discovered adequate Safety Zone, they can’t even see him to follow him out, so he has to guide them via directions over the radio.
I think this is why there is now a major conversation going on right now regarding the necessary RELATIVE SIZE of “AUTHORIZED” (ala the discussion related to the Salt Fire) Safety Zones and the necessary LENGTH and SCOUTING of the Escape Routes to them.
Which is, right now reminding me, also, of the Sadler Fire.
What I am getting from all this is that this kind of, in many instances, “ad hoc” fuzzy thinking (as it appears to me) is increasingly being realized as being not SERIOUS enough.
I haven’t had a chance to interact with Rocksteady in his wondering about the difference between how fires are fought in the USA vs Canada. I wonder how he would evaluate these videos regarding Safety Zones.
Given that, in Canada, they don’t use Fire Shelters, because they have a higher priority to not allow/push/whatever firefighters into the kinds of situations where they would NEED THEM.
Sorry if my thinking is a little jumbled and wandering here. But I’m thinking out loud.
And now, I’m really writing off the top of my head but……..
As I recall, and wrote down in my notes, in regards to the post mortem of the Salt Fire on the Lessons Learned site.
Calvin would love this.
The Dozer Operator and the Transport Driver for the Dozer, it was determined, didn’t have adequate radio communications with the OPS guy and the IHC Superintendent, who were organizing and leading the evacuation from the inadequate parking area, which was proving to not be an adequate Safety Zone, down the long and winding road to the meadow which WAS an adequate Safety Zone.
Which proved to be a serious and dangerous headache for all involved.
So several of the recommendations of the Salt Fire review was for majorly better communications technology and specific TRAINING for contractors, specifically DOZERS.
Which made me think, immediately, hmmmmmmm………….
We STILL don’t know what happened with the Dozer, the Dozer Operator (who was, for whatever reason put on the list of possible numbers of people missing that was communicated to the DPS helicopter (by whom and for what reason???)) on the Yarnell Fire.
One of the serious official Lessons Learned from the Salt Fire was that Dozer Operators and their Transport Drivers need to be considered seriously as Firefighters in all of this.
Apparently that wasn’t happening on the Yarnell Hill Fire.
So when I read the original post, I immediately remembered two completely relevant videos. But it took awhile to dig down into my 900-video Yarnell playlist to find them.
By the time I found them, one had already been posted — the Cascade Complex.
And then I had to leave for the days activities.
So this morning I looked at the other one, and I think it’s my all-time favorite “safety zone” video.
It’s from the 2012 Salt Fire, in the infamous Salmon-Challis National Forest in Idaho. It’s a real nail biter. They’re not just moving hotshot crews, but also heavy equipment and lo-boys from one clearing that turned out to not be an adequate safety zone down a narrow winding road to a huge meadow in a VERY short period of time.
I also found the discussion of what happened to be very honest and sobering and quite relevant to what we are discussing here. I highly recommend it!
“The Salt Fire
National Interagency Fire Center ”
http://youtu.be/B3XWNtRsUcQ
Marti,
Thanks for re-posting this. This Salt Fire (August 2012) video has always been a good ‘lessons learned’ fire and the overhead in charge reviewing it. do a good of honestly and openly discussing what led up to the event, what occurred, and what they could/should have done differently. The Salmon-Cahllis NF has quite a history of NUMEROUS fire shelter deployments and fatality fires over the years.
Some key points made during the discussion were:
Don’t call a Safety Zone a Safety Zone until it actually is one.”
Make sure everyone has all the information they need, like all the components of LCES. Ask people – “what is your Escape Route, where is your Safety Zone, etc.”
Watch out for the “THE TRAP OF PASSIVE LEADERSHIP’ by seeing something you don’t like and/or are not comfortable with and you do NOT say anything about it. Say something and effect the changes needed.
Exactly.
Those points are so relevant to the Yarnell Fire. In so many ways. It’s like these two totally different fires are trying to talk to each other. I listed point after point after point after point in my notes.
One of the things that piqued my interest, all things considered, was all the issues connected to that road to the Meadow Safety Zone.
I mean this whole thing was a serious relative last-minute scramble.
But BOTH the Ops (T) and the Idaho City Hotshots Sup had DRIVEN it before they both AUTHORIZED it as an adequate Escape Route to an AUTHORIZED Safety Zone.
That was something they discussed as having been NECESSARY afterwards. Especially given all the confusion beforehand about how the “parking space” was being re-framed as a Safety Zone.
That issue of that confusion SO links me back to the whole thing on the Yarnell Fire about Gary Cordes just generally pointing to that “Boulder Springs Ranch thingy” on the iPad that morning and saying that’s a “Predetermined Safety Zone.” Which then became “a term” just, apparently, used and used and used during the late afternoon’s conversations about where Granite Mountain was headed to (the Predetermined Safety Zone — Trademark).
Well, YEAH, on GOOGLE EARTH, that looks like it MIGHT BE an AWESOME SAFETY ZONE, but what if, in actual reality (because the so-called escape route–especially the short-cutted one–to it isn’t even remotely adequate, all things considered, including the timing, given the fire behavior) that particular Escape Route could possibly become a fuel-filled death trap?
Oh, wait, Google Earth on an iPad can’t, by itself. indicate that.
Oh well.
And also this, as you also said:
“Watch out for the “THE TRAP OF PASSIVE LEADERSHIP’ by seeing something you don’t like and/or are not comfortable with and you do NOT say anything about it. Say something and effect the changes needed.”
I’m not sure exactly which thing you are thinking of, but what REALLY reverberated in my brain when I heard him saying this was the whole thing about Bravo 3 realizing, as they were reconning the fire, REALIZING (as both WTKKT and I have RANTED about) around 12:30 PM, that, given the most likely weather and the topo, the fire was going to reverse direction THAT AFTERNOON and burn uphill under a thunderstorm cell toward Yarenell (with all the implications of THAT) and who did he communicate that to????
Rance Marquez, a late-arriving Div Z Supervisor who got in an argument with Eric Marsh and, thus, wandered off to half-heartedly communicate his findings to not even the OPS who he was actually responsible to (Todd Abel) and didn’t even mention that MOST IMPORTANT communique from Bravo 3 ………..
As they say on Twitter:
I. Just. Can’t.
That thing about “passive leadership” is just so relevant to this fire. It’s like NOBODY ever wanted to even begin to take any kind of REAL responsibility for it
EVER.
From the very get go. Even though they all signed on and got paid for ……………..
What?????
At least the decision-makers on this whole Safety Zone deal on the Salt Fire were willing to sit down and discuss it honestly. And take responsibility for the mistakes they made.
So what is Arizona Department of Forestry, the managers of the Yarnell Hill Fire doing right now?
Oh wait. This is a “different” fire.
At this point I feel I need to be honest with you, Robert the Second. I don’t know if you know my story.
My brother, in January, 51 years ago, was an Eagle Scout Patrol Leader in a Boy Scout Troop. He led his Patrol, under some time pressure from his Troop Leader, to “hurry up” and come down from a ridge above Tent Rocks, in the Jemez, northwest of Albuquerque.
He chose to lead them down what he considered to look like a shortcut from where they were. That “shortcut” led them down onto a ledge. As he was standing out on that ledge, trying to figure out where to go next, the ledge broke from under him. He fell 350 feet, and landed on his head, and was killed.
The rest of his Patrol was still stranded on that ledge.
A helicopter flew into that area from Albuquerque to rescue the rest of his Patrol. As it was attempting to do that, it almost clipped its rotors on the steep side of the upslope.
A rescuer rappelled from the helicopter down to the boys in my brother’s Patrol to rescue them. He broke his leg in that rescue.
In spite of this, those Boy Scouts were rescued. It was ALL OVER the newspapers. I was 13 at the time. My brother was 15.
I remember sitting in his bedroom after that. Sensing a combination of things.
One of them was, essentially, “WTF????? What were you even THiNKING?????????”
I couldn’t for the life of me figure out the answer to that question.
Even in my 13-year-old mind (and I was a relatively experienced Girl Scout at that point) I was aware of both the danger he put himself into and the danger he put the rest of his Patrol into. Et al.
And I just couldn’t.
The only thing I could even possibly do with this was to…
Decide that, even though I couldn’t understand WHY/HOW he could have been thinking what he was thinking as he led his “crew” down onto that sandstone ledge, under some “pressure” from his Troop Leader (who, if this had happened in these litigious times would have been sued up the wazoo, but my dad was a really good friend of his (and was there when it happened) so he wouldn’t have even thought of doing that)…..
….I could decide never to lead a group of people who were less experienced than I into the same kind of situation.
I led groups of people all over the Grand Canyon for ten years and I was always absolutely committed to NEVER EVER leading them too far out onto dangerous places in the Grand Canyon (even though, I admit, I often went to those dangerous places myself).
This is one of the reasons I haven’t always been able to, personally, jump on your bandwagon. But I’ve always taken you perspective seriously.
That’s why I have written periodically that Shakespeare could have written this fire.
Just as how Shakespeare could have written my brother’s death and all the resulting complicated layered human consequences that resulted from that tragedy.
I’m thinking of your relentless focus on dangerous actions with previous positive outcomes. There have been times when that relentless focus has set my teeth on edge. Maybe because I am sometimes guilty of the same thing? Because I am aware of how many of us are (to be honest) also? My daughter’s driving makes me crazy, in spite of all I taught her about defensive driving.
BUT I think back to how I decided to NEVER EVER make the same mistake my brother did when it came to OTHER PEOPLES lives, even though I took some serious risks that completely freaked out my mother regarding my own life.
I don’t know exactly where you are located. I was a 1973 graduate of Prescott College. A bunch of my friends were in the Prescott College Wildfire Fighting Crew that was, essentially, the grandmother of the Granite Mountain Hotshots. I worked for the caterer who fed the firefighters during the wildfires around Prescott while I was a student at Prescott College.
So, in essence, as we discuss these things, and as I struggle to understand them, and as you write what you write, I’m feeling now that I want you to know a bit more about who I am and where I’m coming from.
I am here in Albuquerque, near Rio Rancho, where both Bea Day and Tom French live, near where Chuck Maxwell works. not all that far from Silver City, where Bravo 33 flew out from, I was raised by and worked for a major southwestern meteorologist, I have serious history in both Prescott and Flagstaff (I lived there for 10 years), and, for some reason, I just want you to know that at this time, all things considered.
And I’m currently contemplating a much needed (for a variety of reasons) visit to Arizona.
And after, and during, I wrote all of this, and even before this, I have been feeling INCREASINGLY concerned about the reality that we haven’t heard anything from Joy.
Or Sonny.
I’m not feeing good about this.
Hmm. I posted the Salt Fire page on the Lessons Learned Site but I guess I did something wrong becuz it didn’t go through. A bunch more information on that Safety Zone Incident:
“Salt Fire (2011)
On August 29, 2011, at approximately 1800 hours, fire activity increased significantly on the east end of the Salt Fire. Ground resources were ordered to disengage and evacuate. During evacuation, one of the predetermined escape routes became engulfed by the fire. Ground resources using that escape route were then ordered back to a parking area and then into a safety zone. While at the parking area, a transport driver and a dozer operator shared a fire shelter to shield themselves from the intense heat from the advancing fire. Soon after the two took cover using the fire shelter, a line safety officer at the parking area drove up to the two individuals, loaded them in his truck and transported them to the safety zone. No injuries were reported.”
OK every time I post a link to a page of documents on the Lessons Learned site, the link disappears.
So, if you are interested in reading the VERY interesting materials on the Salt Fire and the Safety Zone incident, google “salt fire” and “lessons learned” and it will take you to a link called “Salt Fire (2011) – Wildland Fire Lessons Learned Center”
And, yes, Calvin, they DO hunker and be safe in their safety zone and take awesome videos!
This is on the Santiago Fire, in California, in 2007.
“Santiago wildland fire, Trapped in the Safety Zone”
http://youtu.be/b1u9hHcJ-Cs
At +8:50 into the video ( and for the next 60 seconds ).
Cyclonic development. Fire whirl. Amazing stuff.
Yes it is.
AND I kept thinking hmmm “I remember the Santiago Fire for something else, what was that??”
Oh yes!! They had a fire shelter deployment that was pretty awesome. And successful. You DEFINITELY have to see THIS:
“Santiago Fire Shelter Deployment
WildlandFireLLC”
“Fire shelter deployment from October 22, 2007 by Orange County Fire Authority engine crews. Photos by Karen Tapia Anderson of the Los Angeles Times. Video courtesy of the LA Times.”
http://youtu.be/HF0UedIiIrc
The Santiago fire was one of the hellacious fires during the hellacious awful 2003 Southern California Extreme Fire Season.
Correction. I meant 2007 Extreme Southern California Wildfire Season. It’s easy to get the two mixed up. They were both catastrophic.
Here’s the WildlandFireLLC video about the deployment, described by the crew that deployed:
Santiago Fire
“Published on Mar 19, 2014
“Fire Shelter Deployments: Stories and Common Insights” is a program developed by the US Forest Service Missoula Technology and Development Center (MTDC) that will help you understand what you may experience in a fire shelter deployment.”
http://youtu.be/hLRomIYWq5s
Marti,
For those of us in this line of work, the October 22, 2007 Santiago Fire “Shelter Deployment” by 12 La and/or Orange County MUNICIPAL firefighters was a complete joke, totally predictable, and therefore preventable and TOTALLY unnecessary.
Below is a link of a California Division of Forestry (CDF – now called Cal Fire)’Green Sheet’ that goes through the detail of fuels, weather, topography, fire behavior, and a description of the event.
http://hotlist.wildlandfire.com/printthread.php?t=2253&pp=10&page=2
They were basically working on a spot fire across a paved road from the main fire, and while working this, their Lookout(s) reported a SECOND spot below them. There was also a fiasco of their hose being burned through. They were only SIXTY (60) FEET off the road.
The report claims “The company officers then looked for other possible escape routes and immediately recognized the only escape route was over the steep cut bank (95% slope) on Santiago Canyon Road..”
Notwithstanding the steep cut bank, this was TOTALLY predictable AND PREVENTABLE AND therefore avoidable. They had ‘BLACK’ that was small (25′ x 40′) but sufficient. When you watch the video, you can actually see them standing up there on the hill.
This event was TOTALLY avoidable.
Another farce on this Santiago Fire shelter deployment and the Old Fire ‘Surrounded by Fire’ video clip posted by WTKTT is the claim that they were “TRAPPED IN A SAFETY ZONE.”
You CANNOT be ‘trapped in a SZ.’ Going to and utilizing a SZ is fighting fire, it’s okay, you’re NOT trapped. But you can be trapped and burned and likely killed if you get trapped on a fire without being in one (Safety Zone).
So. Being a newbie and all to this “how to fight a wildfire without risking getting yourself killed” stuff and all. And a student of it all.
And, although, after I’ve spent over a year studying the Yarnell Fire, and reading lots of stuff, and watching lots of videos, to the point where I can, at least here, write things that make it appear I know what I’m talking about….
There are still TONS of things I still don’t understand very well. And want to understand better. (because you just never know……)
You said, “Notwithstanding the steep cut bank, this was TOTALLY predictable AND PREVENTABLE AND therefore avoidable. They had ‘BLACK’ that was small (25′ x 40′) but sufficient. When you watch the video, you can actually see them standing up there on the hill.
This event was TOTALLY avoidable.”
I don’t know what you mean by that and I would really like to know.
How was it, in your mind, TOTALLY avoidable?
I’m really intrigued by the upstream convo with Rocksteady about Fire shelters and how the “pushing of them” has allowed the firefighters and the system to sacrifice real safety thinking and “just saying no,” on even more than a “boots on the ground” level.
So when you say this was TOTALLY avoidable, I’m thinking that you are thinking that if they weren’t playing the Shelters Game (it was photographically dramatic–a perfect media photoshoot), that would have forced them to have made this TOTALLY avoidable.
But, in lack of experience/knowledge, I don’t know what they should have done, instead, if that’s what they were intending to do.
What are you thinking?
Fred/RTS suggested below that the way to figure out if a dangerous downburst is likely to arrive is to wait and see if you get virga. If you get virga, you need to retreat, because there is a decent chance that you are minutes away from a dangerous downburst.
Well, with all due respect, if that is honestly the BEST way to reliably figure out if you are going to get a downburst or if the cell is one of the many many many that are going to pose no threat to anyone, then I am surprised more folks are not killed on fires. If the way you anticipate downbursts is by waiting for the virga to arrive, after which you have – what, barely minutes to get out of the way – that’s kind of late notice, no? What if you – like Kenny Jordan – don’t have anywhere to GO that is within a few minute sprint?
And, for those of you who are about to reply with “that is why GM should have stayed hunkered in the black,” you are forgetting two things:
(1) Look at where Brian Frisby and Bucky Yowell were – they weren’t in a safety zone or in the black – and
(2) How many downbursts NEVER materialize – if you want to fight fire in mid to late June in Arizona, you need to get used to working on days that might have a period of weather warning, both before and after which you will be working. The question is: How do you know how long to stay hunkered down and how do you know at what time you need to start hunkering? (On the Clear Creek Fire, Robert the Second’s crew was hunkered in the black as soon as the Assistant or Squad Bosses started feeling a bit uneasy about the spot(s), while Robert the Second instead remained OUTSIDE the black, yelling at his crew on the radio about something to the effect of “Am *I* going to be the only one out here fighting fire?” He obviously thought that his Assistant Supt. or Squad Boss(es) had pulled the crew into the black a bit too early, and, according to what I am being told, Robert the Second was *pissed.* So I find the comments that he makes on here about how easy it is to time things or pull the trigger and hunker down particularly ironic. The Payson guys who served under him on the Clear Creek Fire might beg to differ.)
Elizabeth/Logical Phallacy,
You make the assertion in the first paragraph that “There is no 100% reliable way to predict with certainty when a downburst (as opposed to a downdraft) is going to hit a fire, *IF* it is even going to do so.” Then you fallaciously follow up with your conclusion in the second paragraph as follows: “Meaning, there is no 100% reliable way to time whether a downburst will EVER show up and in what time frame it will arrive.”
This is the FALLACY OF CIRCULAR REASONING or BEGGING THE QUESTION. This is defined as “to assume the truth of what one seeks to prove, in the effort to prove it.” This is in the Logical Fallacy section of any number of Introduction to Logic books and the Wikipedia definition as well. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Begging_the_question
Save your histrionics for the courtroom where you can fool and sway the ignorant.
Reply to Elizabeth (counselor) post on March 1, 2015 at 1:12 pm
>> counselor said…
>>
>> Fred/RTS suggested below that the way to figure out if a dangerous
>> downburst is likely to arrive is to wait and see if you get virga.
He said no such thing.
YOU are the one putting the word ‘virga’. into his mouth… which is just a continual demonstration that you don’t have the faintest idea what you are talking about on this topic nor do you have the skills/ability to really understand it.
VIRGA is rain that EVAPORATES before reaching the ground.
If you are standing on the ground ‘feeling raindrops’… then its NOT VIRGA.
The clips from the SAIR report I posted down below in an attempt to educate you ( if you even bothered to read them ) explain this very thing.
**From PDF page 29 of the
** Yarnell Special Accident Investigation Report (SAIR)
**Published September 28, 2013. ( 74 weeks ago )…
—————————————————————————
OUTFLOW WINDS
When thunderstorms produce rain, hail, or VIRGA ( rain that EVAPORATES before reaching the ground ), strong DOWNDRAFT winds develop under the storm cloud. The DOWNDRAFTS turn horizontal when they reach the earth’s surface and become “outflow winds.” These winds can reach speeds in excess of 50 miles per hour. An outflow boundary, also called a gust front, is the leading edge of the outflow winds as they move away from the thunderstorms.
——————————————————————————–
If you want to make positive contributions to this ongoing discussion… please confine your incessant ( and usually inane ) questions to topics that you ARE capable of understanding and stop wasting everyone’s time.
WTKTT,
Thanks for your comments here. She refuses to listen to anything I say and continues to harp on the Clear Creek Fire even though former Sierra IHC Superintendent Ken Jordan has posted repeatedly on her own website that the Payson IHC and Superintendent safely accomplished their mission on that fire. And also her delusional accusations regarding “Fred,” another unhealthy obsession with her.
She is all about utilizing the logical fallacies here in this forum. She continues to use the Ad Hominem Fallacy to attack the person rather than the argument presented. In the case of the ‘virga,’ she uses a Straw Man fallacy whereby an opposing argument is overstated or misrepresented in order to be more easily attacked or refuted. I originally mentioned “spritz” of rain and/or hail and she used ‘virga’ to counter it. So typical of her and attorneys in general.
The ‘Logical Phallacy’ moniker that she uses from time-to-time is an indication to me that she has somewhat accurately labeled herself, yet the rather disturbing images of all kinds of perversion are very nauseating. Oh, perish the thought.
I participate in a LOT of forums like this… and there are ALWAYS the TROLLS… but I have to be honest and admit I’ve NEVER seen anything quite this bad.
Even beyond the usual TROLL tactic of just pretending to ask a ‘simple’ question… and then everyone discovers that it’s just the same TROLL coming back and just pushing the same agenda and refusing to even ‘accept’ any valid ‘answers’ to the questions posed…
…there is a very ‘disturbed’ element to this particular TROLL situation.
There has ALWAYS been a serious ‘hidden agenda’, on her part.
There is also this disturbing ‘didactic’ component whereby only she is ever on the ‘moral high ground’, combined with a personality that is obviously one of those people who can never admit they are WRONG about anything… and not just on public Internet forums, either. I am sure the people that have to deal with this personality in-person continually struggle with the same behavior.
This is NOT any kind of attack. It’s just ‘analysis’ and a quick ‘skinny’ on previous experience with online TROLLS.
I have also ( to be honest ) never seen a TROLL like this survive for this long in an ongoing discussion without the moderator BLOCKING any further posts.
I am all for free speech… but there ARE times when it is SOOOO obvious that someone is, in fact, just a TROLL… and is ONLY trying to ‘disrupt’ and ‘obfuscate’ and ‘confuse’ ( the goal of most TROLLS ) that even the most stringent of moderators usually realizes it is not a good thing to allow that person to continue to post messages.
Sort of like people getting up to speak at PUBLIC meetings.
Everyone can/should have that right… but there are also times ( I’ve been in such public meetings ) when someone is obviously just bat-crap-crazy and they still keep trying to get up to the microphone and ‘make it all about them’ and just ‘disrupt’ an otherwise useful ( and necessary ) public meeting.
It happens… and that’s when the person ultimately responsible for the overall productivity of the meeting has to step in and put a stop to it.
Answering the incessant ( and inane ) questions from a TROLL is NEVER going to ‘solve the problem’.
TROLLS are usually never looking for ‘answers’ at all.
These are usually personality types that are NEVER interested in having their questions answered at all.
They just use the *questions* to *appear* to be participating in the discussions in the hopes they will get to continue to pursue their own agenda(s) somewhere in the ‘replies’ to the inane questions.
I think the Troll is studying the inhabitants of this forum, with either a view to writing a book about it, or maybe submitting a dissertation so they can get a new “internet” degree/phd/letters after name/qualification that won’t be worth the digital ink it’s written in.
All the troll has to do is introduce the right stimulus “so-and-so said 100%…” etc “you are him – he is you” etc and unfortunately someone from the forum bites. And another entry goes into the trolls book/dissertation.
I am going to try my best to ignore the comments/questions and the disruption the troll is causing. The troll advances this discussion not a millimeter!
I’m really happy that everyone else is in the forum, even now, great theories and ideas are pouring forth. Keep going guys, I know you will get there, you will find the reason all this happened, and the lessons to be learned.
Thanks for your correction. Fred Schoeffler aka Robert the Second did not say virga. Dr. Brian Potter did.
Correct. He ( Potter ) first said it at +27:25 in his webinar.
The firefighters in Harper Canyon and the Youth Camp area ( Captain Darby Starr included ) were feeling some ACTUAL raindrops… which means it was NOT VIRGA… nor can it be assumed the conditions were right for that.
* Wildland Fire Lessons Learned Center – WEBINARS – Feb 2015
Column / Plume Dynamics
Synthesis of Knowledge of Extreme Fire Behavior
Brian Potter
Research Meteorologist
Pacific Wildland Fire Sciences Lab
USDA Forest Service
This ‘webinar’ is 1 hour and 15 minutes and 16 seconds long.
It consists of a 39 minute presentation by Brian Potter followed
by a 36 minute Q/A session.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=552Spr6Rhbo&feature=youtu.be
Let’s try this again: There is no 100% reliable way to predict with certainty when a downburst (as opposed to a downdraft) is going to hit a fire, *IF* it is even going to do so. Unfortunately, if a fire is hit by a downburst, the impact can be far more unpredictable than if the fire is hit by simply a wind from the NE. A downburst (as I am understanding guys like Dr. Potter to use that term) is less linear in its impact.
On the YHF, there was a radio warning of winds from the NE within the half hour. I do not recall anyone suggesting that GM was warned of downbursts, and, if GM was supposed to be on guard for them, please explain to me more about how they would have precisely timed them. Meaning, there is no 100% reliable way to time whether a downburst will EVER show up and in what time frame it will arrive.
So what is a crew to do? Well, it appears from the pictures that GM did what was sensible: They sat down and watched the weather and talked to others. The question then becomes, how LONG should they have sat still? It is easy to say in hindsight that they should have kept sitting until at least 6 p.m., but they did not have the benefit of hindsight. As of 4 p.m., the lookouts were still out, and WFFs were not running for cover (see True Brown’s GPS as opposed to relying on unit logs for this – the times stated by folks in unit logs and interviews are not always particularly accurate).
When GM left for the BSR, the fire was moving as a head fire not toward the BSR but, rather, toward the EAST – toward Shrine. If you look at Brendan McDonough’s 4:08 p.m. pictures, it actually appears that the wind is pushing more TOWARD the NE as of 4:08 p.m., which would suggest that the fire will continue moving more toward Shrine and not toward the BSR. What you do NOT see at 4:08 p.m. is the smoke column leaning toward the BSR, and my understanding is that the lean of the column can be a predictor.
One Picture in this line of Pictures explains all the collapse of the smoke column to the ground
covering the Flaming front. This is a serious indicator of a change in the wind.
As said earlier the wind was getting Squirrely before 1600. The flames were dancing all over the place in those last pictures.
Bob, Brendan’s 4:08 p.m. pictures were taken AFTER those pictures. So maybe go look at those 4:08 p.m. pictures, look at the direction of the smoke, and let me know if you see the smoke pushing to the North (indicating that the fire is moving to the north) the way that I do. If I am wrong, that’s fine. But, again, those 4:08 p.m. pictures are AFTER the Mckenzie pictures to which you are referring.
What in the bloody hell are you blathering about now?
There are NO Brendan McDonough photos with a timestamp of 4:08 PM.
Please provide the exact filenames and locations in the public record of the photos you are NOW basing more of your ramblings on… so at least we have a CHANCE of understanding what the hell you are even TRYING to say.
Are you talking about the three photos Brendan took with his iPhone out the driver’s window of the GM SUPT truck as he was part of the convoy moving the GM vehicles to the Youth Camp?
How long should have GM sat safe in the black?
Easy answer Until They Could Move Safely to Their Next Target without Risk of Being Entrapped…
How to figure when that is
EASY ANSWER Once they have had enough time to observe fire behaviour, gather Intel from other sources (AA/bucket ships/sir tankers ) predict the timing of their next move, then decide on the chance of success. If there is not a high probability of success, then they “HUNKER AND STAY SAFE”
Where have we heard that advice before?????
Rocksteady, just to remind you, AirAttack had indicated to Marsh or GM that they had at least an hour or two. And the SAIT (I think!) seemed to indicate that maybe GM might have thought that they had already witnessed any likely worsening due to the winds when there was the big “wind shift” of which Air Attack was speaking to B33 and the fire changed direction at roughly 3:35 or so. So, at that point, GM was seeing a head fire to the due EAST at, say, roughly .75 mph, with only minimal lateral spread toward the BSR. With that type of fire behavior, it is easy to see why Cordes (and presumably GM) thought they had “plenty” of time to make it to the BSR. GM did not walk into the direct path of a head fire. Rather, they were more flanking the fire (which my friends who are WFFs in Arizona or in the SW tell me that plenty of WFFs in Arizona do throughout the season, provided they have a decent cushion of time and space and a lookout and such).
Moreover, if Brendan McDonongh’s pictures show that, as of 4:08 p.m., the wind was now pushing more NORTH and Northeast, which would *not* push the fire toward the BSR, does that make the move more understandable? I don’t know – I’m still just thinking out loud.
The observations needed, as well as gathering Intel takes a period of time,not just making a decision at one specific point in time, such as you are stating, based on one picture at 4:08
Let me be clear here——–
My reference to the smoke laying down was to identify indicators of
what the fire activity was at that point and what it was saying to Fire Fighters who were paying attention.
At that time in the Mackenzie cell phone photos #9,10,11 it was obvious a wind was in fact active on the Fire and was laying the smoke to the south.
The Flame was also moving toward the old grader site that can clearly be seen. Below and to the East of GM.
The North wind slowly rotated to the NE and E in a period of time between 1600 and 1700 pushing the Fire toward the SW and West.
West being the Weaver Mountains that the BSR sat at the base of.
The collapse of the smoke column across the flats below the crew is a indicator of a erratic wind affect on the Fire. The wind is picking up and changing directions as the front affects the fire again this was a wind driven fire of 20 plus MPH winds. The weather forecast was happening all ready before the crew ever moved.
When you have wind predictions of that high you do not ignore them you
find a safe place and wait them out.
The suggestion that AA said they had 1 to 2 Hours before the fire hit Yarnell should have been an indicator as that trigger was met in a half hour another indicator ignored.
Rocksteady, I was not suggesting they based a decision on only one piece of intel! I was pointing out that the Mackenzie pictures were not the *only* piece of intel. We see in the later McDonough pictures at roughly 4:08 and in other pictures as well (later than the Mackenzie pictures) that the Mackenzie pictures were not the end-all of what the fire was doing. Meaning, if GM sat in the black and saw that the fire totally turned around, stopped moving east at all, and resumed moving back north with absolutely no lateral or flanking movement in any other direction, presumably GM could move to the BSR. I am not suggesting that that is what happened, but, rather, I *am* suggesting that looking at the Mackenzie pictures and saying “I would never leave the black, given those pictures,” does not consider what happened *after* those pictures. (By the way, Rocksteady, I am not suggesting that *YOU* said you’d never leave the black. Others have said that, however, based only on the Mackenzie photos, and I respectfully suggest that it does not make sense to fail to consider what happened in the roughly 25 minutes or so *after* those pictures were taken.)
Anyway, thanks for your feedback, RS. Obviously in order to learn from this tragedy, we need to figure out what GM was seeing to try to figure out why it made sense – in 19 of their minds – for them to do what they did. No wildland firefighter *wants* to deploy and die, so obviously GM had a good reason for thinking that that was not likely to happen.
Elizabeth/Logical Phallcy,
Once again it was because of their habit of BAD DECISIONS WITH PRIOR GOOD OUTCOMES otherwise known as the RULE OF 99.
Rocksteady, I was not suggesting they based a decision on only one piece of intel! I was pointing out that the Mackenzie pictures were not the *only* piece of intel. We see in the later McDonough pictures at roughly 4:08 and in other pictures as well (later than the Mackenzie pictures) that the Mackenzie pictures were not the end-all of what the fire was doing. Meaning, if GM sat in the black and saw that the fire totally turned around, stopped moving east at all, and resumed moving back north with absolutely no lateral or flanking movement in any other direction, presumably GM could move to the BSR. I am not suggesting that that is what happened, but, rather, I *am* suggesting that looking at the Mackenzie pictures and saying “I would never leave the black, given those pictures,” does not consider what happened *after* those pictures. (By the way, Rocksteady, I am not suggesting that *YOU* said you’d never leave the black. Others have said that, however, based only on the Mackenzie photos, and I respectfully suggest that it does not make sense to fail to consider what happened in the roughly 25 minutes or so *after* those pictures were taken.)
Anyway, thanks for your feedback, RS. Obviously in order to learn from this tragedy, we need to figure out what GM was seeing to try to figure out why it made sense – in 19 of their minds – for them to do what they did. No wildland firefighter *wants* to deploy and die, so obviously GM had a good reason for thinking that that was not likely to happen.
Your last sentence is why we have been on here for 12 chapters, still without a good answer.
That sentence could be posted as the maiden voyage statement in chapter I.
🙂 Presumably that is why you are not among those who snark at me. Just saying these guys were “reckless” or they “ignored the weather” doesn’t deal with the fact that (a) none of them wanted to die and (b) hotshots who do not want to die tend NOT to ignore weather and (c ) GM would not have done what they did if they did not think they could safely do so.
I prefer not to “snark”…. however, there have been/will be times that I will in order to get a point across.
A lot of the SNARK on here distracts from the true intent of the discussion.
Take the high road. Don’t snark too and maybe others will stop.
Not specifically aimed at any poster.
And some people deserve every bit of snark they get.
Especially TROLLS and/or people who keep trying to change the facts to fit their own theories.
Not specifically aimed at any particular poster.
The National Weather Service has issued a
Flash Flood Warning.
TTWARE is RIGHT.
Elizabeth/Logical Phallacy,
You stated “There is no 100% reliable way to predict with certainty when a downburst (as opposed to a downdraft) is going to hit a fire, *IF* it is even going to do so.”
There actually is – and that is by watching the smoke column and feeling a “sprtiz of rain” or even light hail, indicating the downburst is approaching. The downbursts and downdrafts will push the smoke down, just as they did on the 1990 Dude Fire and on the YH Fire. Firefighters from the Sun City West FD utilized this technique to know when it was time for them to get out of the Shrine area. FF Darby Starr credited this indicator/warning technique to hearing about it at the AZ Wildland Fire Academy in Prescott when someone recounted the anecdote of how it was used SUCCESSFULLY on the 1990 Dude Fire. Starr recounted that day as follows: “He was talking about the weather conditions he was experiencing, the fire behavior he was seeing. He mentioned he got spritzed with rain, and that was just strange enough for him to turn around and go back the other direction. He had been headed right for the guys who were burned over,” Starr recalled. “At the Yarnell Hill fire, I started seeing that strange fire behavior.”
http://www.scwfire.org/index.asp?Type=B_PR&SEC={F4FE4EEB-5876-4E01-BCCB-669A006CABC1}&DE={3C56CA33-8D8E-40E0-858D-D1C62EEC0395}
WTKTT also placed this same ‘otflow boundary’ warning above for ‘several WFF on the YH Fire’ above in his WantsToKnowTheTruth says February 25, 2015 at 9:30 pm post.
Just accept the FACT that the GMHS had plenty of warning, yet they f***ed up and f***ed BAD and paid for it with their lives.
The Sun City West article failed to post properly above so here it is below
“Sun City West Fire District employee Darby Starr wins national honor Tuesday, July 22, 2014 at 6:05 PM
Sun City West firefighter Darby Starr accepts the VFW’s National Firefighter of the Year award from Post 10695 Cmdr. Jim Katzenberger at the SCW Fire District administration building.
Sun City West firefighter Darby Starr accepts the VFW’s National Firefighter of the Year award from Post 10695 Cmdr. Jim Katzenberger at the SCW Fire District administration building.
By Jeff Grant, DAILY NEWS-SUN Posted: Friday, July 18, 2014 7:42 am | Updated: 9:30 am, Fri Jul 18, 2014. –
The spritz of rain was the final warning sign for Darby Starr.
As the Fire District of Sun City West’s engine boss for wildlands fire assignments, Starr and three colleagues — one each from Sun City West, Peoria and Glendale — had seen the late-afternoon winds become terribly erratic as they helped fight the Yarnell Hill blaze on June 30, 2013. Starr noticed what seemed to be fire moving in the opposite direction of where it had been headed all day. He even thought he heard some claps of thunder.
Then came the spritz of rain.
“As soon as I felt that rain, that’s when I decided we needed to pull out,” he said.
It was a decision colleagues believe prevented further loss of firefighter lives in the blaze that claimed 19 members of the Granite Mountain Hotshots in the deadliest day for U.S. Forest Service firefighting since 1933.
It also earned Starr, 42, the Veterans of Foreign Wars’ National Firefighter of the Year Award, one of the VFW’s highest honors bestowed on public safety and public service workers throughout America. The VFW also recognizes police, paramedics and teachers each year, said Post 10695 Commander Jim Katzenberger following a ceremony Thursday honoring Starr at Sun City West Fire District headquarters.
“These people directly serve our communities, and keep us safe and sound. They’re the backbones who hold our country together,” Katzenberger said.
Starr, fellow Sun City West firefighter Coy Boggler and two others — one each from Peoria and Glendale — were part of a 10-member task force called to Yarnell Hill early the morning of June 29, 2013, to join other firefighters from throughout the state, including the Granite Hill team and the Blue Ridge Hotshots, fighting the blaze.
Initially, the team thought it would be there for two days at most. Then, conditions deteriorated rapidly the afternoon of June 30. The unpredictable winds, intense heat and shift in fire movement left the Granite Mountain team with nowhere to go but their deployed fire shelters, where they were overrun by the flames and heat.
Assigned to cut fireline between homes and the flames, the Brush 103 crew worked on, unaware at first of the Granite Mountain team’s plight but with Starr taking note of conditions and becoming increasingly concerned for the men’s safety.
“I was at the front of the line, right against this hill. It was about 200 feet high. I kept watching fire that seemed to be moving in the opposite direction it had been moving all day. I set a ‘trigger point,’ which was when the fire topped the hill, it was time to go. Shortly after that, I heard thunder. I got that spritz in the face, I turned around, looked at the hill, and fire was over the hill. I told my guys, ‘Let’s go.’”
As he led the team away from the scene along a planned escape route to a safety zone, the veteran of 20 years wildlands firefighting recalled conditions he had never seen.
“I’d never experienced that kind of fire heat. I’d never seen fire heat so violent. It was astonishing to see exactly how violent this could be and the rate it was moving at. Even in our safety zone, we were crouching behind our truck because of the heat waves we were getting.”
Another veteran Sun City West firefighter and paramedic, Coy Boggler, recalled his team’s leader’s calm under “immense pressure,” instructing the crew to remain together as it made its way through dense brush toward the truck.
“The fire and smoke bore down on us, creating an incredibly tense trek. Captain Starr remained calm and collected. Had Captain Starr not ordered our expedited retreat to the truck, I believe we may have been trapped and would have to deploy our shelters,” Boggler stated in a written report.
“Both of the other two firefighters and myself feel Captain Starr prevented a second tragedy.”
It was not until the next morning that the Brush 103 crew would learn officially that their colleagues from Granite Mountain had perished, although Starr said a lack of information on their status during the tense late-afternoon hours June 30 raised suspicions that something had gone wrong.
Starr credited experience and training for his decision-making, including a story from a wildfire academy earlier last year, part of the Sun City West’s year-round wildlands-firefighter training.
As the academy director addressed his class, he discussed June 1990’s Dude Fire near Payson, which killed six firefighters and until Yarnell Hill had stood as the worst loss of firefighter life in Arizona wildlands firefighting history.
“He was talking about the weather conditions he was experiencing, the fire behavior he was seeing. He mentioned he got spritzed with rain, and that was just strange enough for him to turn around and go back the other direction. He had been headed right for the guys who were burned over,” Starr recalled. “At the Yarnell Hill fire, I started seeing that strange fire behavior.”
SCW Assistant Fire Chief Tim Van Scoter, another veteran wildlands firefighter, said Starr’s actions reflect on his leadership and recognize the kind of work done by many district members throughout the year.
“Firefighters don’t look for this recognition. It’s nice when it comes. That’s not why they did what they did that day. They didn’t even know it was going to be submitted.”
“I’m very honored,” said Starr. “We were just doing our job. I don’t feel like I did anything extraordinary. But to be recognized by my friends, my co-workers and the VFW is an honor,” he said.
An organization formed 115 years ago to provide social, financial and emotional care to veterans returning from combat, the VFW includes 10,000 posts throughout the world. Each nominates an individual for the organization’s annual awards. Recipients are selected after careful review in a several-step process, said Katzenberger.”
Calvin,
I think it was you that requested a YouTube clip showing crews in a SZ as the fire burned around them, This one will have to suffice until I find the precise one I’ve been searching for.
This is a video clip of the August 13, 2007 Cascade Complex on the Boise NF in central Idaho. This is video of the fire actually burning AROUND the Fire Camp. The IMT and the ensuing highly biased Investigative Report used the euphemism of a “Burn Around” – a first – to cover for the IMT’s incompetence. Numerous Crews and Overhead had told the IMT that the Fire Camp was in direct alignment when the numerous fires surrounding the Fire Camp grew together on several occasions, but to no avail. These fires eventually did grow together and align with the Cascade Complex Fire Camp just as the Crews and Overhead had accurately predicted. The Fire Camp in this case was in essence a SZ and a quite large one at that, so you’ll get the idea as you watch it.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RLJYigWchf0
Someone even had T-shirts made of the event and the IC was quick to stop the sale of them as quickly as he could to quell any further embarrassment to him and his IMT for NOT heeding the accurate and timely warnings.
Bob said
I believe we were discussing with Calvin using the Black as the number 1 SZ used by Fire Fighters and retreated to quite often ..
Never got to where he was going on that discussion. or if it related back to GM and their decision to leave the Black.
Bob, Thanks
I was just saying that I (as a nonWFF) I am looking for video evidence of a hotshot crew, sitting in the black as extreme fire behavior rages around them.
Bob said
Like the pictures of GM at their break spot in the black. If they had stayed there they probably would have got some interesting pictures—-OR A LOT OF SMOKE and nothing else—–
See above. It just seems like other hotshot crews (better than GMH?) would have posted those videos as extreme fires raged upon their SZ. As you say either the images are truly amazing, or, they are smoke filled. I agree that the smoke filled images would NOT make you tube. The other ACTION videos, should make “the cut”
I guess I am wondering, all things consider ,WHY GM were expected to be fighting the fire DIRECT, while the other resources were going INDIRECT?
Calvin,
You asked why GMHS was expected to go DIRECT while all others were expected to go INDIRECT.
The GMHS were going direct because they could. The piece of line they were assigned to had made its run(s) and ‘laid down’ enough were they could go direct, right on the fire’s edge. Others that had to go indirect didn’t have those opportunities because the fireline was too active and/or too hot to work right on the fire’s edge. One of the issues with indirect line is that it must be fired out in order to be safe and effective.
Marsh/Steed were also FORCED to go direct.
There original PLAN ( and the one they were actually executing when they all arrived on on the ridge ) was to go INDIRECT and ‘tie in’ the black that was there with the two-track road. That’s exactly what they started doing.
Air Attack Rory Collins didn’t like what he was seeing… and he directed two SEATS to drop retardant directly on GM’s indirect burnouts… FORCING them to change tactics and then go DIRECT.
ADOSH was never able to either contact or interview the elusive Mr. Rory Collins.
PDF page 23 of the SAIR…
Timeframe: 9:00 AM – Before GM hikes to the ridge.
Lookout ( Brendan McDonough ) later recounts: the weather would be “superhot and windy,” structures are threatened, and escape routes will be into the black or back to the carriers. The lookout also recalls the crew’s assignment is to establish an anchor point, then determine whether to go direct along the black or to go indirect and burn off a two-track road.
PDF page 24 of the SAIR…
Timeframe: Circa 11:00 AM
On the east side, fire activity picks up a bit and the rest of the crew slowly burns off adjacent to the two-track road, keeping pace with the fire.
As the Granite Mountain IHC continues its burnout, DIVS A and Air Attack discuss options. Air Attack directs two SEAT drops at 1136 and 1145 directly onto the burnout. DIVS A is frustrated. This is not what he wanted but he has Granite Mountain IHC shift tactics and go direct along the fire’s edge.
A good question on their assignment——–
The fire had laid down to out across the area they were assigned line needed to be built
along the black edge from an anchor point to tie in with the Eastern side of the fire.
There was no way on the side hill to put dozer line with all the rocks. So a Hand Crew Job.
They could have made better time had the Air Attack allowed them to burn out areas as they went. Fire dose not burn in a strait line so you have figure burning by cutting across from finger to finger and burning the live fuel pockets in-between you can make better progress on the line construction. In other words 1 chain of line and burn out verses following the black around building 6 chains of line.
In order to contain the Fire a crew or crews needed to get hand line in on the open line.
One thing we discussed earlier was according to line construction charts 1 hot shot crew
could not construct the line in the shift they had and the assignment given them.
Hanging out constructing Line up on the mountain if the fire got under them all they had to do was retreat to the Black.
They could no longer build line at 1530 as the fire was loose and starting to wrap around and eventually go across under them their hand line was totally compromised at the time they were at the break spot in the Black.
So many Fire Fighters like my self and others on here and not on here look at the same thing we have seen in our carriers and question WHY would GM leave a good black Safety Zone
in that situation. Sooner or later that flaming front they were looking at was going to move across the landscape below them. All the known and trained for indicators were there
Serious bells and warnings going off and yet they moved ignoring all the signs and Safety measures.
**
** WHAT ADOSH IS DEMANDING TO SEE FROM ARIZONA FORESTRY
This is a quick ‘breakdown of what is actually in that legal document which just appeared in the ADOSH ALJ hearing file… which represents the latest legal action in the case of Arizona Forestry trying to contest the ADOSH citations.
That latest document ( updated February 23, 2015 ) is here…
https://docs.google.com/file/d/0B6N47Z5CNR-CV3cyRkdFcmk2cG8/edit?pli=1
What we are seeing now in this ALJ Hearing file is the ADOSH lawyers making specific “Production of Document” requests to Arizona Forestry, and Arizona Forestry now has ‘objections’ to ALL of those requests and is filing legal documents to that effect and informing ALJ Judge Michael A. Moseso.
This is a SHORTENED version of that document for the purposes of just making it clear what ADOSH is now ASKING Arizona Forestry to produce.
Even just the REQUESTS from ADOSH are ‘telling a story’ and indicating the ADOSH lawyers know about some things that aren’t really public information yet.
NOTE: In these legal documents… Arizona Forestry refers to ITSELF using the acronym ASFD ( Arizona State Forestry Division ).
The FIRST part of the document is simply where Arizona Forestry is telling Judge Mosesso that they object ‘in general’ to ALL of the requests because they say they are ‘vague’ and ‘burdensome’ and ‘not likely to lead to admissible evidence’… yada… yada… yada.
Nothing unusual there. Just the usual lawyer bullshit you expect to see associated with ‘Requests for Production of Documents’ filings.
—————————————————————————–
RESPONDENT’S ( Arizona Forestry’s ) RESPONSES
TO COMPLAINANT’S ( ADOSH’s ) FIRST SET OF REQUESTS
FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS.
( Case assigned to the Honorable Michael A. Mosesso )
* General ASFD objections being applied to ALL of the requests…
Respondent ( ASFD ) generally objects to EACH of the requests herein to the extent that each request seeks information or documentation shielded from disclosure by any applicable privilege, including the attorney-client privilege and attorney work product doctrine.
Respondent (ASFD) also generally objects to EACH of the requests herein as vague, overly broad, unduly burdensome, compound, and not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
———————————————————————————-
Okay… that’s pretty much the ‘411’ for Arizona Forestry’s GENERAL OBJECTIONS which they will then repeat ( ad inifintium ) along with each and every ADOSH ‘Request for Production of Documents’.
Now here is the SHORT list of those requests from ADOSH without the repeated ‘general objections’… and only the ‘specific’ objections to each of ADOSH’s requests.
Actually… here is the SHORT-SHORT list of those ADOSH ‘Document Production’ requests…
01 – A privileged response log file.
02 – Entire ASFD file related to Yarnell Fire.
03 – Entire ASFD file related to ADOSH citations.
04 – All documents internal to ASFD related to Yarnell Fire.
05 – All documents internal to ASFD related to ADOSH citations.
06 – All intergovernmental agreements for all agencies at Yarnell.
07 – All documents related to Yarnell worker’s comp injury and death claims.
08 – All documents reviewed/relied upon by ASFD relating to citations.
09 – All documents related to ASFD’s relationship with Dr. Tom Zimmerman.
10 – All information ASFD relied on to even contest ADOSH citations.
11 – All information about why ASFD claims it didn’t know full situation in Yarnell.
12 – All correspondence between ASFD, Scott Hunt, and SAIT team.
13 – All presentations ASFD knows about… including Mike Dudley’s in Utah.
14 – All documents related to ASFD Dispatch Center radio recording capability.
15 – All mobilization plans between ASFD and other public agencies for 2013.
Some very interesting ones are…
** 09 – All documents related to ASFD’s relationship with Dr. Tom Zimmerman.
This is revealing. It proves that ADOSH already knows that Arizona Forestry has been relying heavily on this Dr. Tom Zimmerman guy… and seem to have him on payroll to help them fight ADOSH.
This Zimmerman guy is currently head of the International Association of Wildland Fire (IAWF).
More about him later. He has (apparently) been ‘secretly’ advising Arizona Forestry about how to handle the Yarnell incident from day one… and he runs in the same circles as US Forestry employee and SAIT Co-Lead Mike Dudley.
But Zimmerman was NOT ever listed as being involved with the actual SAIT investigation.
** 13 – All presentations ASFD knows about… including Mike Dudley’s in Utah.
ADOSH already knows all about this infamous presentation of Mike Dudley’s to that roomful of firefighters in Utah on June 20, 2014. This the one where Dudley was revealing that the SAIT itself knew a LOT more than ever appeared in any report or in their own investigation notes… including the ‘multiple people’ that reported hearing this ‘argument’ between Marsh and Steed.
ADOSH wants to know ‘all about it’… and what OTHER ‘presentations’ to ‘roomfuls of firefighters’ might have gone on of a similar nature.
** 14 – All documents related to ASFD Dispatch Center radio recording capability.
ADOSH knows that this whole issue of whether Arizona Forestry’s Dispatch Center still has radio recordings that might have never seen the light of day yet has never been fully resolved… and they want all the documents related to this and the Dispatch Center’s actual capabilities.
So here is now just the SHORT list… with each FULL request from ADOSH and just the specific objections ( other than the general bullshit ) being claimed by Arizona Forestry…
** ADOSH – REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 1
** Produce a privilege log for Respondent’s ( ASFD’s ) interrogatory responses
** and its responses to requests for production.
Respondent (ASFD) objects to preparing a privilege log that individually lists communications prepared by or sent to or from the Attorney General’s Office or outside counsel, as those documents are undeniably privileged.
** ADOSH – REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 2
** Produce the entire file of the Arizona State Forestry Division
** regarding the Yarnell Hill Fire of June 28, 2013 to July 10, 2013.
Arizona State Forestry Division (ASFD) has previously produced to ADOSH many of the documents in ASFD’s possession for the timeframe requested. Submitted concurrently herewith are emails between ASFD employees and to and from ASFD employees to third parties. See documents bates numbered ( List of ASF0000xxxx documents is then supplied in the text ).
In addition, ASFD has three (3) large boxes of files relating to the the Incident Management Team. The documents are available for review during normal business hours.
** ADOSH – REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 3
** Produce the entire file of the Arizona State Forestry Division
** regarding ADOSH’s Inspection Number L3419-317242683
Respondent (ASFD) has not kept a “file” relating to the Inspection and has only the documents given by ADOSH. Some communications with ADOSH can be found in the documents provided on DVD with this production as set forth in ASFD’s Response to Request for Production #1.
** ADOSH – REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 4
** Produce all documents and recordings reflecting communications among or
** documents sent to, received by, possessed by, or reviewed by the Arizona State
** Forestry Division in connection with the Yarnell Hill Fire.
See response to Request Nos. 2 and 3.
** ADOSH – REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 5
** Produce all documents reflecting communications among or documents sent to,
** received by, or reviewed by the Arizona State Forestry Division in connection with
** the citations arising out of Inspection Number L3419-317242683.
See response to Request Nos. 2 and 3.
** ADOSH – REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 6
** Produce all documents reflecting intergovernmental agreements with agencies who
** appeared at, assisted with, or participated in suppressing the Yarnell Hill Fire of
** June 28, 2013, to July 10, 2013.
See list of agreements with the various agencies, bates numbered ASF 000900/ADOSH through ASF 000903/ADOSH. As the list is extensive please advise ASFD of which agreements ADOSH would like and ASFD will work to provide ADOSH with the agreements.
** ADOSH – REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 7
** Produce all documents, claims, notices of claim status, and notices of death benefits
** involving worker’s compensation benefits for any firefighter, or family member of a
** firefighter arising from the deaths or injuries suffered during the Yarnell Hill Fire of
** June 28, 2013 to July 10, 2013.
Respondent (ASFD) is still working to obtain the information and information will be provided when obtained. ASFD does not possess documents relating to workers compensation claims or benefits for the firefighters or firefighter’s families.
** ADOSH – REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 8
** Produce all documents reviewed by or relied upon by the Arizona State Forestry Division
** concerning the citations arising from Inspection Number L3419-317242683.
See responses to Requests No. 2, 3, 5, and 6. See also documents provided on DVD and bates numbered ( List of document names ). In addition, ASFD is in the latter stages of the preparation of a comprehensive atlas consisting of a set of maps and indicies depicting the location and direction of the fire and the location of the resources assigned to the fire at selected times on June 30, 2013.ASFD will produce those documents upon completion.
** ADOSH – REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 9
** Produce all documents received from or sent to Dr. Tom Zimmerman by the Arizona
** State Forestry Division and all communications between the Arizona State Forestry
** Division and Dr. Tom Zimmerman including but not limited to those regarding his fee
** arrangement with Arizona State Forestry Division, hours billed, and compensation paid.
ASFD has sent Mr. Zimmerman the SAIT report, the ADOSH Citations, Inspection Worksheets, Inspection Narrative, and the Wildland Fire Associates Report, all of which have been produced.
** ADOSH – REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 10
** Provide all statutes, standards, case law, and reference materials relied upon to
** deny that Arizona State Forestry Division committed the citations issued as a
** result (sic) ADOSH Inspection L3419-317242683.
ADOSH’s Request for Production is objectionable because it seeks material protected at this stage of the case by the attorney work product doctrine and is premature. ADOSH has not produced sufficient discovery to justify its allegations and Respondent (ASFD) obviously has the opportunity to identify and present all of its documents and authority in response to ADOSH’s allegations. In addition, the request is objectionable to the extent that it seeks documents that have been printed utilizing Westlaw or other copyrighted services, as photocopying the documents might infringe upon the copyright interest or subscription terms for such services. In a timely manner and in conformance with the normal procedural process of litigating OSHA cases, Respondent (ASFD) will provide appropriate arguments and authority as the briefing in this case occurs.
** ADOSH – REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 11
** Provide any and all written or recorded documents upon which you rely that Arizona
** State Forestry Division did not know that suppression of extremely active chaparral
** fuels was ineffective, that Arizona State Forestry Division did not know that the wind
** would push active fire towards non-defensible structures, and that Arizona State
** Forestry Division did not know that that firefighters working downwind needed to
** be promptly removed from exposure to smoke inhalation, burns, and death.
ASFD hereby requests that ADOSH re-word the Request so ASFD can determine the documentation sought by ADOSH in Request No. 11.
** ADOSH – REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 12
** Provide any and all written or recorded documents to and from Arizona State
** Forestry, Arizona State Forester Scott Hunt, or his agents with the Serious
** Accident Investigation Team (SAIT) or any of its members including
** but not limited to direction, advice, warnings, and the focus for SAIT’s
** investigation of the Yarnell Hill Fire of June 28, 2013, to July 10, 2013.
See documents provided on DVD, bates numbered ( list of document names ).
** ADOSH – REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 13
** Provide any and all written or recorded documents of any presentation by SAIT
** or any of its members , the Arizona State Forestry Division, or any of its employees
** including but not limited to the presentation to the families of the deceased
** members of the Granite Mountain Hotshot Crew, the presentation to the Greater Salt
** Lake Unified Authority, and the presentation by Jerry Payne.
The members of the SAIT Team were not employees of ASFD. ASFD does not have possession of written or recorded documents other than what ASFD has already produced and documents in ADOSH’s possession that have been produced to ASFD. ASFD also does not have possession of any presentations by SAIT team members. SAIT did a presentation for the GMIHC family members, but ASFD did not record the presentation, nor does it have knowledge of a recording of the presentation. ASFD has no knowldege of the presentation to the Greater Salt Lake Unified Authority, as it was not presented by ASFD. Jerry Payne has not made a presentation during the time period of at least five years prior to the Yarnell Hill Fire through the present. ADOSH provided ASFD with a presentation from Mike Dudley, an employee of the US Forest Service, on September 30, 2014.
** ADOSH – REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 14
** Provide any and all written or recorded documents on, the recording equipment at
** the Arizona State Forestry Division’s dispatch center including but not limited to
** documentation on its condition, operating abilities, and the decision not to repair or
** replace the equipment.
ASFD Dispatch is not a 911 disptatching operation and is not required to record any conversations. In addition, because of bandwidth issues, once a local team takes over the fire, the Dispatching office does not listen to the conversations in many cases. Otherwise, the ASFD Dispatch would have potentially an enormous number of people on the radios at once, degrading the frequencies. Logs are used to reflect who radioed Dispatch and what the person communicated. ASFD has been advised that BLM funded a Rascal Radio recorder that failed sometime in March, 2013. Prior to March, 2013, ASFD had recorded radio and fire reporting lines with loaned radio recorders.
** ADOSH – REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 15
** Produce for (sic) mobilization plans or any other documents from State Forestry
** to other public agencies for 2013.
Respondent responds as follows ( List of documents alread provided ).
END OF ‘REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION’ DOCUMENT SUMMARY
Since this is so OBVIOUS to me, I want to bring this to the top.
I said on FEBRUARY 28, 2015 AT 11:04 PM:
“Elizabeth said:
‘
Marti, down below, Rocksteady, who is actually an FBAN (or the equivalent up north), noted that it is not unusual for a forecast to be WRONG. ‘
Gimme a break, counselor (who is not a meteorologist nor a FBAN}.
I was RAISED by a friggin’ meteorologist who forecasted the weather for the ENTIRE Atmospheric Nuclear Testing Program and the International Balloon Fiesta, both of which had …….
LIVES AT STAKE!
We talked CONSTANTLY about the uncertainties related to forecasting the weather.
You don’t have to tell me that Rocksteady says forecasts can be wrong.
I ALREADY know that!!!
That being said, after about a year and a half of looking at this fire, in my opinion, there was NOTHING in the forecasts that came from Flagstaff to the people on this fire that……..was……..
WRONG.
The fire behaved EXACTLY as it shoulda woulda. given the Flagstaff weather forecast.
So much so that Chuck Maxwell, at the Albuquerque GACC office was seriously UPSET, thinking he REALLY needed to (against protocols) INTERVENE directly into what was happening because…………
he didn’t believe the FIREFIGHTERS were taking the WEATHER FORECASTS SERIOUSLY enough.
It wasn’t the weather forecasts that FAILED.
It was the HUMANS on the fire that FAILED.”
I’m seriously open to someone reliably proving me wrong.
Even though tomorrow I will be fully engaged in my mom’s memorial service and probably won’t be able to reply to anybody’s replies to me until Monday.
Marti,
You’re doing just fine, keep up the good work. You are right on point with these statements: “It wasn’t the weather forecasts that FAILED. It was the HUMANS on the fire that FAILED.” The GMHS was NOT heeding the blatantly obvious weather warnings.
Elizabeth/Logical Phallacy chooses to be selectively ignorant in order to continue to pursue her delusional agenda. Until she either leaves this site or seeks the mental health therapy she so desperately needs she will not change. She enjoys trying to suck the life out of those that disagree with her.
Reply to Marti Reed post on March 1, 2015 at 12:00 am
>> Marti said…
>>
>> It wasn’t the weather forecasts that FAILED.
Of course not.
>> Mart also said…
>>
>> It was the HUMANS on the fire that FAILED.
Unfortunately… yes.
The TROLL know as ‘Elizabeth’ ( counselor ) is probably going to continue to push her misguided agenda about how could anyone expect these professional WFF firefighters to have known about all the things that good professional WFF firefighters SHOULD have anticipated in order to stay alive… but it’s a dead-end street.
You can actually take ALL the ‘forecasting’ and throw it out the window… and there is STILL proof that the LEADERSHIP of Granite Mountain just “wasn’t paying attention”.
According to the SAIT itself… at 1615 ( 4:15 PM ) Granite Mountain was STILL just hiking SOUTH on that high-ridge two-track and STILL had the BEST VIEW OF THE FIRE and what it was now DOING than anyone in the entire area… except for the guys up in the airplanes.
At the SAME TIME… ( 1615 / 4:15 PM ) Blue Ridge Captain Trueheart Brown says that ALL of the weather events and fire behaviors that would eventually kill those men were ALREADY HAPPENING.
** From Blue Ridge Captain Trueheart Brown’s Unit Log…
———————————————-
1615 – OUTFLOWS begin. Fire starts to increase ROS DRAMATICALLY moving to the SOUTH… VERY QUICKLY and SPOTTING. (xxxxxxx) the thunderstorm has significant DOWNDRAFTS 20+ MPH and these are DRAMATICALLY increasing fire behavior, PUSHING things to the SOUTH.
———————————————
In that SAME time period ( prior to and during the FF evacuation sequence ) SPGS1 Gary Cordes testified to ADOSH that the fire was ALREADY ‘spotting ahead of itself to the SOUTH’ at least a HALF-MILE.
Again… ( according to the SAIT ) this would have been BEFORE those men even decided to walk down a dangerous fuel-choked drainage chute into an equally dangerous box-canyon filled with explosive fuel with the fire now MUCH less than a mile away.
So at 1615 ( 4:15 PM )… no weather FORECASTING was needed.
If they ( the leadership of Granite Mountain ) weren’t aware of what was happening… it isn’t because this kind of fire behavior is ‘unpredictable’.
It was ALREADY HAPPENING… even BEFORE some critical decisions were made.
No ‘predictions’ or ‘assumptions’ required.
They died because they weren’t paying proper attention to their circumstances, following all the rules of their profession… OR bothering to properly consult with other GROUND and AIR resources.
THAT is the story that the EVIDENCE tells us or anyone who bothers to look at it.
There is still a ‘gross negligence’ component involved here that isn’t going to just ‘go away’.
BOB says
I believe we were discussing with Calvin using the Black as the number 1 SZ used by Fire Fighters and retreated to quite often ..
Never got to where he was going on that discussion. or if it related back to GM and their decision to leave the Black.
Bob, Thanks
I was just saying that I (as a nonWFF) I am looking for video evidence of a hotshot crew, sitting in the black as extreme fire behavior rages around them.
Bob said
Like the pictures of GM at their break spot in the black. If they had stayed there they probably would have got some interesting pictures—-OR A LOT OF SMOKE and nothing else—–
See above. It just seems like other hotshot crews (better than GMH?) would have posted those videos as extreme fires raged upon their SZ. As you say either the images are truly amazing, or, they are smoke filled. I agree that the smoke filled images would NOT make you tube. The other ACTION videos, should make “the cut”
I guess I am wondering, all things consider ,WHY GM were expected to be fighting the fire DIRECT, while the other resources were going INDIRECT?
Elizabeth said
One of GM’s tasks was to secure the EAST flank of the fire. Presumably they could only do that if the fire was to the WEST of them, no?
Are you saying that at 4pm and beyond GM were still trying to keep the fire to the west of them?
Calvin, I’m so sorry – I seem to have confused things in trying to make the point that there was seemingly no wind that ever arrived from the NE at 40 mph. My point was this: “The only point I was trying to think through is this: If you look at where the fireline was at 3:52 p.m.-ish in Chris Mckenzie’s pictures, and you hit that fire with a 40 mph wind from the NE, it is going to push the fire to the SW. Take the fireline as it exists at 3:52-ish p.m., and reverse it to the SW. Is the BSR in that line of push to the SW? Not as I am seeing it. As I am seeing it, if that predicted 40 mph NE wind had hit the fire as it existed in the Mckenzie pictures, it would have pushed the fire AWAY from the BSR. No?”
Sorry for the confusion. (If your question remains, I can try to answer it, but that was not the direction in which I was going. Sorry!)
Moving these to the top here rather than have them separately ‘lost in the weeds.’
rocksteady says February 28, 2015 at 10:44 am
“Any decent wff/crew boss/DIV sup/ops/ic always have MORE THAN 1 ESCAPE ROUTE OF PLAN B.” (EMPHASIS ADDED)
In response Elizabeth says February 28, 2015 at 11:11 am
” …. Also, NOBODY appears to have had FOUR POSSIBLE ESCAPE ROUTES PLANNED (based on what I am reading in the materials I have obtained). … I CAN TELL YOU FOR SURE THAT DID NOT HAPPEN ON THE YHF WITH ANY CREW OR TASK FORCE OR WHATEVER FOR WHOM I HAVE RECORDS.” (EMPHASIS ADDED)
So, breaking this down, Rocksteady mentions the common use of only ONE ALTERNATIVE ESCAPE ROUTE OR PLAN B. Yet, in typical Elizabeth/Logical Phallacy fashion, she declares that BASED ON HER RECORDS … nobody (Crew or Task Force) had “FOUR POSSIBLE ESCAPE ROUTES PLANNED.” That’s quite an impermissible leap or non-sequitor to go from ONE ESCAPE ROUTE TO FOUR POSSIBLE ESCAPE ROUTES.” Rocksteady mentions only ONE and then Elizabeth/Logical Phallacy fallaciously increases the number and comes back with FOUR. So, she is correct in that NOBODY had FOUR POSSIBLE ESCAPE ROUTES PLANNED. How do you do that? You just seem to make it all up as you go or what?
Regarding the “UNFAIR TO THE DECEASED” argument. They are deceased because of their poor decisions and actions. They failed to follow the most BASIC WFF Rules of LCES and left a perfectly good SZ at the worst possible time WITHOUT a REQUIRED LOOKOUT. In other words, Bad Decisions With Prior Good Outcomes. In order to truly benefit from Lessons Learned and determine WHY this happened, we must always delve into uncomfortable and controversial areas to accomplish that. Political correctness has NO place in these matters. I’m with Marti on this one and also “find that attitude to be quite OFFENSIVELY PATRONIZING.”
Regarding the Wildland Fire LLC webinar on Downdrafts and such, researcher Brian Potter, talking primarily about Plume Dominated Fires, mentions in his “Profound Closing Remarks” segment at 38:23 that “LOOKOUTS AND SITUATIONAL AWARENESS ARE THE BEST, SOMETIMES THE ONLY, TOOLS AVAILABLE TO ASSESS PLUME DEVELOPMENT.” (ALL EMPHASIS ADDED).
First off, the YH Fire was NOT a Plume Dominated fire, but was instead a WIND DRIVEN fire driven laterally by very intense outflow winds. The GMHS had the absolute BEST view of the entire YH Fire all day on 30 June 2013, therefore, they SHOULD have had the BEST LOOKOUT SITE AND THE BEST SITUATIONAL AWARENESS of anyone on the entire YH Fire in order to assess the fire plume development and the current and expected fire behavior (Fire Orders #3 and #5) Yet, they made an epic, fatal mistake to leave their perfectly good SZ at the worst possible time, and walk through unburned fuels in chimneys and chutes and ultimately into an unburned, fuel choked bowl, and into the head of the fire approaching the BSR and Yarnell..
Reply to Robert the Second (RTS) post on February 28, 2015 at 3:21 pm
>> RTS said…
>>
>> Regarding the “UNFAIR TO THE DECEASED” argument. They are deceased
>> because of their poor decisions and actions. They failed to follow the most
>> BASIC WFF Rules of LCES and left a perfectly good SZ at the worst possible
>> time WITHOUT a REQUIRED LOOKOUT.
Regardless if ANY other details emerge, even from KEY witnesses that we now KNOW have always been HIDING information from investigators… that is what the current EVIDENCE record tells us ( or anyone who bothers to look at it ).
>> RTS also said…
>>
>> In other words, Bad Decisions With Prior Good Outcomes.
Very possible. As hard as it might be for some people to ultimately accept… it really might turn out that the behavior and the leadership decision making exhibited that day ( which so many other professional WFFs have always been finding inexplicable ) was simply NORMAL behavior for that particular unit… but this time the slot-machine came up all-lemons.
Lesson to Learn?
FIND/IDENTIFY other similar organizations with similar attitudes and practices on the part of the leadership… and REPLACE that leadership before more people get KILLED.
If it’s TRAINING issues… FIX it.
If it’s CERTIFICATION issues… FIX it.
If it’s HIRING / PROMOTIONAL issues… FIX it.
If it’s CULTURAL issues… FIX it.
Common denominator: FIX it.
>> RTS also said…
>>
>> In order to truly benefit from Lessons Learned and determine WHY this
>> happened, we must always delve into uncomfortable and controversial
>> areas to accomplish that. Political correctness has NO place in these
>> matters. I’m with Marti on this one and also “find that attitude to be
>> quite OFFENSIVELY PATRONIZING.”
Only the TRUTH can lead to any kind of real UNDERSTANDING.
And only UNDERSTANDING can lead to the best chance of it never happening again.
I haven’t heard ANYONE yet say ( even the people just riding the political and emotional rails ) say “I hope this happens again sometime”.
>> RTS also said…
>>
>> The YH Fire was NOT a Plume Dominated fire,
No. It was not… even though some personnel on the ground there actually THOUGHT it was.
One of the WFFs on the Sun City Crew was heard to shout out ( during one of the Jerry Thompson videos )…
“Plume dominated fire!”
He was one of the ‘lookouts’ there about 1/2 mile south of the Shrine Road area that failed to give anyone in the Youth Camp or Harper Canyon area any actual warnings at all.
He was UNDERNEATH the column at that time… and was just making assumptions.
>> RTS also said…
>>
>> …but was instead a WIND DRIVEN fire driven laterally by very intense outflow winds.
That is what the EVIDENCE has always shown.
>> RTS also said…
>>
>> The GMHS had the absolute BEST view of the entire YH Fire all day
>> on 30 June 2013, therefore, they SHOULD have had the BEST LOOKOUT
>> SITE AND THE BEST SITUATIONAL AWARENESS of anyone on the
>> entire YH Fire in order to assess the fire plume development and the
>> current and expected fire behavior (Fire Orders #3 and #5)
According to the SAIT itself… at 1615 ( 4:15 PM ) Granite Mountain was STILL just hiking SOUTH on that high-ridge two-track and STILL had ( as you say ) the BEST VIEW OF THE FIRE and what it was now DOING than anyone in the entire area… except for the guys up in the airplanes.
At the SAME TIME… ( 1615 / 4:15 PM ) Blue Ridge Captain Trueheart Brown says that ALL of the weather events and fire behaviors that would eventually kill those men were ALREADY HAPPENING.
** From Blue Ridge Captain Trueheart Brown’s Unit Log…
———————————————-
1615 – OUTFLOWS begin. Fire starts to increase ROS DRAMATICALLY moving to the SOUTH… VERY QUICKLY and SPOTTING. (xxxxxxx) the thunderstorm has significant DOWNDRAFTS 20+ MPH and these are DRAMATICALLY increasing fire behavior, PUSHING things to the SOUTH.
———————————————
In that SAME time period ( prior to and during the FF evacuation sequence ) SPGS1 Gary Cordes testified to ADOSH that the fire was ALREADY ‘spotting ahead of itself to the SOUTH’ at least a HALF-MILE.
Again… ( according to the SAIT ) this would have been BEFORE those men even decided to walk down a dangerous fuel-choked drainage chute into an equally dangerous box-canyon filled with explosive fuel with the fire now MUCH less than a mile away.
>> RTS also said…
>>
>> Yet, they made an epic, fatal mistake to leave their perfectly good SZ at
>> the worst possible time, and walk through unburned fuels in chimneys
>> and chutes and ultimately into an unburned, fuel choked bowl, and into
>> the head of the fire approaching the BSR and Yarnell..
See above.
If they weren’t aware of what was happening… it isn’t because this
kind of fire behavior is ‘unpredictable’.
It was ALREADY HAPPENING… even BEFORE some critical decisions were made.
No ‘predictions’ or ‘assumptions’ required.
They died because they weren’t paying proper attention to their circumstances, following all the rules of their profession… OR bothering to properly consult with other GROUND and AIR resources.
THAT is, in fact, the story that the EVIDENCE tells us or anyone who bothers to look at it.
Agreed. I’d simply add that, not only were there high winds on the YHF that were forecast, developed as predicted, and were observed by GM themselves, but also this is not an unusual weather event for that area that time of year. Dealing with snow in the southeast causes issues in part because people don’t see it that often, so don’t know how to process it. You have thunderstorms roll down off the rim in that part of AZ on a regular basis, and any regular user of the outdoors there should be and normally is mindful of this.
It should be of great interest to everyone whether there was a conscious decision to just race the weather and fire, or if not, what clues exist in the content of the conversations between Marsh and Steed that might explain why they weren’t thinking about what was right in front of them, which was a known, usual, predicted phenomenon. It is as if someone in CA dealing with Santa Anas decided to act as if the forecast Santa Anas, which were in fact blowing, didn’t exist.
To be clear here.
I, as an ic/ops etc never count on only 1 escape route for my people during extreme fire behaviour. Putting all of your faith in only 1 escape route is foolish.
During extreme behaviour I have my people identify, test, flag and time each route, dependant on what direction the fire behaviour tells them that they must use to remain safe.
The policy of my agency is that once we reach a certain threshold, based on the FBAN calculation of fire intensity and rates of spread, in the form of BTU’S per chain per hour. This policy states there MUST be a lookout posted and at least 2 escape routes must be scouted, flagged and timed.
Here is a high level question for you to ponder…..Why are so many US wff entrapped, burned over, shelter deployment, killed over the years compared to Canada?
We can also get extreme fire behaviour, but all provinces teach situational awareness and entrapment avoidance in many courses throughout a wff career. We prefer to walk away and come back the next day to try again, versus trying to win an acknowledged losing battle or non winnable plan A.
Rocksteady, thank you, again, for sharing this insight and question to ponder. Allow me to give you one in return: Does Canada have the same number of hotshot crews per wildland fire that the states have, and are your crews paid the same way?
Back when Bob Powers was on a hotshot crew, there were fewer than 50 or so hotshot crews. There are now over 100 hotshot crews, and they make their money in large part via OVERTIME during the fire season. The 2013 fire season up until June 30 had been a slow one, so, according to one of the wives of the deceased, GM took the YHF assignment rather than staying home in part because the guys were not making the money they were used to making to store up for the non-fire season because the season had been so slow to that point.
Just thinking out loud. So you folks have black-and-white rules, which seem really useful. But I am wondering if you also have the same number of hotshot crews per wildland fire and are they paid the same way (e.g. hourly, relying on overtime to sustain them for the non-fire season)? Just thinking all this through.
Thank you, sincerely, for sharing your expertise and doing so without attacking.
We have over 20 hotshot crews (we call them unit crews) in the province of BC alone.
They are paid the same as the US, regular work hours, then overtime for work outside of core hours.
From the $ standpoint, it would have been beneficial for GM to sit in the black all day, let the fire run, then work it the next day.
If you are all edging tactical and operational decisions are based on the amount of money a crew can maximize, that is a HUGE red flag to me.
Agree you do not last long stretching the fire out to benefit your pocket book.
Rocksteady said: “If you are all edging tactical and operational decisions are based on the amount of money a crew can maximize, that is a HUGE red flag to me.”
Just to be clear, I was not saying that. Rather, I am saying (1) there are far more hotshot crews now than there used to be when Bob was on a hotshot crew- presumably that at least in part puts some sort of pressure on crews in certain circumstances and (2) my understanding is that one of the likely reasons why GM took the YHF assignment is b/c it was a slow fire season and the guys count on making money during fire season to sustain them during non-fire-season.
It may have been a slow season, with more crews available, but you couple that with numerous reports that the season is starting earlier, ending later and fires are more aggressive than they have ever been, an experienced inter agency hotshot crew would know they will get their piece of the pie.
I’m just telling you what one of the family members (or more than one) said. My guys who are WFFs in the S/SW said last year was slow, too. They all made less than normal.
Reply to Elizabeth (counselor) post on February 28, 2015 at 9:39 am
>> counselor said…
>>
>> Hindsight is obviously 20/20, but it is unfair to the deceased for
>> you to try to suggest that you actually were aware of and thinking
>> of downbursts prior to Dr. Brian Potter mentioning them (which,
>> by the way, happened almost two YEARS after GM died).
Fer cryin’ out loud.
counselor… PLEASE come down off that didactic high-horse you are ALWAYS riding and stop being such a mis-informed TROLL.
Anyone who ever read the original SAIR report ( yes, almost TWO YEARS ago ) knows that DOWNDRAFTS / DOWNBURSTS were involved in what happened in Yarnell on June 30, 2013.
You are NOT even remotely presenting any NEW information.
**From PDF page 14 of the
** Yarnell Special Accident Investigation Report (SAIR)
**Published September 28, 2013. ( 74 weeks ago )…
Conditions leading up to the Yarnell Hill Fire consisted of VERY HIGH to EXTREME FIRE DANGER and EXTREME DROUGHT during a transition to the Southwest’s summer monsoon season. During this seasonal transition, temperatures are typically very hot. Relative humidity values remain low but fluctuate as STORMS become more numerous and cloud cover more prevalent. WINDS ARE HIGHLY VARIABLEwith the HIGHEST WIND SPEEDS occurring during THUNDERSTORMS. These storms can generate STRONG DOWNDRAFTS, micro-bursts, outflows, and gust fronts, ALL of which can AFFECT FIRE BEHAVIOR.
**From PDF page 29 of the
** Yarnell Special Accident Investigation Report (SAIR)
**Published September 28, 2013. ( 74 weeks ago )…
OUTFLOW WINDS
When thunderstorms produce rain, hail, or virga (rain that evaporates before reaching the ground), strong DOWNDRAFT winds develop under the storm cloud. The DOWNDRAFTS turn horizontal when they reach the earth’s surface and become “outflow winds.” These winds can reach speeds in excess of 50 miles per hour. An outflow boundary, also called a gust front, is the leading edge of the outflow winds as they move away from the thunderstorms.
**From PDF page 74 of the
** Yarnell Special Accident Investigation Report (SAIR)
**Published September 28, 2013. ( 74 weeks ago )…
WEATHER
The Southwest region of the United States experiences a weather phenomenon known as the Summer Monsoon. The monsoon period represents a switch in wind patterns from a drier westerly flow to a moist southerly or easterly flow. This typically occurs from mid-June through mid-July and generally lasts into September. During the initial stages of the monsoon, drier thunderstorms are dominant but generally give way to larger footprints of wetter storms. GUSTY OUTFLOW WINDS DOMINATE the drier thunderstorm period. Storms typically form over the higher terrain such as the Mogollon Rim and then try to move off the higher terrain as the day progresses. Terrain features pertinent to thunderstorm formation include the Bradshaw Mountains and Mogollon Rim. There is typically a one to two-week period when the moisture shift is dynamic and provides HIGHLY VARIABLE weather.
Temperatures are typically hot just prior to and during this transition. Relative humidity values will start out low and then fluctuate widely as storms and cloud cover become more numerous. WINDS ARE HIGHLY VARIABLE during this period with HIGHEST WIND SPEEDS tied to THUNDERSTORMS.
These winds, known as DOWNDRAFTS, micro-bursts, outflows, and gust fronts, generally deliver ERRATIC WIND SHIFTS and SHORT BURSTS of STRONG SPEEDS.
**From PDF page 75 of the
** Yarnell Special Accident Investigation Report (SAIR)
**Published September 28, 2013. ( 74 weeks ago )…
The Phoenix and Flagstaff National Weather Service (NWS) offices released routine weather balloons to capture atmospheric profiles of temperature-humidity and winds at 0400 MST ( on June 30, 2013 ). These balloons reported increased moisture and instability across the middle portion of the atmosphere, indicating potential for thunderstorm development and a HIGH LIKELIHOOD for STRONG DOWNDRAFT WINDS and SUBSEQUENT OUTFLOWS..
**From PDF page 77 of the
** Yarnell Special Accident Investigation Report (SAIR)
**Published September 28, 2013. ( 74 weeks ago )…
From 1500 to 1530 MST, the FAA radar showed an outflow boundary originating from the thunderstorms to the northeast. An outflow boundary, or gust front, is the leading edge of an outflow wind system caused by DOWNDRAFTS from cumulonimbus clouds.
Agree. Thinking about and discussing being….
“aware of and thinking
>> of downbursts prior to Dr. Brian Potter mentioning them” is seriously NOT NEWS.
And I would REALLY REALLY like to add, from my own perspective of having to contemplate and question a somewhat similar situation regarding my brother, that discussing and questioning why anybody would do something that is increasingly appearing to be dangerously “stupid” is not being “unfair to the deceased.”
I find that attitude to be quite OFFENSIVELY PATRONIZING.
People (including myself) do what appear to be dangerously “stupid” things all the time.
It’s important for them and us to be honest about them.
Especially if they and us are going to learn ANYTHING from them.
YES. This is so important, Marti.
The solution to the cruelty of assuming the dead were ignorant/irrational people is *not* to deny their mistakes. The solution is to study their mistakes, *understanding that we all have blind spots and imperfections, and must constantly fight our own complacencies.* Part of being human is to be ignorant and irrational at times — none of us are above that.
There is a certain cruelty and self-righteousness in telling survivors that these things would never have happened one any of your crews. It should not be confused with the honesty of saying particular practices were not allowed (or typical) on your crews, and are danger signs that should be pointed out for the safety of all. Even conscientious, experienced firefighters make mistakes. I don’t doubt that many of them spend their entire careers never making some of the particular mistakes that were made on the Yarnell Hill Fire. But things are broken enough in our subculture to allow this tragedy, and probably a lot of near fatalities, too (most of us can admit the cause wasn’t some freak weather phenomenon).
The only sensible move forward is to learn from our mistakes. Pretending we are above making mistakes tends to shut down discussion. And it makes those of us still working in fire more vulnerable to f***ups, ourselves. (I do understand that we have someone here who pounces on every admitted imperfection — almost like a trial lawyer — but if we can ignore that burr, I think we’ll have a more trusting, honest, and productive learning experience.)
Thanks to everyone who has kept this forum going, long after I could find any further insights to extract. Marti, I’m sorry you lost your mom — I’m glad she had you caring for her.
Reply to Sitta post on March 1, 2015 at 10:51 am
>> Sitta said…
>>
>> The solution to the cruelty of assuming the dead were
>> ignorant/irrational people is *not* to deny their mistakes.
>> The solution is to study their mistakes,
If you wrapped that your entire comment up above in an email and popped it off to your own MANAGEMENT ( both State and Federal levels )… it might go a long way.
I’m serious. A lot of ‘honest truth’ in there that it is taking WAAY too long to become the ‘general truth’ with regards to this tragic Yarnell incident.
If you read the ‘wrongful death’ lawsuit complaints carefully… you will discover that the sentiments you just expressed are EXACTLY what the families of the fallen are also hoping will come out of this… but they are also being realistic.
They want to see SOME SIGN from MANAGEMENT that they also recognize the ‘way forward’ towards ‘understanding’ and the best attempt(s) to make sure it never happens again.
Marti, my comment was to Bob Powers. It is dishonest for Bob to suggest that he was thinking or talking about downbursts (as distinguished from downdrafts) prior to Dr. Potter’s webinar. Bob wasn’t. To suggest that he was and that “downbursts” were such an obvious topic is dishonest and disrespectful to the families of the deceased, because it suggests that downbursts and their timing were obvious, which they were not.
What the hell we are discussing weather here————–
What is dishonest or disrespectful to the Families here.
To be very clear down bursts and out flows are a basic part of thunder storms and cells that move across the west north west and South west. Again this is a normal occurrence in my life having lived in the west since I was 5.
They are obvious occurrences with these storms year around.
Creating as I have said over and over erratic winds which are forecast with these storms.
You are becoming very delusional in trying to attack and discredit people.
You continue to push the disrespect of families to a total idiocy.
Let me just say I am in contact with 2of the family members who support what I have been saying here. I will leave it at that———–
Bob, as you and WTKTT (aka Fred) seem not to understand, downdrafts are not the same as downbursts.
What ever did I say they were?????????????
Sorry, Elizabeth, you are SERIOUSLY splitting hairs here in a way that is essentially meaningless. (Again).
These various words describe inter-related things, that change and shift and stop and start and are a VERY NORMAL part of southwest thunderstorms (if you had bothered to read my fairly detailed comments below).
The terms are often used fairly interchangeably, in real life, because they describe things that are connected to each other, influence each other, and don’t have exact firewalls between each other.
Along with my careful descriptions downstream, WTKTT also described these terms and relationships very accurately down below even further.
Apparently you didn’t read that, either. Or, apparently, you think you know better. However, you DON’T.
I suggest you actually read what WTKTT (who is nobody but WTKTT here) and take it seriously, because he is RIGHT.
It starts here:
“WantsToKnowTheTruth says
FEBRUARY 26, 2015 AT 5:15 PM
…If you understand anything at all about weather… ‘outflow winds’ from thunderstorms pretty much ALL start as downbursts/downdrafts. ”
http://www.investigativemedia.com/yarnell-hill-fire-chapter-xii/#comment-265182
And after you READ THAT, I encourage you to read his following comment which is EQUALLY ACCURATE:
“WantsToKnowTheTruth says
FEBRUARY 26, 2015 AT 7:48 PM
…VERY often… MORE than just one ( outflow boundary ), which is why anyone who has to monitor this sort of thing for a living or ever have it enter into their own ‘safety concerns’ ( High Rise Window Washers, Firefighters, Airline Pilots, Radio Tower Climbers, Crane Operators, High Rise Construction Workers, etc. etc. etc. ) should NEVER be so foolish as to believe that just because one strong ‘outflow boundary’ hits your area that doesn’t mean there won’t be another one ( maybe even stronger ) shortly after that.
That is ALWAYS possible and could never be considered some kind of ‘freak weather event’.”
http://www.investigativemedia.com/yarnell-hill-fire-chapter-xii/#comment-265246
Marti, down below, Rocksteady, who is actually an FBAN (or the equivalent up north), noted that it is not unusual for a forecast to be WRONG. Moreover, a downburst is far more dangerous on a fire than a downdraft, and, unfortunately, there is no way to predict a downdraft of significant magnitude with any accuracy.
To remind you, at roughly 3:30 p.m., GM heard a radio warning of winds from the NE within the half hour. At roughly that same time, the fire changed direction to the east. GM appears to have sat at least some of their crew down for the next half hour to WATCH the weather and the fire behavior, as would be appropriate (in terms of situational awareness). If you watch the clouds in the videos from the NE, you do not actually see anything that looks like an arriving cell. How long should a crew wait before determining that either the cell is not coming or it has already come, and how should they make that determination, Marti? (To be clear, I do not expect you to answer these questions, in part because neither you nor I have the expertise, but they are worth considering.)
“downdraft of significant magnitude” should be “downburst of ….”
Sorry.
Reply to Elizabeth (counselor) post at
February 28, 2015 at 8:52 pm
You still keep pushing your agenda that there was nothing the two men who led these others down to their deaths could have done to have predicted or known about the absolute deadly conditions that were about to develop in the path of their planned ‘mission’ ( which also involved breaking most of the safety rules of their own profession ).
See below.
>> counselor said…
>>
>> Marti, down below, Rocksteady, who is
>> actually an FBAN (or the equivalent up north),
>> noted that it is not unusual for a forecast to
>> be WRONG.
And all professional WFFs know that.
THAT is why you should never trust them completely and be absolutely SURE that YOU, yourself, what the fire is DOING… and what it MIGHT do.
>> counselor also said…
>>
>> Moreover, a downburst is far more dangerous
>> on a fire than a downdraft,
In what way? They are both, essentially the same thing… and both will kill you just as dead if you are in the wrong place at the wrong time and under the wrong circumstances.
Again… professional WFFs know this.
>> counselor also said…
>>
>> and, unfortunately, there is no way to predict
>> a downdraft of significant magnitude with
>> any accuracy.
And that is why… if there is even the POSSIBILITY of that entering into “Current and expected fire behavior”… you stay the hell out ANY situation where there is even the slightest chance of getting ‘trapped’ by such an event.
Situations such as… taking a stroll down an always-dangerous fuel-choked drainage chute to reach the floor of an always equally dangerous explosive fuel-choked box canyon within less than 1 mile of what you know is an active, dangerous fire… and setting NO lookout while you are doing it.
You know… THAT kinda situation.
>> counselor also said…
>>
>> To remind you, at roughly 3:30 p.m.,
>> GM heard a radio warning of winds
>> from the NE within the half hour.
‘Within the half hour’ in that context means that’s when the event is predicted to START. It NEVER means it’s like a bus going by and once you see it it’s now OK to cross the street without looking both ways.
It was simply the predicted START time of what these men KNEW would be most assuredly be a sustained weather event that was going to dramatically affect the fire from that point on… which it DID.
>> counselor also said…
>>
>> At roughly that same time, the fire
>> changed direction to the east.
As part of its inevitable rotation to the SOUTH, just as the 1530 weather forecast was predicting.
>> counselor also said…
>>
>> GM appears to have sat at least some
>> of their crew down for the next half
>> hour to WATCH the weather and the
>> fire behavior,
Where do you get half-an-hour?
Even the SAIT’s own timeline has them assembling at that final ‘rest spot’ circa 1550 and then DEPARTING at 1604. That’s only 14 minutes.
The TRUE sequence of the MacKenzie photos even suggests the men *might* have ‘gaggled up’ and left that ‘rest spot’ as early as 1556 and Parker simply ‘snuck’ his text transmit out to the network at 1604 as they were ALREADY hiking south.
That’s only SIX minutes.
>> counselor also said…
>>
>> as would be appropriate (in terms of
>> situational awareness). If you watch the
>> clouds in the videos from the NE, you
>> do not actually see anything that looks
>> like an arriving cell.
Fer cryin’ out loud.
Cells do NOT have to be ARRIVING in order for some hellacious ‘outflow boundaries’ to arrive in YOUR area. Look at the actual radar images for ANY ‘outflow boundary’. It is usually WAY out ahead of the ‘cell’… and that’s what makes them so dangerous to people who need to monitor that sort of thing for their own safety.
Your continual demonstration(s) of absolute ignorance in these areas is astounding.
>> counselor also said…
>>
>> How long should a crew wait before
>> determining that either the cell is not
>> coming or it has already come, and
>> how should they make that
>> determination, Marti?
Again… you are just pushing your own ( not so hidden ) ‘agenda’. here.
Q: How long should anyone wait when their life might depend on it?
A: Until they are DAMN sure.
According to Blue Ridge Captain Trueheart Brown’s own Unit Log… EVERYTHING that was happening with the weather and the fire that was going to eventually KILL these men was ALREADY happening at 1615 ( 4:15 PM )… when the SAIT itself says they were still walking up on that high-ridge two-track and had a BETTER view of the fire than ANYONE else on the fire except for the guys in the airplanes.
** From Blue Ridge Captain Trueheart
** Brown’s Unit Log…
———————————————-
1615 – OUTFLOWS begin. Fire starts to increase ROS DRAMATICALLY moving to the SOUTH… VERY QUICKLY and SPOTTING. (xxxxxxx) the thunderstorm has significant DOWNDRAFTS 20+ MPH and these are DRAMATICALLY increasing fire behavior, PUSHING things to the SOUTH.
———————————————
In that SAME time period ( prior to and during the FF evacuation sequence ) SPGS1 Gary Cordes testified to ADOSH that the fire was ALREADY ‘spotting ahead of itself to the SOUTH’ at least a HALF-MILE.
Again… ( according to the SAIT ) this would have been BEFORE those men even decided to walk down a dangerous fuel-choked drainage chute into an equally dangerous box-canyon filled with explosive fuel with the fire now MUCH less than a mile away.
If they weren’t aware of what was happening… it isn’t because this kind of fire behavior is ‘unpredictable’.
It was ALREADY HAPPENING.
No ‘predictions’ or ‘assumptions’ required.
They died because they weren’t paying proper attention to their circumstances, following all the rules of their profession… OR bothering to properly consult with other GROUND and AIR resources.
THAT is the story that the EVIDENCE tells us.
Elizabeth said:
“Marti, down below, Rocksteady, who is actually an FBAN (or the equivalent up north), noted that it is not unusual for a forecast to be WRONG. ”
Gimme a break, counselor (who is not a meteorologist nor a FBAN}.
I was RAISED by a friggin’ meteorologist who forecasted the weather for the ENTIRE Atmospheric Nuclear Testing Program and the International Balloon Fiesta, both of which had …….
LIVES AT STAKE!
We talked CONSTANTLY about the uncertainties related to forecasting the weather.
You don’t have to tell me that Rocksteady says forecasts can be wrong.
I ALREADY know that!!!
That being said, after about a year and a half of looking at this fire, in my opinion, there was NOTHING in the forecasts that came from Flagstaff to the people on this fire that……..was……..
WRONG.
The fire behaved EXACTLY as it shoulda woulda. given the Flagstaff weather forecast.
So much so that Chuck Maxwell, at the Albuquerque GACC office was seriously UPSET, thinking he REALLY needed to (against protocols) INTERVENE directly into what was happening because…………
he didn’t believe the FIREFIGHTERS were taking the WEATHER FORECASTS SERIOUSLY enough.
It wasn’t the weather forecasts that FAILED.
It was the HUMANS on the fire that FAILED.
Go read about Chris Cuoco (sp?) and South Canyon. Then read Simeoni’s essay. The fact that Chuck is upset does not mean that the weather appeared as predicted.
Elizabeth/Logical Phallacy,
The 2013 YH Fire in many ways is a MIRROR IMAGE of the 1994 South Canyon Fire.
Meteorologist Chris Cuoco, like meteorologist Chuck Maxwell, was frustrated with the weather forecast allegedly not being broadcast and/or understood by those on the fireline. This is somewhat inaccurate in that the resources actually had the means to hear the strong winds forecast on their handheld radios.
On BOTH fires, the resources on these fires had (or should have had) the ‘NOAA Weather Channel’ in their radios (162.550 and local variations) programmed into their handheld and/or vehicle radios. This is common knowledge and Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) in the wildland fire world. These frequencies are touted as ‘The Voice of NOAA’s National Weather Service.’
http://www.nws.noaa.gov/nwr/resources/NWR_Brochure_NOAA_PA_94062.pdf
The fact that the GMHS and those on the South Canyon Fire chose to ignore the readily available means to know the forecast weather falls on them – NOT on the NWS meteorologists. The first Fire Order is “Recognize current weather conditions and obtain forecasts.” the NOAA weather channel is one of the key means that WFF use to do this.
** GM HAD THE NOAA WEATHER
** CHANNEL ON THEIR RADIOS
Reply to Robert the Second (RTS) post on March 1, 2015 at 10:00 am
>> RTS said…
>>
>> On BOTH fires ( Yarnell and South
>> Canyon), the resources on these
>> fires had (or should have had)
>> the ‘NOAA Weather Channel’ in
>> their radios (162.550 and local
>> variations) programmed into their
>> handheld and/or vehicle radios.
>> This is common knowledge and
>> Standard Operating Procedure
>> (SOP) in the wildland fire world.
>> These frequencies are touted
>> as ‘The Voice of NOAA’s National
>> Weather Service.’
http://www.nws.noaa.gov/nwr/resources/NWR_Brochure_NOAA_PA_94062.pdf
>> The fact that the GMHS and those
>> on the South Canyon Fire chose
>> to ignore the readily available
>> means to know the forecast
>> weather falls on them – NOT on
>> the NWS meteorologists. The first
>> Fire Order is “Recognize current
>> weather conditions and obtain
>> forecasts.” the NOAA weather
>> channel is one of the key means
>> that WFF use to do this
Whether they ( Marsh/Steed/Crew ) were payiing ANY attention to the NOAA Weather Channel remains a mystery… but there is CONFIRMATION ( from Brendan McDonough ) that they DID normally have that channel punched into all the GM radios.
At the following point in Brendan’s first ADOSH interview, ADOSH investigator Barry Hicks is going over with Brendan what he was actually doing for most of the afternoon down there at his lookout mound position.
Brendan verifies that he did, in fact, have the standard (public) NOAA Weather Channel punched into his radio and he WAS hearing about the weather that way. He describes listening to the exact ‘computerized voice’ that is used by the NOAA Weather Channel reporting the ‘local’ weather.
PDF Page 18 of Brendan’s first ADOSH interview on August 20, 2013
Q1 = Barry Hicks, ADOSH investigator
A = Brendan McDonough
—————————————–
760 Q1: Were you noticing any – did you notice any change in the winds
761 as the day progressed, ah, either direction or strength, um, or?
762
763 A: I’d say we had winds between five and ten. Consistently out of south,
764 southwest and they didn’t shift until moments after the weather came over the
765 radio.
766
767 Q1: You mean when they – they announced the thunderstorms building – how did
768 they – how did they say that over the radio?
769
770 A: It’s almost like a computer voice. What the weather is in the local areas.
——————————————-
You are some ‘piece a work’, counselor.
Why don’t you cut to the chase here and tell us all what the POINT of all this is instead of burning up more real estate with your constant didactic/judgemental moral spew.
What are you TRYING to say with regards to the incident itself?
Are you actually trying to say that some heretofore unknown and unexpected DOWNBURST is what caused the deaths… and there’s no way they could have known that wasn’t a possibility?
That’s the ‘agenda’ you keep pushing, right?
That there’s no way these men could have been expected to know what was possible as they went for their little stroll in that powderkeg?
The only way they could NOT have known that was a possibility is if they were 19 tourists on a bird-watching hike from someplace where there never any thunderstorms or fires.
Even Tex (Sonny) Gilligan KNEW what could happen in that very area upwards of THREE HOURS before it happened… and he has no ‘red-card’ or has ever even called himself a professional firefighter.
Kudos to EN. This is her best effort yet to distract, divert, and destroy a particular discussion line.
I’ll agree with WTKTT, that taking this fork in the road is using up an amazing amount of “real estate”, along with time, effort, and research, for something that is nothing more than a wild goose chase with a purpose.
I’ll bet hardly anyone can remember what we were discussing just prior to her jumping in, as if on cue.
I believe we were discussing with Calvin using the Black as the number 1 SZ used by Fire Fighters and retreated to quite often ..
Never got to where he was going on that discussion. or if it related back to GM and their decision to leave the Black.
“To suggest that he was and that “downbursts” were such an obvious topic is dishonest and disrespectful to the families of the deceased, because it suggests that downbursts and their timing were obvious, which they were not”
That is just complete and utter horseshit.
I suggest you go back to being a law professor and quit trying to pretend to the world that you are some kind of reliable source of weather and weather-related fire behavior expertise.
You’re NOT. You have actually no clue about what you are talking about in any kind of meaningful way. You’ve demonstrated that repeatedly here.
And this comment is the icing on the cake.
I’ve been responding because it’s been awhile since we discussed this and I think maybe some people reading here might benefit from reading this conversation and various peoples attempts to explain what was going on.
Others may also be confused.by the things you’re confused by. I don’t hold that against anybody. But your tone, as if you’re somehow more knowledgeable about these things than people like Bob is actually incredibly, disrespectful, given that you clearly really don’t know what you are talking about.
Other than that, you have added nothing of any value or reliability to this conversation.
So my case is now closed and I’m done with this conversation. I actually HAVE learned some things from it, and I appreciate what various certain people have offered to it.
DONE
You are welcome, Marti.
In the meanwhile, since you are unclear about the difference between a downburst and a downdraft, I suggest you watch Dr. Brian Potter’s recent webinar (posted on the Wildland Fire Lessons Learned Center website). Fred quotes Potter here as a reliable source, and Potter differentiates between downburst and downdraft. Given that Potter has a doctorate in meteorology or some such, it seems prudent for folks to consider his view.
To that end, Marti, what is your view of Viegas’s and Siemoni’s comments on the South Canyon Fire as they parallel to the YHF? Have you read their work yet? I have. 🙂
I am not even remotely “unclear about the difference between a downburst and a downdraft”
One more thing: Both Esquibel and one of the Blue Ridge guys (I forget which one) state that the wind was out of the NW at roughly the time of the deployment.
B;lue Ridge Captain Trueheart Brown also reported to Blue Ridge Superintendent Brian Frisby that the work on the ‘Cutover Trail’ wasn’t going to succeed because there had been at least THREE major wind shifts in just a matter of minutes.
So what?
What is your actual POINT with all of this stuff?
** From Blue Ridge Captain Trueheart Brown’s Unit Log…
NOTE: According to the Arizona Forestry’s SAIR itself… at 1615 Granite
Mountain hadn’t even reached the saddle yet up on that high-ridge two-track
and they STILL had the best view of the fire ( and everything Captain Brown
now says was starting to happen ) of anyone there that day just short of
the guys up in the airplanes.
1615 – OUTFLOWS begin. Fire starts to increase ROS DRAMATICALLY moving to
the SOUTH… VERY QUICKLY and SPOTTING. (xxxxxxx) the thunderstorm has
significant DOWNDRAFTS 20+ MPH and these are DRAMATICALLY increasing
fire behavior, PUSHING things to the SOUTH. We continue to drive up the 2
track to see how much time we have. It becomes obvious that the current
plan ( improving the Cut-Over trail ) will NOT WORK. I call (Travis?) and tell
him to DISENGAGE the crew and head to the trucks.
** From PDF page 9 of the SAIT Yarnell Investigation Notes ( YIN )
** Interview with Blue Ridge Hotshots Frisby, Brown, Fueller and Ball
** Regarding the plan to use the “Cutover Trail” as a firebreak…
“I don’t think this plan is going to work, this is the 3rd wind shift.”
NOTE: The THIRD wind shift. The fire was ROTATING AROUND and
constantly shifting until it eventually headed due SOUTH.
The only point I was trying to think through is this:
If you look at where the fireline was at 3:52 p.m.-ish in Chris Mckenzie’s pictures, and you hit that fire with a 40 mph wind from the NE, it is going to push the fire to the SW. Take the fireline as it exists at 3:52-ish p.m., and reverse it to the SW. Is the BSR in that line of push to the SW? Not as I am seeing it. As I am seeing it, if that predicted 40 mph NE wind had hit the fire as it existed in the Mckenzie pictures, it would have pushed the fire AWAY from the BSR. No?
You have continually demonstrated that you have absolutely no concept of ‘fluid dynamics’ and/or fire behavior.
You (apparently) also have no ability to even visualize what happened that day even
though hundreds of videos and photos are there ( before / during and AFTER the blowup ) to SHOW you what DID happen.
So why are you even trying to ‘think your way through this’.
You do NOT have the skills and/or ability to do so.
So I sat and stared at Google Earth with the “sun” at about 4 PM, to get a better feel of the topography, which is harder for me to read on GE than on a topo, which I don’t have.
I think the mistake you are making, as I wrote down below, is to equate what the GM photos/videos are showing, with the entirety of the “flaming front” of the whole fire.
It DOES look as if that BIT of the “flaming front” they are capturing, is burning a bit from the northwest to the southeast. I think that’s a topographic micro-effect, because the whole REST of the fire was being pushed, by the thunderstorm, from the northeast to the southwest, as it was also rotating in a clockwise direction.
AFTER that point, all the rest of the fire was still coming ESSENTIALLY from the northeast to the southwest, as it pushed over the ridge above Shrine Road and the rest of the top of the bowl as it extends westward, and from there, down into the bowl under those winds which were ESSENTIALLY pushing the whole “flaming front” to the southwest, where everything near the Boulder Springs Ranch was directly in its path.
I wrote many moons ago that I believed the “wiinds from the west” thing was, also a topographically influenced micro-effect. Like I said earlier, this is the way it happens all the time under a major thunderstorm cell in the southwest, and, I would add, ESPECIALLY in complicated canyon country. The winds can blow one way for ten minutes and then switch to a completely different direction, depend on what they are blowing over, under, around, and through.
And then, pile on top of that complicated situation, the macro- and micro-effects of the rotating fire column itself.
It’s complete witching hour. That’s why you HEAD FOR COVER.
So, looking at Chris’ photos/videos or hearing someone saying the winds were blowing (at the time they said it) from the west, really doesn’t say much of a heck of a lot about much of anything, to be honest.
The whole fire is moving from northeast to southwest, and Boulder Springs Ranch, et al, is directly in its over-all path.
That never changed.
I need to bring this to the top:
“Elizabeth says
FEBRUARY 28, 2015 AT 11:07 AM
Marti, the main Air Study videos do not show the Shrine Road area until just minutes before the deployment, right? I will go back and watch them – what are you telling me to be looking for?
Those videos showed, I thought, that the fire was essentially WEST and north of GM at the time of Mckenzie’s 3:52 p.m. videos, such that a NE wind would have pushed the fire AWAY from the Boulder Springs Ranch. Am I missing something.”
Reply
“Marti Reed says
FEBRUARY 28, 2015 AT 12:18 PM
You have got to be kidding me.
Do you know the difference between east and west???
The fire was NEVER “essentially” west of Granite Mountain. Never that entire day.”
And the fire was not even REMOTELY “essentially” west of Granite Mountain at the time of the MacKenzie photos and videos.
Marti, let’s try this again, shall we:
One of GM’s tasks was to secure the EAST flank of the fire. Presumably they could only do that if the fire was to the WEST of them, no?
I looked at my maps and then tried to clarify what I was saying up above, Marti. Thanks for pushing me on it.
No.
They were at the very bottom mini area on the southwest corner of the fire, where it had started.
The fire had burned and grown from that point in an increasing v-shape to the northeast. They were securing that bottom east flank of the fire. But they were still on the southwest corner of the fire.
And from there, the fire was, always, essentially, to the northeast of them.
It’s kind of like a wedge of a circular wheel of cheese. The arc of the cheese is at the northeast. One side of the wedge is kind of pointed essentially north with a bit of a tilt to the northeast. The other side of the wedge is pointed to the northeast.
GM is on the bottom (southwest) angle spot of the wedge. They are working from that bottom spot up that east side (flank) of the wedge as it extends to the northeast.
“Elizabeth says
FEBRUARY 27, 2015 AT 8:44 AM
…
If those winds had actually come as predicted, they would have pushed the fire to the SW, which would be AWAY from the Boulder Springs Ranch (which was to the SE).”
To the southeast of exactly what?
“Again, if the predicted outflow boundary winds had actually come to pass and hit the fire, they would have pushed the fire AWAY from the BSR.”
Until you can say the above with any credibility (including factoring in the topographic elements), you need to answer the question I asked above.
Marti, in answer to your question, the BSR was to the SE of the flaming front (meaning the flaming front that we see in Chris McKenzie’s pictures, in Brian Lauber’s pictures, etc.). So if the winds were going to push incredibly HARD (e.g. 40 mph) from the NE, they would have pushed the fire AWAY from the BSR. NE winds at 40 mph would push the fire toward the SW, generally speaking, NOT toward the BSR, which was to the SE.
P.S. Marti, I am sorry, again, about the loss of your mom. I am sure she was incredibly proud of you and you gave her much joy. Peace to you and Terra.
Look at a Goddam map———
BSR was on the S, SW side of the fire..
S, SE was Yarnell
I will add More.
BSR is located just inside sec.10 SW 1/4
It is close to the Line of Sec.9 where the deployment site is slightly NW of
the BSR.
Section 11 to the east is Glen Isla and to the East of Glen Isla is Yarnell.
So running from east to west you are at the BSR. in the South/ South West
area of the fire.
Laid out on a Map the NE corner and SW corner lay at a angel across the map running thru BSR in the GUESS WHAT SOUTH WEST CORNER.
BAISED ON THE MAP THE NE WIND WAS BLOWING TOWARDS >>>>>>BSR
Any decent wff/crew boss/DIV sup/ops/ic always have more than 1 escape route or plan B.
With the predicted wind event, which it would bring squirrely winds, the discussion at the briefing (be it at the ICP or just the GM crew brief should have gone down like this….
“If the wind comes from the East, we go into the safe black, if it comes from South, we go West, if it comes from West, we stay black, if it comes from West we go to 2 track..”…. or whatever the predetermined tactics are….
This should have been followed by “We are in extreme conditions, a big cell may be coming, everyone keep eyes on the fire and monitor the weather. If wind or fire behaviour changes, you call me on intercrew frequency ASAP.. Understood?????””””
Rocksteady, you are talking about the morning briefing, I take it? Why do you suppose there wasn’t a red flag warning? Also, nobody appears to have had four possible escape routes planned (based on what I am reading in the materials I have obtained). If you, Rocksteady, are saying that that is supposed to be the norm when working on a wildland fire in the SW, I can tell you for sure that that did not happen on the YHF with any crew or task force or whatever for whom I have records.
Not standard policy, bu
t an experienced crew leader would do it, in order to keep their crew safe.
I hear you, Rocksteady. Thank you. Thank you for explaining (and thanks for being nice about it – I am grateful).
Bob Powers says FEBRUARY 28, 2015 AT 10:08 AM
“Look at a Goddam map——— BSR was on the S, SW side of the fire..
S, SE was Yarnell”
Bob, go back to Chris Mckenzie’s pictures. Draw a line on a map of where the fire is in those pictures (at roughly 3:52 p.m.). Then pretend a wind of 40 mph is hitting that fire from the NE. Is the fire going to move TOWARD the BSR or AWAY from the BSR, based on where the fire is at that time?
So looking at the Fire pictures and the known fact that the fire was to the old grader and north to the old burn area ( hand line) the fire line then ran into Yarnell.
From the old grader draw a line SW to the BSR I still do not see your argument. The Fire was moving West South West pushed by a North East wind—- Yes it was moving towards the BSR..
.
If that dose not satisfy you look at the fire burn maps which all show a basic —SW burn direction— as the fire progressed across the unburned fuel bed. The fire spread in a north and south direction as it burned towards the SOUTHWEST. and WEST.
Did you look at the map I suggested you review? Evidently not—-
Based on the out come the NE wind pushed the Fire thru the BSR devouring every thing in its path — In roughly 40Min.
What is your point????????????????
Bob, I thought you said you were going to ignore me. I believe you stated that multiple times. Were you lying about that? 😉
No just continually trying to correct an idiot who wants to change the facts to fiction.
I will not stand by and allow you to manipulate the truth. as most others here are not going to either.
I do not like you your methods or your manipulation.
Your personal attacks on my friends or me.
I hope that is plain enough.
Bob, you said you were going to ignore me. It seems like you were lying about that, right?
Reply to Elizabeth ( counselor ) post on
February 28, 2015 at 1:14 pm
>> counselor said…
>>
>> It seems like you were lying about that, right?
counselor… you really DO need some help.
You come across on this forum as more than just the garden variety TROLL. You take it to another level.
Please take the (honest) advice others have already given you about that… and go find some.
Until the moderator of this forum realizes you ARE just a TROLL with some kind of ‘agenda’ to obfuscate, disrupt and conduct personal attacks and the moderator sees fit ( hopefully soon because it is WAAAY overdue ) to start BLOCKING your posts…
I stand with Mr. Powers.
I will also continually try to correct an idiot who wants to change the facts to fiction.
I will also not stand by and allow you to manipulate the truth or pursue your mysterious agenda.
Clear?
Fred Schoeffler, nobody was talking to you! 🙂
Perhaps you missed Mrs. Pfingston making clear the toll Bob Powers is taking.
(If there was any doubt that WTKTT is Fred Schoeffler, that doubt might well be gone at this point, no?)
She has totally lost it continuing to answer her
is a attempt at futility.
Elizabeth/Logical Phallacy,
It certainly appears that you have COMPLETELY lost it now! You are even more delusional than I thought. Isn’t it a requirement that attorneys and.or law professors be of “sound mind?” No?
There is a method to her madness, and I’m surprised you all didn’t recognize that long ago. Just ignore her, and her rants will carry no weight.
WTKTT has said, “don’t feed the trolls”, but he and the rest of you continue to feed this one, over, and over. and over again.
Hating to beat an already dead argument more to death (all things considered–sorry for the terrible metaphor but it fits), but I’ve been kind of detoured this week all things considered. So I wanted to ask you that question.
I agree with Bob. Look at a map. If Boulder Springs Ranch was southeast of the thing you call the flaming front (as you say from the photographs), how do you account for the fact that a major chunk of Glen Isla ( a skip and a jump southeast of BSR) burned down, probably quite a few more pieces of Yarnell would have if it hadn’t been for the retardant drops, the Shrine on Shrine Road burned down, and the fire swept through Boulder Springs Ranch, itself? Oh yes and also the grader and the place where the vehicles were parked.
I’m just not seeing, on the map, what you are saying, at all. Have you even looked at Yarnell on the most recent iteration of Google Earth? It turned around and burned, headed toward the southwest from where it was threatening the Command Post , Model Creek Road, and Sickles Road,
Me thinks the problem is that you have WAY too narrow of a definition of “the flaming front.” The part you see in the photos is only one small piece of the “the flaming front” of that fire at that time.
And thanks for the condolences.
And, PS, Elizabeth, have you watched the Air Study Air 2 Air video? You can see the column rotating and you can see the various “flaming fronts” as it does so. You can see it hit the Shrine Road area. And you can see it hit the Boulder Springs Ranch area, and start flamng up the bowl. You can see it. It’s right there.
Marti, the main Air Study videos do not show the Shrine Road area until just minutes before the deployment, right? I will go back and watch them – what are you telling me to be looking for?
Those videos showed, I thought, that the fire was essentially WEST and north of GM at the time of Mckenzie’s 3:52 p.m. videos, such that a NE wind would have pushed the fire AWAY from the Boulder Springs Ranch. Am I missing something.
You have got to be kidding me.
Do you know the difference between east and west???
The fire was NEVER “essentially” west of Granite Mountain. Never that entire day.
One of GM’s tasks was to secure the EAST flank of the fire. Presumably they could only do that if the fire was to the WEST of them, no?
How about the fire was East and North also south of GM rest site.
Elizabeth you are totally backwards on your COMPASS.
I hear you. I suppose the only point I am trying to think through is that, if you look at where the fireline was at 3:52 p.m., and you hit it with a 40 mph wind from the NE, it is going to push the fire to the SW. Is the BSR in that line of push? Not as I am seeing it. As I am seeing it, if that predicted NE wind had hit the fire as it existed in the Mckenzie pictures, it would have pushed the fire AWAY from the BSR. No?
See other comments above.
You have continually demonstrated that you have absolutely no understanding of fluid dnamics and/or fire behavior.
If you are NOT capable of understanding what DID happen that day by studying the hundreds of photos and videos ( and reading the reports )… there is nothing anyone can do for you here on this forum.
Typo above. Should have read like this…
You have continually demonstrated that you have absolutely NO understanding of FLUID DYNAMICS and/or FIRE BEHAVIOR.
PS: Please do NOT post back asking what FLUID DYNAMICS has to do with FIRE. That would be beyond absurd.
**
** CITY OF PRESCOTT MIGHT STILL APPEAL *ALL* RECENT GM BENEFIT DECISIONS
Just about 48 hours ago… it became clear that Prescott’s Public Safety Personnel Retirement System (PSPRS) Board had FINALIZED ( and codified ) their January decision that Granite Mountain Hotshots Sean Misner and William Warneke WERE eligible for ALL pensions and benefits… and they sent that WRITTEN decision over to City of Prescott Attorney Jon Paladini.
The City of Prescott now has 35 days to decide whether to APPEAL that decision and try to get OUT of paying those benefits to the widows of Misner and Warneke.
Jon Paladini refuses to say whether Prescott is GOING to do that, or not.
Paladin ALSO reminded everyone that the previously ruled-on Andrews Ashcraft benefits still aren’t a ‘done deal’ as far as he and the City of Prescott are concerned.
Apparently… even though a Judge upheld that previous PSPRS Board decision and ruled in Ashcraft’s favor some time ago… that decision was ‘from the bench’ and Paladini is saying they haven’t received the actual ‘written notification’ of the Judge’s decision yet. When that arrives… Paladini says the City of Prescott will STILL have 30 days whether to decide to still try and appeal THAT Ashcraft decision as well.
The very BOARD that ( by law ) is entitled to MAKE these decisions has ALREADY decided all THREE of these cases… ( and a Judge has already RULED on the Ashcraft decision ) but Jon Paladini still won’t say if the City is STILL going to try and get out of having to pay ANY of the money or supply ANY benefits to the widows of their own deceased firefighters.
More games to come.
If this is what the City of Prescott meant following the tragedy when Prescott officials said “We always take care of our own”… then someone remind me (again) to NEVER take a job in that podunk, penny-pinching poor excuse for a City.
The Prescott Daily Courier
Article: Fire board issues official decision on Misner/Warneke retirement claims
Published 2/24/2015 6:00:00 AM by Cindy Barks
From this latest February 24 article…
———————————————————————————
PRESCOTT – With a written decision on Feb. 23, Prescott’s fire retirement board made it official: Fallen Hotshots Sean Misner and William Warneke were eligible for the Public Safety Personnel Retirement System, starting on their first day of work.
Later, City Attorney Jon Paladini said he had received the written comments – setting off a 35-day appeal period for the city.
Neither Paladini nor Mayor Pro Tem Chris Kuknyo were certain Monday afternoon when the matter might go before the Prescott City Council, although Paladini said it likely would not occur this week.
(Because Mayor Marlin Kuykendall serves as the chairman of the local PSPRS retirement board, he has chosen in the past not to take part in the discussion about possible city appeal of the board’s decisions.)
Kuknyo said Monday afternoon that the council likely would discuss the matter first in executive session.
Any decision to appeal the board’s decision on the Misner and Warneke benefits would have to take place in public session, Paladini noted.
Along with the appeal decision on Warneke and Misner, a decision is also pending on whether the city will appeal Yavapai County Superior Court Judge David Mackey’s earlier affirmation of the retirement benefits for the family of fallen Hotshot Andrew Ashcraft.
Paladini said the city will have 30 days after Mackey’s signed written decision to decide whether to appeal THAT decision to the Arizona Court of Appeals.
———————————————————————————
Here is the link to the actual February 24, 2015 Prescott Daily Courier article mentioned above…
http://dcourier.com/m/Articles.aspx?ArticleID=142186
Elizabeth is and has stuck to this stupidity for a long time.
So I do not know what her out come is? Did GM get caught in a Canyon above BSR and Get burned over.
Did the fire move across the land scape and burn over BSR? Did the Fire Burn into Glen Isla and destroy severial Residences?
All those answers are yes———-
One more time when a down push wind hits a flaming front it spreads the fire in at least a 180% area
It is laying the flames into the fuel bead 20 MPH to 50 MPH it is going to lay the fire across the land scape. It is not like pushing a single finger in one direction which you seem to be fixated on.
The wind was a critical part of the spread of the fire but many factors spread it in different directions. All in a general direction of S/SW/W and burned back up the canyons to the N and NW.
Exactly.
Although I think you meant to say:
“One more time when a down push wind hits a flaming front it spreads the fire in at least a 180 degree area”
…when you said:
“One more time when a down push wind hits a flaming front it spreads the fire in at least a 180% area”
This stuff happens all the time here. We get forecasts of thunderstorm-cell-generated downdrafts and such, and we experience winds going every which way, depending on what they hit, what they bend around, etc etc etc, even if the forecast says “prevailing winds out of the northeast” or such.
Which is why, when it happens, I agree it’s time for everybody in the general direction of where the weather and fire are headed to get Out Of The Way.
There were a number of people on this fire who realized that.
You can get all “counting the number of angels on the head of a pin” about “formulas” etc. In real life, it’s fairly pointless. You seek cover. Afterwards the fire behavior analysts model it and whatever.
It’s exactly the same stuff in flying hot air balloons. If the winds are over 15 knots at the surface (regardless of which direction), you tell the pilots, “You need to know, despite everything (including the officials who may be looking at a million or two million dollar loss and don’t like that), this is NOT a morning to fly. PERIOD.”
Same thing as tornadoes. When the sirens go off you head for the basement.
The meteorologists don’t know exactly which complicatedly winding path the tornado will take, but they kinda sorta know which general direction it will head.
The storm chasers follow the tornado, knowing the general direction it will go. And sometimes they (RIP) get killed doing that, because the relative micro-moves of the tornado are relatively unpredictable at the time. While others go home to model the tornado on their computers to learn more about them because……….science.
With weather, you have to understand the difference between relatively macro and relatively micro.
I don’t see a molecule of difference, in this regard, as we discuss the weather-related fire behavior on the Yarnell Hill Fire.
I bet this even holds true regarding the weather that surrounds Columbia University. I bet people who oversee fighting structure fires near Columbia University probably have to know a bit about this, also.
Because……….physics.
And because………….safety.
PS I’m a seriously-hardcore-meteorologist’s daughter.
PS It’s snowing HARD right now in Albuquerque.
If I were on Twitter right now, I’m 75% sure I would see all the local and regional meteorologists currently jumping for joy that their otherwise often wishfully optimistic (we need every molecule of precipitation these days that we can get) forecasts of relatively heavy snow in the Albuquerque area are coming true.
But they would NEVER (at least given the current state of technology and forecasting and formulas and such) have been able to predict how much snow would fall near Kathryn and San Mateo where I live.
But that’s why there’s a whole program here of having local residents collect precipitation levels near their houses and report that information.
Because…………….Science. Which is, at least here in the southwest, influenced by Drought.
Clarification:
When I wrote:
“jumping for joy that their otherwise often wishfully optimistic (we need every molecule of precipitation these days that we can get) forecasts of relatively heavy snow”
That refers to the EXISTENTIAL FACT that, even meteorologists (who are human first) can, kinda sorta, get their forecasts a bit skewed by their personal orientations.
Which may be related to why, while the Flagstaff meteorologist was simply sending out terse weather bulletins, Chuck Maxwell, the fire meteorologist at the Interagency Southwest Coordinating Center in Albuquerque, was totally agonizing (and still is) about how he felt he needed to INTERVENE that fateful Sunday, June 30, because he didn’t think the fire-fighters were taking the WEATHER, and its implications, SERIOUSLY enough.
Bob, this is the first time that you have referred to the downburst. Never before have you used that parlance or even suggested that the wind was anything other than a linear phenomenon from the NE. Indeed, you had suggested previously that you thought the wind first came from the W, then the N, then the NE, then the E, etc. What you are suggesting now is a new viewpoint for you to articulate, presumably informed by Dr. Brian Potter’s passing comment and my mentioning it here. Please do not try to pretend that you somehow were of this view previously.
Hindsight is obviously 20/20, but it is unfair to the deceased for you to try to suggest that you actually were aware of and thinking of downbursts prior to Dr. Brian Potter mentioning them (which, by the way, happened almost two YEARS after GM died).
The Front as it passes a given area has a clockwise rotation A 50 MPH wind can also Carrie down bursts with it I ha on many occasions spent time on a Lookout as well as a mountain top and experienced all of what we are talking about. I have as well witnessed the same on fires. No 20/20 hind site unless you want to call my 33 years as a FF and my pre and post years living in the mountains another 38 years in western mountain storms less than evidence. Then I would say for some one with no western mountain experience you seem to have all the answers and really have no clue.
With strong weather cells and high winds normally come down bursts Did it happen I do not know dose it happen yes. The real point is any predicted wind of 20 plus MPH is serious and will raise hell with any fire. What part of ERRATIC WINDS DO YOU NOT UNDERSTAND???? I have said that all along it includes a lot of different wind actions on a Fire.
Nothing New in your professors down burst theory it happens quite often’
I have not seen any info to say it did on Yarnell but biased on my Background and knowledge it would not surprise me.
Reply to Elizabeth (counselor) post on February 28, 2015 at 9:39 am
>> counselor said…
>>
>> Hindsight is obviously 20/20, but it is unfair to the deceased for
>> you to try to suggest that you actually were aware of and thinking
>> of downbursts prior to Dr. Brian Potter mentioning them (which,
>> by the way, happened almost two YEARS after GM died).
Fer cryin’ out loud.
counselor… PLEASE come down off that didactic high-horse you are ALWAYS riding and stop being such a mis-informed TROLL.
Anyone who ever read the original SAIR report ( yes, almost TWO YEARS ago ) knows that DOWNDRAFTS / DOWNBURSTS were involved in what happened in Yarnell on June 30, 2013.
You are NOT even remotely presenting any NEW information.
**From PDF page 14 of the
** Yarnell Special Accident Investigation Report (SAIR)
**Published September 28, 2013. ( 74 weeks ago )…
Conditions leading up to the Yarnell Hill Fire consisted of VERY HIGH to EXTREME FIRE DANGER and EXTREME DROUGHT during a transition to the Southwest’s summer monsoon season. During this seasonal transition, temperatures are typically very hot. Relative humidity values remain low but fluctuate as STORMS become more numerous and cloud cover more prevalent. WINDS ARE HIGHLY VARIABLEwith the HIGHEST WIND SPEEDS occurring during THUNDERSTORMS. These storms can generate STRONG DOWNDRAFTS, micro-bursts, outflows, and gust fronts, ALL of which can AFFECT FIRE BEHAVIOR.
**From PDF page 29 of the
** Yarnell Special Accident Investigation Report (SAIR)
**Published September 28, 2013. ( 74 weeks ago )…
OUTFLOW WINDS
When thunderstorms produce rain, hail, or virga (rain that evaporates before reaching the ground), strong DOWNDRAFT winds develop under the storm cloud. The DOWNDRAFTS turn horizontal when they reach the earth’s surface and become “outflow winds.” These winds can reach speeds in excess of 50 miles per hour. An outflow boundary, also called a gust front, is the leading edge of the outflow winds as they move away from the thunderstorms.
**From PDF page 74 of the
** Yarnell Special Accident Investigation Report (SAIR)
**Published September 28, 2013. ( 74 weeks ago )…
WEATHER
The Southwest region of the United States experiences a weather phenomenon known as the Summer Monsoon. The monsoon period represents a switch in wind patterns from a drier westerly flow to a moist southerly or easterly flow. This typically occurs from mid-June through mid-July and generally lasts into September. During the initial stages of the monsoon, drier thunderstorms are dominant but generally give way to larger footprints of wetter storms. GUSTY OUTFLOW WINDS DOMINATE the drier thunderstorm period. Storms typically form over the higher terrain such as the Mogollon Rim and then try to move off the higher terrain as the day progresses. Terrain features pertinent to thunderstorm formation include the Bradshaw Mountains and Mogollon Rim. There is typically a one to two-week period when the moisture shift is dynamic and provides HIGHLY VARIABLE weather.
Temperatures are typically hot just prior to and during this transition. Relative humidity values will start out low and then fluctuate widely as storms and cloud cover become more numerous. WINDS ARE HIGHLY VARIABLE during this period with HIGHEST WIND SPEEDS tied to THUNDERSTORMS.
These winds, known as DOWNDRAFTS, micro-bursts, outflows, and gust fronts, generally deliver ERRATIC WIND SHIFTS and SHORT BURSTS of STRONG SPEEDS.
**From PDF page 75 of the
** Yarnell Special Accident Investigation Report (SAIR)
**Published September 28, 2013. ( 74 weeks ago )…
The Phoenix and Flagstaff National Weather Service (NWS) offices released routine weather balloons to capture atmospheric profiles of temperature-humidity and winds at 0400 MST ( on June 30, 2013 ). These balloons reported increased moisture and instability across the middle portion of the atmosphere, indicating potential for thunderstorm development and a HIGH LIKELIHOOD for STRONG DOWNDRAFT WINDS and SUBSEQUENT OUTFLOWS..
**From PDF page 77 of the
** Yarnell Special Accident Investigation Report (SAIR)
**Published September 28, 2013. ( 74 weeks ago )…
From 1500 to 1530 MST, the FAA radar showed an outflow boundary originating from the thunderstorms to the northeast. An outflow boundary, or gust front, is the leading edge of an outflow wind system caused by DOWNDRAFTS from cumulonimbus clouds.
At roughly 3:27 p.m. on June 30, 2013, weather predictions were conveyed over the radio at the YHF warning of strong winds within the half hour possibly from the north or northeast.
If those winds had actually come as predicted, they would have pushed the fire to the SW, which would be AWAY from the Boulder Springs Ranch (which was to the SE).
Again, if the predicted outflow boundary winds had actually come to pass and hit the fire, they would have pushed the fire AWAY from the BSR.
You have continually demonstrated that you have absolutely no grasp on fluid dynamics and fire behavior. It is barely even possible for those who DO to explain to you the misconceptions you continually seem to be holding in your head… so please ‘give it up’.
If you want to make positive contributions to this ongoing discussion… please stick to things that you ARE capable of understanding.
Regarding “push vs. pull”:
After thinking about it, and thinking about it, and thinking about it some more, I have come to the conclusion that under those conditions, I don’t believe ANYONE could be prodded to descend into THAT bowl by someone who had never before seen what they (the crew) were then looking at from the top.
I think the standard response back to someone ‘pushing’ them to do that, would be, “NO, YOU NEED TO SEE THIS! We’ll wait here until you catch up to us”.
To me, the only logical conclusion is that, they were convinced by someone who had already traveled on, scouted, and flagged, that portion of their ‘pre-determined escape route”.
In the comment above perhaps “still had not seen” would be a better phrase than “had never before seen”, to read thus:
“I don’t believe ANYONE could be prodded to descend into THAT bowl by someone who still had not seen what they (the crew) were then looking at from the top.
Repl,y to The Truth Will Always Remain Elusive (TTWARE) post
on February 27, 2015 at 8:16 am
>> TTWARE said…
>>
>> Regarding “push vs. pull”:
>>
>> After thinking about it, and thinking about it, and thinking
>> about it some more, I have come to the conclusion that under
>> those conditions, I don’t believe ANYONE could be prodded to
>> descend into THAT bowl by someone who had never before seen
>> what they (the crew) were then looking at from the top.
Good observation and yes… I would think that was probably the case.
I mean… have you LOOKED at those STEEP CLIFFS in the Frenandez photos
right there back at the anchor point where they had been working all day?
We’re talking CLIFFS. One extra step in the wrong place and you are DEAD.
Now… the topography on the EAST slope(s) of the Weavers was different and
more sloping… but how could they have been sure there wasn’t some kind
of hellacious DROPOFF there at the WEST END of that box canyon.
Again… referring to photographs taken just after the disaster.
When you are standing up on that two-track the ground just FALLS AWAY from you
and it’s impossible to really tell what that ‘downslope’ looks like.
Unless someone had TOLD them it was a fairly steep, but manageable downslope ( and no dropoffs or cliffs )… they would have been nuts to just start walking EAST towards the BR from that Descent Point.
Even stopping and taking the time to consult Google Maps on their smartphones
would not have made them SURE it wasn’t an extremely DANGEROUS descent.
So yea… that’s a very realistic theory and adds to the mounting evidence that Marsh must have been somewhere AHEAD of Steed/Crew that afternoon.
At roughly 3:27 p.m. on June 30, 2013, weather predictions were conveyed over the radio at the YHF warning of strong winds within the half hour possibly from the north or northeast.
If those winds had actually come as predicted, they would have pushed the fire AWAY from the Boulder Springs Ranch, according to where the fire was located in the pictures taken by Chris McKenzie.
What am I missing?
I suggest you are missing a compass and some orientation either on the photo’s or the maps you have in front of you.
I think to simplify it (I know nothing of weather or fire effects really)
The photo’s of fire from the rest stop are looking towards the North East (could be anywhere between North and East).
BSR is South West of where they are.
Therefore winds FROM the North/North East (i.e. behind the fire) will drive it South/South West.
Though probably not that simple at all – happy to have someone tell me otherwise.
The Boulder Springs Ranch was southEAST of where GM was, so winds from the NE would have pushed the fire AWAY from where they were headed.
You’re right – happy to be corrected – BSR was SE from them.
However, this might help;
http://media.outsideonline.com/images/Fire-map_full.jpg
Very basic I know, but I think it illustrates it very well
Nope – that map is taken from the SAIR fire progression map, which we know is wrong.
The pictures from the SAIT dump and the Channel 15 videos show that the SAIR fire progression map is wrong. (Heck, Hulburd’s videos and True Brown’s GPS records help make that clear.)
I always thought it was the timings that were incorrect in the original fire progression map, not the directions.
I wasn’t using the picture to illustrate timings – but to illustrate orientation, namely the direction that the fire FRONT (the line of fire, not just a spot of fire) came from, places where GMHS had been, and where BSR was relative to each other.
of course the path of the fire IS going to be dependent on things other than just the wind direction.
Otis— as well said as you can that is the wind direction.
The real problem That Elizabeth has had a problem with is as the front moves the
down push or out push winds rotate they do not stay consistent wind rotation is a normal part of a front even if it is severial miles from the Fire.
When the Weather service predicts Fire weather of this magnitude pay attention.
The wind was coming a half hour or an hour Be prepared.
As for BSR they were in the path of the fire all day the total Brush field between them and the fire front with nothing to stop the fire.
The WIND arrived and the fire went ballistic. Predictable and predicted.
McKenzie picture’s are a stark reality of the fire behavior at that time. Fire swirls, a 2 mile FIRE front with smoke collapsing to the ground and back only 3/4 of a mile from the canyon they are about to walk down. 10 plus foot brush 40% dead heavy growth Manzanita. !00 plus temperatures low humidity’s in the teens all that was needed was a 15 MPH plus wind out of the NE /E blowing the fire across the Flats and yes right at Glen Isla and BSR. The Fire front ran across the mountains from
GM’s hand line to Glen Isla it was not one single finger it was a 2 plus Mile Fire front moving West/Northwest/South West Across an unburned fuel bed the wind and topography were predicting how it burned.
Bob, according to what guys like you, Fred, and Rocksteady say, a wind from the NE across the flats is going to push fire to the SW. That would have pushed the fire AWAY from the Boulder Springs Ranch.
But yet that is NOT what happened.
A lot depends on the size of the cell and its angle of approach.
A cell poushing down directly from above should make all sides of the fire equally, however if teh cell is coming in at an angle, you could have greater winds at teh angle it is aiming at to become the head. The flanks may push sideways at a faster rate of spread and in directions that make them resemble a head as well.
Wind is only one factor here Elizabeth.
You are correct, in a PERFECT table top flat fire with continious and homogenous fuel loading and fuel type the fire should burn to the SW IF a NE wind hits it. However, there is variability on rates of spread based on vegatation, fuel loading, how continous is it, is it all the same species, same height, etc as well the difference in terrain (what if tehre is a side drainage that the wind(not the fire yet) comes across the plateau and goes up the draw, it will draw the fire in behind it.
Finding continuos , homogenous fuel types that are absolutely similar all the way across is rare. An area of heavier fuel loading will create higher fire intensity, realeasing more energy, which attempts to climb straight up. Less energy, less climb effect. Couple the climb effect with wind and who knows. Wind events, at teh start are not perfect. They are not perfectly straight, constant wind in athe same direction. They swirl, ebb and flow until they get teh main front coming in straight, hot and steady.
All you have to do is look back at a time you were driving at night in a snowstorm. Was teh snow coming directly at you at all times? NO.. It ebbs, flows and changes, even though your speed and direction are constant.
I have a feeling EN has at least been by a gas firepit at a hotel or similar open outdoor area even if not at her home. Even with by definition fairly homogeneous fuel being supplied by the propane tank or gas line, through fairly homogenous decorative fire glass, and even with winds that don’t seem all that variable, the flames from the firepit get blown around a good bit. That the direction of the flames will vary is a predictable phenomenon, even if the exact nature of that variance can’t be modeled or predicted with precision.
SR, according to Drs. Viegas and Finney, among others, that is due to the fire ITSELF influencing the air….. Presumably you already knew that.
Not with 20, 30, 40, or 50 MPH winds at that point the fire is being pushed by the wind———-
Or with 5 mph winds gusting to 10 with a firepit, in which case the fire is again being pushed by the wind. It is a basic phenomenon. EN being so consistently dense on these issues seems intentional and aimed at clouding the conversation more than anything.
Reply to calvin post on February 26, 2015 at 3:27 am
>> calvin said…
>>
>> Has anyone seen a WFF video of a crew sitting in the black, watching
>> the fire burn around them?
This one might not be exactly what you were thinking of ( some crew just sitting there in a safe black area taking video of a fire )… but it does involve ‘the black’… and what can happen when you step out of it for even one moment and your ‘situational awareness’ and ‘safety mindfulness’ are NOT where they are SUPPOSED to be.
And the FINDINGS and LESSONS LEARNED read almost exactly like what might someday be said of the Yarnell Hill Fire and the Granite Mountain fatalities.
** THE CLAY SPRINGS BURNOVER – JUNE 27, 2012
On June 27, 2012, three Oak Creek (Utah) Fire Department FFs identified using only their first names ( Clarke, Ross and Camron ) set out to fight a reported wildfire in the nearby Clay Springs area in a old converted military truck they named ‘Rambo’.
‘Rambo’ had SIX-WHEEL drive and had been converted to be a Type 6 Brush Engine with a 1200 gallon tank and two nozzle/hose arrays.
They WERE working from ‘in the black’ on the edge of the fire, but at some point decided to get ‘outside’ the black for a moment to work on a flank.
That’s when the wind whipped up and they were being ‘trapped’ by the fire.
They lost their situational awareness, did NOT even mentally consult the WATCHOUT list(s), and then their poorly planned escape route got ‘cut off’ by the fire behavior.
The only way they survived was by deciding to just drive ‘Rambo’ directly into ( and THROUGH ) the fireline and try to ‘reach the black’ again… which they should have never even LEFT.
They made it ( back to the black )… but not without cost. The TWO FFs running the hoses on the side of ‘Rambo’ didn’t even have time to get into the cab of the truck and had to ‘ride out’ the mad dash back to the black on the sides of the truck.. They both suffered severe burns… but lived.
What makes this VIDEO unique ( and worth watching ) and relevant to Yarnell were the FINDINGS and the LESSONS LEARNED.
They are VERY similar to what COULD be said of the actions ( and inactions ) of the Granite Mountain leadership on June 30, 2013.
Pretty much the same WATCHOUT orders and lapses in safety considerations that were cited as the cause(s) of this incident could easily be applied to what happened in Yarnell.
This Clay Springs incident happened almost one year to the day as the tragedy in Yarnell. June 27, 2012 versus June 30, 2013.
Here’s the VIDEO… and a transcript of some of the dialogue from it including the FINDINGS and LESSONS LEARNED section.
********************************************************************************************************
*** WARNING: GRAPHIC IMAGES IN THIS VIDEO!
********************************************************************************************************
Near the end of this video there are closeups of the burn injuries sustained.
They are GRAPHIC images and might be very hard for some people to look at.
********************************************************************************************************
Clay Springs Burnover 2012
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qe7nl1tqclk
Published on Mar 10, 2014
About: A burnover event from the 2012 Clay Springs Fire in Millard County, Utah. Three Firefighters from the Oak City Fire Department escaped tragedy through decisive thinking and quick action. Learn from their experience.
Video length: 20 minutes and 6 seconds.
The NARRATOR of this film is Rowdy Muir, a qualified National Level Type 1 Incident Commander.
———————————————————————
Clay Springs Burnover 2012
A Lesson in Wildland Fire Safety
A Film By Utah Fire and Rescue Academy at Utah Valley University
Narrator ( Rowdy Muir ) opens the video…
Central Utah, late June, 2012. It’s been over 2 months since the last measurable precipitation. Winter left very little snowpack. Red Flag fire conditions have been persistent with days of high winds, low relative humidity. The desert fuels, sage and Juniper, are parched and vulnerable to fire. Nearby, members of the Oak City volunteer fire department recently completed their annual wildland fire refresher training course and physical fitness test. Members of the fire department all work at regular daily jobs and only serve on the fire department during weekly drills and when a pager demands of them to drop everything and run to the aid of their town during a fire.
Hello. I’m Rowdy Muir
District Ranger – Flaming George National Recreation Area
Ashley National Forest – Qualified Type 1 Incident Commander
I have 25 years experience in wildland fire supression and in Incident Management. I recently spent 6 years as an Incident Commander on a National Type 1 Incident Management team.
You are about to hear the accounts from three men involved in a burnover incident near the Clay Springs area just south of Oak City, Utah.
The Oak City Fire Department is a good Fire Department. These firefighters train and practice regularly. Each of the participants in the Clay Springs fire is red-carded. These men had many years experience fighting fires on the west desert of Utah.
This fire initially didn’t seem out of the ordinary. However… extended drought combined with red-flag conditions placed these men in a situation to which they were unaccustomed.
As the event unfolded, many WATCHOUT situations were present.
These WATCHOUT situations are IMPORTANT things that Clarke, Ross and Cameron would like you to LEARN from THEIR experience.
( Sound of a pager going off in the video )
June 27, 2012, 14:15 hours – Oak City, Utah.
Audio: “Oak City Fire Department… you are needed for a 10/70 Wildfire out in the Clay Springs area.”
( The video then does a detailed presentation of what happened )
+15:34 – Rowdy Muir begins the FINDINGS and LESSONS LEARNED section
(Rowdy Muir): We, as Wildland Firefighters, need to learn from this experience.
Many WATCHOUT situations as well as extreme fire behavior were present.
Let’s examine some of them now.
( The Interagency Response Pocket Guide now appears in the video and )
( each existing, published WATCHOUT, as it appears on the BACK COVER )
( of this Guide is then highlighted on the Pocket Guide itself as it is discussed ).
Watchout situation number 3
Safety Zones and escape routes not properly identified.
(Rowdy Muir): While they THOUGHT their escape routes were viable, the conditions that existed at the time compromised their plan.
Watchout situation number 4
Unfamiliar with weather and local factors influencing fire beahvior.
( Rowdy Muir): We must learn that the combined effects of an extended drought and red flag conditions MAY create UNFAMILIAR fire behavior. It is IMPORTANT to know weather conditions and ANTICIPATE their effect on the fire.
Watchout situation number 5
Uninformed on strategy, tactics, and hazards.
(Rowdy Muir): It is important to COMMUNICATE tactics, and COORDINATE efforts with OTHER resources.
Watchout situation number 6
Instructions and assignments not clear.
(Rowdy Muir): Since there was a strong feeling of urgency, instructions and assignments were not fully discussed between the resources.
Watchout situation number 7
No communications link with crewmembers or supervisors.
(Rowdy Muir): As in nearly ALL fire tragedies, communications between resources played an important role. The urgency of this fire contributed to a lack of communications and coordination. One message that Firefighter Clark wants conveyed is the IMPORTANCE of not taking any fire too PERSONAL, feeling too much URGENCY, and developing TUNNEL VISION.
Watchout situation number 8
Constructing line without safe anchor point.
(Rowdy Muir): We should learn from this incident that a good anchor point, in this case the McCornick Road, can be invalidated if the line between you and your anchor point is NOT secure.
Watchout situation number 11
Unburned fuel between you and the fire.
(Rowdy Muir): These men were fighting fire from the unburned side of the fire. While if often might SEEM to make sense to fight fire from the green side of the line, it can lead to an accident… especially when combined with other watchout situations.
Watchout situation number 15
Wind increases and/or changes direction.
(Rowdy Muir): A change in wind speed and direction was a critical factor in this incident. While initially the fire was unthreatening, the FORECASTED winds soon MANIFESTED. What we can learn from this incident is to ALLOW for changes in wind speed and direction.
Watchout situation number 17
Terrain and fuels make escape to safety zones difficult.
(Rowdy Muir): Steep terrain to the right of Engine ‘Rambo’ prevented any escape in that direction. The patch of Junipers to the north nullified an escape through them. The EFFECTS of the TERRAIN and the FUEL should be CAREFULLY evaluated to INSURE that your escape routes will WORK.
SUMMARY ( by Rowdy Muir )
To learn from the experiences of the Oak City Fire Department and AVOID life-threatening situations, we must CONSTANTLY evaluate our SITUATIONAL AWARENESS by applying the risk management principles contained on the green page one of the Interagency Response Pocket Guide ( IRPG ).
* Learn all you can about YOUR incident.
* Be CONSTANTLY alert to NEW and CHANGING conditions.
* IDENTIFY possible HAZARDS and MITIGATE those hazards using the Standard Firefighting Orders and LCES. Once you’ve placed adequate controls on existing hazards, you can proceed… but NEVER STOP EVALUATING for CHANGE. You must QUICKLY identify CHANGES to your circumstances and REPEAT the Risk Management process to insure your safety and the safety of those around you.
The Clay Springs Fire near Oak City, Utah, was a major misfortune to three firefighters and their families… however… it could have been MUCH worse.
They have now offered to YOU an opportunity to learn from their experience.
It is their hope you will LEARN from their story and another tragedy that could be YOURS will be avoided.
CREDITS ROLL
Produced by Utah Fire and Rescue Academy at Utah Valley University
In cooperation with Utah Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands.
Special Thanks to:
The Oak City, Utah Fire Department – Chief Russell Dewsnup
Clarke, Ross and Camron… for their courage and generosity to share their story.
END OF VIDEO
Followup…
The Clay Springs Incident may have been in Utah… but the TERRAIN where this took place is eerily similar to the Yarnell area. There are some photos of the area at the start of the video that you would swear were taken from the Ranch House Restaurant in Yarnell and looking WEST towards the Weaver Mountain ridge.
Nope
That is not what I was looking for.
There are numerous hotshot crews that posted their 2014 videos (also 2013, 2012, etc) on you tube and I really do not see this “SOP” of WFF sitting in a safe area watching the fire burn around them.
You would think that would make for some good footage?
Interestingly, it seems absent from those videos. Or maybe I cant find it, which is why I asked if anyone else has saw anything like that
On a similar note. Has anyone seen the 2014 Vale hotshot video? Damn!!
Calvin,
Why don’t you try to find YouTube video of fisherman waiting for better water conditions before they go fishing? Most people like to post video that shows some type of action. The world isn’t defined by what happens on YouTube.
I thought the black is where you guys went during extreme fire behavior?
The only thing you are missing Calvin is if there was a need to retreat to
the black during last years fires. Good line in a good location may have pre emptied a retreat to the black.
There were severial crews who went to SZ last year not all Carrie cameras
not all release videos showing every body they had to retreat.
In many cases backing up into the Black for a half hour or more then reengaging is common and some times not a made for TV shot the main fire may make a run and then settle back down. Its like Filming you crew sitting eating lunch for a half hour. Like the pictures of GM at their break spot in the black. If they had stayed there they probably would have got some interesting pictures—-OR A LOT OF SMOKE and nothing else—–
A lot of reasons you may not be seeing a made for the moves/TV shot of a roaring fire chasing crews into the Black.
The Fire Wars Video I referred you to is a good example of a crew sitting out a fire run in the Black filmed by a TV crew that followed the Arrow Head HS thru a Fire Season. It was edited for a TV special and is available thru Amazon.
Reply to calvin post on February 27, 2015 at 4:56 am
>> calvin said…
>>
>> Nope
>>
>> That is not what I was looking for.
I figured not… but when I came across it and realized how RELEVANT it was to Yarnell and how eerily similar the ‘mistakes’ made were… I felt it was worth a look.
Including the part that FF Clarke really wants the community to LEARN.
By their own admission ( because they LIVED to talk about it ), they had too much of a sense of URGENCY about leaving the black to attack that flank… and that is what made them IGNORE all the safety rules they were taught.
They were taking the fire TOO PERSONAL and feeling like it was too much THEIR JOB to take risks ( and not communicating/coordinating with others like they should have ).
Sounds VERY much like what might have happened in Yarnell.
>> calvin also said
>>
>> There are numerous hotshot crews that posted their 2014 videos
>> (also 2013, 2012, etc) on you tube and I really do not see this
>> “SOP” of WFF sitting in a safe area watching the fire burn
>> around them.
>>
>> You would think that would make for some good footage?
Well… maybe sometimes… but probably most often NOT.
I agree with SR. The ‘YouTube’ world likes ACTION.
What would the captions be on these videos you are looking for?
“Here we are at the XXXXXX Fire, sitting on our butts in the black waiting to go back to work”
You MIGHT find one or two of those… but probably not a LOT.
Did anyone else listen to today’s wildland fire lessons learned center (LLC) webinar on extreme fire behavior? The scientist sounded like he mentioned YHF and “downburst.”
Did anyone else hear this or was I hearing things?
Was the YHF entrapment the product of a “downburst” (as opposed to, say, “predicted outflow boundary winds”)?
Reply to Elizabeth ( counselor ) post on February 26, 2015 at 3:26 pm
>> counselor asked…
>>
>> Was the YHF entrapment the product of a “downburst” (as opposed to,
>> say, “predicted outflow boundary winds”)?
If you understand anything at all about weather… ‘outflow winds’ from thunderstorms pretty much ALL start as downbursts/downdrafts. The air in/around the cell is being ‘cooled’ by the rain and the cooler air is then FALLING ‘downward’. It hits the ground and then flows ‘out’ from underneath the storm. Hence… “outflow”.
So the terms ‘outlfow’, ‘outbursts’, ‘downdrafts’, ‘downbursts’, etc. are often all used to just describe the same basic event.
The Wildland Fire Lessons Learned Center’s ( LLC’s ) own published CASE STUDY of the Yarnell Hill Fire has always been describing what happened that day using BOTH the
terms ‘outflow boundary’ and “downdraft”.in reference to the same basic event.
In their OWN actual (published) ‘definition’ of ‘outflow boundary’ they say it is…
Outflow Boundary ( defined )
Strong DOWNDRAFT winds can develop under storm clouds.
DOWNDRAFTS reach the earth’s surface and become “outflow winds,”
which can exceed 50 miles per hour.
The LLC’s Yarnell Case Study is TOTALLY based on the original SAIR report and, to this day, includes the same basic errors in the timeline and the facts that were present in the original SAIR document.
That LLC Yarnell Case Study is the first link at the top of their page dedicated to the Yarnell Hill Fire… which is here…
http://www.wildfirelessons.net/orphans/viewincident?DocumentKey=1a2dac92-1d79-420f-be0e-1aa616a40a70
From the YarnellCaseStudy-09June2014-1.ppt document…
Slides 28 and 29 of this Microsoft Powerpoint presentation talk about the weather and the ‘Outflow boundary’.
Slide 29 is THEIR definition of an ‘Outflow boundary’ which contains THEIR references to DOWNDRAFTS.
——————————————————————————
Slide 28 – Weather Conditions
1630: Outflow boundary hits the southern perimeter of the fire.
Wind shifts again and increases, driving the fire south.
Slide 29 – Weather ( Continued )
Outflow boundary:
1) Strong DOWNDRAFT winds can develop under storm clouds.
DOWNDRAFTS reach the earth’s surface and become “outflow winds,”
which can exceed 50 miles per hour.
2) An “outflow boundary,” or “gust front,” is the leading edge of the
outflow winds as they move away from thunderstorms.
Note – Changes in air pressure can bring wind shifts, even before the outflow boundary arrives. Then, the outflow boundary itself can bring another wind shift.
——————————————————————————
He did say “could, may or something along those lines, he did not say 100% sure
DAAAAAM cant beat that explanation.
Still no surprises———-
I didn’t bother to also add the ‘displacement’ factor of physics whereby separate pieces of ‘matter’ cannot occupy the same place at the same time. The heavier the rain… the more it is also DISPLACING the air underneath it as it falls… which contributes to the intensity of the ‘outflow’ from that particular cell.
Doesn’t matter. The RESULT is still ‘outflow winds’ that will then create an ‘outflow boundary’ out ahead of the cell itself.
VERY often… MORE than just one ( outflow boundary ), which is why anyone who has to monitor this sort of thing for a living or ever have it enter into their own ‘safety concerns’ ( High Rise Window Washers, Firefighters, Airline Pilots, Radio Tower Climbers, Crane Operators, High Rise Construction Workers, etc. etc. etc. ) should NEVER be so foolish as to believe that just because one strong ‘outflow boundary’ hits your area that doesn’t mean there won’t be another one ( maybe even stronger ) shortly after that.
That is ALWAYS possible and could never be considered some kind of ‘freak weather event’.
Pulling this out of yesterday’s weeds and bringing it to the top. It’s pretty much
only for those that are open minded and want to learn.
Robert the Second says
February 25, 2015 at 9:19 pm
Bob and Rocksteady,
Redoubling and further clarifying here what Bob Powers says above about fire weather and fire behavior resulting “across an unobstructed landscape.”
My reference to the YouTube video below: Wildland Fire LLC YouTube video clip of a webinar titled ‘EFFECTS OF COMPLEX TERRAIN ON EXTREME FIRE BEHAVIOR focuses on the section titled ‘FIRE BEHAVIOR IN CANYONS’ that runs from about 29:26 to 36:28. This will definitely help you to better understand what occurred on the afternoon of the YH Fire on 30 June 2013.”
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CWauaWOnOZ8
The ‘Fire Behavior in Canyons’ segment focused on canyons with SLOPE to them. The YH Fire bowl/box canyon had virtually no slope until the far reaches at the base of the lower slopes of the Weaver Mountains, just outside the perimeter of the BSR.
As Bob pointed out, ‘unobstructed wind’ has basically the same fire behavior, fire intensity, rates of spread, etc. as fire running up a steep canyon or chimney or chute. Everything is the same except there is NO slope and NO steepness.
In fact, more fires get larger in a 24-hour period in flat terrain than fires in mountainous terrain due to the ‘unobstructed’ nature of the topography. Fires in mountainous terrain have fast uphill runs followed by slower fire spread backing down the opposite slope. Gravity winds such as Santa Ana and Chinook winds are different and will virtually ‘hug the terrain’ so that they blow just as fast uphill as downhill.
However, that was NOT the case on the YH Fire. The OUTFLOW WINDS basically functioned as a virtual BLOWTORCH and these winds and resultant fire behavior closely followed the terrain features, in this case the wide canyon leading into the BSR bowl/box canyon.
So then, IMHO, the 30 June 2013 fire weather influencing the fire behavior on YH Fire was the result of a powerfully wind driven, terrain channeled fire that swept into the narrowly-restrictive box canyon, basically resulting in ‘area ignition’ in the confines of the bowl.
Bowls are extremely deadly features and establishing control features within them should be avoided and deploying fire shelters within them should clearly be avoided at all costs. In fact, the required fire shelter training specifically states to avoid deploying your fire shelters in chimneys, chutes, or bowls, in spite of what one PFD fire official stated in a news conference at the YHF fatality site. This PFD fire official confidently stated “this is where they had to deploy … I think they picked the best location in this bowl … you’re in a box canyon here …” Really? The best location in this bowl?
The ONLY reason they ‘HAD TO DEPLOY IN THIS BRUSH CHOKED BOWL IN A BRUSH FILLED BOX CANYON is because, WITHOUT A REQUIRED LOOKOUT IN PLACE, they left their perfectly good SZ and traveled downhill through steep, unburned chimneys and chutes into an unburned box canyon and an unburned bowl at the worst possible time, as outflow winds ‘across an unobstructed landscape’ intensely accelerated the fire behavior. Staying in their perfectly good SZ should have been the right decision at the time. The ‘Rule of 99′ was in play.
To clarify, I don’t think GM descended through chutes or chimneys, though the rocks to the north would/do have discontinuous versions of those features. Certainly there was an interesting combination of drift in safety standards and then also comprehensive failures in the “mental math” of rate of travel, rate of spread, routefinding, implications of topography, etc. Or, alternatively, one is imo left with a conclusion of recklessness if there were not comprehensive failures in these regards.
SR,
I’ve hiked the GMHS route from the mid-slope road down to the BSR twice and there are a lot more chimneys and chutes than you would think. They are small for sure compared to what one thinks of these features, but it doesn’t take much of a chimney or chute to rapidly and intensely funnel fire through them.
Another phenomena of tighter valleys is the venturi effect…. Winds significantly increase when the valley tightens up… As well, you may have radiant heat on both sides of the slopes facing the bottom, leading to area ignition.
It may depend on what one classifies as a chimney or chute.
Relative to the crew and the fire behavior that cause the burnover, I don’t think that the crew being in a “chute” or chimney was a factor. The rocks to the north certainly have discontinuous chimneys and chutes, where while in some ways the rocks offered potential refuge and in fact a crew some time ago did survive a deployment in similar circumstance in a rock pile (but with a less-hot fire) the chimneys and currents of hot air there in the rocks also could have been an active negative.
I completely agree with your overall point, and probably shouldn’t have even mentioned the chimney point. The reality is that they were in a classic terrain trap however one defines it, and one that was obvious and known beforehand.
SR,
Yes, your ‘terrain trap’ point is a good one. However, I’m still not convinced on the boulders issue. The boulders and such would have acted SOMEWHAT as heat sinks but travel through the boulders with brush in between would have been difficult at best (Watch Out #17).
My point on the chimneys and chutes was the fact that they hiked DOWN through them as they went into the bowl and box canyon at the bottom near the BSR. These unburned chimneys and chutes COULD have been very hazardous had there been an ember shower or a bunch of spot fires amongst them as they hiked through the channeling terrain features.
Reply to Robert The Second (RTS) post on
February 27, 2015 at 2:04 pm
>> RTS said…
>>
>> My point on the chimneys and chutes was the fact
>> that they hiked DOWN through them as they went
>> into the bowl and box canyon at the bottom
Good point… and a good distinction to remember here.
Bad enough they were actually going DOWN into a ‘box canyon’… but to actually be descending INTO via an actual, classic ‘chute’?
Holy. Frickin’ Cow.
WTKTT,
This fire was just the final, fatal link in a long chain of Bad Decisions With Prior Good Outcomes UNTIL the fatal decision to make a stand in the bowl. The Rule of 99 prevailed.
It was there that they made the fatal decision and attempt to cut out a SZ by hand in 10′ tall oak brush for 2-3 minutes instead of haul ass running to the BSR.
Better yet, how about just staying put in your perfectly good SZ, “Hunker and be safe” and wait for the fire behavior to pulse …
How I wish that, at 1553.54 ( 3:53:54 PM ), when we heard Jesse Steed say to ( almost assuredly ) Eric Marsh…
“I copy… and it’s almost made it to that two-track
road we walked in on.”
That he had ALSO said one of the following two things…
“…and if you come back HERE from wherever the hell you are then by the time you even get here we can all probably just walk back down that two-track the way we came up”.
*** OR
“…by the time we schlep ourselves all the way south on that ridge to some saddle you are talking about now… we might as well just stay HERE and wait just a little bit and then we can just walk back down that two-track the way we came up.
Could THAT (maybe) have actually been the ‘essence’ of this alleged ‘argument’ they ended up having?
WHY should we schlep SOUTH when we can see for ourselves from right HERE that the clear way back to town will probably be ALL BLACK in just a little while?
It’s not really a stretch to wonder if that might have been the essence of any ‘consternation’ and/or ‘arguments’ about MOVING.
We can see for OURSELVES ( thanks to Christopher MacKenzie ) that that was a VIABLE option, even at 1553.
The fire really HAD “almost made it to that two-track road they walked IN on”.
NOTE: I’m not expecting you to answer that or reveal anything else about what might have heard. It’s just another “maybe that’s what went down” musing on my part.
Deborah Pfingston says FEBRUARY 23, 2015 AT 10:50 AM
Bob Powers you are an ass who has mislead his group. I will NEVER return to this site. Anyone who believes his crap is a puppet of lies. Goodbye.
Reply
Deborah Pfingston,
I am so sorry for your loss. I grieve for the family, friends, and loved ones of the GMHS every day.
I am including your Facebook link below where you tell folks you are “seeking information, ideas, suggestion and thoughts about what happened and how it we can change things.”
https://www.facebook.com/PrescottGraniteMountainHotshots/posts/700230079987757
That’s what almost all of us are doing here on this site. It sounds like what you read was not what you wanted to hear. The truth is controversial, painful, and uncomfortable most times. Please do NOT believe any AZ Forestry or PFD “talking points” released by their (Dis)Information Officers. These are generally lies and only what they want you to believe.
Reply to Robert the Second ( RTS ) post on February 26, 2015 at 8:53 am
>> RTS said…
>>
>> I am including your Facebook link below where you tell folks
>> you are “seeking information, ideas, suggestion and thoughts
>> about what happened and how it we can change things.”
https://www.facebook.com/PrescottGraniteMountainHotshots/posts/700230079987757
Here is the actual TEXT from Deborah Pfingston’s PUBLIC Facebook page…
———————————————————————————
Deborah Pfingston
Prescott Granite Mountain Hotshots
November 6, 2013 ·
My name is Deborah Pfingston and I am the mother to Andrew Ashcraft (Granite Mountain Hot Shot). I am seeking information, ideas, suggestion and thoughts about what happened and how it we can change things. If you are concerned about confidentiality I understand. Please build a fake (cover) email address and send me what you would like to say – Deborah.pfingston (at) gmail.com. Please share with any group or location you think would be helpful. Thank you.
———————————————————————————-
Reply to Elizabeth (counselor) post on February 26, 2015 at 7:06 am
>> Elizabeth said…
>>
>> :: Deborah Pfingston says FEBRUARY 23, 2015 AT 10:50 AM
>> ::
>> :: Bob Powers you are an ass who has mislead his group.
And as I noted down below when this was originally posted… this is NOT anyone’s ‘group’.
It belongs to no one in particular.
It is simply a PUBLIC forum where people are free to express their views so long as the moderator feels the commentary is within’ stated guidelines and allows the posting to appear.
People are free to post… and everyone is then totally free to totally ignore them.
That’s how it works.
And since I only posted the Known Facts and said so I stand by what I said that Up set
Deborah Pfingston. The Facts are there the Granit Mountain Supervisors Failed to follow the Safety Guidelines. Ignored the warning signs and are responsible.
If there is any other documented proof out there to dispute my findings I would be glad to review it.
Elizabeth If you think I misled this group or I am a Puppet of lies. Then show me the facts.
As for being called an ASS I have been called worse.
When you search for the truth or state the truth you are never going to make every body HAPPY.
The only reason Elizabeth reposted the statement was for her own petty ignorance.
To insult and attack me. So be it things coming out of the Deposition may be much worse?????????????
Reply to Bob Powers post on February 26, 2015 at 10:21 am
>> Bob Powers said…
>>
>> Things coming out of the Deposition may be much worse?????
Yes. It’s possible.
We really have NO IDEA what it is that Brendan McDonough has been hiding for so long now and feels he needs to “get off his chest”.
It could just be confirmation of any of the ‘theories’ that have been diligently researched here on this forum… or it could be something totally different that hasn’t even been ‘imagined’ yet.
I can’t really think of anything that would be sadder than to receive confirmation of the PULL theory… that Marsh was out AHEAD of those men and somehow they all managed to walk straight into a fireline, anyway.
Even there is even further confirmation that Jesse Steed somehow felt Eric Marsh was SUPPOSED to be his “forward lookout” that day… and then Marsh apparently failed that task in a horrific manner… that’s just going to add to the sadness and the confusion about how this all could have actually ever happened.
“People may IMAGINE things that are false, but they can only UNDERSTAND things that are true, for if the things be false, the apprehension of them is NOT understanding.”
Sir Isaac Newton
Here’s to hoping for a lot less ‘apprehension’ and a LOT more ‘understanding’ about what REALLY happened in Yarnell on June 30, 2013.
Bob said
Why would any one worry about GM they were next to or in the BLACK no reason to move their safety Zone was right there.
The place where 1000’s of fire fighters have retreated to in these kinds of situations. The number one place your brain says is safe. The number one place your training tells you to go.
I have been looking on you tube in attempt to find a video posted by a hotshot , or type 2 crew that shows this exact thing bob describes above.
Has anyone seen a WFF video of a crew sitting in the black, watching the fire burn around them?
Calvin All training about direct attack 1foot in the Burn Starts with s110 the first 40 hours of fire fighter training.
You might also refer to a DVD I picked up FIRE WARS which follows the Arrow head hotshots
2002/2005. The crew sits out a fire in the black.
You have the Clear creek fire where 3 crews sat out the Fire in the black Though no video to my knowledge RTS could give you info on that there were at least 2 HS crews there.
There are not many Wild land Fire Fighters Who have not spent some time in the Black on Fires.
Not a lot of crews have Film companies with them but the recent addition of Hand held and Helmet cams may produce this type of record.
If you are wondering it is a common occurrence Building direct line brings the Black with you.
It is the #1 Safety Zone in Wild Land Fire Fighting.
Reply to Bob Powers post on February 26, 2015 at 9:17 am
>> Bob Powers said…
>>
>> There are not many Wild land Fire Fighters Who have not spent
>> some time in the Black on Fires.
Dave Larsen ( Rest in Peace ) was one of the lead WFA / ADOSH investigators, and he says he spent HALF his career ‘in the black’.
From Brendan McDonough’s first ( of two ) ADOSH interviews 8/20/13…
Q2 = Dave Larsen, WFA / ADOSH investigator ( Rest in Peace )
A = Brendan McDonough
NOTE: Dave Larsen ( Rest in Peace ) passed away not long after the ADOSH / WFA report(s) were released, but his bio/resume’ is still online at Wildland Fire Associates… and it is HERE…
http://www.wildlandfireassociates.com/staff/dave-larsen/
——————————————————————————
Mr. Larsen is an expert in fire management and the tactical application of resources in fire suppression. Mr. Larsen has held the positions of Incident Commander Type I, Deputy Incident Commander Type I, Incident Commander Type II, Prescribed Burn Boss Type I, Prescribed Fire Manager Type I, and Fire Use Manager Type I.
Mr. Larsen’s fire management experience includes work as a fire lookout, district engine foreman and crewmember, district trail crewmember, district brush disposal crew and a hot shot crew supervisor. Mr. Larsen was a District Fire Management Officer as well as a Forest Fire Management Officer for the Helena National Forest. Mr. Larsen’s expertise includes All-Risk Incident Commander including Hurricanes Katrina and Rita Operation Section Chief, Type II, and Fire Behavior Analyst. Additionally, Mr. Larsen has Instructed S-290, S-390, S-490, S-339, S-330, I-400 and other ICS courses.
——————————————————————————
Dave Larsen was the SUPERINTENDENT of the “Helena Hotshots”, in Montana, for five years from 1983 through 1988.
He said ( during the ADOSH interview with Brendan ) that he has probably spent HALF his career ‘in the black’. That’s just what good WFFs do.
From Brendan’s ADOSH interview…
——————————————————————————
2266 Q2: In your experience with the crew did you guys ever have to – did you ever –
2267 ever set in the black for a while? Experience that? Did you ever do that?
2268
2269 A: Not with me. No I never had a hairy situation with ’em. I’ve always felt
2270 comfortable, um, just because of the strength and the – the leadership. You
2271 knew from the Hotshot community that who you’re working for were great
2272 people and they’re smart and educated.
2273
2274 Q2: Oh sure. Absolutely. No question about it, I was just wondering if – if, ah, if –
2275 had you ever heard stories, that we had to ride one out for an hour or two in
2276 the black, had to retreat down a line into the black. Did you ever hear stories?
2277
2278 A: I can’t seem to remember any but I think I would.
2279
2280 Q2: See I – I think I spent half of my career in the black.
2281
2282 A: Yeah.
2283
2284 Q2: Goin’ – going direct, getting chased out, chased back into the black. I gotta a
2285 bunch of – with – with thunderstorms and what not knowing that that, uh…
2286
2287 A: I mean, we’ve pulled off pieces. Yeah. But we haven’t been chased out of
2288 somewhere in like a high stressful situation.
2289
2290 Q1: I think Dave’s talking about, like, ah…
2291
2292 A: Like this situation are you saying if they would have lived, like that kind of
2293 hairy situation? No. Nothing like that on that level, no.
2294
2295 Q2: Okay. All right.
———————————————————————————-
So Brendan was in his THIRD year with ‘Granite Mountain’ and he says that not only can HE ( personally ) EVER recall the GM organization ‘sitting it out in the black’… he doesn’t recall any ‘stories’ about it happening at ANY time with this organization, even prior to his service ( even though we know something very strange happened with GM on the Nevada Fire and there was a ‘burnout of a safety zone’ ).
That actually just means 1 of 2 things.
1) In all that time… the situation just never arose.
2) The situation had presented itself ( maybe any number of times ), but
‘sitting it out in the black’ was never something the leadership of this GM
organization felt was the ‘right thing to do’.
Dave Larson had not been on a hotshot crew since 1988.
That was 27 years ago.
So what was your point there with THAT remark?
That serving 5 years as the Superintendent of a famous Type 1 Hotshot Crew ( Helena Hotshots ) at ANY time in one’s life doesn’t make you qualified to know what you are talking about… or what the RULES of the profession are?
He said he spent “Half his career in the black”.
That included a lot of years BEFORE even becoming the SUPT of a very famous Hotshot crew.
Down below, Calvin made reference to Chris McKenzie’s two videos (taken at roughly 3:52-ish p.m.), and WTKTT stated:
“Whether that really is a THIRD participant in that radio conversation responding to Marsh’s statement with “You bet”… or whether it’s just Marsh adding a tag phrase of “You bet” onto the end of his own statement has never been resolved.
If it really WAS a third participant… I still have no ‘good guess’ WHO it might have been….”
In terms of the “no ‘good guess'” about possible other participants to the conversation other than Steed and Marsh, presumably Blue Ridge (either True or Brian) are the most likely other participants, just given the “evidence” and confirmed aspects of the context.
Here is why I say this: The time of McKenzie’s two videos was roughly 3:52 p.m.-ish. According to the Blue Ridge unit logs, according to my sources, and according to Brendan’s 3:49 p.m. photos and True Brown’s GPS time-stamps, it seems that there was some radio back-and-forth in this time frame that involved BR communicating with GM’s leadership. Although you all know my view of audio forensics, my ears hear something like “stage” or “staged” (whereas Calvin hears “change” or “changed”), and “stage” or “staged” fits with what BR states was being discussed at exactly that time between GM leadership and BR (e.g. where BR was going to move the buggies to be “staged” and whether GM could see it or understood where it was or some such).
Reply to Elizabeth (counselor) post on February 25, 2015 at 6:57 am
>> counselor said…
>>
>> Down below, Calvin made reference to Chris McKenzie’s two videos ( taken at
>> roughly 3:52-ish p.m.)
>>
>> The time of McKenzie’s two videos was roughly 3:52 p.m.-ish.
That’s correct. More into the 3:53 PM minute but close enough.
Here is what I believe was the last ‘consensus’ on the ACTUAL times for that mix of both MacKenzie’s Apple iPhone 4s Smartphone and his CANON Digital Camera images and videos ( and the REAL times for them )…
P = Christopher MacKenzie’s Apple iPhone 4s Smartphone
NOTE: MacKenzie’s Apple iPhone 4s had network capability and so the timestamps for his iPhone photos must have been accurate that day.
C = Christopher MacKenzie’s CANON Digital Camera.
NOTE: MacKenzie’s CANON appears to have had its own internal timestamp clock set 8 minutes and 16 seconds AHEAD of REAL time on June 30, 2013. The TIMES being assigned to the four items he took with his CANON at that ‘rest spot’ ( one 9 second movie, two still photos, and then another 9 second movie ) in-between his cellphone photos IMG_2736.JPG and IMG_2737.JPG are based on the simple assumption that it took him the SAME amount of time ( approximately 77 seconds ) to switch from using his iPhone to using his CANON as it did for him to switch BACK to using his iPhone again after taking those 4 items with the CANON.
+00:00 – ( 1549:59 / 3:49:59 PM ) – P – IMG_2733.JPG
+00:07 – ( 1550:06 / 3:50:06 PM ) – P – IMG_2734.JPG
+00:13 – ( 1550:19 / 3:50.19 PM ) – P – IMG_2735.JPG
+01:39 – ( 1551:58 / 3:51:58 PM ) – P – IMG_2736.JPG
( Mackenzie switches from using his iPhone to using his CANON )
+01:17 – ( 1553:15 / 3:53:15 PM ) – C – MVI_0888.MOV – Video Duration 9.24 sec.
Audio captured in this 9.24 second MVI_0888 video clip…
—————————————————————————————
(Eric Marsh, on the radio, with modulation): Ah… I jus… I was just sayin’ I knew this was comin’ when I called ya and asked how… what your comfort level was. I could just feel it… ya know.
(Firefighter standing to the right of Jesse Steed): ?( We’ver been feelin’ it all day )( then he spits on the ground and the FF to his right laughs at what he said ).
—————————————————————————————
+00:21 – ( 1553:36 / 3:53:36 PM ) – C – IMG_0889.JPG
+00:08 – ( 1553:44 / 3:53:44 PM ) – C – IMG_0890.JPG
+00:10 – ( 1553:54 / 3:53:15 PM ) – C – MVI_0891.MOV – Video Duration 9.14 sec.
Audio captured in this 9.14 second MVI_0891 video clip…
—————————————————————————————
(Eric Marsh, on the radio, with modulation): …change, ya know.
NOTE: Two words then follow on the radio, with modulation, which sound like either “You bet” or “Too bad” ( or even something else ) and might be either Eric Marsh finishing his own statement or someone else ( over the radio ) responding to what Marsh just said. This has still not been fully determined and/or resolved.
(Jesse Steed, in the foreground, no modulation): I copy… and it’s almost made it to that two-track road we walked in on.
————————————————————————————–
( Mackenzie switches from using his CANON back to using his iPhone )
+01:26 – ( 1555:20 / 3:55:20 PM ) – P – IMG_2737.JPG
+00:11 – ( 1555:31 / 3:55:31 PM ) – P – IMG_2738.JPG
All picture taking at the ‘rest spot’ stopped abruptly at 1555:31 ( 3:55:31 PM ).
MacKenzie’s IMG_2738.JPG is the end of his iPhone photos and the last known photo taken at the ‘rest spot’ prior to them leaving that location.
The Wade Parker photo was NOT taken at 4:04 PM, as the initial investigation(s) seemed to believe. That was only the network timestamp for when it was ‘texted’ out to the network by Parker. The actual Parker photo that was attached to that text message was taken much earlier than 4:04 PM and, based on the content of the photo itself, either right before or right around the time that Robert Caldwell was shooting his second ( of only two ) videos that day circa 3:50 PM.
But here is that ‘1604’ Parker ‘text’ message event in relation to the timetable.above…
It shows that 8 minutes and 29 seconds elapsed between the last known photo taken at the ‘rest spot’ and when Parker actually ‘texted’ the photo he had taken much earlier ( circa 3:50 PM ) out to the network…
+08:29 – ( 1604.00 / 4:04:00 PM ) – Wade Parker texts his photo to the Network.
There are still really only 2 possibilities here.
1) The men remained at the ‘rest spot’ until 4:04 PM even though the picture taken abruptly stopped ( and never resumed ) about 8 minutes and 30 seconds earlier… and this ‘text’ message transmit at 4:04 PM was the last thing Parker did from that ‘rest location before the men actually started hiking south on the two-track.
2) Somewhere between 3:55 PM and 4:04 PM… the men had already started walking south and Wade Parker got around to ‘sneaking in’ a text message at 4:04 PM WHILE they were already hiking south.
>> counselor also said…
>>
>> According to the Blue Ridge unit logs, according to my sources, and according
>> to Brendan’s 3:49 p.m. photos and True Brown’s GPS time-stamps, it seems
>> that there was some radio back-and-forth in this time frame that involved BR
>> communicating with GM’s leadership.
That is also correct.
There were/are MULTIPLE conversations between Frisby/Brown and Marsh/Steed reported to have been taking place in this timeframe.
The ‘snippets’ of radio como we hear in the MacKenzie 9 second video clips could still actually be part of any number of those ‘reported’ conversations ( but see the end of this message for a ‘caveat’ regarding what Brendan McDonough testified to ).
** TRUEHEART BROWN’S UNIT LOG
In Blue Ridge Captain Trueheart Brown’s (redacted) Unit Log… he reports personally having MANY back-and-forth communications with BOTH Eric Marsh and Jesse Steed during the time immediately following Brendan’s evacuation and on up until ALL of the GM vehicles had been safely moved and parked over at the Shrine Road Youth camp.
This WOULD cover the timeframe between 1542 ( when Brendan was just climbing into Frisby’s UTV out at the old-grader ) and on into the 1550 to 1600 timeframe when the GM vehicles were actually being moved ( and MacKenzie was shooting his videos ).
Here is that pertinent section from Captain Brown’s Unit Log.
NOTE: In this section of Brown’s Unit Log… most of the words and phrases that were ‘blacked out’ (redacted) by US Forestry are pretty obvious based on other evidence. Some of them are also pretty obvious because US Forestry only blacked out a specific exact number of typed characters… which also makes it pretty easy to tell what specific WORDS they were trying to hide.
——————————————————————————-
( Brian ) drives in on the 2 track and sees Granite Mountain’s ( lookout walking ) out to the 2 track and tells him to get in since ( Brian ) can see that fire will soon be at their location.
( Brian calls Marsh ) and lets him know that we have their trucks and buggies and then calls me and asks for some drivers to bump back to grab their trucks and buggies because Granite Mountain trucks will be burned over very soon ( Brian ) also calls Granite Mountain and lets them know that we will move their trucks.
I do an about face ( at exactly 1542, according to Brown’s own GPS unit ) and hike through the (Blue Ridge) crew that is now prepping the dozer line ( on the Cutover Trail ). I grab the last ( ?? ) and send the ( ?? ) up with the rest of the crew and ( ?? ) plus myself and ( ?? ) head to the main 2 track. ( Brian ) is heading to the Granite trucks at this time, too.
I call the driver that is bumping the supt truck and him turn around and meet us at the location where the crew unloaded. We tie in with him quickly and head up the road. ( Brian ) drops off the ( GM lookout ) off at the trucks and comes back for me and grabs me and with the ranger we head up to ( GM ) supt and chase trucks. I instruct our guys to grab their buggies and wait until we get back to them. I jump in their ( GM’s ) chase ( truck ) and the ( GM lookout follows ) me and and we pick up our guys in their ( GM’s ) buggies who fall into the convoy. I have the front and ( buggies ) bring up the rear. I then get conformation that our trucks are at the youth camp from ( ?? ).
At this time I jump on their ( GM’s ) crew radio and talk with ( Steed? Marsh? ) about where we are taking the buggies and the situation down here. I explain about what we are doing and what the fire behavior is doing.
( Entire sentence redacted. Would contain Steed’s or Marsh’s response to Brown ).
I also reiterate that we are going to keep their ( lookout ) with us too because things are very dynamic now, and ( Eric *1 ) mentions that they are trying to come down off the hill, he mentions traveling through the black. I also get positive conformation that ( Eric *2 ) understands where the trucks will be parked because he can see the trucks driving out and I orient him to the rocky area north along the dozer line ( end of shrine rd ) that we are taking them to.
( Next two FULL sentences completely BLACKED OUT ).
We drive around to the youth camp and park their rigs with ours. We then get positive conformation that the area that the Granite Mountain trucks were in was burned, from ( Jesse *3 ) via the radio.
———————————————————————
That is the END of Captain Brown’s references to his own communications ( over the radio ) with both Eric Marsh and Jesse Steed. There are no more references in his Unit Log that say he communicated with either of them again up to the time the MAYDAY traffic hit the radio at 1639.
NOTE: For items *1 and *2 above… the actual redaction in the Unit Log is simply too short for it to possibly be either the word ‘Jesse’ or ‘Steed’. The ‘blackout’ is ONLY long enough to be 4 letters and so is MOST likely the name ‘Eric’.
For item *3, the converse is true. The blackout is exactly 5 typed characters, not 4, and so is most likely the 5 character name ‘Jesse’ or ‘Steed’.
** BRIAN FRISBY’S UNIT LOG
Here is the corresponding section from Blue Ridge Superintendent Brian Frisby’s (redacted) Unit Log.
His ‘version’ of events matches Trueheart Brown’s almost exactly… but Frisby reports having any number of his OWN direct radio communications with both Marsh and Steed in the same timeframe Brown reports having his ( separate ) conversations with them.
This covers the same time period from 1542 ( when Brendan had just climbed into the back of Frisby’s UTV out at the old-grader ) on through the 1600 timeframe… and also include the time when Christopher MacKenzie was shooting his 1555 videos.
This ‘section’ from Frisby’s log actually begins at 1530, which is when he believed Marsh requested that second face-to-face with him.
Once again ( as with Brown’s Unit Log ) the parts that the US Forestry Service ‘blacked out’ are pretty obvious based on other evidence… and some of the WORDS that are blacked out also represent specific numbers of ‘characters’ based on Frisby’s predictable handwriting… which makes it easier to assume what WORDS they actually might have be.
—————————————————————-
15:30
I had four of our guys bring out truck around and the rest geared up and headed to the ( Cutover Trail ) dozer line preping towards Shrine ( Road ). I tried to call ( Eric ) a few times on tac 1 ( DIVA ) without any luck so I call ( Granite Mountain ) and was able to talk to ( Jesse ). I told him that we were going to start preping the dozer line to be able to burn if our hand was forced. We would at least be able to protect some of the structures. He agreed that our time was best spent down towards the structures and that it was slow going and they would probably be another hour before they tied into the two-track to the north.
( DIVSA Marsh ) called me right after that to let me know he had copied direct and agreed with the the plan. He also said he would like to meet up when I get a chance. I told him I would head his way with the ranger. ( True ) grabbed his gear to go and look at a rocky area to see if we could hang up fire we had to burn. I headed up towards Granite Mountain.
As I headed west towards them I noticed fire activitie picking up close to where ( the Granite Mountain lookup was ) and as I got closer I looked back to the east and noticed the whole flank had gone from a backing fire to a running fire with 50ft flame lengths. I was just about to call ( the Granite Mountain lookout when he suddenly appeared coming out ) to the two-track I pulled up on
( Next SIX complete sentences totally BLACKED OUT )
( Next unredacted line has Frisby now trying to talk to DIVSA Marsh again ).
I that we needed to move their vehicles due to the fire behavior. I didn’t have any luck on tac 1 so ( GM lookout ) let me use his radio to talk on their Crew net. I talked to ( Eric ) and he agreed that with the increased fire behavior they should move their trucks and they all called out where the keys were for each truck.
SIDENOTE: This has always been an interesting entry in Brian Frisby’s Unit Log where he is saying that while he was talking to (Eric?) on the GM Crew Net… all of the DRIVERS for the GM vehicles were also hearing all the conversation and were then able to all ‘chime in’ on the GM intra-crew radio channel and tell Frisby where all the KEYS for the trucks could be found so they could all be moved. Frisby’s Unit Log then continues…
I also asked ( entire rest of sentence BLACKED OUT ).
I then called ( True ) to let him know that I needed three drivers to help move Granite Mountain’s vehicles due to the increased fire behavior. He said they were heading around to help.
SIDENOTE: This is now the 1542 moment when, according to BR Captain Truehart Brown’s own Unit Log AND his GPS data, he did his ‘about face’ on the Cutover Trail and started taking care of this task. Friby’s Unit Log continues…
As we ( Frisby and McDonough in the UTV ) got to the Supt truck and Chase truck ( at the top of the Sesame Clearing area ), ( GM lookout ) got out and started both vehicles while we waited for the other drivers.
I noticed that the fire was approaching quickly so I drove the ranger out to meet the drivers and quickly grabbed ( True ) and headed for the trucks. ( True ) got in the truck and he and ( GM lookout ) headed out along with the other trucks..
I drove down the dozer line where my guys were working and stopped and talked to ( Marsh? Steed? ). We talked about the increase in the fire behavior. I then headed for the Supt truck to refuel the Ranger. I met ( ?? ) there and I was called by ( Cordes ) on tac 1 and he asked if burning the two track was still an option. I told him no and that if it hadn’t yet it will burn over the two track very quickly.
He copied and ( DIVSA Marsh ) called and agreed with what I said and he said where the trucks were parked was all black.
( Next TWO full sentences completely BLACKED OUT ).
( Indicates more conversation between Marsh and Frisby and Marsh )
( informing Frisby about something since text resumes with )
( Frisby saying “I copied”. )
I copied and I headed east on the dozer line to check on our guys and see how far the fire had progressed.
————————————————————————————
This is now the place in Frisby’s Unit Log where he reports no more conversation with either Steed or Marsh up until the time when the MAYDAY traffic would hit the radio at 1639.
Actually… those pages have always been MISSING from Brian Frisby’s handwritten log. His Unit Log actually stops ( in mid-sentence ) just as he was recounting having to tell the firefighters at the end of Harper Canyon to “Hurry up” and exit the Youth Camp area.
Even that last sentence on that last page was obviously going to continue on the next page… but those final ‘pages’ of Frisby’s Unit Log were never released by US Forestry.
Frisby’s handwritten Unit Log ends with…
“I stressed that they needed to hurry up. We were getting multiple spots and…”
>> counselor also said…
>>
>> Although you all know my view of audio forensics, my ears hear something
>> like “stage” or “staged” (whereas Calvin hears “change” or “changed”), and
>> “stage” or “staged” fits with what BR states was being discussed at exactly
>> that time between GM leadership and BR (e.g. where BR was going to move
>> the buggies to be “staged” and whether GM could see it or understood
>> where it was or some such).
It’s possible.
See everything above.
Those kinds of conversations WERE taking place at approximately the time ( 3:53 PM ) of the MacKenzie videos.
HOWEVER…
All of that being said… please revisit the transcript of Brendan McDonough’s SECOND ADOSH interview.
That was the interview where they actually PLAYED the Mackenzie video clips for Brendan during the interview itself… and Brendan confirmed to ADOSH that the voices captured in those videos were just Eric Marsh talking to Jesse Steed.
Period. End of story.( according to Brendan, anyway ).
Brendan make NO mention of ANYONE from Blue Ridge being involved in those conversations or appearing on the radio during those MacKenzie clips.
WTKTT,
As usual, EXCELLENT work. Very informative. Thank you.
Here’s a little GEM from Blue Ridge Captain Trueheart Brown’s Unit Log, in the same 1542 to 1600 section reprinted above.
We basically KNOW that Brendan ended up driving the GM Superintendent truck out of that place at the top of the Sesame Clearing area where Marsh had parked it that morning.
We also KNOW ( from Brendan’s own testimony ).that the first thing he did after starting both vehicles during the evacuation was to also turn the air-conditioner on AND turn the radio up basically FULL volume. That would be so that he would be SURE he didn’t miss anything being said over the GM intra-crew radio channel.
We also KNOW ( from HIS own testimony ) that Captain Brown ended up driving the GM Chase Truck out of that same place… and that there is no doubt the onboard radio would have had the GM intra-crew frequency also set as its priority channel.
So there’s always been every reason to assume that while he was driving that GM Chase Truck… BR Captain Trueheart Brown would have overheard EVERYTHING that was transpiring over the GM intra-crew radio channel.
However… the following little GEM in Brown’s own testimony pretty much proves that not ONLY could he HEAR everything on the GM intra-crew channel via that onboard radio… Captain Brown was also USING this onboard radio to actually TALK with Marsh/Steed on the GM intra-crew channel itself…
From Captain Brown’s Unit Log…
—————————————————————————
At this time I jump on their ( GM’s ) crew radio and talk with ( Steed? Marsh? ) about where we are taking the buggies and the situation down here. I explain about what we are doing and what the fire behavior is doing.
—————————————————————————
When Brown says he “jumped on their (GM’s) CREW RADIO”… he is talking about the radio that was onboard the GM Chase Truck.
Brendan had the only BK portable that had the GM intra-crew frequency punched in… and Brendan was NOT with Brown. Brendan was ALONE in the GM Superintendent truck and FOLLOWING Brown in the GM Chase Truck all the way ( the long way around ) through Glen Ilah, then Yarnell proper, then down Shrine road and all the way out to the Youth Camp.
If Brown was speaking TO Marsh/Steed on the GM intra-crew… then Brown was doing it using the onboard radio in the GM Chase truck.
So NO ONE is going to be surprised if one of these days we find out that it may have been Captain Brown himself who ‘recorded’ some of the conversation that was taking place on GM intra-crew channel in that whole timeframe. He was in a perfect position to do so.
Ditto for the OTHER TWO Blue Ridge Hotshots who were driving the GM Crew Carriers. They were in the same convoy, at the same time, and hearing EVERYTHING that was taking place that whole time over the GM intra-crew radio frequency.
And that’s TWO more distinct and separate ‘perfect opportunities’ for one ( or both ) of THEM to have actually RECORDED some/all of that.
As we have always said there were people Monitoring the Crew Net
And herd it all. Maybe some of my information the person or persons who herd the argument????????
Since TODAY ( Feb 26, 2015 ) is the day that Brendan McDonough is ( for the FIRST time ) supposed to have to swear to “tell the WHOLE truth… and nothing BUT the truth”…
…I think it’s worth pointing out that he was the FOURTH person who had constant access to the GM intra-crew frequency with BOTH a BK portable and the radio onboard the GM Supt truck he was driving.
So it is STILL very likely that if some video/audio exists that captured a lot of what was transpiring on that GM intra-crew radio channel that it COULD have been Brendan McDonough capturing it with his iPhone.
Brendan DID have his iPhone ‘out and ready’ and he WAS USING IT during that ‘drive’ out from the Sesame clearing area, south to Glen Ilah, then all the way east on Lakewood to Hwy 89, then all the way north through Yarnell to Shrine road, then all the way west on Shrine Road to the Youth camp.
He was FOLLOWING BR Captain Trueheart Brown in the GM Chase truck because Brendan had no frickin’ idea where this ‘Youth Camp’ even was.
The other two Blue Ridge Hotshots were in the same Convoy driving the two GM Crew Carriers.
That was a pretty time-consuming drive ( at least 10, maybe even 15 minutes ).
When Brendan turned off Lakewood onto Highway 89… he stuck his iPhone out the window and took some still photos of the fire EXPLODING off to the west of Highway 89.
So that means for that whole drive… Brendan has his iPhone OUT, in his hand, and he was USING it.
Who is to say that he wasn’t recording video during that drive as well… and that is how he captured additional ( important ) conversation blaring over the GM intra-crew radio channel during that whole drive to the Youth Camp.
We KNOW now that Brendan has ALWAYS had his own agenda. That was to appear to be cooperating with the official investigations… but never really ‘volunteer’ any information. Just answer the questions asked and if no one asks the important questions… who cares. Mission accomplished.
So maybe part of Brendan’s initial ‘agenda’ to avoid supplying all the information he had in his head was to ALSO never supply ALL of the photo/video evidence he knew he had.
Maybe Brendan handed the SAIT a CD that was just part of his ‘agenda’ and ONLY had stuff on it that he wanted them to see… but wasn’t the complete photo/video record in his possession.
Then maybe Brendan started to feel ‘guilty’ and chose to show just a few select people ( family members? ) the ‘other’ video(s) that he had.
Maybe he thought he could get away with just doing that… and it would make him feel better but never bubble up to ‘the evidence record’.
Right along the lines of Darrell Willis taking those photos out at the deployment site of those flag-draped body-bags… and then Willis ONLY shared the photo with some family members with the ‘understanding’ that this is “just for us fire people since we’re the only ones who understand us”… or some such nonsense.
Well… someone TALKED.
One of those persons Willis shared that “bodies with flags on them” photo with actually published it on Facebook.
Whoops. So much for Willis’ “only between us fire people” plan.
Willis got called by the media ( since he was obviously one of the people who could have taken that photo ) and he had to be fast on his feet. Obvilusly his almost-preacher-like deep faith wouldn’t allow him to just lie about it… so he didn’t. He basically admitted he took the photo and shared it with a ‘private list’ of people… but said he never authorized it to be published on Facebook.
That brings us back to McDonough.
Maybe he did a ‘private list’ distribution of some other video he had EXACTLY like Willis did with his flags-on-bodies photo and thought he could get away with it.
But someone told someone… who told someone else… who may even told someone else who then posted about it on some public forum that shall remain nameless.
Whoops. So much for the ‘private list’ distribution model, again.
So now Brendan is forced to realize that unless he ‘comes clean’ about all this… he really COULD be accused of “obstructing an official investigation”.
So that brings us to today.
Brendan wants to ‘get something off his chest’.
Could it be simply all the things he should have told the investigators in the first place… and even some information about this ‘private list’ distribution he tried to pull off with a video just like Willis did with his photo of a bunch of flag-draped body bags?
We shall see.
POSTSCRIPT: I also wanted to just mention something else.
If you look very closely at Robert Caldwell’s video taken at 3:50 PM… you can see that NONE of the GM vehicles had actually been driven out of the Sesame area yet. At 1550… Brendan was still standing by the GM Supt and Chase trucks and Frisby had taken off south in the BR Polaris Ranger to ‘meet up’ with Brown and ‘hurry them up’ towards getting up to the GM Supt and Chase trucks.
In the Caldwell video… you can actually see two WHITE DOTS in the distance in TWO different locations.
1) The GM Supt and Chase trucks still parked at the top of the Sesame Clearing area.
2) The two GM Crew Carriers still parked in that Sesame clearing area SOUTH of the GM Supt and Chase trucks.
All FOUR of those ‘white dots’ represent the FOUR GM vehicles… and they aren’t moving yet. They are still sitting there.
That means that it was shortly AFTER 1550 when Brown got into the GM Chase truck and the other TWO Blue Ridge Hotshots got into the GM Crew Carriers.
That puts all FOUR of these people ( McDonough in the GM Supt Truck, Trueheart Brown in the GM Chase truck, and two more BR Hotshots in the 2 GM crew carriers ) at exactly the time when the entire “discussing their options” conversations were taking place between Marsh and Steed over the GM intra-crew channel.
And ANY one of these FOUR people ( or even more than one of them ) COULD have been RECORDING what was coming over the truck radios.
Followup…
Since there seems to have been some strange conversation below trying to suggest that NONE of the firefighters on the fire knew that the fire was going to turn into the monster it did… or even COULD have known…
I think it’s worth pointing out that the ’roundup’ presented above of all the reported radio conversations between Marsh/Steed and Frisby/Brown WERE in the 1542 to 1600 timeframe… and were taking place BEFORE those men ever decided to leave their safe black.
Even if they ( Marsh and Steed ) did NOT have the absolute best view of the ENTIRE fire situation that day ( just short of being in an airplane )… and even if they were NOT (supposedly) professional enough to look at a fire and determine “Current and EXPECTED fire behavior”…
…there is NO DOUBT that Marsh/Steed were being TOLD exactly what was happening ‘down there’ as the fire was actually ‘exceeding everyone’s expectations’ and all hell was already breaking loose.
Even if they couldn’t see ( or understand ) that this fire was now EXPLODING and ‘exceeding everyone’s expectations’ even in the 1550 to 1600 timeframe… that’s still exactly WHEN they were being TOLD that’s how dangerous this fire had become and it was only getting worse.
But they STILL (apparently) thought that wasn’t much of their concern and still decided to make a risky 2 mile move through unburned fuel with no lookout less than 1 mile from a VERY dangerous, plume dominated fire.
The conversation below is trying to make it sound like things were ‘normal’ or, in some way, ‘predictable’ at the time some critical decisions were being made.
That’s absurd.
The fire was ALREADY EXPLODING and had ALREADY achieved the ‘totally outperforming expectations’ and ‘totally unpredictable’ state BEFORE thos emen even decided to try and beat it to the Boulder Springs Ranch ( with no lookout ).
Why would any one worry about GM they were next to or in the BLACK no reason to move their safety Zone was right there.
The place where 1000’s of fire fighters have retreated to in these kinds of situations. The number one place your brain says is safe. The number one place your training tells you to go.
Exactly. I was just pointing out that by the time that fire was running right at Blue Ridge and forcing Brendan to barely escape with his life ( along with Blue Ridge )… and the fire was ALREADY “outperforming ALL expectations’ and SPGS1 Gary Cordes was ordering everyone to “Get OFF the FIRE! GO to your pre-determined areas”…
…you didn’t have to be any kind of fire-whisperer ( or even half of genius ) to know that the ‘Big Dog’ was now TOTALLY outside expectations and TOTALLY unpredictable.
It was ( even that early ) just time for any sane firefighter to just get OFF the fire and be safe.
All of that happened BEFORE any decision was even MADE about ‘leaving the black’.
There was a conversation somewhere down below about Marsh/Steed perhaps having NO IDEA what KIND of fire it had turned into either before they made their decision to leave the black… or even WHILE they were walking through unburned fuel in a box canyon.
Not a chance.
They DECIDED to be ‘Ranger Danger’… and run a foot-race… and they paid for that bad decision with their lives.
Thanks I know you get it—–
Just finding a simple reason of why the hell they went into that canyon
would be nice.
It may be simpler than we think——-
Here’s a few simple reasons why ….
1) Bad Decisions With Prior Good Outcomes. 2) The Rule of 99.
3) The Normalization of Deviance.
Very possible.
As hard as it might be for some people to eventually understand… perhaps the leadership of this particular organization was simply doing what was NORMAL for THEM… and the slot-machine came up all-lemons this time.
Lesson to be learned?
FIND/IDENTIFY any other similar organizations with similar attitudes amongst the leadership… and REPLACE that leadership before more people get KILLED.
WTKTT,
Some of the events immediately leading up to the YH Fire fatalities were VERY SIMILAR to those on both the 1994 South Canyon Fire and the 2001 Thirty-mile Fire in WA. These fires also each had a safe ‘LUNCH SPOT’ where it was just as if TIME STOOD STILL FOR THEM while the fire raged nearby.
They were still engaged in the fire in the sense that they were on the firelines, observed CURRENT fire behavior, NOT really paying heed to EXPECTED fire behavior, and then attempted to re-engage the fire SERIOUSLY LACKING in Situational Awareness, a required principle for making good, sound Risk Management decisions.
The similarities in this respect are quite chilling actually.
Sorry to be blunt… but as someone just looking at this WFF business from the ‘outside’… that represents nothing more than just perfectly identifiable systemic ( and VERY BAD ) hiring, training, promotional and management practices.
In any other ( sane ) business… those are the kinds of things that needs to always be corrected IMMEDIATELY, once identified.
Not 10 years from now.
**
** AZF VERUS ADOSH ALJ HEARING FILE UPDATED
Well… the hardball is well underway in Arizona Forestry’s contesting of the ADOSH findings.
That ADOSH “Adminstrative Law Judge” ( ALJ ) hearing file that appeared the other day
containing Jude Mosesso’s refusal to issue Arizona Forestry’s request for a subpoena
for Brendan McDonough has been UPDATED ( as of today ) and contains more copies
of more documents that have been filed.
What is happening now is that Arizona Forestry is filing OBJECTIONS to every single “Request for Production of Documents” that ADOSH has already made to Arizona Forestry.
This kind of ‘discovery’ process ( even in just something that ends up in a ‘hearing’ like this puppy ) is a two-way-street. Arizona Forestry is entitled to know everything ADOSH knows… and vice-versa.
So ADOSH has asked for a pretty specific list of things… but Arizona Forestry is now OBJECTING to having to provide those things.
Example: ADOSH has specifically asked for ALL Air-To-Air AND Air-To-Ground recordings related to Yarnell and specifically ALL recordings that may have been made by Arizona Forestry’s own Dispatch Center. Arizona Forestry is objecting to the request and just says something that as far as they know… the ‘Rascal Recorder’ that was being used by their Dispatch Center to record things busted in Marsh of 2013 and hadn’t been fixed by June 30… or some such nonsense.
This NEW round of ‘hardball’ is now at that top of the following online PUBLIC document…
https://docs.google.com/file/d/0B6N47Z5CNR-CV3cyRkdFcmk2cG8/edit?pli=1
More about this later.
Two bad typos above…
Title of post should have (obviously) been…
** AZF VERSUS ADOSH ALJ HEARING FILE UPDATED
and I typed ‘Marsh of 2013’ instead of ‘March of 2013’.
Sentence above should have read like this…
Arizona Forestry is objecting to the request and just says something that as far as they know… the ‘Rascal Recorder’ that was being used by their Dispatch Center to record things busted in MARCH of 2013 and hadn’t been fixed by June 30… or some such nonsense.
NOTE: This is being ‘pulled up out of the weeds’ from down below in
order to ask ‘Robert the Second’ ( RTS ) a quick question…
>> On February 22, 2015 at 5:08 pm, WTKTT said…
>>
>> Again… I’m not criticizing RTS in any way.
>>
>> I BELIEVE him that HIS sources have knowledge of this heretofore not widely
>> seen/heard video/audio material… but I think he is still saying HE, HIMSELF
>> has NOT seen this evidence for himself and is NOT exactly SURE of all the details.
>>
>> Bottom line: The only thing I see RTS ‘confirming’… without a shadow of a
>> doubt… is that he knows people who know something and that ‘something’
>> will PROBABLY prove that Marsh was NEAR ( but never actually AT? ) the
>> BSR that day… if and when that evidence ever emerges.
>>
>> So for now… it just seems like more incremental information that
>> the PULL theory is PROBABLY the correct one.
>> On February 22, 2015 at 5:31 pm, Robert the Second (RTS) replied…
>>
>> WTKTT,
>>
>> Jolly good deduction Mr. Watson.
>>
>> I can only tell you so much ya know and then I have to draw a line.
>> I have to abide by my principles promising confidentiality to my sources.
I completely understand.
Can I ask you a quick question, though?
I don’t THINK answering this question would violate any promises you may have made to anyone… but ( of course ) only you can know that.
Would you say that your sources really do NOT want this evidence to ‘see the light’ of day…
…or they really DO want that to happen… but are (currently) just being PREVENTED from ‘telling what they know’ by OTHER people?
Feel free to totally ignore this question. I just thought I would ask.
WTKTT,
I think it’s safe to say that they all DO want this to see ‘the light of day.’ They want the truth to come out because they know they are being lied to.
Thank you.
Elizabeth/Logical Phallacy,
On February 24,2015 at 7:53 AM you said “… there is a fine and unpredictable and unascertainable (in advance) line between extreme fire behavior ultimately and shortly erupt so violently and quickly that it can close that 1 mile gap faster than you can get out of the way. Relatively speaking, fire science – particularly with respect to extreme fire behavior – is nascent.:
OMG! You actually believe this feculence don’t you. Please provide your SOURCE(S) for this blather. You should quit the lawyer gig and start actually WRITING FICTION. Your Logical Phallacy moniker should generate millions of readers.
My all-time favorite line is the “THERE IS A FINE AND UNPREDICTABLE AND UNASCERTAINABLE LINE BETWEEN EXTREME FIRE BEHAVIOR that a WFF can arguably safely get within a mile of on foot and extreme fire behavior that will ULTIMATELY AND SHORTLY ERUPT SO VIOLENTLY AND QUICKLY THAT IT CAN CLOSE THAT 1 MILE GAP FASTER THAN YOU CAN GET OUT OF THE WAY.” (ALL EMPHASIS ADDED). REALLY? This is such amazing fire behavior information here.
Where do you come up with this feculence? This ‘fine and unpredictable and unascertainable line’ is TOTALLY AND UNEQUIVOCALLY FALSE!. And ‘FASTER THAN YOU CAN GET OUT OF THE WAY.’ Really? You really believe this feculence don’t you?
Good, safe, competent WFF HABITUALLY use ‘The WFF Rules’ AND Situational Awareness AND the Risk Management process to make good, sound decisions. This kind of histrionics and drama that you present here works in the courtroom though, doesn’t it? Experts say it takes 21 days to start or stop a habit, so start today.
Good, competent, safe WFF using LCES would have plenty of time to observe all this, communicate to others, make a sound decision and ‘get the f*** out of the way’ in plenty of time. Start writing fiction. You’re good at it.
Once again, please provide your source(s) for the above unpredictable and unavoidable extreme fire behavior assertion. Fire science and extreme fire behavior are NOT “nascent.” Just checking the dates of the scores of references cited in this Extreme Fire Behavior publication will debunk your ‘nascent’ claim.
http://www.fs.fed.us/pnw/pubs/pnw_gtr854.pdf
A necessary CORRECTION to the above – ‘with all due respect.’
On February 24,2015 at 7:53 AM you said: “Unfortunately, there is a fine and unpredictable and unascertainable (in advance) line between extreme fire behavior that a WFF can arguably safety get within a mile of on foot and extreme fire behavior that will ultimately and shortly erupt so violently and quickly that it can close that 1 mile gap faster than you can get out of the way. Relatively speaking, fire science – particularly with respect to extreme fire behavior – is nascent.”
Hm. Interesting, Robert-the-Second (Fred S.). Thanks for sharing your own assessment of your expertise. If I am understanding your above comments correctly, you have a mathematical formula or a modeling tool that even Dr. Mark Finney, Marty Alexander, Dr. Brian Potter, etc. do not have. You apparently have the ability to ascertain ex ante when looking at a fire that is exhibiting extreme fire behavior (e.g. a head fire moving due east with a ROS of 2.1 mph) WHETHER that fire is going to remain as it is as a “mere” extreme fire behavior fire (e.g. racing due east with a ROS of 2.1 mph) or WHETHER and, more importantly(!!!), WHEN that fire is going to “erupt” into what I would call “uber-extreme fire behavior” and change direction and go (in a matter of minutes) from racing due east at a ROS of 2.1 mph to racing due SOUTH/SW at a ROS of likely over 12 mph.
Impressive, Robert-the-Second. So, tell us: What formula are you using, and how does it allow you to nail down the time frame for this change in fire behavior to a window of, say, ten minutes (or even 15 minutes, which is what it could take a hotshot crew to cover a full mile in certain terrain)? 🙂 (Also, if you have such a precise, time-tailored formula, how do you explain the fact that others had to move your crew buggies at least once because you apparently underestimated the likely fire behavior when you were a Hotshot crew superintendent?)
To that end, re-read the document to which you are linking, above. What you will see is that the authors of the chapters in that document do not hide the fact that the science is pretty uncertain (what I am calling “nascent”) in many cases. For example, go re-read the chapter on combining duel columns, and then tell us how and when you can tell which of two huge columns is going to pull the other toward it and WHEN (down to a ten or even 15 minute window) that is going to happen. And tell us how you definitively predict in advance whether there columns will even pull, and, if so, at what size and distance and TIME it will happen. It is ok if you are off by a few minutes or a few yards, FYI. 😉
Elizabeth, I think we all agree here that fire science is NOT a finite science. There are way too many variables in the fire environment to create a mathematical formula that will give all of the answers.
Your question to RTS, asking him to tell you exactly when the fire would go from 2.1 mph to 12 mph is fairly easy to answer…..
When the PREDICTED outflow winds from the thunderstorm, go from 10 mph to 40 mph. Way way way back in the earliest chapters of this discussion, I gave predicted rates of spread, using the fuel modelling software.
They knew the storm was coming, they knew it was going to be windy, they knew rates of spread were gonna go ballistic. It was fully identified in the Fire Behaviour Forecast….
They IGNORED the prediction, for some strange reason.
A a fire Behaviour Analyst, I can only put out the prediction to the best of my abilities, with the knowledge that I have gathered (Wx forecasts, modelling, local knowledge, ) I CAN”T make people make good decisions during times of bad fire behaviour.
Rocksteady – thank you for your reply. I am grateful. I will say this again: You obviously know far far more about wildland fire than I will ever know, and I am grateful for you sharing your input. I have three questions, if you want to answer them:
1. Have you ever predicted 40 mph winds that never materialized?
2. If what was predicted to arrive in a half hour does not come within the half hour, and there is nothing in the sky to suggest that it is on the way (the column is not moving in advance of the winds, the clouds are not moving the storm clouds that were sitting to the NW and NE all day are still sitting in the same spot), isn’t it sometimes the case that predicted weather event dissipated, will not be coming, and will not directly impact the fire behavior?
3. If winds were going to come from the NE at 40 mph, which direction would they push the fire? Presumably to the SW, right?
Again, Rocksteady, I am not trying to refute you or offend you or be rude. I am trying to think this through and understand things. Obviously GM thought what they were doing would NOT get them killed, so I am trying to think through why….
Thanks if you feel like answering, and, if you do not, that is obviously fine, too.
First you are saying Weather Forecasters Meteorologists are not evaluating scientific facts to Predict the weather? WHEN YOU ARE TALKING 40 mph WINDS YOU BETTER PAY ATTENTION.
That is an EXTREEM FORCAST.
Second you are asking if Fire Behavior Officers Predict the Weather?
or predict the wind speed? ABSOLUTLY NOT They use the meteorologists forecast————
Third that is the stupidest Question I ever herd.
Yes if unobstructed across a flat land scape. SW
Obstructions, Topography and local influence will affect any high wind occurrence. Thus creating erratic winds.
ALL SHOUT WATCH OUT.
Bob and Rocksteady,
Redoubling and further clarifying here what Bob Powers says above about fire weather and fire behavior resulting “across an unobstructed landscape.”
My reference to the YouTube video below: Wildland Fire LLC YouTube video clip of a webinar titled ‘EFFECTS OF COMPLEX TERRAIN ON EXTREME FIRE BEHAVIOR focuses on the section titled ‘FIRE BEHAVIOR IN CANYONS’ that runs from about 29:26 to 36:28. This will definitely help you to better understand what occurred on the afternoon of the YH Fire on 30 June 2013.”
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CWauaWOnOZ8
The ‘Fire Behavior in Canyons’ segment focused on canyons with SLOPE to them. The YH Fire bowl/box canyon had virtually no slope until the far reaches at the base of the lower slopes of the Weaver Mountains, just outside the perimeter of the BSR.
As Bob pointed out, ‘unobstructed wind’ has basically the same fire behavior, fire intensity, rates of spread, etc. as fire running up a steep canyon or chimney or chute. Everything is the same except there is NO slope and NO steepness.
In fact, more fires get larger in a 24-hour period in flat terrain than fires in mountainous terrain due to the ‘unobstructed’ nature of the topography. Fires in mountainous terrain have fast uphill runs followed by slower fire spread backing down the opposite slope. Gravity winds such as Santa Ana and Chinook winds are different and will virtually ‘hug the terrain’ so that they blow just as fast uphill as downhill.
However, that was NOT the case on the YH Fire. The OUTFLOW WINDS basically functioned as a virtual BLOWTORCH and these winds and resultant fire behavior closely followed the terrain features, in this case the wide canyon leading into the BSR bowl/box canyon.
So then, IMHO, the 30 June 2013 fire weather influencing the fire behavior on YH Fire was the result of a powerfully wind driven, terrain channeled fire that swept into the narrowly-restrictive box canyon, basically resulting in ‘area ignition’ in the confines of the bowl.
Bowls are extremely deadly features and establishing control features within them should be avoided and deploying fire shelters within them should clearly be avoided at all costs. In fact, the required fire shelter training specifically states to avoid deploying your fire shelters in chimneys, chutes, or bowls, in spite of what one PFD fire official stated in a news conference at the YHF fatality site. This PFD fire official confidently stated “this is where they had to deploy … I think they picked the best location in this bowl … you’re in a box canyon here …” Really? The best location in this bowl?
The ONLY reason they ‘HAD TO DEPLOY IN THIS BRUSH CHOKED BOWL IN A BRUSH FILLED BOX CANYON is because, WITHOUT A REQUIRED LOOKOUT IN PLACE, they left their perfectly good SZ and traveled downhill through steep, unburned chimneys and chutes into an unburned box canyon and an unburned bowl at the worst possible time, as outflow winds ‘across an unobstructed landscape’ intensely accelerated the fire behavior. Staying in their perfectly good SZ should have been the right decision at the time. The ‘Rule of 99’ was in play.
)Unfortunately Elizabeth, I have predicted extreme fire behaviour, based on a meteorologist wind prediction that did not come true. As with Fire Behaviour, weather predictions are also a infinite science. Overpredicting is better than underpredicting… From a safety point of view.
2) I experienced this a couple years ago, the met predicted killer thunder cells with winds of 40 mph, based on what he was seeing on the weather charts, however, we never had them materialize, We saw no indication that the buildup was occurring anywhere that we could seee, so in discussion with the met, we went green light on teh burn, and it was very successful. Sometimes mets are wrong, based on what they are seeing.
3) The wind out of the NE SHOULD drive the fire to the SW, unless, terrain influences it or the column driven winds override the incoming winds…
Hope this helps…
Reply to rocksteady post on February 26, 2015 at 8:56 am
>> rocksteady said…
>>
>>
>> 3) The wind out of the NE SHOULD drive the fire to
>> the SW, unless, terrain influences it
This was absolutely CONFIRMED to be the case that day in Yarnell by Brendan McDonough himself during his first ADOSH on August 20, 2013.
The timeframe under discussion was as early as 1542… when Brendan was being ‘evacuated’ to the east by Brian Frisby.
Brendan testified that even that early on… the WINDS were already primarily coming right out of the NORTH and blowing the FIRELINE due SOUTH… but it was the TERRAIN itself near Yarnell that was also causing a ‘spreading out’ component to the fire and forcing it’s expansion in EASTERLY directions at the same time.
From Brendan’s ADOSH interview…
A = Brendan McDonough
—————————————————————-
1976 A: So it was – the winds were out of the north, northeast but primarily due to the
1977 terrain of that ridge, it’s moving to the east.
—————————————————————-
Rocksteady,
Thanks for your FBA explanation. The fire behavior based on the fuels, weather, and terrain alignment seemed pretty straight forward to me. I should have taken SR’s lead on this one when he said “I’d just note that EN again is getting enough wrong that there’s no point in going through it.”
Elizabeth/Logical Phallacy – you chose to live in your own world of fiction and histrionics which also includes selective knowledge and selective ignorance. Save it for the courtroom drama where you can sway the jury.
If we follow ‘The Rules,’ with experience, and by the Grace of God, we learn how to ‘read’ a fire and do a lot of stuff by the ‘seat of our pants’ so to speak based on the ‘70% solution.’ It’s not a perfect science. We all make mistakes, and that’s how we learn. Unfortunately, I allege this didn’t ever sink in for GMHS Supt. Marsh.
Robert the Second, I had offered a couple of responsive thoughts or questions for you, and you seem to have missed them, so I will try again:
“Robert-the-Second. So, tell us: What formula are you using, and how does it allow you to nail down the time frame for this change in fire behavior to a window of, say, ten minutes (or even 15 minutes, which is what it could take a hotshot crew to cover a full mile in certain terrain)? 🙂 (Also, if you have such a precise, time-tailored formula, how do you explain the fact that others had to move your crew buggies at least once because you apparently underestimated the likely fire behavior when you were a Hotshot crew superintendent?)
To that end, re-read the document to which you are linking, above. What you will see is that the authors of the chapters in that document do not hide the fact that the science is pretty uncertain (what I am calling “nascent”) in many cases. For example, go re-read the chapter on combining duel columns, and then tell us how and when you can tell which of two huge columns is going to pull the other toward it and WHEN (down to a ten or even 15 minute window) that is going to happen. And tell us how you definitively predict in advance whether there columns will even pull, and, if so, at what size and distance and TIME it will happen. It is ok if you are off by a few minutes or a few yards, FYI.”
Also, you make reference to SR’s comment down below directed at me, but I thought we all agreed that SR was also one of the names that you use here on this BB to anonymously post under, to make it sound like MULTIPLE different people agree with you. I thought we agreed that SR, TTWARE, Fire20+, etc. were *all* actually Robert the Second just using different made-up names (like “seymour”), no?
Elizabeth/Logical Phallacy,
On February 25, 2015 at 10:07 AM you said “I thought WE ALL AGREED that SR was also one of the names that you use here on this BB to anonymously post under, to make it sound like MULTIPLE different people agree with you. I thought WE AGREED that SR, TTWARE, Fire20+, etc. were *all* actually Robert the Second just using different made-up names (like “seymour”), no?” (ALL EMPHASIS ADDED except for ‘MULTIPLE and TTWARE’)
In YOUR mind only do they exist as one. We did NOT all agree. You agreed with your multiple personalities. You are delusional. You really need help. Please seek the mental health therapy you so desperately need. There are certified, educated, and trained professionals that can and will offer you the help you need. Search the Unaffordable Careless Act for a list of these professionals.
I can’t believe that anyone, ANYONE, still responds to any of her comments.
She has added nothing to this discussion from the beginning. She just gets enjoyment out of yanking people’s chains.
I have to agree with RTS, that the only “we agreed” going on here is between her and her multiple personalities.
Apparently, all of “those people” have forgotten the times she repeatedly accused me of being WTKTT, and not RTS. But, I guess those superior investigative skills have finally got the drop on all of us.
TTWARE,
She is indeed a ‘legend in her own mind’ and she clearly needs professional help.
First well said.
This will sound crazy to non wild land Fire People.
I was mentored by a 58 year old District FMO who started in the late 40’s.
He was highly respected in the Early 60’s by many well known Fire people
He taught me many things on of which I never forgot.
OLD SCHOOL as it is referred to—-
When you learn all of the Science about fire that you will use in Suppression
Add this to your division process..
The Fire always has things to tell you about what it is doing and plans to do.
ALWAYS LISTEN AND LOOK THE FIRE WILL TELL YOU WHAT IT IS GOING TO DO WHERE IT IS GOING AND HOW FAST IT WILL GET THERE.
When a fire tells you it is about to get up and run you feel it you know it you understand it.
The Yarnell Fire gave a lot of warning signs not many paid enough attention to them to move early out of harms way.
All the signs for this fire to blow up were there at 1300 by 1600 it was telling every one it was moving Weather for casts said it was going to do its thing with erratic winds, the 2 mile FIRE FRONT said your not going to stop me now
its to late get out of the way.
99% of all current Superintendents would tell you they would never have left the BLACK. Frisby and Brown would tell you the same they could not believe where GM was.
The Superintendents for the FS and BLM have discussed this and though they will not say publicly they are all saying the choice was to stay in the Black.
None would have moved to the BSR.
Reply to Bob Powers post on February 25, 2015 at 9:24 am
>> Bob Powers said…
>>
>> This will sound crazy to non wild land Fire People.
None of the above sound the least bit ‘crazy’ at all.
Of COURSE you have to have ( in the end ) a ‘feel’ for what a fire is going to do. It would be hard to call yourself a professional firefighter if you were NOT able to do that.
But see the following comment just posted above.
It’s basically just a ’roundup’ on ALL of the reported conversations that Marsh/Steed were having with Frisby/Brown in the 1542 to 1600 timeframe.
Even if they ( Marsh and Steed ) did NOT have the absolute best view of the ENTIRE fire situation that day ( just short of being in an airplane )… and even if they were NOT (supposedly) professional enough to look at a fire and determine “Current and EXPECTED fire behavior”…
…there is NO DOUBT that Marsh/Steed were being TOLD exactly what was happening ‘down there’ as the fire was actually ‘exceeding everyone’s expectations’ and all hell was already breaking loose.
Even if they couldn’t see ( or understand ) that this fire was now EXPLODING and ‘exceeding everyone’s expectations’ even in the 1550 to 1600 timeframe… that’s when they were being TOLD that’s how dangerous this fire had become and it was only getting worse.
But they STILL (apparently) thought that wasn’t much of their concern and still decided to make a risky 2 mile move through unburned fuel with no lookout less than 1 mile from a VERY dangerous, plume dominated fire.
Here’s that latest comment up above with that ’roundup’ in it…
http://www.investigativemedia.com/yarnell-hill-fire-chapter-xii/#comment-264384
WTK said
If you are referring to MacKenzie’s second 9 second video ( MVI_0891 )… I am also hearing that clip start with ‘change, ya know” ( ss if he was saying something along the lines of “I could tell things were gonna change, ya know” )….
Or another GUESS at the words that preceded the “change, ya know” could have been…..
sometimes plans change , ya know
But that is just a guess
WTK says
but no one says “too bad” after that
That is your opinion. I sure would like to hear some other people opine about this in addition to you and I, ya know?
WTK says
Right after Marsh finishes his statement with “change, ya know”… SOMEONE then says ( over the radio, with modulation )… “You bet”.
I totally do not agree here. The same static is heard during change “change, ya know, and too bad”
There is no interruption in the static between those two thoughts.
And if you think think that is a different voice, I counter that it is just someone talking while they are exerting themselves.
Remember how Marsh had just reported that he was working his way off the top? He was moving so his voice would change (do not know if that is the right word?) as he was moving between the two track and the DZ. Pretty strenuous section of trail.
Yea… all of the above is just another rehash of where this got left last time.
You insist you hear something that I just can’t believe anyone would even think it was.
There are a LOT of dicey and unclear radio transmissions in this radio record… but
this isn’t one of them.
We agreed to disagree before. Same thing now.
Other opinions WOULD be nice.
I do believe there is some truth to the alleged argument that supposedly happened between Marsh and Steed in the timeframe of the Mackenzie, Possibly?
So it does make sense that Marsh would say the words TO BAD.
I have been unable to agree one way or the other.
it could be either—Both seem to lead to additional discussion? .
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Usn7zvmix2U
Maybe all overhead types should review this prior to every fire season, as well as Hotshots 🙂
Yes, this video is a must especially for IMT’s. it’s a good one. Thanks.
WTK said
But we also know they HEARD the same “Hunker and be safe” directive from OPS1 Abel at 1550.
So the men themselves KNEW that OPS had told them to “Hunker and be safe” right there where they were.
Unlike you and me, the GMIHC probably heard the entire conversation.
And
Just to be clear
1. Robert Caldwell’s video comes moments before the
2. Mackenzie video where Marsh can be heard saying (IMO) 0891 first two seconds
“change you know, too bad”
FYI, I asked one of my hotshot/WFF pals last night if he’s ever told anyone on a fire to “hunker.” He said the only time he can recall saying it is when he’s got a storm coming in, and he’s telling one of his crews or squads to hunker down and ride out the rain or something. Other than a storm, he does not think he has given the instruction to “hunker.”
I have always thought that I heard thunder in Caldwell’s video, not wind.
I’m not sure if these thoughts matter, Calvin, but I wanted to put them in your hopper.
There are a lot of different terms that vary on the fireline, depending on the location of their home jurisdiction.
When I was in the NWT, I used the term Communications Plan, the Hotshots used “Commo”. 5/8″ fire hose was called “pee line” by the Hotshots, we call it 5/8. We call chainsaw gerry cans (Oil and gas) combi cans, they called them something different.
Just because your source says he has never used “hunker” does not mean that those on the fire did not use it, meaning “stay where you are”…
Rocksteady – I wasn’t suggesting that any particular usage of the word “hunker” was for sure the answer. I just wanted to share what my friend said.
FYI, my friend (or source or whatever) was speaking about what he has used as parlance in the SW and in Arizona. My friend/source/whatever had worked with GM, he’s pretty senior in the SW, he knows Robert-the-Second very well and has worked closely with him for a very long time, etc.
So I’m not saying his usage of “hunker” is how EVERYONE in the SW would use the word “hunker.” But I thought it was worth mentioning here, just for consideration, because it might (or might not) be relevant to folks reading here. 🙂
Reply to Elizabeth ( counselor ) post on February 24, 2015 at 6:12 am
>> counselor said…
>>
>> FYI, I asked one of my hotshot/WFF pals last night if he’s
>> ever told anyone on a fire to “hunker.” He said the only time
>> he can recall saying it is when he’s got a storm coming in, and
>> he’s telling one of his crews or squads to hunker down and ride
>> out the rain or something.
The ‘or something’ is lightning.
During OPS1 Todd Abel’s interview he told them the approaching storm WAS one of the things ‘on his mind’ around the time we know he was telling Marsh ( and GM ) to “Hunker and be safe” up on that ridge. Todd Abel even repeats the word “hunkered’ in this context during his own ADOSH interview.
From Field OPS1 Todd Abel’s August 22, 2013 ADOSH interview…
A = Field OPS1 Toddl Abel
——————————————————————
545 A: Okay what – what that monsoon wea- possibility of monsoon build ups, to me,
546 it – it – obviously it does a lot of things to fire and safety for firefighters.
547 Knowing that these guys could be at – were gonna be up on this ridge,
548 lightning was a concern for me.
549
550 Q1: Okay.
551
552 A: I wanted them to make sure that they kept good lookouts and watched for
553 those build ups, ‘cause of the lightning.
554
555 Q1: Okay.
1930 Q1: Let me ask you this, you say you’re nervous, um, because of this…
1931
1932 A: This cell building over here.
1933
1934 Q1: …this cell – what does that mean to you?
1935
1936 A: That means outflows, possible lightning strikes, all that stuff.
1937
1938 Q1: Okay.
1939
1940 A: So that’s why I wanted to make sure that he had eyes on it to make sure he
1941 watches that thing and make sure that if it’s getting too – if he gets to really
1942 start feeling those winds changing and everything that they can get hunkered
1943 in that black – that 250 acres of safety zone there.
1944
1945 Q1: Mm-hm.
1946
1947 A: And – and stay out of harm’s way. You know they could even drop down off
1948 the ridge for lightning purposes if they had to.
1949
1950 Q1: Sure.
1951
1952 A: Was my thought process.
——————————————————————–
>> counselor also said…
>>
>> I have always thought that I heard thunder in Caldwell’s video, not wind.
At what offset in the video do you even think you are hearing this?
NOTE to moderator: The comment above can/should be deleted. It went into moderation because of a mis-typed ‘Name’ field. It has been resubmitted already using the right ‘Name’. and is duplicated below.
Reply to Elizabeth ( counselor ) post on February 24, 2015 at 6:12 am
>> counselor said…
>>
>> FYI, I asked one of my hotshot/WFF pals last night if he’s
>> ever told anyone on a fire to “hunker.” He said the only time
>> he can recall saying it is when he’s got a storm coming in, and
>> he’s telling one of his crews or squads to hunker down and ride
>> out the rain or something.
The ‘or something’ is lightning.
During OPS1 Todd Abel’s interview he told them the approaching storm WAS one of the things ‘on his mind’ around the time we know he was telling Marsh ( and GM ) to “Hunker and be safe” up on that ridge. Todd Abel even repeats the word “hunkered’ in this context during his own ADOSH interview.
From Field OPS1 Todd Abel’s August 22, 2013 ADOSH interview…
A = Field OPS1 Toddl Abel
——————————————————————
545 A: Okay what – what that monsoon wea- possibility of monsoon build ups, to me,
546 it – it – obviously it does a lot of things to fire and safety for firefighters.
547 Knowing that these guys could be at – were gonna be up on this ridge,
548 lightning was a concern for me.
549
550 Q1: Okay.
551
552 A: I wanted them to make sure that they kept good lookouts and watched for
553 those build ups, ‘cause of the lightning.
554
555 Q1: Okay.
1930 Q1: Let me ask you this, you say you’re nervous, um, because of this…
1931
1932 A: This cell building over here.
1933
1934 Q1: …this cell – what does that mean to you?
1935
1936 A: That means outflows, possible lightning strikes, all that stuff.
1937
1938 Q1: Okay.
1939
1940 A: So that’s why I wanted to make sure that he had eyes on it to make sure he
1941 watches that thing and make sure that if it’s getting too – if he gets to really
1942 start feeling those winds changing and everything that they can get hunkered
1943 in that black – that 250 acres of safety zone there.
1944
1945 Q1: Mm-hm.
1946
1947 A: And – and stay out of harm’s way. You know they could even drop down off
1948 the ridge for lightning purposes if they had to.
1949
1950 Q1: Sure.
1951
1952 A: Was my thought process.
——————————————————————–
>> counselor also said…
>>
>> I have always thought that I heard thunder in Caldwell’s video, not wind.
At what offset in the video do you even think you are hearing this?
At roughly seven or so seconds in.
Also, the Blue Ridge unit logs mention the guys hearing thunder.
Reply to Elizabeth (counselor) post on February 25, 2015 at 6:48 am
>> counselor said…
>>
>> At roughly seven or so seconds in.
I hear no thunder. Just wind noise. It increases just as Caldwell changed the orientation of the camera. That is to be expected.
Be sure to listen to the ORIGINAL video… and not just the WAV audio track that accompanied Caldwell’s video in the SAIT release.
The SAIR itself says that The Earth Networks Total Lightning Network verified some some lightning/thunder that afternoon, showing TWO in-cloud lightning flashes at 1620.
But that didn’t happen until a full half-hour AFTER Caldwell’s video.
From the SAIR…
PDF page 35 ( Reference 1 )
The outflow boundary reaches the northern portion of the fire around 1618. Thunder rumbles and spritzes of rain or mist mixed with ash fall over portions of the fire area.
PDF page 35 ( Reference 2 )
Thunder heard with the smattering of rain and a very short period of calm wind conditions cause several firefighters in Yarnell to think about the 1990 Dude Fire in Arizona and the six fatalities that occurred on that fire.
PDF page 78
Around 1620 MST, field personnel near Highway 89 in the Yarnell area began to hear thunder.The Earth Networks Total Lightning Network verified the thunder, showing two in-cloud lightning flashes at 1620.
PDF page 83
Other distinct indicators included “spritzes” of rain, thunder, and some flashes of lightning.
>> counselor also said…
>>
>> Also, the Blue Ridge unit logs mention the guys hearing thunder.
Your use of the ‘plural’ there seems to suggest this information is in more than just one BR Unit Log.
Which ones are you talking about?
Reply to calvin post on February 24, 2015 at 4:47 am
>> calvin said…
>>
>> WTK said
>> But we also know they HEARD the same “Hunker and be safe” directive
>> from OPS1 Abel at 1550.
>> So the men themselves KNEW that OPS had told them to “Hunker and
>> be safe” right there where they were.
>>
>> Unlike you and me, the GMIHC probably heard the entire conversation.
Yes. I pointed that out in the same comment you are quoting… but at 1550 we really can’t be sure how MANY of the men had assembled at that rest spot. It still seems ( at 1550 ) that they were still in the process of ‘assembling’ there.
Remember… even 5 minutes later in the MacKenzie photos/videos… there are still at least half of the Granite Mountain Hotshots MISSING. We have always been assuming they are all standing/sitting BEHIND Christopher MacKenzie’s location… but he never turns his camera around and takes a photo to prove it.
Bottom line is YES… however many of the men really were at that location must have heard ALL of the same radio conversations WE can now only hear snippets of. In all three videos ( Caldwell and both MacKenzie videos ) whichever radio is being captured by the camera was LOUD so they ALL should have heard what was being said.
>> calvin also said…
>>
>> And
>>
>> Just to be clear
>>
>> 1. Robert Caldwell’s video comes moments before the
>>
>> 2. Mackenzie video where Marsh can be heard saying (IMO) 0891
>> first two seconds “change you know, too bad”
If you are referring to MacKenzie’s second 9 second video ( MVI_0891 )… I am also hearing that clip start with ‘change, ya know” ( ss if he was saying something along the lines of “I could tell things were gonna change, ya know” )… but no one says “too bad” after that.
Right after Marsh finishes his statement with “change, ya know”… SOMEONE then says ( over the radio, with modulation )… “You bet”.
This has been the subject of a many discussions.
I ( me, personally ) still believe that is a THIRD VOICE in that video, and NOT Marsh inserting the “You bet” comment. It does NOT ( to me, personally ) sound like Eric Marsh. It sounds like someone ELSE who was participating in that radio conversation ( other than Marsh or Steed ) is acknowldeging Marsh’s “…change, ya know.” statement with “You bet”.
Right after SOMEONE says “You bet” is when we hear Jesse Steed chime in ( in the foreground, no modulation ) and say “I copy… and it’s almost made it to that two-track road we walked in on.
Whether that really is a THIRD participant in that radio conversation responding to Marsh’s statement with “You bet”… or whether it’s just Marsh adding a tag phrase of “You bet” onto the end of his own statement has never been resolved.
If it really WAS a third participant… I still have no ‘good guess’ WHO it might have been.
We know it wasn’t Darrell Willis.
Gary Cordes? Brian Frisby? Trueheart Brown?
It does NOT sound like Field OPS1 Todd Abel’s or Planning OPS2 Paul Musser’s voice.
NOTE to moderator: The comment above can/should be deleted. It went into moderation because of a mis-typed ‘Name’ field. It has been resubmitted already using the right ‘Name’. and is duplicated below.
Reply to calvin post on February 24, 2015 at 4:47 am
>> calvin said…
>>
>> WTK said
>> But we also know they HEARD the same “Hunker and be safe” directive
>> from OPS1 Abel at 1550.
>> So the men themselves KNEW that OPS had told them to “Hunker and
>> be safe” right there where they were.
>>
>> Unlike you and me, the GMIHC probably heard the entire conversation.
Yes. I pointed that out in the same comment you are quoting… but at 1550 we really can’t be sure how MANY of the men had assembled at that rest spot. It still seems ( at 1550 ) that they were still in the process of ‘assembling’ there.
Remember… even 5 minutes later in the MacKenzie photos/videos… there are still at least half of the Granite Mountain Hotshots MISSING. We have always been assuming they are all standing/sitting BEHIND Christopher MacKenzie’s location… but he never turns his camera around and takes a photo to prove it.
Bottom line is YES… however many of the men really were at that location must have heard ALL of the same radio conversations WE can now only hear snippets of. In all three videos ( Caldwell and both MacKenzie videos ) whichever radio is being captured by the camera was LOUD so they ALL should have heard what was being said.
>> calvin also said…
>>
>> And
>>
>> Just to be clear
>>
>> 1. Robert Caldwell’s video comes moments before the
>>
>> 2. Mackenzie video where Marsh can be heard saying (IMO) 0891
>> first two seconds “change you know, too bad”
If you are referring to MacKenzie’s second 9 second video ( MVI_0891 )… I am also hearing that clip start with ‘change, ya know” ( ss if he was saying something along the lines of “I could tell things were gonna change, ya know” )… but no one says “too bad” after that.
Right after Marsh finishes his statement with “change, ya know”… SOMEONE then says ( over the radio, with modulation )… “You bet”.
This has been the subject of a many discussions.
I ( me, personally ) still believe that is a THIRD VOICE in that video, and NOT Marsh inserting the “You bet” comment. It does NOT ( to me, personally ) sound like Eric Marsh. It sounds like someone ELSE who was participating in that radio conversation ( other than Marsh or Steed ) is acknowldeging Marsh’s “…change, ya know.” statement with “You bet”.
Right after SOMEONE says “You bet” is when we hear Jesse Steed chime in ( in the foreground, no modulation ) and say “I copy… and it’s almost made it to that two-track road we walked in on.
Whether that really is a THIRD participant in that radio conversation responding to Marsh’s statement with “You bet”… or whether it’s just Marsh adding a tag phrase of “You bet” onto the end of his own statement has never been resolved.
If it really WAS a third participant… I still have no ‘good guess’ WHO it might have been.
We know it wasn’t Darrell Willis.
Gary Cordes? Brian Frisby? Trueheart Brown?
It does NOT sound like Field OPS1 Todd Abel’s or Planning OPS2 Paul Musser’s voice.
Reply to Bob Powers post on February 22, 2015 at 10:16 pm
>> Bob Powers said…
>>
>> My source said the argument order happened before the crew left the rest area.
>> So 1600 to 1604..
Copy that… but don’t forget that we have proved that the ‘picture taking’ actually stopped at 1555 ( 3:55 PM ). MacKenzie’s CANON timestamps were about 9 minutes ahead of real time that day.
The Parker photo WAS texted at 1604… but it was TAKEN much earlier. We proved that, too.
That MIGHT have been the last thing Parker did before they actually started walking south… but he also MIGHT have been able to sneak in that 1604 transmit to the network WHILE they were already walking south.
So there is now that 9 minute gap in time between 1555 and 1604 when we really can’t be sure they were still at that ‘rest spot’… or not.
>> Bob Powers also said…
>>
>> The other argument at the saddle that Dudley stated was not
>> given to me by the informant. I have not been able to confirm that part.
Mike Dudley was ‘mis-remembering’ a lot of stuff during that speech he gave to that roomful of Utah firefighters on June 20, 2014. He basically screwed up just about every quote he reported from the video/audio record… so there’s no telling if Dudley was remembering the ‘allegations’ about the “argument between Marsh and Steed… and which way they should go” totally accurately, either. He may have added the “at the saddle” part all on his own.
In other words… RIGHT about the fact that ‘multiple people made that allegation’ but WRONG about whether what they heard was taking place at the “saddle” or not.
>> Bob Powers also said…
>>
>> McDonough may have a lot to tell. I believe the others will come forward unless
>> they are stopped by the Federal Lawyers.
Since you just specifically said “stopped by the Federal Lawyers”… I’m going to assume that means that some/all of these ‘others’ that you and RTS keep referring to are, in fact, Blue Ridge Hotshots.
That would actually be no real ‘revelation’., if that is the case.
If this video that supposedly captures DIVSA Eric Marsh ORDERING GMIHCS Jesse Steed to bring those men ‘out of the safe black’ and down to the BSR actually exists… it has ALWAYS been HIGHLY LIKELY it would have been recorded by one ( or more? ) of the Blue Ridge Hotshots who were helping to move all FOUR of the Granite Mountain vehicles.
MOST of these Blue Ridge guys had smartphones and/or video/audio capable recording devices with them that day… and they were fond of using them.
It would not surprise me in the least if, while they were moving the GM vehicles which ALL had the GM intra-crew radio channel programmed into their onboard radios, one ( or more ) of these Blue Ridge Hotshots actually RECORDED the conversations happening on that crew-net while they were IN the vehicles.
This topic will be a might off topic for the moment, however, germane to the overall YH Fire in the FIRE BEHAVIOR realm as it relates to Complex Terrain. It should be a welcome break for many of you.
This is a Wildland Fire LLC YouTube video clip of a webinar titled ‘EFFECTS OF COMPLEX TERRAIN ON EXTREME FIRE BEHAVIOR.’ The entire video is very good and very informative and runs for over an hour.
However, for now, please focus on the section titled ‘FIRE BEHAVIOR IN CANYONS’ that runs from about 29:26 to 36:28. This will definitely help you to better understand what occurred on the afternoon of the YH Fire on 30 June 2013. This will also expand your ever-increasing fire behavior knowledge.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CWauaWOnOZ8
What you will see initially is research from Viegas and others of fires in Portugal and Spain, however, it is very relevant to what occurs anywhere in the world. Terrain is terrain no matter where you go. Viegas et al also utilize lab and model results to demonstrate some explosive fire behavior that is very stunning. They refer to it as ‘eruptive fire’ and state that it is a very “common occurrence.” In other words, it is NOT a rare event. Other researchers and their works are also covered throughout the webinar, e.g. Santa Ana winds, Lateral Fire Spread on Lee Slopes, Inversions and Thermal Belts, and more
This overall LLC webinar series is taken from the USDA, Forest Service, Pacific Northwest Research Station publication titled: “Synthesis of Knowledge of Extreme Fire Behavior: Volume I for Fire Managers.” It is General Technical Report PNW-GTR-854, November 2011. It was compiled by at least nine (9) fire weather and fire behavior researchers.
It can be obtained for FREE either searching online for the above title and/or by sending an email to the Pacific Northwest Research Station. The limiting factor of one internet link restricts me from providing these other links referenced above.
>> RTS said…
>>
>> The limiting factor of one internet link restricts me from providing these
>> other links referenced above.
This installation of WordPress is only allowing 1 active hyperlink per post.
A ‘Repy’ is a different posting so if you have other links you want to share… just post them as separate ‘Replies’ and nothing will bounce into ‘moderation land’.
Thanks for posting this link. I intended to watch it but………………….. my life has been seriously intense……….
Fred, I posted a reference below (and Marti found the link for me, for which I thank her) to Butler’s webinar, which is also useful.
Also, somewhere on this BB I posted an analogy to an orca, which was useful to at least some folks here, and which was the best analogy I could come up with with respect to extreme fire behavior. In short, in the U.S., WFFs are called upon to work around fires that are exhibiting extreme fire behavior. Unfortunately, there is a fine and unpredictable and unascertainable (in advance) line between extreme fire behavior that a WFF can arguably safety get within a mile of on foot and extreme fire behavior that will ultimately and shortly erupt so violently and quickly that it can close that 1 mile gap faster than you can get out of the way. Relatively speaking, fire science – particularly with respect to extreme fire behavior – is nascent.
I’d just note that EN again is getting enough wrong that there’s no point in going through it. What RTS posted is good stuff.
I do note that it’s quite possible that, in terms of subjective mindfulness of the possibility of a rapid rate of spread, that Marsh and others may well have not been MINDFUL of known, observed, and predicted weather and conditions, and given that lack of mindfulness may have instead simply plugged in the rate of spread of some ordinary fire in their mental “spreadsheets,” as it were. That’s like people not being mindful of the risk of avalanche right after a huge snowstorm: the risk is known, common, and frequently abundantly predicted.
Fred, the fire moved in a direction OPPOSITE to the forecast wind (in part b/c the fire was creating its own “wind”). How exactly was GM supposed to anticipate that?
I am assuming SR is Fred again????????
SR responding to The black Widow on this Wind issue will get you no where.
She believes that the wind was never a factor in the burn over no matter how mush in formation out there shows a north wind of 25 to 30 blowing directly at the BSR Just before deployment.
No amount of information will sway her so just move on.
If you do not anticipate fire created wind in a highly flammable situation
Then you need to find another carrier.
The weather that afternoon at 1600 was highly volatile look at McKenzie’s photos.
Wind swirls a solid fire front, Heavy fuels dried to low humidity’s with temperatures 100 to 106 degrees. All the fire needed was a little wind
and it got a lot of that AS PREDICTED.
The Fire created its own wind that was not predictable—-BULL SHIT
The fire created its own Burn Rates based on flame length, Topography and wind. When it turned up the Canyon the crew was in it was a monster with 1500 to 2000 BTU’s a blow torch.
Predictable YES a run across the flats straight at BSR Predictable yes.
Elizabeth/Logical Phallacy,
See post to SR. Stop reading so much fiction. Return to reality.
It appears that all others anticipated it. GMHS had other things on their minds, like leaving their perfectly good SZ at the worst possible time. Their required Situational Awareness and looking at the Big Picture had all but shut down.
SR,
I agree and the avalanche comparison is spot on. Human Factors psychologist Ted Putnam and former SAIT investigator wholeheartedly endorses “mindfulness” and encourages Crews and others to seek this training and utilize it while on wildfires.
Regarding the fire weather, Brent Wachter, the YH Fire SAIT Weather Investigator has done several presentations on the YH Fire weather and talks about “how normal weather indicators taught to firefighters may have been masked or modified by the local environmental conditions.”
I take issue with the “masked or modified” by local conditions conclusion. This was clear and simple – a NORMAL Southwestern thunderstorm with outflow winds. Nothing more and nothing less. This was the GMHS’ home turf, so they COULD/SHOULD have been used to this type of fire weather. A good IHC would train regularly on that kind of thing.
And of course, there were sufficient warnings from the Flagstaff office of the NWS, And the GMHS had the BEST view of anyone on the entire YH Fire – they could see EVERYTHING from their perfectly good SZ. So they should have certainly seen the thunderstorm development and movement. There was NO excuse for this FORECAST AND EXPECTED thunderstorm and outflow winds to allegedly catch them off guard or sneak up on them.
In other words, it was as if Watch Out #4 applied to the GMHS “Unfamiliar with WEATHER AND LOCAL FACTORS influencing fire behavior.” It was their own backyard so-to-speak and they were completely surprised and caught off guard? I don’t think so.
I agree with you, GM had a great vantage point to observe ACTUAL, not predicted fire behaviour.
In the Mackenzie photos you can see the fire evolving and getting ready to “get up and dance”…..
I don’t believe that GM missed that cue, I believe they tried to “beat the train” to the BSR.
And THEY LOST!!!!
Rocksteady, you have watched the newest videos that John Dougherty posted, right – particularly the ones that ends in “63” and “64” (I think)? Those videos are interesting to me, in part because they show that really, really stellar wildland firefighters who are well-regarded in the SW/AZ-area were caught off guard by how explosively this fire moved when it did. Paul Musser, Bucky Yowell, Aaron Hulburd, True Brown, and others in the videos are all senior, seasoned SW WFFs who are known to be good, well-respected WFFs, yet they are ALL in the unburned fuel saying or doing things that suggest that things on this fire are changing far faster than they had anticipated.
I have forced various folks to watch those videos with me, and what stuck out the most to one of the guys who knows Musser well is Musser muttering something about the fire behavior “going to shit.” Apparently Musser muttering that is sort of like the functional equivalent of someone like me jumping up and down and screaming “This Fire is BLOWING UP – This Fire is BLOWING UP – RUN!!!!” (I might be using a *bit* of hyperbole and exaggeration here, but you see the point I am making: WFFs who clearly were experienced in anticipating “extreme fire behavior” were caught off guard by how bad this got in just a matter of MINUTES. Musser saying “going to shit” is about as extreme is he is going to get in his reaction, so his saying “going to shit” is saying something.)
If Musser was a bit taken aback by or surprised by or caught off guard by the explosion of the fire – and he was way, way more senior than anyone on the GM crew (Musser was the well-respected Supt. of Flagstaff IHC for years) – what does that say about Steed and Marsh? Neither Steed nor Marsh had anywhere NEAR the experience Musser had. Neither Steed nor Marsh had ever served as an assistant supt., for example, under a Supt. as experienced as, say, Sciacca, Wilcox, Kenny Jordan, etc. Neither Steed nor Marsh likely had a picture in their mental “slide” file from a fire that – in a matter of minutes – changed direction up to 90 degrees AGAINST the anticipated wind and accelerated its ROS more than 14 TIMES (the equivalent of a car going from 25 mph in a residential area to over 300 mph). Indeed, if I were a betting woman, I’d bet most 10 year WFFs (or even more senior WFFs) do not have such a slide.
Reply to Elizabeth (counselor) post
on February 25, 2015 at 8:52 am
>> counselor said…
>>
>> Paul Musser, Bucky Yowell, Aaron Hulburd,
>> True Brown, and others in the videos are all
>> senior, seasoned SW WFFs who are known to
>> be good, well-respected WFFs, yet they are
>> ALL in the unburned fuel saying or doing
>> things that suggest that things on this fire are
>> changing far faster than they had anticipated.
You really are “all messed up in your head” about all this.
ALL of the people you just mentioned were NOT “in the unburned fuel” in the timeframe you are talking about.
They were ACTIVELY EVACUATING.
They all had perfectly good and clear ‘escape routes’ and they were USING them… exactly when they SHOULD have been.
We even seen “The 3 Prescotreers” ( Hulburd, Clawson and Yowell ) jumping in their trucks and hauling ass out of there when they knew they were ‘pushing it’ where they were.
Hulburd even left his camera running and we saw exactly where they retreated to.
The things THEY were “saying and doing” from the time Gary Cordes ordered everyone to get OFF the fire just all had to do with everyone GETTING OUT.
They ALREADY knew this fire was OUT OF CONTROL and was already “exceeding all expectations”. It was, at that point, no SURPRISE at all what was (now) happening.
ALL of the radio communications even at that point ( in the 4:00 PM to 4:30 timeframe ) were ALSO able to be fully heard ( and understood ) by Granite Mountain. They had the same frequencies on THEIR radios. You KNOW that, right?
Besides… Marsh and Steed KNEW the fire had ALREADY ‘exceeded all expectations’ and was now EXPLODING even BEFORE they decided to leave the safe black.
See the ’roundup’ up above of all the reported radio communications between Frisby/Brown and Marsh/Steed from the moment Frisby had to save Brendan’s life and on through their own frantic evacuation from the Cutover Trail.
You are trying to hold some idea in your head ( and sell it to US like snake oil ) that Marsh and Steed could have somehow been ‘oblivious’ to what was happening with the fire… and how DANGEROUS it had already become… either before they even decided to go on their ‘mission’ and even to the point where they could have been clueless there was a VERY dangerous fire ahead of them while still walking through a box canyon without having set a lookout.
The evidence record absolutely contradicts this ‘idea’ you are trying to pawn off. It’s absurd.
They KNEW.
They KNEW what was happening ‘down there’.
They KNEW the fire was ‘out of control’ and building steam even BEFORE they left the safe black.
They just didn’t care.
They thought they were ‘Ranger Danger’ and they could break almost all the safety rules of their profession, run a race with the ‘Big Dog’, and WIN the race.
They were wrong… and paid for it with their lives.
>> counselor also said…
>>
>> If I were a betting woman, I’d bet most 10 year
>> WFFs (or even more senior WFFs) do not have
>> such a slide.
Marsh and Steed didn’t need a ‘slide show’… in their heads or anywhere else.
They KNEW what was happening ‘down there’… even before they decided to run a race with the devil ( and lose it ).
They were TOLD ( by Frisby and Brown ) that the fire was EXPLODING and had already “exceeded all expectations” even BEFORE they decided to leave the safe black.
They could also then hear everything transpiring on the radio AFTER that… as well as just ‘looking up’ at what was happening ABOVE them…
but they Just. Kept. Going.
Right to a place where there was no escape… and no choice but to lay down and die.
It remains INEXPLICABLE to almost any experienced WFF that looks at what really happened and the (incredibly bad) decisions being made that day.
I have watched the videos. It is hard to take in the full context his comments…
Saying fire behaviour is going for a shit, may not be all that surprising to him, he could be meaning the fire behaviour is going erratic, making his whole suppression, containment plan going for a shit… Thus Plan B, C,D or whatever else will work..
He may have thought the behaviour MAY go erratic, and it is just ruining his previous plans.
So IF, and I am only saying , IF it is found that Eric Marsh was unltimately responsible for the crew move, what legal implications does that start?
As an employee of Prescott FD does that put Prescott on the hook for damages? Does it put any other agencies on the hook, as well , Arizona???
Just wondering out loud here, a lot more litigation occurs in the US than Canada, so just thinking out loud.
Based on the Court system????? He was a Division Supervisor working for Arizona State Forestry as Overhead That could still make AZ FIRE responsible.
Again Law suits and Courts who knows the final outcome???
There are several levels of potential liability, ranging from individuals either on the fire (Hall etc.) to those like Willis not directly charged with GM on the fire but possibly with prior knowledge of a pattern of conduct, to Prescott, to the State.
But, the very general rule for these roles is that if someone is acting within the scope of their official duties and only negligent, they (and by extension their employer) aren’t liable for bad outcomes.
I think it would be quite hard to show that people on the fire displayed anything like reckless disregard for GM’s safety, and in fact a pattern of several calls and then an outright order to Steed as RTS suggests would, by being so unusual in that situation, make others’ decisions seem more reasonable. Unless there was specific communication between Willis and Marsh, again it does not seem that Willis or Prescott directly tie into the decision. Willis may have been reckless as regards the tennis courts, but likely would be viewed as at most negligent, but nothing happened there and it did not contribute to what happened to GM.
The real hook for Prescott may turn out to be if there was knowledge of some of this type of thing from prior fires. That could suggest reckless indifference towards the safety of the crew, at least to an extent sufficient enough that Prescott wants to settle. But, at present I don’t think that theory is being pursued, so unless someone chooses to go down that road, Prescott may be off the hook anyway.
How one assesses the reported behavior at an individual level is interesting. For me, clearly several huge mistakes were made. But, were they reckless as opposed to negligent? Remember the engine captain from early days on this site who claimed to be from AZ but was clueless about chaparral and clueless about SZs? Not everyone has full command of these issues, which is one way some people make big mistakes.
Reply to rocksteady post on February 23, 2015 at 1:27 pm
>> rocksteady said…
>>
>> So IF, and I am only saying , IF it is found that Eric Marsh was unltimately
>> responsible for the crew move, what legal implications does that start?
>>
>> As an employee of Prescott FD does that put Prescott on the hook for damages?
>> Does it put any other agencies on the hook, as well , Arizona???
There was a time when it was mystery whether Arizona Forestry was going to try and throw DIVSA Eric Marsh ‘under the bus’ and claim that even though he was officially on the Arizona State Forestry Fire Management team for THEIR ‘Yarnell Fire’… that he was not actually an Arizona State Forestry ’employee’ that day.
Back on October 24, 2014… they solved that mystery themselves when they filed a legal petition for the ‘wrongful death’ cases to be dismissed for various reasons they were coming up with.
In that letter to the Judge requesting dismissal… Arizona Forestry ‘showed their hand’ and proved they were NOT going to try to get out of having responsibility for DIVSA Eric Marsh’s actions that day.
In that letter… the Arizona Forestry lawyers STIPULATED that not only was Eric Marsh to be considered a de-facto ’employee’ of the State of Arizona in Yarnell on June 30, 2013… so were ALL of the (contracted) Granite Mountain Hotshots.
Here is the original AZCENTRAL articled from October 24, 2014…
AZCENTRAL
Article Title: State seeks dismissal of suit in Yarnell Fire
http://www.azcentral.com/story/news/local/arizona/2014/10/25/yarnell-fire-lawsuit-hotshots-survivors/17894343/
From the article…
————————————————–
Granite Mountain Hotshots were fighting the fire as de facto state employees covered under Arizona’s workers’ compensation law, which precludes litigation.
————————————————–
Workers compensation does NOT automatically preclude litigation for death or injury.
L:egally speaking… any death benefits coming from Worker’s compensation ARE considered to be an ‘Exclusive Remedy’… but ONLY if the cause of the death does not rise above a certain level of provable incompetence or negligence.
The ADOSH report basically established that there WAS a level of incompetence and negligence in that workplace that day which created an unnecessarily ‘unsafe workplace’… in particular with regards to all of the potential ( and the one actual ) ‘entrapment’ situations which developed that day. ADOSH was going to originally issue separate citations for FOUR different potential/actual ‘entrapment situation’ at that workplace that day… but once they realized they were already ‘pegging the meter’ on the fines they were legally allowed to impose against Arizona Forestry they just consolidated all of those into one general citation in their final report.
That’s why Arizona Forestry had to ‘contest’ the ADOSH findings and try to get them ‘mitgated’ or even ‘reversed’.
They thought ( and might still do? ) that if they can get THOSE particular findings mitigated then there won’t be enough proof of negligence to rise above the threshold whereby the ‘Exclusive Remedy’ clause of Worker’s Compensation is to be considered the ‘end of the story’… financially speaking.
I don’t think that ‘plan’ is even valid anymore.
The lawyers for the ‘wrongful death’ plaintiffs have now had plenty of time to do their own ‘investigating’ and can probably walk into court and present their OWN case of extreme incompetence and negligence in that workplace… maybe even far better than the ADOSH report did.
Obviously whatever arguments Arizona Forestry tried to make to have the wrongful death suits dismissed didn’t work… because those cases ARE proceeding… and Arizona Forestry has now agreed to begin talks about ‘settling’ those suits with the first scheduled ‘Global Mediation’ session with those plaintiffs taking place on March 2 and 3, 2015.
As for the City of Prescott… the reason they were originally listed as ‘defendants’ in the initial ‘notice of claim’ documents is because ( of course )… Eric Marsh and Jesse Steed were both, in fact, employees of the City of Prescott.
The (apparent) reason why the City of Prescott was then REMOVED from the list of defendants when the ACTUAL ‘wrongful death’ suits were filed is, again, because of this ‘Exclusive Remedy’ clause of Worker’s Compenstion Insurance here in the USA.
It was obvious ( and City of Prescott attorney John Paladini said so ) that Prescott would be claiming that no negligence could ever be proved on the City of Prescott’s part that would rise above the ‘Exclusive Remedy’ clause for wrongful death benefits in Worker’s Compensation insurance.
The attorneys for the plaintiff’s apparently had to admit that would be a hard-road-to-go and that the City of Prescott would always have that ‘get-out-of-negligence-free’ card to play… so they obviously advised the plaintiffs it wasn’t worth keeping City of Prescott listed as ‘defendants’ in the ‘wrongful death’ proceedings.
That being said…
If it actually DOES come out that there was a REPEATED pattern of ‘risk taking’ and/or ‘safety violations’ on the part of this City sponsored organization known as ‘The Granite Mountain Hotshots’… AND that this pattern of behavior WAS known to City managers and/or City officials but nothing was being done about it…
…that’s a ( as they say ) “whole ‘nother story”.
There WOULD be liability there on the part of the City of Prescott and they MAY come ‘back into the hopper’ as litigation targets.
As a Fire Behaviour Analyst, I have answered questions about fire behaviour and rates of spread.
Maybe Elizabeth, the LAWYER, can fill in the details on this, for us?
Reply to rocksteady post on February 24, 2015 at 9:07 am
>> rocksteady said…
>>
>> As a Fire Behaviour Analyst, I have answered questions
>> about fire behaviour and rates of spread.
>>
>> Maybe Elizabeth, the LAWYER, can fill in the details on this, for us?
Maybe she will… when she gets done ( once again ) pretending to practice YOUR profession.
When you say the argument took up the time the crew had to move.
Then you also say that the decision to move was a calculated risk that violated Safety.
Verses staying in the Black.
If the move was time sensitive to get to a SZ when Staying where you were carried no risk and followed all Safety procedures All the Fire Fighters I have known and know would say stay right there
You can’t have it both ways They had time to move and still have to ride the fire out in another location. Probably deploying shelters at the BSR. We are not talking about being totally out of the Fire or a burn over those were very real had they reached the BSR. he risk of burns and injuries were still high even at the BSR.
Again the Black SZ provided Safety Security and a No injury area stay put.
At the point the decision was made to move could they have really reached the BSR before burn over. While a cleared area it got dammed hot at BSR and it was totally burned over.
So My question is——-as a Crew supervisor would you make a choose to put your crew thru a BURN Over VERSES a sit in the black and stay out of the heat and smoke ???
Which choice is the SAFEST PLACE to be???????????
The total Burn over of BSR was a 100% possibility. There was nothing and proved to be nothing to stop the fire from doing just that. Why put your crew in that position ??????
Putting your crew thru a very high exposures of moving a mile and a half thru UNBURNED heavy flash fuel to reach this SZ with little time to spare with a guaranteed burn over at BSR
suggests total incompetence, As has been proven in this case.
High exposure verses no exposure—————–
Getting ugly here. Total incompetence is a BIG stretch Bob, Eric Marsh didn’t get to be a Supt because he was totally incompetent. Considering all of us, including you Bob, don’t know EXACTLY what Eric knew or didn’t know and what made sense to him at the time, I say keep your mouth shut. We, at least most of us here, understand going through the green was a deadly mistake but please don’t say there was total incompetence.
And what you are suggesting is based on a rumor and nothing has been proven or shared publicly. I’m so exhausted from reading here…”I heard this” or “it will be coming out soon per Brendan”, blah blah. We don’t know what Brendan is going to say so why the f*#k speculate to no end? Is it ego or just information sharing? “I heard this and that first so I will publicly spew it on IM?” I pray Brendan has some truth to share but I am not publicly speculating until I’ve heard it for myself. I’ve heard rumors about YHF since day one too, and they’re probably the same ones you are talking about, but I don’t share it, why bother?
Your post below suggests GM was in the black with their gear off and snapping pictures, getting ready to watch the show. What picture shows them with their gear off and chilling? I haven’t seen that picture, I’ve only seen pictures of them with their packs on, saws chapped, tooled up, and ready to move.
I’m as emotionally involved in this as you Bob, I recommend (and I’m following my own advice after this post) take a breath before typing a message up and hitting post comment.
I am sorry but that is what I see and I will stand by what I said. Eric’s Decision on this move was total incompetence what else would you call it???
Evaluate the facts and come to another conclusion.
Would you ever for no reason put your Crew in a Burn over position???
When there was no reason to.
BSR was in that position nothing to stop it from happening the only question was at what time that would happen.
I have never said that I have any proof of who and what was told to me.
I was called by a reliable source backed up by another reliable source.
I believe what they told me. They were sincere I have said With out their names and support I can provide no facts or written proof.
Without that proof the possibility of Marsh being in front of the crew is only another possible clew.
All the pictures at the Rest site showed gear off tools down saw shields on
did all have gear off probably not. Were they kicked back yes.
I gain nothing by bringing out information I am not writing a book nor do I have any authority to even believe what I say will change a Dammed thing.
I respect you a lot but I would never tell you to keep your mouth shut we all have our back ground and reasons. this is an open forum weather you agree with me or not I have information to believe what I said. Including undisputable Facts of Safety Violations.
Bob Powers you are an ass who has mislead his group. I will NEVER return to this site. Anyone who believes his crap is a puppet of lies. Goodbye.
All I can say is I am sorry—–
What I stated is Fact no more no less.
I would stand in a Court of law and state the same
on a witness stand I can do no less.
Reply to Deborah Pfingston post on February 23, 2015 at 10:50 am
>> Deborah Pfingston said…
>>
>> Bob Powers you are an ass who has mislead his group.
This is NOT ( in any way ) Bob Powers’ group.
It is ( and always has been ) just a PUBLIC forum where people are free to say what they like so long as the moderator of the forum feels the postings follow published guidelines and allows the message(s) to appear.
People ARE free to express their views here… and others are then totally free to totally ignore them.
That’s how it works.
Please tell me where the pictures are of GM with their packs off at the ‘rest site” you refer to? Not seeing them, again all I see from the GM crew pictures are them with packs on, saws chapped, tooled up, waiting for something to trigger them to move. I suppose the pics you could be referring to are the ones Joy took of them sitting along their handline?
You are right, I apologize for telling you to keep your mouth shut, not cool on my account. I respect your experience and opinion as well.
Again I circle back to what the hell made sense to Eric at that time? What information did he have that made sense to him? Even if it did involve moving through the green and breaking fundamental wild land firefighting orders. What was the PLAN? I don’t have the answer. You can call it total incompetence, I’m not sure what to call it except I believe Eric didn’t have the intel to make a good decision with what he knew. I stand by that we, collectively, do not know what exactly went down that day, most importantly including the “predetermined ER” and “predetermined SZ” references throughout the evidence we see and hear. Did those people pull those references out of their asses? Cordes, Abel, B33, Eric Tarr, unknown voices, and Eric Marsh referred to this. There’s something more there and hopefully Brendan will shed light on it.
First and foremost I am a wild land Fire Fighter
Old School/ 1960s trough the early 90’s started 5 years after the 10 and 13/18 came out.
We called a spade a spade none of the nice don’t state the facts
in my day.
I have said over and over Marsh and Steed were responsible for the crew the Crews Safety rested on their shoulders.
Saying What I based on Training Safety and Facts is not misleading anyone.
While I have upset the Mother of a GM Fire fighter it is what answers
will eventually cause. It was not my intent to hurt.
My statements above were based only on the Facts.
I can go back over and over the 18 situations not used
the 10 standard orders Violated. Absolutely no LCES
What dose any body not agree with about moving a crew to the BSR where it was going to be over ran by fire verses staying in the Black? The fire had a 2 mile front moving toward BSR when the crew left the rest area. the fire front burned thru the BSR at 1700
The Fire had already cut off the road from Glen Isla at 1610.
The crew if they made the move was going to have to go thru a burn over at BSR. This move was a very high exposure situation
Why put a crew thru that dose any one disagree with that evaluation
As I said the facts are all there—- they were there for Marsh.
I can not change those facts only rely on them.
One of the reasons those that have called me to relay the info I departed here is their concern of the response of the Families.
They are to close to that epicenter to withstand the impact..
If what I have been told comes out it is not going to be pretty.
and much worse than what I have said here.
So I am going to take a minuet here to say– I wish there were hero’s in Fatality Fires. they do not just happen some one made bad safety decisions and put people at risk. That is a known factor.
Their are Hero actions that occur some occasionally change the out come.
So My Own Hero dad he did not save the other 14 with him he was already a proven hero. First he started pushing the men back up the fire line 9 got out before that escape route was shut off.
So my real Hero Father happened during world War II his B17 was shot down over China He and the side gunner were able to bail. He help the side gunner out of the plane he was critically wended.
MY father was not wounded they were the only 2 survivors.
The Side gunner died 3 days later as my Father stayed with him.
My father was captured and spent 2 years in a Japanese POW camp
He had dysentery and Malaria when he was finally home I was 2 years old 7 years latter he died on the Rattle Snake Fire Why could he have not been the hero there??? it just was not in the Cards. So that is my story of a real HERO.
That is probably more than I wanted to say but if any of you think that I do not feel the Pain of the Families and the need to find answers then you have spent a long year and a half not understanding where I am coming from.
I not like the rest of you– who have never lost a Fire fighter Family member know the Pain the Hurt the nightmares and the wonting to know the truth. It takes time and some times after 60 years it still comes back and it still hurts.
I lived with the truth I studied the Truth I understood what my father did and did not do. and I worked hard to follow the Safety and rules that kept me and those under me alive.
Fire 20+—
You are correct the pictures I referred to the Crew still has their packs on my mistake the ones we can see looked scattered and relaxed not expecting to move. My conclusion.
I could reflect back that I never took off my pack either when breaking to eat or sit as with GM their Radios are connected to the Packs. Taking Pictures calling Family watching the fire running into Yarnell all seem laid back.
Again My conclusion.
If Eric did not have the Intel why did he move?
The situation look outs were right there in front of him why move?
there were enough warnings in the 10 standard orders why Move?
What did BSR have that the Black they were in did not?
What were the real exposures to accomplish the move?
I am just working with the Facts and what my conclusions are.
>> Reply to Bob Powers…
>>
>> What did BSR have that the Black they were in did not?
This might sound mundane given the horrible consequences that resulted… but it’s quite possible that some of the ‘discussing their options’ back-and-forth radio como included a discussion of how if they did NOT try to get to the BSR before dark… then Granite Mountain would have had to ‘go coyote’ up there on the ridge with not enough supplies onboard to make that a comfortable ‘camp out’.
We all know now that they COULD have just waited for about 40 minutes there at that resting spot and then probably just walked back to Yarnell the exact same route they hiked in on. It would have been a hot, smoky walk… but Frisby and Brown proved without a doubt that once that fire moved south that east-west two track they hiked IN on that morning was safe very shortly after the fire burned over it.
But maybe they didn’t KNOW that.
Maybe they thought they were going to get ‘stuck’ up there overnight that idea just wasn’t sitting well with anyone.
Pretty mundane reason to violate all kinds of safety rules and take such a huge ( unnecessary ) risk… but maybe that’s what ‘comfort level’ was all about in some of those conversations.
How ‘comfortable’ was Steed facing the idea of going ‘coyote’ up on that ridge with few supplies… versus trying to get somewhere where they could get picked up and actually have dinner somewhere?
Followup… Brendan McDonough probably knows if this had ANYTHING to do with ‘comfort levels’ or factored into any of the ‘discussing their options’ conversations that both the SAIT and ADOSH reports said he definitely overheard.
Again… I hope that’s on the list of ‘questions’ Brendan gets asked during this upcoming deposition / cross-examination.
Two simple things here WTKTT
1. Hot shots carry a double Ration in their packs
So they can and often do Coyote double shifts.
2. They had a couple of locations to get off the Assignment after dark. that would have been maybe a 1hr. hike.
On the other hand what you said above is what I have said severial times.
Their only reason to move was to get off the mountain end of shift lets bail no great and grand moving to redeploy abandon their assignment and move to a place they can be picked up.
No Plan– No Leave a lookout– just get off the mountain to the Ranch for Pickup– McDonough is waiting to be notified to come and get them.
Wooops—-Redeploy should have been reengage.
Reply to FIRE20+ post on February 23, 2015 at 10:55 am
>> FIRE20+ said…
>>
>> All I see from the GM crew pictures are them with
>> packs on, saws chapped, tooled up, waiting for
>> something to trigger them to move.
Christopher MacKenzie definitely captured the ‘tools up’ and ‘work stop’ moment. No question. The sawyers not only had the sheaths on the blades… one of them is seen removing his chaps and gloves… and then stowing them away.
So the men definitely KNEW that the work at that location was OVER for the day. It was definitely now a “smoke ’em ya gotta ’em” moment… which is why all that picture taking was suddenly ‘acceptable’.
However… we still can’t be sure they had ANY idea that a ‘move’ was even in the works. Yes… we can hear Marsh getting into the ‘comfort level’ discussions with Steed at that time… and the men themselves could hear ALL of just that small part of what we can here. They were even making ‘jokes’ about what Marsh was saying over the radio… and spitting on the ground with emphasis.
But we also know they HEARD the same “Hunker and be safe” directive from OPS1 Abel at 1550.
So the men themselves KNEW that OPS had told them to “Hunker and be safe” right there where they were.
The reason we have to assume they heard this is because WE can hear it ourselves. Robert Caldwell was shooting his video that captured this radio transmission about 20 feet down the rock pile from where Steed was sitting on that rock with his hands on his knees. We don’t know WHICH radio Caldwell’s video was capturing that transmission… but it is safe to say it wasn’t Caldwell’s radio. The radio como is ‘faint’ in that capture which means it was coming from one of the radios about 20 feet UP the rockpile from Caldwell… and not his own radio.
So if WE can hear that “Hunker and be safe” directive from OPS coming over the radio at 1550… then so could any/all of the men assembled at that location at that time.
So that’s all we know, really.
The MEN, themselves, were now hearing TWO different things with their OWN ears. They had HEARD an OPS Supervisor telling them to “Hunker and be safe”… but now they are ALSO hearing the start of this ‘comfort level’ prodding from Marsh to Steed.
So at that moment ( the MacKenzie photos/videos )… it’s safe to say they had no idea WHAT they were actually going to be doing next. They were just ‘waiting’ for Marsh and Steed to ‘work it out’.
>> FIRE20+
>>
>> I apologize for telling you to keep your mouth shut,
>> not cool on my account.
IMHO there has always been waaay *TOO MUCH* ‘just keep your mouth shut’ attitude associated with this terrible tragedy… from the PACT that was made between the 25-30 firefighters who spent the night near the deployment site to NOT talk about ‘what happened’… to the worthless “no one did anything wrong” SAIR report… then on to the prevalent “ask me the right question and I *might* give you an answer” attitude among many of the ADOSH interviewees… and on to these now multiple instances where it is KNOWN (now) that people have *always* known a lot more than they have ever said and are STILL actually AFRAID to talk openly about any of it.
What this whole thing has always needed is more people WILLING to TALK ABOUT WHAT THEY KNOW and see to it that the agencies tasked ( by law ) with investigating this horrible accident have ALL the information they need.
That includes not ONE ( Zero, zip, nada ) of any of the DOZENS of people still alive who used to WORK for this GM organization willing to say anything at all… either good, bad or ugly.
That is still just as weird as it can be. Almost as if they ALL fear some kind of ‘retribution’ for even talking about a job they USED to have and the people they USED to work with.
VERY strange. Like it’s the ‘mafia’ trying to ‘cover something up’ or something.
>> FIRE20+ also said…
>>
>> Again I circle back to what the hell made sense to
>> Eric at that time?
>>
>> What information did he have that made sense to him?
>>
>> Even if it did involve moving through the green and
>> breaking fundamental wild land firefighting orders.
>>
>> What was the PLAN? I don’t have the answer.
Neither do I… but it’s worth mentioning once again something that OPS2 Paul Musser testified to in his ADOSH interview.
I still think this MAY have had something to do with what was going on in Marsh’s head that afternoon… but it hasn’t really been talked about all that much.
I’m going to just reprint part of this recent comment down below…
http://www.investigativemedia.com/yarnell-hill-fire-chapter-xii/#comment-262324
…which is where this was mentioned again.
————————————————————–
Another ‘interesting’ place in his ADOSH interview when Planning OPS2 Paul Musser was talking about hearing ‘pre-determined escape route’ is when ADOSH was asking Musser how SPGS1 Gary Cordes informed his forces to evacuate.
This is obviously not related to Musser’s YIN statement… but it’s fascinating to hear him say that he thinks Gary Cordes himself used the phrase “everybody go out to their pre-predetermined areas” during his actual TAC 1 radio transmits telling everyone to ‘get off the fire’.
If that transmission was on TAC 1… then both Marsh and Steed could/would have heard the same ‘directive’ with the same ‘pre-determined areas’ destination in it.
Yes… I know… DIVSA and GM were NOT (officially) working for Gary Cordes ( as the org chart goes ) and that ORDER would NOT have been ( officially ) directed at them… but maybe Marsh himself saw things differently at that time.
Maybe that became part of Eric Marsh’s ‘alleged’ argument with Steed and why Marsh seems to have been the one ‘urging’ Steed to make that move to the ‘pre-designated safety zone’… the Boulder Springs Ranch.
Maybe Marsh was using that as part of his arguments to Steed to try and convince him that they were SUPPOSED to leave the black and go to the BSR.
That it really was a valid ‘fire command ORDER’ that they were now supposed to OBEY… or something.
Maybe ( I know… more maybes… but stick with me ) Marsh said to Steed…
“Cordes SAID we are supposed to go to our pre-designated area/safety zone. So we are SUPPOSED to leave here and get to that ranch. That’s what we are SUPPOSED to be doing, Jesse”.
A longshot… I know… but if Marsh REALLY wanted Steed to make that journey and wanted his “comfort level” to be high with regards to whether they SHOULD be doing it… maybe Marsh threw that ‘argument’ into the mix to get Steed to agree to “the mission”. Made it sound like that’s what Cordes said they were all SUPPOSED to do, or something.
From Planning OPS2 Paul Musser’s ADOSH interview on August 16, 2013
Q2 = Barry Hicks, ADOSH investigator
A = Planning OPS2 Paul Musser
—————————————————————————
Q2: Okay. Now when – when Gary pulled everybody out, how did that go? I mean what was the process that he used there to do that?
A: Uh, he just made calls to all his resources and said re-secure your point.
Q2: Okay.
A: And everybody go out to their pre-predetermined areas.
Q2: Okay. And, uh – and so the predetermined area for Granite Mountain was the black on top?
A: Right. Granite Mountain was not part of that structure group…
Q2: Right.
A: Or Gary’s thing. Granite Mountain…
Q2: When – when – when you’re talking about Gary’s group, you’re talking about the people down on that lower end?
A: The dozer at that time – at that time was Blue Ridge.
Q2: Right.
A: Two or three engines. Uh, task force leader, may – maybe more engines than that, ‘cause he had – I – I – I don’t know the exact numbers.
Q2: And – and when Gary’s making that – that call he’s probably doing it on the tactical…
A: Yes.
———————————————————————
So Musser testified that Cordes actually said ( over TAC 1 )…
“EVERYBODY go OUT to their pre-predetermined areas”.
Obviously ADOSH then CONFIRMED ( with only Musser, anyway ) that DIVSA and GM were NOT actually working for SPGS1 Gary Cordes… and that they *should* have been considering the ‘safe black’ to be their PRIMARY ‘safety zone’.
Musser said “Right’… but what Musser didn’t know ( or failed to mention if he did ) is that ‘the black’ had only been just casually mentioned by SPGS1 Gary Cordes that morning as one of Marsh’s OTHER ( default ) alternatives. The exact ‘area’ that Cordes DID tell Marsh was his (quote) “pre-determined Safety Zone” was, in fact, the Boulder Springs Ranch.
So if an ORDER like…
“EVERYBODY go OUT to their pre-predetermined areas”.
…got broadcasted over TAC 1… Eric Marsh could have easily ASSUMED “this means US, too”… and that the ‘pre-determined area’ meant the Boulder Springs Ranch… just like Cordes had said to him that morning.
It’s just really odd that here we have Gary Cordes saying ( over the public TAC 1 channel )…
“Everybody go out to their pre-predetermined areas”.
…and then we get all these reports of Eric Marsh and/or Jesse Steed using the same exact PHRASING during all their further (albeit sparse and terse) communications to describe to others what they had decided to do…
“We’re headed out our escape route to our pre-determined safety zone”.
The BLACK was where they needed to stay.
We all KNOW that.
…but we also know that Gary Cordes had TOLD Eric Marsh that morning that the Boulder Springs Ranch, was, in fact, to be considered HIS ‘pre-determined safety zone’ that day.
————————————————————–
So regardless if any more evidence ever emerges about that ‘last-minute plan’ of Cordes to cut more dozer line near Glen Ilah… and how that may or may not have ‘involved’ Granite Mountain…
…the fact that Gary Cordes sent an order over the radio for “EVERYONE go OUT to their pre-determined areas” could still have been… in some bizarre way… interpreted by Marsh to be something that he was SUPPOSED to do.
>> FIRE20+ also said…
>>
>> You can call it total incompetence, I’m not sure what
>> to call it
From Webster’s dictionary…
competence; noun; com·pe·tence
:The ability to do something well.
incompetence; noun; in-com·pe·tence
: Lack of the ability to do something well
total; adjective; to·tal
: Complete or absolute
: After everything or everyone is counted
>> FIRE20+ also said…
>>
>> I believe Eric didn’t have the intel to make a good
>> decision with what he knew.
If that was true, then that would have been ( ultimately ) no one’s fault but his own.
There were upwards of 11 (working) radios there in that group up on that ridge and at least 4 active smartphones with good Internet connections, Browsers, and access to Google Maps and other sophisticated mapping resources… not to mention Air Resources constantly overhead that COULD give complete and accurate ‘intel’ at ANY moment… if anyone out there had bothered to ask them.
If Marsh had been relying on the circa 1550 report from the departing Air Attack Rory Collins that the fire was “1 to 2 hours away from Yarnell”… and he ended up just relying on that report for the NEXT HOUR without checking for ‘new intel’ and any ‘changes’… then what can be said. That wouldn’t have been the smartest thing to be doing, either.
>> FIRE20+ also said…
>>
>> I stand by that we, collectively, do not know what
>> exactly went down that day, most importantly
>> including the “predetermined ER” and “predetermined SZ”
>> references throughout the evidence we see and hear.
>> Did those people pull those references out of their asses?
No. See above. That is EXACTLY the ‘term’ that Gary Cordes supposedly gave to the Boulder Springs ranch that very morning when he was pointing it out to DIVSA Eric Marsh on BLM Rep Dean Fernandez’s iPad.
So when an ORDER went out on TAC 1 later in the day for “EVERYONE go OUT to their pre-determined area”… there could have been NO confusion on Eric Marsh’s part that however that ‘order’ *might* ( or might not ) have pertained to HIM… it still couldn’t have meant anything other than ‘go to the Boulder Springs Ranch’..
>> FIRE20+
>>
>> Cordes, Abel, B33, Eric Tarr, unknown voices, and Eric
>> Marsh referred to this. There’s something more there
>> and hopefully Brendan will shed light on it.
In the evidence record…
1) SPGS1 Gary Cordes was the FIRST person that day to use this term “pre-determined safety zone / escape route”. He pointed to the Boulder Springs Ranch on Dean Fernandez’s iPad ( with Eric Marsh standing right next to him ) and said to Marsh “That is you pre-determined Safety Zone”. Cordes then also supposedly said “of course you also have the black”… but the ‘pre-determined’ label had already just been used for the Ranch, not the black.
2) OPS1 Todd Abel had no frickin’ idea what was meant by ‘pre-determined escape route’ or ‘pre-determined safety zone’ as it related to Granite Mountain until AFTER the tragedy. He was NEVER informed ( that day ) that Cordes had made those ‘assignments’ to DIVSA Marsh that morning.. and Marsh also never explained what any of that meant to Abel himself… not even when he was using those phrases on the radio later that day.
You didn’t include OPS2 Musser in your list but I will add him here with OPS1 Abel. Musser told ADOSH he clearly heard this “pre-determined” phrase coming out of Marsh’s mouth on the radio… but Musser also told ADOSH that he had no frickin’ idea what that really meant… and Musser was just ‘assuming’ that whoever the heck Marsh was talking to understood what it meant.
3) B33 – Same as OPS1. Not a clue what ‘pre-determined safety zone’ and/or ‘pre-determined escape route’ meant in relation to Granite Mountain… and no one was explaining it to them, either, even when it was being said to them over the radio.
4) Eric Tarr, (unknown voices ) – Ditto. People were HEARING these things on the radio but had no real knowledge what any of it meant. Eric Tarr happened to hear the word ‘ranch’ in one of the transmissions… but no other identifying information. As it turned out… just that keyword ‘ranch’ is what enabled DPS Helicopter Ranger 58 to actually locate the deployment site.
5) Eric Marsh – Yes… he ended up using that same exact ‘pre-determined’ phrase any number of times later that day… but NEVER explained what it really meant to ANYONE.
The ONLY person on the other end of ANY radio that day that really knew what that meant coming out of Eric Marsh’s mouth was the man who had put that same “pre-determined” word into Marsh’s ears that morning standing in front of an iPad.
SPGS1 Gary Cordes.
Consequently… Gary Cordes was the ONLY one who actually ‘understood’ any of this radio como from Marsh… and Cordes says he ALWAYS knew that is where those men were going and that ( in his own situationally-deficient opinion ) they (quote) “Had plenty of time to get there”.
Good and interesting information.
There are a few other things we have to look at during all of those exchanges.
The Crew Told I believe Musser they were committed to the black and to call BR.
The Hunker and be safe referring to staying in the Black
Notify me of any changes.
Again they were not Cordes resource so more confusion.
Another question that I haven’t found ——
Did Steed know any thing about the BSR safety zone– he was not at the briefing– did Marsh tell him or do we even know that???
Cordes— plenty of time to get there
There is a lot of Safety questions here—-
That need answers.
Reply to Bob Powers post on
February 23, 2015 at 3:30 pm
>> Bob Powers said…
>>
>> The Crew Told I believe Musser they were
>> committed to the black and to call BR.
Yes… but according to Musser’s ADOSH interview he was ‘sure’ that he had called DIVSA ( Marsh ) and not GM directly. So the continuing head-scratcher there is that these words “we are committed to the black… try Blue Ridge” were coming out of DIVSA Eric Marsh’s own mouth. Whether that was what Marsh really believed himself, at that time ( circa 1545 )… or whether he had already made up his mind to try and convince Steed to LEAVE the black remains a mystery.
Just one more thing Brendan McDonough might be able to ‘clear up’… if people remember to ASK him all the right questions.
>> Bob Powers also said…
>>
>> The Hunker and be safe referring to staying
>> in the Black. Notify me of any changes.
>> Again they were not Cordes resource so more
>> confusion.
Yes. DIVSA Marsh was NOT ( on the org chart level, anyway ) directly responsible to any SPGS on the fire… Cordes included… but that still doesn’t mean that in some bizarre way that day… Eric Marsh didn’t personally believe that if Cordes told him to do something ( such as “go to your pre-determined safety area” ) that he was obligated to do it.
Even one more thing Brendan might know something about if someone ‘asks him the right questions’.
>> Bob Powers also said…
>>
>> Another question that I haven’t found ——
>> Did Steed know any thing about the BSR
>> safety zone– he was not at the briefing–
>> did Marsh tell him or do we even know that???
This HAS been discussed before but the bottom line is that there is no direct evidence that Jesse Steed himself was standing there in that 7:00 AM Yarnell Fire Station briefing alongside Eric Marsh.
He actually may have been THERE at the YFD… but still no proof he was actually ‘in the meeting’ or had any idea that when Marsh emerged from the meeting he was going to tell him “You’re SUPT today. I’m gonna be DIVSA”.
There IS evidence that both Marsh and Steed went out to the top of the Sesame clearing area together with Cordes ( where the second briefing about BSR supposedly happened )… but that is only because both the GM Supt. Truck and the GM Chase truck were eventually photographed there at the top of that clearing and Gary Cordes testified that he had, in fact, put a one-blade-wide dozer ‘ring’ around BOTH vehicles to protect them.
It’s also still possible Steed was with the 2 GM Crew Carriers and simply ‘parked’ farther up that clearing alongside Marsh’s truck circa 9:00 AM when he and the full GM crew finally arrived in that area.
Brendan McDonough CERTAINLY knows the answer to this questions about whether Steed was with them when they arrived AND how MUCH Jesse Steed knew ( or didn’t know about ) the Boulder Springs Ranch… but no one ever asked him about any of that.
>> Bob Powers also said…
>>
>> Cordes— plenty of time to get there
>> There is a lot of Safety questions here—-
>> That need answers.
Exactly… such as… was more than just a ‘thought’ he had that he was later reporting to ADOSH?
Is it possible someone ( Marsh? Steed? ) actually ASKED him about the TIME factors for the journey that they KNEW he understood they were about to take ( and WHERE )… and he actually reported to whoever was asking him “You’ve got plenty of time”?
No one ever actually ASKED Gary Cordes directly…
“Did YOU have ANY communications with Marsh or Steed ( radio or cellphone ) about this ‘mission’ they decided to embark on?”
Cordes says he ALWAYS knew exactly where they were going. Is that just because of some overheard radio como… or was it because he *might* have actually talked directly TO them about it… at some point?
There is still ( and has always been ) SOMEONE at 4:27 PM apparently talking directly to Marsh ( as captured in BR Hotshot Ronald Gamble’s video ) and urging Marsh ( and GM ) to ‘hurry up’. Could that still have been Cordes?
As I piece together my own speculative scenario, I have begun lately to see more pieces of the puzzle that could easily fit together.
It seems the “pull” scenario has become quite persuasive to me and some others.
I’m wondering if the “hurry-up” conversation mentioned above, could have been the impetus for Marsh to head back up to tie-in with the crew so he could “hurry them up”?
Reply to TTWARE post on
February 23, 2015 at 7:35 pm
>> TTWARE said…
>>
>> It seems the “pull” scenario has
>> become quite persuasive to me
>> and some others.
Until the ADOSH evidence ( actual real interviews, etc. ) became available… there wasn’t much to even suggest that the ‘pull’ theory was possible. It just seemed that given the way those men got TOTALLY surprised by the fire… and that the first MAYDAY was coming from Jesse Steed and NOT Marsh and then Marsh finally comes on the radio ( out of breath ) saying “I’m here NOW with Granite Mountain”… that there was no way anyone could have been out in FRONT of Jesse Steed and Marsh must have just been ‘catching up from behind’.
The idea that anyone could have been out AHEAD of Jesse Steed… and would not have WARNED those men about the trap they were walking into was just inconceivable.
I ended up changing my OWN mind about that after studying the full body of the ADOSH evidence.
I am not saying it happened.
I am just saying that even if Brendan never says anything about this one way or the other OR some body of mysterious people that seem to have seen/heard some mysterious VIDEO never say a word about it…
…the evidence record itself DOES indicate Marsh COULD have been out in front of those men… but somehow they ended up walking straight into a fireline, anyway.
It doesn’t EXPLAIN how that could have been possible. It just establishes that it MIGHT have been possible for that to have happened.
>> TTWARE also said
>>
>> I’m wondering if the “hurry-up”
>> conversation mentioned above, could
>> have been the impetus for Marsh to
>> head back up to tie-in with the crew
>> so he could “hurry them up”?
It’s very likely.
There actually was a time when even I suggested that might have been the moment when the decision was made to ‘bushwhack’ ( as in ‘take the shortcut’ ) versus just staying on that two track road all the way to the BSR…
…but after looking at all the evidence and plotting all the time/distance points and whatnot… I came to the conclusion that wasn’t very likely.
I still don’t trust the SAIR’s original estimate that they reached the ‘Descent Point’ at exactly 4:20 PM… and then immediately started walking down into the canyon…
…but the evidence suggests that even if 4:20 PM is wrong… by 4:27 PM they pretty much HAD to have already made the decision to ‘bushwhack’ and been some distance down that slope already.
If they were still standing up on the two-track and trying to figure out which way to go at 4:27 PM… when someone called out and (apparently) asked them to “Hurry up”…
…and that “Hurry Up’ request is what CAUSED them to attempt the ‘shortcut’…
…they would have had to be making MUCH better time on that ‘Descent’ than any number of people here have said could even have been possible in order to reach the place where they were going to die in just 12 minutes.
( 4:27 PM plus 12 minutes = 4:39 PM and first MAYDAY call from Captain Jesse Steed ).
Followup to above…
Actually… looking at this again… it really MIGHT have been possible for the 4:27 PM “Could you hurry up?” message in the YARNELL-GAMBLE video to have been the actual thing that made them decide to take the ‘shortcut’ through the box canyon versus staying on the two-track/trail.
Looking at the math again… it seems it WOULD have been possible for Steed/Crew to still be standing at the ‘Descent Point’ at 4:27 PM… and still make it down to the deployment area in just 12 minutes after someone asked if they could please “HURRY UP”.
On PDF page 26 of the SAIR document, the SAIT themselves say that the distance from the ‘Descent Point’ on the high-ridge two-track road down to the deployment site ( along their best estimate as to the path GM took ) was 470 yards.
Here’s the math (again) for covering 470 yards in just 12 minutes…
1.3352 mph
2.1488 kmh
0.5969 meters/sec
117.4999 feet/minute
1.958 feet per second
That actually still seems ‘do-able’ for that descent from the two-track down to the deployment site.
Correction for above…
>> On February 23, 2015 at 3:30 pm, Bob Powers said…
>>
>> The Crew Told I believe Musser they were
>> committed to the black and to call BR.
When I replied to this above… and I was confirming it… I made the same mistake that I ( and others ) seem to keep making regarding this quote from Musser.
Paul Musser did NOT say that Marsh told him they were “committed to the BLACK”.
Musser told ADOSH very specifically that Marsh said they were “committed to the RIDGE”.
It was Musser himself who also then added he was ‘assuming’ that also meant “committed to the black” since that’s what their assignment was and they would have had ‘one foot in the black”.
It’s a small semantic difference ( “ridge” versus “black” )… but I just wanted to be sure and correct my own mis-speak up above.
“Committed to the RIDGE” could be translated as just “Still committed to our work assignment”.
It does NOT ( technically ) mean that Marsh was ever telling anyone he was “committed to the BLACK”.
I still think the thinking was along the lines of get to BSR, work over into town, ???? .
And there was nothing more to it than that, i.e. a vague desire to get to “the structures” and be vaguely useful.
I think we’ve all known civic-minded people who felt a strong need to stop at car accidents “to help” even if they don’t have the training or means to do much other than get in the way. I’ve seen mothers commend there young children for getting out of the car, also intending to help, at an accident when everyone was at risk of getting hit by a car. People don’t always think things through.
I also think Marsh subjectively THOUGHT the BSR would be safe, because I don’t think there was any rigor applied on that whole fire or prior fires to SZs.
It still might turn out it really WAS just that simple.
No ‘heroics’… no ‘rush into the burning building’ crap like Willis suggested at the first official news conference from the deployment site.
They just didn’t want to get ‘stuck’ up there on that ridge overnight.
They sure as heck knew that the Crew Carriers were NOT going to be able to get where they were… so it was then all about “How do WE now get to the where the Crew Carriers even have a chance of picking us up… before it gets dark”.
I don’t think even Marsh had any real idea how far away from Glen Ilah itself the actual Boulder Springs Ranch was… but there was also no doubt there HAD to be road access to that place FROM town… so all they had to do was get there and even if it got dark they could just get Brendan to orchestrate ‘picking them up’ there.
As for Steed (apparently) not being ‘fully onboard’ with even leaving the safe black… he simply might have had the same desire to just ‘get the hell off this ridge’… but he also still hadn’t totally lost his ‘safety’ concerns. It took a little more prodding ( and wasting time they really didn’t have ) before his own ‘comfort level’ reached the “gaggle up, boys!… we’re leaving” point.
Unless Brendan has his own agenda again walking into yet another set of interviews… I’m assuming we really will find out ( if nothing else ) more about WHY they even decided to make this move in the first place.
Both the SAIR and ADOSH reports say ( unequivocally ) that he heard Marsh and Steed “discussion their options”.
There HAD to be some indication in there of even WHY they were “discussing their options”… like WHY they felt the need to get off that ridge at all.
RTS said
I think we will discover that Marsh was at The Ranch (BSR) calling Steed on their Crew Net to bring the Crew down to The Ranch; and Steed told him at least three (3) times, “we’re in the black,” and then finally he gave in and took the Crew down into the unburned chutes, chimneys, and the bowl/box canyon
1. If Steed told Marsh NO (if that is what RTS is insinuating when he says Steed says “we are in the black”(at least 3 times) What convinced him to say yes on the fourth time?
2. And , TOL, how long did this back and forth go on? How much time did this “debate” (comfort level check)) take? Did it play a role in the actual entrapment and subsequent deployment? Like, if this debate went on 20-30 minutes, would that explain why Cordes thought they had plenty of time to get to BSR?
Only people who have seen/heard this (supposed) video/audio evidence can probably answer #2… but as for #1…
I seemed to recall when this was originally discussed it was mentioned that the same (supposed) evidence proves that all the back-and-forth actually culminated in a direct ORDER from DIVSA ( Marsh ) to the GMIHCS ( Steed ) to move those men out of the black and to the Boulder Springs Ranch.
I went looking for that… but then realized that Bob Powers just reiterated that possibility down below.
On February 22, 2015 at 10:29 am, Bob Powers said…
—————————————————————
Again I will put forward Marsh got to BSR Maybe the Fence no proof the compound.
Ordered the crew to Come off the mountain to the Ranch SZ. Turned around And went back the way he Flagged to meet the crew.
—————————————————————
So it would seem that this ‘evidence’ contains some proof that after trying several times to get a good ‘comfort level’ out of Steed for what Marsh WANTED him to do… Marsh just went ahead and ORDERED him to do it… and Steed caved in.
POSTSCRIPT: In the case of BOTH #1 and #2… of COURSE the TIME made a difference that day. They didn’t have one single minute to lose… if they really were going to stay alive that day. Even just a FEW minutes wasted might have been the difference between life and death.
That’s what is going to be ESPECIALLY tragic once everything is finally known… and this alleged scenario turns out to be TRUE.
WTKTT–
That covers it well enough.
My source said the argument order happened before the crew left the rest area.
So 1600 to 1604..
The other argument at the saddle that Dudley stated was not
given to me by the informant. I have not been able to confirm that part.
McDonough may have a lot to tell. I believe the others will come forward unless they are stopped by the Federal Lawyers.
An old saying goes—- the silence is defining—
Just remember that there is now a 9 minute gap between 1555 and 1604 when we are NOT sure they were still there at that resting spot.
The LAST photo taken at the ‘resting spot’ has now been timestamped at 1555. Christopher’s Canon was about 9 minutes ahead of real time that day.
The ONLY thing that still points to 1604 the fact that that is still the Network Timestamp on that photo Parker took much earlier… but only got around to actually SENDING to the Network at 1604.
So either that’s the last thing he did before they ‘moved out’… or Parker was actually able to ‘sneak in a transmit’ WHILE they were already marching south.
Either way… the fact that we see them resting there as early as 1550 ( The Caldwell video ) and they actually might NOT have left that area until 14 minutes later at 1604 means SOMETHING has to explain “What they were waiting for”.
I mean… there are the 14 minutes right there that would have saved their lives that day.
If they hadn’t just been ‘parked’ at the resting spot at such a critical time and just ( apparently ) waiting for something to happen… things would be different.
You really can’t help but LOOK at those MacKenzie photos and want to scream at the men in the photos… WHAT ARE YOU WAITING FOR??
IF YOU ARE GOING… THEN GO!
There’s no time to lose.
Whether we ever see this ‘other evidence’ or not… an actual process of consternation between Marsh and Steed… and an eventual ‘MOVE OUT’ order would explain what all that ‘waiting’ was about.
That kind of back-and-forth on the radio takes TIME.
TIME they didn’t have.
They had gathered in their Black SZ 400 acres of safety they did not plan on moving equipment off they planed to straight there no emergency to move.
If the pressure was that great that there is no time to lose???
IT IS A RACE AGINST THE FIRE.
Then the took a great risk that all the safety directives were against.
All the waiting was Steed not wanting to move the crew out of the
SAFE BLACK….
Your questions are in reality reflecting what was going on.
They were set to stay and watch the show—-
They were well into the black.
Gear off and taking pictures—
Chainsaws moving up with the crew–
Was it just a rest area or had Steed picked a SZ area to wait out the afternoon fire???????????
That is what I have seen in the Crew pictures since I first saw them I have been there many times the crew activity was very Familiar to me.
Their race against the FIRE was one they could not win and should never have tried By 1600 it was to late….
All the calculating Speed of decent location of decent against.
Time of day, Fuel type, Weather, projected wind, Current fire behavior
Leaves little doubt in my book that staying put was the only choice
EVERY THING ELSE WAS A GAMBLE
Reply to Bob Powers post on February 23, 2015 at 8:12 am
>> Bob Powers said…
>>
>> Gear off and taking pictures.
Yes. There is no photo/video evidence of any of them actually taking their packs off… but remember that at no time are we EVER actually seeing ALL of the GM Hotshots assembled at this ‘rest spot’ in ANY of the photos/videos taken at that location. We never seen more than half of them. We are still just ‘assuming’ that the other half of them were simply doing much the same thing… but BEHIND Christopher MacKenzie and a little further up the rockpile… but Christopher never turned AROUND to take a photo to prove that was actually the case.
The ‘Gear off’ part is still true, however.
Some of the verification of the timestamps on some of these photos even came from close examination of one of the sawyers taking his ‘Gear off’ and STOWING it as he was sitting there on that rock directly in front of Christopher MacKenzie.
It was definitely a “work stop” and a “smoke ’em if ya got ’em” moment captured by Christopher MacKenzie. Whether they had any idea a ‘move out of the black’ was going to come out of that ‘comfort level’ radio como they could now ( all ) hear between Marsh and Steed… we simply don’t know (yet).
If Brendan can accurately recall the REST of that conversation that we can only hear parts of… then that might become clear.
>> Bob Powers also said…
>>
>> Was it just a rest area or had Steed picked a SZ
>> area to wait out the afternoon fire???????????
That’s actually a VERY good question… and I don’t think it’s been discussed before.
Was that ‘rest spot’ where all the MacKenzie photos/videos were taken actually the place where Captain Steed had decided it would be OK to ride out the fire… or ( if they HAD decided to stay there ) would they have still ‘moved’ somewhere else like deeper into the black?
Maybe Brendan McDonough knows something about that, too.
I hope someone asks him.
Reply to calvin post on February 22, 2015 at 5:47 am
>> calvin said…
>>
>> Yes this has always been a theory.
And it’s still the LEADING theory. It really is. We’ve been over this ‘push’ versus ‘pull’ thing like DOZENS of times.
>> calvin also said…
>>
>> I am the one here that has always thought Marsh was ahead of the crew.
>> But yesterday, RTS stated that as fact.
Well.. he actually didn’t.
What he ACTUALLY said was…
—————————————————————————-
I think we will discover that Marsh was at The Ranch (BSR) calling Steed on their Crew Net to bring the Crew down to The Ranch; and Steed told him at least three (3) times, “we’re in the black,” and then finally he gave in and took the Crew down into the unburned chutes, chimneys, and the bowl/box canyon
—————————————————————————-
Look at the first FOUR words…
“I THINK we will discover…”
YOU ARE RIGHT, HE DID SAY THAT, BUT HE ALSO SAID ( in respose to me asking him what this actually meant)
Calvin,
Yes, that’s what I’m saying because from everything I know, It’s been fairly common knowledge from the very beginning,
To be clear.
RTS didn’t say everything he has heard. And he actually says it has been fairly common knowledge.
Did you really miss this exchange that included rocksteady?
What you actually ASKED him in response to his “I THINK we will discover post” was…
“Rts… Are you suggesting that Marsh was at BSR prior to GM leaving the black? Like say at 1555-1600?”
What he actually then said in response was…
“Yes, that’s what I’m saying because from everything I know, It’s been fairly common knowledge from the very beginning.”
So RTS was simply CONFIRMING to YOU that that really is what he “THINKS we will discover”.
He adds the “fairly common knowledge from the beginning” descriptor but is also still ‘qualifying’ that with “from everything I know”.
All that means is that he really has heard about this video… and that anyone who has seen or heard it seems to have the ‘common knowledge’ he is referencing…
…but RTS himself is still not 100 percent SURE about the content.
That’s the way I read that exchange, anyway.
You are treating it as an ABSOLUTE CONFIRMATION of something.
That’s not the case.
All RTS is saying is that one of these days he THINKS we will get CONFIRMATION on that… and when we do… it will also turn out that any number of people have known it all along ( because they saw/heard this mysterious video ).
That day hasn’t arrived yet.
I am not doubting that RTS ‘thinks’ is all going to come out.
It probably will.
RTS have even already ‘backed off’ the implied claim that Marsh was actually AT the Boulder Springs Ranch ( as in… actually INSIDE the compound ).
When I presented even my off-notes-away-from-computer recollections of some of the reasons we’ve been assuming Marsh could NOT have been all the way AT the BSR… RTS then said…
On February 21, 2015 at 5:48 pm RTS said…
WTKTT, Fair enough. CLOSE to the BSR for sure.
CLOSE only counts in horseshoes and hand-grenades.
Again… I’m not criticizing RTS in any way.
I BELIEVE him that HIS sources have knowledege of this material… but I think he is still saying HE, HIMSELF has NOT seen this evidence for himself and is NOT exactly SURE of all the details.
Bottom line: The only thing I see RTS ‘confirming’… without a shadow of a doubt… is that he knows people who know something and that ‘something’ will PROBABLY prove that Marsh was NEAR ( but never actually AT? ) the BSR that day… if and when that evidence ever emerges.
So for now… it just seems like more incremental information that the ‘Push’ theory is PROBABLY the correct one.
Still a lot of ‘probably’ and ‘if’ in there to call it CONFIRMATION of anything.
Apologies…. total Brain Fart and Typo up above.
I meant to say PULL THEORY and not PUSH THEORY.
Line above should have read like this…
So for now… it just seems like more incremental information that the PULL theory is PROBABLY the correct one.
WTKTT,
Jolly good deduction Mr. Watson. I can only tell you so much ya know and then I have to draw a line. I have to abide by my principles promising confidentiality to my sources.
Insistent blather
Either RTS stands by what he said or not? Or I guess it can be left up to interpretation, kind of like the YIN?
Calvin.
Do you mean PERSISTENT blather instead of ‘insistent?’
I stand by what I said. See above post.
It’s still a free country, so you all can interpret it any way you want, Using proper deductive and inductive logic principles of course will insure more accurate conclusions.
Calvin–
You have brought up some good points and information from the
Time between 1530 and 1650.
Let move one forward—We all were looking for some one that could have ordered the crew out of there Black safety zone.
Don’t overlook Marsh he had the power and authority to do just that.
Would they follow him into hell if he told them to gaggle up and move out??????????
Think about it —It is not a hard question—Would Steed follow his orders a lot of personality stuff going on here.
A lot of Fire Fighters around Prescott know the answers some were talking between each other the day after the burn over and talking to people outside the City circles. You just can not hide all that radio traffic. The SAIT tried but thins have been turning up.
And more is out there??????????
Reply to Bob Powers post on
February 22, 2015 at 10:31 pm
>> Bob Powers said…
>>
>> Think about it —It is not a hard question—Would
>> Steed follow his orders a lot of personality stuff
>> going on here.
If there were really THREE separate exchanges… could have gone something like this…
FIRST request by Marsh for Steed to move the men to Boulder Springs Ranch.
Steed gives a TDAO ( Turn Down With Alternate Option ) of…
“Comfort level not high. Route hasn’t been scouted. We should stay here in the black”.
So Marsh responds with….
“Fine. Whatever. I will go SCOUT it out.”
Marsh takes off SOUTH by himself and either partially ( to the saddle ) or fully ( to near the BSR ) scouts the route while Steed/Crew just sat around waiting back at the rest spot.
Marsh comes back with “OK… route is scouted. Looks do-able How’s your comfort level now?”
Steed does another TDAO and says “We don’t have a lookout for the whole move and no time to set one. We’re better off here in the black”.
DIVSA Marsh counters this SECOND TDAO from GMIHCS with “I will be your forward lookout. How’s your comfort level now?”
Steed still doesn’t feel right about it… has run out of TDAO… but still says he has no sufficient ‘comfort level’.
DIVSA Marsh then says. I’m not hearing any more valid TDAO from you. I ORDER you to come down here with those men.
Steed like his job ( and wants to succeed Marsh as GMIHCS ), so he just, in turn, orders the men to ‘gaggle up’ and head for the Boulder Springs Ranch.
>> Bob Powers said…
>>
>> A lot of Fire Fighters around Prescott know
>> the answers.
>>
>> Some were talking between each other the
>> day after the burn over and talking to
>> people outside the City circles. You just can
>> not hide all that radio traffic.
They actually might have all started ‘talking to each other’ and ‘exchanging information’ that very NIGHT… up near the deployment site.
Prescott Battalion Chief Corey Moser pretty much admitted that was the case when he granted an on-camera interview to AZFAMILY just before the first anniversary.
Moser was Willis’ right-hand-man that day in Yarnell and he himself ended up spending the night out at the deployment site with what he himself says were a whopping 25-30 other firefighters.
He also told AZFAMILY on-camera that those 25-30 firefighters had sort of formed an actual PACT of some kind that very night to NOT ever talk about what HAPPENED.
AZFAMILY
Firefighter who was at Yarnell Hill recalls tragedy, aftermath
Posted on June 30, 2014 at 12:48 PM – by Fields Moseley
Bio | Email | Follow: @fieldsmoseley
http://www.azfamily.com/news/wildfires/Firefighter-on-the-line-recalls-tragedy-265221861.html
At +2:40 in the VIDEO interview with Prescott Battalion Chief Cory Moser.. the reporter says this…
——————————————-
Moser says that, ya know, there are some parts of that night that are being kept ‘sacred’. He said that the firefighters up there… they kinda decided to kinda keep a PACT about.. uh. what had HAPPENED… and what they had seen up there… and just kinda keep that between them.
———————————————–
The written copy accompanying the video doesn’t use the exact word PACT but essentially then reports the same thing that was in the VIDEO interview…
———————————————–
“The No. 1 overriding thought is we got to get these guys back home,” Moser said.
Everything was secondary to being with their fallen brothers. Moser said 20 to 30 people, who all knew these men, gathered on that hill in Yarnell together, yet isolated from the world where the news was spreading.
“We all kept vigil out there all night long,” he said. “It was a long night. I don’t think you would find anyone that was sleepy. We were all pretty wide awake.”
Their grief was overwhelming, but their concerns simple: Show these men the utmost respect and get them to their families. They covered the bodies with American flags and got trucks ready to move them.
Moser said parts of what he and his men saw, said and did during their nightlong vigil for the Yarnell 19 is something the firefighters have kept to themselves.
———————————————————–
Reply to calvin post on February 22, 2015 at 5:01 am
>> calvin said…
>>
>> WTK asked
>>
>> Do you think what Sergeant Paulson says he heard could be proof that
>> ‘Bravo 33′ really DID fly down to check on Granite Mountain ( as OPS1 Abel
>> Requested ) and they really were asking them WHAT they were doing and
>> WHERE they were GOING?
>>
>> Paulsons (ADOSH) telephone interview
>>
>> Sergeant Paulson stated that during the day he heard air attack communicating
>> with the Granite Mountain Hotshots and questioning what they were doing and
>> where they were going in addition to the shelter deployment over the radio.
>>
>> 1. As we hear at the beginning of the helmet camera video, B33 NEVER responds
>> to the title AIR ATTACK.. I am not really sure if Burfiend answered to that handle
>> anytime in the captured radio transmissions?
I really do hate to quote it at all… but since you, yourself seem put a lot of faith in the YIN B33 notes… there is this testimony about the moment they say they had that WEIRD ‘changeout’ with the previous Air Attack Rory Collins…
From YIN B33 notes ( Thomas French, John Burfiend, Clint Cross )
——————————————————————————————–
(1700 NM time). It was a strange change out. He just said “you have the fire, I’m leaving”. Not sure if I was talking to structure group 1 or 2. I remember looking up. Talking to ops structural group 1, 2 and ops. I knew there was 2 structural groups. I wrote down 2. Tom said “hey dude, you are the air attack”.
——————————————————————————————–
Key phrase: ( Tom French to John Burfiend ) “Hey dude, YOU are the Air Attack”.
John Burfiend knew damn well he was now “Air Attack” from 1558 onwards… and was now REQUIRED to respond to any calls on A2G with that callsign prefix.
>> calvin also said…
>>
>> 2. Paulsons note assigns no time
No. You are right. None whatsoever. He COULD have been referring to ‘Air Attack’ Rory Collins and anything that had transpired at almost any time that day.
>> calvin also said…
>>
>> 3. Nor does it include the phrase or thought that they were leaving
>> the black, or moving into the green.
Correct again. Sergeant Paulson apparently only remembered hearing ‘Air Attack’ ASKING Granite Mountain “WHAT are you doing?” and “WHERE are you going?”… but not any ‘responses’ about ‘black’ or ‘green’ or ‘purple’ or ‘escape route’ or ‘safety zone’ or anything at all.
If he did… the ADOSH” investigator just neglected to write it down.
They probably should have progressed to full in-person interview with Sergeant Paulson.
>> calvin also said…
>>
>> The move that air attack questions could have been just a move
>> within the black, right?
Technically possible… yes… but I really doubt an Air Attack would be wasting his time asking someone about such a barely-detectable-from-the-air incremental move.
I would tend to think the “WHERE are you going?” question would have been because of some OBVIOUS ‘move’ in progress such as seeing ALL the men ‘gaggled up’ or ‘lined up’ and actually MOVING somewhere.
This is of course… just CSF ( Common Sense Filtering ) being applied on my part and doesn’t prove anything one way or the other.
>> calvin also asked.
>>
>> 4. According to the YIN (I understand it is sketchy) B33 says two
>> different things.
>>
>> 1) I head something about a crew being in a safety zone.
>> Called ops and asked “do we stop and go look for the crew?”
>> Ops said “no, they are safe, it’s Granite Mountain”.
>>
>> and
>>
>> 2) they say (per YIN) Never say them earlier. I didn’t know they
>> were there. Air attack didn’t tell me there were resources in the area.
Re: (1) – Nothing I can add there. One either believes that statement from the YIN B33 notes that the ‘Safety Check’ never happened at all… or one has to believe the other evidence that it DID. Somehow… some number of people are full of crap about all this. We just don’t know WHO ( yet ).
Re: (2) – Hearing Thomas French or John Burfiend or Clint Cross ( we still have no idea who was speaking there in the YIN ) say “I didn’t know they were there” is a DIRECT CONTRADICTION to what is said just a few lines about that in this same YIN B33 you are quoting.
Just a few lines above that is your actual (1) quote… but you didn’t copy the Q/A comment just underneath it.
That full section is actually…
——————————————————
I head something about a crew being in a safety zone. Called ops and asked “do we stop and go look for the crew?” Ops said “no, they are safe, it’s Granite Mountain”. I didn’t know that Blue Ridge was there until we were home watching the news.
Q: When did you hear about Granite Mountain?
A: Before 16:30 – before the fire turned,
——————————————————-
So TWO TIMES just before one of those three men saying “I didn’t know they were there” they testified they were TOLD that “Granite Mountain” not only WAS there… but that they were ‘safe’. They are also THEN sure they HEARD ‘about Granite Mountain’ BEFORE 1630 and BEFORE the deployment. Maybe WAY before that depending on when that ‘Should we go check on them?” discussion took place.
The ONLY crew they say they did NOT really know was there was ‘Blue Ridge’.
So maybe this quote you are depending on further down in their testimony…
“Never say them earlier. I didn’t know they were there.”
…is just one of those TOTALLY ‘out of sequence’ and ‘out of nowhere’ YIN notes and it might ONLY be them referring to BLUE RIDGE.
The evidence is right there in the YIN they were TOLD Granite Mountain was there.
The evidence is right there in the YIN they did NOT know Blue Ridge was there.
When they say “Never say them earlier” ( which was obviously meant to be “Never SAW them earlier” )… maybe THAT is only referring to Blue Ridge as well.
I really do NOT (fundamentally) trust these YIN B33 notes… and I hate it when we have to refer to them, anyway, because it’s all we have go on for some things… but I still think it’s worth pointing out where the YIN B33 actually contradicts ITSELF… even just a few lines apart.
>> calvin also said…
>>
>> That is my thoughts
And thank you for responding.
WTK said
If he has even been ‘wandering’ back towards the men after making sure the Boulder Springs Ranch was even accessible from the west… he could have gotten into that 2-minute-hard-run circle range from the deployment site at even LESS than 5 mph.
A couple of thoughts about the wondering back to “meet and greet” the crew theory.
1. As stated there was a fence that presented an obstacle. The time wondering back for the meet and greet could have been spent looking for a place to gain access to the SZ
2.At 4pm after x amount of consecutive days worked, I would venture a guess that even Captain America would have been tired and not just wondering around in the brush for a “meet and greet” , and no other reason
RE (1): It was just a couple of strands of barbed wire. Nothing to worry about. It was NOT going to stop 18 guys from doing anything and no other ‘access’ needed to be found.
RE (2): I think you are right. I think Marsh would have needed a REASON to start hiking ‘backwards’ that day, at that time.
Possible (REAL) reasons…
1) He really did suddenly realize they were NOT making ever near the kind of ‘forward progress’ they needed to… and if he didn’t get out there to ‘hurry them up’ they were never going to make it.
2) He really did realize, at some point, they were ALREADY ‘not going to make it’ ( long before Steed’s first MAYDAY call ) and he decided he better start ‘hauling ass’ out there.
Number (2) would be really, really disturbing.
It would mean that even LONG before Steed’s first MAYDAY… Eric Marsh was not only NOT informing anyone on TAC of an impending emergency… he was still LETTING those men come forward to their deaths.
I have said this before and I will say it again.
Any final PROOF that Eric Marsh really was anywhere EAST of that deployment site in any kind of timeframe prior to deployment is going to raise some SERIOUS behavioral questions that are then going to need their own explanation(s).
Heavy sigh
BR YIN
Tie in with the crew at the ranch house and hit main rd @ 1640 they make a turn, and hear yelling on Tac 1, a little further they hear yelling on Tac 5 AA and GM7 yelling multiple times. AA says unit yelling at AA on A/G stop yelling and stand by.
There was emergency radio traffic on Tac 1 and Tac 5 prior to the deployment .
Reply to calvin post on February 22, 2015 at 2:09 pm
>> calvin said…
>>
>> BR YIN
>>
>> Tie in with the crew at the ranch house and hit main rd @ 1640
>> they make a turn, and hear yelling on Tac 1, a little further
>> they hear yelling on Tac 5 AA and GM7 yelling multiple times.
>> AA says unit yelling at AA on A/G stop yelling and stand by.
>>
>> There was emergency radio traffic on Tac 1 and Tac 5 prior to the
>> deployment .
According to what you just quoted… only SECONDS of separation.
Matter of fact… if you are saying we should believe the YIN here as well AND take it literally… then the TIME is a minute too late and not to be trusted. If taken literally… then they heard the frist ‘yelling on TAC 1’ at 1640… a full minute AFTER Steed’s first MAYDYAY at 1639.
Of course that has to be wrong. If it happened at all it was just seconds before the start of the Hulburd’s 1639 video.
But it’s just more proof about being careful about taking the YIN so literally.
>> calvin also said…
>>
>> Heavy sigh
Not sure why you feel the need to exhale.
Nothing you just quoted ( even if true ) is any kind of PROOF of when either Marsh or Steed really knew they were in deep shit.
It could have been even SEVERAL minutes before anything hit the radio ( TAC 1 or A2G ).
We just don’t know.
WTKTT,
As usual, you raise some very good points. Marsh NOT informing anyone on TAC or Command of his/their whereabouts and/or intentions fits with his habitual disingenuous nature – fairly common knowledge to those of us that worked with him in the past.
And the behavioral issues associated with the entire matter are very disturbing indeed. Depending on the psychologist one talks to, it runs the gamut from the ‘Captain going down with his ship’ to guilt to hero to desperation and then some.
Basically, it’s hard to make heroes out of those that messed up.
They will always be ‘heroes’ just because of the kind of people they were.
These were (apparently) some of ‘the best of us’.
But I wouldn’t start passing out any medals just because anyone might have taken last-ditch efforts to save anyone’s life when they were the ones who put them into that situation in the first place.
That’s’ like a driver of a school bus ignoring major safety and road rules and having a terrible accident because of it… but then getting thrown clear of the bus… but witnesses say he/she ran back toward the bus to try and help, anyway.
If any of the kids on the bus died in that accident… you would be hard pressed to find ANYONE suggesting that bus driver was ANY kind of ‘hero’.
Calvin – “meet and greet” – God bless you for being a voice of reason. Friggin’ meet and greet….
WTK shared this in the previous chapter. (And by the way, THANK YOU for all you do here)
The TIME that would have been needed for this final 1,899 foot dash to safety is somewhere in the following chart…
1 mph ( 01.4 feet per second ) = 21 min 34 sec
2 mph ( 02.0 feet per second ) = 10 min 47 sec
3 mph ( 04.4 feet per second ) = 07 min 11 sec
4 mph ( 05.8 feet per second ) = 05 min 23 sec
5 mph ( 07.3 feet per second ) = 04 min 18 sec
6 mph ( 08.8 feet per second ) = 03 min 35 sec
7 mph ( 10.2 feet per second ) = 03 min 04 sec
8 mph ( 11.7 feet per second ) = 02 min 41 sec
As we discuss what the information that RTS provided yesterday means; I think we can use this information.
Again, thanks WTK, and everyone who continues to participate In this discussion.
I was going to go retrieve that myself. It seemed relevant as we look at those final moments again… and WHERE Marsh might have actually been.
Is it POSSIBLE this man could have achieved 8 mph?
I don’t know. He was in fantastic shape for a man of 43.
There is also something amazing that can happen to people when that kind of adrenaline rush takes place.
If he has even been ‘wandering’ back towards the men after making sure the Boulder Springs Ranch was even accessible from the west… he could have gotten into that 2-minute-hard-run circle range from the deployment site at even LESS than 5 mph.
From the BSR, it’s a bit of an uphill run the whole way, with poor footing added-in..
And, there’s always the possibility that Marsh had already been hiking back up to meet the crew, and as he got into the heavier brush he could not see the fire rushing in behind him. Perhaps the crew, at a slightly higher elevation and heading toward the fire, actually saw the ‘flaming front’ before Marsh did.
Yes. Very possible… but still incredulous for anyone who calls himself a Wildland Firefighter to be that ‘clueless’ about his OWN situation.
Notice also that the moment it is either proved or accepted that Eric Marsh WAS ‘scouting ahead’ for those men… a LOT of other serious questions have to be answered.
In that scenario… ( The ‘Pull’ Scenario )… there is no doubt that Marsh must have been saying things like “I’ve scouted it. Everything’s fine. Come on down”… and he was ‘pulling’ those men into that situation.
He also MAY have even been able to ‘win’ any arguments with Steed about this ‘risky move’ by even TELLING him “I am your forward lookout… you’ll be fine”… and then he FAILED that important task in a horrific way.
There is also the distinct possibility that Marsh HAD been ‘pink flagging’ the CLEAR route to the BSR… and when/it if came time for him to absolutely haul ass back that way… he had his OWN flagging to follow for a clearer, faster run.
I’m still thinking that covering the distance from the BSR back to the deployment site would even be hard for Captain America… but we also still do NOT know when Marsh himself became aware of the deep-shit he had gotten those men into.
Add even 60 more seconds to Marsh’s knowledge of what he had really just done to them… and the ‘run chart’ ( and where he COULD have actually been ) changes.
TTWARE
Uphill, really? So that adds more credence to the theory that GM should have ran toward Marsh then, Right? Downhill?
And poor footing? Compared to what? The near vertical descent from the two track to the Deployment site?
There is a drainage that runs downhill from the deployment area towards the ranch, so any running that might have been done would have been going uphill, as opposed to a flat, or downhill run.
Anyone familiar with that country knows that if you’re not in a sandy wash bottom, the footing is poor, everywhere.
TTWARE
Correct me if I am wrong
The drainage that you mention above was basically a sandy bottomed wash, right?
I mentioned the drainage (there are actually two) specifically to give reference to the downward slope of the land towards the east.
Nothing more, nothing less.
Both drainages eventually veer significantly away from BSR, and would likely never be used by anyone wishing to get from point A to point B. They cover a very indirect route that with all the zig-zagging involved, would take a good deal longer to traverse.
My whole comment above, was intended just to acknowledge the downward slope of the land, along with the rough footing involved with a point-to-point trek in either direction through that country.
Based on your response, perhaps you misunderstood that.
In no way was it intended to convey that the wash(es) were a route that anyone might have considered on 6/30/13, or that they could have somehow been a quicker ingress-egress route for anyone.
Bob said (chapter 11) 2/13
Severial months back we decided we really did not know where Marsh was with out more info he could have been Behind the crew or in front.
We were not sure when he left the meeting place after he found out Frisby would not be there. We only know the Crew started off the mountain at 1604.
Where was Marsh?????????
we need definitive proof not assumptions.
We know he was with the crew just before they deployed.
From 1530 till then we have no specifics to his location.
He was some where on Division A??????
Now Bob says 2/21
Calvin— that is not a revelation we went thru this last summer.
There is proof out there that has not surfaced with a name
and cold hard evidence.
We had quite a long conversation about this with evidence and non evidence
of both the Push or Pull. Theory until more facts come forward.
Where exactly do you stand on this Bob? One week ago you said it was merely an assumption that Marsh was ahead of the crew.
Now, you seem to back RTS up and yourself believe that Marsh was ahead of the crew
Bob said
Common Knowledge—
Internal Grape vine Local area and FS.
Hear say from some evidence not released.
Trusted sources from Fire Fighters close to the people there.
Information from people there not released.
The key to the Flood gate is McDonough.
First read what I said.
RTS and Myself have gained information from reliable sources that do not want to front that information for one reason or another. That leaves us with out stated proof or names of those individuals.
Simply put we as retired FS Firefighters active in this Blog have access to people with information that have trusted us with some things that have not come to light in the investigation.
I have said over and over I can not nor can RTS prove what we are being told without the backup of our sources.
I will not revel my sources which are few comp aired to RTS. He will not revel his as they are trusted friends and acquaintances.
So which is it??????
I believe that the information I have and RTS has is accurate Marsh was ahead of the crew.
At this time neither one of us can prove it because we are the messengers not the Witnesses.
I am sure every thing would go ballistic from you , Elizabeth and WTKTT with out names and facts that I can not release.
So I can only say I have information personally from very reliable sources that there is a written statement, Video/Audio and McDonough that will verify this.
I can not produce those here I can only say I believe they exist.
Again I will put forward Marsh got to BSR Maybe the Fence no proof the compound.
Ordered the crew to Come off the mountain to the Ranch SZ. Turned around And went back the way he Flagged to meet the crew.
All travel times are open— the crew started off the Mountain at 1604 Marsh started back at some time frame near that time The crew traveled 2/3 rds. of the way to the deployment area Marsh traveled back 1/3 of the distance to meet them easily accomplished with out the Captain America dash. Puts Marsh in the canyon where he could not see the Main Fire thus does not know of the change in fire activity or perhaps knew he had to hurry the crew along
to get back to the BSR.
ALL THE ABOVE ARE MY ASSUMPTIONS AS TO THE ABILITY OF MARSH TO GET TO THE BSR SZ AND WORK BACK TO THE CREW SLIGHTLY DIFFERENT THAN WTKTT MAD DASH
BACK TO THE CREW.
I can not ask you to believe me I can only state that there is definitely more information out there than what was released in the SAIR so the full story has not been told.
So right now we are left with 2 Theories —–Push or Pull Until information comes forward
and we know where Marsh was we are at an Impasse?????????????????.
LET ME ADD HERE NEATHER RTS OR ANY INFORMATION WE HAVE DEPARTED
HERE HAS EVER IN ANY WAY STATED THAT MARSH RAN BACK TO THE GM
CREW THRU AN INFERNO TO SAVE THE CREW.
MARSH WAS WITH THE CREW AT DEPLOYMENT OTHERS HAVE REFERED TO THE RUNNIG THERIORY.
I ONLY POSE THE POSIBILITY THAT IF MARSH WAS AT THE BSR OR NEAR IT AT 1604 WHEN THE CREW PICKED UP AND MOVED OFF THE HILL HE HAD PLENTLY OF TIME TO GO BACK FROM BSR AND MEET THE CREW..
AGAIN RTS AND I HAVE NEVER SAID ANY THING ABOUT RUNNING BACK TO THE CREW ………..NOR HAVE WE HERD ANY INFORMATION TO STATE THAT
I think it’s worth pointing out here that the ONLY real evidence that exists that Marsh was NOT actually with the Crew when Steed’s first MAYDAY hit the radio has always been a bit shaky unto itself.
The ONLY reasons we have ever really been assuming Marsh was NOT already with them at 1639 and had to ‘run to get there’ is twofold…
1) The very fact that it was Captain Jesse Steed making the first MAYDAY call and not DIVSA Eric Marsh himself. That has always been simply assumed to mean Marsh was NOT there with them at that moment.
2) When we finally DO hear DIVSA Marsh jumping into the MAYDAY calls at +2 minutes… he sounds OUT OF BREATH. The assumption there has also always been that means he had been RUNNING to get there.
NONE OF THAT MIGHT BE THE REALITY.
It’s always been a ‘logical’ assumption to make based on the evidence we can see/hear… but it really, truly, is some pretty SLIM evidence.
Marsh MAY have been there the whole time and the reason Steed appeared first on the radio is because Marsh was too busy DIRECTING the burnout operations to get on any radio channel… and the reason he is ‘out of breath’ when he finally DOES make that final call is for the same reason. He had been busting his ass helping to prepare the deployment site.
So there might not have been any ‘mad dash’ or ‘Super-hero running into the inferno’ crap going on at all.
He may have ALREADY BEEN WITH THEM when they ALL realized ( together ) what deep-shit they had gotten themselves into.
WTK said
>> calvin also said…
>>
>> And what do you think the revelation from RTS confirming that
>> Marsh was ahead of the crew (near BSR) does to the timeframe(s)?
That is by no means ANY kind of revelation.
Horseshit.
RTS has now went on record saying that he heard this information 7/1/2013, one day after the deaths of GMIHC
He also said Yes, that’s what I’m saying because from everything I know, It’s been fairly common knowledge from the very beginning,
Again, RTS says he is not just repeating some rumor. He actually KNOWS this, and it has been common knowledge from the very beginning.
Yes, that is news to me and rocksteady at least. And Elizabeth too, I think
Yes this has always been a theory, I am the one here that has always thought Marsh was ahead of the crew. But yesterday, RTS stated that as fact.
And with this information, the existing evidence needs a thorough going over.
One example is the wording directly from the Caldwell video at 1550 Marsh says WORKING MY WAY OFF THE TOP.
Does that mean anything different to you all now? Now that we actually know approximately where Marsh wasn’t. He was not in the black, he was not north of the GM crew.
No?
Horseshit back at ya, buddy.
I have all the respect in the world for both YOU and RTS… but we are still talking about 3rd-hand testimony and heresay… unless we know more about the ‘mysterious sources’.
RTS has proved his sources to be ‘in the know’ on any number of occasions… and I have no reason to doubt ANYTHING he says…
…but it is still not a KNOWN FACT that Marsh was out ‘ahead of the crew’.
It’s still just the ‘leading theory’… and THAT is ( by no means ) “a revelation”.
I don’t know what amount of evidence and/or open testimony it’s going to take to be SURE that’s what was happening out there that day… but it hasn’t happened yet.
Let’s see what Brendan has to say… and what might then even emerge following that to back up HIS ( long overdue ) testimony.
Reply to calvin post on February 22, 2015 at 5:47 am
>> calvin said…
>>
>> Yes this has always been a theory.
And it’s still the LEADING theory. It really is. We’ve been over this ‘push’ versus ‘pull’ thing like DOZENS of times.
>> calvin also said…
>>
>> I am the one here that has always thought Marsh was ahead of the crew.
>> But yesterday, RTS stated that as fact.
Well.. he actually didn’t.
What he ACTUALLY said was…
—————————————————————————-
I think we will discover that Marsh was at The Ranch (BSR) calling Steed on their Crew Net to bring the Crew down to The Ranch; and Steed told him at least three (3) times, “we’re in the black,” and then finally he gave in and took the Crew down into the unburned chutes, chimneys, and the bowl/box canyon
—————————————————————————-
Look at the first FOUR words…
“I THINK we will discover…”
It doesn’t say…
“I am absolutely, positively 100 percent SURE we will discover…”
RTS is obviously referring to that VIDEO that is supposed to exist… but I also think it is obvious he has not actually SEEN or HEARD it himself.
He has every reason to trust his sources… and WE have every reason to trust HIM.
His ‘sources’ have been absolutely right on any number of occasions.
But we’re still not getting THE EVIDENCE. Just ‘hearsay’.
Even if you add in RTS’s ‘common knowledge’ comments ( which implies multiple people possess the same knowledge ) that doesn’t get this puppy into the ‘end zone’.
For a while after the SAIR was published… it supposedly became ‘common knowledge’ that no on in fire command knew where Granite Mountain was, or what they were doing, or had any direct communication with them for 30 to 35 minutes.
We know NOW that was always total horseshit.
So you have to be careful of ‘common knowldege’ as well… especially when you don’t know who constitutes “the common”… or even what the real “knowldege” is.
RTS ‘thinks’ we will hear something… and gives some pretty good detail.
I ‘think’ it will all come out sooner or later.
But it hasn’t YET.
Reply to calvin post on February 21, 2015 at 7:32 pm
>> calvin said…
>>
>> What time do you think this safety check happened (if it did?)?
I don’t know.
The existing evidence isn’t giving me enough to go on to know when it REALLY happened… even IF it ever really happened.
There is only ONE place in the Panebaker Air-To-Air radio channel captures where the pilot of ‘Bravo 33’ ( Thomas French ) seems to be actually telling another pilot ( VLAT 911 ) that he would like him to ‘standby’ because (quote) “I need to check out something”.
That happened at exactly 1611.07 ( 4:11.07 PM )
That would actually match the timing just prior to the 4:13 moment when we appear to hear ASM2/B33 discussing Granite Mountain with someone on the ground… which was then going to lead right into that 4:13 PM “Granite Montun… wuz yo status rat now?” radio query.
But here’s the problem.
Even though Thomas French ( at 4:11.07 PM ) is actually telling the VLAT 911 pilot he “needs to go check something”… the VLAT pilot comes right back and says he now has B33 in sight and is ready for a ‘live run’.
So Thomas French then pulls his request back for VLAT 911 to just ‘standby while I go check on something’… and the two of them just proceed to do the ‘live’ VLAT drop, anyway.
There is then no further indication ( from the A2A radio capture, anyway ) that Thomas French ever returned to whatever it was he was telling VLAT 911 he “needed to go check out”.
There are then some periods of ‘silence’ on the A2A channel capture where a quick ‘Safety Check” on Granite Mountain *could* have probably happened… but there is no actual conversation about it from B33 pilot Thomas French. It would have had to have been ALL happening over on the Air-To-Ground radio channel ( with John Burfiend handling all of that ).
Here is that ONLY place in the A2A captures where we hear B33 pilot telling someone he “needs to go check something”…
——————————————————————————–
PANEBAKER AIR-TO-AIR CHANNEL CAPTURE VIDEO
20130630_1628_EP STARTS AT 1547.46 ( 3:47.46 PM )
——————————————————————————–
+23:11 ( 16:10.57 / 4:10.57 PM )
(DC10 VLAT 911): Okay. Lookin’ for ya.
+23:15 ( 1611.01 / 4:11.01 PM )
(DC10 VLAT 911): Are ya comin’ around to the left?
+23:17 ( 1611.03 / 4:11.03 PM )
(B33 – French): Yea. Affirmative
+23:18 ( 1611.04 / 4:11.04 PM )
(DC10 VLAT 911): Okay… ya still must be under the smoke there. I don’t have ya yet.
+23:21 ( 1611.07 / 4:11.07 PM )
(B33 – French): Yea… I’ll tell ya what. I think we got a little bit a time. I’d like to give you another ‘show’ and I need to check out somethin’ anyway so… ah… let me know when ya got me. I’m at your… uh.. looks like about your twelve thirty.
+23:31 ( 1611.17 / 4:11.17 PM )
(DC10 VLAT 911): Yea… I gotcha now. You just came out of the smoke column.
+23:34 ( 1611.20 / 4:11.20 PM )
(B33 – French): Yea. This’ll work out good. We got some time.
+23:37 ( 1611.23 / 4:11.23 PM )
(DC10 VLAT 911): Okay.
+23:41 ( 1611.27 / 4:11.27 PM )
(DC10 VLAT 911): It was pretty straight forward. You got smoke… ah… we can just go right into it if ya want to.
+23:45 ( 1611.31 / 4:11.31 PM )
(B33 – French): Yea. Yea… if you wanna do it why dontcha get behind me. We’ll make this a live run.
+23:50 ( 1611.36 / 4:11.36 PM )
(DC10 VLAT 911): Sounds like a plan.
————————————————————————————–
If the 1611 time is when B33 did do a check on GM, it can be assumed that they were not in the black. As Todd Abel says that is what B33 reported.
So if someone did a check on GM, I think
1. it happened prior to 1600, before GM left the black
2. And it was done by AA Collins
There actually IS a recorded moment in the Air-To-Air channel radio captures when Rory Collins himself was telling ‘Bravo 33’ that he thought he might need to go ‘check on something’.
It happened at 3:50 PM plus 30 seconds.
That could have been IMMEDIATELY after the Caldwell video and OPS1 Todd Abel’s directives to Marsh to “Hunker and be safe” and “Keep ME informed”.
It was part of that ‘report’ Rory Collins was making to ‘Bravo 33’ that he only had minutes left before leaving… but that in case they didn’t know it there was now a LOT of fire headed straight for Yarnell and B33 NEEDED to ‘swing around and take a look at that’.
From the video where this was captured…
VIDEO 20130630_1628_EP STARTS AT 1547.46 ( 3:47.46 PM )
—————————————————————————–
+2:38 ( 1550.24 / 3:50.24 PM )
(AA – Rory Collins): Bravo three three… Air Attack.
+2:40 ( 1550.26 / 3:50.26 PM )
(B33 – French): Go ahead Air Attack.
+2:41 ( 1550.27 / 3:50.27 PM )
(AA – Rory Collins): Okay… if ya haven’t noticed they got a heck of a wind shift here… ah… we’ve got a lot of fire headed over towards… ah… Yarnell. Ya wanna swing around and take a look at that we’re gonna have to check somethin’ there… either… shortly… I think. And also… uh… nine one one, I believe, is off… uh… about 20 minutes out.
+2:58 ( 1550.44 / 3:50.44 PM )
(B33 – French): Copy… we’re headed that way.
+3:00 ( 1550.46 / 3:50.46 PM )
(AA – Rory Collins): Ground contact out there… ahhhh… I was talkin’ to… Alpha
+3:05 ( 1550.51 / 3:50.51 PM )
(B33 – French): Ground contact Alpha.
—————————————————————————–
But this in NO WAY would match what OPS1 Todd Abel testified to and would require even more ‘fiction filtering’ about this ‘part of the story’ and what is in the official evidence record.
Todd Abel testified ( unequivocally ) that it was John Burfiend in ‘Bravo 33’ who he asked to go do this ‘Safety Check’… which would mean the request had to have come after 1558 when Rory Collins left the Yarnell airspace and officially ‘handed over’ Air Attack responsibilities to ‘Bravo 33’.
From OPS1 Todd Abel’s interview with ADOSH on August 22, 2013
Q1 = Dave Larsen, WFA / ADOSH investigator ( Rest in Peace )
A = OPS1 Todd Abel
————————————————————————————–
1783 A: I then jump on the radio, uh, on air ground with Bravo 33 and, uh, asked John
1784 Burfiend was – the Bravo 33, I said hey, when you get a chance, I need you to
1785 run down to the south end. He’s up here dropping SEATs to keep it out of
1786 these structures.
1787
1788 Q1: Right.
1789
1790 A: He’s kind of 1790 trying to tie stuff in to keep it out of those structures. And I said
1791 I need you to run down, uh, south and check on Granite – Division Alpha and
1792 Granite Mountain and Blue Ridge. He said copy that. He said I got – he goes
1793 what’s going on? I go now the winds are getting squirrely down there, they’re
1794 in the black, everybody’s good. He said okay I got two more SEATs to drop
1795 and I’ll buzz down there.
1796
1797 Q1: Okay.
1798
1799 A: So he dropped the other two SEATs. So you know you’re talking – I don’t
1800 know – you got 3:45 to 4 o’clock was probably wind change. Me and Eric
1801 having the conversation was probably right in that same timeframe. Yeah, I’d
1802 say that’s probably pretty close.
1803
1804 Q1: Okay.
1805
1806 A: So and then John made a run down there, everybody looked good, they were
1807 in the black, no, you know ev- no issues, no nothing. So ev-everybody was
1808 good. I was just trying to make – I’m just trying to paint that picture on the
1809 timeframes for you.
1810
1811 Q1: Thank you.
——————————————————————————————
Here’s the relevant ‘short roundup’ from Abel’s own testimony…
1) I then jump on the radio, uh, on air ground with Bravo 33
2) I asked John Burfiend was – the Bravo 33, I said hey, when you get a chance, I need you to run down to the south end.
3) He (John) said okay I got two more SEATs to drop and I’ll buzz down there.
4) John made a run down there, everybody looked good, they were in the black, no, you know ev- no issues, no nothing.
So there is no way to read this testimony any other way than that OPS1 Todd Abel specifically asked John Burfiend in ‘Bravo 33′ to ‘run down there’ and do an actual ‘Safety Check’ on Granite Mountain… and that they DID… and reported back to Abel that they were definitely ‘in the black’ and everyone ‘looked good’.
NOTE: The ‘looked good’ part would also imply that when Bravo 33 made this ‘Safety Check’ run they actually did achieve a VISUAL on Granite Mountain.
So between the YIN B33 notes ( which say this ‘Safety Check’ NEVER happened ) and then Todd Abel + Seargeant Paulson + Gary Cordes + (other) testimony which says it DID happen… and now the actual possibility that it was the previous Air Attack doing the ‘check’ just following the Caldwell video exchange between OPS1 Abel and DIVSA Marsh…
…SOMEONE who has ‘testified’ about this ‘part of the story’ is full of crap…
…and I would like to find out WHO.
There actually MIGHT be a way to nail down WHEN this ‘Safety Check’ took place ( if it did ).
Here’s that ‘short roundup’ on Todd Abel’s testimony again…
1) I then jump on the radio, uh, on air ground with Bravo 33
2) I asked John Burfiend was – the Bravo 33, I said hey, when you get a chance, I need you to run down to the south end.
3) He (John) said okay I got two more SEATs to drop and I’ll buzz down there.
4) John made a run down there, everybody looked good, they were in the black, no, you know ev- no issues, no nothing.
Notice this testimony from Abel…
3) He (John) said okay I got two more SEATs to drop and I’ll buzz down there.
Abel is specifically recalling Burfiend saying he would do the ‘Safety Check’ right after he finished up TWO SEAT DROPS.
That might have been the SPLIT SEAT DROP where they brought both of them in together and had them ‘tag and extend’ up there in the Model Creek / Miner’s Camp Road area.
There weren’t that many times when B33 was actually dealing with TWO SEATS at once over the fire… but this was one of those times.
Quick followup…
When Air Attack Rory Collins first ‘informed’ Thomas French ( pilot of Bravo 33 ) that there was ( at 3:50 PM ) a (quote) “LOT of fire headed over towards Yarnell” and he also told B33 to “swing around and take a look at that”… French responded with…
+2:58 ( 1550.44 / 3:50.44 PM )
(B33 – French): Copy… we’re headed that way.
…but that never happened.
‘Bravo 33’ did NOT ‘head that way’ circa 1550 ( 3:50 PM ).
Not even close.
They just continued working on that retardant line in the Model Creek Road / Miner’s camp road area for about the next HALF-HOUR.
It would not be for almost a HALF-HOUR before Thomas French would even fly down to the SOUTH end of the fire and then tell another pilot down there “This is my FIRST time down here”.
Elizabeth/Logical Phallacy,
Once again, there is NO Fred or Fred S posting on this blog or elsewhere on other blogs. He ONLY exists in your mind. Please seek the professional mental health that you so desperately need. There are qualified and trained professionals out here, ready and willing to assist you.
Elizabeth/Logical Phallacy said “Thank you, RTS and Bob, for raising the idea that perhaps Marsh actually voluntarily ran into an inferno to try to help his men.”
Really? NOPE, it didn’t happen. What in the name of Jehovah was he going to accomplish by running “into an inferno to try and help his men”?? He was going to do NOTHING!!!!! You are definitely living in some type of a media/novel/movie dreamworld to actually believe this! That kind of drama ONLY happens in the movies and novels and fiction, not in real life.
Marsh is/was NO hero. I allege that he is primarily responsible for the death of his Crew by directing Steed to bring the GMHS down to The Ranch (BSR). The ULTIMATE responsibility of each and every Supervisor is the SAFETY AND HEALTH of those they supervise. Period! He turned that responsibility completely upside down, on its head.
Once again, he is NO hero. I allege that once he realized that his poor decision to do that finally sunk in and he realized it would be fatal, he made a desperate ‘WTF have I done’ attempt to mollify and/or somehow make things right or whatever. He made this fatal decision based on years and years of prior bad decisions with good outcomes.
The only way Marsh could have ‘saved his Crew’ was to NOT pressure Steed and the GMHS out of their perfectly good SZ and down into what would soon become the hinges of hell – AT THE WORST POSSIBLE TIME WITH THE FIRE WEATHER AND FIRE BEHAVIOR IN DEADLY ALIGNMENT. The Rule of 99 caught up with him. Only some courtroom attorney psycho-babble would fecklessly attempt to justify WHY he did what he did using your hero reasoning.
Robert the Second (Fred S.) said on February 13, 2015:
“I think we will discover that Marsh was at The Ranch (BSR) calling Steed on their Crew Net to bring the Crew down to The Ranch; and Steed told him at least three (3) times, “we’re in the black,” and then finally he gave in and took the Crew down into the unburned chutes, chimneys, and the bowl/box canyon”
If this is honestly true about Marsh being AT the Boulder Springs Ranch, than Marsh was a hero. He deliberately raced back INTO an inferno to try to help the crew. Of course, that begs the question: if he had time to race INTO the inferno from the BSR, where RTS/FredS. says Marsh was at, why didn’t the CREW have time to race OUT to the BSR?
Also, if what RTS/FredS. is saying is true about Marsh being all the way to the BSR (and presumably having flagged the route down on the way so that the 19 could also make the trek behind him), this refutes the notion that the trek to the BSR was a time-consuming bushwhack. Otherwise Marsh would have never had time to make it all the way.
Thank you, RTS and Bob, for raising the idea that perhaps Marsh actually voluntarily ran into an inferno to try to help his men. 🙂
Reply to Elizabeth (counselor) post on February 21, 2015 at 9:39 pm
>> counselor said…
>>
>> If this is honestly true about Marsh being AT the Boulder Springs Ranch,
>> than Marsh was a hero.
It has always been a fact that Marsh was a minimum of 2 minutes away from the deployment site when Jesse Steed’s first MAYDAY hit the radio.
So it has also ALWAYS been true that whether he was ‘behind’ the men and ‘catching up from the rear’… or in ‘front of the men’ ( and SUPPOSED to be acting as their forward lookout? )… that he RAN TOWARDS THEM the moment he realized what deep shit he had gotten them into.
Whether that’s the act of a ‘hero’ or not… remains open to interpretation.
>> counselor also said…
>>
>> He deliberately raced back INTO an inferno to try to help the crew.
If he had known that he had trained the crew properly… then he would have also known that he didn’t need to do that. They should have known what to do whether he was with them or not. One more guy standing around needing to go into an aluminum shelter wasn’t going to make any difference one way or the other.
They should have never gotten into that situation in the FIRST place.
The only real cure was prevention.
>> counselor also said…
>>
>> Of course, that begs the question: if he had time to race INTO the inferno
>> from the BSR, where RTS/FredS. says Marsh was at, why didn’t the CREW
>> have time to race OUT to the BSR?
Ah… so you’re ARE aware of that fact? That’s good.
That means it doesn’t have to be explained to you ( again ).
It IS, in fact, a fact.
Any theory that says Marsh had time to run FROM some safe place to where the men were about to die means those same men didn’t have to die at all.
All they had to do was just do the same thing in the opposite direction.
>> counselor also said…
>>
>> Also, if what RTS/FredS. is saying is true about Marsh being all the way
>> to the BSR (and presumably having flagged the route down on the way
>> so that the 19 could also make the trek behind him), this refutes the notion
>> that the trek to the BSR was a time-consuming bushwhack. Otherwise
>> Marsh would have never had time to make it all the way.
The two people who knew that exact location better than anyone ( Tex (Sonny) Gilligan and Joy Collura ) have testified over and over to the fact that in that kind of terrain… a single person ( by themselves ) can move MUCH faster than a line of 18 men trying to ‘stay together’ and traverse the same ground.
If Marsh himself didn’t realize that… and know he could not possibly assume those 18 men would ever ‘make the same time’ he might have achieved by himself… then he had no business being the leader of that organization… or ANY Wildland Fire Crew.
>> counselor also said…
>>
>> Thank you, RTS and Bob, for raising the idea that perhaps Marsh actually
>> voluntarily ran into an inferno to try to help his men. 🙂
There’s something really, really twisted ( and more than just a little sick in the head ) about offering ‘thanks’ for something like that.
WTKTT said: >> Thank you, RTS and Bob, for raising the idea that perhaps Marsh actually >> voluntarily ran into an inferno to try to help his men. 🙂
There’s something really, really twisted ( and more than just a little sick in the head ) about offering ‘thanks’ for something like that.
My only point in thanking Bob and Fred S. (RTS) for raising the point was because Marsh has been so maligned on here by guys like Bob Powers and apparently Fred Schoeffler.
I have come to believe you need some help… and I don’t think that’s the first time it’s been said to you.
If it turns out that Eric Marsh was primarily responsible for the deaths of those men… then that’s just the way it is.
Something tells me even HE would be explaining that to you, if he could.
So, WTKTT/Fred 😉 – the fact that Fred and Bob are suggesting that Marsh VOLUNTARILY went into the inferno to try to help his guys does not make Eric Marsh a hero (if that story is true) in your eyes? Honestly?
No. It doesn’t. Honestly.
Anyone can DECIDE to kill themselves… for any number of reasons.
It doesn’t (automatically) make them a hero.
If you think it does… then you DO need to seek some help.
This struck me as relevant to the question you asked ( and the answer I gave ) so I thought I would post it here.
It’s from the Collins English Dictionary which shows the ORIGINS of commonly used words ( like “hero” ).
In the GREEK origin of the word “Hero”… it refers to one of Aphrodite’s priestesses… who decided to kill herself when her lover drowned trying to get across a river to come see her.
http://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/hero
(Greek) HERO – noun
(Origin – Greek mythology) a priestess of Aphrodite, who killed herself when her lover Leander drowned while swimming the Hellespont to visit her
Dig a little deeper into the legend of “Hero”… and you discover the reason she killed herself is that she blamed herself for Leander’s death.
He was trying to get to her in the dark… and she was supposed to ‘guide his way’ with a lantern… but a storm whipped up out of nowhere and blew the lantern out.
Leander then got ‘lost’ in the sudden storm and drowned.
HERO blamed herself… and then killed herself.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hero_and_Leander
**
** DID BRAVO 33 EVER ACTUALLY FLY DOWN TO THE SOUTH
** AND DO A ‘SAFETY CHECK’ ON GRANITE MOUNTAIN?
This one has been ‘laying on the table’ for quite some time, and I think it’s at least as important to figuring out what really happened that day as other things ( like “knowing where Eric Marsh really was”, etc. )
It’s still a VERY important part of the ‘story’ that day that remains a mystery.
It became a ‘point of contention’ ( once again ) during the attempt made a few days ago to just try and do a ’roundup’ on all the testimony regarding who heard what… and when… on the Air-To Ground channel.
So here is another attempt at a ’roundup’ of the available evidence to see what is KNOWN and/or NOT KNOWN about this one simple ( but VERY important ) possible event that day.
There’s only one way to present what is known or not known about this.
It would be to present TWO sections.
One would contain the evidence that they DID NOT check on Granite Mountain.
The other would contain the evidence that they DID check on them.
And then let the reader make up their own mind(s) whether it happened, or NOT.
** THE EVIDENCE THAT THEY DID NOT
There is basically only ONE piece of testimony in the evidence record ( and published reports ) that suggests it never happened at all.
That would be the following ‘cut’ from the SAIT Investigation Notes document where they were interviewing all THREE of the occupants of ‘Bravo 33’ together… in the same room… at the same time…
On page 15 of the SAIT Yarnell Investigation Notes ( YIN )
NOTE: We still do NOT know who is ‘speaking’ here. It is most likely John Burfiend who was primarily monitoring the A2G channel in B33 while Thomas French was primarily monitoring the A2A channel… but it could have even been ATS Trainee Clint Cross making the following statement to the SAIT investigators. We simply don’t know.
—————————————————————————
I head something about a crew being in a safety zone.
Called ops and asked “do we stop and go look for the crew?”
Ops said “no, they are safe, it’s Granite Mountain”.
—————————————————————————
That’s it. That’s the totality of the YIN B33 ‘notes’ regarding whether they ever actually flew down to check on Granite Mountain… or NOT.
There is no way to read that ‘note’ any other way than that they were asking if they NEEDED to go do that… but someone they were identifying as just OPS ( but then the SAIR would change this to OPS1 ) told them it simply wasn’t even necessary. So they didn’t.
That simple statement in the YIN then appeared to be the sole basis for the following report about this that appeared in the final SAIR document itself…
PDF page 33 of the published SAIR document…
—————————————————————————–
At approximately 1600, ASM2 overhears a comment on the radio referencing a crew and a safety zone. ASM2 calls OPS1 and clarifies, “I heard a crew in a safety zone, do we need to call a time out?” OPS1 replies, “No, they’re in a good place. They’re safe and it’s Granite Mountain.” They talk about flying over to check on the crew, but for now, they think the crew is safe in the black.
—————————————————————————–
That is obviously just an ’embellished’ version of the original YIN B33 statement, and just like that original statement there is only ONE conclusion to make when reading this. ASM2 ( Bravo 33 ) offered to go check… but they were told it wasn’t necessary… so they didn’t.
So that is it for the evidence that ‘Bravo 33’ NEVER actually flew down to purposely do any kind of ‘Safety Check’ on Granite Mountain.
It is what Arizona Forestry and the SAIT CHOSE to present in their PUBLIC report about the incident.
** THE EVIDENCE THAT THEY DID
The PRIMARY piece of evidence that ‘Bravo 33’ did, in fact, fly down to do a ‘Safety Check’ on Granite Mountain comes from OPS1 Todd Abel himself… and his testimony to ADOSH.
OPS1 Todd Abel told ADOSH that it DID happen.
From OPS1 Todd Abel’s interview with ADOSH on August 22, 2013
Q1 = Dave Larsen, WFA / ADOSH investigator ( Rest in Peace )
A = OPS1 Todd Abel
————————————————————————————–
1783 A: I then jump on the radio, uh, on air ground with Bravo 33 and, uh, asked John
1784 Burfiend was – the Bravo 33, I said hey, when you get a chance, I need you to
1785 run down to the south end. He’s up here dropping SEATs to keep it out of
1786 these structures.
1787
1788 Q1: Right.
1789
1790 A: He’s kind of 1790 trying to tie stuff in to keep it out of those structures. And I said
1791 I need you to run down, uh, south and check on Granite – Division Alpha and
1792 Granite Mountain and Blue Ridge. He said copy that. He said I got – he goes
1793 what’s going on? I go now the winds are getting squirrely down there, they’re
1794 in the black, everybody’s good. He said okay I got two more SEATs to drop
1795 and I’ll buzz down there.
1796
1797 Q1: Okay.
1798
1799 A: So he dropped the other two SEATs. So you know you’re talking – I don’t
1800 know – you got 3:45 to 4 o’clock was probably wind change. Me and Eric
1801 having the conversation was probably right in that same timeframe. Yeah, I’d
1802 say that’s probably pretty close.
1803
1804 Q1: Okay.
1805
1806 A: So and then John made a run down there, everybody looked good, they were
1807 in the black, no, you know ev- no issues, no nothing. So ev-everybody was
1808 good. I was just trying to make – I’m just trying to paint that picture on the
1809 timeframes for you.
1810
1811 Q1: Thank you.
——————————————————————————————
Here’s the relevant ‘short roundup’ from Abel’s own testimony…
1) I then jump on the radio, uh, on air ground with Bravo 33
2) I asked John Burfiend was – the Bravo 33, I said hey, when you get a chance, I need you to run down to the south end.
3) He (John) said okay I got two more SEATs to drop and I’ll buzz down there.
4) John made a run down there, everybody looked good, they were in the black, no, you know ev- no issues, no nothing.
So there is no way to read this testimony any other way than that OPS1 Todd Abel specifically asked John Burfiend in ‘Bravo 33’ to ‘run down there’ and do an actual ‘Safety Check’ on Granite Mountain… and that they DID… and reported back to Abel that they were definitely ‘in the black’ and everyone ‘looked good’.
NOTE: The ‘looked good’ part would also imply that when Bravo 33 made this ‘Safety Check’ run they actually did achieve a VISUAL on Granite Mountain.
One of the other pieces of official testimony that also seems to establish that ‘Air Attack’ B33 did, in fact, actually perform this ‘Safety Check’ on Granite Mountain comes from Sergeant Paulson of the DOC Globe Crew.
Sergeant Paulson was interviewed ( via telephone ) by ADOSH.
The notes from their interview with Sergeant Paulson ended up in this document in the ADOSH release folder(s)…
/ ADOSH Dropbox / ADOSH Notes and Emails / L3419 Notes redacted.pdf
The Paulson interview notes are on Page 9 and are as follows…
————————————————————————————-
Sergeant Paulson stated that during the day he heard air attack communicating
with the Granite Mountain Hotshots and questioning what they were doing and
where they were going in addition to the shelter deployment over the radio.
————————————————————————————-
This would seem to be independent VERIFICATION that ‘Bravo 33′ actually DID fly down to check on the status of Granite Mountain just as OPS1 Todd Abel testified he had requested them to do… and while they were doing that ‘Safety Check’ on them they (B33) WERE asking Granite Mountain some pretty direct questions such as…
1) WHAT are you doing?
2) WHERE are you GOING?
There are then ADDITIONAL bits of independent testimony that, while not direct verification there was this specific ‘Safety Check’ being performed by ‘Bravo 33’ at the request of OPS1 Abel… they all suggest that people WERE overhearing the same sort of thing that Sergeant Paulson testified HE heard.
People overhearing conversations that they say were specifically between Eric Marsh and/or Jesse Steed with ‘Air Attack’ B33… and included apparent responses to the same sort of “WHAT are you doing?” and/or “WHERE are you going?” questions Sergeant Paulson recalls hearing.
The most significant one of those comes from SPGS1 Gary Cordes himself.
Gary Cordes testified to ADOSH that, in no uncertain terms, HE heard Eric Marsh talking directly to ‘Air Attack’ B33 and apparently answering a question along the lines of “WHERE are you going?”
Gary Cordes CONFIRMED ( twice ) that he was SURE he overheard this as part of a radio exchange between Eric Marsh and ‘Air Attack’ B33… and in a timeframe that would match when this ‘Safety Check’ *might* have been being performed by B33.
From Gary Cordes’ ADOSH interview on September 11, 2013
Q1 = Barry Hicks, ADOSH investigator
A = SPGS1 Gary Cordes
———————————————————————————
1454 A: Yeah, what I had actually heard, and that’s what I was touching on a little bit
1455 earlier, but I didn’t wanna get too, too far into it, ‘cause I’m not sure of the
1456 timeframe and what had actually occurred, but I did hear Eric say that he was,
1457 he was headed to his pre-designated safety zone. And, and so my assumption
1458 was that he was headed to the um, to the Boulder Springs Ranch.
1459
1460 Q1: So that was your assumption is that he was going to the Boulder Springs
1461 Ranch and not the black, is that right?
1462
1463 A: Yeah, exactly.
1464
1465 Q1: Um, okay.
1466
1467 A: And I was…
1468
1469 Q1: But you don’t know what that time frame might’ve been or…
1470
1471 A: No, that’s what I was trying, that’s what I was trying to fi – you know, jumble
1472 that in to what I had here and I’m not really sure, um, when that actually
1473 happened and how that correlated with him letting me know that it had
1474 crossed the dozer line, uh, by the grater. So I’m not sure which came first.
1475
1476 Q1: Okay, so then somewhere in there he, and he actually called you rather than
1477 somebody else…
1478
1479 A: No, he did not call 1479 me, he, he made the announcement to air attack on air to
1480 ground.
———————————————————————————
Cordes would then ( a few moments later ) VERIFY to ADOSH that this was something he heard between Marsh and B33 on the A2G channel… and that he was hearing this at a time when HE believed there was still (quote) “plenty of time” for those men to reach the Boulder Springs Ranch.
———————————————————————————-
1498 Q1: Uh, he tells air attack that he’s going to his designated, pre-designated safety
1499 zone…
1500
1501 A: Right.
1502
1503 Q1: …and he doesn’t say where that is, he just says, safety zone?
1504
1505 A: Right.
1506
1507 Q1: And so your assumption is…
1508
1509 A: He had plenty of time to get there and, and he was headed to the Boulder
1510 Springs Ranch.
1511
1512 Q1: Okay.
1513
1514 Q2: Did he say that on air attack, air to ground, the air attack…
1515
1516 A: I’m sorry, air to ground, he said it to air attack, yes.
——————————————————————————————-
So that entire exchange between Eric Marsh and John Burfiend in B33 over the A2G channel that Cordes says HE heard ( in a timeframe that was close to when this ‘Safety Check’ might have been taking place ) could have easily all been intiated with one ( or both ) of the same questions that Sergeant Paulson testifed HE heard B33 asking ‘Granite Mountain’.
1) WHAT are you doing?
2) WHERE are you GOING?
There are other similar reports from multiple other sources… but either those sources cannot verify what they were hearing as definitely a converation with ‘Air Attack’ OR the ‘times’ being given are closer to the 1630 timeframe than when this ‘Safety Check’ might have been being performed…
…but even those other reports indicate what was being heard were ANSWERS to QUESTIONS similar to…
1) WHAT are you doing?
2) WHERE are you GOING?
** SUMMARY
The BOTTOM LINE here is that there is (currently) more evidence that ‘Bravo 33’ actually DID perform this ‘Safety Check’ on Granite Mountain than there is evidence they did NOT do it.
What time do you think this safety check happened (if it did?)?
And what do you think the revelation from RTS confirming that Marsh was ahead of the crew (near BSR) does to the timeframe(s)?
Calvin— that is not a revelation we went thru this last summer.
There is proof out there that has not surfaced with a name
and cold hard evidence.
We had quite a long conversation about this with evidence and non evidence
of both the Push or Pull. Theory until more facts come forward.
Reply to calvin post on February 21, 2015 at 7:32 pm
>> calvin said…
>>
>> What time do you think this safety check happened (if it did?)?
I don’t kniow. The point of the post was to just show there is more evidence that it actually happened… than there is evidence that it did not.
If it did happen… it’s perfectly obvious it had to have happened AFTER ‘Air Attack’ Rory Collins left the airspace and handed over “Air Attack” duty to ‘Bravo 3’ at 1558 ( 3:58 PM ).
That’s the ‘low side’ of the window.
I would put the ‘high side’ of the window right there at 1613 ( 4:13 PM ) when we hear all that “Granite Montain… what’s your status right now?” conversation in the Panebaker video. Either that captured radio traffic was actually PART of this ASM2/B33 ‘Safety Check’ on Granite… it was happening immediately after that.
So that’s just a 15 minute window ( Sometime after 3:58 PM but before/during 4:13 PM ).
If what Gary Cordes heard was PART of that ‘Safety Check’…. I would move the high side of the window down to more like 1605 because that is when Gary Cordes said he was convinced “They (still) had plenty of time to get the Boulder Springs Ranch”.
The farther we get towards the 4:15 to 4:30 timeframe… that assumption gets less and less possible on anyone’s part.
So… instead of just answering questions with questions… do you have a comment on the actual post with regards to whether you think it simply DID or DID NOT even happen?
Are you sticking with the YIN B33 as if it was gospel truth and there was NEVER any such ‘Safety Check’ on B33’s part?
>> calvin also said…
>>
>> And what do you think the revelation from RTS confirming that
>> Marsh was ahead of the crew (near BSR) does to the timeframe(s)?
That is by no means ANY kind of revelation.
See my other comment below. We have been discussing the “Push’ versus ‘Pull’ theories ( and the evidence that supports both ) for a LOOOOONG time.
Robert the Second (Fred S.) said on February 13, 2015:
“I think we will discover that Marsh was at The Ranch (BSR) calling Steed on their Crew Net to bring the Crew down to The Ranch; and Steed told him at least three (3) times, “we’re in the black,” and then finally he gave in and took the Crew down into the unburned chutes, chimneys, and the bowl/box canyon”
If this is honestly true about Marsh being AT the Boulder Springs Ranch, than Marsh was a hero. He deliberately raced back INTO an inferno to try to help the crew. Of course, that begs the question: if he had time to race INTO the inferno from the BSR, where RTS/FredS. says Marsh was at, why didn’t the CREW have time to race OUT to the BSR?
Also, if what RTS/FredS. is saying is true about Marsh being all the way to the BSR (and presumably having flagged the route down on the way so that the 19 could also make the trek behind him), this refutes the notion that the trek to the BSR was a time-consuming bushwhack. Otherwise Marsh would have never had time to make it all the way.
Thank you, RTS and Bob, for raising the idea that perhaps Marsh actually voluntarily ran into an inferno to try to help his men. 🙂
And the reality is and always has been that all Elizabeth has tried to do is find a way to make Marsh a HERO.
Every thing she says and dose is in that quest. So cherry pick, manipulate and maneuver evidence to fit your story.
Attack every body else who dose not agree with you, and keep pushing the bloggers on here are someone named Fred. Which eliminates all the other voices against her.
Elizabeth has made enemies of several people on here many who will no longer converse with her and have blocked her from their emails.
Her only resort is to prove us and the evidence wrong. Sounds like we are being played by a defense attorney———–
She has been playing the game for months—
To be very clear and with a lot of sorrow I can only say Marsh was responsible for the deaths of 18 Fire Fighters and him self. A hero NO
He made choices as a supervisor that cost their lives——
When you are in charge the buck stops here. Every Hot Shot Superintendent that I have ever known will tell you that.
End of sermon– beware of the Black Widow———
Reply to Elizabeth (counselor) post on February 21, 2015 at 7:09 pm
>> counselor said…
>>
>> If this is honestly true about Marsh being AT the Boulder Springs Ranch,
>> than Marsh was a hero.
It has always been a fact that Marsh was a minimum of 2 minutes away from the deployment site when Jesse Steed’s first MAYDAY hit the radio.
So it has also ALWAYS been true that whether he was ‘behind’ the men and ‘catching up from the reat’… or in ‘front of the men’ ( and SUPPOSED to be acting as their forward lookout? )… that he RAN TOWARDS THEM the moment he realized what deep shit he had gotten them into.
Whether that’s the act of a ‘hero’ or not… remains open to interpretation.
>> counselor also said…
>>
>> He deliberately raced back INTO an inferno to try to help the crew.
If he had known that he had trained the crew properly… then he would have also known that he didn’t need to do that. They should have known what to do whether he was with them or not. One more guy standing around needing to go into an aluminum shelter wasn’t going to make any difference one way or the other.
They should have never gotten into that situation in the FIRST place.
The only real cure was prevention.
>> counselor also said…
>>
>> Of course, that begs the question: if he had time to race INTO the inferno
>> from the BSR, where RTS/FredS. says Marsh was at, why didn’t the CREW
>> have time to race OUT to the BSR?
Ah… so you’re ARE aware of that fact? That’s good.
That means it doesn’t have to be explained to you ( again ).
It IS, in fact, a fact.
Any theory that says Marsh had time to run FROM some safe place to where the men were about to die means those same men didn’t have to die at all.
All they had to do was just do the same thing in the opposite direction.
>> counselor also said…
>>
>> Also, if what RTS/FredS. is saying is true about Marsh being all the way
>> to the BSR (and presumably having flagged the route down on the way
>> so that the 19 could also make the trek behind him), this refutes the notion
>> that the trek to the BSR was a time-consuming bushwhack. Otherwise
>> Marsh would have never had time to make it all the way.
The two people who knew that exact location better than anyone ( Tex (Sonny) Gilligan and Joy Collura ) have testified over and over to the fact that in that kind of terrain… a single person ( by themselves ) can move MUCH faster than a line of 18 men trying to ‘stay together’ and traverse the same ground.
If Marsh himself didn’t realize that… and know he could not possibly assume those 18 men would ever ‘make the same time’ he might have achieved by himself… then he had no business being the leader of that organization… or ANY Wildland Fire Crew.
>> counselor also said…
>>
>> Thank you, RTS and Bob, for raising the idea that perhaps Marsh actually
>> voluntarily ran into an inferno to try to help his men. 🙂
There’s something really, really twisted ( and more than just a little sick in the head ) in there about offering ‘thanks’ for something like that.
Elizabeth/Logical Phallacy,
Once again, there is NO Fred or Fred S posting on this blog or elsewhere on other blogs. He ONLY exists in your mind. Please seek the professional mental health that you so desperately need. There are qualified and trained professionals out here, ready and willing to assist you.
Elizabeth/Logical Phallacy said “Thank you, RTS and Bob, for raising the idea that perhaps Marsh actually voluntarily ran into an inferno to try to help his men.”
Really? NOPE, it didn’t happen. What in the name of Jehovah was he going to accomplish by running “into an inferno to try and help his men”?? He was going to do NOTHING!!!!! You are definitely living in some type of a media/novel/movie dreamworld to actually believe this! That kind of drama ONLY happens in the movies and novels and fiction, not in real life.
Marsh is/was NO hero. I allege that he is primarily responsible for the death of his Crew by directing Steed to bring the GMHS down to The Ranch (BSR). The ULTIMATE responsibility of each and every Supervisor is the SAFETY AND HEALTH of those they supervise. Period! He turned that responsibility completely upside down, on its head.
Once again, he is NO hero. I allege that once he realized that his poor decision to do that finally sunk in and he realized it would be fatal, he made a desperate ‘WTF have I done’ attempt to mollify and/or somehow make things right or whatever. He made this fatal decision based on years and years of prior bad decisions with good outcomes.
The only way Marsh could have ‘saved his Crew’ was to NOT pressure Steed and the GMHS out of their perfectly good SZ and down into what would soon become the hinges of hell – AT THE WORST POSSIBLE TIME WITH THE FIRE WEATHER AND FIRE BEHAVIOR IN DEADLY ALIGNMENT. The Rule of 99 caught up with him. Only some courtroom attorney psycho-babble would fecklessly attempt to justify WHY he did what he did using your hero reasoning.
So Fred S./Robert-the-Second, why did Marsh run back from the BSR into the inferno, if not to try to HELP his men, like a true hero would? Remember, it is YOUR story that suggests that Marsh deliberately ran INTO a fire from the safety of the BSR to try to help his men…. That’s YOUR story, Fred/Robert-the-Second, not mine.
Also, Mike says “hi.” 🙂
The ( GREEK ) origin of the word HERO goes back to Greek mythology.
HERO was a priestess of the goddess Aphrodite.
One night… her lover Leander was trying to swim the Hellespont ( now known as the Dardanelles ) and she was supposed to be his “lookout” and also “guide his way” with a lantern.
A sudden storm whipped up and both blew out her lantern and roughed up the waters of the Hellespont.
Leander drowned.
HERO blamed herself… and then killed herself.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hero_and_Leander
So…….I
I’m sitting here in this little cafe in Jemez Springs, New Mexico. It’s the only thing for miles that’s open for dinner. Except two bars.
There’s a Boxy little Honda van (which there are a lot of around here) with “wildland firefighter” and WFFoundation stickers all over.
And I’m sitting here wondering, OK, who is it???
Interesting visit to Valles Caldera today. Where GM fought the Thompson Ridge Fire not long before they perished at Yarnell.
And finally broke out my new camera. Best day in Ages!!!
best dinner I’ve had in ages, also!!!!!! No wonder wild land fire fighters eat here.
I’m guessing the guy that looks the least like a wild land firefighter is the wild land fire fighter. That would fit this whole narrative.
Just yell ‘GAGGLE UP!’…. and see if anyone leaps to their feet.
LOL!!
Too bad I didn’t see that in time………
RTS said 2/13 1007pm
I think we will discover that Marsh was at The Ranch (BSR) calling Steed on their Crew Net to bring the Crew down to The Ranch; and Steed told him at least three (3) times, “we’re in the black,” and then finally he gave in and took the Crew down into the unburned chutes, chimneys, and the bowl/box canyon
Rts.
Are you suggesting that Marsh was at BSR prior to GM leaving the black? Like say at 1555-1600?
Calvin—-I went back thru the statements and found no statement like that from RTS.
I may have missed it could you bring it up here for reference.
I did how ever open the discussion severial months back that there were people with knowledge and video/audio showing that marsh was actually ahead of the crew and may have been to the BSR. I got no specific time frame other than it was before the crew move.
I admitted this was all second hand from a caller who called me direct.
Calvin,
Yes, that’s what I’m saying because from everything I know, It’s been fairly common knowledge from the very beginning,
Common knowledge???
To whom? Where does this come from?
If true,could put a whole new twist on the incident
Common Knowledge—
Internal Grape vine Local area and FS.
Hear say from some evidence not released.
Trusted sources from Fire Fighters close to the people there.
Information from people there not released.
The key to the Flood gate is McDonough.
rocksteady,
Yes, common knowledge since I first heard of it on July 1, 2013 and verified several times since then. Bob Powers also has it right.
Thanks RTS
Think about this for awhile.
During the McKenzie video, after Marsh spews the ‘comfort level’ thing, we hear Steed describing to Marsh the location and intensity of the fire and such, down below. If Marsh was up high and could see all of that, he would have said something like, ‘Copy, that’s what I’m seeing as well.’ or something similar. Steed KNOWS he’s not with the Crew and somewhere he CANNOT see the fire behavior.
We’ve always been working ‘both sides of the coin’ here with regards to Marsh’s whereabouts from about 3:40 PM right up to his last verified location ( the deployment site itself ).
That’s because there’s always been evidence in this sketchy and incomplete record to suggest both the ‘push’ and the ‘pull’ scenarios.
Push scenario – Marsh was BEHIND Steed/Crew and ‘catching up”
Pull scenario – Marsh was AHEAD and urging them to come down.
But EACH scenario has always had its own ‘head scratchers’, or something that didn’t quite fit ALL the evidence.
Even now… there are still things that would suggest there is NO WAY Marsh could have made it all the way to the BSR that day… especially not BEFORE Steed/Crew ever even departed that rest area in the black.
I’m not anywhere near my own notes but just off the top of my head…
1) Lee and DJ Helm testified they NEVER saw any firefighters on their property in that timeframe. Not even one… and not until people started arriving there post-deployment. They had been out running errands and were not there ALL day Sunday… but from the time they arrived back at the Ranch circa 3:00 PM and on through riding out the burnover themselves… they say they saw NO ONE.
2) Even if Marsh was Captain America it would have been pretty much impossible for him to cover the full distance between the BSR and the deployment site in the time between just what (supposedly) would have been his own realization that GM was in deep tapioca out there ( Steed’s actual first MAYDAY call ) and the time when he suddenly appears on the radio in the middle of the MAYDAY sequence saying “This is DIVSA… and I’m HERE NOW with Granite Mountain’. For that to have happened… he pretty much HAD to have known prior to Steed’s MAYDAY how much trouble they were really in… but then took off running west like a wild man and still wasn’t notifying anyone of what he now knew.
3) The whole ‘requested face-to-face’ with Frisby thing. That always seems to have also been the limitation for when he could have even started heading off the ridge… unless there’s something we still don’t know about that request and whether it was ‘called off’ even earlier than the testimony would indicate ( when Frisby ran into Brendan ).
But NONE of these things has ever been de-facto PROOF of either where Marsh really was… how he got there… and how he ended up at the deployment site itself.
A simple explanation for all THREE of these things is that YES… he was out AHEAD of them… but not QUITE to the Boulder Springs Ranch.
Somewhere EAST of the deployment site… but still within a (maximum) 2 minute hard run through the manzanita to get BACK to it when the shit started hitting the fan.
The Arizona Forestry lawyers have already indicated to the ADOSH Administrative Law Judge Michael A. Mosesso that Bredan is EXPECTED to testify as to the “whereabouts of Eric Marsh that day”.
Let’s hope he doesn’t ‘back off’ that and leave it a mystery.
There is actually still no indication that Brendan McDonough has ANY intention of telling EVERYTHING he knows.
The only ‘motivation’ indicated in the lawyer’s letters is that he just wants to ‘unburden himself’ of some previously unrevealed information and ( after all this time now ) just ‘get it off his chest’.
Nobody knows what that really means.
He could very will still just have his own agenda like he did for the first round of official interviews and ONLY wants to reveal things that HE is choosing to ‘get off his chest’.
Telling the WHOLE story could still be the furthest thing from his mind.
There is another possibility—-
After Marsh knew Steed was coming down he started working his way back to the crew thus with them or almost with them when the call went out we are in front of the flaming front. He had plenty of time to return to the crew before deployment.
Marsh could have made it to the BSR fence and not into the Compound which would mean the Helms never saw Marsh.
This would also put Marsh where he could not see the main Fire.
when it made the run.
Still all open to discussion with out evidence but plausible.
No need to be Mr. America————-
WTKTT,
Fair enough. CLOSE to the BSR for sure.
And everything Bob Powers just suggested is also possible. He may have gotten close enough to the BSR to at least ascertain there wasn’t a 12 foot high chain link / razor wire fence around the compound ( which he might not have been sure about at all )… or a pack of dobermanns guarding the place…
…and then just started wandering BACK towards the men to ‘hurry them up’… which then got him within the two-minute-hard-run distance before it all hit the fan.
There’s no telling.
Actually… I hope there is ‘some telling’.
I hope Brendan McDonough isn’t just playing ANOTHER game and coming into ANOTHER set of interviews with his own ‘agenda’ again.
I hope he just does now what he should have done in the first place and that he DOES reveal where Marsh actually was and/or what the hell was going on out there.
**
** YARNELL HILL MEMORIAL SITE BOARD MEETING ANNOUNCED
The ‘Yarnell Hill Memorial Site Board’ has announced that their next PUBLIC meeting
will be just 6 days from now… on February 27, 2015 ( and the day after Brendan McDonough’s scheduled deposition where he is supposed to ‘get something off his chest’ ).
It was announced here on their site and here on the Arizona Forestry site…
https://azsf.az.gov/notice-public-meeting-yarnell-hill-memorial-site-board
————————————————————————————————
NOTICE OF PUBLIC MEETING OF THE YARNELL HILL MEMORIAL SITE BOARD
Yarnell Hill Memorial Site Board Meets February 27;
The Donations Site for the Memorial Fund is Now Online
(Phoenix, Arizona – February 6, 2015) – The Yarnell Hill Memorial Site Board’s next meeting will be on Friday, February 27, 2015 at 3 p.m. It will be held at the Yavapai County Administrative Services Building at 1015 Fair Street in Prescott. The public is invited and the agenda for this meeting will be posted at the new website for the Memorial Fund.
———————————————————————————————
The Arizona Forestry page announcing this next February 27 meeting of the ‘Yarnell Hill Memorial Site Board’ says the ‘agenda’ for the meeting is supposed be sitting at the following page…
http://www.yarnellhillmemorialfund.org/what-we-do.html
…but it’s not there.
Not yet, anyway.
They still have a few more days to publish the agenda… according to Arizona Law.
**
** ADOSH ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE ( ALJ ) MICHAEL MOSESSO HAS
** DENIED ARIZONA FORESTRY’S REQUEST THAT HE SUBPOENA
** BRENDAN MCDONOUGH TO APPEAR FOR DEPOSITION ON FEB 26, 2015
A new file has been added to the online “ALJ Hearing” file in the “Arizona Forestry vs. ADOSH” hearing where AZF is challenging the ADOSH report.
Arizona Forestry had asked ALJ Judge Michael Mosesso to issue a no-shit subpoena to McDonough to appear for the scheduled under-oath deposition on February 26, 2015 because as of the middle of January they still hadn’t seen Brendan’s new criminal attorney ( David M. Shapiro ) file the proper “Notice of Appearance” assuring that he and his client would, in fact, be attending the February 26 deposition.
Arizona Forestry wanted Judge Mosesso to issue this actual subpoena and FORCE Brendan to appear because they are scared to death they might have to walk into the first scheduled ‘Global Mediation’ meeting with the “wrongful death” lawsuit plaintiffs ( on March 2, 2015 ) WITHOUT knowing exactly what it is that Brendan McDonough now wants to ‘get off his chest’.
Judge Michael Mosesso has now DENIED Arizona Forestry’s request to issue a subpoena to McDonough.
He was very blunt. He told Arizona Forestry he doesn’t issue subpoenas for depositions as long as everyone who is supposed to be there has been notified they are supposed to be there.
The rejection letter from Judge Michael Mosesso is right at the top of the new online document and basically just tells Arizona Forestry…
———————————————————————————-
Your Notice of Deposition is sufficient.
I do NOT issue subpoenas for the appearance of witnesses at depositions.
Sincerely;
MICHAEL A. MOSESSO
Vice Chief Administrative Law Judge
———————————————————————————-
Period. End of story.
Here is a direct link to that new document that just appeared in the “ALJ Hearing file”…
https://docs.google.com/file/d/0B6N47Z5CNR-CZUs4c1pxWGR4MWc/edit?pli=1
It’s a short PDF file this time… and it ONLY contains all the back and forth regarding this requested issuance of subpoena to Brendan McDonough. ADOSH did not actually have any objections to Arizona Forestry’s request… but in their own letter(s) to Judge Mosesso they pointed out that it was obvious the ONLY reason Arizona Forestry was SO worried that Brendan might blow off this scheduled deposition ( like he did the night before the previously scheduled November 26, 2014 one ) is because of the looming March 2 and 3 dates for ‘Global Mediation’ with the wrongful death lawsuit plaintiffs. ADOSH didn’t feel that was sufficient reason for anyone to be issuing no-shit subpoenas to anyone… and apparently Judge Mosesso agreed.
ADOSH made it pretty obvious that they don’t think whatever it is that McDonough wants to say now is going to have any affect on the validity of their original findings that it was an ‘unsafe workplace’ that day or have any affect on the issued citations… and Arizona Forestry should be seeing things that way as well… since they ALREADY have all the ‘evidence’ from ADOSH that supports their findings and their citations.
Remember… the documents we are seeing in this ALJ file are ONLY related to the ‘contest hearing’ that Arizona Forestry has requested over the ADOSH report findings and citations.
It is NOT a ‘lawsuit’ or even (technically) a civil or criminal proceeding.
It ONLY results in a final ‘hearing’ where either the ADOSH citations get upheld by the ALJ… or they get ‘adjusted’ in some way.
It is still not ADOSH’s job to find out EVERYTHING that happened in Yarnell.
They already hit Arizona Forestry with the maximum fines and citations they were allowed by law to issue ( based on evidence of FOUR separate and distinct possible ( and actual ) fatal entrapments in that workplace and a general ‘unnecessarily unsafe workplace’ )… so all ADOSH has to do is DEFEND those conclusions.
They ( ADOSH ) just don’t think whatever Brendan wants to ‘get off his chest’ is going to make the citations ‘go away’ or prove that was NOT an unnecessarily dangerous workplace.
So ADOSH is certainly CURIOUS about what Brendan has to say… but you can tell they are not all that worried about it like Arizona Forestry is.
Arizona Forestry is just shaking in their boots that they might have to enter the first March 2, 2015 ‘Global Mediation’ session with all of the ‘wrongful death’ plaintiffs WITHOUT knowing everything Brendan knows.
So all Arizona Forestry can do now, I guess, is keep all their fingers and toes crossed that Brendan won’t ‘blow off’ this scheduled Feb 26 deposition like he did the last time in November, 2014.
That’s only 5 days from now.
**
** GLOBE CREW SERGEANT SAYS HE HEARD AIR ATTACK ASKING
** GRANITE MOUNTAIN “WHERE ARE YOU GOING?”
At the very top of the ADOSH “Inspection Narrative” they provided a LIST of all the people that they interviewed.
Some of the people on this list did NOT end up with actual audio recorded interviews and/or transcripts in the various ADOSH information folders eventually released to the public.
But that doesn’t mean they weren’t actually interviewed.
SOME of the interviews were just ‘phone interviews’… and the notes taken by ADOSH during those interviews just ended up in various documents under the “Notes and Emails” folder in the ADOSH public information ‘dump’.
One of those interviewees that didn’t end up with a full audio file or a transcription file was listed under their ‘Arizona Department of Corrections – AZDOC’ section in the ‘Inspection Narrative’.
His name was Sergeant Paulson and they listed him as follows…
Sergeant Paulson, Structure Group 2 resource ( Double Bar A Ranch, Model Creek Subdivision, Peeples Valley ), ASPC-Globe inmate hand crew.
This one one of their ‘telephone only’ interviews and the notes from their interview with Sergeant Paulson ended up in this document in the ADOSH release folder(s)…
/ ADOSH Dropbox / ADOSH Notes and Emails / L3419 Notes redacted.pdf
The Paulson interview notes are on Page 9 and are as follows…
————————————————————————————-
Sergeant Paulson stated that during the day he heard air attack communicating
with the Granite Mountain Hotshots and questioning what they were doing and
where they were going in addition to the shelter deployment over the radio.
————————————————————————————-
This would seem to be VERIFICATION that ‘Bravo 3’ actually DID fly down to check on the status of Granite Mountain just as OPS1 Todd Abel had requested them to… and they WERE asking Granite Mountain some pretty direct questions such as…
1) WHAT are you doing?
2) WHERE are you GOING?
The possible ‘WHERE are you GOING?’ query would actually indicate any number of things… including…
1) This reported ‘Air Attack to Granite Mountain’ conversation that Sergeant Paulson supposedly heard could NOT be mis-construed to be a conversation between the previous Air Attack Rory Collins and Granite Mountain. Rory Collins was already leaving the Yarnell airspace at 1555 which would have been while we can see with our own eyes via the MacKenzie photos and videos that GM was ‘at rest’ up there on the ridge and NOT moving (yet).
2) Bravo 3 ( Thomas French and John Burfiend ) must have actually already SEEN Granite Mountain MOVING. Why else would they even ask that question unless they already had a VISUAL that that is what was happening.. and the wanted to know WHERE they were going.
Actually BOTH questions fit together since prior to being asked to fly down and check on them by OPS1 Todd Abel… there had been some discussion about them and Abel said he was sure they were ‘in the black’.
So if/when B33 actually SAW them ‘on the move’ down there… BOTH questions “WHAT are you doing?” and “WHERE are you going?” would have been related. John Burfiend in B33 wanted to know what the hell was going on down there since it didn’t match what he was told to expect.
This could also have been the moment when others have reported hearing similar “Are you OK?” queries and then supposedly DIVSA Eric Marsh gave one of his famous incomplete and obtuse responses along the lines of “Everything is OK… we’re just moving”.
If Sergeant Paulson’s recollections are correct… then the BIG question would be that if John Burfiend was making those kinds of queries down to Granite Mountain because he could SEE that they were MOVING ‘down there’… then WHY did he not report that ‘movement’ back to OPS1 Todd Abel?
OPS1 Todd Abel testified to ADOSH that he NEVER knew they had moved away from the safe black at the anchor point until the MAYDAY traffic was hitting the A2G channel at 1639.
One more thing… this testimony from Sergeant Paulson *might* also be independent verification that the 4:13 PM radio conversation between various people and Eric Marsh / Jesse Steed really is the way it appears to be in the Panebaker Video backround audio.
That Panebaker video actually BEGINS with what appears to be the following conversation…
—————————————————————————————-
* PANEBAKER VIDEO 161620 STARTS AT 1612.49 ( 4:12.49 PM )
+0:08 ( 1612.57 / 4:12.57 PM )
(Unknown – to ASM2 Bravo 33): ASM2, Copy that… behind the hills is where you place Granite Mountain?
+0:12 ( 1613.01 / 4:13.01 PM )
(ASM2 – John Burfiend?): They’re on the corner just repeatedly saying that they’re
comfortable and that’s not credible. ASK him whether Alpha can be placed WITH them.
NOTE: A few seconds later… Someone OTHER than who ASM2 was just talking to ( someone with what sounds like a Cajun accent? ) does exactly what ASM2 just TOLD them to do. He calls Granite Mountain directly and asks them to report their STATUS.
+0:41 ( 1613.30 / 4:13.30 PM )
(Unknown): Granite Mountain ( Five? )… What’s your status right now?
NOTE: A pretty heavy accent on this caller. Sounds like Louisiana Cajun?
What he says almost sounds like… “Granite Montun… wuz yo status rat now?
———————————————————————————-
The REST of that audio capture is, of course, the now infamous exchange where Eric Marsh supplies incomplete information about what GM is actually doing and the only person who could have understood the response was SPGS1 Gary Cordes…. and then when the caller also asks Marsh directly ( as ASM2 told the caller to do second earlier ) “Are you WITH Granite Mountain right now?”… Eric Marsh’s dodges the question with this obtuse response…
“Uh… ‘just checkin’ it out to see where we’re gonna jump out at”.
So this entire “Granite Montun… wuz yo status rat now”? conversation happening at 4:13 PM could have been a direct result of the same conversation from Air Attack ( Bravo 33 ) to Granite Mountain that Sergeant Paulson is reporting… and it happened directly AFTER what Sergeant Paulson has testifed HE heard.
As the Panenbaker audio capture seems to indicate… ASM2 ( Bravo 33 ) was dissatisfied with the ‘answers’ they were getting to their questions ( calling them ‘not credible’ ) and so they were now asking someone on the ground to kick in and do their own status check on them.
Here is a DIRECT link to the ADOSH document that contains DOC Globe Crew Sergeant Paulson’s telephone interview with ADOSH ( on page 9 )…
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/20inrene9tcx74a/AABioHF9BSZLqE8RLiENzMNwa/ADOSH%20Notes%20and%20Emails/L3419%20Notes%20redacted.pdf?dl=0
You did not include the moment that B33 calls OPS on A/G at the 48 second mark of that video.
Why?
Reply to calvin post February 21, 2015 at 5:04 am
>> calvin said…
>>
>> You did not include the moment that B33 calls OPS on A/G at
>> the 48 second mark of that video.
>>
>> Why?
Not intentional. That was just a ‘short summary’ from that video and not the full transcript. Yes. That callout is there even though there is no evidence it was ever either received or acknowldeged by any OPS person ( Abel? Musser? ).
That’s a complex set of conversations in that video and it’s happening on FOUR different levels.
Below is the COMPLETE transcript I have from that video ( including the call you mention ) and ALL of the FOUR levels going on at the same time.
Let me know if this differs in any way from YOUR transcript.
Before I ‘dump’ that transcript, though… any comments at all on the actual subject of the post above?
Do you think what Sergeant Paulson says he heard could be proof that ‘Bravo 33’ really DID fly down to check on Granite Mountain ( as OPS1 Abel Requested ) and they really were asking them WHAT they were doing and WHERE they were GOING?
** THE FULL TRANSCRIPT FOR 20130630_161620_VLAT_split_1_EP
There are actually FOUR levels of ‘conversation’ captured in this video
and sometimes they are ‘overlapping’.
1) Air-to-Air channel traffic between B33-French and VLAT 911 as it makes a drop.
2) Foreground conversation between Eric Panebaker and other Air Study people.
3) The “GM… what’s your status?” background TAC channel conversation.
4) Other miscellaneous background radio transmissions.
This video is 3 minutes and 31 seconds long.
Since the timestamps used in the filenames for these Panebaker videos actually represents the END time for the clip(s)… that means the actual START time for this 161620 video is 1612.49 ( 4:12.49 PM )
HUGE CAVEAT: This is MY best interpretation of the background audio for that entire video. Your mileage may, of course, vary.
* PANEBAKER VIDEO 161620 STARTS AT 1612.49 ( 4:12.49 PM )
+0:00 ( 1612.49 / 4:12.49 PM )
(B33 – French to VLAT DC10 911): …plan a left turn out back to Phoenix.
+0:03 ( 1612.52 / 4:12.52 PM )
(DC10 VLAT 911): Allright. We can do all the way around. That’ll work
+0:05 ( 1612.54 / 4:12.54 PM )
(B33 – French): I’m at one-fifty.
+0:06 ( 1612.55 / 4:12.55 PM )
(DC10 VLAT 911): Perfect. Spacing looks good.
+0:08 ( 1612.57 / 4:12.57 PM )
(Unknown): ASM2, Copy that… behind the hills is where you place Granite Mountain?
+0:13 ( 1613.02 / 4:13.02 PM )
(ASM2/B33 – Burfiend?): They’re on the corner just repeatedly saying that they’re comfortable and that’s not credible. ASK him whether Alpha can be placed WITH them.
NOTE: A few seconds later… Someone OTHER than who ASM2 (B33) was just talking to ( someone with what sounds like a Cajun accent? ) does exactly what ASM2 (B33) just TOLD them to do. He calls Granite Mountain directly and asks them to report their STATUS.
+0:28 ( 1613.17 / 4:13.17 PM )
(DC10 VLAT 911): Do you have an (Alpha) two two ( there with ya? ).
+0:30 ( 1613.19 / 4:13.19 PM )
(B33 – French): No.. I dished out at forty-seven at the bottom and I believe I was about fifty-five at the top but I’m not a hundred percent on that.
+0:36 ( 1613.25 / 4:13.25 PM )
(Foreground: Air Study Person 1): ( Is he on the list? )
+0:37 ( 1613.26 / 4:13.26 PM )
(DC10 VLAT 911): Okay.
+0:38 ( 1613.27 / 4:13.27 PM )
(Foreground: Air Study Person 2): ( Right there? )
+0:38 ( 1613.27 / 4:13.27 PM )
(Foreground: Air Study Person 1): ( Yup )
+0:40 ( 1613.29 / 4:13.29 PM )
(Foreground: Air Study Person 2): Nah.
+0:40 ( 1613.29 / 4:13.29 PM )
(B33 – French): I’m gonna stay high. I’m gonna stay at six thousand until we’re on final.
+0:41 ( 1613.30 / 4:13.30 PM )
(Unknown): Granite Mountain ( Five? )… What’s your status right now?
NOTE: A pretty heavy accent on this speaker. Sounds like Louisiana Cajun? What he says almost sounds like… “Granite Montun… wuz yo status rat now?
ALSO NOTE: Even though the caller asked for ‘Granite Mountain’ specifically, and not ‘DIVS A’… Eric Marsh responds immediately on behalf of Granite Mountain before Jesse Steed even has a chance to say anything. Jesse only appears to ‘chime in’ with his own ‘status’ report about “we’re pushin’ our way down into the structures” when Marsh is done speaking.
+0:44 ( 1613.33 / 4:13.33 PM )
(DC10 VLAT 911): Yea. That’s fine.
+0:47 ( 1613.36 / 4:13.36 PM )
(B33 – Burfiend?): (And) Operations, Bravo three three, air to ground.
NOTE: There is no discernible response to this callout anywhere in this video.
+0:49 ( 1613.38 / 4:13.38 PM )
(DC10 VLAT 911): Spacing looks good.
+0:52 ( 1613.41 / 4:13.41 PM )
(Unknown – Sounds like same person who just asked for GM Status): How (far) in general?
+0:52 ( 1613.41 / 4:13.41 PM )
(B33 – French): Yes, it does.
+0:54 ( 1613.43 / 4:13.43 PM )
(Eric Marsh): Well the guys… uh… Granite… is makin’ their way out the exact escape route from this mornin’… an’ it heads… ah… (pause) SOUTH. (slight pause) mid-slope, cuttin’ over.
+0:57 ( 1613.46 / 4:13.46 PM )
(B33 – French): Okay… I’m gonna start my turn back.
+0:59 ( 1613.48 / 4:13.48 PM )
(DC10 VLAT 911): Roger
+1:07 ( 1613.56 / 4:13.56 PM )
( Another voice immediately adds to what Marsh said but it is )
( NOT Marsh this time. It sounds like Jesse Steed )
(Jesse Steed?): We’ll be pushin’ our way down into the structures.
+1:10 ( 1613.59 / 4:13.59 PM )
( Another voice. Very quickly): Copy that.
+1:11 ( 1614.00 / 4:14.00 PM )
(B33 – French): And that… this whole flank kinda points at that circular dark green field that I’m talking about that should be off your right side on the exit. Ya got that in sight?
+1:18 ( 1614.07 / 4:14.07 PM )
(DC10 VLAT 911): Yea. I got that. In front a that horseshoe pond is where they’re dippin?
+1:21 ( 1614.10 / 4:14.10 PM )
(B33 – French): Affirmative
+1:21 ( 1614.10 / 4:14.10 PM )
(Unknown): Ten four. You with Granite Mountain right now?
NOTE: Whoever is talking with Marsh at this point uses the phrase ‘Ten four’ to acknowledge a transmission instead of the usual ‘Copy’ or ‘Copy that’. This, itself, should help to identify the caller.
+1:22 ( 1614.11 / 4:14.11 PM )
(DC10 VLAT 911): Okay
+1:23 ( 1614.12 / 4:14.12 PM )
(DC10 VLAT 911): Left turn before then?
+1:24 ( 1614.13 / 4:14.13 PM )
(Eric Marsh): Uh… just checkin’ it out to see where we’re gonna jump out at.
NOTE: Marsh seems to completely ‘dodge’ the question he was asked. Either he didn’t hear it correctly or he was purposely deciding NOT to say whether he was actually ‘with’ Granite Mountain at that point in time.
+1:25 ( 1614.14 / 4:14.14 PM )
(B33 – French): Yes. That’s affirmative.
+1:27 ( 1614.16 / 4:14.16 PM )
(B33 – French): You’re gonna see a little bit a smoke off your left side. Uh… disregard that, okay? We’re gonna be on the main fire flank.
+1:30 ( 1614.19 / 4:14.19 PM )
( Short burst of static. Keyed mic? )
+1:32 ( 1614.21 / 4:14.21 PM )
( Longer burst of static. Keyed mic? This time with a voice in it. )
( Only discernible word in this static *might* be something like “Dennis”? )
+1:34 ( 1614.23 / 4:14.23 PM )
(DC10 VLAT 911): Okay
+1:35 ( 1614.24 / 4:14.24 PM )
( Another short burst of static. Keyed mic? )
+1:37 ( 1614.26 / 4:14.26 PM )
(B33 – French): ( Droppin’ out ) you should be about zero eight zero.
+1:37 ( 1614.26 / 4:14.26 PM )
(Unknown – Overlaps with A2A channel traffic): It’s gonna be ( up there ) about ( three hundred and fifty ) feet to the left.
+1:39 ( 1614.28 / 4:14.28 PM )
(DC10 VLAT 911): Roger
+1:40 ( 1614.29 / 4:14.29 PM )
(Unknown – Responding to +1:37 directions?): Yea. That’s what I thought.
+1:43 ( 1614.32 / 4:14.32 PM )
(B33 – French): This is your line.
+1:45 ( 1614.34 / 4:14.34 PM )
(DC10 VLAT 911): Allright.
+1:47 ( 1614.36 / 4:14.36 PM )
(B33 – French): And after you pass this… uh… this rocky ridge which I’m gonna pass at about fifty-five then you’re gonna see the flank shows up real nice.
+1:52 ( 1614.41 / 4:14.41 PM )
( Foreground: Camera shutter click. Just once. )
+1:54 ( 1614.43 / 4:14.43 PM )
(DC10 VLAT 911): Okay.
+1:55 ( 1614.44 / 4:14.44 PM )
(B33 – French): Gimmee a little bit of an early start. I will go ahead and pop smoke. There’s a little bit of a fuel break just before the flame… in the flats.
+2:02 ( 1614.51 / 4:14.51 PM )
(DC10 VLAT 911): Okay.
+2:05 ( 1614.54 / 4:14.54 PM )
(B33 – French): And that is right here. Stay as direct as ya can. I’m out left.
+2:10 ( 1614.59 / 4:14.59 PM )
(DC10 VLAT 911): Okay.
+2:12 ( 1615.01 / 4:15.01 PM )
(DC10 VLAT 911): Bend it around to the left and stay away from the green field out there.
+2:15 ( 1615.04 / 4:15.04 PM )
(B33 – French): You bet… and if you need to make that turn, just shut off your retardant and we’ll come back.
( NOTE; THIS BEGINS A 28 SECOND PAUSE IN )
( THE AIR-TO-AIR RADIO CHANNEL TRAFFIC )
( DC10 VLAT 911 DROP TAKES PLACE DURING THIS PAUSE )
+2:18 ( 1615.07 / 4:15.07 PM )
(Unknown): ( Vance? ) this is ( Polynesia? ) one five one.
+2:22 ( 1615.11 / 4:15.11 PM )
VLAT 911 STARTS DROPPING RETARDANT
NOTE: This is now when we begin to hear the 11 ( ELEVEN ) shutter clicks of Eric Panebaker and the others with him in the foreground actually shooting still photos of the VLAT drop.
+2:24 ( 1615.13 / 4:15.13 PM )
(Foreground: One camera shutter click.)
+2:27 ( 1615.16 / 4:15.16 PM )
(Foreground: One camera shutter click.)
+2:29 ( 1615.18 / 4:15.18 PM )
(Foreground: One camera shutter click.)
+2:30 ( 1615.19 / 4:15.19 PM )
(Unknown – Related to ‘one five one’ transmit at +2:18?): This is one five one.
+2:32 ( 1615.21 / 4:15.21 PM )
(Foreground: One camera shutter click.)
+2:33 ( 1615.22 / 4:15.22 PM )
(Unknown – Responding to ‘one five one’ from +2:30?): Yea… I wanted to know… ??… head’s up.
+2:34 ( 1615.23 / 4:15.23 PM )
(Foreground: One camera shutter click.)
+2:36 ( 1615.25 / 4:15.25 PM )
VLAT 911 STOPS DROPPING RETARDANT AND
DOES A ‘HARD LEFT ON EXIT’
VLAT 911 RETARDANT DROP DURATION: 14 SECONDS
NOTE: This matches exactly the ‘drop location’ and ‘drop duration’ of the VLAT drop filmed by ABC15 Helicopter Air15 when it was over the fire from 3:59 PM to 4:39 PM that day. This would be sequential clip number 05 in the ‘Air15′ raw video footage.
+2:38 ( 1615.27 / 4:15.27 PM )
(Foreground: One camera shutter click.)
+2:38 ( 1615.27 / 4:15.27 PM )
( Another short burst of static. Keyed mic? )
+2:39 ( 1615.28 / 4:15.28 PM )
(Foreground: One camera shutter click.)
+2:42 ( 1615.31 / 4:15.31 PM )
(Foreground: One camera shutter click.)
+2:44 ( 1615.33 / 4:15.33 PM )
(Foreground: One camera shutter click.)
+2:44 ( 1615.33 / 4:15.33 PM )
(B33 – French): Nicely done, Jack. That was right on. You got any left?
+2:46 ( 1615.35 / 4:15.35 PM )
(Foreground: One camera shutter click.)
+2:47 ( 1615.36 / 4:15.36 PM )
(DC10 VLAT 911): Got about two thousand left.
+2:48 ( 1615.37 / 4:15.37 PM )
(Foreground: One camera shutter click.)
+2:50 ( 1615.39 / 4:15.39 PM )
(B33 – French): Okay… follow me around… and that was eight three zero callin’ in?
+2:55 ( 1615.44 / 4:15.44 PM )
(B33 – French): Okay… join eight seven four holdin’ about… uh… five to seven out, okay?
( START OF A 21 SECOND PAUSE IN THE )
( AIR-TO-AIR RADIO CHANNEL TRAFFIC )
+3:06 ( 1615.55 / 4:15.55 PM )
(Foreground: Air Study person 1): That was (sweet). Looked good, huh?
+3:08 ( 1615.57 / 4:15.57 PM )
(Foreground: Air Study person 2): Yup.
+3:10 ( 1615.59 / 4:15.59 PM )
(Foreground: Air Study person 1): Man. We’re gettin’ all the good stuff. Good loads… coverage level fours…
+3:16
(B33 – French): Hey, Jack… I’m gonna sneak in and just take a quick look at that. Keep your pattern comin’ around. Expect a live run. Uh… I think what we’re gonna do is tie in where your retardant ended, keep goin’, and I’m gonna check out the exit… uh… straight out for ya, okay?
+3:17 ( 1616.05 / 4:16.05 PM )
(Foreground: Air Study person 2): I wish ( Alfred? ) was hanging out. He could ( burn ) it and isolate.
+3:30 ( 1616.19 / 4:16.19 PM )
(Foreground: Air Study person 1): Did you hear how many gallons… ( Video ends ).
+3:30 ( 1616.19 / 4:16.19 PM )
(DC10 VLAT 911): Okay… ( Video ends )
NOTE: Full (final) statement from DC10 VLAT 911 that got cut off in this video on the word ‘Okay’ was actually “Okay… comin’ around behind ya.” as per the corresponding dedicated ‘Air-To-Air’ channel audio capture.
* PANEBAKER VIDEO 161620 ENDS AT 1616.20 ( 4:16.20 PM )
WTK asked
Do you think what Sergeant Paulson says he heard could be proof that ‘Bravo 33′ really DID fly down to check on Granite Mountain ( as OPS1 Abel Requested ) and they really were asking them WHAT they were doing and WHERE they were GOING?
Paulsons telephone interview
The Paulson interview notes are on Page 9 and are as follows…
————————————————————————————-
Sergeant Paulson stated that during the day he heard air attack communicating
with the Granite Mountain Hotshots and questioning what they were doing and
where they were going in addition to the shelter deployment over the radio.
1.As we hear at the beginning of the helmet camera video, B33 NEVER responds to the title AIR ATTACK.. I am not really sure if Burfiend answered to that handle anytime in the captured radio transmissions?
2. Paulsons note assigns no time
3. Nor does it include the phrase or thought that they were leaving the black, or moving into the green. The move that air attack questions could have been just a move within the black, right?
4. According to the YIN (I understand it is sketchy) B33 says two different things. 1)I head something about a crew being in a safety zone. Called ops and asked “do we stop and go look for the crew?” Ops said “no, they are safe, it’s Granite Mountain”. and 2) they say (per YIN) Never say them earlier. I didn’t know they were there. Air attack didn’t tell me there were resources in the area.
That is my thoughts
calvin… thanks for the detailed reply.
I posted a response up above with this new ‘parent’ comment because it needed the full horizontal formatting…
http://www.investigativemedia.com/yarnell-hill-fire-chapter-xii/#comment-263224
**
** MARSH’S DIVISION SUPERVISOR EXPERIENCE
FIRE20+ posted a very well researched message way down below that pretty much ‘wrapped up’ a discussion about how much ‘Division Supervisor’ experience Eric Marsh really had prior to June 30, 2013… and I didn’t want it to get ‘lost in the weeds’… so here it is again ‘up here’…
>> On February 19, 2015 at 1:21 pm, FIRE20+ said…
>>
>> Eric Marsh’s DIVS PTB was initiated on 3/7/06 and Certified on 8/26/09, then
>> was put into the system post Red Card Committee approval on 5/31/10 and
>> expired 6/30/18. Eric was a fully qualified DIVS as of fire season of 2010.
>>
>> Looking through Eric Marsh’s fire experience and his Master Record… he does
>> not have himself showing fire experience as DIVS on the Holloway Fire, but is
>> showing CRWB. Also his Master Record doesn’t show DIVS for the Holloway
>> fire either but does have TFLD as experience. I’m not saying that maybe Eric
>> jumped into a DIVS role on the Holloway Fire because it was needed, but most
>> resources will show their actual fire experience (position) because it keeps their
>> quals current.
>>
>> Eric’s Master Record and fire experience shows qualified DIVS experience in
>> 2011 for the New Water Fire, 2012 for the Halstead Fire, 2013 shows Perkinsville
>> (and we know he was the DIVS on the Doce and YHF, but neither of these made
>> it to his fire qualification paperwork).
Thank you. Great information.
So that pretty much wraps up the discussion of whether Yarnell was actually only the FIRST or the SECOND time Eric Marsh had been assigned to be a DIVS on a fire ( whether he ended up listed that way in the resource orders or not ).
It wasn’t. He’d served in that capacity many times since he was ‘certified’ as DUVSUP in 2010.
It also wraps up the discussion that Eric Marsh HAD to be FULLY aware of ‘Rule 29’ from the official NWCG ‘Division Supervisor’ TASK BOOK.
The actual official NWCG ( National Wildfire Coordinating Group ) TASK BOOK for the ICS position of “Division Supervisor” is designated PMS-311-09… and it is here…
http://www.nwcg.gov/pms/taskbook/operations/pms-311-09.pdf
On page 13 ( of 16 pages )…
——————————————————————————————
TASK
Behavior: Make appropriate decisions based on analysis of gathered information.
29. Determine need for assistance.
– Notify Operations Section Chief when resources are moved or shared between divisions/groups, or excess to operational needs.
————————————————————————————–
One more time… with EMPHASIS…
*** NOTIFY OPERATIONS SECTION CHIEF WHEN RESOURCES ARE MOVED.***
DIVSA Eric Marsh did NOT do this one simple ( REQUIRED ) thing on June 30, 2013… and people died.
Obtuse, offhand, incomplete comments over a radio to people who were NOT his direct OPS Level Supervisor don’t count.
Nor does just making similar obtuse, incomplete ‘announcements’ to Air Attack and ‘assuming’ your OPS Supervisor will accidentally hear it and consider himself ‘informed’.
Not a chance.
One more time… from OPS1 Todd Abel’s ADOSH interview where he was asked if he had ANY idea that his DIVSA was moving himself and ALL of his resources OUT of his assigned Division to a location just short of TWO MILES AWAY from where OPS1 Todd Abel thought they were “hunkered and safe” in the black…
Q1 = Dave Larsen, WFA / ADOSH investigator ( Rest in Peace )
A = OPS1 Todd Abel
————————————————————————————————
2629 Q1: No word on we’re leaving the black?
2630
2631 A: Nothing. I heard nothing – the last conversation I had with them, we’re in the
2632 black, we’re good, copy that. Every- got everybody in the black and
2633 everybody’s good, that’s affirmative, copy.
———————————————————————————————-
**
** ASGS BRAD ZETTLER WAS INTERVIEWED BY ADSOH
Reply to calvin post on February 20, 2015 at 9:21 am
>> calvin said…
>>
>> Per Eric Tarr’s unredacted law enforcement document in the SAIR material
>>
>> Within a minute or two of Granite Mountain 7 advising they were deploying
>> shelters the Air Operations Chief drove up to our location. I advised him
>> of the emergency radio traffic that I had heard on A?G 16 and he advised
>> me that he was on a separate channel and did not hear the traffic.
>>
>> Is this Dan Sullivan being referred to in Tarr’s document?
As it turns out… ASGS Brad Zettler was interviews by ADOSH ( but AOBD Bob Ortlund and the other ASGS Dan Sullivan were not ).
In Zettler’s ADOSH interview he says something that matches the testimony calvin is quoting above from DPS Officer Tarr almost exactly…
ASGS Brad Zettler’s ADOSH interview transcript is HERE…
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/20inrene9tcx74a/AABoIwGdTRRb2F53HyTR742va/ADOSH%20Yarnell%20Hill%20Investigation/AZ%20Forestry%20Division/Employee%20Interviews%20By%20ADOSH/Transcripts/Brad%20Zettler%20Interview%208-15-13.pdf?dl=0
From Zettler’s ADOSH interview…on August 15, 2013
Q1 = Barry Hicks, ADOSH investigator
A = ASGS Brad Zettler
———————————————————————————
779 Q1: Who – who made the call about the deployment do you know?
780
781 A: I did not hear the radio.
782
783 Q1: You didn’t hear…
784
785 A: No sir.
786
787 Q1: …the radio transmission?
788
789 A: No. I – I was talking to – I had stepped away from a radio for about 10
790 minutes.
791
792 Q1: Okay.
793
794 A: And I was talking with, uh, one of the DPS crewmen. And then one of his
795 counterparts came up and said, “Did you just hear that?” and I said, “No,
796 what?” and then of course then everything changed.
———————————————————————————
So this quote from DPS Officer Tarr’s testimony…
“…the Air Operations Chief drove up to our location. I advised him
of the emergency radio traffic that I had heard on A/G 16”
…matches almost exactly this quote from ASGS Brad Zettler’s testimony…
“I was talking with, uh, one of the DPS crewmen. And then one of his
counterparts came up and said, “Did you just hear that?”
Officer Tarr might have REPEATED this “I advised him of the emergency radio traffic”
again meybe some minutes later with either the SCOND ASGS Dan Sullivan OR
with AOBD Bob Ortlund… but this seems to prove he definitely ‘informed’ ASGS
Brad Zettler of the deployment just minutes after it happened.
What I find interesting is the arrangement of the firefighters at the deployment site. This may have been covered before but I don’t recollect. Starting a timer at the time of the first panic call of “we are in front of the flaming front” and to Marsh’s “Affirm!” we have a about 146 seconds. Given that the fire was traveling 11 mph, and it takes a pro to fully deploy in 25 seconds, I added that time onto Marsh’s last call. My generous math put the fire first viewed out at a distance of 2800 ft. 6 of the hotshots were not deployed in the proper arrangement of feet to fire and 5 of them were lying supine. This fire hit so fast and with such ferocity that I highly doubt the squelch’s heard after the deployment call were hotshots.
The deployment site itself had a length of 24 ft. The fire would have wiped them all out in 1.5 seconds when physically reaching them and that isn’t take into account oxygen depletion and fire head lengths. Also interesting that high ranking Steed was found facing the west, fully deployed and prone, while McKee right next to him was barely deployed and was lying supine. I don’t know if it means much but the full report also states the west side of the deployment site received the highest temperatures and here you will find most of the hotshots deploying in the wrong direction to the fire.
I’m scrambling and don’t have a lot of time before I leave town tomorrow, but.
I spent most of December 2013 studying the photos of the Deployment Site and trying to figure out what was there, what/who it was connected to, etc. The “map” of the Deployment Site in the SAIR is really bad. It’s just a diagram of where the bodies, essentially, were. And even THAT isn’t accurate, according to what was on the ground in the photos.
As I was trying to figure it out, two big questions were in my mind, and I’ve never been able to answer them.
One was made up of, essentially, all the questions you are asking. Everything I ever read about how you’re “supposed” to deploy didn’t even begin to relate to what I was seeing on that site.
The second question was, why wasn’t an actual map of the deployment site ever published? I don’t think I’ve ever seen a fatal wildland fire accident investigation without at least some attempt to create at least some kind of relevant map.
So yes. I agree with your questions!!!!!
Again this is another Failure of Marsh and Steed to train properly.
The Shelter should be arranged where your feet are towards the on coming fire.
in this case that would have made no difference. But another example of lack of
Training and enfaces on Safety requirements.
Reply to John post on February 20, 2015 at 11:22 am
Those are some VERY complicated questions. Always have been.
The investigation of this accident was so piss-poor that it’s doubtful there will ever be definitive answers to some of these questions.
Example: There isn’t even any evidence that anyone tried to determine WHERE around that deployment site accelerants were used. We KNOW they were doing that… but (apparently) no one ever even attempted to figure that out. There are a number of fusee phospor slag piles seen in the photos… and it could be ‘generally’ said they line up on the northeast side of the deployment area… but then there are some ‘slag’ remnants on the OPPOSITE side of the deployment area as well.
One of the basic principles behind ‘back burning’ and ‘indirect attack’ is based on the laws of physics. When you are near a fireline… it is consuming vast amounts of oxygen and the atmosphere around it is always naturally trying to ‘fill that hole’. That creates an INFLOW towards the fireline itself regardless of what the atmospheric winds are even doing.
If there was signifcant INFLOW happening near that deployment site AS they were ‘buring out around themselves’… then any fires lit on the opposite side of the deployment area to the fireline could have been being pulled back TOWARDS them… perhaps even in a horrific manner.
As that video that calvin found of those FFs riding out that burnover in their vehicles showed… the moment the fireline reached that area it became impossible to tell WHICH way the wind had been ‘blowing’. That became a moot point. There was then ‘area ignition and the wind shows the fire being violently pulled/pushed and twisting and turning in ALL directions around that site.
So there comes a moment… I suppose… when you are trying to get into your shelter and you really can’t tell WHICH direction would be the best way to protect yourself. The fire is literally coming at you from ALL directions.
I also think it is worth pointing out what we know now about the initial condition of the deployment site versus the way it was when the YCSO investigators showed up circa 5:00 AM ( first light ) and then had to take TWO sets of 3D images with their FARO-3D system.
All of the bodies had been covered with TARPS sometime during the night. There were ( according to Corey Moser ) upwards of 30 ( THIRTY ) firefightes just ‘hanging around’ in the area ( BSR mostly but no account of how many visited the deployment site ). Cory Moser has even said these men have formed some kind of ‘pact’ and vowed to never discuss what they saw or heard or what really transpired out there that night before the YCSO police investigators arrived. Very weird… but there it is.
So the YCSO investigators had to first used the FARO-3D imaging on the site exactly they way they found it… complete with unauthorized tarps all over everything… and THEN they say they removed all the tarps as carefully as they could and they then used the FARO-3D imaging system to photograph the entire site AGAIN.
There is no telling if… by the time all that placing of… and then removing the tarps actually disturbed the site to obscure important details.
It’s also worth noting that when DPS Ranger 58 Helicopter first found the shelters and started circling the area in a counter-clockwise fashion ( as per their testimony ) Officer Charles Main said he only saw ‘2 or 3 bodies outside of shelters’.
Pilot Clifford Brunsting then testified that he tried to land TWICE right there near the deployment site… but the ‘ash kickup’ from the rotors was so bad both times that he had to abandon those attempts.
Those TWO attempts to land a helicopter right there near the deployment site could have seriously disturbed the evidence and easily ‘blown shelters’ off of men that HAD made into them at deployment time.
I seriously doubt the rotor wash could have been so bad as to ultimately change the positon and/or orientation of any of the bodies… but it most certainly could have been blowing those shelters off some of those men.
Followup…
That diagram showing where the bodies were that appeared in the SAIR was no doubt based on the actual original YCSO FARO 3-D imaging taken at the site. It was known that the SAIT received a copy of those photos.
However… I don’t think it was anywhere near ‘to scale’.
In other words… I think the ‘groupings’ of bodies shown was probably accurate ( along with body orientation )… but I don’t think the distances between the groupings were at all correct.
The actual deployment site photos we CAN see indicate there was more ‘separation’ between the groupings than that SAIR diagram indicated.
At some point… someone was inserting little ‘flags’ into the ground to mark the location of the bodies… and those CAN be seen in the publicly released site photos.
Those ‘flags’ don’t match the diagram that appeared in the SAIR as far as ‘distances’ go. The bodies seemed to be more ‘spread out’ than the SAIR diagram would seem to have us believe.
This is just confirmation that those ‘little flags’ seen in a lot of the PUBLIC deployment site photos really do represent the locations where each of the GM Hotshots died.
From ADOSH’s own documented description of the day/time they first arrived at the deployment site. The ‘spotting flags’ were ALREADY in place…
From page 2 of ADOSH document “L3419 Notes Redacted.pdf”
——————————————————
7/16/2013 – ADOSH Fire investigation team arrived in Yarnell, AZ at approximately 1230. We drove through the Glen Ilah Subdivision to the Helm’s ranch entrance. Once at the ranch house team members went to the site where the Granite Mountain IHC deployed their fire shelters. A flag pole memorial had been erected at the site and the site was cordoned off with caution tape. Each location where a Granite Mountain hotshot was found was marked with a piece of caution tape. Residue from the fire shelters was also noted.
——————————————————
Actually… this whole issue about EXACTLY where each body was found and whether it really does match the chart that appeared in the SAIR is probably going to have to be addressed by the newly formed “Yarnell Hill Memorial Site Committee”.
THEY are going to have to decide if there really SHOULD be a specific ‘marker’ out there at the exact point where each body was really found… or if they are going to NOT do that and go with just one generic marker somewhere.
If they decide on the former… then they are going to have to get it RIGHT.
Per Eric Tarr’s unredacted law enforcement document in the SAIR material
Within a minute or two of Granite Mountain 7 advising they were deploying shelters the Air Operations Chief drove up to our location. I advised him of the emergency radio traffic that I had heard on A?G 16 and he advised me that he was on a separate channel and did not hear the traffic.
Is this Dan Sullivan being referred to in Tarr’s document?
Probably not.
Dan Sullivan was in Yarnell ‘just a minute or two’ after deployment.
He is the one who informed Paul Musser on the side of the road that
there had been a deployment right after it happened.
Sullivan COULD have made it up to where R58 was staged in about 5 minutes or so… but he would have to have been hauling some ass.
Brad Zeitler ( Helibase Manager ) says he did the same thing… but not ‘within a minute or two’ of deployment. More like 15 minutes.
To the DPS Officers… The Helibase Manager would also qualify as an “Air Operations Chief’.
From PDF page 26 ( of 51 pages ) of Unit Logs released February, 2014
Brad Zeitler’s Unit Log
1700 ( All times approximate )
Met with the pilot and crew of DPS Ranger 58 and talked about
the possibility of doing an aerial reconnaissance mission to search
for the Granite Mountain Hotshot Crew.
Bobby Ortlund was AOBD for YHF. He wasn’t interviewed but is referenced in Roy Hall’s interview, Glenn Joki’s interview and he has a Resource Order O-16.3 for Roy’s team.
Copy that. Thank you.
AOBD = Air Operations Branch Director
According to the AIR OPERATIONS org chart…
ASGS ( Air Support Group Supervisor ) is at the same exact ‘level’ as the ATGS ( Air Tactical Group Supervisor ) and they BOTH have an immediate up-level AOBD Supervisor ( Air Operations Branch Director ).
So… do you think it is safe to say the following?…
From the moment AA Rory Collins left the fire… John Burfiend was ATGS flying in the right seat of ‘Bravo 33’ ( with pilot Thomas French still performing Lead Plane (LP) duty… and Dan Sullivan was ASGS on the ground…
…and they were BOTH at the same ‘command’ level in the Air Operations but BOTH directly answerable to AOBD Bobby Ortlund ( wherever the heck he was operating from )?
NOTE: Clint Cross was listed as ATGS(t) Trainee that day in B33 and he was mentoring under John Burfiend.
Followup…
** AOBD BOB ORTLUND WAS THERE AT 9:11 AM ON SUNDAY
From document “J- Resource Orders.pdf”
On PDF page 137 ( of 213 ) pages.
NOTE: This is one of those ‘funky’ Resource Orders where the ‘Estimated Time of Departure/Arrival’ is the exact same Date/Time as the ‘Released Date’… but the ‘Assigned Date/Time’ appears to be the only indication when that person ‘showed up’ at the Incident.
This record indicated Robert (Bob) Ortlund was ordered up as AOBD at 10:49 PM on Saturday night… and he arrived in Yarnell on Sunday, June 30, 2013 at 9:11 AM.
————————————————————
Request Number: O-16.3
Ordered Date/Time: 06/29/13 2249 PNT
From: AZ-ADC (Dispatch) 800-309-7081
To: AZ-ADC
Qty: 1
Resource Requested: AIR OPERATIONS BRANCH DIRECTOR
(AOBD) (Ortlund, Robert A (AZ-PHC))
Needed Date/Time: 06/30/13 0800 PNT
Deliver To: YARNELL HILL
From Unit: AZ-PHC
To Unit: AZ-ADC
Assigned Date/Time: 06/30/13 0911 PNT
Resource Assigned Unit ID: AZ-TNF
Resource Assigned: Ortlund, Robert A (AZ-PHC) [EFF/AD]
M/D Ind: D
Estimated Time of Departure: 07/02/13 0800 PNT
Estimated Time of Arrival: 07/02/13 0830 PNT
Released Date: 07/02/13 0800 PNT
Released To: PHOENIX SKY HARBOR INTL (PHX)
——————————————————–
** THERE WERE TWO ASGS THERE ON SUNDAY
I think it’s also worth noting that while Brad Zettler is listed in most documents as the “Helibase Manager”… his Resource Order says he was ordered as a another ASGS ( Air Support Group Supervisor ) exactly like Dan Sullivan’s resource order.
What’s ‘funky’ about Zettler’s Resource Order is that while it has the same weirdness with ETD and ETA being identical to ‘Released Date’… his ‘Assigned Date/Time’ field is also exactly identical to the moment he was ordered ( 6/29/13 2249 ) so can’t be trusted as the moment he arrived to work on Sunday.
——————————————————————————
Request Number: O-16.2
Ordered Date/Time: 06/29/13 2249 PNT
Resource Requested: AIR SUPPORT GROUP SUPERVISOR (ASGS)
Needed Date/Time: 06/30/13 0800 PNT
Deliver To: YARNELL HILL
Assigned Date/Time: 2249 PNT AZ-AZS
Resource Assigned: ZETTLER, BRAD D (AZADC)
——————————————————————————-
So this means there were, in fact, TWO ASGS officers ‘on duty’ there that Sunday in Yarnell… and both were answerable to AOBD Bob Ortlund.
Is that actually normal?
Since Dan Sullivan’s ASGS order wasn’t part of the original Type 2 SHORT Team order ( as Zettler’s was )… does that mean ASGS Brad Zettler really could have handled all the ASGS duties that day… but Dan Sullivan was just sort of ‘helping him out’?
I think it’s also worth noting that AOBD Bob Ortlund and ASGS Brad Zettler were ordered as part of the Type 2 SHORT team circa 10:50 PM on Saturday night… but the SECOND ASGS Dan Sullivan wasn’t ordered until 9:34 AM Sunday.
Resource Order, Resource Requested – Assigned
O-16, Team – Type 2 Short
O-16.1, INCIDENT COMMANDER TYPE 2 (ICT2) – Roy Hall
O-16.2, AIR SUPPORT GROUP SUPERVISOR (ASGS) – Brad Zettler
O-16.3, AIR OPERATIONS BRANCH DIRECTOR (AOBD) – Robert Ortlund
Dan Sullivan’s ASGS order was NOT part of this ‘Type 2 Short Team’ 16.X group of resource orders.
His ‘order’ wasn’t placed until 9:34 AM on Sunday, June 30, 2013, and was off by itself as Resource order O-30.
See what I just wrote below.
Also, (I don’t have time to check this out further) I think it’s possible Dan Sullivan was another part of Bea Day’s Team.
I googled him and up came a bunch of videos showing her team doing the Public Information Sessions at the Assayii Lake Fire last summer on the Navajo Reservation.
Dan Sullivan was “SWIMT 3 Air Operations Branch Director” on that fire.
Here’s one of the videos that show Todd Abel being “Operations Chief,” Dan being the above, Marty Cole being “Southwest Incident Management Team 3 Safety Officer,” and Roy Hall being “SWIMT 3 Deputy Commander.”
YOUTUBE VIDEO: DAY 7 – ASSAYII LAKE FIRE “LARGEST FIRE” ON NAVAJO RESERVATION
http://www.dineresourcesandinfocenter.org/youtube-video-day-7-assayii-lake-fire-largest-fire-on-navajo-reservation/
Thanks, FIRE20+
As per the brief mentions in those interviews, it seems like Ortlund was working at the Deer Valley Dispatch Center part of the day and then came up to the Incident Command Post at Yarnell, where he was, according to Hall, very upset about the great difficulty he was having finding a relief aircraft/pilot to fly Air Attack Rory Collins.
Per Eric Tarr’s unredacted law enforcement document
Within a minute or two of Granite Mountain 7 advising they were deploying shelters the Air Operations Chief drove up to our location. I advised him of the emergency radio traffic that I had heard on A?G 16 and he advised me that he was on a separate channel and did not hear the traffic.
Is this Dan Sullivan being referred to in Tarr’s document?
**
** WHERE 1637 CAME FROM
>> Marti said…
>>
>> Thinking out loud here.
>>
>> Seems to me that that “that’s where we want it” callout would have been earlier.
>>
>> Where are we getting 4:37 for that?
That’s what is absolutely RIDICULOUS about fully trusting this particular statement in the YIN B33 notes ( and its eventual reproduction in the SAIR itself ) as if it was some kind of ‘established fact’.
Burfiend and/or French and/or Cross ( we still don’t even know who was SAYING this in the B33 YIN ) NEVER put a TIME on that at all.
They basically only had a VAGUE IDEA when it happened… if it even happened.
It was the SAIT that really seemed to WANT this statement to appear in their SAIR report because it fit their own narrative about having “Air Support” up at the time… and it was the SAIT that did their own ‘funny math’ to come with a completely ‘guesstimated’ time of 1637 for this radio transmission.
And don’t forget… this totally UNVERIFIED transmission ( with its eventual ‘made up’ timestamp ) was actually the transmission that the SAIT used for their de-facto ( also totally made up ) “Communications Blackout”.
Burfiend and/or French and/or Cross ONLY said they *thought* this transmission happened (quote) “within 5 minutes before they went into shelters”.
So the SAIT just trusted that as ‘gospel’ truth and SUBTRACTED a FULL 5 minutes from when THEY assumed the ‘moment of going into shelters was’. Their assumption there was it was the exact moment in the Helmet Cam video when Marsh said they were ‘deploying shelters’.
The SAIT had that at 1642… so they just subtracted the 5 minutes that was mentioned and Voila!… put a willy-nilly timestamp of 1637 on the “That’s where we want retardant” transmission.
I was actually answerinig your original question about this back in Chapter 6 of this ongoing discussion… in May of 2014.
The answer hasn’t changed.
The SAIT just completely trusted Burfiend’s and/or French’s and/or Clint Cross’s vague recollection that the “That’s where we want retardant” transmission happened EXACTLY 5 minutes before the ‘going into shelters’ moment ( which the SAIT put at 1642 )…
…so the SAIT just willy-nilly subracted EXACTLY 5 minutes from 1642 and THAT is how they came up with 1637 for this (supposed) radio transmit… and THEN even went so far as to say this was the now the VERIFIED end of the ridiculous “30 minute Communications Blackout” they tried to get us all to swallow.
Here is a direct link to that original discussion about this back in Chapter 6…
http://www.investigativemedia.com/yarnell-hill-fire-chapter-vi-comments/#comment-44702
—————————————————————–
On May 9, 2014 at 10:07 pm, WantsToKnowTheTruth ( WTKTT ) said…
Marti… not only am I not sure we can really trust either Burfiend’s or French’s statements in the SAIT investigations notes about the “that’s what we want” statement… I think their recollection in *general* is kinda wonky.
For example…
Here is the exact ‘infamous’ paragraph from their SAIT interview that has that one and only reference in the *entire* evidence record in it about “that’s what we want”…
:: B33 YIN
::
:: I was talking to Tom about the rising terrain on exit.
:: Division A clad and said “that is what we are looking for, that is exactly right”.
:: Within 5 minutes of that, they went in shelter.
So this LAST STATEMENT about them ‘going into shelter’ within 5 minutes of the “that is what we are looking for” transmission ( according to their recollection ) MUST be what the SAIT used to actually come up with the 1637 timestamp for Marsh’s (supposed) transmission.
French and Burfiend had no frickin’ idea what time it *really* might have been… but somehow they also seemed to be SURE that ‘within 5 minutes’ is when Eric announced they were ‘deploying’.
So the SAIT just took their ‘recollection’ about the previous transmission from Marsh being ‘within 5 minutes’… and then they just counted BACKWARDS ( a FULL 5 minutes ) from 1642… when the Helmet Cam captured Marsh’s final statement(s) about “we are deploying shelters”.
1642 minus 5 minutes = 1637
Voila!… The SAIT was now SURE that 1637 is when Marsh MUST have said “That is what we are looking for”… and they frickin’ PUBLISHED that in the SAIR as if it was fact.
EVEN though they only ever said “within 5 minutes” and not even “exactly 5 minutes”.
Unbelievable.
—————————————————————————
END OF POST FROM CHAPTER 6
Got it, thanks.
So hard to remember what we conversed about way back in May of last year.
Reply to Marti Reed post on February 20, 2015 at 12:04 am
>> Marti said…
>>
>> So hard to remember what we conversed about
>> way back in May of last year.
“I never carry information in my mind if I know I can look it up.”
Albert Einstein
In response to not knowing the speed of sound as included in the Edison Test.
New York Times (18 May 1921)
** AS REQUESTED
**
** COMPLETE TRANSCRIPT FOR PANEBAKER VIDEO 20130630_1643_EP.MOV
NOTE: There is no ZERO degree HEADING in Aviation. 360 is used to mean ‘true North’.
If a pilot says his heading is “Three Six Zero degrees… that means he is flying TRUE NORTH.
Example… when Thomas French says the following…
+09:11 ( 1640.01 / 4:40.01 PM )
(B33 – French): You betcha… and I kinda started at three six zero on the heading and ended up at about three three five.
…what he means is that he is telling the other pilot to start flying a route DUE NORTH ( 360 degrees ) and then end up banking slightly LEFT ( to the WEST ) and end up with a heading
of 335 degrees.
This video is located here in the SAIT FOIA material online Dropbox…
AerialFirefightingStudy / Panebaker / Video_with_134175_audio / 20130630_1643_EP.MOV
SOME of the EXIF Metadata embedded in this video…
————————————————————————————————-
File Name: 20130630_1643_EP.MOV
File Size: 1118 MB
File Type: MOV
MIME Type: video/quicktime
Major Brand: Apple QuickTime (.MOV/QT)
Create Date: 2013:06:30 16:30:50
Media Create Date: 2013:06:30 16:30:50
Media Duration: 0:12:23
———————————————————————————
According to the metadata timestamp in the video, this 20130630_1643_EP video STARTED at 16:30:50 ( 4:30.50 PM ) and is exactly 12 minutes and 23 seconds long.
If we add 12 minutes and 23 seconds to a start time of 1630.50 we get… 1643.13.
That matches the filename chosen for this video even though the
13 seconds aren’t represented in the filename.
The filename really should have been… 20130630_164313_EP
** AIRCRAFT HEARD IN THIS VIDEO
TANKER 413
The SEAT that perfomed the ‘spot on’ drop circa 1633
VLAT DC10 911 – Pilot’s name: Kevin
Was in a holding pattern 7 miles out ( to the south ) when the 1633 SEAT drop too place, and was in the process of being brought in from the SOUTH when the MAYDAY traffic appeared. When French realized men were in trouble… he told pilot ‘Kevin’ to just ‘standby’. Kevin then was sticking close to B33 and watching them like a hawk in case they needed a retardant drop.
FIVE KILO ALPHA ( 5KA )
The Price Valley Helitack Chopper that had been working the fire all day.
It was leaving to go refuel when the MAYDAY traffic appeared and then ‘came back’
and was trying to help locate Granite Mountain as long as it could give fuel situation.
FIVE HOTEL DELTA ( 5HD )
This is the ABC15 Media Chopper that contacts French DURING the MAYDAY calls just to tell him they are LEAVING Yarnell.
HELITANKER/ SKYCRANE N243AC
Following the deployment traffic… Helitanker/Skycrane 749 reports to French that they are (apparently) about 8 miles away and returning to Yarnell. This is the same Orange ‘Skycrane’ that almost crashed into the VLAT earlier that afternoon.
** FULL TRANSCRIPT OF PANEBAKER VIDEO 20130630_1643_EP
VIDEO 20160630_1643_EP STARTS AT 1630.50 ( 4:30.50 PM ) ( EXIF timestamp ).
+00:01 ( 1630.51 / 4:30.51 PM )
(B33 – French): Kilo Alpha… go ahead and… uh… hold at the dip.
+00:06 ( 1630.56 / 4:30.56 PM )
(5KA): Kilo Alpha holding at the dip.
+00:24 ( 1631.14 / 4:31.14 PM )
NOTE: Foreground action in video. Tripod is set down in front of camera and camera is then panned to the left so it is looking SOUTH from Hays Ranch Road at the huge smoke column. In the left side of the frame we now see the back of a trailer that belongs to one of persons in the Air Study group and the right rear tire of a UTV that is strapped into that trailer.
+00:33 ( 1631.23 / 4:31.23 PM )
(B33 – French): Hey… four one three… ya got me in sight off your right side?
+00:38 ( 1631.28 / 4:31.28 PM )
(B33 – French): Allright I’m gonna get it as low as I can… start your turn in… we’re gonna… we’re gonna cross that ridge to left of the big white antenna.
+00:49 ( 1631.39 / 4:31.39 PM )
(Tanker 413): Which way are you turning?
+00:50 ( 1631.40 / 4:31.40 PM )
(B33 – French): I’m turnin’ right… my heading is through 300… I’m gonna roll out at about three four… ah… zero
+00:56 ( 1631.46 / 4:31.46 PM )
(Tanker 413): Roger that
+00:57 ( 1631.47 / 4:31.47 PM )
(B33 – French): I’m at one ten ( 110 ).
+01:07 ( 1631.57 / 4:31.57 PM )
(B33 – French): Your target’s gonna be at… uh… kinda the far end here… kind of up on a little hill… some open flame… ok… I’m actually on a long final.
+01:14 ( 1632.04 / 4:32.04 PM )
(Tanker 413): Ok… ah… you’re still far ahead of me… uh… I’ll just do what I can.
+01:18 ( 1632.08 / 4:32.08 PM )
(B33 – French): Ok.. ah… just kinda follow me… I’m passin’ the white antennas now.
+01:27 ( 1632.17 / 4:32.17 PM )
(B33 – French): You’re gonna be kind of a gentle right turn on the exit.
+01:48 ( 1632.38 / 4:32.38 PM )
(B33 – French): Hey… uh.. four one three… if ya got me in sight… what I’d like to do is pretty much anywhere in here where it’s heavy open flame is in the fuel… right through here…have ya got that?
+01:57 ( 1632.47 / 4:32.47 PM )
(Tanker 413): Yea… is it like starting up the… ah… the ridgetop or anything?
+02:01 ( 1632.51 / 4:32.51 PM )
(B33 – French): Affirmative.
+02:03 ( 1632.53 / 4:32.53 PM )
(Tanker 413): Okay… do what I can
+02:05 ( 1632.55 / 4:32.55 PM )
(B33 – French): Then give me a gentle right turn on the exit
+02:07 ( 1632.57 / 4:32.57 PM )
(Tanker 413): You got it.
+02:24 ( 1633.14 / 4:33.14 PM )
(Tanker 413): Off the drop.
+02:27 ( 1633.17 / 4:33.17 PM )
(B33 – French): Okay follow me around in the right hand and then… ah… load and return, okay?
+02:31 ( 1633.21 / 4:33.21 PM )
(Tanker 413): Roger that. Load and return.
+02:34 ( 1633.24 / 4:33.24 PM )
(B33 – French): Yea… we liked your drop… I know there was a lotta fire in there… but… ah… (laughter) nicely done
+02:39 ( 1633.29 / 4:33.29 PM )
(Unknown): Yea (laughter)… it’s… it’s like spittin’ at it.
+02:42 ( 1633.32 / 4:33.32 PM )
(B33 – French): Yea… you bet… and, uh… be on the lookout for the DC10, there kinda holdin’ seven miles out for… ah… 413, okay?
+02:50 ( 1633.40 / 4:33.40 PM )
(Tanker 413): Yea… should I go out pretty low… like 5,000?
+02:53 ( 1633.43 / 4:33.43 PM )
(B33 – French): Yea… affirmative… that’ll work out just fine.
+02:55 ( 1633.45 / 4:33.45 PM )
(Tanker 413): Okay… just whatever it takes to clear the ridges up here?
+02:58 ( 1633.48 / 4:33.48 PM )
(B33 – French): That’s affirmative… I think… I think you five should clear ’em.
+03:01 ( 1633.51 / 4:33.51 PM )
(Tanker 413): Roger that. See ya on the way back.
+03:04 ( 1633.54 / 4:33.54 PM )
(B33 – French): Allright, thanks a lot, good work… and… ah… nine one zero… Just… ah… can you hold for just a minute?
NOTE: We don’t seem to be able to hear 911’s side of the conversation with French in B33 at this point. We can only hear French talking to 911.
+03:11 ( 1634.01 / 4:34.01 PM )
(B33 – French): Perfect. Set… set me up a level… ah… 4 for now… whole load, and I’ll get back with ya.
+03:20 ( 1634.10 / 4:34.10 PM )
(5KA): Three three… Kilo Alpha… sorta halfway back at the head of the fire.
+03:25 ( 1634.15 / 4:34.15 PM )
(B33 – French): Okay, copy that.
+03:27 ( 1634.17 / 4:34.17 PM )
(5KA): We’re gonna continue into the drop… did you want me up that valley or do you want me to stay clear of them for now?
+03:31 ( 1634.21 / 4:34.21 PM )
(B33 – French): Uh… Keep workin’ where you were workin’ and you are clear to the drop.
+03:34 ( 1634.24 / 4:34.24 PM )
(5KA): Five Kilo Alpha.
+03:36 ( 1634.26 / 4:34.26 PM )
(B33 – French): Tanker four one three… Bravo three three
+03:38 ( 1634.28 / 4:34.28 PM )
(Tanker 413): Go ahead. Four (one) three.
+03:40 ( 1634.30 / 4:34.30 PM )
(B33 – French): Looks like Wickenburg is out of retardant… uh… can you make it back to Gateway… load and return?
+03:46 ( 1634.36 / 4:34.36 PM )
(Tanker 413): I can… uh… I might check into a private club. Uh… uh… I might do the private club in Wickenburg before I head over.
+03:53 ( 1634.43 / 4:34.43 PM )
(B33 – French): Approved.
+03:54 ( 1634.44 / 4:34.44 PM )
(Tanker 413): Thank you. I’ll check and see what they want.
( 37 SECOND PAUSE – NO RADIO TRAFFIC )
+04:31 ( 1635.21 / 4:35.21 PM )
(5KA): Five Kilo Alpha’s off the drop.
+04:35 ( 1635.25 / 4:35.25 PM )
(B33 – French): Three three copies.
+04:37 ( 1635.27 / 4:35.27 PM )
(B33 – French): And hey… I’m also gonna bring the… uh.. the ten… uh… back in we got.. uh… nine one zero out there. I may just hold you at your… uh… hold on the ground… are you… kinda need to fuel by now?
+04:48 ( 1635.38 / 4:35.38 PM )
(5KA): Yea… why don’t I just drop the bucket and go for fuel.
+04:51 ( 1635.41 / 4:35.41 PM )
(B33 – French): Perfect, thank you.
+04:52 ( 1635.42 / 4:35.42 PM )
(5KA): Okay.
+04:55 ( 1635.45 / 4:35.45 PM )
(B33 – French): And let me know when you’re… uh… on the ground, helibase.
+04:58 ( 1635.48 / 4:35.48 PM )
(5KA): Will do.
( 27 SECOND PAUSE – NO RADIO TRAFFIC )
+05:25 ( 1636.15 / 4:36.15 PM )
(Helicopter 5KA): Five Kilo Alpha’s (on) short final… landing just short of that helibase… in the green circle here.
+05:30 ( 1636.20 / 4:36.20 PM )
(B33 – French): Okay copy that… are you gonna drop your bucket and have to lift back somewhere else?
+05:34 ( 1636.24 / 4:36.24 PM )
(5KA): Yea… I’ll have to drop the bucket and then I’ll head for Wickenburg for fuel.
+05:38 ( 1636.28 / 4:36.28 PM )
(B33 – French): Oh… okay… gotcha… okay… give me a call… ah… ready to lift.
+05:43 ( 1636.33 / 4:36.33 PM )
(5KA): Will do.
+05:46 ( 1636.36 / 4:36.36 PM )
(B33 – French): Tanker nine one zero… you are cleared in… come on in at… six thousand five hundred with nine eight zero.
+05:56 ( 1636.46 / 4:36.46 PM )
(B33 – French): And I’ve got a project for you.
+06:01 ( 1636.51 / 4:36.51 PM )
(B33 – French): It’s all good, though.
+06:05 ( 1636.55 / 4:36.55 PM )
(B33 – French): That’s affirmative… uh… on the east side… uh… can’t really get in where we really need it we’ll be a little bit further to the north… there’s just a lot of open flame… that’s your target.
+06:15 ( 1637.05 / 4:37.05 PM )
(DC10 VLAT 910 – Kevin): (Transmission breaks up) ?? Uh… ?? smoke ??
+06:19 ( 1637.09 / 4:37.09 PM )
(B33 – French): If you need more altitude let me know… you should be okay at sixty five, only other aircraft I’ve seen is a media ship at… uh… niner-thousand five hundred.
+06:35 ( 1637.25 / 4:37.25 PM )
(DC10 VLAT 910 – Kevin): (Transmission breaks up) How far you want (up) me to… ?? towards the white smoke… or… ?? (black?) smoke?
+06:40 ( 1637.30 / 4:37.30 PM )
(B33 – French): Kind of in the middle.
+06:41 ( 1637.31 / 4:37.31 PM )
(DC10 VLAT 910 – Kevin): Okay.
( 33 SECOND PAUSE – NO RADIO TRAFFIC )
+07:13 ( 1638.03 / 4:38.03 PM )
(5KA): Five Kilo Alpha’s ready to lift for Wickenburg.
+07:16 ( 1638.06 / 4:38.06 PM )
(B33 – French): You’re clear to lift, Five Kilo Alpha. Hey… can you… uh… just fly direct west and then go around the west side of the fire?
+07:22 ( 1638.12 / 4:38.12 PM )
(5KA): I sure can. Here we go.
+07:24 ( 1638.14 / 4:38.14 PM )
(B33 – French): Yea… that would really help me out. You’re cleared… uh… west departure back to Wickenburg… and hey… thanks for all the good work… we’ll see ya in ( bit ).
+07:30 ( 1638.20 / 4:38.20 PM )
(5KA): You bet.
( 13 SECOND PAUSE – NO RADIO TRAFFIC )
+07:43 ( 1638.33 / 4:38.33 PM )
(DC10 VLAT 910 – Kevin): Yea… nine one zero… I’m just comin’ up over the ridge seein’ all the open flame.
+07:47 ( 1638.37 / 4:38.37 PM )
(B33 – French): Okay, copy that. I’m a little bit out of position… but… I’ll try to sneak in front of ya… I’m actually at your… oh… about… one o’clock.
+07:55 ( 1638.45 / 4:38.45 PM )
(DC10 VLAT 910 – Kevin): Okay… and we’re lookin’…
( 8 SECOND PAUSE – NO RADIO TRAFFIC )
+08:03 ( 1638.53 / 4:38.53 PM )
(B33 – French): And I’m at… uh… six thousand, Kevin, kinda low out your one o’clock moving twelve.
+08:10 ( 1639.00 / 4:39.00 PM )
(DC10 VLAT 910 – Kevin): Yea… I got a beacon there… yea… I got your lights.
+08:13 ( 1639.03 / 4:39.03 PM )
(B33 – French): Okay copy that… It… ya know… it’s gonna be a little rough for the show me ‘cus I’ve actually gotta angle back left… I do have you in sight. Basically that… that open flame and the heavy fuel out your left si… correct… yea… your left side… that’s what we’re gonna hit. I’ll try to turn this into a show me. Ya still got me?
+08:29 ( 1639.19 / 4:39.19 PM )
(DC10 VLAT 910 – Kevin): I do and I’ll try to keep ya… I may end up going back a one-eighty but, uh… yea… I’ll keep ya in sight.
+08:34 ( 1639.24 / 4:39.24 PM )
(B33 – French): Okay copy that… so… let’s do what we wanna do… There’s a little bit of a… kinda of fuel break that snakes through here… that’s gonna be your start point… I’m rollin’ in on short final now.
+08:44 ( 1639.34 / 4:39.34 PM )
(DC10 VLAT 910 – Kevin) Yea… I still got ya there.
——————————————————————————————
MAYDAY TRAFFIC BEGINS OVER ON THE AIR-TO-GROUND CHANNEL
——————————————————————————————
This is now the moment when Captain Jesse Steed is making his first “We are in the front of the flaming front” MAYDAY call, followed by (apparently) Robert Caldwell making repeated attempts to get “Air Attack” to respond to them.
The NEXT transmission captured in THIS VIDEO is apparently coming from
the pilot of Helicopter ‘Five Kilo Alpha’ (5KA) who heard the same radio traffic captured
in Aaron Hulburd’s M2U00265 video. The piloto of 5KA has already heard OPS1 Abel
calling B33 but not getting any response… and he is trying to advise (B33 – French) that
‘Operations’ is trying to get hold of him and that something is ‘going on’.
Thomas French in B33 does not acknowledge this transmission from 5KA nor does he
respond to it… and just continues focusing on the planned drop with ‘Kevin’ in the DC10 VLAT.
It won’t be until 1641.07 ( 1 minute and 33 seconds from now ) that there is any indication from French over the A2A channel that a possible ’emergency’ is taking place on the ground.
——————————————————————————————
+08:48 ( 1639.38 / 4:39.38 PM )
(Helicopter 5KA): Bravo three three… you’ve got Operations calling Air to Ground. Sounds like they got somethin’ for ya.
+08:54 ( 1639.44 / 4:39.44 PM )
(B33 – French): Okay Kevin… if you’ve still got me in sight… basically we wanna start here… and just kinda contour. I was at 49 at the start. 48 here… we’ll just bring it around level 4. If ya get to this… this point… just go straight towards the meadow here.
+09:08 ( 1639.58 / 4:39.58 PM )
(DC10 VLAT 910 – Kevin): Okay… run it all the way out to the meadow if we’ve got enough?
+09:11 ( 1640.01 / 4:40.01 PM )
(B33 – French): You betcha… and I kinda started at three six zero on the heading and ended up at about three three five.
+09:19 ( 1640.09 / 4:40.09 PM )
(DC10 VLAT 910 – Kevin) Very good… I’ve gotcha down now… I’ll letcha come out my right side.
+09:23 ( 1640.13 / 4:40.13 PM )
(B33 – French): Yep… that’s what I’ll do… and I’m gonna climb up to sixty five… I’m gonna give ya a nice long final and… uh… uh… we might have to do a little bit of adjusting on final… but expect your beginning drop to be about three three five or so.
+09:36 ( 1640.26 / 4:40.26 PM )
(DC10 VLAT 910 – Kevin): Perfect.
NOTE: The very next ‘Okay… uh…’ from French has him ‘taking a breath’ and it sounds like he may have just been informed of something… like what is going on with GM He then tells Kevin he may have to ‘dial it back’ and he may already be thinking he needs to SAVE some retardant… but he in no way stops what he is doing, at this point.
+09:38 ( 1640.28 / 4:40.28 PM )
(B33 – French): Okay… uh… I may dial it back a little bit… standby… keep it at coverage level 4.
+09:43 ( 1640.33 / 4:40.33 PM )
(DC10 VLAT 910 – Kevin): Okay.
+09:44 ( 1640.34 / 4:40.34 PM )
(B33 – French): And you’ve got… we’re kind of alone on the fire now… you just got a nice gentle right turn out… I’ll be a hard right… I’m comin’ up on your four o’clock.
+09:52 ( 1640.42 / 4:40.42 PM )
(DC10 VLAT 910 – Kevin): Very good. I’m just gonna keep this shallow turn ( so we’ll see you ).
————————————————————————–
NOTE: All of sudden… ABC15 Media Helicopter 5HD ( Five Hotel Delta ) calls ‘Bravo 33’ just to tell him they are DONE for the day and they are LEAVING.
——————————————————————————-
+09:58 ( 1640.48 / 4:40.48 PM )
(ABC15 Media Helicopter 5HD): Bravo three three… this is Five Hotel Delta.
+10:00 ( 1640.50 / 4:40.50 PM )
(B33 – French): Go ahead sir.
+10:02 ( 1640.52 / 4:40.52 PM )
(ABC15 Media Helicopter 5HD): Yes sir. Uh… we’re complete. We’re heading back to Scottsdale. Thank you very much… uh… (got a little) work down there… and… ah… I’ll see ya tomorrow morning.
+10:10 ( 1641.00 / 4:41.00 PM )
(B33 – French): Okay… ah… Delta… uh… one five hel… (French laughs at his own
mess-up on the call sign) Oh… Delta… uh… thanks a lot… appreciate the… uh… good como.
+10:17 ( 1641.07 / 4:41.07 PM )
(Helicopter 5HD): Thank you sir. Good night.
_________________________________________________________________
NOTE: This is now the moment when (B33 – French) finally realizes that Granite Mountain is in serious trouble… and the situation/plan changes. He calls ‘Kevin’ in the DC10 to tell him this, cancel the drop they were just about to do… and he asks him (Kevin) to go into a holding pattern while they try to locate Granite Mountain.
____________________________________________________________________
+10:19 ( 1641.09 / 4:41.09 PM )
(B33 – French): Hey… uh… Kevin… uh… we got… situation’s changed and we got some folks in trouble and I don’t know where they’re at yet… uh… just… uh… standby.
+10:26 ( 1641.16 / 4:41.16 PM )
(DC10 VLAT 910 – Kevin): Roger. I’ll just stay out here to the north ( and the east ).
+10:31 ( 1641.21 / 4:41.21 PM )
(B33 – French): Looks like we may have a deployment in progress so… uh… dial me up a level six for now and I don’t know what the… ah… drop sequence is gonna be yet.
+10:39 ( 1641.29 / 4:41.29 PM )
(DC10 VLAT 910 – Kevin): I’m just gonna tag in behind ya and follow ya, then.
( 18 SECOND PAUSE – NO AIR-TO-AIR CHANNEL RADIO TRAFFIC )
NOTE: We can’t hear who French is talking TO for the next callout as he tells someone to ‘Come on back’.
ALSO NOTE: There is also now a great sense of URGENCY in French’s voice. He is speaking VERY quickly and efficiently now.
+10:57 ( 1641.47 / 4:41.47 PM )
(B33 – French): Come on back.
+11:00 ( 1641.50 / 4:41.50 PM )
(B33 – French): Go get some water.
+11:06 ( 1641.56 / 4:41.56 PM )
(B33 – French): Affirmative.
+11:08 ( 1641.58 / 4:41.58 PM )
(B33 – French): I’m up at six thousand and above.
——————————————————–
HELITANKER/ SKYCRANE N243AC CALLS
——————————————————–
Now here comes Helitanker/Skycrane 749 reporting to French that they are (apparently) about 8 miles away and returning to Yarnell. This is the same Orange ‘Skycrane’ that almost crashed into the VLAT earlier that afternoon.
——————————————————–
+11:16 ( 1642.06 / 4:42.06 PM )
(Helitanker/Skycrane 749): Air Attack… Helitanker Seven Four Nine.
+11:17 ( 1642.07 / 4:42.07 PM )
(B33 – French): Seven Four Nine… go.
+11:19 ( 1642.09 / 4:42.09 PM )
(Helitanker/Skycrane 749): (Transmission breaks up in recording) Yea… we’re ?? ( 8 ) miles out… and… uh… ??
+11:23 ( 1642.13 / 4:42.13 PM )
(B33 – French): You’re clear direct to your dip. Call me at.. uh… five miles.
+11:26 ( 1642.16 / 4:42.16 PM )
(Helitanker/Skycrane 749): Copy that.
+11:27 ( 1642.17 / 4:42.17 PM )
(B33 – French): What direction ya comin’ in from?
+11:29 ( 1642.19 / 4:42.19 PM )
(Helitanker/Skycrane 749): (North?)
+11:30 ( 1642.20 / 4:42.20 PM )
(B33 – French): Copy.
( 52 SECOND PAUSE – NO OTHER AIR-TO-AIR RADIO TRAFFIC RECORDED )
NOTE: No other Air-To-Air channel radio communications are heard in this video during the 52 seconds left before the video ends. It is still not known if this was some EDITING or TRUNCATING of this video or whether the Panebaker Air Study Group setup really just ‘stopped’ recording any Air-To-Air traffic for the final 52 seconds of this video. It seems odd that given the circumstances, there would NOT have been any more A2A traffic similar to what we were just hearing for the next 52 seconds ( and even after that ).
+12:23 VIDEO ENDS
VIDEO 20160630_1643 ENDS AT 1643.13 ( 4:43.13 PM )
NOTE: The following is the moment when French ( in B33 ) tells Kevin ( in VLAT 911 ) that he is ‘out of position’ and is going to try and ‘sneak in front of him’ as he is INBOUND from the SOUTH. This could have been a moment when B33 was doing a ‘tight circle’ over Yarnell and was, at some point, on a WEST-TO-EAST flight path in order to ‘sneak in front’ of VLAT 911.
The VLAT is inbound from the SOUTH so when French says “I’m at your one o’clock” that would, in fact, mean almost dead ahead of the VLAT but just slightly to his RIGHT.
07:47 ( 1638.37 / 4:38.37 PM )
(B33 – French): Okay, copy that. I’m a little bit out of position… but… I’ll try to sneak in front of ya… I’m actually at your… oh… about… one o’clock.
So right now I’m thinking roughly……
If someone (Dan Sullivan) said something like “that’s it, that’s what we want ” after the 4:33 PM drop at about 4:37 (where did we get this number, anyway????? even though it fits fairly comfortably into our current timeline vis a vis the Aaron videos) he would have been saying that at about the same time this setting up of the DC10 VLAT preliminary path is going on:
“+06:19 ( 1637.09 / 4:37.09 PM )
(B33 – French): If you need more altitude let me know… you should be okay at sixty five, only other aircraft I’ve seen is a media ship at… uh… niner-thousand five hundred.
+06:35 ( 1637.25 / 4:37.25 PM )
(DC10 VLAT 910 – Kevin): (Transmission breaks up) How far you want (up) me to… ?? towards the white smoke… or… ?? (black?) smoke?
+06:40 ( 1637.30 / 4:37.30 PM )
(B33 – French): Kind of in the middle.
+06:41 ( 1637.31 / 4:37.31 PM )
(DC10 VLAT 910 – Kevin): Okay.”
And if that’s the case this is a bit before Burfiend is, at the beginning of “The Helmet Cam Video” describing to, most likely Dan Sullivan, why there might be some difficulty with flying this retardant drop.
So right now I’m having a bit of a cognitive dissonance.
Thinking out loud here.
Seems to me that that “that’s where we want it” callout would have been earlier. Where are we getting 4:37 for that?
Because all of this setting up of the VLAT is focused on, I believe, a different route, more to the west but running more south to north. (I really wish I knew how to just “paint” curvy lines into Google Earth to represent these drops). Is that what you are seeing here, WTKTT?
But, even given all that (that this seems to indicate that the callout “that’s where we want that” would/could have taken place earlier than 4:37), I’m thinking that it could be the case that as French was beginning to lead VLAT DC 10 into this route that he was setting up, Burfiend could have been communicating to Sullivan the words that we hear him saying at the beginning of the “Helmet Cam Video.”
Does that make sense?
I’m just trying to not get too far off track regarding this.
Reply to Marti Reed post on February 19, 2015 at 8:27 pm
>> Marti said…
>>
>> Seems to me that that “that’s where we want it” callout would have been >> earlier. Where are we getting 4:37 for that?
See a new parent comment above AND the place where I answered this question originally way back in Chapter 6.
Here’s a direct jump link to that previous posting back in Chapter 6…
http://www.investigativemedia.com/yarnell-hill-fire-chapter-vi-comments/#comment-44702
Bottom line: The time of 1637 for the (supposed) “That’s where we want retardant” transmission was MADE UP by the SAIT and it only first appeared n the SAIR itself. B33 had no frickin’ idea when it actually even might have happened. All they said AFTER reporting that was that “within 5 minutes of that they went into shelter”. So the SAIT just subtracted a FULL 5 minutes from when THEY thought that moment was ( 1642 )… and Voila!… they came up with 1637 and published that in the SAIR ( along with the UNVERIFIED reported transmission itself ) as if it was fact.
>> Marti also said…
>>
>> Because all of this setting up of the VLAT is focused on, I believe,
>> a different route, more to the west but running more south to
>> north. (I really wish I knew how to just “paint” curvy lines into
>> Google Earth to represent these drops). Is that what you are
>> seeing here, WTKTT?
We’ve also been over this before when I verified for you where that 1633 SEAT drop actually was. That drop was ‘spot on’ there to the NORTH of Yarnell proper and French’s only intention was to then use the inbound VLAT to CONTINUE that same line.
There obviously is no ‘line on the ground’ that represents this particular ‘next drop’ that French had planned because the whole thing got shut down WITHOUT there being an actual drop because 19 men were now dying out in a box canyon.
Copy. Yes, the carefully set-up VLAT DC10 retardant drop that was so misunderstood (along with the whole narrative around it) and that never even happened.
That was being set up to try, in the last minute, to protect Glen Isla, as they had successfully protected the neighborhood before it.
Reply to Marti Reed post on February 20, 2015 at 12:09 am
>> Marti said…
>>
>> That was being set up to try, in the last minute, to
>> protect Glen Isla, as they had successfully protected
>> the neighborhood before it.
That is not the case.
This VLAT drop was ONLY being targeted at a spot just north of Yarnell proper. The ‘keys’ to that are how French is telling Kevin he wants him to ‘start’ at that ‘fuel break’… and then the two men acknowledge that as he was dropping… and if he had anything left… to just take the drop on out ‘into the meadows’.
There were NO MEADOWS anywhere near Glen Ilah.
The only ‘meadows’ they could have possible been talking about are this flat, grassy areas to the north of Yarnell just to the east of Highway 89.
The ‘fuel break’ he is referring to is also most likely that same ‘fuel break’ coming through the foothills there just to the north of Yarnell that Warbis and Lenmark was using for the EAST end of their long WEST-TO-EAST retardant line.
This VLAT drop was all about just trying to ‘do some good’ but WITHOUT having to fly into or through that massive smoke cloud
that was now advancing on ( and enveloping ) both the town of Yarnell and the Glen Ilah area.
Correction for above. Typed ‘east’ instead of ‘west’.
Sentence above should have read like this…
The only ‘meadows’ they could have possible been talking about are those flat, grassy areas to the north of Yarnell just to the WEST of Highway 89.
Since curiosity is my driving force…….
I’m still curious where they were planning to put that retardant line in.
Have you figured that out?
So I’m thinking it was (given the coordinates French was giving to the VLAT 911 pilot), conceivably, coming in from the south (starting where?) to the north, to, I’m assuming tie into the 4:33 line that started from just west of Shrine Road and headed up to the northeast over the “Norton Way” area — the line that saved that neighborhood.
I’ve all along assumed that line had something to do with protecting Glen Isla. But I’m having a hard time envisioning where that line was being “set up” to go.
Have you figured that out??
Reply to Marti Reed post on February 20, 2015 at 12:43 am
>> Marti said…
>>
>> I’m still curious where they were planning to put that
>> retardant line in.
>>
>> Have you figured that out?
Not to the point where I could give specific LAT/LONG… but I’m not sure that could ever be done.
I think it’s pretty obvious, based on the conversation, where French wanted that drop to be.
The whole point here was to just try and ‘do some good’ near Yarnell without having to fly into ( or through ) that massive smoke cloud that was now advancing on ( and enveloping ) the Yarnell and Glen Ilah areas.
That only left them some options to the north of Yarnell proper.
The two KEYS in the conversation above are the point where French said he wanted Kevin to START the drop ( the fuel break ) and how the two men agreed that if Kevin had anything left he should just ‘take it out’ into the ‘meadows’.
The only ‘meadows’ they could have been referring to are those flat, grassy areas out there to the north of Yarnell, where the foothills end.
The ‘fuel break’ where French wanted the drop to START is most likely that same ‘fuel break’ that Warbis and Lenmark had been using as the EAST end of that long WEST-TO-EAST retardant line earlier in the day.
So… if you remember the 4490red videos… French seems to have been talking with Kevin in THIS timeframe about the same general area where we DO see a VLAT drop being made in one of 4490red’s videos… just north of the U-Store-It area. and beyond that start of the white-rail-fence for Maughn Ranch.
Can you take a rough guess about lat/long, ’cause I can’t even envision where you are contemplating the line? I’m not saying I disagree – I just cannot picture it.
Look at the photo at the top of this MSM article…
http://www.ibtimes.com/yarnell-hill-fire-central-arizona-contained-eight-percent-full-containment-fire-killed-19-1332685
The unmistakable line of RED retardant in the upper left part of the picture is what these guys were working on at that point on June 30, 2013.
The SEAT started that line from about the Shrine Road area and the VLATS ( Pilot Kevin in 910 ) continued it on to the north… AFTER they were no longer focusing on the deployment situation circa 5:05 PM or so.
As the photo clearly shows… that work was a success. That work obviously held the fire from coming any closer to that north part of Yarnell.
At 1645… Eric Panebaker stopped the Air-To-Air channel recording for about 2 minutes and either swapped batteries or SD cards… or both.
Then he started recording again.
This ended up the A2A recording that was FILLED with static. The first 15 or 20 minutes ( to roughly about 1705 ) are almost nothing but static… but we CAN hear a few things in there such as the moment when VLAT 910 was calling French and said he thought he just heard DIVSA Marsh trying to call him at exactly 1648 ( 4:48 PM ).
After about the 5:00 PM mark… the static clears and we can now hear the A2A traffic again pretty clearly.
At about 5:05 PM… ‘Bravo 3’ ( Rusty Warbis onboard again ) is back over the fire and just ‘watching’ what French is doing.
Rusty Warbis tells French he is ‘there’… and then French advises him they are basically done paying attention to the deployment situation and they are going to return to work making retardant drops. French tells Warbis they are now “about as briefed as we can be”…
From Panebaker VIDEO 20130630_1716_EP
—————————————————
+15:17 ( 1700.36 / 5:00.36 PM )
(Bravo 3): Bravo Three Three, Bravo Three, when you get a minute I’m just hanging out here. Just… ah… call me when you can.
+16:17 ( 1701.36 / 5:01.36 PM )
(B33 – French): Copy that. I think we’re briefed. As much as we can be, anyway.
————————————————–
French takes care of some helicopters getting to/from dip sites and then immediately tells VLAT 910 ( Pilot Kevin ) that since things are ‘clearing up’ now they are basically going to ‘pick up where they left’ off with that drop that got interrupted by the deployment situation.
—————————————————-
+18:41 ( 1704.00 / 5:04.00 PM )
(B33 – French): Okay… everything is startin’ to clear up. I’m gonna start my descent. I’m out of six thousand.
+18:46 ( 1704.05 / 5:04.05 PM )
(DC10 VLAT 910 – Kevin?): Perfect. Yea… we’re in the… uh… clear, too.
+18:59 ( 1704.18 / 5:04.18 PM )
(B33 – French): Okay… we’re gonna have a… kind of a… little bit of a turn on short final. Just go ahead and follow me.
——————————————————-
Then the drop takes place… about where they were trying to do it before the deployment interrupted them…
The ‘road’ French is referring to is Shrine Road.
——————————————————
+19:47 ( 1705.06 / 5:05.06 PM )
(B33 – French): We’re gonna have to go over a road right about… here. See where the (??) flames… get it good as you can. I’m at forty-eight hundred.
+19:55 ( 1705.14 / 5:05.14 PM )
(DC10 VLAT 910 – Kevin?): Okay.
+19:57 ( 1705.16 / 5:05.16 PM )
(B33 – French): I’m hard right. You’re gentle right (on exit).
+19:59 ( 1705.18 / 5:05.18 PM )
(DC10 VLAT 910 – Kevin?): Got it.
** 26 SECOND PAUSE. NO AIR-TO-AIR
** CHANNEL TRAFFIC
** THE DC10 VLAT 910 DROP TAKES
** PLACE DURINING THIS 26 SECOND
** PAUSE IN THE A2A CHANNEL TRAFFIC.
+20:25 ( 1705.44 / 5:05.44 PM )
(DC10 VLAT 910 – Kevin?): TONE. Drop complete.
+20:28 ( 1705.47 / 5:05.47 PM )
(B33 – French): Yea. I think I stepped on ya. How’d that work?
+20:30 ( 1705.49 / 5:05.49 PM )
(DC10 VLAT 910 – Kevin?): Ah… that worked fine. Uh… Drop complete. We’re gonna go north just a bit.
+20:34 ( 1705.53 / 5:05.53 PM )
(B33 – French): You bet. Take as much room as ya need. You got all the room out there. That’s gonna be a load and return Phoenix… and that looked like it went in there really good. Uh… nicely done. I appreciate all your help on that one.
+20:43 ( 1706.02 / 5:06.02 PM )
(DC10 VLAT 910 – Kevin?): Yep. Ah… no problem. Ah… load and return. See ya in a bit.
—————————————————
As soon as French dismisses VLAT 901 with ‘Load and return’ directive… Rusty Warbis in Bravo 3 chimes in again.
Warbis knows he is about to take over as Air Attack for the ongoing Tactical side of things ( and not the ‘Incident Within an Incident’ situation ) and he is asking French if he should just ‘continue that line’ with more retardant.
This is where we hear French telling Warbis that the drop wasn’t even really where he wanted it to be.
—————————————————–
+20:56 ( 1706.15 / 5:06.15 PM )
(Bravo 3 – Rusty Warbis): Bravo Three, Bravo Three Thr… Uh… Bravo Three Three, Bravo Three.
+20:59 ( 1706.18 / 5:06.18 PM )
(B33 – French): Go ahead, Rusty.
+21:00 ( 1706.19 / 5:06.19 PM )
(Bravo 3 – Rusty Warbis): Ya want me to just look at extendin’ that?
+21:05 ( 1706.24 / 5:06.24 PM )
(B33 – French): Hey Rusty… you (faded) out. Say again?
+21:07 ( 1706.26 / 5:06.26 PM )
(Bravo 3 – Rusty Warbis): Are you lookin’ at just extendin’ that line.
+21:10 ( 1706.29 / 5:06.29 PM )
(B33 – French): Well… ( he laughs)… that’s… that’s not even the line I wanted. I wanted to be further to the south.
+21:22 ( 1706.41 / 5:06.41 PM )
(Bravo 3 – Rusty Warbis): Yea… good luck on that, though. Can you get underneath it that far?
+21:25 ( 1706.44 / 5:06.44 PM )
(B33 – French): Nah. I couldn’t. I could a few minutes ago… we got so busy kinda lookin’ for the… uh… deployment… but… yea… if I were you I would just kind of extend that as best you can… and then… if you can get in there, then just back up further north.
——————————————————-
So this is where French was then telling Warbis what the situation was when he was trying to do that VLAT drop just BEFORE the deployment situation.
He was trying to get ‘underneath’ that smoke column as best he could… but the drop never happened.
And now that they had come back to it… it ended up farther north than he wanted it but that was the best they could do with the smoke only still clearing.
All of this matches that photo I just gave you a link to.
Thanks WTKTT!!!
That photo, which I had never seen before (fancy that!!!), does help a lot.
I didn’t realize that the drop they FINALLY were able to lay down after the deployment, was, essentially the drop they were lining up before the deployment.
I really was thinking it would have been logical, given that the fire was bearing down so hard on Glen Isla, that they would have been trying to do something to protect it.
Like they quite successfully did around Sickles Road and around the Model Creek Road area.
And Burfiend’s comment regarding “that valley” made me think he was referring to the larger bowl surrounding Glen Isla.
So I’m sitting here, a little mystified regarding what he meant by that.
But I was also stumped by the south to north line-up, which I couldn’t sync with the layout to the west of the first drop, i.e. that Glen Isla area.
So it pretty much seems that, after they laid down the retardant line that saved the neighborhood Cordes was working in, Bravo 33 (probably in conversation with Dan Sullivan), decided the next place to focus on was further towards the northeast…….
…….which actually wasn’t in as much danger, compared to Glen Isla, which was actually burning……
….and thus creating all that smoke that they, apparently, thought they probably couldn’t fly through.
Do my musings make sense to you? Do you think I’m understanding this correctly?
Reply to Marti Reed post on
February 20, 2015 at 11:34 pm
>> Marti said…
>>
>> I didn’t realize that the drop
>> they FINALLY were able to lay
>> down after the deployment, was,
>> essentially the drop they were lining
>> up before the deployment.
That DOES appear to be the case. As soon as Thomas French ( in Bravo 33 ) tells Rusty Warbis ( in Bravo 3 ) that they have been ‘briefed about as well as they can be’ regarding the deployment and the now-active search and rescue… they ( French and Kevin in the VLAT ) just went right back to what they were doing when then MAYDAY traffic had interrupted them earlier.
>> Marti also said…
>>
>> I really was thinking it would have
>> been logical, given that the fire
>> was bearing down so hard on
>> Glen Isla, that they would have
>> been trying to do something to
>> protect it.
They didn’t have a chance of doing that… not after French has already wasted all that time finishing his Model Creek Road / Miner’s Camp Road project on the NORTH.
They ( French and Burfiend in B33 ) were VERY LATE getting ‘down there’ to the SOUTH end of the fire.
By the time they DID get down there… they had lost a LOT of options.
They were not going to fly/drop THROUGH that massive ( and still expanding ) smoke column itself.
All they could do is try to attack the ‘edges’ of it where it was still safe to even try.
>> Marti also said…
>>
>> Like they quite successfully did
>> around Sickles Road and around
>> the Model Creek Road area.
The time that was spent doing all THAT up on the NORTH end is what lost them their options on the SOUTH end when they finally ‘got to work’ down there.
>> Marti also said…
>>
>> And Burfiend’s comment regarding
>> “that valley” made me think he
>> was referring to the larger bowl
>> surrounding Glen Isla.
>> So I’m sitting here, a little mystified
>> regarding what he meant by that.
At that point… I think ‘valley’ ( to them ) meant just that general ‘valley’ where the town of Yarnell itself was.
I suppose there’s still a chance whoever was talking to Burfiend between 1637 and 1639 about ‘retardant drops’ was actually asking if they thought they could drop into the ‘Harper Canyon Valley’ itself… but I actually doubt it. Even though that’s where the fire WAS during that conversation… it would have been VERY dangerous to try it and it wasn’t even a good enough tactical target to even justify the risk.
>> Marti also said…
>>
>> But I was also stumped by the south
>> to north line-up, which I couldn’t sync
>> with the layout to the west of the
>> first drop, i.e. that Glen Isla area.
I don’t think there ever really was a ‘first drop’ that could be construed to have been in the ‘Glen Ilah’ area. By the time they got down there… ( way late ) the only option they had was what they were doing… trying to keep the fireline from coming into the north part of Yarnell proper from that northwest direction.
>> Marti also said…
>>
>> So it pretty much seems that, after
>> they laid down the retardant line
>> that saved the neighborhood Cordes
>> was working in, Bravo 33 (probably
>> in conversation with Dan Sullivan),
>> decided the next place to focus on
>> was further towards the northeast…….
>>
>> …….which actually wasn’t in as
>> much danger, compared to Glen
>> Isla, which was actually burning……
>>
>> ….and thus creating all that smoke
>> that they, apparently, thought they
>> probably couldn’t fly through.
>>
>> Do my musings make sense to you?
>> Do you think I’m understanding
>> this correctly?
Yes. That now matches my take on the whole situation, anyway.
Because they got down there LATE… they were doing the only thing that was SAFE but was still a VALID use of the retardant.
The fire had already started heading due SOUTH and that fireline that was coming out of those foothills to the northwest of Yarnell was not AS much of a threat, in the end, as they might have thought at the time…
…but it was still a POTENTIAL threat.
If that fire really had blasted into the north end of town out of those foothils… it could have burned right past the U-Store-It area and set all of downtown on fire.
PS For all who are reading this
WTKTT has a couple of typos.
There are several places where he types B3 when he really means B33.
Given that these two Air Support Modules were “playing leap-frog” with each other throughout this day, I think it’s important to clarify this.
OK now that I just re-read this, I wish I could delete what I just wrote above.
Both B33 and B3 are both on the fire and this is the pass-off between them.
Sorry, WTKTT for making this mistake.
And PS.
F**K YOU SAIT/SAIR for writing up a report that made it seem as if Bravo 33/Air Attack was even REMOTELY involved in trying to line up ANYTHING even REMOTELY related to DivA Supervisor Eric Marsh and the Granite Mountain Hotshots as they were facing their situation and hence, DIE.
Again. I. Just. Can’t.
IMHO
There needs to be an INVESTIGATION
of their INVESTIGATION.
Thanks for posting this!! As in really!!
I may be up all night working through it.
While my state-of-the-art brand new camera that my now-deceased mom gave me for Christmas is still sitting, lonely, in its box under my kitchen table. And I’m supposed to be getting a bunch of things prepared so I can leave Burque early Saturday morning.
I think it’s really important that we clear this thing up as much as we can right now, since it has been total headaches all along given that seriously inaccurate SAIT YIN thing that people keep thinking is some kind of “gospel truth.”
So isn’t B33 basically flying a dry run to show the VLAT where he wants the VLAT? And Burfiend does the cut-across-the-throat gesture to get French (the pilot) to STOP and not drop the VLAT? Isn’t this what Calvin is saying?
I haven’t gotten there yet.
I seriously doubt Burfiend would use that gesture.
He has inter plane Communications with French they talk in the cockpit to each other all the time. Seperiate from the fire frequencies.
Chilin sounds good It is time to move on. We are not going any further here than the last time.
Bob, that’s exactly why Burfiend did it.
(And, umm, didn’t you say you weren’t talking to me ever again? Indeed, you have been saying that for months, if I recall correctly. It’s not really going too well for you, is it? 😉 Did you make any Lenten resolutions yesterday, by chance?)
Reply to Elizabeth post on February 19, 2015 at 8:04 pm
>> Elizabeth said…
>>
>> So isn’t B33 basically flying a dry run to show the VLAT
>> where he wants the VLAT?
He is showing him where he wants him to drop if they go through with it… yes… but this is the FIRST time VLAT 911 is even close enough to see what French wants because it is still INBOUND from DUE SOUTH where it had been in a holding pattern SEVEN MILES away.
They didn’t even get the point where you could call it a ‘dry run’ or a ‘show me’ before the MAYDAY radio traffic forced French to abandon that plan.
There are no ‘made a few practice runs’ as reported in the YIN B33 notes.
Never happened.
>> Elizabeth also said…
>>
>> And Burfiend does the cut-across-the-throat gesture to get
>> French (the pilot) to STOP and not drop the VLAT?
If any of these YIN B33 notes are to be believed… Burfiend did his ( inappropriate ) “slash across the throat” gesture to Thomas French AFTER the whole operation with VLAT 911 had already been ‘called off’. According to the timing it would have also been AFTER Burfiend had heard all the MAYDAY traffic including the final “Affirm!” transmit from Marsh verifying that they were deploying on the SOUTH side of the fire.
So Burfiend’s ( inappropriate ) “slash across the throat” gesture to French was more of an indication that Burfiend already felt the GM crew were “goners” and there wasn’t really going to be anything they could do about it. They did TRY, though. They had to. That was their job.
Here’s the B33 YIN notes you are mis-remembering…
Division A called and said “we are starting a burn out, we are getting in our shelters. I said we got pople in trouble. Tanker called and said I got you in sight. I claimed out – the DC10 swung wide. I looked at John and he did this (slash across the throat).
The way some of the SAIR YIN notes were done was piecemeal. If there were three folks in the interview, and two or three of them took notes, they would then aggregate their notes afterward, even if that meant that sometimes the notes were out of order or not fitting together well.
So… is that your way of saying there is no way of actually telling when just about anything REALLY happened with regards to these YIN B33 notes?
Was that also meant to imply that you don’t think anyone can be sure Burfiend’s “slash across the throat” gesture happened AFTER the VLAT drop had already been called off?
Please clarify what you were actually TRYING to say there.
POSTSCRIPT: Yes… it’s possible these YIN B33 notes are just one big out-of-sequence mess… but that’s just one more reason to criticize the SAIT for such a piss-poor investigation. Regardless of how many people were ‘taking notes’… they SHOULD have made an attempt to at least get the note-taking into the right order.
Thanks WTKTT I agree and support your notes.
Any thing else is not Creditable.
I would be the first one to accept that those ‘notes’ in the B33 YIN are TOTALLY out-of-sequence and cannot be trusted for one second to represent ANY kind of sequential reporting of events…
…but if they are to be believed… then Burfiend’s “Slash across the throat” gesture that he made to French in the cockput was… indeed… AFTER the VLAT run had been cancelled and AFTER all the MAYDAY traffic.
The YIN B33 notes themselves just suggest that was Burfiend’s way of indicating to French that according to what Burfiend had now just finished hearing on the A2G channel ( which French wasn’t listening to )… there wasn’t going to be much they were going to be able to do about this developing situation.
They still tried. What else was there to do?
Marti… far be it from me to even suggest what anyone should focus on… but I just feel the need to say “Don’t sweat this”.
It’s not going anywhere and we really have been ALL through this before.
There is nothing there that is really going to ‘prove’ or ‘disprove’ that statement in the YIN B33 regarding someone ( French? Burfiend? Clint Cross? ) *supposedly* reporting that they heard DIVSA Marsh say “That’s exactly what we want. That’s where we want the retardant” on the A2G channel.
John Burfiend was handling A2G exclusively at that time.
We ONLY have recordings of Thomas French on A2G and there are no captures of this (supposed) transmission on any other Panebaker video that was ‘accidentally’ capturing A2G traffic.
The ‘proof’ that has led to pretty much a ‘consensus’ ( which of course, never means a majority ) opinion that it probably could NOT have been DIVSA Marsh saying this ( if it was ever said by anyone ) comes from OTHER evidence mixed with a lot of just common sense.
The ONLY thing that is going to solve the mystery of that statement is if someone comes forward ( Like Dan Sullivan ) and actually says… “That was ME saying that and not DIVSA Marsh” and/or “That was ME talking to John Burfiend about where to drop retardant just before the MAYDAY calls”.
OR even Dan Sullivan CONFIRMING that he heard DIVSA say something similar.
Dan Sullivan definitely had A2G as his priority channel.
He heard EVERYTHING happening on A2G in this timeframe which is why HE was the one who had to inform OPS2 Paul Musser there had been a deployment.
If anyone ( other than him ) had heard the (supposed) 1637 “That’s where we want retardant” transmission OR… if anyone ( other than him ) was on the radio giving retardant drop instructions to John Burfiend circa 1639…
…then ASGS ( Air Support Group Supervisor ) Dan Sullivan would know about it.
He needs to be interviewed and/or deposed. That’s all there is to it.
Have a good trip.
Copy. Totally agree. Thanks for writing that.
I’m chillin’.
Eating BBQ chicken and mashed potatoes and sipping on my usual nightly hot orange juice and rum.
There’s just a part of me that wants to fix this mess.
But as you are saying, and Joy has also said, the Truth is working itself out on this, via us and others, in it’s own time.
Reply to Marti Reed post on February 19, 2015 at 2:11 pm
>> Marti said…
>>
>> And another little question I made my walk interrupt was, “But wait! If it was
>> Air OPS Dan Sullivan who made the ‘that’s where we want it’ call, you
>> would THINK Burfiend wouldn’t have confused THAT call sign with
>> Division Alpha!!”
>>
>> But who knows??
>>
>> But really, some version of the Dan Sullivan/Gary Cordes narrative has to be
>> where this all is leading.
>>
>> Given all of this stuff regarding all these missing Air Attack people, you
>> would THINK Air OPS Dan Sullivan would have been interviewed by ADOSH!
>>
>> But nope nada nothing.
Yes, you WOULD expect that he needed to be interviewed… especially given the fact that ( as you seem to have just proved below ) it is MOST likely that really was him saying that circa 1637 ( and not DIVSA Marsh )… and that he also most likely is that person discussing ‘retardand drops’ and general ‘Air Support’ strategy with John Burfiend circa 1639.
Dan Sullivan is now sort of like the “3 Prescotteers”.
We KNOW he was there… we (now) KNOW he was right there in the “thick of it” in the Shrine Road area and he was interacting with fire command and ( most probably ) ‘Bravo 33’ itself.
We KNOW he one of those who HEARD all the MAYDAY traffic on A2G ( and all the mysterious A2G transmits leading up to that ) because he’s the one who told OPS2 Paul Musser there had been a deployment.
But NO ONE has bothered to interview him… and NONE of the official reports really mention his ‘involvement’ ( in any way ) in the critical events of that afternoon as either a direct participant OR as a key witness… even though ( Just like the “3 Prescotteers” ) we KNOW he was BOTH.
According to TWO official investigations… it’s like he was never even there.
But he WAS there… and even unlike the “3 Prescotteers”… there is an official RESOURCE order for him as an “Air Support Group Supervisor” (ASGS) and other proof that he was THERE in Yarnell even before NOON ( 11:30 AM, according to Helibase Manager Brad Zeitler’s Unit Log ).
He was not ‘under the radar’ and ‘freelancing’ with a resource order that was obsolete by the time he got there… like the “3 Prescotteers” were.
He was officially ON THE CLOCK… as ASGS ( Air Support Group Supervisor )… since that very morning.
It’s just that there is very little evidence what he was really DOING all day.
Here’s a quick roundup about what we DO know regarding Dan Sullivan and his presence in Yarnell on Sunday, June 30, 2013.
And YES… it really looks VERY LIKELY now that he was the one sending the “That’s where we want retardant” message at 1637 and then, immediately after that, discussing the overall Air Support strategy for the south end of the fire with Air Attack ‘Bravo 33’ John Burstein.
I mean… what ELSE would he have been doing?
If he’d left the Brad Zeitler and the Helibase and ‘jumped into the pool’ down there in Yarnell… that’s exactly what he WOULD / SHOULD have been doing.
He wasn’t even being PAID to do anything but THAT… on that day.
** RESOURCE ORDER FOR DAN SULLIVAN
Dan Sullivan was ‘ordered up’ as an ASGS ( Air Support Group Supervisor ).
Dan Sullivan’s resource order from the “J- Resource Orders.pdf” document
PDF page 141 ( of 213 pages )
————————————————————————————-
Request Number: O-30
Ordered Date/Time: 06/30/13 0934 PNT
From: AZ-ADC (Dispatch) 800-309-7081
To: AZ-ADC 1
Resource Requested: AIR SUPPORT GROUP SUPERVISOR (ASGS)
Needed Date/Time: 06/30/13 1100 PNT
Deliver To: YARNELL HILL
From Unit: AZ-PDC
To Unit: AZ-ADC 06/30/13
Assigned Date/Time: 1010 PNT
Resource Assigned Unit ID: AZ-PNF
Resource Assigned: Sullivan, Dan (AZ-PDC) [EFF/AD]
M/D Indicator: D
Estimated Time of Departure: 07/01/13 1630 PNT
Estimated Time of Arrival: 07/01/13 1650 PNT
Released Date: 07/03/13 1238 PNT
Released To: PHOENIX SKY HARBOR INTL (PHX)
Travel Mode: ( No entry )
Financial Code: AZ-A1S-130688
Special Needs: NAME REQUEST FOR DAN SULLIVAN, RENTAL AOV, POV
Reporting Instructions: ICP MIDDLE CREEK SCHOOL IN PEEPLES
VALLEY 18912 HAYS RANCH ROAD, PEEPLES VALLEY AZ. REPORT
TO BRAD ZETTLER
————————————————————————————
From Helibase Manager Brad Zeitler’s Unit Log that wasn’t
released until February of 2014…
————————————————————————————
1130
Dan Sullivan, a qualified Air Support Group Supervisor (ASGS) from
the Prescott National Forest arrived and offered to assist.
1150
Dan Sullivan and myself met with Don Glascow at the Incident
Command Post and discussed an alternative helibase location.
Don offered a private airstrip owned by the ranch. Dan (Sullivan)
said that he would check out the airstrip to see if it could safely
meet our needs.
————————————————————————————
Those are the ONLY two mentions of Dan Sullivan in Brad Zeitler’s Unit Log… but it proves that ASGS Dan Sullivan was there in Yarnell as early as 11:30 AM on June 30, 2013.
** SO WHAT IS AN ASGS, ANYWAY?
From the NWCG online documentation…
———————————————————————
Air Support Group Supervisor (ASGS)
This ICS position is responsible for overseeing logistical support and management of helibase and helispot operations and temporary fixed-wing base(s) and reports to the Air Operations Branch Director. This position also maintains liaison with air tanker and fixed-wing bases supporting incident operations.
——————————————————————–
A DIVS and ASGS are, essentially, at the same management level in the ICS structure.
From the official AIR OPERATIONS Guide…
—————————————————-
https://www.fws.gov/contaminants/FWS_OSCP_05/fwscontingencyappendices/C-ICS/ICS-text/ICS10I-300Air.pdf
Incident Command System – National Training Curriculum
AIR OPERATIONS
NOTE: According to the ORG chart on page 12 in this official manual, the ASGS ( Air Support Group Supervisor ) is at the same exact ‘level’ as the ATGS ( Air Tactical Group Supervisor ) and they BOTH have an immediate up-level AOBD Supervisor ( Air Operations Branch Director ).
II.Air Operations Organization.
When activated, the Air Operations Branch Director (AOBD) is responsible for managing ALL air operations at an incident. This includes both TACTICAL and LOGISTICAL operations. Prior to the activation of the Air Operations Branch, management of aviation operations ( including the use of aircraft for logistical support ) is the responsibility of the Operations Secion Chief ( OSC ) or Incident Commander ( IC ) if the OSC position has not been activated.
It is not necessary to activate the Air Operations positions if the function can be adequately managed at the Operations Section Chief level.
A. Air Operations Branch Activities
The Air Operations Branch is managed by the Air Operations Branch Director ( AOBD ), who REPORTS to the Operations Section Chief (OSC). The Air Operations Branch Director for an incident is ALWAYS ground-based. Under the Air Operations Branch Director are TWO supervisors, the Air Tactical Group Supervisor (ATGS) and the Air Support Group Supervisor (ASGS).
1. Air Tactical Group Supervisor ( ATGS )
Is responsible for coordinating the airborne tactical operations of fixed- and/or rotary-wing aircraft operating on an incident. Helicopter Coordinators and Air Tanker/Fixed-Wing Coordinators may be assigned as required to manage their respective aircraft. If assigned, they will report to the Air Tactical Group Supervisor (ATGS).
2. Air Support Group Supervisor ( ASGS )
Provides logistical support to helicopters operating on an incident or at an event, and manages helibase and helispot operations. The Air Support Group Supervisor is ALSO responsible to maintain liason with fixed-wing air BASES.
—————————————————————————-
“2. Air Support Group Supervisor ( ASGS )
Provides logistical support to helicopters operating on an incident or at an event, and manages helibase and helispot operations. The Air Support Group Supervisor is ALSO responsible to maintain liason with fixed-wing air BASES.”
….AND….between the lines maybe, all things considered…….
…when a chaotic mess is beginning to happen and a fire is gradually reversing direction and threatening people and property etc…
…leaves the Incident Command Post…
(some……………time after briefing the USFS Air Study team as to what is happening and what they need to pay attention to and document)
…to drive out onto the actual fire (and do what??)……
………and then, as the Air Attack/Lead Plane is shifting from where they’ve been to the new place where they’re going…
…goes where the fire is headed to make sure that there’s some kind of ground support for their mission…
…and, when encountering a structure protection group supervisor who is attempting to evacuate a neighborhood when the said fire is bearing down upon it…
…especially when said structure protection group supervisor is not able to communicate with Air Attack…
….realizes things are going down the tubes rapidly…
…and quickly converses with that supervisor who, relatively speaking, knows what’s happening….
…and communicates with Air Attack ordering a retardant drop over that endangered, evacuating neighborhood…
…and then, in conversation with that supervisor, and, while paying attention to the fact that the fire is now also threatening another neighborhood to the west of that one…
…communicates with Air Attack that another retardant drop needs to be laid to the west of the one they just did, since another neighborhood is seriously endangered and the folks who live there haven’t been given enough warning to evacuate in time…
…and hears said Air Attack describe how that might be difficult at this point…….
…so, therefore, then heads out of the current neighborhood, towards the west, to stay in contact with Air Attack…
…and then, when hearing, over the Air 2 Ground channel a MAYDAY and a deployment……
…when encountering the Field Ops who is parked on the highway…
…stops to tie in with him and, upon hearing that said Field Ops doesn’t know about the deployment, advises him of it…
…and……….
……….I wonder what Dan Sullivan did next?
I bet he knew the Granite Mountain Hotshots.
And this is a person who was neither mentioned by the Serious Accident Invention Team in their Serious Accident Investigation Report nor realized by the Arizona Department of Occupational Safety in Health that……….
…….they might need to interview him, all things considered.
And all of the above could be complete fiction and utter horse manure…..
But it IS GROUNDED in some serious EVIDENCE
And I think it is, therefore, as good of a narrative
As any of the OFFICIAL reports have given us.
FWIW… I would agree with every ‘STEP’ of your ‘scenario above’.
Yes… it’s just another ‘narrative’ at this point… but it would make sense and there IS evidence to support it.
it would actually explain a LOT of ( so far ) ‘unexplained’ things.
Like I said below… if Dan Sullivan had really senses how it was all hitting the fan and he ‘jumped into the pool’ down there in Yarnell to see if he could help…then what ELSE would he have been doing?
He was HIRED as an ASGS. That’s what he would have been doing.
And since an ATGS ( Burfiend in B33 ) is on the same exact ORG level chart plane as an ASGS… if ASGS Dan Sullivan had called him to talk about the Air Tactics… John Burfiend was pretty much REQUIRED to respond to him.
I think that’s relatively speaking what happened.
*Drinks hot orange juice with rum*
*Eats barbecued chicken*
*Breathes*
Can’t wait to hear what Donut has to say.
Whenever.
*Is thankful to the Universe that this is her awesome daughter’s birthday and that a whole lot of things aligned so she could give her daughter a truly awesome, very much needed, birthday present*
Marti said
Cordes is the ONLY “OVERHEAD” with the kind of AUTHORITY everyone said someone would NEED to be conversing with B33 about those retardant drops, and who is in any LOCATION, that I know of, where he would have SEEN the 4:33 drop and would KNOW what it was about because it was RIGHT over where he was located in that Norton Way neighborhood (evacuating people as the fire was burning toward them), RIGHT below where that retardant was DROPPED (in order to stop that fire that he was evacuating endangered people from).
I think I am a bit confused.
You are talking about a 1633 drop in the paragraph above. But the supposed radio transmission from DivA came at 1637? Right?
And I have always thought (incorrectly?) that the comment “that is exactly where we want it” was not associated with an actual drop, but instead DivA was saying that B33 was in the right place for the drop as they were lining it up.
The first retardant drop that was laid down by Bravo 33 and a Tanker (can’t remember which one) was “at” 4:33 PM. There is footage of it. We’ve been calling it the “4:33 drop” or something along those lines for months.
It was flown from southwest to northeast, starting just west of Shrine Road, ran along the north-ish side of the so-called (in interviews) Norton Way area, exactly above where Gary Cordes (et al some unknown others) were getting people to evacuate at that time, because the fire was bearing down on that neighborhood.
The retardant line exactly stopped the fire from burning through the neighborhood. You can see it on the aerial photography.
That’s what that call was about. If you “start” a retardant drop at 4:33 ish, it is logical that a 4:37 call that says “that’s where we want that” is about that retardant drop, not some other, necessarily later, show-me flight over a completely different area of the fire.
That’s why WTKTT, Bob Powers, and I have been saying all along that DivS Marsh was not in a position to definitively see, much less evaluate that drop, Much less have much of anything to do with it.
And that is why I have been assuming that the 1633 drop was not what Marsh was calling to B33 about.
B33 YIN
We came around, made a practice run through the bowl, west to east. I was talking to Tom about the rising terrain on exit. Division A clad and said “that is what we are looking for, that is exactly right”.
I know that’s what you’re reading in the YIN.
Problem is that what was actually HAPPENING from 4:33 to 4:37 was an ACTUAL retardant drop over the Norton Way neighborhood (it’s in the Air 2 Air video), which is where Gary Cordes (and probably also Air OPS Dan Sullivan) were actually working, evacuating that neighborhood as the fire was bearing down upon it, which is why they were making that drop in that place.
In Eric Panebaker’s “Panebaker Photo and Video Information.docs” it is listed as:
1624 T413 in area.
1633 T413 drop.
1640 Possible deployment in division A, hold T910.
1647 Still can’t find people or get ahold of Div. A or Granite ;Mountain.
1658 T910, CL4 full load.
Marti Reed says
FEBRUARY 19, 2015 AT 3:58 PM
There’s no time in that list for this:
“We came around, made a practice run through the bowl, west to east. I was talking to Tom about the rising terrain on exit. Division A clad and said “that is what we are looking for, that is exactly right”.
Unless it’s a show-me for the 1633 T413 drop, which would have happened before 1633 and still wouldn’t have been over where Eric Marsh was, in terms of evaluating either the practice run or the actual drop, given where they were aiming that drop.
I KNOW it’s confusing. If it wasn’t, we would have figured it out a LONG time before now.”
Couple that with the fact ( stated many times before ) that it just doesn’t make any sense that just because someone ( with actual experience regarding Air Operations ) might have seen a plane circling around somewhere that that is ANY reason to assume THAT flight is an imminent drop location WITHOUT having further communications about it.
If B33 as instructed was picking the drop locations.
and never talked to Marsh/DIVA, then also the statement is out of context. Other wise 33 would have been discussing with DIVA about where he was and the drop he wanted.
NO ONE HAS EVER SAID ANY THING ABOUT A DISCUSSION LIKE THAT……….
The B33 said DIVA Clade —-Could very well be the SAIR
adding something to the Statement, as WTKTT has been saying. The YIN is a condensed version of the Full investigation.
B33 never knew where marsh was Lat.& Long.
and could never confirm a location any closer than South side of fire.
Every time we look at it… the likelihood that that statement in the YIN B33 notes is accurate just DECREASES…
…and the likelihood it either never happened OR was someone else ( Which Marti has basically additionally proved today could EASILY have been the actual ASGS Dan Sullivan who was right there in Yarnell ) just INCREASES.
I mean c’mon. If there had been ANY intention on B33’s part of paying ANY attention to this supposed 1637 call… why would Air Attack Burfiend still not be sure ( 5 minutes later ) where in the hell the guy even WAS.
“So… you’re on the south side of the fire, then?”
Does that sound ANY”THING like what an Air Attack would be asking someone just minutes after he ( supposedly ) talked to him about a retardant drop?
Didn’t add up at from day one… and still doesn’t now.
calvin… if you are going to continue to just keep referring back to that statement in the YIN B33 interview and treat it as the gospel truth… that’s OK… but here we are again presenting ALL kinds of evidence ( once again… deja vu ) that that statement in the 3rd-person-removed YIN B33 notes most likely was just ‘in error’ with regards to WHO might have been saying it… or exactly WHEN.
Yes… that statement is THERE in the YIN. No question. Always has been.
No… it is really NOT likely that’s what actually happened… and the evidence just keeps mounting that either Burfiend or French ( and/or Clint Cross ) were mistaken about WHO this was coming from ( and exactly WHEN ).
I really don’t know what else to say about this one.
It’s all been said before… and now Marti is providing yet another plausible explanation for it. It was coming from ASGS Dan Sullivan and he was ‘confirming the goodness’ of that 1633 Air Drop.
It really was ‘spot on’… and was making a difference… and he would have been encouraging B33 to continue what they were doing.
And PS. While I was looking at that list-note-docx I found this:
“Video in the “video_with_134175_audio” is video taken with a Contour 2 camera and the audio from the Air-to-Air frequency 134.175. This footage is almost a constant feed of the of the air-to-air radio traffic. There are a few breaks due to battery issues and the footage cut off when we left the Peoples Valley location to assist with the medical/recovery task force.”
Le sigh.
Not a word about an audio file or ANYTHING regarding the Air 2 Ground channel being recorded.
I could actually cry about that.
I could accept the fact that they just didn’t do it… and whoever had informed ADOSH that the SAIT already had such recordings ( which is what prompted ADOSH to specifically ask for them in THEIR FOIA request to US Forestry for the Panebaker material ) was somehow mistaken… or was actually just referring to the haphazard and occasional background A2G captures in the videos themselves…
…but I would still say that was a pretty piss-poor way to go about doing an EXPENSIVE “Aerial Firefighting Study” at the taxpayer’s expense.
If they didn’t have enough equipment to do the job RIGHT… then this ‘government contract’ should have gone to someone who DID.
I totally agree.
And like I said before, hooking up a digital recorder to another friggin radio is neither rocket science nor EXPENSIVE.
They had, let’s see, HOW many friggin cameras, how many friggin people, how many vehicles, and I think even a utv in a friggin trailer, and maybe even a partridge in a pear tree?
There’s just something about this that just isn’t, in my opinion, passing the “smell test.
It just doesn’t make sense to me that they would have been doing all of this to document the effectiveness of aerial fire suppression without recording stuff like:
“that’s great that’s exactly where we want it” on a retardant drop that saved a neighborhood from a wildfire in the last minutes while people were being evacuated, without recording the ground crew and the Air OPS (who Eric Panebaker had been briefed by) saying that, and then next discussing where, it seems to me to have happened, given what B33 said next, that ground contact Air OPS wanted the next retardant drop to go, and what Air Attack said might be the difficulty of doing that.
I mean really?
As they say on Twitter:
I. Just. Can’t.
I mean, given this operation,
Who knows how much Dan Sullivan was involved in a whole lot of OTHER retardant drops as well…..
And we have neither…..
ANY interviews with him……..
or
ANY recordings of the Air 2 Ground channel over which any of that coordination (or any including anybody else — which probably was happening) and evaluation would have been happening.
Something in me just doesn’t believe this.
Not only that, but they drove/flew in from Montana, Colorado, and California to do it!!!
And I’m being told they didn’t hook up a recorder to a radio to record the Air 2 Ground channel?
I just I just I just I just……
Don’t believe that.
I just don’t.
Remember, all these folks either directly or indirectly….
work for the United States Forest Service.
>> Marti said…
>>
>> I. Just. Can’t.
Imagine when they would have gone to actually WRITE UP this ‘Aerial Firefighting Study”… OR produce a video ( we don’t even know what the target format was since there isn’t even any evidence of this CONTRACT anywhere on any GSA site ).
How would they have actually gone about ‘writing this up’ WITHOUT being able to match drops with associated Air-To-Ground conversation?
It would still have been a report leaving people asking… “Nice video and stuff… but WHO was asking for these drops and how closely were the fly-boys following instructions from the ground?”
Exactly. There’s just no way.
They would have HAD to anchor it to Air 2 Ground.
I definitely think someone in the higher echelons of the USFS decided
NOPE
and engineered this thing.
Kinda sorta like “someone” with Prescott Fire Department engineered the long and winding path of Chris McKenzie’s Canon Powershot Camera; and like “someone” with the USFS engineered the “release” of their “version” of Aaron Hulburd’s videos.
No tin-foil hat needed.
PS I don’t really have time to do this right now, but we might oughtta go over that 1643 Air2Air video and see if it adds any clarity to this.
Been there. Done that. I believe the last time we covered this there was quite enough evidence to simply say it is very likely that statement in the B33 YIN was NOT coming from DIVSA Marsh.
As always… I am willing to stand corrected.
But as for doing all that dog-work again… it would be calvin’s turn this time to go through that and see if HE can find something that further supports HIS theory that the YIN B33 should be taken as gospel truth.
Personally… I still think it is MUCH more important to find out who John Burfiend was speaking to in those final seconds BEFORE the first MAYDAY call… and what the REST of that conversation was like.
Somewhere in solving THAT mystery might be the answer to this long-standing mystery about that YIN B33 statement as well.
And yes… I’m talking about SOMEONE getting ANOTHER Interview/deposition/cross-examination ( under-oath this time ) with Mr. John Burfiend… and NOT while he has Thomas French in the room with him as he did for whatever pseudo-interview the SAIT did.
There’s no time in that list for this:
“We came around, made a practice run through the bowl, west to east. I was talking to Tom about the rising terrain on exit. Division A clad and said “that is what we are looking for, that is exactly right”.
Unless it’s a show-me for the 1633 T413 drop, which would have happened before 1633 and still wouldn’t have been over where Eric Marsh was, in terms of evaluating either the practice run or the actual drop, given where they were aiming that drop.
I KNOW it’s confusing. If it wasn’t, we would have figured it out a LONG time before now.
Ack. WTKTT dropped his reply in right where I wanted this one to go.
When it rains it pours.
Since we have been all over this ( in detail ) before… it’s also worth noting that we determined as best we could that the ONLY time anyone out in that bowl could have been witnessing a due WEST-TO-EAST flight of ‘Bravo 33’ is that moment when the Panebaker Air-To-Air channel captures prove that the VLAT was inbound from the SOUTH… and they were just ‘circling around’ trying to get in FRONT of it for a ‘live drop’ exactly where the 1633 ‘spot on’ SEAT drop had taken place… and someone had called and said “That’s it. That’s where we want the retardant”.
They were going to just CONTINUE dropping in that same location where the 1633 SEAT drop had been ‘spot on’… and someone on the ground (apparently) confirmed that to them.
So at no time was the VLAT ‘following’ French and Burfiend in any kind of WEST-TO-EAST direction.
French and Burfiend were just ‘circling around’ down there trying to get in FRONT of the VLAT inbound from the SOUTH.
If it was a show me, it was a show me for the DC10. T413 had already dropped.
But I will stop here.
French and Burfiend ( after the 1633 SEAT drop that was ‘spot on’ ) did actually intend to do a ‘show me’ for the VLAT that was inbound from the south…
…but as they were circling around in front of the VLAT the pilot said he thought he had the target in sight and so they deicded to just ‘go live’.
The TARGET for that drop was the SAME area where the 1633 SEAT drop had taken place. It was going to happen in basically a SOUTH-TO-NORTH direction.
The ONLY reason anyone could have perceived ‘Bravo 33’ flying any kind of WEST-TO-EAST route would have simply been the moment they were trying to make a ‘tight circle’ and get in FRONT of the VLAT as it was inbound from the SOUTH.
This is actually ALL documented in real time in the Panebaker Air-To-Air channel captures ( complete with compass and heading directions being reported by the pilots themselves ) and we really have been all over this ( in detail ) before.
I still acknowldege that this statement in the YIN you keep bringing up DOES exist. It’s there. It’s always been there.
I have no idea HOW it got there.
We aren’t seeing the ACTUAL interview transcripts.
You could even call these YIN notes “FOURTH hand” notes… since even the person transcribing what might have been handwritten notes from a 3rd party interview could have added their own screw-ups to it.
Followup…
One of the other reasons to really NOT trust that statement in the YIN B33 interview as far as accuracy goes ( with respect to WHO said it… and WHEN )… is that the YIN B33 notes are OBVIOUSLY incomplete.
There is absolutely NO mention on Burfiend’s part of this EXTENDED conversation he was then having with someone in those 120 seconds between 1637 and 1639 and the start of the MAYDAY traffic.
It happened. We can HEAR it happening ourselves.
So why is it not even mentioned in the YIN B33 stuff?
The exclusion of something as important as THAT from the YIN B33 notes just has to make you sort of not trust those particular interview notes at all… IMHO.
No. I don’t agree with you, at this point.
I started looking at the Air 2 Air video (before I broke off to rant about the Air Study not having a recording of the Air 2 Ground traffic) and there IS a bit of show-me positioning going on between French and the tanker before the 4:33 drop.
And I don’t think that’s irrelevant to this possibility. I think, right now, it’s POSSIBLE that what B33 says in the YIN is related to this “show me.”
And that’s why I told WTKTT that “we” should do another go-over of the 1643 video and again see/hear what’s going on.
( Heavy sigh ).
Watch for a new parent comment.
I will publish the ENTIRE transcript of the Panebaker Air-To-Air Channel video that covers this timeframe ( once again ) somewhere above… when I get a chance.
I assure you you won’t even find the evidence that matches the YIN B33 statement of “We flew a couple of practice runs”.
They didn’t even have TIME for that.
I’m totally not surprised.
And thank you!
See above.
The ENTIRE transcript for that Air-To-Air channel video covering the 1630 to 1645 timeframe has been added as a new parent comment.
It still doesn’t match some statements being made in the YIN B33 notes… and it never will.
AND
There was NO “show me” for the DC 10 happening at all in any of this time framework.
It was INTERRUPTED
by the DEPLOYMENT
while the DC 10 was circling on stand-by
way up high above.
Weeelll… not technically true.
French WAS in the process of bringing the VLAT in from the south… and was already discussing where the drop should go and giving ‘Kevin’ some headings and whatnot… but YES… ALL of that was then interrupted by the deployment radio traffic.
I’m gonna put this at the top, because I think I just figured out who the mystery person was on the B33 convo re the retardant drops we’ve been collectively scratching out heads over.
In order to really understand this you need to read my reply that this reply was attached to but this is what all of a sudden dawned on me. So here it is:
“Marti Reed says
FEBRUARY 19, 2015 AT 1:06 PM
I just had another thought, after writing that, and after reading Musser’s interview.
Musser said he learned about the deployment when Dan Sullivan, who was Air OPS, drove by while he was parked on 89.
Maybe Dan Sullivan was involved in this. It would make perfect sense that he would have been. If he just drove by Musser at the intersection with 89, he could have been heading west from the Norton Way area towards Glen Isla and conversing with B33 about a line further to the west to protect Glen Isla.
He might not even had known Gary couldn’t connect with B33 via Air 2 Ground. Heck, they could have been standing together in the Norton Way area, Sullivan said to B33, something like I’m with Gary and “that’s right where we want it,” then he suggested they drop a line over Glen Isla, B33 said what they said at the beginning of the Helmet Cam Video,” B33 didn’t know Gary couldn’t hear/speak with them, broke the convo and called Gary.
Meanwhile Dan Sullivan took off, heard the Breaking in Mayday and the Deployment on his Air 2 Ground, (which Gary couldn’t hear), saw Musser and told HIM about the deployment.
Gary then headed down to the Ranch House Cafe and tied in with his crew, where HE heard about the deployment from Engine 59,
BOOM!”
The comment this was a reply to was actually a reply to something WTKTT had written saying why it couldn’t have been Gary Cordes:
“Marti Reed says
FEBRUARY 19, 2015 AT 12:46 PM
Exactly. I’ve known that all along. And I essentially said that.
HOWEVER what made me think Cordes might have had something to do with responding to that drop and participating (via a relay or a borrowed radio) with B33 regarding the NEXT drop was, as I said,
Cordes is the ONLY “OVERHEAD” with the kind of AUTHORITY everyone said someone would NEED to be conversing with B33 about those retardant drops, and who is in any LOCATION, that I know of, where he would have SEEN the 4:33 drop and would KNOW what it was about because it was RIGHT over where he was located in that Norton Way neighborhood (evacuating people as the fire was burning toward them), RIGHT below where that retardant was DROPPED (in order to stop that fire that he was evacuating endangered people from).
And it also fits with Musser saying he wasn’t involved and the divisions and “groups” were running that show.
Get my logic?
Because of that, I am STILL not ready to write him out of this equation.
PS Is everybody else having to sign in just about every time they post a comment like I am????? The spam must be on a roll!
After which I had added, in a moment of mystified frustration:
“Marti Reed says
FEBRUARY 19, 2015 AT 12:49 PM
If somebody else can conjure up anybody else who would have been right there, also, in view of that drop, and had the authority to be involved in that operation, I’m perfectly willing to stand corrected.”
I guess I did my own conjuring.
Yes… it now looks VERY likely that the 1637ish “That’s where we want retardant” message and then the subsequent discussion of overall Air Support strategy for the south end of the fire had everything to do with “Air Support Group Supervisor” (ASGS) Dan Sullivan.
He had left Brad Zeitler ( Helibase Manager ) at some point and had apparently ‘jumped into the pool’ on the south end of the fire to help OPS2 Paul Musser.
Since that was the case… then what ELSE would he even have been doing BUT trying to ‘coordinate’ the Air Support down there?
That would, in fact, be exactly what he was being PAID to do that day… and he had been in Yarnell since 11:30 AM that morning ( according to Helibase Manager Brad Zeitler’s Unit Log ).
Remember, we don’t know Todd Abel relayed to B33 the info that Gary Cordes wanted them to “drop at will” because he couldn’t communicate with B33.
Musser does say that Gary told Abel to do that, while they were standing together on 89 (in a DIFFERENT LOCATION from where Cordes was during this Norton Way retardant drop thing).
But apparently it may be highly possible that Abel didn’t relay that to B33. Or maybe he did and B33 just forgot. And that’s why he mistakenly tried to contact Gary.
I’m not getting the 15 other things done that I need to do today, so I’m going to have to SAFK (step away from keyboard). I’m getting ready to (YAY!!) flee Burque and head to Jemez Springs early Saturday and I need to AT LEAST unbox my new camera that’s been sitting in a box under my kitchen table since my mom gave it to me for Christmas.
And do a whole bunch more other things.
But I’m ALWAYS READING!
We still don’t even know if that directive to Air Support to “Drop at will” might have gone up to Air Attack Rory Collins… just BEFORE he left the Yarnell airspace… and maybe HE is the one who forgot to pass that ‘directive’ on to ‘Bravo 33’.
We DO have that Air-To-Air channel radio traffic capture covering this entire time period… and there is NO such directive being passed on from Rory Collins to Thomas French ( not on the Air-To-Air channel, anyway ).
ADOSH was never able to interview the elusive Mr. Rory Collins.
They tried and tried… but no one even knew WHERE he was.
Turns out he was ‘out of the country, or something like that.
And yes, BINGO!
Right before I ran out for my required 1/2 mile afternoon walk, I was starting a quick run-thru in my mind about “Wait, who would have gotten that, Collins or B33???” when I said to myself, “STOP and go for a walk.”
It was at a perfect time for that callout to get lost in the shuffle.
And another little question I made my walk interrupt was, “But wait! If it was Air OPS Dan Sullivan who made the ‘that’s where we want it’ call, you would THINK Burfiend wouldn’t have confused THAT call sign with Division Alpha!!”
But who knows??
But really, some version of the Dan Sullivan/Gary Cordes narrative has to be where this all is leading.
Given all of this stuff regarding all these missing Air Attack people, you would THINK Air OPS Dan Sullivan would have been interviewed by ADOSH!
But nope nada nothing.
**
** WHAT WAS ‘LEFT OUT’ OF BRENDAN MCDONOUGH’S
** FIRST ADOSH INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPT
I am NOT trying to change the main discussion topic away from the ‘Air-To-Ground’ radio exchanges ’roundup’ that’s been taking place… but with only 6 days and some hours to go before Brendan McDonough (supposedly) supplies this ‘new information’ he says he has… I just wanted to get the following ‘off my desk’ ( so to speak ).
There is no great revelation here now that Brendan McDonough HIMSELF is admitting he has NEVER told investigators “all he knows” and/or “all he HEARD”… but it turns out there WAS every indication he “HEARD more than he was saying” way back when during his ADOSH interview.
For his first ADOSH interview… Brendan was VERY ‘tentative’ and ‘cautious’ and was obviously being careful to “only answer questions you are asked” and “don’t volunteer information”.
His attorney Emily Dolan was sitting right next to him throughout that ADOSH interview and I have to believe Brendan was simply following HER legal advice for that interview.
Nothing wrong with that. Emily Dolan was just ‘earning her paycheck’ and ‘doing her job’ and advising her client how to comply with this interview process… but not get into ‘gray’ areas while doing so OR ‘over testify’.
I’m absolutely sure that she probably advised him “It’s okay if you don’t volunteer information. Just make sure you don’t make any FALSE statements in response to the specific questions they are going to ask you. That would be the WORST thing you could do, in this situation.”
So you can HEAR Brendan sort of conducting himself along these lines, as per that kind of ‘legal advice’… but Brendan ‘slipped up’ pretty bad at one point.
There WAS a moment when he STARTED to say one thing… obviously ‘caught himself’ before the rest of the words left his mouth… and then ‘backed away’ from what he was GOING to say.
It was during one of those moments that never actually made it into the TRANSCRIPT for his first ADOSH interview and was just indicated in the transcript with a blurb that said (( Crosstalk )).
There were almost a DOZEN times during that interview where the ADOSH transcriber just used the phrase (( Crosstalk )) and didn’t make a good attempt to really HEAR what was being said at those times.
At some point I went back and listened to ALL of these (( Crosstalk )) sections in Brendan’s ADOSH interview and discovered it’s actually pretty clear what was being said. Why the transcriber him/herself would chose to not transcribe some of these sections and just type the phrases (( Crosstalk )) or (( unintelligible )) is a mystery, if you listen to the actual AUDIO.
I’m not going to list ALL of these actual transcriptions of ALL of these (( Crosstalk )) and (( unintelligible )) sections. I have them here… but there really are no great revelations in any of them…
…except maybe for THIS one.
I’m going to just ‘dump’ the section from the actual ADOSH transcription first… complete with just the (( Crosstalk )) and (( unintelligible )) blurbs that were in the original document… and then I’m going to show you what was ACTUALLY said inside of those (( Crosstalk )) and (( unintelligible )) moments based on the AUDIO tape itself.
From Brendan McDonough’s FIRST ( of two ) ADOSH interviews on August 20, 2013…
Q1 = Barry Hicks, ADOSH
Q2 = Dave Larsen, WFA / ADOSH ( Rest in Peace )
A = Brendan McDonough
—————————————————————————–
2012 Q2: So when you – you went and they picked you up and you moved vehicles and
2013 all that stuff that’s going on, do you know what the – what the crew was
2014 doing? Were they moving towards the ranch?
2015
2016 A: That wasn’t relayed to me. I just told – ‘cause I knew – I knew the storm was
2017 coming in. I knew they weren’t — I mean, you don’t want to sit there and be a
2018 Chatty Cathy on the radio. ‘Cause I told them, “Hey if you guys need
2019 anything? I’ll be with Blue Ridge.” They knew that. “Um, just let me know.
2020 And I’ll get ahold of you and I’ll see you guys soon.”
2021
2022 Q1: Right.
2023
2024 (( Crosstalk ))
2025
2026 A: …last transmission that (unintelligible).
2027
2028 Q1: Yeah. Anything else, Dave, that you can think of?
—————————————————————————–
So this was just one of the moments in the interview when Brendan was being directly asked what he knew about what Granite Mountain was doing during/following his own evacuation from his lookout position… and the moments after that… and what he might have known about WHERE they were going and/or HOW they were getting there.
SIDENOTE: In one of the letters from the Arizona Forestry lawyers to ADOSH Administrative Law Judge Michael A. Mosesso regarding that whole frap about trying to force Brendan to testify back on November 26, 2013… the AZF lawyers were suggesting to Judge Mosesso that ADOSH had ‘botched’ their interviews with Brendan and had never asked him about this ‘timeframe’ with regards to GM. That is NOT the case. As shown above… ADOSH did specifically ask Brendan ( even more than just this once ) about the “Where was GM going” timeframe and gave Brendan every opportunity to tell them, right then and there, everything he might have known ( or HEARD ) in that ‘after leaving the black’ timeframe. Brendan CHOSE to NOT do that… at that time.
Now here is that same section from the ADOSH transcript complete with what was ACTUALLY being said during those (( Crosstalk )) and (( unintelligible )) moments…
NOTE: It isn’t just the (( Crosstalk )) and the (( unintelligible )) parts that are ‘filled in’ here.
The ADOSH transcriber actually mis-heard some of the other questions/statements and
left some words out.
Example: In the question from Q2 ( Dave Larsen – Rest in Peace )… the transcriber
actually left the words SAFETY ZONE off the end of what Mr. Larsen ACTUALLY
asked Brendan McDonough.
So this is the more ACCURATE transcription, including what Larsen and Hicks were saying.
—————————————————————————–
2012 Q2: So when you – you went and they picked ya up and you moved vehicles and
2013 all that stuff is goin’ on, do you know what the – what the crew was
2014 doin’? Were they moving towards the ranch SAFETY ZONE?
2015
2016 A: That wasn’t relayed to me. I just told – ‘cause I knew – I knew the storm was
2017 coming in. I knew they weren’t — I mean, you don’t wanna sit there and be a
2018 Chatty Cathy on the radio… so I told ’em, “Hey… if you guys need
2019 anything I’ll be with Blue Ridge.” They knew that. “Um, just lemmee know…
2020 and I’ll get ahold a ya and I’ll see you guys soon.”
2021
2022 Q1: Right.
2023
2024 (( Crosstalk ))
Q1: Was that your…
A: That’s the last…
Q1: That was your last?…
A: I heard… I mean…
2025
2026 A: …that last transmission with them goin’ off ( with Steed? ).
Q2: Really?
Q1: Okay
2027 ( 4 second pause. No conversation ) Q1: Uh…( 5 second pause. No conversation )
2028 Q1: Anything else, Dave, that you can think of?
—————————————————————————–
So there is no question there that Brendan sort of ‘dodges’ the direct question about whether he knew GM was ‘moving’ with the legal semantic of “That wasn’t relayed TO me”.
In other words… Brendan’s responsne there was probably based on even more Emily Dolan legal advice going into the interview along the lines of “If they ask you about any radio communications that you were NOT a DIRECT participant in and/or NOT DIRECTLY targeted TO YOU… you don’t have to talk about them”.
And THIS is what was actually being said during the (( Crosstalk )) moment…
————————————
Q1: Was that your…
A: That’s the last…
Q1: That was your last?…
A: I heard… I mean…
————————————
Brendan McDonough had just reiterated that “Lemmee know if you need anything. See ya soon” conversation he admits having with Steed as Frisby was picking him up… but then ADOSH investigator Barry Hicks was specifically trying to clarify if that was the LAST time he either heard or talked to them.
Brendan started to say “That’s the last I heard… ( ? from them )”
but he audibly CATCHES himself before finishing that statement, stumbles for a moment and just says “I mean…” then he corrects himself and just says…
2026 A: …that last transmission with them goin’ off ( with Steed? ).
So it appears that Brendan was ABOUT to answer Hick’s question “Was that the LAST time ( ? you heard form them) with an affirmative “That’s the last time I heard ( ? from them )”…
but he CATCHES himself and then consciously decides to ‘back off’ from saying that was that last time he HEARD something… to that’s the last TRANSMISSION I participated in with them.
Right along with the lawyer’s probable advice of “don’t say anything about radio transmissions in which you were not an involved participant”.
So again… no great revelation here now that we KNOW Brendan has always known more than he was saying… and has always HEARD more then he has previously admitted to… but I thought it was interesting to see how close he came to admitting this in his first ADOSH interview.
And it seems that Musser wasn’t volunteering any info to ADOSH either.
Per the YIN Musser and Abel
Musser hears radio traffic from Eric Marsh, Granite Mountain, that said “they were going to pre-determined route to the structures”. Musser was not sure who that radio traffic was sent to?
But I do not see one thing about that in Musser’s ADOSH interview.
calvin… it’s there.
Near the end of Musser’s ADOSH interview.
Musser repeats ( nearly word for word ) to ADOSH what you just pointed out WAS also in the YIN including the part where he wasn’t sure WHO that message was being sent TO.
From Planning OPS2 Paul Musser’s ADOSH interview on August 16, 2013
Q2 = Barry Hicks, ADOSH investigator
A = Planning OPS2 Paul Musser
————————————————————————–
2545 Q2: Oh. Uh, anything else you can think of that we probably need to know at this
2546 point and time? Uh…
2547
2548 A: Uh, at one point I did hear Granite Mountain say they were using their
2549 predetermined route towards the structures.
2550
2551 Q2: Oh, you did hear that?
2552
2553 A: I did – I overheard that. Uh, I don’t know whether that was Granite talking to
2554 Eric or who they were – I did – I overheard that part of a conversation.
Page 58
2555
2556 Q2: Between Granite and somebody?
2557
2558 A: Yes.
2559
2560 Q2: Uh, but you don’t know who they were actually talking or…
2561
2562 A: No I do not.
2563
2564 Q2: But that had to be…
2565
2566 A: That was…
2567
2568 Q2: …some – sometime after that picture?
2569
2570 A: Uh, I assume it was after that picture. I don’t know whether it was prior to
2571 they were just getting ready or what. I don’t know that.
2572
2573 Q2: Uh…
2574
2575 A: But there was no urgency, no – never talked of an escape route or safety zones
2576 or anything like that. It was just – or…
2577
2578 Q2: And how did they say it? They…
2579
2580 A: I think they said we’re going down our predetermined route towards the
2581 structures, I think is what was said.
2582
2583 Q2: Uh…
2584
2585 Q: Is that predetermined route something they might have marked with flags or…
2586
2587 A: Uh, obviously whoever – who they were talking to knew what that meant.
2588
2589 Q: Okay.
———————————————————————-
This was discussed just recently down below in the same comment where I introduced that first (preliminary) GM-To-AA-On-AA transmissions ’roundup’ list.
http://www.investigativemedia.com/yarnell-hill-fire-chapter-xii/#comment-261402
To reiterate… I think the fact that Musser seems to remember hearing both phrases “predetermined route’ and ‘structures’ in the same transmission *could* mean the conversation he was ‘over-hearing’ ( but didn’t know who was talking to who ) was that 4:13 PM exchange captured in the Panebaker video.
That’s the transmission ( at 4:13 PM ) where Eric Marsh was directly responding to someone asking “Granite Mountain… wuz yo status rat now?” that contains BOTH of those phrases and went like this…
From Panebaker 20130630_161620_VLAT_split_1_EP.MOV video
—————————————————————————-
NOTE: This exchange is all taking place on the TAC 1 channel, and NOT the Air-To-Ground channel.
+0:41 ( 1613.30 / 4:13.30 PM )
(Unknown): Granite Mountain ( Five? )… What’s your status right now?
NOTE: A pretty heavy accent on this speaker. Sounds like
Louisiana Cajun? What he says almost sounds like…
“Granite Montun… wuz yo status rat now?
ALSO NOTE: Even though the caller asked for ‘Granite Mountain’ specifically, and not ‘DIVS A’… Eric Marsh responds immediately on behalf of Granite Mountain before Jesse Steed even has a chance to say anything. Jesse only appears to ‘chime in’ with his own ‘status’ report about “we’re pushin’ our way down into the structures” when Marsh is done speaking.
+0:52 ( 1613.41 / 4:13.31 PM )
(Eric Marsh): Well the guys… uh… Granite… is makin’ their way out the exact
escape route from this mornin’… an’ it heads… ah… (pause) SOUTH. ( slight pause ) mid-slope, cuttin’ over.
+1:07 ( 1613.56 / 4:13.56 PM )
( Another voice immediately adds to what Marsh said but it is )
( NOT Marsh this time. It sounds like Jesse Steed )
(Jesse Steed??): We’ll be pushin’ our way down into the structures.
+1:10 ( 1613.59 / 4:13.59 PM )
( Another voice. Very quickly): Copy that.
+1:21 ( 1614.10 / 4:14.10 PM )
(Unknown): Ten four. You with Granite Mountain right now?
NOTE: Whoever is talking with Marsh at this point uses the phrase ‘Ten four’ to acknowledge a transmission instead of the usual ‘Copy’ or ‘Copy that’. This, itself, should help to identify the caller.
+1:24 ( 1614.13 / 4:14.13 PM )
(Eric Marsh): Uh… just checkin’ it out to see where we’re gonna jump out at..
—————————————————————————-
Thanks for correcting me.
See next comment. I was searching for ‘pre-determined’ in Musser’s ADOSH transcript and had forgetten there was ANOTHER place where he says he heard that over the radio.
Had nothing to do with YIN… but Musser was then testifying he heard Gary Cordes himself use the same “pre-determined” phrase over the radio when he gave those orders for everyone to get ‘off the fire’.
Musser testified that Cordes actually said ( over TAC 1 channel )…
“Everybody go out to their pre-predetermined areas”.
If it was on TAC 1… then Marsh and/or Steed heard that ‘directive’, and Cordes HAD told Marsh ( that morning ) that the Boulder Springs Ranch was to be considered HIS ( and Granite Mountain’s ) “pre-determined safety zone” that day ( as well as the black ).
In some bizarre way ( even though they really weren’t working for Cordes ) could Marsh and/or Steed have been taking that as an ‘order’ from Cordes that they were SUPPOSED to leave the black and go to the Boulder Springs Ranch?
Followup…
Another ‘interesting’ place in his ADOSH interview when Planning OPS2 Paul Musser was talking about hearing ‘pre-determined escape route’ is when ADOSH was asking Musser how SPGS1 Gary Cordes informed his forces to evacuate.
This is obviously not related to Musser’s YIN statement… but it’s fascinating to hear him say that he thinks Gary Cordes himself used the phrase “everybody go out to their pre-predetermined areas” during his actual TAC 1 radio transmits telling everyone to ‘get off the fire’.
If that transmission was on TAC 1… then both Marsh and Steed could/would have heard the same ‘directive’ with the same ‘pre-determined areas’ destination in it.
I know… DIVSA and GM were NOT working for Gary Cordes and that would NOT have been directed at them… but maybe that became part of Eric Marsh’s ‘alleged’ argument with Steed. Maybe Marsh was using that as part of his arguments to Steed to try and convince him that there were SUPPOSED to leave the black and go to the BSR.
Maybe ( I know… more maybes… but stick with me ) Marsh said to Steed…
“Cordes SAID we are supposed to go to our pre-designated area/safety zone. So we are SUPPOSED to leave here and get to that ranch.”
A longshot… I know… but if Marsh REALLY wanted Steed to make that journey and wanted his “comfort level” to be high with regards to whether they SHOULD be doing it… maybe Marsh threw that ‘argument’ into the mix to get Steed to agree to “the mission”. Made it sound like that’s what Cordes said they were all SUPPOSED to do, or something.
From Planning OPS2 Paul Musser’s ADOSH interview on August 16, 2013
Q2 = Barry Hicks, ADOSH investigator
A = Planning OPS2 Paul Musser
—————————————————————————
1616 Q2: Okay. Now when – when Gary pulled everybody out, how did that go? I mean
1617 what was the process that he used there to do that?
1618
1619 A: Uh, he just made calls to all his resources and said re-secure your point.
1620
1621 Q2: Okay.
1622
1623 A: And everybody go out to their pre-predetermined areas.
1624
1625 Q2: Okay. And, uh – and so the predetermined area for Granite Mountain was the
1626 black on top?
1627
1628 A: Right. Granite Mountain was not part of that structure group…
1629
1630 Q2: Right.
1631
1632 A: Or Gary’s thing. Granite Mountain…
1633
1634 Q2: When – when – when you’re talking about Gary’s group, you’re talking about
1635 the people down on that lower end?
1636
1637 A: The dozer at that time – at that time was Blue Ridge.
1638
1639 Q2: Right.
1640
1641 A: Two or three engines. Uh, task force leader, may – maybe more engines than
1642 that, ‘cause he had – I – I – I don’t know the exact numbers.
1643
1644 Q2: And – and when Gary’s making that – that call he’s probably doing it on the
1645 tactical…
1646
1647 A: Yes.
———————————————————————
So Musser testified that Cordes actually said ( over TAC 1 channel )…
“Everybody go out to their pre-predetermined areas”.
Obviously ADOSH then CONFIRMED that DIVSA and GM were NOT working for SPGS1 Gary Cordes… and that their PRIMARY ‘safety zone’ was the safe-black right where they were.
But it’s really odd that here we have Gary Cordes saying ( over the public TAC 1 channel )…
“Everybody go out to their pre-predetermined areas”.
…and then we get all these reports of Eric Marsh and/or Jesse Steed using the same exact phrasing to describe what they had decided to do…
“We’re headed out our escape route to our pre-determined safety zone”.
The BLACK was where they needed to stay… but we also know that Gary Cordes had TOLD Eric Marsh that morning that the Boulder Springs Ranch, was, in fact, his ‘pre-determined safety zone’ that day ( as well as black ).
Dan Philbin 9/23/13 ADOSH interview
351
that’s when I heard the uh, commotion on the
radio. Somebody was yellin
g
at
352
Air
A
tt
ack. And the voice was saying um, was callin
g
himself Division
353
Alpha. Uh, next time
the
same voice would call himself uh, Gran
ite
Mountain
354
Crew 7. And that went o
n a couple times. And uh, Air
A
tt
ack responded
355
say
ing
that
uh, uh, “Who’s yellin
g
at me? You need to calm down.” Uh, then
356
they got back on the radio sa
id that
, “This is Gran
ite
Mountain Crew 7. Our
357
escape route
’
s been compromised. Um, looking for uh, deployment site.”
358
Uh, a couple minutes after that
I’m not sure exactly the
–
the timeframe but it
359
INTERVIEW WITH DAN PHILBIN
Interviewer: Brett Steurer
09
–
23
–
13/2:45 pm
Case # SteurerInterviews
Page
9
wasn’t too terribly long after that
h
e said
–
he got back on the radio yellin
g
at
360
uh, they were going into shelters. Um, it was
static for about five seconds
361
with some poppin
g
cracklin
g
in there. Air
Atta
ck
responded over the top of
362
that. And
then
that was the las
t I heard from Gran
ite
Mountain.
Sorry that last post is so hard to read. But it appears to me to have some relevant information concerning the last few minutes and what transpired prior to the helmet camera video.
Dan Philbin says
1. There was a time when B33 says the words “calm down” just like B33 says in their YIN. Philbin also says B33 asked who was on the radio yelling at him. Philbin also says that the answer to that was this is GRANITE MOUNTAIN 7.
2. It appears that the next radio transmission from GM7 was that the ER had been compromised, and they were LOOKING for a deployment site
3. And finally Philbin says that it wasn’t too terribly long after that someone yelled they were going into shelters.
If you put this testimony beside B33 YIN, it seems that they are describing the same event, and the timing of the actual First Frantic call from GM/Marsh as it was sometime before the helmet camera video..
B33 YIN says
Heard a frantic call from Granite Mountain 7 to Air Attack told him to calm down. 20 minutes from that call to when they deployed.
Q: Do you remember what the frantic call was? No answer
I’m not going to discount any of this testimony. It’s always been there.
BUT… I AM just going to point out that the SIMPLE explanation for all of this is just the “Fog of recall’.
I still would find it impossible to believe that anyone out in that canyon could have possibly realized they were in deep trouble… made ‘frantic’ radio calls about it… and then stood around doing nothing to save themselves for TWENTY minutes… before finally just deciding to get in their shake and bakes.
Brendan’s under-oath testimony ( whenever we finally get to see a transcript of it ) will more than likely clear all this up.
Yes. That is a possible explanation. Always has been
But if what Philbin says is true, they didn’t just stand there. They were actively looking for a deployment site
And honestly I can see the 20 minute estimate as being high. What if it was only 10 minutes, or 5?
Who knows? But either way, it seems that GM did tell B33 they were looking for a deployment site. Philbin overheard it!
There have also ALWAYS been those fragments of testimony that indicate the “We are in front of the flaming front” MAYDAY call we hear coming from Captain Jesse Steed near the start of Hulburd video M2U00265 was NOT the first indication of ‘trouble’.
SOME have testified they heard SOMETHING on the TAC 1 channel just prior to that first call from Steed that was then definitely on A2G.
There APPEAR to be references to this very thing in the Blue Ridge Log Notes… but those critical sections in those notes were BLACKED OUT by the US Forestry Service.
Some people have asked over and over… why would Steed even be trying to BREAK IN on the A2G channel without saying anything over the other channels first.
Well… maybe he did.
Maybe he WAS trying to communicate their situation ( and location? ) over the other TAC channels… but wasn’t getting any response… so he turned ( in desperation ) to the A2G channel.
And maybe ( a lot of maybe’s here… but what else is new ) those pre-A2G MAYDAY transmits are what people are ‘sort of’ remembering and variously describing them as ‘frantic calls’… but then getting very mixed on the time separation between those and the A2G MAYDAY calls.
It’s possible. It’s always been *possible*.
And YES… I could imagine Arizona Forestry not wanting to publish evidence that shows those men ‘frantically’ trying to inform fire command of their emergency… when there still might have been time to do something about it… but they got NO responses.
That would be VERY embarrassing to both Arizona Forestry and the command level individuals involved.
Again… whatever Brendan now wants to ‘get off his chest’ ( after all this time ) might change the whole picture here.
Elizabeth asked calvin
“So please share with me your view – who do YOU think is talking to Burfiend at the start of that helmet camera video? If you had a gun to your head and HAD to pick someone that you thought he was talking to, who would you pick?
1. I really do not think it was Marsh. I hypothesize Marsh was hauling ass toward the crew during this time period. After the lead plane flew the West to east path through the middle bowl area, but didn’t drop the Vlat that was behind them. And the next radio transmission from Marsh begins with a formal callout to B33 and introduction. That seems unnecessary if Marsh had just been in conversation with B33 that never had a formal ending.
2. 100% of me does believe that B33 is talking about the GMH at the first of the helmet cam video. And I think that the immediate call out to Cordes, is an attempt to get additional information about the location of GM
3. And I think that the silence from B33 could signify two different things a) B33 was waiting for a response from Cordes SPG1. b) he was totally ignoring GM7. Per B33 YIN, he had told GM7 to calm down approximately 20 minutes before this video capture.
But I really do think B33 was hearing the calls from GM7 to air attack in the helmet cam video.
I do not really have a guess as to who B33 is talking to, I really do not. But I do not think it was Musser, Cordes, Abel, or Hall.
So it seems that there is quite a short list of people that it could be?
Interesting take. Thanks, Calvin!
Two questions.
1) Why, specifically do you think “100% of me does believe that B33 is talking about the GMH at the first of the helmet cam video,” therefore, obviously not thinking what I was thinking that this was about just laying down a retardant line (to protect Glen Isla, which was being seriously hit) to connect with the one they had just done.
2) Why, specifically, do you think he was NOT talking to Musser?
Marti, Answer to question #1.
B33 actually says that they got a frantic call from GM7 some time before the deployment. 20 minutes before, according to the B33 YIN. So it appears to me that B33 was aware of GM’s predicament before the helmet cam video.
And Plilbin’s ADOSH interview seems to support this early FRANTIC CALL from GM. But he does not say it happened 20 minutes, but he washed his original notes, so he did not have timeframes.
And I think that another clue that B33 knew GM was in trouble before the communication from DiV A, was that B33 had already ordered the type 1 helicopters back, as he told Abel
The thing about the “20 minutes before” report that does not compute is simply this:
If ANYONE had known there was a crew in trouble at that point, there would have basically been an ‘all stop’ with all resources and leadership trying to figure out a way to help that crew.
AA would have spent the entire 20 minutes trying to pinpoint the location of the crew until they found them. In 20 minutes time, they would have had time to do that!
Also, It wouldn’t be the sort of thing AA would sit on for 20 minutes while they investigated it, AND they would have gotten immediately with GM7 when the yelling in the recorded conversation started, because supposedly, they would have known they were in trouble much prior to that.
None of this happened, so I believe to 20 minute thing is just a faulty memory, or else a misestimation of time. The same with Philbin’s recollection with Div A vs GM7.
Ordering the Type I helicopters back in, could have simply been because, as Yarnell was getting ready to lose a bunch of structures, they certainly couldn’t justify not having them front and center in the fight.
Marti, Answer to #2
According to Musser’s ADOSH interview notes. He says that after Cordes had radio issues, he could still talk to AA but,
1677But at that point, um, the divisions and the groups are the ones that are
running that part of the show.
I interpret this as Musser says he wasn’t calling in retardant drops to air attack, it was the divisions and the groups
Copy. I just went back and read both Musser’s and Cordes’ ADOSH interviews. Still as befuddled as ever!
Re Musser. Yeah, he does sound like he wasn’t involved in working with Air Attack. The OTHER interesting thing is he says he led the last engine out to 89 and parked on the side of 89, but didn’t hear about the deployment via the Air 2 Ground radio stuff. He didn’t know it had happened until Dan Sullivan drove up and told him GM had deployed.
I’m still trying to integrate that with the videos. But I have to move on to about 10 big things I have to get done today, so don’t have time to pursue that much more today.
The interesting thing with Cordes’ interview. Someone asks him if he was aware of the retardant drops while he was evacuating people out of the Norton Way area (he says they were evacuating people, not doing structure protection).
He doesn’t really answer that question, he sort of wanders off, but it doesn’t sound like he was aware of that.
Seems to me if it had been Gary who made (including, as several have said, having the AUTHORITY to be talking to Air Attack about it) the “that’s where we want it” comment and had been involved in that drop and setting up the next drop (via a relay or Musser or whatever) I would think he would have actually answered that question.
So that’s why I am, after thinking I had been getting close to figuring this out, back to square one and being as mystified as I was before Elizabeth asked that question.
The convo re Gary and the drops is here:
“1742 Q1: Alright. Okay, um, and um, you know, um, you know uh, I had heard a while
1743 back that you had um, requested um, to the air tankers to drop at will, was,
1744 was any of that uh, happening in and right around Yarnell as all of this um, is
1745 going on that you just described to us?
1746
1747 A: Um, it was prior to my entry in doing the rescues, it was before it actually, it
1748 was as it was, it was marching very fast at town. And…
1749
1750 Q1: Right.
1751
1752 A: …and so when I made that, when I made that request, it had not crossed, at
1753 least from my perspective, it had not crossed any of those heavy ridges
1754 running east to west. It was pushing those ridges at that time and I knew it was
1755 just a matter of time before it, it made it into town. So that…
1756”
And then they go back to talking about the trigger points and the Shrine Road scene and his crews.
When he mentions the rescue stuff, that refers to when he went into Glen Isla, not when he was evacuating people from Norton Way.
Gary Cordes had already told OPS1 Todd Abel to tell Air Attack to ‘drop at will’ LONG before the 1630 timeframe. Like 45 minutes earlier.
All the more reason why it really was probably NOT SPGS1 Gary Cordes having that “where to drop retardant” conversation with Burfiend circa 1639.
Besides… the fact that Burfiend ENDS that conversation with an apparent attempt to actually TALK directly to ‘Structure 1’ has always meant TWO things…
1) Whoever Burfiend was talking to at 1639 about retardant was NOT ‘Structure 1’ Gary Cordes.
2) Whoever Burfiend was talking to apparently TOLD Burfiend to get in touch with ‘Structure 1’ ( for some reason ) DURING that conversation… and that’s exactly what we hear Burfiend doing the moment he was done talking to that ‘other’ person.
Exactly. I’ve known that all along. And I essentially said that.
HOWEVER what made me think Cordes might have had something to do with responding to that drop and participating (via a relay or a borrowed radio) with B33 regarding the NEXT drop was, as I said,
Cordes is the ONLY “OVERHEAD” with the kind of AUTHORITY everyone said someone would NEED to be conversing with B33 about those retardant drops, and who is in any LOCATION, that I know of, where he would have SEEN the 4:33 drop and would KNOW what it was about because it was RIGHT over where he was located in that Norton Way neighborhood (evacuating people as the fire was burning toward them), RIGHT below where that retardant was DROPPED (in order to stop that fire that he was evacuating endangered people from).
And it also fits with Musser saying he wasn’t involved and the divisions and “groups” were running that show.
Get my logic?
Because of that, I am STILL not ready to write him out of this equation.
PS Is everybody else having to sign in just about every time they post a comment like I am????? The spam must be on a roll!
If somebody else can conjure up anybody else who would have been right there, also, in view of that drop, and had the authority to be involved in that operation, I’m perfectly willing to stand corrected.
See above. You realized ( yourself ) there WAS someone else “with that kind of authority” who WAS “right there”.
Air Support Group Supervisor ( ASGS ) Dan Sullivan.
I only put this here in case someone was reading along at this point and didn’t realize this conversation continues up above and proves that ASGS Dan Sullivan could very well have been BOTH of the following…
1) The person who called B33 and said “That’s where we want the retardant”.
2) The person actually having that extended conversation with John Burfiend in B33 about retardant drops that we hear the END of at the start of Hulburd’s M2U00265 ‘Helmet Cam’ video with the MAYDAY calls in it ( just 13 seconds after Burfiend finished that converstation about retardant drops ).
Followup… the ‘segue’ into the conversation about ASGS Dan Sullivan begins with Marti’s very next Reply below… and THEN continues up above.
I just had another thought, after writing that, and after reading Musser’s interview.
Musser said he learned about the deployment when Dan Sullivan, who was Air OPS, drove by while he was parked on 89.
Maybe Dan Sullivan was involved in this. It would make perfect sense that he would have been. If he just drove by Musser at the intersection with 89, he could have been heading west from the Norton Way area towards Glen Isla and conversing with B33 about a line further to the west to protect Glen Isla.
He might not even had known Gary couldn’t connect with B33 via Air 2 Ground. Heck, they could have been standing together in the Norton Way area, Sullivan said to B33, something like I’m with Gary and “that’s right where we want it,” then he suggested they drop a line over Glen Isla, B33 said what they said at the beginning of the Helmet Cam Video,” B33 didn’t know Gary couldn’t hear/speak with them, broke the convo and called Gary.
Meanwhile Dan Sullivan took off, heard the Breaking in Mayday and the Deployment on his Air 2 Ground, (which Gary couldn’t hear), saw Musser and told HIM about the deployment.
Gary then headed down to the Ranch House Cafe and tied in with his crew, where HE heard about the deployment from Engine 59,
BOOM!
Reply to Marti Reed post on February 19, 2015 at 1:06 pm
>> Marti said…
>>
>> I just had another thought, after writing that, and
>> after reading Musser’s interview.
>>
>> Musser said he learned about the deployment
>> when Dan Sullivan, who was Air OPS, drove by
>> while he was parked on 89.
>>
>> Maybe Dan Sullivan was involved in this. It would
>> make perfect sense that he would have been.
Yes. It does.
Couple that with the fact that he was hired as an ASGS ( Air Support Group Supervisor ) and that means it would have been his actual JOB to be helping coordinate those retardant drops there near Yarnell… in this timeframe.
It ALSO means that the “Air-To-Ground” channel was most likley his priority-scan channel… which is why HE definitely heard the MAYDAY traffic and was the one who had to inform Musser about the deployment.
That would also mean that even if it wasn’t him… Dan Sullivan would have also definitely heard this mysterious 1637 “That’s where we want retardant” radio call that has ONLY ever been mentioned just once… in the B33 SAIT Investigation notes.
ASGS Dan Sullivan was ( apparently ) never interviewed by ANYONE… nor was Air Operations Branch Director (AOBD) Robert (Bob) Ortlund who was ALSO in Yarnell that day and was Dan Sullivan’s direct Supervisor.
For anyone ‘reading along’ here… see above. This “Dan Sullivan” conversation continues.
Methods says 2/18 1149AM
Marsh was acting as DIVS on the Holloway Fire in northern Nevada in 2012. I don’t remember him being a trainee but could be wrong.
Didn’t want this to get missed as it is buried deep.
Thanks for bringing this up.
Eric had finished his DivS Task Book and was approved via an email review (they had run out of time at the previous meeting to complete all the reviews) somewhere between May and December of 2010.
So, unless I’m missing something, I would think he would not longer be a DivS Trainee by August of 2012, when the Holloway Fire happened.
That was a BIG fire!!
“The huge Holloway range fire on the Nevada-Oregon border (updated)”
http://www.thewildlifenews.com/2012/08/11/the-huge-hollaway-range-fire-on-the-nevada-oregon-border/
The Holloway fire was where GMHS’s buggies were almost burnt up and where a Zuni HS member actually deployed her shelter and received burns. I’m not insinuating that Marsh was responsible for either, but I do believe he was the acting DIVS. Zuni and GM were working near each other on the Holloway fire, similar to BR and GM on YHF. Just another example of “bad choices with good outcomes” which seem to be a common theme with GM.
Gotcha. Thanks. See the video I posted below. That road was just really close to that fire, and everybody was working really close to it.
Another related video.
“V.L.A.T. on Holloway fire 8-12-12
Published on Sep 2, 2012
best seat in the house to watch this vlat do a drop. engine 619 and the zuni hotshots.”
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wNFnE1sk9xA
They have another video of a helicopter, also.
Note the guy with his sleeves rolled up. And the hard hat that looks like it has retardant all over it.
Thanks Mart. Also thank for pointing out the comment section. Another safety violation breech, no helmets on UTV.
There really appears to be safety infractions in a lot of the vides that are published publicly.
TOL
If I knew my video contained safety violations in my workplace, I do not think I would post them.
Reply to calvin post February 19, 2015 at 12:22 pm
>> calvin said…
>>
>> If I knew my video contained safety violations in my
>> workplace, I do not think I would post them.
Keyphrase: “If I knew”.
That’s obviously the THEME here with these videos.
Somehow… these guys have been taught that these things are NOT “Safety Violations” or anything they ever need to be concerned about.
Indicates FULL STOP review of ALL training procedures is needed… industry wide.
Things that make you go Hmmmm
Exactly, both Calvin and WTKTT.
I have to say, as long as we talk about sleeves and gloves and stuff
I’ve seen a LOT of videos where it’s like
YAY I got hit by a RETARDANT DROP!!!!!!!!!
While I’ve read over and over again in the “this is how we’re NOT supposed to do it stuff” —
NEVER stand under a retardant drop!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
There are some SERIOUS “cultural” issues woven in and out of the whole SAFETY thing.
Personally, after this whole year of looking at this fire and gazillions of related things…..
I don’t think the United States Forest Service really gives much of a hoot about SAFETY.
For them, firefighters are, in the whole great scheme of things,
a dime a dozen.
Everything else is just
Window Dressing.
Also. From Wildfire Today:
“Firefighter burned while fighting Holloway Fire”
http://wildfiretoday.com/2012/08/15/firefighter-burned-while-fighting-holloway-fire/
Be sure and read the comments. Safety. Ahem.
Eric Marsh’s DIVS PTB was initiated on 3/7/06 and Certified on 8/26/09, then was put into the system post Red Card Committee approval on 5/31/10 and expired 6/30/18. Eric was a fully qualified DIVS as of fire season of 2010.
Looking through Eric Marsh’s fire experience and his Master Record… he does not have himself showing fire experience as DIVS on the Holloway Fire, but is showing CRWB. Also his Master Record doesn’t show DIVS for the Holloway fire either but does have TFLD as experience. I’m not saying that maybe Eric jumped into a DIVS role on the Holloway Fire because it was needed, but most resources will show their actual fire experience (position) because it keeps their quals current.
Eric’s Master Record and fire experience shows qualified DIVS experience in 2011 for the New Water Fire, 2012 for the Halstead Fire, 2013 shows Perkinsville (and we know he was the DIVS on the Doce and YHF, but neither of these made it to his fire qualification paperwork).
Thank you for this. I’m gonna come back to this and ask you some more questions, for sure!
Fire 20+,
The Halstead Fire was the one the GMHS burned up their ATV, shown in their 2012 GMHS Crew Video.
Peer Hot Shot Crews and another DIVS warned the GMHS many times to use parallel and indirect tactics because it was too hot to go direct, but they insisted on going direct in spite of intense fire behavior each day.
Copy. And thank you. I had read both of these stories. But didn’t know the names of the fires.
This shows the footage of the crew stopping the Holloway Fire from burning the Granite Mountain buggies:
“Holloway Fire
from Colby Drake 2 years ago NOT YET RATED
This video was taken while on the Holloway Fire in northern Nevada. Got to see some extreme fire behavior and we saved the Granite Mt. Hotshot buggies from burning up!”
https://vimeo.com/48411010
Bob said (to calvin)
I have not seen any thing that B33 said in interviews or on radio that made a statement —DIV A Clad and said–That is what we are looking for——
We discussed this way back but could not determine who may have said it
the drop in question was on Yarnell——-
If you can reference this statement please correct me—-
WTKTT —– is referencing testimony or radio recordings that are complete.
all this other stuff is confusing the actual text that was taken in testimony.
Bob I am not sure I am understanding you..
Again Per YIN B33
Division A clad and said “that is what we are looking for, that is exactly right”.
Reference the last line in B33 interviews. Division A Clad. I have not found that statement.
Bob
This is a copy and paste from the YIN B33
Division A clad and said “that is what we are looking for, that is exactly right”.
I still do not know what you “have not found” That statement is from the YIN
Does that help?
Is there a direct reference line # that B33 stated in a interview?
.
Thanks Calvin found it mostly original notes.
I think we went thru this severial months back and B33 memory
and attaching Marsh to that call was strange.
He had very little con tact with DIV A and was not making the Drop in their area. This is one of those confusing statements along with what WTKTT said above. I am suspicious about it being accurate.
I filed it in the Possible but doubtful category severial months ago.
Based on the Time of the drop and location. It put the Crew in the canyon where they might have herd the plans but had no other visual.
If Musser was relaying to Burfiend on behalf of Cordes in the communication that ends at the start of the helmet camera video, then Burfiend would not end then proceed directly after that communication to try to raise Cordes directly, which is what Burfiend did, right?
In an unrelated vein (or maybe related), if you go back to the 1628 Panbaker video, you will hear that AirAttack wants B33 to use the incoming VLAT (the one that was 20 minutes out, that arrived at somewhere around 4:10-ish or 4:15-ish p.m. for drops on the EAST side of the fire, given that the fire was now marching due EAST. But that never happened. Instead, the VLAT was dropped on the NORTH side of the fire at roughly 4:17 p.m.
Lastly, while the SAIT notes suggest that B33 flew a dry run for the VLAT just before deployment in a west to east pattern, it sure looks to me from videos and photos that the dry run for the on-site VLAT was an east to west pattern.
I want to respond to something Elizabeth wrote way downstream yesterday morning in a convo with Calvin (and, unfortunately, when I copied her comment, I forgot to capture the time of it), but it was yesterday morning. I spent some time thinking about it.
She wrote (to Calvin):
“So please share with me your view – who do YOU think is talking to Burfiend at the start of that helmet camera video? If you had a gun to your head and HAD to pick someone that you thought he was talking to, who would you pick?
According to my friends who are or who have been Hotshot sups or assistant sups, it it normally the case that only a very limited number of folks on a fire (relatively speaking) would speak to Air Attack, and fewer still would speak to the Lead Plane. So the list of possible speakers with Burfiend is relatively short. ”
Given that, at that time, Gary Cordes was working in that little neighborhood (I don’t have Google Earth open and I can’t remember the name that was attached to it) on 89 just northeast of Shrine Road, overseeing Structure Protection ops, he is the closest I can come to any kind of Overhead near where that 4:33 drop occurred and where B33 was planning to continue that retardant line across the northwest side of 89 to protect Yarnell. (A severely interrupted but finally completed line).
I mean, really, Cordes is my first logical answer, if I had a gun pointed to my head. Both for the “that’s where we want it” statement and this conversation at the beginning of the “Helmet Cam Video.” That’s what was going on at that time.
But, as we all know, according to him, he had lost his ability to respond on Air 2 Ground and never got that back.
I really don’t think it would have been anybody that was in the Shrine Road area at that point, because they couldn’t see much of anything and they were focused on what they were doing there.
And there’s really no other Overhead working close enough to that drop, that I currently know of, who could have evaluated that drop.
And I don’t think it’s Eric/Steed/Granite Mountain because, given where they were at that time, I agree with Bob Powers that they couldn’t have seen all the way over thru all the smoke and such, that drop in much of any kind of definitive way. And that 4:33 drop didn’t have anything to do with Granite Mountain, it was the west end of a line to the east that B33 was trying to construct to protect Yarnell proper and not even Glen Isla, much less Granite Mountain.
It really would, logically, have been more related to where/what Gary Cordes was working/doing/overseeing. The only thing I can think of is two things:
1). Gary Cordes was working with somebody who COULD communicate with B33, or was borrowing a radio that could, at that time.
2) Gary Cordes might have been talking to Musser, who then relayed the convo to B33. You can see Musser in the video. So that could mean B33 was responding to Musser in the beginning of that video. And that also could mean that it was Musser that relayed to B33 from Cordes the “that’s right where we want it” comment.
That’s pretty much where I had landed before the conversation here turned to other communications issues. I can’t think of anything else that works.
Elizabeth asked this question yesterday, FEBRUARY 17, 2015 AT 6:06 AM.
Another thing I just thought. It could have been Rance Marquez relaying for Cordes. And he could have said “Div Zulu” and Burfiend mis-construed that (easily, all things considered) as Div Alpha.
Rance could easily have, before heading up Shrine Road, tied in with Cordes in that little neighborhood. He wasn’t really engaged, at that point, in anything in particular, like just about everybody else was, as far as I know. If so, he would have had more SA about that 4:33 drop than anybody else we are seeing in the Shrine Road videos.
He is seen driving up to the Shrine and U-turning to go back down just before this video.
So I’m thinking we could add Marquez to that short list of “Overhead” who might have been talking with B33 at that time.
If not Cordes I would bet on Musser.
At that point the OPS would be seriously involved in the Retardant calls not lower or non connected Overhead unless OPS gave them the authority That was a critical time and OPS would not won’t someone diverting drops. OPS was setting priorities then.
Thanks, Bob. That makes sense.
If that’s the case, Cordes is actually being Musser’s eyes on the retardant drop. Talking to Musser about what’s going on and Musser is talking to B33 about what needs to happen next.
With The shit hitting the fan OPS has to take control and prioritize drops.
Every body and their brother would be asking for them if no one was in control.
If Cordes A to G was not working Then that might be why they tied in together.
Agree. It could have easily been Missed. I would believe Marsh… but despite what someone said below about Missed not being on the list of candidates… I don’t know where that was coming from. It could have easily been Missed.
Absolutely amazing that no one ever testified to having this conversation with Burfiend just mere SECONDS before Steed’s first MAYDAY hit the A2G channel.
Wow. Major ‘smartphone spell checker’ glitches above. Everywhere I typed “Musser” the smartphone spell checker changed it to “Missed”.
Sorry about that.
No prob. Kinda funny. Sometimes we need funny.
Actually, Elizabeth did include Musser:
“Was it Musser? Maybe. Or it was Marsh, because Burfiend seems to have told the SAIT that he heard from Marsh right before the entrapment?”
I think it would have been fairly easy for Bravo 33, who had been told by Rory Collins that his ground contact had been DivA (whose actual location they didn’t know), to have, as they were transitioning into the relatively unfamiliar area (including who was on the ground) of Yarnell “proper,” to have, this early on, mistakenly “heard” and then “remembered” something like “OPS Musser” as “Div Alpha” when that “that’s where we want it” message first came over.
I also think it’s interesting that right before “BREAKING IN” comes over, B33 is calling Structure Protection 1, i.e. Gary Cordes.
Remember, they had no clue where “Division Alpha” was located. They had no idea that “Division Alpha” was not where he could really see, much less evaluate, where that 4:33 drop was where it was, much less how exactly good it was.
So that pretty much solidifies that whoever B33 is talking to at the beginning of the video isn’t Cordes.
Don’t forget that we have recently proved that the Hulburd video that immediately precedes this one actually ENDED at about 1637 on the nose.
And… it is still accepted that the START time for the famous original Hulburd “Helmet Cam” video with the MAYDAY” traffic ( and which catches John Burfiend ending an active conversation about a request to drop retardant somewhere and how they will “give it a shot” )… is still 1639.
That leaves only approximately 120 seconds of radio capture ‘missing’ in-between the two videos.
Also… by the time the preceding video ENDS ( at 1637 )… we have still NOT heard the radio capture of this supposed “That’s it. That’s where we want retardant” transmission.
It is also nowhere PRIOR to that.
So that means… ( and I know we are holding to a tight timeframe here based on some pretty shaky YIN testimony… but bear with me )… if someone really did make that “That’s where we want retardant” radio call to B33 on A2G anywhere near 1637 ( as only the YIN B33 interview reported )… then it would had to have happened just AFTER the end of that Hulburd M2U00264 video.
So now we only have 120 seconds to work with… and we still haven’t heard the “That’s where we want retardant” call yet.
It’s actually less than 120 seconds considering we haven’t even heard that mysterious transmit to B33 yet.
If it really happened… then the conversation we hear Burfiend ENDING at the start of the Hulburd MAYDAY video ( starting at 1639 ) could VERY well be the end of his ‘response’ to whoever it was that called him saying “That’s it. That’s where we want the retardant”.
Burfiend might have called that person BACK and was asking for clarification regarding what they really meant by that statement they just made to him.
There would hardly have been enough time for it really to have been anything other than that.
I have posted the following possible scenario before… but let me illustrate the point one more time…
I’m going to assume the “That’s where we want retardant” transmission came out of nowhere to Burfiend at 1637 plus 10 seconds… since we haven’t heard it yet by 1637 itself.
———————————————————–
16:37:00 – HULBURD VIDEO M2U00264 ENDS
16:37:10
(Someone? Direct to B33 on A2G): That’s exactly what we’re looking for. That’s where we want the retardant.”
It probably took a minimum of 5 seconds for someone to say that to Burfiend… so we are now at 16:37:15
NOTE: The following is just a ‘hypothetical’ outline of what might have then transpired for the next 1 minute and 55 seconds ( 115 seconds )…
1) Slight pause for radio como turnaround
2) John Burfiend responds to whoever just called him asking for clarification about what “That’s where we want retardant” really means.
3) Another slight pause for radio como turnaround.
4) Original caller begins to explain exactly what they meant and exactly where they would like retardant dropped.
5) Another slight pause for radio como turnaround.
6) Burfiend BEGINS his explanation about whether he will be able to fulfill this request… which we are going to hear the END of as Hulburd VIDEO M2U00265 now begins…
16:39:00 – HULBURD VIDEO M2U00265 STARTS
(Bravo 33 – John Burfiend): …have it on scene h(ere we’re gonna, gonna try and do what we can with that valley in the smoke where it’s kinda tough on us but we’ll, we’ll give it a shot, break uh, Structure 1, Bravo 33 on air to ground.
———————————————————–
So even if that wasn’t Burfiend just ‘calling back’ to whoever might have made this (supposed) 1637 callout to him requesting a retardant drop…. then pretty much the same ‘hypothetical’ sequence shown above would still have to have fit into those 120 seconds between the end of video 264 and the start of video 265 no matter WHO Burfiend was ‘finishing’ that conversation with at the start of video 265.
BOTTOM LINE: It’s a TIGHT timeframe there in-between those 2 videos for ANY kind of ‘back and forth’ discussion about a ‘retardant drop’.
Whoever Burfiend was ‘finishing’ that conversation with at the start of video 265… that ‘conversation’ pretty much had to have been initiated at 1637 ( plus a few seconds ) no matter WHO it was.
Followup…
It goes without saying that these ‘missing 120 seconds’ in-between Hulburd video M2U00264 and M2U00265 are pretty darn critical with regards to a number of things.
In those missing ‘120 seconds’ are…
1) The REST of that conversation between Blue Ridge Hotshots Brian Frisby and Trueheart Brown with “The 3 Prescotteers” ( Jason Clawson, Aaron Hulburd and KC ‘Bucky’ Yowell ) about where Granite Mountain really was and what they were really doing… as far as Frisby and Brown knew.
2) The BEGINNING ( and the MIDDLE ) of that conversation about ‘retardant drops’ that we only hear ENDING at the start of the next Hulburd video… M2U00264… including WHO the caller really was and WHAT they were requesting ‘Bravo 33’ to actually DO.
3) The POSSIBLE capture of that initial emergency call from Granite Mountain that some have testified they heard on the TAC 1 radio channel… BEFORE that first “We are in front of the flaming front” MAYDAY call from Steed on the A2G channel at 1639.
That’s a lot of important ‘stuff’ to just be ‘accidentally’ missing in-between two videos.
Couple that with the fact that it makes no sense that Hulburd would have turned his camera OFF for just those 120 seconds… and… well… what can I say?
I still think Aaron Hulburd himself needs to be DEPOSED and asked a few pointed questions… by SOMEONE.
Copy. Reading and agreeing with everything you are saying here.
Will continue thinking about this. Right now it’s really late, I’ve been doing a lot of other stuff, and fairly braindead.
Agree this time frame is extremely important.
This:
“That’s a lot of important ‘stuff’ to just be ‘accidentally’ missing in-between two videos.
Couple that with the fact that it makes no sense that Hulburd would have turned his camera OFF for just those 120 seconds… and… well… what can I say?”
I agree.
The camera that he was using wasn’t like the one he used up on Model Creek Road that quite possibly was only capable of taking those really short videos.
Or even like my Canons that are fairly limited in what they can capture. This Sony could capture relatively long videos. As he did with some of the others.
And it doesn’t have a remote, so it’s something of a relative hassle to turn it on and off.
We could be wrong, but I agree that I don’t trust the beginnings and endings of these videos.
And thanks for bringing up and exploring that 120 second gap.
Listening this again. B33 says:
“…we’re gonna try to do what we can with that valley and the smoke we’re it’s kinda tough on us but we’ll get the shot. Break uh Structure 1 Bravo 33 on Air 2 Ground.”
Right after that is
“BREAKING IN…..”
So I’m thinking it may be possible that they are talking about using the VLAT to put a retardant line in more to the west — “that valley” — and not continuing the 4:33 drop to the east (as I was thinking earlier). Bcuz — Glen Isla. Which was now getting hit.
But I still don’t think any of this has to do with DivA/Granite Mountain/the chimney bowl they were in.
I just don’t think that’s what B33/Cordes/Musser were thinking about at that point.
Marti… see a new post/reply just above.
We have now proven there were only about 120 seconds between the END of Hulburd video M2U00264 ( which ends during Frisby’s report about where Granite Mountain was ) and the START of video M2U00265 ( which begins with Burfiend FINISHING a conversation with someone regarding where they want B33 to try and drop retardant ).
If Hulburd had not supposedly ( and mysteriously?) decided to turn his camera OFF for JUST those 120 seconds…. we would be hearing the complete report from Frisby about Granite Mountain AND we would know exactly WHO initiated that conversation about ‘retardant drops’ with B33 John Burfiend that we hear being ‘completed’ at the start of M2U00265.
Various anonymous internet folks keep trying to point a finger at and brutally criticize poor John Burfiend, who was the right-seater in the lead plane (B33) at the time that the GM19 were entrapped.
Down below, I posted yet again an explanation that Burfiend was not deliberately ignoring men whom he knew to be in dire trouble, but, rather, Burfiend had not heard all of the initial radio traffic of the men calling for help (that we hear at the start of what has been called the “helmet camera video”).
I was told in response to my explanation that I was “wrong” and that I was ignoring the “evidence.” So I went back and listened to the helmet camera video yet again. And, sure enough, the “evidence” still confirms what I have communicated here before: Burfiend justifiably did not hear/understand all of the initial transmissions from GM in full in that helmet camera video, as Burfiend says at roughly 1 minute and 23 seconds into that helmet camera that he is only catching a “little bit” of that radio traffic.
“A little bit.” Burfiend states at 1.23 mins. into that helmet camera video that he is ONLY catching “a little bit” of that radio traffic.
To remind you all, my impression is that Burfiend KNEW at the time that the initial “helmet camera” video starts that Marsh wanted a VLAT drop, because Burfiend had heard from Marsh about that, and the lead plane had just done a dry run for the drop just minutes before the entrapment, whereupon Marsh apparently told the guys in the air something like “that’s right where we want it.” So Burfiend presumably sounds relatively calm at the start of the helmet camera video because (a) he knew GM wanted that particular drop, and French was en route with it and (b) he (Burfiend) had not fully HEARD and comprehended the desperate calls for help because they were initially on Tac1 (not Burfiend’s priority channel) and Burfiend was busy on other radio transmissions (and he cannot HEAR Tac1 when he is transmitting or receiving on other channels/frequencies).
Calvin mentioned yesterday that certain folks on this website tend to cherry-pick facts in order to try to point fingers at certain people who were working on the YHF. Calvin – who some on this website called the “steely-eyed rocket man” – specifically used the phrase “cherry-pick” to refer to the way that some folks (or maybe just one individual 🙂 ) use certain facts but not ALL of the facts in order to advance an agenda of blame and finger-pointing. The attacks on John Burfiend are one instance in which I wish the cherry-picking would stop. Meaning, if you contextualize more than just certain isolated facts (so include the fact that Burfiend had just heard from Marsh and all seemed relatively ok, the fact that GM accidentally was first communicating their calls for help on Tac1 such that Burfiend did not hear them in full, etc.), it becomes clear that Burfiend was not deliberately and knowingly ignoring men whom he knew to be in dire circumstances and about to die. The same way that it took Bucky and Aaron a bit to figure out what GM was communicating on the radio in that helmet camera video, it also took Burfiend – who had far more balls in the air than Bucky and Aaron at the time – the same.
Moreover, before you point the finger at Burfiend and accuse him of ignoring desperate men, as yourself this: WHY would Burfiend – who WORKED on Hotshot crews and who is therefore presumably sympathetic to how hard they work on the line and the inherent dangers that they always face – IGNORE deliberately a Hotshot crew that is in trouble? It does not make common sense, which suggests that it is likely not true (or, at the very least, requires more probing). The fact that some people on this website (or at least just one) fail to get this point suggests that there is an agenda that is being advanced, even at the cost of defying common sense.
I honestly don’t think anyone could get to the bottom of the who said what when to who just by discussing it piecemeal as happens on here. Or if we do, it will have taken a lot longer than it should have. It needs to be as methodical as possible, and it has to have room to place the unknowns, as there are so many unknowns in this whole jigsaw. It also needs to take into account the different interpretations people attach will to the quotes/comments.
Sometimes I struggle to understand why there are such negative comments between you all. Please just rise above it, yes some goad and prod looking for reaction. I sometimes wonder if there isn’t some sort of social “Human Behaviour” experiment going on here (prod the inhabitants and see them attack each other) and a dissertation being written up about it!
Lets play nice.
OTIS—We as a group cruse and rely on each other when
ELIZABETH DOSE NOT INSERT HERSELF
Severial have had bad dealing with her including RTS she attacks new people like you asserting you are RTS.
I do not talk to her any more.
Just for your Info………….
Bob, what does “cruse” mean? Thank you in advance.
A small vessel that holds liquid like a shot glass of Black Velvet.
An enjoyable relaxing drink of choice.
Not the poison you serve up.
Just saying…………………………..
Reply to Otis post on February 18, 2015 at 8:04 am
>> Otis said…
>>
>> I honestly don’t think anyone could get to the bottom of the who
>> said what when to who just by discussing it piecemeal as
>> happens on here.
I hear ya… but that process has actually already proven to be valid
for a number of things HERE on this forum… such as WHO was really
WHERE and WHEN ( a long detailed examination of the photos ) and
the exact time sequence of the MacKenzie / Parker photos / videos.
We are still the ONLY ones who ( piecemeal and with much back and
forth ) finally ‘figured that out’.
The “Who said what to Air Attack when” problem has always been lying
on the table… and is VERY complicated. It’s going to take a lot of
‘back and forth’ ( yes… some of it VERY noisy ) to actually ever sort that out.
>> Otis also said…
>>
>> Or if we do, it will have taken a lot longer than it should have.
EVERYTHING to do with this takes ‘longer that it should have’ because of the piss-poor investigations that were done.
Any number of people had the chance to ‘get this right’ and ‘get it over with’ a long time ago. It didn’t happen.
We’re here just trying to do what should have ALREADY been done.
>> Otis also said…
>>
>> It needs to be as methodical as possible, and it has to have
>> room to place the unknowns, as there are so many unknowns
>> in this whole jigsaw.
Yes. Part of ‘Investigations 101’ says that it’s just as important to be absolutely sure what you do NOT know as it is to be sure what you DO know.
We’ve actually done a pretty good job of that here, too.
>> Otis also said…
>>
>> It also needs to take into account the different interpretations
>> people will attach to the quotes/comments.
We’ve seen that in spades.
Again… “Investigations 101” says that when it comes to some things… the best you can hope for is a ‘consensus’. That doesn’t mean some people will EVER go along with the ‘consensus’. Consensus does NOT mean ‘total agreement’. Not by a long shot. Some things ARE just too open to interpretation and differing ‘agendas’ to ever be more than just a ‘consensus’ as to what the truth might be.
>> Otis also said…
>>
>> Sometimes I struggle to understand why there are such negative
>> comments between you all. Please just rise above it, yes some
>> goad and prod looking for reaction. I sometimes wonder if there
>> isn’t some sort of social “Human Behaviour” experiment going on
>> here (prod the inhabitants and see them attack each other) and
>> a dissertation being written up about it!
Since you seem to be new to the whole ‘online forum discussion’ thing… let me assure you that the ‘studies’ you are talking about HAVE been done… pretty much even pre-Internet when America Online and Prodigy discovered that just allowing people to have online ‘chat’ rooms seems to have led to some of the most obnoxious and potty-mouthed conversation the world had ever seen.
If you are referring to people that seem to appear here on this forum to actually just ‘stir up the pot’ and/or distract from constructive, productive conversations… there IS a word for that kind of ‘forum behavior’.
Those people are officially known as TROLLS.
They seem unable ( or unwilling ) to follow the current flow of the conversation and make any positive contributions.
They are documented ‘personality types’… and some forums allow TROLLS to continue to particpate in the discussions. Others do NOT.
If you are participating in an online forum where the moderator allows the continued presence of obvious TROLLS… then you just have to learn to ignore them. That’s all there is to it.
Who can, or can not participate in an online forum is always up to the moderator of the forum and not the participants themselves. Also ‘just the way it is’.
Thanks for your intelligent ( and constructive ) comments.
Now… back to work.
YOU are the one doing the cherry-picking here.
YOU are only taking Burfiend’s SECOND report to OPS1 about the traffic and ignoring the FIRST report he made where he does NOT say he only heard ‘some of it’. When he FIRST responded to Abel he used no such qualifiers.
As I pointed out down below… the PROOF that he DID hear those MAYDAY calls, and that they DID fully register with him is the fact that even before he had to be ORDERED by OPS1 Abel to RESPOND to those men trying to contact him… he was TELLING OPS1 Abel that he had fully understood what was happening.
He was TELLING OPS1 Abel that he’d order the Type 1 Helicopters back in and that they ( Bravo 33 ) would do “All they can” to address the obviously unfolding emergency.
It still wasn’t until +2 minutes from the start of the emergency radio traffic that he made ANY attempt to RESPOND… and he only did so then because OPS1 Todd Abel just ORDERED him to do so.
No one can change the facts. That’s just the way it went down.
I ( me, personally ) do not know WHY he was fully aware of what was happening for upwards of 2 minutes but still had to be ORDERED by an OPS level Supervisor to actually ANSWER the radio calls.
All I know is… that is, in fact, what happened that afternoon.
WTKTT—I’ll take B33’s side for a minuet.
Having been in that seat you are not the message relay person.
If you are busy making a run with a retardant plain behind you, you are on AtoA
At this point until there was a clear we are in front of the flaming front B33
was trying to save structures and provide citizens extra time to get out
B33 had no Idea exactly where GM was no coordinates and the smoke was laid over GM. The —That’s where we want it —in my belief never came from Marsh and I have stuck to that sense it was first out there. It just dose not match location with Air Tanker drop.
John Burfiend was not flying the airplane nor was he lead plane. He was only sitting in the right hand seat and his priority task was just to monitor/respond to traffic on the A2G channel. French was handling all A2A traffic. That’s how they had decided they would handle the LP/AA double-duty that got dumped in their laps when Rory Collins left that airspace at 1558.
Burfiend WAS hearing the MAYDAY traffic on A2G. He was choosing to not respond to the caller until an OPS level Supervisor had to ORDER him to do so. I do NOT know WHY it happened that way… but that’s what actually happened.
I still agree about it probably NOT being Marsh saying “That’ where we want retardant”. Still more likely just someone else commenting on the 1633 SEAT drop that was ‘spot on’.
In the interest of making all of this who/what/when/to who – clearer, it’s almost like it needs a chart with the following 5 column headings (for example)
Approx Time : Statement/Quote : Speaker : Heard 1st hand by : Not heard 1st Hand by : Heard 2nd hand by
Approx time – the times recorded or estimated times that things were said.
Statement/Quote – The statement or quote attributed to that time – similar quotes could be gouped together.
Speaker – Who is thought to have said it – or just Unknown.
Heard 1st hand by – a list of all those who have stated they DID hear the quote themselves directly from the source, what report/interview they stated it in, and including method eg which radio channel.
Not Heard 1st hand by – a list of all those who have stated they did NOT hear the quote 1st hand, with the report/interview details, method from above.
Heard 2nd hand by – similar to Heard 1st hand, except those that heard the quote not from original source, but from someone else.
…it would be a huge undertaking! and apologies I’m not volunteering myself for that.
Reply to Otis post on February 18, 2015 at 6:59 am
>> Otis said…
>>
>> Approx Time : Statement/Quote : Speaker : Heard 1st hand by :
>> Not heard 1st Hand by : Heard 2nd hand by
I agree. That’s why I don’t think the quote from Roy Hall’s SAIT interview notes with Todd Abel just informing him of what appeared to now be the ‘common/collective’ knowledge being shared/exchanged down at the Ranch House Restaurant qualifies…. and it’s also why I did not include the OTHER two DPS Officer’s testimony.
BOTH of the other DPS Officers besides Eric Tarr ( Pilot Brunsting and Officer Main ) ALSO testified about the 1630 A2G transmits… but they were ONLY referencing them in the context of being TOLD about them by Officer Tarr.
In other words… that is, in fact, THREE reports in the evidence record about A2G transmits from “Granite Mountain 7″… but only ONE of the Officers apparently heard it in REAL TIME.
The whole point of the exercise is to see if there IS some way to ‘boil down’ all these reported A2G transmits to eliminate ‘duplicate reports’ and to try and really figure out, once and for all… how MANY of these GM-to-AA–on-A2G transmits there REALLY were that day… and WHEN.
Reply to calvin post on February 17, 2015 at 7:01 pm
>> calvin said…
>>
>> It seems to me that there is a seventh radio transmission that was given by
>> Marsh and it was not on the list of six given by WTK earlier today
>>
>> #7 Todd Able reported that the last communication with Eric Marsh was
>> “We are on the west ridge descending a predetermined escape route
Nope. I disagree. That is just from Roy Hall’s YIN interview notes saying what Abel was reporting to him almost an hour AFTER the deployment.
This was covered at the very start of this new chapter.
I already told you that I ( me, personally ) think this is nothing more than ( now ) Incident Within an Incident Commander Todd Abel doing his job and ‘polling the room’ down there at the Ranch House Restaurant to discover WHO heard WHAT on the radio with regards to Granite Mountain… and also figuring out as best they could what the LAST thing anyone heard was so they could figure out WHERE they were.
I don’t think this can even be construed, in any way, to mean that Todd Abel was telling Roy Hall that HE ( personally ) heard this kind of thing on the radio prior to deployment.
Indeed… OPS1 Todd Abel testified to ADOSH that he NEVER heard they were ‘on the move’ ( not over the radio… OR from anyone ) prior to the MAYDAY traffic hitting the radio.
>> calvin also said…
>>
>> If Todd Able didn’t himself hear that radio transmission. Who reported hearing it?
>> This is the very first mention of any WEST RIDGE.
See above. It probably just came out during the ‘huddles’ down at the Ranch House Restaurant. Todd Abel was probably just doing his JOB as IWIC at that point and ASKING people ( anyone/everyone ) what they heard… and WHEN they heard it.
That is what Abel SHOULD have been doing, at that point. Who wouldn’t?
All that being said… I have found yet ANOTHER reported “To Air Attack over A2G” transmission that was supposedly being made by Eric Marsh or Jesse Steed.
This time the witness just says it was “Granite Mountain” talking to AA on A2G.
That ‘witness’ is DIVSZ Rance Marquez.
From Rance Marquez’s SAIT Interview notes…
———————————————————————-
1530-1600 I heard traffic between AA and Granite Mountain asking Granite Mountain if they were okay. They replied “yes we are hunkered down in the black”.
———————————————————————-
This would appear to be radio traffic between GM and AA on the A2G channel specifically associated with B33 performing that ‘check’ on them that OPS1 Todd Abel told ADOSH he asked them to do.
( How’s that for a lot of acronyms in just one paragraph! LOL ).
( Do I win a prize for that one? LOL ).
NOTE: Rance Marquez apparently says NOTHING about this in his actual ADOSH interview. This report on his part of yet another ‘overheard’ conversation between Marsh/Steed and Air Attack is ONLY mentioned in his SAIT Interview notes.
So I think THIS would be a better candidate for transmission number SEVEN on the GM-to-AA-on-A2G list than that report from Abel to Roy Hall.
More later.
Reply to Marti Reed post on February 17, 2015 at 6:47 pm
>> Marti said…
>>
>> I’ve been kinda sorta following this discussion all day while trying to get a
>> bunch of other stuff done.
>>
>> After I read your comment I went back and looked at Frisbee’s and Trew’s
>> written statements. Having kind of a wow moment.
>>
>> Even I had bought into some version of the narrative that GM told Frisbee they
>> were taking the two track down and Frisbee asked “the one you came in on”
>> and Eric said yes. Even that narrative doesn’t exist anywhere.
>>
>> I have to admit I hadn’t carefully read Frisbee’s statement because it’s so hard
>> to read. There is nothing nada there about that conversation (unless it’s been
>> redacted).
>>
>> And the only reference to anything like it in Trew’s statement is on page 5.
Marti… this has all been discussed at length some time WAAY back.
The ‘Zero, Zip. Nada’ moment is that NOWHERE is there ANYTHING to support the statement that the SAIR document chose to willy-nilly ‘insert’ into Brian Frisby’s head that he THOUGHT, even for one moment, that Eric Marsh was “heading towards a ranch to the northeast”.
The part about Frisby never really having any other thought than that Marsh meant he would be coming DOWN that same two-track he and Brown went UP there on is right there in the NEXT SENTENCE in the SAIR itself… AND it is in the very Blue Ridge interview notes that the SAIT supposedly based their OWN SAIR narrative on.
But even their OWN notes from their OWN interview(s) with Blue Ridge don’t match the crap they actually published in the SAIR itself.
Example…
Here is the ‘cut’ from the notes from the only actual ‘interview’ we know of that took place with BR Hotshots Frisby, Travis, Fueller and Ball.
NOTE: I really do hate to have to reprint ANYTHING from this crazy ‘SAIT Interview Notes’ document… but since US Forestry did everything they could to PREVENT Arizona Division of Occupational Safety from doing their job and ever interviewing any Blue Ridge Hotshot… the SAIT notes from their ( freely granted ) interviews with Blue Ridge are (unfortunately) all we have for now.
PDF page 9 of the SAIT Investigation Notes – Blue Ridge interview
————————————————————————————
B & T get in the trucks and bump them around. Cortis wants to know if the Rd to GM is an option, Eric says I copy fire is progressed to the buggies, Also going to make our way through out escape route. Brian asks are you in good black? Eric says “picking our way through the black to the rd in the bottom out towards the ranch” Brian thinks he meant towards the 2 track. To confirm Brian says, “the rd we came on w/ the ranger…affirm.” (…) Brian thought GM would come down the same rd him and Trew went on.
————————————————————————————
Here it is…
“Brian thought GM would come down the same rd him and Trew went on”
Absolutely NOTHING in that statement about NORTHEAST or about Brian Frisby having any kind of *THOUGHT* ( himself ) that Marsh was “heading for a ranch to the northeast”.
Marsh supposedly did mention the word ‘ranch’… but Frisby apparently didn’t THINK one thing about that one way or the other since, according to the interview notes, he was ONLY convinced Marsh meant he was coming down the same road they went UP on.
Now compare these SAIT interview notes about this moment with what was then ACTUALLY published in the SAIR…
Someone got ‘creative’… even with their OWN interview notes…
SAIR page 30
———————————————————————————-
As BR Supt is en route to pick up drivers to move the Granite Mountain crew carriers, SPGS1 contacts him to ask if they still have the option to burn out from the dozer line. BR Supt tells him no. DIVS A, hearing the transmission, agrees and says he believes the fire is almost as far as the Granite Mountain vehicles. A moment later, DIVS A says, “I want to pass on that we’re going to make our way to our escape route.” BR Supt attempts to clarify, “You guys are in the black, correct?” DIVS A responds, “Yeah, we’re picking our way through the black.” DIVS A then mentions a road in the bottom and “going out toward the ranch.” BR Supt thinks DIVS A is talking about heading northeast, through the black, to one of the ranches in that direction. BR Supt says, “DIVS A, to confirm, you’re talking about the road you saw me on with the UTV earlier, in the bottom.” DIVS A replies, “Yes, the road I saw you on with the Ranger [the UTV].”
———————————————————————————-
So not only did the SAIR authors apparently just ‘insert’ that ‘thought’ about a ‘ranch to the northeast’ into Frisby’s head… the VERY NEXT SENTENCE in their OWN document then seems to REVERSE even that ‘inserted’ thought and they seem to then CONFIRM that Frisby was only thinking about that same two-track he had gone UP to see Marsh on ( the east-west two-track that comes up from the ‘bottom’ and up the ridge ).
But many people ( the media included ) ONLY ‘latched on’ to that made-up statement in the same paragraph that “BR Supt thinks DIVS A is talking about heading northeast, through the black, to one of the ranches in that direction”.
THAT is the ‘made-up’ statement that went VIRAL… even though the VERY NEXT SENTENCE in the same damn paragraph seems to actual refute that statement and is closer to the truth about what Frisby REALLY did think ( according to the SAIT’s own interview with him ).
But the rodeo didn’t stop there.
Then… on page 63 of the SAIR… they repeat this inaccurate description of what Frisby actually said in their own interview with him… but this time they LEAVE OUT the ‘ranch’ part of the fiction altogether. This time the ‘thought’ they are still inserting into Frisby’s head was simply that Marsh meant he’d be heading northeast on the two-track. No RANCH mentioned whatsoever.
Page 63 of the SAIR…
——————————————————————-
When DIVS A told BR Supt that they were “picking our way through the black” toward the road at the bottom then to a ranch, BR Supt thought Granite Mountain was going out the two-track road to the northeast. After leaving the lunch spot, the Granite Mountain IHC traveled in a different direction toward the Boulder Springs Ranch. It is clear now, in hindsight, that the message BR Supt perceived was not the message DIVS A believed he relayed.
——————————————————————-
So NOW ( on page 63 ) not only are they still getting what Frisby said in his OWN interview with them wrong… they are trying to establish it was one of the more serious ‘miscommunications’ that day.
Yes… Marsh and Frisby miscommunicated that day… but there is still NO evidence ( not even in the SAIT’s OWN BR interview notes ) that Frisby EVER ‘thought’ Marsh was going NORTHEAST, much less “to a ranch in that direction”.
That still appears to just be TOTAL FICTION made up by the SAIR authors because it helped them establish their desired ‘cover story’ that while some people may have heard about a ‘ranch’… they can’t be blamed for being confused because that could have meant any number of ‘ranches’.
They appear to have sort of USED Brian Frisby… and put ‘thoughts into his head’ that he apparently never had just to support their own pre-determined narrative.
This really has all been covered before… at length.
Copy. Thank you!! Will seriously re-read and respond when I’m a little bit less, all things considered, brain-dead.
Keep in mind that regardless of what ‘thoughts’ the SAIR authors were willy-nilly ‘inserting’ into Frisby’s head to make their own ‘narrative’ align better with their pre-determined version of events…
…this exchange between Frisby and Marsh has NOTHING to do with the radio transmission that SPGS1 Gary Cordes says HE heard… and which was the basis for him testifying “They were headed to the Boulder Springs Ranch and they had plenty of time to get there”.
Cordes told ADOSH up to THREE time, during his interview, that the transmission HE heard which he reported to ADOSH this way…
“I did hear Eric say that he was headed to his pre-designated safety zone”
…was absolutely on the A2G channel and it was Eric Marsh ‘announcing’ this specifically to Air Attack ( Bravo 33 ).
NOWHERE does Cordes report hearing this “Which two-track are we talking about?” conversation between Frisby and Marsh.
I WAS trying to keep the focus on JUST the transmissions that all these people are saying they specifically heard going up to ‘Air Atack’ on the A2G channel… to TRY and do a ’roundup’ on those once and for all.
To introduce these other TAC X channel and/or GM crew-net transmissions that (yes) appear to also have been heard by some people just muddies the waters as far as focusing on the “Who heard what on A2G” issue.
But whadda ya gonna do.
These conversations always ‘bleed over’ into other things, it seems, and it IS hard to stay ‘focused’ enough to see one topic through to a conclusion.
Thanks for hanging in there thru all of this, WTKTT.
I have just never considered either the SAIR nor the YIN as a reputable source for “anchoring” anything. So I guess this convoluted argument serves at least one good purpose — proving why that is the case. I’ve just never understood anyone pinning anything to the SAIT/YIN as if it’s some kind of gospel truth.
Except for the unfortunate fact that those interviews COULD have been, if conducted and documented properly, a good source of various peoples raw, if still confused, memories before those memories got contaminated with conversations, shifts, etc before they were interviewed by ADOSH.
But that wasn’t the case, as has been obvious for a long, long time.
I know/remember us debunking the “northeast to a ranch” meme a long time ago. But I didn’t know/remember us debunking the entire conversation via Trew’s/Frisbee’s written testimonies. So it was still stuck in my mind that there was some truth to the idea that Frisbee/Trew had interacted with the meme about the road GM had come in on.
Which still could be, relatively true, if it’s buried under one of those black magic marker lines.
But, if that were the case, it would seem the SAIT wouldn’t have wanted to cover it up with a black magic marker.
The huge problem with this otherwise awesome “meeting room” is that there is no way for us to write up something like “weekly minutes.” There are twelve chapters to this book, and no Table of Contents and no Summaries, no Editorials, nothing but Twelve long, often convoluted bunches of conversations.
It can be really hard for those of us who have been here all along to remember what happened in the past, much less what got resolved and what didn’t, much less anyway for any readers/visitors/newcomers to even begin to get themselves oriented here.
I’m thankful we at least have, via John Dougherty, this meeting room, but it leaves a bit to be desired and everybody needs to keep that in mind when deciding how and where to post their comments, IMHO.
Bringing this back to the top as I am totally not in a happy mood if any on cares. http://www.investigativemedia.com/yarnell-hill-fire-chapter-xii/#comment-261673k to the top as I s
Nothing there bob
It’s just the extra letter ‘k’ on the end preventing that hyperlink from working.
One character too much added during the ‘Copy Link Location’ action.
This works…
http://www.investigativemedia.com/yarnell-hill-fire-chapter-xii/#comment-261673
I guess I’m with Bob on this.
Several days of very intense commentary about issues that can never be resolved until people (and they are out there) who actually know the answers to the questions, finally speak out about the truth of these matters.
A whole lot of spinning of wheels for days now, and not getting anywhere!
Perhaps, time to move on to something else?
I still think ( and have always thought ) it is important to figure out ( if possible ) exactly how many of these “Marsh and/or Steed reporting directly to AA on A2G” tansmissions there really were that day.
I knew the minute I started going ‘down that road’ and trying to present a LIST it was going to get messy.
I also knew the whole issue of whether or not the YIN B33 interview is actually accurate and whether or not B33 really DID fly down to check on GM was also going to enter into that picture.
Because YES… if you are trying to assemble a list of specific transmissions taking place ONLY between Marsh and/or Steed and AA… then that (supposed) ‘fly down and check on them’ even is part of that picture.
I still think it’s worth just figuring out how many of these reports of GM-to-AA-on-A2G radio traffic are DUPLICATES of each other with people just mis-remembering what was actually said.
The ONLY GM-to-AA-on-A2G transmission and what WORDS were in it we can be 100 percent sure of is the one where DPS Officer Eric Tarr is sure he heard someone say “We are making our way to a ranch we have in sight’.
Officer Tarr says it came from callsign “Granite Mountain 7” versus “Division Alpha”… so the implication there is that it was Jesse Steed ( or someone else in the GM crew ) electing to ‘announce’ something to Air Attack… and NOT DIVSA Eric Marsh.
We can be sure Office Tarr heard the word ‘ranch’.
It’s the only one of these reported GM-to-AA-on-A2G transmits that has an ‘external verification’ event. Office Tarr MUST have been sure he heard that phrase “heading to a ranch” because that is how Helicopter Ranger 58 was actually able to find the deployment site.
At the same time… the “moving in the black” part of that same transmit remains an absolute mystery.
In order to ‘have the ranch in sight’… Steed/Crew would have had to have been long gone from the anchor point and the ‘safe black’.
So was that someone choosing to actually supply ‘dis-information’ just to make the ‘move’ sound like it was safer than it really was?
It seems to me that there is a seventh radio transmission that was given by Marsh and it was not on the list of six given by WTK earlier today
#7 Todd Able reported that the last communication with Eric Marsh was “We are on the west ridge descending a predetermined escape route
If Todd Able didn’t himself hear that radio transmission. Who reported hearing it? This is the very first mention of any WEST RIDGE.
Interesting?
And how did Abel know this was the actual “last communication with Eric Marsh”?
Once Todd Abel became the “Incident Within An Incident” Commander there in the parking lot of the Ranch House Restaurant… I can easily imagine that one of the FIRST things he felt it WAS important to do is “poll the room” down there and find out WHO had heard WHAT… and WHEN.
Finding out WHO had the ‘latest information’ or might have heard something would have been very important to do.
So I think he did that.
Somewhere in the ‘huddles’ there was some agreement about what the LAST probable transmission was that someone heard… and this is what Abel reported back to Roy Hall via cellphone.
It still does NOT mean ( in any way ) that it was something OPS1 Todd Abel himself heard. It was just the report he was making to Hall after “polling the room” and finding out what OTHER people might have heard before the actual MAYDAY call(s).
That being said…
I don’t know if the ‘west ridge’ part of what Abel reported to Hall was just an ’embellishment’ ( On Hall’s part?… on Abel’s part? Someone else’s? part? ) to what appears to be the same thing both Cordes and Musser would later testify to ‘overhearing’ on the A2G channel.
Maybe. Maybe not.
Maybe someone else really DID hear ‘west ridge’ along with that seemingly identical quote that Cordes and Musser would later recall to ADOSH.
I think the simplest explanation is that what ended up being reported to Hall via ICIWC Abel as the ‘last known como’ really was coming from either Cordes or Musser down in that RHR parking lot… and somewhere along the line the ‘west ridge’ part just got added to the front ( by somebody ).
Doesn’t mean it was actually part of the original transmission.
My 2 cents on the ‘west ridge’ part of that.
And then there was the quote from DW. WE heard they were headed in a SOUTHERLY DIRECTION
#8 Maybe?
Perhaps… but two points here…
(1) I think that by the time Darrell Willis gave that press conference… the SAIT had had a lot of time to review a lot of evidence… including the Panebaker Air Study Videos and the radio captures contained in them. Remember that the SAIT had these complete Panebaker Videos early on. They had NO PROBLEM getting full copies via the US Forestry Service. ADOSH was forced to file FOIA requests for the same material and it took a long time for them to get the same material.
In the Panebaker 20130630_161620_VLAT_split_1_EP.MOV video is where we hear Eric Marsh saying VERY CLEARLY ( and LOUDLY ) the word ‘SOUTH’.
It was part of his description about where “the guys” ( Granite ) were “heading” in response to that direct question “Granite Mountain, wuz yo status rat now?” radio query at exactly 1613.30 ( 4:13.30 PM ).
That’s the ONLY place this word ‘SOUTH’ really appears in any of the evidence as pertaining to Marsh and/or Granite Mountain and their actual ‘movements’… so I think before Darrell Willis ever stepped in front of those cameras he was aware this evidence existed.
Even if Willis never heard that transmit itself in real time… I think he was aware it existed prior to the press conference and it definitely indicated which WAY” Granite Mountain was headed that afternoon.
Once again… that exchange ( on TAC 1 ) in the Panebaker video was as follows…
————————————————————————–
+0:41 ( 1613.30 / 4:13.30 PM )
(Unknown): Granite Mountain ( Five? )… What’s your status right now?
NOTE: A pretty heavy accent on this speaker. Sounds like
Louisiana Cajun? What he says almost sounds like…
“Granite Montun… wuz yo status rat now?
ALSO NOTE: Even though the caller asked for ‘Granite Mountain’ specifically, and not ‘DIVS A’… Eric Marsh responds immediately on behalf of Granite Mountain before Jesse Steed even has a chance to say anything. Jesse only appears to ‘chime in’ with his own ‘status’ report about “we’re pushin’ our way down into the structures” when Marsh is done speaking.
+0:52 ( 1613.41 / 4:13.31 PM )
(Eric Marsh): Well the guys… uh… Granite… is makin’ their way out the exact
escape route from this mornin’… an’ it heads… ah… (pause) SOUTH. ( slight pause ) mid-slope, cuttin’ over.
+1:07 ( 1613.56 / 4:13.56 PM )
( Another voice immediately adds to what Marsh said but it is )
( NOT Marsh this time. It sounds like Jesse Steed )
(Jesse Steed??): We’ll be pushin’ our way down into the structures.
+1:10 ( 1613.59 / 4:13.59 PM )
( Another voice. Very quickly): Copy that.
+1:21 ( 1614.10 / 4:14.10 PM )
(Unknown): Ten four. You with Granite Mountain right now?
NOTE: Whoever is talking with Marsh at this point uses the phrase ‘Ten four’ to acknowledge a transmission instead of the usual ‘Copy’ or ‘Copy that’. This, itself, should help to identify the caller.
+1:24 ( 1614.13 / 4:14.13 PM )
(Eric Marsh): Uh… just checkin’ it out to see where we’re gonna jump out at.
———————————————————————-
When Marsh used the word SOUTH in this exchange… he said it VERY clearly and its one of the easiest parts of the conversation to hear.
(2) If we do assume that 4:13 PM transmission is where Darrell Willis was getting his “We heard they were heading in a SOUTHERLY direction”… then even as important as that is I don’t think it qualifies for the actual “What people heard on Air-To-Ground” transmission list ( which is what we were trying to assemble ).
This entire 4:13 PM radio exchange with someone asking “Granite Mountain… wuz yo status rat now?” ( and the response from Marsh ) appears to have all taken place on the TAC 1 radio channel and not the Air-To-Ground channel.
Link(s) Source(s) ??
Marti.
I cant find that in my notes. But it seems that it came from the deployment site interview that he did in July 2013
Gotcha. Thanks!
Reply to calvin post on February 18, 2015 at 5:28 am
>> calvin said…
>>
>> I cant find that in my notes. But it seems that it came from
>> the deployment site interview that he did in July 2013
Yes. That’s where we heard ( for the first time ) that there was any ‘evidence’ that anyone involved with Granite Mountain had indicated their DIRECTION to anyone.
See above. I still think Darrell Willis was referencing that TAC 1 radio channel exchange that was captured in the Panebaker 1616 video… which is where we hear Eric Marsh himself say the word ‘SOUTH’ very loudly and clearly…
+0:52 ( 1613.41 / 4:13.31 PM )
(Eric Marsh): Well the guys… uh… Granite… is makin’ their way out the exact
escape route from this mornin’… an’ it heads… ah… (pause) SOUTH. ( slight pause ) mid-slope, cuttin’ over.
WTK said
>> calvin said…
>>
>> B33 YIN
>>
>> “Never say them earlier. I didn’t know they were there. Air attack didn’t tell me
>> there were resources in the area.”
So WHO do you think is making that statement?
Thomas French… or John Burfiend?… or maybe even Clint Cross at that point?
The friggin’ SAIT notes are so BAD… we don’t even know for sure.
What if while they were flying that recon… French ( the pilot ) was preoccupied with looking at the upcoming retardant drop/lead plane situation and he was just relying on Burfiend to look out the window and do the ‘visual’ check for GM?
What if this statement is ONLY Thomas French chiming in during that side-by-side interview between he and Burfiend ( and Clint Cross )… and some SAIT person just jotted down what French said.
Maybe French DIDN’T ‘see them’… but Burfiend DID… and was the one reporting back to OPS1 on the A2G since French was only speaking on the A2A channel.
Who the hell knows.
Seems you do.
I mean, you actually think Burfiend would sit directly beside French and let French give inaccurate detailed information to a Serious Accident Investigation Team?
Really?
Reply to calvin post on February 17, 2015 at 6:41 pm
>> calvin said…
>>
>> :: WTKTT said…
>> :: Maybe French DIDN’T ‘see them’… but Burfiend DID… and was the one
>> :: reporting back to OPS1 on the A2G since French was only speaking
>> :: on the A2A channel.
>> :: Who the hell knows.
>>
>> Seems you do.
No. I don’t.
I have NO IDEA what was really going on inside that airplane that day… and the SAIT Investigation notes are really not much help figuring it all out.
>> calvin also said…
>>
>> I mean, you actually think Burfiend would sit directly beside French
>> and let French give inaccurate detailed information to a Serious Accident
>> Investigation Team?
>>
>> Really?
If you READ what I just said… then there would have been nothing ‘inaccurate’ about French being focused on one thing during that recon and Burfiend being focused on something else.
That MAY have been how it was going down.
If French really was more preoccupied with looking at the terrain and he was letting Burfiend just handle this ‘look for resources on the ground’ thing they were asked to do by OPS ( Since Burfiend was handling A2G and French was not )…
…then Burfiend would have said nothing at all when French said “Never say them earlier”.
That *MIGHT* have been the truth.
Notice what that statement ALSO contains…
“Air attack didn’t tell ME there were resources in the area.”
Keyword: ME ( singular ).
Not US ( plural ).
So that really was just ONE of the men ‘speaking for himself’ at that point.
The SAIT notes are so piss-poor bad we have no idea WHICH of the two was speaking… but I would venture a guess that it WAS French and NOT Burfiend simply because of the other additional phrase “Air Attack didn’t tell ME”.
In the Panebaker Air-To-Air channel captures… we can HEAR for ourselves that MOST of the interaction between Rory Collins and B33 was, in fact, taking place between Collins and French on the Air-To-Air channel.
So when whoever this person is speaking in the YIN B33 section says “Air Attack didn’t tell ME”… it seems more than likely that means it was Thomas French speaking and not John Burfiend.
Bottom line here…
Either the YIN B33 interview notes are ‘fiction’… or OPS1 Todd Abel’s testimony is ‘fiction’.
It really can’t be that BOTH are true.
Either B33 went ‘down there’ and either SAW and/or VERIFIED that GM was ‘in the black’…
…or they DIDN’T.
I hope we find out the truth on that someday.
Reply to calvin post on February 17, 2015 at 3:43 am
>> calvin said…
>>
>> Per the SAIR p33
>>
>> B33 overhears a call AT APPROXIMATELY 1600
That is referring to whatever the heck it was that prompted B33 ( in the 1600 timeframe ) to then (supposedly) ask Abel if he wanted them to go check on Granite Mountain ( again… according to the rest of the YIN B33 notes ).
This part… ( SAIR page 33 )…
———————————————————————–
At approximately 1600, ASM2 overhears a comment on the radio referencing a crew and a safety zone. ASM2 calls OPS1 and clarifies, “I heard a crew in a safety zone, do we need to call a time out?” OPS1 replies, “No, they’re in a good place. They’re safe and it’s Granite Mountain.” They talk about flying over to check on the crew, but for now, they think the crew is safe in the black.
————————————————————————
We still have NO IDEA what “ASM2 overhears a comment” means… which is (supposedly) what prompted them to ask Abel about taking a ‘timeout’. circa 1600 ( 4:00 PM ). That does NOT sound like any one of the radio callouts direct to B33 that have been under discussion here yesterday and today. Sounds more like they just ‘overheard’ someone talking to someone ELSE ( and not THEM ).
This 1600 ‘overheard something’ thing is NOT the “Air To Air” radio transmit I was talking about in that section in the SAIR.
I was talking about the one they said came AFTER that.
SAIR makes it sound like it was RIGHT after the 1600 deal, or something, but it was actually (according to YIN B33 notes ) about 30 mins later, at 1630.
>> calvin said…
>>
>> How/ why do you get 1630 out of that?
Simple. That’s the time the YIN B33 interview itself puts on that SECOND “Air To Ground” transmit.
YIN page 15… B33 interview…
—————————————————-
We needed to go back to the right flank (16:30 AZ time). Made 3 practice runs. Painted 2. We came around. Got a call from Division A stating they
“were going down their escape route to the safety zone”
—————————————————–
SAIR…. page 33…
——————————————–
ASM2 hears DIVS A announce on the radio,
“We’re going down our escape route to our safety zone.”
——————————————–
* Just the statements themselves…
YIN/B33: “They were going down their escape route to the safety zone”
SAIR: “We’re going down our escape route to our safety zone.”
IDENTICAL statements except that the SAIR authors apparently took the liberty of changing it from 3rd person ( their escape route ) to 1st person ( our escape route ) because that just ‘sounded better’ for their narrative.
But the TIME for this statement comes from the YIN itself… and appears to have been just shortly after 1630 when they made 2 practice runs and then ‘came around.
WTK said
Cordes says he definitely heard Eric Marsh calling directly to ‘Air Attack’ on the Air-To-Ground channel and telling THEM ( Burfiend, specifically, since we was the one handling A2G traffic in B33 ) he was (quote) “headed to his pre-designated safety zone”.
This still appears to be one of those A2G ‘announcements’ that came EARLIER ( in the 4:00 PMish timeframe ) than the other ones reported by B33 and DPS Officer Tarr later on in the 4:30 PMish timeframe.
I still don’t trust the YIN as far as I can throw it… but the TIMING would match here.
1. Cordes hears Marsh ‘announce’ direct to AA “”headed to pre-designated safety zone”.
2. Burfiend tells OPS Abel “I heard something about a crew and a safety zone”.
3. Burfiend ( according to YIN/SAIR only ) asks Abel if they should ‘go check’.
4. Abel didn’t hear that transmit, doesn’t know Burfiend is talking about something Marsh hiself just said.
5. Then ( according to YIN/SAIR only ) Abel… says “Nah… it’s GM. Their safe”.
If you believe the YIN/SAIR… the timing matches… but Abel ‘called off’ B33 and
they never went to actually check on GM ( or anyone on the south side ).
Read your own posts.
It seems that you answered your own question here
I agree that the message being discussed here is what Cordes mentions in his ADOSH interview as hearing, over Air2Ground (even though he couldn’t speak but could hear Air2Ground) Eric saying, “pre-designated safety zone.”
And, as I’ve written in more detail a bit downstream, Cordes heard that as he was standing on 89 with Paul Musser.
Which is, all things considered, a bit enigmatic, or maybe a bit questionable.
I don’t know how long Musser and Cordes were standing there on 89 having their discussion. While Cordes was, according to his ADOSH interview, hearing this transmission.
This is the same time, relatively speaking, that Eric and Granite Mountain (i.e Steed most likely) were still having their “Options Conversation.”
If Cordes heard this, it would have to have been AFTER the “Options Conversation” and after Granite Mountain had actually gotten up and gotten re-organized and then started heading toward their “pre-designated safety zone.”
We are still uncertain (despite what the SAIR says) exactly when they all stood up and started heading toward their “pre-designated safety zone.”
But it couldn’t have been much later than Chris McKenzie’s last iPhone photo IMG_2738.JPG taken at 3:55:41 PM or his last Canon Powershot video which I have timestamped at 4:02:10 PM, but we might have collectively re-timestamped that a bit but I didn’t attach that to the file.
So if Gary Cordes heard that, it would have had to have been probably a bit after 4:02ish PM, I think.
AND, I might add
As a note to Bob Powers
THIS would have been when Gary Cordes’ mental timeclock would have started ticking inside his head as to his idea that Granite Mountain could have relatively safely reached, if they took the longer but easier and, therefore quicker, two mile two-track all the way to Boulder Springs Ranch, that Ranch in about 30 minutes.
In other words, at about 4:35 PM.
Which also means Cordes still should have been surprised upon learning where Granite Mountain deployed. The Deployment Site was not on that route that was, apparently, inside of his head.
Except we also STILL do NOT know what actually transpired that morning while Cordes and Marsh were looking at that map on Dean Fernandez’s iPad.
Someone ( Marsh? Cordes? ) might have ACTUALLY ‘drawn their finger’ through that fuel-filled box canyon… and BOTH men might have agreed right then and there that YES… that’s the shorter way to go. That’s the preferred ‘escape route’.
it is still possible that’s what went down that morning… and why Gary Cordes was ( as he, himself, said ) in NO WAY surprised where those bodies were found.
Yep. That also.
Reply to calvin post on February 17, 2015 at 10:34 am
NOTE: This was brought up from down below in those IMMENSELY confusing threads trying to make sense out of of “who heard what when” with regards to Marsh and/or Steed making ‘announcements’ directly to Air Attack.
This was a quick comment… but it implies a lot and needs to be clarified.
>> calvin said…
>>
>> There appears to be direct evidence that Marsh did in fact report their
>> move to B33, and in turn B33 called Abel.
What ‘direct evidence’?
If you are talking about whether B33 really did go check on GM ( as Todd Abel says happened )… then YES… Todd Abel ALSO says there was a ‘report’ back to him FROM B33 once they performed that recon that GM was ‘in a good place’ and right where Abel thought they were.
There was no reported MOVEMENT. That recon was apparently taking place while they were still either stationary in the black or had just BEGUN to move out… but that ‘move’ was not perceptible to B33 before they reported back to Abel.
If you are talking about the OTHER radio transmits that were overheard later on ( DPS Officer Tarr’s signed testimony puts them at 1630 )… then “YES… those transmits were happening WHILE GM was moving…
…but there is NO DIRECT EVIDENCE that Air Attack B33 was ‘passing on’ THOSE transmits to OPS1 Todd Abel.
Indeed… the very statement that DPS Officer Tarr says he heard which eventually enabled them to find the deployment site HAD to have taken AFTER about 4:20… because the actual “quote” that supposedly floated up to B33 was that they were “heading to a ranch we have in sight”.
If that caller had the “ranch in sight”… then it HAD to be from somewhere around the saddle and not anywhere near back by the anchor point. The BSR was NOT VISIBLE from back there.
So B33 may have reported back to OPS Abel about seeing them at the anchor point… earlier on… but it appears that they were just ‘swallowing’ these LATER transmits about ‘moving’ and ‘heading for a ranch we have in sight’. They were NOT passing THESE transmits on to OPS1 Abel.
OPS1 Todd Abel has testified that he NEVER heard they were MOVING.
Not from Marsh, not from Steed, not from Musser, not from Cordes, not from ‘Bravo 33′.
Not from ANYONE.
One more time… from Field OPS1 Todd Abel’s ADOSH interview…
————————————————————————————————
2629 Q1: No word on we’re leaving the black?
2630
2631 A: Nothing. I heard nothing – the last conversation I had with them, we’re in the
2632 black, we’re good, copy that. Every- got everybody in the black and
2633 everybody’s good, that’s affirmative, copy.
———————————————————————————————-
WTK said
Cordes says he definitely heard Eric Marsh calling directly to ‘Air Attack’ on the Air-To-Ground channel and telling THEM ( Burfiend, specifically, since we was the one handling A2G traffic in B33 ) he was (quote) “headed to his pre-designated safety zone”.
This still appears to be one of those A2G ‘announcements’ that came EARLIER ( in the 4:00 PMish timeframe ) than the other ones reported by B33 and DPS Officer Tarr later on in the 4:30 PMish timeframe.
I still don’t trust the YIN as far as I can throw it… but the TIMING would match here.
1. Cordes hears Marsh ‘announce’ direct to AA “”headed to pre-designated safety zone”.
2. Burfiend tells OPS Abel “I heard something about a crew and a safety zone”.
3. Burfiend ( according to YIN/SAIR only ) asks Abel if they should ‘go check’.
4. Abel didn’t hear that transmit, doesn’t know Burfiend is talking about something Marsh hiself just said.
5. Then ( according to YIN/SAIR only ) Abel… says “Nah… it’s GM. Their safe”.
If you believe the YIN/SAIR… the timing matches… but Abel ‘called off’ B33 and
they never went to actually check on GM ( or anyone on the south side ).
Read your own posts.
It seems that you answered your own question here
Reply to calvin post on February 17, 2015 at 6:20 pm
>> calvin said…
>>
>> Read your own posts.
>>
>> It seems that you answered your own question here.
Exactly what ‘question’ are you referring to?
That post is just establishing that IAOI you actually TRUST the SAIT Investigation Notes ( in particular the B33 interview section )… and IAOI you believe that the same ”headed to pre-designated safety zone” A2G transmit that Cordes says he heard is, in fact, what Burfiend meant when the YIN says he said…
Burfiend tells OPS Abel “I heard something about a crew and a safety zone”
…then that COULD have been what Burfiend was referring to when he says he ‘heard something’ and that is what prompted him to ask OPS Abel ( circa 4:00 PM? ) if they needed to take a ‘timeout’ and go check on that.
There is no ‘question’ there.
Either you believe this is possible… or you don’t.
The ‘Catch-22’, of course, is that if you believe the B33 interview section of the SAIT Interview notes… then you have to believe that B33 never actually went on the recon because Todd Abel ‘called them off’… and you then have to automatically believe that everything Todd Abel himself said to ADOSH about all this is ‘fiction’.
So no real ‘question’ there.
One of the narratives is complete fiction.
We just don’t know WHICH one.
I will repeat ( in case you missed it below )… I ( me, personally ) do NOT KNOW which one is the ‘fiction’.
WTKTT——-
Getting lost down below
On Eric Tarr he was not the only one that herd heading to the Ranch.
If you remember Frisby was talking with Marsh and Marsh said the were moving thru the Black to a Ranch. Frisby thought they were talking about a ranch on the North East side of the Burn.
There were a lot of single statements that were being picked up and latter the people that herd them were adding their take to the conversation. Its human nature. You have to sift thru these kinds of statements and find the facts like the 6 different statements on one radio message you went thru below.
We seem to be getting into a Lawyer type cross that is specifically done.
to confuse the Jury to the point they say– The hell with it not guilty.
To bad we do not have a judge to say OUT OF ORDER.
Is this a plan to leave readers out side this discussion CONFUSED?????
Thanks to WTKTT we can at least refer back to investigation statements to keep things in perspective.
We are now beating a dead horse here and spinning wheels some questions right now have no answers and some we have answered over and over. and the other Parties refuse to accept the answers………
The one fact for sure is the person that should have been consulted and never was did not know what Marsh and GM were doing.
All we have done is chase rabbits for 2 days have we found any substantiated new evidence
to add the the record————NO
Reply to Bob Powers post on February 17, 2015 at 2:24 pm
>> Bob Powers said…
>>
>> On Eric Tarr he was not the only one that herd heading to the Ranch.
>> If you remember Frisby was talking with Marsh and Marsh said the
>> were moving thru the Black to a Ranch. Frisby thought they were
>> talking about a ranch on the North East side of the Burn.
NO. That is absolutely NOT the case. We’ve been over this one seems like DOZENS of times now.
There is absolutely NO evidence… in ANY published testimony involving Blue Ridge… that Brian Frisby EVER said and/or thought any such thing.
The ONLY place this bullshit about Frisby thinking they were “headed to some ranch up north” was in the SAIR document itself.
The authors of the SATI just MADE THAT UP and they ‘inserted’ that ‘thought’ into Brian Frisby’s head because it helped to justify the narrative they were pushing that no one knew where GM was or where they were really going.
It is absolute FICTION… and (unfortunately) they got away with it.
There were MANY multimedia outlets that then regurgitated this piece of fiction as if it was fact. Some even went so far as to say it was something the SAIT said Frisby said he HEARD.
Also total horseshit.
The SAIR even only said “BR Supt THINKS divsa is talking about heading northeast, through the black, to one of the ranches in that direction”.
It was just a THOUGHT they were attributing to Frisby ( which he never even had )… and not, in any way, anything anyone even supposedly SAID to him.
I hate to even reprint this crap even one more time… but for the sake of completeness here is that section from the SAIR again where we see the SAIT people ‘inserting’ thoughts into Brian Frisby’s head because it fit their purposes to do so…
———————————————————————
A moment later, DIVS A says, “I want to pass on that we’re going to make our way to our escape route.” BR Supt attempts to clarify, “You guys are in the black, correct?” DIVS A responds, “Yeah, we’re picking our way through the black.” DIVS A then mentions a road in the bottom and “going out toward the ranch.” BR Supt thinks DIVS A is talking about heading northeast, through the black, to one of the ranches in that direction. BR Supt says, “DIVS A, to confirm, you’re talking about the road you saw me on with the UTV earlier, in the bottom.” DIVS A replies, “Yes, the road I saw you on with the Ranger [the UTV].”
———————————————————————
If you read Brian Frisby’s own Unit Log… even the unredacted parts indicate what a bunch of ‘fiction’ this stuff that showed up in the SAIR was.
As that last exchange in the SAIR indicates… the ONLY ‘thought’ Brian Frisby had about what ‘route’ Marsh might have been talking about was coming down on that same two-track that he and Brown had used to go up to meet them earlier that day.
No ‘heading to the northeast’… No ‘ranches in that direction’.
Zero. Zip. Nada. ( Not in Frisby’s own testimony, anyway ).
I still think that Brian Frisby himself would like to have the opportunity to ‘set the record straight’ on even just this one item… since the media jumped all over this fiction and it is all over the place now.
I think even Brian Frisby would like the opportunity to say, one of these days…
“I never thought any such thing. Someone just made that up.”
>> Bob Powers also said…
>>
>> There were a lot of single statements that were being picked up and
>> latter the people that herd them were adding their take to the
>> conversation. Its human nature. You have to sift thru these kinds of
>> statements and find the facts like the 6 different statements on one
>> radio message you went thru below.
I think if ADOSH had had the chance to interview these THREE critical witnesses who were all in ‘Bravo 33’ that day and on headsets ( Thomas French, John Burfiend and Trainee Clint Cross )… we would not be NEARLY as confused about this part of the ‘story’.
ADOSH tried very hard to do this. They made it clear that interviewing these people was crucial to them being able to perform their legal duty to investigate this incident properly.
But it was not to be.
For reasons still unknown… Arizona Forestry and the US Forestry Service PREVENTED ADOSH from interviewing any of these key witnesses.
Thanks that makes it a lot clearer to me now that you refresh my memory.
So when it comes to ACTUAL evidence/testimony… the ONLY person who has EVER reported hearing the word ‘ranch’ over the radio appears to be just DPS Officer Eric Tarr, in his signed testimony.
He says he heard it right around 1630. ( 4:30 PM ).
Here are those relevant ‘cuts’ regarding BOTH of those ‘GM7′ transmissions from DPS Officer/Paramedic Eric Tarr’s signed deposition in document “M-Law-Enforcement no-redactions.pdf”
———————————————————————–
EMERGENCY RADIO TRAFFIC
Around 1630 hours I was standing near the aircraft ( Helicopter Ranger 58 ) monitoring traffic on channel Air-To-Ground ( A/G ) 16 when I heard a voice come up on the radio with a Call sign of Granite Mountain 7. He advised on the radio that they were moving towards Yarnell in the black.
A short time later he came back up on the radio advising they were heading to a ranch they had in sight.
————————————————————————-
I am GLAD that Officer Tarr heard this “heading to a ranch we have in sight” coming from callsign prefix “Granite Mountain 7” ( Steed? not Marsh? )… because THAT is exactly what made Ranger 58 able to find the deployment site…
…but it is still absolutely BIZARRE that NO ONE ELSE has reported hearing this same statement even though lots of people (supposedly) were catching lots of OTHER transmits on the Air-To-Ground channel that day.
Why would some DPS guy standing next to a helicopter have been (apparently?) the ONLY one to hear this VERY important transmit coming from “Granite Mountain 7″… when SO many other people were monitoring the A2G channel as well in that timeframe.
So what the hell is the statement in the Black????
way out of place at 1630??????
Yes. It is. Total mystery there… unless it was actual ‘disinformation’ coming from ?? who ?? Marsh? Steed?
Tarr says the the callsign prefix on that was also “Granite Mountain 7”, which I have explained below seems more likely to mean it was Jesse Steed or Robert Caldwell ( or someone else in GM ) making that radio call to AA on A2G.
Marsh was using callsign prefix “Division Alpha” that day… right up until his death.
There is no reason to doubt the TIME he heard this, either.
1630 ( 4:30 PM )
…which is really equally mysterious.
Just 9 minutes before Steed’s first MAYDAY hit the A2G channel.
DPS Officer Tarr was pretty diligent ( and accurate ) about most of the TIMES he was reporting in his signed testimony… as one would expect of a Police Officer and any official report he was making.
So there’s really ZERO reason to doubt this one…
But LOTS of reasons to scratch one’s head about it.
This transmissions falls directly in the time period that the Arizona Forestry lawyers have told Judge Mosesso they EXPECT Brendan McDonough to supply ‘additional information’ on ( time leading up to and shortly before deployment )…
…so maybe someone will remember to ask Brendan about these reported transmissions from “Granite Mountain 7”.
Addendum/Correction for my own post above…
>> On February 17, 2015 at 6:06 pm, WTKTT said…
>>
>> So when it comes to ACTUAL evidence/testimony… the
>> ONLY person who has EVER reported hearing the word
>> ‘ranch’ over the radio appears to be just DPS Officer
>> Eric Tarr, in his signed testimony.
I was TRYING to just stay focused on the things that people say they specifically heard coming from Marsh/Steed on the A2G channel with ‘Air Attack’ as the target recipient.
That’s what I meant above by “ONLY person who has EVER reported the word ‘ranch'”
If you include radio transmissions OTHER than these specific things people thought they heard going to AA on A2G… then there IS at least one other reported radio transmit with the words ‘ranch’ coming out of Marsh’s mouth.
That would be the supposed exchange between Marsh and Frisby prior to 4:00 PM where Frisby says Marsh ‘announced’ on TAC1 that he was ‘making his way out the escape route… towards the ranch’. That’s also the conversation where Frisby was trying to verify which two-track Marsh was referring to and he thought he got confirmation Marsh was talking about the same two-track Frisby used to go up there to see him for the noon face-to-face.
So technically the paragraph above SHOULD have read like this…
When it comes to ACTUAL evidence/testimony… the
ONLY person who has EVER reported hearing the word
‘ranch’ over the radio during these transmits specifically
from either Marsh or Steed TO AA over the A2G channel
appears to be just DPS Officer Eric Tarr, in his signed testimony.
If my memory serves me correctly.
RTS helped establish this Heading north narrative from BR.
I think he actually said he stood at the helispot and could actually see the ranch in the distance to the north. The same one Frisby thought Marsh meant when he gave his intent over the radio.
Apologies, if I am mistaken
Until those Blue Ridge Unit logs were fully released… and those other misc. Unit Logs from other personnel that weren’t released until February of 2014… it was not possible to see that there really was NO evidence Brian Frisby ever said or thought any such thing.
>> calvin also said…
>>
>> The same one Frisby thought Marsh meant when he
>> gave his intent over the radio.
Even if Frisby DID have that ‘thought’ ( there is NO evidence he actually did )… there is doubly no evidence that Frisby would have been thinking it even might have been the same one RTS said he could see from that ridge.
The only things ‘out there’ to the northeast all the way to the Model Creek and Peeples Valley area were a couple of cattle stations and the Double-Bar-A ranch itself… which had already burned to the ground by 4:00 PM and would have been still shrouded in smoke because of the now south-bound fireline and smoke column.
I’ve been kinda sorta following this discussion all day while trying to get a bunch of other stuff done.
After I read your comment I went back and looked at Frisbee’s and Trew’s written statements. Having kind of a wow moment.
Even I had bought into some version of the narrative that GM told Frisbee they were taking the two track down and Frisbee asked “the one you came in on” and Eric said yes. Even that narrative doesn’t exist anywhere.
I have to admit I hadn’t carefully read Frisbee’s statement because it’s so hard to read. There is nothing nada there about that conversation (unless it’s been redacted).
And the only reference to anything like it in Trew’s statement is on page 5. I have to hand type it because you can’t select it to cut and paste.
“I instruct our guys to grab their buggies and wait until we get back to them. I jump in their chase and the xxxxxxxxxxx me and we pick up our guys in their buggies who fall into the convoy. I have the front and xxxxxs bring up the rear. I then get conformation [sic[ that our trucks are at the youth camp from xxxxxxxxx. At this time I jump on their crew radio and talk with xxxxxxxxxxxxx about where we are taking the buggies and the situation down here. I explain about what we are doing and what the fire behavior is doing. xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx I also reiterate that we are going to keep their xxxxxxx with us until we tie in with them later. I explain that we will keep their rigs with us too because things are very dynamic now, and xxxxx mentions that they are trying to come down off the hill, he mentions traveling through the black. I also get positive conformation [sic] that xxxx understands where the trucks will be parked because he can see the trucks driving out and I orient him to the rocky area north along the dozer line (end of shrine rd) that we are taking them to.
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx We drive around to the youth camp and park their rigs with ours. We then get positive conformation [sic] that the area that the Granite Mountain trucks were just in was burned, from xxxxx via the radio. ”
That’s it. That’s all there is about GM/Eric telling Blue Ridge about their exit plan..
LOL. Sorry about the long x line. Didn’t realize it would run right off the page. In the PDF it’s an almost two line black line.
PS I don’t have the link to that at hand. It’s called “BlueRidgeIHC.pdf”.
Strangely enough, that pdf doesn’t include Frisbee’s testimony. His is in a separate pdf called “FrisbeeBlueRidgeIHC.pdf”.
One WOULD THINK
That the SAIT, after having given forth that narrative about that conversation, wouldn’t have redacted it out of either Trew’s or Frisbee’s written testimonies if it existed in one or both of them.
Definitely makes me wonder what’s behind those black lines.
Me too Marti! it might help clear some of this up, really.
Calvin
Glad you caught this and yes I think it might!
calvin and Marti
See a new parent comment above.
You’re looking in the wrong place for the confirmation that the only thing Frisby ever REALLY thought was that Marsh was attempting to ‘come down’ the same two-track that Frisby and Brown used to go UP for the face-to-face.
The actual (unredacted) statements from Frisby to that effect are in the NEXT SENTENCE in the SAIR report itself… AND in the SAIT’s own Blue Ridge interview notes.
Copy. I understand that. I’m just focusing here on what Trew/Frisby wrote in their written testimonies, not what SAIT/YIN said they said/thought. For all the reasons we have discussed.
PS Regarding the SAIR, the YIN, the ADOSH the narratives, and today’s argumentative conversation.
I had a four-hour conversation on Sunday with a friend (who has turned out to be the ONLY person in my REAL LIFE who, rather than roll their eyes in the back of their head before going to sleep when I discourse on about the Yarnell Hill Fire) who quite adamantly stated that…
….everybody should have been interviewed IMMEDIATELY with a tape recorder running, because, in his experience, the most reliable (even though clouded by the fog of disaster/war/whatever and all that Elizabeth correctly reminds us is witness inaccuracies) that’s when their memories are the most un-contaminated by all kinds of other narrative/info/rumors/conversations/comparisons etc.
That’s something I’ve been thinking about all day as I’ve tried to pick my way through this extremely confusing collection of threads.
As I have plainly stated, I agree with WTKTT in his damning assessment of the YIN, not to mention the SAIR. And the fact that their GM/Eric via Blue Ridge narrative doesn’t even remotely correspond to what Trew and Frisbee wrote (unless it’s buried behind those long black redaction lines) further substantiates that damning assessment.
The problem is that, even if ADOSH is now finally being able to conduct all those interviews that they couldn’t/didn’t have time to conduct in 2013, Godde only knows what people will now “remember” about what happened on that fateful day over a year and a half ago.
That being said, I REALLY want to see the un-redacted versions of these written testimonies and I REALLY want to listen to what I believe are the EXISTENT Air 2 Ground Radio files before I am even about to engage in endless arguments about all this stuff.
THAT BEING SAID.
Way downstream I wrote TWICE about how I thought Abel and Musser roughly geographically divvied up the fire around about 3:30-4:00ish PM. I still think they did that.
And then I asked if, all thing considered, Musser might have known about/agreed to/whatever Cordes’ plan, thus making that plan a bit less “rogue” than we’ve been seeing it.
And also, possibly providing a reason inside Eric’s/GM’s heads for not keeping TODD ABEL posted, after about 3:50 PM, as to their plans/whereabouts.
That they were possibly thinking, after that time, that Abel was no longer their direct overhead, who then was more like Musser/Cordes. I was thinking about that quite seriously, and asking for feedback, which I didn’t get.
So I’m still wandering around, figuratively speaking, still wondering if this might have any relevance.
The ONE thing that has shifted in my mind, as a result of today’s convoluted, sometimes angry, really difficult to follow in this format, argument is……
…… the possible role of Paul Musser in being aware of/agreeing to/paying any attention to/following/being concerned about/being aware of the possible consequences of Gary Cordes “Plan” to put a dozer line in between Glen Ilah and the Boulder Springs Ranch — something that he got Blue Ridge Hotshot Ball and possibly the dozer operator involved in and may have had in mind as he learned about, around 4ish PM, via Eric’s communication to Air Attack (which he heard in some convoluted way) that they were “headed to his pre-designated safety zone”.
One of the biggest take-aways I have gathered from all of this is that, even tho Paul Musser was, effectively, the Field OPS for this south part of the fire after about 3:30 PM, and…
….even though Musser spent a bit of time conversing with Gary Cordes while Cordes was, both having trouble signaling to Air Attack and communicating with Eric/Granite Mountain while overhearing that Eric was ““headed to his pre-designated safety zone,” — I mean both of those things happened at the same time while Gary Cordes was standing on Hiway 89 talking with Paul Musser…..
……Apparently Musser proceeded to seemingly know nothing about
1) Gary Cordes’ plan
2) the potential (or reality) of the dangerous path Eric/Granite Mountain were beginning to pursue
3) the need for him to intervene in this, given that he was now the Field OPS for that whole area
4) Gary Cordes’ continuation of attempting to put his plan in place
5) much of anything about what was happening on the southwest part of the fire (which he was now the Field OPS of)
6) any of the various radio communications that were going on all during this time regarding Eric’s/Granite Mountain’s actual whereabouts from before 4PM until it was too late.
So that’s what I have learned from today’s heated conversation. So thank you, all!!!
It has been a long day running into dead ends or open spaces.
still not sure we found any new info that has some cold hard facts.
A lot of frustration and at time I got lost in who and what facts were
supported by any evidence so tomorrow is a new day.
maybe some one will ring a bell we can hope.
Agree.
But at least this debate led me to understand Musser’s apparent situational awareness involving certain things as all this was happening.
And, as I noted to you some ways above stream, when Gary Cordes most likely would have started his timeclock in terms of Granite Mountain’s journey toward Boulder Springs Ranch.
Reply to Bob Powers post on February 17, 2015 at 9:51 pm
>> Bob Powers said…
>>
>> It has been a long day running into dead ends or
>> open spaces. still not sure we found any new info
>> that has some cold hard facts.
Two phrases come to mind…
“Sometimes facts take more than a day”
“Sometimes you have to get ‘lost’ before you can ‘find’ anything”
This long-standing mystery about who heard what… and when… coming specifically from either Marsh or Steed over the Air-To-Ground channel and specifically being said to “Air Attack” has always needed a good ’roundup’.
But it’s a frickin’ MESS… thanks to the piss-poor SAIT interview notes and the fact that US Forestry succeeded in preventing ADOSH from interviewing French and Burfiend.
I still think it is worth trying to ‘figure out’… even though it’s really messy and hard.
So yea… tomorrow is another day.
Marti wrote above:
And then I asked if, all thing considered, Musser might have known about/agreed to/whatever Cordes’ plan, thus making that plan a bit less “rogue” than we’ve been seeing it.
And also, possibly providing a reason inside Eric’s/GM’s heads for not keeping TODD ABEL posted, after about 3:50 PM, as to their plans/whereabouts.
That they were possibly thinking, after that time, that Abel was no longer their direct overhead, who then was more like Musser/Cordes. I was thinking about that quite seriously, and asking for feedback, which I didn’t get.”
**************************
I thought I had given you some round about feedback on that.
Let me reiterate something I said on 2/14.
“The Incident Command System only allows an entity to have one supervisor, PERIOD.”
“On an incident that requires “Operational” supervision in more than one area, “Branches” are formed, with one Ops Chief, over the 2 or more Branches. In the case of the YHF, the 2 separate (Branch) areas would have still have needed ONE supervisor over them, which at the time due to the limited resources, could have been the IC, but as we know, he was totally disengaged from all operational activities that day.”
(And I also added this CRITICAL REQUIREMENT!)
“The other ABSOLUTE REQUIREMENT for splitting Operations into separate geographical areas is that ALL resources MUST be made aware of this new development, and to which specific (ONE, AND ONLY ONE) supervisor they will be reporting to.”
While this comment was originally made as a response to a WTKTT response to an RTS comment, you responded to my comment thanking for the clarification. Because of that, I assumed that your query regarding the division of duties between Musser and Abel had been put in a better perspective.
Let me just add for further clarification, that NO ONE who was interviewed or who had provided written notes EVER stated that at xx time, the fire was divided geographically between the two OPS Chiefs, and xxxxxxx was now my supervisor.
THIS REQUIRED PROCEDURE DID NOT HAPPEN, because if it did, SOMEONE (MANY PEOPLE) would have made mention of it in written or verbal documentation.
I think a more fair statement to make would be that by 1630 hrs, the chain of command was so screwed-up that hardly anyone knew who they were supposed to report to.
“I think a more fair statement to make would be that by 1630 hrs, the chain of command was so screwed-up that hardly anyone knew who they were supposed to report to.”
Literally Laughed Out Loud.
I think that does definitely describe the scene fairly accurately.
Reply to Bob Powers post on February 17, 2015 at 2:24 pm
>> Bob Powers said…
>>
>> WTKTT
>>
>> There were a lot of single statements that were being picked up and later
>> the people that heard them were adding their take to the conversation.
>>
>> Its human nature.
>>
>> You have to sift thru these kinds of statements and find the facts like
>> the 6 different statements on one radio message you went thru below.
I hear ya… but minor correction.
I NEVER said that ALL 6 of those various statements about what people say they heard being said directly from Marsh and/or Steed to ‘Air Attack’. ( and coming from FOUR different sources of evidence ) were all ONE AND THE SAME radio transmission.
I said that I thought SOME of them had to be ‘repeat’ reports of the same transmission and it was *possible* they could get ‘boiled down’ to LESS than SIX different and separate transmissions.
Here’s that list again…
NOTE: These are ONLY direct quotes from those FOUR different evidence sources where people say they heard Marsh and/or Steed saying something direct to Air Attack ( B33 ) on the Air-To-Ground channel.
The FOUR different SOURCES where these statements are made are…
The SAIT Investigation notes, B33 interview.
The SAIR report itself.
Various ADOSH interviews.
DPS Officer Eric Tarr’s signed testimony.
The A2G channel statements ( direct to Bravo 33 ) being reported are…
1) They were going down their escape route to the safety zone.
2): We’re going down our escape route to our safety zone.”
3) They were moving towards Yarnell in the black.
4) They were heading to a ranch they had in sight.
5) They said we’re going down our predetermined route towards the structures.
6) I did hear Eric say that he was headed to his pre-designated safety zone
And here’s the SHORT LEGEND of WHO was reporting these things, and WHERE it’s being reported, and WHEN they say they heard it ( if their report had any definite time associated with it ).
1) From the YIN B33 interview. Time: 1630
2) From the SAIR report ( based on YIN B33 interview ) Time: 1630
3) From DPS Officer Tarr’s signed testimony. First transmit. Time: 1630
4) From DPS Officer Tarr’s signed testimony. Second transmit. Time: 1630
5) From Paul Musser’s ADOSH interview. Time: ??? Unsure.
6) From Gary Cordes’ ADOSH interview. Time: ??? Unsure
I DO think that SOME of these reported transmits are ‘one and the same’ and being are just recalling what they heard in different ways… but it’s still doubtful they are ALL the ‘same transmission.
Example… I don’t see how it’s possible to take the two things DPS Officer Tarr says he heard right at 1630 ( 4:30 PM )…
3) They were moving towards Yarnell in the black.
4) They were heading to a ranch they had in sight.
And have that get ‘morphed’ into the same things Musser and Cordes say THEY heard…
5) They said we’re going down our predetermined route towards the structures.
6) I did hear Eric say that he was headed to his pre-designated safety zone
So I DON’T KNOW how many ‘actual’ A2G transmits there REALLY were.
I just don’t think all SIX of these reports indicate an actual SIX different transmissions.
B33 YIN
Never say them earlier. I didn’t know they were there. Air attack didn’t tell me there were resources in the area.
I am going to assume (which I do not like to do) that the second word in that sentence is saw.
Which would make the sentence read. “I never saw them earlier”
Well, this seems to support B33 saying he never checked on GM, even though Abel says he told them to and he did and they were all good!
Reply to calvin post on February 17, 2015 at 10:43 am
>> calvin said…
>>
>> B33 YIN
>>
>> “Never say them earlier. I didn’t know they were there. Air attack didn’t tell me
>> there were resources in the area.”
So WHO do you think is making that statement?
Thomas French… or John Burfiend?… or maybe even Clint Cross at that point?
The friggin’ SAIT notes are so BAD… we don’t even know for sure.
What if while they were flying that recon… French ( the pilot ) was preoccupied with looking at the upcoming retardant drop/lead plane situation and he was just relying on Burfiend to look out the window and do the ‘visual’ check for GM?
What if this statement is ONLY Thomas French chiming in during that side-by-side interview between he and Burfiend ( and Clint Cross )… and some SAIT person just jotted down what French said.
Maybe French DIDN’T ‘see them’… but Burfiend DID… and was the one reporting back to OPS1 on the A2G since French was only speaking on the A2A channel.
Who the hell knows.
We have NEVER been able to rely on just the SAIT YIN notes to figure out what was really going on here with Bravo 33… and WHEN.
The notes are simply too disjointed, and too BAD to be SURE they are even accurate.
>> calvin also said…
>>
>> Abel says he told them to and he did and they were all good!
Yes… he did. ( So much for the YIN? )
Once again… from Todd Abel’s ADOSH interview on August 22, 2013
Q1 = Dave Larsen, WFA / ADOSH investigator ( Rest in Peace )
A = Field OPS1 Todd Able
—————————————————————————————–
1783 A: I then jump on the radio, uh, on air ground with Bravo 33 and, uh, asked John
1784 Burfiend was – the Bravo 33, I said hey, when you get a chance, I need you to
1785 run down to the south end. He’s up here dropping SEATs to keep it out of
1786 these structures.
1787
1788 Q1: Right.
1789
1790 A: He’s kind of 1790 trying to tie stuff in to keep it out of those structures. And I said
1791 I need you to run down, uh, south and check on Granite – Division Alpha and
1792 Granite Mountain and Blue Ridge. He said copy that. He said I got – he goes
1793 what’s going on? I go now the winds are getting squirrely down there, they’re
1794 in the black, everybody’s good. He said okay I got two more SEATs to drop
1795 and I’ll buzz down there.
1796
1797 Q1: Okay.
1798
1799 A: So he dropped the other two SEATs. So you know you’re talking – I don’t
1800 know – you got 3:45 to 4 o’clock was probably wind change. Me and Eric
1801 having the conversation was probably right in that same timeframe. Yeah, I’d
1802 say that’s probably pretty close.
1803
1804 Q1: Okay.
1805
1806 A: So and then John made a run down there, everybody looked good, they were
1807 in the black, no, you know ev- no issues, no nothing. So ev-everybody was
1808 good. I was just trying to make – I’m just trying to paint that picture on the
1809 timeframes for you.
1810
1811 Q1: Thank you.
—————————————————————————————–
Do you yourself believe also that B33 did a visual check on BR., and they were in the black? like Able says he remembers?
I mean seriously. And if Abel was so sure GM and Marsh were in the black, why would he distract the lead plane that was serving double duty as AA, with that task?
Why wouldn’t he just call Div A directly?
Reply to calvin post on February 17, 2015 at 12:02 pm
>> calvin asked…
>>
>> Do you yourself believe also that B33 did a visual check on
>> BR., and they were in the black? like Able says he remembers?
I don’t know. Not yet, anyway.
( By the way… I know it’s an easy TYPO to make but we ALL need to try and cut out the ‘Able’ stuff. The man’s name is ABEL, Todd Abel ).
There just isn’t enough cross-verifiable evidence to explain why the SAIT interview notes with ‘Bravo 33’ are in DIRECT contradiction with what an OPS Level Supervisor ( Todd Abel ) testified to during HIS interview with the Arizona Division of Occupational Safety and Health.
One of those transcripts appears to be DEAD WRONG… and until the parties involved can be deposed under-oath… I don’t know how to resolve it.
I DO believe that at 4:16… the fact that someone ( still unknown ) made that direct call to ‘Granite Mountain’ saying “Granite Montun… wuz you status rat now?” has SOMETHING to do with what appears to be a conversation with ASM2 ( Bravo 33 ) just 13 seconds BEFORE that radio query.
Whether this alleged ‘check on Granite Mountain’ was actually happening at THAT time… or whether this was ANOTHER ‘check’ on them resulting in that radio traffic captured in that 4:16 PM video… I also don’t know.
I wish I did.
I wish TWO sets of investigators had had the competence to not have this important part of ‘the story’ all be just one big jumbled, confusing MESS.
It’s actually not ADOSH’s fault.
They tried as hard as they could to get these two CRITICAL witnesses ( John Burfiend and Thomas French ) in front of them so they could do their jobs and actually INVESTIGATE this incident…
…but Arizona Forestry and the US Forestry Service did everything THEY could do to PREVENT that from happening… for reasons still unknown.
That really is too bad.
We would know a LOT more than we do about this critical part of the story if ADOSH had been allowed to interview these two critical witnesses.
>> calvin also said…
>>
>> I mean seriously. And if Abel was so sure GM and Marsh were
>> in the black, why would he distract the lead plane that was
>> serving double duty as AA, with that task?
>>
>> Why wouldn’t he just call Div A directly?
It’s a good question.
I’d still settle for knowing even just what Eric Marsh SAID back to his direct OPS1 Level Supervisor when he was directly told ( by Abel )…
1. Hunker and be safe.
2. Keep me informed.
What did DIVSA Marsh SAY in response?
Did he say “Aye, aye sir”?
Did he say “The hell we will”?
Did he say ???? Nothing at all?
Maybe Eric Marsh ‘hung up’ on Abel at 1550… and that is what prompted Abel to request that B33 go VERIFY that what Marsh just told him was true.
Maybe Abel didn’t even trust what Marsh had TOLD him, at that point, and wanted his own independent verification that the guy wasn’t just lying to him.
Who knows ( not me ).
I love it when you finish sentences in a way that supports your agenda. Marsh is the bad guy. A liar and a fool.
You asked me why I thought OPS1 Todd Abel would have even ordered a busy AA to go check on something someone had already told him.
It was/is a good question.
Are you saying one possible explanation for that (good) question that you, yourself seem to be seeking an answer to wouldn’t be…
“Maybe the one guy wasn’t trusting what the other guy told him?”
What would be YOUR answer to just this one of these constant questions you keep asking?
Why do YOU think Abel sent B33 down there when Marsh had already TOLD him they were OK?
Would love to hear it.
The only agenda I have is in the handle I use to post here.
I want to know the TRUTH about what really happened that day.
Good, bad, or ugly.
IAOI B33 is quoted accurately, B33 never went to look for gm. Abel told them not to go look. Possibly after marsh said they were moving.
Reply to calvin post on
February 17, 2015 at 1:59 pm
>> calvin said…
>>
>> IAOI B33 is quoted accurately, B33 never went
>> to look for gm. Abel told them not to go look.
Exactly correct…
…which means OPS1 Todd Abel’s testimony about this part of what happened that day is pure fiction.
OTOH… IAOI Todd Abel is quoted accurately… then the pure fiction is coming from John Burfiend and/or Thomas French ( via 3rd party SAIT note scribbles from an interview THEY had with them ).
So which is it?
I answered your question on this already.
I ( me, personally ) do NOT know… and it is not possible for either you or I ( or anyone? ) to tell from the existing evidence which ‘story’ is the ‘true’ one.
WTKTT
I totally agree with you.
I will say it again this is a discussion no one is calling any one a lier or a fool.
we are trying to find information that fits.
If there is no proof then we should never make up a story to fit the scenario. we do the investigation a disservice————–
It is equally inconceivable to me that some WFF Air Support proffessioals would have testified to the SAIT that something did NOT happen ( when they knew it really did )… as it is to have to believe that a professional WFF like OPS1 Todd Abel would testify to ADOSH that something DID happen( when he knows it did not ).
But ONE of those published transcripts is fiction with regards to whether B33 ever actually flew down to check on Granite Mountain.
We just don’t know which one.
I hope someone still has the ability to find out.
And abel denies even remembering the conversation you continue to use as evidence against marsh. And that is what Abel himself told Karel on 8/14 so are you even sure that is Abel that is heard promising air support?
Reply to calvin post on February 17, 2015 at 2:02 pm
>> calvin said…
>>
>> And abel denies even remembering the
>> conversation you continue to use as
>> evidence against marsh.
He (Abel) can ‘not remember’ it all day long.
A VERY important part of it was RECORDED.
DIVSA Eric Marsh’s direct OPS level Supervisor ( Todd Abel ) gave Marsh two direct orders at 1550 ( 3:50 PM )…
1) Hunker and be safe.
2) Keep ME informed.
In the end… DIVSA Marsh did NEITHER of those things… and we still don’t know why he disobeyed BOTH of those directives from his Supervisor.
We actually also still don’t even know if he even AGREED to obey those directives.
We still have NO IDEA what DIVSA Eric Marsh’s own response was to those 1550 directives from his Supervisor.
One more set of questions I hope SOMEONE remembers to ask Brendan when he is finally under-oath just 9 days from now.
Did Brendan HEAR this 1550 conversation… or was he still too busy saving his own life around that time?
If he did hear any of it… then WHAT did Marsh SAY back to Todd Abel when he was TOLD by his direct OPS Level Supervisor to….
1) Hunker and be safe.
2) Keep ME informed.
>> calvin also said…
>>
>> And that is what Abel himself told Karel
>> on 8/14 so are you even sure that is
>> Abel that is heard promising air support?
SAIT Co-lead Mike Dudley said that Todd Abel himself VERIFIED that was HIS VOICE giving those firm directives to DIVSA Eric Marsh at 1550… yet Abel still wants us to believe he doesn’t recall the conversation, even identifying his OWN voice in the recording.
From Mike Dudley’s speech to that roomful of Utah FFs on June 20, 2013…
NOTE: As was his habit during this entire speech… SAIT Co-Lead Mike Dudley ends up screwing up the actual quote from the captured audio… but the gist is still there. Todd Abel himself verified his own voice as the one giving those clear directives to DIVSA Eric Marsh.
—————————————————
Mike Dudley: But… prior to that… by like five minutes… there is a discussion that takes place between OPS and Eric Marsh… and all you hear is Eric saying “I’m making my way off the top”.
Top a what?
Top of that box canyon?
Top of to the north end?
And OPS says… “Copy that. You guys hunker and be safe. Let me know if you need air support.”
You don’t hear the front-end of that conversation.
You don’t hear the tail-end of that conversation.
You just hear that clip.
We replayed that audio for OPS and said… “Is this you?”… and he goes “Yup… that’s me.
I do NOT remember that conversation.”
—————————————————-
Okay… I’ve answered even MORE of your ‘questions’ now.
Your turn.
See above.
You asked me why I thought Abel might have even sent B33 down to ‘check on Marsh’ when he had already (supposedly) told Abel they were ‘in the black”.
My response to your legitimate question was that maybe the one guy just didn’t trust what the other guy had told him and he wanted independent verification.
What is YOUR explanation?
I want to hear it.
WTK said
Either way… BOTH sets of testimony support Todd Abel’s testimony that HE ( himself ) did NOT hear this ‘announcement’ from Marsh to AA on the A2G channel
Likewise.
Both sets of testimony support the fact that AA/B33 did notify Abel that GM was on the move.
The confusion is whether B33 did go check on them or not. And B33 denies that in their interview
WTK said
…then don’t forget that right before Air Attack Rory Collins left the fire at 1558 and dumped both Lead Plan and Air Attack duties in B33’s lap… Collins specifically told Thomas French… “My contact down there was Alpha”.
So if a call from “Division Alpha” regarding ‘where to drop’ hit Burfiend’s A2G channel… he was SUPPOSED to respond to it
Along the same lines.
If B33 knew DivA was his contact on the south side, how does that influence the seeming fact that DivA called AA and told him they were moving to the SZ.
I mean why would Marsh have called and reported that to AA?
Reply to calvin post on February 17, 2015 at 10:20 am
>> calvin also said…
>>
>>
>> If B33 knew DivA was his contact on the south side, how does that
>> influence the seeming fact that DivA called AA and told him they
>> were moving to the SZ.
>>
>> I mean why would Marsh have called and reported that to AA?
It’s a mystery. Always has been.
WHY would a DIVS choose to be giving ONLY “Air Attack” the very information that his job description REQUIRED him to deliver directly to his OPS Level Supervisor instead?
Maybe Brendan can tell us more about this when he is ( finally ) under-oath about 10 days from now.
I hope someone remembers to ASK him if he knows anything about this.
Calvin I may be off a little here but my memory says that B33 called Division Alpha and asked if they were ok and got the response—- they were just moving to their SZ—
I also do not believe we ever confirmed who actually said—during the Air drop —
That’s right where we won’t it—-one of the problems was AA was dropping in Yarnell any number of people would be calling the drops there as Marsh 2 plus miles away.
Marsh could not see if the drop hit the target from his location where ever that was????
Normally people near the drop site make those kind of statements.
Bob
B33 YIN
Got a call from Division A stating they were going down their escape route to the safety zone. Didn’t know Division A was the superintendent of the Granite Mountain hot shots. Asked him “is everything OK?” He replied “everything is ok, just heading to the safety zone”. We came around, made a practice run through the bowl, west to east. I was talking to Tom about the rising terrain on exit. Division A clad and said “that is what we are looking for, that is exactly right”. Within 5 minutes of that, they went in shelter.
B33 does not seem to be confused about who said they wanted a drop. Also, B33 Burfiend says he got a direct call from Div A. Again, no question in his mind
He never said DIVA clad and said That is what we are looking for—–
it was a statement after the run for a drop on Yarnell—
from west to east the bowl was the flats between BSR and Yarnell
Not the Canyon the crew was trapped in. Otherwise if that was the run and drop area then they would have dropped on the canyon.
I have not seen any thing that B33 said in interviews or on radio that made a statement —DIV A Clad and said–That is what we are looking for——
We discussed this way back but could not determine who may have said it
the drop in question was on Yarnell——-
If you can reference this statement please correct me—-
WTKTT —– is referencing testimony or radio recordings that are complete.
all this other stuff is confusing the actual text that was taken in testimony.
I think if we make a statement or any one the line number and statement needs to be noted like WTKTT dose so we can go and check it.
If some one adds or drops a word it can change the whole meaning and every one gets a confused statement.
Like DIV A clad and said that’s straight forward but I do not remember that as
I severial months ago questioned if that was Marsh as was stated then and we
could not verify who it was. There was no Identity to the caller.
Again if they were dropping on the Canyon (Marsh and GM) then I could totally agree with you. The following drop with this Conversation was in Yarnell 1.5 to 2 Miles away from Marsh and crew.
That is biased on the times WTKTT had on the drop and the discussion.
Back a few months ago.
Elizabeth said
4) I tentatively believe that Burfiend was talking to Eric Marsh in the conversation that ends at the beginning of the “Helmet Camera” video. If Burfiend is not speaking to Marsh, or if Burfiend had NOT just spoken to Marsh, then who is Burfiend speaking with? Anyone?
I would like to know why you think B33 was talking to Marsh? Is it because Musser and Abel can be ruled out since they start calling out to GM immediately following the we are in front of the flaming front transmission?
I do not think it was Marsh.
Which leads me to another point. It seems that Musser and Able were hearing the A/G channel clearly enough to know that GM were in trouble following the “we are in front of the flaming front”
So why didn’t Abel copy any of the numerous transmissions that were heard by others on A/G that GM were moving 1. toward Yarnell, 2. toward the structures, 3. to the pre determined SZ
Calvin, in answer to your question of why I TENTATIVELY think that (MAYBE) Burfiend was talking to Marsh, two of the reasons are (a) because who else would it be and (b) because Burfiend says he spoke with Marsh (or Marsh spoke with him, saying something like “that is right where we need it”). I am emphasizing tentatively and maybe in the prior sentence only because I obviously cannot say anything for sure on this matter. I suppose I am just thinking out loud.
So please share with me your view – who do YOU think is talking to Burfiend at the start of that helmet camera video? If you had a gun to your head and HAD to pick someone that you thought he was talking to, who would you pick?
According to my friends who are or who have been Hotshot sups or assistant sups, it it normally the case that only a very limited number of folks on a fire (relatively speaking) would speak to Air Attack, and fewer still would speak to the Lead Plane. So the list of possible speakers with Burfiend is relatively short. It obviously wasn’t Cordes, Bucky, Aaron, or Clawson. Presumably it wasn’t Abel, b/c he was on the NORTH end, dealing with the remaining spot fires and the house burn-out, and Burfiend mentions the “canyon,” which is not relevant to the North end. Was it Musser? Maybe. Or it was Marsh, because Burfiend seems to have told the SAIT that he heard from Marsh right before the entrapment?
Also, Calvin, you said: “So why didn’t Abel copy any of the numerous transmissions that were heard by others on A/G that GM were moving 1. toward Yarnell, 2. toward the structures, 3. to the pre determined SZ”
My tentative thoughts are these:
I don’t think there were “numerous transmissions.”
I think that Abel did not copy for the same reason that it seems that Bucky and Aaron *BOTH* do not register the first GM7 transmission screaming “we are in front of the flaming front.” Alternatively, I suspect that maybe Abel was on the radio himself.
That, by the way, is what was going on with Burfiend during the time period when WTKTT claims Burfiend was IGNORING GM’s calls for help (which Burfiend obviously was not). Burfiend was making and receiving transmissions on his priority channel, such that he did not HEAR in full GM7 screaming the first time (or the first few times).
I have said this before there, but folks seem not to remember, so I’ll say it again, just to remind us all:
When you are using radios of the sort these guys were using on the YHF, and you are transmitting (speaking) on a certain channel (such as A/G), you CANNOT HEAR what others are transmitting *to* you at the same time that you are speaking. If you are speaking, you cannot simultaneously RECEIVE or hear a transmission, which is why good WFFs train themselves to be very very short and brief (almost to the point of being cryptic sometimes to an outside listener like us) in what they say on the radio – they want to STOP speaking quickly, so that they can HEAR, so that they can keep up their intel.
Also, if someone is replying to what you have just said on A/G, and they are doing it via your priority channel (A/G or A/A or A/G2), that is going to block out what someone like GM7 is trying to communicate to you on your non-priority tac (Tac1). That first call for help from GM to Air Attack – or maybe the first FEW – were not on A/G or any of the air tacs. They were on Tac1, which was NOT Burfiend’s priority channel, such that that channel is not going to pick up if Burfiend was going back-and-forth on another channel, which he was – which we can HEAR, because he is trying to raise SG1 on that other channel. After Burfiend transmits on A/G to try to raise SG1, his radio is likely going to HANG on A/G for at least a few seconds before it starts scanning again and thereby picks up Tac1 (which it will pick up via scan). This means he is only going to hear fragments, if anything, from Tac1 at that point. Indeed, if Tom French or Clint Cross try to get Burfiend immediately after Burfiend tries to raise SG1, then there is no CHANCE Burfiend will hear Tac1, because French for sure will block out all other transmissions to Burfiend.
It therefore continues to stun me that some folks on here continue to this day to try to claim that Burfiend was somehow doing something wrong in how he responded to GM in the first couple of minutes of the original “helmet camera” video. He did not HEAR all of those transmissions, not because he was asleep at the wheel, but, rather, because of the way that radios work.
It ain’t what they don’t know that bothers me.
It’s what they know fer sure… that just ain’t so.
Mark Twain.
We’ve been over this many times.
You are still as WRONG now as you were then.
Read the evidence.
John Burfiend himself told OPS1 Todd Abel (twice) DURING the MAYDAY sequence that he DID hear that radio traffic. He was just choosing to NOT respond to it until ( also clearly heard in the MAYDAY traffic ) OPS1 Abel ORDERED him to do so.
I believe Burfiend said he was only catching some of that or a little bit of that or some such. It obviously did not register with him what he was hearing.
Just like it did not register with either Aaron or Bucky or Jason at first.
Reply to Elizabeth (counselor) post on February 17, 2015 at 9:30 am
>> counselor said…
>>
>> I believe Burfiend said he was only catching some of
>> that or a little bit of that or some such.
At +1:04 into the Hulburd video…
(Bravo 33 – John Burfiend): Operations, Bravo 33, I was copying
that traffic on air to ground.
** I WAS COPYING THAT TRAFFIC ON AIR TO GROUND **
>> counselor also said…
>>
>> It obviously did not register with him what he was hearing.
Yes. It DID. The argument can easily be made that the reason John Burfiend was able to surmise ( AFTER he was basically told by OPS1 Abel to get his head out of his ass and RESPOND to those poor men )
that they were “on the south side of the fire” is because he DID hear them say “We are in front of the flaming front” about 2 minutes earlier.
He SAID he was “Copying that traffic”… INCLUDING the intial “We are in front of the flaming front” message.
At +1:17 into the same video… we also hear John Burfiend telling OPS1 Todd Abel…
“We’ll do the best we can. We got the type 1 helicopters ordered back in. Uh, we’ll see what we can do.”
Absolute proof that John Burfiend WAS ‘copying’ those MAYDAY transmissions in real time… and they DID completely ‘register’ with him.
He KNEW those men were ‘in trouble’… and he’s now telling OPS Abel exactly what he will start doing about it…
…but he STILL, even at this point, had not acknowledged the transmissions or was making any attempt to answer those poor men.
It would still take another 45 seconds or so, and even MORE desperate attempts from those men to contact him… that OPS1 Todd Abel himself had to ORDER to Burfiend to RESPOND to them.
It was a until a full 2 minutes after the MAYDAY calls began that Burfiend made any attempt to respond… and only then because OPS Abel had just ORDERED him to do so.
I would believe that it was, in fact, DIVSA Eric Marsh that Burfiend was ‘finishing’ a conversation with at the very start of that 1639 MAYDAY capture video.
Remember… it also could NOT have been SPGS1 Gary Cordes.
Cordes had lost his ability to TRANSMIT anything on the Air-To-Ground channel almost an HOUR prior to 1639… which is why he had to get OPS1 Todd Abel to relay his “drop at will” directive to Air Attack in the 1540 timeframe.
Cordes testified to ADOSH that he never RECOVERED his ability to transmit on the A2G channel after he lost it that day.
So it could NOT have been SPGS1 Gary Cordes having a two-way conversation with John Burfiend at 1639.
If Marsh really did call up to B33 circa 1637 and just say something like “That’s it. That’s where we want the retardant”… and he really did prefix his callout with callsign “Division Alpha”…
…then don’t forget that right before Air Attack Rory Collins left the fire at 1558 and dumped both Lead Plan and Air Attack duties in B33’s lap… Collins specifically told Thomas French… “My contact down there was Alpha”.
So if a call from “Division Alpha” regarding ‘where to drop’ hit Burfiend’s A2G channel… he was SUPPOSED to respond to it.
At 1639…. Burfiend COULD have been just finishing a conversation with DIVSA about where to try and drop retardant that actually STARTED 90 to 120 seconds earlier… at 1637.
The timing would fit the existing evidence.
Followup… what does NOT ‘fit’., however, is that John Burfiend NEVER testified that that is actually what was happening.
If Burfiend really had been having an actual two-way conversation with DIVSA Eric Marsh just SECONDS before Steed’s first MAYDAY was going to hit the airwaves… then the only reason I can think of that he would not have reported that to investigators is that he didn’t really want them to know it.
Or it did not REGISTER with him what he was hearing the first few times that GM7 called for help in part b/c he missed MOST of those transmissions for the reasons I explained above.
Reply to Elizabeth (counselor) post on
February 17, 2015 at 9:31 am
>> counselor said…
>>
>> Or it did not REGISTER with him what he was hearing
>> the first few times that GM7 called for help in part
>> b/c he missed MOST of those transmissions for the
>> reasons I explained above.
Those weren’t reasons.
They are your ‘guesses’ not supported by actual evidence.
At +1:04 into the Hulburd video…
(Bravo 33 – John Burfiend): Operations, Bravo 33, I was copying
that traffic on air to ground.
** I WAS COPYING THAT TRAFFIC ON AIR TO GROUND **
He heard the transmissions… and they DID ‘register’ with him.
He started talking ( to OPS Abel ) about “getting the helicopters ordered back in’ and “we’ll see what we can do’ even BEFORE bothering to respond to those men. That means he KNEW they were in trouble but still was NOT responding to their radio calls.
The argument can also easily be made that the reason John Burfiend was able to surmise ( AFTER he was basically told by OPS1 Abel to get his head out of his ass and RESPOND to those poor men ) that they were “on the south side of the fire” is because he DID hear them say “We are in front of the flaming front” about 2 minutes earlier.
He SAID he was “Copying that traffic”… INCLUDING the intial “We are in front of the flaming front” message.
Abel ADOSH interview
1791 I need you to run down, uh, south and check on Granite – Division Alpha and
1792 Granite Mountain and Blue Ridge.
1806 A: So and then John made a run down there, everybody looked good, they were
1807 in the black, no, you know ev- no issues, no nothing. So ev-everybody was
1808 good
So Todd Abel also testifies to ADOSH that B33 had eyes on BR also. But B33 didn’t even know BR was there per there recollection.
Once again, from B33
I didn’t know that Blue Ridge was there until we were home watching the news.
Todd Abel may have included Blue Ridge in his request to B33… but maybe when they got down there they ONLY checked on GM.
At the time this recon would have been flown… Blue Ridge had already bumped the vehicles over to the Shrine Road Youth Camp and were just beginning to hike into the end of that Cutover Trail.
They were NOT where they HAD been all day ( Sesame Clearing area ) and would have been very hard to spot from the air… even if you were dedicating time to LOOK for them.
I think if Abel really ever did include BR in his ‘recon’ request… they just ‘fell through the cracks’ and there wasn’t even any attempt to check on THEM… only GM / Alpha.
Remember… if that radio como in the 1616 Panebaker video is correct… then ‘Bravo 33’ seemed to be saying they had a VISUAL on ‘Granite Mountain’ themselves ( “They are behind those hills there” )… but apparently no VISUAL on ‘Alpha’.
THAT is why they (apparently) called down to the ground and asked someone to “Call them and ask them if Alpha can be placed WITH them”.
13 seconds later…. someone ( still unknown ) did exactly that.
B33 denies doing what you are continuing to say they did. Fer crying out loud. It appears that you are cherry picking the evidence that does exist. And discrediting testimony at your own discretion. At no time ever does B33 say they saw gm. Actually they say otherwise. And deny even knowing there was resources in that area. Give me a break.
Reply to calvin post on February 17, 2015 at 12:48 pm
>> calvin said…
>>
>> B33 denies doing what you are continuing to say they did.
>> Fer crying out loud. It appears that you are cherry picking
>> the evidence that does exist. And discrediting testimony at
>> your own discretion. At no time ever does B33 say they
>> saw gm. Actually they say otherwise. And deny even
>> knowing there was resources in that area. Give me a break.
Geezus, calvin… for a ‘steely eyed rocket man’ your reading skills
have dropped off the charts.
Do I have to say this again ( feels like the 10th time ).
I DO NOT KNOW if Bravo 33 went to check on them, or not.
One official document tells me it happened.
Another official document tells me it did NOT.
I can argue it one way or the other… because official sources are telling me TWO different things.
Time for YOU to stop asking incessant questions and ANSWER a few.
What do YOU believe actually happened?
Are you coming down on one side or the other?
It SOUNDS like you trust this SAIT / YIN stuff like it was Gospel.
Fair enough. That’s your right.
Are you trying to say YOU believe that the SAIT / YIN B33 interview is the absolute truth regarding this one particular part of the ‘story’ that day… and that what OPS1 Todd Abel testified to is the fiction?
Is that where YOU are on this?
Todd Abel’s ADOSH interview (his words from what he told B33)
1791 I need you to run down, uh, south and check on Granite – Division Alpha and
1792 Granite Mountain and Blue Ridge.
per B33 YIN
I head something about a crew being in a safety zone. Called ops and asked “do we stop and go look for the crew?” Ops said “no, they are safe, it’s Granite Mountain”. I didn’t know that Blue Ridge was there until we were home watching the news.
We seem to have conflicting testimony here. B33 says he didn’t even know BR was there? Abel says he told B33 to check on BR?
This would also APPEAR to be related to what Cordes says HE heard on A2G.
Cordes says he definitely heard Eric Marsh calling directly to ‘Air Attack’ on the Air-To-Ground channel and telling THEM ( Burfiend, specifically, since we was the one handling A2G traffic in B33 ) he was (quote) “headed to his pre-designated safety zone”.
This still appears to be one of those A2G ‘announcements’ that came EARLIER ( in the 4:00 PMish timeframe ) than the other ones reported by B33 and DPS Officer Tarr later on in the 4:30 PMish timeframe.
I still don’t trust the YIN as far as I can throw it… but the TIMING would match here.
1. Cordes hears Marsh ‘announce’ direct to AA “”headed to pre-designated safety zone”.
2. Burfiend tells OPS Abel “I heard something about a crew and a safety zone”.
3. Burfiend ( according to YIN/SAIR only ) asks Abel if they should ‘go check’.
4. Abel didn’t hear that transmit, doesn’t know Burfiend is talking about something Marsh hiself just said.
5. Then ( according to YIN/SAIR only ) Abel… says “Nah… it’s GM. Their safe”.
If you believe the YIN/SAIR… the timing matches… but Abel ‘called off’ B33 and
they never went to actually check on GM ( or anyone on the south side ).
If you believe OPS1 Todd Abel’s version of this… then the timing also ‘kinda’ matches… except for the fact that Abel says HE was the one who ASKED B33 to definitely ‘go and check’… and then they DID.
Either way… BOTH sets of testimony support Todd Abel’s testimony that HE ( himself ) did NOT hear this ‘announcement’ from Marsh to AA on the A2G channel.
From Gary Cordes’ ADOSH interview…
——————————————————————————-
1454 A: Yeah, what I had actually heard, and that’s what I was touching on a little bit
1455 earlier, but I didn’t wanna get too, too far into it, ‘cause I’m not sure of the
1456 timeframe and what had actually occurred, but I did hear Eric say that he was,
1457 he was headed to his pre-designated safety zone. And, and so my assumption
1458 was that he was headed to the um, to the Boulder Springs Ranch.
1459
1460 Q1: So that was your assumption is that he was going to the Boulder Springs
1461 Ranch and not the black, is that right?
1462
1463 A: Yeah, exactly.
———————————————————————————
It seems B33 recalls THREE distinctly different calls from DivA/ GM7 in the 1600-1630 timeframe
From YIN
1. I head something about a crew being in a safety zone. Called ops and asked “do we stop and go look for the crew?” Ops said “no, they are safe, it’s Granite Mountain”. I didn’t know that Blue Ridge was there until we were home watching the news. (sair reports time of 1600 for this call p33)
After B33 heard something, his response was to call OPS
2. Got a call from Division A stating they were going down their escape route to the safety zone. Didn’t know Division A was the superintendent of the Granite Mountain hot shots. Asked him “is everything OK?” He replied “everything is ok, just heading to the safety zone”. (time unknown)
Following this direct call to B33 from DIV A Marsh. B33 actually follows up and once again Marsh verbalizes intent.
3.Heard a frantic call from Granite Mountain 7 to Air Attack told him to calm down. 20 minutes from that call to when they deployed.
As we can hear in the helmet cam video. B33 does not tell GM7 to calm down, and it doesn’t seem that it was 20 minutes from the helmet cam video until deployment. (circa 1617)
Calvin, you state above the following:
“As we can hear in the helmet cam video. B33 does not tell GM7 to calm down….”
I have always assumed that B33 was referring to its communication to GM7 to stop yelling in the radio. To that end, FWIIW, let me say this: Human recall can be dicey. Even the very best, most sincere, most honest eyewitnesses can get things very wrong, and they can often paraphrase without overtly declaring that they are doing so. Very rarely will I blindly assume as an initial matter than a conversation took place exactly the way that someone (even a relative) is telling me the conversation took place. Even the BEST eyewitnesses can often misremember exactly what was said to them or that they said to someone else, particularly under times of stress.
So, it is possible that, in B33’s mind, he was telling GM7 to calm down, which is why he allegedly relayed such to the SAIT.
“So, it is possible that, in B33’s mind, he was telling GM7 to calm down, which is why he allegedly relayed such to the SAIT.”
That would also be my intepretation of that disjointed, seeminly out-of-sequence statement in the SAIT YIN B33 notes.
That was just Burfiend ‘loosely’ recalling that moment when what he ACTUALLY said to those poor men in trouble was (basically) “Unit hollerin’ in the radio… I need you to Shut The Fuck Up”.
Did you see how OTHER people described Burfiend’s comments? They did not describe them as “shut the EFF up” as you do. They describe them closer to what Burfiend describes them as.
Your need for drama, finger-pointing, and inaccuracy knows know bounds, does it? You and Fred are peas in a pod. 😉
Why dose any one continue to answer this persons CRAP??????
Reply to Elizabeth ( counselor ) post on
February 17, 2015 at 9:33 am
>> counselor said…
>>
>> Did you see how OTHER people described Burfiend’s comments?
>> They did not describe them as “shut the EFF up” as you do.
People are free to ‘describe’ other people’s comments any way they like.
On the streets where I come from…
“Unit Hollerin’ in the radio… I need you to QUIT”
is easily ‘shortened’ to…
“Hey YOU… Shut the Fuck Up”.
Both accomplish the same intended goal.
To get someone to ‘Shut Up’ for at least a minute or two.
It is not really the wording that bothers me. It is the fact that there is no 20 minutes between the we are inf ront of the flaming front until Marsh announces preparing to deploy.
That is exactly what Burfiend says. That is a clear statement
B33
.Heard a frantic call from Granite Mountain 7 to Air Attack told him to calm down. 20 minutes from that call to when they deployed.
You are obviously hanging onto this one as if it was gospel truth.
Whatever.
I still think the simple explanation is that Burfiend was WRONG.
Look at what Aaron Hulburd says in his own video.
KC ‘Bucky’ Yowell asked him how LONG it had been since the MAYDAY traffic.
It had only been a few minutes… but Hulburd says he thought it was at least TEN minutes.
People perceive TIME in weird ways… especially under stress.
Marti said
So I agree with Calvin, and I would expand what he is saying to the possibility that what they don’t want us to hear may include a lot more than what happened just leading up to the deployment. Although, it may be that that time period might be what they’re mostly concerned about. But there may be more. All things considered
If we can believe B33 comment
Heard a frantic call from Granite Mountain 7 to Air Attack told him to calm down. 20 minutes from that call to when they deployed.
I would guess the 20 minute timeframe before deployment contains other FRANTIC CALLS
You have to remember how all of this was going down… with regards to the EVIDENCE that was emerging at that time.
The SAIT knew about Hulburd’s videos ( ALL of them ) very early on… including the one that actually captured the final radio transmits.
The SAIT had originally said that ADOSH would be ‘included’ in their investigation. Then ( just shortly into the evidence gathering phase )… the SAIT ‘kicked them out’.
That actually MIGHT have been related to their discovery of some of this taped evidence ( Hulburd, Panebaker, etc. ) as it was being brought to their attention.
They MAY have ‘changed their minds’ about ADOSH being involved when they realized that if ADOSH had full access to this same evidence… they would NOT be able to ‘control the narrative’ the way they wanted to.
And for that same reason ( being able to control the narrative ), they probably started looking really hard ( along with attorneys from the Arizona Attorney General’s office ) at what they could LEGALLY get OUT of having to release to ANYONE… “Arizona Open Records” and FOIA/FOIL laws be damned.
It was early on in the investigation(s).
I believe that THEY believed ( at that time ) they really could get away with HIDING some of this evidence forever… or makinig sure ONLY some select people ever knew it existed.
They lost in the end. Too many leaks and too much interest in the story.
But that doesn’t mean they weren’t entertaining the idea, early on, that they could HIDE a lot of this evidence, publish their controlled ‘narrative’… and call it a day.
Followup to above… forgot to make something clear.
If their PLAN was to hide some evidence forever… like the Hulburd MAYDAY video(s) and/or certain files associated with the Panebaker Air Study… I believe it’s possible that some underling in the Arizona Attorney General’s office may have been telling them “There IS a way”.
There ARE, in fact, ALWAYS ‘exceptions’ that can be claimed to fight off an “Arizona Open Records” request and/or any FOIA/FOIL request.
The EASIEST way it to go for the “Sensitive Information’ exception.
Arizona Forestry and the SAIT might have been advised that if ANY evidence actually contained ANY of the voices of ANY of the Granite Mountain Hotshots… they could always claim the “Sensitive Information” exception and then not have to release ANY of that material.
Add that get-out-of-almost-anything-free blurb about “Respecting the sensitivities of the familes of the fallen”… and it could work. No problem.
So Arizona Forestry / SAIT really MIGHT have been convinced ( early on ) that they would NEVER have to release anything that had any VOICE of ANY of the GM Hotshots contained in it.
This “never see the light of day” based on the “Sensitive Information” and “Out of respect for the families” thing is ALREADY in effect.
No one has ever seen the FARO-3D photos taken of the deployment site by the Arizona Department of Public Safety ( and NO ONE probably ever will ) even though that is just as much PUBLIC information ( paid for by taxpayer dollars ) as anything else associated with this incident is.
What is protecting that PUBLIC information from ever being seen by the PUBLIC is just what I was talking about above. People ready to continually claim the “Sensitive Information” excpetion to fight off ANY “Arizona Open Records” or FOIA/FOIL request.
So there really COULD still be full, contiguous Air-To-Ground radio channel captures in the Panebaker material.
It might be being ‘shielded’ as hard as the FARO-3D pictures currently are using a very simple “Sensitive Information” exception claim.
**
** THE TRANSMISSIONS PEOPLE HEARD GOING TO ‘AIR ATTACK’
TWO different ( but important ) questions were posed in TWO separate threads down below and they BOTH deserve answers.
So I’m going to try and answer them both with the same information, because I think that information DOES supply some of the ‘answers’ to BOTH questions.
Not sure if this will really work… but here goes…
>> On February 15, 2015 at 6:19 pm, calvin asked…
>>
>> :: WTK said
>> :: IAOI ( If And Only If ) the radio transmits being reported in the YIN on the A2G
>> :: channel regarding “going out our escape route” and the ones being reported
>> :: by DPS Officer Eric Tarr are, in fact, one and the same… then SOMEONE is
>> :: probably mistaken about WHO was making them
>>
>> I really do want to know why you assume they are the same radio transmissions?
>> Do you not think it is possible that both Div A and GM were making radio calls?
>> They were not together, right?
>> On February 16, 2015 at 7:57 pm, Marti Reed asked…
>>
>> Did Cordes know when Granite Mountain left the Options Discussion spot?
>>
>> And, if he did, how did he know that?
** THE SHORT STORY
— To Marti…
Gary Cordes is one of the MANY people who ( when all the SAIT and ADOSH interviews were finally over ) ended up testifying that he ‘also’ HEARD a specific radio transmission directed specifically to “Air Attack” ( Bravo 33 ) that was (supposedly) DIVSA Eric Marsh telling Air Attack that he was ( in Cordes’ own words ) “headed to his pre-designated safety zone”.
So if there was NO other communication that afternoon ( by any method, radio or cellphone ) between Marsh and Cordes… then it can be assumed THIS would have been the moment Gary Cordes started his own internal ‘countdown clock’ that was allowing HIM to make his stated assumption that “They were headed to the Boulder Springs Ranch and they had PLENTY of TIME to get there”.
— To calvin…
The reasons I am ‘assuming’ that SOME of these many reported transmissions between Marsh and/or Steed that were specifically being recalled as going directly to Air Attack are one and the same ( but with people recalling different words ) are basically twofold…
1) Some of them are being reported ( but with different words ) at the EXACT same time of 1630.
2) ALL of them are so simillar that it is hard to believe they could have ALL been separate transmissions at separate times.
In answer to your question “Do you not think it is possible that both Div A and GM were making radio calls? They were not together, right?”
You are correct. They were (supposedly) NOT together and they were BOTH perfectly capable of calling ‘Air Attack’ on the A2G channel.
However… My FEELING is that some of the reports about these transmissions are referencing the same actual transmit… but with different interpretations regarding WHO was making the call.
Here is the SHORT LIST from FOUR different ‘sources’ regarding what various people reported hearing being specifically ‘announced’ to Air Attack.
These do NOT include any reports from anyone ( like Blue Ridge ) that they heard anything similar over the TAC channels. These are ONLY the actual words various people report hearing from either Marsh or Steed being said specifically to ‘Air Attack’ on the A2G channel.
The FOUR different SOURCES where these statements are made are…
The SAIT Investigation notes, B33 interview.
The SAIR report itself.
Various ADOSH interviews.
DPS Officer Eric Tarr’s signed testimony.
1) They were going down their escape route to the safety zone.
2): We’re going down our escape route to our safety zone.”
3) They were moving towards Yarnell in the black.
4) They were heading to a ranch they had in sight.
5) They said we’re going down our predetermined route towards the structures.
6) I did hear Eric say that he was headed to his pre-designated safety zone
And here’s the SHORT LEGEND of WHO was reporting these things, and WHERE it’s being reported, and WHEN they say they heard it ( if their report had any definite time associated with it ).
1) From the YIN B33 interview. Time: 1630
2) From the SAIR report ( based on YIN B33 interview ) Time: 1630
3) From DPS Officer Tarr’s signed testimony. First transmit. Time: 1630
4) From DPS Officer Tarr’s signed testimony. Second transmit. Time: 1630
5) From Paul Musser’s ADOSH interview. Time: ??? Unsure.
6) From Gary Cordes’ ADOSH interview. Time: ??? Unsure
Notice that despite all the variations in what people think they heard… the TIME for the first FOUR reports is identical. 1630 ( 4:30 PM ).
These first FOUR reports with identical TIME reported of 1630 are the ones where the FIRST two ( based solely on B33 SAIT Interview notes ) say that whatever they heard was coming from DIVSA Eric Marsh, but the SECOND two ( based solely on DPS Officer Tarr’s testimony ) say the ‘similar’ transmissions were only prefixed with the callsign ‘Granite Mountain 7’.
So if you accept a conclusion that BOTH sources are accurately reporting WHO they heard making these 1630 transmissions… and that it was NOT likely that DIVSA Eric Marsh would have been using the callsign prefix “Granite Mountain 7″…
…that means we have to believe that BOTH Eric Marsh and Jesse Steed were making almost IDENTICAL radio ‘annoucements’ to ‘Air Attack’ with basically IDENTICAL information/content… at almost the same exact moment ( 1630 ).
I simply don’t think that is likely. It just doesn’t even make any sense that they would BOTH feel the need to report the SAME basic thing to ‘Air Attack’ within the same 60 seconds.
Possible Explanation?: One or the other ‘source’ reporting about the 1630 callouts to ‘Air Attack’ is simply wrong about WHO those callouts were coming from.
** THE LONG STORY
— To Marti…
Hear is when Cordes tells ADOSH he specifically heard Eric Marsh telling Air Attack that he was “headed to his pre-designated safety zone”.
Cordes was, of course, the ONLY person hearing this transmission who had any frickin’ idea what that really meant.
From Gary Cordes’ ADOSH interview…
————————————————————————
1454 A: Yeah, what I had actually heard, and that’s what I was touching on a little bit
1455 earlier, but I didn’t wanna get too, too far into it, ‘cause I’m not sure of the
1456 timeframe and what had actually occurred, but I did hear Eric say that he was,
1457 he was headed to his pre-designated safety zone. And, and so my assumption
1458 was that he was headed to the um, to the Boulder Springs Ranch.
1459
1460 Q1: So that was your assumption is that he was going to the Boulder Springs
1461 Ranch and not the black, is that right?
1462
1463 A: Yeah, exactly.
————————————————————————–
As for WHEN he actually heard this… Cordes isn’t much help…
————————————————————————–
1469 Q1: But you don’t know what that time frame might’ve been or…
1470
1471 A: No, that’s what I was trying, that’s what I was trying to fi – you know, jumble
1472 that in to what I had here and I’m not really sure, um, when that actually
1473 happened and how that correlated with him letting me know that it had
1474 crossed the dozer line, uh, by the grater. So I’m not sure which came first.
————————————————————————–
And here is where Cordes VERIFIES to ADOSH that this ‘announcement’ from Marsh was being made specifically to ‘Air Attack’ on the A2G channel…
————————————————————————–
1476 Q1: Okay, so then somewhere in there he, and he actually called you rather than
1477 somebody else…
1478
1479 A: No, he did not call me, he, he made the announcement to air attack on air to
1480 ground.
————————————————————————–
So even though the TIME is not nailed down for Cordes hearing this ‘announcement’ from Marsh… there’s probably no doubt this is when he did his own ‘time/distance calculation’ in his own head which caused him to believe “They have PLENTY of TIME to get there”.
— To calvin…
In the ‘more than you probably wanted to know’ category.. here is that same list of the SIX different reported ‘callouts’ to ‘Air Attack’ that are being reported in FOUR different sources… but with the exact original source(s) shown.
Remember… these are ONLY reports in official documents about what people testified they heard being said specifically from either Eric Marsh or Jesse Steed specifically to ‘Air Attack’ on the A2G channel.
— 1) They were going down their escape route to the safety zone.
Source: The YIN B33 interview.
Time: 1630
‘Bravo 33’ SAIT Investigation Notes ( YIN )…
——————————————————————–
We needed to go back to the right flank (16:30 AZ time). Made 3 practice runs. Painted 2. We came around.
Got a call from Division A stating they were going down their escape route to the safety zone.
Didn’t know Division A was the superintendent of the Granite Mountain hot shots. Asked him “is everything OK?” He replied “everything is ok, just heading to the safety zone”.
———————————————————————
— 2): We’re going down our escape route to our safety zone.”
Source: The SAIR report ( based on YIN B33 interview )
Time: 1630
NOTE: At this point… any reference to ASM2 simply means ‘Bravo 33′.
SAIR…. page 33…
——————————————–
At approximately 1600, ASM2 overhears a comment on the radio referencing a crew and a safety zone. ASM2 calls OPS1 and clarifies, “I heard a crew in a safety zone, do we need to call a time out?” OPS1 replies, “No, they’re in a good place. They’re safe and it’s Granite Mountain.” They talk about flying over to check on the crew, but for now, they think the crew is safe in the black. Following this conversation, ASM2 hears DIVS A announce on the radio, “We’re going down our escape route to our safety zone.” ASM2 asks, “Is everything okay?” to which DIVS A replies, “Yes, we’re just moving.”
——————————————–
— 3) They were moving towards Yarnell in the black.
Source: DPS Officer Tarr’s signed testimony. First transmit.
Time: 1630
DPS Officer Eric Tarr’s signed testimony…
———————————————————————
Around 1630 hours I was standing near the aircraft ( Helicopter Ranger 58 ) monitoring traffic on channel Air-To-Ground ( A/G ) 16 when I heard a voice come up on the radio with a Call sign of Granite Mountain 7. He advised on the radio that they were moving towards Yarnell in the black.
———————————————————————
— 4) They were heading to a ranch they had in sight.
Source: DPS Officer Tarr’s signed testimony. Second transmit.
Time: 1630
DPS Officer Eric Tarr’s signed testimony…
———————————————————————
A short time later he came back up on the radio advising they were heading to a ranch they had in sight.
———————————————————————
— 5) They said we’re going down our predetermined route towards the structures.
Source: Planning OPS2 Paul Musser’s ADOSH interview.
Time: ??? Unsure.
From Paul Musser’s ADOSH interview…
————————————————————————-
2545 Q2: Oh. Uh, anything else you can think of that we probably need to know at this
2546 point and time? Uh…
2547
2548 A: Uh, at one point I did hear Granite Mountain say they were using their
2549 predetermined route towards the structures.
2550
2551 Q2: Oh, you did hear that?
2552
2553 A: I did – I overheard that. Uh, I don’t know whether that was Granite talking to
2554 Eric or who they were – I did – I overheard that part of a conversation.
Page 58
2555
2556 Q2: Between Granite and somebody?
2557
2558 A: Yes.
2559
2560 Q2: Uh, but you don’t know who they were actually talking or…
2561
2562 A: No I do not.
2563
2564 Q2: But that had to be…
2565
2566 A: That was…
2567
2568 Q2: …some – sometime after that (MacKenzie) picture?
2569
2570 A: Uh, I assume it was after that picture. I don’t know whether it was prior to
2571 they were just getting ready or what. I don’t know that.
2572
2573 Q2: Uh…
2574
2575 A: But there was no urgency, no – never talked of an escape route or safety zones
2576 or anything like that. It was just – or…
2577
2578 Q2: And how did they say it? They…
2579
2580 A: I think they said we’re going down our predetermined route towards the
2581 structures, I think is what was said.
2582
2583 Q2: Uh…
2584
2585 Q: Is that predetermined route something they might have marked with flags or…
2586
2587 A: Uh, obviously whoever – who they were talking to knew what that meant.
2588
2589 Q: Okay.
————————————————————————-
— 6) I did hear Eric say that he was headed to his pre-designated safety zone
Source: Gary Cordes’ ADOSH interview.
Time: ??? Unsure
From Gary Cordes’ ADOSH interview…
————————————————————————
1454 A: Yeah, what I had actually heard, and that’s what I was touching on a little bit
1455 earlier, but I didn’t wanna get too, too far into it, ‘cause I’m not sure of the
1456 timeframe and what had actually occurred, but I did hear Eric say that he was,
1457 he was headed to his pre-designated safety zone. And, and so my assumption
1458 was that he was headed to the um, to the Boulder Springs Ranch.
1459
1460 Q1: So that was your assumption is that he was going to the Boulder Springs
1461 Ranch and not the black, is that right?
1462
1463 A: Yeah, exactly.
1464
1465 Q1: Um, okay.
1466
1467 A: And I was…
1468
1469 Q1: But you don’t know what that time frame might’ve been or…
1470
1471 A: No, that’s what I was trying, that’s what I was trying to fi – you know, jumble
1472 that in to what I had here and I’m not really sure, um, when that actually
1473 happened and how that correlated with him letting me know that it had
1474 crossed the dozer line, uh, by the grater. So I’m not sure which came first.
1475
1476 Q1: Okay, so then somewhere in there he, and he actually called you rather than
1477 somebody else…
1478
1479 A: No, he did not call me, he, he made the announcement to air attack on air to
1480 ground.
1481
1482 Q1: Oh.
1483
1484 A: That, that he was going to the pre-designated safety zone.
1485
1486 Q1: And, and he told air attack that it had crossed the dozer line as well?
1487
1488 A: He, uh that, that transmission, I believe, came, I was trying to get that
1489 information and, and I believe I heard it direct from Eric. I was unable to hook
1490 up with him and I was, and I was communicating through Blue Ridge trying
1491 to get that information from Blue Ridge and then I heard it, when he was
1492 answering Blue Ridge, I heard it direct from…
1493
1494 Q1: (Unintelligible)
1495
1496 A: …from Eric. Right. That it has crossed by the grater.
1497
1498 Q1: Uh, he tells air attack that he’s going to his designated, pre-designated safety
1499 zone…
1500
1501 A: Right.
1502
1503 Q1: …and he doesn’t say where that is, he just says, safety zone?
1504
1505 A: Right.
1506
1507 Q1: And so your assumption is…
1508
1509 A: He had plenty of time to get there and, and he was headed to the Boulder
1510 Springs Ranch.
1511
1512 Q1: Okay.
1513
1514 Q2: Did he say that on air attack, air to ground, the air attack…
1515
1516 A: I’m sorry, air to ground, he said it to air attack, yes.
————————————————————————-
** MARSH’S OPS LEVEL SUPERVISOR HEARD NONE OF THIS
Notice who is conspicuously ABSENT from this list of people who say they heard Eric Marsh and/or Jesse Steed saying they were going anywhere at all.
DIVSA Marsh’s direct OPS level Supervisor Field OPS1 Todd Abel.
That’s because he did NOT hear any of this… and no DIRECT report was made to HIM ( as should have been ) that DIVSA Eric Marsh was abandoning his assignment and moving ALL of his Division Resources ( Granite Mountain ) to a completely different area in a completely different ‘Division’ of the fire.
By the time ADOSH interviewed Field OPS1 Todd Abel they were already ‘aware’ that other people had reported hearing these ‘To Air Attack over A2G’ transmits from either Marsh or Steed.
So they found a moment to specifically ask Abel if HE heard anything similar.
Abel says (unequivocally) that he did NOT.
From Field OPS1 Todd Abel’s ADOSH interview…
——————————————————————————————-
2629 Q1: No word on we’re leaving the black?
2630
2631 A: Nothing. I heard nothing – the last conversation I had with them, we’re in the
2632 black, we’re good, copy that. Every- got everybody in the black and
2633 everybody’s good, that’s affirmative, copy.
——————————————————————————————-
So DIVSA Marsh’s direct Field OPS1 Supervisor had NO IDEA that his DIVSA was abandoning his entire Division and MOVING all his resources to ANOTHER part of the fire.
This is a DIRECT violation of ‘Rule 29’ in the NWIC DIVS TASK BOOK
The actual official NWCG ( National Wildfire Coordinating Group ) TASK BOOK for the ICS position of “Division Supervisor” is designated PMS-311-09… and it is here…
http://www.nwcg.gov/pms/taskbook/operations/pms-311-09.pdf
On page 13 ( of 16 pages )…
——————————————————————————————
TASK
Behavior: Make appropriate decisions based on analysis of gathered information.
29. Determine need for assistance.
– Notify Operations Section Chief when resources are moved or shared between divisions/groups, or excess to operational needs.
————————————————————————————–
One more time… with EMPHASIS…
*** NOTIFY OPERATIONS SECTION CHIEF WHEN RESOURCES ARE MOVED.***
DIVSA Eric Marsh did NOT do this one simple ( REQUIRED ) thing on June 30, 2013.
Obtuse, offhand, incomplete comments over a radio to people who were NOT his direct OPS Level Supervisor don’t count.
No way.
Nor does just making similar obtuse, incomplete ‘announcements’ to Air Attack and ‘assuming’ your OPS Supervisor will hear it and consider himself ‘informed’.
Not a chance.
WTK said
— 2): We’re going down our escape route to our safety zone.”
Source: The SAIR report ( based on YIN B33 interview )
Time: 1630
NOTE: At this point… any reference to ASM2 simply means ‘Bravo 33′.
SAIR…. page 33…
——————————————–
At approximately 1600, ASM2 overhears a comment on the radio referencing a crew and a safety zone. ASM2 calls OPS1 and clarifies, “I heard a crew in a safety zone, do we need to call a time out?” OPS1 replies, “No, they’re in a good place. They’re safe and it’s Granite Mountain.” They talk about flying over to check on the crew, but for now, they think the crew is safe in the black. Following this conversation, ASM2 hears DIVS A announce on the radio, “We’re going down our escape route to our safety zone.” ASM2 asks, “Is everything okay?” to which DIVS A replies, “Yes, we’re just moving.”
Per the SAIR p33
B33 overhears a call AT APPROXIMATELY 1600
How/ why do you get 1630 out of that?
Reply to calvin post on February 17, 2015 at 3:43 am
>> calvin said…
>>
>> Per the SAIR p33
>>
>> B33 overhears a call AT APPROXIMATELY 1600
That is referring to whatever the heck it was that prompted B33 ( in the 1600 timeframe ) to then ask Abel if he wanted them to go check on them ( according to the rest of the YIN B33 notes ).
This part… ( SAIR page 33 )…
———————————————————————–
At approximately 1600, ASM2 overhears a comment on the radio referencing a crew and a safety zone. ASM2 calls OPS1 and clarifies, “I heard a crew in a safety zone, do we need to call a time out?” OPS1 replies, “No, they’re in a good place. They’re safe and it’s Granite Mountain.” They talk about flying over to check on the crew, but for now, they think the crew is safe in the black.
————————————————————————
We still have NO IDEA what “ASM2 overhears a comment” means… which is (supposdley) what prompted them to ask Abel about taking a ‘timeout’. circa 1600 ( 4:00 PM ). That does NOT sound like any one of the radio callouts direct to B33 that have been under discussion. Sounds more like they just ‘overheard’ someone talking to someone ELSE ( and not T”HEM ).
This 1600 ‘overheard something’ thing is NOT the “Air To Air” radio transmit I was talking about in that section in the SAIR.
I was talking about the one they said came AFTER that.
SAIR makes it sound like it was RIGHT after the 1600 deal, or something, but
it was actually (according to YIN B33 notes ) about 30 mins later, at 1630.
>> calvin said…
>>
>> How/ why do you get 1630 out of that?
That’s the time the YIN B33 interview itself puts on that SECOND “Air To Ground” transmit.
YIN page 15… B33 interview…
—————————————————-
We needed to go back to the right flank (16:30 AZ time). Made 3 practice runs. Painted 2. We came around. Got a call from Division A stating they
“were going down their escape route to the safety zone”
—————————————————–
SAIR…. page 33…
——————————————–
ASM2 hears DIVS A announce on the radio,
“We’re going down our escape route to our safety zone.”
——————————————–
* Just the statements themselves…
YIN/B33: “They were going down their escape route to the safety zone”
SAIR: “We’re going down our escape route to our safety zone.”
IDENTICAL statements ( based on YIN ) except that the SAIR authors apparently took the liberty of changing it from 3rd person ( their escape route ) to 1st person ( our escape route ) because that just ‘sounded better’ for their narrative.
But the TIME for this statement comes from the YIN… and appears to have been just shortly after 1630 when they made 2 practice runs and then ‘came around.
B33 YIN
I head something about a crew being in a safety zone. Called ops and asked “do we stop and go look for the crew?” Ops said “no, they are safe, it’s Granite Mountain”. I didn’t know that Blue Ridge was there until we were home watching the news.
Q: When did you hear about Granite Mountain?
A: Before 16:30 – before the fire turned,
B33 says they heard about GM before 1630. Is this more proof there were numerous transmissions from GM/Marsh?
And it can be assumed that this transmission came before the exchange where GM7 makes a frantic call, and B33 tells him to calm down. Right?
The more we go thru this the more my thoughts go to the questions and the after thoughts that the information is getting intermingled with post fire info.
In other words what was herd and the times are getting lost in who herd what when and where with the knowledge of where the crew ended up at. and all the discussions between each other before they were interviewed.
Todd Abel may be the only one stating actual fact?
With all the radio traffic and different channels people were on at this point in the fire
some could be hearing only portions of the conversations and putting 2 and 2 together that may not really add up to 4.
What they herd at 1630 to 1650 and what they discussed after the tragedy was found and every ones different what was herd and intermix of every thing can
change the story and the teller can believe what they are saying is pure fact.
Similar to starting a simple state meant and having it passed on what the first person passed to the next is not what the last person says the statement was.
No one is really lying the information just gets twisted as memory’s are influenced by out side information. You end up truly believing its what you herd thus the conclusion may not be absolute fact. .
The only thing to clarify is the radio tapings.
Last line meant to say Radio Recordings.
Good points.
Yes… trying to assemble the right sequence and the reality of all these (supposed) radio calls from either Marsh or Steed is a nightmare… and the SAIT/YIN is really no help. It just ADDS to the confusion because of what a piss-poor job they did as investigators.
There is at least ONE thing we can probably be 100 percent sure of, though.
DPS Officer Eric Tarr really did hear something along the lines of “we are heading to a ranch we have in sight”.
How can we be basically SURE that is an absolutely ACCURATE recollection on Eric Tarr’s part?
Because that’s how they found the deployment site later.
ALL THREE of the DPS Officer’s testimony are reporting that the way they found the deployment site in DPS Chopper Ranger 58 is because Eric Tarr was SURE he heard someone say something about “heading to a ranch”.
When the smoke cleared enough for Ranger 58 to actually SEE the Boulder Springs Ranch in the distance ( from where they were out WEST )… they then purposely ‘flew a line’ from out west directly TOWARDS the Boulder Springs Ranch… based solely on what Officer Tarr was telling them he heard.
That is how they found the deployment site.
But here is the kicker….
Even though ( for reasons stated above ) we can be absolutely SURE that SOMEONE actually did say “heading to ranch we have in sight” on the A2G channel…
…then why is NO ONE ELSE reporting hearing it at all?
Of ALL of the people in ALL of these various reports and investigation notes are reporting ALL of these things they THINK they heard being said to Air Attack on the A2G channel…
…why is DPS Officer Tarr the ONLY one reporting ever hearing the word RANCH in any of the transmits?
There is also this GEM from OPS2 Paul Musser’s ADOSH interview…
————————————————————————–
2578 Q2: And how did they say it? They…
2579
2580 A: I think they said we’re going down our predetermined route towards the
2581 structures, I think is what was said.
2582
2583 Q2: Uh…
2584
2585 Q: Is that predetermined route something they might have marked with flags or…
2586
2587 A: Uh, obviously whoever – who they were talking to knew what that meant.
———————————————————————-
Here is the GEM in that testimony…
A: Uh, obviously whoever – who they were talking to knew what that meant.
So OPS2 Paul Musser is admitting flat-out that HE ( himself ) had NO FRICKIN’ IDEA what ‘predetermined route’ meant.
Not even a CLUE.
He just assumed that transmission was directed to DID know it… but then Musser doesn’t even lift one finger to FIND OUT what that meant.
1) Musser is now OPS on the south end of the fire.
2) Musser admits HEARING ( himself ) that one of the most important resources down there ( Granite Mountain ) is now ‘on the move’. during a VERY dynamic and dangerous fire situation.
3) Musser admits he has NO IDEA what that meant.
4) Musser doesn’t even bother fo FIND OUT what that meant… even though he was possibly standing ( by that time ) right next to SPGS1 Gary Cordes… who DID know EXACTLY what that meant.
Unbelievable.
There is also a finite list of people Marsh would have been reporting that to. Even though there appears to be direct evidence that Marsh did in fact report their move to B33, and in turn B33 called Abel.
Reply to calvin post on February 17, 2015 at 10:34 am
NOTE: This was brought up from down below in those IMMENSELY confusing threads trying to make sense out of of “who heard what when” with regards to Marsh and/or Steed making ‘announcements’ directly to Air Attack.
This was a quick comment… but it implies a lot and needs to be clarified.
>> calvin said…
>>
>> There appears to be direct evidence that Marsh did in fact report their
>> move to B33, and in turn B33 called Abel.
What ‘direct evidence’?
If you are talking about whether B33 really did go check on GM ( as Todd Abel says happened )… then YES… Todd Abel ALSO says there was a ‘report’ back to him FROM B33 once they performed that recon that GM was ‘in a good place’ and right where Abel thought they were.
There was no reported MOVEMENT. That recon was apparently taking place while they were still either stationary in the black or had just BEGUN to move out… but that ‘move’ was not perceptible to B33 before they reported back to Abel.
If you are talking about the OTHER radio transmits that were overheard later on ( DPS Officer Tarr’s signed testimony puts them at 1630 )… then “YES… those transmits were happening WHILE GM was moving…
…but there is NO DIRECT EVIDENCE that Air Attack B33 was ‘passing on’ THOSE transmits to OPS1 Todd Abel.
Indeed… the very statement that DPS Officer Tarr says he heard which eventually enabled them to find the deployment site HAD to have taken AFTER about 4:20… because the actual “quote” that supposedly floated up to B33 was that they were “heading to a ranch we have in sight”.
If that caller had the “ranch in sight”… then it HAD to be from somewhere around the saddle and not anywhere near back by the anchor point. The BSR was NOT VISIBLE from back there.
So B33 may have reported back to OPS Abel about seeing them at the anchor point… earlier on… but it appears that they were just ‘swallowing’ these LATER transmits about ‘moving’ and ‘heading for a ranch we have in sight’. They were NOT passing THESE transmits on to OPS1 Abel.
OPS1 Todd Abel has testified that he NEVER heard they were MOVING.
Not from Marsh, not from Steed, not from Musser, not from Cordes, not from ‘Bravo 33’.
Not from ANYONE.
One more time… from Field OPS1 Todd Abel’s ADOSH interview…
————————————————————————————————
2629 Q1: No word on we’re leaving the black?
2630
2631 A: Nothing. I heard nothing – the last conversation I had with them, we’re in the
2632 black, we’re good, copy that. Every- got everybody in the black and
2633 everybody’s good, that’s affirmative, copy.
———————————————————————————————-
**
** ADOSH FILED FOIA FOR AIR-TO-GROUND RADIO RECORDINGS
NOTE: this was brought up from a thread down below.
>> On February 16, 2015 at 5:10 am, Marti Reed said…
>>
>> And also, I would like to say, I agree with WTKTT when he has said that it should
>> be probable that the Air Study team, most likely, all things considered, would have
>> been recording the Air to Ground channel through all of this. Which makes it kind of
>> mind-boggling that we don’t have access to these recordings.
>>
>> On February 16, 2015 at 5:25 am, calvin replied…
>>
>> I agree. And just have to consider that the SAIT didn’t want anyone to hear what was
>> transpiring in those final 20 min.
I just wanted to point out that ADOSH was, in fact, assuming that there WERE both Air-To-Air AND Air-To-Ground radio channel captures available as part of that Panebaker Air Study Video taking place in Yarnell. Someone seems to have TOLD them that was the case.
So when they ADOSH was forced by Arizona Forestry to file their OWN FOIA for the material… ADOSH did, in fact, actually request BOTH A2A AND A2G recordings.
What actually happened here is that ADOSH was ‘informed’ on a ‘back-channel’ about this Panebaker Air Study… and what it contained… and they were also told that Arizona Forestry already had everything.
They ASSUMED it would all be included ( and given to them ) when they filed an ‘Arizona Open Records’ request with Arizona Forestry.
They ASSUMED wrong.
Arizona Forestry did not WANT ADOSH to have these ‘recordings’… and ADOSH found out about that, too.
Some serious HARDBALL then ensued whereby Arizona Forestry was claiming ( to ADOSH ) that all of this Panebaker video/audio material that THEY already had was actually ‘owned’ by the US Forestry Service… and they couldn’t supply any of what THEY had been given by USFS to ADOSH even via any ‘Arizona Open Records’ request.
So ADOSH was forced to file its own FOIA request direct to the US Forestry Service to obtain copies of this Panebaker material.
Below is the actual first letter written by ADOSH Attorney Christoper Andersen to George Vargas of the US Forestry Service requesting BOTH the Air-To-Air AND Air-To-Ground radio channel captures AND VIDEO captures that ADOSH was told were currently in their possession.
SIDENOTE: George Vargas is an ‘Information Quality / FOIA Officer’ for the US Forestry Service. This is the same ‘George Vargas’ guy who handled/processed the recent InvestigativeMEDIA FOIA requests for (supposedly) ALL of the rest of Aaron Hulburd’s videos taken at the Yarnell Hill Fire.
In the PUBLIC folder…
ADOSH Dropbox / ADOSH Notes and Emails / Krotenberg
From document named “N9589 August (3) 2013.pdf”
On page 24 ( of 57 pages )
——————————————————————————————
From: Christopher Anderson ( Legal Counsel for ADOSH )
Sent: Wednesday, August 21, 2013 6:22 PM Coordinated Universal Time
To: Vargas, George – FS
Cc: Marshall Krotenbeg ( ADOSH )
Subject: RE: Yarnell Hill Fire
Mr. Vargas,
The Arizona Attorney General’s Office, counsel for the Arizona Division of Forestry, has informed my office that we have the Division of Forestry’s permission to obtain copies of audio recordings of air to air AND air to ground radio transmissions in your possession concerning the Yarnell Hill Fire.
Apparently, you have possession of these recordings as you are involved in a study regarding the fire retardant that was used on this fire.
The Arizona Division of Occupational Safety and Health ( ADOSH ) is conducting an investigation of this fire and wishes to review those recordings.
Please call me at (xxxxxxx) or email a response to me so that we can arrange the delivery of the recordings to ADOSH.
Thank you,
Christopher Anderson
Staff Attorney, Legal Division
Industrial Commission of Arizona
——————————————————————————————
Key sentence from above…
“We (ADOSH) have the Division of Forestry’s permission to obtain copies of audio recordings of air to air AND air to ground radio transmissions in your possession concerning the Yarnell Hill Fire.”
This is not ‘definitive’ proof that there WERE, in fact, A2G channel captures as well as A2A captures in the Panebaker material… but somehow ADOSH was under that impression that was definitely the case when they filed their own FOIA request for the Panebaker material.
A lot more HARDBALL then took place… but ( at ADOSH’s request ) Federal Level OSHA stepped in eventually and basically informed the US Forestry Service that they HAD to fulfill this Arizona ADOSH request… so they did.
Kinda.
What ADOSH actually received from the US Forestry Service were those heavily REDACTED versions of all the Panebaker videos. Those are the ones where someone went painstakingly through the recordings and tried to BLEEP OUT every single reference to anyone’s CALL SIGN on ALL of the radio transmission. They missed a few… but this effort represented TONS of hours on someone’s part making sure that ADOSH did not receive the actual original Panebaker material.
What was NEVER supplied, however, were any Air-To-Ground radio captures similar to the dedicated Air-To-Air captures.
There is also (still) no proof as to whether the SAIT ever had such Air-To-Ground captures, either, and then just conveniently chose to exclude them from that eventual ‘dump’ of (supposedly) all their evidence over to ADOSH.
Maybe they DID have Air-To-Ground radio captures, but ( as calvin pointed out above ), they were so paranoid that these A2G captures actually contained the MAYDAY radio traffic that they just didn’t want any of that to see the light of day. Maybe they thought ( at that point? ) that if pressed… they could always just claim a ‘privacy’ exception to any records requests on the grounds of ‘sensitivity to the families of the fallen’… or something like that. Who knows.
I still think there probably WERE complete Air-To-Ground radio channel captures that were part of that original Panebaker Air Study material.
It still would MAKE NO SENSE that this expensive Aerial Firefighting Study team that was in Yarnell that day would NOT have been capturing the Air-To-Ground radio channel with a dedicated, continuous feed exactly the way they were capturing the Air-To-Air radio channel that day.
If they really weren’t doing it… and the excuse might be that they didn’t have enough cameras or radios with them that day to pull that off… then I would say this HIGH-DOLLAR GOVERNMENT CONTRACT should have gone to some other (better) outfit that DID have all the equipment to do the study RIGHT.
It would have been a pretty piss-poor ‘Aerial Firefighting’ study WITHOUT having captures of BOTH the Air-To-Air AND Air-To-Ground radio traffic.
Great catch, thanks a lot!!!
Question. Is that Dropbox via this site or something on the ADOSH site?
A couple of quick preliminary thoughts.
This means that ADOSH could/did push UP to get NIOSH to intervene on behalf of them vis a vis USFS. Which relates to what we discussed down below regarding ADOSH’s ability to exert the power necessary to force the federal agencies to divulge information and overcome their gag orders. Which may be part of what may be going on “behind the scenes” currently.
Also, I might add, the ADOSH collection hasn’t been updated since January 26. Unless I’m missing something.
Back to the Air2Ground files.
I have periodically sat here and tried to figure out what they might be. I’ve ALWAYS thought that this kind of study would have HAD to include the air to ground traffic. Otherwise there’s no way to know what relationship there was between the air operations and the ground operations, which is an essential part of analyzing the effectiveness of the air operations, which is exactly what this study was originally all about. Like DOH!!!
And I do believe there was communication going on between air operations and ground operations, even though it doesn’t seem that way in the Air2Air videos. Especially during all those retardant and helicopter drops in the Sickles Road and Model Creek Road areas, which were fairly complicated, fairly intense, and fairly accurate. And I, for one, would love to hear all of that, just to learn more about how this stuff happens.
The Air2Air videos seem to be recorded using some kind of direct plug-in from the camera to a radio. There is no ambient noise in them, like there is in the Panebaker videos, where he is just recording the videos and picking up the sounds from his radio among the ambient sounds. Which is why there is so much noise that makes it especially hard to hear what’s coming through the radio.
I’ve mostly thought they most likely were using just a sound recorder also plugged into another radio set on the Air2Ground channel for the Air2Ground recordings. That would provide the clearest recording, and that’s what they would have wanted. And I can’t imagine they wouldn’t have/couldn’t have afforded that. This is not uber-expensive rocket technology.
These sound files, however, would not be synced to the imagery in the videos, like they are with the Air2Air videos. It might take some work/time for someone to do that syncing.
But really, give me a break.
I just can’t think of any “technical” reason for these files to not have been made available to ADOSH and, thus, to the rest of us, by now. And I can’t think of any reason for them not to have been recorded in the first place.
I have a little confusion. I know the videos that were first supplied to ADOSH were heavily redacted (which was a pain in the butt for them). But the ones we have now aren’t. Or are they? Am I missing something? I’ve listened to those videos over and over and I’ve never heard any redacting of the call signs.
So was the original collection redacted and then ADOSH managed to get hold of un-redacted files?
Which leads back to the Air2Ground files.
The only reason I can think of for them not to have been made available to ADOSH and the rest of us is that there definitely must be stuff on them that USFS/AZForestry really doesn’t want us to hear, and which would be too difficult for them to redact out. So I agree with Calvin, and I would expand what he is saying to the possibility that what they don’t want us to hear may include a lot more than what happened just leading up to the deployment. Although, it may be that that time period might be what they’re mostly concerned about. But there may be more. All things considered.
Which all leads me into another line of questioning. Regarding what may be happening now.
Two biggies.
First, the negotiations/gathering of testimonies/gathering of evidence (including likely these Air2Ground files)/subpoenaed deposition of Brendan McDonough/testimonies of the Federal employees — all the stuff ADOSH is doing/collecting. My understanding is that this is all stuff that is, ultimately, Public Domain stuff. Given Arizona’s relatively strong open (at least compared to New Mexico’s) information laws.
So, in my mind, this would suggest that all of this information would be, relatively speaking, eventually (maybe even fairly soon?) releasable to the public.
Is there anything that would delay this?
However, second. There are the wrongful death lawsuits which are entering into a mediation. A mediation which, according to the plaintiffs, includes the most important goal being the learning of WTF actually really happened. A mediation which includes ADOSH (after all this information gathering) at the table.
The question I have in my mind is:
Is it possible that the mediation process will delay the release to the public of the information that is currently being gathered by ADOSH (and which needs to be released for the public, including wildland firefighters who need this information in order to even begin processing it in order to develop Lessons Learned from this fire)? I just don’t know how all this multi-layered legal stuff works.
Reply to Robert the Second (RTS) post February 15, 2015 at 8:49 pm
>> RTS said…
>>
>> WTKTT, I am posting this reply to your Marsh DIVS qualification
>> question up here so you’ll find it. It’s also posted a few posts below.
Thank you… and likewise… posting this reply up here so you will see it.
>> RTS also said…
>>
>> His Task Book had to be signed by several, separate Fireline Supervisors as
>> QUALIFIED DIVS on the several specific wildfires he was on as a DIVS(T) as a Trainee.
>> There should have been several year’s worth of different fires in different Regions
>> around the nation. AZ State sometimes requires fires in the separate Fuel Types as well.
Yes. Marsh was working on his DIVS taskbook for YEARS.
The proof is in his ‘Performance Evaluations’ that ARE part of his Personnel file.
In the following 2006 Evaluation for Marsh… he first mentions his DIVS Task Book ( which he was already working on by then ) and one of his ‘goals’ would be to complete his DIVS Task Book.
** 2006 – CITY OF PRESCOTT PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL
Employee Name: Eric Marsh
Job Title: Wildland Captain
Evaluation Period: Oct 10, 2005
Evaluation Date: April 10,, 2006
Department: Fire
Division: Wildland
Supervisor: Duane Steinbrink
EMPLOYEE SELF APPRAISAL
———————————————————————————–
What would you like to be doing ini one year/five years?
What can the City of Prescott do to “grow” you into that job?
What training is needed to obtain your goals?
Next season IHC(T). I would like to continue to serve as SUPT of
Granite Mountain, eventually earning full IHC status.
Continue to develop fuels program and continue to explore new
roles for the crew. I would like our (men) to set standards within
our department and also contribute to the IHC community through
(education) and training. Would like to complete DIVS task book.
————————————————————————————
Eric Marsh sort of ‘let that go for’ about 2 years… then in 2008 he was being encouraged AGAIN by his Supervisor, current ( and the first ) Prescott Wildland Division Chief Duane Stenbrink to ‘keep working on it’. In 2008, Steinbring thinks Marsh is still at least TWO years away from being a certified DIVSUP…
On page 24 of Eric Marsh’s PDF Personnel File…
** 2008 – CITY OF PRESCOTT PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL
Employee Name: Eric Marsh
Job Title: Wildland Captain
Evaluation Period Started: April 10, 2007
Evaluation Date: April 10, 2008
Department: Fire
Division: Wildland
Supervisor: Duane Steinbrink
SUPERVISOR’S NARRATIVE ON PERFORMANCE
———————————————————————————–
I would like to see Eric work on his Division Supervisor task book
in the coming year, and obtain certification within two years.
———————————————————————————–
>> RTS also said…
>>
>> The PFD would have had a Red Card Committee of sorts, as Bob pointed out, to
>> approve the Task Book and ultimately then ‘sign off’ on all its contents, i.e. a
>> completed Task Book with Acceptable ratings on each of the tasks on the
>> numerous fires. Then it would have been brought before the ‘Arizona State Wildfire
>> Qualifications Review Committee.” (link below)
Keyphrase: “Acceptable ratings on each of the tasks”
The actual official NWCG ( National Wildfire Coordinating Group ) TASK BOOK for the ICS position of “Division Supervisor” is designated PMS-311-09. It’s online. See other links below.
I’m still most curious who the EVALUATOR was who actually ‘signed off’ on the following in Marsh’s DIVS Task Book. SOMEONE had to sign/initial this part which means Marsh had demonstrated that he fully UNDERSTOOD this DIVS RULE about notifying OPS when MOVING resources…
On page 13 ( of 16 pages )…
——————————————————————————————
TASK
Behavior: Make appropriate decisions based on analysis of gathered information.
29. Determine need for assistance.
– Notify Operations Section Chief when resources are MOVED or shared between divisions/groups, or excess to operational needs.
————————————————————————————–
One more time… with EMPHASIS…
*** NOTIFY OPERATIONS SECTION CHIEF WHEN RESOURCES ARE MOVED.***
DIVSA Eric Marsh did NOT do this on June 30, 2013… and people died.
>> RTS also said…
>>
>> And usually the Task Books are NOT kept in a ‘Personnel File’ but are instead kept
>> in a Fire Experience and/or IQCS (Incident Qualification and Certification System)
>> file, in the Federal system, so the AZ Forestry would have something similar.
Copy that.
>> RTS also said…
>>
>> Here is the link for the AZ State Wildfire Qualifications Review Committee
>>
>> https://azsf.az.gov/sites/default/files/MINUTES%202006-2013.pdf
>>
>> If you search for ‘Marsh’ on this page you’ll find that his “completed
>> DIVS Task Book was approved 5/31/01.”
>>
>> So then he was certified by the AZ State Forestry as a fully qualified
>> DIVS as of May 31, 2001.
Thank you for that link. VERY helpful.
Yes. The entry is there… but you copied the DATE wrong.
It actually happened on May 31, 2010… and not 2001.
On page 60 ( of 103 pages )…
————————————————————————————————
State Wildfire Qualifications Review Committee
EMAIL Reviews completed between MAY 1, 2010 & DECEMBER 6, 2010
MARSH, Eric- Prescott FD: Completed DIVS task book – approved 5/31/10.
————————————————————————————————–
So only on May 31, 2010 did Eric Marsh become a ‘Certified’ DIVS and was then able to add that rating to his red-card.and start being employed in that capacity.
On THAT day… he was ‘certified’ to have FULLY understood ‘Rule 29’ from the official NWCG ‘Division Supervisor’ Task Book…
———————————————————————————————
TASK
Behavior: Make appropriate decisions based on analysis of gathered information.
29. Determine need for assistance.
– Notify Operations Section Chief when resources are moved or shared between divisions/groups, or excess to operational needs.
———————————————————————————————
*** NOTIFY OPERATIONS SECTION CHIEF WHEN RESOURCES ARE MOVED.***
Of all the rules he was breaking that day… I wish he had NOT chosen to break THIS one.
It might have made all the difference that day… and people might not have died.
I had actually spent some time earlier today reading this pdf and realizing that Eric was certified in 2010, not 2001, as DIVS. And hadn’t had time to comment about that.
One of the things I found valuable in reading this was to see how various people we have become relatively familiar with were working their way, sometimes in fits and starts, up through the various levels of fire-fighting qualifications.
Including various other Granite Mountain Hotshots. And also Darrell Willis (who was actually quite qualified in many roles). etc etc etc
The other thing you see by reading this is how Arizona is, by necessity, having to develop an increasingly intense process for integrating local fire department (basically structural) fire-fighters into fighting wildland fires in the Urban-Wildland Interface. By 2013 they were having a fairly hard time keeping up with that process.
While they were increasingly having to develop online methods to handle that process. It’s pretty challenging.
It still is interesting to me that Eric qualified, at least in theory and including some amount of actual experience, which would have had to include Trainee experience, as a Div Supervisor in 2010, but didn’t, as far as we know, actually serve as a Div Supervisor until the 2013 Doce Fire right before the Yarnell Hill Fire.
Is that normal?
Given that, at least as it appears to me by reading all of this, a red-card designation in any given skill/role seems to be considered “expired” if it isn’t documented as being “acted on” in three years. Periodically in this you see people’s red-card designations expiring and them having to re-qualify for them.
Maybe Eric was more focused on other things related to Granite Mountain Hotshots stuff and maybe even the Wildfire Academy and the whole Chainsaw Training/Qualifying Committee (which was a pretty big multi-year deal also documented here) stuff than he was on keeping/exercising his credentials regarding his Div Superintendent qualifications?
Which might be why he may have lost his Situational Awareness regarding that requirement regarding “keeping your superintendent informed of any crew moves” thing in the certification process?
I’m not trying to justify his doing that, and I agree with WTKTT saying, essentially “I wish he hadn’t done that.”
I’m just saying that, all things considered, given this documentation of how various people are, in real life, getting certified in this Arizona process, including Eric Marsh. the reality seems quite a bit messier than, perhaps, our theory.
Keeping your supervisor apprised of your location and significant moves, WHICH INCLUDES ‘permanently leaving your assigned area’, is a requirement at EVERY level of the ICS, NOT just for Div Sups.
It is not a detail or requirement that one first encounters upon beginning Div Sup training.
It should have been well ingrained long before that.
For what it is worth, in reply to Marti’s question and the reply of other’s thereto, it has long been my view that:
1) B33 never went and “checked” on GM – they make clear they never had eyes on GM.
2) Instead, B33 heard GM/Marsh say on the radio (openly, not hiding anything) where they were going – which others heard as well and simply recall it differently (b/c eyewitness testimony is dicey – people remember things differently and often poorly) – and B33 checked in with Abel on it.
3) I suspect that the 4:13-ish p.m. background conversations (that I do not believe we have an accurate transcript for nor do I believe it is forensically possibly to ever get an accurate transcript for) from the Panbaker videos are actually related to this one-time event that B33 and Abel seem to recall differently.
4) I tentatively believe that Burfiend was talking to Eric Marsh in the conversation that ends at the beginning of the “Helmet Camera” video. If Burfiend is not speaking to Marsh, or if Burfiend had NOT just spoken to Marsh, then who is Burfiend speaking with? Anyone?
Reply to Elizabeth (counselor) post on February 16, 2015 at 10:38 am
>> counselor said…
>>
>> It has long been my view that: 1) B33 never went and “checked” on GM
Then you are (basically) calling Todd Abel a liar.
See his ADOSH testimony below.
>> counselor also said…
>>
>> they ( B33 ) make clear they never had eyes on GM.
Not according to Todd Abel. Direct OPPOSITE, in fact.
Todd Abel testified that not only DID ‘Bravo 33’ go down and ‘check’ on Granite Mountain… they reported back to him that they LOOKED good and were IN THE BLACK.
Keyword: LOOKED good ( As in… they SAW they down there IN THE BLACK ).
From Todd Abel’s ADOSH interview on August 22, 2013
Q1 = Dave Larsen, WFA / ADOSH investigator ( Rest in Peace )
A = Field OPS1 Todd Able
—————————————————————————————–
1768 A: It’s kind of standing up more. About that time I get a call from Eric Marsh on
1769 the radio saying, hey, just wanna give you a heads up the winds are getting
1770 squirrely over here, it looks like our retardant line – they had ran a retardant
1771 line – I think came right through this drainage right here, and our dozer line,
1772 see that came right out there and went – that retardant line did?
1773
1774 Q1: Mm-hm, right.
1775
1776 A: And our dozer line are – are compromised – they’re gonna be compromised. I
1777 said okay, I copy. I said are you guys in a safe place? He said affirmative,
1778 we’re in the black. I said copy that, just – once again everybody’s in a good
1779 spot? Yes we’re all in a good spot, we’re in the black. I said copy that.
1780
1781 Q1: Okay.
1782
1783 A: I then jump on the radio, uh, on air ground with Bravo 33 and, uh, asked John
1784 Burfiend was – the Bravo 33, I said hey, when you get a chance, I need you to
1785 run down to the south end. He’s up here dropping SEATs to keep it out of
1786 these structures.
1787
1788 Q1: Right.
1789
1790 A: He’s kind of 1790 trying to tie stuff in to keep it out of those structures. And I said
1791 I need you to run down, uh, south and check on Granite – Division Alpha and
1792 Granite Mountain and Blue Ridge. He said copy that. He said I got – he goes
1793 what’s going on? I go now the winds are getting squirrely down there, they’re
1794 in the black, everybody’s good. He said okay I got two more SEATs to drop
1795 and I’ll buzz down there.
1796
1797 Q1: Okay.
1798
1799 A: So he dropped the other two SEATs. So you know you’re talking – I don’t
1800 know – you got 3:45 to 4 o’clock was probably wind change. Me and Eric
1801 having the conversation was probably right in that same timeframe. Yeah, I’d
1802 say that’s probably pretty close.
1803
1804 Q1: Okay.
1805
1806 A: So and then John made a run down there, everybody looked good, they were
1807 in the black, no, you know ev- no issues, no nothing. So ev-everybody was
1808 good. I was just trying to make – I’m just trying to paint that picture on the
1809 timeframes for you.
1810
1811 Q1: Thank you.
—————————————————————————————–
Key statement from above…
“John ( Burfiend, in Bravo 33 ) made a run down there, everybody LOOKED good, they were IN THE BLACK”
They LOOKED good… as in… they SAW that they were IN THE BLACK ( at that time ).
WTK
There is absolutely no documentation from B33 that they saw GM in the black or anywhere else.
And there is at least three separate calls from GM/Marsh that B33 acknowledges they were not in the Black. They were MOVING.
Reply to calvin post on February 17, 2015 at 4:44 am
>> calvin said…
>>
>> There is absolutely no documentation from B33 that they saw
>> GM in the black or anywhere else.
Keyphrase: FROM B33.
The ONLY ‘documentation’ whatsoever coming ‘FROM’ B33 ended up that piss-poor B33 interview section in the SAIT interview notes document.
ADOSH was PREVENTED from ever interviewing ‘Bravo 33’.
According to this YIN thing… they never even WENT to do the ‘check’ on them… so no… also no corresponding testimony they SAW them anywhere at all. It never happened ( according to YIN ).
Todd Abel testified that the recon DID happen… and that B33 DID say they ‘LOOKED good” ( as in… VISUALLY SAW THEM in a GOOD place ).
WHEN that happened ( if it did ) is still a Mystery.
Even if GM had just started on their hike south… Bravo 33 might have seen them still close enough to the anchor point ( and not really perceived they were moving at all ) to report back to Abel that they were ‘in a GOOD place”.
>> calvin also said…
>>
>> And there is at least three separate calls from GM/Marsh
>> that B33 acknowledges they were not in the Black. They
>> were MOVING.
TWO different sources ( YIN and DPS Officer Tarr ) put some of those transmissions into the 1630 timeframe.
So we really are looking at TWO different TIMEFRAMES for some of these callouts on the ‘Air To Ground’ channel.
Something seems to have happened EARLIER than 1630… when Marsh ‘announced’ they were ‘heading out their predetermined escape route’.
Even THESE reported transmission could be nothing more than people overhearing that “Granite Montun… wuz yo status right now?” exchange that went over the radio at 4:16. Both ‘escape routes’ and ‘structures’ were mentioned in THOSE 4:16 PM radio exchanges with Granite Mountain.
The OTHER ‘set’ of transmission directly to Air Attack appear to have taken place LATER… around 1630… and THOSE are the ones that included the phrase “heading to ranch we have in sight”… which ended up the key to Ranger 58 being able to actually find the deployment site.
I had written up a very lengthy, well thought, intellectual response on Thursday, posted it to Chapter 12 and when I hit send it said awaiting moderation… Since Chapter 12 went live, my comment did not appear. It is still in cyber space I believe.
Here it goes again, as best as I can remember….
Getting back to all of the Youtube videos showing different minor safety infractions of the crews.
Granite Mountain was seen with their sleeves up, no gloves on yada yada and people question their safety consciousness and have gone as far as to say they were not, thus leading to them going rogue and heading to the canyon.
If one of the other crews on the videos happens to have some sort of incident this year, will the video evidence be used to say they were “unsafe/rebels/rogues/renegades/cowboys” ??????
One or 2 minor safety infractions does NOT make a crew unsafe and suggest they make bad decisions.
I ADMIT, I have taken my hard hat off at a staging area to have lunch…. Does that make me unsafe and a bad decision maker???? Don’t think so… I have dug guard without my gloves…. I have slung loads under a helicopter without goggles. I have ridden an ATV without a helmet… Does all of this mean I am unsafe ???? NO!!!!
Lets not throw GM under the bus for a couple minor things.
While I agree with you those in them selves do not ID a rouge crew.
How ever they can be indicators of other problems.
GM was on severial occasions talked to by fire over head about their shirt sleeves
and continued to do it any way.
Every time you do not follow safety guide lines you create an exposure.
The old safety triangle.
So many exposures=
X amount of minor accidents=
X amount of serious injuries=
1-FATALITY
cant remember the numbers but it was something like 100/10/3/1
Just my Safety mind going off No one seems to follow what we use to in the old days.
Kept my record on Safety as I have said before down to Poison Oak and a few sprain ankles.
here and there. No burns/non chainsaw cuts/ no broken legs/ no eye injuries/ defiantly no shelter deployments/why because I made sure my crews followed the rules.
Start of fire assignment Hot Shots or jut crews of different back ground.
Safety Talk Inspection safety rules and follow up—Hard ASS
Reply to rocksteady post on February 16, 2015 at 9:42 am
>> rocksteady said…
>>
>> Getting back to all of the Youtube videos showing different minor safety
>> infractions of the crews.
>>
>> Granite Mountain was seen with their sleeves up, no gloves on yada yada
>> and people question their safety consciousness and have gone as far as
>> to say they were not, thus leading to them going rogue and heading to
>> the canyon.
>>
>> If one of the other crews on the videos happens to have some sort of
>> incident this year, will the video evidence be used to say they were
>> “unsafe/rebels/rogues/renegades/cowboys” ??????
If some of those guys get 3rd degree burns on their forearms because sleeves were rolled up, or serious hand-burns because of ‘no gloves’… or break their skulls open because ‘no helmet in UTV/ATV’… yada, yada…
…then “YES. Of COURSE those videos will be used to illustrate how not following all designated safety procedures makes you an ‘accident waiting to happen’.
It’s an indication of ATTITUDE… and how you approach your work.
A BAD attitude… or a flippant one with regards to ‘Safety’ can get you hurt… or KILLED.
>> rocksteady also said…
>>
>> One or 2 minor safety infractions does NOT make a crew unsafe and
>> suggest they make bad decisions.
Not just 1 or 2. No… but a REPEATED pattern of ignoring safety rules or following the ‘bad decisions with good outcomes’ approach to firefighting CAN and DOES suggest that you might be an ‘accident just waiting to happen’.
That’s just the way it is.
>> rocksteady also said…
>>
>> I ADMIT, I have taken my hard hat off at a staging area to have lunch…. Does
>> that make me unsafe and a bad decision maker???? Don’t think so… I have
>> dug guard without my gloves…. I have slung loads under a helicopter
>> without goggles. I have ridden an ATV without a helmet… Does all of
>> this mean I am unsafe ???? NO!!!!
See above. If you ALWAYS approach your work with that kind of disregard for the rules that are meant to keep you safe and uninjured… then YES… you are an ‘accident waiting to happen’.
>> rocksteady also said…
>>
>> Lets not throw GM under the bus for a couple minor things.
If Caldwell had set his bare forearm on fire that morning while using his drip torch with his sleeve(s) rolled up… maybe we wouldn’t even be here having this conversation. Maybe that ‘minor thing’ might have ‘stopped the show’ while everyone figured out how to evac him for medical treatment.
Ditto if Brendan had deployed. That might have changed everything.
But we are not talking just MINOR things here with regard to GM and what appears to be a repeating pattern of ‘disregarding safety rules’.
They disregarded all the MAJOR safety rules of their profession when working/traveling near a dangerous, dynamic fire.
What’s MINOR about that?
I agree both with you and Bob that safety is very important.
I was just trying to prove that taken singularily, an issues like sleeves does not make the crew not safety conscious.
And your point is well taken ( and true ).
SINGLE, one-offs… probably meaningless.
REPEATED / INGRAINED pattern(s) of disregard for safety rules… most probably an ‘Accident just waiting to happen’.
To take a somewhat strained analogy, think about driving. My life partner has never had an accident, but never signals lane changes. But, she doesn’t speed way above the flow of traffic, uses mirrors, doesn’t get speeding tickets because she’s aware enough (SA in driving terms) to know where police or HP are likely to be, doesn’t use the cell in the car, etc. etc. For my oldest child, I will still insist that that kid learn to signal lane changes, but it doesn’t mean that I feel uncomfortable at all with my life partner driving my kid somewhere. I have another family member who gets tickets all the time, has had serious accidents and near-misses, and doesn’t signal lane changes. I don’t allow my kids in that car with that driver.
The same day of the YHF, GM nearly had its lookout burned over in front of them, while treating it like it was no big deal. There are reports that GM was warned by peers multiple times in the past about safety. The same day of the YHF, GM had to have its buggies moved, and there is video of its buggies having to be saved on another fire. RTS reports a pattern of evasion as to crew location and movements and a culture of secrecy regarding the same. It’s not just sleeves. RTS posted a specific report about evasiveness regarding a medical issue where the evasiveness had the potential to skew, negatively possible outcomes (i.e. if that issue had turned out to be rhabdo). I don’t doubt that subjectively all of these things felt subjectively safe at the time, which is part of how standards drift. But, objectively there does seem to have been quite a bit of drift.
If the wrongful death suits go to trial… the whole business about GM’s past behavior and practices ( and attitudes towards safety and obeying chain of command ) are ALL going to be DIRECTLY relevant to the case and probably presented in a complete way with under-oath testimony.
There is nothing any of us can say here to ‘throw them under the bus’.
They already got THEMSELVES ‘thrown under the bus’.
If it turns out this organization was just an “Accident waiting to happen”…
…the waiting ended on June 30, 2013.
Lesson to Learn: Don’t be an “Accident waiting to happen”.
It will probably happen.
In terms of the idea of throwing GM under the bus, to me, I’d again stress that a lot of the relaxation of standards that is evident for them may have been invisible from inside the group, as it was cultural. Sidney Decker or Dekker has a book, Drift into Failure, that’s a good read as far as the relaxation of standards.
I did leave out some key issues in the laundry list, such as EM having clear communication issues, witness the performance review where he was told he had to learn to speak when spoken to. That’s a big wildcard in terms of managing a complex environment well. RTS’ reports that there may have been 3 calls from EM to Steed strongly urging them down to the BSR needs to be looked at in this regard.
What would be truly surprising is if a catastrophic failure on multiple levels did just happen from random chance out of the blue when it required multiple actions to cause the failure.
SR, you indicate in your post that you are trying to say that Marsh had communication issues that somehow relate to the tragic loss of the 19 Granite Mountain Hotshots. I object to this narrative, in part because I believe that it is premature (meaning, maybe Marsh *DID* have communication issues, but we have no reason to suspect that they were directly related to the deaths of the GM19).
In terms of Hotshot Superintendents and communication issues, have you read the document at this link: http://www.mspb.gov/netsearch/viewdocs.aspx?docnumber=215304&version=215523&application=ACROBAT
This document tells part of the story about a former Hotshot Superintendent who allegedly LIED repeatedly regarding his duties and actions, yet this particular Superintendent never had a fatality. If lying or communication problems by a Superintendent had a direct causal relationship that leads to deaths on a Superintendent’s crew, wouldn’t you think it would have come to be manifest during the long career of the Superintendent who is the subject of the document to which a link is provided above?
Reply to Elizabeth ( counselor ) post on
February 17, 2015 at 8:15 am
>> counselor said…
>>
>> maybe Marsh *DID* have communication issues,
There is on MAYBE about it.
Just read his performance evaluations in his Personel file.
‘Interpersonal Communication issues’ were a CONSTANT issue in his performance evaluations… ranging from basically non-existent early on and was cause for him being put on actual PROBATION… to still being told he needed to ‘improve’ in that area almost every year following that.
He had IMPROVED… but we are looking at someone who is DOCUMENTED and having to ‘struggle’ with this almost all the time… especially when people were not living up to his ultra-high ‘moral’ and/or ‘performance’ expectations.
>> counselor also said…
>>
>> but we have no reason to suspect that they were directly
>> related to the deaths of the GM19).
Yes. We DO.
The actual official NWCG ( National Wildfire Coordinating Group ) TASK BOOK for the ICS position of “Division Supervisor” is designated PMS-311-09… and it is here…
http://www.nwcg.gov/pms/taskbook/operations/pms-311-09.pdf
On page 13 ( of 16 pages )…
——————————————————————————————
TASK
Behavior: Make appropriate decisions based on analysis of gathered information.
29. Determine need for assistance.
– Notify Operations Section Chief when resources are moved or shared between divisions/groups, or excess to operational needs.
————————————————————————————–
One more time… with EMPHASIS…
*** NOTIFY OPERATIONS SECTION CHIEF WHEN RESOURCES ARE MOVED.***
DIVSA Eric Marsh did NOT do this one simple ( REQUIRED ) bit of ‘communicating properly’ on June 30, 2013… and people died.
Obtuse, offhand, incomplete comments over a radio to people who were NOT his direct OPS Level Supervisor don’t count.
No way.
Nor does just making similar obtuse, incomplete ‘announcements’ to Air Attack and ‘assuming’ your OPS Supervisor will hear it and consider himself ‘informed’.
Not a chance.
>> counselor also said…
>>
This document tells part of the story about a former Hotshot Superintendent who allegedly LIED repeatedly regarding his duties and actions, yet this particular Superintendent never had a fatality.
>> If lying or communication problems by a Superintendent
>> had a direct causal relationship that leads to deaths
>> on a Superintendent’s crew, wouldn’t you think it would
>> have come to be manifest during the long career of the
>> Superintendent?
So just because some ONE guy got ‘lucky’ and never killed himself or anyone else… you’re trying to say that should be taken to mean it is OK to have serious communication issues and break the safety rules of your chosen profession?… on a REGULAR basis?
You only have to DIE once… and hopefully NOT take anyone else whose full safety has been entrusted to your care WITH you.
Correction for above.
“There is on” should have been “There is NO”…
Section above should have read…
>> counselor said…
>>
>> maybe Marsh *DID* have communication issues,
There is NO MAYBE about it.
Just read his performance evaluations in his Personell file.
He improved from being almost clinically catatonic at times… but it was an ONGOING issue for him.
My theory on the GM7 call sign. It may or may not be accurate.. NOT FACT, just my opinion….
On our Unit Crews (equivelant to hotshots) the crew used to be numbered 1 thru 20. 1 was the Superintendant, 2,3,4, and sometimes 5 were squad bosses. (depending on crew config, if they had 3 or 4 squads. Then the crew members were given the reamianing numbers.
Recently our crews (as well as witnessed by my working with an Alaskan Hot shot crew this summer) The leader is called Hotshot Sup, each squad is given an alphanumeric, for example A1-crew Boss, A2 thru 4, crew members. B1 Crew Boss B2 thru 4 Crew Members.
In the desperate moments of the frantic call for help, maybe the individual fell back to his old call sign of being Granite Mountain 7, when they were numbered 1 thru 20.
I could be wrong, but this is the first thing that popped into my head, the very first time I listened to that audio track.
Maybe someone close to teh Hotshot world can confirm for me if that is the way the old crews used to be numbered to either validate or squish my theory, beofre the IM board goes sideways on a simple thought 🙂 Not like that has happened before.
Reply to rocksteady post on February 16, 2015 at 9:33 am
>> rocksteady said…
>>
>> In the desperate moments of the frantic call for help, maybe the individual
>> fell back to his old call sign of being Granite Mountain 7, when they were
>> numbered 1 thru 20.
That’s a valid theory… but there is NO evidence they were ever using this ‘numbering’ scheme you say you have seen before.
This has been discussed at length many moons ago.
They used to be ‘Crew 7’… they became ‘Granite Mountain’. Some of the guys just morphed the call sign into ‘Granite Mountain 7’ and it just became a ‘habit’, or something.
>> rocksteady also said…
>>
>> Maybe someone close to teh Hotshot world can confirm for me if that is the
>> way the old crews used to be numbered to either validate or squish my
>> theory, beofre the IM board goes sideways on a simple thought 🙂 Not
>> like that has happened before.
Not likely to go sideways. It’s simple. Some of them were just used to adding the ‘7’ prefix to their radio callouts. It was just a habit going back to being just “Crew 7”.
What we have NOT heard from ANY other former GMHS, however… is whether that really was just SOP for them… or whether the reversion to ‘Granite Mountain 7’ in the last moments of their lives really was some sort of clinical ‘mental throwback’ because of the stress.
Actually… we have heard NOTHING AT ALL from ANY former GMHS.
Zero. Zip. Nada.
Not even anything GOOD, really. Just ‘total silence’ from the dozens and dozens of people still alive who used to work for this organization.
I STILL think that is VERY strange… and MEANS something.
Not sure WHAT… but SOMETHING.
Typo above. Meant to say ‘suffix’, not ‘prefix’.
Sentence above should have read…
Not likely to go sideways. It’s simple. Some of them were just used to adding the ‘7’ SUFFIX to their radio callouts. It was just a habit going back to being just “Crew 7″.
RockSteady–
We had 5 crews on the Angeles NF.
2 on the District I was on Oak Grove and Chilao
We had Forest call Signs Crew 5-1 and Crew 5-2, The others Crew4-1, Crew3-1 and Crew 2-1
Inter crew we used last names. We went by Crew Names on Fires no call numbers
Oak Grove, Chilao ,Sagus,Texas Canyon and Dalton. all crews were the same the Supervisor /Superintendent answer the crew call.. We never used our call sign on Fires.
Thanks Bob, was a shot in the dark..
And, as long as I’m sitting here, having been awakened by my neuropathetic legs, I’m going to re-ask something I asked, in a conversation, way downstream, with TTWARE, regarding his saying that:
“The Incident Command System only allows an entity to have one supervisor, PERIOD.
On an incident that requires “Operational” supervision in more than one area, “Branches” are formed, with one Ops Chief, over the 2 or more Branches. In the case of the YHF, the 2 separate (Branch) areas would have still have needed ONE supervisor over them, which at the time due to the limited resources, could have been the IC, but as we know, he was totally disengaged from all operational activities that day.
The other ABSOLUTE REQUIREMENT for splitting Operations into separate geographical areas is that ALL resources MUST be made aware of this new development, and to which specific (ONE, AND ONLY ONE) supervisor they will be reporting to.”
I wrote:
“FEBRUARY 14, 2015 AT 1:26 PM
What was going on in my head after reading TTWARE’s comment was hmmmmmmm. If what he is saying is normally the case, which I’m sure it is, it would make sense for the two, Abel and Musser, to have at least roughly divided the fire geographically (in their heads), with Abel Field Ops for “DivZ” ie everything somewhat east (and seriously north) of the bowl, and Musser Field Ops for DivA ie everything from the Ridge over thru the bowl thru most of Yarnell proper and south from there.
Which seems to me pretty much what [De Facto] happened. Which might be why Marsh/Steed no longer considered Abel their DeFacto Supervisor/Overhead and were thinking Musser (who I don’t think had much SA of that area at that time) was more their OPS. For whatever that, all things considered, was worth.
So far, at this point we don’t know if that geographic divvying up of the fire between the two Field Ops had formally been communicated to DivA/Granite Mountain, or anybody else. But that’s pretty much what was happening, it seems to me.
That’s why Musser left Sickles Road and headed south toward Yarnell. And was focused on assessing resources in that area. And meeting with Cordes. And he had plenty of time to make a quick drive further southwest on 89 to that Yarnell area and back again and then up Shrine Road to get a quick view of things. Not that there’s any evidence he did that, but I have always wondered what Musser was doing during all that time. {Current note: I now longer think that was true, via the visual evidence]
I think he was, in fact, focused on that area of the fire and Abel was focused on the areas east and north. And, actually there was another Division up there, which became more important that night and during the next day.
Which leaves room, still, for begging the question:
How much did/didn’t Musser (essentially Cordes’ Supervisor/Overhead [at that point]) know about “The Cordes Plan”? As long as everybody’s talking about “Rogue” stuff, how “Rogue” was that plan?
Was Cordes putting it together with or without consulting Musser? Maybe it wasn’t “Rogue” at all. Maybe it was seriously “Rogue.” Either of those possibilities has very different implications and consequences.
I’m just trying to look at everything through that somewhat different lens.”
> I’m totally willing to have this idea (and its resulting questions) refuted. It’s just a path my mind has wandered on to. And so far, in the back-and-forth convos regarding who said what to whom and who was responsible for what to whom, nothing has created a blockade to that path. Or my questions regarding its possible implications.
And, just in case there’s any confusion, I’m meaning this geographical dividing up of the fire wasn’t the case until Musser went from being “Planning OPS.” (located in the Incident Command Center), to being, jointly with Todd Abel, “Field OPS.” (thus located on the fire itself, from the Willis Model Creek Road backfire to the Sickles Road operation, and from there down to the Yarnell area).
And also, I would like to say, I agree with WTKTT when he has said that it should be probable that the Air Study team, most likely, all things considered, would have been recording the Air to Ground channel through all of this. Which makes it kind of mind-boggling that we don’t have access to these recordings.
I agree. And just have to consider that the SAIT didn’t want anyone to hear what was transpiring in those final 20 min. As B33 says. There was no tankers in the air to help. And we know that B33 reports that marsh was trying to line up a retardant drop. But it appears that B33 didn’t have a tanker behind them. They were just getting ready for the DC 10. And then, it was too late.
calvin… see a longer reply up above as a new parent comment.
As it turns out… ADOSH themselves seem to have been TOLD that the Panebaker material contained BOTH Air-To-Air and Air-To-Ground channel captures.
When ADOSH was forced to make their own FOIA request directly to US Forestry for the Panebaker Air Study Material… they specifically ASKED for BOTH the Air-To-Air and Air-To-Ground radio captures that they already ‘understood’ were in US Forestry’s possession.
RTS said
Here are some examples of past fatality fires, including the YH Fire. On the South Canyon Fire (1994) in Colorado, IC Mackey resorted to sharpening a chainsaw rather than managing the fire and managing the resources. On the Thirtymile Fire (2001) in Washington, IC Daniels was using hose and a nozzle on a hot spot on the fire rather than what he was responsible for, managing the fire and resources. On the Yarnell Hill Fire (2013), GMHS Marsh and Steed in their most stressful period “in front of the flaming front’ several times refer to themselves as “Granite Mountain 7.” Before they were a certified IHC they were the PFD Fuels Crew known as Crew 7
That makes sense to me.
B33 YIN
Heard a frantic call from Granite Mountain 7 to Air Attack told him to calm down. 20 minutes from that call to when they deployed.
If the statement from B33 is accurate. GM knew they were in deep shit 20 minutes before going into shelter. To the point of calling themselves GM7
Calvin,
Very possibly correct that they were “in deep shit 20 minutes before going into shelter[s]”
Stress matters as Daniel Goleman says. And stress can be a cumulative thing. I think the GMHS knew they were in deep shit once they left their perfectly good SZ and certainly once they stepped off the mid-slope road into the unburned abyss and down into what would soon become ‘the hinges of hell.’
I would also agree they may not have been able to see the fire but I cant believe they could not see the Smoke Colum and hear the Fire it had to be making some noise.
the smoke would have been black and putting up a good solid smoke.
They committed themselves the goal was BSR and that was their mind set.
Reply to calvin post on February 16, 2015 at 3:22 am
>> calvin said…
>>
>> That makes sense to me.
>>
>> B33 YIN
>>
>> Heard a frantic call from Granite Mountain 7 to Air Attack told him
>> to calm down. 20 minutes from that call to when they deployed.
>>
>> If the statement from B33 is accurate. GM knew they were in deep shit 20
>> minutes before going into shelter.
I think you are putting WAAAY too much ‘faith’ in any number of those third-hand ‘notes/quotes’ that supposedly came from the SAIT’s interview with John Burfiend
and Thomas French. ( Bravo 33 ).
I don’t think there is any way that Granite Mountain could have realized they were in ‘deep shit’ a full 20 minutes before deciding to jump into their ‘shake and bake’ shelters.
Not a chance.
If they DID… it would be totally inconceivable why they would have stood around with their heads up their asses for 20 minutes… and then decided to lay down and die.
Somewhere in that (supposed) testimony… someone ( Thomas French and/or John Burfiend and/or Clint Cross ) is just plain mis-remembering something.
NOTE: This YIN B33 interview notes are so piss-poor that except for a few specific places we can’t even ever be sure WHICH of those THREE men are supplying the testimony there at any given moment.
So that just means ALL of these B33 (supposed) statements as reported in the YIN have to be taken with MANY grains of salt.
ADOSH tried and tried and tried to interview these THREE men themselves.
They were PREVENTED from doing so.
That’s a shame.
If ANY of the court cases come to trial… I think BOTH French and Burfiend ( AND the mysterious Clint Cross who was in the same airplane with them all day ) need to be put on the stand and asked a LOT of questions.
And, given all the back and forth conversation I’m reading here today, in regards to all the conversations going on as the fire was reversing direction and Granite Mountain were communicating/not communicating with various entities:
I repost what I posted somewhere downstream:
“How much power does ADOSH have to force testimony, in their investigation, by the Federal employees? i.e. in particular USFS and BLM? Or Rory Collins? Are they limited to just Arizona participants?
There are, to my knowledge, no back-and-forth communications in their collection with any of these entities.”
Reply to Marti Reed post on February 15, 2015 at 10:23 pm
>> Marti said…
>> How much power does ADOSH have to force testimony, in their investigation,
>> by the Federal employees? i.e. in particular USFS and BLM? Or Rory Collins?
>> Are they limited to just Arizona participants?
No. See below.
>> Marti also said…
>>
>> There are, to my knowledge, no back-and-forth communications in their
>> collection with any of these entities.”
There is a TON of this kind of stuff. Emails back/forth, etc. including ALL the efforts they were making to interview USFS and BLM employees… and to even try and FIND the elusive Mr. Rory Collins ( they never did ).
All of this stuff is in the following two ADOSH Dropbox folders…
ADOSH Dropbox / ADOSH Notes and Emails
and
ADOSH Dropbox / ADOSH Notes and Emails / Krotenberg
ADOSH has all the authority in the world to try and get evidence from anyone if it is in any way related to any investigation they are tasked with… Federal and/or out-of-state persons/agencies included… and they TRIED. Very hard.
In Marshall Krotenberg’s own collection of emails released publicly… he got so fed up with dealing with trying to get ANY cooperation out of the US Forestry Service that he personally wrote a letter to his own Federal Level OSHA supervisor/liason requesting his assistance… and he wanted the letter he wrote about how USFS was not cooperating to be forwarded to Arizona Governor Jan Brewer.
Here is just a QUICK summary of the emails in the Krotenberg folder.
This ‘quick summary’ is in no way all-inclusive and is just a BRIEF description of some of the emails found in the various file(s)…
ADOSH Dropbox / ADOSH Notes and Emails / Krotenberg
Filename: “N9589 July 2013.pdf”
Contents: Investigation setup, evidence gathering, intial discovery that some agencies are going to force FOIA and Touhy requests.
Filename: “N9589 August (1) 2013.pdf”
Contents: Emails trying to get Arizona Department of Corrections to cooperate. Like pulling teeth. More evidence gathering / scheduling.
Filename: “N9589 August (2) 2013.pdf”
Contents: More evidence gathering, interview scheduling, first of MAY attempts to try and either contact and/or interview Rory Collins. None would ever succeed.
Filename: “N9589 August (3) 2013.pdf”
Contents: First attempts to interview any FED employees like BLM and USFS Blue Ridge. Brick wall. FEDS will force ‘Touhy’ requests. Attempts made. Stonewalled. Contains Marshall Krotenberg’s FIRST email letter to Barnett Zachary of Federal Level OSHA informing him USFS is ‘stonewalling’ and they will probably need his help getting valid Touhy requests honored by USFS. That letter is on page 29 of this 57 page document.
Also contains first ( of many ) requests for Panebaker Air Study Videos and recordings. More stonewalling there from Arizona Forestry itself.
Filename: “N9589 September (1) 2013.pdf”
Contents: Emails to Federal BLM regarding Touhy request(s) ADOSH was forced to file, particuarly request to interview ‘Bravo 3’ Rusty Warbis and Paul Lenmark. More emails about effort to get Blue Ridge Unit Logs and arrange to interview any/all Blue Ridge Hotshots. Notifciations from US Forestry that they require Touhy requests for any of this.
Filename: “N9589 September (2) 2013.pdf”
Contains: FOIA requests for Paul Lenmarks photos, More emails about Touhy request(s) to BLM they were forced to file just to be able to intervew ‘Bravo 3′ Rusty Warbis and Paul Lenmark, FOIA requests to Federal NOAA just to get weather data, etc.
Filename: “N9589 October 2013.pdf”
Contents: More followup on bogged-down Touhy requests to USFS to interview Blue Ridge Hotshots, etc.
Filename: “N9589 November 2013.pdf”
Contents: Emails about trying to interview Rory Collins and discussion of how/why he was dropping retardant on Marsh’s indirect burnouts. Some emails from Sonny (Tex) Gilligan regarding the burned up pink ribbon, etc.
Filename: “N9589 December 2014.pdf”
NOTE: This monthly correspondence file is MISSING and was never released by ADOSH.
Filename: “N9589 January 2014.pdf”
Contents: Holly Neil’s LONG (personal) emails to Marshall Krotenberg with HER transcripts of what she thinks she is hearing in the Panebaker Air Study Videos. This is where she first proposed the theory that Marsh was saying he was “at the house’ and she was assuming that meant “The Boulder Springs Ranch”.
The ‘Holly Neil’ emails to ADOSH lead investigator Marshall Krotenberg all happened well before Holly Neil decided to go PUBLIC with her Panebaker Video transcriptions over at WildfireToday BLOG site.
Thanks, WTKTT.
But I’m talking about NOW, not then.
And I’m talking about actual current POWER, not failed past attempts.
How much POWER does ADOSH, a STATE agency, have, NOW, to SUCCESSFULLY force those FEDERAL agencies to UNGAG their employees, and get them to testify?
Especially given that, on their website collection of communications between lawyers and lawyers, there is nothing posted regarding communications between their lawyers and any lawyers (or other entities) representing the Federal Agencies involved.
What is posted online and being updated on a weekly basis ( as required by Arizona Law ) is the ALJ Hearing File.
It mostly ONLY contains correspondence to/from the lawyers for both ADOSH and Arizona Forestry to/from ALJ ( Administrative Law Judge ) Michael A. Mosesso.
There’s no telling what is actually going on ‘behind the scenes’.
I assure you… ADOSH has all the legal powers it had during their original investigation ( if not moreso ) now that Arizona Forestry has challenged the citations.
Gotcha. Thanks.
Something I’m not altogether currently understanding.
Why, all of a sudden, as of yesterday and today, does it seem (at least to me) that everybody is taking the SAIT YIN so seriously?
As if they’re some kind of anchor point to determine any kind of evidence??
We don’t even know who wrote them up. Or what “who wrote them up” was using as a basis of them. We don’t know how well they actually reflect the interviews they are based on. There are a number of flaws in their narratives, compared to the ADOSH interviews. We don’t know if they were even recorded or transcribed. Thus we don’t know whether who wrote them up was basing them on a recording or a transcription or even someone’s hastily written “notes.”
Because of all that, I’ve never actually taken them all that seriously. Especially, all things considered, all things considered regarding the SAIT investigation.
Why is it that right now we/y’all are, seemingly using them as some kind of, apparently, framework for trying to determine what actually was happening regarding Eric/Granite Mountain communications to whomever whenever as all this chaos was happening?
I’m having a kind of cognitive dissonance right now regarding this.
Thanks in advance to anybody who can help me comprehend this.
My fast answer as I am going to go to bed.
We have been referencing the SAIT investigation notes with regards to what each individual gave or answered questions about the fire.
To me the same as a detective taking notes or using a tape recorder then having them trans scribed. The memory of events by all who were there.
This is the only thing we have with out it this discussion would have died DEAD long ago
Rep;y to Marti Reed says February 15, 2015 at 9:56 pm
>> Marti said…
>>
>> Why is it that right now we/y’all are, seemingly using them as
>> some kind of, apparently, framework for trying to determine
>> what actually was happening regarding Eric/Granite Mountain
>> communications to whomever whenever as all this chaos was
>> happening?
>>
>> Thanks in advance to anybody who can help me comprehend this.
I ( me, personally ) am certainly NOT doing that.
The SAIT Interview Notes have always been one big questionable MESS.
Example: According to the SAIT notes ( and eventually the SAIR ) itself… Bravo 33 ( Thomas French and John Burfiend ) had OFFERED to ‘go and check’ on Granite Mountain… but were then ‘called off’ that task by OPS1 Todd Abel when he simply told them he KNEW Granite Mountain was ‘in a good place’ already.
Here is exactly what was in both the SAIT notes and (eventually) the SAIR itself.
—————————————————————
At approximately 1600, ASM2 overhears a comment on the radio referencing a crew and a safety zone. ASM2 calls OPS1 and clarifies, “I heard a crew in a safety zone, do we need to call a time out?” OPS1 replies, “No, they’re in a good place. They’re safe and it’s Granite Mountain.” They talk about flying over to check on the crew, but for now, they think the crew is safe in the black.
—————————————————————
Fast Forward to OPS1 Todd Abel’s own ADOSH interview and that becomes complete HORSESHIT.
Todd Abel told ADOSH that HE was the one that asked ‘Bravo 33’ to fly down there to check on BOTH Granite Mountain… and Todd Abel says they DID do that… and confirmed they were in the safe black.
So which is it?
Did Bravo 33 REALLY ( actually ) go check on them… or did they not.
The Panebaker Air Study captures in the 4:16 timeframe seem to confirm that ‘Bravo 33’ WAS spotting them there ‘behind those hills there, on the corner of the fire’… and that is when (supposedly) someone ( Burfiend? ) in B33 called down to someone on the ground and said something like “They are continually saying they are comfortable and that’s not credible. CALL them and ASK them if Alpha can be placed WITH them.”
13 seconds later… someone on the ground did just that.
That is when we get the “Granite Montun… wuz you status rat now?” radio callout and the eventual exact question that B33 had requested be asked.
“Are you WITH Granite Mountain right now?”
and then Marsh’s now famously OBTUSE dodge of the question…
“Uh… jus’ checkin’ it out to see where we’re gonna jump out at”.
So which is it?
Did B33 actually fly over and visually check on GM.
SAIT Notes/SAIR says NO. OPS1 Abel interview says YES.
If they really DID… then is that what is captued in the 4:16 Panebaker video… or was that some OTHER ‘flyover’ check at a LATER time than the one being reported by OPS1 Todd Abel?
But here is where the ‘rubber meets the road’.
There ARE statements being made in the SAIT Notes and SAIR report that have always been worth VERIFYING… if nothing else.
A lot of it simply hasn’t been ‘run to ground’ yet… and it should be.
Such as whether any of these “I heard Marsh and/or Steed saying something to Air Attack’ statements. They MAY be backed up with other testimony in ADOSH interviews and CPS Officer Tarr’s testimony… but some people might be reporting about the same transmissions… but in different ways and remembering different times.
More on this later. I’m finally trying to get a handle on these discrepancies myself.
So far… between both the YIN and the ADOSH interviews… here are ALL of the various things various people are saying they HEARD either Marsh or Steed saying directly to ‘Air Attack’ specifically on the Air-To-Ground channel…
These are ACTUAL QUOTES from the various documents and are ONLY things people specifically say they heard being said to “Air Attack” on the “Air-To-Ground” channel…
1) They were going down their escape route to the safety zone.
2): We’re going down our escape route to our safety zone.”
3) They were moving towards Yarnell in the black.
4) They were heading to a ranch they had in sight.
5) They said we’re going down our predetermined route towards the structures.
6) I did hear Eric say that he was headed to his pre-designated safety zone.
See what I mean?
SOME of these statements are in the YIN… and SOME of them are in ADOSH interviews and DPS testimony.
So how MANY ‘frickin’ different’ transmissions to ‘Air Attack’ are we really even looking at here ( in reality )?
Can these all be boiled down to just ONE or TWO transmits… and everyone is reporting hearing something VERY similar… but also VERY different?
It’s past time that got ‘figured out’ once and for all ( if possible ).
More later.
Attempting here to solve the mystery of why the GMHS refer to themselves as “Granite Mountain 7” instead of who they actually were – the GMHS – during the extremely stressful time prior to the intense outflow winds and terrain alignment induced burnover, the afternoon of June 3oth. EMPHASIS IS ADDED IN CAPS,
Researcher Daniel Goleman states that “STRESS MATTER. When people feel STRESSED, they no longer feel safe and are INHIBITED IN PRACTICING NEW WAYS OF ACTING. … become defensive, RELYING ON THEIR MOST FAMILIAR HABITS.” (2012) SPACES
Researcher Linda Ray, following the works of Goleman stated that “… when we’re in our ‘SURVIVAL MIND’, our UNCONSCIOUS MIND IS IN CHARGE. … It’s a balancing act, however. WHEN WE EXPERIENCE TOO MUCH STRESS AND THREAT, THE TENDENCY IS TO RETREAT INTO HABITUAL KNOWN RESPONSES.” (2014) Brainwaves for Leaders
Kevin Langdon did a book review of one of Daniel Goleman’s books and stated “IT’S THE FEELING THAT YOUR LIFE IS IN DANGER AND THERE’S NOTHING YOU CAN DO TO ESCAPE IT — THAT’S THE MOMENT THE BRAIN BEGINS TO CHANGE.” He goes on to say the results of extreme stress are “… DEVASTATING because … They interrupt the chronic misapprehension of people … that they are in control of their lives. … and IF I AM NOT IN CONTROL THEN “I” DO NOT EXIST.” (1999)
So, when we are extremely stressed, our brain functions begin to break down and fail and we do NOT think clearly and resort to those familiar habits we are most used to, instead of the tasks at hand, e.g. supervising WFF and managing a wildfire. The examples below suggest that the extreme stress deteriorated their necessary and required supervisory and/or risk management skills to keep their Crew safe.
This is a link for Kevin Langdon’s review of ‘Emotional Intelligence’ by Daniel Goleman, http://www.polymath-systems.com/intel/essayrev/emintrev.html
Here are some examples of past fatality fires, including the YH Fire. On the South Canyon Fire (1994) in Colorado, IC Mackey resorted to sharpening a chainsaw rather than managing the fire and managing the resources. On the Thirtymile Fire (2001) in Washington, IC Daniels was using hose and a nozzle on a hot spot on the fire rather than what he was responsible for, managing the fire and resources. On the Yarnell Hill Fire (2013), GMHS Marsh and Steed in their most stressful period “in front of the flaming front’ several times refer to themselves as “Granite Mountain 7.” Before they were a certified IHC they were the PFD Fuels Crew known as Crew 7.
Reply to Robert the Second post on February 15, 2015 at 9:52 pm
RTS… thank you for that.
Obviously some very TRUE observations… but that is why people train and train and train and train and train… then they TRAIN some more.
Anyone who ‘works’ in potentially stressful situations knows that when the shit is hitting the fan… it’s your TRAINING that HAS to kick in and override other natural ‘impulses’.
So was the TRAINING really sufficient for this Interagency Hotshot Crew?
1) They (apparently) reverted to slightly confusing callsigns on the radio.
2) Less than half of the men threw their packs clear of the deployment site.
3) Less than half of the men were actually able to get fully into their shelters in time.
4) More than half the men tried to go into shelter with their sleeves still rolled up.
I don’t think this can all be chocked up to “Well… they just didn’t have the TIME”.
That is then a TRAINING issue itself.
Whatever you are doing… you are SUPPOSED to have the TIME to perform at least these minimal ( and potentially life-saving ) actions.
So maybe the WFF needs to admit that walking out into the woods just once before each fire season and playing around with the GREEN BAGS just isn’t cutting the cake.
Oh… I’m sorry. I forgot.
No one did AN”YTHING wrong that day.
Nothing to see here.
These aren’t the droids you’re looking for.
Move along.
Move along.
WTKTT,
I am posting this reply to your Marsh DIVS qualification question up here so you’ll find it. It’s also posted a few posts below.
Robert the Second says
February 15, 2015 at 8:43 pm
WTKTT,
I am posting this reply to your Marsh DIVS qualification question from below.
You asked “RTS.. do you happen to know WHO was ‘signing off’ on all of the items in Eric Marsh’s “Division Supervisor” PMS-311-09 TASK BOOK… when he was being ‘certified’ as a qualified DIVSUP?”
His Task Book had to be signed by several, separate Fireline Supervisors as QUALIFIED DIVS on the several specific wildfires he was on as a DIVS(T) as a Trainee. There should have been several year’s worth of different fires in different Regions around the nation. AZ State sometimes requires fires in the separate Fuel Types as well.
The PFD would have had a Red Card Committee of sorts, as Bob pointed out, to approve the Task Book and ultimately then ‘sign off’ on all its contents, i.e. a completed Task Book with Acceptable ratings on each of the tasks on the numerous fires. Then it would have been brought before the ‘Arizona State Wildfire Qualifications Review Committee.” (link below)
And usually the Task Books are NOT kept in a ‘Personnel File’ but are instead kept in a Fire Experience and/or IQCS (Incident Qualification and Certification System) file, in the Federal system, so the AZ Forestry would have something similar.
Here is the link for the AZ State Wildfire Qualifications Review Committee https://azsf.az.gov/sites/default/files/MINUTES%202006-2013.pdf
If you search for ‘Marsh’ you’ll find that his “completed DIVS Task [was] approved 5/31/01.” So then he was certified by the AZ State Forestry as a fully qualified DIVS as of May 31, 2001. I question whether he would have gone that long without ever being a DIVS, that the Doce Fire was his first DIVS assignment. You will also note that Marsh sat on and commented as a ‘Guest’ or Review Committee member on several WFF Red Card reviews.
Interesting.
According to the City of Prescott website Granite Mountain Hotshots page:
http://www.prescott-az.gov/services/fire/hotshots/
“The Granite Mountain Hotshots were a team within the Prescott Fire Department whose mission was to fight wildfires and when not so, engaged in work to reduce growth of fireprone vegetation. Originally founded in 2002 as a fuels mitigation crew, they were later formed as Crew 7, a Type II hand-crew in 2004, and eventually transitioned into a Type I Inter-agency hotshot crew in 2008.”
I’m a little bit braindead right now, but did you look at that pdf and is there any indication of who Eric was working for/with when he got that certification?
Is there any way to find out if there were any more fires before Doce on which Eric actually served as a Division Superintendent?
Marti,
I read the PDF but nothing in there that I saw referenced who he actually worked for.
One of the names of former Marsh supervisors that I recognized did show up – Duane Steinbrink of the Prescott F.D. He was one of the original founders of Crew 7 which became the GMHS. Another one from the Crew 7 days that I recall was Marty Cole – Prescott F.D.
WARNING: DO NOT GIVE ELIZABETH/LOGICAL PHALLACY YOUR EMAIL BECAUSE SHE WILL USE IT AGAINST YOU AND YOU WILL BE SORRY BECAUSE SHE WILL STALK YOU.
Reply to Robert the Second (RTS) post February 15, 2015 at 8:49 pm
>> RTS said…
>>
>> WTKTT, I am posting this reply to your Marsh DIVS qualification
>> question up here so you’ll find it. It’s also posted a few posts below.
Thank you… and likewise… posting this reply here AND up ‘at the top’ so you will see it.
Marsh didn’t actually get his DIVS Task Book approved until May 31, 2010, not 2001.
You just copied the date wrong from that PDF file. See below.
>> RTS also said…
>>
>> His Task Book had to be signed by several, separate Fireline Supervisors as
>> QUALIFIED DIVS on the several specific wildfires he was on as a DIVS(T) as a Trainee.
>> There should have been several year’s worth of different fires in different Regions
>> around the nation. AZ State sometimes requires fires in the separate Fuel Types as well.
Yes. Marsh was working on his DIVS taskbook for YEARS.
The proof is in his ‘Performance Evaluations’ that ARE part of his Personnel file.
In the following 2006 Evaluation for Marsh… he first mentions his DIVS Task Book ( which he was already working on by then ) and one of his ‘goals’ would be to complete his DIVS Task Book.
** 2006 – CITY OF PRESCOTT PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL
Employee Name: Eric Marsh
Job Title: Wildland Captain
Evaluation Period: Oct 10, 2005
Evaluation Date: April 10,, 2006
Department: Fire
Division: Wildland
Supervisor: Duane Steinbrink
EMPLOYEE SELF APPRAISAL
———————————————————————————–
What would you like to be doing ini one year/five years?
What can the City of Prescott do to “grow” you into that job?
What training is needed to obtain your goals?
Next season IHC(T). I would like to continue to serve as SUPT of
Granite Mountain, eventually earning full IHC status.
Continue to develop fuels program and continue to explore new
roles for the crew. I would like our (men) to set standards within
our department and also contribute to the IHC community through
(education) and training. Would like to complete DIVS task book.
————————————————————————————
Eric Marsh sort of ‘let that go for’ about 2 years… then in 2008 he was being encouraged AGAIN by his Supervisor, current ( and the first ) Prescott Wildland Division Chief Duane Stenbrink to ‘keep working on it’. In 2008, Steinbring thinks Marsh is still at least TWO years away from being a certified DIVSUP…
On page 24 of Eric Marsh’s PDF Personnel File…
** 2008 – CITY OF PRESCOTT PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL
Employee Name: Eric Marsh
Job Title: Wildland Captain
Evaluation Period Started: April 10, 2007
Evaluation Date: April 10, 2008
Department: Fire
Division: Wildland
Supervisor: Duane Steinbrink
SUPERVISOR’S NARRATIVE ON PERFORMANCE
———————————————————————————–
I would like to see Eric work on his Division Supervisor task book
in the coming year, and obtain certification within two years.
———————————————————————————–
>> RTS also said…
>>
>> The PFD would have had a Red Card Committee of sorts, as Bob pointed out, to
>> approve the Task Book and ultimately then ‘sign off’ on all its contents, i.e. a
>> completed Task Book with Acceptable ratings on each of the tasks on the
>> numerous fires. Then it would have been brought before the ‘Arizona State Wildfire
>> Qualifications Review Committee.” (link below)
Keyphrase: “Acceptable ratings on each of the tasks”
The actual official NWCG ( National Wildfire Coordinating Group ) TASK BOOK for the ICS position of “Division Supervisor” is designated PMS-311-09. It’s online. See other links below.
I’m still most curious who the EVALUATOR was who actually ‘signed off’ on the following in Marsh’s DIVS Task Book. SOMEONE had to sign/initial this part which means Marsh had demonstrated that he fully UNDERSTOOD this DIVS RULE about notifying OPS when MOVING resources…
On page 13 ( of 16 pages )…
——————————————————————————————
TASK
Behavior: Make appropriate decisions based on analysis of gathered information.
29. Determine need for assistance.
– Notify Operations Section Chief when resources are MOVED or shared between divisions/groups, or excess to operational needs.
————————————————————————————–
One more time… with EMPHASIS…
*** NOTIFY OPERATIONS SECTION CHIEF WHEN RESOURCES ARE MOVED.***
DIVSA Eric Marsh did NOT do this on June 30, 2013… and people died.
>> RTS also said…
>>
>> And usually the Task Books are NOT kept in a ‘Personnel File’ but are instead kept
>> in a Fire Experience and/or IQCS (Incident Qualification and Certification System)
>> file, in the Federal system, so the AZ Forestry would have something similar.
Copy that.
>> RTS also said…
>>
>> Here is the link for the AZ State Wildfire Qualifications Review Committee
>>
>> https://azsf.az.gov/sites/default/files/MINUTES%202006-2013.pdf
>>
>> If you search for ‘Marsh’ on this page you’ll find that his “completed
>> DIVS Task Book was approved 5/31/01.”
>>
>> So then he was certified by the AZ State Forestry as a fully qualified
>> DIVS as of May 31, 2001.
Thank you for that link. VERY helpful.
Yes. The entry is there… but you copied the DATE wrong.
It actually happened on May 31, 2010… and not 2001.
On page 60 ( of 103 pages )…
————————————————————————————————
State Wildfire Qualifications Review Committee
EMAIL Reviews completed between MAY 1, 2010 & DECEMBER 6, 2010
MARSH, Eric- Prescott FD: Completed DIVS task book – approved 5/31/10.
————————————————————————————————–
So only on May 31, 2010 did Eric Marsh become a ‘Certified’ DIVS and was then able to add that rating to his red-card.and start being employed in that capacity.
On THAT day… he was ‘certified’ to have FULLY understood ‘Rule 29’ from the official NWCG ‘Division Supervisor’ Task Book…
———————————————————————————————
TASK
Behavior: Make appropriate decisions based on analysis of gathered information.
29. Determine need for assistance.
– Notify Operations Section Chief when resources are moved or shared between divisions/groups, or excess to operational needs.
———————————————————————————————
*** NOTIFY OPERATIONS SECTION CHIEF WHEN RESOURCES ARE MOVED.***
Of all the rules he was breaking that day… I wish he had NOT chosen to break THIS one.
It might have made all the difference that day… and people might not have died.
Bob said
So we still have something off here.
Yes. I totally agree
WTK said
Read my posts.
IAOI ( If And Only If ) the radio transmits being reported in the YIN on the A2G channel regarding “going out our escape route” and the ones being reported by DPS Officer Eric Tarr are, in fact, one and the same… then SOMEONE is probably mistaken about WHO was making them
I really do want to know why you assume they are the same radio transmissions? Do you not think it is possible that both Div A and GM were making radio calls? They were not together, right?
Bob said
Calvin asked earlier the elevation drop.
Along the ridge to the saddle about 200 ft. Down the 2 track was more gentle until the last to BSR but roughly 1000 ft. plus or minus a little.
Est. 1200 Ft. drop from rest area to BSR not extreme in a 1.5 mile area
Thanks Bob. That is about what I thought.
Bob.
Thanks for looking at the elevation changes along the ridge and two track and to the DZ.
The 1000-1200 ft drop from the two track to the DZ occurred over a much shorter distance than the 1.5 miles. .
The SAIR says the route from the two track to the DZ (descent route) was a short 470yrds.
And that is why I continue to push on the OFF THE TOP comment. Before leaving the two track, GM/Marsh was walking along the ridge
The ridge coming off the top actually starts at the HeliSpot and drops adjacent to the Fire start area dropping thru the black to the Fire line and anchor point. and then down the ridge all on the 2 Track to the Saddle and the place the crew dropped into the canyon.
My education and life in the west both work and hunting has taught me to follow ridges as much as possible as they are more open and have a gentler slope than steep canyons. If you are in a hurry down hill a trail like the 2 track would be a much faster route than a canyon. The 2 track running down the ridge was established as the best route to the Top. Evidently marked as a trail. It more than likely had been there for years.
Had the crew left the top as we suspect at 1604 they should have been at the BSR in 30 min.1635 that’s a easy fast hike out for a Hot Shot crew roughly 1.5 miles in 30 min. mostly down hill. A approximately 1200 ft. drop.
My point Cordes time estimate was the 2 track trail and they would have been at BSR in his estimate. Though just ahead of the fire which was pushing it close and taking a huge risk.
Dropping of the saddle into the brush canyon was a huge mistake while it looked to be a short cut it slowed GM down to a crawl.
Staying in the black at 1600 was the best choice moving to BSR was a gamble and a risk at best. Not something Fire Fighters should be doing when they were already in safe black???
I just plotted both the short-cut route (through the bowl) and the longer route (staying on the 2-track) on Google Earth.
The shortcut route is roughly 1.5 miles.
The longer route is roughly 2 miles.
Does this change your time calculation?
Just quickly calculated that. If you’re estimating they could have easily covered 1.5 miles on the two-track in 30 minutes, they could have covered 2 miles on it in 40 minutes. Still a bit tight, given what the fire was doing at that 40 minute point at the Boulder Springs Ranch, but …..
Marti—My original estimate of a Hot Shot Crew moving down a trail at a faster than walking speed says without obstacles they could move at roughly 15 Min. per Mile so 2 Miles 30 Min. Thus they could make the BSR easily in 30 Min. 1.5 Miles. .
I missed the trail Miles of 2 but still within my original time frame.
They were still cutting it very tight for what ever reason.
As I said before they took a very high calculated risk they could beat the fire to BSR. when there was no reason to do so High Risk verses no risk. WHY ?????
Thanks. I misunderstood what you were writing. And yes, no matter which route they took they were taking on an unnecessary high risk.
But that wasn’t what you were originally referring to.
You were thinking about what might have been inside Gary Cordes’ mind as he was estimating where Granite Mountain was and thinking they had time to get to the Boulder Springs Ranch. And I think this makes sense that he could have estimated that they had taken the (relatively safe) long route and would have been able to get there in that time frame.
Which then begs the following questions:
Did Cordes know when Granite Mountain left the Options Discussion spot?
And, if he did, how did he know that?
And, if that’s the case, why don’t we know, via him, more accurately when that was?
And even given that, if he was assuming they were taking the safer longer two-track all the way to Boulder Springs Ranch, why was he so Not Surprised when he found out where they deployed? Because the Deployment Site wasn’t on the route he was assuming they had taken.
Bob said
So how could he have known GM had plenty of time to get to the Ranch/BSR
Moments before the call announcing that “we are in front of a flaming front” Gary Cordes was ordering two engines to drive in front of the fire to BSR.
Where was his SA?
And if he thought GM had plenty of time, he was only wrong by 10 minutes or so. I wonder when Cordes himself thought GM left the black where they had been working? I mean, if he thought they had plenty of time, he must have had an idea what time they started (or at least when plan was finalized)
It is DURING the evacuation of his OWN resources from Harper Canyon and the Youth Camp when we hear Gary Cordes telling Esquibel to make sure someone ( at least 1 Engine but preferable 2 ) are to be there at Boulder Springs Ranch to “get with” Granite Mountain and to also make sure they (quote) “get out safely”.
That means that even at the moment Cordes’ forces are still just LEAVING the Youth Camp area… Cordes had the impression that Granite Mountain was either ALREADY at the Boulder Springs Ranch or just about to arrive there.
I would say that has to mean that, in Cordes’ mind, he was sure Granite Mountain had LEFT on their journey at least 20 to 30 minutes prior to that.
Gary Cordes was VERY familiar with that ‘middle bowl’.
He had hiked it himself ( all the way to the fireline ) the night before… was riding the dozer himself as it was clearing that two-track to the old-grader… and he had been out there in the Sesame Clearing area several times for meetings THAT day ( Sunday ).
He knew the terrain out there… and the distances involved.
So for Cordes to be telling Esquibel to (essentially) “go and pick up Granite Mountain” in the 4:27 to 4:30 timeframe ( before Esquibel himself even exited the Youth Camp )… Cordes could not possible have thought Granite didn’t even start on their mission in the last 5 or 10 minutes prior to that.
Even if Cordes KNEW that the understood ‘predetermined escape route” was right through that fuel-filled box canyon… he also knew that it was at LEAST a 20-30 minute hike from the anchor spot to the BSR… even at a ‘brisk’ pace.
So for him to tell ADOSH he was sure they had “Plenty of time”… I would say that means Cordes must have also been SURE they had left on that journey in the 3:55 to 4:00 PM timeframe.
In other words… EXACTLY when they probably DID leave.
There’s still a chance there was a phone call somewhere in here between Marsh and Cordes… and that’s why Cordes knew exactly WHEN they DID leave… and was then able to convince himself “They had plenty of time”.
Why two engines? Why not the 2 GM crew carriers if it was a pick em up?
My own personal belief there is that Gary Cordes *might* not have been sure how SAFE it really was to be sending anyone all the way out to the BSR at that point… and Crew Carriers have no firefighting apparatus.
I think Cordes thought the only SAFE vehicles to send back there were ones that might actually be able to spray some water if they had to.
As for HOW he thought 19 guys were going to ride an engine out of there… I don’t know. Hanging onto the sides?
Remember that Esquibel responded to Cordes’ query about the TWO engines by saying he would send just ONE in there as soon as he got down to the Ranch House Restaurant.
Gary Cordes then AGREED to that and simply said…
“Sounds like a plan”.
So again… just MORE questions that only Gary Cordes could answer at this point. What WAS he really thinking and what WAS he expecting to happen even if just ONE Engine got back there to the BSR and all hell was breaking loose?
Just have everyone ‘hunker down’ at the ranch and at least there would be ONE water-spray capable Engine there to help them ‘ride it out’ there?
I thought Cordes was absolutely sure the BSR was ‘bomb-proof’?
Why would he then be thinking there BETTER be at least one Engine there?
Changed his mind about the real ‘Safety’ of that ‘Safety Zone’, maybe?
The only problem here is it was already to late to get out to BSR the Road out was already comprised into Glen Isla and beyond
There for my earlier statement Cordes had no Idea what the opposite side of the Fire was doing. To late to send any one to BSR.
Seeing what happened at BSR I am glad there were no Engines staged there. it was not as bomb proof as Cordes thought.
Bob,
Do you really think Cordes was sending an engine or two in front of the flaming front to protect either
1. BSR
2. GM
?
I believe he wanted to have some one check that GM was Safe or make sure they were safe.
Now we have did he expect them to be at BSR or on the mountain?
I do not believe he knew the Fire had got into Glen Isla thus cutting off access to BSR. I don’t think he thought he was sending an engine out if front of the fire.
Again I do not believe he knew what the west and south side of the fire was doing outside Glen Isla when he made that request.
I believe and I could be wrong Cordes ask the Cat/catboss to see if they could build line out of Glen Isla. It was as well to late to do that. So while the troops were bailing out the fire had already compromised the road to BSR.
For some reason he never staged an Engine at BSR I have always thought that was strange if you are protecting structures. WHY NOT?????
This was close to a million dollar ranch that had defensible area from his description. Yet they lost a structure
and some other things within the compound.
Or was he concerned about trapping an engine out there and having possible injuries?
NO ONE EVER ASKED THOSE QUESTIONS EATHER???????
I don’t think Cordes had a clue what was going on over there.
As I have said before, it’s pretty clear that by this time, none of the “overhead” had much of any situational awareness of much of anything beyond what they were seeing right in front of their eyes.
So we still have something off here.
Cordes believed a 20 to 30 min. hike.
That is way off of actual if they started at 1604 and were in front of the flaming front at
1648 that’s 44 min. and they were still another maybe 15 to 20 from BSR.
That adds up to an hour give or take a few min.
I do not believe Cordes thought they would go down thru the brush filled bowl.
His estimate may have been down the 2 track with a decent trail a crew can make
good time down hill 2 miles 30 min. or less.
Calvin asked earlier the elevation drop.
Along the ridge to the saddle about 200 ft. Down the 2 track was more gentle until the last to BSR but roughly 1000 ft. plus or minus a little.
Est. 1200 Ft. drop from rest area to BSR not extreme in a 1.5 mile area.
The canyon route was the steepest 900 ft. from saddle to deployment site.
It was fairly steep directly off the saddle but was more gentle by the time they were at the deployment site around 100 or so ft. drop to BSR.
My bet is the brush was much thicker as they got into the flatter area.
The canyon would have had thick brush maybe shorter than the flats.
and harder to punch thru.
WHY. The canyon collects water and the flats have deeper soil to hold water and
provide a deeper root system I am basing this on southern California and not Arizona but should be some what similar.
Chemise type brush takes less water to survive in arid climates 4 to 7 In. per year rain fall. and the moisture content is low. During the summer months producing the oily leaves that burn like gas. The woody fuel as you can see on the fire is consumed to the stumps like moon scape very little left.
Right of the saddle definitely a bit more open, but loose and tough and slow going simply for that reason among others. Lower down not just dense brush, but more rocks, so the going would be tougher and slower. I agree Cordes may well have thought they would be staying on the 2-track.
Right off the saddle, I meant, i.e. on the steepest part right after they dropped down.
Copy.
WTKTT,
I am posting this reply to your Marsh DIVS qualification question from below.
You asked “RTS.. do you happen to know WHO was ‘signing off’ on all of the items in Eric Marsh’s “Division Supervisor” PMS-311-09 TASK BOOK… when he was being ‘certified’ as a qualified DIVSUP?”
His Task Book had to be signed by several, separate Fireline Supervisors as QUALIFIED DIVS on the several specific wildfires he was on as a DIVS(T) as a Trainee. There should have been several year’s worth of different fires in different Regions around the nation. AZ State sometimes requires fires in the separate Fuel Types as well.
The PFD would have had a Red Card Committee of sorts, as Bob pointed out, to approve the Task Book and ultimately then ‘sign off’ on all its contents, i.e. a completed Task Book with Acceptable ratings on each of the tasks on the numerous fires. Then it would have been brought before the ‘Arizona State Wildfire Qualifications Review Committee.” (link below)
And usually the Task Books are NOT kept in a ‘Personnel File’ but are instead kept in a Fire Experience and/or IQCS (Incident Qualification and Certification System) file, in the Federal system, so the AZ Forestry would have something similar.
Here is the link for the AZ State Wildfire Qualifications Review Committee https://azsf.az.gov/sites/default/files/MINUTES%202006-2013.pdf
If you search for ‘Marsh’ you’ll find that his “completed DIVS Task [was] approved 5/31/01.” So then he was certified by the AZ State Forestry as a fully qualified DIVS as of May 31, 2001. I question whether he would have gone that long without ever being a DIVS, that the Doce Fire was his first DIVS assignment. You will also note that Marsh sat on and commented as a ‘Guest’ or Review Committee member on several WFF Red Card reviews.
Bob said “Marsh and or Steed mentioned they were in the Black several times to different people. Frisby — Able –B33″
According to B33.
Not only did Marsh call him, so did GM7, 20 minuted before deployment
There’s always been a discrepancy between the YIN and other testimony here.
We have essentially the same ‘report’ supposedly being made to “Air Attack”… but the B33 YIN notes say it was coming from “Division Alpha” and DPS Officer Eric Tarr’s signed testimony says he was SURE the caller was prefixing the statements with the “Granite Mountain 7” call sign.
It’s NEVER really been clear if these are TWO completely separate ‘reports’ suddenly appearing on the A2G channel… or whether all parties are referring to the same radio como but variously mistaken about WHO was making the call(s).
There is also the odd fact that even though there are various background radio captures including locations where people in the foreground WERE capturing the A2G channel… there is no audio evidence that ANY of these A2G transmissions happened at the time they are being reported.
These (various?) sudden and unsolicted ‘announcements’ ( from Marsh, Steed, both? ) to Air Attack ( B33) on the A2G channel have always been ( and remain ) an ‘unresolved mystery’.
Surely SOME of it happened… but did they ALL happen… and exactly WHEN people say they did?
Still unknown.
So, WTKTT, if you are admitting this lack of clarity, then why are you so sure my interpretation/understanding is incorrect and yours is correct?
Reply to Elizabeth ( Counselor ) post on February 15, 2015 at 4:21 pm
>> Counselor said…
>>
>> So, WTKTT, if you are admitting this lack of clarity, then
>> why are you so sure my interpretation/understanding is
>> incorrect and yours is correct?
You’re interpretation of WHAT?
I’m sorry… lot going on here today.
Remind me again what point you were trying to make ( if you ever really had one in the first place ).
WTK said
It’s NEVER really been clear if these are TWO completely separate ‘reports’ suddenly appearing on the A2G channel… or whether all parties are referring to the same radio como but variously mistaken about WHO was making the call(s).
Never been clear to who? The people giving the information? It seems they are sure if they indicate it was DivA,, GM7.
Are you calling them liars? Are you saying that they were not clear on what they heard?
Calvin– this is a discussion not a they are liars thing can we ask questions and be civil ? I truly am trying to work with you but you need to make this a question and answer discussion and not go negative like Elizabeth has done.
Ill leave it there————–
Reply to calvin post on February 15, 2015 at 4:34 pm
>> calvin said…
>>
>> Never been clear to who? The people giving the information?
>> It seems they are sure if they indicate it was DivA,, GM7.
Read my posts.
IAOI ( If And Only If ) the radio transmits being reported in the YIN on the A2G channel regarding “going out our escape route” and the ones being reported by DPS Officer Eric Tarr are, in fact, one and the same… then SOMEONE is probably mistaken about WHO was making them.
The YIN notes are just that. Notes.
They are not transcripts… nor are they SIGNED testimony from the actual persons testifying.
Not so with DPS Officer Tarr’s testimony.
That is an official Public Safety Officer’s SIGNED ( and unredacted ) testimony about what he saw, heard and did on June 30, 2013.
If I was a betting man… my money would be on the Eric Tarr testimony.
>> calvin also said.
>>
>> Are you calling them liars?
Nope. See above. IAOI these people are talking about the same radio como… then ONE of them appears to be mistaken about who was making the call(s).
>> calvin also said…
>>
>> Are you saying that they were not clear on what they heard?
Again… since the YIN notes are ‘third-person removed’ and not ACTUAL ( signed ) testimony… my money would be on DPS Officer Tarr’s official first-party signed ( sworn ) testimony about what those radio conversations actually contained.
They are similar enough to make it appear that both parties are talking about the SAME actual radio como… but only (apparently) mistaken about WHO was making them.
B33 YIN
16:42 Division A radioed that they were going in shelters. Heard a frantic call from Granite Mountain 7 to Air Attack told him to calm down. 20 minutes from that call to when they deployed. There was a period of 10-15 minutes where there were no air tankers in the area. I made a right hand pattern. In my mind Granite Mountain was OK.
So if you trust in what B33 says. Not only did B33 receve a call from Div A, he also got a call 20 minutes before the GM went into shelter, from GM7. And during that time, there was a 10-15 minute timeframe where there was no tanker.
My impression of the above.
20 minutes before GM went in to shelters, GM7 called AA and asked for air support, but there was no air tankers in the air
No?
I ( personally ) don’t believe that’s the way it went down.
This particular section of B33’s YIN Interview notes has always been a confused mess.
The word ‘frantic’ is specifically used with regards to the GM7 radio call.
I believe that can ONLY be referring to one or more of the MAYDAY calls coming from Steed and Caldwell… which did, in fact, all contain the “Granite Mountain 7” call prefix.
But there is NO WAY another 20 minutes went by before deployment.
Conversely… if the call beinig referred to WAS 20 minutes before the first MAYDAY… there would have been no reason for it to be a ‘frantic’ call… or have that adjective associated with it.
So who knows. This is all just part of the confusion that still exists surrounding the A2G traffic leading UP TO the deployment.
That still includes the supposed “That’s what we want… that’s where we want the retardant” call from ( again, supposedly ) “Division Alpha” Eric Marsh.
NO ONE ELSE but John Burfiend in B33 has ever even reported hearing that… even though it was supposedly on the very popular and well-listened-to Air-To-Ground channel.
I still also would not be surprised to discover that Eric Panebaker and his Air Study Group really WERE capturing the Air-To-Ground radio traffic exactly the way they were capturing the Air-To-Air channel that day in Yarnell… but we have simply never seen or heard THOSE recordings.
I mean… why WOULDN’T they be?
If you are being paid to do a comprehensive “Aerial Firefighting Study”… it would be just as important to capture the A2G traffic as it would be to capture the A2A traffic.
Agree
From below
>> calvin said…
>>
>> From Gary Cordes’ ADOSH interview…
>>
>> Q1: Uh, he tells air attack that he’s going to his designated, pre-designated safety zone?
>>
>> So this radio transmission from Marsh did not go over crew net, or cell phone.
>> Cordes said it was directly to AA. So it must have been A/G?
Yes… but we actually still don’t know if it really was Eric Marsh.
If this is he same ‘callouts’ that DPS Officer Eric Tarr has sworn that HE heard going up to ‘Air Attack’… then it’s most likely it was NOT DIVSA Eric Marsh.
WRONG
According to B33YIN
Got a call from Division A stating they were going down their escape route to the safety zone. Didn’t know Division A was the superintendent of the Granite Mountain hot shots. Asked him “is everything OK?” He replied “everything is ok, just heading to the safety zone”. We came around, made a practice run through the bowl, west to east. I was talking to Tom about the rising terrain on exit. Division A clad and said “that is what we are looking for, that is exactly right”. Within 5 minutes of that, they went in shelter
So this seems to be a confirmation of what Cordes overheard. Which was Marsh calling AA/B33.
Keyword: SEEMS to be.
See my other post about how there have ALWAYS been ‘discrepancies’ regarding what people are saying about what appear to be the same radio transmits.
If the radio como you are talking about here really is either one of the TWO that DPS Officer Eric Tarr says he heard… then it most likely was NOT coming from ‘Division Alpha’. Marsh most probably would NOT have been prefixing HIS radio callouts with “Granite Mountain 7″… which is all Officer Tarr says he ever heard.
And there is no reason to doubt DPS Officer Tarr.
He obviously had a VERY good recollection of what he was hearing that day.
That’s how he was able to recall hearing ‘ranch’ ( from one of the radio calls that had the ‘Granite Mountain 7’ callsign prefix ) and actually find the deployment site.
If you can actually straighten all this out once and for all… then have at it.
I’m all ears.
Reply to Bob Powers post on February 15, 2015 at 9:08 am
>> Bob Powers said…
>>
>> My only comment and still a possibility.
>> Cordes put 2 and 2 together after the Fact.
>> He did not know where they were headed till the Deployment spot was found close to BSR.
>> Still a lot of open space and lack of fact going on here.
>> Gary Cordes—was he on or monitoring. Crew net?
>> Did he Talk with Marsh on the Phone?
>> Marsh was not assigned to Cordes so I am confused as to why they were
>> not coordinating thru OPS.
It has also NEVER been established exactly what was ‘understood’ to be the ‘escape route from this morning’ ( as Marsh said on the radio ).
Cordes has NEVER testified what he even TOLD Marsh ( that morning ) he was SUPPOSED to use as a full (safe) ‘escape route’ to that ‘predesignated safety zone’.
What I mean is…
Was the ‘escape route part’ of that ‘plan’ even discussed at ALL that morning… when Cordes was showing Marsh where the Boulder Springs Ranch was on that iPad?
Did Cordes ever actually SHOW Marsh that the clearly visible two-track/trail up on that high ridge did, in fact, go ALL THE WAY to the BSR?
OR… did Marsh and/or Cordes just ‘draw their finger’ across the iPad and through that fuel-filled box canyon and both AGREE that “Yeah… that would be the shorter escape route if you need to get to that ranch”?
We still have NO IDEA if ANY of that happened.
Cordes needs to be DEPOSED and asked specifically if ANY of that was discussed… or if he really had any idea they were ‘bushwhacking’ later on in order to get to that ranch.
I would actually believe Cordes if he said “I showed Eric that clear two-track/trail that led ALL the way to the Ranch from where he would be working… and we both agreed that was the ‘designated escape route’ to the ranch itself… so I had NO IDEA they would even THINK of doing that bushwhack”.
But we don’t know if that really happened… or if Cordes might have done the opposite and actually APPROVED that ‘shortcut through the canyon’ that very morning when he was making this ‘predetermined escape route’ assignment to DIVSA Eric Marsh.
It’s a VERY important part of this whole ‘story’ that NO ONE has bothered to find out yet.
What did Gary Cordes REALLY mean ( as far as the TIME component goes ) when he told the ADOSH…investigators…
From Gary Cordes’ ADOSH interview…
Q1 = Barry Hicks, ADOSH investigator
A = SPGS1 Gary Cordes
—————————————————————————-
Q1: Uh, he tells air attack that he’s going to his designated, pre-designated safety zone?
A: Right.
Q1: …and he doesn’t say where that is, he just says, safety zone?
A: Right.
Q1: And so your assumption is?
A: He had plenty of time to get there and, and he was headed to the Boulder Springs Ranch.
—————————————————————————-
“Plenty of time to get there”… using WHAT ROUTE?
WHAT ROUTE did Gary Cordes really have in his own head to make him so sure they had “plenty of time to get there”?
Was he ONLY thinking of the full two-track/trail that led all the way to the BSR?
*OR*
Was he ASSUMING they were going to cut through that canyon?
*OR*
He had no friggin’ idea WHAT the actual ‘escape route’ was ( because he and Marsh might have actually never even talked about it that morning ) but was then STILL ( somehow. ) SURE they had ‘plenty of time’ no matter how they were ‘getting there’?
Which is it?
My feeling again is he had to HAVE been surprised they took a Brush filled canyon in their rout to BSR.
FOR CRYING OUT LOUDE–Every one else could not understand their route it was a shock to find them in a canyon with no trail which earlier had heavy brush fuel.
Cordes is making a very big statement here if he knew they were in that brush field canyon and said nothing but—– he wasn’t surprised at where they were.
THAT IS IN MY BOOK ABSOLUTLY CRAZY.
Exactly.
If you take Cordes TWO statements TOGTHER…
SAIT
Q:Were you surprised where they were?
A: No
ADOSH
He ( Marsh ) had plenty of time to get there and, and he was headed to the Boulder Springs Ranch.
It really DOES sound like Gary Cordes knew FULL WELL that GM was ‘bushwhacking’ through that canyon… and that this was somehow the ACTUAL ‘predetermined escape route from this morning’.
Gary Cordes MAY have actually just ‘drawn his finger’ across his iPad and through that fuel-filled canyon that morning when he was ‘showing’ this BSR safety zone site to Eric Marsh.
They may have both AGREED ( well in advance of the tragedy ) that ‘bushwhacking’ through that explosive vegetation was the PREFERRED ‘escape route’ that day.
This is what we still don’t know.
EXACTLY what was discussed with regards to ‘predetermined escape route’ that morning… when Cordes and Marsh were standing in front of that iPad.
The real problem here is Cordes I do not believe had any Idea of what the fire was doing where GM was. He was on the total opposite side of the Fire.
So how could he have known GM had plenty of time to get to the Ranch/BSR
I am of the belief that Cordes told Marsh of the BSR SZ but never talked about how to get there. It was really part of his structure protection plan as I remember he also stated and you also have the Black.
#1 Safety Zones are worthless with out a good escape route scouted and marked.
#2 Escape Routes should be open and accessible to the SZ.
#3–Unburned Fuel between you and the fire/ Can’t see the Fire/ in a canyon with heavy flash fuel that could act as a chimney.
ALL THIS SCREEMS BAD, BAD, BAD——
#4 of course you always have the BLACK—and we are back to why move.
Cordes said this to Marsh— If he also knew they were in the BLACK—
then why think they would move to the BSR? Something aint right here.
Bob. it wasn’t Cordes who was on the opposite side of the fire as GM. It was Able. (ps I do not care how it is spelled.)
Reply to Bob Powers post on February 15, 2015 at 2:48 pm
>> Bob Powers said…
>>
>> The real problem here is Cordes.
>>
>> I do not believe had any Idea of what the fire was doing
>> where GM was. He was on the total opposite side of the Fire.
Well… by his own ‘admission’… Cordes wasn’t even really that sure what the part of the fire that WAS in his same geographic area ( north Yarnell ) was doing… until it was flipping his trigger points an hour too early and smacking him in the face.
All he said about that was “It outperformed my/our expectatons”.
No shit, Sherlock.
So yes… I would agree that Cordes really had NO IDEA how fast that fireline was really moving out there in the middle bowl.
He wasn’t even getting any intel from Air Attack (B33) about it.
>> Bob Powers also said…
>>
>> So how could he have known GM had plenty of time
>> to get to the Ranch/BSR
That’s a good question.
ADOSH did not ‘pull that statement’ out of him.
He VOLUNTEERED that that is exactly what he thought.
But ( typically )… none of the ADOSH people ( in-house or WFA contractors ) then thought to ask.
“Why did you just say that? What made YOU think they had PLENTY of time? When did you first KNOW they were on the move that would allow you to even make that assumption?”
>> Bob Powers also said…
>>
>> I am of the belief that Cordes told Marsh of the BSR SZ but
>> never talked about how to get there.
Yes. I would be ready to believe that too.
Cordes just points to the BSR. Says it ‘bomb-proof’. Tells Marsh to consider it his ‘predetermined Safety Zone’ for that work cycle ( in addition to the black )… and they just left it at that.
I would be ready to believe that HOW Cordes expected Marsh to even GET to this ‘predetermined Safety Zone’ he was assigning was never even discussed. The ‘escape route’ part of the whole ‘Safety Zone’ thing was just left undiscussed… and assumption was that Marsh would just ‘figure it out’ if he had to.
Yes. I would be ready to believe that was just more FAIL that day and incomplete communications/briefings.
However… there is still THIS statement from Cordes to the SAIT.
SAIT: Were you surprised where they were?
Cordes: No.
‘Surprised where they were’ meant “Were you surprised they were found dead on the floor of that fuel-filled box canyon?”
If Cordes had had no prior clue they were ‘bushwhacking’… I would have expected him to say something like…
Cordes: I wasn’t really surprised they got cut off trying to make it to the Boulder Springs Ranch… but YES… I was totally surprised to discover they were ‘bushwhacking’ to get there. That was never part of the plan.
He didn’t say anything like that.
He just responded with ONE WORD… “No”.
Meaning? “No… I knew they were bushwhacking through that box canyon so the actual location of the bodies did not really surprise me”.
>:> Bob Powers also said…
>>
>> It was really part of his structure protection plan as I
>> remember he also stated and you also have the Black.
>> Bob Powers also said…
>>
>> Something aint right here.
No…. and the only thing can clear up some of THESE important questions is an under-oath deposition / cross-examination of SPGS1 Gary Cordes.
Now that it’s obvious what many of the most important questions to ask him are… maybe some of the VERY important answers would finally be supplied.
Cordes is like McDonough at this point.
Whether they like the cards that fate has dealt them or not… they are the only ones who can probably solve some of the lingering mysteries about what really happened that day.
The last paragraph of p1 of the YIN is not true and incomplete
the ~1555 radio conversation that we have on the video, (which includes the phrase okay, you hunker down in the black)—Abel did not recal having this conversation with marsh.
The quote you hunker down in the black never happened. Unless there is a audio clip that hasn’t been released.
I believe this was an intentional LIE intended to mislead everyone. We can all hear that the words IN THE BLACK never happened.
And, the YIN also doesn’t include the comment from Marsh saying WORKING MY WAY OFF THE TOP. To be clear, he did not say WORKING MY WAY ALONG THE RIDGE.
He specifically says OFF THE TOP. That is not obtuse. That is clear, concise, intell. And if that was in fact being conveyed to ABLE, he should have known what that meant. He saw the area 2 times from a helicopter.
Is there another reason the YIN and SAIT would have provided a false and incomplete paragraph, as they did on the very first page of the YIN? If so, please help me understand.
And it doesn’t seem that Able would have been able to provide additional information from that audio clip because. ABLE DOESNT REMEMBER THAT CONVERSATION WITH MARSH.
So if he doesn’t remember that conversation. Then when exactly did Able give the order for Marsh and GM to stay in the black?
Able said Hunker and be safe. after a discussion with Marsh/GM They said they were unavailable and in the black.
You are Right we covered that severial times Able never said in the BLACK only hunker and be safe and keep me informed.
Marsh and or Steed mentioned they were in the Black several times to different people.
Frisby — Able –B33
The statement working off the top is still very confusing as there is no specific point mentioned. You could say off the top of the Fire? which was where the meeting point
of Marsh and Frisby was. In the Black
Working off the Top from the Helispot in the Black?
Working down the ridge in the green from the Fire?
We still have no specific location to refer to as none was given.
Until and If McDonough can clear this up we are stuck with exactly what the location was with severial choices any of which could be true.
Again Calvin we are at a loss as to where Marsh was from 1530 till the deployment at 1648.
We know that most of the Day he was on Top/above the crew along the 2 track in the black.
Did he move from there before or after the discussion with Frisby and cancelation of there meeting??????? We are still Not sure of where Marsh was for at least an hour and a half.
Bob said “Marsh and or Steed mentioned they were in the Black several times to different people. Frisby — Able –B33”
Not true. Stop spreading rumors/misinformation.
Fer cryin’ out loud.
Hit SEND too early.
Fer cryin’ out loud.
What’s not true about that general statement?
Do we have to show you where this stuff is in the evidence AGAIN?
Fred, where is Bob getting that B33 was told by Marsh that they were in the black when the were actually on the way to the BSR?
THIS DESERVES NO ANSWER ——–
EVERY BODY IS FRED NOW WTKTT HAS THAT HONOR.
I WILL RE FRAZE HOW ABOUT B3 TOLD B33 THAT THE CREW WAS ON THE MOUNTAIN IN THE BLACK ON THE SW SIDE OF THE FIRE.
I THINK YOU MIGHT BE ABLE TO LOOK THAT UP.
BUT THEN AGAIN THAT DOSE NOT FIT YOUR STORY.
Bob said “I WILL RE FRAZE HOW ABOUT B3 TOLD B33 THAT THE CREW WAS ON THE MOUNTAIN IN THE BLACK ON THE SW SIDE OF THE FIRE.”
Bob, if you are trying to say that B3 told B33 before GM deployed that GM was on the mountain in the black on the SW side of the fire, you are STILL 100% wrong. Get your facts straight, friend. With all due respect, Bob, surely you can appreciate that it does not help when you start rumors, spread needless gossip, or deliberately state misinformation as though it were gospel fact. How would you feel if folks had done that about your father’s death? (Rhetorical question, obviously, and asked with all due respect.)
OK GO TO HELL NO respect intended.
I stated no rumors nor did I Gossip.
And If you keep throwing my Father into this discussion from you sick mind you will hear a lot more.
Stop it or get out of this discussion you are disgusting.
You continue to take this whole discussion to an attack level. So I will reply to all of your questions
NO MORE……………………..
Bob,
When a lawyer uses the phrase “with all due respect” what it really means is “FU** YOU.”
Yap I have set in court on a lot of trials over the past 18 years as a court security/Bailiff.
That’s why the response. and I have cooled off.
Thanks……….
Reply to Elizabeth post on February 15, 2015 at 11:12 am
>> Elizabeth said…
>>
>> Fred,
Hi, counselor.
This wasn’t directed at me but I think I have a response.
>> Counselor also said…
>>
>> Where is Bob getting that B33 was told by Marsh
>> that they were in the black when they were actually
>> on the way to the BSR?
You ARE kidding me, right?
Did you bump your head on your toilet lately?
Just in case that might have happened…
B33 ( Bravo 33 – Thomas French and John Burfiend ) are the ones who SUPPOSEDLY ( actually ) flew down ( at OPS1 Todd Abel’s request ) to VERIFY that ‘they’ ( Granite Mountain ) were ‘in the safe black’.
And they (supposedly) did that.
They (supposedly) actually conversed with Marsh during that ‘check’ and they verified that they were comfortable down there ‘in the black’…. and B33 reported this back to OPS1 Todd Abel.
That being said… if you believe the SAIR report… this actually never happened at all…
…but the SAIR report STILL says that B33 was directly informed that Granite Mountain was ‘in the safe black’.
Either way ( with either their own visual confirmation and radio como with Marsh OR being informed directly )…
…B33 ( Bravo 33 / Air Attack ) knew they were ‘in the black’ circa 3:50 PM.
As if any other proof is needed…
From Field OPS1 Todd Abel’s ADOSH interview…
A = OPS1 Todd Abel
———————————————————–
A: That ( the anchor point ) was the last known location.
I had no idea they’d left that location. Blue Ridge Hotshots were working in the same area and thought they were up in this location.
2280
2281 Q1: Blue Ridge thought they were there?
2282
2283 A: Mm-hm. The helicopters thought they were there, air attack thought they were there, everybody thought they were right here ( in the black ), including myself.
——————————————————–
Wrong-o. According to B33, they heard GM saying they were going down their escape route, and they allegedly touched base with Abel about that. Go back and read the YIN. The YIN might be cryptic at times, but the YIN is closer to a “present sense recollection” than the ADOSH interviews, in some (many?) respects.
Wrong NO RESPONSE
WTKTT
Thanks for setting the record straight.
I knew I was on track with what was said..
I am still a little concerned with Cordes.
Was he Covering for his friend Eric?
It is very possible they worked in the same area
for years and knew each other well.
It is only a question. I have only their area of work.
But he is the only one that seems to have not been surprised but only overhead the radio conversation and from what we have they never talked to each other before or during the move and deployment.
Reply to Elizabeth ( Counselor ) post on
February 15, 2015 at 12:58 pm
>> Counselor said…
>>
>> Wrong-o. According to B33, they
>> heard GM saying they were going
>> down their escape route,
At a LATER time ( circa 1630 ) than was just being discussed… yes.
That’s the SAME A2G transmission sequence that DPS Officer Eric Tarr has testified he heard.
You can’t cherry-pick your way out of this one, counselor.
>> Counselor also said…
>>
>> and they allegedly touched base
>> with Abel about that.
Complete horseshit.
There is NOTHING in even the YIN about them doing anything of the sort.
>> Counselor also said…
>>
>> Go back and read the YIN.
I did. I suggest you do the same.
Addendum for above…
>> Counselor also said…
>>
>> and they allegedly touched base
>> with Abel about that.
Complete horseshit.
There is NOTHING in even the YIN about them doing anything of the sort.
If your confused brain was referring to a time period more than a half-hour BEFORE the alleged A2G transmission… when B33 was talking to Abel about ‘do we need to stop what we are doing and go check on them’… THAT is where the YIN directly contradicts ADOSH testimony and says that OPS1 Abel ‘called them off’ and simply TOLD B33 that GM was ‘in a good place’.
This direct discrepancy between what the SAIT people were publishing and what the parties involved testified to with ADOSH has never been resolved.
Elizabeth/Logical Phallacy,
Once again I ask – Who is ‘Fred’? There is NO one on this site with that name. Only in the mind of the delusional it appears. And the multiple personalities in the mind of the delusional as well. Only YOU continue to refer to ‘Fred’ on this site.
There is help for you in the form of certified, educated, and trained mental health professionals. Please seek the help you so desperately need. Otherwise, go back to your web.
Reply to calvin post on February 15, 2015 at 5:30 am
>> calvin said…
>>
>> The last paragraph of p1 of the YIN is not true and incomplete
>>
>> the ~1555 radio conversation that we have on the video, (which includes
>> the phrase okay, you hunker down in the black)—Abel did not recal
>> having this conversation with marsh.
>>
>> The quote you hunker down in the black never happened. Unless
>> there is a audio clip that hasn’t been released.
You are right. This has been discussed at length before.
The quote in the SAIT notes has the words ‘in the black’ added to it and this was a ‘double eye’ situation.
It was either Icompetence or it was Intentional.
>> calvin also said…
>>
>> I believe this was an intentional LIE intended to mislead everyone.
>> We can all hear that the words IN THE BLACK never happened.
I think someone on the SAIT just decided adding those words would be the EASY thing to do.
Without doing that… they would have had to add more CONTEXTUAL INFORMATION such as the fact that OPS1 Todd Abel knew their PRIMARY safety zone was those hundreds of acres of cold black up there… and THAT is where he EXPECTED them to stay when he gave them his directive to “Hunker and be safe”.
Indeed… that is where he was SURE they were ( according to his own testimony ) right up until the time of deployment.
>> calvin also said…
>>
>> And, the YIN also doesn’t include the comment from Marsh saying
>> WORKING MY WAY OFF THE TOP. To be clear, he did not say
>> WORKING MY WAY ALONG THE RIDGE.
I think the reason they left that out for public consumption is because, as Mike Dudley himself told that roomful of firefighters, they really had no idea what it meant. It COULD have meant a number of different things… and to mention it at all would have also meant supplying a whole bunch of other CONTEXTUAL information. They just didn’t want to go there.
Yes. They ( the SAIT ) were ‘picking and choosing’ what to report and what to not report.
No question.
>> calvin also said…
>>
>> He specifically says OFF THE TOP. That is not obtuse.
>> That is clear, concise, intell.
No, it’s not.
If Marsh has just been a little less than 1/2 mile ( about 2,100 feet ) north of the anchor point and anywhere near the “Helispot’ ( which would have been an ideal place for any DIVS to be viewing the entire fire that day )… then he was 311 feet higher than the GM work area and was up on the TOP of one of those many other ‘peaks” on that ridge. If he was already ‘coming down off that TOP’ and back to the GM work area… then that is what “working my way off the TOP” *might* have meant.
And that’s just ONE of the possible scenarios.
We know that YOU are convinced there is only one possible interpretation for the simple phrase “Workin’ my way off the TOP”… and you MAY be right…
But is was NOT ‘clear intel’… and it is still NOT clear what it actually meant.
Hopefully Brendan’s under-oath testimony can finally establish an actual location for Eric Marsh at the time this statement was made and he was talking to his direct Supervisor Field OPS1 Todd Abel.
>> calvin also said…
>>
>> And if that was in fact being conveyed to ABLE,
It’s ABEL. Todd Abel. Not ABLE. Yes… easy to mis-type… I know… but there it is.
>> calvin also said…
>>
>> he should have known what that meant.
If you are trying to say that OPS1 Todd Abel SHOULD have known that this simple “I’m working my way off the TOP” statement from Marsh meant that Abel should have realized Marsh was (already) coming ALL the way off the ridge and back towards Yarnell at that moment…
…I totally disagree.
There was NOT ENOUGH INFORMATION in that statement for ANY”ONE to make any such conclusion.
>> calvin also said…
>>
>> He saw the area 2 times from a helicopter.
Yes. He did.
All the more reason for OPS1 Todd Abel to conclude that “Working my way off the TOP” *might* have simply meant that Marsh was coming down from one of those other ‘peaks’ near the work area where he had been scouting/observing the fire all afternoon.
>> calvin also said…
>>
>> Is there another reason the YIN and SAIT would have provided a false
>> and incomplete paragraph, as they did on the very first page of the
>> YIN? If so, please help me understand.
See above. It was definitely a ‘double eye’ situation.
It was either Incompetence or it was Intentional.
I would still actually believe it was the former… and somebody just ‘screwed up’… or they were TOLD the wrong thing.
Example: If it was Mike Dudley just telling whoever was typing those notes up what HE thought he heard in the Caldwell video… then it could have easily been ‘wrong’. Listen again to Mike Dudley’s entire speech to that roomful of firefighters. Dudley was REALLY BAD at remembering the *exact* words from ANY of those videos or captured radio transmissions. He pretty much ‘got it wrong’ EVERY time he was telling that roomful of firefighters what was captured in a video or a radio transmission.
>> calvin also said…
>>
>> And it doesn’t seem that Able would have been able to provide additional
>> information from that audio clip because. ABLE DOESNT REMEMBER
>> THAT CONVERSATION WITH MARSH.
Read Todd Abel’s ADOSH interview.
He still doesn’t specifically tell them he remembers saying “Hunker and be safe”… but by the time he was recalling the 1550 timeframe and his conversations with Marsh to ADOSH he was ‘remembering’ all the rest of what happened in that timeframe pretty damn well.
>> calvin also said…
>>
>> So if he doesn’t remember that conversation. Then when exactly did
>> Able give the order for Marsh and GM to stay in the black?
At 1550 ( 3:50 PM ).
That’s when the Caldwell video was recorded.
It doesn’t matter that OPS1 Abel did not, himself, add the words “in the black” to his “Hunker and be safe” directive. This is IMPLIED just because of the time and the circumstances.
Abel was perfectly aware they had hundreds of acres of clod black right there where they were… and he was also totally aware that was their PRIMARY safety zone that day.
He never expected them to MOVE.
He never expected them to be anywhere ELSE but where he knew they were at 1550.
Indeed… he testified to this.
He had NO IDEA they were anywhere BUT up there in that ‘safe black’ right up until the time of deployment… so his “Hunker and be safe” directive could not possibly have included any alternate location other than right there where they were at 1550.
The following is about as close as we get to Field OPS1 Todd Abel telling ADOSH about the moment he told Eric Marsh to “Hunker and be safe”.
At this point in the interview… ADOSH is now ASKING Abel about this conversation he was having with Marsh in the 1545 to 1550 timeframe.
As you can see below… Abel now seems to be recalling this ENTIRE conversation pretty damn well… including all the discussion of the shifting winds, changing fire conditions, and whether Marsh has good eyes on it, etc.
Abel also uses the same HUNKERED word and YES… this time he, himself, DOES add the phrase “in the BLACK’ to the end.. since that is ALWAYS what he meant.
From Todd Abel’s ADOSH interview on August 22, 2013
Q1 = Dave Larsen, WFA / ADOSH investigator ( Rest in Peace )
A = Field OPS1 Todd Abel
————————————————————————–
1920 Q1: …3:45. This all was about in the same timeframe of wind shifts, the
1921 conversation with Eric. He was the first one to feel those squirrely winds start,
1922 right?
1923
1924 A: Yeah.
1925
1926 Q1: And he’s talking to you about he’s got wind issues.
1927
1928 A: Mm-hm.
1929
1930 Q1: Let me ask you this, you say you’re nervous, um, because of this…
1931
1932 A: This cell building over here.
1933
1934 Q1: …this cell – what does that mean to you?
1935
1936 A: That means outflows, possible lightning strikes, all that stuff.
1937
1938 Q1: Okay.
1939
1940 A: So that’s why I wanted to make sure that he had eyes on it to make sure he
1941 watches that thing and make sure that if it’s getting too – if he gets to really
1942 start feeling those winds changing and everything that they can get hunkered
1943 in that black – that 250 acres of safety zone there.
1944
1945 Q1: Mm-hm.
1946
1947 A: And – and stay out of harm’s way. You know they could even drop down off
1948 the ridge for lightning purposes if they had to.
1949
1950 Q1: Sure.
1951
1952 A: Was my thought process.
———————————————————————————
Todd Abel told ADOSH…
“I wanted to make sure that he had eyes on it to make sure he watches that thing and make sure that if it’s getting too – if he gets to really start feeling those winds changing and everything that they can get hunkered in that black – that 250 acres of safety zone there.”
Once more with emphasis…
“HUNKERED IN THAT BLACK”
JUST TO ADD HERE
Hunker—Stay in your location and wait out the fire—-SIMPLE
Be Safe—-stay in a good location and pay attention to your SAFTY
Keep me informed—-Do not move change locations and if some thing changes
ADVISE ME OF ANY CHANGES OR MOVES YOU NEED TO MAKE
How much clearer could your direct supervisor give you his requirement’s ???
KEEP ME INFORMED
So like it or not we have direct insubordination here.
Sorry but that is the facts in black and white and on tape
The above is absolute fact until something new and real changes it
WITH —REAL—HARD—EVIDENCE————
Reply to Bob Powers post on February 15, 2015 at 12:30 pm
>> Bob Powers said…
>>
>> So like it or not we have direct insubordination here.
>> Sorry but that is the facts in black and white and on tape
The evidence of that has been clear for quite some time.
The ONLY question is how are the Arizona Forestry lawyers going to try and ‘spin this’ when the wrongful death suits go to trial?
The Arizona Forestry lawyers have ALREADY ‘stipulated’ that DIVSA Eric Marsh was a direct employee of an Arizona Forestry Management Team that ENTIRE day. They aren’t even going to ‘try’ and get out of that.
I can’t imagine how they even think they can ‘spin this’ to try and get out of the obvious ( legal ) responsibility.
And The beat goes on…………..
From Gary Cordes’ ADOSH interview…
—————————————————————–
Q1: Uh, he tells air attack that he’s going to his designated, pre-designated safety zone?
So this radio transmission from Marsh did not go over crew net, or cell phone. Cordes said it was directly to AA. So it must have been A/G?
Before someone jumps down my throat. I am not saying it was ok for Marsh to report to AA, all I am saying is that there was communication.
I wonder what AA said or didn’t say in response?.
Reply to calvin post on February 15, 2015 at 4:53 am
>> calvin said…
>>
>> From Gary Cordes’ ADOSH interview…
>>
>> Q1: Uh, he tells air attack that he’s going to his designated, pre-designated safety zone?
>>
>> So this radio transmission from Marsh did not go over crew net, or cell phone.
>> Cordes said it was directly to AA. So it must have been A/G?
Yes… but we actually still don’t know if it really was Eric Marsh.
If this is he same ‘callouts’ that DPS Officer Eric Tarr has sworn that HE heard going up to ‘Air Attack’… then it’s most likely it was NOT DIVSA Eric Marsh.
Officer Tarr was VERY specific about those TWO transmissions HE heard on the “Air-To-Ground” channel and that the CALLER was identifying himself as “Granite Mountain 7″… and NOT “Division Alpha’.
Even right up until his death… Eric Marsh was prefixing HIS radio callouts with ‘Division Alpha’ that day.
It was only Jesse Steed, Robert Caldwell ( and others in the GM crew ) that were prefixing THEIR callouts with the “Granite Mountain 7” call sign.
To the best of his recollection… DPS Officer Tarr overhead TWO sequential calls from caller “Granite Mountain 7″ in the 1630 timeframe going out to “Air Attack” on the “Air-To-Ground” channel… but all he could recall hearing was…
1) He ( GM7 ) advised on the radio they were moving towards Yarnell in the black
( Just a few seconds?/minutes? later )
2) He ( GM7 ) came back up on the radio advising they were heading to a ranch they had in sight.
For the sake of completeness…
Here are those relevant ‘cuts’ regarding BOTH of those ‘GM7′ transmissions from DPS Officer/Paramedic Eric Tarr’s signed deposition in document “M-Law-Enforcement no-redactions.pdf”
———————————————————————————————–
EMERGENCY RADIO TRAFFIC
Around 1630 hours I was standing near the aircraft ( Helicopter Ranger 58 ) monitoring traffic on channel Air-To-Ground ( A/G ) 16 when I heard a voice come up on the radio with a Call sign of Granite Mountain 7. He advised on the radio that they were moving towards Yarnell in the black.
A short time later he came back up on the radio advising they were heading to a ranch they had in sight.
It was shortly after THAT Granite Mountain 7 came back up on the radio sounding excited, out of breath, and repeatedly clearing Air Attack with no response.
Granite Mountain 7 (then) advised their escape route had been cut off and they were deploying their shelters.
——————————————————————————–
There is absolutely ZERO reason to doubt DPS Officer Eric Tarr’s sworn testimony.
If he says the originating caller was using the call sign “Granite Mountain 7” ( and NOT “Division Alpha” )… then you can be almost 100 percent sure that is what he was actually hearing that day.
>> calvin also said…
>>
>> Before someone jumps down my throat. I am not saying it was ok for
>> Marsh to report to AA, all I am saying is that there was communication.
Yes. There was. See above.
There has never been ANY reason to doubt DPS Officer Eric Tarr’s signed testimony.
But if this “callout to AA’ is referencing those same TWO transmissions HE has testified to hearing… then we really can’t be sure it was Eric Marsh. It really sounds more like those TWO callouts to “Air Attack” were coming from Jesse Steed or Robbert Caldwell.
>> calvin also said…
>>
>> I wonder what AA said or didn’t say in response?.
I don’t think John Burfiend in Bravo 33 responded to these ‘announcements’ at all.
I believe that if there HAD been any kind of response… DPS medic Eric Tarr would have at least mentioned something about that as well in his signed testimony.
Those transmissions seemed to just sort of be ‘out of nowhere’ and not even expecting a response. Just FYI sort of thing. Not even any ‘request’ associated with them.
No one even testifies hearing any kind of ‘request’ that the information be FORWARDED to anyone because they might have been having transmission problems and wanted to use Air Attack as a relay, or something.
SIDENOTE: I think it is worth mentioning that whether or not these TWO transmissions that DPS Officer Tarr remembers hearing were coming from “Division Alpha” Eric Marsh or “Granite Mountain 7” ( Steed, Caldwell, etc. )…
…if these SAME two announcements had been radioed directly to Eric Marsh’s OPS level Supervisor ( instead of Air Attack )… I think it’s HIGHLY likely that Field OPS1 Todd Abel would have shot back with…
“Say WHAAAT? What are you talking about? I thought I told you to stay put.”
According to OPS1 Abel’s testimony… if those calls HAD been directed to HIM ( or if he had even accidentally heard them himself )… that would have been the first moment when he had ANY IDEA that Granite Mountain had decided to NOT stay where he had TOLD them to ( circa 1550 )…
…and I believe he WOULD have had something to say about it.
Reply to calvin post on February 14, 2015 at 11:24 am
>> calvin said…
>>
>> Well it seems that ole Roy could have his times off by as much as 30minutes, right?
>> So that could put the phone call from Abel as early as 1700, right?
>>
>> Not sure if that changes anything. Chasing rabbits
Well… the whole thing about what Todd Abel might have been saying to Hall…. and when… might be a ‘rabbit’… but before we leave the whole “Roy Hall YIN’ thing I think it’s worth pointing out again that there has always been THIS weird section in his SAIT Interview Notes…
From Roy Hall’s SAIT Interview Notes…
—————————————————————————————–
Q: Were you surprised by the location of where Granite Mountain was found?
A: Shocked
Q: Why were you shocked?
A: When Paul Musser called and said they are descending a predetermined escape route. I assumed it had been scouted.
Q: Were you aware that it was heard several times that he was in the black.
A: We heard “can see what’s going on – we are in hard black”.
—————————————————————————————–
I’ve never known what to really make of THIS.
Roy Hall seems to be saying that the moment Paul Musser accidentally ‘overheard’ ( Marsh? Steed? ) telling someone ( was this the supposed call to Air Attack? ) that they were now ” descending a predetermined escape route”… that Paul Musser IMMEDIATELY called Roy on the PHONE and told him all about that. In REAL TIME.
Roy Hall’s reaction ( also in REAL TIME? ) seems to have been something along the lines of…
“So what. They must have scouted it.”
‘
Then… his next statement seems to suggest that HE ( himself ) heard some OTHER transmit from ( Marsh? Steed? ) confirming that they could see what was happening and they were in the ‘safe black’.
Roy Hall did NOT have a radio that day. Not even later when Musser had called him and told him there was a deployment.
Roy Hall was doing ALL of his ‘communicating’ that day with just his CELLPHONE.
It’s also worth noting that Roy Hall mentions NOTHING about ANY of this during his ADOSH interview.
No call from Musser about “They are heading out a predetermined escape route”… or his reaction that “Well… they must have scouted it”… or that he was in any way aware that GM had been reporting they could “see what was happening” and were “in safe black”.
So WTF?
There aren’t even any wonky TIMES in this part of Hall’s SAIT notes to complain about it.
The issue really is… did ANY of this ACTUALLY HAPPEN?
Followup…
Not only does Roy Hall say NOTHING about this mysterious ( but important? ) part of his own SAIT interview to ADOSH…. Paul Musser’s ADOSH interview also says nothing about it.
Zero. Zip. Nada.
Paul Musser WAS telling ADOSH about this moment when he heard someone with Granite ( Marsh? Steed? ) telling someone ( not HIM ) they were ‘heading out a predetermined escape route’.
That is the same moment Roy Hall was saying Musser then CALLED him and told HIM that is what just appeared on the radio…
…but Musser says NOTHING about calling Roy Hall to tell him that when he heard it.
So did that really happen?
Did Musser really call Hall ( in REAL TIME ) and tell him Granite was “on the move”?
Abel and Musser YIN 7/6
OSC Musser or Able did not know of the predetermined route mentioned by Marsh to the ranch structures of the Granite Mountain crew.
How do you interpret this sentence? It seems to me to be saying that BOTH Musser and Able heard Marsh mention the move. But they neither knew or followed up after hearing this.
Don’t forget… the SAIT interviewed Field OPS1 Todd Abel and Planning OPS2 Paul Musser TOGETHER… not separately.
They were both physically in each other’s presence when the SAIT was interviewing them… and this interview supposedly happened at the deployment site itself.
This came out during Paul Musser’s ADOSH interview..
This is ALSO the moment in Musser’s interview when he seems to be telling ADOSH that he considered HIMSELF to be the “top dog” (quote) “MAIN operations chief” in Yarnell on June 30, 2013.
In other words… Musser seemed to think HE was ‘more OPS than the other OPS”.
From Paul Musser’s ADOSH interview…
A = Planning OPS2 Paul Musser
—————————————————————————-
2631 A: Oh and when we talked to the serious acc-accident investigation team, Todd
2632 and I actually did it side by side at the site, so that we could – ‘cause that…
2633
2634 Q2: Did that help in the regard?
2635
2636 A: Yes it did.
2637
2638 Q2: It did.
2639
2640 A: Because we were – we were both oper- I – I am the main operations chief…
2641
2642 Q2: Mm-hm.
2643
2644 A: But I mean I’m – I’m the – I’m that person.
2645
2646 Q2: Yeah.
2647
2648 A: But, uh, Todd was handling the field ops at the time. And because we were
2649 doing different, but similar task, by having us together we were able to – well I
2650 did this – oh but I’d done this just before and so we could…
2651
2652 Q2: Uh-huh.
2653
2654 A: I – I think possibly give a little bit better timeline.
2655
2656 Q1: Okay.
————————————————————————-
So forget this bit of weirdness where Musser says he thought HE was “More OPS than the other OPS” that day.
The fact that the SAIT interviewed BOTH of these guys together, at the same time, and was ALLOWING them to compare notes during the interview pretty much means that you have to take everything in those (incomplete) YIN notes from their interview with a grain of salt.
I take the statement you are curious about…
“OSC Musser or Able did not know of the predetermined route mentioned by Marsh to the ranch structures of the Granite Mountain crew.”
…to mean that NEITHER of them knew anything about what Gary Cordes had told Marsh that morning.
Cordes NEVER told either one of them he was going to be telling the SUP of that Hotshot Crew that he could/should consider a place called “The Boulder Springs Ranch” to be a ‘predetermined safety zone’… even though he KNEW it was going to be TWO MILES AWAY from where that Hotshot crew would be working.
I don’t think this YIN statement indicates… one way or the other… whether ONE or BOTH of the men HEARD the words ‘predetermined escape route’ over the radio at some point.
We really do KNOW that Musser heard it.
And if you don’t think Todd Abel is lying… we know that he did NOT hear it.
But I think the statement definitely proves that NEITHER Abel NOR Musser were ever aware of what Cordes had told Marsh that morning.
Reply tp Robert the Second (RTS) post on February 14, 2015 at 2:04 pm
>> RTS said…
>>
>> WTKTT said…
>>
>> “Was Eric Marsh ALWAYS this ‘obtuse’ and ‘uncommunicative’… or was
>> something really strange going on just that particular day.”
>>
>> Maybe not always but certainly common enough.
>> Even those that filled in on GMHS called this disingenuous type of
>> behavior, ‘classic Marsh.’
RTS.. do you happen to know WHO was ‘signing off’ on all of the items in Eric Marsh’s “Division Supervisor” PMS-311-09 TASK BOOK… when he was being ‘certified’ as a qualified DIVSUP?
I know he was a DIVS ( for the very FIRST time? ) just 10 days before Yarnell on the Doce fire… but how did he get his TASK BOOK signed before that?
Was it all just local Prescott or PNF people ‘signing off’ on his DIVS TASK BOOK?
No one in either investigation ever bothered to actually OBTAIN that task book… even though official ‘Arizona Open Records’ laws were cited to obtain (supposedly) ALL of Eric Marsh’s ‘Personnel File’.
Wouldn’t a copy of that TASK BOOK ( showing certification ) normally be considered part of someone’s personnel file?
WTKTT if as in the past it is personnel file .
All training S courses and training possessions held on fire assignments.
Personal Performance ratings not necessarily Crew Performance.
It is the Red Carding Process approved by in my time a red card Committee.
So yes it would all be in Marshes Personnel File.
Well… apparently… it was NOT.
There really is a PDF file in the evidence record that is SUPPOSED to represent Marsh’s entire personnel file… and there is no copy of any TASK BOOK in it.
I don’t doubt that Marsh really did have DIVSUP punched onto his red-card even BEFORE the Doce fire ( just 10 days before the Yarnell tragedy ).
What I really want to know is WHO was ‘signing off’ on ALL of those items in the task book… especially the parts where the DIVS applicant has to demonstrate that he understands ALL of the responsibilities regarding keeping your OPS level supervisor notified about what the hell you are doing at ALL times.
From my old days 20 years ago their is a Regional Red card committee.
or Possibly a State red card committee.
that signs off on the Division level and above.
Local has sign off on Crew boss, Falling, Tractor and Engine Boss, Strike Team Leader.
The only other thing I could think would be Marsh keeping his own task book
seperiate from the personnel Files. In his office desk or file cabinet where he could update it. Personnel Files are kept seperiate and not easily accessible.
If he had to have sign off on the Fires he was at then he could have had it in the truck. No telling where it is now?????
Marsh was acting as DIVS on the Holloway Fire in northern Nevada in 2012. I don’t remember him being a trainee but could be wrong.
Thank you!
Reply to Elizabeth post on February 14, 2015 at 2:24 pm
>> Elizabeth said…
>>
>> I have yet to find a rule that suggests that Marsh was supposed to
>> get Abel’s or Musser’s explicit sign-off before Marsh as DivsA allowed
>> GM to move toward the BSR.
You could not have possibly looked very hard, then.
How about the actual TASK BOOK for becoming an ICS based “Division Supervisor”?
In order to even BECOME eligible to be a ‘Division Supervisor’ within any standard WFF “Incident Command System” ( ICS )… there is an official TASK BOOK that has to be completed.
This TASK BOOK lists all the principle EXPECTED areas of competency and understanding ( which also includes all common ICS principles like respect for command chain, etc. ) and then has detailed lists of SPECIFIC skills/rules that need to be demonstrated/understood.
There are BOXES alongside each of these things where the EVALUATOR can ‘sign off’ to prove the DIVS candidate has ‘accomplished’ and/or ‘demonstrated’ that skill or that they fully understand the REQUIRED RULES and BEHAVIOR.
The actual official NWCG ( National Wildfire Coordinating Group ) TASK BOOK for the ICS position of “Division Supervisor” is designated PMS-311-09… and it is here…
http://www.nwcg.gov/pms/taskbook/operations/pms-311-09.pdf
On page 13 ( of 16 pages )…
——————————————————————————————
TASK
Behavior: Make appropriate decisions based on analysis of gathered information.
29. Determine need for assistance.
– Identify need for additional assistance by monitoring work progress or based on reports from subordinates.
– Coordinate with Operations Section Chief or Branch Director and request assistance according to procedures discussed in briefing.
– Notify Operations Section Chief when resources are moved or shared between divisions/groups, or excess to operational needs.
————————————————————————————–
This is a comprehensive document… and there are MANY places where it states SPECIFIC rules and regs with regards to a DIVS and their responsibilities to OPS and IC… but I’m going to stop right here and you can read the rest at your leisure. I assure you… there are MANY other ‘rules’ clearly stated in this document that were NOT being observed by DIVSA Eric Marsh…
But I’m stopping right here… because of THIS RULE under Section 29…
– Notify Operations Section Chief when resources are moved or shared between divisions/groups, or excess to operational needs.
One more time… with EMPHASIS…
*** NOTIFY OPERATIONS SECTION CHIEF WHEN RESOURCES ARE MOVED.***
DIVSA Eric Marsh did NOT do this one simple ( REQUIRED ) thing on June 30, 2013.
Obtuse, offhand, incomplete comments over a radio to people who were NOT his direct OPS Level Supervisor don’t count. Not even close.
Any questions?
I have yet to find a rule that suggests that Marsh was supposed to get Abel’s or Musser’s explicit sign-off before Marsh as DivsA allowed GM to move toward the BSR, which was where Gary Cordes (to whom Musser says Musser was operationally deferring) had indicated that he needed resources.
Particularly when communications are heavy and a move appears – APPEARS – to be noncontroversial, my WFF sources (at least one of whom worked closely with Fred aka Robert-the-Second aka seymour, TTWARE, SR, etc. if not was TRAINED by Fred) indicate that getting sign-off from Musser or Abel on a transition fire would not be required.
To be clear, Abel was at the NORTH end of the fire. Does ANYONE on this BB actually think that Abel would have said to Marsh – at roughly 4 p.m. or 4:10 p.m. – “No, don’t go to where it seems that Musser and Cordes want or need resources and to where YOU (as the guy actually on that end of the fire) think that you can move safely”? I highly doubt that Abel would have said that.
Elizabeth Line OF Command—-Red Book—Changing your assignment moving to a new assignment—Division Supervisor is responsible to the OPS for any changes in his plan and
maintains contact with that supervisor to discuss changes.
Moving from your assignment must be approved except in an emergency then you should notify the OPS of what you and your recourses Crews etc. are doing.
ICS Job Descriptions—RED BOOK.
Reply to Bob Powers post February 14, 2015 at 3:55 pm
>> Bob Powers wrote…
>>
>> Changing your assignment moving to a new assignment — Division
>> Supervisor is responsible to the OPS for any changes in his plan and
>> maintains contact with that supervisor to discuss changes.
>>
>> Moving from your assignment must be approved except in an
>> emergency then you should notify the OPS of what you and
>> your recourses Crews etc. are doing.
Yep. These ‘RULES and REGS’ are in MORE than just the “Red-book’.
They are even in the frickin’ TASK BOOK you have to complete to even BECOME a qualified ‘Division Supervisor’.
The actual official NWCG ( National Wildfire Coordinating Group ) TASK BOOK for the ICS position of “Division Supervisor” is designated PMS-311-09… and it is here…
http://www.nwcg.gov/pms/taskbook/operations/pms-311-09.pdf
On page 13 ( of 16 pages )…
——————————————————————————————
TASK
Behavior: Make appropriate decisions based on analysis of gathered information.
29. Determine need for assistance.
– Notify Operations Section Chief when resources are moved or shared between divisions/groups, or excess to operational needs.
————————————————————————————–
One more time… with EMPHASIS…
*** NOTIFY OPERATIONS SECTION CHIEF WHEN RESOURCES ARE MOVED.***
There is no ‘should’ in there. It’s a MUST.
DIVSA Eric Marsh did NOT DO THIS on June 30, 2013… and something very terrible happened.
Elizabeth/Logical Phallcy,
The Wildland Fire Incident Management Guide (link below) replaced the old Fireline Handbook.
http://www.nwcg.gov/pms/pubs/pms210/pms210.pdf
It lists the duties and responsibilities of a Division Supervisor with EMPHASIS IN CAPS as follows:
“Division/Group Supervisor (DIVS)
The Division/Group Supervisor is responsible for implementing the assigned portion of the IAP
.
CRITICAL SAFETY RESPONSIBILITIES
•
USE THE RISK MANAGEMENT PROCESS, and supervise operations in the Division.
•
Maintain accountability of assigned resources at all times.
•
Coordinate activities with adjacent Divisions.
•
KEEP SUPERVISOR INFORMED OF SITUATION AND RESOURCES STATUS.
•
Provide safety briefing to subordinate resources.
OTHER DUTIES
•
Brief and assign specific work tasks to Task Forces/Strike Team Leaders.
•
INFORM COMMUNICATIONS OF ALL STATUS CHANGES OF ASSIGNED RESOURCES.
•
ENSURE THAT ASSIGNED PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT GET ON AND OFF THE FIRELINE IN A TIMELY AND SAFE MANNER.
•
Resolve logistics problems within the Division/Group.
•
Approve and turn in time for all resources in Division/Group to the Time Unit
So, it’s pretty clear the responsibilities of a DIVS included utilizing ‘the Risk Management Process’ to make safe and sound decisions supervising his resources while keeping their supervisor informed of the situation and resource status. THE SITUATION WAS THAT THEY WERE LEAVING THEIR PERFECTLY GOOD SZ AND ALL THE DIV ‘A’ RESOURCES WERE EITHER GONE AND/OR LEAVING. NOR did he inform Communications and he certainly did NOT ensure that his personnel get off the fireline in a safe manner.
You ask above “Does ANYONE on this BB actually think that Abel would have said to Marsh – at roughly 4 p.m. or 4:10 p.m. – “No, don’t go … I highly doubt that Abel would have said that.”
First of – what is a BB? Next, Abel told them very clearly to “HUNKER AND BE SAFE.” YES, I highly and most definitely believe that Abel would have told them ‘NO, DON’T GO.” Those three words are all that is necessary. The other drama words you added are merely meaningless blather, so I did not address them.
Reply to Robert the Second (RTS) post on February 14, 2015 at 5:42 pm.
>> RTS said…
>>
>> First of – what is a BB?
I believe that stands for “Bulletin Board”. The term predates BLOG.and even the Internet itself. Early dial-in AOL and Prodigy had ‘Bulletin Boards’ where people would discuss what they wanted to.
>> RTS also said…
>>
>> Next, Abel told them very clearly to “HUNKER AND BE SAFE.”
>> YES, I highly and most definitely believe that Abel would have
>> told them ‘NO, DON’T GO.” Those three words are all that
>> is necessary.
Totally agree. Even when Marsh requested that face-to-face with Frisby and it turned into a rescue mission for McDonough… I believe it was too late to consider a ‘bushwhack’ through any unburned fuel ‘out there’.
There MAY have been time ( at the point ) for the full-walk on the ‘two-track/trail’ that did, in fact, lead all the way to the Boulder Springs Ranch.
But ‘bushwhack time’ was OVER that day. No doubt.
AND… I DO believe that if Marsh’s direct supervisor ( Field OPS Todd Abel ) had been consulted about that decision… and was ALSO told a long ( 20-30 minute ) ‘bushwhack’ was going to be the ‘second part’ of the planned move…
…I think he might have added a few choice words to his “No. Don’t do it” directive something along the lines of…
“What… are you NUTS?”
WTKTT,
I do not have his interview notes, but remember that Abel was confounded and confused when told that GMHS had left their perfectly good SZ and then when they were cut off and all. He was dumbfounded and incredulous. They were ‘in the black’ and everyone knew it – EVERYONE.
Thanks for pulling out the Book and referencing it. I have not seen one in 20 years but purity much what I remember.
Reply to Robert the Second (RTS) post on February 14, 2015 at 7:33 pm
>> RTS said…
>>
>> I do not have his interview notes, but remember that Abel
>> was confounded and confused when told that GMHS had
>> left their perfectly good SZ and then when they were cut
>> off and all. He was dumbfounded and incredulous.
>> They were ‘in the black’ and everyone knew it – EVERYONE.
From OPS1 Todd Abel’s ADOSH interview…
—————————————————————–
A: When – when he was up here and saying my escape route’s been comprised, I’m thinking he’s UP HERE. I’m in TOTAL CONFUSION. I have no idea. Two hundred and fifty acres of black, they’re direct, all they gotta do is step into that. That – that’s where I thought they were at. That’s where EVERYBODY thought they were at.
—————————————————————–
Not EVERYBODY was CONFUSED, however.
Compare that TOTAL CONFUSION on Marsh’s DIRECT Field OPS Supervisor’s part to Gary Cordes’ testimony…
From Gary Cordes’ SAIT Interview Notes…
—————————————————————–
Q: Were you surprised where they were?
A: No.
—————————————————————–
From Gary Cordes’ ADOSH interview…
—————————————————————–
Q1: Uh, he tells air attack that he’s going to his designated, pre-designated safety zone?
A: Right.
Q1: …and he doesn’t say where that is, he just says, safety zone?
A: Right.
Q1: And so your assumption is?
A: He had plenty of time to get there and, and he was headed to the Boulder Springs Ranch.
—————————————————————–
WTKTT,
Thanks. Cordes either knew what Marsh and GMHS intended either because he had the GMHS Crew Net or by cell phone. How else did he know?
Reply to Robert the Second (RTS) post on
February 14, 2015 at 10:19 pm
>> RTS said…
>>
>> Cordes either knew what Marsh and GMHS intended
>> either because he had the GMHS Crew Net or by
>> cell phone. How else did he know?
Gary Cordes was the only one overhearing Marsh’s obtuse references to ‘escape route from this morning’ because HE was the one who TOLD Marsh about the stupid Boulder Springs Ranch that morning… and that Marsh was ‘allowed’ to consider it to be one of his ‘predetermined safety zones’ even though it was going to be TWO MILES AWAY from where Cordes knew they would be working.
Cordes actually had no real ‘authority’ to even make that ‘safety zone’ assignment to someone who wasn’t even going to be working for him that day… but he did it anyway.
So there was DIVSA Eric Marsh… as late as 4:16 PM… telling people on the radio he ( and ‘the guys’ ) were headed towards one of their OFFICIAL ‘predesignated’ safety zones.
But NO ONE ELSE ( but Marsh and Cordes ) had any frckin’ idea what all that really meant.
Not only did Cordes NOT tell even the SECOND Hotshot crew to show up for work in the same area about the “Boulder Springs Ranch”… Cordes also never told Field OPS Todd Abel or Planning OPS Paul Musser about it, either.
It was a ‘secret’.
A ‘secret’ that was ONLY shared between Eric Marsh and Gary Cordes.
And people DIED because of this ‘secret’… by not fully understanding what they were hearing from a man who was not willing to fully explain it to them at critical moments.
If even Gary Cordes ( the only man who understood what was really happening with Granite Mountain ) had had more ‘Situational Awareness’ himself about how that fire was picking up speed out in that bowl… then HE would NOT have simply thought “They have plenty of time”.
Better SA on Cordes’ part COULD have caused one of the only chances at an ‘intervention’ that day.
Since he was the only one who knew where they were really headed… then ( in a very real sense )… he was the only one who had that opportunity to get a message to them saying…
“Negative. You do NOT have the time for that. Stay where you are.”
Correction for above.
First paragraph didn’t make something clear.
OTHER people WERE hearing these short, obtuse radio reports from Marsh about ‘escape route’ and ‘ranch’…. but Gary Cordes was the only one who UNDERSTOOD what the hell Marsh was talking about.
First paragraph above should have read like this…
Gary Cordes was the only one overhearing Marsh’s obtuse references to ‘escape route from this morning’ that UNDERSTOOD what they really meant… because HE was the one who TOLD Marsh about the stupid Boulder Springs Ranch that morning… and that Marsh was ‘allowed’ to consider it to be one of his ‘predetermined safety zones’ even though it was going to be TWO MILES AWAY from where Cordes knew they would be working.
If you and I are in communication via radio, and therefore, keeping our comments brief and pointed, in order to keep the channel open, and I say something seemingly important, and you do not understand.
How am I supposed to know you do not understand unless you tell me?
I’ll see your “whose job is it to communicate” question and raise you another…
If you and I are in communication via radio and you are ASKING me what my status is… and what the men I am responsible for are DOING right now… but I know that you were NOT standing next to me that morning when some Structure Protection guy pointed to something on an iPad and said “That’s one of your safety zones”…
…how in the hell could I be so stupid to assume you are going to know what I really mean if I just used vague phrases like “escape route from this morning” and “safety zone”.
That could mean ANYTHING ( to you ).
If that’s all I tell you… then I am NOT “Communicating clearly and effectively”.
No one should have HAD to perform some kind of “interrogation” of Marsh over the radio to get clear answers to the clear questions he was being asked.
Be that as it may… I sure with they HAD.
I wish the radio exchange where someone clearly asked Marsh “Are you WITH Granite Mountain right now?” had actually gone like this…
Mysterious caller: “Are you WITH Granite Mountain right now?”
Eric Marsh: “Uh… jus’ checkin’ it out to see where we’re gonna jump out at”
Mysterious caller: “No copy. What the hell is that supposed to mean? Answer my question. Are you physically WITH the Granite Mountain crew right now…. or are you NOT… and tell me exactly WHERE the hell you are right now.”
My only comment and still a possibility.
Cordes put 2 and 2 together after the Fact.
He did not know where they were headed till the Deployment spot was found close to BSR.
Still a lot of open space and lack of fact going on here. Gary Cordes—was he on or monitoring. Crew net did he Talk with Marsh on the Phone?
Marsh was not assigned to Cordes so I am confused as to why they were not coordinating thru OPS. Cordes was bossy with his own problems to be copying every thing Marsh was communicating on at least 3 different frequencies. My simple observation.
It has also NEVER been established exactly what was ‘understood’ to be the ‘escape route from this morning’ ( as Marsh said on the radio ).
Cordes has NEVER testified what he even TOLD Marsh he was SUPPOSED to use as a full (safe) ‘escape route’ to that ‘predesignated safety zone’.
What I mean is…
Was that even discussed at ALL that morning… when Cordes was showing Marsh where the BSR was on that iPad.
Did Cordes SHOW Marsh that the clearly visible two-track/trail up on that high ridge did, in fact, go ALL THE WAY to the BSR…
or did Marsh and/or Cordes just ‘draw their finger’ across the iPad and through that fuel-filled box canyon and both AGREE that “Yeah… that would be the shorter escape route if you need to get to that ranch”.
We still have NO IDEA if ANY of that happened.
Cordes needs to be DEPOSED and asked specifically if any of that was discussed… or if he really had any idea they were ‘bushwhacking’ in order to get to that ranch.
I would actually believe Cordes if he said “I showed Eric that clear two-track/trail that led ALL the way to the Ranch from where he would be working… so I had NO IDEA they would decide to do that bushwhack”.
But we don’t know if that really happened… or if Cordes might have actually APPROVED that ‘shortcut through the canyon’ that very morning when he was making this ‘predetermined escape route’ assignment to DIVSA Eric Marsh.
It’s a VERY important part of this whole ‘story’ that NO ONE has bothered to find out yet.
OK even I am getting confused. Cant bring the map up here’
Will roughly lay out the position of land marks’
North—–Model creek
South —-Glen Isla
East—— Peoples valley
West—–Fire Origen and Helispot
WTKTT can you pull up the first or second map for reference here.
The second map is laid sideways. the rest seem to be correct
Yes. The ‘fire progression’ maps appearing in the SAIR and in the ADOSH supplement are sometimes SIDEWAYS. Looker beware.
As for your general bullet list above… Peeples Valley is definitely on the wrong compass point.
Peeples Valley was even farther NORTH than the Model Creek Road area.
In very general terms… I would put the EAST side of the fire as ‘Yarnell’… but not the whole EAST side. Yarnell was really in the SOUTHEAST corner of all these topo maps used as background for the SAIT fire progression maps.
Like I said Roughly tried to use Identifiable points.
Below, Calvin references a communication in which “AA Collins tells B33 there is a wind shift and the south side of the fire needs “checked”.”
Bob Powers responded by saying:
“Calvin the South side of the Fire at that time was east to west from Glen Isla not to BSR when the wind shifted. Around 1620 to 1630.”
Can anyone help me understand what Bob is trying to say? As I understand things, Collins had just communicated with Marsh about the fact that they had lost or were going to lose the retardant line that the VLAT had most recently dropped upon, Marsh was promised some air support ASAP, and Collins – who was about to leave the fire – told B33 to bring the next arriving VLAT to the east side of the fire (as opposed to using it on the North side of the fire). Based on the smoke and the pictures, it seems that the fire was then moving due east toward the Shrine area (as opposed to the Boulder Springs Ranch area), with only moderate (relatively speaking) SE spread. Is that what Bob is trying to say?
Sorry Elizabeth what I meant to say was that Glen Isla is and at that time was the south end of the Fire. The fire head was in a north south line moving slowly west and was starting the clockwise move in direction to the west towards GM and BSR.
Hope this also helps
The Fire moved into Yarnell south East— then south into Glen Isla— then west toward BSR and The Granit Mountain Crew.
The crew entrapment was more West/ South West not the south portion of the Fire. Fire…..
Reply to Elizabeth post on February 14, 2015 at 12:57 pm
>> Elizabeth said…
>>
>> As I understand things, Collins had just communicated with Marsh
>> about the fact that they had lost or were going to lose the
>> retardant line that the VLAT had most recently dropped upon,
Where are you getting that from?
Yes… Eric Marsh was the one who ‘announced’ ( over TAC channel ) that the fire had burned through that ‘Bravo 3’ ( Warbis and Lenmark ) retardant line… but there is no radio conversation captured with AA Rory Collins and Eric Marsh ‘discussing’ this.
Not that I am aware of, anway.
So enlighten me. What are basing your ‘understanding’ on?
>> Elizabeth also said…
>>
>> Marsh was promised some air support ASAP
Eric Marsh was never personally promised any ‘Air Support’.
The only thing Todd Abel said to him was…
“We’ll get some Air Support down there ASAP”.
That was more just OPS1 Todd Abel acknowledging to Marsh that Air Support needed to start switching its attention to the ENTIRE south side of the fire, in general, and was not any kind of SPECIFIC promise being made to Eric Marsh himself.
OPS1 Todd Abel’s own ADOSH interview supports this.
>> Elizabeth also said…
>>
>> and Collins – who was about to leave the fire – told B33 to
>> bring the next arriving VLAT to the east side of the fire (as opposed
>> to using it on the North side of the fire).
Nope. Didn’t happen.
In those minutes before Collins was about the leave the fire ( at 1558 )… the only conversation between he and Thomas French ( in B33 ) over the Air-To-Air channel was just a general discussion about whether B33 felt comfortable taking the fire ( they did )… and that there was a VLAT inbound and about 20 minutes out.
It was Thomas French ( pilot of B33 ) who said he wanted to use that inbound VLAT to finish that retardant line he’d been working hard on up there in the Model Creek and Miner’s Camp road area… and Rory Collins gave him permission to use the VLAT that for that. Collins said “Yea… why don’t you go ahead an do that.”
If you have evidence that contradicts this conversation captured in the Panebaker Air-To-Air radio channel recordings… please present it.
>> Elizabeth also said…
>>
>> Based on the smoke and the pictures, it seems that the fire was
>> then moving due east toward the Shrine area (as opposed to the
>> Boulder Springs Ranch area), with only moderate (relatively speaking) SE
>> spread. Is that what Bob is trying to say?
Brendan McDonough himself ( a young, but qualified WFF lookout ) gave ADOSH the real ‘scoop’ on what the fire was doing out there in that bowl in the timeframe you are talking about… and he would know. He was THERE and being influenced directly by it.
Brendan says that even around the time he had to evacuate… and on into the time he and the other Blue Ridge Hotshots were moving the GM vehicles… the fireline itself was now heading in almost a STRAIGHT NORTH-TO-SOUTH direction. The SMOKE was being hit with crosswinds as it rose and perhaps giving a false indication of the actual direction of the ground-level fireline itself.
Brendan’s exact QUOTE to ADOSH for this timeframe…
“McDonough: At this point, the fire is moving straight UP and DOWN as NORTH SOUTH.”
Also… Brendan points out the that movement of PARTS of the fireline to the EAST was based a lot on simple topography and not the general wind situation.
The fire was TURNING AROUND to its eventual full NORTH-TO-SOUTH direction and was being perceived differently by people in different ground locations… depending on where they were.
It was a VERY dynamic situation.
From Brendan McDonough’s FIRST ( of TWO ) ADOSH interviews
on August 20, 2013.
Q1 = Barry Hicks, ADOSH investigator
Q2 = Dave Larsen, WFA / ADOSH investigator ( Rest in Peace )
A = Brendan McDonough
———————————————————————————
1953 Q1: And so you guys moved if I understand right, all four of y’all’s vehicles.
1954
1955 A: Yes, sir.
1956
1957 Q1: Okay. And, ah…
1958
1959 Q2: And can you remember what time that was?
1960
1961 A: No.
1962
1963 Q2: Four? Okay.
1964
1965 A: At this point, the fire is moving straight up and down as north South. It’s
1966 moving – it’s starting to come out of the north but it’s really moving east so
1967 that my way out is getting cut off sooner than theirs. They had more concern
1968 at that point for me and my safety.
1969
1970 Q1: Right.
1971
1972 A: Just because of the direction of the fire.
1973
1974 Q2: Right.
1975
1976 A: So it was – the winds were out of the north, northeast but primarily due to the
1977 terrain of that ridge, it’s moving to the east.
1978
1979 Q1: Okay. Gotcha.
———————————————————————————-
So even Brendan agrees the fire was moving due EAST (as opposed to SE toward the BSR).
As the fire was ‘turning’. around to its eventual DUE SOUTH direction… the topography itself was producing an EASTERLY movement… but even as Brendan was evacuating the winds were already ‘out of the NORTH / NORTHEAST ( not the WEST ).
Brendan’s exact QUOTE to ADOSH for the timeframe when he was evacuating and the GK vehicles were being moved…
“McDonough: At this point, the fire is moving straight UP and DOWN as NORTH SOUTH.”
This matches the photos taken from the ‘resting spot’.
On the EAST side of the fire it was ‘taking off’ into those draws, as Brendan described. Harper Canyon was one of those ‘draws’.
On the WEST side of the fire, and out in the bowl, the fireline was already moving mostly due SOUTH ( and already starting to spot ahead of itself to the SOUTH, according to the MacKenzie photos ).
Typo… Should have been “GM vehicles”, not “GK vehicles”.
Below, Calvin references a communication in which “AA Collins tells B33 there is a wind shift and the south side of the fire needs “checked”.”
Bob Powers responded by saying:
“Calvin the South side of the Fire at that time was east to west from Glen Isla not to BSR when the wind shifted. Around 1620 to 1630.”
Can anyone help me understand what Bob is trying to say? As I understand things, Collins had just communicated with Marsh about the fact that they had lost or were going to lose the retardant line that the VLAT had most recently dropped upon, Marsh was promised some air support ASAP, and Collins – who was about to leave the fire – told B33 to bring the next arriving VLAT to the east side of the fire (as opposed to using it on the North side of the fire). Based on the smoke and the pictures, it seems that the fire was then moving due east toward the Shrine area (as opposed to the Boulder Springs Ranch area), with only moderate (relatively speaking) SE spread. Is that what Bob is trying to say?
WTK said
It would also be nice to add context when it exists… such as the fact that whatever OPS1 “Incident Within An Incident” Todd Abel was telling Roy Hall at 1730 does NOT represent proof that he heard those radio conversations himself… in REAL TIME. He had already had plenty of time to hear about these things from others around him who had been reporting to HIM.what THEY had heard.
Ok.
recopy from the YI N Roy Hall with more “context”
17:11 BPS Ranger responding to Lead B3 request. Paul Musser called – all firefighters were exiting. One Granite Mountain exited with Blue Ridge Hotshots.
17:30 Paul Musser called and advised to organize and incident within an incident called Granite. Todd Able reported that the last communication with Eric Marsh was “We are on the west ridge descending a predetermined escape route.” Their communication prior to between Brian Frisbee Blue Ridge and Eric Marsh “we have your one crew member. Can we use him to move vehicles? Can you see what’s going on, are you in a safe area? We are alright, we are in hard black.”
According to this, Roy Hall is reporting that BR were exiting with Mcdonough as late as 1711. Right?
Well it seems that ole Roy could have his times off by as much as 30minutes, right? So that could put the phone call from Abel as early as 1700, right?
Not sure if that changes anything. Chasing rabbits
I think the only thing you can trust about any of Roy Hall’s YIN notes is that he was just struggling to remember when his phone rang and someone told him something.
Read Roy Hall’s ADOSH testimony.
The guy didn’t even bother to grab a RADIO even AFTER Paul Musser called him and told him there had been a deployment.
ANYTHING Roy Hall was hearing after the deployment was happening with phone calls.
WHEN he actually got ‘the call’… or how ‘past tense’ the information then was is anybody’s guess.
Yes… Musser eventually told Hall that one of the GM had ‘escaped’ and ‘survived’ and was down there in the parking lot… but that information was probably getting mixed up with a lot of other ‘reports’ during the same phone calls.
I just want to go back to the original point you were trying to make with presenting these ‘Roy Hall’ YIN snippets.
I don’t think anything Roy Hall says HE was hearing from anyone after the deployment can be used as proof that the caller themselves ( Abel, Musser, whoever ) had heard those things themselves in REAL TIME.
There had already been too much ‘comparing of notes’ going on down there amongst that group at the Ranch House Restaurant.
Of COURSE they were all busy down there ‘sharing information’ or telling each other what THEY had heard.
Of COURSE they were all doing everything they could to determine exactly WHERE the deployment might have taken place… and WHO knew WHAT or had HEARD something.
So shortly after all that ‘consulting’… a think a lot of people down at the RHR ( Abel and Musser included ) knew a lot of things that they, themselves, didn’t personally know before all that ‘sharing of information’ took place in the parking lot.
And then every now and then… Roy Hall’s phone rang and someone was just ‘passing along’ the current ‘common knowledge’ as it was developing.
There’s a line between showing initiative or adapting to changes in conditions — or trying to avoid actions you view to be unsafe in an indirect manner — and being directly evasive. In the communications that are known, I think we can see that when pressed for a direct answer. EM tended to respond with more indirect statements. Using a military analogy, initiative is encouraged there, but that type of direct evasion can result in court martials and ruin careers (but not units).
Frankly there’s a bit of a civil service mentality issue that needs to be addressed.
This was meant to be in addition to RTS and Fire20+ exchange, not a stand-alone, sorry.
Actually R38 not F20+, I am posting-challenged this am, clearly.
Roy Hall’s YIN says this
Todd Able reported that the last communication with Eric Marsh was “We are on the west ridge descending a predetermined escape route.” Their communication prior to between Brian Frisbee Blue Ridge and Eric Marsh “we have your one crew member. Can we use him to move vehicles? Can you see what’s going on, are you in a safe area? We are alright, we are in hard black.”
Musser and Able YIN 7/6
Musser hears radio traffic from Eric Marsh, Granite Mountain, that said “they were going to pre-determined route to the structures”. Musser was not sure who that radio traffic was sent to?
It sure would be nice if we stayed focused on what we DO know from the information, and documentation that does exist
Calvin–
#1 The west ridge was in the as stated Hard Black.
GM we are all right we are in the Hard Black.
#2 now the confusion we are on the west ridge descending pre determined escape route.
Were they descending to some other point in the Black they had Identified in the Hard Black?
Of those statements That is what we do Know. If they mean something else BR Frisby Asked Can you see what is going on Some concern here. Answer we are all right we are in the Hard Black.
Musser after the fact in an interview interrupts what he heard to mean they were going a predetermined route to the structures. My point here is he hear traffic that after the fact when GM was found in the canyon Above BSR and during interview add more than he had heard to the answer? It happens with witnesses all the time. And throws things into the mix that do not fit.
Again my fact check.
When evaluating statements after the Fact you need to be vary careful.
We have Frisby’s statements that every thing he herd was that GM was in safe black.
That is where most on the Fire thought GM was.
We have Frisbys statement on the Video at the top of the Canyon looking down on the deployment site…….”Every body’s going to be asking the question what the Fuck were they doing down there?” ( My quote is a little off from the audio).
The Map lay out on this fire is causing some con fusion. For some reason the Map was not laid in a true NORTH direction as is done on most fires I have been on.
It is laid in a West direction which is confusing if you are unaware of the side ways lay out..
Reply to Bob Powers post on February 14, 2015 at 9:26 am
>> Bob Powers said…
>>
>> We have Frisby’s statements that every thing he herd
>> was that GM was in safe black.
Yes… including what we hear him reporting to the “3 Prescotteers” ( Jason Clawson, Aaron Hulburd and KC ‘Bucky’ Yowell ) the moment they pulled up in the BR UTV to meet them in the parking lot of the St. Joseph Shrine.
At that point.. BOTH Brina Frisby AND Trueheart Brown responded to the question “Where’s Granite?” with “They’re in the black”.
>> Bob Powers also said…
>>
>> That is where most on the Fire thought GM was.
Yes.
From OPS1 Todd Abel’s ADOSH interview…
——————————————————————-
A: When – when he was up here and saying my escape route’s been comprised, I’m thinking he’s UP HERE. I’m in TOTAL CONFUSION. I have no idea. Two hundred and fifty acres of black, they’re direct, all they gotta do is step into that. That – that’s where I thought they were at. That’s where EVERYBODY thought they were at.
——————————————————————-
>> Bob Powers also said…
>>
>> We have Frisbys statement on the Video at the top of the
>> Canyon looking down on the deployment site…….”Everybody’s
>> going to be asking the question what the Fuck were they
>> doing down there?” ( My quote is a little off from the audio ).
Yes… a little off… but same ‘paraphrased’ intent.
The video actually CUTS OFF the last part of that statement.
Here is the TRANSCRIPT of that video again complete with the Blue Ridge GPS tracking data that proves the TIME on the video and that Captain Trueheart Brown ( Who was carrying the GPS unit on him at that time ) was THERE at the top of the ridge when Hulburd shot this video.
** AARON HULBURD VIDEO M2U00278.MPG
** Start: 1946 ( 7:46 PM ) ( Approx ) – Length: 8.512 seconds
Short video shot near dark from back at the ‘descent point’.
The video looks back across the box canyon, the Boulder Springs Ranch, and shows spot fires still burning over in the Glen Ilah area.
For June 30, 2013… in Central Arizona…
Sunrise: 5:22 AM
Sunset: 7:42 PM
From BR Captain Brown’s GPS data…
1945 – 34.221022, -112.781755 – Heading west back up to ridge
1946 – 34.221279, -112.782115 – Arrival back on two-track on top of ridge
1947 – 34.221816, -112.782378 – Heading northwest on two-track now
TRANSCRIPT FOR M2U00278
———————————————————————
Video length is 8.512 seconds
+0:01
(Foreground: Unknown): ( For the ?? )
+0:06
(Foreground: Unknown: Captain Brown?): The most lasting question’ll be… ( Video ends abruptly )
END OF VIDEO M2U00278
——————————————————————–
So we don’t actually get to hear what ends that sentence.
Either Hulburd really did stop his recording at that exact point… or the US Forestry Service itself ‘chopped off’ that last part of the released clip.
All we hear is the first half of the statement…
“The most lasting question’ll be… ( video abruptly cuts off )”
…but I would agree with your “Fill in the blank” there.
That sentence was probably finished with something like…
“What the fuck were they even DOING down there?”
Bad typo above. Should have been “Brian Frisby”, not “Brina Frisby”.
Sentence above SHOULD have been…
At that point.. BOTH Brian Frisby AND Trueheart Brown responded to the question “Where’s Granite?” with “They’re in the black”
And that question is what we have been stuck with for or seem ably lasting for 20 months and still counting.
Both Frisby and Brown had been UP there.
They are now only 2 of 3 people left alive that were UP there on that fateful day. The other is McDonough.
We still really have NO IDEA what Frisby, Brown, Marsh and Steed really TALKED about when Frisby and Brown were ‘up there’ from 11:55 AM to 12:25 PM… other than piss-poor briefings, radio tone guard and squelch issues… and could Frisby and Brown give them some cubies and some Gatorade.
I think it’s pretty obvious, though, that neither Marsh nor Steed EVER mentioned the “Boulder Springs Ranch” or that they really were considering it one of their valid ‘safety zones’.
They MAY have pointed out that trail heading SOUTH from the anchor point… but not in terms of it being a valid ‘escape route’ or that it led to something called “Boulder Springs Ranch”.
If any specific conversation like that had happened up there between 11:55 AM and 12:25 PM… then Frisby and Brown wouldn’t have been so confused about the obtuse radio como that was going to fly by ( from Marsh ) later that day.
Likewise… if Gary Cordes had even bothered to give this SECOND Hotshot crew showing up to work that area the same ‘briefing’ he gave to the FIRST Hotshot crew that morning… there might not have been that confusion on Frisby and Brown’s part later that day.
Bottom line is that YES… Frisby and Brown had been UP THERE with Granite that day.
They had SEEN the situation up there with their own eyes.
Regardless of all the obtuse mention on the radio later of ‘escape routes’ and ‘some ranch’… it was still INCONCEIVABLE to them that Granite would have LEFT that location up there when everything started ( literally ) ‘going south’.
Bob, you wrote:
“The Map lay out on this fire is causing some con fusion. For some reason the Map was not laid in a true NORTH direction as is done on most fires I have been on.
It is laid in a West direction which is confusing if you are unaware of the side ways lay out..”
What map are you talking about?
The Incident maps in the documents.
In the Documents File Maps
Clarify The first big Topographic. map is side ways and the true North is wrong.
The second map topographic. is sideways true North is correct on the Right side of map
The rest are set true North at the top.
It dose make things confusing. WTKTT caught it some time back with his Google Maps.
Clarify the first big Topographic map is correct..
OK. Thanks!
I pretty much haven’t looked at them since they first came out. Because……..sideways.
I’ve been relying on pinning points on my map in Google Earth.
I think a lot of the directional references in the radio communications, etc., are pretty vague, to be honest. Which makes some sense to me, at least, given that, mostly, when people are saying them, they’re mostly not looking at a map.
Even during the ADOSH interviews, when they’re trying to put locations on the maps that are included with the interviews (also sideways), there’s a TON of confusion and mis-placement of locations.
On all fires I was on I always tried to have a map Topography or even 1/2 inch to the Mile forest maps over 30 years of flying fixed wing fire recons and on the ground I got really good at locating my self on the small Maps.
The big topo’s were like Heaven. Its hard for the younger generation to realize we did not have Google Earth or even
cell Phones until the late 80’s early 90’s and those were not in communications in many places.
Glad you like the big topos!
I used to draw them for an engineering company.
That’s why sometimes I have trouble with Google Earth. Just show me the contour lines!!!!!
What?
Could you please clarify your thoughts above?
Calvin was repeating what you said in clarification.
Also stating how the map is laid out.
What exactly did you need clarified?
Most on the Fire thought GM was in the Black?
Marsh on west side of fire working thru the Black?
Marsh to Frisby we are all right in the Hard Black?
All statements of record————
Frisbys statement in the last video at the top of the Saddle where the UTV’s were Parked looking down on deployment site. The statement is not word for word I can go back and look it up or you can.
See above. I reproduced that transcript for Hulburd video M2U00278.
The last part of that statement ( which actually sounded more like it was being said by Captain Trueheart Brown rather than BR Sup Frisby ) got ‘cut off’… but I would agree with your “Fill in the blank”.
That statement most likely ended with something like…
“What the fuck were they even DOING down there?”.
Hot Shot Language Four letter words seem to exist in the work site.
From what we can hear in the video captures… Blue Ridge Captain Trueheart Brown is/was very fond of the F-bomb.
Bob
this is from the YIN Roy Hall
Paul Musser called and advised to organize and incident within an incident called Granite. Todd Able reported that the last communication with Eric Marsh was “We are on the west ridge descending a predetermined escape route.” Their communication prior to between Brian Frisbee Blue Ridge and Eric Marsh “we have your one crew member. Can we use him to move vehicles? Can you see what’s going on, are you in a safe area? We are alright, we are in hard black.”
The communication between Frisby and Marsh (were in good black) happened PRIOR to the last communication of We are on the west ridge descending a predetermined escape route.
Again west ridge is in the black very confusing?
The 2 track is on the south ridge in the green.
So the statement you are referencing confusing and
Todd Able was referencing some thing told to him
which was not a direct communication to him and very well his repeated statement may be different
than the original. In other words how many times was it repeated to some one else before it got to ABLE?????
Repeated memory and changed wording
Happens all the time.
West ridge says there location was in the black.
Reply to calvin post on February 14, 2015 at 5:29 am
>> calvin said…
>>
>> Roy Hall’s YIN says this
>>
>> Todd Able reported that the last communication with Eric Marsh was
>> “We are on the west ridge descending a predetermined escape route.”
>> Their communication prior to between Brian Frisbee Blue Ridge and
>> Eric Marsh “we have your one crew member. Can we use him to move
>> vehicles? Can you see what’s going on, are you in a safe area? We are
>> alright, we are in hard black.”
I noticed that you did not also reprint the TIME on that entry in Roy Hall’s YIN note.
It was 1730 ( 5:30 PM ) and some 45 to 50 minutes after deployment.
The ‘Incident Within An Incident” was well under way, and Todd Abel had been put in charge of that. There had already been plenty of time for everyone to ‘compare notes’ and report things TO IWIC Abel about what had been heard over the radio prior to the deployment.
So by the time OPS1 Todd Abel is making this 1730 ‘report’ to IC Roy Hall… it was Todd Abel’s JOB to know these things he’s now reporting to Hall.
That still is no proof Abel was telling Hall things that he had heard in real-time that day.
In OPS1 Todd Abel’s own ADOSH inteview… he says NOTHING about hearing any of these snippets of radio como that other people say THEY were hearing between the 1550 and 1639 timeframe.
OPS1 Abel does tell ADOSH about the conversation he had with Marsh up on the ridge about the shifting weather and the fire… and whether they were ‘in the black’ up there… and Abel puts a TIME on that conversation of about 1545. It is still unclear if Abel is referencing the 1550 Caldwell conversation around that time. Abel does NOT mention to ADOSH that he told them to “Hunker and be safe… Keep ME informed… etc.”
But regardless… OPS1 Abel then makes NO MENTION whatsoever of overhearing ANY other ‘snippets’ of radio como about “predetermined escape routes” or “going to the ranch”.
The only NEXT radio como Abel admits to hearing with anyone from Granite Mountain speaking on the radio is the start of the MAYDAY traffic at 1639.
He then tells ADOSH that as that MAYDAY traffic continued and it then became obvious what was happening… he was TOTALLY CONFUSED.
OPS1 Todd Abel says ( unequivocally ) he had NO IDEA they had ‘moved’ away from the anchor point and the safe black.
From Todd Abel’s ADOSH interview…
NOTE: Once again… at this point in the interview they are all looking at MAPS… and when Todd Abell says “I’m thinking he’s UP HERE”, he is pointing at the ANCHOR POINT.
Q1 = Dave Larsen, WFA / ADOSH investigator ( Rest in Peace )
A = OPS1 Todd Abel
Here he is reporting about his TOTAL CONFUSION when MAYDAY traffic appeared…
—————————————————————————————–
2374 Q1: Okay. So when you’re hearing the, my escape route has been cut off, can you
2375 talk about that?
2376
2377 A: Mm-hm.
2378
2379 Q1: Somebody recorded that.
2380
2381 A: Yep.
2382
2383 Q1: Talk to me about what you think he was referring to?
2384
2385 A: I mean I can give you – I don’t know, but I can give you Todd’s – Todd Abel’s
2386 opinion. Knowing – knowing where they’re at now.
2387
2388 Q1: Okay. Right.
2389
2390 A: You know? When – when he was up here and saying my escape route’s been
2391 comprised, I’m thinking he’s up here. I’m in total confusion, I have no idea.
2392 Two hundred and fifty acres of black, they’re direct, all they gotta do is step
2393 into that. That – that’s where I thought they were at. That’s where everybody
2394 thought they were at.
—————————————————————————————-
And here is Abel talking about the ‘ground rescue’ effort and how it was
focused on the ‘anchor point’ because that was their ‘last known location’
and HE ( and Blue Ridge and “everyone” ) thought that’s where they were…
—————————————————————————————
2262 After the deployment they were waiting for this fire
2263 to get through Yarnell, calm down a little bit and then they were gonna work
2264 their way up to go find the Granite Mountain sho- Hotshots. Also in that
2265 group with those three guys was Brian Frisby the superintendent from Blue
2266 Ridge Hotshots and his Captain True Brown, so there was five guys total. All
2267 right, um, at that point, once they were able to get through – I was in radio
2268 communication with them, once they worked their way through, everybody
2269 went up to here.
2270
2271 Q1: Okay.
2272
2273 A: To the ridge.
2274
2275 Q1: Right.
2276
2277 A: That was the last known location. I had no idea they’d left that location. Blue
2278 Ridge Hotshots were working in the same area and thought they were up in
2279 this location.
2280
2281 Q1: Blue Ridge thought they were there?
2282
2283 A: Mm-hm. The helicopters thought they were there, air attack thought they
2284 were there, everybody thought they were right here, including myself.
—————————————————————————————-
OPS1 Todd Abel specifically says…
“I had NO IDEA they’d left that location”.
>> calvin also says…
>>
>> Musser and Able YIN 7/6
>>
>> Musser hears radio traffic from Eric Marsh, Granite Mountain, that said “they
>> were going to pre-determined route to the structures”. Musser was not sure
>> who that radio traffic was sent to?
Yes. Musser even talks more about this in his ADOSH interview.
It can be assumed here that Musser is referring to that “Granite Mountain, what’s your status right now?” exchange as captured in the 1616 Panebaker Air Study Video.
That’s the radio capture where Eric Marsh is clearly heard responding to this “Mystery person” who had just asked him for a status report.
ADOSH actually pressed Musser about this “Mystery person” who had been the one ASKING Granite Mountain to report their ‘status’.
OPS2 Paul Musser bascially had NO IDEA who that person was… and to this day… we still don’t know WHO was calling Granite Mountain at 4:16 PM and asking them for STATUS.
It would still be someone who appeared to have a slight Cajun accent since the actual radio query sounded more like this…
“Granite Montun…. wuz yo status rat now?”
NOTE: So there is no doubt OPS2 Paul Musser overheard some of these snippets of radio como ( as did others like Eric Tarr ) in the 1550 to 1639 timeframe… but still no proof that OPS1 Todd Abel heard any of it.
But even if he ( Abel ) did… none of these ‘obtuse’ radio como snippets represent any kind of normal and official communication that one would EXPECT to take place between a ‘Division Supervisor’ on a fire and his DIRECT Operations Level Supervisor telling him a Division is being abandoned and resources are being moved from one Division to another during a dangerous, dynamic fire situation.
>> calvin also said…
>>
>> It sure would be nice if we stayed focused on what we DO know
>> from the information, and documentation that does exist
It would also be nice to add context when it exists… such as the fact that whatever OPS1 “Incident Within An Incident” Todd Abel was telling Roy Hall at 1730 does NOT represent proof that he heard those radio conversations himself… in REAL TIME. He had already had plenty of time to hear about these things from others around him who had been reporting to HIM.what THEY had heard.
WTK said
It was 1730 ( 5:30 PM ) and some 45 to 50 minutes after deployment.
The ‘Incident Within An Incident” was well under way, and Todd Abel had been put in charge of that. There had already been plenty of time for everyone to ‘compare notes’ and report things TO IWIC Abel about what had been heard over the radio prior to the deployment
If there had been no radio transmissions from GM/Marsh, Able would have had nothing to report to Roy Hall @ 1730.
You are helping to make my point that Marsh and GM were not out sneaking around the backcountry.
WTK said
It can be assumed here that Musser is referring to that “Granite Mountain, what’s your status right now?” exchange as captured in the 1616 Panebaker Air Study Video.
That is a mighty big assumption. But if Musser heard it (even if it wasn’t directed to him), that is just further proof that there was communication from Marsh, et al
Reply to calvin post on February 14, 2015 at 10:45 am
>> calvin said…
>>
>> If there had been no radio transmissions from GM/Marsh,
>> Able would have had nothing to report to Roy Hall @ 1730.
I agree. You aren’t reading my responses to this thread very well.
I AGREE that there WERE these ‘obtuse’ pieces of radio como flying around between 1545 and 1639, prior to the actual deployment.
I AGREE that any number of people heard some/all of these ‘snippets’.
I do NOT AGREE that just because some people reported hearing them… that that means Eric Marsh’s direct line supervisor heard them in real time as well… or that they constitute any kind of normal, expected reporting from a DIVS to his OPS about what he is DOING…. and WHY he is doing it.
>> calvin also said…
>>
>> You are helping to make my point that Marsh and GM were
>> not out sneaking around the backcountry.
Not really.
Serious questions remain about whether they fully intended for everyone who was SUPPOSED to know WHAT the were doing… and WHY they were doing it.
People like their OWN DIRECT SUPERVISOR ( OPS1 Todd Abel ).
OPS1 Todd Abel did NOT KNOW they were ‘moving’… and they appeared to not give a shit whether he did, or not.
I don’t know WHAT to call that kind of behavior.
Every time Marsh ( or Steed ) just said “escape route” or “ranch”… they might have actually THOUGHT the person they were talking to knew what they hell they were talking about…
…but ONLY SPGS1 Gary Cordes actually did.
If they were not INTENTIONALLY trying to make it hard for everyone they were communicating with to FULLY understand WHAT they were doing… or WHY they were doing it… and HOW they were going about it… then you sure coulda fooled me.
Even SAIT Co-Lead Mike Dudley said ( to that roomful of firefighters in Utah on June 20, 2014 ) that it was astounding how badly people were using their radios that day. There was a lot of TALK… but very little actual COMMUNICATION going on.
>> calvin also said…
>>
>> It can be assumed here that Musser is referring to that
>> “Granite Mountain, what’s your status right now?” exchange
>> as captured in the 1616 Panebaker Air Study Video.
>>
>> That is a mighty big assumption.
I don’t think so.
What other radio como do you know of that had BOTH of the things that Musser was referring to in it? I’m talking about radio como that had BOTH the phrases “escape route” and “structures” in it.
That’s what Musser is reporting hearing.
That’s what is in the 1616 Panebaker radio capture.
It also matches the TIME that Musser says he heard these words.
>> calvin also said…
>>
>> But if Musser heard it (even if it wasn’t directed to him), that
>> is just further proof that there was communication from Marsh, et al
Yes. I agree.
We all know it is absolute HORSESHIT that there was any kind of 30 to 40 minute BLACKOUT with regards to direct communications with Granite Mountain… as originally reported by the SAIR.
That became obvious a LOOONG time ago.
What we STILL don’t know is WHO some of these ‘mysterious voices’ are that we can actually HEAR communication directly with Granite Mountain.
I also think it is quite bizarre that even OPS2 Paul Musser himself doesn’t know who was on the radio and who he was hearing talking to Granite.
That’s just really weird.
What… does that mean there were still actually OTHER people there in Yarnell with radios that day talking to Granite Mountain… and we still don’t even know WHO they were?
The poor communication issues described by Dudley could have applied to any number of people on the fire that day.
Like when AA Collins tells B33 there is a wind shift and the south side of the fire needs “checked”.
It never happened, and the fire blew through Glen isla.
Calvin the South side of the Fire at that time was
east to west from Glen Isla not to BSR when the wind shifted. Around 1620 to 1630.
Well stated and organized can always count on you.
This all goes back over and over of Elizabeth trying to.
say or prove Marsh told people clearly what they GM were doing.
Yet we have no actual discussion between Marsh and any one specific. and no statements of a discussion between Marsh and any given person other than I over herd this.
Which is really pieces and parts. These may or may not be relevant taken separately.
And we chase the same Rabbits Again.
There is still all the evidence in the world that Eric Marsh was making it DIFFICULT for people he was communicating with to understand WHAT he was doing… HOW he he was going about it… and WHY he was even doing it.
I don’t know what to call that.
He was asked directly ( by some mysterious person on the ground ) what Granite Mountain’s STATUS was ( at 4:16 ).
He mentions ‘escape routes from this morning” and ‘mid-slope, cuttin’ over… but never himself mentions ‘Boulder Springs Ranch’.
Insufficient information.
He was then asked seconds later if he was physically WITH the Granite Mountain Crew ( as apparently ASM2 asked someone to ask him because THEY” wanted to know ).
He dodges the question.
All he says is…
“Jus’ checkin’ it out to see where we’re gonna jump out at.”
That was NOT a direct answer to the direct question he was asked… and the mysterious caller on the ground ‘let it go’ and didn’t follow up asking for a REAL answer to the question.
REAL answers to that question would have been.
“Yes. I am with Granite Mountain down here in this box canyon just west of the Boulder Springs Ranch”
OR
“No. I am scouting ahead in the box canyon, about 600 yards west of the Boulder Springs Ranch. Granite Mountain is still hiking off the ridge.”
I actually hope they DO get into some of this during Brendan McDonough’s under-oath testimony / cross-examination on February 26.
Was Eric Marsh ALWAYS this ‘obtuse’ and ‘uncommunicative’… or was something really strange going on just that particular day.
WTKTT,
“Was Eric Marsh ALWAYS this ‘obtuse’ and ‘uncommunicative’… or was something really strange going on just that particular day.”
Maybe not always but certainly common enough. Even those that filled in on GMHS called this disingenuous type of behavior, ‘classic Marsh.’
Test1
YIN 7/6 Musser and Able says
Musser hears radio traffic from Eric Marsh, Granite Mountain, that said “they were going to pre-determined route to the structures”. Musser was not sure who that radio traffic was sent to?
When Roy Hall was interviewed on July 8 , by the SAIT, he says
Todd Able reported that the last communication with Eric Marsh was “We are on the west ridge descending a predetermined escape route.”
Obtuse, secretive.
Come on guys!
Carrying this over from Chapter XI replying to a WTKKTT post dated February 13, 2013 at 1053 AM
“Robert the Second says
February 13, 2015 at 2:01 pm
WTKTT,
Outstanding rebuttal on all counts! She continues to have NO clue what she is talking about and in classical Logical Phallacy delusional fashion, even uses her own Straw Man fallacy to attempt it. So predictable.
Once again, outstanding and accurate points made here.
Fire Order Number 7 CLEARLY states to: “Maintain PROMPT communications with your forces, YOUR SUPERVISOR, and adjoining forces.” Marsh NEVER did this. Marsh NEVER directly radios his supervisor(s) (Abel or Musser) of his intention and/or his actions or those of the GMHS. Classic Marsh!
And who is ‘Fred’? There is NO one on this with that name. Only in the mind of the delusional it appears. And the multiple personalities in the mind of the delusional as well.
I also want to point out that the GMHS safety violations regarding improper PPE, i.e. sleeves rolled up, is an ATTITUDE thing. “It’s not going to happen to me/us, therefore …” Bad Decisions With Prior Good Outcomes – Normalization of Deviance. Yes, there are photos/videos of others doing the same, however, that is the classic Straw Man Fallacy.
Elizabeth says
February 13, 2015 at 3:35 pm
Robert-the-Second said “And who is ‘Fred’? There is NO one on this with that name. Only in the mind of the delusional it appears. And the multiple personalities in the mind of the delusional as well.”
You are kidding, right? You honestly are not aware of anyone who posts on this website using multiple made-up names whose REAL name is Fred (or Fredrick or some such)?
Reply
Robert the Second says
February 13, 2015 at 5:38 pm
Elizabeth,
Correct, I am “NOT aware of anyone who posts on this website using multiple made-up names whose REAL name is Fred (or Fredrick or some such)..” I empathize with your delusional disability. There is hope for you though with educated and trained professionals in that field. There is hope. There is NO Fred that posts on THIS site – only in YOUR mind.
WARNING: DO NOT GIVE ELIZABETH/LOGICAL PHALLACY YOUR EMAIL BECAUSE SHE WILL USE IT AGAINST YOU. YOU WILL BE SORRY. SHE WILL STALK YOU.”
Reply to Robert the Second (RTS) post on February 13, 2015 at 7:25 pm
>> RTS said…
>>
>> Fire Order Number 7 CLEARLY states to: “Maintain PROMPT communications
>> with your forces, YOUR SUPERVISOR, and adjoining forces.” Marsh NEVER did
>> this. Marsh NEVER directly radios his supervisor(s) (Abel or Musser) of his
>> intention and/or his actions or those of the GMHS.
Not only did he NOT directly radio either one of his active OPS Supervisors that day and fully detail his plans ( and/or intentions )… one of the disturbing things that might yet be revealed is that he might have ALREADY been heading south to the Boulder Springs Ranch BEFORE he had that 1550 conversation with OPS1 Todd Abel ( as captured in the Caldwell video ).
If Marsh really did decide they were all going to just “get the hell out of there” as soon as they saw Brendan evacuating his lookout position and as soon as Marsh knew that Frisby was cancelling the face-to-face up at the anchor point…
…then that means Marsh had already decided to ‘take off’ and ‘work his way off the top’ and down towards the Boulder Springs Ranch before OPS1 Abel even called HIM at 1550.
That will mean that (apparently) WHILE he was was talking to his direct supervisor OPS1 Abel… he still did NOT tell Abel what he was really doing and what his plans and intentions were.
When we hear OPS1 Todd Abel ( with our own ears ) tell Marsh to….
1) Hunker and be safe.
2) Keep ME informed.
…Marsh might have already been well on his way to ‘scout out’ the fastest way to the Boulder Springs Ranch, with every intention of bringing GM that way, and he did NOT mention ANY of this to OPS1 Todd Abel.
If the timing works out that way… that’s going to be really quite disturbing.
Perhaps whatever it is that Brendan McDonough now wants to ‘get off his chest’ will shed a little more light on the exact TIMING here.
Here is what the lawyers for Arizona Forestry have already told ADOSH ALJ ( Administrative Law Judge ) Michael A. Mosesso they have every reason to believe Brendan McDonough is GOING to TESTIFY to on February 26, 2015…
From the Arizona Forestry Lawyers’ letter to Judge Mosesso…
———————————————————————————
Mr. McDonough is believed to have information relating to the decision made by GMIHC to move from the “black”, i.e. the large, burned-out area where GMIHC was working and which was the primary safety zone for GMIHC, to the box canyon that ultimately became their deployment site.
It is EXPECTED that Mr. McDonough will testify as to events that took place involving GMIHC on the afternoon of June 30, 2013, specifically DURING the timeframe that GMIHC moved from the “black” toward Helms Ranch, and MOMENTS PRIOR to GMIHC’s deployment.
It is ALSO EXPECTED that Mr. McDonough will testify as to the whereabouts of Eric Marsh, Jesse Steed, and the other crewmembers of GMIHC on the afternoon of June 30, 2013, as well as radio communications between the later Eric Marsh, the GMIHC Superintendent, and the late Jesse Steed, GMIHC Crew Chief, DURING the MOVE from the “black” and MOMENTS BEFORE deployment.
———————————————————————————
Here is the relevant quote from the lawyer’s letter to Judge Mosesso…
“It is ALSO EXPECTED that Mr. McDonough will testify as to the WHEREABOUTS of Eric Marsh, Jesse Steed, and the other crewmembers of GMIHC on the afternoon of June 30, 2013″.
So maybe we really will find out, once and for all, WHERE Eric Marsh really was at certain points that day… and what “making my way off the top” REALLY meant circa 1550 when he was talking to his DIRECT SUPERVISOR… OPS1 Todd Abel.
I’m not sure which is going to be worse.
If “Making my way off the top” just meant Marsh was north of GM circa 1550 and still working his way back south to the anchor point… that means Marsh/Steed decided to abandon the safe black ( and their Division ) AFTER talking with OPS1 Abel and being TOLD to “Hunker and be SAFE”… but still made a conscious choice to not even inform him of their ‘new’ decision to pay no attention to that directive.
If “Making my way off the top” actually meant Marsh had ALREADY decided to go scout the escape route to the Boulder Springs Ranch, and that he already had every intention of taking GM off the fire that way PRIOR to 1550… then that means WHILE Marsh was actually talking to his DIRECT SUPERVISOR he made a conscious choice to NOT tell him what his real plans and intentions already were.
WTKTT,
Once again, very good points, more accurate than you know.
Regarding the FAILURE to PROMPTLY notify his supervisor(s) OPS Musser and/or Able, I allege this is/was fairly common knowledge of CLASSIC Marsh actions/behavior, being DISINGENUOUS, COY, SNEAKY, whatever word you choose, when it came to him allowing and/or wanting the overhead – any overhead – to know the GMHS INTENTIONS, POSITION and/or LOCATION and/or WHAT THE GMHS WAS ENGAGED IN.
I think we will discover that Marsh was at The Ranch (BSR) calling Steed on their Crew Net to bring the Crew down to The Ranch; and Steed told him at least three (3) times, “we’re in the black,” and then finally he gave in and took the Crew down into the unburned chutes, chimneys, and the bowl/box canyon
RTS,
From a lessons learned standpoint, and moving into the future How/What do we do with crews that take the same approach as Marsh with communication (or lack of)? Through out my career I have had crews that have taken the same “off the radar” approach with overhead – not really wanting anyone else to know what they were doing or their location. Don’t get me wrong, these crews were few and far between, but its not just GM playing this game, so how does that get fixed for the future? The” off radar” approach has never set well with me, and this certainly reinforces my feelings on that. It seems the Wildland Firefighting “system” needs to be looked at from a perspective of Annual Resource Review from someone other than the host Forest. Performance evaluations currently go back to the home agency, with a copy in the Incident Doc Box – does that really provide the feedback needed to remedy an issue. Lets see, I”m a chief, I receive a poor review on my type 1 crew. What should I do? I will certainly discuss it with the Supervisor, but do I want to make a statement Nationally that they are poor performers? NO, OF COURSE NOT! I know, word of mouth and the rumor mill gets some unofficial word out, but I think the system needs some tweaking to hold these resources more accountable for their “rogue’ actions and attitudes. .
RW38,
Good comments and questions. I think that there are all types of resources that engage in these ‘rogue’ actions and attitudes – more than you know – from overhead to Engines to Crews and more. I allege that the GMHS was an extreme case in this behavior and did it on a regular basis.
Some refer to it as ‘going dark.’ It’s usually used when the plan doesn’t makes sense and so the supervisor is scouting for a better route or the weather is changing and the resource overhead are deciding on a different plan or they may even be just ‘dragging their feet,’ just waiting for things to improve more to their liking. It’s generally when ‘the plan’ doesn’t make sense and/or it’s not safe. They may have even collaborated with other resources that feel the same way about ‘the plan’ and they are all just trying to figure things out and come up with a better plan and/or waiting for weather, and therefore fire behavior conditions to improve. They are (or should be) monitoring the tactical and command frequencies, thus more-or-less complying with Fire Order #7 to maintain communications. They’re just not directly and promptly contacting their supervisor as Fire Order #7 requires.
Definitely engage the supervisor(s) of the resource(s), ask them what is going on and why. Calling BS on them if they’re not forthright and then getting them to suggest what they have in mind or their intentions. Then for sure inform your supervisor about what’s going on. And worst case, I suppose you could always file a SAFENET and document it that way. Many of these supervisors, even though merely serving in a Single Resource Boss capacity have either higher IQCS qualifications and/or a better sense of what needs to be done. It goes back to Watch Out #19 – Death From Above that starts with incompetent, inexperienced, unsafe, or whatever overhead. It’s basically a trust issue. We have to trust our overhead to follow their orders.
RTS.
I think you are right. I think Marsh was at the BSR, and returned to his crew. I also believe there is evidence that there were other WFF’s there also.
Per Byron Kimball’s YIN
“Eric being into the helm ranch…Cortez pat was talking to individual. Crew was wking towards us Eric heard on crew net and left.
I know that this could represent medic Eric Tarr. And the YIN are written so poorly, who knows.
But I do not think Eric Tarr would have been talking to the BR guys on crew net. They had a separate channel for the Granite incident, right?
WTKTT said in regards to Div A:
“Not only did he NOT directly radio either one of his active OPS Supervisors that day and fully detail his plans ( and/or intentions )… ”
We have discussed this before, but……
The Incident Command System only allows an entity to have one supervisor, PERIOD.
On an incident that requires “Operational” supervision in more than one area, “Branches” are formed, with one Ops Chief, over the 2 or more Branches. In the case of the YHF, the 2 separate (Branch) areas would have still have needed ONE supervisor over them, which at the time due to the limited resources, could have been the IC, but as we know, he was totally disengaged from all operational activities that day.
The other ABSOLUTE REQUIREMENT for splitting Operations into separate geographical areas is that ALL resources MUST be made aware of this new development, and to which specific (ONE, AND ONLY ONE) supervisor they will be reporting to.
The reasons for having only one clearly defined supervisor became once again, painfully obvious at YH. Whether one worked in Div A or Z (the ONLY two actual Divisions on the fire), the chain of command was cloudy, at best, and changed so much during the day that by the end of the day, no one knew who was supposed to be telling them what to do.
Thank you. That really helps. I have spent, along with you all, some time, periodically, trying to figure out why Marsh quit clearly communicating with Abel after 3:50 PM. I was mostly thinking that by then he had totally quit trusting (for a number of good reasons) the Overhead, including Abel, who was probably a good friend of his.
And I haven’t been totally comfortable with this uber-focus on Eric’s evasive/sloppy communication as being, somehow, unique on this fire. Most of the communication I’ve heard etc on this fire has been amazingly sloppy, to me. Like I’ve said before, if this had been the restaurant I worked at in Flagstaff, EVERYBODY would have been FIRED for it.
OR his “rogue behavior.” Quite frankly, in my humble opinion, by that time on that fire, mostly everybody that did’t have any supervisor/overhead telling them exactly what to do (which was a lot of people) was HAVING to go rogue, because the Overhead was stretched so thin they pretty much had no clue what was going on anywhere except right in front of their eyes.
And it kinda sorta begs the question that’s been in my mind for quite awhile now. How much did Paul Musser (who was by then OPS Division A over both Marsh and Cordes, not to mention Blue Ridge) know of Gary Cordes’ “Plan”? And, also, how much did Paul Musser actually have SA as to what the fire behavior etc was on the ridge side of the fire? Probably not much all things considered. And I don’t think Cordes had much either. But I do want to know whose heads contained any of Cordes’ “Plan Slides.” And what would be the implications of that.
This reply affords me the opportunity to do what I’ve not really had time to do until now (and I don’t really have a lot of time now) to thank everybody for their thoughts and support over the past week. I really appreciate it. My mom actually died early Feb 4. I wrote that little February 9 note on Facebook while I was just sitting at my computer late at night trying to get a bead on what I was actually feeling. I’ve cried WAY more tears over the Granite Mountain 19 than I probably will over my mom. At least she got to live to almost 93 and a half years old.
One memorial service down and one more to go, along with emptying my mom’s apartment by mid-March, is about all the coherent thinking I can initiate, so I probably won’t be doing a lot of commenting unless what I want to say is relatively quick and easy for awhile.
But I did spend all day yesterday reading back over the past four days worth of comments, which I had not had time to read. WHEW!! I’ve had lots of reactions, but I couldn’t figure out how to write them.
Oh, and one more question that emerged in my addled brain overnight is:
How much power does ADOSH have to force testimony, in their investigation, by the Federal employees? i.e. in particular USFS and BLM? Or Rory Collins? Are they limited to just Arizona participants?
There are, to my knowledge, no back-and-forth communications in their collection with any of these entities.
OK It’s off to the races for me. BUT I AM reading. Have been all along.
So Marti is in agreement with Elizabeth that Musser was the OPS over Marsh and Cordes.
Interesting
I just expressed my agreement with, not Elizabeth, but TTWARE, that what he is saying, from the experience of a fire-fighter, would make sense here, and would help make some other things make sense.
And it was only via reading TTWARE’s comment, that I STARTED realizing that. Up until the moment I read that, I had NEVER even THOUGHT about that as a possibility.
It also make all the upstream wrangling over Eric’s non-communication with Todd Abel………..kinda moot. It also raises a HOST of other DIFFERENT questions.
Technically… the moment there were now TWO active ‘Field OPS’ running the same fire… then YES… they BOTH had ‘equal authority’ over the resources on the fire ( DIVS, SPGS, etc. ).
That’s just part of the total screw-up at that fire.
What if any DIVS or SPGS on that fire had received TWO different radio calls within seconds of each other.
One from OPS Abel telling them to do one thing.
One from OPS Musser telling them to do the opposite.
Which ‘command’ are they supposed to obey?
What… are you supposed to get the IC involved at that point and say “Who the hell am I supposed to be taking orders from?”
What was going on in my head after reading TTWARE’s comment was hmmmmmmm. If what he is saying is normally the case, which I’m sure it is, it would make sense for the two, Abel and Musser, to have at least roughly divided the fire geographically (in their heads), with Abel Field Ops for “DivZ” ie everything somewhat east (and seriously north) of the bowl, and Musser Field Ops for DivA ie everything from the Ridge over thru the bowl thru most of Yarnell proper and south from there.
Which seems to me pretty much what happened. Which might be why Marsh/Steed no longer considered Abel their DeFacto Supervisor/Overhead and were thinking Musser (who I don’t think had much SA of that area at that time) was more their OPS. For whatever that, all things considered, was worth.
So far, at this point we don’t know if that geographic divvying up of the fire between the two Field Ops had formally been communicated to DivA/Granite Mountain, or anybody else. But that’s pretty much what was happening, it seems to me.
That’s why Musser left Sickles Road and headed south toward Yarnell. And was focused on assessing resources in that area. And meeting with Cordes. And he had plenty of time to make a quick drive further southwest on 89 to that Yarnell area and back again and then up Shrine Road to get a quick view of things. Not that there’s any evidence he did that, but I have always wondered what Musser was doing during all that time.
I think he was, in fact, focused on that area of the fire and Abel was focused on the areas east and north. And, actually there was another Division up there, which became more important that night and during the next day.
Which leaves room, still, for begging the question:
How much did/didn’t Musser (essentially Cordes’ Supervisor/Overhead) know about “The Cordes Plan”? As long as everybody’s talking about “Rogue” stuff, how “Rogue” was that plan?
Was Cordes putting it together with or without consulting Musser? Maybe it wasn’t “Rogue” at all. Maybe it was seriously “Rogue.” Either of those possibilities has very different implications and consequences.
I’m just trying to look at everything through that somewhat different lens.
At what point did Able commit himself on the north side for the long haul?
I don’t think the fire was intended to be divided up between the 2 Ops people.
I have a theory that can either be supported or debunked by the comparison of some event times which I am not sure of at this moment.
My theory is that Able was handling the whole fire, as was his job, until the radio traffic from AA saying the crews on the north apparently did not have good SA and the fire was about to cut off their escape route.
I think that when Able heard that, he headed north to make sure he didn’t lose some people and ended up getting hung-up up there.
Then when the fire blew south, Musser stepped-in to ram-rod that area out of “necessity”, without having previously discussed it, OR worked out the details, OR MADE ALL OF THEIR PERSONEL AWARE OF IT.
So, as my theory goes, it was the life safety issues on the north that started the ball rolling, leading to a more chaotic command structure on the south, creating additional life safety issues in multiple areas there.
I don’t totally agree with all the details of your theory. But, generally, a qualified yes.
I’m keystoning off of Aaron’s video M2U00261. Aaron’s shooting that video from the Command Center parking lot. Abel (and the correct spelling is ABEL not ABLE) is flying reconnaissance and talking, at first with Cory Moser. Telling him the fire’s endangering them and Moser is saying they’re burning out while getting out.
This was about 2:30 PM. I think this is a bit later than when AA B3 was warning them and expressing that concern that he didn’t think they had situational awareness.
They did manage to evacuate without fanfare, apparently.
After the convo with Moser, Abel talks with Musser, telling him what’s going on and telling him there are about eight structures to the NW that are most likely to be hit. There’s a bunch of noise. I can’t tell if Abel tells Musser there are resources there (which there are).
Then Moser ties back in, saying he copied that.
I think the concern, from this, on Abel’s part is not so much Willis’ operation, which was ending, but the fact that there were houses spread out in the path of the fire in the Model Creek Road area.
I think that’s why, after he landed, he headed up there and began concentrating first on that area.
At that time, Musser was still at the Command Post, where Marquez had, relatively speaking, just told him that DivA/Granite Mountain’s assignment was effectively moot (without telling him about Bravo 3’s concern that the fire was going to turn and run uphill to Yarnell that afternoon and Yarnell needed to be evacuated). According to Marquez, Musser essentially ignored what he was telling him about DivA/Granite Mountain’s situation.
From here I’m writing off my head, with no notes.
I think it’s sometime after Abel’s convo with him that Musser headed out from the Command Post, first to Sickles Road, where a bunch of structures were threatened and AA was doing drops and such, and various crews were “roguingly” doing structure protection, and then he headed down toward Yarnell. During that drive he asks DivA/GM if they were available and then he met up with Cordes about 3:50 on 89.
So, yeah, it’s possible the defacto roughly geographical divvying up of the fire between Abel and Musser was happening as those things were happening.
Marti,
Thanks for clarifying some of those times and events.
You seem to have a better grasp of a lot of that stuff than I do
I just have a piece of software that allows me to data-base and compare all the visual data. Which I have been doing, so I’m pretty familiar with what things looked and sounded like when.
The point I was trying to make in the last chapter was that all crews do not adhere to every rule/regulation every minute of every day.
The evidence is on the Youtube videos.
Having said that, I feel it is unfair to toss Granite Mountain “under the bus” because they did not have their sleeves down or their gloves on.
Maybe they just forgot, after all they are humans. I don’t believe it was blatant disregard for safety policy and procedures.
If this year anyone of these hotshot crews in the 2014 videos has a significant injury, will they be thrown to the wolves because of some of these tidbits and called “rebels/rogues/renegades/cowboys/loose cannon/safety naysayers”.. I hope not.
I think some people are making too much of the GM sleeves and gloves issue.
I admit, I have been known to take off my hart hat, when having lunch at a staging area on teh fireline. Does that make me not safety conscious? Nope… But to the other extreme I don’t run around on fires in shorts and flip flops either (that would be blatant disregard)…