Please begin Chapter XI comments here.
Chapter I, Chapter II, Chapter II supplement, Chapter III, Chapter IV, Chapter V, Chapter VI, Chapter VII, Chapter VIII , Chapter IX and Chapter X.
© Copyright 2014 John Dougherty, All rights Reserved. Written For: Investigative MEDIA
There is a new chapter
Direct ‘jumplink’ to the new CHAPTER 12 ( TWELVE ) is…
http://www.investigativemedia.com/yarnell-hill-fire-chapter-xii/
Reply to calvin post on February 13, 2015 at 4:01 pm
NOTE: Brought up from a thread somewhere down below.
>> calvin said…
>>
>> You know B33 had a pretty good idea where GM was.
>> He heard they were moving to a SZ. He possibly heard they were
>> moving towards Yarnell as did Eric Tarr.
Possibly… yes.
Matter of fact… the transmission(s) ( plural ) that Eric Tarr accidentally overheard while standing next to Helicopter Ranger 58 ( at approx 1630, according to Tarr ) were BOTH (supposedly) transmitted directly TO B33 ‘Air Attack’ on the “Air-To-Ground” channel, and the ‘call-sign’ being used by the ‘transmitter’ for BOTH of these transmissions was “Granite Mountain 7” and NOT “Division Alpha”.
This most LIKELY means these TWO transmissions on the A2G channel were originating from Jesse Steed ( or someone else in the GM7 crew ) and NOT DIVSA Eric Marsh himself… who was ( right up until his death ) preceding HIS radio calls with call-sign “Division Alpha” that afternoon.
We also know that the way French and Burfiend had decided to handle the ‘Lead Plane/Air Attack ‘double duty’ that got dropped into their laps at 1558 was to have French concentrate on the A2A channel and Burfiend concentrate on the A2G channel.
So if these TWO transmissions from ( probably Steed ) went up to ‘Air Attack’ on A2G… then it WAS John Burfiend who most likely heard BOTH of them.
The FULL content of BOTH of those transmission(s) has never been fully proven or fully reported by anyone. Not even by Burfiend.
Eric Tarr himself doesn’t even fully recall the transmission(s).
To the best of his recollection… he overhead TWO sequential calls from caller “Granite Mountain 7” in the 1630 timeframe but all he could recall hearing was…
1) He ( GM7 ) advised on the radio they were moving towards Yarnell in the black
( Just a few seconds?/minutes? later )
2) He ( GM7 ) came back up on the radio advising they were heading to a ranch they had in sight.
For the sake of completeness…
Here are those relevant ‘cuts’ regarding BOTH of those ‘GM7’ transmissions
from DPS Officer/Paramedic Eric Tarr’s signed deposition in document
“M-Law-Enforcement no-redactions.pdf”
———————————————————————————————–
EMERGENCY RADIO TRAFFIC
Around 1630 hours I was standing near the aircraft ( Helicopter Ranger 58 ) monitoring traffic on channel Air-To-Ground ( A/G ) 16 when I heard a voice come up on the radio with a Call sign of Granite Mountain 7. He advised on the radio that they were moving towards Yarnell in the black.
A short time later he came back up on the radio advising they were heading to a ranch they had in sight.
It was shortly after THAT Granite Mountain 7 came back up on the radio sounding excited, out of breath, and repeatedly clearing Air Attack with no response.
Granite Mountain 7 (then) advised their escape route had been cut off and they were deploying their shelters.
SEARCH FOR GRANITE MOUNTAIN HOTSHOTS
I saw the ranch house appear through the smoke and knew the Firefighters had said they were trying to get to a ranch house from their prior radio transmissions. We began searching toward the Ranch house from the ridgeline when I located a group of deployed fire shelters off the nose of the aircraft at approximately 1810 hours.
——————————————————————————–
>> calvin also said…
>>
>> And when he finally answers the frantic calls from the trapped WFF’s. He doesn’t
>> even ask where they are. He says in his own words. So you are on the south side
>> of the fire, right?
Correct… but it’s also possible he made that simple assumption by just recalling the FIRST MAYDAY from Captain Jesse Steed when he yelled into the radio “We are in FRONT of the FLAMING FRONT”.
The ‘flaming front’ WAS now heading almost ‘due south’ at that point.
Anyone’s ‘best guess’ at that time as to what that simple statement meant as far as a possible location goes might have been “So… you’re on the SOUTH side of the fire, then?”
I see what you are trying to establish… and I actually DO believe that ‘Bravo 33’ DID see them (previously) ‘behind those hills there’ right before they asked someone to call them and see if “Division Alpha’ was with them and we then get the 4:16 PM “Granite Mountain… what’s your status right now?” call from some ‘mystery caller’…
…but taking JUST the MAYDAY / DEPLOYMENT radio traffic all by itself I still think the same “So… you’re on the SOUTH side of the fire, then?” assumption would have been anyone’s ‘best guess’ just based on that transmission sequence alone.. at THAT time.
>> calvin also said…
>>
>> And as Elizabeth said. The bodies of the GMIHC were found as
>> soon as the smoke cleared enough for Ranger 58 to get into that valley.
Unless you think a DPS Officer’s signed deposition is somehow ‘false’ or being ‘made up’… then YES… there is really NO QUESTION that the reason DPS Helicopter Ranger 58 was finally able to locate the deployment site is because DPS officer Eric Tarr really DID overhear someone ( Steed? ) say something over the A2G channel about a ‘ranch’ in the 1630 timeframe.
Okay… all that being said…
Was there some kind of POINT you were trying to make?
I really don’t see one.
My best ‘guess’ at a ‘point’ y0u might have been trying to make might be along the lines of…
“There is evidence that Eric Tarr heard someone say they were heading to a ranch… and there is evidence that ‘Bravo 33’ also kinda-sorta knew where they were.”
And?…. So??….
Are you ALSO trying to say this is some kind of PROOF that DIVSA Eric Marsh’s DIRECT SUPERVISOR on the fire, OPS1 Todd Abel, was then also properly and automatically INFORMED of exactly what Marsh/Steed/Crew were DOING that afternoon… and that OPS1 Todd Abel is some kind of liar when he says that he had NO IDEA they were even ‘moving’?
My point is that Cordes was not the only person who heard/ overheard radio transmissions from GM/ Marsh that they were moving, and where they were moving. As you stated as a fact earlier, in agreement with Bob.
They were not sneaking around in the brush trying to play some sort of hero role as you have asserted more than once.
That is all.
They were moving, yes, BUT, not one of those people except for Cordes knew exactly WHERE they were headed, OR what route they were taking to get there. Their own supervisor, the one person that absolutely should have known, never had a clue.
The whole ‘south side of the fire’ thing is all relative. They were on the ‘south side of the fire’ when they first started cutting line that day. The ‘south side of the fire could have been anywhere along a several mile long fire front.
You NEVER leave an assigned area unless being chased out by fire, UNLESS you have discussed it with you supervisor.
TTWARE… looks like we pressed TRANSMIT at the same time.
See below.
Yes. There is evidence a lot of people heard ‘snippets’ of radio como…
…but in ALL of the interviews and ALL of the testimony we discover that SPGS1 Gary Cordes appears to be the only one who UNDERSTOOD what it all meant… and it was AOK with him ( paraphrasing Cordes’ testimony: “I felt they had plenty of TIME to get to the Boulder Springs Ranch” ).
Not even this Division’s DIRECT Supervisor had any idea they were ‘moving’.
That is still ‘off the reservation’. and deserves an explanation… because 17 men died horrible deaths right along with the TWO that LED them down into that deathtrap.
It is still absolutely bizarre that there is ( and always has been ) ALL of this evidence that SPGS1 Gary Cordes knew EVERYTHING about the MOVE ( all the details… and not just the obtuse radio como )… yet he was never called back for a second interview and has yet to be DEPOSED under oath.
Again I have to say SPGS1 Was not the immediate Supervisor of DIVS Marsh.
They both worked for OPS1.
Why would there be any contact between either on what Marsh was doing.
OPS1 was left out of the info loop.
Reply to calvin post on February 13, 2015 at 6:49 pm
>> calvin said…
>>
>> My point is that Cordes was not the only person who
>> heard/ overheard radio transmissions from GM/ Marsh
>> that they were moving, and where they were moving.
No, he wasn’t… but my point somewhere below is that it appears that SPGS1 Gary Cordes may have been the ONLY one overhearing these transmissions who actually UNDERSTOOD what the hell they meant.
There is evidence that members of Blue Ridge heard almost all of these confusing ‘snippets’ of radio como that have been reported…
…but they still had no frickin’ idea what any of it really MEANT.
That’s because SPGS1 Gary Cordes didn’t give the same briefing to the SECOND Hotshot Crew to show up in his area that he did to the FIRST Hotshot Crew that morning.
Both Hotshot Crews were working the same general area.
ONE knew what “predetermined escape route” and “ranch” meant.
The other was totally clueless.
>> calvin also said…
>>
>> They were not sneaking around in the brush trying to play
>> some sort of hero role as you have asserted more than once.
>>
>> That is all.
Then what WERE they doing?
Can YOU say for sure?
I’m all ears.
Tying in with adjoining forces
I mean, really. What else would they have been doing?
On whose authority?
It involved ABANDONING a Division… and choosing to NOT notify one’s immediate Supervisor about it.
That’s ‘off the reservation’.
Exactly If OPS1 did not request a move to reengage.
Marsh did not talk to OPS1 about any move
Then what were they doing abandoning there Division.
For no reason. They first said they were committed to the black.
That’s all there direct supervisor knew.
I just ran the following words through both a thesaurus and an ‘anagram scrambler’….
OPS1 to his DIVSA….
1) Hunker and be safe.
2) Keep ME informed.
3) We’ll get some Air Support down there ASAP.
No piece of word-scrambling software I have comes back with…
“And go ahead and tie in with adjoining forces and don’t tell me anything about it… or even HOW you’re doing it.”
WTK said
OPS1 Todd Abel had seen that entire area TWICE from a Helicopter.
He was VERY familiar with the topography, the fuel loads, and distances down there.
Well if that is true. And Abel was familiar with the terrain and topography. Then When Marsh says I am trying to work my way off the top, at 1550, Abel should and would have known that he was coming down off the ridge (off the top).
Todd Abel’s hunker and be safe is the immediate response Abel gave Marsh after Marsh gave him an update stating that he was actively coming off the top. How is that interpreted as obtuse?
You know I would not keep hammering this point if the exchange had went like this.
Marsh…. Yeah, we are sitting here in the black watching the fire move toward the old grader.
Abel… Hunker and be safe, yada yada.
But that is not what was said in the Caldwell video.
Ding, ding, ding.
Dong, dong, dong.
See below.
And if Marsh had stopped in his tracks when Abel says hunker and be safe, he would have been burned over. Because at 1550 Marsh reported to Abel that he was moving (off the top) and he was in the green at that point
Calvin remember he was on top in the black to meet with Frisby.
So my interpolation he was working his way off the top of the black towards the crew.
I do not believe he said any thing about the Green, Black or what ever.
Frisby came back and asked if he was in the black?
Marsh replied working our way thru the black towards the Ranch. Not a very good explanation. Frisby was not sure exactly what he meant other than he was in the black. And he was moving toward a ranch.
Based on Our current info the Crew and Marsh never moved out of the Black till 1604. At this point we have no actual location of Marsh.
And currently still have no actual location of him from 1530 till 1650 when he radioed he was with the crew.
That’s what we have been discussing for severial months he could have been behind the crew in front of the crew or with the crew.
We have assumed he was on the ridge on the tow track to meet with Frisby when that meeting was canceled. We assume that because Frisby said the were going to meet in the same location as the first meeting.
My Belief he was doing what we have believed and returning to the crew from the meeting place on top of the mountain above the crew.
” Thus– I am moving off the top thru the black” Very vague and non committal.
No mention of moving to the Ranch SZ–Ever.
Again Very Vague——-When asked by Frisby all they committed to was they were in the Black or moving thru it.—Still no real info.
And. Unless I have missed something. We do not hear abel direct marsh (at circa 1550 when marsh was in green, descending from the ridge), to retreat to the black. No?
Reply to calvin post on February 13, 2015 at 5:14 pm
>> calvin said…
>>
>> And. Unless I have missed something. We do not hear abel
>> direct marsh (at circa 1550 when marsh was in green,
>> descending from the ridge), to retreat to the black. No?
See post directly below.
You are still ASSUMING that “coming off the top” meant he was coming all the way off the ridge.
We still do NOT KNOW if that is what Marsh really meant.
If Marsh had only been just 1/2 mile north of GM and doing his ‘observing the fire’ from the Helispot… he was at least 311 feet HIGHER than the anchor point and standing on the TOP of a PEAK there.
So his “coming off the top” could have meant simply that.
He was coming ‘off the top’ of that peak and heading back south.
That trip would have been pretty much ALL in BLACK… not GREEN.
Also… see the excerpts below from OPS1 Todd Abel’s ADOSH testimony.
He was putting his finger on a MAP and pointing directly at the anchor point and testifying that at NO TIME did he EVER think Marsh/Steed/Crew were anywhere OTHER than that point up on the ridge.
Until he heard about a deployment… and it was time to figure out WHERE the hell they really were.
How many ft elevation difference from the black where Mackenzie took his photos, videos to the spot where the deployment took place?
Just use the following link.
It’s ‘Google Maps’ with ability to click anywhere you like
and immediately get elevation information…
http://www.daftlogic.com/sandbox-google-maps-find-altitude.htm
Reply to calvin post on February 13, 2015 at 3:51 pm
>> calvin said…
>>
>> And if Marsh had stopped in his tracks when Abel says hunker
>> and be safe, he would have been burned over. Because at 1550
>> Marsh reported to Abel that he was moving (off the top) and
>> he was in the green at that point
We don’t know that.
If Marsh was actually even just at the Helispot ( an excellent vantage point that day ), then he was 311 feet HIGHER than where GM was working and his “working my way off the top” could have just meant he was coming that 1/2 mile back south ( and DOWN ) to where GM was.
That ‘coming off the top’ move would have been pretty much completely in BLACK.
Marsh was not at the helispot. He had been heading South for 20- 25 minutes (since 1525-1530)and and when Frisby cancelled the meeting, Marsh continued to head south. Then 5 minutes later Steed gives him an update on the fire progression because he has lost sight of the fire as he descended toward BSR
Reply to calvin post February 13, 2015 at 7:41 pm
>> calvin said…
>>
>> Marsh was not at the helispot. He had been heading
>> South for 20- 25 minutes (since 1525-1530)and and
>> when Frisby cancelled the meeting, Marsh continued
>> to head south. Then 5 minutes later Steed gives him
>> an update on the fire progression because he has lost
>> sight of the fire as he descended toward BSR
You MAY be right…. but we still can’t say we know for sure.
I hope Brendan’s testimony clears some of this up… but it’s going to also RAISE a lot more questions than it might answer.
Example: If Marsh had decided they needed to go to BSR as early as the moment he knew Brendan had to be evacuated and Frisby wasn’t going to make that face-to-face…
…then why the hell didn’t GM just ‘gaggle up’ and head that way at the same time?
That would have made all the difference that day… and ALL of those men would probably still be alive.
To have to accept the fact that Marsh may have insisted he ‘scout ahead’. at that late point in the day ( which could/should have been done at any time prior to that ) and that much TIME got wasted before he finally radioed back to Steed and said “Bring ’em down” anyway…
…is going to be heartbreaking.
That one TIME difference alone doing something that SHOULD have already been done earlier that day could, all by itself, account for their eventual deaths.
Severial months back we decided we really did not know where Marsh was with out more info he could have been Behind the crew or in front.
We were not sure when he left the meeting place after he found out Frisby would not be there. We only know the Crew started off the mountain at 1604.
Where was Marsh?????????
we need definitive proof not assumptions.
We know he was with the crew just before they deployed.
From 1530 till then we have no specifics to his location.
He was some where on Division A??????
What calvin doesn’t mention, however, is that IF his proposed timing is right… that means that Marsh had ALREADY decided to take off and ‘scout’ the route to the Boulder Springs Ranch BEFORE he had that conversation with OPS1 Todd Abel captured in the Caldwell video.
That’s going to raise a very ugly scenario whereby Marsh had already made up his mind what he was going to do ( WITHOUT consulting with his Supervisor )… and even when he was then eventually talkiing to his DIRECT SUPERVISOR ( Abel )… he was ‘hiding’ his true intentions.
It means that Marsh was already walking south with every intention of taking the men to the BSR when his Supervisor told him…
1) Hunker and be safe.
2) Keep ME informed.
We still do NOT know what the END of that conversation was like ( or if those were the last words and Marsh said NOTHING in response ).
Did Marsh respond to those directives from Abel with…
“Yes. We will do that”
or did he say…
“The hell we will”.
If it was the latter… then how could OPS1 Todd Abel sit in a room with ADOSH and swear that at NO TIME did he think Marsh/Steed/Crew were anywhere OTHER than ‘in the safe black’ back at the anchor point.
Somewhere in here… it still looks like Marsh was intentionally hiding his decisions ( and his real plans ) from his direct supervisor.
Per Roy Hall’s YIN
Todd Able reported that the last communication with Eric Marsh was “We are on the west ridge descending a predetermined escape route.”
How do you dismiss that statement from the IC??
Reply to calvin post on February 13, 2015 at 3:47 pm
>> calvin said…
>>
>> When Marsh says I am trying to work my way off the top, at 1550, Abel
>> should and would have known that he was coming down off
>> the ridge (off the top).
Not necessarily.
“Off the top” remains a ‘relative’ term when there are mountains and ridgelines and various elevations involved as you move from place to place ‘up there’.
OPS1 Todd Abel’s ‘assumption’ might have been quite the opposite, actually.
Having flown that area TWICE in a helicopter… OPS1 Todd Abel would have been perfectly aware that the ridge INCREASED in height as you moved north from the anchor area… and that the TOP of the ‘Weaver Mountains’ was to the NORTH of that area, not the SOUTH.
Example: The “Helispot”… which is just 1/2 mile north of where GM was working and would have been an EXCELLENT place for Marsh to be ‘observing’ the fire from for most, if not all of the day… was upwards of 311 feet HIGHER than where GM was working. That’s a lot… and the ‘peaks’ of the Weaver Mountains even just north of the Helispot got even higher than the Helispot.
OPS1 Abel ALSO knew that Marsh had been in a good position to watch the fireline burn through the retardant line just 8 minutes before their 1550 conversation… which means it WAS very likely Marsh had been ‘up the line’ ( to the NORTH ) from where GM was working.
So having seen that area… OPS1 Abel could have easily just assumed that “working my way off the TOP” just meant Marsh was coming back SOUTH from those ‘higher points’ north of where GM was working.
We do not KNOW where Marsh was at that point… and we also do not KNOW if his exact location was made clear to OPS1 Todd Abel during any of their conversations.
SAIT Co-Lead Mike Dudley summed this up himself in his speech to that roomfull of Utah firefighters.
Here is Dudley himself telling ‘the room’ about the snippet of conversation captured in the 1550 Caldwell video…
———————————————————————————–
Mike Dudley said…
There is a discussion that takes place between OPS and
Eric Marsh… and all you hear is Eric saying “I’m making my way off the top”.
Top a what?
Top of that box canyon? Top of to the north end?
And OPS says… “Copy that. You guys hunker and be safe.
Let me know if you need air support.”
You don’t hear the front-end of that conversation.
You don’t hear the tail-end of that conversation.
You just hear that clip.
———————————————————————————-
Perhaps Brendan McDonough still knows something here.
The lawyers for Arizona Forestry have already notified Judge Michael A. Mosesso about what Brendan McDonough is EXPECTED to testify to ( under oath ) on February 26.
From their Arizona Forestry Lawyers’ letter to Judge Mosesso…
———————————————————————————
Mr. McDonough is believed to have information relating to the decision made by GMIHC to move from the “black”, i.e. the large, burned-out area where GMIHC was working and which was the primary safety zone for GMIHC, to the box canyon that ultimately became their deployment site.
It is EXPECTED that Mr. McDonough will testify as to events that took place involving GMIHC on the afternoon of June 30, 2013, specifically DURING the timeframe that GMIHC moved from the “black” toward Helms Ranch, and MOMENTS PRIOR to GMIHC’s deployment.
It is ALSO EXPECTED that Mr. McDonough will testify as to the whereabouts of Eric Marsh, Jesse Steed, and the other crewmembers of GMIHC on the afternoon of June 30, 2013, as well as radio communications between the later Eric Marsh, the GMIHC Superintendent, and the late Jesse Steed, GMIHC Crew Chief, DURING the MOVE from the “black” and MOMENTS BEFORE deployment.
———————————————————————————
Here is the relevant quote from the lawyer’s letter to Judge Mosesso…
“It is ALSO EXPECTED that Mr. McDonough will testify as to the WHEREABOUTS of Eric Marsh, Jesse Steed, and the other crewmembers of GMIHC on the afternoon of June 30, 2013”.
So maybe we really will find out, once and for all, WHERE Eric Marsh really was at certain points that day… and what “making my way off the top” REALLY meant circa 1550 when he was talking to OPS1 Abel.
>> calvin also said…
>>
>> Todd Abel’s hunker and be safe is the immediate response
>> Abel gave Marsh after Marsh gave him an update stating that
>> he was actively coming off the top. How is that interpreted as obtuse?
Because when you are already up on a mountain ridge with a lot of TOPS involved ( some higher than others )… just saying you are “making your way off the TOP” is INCOMPLETE INFORMATION ( hence… obtuse ).
obtuse
adjective ob·tuse \äb-ˈtüs, əb-, -ˈtyüs\
Lacking sharpness; difficult to comprehend; not clear or precise in thought or expression.
>> calvin also said…
>>
>> You know I would not keep hammering this point if the exchange had went like this.
>> Marsh…. Yeah, we are sitting here in the black watching the fire move
>> toward the old grader.
>>
>> Abel… Hunker and be safe, yada yada.
That would have been ‘less obtuse’ than what he DID say, yes.
>> calvin also said…
>>
>> But that is not what was said in the Caldwell video.
No, it’s not. What we hear in the Caldwell video is INCOMPLETE INFORMATION, and not enough to be fully SURE what Marsh really meant… or what his actual location was during that conversation.
See above. Maybe Brendan’s testimony will finally help out here.
Let’s try this again:
1. GM/Marsh *DID* communicate over the radio about where they were going. Eric Tarr, Bravo33, Paul Musser (Ops), Todd Abel (Ops), and Gary Cordes (essentially acting as Ops since Musser was deferring to him, according to Musser’s ADOSH interview) ALL heard this communication.
Eric Tarr (in the Ranger58 helicopter) only FOUND the deployment area as quick as he did after the smoke finally lifted because he REMEMBERED hearing Marsh advising on the radio that GM was heading to the ranch (e.g. the Boulder Springs Ranch).
The notion that GM was hiding what they were doing was a figment of Fred’s imagination. If GM/Marsh were trying to HIDE what they were doing, presumably they would not have advertised it on the radio clearly enough that Eric Friggin’ Tarr remembered it and used that intel to find the deployment site.
2. I do not believe that Abel ever told Marsh or GM to stay where they were. Period. Abel himself has never said that he said it – indeed, he has indicated the opposite. Plus, Ops Musser had called GM/Marsh to see if they were available to bump to the east side (Yarnell) of the fire, so Marsh knew that the idea to shift within the division to the ranch seemed noncontroversial. We HEAR Cordes – to whom Musser himself had basically said in the ADOSH interview he was deferring – direct Esquibel (on the radio) to send resources to the Boulder Springs Ranch. It is a straw man argument for some of you to argue that Marsh somehow failed to vet the idea with his “supervisor” (whomever that was). Indeed, you hear Brian Frisby indicating that he is getting all of the crews out. Did BRIAN vet that idea with someone before doing it? With whom did he vet the idea? His supervisor? If you have never been on a wildland fire or you have not worked on a hotshot crew since the 1980s, your intel might not be the best on this point, such that it might make sense to pay attention to what guys like Frisby were actually DOING, before you point fingers at Marsh for NOT doing it. (To that end, Esquibel seems not to have briefed HIS boss about the fact that he was moving until he was already moving and his guys were OUT. Yeah – communicate with your supervisor in advance. Uhm, NOBODY was doing that that I can see.)
3. Even if there WAS a rule that suggests that GM needed to advise that they were making what appeared to be a noncontroversial move BEFORE making the move and explicitly getting sign-off BEFORE making that move to restage, who do you think would have said “no”? Abel was at the other end of the fire, so he would not have said “no,” and Cordes was trying to TELL Esquibel to get an engine to the BSR, so Cordes would not have said “no,” so who was going to say “no”?
I suppose my main difficulty with your point was that it was “beyond dispute” that it was “made clear” and “These are the facts”.
I didn’t actually remember any statements from Cordes/Musser/Abel and B33 about this subject that didn’t seem ambiguous to me. (actually a lot of what I’ve read from most transcripts seems ambiguous – and I don’t mean deliberately – just the way it seems to me). Which is why I genuinely requested you provide the transcripts – as I’m open to be proven wrong, and thought I’d missed something.
Given the level of discussion about where GMHS were and why they did what they did, I’m still not convinced that I have seen anything in your post that is therefore “beyond dispute”.
I’m not sure how to take being called Fred – I totally skipped that in your reply – thinking it was part of the following list of names, but he/she/it are not me, I don’t know Fred at all, actually I know none of you – you’re all on another continent to me. But I digress.
Here’s some Cordes examples of knowing where GM was and where they were going.
SAI interview: “15:50 Was told to get the guys out, you have some time. Then there was a spot and I told them to get out now.”
Contextually it is very difficult to say who Cordes is talking about and the actual time he is referring to, thank the SAIT for this.
SAI interview: “Q: Were you surprised where they were?
A: No”
ADOSH pg 34: “Q: And so your assumption is…
A: He had plenty of time to get there and, and he was headed to the
BSR.”
I realize we all do not hear the same thing in the audio throughout the YHF, but I stand by this.
Cordes to Esquibel: “Can we have a couple of engines hold in place at the , ah, Boulder Springs Ranch. (Get with) Granite Mountain if you have any problems.” There is a difference in what you all are saying about Cordes ‘asking’ Esquibel to SEND an engine to BSR…Cordes believes there are already a couple engines there and to keep them there and tie in with GM because they’re either there already or almost there. Go back and listen to this audio, I’ve listened to it many times and I’ve always heard this from the beginning.
And let’s not forget the Yarnell_Gamble audio:
“Anyway, uh, come down, it’d help (us if) go a little faster, but your’e the supervisor. (unknown voice to us)
To the community. (unknown voice to us)
They’re coming from the heel of the fire.” (Eric Marsh)
For what it’s worth in Mike Dudley’s presentation he eludes a few times regarding GM moving.. “No pressure on them to move, but there was internal conversations.” “Something triggered their mind, not pressure.” “Not complex. Crew decision and leadership to decide what they’re gonna do.” I wonder if Dudley wishes he could take back this presentation…or it played out perfectly for him and the SAIT. They do nothing that isn’t preplanned and manipulative.
Don’t feel bad Otis, I am you and blah blah blah. Diversions, for what?
I noticed a word misused in my comment, no need to give ammo to anyone here. Should read allude not elude. Small potatoes but it matters.
Reply to Elizabeth post on February 13, 2015 at 9:39 am
>> Elizabeth said…
>>
>> Let’s try this again:
Okay.
>> Elizabeth also said…
>>
>> 1. GM/Marsh *DID* communicate over the radio about where they were going.
Sort of. The ONLY information he ever actually imparted was using phrases like ‘predetermined escape route’ and ‘ranch’. That qualifies as ‘obtuse’ information because only people who knew what might be talking about would know what the hell you are talking about.
Example: Blue Ridge Hotshots. They also heard some of these radio transmits… but still had no frickin’ idea what Eric Marsh was really talking about.
>> Elizabeth also wrote…
>>
>> Eric Tarr, Bravo33, Paul Musser (Ops), Todd Abel (Ops), and Gary Cordes
>> (essentially acting as Ops since Musser was deferring to him, according
>> to Musser’s ADOSH interview) ALL heard this communication.
Whoa. You are saying it is a FACT that Field OPS1 Todd Abel heard these
same transmissions in REAL TIME… and has TESTIFIED as such?
Where is that testimony?
The only thing I know of that Eric Marsh’s direct supervisor ( OPS1 Todd Abel ) has ever testified is that he was SURE they were NOT MOVING… and were exactly where he thought they were supposed to be when he told Eric Marsh ( at 1550 ) to “Hunker and be safe ( in the black )… and keep ME informed ( of your situation and your whereabouts )”
From OPS1 Todd Abel’s ADOSH interview…
NOTE: At this point in the interview… they have MAPS in front of them and have been pointing to various locations with their fingers. When OPS1 Todd Abel says ‘right here’… he is actually pointing to the ‘anchor point’ on the map.
Q1 = Dave Larsen, WFA / ADOSH investigator ( Rest in Peace )
A = OPS1 Todd Abel
———————————————————————–
2273 A: The ridge.
2274
2275 Q1: Right.
2276
2277 A: That was the last known location. I had NO IDEA they’d LEFT that location. Blue
2278 Ridge Hotshots were working in the same area and thought they were up in
2279 this location.
2280
2281 Q1: Blue Ridge thought they were there?
2282
2283 A: Mm-hm. The helicopters thought they were there, air attack thought they
2284 were there, EVERYBODY thought they were right here, including MYSELF.
———————————————————————–
Show me something else which contradicts this.
>> Elizabeth also said…
>>
>> Eric Tarr (in the Ranger58 helicopter) only FOUND the deployment
>> area as quick as he did after the smoke finally lifted because he
>> REMEMBERED hearing Marsh advising on the radio that GM was
>> heading to the ranch (e.g. the Boulder Springs Ranch).
That is TRUE… but there is NO EVIDENCE that Eric Marsh’s direct supervisor, OPS1 Todd Abel, ever ‘accidentally’ heard that same transmission.
Eric Tarr himself testified he ONLY ‘accidentally’ heard that because it was over the “Air-To-Ground” channel that he was monitoring from outside the staged ‘Ranger 58’ Helicopter.
If Marsh’s DIRECT supervisor ( OPS1 Todd Abel ) had also been either ‘busy’ or handling some other radio conversation when that message floated out over the Air-To-Ground channel… then he would have never also “accidentally’ heard it.
According to OPS1 Todd Abel’s own ADOSH testimony… he did NOT hear this… nor ( more importantly ) did he ever hear DIRECTLY from his own DIVSA that he was ‘abandoning his assigned area’.
>> Elizabeth also wrote…
>>
>> The notion that GM was hiding what they were doing was a figment
>> of Fred’s imagination. If GM/Marsh were trying to HIDE what they’
>> were doing, presumably they would not have advertised it on the
>> radio clearly enough that Eric Friggin’ Tarr remembered it and
>> used that intel to find the deployment site.
See above. Eric Tarr only heard that float over the “Air-To-Ground” channel as
he was standing outside the staged ‘Ranger 58″ helicopter.
OPS1 Todd Abel could have easily ‘missed that’… and, indeed, testified that
he did NOT hear any such transmit.
This ‘obtuse announcement’ from Eric Marsh ( on any channel ) IN NO WAY represents
any kind of proper communication from a DIVS to his direct OPS level supervisor that
he is ‘abandoning his assignment’ and moving to another location.
>> Elizabeth also said…
>>
>> 2. I do not believe that Abel ever told Marsh or GM to stay where they
>> were. Period. Abel himself has never said that he said it – indeed, he has
>> indicated the opposite.
That is true. The SAIT played the Caldwell video for Abel and while he absolutely acknowledges that is HIS voice saying ( specifically )…
1. Hunker and be safe.
2. Keep ME informed.
3. We’ll get some Air Support down there ASAP.
…Mike Dudley then told that roomful of firefighters that Abel ALSO said he
didn’t ‘recall’ the REST of the conversation.
I believe you have presented your own mental gymnastics before about how you are interpreting a common directive like “Hunker and be safe” to mean something other than “Stay where you are and be safe”… ( like anyone else would take it to mean ) but just for entertainment’s sake why don’t you explain that again for us.
>> Elizabeth also said…
>>
>> Plus, Ops Musser had called GM/Marsh to see if they were available
>> to bump to the east side (Yarnell) of the fire, so Marsh knew that the
>> idea to shift within the division to the ranch seemed noncontroversial.
Moving from the anchor point to the Boulder Springs Ranch was NOT a move ‘within his Division’. It involved ABANDONING his Division and crossing over into Division ‘Z’ ( Ranch Marquez’s Division ).
Look at a map. The ‘Division break’ that Marsh himself finally agree to was the old-grader location.
WEST of there was ‘Division A’.
EAST of there was ‘Division Z’
The Boulder Springs Ranch was NOT in Marsh’s ‘Division A’.
Regardless… as Mr. Powers has pointed out MANY times… a fully qualified DIVS does have the ability to decide for himself to abandon his assignment/Division….
…but the idea that any DIVS would NOT directly notify his OPS level Supervisor that he is doiing this is ‘off the reservation’. To NOT do so would imply that you are following some kind of “forgiveness is easier than permission” policy and you don’t want him to override your own decision, or something.
In other words… no explanation is necessary to justify when a DIVS would be notifying his direct supervisor OPS that he is ‘abandoning his assignment’. That would be NORMAL.
What is NOT NORMAL is for a DIVS to NOT do this… and some explanation IS now required to explain THAT kind of behavior.
>> Elizabeth also said…
>>
>> We HEAR Cordes – to whom Musser himself had basically said in the
>> ADOSH interview he was deferring – direct Esquibel (on the radio) to
>> send resources to the Boulder Springs Ranch. It is a straw man argument
>> for some of you to argue that Marsh somehow failed to vet the idea with
>> his “supervisor” (whomever that was).
There is no “whomever it was” about it.
DIVSA Eric Marsh’s DIRECT SUPERVISOR on that fire was Field OPS1 Todd Abel.
It is YOU now making the ‘strawman’ argument that maybe Eric Marsh didn’t know that ( or didn’t care ) in order to justify your own theories.
>> Elizabeth also said…
>>
>> Indeed, you hear Brian Frisby indicating that he is getting all of the crews out.
>> Did BRIAN vet that idea with someone before doing it? With whom did he
>> vet the idea? His supervisor? If you have never been on a wildland fire or
>> you have not worked on a hotshot crew since the 1980s, your intel might
>> not be the best on this point, such that it might make sense to pay attention
>> to what guys like Frisby were actually DOING, before you point fingers
>> at Marsh for NOT doing it.
So let me get this straight… You are trying to COMPARE what Brian Frisby was
doing in the Shrine Road area and helping to make sure EVERYONE was getting
out of there ( even AFTER Cordes had issued their evac orders )… to what
Eric Marsh did?
If Blue Ridge was ‘working’ for anyone circa 4:00 PM and onward… it was as
an attachment to SPGS1 Cordes’ resources in the Shrine Road area.
Brian Frisby WAS keeping SPGS1 Gary Cordes ( his sic: supervisor ) DIRECTLY
INFORMED about what he was doing… and WHY and WHEN.
Just listen to the start of the M2U00264 video.
That’s just one place Frisby was REPORTING directly to Cordes about what
was happening back there… and why.
Eric Marsh never did any similar thing.
Eric Marsh’s own DIRECT SUPERVISOR on that fire ( Field OPS1 Todd Abel ) has testified any number of times that he was NEVER DIRECTLY INFORMED what his subordinate DIVSA was doing… or WHY he was doing it.
>> Elizabeth also said…
>>
>> (To that end, Esquibel seems not to have briefed HIS boss about the fact
>> that he was moving until he was already moving and his guys were OUT.
Tyson Esquibel was the DIRECT recipient of SPGS1 Gary Cordes ORDER to
“get everyone out of there”. Everything he was doing from that point on was
KNOWN to Cordes because Cordes TOLD him that’s what he should be doing.
Absolutely NOT the case with DIVSA Eric Marsh and HIS direct supervisor.
Again… ( sounding like a broken record now ) OPS1 Todd Abel has testified many times that he was NEVER directly informed by his subordinate DIVSA WHAT he was doing… or WHY he was doing it.
>> Elizabeth also said…
>>
>> Yeah – communicate with your supervisor
>> in advance. Uhm, NOBODY was doing that that I can see.)
Seriously?
When was your last eye ( or ear ) exam?
>> Elizabeth also said…
>>
>> 3. Even if there WAS a rule that suggests that GM needed to advise
>> that they were making what appeared to be a noncontroversial
>> move BEFORE making the move and explicitly getting sign-off
>> BEFORE making that move to restage, who do you think would
>> have said “no”?
Any number of people… if they had been SURE what Marsh meant was he was about to go bushwhacking in front of a rapidly advancing flamefront… with no lookout.
>> Elizabeth also said…
>>
>> Abel was at the other end of the fire, so he would not have said “no,”
Being at the other end of the fire would not have made a difference.
OPS1 Todd Abel had seen that entire area TWICE from a Helicopter.
He was VERY familiar with the topography, the fuel loads, and distances down there.
If OPS! Todd Abel had been fully and directly informed of this planned ‘move’ ( as he should have been )… it is VERY likely he would have reiterated his 1550 instructions to just “Hunker and be safe (in the black… where you are )”. Anything else is too risky right now.
Add in any knowledge on OPS1 Abel’s part that what Marsh really had in mind was a total bushwhack through explosive fuels in front of a charging, unpredictable firefront and WITHOUT a lookout…
…and YES… the likelihood that OPS1 Abel would have said “DON’T DO IT” is HIGHLY LIKELY.
>> Elizabeth also said…
>>
>> and Cordes was trying to TELL Esquibel to get an engine to the BSR,
>> so Cordes would not have said “no,” so who was going to say “no”?
See above.
Just about ANYONE who had been PROPERLY informed of what Eric Marsh’s real intentions were regarding this ‘bushwhack’… at THAT time… in THAT area… under THOSE conditions… and WITHOUT even setting a damn lookout.
WTKTT—-Isn’t this at least the fourth time we have gone thru this with Elizabeth?
She keeps trying to change the facts to fit her conclusions. Every thing you said you have said before and you have always been right on
Also the being on a Hot Shot crew since the 1980’s was a remark directed at me.
Fire Fighting has changed little since I retired in 1994.
The Safety requirements have not changed since 1956.
The 10 and 13 /18, and LCES was added but LCES is taken from the 10……
They still have the Same PPE, Fire Shelters, Line construction Tech. Weather, fuels, topography, Fuel Moisture, even Drought has come and gone a few times since the 1940’s. I could go on Ill stop here.
They are responsible to the next supervisor in the Chain of command. Get the Red Book and read it. DIVS are responsible to and answer to the OPS. Any change that a DIVS makes on the assignment must be approved by OPS. OPS works for the IC and carries out the IC’s Orders, directions and plans to suppress the FIRE.
STLD have Crews, Engines, Tractors etc. under them and answer directly to the DIVS, or in DIVS absence to the OPS.
Just a refresher———–
WTKTT,
Outstanding rebuttal on all counts! She continues to have NO clue what she is talking about and in classical Logical Phallacy delusional fashion, even uses her own Straw Man fallacy to attempt it. So predictable.
Once again, outstanding and accurate points made here.
Fire Order Number 7 CLEARLY states to: “Maintain PROMPT communications with your forces, YOUR SUPERVISOR, and adjoining forces.” Marsh NEVER did this. Marsh NEVER directly radios his supervisor(s) (Abel or Musser) of his intention and/or his actions or those of the GMHS. Classic Marsh!
And who is ‘Fred’? There is NO one on this with that name. Only in the mind of the delusional it appears. And the multiple personalities in the mind of the delusional as well.
I also want to point out that the GMHS safety violations regarding improper PPE, i.e. sleeves rolled up, is an ATTITUDE thing. “It’s not going to happen to me/us, therefore …” Bad Decisions With Prior Good Outcomes – Normalization of Deviance. Yes, there are photos/videos of others doing the same, however, that is the classic Straw Man Fallacy.
Robert-the-Second said “And who is ‘Fred’? There is NO one on this with that name. Only in the mind of the delusional it appears. And the multiple personalities in the mind of the delusional as well.”
You are kidding, right? You honestly are not aware of anyone who posts on this website using multiple made-up names whose REAL name is Fred (or Fredrick or some such)?
Elizabeth,
Correct, I am “NOT aware of anyone who posts on this website using multiple made-up names whose REAL name is Fred (or Fredrick or some such)..” I empathize with your delusional disability. There is hope for you though with educated and trained professionals in that field. There is hope. There is NO Fred that posts on THIS site – only in YOUR mind.
Reply to Rocksteady post on February 12, 2015 at 10:09 am
NOTE: This was brought up from down below in a thread that was running out of room.
>> On February 11, 2015 at 3:09 pm, Elizabeth asked ‘rocksteady’…
>>
>> Have you ever personally seen a fire go from a ROS of .75 mph to a ROS of
>> roughly 12 mph (or more) in less than 10 minutes?
>>
>> On February 12, 2015 at 10:09 am, rocksteady replied…
>>
>> Yes, I have seen that sort of behaviour.
>>
>> How I dealt with it:
>>
>> 1) Read and disseminated the potential fire behaviour from the FBAN to ALL
>> personnel on my division/branch.
>>
>> 2) Had definitive trigger points (behaviour/wind, etc) when we were going to do
>> a “tactical retreat”, not an emergency drop packs and run.
>>
>> 3) Ensured that we always had a helicopter in the air, be it a rotor wing bird dog,
>> bucket ship, OPS or whomever watching fire behaviour for us, rather than using a
>> ground based 2 year guy from the crew, as a lookout.
>>
>> 4) Made the call to get out early, rather than waiting til its too late
>> and then being screwed.
>>
>> Once fire behaviour reaches this state, there is NOTHING that can be done.
>> No amount of heavy equipment, helicopters or air tankers will stop it, so why
>> risk your neck for something that is going to fail anyways.
With regards to…
“We were going to do a “tactical retreat”, not an emergency drop packs and run”.
AND
“Made the call to get out early, rather than waiting til its too late”
AND
“Why risk your neck for something that is going to fail anyways”…
I think the following should be noted regarding the Yarnell HIll fire…
‘Bravo 3’ ( Rusty Warbis and Paul Lenmark ) testified to ADOSH that it was plainly obvious to THEM ( as early as about 12:45 PM ) that whatever almost 6-hour-old ‘plan’ it was that Granite Mountain was working on ‘down there’ was now ( due to observed fire behavior ) POINTLESS..
Warbis and Lenmark also testified that it was so obvious to THEM that Granite Mountain was ( even as early as 12:45 PM ) “out of the game’… they were convinced that Granite Mountain was simply ‘staging’ out there and just waiting for some other more useful assignment.
OPS2 Paul Musser himself ALSO testified to ADOSH that whatever plan they had developed for Granite Mountain that morning to try and ‘direct attack’ the fire with ‘one foot in the black’ and ‘keep it small’ became USELESS as early as NOON that day… even WHILE Frisby and Brown were having their ‘face-to-face’ meeting with Marsh and Steed.
In BOTH of these cases… that left more than THREE HOURS for Granite to have been safely ‘pulled’ from that (now) ‘worthless’ assignment with a simple ‘Tactical Retreat’.
This is exactly what the ADOSH report cited as something that SHOULD have been done that day… but was NOT done.
A (safe) “Tactical Retreat” from a work assignment that had become a worthless assignment because of the increased fire activity itself.
At the very END of OPS2 Paul Musser’s interview is when he was asked the same question ADOSH was asking all the interviewees regarding “Is there anything you would have done differently?”.
Musser said NO. There was NOTHING he would have done differently.
But that wasn’t the END of the actual interview.
ADOSH investigator Barry Hicks picked up on something Musser said in his response and then another brief exchange happens before the recorder is turned off where we hear OPS2 Paul Musser ‘summarizing’ what their ‘intent’ had been on Sunday… and how the ‘intent’ changed when the fire behavior picked up much earlier than anyone had planned on.
Musser says the ‘plan’ had, in fact, been to get Granite Mountain up there early to try and do some ‘direct attack’ with ‘one foot in the black’ and ‘keep it small’ BEFORE the fire activity ‘picked up’. later in the day.
But once that ‘fire activity’ did ‘pick up’ much earlier in the burn cycle than anyone anticipated ( even as early as the NOON timeframe )… OPS2 Paul Musser himself then admits that they had now ‘lost the opportunity’ for that ‘plan’ with Granite Mountain to make any difference that day.
Q2 = Barry Hicks, ADOSH investigator
A = OPS2 Paul Musser
——————————————————————————————–
2785 A: And, no I don’t know of anything that I would have done different. They were
2786 given a safe assignment. Uh, we had – I mean our job was to suppress the fire.
2787 The only thing we could have done different is not suppress the fire.
2788
2789 Q2: Right.
2790
2791 A: And had we not been there and taken over the fire, that wouldn’t have
2792 happened, but we may have lost 1000 civilians.
2793
2794 Q2: Yeah.
2795
2796 A: Uh, and so no there’s – there’s nothing prior to the accident that I would do
2797 different.
2798
2799 Q2: Well, let me – uh, you – you bring up a very good point and I want – I wanna
2800 just follow that just for a minute. Uh, uh, because the one thing that you did
2801 say is that the only thing that we could have done different was not suppress
2802 that fire. And I’m assuming you mean in that location. Uh, because there’s
2803 other suppression techniques that you can use without going up on that hill.
2804 Uh, and, um…
2805
2806 A: The safest place to attack a fire is when it’s smallest and you have one foot in
2807 the black.
2808
2809 Q2: Yeah.
2810
2811 A: That was our intent. Our intent was to keep it as small as possible, one foot in
2812 the black. We had people out for point protection if that failed.
2813
2814 Q2: Yeah.
2815
2816 A: But our emphasis was direct attack with one foot in the black and…
2817
2818 Q2: But – but didn’t that fail yesterday? Not today?
2819
2820 A: It failed…
2821
2822 Q2: It was 100 acres when y’all got there.
2823
2824 A: No I would think a little bit bigger than that.
2825
2826 Q2: But that – I mean that’s my point. Is that at that point and time the – the keep it
2827 small and – and – and, uh, one foot in the black…
2828
2829 A: A hundred acres is small compared to 8000.
2830
2831 Q2: Well, yeah, it’s all relative.
2832
2833 A: Yeah.
2834
2835 Q2: Um – and, uh, but is there still a point where – where you don’t put somebody
2836 up on that hill, uh, at – and – and say we’re gonna go and do point protection
2837 and that’s – that’s gonna be our strategy?
2838
2839 A: Um, in hindsight, I guess you could say that.
2840
2841 Q2: That’s what – exactly what I was looking for, is hindsight.
2842
2843 A: Yeah, I guess in hindsight you could say that.
2844
2845 Q2: Yeah. Yeah.
2846
2847 A: But no our – our emphasis was to go in and keep it as small as possible. Direct
2848 attack, one foot in the black.
2849
2850 Q2: Right.
2851
2852 A: Uh, and get on it as soon as we possibly could. That’s…
2853
2854 Q2: Right.
2855
2856 A: …that’s why they were put up there early. It’s before we had activity. When
2857 we still had an opportunity.
2858
2859 Q2: Right.
2860
2861 A: Our oppor- our opportunity went away about noon. And…
2862
2863 Q2: Yeah. And, uh, well I – I’m glad you said that, because I – I do believe that
2864 that was – uh, and in my hindsight now looking at this thing from a far is that,
2865 uh – that, uh – and – and I – I guess the way I would ask the question is this. Is
2866 can the State of Arizona, make that kind of decision to use that tactic as
2867 opposed to, uh, uh, the direct attack staying with it…
2868
2869 A: Yes.
2870
2871 Q2: Once it – once it has escaped initial attack?
2872
2873 A: Yes we have a full range of suppression options that we can use. Uh, point of
2874 protection being one of them.
2875
2876 Q2: And so, uh, for Roy Hall’s team to come in and say we’re gonna back off and
2877 do point protection is an option that you guys probably have used in the past
2878 and didn’t have any issues with exercising then in this case?
2879
2880 A: That’s correct.
2881
2882 Q2: Okay. Uh…
2883
2884 A: And after it es- basically escaped – or that’s what we went to was…
2885
2886 Q2: Yeah.
2887
2888 A: Point protection. Uh, the box that we drew was south of Weber Peak –
2889 Weaver Peak, uh, north and west of 89. We had the one slop over at the café,
2890 but that was – we were able to pick that one up.
2891
2892 Q2: Yeah.
2893
2894 A: And east of the railroad, which is at the bottom of the hill. That’s the box we
2895 drew.
2896
2897 Q2: Okay.
2898
2899 A: I don’t know what the type 1 team did when they took over. But that was the
2900 box that we drew.
2901
2902 Q2: Okay. Well Paul I wanna thank you. You had good information.
2903
2904 Q: Well official time is about 10:50, I’m gonna stop the recorded interview.
2905
——————————————————————————————–
Once again… here is the KEY part where OPS2 Paul Musser tells ADOSH that whatever ‘plan’ they had at 7:00 AM that morning… their ‘opportunity’ for that to make any difference was LOST around NOON…
——————————————————————————————–
2847 Our emphasis was to go in and keep it as small as possible. Direct
2848 attack, one foot in the black. ( Granite Mountain’s assignment at 7:00 AM ).
2849
2850 Q2: Right.
2851
2852 A: Uh, and get on it as soon as we possibly could. That’s…
2853
2854 Q2: Right.
2855
2856 A: …that’s why they were put up there early. It’s BEFORE we had ACTIVITY. When
2857 we still had an OPPORTUNITY.
2858
2859 Q2: Right.
2860
2861 A: Our oppor- our OPPORTUNITY WENT AWAY about NOON.
——————————————————————————————–
So if even OPS2 Paul Musser KNEW that the ‘opportunity’ for the 7:00 AM plan to make any difference was LOST around NOON…
…then what in God’s name were Granite Mountain doing still beating their brains out up there on that ridge for the next FOUR HOURS?
WHY ( anytime during those next FOUR HOURS ) wasn’t a simple ‘Tactical Retreat’ ordered for Granite Mountain… and then none of us would even be here having these conversations?
WHY were those poor men left working up their for the next FOUR HOURS when even ‘Air Attack’ and OPERATIONS level people knew they were ‘out of the game’ as early as NOON or 12:45 PM?
You said every thing that I have questioned or said all along.
By no later than 3PM or 1500 All the crews in the uncontrolled areas should have been
off the line and much better if it was 1400.
Base all actions on current and expected Fire behavior—-Fire fighting order #3
Fire weather Forecasts—Fire Fighting order #1
Every thing GM should have been aware of so should the IC and OPS.
Reply to Bob Powers post February 12, 2015 at 5:16 pm
>> Bob Powers said…
>>
>> You said every thing that I have questioned or said all along.
>> By no later than 3PM or 1500 All the crews in the uncontrolled
>> areas should have been off the line and much better if it was 1400.
I actually forgot to include testimony that even TWO other command level personnel felt ( as early as circa 12:45 PM or 1:00 PM ) that the ‘anchor and flank’ plan conceived at that morning’s 7:00 AM briefing was no longer ‘an option as early as 1:00 PMish.
In addition to “Air Attack” AND OPS2 Paul Musser… those OTHER TWO command level persons appear to have been…
DIVSZ Rance Marquez
and
DIVSA Eric Marsh himself.
From DIVSZ Rance Maquez’s SAIT Interview Notes…
——————————————————————-
I got back on the horn with Eric to iron out the plan. Eric suggested and I agreed to go back and find another way in; possibly the Shrine Rd. He mentioned, the we need to consider point protection. No division breaks were decided on. I found that a lot of the roads on the maps aren’t actually there. My conversation with Eric led me to believe that he felt he wasn’t going to be effective where they were.
——————————————————————-
Key phrase from DIVSZ Rance Marquez’s testimony…
“ERIC led me to believe that HE felt HE wasn’t going to be effective where they were.”
So (apparently) even as early as 1:00 PM… DIVSA Eric Marsh had ‘joined’ that list of ‘command’ personnel who saw the futility of continuing the 7:00 AM plan after the fire activity picked up circa 12:30 PM to 1:00 PM… and he SHARED that feeling with the only other DIVS on the fire… DIVSZ Rance Marquez.
So if anyone had the ‘authority’; to call for a ‘Tactical Retreat’ of a Hotshot Crew named Granite Mountain at that time ( with PLENTY of time to just get back to their buggies the same way they walked up )… it would have been DIVSA Eric Marsh himself.
But he didn’t.
He kept Granite Mountain working on a now-6-hour old ‘plan’ that had already been rendered moot ( by 1:00 PM ) by the pickup in the fire activity itself.
They were NOT going to be able to ‘anchor and flank’ as they had originally planned 6 HOURS earlier at 7:00 AM that morning.
It just wasn’t going to happen.
Not from where they were up on that ridge, anyway.
As for WHY OPS2 Paul Musser himself didn’t (then) order a ‘Tactical Retreat’ when he, himself, became aware of the same futility of that ‘morning plan’… I believe a ‘cut’ from Rance Marquez’s actual ADOSH interview provides some insight there.
Rance Marquez told ADOSH that he, himself, is the one that basically informed OPS2 Paul Musser that that ‘anchor and flank plan’ was ‘not achievable’ following these discussions and communication he had with Marsh circa 12:30 PM to 1:00 PM.
When Marquez left Yarnell and returned to the ICP… the first thing he did was ‘report’ all this to OPS2 Paul Musser.
According to Marquez… it basically went “in one ear and out the other”.
Musser was now realizing the ‘Incident’ was going to have to go from the morning’s “suppresssion mode” plan to just full blown “structure protection mode”… and his (multiple) radios were now humming trying to get that going.
He basically said “Yeah, OK, whatever” to Marquez’s report about the futility of Granite Mountain’s ‘mission’ on the south side… and Musser brushed Marquez off.
So right there was the opportunity for this OPS person ( Musser ) to realize then and there that if that Hotshot Crew was now working on a ‘useless exercise’ that they needed to get OUT of there and back to town in a SAFE and CONTROLLED manner.. with plenty of time to spare.
This was the actual “Order a Tactical Retreat for that Resource” opportunity.
That ‘opportunity’ just fell through the cracks.
OPS2 Paul Musser was ‘preoccupied’ and not really paying attention to what DIVSZ Rance Marquez was reporting to him…
…and so Granite Mountain IHC became the ‘forgotten resource’ at that point.
No one was even thinking about them anymore until the weather/fire REALLY started to go bat-shit-crazy… and when they finally ‘remembered’ they were still actually up there on the ridge the concerns were then just “are they safe up there”.
From Rance Marquez’s ADOSH interview 9-23-13
Q2 = Barry Hicks, ADOSH investigator
Q3 = Dave Larsen, ADOSH investigator ( Rest in Peace )
A = DIVSZ Rance Marquez
———————————————————————-
Q3: Okay. And you tied in with Musser and told him the – the – looks like a tough chance down there and uh, and anchoring and flanking. No tough – well – well don’t let me speak to you. What did you tell him?
A: No. It – basically, that’s exactly – it – I don’t know exactly what I told word for word but I just told him that I tied in with Eric. We could not find an anchor point. We could not agree with one and there’s not even one to be had really if we had agreed. Um, the ground’s really tough and there just isn’t – there aren’t any good options right in – right in that uh, in that area.
Q3: Okay.
Q2: Is that – any other strategy at that point uh, Rance?
A: Uh, for which portion? We basically went to point protection after that. It was forced on us.
Q2: And yeah – yeah, I know it was forced on you, but did you and – you and Musser have that discussion uh, at all at that point in time?
A: No. We did not. Um, he understood what I was saying, but he had about two other radios going off in his ear plus other things going on, so he just said, “Yeah. Um, we’re off – we’re going to have uh, at a later – later time.” and started to prioritize information.
————————————————————————-
So what OPS2 Paul Musser did not ‘prioritize’ then was that his DIVSZ had just informed him that he had been consulting with his ONLY other DIVS ( DIVSA ) and now they BOTH felt there just wasn’t a good place to ‘anchor and flank’ down on the south end anymore ( circa 1:00 PM ) and that “suppression mode” was now basically OVER that day.
OPS2 Musser basically just said “Yeah… whatever… I’ll deal with that LATER” and went about his ‘structure protection mode’ business. He didn’t transmit any instructions to his DIVSA to do a ‘Tactical Retreat’ and get the Hotshot resource(s) off that ‘obsolete’ assignment and down off that ridge.
Remember that OPS2 Paul Musser was still just ‘Planning OPS’ at this time and ensconced at the ICP helping IC Roy Hall. Musser was only now ( circa 1:00 PM ) beginning to realize he needed to transition into being the SECOND active ‘Field OPS’ on the fire now that they were abandoning “suppression mode” and going to a pure “structure protection” effort that day.
So DIVSZ Rance Marquez was really reporting this critical information to the WRONG person at this time ( circa 1:00 PM ).
There is NO evidence that the current Field OPS1 Todd Abel heard ANY of this report from DIVSZ Marquez about the ‘futility’ of that 6-hour-old ‘anchor and flank’ effort on the south side of the fire… or that it was now ( circa 1:00 PM ) just a ‘useless exercise’.
If he HAD ( heard this news )… perhaps OPS1 Todd Abel would NOT have been as ‘distracted’ as OPS2 Paul Musser and would have recognized the need to get that Hotshot resource down off that ridge ASAP… with plenty of time to spare before things REALLY went (literally) ‘south’ that day.
The question of why GMIHC were left out on that ridge with no real effective assignment and with decreasing amount of time to retreat safely to safety has always been on my thoughts.
I wonder how/if this “assignment” had anything to do with the decisions made later in the day?
They were already safe, and had at least two (in fact more) safe options if they wanted off. 1. Follow the black to town. 2. Drop off the backside.
SR.
Both of the options you listed above would have taken GM out of the fire fight. Right?
All I am saying is WHY did GM stay out on the ridge until there was not a way to get back to their trucks. Evacuate to the Ranch house and re engage the fire.
Why did they not evacuate earlier. Who had the authority to bring them off the hill? Abel?
Two Things
One– they were working next to the Black with 400 plus acres of safety zone. They had that option all day and the rest area seemed to indicate they had pulled up into it. They basically dropped packs and were in lets wait this out in the BLACK.
Two– They had a route to their trucks or pickup by dropping off the back side and hiking to Hwy 89. Roughly 2 miles thru the desert from the rest site down to the saddle then down a fairly open ridge with light to medium fuel and out to the road. Based on topography maps that I looked at not a really steep decent at all. Looked doable to me.
I think most overhead here felt GM was in a good location and could retreat to the black at any time if things went bad. No one thought they would leave the black. Or would move without notifying OPS.
The question then is what was Marsh doing keeping the crew on their assignment If they could not accomplish it. 1230 to 1300 seems the decision point. A fully qualified Division Supervisor Can make the decision to abandon the line assignment and pull out. When they pulled back to the rest area they were pulling back to the Anchor Point..
They abandoned a Mile or more of line along the fire edge.
You could as well ask if they as stated were going to a SZ the BSR they could not get to their trucks from there or their trucks could not get to them. They could see the fire was moving into the towns and cutting off the road access to BSR before they left the rest area.
If the decision had been made to leave the mountain at 1300 they could have hiked back to their trucks and moved the them selves. After the meeting with Frisby and never posted a Lookout.
They had almost 3 hours to do that.
So did Marsh really believe the fire was going to move in their direction
If he didn’t why post a look out to watch the fire advance?
My thoughts.
To follow up on a previous mini thread, there were accusations the GMIHS were an unsafe crew, because they were on the line with their sleeves rolled up.
Be the judge yourself. Go to Youtube, search “hotshots 2014”
You will see many videos of the crews activities from last year.
Safety concerns I saw on other crews:
Sleeves rolled up (so not just a Granite Mountain thing)
Many workers within striking distance of trees being felled.
Crews within a tree length during heli drops from Mediums and Heavies.
Driving UTV’s without seatbelts on.
I guess, using the logic that called GMIHS unsafe because of teh sleeves, you could call these crews “Darwin Nominees”.
1 minor safety infraction does not make you an unsafe crew.
Reply to Rocksteady post on February 12, 2015 at 1:03 pm
>> Rocksteady said…
>>
>> Driving UTV’s without seatbelts on.
Just adding to the ‘list’ here with regards to UTV/ATV.
Helmets and Gloves.
The NIFC regulations for operating ATV/UTV on a fire are pretty specific when it comes to required PPE and whatnot.
Chapter 14 of the National Interagency Fire Center’s “Firefighting Equipment Standards” publication is here…
http://www.nifc.gov/PUBLICATIONS/redbook/2015/Chapter14.pdf
On page 6 is the section that covers ATV/UTV ‘Standards’…
——————————————————————————–
All Terrain Vehicles (ATV)/Utility-Terrain Vehicles (UTV)
The operation of ATV/UTVs can be high risk. The use of ATV/UTVs should be evaluated to ensure that use is essential to accomplish the mission, rather than for convenience.
Because of the high risk nature, agencies have developed specific operational policy (refer to current agency policy). ATV/UTV operators will meet the training and certification requirements of their agency; employees certified by their agency will be considered qualified ATV/UTV operators regardless of incident jurisdiction. Common policy requirements for wildland fire operations are highlighted below:…
If operating ATV/UTV on the fireline, the following are required:
– Leather or leather/flame resistant combination gloves. Flight gloves are not approved for fireline use;
– Yellow flame resistant shirt;
– Flame resistant trousers;
– Wildland fire boots; and
– Appropriate head protection ( and other PPE ) as described…
Required PPE includes:
ATV Head Protection for Wildland Fire Operations:
– ATV Helmets must be worn at all times during ATV operations (on and off the fireline); and
– ATV Helmets must meet Snell SA2005, SA2010, or DOT certification.
– A 3/4 face model meeting Snell SA2005 or SA2010 certification is acceptable for use.
– Use of half “shorty” helmets requires a JHA/RA for fireline use and must include justification for its use. Refer to MTDC Tech Tip publication, A Helmet for ATV Operators with Fireline Duties (0651-23 2350-MTDC).
UTV Head Protection for Wildland Fire Operations:
– Helmets must meet DOT, ANSI Z90.1; or Snell SA2005 or SA2010 unless:
– UTV is used for low speeds and smooth travel surfaces, administrative use (e.g., campgrounds, incident base camps) UTV operators are not required to wear hardhats or helmets; or
– UTV is equipped with approved Rollover Protection System (ROPS)
——————————————————————————–
There are a number of photos from Yarnell showing Blue Ridge Captain Trueheart Brown DRIVING the BR Polaris Ranger UTV and Blue Ridge Superintendent Brian Frisby riding in the passenger side.
Neither one is observing the NIFC regulations.
Brian Frisby is never seen wearing a Helmet ( he was only wearing his cloth baseball cap all day ) and Driver Trueheart Brown is never seen wearing gloves. That’s why we are able to see the wedding ring on his finger in close-up in the Hulburd video shot just as they pulled up to the “3 Prescotteers” ( Jason Clawson, Aaron Hulburd and KC ‘Bucky’ Yowell ) during the Shrine Road evacuations.
Here are just some of those photos from the evidence record…
– Blue Ridge Hotshot Desoto’s photo “yarnell-desoto 002.jpg” is the one showing the Polaris Ranger in full profile having just pulled up to where the Blue Ridge Crew Carriers are parked. Brian Frisby is standing next to the Polaris only wearing his cloth baseball hat. Trueheart Brown is driving… He has his blue helmet on but is wearing no GLOVES whatsoever and we can see his wedding ring on his finger, which has helped to identify him in OTHER photos in the evidence record.
– Blue Ridge Hotshot Papich’s photo “IMG_3955.jpg” shows the BR Ranger at the Youth Camp with FLAMES in the background coming over the ridge. Brian Frisby is visible riding in the passenger side of the Ranger and he is wearing only his cloth baseball cap.
– Blue Ridge Hotshot McCord’s photo “yarnell 106.jpg” is the one that was taken in the Ranch House Restaurant parking lot just seconds after Frisby and Brown had arrived there in the Polaris UTV.
Brian Frisby is still only wearing his cloth baseball hat.
Thanks Rocksteady.
I am glad to see a WFF call BS on the shirt sleeve thing.
BS is not true. The shirt thing is in fact a PPE requirement by the safety rules of the Federal Government. The manufacture requires that the shirt be fastened around the wrist. It is also a statement in the Fire Shelter Training that the sleeves must be down and securely fastened and gloves on.
While in its self not the one thing to consider as far as Safety, it is a indicator of a lack of safety awareness by a crew and their supervisors. What else do they consider as necessary to follow. Hiking with no sheathes on tools. sharping tools with out gloves on or File guards. They just all start adding up.
Like the Two violations of safety protocol below
Like McDonough’s statement Fire Orders are Hillbilly.
Leaving your fire assignment without notifying your supervisor of what you are doing.
Bob, GM was heard on the radio advising that they were moving.
Elizabeth… read what Bob Powers actually said.
Their SUPERVISOR has testified MANY times that HE was NOT INFORMED.
Bob, I believe it is beyond dispute that GM advised via radio what they were doing when they starting moving to the Boulder Springs Ranch. Cordes made clear that he wanted resources at the Boulder Springs Ranch. Musser contacted Marsh to see what resources were available for that area.
These are the facts.
I’m lost.
Can you provide the transcripts of those convo’s?
Fred, Cordes and Musser and Abel and B33 revealed these things in their interviews. Surely you remember that….
Elizabeth none of what you stated is correct Marsh never stated where he was moving to. nor did any of them know where the Crew was when they went to shelters. As Otis said Provide the transcripts. I assumed you called Otis Fred which he isn’t.
Cordes, Musser, Abel and B33 did not know where the crew was. Thus the confusion in RESCUE.
The IC thought they were in the black, B33 had seen them on a ridge on the south side of the fire, one OPS had only herd them on the Radio when they were in trouble. The other OPS after the fact thought they may have been going to BSR. Because he had told them it was a good SZ.
So we go chasing Rabbits again. Along with your paranoia over All the Fred’s which now includes Otis.
Reply to Bob Powers post on
February 13, 2015 at 9:15 am
>> Bob Powers said…
>>
>> Cordes, Musser, Abel and B33 did not know where
>> the crew was.
Absolutely true… except for the first gentleman.
SPGS1 Gary Cordes knew EXACTLY what they were doing… WHERE they were going… and probably exactly WHY they were doing it ( but has still never said so ).
That really IS him ( Cordes ) telling Esquibel to send some people to the Boulder Springs Ranch to be SURE that Granite Mountain gets (quote) “out of there safely”.
When Cordes gave that directive to Esquibel to send people to ‘get’ Granite Mountain… he actually thought they were either ALREADY there… or just about to ARRIVE there.
What Eric Marsh (apparently) NEVER did, however, is directly and properly inform his OWN direct SUPERVISOR ( Field OPS1 Todd Abel ) what he was doing.
As far as we know, anyway.
No one has still ever seen Eric Marsh’s or Todd Abel’s cellphone records.
WTK
You know B33 had a pretty good idea where GM was. He heard they were moving to a SZ. He possibly heard they were moving towards Yarnell as did Eric Tarr.
And when he finally answers the frantic calls from the trapped WFF’s. He doesn’t even ask where they are. He says in his own words. So you are on the south side of the fire, right?
And as Elizabeth said. The bodies of the GMIHC were found as soon as the smoke cleared enough for Ranger 58 to get into that valley.
Will SAY again the south side of the e was from
the anchor point to BSR Ranch that’s roughly 1.5 Miles. The last B33 saw Marsh and Crew they were on a ridge near the anchor point that’s a ways from where they were found.
South side of the fire was from.
Missed fire only had a e,,,,,,,,,,,,
Bob, you said “The IC thought they were in the black, B33 had seen them on a ridge on the south side of the fire, one OPS had only herd them on the Radio when they were in trouble. The other OPS after the fact thought they may have been going to BSR. Because he had told them it was a good SZ.”
Not true. You cannot make up the facts, Bob – that does not HELP the situation. It only hurts the survivors.
Elizabeth I do not know why I am even answering you.
Read what WTKTT said above in full agreement with me, except the Information on Gary Cordes. He never actually testified to knowing or talking with Marsh.
Cordes was not Marshes direct Supervisor.
Did he know where Marsh and Crew were or did he assume he knew where they were. Based on trying to send an Engine Esquibel to check on them?????
More explanation needed here.
Did he think they were at the BSR
Did he know they were at the BSR
Did he think they would move to the BSR when safe to do so??????? A lot of open questions here that were never asked..
Reply to Elizabeth post on February 13, 2015 at 4:35 am
>> Elizabeth said…
>>
>> I believe it is beyond dispute that GM advised via radio
>> what they were doing when they starting moving to
>> the Boulder Springs Ranch.
It is also beyond dispute ( if you believe that OPS1 Todd Abel’s interviews are accurate ) that their DIRECT SUPERVISOR was NOT INFORMED that they were abandoning their assigned area.
It’s almost as if… following being told by his DIRECT SUPERVISOR to “Hunker and be safe… and keep ME informed ( of your situation and your whereabouts )”… that Eric Marsh suddenly decided he was “working for someone else now” and just didn’t feel the need to DIRECTLY inform his own OPS level supervisor that he was abandoning his assigned area.
Throwing some obtuse answers over the radio to ( still unknown ) people asking you what your ‘status is’ does NOT represent ( in any way, shape or form ) proper notification of your SUPERVISOR what you are ‘doing’. during a dangerous, dynamic fire situation.
You are Right on
WTKTT, as you know, I do not agree that we know that anyone was asking GM for their “status.” I do not agree with you on a lot of what your ears are hearing in those background sounds in the recordings. Regardless, we know that Cordes (who was basically calling the shots on the east side of the fire), the acting air attack folks, Paul Musser, Eric Tarr, and others all heard GM advising that they were moving.
Why are you of the view that (a) it was necessary for GM/Marsh to say more than that and (b) that it would have made a difference had GM/Marsh done so?
Reply to Elizabeth post on February 13, 2015 at 9:56 am
>> Elizabeth said…
>>
>> WTKTT, as you know, I do not agree that we know
>> that anyone was asking GM for their “status.” I do
>> not agree with you on a lot of what your ears are
>> hearing in those background sounds in the recordings.
And as I have told you before… I would be the FIRST to agree that SOME of these things are hard to hear… but YOU still maintain that you cannot hear things which are CLEARLY heard by anyone with NORMAL hearing.
I still suggest you get you ears checked.
Seriously. I mean it.
If you really can’t hear that person calling out to Granite Mountain in the Panebaker 1616 video and saying…
“Granite Mountain… what’s your status right now?”
…then you really do need your hearing checked.
My wife just got an AMAZING new hearing aid.
They are really, really sophisticated these days and can even be tuned to accomodate specific ranges of frequencies.
A lot of people are DEAF in certain very specific frequency ranges just like a lot of people are color-blind to some very specific color wavelengths.
The new technology is doing wonders for these people.
It is literally a “I never knew what I was missing” revelation for them… like it was for my wife.
>> Elizabeth also said…
>>
>> Regardless, we know that Cordes (who was basically
>> calling the shots on the east side of the fire), the
>> acting air attack folks, Paul Musser, Eric Tarr, and
>> others all heard GM advising that they were moving.
Ah… so now you ARE leaving OPS1 Todd Abel out of your little ‘list’? I assume that means I’m not going to see your proof for your prior statement that Eric Marsh’s direct supervisor ALSO (accidentally) heard these things?
>> Elizabeth also said…
>>
>> Why are you of the view that (a) it was necessary
>> for GM/Marsh to say more than that and (b) that
>> it would have made a difference had GM/Marsh
>> done so?
I’m going to answer these two ABSURD questions with an old saying…
To those who understand… no explanation is necessary.
To those who do not… no explanation is possible.
Guess which category you fall into?
Not just the sleeves. When the same day you nearly get your lookout burned over and don’t think it’s a big deal, when you have a history of repeatedly having to get your buggies rescued, when you repeatedly get lectured by peers that you aren’t doing things the right way, when you get told in written performance reviews that you need to speak when spoken to, when you can’t assess distance correctly — when all those things are present, there may be some issues that are specific to that crew. The reality is that safety or lack thereof is a cultural thing, and does tend to travel in groups both positively and negatively.
In Christopher MacKenzie’s Canon photo name IMG_0876, taken that very Sunday morning in Yarnell… Robert Caldwell is photographed using his DRIP TORCH.
He has gloves on… but his right SLEEVE is still ROLLED UP and his bare forearm is showing.
Fer cryin’ out loud.
The guy is wearing an expensive fire resistant shirt… using a LIGHTED DRIP TORCH with flaming gas dripping out of it… and he doesn’t even bother to roll his sleeves down?
C’mon… that can’t even be attributed to “We’re Ranger Danger!” stuff.
That’s just plain STUPID.
SR
If you truly believe that Mcdonough almost got himself burned over then you must accept that Frisby was also putting himself at unnecessary risk. And not even wearing a helmet while operating his UTV, against the rules?
Come on guys (and girls). As Rocksteady said. Go watch some 2014 hotshot videos and judge for yourself.
WTK
As for the Mackenzie photo of Caldwell. It appears to me that both sleeves are rolled up once. And I think that has been described (accurately) as the sleeves are sometimes too long as they are not made to order.
But either way. There are so many pictures and videos of these WFF guys working on the fireline with sleeves at some level of rolled up that it seems to be a common practice. Even f it is against the rules.
Also. Is that image taken at the exact location that Mackenzie, Parker, Caldwell and Norris take videos and photos circa 1550 that day?
Reply to calvin post on February 13, 2015 at 3:18 am
>> calvin also said
>>
>> WTK
>>
>> As for the Mackenzie photo of Caldwell. It appears to me that
>> both sleeves are rolled up once.
His BARE FOREARM is showing… WHILE he is using a frickin’ DRIP TORCH.
What else is there to say?
It’s a DIRECT VIOLATION of NWCG safety rules.
From the OFFICIAL ‘National Wildfire Coordinating Group’ ( NWCG )
Training and Safety manual regarding ‘Firing Devices’…
NOTICE the SPECIFIC references to keeping ALL shirt sleeves completely rolled DOWN when using one of these puppies ( and when using fusees )…
Module 7: Firing Devices
http://training.nwcg.gov/classes/s130/508%20Files/071231_s130_m7_508.pdf
————————————————————————-
Topic 1: Introduction
* Firing devices module overview
It’s time to turn up the heat. This topic introduces you to the tools you will use to fight fire with fire. Each firing device has its own advantages and hazards, but all of them are reliable when you need to burn out or backfire during wildland firefighting operations.
In this module, we’ll discuss the following firing devices:
– Drip torches
– Fusees
Firing devices are powerful tools with the potential to be POWERFULLY DANGEROUS, so we’ll also run down the SAFETY features and PROCEDURES of each device.
* Drip torches
The drip torch is perhaps the most commonly used ignition device for burning out. When you’re carrying the torch, it allows the burning fuel to drip onto the vegetation where you want to burn.
Drip torch HAZARDS and SAFETY PRECAUTIONS
Drip torches have MANY HAZARDS, including flaming fuel, PERSONAL BURNS, improper fuel mix, flash back or explosion, and injuries from improper carrying and handling.
To overcome these hazards, there are several drip torch safety precautions to take.
– Wear all personal protective equipment (PPE) properly, including SLEEVES DOWN.
* Fusee hazards and safety precautions
The two primary hazards of burning fusees are from the released particles and fumes. Fusees burn at 1,400° F (760° C) and can BURN YOU SEVERELY.
Also, when fusees burn, they give off toxic fumes. Avoid these fumes as well as CONTACT with HOT SPLATTERING PHOSPHOROUS SLAG.
When using fusees:
– Wear all PPE properly, including SLEEVES DOWN.
————————————————————————-
Also remember… Robert Caldwell is the one who was promoted to ‘Crew Boss’ at the beginning of April, 2013… to replace Philip Maldonado who had taken a job with the Prescott Solid Waste Division.
So Robert Caldwell isn’t just a ground-pounder when this photo was taken.
He is now a ‘Crew Boss’… and a LEADER… and supposed to LEAD BY EXAMPLE.
That is almost proof-positive that there WAS a ‘relaxed’ culture within this GM organization when it came to following established industry SAFETY rules.
>> calvin also said…
>>
>> And I think that has been described (accurately) as the sleeves are
>> sometimes too long as they are not made to order.
This is a multi-BILLION ( with a ‘B’ ) industry.
The shirts themselves are expensive.
If they don’t come in the range of correct sleeve lengths so that someone doesn’t have to use THAT as an excuse for rolling up their sleeves all the time… then the WFF industry needs to get with the manufacturers ASAP and ‘figure it out’.
>> calvin also said…
>>
>> But either way. There are so many pictures and videos of these
>> WFF guys working on the fireline with sleeves at some level of
>> rolled up that it seems to be a common practice. Even f it is
>> against the rules.
And this is OKAY with you?
Are you actually DEFENDING the ‘common practice’ of ‘breaking the rules’ in an industry that is supposed to pride itself on SAFETY FIRST?
>> calvin also said…
>>
>> Also. Is that image taken at the exact location that Mackenzie, Parker,
>> Caldwell and Norris take videos and photos circa 1550 that day?
No. It was down the slope a ways where they were trying to burn from the edge of the existing cold-black over towards the tw0-track they walked up on. This was before Air Attack Rory Collins just dumped retardant all over everything they were doing because HE just wanted them to go ‘direct’.
Again Right ON
Collins claims he dumped on the burn to cool it down. I vaguely recall someone saying in a written statement that Marsh actually asked Collins to dump to pre-treat the edge where they were going to burn, which would obviously be consistent with what Hotshot Sups or Assistant Sups often want.
Reply to Elizabeth post on February 13, 2015 at 9:59 am
>> Elizabeth said…
>>
>> Collins claims he dumped on the burn to cool it down.
>> I vaguely recall someone saying in a written statement
>> that Marsh actually asked Collins to dump to pre-treat
>> the edge where they were going to burn, which would
>> obviously be consistent with what Hotshot Sups or
>> Assistant Sups often want.
Go check your notes.
Yes… Marsh requested that the SEATS pre-treat the edges of where they wanted their indirect burns to terminate up against the green side of the two-track… but Collins had other ideas.
This has been discussed before.
The Oregon fly-boys don’t really believe in ‘indirect’ attacks and Collins thought if he dumped right on the heat they could then just go DIRECT…. like HE wanted them to.
After the first dump right on their own heat… Marsh called back up to Colliins and ARGUED with him. That was NOT what he wanted.
Collins didn’t give a shit.
He had the SEATS dump on the rest of the ‘heat’… and FORCED DIVSA Marsh to change his plans and left him with only one option… go DIRECT now.
Calvin,
No, it doesn’t work that way. Frisby had mobility on his side, whereas GM’s lookout, in plain view of them all, was walking around looking at deployment sites because on foot he didn’t have that mobility. And, news that he was doing so was received “calmly.” There are multiple levels of wrong there. Not intentional, simply cultural as a result of not having experienced bad outcomes YET. If McDonough HAD been burned over, I’m sure the next time GM’s lookout was about to be burned over, their reaction would have been different.
Culture and training and history.
As I said I would do, I went Back to the Videos of the Rescue grouped going thru the fire and power lines. At no time did I consider any thing viewed on the video riding thru the left over burning debris or the power lines that were sagging or down as any serious safety problem than what I have walked thru on many occasions. The power lines were a problem but negotiable. Frisby walked in to check the route and the venting propane tank as I have said before, he evaluated that the venting was not a problem.
The house and the Tank were burning hot and a lot of reflective heat they had to go close to that to stay on the road thus the Hot, Hot, Lots of smoke. They manipulated thru the power lines which were ganging low across their path and probably would not have gone under them in a full sized Truck.
Although not clear I think that was the reason for telling anyone else not to go the way they did. other than ATV’s or UTV’s. What they did and how they went was is within the bounds of what Fire Fighters do all the time after a fire passes and the work their way into the burned area on Roads, on foot or in vehicles. My observations based on what I could see in the Videos.
Copy that.
You also wondered if the power lines were still ‘live’.
There is no definite proof that the ‘grid’ had been shut down circa 1735 ( 5:35 PM ) or so when this ‘breakthrough’ took place… but OPS2 Paul Musser DOES talk about getting the ‘grid’ shut down at some point in his ADOSH interview.
The following ‘cut’ from Musser’s ADOSH interview seems to suggest that no one got with APS ( Arizona Public Services Co. ) to make sure all the power lines were dead until sometime AFTER the bodies were discovered and they then started figuring out how they were going to push that dozer road from the Helms’ place out to the deployment site.
NOTE: At this point in the interview… when Musser says “The people on the ridge came down to the deployment site” he is referring to Frisby, Brown, Clawson, Hulburd and Yowell and the moment when they pulled their UTVs up to the Saddle point and then ran/walked on foot down the same path GM had took to get to the floor of the canyon.
Q2 = Barry Hicks, ADOSH
A = OPS2 Paul Musser
————————————————————————————-
2398 A: The people off the ridge
2399 came (down) to the deployment site and then started trying to find
2400 ground access. Uh, to get us in there. Still active fire going on structures and
2401 stuff. Uh, a lot of power lines down. Um, so we had to figure how we could
2402 get in and get around the power lines and stuff like that…
2403
2404 Q2: Right.
2405
2406 A: …to gain ground access. Met with, uh, APS – several different people in APS
2407 to make sure that everything was dead. Which took us a while to do. ‘Cause
2408 we had confirmation that it was dead, but I couldn’t talk to the person that
2409 gave that confirmation, so…
2410
2411 Q2: Oh yeah.
2412
2413 A: …so I had to talk to them personally that everything was dead, um, because
2414 we were gonna bring a dozer in to, uh, help clean up and create access. Tried
2415 to get them to cut the lines, they said just push it over and move on. Which
2416 then tangled up in the dozer
—————————————————————————————
SIDENOTES….
This is just FYI… but APS ( Arizona Public Services, Co. ) are also the ones who did the following two things in the days following the tragedy…
1) APS donated and installed that ‘flagpole’ that is currently at the deployment site.
2) APS completely PAID for ALL of the Hotshots funerals.
** TAGGING ALONG
I think it’s also important to note that regardless of exactly how DANGEROUS this ‘breakthrough’ was or wasn’t… or how many safety rules may have been being stretched… I don’t think there is any real evidence that the “3 Prescoteers” were even ‘officially’ supposed to be involved in this ground rescue mission.
Frisby and Brown were ‘officially’ given permission by IWIC ( Incident Within an Incident Commander ) Todd Abel to act as the ‘search team’ to go in there and try and find where GM had deployed.
Frisby and Brown FIRST tried to ‘break through’ down in the Glen Ilah area, which has always been SOME indication that sometime before they left that Ranch House Restaurant parking lot in their UTV it had become known it was ‘highly likely’ they were out there beyond the BSR
When everything was deemed ‘TOO DANGEROUS’ down there… THAT is when they headed back up to the Shrine area to take a route they were already familiar with.
When Frisby and Brown arrived up at the end of Shrine Road… the “3 Prescotteers” had already unloaded their own ATV and UTV and had been considering trying to ‘break through’ themselves.
Remember… Clawson, Hulburd and Yowell were still ‘off the radar’ at this point and basically just ‘freelancing’ at the Yarnell Hill Fire.
I don’t think IWIC Todd Abel ( or Frisby or Brown ) really had any idea they were still ‘hanging around’ up there on Shrine Road… or that they were contemplating trying to go look for GM themselves.
My point here is that Frisby and Brown knew what they needed to do.
They had to try and just find the location, then relay it back to the FULL ‘Medical Team’ that was still assembled and waiting back at the Ranch House Restaurant.
Frisby and Brown did not NEED Clawson, Hulburd and Yowell to particpate.
I think what happened is that once Frisby and Brown actually met with the “3 Prescotteers” up on Shrine Road… Clawson, Hulburd and Yowell just sort of ‘invited themselves’ to TAG ALONG behind Frisby and Brown.
So it was Frisby and Brown who made the decision to ‘bust through’ ( since THEY were the ones who KNEW what was on the other side ). I don’t think they even fully realized that Clawson, Hulburd and Yowell were going to just TAG ALONG behind them.
Clawson, Hulburd and Yowell had been there for some time and were deciding it WAS, in fact, TOO DANGEROUS to try and bust through there… but it was because they, themselves, had NO IDEA what was really ‘on the other side’.
When Frisby and Brown showed up… evaluated the situation… and then ‘went for it’ anyway… THAT is when Clawson, Hulburd and Yowell just trusted their judgement and had their own “Fuck it, let’s go for it TOO’ moment.
I’m actually not even sure that as Frisby and Brown hauled ass west out towards the anchor point that they really had any idea that Clawson, Hulburd and Yowell had decided to follow them and were behind them.
It really still would be nice if SOMEDAY… these THREE critcal witnesses to events leading up to, during, and after the deployment ( Clawson, Hulburd and Yowell ) would actually get INTERVIEWED and/or DEPOSED by someone.
OR… if Arizona Forestry already did… that they someday ‘find’ these interviews down there behind that filing cabinet along with the Peeples Valley Firefighter interviews, photos, and cellphone records.
Time for Chapter XII Mr. Moderator
Site is superslow and starting to misfile comments.
Bob
I began riding dirt bikes when I was 5. I have hundreds or even thousands of hours on motorcycles and 4 wheelers. But never been on a UTV.. And I have lived in the largest mountains in the East , all my life. And all my favorite hobbies are outdoor/ adventure oriented.
My past work experience includes being a member on an aero medical team. I have over one hundred helicopter rescue missions under my belt. I have been in the hero business.
And now I own a small business and maintain and operate small and medium sized machinery daily. Both tracked equipment and equipment with air filled tires as well as flat free tires. I am aware of the importance of preventative maintenance but understand that break downs do indeed happen at the most inopportune / inconvenient time.
But I want to make clear that never once did any of my pilots look at me and say “Fuck it lets go for it”
NEVER! And we knew that someone was in dire need of our services
Thank that gives me some perspective on your background. I would not expext pilots to push the envelope very far 1 skid landings under power are a little in the gray area but are done when needed. And allowed by some companies.
With some of the questions I was trying to get a feel where people were and their experience.
ATV’s operate a little different than Motorcycles but mostly the same uses the main difference
is balance and trail size a motor cycle can climb side hill where a ATV would have trouble on a steep slope.
Maybe you can reflect on this question.
Have you ever wanted to go some place on your motor cycle that was a little tricky
and you just decided you could do it and went for it?
You had confidence in your ability that would have looked dangerous to some one else.
in your brain you said fuck it I’m going for it??????
That’s kind of where I am trying to get an understanding here. Confidence Knowledge and ability. Make any since????
My expertise lies more in things like fact-finding and human behavior than in operating an atv/utv/motorcycle (though I have operated such things before). Therefore, I want to comment on Bob’s incorrect statement above, that “I would not expext pilots to push the envelope very far….”
One of the largest air rescue companies in the nation recently adopted a black-and-white rule regarding conditions under which its pilots were prohibited from accepting an assignment from dispatch, because the company realized that there was huge (and dangerous, from a risk exposure standpoint) variation among its employee pilots in terms of conditions under which they were willing to attempt a transport when it was not certain that the flying conditions would be great. To wit, the company realized that, when conditions were not HORRIBLE, but were a bit… sketch, some pilots would try to take an assignment coming through dispatch, and some would flatly say “no.” The company adopted a basically black-and-white rule to take away what Bob would consider the “pushing the envelope” discretion of the pilots, because the company realized that some pilots WOULD push the envelope (which was a bad thing) while some would avoid the envelope completely. (According to a source close to the situation, the younger guys, who were former pilots in the military, for example, would take the dicier assignments, while the older pilots, who were close to retirement and had nothing to prove, had no problem turning down every single assignment on their shift if they did not feel 100% confident in the potential trips.)
The empirical research regarding human behavior suggests that, generally speaking, people – including highly-trained hotshots, pilots, retired AFMOs, etc. – tend to be irrationally over-confident in their abilities and freakishly naive in their own “it could never happen to me” or “I would never make THAT mistake” mindsets.
In a sort-of related vein, I have always wanted to ask Sonny why he never put the YHF out himself, since he said one person with a shovel could have done it himself or herself on Friday night. If Sonny was there, is there any reason why he did not take a stab at putting the fire out himself, since he indicated that he thought that that was do-able. (That is a sincere question – I am not being sarcastic. If I recall correctly, Joy was hiking in the Yarnell area that Friday and Saturday, and presumably Sonny – her hiking partner – was with her.)
Seriously Elizabeth???
Irrationally over confidenttheir abilities?
Freakishly Naive?
I would like to see this study and who conducted it.
Was it conducted by an experienced FF who pointed out that or was it some desk jockey psychology intern who does not even know what the job is?
FF build confidence by being at fires, many fires, differing terrain and fuel types, as well as different fire behaviour.
Now you are classing us as the above mentioned insults?
If you were such a fact finder, as you state, you would not even print something like that…
BTW, time for a new chapter, this one is bogging down hard on the site..
RS, I said “PEOPLE” – all people (on average) – not just FFs, WFFs, etc.
ALL PEOPLE tend (on average and speaking generally (and generically) to overestimate and underestimate in the way that I described above. I made a general statement about the empirical research regarding human behavior, not about any FF-specific study!
Go back and re-read my comment.
I think you should read your second to last paragraph.
That is exactly what you said.
Rocksteady, I apologize for offending you – I was not intending to single out folks like WFFs and pilots as outliers, but, rather, I was mentioning them specifically in order to INCLUDE them with the rest of us humans, in order to essentially say “these biases and cognition issues tend to impact ALL of us, including seasoned WFFs, pilots, etc.”! (FYI, it is frustrating when posters here on IM like Bob Powers get a pass on horrible wording, spelling, and communication, while I get jumped on for phrasing things poorly now and again. Weird, that….. 🙂 ) Let me try to fix things by saying the following:
I want to clarify a point about human behavior that I made above, that apparently I made poorly (for which I apologize to Rocksteady). ☺
When talking about humans taking various risks, Bob Powers had said “I would not expext pilots to push the envelope very far….”
In response to Bob’s point (and perhaps recent other posts), I attempted to make the point that, speaking in broad generalities about human behavior, the empirical research does not tend to support Bob’s point.
To wit, the empirical research suggests that humans are not great at NOT pushing the envelope too far, in part because humans tend to UNDERESTIMATE the chances that they will make the same missteps or misjudgments or bad decisions that others have made and OVERSTATE their ability to avoid problems/missteps/accidents. “I would NEVER go into the green like Granite Mountain did” is an example of the type of statement I sometimes see on here that makes me think of the relevant behavioral (and cognition) research.
In my post below regarding Bob’s specific point about pilots, I shared intel regarding one of the biggest air rescue companies in the nation and an explicit rule the company recently adopted, in part to mitigate the potential for (or the practice of) some of their employee pilots sometimes pushing the envelope.
To be clear, the behavioral or cognitive tendencies to which I am referring (e.g. those that motivate statements such as “I would NEVER do what [insert names of dead folks here] did”) tend to impact EVERYONE (on average), myself included! One of the most effective ways to deal with these tendencies or biases or cognitive weaknesses is to be aware of them and be prepared to challenge them. Or you can adopt black-and-white rules designed to address them (like the company I reference above did).
So, apologies, Rocksteady, for offending you, apparently by seeming like I was somehow saying that only WFFs or pilots or whomever exhibited these overestimation and underestimation biases. My point – poorly worded – was that I tend to believe based on the research and speaking generally that NO category of person (such as pilots or seasoned WFFs or researchers ☺ or whomever) are categorically exempted from these overestimation and underestimation problems with respect to risk management/mitigation/avoidance. I believe – speaking generally – that we ALL risk falling prey to these typical human behavior and cognition biases or weaknesses.
I hope this clarifies, and, again, I apologize.
You kind of shoveled a deep hole in your explanation,
How ever I already know what you think of me and could care less.
I have apologized before for some of my spelling but if it bothers you I will just leave it as is. on top of my key board skipping letters it is what it is.
I DO NOT EXCEPT YOUR WIMPY APOLAGY.
Nor do I consider you a viable source in this discussion.
.
Woops—ACCEPT ——-enjoy.
Bob, I wasn’t apologizing to you. Sorry for the confusion.
No Confusion here.
But what you said about Fire Fighters, Hot Shots, Retired AFMO’s, Etc. covered me as well as severial others on here.
So your apology was not meant for all but Rocksteady.
You really said what you believe. I know it and so do you.
You have about wore out your welcome here.
WTKTT, Calvin and Elisabeth seem to be struggling with safety, fire spread, and vehicle break downs .
Realizing none of you have any Fire experience, ATV or UTV experience and I am not sure about Western Mountain experience, We are having a large disconnect here.
I have tried to explain some of my experiences down below here to familiarize you with what wild land Fire Fighters experience and the exposures they face every day.
I know none of you have ever fought wild fire or been up close and personal.
Do any of you have experience with ATV’s or UTV’s like 200 plus hours of operation in mountainous terrain???
Have any of you flown in a Helicopter landing and taking off in the Mountains???
Not trying to be critical of your lack of knowledge here but trying to help you see what a Fire Fighter is and dose year after year.
Fire is an interesting phenomena like other acts of nature. like Thunderstorms, Tornados, Hurricanes, so like the above they all react different in different places and do different things.
Fire can simply start and laydown or go out or creep around with no real activity. They can lay down at night and in the morning, and increase activity after 1200. They can also burn intensely day and night. There are many factors that produce different burning conditions. Wind is one of the bigger factors how ever Drought and prolonged drought can change things drastically.
So first the fire fighter has–Fuels, Fuel types, fuel density, next is topography, Canyons, slopes or flat. and a lot in between. Fuel moisture can have an effect cause by drought. The amount of moisture in fuels are measured in 1 Hr. 10Hr. 100Hr. and 1000Hr fuels. From Grass to Timber fuels.
The less the moisture content the faster the fuel ignition and the hotter it burns. Influenced by winter snow packs and rain as well as low temperatures, rain and night time humidity’s high and low day time humidity’s all of these things along with others affect what a fire dose.
A good Fire Fighter understands when they can be aggressive and when they need to back off.
You do not learn this in books you are thought by old experienced Fire Fighters and you learn by experience of fire after fire all sizes and burning conditions.
Which brings me to the UTV of Frisby and Brown what you perceive as taking a chance with fire is not necessarily so. When they took the trip up to where the fire was burning after dropping McDonough off. I would venture a guess at that time the fire was not very active before or around noon. Using the UTV is an accepted practice, qualified drivers and good equipment you are not concerned with what ifs. Your concerned with following safe operations.
You also question them going thru fire to go on a search mission. I have tried to explain that severial times. One more time– This was not a flaming fire head but debris and downed trees burning not a flaming front while there was fire it was not a wide flaming area so there was room with fast UTV’s to go thru with very little exposure to prolonged heat. Experienced fire fighters would understand that and just go thru it. If you need to get to the burned area some times you have to deal with some, fire experience dictates where the best place and time is to do that.
So my reflection is both of these things happened with a knowledge and for thought that it was Safe. You will have to believe me when I say based on the information I have seen and read I believe what they did was safe. Based on all my back ground and experience you will have to believe me.
Reply to Bob Powers post on February 10, 2015 at 11:14 am
>> Bob Powers said…
>>
>> WTKTT, Calvin and Elisabeth seem to be struggling with safety,
>> fire spread, and vehicle break downs .
Nope. Not ‘struggling’ with it all all ( speaking for myself, anyway ).
You had said that EVERYTHING Blue Ridge did was all ‘tickety-boo’ that day… and no
chance that they, themselves, had been ‘pushing the envelope’ that day with regards to
safety.
Calvin respectfully disagreed with that carte-blanche assumption.
>> Bob Powers also said…
>>
>> Realizing none of you have any Fire experience, ATV or UTV experience
Not a good assumption on your part.
I used to own a UTV with a covered roll-frame and a dumper bed.
Used it a lot to reach my back 40 and haul firewood back uphill.
It was a Kawasaki KAF620A4 Mule 2510 (4X4).
It was a piece of shit.
It was well-maintained… but crapped out on me any number of times
when I was least expecting it… and I had long walks home.
Fortunately ( for me ) there was never an ‘active fire’ in the area when it happened.
So I’m glad you never had consistent ‘breakdowns’ in any UTV/ATV you were riding in… but I did. I got rid of it. It was ( in my opinion ) an “unreliable”.piece of machinery.
I won’t even mention the actual Granite Mountain UTV that crapped out on THEM… and in a place where it was too late to do anything about it so they just let it burn up.
SIDENOTE: In a very bizarre ‘connected’ way… if GM had REPLACED that burned-up UTV and had another with them on June 30, 2013… a LOT of things might have actually turned out differently that day. They SHOULD have had one up on that ridge that day.
Maybe then it wouldn’t have been up to just another Hotshot crew to save McDonough’s life… and maybe then they could have actually done the ‘scouting’ they should have done to save their OWN lives that day.
>> Bob Powers also said…
>>
>> We are having a large disconnect here.
No. We’re really not. We’re having a discussion.
You are defending just one perspective on the topic.
You are maintaining that the Blue Ridge Hotshots were ‘tickety-boo’ with regards to safety that day and ‘within acceptable safety guidelines’ at all times.
Calvin (respectfully) disagreed.
Read on and see if you still think it was the case.
>> Bob Powers also said…
>>
>> I have tried to explain some of my experiences down below here to familiarize
>> you with what wild land Fire Fighters experience and the exposures they
>> face every day.
YOUR experiences and insight into firefighting ‘in general’ are always valuable… but now I will try to familiarize YOU with a few more ‘facts’ about what was happening in Yarnell on June 30, 2013 that you seem to be unaware of.
>> Bob Powers also said…
>>
>> Which brings me to the UTV of Frisby and Brown what you perceive as
>> taking a chance with fire is not necessarily so. When they took the trip
>> up to where the fire was burning after dropping McDonough off. I would
>> venture a guess at that time the fire was not very active before or around noon.
Your guess would be wrong.
At the time Frisby and Brown were heading DEEP into the unburned fuel of that northern bowl ( and driving straight towards the fireline on roads that only another UTV could have navigated if a ‘rescue’ was needed )… the fire behavior was already VERY ACTIVE and had ALREADY started TURNING.
They were (apparently) UNAWARE of this and kept driving right towards the now-shifting fireline through massive amounts of VERY volatile unburned fuel.
This is all verified in the ADOSH interview with ‘Bravo 3’ ( Rusty Warbis and Paul Lenmark ) who arrived over Yarnell about 12:15 PM.
First… let’s look at the actual TIMING here.
You just said you were assuming this ‘scouting trip’ was in the NOON timeframe and the only consideration was the fire activity around THAT time.
That’s not the case.
From NOON to about NOON-THIRTY was when Frisby and Brown were still up in the high ridge having that face-to-face with Marsh and Steed.
The ‘scouting trip’ was in a later timeframe.
They were far to the north there in the middle of nowhere and right at the active ( and now shifting ) fireline more like an HOUR later… at 1:08 PM.
Here is a summary of the actual TIMES involved based on the Blue Ridge GPS data…
——————————————————————————–
1225 ( 12:25 PM )
Frisby and Brown begin to leave the anchor point where they had been having their face-to-face with Marsh and Steed and head back east on the two-track road ‘in the bottom’. Brendan McDonough is now ‘onboard’ the BR Polaris Ranger and Frisby and Brown are going to drop Brendan off near the old-grader on their way back east.
1232 ( 12:32 PM )
The second time that day they are at the exact spot labelled ‘Mystery panel’. on the Blue Ridge GPS tracking data background map. We still don’t know what ‘Mystery panel’ means.
1240 ( 12:40 PM )
The actual moment they stopped near the old-grader location to drop Brendan off so he can begin his lookout duties. They only stop here for 1 minute before continuing back east on that dozer-improved east-west two-track.
1249 ( 12:49 PM )
They arrive back at the top of the Sesame Clearing area where the Grainite Mountain Supt. and Chase trucks were parked. They only stop there for 1 minute before beginning a ‘scouting trip’ north from the Sesame area on what is marked on the visible map as the ‘Jeep Trail’. Despite it being called a ‘Jeep Trail’. on the TOPO maps… none of the roads they will take on this entire ‘scouting trip’ have been improved in any way and the only way anyone could have reached them if they had any kind of emergency during the next 45 minutes would have been with another UTV or ATV or by chopper.
1250 to 1308 ( 12:50 PM to 1:08 PM )
Their ‘scouting trip’ north on the ‘Jeep Trail’. At 1308 ( 1:08 PM ) they are at the farthest point north that they would travel and are actually at a point where both the SAIR and the ADOSH fire progression charts seem to say should have been ‘inside the fire area itself. They may have actually ‘broken through’ the actual fireline on the ‘Jeep Trail’ itself as part of this ‘scouting trip’. If not… then they certainly went RIGHT UP to the fireline that day.
1308-1332 ( 1:08 PM to 1:32 PM )
A slow trip back doing more ‘scouting’. They arrive back at the top of the Sesame Clearing area where this ‘scouting’ trip started and where the Granite Mountain Supt and Chase trucks were still parked at 1332, but only remain there for 7 minutes before heading back south to rejoin the BR Crew.
———————————————————————————–
‘Bravo 3’ ( Warbis and Lenmark ) arrived over Yarnell about 12:15 PM… WHILE that ‘face to-face’ was still going on up on the ridge between Frisby, Brown, Marsh and Steed.
About 12:40 PM, at the same moment Frisby and Brown were dropping Brendan off at the old-grader and still 10 minutes BEFORE they would even BEGIN their ‘scouting trip’ north into the unburned fuel and towards the fire… ‘Bravo 3’ took their ‘first full pass’ around the fire and made their evaluations of the situation.
Here is what they told ADOSH they saw at the time ( circa 12:40 PM )…
Q = Barry Hicks, ADOSH investigator
A = Rusty Warbis ( Bravo 3 )
A1 = Paul Lenmark ( Bravo 3 )
—————————————————————————————-
Q: If you could describe the fire behavior you all were seeing at that point in time, that would be good, I think.
A or A1: Um, the fire behavior – it was, ah, for earlier in the day, it was pretty substantial. Um, that fire was burning, ah, downhill to the north from that upper rim, point of origin, ah, pushing downhill, um, which would be unusual and, ah, it was advancing, um, it was advancing along pretty good. It was, ah, it was chomping right along.
That fire’s running down that ridge you can see (unintelligible). Peeples Valley and Yarnell sits over here and you can see that the fire’s been running downhill.
Q: Right.
A or A1: Every once in a while, that fire would swing a little bit to the east, and when it did, it would stand up of course because it was a long front.
A or A1: …um, portray y to Division Zulu that he had, um, a lot of fire that Yarnell was um, we’re in a lead plane and we’re looking up kind of at Yarnell. It was vey obvious…
Q: Yeah.
A or A1: …of that train. And, ah… On that – on the first pass as we came around there, we identified that.
A or A1: I remember the discussion with division (Zulu) talking about trigger points. You know, and at that point, we’re not thinking crews at all. We’re thinking evacuation of Yarnell.
Q: So were they able to describe that to ya – what the trigger points were?
A or A1: They didn’t, we had, ah, they gave – I had a conversation with Zulu that hey, um, you got a lotta fire… when it became obvious that the fire was going to go to Yarnell, um, when that – when – when the winds and, ah, terrain aligned.
I remember having a conversation with him about having trigger points, um, letting him know that w- that this is what we’re going to use – don’t know what you got in place, but, um, this fire’s gonna get to ya TODAY.
A or A1: This is the first turn, you know, so this is – we’re gathering, you know.. we’re just trying to gather that assessment…
We’re identifying, okay, Yarnell’s gonna be in trouble here.
—————————————————————————————
So on their very FIRST pass around the fire circa 12:40 PM… ‘Bravo 3’ was noticing all of the following…
1) The fire was already SUBSTANTIALLY active for that early in the afternoon.
2) It was already ‘swinging’ and trying to SHIFT to the EAST.
3) It now had mulitiple heads burning in multiple directions.
4) The fire was GOING to go into Yarnell THAT day, during THAT burn cycle.
5) Yarnell was going to need to be evacuated.
And they made all these observations BEFORE Frisby and Brown even STARTED on their ‘scouting trip’ all the way to the north towards that ‘substantially active’ and ‘switching’ fireline through all that unburned fuel.
So an argument COULD be made that that ‘scouting trip’ Frisby and Brown took was not only totally unnecessary ( given the changing fire conditions and no chance of ‘the plan’ ever working on the south side )… it was potentially DANGEROUS.
Thankfully… nothing terrible happened there.
>> Bob Powers also said…
>>
>> You also question them going thru fire to go on a search mission.
>> I have tried to explain that severial times. One more time– This was
>> not a flaming fire head but debris and downed trees burning not a
>> flaming front while there was fire it was not a wide flaming area so
>> there was room with fast UTV’s to go thru with very little exposure
>> to prolonged heat. Experienced fire fighters would understand that
>> and just go thru it. If you need to get to the burned area some times
>> you have to deal with some, fire experience dictates where the
>> best place and time is to do that.
I understand perfectly what you are saying… and that it is your (current) OPINION that this was just “all in a day’s work” for WFF’s like Blue Ridge and YOU ( yourself ) are (currently) convinced it was NOT all that DANGEROUS.
What you seem to either be forgetting or were never aware of is that this “Fuck it, let’s go for it” break-through by Frisby and Brown was ALREADY classified as being WAAY too dangerous for anyone to attempt RIGHT after it happened… and a specific ORDER was given after the break-through took place that NO ONE ELSE should try to attempt it BECAUSE of how DANGEROUS it really was.
NOTE: According to BR Captain Brown’s own ‘Unit Log’ it was HIM ( and not Frisby ) who actually eventually said “Fuck it… let’s go for it”, and they then disregarded all safety concerns and did just that.
The radio message that came right after the break-through informing everyone else that it had been so DANGEROUS that NO ONE ELSE should attempt it came from the same man who, moments earlier, had said “Fuck it… let’s go for it”.
Blue Ridge Captain Trueheart Brown himself.
From Blue Ridge Captain Trueheart Brown’s own ‘Unit Log’…
————————————————————————————
1710 – Brian (Frisby) and myself depart the staging area ( at the Ranch House Restaurant ) and try to find access.
We initially try to gain access via shrine rd.
This is NOT POSSIBLE due to propane tanks exploding/venting and a large wall of fire as well as trees across the road.
Then we try via the Lakewood rd. We determine very quickly that it is TOO DANGEROUS and we tie in with (xxxxxx) on an ATV on Lakewood rd and tell him to not let anyone back into the area.
We try another route off Lakewood and when we are heading back to 89 after determining that this way is ALSO TOO DANGEROUS we see (xxxxxx) sending in engines to engage and we turn them around and send them back to 89.
There were multiple propane tanks venting and exploding on BOTH routes as well as multiple flame fronts impeding the way.
1725 – We then try to access again via shrine again and tie in with ( PFD guys Clawson, Hulburd ) and ( Yowell? ) and they have a Polaris razor and a ATV. We only have a few bottle of 02 (oxygen), one med bag and a backboard.
We drive up as far as we can on shrine and then sit there for a few minutes contemplating the situation.
We all know that it is cold black beyond the first wall of heat and the propane tanks that are venting.
I remember saying “Fuck it lets go for it” and then we all just go for it.
There are multiple trees across the road and POWER LINES are hanging very low too.
We punch it and make it through.
I transmit this over crew to (xxxxx) at the staging area who relays this to the Medical group leader.
I also relay the access that we took into the black and tell the resources to wait until we find them because it is SO DANGEROUS to get through the WAY WE CAME.
————————————————————————————–
So after trying MULTIPLE times to ‘break-through’ and deciding everything was ‘TOO DANGEROUS’… BR Captain Brown’s intelligent, safety-minded decision was “Fuck it… let’s go for it”… and they did it anyway.
And right AFTER doing it Captain Brown himself was the one informing everyone else ( via the radio ) to NOT try the same thing THEY just did because it was TOO DANGEROUS.
Does that STILL sound ( to YOU ) like “all in a day’s work” and ‘by-the-book’ tickety-boo safety conscious decision making on Blue Ridge’s part?
My thoughts were they were talking more about the down Power lines than the Fire
My only comment they made it thru with out any problems. From what I saw with the camera at that place seemed to not be fire critical. That’s the rescue picture ride in the first of the last three videos. I will have to go back and take another look.
On your UTV No wonder a Kawasaki Mule WOW.
Reply to Bob Powers post on February 10, 2015 at 7:24 pm
>> Bob Powers said…
>>
>> My thoughts were they were talking more about the down
>> Power lines than the Fire.
Well if that’s what they encountered/saw only AFTER deciding “Fuck it… let’s go for it”… I would certainly HOPE that’s why they made sure no one else tried the stupid move THEY just made.
>> Bob Powers also said…
>>
>> My only comment they made it thru with out any problems.
Thank goodness. Yes… but how COMMON is what happened here?
That a crew would make a VERY risky decision and then… just moments later… actually get on the radio themselves and call back to their compadres saying ( basically ) “Okay… NOBODY better try what WE just did. It’s TOO DANGEROUS. You might get KILLED. We almost did”.
I mean… really… does that happen often?
Is THAT “all in day’s work?” on a typical WFF fireline?
>> Bob Powers also said…
>>
>> From what I saw with the camera at that place seemed
>> to not be fire critical. That’s the rescue picture ride in the
>> first of the last three videos. I will have to go back and
>> take another look.
Don’t forget to watch the NEXT video with KC ‘Bucky” Yowell practically screaming “HOT! SMOKY! HOT! HOT!”.
He almost sounded like he was genuinely in PAIN.
Sounds like they are VERY lucky they didn’t get clotheslined ( or even electrocuted ) by some power lines they (apparently) didn’t see BEFORE they said “Fuck it… let’s go for it”… or that they didn’t suffer some lung injuries if the HEAT was still that bad on the breakthrough… OR that their own tires didn’t melt and/or explode.
>> Bob Powers also said…
>>
>> On your UTV No wonder a Kawasaki Mule WOW.
Okay… so that begs a question given the nature of this discussion.
If it is ‘accepted’ among WFFs that some makes/models of UTVs are more reliable than others ( as you yourself just seemed to express )… then what are the WFF STANDARDS for purchasing/using these things?
Are there only SOME types of these things that are ALLOWED on the firelines… or not?
What if the Coconino National Forest ( essentially the Blue Ridge Hotshots’ parent company’ and sponsor ) had been trying to save a few bucks and Blue Ridge had been out there with a Kawasaki rather than a Polaris?
Did you just say that if that WERE the case… your opinion(s) about whether anything they were doing that day in their UTV would be completely different?
SIDENOTE: I actually would HOPE that a lot of ‘testing’ HAS been done and that… yes… there are only certain (tested/trusted) types of ATV/UTV that are ‘allowed’ or ‘licensed’ to be used in critical WFF situations.
I would hate to think that the WFF industry knows what is or isn’t a piece of shit… but they still allow the equipment considered to be ‘unreliable’ out on the firelines.
Followup…
Chapter 14 of the National Interagency Fire Center’s “Firefighting Equipment Standards” publication is here…
http://www.nifc.gov/PUBLICATIONS/redbook/2015/Chapter14.pdf
On page 6 is the section that covers ATV/UTV ‘Standards’…
———————————————————————
All Terrain Vehicles (ATV)/Utility-Terrain Vehicles (UTV)
The operation of ATV/UTVs can be high risk. The use of ATV/UTVs should be evaluated to ensure that use is essential to accomplish the mission, rather than for convenience.
Because of the high risk nature, agencies have developed specific operational 8 policy (refer to current agency policy). ATV/UTV operators will meet the 9 training and certification requirements of their agency; employees certified by 10 their agency will be considered qualified ATV/UTV operators regardless of 11 incident jurisdiction. Common policy requirements for wildland fire operations 12 are highlighted below:…
( List of requirements for ATVO certification ).
—————————————————————–
There is NOTHING in this publication about which TYPES of UTV/ATV are either ‘acceptable’ or even ‘allowed’ out on the fireline.
Even though this is the National Interagency Fire Center’s official “Firefighting EQUIPMENT Standards” publication… the UTV/ATV section ONLY deals with ‘ATV/UTV Operator requirements’ and ONLY outlines the steps needed to get the “All Terrain Vehicle Operator” ( ATVO ) designation punched into your own red-card.
There is NOTHING about the EQUIPMENT itself.
What is ‘accepted’ or what isn’t.
So according to even the “National Interagency Fire Center” itself… a piece of shit Kawasaki would ( apparently ) be considered just as ‘safe’ and ‘reliable’ to be using ‘out there’ as anything else.
Yikes.
I would say you are probably correct on Polaris. The Government would release some requirements and specifics for bids or set certain requirements that they would then recommend or require a specific manufacture. Gov. red tape.
I would have to say this was not a Fire mission but a rescue mission to find and assist so some of what they did was a decision to get there
I have seen it before so I do not know if I would or would not do the same if lives were at risk. It is a spur of the moment decision on a search and rescue mission I am sure they felt they could make it and put the pedal to the metal. Right or wrong there choice.
Reply to Bob Powers post on
February 10, 2015 at 10:04 pm
>> Bob Powers said…
>>
>> I would say you are probably correct on Polaris.
>> The Government would release some requirements
>> and specifics for bids or set certain requirements
>> that they would then recommend or require a
>> specific manufacture. Gov. red tape.
Well… best I could discover with the limited time I had this evening about this is that what you just said is still, as late as April of 2014, just something that people would LIKE to see start happening with regards to these UTVs and ATVs.
At the GBCG ( Great Basin Coordinating Group ) Spring Meeting held back on April 1 -2, 2014 in Wendover Nevada,
they put forth just some ‘proposals’ related to UTV/ATV on the fireline… like even just making sure they are listed in resource orders… and someone coming up with some STANDARDS for when these things have to be ordered for use on firelines.
They even think it would be nice if these things had to be APPROVED and/or INSPECTED for proper running condition ( by ICs or Safety Officers ) before being allowed on the fireline.
Apparently… there isn’t even any requirement for THAT to happen yet… so pretty much any piece of shit could currently be ‘out there’ being used in critical situations.
http://gacc.nifc.gov/gbcc/GBCG/Meeting%20Notes/Spring%20Meeting%20Notes%202014.pdf
Page 2 ( of 5 pages )
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ATV/UTV Guidance:
Propose that the IC or Safety Officer will approve the use of ATV/UTV on incidents. If a resource assigned to a fire arrives with an ATV or UTV it will need to be placed on a resource order (either as a support request, special needs, etc) if it’s going to be used on the incident. If the equipment is not on an order the home unit will be responsible for damages etc. Also need some/direction and specifications for Buying Teams when incidents order ATV/UTV equipment to that they get the appropriate type of vehicle. Will send out a memo with ATV/UTV protocol and work with the IBIB to get specifications.
———————————————————
>> Bob Powers also said…
>>
>> I would have to say this was not a Fire mission but
>> a rescue mission to find and assist so some of what
>> they did was a decision to get there
I understand. You do realize, though, that this discussion IS related to Granite Mountain?
What if Brendan McDonough testifies that he heard Eric Marsh truly believing that ‘lives were in danger’ in town and that it was their “responsibility’ to ‘get there”… and THAT is what all the ‘discussion’ and possible ‘argument’ was with Steed? Steed wasn’t ‘onboard’ with that and (perhaps) ended up having to be ORDERED to move.
Does that change the rules… as you seem to be suggesting it did for Blue Ridge now?
I know this “does the motivation change the rules” discussion has come and gone many times before… but it seems like we have sort or ‘back-assed’ into it again with this whole thread about whether Blue Ridge was all ‘tickety-boo’ that day… or not.
>> Bob Powers also said…
>>
>> I have seen it before so I do not know if I would
>> or would not do the same if lives were at risk.
>> It is a spur of the moment decision on a search
>> and rescue mission I am sure they felt they
>> could make it and put the pedal to the metal.
>> Right or wrong there choice.
Once again… you seem to now be saying that whether or not you have to follow all the ‘rules’ totally depends on what YOU think you ‘have to do’… with no consultations or permissions.
In the ‘spur of the moment’… you can decide you have some kind of ‘critical mission’ and throw all the safety rules out the window.
It really will be interesting to hear what Brendan McDonough heard that day… and whether Eric Marsh really believed they were now on some kind of ‘life saving mission’… and all he had to do was convince Steed of the same thing to get HIM to ‘break the rules’ as well.
There’s gonna be a HUGE ‘Lesson Learned’ takeaway here… if that turns out to be the case… and ( hopefully ) some equally HUGE policy changes for the WFF industry.
No They could do nothing with people in town as a hand crew. GM’s move was not an emergency. They were not asked to leave their assignment to go save people and as a Supervisor making a decision to put 19 men at risk is not acceptable.
Frisby was asked to see if he could get to the Trapped Deployed GM after the fire went thru as he knew how to get to the area with a UTV. A huge difference. In exposure and a known injuries and Possible Fatalities.
Once past the blockage point there was no other exposure. You are asking if the blockage met any of the 10 Standard Orders I would say no.
My thoughts you run into a feature that stops your progress building hot line. a seep canyon, a rock bluff
you consider a way around it some times a little scary but you estimate the best route and maneuver thru it.
Driving thru burning materials and down power lines Can be accomplished even if it looks hairy so my main point is we do not have all the information or a picture of it to determine what they actually did. They accomplished it and moved on.
I would have also said do not send any one else thru here its not a good access.
To the Statement—–Fuck it lets go for it can be thought of in severial ways. A general statement? The Hell with safety? It looks doable lets go. Back to your knowledge, ability and experience verses some one else.
I am sure it was going to be smoky and hot.
Were the down power lines hot??
If you are driving across them with no metal touching them the rubber tires act as a insulator between the electricity and the vehicle. or were they able to dodge the power lines completely by maneuvering thru them
which they saw as a path to the black?
I think we need some more answers here.
The only thing we know for sure they made it thru with out injury. All I am saying is they saw something that they felt they could get thru with out to much risk and did it.
Some of us may have not made that choice.
If your the one standing there looking at it you are the one that will make that decision we were not there so we do not have all the data to make a decision.
I’ll just have to leave it there.
Risk tolerance changes due to what is at stake. The same rules of safety apply, but its hazard X time of exposure = risk.
The fact that they had a couple speedy ATV/UTV, as compared to hiking, lessened the exposure time. The assignment was to get to 19 FF who had declared an emergency, having to deploy shelters and then no further contact, heightened the stakes.
Look at it this way, a fire department shows up to a burning barn, they set up hose lays, prevent it from spreading and let it collapse onto itself. The exact same department and crew show up to a burning apartment complex, which may or may not have occupants trapped, they don there SCBA and do a room to room search of the whole complex. Risks are higher, consequences are higher, however the need for action (stakes) are also much higher. They still follow safety protocol, but if they don’t do anything, they are not doing their job, not doing what they are trained to do.
I believe part of the quote “Too dangerous, don’t send anyone else in” could also be the fact that the crew on the UTV’s were basically going on a recon mission. They would go in (again limiting exposure to other workers that MAY or MAY NOT be needed) until they had reached the crew and determiined if more help was required or if it was a false alarm (or in this case, too late). IF there were seriously injured survivors, I am sure he would have said “Yep, you can get in here the way we came, but there is downed powerlines, some venting of tanks, but be careful and you will have no problems”.
Another issue that I have observed many times, is an incident of some sort takes place, everyone responds, you end up with way too many people and no one is dedicated as the I/C, (AKA the person in charge). People are all trying to do their best, but there is no coordination, so there is lots of confusion, duplication of work, confusion of what the priorities are, who is doing what. Imagine 30 people going in from various work units, everyone has a radio and all 30 trying to contact dispatch for a medivac machine. What a cluster that would have been. Some would be radioing dispatch, others the I/C or OPS, others their TFL, still others may be calling the Medical dispatch directly on cell phones, giving bad coordinates or details. ONE person needs to take the lead and manage the incident within an incident.
TOO MANY COOKS SPOIL THE SOUP!!!
Marti.
Sorry to hear about your mom. Peace be with you and your family.
Marti, I, also, am so sorry to hear about your loss. Godspeed to your mother. Peace to you and Terra. My condolences, and namaste.
Likewise. VERY sorry to hear of this loss to you and your entire family, Marti.
Please know that others are holding you in their thoughts during this sad time.
Namaste.
Calvin made the following comments below:
“Brian Frisby was at the same exact location as Mcdonough (at the old grader) and only a minor mechanical failure or accident away from trouble. And why exactly would he place himself in that position? [Meaning that Brian could have certainly said “no” to Marsh when Marsh asked Brian to come for a face-to-face meeting.]”
A point that both Calvin and I have been trying to make is that the extreme fire behavior and the very specific “blow-up” or series of blow-ups on the YHF on June 30, 2013, seem to have caught even the WFFs whom guys like Fred respect (and perhaps even trained) off-guard.
It is important to recognize that even senior WFFs who were NOT Eric Marsh failed to accurately time/anticipate the extreme fire behavior on the YHF. Had Brian Frisby’s UTV unexpectedly crapped out as he was going to the face-to-face with Eric Marsh, Brian would have been in as bad a position as Brendan, and guys like Fred and Bob Powers would be likely saying “prior bad decisions” about Brian as well if Brian therefore died, despite the fact that Fred earlier on these threads sang the praises of Brian (and/or his crew or crew leaders).
If MULTIPLE senior guys on the YHF were all failing to accurately anticipate the fire behavior, and the only difference was that GM died due to their failure, then maybe the problem at issue on the YHF is bigger than just “prior bad decisions” or “human factors,” to use the phrases that some folks on here have been using.
Absolutely ridicules lets go chase rabbits————–
What is so ridiculous (I am assuming that is what you meant), Bob? What specifically is ridiculous?
Frisby acted with in safety guide lines.
when he picked up McDonough.
Notified Marsh that he could not meet with him do to the need to move the Vehicles No immediate danger of the fire trapping him or McDonough as they returned on the ATV to the vehicles. Chasing Rabbits–T he vehicle quitting running never happened You could considered that as a possibility or the trucks not starting and burning up lets just stick to facts and a perfectly good running vehicle that took less than 5 min. to return to the Trucks. at this time the fire was not being pushed by wind toward the Old Tractor area it was moving slowly in that direction with topography fuels and weather. It did not chase McDonough off the hill with Flames burning his shirt Tails.
This is a ridiculous discussion base on fact and Fire behavior at this point.
I believe if nothing else Frisby planed on picking up McDonough any way Before or after meeting with Marsh. The need to move the trucks was a needed priority. Again Frisby knew where he was what the fire activity was what he was doing and what the need for safety was that’s why he did not meet with Marsh. Last comment on this ridiculous question.
Reply to Elizabeth post on February 9, 2015 at 6:57 am
>> Elizabeth said…
>>
>> Calvin made the following comments below:
>> “Brian Frisby was at the same exact location as Mcdonough (at the old
>> grader) and only a minor mechanical failure or accident away from trouble.
That is not a false statement. Something COULD have happened ( to the UTV ) and then, yes, they would have BOTH been in some Tapioca…
…but remember… that east-west two-track that people decided that morning was only navigable by UTV’s or hiking had been IMPROVED by the dozer that morning all the way from the Sesame Clearing area out west to the old-grader.
If Frisby’s UTV had crapped out at that critical moment… It MIGHT have been possible for one of the light chase trucks ( or any light pickup or four-wheeled vehicle ) to run out there and save BOTH of them. It would have to have been QUICK… but remember that GM Supt and Chase trucks and the Blue Ridge vehicles had NOT been ‘moved’ out of the Sesame Clearing area yet. That only happened AFTER Frisby ( successfully ) returned with Brendan.
What calvin did NOT use as another valid example for the point he was trying to make was that ‘scouting’ trip that Frisby and Brown made right after they came back down from the NOON to NOON-THIRTY face-to-face with Marsh and Steed.
As far as possible ‘risky behavior’ goes… that might have been an even better example than Frisby’s dash out to meet with Marsh when the fire was already bearing down on Brendan.
Once Frisby and Brown got all the way back east to the top of the Sesame Clearing area after that face-to-face ( where the GM Supt and Chase trucks were still parked )… they took off NORTH and headed directly towards the active fireline.
That ‘trip’ took place on trails that had NOT been improved at all and were ONLY navigable by UTVs or ATVs.
They went EXTREMELY FAR up into that ‘upper bowl’ and their GPS tracking indicates they pretty much drove all the way up to the fireline itself before turning around.
At that point… they were in the middle of NOWHERE ( in the middle of just as much unburned explosive gasoline-on-a-stick as was in the southern middle-bowl and box-canyon ) with only the possibility of another UTV coming to rescue them if their UTV had crapped out of they had an accident of some kind.
So… was that ‘off the reservation’ and were they taking ‘too much risk’ at that point?
Here’s the online report about the Schoolhouse fire ATV fatality.
The death was caused by that actual ATV rolling over onto the firefighter and breaking his neck… but the REPORT actually discusses this now commonly-accepted practice of ‘bombing around’ on your little four-wheelers either by yourself or without making sure you have fast/safe rescue options if something goes wrong ‘out there’….
Report released on Schoolhouse Fire ATV fatality
http://wildfiretoday.com/2014/01/14/report-released-on-schoolhouse-fire-atv-fatality/
This guy was ALONE… ( and that’s why they didn’t find his body for NINE days )… and the incident was truly labeled an ‘unfortunate accident’… but the reports DO touch on this now ‘commonly accepted’ practice of just ‘bombing around’ ( either by yourself OR with others ) in these little machines that can go where ONLY other UTVs or ATVs could affect any kind of quick rescue, if necessary. The report doesn’t recommend any ‘policy’ changes… but it does suggest that this sort of now ‘commonly accepted practice’ should be looked at carefully.
Just for reference This was not Frisby or Browns First Rodeo.
I would suggest they were well verse and very familiar with their ATV.
In the FS you have to be trained and carded to operate ATV’s, 4X4’s, Snow Machines and Snow Cats. Crew carriers and Busses, as well as tow trailers.
Also scouting the Fire and line is done quite often. I would have loved to have had a ATV back in the 70’s can cover a lot more ground in a hurry We had 4×4 jeeps and motor cycles tote goats and horses used them all to scout line and the fire when the least active usually morning..
I am also well trained on an ATV I ride trails with mine all the time its a 2006 and has never broke down on me. if you maintain them and keep them in good condition they are very good at getting you to and from any location. I have a 1987 Jeep Wrangler 4×4 and 2 4×4 trucks never been stuck or had a breakdown in 40 years. So I guess I am saying what is the chance of This ATV of BR breaking down or having a accident? Let talk about reality not what ifs. We use to do that.
When they were scouting it was earlier and this fire was not doing much very easy to get into it and asses it.
Any equipment can break down including a dozer you would never get the job done if you worried about breakdowns. Those are classed as unexpected events.
You keep your safety in mind and do not push the envelope. Simple to those of us who have been there in many different situations.
Again the education of wild fire gives you the information to make the decisions to do what you do.
Bob Powers post on February 9, 2015 at 7:49 pm
>> Bob Powers said…
>>
>> You keep your safety in mind and do not push the envelope.
Exactly… but after the guy at the Schoolhouse fire was miles and miles away from everyone and rolled his ATV on that not-even-drastic 30 percent grade slope… and it broke his neck and they couldn’t even find his body for 9 days because no one really knew WHERE he was in his little machine…
…THAT is when the official report said… “Have we even bothered to define what the ENVELOPE is with these little buggies and what we are letting people do with them… so that we can even tell when someone IS pushing the (safety) envelope… or not”?
MILES away from safety… just “bombing around”… and no GPS transmitter required so no one even knows where you are?
Is that (already) ‘pushing the (safety) envelope’ with these things?
It’s a good question to ask.
Remember… we are not talking about guys who are just out at deer camp and a gunshot away from their buddies to use as a location tool if they get stranded ( or badly hurt) in the boondock.
The situation we are talking about is that SOMEWHERE very near where these guys are ‘bombing around’ in these things is a FIRE.
Whatever might happen… you only might have a very limited amount of TIME before you could DIE if someone can’t get to you.
The ‘envelope’ is defined by the situation itself. There is a FIRE there somewhere and it could KILL you ( even if the machine doesn’t ).
This goes back to my point about both Dr. Brett Butler’s Safety Zones video and the comments guys as senior as Bucky and Paul are making in the YHF videos. That fire caught EVERYONE off guard with how fast it changed and exploded between 4:25 and 4:39. Dr. Butler, one of the federal government’s best fire scientists, basically admitted in his most recent webinar that the state of fire science is still nascent. We just do not have a good, definitive way to predict down to a ten-minute or even 20-minute window what a “bad” fire is going to do, and it is not yet the norm for WFFs to completely stand down in a huge safety zone any time things get a bit “bad” (whatever “bad” means).
Sea World has no decent way to predict when an orca is going to be in a good mood versus when it is going to grab a trainer by the arm (e.g. Dawn Brancheau) and drown her. So Sea World is claiming it will be keeping all trainers OUT of the water with respect to the orcas in the indefinite future.
The Good Doctor is Right and wrong. Fire Fighters have been standing down for years in the Black and Safety zones when things are predicted to turn bad. Yarnell had the predictions and fire activity for a warning to pull back an hour before it went crazy. Some did not heed that warning.
BR pulled out had there crew in vehicles and was re grouping at the Restaurant. Some other crews and Eng. were there as well.
The only thing you can predict during the drought conditions and erratic fire behavior is that it is going to happen and be prepared to stay ahead of the fire thru Weather forecasts, LCES, and stay alert if you wait till a 10 or 20 Min. window your behind the fire projections.
Back in the 60’s and 70’s on southern California Brush Fires we learned and practiced that without fail you become a different type of Fire fighter. You learn and teach others what signs indicate things are about to go south you learn to stay ahead of the Fire.
Eric Marsh, Jesse Steed ( and all the men they were in charge of ) could see the ORCA better than anyone else that day. They could SEE the ORCA was in a very, very bad mood. No question.
But they jumped into the water, anyway… with a VERY long way to go to make it to the other ‘safe’ side of the pool… and without even making sure someone was keeping an eye on the ORCA.
They broke the rules… and paid for it with their lives.
Doctor Butler is just that.. A Dr. of fire science. Likes looking at algorithms, bell curves and scientific things. He is not an experienced fire fighter (as far as I know) who has learned this stuff on the fireline versus a lab.
His work is suggesting that dependant on the fuel/fire behaviour/tree ehight etc that the BTU output (according to the algorithms) is going to be XXXX and therefore a safety zone needs to be X number of feet square.
Wildland fire is dynamic, it is not a science and the variables fluctuate very quickly.
A wind of 5 mph on a fire no big deal, a wind of 12 mph, big difference in fire behaviour, BTU, spotting and thus the size of the safe zone.
He is only one source, do not take it as gospel (Look at all of the scientists preaching 20 years ago “global warming”…. No one uses that anymore, its climate change….
Bob
Are the UTV’s like the one BR had equipped with flat free tires? I understand your point about using well maintained equipment. But some mechanical issues and unforeseen issues can happen without warning.
Good Question Calvin— First these tire’s are very heave duty and most carry a can of air that has I just call it goop to re inflate and patch a hole. Also these larger UTVs can have a spare tire.
My son has a Razor UTV he got a flat that was a small tear could not patch. Teaching his wife to drive. The drove on the flat 5 miles back to their vehicle the tire did not come apart but the rim got beat up. He now carries a spare.
If in every job where there are hazards and exposures you did not do your job like climb a mountain to a fire for fear you could break a leg. or run a chainsaw or use a Pulaski or ax because you might cut yourself.
Get on a helicopter because it might crash.
First the percentages are very slim and I doubt you would stay very long on any fire crew. or in that line of work.
Each job has its hazards but what are The percentages connected to well maintained equipment failure with highly qualified operators.
I am not saying it could not happen but the chances are very slim and should not get in the way of your job.
In my years in Fire Fighting I have seen More Helicopters Crash than I would like to talk about. On the Angeles NF The Helitack Foreman on my district Died in a crash with 4 Redding hot shots. Out of 4 Helicopters on that forest 3 Helitack Foreman over a 8 year period Died. A very close friend that I started FF with during that period and the 4th Foreman had a close call with a power line that put the helicopter down. He quit the FS and started a land scape business.
The Story here is yes accidents do happen dose that stop you from doing your Job? I still flew on Helicopters for the next 20 years and did my job. Wild land Fire Fighters have Vehicle Accidents on some of the dirt roads in the Mountains and some Die.
No one ever said it was not a hazardous occupation. Like every job there are safety practices and procedures you follow and train in and follow.
I do not know how else to explain it. If you worry about flat tires you will never get your job done Every vehicle you drive has tires and you are in mountainous terrain most of the time.. If you think your horse will fall of a mountain Trail you will never ride a horse in the mountains. If you are afraid to ride a ATV in steep terrain for fear it will roll over and break your neck then you will never ride one. As a Fire Fighter if you are afraid every time you get in a Helicopter it will crash then you probably will not last long in your job. Most FF will get a Helicopter ride to the Top of a mountain a minimum of 4 times a summer.
My information says out of a 1000 fires all with 5 or more UTV’s you may have only 1 accident that requires Medical treatment.
To discuss here Unforeseen Issues that never happened is to me outside our investigation discussion. The exposures are always there but they do not stop getting the job done. Practice safety, keep your equipment in good condition and the rest will take care of its self.
VERY well said. Same in the construction business. Almost everything you do involves some piece of equipment that COULD hurt you if you’re not careful… OR break down when you weren’t expecting it to… but if you stood around worrying about that the work would never get done.
I think the only point Calvin was originally trying to make is that there MIGHT have been circumstances in Yarnell on June 30, 2013 when people other than Granite Mountain might have been ‘pushing the envelope’ with regards to safety.
That actually is a given.
ADOSH found ample evidence to issue citations for at least FOUR potential/actual entrapments that day.
1) Willis’ forces at the Double-Bar-A Ranch
2) McDonough at his lookout location
3) The forces in Harper Canyon
4) Granite Mountain
It was an ‘unsafe workplace’ that day… and a LOT of other firefighters ALMOST died… in addition to the 19 that DID.
There have GOT to be significant “Lessons Learned’ coming out of this. If this is just ‘business as usual’ and ‘getting the job done’ then it’s a wonder we aren’t hauling DOZENS of dead young men out of these fires every single season.
Excuse me… I wasn’t being properly inclusive up above.
Meant to say…
There have GOT to be significant “Lessons Learned’ coming out of this. If this is just ‘business as usual’ and ‘getting the job done’ then it’s a wonder we aren’t hauling DOZENS of dead young MEN and WOMEN out of these fires every single season.
WTKTT Again I will say the 4 above potential entrapments above Are not the Norm this fire was a mess and I have noted over and over they were all on the fringes of the 10 Standard orders and the real need for LCES.
Lack of lookouts and close true safety zones. Having the safety zone at a restaurant a ways from the Fire?????
As a Division Super. or an OPS I would have pulled every body out until a SZ could be build or not gone back.
The overhead on this fire were not in the real world.
At some point you have to say the plan is stretching us to far from Safety for my crew and Stop and fix it or move back to safety till it is fixed.
I have said all along McDonough’s Look Out spot was a very bad choice. He could have done just as well in the Black above the old grader and probably seen more.
He should have never been there to begin with. one of the foreman should have been chosen for lookout.
Just another crazy twist in this fire.
The meet never would have happened if the BR and GMIHS had seen fire behaviour occurring near the meeting spot that caused them concern for their safety. Its not like they met up there with blinders on. They picked that spot because it was close to both parties AND SAFE.
Even in the biggest blowups of fires, its not like flipping a swith from calm to inferno. It starts gradually, a wind change, either direction or speed, smoke changes colour, fire behaviour intensifies slowly.. Once the fire has reached inferno, its too late to be making observations on the little things that are changing. As a Fire Behaviour Analyst, using the fire modelling software, there is a term used, “Equilibrium Rate of Spread”.
This means a fire starts at “X” time, slowly growing (depending on fuel type) until it reaches equilibrium, that the fire is now the lead factor. Wind, slope etc are minimal influences. The fire is burning how it wants. Usually, as a guide, we have a 30 minute period from ignition to the Equilibrium.
This also applies to an ongoing larger fire, such as Yarnell. The existing fire was burning moderately active (as can be seen in photos), but you can see the fire transitioning to something more in the pics from the lunch spot. How much later were GMIHS trapped in the canyon by a flaming inferno coming at them? I would say around 30 minutes.
Even with a predicted weather system coming at them, there would have been subtle changes well before hand. Experienced, observant fire fighters pick up on this, process the information and act accordingly.
I am sure Bob Powers can confirm my opinion.
Rarely is there any changes in weather, thus fire behaviour, that come with absolutely no warnings and indicators.
For some reason, GMIHS (at the lunch spot) observed the transitioning fire behaviour and did not process where and how the fire was going to change and go, but still made the decision to try to get around the advancing front to the Ranch.
So, in my opinion, it was human error. Either the GMIHS said “We can beat the train” or someone said “Get to teh ranch, or you are gonna be in trouble once we get back to the home unit, you wusses”…
Particularly in the SW in areas that have not had proper fuels management, “eruptive fire behavior” means that a fire can go from a ROS of .75 mph to 12 mph in a matter of minutes. Unfortunately, there is no way to predict down to a ten or even 15 minute window when such an eruption is going to happen. Worse, that type of fire behavior – when it is ramping up to an actual “eruption” – does not always escalate at a constant rate.
The escalation (or worsening in fire behavior) can become exponential, which is why we often see the phrase “blow-up” or “eruption” used. Some scientists would say that sometimes (due to mass ignition or a “blow-up”) it is indeed like a switch was flipped (meaning that there was no obvious ramp-up, but, rather, there was just a transition from a fire with a ROS of, say, .5 mph to a fire with a ROS of 10 mph). To that end, WFF/FF Kelly Close (who is a well regarded guy in the W/SW who is (or was) on the NWCG fire behavior committee and has seen more fire in the W/SW than most men will ever see) did a paper a while ago about the difficulty that WFFs have with fire behavior that does not increase at a constant rate of speed to an actual “equilibrium,” but, rather, that EXPONENTIALLY exacerbates. It is like a car that is coming at you on a residential street at, say, 35 miles per hour, and that then speeds up in a matter of seconds to, say, 300 mph. It is hard to mitigate (or even anticipate) that.
And my impression is that the insane winds on the YHF between 4:33 and 4:37 were more a product of indrafting and convection than they were any forecast weather cell (that was actually separated from the fire by a huge honkin’ layer of clouds, air, smoke, etc.). Meaning, just as with the Beaver Fire or the South Canyon Fire (according to Dr. Viegas, anyway), it is hard to blame the entrapment on the weather more than the extreme fire behavior creating its own indrafting and convection (aided by terrain).
(For lack of a better place to make mention, the pictures that RS references were taken almost an hour before GM was entrapped, not 1/2 hour. I’m not sure that that matters, but I just wanted to point that out. Indeed, even less than 10 minutes before GM was entrapped, the fire was still roughly 3/4 of a mile or so away from GM.)
I’m not sure any of my comments add anything, but I thought I’d reiterate them, regardless. Obviously folks like RS know far more than me about fire behavior! 🙂
First spend a little time and read Rocksteadys information he imparted as a Fuels Specialist. SW, NW, and western US. All have the Fuel build up,
As I said earlier if you are paying attention to all the indicators you can see the build up coming to a erratic fire Behavior some times 1 to 2 hours based on severial factors again your to late with a 10 to 15 minuet window..
Winds help push Blowups and even in drafting.
Based on the charts the last Pictures taken by GM were 1600 to 1604.
They had fire in front of them at 1648. The fire spared charts showed the fire with in and behind the ridge line on the crews left at 1640 only a 1/4 mile from the crew with in 8 minuets of that the fire was in front of the canyon mouth and on the ridge line on there left. The fire never covered 3/4 of a mile in 10 minuets.
The Fuels Topography weather and time of day the dry conditions all were predicting this to happen as early as 1400 and absolutely by 1500.
Plane and simple no one paid attention. Every thing was primed for a Blow up, for crying out loud it happened at almost the same time on Saturday when the fire took off from the ridge and burned over 400 Acres..
Every fire tells its story, and it never lies!!!!
But if you are not listening (and seeing the indicators) that the fire is giving you, that is when incidents like this happen.
The PRIMARY job of the LOOKOUT is to observe, record and report changes in fire beahviour and weather. Having a juniour crew guy in this role is asking for bad intelligence and thus bad decision making.
Whether you wish to use the term “equilibrium rate of spread” or “exponentially” is semantics.
The truth is a fire does not go from a small fire to an inferno in miliseconds.
Depending on conditions it may transition quicker than other times, but even if it transitions quicker than normal, the fire/weather is still giving indications
These clues were ignored by some people on teh Yarnell Fire (from start to finish)..
Elizabeth,
go to your nearest National Forest, build a campfire, actually 100 of them and see if they exponentially (without use of an accelerant) grow or if they transition. You will be amazed at how it takes time for the campfire to become that.
Report back to us…
RS, go watch Butler’s video. He actually has video of a mass ignition out on an actual fire. He or his colleagues put cameras out in the middle of actual fires.
Then watch the video from the Beaver Fire.
My understanding is that uber-extreme fire behavior can behave in a way that is… uber-extreme. Have you ever personally seen a fire go from a ROS of .75 mph to a ROS of roughly 12 mph (or more) in less than 10 minutes? (I have never seen such a thing, and most WFFs that I have grilled have never witnessed such a thing firsthand. Yet it happens.)
Yes, I have seen that sort of behaviour.
How I dealt with it:
1) Read and disseminated the potential fire behaviour from the FBAN to ALL personnel on my division/branch.
2) Had definitive trigger points (behaviour/wind, etc) when we were going to do a “tactical retreat”, not an emergency drop packs and run.
3) Ensured that we always had a helicopter in teh air, be it a rotor wing bird dog, bucket ship, OPS or whomever watching fire behaviour for us, rather than using a ground based 2 year guy from teh crew, as a lookout.
4)Made the call to get out early, rather than waiting til its too late and then being screwed.
Once fire behaviour reaches this state, there is NOTHING that can be done. No amount of heavy equipment, helicopters or air tankers will stop it, so why risk your neck for something that is going to fail anyways.
You MAY be able to steeer the column and pull the fire a different direction using aerial ignitionwith several torch ships but still a “hail Mary” manuever.
I know it is hard for those of you that have never been on the fire line or trained in fire suppression to understand what I am trying to impart to you.
Its not a collage course it is a school of hard knocks an on the ground learning process some of which is not written in black and white and changes with each Fire its a mental understanding if you are
fatigued not thinking clearly and paying attention you can make the wrong decision. That is why I memorized the 1o Standard orders so they always led me to the safest out come.
Other Fire Fighters know what I am talking about I hope you can reflect on what I am trying to impart to you. I am trying to give you an understanding of what we do.
On a Personal Note——–
AS we have gone thru the Fire the pictures and all the stories I mentally have been able to relate to them what happened why it happened and the out come.
The reason I am here and still here Is Granit Mountain.
My brain can totally relate to what they were doing all day on the fire line, when the moved into the black dropped packs and were safe watching the Fire.
My brain has yet to understand the reason they left the black and went into a brush field canyon.
My brain has been unable with all my back ground to understand justify or find reason for
what they did. In other words I have found nothing to understand that move or why all of them went down there with out a question. There has been severial reasons stated but none have made any sense or given me a OK I see that and relate to it.
Again I can relate good or bad to every thing else that happened on this fire I have seen it and lived it. Bad and good Supervisors, Crews Etc. Even the AA.
If I had been in Frisby’s shoes I would have done what he was doing keeping my crew safe and paying really close attention to what this crazy overhead team was doing at this point not trusting anyone but myself and my crew bosses.
Been there done that and in that position its never easy. You just know someone is going to get bad hurt or Die. You go into protection mode and deal with it.
Reply to Bob Powers post on
FEBRUARY 7, 2015 AT 12:03 PM
:: Bob Powers said…
::
:: My brain has been unable with all my
:: back ground to understand justify or find
:: reason for what they did. In other words I
:: have found nothing to understand that
:: move or why all of them went down there
:: with out a question.
If Brendan ever tells all he knows I think we will discover that while we will never truly know what the in-person conversation was like amongst all those men who died… there WILL be some evidence that Steed himself DID have some serious questions and/or doubts about this ‘mission’ they were undertaking.
Unless Brendan has some radical new evidence I think it has always been pretty safe to assume that the actual IDEA to take on this ‘mission’ and depart the safe black was coming from DIVSA Eric Marsh.
It then involved checking Steed’s “comfort level” and whatnot.
It also involved TWO separate ( and equally critical ) decision points. The first was deciding to take on ‘the mission’ at all. The second was deciding to drop into that canyon KNOWING they would be losing sight of the very active fire and also deciding to do it WITHOUT setting a lookout.
I think Steed MAY have gone along with ‘the mission’ at first up at that rest spot… but I think the SECOND decision point at that saddle is when he probably had his own WTF moment and that is when ( if it really happened ) the ARGUMENT took place.
I’ve also said this before but if it turns out that Marsh really was ahead of Steed/Crew and the way he won that argument with Steed at the Saddle decision point was to tell Steed that HE would function as their lookout…
…that’s going to be even more disturbing than to just try and accept the fact that NONE of these men knew where the fire was… but they just kept moving ahead straight to their deaths.
If Eric Marsh himself had promised Steed he would act as ‘forward lookout’…then it’s pretty safe to then say he obviously FAILED that task pretty miserably.
I still really ( personally ) don’t want to have to start even considering WHY Eric Marsh might have been forward of those men and might have had ‘eyes on the fire’… yet he still LET them keep coming forward to their deaths.
WTKTT– The Last part of what you said still dose not register in my Brain with any reality or understanding of why they moved or even if Marsh could have possibly had eyes on the Fire It makes no sense he would have not seen what was happening unless he to was blind to the fire activity.
I could understand a order direct to Steed to move the crew or else.
But the choices made are just out side reality right now for me. Going into unburned heavy brush fuel in a canyon, no lookout lost site of Fire. no scouted route. move from a 100% safe black area to a very dangerous fuel area in a canyon what for??????
WTKTT also got a Face Book from Marti her Mom Passed Yesterday.
I’m very sorry to hear that… but thank you for passing that along. Extended hospice situations can become a nightmare for the patient AND anyone else involved. I know. Been there. Done that.
Bob said
This Fire is a total training session in its self of Fire Safety only a few like BR and some Eng. Crews were really paying attention every one else was depending on there OPS to take care of them.
I really cannot understand how you say BR was being safe. I do not want to sound insulting or disrespectful but…..
1. Brian Frisby was at the same exact location as Mcdonough (at the old grader) and only a minor mechanical failure or accident away from trouble. And why exactly would he place himself in that position? Marsh did not have the authority to ORDER Frisby to come up for a meeting , did he? Also, did Frisby have a lookout for himself when he was traveling in front of the fire line when he picked Mcdonough up?
2. We can see for ourselves in McCord’s images that the flames are rapidly approaching and that there are embers and ash falling all around. Not only the crew carriers, but also the UTV.
3. There is seeming evidence that Brown and Frisby were the LAST people to evacuate, therefore putting themselves in danger. Where was there SA, and where was there lookout?
4. We also know that following deployment, Frisby himself says “Fuck it, lets go for it” and proceeds into the fire where power lines are drooping/ falling, and propane tanks are venting. Remember how the Prescotteers saw the propane tank venting and said something like “yeah I don’t want to go in there right now” (M2U00267 at 115), yet they seem to have just followed in line and were led into the fire area by Frisby.
5. And also we see Frisby himself walk directly towards a venting propane tank. And I do remember the past discussion as to how it was actually safe to walk towards that propane tank as the venting was actually a safety feature. However, Frisby was not aware of the integrity of the steel walls of the vessel itself and also couldn’t know if an overhanging tree branch could actually fall and pierce the vessel causing an explosion. Honestly, that really seems like a careless/ wreck less move on Frisby’s part.
Again, no disrespect, just different perspective.
*Nods her head*
Good points, all.
But but but but but………
They were on a life-saving mission!!!!!!!!
Re-visiting the question of……………
Does that change the rules?
It seems that Marti and WTK both agree that Frisby and Brown were the last ones seen evacuating in the video M2U00264.
This leads me back to a question I had a wile back. concerning WHO is speaking at the 205 mark in video M2U00264.. This person says “Yeah Im the last one coming out right now, well regroup at the café and then send somebody in”
In my analysis, that almost has to be Frisby. Right?
Actually, that’s Tyson Esquibel. Conversing with Gary Cordes.
I think he’s referencing his Task Force, not the entire everybody that was coming out. Which is what Cordes was referring to. He was asking Tyson for a “couple of engines.”
Yes. Esquibel was talking directly to Cordes, at that point, and Esquibel’s statement of “I’m the last one out” pertained ONLY to the Task Force resources that were back there in Harper Canyon.
Esquibel wasn’t considering Blue Ridge to be ‘part of that Task Force’.
Blue Ridge was, essentially, a ‘free agent’ that day.
There is still disagreement among the witnesses interviewed about WHO they were even ‘attached to’ that day. Some thought DIVSA, some thought SPGS1, and even others thought they answered only to the ‘disappeared’ DIVSZ.
Truth is… they were ‘on their own’ that day.
They were doing work FOR various people that day… as the need(s) arose.
Calvin & Marti
We went thru this before I will try to revisit.
Frisby fully operated with in Safety on this Fire.
Marsh and Frisby were working to gather to meet the line requirements.
I do not believe Marsh Ordered Frisby to meet with him.
Frisby in a ATV picked up McDonough at the time no Fire problem that he could not negotiate
His ATV was functioning there was no reason to think his equipment would fail. He was his own lookout.
Ash Falling HAPPENS ALL THE TIME Not sure your concern here.
Driving into the Burned area was not a unsafe act driving thru the fire edge or even running thru it happens all the time. It totally depends on the amount of flame and what’s burning
This was not a moving flaming front but the derbies still burning.
Watching a venting tank or walking near it is not a problem when the tank is not venting then get worried. THEY DO NOT EXPLODE IF THEY ARE VENTING WITH FLAME. Believe me I have been there many times.
As Supervisors or on the Line with others it dose not surprise me that Frisby and Brown were the last out or even close to the last out with Tyson the Eng. STL The person in charge is usually the last out to insure all their resources are out. I Have been there many times as
Hot Shot Asst., STL, DIV, and Crew boss. It is part of you job you responsibility you want to know all your recourses people are out and safe there for the last one.
Calvin— I understand your questions the best I can say there are just things you learn know and understand after a few years as a wild land Fire fighter that allows you to make– is it a hazard or threat or not– in each of your questions. I believe most Fire Fighters would tell you the same from their exposures over the years.
Reply to Bob Powers post on February 6, 2015 at 10:10 pm
NOTE: This was brought up from down below in a thread that was running out of room.
>> Bob Powers said…
>>
>> A question I have How big was the Youth camp?
It was a fairly ‘open’ area there in Harper Canyon at the end of the dirt part of Shrine Road. Enough ‘parking space’ for all the GM vehicles ( four ) and the two BR Crew Carriers… but the area was filled with plenty of tall TREES and BRUSH and GRASS and other fuels ( wood structures ).
>> Bob Powers also said…
>>
>> and did it burn?
Yes. Completely. The ‘tall trees’ were not totally ‘skunked’ and never fell down… but the area was basically ‘moonscaped’. Just go to ‘Google Maps’, enter “Yarnell, AZ’ in the search bar, then go into satellite mode and zoom down to the end of Shrine road and you will see what I mean.
>> Bob Powers also said…
>>
>> I have never read if it survived or not. or if it could have been a safety zone?
It was at NO TIME considered by ANYONE to be a ‘Safety Zone’.
There was a BRIDGE there over a dry creek ( about 80 feet from where all the Crew Carriers had been ‘staged’ ) that also had about the largest ‘grassy, open area’ next to it. No larger than the ‘tennis court that Darrell Willis was using for his ‘Safety Zone’ at the Double-Bar-A Ranch.
Whether that could have been a survivable spot out at the Youth Camp by firefighters trying to deploy there is anyone’s guess.
>> Bob Powers also said…
>>
>> One more thing After the weather forecast predicting the wind
>> at that time all I will repeat all personnel should have been pulled
>> back to safe areas or moved into the Black. Overhead should have
>> insured contact and moved there resources do not assume some
>> one herd your Radio Confirm each crew and equipment.
>> This is where things went to hell with last minuet movement.
1) OVERHEAD SHOULD HAVE INSURED CONTACT ( WITH EVERYONE )
2) DO NOT ASSUME SOMEONE HEARD YOUR RADIO ( ORDER ).
3) CONFIRM EACH CREW AND EQUIPMENT ( GOT THE MESSAGE )
NONE of that happened.
From Gary Cordes’ one-and-only ADOSH interview, September 11, 2013
Q2 = Dave Larsen, WFA / ADOSH ( Rest in Peace )
A = SPGS1 Gary Cordes.
At this part in the interview… Dave Larsen is going through Cordes’ Unit Log with him… line by line… and trying to verify the TIMES that Cordes’ has written in his Unit Log for certain things.
Cordes first says he notified ‘the guys’ it was time to ‘get out’… then he backtracks and says he ONLY told this to his TFLD(t) Tyson Esquibel and was then just ASSUMING Esquibel would ‘pass it along’ and/or ‘confirm’ everyone got the order.
Cordes himself then made no attempt to make sure ALL the resources under his command ever got the ‘message’… nor did he make SURE Esquibel had done so.
Cordes then tells ADOSH he didn’t find out who heard the order until the NEXT DAY.
Cordes tells ADOSH he ‘debriefed them’ ( the NEXT DAY ) and Cordes also tells ADOSH that they had (quote) “all heard that order”.
That doesn’t match other tesimony.
Some of the resources under SPGS1 Gary Cordes and TFLD(t) Tyson Esquibel testified they never heard ‘that order’ at all… much less anyone even trying to make SURE they did.
——————————————————————————————–
1279 Q2: …1540 Yarnell, Yarnell evacuation trigger point met and you requested that,
1280 so…
1281
1282 A: Right, and Of – Musser showed up and, and met with me where I was parked
1283 on the road, asked me what I thought and I basically said this thing’s gonna
1284 move, it’s moving pretty aggressively towards town. Um, during…
1285
1286 Q2: Okay.
1287
1288 A: …that time, within that time frame, as you drop to the next line, the trigger
1289 point for crew rem- uh, removing the crew was met so I, I got on the, uh, told
1290 the guys to start picking up and, and getting ready to get out of the area.
1291
1292 Q2: Uh, and you told that to your guys?
1293
1294 A: To, Tyson and then of course I’m sure all of our guys were – heard that, I got
1295 feedback from the crews the next days after I debriefed ‘em and they had all
1296 heard that order.
——————————————————————————————–
Agree. That’s my take on it also.
This whole thing needs to be seriously unpacked by ADOSH.
While I do not like to assign Fault to some of these over head it just seems like the They were never in control or operating as such— when in charge take charge.
This also falls to better direction and orders to GM to stay in the black and ride the fire out hunker down in the black till I call you to pull you out. The IC or The OPS should have been giving orders not asking questions.
Was trying to remember the Youth camp lay out— thanks WTKTT
No one mentioned it as a SZ so I did not think it was.
Also there was a cat line around the parked trucks GM and BR It might have been big enough for a Deployment site in a real pinch grass burns fast. If your trapped you have few choices. I always looked for and planed SZ not deployment sites
—Every body got out so no deployment ever happened in that youth camp area Just my double checking thoughts.
Reply to Bob Powers post on February 7, 2015 at 9:39 am
>> Bob Powers said…
>>
>> Also there was a cat line around the parked trucks GM and BR
Slight correction. There was NO ‘cat line’ around the ‘parked trucks’ over on the Youth Camp. They were all parked in a grassy/cleared area right
off the dirt road and just over that ‘bridge’ over the dry creek.
The one-blade-wide ‘ring’ that Cordes had the dozer put around the ‘GM vehicles’ was just the GM Supt and Chase trucks where they HAD been parked that morning up at the top of the Sesame clearing area.
>> Bob Powers also said…
>>
>> It might have been big enough for a Deployment site in a real
>> pinch grass burns fast. If your trapped you have few choices.
Yes. It’s possible. If those 6 firefighters trying to ‘escape’ from the western end of Harper Canyon had been ‘cut off’ by the fire ( like the Perryville Crew was in Walk Moore Canyon at the DUDE fire )… they MAY have found a place there to survive.
There were places where it wouldn’t have been like the DUDE fire.
There were places to deploy where the ‘flamefront’ wouldn’t have been tearing at their shelters like it did with the poor Perryville crew.
I still don’t think it’s been discussed much how the ‘Air Support’ also failed here in NOTIFYING the ground forces about the location of the charging flame front. At the time that flame front came charging up over that ridge ( which was the only visual warning those 6 FFs in Harper Canyon got and then they started hauling ass )… the ‘Air Support’ over the fire was not helping in any way down there on SOUTH end.
Air Attack Rory Collins had ‘bailed out’ of the fire at 1558 and just dumped both ‘Air Attack’ and ‘Lead Plane’ duties on French and Burfiend in “Bravo 33”.
Burfiend was ‘playing’ Air Attack in the right seat of “Bravo 33″… but French was the pilot and “Lead Plane” and he was still preoccupied with finishing that retardant line up by Model Creek and Miner’s camp road.
Nearly a half-hour had passed since Collins had TOLD French and Burfiend that (quote) “We got a lotta fire headed toward Yarnell and you need to go look at that”.
I don’t know how aware ‘Air Attack’ is ever supposed to be of WHO is on the ground… and WHERE… but on this day “Bravo 33” was still preoccupied on the NORTH end of the fire as it was already charging into Yarnell and there was NO chance of even getting any WARNINGS from the Air about how fast the fireline was charging into Harper Canyon.
NOTE–On type 2 and type 1 full teams there is a AA with the team that is directly connected to the ops and IC to support their plan.
Again this short team had no cohesiveness or control it fluctuated as to who was calling the shots not a good out come as we have found over and over.
Reply to Bob Powers post on February 7, 2015 at 10:57 am
>> Bob Powers said…
>>
>> Again this short team had no cohesiveness or control it
>> fluctuated as to who was calling the shots
And speaking of “who was calling the shots” ( at critical times)… at 3:50 PM and just shy of 10 minutes before Air Attack Rory Collins would exit the Yarnell airspace ( at 3:58 PM ) is when he called Thomas French in ‘Bravo 33’ on the Air-To-Air channel and informed him he only had “about ten minutes” before his pilot was going to ‘time out’ and he would be leaving.
It was then ( 3:50 PM ) that Rory Collins told French (quote) “I don’t know if you noticed but we got a heck of wind shift goin’ on here. There’s a lotta fire headed into Yarnell and you guys need to go take a look at that”.
Thomas French acknowledged that… but then the discussion turned to the inbound VLAT. French wanted to use it to ‘finish up’ that retardant line he’d been working on up there on the NORTH end of the fire in the Model Creek road and Miner’s Camp road area(s).
Air Attack Rory Collins ( still technically in charge of Air Ops over the fire ) told French (quote) “Yea… why don’t you go ahead and do that.”
So that’s what ‘Air Support’ ended up doing for as much as the next HALF-AN-HOUR… right on up through the time the fire on the SOUTH end was now charging into Harper Canyon and FFs on the ground were running for their lives.
My point is… THAT decision about WHERE the Air Support focus should be at that point AND how to use the inbound VLAT was made by just two guys in their airplanes talking to each other
on the Air-To-Air Channel ( and not Air-To-Ground channel ).
There is NO evidence that either one of them was even BOTHERING to check with the IC or OPS ( or anyone on the ground ) about where the Air Support focus really SHOULD be or how that inbound VLAT should be used in that crucial 4:00 PM to 4:15 PM timeframe.
They just made the decision between themselves… and that was that. Not even any attempt to consult with anyone else.
Lets pretend for one moment that T911had enough time to line up a retardant drop extending from the northern rim of the deployment bowl , and continuing to the east. Lets pretend there was a retardant line placed 15- 20 minutes before the fire arrived within sight of GMIHC
Would that have slowed the fire progression enough to allow safe passage to BSR?
Reply to calvin post February 9, 2015 at 5:43 pm
>> calvin said…
>>
>> Would that have slowed the fire progression
>> enough to allow safe passage to BSR?
From the exact point where they all died to the very perimeter of the Boulder Springs Ranch was 1,899 feet.
That is measured pretty much following exactly along the ‘dozer push’ that was done to retrieve the bodies and probably represents the exact final route that running men on the ground would have also taken directly to the ranch without running up any of the ‘knolls’ along the way.
The TIME that would have been needed for this final 1,899 foot dash to safety is somewhere in the following chart…
1 mph ( 01.4 feet per second ) = 21 min 34 sec
2 mph ( 02.0 feet per second ) = 10 min 47 sec
3 mph ( 04.4 feet per second ) = 07 min 11 sec
4 mph ( 05.8 feet per second ) = 05 min 23 sec
5 mph ( 07.3 feet per second ) = 04 min 18 sec
6 mph ( 08.8 feet per second ) = 03 min 35 sec
7 mph ( 10.2 feet per second ) = 03 min 04 sec
8 mph ( 11.7 feet per second ) = 02 min 41 sec
If the Tanker could have seen them to make the drop yes it may have worked the problem was smoke by 1648 and no location of the crew. TO LATE
You do not send a plane thru smoke with no visual to the ground it just dose not work.
If they had known 15 to 20 min. before they saw the fire in front of them. that just might have worked.
But they did not know they were even in trouble at 1630.
One of the interesting things that might come out of what Brendan McDonough now wants to ‘get off his chest’ is HOW LONG some of these possible ‘discussions’ and/or ‘arguments’ regarding the ‘move’ actually took.
Example 1: How long did those ‘comfort level’ discussion really go on with Marsh talking to Steed up there at the resting spot ( as we hear part of in the MacKenzie videos ). Was Steed ‘onboard’ with ‘the mission’ just shortly after those videos… or did it take many minutes more back-and-forth between he and Marsh before they actually even left. Remember that we still do NOT know exactly when they actually ‘gaggled up’ and started heading south.
Example 2: When Steed/Crew reached that ‘saddle’ and (perhaps) that is when Steed had his own WTF moment AND (perhaps) that is where this alleged ‘argument about which way to go’ ensued that Mike Dudley said several people ‘reported’… how LONG did it take THEN to resolve THAT issue. 1 minute? 2 minutes? 3, 4, 5 minutes?
All of that TIME is going to ‘add up’ and might represent more of the TIME they would have needed to stay alive that day.
If Brendan supplies nothing else… I hope we get a better idea of EXACTLY when they even started this ‘mission’… and WHY they weren’t doing ‘double-time’ up on the two-track if it was really all that important… and then how much time might have been wasted at that saddle deciding whether to even try the box canyon route.
TIME was the real enemy that afternoon.
As ‘risky’ and ‘incomprehensible’ as that ‘move’ was… if they had just done it SOONER and QUICKER… we probably wouldn’t even be here having this conversation.
WTKTT said:
“There is NO evidence that either one of them was even BOTHERING to check with the IC or OPS ( or anyone on the ground ) about where the Air Support focus really SHOULD be or how that inbound VLAT should be used in that crucial 4:00 PM to 4:15 PM timeframe.
They just made the decision between themselves… and that was that. Not even any attempt to consult with anyone else.”
I agree in the fact AA was doing their own thing, however Cordes did ask Abel to tell AA to ‘drop at will” because his A-G freq all of a sudden quit working for some strange reason. Hmmmm. Abel’s focus was narrowly to the North still, although the fire had turned and kept doing so unbeknownst to Abel (where the f*#k is his SA). And if OH has a priority for retardant don’t you think they would tell AA? Where and what were you doing exactly Cordes? Drop at will? When there’s an entire community that you were the Structure Group Specialist for? Now whether or not Abel gave this direction I can’t say…but again Abel’s head was down, doing his own thing up N.
Reply to FIRE20+ post on
February 10, 2015 at 8:08 am
>> FIRE20+ said…
>>
>> I agree in the fact AA was doing their own
>> thing, however Cordes did ask Abel to tell
>> AA to ‘drop at will” because his A-G freq
>> all of a sudden quit working for some
>> strange reason. Hmmmm.
Well… yes… that is what Gary Cordes SAID he did in HIS Unit Log ( circa 1555 )… but there really is no other evidence to prove this really happened.
From SPGS1 Gary Cordes’ official ‘Unit Log’ ( that wasn’t released by Arizona Forestry until February of 2014 )…
NOTE: Cordes made a note on his log saying “All times are approximate”
—————————————-
Date/Time: 6/30 1550
Trigger point for crew removal met.
Ordered to start out of assigned area.
Date/Time: 6/30 1555
Fire hitting top of ridge north side of town.
Ask OPS-Abel to have Air Ops start dropping at will.
Also advised I had lost use of Air-To-Ground FX.
—————————————–
If we assume that Cordes’ recollection of WHEN he asked Abel to tell ‘Air Ops’ to ‘drop at will’… and we also assume Abel passed that on right away to ‘Air Attack’… then that means the message went up to AA Rory Collins, and not French and Burfiend in ‘Bravo 33’.
That also means the Rory Collins is the one who ‘received’ this ‘drop at will’ message just 3 minutes before he, himself, exited the Yarnell Air Space.
There is complete Air-To-Air radio channel traffic captured for that timeframe and there is NOTHING in there which indicates Rory Collins passed this ‘directive’ to ‘drop at will’ that he might have just received from Abel along to French and Burfiend in ‘Bravo 33’.
In the SAIT interview notes for ‘Bravo 33’ ( French and Burfiend ) there is also absolutely no mention of them ever being told by anyone to ‘drop at will’ on the SOUTH end of the fire.
Ditto for OPS1 Todd Abel’s ADOSH interview on August 22, 2013. Todd Abel makes absolutely NO mention to ADOSH of ever receiving a ‘drop at will’ request from Cordes’ OR ever giving any specific order like that himself to Air Attack.
The conversation between Rory Collinis and Thomas French I was detailing above happened at 1550.
If Cordes really did tell Abel to tell ‘Air Attack’ to ‘drop at will’ circa 1555… then that happened AFTER Collinis and French had simply agreed between themselves ( on the Air-To-Air channel ) that the best use of the inbound VLAT would be for French to just finish that liine he had been working on up there on the NORTH end of the fire.
If any ‘please drop at will now on the SOUTH end of the fire’ request ever DID go up to ‘Air Attack’ ( to Collins? French? Burfiend? )… then it was still apparently IGNORED for almost the next half-hour while French did what Collins gave him permission to do up on the NORTH end.
And Cordes didn’t write his Unit Log until 7/26/13…lots of time to be creative. Cordes is #1 on my list. I have also heard from sources he has said he hates the conspiracy theorists and he should…he has left too many holes to not speculate. You are right, there is no recorded audio of “drop at will”, and to just lose that A-G freq…it’s too conveniently weird. Pass the buck Cordes, stand back and be the important guy (weren’t you on the road with Musser and Sciacca at this point?) but you didn’t do shit for your people. I feel for Esquibel, not only being a TFLD-T, but having Cordes as your direct chain of command…Esquibel was left to figure it out as he went.
If that ‘drop at will’ did go to Rory Collins (which we have no proof in the A-A audio) then he did drop the ball. I’m not seeing this though. Rory Collins tells B33 the ground contact is Alpha then says go through OPS up N. Rory Collins tells (paraphrase–I am away from my files) B33 fire is pushing into Yarnell and they need to go check it out–they never did. They had their mind set on finishing that retardant line to the N and E. And what about Abel saying he asked B33 to go S and check on GM? That never happened either…in the end B33 says they had not been down S until they made it there when the fire had already turned.
Reply to FIRE20+ post on
February 10, 2015 at 11:29 am
>> FIRE20+ said…
>>
>> And Cordes didn’t write his Unit Log
>> until 7/26/13…lots of time to be
>> creative. Cordes is #1 on my list.
>> I have also heard from sources he
>> has said he hates the conspiracy
>> theorists and he should…he has
>> left too many holes to not speculate.
There is probably no one ( other than Brendan McDonough ) who can probably ‘fill in more blanks’ here with an under-oath deposition than SPGS1 Gary Cordes.
It’s also curious that Arizona Forestry is in such a tearing hurry to get Brendan ‘deposed’ before they have to get into the room with the ‘wrongful death’ plaintiffs ( on March 2 )… but (apparently) not concerned at all about getting any ‘additional’ statements or lingering questions answered by Cordes.
That really IS him in the Hulburd videos telling Esquibel to send some engines to the Boulder Springs Ranch to make sure Granite Mountain ‘gets out of there safely’.
Cordes thought they were ALREADY there… of just ABOUT to arrive there.
So all this stuff about Command/OPS ‘not knowing where GM really was or what they were really doing’ is total horseshit.
Cordes knew ALL about it… and still may have had more to do with them actually undertaking that ‘mission’ than has ever been adequately discovered.
>> FIRE20++ also said…
>>
>> You are right, there is no recorded
>> audio of “drop at will”, and to just
>> lose that A-G freq…it’s too conveniently
>> weird.
What is also ‘weird’ is that there appears to be absolutely NO information available about this ‘Aerial Firefighting Study’ that was going on that day and being paid for with taxpayer dollars.
I know. I checked.
There was a LOT of money behind that ‘Study’… and not only was it never finished… there is no evidence it was ever even authorized or contracted with anyone.
What I was trying to find were the ‘specifications’ for this ‘government contract’ that AUTHORIZED that study.
If we could see those ‘specifications’ for the study itself… I would find it hard to believe that the study was requiring FULL audio capture of the Air-To-Air channel ( as Panebaker was doing )… but somehow NOT also require the same full capture of the ‘Air-To-Ground’ channel as well.
It’s still ‘strange’ that Panebaker would have gone to so much trouble to make full recordings of the Air-To-Air conversation… but not had a similar setup going to capture the full Air-To-Ground traffic as well.
That’s just as important to an “Aerial Firefighting Study” as hearing what the planes are saying to each other.
It still would NOT surprise me to discover that Panebaker WAS also capturing the A2G channel… but it was NOT part of the package released by US Forestry.
>> FIRE20++ also said…
>>
>> If that ‘drop at will’ did go to Rory
>> Collins (which we have no proof
>> in the A-A audio) then he did
>> drop the ball. I’m not seeing this
>> though. Rory Collins tells B33 the
>> ground contact is Alpha then
>> says go through OPS up N. Rory
>> Collins tells (paraphrase–I am away
>> from my files) B33 fire is pushing
>> into Yarnell and they need to go
>> check it out–they never did.
There is one single statement from French ( in the A2A chanel captures ) when he was talking to one of the tankers along the lines of “We might need to go check something out”… but then there is nothing to prove that B33 ever did anything of the sort.
>> FIRE20++
>>
>> They had their mind set on finishing
>> that retardant line to the N and E.
I actually understand the ‘motivation’ there.
Leaving a big HOLE in a retardant line is about as bad as ground-pounders leaving a big hole in a scraped fireline. The fire COULD go right through that ‘hole’ and so much for all the work you were doing.
The problem was is that the fire had ALREADY shifted to the other direction and there really wasn’t the need to be so obsessive ( at that time ) about finishing that work on the NORTH.
The SOUTH end was where it was now critical but no one was making that crystal CLEAR to French and Burfiend.
>> FIRE20++ also said…
>>
>> And what about Abel saying he
>> asked B33 to go S and check on GM?
>> That never happened either…in the
>> end B33 says they had not been
>> down S until they made it there
>> when the fire had already turned.
Absolutely correct. When French was talking to that SEAT that was going to do the 1633 drop… he did say “This is my first time down here”.
However… there is also that possible radio capture in the Panebaker 1616 video of someone on the ground talking to ‘ASM2’ and verifying that they could “see Granite Mountain there on the corner of the fire” and that they had been repeatedly telling ASM2 they were ‘comfortable’ down there… but ASM2 found that ‘not credible’ and was then telling someone on the ground to “Call them and ask them if Alpha is WITH them”… which is then exactly what happened… and we then hear Eric Marsh’s obtuse responses to the direct “Granite Mountain… What’s your status?” query.
Combine that with what the SAIT says happened with all this “Should we go check on them?” talk with “Air Attack”… and who knows WHAT the real story is there.
This whole deal really is still one of the most ‘unfinished stories’ of the entire day.
WHO really asked WHO ( in Air Support ) to go do WHAT with regards to Granite Mountain… and WHEN… and if it ever happened at all.. WHAT were the actual results.
Did they get ‘called off’ that task when OPS Abel said “Nah… they’re OK… they’re in the black” like the SAIR says happened….
…or did they really go check and then there was all this “We see them behind those hills there” and “Are you comfortable down there?” stuff happening on the radio.
Who the hell knows.
None of this has ever been ‘sorted out’.
Hopefully… it WILL be.
It’s important.
I posted something way below that I meant to actually post up here at the top. It relates to Elizabeth’s very valid concerns about fuels mitigation, and the lack thereof, and the Yarnell Fire. And others’ saying that that doesn’t forgive Granite Mountain’s decision to leave the black they were in and walk down into a bowl full of fuel with an out-of-control fire headed toward it.
I think we need to look at this in layers. Various points where things happened that, incrementally, led to this tragedy.
Elizabeth said on FEBRUARY 6, 2015 AT 9:44 AM
“That said, if, as you believe, the GM tragedy was the product of human error, then it seems to me that fuels mitigation becomes even more important, because, obviously, if 19 men can make whatever human error you are fingering, presumably others stand to do the same.”
Elizabeth~
I don’t know if you have read most of the last month’s worth of our conversations about what happened regarding what appears to have been a pretty badly mis-managed Initial Attack on this fire.
It relates to what you are asking.
I see this whole thing as a set of concentric circles.
Circle One:
Obviously, if Yarnell had taken more responsibility for mitigating their wildfire risk, including that around their homes, this fire wouldn’t have carried, relatively speaking, the probable highly disastrous risk it had. That’s why I wrote about Payson vs Sedona/Flagstaff.
I think that lack of having taken responsibility will be a factor in the homeowners’ lawsuits.
However,
Circle Two:
If the Initial Attack on Saturday (and I’m not faulting not attacking the fire Friday night, which is kind of 50/50 to me) had been managed by the Agency that decided to OWN it, in a much more responsible way (see all we have written about that over the past month), it is likely this fire would never have escaped the Initial Attack, thus not causing the whole debacle that happened on Sunday.
Circle Three:
As a number of us have written in various ways over the past YEAR, it is quite possible that, if Arizona Department of Forest had chosen, after Initial Attack Incident Commander Russ Shumate FINALLY admitted the fire had escaped Initial Attack and required a Type 2 Team. to assign Bea Day’s Type 2 Full Team instead of Roy Hall’s Type 2 Short Team (which he spent most of Sunday trying to reinforce with pieces of Bea Day’s team instead of actually fighting his fire), the fire would have been sufficiently resourced to have not had the massive HOLES in its resourcing, which MAY have prevented Granite Mountain from having fallen “under the radar” to the point that they ended up lost in the NOISE (as MANY other people almost were) as the fire reversed and headed toward Yarnell.
Circle Four.
At approximately 12:30 PM on Sunday, Bravo 3, according to its ADOSH interview, realized that the fire was HUGELY likely, given the probable afternoon thunderstorms coupled with the topography of the land, to reverse its direction and burn toward Yarnell that afternoon. Unfortunately, they didn’t bother to alert ANYBODY as to that, other than Rance Marquez, who, then abandoned his responsibilities to Division Z and went elsewhere. So NONE of Bravo 3’s concerns were EVER communicated to anybody who mattered. If that had not been the case, maybe a whole bunch of things would have turned out differently.
Circle Five.
Given that we still don’t know, over a year and a half later, WHY Granite Mountain decided to abandon their best-view-of-the-fire location in a LARGE safety zone (something that maybe Brendan McDonough has some perspective on) and descend into a chimney-canyon bowl full of highly flammable fuels without posting an effective LOOKOUT, it’s pretty apparent, still, that if they hadn’t done that, they would still be alive to this day and we wouldn’t be having this conversation.
So what I’m saying is that, along with Yarnell’s apathy regarding their situation, there are a number of layered factors leading to this tragedy. There are a number of pressure points where, even given Yarnell’s apathy, other peoples relative apathy/ineffectiveness/misjudgment also contributed to what happened.
For want of a nail…………….and………………and……………and……….
As I have said in the past, and I’m sure WTKTT would agree, Shakespeare could have written this fire.
And, yes, if this fire has any possibility of preventing future wildland fire-fighters deaths, ALL of these concentric circles need to be scrutinized.
And, I might add, for ALL of these concentric circles to be scrutinized, a whole bunch more FACTS need to be released to the public.
Kind of like the Swiss Cheese hole alignment. Or stacked dominos start one falling and y take the others each one is a failure that add ton the next till the whole thing comes apart. And the Fire blew up again like it did on Saturday. And every one was scrambling again. Plug 1 hole or eliminate 1 circle and the out come changes.
Again this fire was a classic of what not to do till the Team took charge on Monday and finished it out.
I think I would add something to one of the ‘circles’… but not sure if it should have just been PART of CIRCLE 2… or somewhere in-between CIRCLE 2 and CIRCLE 3.
That would be the ‘sense of urgency’ that seemed to missing all day Saturday.
Yes… the fire looked ( quoting both Shumate and Fernandez ) “fairly innocent’ during the Saturday morning 10:30 AM RECON in N14HX… but anyone who took just one look at that situation should have realized what MIGHT happen if that thing flared up and escaped.
The topography was a NIGHTMARE.
If that ‘innocent’ fire flared up and somehow got out into that massive bowl of gasoline-on-a-stick that hadn’t burned in 40 years… it should have been obvious on Saturday that there would be very little to stop it from consuming that entire valley. ( Which is exactly what eventually happened ).
So there should have been NO QUESTION that thing needed to be absolutely DEAD-AS-A-DOORNAIL before any WIND picked up on Saturday afternoon.
It didn’t happen. There just wasn’t that ‘sense of urgency’ about what MIGHT happen if that all-important Initial Attack FAILED.
I gather that type 4 teams aren’t really even REQUIRED to have any FBANs… or someone who REALLY knows what all the risks are given the topography and the fuel type and the fire conditions?
I think if there had been just ONE fully-qualified FBAN there on-scene with ICT4 Shumate Saturday morning… then HE could have injected the right ‘sense of urgency’ into the situation with a single question to Sumate…
“Do you have ANY idea what might happen if you don’t knock this thing out before this afternoon?”
Followup…
At the end of ICT4 Russ Shumate’s first ( of two ) ADOSH interviews on August 15, 2013… Shumate was asked the same question the WFA investigators were asking all the interviewees.
That was “Is there anything you would have done different?”
Shumate’s response to that actually contained his own realization that what he SHOULD have done sometime Saturday ( before the wind ever picked up ) was to (quote) “wash it off the mountain”.
Shumate’s exact words…
———————————————————————
A: I don’t know if I can tell you a better way than what I did. I’ve felt I was reasonable in my responses that I knew what I had there. The flipped answer would be that I’d order the VLAT to wash it off the mountain when there is no smoke showing.
———————————————————————
Notice that the DIFFERENCE between his two ‘flipped answer’ responses simply involves one simple phrase…
“A sense of URGENCY”.
So, since Elizabeth couldn’t be BOTHERED to provide a link for the post she wrote about regarding Bret Butler’s thing about Safety Zones, here is Wildfire Today’s December 2014 article about it:
“Still another revision of safety zone rule”
http://wildfiretoday.com/tag/bret-butler/
Within the past month or so, Bret Butler gave a webinar on Safety Zones. I suggest you all watch it. As you watch it, reflect on the videos that many of you have watched within the past month or so from the Prescott guys which show that even the most senior WFFs on the YHF were seemingly caught off guard by how bad the fire got as quickly as it did.
Moreover, what those videos show – and what none of you are talking about – is the fact that, had the indrafting and two columns at the YHF not started directing the fire toward GM, it could have just as easily been the Shrine area guys who died.
Here’s the take-away (or one of the take-aways) for me: There is not yet a reliable, 100% certain way to calculate – when dealing with explosive or “eruptive” fire (to quote Dr. Viegas) – how short an escape route needs to be and how big a safety zone needs to be. For those of you who think that the guys up in the Shrine area somehow had superior knowledge that day – as opposed to just getting lucky that the pieces of fire started interacting and things like indrafting and convection started pulling the fire away from Bucky et al and instead toward the south – you and I might have to agree to disagree.
My comment—SAFETY ZONES—-The BLACK. The BLACK
When in critical burning conditions like Yarnell Hill
Direct line bring the black with you.
Years of experience in Southern California Brush Fires.
#1 Safety Zone — The BLACK
#2 Safety Zone Built by Cats as they build indirect line
Build or Identify new Safety Zones as your Line Progresses.
Keep your Safety Zones with in 200 to 300 Feet of your crew scouted and marked.
These are covered in training of Wild land FF’s every year.
Always have LCES in place when extreme conditions are present.
Every Strike Team Leaders Responsibility.
This Fire is a total training session in its self of Fire Safety only a few like BR and some Eng. Crews were really paying attention every one else was depending on there OPS to take care of them.
I never saw in my life of Fire Fighting Identifying a Safety Zone A mile from my crews..
Well over 90% of the time it was the BLACK.
The rest of the time indirect line required Safety zones every 100 Yards they were built by Cats on open Ridges as we moved. If that could not be accomplished we went back to direct line period. We brought the black with us.
Most Wild Land Fire Fighters know what it takes to protect our crews in any situation. Again while there were close calls on this fire that should not have been close no one else was injured or killed.
They had there plans and followed them to Safety. The Biggest complaint they should have moved sooner.
There is nothing new here in Extreme Fire Behavior especially the end of June in Arizona.
Last but not least—The Shrine Guys never had any superior knowledge they were in a different area with a different set of circumstances and a shot escape route back to vehicles and out on Roads to a SZ, they were not in the middle of 3000 acre’s of Brush.
:: Bob Powers said…
::
:: I never saw in my life of Fire Fighting
:: Identifying a Safety Zone A mile from
:: my crews.
If Gary Cordes really did expect them to use that ‘road/trail’ that was clearly visible on Google Maps… then the total distance from where Cordes knew they being assigned to work and the perimeter of the Boulder Springs Ranch was more like TWO miles… not just ONE. It was actually just shy of TWO miles… like 1.9 and some change.
Reply to Elizabeth post on February 6, 2015 at 2:22 pm
>> Elizabeth said…
>>
>> What none of you are talking about – is the fact that, had the indrafting
>> and two columns at the YHF not started directing the fire toward GM,
>> it could have just as easily been the Shrine area guys who died.
There has been extensive discussion of the ‘Harper Canyon’ situation during this ongoing forum. AFAICT there is NO disagreement those men could have ‘easily died’…. for any NUMBER of reasons.
They supposedly had no less than THREE ( count ’em, THREE ) separate ‘lookouts’ that afternoon… including SPGS 1 Gary Cordes himself… and they still ended up ‘running for their lives’.
>> Elizabeth said…
>>
>> For those of you who think that the guys up in the Shrine area somehow
>> had superior knowledge that day – as opposed to just getting lucky
>> that the pieces of fire started interacting and things like indrafting and
>> convection started pulling the fire away from Bucky et al and instead
>> toward the south – you and I might have to agree to disagree.
I don’t know who in this ongoing discussion you might be referring to with regards to the men in Harper Canyon ‘somehow having superior knowledge’ that day.
Yes. They were DAMN ‘lucky’ they didn’t all die… and AFAIK there really is no disagreement about that. The firefighters themselves have said that was the case.
Don’t forget… the Harper Canyon situation WAS one of FOUR distinct and separate potential/actual entrapment situations that ADOSH was ready to cite Arizona Forestry for.
When ADOSH realized they had more than enough evidence to issue the maximum fines they were allowed to impose against that agency and its ‘unsafe workplace’. ( even before they finished the first round of interviews ) they simply consolidated the FOUR separate ‘entrapment’ citations into that one general “too much unnecessary risk of injury or death in the workplace” citation.
If Arizona Forestry ever ‘coughs up’ the Peeples Valley firefighter evidence which is KNOWN to exist ( FULL depositions/interviews, photos, possible videos with radio captures, cellphone records, etc. ) but has never seen the light of day… perhaps we will learn more about what REALLY went on there in Harper Canyon… and why a work unit under the supervision of SPGS1 Gary Cordes and TFLD(t) Tyson Esquibel came so close to dying that day.
Can anyone tell me if video M2U00264 was taken before or after the images found in McCord’s folder that are titled yarnell093.jpg – yarnell 099.jpg?
Also, at the end of video M2U00264, when Frisby and Brown drive up to the camera, are there any other fire personnel behind them?
I think the two photos most relevant to your question are 098 and 099. I currently have them pegged at about 4:29:48 and 4:29:53 PM. 098 shows Brian and Trew on the UTV fairly close-up (even at 50 mm, and 099 shows the camp–that silo/tank (or whatever) at more of a distance. I’m not sure exactly whether he was panning right or left in these two images. But at that point Brian and Trew were fairly close to him and where the BR buggies were at that point.
There’s a lot of smoke and embers in the photos, so it’s pretty clear that even at that time the Youth Camp was being impacted a lot by the fire.
Also the other relevant photo is from the Papich folder, IMG_3954.jpg, taken with an iphone at 4:29:38 PM. It’s from more of a distance and shows Brian and Trew on the UTV from further away. So pretty close to the same time but from, apparently, much further away.
I’m not sure how to interpret these differences, tbh. I’d give more credence to the timestamp of the Papich iphone photo, for all the reasons we’ve discussed ad nauseum.
This photo shows the Sun City West Brush Truck and the Central Yavapai Engine parked next to where True and Brian are parked.
Also Papich’s photo IMG_3956.jpg, taken at 4:29:38 shows the Glendale truck Task Force Leader Trainee Tyson Esquibel was using that day, as well as a white truck with a winch on top of the cab that I have never been able to identify.
We know Tyson Esquibel drove out before Brian and Trew as well as the Brush Truck and the Central Yavapai Engine.
Actually Aaron’s video 263 shows a Blue Ridge buggy coming out (it may show more by Lightroom is being bugggy with me right now.
All things considered, I’m currently willing to accept the Blue Ridge narrative that the buggies and other various trucks went out before Brian and Trew. I really don’t have any reason not to, via the visual evidence we currently have.
So the order I’m seeing vehicles come out is:
Video 263:
Peeples Valley Water Tender “Slow Down Skippy!!”
Blue Ridge Buggy
Probably another Blue Ridge Buggy
Video 264:
Central Yavapai Engine
Sun City Brush Truck
Folks walking
Rance Marquez comes in and turns around (ahem)
Tyson Esquibel in Glendale Truck
Brian and Trew
What I find interesting is that the Peeples Valley Water Tender is shown coming out pretty fast (“Slow down, Skippy!!) and at the head of a whole bunch of other vehicles.
All things considered.
Reply to calvin post on February 6, 2015 at 5:43 pm
>> calvin said…
>>
>> Can anyone tell me if video M2U00264 was taken before or
>> after the images found in McCord’s folder that are titled
>> yarnell093.jpg – yarnell 099.jpg?
** THE SHORT ANSWER
If we are to trust the DATE/TIME settings on McCord’s NIKON COOLPIX S01 camera… then his image “yarnell 093.jpg” was taken at 4:27:23 PM, and his image “yarnell 099.jpg” was taken exactly 90 seconds later at 4:28:53 PM.
The START time of the M2U00264 video was right around 4:33:23 PM.
So Aaron Hulburd’s M2U00264 Video was taken AFTER both of McCord’s “yarnell 093.jpg” and “yarnell 099.jpg” photos.
“yarnell 093.jpg” = 4:27:23 PM
“yarnell 099.jpg” = 4:28:53 PM ( +90 seconds )
M2U00264 START = 4:33:23 ( +4 minutes and 30 seconds )
** THE LONG ANSWER
* Aaron Hulburd Video M2U00264
The M2U0064 video is 3 minutes and 37 seconds long.
At the very end of that video is when Brian Frisby and Trueheart Brown ‘pull up’ to the “3 Prescotteers” Jason Clawson, Aaron Hulburd and KC ‘Bucky’ Yowell in the St. Joseph Shrine parking lot and that moment is time stamped with the Blue Ridge GPS satellite-based time data as exactly 1637 ( 4:37:00 PM ).
Subtracting the LENGTH of the video from 4:37:00 PM makes the actual START time for this M2U0064 video right around 1633.23 ( 4:33.23 PM ), give or take 30 seconds or so for the time it took the GPS unit to ‘update’ and show them ‘parked’ there by Jason Clawson, Aaron Hulburd and KC ‘Bucky’ Yowell.
Assumed START time for M2U00264: 4:33:23 PM
Assumed END time for M2U00264: 4:37:00 PM ( Duration: 3 min 37 sec ).
* Blue Ridge Hotshot McCord Photo “yarnell 093.jpg”
Some of the EXIF metadata embedded in this photo…
File Name: yarnell 093.jpg
File Size: 2.3 MB
Camera Make: NIKON
Camera Model Name: COOLPIX S01
Date/Time Original: 2013:06:30 04:27:23 ( 4:27:23 PM )
Create Date: 2013:06:30 04:27:23 ( 4:27:23 PM )
* Blue Ridge Hotshot McCord Photo “yarnell 099.jpg”
Some of the EXIF metadata embedded in this photo…
File Name: yarnell 099.jpg
File Size: 2.0 MB
Camera Make: NIKON
Camera Model Name: COOLPIX S01
Date/Time Original: 2013:06:30 04:28:53 ( 4:28:53 PM )
Create Date: 2013:06:30 04:28:53 ( 4:28:53 PM )
>> calvin also said…
>>
>> Also, at the end of video M2U00264, when Frisby and Brown drive
>> up to the camera, are there any other fire personnel behind them?
Apparently not. By all accounts ( and backed up with video M2U00264 ), Frisby and Brown really were the ‘last ones out’ of the Youth Camp Area at 4:37:00 PM.
SIDENOTE: Notice the END time for Hulburd Video M2U00264. It is 4:37 PM… the exact moment when ‘Bravo 33’ reported to the SAIT that they heard ( on the Air-To-Ground channel ) someone they ‘believed’ to be DIVSA Eric Marsh making that statement about “That’s it. That’s exactly where we want the retardant”.
Hulburd and KC ‘Bucky’ Yowell WERE scanning the Air-To-Ground frequency.
So it’s interesting to note that for the entire time this M2U00264 video is running ( from 4:33:23 to 4:37:00 PM ) we do NOT hear any traffic on the Air-To-Ground channel resembling what ‘Bravo 33’ says they heard.
The M2U00264 video ENDS at 4:37 ( give or take 30 seconds )… so of course that Air-To-Ground transmission could have come IMMEDIATELY after the END of this video… but think about what THAT means.
That means that entire group of FFs there ‘conferencing’ in the St. Joseph Shrine parking lot would have *probably* heard this same Air-To-Ground transmission that ‘Bravo 33’ has attributed to Eric Marsh at 4:37… but here’s the situation there…
1) NONE of the “3 Prescotteers” ( Clawson, Hulburd and Yowell ) seem to have been interviewed by ANYONE. So we don’t know if THEY could back up what ‘Bravo 33’ is saying about what they heard at 4:37 PM.
2) The Blue Ridge Unit Logs for Blue Ridge Hotshots Brian Frisby and Trueheart Brown were HEAVILY redacted by the US Forestry Service.
They MIGHT actually be mentioning hearing this same radio call from Marsh about ‘retardant’ at 4:37 PM in THEIR Unit Logs… but that MIGHT be one of the sections we aren’t allowed to see even with valid FOIA requests.
Good points. Thanks.
Marti… I don’t seem to have any ‘time adjustment’ notes for that NIKON COOLPIX of McCord’s. We ARE trusting the timestamps, there, correct?
If we are… then I think it’s also worth noting that McCord’s
“yarnell 093.jpg”, taken at 4:27:23 PM, was taken at the exact same moment that Blue Ridge Hotshot ‘Gamble’ was sitting in that Blue Ridge Crew Carrier still there at the Youth Camp and shooting his YARNELL-GAMBLE video.
That is, of course, the video that captures someone ( OPS1 Todd Abel? ) apparently telling Eric Marsh he would ( paraphrasing ) “Appreciate it if you guys could hurry up” and Marsh responds wiith “They’re comin’ from the heel of the fire”.
To be honest, it has been so long ago that I messed around with those photos and their timestamps that I don’t remember exactly how I handled them. And I didn’t write any notes on them, as I started to do later on stuff like Tom Story’s photos and the Panebaker stuff.
But I didn’t make any HUGE changes on them, so that tells me that I didn’t find any reason, at that time to do so.
Thank you. Same story here. I neglected to make any notes along the lines of ‘already verified’ or any time ‘adjustment’ notes. No notes at all in that regard.
I think that’s because the times ARE accurate… and can be trusted.
If they are ‘off’ at all… it’s only by a matter of a minute or two… which is ( as the Tom Story photos proved ) about as good as can be expected with some of these photos.
The timing of these ‘evacuating the Youth Camp’ photos of McCord’s DO match the overall timing pretty well.
If I owned a freakin’ NIKON… I would be sure the DATE and TIME were correct.
It’s just a coolpix. Pocket camera.
Not a full-blown hard-core Nikon.
As I have periodically reiterated, nobody but wedding photographers cares all that much about their time-stamps. There’s no “in real life” reason to.
WTKTT
These crews did 2 things that saved them from first Deployment and second Possible death…I say possible for a reason.
First They had a planed escape route well identified back down the line.
Second they had a planed SZ with vehicles to get them there
Admittedly they would have missed their ride had not their driver waited for them.
So yes close calls but if you were to look at most Fire Fighters who move to safety zones.
They some times have the fire chasing their butt into them. It happens it is part of the job the last man in line the Boss is the one who pushes the crew or crews making sure the slowest make it. So Close calls happen.
Good Lookouts usually give you time to move.
I will totally admit that the Supervisors on this fire like Cordes waited to long to move the crews out.
That’s why I say again each crew is responsible for LCES even a 5 man Engine crew. Post a lookout when you are in these situations and make sure you have Radio contact.
They all had a little luck on their side and they had a Escape route and a planed SZ
Those 2 things were instrumental in Saving them.
POSSABLE–if their was any areas available for deployment like Cat line open cleared areas, Parking lots etc. they still may have deployed and survived.
I do not know if there is any pictures of those areas they were working in building line. Situational awareness is always key to survival.
Again for some reason this fire made all the statements of what not to do
It never was a normal operation??????
Reply to Bob Powers post on February 6, 2015 at 7:07 pm
TWO minutes ( 120 seconds ).
That’s what Peeples Valley Firefighter Bob Brandon said was the difference between life or death that day in Harper Canyon.
Once again… from Bob Brandon’s OWN account as reported to the Prescott Daily Courier.
NOTE: Arizona Forestry has his actual written testimony and Unit Logs… but we have still never seen those… OR the photos and cellphone records he ALSO says they took from him ( AND all the other Peeples Valley Firefighters that were there ) just 48 hours after the tragedy.
The Prescott Daily Courier
A Narrow escape: Peeples Valley firefighters recount that frightening day
Published: 6/30/2014 6:00:00 AM by Joanna Dodder Nellans
http://dcourier.com/main.asp?SectionID=1&SubsectionID=1&ArticleID=133345
————————————————————————
Peeples Valley Firefighter Bob Brandon feared his fellow firefighters would have to deploy their shelters. The fire was too loud to talk. In the midst of the chaos, he texted them and they said they were OK.
Their group supervisor pulled up and told Brandon and Keehner they had to move their trucks out. Brandon refused, telling the commander that his crew was still in there. The supervisor repeated his order, saying the other guys couldn’t run that fast.
Brandon didn’t want to think about what the supervisor meant.
Brandon and Keehner followed the order, but tried to move as slowly as possible as they turned on the trucks and headlights.
They went about 100 feet to the shrine parking lot and waited at the end of the ravine, hoping their buddies would run straight to them through the sandy gulch. They decided they wouldn’t go any farther until they saw their buddies. Then they spotted them running down the road, followed by the Wickenburg and Sun City vehicles.
“It happened so fast,” Smith said. He credits fellow Peeples Valley Capt. Jake Moder with saving his life by keeping a close eye on their situation while they were digging and cutting the line.
While they were building the line, Moder saw the hill to the north catching fire. Smith knew it was time to run when he saw Moder’s face as he ran toward him about 4 p.m.
“We felt impending doom,” he recalled. “We were literally running and it was coming at us fast. You could feel it burning the hair on the back of your neck and sizzling your arms.
“I didn’t think we were going to make it.”
They ran down the ravine about 100 yards and were angry when they realized the trucks were gone. But when they cut over to the paved road, they felt like they were going to survive.
“We were probably TWO MINUTES from becoming a statistic,” Smith said. “You’d have a memorial here for us.”
They ran down the paved road toward their safety zone at the shrine parking lot. The Wickenburg and Sun City firefighters offered them a ride but they could see their own trucks by then.
Smith said he realized that his buddies might have saved his life by moving the trucks, because that kept him and Moder from trying to stop and get the vehicles. It’s likely they already would have been burned up,
———————————————————————–
Followup…
Brandon’s account is VERY similar to what happened at the DUDE fire in Walk Moore canyon… where all those DOC Perryville firefighters lost their lives.
Similar ‘canyon’… similar circumstances… thankfully not similar results.
In Walk Moore Canyon… the Navajo Hotshot had seen it coming and yelled “Get OUT of HERE!”… so the Perryville Crew ( like the 6 FFs in Yarnell ) were already ‘on the run’ down towards the Control Road.
The fire ‘cut the crew in half’.
The half that was closer to Control Road kept running and lived.
The half that had been ‘cut off’ deployed… and most of them died.
Those 6 FFs in Harper Canyon could have easily been just like that half of the Perryville Crew that got cut off.
Some reports following the DUDE fire say that if that ‘upper’ half of the Perryville Crew had just had 2 more minutes ( 120 seconds )… they *might* not have been ‘cut off’ like they were.
That’s the same 2 minutes Bob Brandon is now saying was the difference between life or death that day in Harper Canyon, Yarnell, June 30, 2013.
SIDENOTE: Tony Sciacca was THERE that day at the DUDE fire.
He was the foreman of the Prescott Hotshots at that time who were working just UP Walk Moore Canyon from where the Perryville Crew was. That put Sciacca and his crew closer to the Bonita Springs subdivision and they all made it to safety THAT way. They ran INTO the Bonita Springs subdivision and not DOWN towards the Control Road like Perryville. did.
Tony Sciacca was standing RIGHT THERE in Harper Canyon by the St. Joseph Shrine on June 30, 2013.
He has never said so… but I’ll bet he had a moment there in that developing situation ( knowing there WERE some ‘crews’ still back there at the Youth Camp ) when it might have occurred to him “Oh My God… it’s going to happen again. They might get cut off trying to get out.”
Correction for above. Brain Fart.
It was the ‘Bonita Creek’ subdivision there near Walk Moore Canyon at the DUDE fire… not ‘Bonita Springs’.
That’s where Tony Sciacca took his Prescott Hotshots and survived.
I’m still not completely trusting Bob Brandon’s account, given what’s in the video. His water tender comes out at a pretty fast pace (“Slow down, Skippy”) right before the Blue Ridge Buggies. There’s no Aaron video of the Blue Ridge Sup Truck or any of the 4 Granite Mountain Trucks coming out. And after him a SIGNIFICANT number of other vehicles are shown coming out.
This whole thing just doesn’t square to me, given what I’m seeing.
Bob Powers said:
“I will totally admit that the Supervisors on this fire like Cordes waited to long to move the crews out.”
I’m not, at this time, willing to throw Gary Cordes under the bus, so to speak, regarding this. I don’t have any evidence to believe, at this point, that he didn’t, as he said in his interview, radio the order for the Task Force to abandon what they were doing and evacuate at 3:50 pm, way before they actually did (if we are to believe Bob Brandon’s etc narratives).
Also Bob wrote:
“I do not know if there is any pictures of those areas they were working in building line. Situational awareness is always key to survival.”
I DEFINITELY think Bob Brandon was taking a lot of photos. And somebody is sitting on them.
There is an article he wrote (I don’t have the link at hand at the moment) where he says he was taking a lot of photos. I think that disc of photos he gave to the team that was interviewing/collecting data to pass on to the SAIT probably has a lot of visual data/evidence on it, and I agree with WTKTT that the with-holding of those interviews and data has to be (all things considered–given what all HAS been released) being done for some kind of a REASON.
What that reason is, I don’t know.
And by saying I don’t totally trust Brandon’s account, I don’t mean I don’t trust him. I just think there was a LOT of chaos happening and the various accounts of all that chaos don’t square with each other.
Which is totally natural and understandable.
I’m still not sure exactly what has happened, and when, in the last week of my recent totally chaotic life.
AS you say it is not unusual to think you are about to die and things tend to close in on you as you are in a hurry to get to Safety.
The fact that shortly after you are safe a crew burns to death
it makes your peril seem much closer than it really was.
He is not the first or the last to think things were worse than they really were.
They got out with no 1st, 2nd, or 3rd, degree Burns
so how close was it really 2, 4 or even 6 min. no one is timing the escape in those times a min can be an eternity and 5 min. can seem like 1 min. your brain is not calculating time it is calculating distance to safety.
One of the things I have said severial times is your look out must be strike team leader or above, understand fire behavior and be able to know when to pull the pin early.
Some crews have waited to long thinking they can catch the breakout. having an escape route known and a safety zone plan can save your ass. Close calls or plenty of time.
There are a lot of close calls some not as hair raising as some of the after stories would have you believe.
A question I have How big was the Youth camp? and did it burn? I have never read if it survived or not. or if it could have been a safety zone?
One more thing After the weather forecast predicting the wind at that time all I will repeat all personnel should have been pulled back to safe areas or moved into the Black. Overhead should have insured contact and moved there resources do not assume some one herd your Radio Confirm each crew and equipment.
This is where things went to hell with last minuet movement.
Bob said
“They all had a little luck on their side and they had a Escape route and a planed SZ
Those 2 things were instrumental in Saving them.”
That is actually 3 things (that as you say) “were instrumental in saving them”
1. a little luck
2. an escape route
3. a planned SZ
And it’s too bad they didn’t (in my humble opinion) have a competent Task Force Leader.
A LINK would be helpful.
Thx.
**
** WHO REALLY ADVISED BRENDAN MCDONOUGH TO
** RETAIN A CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYER?… AND WHY?
As the online “Arizona Forestry vs. ADOSH” Court documents now tell us… a lot of ‘lawyer rodeo’ went on in order to set up that ORIGINAL under-oath deposition date of ‘November 26, 2014’ for Brendan McDonough.
Arizona Forestry wanted it to happen IMMEDIATELY after learning that Brendan was now ready to talk about ‘what he knows’ that has NOT been previously revealed… and Arizona Forestry also already knew that Brendan had (apparently) already shared this critical information with MULTIPLE other people… and they were VERY scared that the media would get a hold of this before even they had a chance to hear it all from Brendan himself.
ADOSH was trying to be forced into participating in the McDonough deposition BEFORE they had even received the other ‘discovery’ information that wasn’t due to be given to them by Arizona Forestry until December 15, 2014.
ADOSH simply wanted McDonough’s deposition to take place AFTER that ‘exchange of information’ so that they could see the depositions of other witnesses and be FULLY prepared to cross-examine Brendan McDonough for (perhaps) that one and only time to do so. Brendan had sat in front of ADOSH twice before and played some kind of “Ask me the right question and I might give you the right answer” game… so ADOSH simply wanted to be SURE they had a good list of ALL the ‘right questions’ to ask McDonough this THIRD time they were going to be in the room with him.
TWICE burned… THIRD time be wiser.
Anyway… Judge Mosesso allowed that first deposition to ‘go ahead’, anyway, on November 26, 2014… as Arizona Forestry wanted.
Judge Mosesso ruled that since it WOULD be possible to recall Brendan McDonough ( with subpoenas, if necessary ) any number of times during this proceeding… that the November 26 date for the first deposition was OK with him.
So everything was scheduled for November 26, 2014 and ‘on track’.
Then Brendan McDonough himself through a WRENCH in the works.
The day BEFORE that November 26 deposition was going to take place, Brendan McDonough now informed everyone that he had just retained a NEW ‘Criminal’ defense attorney ( David Shapiro of Prescott ) and it was Mr. Shapiro who was ‘very busy’ with another trial and wouldn’t be able to be there with him on November 26.
So Brendan NOW said he was ‘not available’ for the November 26 deposition, just 24 hours or so before it was supposed to happen.
As it turns out… ( and as I had earlier thought )… this was NOT a case whereby Brendan’s previous attorney ( Emily Dolan ) who was right by his side during the ADOSH interviews had suddenly ‘backed out’ on him.
Nothing of the sort.
The law firm that Emily Dolan worked for had already told the Arizona Forestry lawyers MONTHS before this that they had ONLY been representing Brendan McDonough for his ADOSH interview, before the citations were ever issued by ADOSH, and that they no longer considered McDonough to be a ‘client’ and they would NOT be ‘participating’ in these “Arizona Forestry vs. ADOSH” proceedings.
That was in MARCH of 2014… a full SEVEN MONTHS before the November 26, 2014 deposition date would eventually be set for McDonough in “Arizona Forestry vs. ADOSH”.
It now APPEARS that for those SEVEN months… Brendan simply went back to relying on legal advice from The Prescott City Attorney John Paladini.
It was actually Paladini who told Arizona Forestry that this NEW ( and heretofore UNHEARD ) testimony from Brendan MUST come out in an official DEPOSITION rather than just an ‘interview’ with the AZF Attorneys.
It was also Paladini who then was the ‘middle-man’ between McDonough and Arizona Forestry while they tried to to ‘hurry-up’ and arrange this deposition of McDonough. Paladini is on record in the documents as the one who was making the assurances to ADOSH that if they needed a second ( follow-up ) under-oath session with McDonough… that both he and McDonough would not have problem with that ( Just a VERBAL promise… but a promise nonetheless ).
So the bottom line here is that even just about two weeks before the scheduled deposition… Brendan McDonough was AOK with having City of Prescott Attorney John Paladini ‘representing’ him and making all the final arrangements and promises for this under-oath deposition.
All of sudden ( and at the very last moment ) Brendan pushes Paladini out of the picture and hires his own ‘criminal’ defense attorney David Shapiro.
So Emily Dolan ( Brendan’s previous attorney ) had been ‘out of the picture’ for MONTHS prior to this… and McDonough seemed to be ‘OK’ with Paladini as his primary counsel until just a few days before the scheduled deposition.
The QUESTION here would then be… did Paladini himself actually advise McDonough that he better get a ‘criminal’ defense attorney… or did Brendan ‘arrive’ at that conclusion himself at the ‘last minute’… or was there even someone ELSE ( but NOT Emily Dolan ) ‘advising’ McDonough at this point?
Something tells me Prescott City Attorney John Paladini was just as ‘blind-sided’ by Brendan’s move to get a ‘criminal’ attorney as everyone else was. Paladini was playing ‘middle-man’ and arranging this McDonough deposition AND was the one making ‘promises’ about a potential followup-up deposition… so Paladini ended up with as much ‘egg on his face’ over this as everyone else.
So the following is the PROOF that ‘Emily Dolan’ ( and the firm she worked for ) has ONLY agreed to represent McDonough for those two ADOSH interviews ( where he didn’t tell all he knew )… and they apparently never had any intentions of ‘continuing’ to represent him for anything that would come after that… and that they TOLD the Arizona Forestry lawyers this fact SEVEN MONTHS before the ‘November games’… on March 11, 2014.
The document named “2014_03 Updated 10.24.14.pdf” is HERE…
https://docs.google.com/file/d/0B6N47Z5CNR-CTUtBNzBfUGRJREU/edit?pli=1
Page 7 of the 66 page “2014_03 Updated 10.24.14.pdf” document…
—————————————————————————————
VI. COMMUNICATIONS REGARDING THE POTENTIAL
PARTICIPATION OF AN INTERVENOR
Because the issue of potential participation by other parties has been raised by ADOSH, counsel for Respondent ( Arizona Forestry ) hereby notifies the Tribunal ( Judge Mosesso ) that he has received two communications from the Offices of Emily C. Dolan, counsel for Mr. Brendan McDonough.
Her office has communicated both through a voicemail message and an email that is attached hereto as Exhibit B the she represented Mr. McDonough ONLY with respect to the interview of him conducted by ADOSH during its investigation prior to the issuance of the citations.
It therefore does not appear that Mr. McDonough seeks to participate as an intervenor in this matter. Counsel for Respondent ( Arizona Forestry ) has requested that his counsel clarify whether Mr. McDonough intends to participate in these proceedings, and whether his counsel, Ms. Dolan, desires to continue to receive notices of matters filed in these proceedings.
“Exhibit B – Email”
———————————————————————————
From: Beth Asadourina
Sent: Tuesday. March 11, 2014 2:01 PM
To: Selden, David ( Attorney for Arizona Forestry )
Subject: OSHA v AZ State Forestry Division of AZ
Dear Mr. Selden
We received your packet of various discovery requests and deposition notices with respect to the above-referenced matter. Thank you.
Ms. Carman just wanted to make sure that you were aware of our firm’s scope of representation regarding Brendan McDonough ONLY involved his statement to OSHA relating to their investigation.
As such, we obviously will NOT be responding to any of the requests or appearing for any depositions.
Yours very truly
Beth
Elizabeth J. Asadourian
Paralegal to Krista M. Carman, Esq.
Warnock MacKinlay & Carman, PLLC
P: 928-445-XXXX
F: 928-445-XXXX
email: beth @ xxxxxxx
Website: w w w.lawwmc.c o m
———————————————————————————
Copy.
Thank you.
Actually… the really SHORT version of the above post would be that I had *thought* that ( perhaps ) it was Attorney Emily Dolan herself who had ‘advised’ Brendan that he better retain a ‘criminal’ attorney for any future depositions…
…but these court documents now prove that most probably was NOT the case.
Emily Dolan ONLY agreed to take Brendan through his ADOSH interviews… and that was before the citations were even issued OR anyone knew that Arizona Forestry was going to ‘contest’ the citations.
Emily Dolan ( and her firm ) had ‘disengaged’ from Brendan before that even happened and they notified Arizona Forestry this was the case as early as March 11, 2014.
It also does NOT look like it was Prescott City Attorney John Paladini who might have made this ‘suggestion’ to McDonough.
So WHY Brendan would feel he needed his own ‘criminal’ attorney going into the November 26, 2014 deposition… and WHO might have advised him of this… remains a mystery.
Perhaps when we learn what Brendan has been ‘withholding’ for so long now… it might become more clear why he would have been advised to retain counsel with ‘criminal’ proceedings experience.
Clarification for last comment…
That last paragraph above is not meaning to imply that this ‘new’ information Bredan now wants to ‘get off his chest’ might, in any way, subject HIM to any kind of ‘criminal’ charges because of what did ( or didn’t ) happen on the afternoon of June 30, 2013.
There is absolutely ZERO likelihood of that.
But as far as someone (perhaps) *advising* him to have someone with ‘trial’ experience by his side as he goes through this inevitable process… I think that depending on the actual content of his ‘new information, AND his ‘reasons’ for not revealing it until now… there really *might* be some grounds for some ‘purposely obstructing an official investigation’ charges.
That’s the real ‘seriousness’ of this.
Not so much what Brendan might have been ‘responsible’ for on the day of June 30, 2013… but what is now ‘responsible’ for FOLLOWING that day.
I think if Brendan now just ‘fills in the blanks’ and supplies some answers to the ongoing mysteries of that day…. no one is going to turn around and ‘punish’ him for anything… but I’m just talking about WHY someone else *might* have advised him he needs someone who knows their way around these kinds of possible ‘obstruction’ charges… just in case.
WTKTT I think you are close to right there. Depending on what he with held he could be walking a fine line on criminal charges. Having that type of Lawyer for advice doesn’t hurt.
If what Brendan McDonough now WANTS to ‘get off his chest’ really does turn out to be significant NEW information about WHY and/or HOW 19 (supposedly) professional Wildland firefighters ended up dead on the floor of a box canyon… then I cannot imagine that one of the under-oath questions he will also be asked would be along the lines of…
“…and WHY were you withholding this obviously important information from investigators during at least THREE official interviews?”
I certainly hope Brendan doesn’t think a legitimate answer to that question would be…
“…because nobody ever asked me the right question(s)”.
Whoops. Left the word NOT out of that sentence above.
Meant to say…
“…I cannot imagine that one of the questions he will be asked ( while still under oath ) will NOT be along the lines of…”
“…and WHY were you choosing to withhold this important information during THREE separate official interviews?”
Agree.
$15,000 – that was all that the Yarnell Fire District was allocated (and later forfeited) in terms of grant money for fuels or wildland fire work. Those who know anything about doing prescribed fires know that you cannot burn diddley in fuel of the sort surrounding Yarnell for that amount of money. It would have been great if the YFD had taken the grant money and used it for something, but, WTKTT/Fred/whomever, do not delude yourself into think that THAT would have even put a dent in the fuels problem in the area where the YHF burned and killed the Granite Mountain Hotshots.
Again, if you live in or near the WUI in the s/sw, you should be asking your state forest service or your local federal agencies what they are doing or plan to be doing in the winter for fuels work (prescribed fire, mastication, etc.).
(Not for nothin’, but my impression is that it would have taken hundreds of thousands of dollars to run a prescribed burn in the winter of 2012 or before in the area where the YHF burned on Saturday (and early Sunday). It obviously would have been worth it, but it would not have been cheap. Again, I am curious what AZ does in terms of prescribed fire and mastication work. Does anyone know? Fred, you obviously have a lot of time these days – what sayeth you?))
Agree. $15,000 was not enough.
And see what I wrote below. About fuels mitigation in the Southwest, Arizona especially. It’s not a simple thing.
And even though I appreciate your interest in this topic, as long as you are writing about about “WTKTT/Fred/whomever,”
I hate to say it but that speaks to me that you are not currently willing to think clearly/specifically/un-biasedly/scientifically/nuancedly/rationally/ complicatedly/discernibly enough to really appreciate what you are asking/writing about.
**
** SUBPOENAS AND DEPOSITIONS
I think that now that we can see the “Industirial Commission of Arizona” ( ICA / ADOSH ) side of the ‘Arizona Forestry vs. ADOSH’ citation contestment hearing at this link…
https://sites.google.com/site/yarnellhillinformation/home/yarnellhillaljhearingfile
…and we can now see the ‘Request for SUBPOENA’ for Brendan McDonough to be forced to appear on Feburary 26, 2015 in THIS document ( posted just 10 days ago )…
“2015_01 Updated 01.26.15.pdf”
it’s worth pointing out that this already-scheduled under-oath DEPOSITION and cross-examination of Brendan McDonough is ONLY for the ‘Arizona Forestry vs. ADSOH’ case.
In other words… no matter what happens on February 26, 2015… it has nothing to do with the OTHER Yarnell Hill Fire related court cases that are also ‘active’ in the Arizona Court System.
ANY of the lawyers involved with ANY of those other court cases still have the right to request their own ‘under-oath’ DESPOSITIONS ( and SUBPOENAS ) for Brendan McDonough.
The entire “Arizona Forestry vs. ADOSH” thing is not even actually a ‘Court Case’, per se.
It is simply a very predetermined and prescribed PROCEDURE that is taking place whereby an employer or an agency has the right to CONTEST any ADOSH citations imposed on them.
It follows a very strict procedure established by Arizona Law involving ‘Adminstrative Law Judges’ ( ALJs ) and ultimately results in just a ‘hearing’ where the citations are either upheld… or they get ‘adjusted’ by the ALJ.
The ALJ is ‘running the show’ here ( as in… ALJ Judge Michael A. Mosesso ).
He DOES have all the same powers of SUBPOENA as a judge does in a ‘Civil’ or ‘Criminal’ proceeding… but it’s NOT a ‘trial’. It all just comes down to a ‘hearing’.
Likewise… the penalties for disobeying a SUBPOENA from an ‘ALJ’ are just as strict.
Anyone who violates an ALJ SUBPOENA is subject to the same (serious) ‘Contempt of Court’ charges as if it were an actual Civil or Criminal trial.
So even if Brendan McDonough does attend this already-scheduled under-oath DEPOSITION and cross-examination session on Feburary 26, 2015…
…that could be just the START of his having to ‘testify about what he knows’.
He STILL may have to repeat this ‘testimony’ ( and be subject to even more cross-examination ) any number of additional times in either ‘other’ under-oath depositions OR on the witness stand in any of the other valid Court cases where he is desgnated to be a ‘witness’.
If all the attorneys on BOTH sides of a case will not ACCEPT a simple sworn ‘DEPOSITION’ from a witness… then in a REAL trial ( complete with Court dates and PUBLIC access ) that witness can still be ‘called to the stand’ and have to talk about all this in REAL time… in the Courtroom.
It’s unfortunate for Brendan… but that’s the way it is.
He is a KEY witness in all THREE of the ‘proceedings’ that are in progress…
1) The “Arizona Forestry vs. ADOSH” proceeding ( that only results in a HEARING ).
2) The multiple ‘wrongful death’ lawsuits that COULD go to TRIAL..
3) The ‘Property Damage’ lawsuits ( with 160+ plaintiffs ) that also COULD go to TRIAL.
Gotcha. Thanks.
Fuels Reduction Work: I just want to make sure that this point does not get lost below.
As folks who work in the U.S. WFF world know, there are some governmental bodies in some regions of the U.S. that seem to do a good job (in light of their resources) with fuels reduction work during the wildland fire “off” season. They, in the off season, essentially do burning and fuels removal work to try to reduce the risk of a catastrophic fire in certain vulnerable areas.
My understanding is that the area where the YHF burned had not burned in roughly 40 years, and there had been only minimal mitigation work pursuant to various grants and such in the years leading up to the YHF. I would encourage those who live in a vulnerable area (which is what Yarnell/Glen Ilah were) to keep tabs on fuels reduction work in their area. Meaning, let’s learn from the YHF and get a bit more proactive about open areas that might merit some fuels reduction work in the off season. Rocksteady makes a stellar point below about NIMBY, but at least a few of my WFF friends have seen real success in their areas (in the U.S. – not Canada) once the surrounding communities are informed about the value of and the need for prescribed fire and fuels reduction work.
Just a thought.
Surely you have seen all the ‘evidence’ that the Yarnell Fire Department DID receive a significant grant ( even in 2012 ) to do exactly what you are ‘suggesting’… but Yarnell Fire Chief Koile ‘shut it down’ and the work was never done because he said there just wasn’t enough manpower and they could never (quote) “get it together” to do the work… regardless of how much money they had access to.
It’s all in the ADOSH investigation notes. They looked into all this.
Believe me… this is ALL going to be covered during the “Property Damage” lawsuits ( with 160+ plaintiffs ) when that puppy comes to trial.
So stay tuned.
Fuels Management/reduction takes on many forms beside Burning.
The problem as stated by Rocksteady is the private land owners.
They are not inclined to meet any City County or State law in many western States
so Fuels reduction generally takes place on Federal or some State Land and no Fines have been stated for non compliance.
All the methods are expensive and lack funding to accomplish. So its a great Idea with no support or very little even on Federal Lands.
Bob, that’s the issue, right? Either pay the money on the front end – by paying for incredibly expensive fuels work over the winter – or pay the money on the back end (by paying for an out-of-control wildland fire and the resulting lawsuits). I personally prefer the ex ante solution, but hindsight is 20-20.
Elizabeth,
The problem of forest fuels accumulating over the past 100 years due to a strict “put it out” fire management policy, as well as public hatred for prescribed burning (smoke), added to the expense of doing fuels management, plus the predictions of worse fire seasons coming is a world wide issue. It is not unique to Yarnell, Arizona or even the U.S. for that matter.
HOWEVER, no matter what the reasons for the fire behaviour experienced on June 30th on teh Yarnell Hill fire is not a valid defence for the terribly bad decision making made by people on this fire, that ultimately cost 19 people their lives.
You can blame a fuels build up, drought, weird wind event, lack of IA resources or whatever you wish, it still does not forgive the decision by WHOMEVER for the GMIHS crew to go where they did that day. Human error caused these deaths 100%. PERIOD. END STOP.
Rocksteady, I wasn’t trying to excuse or blame anything (just in case you thought otherwise). 🙂 That said, if, as you believe, the GM tragedy was the product of human error, then it seems to me that fuels mitigation becomes even more important, because, obviously, if 19 men can make whatever human error you are fingering, presumably others stand to do the same.
Elisabeth—Let us hope the HELL not.
Heavy fuels are a critical part of a fire fighters assessment of fire behavior. 99.9% of them pay close attention to the fuel they are in and do not take hikes out thru it as if it is of no consequence.
Another critical part that GM did not asses and evaluate, along with Weather, fire activity and the close proximity of the flaming front. to say nothing of walking into a Canyon.
Bob, many other men were even CLOSER to the flaming front and in unburned fuel at the exact same time that day! Of COURSE the exact same thing could happen again….
Of course there was human error.
A wise man once told me “Every fire tells a story and it never lies”..
Even though I am not from the area, not familiar with teh fuel type, just looking at the weather conditions that day (1oo+F, single digit RH, winds 30 to 50 MPH, chaparral fuel type, prolonged drought) I KNEW (without running REDApp or other modelling) that it was gonna be a HOLY SH!T DAY….
I find it hard to believe that experienced firefighters and overhead, on their own turf, in familiar fuel types, could not see the potential….
If that is not human error, I don’t know what is…
Really Elisabeth
“many other men were closer to the front in unburned fuel”
All the other resources assigned were on Fire Lines not out in the middle of a canyon in 3000 acres of unburned fuel.
They had escape routes, Safety zones and communications and in some areas Lookouts.
While they had close calls they all got out.
No thanks to the Overhead on the fire.
There is always a possibility that Human error could cause another entrapment.
Fire Fighters deal with these kind of Fuels all the time and they medicate the problem by the 10 and 18 and LCES.
I know your ignorance on the 10 and 18 so I will just move on from here.
Back to no reply to Elisabeth.
Elizabeth says
FEBRUARY 6, 2015 AT 9:44 AM
“That said, if, as you believe, the GM tragedy was the product of human error, then it seems to me that fuels mitigation becomes even more important, because, obviously, if 19 men can make whatever human error you are fingering, presumably others stand to do the same.”
Elizabeth~
I don’t know if you have BOTHERED to read most of the last month’s worth of our conversations about what happened regarding what appears to have been a pretty badly mis-managed Initial Attack on this fire.
It relates to what you are asking.
I see this whole thing as a set of concentric circles.
Circle One: Obviously, if Yarnell had taken more responsibility for mitigating their wildfire risk, including that around their homes, this fire wouldn’t have carried, relatively speaking, the probable highly disastrous risk it had. That’s why I wrote about Payson vs Sedona/Flagstaff.
I think that lack of having taken responsibility will be a factor in their homeowners’ lawsuit.
However,
Circle Two: If the Initial Attack on Saturday (and I’m not faulting not attacking the fire Friday night, which is kind of 50/50 to me) had been managed by the Agency that decided to OWN it, in a much more responsible way (see all we have written about that over the past month), it is likely this fire would never have escaped the Initial Attack, thus not causing the whole debacle that happened on Sunday.
Circle Three: As a number of us have written in various ways over the past YEAR, it is quite possible that, if Arizona Department of Forest had chosen, after Initial Attack Incident Commander Russ Shumate FINALLY admitted the fire had escaped Initial Attack and required a Type 2 Team. to assign Bea Day’s Type 2 Full Team instead of Roy Hall’s Type 2 Short Team (which he spent most of Sunday trying to reinforce with pieces of Bea Day’s team instead of actually fighting his fire), the fire would have been sufficiently resourced to have not had the massive HOLES in its resourcing, which may have prevented Granite Mountain to have fallen “under the radar” to the point that they ended up lost in the NOISE (as MANY other people almost were) as the fire reversed and headed toward Yarnell.
Circle Four. At approximately 12:30 PM on Sunday, Bravo 3, according to its ADOSH interview, realized that the fire was hugely likely to, given the likely afternoon thunderstorms coupled with the topography of the land, to reverse its direction and burn toward Yarnell that afternoon. Unfortunately, they didn’t bother to alert ANYBODY as to that other than Rance Marquez, who, then abandoned his responsibilities to Division Z and went elsewhere. So NONE of Bravo 3’s concerns were ever communicated to anybody who mattered. If that had not been the case, maybe things would have turned out differently.
Circle Five. Given that we still don’t know, over a year and a half later, WHY Granite Mountain decided to abandon their best-view-of-the-fire location in a LARGE safety zone (something that maybe Brendan McDonough has some perspective on) and descend into a chimney-canyon bowl full of highly flammable fuels without posting an effective LOOKOUT, it’s pretty apparent, still, that if they hadn’t done that, they would still be alive to this day and we wouldn’t be having this conversation.
Elizabeth~
I Agree.
Fuels Reduction is really important. However, as you wrote above, it takes more money than Yarnell was granted to actually do what often needs to be done. And Yarnell didn’t even bother to do what they could with what they were granted, much less get serious about spending some of their OWN resources to do it. And thus — the aftermath.
Which is why I wrote what I wrote down below:
“My daughter’s Ohio-based uncle is making a bid on a house in Payson, Arizona (partially since her father lives in Flagstaff).
I came across this article about how Payson, as a result of the Yarnell Hill Fire, began last year to attempt to make their community, via codes etc, conform to what is called “FireWise.” But because of how folks there resent any kind of “government-imposed” rules, yah know…….
Nothing has happened.
From the “Payson Roundup”
By Pete Aleshire
Friday, January 2, 2015
“Fire Building Codes Year In Review”
“In the 18 months since the Yarnell Hill Fire killed 19 firefighters trying to protect a woefully unprepared community, Payson and Gila County have taken few actions to avert a similar tragedy here.
Payson grappled with a fire department recommendation to adopt a Wildland-Urban Interface building code, but in the shadow of an election year, put off any action for at least 18 months.
The town did set up a committee to try to convince residents to voluntarily clear thickets and brush from their properties — but after one event, the unfunded committee has not undertaken many visible actions.”
http://www.paysonroundup.com/news/2015/jan/04/fire-building-codes-year-review/
Good Luck, Arizona!!!
Good Luck, Uncle Tom!”
There’s a complicated mix of things going on in the Southwest — specifically (as I look at it) New Mexico and Arizona. Because of mixed land ownership and land use.
Fundamentally, in my opinion, it really requires local communities to recognize the threat to their existence. And, then, to collectively decide to do something about that. Unfortunately, in Arizona especially (as witnessed regarding Payson above), and New Mexico also, there’s a strong libertarian streak that resists “collective” thinking. Which is required for calling for regulations such as fire-wise coding.
What I am looking at is how Native American communities in the Southwest are handling this challenge. They’re ahead of the curve. Partly because they have long used fire to maintain fire-evolved ecosystems, they don’t think like individualistic White People, and they don’t have to conform to either federal, state, or typical local assumptions or rules regarding their handling of their lands.
I could go on and on about this, but I won’t. Just saying if you’re interesting in this, there are lots of ways to use google to pursue it. And it’s well worth pursuing.
PS It was extremely interesting last summer when the Slide Fire hit Sedona AZ. Because of how the USFS Four Forest Project had been pursued, especially around Flagstaff and also around Sedona, doing a lot of fuels reduction (although not enough), and I also think a lot of pre-planning had occurred, when the fire was ignited, it was carefully managed to push it into fuel-managed areas, and thus to contain it and ultimately control it.
**
** WHY THE COURT DOCUMENTS FOR
** ‘ARIZONA FORESTRY VS. ADOSH’ ARE PUBLIC
This might be obvious to some… but not to others… so as the discussion of the online ‘Arizona Forestry vs. ADOSH’ court documents continues I thought I would just take to a moment to make it clear WHY we are able to see these lawyers ‘talking’ to the Industrial Commission of Arizona ( ICA ) Administrative Law Judge ( ALJ ) Michael A. Mosesso.
These are NOT some kind of ‘secret documents’ that can only be accidentally found with a ‘Google Search’., or something. That PUBLIC ‘Google Docs’ site where these ongoing court documents are being posted in almost real-time is the same site that ICA / ADOSH set up to hold all their PUBLIC ‘Yarnell Hill Investigation’ documents.
So WHY would the ICA be posting this ‘real-time’ update of legal filings and conversations with ALJ Judge Mossesso?
The short answer is… because it’s REQUIRED by Arizona Law… and they SAY so right there on the PUBLIC page where these documents are being made available to the PUBLIC.
Following the release of the original Yarnell ADOSH report, the website for the Industrial Commission of Arizona ( which oversees ADOSH ) was getting hit hard… so they created themselves a PUBLIC ‘Google Docs’ folder to take the heavy ‘hits’ away from their own Server.
They NAMED this PUBLIC ‘Google Docs’ folder… ‘yarnellhillinformation’ and here is that direct link to it…
https://sites.google.com/site/yarnellhillinformation/
They uploaded all the original ADOSH ‘Yarnell Hill Fire Inspection Documents’ to that PUBLIC ‘Google Docs’ folder.
When Arizona Forestry then ‘contested’ the ADOSH citations and started the formal ‘hearing’ process… that’s when the ‘Administrative Law Judge’ (ALJ) Division of ADOSH kicked in.
The ‘ALJ Hearing File’ that then started to be generated is required by Arizona Law to be a PUBLIC document.
So the Industrial Commission of Arizona ( ICA ) just added a NEW folder to their existing PUBLIC ‘Google Docs’ ‘Yarnell
The name of THAT folder was ‘ALJ Hearing File’.
They then updated their own HOME page for this ‘Google Docs’ ‘yarnellhillinformation’ folder explaining what the new ‘ALJ Hearing File’ was and WHY it was there… and they provided a direct ‘Jump Link’ to that new ‘ALJ Hearing Folder’ right there on the HOME page.
Underneath that new ‘ALJ Hearing Folder’ jumplink are all the orginal links to ALL of the original ‘ADOSH Inspection Narrative’ documents uploaded there way back when… which is why they created this ‘Google Docs’ site for themselves in the first place.
Here is the exact text from that ICA HOME page at ‘Google Docs’…
——————————————————————–
Under Arizona law, the hearing file for an Occupational Safety and Health
case is a PUBLIC RECORD.
The Administrative Law Judge Division’s hearing file is available for review. The hearing file contains notices and orders issued by the Presiding Administrative Law Judge and documents filed by the parties. Some items in the hearing file may be omitted or redacted to protect privacy interests.
To review the hearing file, click on the link below.
ALJ Hearing File ( Direct clickable link to Hearing File )
Other ( original ) clickable links…
* Yarnell Hill Fire Inspection Documents
ADOSH 12/4/13 Agenda Sheet Arizona State Forestry Division
Citation and Notification of Penalty – ASFD
Inspection Narrative – ASFD
Worksheets for Citations – ASFD
Supporting Photos and Maps – ASFD
Wildland Fire Associates Report
* Industrial Commission Press Release
12/04/13 Press Release
———————————————————————-
Next reply will have another link to the applicable Arizona LAW that REQUIRED this ICA ‘ALJ Hearing File’ to be a PUBLIC RECORD.
At the very TOP of the section in the actual “Arizona Attorney General’s Agency Handbook’ that pertains to PUBLIC RECORDS… it lists over 30 examples of what are to be considered PUBLIC RECORDS in the State of Arizona.
Right at the TOP of their own list… ( Example number 3 ) is the “Industrial Commission of Arizona” ( ADOSH ).
Chapter 6 of the Arizona Attorney General’s Agency Handbook…
PUBLIC RECORDS
https://www.azag.gov/sites/default/files/sites/all/docs/agency-handbook/ch06.pdf
————————————————————————
6.3 Types of Public Records. The following are examples of some of the types of documents that have been found to be “public records and other matters” and thus are available upon request to the public except for any portions of documents that may be protected from disclosure (discussed in Section 6.5.3 infra):
3. Official records of proceedings of state boards and commissions, such as the Arizona Board of Tax Appeals, Ariz. Att’y Gen. Op. I79-316, and the Industrial Commission, Industrial Comm’n v. Holohan, 97 Ariz. 122, 126, 397 P.2d 624, 627 (1964);
Schoeneweis, 223 Ariz. at 175-76 ¶ 23, 221 P.3d at 54-55. The “records of the Industrial Commission’s proceedings, orders and awards” are PUBLIC but “information which is not collected to serve as a memorial of an official transaction or for the dissemination of information is private . . .” Industrial Comm’n, 97 Ariz. at 126, 397 P.2d at 627. The public’s right to know generally outweighs the privacy concerns…
Relavant Arizona Statutes…
Labor – Industrial Commission, information sharing § 23-107, 23-105
—————————————————————————
One of the Arizona LAWS being listed above…
—————————————————————————
23-105. Industrial Commission of Arizona – Records
B. The commission offices shall be open for the transaction of business from eight o’clock a.m. until five o’clock p.m. each day from Monday through Friday, except on holidays. Sessions of the commission shall be PUBLIC and ALL proceedings of the commission shall be shown on its records, which shall be a PUBLIC RECORD.
—————————————————————————
The ‘exceptions’ mentioned above, as they relate to the ‘Industrial Commission of Arkansas’, really only fall into two small categories…
1) Any TRADE SECRETS than some business or an employer claims should be excluded from the documents during their interactions with ADOSH.
2) Any documents received from ‘out of state’ that might be specifically requested by the Non-Arizona entity or agency be held as ‘private documents’ according to the laws of the State where those documents are coming from.
That’s pretty much it.
All other ‘activities’ and ‘interactions’ involving the Arizona Industrial Commission ( and ADOSH ) are required to be a matter of PUBLIC RECORD.
Typo above… should have ( obviously ) been ‘Arizona’ and not ‘Arkansas’…
Should have been…
The ‘exceptions’ mentioned above, as they relate to the ‘Industrial Commission of Arizona’, really only fall into two small categories…
A bit brain-dead, all things considered, but COPY.
Thanks so much for continuing to unpack this.
I’ve been tweeting this, cc-ing @azcentral and @yvonnewingett, as well as others that cover #wildfire.
I really think the media needs to start covering this whole story.
Fuels Reduction: My understanding is that the area where the YHF struck had not burned for roughly 40 (or more) years. That means that there was a ton of fuel available to burn, burn hot, and fuel spotting (among other things). If I am understanding correctly, much of the land where the YHF was in the early stages was owned by either the state or the federal government, such that it was under the control of either the state of Arizona or the BLM.
So my question is this: The BLM has fuels-reduction programs (where folks go out and cut things or burn things during the off-season, to mitigate the risk of uncontrollable wildland fire), but does the state of Arizona have a similar program? If so, how do they determine where to do fuels mitigation work, and why wasn’t the YHF area on the list to address at some point during the past ten or so years?
While I considered weather to answer tis or not I will add a few statistics.
First a very small peace of BLM land burned near Peoples Valley.
The rest of the Fire %000 plus Ac. Private and 2500 plus State.
There was some funding to the Yarnell Fire department that they used to build Fire Breaks.
all on Private land thru Coop. That occurred some years ago.
All land around Yarnell is Private and based on Arizona legislature they do not mandate clearance or fines to private land owners.
The State land and its location made it quite a project to do fuels reduction on with little to no road access probably a very low priority compared to say the northern timber lands.
Brush fuels reduction is a totally different program than Timber stand understory reduction.
Mostly cost prohibitive based on the State land location.
Private land owners are not going to spend there money to reduce large sections of Brush fuel. Agreements between land owners could be a nightmare. Fuels reduction in towns could happen but it takes a city willing to pass laws and Fines to get property owners to comply. Again in Arizona and some other western States just not happening.
I do not know how much Arizona State Budgets for Fuels Reduction on their lands Yearly.
I doubt if it is any where near what the BLM and FS do.
Should have read 5000 plus Ac. Private . Not %000 Ac.
Bob, thanks for the reply. Just thinking out loud here, couldn’t they (presumably BLM) have used the two-tracks as holding lines to do burning, if they wanted to do fuels reduction during the winter?
To be clear, I am NOT looking to point fingers or blame – I am just thinking out loud about how to avoid future tragedies. Fuels reduction has been a wildland fire risk mitigation strategy since at least the 1970’s or 1980’s, and my impression is that the really good landowners (both private and public) try to hit very sensitive parcels (like those adjoining the WUI or in the WUI) at least once every five to seven years (and ideally more often). Having a huge area adjoining the WUI that has not burned in 40-ish years just seems like a big red flag. But I admittedly know very little about this topic.
Thanks for thinking these things through with me. You were in Idaho, right? Did your parks or forests or wherever you worked have an active fuels mitigation strategy under your leadership (in the 1980s, right?), or was that outside the scope of your work?
Elizabeth,
Fuels Management is my job. It is very difficult to pick priorities. I believe that most of the western states would qualify as needing a treatment, however with limited funds, all of it can not be done. In my location we have lots of suitable sites, but due to time and money constraints can only do what we can.
Another important factor is the Human Factor. I have identified areas that require treatment and have met strong opposition from the public. It is the old NIMBY (Not In My Back Yard mentatility)Do your fuels projects, but not behind my house, cause I walk my dog there, or whatever…
A lot of people are also very opposed to prescribed burning, not only from the assumed danger (there is no danger if done properly) and impact of smoke on sensitive respiratory systems. Its called avoidable smoke, as it does not need to be burned, as compared to wildfire smoke, which is avoidable.
It is easy to look back at the fire behaviour on this incident and say it “should have” been treated, however, its a moot point. It was not treated, and YES, it could have contributed to the spread and intensity of the fire, which in turn lead to the GMIHS demise.
I have decided to no longer answer any questions you pose on here.
I refuse to carry on any more conversations with you. Here or any where
else.
Was that aimed at me Bob? 😉
NO ELIZABETH you must have jumped in over me while I was typing………..
**
** RTS POST ON DECEMBER 11 WAS SPOT ON
I think it should be noted that “Robert the Second’s” post way back on December 11, 2014
has now been proven to be EXACTLY correct. So whoever RTS was hearing it from was obviously ‘dialed in’ to the situation as it was actually happening.
>> On December 11, 2014 at 3:38 pm, Robert the Second said…
>>
>> As of last week, Brendan McDonough has obtained a Criminal Attorney, and
>> he is working with the AZ State Attorney General. We may see something
>> about this by mid to late January, at the earliest.
Additional information from online PUBLIC documents.
These are the AZF and ADOSH attorneys notifying each OTHER ( and Judge Mosesso ) that Brendan just hired a new (criminal) attorney and that is why he can’t make the originally scheduled November 26, 2014 deposition.
Notice that all the DATES match what “Robert the Second” said, WHEN he said it.
From the “2014_11 Updated 12.01.14.pdf” in the PUBLIC ‘Google Docs’ folder…
Letter sent from Christopher Anderson ( ADOSH attorney ) to Judge
Michael A. Mosesso on November 25, 2014, just the day before McDonough’s
under-oath deposition was FIRST supposed to take place…
——————————————————————————–
The Industrial Commission of Arizona – Legal Division
P.O Box 19070, Phoenix, Arizona, 85005-9070
Andrew F. Wade, Chief Counsel
Phone: (602) 542-xxxx
Fax: (602) 542-xxxx
David Parker, Chairman
Susan Strickler, Vice Chair
Michael G. Sanders, Member
Joseph M. Hennelly, Jr., Member
Laura L. McGrory, Director
November 25, 2014
To: The Honorable Michael A. Mosesso
Re: ADOSH vs. ARIZONA STATE FORESTRY DIVISION
Inspection No: L3419-317242683
Dear Judge Mosesso:
Mr. Selden ( Attorney for Arizona Forestry ) has notified ADOSH that Mr. McDonough’s deposition will not be going forward tomorrow as he has employed an attorney who is unavailable for the deposition. I attach a copy of Mr. Selden’s email.
Thank you for your consideration in this matter.
Sincerely,
Christopher Anderson
Attorney for ADOSH
Enclosure
c: David Seden, Esq.
Joy Hernbrode, Esq.
Jon M. Paladini, Esq.
William Warren, ADOSH Director
EMAIL attachment:
From: Selden, David
Sent: Monday, November 24, 2014 5:08 PM
To: Christopher Anderson; Valli Goss
Cc: ‘Hernbrode, Joy’
Subject: ASFD adv. ADOSH; Brendan McDonough deposition
Chris and Valli,
Mr. McDonough has recently retained a private attorney. I spoke to him this afternoon. He communicated that he is not available for a deposition this week. Due to the attorney’s preparation for a lengthy trial in January, the attorney does not anticipate that he will be available for a deposition until the completion of the trial in mid February.
Dave.
David A. Selden / The Cavanaugh Law Firm / Responsive, Creative, Results
1850 North Central Avenue, Suite 2400 / Phoenix, Arizona 85004
direct: 602.322.xxxx / fax: 602.322.xxxx / mobile: 602.702.xxxx
web: w w w . cavanaghlaw . c o m
——————————————————————————————–
From the “2015_01 Updated 01.26.15.pdf” file in the PUBLIC ‘Google Docs’ folder
This is where Mr. David Shapiro is NAMED as Brendan’s ‘new criminal attorney’…
This is the latest document in the online ‘Google Docs’ folder and it contains the request from Arizona Forestry that Judge Mosesso issue a subpoena to Brendan McDonough to FORCE him to appear at the upcoming February 26, 2015 under-oath deposition… since Arizona Forestry hasn’t received proper notification from Brendan’s new criminal attorney David Shapiro that he and Brendan WILL be there at the deposition on February 26…
————————————————————————————-
Respondent ( Arizona Forestry ) requests that the Tribunal ( Judge Mosesso ) issue the subpoena and send it to the undersigned counsel for service upon Mr. McDonough.
A subpoena is necessary because, on information and belief, Mr. McDonoudh has engaged private counsel, David Shapiro (“Mr. Shapiro”), although Mr. Shapiro has not filed a Notice of Appearance on behalf of Mr. McDonough. The undersigned counsel has communicated several times with Mr. Shapiro and have notified him of the February 26, 2015 deposition date. He has not responded to our requests for confirmation of dates to depose Mr. McDonough, but has also not stated that February 26, 2015 is invalid. It should be noted that Mr. Shapiro is currently in a trial that is to last until mid-February and he previously requested that the deposition not be scheduled until after his trial.
—————————————————————————————-
WTKTT, I’m just going to call you “Fred,” because either you are him or you are a shill for him (aka Robert the Second, TTWARE, seymour, etc.).
For example, you state in the post to which I am responding that Fred aka RTS he got things “EXACTLY” right, yet your post itself shows that he didn’t.
And didn’t he and Bob Powers claim up and down months ago that Brendan had ALREADY been deposed, which we now know to be totally wrong?
Again, it is curious to me that you make repeated comments or posts sucking up to Fred aka RTS even when he is wrong. That is what his other alter-egos do, which is kind of funny (because it is equivalent to Fred stroking himself and saying “Fred/RTS, you are so right, so smart, such a good leader, etc.” The day I read SR stroking Fred for the kind of leader SR apparently believed Fred to be, I laughed right out loud and called one of Fred’s old squad bosses. Stuff like that is typical Fred – posting under different anonymous names in order to praise himself – according to the guys who have worked for Fred, like Mike and others.)
Ah,..yes, what looks familiar here??
Topic gets hot and heavy – check
Up pops the jack-in-the-box, waving around attempting to grab attention – check
An attempt to divert, dilute, or derail the current topic – check
The attempt to start any alternate discussion that would divert the current discussion, this time in regards to government prescribed burns which DON’T HAVE anything to do with ANYTHING currently being discussed. – check
Delusional, but ‘maybe intentional with a purpose’ rants about everyone posting here actually being one person. – check
This stuff used to really piss me off, but now it’s just funny and sad at the same time. It’s hard for me to believe that an attorney could be THAT delusional or paranoid, so the ONLY other option is that this is being done intentionally to stir the pot. The problem with THAT particular motivation, is that it’s being done in such an over-the-top manner, that most people see it for exactly what it is.
If by “most people” you mean Fred (aka TTWARE, Fire20+, seymour, etc.) and his shill Bob Powers, then you are likely correct. 🙂
OK now I am a Shill—Well for a fact I can personally say none of the above mentioned people are in any way shape or form– Other names RTS uses.
He has no other user names on here. That I can state with certainty as I talk to him regularly. So let us move on.
Are you stalking RTS on here to get back at him.
We now have the name of an ex squad boss who was probably Fired and is using you to get back at RTS.
Interesting since all the posts on your other blog were debunked by another Superintendent. Who confirmed your source was not factual
No more argument by me we move on from here.
Really? This again Elizabeth?
I’m with the rest of you on this, following the complicated investigation…and then this rubbish gets interjected and screws the flow. Watching/Reading from over the water – Your behavior..Elisabeth makes no sense.
Lets keep the conversation about the subject we’re all here to discuss.
Deliberate misquote::-
Elisabeth – If you have something stupid to say, please raise your hand and put it firmly over your mouth!.
And finally,………..the last trick out of the bag:
Personal attacks – check
Reply to Elizabeth post on February 5, 2015 at 6:53 am
>> Elizabeth said…
>>
>> It is curious to me that you make repeated comments or posts
>> sucking up to Fred aka RTS even when he is wrong. That is what
>> his other alter-egos do, which is kind of funny (because it is equivalent
>> to Fred stroking himself and saying “Fred/RTS, you are so right, so
>> smart, such a good leader, etc.” The day I read SR stroking Fred
>> for the kind of leader SR apparently believed Fred to be, I laughed
>> right out loud and called one of Fred’s old squad bosses. Stuff
>> like that is typical Fred – posting under different anonymous
>> names in order to praise himself – according to the guys who
>> have worked for Fred, like Mike and others.)
Madam, how like you this play?
The lady doth protest too much, methinks.
( William Shakespeare, Hamlet Act 3, scene 2, 222–230 )
Just giving CREDIT where CREDIT is due.
RTS ( and his sources ) were correct.
“EXPECTED” and “MAY” and words like that suggest that rumor-mongering is at issue. Supposition and conjecture.
For some one who knows or supposedly knows LAW you are calling official court documents
SUPPOSITION AND CONJECTURE.
Have you even read the 145 pages?
We are again wasting our words on some one who only wants to confuse and cause havic on this IM site.
Bob, read the documents in full. “May” and “expect” and other words of supposition are the words used in the court documents.
When a licensed attorney is telling a bona-fide Judge what a witness is EXPECTED to testify to… it is also EXPECTED that it isn’t based on just ‘rumor’, ‘supposition’ or ‘conjecture’.
They actually teach that in Law School ( as I’m sure you know ).
If you read the documents carefully… it’s pretty obvious that the attorneys for the State of Arizona seem to know more than they are saying about this NEW testimony that Brendan McDonough wants to supply.
The reason they couldn’t say more as far as ‘discovery’ goes is because it is/was City of Prescott John Paladini insisting that the FULL content of what Brendan WANTS to now testify to must only ‘come out’ in a DESPOSITION.
It is/was Paladini who is insisting on a DEPOSITION versus just an ‘interview’.
The documents also make it clear that Arizona Forestry is VERY afraid that some of this ‘actual content’ will be ‘leaked’ by some of the MULTIPLE people that McDonough has apparently already passed ‘what he know’ on to.
That’s why they were ( and are still ) in such a hurry to get this DEPOSITION done.
WTKTT I totally agree what else can be said.
Lets see what happens in March.
We know for a fact there was a argument as stated By Asst. SAIT investigator Mike Dudly. that was over the Radio and heard by ?????? the investigation turned that up.
As a past Hot Shot if McDonough had a radio which we know he did he was tuned to Crew Net from the time Frisby put him in the ATV until the crew went into shelters he was part of the crew there was no way that he would not monitor them and also Waite to be called to take the trucks to them. He herd what ever was said from 1604 to 1650 no doubt in my mind. I believe there were others that Herd the transmissions as well. We shall see.
There is still that statement from SAIT Co-Lead Mike Dudley that won’t go away.
Here is that full moment again from Mike Dudley’s speech before that roomful of Utah Firefighters on June 20, 2014.
This is the QUESTION he was being asked and the answer he gave…
—————————————————————————-
** At +1:04:10 into Dudley’s speech…
**
** Question from audience member: Do you know of any… uhm…
** dissension within the crew? Did they try and split off at any
** point prior to or during the deployment?
Mike Dudley: The question is… was there any decision… dissension within the crew and did any folks try to split off.
Ah… Blue Ridge made the comment.. a number of those folks… they said “you know what… when they left the lunch spot… they were ALL in lock-step with one other”… because that was a pretty cohesive crew. Uh.. they were very, very close to one another.
Ahm… so no… there was no indication… now… there’s some allegations that there was an argument between the Captain and the Superintendent about which way to go… from that saddle.
We can’t validate that.
Some people made that allegation.
————————————————————————-
‘Some people’… as in… MORE than ONE person.
Also keep in mind that he suddenly inserts this comment right after he was also recalling some things that members of ‘Blue Ridge’ had said during their SAIT interview.
Remember… only the SAIT (apparently) had full and free ‘interview’ access with the Blue Ridge Hotshots. When ADOSH tried to talk to ANY of them… the FEDS asked for Touhy requests… and then wouldn’t even honor those.
So could it be that at the moment he was recalling what ‘some’ of the Blue Ridge Hotshots had said about the ‘cohesiveness’ of the crew… that he also suddenly recalled a few of THEM also saying they heard ‘an argument’?
He also never said what the SAIT even tried to do to ‘validate’ these ‘allegations’ ( coming from more than one source ) about an ‘argument’.
He just said… “We can’t validate that”.
I think what this really means is that Mike Dudley never actually heard any of these ‘allegations’ of an ‘argument’ from Brendan McDonough himself. The ‘some people’ he was referring to MUST have been other people who had access to the GM intra-crew radio frequency… which is where this ‘argument’ would have taken place between Marsh and Steed.
That really does point to these THREE other members of Blue Ridge who were helping to move the GM vehicles right around the time this ‘argument’ would have actually taken place.
I think that if Brendan McDoough himself had told Dudley flat-out that HE heard this ‘argument’… or if Brendan was one of the ‘some people’ Dudley was referring to… Dudley would NOT have said “We can’t validate that”.
If McDonough himself had told him he heard it… that should/would have been all the ‘validation’ Dudley needed.
So let’s say that Brendan really does testify that this ‘argument’ between Marsh and Steed actually took place.
Then WHO would these other ‘some people’ be that Dudley was referring to… and could their ‘testimony’ not now be used to VERIFY whatever Brendan says he heard?
I think if Brendan really does VERIFY the ‘argument’… then these other ‘some people’ should be called back for additional ‘depositions’ to find out EXACTLY what THEY originally said they heard… and then it can finally be compared to what Brendan says he heard.
Hopefully this ‘argument’ really WAS captured in a VIDEO… and THAT can be used to verify any new testimony from Brendan… but in lieu ( or in addition to that )… there are still these other ‘some people’… and SAIT Co-Lead Mike Dudley STILL knows WHO they are.
WTKTT said: “When a licensed attorney is telling a bona-fide Judge what a witness is EXPECTED to testify to… it is also EXPECTED that it isn’t based on just ‘rumor’, ‘supposition’ or ‘conjecture’.”
You are kidding, right? Supposition or conjecture can sometimes be *all* that a lawyer has to go on in anticipating what a potential deponent might say!
( VERY ) Heavy sigh.
Followup…
From Webster’s Online Dictionary…
————————————————————-
sigh – sī/
verb or noun
sigh; 3rd person present: sighs; past tense: sighed; past participle: sighed; gerund or present participle: sighing
To emit a long, deep, audible breath expressing sadness, relief, tiredness, or any combination of the above.
————————————————————–
Reply to Elizabeth post on February 4, 2015 at 9:03 am
>> Elizabeth said…
>>
>> It is a rumor (and apparently a completely untrue rumor) to state that Brendan
>> told his lawyers or others close to him that Brendan has some big information
>> regarding the last minutes that Brendan now wants to get off his chest.
From the following PUBLIC online document… 2014_11 Updated 12.01.14.pdf
Direct link to this 145 page document in that PUBLIC ‘Google Docs’ folder…
https://docs.google.com/file/d/0B6N47Z5CNR-CZjdhelNfeWVFb3c/edit?pli=1
Respondent ( Arizona Forestry ) has received credible information from reliable sources, including a Prescott Official in the PRESENCE of the Prescott City Attorney, that Mr. McDonough heard radio transmissions between crew members about their tragic actions in leaving the safety of “the black” and heading towards the location at which they perished.
Mr. Selden ( Attorney for Arizona Forestry ) specifically told Mr. Andersen and Ms. Goss ( Attorneys for ADOSH ) that Mr. McDonough has communicated that he heard the radio transmissions of the GMIHC crew DURING the time period that led UP TO their deaths.
Mr. McDonough has communicated, actually confided, to others that he wants to relieve himself of the burden of carrying information about the last radio transmissions among the GMIHC members.
>> Elizabeth also said…
>>
>> Brendan did not hear anything over the radios in the last twenty or thirty minutes
From the same online document…
What is ADDITIONAL information, however, is that after his departure ( from his lookout position ), Mr. McDonough heard on his radio, which was tuned to the GMIHC crew frequency, radio communications DURING the time period leading UP TO the deaths of his 19 fellow GMIHC members.
Mr. McDonough’s knowledge of the last communications among the GMIHC crew is likely to become public. He has told several people about what he heard on the crew’s radio frequency. This information will certainly be the subject of news media interest.
** In the same PUBLIC document…
**
** From Arizona State Forestry Division Attorney David A. Selden’s (signed) letter
** sent to Judge Michael A. Mosesso detailing the phone conversation(s) he had with
** ADOSH Attorneys Chris Anderson and Valli Goss on October 29, 2014, immediately
** after learning that Brendan McDonough has NEW information he wants to supply…
The NEW development about which I wanted to speak with them was that we had reliable information that the sole survivor among the Granite Mountain Interagency Hot Shot Crew ( “GMIHC” ), Mr. Brendan McDonough, possesses important information that was not communicated during ADOSH’s interviews of him during its investigation.
(a) Mr. McDonough WANTS to testify about the ADDITIONAL information, and is available to do so soon.
(b) The Prescott City Attorney was coordinating communications with Mr. McDonough and was cooperative about schedule a deposition, but Mr. McDonough AND the Prescott City Attorney wanted to have Mr. McDonough’s information communicated through a DEPOSITION, and NOT through a statement or witness interview.
Mr. Anderson responded to the above information by asking me about NATURE of the additional information that Mr. McDonough possesses.
I replied by telling Mr. Anderson and Ms. Goss that reliable people had communicated to the Attorney General’s Office and me that Mr. McDonough heard radio transmissions on the GMIHC radio frequency during the time period IMMEDIATELY BEFORE the fatalities of the 19 GMIHC members.
Those radio transmissions INCLUDED discussions between the GMIHC Division Superintendent and the GMIHC Captain about the movement of the GMIHC members to the location at which the fire overtook them and they perished.
I added that it was my understanding that Mr. McDonough had confided in MULTIPLE PEOPLE about the contents of the radio communications by the GMIHC crew during the period leading UP TO their fatalities, and that I expected that the additional information that he possesses would become PUBLICLY KNOWN before long.
Mr. McDonough is believed to have information relating to the decision made by GMIHC to move from the “black”, i.e. the large, burned-out area where GMIHC was working and which was the primary safety zone for GMIHC, to the box canyon that ultimately became their deployment site.
It is EXPECTED that Mr. McDonough will testify as to events that took place involving GMIHC on the afternoon of June 30, 2013, specifically DURING the timeframe that GMIHC moved from the “black” toward Helms Ranch, and MOMENTS PRIOR to GMIHC’s deployment.
It is ALSO EXPECTED that Mr. McDonough will testify as to the whereabouts of Eric Marsh, Jesse Steed, and the other crewmembers of GMIHC on the afternoon of June 30, 2013, as well as radio communications between the later Eric Marsh, the GMIHC Superintendent, and the late Jesse Steed, GMIHC Crew Chief, DURING the MOVE from the “black” and MOMENTS BEFORE deployment.
Brendan has NOT told folks (who then told the lawyers) that he has information that he wants to get off his chest, presumably because Brendan does NOT have “smoking gun” information that he wants to get off his chest. And presumably that is why the lawyers used the word “may” in their filing – they know that they are going on a fishing expedition with poor Brendan!!
More candidly: It is a rumor (and apparently a completely untrue rumor) to state that Brendan told his lawyers or others close to him that Brendan has some big information regarding the last minutes that Brendan now wants to get off his chest. (Just like it was an untrue rumor for Bob and Fred to say months ago that Brendan had already been deposed…. Now you all finally see that he had not been deposed.)
I stand by what was indicated to me by one of my sources (who is someone who is close to Brendan):
Brendan tried hard to be responsive and articulate what he knew when he was interviewed by ADOSH and the SAIT. Brendan did not try to hide material facts. For example: Brendan did not hear anything over the radios in the last twenty or thirty minutes that somehow suggests that someone forced GM into ending up where they were when they died.
OK so lets take a breath here. First none of us were privy to the letters between Lawyers on the November Disposition and the Fact that it was or did not happen.
McDonough’s Lawyers took information from McDonough and he wanted to give more testimony that had not been released as indicated in the 145 page’s of letters and legal papers.
So fact Brenden got a New Lawyer on a recommendation that he needed to have one if he was releasing new information, Brenden then reveled the information to his Lawyer that had not been released by him. His Lawyer requested a deposition to get all of his testimony into State record. The Deposition in November did not occur. The paper work indicates there is new information that has not been released by Brenden McDonough. If there is no new testimony why go thru all of the deposition and the attempt to not allow it?
I would suggest Elisabeth that if you are not privy to the Lawyers in this case You have no further clue than we do as to the specifics being with held by McDonough.
Your sources as always have had no validity as WTKTT has proven with all the questions he has asked you that you have never answered.
I will also state that my contact is as good or maybe more reliable than yours. That is if you really have one? Your sources have been wrong before if they even exist.
We shall see.
If YOUR ‘report’ ( based on mysterious unnamed sources ) is accurate… and Brendan is just innocently ‘caught in the middle’ of some kind of ‘much ado about nothing’… then the rumors are now coming from Prescott City officials themselves.
The online documents have the lawyers for Arizona Forestry specifically telling Judge Mosesso that they learned of this NEW critical testimony that Brendan only now wants to supply from a (quote) “Prescott City Official in the presence of the Prescott City Attorney”
This under-oath deposition of Brendan is GOING to happen… and if Judge Mosesso grants Arizona Forestry the subpoena they requested 8 days ago for Brendan McDonough… then it is GOING to happen on February 26… just before Arizona Forestry walks into that first ‘Global Mediation’ session with all the ‘wrongful death’ plaintiffs on March 2, 2015.
The contents of that deposition will not be immediately available… but there is no doubt that content WILL become ‘public information’ at some point.
It is very telling that the lawyers state Brendan is the only person alive who knows why the crew left the black. He heard it all. It must be quite damning information he has with all this brouhaha.
Reply to John post on February 4, 2015 at 7:26 am
>> John said…
>>
>> It is very telling that the lawyers state Brendan is the only person alive
>> who knows why the crew left the black.
Well… actually… they DID use the word *MAY* in there.
They actually say he “MAY be the only person alive who heard these transmissions”.
So they DO seem to at least be acknowledging the possibility that at least the other THREE Blue Ridge Hotshots who were helping to move all FOUR of the GM vehicles *MAY* have heard some/all of the same critical radio conversations on the GM intra-crew channel. I think we have already established here that it is a ‘given’ that all the onboard radios in the GM vehicles would have had the GM intra-crew channel punched in and ALSO set as the ‘priority’ channel in each of those vehicles. That’s the channel they would all be using to communicate from vehicle to vehicle as they are driving along.
We have also established here that the TIMING is such that it is VERY likely many of these ‘other’ conversations did, in fact, take place WHILE the vehicles were all being moved.
What the attorneys are NOT telling Judge Mosesso, in their filings aimed at his ears, is that it is probably just as important to get depositions from all THREE of these other Blue Ridge Hotshots about all this as it is to get McDonough’s.
And here is WHY.
Even if Brendan McDonough puts his hand on a very large stack of Bibles… there are going to be some who will question the veracity of ANYTHING he has to say now.
Who is to say Brendan won’t be still trying to ‘edit’ the information and ONLY supply a PART of what he knows… just to ‘unburden’ himself… but still not tell “the WHOLE story”.
At this point… “Investigations 101” says that ANYONE who might have even also possibly heard these now-known-to-exist ‘other’ radio communications should be DEPOSED ( under-oath )… and in a way where none of the people being DEPOSED have had access to the depositions of the other witnesses.
Then ( and only then ) is it possible to COMPARE the testimonies.
In other words… TRUST… but still VERIFY.
>> John also said…
>>
>> He heard it all.
Apparently so… but see above.
Can we really TRUST whatever McDonough says at this point?
If he had this ‘agenda’ before… then does he have another ‘agenda’ of his own now?
>> John also said…
>>
>> It must be quite damning information he has with all this brouhaha.
I think ‘damning’ is a pretty strong word… and not really appropriate.
No one is going to be ‘damned’ by ANYTHING Brendan McDonough has to say now.
All that is going to happen here is that we might finally learn one of ( if not THE ) most important ‘pieces of the puzzle’ with regards to what really happened on June 30, 2013.
The information Brendan has ( and has ALWAYS had ) also represents the key to the most important “Lessons Learned” that might help save other firefighters lives in the future.
And that has always been the ‘prime directive’ here.
To discover as best as possible how, and WHY this tragedy really happened and to implement any/all rules/procedures to make sure ( as much as possible ) that it never happens again.
If you missed any of “The Big Burn” tonight you can watch it archived/streaming here:
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/films/burn/player/
**
** WHAT MCDONOUGH REALLY KNOWS
It’s pretty obvious now. McDonough knows WHY they left the black, and that he has ALWAYS known… even while many investigators were talking to him and trying to discover the same thing.
He knows WHO was really making that decision… and WHO was trying to convince WHO
that they should make this risky move at that time.
Just in case any of the PUBLIC documents about all this suddenly EVAPORATE or otherwise disappear… I thought I would reproduce some of the more critical text from at least one of them.
I’ve also included some SIDENOTES below as the text goes along just to point out some
things that are NOT mentioned in the legal documents themselves.
From the following PUBLIC online document…
2014_11 Updated 12.01.14.pdf
Direct link to this 145 page document in that PUBLIC ‘Google Docs’ folder…
https://docs.google.com/file/d/0B6N47Z5CNR-CZjdhelNfeWVFb3c/edit?pli=1
This document contains Arizona Forestry’s ‘response’ to ADOSH’s ‘Reply and Objection’ to the originally scheduled November 26, 2014 deposition session’ with Brendan McDonough.
ADOSH was NOT trying to ‘shut down’ the Brendan McDonough deposition.
It simply became an argument about the TIMING of it.
Arizona Forestry wanted it to happen ASAP… on November 26, 2014… but ADOSH said they would prefer if it happened AFTER December 15, 2014… which was the deadline for them receiving all the other ‘written depositions’ from Arizona Forestry.
From the document…
( Remember… these are the attorneys for Arizona Forestry ‘speaking’ directly to Judge Michael J. Mosesso here )…
————————————————————————————
Mr. McDonough has communicated, and confided would be an apt term for
those communications, that he now wants to get off his chest the burden of
additional information that was not elicited during his previous interviews
about the Yarnell Hill Fire.
————————————————————————————-
SIDENOTE: The lawyers for AZF are trying to make Judge Mosesso believe
here that Brendan McDonough was NEVER asked by ANY investigators
( SAIT or ADOSH ) if he knew WHY Marsh/Steed/crew had decided to leave
the safe black or whether he heard any GM intra-crew radio traffic after
he left his deployment location. That is NOT the case.
————————————————————————————-.
Mr. Selden ( attorney for Arizona Forestry ) specifically told Mr. Andersen
and Ms. Goss ( Attorneys for ADOSH ) that Mr. McDonough has communicated
that he heard the radio transmissions of the GMIHC crew during the time
period that led up to their deaths.
Section III. MR. MCDONOUGH POSSESS RELEVANT INFORMATION THAT
SHOULD BE PART OF THE RECORD OF THIS CASE
As the designated lookout for the GMIHC crew, Mr. McDonough was in radio
communication with the crew. The interviews in this case conducted by ADOSH
already confirm that he discussed with his superior that the fire had reached the
designated “trigger point” for him to evacuate his lookout location, that his
superior’s observed the fire’s advance to his trigger point, and that his superiors
were aware of his departure, as planned.
What is ADDITIONAL information, however, is that after his departure,
Mr. McDonough heard on his radio, which was tuned to the GMIHC crew frequency,
radio communications during the time period leading up to the deaths of his 19
fellow GMIHC members.
That information could be very important because a critical issue in this case is
why GMIHC left the safety zone of thousands of acres of thoroughly burned area
adjacent to where they had been working, referred to as “the black”, and walked
through unburned, dry chaparra, in a boulder-strewn rough terrain, down a box
canyon, towards a tiny island of a safety zone known as the Helms Ranch, on the
outskirts of Yarnell and in the direction to which the fire was rapidly advancing.
…
ADOSH has had two lengthy opportunities to obtain the information now available
from Mr. McDonough. Respondent ( AZF ) deserves the opportunity to take the
deposition needed at this time.
Information about the radio communications among the GMIHC crew during the
time leading up to the tragic loss of the 19 crew members is not included in
ADOSH’s transcripts of its recorded interview of Mr. McDonough.
Respondent ( AZF ) has received credible information from reliable sources,
including a Prescott official in the presence of the Prescott City Attorney, that
Mr. McDonough heard radio transmissions between crew members about their
tragic actions in leaving the safety of “the black” and heading towards the location
at which they perished.
Mr. McDonough may be the only person alive who heard those communications.
In view of this additional information, his deposition testimony should be obtained
on November 26, 2014.
—————————————————————————————-
SIDENOTE: So in this attempt to FORCE the original deposition to take place
on November 26, 2014 ( even though ADOSH said they would prefer if it happened
after December 15 when they would finally have all the other ‘written depositions’
from other witnesses ) lawyers for Arizona Forestry are trying to make it sound like
it was ADOSH’s FAULT that this information never came in out their two recorded
interviews with McDonough. No mention at all of McDonough having had the
opportunity during BOTH of his ADOSH interviews to report this information which
was OBVIOUSLY relevant to the investigation(s), but he was pursuing his own agenda
at that time and CHOSE ( himself ) not to do so.
ALSO NOTE: The Arizona Forestry attorneys are forgetting something here.
They say “Mr. McDonough MAY be the only person alive who heard those
communications”. They are forgetting that if it is now a FACT that there WERE
these very important ‘additional conversations’ taking place over the GM
intra-crew frequency… that there are at least THREE other people that most
likely heard some ( or all ) of them as well. That would be the THREE Blue Ridge
Hotshots who were also moving the Granite Mountain vehicles during this same
timeframe that Brendan now says he heard these ‘additional’ communications.
No mention of this from the AZF attorneys… or any suggestion that it is now as
important as it has ever been to find out EVERYTHING those THREE Blue Ridge
Hotshots might also have heard that day while moving the GM vehicles.
Back to the legal document…
—————————————————————————————-
Mr. McDonough has communicated, actually confided, to others that he wants
to relieve himself of the burden of carrying information about the last radio
transmissions among the GMIHC members.
After all that he has been through, ADOSH should not be allowed to drag out
the process for him still longer when he wants to get this aspect of his burden
off his chest by sharing the information he has on this subject.
Respondent ( AZF ) obviously will not do anything to publicize the deposition
testimony, but when the subject does become more widely known, there should
be a deposition transcript available for people to refer to as an authoritative
source about Mr. McDonough’s version of events.
—————————————————————————————-
SIDENOTE: So there is Arizona Forestry expressing its ‘concern’ that since
Brendan has obviously already been talking to ‘others’ about what he knows,
that this might hit the MEDIA before a FULL accounting has been obtained
from him. They are using that for a REASON why they feel this deposition
should take place ASAP… even despite ADOSH just wanting a little more TIME
to fully prepare for the cross-examination part of the deposition.
Back to the legal document…
—————————————————————————————-
ADOSH’s reason for attempting to block the deposition of Mr. McDonough at
this time is that it prefers to take the deposition later, after written discovery
responses have been served. Respondent ( AZF ) accomodated this purported
concern by ADOSH by inquiring of the Prescott City Attorney whether Mr.
McDonough would agree to be subject to a second deposition later.
The Prescott City Attorney ( John Paladini ) communicated to Respondent ( AZF )
that Mr. McDonough would indeed be willing to be deposed on November 26,
2014, and again at a later time. Respondent’s counsel communicated to ADOSH
that he had received that reassurance from the Prescott City Attorney.
—————————————————————————————-
SIDENOTE: So now we hear the AZF attorneys simply trying to tell Judge
Mosesso that ADOSH has no right to be worried that the November 26 deposition
would be a ‘one shot deal’ and that without even yet having the other ‘written
depositions’ from other witnesses they would not be fully prepared for the
McDonough cross-examination. They are saying that THEY contacted Prescott
City Attorney ( Paladini ) and simply got some kind of VERBAL promise that
McDonough would consent to a ‘follow-up’ ( under oath ) interview if any
new questions arose that, perhaps, only McDonough could still answer.
We also now see proof that City of Prescott attorney(s) have always been
directly involved in this process and still seem to feel they have the right
to control WHO their former employee ( McDonough ) talks to, about WHAT
and WHEN.
ADOSH simply doesn’t trust McDonough ( OR the AZF attorneys OR the City
of Prescott attorneys ) at this point.
They want to be SURE they have received all the other (sworn) written
depositions from other witnesses BEFORE they get into the room again ( for
the THIRD time ) with McDonough so they can be SURE they have all the
right ‘questions’ assembled this time.
ADOSH was only being given some kind of ‘verbal’ promise from both McDonough
and Prescott City Attorney Paladini that Brendan would ‘consent’ to a SECOND
interview ( and followup questions ) in case something else comes up AFTER
McDonough’s first deposition which requires McDonough to answer more questions.
ADOSH was NOT trusting just that ‘verbal’ promise.
They seemed to think it wasn’t even worth the paper it was printed
on ( which it wasn’t even printed on… just a VERBAL promise ).
They just want to be SURE they know everything they can from all the other witnesses
about what went on that afternoon BEFORE they get into the room again for what
COULD be their only chance to finally get ALL the right questions answered by McDonough.
McDonough played ‘games’ with them TWICE before while being interviewed so they
just want to be sure they are fully prepared before they get into the room with him
for a THIRD time.
The document actually goes right on and ADDRESSES this obvious ‘lack of trust’ of
McDonough ( and the attorneys themselves ) on ADOSH’s part.
They, themselves, ( the AZF attorneys ) use the phrase ‘double-cross tactic’……
—————————————————————————————-
This Tribunal ( Judge ) has within its authority the ability to issue a subpoena for
Mr. McDonough to be deposed a second time, if necessary. Respondent’s ( AZF’s )
counsel has communicated with the Prescott City Attorney and has an agreement
to enable a second deposition, if necessary. Respondent ( AZF ) will not participate
in engaging in any double-cross tactic of opposing a second deposition therefore
making ADOSH’s concerns unfounded. Even if Respondent ( AZF ) changed its
position of allowing a second deposition, should one be necessary, The Tribunal
( Judge ) could issue a subpoena for a second deposition.
—————————————————————————————-
SIDENOTE: Yea right… and if the ‘double-cross’ DOES take place… then depending
on the reams of legal shit that could fly back and forth once again… the ‘Tribunal’
( Judge Mosesso ) could also side with AZF and/or the City of Prescott that second
time around and DENY ADOSH’s request for that subpoena for that second ‘re-interview’
with McDonough. So there was still ‘risk’ there on ADOSH’s part just taking the
AZF ( and City of Prescott attorney’s ) ‘word for it’ that a followup interview would
be a ‘no brainer’.
ADOSH doesn’t trust McDonough, Arizona Forestry, The City of Prescott, or Paladini.
They want to get this THIRD interview with McDonough right the FIRST time… and not
have to potentially play ‘hardball’ for a FOURTH time just to get that second interview
This is even CONFIRMED in the document itself…
From Mr. Selden’s sworn testimony about the phone call he had with the ADOSH Attorneys…
—————————————————————————————-
15. Mr. Andersen replied that ADOSH wanted the ( McDonough ) deposition
to occur AFTER it had received the written discovery ( from AZF, due
December 15, 2014 ) was exchanged because ADOSH would be better
prepared for the deposition after it had received the written discovery responses.
Mr. Anderson added that if the deposition occurred before the written discovery,
there could be information in the written discovery about which ADOSH would
want to depose Mr. McDonough, but would not have that opportunity if the
deposition occurred prior to the exchange.
—————————————————————————————-
SIDENOTE: Brendan had EVERY opportunity to ‘unburden’ himself during either
one, or BOTH of his ADOSH interviews. He was consciously choosing to NOT
share everything he knew during BOTH of those interviews even though he
KNEW the information he had was VERY important to those investigators.
Everybody ( ADOSH included ) knows this to be a fact now… and so before
they get into the room with McDonough again for, perhaps, another round
of “Ask me the right questions and I might give you the right answers”… ADOSH
just wants every opportunity here to make SURE they have a list of “all the right
questions’ to ask McDonough BEFORE the under-oath deposition takes place.
The irony here is that all this ‘legal wrangling’ about Arizona Forestry wanting to FORCE
McDonough’s depostion to take place ASAP ( on November 26, 2014 ) became moot
when the day BEFORE the scheduled deposition… it was Brendan McDonough himself
who ‘shut it down’.
Just 24 hours shy of the scheduled interview… McDonough ‘informed’ everyone that he
had obtained a new ‘criminal’ attorney ( DAvid Shapiro of Prescott )… and Mr. Shapiro
was simply ‘busy’ with other things and couldn’t make the scheduled November 26
deposition.
Now it was McDonough ( and Shapiro ) ‘driving the bus’.
Shapiro said he’d be busy with some other trial until mid-February of 2015… so all of Arizona Forestry’s concerns about this getting done ASAP had to be ‘put off’.
ADOSH just wanted more TIME here… and didn’t want to walk into that November 26, 2014 deposition and cross-examination without having seen all the other ‘written depositions’ from other witnesses first.
So after all the ‘legal rodeo’ concerning November 26… ADOSH ( apparently ) won that game ( thanks to McDonough himself deciding to change attorneys ) and ADOSH got the TIME they wanted to better prepare for this upcoming Brendan McDonough depostion and cross-examination.
About the only way I can really ‘sum all this up’ is to say the same thing I have
said a number of times before…
“Oh what a tangled web we weave… when first we practice to deceive”.
Also remember to get to the Federal Employees they will have to go thru the Federal Lawyers
so you could see a bunch more Paper legal maneuvering before any of the BR crewman reach court, or this Tribunal. McDonough is no longer an Employee of the City and has his own Lawyer not sure the City Lawyers Have any control over him at this point.
Touhy requests were designed for EXACTLY these kinds of circumstances… where Federal employees may possess information that is critical to a non-federal level investigation or civil action.
If the lawyers decide the under-oath depositions of any/all Blue Ridge Hotshots that were there are critical in this matter and the file Touhy requests… it’s going to hard for the Feds to continue to deny access to Blue Ridge.
NOTE: ADOSH filed Touhy requests previously… but circumstances are now different.
The best thing to come out of this legal skirmish, is that, even though it all became moot at the last minute, it provided us with a ‘window’ into the expected testimony of Brendan, and that, ‘apparently’, as many of us have suspected, he heard all of the radio transmissions, which he now wants to reveal.
This information, which tends to back-up the information provided by the sources that Bob and RTS mentioned previously, WOULD NOT have become public at this time, had it not been for this ADOSH/ADOF fight over the deposition timing. In fact, even after any deposition had been taken, information regarding any subject matter discussed may not have become public for months, or longer. As I mentioned in a response to a Bob made down below, while we still don’t have these facts attested to yet, we do now have more smoking guns.
WTKTT:
Your description of the legal wrangling seems to make a lot of sense, and while none of us can know the real motivations at play, I’ll go with it for now.
Where you and I don’t see eye to eye, is regarding the possible motivations of Brendan. and your continual alluding to the possibility that he was acting in an unscrupulous manner by withholding information.
I am seeing Brendan through a different lens.
Here was a young man, while old enough to vote and drink, who was due to circumstances, thrown into a situation that made him a strong candidate for PTSD. This is an illness that can take even a tough, old man, and turn him into a scared little boy.
When it all happened, I’m sure he was shocked, stunned, and scared. Perhaps enough so, that he couldn’t think, or know what to do, or say. The first coherent thing he might have thought of to do, was protect his ‘band of brothers’ and their families. Certainly understandable to me.
Then, along came the ‘advisors’, perhaps some from the legal world, perhaps some co-workers or friends, advising him the best thing to do was clam-up like everybody else. Some of these ‘advisors’ may have not been acting in Brendan’s best interest, but rather their own self-preservation, or perhaps even institutional preservation. Someone in his shoes, who MAY have PTSD, would likely be very malleable to these types of external suggestions and pressure.
As time passed, along with the truth eating at him, Brendan may have just had motivations to ‘do the right thing’. At that point, he had to figure out how undo that which he had been a participant in. Which may be the point in time where we are at today.
Yes, this is all just my speculation. Is it likely that this could be the way it went down. Yes, again. But this is the lens I see Brendan through until proven otherwise. I will never hold anything against him for his previous lack of providing information, if he comes forward with it now.
Just think about HOW MANY people that participants who have commented on this site said need to be re-interviewed, because of the shitty job both the SAIT and ADOSH did with a lot of their questioning.
There’s certainly a lot of blame to go around for the apparently sparse questioning and information gathering during both of those investigations, but for the reasons I mentioned up-above, I think Brendan should be given more lee-way than anyone else, and for lack of a better description, be ‘pardoned’ for his actions up until now.
I really agree with you on your take on Brendan. There was no way he was “mature” enough to handle the tsunami overtaking him. My heart really goes out to him.
ARE WE FINALLY GETTING TO THE BATTLE FOR THE TRUTH?
On Feb 2, at 9:07pm, Marti posted this link to the ADOSH Yarnell Hill hearing file:
https://sites.google.com/site/yarnellhillinformation/home/yarnellhillaljhearingfile
Go down the page to the file: 2014-11 Updated 12 01 14 PDF which is 145 pages.
The attorneys for the two sides expend 145 pages of documents arguing why, or why not, Brendan should delay his deposition which was scheduled for Nov. 26th.
After reading down through the pages a ways, you will come across what information the attorneys expect Brendan to provide during his deposition.
You should read it for yourself, realizing that while the attorneys are describing potential testimony, it is NOT something that Brendan has yet provided to anyone under oath, but DOES seemingly describe that Brendan has told multiple people that he heard ALL of the radio conversations up until the time of deployment, including various conversations about the move.
According to the description provided by one of the attorneys, it’s something “Brendan wants to get off his chest”
As I said, read it for yourself. It’s a public document. At 145 pages, it’s long, and much of it is just legal back and forth, but it appears that the truth is REALLY out there as many of us have suspected, and it could be VERY CLOSE to seeing the light of day.
And why would there be 145 pages of argument on whether to delay Brendan’s deposition?
Well, it appears to my non-legal-expert mind, that based upon the arguments presented, ADOSH is pushing for a delay, believing that this new information may hurt their case.
(of course, this is ALL open for interpretation).
See another post down below. That’s not what I am getting from the documents.
It really seems to be simple.
Yes… there was all this ‘lawyer rodeo’ wrangling going on about WHEN the ‘under oath’ deposition and cross-examination of McDonough was going to happen… but it was all for pretty specific reasons.
1) Arizona Forestry wanted it to happen AS SOON AS POSSIBLE once they learned that McDonough was now itching to ‘get this all off his chest’. AZF was most concerned that this would all hit the media BEFORE there was a official ‘deposition’ to refer to. And now… Arizona Forestry feels they MUST have this done BEFORE they have to walk into the room with the ‘wrongful death’ plaintiffs for that first ‘Global Mediation’ meeting on March 2 and 3, 2015. That’s why they just asked for the SUBPOENA to FORCE this all to happen BEFORE they have to walk into that ‘Global Mediation’ stuff.
2) ADOSH said “Slow down… sparky”. ADOSH just wants to be be sure and get this RIGHT this time. McDonough has already played his “Ask me the right question and I might give you the right answer” game with them TWICE before… so this time they want to be as prepared as possible. They simply want to be sure they have ALL of the other ‘written depositions’ from ALL of the other witnesses before they get into the room with this mysterious Brendan McDonough again. They COULD subpoena for a ‘follow up’ under-oath deposition… but they don’t WANT to do that. ADOSH wants to be fully prepared and get it RIGHT this time… once and for all.
In my follow-up above, I alluded to the fact that the reason ADOSH may want to delay the deposition is that it could hurt their case.
Think about that for a minute.
ADOSH are the one’s who are kicking and screaming to delay the testimony of this new, important information.
While, as I alluded to above, this new information MAY hurt their case, I think I have to agree with one of the opposing attorneys who says one of the main reasons ADOSH wants to delay this new information from coming forth, is that it will be a HUGE embarrassment to them and their investigatory process. A likely truth, no doubt.
JUST A THOUGHT:
Many of us on this site have had extensive comments on what Brendan should, or could have done, on June 30th, 2013. Also, along those same lines, lots of comments on what Brendan should, or could do, from this point forward. It appears for whatever reasons, Brendan is trying to do the right thing IF they’ll let him. We’ve already said all there is to say about shoulda, coulda, and perhaps we should all dial it back bit towards him here for a while, and give him some breathing room, as he attempts to do the right thing. Just a thought.
Reply to The Truth Will Always Remain Elusive (TTWARE)
post on February 3, 2015 at 1:06 pm
>> TTWARE said…
>>
>> In my follow-up above, I alluded to the fact that the reason
>> ADOSH may want to delay the deposition is that it could
>> hurt their case.
In all reality… whether Brendan McDonough has more information about the entrapment that killed 19 people that day or not… it’s really not possible for anything McDonough has to say ( now or in the future ) to ‘hurt’ ADOSH’s case.
ADOSH was not responsible for determining EXACTLY what the ‘motivations’ were for the men who were killed in that workplace. Their PRIMARY job was to discover if that was, in fact, an ‘unsafe workplace’ and whether fines could be imposed.
They did that. In spades.
Don’t forget that ADOSH was willing to issue citations for at least FOUR potential and/or actual ‘entrapment’ situations in that workplace on Sunday, June 30, 2013.
They only reason they didn’t issue all FOUR of those citations was that as soon as they realized they had enough evidence to basically issue the MAXIMUM fines they were allowed by law to issue… they simply ‘consolidated’ all FOUR of the entrapment citations into one general ‘unsafe workplace with too much potential risk of death or injury’ citation… and they ‘went to press’ with that, instead.
So no… I don’t think ADOSH really is all that concerned with whatever McDonough has to say ‘hurting their case’. It was still a chaotic, dangerous and unsafe workplace workplace with serious mis-management issues taking place… and I believe the ADOSH citations and fines will stand up to any legal test.
The only reason Arizona Forestry is ‘going after them’ and still needs to ‘mitigate’ the ADOSH findings is because that is what first provided de-facto proof of ‘negligence’ in that workplace and allowed the ‘wrongful death’ lawsuits to proceed. They (AZF) still think if they can ‘mitigate’ the ADOSH findings then the ‘wrongful death’ suits can be dismissed and everything just falls back to the ‘exclusive remedy’ clause of worker’s compensation death benefits. End of story.
I’ve already posted about this… but I still believe that it is too late for even that strategy to work. Since the wrongful death lawsuits WERE allowed to proceed…. and those lawyers for the plaintiffs ‘got to work’… even if the ADOSH report is mitigated the attorneys for the families probably still now have their OWN large body of evidence proving ‘negligence’ in that workplace… and they can then just present their OWN (complete) case in civil now without even relying on the ADOSH findings… not to mention what still might come out if most of the witnesses are just deposed and/or put on the stand and subject to questioning / cross-examination.
>> TTWARE also said…
>>
>> Think about that for a minute.
>> ADOSH are the one’s who are kicking and screaming to delay the
>> testimony of this new, important information.
I’ve read the documents… and I wouldn’t really characterize it that way.
Yes… there’s a lot of ‘legalese’ in these documents… but most of them are actually just in ‘narrative’ and ‘conversational’ format whereby the attorneys are submitting ‘requests’ to the Judge and they really are just ‘speaking plain English’..
There’s actually even proof that ADOSH really didn’t much give a crap what McDonough has to say, at this point.
When the attorneys for AZF became aware that Brendan NOW couldn’t play this game of his anymore and now wants to ‘get this all off his chest’… that was when they called AZF attorneys and said they thought Brendan should be deposed RIGHT AWAY. Their other reasoning was a fear on their part that this information was going to go ‘public’ at any moment and the media would be all over it so they ( AZF ), of course, wanted the ‘deposition’ to happen as quickly as possible to ‘head that off at the pass’.
ADOSH attorneys were obviously not as concerned about the ‘publicity’ surrounding all this as AZF seemed to be… and was NOT sharing their sense of ‘urgency’.
ADOSH actually first responded and said they didn’t care much whether an attorney for the Arizona State Attorney General’s office ‘took the deposition’ or not… so long as someone did.
That wasn’t good enough for Arizona Forestry. THEY are the ones who then wanted it all to happen more under the control of their own contracted lawyers rather than just passing off to the AG’s office like ADOSH suggested.
So that’s when the HARDBALL began.
*( And yes, folks, this is what HARDBALL looks like when these lawyers start both trying to get what they want ).
ADOSH now had one, simple, overriding concern.
Arizona Forestry wasn’t scheduled to even deliver all their own written discovery to ADSOH until December 15, 2014. Arizona Forestry wanted McDonough ‘deposed’ the day before Thanksgiving… November 26, 2014.
That would mean ADOSH would get this one chance to ‘get in the room’ with McDonough BEFORE they even saw all of the new ‘sworn’ testimony via the discovery process.
ADOSH said “Not a chance”
ADOSH simply felt they would be ‘better prepared’ to conduct a successful cross-examination of McDonough AFTER they had seen all this other evidence that wasn’t due until December 15, 2014.
Arizona Forestry then countered with some kind of didactic lecture about how ADOSH was not ‘obstructing the process’ and ‘dis-respecting Mr. McDonough’s wishes to get this over with’.. Arizona Forestry was still scared to death this fact that McDonough was now finally ready to tell the WHOLE truth would hit the media and they would ‘lose control of the story’. ADOSH’s wish to be ‘better prepared’ for this interview meant they weren’t going to get their way.
A lot more back and forth… and a lot more negotiation over whether ADOSH could RECALL McDonough for a SECOND ‘under oath’ interview in case new evidence received AFTER the deposition raised even more questions that perhaps only Brendan could answer.
Arizona Forestry agreed to that, eventually… but it was just a VERBAL promise that Brendan would consent to second deposition, if needed.
Bottom line here is that ADOSH doesn’t trust Arizona Forestry, their lawyers, or the City of Prescott and their lawyers ( specifically Paladini )… and they certainly do NOT trust the mysterious Mr. Brendan McDonough at this point.
Even the Arizona Forestry lawyers were poo-pooing ADOSH’s request to be as prepared as possible the FIRST time for a new interview with McDonough and saying things like “We promise we won’t pull a double-cross and refuse the second deposition… but even if we did ADOSH could just ask the Judge for a subpoena to force the SECOND deposition”.
Well… of COURSE they ( ADOSH ) could do that…. but that’s just more legal HARDBALL and even comes with the risk that the Judge might NOT agree to issue subpoena for that second interview.
So that’s really what all that is/was about.
ADOSH doesn’t trust McDonough or his attorneys or Arizona Forestry.
They want to be sure they know EVERYTHING they want to ask McDonough ( under oath ) during the FIRST ( and perhaps ONLY ) next chance they get.
Arizona doesn’t want to WAIT… because of their fear of all this going PUBLIC.
The WRENCH that got thrown into the works here is when McDonough himself, the very day before the November 26 deposition, informed everyone that he now had a new ‘criminal attorney’ ( David Shapiro of Prescott )… and that his new attorney couldn’t make that November 26 deposition because he was busy with other things.
So everything got ‘postponed’ anyway… but it was because McDonough himself ( at the last minute ) decided he better have a CRIMINAL attorney representing him rather than just Emily Dolan of Prescott.
I have said this before… but I believe the reason attorney Emily Dolan advised Brendan herself to get a CRIMINAL attorney is because this really could still break down into possible ‘obstructing an official investigation’ charges against McDonough… and he better have someone who knows his way around those kinds of ‘criminal’ charges by his side as he tries to ‘get this off his chest’.
So that then became the reason for the CURRENT timing.
Mr. Shapiro is simply a BUSY guy. He said that HE would be tied up with another trial until the middle of February… so all this ‘deposition’ stuff then just got pushed off until February 26, 2015.
The only reason an actual request for a SUBPOENA for McDonough to finally testify was issued 8 days ago is because while Shapiro apparently initially agreed to February 26, 2015… he hasn’t made the correct moves to PROVE that he and McDonough will actually be there… nor has he said that date is NOT good for him.
Everybody’s been burned by McDonough at least once already on this when he informed everyone just the DAY before the other deposition that he was ‘switching’ to another attorney who, himself, couldn’t be there the next day.
No one wants to get ‘burned’ by McDonough AGAIN on this… so instead of just ASSUMING McDonough is going to show up on Feb. 26… they want a SUBPOENA to go out and make SURE he and Shapiro are going to show up this time.
.>> TTWARE also said…
>>
>> While, as I alluded to above, this new information MAY hurt their case,
I still don’t think that’s possible ( see above )… but I hear ya.
THEY still might THINK it will… and they, of course, dont’ want their original findings to be ‘mitigated’ or ‘reversed’.
>> TTWARE
>>
>> I think I have to agree with one of the opposing attorneys who
>> says one of the main reasons ADOSH wants to delay this new
>> information from coming forth, is that it will be a HUGE
>> embarrassment to them and their investigatory process.
>> A likely truth, no doubt.
Again… see above. I really don’t think ADOSH is all that concerned
about this. The ONLY reason for all the ‘memo wars’ over the planned
deposition dates is because Arizona Forestry was trying to force the
McDonough deposition to happen BEFORE they even had to deliver
all the ‘written discovery’ to ADOSH on December 15, 2014.
ADOSH just wants to ‘get it right the FIRST TIME’ here and be as prepared as they can possibly be for this ‘under oath’ deposition and cross-examination of McDonough.
Remember… McDonough sat right in front of ADOSH twice… and BOTH times he head every opportunity to ‘unburden himself’. McDonough was CHOOSING to ‘withhold’ information during those previous interviews.
McDonough was playing the same game with ADOSH that many of the interviewees were.
It was the “Ask me the right question and I’ll answer it” game.
ADOSH doesn’t want to ‘play that game’ again with McDonough.
ADOSH wants to review ALL of the other sworn statements from witnesses this time BEFORE they get ( perhaps ) this one-and-only final shot to ‘ask the right questions’.
>> TTWARE also said…
>>
>> Many of us on this site have had extensive comments on what
>> Brendan should, or could have done, on June 30th, 2013. Also,
>> along those same lines, lots of comments on what Brendan should,
>> or could do, from this point forward. It appears for whatever reasons,
>> Brendan is trying to do the right thing IF they’ll let him. We’ve already
>> said all there is to say about shoulda, coulda, and perhaps we should
>> all dial it back bit towards him here for a while, and give him some
>> breathing room, as he attempts to do the right thing. Just a thought.
Tell that to Prescott City Attorney John Paladini.
HE is the one actually ‘controlling’ this entire process.
HE is the one who is insisting that Brendan must be DEPOSED’, which has led to all the HARDBALL about when and how that’s going to happen.
If Brendan really wanted to ‘unburden himself’…. he could just pick up
the phone and call the Prescott Daily Courier and get it over with.
It is John Paladini who is still trying to CONTROL this process and will not LET former Prescott employee Brendan McDonough do that.
Paladina ( apparently ) still senses some ‘liablity’ here on behalf of Prescott so HE wants to remain in control of what former employees have to say… and WHO they say it to.
That’s what seems to be ‘the story’ in these PUBLIC documents, anyway.
WTKTT,
You make very good points, most of which I can’t disagree with.
I must say though, “the story” that I see in these public documents are the many indications that the full truth has already been put out there, having been relayed to several people.
That, along with the strong possibility that someone who many long suspected of knowing the answers, finally is clamoring to come forward to share them (for whatever motivations), is the meat and potatoes of this for me.
I truly believe the information I got and RTS got and shared here last fall
has to do with some of the known facts that were released by those that have the information all ready That McDonough has talked to others in the Prescott Fire department and City about. Some of what I was told and released here by me. The Refusals the Order and the location of Marsh.
We may be getting closer to those actual occurrences.
Its still Hearsay till its facts.
Bob,
I just came back on here to reference those comments made previously by you and RTS, and I saw that you’d already posted (above).
I was just going to say that the information provided by your sources back then, certainly dovetails with what ‘reliable sources’ told the AZ Attorney General and the respondent’s lawyer just prior to this massive paperwork back-and- forth shuffle over the ‘delay of the deposition.
Granted, there are NO facts out there yet, but there certainly are more and more smoking guns.
Also the Video with the argument on it has not been referenced yet. Could still be unreleased or Discovery in the hands of a Lawyer, Maybe McDonough’s testimony will break loose some more evidence (open the flood gates)???????
There is still a chance that this ‘other video’ might have been taken by BrendanMcdonough himself.
We KNOW he had a video/audio recording capable device with him that day… ALL day. It was an iPhone. What is still essentially unknown is how his photos/videos that ended up in a special folder in the SAIT evidence package with his name on the folder were actually collected.
In other words… did Brendan himself just deliver a CD to the SAIT… or did the SAIT actually have full access to his iPhone?
Still unknown.
Thanks TTWARE and WTKTT for starting to decipher this. I kinda saw it but wasn’t sure quite what was going on. And then we launched into “What Happened Saturday” and I felt we really needed to dig into that and I had some of the resources needed to do that.
We’re moving my mom out of the hospital she’s been in for a week and a half to another one for a version of Hospice. She’s had her fill of it all. But she still has to be on an IV, so we can’t move her back to her awesome apartment for Hospice there.
And Terra has to go to Santa Fe, so I’ll be at the hospital w/Mom tomorrow. I have my ipad with me but not my computer with all its resources. Including better handling of .docs and .pdfs.
I figured this would be kind of a bombshell. Honestly I thought someone would have found it by now. I found it googling “ADOSH Yarnell.” Boom.
PS Everybody be sure to watch “The Big Burn” on PBS tonight!!
That Is A Plan Here———-
Hey Bob,
The action of the Buffalo Soldiers in that small town (Taft??) is an example of the “hail Mary pass” that I was referring to in earlier chapters. Doesn’t always work but sometimes you don’t have any other options..
I hope they rebroadcast this! I was totally determined……..
So while all kinds of nurses, and my daughter, were doing all kinds of stuff to my mom,
I was sitting over to the side with the remote right up against my ear so I could hear it….
And, yeah, the part about the Buffalo Soldiers caught my attention…..and the 70 mph winds….
But there was a bunch I missed because of all the stuff going on all around me….
And I just got “the phone call,” that my mom is definitely on her way out, like really, but I just took a sleeping pill, and so did my daughter, so the nurse said, don’t worry, I’m with her and it’s all OK……. I LOVE Hospice!!!!
And I’ll be VERY interested in what you all think about the documentary (and lots of other people also) …..
And I may not be posting much over the next few days but I WILL be reading!
And I’m glad I was able to post the ADOSH stuff last night!!!! I knew you would find it valuable…
Namaste y’all!
God be with your Family, you and your Mom————
Thank you, Bob. We’re hanging in there. Having my awesome daughter Terra with me through this has been more than a blessing.
In another piece of potentially relevant news–
Arizona has a new State Forester:
via YumaNewsNow.com
“Governor Doug Ducey Announces State Forester”
Published: Friday, 30 January 2015 00:11 Written by YNN
“Phoenix, Arizona – Governor Doug Ducey today announced the appointment of Jeff Whitney as director of the Arizona State Forestry Division.
“Jeff possesses more than 40 years of professional experience in forestry and fire prevention,” said Governor Ducey. “Particularly in a state that is no stranger to large and destructive wildfires, Jeff’s background and expertise as a National Type 1 Incident Commander will be integral to the health of our forests and the safety of our communities.”
http://www.yumanewsnow.com/index.php/news/arizona/9477-governor-doug-ducey-announces-state-forester
Reply to Marti Reed post on February 2, 2015 at 11:01 pm
>> Marti said…
>>
>> Arizona has a new State Forester:
>>
>> “Phoenix, Arizona – Governor Doug Ducey today announced the
>> appointment of Jeff Whitney as director of the Arizona State
>> Forestry Division.
A very weird connection now going on here between The Yarnell Hill Fire and the Dude fire in 1990. The Dude fire is where those members of the Perryville DOC crew perished in Walk Moore Canyon.
All of the following were THERE at the Dude Fire, in management positions…
Jeff Whitney, Dan Eckstein and Tony Sciacca.
Jeff Whitney is now the new Arizona State Forester.
Dan Eckstein was ICT4 Russ Shumate’s first ‘Air Attack’ in Yarnell on Saturday morning
during the start of what would be that FAILED Initial Attack. Dan Eckstein is the one
who was supposed tp ‘box the fire’ with the SEATS on Saturday morning.
Tony Sciacca was one of the ‘Safety Officers’ in Yarnell ( along with former GMIHC Superintendent Marty Cole ) at the time of the deployment. He had only been in
Yarnell for about an hour before the deployments took place and he was standing
on Shrine Road when the (empty) GM Crew Carriers passed by.
All THREE of these people are mentioned extensively in the following comprehensive report on the Perryville crew fatalities at the Dude fire ( 1990 )…
http://www.fireleadership.gov/toolbox/staffride/downloads/lsr11/lsr11_Dude%20Fire_Mike_Johns_2009.pdf
Jeff Whitney – a Type I Team Supervisor, arrived at the fire at 0500 and
was briefed at 0630. Cooke assigned him to protect the Bonita Creek
Subdivision, immediately adjacent to Walk Moore Canyon.
Dan Eckstein – An assistant Arizona Fire Management Officer ( AFMO ) who
was assigned to be Division E Supervisor’ on June 26, 1990. Division ‘E’ is
where the Perryville crew fatalities would take place that afternoon in
Walk Moore Canyon.
Tony Sciacca – On June 26, 1990, Tony Sciacca was the Foreman of
the Prescott Hotshots. The Prescott Hotshots were working in the
same Walk Moore Canyon as the Perryville and Navajo crews, but
they evacuated to the Bonita Creek subdivision when the blowup took place.
Here are two places in the document where both Jeff Whitney and Dan Eckstein are both mentioned in the SAME paragraph(s)…
From page 17 ( of 88 pages )…
———————————————————————-
DAN ECKSTEIN arrived at the Dude fire at about 0530 to 0600.
The supervisors were generally working together as a group
in the vicinity of the Bonita Creek subdivision; Phil Gil, Dale
Ashby and JEFF WHITNEY.
———————————————————————-
Page 22…
———————————————————————-
Burnout of the constructed line was started in the Northeast
corner of the subdivision above the water tank, and proceeded
downhill toward the Northwest corner of the subdivision. Phil Gil,
the Type II Team Division Supervisor for Division D, stayed on
and assisted DAN ECKSTEIN because of the emphasis to protect
the Bonita Creek subdivision. He was joined by JEFF WHITNEY,
the Supervisor for the Type I Team. Gil acted as the firing boss
and they began the burnout. The firing was handed off to
successive Hotshot Crews down the line.
———————————————————————–
Also, as long as I’m sitting here posting stuff.
Back in December, as we were discussing AZ Fire’s “interesting” process of posting Aaron’s videos of the Shrine Road scene (as well as the Model Creek Road scene).
I asked Google about the rules of FOIA requests.
One of the absolutely totally most interesting and useful things I found was The Center for Public Integrity and their “Integrity Investigation.”
We are now using this in New Mexico to get a better grip on how to get information about our now nationally infamous police department and our fairly corrupt government.
Here is their homepage:
http://www.publicintegrity.org/accountability/state-integrity-investigation
So, what I did, as we were discussing AZ Fire’s release of those videos was click on “Grading the nation: How accountable is your state?” which took me to a map of the United States.
http://www.publicintegrity.org/2012/03/19/8423/grading-nation-how-accountable-your-state
When here, I clicked on the state of Arizona. Which took me to here, Arizona’s page:
http://www.stateintegrity.org/arizona
Which shows all kinds of categories they use to rate a state’s integrity/corruption risk Report Card.
Including the category (which they consider the MOST IMPORTANT and thus the FIRST) called:
“Public Access to Information.”
Click on that and explore. Shows the laws and rules regarding public access to information in Arizona.
One of the things I discovered via all of this was that if the Yarnell Hill Fire had happened in New Mexico, we wouldn’t be able to access a fraction of the information we’ve been able to access in this Arizona Fire.
I’ve been trying to use Twitter to amplify this project in New Mexico and warn my state neighbors as to all of this.
AND as long as I’m posting stuff while waiting on various processes/test results that are happening regarding my mom (with whom I had an entirely cogent and interesting conversation tonight regarding “boyfriends.” specifically due to my awesome daughter’s boyfriend who, while supporting her in this stressful experience is also in charge of the Albuquerque School Board Elections tomorrow ……
My daughter’s Ohio-based uncle is making a bid on a house in Payson, Arizona (partially since her father lives in Flagstaff).
I came across this article about how Payson, as a result of the Yarnell Hill Fire, began last year to attempt to make their community, via codes etc, conform to what is called “FireWise.” But because of how folks there resent any kind of “government-imposed” rules, yah know…….
Nothing has happened.
From the “Payson Roundup”
By Pete Aleshire
Friday, January 2, 2015
“Fire Building Codes Year In Review”
“In the 18 months since the Yarnell Hill Fire killed 19 firefighters trying to protect a woefully unprepared community, Payson and Gila County have taken few actions to avert a similar tragedy here.
Payson grappled with a fire department recommendation to adopt a Wildland-Urban Interface building code, but in the shadow of an election year, put off any action for at least 18 months.
The town did set up a committee to try to convince residents to voluntarily clear thickets and brush from their properties — but after one event, the unfunded committee has not undertaken many visible actions.”
http://www.paysonroundup.com/news/2015/jan/04/fire-building-codes-year-review/
Good Luck, Arizona!!!
Good Luck, Uncle Tom!
Something else I’ve been meaning to post but hadn’t gotten “a round tuit.”
ADOSH has a page which contains all the links to what, as I read back in December, seem to be the correspondences between the ADOSH lawyers and Arizona Dept of Forestry lawyers. I don’t really understand “legalese,” but what I read of these files then suggested to me that there’s been quite a battle going on. And in Fall-December that battle betan including Brendan McDonough’s lawyers.
I haven’t read any of this since I discovered it in December (when my in-real-life life started spiraling into chaos) and I hadn’t posted it because my in-real-life life was spiraling into chaos and I didn’t think I could “shepherd” it.
But I want to post it now, as my life is still spiraling into chaos so you all who seem to be more capable than I am at comprehending this legal stuff can
ahem
have at it.
“Industrial Commission of Arizona | Yarnell Hill Fire Information”
https://sites.google.com/site/yarnellhillinformation/
Typo.
“And in Fall-December that battle betan including Brendan McDonough’s lawyers.”
Should read:
“And in Fall-December that battle began including Brendan McDonough’s lawyers.”
So what you need to do to access all the Documents that include the back and forth stuff between the lawyers is click on the “ALJ Hearing File” link on that page.
Which takes you to here:
“Yarnell Hill ALJ Hearing File”
Where it says:
“This page will be updated on the first business day of each week to incorporate documents the parties have filed since this page was last updated. Anyone reviewing this page does so with the full knowledge that there may be documents that have been filed with the Administrative Law Judge Division but have not yet been scanned and loaded onto this website. In addition, the Commission is only providing public records. By using this page, the user agrees that neither the Commission nor any of its employees are responsible or liable whatsoever for the content of any document or any information provided through this page.”
https://sites.google.com/site/yarnellhillinformation/home/yarnellhillaljhearingfile
Thanks for all those links, Marti.
Yes… a lot of ‘legalese’ flying around in those documents.
The LATEST document in the list was made public just 8 days
ago on January 26, 2015.
It is sitting online in a PUBLIC ‘Google Docs’ folder…
The title of the document in the ‘Google Docs’ folder is…
2015_01 Updated 01.26.15.pdf
Here is a direct link to just that ‘latest’ document in the ‘Google Docs’ folder…
https://docs.google.com/file/d/0B6N47Z5CNR-CelpmYXZwSVZNa1U/edit?pli=1
It contains copies of a document generated on January 15, 2015.
This document is a request being sent by the Attorneys for Arizona Forestry to Judge Michael A. Mosesso for a SUBPOENA to be issued to Brendan McDonough to FORCE him to appear at an already scheduled ‘under oath’ interview and deposition session on February 26, 2015.
The reason Arizona Forestry now wants the Judge to FORCE McDonough to appear is because as of January 15, 2015 ( when these documents were generated ) they simply still weren’t sure he was going to be at the deposition.
In a nutshell…
Arizona Forestry had been amicably trying to arrange this ‘under oath’ deposition of McDonough with his new ‘criminal defense’ attorney David M. Shapiro, of Prescott, Arizona.
Mr. Shapiro had indicated that he would be heavily involved with another trial until the middle of February… so Arizona Forestry set a desired date for the McDonough ‘under oath’ deposition of February 26, 2015.
The reason Arizona Forestry has now made this request for a SUBPOENA is because as of January 15, 2015, McDonough’s lawyer had still not filed any standard ‘Notice of Appearance’ with regards to the February 26, 2015 date ( which would mean he and McDonough promise to be there ) nor has Mr. Shapiro said that this date is not good for either he or his client ( McDonough ).
In other words… as of January 15 Arizona Forestry lawyers still didn’t know if Shapiro and McDonough will even appear for this ‘deposition’ on February 26… so they want a judge to now issue a SUBPOENA to make SURE they both appear for the already-scheduled deposition.
Bottom line here is that Arizona Forestry wants to make SURE it finds out EVERYTHING Brendan McDonough might ( or might NOT ) know about what happened in Yarnell BEFORE they have to step into these first ‘Global Mediation’ meetings with all the ‘wrongful death’ plaintiffs on March 2 and 3, 2015.
That is, in fact, exactly what the Arizona Forestry lawyers themselves say in this request to Judge Mosesso for the McDonough SUBPOENA… and why it is so important that McDonough be interviewed ( under oath ) before March 2.
More later.
Some interesting tidbits here one of which is the request for the cd of the Utah Training session that includes some interesting statements by Mike Dudly’
May be an indication why the are after a interview of McDonough to determine what he heard could be a real surprise to one or the other of the state Lawyers.
Or they are making sure there are no surprises.
Two different out comes.
1. The crew acted on its own where it decided to go and were entrapped.
Supports the States case of no fault
2. The crew was told directed or ordered to go down into the entrapment bowl by State officials. Which could include the Division Supervisor Marsh
as a State Employee directing the crew.
Supports ADOSH conclusions and Fines
Was any one ordered out of the BLACK??????????
Just my Scenario of what is transpiring between the 2 sides.
I think it has a lot to do with Mike Dudly’s little bomb shell recorded in Utah.
Along with the Information still held by McDonough.
We should be able now to assume he in fact did give a deposition to his Lawyers last year as we learned here. Now the courts are requesting that deposition with cross examination under oath.
And as I always say the Legal Mumbo Jumbo goes on.
We have this hearing to contend with that may not release any thing to the Public.
I’ve been having a hard time understanding the ins and outs of the Misner-Warneke Claims confusion. Reading this helped me a lot. This is Lynne LaMaster’s Prescott Enews courtroom coverage of the hearing last week. This particular link is from the third day. Scroll down to find her coverage from the other two days.
So it seems the conclusion came from Lawyer McGroder convinced everybody but the Mayor that, according to AZ State Law, if the wildland fire-fighters employed by Prescott were contracted for at least six months (and these two were contracted for seven) and doing “hazardous work,” they were required by State Law to be eligible for the city’s PSRPS (and sitting here right now I don’t know what “PSRPS” exactly translates to). And that State Law over-rides whatever form they signed on to.
Interesting/Relevant statement in McGroder’s rebuttal to City Attorney Paladini’s Closing Argument:
“There’s an old adage that says, “When you don’t have the facts, you argue the law. When you don’t have the law, you argue the facts,” said McGroder.
Well worth reading. Good photos, throughout, too.
Friday, 30 January 2015 00:00
THIRD DAY IN MISNER AND WARNEKE PSPRS HEARINGS
Lynne LaMaster
http://www.prescottenews.com/index.php/news/current-news/item/24912-third-day-in-misner-and-warneke-psprs-hearings
Thanks for the link, Marti!
>> Marti said…
>>
>> I don’t know what “PSRPS” exactly translates to.
Acutally.. it’s PSPRS…
Public Safety Personnel Retirement System ( of the State of Arizona ).
Their website is here…
http://www.psprs.com/
**
** LEWIS DOC CREW BOSS JAKE GUADIANA’S VIDEOS
**
** THE TRANSCRIPTS
Some of the Jake Guadiana videos contain no foreground conversation or background radio captures at all… but MOST of them do.
ALL of the TRANSCRIPTS for ALL of Jake Guadiana’s VIDEOS taken both Saturday, June 29, 2013 and Sunday, June 30, 2013 are included below in this single posting.
Sorry if that makes this post a little long… but at least they are ALL here in one place.
USUAL CAVEAT: This is what I ( me, personally ) am hearing in these videos. Your mileage, may, of course vary.
ALL of these VIDEOS can be found in the following ADOSH Dropbox Folder…
ADOSH Yarnell Hill Investigation / Photos and Video / ASFD Photos / Jake Guadiana
Here is a DIRECT LINK to that folder…
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/20inrene9tcx74a/AAB1Wb5GbaqoEXohtiCKsdyKa/ADOSH%20Yarnell%20Hill%20Investigation/Photos%20and%20Video/ASFD%20Photos/Jake%20Guadiana?dl=0
Some of the more ‘interesting’ exchanges captured in these VIDEOS…
File Name: USB YARNELL HILL 009.avi
Actual Date/Time: Saturday, June 29, 2013 @ 5:58:13 PM
This video shows the fire burning down in the drainage after it has ‘escaped’. In this video… we hear 2 of the FFs admitting they are NOT going to be able to ‘catch’ this ‘escaped’ fire.
(Foreground: Unknown 1): We can’t catch it?
(Foreground: Unknown 2): I doubt it.
File Name: USB YARNELL HILL 011.avi
Actual Date/Time: Saturday, June 29, 2013 @ 6:36:25 PM
This video shows the fire burning in the drainage after it ‘escaped’. This video seems to have the only AUDIO captures of both the pilot of N14HX and ICT4 Russ Shumate. The ‘escaped’ fire is now ‘moving fast’ and the pilot of N14HX is communicating with someone up on the ridge and says he feels he ought to “pick him up”. ICT4 Russ Shumate seems to ‘cut in’ to that conversation and says “Let’s just get ’em off the hill”.
(Foreground: Unknown 1): It’s goin’ pretty fast.
(Background Radio: Pilot of N14HX answering Unknown 1): Yea, it is.
I’m thinking that… uh… maybe I oughta pick ya up?
(Background Radio: Unknown 3: Probably ICT4 Shumate):
??… Let’s… ah… let’s just get ’em off the hill.
File Name: USB YARNELL HILL 012.avi
Actual Date/Time: Saturday, June 29, 2013 @ 6:59:35 PM
This video shows fire burning at the top of drainage after ‘escaping’.
Even though we have heard the FFs admit to themselves ( in the previous video )
that they were not going to CATCH this ‘escaped fire’… one of the FFs is having
a personal phone call with someone and tells them “Everything is going GOOD”…
(Foreground: Unknown 1): Yea… everything’s goin’ good. We’re jus… we’re just
gonna be… uh… coyotin’ it up tonight.
File Name: USB YARNELL HILL 013.avi
Actual Date/Time: Saturday, June 29, 2013 @ 7:23:08 PM
This video shows the fire burning down in the drainage just EAST of where it had escaped over the two-track road. Someone ( Justin Smith? ) is complaining to another FF about ‘paperwork’…
(Foreground: Unknown 1): It has to be nuthin’ that’ll be hard to ‘S’ number, then ??
(Foreground: Unknown 2): No. Yea. Yea.
(Foreground: Unknown 1:) That’s the worst. Burnup (that?) big. That’s the
WORST…’cus the paperwork…
(Foreground: Unknown 2): Uh-huh
(Foreground: Unknown 1): I left him TALKIN’ about it.
File Name: USB YARNELL HILL 021.avi
Actual Date/Time: Sunday, June 30, 2013 @ 4:53:47 PM.
This video was shot just 14 minutes after Captain Jesse Steed’s first MAYDAY call at 4:39 PM. It was taken from the Model Creek School ICP looking back south at the gigantic smoke plume. At the end of the video the FFs in the foreground have this exchange…
(Foreground: Unknown 2): We made it just in time.
(Foreground: Unknown 4): Yep. Ya gotta have the time to leave.
(Foreground: Unknown 2): We can’t just forget it.
(Foreground: Unknown 4): Nope.
(Foreground: Unknown 5): Whadda we do?
(Foreground: Unknown 2): We need to get anything we can ( in there ).
(Foreground: Unknown 5): Did they have black?
(Foreground: Unknown 2): Absolutely.
(Foreground: Unknown 4): For the whole day.
(Foreground: Unknown 5): Unbelievable.
(Foreground: Unknown 4): When ya hide behind the (OPS?) radio… (VIDEO ENDS)
Here are ALL of the transcripts for ALL of Jake Guadiana’s VIDEOS…
******************************************************************************
* SATURDAY, JUNE 29, 2013
******************************************************************************
File Name: USB YARNELL HILL 002.avi
File Size: 14 MB
File Type: AVI
Date/Time Original: 2011:03:05 23:36:13
Software: CanonMVI06
Duration: 8.78 s
Actual Date/Time: Saturday, June 29, 2013 @ 11:36:11 AM
This video shows Helicopter N14HX on ‘approach’ to the Helispot with the first 3 Lewis DOC Crew members onboard.
The Firefighters onboard are getting their first view of the actual fire location and are commenting on the SEAT drops that have already taken place that morning.
The ONLY ( tiny ) bit of smoke seen anywhere is on the WEST side of the fire area and down in the steep rocks.
+0:00
( Throughout this video the major foreground audio is the sound )
( of the Helicopter engine itself ).
NOTE: This FF seems to be answering a question related to the
SEAT drop and he qualifies his answer with ‘If’…
+0:01
(Foreground: Unknown 1): If the SEAT did really well.
+0:8.78 – VIDEO ENDS
File Name: USB YARNELL HILL 003.avi
File Size: 15 MB
File Type: AVI
Date/Time Original: 2011:03:05 23:39:28
Software: CanonMVI06
Duration : 8.27 s
Actual Date/Time: Saturday, June 29, 2013 @ 11:39:28 AM
This video shows two Firefighters with BLUE Helmets disembarking from Helicopter N14HX which has landed at the Helispot on the ridge.
This appears to be the FIRST delivery of the first three members of the Lewis DOC crew up to the Helispot.
Jake Guadiana has obviously preceded them out of the Helicopter and has now ‘turned around’ and is filming his video as the remaining two Lewis DOC crewmen exit the chopper.
Moki Helitack Nate Peck ( also wearing Nomex and a BLUE Helmet ) is working the door of the Helicopter and is instinctively holding his arm out and pointing the men towards a FORWARD exit path and away from the tail rotor, just as he was TRAINED to do. He also appears to be beginning to pull some gear from the rear compartment as the video ends.
Nate Peck had already been dropped off up there at the Helispot during the earlier RECON mission which first found it.
The actual identity of the other two Lewis DOC crewmen in this video remains unknown. There are no NAMES on their helmets or anywhere on their clothing.
The second FF is carrying wearing a chest-strapped handheld radio so IAOI ( If And Only If ) Sergeant Leo Vasquez was actually UP there on the ridge then he is most likely this second FF with the radio.
The reason I say IAOI on that one is because we really still do NOT know if Sergeant Leo Vasquez was, in fact, one of the SIX Lewis DOC crew up on the ridge that day.
Arizona Forestry has never really seen fit to say exactly WHICH 5 other members of the Lewis DOC Crew ( other than Jake Guadiana ) was actually UP there on the ridge all day and the two investigations didn’t seem to bother to nail that down, either.
It is possible that Sergeant Vasquez was left down at the Yarnell Fire Station that day to be sure and ‘supervise’ ALL the other inmates, who ended up sitting around doing NOTHING all day down there.at the YFD Station.
+0:00
(Throughout this video all we hear is the Helicopter Engine idling )
( No foreground talk or background radio conversations ).
+0:8.27 – VIDEO ENDS
File Name: USB YARNELL HILL 004.avi
File Size: 9.2 MB
File Type: AVI
Date/Time Original: 2011:03:06 00:04:51
Software: CanonMVI06
Duration: 7.51 s
Actual Date/Time: Saturday, June 29, 2013 @ 12:04:51 PM
This video shows a SEAT drop on the WEST side of the fire and out in the steep rocks towards the Congress side of the ridge.
+0:00
( Throughout this video we hear the SEAT engine as it makes it drop )
+0:05
(Foreground: Unknown 1): It probly doesn’t ( contribute )… (VIDEO ENDS)
+0:7.51 – VIDEO ENDS
NOTE: That’s it for AVI MOVIE files again until sequence number ‘9’. Jake Guadiana photo sequence numbers 5,6,7 and 8 are all JPEG still photos.
File Name: USB YARNELL HILL 009.avi
File Size: 17 MB
File Type: AVI
Date/Time Original: 2011:03:06 05:58:13
Software: CanonMVI06
Duration: 12.18 s
Actual Date/Time: Saturday, June 29, 2013 @ 5:58:13 PM
This video shows the fire burning down in the drainage after it has ‘escaped’.
+0:00
( Throughout this video there are noises close to the camera like someone fooling with metal or plastic canteens or bottles, and there is also the sound of a fixed wing aircraft flying overhead ).
+0:04
(Foreground: Unknown 1): We can’t catch it?
+0:07
(Foreground: Unknown 2): I doubt it.
+0:12.18 – VIDEO ENDS
File Name: USB YARNELL HILL 010.avi
File Size: 7.6 MB
File Type: AVI
Date/Time Original: 2011:03:06 05:59:52
Software: CanonMVI06
Duration: 4.30 s
Actual Date/Time: Saturday, June 29, 2013 @ 5:59:52 PM
This video shows smoldering black and 3 FFs walking towards camera.
+0:00
( Just the sound of wind in the microphone throughout this video ).
( No foreground talk or background radio conversations ).
+0:4.30 – VIDEO ENDS
File Name: USB YARNELL HILL 011.avi
File Size: 15 MB
File Type: AVI
Date/Time Original: 2011:03:06 06:36:25
Software: CanonMVI06
Duration: 14.11 s
Actual Date/Time: Saturday, June 29, 2013 @ 6:36:25 PM
This video shows the fire burning in the drainage after it ‘escaped’.
+0:01
(Foreground: Unknown 1): It’s goin’ pretty fast.
NOTE: Unknown 2 is most likely the pilot of N14HX because when he keys his microphone you can hear rotor noise underneath his transmissions.
+0:02
(Background Radio: Pilot of N14HX answering Unknown 1): Yea, it is.
I’m thinking that… uh… maybe I oughta pick ya up?
+0:08
(Background Radio: Unknown 3: Probably ICT4 Shumate): ??… Let’s… ah…
let’s just get ’em off the hill.
+0:12
(Background Radio: Unknown 4): Cole to (Kumpet?)… Fire ( up? ) ( out? ) (VIDEO ENDS)
+0:14.11 – VIDEO ENDS
File Name: USB YARNELL HILL 012.avi
File Size: 29 MB
File Type: AVI
Date/Time Original: 2011:03:06 06:59:35
Software: CanonMVI06
Duration: 25.32 s
Actual Date/Time: Saturday, June 29, 2013 @ 6:59:35 PM
This video shows fire burning at the top of drainage after ‘escaping’.
NOTE: Throughout this video… ‘Unknown 1′ in the foreground is having a personal conversation with someone on his cellphone who is NOT at the fire.
+0:00
(Foreground: Unknown 1): Yea. It all depends on if I wanna… wanna be caressed or not.
+0:01
(Background Radio: OPS Nate Peck): Alpha. Operations. Go ahead.
+0:03
(Background Radio: DIVSA Justin Smith): Hey… did you catch that with… uh… with
Air Attack as far as tryin’ to get a… uh… you know… a ?? of gear up. You remember ??
laid that stuff. Ah… that’s over at the LZ Uhm… some were along with us.
+0:08
(Foreground: Unknown 1): Yeah.
+0:09
(Foreground: Unknown 1): ( Laughing ).
+0:13
(Foreground: Unknown 1): Nice.
+0:14
(Foreground: Unknown 1): Nice
+0:15
(Foreground: Unknown 1): Yea… everything’s goin’ good. We’re jus… we’re just
gonna be… uh… coyotin’ it up tonight.
+0:17
(Background Radio: OPS Nate Peck): Yea… I heard that. Are you… do you think you
know of having someone come up internal… in the helicopter… and then… uh…
+0:22
(Foreground: Unknown 1): What?
+0:24
(Foreground: Unknown 1): Allright.
+0:25.32 – VIDEO ENDS
File Name: USB YARNELL HILL 013.avi
File Size: 14 MB
File Type: AVI
Date/Time Original: 2011:03:06 07:23:08
Software: CanonMVI06
Duration: 12.11 s
Actual Date/Time: Saturday, June 29, 2013 @ 7:23:08 PM
This video shows the fire burning down in the drainage just EAST of where it had escaped over the two-track road.
+0:00
(Background Radio: Unknown): Copy that.
+0:01
(Foreground: Unknown 1): It has to be nuthin’ that’ll be hard to ‘S’ number, then ??
+0:02
(Foreground: Unknown 2): No. Yea. Yea.
+0:03
(Foreground: Unknown 1:) That’s the worst. Burnup (that?) big. That’s the
WORST…’cus the paperwork…
+0:04
(Foreground: Unknown 2): Uh-huh
+0:05
(Foreground: CHAINSAW fires up near source of recording)
+0:06
(Foreground: Unknown 1): I left him TALKIN’ about it.
+0:08
(Foreground: CHAINSAW stops)
+0:09
(Foreground: Unknown 2): Ya know… slingin’… ah… slingin’ stuff… ya know… over there…
+0:12.11 – VIDEO ENDS
File Name: USB YARNELL HILL 014.avi
File Size: 11 MB
File Type: AVI
Date/Time Original: 2011:03:06 07:23:33
Software: CanonMVI06
Duration: 8.04 s
Actual Date/Time: Saturday, June 29, 2013 @ 7:23:33 PM
This video shows flame-lengths of the ‘escaped’ fire circa 7:23 PM on June 29, 2013.
This is the video that appears to have Nate Peck responding to ICT4 Russ Shumate’s request that Nate get a ‘resource’ order together so some supplies can be delivered before dark because it is now a given that the 13 men up there will be going ‘coyote’ and spending the night up there.
+0:00
(Foreground: Unknown 1): …possibility it could cross two canyons?
+0:02
(Foreground: Unknown 2): Nope
+0:03
( Foreground: Unknown 3): No way
+0:04
( Foreground: Most likely Nate Peck): So… I need to put together an order for… ah…
+0:8.04 – VIDEO ENDS
File Name: USB YARNELL HILL 015.avi
File Size: 11 MB
File Type: AVI
Date/Time Original: 2011:03:06 07:27:24
Software: CanonMVI06
Duration: 9.18 s
Actual Date/Time: Saturday, June 29, 2013 @ 7:27:24 PM
SEAT drop on the ‘escaped’ fire at 7:27 PM on June 29, 2013. This is the one where we get an extreme close-up view of the SEAT as he approaches from the WEST, flies directly over the ridge, crosses directly in front of the camera, and then drops retardant directly ON some flames on the southern edge of the ‘escaped’ fire.
In the second half of the video we also see a firefighter in a BLACK helmet ( and holding portable radio ) sitting on a rock and watching the drop take place. This could be Justin Smith.
+0:00
( Just the sound of the airplane engine throughout this video ).
( No foreground talk or background radio conversations ).
+0:9.18 – VIDEO ENDS
File Name: USB YARNELL HILL 016.avi
File Size: 6.4 MB
File Type: AVI
Date/Time Original: 2011:03:06 08:03:35
Software: CanonMVI06
Duration: 4.47 s
Actual Date/Time: Saturday, June 29, 2013 @ 8:03:35 PM
SEAT drop on the ‘escaped’ fire at 8:03:35 PM on June 29, 2013, just before dark.
The entire video is slightly ‘out of focus’.
+0:00
( Just the sound of the airplane engine throughout this short video ).
( No foreground talk or background radio conversations ).
+0:4.47 – VIDEO ENDS
*************************************************************************
* SUNDAY, JUNE 30, 2013
*************************************************************************
File Name: USB YARNELL HILL 017.avi
File Size: 12 MB
File Type: AVI
Date/Time Original: 2011:03:07 02:47:40
Software: CanonMVI06
Duration: 10.48 s
Actual Date/Time: Sunday, June 30, 2013 @ 2:47:40 PM
This is the video taken while all those vehicles were still staged in that field just south of the Model Creek Elementary School ICP and the fire was approaching that field from the southwest.
+0:00
( Just the sound of a diesel truck engine idling throughout this short video ).
( No foreground talk or background radio conversations ).
+0:10.48 – END OF VIDEO
NOTE: “USB YARNELL HILL 018.jpg” is a JPEG still photo taken in-between these AVI videos.
File Name: USB YARNELL HILL 019.avi
File Size: 8.0 MB
File Type: AVI
Date/Time Original: 2011:03:07 03:56:25
Software: CanonMVI06
Duration: 8.11 s
Actual Date/Time: Sunday, June 30, 2013 @ 3:56:25 PM
This is the video showing a Bucket Drop from Helicopter ‘Five Kilo Alpha’ and it was filmed almost right underneath it as it was ‘dropping’ There are FFs working with hoses near a chain link fence and there is a large, old-style black satellite dish inside the fencing.
This is one of the structure protection efforts that was happening in the Sickles Road area.
This house in the Sickles Road area was actually at the very southern end of ‘Apache Way’.
The large black-mesh satellite dish seen in the video is exactly here…
34.265465, -112.744423
That puts the Firefighter in the WHITE Helmet running the hose exactly here, just outside the fence that surrounds the residence, and spraying water due WEST towards the fire.
34.265386, -112.744379
+0:00
( Helicopter noise throughout this 8 second video clip )
+0:03
( Helicopter starts dropping water )
+0:06
(Foreground: Unknown 1): Crap.
+0:07
( Helicopter stops dropping water )
+0:07.5
(Foreground: Unknown 2): More ( power? ).
+0:8.11 – VIDEO ENDS
File Name: USB YARNELL HILL 020.avi
File Size: 17 MB
File Type: AVI
Date/Time Original: 2011:03:07 04:16:46
Software: CanonMVI06
Duration: 15.31 s
Actual Date/Time: Sunday, June 30, 2013 @ 4:16:46 PM
NOTE: This is the video taken looking west from Highway 89 just north of Yarnell proper with what appears to be Rance Marquez, Cougan Caruthers and Tony Sciacca conferring in front of the white cattle fence across the road.
+0:00
(Foreground: Unknown 1): That one can certainly wait.
+0:01
(Background: Unknown 2: Sounds like OPS1 Todd Abel ): ( To John Burfiend
in B33 ) He said… both parties should be waitin’ ( in the attack area? ) ( to call ? ).
+0:04
(Foreground: Unknown 3): ( Laughing )
+0:05
(B33 – John Burfiend): Okay… soooo… right up against the pulse there… that’s where
we’re gonna ( be droppin’ )?
+0:07
(Foreground: Unknown 1 ): What are you concerned about?
+0:08
(Foreground: Unknown 3 ): Nuthin’. Catching sumthin?
+0:10
(Foreground: Unknown 1 ): ( Laughing )
(Foreground: Unknown 3 ): ( Also laughing )
+0:11
(Background: Unknown 2: Sounds like OPS1 Todd Abel ): That’s when I’m clearin’ fire
around that structure… and they’re gonna get in the ( road ) ( VIDEO ENDS AND
CUTS OFF THE NEXT WORD ).
+0:15.31 – END OF VIDEO
File Name: USB YARNELL HILL 021.avi
File Size: 27 MB
File Type: AVI
Date/Time Original: 2011:03:07 04:53:47
Software: CanonMVI06
Duration: 22.19 s
Actual Date/Time: Sunday, June 30, 2013 @ 4:53:47 PM.
This is the video taken from the ICP at the Model Creek Elementary School and looking back SOUTH at the gigantic smoke plume over Yarnell.
This video was taken just 14 minutes after the first Granite Mountain MAYDAY call had appeared on the Air-To-Ground channel at 4:39 PM.
At the END of this video is where we hear a group of FFs close to the camera talking about how they barely had time to get out themselves… and what they should DO now that the deployment traffic has hit the radio. They also discuss amongst themselves whether Granite Mountain had BLACK where they were… and one FF verifies that and says they had it (quote) “for the whole day”. Another FF responds to that with “Unbelievable” and then finally one FF begins to say something about “Hiding behind the radio”.
+0:00
(Background Radio: Unknown 1): When you (come?)(call?) be sure to ??
+0:02
(Foreground: Unknown 2): We made it just in time.
+0:03
(Foreground: Unknown 3: He is calling someone’s name): Billy.
+0:04
(Foreground: Unknown 4: Responding to Unknown 2): Yep. Ya gotta have the time to leave.
+0:05
(Foreground: Unknown 2): We can’t just forget it.
+0:07
(Foreground: Unknown 4): Nope.
+0:08
(Foreground: Unknown 5): Whadda we do?
+0:12
(Foreground: Unknown 2): We need to get anything we can ( in there ).
+0:13
(Background Radio: Unknown 6): One Task Force pulled out all the men but
they did it at the announcements.
+0:16
(Foreground: Unknown 5): Did they have black?
+0:17
(Foreground: Unknown 2): Absolutely.
+0:18
(Foreground: Unknown 4): For the whole day.
+0:19
(Foreground: Unknown 5): Unbelievable.
+0:21
(Foreground: Unknown 4): When ya hide behind the (OPS?) radio… ( VIDEO ENDS )
+0:22.19 – VIDEO ENDS
Thanks for posting these, WTKTT. I was hoping you would. I haven’t even read this, but I will.
Just wanted to say……I think we’re going to lose my mom. So I probably won’t post a bunch of things I was going to post, including re-organizing and reposting the Moki stuff, as well as a couple of other things. I’ve been pretty busy……..
I just want to pop in and say I hope everybody sees “On PBS: “The Big Burn” — the fires of 1910” on Tuesday evening. There’s a bunch of things that have been recently published about it recently.
Here’s the announcement article on Wildfire Today:
http://wildfiretoday.com/2015/01/25/on-pbs-the-big-burn-the-fires-of-1910/
They’ve done some other things about it also, so follow their various links.
Funny think is, I don’t even have a TV set and this is the first thing in over a decade that makes me wish I did. Oh well, I know where to find a few.
So, if I don’t post for awhile this is why. But I’m still here in SPIRIT and will definitely be READING!!! And I WILL be back! And, TBH, I tweet this “campfire” regularly. So there’s that.
Thank you all for everything! Namaste!
We defy augury.
There’s a special providence in the fall of a sparrow.
If it be now, ’tis not to come.
If it be not to come, it will be now.
If it be not now, yet it WILL come… the readiness is all.
(William Shakespeare, Hamlet, V ii, 234-237)
Namaste, Marti.
Thank you.
Followup… I forgot to point out one of the more interesting ‘radio captures’, and what it could possibly mean and/or prove.
It’s in this Guadiana video…
File Name: USB YARNELL HILL 020.avi
Actual Date/Time: Sunday, June 30, 2013 @ 4:16:46 PM
This is the video taken looking west from Highway 89 just north of Yarnell proper with what appears to be Rance Marquez, Cougan Caruthers and Tony Sciacca conferring in front of the white cattle fence across the road.
The ‘interesting’ part is the radio conversation captured in the background between John Burfiend in ‘Bravo 33’ and OPS1 Todd Abel.
The time here ( in this Guadiana video ) is 4:16 PM.
AA Rory Collins had left the fire because his pilot ‘timed out’ about 18 minutes prior to this at 3:58 PM. At about 3:50 PM ( just before he left ) is when Rory Collins told Thomas French and John Burfiend in B33 that “in case they hadn’t noticed” there was a LOT of fire headed straight for Yarnell and they had better (quote) “get down there an take a look at that”.
Thomas French ( in B33 ) wanted to finish what he had been doing with the VLATS up NORTH on Model Creek Road and said he would turn his attention to Yarnell when he was done with that. Rory Collins actually sort of gave French ‘permission’ to go ahead and do that first.
So at this moment in this Guadiana video… the following things are true…
It’s been 18 minutes since Rory Collins officially left and B33 has, since that moment, been doing ‘double duty’ as BOTH ‘Air Attack’ and ‘Lead Plane’ at the same time. The ‘agreement’ between French and Burfiend on how they were going to really handle that was that Thomas French ( the pilot of B33 ) would handle all the “Air-To-Air” radio traffic and John Burfiend ( in the right seat of B33 ) would handle all the “Air-To-Ground” radio traffic. ATGS Trainee Clint Cross was the THIRD person in B33 that day and mostly ‘mentoring’ with John Burfiend but we still have no idea what Clint Cross really was or wasn’t doing… or what he might have heard or witnessed himself that day. He was present at the SAIT interview with French and Burfiend but no one ever asked him a question and he is not quoted as having said anything to the SAIT investigators.
It’s been 26 minutes since Rory Collins first advised French and Burfiend that the fire was headed straight for Yarnell… and they needed to start dealing with that.
It’s also been 26 minutes since we have heard OPS1 Todd Able say to Eric Marsh ( in the 3:50 PM Robert Caldwell video )… “You guys hunker and be safe, keep ME informed, and we’ll get some Air Support down there ASAP”.
So that’s the ‘context’ for this radio conversation we now hear in Guadiana’s 4:16 PM video.
It’s now 4:16 PM and it’s been almost a half-hour since Rory Collins told B33 to start dealing with protecting Yarnell… and also almost a half-hour since OPS1 Todd Abel told Marsh there would be “Air Support down there ASAP”.
Yet… even here at 4:16 PM we ( apparently ) hear OPS1 Todd Abel still preoccupied with that single structure protection work ( just one house ) he was doing out on Miner’s Camp Road and arranging with Burfiend in B33 for ‘another drop’ up there on the NORTH side of the fire where HE was working.
Here is the condensed exchange between Abel and Burfiend at 4:16 PM…
——————————————————————————–
+0:01
(Background Radio: Sounds like OPS1 Todd Abel ): ( To John Burfiend
in B33 ) He said… both parties should be waitin’ ( in the attack area? ) ( to call ? ).
+0:05
(B33 – John Burfiend): Okay… soooo… right up against the pulse there… that’s where
we’re gonna ( be droppin’ )?
+0:11
(Background: Unknown 2: Sounds like OPS1 Todd Abel ): That’s when I’m clearin’ fire
around that structure… and they’re gonna get in the ( road ) ( VIDEO ENDS AND
CUTS OFF THE NEXT WORD ).
———————————————————————————-
Without that THIRD follow-up call from Abel to Burfiend… the first TWO transmissions could almost be taken to mean that Abel was trying to tell Burfiend to drop near that ‘pulse’ on the SOUTH side of the fire… near Yarnell… and that two ‘mysterious’ PARTIES were down THERE ‘waiting to call him’… or something.
However… given the specifics in that THIRD follow-up transmission… with Abel seeming to indicate the drop he wanted had everything to do with what HE was doing there on Miner’s Camp road… I’d say that means this exchange with Burfiend really was Abel trying to arrange for another retardant drop up there where HE was…and NOT anywhere down on the SOUTH end of the fire.
Either way… this single exchange would then probably mean one of the following…
1) If Abel just wanted a drop where the fire was ‘pulsing’ up NORTH on Miner’s camp road and where HE was working on trying to save one single house… then that means the OPS1 on this fire himself was still ( as late as 4:16 PM ) delaying ‘Bravo 33’ from getting to the SOUTH end of the fire and even starting to do anything about protecting Yarnell.
2) If Abel was actually referring to where the fire was ‘pulsing’ down there on the SOUTH end and near Yarnell… then who are the TWO mysterious ‘parties’ that Abel seems to be telling Burfiend are “waiting to talk to him” when he ( Burfiend ) got down there?
Could one of those mysterious ‘parties’ Abel was referring to have been Eric Marsh?… to whom Abel had already said almost a half-hour earlier “We’ll get some Air Support down there ASAP’?
WTKTT
A little information on DOC crews.
If they are run the same as in the past. The Crew Boss is a State FF and runs the crew on the Fire The Sargent is like the Jail Guard takes care of the inmates off the fire, He probably would have stayed with the crew that did not go up on the fire just my guess. I was wondering why he would be on the fire????? Also doubt that any of the Inmates Names would be released in any report or investigation not normal. The dispatch record may not show their names either.
Correct. The Dispatch logs do NOT list the names of any prison inmates… and rightly so.
In the ADOSH notes and emails folder, however, there IS a copy of a document ADOSH received listing the names of all 20 of the Yuma DOC crew that were there in Yarnell from 8:00 AM Saturday morning and on through Sunday. The entire Yuma crew was given no assignment at all on Saturday by AZF ICT4 Shumate. They ended up just ‘hanging around’ the Yarnell Fire Station for all of Saturday.
There is no corresponding ADOSH document listing the members of the Lewis crew.
So other than Lewis CRWB Jake Guadiana… we really still do NOT know who the other FIVE Lewis crew members were up on the ridge on Saturday.
We do know Lewis Prison Sergeant Leo Vasquez WAS there in Yarnell… but there doesn’t seem to be any definite proof he was ever up on the ridge.
When I saw that second FF exiting the chopper with the chest mounted radio rig my first thought was… that must be Vasquez since Guadiana is obviously filming the video.
My next thought was then… Whoa… wait a minute… if both Guadiana and Vasquez are up on the ridge then who is down in Yarnell watching the other 14 or so prison inmates.
I know it is very rare for any of these DOC inmates to just ‘walk away’ while on a fire assignment… but it has been known to happen.
So yes… I think we can assume Sergeant Vasquez remained in Yarnell on Saturday.
That still just begs the question… who were the other FIVE firefighters up there with Jake Guadiana and Nate Peck… and why were none of them (apparently) never interviewed.
Actually… there’s always been another ‘question’ begging in there and that has to do with whether any of these Lewis prison inmates will EVER be able to talk about what happened on Saturday, June 29, 2013 or Sunday, June 30, 2013.
When you go to prison… you lose most ( but not ALL ) of your first amendment rights to freedom of speech. That’s a given.
So there is no doubt the State of Arizona Corrections Department and Arizona Forestry have been able to control and/or restrict WHO has access to these inmates and WHAT they are allowed to say to anyone who DOES contact them about any work they were doing on an AZ DOC work crew.
But what about when any of these inmates have fulfilled their obligation to society and they get OUT of prison?
I wonder if they still would be bound by some kind of perpetual ‘cofidentiality’ agreement that they may have had to sign when they joined one of these in-house work programs like the DOC Wildfire crew(s)?
I haven’t been able to find any documents online that resemble anything like a ‘contract’ that any of these inmates might have to sign when they start working on one of these crews.
I will bet that more than just one of these inmates really wouldn’t mind telling their own ‘story’ of their experiences in Yarnell that weekend.
I hope some ( or all ) of them one day get the chance to do that.
This wasn’t a ‘first fire’ for the famous Lewis DOC Crew.
They were not ‘rank amateurs’ and they had been ‘around the block’.
Heck… for all we know… these Lewis Crew inmates might have actually been just as mystified by the actions of ICT4 Russ Shumate on Saturday and might have had just as ‘little faith’ in Shumate’s decisions as Moki Helitack Nate Peck himself said HE was/had.
Once again… from Moki Helitack Nate Peck’s SAIT interview…
——————————————————————–
Right before dark, called IC and asked for intent.
He was asked for his order for resources as intent.
By this point, fire is moving,
SEAT dropped MISSED.
Still need to tie in but NO SAW GAS and NOT going to happen.
Focus now is to secure the anchor point for the next morning’s work.
I have felt that things were poor at this time and little faith in IC and process.
Stayed on the clock with crew all night.
I have struggled with the IC and process.
——————————————————————–
**
** ONE BUSH
In Shumate’s second ADOSH interview… he says that the infamous moment when the fire ‘jumped over’ the two-track road that was supposed to be the EAST containment boundary of the fire was just ONE BUSH that flared up… and it happened WHILE the Helicopter was hovering directly over the fire and delivering those 12 Bladder Bags.
———————————————————————————–
1375 The anchor was the rock face with the retardant.
1376 The only place it was moving was it had jumped,
1377 there was a little green pocket between the fire’s edge and that Jeep trail and
1378 that’s what it’s like one bush that took off and jumped over that road.
————————————————————————————
So for the sake of just ONE BUSH… the entire ‘Initial Attack’ was lost.
There had been NO attempt to reinforce that two-track with retardant during the morning SEAT drops under Dan Eckstein’s AA supervision… OR any attempt to drop any retardant on these ‘green pockets’ that were known to be sitting there along the two-track.
AA Dan Eckstein had ONLY directed the SEATS to drop on the NORTH and SOUTH sides of the fire. There were also only four SEAT drops that morning before Shumate ‘released’ Eckstein and the SEATS back to base. 2 drops each from 2 separate planes.
2 drops on the NORTH edge of the fire and 2 drops on the SOUTH edge of the fire.
Also… the 7 person crew that was up there all afternoon had made NO attempt to ‘improve’ the two-track or even ‘cut back’ any vegetation from the sides of that two-track road.
We still don’t know what Nate Peck, Jake Guadiana, Leo Vasquez and the four inmates were really doing all afternoon up there… but we know (now) some things they did NOT do.
Followup…
Shumate said…
“ONE bush that took off and jumped over that road”.
He makes it sound like the bush itself got up and walked across the road.
Not a chance. That automatically means that not only was there this kind of FUEL still left there along the fire-side of the two-track even after hours of ;mop up’ work… it means that the OTHER side of the two-track hadn’t been improved or cleared of any ‘catch-fuel’, either.
All this information of the escape of the fire from someone sitting in Yarnell.
He never was on the Fire line Interesting.
Exactly. For Shumate to actually be telling ADOSH “It’s like ONE BUSH that took off”… that can’t be a GUESS on his part.
Since he, himself, was NEVER up there ( and never even did any of his own RECONS with N14HX )… then this really must represent what someone ?? who WAS up there had TOLD him about ‘what happened’.
So how much ELSE was he told about what did ( or didn’t happen ) up there that day that has never seen the light of day?
Better yet… WHO was telling this to Shumate and why has that first-hand account also never seen the light of day?
Reply to Marti Reed post on January 29, 2015 at 9:01 pm
>> Marti Reed said…
>>
>> I still believe if they had been making any kind of efficient use of N14HX,
>> which was ALREADY being paid for. this whole moment of uncertainty
>> could have been avoided.
There is also the following from ADOSH’s interview with Arizona State Fire Managment Officer ( FMO ) David Geyer.
Arizona Forestry was ‘paying’ for one Arizona DPS’s helicopters, and a ‘cooperative’ agreement was in place for AZ Forestry to use up to THREE DPS Helicopters ( at basically ANY time ) for ‘Bucket Work’. on a ‘Initial Attack’.
Arizona Forestry had also seen to it that all the DPS Pilots were ‘certified’ for Bucket Work.
So even if BLM Duty Officer Bruce Olsen hadn’t decided on Friday night that BLM should enter into this ‘cooperative IA’ plan with Shumate and also ‘bring resources’ to Yarnell on Saturday… AZ Forestry ICT4 Russ Shumate still had that ‘DPS Bucket Drop’ option available to him.
NOTE: The following day ( Sunday )… when DPS Helicopter Ranger 58 was finally requested to help in Yarnell… it DID arrive with it’s own ‘Bambi Bucket’ and fully ready to participate in ‘Bucket Work’. It was never used for that purpose on Sunday. Ranger 58 was ONLY being used for RECON on Sunday.
But Shumate COULD have called it in on Saturday if he wanted to… complete with ‘Bucket’.
Actually ( according to FMO David Geyer ), Shumate could have called in up to THREE DPS Helicopters that day… each with its own ‘Bambi Bucket’.
Here is that part of David Geyer’s ADOSH interview…
Q1 = Dave Larsen, ADOSH WFA investigator ( Rest in Peace )
A = David Geyer, Arizona State Forestry’s Fire Management Officer ( FMO )
————————————————————————————–
522 Q1: You have a – you have helitack – state helitack people?
523
524 A: We do not – we do not have our own helicopter. Um, what we have done in
525 the aviation side of the world is this last year we partnered very well with the,
526 uh, the Department of Public Safety, DPS.
527
528 Q1: Okay.
529
530 A: We paid to keep one of their – their helicopters on and it doesn’t mean that
531 that’s our helicopter. What it means is instead of having one or two on that
532 day, they can have two or three. They are all trained. You – this last year, we
533 took them through the bucket work and – and, uh, and so they’re trained at
534 that.
535
536 Q1: Carded for buckets?
537
538 A: Ah… basically for the state land. They’re not for the federal. Um, would I like
539 to see that in the future? But they are – they are a useful tool for the buckets.
540 They have been used for inserting of our own personnel. Um, that – that kind
541 of area. Ah, we can call on the National Guard as well.
————————————————————————————–
The Yarnell fire was definitely on STATE land.
So even if BLM hadn’t decided to bring N14HX to Yarnell on Saturday… Shumate had direct access to up to THREE ‘Bucket capable’ DPS Helicopters on Saturday if he had felt the need to include ‘Bucket Drops’ as part of his ‘Initial Attack’.
Actually… if N14HX itself had NOT just ‘happened’ to be coming to Yarnell on Saturday as part of the ‘cooperative Initial Attack’ plan with BLM… then the moment the Lewis CRWB told Shumate the DOC crews would NOT be able to (quote) “achieve a hike to the fire”… I suppose Shumate would have HAD to call up one of the DPS Helicopters to try and get anyone up there to fight the fire on Saturday.
Without N14HX just ‘accidentally’ being there… Shumate would have then been stuck with 2 full Type 2 Hand Crews standing around in the Yarnell Hill Fire Department parking lot and no way to get any of them up there to fight the fire.
OR… he may have had to turn to the Lewis and Yuma CRWBs and say…
“I’m not sure you fully understand the situation. You have GOT to find a way to hike up there.”
WTKTT and Marti
Know you were Discussing the Air tanker accuracy. wanted to reply.
There are several variables to accuracy. Wind, Height, Terrain & Pilot proficiency.
The average accuracy is probably around 80% some Pilots are better than that but few ever
have a 100% on all drops all year. They do not have bomb sites like Bomb plains its purity much a fly by the seat of your paints thing Pilot estimates of when to let go and adjust for wind, speed, and Height. About the time you really need a great drop Your at their mercy have lost a couple of fires because of a blow out from a missed drop. Also have had great success with others.
That is what I like about Helicopters they are a lot more accurate if they don’t get to close to the ground.
Reply to Bob Powers post January 31, 2015 at 10:46 am
>> Bob Powers said…
>>
>> The average accuracy is probably around 80% some Pilots are better
>> than that but few ever have a 100% on all drops all year.
Copy that. I wasn’t suggesting for one second that ALL of the SEAT drops on Saturday were worthless. Nothing of the sort.
In fact… take a look at the following Jake Guadiana video…
“USB YARNELL HILL 015”
That’s the video clip of that SEAT coming right over the ridge and absolutely NAILING that drop on the side of the ‘escaping’ fire.
It’s absolutely awesome how LOW he was coming ‘blind’ over that ridge and how he absolutely nailed it.
All I was saying is that at the same time there is photographic evidence that SOME of the SEAT drops were SPOT on… there is also some actual photographic evidence of some TOTAL MISSES… and that one of those was at a very critical moment just after the fire had jumped the two-track road ( The Rory Collins photos ).
>> Bob Powers also said…
>>
>> They do not have bomb sites like Bomb plains its purity
>> much a fly by the seat of your paints thing Pilot estimates of
>> when to let go and adjust for wind, speed, and Height.
Exactly. The photographic evidence of the critical MISSED drop doesn’t show any kind of ‘access’ or ‘alignment’ problem. The guy was ‘flying the right line’. It just appears that he totally misjudged the ‘drift’ and it all fell to the ground faster than he thought it would… and just dropped into the black BEHIND the advancing ‘escaped’ fireline.
That just unfortunate. It fell in the WORST place it could where it made no difference at all.
If he had ‘erred’ in the OTHER direction ( towards the Leeward side ), then is MIGHT have then fallen in FRONT of the advancing fireline instead of ON it ( which is what it looks like he was trying to do )… and at least that MIGHT have had some chance of slowing it down.
The whole thing falling BEHIND the fireline and into the black meant it was a worthless drop and had no chance of affecting anything at all.
>> Bob Powers also said…
>>
>> About the time you really need a great drop Your at their mercy
>> have lost a couple of fires because of a blow out from a missed drop.
>> Also have had great success with others.
>> That is what I like about Helicopters they are a lot more accurate
>> if they don’t get to close to the ground.
See a new post above with some testimony from Arizona Fire Management Officer ( FMO ) David Geyer.
He was telling ADOSH that Arizona Forestry ( including ICT4 Shumate ) had access to up to THREE ‘Bucket Capable’ DPS Helicopters basically any time they wanted them… and AZF had seen to it that all the DPS Pilots were ‘certified’ for Bucket Work on State Lands.
Followup…here is a DIRECT link to that Jake Guadiana video referenced above.
This is the one where the SEAT absolutely NAILS the target Saturday evening…
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/20inrene9tcx74a/AAB1Wb5GbaqoEXohtiCKsdyKa/ADOSH%20Yarnell%20Hill%20Investigation/Photos%20and%20Video/ASFD%20Photos/Jake%20Guadiana?dl=0#lh:null-USB%20YARNELL%20HILL%20015.avi
It also might be that AZFire was holding the costs down on Shumate which has not been stated any where and could have been Verbal between the State and Shumate. Just saying that could happen Holding costs down is becoming a reality in the IA of fires No body throws every thing at them any more. He had all he was going to get for Saturday.
Actually… the ADOSH investigators did a pretty good job of following this “line of inquiry’ during their interviews with Russ Shumate AND his own AZF ‘higher ups’ like Arizona State Forestry Fire Management Officer ( FMO ) David Geyer… and Geyers boss, State Forester Scott Hunt himself.
Turns out Scott Hunt says he was pretty much ‘clueless’ about what was happening in Yarnell on Saturday. It wasn’t until the whole ‘Type 2’ request showed up after the Initial Attack FAILED that Hunt was even ‘pulled into the loop’.
David Geyer told ADOSH that about the only ‘understanding’ in the Arizona Forestry system is that if any Incident starts to spend more than $50,000 ( FIFTY THOUSAND ) dollars… he would like to then start to be ‘included in the loop’… but only then for what he called ‘informational purposes’. He said his thinking is that if you are spending more than $50,000 for an ‘Initial Attack’ then that means the fire is probably starting to encroach on other jurisdictions and it would then be time for him to get involved and start doing some ‘Public Relations’ work.
As for Shumate… when he was being asked about whether he had to CONSULT with anyone about what to order up for Initial Attack… he said the following…
———————————————————
I have the abilities and authorities to determine an appropriate management response to a fire.
———————————————————
In other words… NO… I get to call the shots on Initial Attack.
ADOSH didn’t just let it go at that. They pressed him for more information about WHEN he was supposed to go ‘higher up’ and start ‘consulting’ with his superiors…
———————————————————
Q2: Okay. And so if you – if you chose to monitor a fire rather than direct – direct action for whatever the reason maybe, you don’t have to go to a higher level of the organization to get that approved, uh, you can take that action and then tell them that you’ve done it that – or that’s what you’re doing? Or do you need some higher level of approval?
A: I would say that it’s case-by-case. Um, I feel that my time in the agency and my experience level has – would probably afford me more leeway to be more of the – this what I’m doing and not inform you of what I’m doing and the response be okay. I probably have more of that leeway than maybe a newer person might.
Q2: Yeah. So the – the ability to do that doesn’t necessarily come with the position, but with – with the knowledge rather than the position?
A: I would say that’s a fair characterization.
Q2: Okay. All right.
A: I would say that there’s oversight and if somebody else had other ideas that there would be a meeting to determine the best and appropriate management response.
Q2: Okay.
A: So if somebody disagreed with me there would be…
Q2: There would be an opportunity to change that.
A: …an opportunity to reevaluate and s- either me give them my reasons for doing it and them giving you their reasons for wanting to do something else.
Q2: Okay. Yeah. All right. Uh, let’s move on.
————————————————————–
Notice that Shumate was only describing in ‘general terms’ what the normal procedure would be. He doesn’t give any detail about exactly what the situation was THAT weekend… for the Yarnell Hill Fire.
In AZ FMO David Geyer’s ADOSH interview we learn that he certainly was ‘in the loop’ about Shumate’s approach to this ‘Initial Attack’… but it’s pretty clear that it was ‘Shumae’s show’ and there is no evidence DAvid Geyer was putting any LIMITS on what Shumate might have wanted or needed.
The decision to bring in a ‘Type 2’ team after the Intial Attack FAILED is a different story.
The decision to bring in just a Type 2 SHORT team seems to definitely have come out of a phone call conversation between David Geyer and Roy Hall.
Shumate said he ‘had no preference’ regarding the Type 2 ‘short’ versus ‘long’ deal… just as long as a boatload of good OPS people would be showing up the next day.
The actual decision to go with a SHORT team seemed to then be made after Shumate’s request and David Geyer got on the phone with Roy Hall.
It really does LOOK like that decision/suggestion was Roy Hall’s itself… but it’s also not known if David Geyer was ‘bean counting’ on that phone call with Hall and encouraging the ‘cheaper’ option himself.
To the best of my recollection, the state ONLY HAD one team of any Type, and THEY were it! I’m not sure if they had the immediate capability to go either LONG or SHORT, or were strictly just able to respond as a Short Team.
But as far as capability goes, I doubt they could respond as a Long Team, because they were never, EVER, able to put together even a full Short Team when they were under-the-gun.
If the bean counters were riding-herd on all State fire responses during that time period, it is completely understandable how they ended-up with only prison crews and a Short Team.
Understandable, but not necessarily acceptable.
Follow-up clarification:
While I noted above that I believed the “State” (State of Arizona) only had one Team, there WERE also 3 other National Type II Teams in Arizona, as well 2 Southwest Type I National Teams with members from AZ and the SW.
But it was a State fire, and they’re going to budget and staff it as they so choose, and we are left with what we are left with.
According to Roy Hall’s own ADOSH testimony… on Sunday morning… it was 20 minutes BEFORE he even had Russ Shumate make the ‘radio announcements’ that it was now HIS fire that he called AZ FMO David Geyer directly and placed his own order for the FULL Type 2 ‘Central West Zone’ team ( Bea Day’s FULL team ).
From Roy Hall’s ADOSH interview…
Notice the TIME. He said it was only 10:00 AM…
—————————————————–
A: And – and made a suggestion to him based on, uh, now it’s 10 o’clock and the fire is a little more active and it’s moving out to the northeast and northwest towards, uh, Model Creek School. And I made a phone call to David and I suggested to him that they go ahead and place an order for the central west zone type 2 team.
——————————————————-
What happened from that point on is that Roy Hall was now just ‘assuming’ he was going to eventually get Bea Day’s FULL Type 2 team… as he just requested… so he just started calling people on that team ‘off the radar’ and telling them to get their butts to Yarnell.
There had still been no ‘complexity analysis’, no IAP, and not even an ‘official’ transition from Shumate’s ‘Type 4’ incident to the ‘Type 2 Short’ management.
An hour goes by. Hall then calls Jim Downey. Geyer hadn’t even told Downey about Hall’s request for Bea Day’s team yet and Roy Hall reiterated his NEED and wanted them to ‘get on it’….
————————————————-
A: Bea Day was the type 2 IC. Following that call I – at 11:07 had a conversation – or thereabouts with Jim Downey. And Jim Downey and I talked and I said I – has David talked to you about the type 2 team order? And he said no. Uh, I said well you guys need to – you guys need to visit. I’m suggesting – strongly suggesting type team full blown central west zone team, because they’re – they’re closest here…
————————————————-
Immediately after that 11;07 AM call to Downey… Roy Hall says he THEN called Bea Day directly to verify here ‘position in the rotation’ since even though he wanted HER team specifically ( because they were closest ) he wasn’t sure if they were ‘up at bat’ or not.
Roy Hall hears direct from Bea Day herself that YES… her team was ‘UP’ in the rotation…
————————————————-
A: I left it at that recommendation and left the conversation between Jim and David. And then after I got off the phone with Jim, I made a call to Bea Day And, uh – and I called Bea Day and asked her about her position in the rotation.
Q2: Mm-hm.
A: Where are you in that – because I don’t follow that.
Q2: Right.
A: I don’t follow those other team’s rotation. It’s too confusing to me. And I don’t know what the batting order is.
Q2: Right.
A: I don’t keep track. And she said no we are up…
Q2: They were up?
A: They were up.
————————————————-
So my whole point here is that Bea Day’s FULL Central West Zone Type 2 team WAS available.
They were just as available the previous night as Hall was now hearing at 11:00 AM Sunday that they were ‘up’ in the rotation… and available.
The only mystery here is why, when Russ Shumate’s Initial Attack FAILED and he was now on the phone asking for a ‘Type 2’ team… that Bea Day’s FULL team wasn’t immediately thrown into action.
By 10:00 AM the next morning… that’s who Roy Hall would now be ‘ordering’ anyway… and her team WAS not only ‘available’… they WERE, in fact, ‘next up’ in the regular rotation.
I still think Yarnell on Sunday would have been a story of being ‘behind the curve’… but if the ‘Central West Zone Type 2’ team had been activated the night before and had hit the ground running in Yarnell Sunday morning… I think a LOT of things might have been VERY different that day… and ( possibly ) no fatalities that afternoon.
Reply to TTWARE post on January 31, 2015 at 8:01 pm
>> TTWARE said…
>>
>> To the best of my recollection, the state ONLY
>> HAD one team of any Type, and THEY were it!
>> I’m not sure if they had the immediate capability
>> to go either LONG or SHORT, or were strictly
>> just able to respond as a Short Team.
See other reply above. They ( Arizona FMO David Geyer, specifically ) DID have the ability to ‘go LONG’, as they say.
We KNOW ( now ) that Bea Day’s FULL Central West Zone Type 2 team was not only available ( and the closest Type 2 team to Yarnell )… they were, in fact, NEXT UP in the ROTATION.
So we ALSO know now that once Shumate requested a Type 2 on Saturday evening… there was some specific decision on David Geyer’s part to NOT call Bea Day right away.
How do we know that?
WHY would David Geyer even be calling Roy Hall and even asking him if he could take Yarnell as a ‘Type 2 IC’ unless Geyer had already decided to NOT activate the next available Type 2 team on the ‘roster’ itself? ( Bea Day’s team ).
Roy Hall should have never even gotten that phone call.
Shumate asked for a Type 2 team.
The Central West Zone Type 2 was ‘available’, VERY close to the fire itself , and NEXT UP in the rotation.
So WHY did Geyer even call Roy Hall at all?
There is nothing in David Geyer’s ADOSH interview about this.
Geyer DID go into detail about his phone call TO Roy Hall… and said it was ‘during that phone call’ that THEY ( plural? ) decided to go with a SHORT roster…
…but ADOSH never asked him…
“Why did you call Roy Hall at all? Why didn’t you just fill Shumate’s request with the next Type 2 ‘up at bat’ on the roster?”
Just for reference… HERE is that moment in Roy Hall’s ADOSH interview where HE describes that initial phone call he got from David Geyer asking him to take Yarnell as a Type 2 IC.
There is still no explanation here why Geyer was even calling Hall and didn’t just order up the next Type 2 team on the roster ( The Central West Zone Type 2 team )… but at least this is Roy Hall confirming that the decision to go with a SHORT ‘Type 2’ team happened WHILE he and David Geyer were talking on the phone…
From Roy Hall’s ADOSH interview…
—————————————————-
A: I was contacted, uh, Saturday evening the 29th of June, uh, by David Geyer, uh, and – and it was about somewhere between 7:30 and 8 o’clock.
We talked about the – the fire and – and so at that point and time we discussed the – the various options and what they felt like their needs were for that fire.
The agreement was that we would go with a – a compliment of team members – of 17 team members including, uh, an additional resource order for two safety officers, closest available.
—————————————————–
So there it is.
It was just David Geyer and Roy Hall discussing what THEY thought Yarnell needed… and they AGREED that a 17 member team would be OK… instead of calling up the next ACTUAL ( Full ) Type 2 team that was ‘at bat’ on the roster ( Bea Day’s team ).
This was 8:00 PM Saturday evening.
Just 14 hours later… at 10:00 AM Sunday morning… Roy Hall would be calling David Geyer back directly and asking him to order Bea Day’s Central West Zone Type 2 team, anyway.
WTKTT said,
“There is still no explanation here why Geyer was even calling Hall and didn’t just order up the next Type 2 team on the roster ( The Central West Zone Type 2 team )…”
I know I’m stating the obvious here, but a jerry-rigged State Short Team on a state juridiction fire, is going to be a MUCH cheaper hit on the State’s budget than ordering a full-blown national Type II Team.
Of course, no-one in the decision making process will ever concede to that thought process, but if it walks like a duck, and quacks like a duck, then…………………
By the time the dust clears and the REAL ‘Hit on the State Budget’ is over… The Governor and the citizens of Arizona are going to wish Arizona Forestry had done both of the following…
1) Let Shumate spend as much money as needed on Saturday… and get the BEST crews and resources available so long as that Initial Attack SUCCEEDED. Spend money up front.. Don’t FAIL. That’s WAAAY more expensive.
2) Let the FMO ( David Geyer ) just call up the next FULL Type 2 team on the roster… instead of using that hodge-podge of ‘On Call’ retired guys.
Lessons Learned?
The ‘legal’ concept at play here is something called ‘assumption of responsibility’.
So let me also do my own ‘stating the obvious’.
It’s simple.
Once an agency or an entity has ‘assumed responsibility’… then it now has legal obligations to perform that task professionally, expediently, and in a manner that is MOST likely to produce SUCCESS, not FAILURE.
“We thought we could save some money” isn’t gonna cut the cake here.
Totally agree with both of you. And (I’m doing this off the top of my head, but I have things I could post to corroborate this) I think that HAS been one of the things that has changed (especially in
“Region 3”) as a result of Yarnell.
I think there are other more specific Lessons Learned that need to be learned from all of this.
But I think beefing up IAs and resources, once “you” decide to take responsibility for fighting the damn fire, is where things are headed.
Which, of course, in this time of stripping dollars from agencies (both federal and state) responsible for maintaining the health of all kinds of versions of “The Commons,” means that:
If you are going to spend whatever it takes to put out fires before they get “really REALLY expensive” to put out, means less money going to the even messier and more complicated work of reducing the factors that are causing these fires to be so dangerous in the first place.
New Update—Looks like the Board approved benefits for the widows of Misner and Warneke.
today with a unanimous vote against the city of Prescott. So they will get the retirement and health insurance benefits for their families.
Reply to Bob Powers post on January 30, 2015 at 4:03 pm
>> Bob Powers wrote…
>>
>> New Update—Looks like the Board approved benefits for the
>> widows of Misner and Warneke.today with a unanimous vote
>> against the city of Prescott.
That’s GREAT news!
>> Bob Powers also said…
>>
>> So they will get the retirement and health insurance benefits for their families.
I certainly hope so. This was just a decision by The Prescott Board of the Public Safety Retirement System (PSPRS) that they are, indeed, ELIGIBLE for the benefits.
I think the Prescott City Council still has to ‘approve’ that decision… or decide to APPEAL it like they did with the Aschcraft ruling.
They are actually even MORE likely to appeal in this case than in the Ashcraft case because while Ashcraft had definitely been working the ‘full time’ hours for 16 months… Misner and Warneke were only actually HIRED onto GM in April of 2013. They had only been working for Granite Mountain / City of Prescott for 3 months when they died.
The MINIMUM eligibility for the PSPRS retirement benefits is actually 6 months of employment. That’s what makes these cases fundamentally different from Ashcraft.
I’m glad the Prescott PSPRS decided that the 6 month requirement was NOT a deciding factor as far as eligibility goes.
Some people are still talking about erecting life-size bronze statues of each and every one of the Granite Mountain Hotshots ( Warneke and Misner included ) either out at the site or somewhere in Prescott… yet here is the City of Prescott itself still trying to decide if their widows and orphaned children are even entitled to pension and heath benefits.
Unbelievable.
Here’s the ‘Daily Courier’ article about the decision.
Not much detail… but article promises more about it tomorrow ( Saturday ).
http://dcourier.com/main.asp?SectionID=1&SubSectionID=1&ArticleID=141238
Here is the Prescott Daily Courier ‘followup’ article that appeared Saturday…
http://dcourier.com/main.asp?SectionID=1&subsectionID=1086&articleID=141259
It’s still not TOTALLY clear whether this decision on the part of the PSPRS retirement Board decision is the ‘end of the story’… and that it is now a ‘done deal’… but the article does say this…
—————————————————————–
Mayor Marlin Kuykendall, who serves as the chairman of the local fire board, earlier voted against the Andrew Ashcraft survivor retirement benefit, saying at the time that he needed more time to consider the evidence.
On the Misner and Warneke claim, Kuykendall voted for benefits, and said afterward: “We’re glad to get this behind us so everyone can start moving forward.”
—————————————————————-
So it appears that the MAYOR of Prescott is ‘onboard’ with the decision this time and I assume that means he won’t be pushing the City Council to ‘appeal’ the PSPRS decision like he did in Ashcraft’s case.
Darrell Willis testified again… and was FOR the widows and children of Warneke and Misner receiving the standard survivor’s benefits.
There were, apparently, no specific questions ( to Willis or any of the others who testified ) about what ‘happened’ on June 30, 2013… but there was an extensive debate about whether the GM Hotshots were doing ‘hazardous duty’ all the time… a repeat of the same debate from the Ashcraft hearings.
Melissa Fousek is the Human Resources ( HR ) director for City of Prescott.
She was ‘on the stand’ and was the one testifying that for the majority of their employment with the City of Prescott… the GM Hotshots were NOT doing ‘hazardous duty’.
Attorney Patrick McGroder ( representing the families of Misner and Warneke ) asked her if she had any ‘personal information’ to back up her claim…
————————————————————————
Patrick McGroder, attorney for Misner and Warneke, asked Fousek repeatedly whether she had “any personal, any foundational information” to back up her claim that the Hotshots were not regularly assigned to hazardous duty.
————————————————————————
Melissa Fousek apparently responded with some whacky bit of mental gymnastics that the only time they were doing ‘Hazardous duty’ was when they were actually fighting a fire… but otherwise the City didn’t consider them to have a ‘Hazardous’ job and their payroll wasn’t coded as such…
————————————————————————
Even though the Hotshots’ duty was hazardous while they were fighting a fire, Fousek said, they were not regularly assigned to hazardous duty. Their payroll was coded differently for the various duties, she said.
————————————————————————
As far as ‘personal knowledge’ goes… remember this is the SAME “Melissa Fousek’ who was on that ‘Employee Interview Committee’ that interviewed all the GM Hotshots who were applying for the GM Squad Boss job when Philip Maldonado vacated that position in March of 2013… just a few months before the tragedy.
Melissa Fousek was the fourth person along with Eric Marsh, Jesse Steed and Clayton Whitted on that committee that ultimately ended up hiring Robert Caldwell as the replacement for ‘Squad Boss’ Philip Maldonado.
Melissa Fousek herself also directly heard that ‘testimony’ from Andrew Ashcraft during the interviews about that ‘dicey’ situation in Nevada where GM ended up ( apparently ) having to ‘burn out their safety zone’ and ‘survive’ something that was potentially life-threatening.
All FOUR of the interviewers made similar notes as Ashcraft was relating the story of the ‘Nevada safety zone’ burnout and how ‘proud’ he was of himself for ‘keeping a cool head’… but here is interviewer Melissa Fousek’s OWN notes that SHE made while Ashcraft was talking…
————————————————————
Committee Member: Melissa Fousek
GM Hotshot being interviewed: Andrew Ashcraft
PDF page: 10
(3) Nevada – burn out safety zone. Kept a cool head.
Turned out ok.
————————————————————
So there is no doubt that at some point… HR Director Melissa Fousek had been hearing ( with her own ears ) directly from GM Hotshots how ‘dangerous’ the work can be.
Anyway… I hope this is the ‘end of the story’ here with regards to the widows and orphaned children of Billy Warneke and Sean Misner receiving full pension and health benefits.
It should be noted that the ‘children’ involved here are BOTH the babies that were born AFTER the men died. They are the ones that will never have known their fathers at all.
I might add for the record. FS and BLM Fire Fighters who start as a crew person and work up thru the Fire ranks when they get a 13 and 13 appointment they start paying into the Federal retirement system. There part time employment also goes toward there years of service. Because of their hazardous occupation
they build a different retirement system than regular Federal employees.
They can retire at age 50 with 20 years of service and Mandatory at age 55.
Under the Fire and law enforcement Government retirement program.
So it is a very well documented Hazardous work environment even Federal Fire Fighters do not work full time in fire suppression spending winters doing other projects.
Personal Note– I retired at 50 with 33 years FS at almost 75% of my base pay.
Benefits to my Spouse during and after service included 55% of my base pay
or retirement benefits and carried on my health insurance until her death or remarriage. That actually goes for all Federal Employees.
Reply to Marti Reed post on January 29, 2015 at 8:50 pm
>> Marti said…
>>
>> I have to admit, as I’ve looked at the aerial photos, I’ve had a hard time
>> seeing what relationship to the actual fire the retardant drops had.
>>
>> I keep thinking, “Am I missing something?”
Not really.
It was the SEATS that were ‘missing something’… like where they really needed the retardant.
Even a series of photos taken by Rory Collins AFTER the fire escaped shows a SEAT drop taking place that did nothing but fall into the ‘black’ BEHIND the actual ‘escaping’ fire.
That would be Collins’ photos IMG_0246 through IMG_0251.
They were ( apparently ) trying to drop ONTO the now-expanding escaped fireline.
They MISSED. Expected more ‘drift’ than they got and it just fell into the black.
Not sure how MANY times that happened. Probably more than once.
>> Marti also said…
>>
>> You said Nate said:
>>
>> “Right before dark, called IC and asked for intent.
>> He was asked for his order for resources as intent.”
>>
>> I actually have no clue what this means. Should I?
From Shumate’s Unit Log
——————————————————————–
I am now expecting the forces on the hill to stay up all night, and I ask ( Nate ) Peck
to get a supply list together so supplies can be delivered.
——————————————————————–
I read that as the moment when Nate Peck had been watching the SEATS ‘miss their targets’ and he now wanted the IC of this fire to tell him what he and the Lewis inmates up there were supposed to be doing. When the SEATS are ‘missing’… then there’s nothing ‘tie in to’.
The response from Shumate was nothing more than “What groceries do you need?… because we can’t even come and get you out of there now.”
The ONE thing that Shumate says he had been BASING his entire IA plan on ( not putting too many people up there and then having no way to retrieve them ) had now just come true, anyway.
Shumate himself told ADOSH that he basically had NO PLAN AT ALL for those men up there for the night other than for them to just stay safe and watch the fire.
As in… no ‘Intent’ for them other than to just hang around up there and be safe.
From Shumate’s ADOSH interview…
—————————————————————————————
A: Our helispot became compromised so we couldn’t – we shut down the
crews shuttle and dug in, so maybe that’s when I would say the initial attack
was recognized as being failed is when I could no longer put more people
up on the hill and knew that the amount of people on the hill were not gonna
be able to achieve the objectives.
That’s when we told the guys up on the hill to stop doing any, oh, as I recall
you know, if you’re not being effective don’t beat yourself up, just kinda hang
up there, stay safe and monitor and give us – be the eyes up on the hill for us
We changed tactics again from pretty much an offensive, trying to catch it to,
you know, we’re not gonna catch it, we’re in this for the long haul, you guys are
gonna now be up on the hill all night long. Let’s settle in for a – a longer pace –
a -a – more of a marathon pace than a sprint pace, and keep safe up there
through the night, stay in that safe areas, keep people up and monitoring the
fire. If you can be effective, do actually be effective, if you’re not being effective,
then don’t spin your wheels was our mindset, by probably a little after sundown.
—————————————————————————————
So that was all she wrote from Shumate that day… even around sundown.
No ‘Intent’ at all for those firefighters up there… other than just ‘hang out and be safe’.
Not even any DIRECTIVES like ‘at least be sure this thing is anchored’.
Copy.
What more can I say?
I’m just really experiencing severe cognitive dissonance regarding all of this.
I have a lot more trust in/respect for Nate Peck than basically anybody else on this Initial Attack. Seriously.
And yet, I’m thinking, WTF regarding that sling-drop that possibly was done too close to the already spreading/flaring fire and possibly caused it to jump the two track?
Or is it possible that that’s not what happened?
I’m so distrustful of anything that has been written about this (all things considered) by “the authorities” that I don’t know what to even believe.
And why didn’t they seriously line/scrape that area between the fire area and that two track which was their supposed east boundary????
And all those SEAT drops which seem totally extraneous while apparently a decision was made (seriously by whom, really?) not to use the helicopter to drop precision water drops (which is the entire reason to use helicopter drops)???
And what I wrote below about not even trying to call in the Prescott Helitack?
And an Initial Attack Incident Commander that never bothers to even set foot on the fire and is located where he can’t even SEE the fire???
There’s just so much about this whole thing that just boggles my mind.
There has to be something about this that someone doesn’t want anybody to know.
That’s what I’m thinking right now.
PS I’m only a “conspiracy theorist” when nothing else seems to make sense no matter what.
And this whole year of looking at this fire has basically left me with an astounding amount of “this doesn’t make sense.”
Reply to Marti Reed post on January 29, 2015 at 10:33 pm
>> Marti said…
>>
>> I have a lot more trust in/respect for Nate Peck than basically
>> anybody else on this Initial Attack. Seriously.
And it wasn’t even ‘his fire’.
You have to remember… the ONLY reason Chopper N14HX was even THERE on Saturday is basically because of the initial screw-up in the Dispatch log about the LOCATION of the lightning strike. It was originally reported in the Dispatch log as being in ‘Section 20’ of Township 10N, Range 05N.
That’s BLM land.
So BLM Duty Officer Bruce Olsen was immediately responding on Friday night.
It wasn’t until he got there to Yarnell and met up with Shumate that it was determined the fire was ACTUALLY on Arizona State Trust Land… and NOT BLM land.
From that moment on, however, Bruce Olsen had a ‘visual’ and thought that TOMORROW… there MIGHT actually be a ‘smoke’ in one of the other adjoining ‘Sections’ which then MIGHT actually be BLM land… and now in HIS lap.
So that’s when the whole ‘cooperative Initial Attack’ plan was agreed to.
BLM was going to ‘stay engaged’ just because of a ‘possibility’ something might actually popup on BLM land the NEXT DAY.
That’s where Helicopter N14HX, BLM ICT3 Dean Fernandez, and the Moki Helitack came from. This ‘idea’ that BLM would then move forces currently in ‘Severity’ mode ( and already being paid ) closer to Yarnell so BLM could react to something on THEIR turf without spending any additional money other than ‘Severity’ funds ( already being spent ).
So yes… Nate Peck got ‘dropped off’ at that Helispot… but I’ll bet he had no idea that was going to happen until Shumate radioed N14HX en-route for RECON and told them his DOC Crew Boss just informed him that the 2 Arizona Crews he ordered up were NOT even going to be be able to ‘hike’ to the damn fire.
That’s when it all changed. Now they knew they were going to have to actively assist the Arizona Forestry guy ( Shumate ) and help him get his people out to that only visible smoke.
The ORIGINAL plan was just to use N14HX for RECON, and then STAGE it at YFD Helibase ( still in ‘Severity’ funding ) just in CASE other smokes popped up. Then Fernandez was going to use HIS resources ( N14HX and Moki ) to handle the OTHER ‘Incident’ in the area.
That’s what Shumate and Fernandez BOTH say the PLAN actually was.
Shumate would handle the visible smoke with Arizona money/resources.
Fernandez would move BLM Severity resources closer to Yarnell just in CASE another smoke popped up ( and might be on a BLM land Section now ).
So there was poor Nate Peck up on a mountain all day WITHOUT his own Moki crew around him… just pitching in trying to help an AZF DOC Crew Boss, a Lewis Prison Sergeant, and four inmates fight a fire.
I don’t think that was how Nate Peck thought his day was going to go when he was having his morning coffee.
>> Marti also said…
>>
>> And yet, I’m thinking, WTF regarding that sling-drop that possibly
>> was done too close to the already spreading/flaring fire and
>> possibly caused it to jump the two track?
We still don’t know if Nate Peck or Jake Guadiana were even TOLD that was coming. They might have been just still trying to get after the ‘creeping’ fire and the next thing they knew this Chopper is over their heads trying to drop bladder bags. Shumate knew Peck wasn’t at the Helispot. It might have been Shumate who just said… “Get this crap up there to them ASAP. Just drop it where they are working.”
Nate Peck might have had his own WTF moment when he saw that chopper coming down on them with some slingload.
Again… we have NOT heard near enough of this ‘story’ from ANY of the people that were actually UP there that day.
>> Marti also said…
>>
>> Or is it possible that that’s not what happened?
Yes. See above. Only the people that were UP there can say fer sure and their interviews might still be ‘accidentally’ sitting behind that Arizona Forestry filing cabinet where the Peeples Valley Firefighters testimony, photos and cellphone records also are.
>> Marti also said…
>>
>> And why didn’t they seriously line/scrape that area between
>> the fire area and that two track which was their supposed
>> east boundary????
The SEATS were there and ‘dropping’ before anyone even got up there that day.
Their ‘assignment’ ( according to Shumae ) was to ‘box the fire’… yet no attempt was ever made to even ‘reinforce the east-side two-track’ with retardant.
Shumate said something about the ‘steepness” prevented that?
From Russ Shumate’s SAIT interview ( notes )…
“SEATS finished box but didn’t line road due to steepness holding road”.
Around NOON… Shumate let the SEATS ( and Air Attack ) go because he thought they now had a good ‘box’ around the fire… but they didn’t.
The EAST containment line ( the two-track ) had NOT been reinforced in any way.
One more turn-around with the SEATS could have taken care of that, but it didn’t happen.
>> Marti also said…
>>
>> And all those SEAT drops which seem totally extraneous while
>> apparently a decision was made (seriously by whom, really?)
>> not to use the helicopter to drop precision water drops (which
>> is the entire reason to use helicopter drops)???
No one can ever expect SEATS to hit their targets ALL the time… but unfortunately that SEAT drop that MISSED ( photo-documented by Collins ) was a really CRITICAL one.
The ‘escaped’ fire was still just sort of a ‘half bowl’ shape and anything ON it or in FRONT of it might have really made a dent in that fireline.
It didn’t happen. They MISSED.
Shortly after that… it ‘took off’ down that deep drainage and then turned into the ‘V’ shape seen in the Guadiana vidoes and other photos.
It had TWO sides to it now… buring both downhill and UP the sides of the drainage at the same time and eventually turning into that ‘circle fire’ seen in the after-dark photos taken on Saturday.
The time to have CAUGHT it with a good SEAT drop had passed.
That’s the drop that MISSED.
>> Marti also said…
>>
>> And what I wrote below about not even trying to call in the Prescott Helitack?
>>
>> And an Initial Attack Incident Commander that never bothers to even
>> set foot on the fire and is located where he can’t even SEE the fire???
>>
>> There’s just so much about this whole thing that just boggles my mind.
>>
>> There has to be something about this that someone doesn’t want
>> anybody to know.
>>
>> That’s what I’m thinking right now.
Of course there are ( and have always been ) things that Arizona Forestry doesn’t want people to KNOW here…. as far as DETAILS go.
The LIABILITY is HUGE for them… and they know it.
I just hope the good folks at Arizona Forestry do realize that withholding evidence in civil proceedings carries the same penalties as if it was a criminal proceeding.
It’s a FELONY.
Copy.
Hang in there, imperfect Yarnell Homeowners!
So does this all beg the question:
Who was in charge of directing all those SEAT drops??
There’s no real evidence that part of the IA wasn’t just going down the way it usually does. The AA shows up, gets some general ‘intent’ directives… and then the Air guys just go about their business. The ACTUAL detail decisions about where the ACTUAL drops should go are the just up to AA or lead plane guy(s) or gal(s).
Saturday morning
AA over Yarnell was Dan Eckstein. Call sign 0ED.
Rory Collins was dealing with a busted plane that morning. General ‘intent’ was to BOX that small fire in up on the ridge. Shumate was told that had been accomplished and he let all the SEATS and Eckstein go around NOON. In reality… the fire had NOT been fully boxed. There had been no attempt to even reinforce that all-important EAST side containment boundary ( the two-track road ) NOR had any retardant been dropped on that ‘pocket of green’ which was going to ‘flare up’ later on and cause the fire to jump the two-track.
Not only did Incident Commander Shumate never set foot up there where his fire was… Shumate never even used Helo N14HX to do his own RECON of the fire at ANY time that day.
Saturday afternoon
When things started going south… Shumate called Air Attack and SEATS back to Yarnell.
This time he got AA Rory Collins. Call sign 9QY.
General ‘intent’ was ‘stop the slopover’.
Some of the SEAT drops hit target… but some of the most critical ones at the most critical moments completely MISSED intended targets.
It was this AA (Collins) who said the terrain wasn’t appropriate for a VLAT and he said he “couldn’t use it”, and that is pretty much the sole reason Shumate declined the VLAT that was being offered to him by Dispatch.
I really think we should, now that we’ve gone over what happened on Saturday, June 29, 2013, with as much of a fine-tooth comb as I think we have available, do a re-look at John Dougherty’s article of October 17, 2013 called “Yarnell Hill Fire Investigation Ignored Major Mistakes by the State.”
http://www.investigativemedia.com/yarnell-hill-fire-investigation-ignored-major-mistakes-by-the-state/
I did, today, and a number of little things regarding the Initial Attack caught my attention, as well as one fairly big thing.
My computer’s overstuffed right now and typing slow and all (so I may have to post this and reboot etc) but this one thing really bothered me today.
It seems, according to this article, that the Prescott Dispatch Center made a seriously significant effort to offer the resources they had access to on the night the fire was ignited. Their efforts were dismissed.
I, personally, don’t feel comfortable second-guessing Shumate’s decision to not attack the fire that night.
However. one asset Prescott Dispatch Center had access to was the Prescott National Forest Heli-Rappel Crew and its helicopter.
That crew and helicopter could have flown to Yarnell way earlier on Saturday morning than N14HX was able to. The crew is very experienced. Moki Helitack was handicapped by their distance from the fire. It took awhile for them to all get to Yarnell. Thus, I guess, Shumate’s thinking in terms of trying to utilize a DOC crew to do the Initial Attack instead of Moki Helitack. (Which, IMHO, could have easily put that fire out on Saturday).
I don’t know what helicopter Prescott Helitack was using in 2013, but, since it was a Rappel crew (with the skills and equipment to rappel), that tells me they might have had a bigger, more powerful helicopter than Moki Helitack had.
It would have taken them, what, an hour to get up to Yarnell? Maybe an hour and a half for the rest of the crew to get there???? Like really???
OK so I can’t guarantee they were available. I don’t know. But Shumate never even took up Prescott Dispatch on their offer to help, so there’s no record as to what Prescott Dispatch had to offer.
I’ve been thinking about this all day.
I think we should really look at what’s in this article.
Things have come a long way ( evidence wise ) since that original article ( and the actual start of this ongoing discussion ).
There were still, at that time, just rumors that all kinds of offers had been made to Shumate on behalf of professional and volunteer firefighters to just ‘go up there and take care of it’.
It was their backyard. Their turf. They knew it was a little ‘risky’… but they are Firefighters ( after all ) and they knew how to balance their own risks and how to handle themselves.
They wouldn’t have made the offer if they didn’t think it was perfectly ‘doable’ and within their capabilities.
We know NOW that those were never just rumors. It’s true. Offers were made by people that were perfectly capable of handling that lighting hit in its infancy to just go on up there and do just that… but Shumate REFUSED those offers of help.
Because Arizona Forestry has NEVER released those interviews they did with both the Peeples Valley and Yarnell Fire department personnel… it wasn’t even really until the first anniversary of the fire that we learned from Bob Brandon and Ron Smith themselves that Peeples Valley FFs had, indeed, offered to just go up there and ‘take care of it’ on Friday evening ( even with daylight left )… but Shumate refused their assistance.
Maybe that really is WHY all these known interviews and photographs and cellphone records that Arizona Forestry took from ALL of the Peeples Valley Firefighters have still never seen the light of day.
We ALSO know now that what happened Saturday morning was the ‘game changer’.
Shumate had seen the terrain ( and the location of the fire had been pointed out to him ) while there was still daylight on Friday night.
If he had ANY doubts that evening as he was doing his ordering that the Arizona DOC crews were not going to be able to handle that terrain… then he shouldn’t have ordered them in the first place. He should have gone for ( as you say ) straight Helitack or Type 1 crews right from the get-go.
He didn’t. He was AOK with being told to use the DOC crews and he left it at that.
It was only when he was then TOLD at 10:00 AM the next morning by the CRWB of the Lewis crew ( Jake Guadiana ) that there was no way either his ( or the Yuma ) crew was going to be able to (quote) “achieve the hike to the fire” that everything CHANGED.
Only NOW did all the ( what would prove to be ) crippling ‘limitations’ enter the picture.
He’s now standing there in the parking lot of the YFD with two full crews and no way to get them up there. Shumate didn’t even know, at that point, if there WAS any valid ‘Helispot’ up there that could even be used by any non-rapel capable Helitack or for crew shuttle.
He still had to wait another HOUR of precious morning fire-fighting time just to find that out.
He now had to radio ahead to N14HX that in addition to its planned RECON… could he ( pretty please ) look around up there for a valid Helispot.
He got lucky.
If not for that para-gliding club that had accidentally cleared that circle up there… he would have been completely screwed with two full crews standing around and no way to get to the fire.
NOW he would have had to order rapel-capable Helitack… and who knows how many MORE hours would then be lost.
OR maybe only NOW would he have had to take the Peeples Valley Firefighters up on the offer they made the night before and let them go up there and take care of it. They seemed to be SURE that THEY could have ‘achieved the hike’ the day before… so I’m sure they were just as capable of doing that on Saturday as well… despite the inabilities of the DOC crews.
So yes… we know a LOT more about the circumstances on Saturday, and the decison makeing ( or lack thereof ) that happened.
But there is still so much MORE to know to get the ‘complete’ picture.
There is STILL no good, detailed account of what really went ON up there all of Saturday afternoon… or how Shumate could have said Guadiana told him they were ‘on track’ for ‘job done’ and ‘dust off’ and then… just an hour later… it was a fire that no one could control.
Followup… meant to include this link ( and quote ) up above…
On-scene Peeples Valley Firefighters ( who knew the area and the location of the fire ) offered to hike up there and put it out Friday afternoon/evening… but Arizona Forestry ICT4 Russ Shumate refused their offer.
The Prescott Daily Courier
A Narrow escape: Peeples Valley firefighters recount that frightening day
Published: 6/30/2014 6:00:00 AM – by Joanna Dodder Nellans
http://dcourier.com/main.asp?SectionID=1&SubSectionID=1&ArticleID=133345
From the article…
———————————————————————————
Bob Brandon, a former Peeples Valley fire chief who helped start the department, hopes that one of the lessons learned from the fire is that fire commanders will listen more to local firefighters.
He said Peeples Valley firefighters wanted to hike in and put out the Yarnell Hill wildfire the day lightning ignited it, but were told to stand down.
———————————————————————————
Not only did the Initial Attack fail on the part of Arizona Forestry, the organization continued to fail with the management and organization of this incident. So they failed on IA (for reasons this site has documented),then activate a Type 2 short team on Saturday evening. Again a failure, is Shumate the only employee of the state? He is currently the IC of an expanding incident, he ordered a team and where is his help? At the point the team was ordered other “agency folks” should be assisting in developing the packet for transition in the morning / and the In brief of the type 2 team. This packet would include goals and objectives, budget to work with, safety concerns, environmentally sensitive areas, private property concerns, and the “Delegation of Authority”. Prior to the transition on Sunday morning this “in brief ” with the Type 2 team should have occurred – no reason not to! To take the fire with limited intel and the comment of ” take the fire and put it out” or something to that effect is totally unacceptable and surprising the incoming IC would take the fire. Again a major event and failure in the overall “Command and Control” of this incident
Oh, and then the failure of not releasing information so we can all learn from the mistakes made. Extremely disappointing Arizona Forestry! We all need to learn from our mistakes!!!
“Again a failure, is Shumate the only employee of the state? He is currently the IC of an expanding incident, he ordered a team and where is his help? At the point the team was ordered other “agency folks” should be assisting in developing the packet for transition in the morning / and the In brief of the type 2 team.”
I was really hoping to find some discussion of this in the ADOSH interviews of Shumate’s upper-ups.
Nada.
There was a full Type 2 Team available in Prescott………Bea Day’s team.
They were the ones Roy Hall was having to “call up” all day Sunday to fill the holes in his team.
Someone in the Arizona Department of Forestry Office decided, “Nah. Let’s go with the Short Team.”
And Shumate said, “Whatever.”
Shumate, who never stepped foot on “his” fire.
Yep, and regardless of which team was ordered – someone still needs to gather information for the in- brief and transition. This is not the role of the IC, although he needs to provide intel, but the Host Agency needs to gather this information for the incoming Team. I have never been involved in an incident that we didn’t have a formal “in brief” for the team and a Delegation of Authority prior to taking the fire. This doesn’t mean we didn’t have team members already in the field trying to gather intel and assist.in suppression efforts , but the transition needs to be official. As far as I can tell there never was an ” Official transition” to the type 2 short team- just my opinion
WTKTT~
Yesterday at 1:54 PM you wrote:
“Actually… just shortly after the ADOSH report came out there was some pretty heated discussion on this ongoing forum about what REALLY happened on Saturday.
The SAIT investigation of Saturday was a joke… but ADOSH took a closer look and although we were a long way from actually seeing all the interviews they did… it was obvious when the report came out that ADOSH knew a lot about what went on Saturday from what had come out in THEIR interviews.”
I’ve been looking for that “heated discussion” and, so far, haven’t been able to find it. Can you give me a link or something?
Thanks!
Reply to Marti Reed post on January 29, 2015 at 10:50 am
>> Marti said…
>>
>> I’ve been looking for that “heated discussion” and, so far, haven’t
>> been able to find it. Can you give me a link or something?
The following might get a little ‘messy’… because the discussions about what happened Saturday really had been ‘fading in and out’ of primary focus really since the very beginning.
Best way I can do this is to just use a whole bunch of separate REPLIES here with direct links to prior posts in different ‘Chapters’ of this ongoing discussion ( since there still can’t be more than 1 link per post here without a comment falling into ‘moderation’. ).
The ‘heated discussion’ I was actually referring to is included in the list below.
First things first…
This entire ‘ongoing discussion’ ( and what is now known as Chapter 1 ) was actually just the series of comments that started appearing in response to InvestigativeMEDIA’s original article ( published on October 17, 2013 ) entitled…
Yarnell Hill Fire Investigation Ignored Major Mistakes by the State
October 17, 2013 By John Dougherty 1,036 Comments
http://www.investigativemedia.com/yarnell-hill-fire-investigation-ignored-major-mistakes-by-the-state/
It was THAT article itself that, for the first time, had some pretty heavy detail about what actually happened on SATURDAY”… and that it was the Lewis DOC crew that was really up there trying to fight the fire that day.
From the article…
————————————————————————
More than 17 hours passed from the initial lightning strike before the state had firefighters helicoptered to within a quarter-mile of the fire at 10:48 a.m. on Saturday, June 29. By this time, the fire was reported at eight acres. Its size was reduced to about two acres shortly after noon.
Not only was the state slow to respond, it sent in an ill-equipped, six-man crew from Lewis State Prison that wasn’t trained to handle initial attacks on wildfires (such crews generally are used for mop-up operations), wildfire experts say. But dispatching $1-an-hour-per-man prison crews rather than deploying more experienced firefighters, such as hotshot crews — which cost about $800 an hour — is a way for the state to save money fighting forest fires.
————————————————————————
So right off the bat… this ‘ongoing discussion’ was ALSO about what happened on Saturday as well as what led to the fatalities on Sunday.
This article ALSO contained that crucial interview with former Yarnell Fire Chief Peter Andersen… which is also the first moment ( way back in October of 2013 ) when we learned that there WAS ‘Bambi Bucket’ capability on Saturday… but it was NEVER used.
He and his wife had driven to Wickenberg between 10-11 AM on Saturday morning and Andersen recalls seeing that BLM chopper ( N14HX ) still sitting down at the Weaver Helibase near Wickenberg. That actually matches the known timing and the Fernandez photographic evidence. N14HX didn’t even leave the Weaver helibase for Yarnell until around 10:15 AM.
I added a complete transcript of that Chief Andersen interview to the comments section following the article… and here is a ‘partial cut’ from that article with Chief Andersen’s comments about what was NOT happening on both FRIDAY and SATURDAY…
———————————————————————————
Q: They got here too late?
Too LITTLE, too late.
They got dozers out there… ah… We built an emergency escape route for Yarnell in case there was a burnout like this and people were unable to get out. We had an emergency escape route for either Yarnell to get out through Glen Ilah or Glen Ilah to get out through Yarnell… and it was back there… well… it went through that area below the Shrine… west of the Shrine… and they had dozers back there widening that so that it would create a fire break.
Too little, too LATE, man.
You shoulda been done doin’ all that Saturday morning.
If they didn’t get that thing out Friday night… which… in my mind there’s NO reason for that to have not… not been put out.
BLM station down here… the Weaver Mountain station… has a helicopter. It was there.
When we went to… ah… my wife and I went to Wickenberg at about… maybe 10 o’clock on Saturday. At the bottom of the hill at an antique store was where we found out that there’d been a fire… and… as we drove by the BLM station I saw this helicopter sittin’ there.
They have a 300 gallon Bambi bucket.
They’ve been given permission to draw out of Hidden Springs Horse Ranch. They have a horshoe shaped lake that they use for training… er.. fer ah… like trainin’ their thoroughbreds and stuff… and… uh… Patrick Barnard has given ‘em permission to draw out of his pond…
…and nobody did.
Q: So they coulda used a chopper to get people up Friday night or early Saturday morning?
They could have DRIVEN to that on Friday night.
And they weren’t doing ANYTHING on Saturday. They were watching it.
And it was… COOKING. I mean… the whole ridge.
That’s the reason I went to the Fire Station when I came back from Prescott. I didn’t come home.
I went to the Fire Station and I said… WHAT… IS… UP???
You TOLD me this afternoon that you guys were on this… that you had it under control. I said this is… this thing’s over 500 acres now. It’s huge.
Q: By Saturday afternoon?
Saturday afternoon… when we WENT to Prescott… we could see a column of smoke… and I’d been told in Pres… in Congress that they’d gotten it OUT Friday night.
So I broke out my cellphone and I called Bruce Olson. I didn’t know Bruce was on the fire but I knew Bruce was this area’s BLM guy. Turned out he WAS on the fire… and he told me “Well… ya know we’ve got it under control, we’re watchin’ it, we’re keepin’ it… ”
They… they had crews up there on Saturday afternoon doing somethin’. ??
Course.. it was ineffective… but…
Without AIR in an area like this…you might as well get out there and piss on it.
Course… that woulda been better than what they WERE doin’.
———————————————————————————
1,036 comments then streamed in about this article… and that started this entire ‘ongoing discussion’ really rolling and those comments would eventually ‘max out’ the WordPress software comments for one article and become known as CHAPTER 1 of this ongoing discussion.
Starting a series of ‘replies’ now to provide more links to important discussions about Saturday that then started ‘fading in/out’ of the ongoing discussion…
Comment about the Lewis crew and Saturday sort of ‘came and went’ throughout Chapters 1 and 2. The ‘focus’ there really was still on trying to decipher the SAIR report and what happened on Sunday.
At the start of Chapter 3 ( end of December / Early January ) is when ‘Robert the Second’ said…
http://www.investigativemedia.com/chapter-iii-for-comments/#comment-7472
—————————————————————————-
Robert the Second says – January 3, 2014 at 9:37 pm
WTKTT, I have heard that before about the radios and it’s similar to what has occured on other shelter deployments, so I’ll go with you on that issue.
But the escape by the AZ State inmates? It was their blunder, their inattention, whatever, that caused the escape of a CONTAINED FIRE ALONG A JEEP ROAD. We’re not talking a one foot handline here; we’re talking a 10′-12′ road ! WTF, over ! THAT is what started the ball cascading downhill, Shumate’s response notwithstanding.
WantsToKnowTheTruth says – January 3, 2014 at 10:01 pm
>> RTS said…
>> But the escape by the AZ State inmates?
>> It was their blunder, their inattention.
You’re right. They were there with the tools. It was THEIR job. They blew it.
The lawyers will determine Shumate’s ‘involvement’ ( or lack thereof ).
Robert the Second says – January 3, 2014 at 9:22 pm
WTKKT, Shumate didn’t let it jump the road, it was the squad of AZ State inmates that let it jump the road that should have know better. THAT is when it all went downhill, and not talking about the fire here.
WantsToKnowTheTruth replied – January 3, 2014 at 9:30 pm
Shumate was in charge. There was time to recover and the logs show he blew that, too. I’m not going to go there. The lawsuits filed are going to settle all that and what really went down on Saturday.
The Truth Will Always Remain Elusive says – January 4, 2014 at 1:46 pm
RTS, CORRECTION: It wasn’t a blunder by the inmates, they were all probably working their asses off, and doing what they were told. It WAS, however, their LEADERSHIP that let it get away, along with the leadership above those leaders.
————————————————————————
This dicussion then got a little ‘heated’ but only because there were still people commenting at that time who were trying to ‘shut down’ the entire conversation and practicing the ‘nothing to see here… why don’t you all just move along’ approach to participating in the discussion.
There were still some people commenting who didn’t think that anyone who doesn’t piss forest green had no right to make any comments about the Yarnell Hill Fire.
During this ‘noisy’ discussion about Saturday… and Shumate’s potential negligence… Mr. David Turbyfill himself chimed in.
His comment is next ‘Reply’ with a direct link because Mr. Turbyfill had a LOT of important things to say and his entire comment is worth reading…
Typo up above.
The paragraph above should have read like this…
“There were still some people commenting ( at that time ) who thought that anyone who doesn’t piss forest green had no right to make any comments about the Yarnell Hill Fire.”
http://www.investigativemedia.com/chapter-iii-for-comments/#comment-8982
David Turbyfill says – January 18, 2014 at 3:59 pm
Hello to all, my name is David Turbyfill; I am the father of Travis, One of the Members of the Granite Mountain Hotshot Group Crew.
I’ve always felt from the beginning, that there has been huge misjudgments and mistakes made by the fire management teams. From the time on Friday evening the decision was made that the fire was too difficult to get to, and the lack of a decisive aggressive attack on Saturday, June 29.
http://www.investigativemedia.com/chapter-iii-for-comments/#comment-8259
WantsToKnowTheTruth says – January 10, 2014 at 11:43 pm
>> TTWARE also said…
>> I have been wondering lately about if there were any, key,
>> irreversible, turning points over the course of the whole incident.
I don’t disagree with your analysis above at all… I think it’s spot
on… but there are still a LOT of people who still think that the
‘irreversible’ sequence of events started Friday night, and
then again on Saturday. Sunday was the real circus… but the
circus parade started the Friday before. That is, in fact, what a
WHOLE bunch of lawyers are going to be arguing quite soon on
behalf of a lot of residents of that area.
WantsToKnowTheTruth says
January 10, 2014 at 11:43 pm
Reply to TTWARE post on January 10, 2014 at 9:05 pm.
>> TTWARE said
>>
>> Many, many avenues, still need to be thoroughly investigated,
>> both on this site, and if necessary, through the courts, to
>> get the truth out into the open.
Sadly… yes.
Around the END of CHAPTER 3 and into the start of CHAPTER 4… the discussions about the failed Initial Attack were ‘revisted’ on and off… and that is when I first proposed that since no one still really knew WHAT had been happening up there all day Saturday… that there was still a possibility that the fire had ‘escaped’ due to an ‘out of control’ indirect burnout up there.
CHAPTER 4
WantsToKnowTheTruth says – February 15, 2014 at 11:04 pm
**
** THE SAIT DID USE THE WORDS ‘MOPPING UP’ TO DESCRIBE
** THE FIRE STATUS ON SATURDAY MORNING.
This is a follow-up to a previous post where Sitta wondered if the
words ‘mop up’ or ‘mopping up’ were ever actually used to describe
the status of the Yarnell HIll Fire on Saturday morning… when all
reports agree the fire was only 2-4 acres and showing ‘little to
no fire activity’.
As it turns out… that is exactly how the SAIT described it.
The OFFICIAL SAIT documentation DOES say that one of the things DOC Lewis
crew was actually doing on Saturday morning/afternoon was simply ‘mopping up’ ( their words ) the Yarnell Hill Fire.
The specific words ‘mopping up’ were written by the SAIT investigation team itself
in their preliminary report that they released just 72 hours after the incident
and after the first pass of interviews.
That original 72 ‘summary’ report from the SAIT is still online here…
http://www.azsf.az.gov/system/files/documents/files/Yarnell%20Hill%20Fire%20Summary%20Revised%207-18-2013%2016%2030.pdf
It contains one of the only specific quotes about what the Lewis DOC crew’s
actual ‘assignment’ was on Saturday morning, June 29, 2013.
That quote is as follows…
“A six man squad from Lewis Crew and one BLM helitack crewman were flown
into the fire ( Saturday, 10:30 AM ) by the BLM light helicopter.
( An additional 7 members of the DOC Lewis crew ‘hiked in’ to the same spot
for a total of 14 firefighters there at the 2-4 acrew fire showing little to no activity
at that time. ) Firefighters made progress hot-spotting the few active areas and
MOPPED UP (extinguishing burning material) along the two track jeep road.”
This preliminary SAIT report released just 72 hours after the Yarnell incident
is also the ONLY official document that gives any detail at all about what
happened later that afternoon… when the fire ‘jumped the jeep road’ and
became the fire that would need to be fought on Sunday.
That quote is as follows…
“At about 4:30 p.m. a small unburned island on the east side of the fire
flamed up and spotted across the two track jeep road on the east side
(called a “slopover”).”
That mention of a ‘small unburned island’ is never mentioned again in
any other official report. All the (final) official reports simply said that
sometime around 4:30 PM the fire that had been ‘fully contained on
all sides’ for over 5 hours suddenly ( and inexplicably ) ‘jumped the jeep road’.
So even though the SAIT specifically says the Lewis DOC crew was
just ‘hot-spotting’ and ‘mopping up’ all day ( along the two-track jeep
road ) there still is no evidence whether they were using any ‘indirect
attack’ or ‘burnoffs’ of their own to accomplish that… or whether any
such ‘manual burnoff’ might have been how the fire “accidentally”
escaped over the jeep road circa 4:30.
The actual link to the COMMENT above about ‘mopping up’ ( and the discussion that followed that ) is here…
http://www.investigativemedia.com/chapter-iv-comments/#comment-10883
Followup… it should be noted that even now… there really is no detail on WHAT Nate Peck and the Lewis crew were really DOING up there all of Saturday afternoon… but MORE is known about other things now.
The Lewis crew was NOT really fully up there and ‘at work’ on that that fire until upwards of 12:15 PM that Saturday.
That’s a full HOUR AND A HALF LATER than Russ Shumate said they were all ‘up there’ in his Unit Log ( He said they were ‘inserted’ at 10:45 AM )
We also know now that using Bucket Drops WAS discussed… but it was the opinion of the Moki Helitack AND Shumate that it would be better to NOT use that option at all and just send up 12 bladder bags. This decision was made BEFORE the fire ‘escaped’ over the two track.
We also know now that SEVERAL TIMES that day ( and long before the fire escaped ) BLM Rep ( and ICT3 ) Dean Fernandez had been urging Shumate to set up some ‘Pumpkins’ for potential ‘Bucket Work’ in support of the operations up on the ridge. Shumate never took any actions on these suggestions until AFTER the fire had ‘escaped’.
We also know much more now about the TIMING and the LOCATION of the ‘hover delivery’ of those 12 bladder bags. Moki Helitack Nate Peck was NOT at the Helispot when Jake Guadiana called down to Shumate and said the fire was now ‘creeping’… so the delivery of the bladder bags was directly to the spot where Moki Helitack Nate Peck and the Lewis Crew were trying to ‘catch’ the fire.
I no longer think it is likely that these men were doing any kind of ‘indirect burning’ up there and that THAT is what caused the fire to jump the road.
Shumate himself says that the fire ESCAPED over the two-track WHILE they were delivering the 12 bladder bags directly to the fire area.
I think it is MUCH more likely now that the ‘flare up’ and the ‘escape’ over the two-track was a result of the ‘rotor wash’ inflaming the fire as this delivery of the 12 bladder bags was taking place.
Thanks for writing this all up, WTKTT!
After writing that, I kept hunting and found the long long collection of comments and replies in Chapter IV and spent the morning reading them.
Explains how it took us until now to figure out (especially using the photos) that those helicopter trips weren’t described accurately in the official reports. They really jumbled that up!
Pretty clear to me that the SAIT/SAIT set the “official record” and then ADOSH and Wildland Fire Associates pretty much copy/pasted their narrative and then that became the reinforced narrative.
The other thing that stands out in my mind right now is the fact that, as you noted, the only mention of that little “island of green” that flared up was only in the synopsis and then became conveniently forgotten.
I’ve also appreciated the fire-fighters here underscoring the importance of the IC being “boots on the ground” on the fire. I think a lot of the confusion etc had a lot to do with the guy with the most authority/accountability not even being where he could actually see, much less taste, smell, feel, walk, i.e. be present where the fire was even burning.
I gotta go real quick. Mom took a turn for the worse, and I had to scramble to make sure with the credit union that her accounts were prepped to go quickly where they need to just in case. Turns out we set them up the right way from the get-go, but that was seven years ago, and I couldn’t remember.
Apparently, though, Terra’s there and mom’s feeling better. It’s really been rough.
**
** AIR ATTACK RORY COLLINS ADVISED SHUMATE NOT TO ORDER VLAT
Reply to Marti Reed post on January 27, 2015 at 11:23 pm
>> Marti said…
>>
>> I am also currently wondering if Air Attack Rory Collins had anything to
>> do with the decision-making on Saturday.
You damn betcha.
When Shumate was told the HEAVY Air Tanker he had ordered up to try and catch this ‘escaped’ fire ( because the SEATS weren’t able to keep up with the spread ) was NOT going to be available… but was then offered a VLAT instead…
…it was the Air Attack over the fire that late afternoon ( Rory Collins ) who ( together with BLM Rep Dean Fernandez ) advised against it.
Shumate admitted to ADOSH he basically didn’t know jack shit about VLATS… so he ‘punted’ that decision to Air Attack Rory Collins and Dean Ferandez ( who, himself, was recently carded as an AA ).
Rory Collins and Dean Fernandez were both of the opinion that the TERRAIN was not right for a VLAT… and Rory Collins additionally thought there wouldn’t be enough ‘time over the fire’ for the VLAT… and Shumate completely deferred to their judgement and ( as IC ) refused the VLAT.
From Russ Shumate’s ADOSH interview on October 18, 2013
——————————————————————————————-
1000 Q5: Yeah. At some point they offered you up a VLAT?
1001
1002 A: That is correct.
1003
1004 Q5: And uh, what – do you remember what the rationale was? Uh, was it based on
1005 input from air attack or…
1006
1007 A: Yes.
1008
1009 Q5: …or was it your own decision about not taking the VLAT at that point?
1010
1011 A: Well, I will say it was my responsibility to say yes or no. I have like almost
1012 everybody in fire service, very little experience with a VLAT, so I honestly
1013 don’t know what it can do and what it can’t do, especially at that time. I’ve
1014 learned a lot since.
1015
1016 Q5: Yeah.
1017
1018 A: But at that time, I – it’s one of those things that I really don’t know what, so
1019 the question I posed to Dean Fernandez, who was a carded air attack, and the
1020 po- question I posed to Rory (Collins) was, they’re offering us the VLAT, is it a tool
1021 that we can use? Both of them came to the conclusion, they thought that the
1022 terrain was not what they could utilize the VLAT on, both – both of those
1023 people had that determination, and then Rory had the additional determination
1024 that if we launch it now and get it here, I don’t know if I can finish its work
1025 before pumpkin time. Which, is cut off.
1026
1027 Q5: Mm-hm.
1028
1029 A: When they have to leave the…
1030
1031 Q2: Sun goes down.
1032
1033 A: Yeah. So, based on – and – and we had 10 minutes to make a decision,
1034 because other – because flight time and pumpkin time would’ve eliminated
1035 that as an option anyway. Uh, so we made the determination no, we don’t feel
1036 that the VLAT is the correct tool to be utilizing at this time, so that’s why we
1037 did not order the VLAT that night.
——————————————————————————————-
The key part… Shumate didn’t know much about VLATS so he was completely
deferring to what Fernandez ( a carded Air Attack ) and Air Attack Rory Collins
were ‘advising’ him…
1019 The question I posed to Dean Fernandez, who was a carded air attack, and the
1020 po- question I posed to Rory (Collins) was, they’re offering us the VLAT, is it a tool
1021 that we can use? Both of them came to the conclusion, they thought that the
1022 terrain was not what they could utilize the VLAT on, both – both of those
1023 people had that determination, and then Rory had the additional determination
1024 that if we launch it now and get it here, I don’t know if I can finish its work
1025 before pumpkin time. Which, is cut off.
Followup…
ADOSH was querying Shumate more about this VLAT decision and Shumate basically then just tried to ‘sum it up’ for them.
He didn’t know crap about VLATS. He asked the guy who is SUPPOSED to know about them ( Air Attack Rory Collins ) and he said he couldn’t use it. End of story. No VLAT.
1047 A: Yeah. But I – I – I think still this type – on the time of the air attack is telling
1048 me he couldn’t use it, I’m not gonna order it, ‘cause he’s the expert on that
1049 and I’m not. I’m not an expert in aviation, I don’t know all the rules and regs
1050 and aviation. That’s their job to know that and inform me. I’m gonna give
1051 aviation the – the task and they’re gonna say yes we can or no we can’t. And,
1052 so that – that’s why I left it to them.
ADOSH was never able to interview Rory Collins.
VALAT—-Simply a Crop-duster Air Craft outfitted as a 100 Gal. Air Tanker.
If you have ever watched these little planes crop dust you can see they are very acrobatic .
I do not think that any one really knew their capability from the sounds of it.
Because of the small loads the problem is turn around time How ever they are able to set up with water and a mix tank and operate off a road or small air port close to the Fire. This was a big selling point in their use when first accepted as a AT.
I am not sure what they are talking about with terrain.
They are used a lot here in Idaho in some very rugged and steep terrain and work well.
If the little tanker had been used on the ridge line where the creeping was before the escape it would have done well as it looked like it did on earlier drops the night before . Looking at the morning flight pictures of the 2 acres.
They are small they have great maneuverability and can get into tight spots.
I never did see where they were reloading at and there turnaround times.
They are low cost and work great on small flare-ups on or near the line and very pin point accurate.
Hey Bob,
They are talking about the Very Large Airtanker (DC 10 ) in their reference to the VLAT.
Messed that up we were looking at the Small AT that they were using on the 28th and I was trying to note that for IA.
Old Brain Fart should know better thanks. There is picture of the light dropping after the escape should have been using it before was my thoughts.
Guadina pictures #15 shows the light making a drop.
There is also testimony that at least one of these critical SEAT drops totally MISSED late Saturday afternoon… which did nothing but ADD to Moki Helitack Nate Peck’s frustration.
Nate Peck said flat out ( to the SAIT )….
“I have felt that things were poor at this time and little faith in IC and process. Stayed on the clock with crew all night. I have struggled with the IC and process.”
From Moki Helitack Nate Peck’s SAIT interview notes…
———————————————————
Right before dark, called IC and asked for intent.
He was asked for his order for resources as intent.
By this point, fire is moving,
SEAT dropped MISSED.
Still need to tie in but NO SAW GAS and NOT going to happen.
Focus now is to secure the anchor point for the next morning’s work.
I have felt that things were poor at this time and little faith in IC and process.
Stayed on the clock with crew all night.
I have struggled with the IC and process.
——————————————————-
I have to admit, as I’ve looked at the aerial photos, I’ve had a hard time seeing what relationship to the actual fire the retardant drops had.
I keep thinking, “Am I missing something?”
You said Nate said:
“Right before dark, called IC and asked for intent.
He was asked for his order for resources as intent.”
I actually have no clue what this means.
should I?
Guadiana’s videos are even more interesting.
WTKTT,
In all fairness to Shumate, both of the AA’s SHOULD HAVE known more about VLAT operations and capabilities in THAT situation.
I think there are a whole lot of OPS people out there that would defer to their aviation (AA) people’s advice on matters of air operations, and rightly so in many cases.
Well… obviously… whatever Mr. Collins thought HE knew about VLATS and what ‘terrain’ they were right for didn’t match anyone else’s opinions the following day.
You realize, of course, that EXACTLY where they needed the VLAT to drop on Saturday night is the EXACTLY where Warbis and Lenmark were using the VLAT the following day.
And I mean… the EXACT spot.
Warbis and Lenmark had the VLAT begin that long line of retardant from the east to the west in the EXACT same drainage where the fire ‘took off’ on Saturday evening after escaping the road.
That VLAT drop, EXACTLY where it might have ended this whole story had it happened on Saturday evening, was caught on VIDEO.
It’s actually the one where there was the near-collision with the Skycrane Helicopter.
That VLAT came in from the WEST, right over where the Lewis crew had been working, and he started dropping RIGHT as he crossed the peak of the ridge. Worked perfectly.
That is EXACTLY the kind of ‘drop’ that might have stopped this thing dead in its tracks on Saturday evening.
So what was Mr. Collins really thinking when he said ‘I can’t use it’ to Shumate on Saturday?
No one has ever asked him.
I agree, and of course, the ‘operative’ words in my comment were “SHOULD HAVE”.
I think that’s definitely true. I also think it’s understandable. Which doubly puts the onus on Fernandez and Collins.
I still believe if they had been making any kind of efficient use of N14HX, which was ALREADY being paid for. this whole moment of uncertainty could have been avoided.
I’m pretty sure that’s why NWCG made it one of their tasks (as advised by the SAIT/SAIR) to produce a report on How To Use VLATs.
I think it was realized that probably significant numbers of Overhead, at this point, are uncertain about the financial wisdom of using those Oh So Expensive Very Large Air Tankers.
They have, in fact, proven their worth.
But, to be honest, I can’t totally fault this team for being unsure of what to do with that offer. All things considered.
I just wish they had put the helicopter they had and the Bambi Bucket they had to work.
But I think I’m going to write some more stuff in a comment I’m going to put at the top.
Based on all this stuff I’ve read today.
Reply to Marti Reed post on January 29, 2015 at 7:34 pm
>> Marti said…
>>
>> I’m pretty sure that’s why NWCG made it one of their tasks
>> (as advised by the SAIT/SAIR) to produce a report on
>> How To Use VLATs.
Of course they did. Finding out that one of the highest level line-duty officials in a State Forestry organization with both tremendous responsibility AND authority to order resources for suppressing fires doesn’t know jack shit about how or when to use a DC10 Air Tanker is never ‘good news’.
Indicates yet another TOTAL FAIL in the command / information chain.
>> Marti also said…
>>
>> I think it was realized that probably significant numbers of
>> Overhead, at this point, are uncertain about the financial
>> wisdom of using those Oh So Expensive Very Large Air Tankers.
There’s really no doubt about that.
Shumate was basically VERIFYING that he wasn’t the only IC(X) in that Arizona organization that was basically ‘clueless’ about that.
From Shumates ADOSH interview…
———————————————————————
A: Even the VLAT, at that point in time, our precep- well, by that
point in time the perception of the VLAT had been changed,
but before Doce Fire, I think the perception of the VLAT was an
astronomical cost. Like I was gonna spend a million dollars a
drop was maybe be the perception.
———————————————————————-
But see above. It wasn’t JUST being ‘clueless’ about the COST.
Shumate admitted to being clueless at even the TACTICAL level… and was, apparently, unable to even make any counter-arguments with the Air Attack ( Rory Collins ) who was working for HIM on HIS fire.
There’s a lot to know when you are a ‘carded IC’ and being given ( and being PAID to handle ) that kind of responsibility and that’s why there are obviolusly all these ‘LEVELS’ of IC that can be punched into someone’s red card… but at ANY ‘Incident Commander’ level at all… I would think having at least the base-level TACTICAL knowledge of what the ‘tools of the trade’ can or can’t do would be a ‘minimum requirement’ to even call yourself an ‘Incident Commander’.
I don’t expect any ‘Single Resource’ manager ( CRWB, HEQB, DOZB, etc. ) to have that kind of base-level tactical knowldege of all the ‘tools of the trade’… but once you start to have the holes punched on your red-card that say things like DIVS, OPS, IC, etc… I would say you OUGHT to know… or that hole should stay ‘un-punched’ on your card.
>> Marti also said…
>>
>> But, to be honest, I can’t totally fault this team for being unsure
>> of what to do with that offer. All things considered.
All things considered… after that fire jumped that road and they ran of bladder bags immediately and there was no gas for the chainsaws and the fire now cut off access to the only way you had to get any firefighting forces anywhere near the fire…
…I would say that if Dispatch had called and offered up the 12 year old from California with his robotic Bambi Bucket… the response should have been “Hell yea… send it… we are in TROUBLE here and we need EVERYTHING we can get or tomorrow is going to be a frickin’ DISASTER”.
I don’t see how anyone could have thought that, given all the extreme conditions and that massive valley full of gasoline-on-a-stick… that this ‘escaped fire’ was NOT now an absolute EMERGENCY… and they needed to throw everything they had at it… for every remaining moment of daylight… max effort all night… and then again at FIRST LIGHT.
Actually.. that sense of EMERGENCY is what was missing all day Saturday.
Yes… it looked ‘innocent’ in the morning… but one look at that valley of explosive fuel that hadn’t burned in 40 years and even just the ‘idea’ of what MIGHT happen if they didn’t throw everything they had at it on Saturday should have been making ALARM BELLS go off in everyone’s minds the first thing Saturday morning.
It didn’t happen.
Even Shumate alleged that he just thought it was a ‘nothing’ little two-acre fire.
No big deal. What could possibly happen?
From Shumate’s ADOSH interview…
———————————————————————-
Q5: Okay, Russ, uh – uh a question about uh – uh were – were any of your
decisions uh – uh based on – and – and I’m – I’m thinking here early on in the –
the first day of this thing, based on minimizing suppression costs?
A: I guess how I’ll answer that is that’s not the foremost part of my decision
making, but it would be irrational and uh, poor use of public monies if I don’t
respond with a reasonable response. If I spend $2 million on a two acre fire, I
think that would be looked upon badly.
———————————————————————-
When all the dust finally clears… and all the monies have finally been paid out over this DISASTER… I will bet Shumate’s employer will be wishing very hard that he HAD spent at least a piddling 2 million on Saturday.
For anyone with that kind of ‘cost effectiveness’ mentality Shumate himself was demonstrating… 2 million is going to be ‘pocket change’ compared to what ended up the ACTUAL costs for this fire AND the ‘additional’ monies that are going to be awarded to plaintiffs.
“When all the dust finally clears… and all the monies have finally been paid out over this DISASTER… I will bet Shumate’s employer will be wishing very hard that he HAD spent at least a piddling 2 million on Saturday”
Yep x X………………….
“Actually.. that sense of EMERGENCY is what was missing all day Saturday.”
And the next day.
This fire was never ever taken seriously. Ever. Ever.
I’m trying to think of when it was.
Willis driving around Saturday night (via his ADOSH interview). He was seeing stuff that made him pretty “concerned.” Not enough, however, to think other priorities might be more important than wasting hours/ resources trying to save Double A Bar Ranch with an inadequate Safety Zone for his crews.
Bravo 3 getting all “concerned” at 12:30 Sunday when they figured out the fire would most likely reverse course and head uphill towards Yarnell……but not “concerned” enough to make sure they communicated that “concern” to anyone other than a lost and confused
Zulu Division Supervisor who basically abandoned his Division.
Structure Protection Group One Supervisor Gary Cordes, who, after he–all of a sudden–realized the fire was seriously reversing direction, apparently scrambled together a last-minute “plan” to use a left-to-defend-for-himself” (without a radio, by that time) un-carded Dozer Operator to play the role of Mighty Mouse via plowing a most-likely unsuccessful fire-break in the direction of the Boulder Springs Ranch.
YCSO spending all day evacuating Peeples Valley, while never ever even beginning to, apparently, think about evacuating Yarnell or Glen Ilah.
Yeah, that’s taking this fire seriously. Etc etc etc.
NOBODY EVER took this fire seriously.
Until all of a sudden, as everything was going south, while Bravo 33 was trying to line up a DC-10 Very Large Air Tanker to fly a retardant drop to begin to protect Yarnell from a fire that was majestically bearing down upon it, a call broke through all the radio traffic. And another. And another.
Until finally. “We are deploying.”
That, in my humble opinion, is the only moment that any molecule of any “sense of EMERGENCY” ever set in on the whole entire totally mis-managed wildfire.
But, yeah,
Sedona.
That was an EMERGENCY.
>> Marti said…
>>
>> Until all of a sudden, as everything was going south,
>> while Bravo 33 was trying to line up a DC-10 Very
>> Large Air Tanker to fly a retardant drop to begin to
>> protect Yarnell from a fire that was majestically
>> bearing down upon it, a call broke through all the
>> radio traffic. And another. And another.
Which was ALSO not ‘taken seriously’ by the very person in an airplane that SHOULD have been reacting right away.
He didn’t even bother to respond to people who were obviously in distress until someone ORDERED him to.
And even then… it was “Unit hollerin’ in the radio… I need you to STFU”.
>> Marti also said…
>>
>> Until finally. “We are deploying.”
Yep. All the SNAFU came to an end then, didn’t it.
>> Marti also said…
>>
>> NOBODY EVER took this fire seriously.
I know ONE man who did.
Tex ( Sonny ) Gilligan.
And I am VERY, VERY glad he did. He saved at least one other person’s life ( along with his own ) that day… by PAYING ATTENTION and NOT having his head up his ass…
…OR by treating it as “just another day at work… SNAFU… no big whoop”.
Sometimes I can’t get that recorded exchange between the active on-duty OPS2 of this fire on Sunday ( Paul Musser ) and KC ‘Bucky’ Yowell.
Here is how they actually GREETED each other in the parking lot of the St. Joseph Shrine ( as captured in video M2U00264 )…
——————————————————–
(KC ‘Bucky’ Yowell): Howdy, Paul!
(OPS2 Paul Musser): ( Everythin’ ) goin’ to shit.
(KC ‘Bucky’ Yowell): Goin’ to shit… EXACTLY!
——————————————————-
Just another day. SNAFU.
Just a few moments later… the ‘Situation Normal’ part of the usual SNAFU was going to be (tragically) taken out of the equation.
You said”
“——————————————————–
(KC ‘Bucky’ Yowell): Howdy, Paul!
(OPS2 Paul Musser): ( Everythin’ ) goin’ to shit.
(KC ‘Bucky’ Yowell): Goin’ to shit… EXACTLY!
——————————————————-”
Where’s that? I can’t hear it.
So I’m sitting here thinking about this thing called EMERGENCY.
Thinking about hearing the surgeon telling me and Terra on Saturday (after sitting in the Operating Waiting Room for 2 1/2 hours while my 93-year-old was in surgery) how my mom was about 30 minutes before death before that surgery. He was pretty intense when he told us that. Like seriously intense. Like this had been an EMERGENCY.
He had recognized that as he was doing that surgery. He didn’t know that before he had started that surgery.
But as soon as he recognized that he knew it.
And, apparently he mobilized whatever he needed to mobilize in order to deal with my mom’s EMERGENCY.
Knowing her life was in his hands.
And that was only ONE life.
But I’m guessing he acted very cool and composed in the Operating Room. He engaged his mind. I don’t think he said, “OMG this is an EMERGENCY!!!”
So I’m not totally agreeing with what I’m sensing you are taking a bit of offense to by this interchange (that I haven’t even heard yet, but I trust you saying is there).
“Here is how they actually GREETED each other in the parking lot of the St. Joseph Shrine ( as captured in video M2U00264 )…
——————————————————–
(KC ‘Bucky’ Yowell): Howdy, Paul!
(OPS2 Paul Musser): ( Everythin’ ) goin’ to shit.
(KC ‘Bucky’ Yowell): Goin’ to shit… EXACTLY!”
From what I’m seeing in those videos, they all seem pretty focused on the seriousness of pushing everybody out of that Shrine Road area as it’s being engulfed by the fire.
As a matter of fact, what I’m seeing in that video is probably a pretty good response to EMERGENCY.
I don’t need someone to shout EMERGENCY.
I need someone to recognize that there’s an EMERGENCY and do what needs to be done regarding that.
Which Shumate, Willis, Bravo 3, didn’t do, in various degrees.
And which I actually think what they were doing on Shrine Road WAS. no matter what they said to each other.
I’m OK if first line emergency responders don’t talk to each other as if something somewhat normal (for them as emergency responders) isn’t happening. All things considered.
Even if there’s some kinds of joking involved. It’s a form of survival skills.
What I want to observe when there is an EMERGENCY is competence. Recognition of the fat that there’s an EMERGENCY emerging/happening and doing what it takes to confront and competently mitigate that.
I actually truly don’t really give an isht what they say to each other as they’re doing what needs to be done. As long as they’re doing that which needs to be done.
In the medical field, if someone says ASAP, that can be taken as a sign of an impending EMERGENCY. And taking action ASAP, helps prevent EMERGENCIES.
Glad you are back Marti! Hope your mom is healing well.
**
** LOCATION OF BLADDER BAGS FOUND ON SUNDAY
Reply to Marti Reed post on January 27, 2015 at 11:13 pm
>> Marti said…
>>
>> So what I am seeing you saying is that the place Joy shows the helicopter
>> picking up that sling load of bladder bags is a different place than what was
>> originally, on Saturday, designated and used as “the Helispot.”
I’m not sure that ‘pickup’ Sunday morning had anything to do with ‘bladder bags’ at all.
Not yet, anyway.
I’m also not sure EXACTLY where that ‘pickup’ is happening yet as per Joy’s photo. Still doing ‘terrain level ID’ on that.
Even if that was a ‘bladder bag’ recovery operation captured by Joy ( and not just recovery of the drop cable )… there had to be a fair amount of bladder bags left up there after that because THAT is what DPS Chopper Ranger 58 was going to ‘discover’ later that afernoon at the start of their search.
Which leads right into your next question…
>> Marti also said…
>>
>> Also, what about where Frisbee and Trew were sent, and what shows up on
>> their GPS video, to look at “something” on Sunday night?
>>
>> I’m wondering how that fits into all of this.
Yes. The ‘bladder bags’ that were found when Ranger 58 first started looking for Granite Mountain.
That’s what Ranger 58 is ‘hovering over’ in that newly released Aaron Hulburd video. The one where we hear KC ‘Bucky’ Yowell and Aaron Hulburd ‘huffing and puffing’ as they work their way on foot through the moonscape… and Ranger 58 is ‘hovering’ in the smoke there in the background.
From page 10 of SAIT Investigation Notes document…
Interview with Blue Ridge: Brian Frisby, Trueheart Brown, Travis Fueller, Cory Ball.
——————————————————————————————
DPS ship was flying around near GM, then he went to the grater and BR couldn’t talk to the ship. The ship went to where the bladder bags were and BR hiked to them, they relayed to B33 that wasn’t the site. Then there was traffic about another site and the ship gave the lat/long and Trew copied it down. Trew started running down the ridge, and I mean running.
——————————————————————————————
DPS Officer Eric Tarr ( like the man of detail that he is ) ended up providing the EXACT GPS coordinates for these ‘bladder bags’ they were directing Blue Ridge to ‘check out’.
From the “M- Law Enforcement – no redactions.pdf” document.
Page 5 of 25 ( Officer Eric Tarr’s signed report )…
————————————————————————————-
Ranger began the search at the last known location where the Firefighters were in the morning and searched the ridge line to the south and east as smoke and heat allowed. The area where the Firefighters were thought to be located was covered in heavy smoke when we started the search. Ranger located some equipment near GPS coordinates N 34-13.75 / W 112-47.53 which appeared to be several yellow backpacks on top of the ridgeline. The majority of the packs were still bright yellow; however a couple of them looked to be burned. The GPS coordinates for the backpacks were relayed to Air Attack.
————————————————————————————-
GPS Degrees, Decimal Minutes
Latitude: 34 deg 13.75′ N
Longitude: 112 deg 47.53′ W
GPS Degrees, Minutes, Seconds
Latitude: 34 deg 13′ 0.00″ N
Longitude: 112 deg 47′ 0.00″ W
GPS Decimal
Latitude: 34.22916666666667,
Longitude: -112.79216666666667
34.22916666666667, -112.79216666666667
That spot is pretty much right smack in the CENTER of what would have been the ‘fire area’ as of Saturday morning, as shown in Dean Fernandez’s 10:30 AM recon photos.
If that really is where Helicopter N14HX set the bladder bags down in the first place on Saturday afternoon… then things were even worse than first believed.
That means that instead of even having the Helicopter hover over at least some part of the two-track road to make the drop… N14HX was hovering DIRECTLY over the most ACTIVE part of the fire at that time in order to drop these damn bladder bags.
WHOOSH goes the fire.
Obviously they had been USING these bladder bags after they were dropped off Saturday since even Justin Smith says they were pretty much EMPTY by the time he got up there on that last shuttle flight for Saturday… so we don’t know if this ‘pile of bladder bags’ eventually being found by Ranger 58 on Sunday afternoon is where they were actually ‘dropped off’ or not.
Only someone who was UP there could say for sure.
But it stands to reason that they might have been dropped there ( and that’s where they were piled back up even when emptied ) since Shumate himself does testify they were dropped “right where the crew was working”… and this location matches the spot where Jake Guadiana reported the fire ‘creeping’… which is why those bladder bags were sent up in the first place.
In other words… why would they NOT just pile the depleted bladder bags back at the same location where they were actually dropped off by N14HX… so the pilot would know exactly where to come pick them up again whenever he got around to doing that?
Anything else would just confuse the pilot and complicate the ‘pickup’ later on.
I said… “Only someone who was UP there could say for sure.”
That isn’t altogether true. There is someone ELSE who would know, fer sure.
The PILOT of Moki Helitack Chopper N14HX.
This person has a LOT of answers about EVERYTHING that was happening Saturday.
This person has never been identified or ( as far as we know ) interviewed by ANYONE.
Followup to followup…
I had originally said that I didn’t think the person clearly photographed by Dean Fernandez at exactly 11:18 AM sitting in the pilot’s seat of N14HX and ‘hamming it up’ for Dean’s camera could have actually been the ‘pilot’ of N14HX.
On closer inspection of those photos ( and others )… I take it back.
I now believe that person ‘hamming it up’ for Dean Fernandez’s camera at exactly 11:18 AM on Saturday is, in fact, the PILOT of Moki Helitack Chopper N14HX.
The key are the ‘gloves’ he is wearing.
Other photos of N14HX show whoever is flying it wearing those same gloves.
So we still don’t know his name… but that’s most likely a VERY clear picture of him taken by Dean Fernandez.
Thanks for this, WTKTT.
And yes.
This stuff is SO important, and somebody needs to interview these people and find out what happened on Saturday.
And yeah, this is not where I have the pick-up (of whatever) that Joy photographed Sunday morning.
So I’m sitting here wondering, how, exactly do they get those coordinates from a helicopter flying over?
Have you checked out the gps on the photo when Rory Collins shot the photo that seems directly over where the fire jumped the two-track?
It’s here:
34°13’32.00″N, 112°47’43.00″W
Hardly right over the spot he captured.
And I don’t intend to look like I’m missing the point, as it may look like I’m doing, by asking that.
I’m just curious.
In this particular case… and given the critical circumstances at the time… I’m assuming that Ranger 58 was trying to be as accurate as possible about these ‘coordinates’ they were giving to Air Attack so they could be ‘relayed’ to the FFs coming in on the UTVs ( the ground rescue mission ).
Those HAD to be coordinates from inside the ‘ship’ itself… but they also say in no uncertain terms that they were HOVERING over what they found as an additional ‘location method’ for the ‘ground rescue mission’.
So I’m assuming those coordinates are accurate.
I really am.
PS: I think it’s also much more likely a HOVERING helicopter can actually come up with accurate ‘right underneath me’ coordinates than a speeding fixed wing aircraft.
Followup.
Another reason to trust these coordinates from Ranger 58.
On the background topographical map in the Blue Ridge GPS Tracking video… there are a number of ‘black dots’ that someone from Blue Ridge has ‘added’ to the map itself… complete with LABELS.
One of those ‘black dots’ up on the ridge says…
“Backpack pump cache found”
That is EXACTLY where the Ranger 58 GPS coordinates are… and I can only assume also represents the exact spot where both Frisby and Brown recall actually FINDING the ‘bladder bags’ on Sunday afternoon.
So, after I noted that Bob Powers had said that Shumate should have been actually physically present on the fire and not Justin, I decided I needed to do some looking around at what, in fact, is expected of Incident Commanders on Initial Attacks.
One thing I found helpful, for starters, was the Standard Operating Procedures Manual of the Santa Fe Hotshots.
On Page 18 of it is “Type 4 and 5 Incident Command Characteristics.”
“Type 4 Incident Characteristics
• Ad hoc organization managed by a Type 4 Incident Commander.
• Primarily local resources used.
• ICS command and general staff positions are not activated.
• Resources vary from a single resource to multiple resource task forces or strike teams.
• Incident is usually limited to one operational period in the contain phase. Mopup may extend into multiple operational periods.
• Written incident action plan (IAP) is not required. A documented operational briefing will be completed for all incoming resources. Refer to the Incident Response Pocket Guide”
Then Pages 20-24 go into great detail about “Initial Attack.” It really does seem apparent to me that, by this description, being a Type 4 Incident Commander on an Initial Attack is not a desk job.
http://www.fs.usda.gov/Internet/FSE_DOCUMENTS/stelprdb5403775.pdf
The Santa Fe Hotshots Initial Attack section is kind of an excerpt of the NIFC’s Redbook’s Chapter 9 — Initial Attack. It goes into even greater detail about it all. So much detail that I haven’t had time to read it yet.
But here it is if you want to read it (this is from 1998, so I assume things have changed, but it’s a good start):
http://www.nifc.gov/PUBLICATIONS/redbook/1998/Chapter9.pdf
The next thing I found that was really interesting was:
“Biscuit Fire Chronology — An Analysis” by
Charles R. Mansfield, Ph.D. Los Alamos, NM
January 2003
If 2003 and Los Alamos don’t ring any bells for you, think —
The Cerro Grande Fire
This is, essentially, an analysis of the botched Initial Attack on the catastrophic Biscuit Fire on the Siskiyou National Forest in Oregon in 2002.
From the Executive Summary:
“The Biscuit fire, which burned a record 500,000 acres of southwest Oregon Forest in the summer of 2002, serves
as a useful example of the problems facing the nation in management of its forests.”
This is a HUGELY bigger Initial Attack failure, than Saturday on the Yarnell Hill Fire. But it’s a useful document to read to understand how Initial Attacks can go astray.
Also, in the Executive Summary, he wrote 10 direct conclusions:
1. Extreme fire conditions existed before and during the Biscuit fire.
2. Insufficient preparation took place given the actual and predicted fire conditions.
3 During a time of extreme fire danger emergency initial response to known fires did not take place.
4. During a time of extreme fire danger minimal effort was made to search for fires after it was known that fires had
been started.
5. The person directly responsible for management of the forest area (District Ranger) did not have sufficient authority to commit suppression resources.
6. There was confusion over the chain of command.
7. Fires were not attacked at the time of lowest fire activity.
8. Too restrictive regulations prevented efficient attack on fires.
9. Too restrictive regulations were used as an excuse not to take action.
10. Priorities for committing suppression resources emphasized protection of private interests over protection of the natural resources.
There were a number of points he made that resonated with me when I read them:
Regarding something the Incident Commander did:
“1741-2002 Del Monte driving into the back country to view the Biscuit #1 fire. Didn’t Del Monte already know the forest conditions? If he didn’t because he worked in Region 5 then why was he the incident commander? At this level of command the incident commander should know the area like the back of his hand.
It takes 2 to 3 hours to drive into this area which means that the IC is out of the command loop during this time.”
“At this level of command the incident commander should know the area like the back of his hand.” This was a Type 4 Incident Commander.
“1840 Helicopter requested for Biscuit but would be ineffective because of distance to water source.
Why were a dip tank and a tank truck to support helitack operations not ordered in the morning or the night before?
This area is notably lacking in water except at the canyon bottoms. The Biscuit fire now 300 acres and growing so the helicopter request is canceled.”
“0800 ? Northwest Interagency Coordinating group set fires at #11 priority for resources. This organization also may be imbued with the notion of a “can’t do” philosophy. First light at this time of year is around 0530 PDT but there are no records in the chronology of actions taking place before 0800. Why was there no sense of urgency by any management personnel?”
“1325 Smoke reported in vicinity of Sourdough Guard station.
1330 Type II crew requested for Florence fire
The legal description of the Sourdough fire is in error. The Biscuit #1 and #2 fires are still unmanned. A decision is
made not to man the Sourdough fire because of the distance between the Biscuit #1 and #2 fires. The comment is made that the decision not to man was in part due to the road being only usable for 4 wheel drive vehicles. Note -I have been over that road in 2 wheel drive vehicles several times in the past. If the road condition was so bad why was not a road grader sent in a week earlier?”
“1735 Decision made not to attack Sourdough fire.
Excessive timidity led to not attacking Sourdough fire. Poor roads, poor communication and inability to make decisions plus questionable calculations (I do not believe that the status of analysis is sufficient to make adequate predictions of fire behavior.) led to not taking action other than road improvement. The “CAN’T DO” attitude appears again in citing reasons for not attacking the fires.”
Anything sound vaguely familiar????
But wait, there’s more!!!! To read it, go here:
http://coyoteaerospace.com/firepape/bisca.pdf
Your getting to know as much as me and learning real Wild land fire
Size up
Assign forces
Hot spot the critical areas first.
Build containment line
and control
Ask for additional forces before the fire gets ahead of you.
Evaluate the fuels Humidity burn period and stay ahead of the fire activity.
Takes about 10 years to be a decision maker and a true IC and you continue to learn all your life until you retire.
The real challenge and adrenalin of a fire fighter each assignment has its challenge and rewards. I would come back in the next life and do it again.
So here’s something else I found that seemed relevant.
On August 4, 2010, Bill Gabbert wrote the following in Wildfire Today:
“A process for analyzing the potential of a wildfire”
“One of the most important pieces of information that should be included in a Report on Conditions during the initial attack of a wildfire is the POTENTIAL. What is the fire expected to do in the next hour or the next several hours?”
http://wildfiretoday.com/2010/08/04/a-process-for-analyzing-the-potential-of-a-wildfire/
I’m curious what folks here would come up with by filling out the little form he provides while putting themselves at the time/point when the fire jumped the two-track and started burning down that drainage with that southwesterly wind pushing it.
PS Try doing it without hindsight bias.
Or, even better, what would you put on the form at about an hour and a half or so BEFORE the fire jumped the two-track, when it was just kind of “creeping,” after you had fought it for about four hours, and you needed to call the Incident Commander back in his ICP at the Yarnell Fire Department (where I agree with Bob that he shouldn’t have been) and tell him what you thought the fire was going to do?
Again, try to do it WITHOUT hindsight bias…..
Nice Job Marti,
Good find on the Command Characteristics and the Redbook, things a type 3/4 IC should do or consider. I totally agree with Bob, Shumate should of had boots on the ground and his Trainee in his hip pocket.
As far as the potential for this fire (with hopefully no hindsight bias) I would probably have put it at low to moderate, WITH the caveat that until line was around the entire fire, mopped up and it held through the afternoon burn period I would still consider it having potential for escape. Factoring in the additional considerations, numerous large fires in area, drought, heat warning issued, difficult access, all of those issues would have added concern on my “potential for this fire” and the importance of securing it in a timely fashion. In addition, having MY boots on site and being able to feel and see the amount of heat near the line would have also given reason for concern and utilizing all resources available to “wrap it up” before prime burning conditions.
**
** ADOSH INTERVIEW WITH JAKE GUADIANA ( ASPC-LEWIS CRWB )
** AND OFFICER LEO VASQUEZ ( ASPC-LEWIS )
The REAL STORY about what went on up there on that ridge for most of Saturday afternoon can only really be told by people that were UP there.
Moki Helitack Nate Peck was the one who was FIRST dropped off up there at 10:41 AM. He stayed up there while Helicopter N14HX flew east to the Yarnell Fire Department Helipad and then began the process of shuttling 6 Lewis DOC crew people up to the ridge.
That took 2 flights ( 3 Lewis crewmembers per flight ) starting around 11:30 AM, and both flights took around 45 minutes total.
So at 12:15 PM there were finally SEVEN people up there to work on the fire ( even though both the full Lewis and Yuma Type 2 crews had been in Yarnell since 8:00 AM that morning )
Nate Peck plus Lewis CRWB Jake Guadiana plus Lewis Officer Leo Vasquez plus 4 Lewis inmates.
Nate Peck WAS interviewed by the SAIT and the notes from that interview WERE included in the SAIT Interview Notes document that they released publicly.
Those ‘Nate Peck’ notes don’t say much. They are obtuse and cryptic and contain little detail other than the fact that Nate Peck himself said he had (quote) “little faith in the IC and the process” with regards to the Initial Attack on this Yarnell fire.
The only other TWO people we are actually SURE were up there all afternoon, before the fire escaped, would be Lewis CRWB Jake Guadiana and Lewis Corrections Officer Leo ( Rosalio ) Vasquez.
As far as we know… neither Guadiana or Vasquez were ever interviewed by the SAIT.
Given ALL of the ‘liability’ that Arizona Forestry must have been aware of on their part for this ENTIRE weekend… I still find it ‘less than credible’ that Arizona Forestry’s SAIT did NOT interview Guadiana or Vasquez or any/all of the 4 Lewis inmates… but if they did… then those interview notes/transcripts are sitting somewhere behind a filing cabinet along with all the Peeples Valley Firefighter interviews, photographs and cellphone records.
Nothing was ever released even in response to valid ‘Arizona Open Records’ and FOIA requests.
ADOSH made a concerted effort to get the names of the Lewis Crew staff from Arizona Department of Corrections. It took many emails for them to even obtain that information but here is the one they finally got with all the names in it…
Email contained in PUBLIC ADOSH document “N9589 August (1) 2013.pdf”
—————————————————————————————————
From: SMITH, KEITH
Sent: Wednesday, August 07, 2013 4:44 PM
To: LANDRY, MIKE, Steurer, Brett – OSHA State ( AZ-SP )
Subject: RE: AZDOC Firefighting Crew, Yarnell Hill Fire Fatalities
Gentlemen,
Below are the staff identified as being assigned to the Yarnell Hill Fire during the incident.This information is also available from State Forestry through their Incident Command documentation.
The staff have informed me that they were told by State Forestry that if they should be questioned about the incident that the Attorney General Office would provide representation. Will the nature of this inquiry require this to occur?
Lewis Complex
Sgt Joe Barreras #4011
COII Rosalio Vasquez #4456
COII Joseph Sullivan #4111
COII William May #XXXX
Yuma Complex
Sgt. Chad Blackwell
COII Manuel Borquez
COII Jose Salazar
Regards,
Keith Smith
Security Operations Administrator
Arizona Department of Corrections
1601 W. Jefferson
Phoenix, Arizona 85007
——————————————————————————————
Once ADOSH had this information… they arranged to interview a select group from this list PLUS Crew Coordinator Jake Guadiana himself.
There are no actual TRANSCRIPTS from these interviews.
There where only ‘phone call’ interviews and the only record of what any of these men said to ADOSH is found in some notes made by ADOSH lead investigator Marshall Krotenberg.
Krotenberg CONFIRMED that the SIX Lewis DOC crew that were up there first on Saturday were Jake Guadiana himself, Officer Vasquez, and then FOUR ( unnamed ) inmates.
From ADOSH Document: “L3419 Notes redacted.pdf”
On page 8 ( of 10 pages )…
——————————————————————————————–
On September 5, 2013 I interviewed over the telephone Sergeant Joe Barreras and Correctional Officer II Leo Vasquez (ASPC-Lewis), Sergeant Chad Blackwell (ASPC-Yuma), Sergeant Parker (ASPC-Florence), Sergeant Paulson (ASPC-Globe) and Arizona State Forestry Division Crew Coordinator Jake Guadiana (ASPC-Lewis).
I discussed the Yarnell Hill Fire incident and the crew assignments on June 30, 2013.
Four members of the Lewis hand crew along with Officer Vasquez, Crew Coordinator Jake Guadiana and one BLM helitack employee were helicoptered to the top of the ridge on Saturday June 29, 2013 to try to establish an anchor point on the fire. Another
6 firefighters including ICT-4 Trainer Justin Smith were flown to the top of the ridge later in the day for a total of 13 firefighters.
Crew was unsuccessful in establishing an anchor point and the fire grew throughout the night primarily on the north and east side of the fire. The crew was removed from the ridge on Sunday morning and ordered to bed down at the ICP.
——————————————————————————————–
That’s it.
That’s all the detail we get even from Krotenberg with regards to ALL of his phone call interviews with these critical witnesses.
All we get about what happened on Saturday, June 29, 2013 is…
“Crew was unsuccessful in establishing an anchor point.”
So exactly what Jake Guadiana and Leo Vasquez ( and the four Lewis inmates ) actually DID, or SAW or HEARD up there all of Saturday afternoon still remains a mystery.
One of these days… I hope these men get to tell ‘the whole story’ of what happened up there on that ridge on Saturday afternoon, June 29, 2013.
Thanks for that, WTKTT.
When I saw your header, I thought, “OMG How could I have missed THAT???”
As if the THAT existed.
Given what we’ve figured out, I smell something rotten here.
I won’t pin the rottenness on ADOSH. They were struggling mightily to figure enough out to try to ask the questions in the really short period of time they had to do this.
But I DO believe AzFire and possibly BLM really didn’t/don’t want the public to know what happened, all things considered, on Saturday. Of COURSE they knew they botched it and hoped the focus on Sunday and the 19 would keep everybody’s attention off of Saturday.
Which has pretty much been the case.
There were a LOT of other email exchanges between ADOSH and the Arizona Department of Corrections and the gist of them was that ADOSH simply first wanted to know exactly WHO ( from Arizona DOC ) was ever AT the Yarnell Hill Fire… and then ADOSH agreed to just do ‘phone interviews’ first without scheduling any ‘official’ ADOSH interviews ( which would then be, according to their own procedures, fully recorded and transcripted ).
Marshall Krotenberg said that ADOSH would NOT schedule any ‘official’ ( in-person, transcripted ) interviews with these men unless they felt then needed to following the informal phone interviews.
Arizona Department of Corrections agreed to that approach… and then coughed up the names.
So Jake Guadinia and Leo Vasquez were just part of that first round of informal phone interviews.
They were NOT called back for in-person ‘official’ interviews.
The only one out of that group that WAS was Sergeant Chad Blackwell, and his ‘official interview ended up in the ADOSH public FOIA release.
Blackwell was with the YUMA Crew ( not the Lewis crew ) and was part of Darrell Willis’ attempts to defend the Double-Bar-A Ranch on Sunday.
It’s the only interview published under the ‘AZ Dept of Corrections’ folder in the ADOSH release… and it is here…
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/20inrene9tcx74a/AADShlBwlfbRyFeQOqUjhclza/ADOSH%20Yarnell%20Hill%20Investigation/AZ%20Dept%20of%20Corrections/Chad%20Blackwell%20Yuma%20DOC%20interview%2010-29-13.pdf?dl=0
This actually was just another ‘phone interview’… but has much more detail about what Blackwell says he SAW and HEARD on Sunday, June 30, 2013.
The REASON that ADOSH was interested in talking to more to Blackwell is because he remembered that he DID hear some things on the radio related to Granite Mountain on Sunday.
ADOSH was also very interested in talking to him about the whole Double-Bar-A Ranch think because ADOSH had already been made aware ( by Bravo 3 Rusty Warbis and Paul Lenmark ) that Bravo 3 had been VERY concerned that everyone there at that Double-Bar-A Ranch was oblivious to what the fire was doing around NOON and Bravo 3 saw a potential ‘entrapment situation’ developing.
It was from Sergeant Blackwell that ADOSH obtained THIS statement…
—————————————————————–
Their safety zone ( at the Double-Bar-A Ranch ) was two side by side tennis courts. Based on fire intensity, Blackwell didn’t believe the tennis courts would have been large enough to be a good safe zone
—————————————————————–
So for ADOSH… that was a ‘productive’ followup interview and gave them more evidence that there were serious faulty ‘management decisions’ and ‘workplace safety’ violations happening all over Yarnell on Sunday, June 30, 2013.
ADOSH really was focused on Sunday, June 30.
They were no uninterested in the day before… but their primary focus was what the workplace environment was really like on the day of the 19 fatalities.
So yea… Saturday was getting ‘lost in the noise’… even in the ADOSH investigation.
SIDENOTE: In other ADOSH notes released publicly we learn that ADOSH really did accumulate enough evidence to issue specific citations for at least FOUR ‘potential/actual entrapments’ on Sunday, June 30, 2013.
One of the ADOSH notes indicates that they were ready to issue FOUR actual citations ( publicly ) for ALL of the following…
– Near-miss entrapment and inadequate safety zones at the Double-Bar-A Ranch ( Darrell Willis, manager ).
– Near-miss entrapment of GMIHC Lookout Brendan McDonough
– Actual entrapment with fatalities in box canyon ( Granite Mountain )
– Near-miss entrapment in Harper Canyon ( Gary Cordes’ forces ).
From the ADOSH document “J9925 Notes redacted.pdf”
Page 43 ( of 50 pages )
—————————————————
( We have ) 4 potential entrapments
1) Structure TWO – Willis
2) Lookout GMIHC
3) 19 GMIHC
4) Structure ONE
—————————————————
What actually happened then is that sometime before the final ADOSH report was put together… it was decided to CONSOLIDATE the FOUR potential entrapments into just one BIG ‘Citation’ of general management failure and ‘putting firefighters at risk’ workplace safety violation(s).
ADOSH basically was ‘pegging the meter’ on the fines they could impose on Arizona Forestry even without issuing the four separate citations… so it was all ‘written up’ as just the general ‘subjecting firefighters to undue risk of death or injury’ citation. in the final report.
Jake Guadiana ( not Guadinia ).
Damn. That’s an easy one to typo. Apologies.
As have said the first thing they should have done was hot spot the smoldering areas get line on them then get an anchor and build line.
Why—This was not a running fire or a flaming fire when they started
the IA. So you have time to contain hot spots as in California cold trail.
If you have a flaming active line then anchor and build line this was not the case a majority of the edge of the fire was cool.
Simply attack the hot spots first. Call in water or a air tanker drop to assist.
Bob–
On JANUARY 27, 2015 AT 5:13 PM
You wrote:
“Shumate should have been on the fire not his trainee.”
That was pretty eye-opening to me. And maybe it shouldn’t have been? Maybe it should have been obvious?
I don’t actually know all that much about initial attack. Most of what I have seen/read are very mobile small teams and, yeah, come to think of it, I don’t think I’ve ever read/seen one in which the IC wasn’t either part of the team itself or right there on the ground with the attack.
Comparatively speaking, Shumate seems more like an administrator than a fire-fighter.
Is this standard practice in some kinds of fires? Or something?
On IA Fires the IC is on the fire. In this case a type 4 is a IA IC not sitting some where
giving orders. Justin should have been in his pocket as a Trainee. On fires up to 10 Acers
a IC or in my day a Fire Boss was minimum Sector Boss Qualified or Strike Team Leader.
You are the on the ground IC on IA Fires. I think the lead Helitack on the Fire was Higher ranked
than Justin. Just another Cluster in this Fire Story.
This fire for the most part was way ahead of all the overhead that were in charge It is a classic.
Thanks for the reply, Bob!
And yes, Nate was more qualified than Justin.
Which is why I’m particularly bothered by the sling-line incident. I just have a really hard time imagining someone with that kind of experience and know-how letting that happen.
But then I wouldn’t have walked down into a chimney-bowl-canyon full of thick fuel with an out-of-control blowing-up fire heading toward it, either.
I just realized there was another relevant YouTube video I forgot to post yesterday. It’s of a helicopter about the same size as N14HX dipping a Bambi Bucket into a pumpkin that looks about the same size as the one they set up at Boulder Springs Ranch.
Seeing this, I still think all that hard stuff around the BSR pumpkin looks a bit dicey. But I guess not impossible.
“Sweetwater Fire Pumkin Dip”
http://youtu.be/ZiGuz5OakEc
Another great (relevant) video, Marti… thank you.
Chopper in video is not only about same SIZE as N14HX… it is also *almost* the same exact make and model. Helicopter. Bell 206 versus Bell 407. Not much difference. Registration number in VIDEO is N1957Z.
The one in the video has same Allison 250 engine but with 650 horspower instead of 600 like N14HX had.
FAA registration details for N14HX ( used in Yarnell )…
1997 BELL 407
Rotorcraft (7 seats / 1 engine)
Engine
ALLISON 250-C47
Horsepower: 600 (Turbo-shaft)
Registration History
09-Aug-2008, HELICOPTER EXPRESS INC, CHAMBLEE GA
FAA registration details for N1957Z ( seen in the video above )…
1994 BELL 206-L4
Rotorcraft (7 seats / 1 engine)
ALLISON 250-C30 SER
Horsepower: 650 (Turbo-shaft)
Registration History
02-Jun-2006, REDDING AIR SERVICES INC., REDDING CA
In the video above… these guys know exactly what they are doing and that is a quick, efficient dip from that pumpkin.
Notice how QUICKLY it can be done when you know what you are doing.
There’s no reason to expect the dips at the Boulder Springs Ranch couldn’t have been happening just as quickly if theyhad only been ‘part of the plan’ on Saturday.
That pumpkin at the BSR was only 1.3 mile(s) ‘as the bird flies’ from where the Lewis Crew was working. The turnaround time for bucket drops would have been REALLY short… and they could have been basically just ‘washing that fire off the ridge’ if they had wanted to.
Yep.
I don’t remember when they set up that pumpkin.
But if the fire jumped the 2-track around 4:30-5, I’m thinking that, instead of wasting another approximately two hours sending up bladder bags and two shuttles worth of helitack crew that weren’t able to do much anyway (bcuz not enuff chain-saw fuel), they could have jumped on that fire with the chopper and water drops and put it out even then. It was awhile before it REALLY took off.
BTW I don’t know if you’ve actually watched Guadiana’s videos from after the fire jumped, but they’re interesting.
Oh doh.
The slop-over was CAUSED by the sling-load flight, not after it.
So, anyway, the rest still applies.
They still had two hours of basic daylight left.
**
** JAKE GUADIANA’S VIDEOS
Reply to Marti Reed post on January 25, 2015 at 8:43 pm
>> Marti said…
>>
>> Could you just get the metadata for all Guadiana’s videos? That would be truly awesome.
Here we go.
Notice that something really WEIRD happens here.
For those first THREE videos on Saturday he took with the Canon… both DATE and TIME
are obviously somewhere in la-la land.
Then he takes a bunch of JPEG pictures before ever taking another MOVIE.
The NEXT movie he shoots… ( sequence number 009 ) still has the DATE wildly wrong… but now the time-of-day actually looks CORRECT as compared to movie content?
Could it be that sometime between movie 004 and movie 009 on Saturday… he left the DATE alone but noticed the time was wrong and set it correctly?… and then it REMAINED correct for all those other movies Saturday evening…. and then on into Sunday?
** THE SHORT STORY
* Saturday, June 29, 2013
File Name: USB YARNELL HILL 002.avi
Date/Time Original: 2011:03:05 23:36:13
File Name: USB YARNELL HILL 003.avi
Date/Time Original: 2011:03:05 23:39:28
File Name: USB YARNELL HILL 004.avi
Date/Time Original: 2011:03:06 00:04:51
That’s it for AVI files again until sequence number ‘9’.
Sequence numbers 5,6,7 and 8 are all JPEG still photos.
File Name: USB YARNELL HILL 009.avi
Date/Time Original: 2011:03:06 05:58:13
File Name: USB YARNELL HILL 010.avi
Date/Time Original: 2011:03:06 05:59:52
File Name: USB YARNELL HILL 011.avi
Date/Time Original: 2011:03:06 06:36:25
File Name: USB YARNELL HILL 012.avi
Date/Time Original: 2011:03:06 06:59:35
File Name: USB YARNELL HILL 013.avi
Date/Time Original: 2011:03:06 07:23:08
File Name: USB YARNELL HILL 014.avi
Date/Time Original: 2011:03:06 07:23:33
File Name: USB YARNELL HILL 015.avi
Date/Time Original: 2011:03:06 07:27:24
File Name: USB YARNELL HILL 016.avi
Date/Time Original: 2011:03:06 08:03:35
* Sunday, June 30, 2013
File Name: USB YARNELL HILL 017.avi
Date/Time Original: 2011:03:07 02:47:40
NOTE: “USB YARNELL HILL 018.jpg” is a JPEG still photo
taken in-between these AVI movies 17, 19, 20 and 21.
File Name: USB YARNELL HILL 019.avi
Date/Time Original: 2011:03:07 03:56:25
File Name: USB YARNELL HILL 020.avi
Date/Time Original: 2011:03:07 04:16:46
File Name: USB YARNELL HILL 021.avi
Date/Time Original: 2011:03:07 04:53:47
**
** THE LONG STORY – MORE EXIF DATA FOR ALL THE SAME FILES
**
* Saturday, June 29, 2013
File Name: USB YARNELL HILL 002.avi
File Size: 14 MB
File Type: AVI
Date/Time Original: 2011:03:05 23:36:13
Software: CanonMVI06
Duration: 8.78 s
File Name: USB YARNELL HILL 003.avi
File Size: 15 MB
File Type: AVI
Date/Time Original: 2011:03:05 23:39:28
Software: CanonMVI06
Duration : 8.27 s
File Name: USB YARNELL HILL 004.avi
File Size: 9.2 MB
File Type: AVI
Date/Time Original: 2011:03:06 00:04:51
Software: CanonMVI06
Duration: 7.51 s
That’s it for AVI files again until sequence number ‘9’.
Sequence numbers 5,6,7 and 8 are all JPEG still photos.
File Name: USB YARNELL HILL 009.avi
File Size: 17 MB
File Type: AVI
Date/Time Original: 2011:03:06 05:58:13
Software: CanonMVI06
Duration: 12.18 s
File Name: USB YARNELL HILL 010.avi
File Size: 7.6 MB
File Type: AVI
Date/Time Original: 2011:03:06 05:59:52
Software: CanonMVI06
Duration: 4.30 s
File Name: USB YARNELL HILL 011.avi
File Size: 15 MB
File Type: AVI
Date/Time Original: 2011:03:06 06:36:25
Software: CanonMVI06
Duration: 14.11 s
File Name: USB YARNELL HILL 012.avi
File Size: 29 MB
File Type: AVI
Date/Time Original: 2011:03:06 06:59:35
Software: CanonMVI06
Duration: 25.32 s
File Name: USB YARNELL HILL 013.avi
File Size: 14 MB
File Type: AVI
Date/Time Original: 2011:03:06 07:23:08
Software: CanonMVI06
Duration: 12.11 s
File Name: USB YARNELL HILL 014.avi
File Size: 11 MB
File Type: AVI
Date/Time Original: 2011:03:06 07:23:33
Software: CanonMVI06
Duration: 8.04 s
File Name: USB YARNELL HILL 015.avi
File Size: 11 MB
File Type: AVI
Date/Time Original: 2011:03:06 07:27:24
Software: CanonMVI06
Duration: 9.18 s
File Name: USB YARNELL HILL 016.avi
File Size: 6.4 MB
File Type: AVI
Date/Time Original: 2011:03:06 08:03:35
Software: CanonMVI06
Duration: 4.47 s
* Sunday, June 30, 2013
File Name: USB YARNELL HILL 017.avi
File Size: 12 MB
File Type: AVI
Date/Time Original: 2011:03:07 02:47:40
Software: CanonMVI06
Duration: 10.48 s
NOTE: “USB YARNELL HILL 018.jpg” is a JPEG still
photo taken in-between these AVI videos.
File Name: USB YARNELL HILL 019.avi
File Size: 8.0 MB
File Type: AVI
Date/Time Original: 2011:03:07 03:56:25
Software: CanonMVI06
Duration: 8.11 s
File Name: USB YARNELL HILL 020.avi
File Size: 17 MB
File Type: AVI
Date/Time Original: 2011:03:07 04:16:46
Software: CanonMVI06
Duration: 15.31 s
File Name: USB YARNELL HILL 021.avi
File Size: 27 MB
File Type: AVI
Date/Time Original: 2011:03:07 04:53:47
Software: CanonMVI06
Duration: 22.19 s
Thanks!
They’re still 12 hours off.
04:16:46 in this sequencing means 4:16 in the morning.
So they still need an AM/PM switch. But that’s easy.
So now we know that at 4:16 PM on Sunday, Rance Marquez and Cougan Carothers weren’t fighting fire in the Sickles Road area, as they both said they were in their ADOSH interviews. They were watching the fire along a fence that looks like the one on 89. Possibly with at least one of the Moki Helitack crew-members.
That’s twenty minutes after they probably both crossed the Air2Air Video Camera at around 3:51 PM heading east on Hays Ranch Road (that’s when Cougan’s blue truck was captured on it).
Which makes sense because by somewhere around 4:35 PM (I’m doing this off the top of my head), Cougan Carothers was seen turning his blue truck around on Shrine Road in one of Aaron’s videos.
One of these days I really need to download and install the Lightroom plug-in version of that software you’re using to read this stuff. But there’s a part of me that keeps procrastinating because I don’t really want to keep doing this kind of thing.
So, again, thank you WTKTT for getting this stuff!
And now that I just wrote this, I’m starting to wonder if that guy in the white helmet in that video just might be Tony Sciacca. That’s been a real stumper for me.
Tony’s truck crossed the Air2Air camera at 3:58 pm and made a few cameos in Aaron’s Shrine Road videos.
So I think that is quite probably Tony.
The two Moki chase trucks–the white one and the yellow one–crossed the Air2Air camera at 4:45 PM after they had been parked on Hays Ranch Road since about 1:15 PM.
So it looks like the white truck left the yellow one earlier and came out to 89, ‘tied in” with Rance, Cougan, and Tony here, then went back to “tie in” with the yellow truck, and they both headed back out east at 4:45, when they crossed the Air2Air camera and then were seen passing behind Russ Reason in that Russ Reason video.
Reply to Marti Reed post on January 28, 2015 at 9:02 am
>> Marti said…
>>
>> And now that I just wrote this, I’m starting to wonder if that
>> guy in the white helmet in that video just might be Tony
>> Sciacca. That’s been a real stumper for me.
>>
>> Tony’s truck crossed the Air2Air camera at 3:58 pm and
>> made a few cameos in Aaron’s Shrine Road videos.
>>
>> So I think that is quite probably Tony.
Probability is HIGH that that is, in fact, Tony Sciacca standing there in that white helmet in this Guadiana AVI video.
A least 3 reasons…
1) The white helmet in this video has the same yellow stripes that are seen on Sciacca’s helmet in the upcoming Hulburd video M2U00262 taken on Shrine road. That’s the video where Sciacca is talking to Russ Shumate on his cellphone and asking for Paul Musser’s cellphone number and telling Shumate “I really need it bad about now”.
2) In that same Hulburd M2u00262 video taken on Shrine Road… there is a distinct BROWN leather ‘strap’ on the BACK of Sciacca’s shirt collar. That same BROWN strap appears to be in the same place on the back of the shirt collar of this white-helmeted FF in the Guadiana video.
3) The timing is right. Sciacca was ‘working his way down’ towards Yarnell in this timeframe and it would make sense that he would stop there were Cougan Caruthers and Rance Marquez were ‘observing the fire’. Marquez and Caruthers had just finished their structure protection work in the Sickles Road area, which is there in the distance in this video.
CAVEAT: Tony Sciacca makes NO mention of this ‘roadside stop’ with Marquez and Caruthers in ANY of his interviews or Unit Logs. All he says is that he left the ICP for Yarnell and his next ‘stop’ was meeting up with Gary Cordes on the side of Highway 89 ( down in Yarnell proper )… and then he went down Shrine Road where we then see him in Hulburd video M2U00262.
By the way… there were TWO of those ‘concrete driveways’ with ‘access gates’ on the east side of Highway 89 as you worked your way south from Hays Ranch Road to Yarnell. This Guadiana video was taken near the concrete driveway that was farther north than the other one.
The FF in the White Helmet ( who is most likely Tony Sciacca ) is actually STANDING exactly here, just south of that concrete driveway…
34.251205, -112.735313
>> Marti also said…
>>
>> The two Moki chase trucks–the white one and the yellow
>> one–crossed the Air2Air camera at 4:45 PM after they had
>> been parked on Hays Ranch Road since about 1:15 PM.
>>
>> So it looks like the white truck left the yellow one earlier and
>> came out to 89, ‘tied in” with Rance, Cougan, and Tony here,
>> then went back to “tie in” with the yellow truck, and they both
>> headed back out east at 4:45, when they crossed the Air2Air
>> camera and then were seen passing behind Russ Reason in
>> that Russ Reason video.
That all sounds right. I believe you have ‘nailed it’ now on this part.
My problem is that, since this visual scenario doesn’t correspond with what Carothers and Marquez told ADOSH, I’m not all that convinced their story about what they did over at Sickles Road is true.
And that ties in with that photo of Carothers’ truck up there on the Dozer Line above Sesame at 10:12 on Sunday Morning.
There’s just too much that doesn’t connect between their visual footprints and their stories.
That’s been bugging me all along……
This is absolutely true.
I just checked again.
Their ‘accounts’ of what they were DOING in what we now know is a fixed moment in time ( +/- a few minutes ) just don’t match the photographic evidence which places them there at that access gate on the side of Highway 89, just ‘watching the fire’.
According to them… at this moment where we now SEE them just watching the fire ‘out there’ from the side of Highway 89… they were supposed to still be over in the Sickles Road area doing ‘mop up’ on the structure protection work they also SAY they had been directly involved with.
Curiouser… and curiouser.
So this also goes to show that I think we can, relatively speaking, trust the time-stamps (except for the AM/PM thing) on that Powershot. They might not be exact, but that 4:15 video syncs in pretty well to the other things I mentioned.
Okay… so check me out on the following because I think we can now say for SURE when the first load of Lewis crew arrived up on the ridge that Saturday morning.
AVI 002 was taken in the sir and on APPROACH to the Helisopt. EXIF time is 23:36. That translates to 11:36 but we now Aldo know the time was actually 12 hours off (exactly)… so that also means it wasn’t 11:36 PM… it was exactly 11:36 AM.
That would, in fact, match what the Fernandez photos are telling us about N14HX still being on the ground at YFD… but was ABOUT to begin shuttling Lewis crew.
Same deal for AVI 003. We can now say for sure those guys are stepping out of that Helicopter and onto that ridge at exactly 11:39 AM.
That’s almost a full HOUR after Russ Shumthate said it was happening that morning.
Smartphone typos above.
Should have been…
“AVI 002 was taken in the AIR…”
Right, essentially.
I’m not assuming the timestamps are EXACT.
But, given where 020.avi fits in to the timelines we have exact stamps on, I would say probably no more than a ten minute margin of error either way.
PS When you do the coordinates for the spots and places we’re discussing, could you put in a coordinate for what you would consider the infamous “Heel of the Fire”?
I’ve never really had a sense of where that actually was, and all of this reorganizing of this space in my head is making me even more confused.
Thanx!
Where is all this picture and video you are talking about I must have missed something????
heh heh get’s really confusing at times even for me!!
These are Jake Gardiano’s photos and videos. From both Saturday and Sunday.
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/20inrene9tcx74a/AAB1Wb5GbaqoEXohtiCKsdyKa/ADOSH%20Yarnell%20Hill%20Investigation/Photos%20and%20Video/ASFD%20Photos/Jake%20Guadiana
Jake Guadiana.
Thanks Very interesting Quite a bit of wind picked up after the Fire escaped from what I could see and hear.
Yes, that’s what I noticed too.
The jump of the road may have been caused by the rotor wash, but by a little after 5 PM that westerly was really pushing it, and it never stopped.
All of Jake Guadiana’s photos and videos from both Saturday and Sunday were also ‘reproduced’ in the ‘AZ Photos and Videos’ folder in the SAIT release.
In this ‘AZ Photos and Videos’ folder… they are all at the BOTTOM of the page…
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/02ue6bnjp6nazkm/AACsLm8p8B-wc-JzgAgGrUNta/Photos%20and%20Video/AZFS%20photos%20videos
WTKTT you wrote on January 27, 2015 at somewhere approximating 4:46 PM, I think:
“It’s pretty obvious ( from Rory Collins’ photos taken later that afternoon ) that the fire jumped that high-ridge two track at right about this spot in the road…”
Which of Rory’s photos are you referencing here?
Thx in advance.
IMG_0245
He took it DIRECTLY over the fire looking straight down at the ‘escaped’ part.
It shows without a shadow of a doubt WHERE that fire jumped that two-track.
Thank you!!!
So I found some interesting and relevant You Tube videos today.
CAL FIRE step off. Apparently it is somewhat “routine” for CAL FIRE. This video shows how they do it:
“Cal Fire Helicopter Pilot”
http://youtu.be/g0Ze9-hBRjs
This video is about the pilot, who is pretty awesome. He flew the Presidential Helicopter when George Bush was the President.
More rotor wash. This video shows a chopper slinging a water tank on what looks like about the same length of line we see N14HX using Sunday morning in Joy’s photos. It’s a fairly long line, but even with that distance to the ground, it really kicks up a lot of dirt and stuff.
“Helicopter Sling Load Tank 02-09-2013”
http://youtu.be/56TuxjvO8sg
That one is GREAT find, Marti. Thank you.
VERY similar topography and terrain as Yarnell area.
I’m not even sure the N14HX ‘drop line’ was as long as this one… yet look at the effect the ‘hovering’ is having at ground level even at that altitude.
This video even goes on for maybe just as long as it took to deliver the bladder bags that Saturday afternoon over the fire in Yarnell… and watch how badly the rotor wash is effecting the ground THROUGHOUT the hovering.
Now imagine that this was all happening RIGHT over the ‘smoldering’ area that also now had some ‘creeping fire’ ( which is why the bladder bags were being sent up in the first place ).
WHOOSH goes the fire.
Yep.
Some thing wrong here with you dismount video.
That is absolutely not according to any Helicopter training.
I would say this crew is free lancing and out right out side
proper helicopter procedures. Hanging off a skid not any safety protocol
in any Helicopter training Period.
Agree. The ONLY title on that video should be… “Perfect example of what NOT to do. Don’t EVER, EVER do this. NOT EVER”. Even the slightest momentary power loss on that chopper and in 1/4 second that idiot would have been chopped in half as hell grounded out.
Typo. Should have been “As HELICOPTER grounded out.”
Followup… in the video that shows that Helitack doing the ‘live’ hookup of the bucket under the hovering helicopter… at least he would have had a chance of surviving a momentary power loss of the helicopter.
It would have slammed to the ground in the blink of an eye… but at least being directly under the chopper he would have had a chance of survival because the skids probably would not have ‘collapsed’. They are designed to take that kind of ‘power loss’ dropout up to a certain height.
As for anyone ‘hanging off a skid’… fugget about it.
Instant amputation/death.
Sling loads and bucked hook up are normally in hover
type jobs
I have to say, everytime I see that I get the heeby-jeebies.
There’s something in me that just wouldn’t want to be under a hovering helicopter.
Another rotor wash. This one is on a shorter line. You can really see the lateral wash kicking in the trees. And it’s also a fairly small helicopter.
“Helicopter Delivering Diving Gear
”
http://youtu.be/u3wSJT_mxfk
Once again… GREAT find. VERY relevant to Saturday afternoon in Yarnell.
This time chopper really is similar size/type to N14HX ( and horsepower ).
Forget the trees… look at what is happening in the GRASS CLUMPS there in the foreground… and even well away from the ‘drop point’.
If the delivery of the bladder blags really was just a ‘cable release’ on a slingload, as shown in this video… then the TIMEFRAME shown in this video would also probably be almost identical to what happened in Yarnell Saturday afternoon.
Now imagine that same area under and around the ‘drop zone’ in this video was an active, smoldering, creeping fire.
WHOOSH goes the fire.
Yeah. I was so blown away by how suddenly the trees started blowing around that I didn’t even look at the grass.
I learned a lot from this one about the kind of basic helicopter stuff we’re talking about:
“Helicopter Crewmember – Part 1 – Helicopter Capabilities”
http://youtu.be/gtAeh8aLM6w
I saved the best for the last. Maybe this is how they should have fought that fire on Saturday??????
“T-REX 600E fight’s fire”
http://youtu.be/Ddcs5Fh66nc
You just gotta watch this one!!!
Happy Snowpocalypse Day!
Yep. That’s the future of firefighting right there.
All robots. All remote.
Not in our lifetimes… but that’s where it’s ALL going ( someday ).
Did you know that the first stealth fighter was also built as a ‘toy’?
Once the technology was proven… here came ‘the big ones’.
I just LOVE this video!!!
As a photographer, I’ve been lusting for that quad that breached the White House perimeter yesterday and captured those videos (and that was a 12-year-old kid who did that) of that fire in California (OMG!!!) last summer.
Actually my love-affair with remote-operating-vehicles began when I spent EIGHT MONTHS after the explosion of Deepwater Horizon documenting the intervention on that Macondo Well via the twelve ROVs (Remote Operating Vehicles) that did ALL of that work.
Here’s on of the (more artistic) videos I made from that ROV intervention:
“Skandi One and the Dancing Brush, Cleaning the Bullseye”
http://youtu.be/7gadZ2roCrY
That happened 5000 feet below the surface of the Gulf of Mexico.
Too funny.
First… 1.8 gazillion dollars worth of equipment mounted to seafloor… and someone forgets to install a simple water jet to keep the crap from accumulating on the window plate of the bullseye.
Then another 2.3 gazillion dollars worth of robotics just to manipulate a 3 dollar plastic handle bootbrush from Ace Hardware to clean the window.
You just can’t make this stuff up.
Thanks for sharing.
When they brushed away all that stuff from the bullseye was when they realized the well had tipped over to the point where it was going to be exponentially harder to build something to cap it.
That little ball there really said something.
But still this shows the capacity of “drone” technology to do things we humans can’t do.
If it hadn’t been for those ROV’s (drones) that well would have never been capped.
And actually it wasn’t funny at all.
Not at all.
None of any of this was even remotely funny.
19 people died when the Deepwater Horizon exploded.
19.
And the ROVs were the first entities to dive down to the bottom of the Gulf of Mexico to intervene.
And I have a video showing when one of the intervening ROVs discovered one of the Deepwater Horizon ROVs.
For the pilot of that ROV, it wasn’t the least bit funny at all.
But I digress.
You are right. Nothing funny about it or the circumstances that led to all of that.
It was still an interesting video. Thanks for sharing.
YW!
I LOVE that brush!
Actually this is the funny one.
Especially given that the first time I published it, YouTube shut it down because Ocean Intervention claimed it was a copyright violation of video that was ordered by the US Justice Department to be publicized so the American public could see what was happening.
My original publication of this had a thousand hits immediately.
“Working 9 to 5 The Bird, the ROV, and the Hardhats”
http://youtu.be/16lc-LmjL3o
OK I promise now to quit digressing.
Another 1.7 gazillion dollars of technology… totally dependent on a 2 dollar bottle of Windex.
There was a LOT of “home-made” DIY stuff being used by the ROVs on the Macondo Intervention.
I think it has to do with the culture of the pilots. Most of them are pretty amazingly awesome.
They’re kind of the Hotshots of deepwater operations.
Reply to Marti Reed post on January 27, 2015 at 8:27 pm
>> Marti said…
>>
>> So I found some interesting and relevant You Tube videos today.
>>
>> CAL FIRE step off. Apparently it is somewhat “routine” for CAL FIRE.
>> This video shows how they do it:
>>
>> “Cal Fire Helicopter Pilot”
>>
>> http://youtu.be/g0Ze9-hBRjs
You do have to love the guy in the red helmet doing the ‘monkey bar swing/crawl down’ off the skids. I wonder if that was a ‘routine ( approved ) egress?
LOL! Yeah, that was my thought too.
No wonder Bob Powers says that USFS doesn’t allow those things and CAL FIRE is much more “experimental.”
As for some of these other videos… the only TITLE really should be…
“Don’t EVER, EVER do it like this. NOT EVER”.
Do NOT put this in your MICROWAVE!!!
Reply to Marti Reed post on January 27, 2015 at 9:34 am
>> Marti Reed asked…
>>
>> How did all their 40-pound packs and their chainsaws and fuel get up there?
Well… at the moment it really is looking like the evidence tells us the ‘load limit’ that Saturday for N14HX was no more than 4 sob ( souls on board ) for any one flight… leaving just enough room for 3 field packs and maybe 1 chainsaw per flight.
There were TWO flights in the morning to deliver the SIX Lewis Crew. They also supposedly then had TWO chainsaws for the rest of the day up there. Probably one chainsaw went with each of the two shuttle flights.
Nate Peck is ( apparently ) the ONLY person from that crucial Moki Helitack crew that was ever even interviewed by anyone… and the SAIT notes from his interview are obtuse, sketchy, and almost worthless.
Why were NONE of these other Moki ( including the PILOT ) ever interviewed?
Maybe they were… and those interviews have ‘accidentally’ fallen behind the filing cabinet right there beside all the Peeples Valley firefighters interviews, photographs, and cellphone records.
>> Marti also said…
>>
>> And I’m also struggling with the locations. Since Lightroom chokes up totally
>> on .avis, I haven’t really looked at Guadiana’s videos, which I’m downloading now.
>> So I’m kinda fuzzy on where all these points are.
>>
>> I’m fuzzy on the “two-track” that got jumped, the the two different places
>> you’re talking about where the crews loaded/unloaded and where the sling
>> load was dropped.
>>
>> Can you give me the coordinates for those?
** HELISPOT
The spot chosen by the pilot of N14HX to use for the ‘Helspot’ up there that day was an old para-gliding launching area created manually by some para-gliding enthusiasts. They had created a ‘flat circle’ up there on one of the Weaver peaks so they could para-glide off it.
Shumate himself says that what it was in his SECOND ADOSH interview.
It was actually NOT just 1/4 mile away from the fire, as reported in the interviews.
It was more like a full HALF mile NORTH on the high-ridge two-track from where fire started.
The center of this ‘Helispot’ is exactly here…
Decimal Latitude: 34.235033
Decimal Longitude: -112.793953
34.235033, -112.793953
As usual… just ‘cut and paste’ line above ( with comma ) into search bar of Google Maps, hit ENTER, and a GREEN ARROW will be pointing right at that spot.
‘As the bird flies’… it was 2,120 feet almost due north of where the center of the ‘smoldering fire’ area was as seen in the Dean Fernandez photos taken Saturday morning.
Walking that little trail down from the Helispot to the two-track… and then walking DOWN the two-track itself and south to the fire was more like 2,796 feet.
That’s 0.52 mile(s). ( A half-mile ).
To put that into perspective… the ‘Helispot’ was about as close to the north of where the fire was as the old-grader was to the east… ‘as the bird flies’.
So that also puts a better perspective on WHY they might have decided to risk dropping the 12 bladder bags right AT the fire location where Moki Helitack Nate Peck was now working with the Lewis Crew.
That was just the easy/quick thing to attempt… rather than take the time to have them all walk back UP to the Helispot, get the bladder bags there, and then have to walk all the way back to the fire again. That ’round trip’ at that crtical time really would have amounted to a MILE worth of crucial time wasted just HIKING to/from the Helispot.
** WHERE THE FIRE JUMPED THE TWO-TRACK
It’s pretty obvious ( from Rory Collins’ photos taken later that afternoon ) that the fire jumped that high-ridge two track at right about this spot in the road…
Decimal Latitude: 34.229618
Decimal Longitude: -112.791397
34.229618, -112.791397
That is right where that ‘green pocket’ is seen up against the two-track in Fernandez’s recon photos taken circa 10:30 AM… and that is also the center of the ‘half bowl’ shaped fire spread pattern seen in Rory Collins’ photos taken after it had already ‘escaped’.
It ‘took off’ right down that fuel-filled drainage there on the east side of the two-track.
** MORE ABOUT THE PARA-GLIDING CIRCLE USED FOR THE HELISPOT
Just a quick ‘other comment’ about that para-gliding circle that they ended up using as the Helispot that day.
It really was just ‘blind luck’ that it was there.
Given the fact that the Lewis CRWB had already determined from his own morning recon that there was no way his own Type 2 Crew was going to be able to ‘hike’ out to that fire… what would Shumate have done if ( a half hour later ) the pilot of N14HX had come back and said “There are no valid Helispots up there”?
That man-made para-gliding circle was, in fact, the ONLY possible place they could have probably ( safely ) used as a Helispot out on that ridge.
It if had NOT just ‘accidentally’ been there… how would Shumate have gotten ANYONE out there to actually fight the fire?
He would have had a situation on his hands whereby the TWO ‘Type 2’ crews he was given for the fire did NOT even have the training or the physical ability to reach the fire… and now EVERYONE would have been standing around in the Yarnell Hill Fire Department parking lot doing nothing at all… probably for the rest of the day…
*OR*
…Until someone could get some ‘Type 1’ crews to Yarnell… which is what should have been ordered in the first place back on Friday night given the known location and known ‘terrain’.
Thanks!
Wow.
That helispot is WAY far north of where I had the helispot located based on something from way back when plus Joy’s photos of N14HX flying that sling out and the two guys on the ridge etc etc etc, and also, I think, the Blue Ridge UTV track.
Based on all of that I had the helispot at 34°13’37.16″N, 112°47’27.49″W.
Interesting.
Also, based on the fact that all that retardant was all over where Granite Mountain was working the heel of the fire and just being in all those photos, I was thinking Saturday slopover had happened somewhere down around that area. You’ve got both those points much further north than I was thinking.
But then I wasn’t looking at Fernandez’ photos when placing them.
Hmmmmmmmmmmmmmm
On the morning of Saturday, June 29, 2013… the first Air Attack over Yarnell was Dan Eckstein. He’s the one who was running those Saturday morning SEAT drops before the Lewis Crew even started to shuttle up to the ridge.
He is also the one that reported the original position of the ‘Helispot’ that N14HX located and was now using ( the para-gliding spot ) back to DISPATCH and it showed up in the Dispatch Logs.
Shumate released Air Attack Eckstein shortly after NOON at the same time he released his SEATS back to Prescott.
When things changed later that afternoon and Shumate had to call both Air Attack AND the SEATS back to Yarnell.. the Air Attack he got for this second go-around was Rory Collins.
From the ‘I-Dispatch-Logs’ document…
———————————————————
Entry Date/Time: 06/29/2013 10:48:44
From: AA ( Air Attack – Dan Eckstein )
To: ALH
H-4HX DROPPED 6 HELITACK OFF 1/4 MILE FROM RIDGE TO HIKE
IN. – WILL GET LAT/LONG FROM HELITACK FOR LZ
Entry Date/Time: 06/29/2013 10:56:38
From: AA ( Air Attack – Dan Eckstein )
To: ALH
THE HELISPOT LOCATION IS 34 14.11 X 112 47.64
———————————————————-
AA ( Dan Exkstein ) reported the coordinates to Dispatch as ‘GPS Degrees, Decimal Minutes’…
GPS Degrees, Decimal Minutes
Latitude: 34 deg 14.11′ N
Longitude: 112 deg 47.64′ W
GPS Degrees, Minutes, Seconds
Latitude: 34 deg, 14′ 6.0″ N
Longitude: 112 deg, 47’ 38.0″ W
GPS Decimal
Latitude: 34.235033
Longitude: -112.793953
So that is what is interesting/important about Joy’s photos of N14HX from Sunday morning. Whatever is going on there… N14HX seems to be picking stuff up from where the Lewis crew had actually been fighting the fire ( and then going coyote ) rather than picking anything up from the Helispot itself.
I’m still about to identify EXACTLY where that activity really is in Joy’s photo(s).
As in.. EXACT GPS coordinates.
Not sure what that might tell us… but it might be another important part of ‘the puzzle’ regarding what really happened on Saturday.
By the way… this will probably come as NO suprise to anyone at this point… but the first Air Attack involved on Saturday ( Dan Eckstein ) has never been interviewed by anyone, either.
Not as far as we know, anyway.
Just one more interview that might have ‘accidentally’ falledn behind the filing cabinet along with the Peeples Valley Firefighter testimony, photos, and cellphone records?
I just really think nobody thought Saturday was important enough to really investigate.
Including us.
I mean, here WE are, a year and a half later, OURSELVES, finally focusing on what happened that day.
That’s why I have always said we need to look beyond the obviously questionable decisions Granite Mountain made that led to their deaths, and take a wider view as to how this whole fire was catastrophically mis-managed up the chain of command from the very get-go.
The families may settle with an investigation into certain specific things that related to the deaths of the Granite Mountain Hotshots.
But what I’m currently hoping for is that those who not only lost their homes etc (even though they may have been partially to blame for not defensibly maintaining their properties) but were subject to a totally irresponsibly managed “evacuation” hold out for a complete investigation of the management of this fire from the get-go.
And now we, after pretty much not looking at this for all this time OURSELVES, are uncovering the mishaps that happened on Saturday, without which this fire probably wouldn’t have even been an issue by Saturday afternoon if this Initial Attack hadn’t been also bungled.
Reply to Marti Reed post on January 27, 2015 at 11:02 pm
>> Marti said…
>>
>> I just really think nobody thought Saturday was
>> important enough to really investigate.
>>
>> Including us.
>>
>> I mean, here WE are, a year and a half later, OURSELVES,
>> finally focusing on what happened that day.
Actually… just shortly after the ADOSH report came out there was some pretty heated discussion on this ongoing forum about what REALLY happened on Saturday.
The SAIT investigation of Saturday was a joke… but ADOSH took a closer look and although we were a long way from actually seeing all the interviews they did… it was obvious when the report came out that ADOSH knew a lot about what went on Saturday from what had come out in THEIR interviews.
It was still a while before we could SEE those same interviews.
It was pretty obvious early on that something was ‘bungled’ on Saturday. Getting to the DETAILS has been the ongoing task.
>> Marti said…
>>
>> That’s why I have always said we need to look beyond
>> the obviously questionable decisions Granite Mountain
>> made that led to their deaths, and take a wider view
>> as to how this whole fire was catastrophically
>> mis-managed up the chain of command from the
>> very get-go.
And I have always agreed.
In the end… there might be even MORE ‘Lessons to be Learned’ in the Friday / Saturday evidence than anyone has still been willing to admit.
The whole thing about only using resources for IA that are in the ‘Severity’ pool ( so as not to start spending extra money ) is still a really good place to start.
As Yarnell proved… NOT the best idea for any IA.
>> Marti also said…
>>
>> The families may settle with an investigation into
>> certain specific things that related to the deaths
>> of the Granite Mountain Hotshots.
>>
>> But what I’m currently hoping for is that those who
>> not only lost their homes etc (even though they
>> may have been partially to blame for not defensibly
>> maintaining their properties) but were subject to a
>> totally irresponsibly managed “evacuation” hold out
>> for a complete investigation of the management of
>> this fire from the get-go.
Agree. Above and beyond the ‘bungling’ of this one incident… there are ‘management’ styles and practices here that really should be put out to pasture.
>> Marti also said…
>>
>> And now we, after pretty much not looking at this for
>> all this time OURSELVES, are uncovering the mishaps
>> that happened on Saturday, without which this fire
>> probably wouldn’t have even been an issue by Saturday
>> afternoon if this Initial Attack hadn’t been also bungled.
What REALLY happened on Saturday is now as much a part of the true ‘story’ of this historic incident as anything else is… and that is why I’m glad ‘Retired with 38’ kicked off this re-vist of the Saturday evidence… and why we are digging a little deeper.
Interesting. I was all intensively focused on the photos of the Deployment Site in December so I guess I missed that (along with a lot of other stuff as well).
What Chapter is December in? I want to go back and read that. I spent most of today looking at stuff regarding Initial Attack.
Will probably post the most useful stuff I found.
I am also currently wondering if Air Attack Rory Collins had anything to do with the decision-making on Saturday.
OK. Gotcha.
So what I am seeing you saying is that the place Joy shows the helicopter picking up that sling load of bladder bags is a different place than what was originally, on Saturday, designated and used as “the Helispot.”
That would explain my current confusion.
At least one half of it.
Also, what about where Frisbee and Trew were sent, and what shows up on their GPS video, to look at “something” on Sunday night?
I’m wondering how that fits into all of this.
Reply to Marti Reed post on January 26, 2015 at 10:10 pm
>> Marti said…
>>
>> Right now I’m contemplating those Saturday photos of the activity
>> around Moki Helicopter N14HX in the Yarnell Fire Department parking
>> lot in my Dropbox collection. They’re from 2:56 to 2:57 PM. Occasionally
>> I’ve thought they might be related to that bladder-bag drop. On the other
>> hand they might not be related to anything that we’re discussing.
Yes. Might be ‘the bladder bag’ supply flight preparation. Might not.
Who’s to say they didn’t just use the bladder bag itself as the ‘sling’?
I wish the interviews for Saturday had gone better.
I am now also going back and looking at ALL of Joy Collura’s photos of N14HX that she took on Sunday morning while the ‘dust off’ was happening.
Some of those show the ‘drop line’ being used and things being ‘picked up’.
I’m wondering now if those photos are telling us something in REVERSE… such as exactly WHERE things were dropped off the day before ( other than that old para-gliding spot they were using for the Helispot on Saturday ).
Once again… Joy Collura’s photos are proving invaluable for trying to ‘piece this together’ since two sets of investigators didn’t seem to feel the need to do so.
THANK YOU once again to Joy Collura.
>> Marti also said…
>>
>> And I’m still kind of mystified, all things considered, why that Bambi
>> bucket is lying there in front of the chopper as the helicopter is getting
>> ready to launch with more of the helitack crew at 5:22 PM. It wasn’t
>> there in the earlier photos.
See above. Maybe the Bambi Bucket itself was ‘the slingload’.
I mean… is that allowed?
Just fill the canvas bucket with stuff ( withing weight limits ) and then lower it (limp) to ground at deliver site and let the Helitack under you empty it manually?
Good morning!
The Bambi Bucket is not attached to the helicopter in the photo.
Oh, and yeah, I’ve had joys photos of NH14HX in mind all along, also.
Bambi Bucket—- Has wiring running to it from bucket to helicopter the wiring in the bucket allows it to fill then open at the bottom to drop water. It can not be used as a net for sling loads.
Nets and cable would be in Helitack truck of which they carry severial.
When dropped the net and cable are released.
Must be recovered at Helispot and flown out to
helibase some times used to fly out equipment after the fire back to base, or just picked up at helispot
Gotcha.
Joy’s Sunday morning photos that we are referencing show N14HX flying into the helispot and flying back out with a sling load attached to it. Unfortunately, she took them from the other side of the ridge, so you can’t see who is connecting it and how. But at least we have the series, so………
Thank you Joy!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
And speaking of stuff and terminology and stuff, I had to spend a couple of hours yesterday google-researching buckets, blivets, pumpkins and other related stuff to even begin to make sense of what Justin was saying and what he was being asked.
That conversation still doesn’t make any sense to me.
Realize that Justin is basically a crew boss trainee he may not have ever trained or worked very much around a Helicopter. Dose not have a lot of knowledge in their use . Just my thoughts.
Yeah, that’s getting more clear to me!
Copy that. Thank you. That’s what some of Joy Collura’s Sunday morning photos seem to show is the recovery of this now infamous slingload apparatus used the previous day.
Since we know for sure now that following Jake Guadiana’s call to Shumate about the fire starting to ‘creep’ on the west side that Shumate WAS considering finally getting some bucket drops up there that day… then the reason those other Saturday photos show the bucket being ‘prepared’ there in front of the chopper is probably because it just would have made sense to start the prep while final decision was being made.
Shumate’s final decision was to NOT start doing any bucket drops. Either all on his own or in conjunction with opinions coming from the Moki Helitack.. he went with the bladder bags option instead.
I think it is important now to try and nail down the EXACT spot up there where those bags were delivered and, hence, EXACTLY where that rotor wash was being applied to the fire. Working on that now.
I still just do not understand the call for Bladder Bags over a helicopter water drop?????????
Bladder Bags would be less affective than a air tanker or a helicopter.
which ever was available should have been used.
The Helicopter should have dropped the Bladder Bags a couple hundred feet from the burning area of the fire not next to it Seasoned Pilots are aware of rotor wash. NEW PILOT TO FIRE FIGHTING??????????
This one Carless act buy who ever’s decision caused the escape of the fire that evening.
Although I would also question the Line construction of the Crew on the ground.
If in fact they were doing California Cold trail they should have had a line around the fire long before the escape.
California cold trail…………Build line where necessary skip areas where fire has burned out no visible heat use natural barriers Rocks, bare ground cold areas concentrate on hot areas shoe string lines or bigger as needed. 2 Acer fire should have taken no more than 2 hours with 11 FF in the rocks and open dirt areas. It is beyond me what they were doing?????
As I remember there was not a lot of fuel where the fire started and a lot of rocks did we not have a good look at that area earlier from WTKTT Goggle Earth ? Before the fire can you get that again WTKTT?????
OK went back to Fernandez photos #6 thru #10 are the fire 0n the Morning of the 29th a good all around look at the burned area.
Again not much in active fire some smoke along the top edges.
The Rocks were controlling about 50% or more of the fire.
Some places on the bottom of the fire looked out.
I went to the Investigation supporting documents to Photos and to Hernandez Photos. Very good look at the initial fire before crews were put on it.
See that pocket of ‘green’ right there on the EAST side, and right up against the two-track?
That’s what ‘flared up’ and right where it hopped the two-track.
That’s also probably right where they set the bladder bags down… in that one little flat stretch of two-track right there by that ‘pocket of green’.
They had at least 2 chain saws up there all afternoon and probably didn’t pay any attention to that ‘pocket’ at all… not even ‘cutting it BACK’ from the two track there.
More about this later.
Yap—-You got it and when there was very little smoke
they should have cut line 50/50 4 0r 5 people with a chain saw and tools 1 to 2 FT. scrape line across the fire edge
roughly west to east Maybe 10 chains in light to medium fuel
What a crying shame.
Setting line construction priorities on this fire was not done
to stop spread then build containment line.
I hear ya. I mean… just look at those Fernandez photos taken at 10:30 AM. They really tell the story.
If they were COUNTING on that east-side two-track to be the ‘containment’ on the EAST side of the fire for the rest of the day ( and forever )… the FIRST thing they should have done is IMPROVED it.
That would have just been a good ‘warm-up’ for the day’s work. They could have just pulled ropes on the saws and WALKED along that two-track… cutting everything BACK from the road so there was little to no chance of ANYTHING ‘spotting over’ later on.
If they had just done that… I don’t think we would even be here talking about any of this.
Throw in the idiotic move later of getting a rotor wash anywhere NEAR that smoldering area… and what can I say.
TOTAL FAIL.
I would NOT want to be any attorney in the Arizona State Attorneys office having to actually DEFEND any of this Saturday operation in a courtroom full of angry property owners… that’s fer sure.
Several Factors
The Lack of boots on the Fire the Night of the 28.
The lack of urgency the morning of the 29th
Fly at day light recon and get boots on ground before 9 AM
not having a crew on ground till almost 11AM and no line construction till after Noon.
Lack of a Good IC on the Fire to set priorities and suppression tactics.
Lake of commitment to use retardant or Water drops across the top of the fire to support the crew Shumate should have been on the fire not his trainee.
They could have dropped the sling load 100 to 200 feet down from the hot spot and been fine
This simple act cost the fire escape and start its run. to 400 Acers.
They had at least 5 hours to contain the head of the fire with the resources they had.
They had safe area to retreat to and the tools necessary to build a line across the fire at the fire edge which would have been better than a indirect line on the 2 track.
Direct line and put out the edge as you go 10 chains 660 ft. across the head of the fire while it was creeping no hot flames no flame lengths’ simple line construction in grass to 3 ft. brush.
6 IA Helitack with a chainsaw and helicopter water drop backup in 2 hours 10 chains easy.
The loss of life and property for lack of a aggressive IA is totally unacceptable when you look at what the fire was doing at 0700 when people should have been getting on the fire and getting it contained.
Oh, and speaking of rotor wash.
I was looking around for more “step-off” videos when I came across this video. It’s a much bigger helicopter, but still.
“Cal Fire Helicopter 404 on the Robbers Fire Iowa Hill”
The guy that shot it writes:
“Shooting this video was a trip as you will see near the point of lift off. I was sitting down firmly braced with my back up against a blast fence to keep me from rolling across the ground when they lifted off. (Not my first up close helicopter take off!) Note the dibri flying around near the end, do not get close to these when taking off or landing.”
http://youtu.be/96fTtvetLZk
**
** SHUMATE CONFIRMED THAT HELICOPTER N14HX WAS HOVERING
** DIRECTLY OVER THE FIRE RIGHT BEFORE IT ‘ESCAPED’
This is sort of a repeat of the previous comment below… but with an important correction.
I was wrong to even suggest that the bladder bags *might* have been dropped up at the Helispot, and not directly over the now-creeping fire.
There is actually no question that when the 12 bladder bags were being delivered… Helicopter N15HX ‘hovered’ directly over the fire and was delivering the bladder bags directly to the spot where the 6 men from the Lewis DOC crew were actually ‘working’ and trying to ‘catch’ the now-creeping fire.
Russ Shumate himself CONFIRMED this to ADOSH.
Shumate decided to allow Helicopter N14HX to hover directly over the fire because he didn’t even want the men to have to waste time hiking up to the Helispot to get the bladder packs, and then back to the active fire again.
Shumate also still confirms that it was DURING this operation of delivering the bladder bags ( and allowing N14HX to hover directly over the now-creeping fire ) that the fire ‘flared up’ and ‘escaped’ over the two-track.
It is still unknown whether they were using a SHORT LINE, or a LONG LONG for this ‘hovering’ slingload delivery… or how LONG N14HX was, in fact, ‘hovering’ over the active fire at that time.
Obviously a SHORT LINE would have intensified the rotor wash onto the now-creeping fire.
From Russ Shumate’s FIRST ADOSH interview on August 8, 2013
The moment everything changed…
Q = Brett Steurer, ADOSH investigator
Q2 = Barry HIcks, ADOSH investigator
A = Russ Shumate, AZF ICT4 on June 29, 2013
———————————————————————————————–
1087 A: I was going to fly more people up
1088 there to help them deal with the creep. We – discussion was should we put
1089 Bambi buckets – run it up there. My determination was what the – what the
1090 altitude density and the efficiency of a Bambi bucket I would probably be
1091 dumping less than 50 gallons a load.
1092
1093 Q2: Yeah.
1094
1095 A: So the determination was well, let’s sling up bladder bags. So the plan was to
1096 sling up — as I recall — 12 bladder bags. A bladder bag is a 5 gallon backpack
1097 of water.
1098
1099 Q: Okay.
1100
1101 A: Um, so we slung load that up there while that sling load was occurring was
1102 when the fire on the – against the two track picked up and spotted over.
———————————————————————————————–
The infamous part…
“WHILE that sling load was occurring was when the fire on the – against the two track picked up and spotted over.”
A few moments later… in the same interview… ADOSH investigator Barry Hicks gets Shumate to CONFIRM that the bladder bags were, in fact, dropped directly where the Lewis DOC Crew was ‘working’ and trying to ‘catch’ the now-creeping fire.
That means the Helicopter hovered DIRECTLY over the fire itself during this ‘operation’…
———————————————————————————————–
1161 Q2: When – when they dropped off the bladder bags did they drop them off at the
1162 helispot or near the fire?
1163
1164 A: No, they drop them off right where the guys were.
1165
1166 Q2: Right near the fire line.
1167
1168 A: Because the helitack went down with the hand crew to work the fire and not
1169 just sit at the helispot.
1170
1171 Q2: Okay.
1172
1173 A: So he was there with the folks…
1174
1175 Q2: And – and handles the sling load down there.
1176
1177 A: …and – and the helitack the sling load right at the crews location.
1178
1179 Q2: (Unintelligible) Yeah. Okay.
1180
1181 A: So that way they didn’t have to hike up and then come back.
———————————————————————————————–
So ( according to Shumate himself ) it was the Helitack who had been assigned to the Helispot himself who came DOWN from there and down to the active fire area to help unload the slingload of bladder bags right where the Lewis DOC crew was trying to ‘catch’ the now-creeping fire… just so that the Lewis crew wouldn’t have had to do the opposite and hike up to the Helispot and return to the work area with the bladder packs.
It was a conscious decision, on Shumate and the Moki Helitack’s part, to ALLOW Helicopter N14HX to ‘hover’ over the now-creeping fire… and it was DURING this operation that the fire ‘flared up’ and ‘escaped’ over the two-track road.
And the rest is (now) history.
A few ‘followups’ here… one at a time since they all have ‘links’ in them.
From “Helicopter Firefighting” by Thomas Eggleston
http://www.sonnet.com/usr/wildfire/helo.pdf
————————————————————————————
Extreme caution must be used when hovering near the fire.
“Rotor downwash will inflame the fire.”
————————————————————————————-
Federal Emergency Management Agency ( FEMA )
Publication: Cross-Training Standards for Structural and Forestry Personnel in Urban Interface Wildfires.
http://www.usfa.fema.gov/pdf/efop/efo29160.pdf
————————————————————————————-
2. Helicopters Operations.
Helicopters are commonly used for point-topoint delivery on wildland fires. Sizes vary from small, to medium, to large. The larger the helicopter, the more wind it creates.
Proper distance.
Be aware that as the helicopter approaches, a cushion of air is generated by the rotors that can exceed 50 mph.
NEARBY hot areas can furiously IGNITE.
Fires can ESCAPE CONTROL LINES due to ROTOR WINDS.
11. Helicopter Bucket Use.
A valuable & effective firefighting tool is the delivery of water from a helicopter bucket. The bucket is attached to the helicopter by a steel cable. The pilot controls the operation of the bucket, including water drops. Safety considerations around a drop zone include:
b. Be aware of ROTOR WASH how it can AFFECT THE FIRE.
————————————————————————————-
From the National Wildfire Coordinating Group ( NWCG )
Publication: Foam versus Fire – Aerial Applications
http://www.fs.fed.us/t-d/pubs/pdf/95511209.pdf
————————————————————————————-
Caution should be used when performing hover drops to avoid
rotor downwash fanning the fire.
————————————————————————————-
From “California Wildfire Aerial Firefighting Tactics”
http://www.pacificnorthwestflying.com/index.php?topic=986.0
————————————————————————————-
Helicopters are very precise and effective but nothing is free and the low level precision carries it’s own risk to the ground personnel. The water must be released at the appropriate height and speed to atomize correctly.
I’ve been struck with blobs of water traveling 50 MPH and it can wallop you pretty hard.
Also, the ROTOR WASH from a Helicopter can suddenly DRIVE THE FIRE right into you or your rig to say nothing of the flying debris.
————————————————————————————
From “The RED Book”
National Wildfire Coordinating Group ( NWCG )
Wildland Fire Suppression Tactics Reference Guide
http://www.coloradofirecamp.com/suppression-tactics/suppression-tactics-guide.pdf
————————————————————————————-
Aircraft Caused Fireline Hazards
Aircraft also can create hazards on the fireline. Air tankers can produce a pair
of counter-rotating wake vortices about one wingspan in diameter. Normally
these dissipate within two minutes. They sink at about 300 to 400 feet per
minute, so they usually are weak or dissipated by the time they reach the ground
if the aircraft is flying above 1,000 feet. Vortex velocity depends on the size of
the wing, the aircraft speed, and the load on the wing. A vortex will feel like a
wind gust which lasts from 15 to 20 seconds normally. This may be enough to
initiate TORCHING and SPOTTING. Helicopters in level flight also can create wake
vortices, but they are much weaker and are not associated with adverse fire
behavior. The problems with helicopters are created by the DOWNWASH, the
induced flow of air down through the rotor blades.
————————————————————————————-
National Wildfire Coordinating Group ( NWCG )
Publication: Interagency Helicopter Operations Guide ( February, 2013 )
http://www.ihst.org/portals/54/helicopter_firefighting_guide.pdf
————————————————————————————-
Longlines may be used during bucket or delivery operations.
This allows access to different dip sites as well as REDUCES the
amount of ROTOR WASH experienced AT THE DELIVERY SITE.
————————————————————————————-
*le SIGH”
I hadn’t had time to respond to your post about the more-than-two crew flights. Which really helped make sense about what wasn’t making sense up until then. But I had read it and was contemplating it for quite awhile last night.
And the more I contemplated it, and shifted things around in my head, the more I started realizing what you just wrote above.
I had not mistakenly thought they dropped the bags at the helispot. I caught that right away. I knew they dropped them near where the crew was working.
I knew Nate Peck had not stayed at the helispot but was down working with the crew. He didn’t come down to unhitch the sling; he was down with the crew all along.
It wouldn’t make sense to sit on a helispot when you’re the most experience fire-fighter on the fire.
I really hadn’t even contemplated that “a load” of crew was less then about six people. It hadn’t even remotely dawned on me. When you broke that out, it was like scales falling from my eyes.
And then I thought about how Justin said he thought when they flew the sling up they took a couple of helitack crew up, also. That comment hadn’t made any sense to me at all until I started thinking about the implications of them NOT flying a full six-person load up at a time.
And in THAT scenario, it would TOTALLY make sense to fly “a couple” of helitack crew up with that load, all things considered.
So then I started imagining how that might look. Here’s the deal (which also corresponds with your surprise at how quickly they unloaded Nate Peck).
Helitack crews don’t need to land to unload themselves. They’re trained to jump off the skid.
So what I started seeing in my mind regarding THIS flight was:
Hovering over while Nate unfastened the sling and then lowering just enough so “the couple of” Helitack crew jumped off the helicopter.
And, knowing in my head that this “unloading” happened after the fire had started to “pick up” and before the fire “flared up” enough to jump the two track, I started thinking, “uh-oh………..”
That’s pretty much where I was when I went to bed last night. So when I got up and read this post I was like…………………. yep.
I didn’t need to read all those things that you linked to. I had already read ppl writing about how rotor-wash and low-flying SEAT retardant drops can really kick fires up.
I had posted those concerns way back when we were discussing the possibilitiy that that 4:33 PM retardant-drop on Sunday might have influenced the micro-fire-behavior as the fire was heading toward the bottom of the Deployment Site bowl-canyon. That idea never caught on so I let it go, especially after it became more apparent that that retardant drop was more east of the canyon than near it.
In spite of that, I had done a lot of reading about how careful you have to be regarding rotor-wash.
So that’s why, last night as I was contemplating what this sling-drop/crew-drop might have looked like, all things considered, I was definitely thinking this possibly could have been influential in the fire jumping the two-track.
And here’s the kicker.
It’s highly improbable that nobody who was interviewed regarding this Saturday initial attack was as unaware of this possibility as they appeared in their interviews. The only people who were unaware of it were the interviewers.
So thanks, WTKKT, for writing about both of these things.
PS I would still totally love it if you would get me the exif/metadata for Jake Gardiana’s video 020. Seriously.
I’d even be willing to send you some Hatch Green Chile for it. The best green chile in the country.
All of that is on the way. Promise. No chile necessary.
Sweet! Thx!
Marti I am going to burst your bubble SORRY
1. Sling loads are under the helicopter attached to a swivel with a electric trigger controlled by the pilot who drop cable and load when the sling touches the ground.
2. During sling loads no one but the Pilot is in the helicopter Federal Regulation.
3. People including Helitack are not to step off of a hovering Helicopter unless they are trained in Repelling and Repel this was not a Repel crew. All Helicopter training says you do not exit the ship until it is on the ground except in a emergency
some times the pilot will do a one skid landing for a person to exit Again EMERGENCY.
4. The FS & BLM stopped doing the Smoke Jumper suited jumps 8 ft. off the ground 25 years ago I know I use to do that To many accidents.
I was a certified Helicopter Manager in the 70’s and also Managed Helicopter Contracts for 12 years on the Sawtooth. NF.
Sling loads have been known to cause helicopters to go down also the loads are the max a helicopter can carry which eliminates riders any way.
This sling load was about 540 lbs back packs w 5 gal. water and net/cable.
3 crew would have been 600 Lbs each trip no room for even 1 extra crewman do to weight if they could have legally carried people.
I hope that helps and clears up the sling load..
Hey, Bob!
I seriously don’t mind my bubble being burst by somebody who has more experience to know more than I do. So thank you!!
This is just a preliminary reply to let you know I caught this and am thinking about it
Thank you!.
Somehow somewhere I really got the idea/visual of Helitack crews doing this stepping off the skid. Possibly too many YouTubes in my brain.
So, given what you are saying about the sling load itself being the maximum the helicopter could have carried, does that mean that what Justin said about thinking two helitack crew members going up with that sling load couldn’t have been true?
If that’s the case, then it would have taken two more flights after this one to get the five or six helitack crew members plus Justin up onto the fire after this flight
Reply to Marti Reed post on January 26, 2015 at 11:05 pm
>> Marti said…
>>
>> If that’s the case, then it would have taken two
>> more flights after this one to get the five or six
>> helitack crew members plus Justin up onto the
>> fire after this flight
I think that is what the evidence is starting to show, yes.
I have been scratching my head about that same statement from Justin about ‘a couple of FFs’ accompanying the slingload myself.
Bob Powers is right.
Not only would that have been against EVERY regulation in the book… it would have been insane.
That was a Type 3 ( light ) helicopter. Only 4 rotor blades.
The ‘altitude density’ and ‘load considerations’ were SERIOUS ISSUES that day and were obviously being ‘respected’ by the pilot of that Helicopter. Didn’t matter how many seats there were… only THREE additional people onboard for one flight was the maximum SAFE load weight.
Weight of ONE gallon of water is 8.34 pounds.
Standard bladder pack is 5 gallons.
A slingload of 12 bladder packs ( 5 gallons each ) would be 60 gallons. Weight of the water alone would then be 500.4 pounds.
Add the weight of the steel cable, and sling itself… and you are right at the 540 pounds Bob Powers quotes above ( if not MORE ).
That’s would have been the max safe ‘altitude density’ load for one flight in that chopper, on that day… especially with that air temperature and the RH.
To have added even just one crew member to the ‘supply shuttle’ flight not only would have been a ‘citation’ issue… it would have been insane.
I DO see ( and almost shared ) your thinking, here however.
If they really had lowered that chopper enough to maybe let some guys off on the two-track after dropping the bags… boy howdy… that would have put MAJOR WIND forces onto that smoldering fire. Pop goes the fire.
I really don’t think it happened that way, though.
Besides… because of the STEEP angle of the terrain surrounding that part of the two-track… it would have been ABSOLUTE INSANITY for the pilot to have tried to lower down onto it there.
The rotors themselves might have started ‘chopping rocks’.
So I think we really ARE looking at TWO more flights following this ‘bladder bag’ delivery in order to deliver the FIVE extra Moki Helitack and Justin Smith up there to the fire.
13 people spent the night up there.
I think we’ve about established that the flights ( leaving exact TIMES out here for a moment ) had to look like this…
MORNING
Flight 1: First recon. Nate Peck dropped at Helispot
Flight 2: First 3 Lewis DOC crew ( To Helispot )
Flight 3: Next 3 Lewis DOC crew. ( To Helispot )
SEVEN people now up there cold-mopping for 4 hours
AFTERNOON
Jake Guadiana tells Shumate fire is ‘creeping’ on WEST side.
Shumate decides to NOT start bucket drops but send bladder bags instead, more Helitack, and more Lewis crew.
Flight 4: Only the pilot and 12 bladder bags in a sling. Delivered right to fire where Nate Peck and Lewis crew are. Helicopter had to hover over the actual fire. Fire ‘escapes’ over the two-track DURING this supply flight.
Flight 5: 3 more Moki Helitack ( To Helispot )
Flight 6: 2 more Moki Helitack… and Justin Smith. ( To Helispot )
There are now 13 people up there.
Evidence says Shumate WANTED to have even MORE flights and send even MORE of the Lewis crew up there at that time… but by the time Flight 6 got up there they noticed that the ‘escaped’ fire was now BELOW the Helispot area… and it wasn’t safe to keep using that Helispot anymore.
Remember… the fire spotted over the two-track WHILE they were dropping the bladder bags during Flight 4… but it took it a while to ‘catch hold’. Enough time for those 2 more flights delivering 5 Moki and Justin Smith… but then that was ‘all she wrote’.
The fire had progressed too far ‘downhill’ by then for it to be safe to start flying anyone else out there… so the Lewis Crew delivery flights were then cancelled… and the 13 that were now up there would be the ones spending the night.
More later.
Correct and Correct The real kicker is no one other than Pilot on sling loads that also includes the bambi bucket.
Also you light Helicopter only seats 5 people, the pilot and 4 passengers. Density altitude reduced the weight capacity to 3 with gear.
The doors were not designed to allow passenger’s to step out of helicopter for Rappelling.
This Hilicopter has to land to let out or pick up passenger’s.
Again no one is aloud to just jump out of the helicopter in hover mode off the ground. Fully trained repelers do not jump they repel attached to cords. out of Heavy Helicopters.
Also do not count on all FF carrying 40 LB. packs.
Hot Shots and Smoke jumpers some IA Helitack
I would be surprised on DOC crews and others.
So you could transport 3 plus gear biased on weight put Chainsaws in the lighter loads.
Thx!!
So I’m struggling right now with the math.
If the most it could carry was three passengers plus the pilot (and at say, 160 lbs per person=640 lbs, which is even over the 600 lb limit we’re talking about) how did all their 40-pound packs and their chainsaws and fuel get up there?
And I’m also struggling with the locations. Since Lightroom chokes up totally on .avis, I haven’t really looked at Guadiana’s videos, which I’m downloading now. So I’m kinda fuzzy on where all these points are.
I’m fuzzy on the “two-track” that got jumped, the the two different places you’re talking about where the crews loaded/unloaded and where the sling load was dropped.
Can you give me the coordinates for those?
You need density altitude charts and what the weight was at that altitude the weight changes with the chart calculations all day as well as elevations. 4 passenger weight would be wit gear around 900 Lbs that would be starting weight and adjust from there.
Reply to Marti Reed post on
January 27, 2015 at 9:34 am
>> Marti said…
>>
>> Can you give me the coordinates for those?
Longer post about this up above… but here is the ‘srhort story’…
** HELISPOT
That Helispot was an old man-made para-gliding circle created by local para-gliding enthusiasts.
The center of this ‘Helispot’ is exactly here…
Decimal Latitude: 34.235033
Decimal Longitude: -112.793953
34.235033, -112.793953
It was NOT just 1/4 mile from the fire as reported in interviews. It was more like a full HALF mile.
** WHERE THE FIRE JUMPED THE TWO-TRACK
It’s pretty obvious ( from Rory Collins’ photos taken later that afternoon ) that the fire jumped that high-ridge two track at right about this spot in the road…
Decimal Latitude: 34.229618
Decimal Longitude: -112.791397
34.229618, -112.791397
It then ‘took off’ down that heavily fuel-filled drainage that was right there east of the two-track.
Another question, given your experience.
This photo shows the location of the pumpkin that was set up on Saturday at the Boulder Springs Ranch, presumedly for N14HX to use to dip into if they were to decide to to water drops on the fire with the Bambi Bucket that is lying in front of the helicopter as it prepares to fly the helitack crew up to the fire:
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/02ue6bnjp6nazkm/AADmRS49JnFywc6HRzzolM_Ta/Photos%20and%20Video/Wachter%20Site%20Visit%20Photos/July%207%20visit/IMG_1149.JPG?dl=0
In your mind, does that look like a reasonable place to put that pumpkin for that purpose?
Yes a little tight but doable also the tank is not full in the picture.
The Bambi is retracted to close it dropped into the tank filled and
flown again the Helicopter dose not land. It is used in ponds, creeks with deep pools, Rivers and Lakes very effective and comes in different sizes.
Great, thanks!
So if what you are saying:
“People including Helitack are not to step off of a hovering Helicopter unless they are trained in Repelling and Repel this was not a Repel crew.”
is true,
then what about this:
“CAL FIRE Helitack – Heli Step and Hover Hook Training – Super Huey”
http://youtu.be/QkbI-XBP9Ps
Wow never seen that before. Cal Fire may be doing it I would be surprised if Feds are.
Again a highly trained crew with a helicopter provided wit big steps to stand on but the training spot is a place to land why add hazard of injury when they could land unload and hook up.
Just a bad exposure to injury when landing is better. I have seen hookups of Sling loads while hovering.
Cal Fire maybe working with the steep offs, Again I would be surprised if Feds. are, as bad as they turned against the Helijumper Program.
Sometimes new programs are being developed again EXPOSURE is the issue here. If it is big enough to hover 2 ft. off the ground it is big enough to land……
Maybe some of our people Like Fire 20 or Sitta can add here..
Thanks Bob.
The other thing I thought was that this is a training session. “Heli-step…..”
So maybe it’s to make sure they know how to do it just in case.
Another point CAlFIRE and LA County are also big users of Fire helicopters and they occasionally do not follow Federal rules and do things Feds do not. Testing new things some good some not. that’s how Helitack has evolved over the years.
Reply to Marti Reed post on January 27, 2015 at 12:04 am
>> Marti said…
>>
>> What about this:
>>
>> “CAL FIRE Helitack – Heli Step and Hover
>> Hook Training – Super Huey”
>>
>> http://youtu.be/QkbI-XBP9Ps
Larger ( more powerful ) chopper than N14HX.
Special doors, special ‘step downs’. Larger skids.
If the Moki had been trying ANYTHING like this out of N14HX then they were a bunch of foolish Yahoos.
Most important thing about this video is the absolute constant proof being seen/heard of both ‘rotor wash’ and ‘vortex’ effects.
Watch this video again and then imagine there being ANY ‘smolder’ ( or even active flame ) anywhere NEAR anything they are doing.
WHOOOSH goes the fire! ( Right up around them, probably ).
I even love the intense ‘wind in the microphone’ effect, even with some altitude, when it is anywhere near the camera.
At the very, very end of this video… even after the chopper has passed over… I believe you can actually hear audio proof of the ‘vortex’ from just the forward motion of the chopper ‘hitting the ground’.
Just before the video ends… you hear the ‘whoosh’ of the vortex hitting the camera microphone as it ‘falls to the ground’ behind the chopper.
Reply to Marti Reed post on January 25, 2015 at 8:30 pm
>> Marti said…
>>
>> So I drove home from the 7-11 thinking how is it nobody seems to be able
>> to say, in any coherent manner, when what crews flew up the the fire to
>> fight it, since that was basically pretty much all that was happening that
>> day other than SEAT drops.
In Russ Shumate’s SECOND ADOSH interview on October 18, 2013, he specifically says it took TWO ‘loads’ ( and 45 minutes ) to get the 6 Lewis DOC crew flown up there.
That means they really were taking the ‘altitude density’ thing seriously and didn’t want to overload that Type 3 light chopper going all the way up to that high ridge.
Can’t blame them for that. That is just ‘playing it safe’.
This statement comes right after the part where Shumate was suddenly a lot more ‘chattier’ about his decision making and thought process that morning than he was in his first ADOSH interview.
Right after he explains ( in much greater detail this time ) how he was taking the Lewis CRWB at his word following his recon that there was no ‘safe’ way to hike up to the fire… he explains why he wasn’t going to push the ‘hiking’ issue and ( bottom line ) is that it really was Shumate’s preference all along to just ‘fly’ them up there.
Russ Shumate said…
—————————————————————
So, that is why my preferred tactic was do helicopter uh – uh, enough people up there to do work, but not so many that I couldn’t get them back off the hill in a timely fashion when lightning started coming the next day or late in the afternoon if monsoons reached us – if the monsoon buildup started to occur over us. So, I figured two loads was – was adequate as that put enough bodies on the hill to deal with the fire behavior we were looking at, and it took us about 45 minutes to do that crew shuttle, so that gave me about an hour’s window to pull the trigger if lightning popped to start pulling guys off the ridgeline.
————————————————————–
Key phrase…
“I figured TWO LOADS was adequate as that put enough bodies on the hill to deal with the fire behavior we were looking at.”
So it took TWO LOADS to get the SIX Lewis DOC up there.
Helitack Nate Peck had already been dropped off up there circa 10:42 AM during the N14HX RECON flight and says in his own SAIT interview notes that had been told to expect THREE loads… ( as in, 9 guys? ) but looks like Shumate eventually decided to just go with 3 guys per flight and two flights = 6 DOC guys.
So that was it for the next FOUR hours or so, until things started to get weird.
Just SEVEN guys up there to ‘mop up’.
Moki Helitack Nate Peck + the 6 Lewis DOC guys.
Also interesting that Shumate is now recalling how LONG it took to accomplish this ‘insertion’.
Shumate said…
“it took us about 45 minutes to do that crew shuttle,”
So since the Fernandez photos show the following…
11:00 AM – N14HX landing at YFD Helipad following RECON.
11:18 AM – N14HX still on Helipad. Engines off. Doors open. Still no one loading yet.
That means the START of the TWO Lewis DOC shuttle flights wasn’t even probably until 11:30 AM at the earliest.
11:30 AM plus 45 minutes is 12:15 PM.
So instead of the Lewis DOC crew really being up there and ‘at work’ at 10:45 AM ( as Shumate says in his signed Unit Log ) the REALITY is that even just these 6 DOC guys were not fully up there and ‘at work’ until an HOUR AND A HALF later than 10:45 AM.
It really couldn’t have been any earlier than 12:15 PM when there were finally fully ‘at work’ on that fire up there.
That’s an amazing FOUR HOURS AND FIFTEEN MINUTES after they first arrived in Yarnell at 8:00 AM that morning.
I’m not seeing much in even Shumate’s SECOND ADOSH interview to help with the ‘other’ part of this puzzle such as EXACTLY how ( and when ) the other SEVEN people ( Justin Smith plus 6 more Moki Helitack ) were finally shuttled up there to reach the final complement of 13 spending the night up there… but at least some more ‘pieces of the puzzle’ are falling together about what went on that morning.
We know now that they did, in fact, DISCUSS ‘Bucket Drops’ when Jake Guadiana called down and said the thing was starting to ‘creep’ on them.
We know now that the Moki guys stepped in and said they didn’t think the Bucket Drops would do any good so they concocted the ‘bladder bag’ plan instead.
We know now that the fire actually ‘jumped the two-track’ WHILE they were delivering these bladder bags directly to the fire site and not the Helipad ( and I still think the rotor wash while doing that might have actually had something to do with it actually ‘flaring up’ and jumping the road DURING that operation ).
We know now that the bladder bags got emptied almost right away and it made no difference, and there was no alternate plan other than calling SEATS back.
We know now that the final shuttle return flight brought the 1 Moki guy ( not Nate Peck ) who was at the Helispot back to Yarnell… and any plans to fly more Lewis Crew up were then cancelled because the fire had, by then, gotten close to the Helispot itself.
What is still missing is exactly how many flights it took to deliver both the bladder bags AND the SEVEN more people ( Justin Smith + 6 more Moki Helitack ).
I still think THOSE pieces of the puzzle are there somewhere in the available information… just needs to be ‘sorted out’ once and for all.
Again… from Shumate’s SECOND ADOSH interview…
The moment when it all changed…
—————————————————————————————-
1087 A: I was going to fly more people up
1088 there to help them deal with the creep. We – discussion was should we put
1089 Bambi buckets – run it up there. My determination was what the – what the
1090 altitude density and the efficiency of a Bambi bucket I would probably be
1091 dumping less than 50 gallons a load.
1092
1093 Q2: Yeah.
1094
1095 A: So the determination was well, let’s sling up bladder bags. So the plan was to
1096 sling up — as I recall — 12 bladder bags. A bladder bag is a 5 gallon backpack
1097 of water.
1098
1099 Q: Okay.
1100
1101 A: Um, so we slung load that up there while that sling load was occurring was
1102 when the fire on the – against the two track picked up and spotted over.
——————————————————————————————-
The infamous part…
“WHILE that sling load was occurring was when the fire on the – against the two track picked up and spotted over.”
If they were dropping the bladder bags right there ON that two-track on the east side of the contained fire ( which is more than likely since the Helispot was 1/4 mile away from the actual fire area )… then the rotor wash itself might have most likely CAUSED the ‘flare up’ and the ‘spot over’.
You would be correct on rotor wash and they should have backed of from there if they had any flames at all with no containment.
They would have been better off to have dropped water than set down a sling load of
bladder bags any way. They should have known better>>>>>>
Reply to Bob Powers post on January 26, 2015 at 11:08 am
>> Bob Powers said…
>>
>> You would be correct on rotor wash and they should have backed
>> of from there if they had any flames at all with no containment.
The REASON these 12 ( 5 gallon ) bladder bags ( backpack pumps ) were being ‘delivered’ at all is because Lewis CRWB Jake Guadiana had already radioed AZF ICT4 Russ Shumate and informed him the fire was now ‘creeping’ on them… and they were having trouble ‘catching it’.
So the fire HAD started to ‘pick up’ before the chopper even showed up.
>> Bob Powers also said…
>>
>> They would have been better off to have dropped water
>> than set down a sling load of bladder bags any way.
>>
>> They should have known better
See new post directly above.
I was wrong to even suggest that the slingload *might* have been delivered to the Helispot.
It was NOT.
Shumate actually had the one Helitack who was at the Helispot walk DOWN to where Guadiana and the other Lewis crew guys were trying to ‘catch’ the now-creeping fire so the bladder bags could be dropped right where they were working on the fire and they wouldn’t have to waste time walking up to the Helispot themselves to get the bladder bags.
The only place that makes sense where that delivery could have happened easily and safely would have been right there on the two-track road right next to the now-active fire.
That is (then) exactly where the ‘spotover’ took place WHILE they were performing this slingload delivery.
And at that point a helicopter water drop would have been more affective.
These backpack pumps are really for mop up not flam attack
A simple explanation we called them Piss Pumps you can not attack 3 ft. plus flames with them They are better for hot Coles and smoldering areas.
They could have spread 40 to 50 gallons over a head flame say 50 Ft’ long with a Helicopter drop and then built line. Much more affective to cool down the hot creep fast and effective with out the prop wash.
A hour earlier would have been even better They had one area that was a hot problem and they did not deal with it first. Evan a 100 Gal. Air tanker drop would have been affective.
The Helitack crew on the fire should have had some idea of suppression tactics necessary to contain the creep…….
Thanks so much for this. As I wrote above, it really helped me make sense of all kinds of stuff that wasn’t making sense.
Right now I’m contemplating those Saturday photos of the activity around Moki Helicopter N14HX in the Yarnell Fire Department parking lot in my Dropbox collection. They’re from 2:56 to 2:57 PM. Occasionally I’ve thought they might be related to that bladder-bag drop. On the other hand they might not be related to anything that we’re discussing.
And I’m still kind of mystified, all things considered, why that Bambi bucket is lying there in front of the chopper as the helicopter is getting ready to launch with more of the helitack crew at 5:22 PM. It wasn’t there in the earlier photos.
Reply to Marti Reed post on January 26, 2015 at 10:10 pm
>> Marti said…
>>
>> And I’m still kind of mystified, all things considered, why that
>> Bambi bucket is lying there in front of the chopper as the
>> helicopter is getting ready to launch with more of the helitack
>> crew at 5:22 PM. It wasn’t there in the earlier photos.
Maybe the Bambi Bucket itself was ‘the sling’ used to deliver bladder packs?
I mean… is that allowed? Just fill the Canvas basket with stuff and then have the Helitack underneath you empty it manually as you are hovering?
Followup… this got answered up above.
Basically… no way in hell.
You don’t just dump shit in the Bambi and use it for a sling load… and the Moki most assuredly weren’t doing that, either.
Reply to Marti Reed post on January 25, 2015 at 12:47 pm
>> Marti Reed said…
>>
>> So the videos are still time-stamping with today’s date and time
>> and I don’t have the software to see anything else.
>>
>> Can you read the original timestamps on the videos with what you have WTKTT??
>>
>> Particularly USB YARNELL HILL 003.avi and USB YARNELL HILL 020.avi.
Here’s a partial reprint from a post down below with that information in it.
That full post is here…
http://www.investigativemedia.com/yarnell-hill-fire-chapter-xi/#comment-242808
There really is no doubt that these two videos show at least ONE of the actual insertion flights for those 6 Lewis DOC crewmembers.
What we still do NOT know is whether it took more than ONE flight to get all 6 of them there.
There was, in fact, ‘altitude load density’ to consider at all times… and it was only a Type 3 Helo ( 4 blade rotor, etc. ). It might not have been SAFE to ever move more than 2 or 3 people in this puppy on any one flight so that means it still took MULTIPLE shuttle flights to even get all 6 of the Lewis DOC crew up to that ridge on Saturday.
Actual flight logs for N14HX would be helpful.. but no one has ever seen those.
It was BLM contract that day so any information about it would have had to come from the FEDS… and since they were ‘playing hardball’ with ADOSH and requiring them to file Touhy requests to even just interview BLM people who were working at Yarnell… they probably never even tried to get the N14HX flight logs.
I wish we could trust the timestamps in these videos.
That would take any guesswork out of WHEN the Lewis Crew was actually finally delivered to the fire that day.
But we can’t. That Canon Powershot was MESSED UP.
From the post somewhere down below…
———————————————————————————
** LEWIS DOC CREW INSERTION ON SATURDAY COULD NOT HAVE
** BEEN AT 10:45 AM… AS REPORTED BY ICT4 RUSS SHUMATE
In the “SAIT / Photos and Videos / AZFS photos videos” folder there have always been at least 2 MOVIES that appear to show the actual ‘insertion’ of some of the Lewis DOC Crew out onto the ‘helispot’ near the Yarnell Hill Fire.
They have filenames of…
“USB YARNELL HILL 002.AVI”
“USB YARNELL HILL 003.AVI”
The FIRST one was filmed from the air and ‘on approach’ to the Helispot, and is another clear view of the actual reality of the fire at that time. Quiet. No flame. No real smokes.
The SECOND one was filmed at the Helispot itself about 1/4 mile north of where the fire was along that Weaver Mountain Ridgeline and actually shows some of the Lewis DOC Crew disembarking from BLM Helicopter N14HX.
The problem with these two videos is that we have never really been able to trust the TIMESTAMPS embedded in these AVI videos.
There were both taken with a Canon Powershot running the CanonMVI06 software, but not only is the DATE stamp obviously way off… it appears the TIME was also not set anywhere near correctly on this device.
Here is just a portion of the EXIF metadata embedded in these two videos…
File Name: USB YARNELL HILL 002.avi
Date/Time Original: 2011:03:05 23:36:13
Software: CanonMVI06
Duration: 8.78 seconds
File Name: USB YARNELL HILL 003.avi
Date/Time Original: 2011:03:05 23:39:28
Software: CanonMVI06
Duration: 8.27 s
Obviously the ‘March 5, 2011′ DATE stamp is wildly WRONG.
As for the TIME… even if you assume it was just a ‘no time zone’ setting issue and then subtract the standard minus 7 hours from the GMT time for Arizona… that still puts the TIME values at…
16:36:13 ( 4:36:13 PM )
16:39:28 ( 4:39:28 PM )
If that is in any way accurate… then these two videos could ONLY possibly be showing some kind of insertion of FFs to the Helispot that was happening much later in the afternoon… and AFTER the fire had already ESCAPED.
——————————————————————————
I saw that and thanked you down below.
I don’t see any indication of another DOC crew flight. N14HX has seven seats and usually carries six crew plus pilot when heading into attack.
And, yeah, totally agree about the flight logs. etc etc etc etc
OTOH. Justin says two interesting related things.
“Q4: Oh sure. Sure go ahead. So you 401 had – you had 11 people there that were
402 working and what – what did they have for tools, saws?
403
404 A: Uh, yeah – yeah it was a combination of uh, I believe there was two chainsaws
405 up there and uh, yeah everybody else had um, tools. I – I believe it was 11
406 people, I might be off slightly it might have been uh, 13 ‘cause they – they did
407 bring two more helitack people up I believe um, when we dropped off water
408 and – and MREs.”
And he says this about Sunday morning:
“Q4: Okay. All right. So when did they get you off of the hill in the morning, what
821 time?
822
823 A: I believe it was around 9:00.
824
825 Q4: Okay.
826
827 A: I mean the first, you know, flights off the mountain of course were uh, you
828 know, earlier than that. I was the last one to – to get flown off and I believe I –
829 I left it at 9:00.
830
831 Q4: Okay. Same uh, type 3 helicopter, is that the procedure?
832
833 A: Yeah, same ship.”
So there’s that. Adds to my confusion. If the chopper had to take two or so people up with the bladder bags, the first crew would have only been four people. I haven’t seen anything anywhere else about this.
And apparently there were three flights to get the crew off the mountain. Plus that sling pickup that Joy captured. Unless it was one of the three flights.
And another little detail in his second interview that clears up some confusion in my head….about the conversation between Nate Peck and Eric Marsh:
“Q4: Okay so he gave you that – that uh, the description of what y’all had seen and
87 he did that over the radio?
88
89 A: Yeah. Yeah. We were already in the uh, off in the air and uh, I believe Eric
90 actually had called him and uh, just confirmed that uh, we were the last group”
OTOH, this:
“405 up there and uh, yeah everybody else had um, tools. I – I believe it was 11 people, I might be off slightly it might have been uh, 13 ‘cause they – they did bring two more helitack people up I believe um, when we dropped off water
and – and MREs” …
…doesn’t make any sense. “I really get a strong sense Justin, the ICTrainee had no clue who was on that mountain with him whatsoever. Is that standard practice??
So I drove home from the 7-11 thinking how is it nobody seems to be able to say, in any coherent manner, when what crews flew up the the fire to fight it, since that was basically pretty much all that was happening that day other than SEAT drops.
I believe the ‘key’ to understanding these ‘shuttle’ flights emerged up above. The pilot was VERY aware ( and rightly so ) of the whole ‘altitude density’ thing that day and regardless of how many seats were in N14HX… no shuttle flight ever had more than 4 sob ( Souls On Board ) that day.
So it really did take TWO separate flights to get all SIX of the Lewis DOC crew up there that morning. ( Total time for this was 45 mins, according to Shumate’s second ADOSH interview ).
PS My relatively educated guess about the date and timestamps being so wildly off is that he never bothered to set up the camera clock in the first place. It doesn’t set itself.
I don’t know what a new camera clock reads (I have a brand spanking new Canon D70 still sitting in a box where it landed the day before my mom started having this particular round of medical emergencies), but it doesn’t accurately set itself up.
I made a boo-boo. Somewhere in my head I thought I had to push that 001 photo three hours forward. (Too much juggling with too many photos in too little time).
The time actually needs to go 12 hours forward. The time problem is simply an AM/PM switch, if it looks like 11:26 AM seems about when they would have loaded on the chopper and that makes 2:40 a good time for the shot of the guy standing on the rocks, and, as I said before, the shadows fit those times.
So I think, barring worrying about the dates which don’t matter, all we have to do for the Guadiano files is push them 12 hours forward.
So I still need a metadata reading for 020.avi. Can you do that for me pretty pleez WTKTT????
Even better, could you just get the metadata for all Guadiana’s videos? That would be truly awesome.
I will get to that. Standby.
**
** THE JUSTIN SMITH ADOSH INTERVIEW(S) – PART 1
Marti’s comments below about Russ Shumate insisting he was ( at ALL times on Saturday ) pre-occupied with the possible ‘late afternoon lightning strike’ situation and that it was influencing ALL of his Initial Attack decisons are backed up by something Shumates ICT4 traineee Justin Smith also says in the first of his TWO separate ADOSH interviews.
Here was Justin’s first opportunity in that interview to describe to ADOSH, in general terms, what his responsibilities were that day.
A = Justin Smith, ICT4(t) on Saturday, June 29, 2013
——————————————————————-
72 A: Um, the – until about noon or so 1:00 ish um, the duties were – were staging at
73 the uh, the Yarnell Fire Department and we were trying to see what we could
74 do as far um, you know, SEATs and – and any kind of air resources to – to
75 knock the fire out being, you know, quarter, half acre at the time. We didn’t
76 want to put too many people up on the hill with the – the monsoonal activity
77 that we had saw the day before and um, throughout the day we, you know,
78 were talking to dispatch and – and watching our radar um, and that’s when we
79 decided to engage with folks on the hill. We put a small squad on the hill, um,
80 enough to be able to transport them off in case monsoons did, you know,
81 come up rather quickly we – we had that – that mindset of being able to get
82 people off safely uh, you know and quickly before it became a – a hazard or
83 safety issue up on the hill. So I was just uh – uh, my – my duty would be uh, I
84 was just um, I was doing what I could as far as uh, logistics with – with meals
85 and – and stuff and trying to coordinate with Russ of a um, another gentleman
86 from BLM and I don’t recall his name um, as far as if there’s anything I could
87 – I could do and – and help out.
——————————————————————————–
Justin’s account of the ‘mindset’ and how they seemed to be basing every decision on whether they could FLY whoever they inserted up there out VERY quickly if they had to matches Shumates’s account almost word for word. Almost oddly so.
At NO TIME did Justin tell ADOSH anything about WHY more of an effort wasn’t made to find a good ‘hiking route’ to the fire… which would have negated ALL their concerns about ‘flying people back’ in a hurry. The closest Smith gets to that in his ADOSH interview was when he related that some one person who works for YFD was telling he and Shumate that all the ‘two-tracks’ out there were not ‘drivable’ because of ‘washouts’.
Shumate touched on that a little and said something about just not wanting to put anyone out into that ‘fuel type’ on foot in case the fire ‘exploded’, or something… but that could just be some CYA going on ‘after the fact’. Shumate obviously DID have ‘expectations’ that one ( or more ) of the DOC crews WOULD be able to ‘hike out there’ that morning since that’s the first assignment he gave to the Lewis CRWB. He told him to ‘find a way to hike out there’.
If Shumate had already made up his mind ( that Saturday morning ) that he just didn’t want anyone out ‘hiking’ in that fuel type… then why would he have even bothered to ask the Lewis CRWB to find a way to do it.
I still think the ‘Game Changer’ that morning is when the Lewis CRWB came back with his report to Shumate at 10:00 AM and said “It can’t be done”.
THAT is when all the ‘limitations’ started entering into the IA plan that morning and air shuttles became Shumate’s ONLY option for getting anyone ‘out there’.
As Justin Smith’s first ADOSH interview went on… we learn that even though he
was the ICT4(t) Trainee that day… and was always working closely with Shumate,
Smith tells ADOSH he has NO IDEA why Shumate released all the SEATS shortly
before the fire actually ‘escaped’ over the two-track road…
——————————————————————————————–
216 Q5: Okay. And then – and then at some point Russ releases the um, the air attack
217 and the SEATs and I thought I recall that was round 2:00 or sometime in that
218 neighborhood. Uh, do – do you – do you remember that and do you remember
219 what – what the – the rationale or the thinking was for releasing the air attack
220 and the SEATs at that point in time?
221
222 A: No, I – I do not know what the thinking was um, on why Russ released them.
…
235 Q5: Yeah, okay. Uh, did y’all ever discuss uh, that uh, later as to um, why that –
236 why that happened?
237
238 A: I – I didn’t ever ask Russ why he um, why he had made that – that call. I didn’t
239 uh, I didn’t want to second guess him on – on his decisions.
——————————————————————————————-
As an ICT4(t) Trainee on an incident… ‘second guessing’ your mentor is one thing… but not even knowing WHY some very important IC related decisions are even being made is something else altogether.
Later on… ADOSH is now asking Justin Smith what his ‘assessment’ of the situation was when Shumate finally sent him up there later on with the new assignment of ‘OPS’ up on the hill.
Smith admits that by the time he even first got up there… it was obvious this fire had ‘escaped initial attack’ and there was no way in hell they were going to ‘catch it’.
—————————————————————————————–
322 Q5: Uh, and so you thought y’all also had a chance at catching that thing?
323
324 A: No – no. When I – when I got there and I saw the uh, yeah what the fire
325 activity was – was doing I didn’t think that it, you know, we had the uh, the
326 appropriate amount of – of personnel up on the – up on the hill to, you know,
327 to get around it but uh, you know, our – our thought was is if we could uh,
328 establish a good um, you know, anchor point off it and – and start, you know,
329 seeing what we could do uh, we were hoping that the – by the time the uh, you
330 know, 8:00 rolled around, the fire activity would – would really slow down
331 and we’d be able to make pretty good progress but that was not the case.
332
333 Q5: Yeah. So you – you really didn’t think at that point in time when you got there
334 that there was any chance y’all were gonna catch it uh, with the resources you
335 had on hand?
336
337 A: No
—————————————————————————————
Keep in mind that this is still one of the ongoing issues about Saturday… and whether the ‘Initial Attack’ was ever declared a failure and ‘Extended Attack’ was now NECESSARY.
From what Smith is saying… it would sound like that should have been officially declared as soon as he got up there and made his ‘assessment’.
It didn’t happen.
Even some of the forces that showed up Sunday morning ( like Granite Mountain ) thought they were still working a fire that was officially in ‘Initial Attack’ mode.
Smith then goes on to say that even by the time HE got up there… ALL of the bladder bags that had been sent up were already exhausted and it hadn’t made any difference.
——————————————————————————————–
415 Q4: Okay. When did they get uh, bladder bags up there? Did you have those that
416 night?
417
418 A: Yeah – yeah they had them uh, they actually had bladder bags up there before
419 I flew up. So when they uh, you know, the – the small group of people got up
420 there uh, they requested for – I don’t even remember the exact number of
421 bladder bags but however many bladder bags they could fit in the uh, the sling
422 load to be, you know, dropped up there. So they had them and I believe the –
423 the bladder bags were empty by the time I got there um, on my flight in.
424
425 Q5: So the bladder bags had actually been used and uh, exhausted all the water, I
426 take it?
427
428 A: Yes.
—————————————————————————————
And here is where Justin Smith admits that when he finally actually got UP
there… he could now clearly see the ‘old-grader’ AND the two-tracks that led
right up to the where the fire was.
A little late in the day to be finally gaining that ‘situational awareness’.
You can even HEAR the sort of incredulity in the ADOSH investigators voices
at this point that Smith would be telling them this is now the FIRST time he
was aware there were good two-tracks leading up to the fire location.
They sort of ‘can’t believe it’ and start wondering if anyone even had an ‘iPad’
and could have seen that with ‘Google maps’ at the start of the day.
—————————————————————————————
448 Q4: You’re discussing all your concerns about getting them off the hill if there
449 was lightning, were you aware of – of the two tracks that led down to the old
450 dozer…
451
452 A: Down to the where?
453
454 Q4: The old grader – the old grader, goes downhill on the – on the east uh, facing
455 aspect, it does down.
456
457 A: I wasn’t aware of that until I uh, until I flew up there and – and got dropped
458 off, that’s when I saw that um, that grader on the bottom and that – that little
459 two track road.
460
461 Q4: What – what were you guys using for uh, maps?
462
463 A: We were…
464
465 Q4: (Unintelligible)?
466
467 A: Um, we were using a um, I guess it’s like an Arizona topo um, map and then
468 he had a uh, he had a BLM map as well of uh, of that area.
469
470 Q4: Which one was better?
471
472 A: Oh I believe it was the – the BLM one. I think it kind of showed some of the
473 uh, some of peaks that we could reference to and if I remember right the – the
474 Arizona one was a little tough to read.
475
476 Q5: And y’all didn’t have an iPad or anything like that?
477
478 A: What was that?
479
480 Q5: You didn’t have an iPad with uh, mapping capability on it, Justin?
481
482 A: No. No, I did not.
483
484 Q5: Do you remember if the uh, the guy that was down there in the IC – in the IC
485 um, with uh, Russ from the BLM, did he have an iPad with him?
486
487 A: Uh, you know, I think he – I think he did.
488
489 Q5: Okay. Did y’all ever look at that as a group or anything?
490
491 A: I know him and – him and Russ had discussed it uh, or you know, discussed
492 something on the – the iPad but um, no I didn’t.
—————————————————————————————
Then right after that.. ADOSH asked how ‘surprised’ he was to only then be discovering
that the two-tracks leading right to the fire location were clearly visible… and now
suddenly Smith is recalling something about someone from YFD telling them about
those two-tracks… but that were ‘not drivable’ with vehicles.
———————————————————————————————-
512 Q4: Were you – were you uh, kind of surprised when you – when you flew up there
513 and found that there was a couple of two tracks uh, almost right to it. Well I
514 guess you knew it was jumping the two track.
515
516 A: Yeah I knew it was jumping a – a two track um, you know, we did – we did
517 know that there was – there was miscellaneous um, you know, quad roads out
518 there but we had talked to uh, I believe it was one of the personnel from the
519 Yarnell Fire Department and they said that, you know, none of those roads
520 were – were drivable even with an ATV or UTV. They said they had been,
521 you know, so washed out and eroded that, you know, they were unsafe to
522 drive.
—————————————————————————————–
So even after all of that… and Justin now admitting that HE could clearly see all
the two-tracks leading out there ( it was still daylight when he arrived up there ),
the conversation turned to what went on that evening and all night.
His answer was basically… “Not much”.
A few questions later we discover that as darkness approached… they had no
medical evac plan in place whatsoever so THAT, itself, became the overriding
point of concern and that is why no significant effort to fight the fire took place
for the rest of the night and on until the following morning.
They were basically just ‘bedding down’ and not even attempting to fight the
fire because of the fears someone would get hurt and there was NO medical
evac plan in place at all…. even though they NOW knew all about those
navigable two-tracks.
—————————————————————————————–
598 Q4: Justin, what was your uh, plan or what were you briefed or what were you
599 thinking along the lines of uh, medevac, I mean you’re up there all night,
600 remote and uh, only get by helicopter at that time or so we thought, so what
601 was – what was the plan if somebody got hurt?
602
603 A: Well the plan was that we, you know, once we realized that we weren’t gonna,
604 you know, be chunking line all night we bedded down to try to, you know,
605 mitigate that hazard um, you know, so we, you know, sat up uh, close to the
606 heel of the fire, we, you know, tried to get whatever rest we could and stayed
607 there until um, you know, we had a helicopter available and then that’s when
608 we were gonna um, fly out.
—————————————————————————————–
In the next exchange… the ADOSH investigator accidentally calls Justin ‘Russ’, but
then asks more about the Bladder bags.
Justin then sort of ‘misunderstands’ the question and we now get HIS explanation
of why they were NOT doing Helicopter Bucket drops that day…
—————————————————————————————–
663 Q4: And Russ – when you – when you got up there and saw they had used all of the
664 uh, bladder bags, if I had gotten that right, I mean that was – correct, they were
665 like all empty by then when you got there?
666
667 A: I mean they appeared to be empty, I didn’t – I didn’t go um, check them all.
668 They – yeah they did appear to be um, you know, empty.
669
670 Q4: Okay. So they were apparently using them uh, quite a bit. Did you ever
671 suggest or talk to Russ about uh, putting in uh, a blivet or two up there on the
672 hill and – and uh, and having more water available at the – at the early stage?
673
674 A: Yeah we did uh, we did discuss that. Um, the – the problem that we ran into
675 was the – the flight time from the nearest site where we could get a blivet to
676 and get it filled with a tender to the actual fire where the um, you know,
677 pumpkin might have been um, you know, it was – it was too far of a distance
678 and we would have lost quite a bit of water, you know, as far as with the uh, I
679 think that – that ship only had a 70 gallon pumpkin on it I believe, or a…
680
681 Q5: Bucket?
682
683 A: Bucket. Yeah and the helitack guys made that uh, made that call that by the
684 time, you know, they got water and they flew all the way up there and then
685 made their circle around, you know, where they were gonna drop it into the
686 wind that it was not – not gonna be as effective as uh, the SEATs were.
687
688 Q4: I was talking about one of those big orange blivet bags okay you don’t really
689 lose water out and then you hook a hose onto and then you go to hosing with
690 the – with the water that’s in the blivet.
691
692 A: Yeah.
——————————————————————————————–
So here is the important part of THAT exchange…
681 Q5: Bucket?
682
683 A: Bucket. Yeah and the helitack guys made that uh, made that call that by the
684 time, you know, they got water and they flew all the way up there and then
685 made their circle around, you know, where they were gonna drop it into the
686 wind that it was not – not gonna be as effective as uh, the SEATs were.
Justin Smith is now telling ADOSH directly that it most definitely WAS the ‘Aviation Guys’
who were ‘making that call’ about whether Bucket Drops should even be attempted.
So apparently ICT4 Russ Shumate was just ‘going along’ with what the Moki Helitack
people thought and Shumate was letting them ‘make that call’ that day.
The Moki Helitack just thought they would lose too much water on the way out and
so it wasn’t even worth trying that day… and Shumate just went along with that.
That actually might explain the frantic attempt in the later afternoon to set up that
pumpkin at the Boulder Springs Ranch. The local ranchers all had standing argreements
that their ponds could be used ( like that Horseshoe dip that would become the primary
dip site for that area the next day ). But maybe ‘Moki Helitack’ just that those ponds were
too far away to make any difference.
So maybe Shumate then said “Well… what if we get a pumpkin set up at this ranch
that’s pretty close to the fire, relatively speaking. What about that? Will that work for ya?”
Maybe the Moki then initially said “Yeah… that might work”… but then nothing ever
happened even though the pumpkin DID actually get set up fairly quickly out there
at the Boulder Springs Ranch.
There were still no attempts to use the bucket to help suppress the fire.
So between the blurb in Shumate’s SAIT interview notes about ‘Aviation’ deciding that
THEY didn’t want too many people on the hill… and now Justin’s confirmation that
THEY didn’t think bucket drops would do much good…
…It is looking like this ‘Moki crew’ was ‘calling the shots’ in any number of ways during
this entire ‘Initial Attack’… and AZ Forestry ICT4 Russ Shumate was just ‘going along’
with what THEY were deciding should or should not happen.
That helps with some of my questions, but raises a few more. So, we have locals from the YFD telling them about a two track (not drivable), we have a “recon” flight over the fire with Fernandez prior to the DOC shuttle, and we have Justin Smith stating in his interview that he didn’t know about the two track till he flew over it.
Lets step back, the AA flight on Friday stated that the West side of the fire had a Jeep trail on it.. Then we have the helicopter recon on Saturday, isn’t finding access part of the recon? If Justin Smith saw the two track when he was finally flown in, why didn’t Fernandez see it on his recon and report to Shumate that they found access for crews via hiking the two track..
Just doesn’t make any sense to me!
I think what is complicating all of this ( and nothing about evaluating these YFD interviews is ever easy, I’m afraid ) is trying to distinguish what decisions were or were NOT being made THAT DAY… by WHO… and WHY… versus people having plenty of time to think about what happened afterwards and then plenty of opportunity to ‘fill in the blanks’ with some kind of “This is what I was thinking” post-script.
Example: Russ Shumate wants us to believe that his overriding concerns for the ENTIRE IA plan were ‘safety concerns’ and that this is what contributed to all the decisions about how many people to put out there, when, and how fast he could retrieve them later. He also wants us to believe he was VERY concerned about even putting anyone out into any ‘unburned fuel’ just to hike to/from the fire.
That all sounds pretty good… and there would be few people who ( looking at that objectively ) could actually FAULT Shumate for that ‘thinking’.
Even Mike Dudley ( SAIT Co-Lead and the one who actually interviewed Shumate on behalf of Arizona Forestry’s investigation ), in his speech to those Utah firefighters on June 20, 2013, was defending Shumate for (supposedly) keeping all these ‘safety concerns’ at the forefront of his IA planning and execution.
Dudley was being asked about the lawsuits and how they were pointing out all the things that SHOULD have been done for a better ‘Initial Attack’.
Mike Dudley said…
——————————————————————–
Well… that’s easy to say in hindsight… but when you’re the person up there
makin’ those decisions and you base it on safety… who are you to be criticized?
——————————————————————–
The problem is… is that REALLY what was happening on Saturday, June 29, 2013… or is that just the ‘simple ‘after some time to reflect’ explanation that happens to match the decision making?
Example: There’s been a LOT of discussion about ‘lightning’ here in this very ongoing discussion and whether that even could have been a decision making factor for Granite Mountain itself. The consensus was NO. Always a ‘concern’… but not enough to have that major an impact on decision making. Just ‘hunker and be safe’ seems to be the best advice. Get off the peaks. Walk down slopes, etc.
Example: Once again… putting oneself out into unburned fuel anywhere near a fire is a ‘Watch Out’… but NEVER do it? How would crews ever even get out to ANY boondock fire? If Shumate had decided ( as his ADOSH interview is suggesting ) that he was so VERY concerned about anyone ‘hiking’ out there near the fire in unburned fuel… then why did he even ASK the Lewis CRWB to determine if there was a way to hike to the fire?
What if the Lewis CRWB had come back to Shumate at 10:00 AM and said… “I talked with the locals and there are two-tracks that go right up to where this thing is smoldering. They say they might not be ‘drivable’ with UTVs because of washouts but we should be able to hike directly there, no problem”.
What would Shumate have said then? I don’t WANT you to do that because you’ll be walking through unburned fuel to get there?
I seriously doubt it.
No… there is ‘more to this story’ than meets the eye.
There is still more to learn about all of Saturday… and WHO was really making all the decisions… and WHY.
It really does look like the ‘Aviation Guys’ were ‘calling the shots’ here on any number of aspects of this IA and that’s something that hasn’t been fully explored yet. That part of the ‘story’ is still only starting to ‘come out’.
It also still could very well be that the moment the Lewis CRWB even heard there was a shuttle-capable chopper headed to the area just to do some RECON… that he decided he just simply didn’t WANT to hike out to the fire OR ask his crew to do it. He might have been just ‘holding out’ for the chopper ride(s).
Riding in helicopters is FUN.
There is so much BS here I do not know where to start.
Les than a 2 mile hike up from BSR to the Fire an a well defined 2 track,
6 to 8 mile round trip with Helicopter and 50 bucket loads use it…….
Back Pack pumps are for mop up not knocking down fire.
Type 4 IC not making decisions needed a type 2 IC with experience
that would take charge.
Waited to long to get FF on fire. They needed to be building line soon after day break.
The Same BS with todays fires cant fight fire at night This has gone beyond real.
You can be safe and fight fire at night being very cashes in hazard areas.
I could not begin to tell you how many 1/4 acre to 2 acre fires I attacked at night or how many nightshifts with crews I was on but there were many and we put a lot of fire out.
Woops—- 50 Gallon bucket loads—not 50 loads
Totally agree Bob!!
Reply to Bob Powers post on January 25, 2015 at 1:47 pm
>> Bob Powers said…
>>
>> There is so much BS here I do not know where to start.
Read the entire Justin Smith interview. It just feels like this guy is trying to sell something. The level of “I don’t know” he is trying to get us to swallow is astounding. He was an ICT4(t) trainee on that incident. If that’s the level of ‘cluelessness’ you get when actually training to be a carded ICT4… then the whole ‘trainee’ thing needs an overhaul.
>> Bob Powers also said…
>>
>> Less than a 2 mile hike up from BSR to the Fire an a well defined 2 track,
Absolutely correct. If you take that trail which has become known as the ‘Alternate Escape Route’ in REVERSE… then from the corner of the Boulder Springs Ranch… ALL THE WAY OUT to where the fire was on Saturday clocks in at just under 2 miles. Something like 1.95 miles.
This is the ROAD that even appears instantly in Google maps… even without going into satellite mode. DOC Trucks could have ‘staged’ at Boulder Springs Ranch as early as 8:30 AM and they could have had the entire crew out putting the nails in the coffin by 9:45 AM. Clear, non-bushwhack hiking ALL THE WAY.
>> Bob Powers also said…
>>
>> 6 to 8 mile round trip with Helicopter and 50 bucket loads use it…….
We can now even see new photos showing EXACTLY where the pumpkin was set up in the clearing at the Boulder Springs Ranch… right near the Llama barns.
The exact ‘as the bird flies’ distance from where it was to the exact location of the fire as of Saturday morning was only 1.34 mile(s).
If that wasn’t ‘good enough’ for bucket work all day then it’s because your bucket must have a big hole in the bottom of it.
>> Bob Powers…
>>
>> Waited to long to get FF on fire. They needed to be building
>> line soon after day break.
Lewis Crew was ‘wheels turning’ at 6:00 AM. They arrived YFD 8:00 AM.
5 minutes out to BSR… hike ‘Alternate Escape Route’ in REVERSE from
corner of BSR out to fire. 45 mins to 1 hour. On scene by 9:00 AM.
Full DOC crew ‘mopping up’ a 1/2 acre no-smokes area. Done by NOON.
Back to town long before thunderstorms and ready for any ‘new starts’.
I wish it had happened that way.
>> Bob Powers also said…
>>
>> The Same BS with todays fires cant fight fire at night This has
>> gone beyond real. You can be safe and fight fire at night being
>> very cashes in hazard areas. I could not begin to tell you how many
>> 1/4 acre to 2 acre fires I attacked at night or how many nightshifts
>> with crews I was on but there were many and we put a lot of fire out.
Again… you owe it to yourself to read all of Justin’s ADOSH interview.
It’s the most complete account of what was NOT happening all night.
There were 13 people up that all night long.
They were NOT fighting the fire.
A little ‘cold trailing’ was going on from time to time but that was it.
Justin called it just “California cold trailing method’, whatever that means.
They were basically just ‘coyote’, catching some winks, and waiting for the dust off in the morning.
Justin’s first ADOSH interview is here…
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/20inrene9tcx74a/AABosCJ7JG0IE3TMaMHfC8KEa/ADOSH%20Yarnell%20Hill%20Investigation/AZ%20Forestry%20Division/Employee%20Interviews%20By%20ADOSH/Transcripts/Justin%20Smith%20Interview%2010-15-13.pdf?dl=0
The fire didn’t lay down that night (Saturday night) – the flame lengths were decent-sized! How was an inmate crew without sufficient tools going to fight that fire during Saturday night, particularly without appropriate support, WTKTT or Bob?
Also, do we know that Fernandez’s pilot was carded for bucket drops? If he wasn’t, he couldn’t do them, and my impression is that there were no Type 1 helicopters within easy grab on Saturday.
The helicopter was a Helitack. Of course the pilot was carded for buckets. That’s part of what they do. And one of the photos in the dropbox folder I posted the link to shows the helicopter sitting in the Yarnell Fire Department parking lot in front of the bambi bucket it had been attached to just before it launches to fly the helitack crew up to the fire at 5:22 pm.
First Elizabeth—-
We are Talking the night of the 28th and the Morning of the 29th
before the fire escaped and went to 400 Ac. on the night of the 29th.
This was a BLM contract Helicopter Federal contract requires certification and fully equipped to do water drops and sling loads.
The only thing that surprises me is they only had a 50 Gal. bucket.
They had more capability than that with the size of helicopter
The inmate crew had sufficient tools to cut and build line like Shovels, Pulaski’s & Mc cloud’s . You can do a good job with those tools even with out a Chain Saw. But again we were not talking about the night of the 29th.
Also in Marti’s Pictures below frame #22 shows the afore mentioned Helicopter with the bucket attached and hanging full under the Helicopter.
Also Justin’s Statements about the 5:00 PM burning when the Fire escaped should have been in the 30th AM briefing with the erratic fire behavior down hill and uphill runs would have been nice to know on the afternoon of the 30th with a lot more fire activity.
That Crew should have built line across the top of the fire
50/50 Black and Green line where the heat was and the
higher chance of escape any heat in the rocks was not going any where. Accompanied with water drops on the hot spots. Once it made a run at the 2 track they were not going to stop it by 1700 it was up and running like it did the next day.
That helicopter’s not Moki, that’s 5KA.
OK looked the same color and size.
5Ka was yellow and white too?
5KA, the chopper in 22 is red and white. It just looks yellowish in the photos.
N14HX didn’t do any bucket drops Sunday either. After it flew the crews down off the ridge that morning, it (and it’s crew) spent the day sitting around on the ground.
Great use of the copter and crew all weekend, for sure!!!
Actually, we ARE talking about Saturday night (not Friday night) when we’re discussing the whole chapter regarding the crew being out on the fire that night. Which is mostly what we’re talking about.
We were talking about Friday night and Saturday morning IA
until the Fire escaped at around 1700 Saturday night.
at that point it was a whole new ball game. With a small hand crew and a hell of a lot of fire.
You wrote:
“We can now even see new photos showing EXACTLY where the pumpkin was set up in the clearing at the Boulder Springs Ranch… right near the Llama barns.”
Where are those new photos? I’ve missed a lot.
Thx
Marti… check out this post that was made below on January 8.
At some point… a lot of NEW photographs started showing up in some of the online Dropboxes.
That included the ‘Rory Collins’ folder and the ‘Wachter Site Visit’ folder.
Here is a direct jump to the post about the NEW photos that appeared in the Wachter Site Visit folder…
http://www.investigativemedia.com/yarnell-hill-fire-chapter-xi/#comment-231311
And here is just the INTRO for that post and what is in it…
————————————————————————
**
** On January 8, 2015 at 9:49 pm, WTKTT posted…
**
** SAIT INVESTIGATOR WACHTER SITE VISIT PHOTOS
** CONTAIN ALL OF THE FOLLOWING…
**
** ACTUAL CLOSEUPS OF BSR FRONT GATE SECURITY CAMERA
**
** ACTUAL PHOTOS SHOWING SAIT INVESTIGATORS COPYING
** CAMERA DATA
**
** ACTUAL PHOTOS OF THE PUMPKIN THAT WAS SET UP AT BSR
In THIS folder in InvestigativeMEDIA’s SAIT online Dropbox…
SAIT-FOIA\Photos and Video\Wachter Site Visit Photos\July 7 visit
—————————————————————————
Here is a direct link to that July 7, 2013 ‘Wachter Site Visit’ Dropbox Folder containing all the images referenced above…
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/02ue6bnjp6nazkm/AAAgEpvfyRH_vfGLvtOaswV9a/Photos%20and%20Video/Wachter%20Site%20Visit%20Photos/July%207%20visit?lst
Thanks, again, WTKTT!
Actually the Rory Collins photos aren’t new. I’ve had them for a long time. And now I remember reading about those BSR photos but was just not able to do anything but read.
That pumpkin placement does look…..sketchy. I’m having a hard time imagining a helicopter dipping out of it with all that hard stuff nearby. It can be bad enough close to trees.
Sitting here thinking about all the stuff we’ve been talking about.
In Nate Peck’s YIN he says:
“I have felt that things were poor at this time and little faith in IC and process. Stayed on the clock with crew all night. I have struggled with the IC and process.”
Given what you said above about Justin’s interview and what I think about Mussers interview, I’m getting a serious overall sense of a combination of interagency conflict on the fire that day; and subsequently everybody trying to sound more coherent in their interviews (not neccessarily successfully) than how the reality played out.
I’m even thinking of passive-aggressive stuff. Right now in my head I’m seeing N14HX sitting there with that bambi bucket right in front of it, that pumpkin placed in what appears a sketchy if not dangerous place, Musser saying it was more efficient to send up 12 50-gallon bladder bags once than actually set up for N14HX to EVER successfully fly water onto the fire, even when it was teensy, Musser saying it was Aviation/Helitack essentially “saying no,” when Nate says they told him they were planning three crew insertions, etc. etc. etc.
Kinda looks/sounds to me that by about 1PM, when that fire should have been pretty much dead out, maybe some folks were starting to get more and more po’d and things just continued to get worse.
I hear ya ( and I know you meant ‘Shumate’ above and not ‘Musser’ ).
See a new post above regarding Shumate’s SECOND ADOSH interview.
He was much ‘chattier’ about his own thinking and decision making ‘process’ than he was in his first ADOSH interview.
Shumate actually says it took TWO loads to get the 6 Lewis DOC shuttled up there… and this took about 45 minutes total.
He was ‘timing’ it because of his overwhelming fears about this ‘lightning’ stuff. He wanted to know EXACTLY how long it took to get those 6 men out so he could know what ‘window’ he needed for retrieval.
He decided for sure that since it too 2 flights and 45 minutes to get those 6 men out there… he needed to save a 1 hour window for retrieval.
And YES… I don’t think near enough has been made of the Nate Peck interview. I’m surprised the SAIT didn’t ‘accidentally’ let that one fall behind a filing cabinet when the FOIA requests started showing up.
It’s really quite scathing.
Nate Peck had basically ZERO confidence in what was being done that afternoon.
Combine that with Dean Fernandez’s comment that he felt Shumate wasn’t being aggressive enough and that’s when Dean asked Shumate if he wanted him to take the fire… and that means it wasn’t just Nate Peck who had ‘low confidence’ in the way Shumate was handling that thing.
Oddly enough… in his SECOND ADOSH interview… the ADOSH investigators asked Shumate directly about this moment when Dean Fernandez told them he asked Shumate if Shumate wanted him ( Dean ) to ‘take the fire’… and Shumate denies that anything like that ever happened.
From Shumate’s SECOND ADOSH interview…
———————————————————
Q5: Yeah. Did uh, did Dean offer to take over as IC at some point in time?
A: I don’t recall him ever offering that. I – I don’t think – the understanding was it was a State fire so I was the commander and he was just sitting in my hip pocket being my support. And, if there was a BLM fire that broke he would break away and take whatever resources he needed from our pool to go to that.
Q5: Okay.
———————————————————
This is the same moment that Dean Fernandez was recalling well enough to report that Shumate responded to his question with “Why… am I doing something wrong?”…
…but Shumate says he doesn’t even recall being asked the question at all.
Hello everybody! A lot of real life stuff has required me to pull back from working/posting here. But I’ve been READING everything.
Including the recent posts about the Initial Attack and the Moki Helitack Crew and their helicopter.
I spent today going through all the digital visual imagery I have in my database of the crew. Putting together a visual timeline. Right now I am creating a Dropbox Folder of that timeline. It’s been quite a challenge, because it contains all kinds of different files from cameras with varying accuracies in their timestamps. But I think I have managed to sync those files and create a fairly accurate timeline.
While my computer is chunking away producing that Dropbox visual narrative, this is what I think, from looking at a whole bunch of visual files.
I think the helicopter N14HX flew to Wickenberg early Saturday morning with probably just Moki Helitack Crew Supervisor Nate Peck and
BLM Dean Fernandez onboard. I think half of the rest of the crew drove to Yarnell in their yellow “official” chase truck, arriving at the Yarnell Fire Department at possibly around 1 PM. There are photos of them working with the helicopter there, eventually loading some of them onto the helicopter to fly up to the fire around 5:20 PM. (I’m writing this out of my head as my computer is working on the files).
I think the Jake Gardiana video WTKTT referenced shows N14HX unloading that DOC partial crew, and he also photographed one of them standing with a pack. I agree with WTKTT on the timing. Therefor I agree that what AA Rory Collins said was wrong, both as regards to the timing and the nature of the crew.
I think the crew also had another chase truck, in which the other half of the crew drove to Yarnell. I don’t know when they arrived. I don’t see that truck in any of the images captured on Saturday. This truck was a white double-cabbed open pickup.
On Sunday, the yellow chase truck is shown in many photos parked on Hays Ranch Road starting a little after 1 PM. Across from it is the white chase truck with various crew members standing/walking around the area and reorganizing equipment in the truck. At first the yellow truck is on the south side of Hays Ranch Road facing the fire to the west. Then it crosses over to the north side of the road, still facing the fire to the west.
After it crosses the road, no photos show the white chase truck. I think it went elsewhere for awhlle. There is another Gardiana video which shows Rance Marquez’ blue pickup and Cougan Carothers’s red covered Central Yavapai Fire District truck (which is actually the one in Joy’s photo that WTKTT incorrectly identified as being Gary Cordes’ truck). In this video there is a blue-helmeted (at Yarnell the Moki Helitack helmets are always blue) fire-fighter walking around over towards a white truck that looks like the white Moki Helitack truck.
Both the white Moki Helitack truck and the Yellow Moki Helitack truck cross the Air2Air Video Camera within seconds of each other heading toward the east at 4:45 PM, in front of the fire as it appeared at the time of the Deployment. Next they pass behind Russ Reason as he tells his story in the “Russ Reason” video, heading west.
The next thing that happens in the visual record is BLM Dean Fernandez, flying in N14HX over the fire around 7:30 PM photographing, with his iPad, the fire burning down through Yarnell.
So this is the stuff you will see in my Dropbox folder (it seems to have gotten hung up on a video, so I’ll have to restart it). I’ll also post a text file identifying all of this as best I can, all things considered, given that my 93-year-old mom just had MAJOR MASSIVE surgery yesterday and that’s part of what I’m dealing with “in real life.”
Oops, I wrote:
“I think the helicopter N14HX flew to Wickenberg early Saturday morning with probably just Moki Helitack Crew Supervisor Nate Peck and
BLM Dean Fernandez onboard.”
I should have written:
I think the helicopter N14HX flew to Wickenberg early Saturday morning with probably just Moki Helitack Crew Supervisor Nate Peck onboard. And there they picked up BLM Dean Fernandez.
Reply to Marti Reed post on January 24, 2015 at 11:59 pm
>> Marti said…
>>
>> I think the helicopter N14HX flew to Wickenberg early Saturday morning
>> with probably just Moki Helitack Crew Supervisor Nate Peck onboard.
>> And there they picked up BLM Dean Fernandez.
Unless some new evidence crops up… I think we have at least ‘nailed down’ this part of the ‘story’ of Saturday morning.
It does appear that ONLY Moki man Nate Peck was onboard N14HX along with pilot as it moved from Payson to the BLM Weaver Helibase, picked up BLM Rep ( and ICT3 ) Dean Fernandez, and then flew direct to Yarnell.
So somewhere in the 9 minutes between these two KNOWN moments when N14HX first landed at the Helispot and was then ‘on approach’ to YFD is when Moki man Nate Peck got OUT of N14HX and remained up at the Helispot…
“2013-06-29 10.41.26″ – Chopper is now LANDING at Helispot on the ridge.
“2013-06-29 10.50.19″ – Airborne again. On APPROACH to Yarnell Fire Station.
SIDENOTE: For photo 10.41.26… I first described it as being taken after N14HX had already landed at Helispot. That isn’t the case. Closer inspection shows this Ferandez photo was taken while it was in the process of landing… but still about 30-40 feet off the ground.
Ditto for the Fernandez 11:00 AM photo taken back at YFD. N14HX is actually still NOT on the ground yet. It is actually still LANDING and perhaps almost 100 feet still off the ground over the YFD Helipad.
So actual ‘rails down’ moment might have been more like 11:01 AM.
And speaking of all that, I also just read Shumate’s 8-15-2013 ADOSH interview. It doesn’t correspond at all with what WTKTT has been posting regarding his SAIT interview etc. It’s just all mind-boggling.
I really do believe him saying “Aviation” was, somehow “responsible” for him only flying one load of DOC firefighters up onto the fire is complete and utter CYA BS.
In his ADOSH interview he doesn’t mention even one molecule of any of that. Instead he goes on and on and on about what seems to be not wanting to put more ppl on the fire than he thinks he can get off the fire in case the monsoons create lightning and, I guess, MUD. ETC.
The other thing that blew my mind and made my head hurt (while I’m trying to, at the same time, create this visual Moki Helitack timeline) was when I read this:
“1101 A: Um, so we slung load that up there while that sling load was occurring was
1102 when the fire on the – against the two track picked up and spotted over. I
1103 ended up getting as I recall a couple more loads of people up there and, um, so
1104 that – my change of tactic was to add more people up to there to help with the
1105 direct attack and to give them bladder bags as that would probably be a better
1106 application of water then the Bambi buckets.”
What COUPLE more loads of people???????????
And about the bladder bags. He figured that since a Bambi bucket only held 50 gallons, it would be more efficient to send up a collection of 12 5-gallon bladder bags instead. And he did that ONCE. That’s why he didn’t use N14HX and a pumpkin to drop water on that fire. I. Just. Can’t.
Apparently the sling load of bladder bags was dropped:
“Q2: When – when they 1161 dropped off the bladder bags did they drop them off at the
1162 helispot or near the fire?
1163
1164 A: No, they drop them off right where the guys were.
1165
1166 Q2: Right near the fire line.”
And there’s this:
“1027 two loads plus the helitack guy would be an
1028 adequate response and allow us to pull them off the hill in case we got the
1029 lightning or the thunderhead buildups.
1030
1031 Q2: Yeah. So you had – you had to mitigate that lightning issue, uh – uh, somehow
1032 and – and not having more people than that, there was a way that you were.
1033
1034 A: Yes, that and I want – I didn’t want them to run them down the hill for terrain
1035 inducing injuries or fire behavior changes in that fuel type.”
So……anybody that is interested in the Saturday, June 20, 2013, Initial Attack really needs to read Russ Shumate’s 08-15-2013 ADOSH Interview, which is located here:
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/20inrene9tcx74a/AAB7vmiO8fPalxonAt_Jazw6a/ADOSH%20Yarnell%20Hill%20Investigation/AZ%20Forestry%20Division/Employee%20Interviews%20By%20ADOSH/Transcripts/Russ%20Shumate%20Interview%208-15-13.pdf?dl=0
My apologies for not taking the time to figure out how to shorten that UrL. This interview doesn’t make sense to me. Neither does it correspond to what WTKTT reports Shumate indicated to the SAIT (which doesn’t make sense either).
Neither does any of this correspond to common sense.
Neither does it correspond to the visual record. I don’t know what it corresponds to.
Thank you in advance for any kind of help on this.
Typo Alert:
“So……anybody that is interested in the Saturday, June 20, 2013, Initial Attack”
should read
“So……anybody that is interested in the Saturday, June 29, 2013, Initial Attack”
Obviously.
PS. There is no visual evidence of a “bladder-bag” trip. That doesn’t mean it didn’t happen.
Glad to have you back hope your mom heals and gets better.
Good info above Thanks.
Thank you, Bob! I’m probably not going to be as “back” as I was, but if I have anything helpful to add, I will!
Finally got the visual timeline up into Dropbox in the right order. These are all the original files, but I had to add a preface number to them in order for them to be in the right order.
2015-01-24 Moki Helitack:
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/i3ja0eou009kr3s/AABZFyEbgrb2u228LAqPWRXna?dl=0
Let me know if this doesn’t work for you.
So I just downloaded and checked some of the files. They kept the original metadata plus my comments on some of them about the timestamps.
Although, the “software” recorded on them is not the original, but my Lightroom 5. So there’s that.
Depending on how my day goes, I’ll be working on a text file that describes each of the photos.
Reply to Marti Reed post on January 25, 2015 at 10:56 am
>> Marti said…
>>
>> Finally got the visual timeline up into Dropbox in the right order.
>> These are all the original files, but I had to add a preface number
>> to them in order for them to be in the right order.
Wow. A LOT of work involved there, Marti. Link works fine.
THANK YOU. Sorry to hear about your mom. I hope everything works out AOK
This looks VERY accurate… but I’m going to nitpick a few of them.
I believe the SECOND sequential photo was taken by Dean Fernandez BEFORE N14HX took off from the BLM Weaver Mountain Helibase down there near Wickenburg. That’s the photo with Fernandez’s RED Helmet and his name on it loaded into N14HX. That photo precedes his other photos of the actual flight up TO Yarnell… and if you look through the windshield you will see that the landscape matches what would be seen down at the BLM Helibase and not anything in the Yarnell area.
I also agree that the VIDEO of the guys getting out of the chopper up at the Helispot really does represent that actual moment of insertion for at least SOME of the Lewis DOC crew… but I was just curious what timestamp YOU are putting on that moment and how you arrived at it?
AFAICT… the EXIF data in the video is just not reliable as far as putting a real TIME on these TWO videos. ( The one filmed on approach and the one then filmed of the Lewis guys getting OUT of the chopper at the helispot ).
I still think the Fernandez photos prove that these VIDEOS of that initial insertion of the Lewis DOC guys could not have taken place any earlier than about 11:30 AM. That’s at least 45 minutes AFTER Shumate says it happened.
I also see you found Nate Peck’s PUBLIC Facebook page, complete with that September 29, 2013 photo of the ‘Moki Helitack’ crew. That’s the day AFTER the SAIR report was frist released. There are 13 people in that photo and I’m assuming that’s the regular size of that crew.
Actual link to that original Nate Peck PUBLIC Facebook photo is…
https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=532575273478541&set=a.104123502990389.5759.100001782193356&type=3&theater
Looking at this GOOD timeline… I also want to thank Joy Collura once again for ALL of her efforts at getting more photos released. As Marti just proved… EVERY photo is important and can probably fit into some crucial TIMELINES somewhere and tell ‘more of the story’.
More about all this ( and your other comments ) later… but just wanted to quickly CONFIRM that YES… there are still some major discrepancies between the THREE important reports/interviews with ICT4 Russ Shumate.
Those THREE important references are…
1) Russ Shumate’s official ( SIGNED ) Unit Log that wasn’t released until Feb, 2014.
2) The SAIT notes from THEIR interview with Russ Shumate.
3) The ADOSH interview(s) with Shumate.
If you also add in ICT4(t) Justin Smith’s TWO separate interviews… not only do some things not match between Shumate’s own accounts… Justin Smith’s account don’t match a lot of what Shumate was saying, either.
It’s all still a ‘puzzle’ that needs to be ‘put together’ so I’m glad we are revisting Saturday, June 29, 2013.
I think MOST of the ‘pieces’ of this “What really happened on Saturday” puzzle are there lying on the table… they just need to be put together into the REAL story once and for all.
Thanks, WTK. I agree with everything you’re saying. Including about Dean’s photo of the inside of the chopper. That’s why I put it right after the first image of what looks like the crew loading at Wickenburg. Or is that at Yarnell? I may have screwed that up, not knowing what Wickenburg looks like.
I’m thinking out loud here.
The Canon Powershot timestamps appeared so hopeless to me I didn’t even try to correct them.. They didn’t even seem sequentially consistent, although I didn’t have time to try TBH. I just put them in a kind of RELATIVE order.
So, I guess it appears I should move the FIRST photo in to after the “inside the chopper” photo.
I was not sure what the photo of the guy standing there after the “insertion” video was about.
Relooking, though, it appears the photo of the guy standing there is three hours after the photo of the guys loading into the chopper (my first photo). Which would make some sense.
So if we, for now, hypothesize that they took off from Yarnell Fire Department around, say 11 or 11:30, that is, at least for now, possibly a good way to sync Dean’s Powershot photos.
I can always re-order these.
So, if we decide the chopper probably launched about 11:30 AM, that would mean the guy standing there is about 2:30 PM. Which looks pretty good given his shadow.
And also looks pretty good given the chopper’s shadow, which is almost right under it.
The blue helmets can get confusing. It looks like Moki Helitack were wearing blue helmets on the Yarnell Fire. But also DOC crews sometimes wear blue helmets. So sometimes it’s hard to tell who’s who.
Oh, and another point of confusion. The Canon Powershot photos were originally in the Jake Guadiana folder. So he took them, not Dean Hernandez.
And yeah, the weird thing is the photos are stamped March and the videos are stamped February.
Actually, I’d LOVE to get these files more accurately stamped because I’ve ALWAYS wanted to know when that video of Rance Marquez and Cougan Carothers and their trucks was taken.
Hmm. Those February timestamps on those videos I have may be because I didn’t import them cleanly into Lightroom way back in February when I was just learning how to do this. I’m gonna go back and rework them.
So the videos are still time-stamping with today’s date and time and I don’t have the software to see anything else.
Can you read the original timestamps on the videos with what you have WTKTT??
Particularly USB YARNELL HILL 003.avi and USB YARNELL HILL 020.avi.
Marti… there’s a post down below that has that information in it. Direct link to that previous posting is…
http://www.investigativemedia.com/yarnell-hill-fire-chapter-xi/#comment-242808
Thanks, WTK, that’s just what I needed.
So after another few hours of trying to figure out something that was weird, it turns out that those night aerial photos of the fire burning thru Yarnell were NOT taken by Dean Fernandez in the Moki chopper.
The were taken by Bravo 3. The way these BLM-employee ipad photos have been processed, collected/foldered/folder-named in Dropbox is really a jumble.
**
** BLM CHOPPER N14HX WAS NEVER ACTUALLY ORDERED AS A ‘RESOURCE’?
>> On January 23, 2015 at 9:57 pm, Retired with 38 said…
>>
>> So okay, I am being a dick – but I think the point is if you order a resource you
>> need to get it or get a UTF. If I were the IC, once that ship showed up I would
>> have considered it my resource. I am sure there was more communication on
>> this that we don’t know about, but come on, this is an IA fire and that is an IA
>> resource, utilize it to its fullest.
>>
>> On January 24, 2015 at 7:29 am, FIRE20+ replied…
>>
>> Hey 38, hell no you’re not being a dick, request the resource, fill or UTF is how it
>> should be for real tracking purposes. The whole loaning of air resources has never
>> sat well with me. YHF is an extreme example and we have access to know all this,
>> but this goes on everyday during fire season. And considering there were
>> many cooperators involved with that one IA ship, who wanted to pay for it?
>> Hell, leave it on the severity code and we have no charge.
The problem here ( and perhaps another ‘Lesson Learned’ in here? ) is that AZ ICT4 Russ Shumate never actually ‘ordered’ the Type 3 Helo N14HX. It was just ‘showing up’ as part of this weird ‘cooperative IA’ that was going on Friday night and Saturday between AZF and BLM.
I think in order to get a better perspective on what was happening there in Yarnell on Saturday morning, June 29, 2013… we have to take a moment to ‘step back’ and look at what happened the day/night BEFORE.
When the Yarnell Hill Lightning strike was first reported on Friday afternoon, Russ Shumate was the on-call ‘Duty Officer’ for Arizona Forestry and Bruce Olsen was the on-call ‘Duty Officer’ for Arizona BLM ( Bureau of Land Management ).
A ‘WildCAD Incident Card’ was first created ( and the incident was first given the name ‘Yarnell Hill’ ) by Arizona Dispatch Center at 1736 ( 5:36 PM ) the afternoon of Friday, June 28, 2013.
The very first WildCAD Dispatch Log entry was made just 4 minutes later at 1740 ( 5:40 PM ) and included an estimated USGS ‘grid’ location of somewhere inside “Township 10 North, Range 05 West, Section 20”.
That is NOT actually where what would soon become known as the “Yarnell Hill Fire” was located.
No aerial recon had been done yet and this location was just coming from initial citizen ‘reports’. It would turn out to be located in the top half of Section 9… but Section 20 is simply where AZ Dispatch was first led to ‘believe’ it was located.
Section 20 of Township 10 North, Range 05 West is officially about 2/3 BLM land, and 1/3 Arizona State Trust Land.
ALL of the Sections adjacent to Section 20 ( Sections 19, 21, 30, 29 and 28 ) are also either completely or partially BLM land.
So when this “Yarnell Hill” Incident first appeared in the WildCAD Dispatch Log it looked for all the world as if it might actually be on BLM Land ( somewhere inside Section 20, T10N, R05W ).
What that means is that BLM ‘Duty Officer’ Bruce Olsen automatically had an obligation to get involved right along with AZF ‘Duty Officer’ Russ Shumate.
A little while later… BOTH Bruce Olsen AND Russ Shumate would find themselves physically present in Yarnell and trying to evaluate this ‘Incident’ TOGETHER.
As the afternoon/evening wore on and an aerial recon was able to be accomplished… it became obvious exactly where the lightning strike had taken place… but there were also a few other ‘smokes’ in the same area. All of those were ‘minor’ and ‘accessible’ and were put out quickly… leaving only that (supposedly) ‘inaccessible’ smoke out there in the top half of Section 9 on the Weaver Ridge.
There was, however, now only 1 Section in-between Section 9 and Section 21 ( to the south ).
That was Section 16.
Section 21 was definitely BLM land, not AZ Trust land.
A Section is always a square that is 1 mile on each side… so even though though the initial location report about the fire being in Section 20 and directly on BLM land was incorrect… the fire was still, in reality, only about 1 mile away from actual BLM land.
That was deemed enough of a ‘threat’ to BLM land that BLM Duty Officer Bruce Olsen remained engaged with AZF Duty Officer ( now officially the AZF IC for the IA on the Yarnell Fire ) Russ Shumate and they continued to make PLANS that evening about what was going to happen TOGETHER.
That is reflected in IC4 Russ Shumate’s own Unit Logs.
Shumate’s Unit Log for Friday night said “I coordinated with BLM for our next day’s actions”.
BOTH Russ Shumate AND Bruce Olsen appeared to be in agreement that there would probably be any number of ‘new smokes’ showing up on Saturday morning, and they should plan to have any number of resources in place to ‘divde and conquer’ whatever showed up the next day in that area.
So they each started making promises to each other about what they could BOTH ‘bring to the table’ as far as ‘resources’ go… but there is no evidence anyone was officially filling out any paperwork *OR* submitting any real ‘requests’ for the ‘loan’ of any of these ‘promised’ resources ( Like the Type 3 Helo N14HX ).
As it turns out… it appears to have originally been Bruce Olsen’s idea ( and not Russ Shumate’s ) to have BLM Contract Chopper N14HX get involved there in Yarnell the next morning.
Apparently, AZF ICT4 Shumate never really ‘officially requested it’ as a resource at all.
From Shumates Unit Log, Friday night.
BLM Duty Officer Bruce Olsen is the one who was
‘promising’ Helo N14HX for the following morning…
————————————————————————
I coordinated with BLM for our next day’s actions. It was thought that multiple smokes would show in the morning in this area. I ordered 2 AZ State Forestry Division (ASFD) crews (Lewis and Yuma), and ASFD engine 151 to report to Peeples Valley store at 0800 to stage. I ordered Air Attack to show up as soon as they came on duty Saturday morning. SEATS were in SE AZ at the time, and I talked with dispatch about timeframes for getting them in play Saturday morning.
BLM would have eng 1660 and a T3 helo as well as overhead report to Yarnell in the morning as well. We planned on having a collection of resources in hand to divide as needed as smokes showed in the morning.
————————————————————————
So that is basically the ‘end of the story’ for Friday night.
Shumate ( AZF ) and Olsen ( BLM ) had ‘shared the planning’ for the next day and they had BOTH made promises about what resources would be there.
Shumate promised 2 DOC crews, Engine 151, Air Attack and SEATS.
Olsen promised Helicopter N14HX and Engine 1660.
I think what this means is that it is hard to say whether that N14HX chopper that Olsen had now ‘promised’ that was going to be there in the morning was really a ‘loaner’, or whether it was simply Bruce Olsen promising to keep this developing Yarnell thing on BLM’s own ‘Severity’ watchlist through tomorrow… and so it was simply a matter of ‘tasking’ it to come to Yarnell because of the REAL threat to BLM land and not so much ‘loaning it to Arizona Forestry’.
So that is what happened the following morning.
This ‘REAL threat’ being ‘called’ on the part of BLM is then officially reflected in the ‘Dispatch Log’ on Saturday morning right along with Bruce Olsen’s ‘promise’ to Shumate to move N14HX from Payson, to Weaver Helibase…
Entry Date/Time: 06/29/2013 07:52:43
From: PIFC
To: NT
STATED THAT BLM DID CALL A THREAT – WILL HAVE A FS ENGINE AND BLM ENGINE AT WEAVER – ALSO WILL BE MOVING 4HX FROM PAYSON TO WEAVER
8 minutes later… the ‘stated plan’ to basically have BOTH AZF IC4 Russ Shumate and BLM ICT3 Dean Fernandez sort of ‘working this one together’ hits the Dispatch Log as well…
Entry Date/Time: 06/29/2013 08:00:50
From: IC
To: NT
STATED PLAN IS TO HAVE RUSS AND DEAN FERNANDEZ WORK AREA AND TAKE INCIDENTS AS NEEDED
20 minutes later… N14HX is ‘on the move’ and flying from Payson down to the Weaver Helibase to pick up BLM ICT3 Dean Fernandez…
Entry Date/Time: 06/29/2013 08:22:01
From: Kathy O
To: WR
H-4HX heading Weaver Mtn and will tie in will DEAN and they will do a recon of the area // ok we will have AA-9QY do a recon as well around 0900 // copy
** SUMMARY
I guess all I am trying to point out here is that there isn’t any real evidence that Helo N14HX was ever actually ‘on loan’ to Arizona Forestry ( or Russ Shumate ) at all… or that Shumate really did have the right to consider it HIS resource… even though he was IC for this Initial Attack.
Since BLM had officially ‘called a threat’ to BLM lands… it was still basically just in the ‘Severity’ pool and it was just one of the resources that BLM itself was ‘bringing to the table’ as part of this stated ‘cooperative effort’ on the IA. BLM was just bringing it into play for RECON and their own assessment of the situation. Shumate still has his OWN ‘on the clock’ RECON in the works with an officially dispatched AZ Air Attack on the way.
The whole thing about using N14HX to shuttle 6 guys from the Lewis crew out to the site only entered the picture at 10:00 AM when the Crew Boss for the Lewis crew reported to AZ ICT4 Shumate that his crew would be (quote) “unable to achieve a hike out to the site”.
BLM obviously gave N14HX ‘permission’ to help Shumate out there when that “we can’t hike to the site” situation developed… but perhaps put their own limits on that and even though Nate Peck said he was told to expect THREE loads of FFs to be delivered out to the Helispot. Maybe BLM was only willing to do ONE load…. or something.
More to come on this.
SIDENOTE: No one ever interviewed BLM ‘Duty Officer’ Bruce Olsen.
So even though it is now obvious that BLM ‘Duty Officer’ Bruce Olsen played just as much a part of the planning of the IA along with AZF ICT4 Russ Shumate… there is no record of the Arizona Forestry SAIT ever interviewing Bruce Olsen.
ADOSH was made to ‘jump through hoops’ in order to intervew any BLM employees that were working the Yarnell Hill Fire such as ‘Bravo 3’ ( Rusty Warbis and Paul Lenmark ), Dan Philbin, Rance Marrquez, etc.
Most of those requests were eventually granted following full-blown Federal Level Touhy requests filed by ADOSH… but ADOSH ( also ) never even ASKED to interview Bruce Olsen.
My old Brain just Clicked.
DOC Crews are Department of Correction crews State Inmate Crews.
Same as the CalFire Inmate crews in California. Serving time in a work camp for Misc. offences low threat inmates.
So that may explain there abilities as well.
The Resource order for the DOC Lewis Crew is the very first one in the publicly released ‘J- Resource Orders.pdf’ document.
The request was for a standard Type 2 Crew, and all that that implies.
It was placed by ICT4 Russ Shumate at 1936 ( 7:36 PM ) Friday evening.
The order was ‘Assigned/Filled’ just 60 seconds after it was requested.
The order was ‘filled’ with the DOC Lewis Crew.
—————————————————————————–
Request Number: C-1
Ordered Date/Time: 06/28/13 1936 PNT
From: AZ-ADC ( Dispatch ) 800-309-7081
To: AZ-ADC
Qty: 1
Resource Requested: Crew, Type 2
Needed Date/Time: 06/29/13 0800 PNT
Deliver To: YARNELL HILL
From Unit: AZ-ADC
To Unit: AZ-ADC
Assigned Date/Time: 06/28/13 1937 PNT
Resource Assigned Unit ID: AZ-ADOC
Resource Assigned: CREW – T2 – LEWIS – AZ-A1S (AZ-ADC)
M/D Ind: M
Estimated Time of Departure: 06/29/13 0600 PNT
Estimated Time of Arrival: 06/29/13 0800 PNT
Travel Mode: AOV ( Agency Owned Vehicle )
Financial Code: AZ-A1S-130688
———————————————————————————
I don’t see any ‘Special Notes’ saying “But can’t hike more than 1 mile”.
The SECOND ‘Resource Order’ in the document ( Order C-2 ) was also for a Standard Type 2 Crew… and it was filled just as quickly with the Yuma DOC Crew.
Again… no ‘notes’ for Yuma Crew about “Can’t hike more than 1 mile”.
Also… in the actual NWCG Field Operations Guide, there is a special section for Field Supervisors regarding dealing with ‘inmate’ Type crews. There is also NOTHING in there that says anything like…
“Inmate Crews rated as Type 2 can/should be able to build line according to the standard rate charts for Type 2 crews, but don’t expect them to be able to hike more than 1 mile”.
These ‘guidelines’ for dealing with inmate crews are basically just saying don’t treat them as ‘lepers’… but certainly don’t don’t treat them as full civilian firefighters, either.
There is NOTHING in the ‘guidelines’ about ever expecting ( or tolerating )
something less than the minimum performance standards.
Here is that complete section from the NWCG Field Guide about ‘inmate crews’…
http://www.nwcg.gov/pms/pubs/pms210/pms210.pdf
Page 120 ( of 160 pages )
——————————————————————————–
USE OF INMATE CREWS
Some states have access to inmate labor for fire operations. Situations may arise where inmates are used on fires involving personnel from many agencies.
Although each state has specific rules governing the use of inmates, the following guidelines will apply in most situations. Check with the inmate crew Liaison Officer, the officer-in-charge, or the appropriate AREP for more specific information in your area.
– Crews on fireline are supervised by forest crew supervisors (resource boss or higher).
– Inmate crews are usually limited to use within the state where they are based although some states have interstate agreements with neighboring states.
– Contact with inmates should be done through the corrections officer-in-charge in camp.
– Contact with inmates should be done through the forest crew supervisor on the fireline.
– Consult the officer-in-charge before giving direction to inmates.
– Keep relationships with inmates on a business basis. For example, do not play cards with, carry messages for, bring gifts to, accept gifts from, or make purchases for the inmates.
– The officer-in-charge or other inmate Camp representative may act as liaison with Fire Overhead on all matters pertaining to inmates (food, bedding areas, etc.).
– The officer-in-charge will remain with the crew while on the fireline. Any fire suppression related problems, such as pumps, tools, drinking water, fire equipment, etc., are to be taken care of by Fire Overhead.
– Inmates should not be used in a “Squad Boss” type position, or given supervision over fellow inmates.
– Inmate crews should be provided a separate sleeping area where they can be away from other crews.
– Provide separate sleeping areas for male and female, and adult and juvenile, crews.
– Interspersing inmate crews with civilian crews on the fireline is generally permitted (but not encouraged), provided the crew supervisor is aware of the situation at all times.
– Intermingling of inmates at the incident Base with civilians should only occur at meal times.
– Inmates will be confined to the incident Base or Camp while offshift.
– Inmates shall not be allowed to handle explosives or detonating devices.
– Civilians and inmates shall have separate schedules for bathing.
——————————————————————————–
The very next page in the NWCG Field Operations Guide is the start of the standard ‘Production Rate’ tables for Type 1 and Type 2 crews.
——————————————————————————–
Sustained Line Production Rates of 20-Person
Crews in Feet per Hour
Fire Behavior Fuel Model, Crew Type 1, Crew Type 2
07 Southern Rough, 264, 132
11 Logging Slash, Light, 990, 594
12 Logging Slash, Medium, 462, 264
13 Logging Slash, Heavy, 330, 198
——————————————————————————–
Once again… there are no ‘asterisks’ or ‘special notes’ here saying “* Unless it is an inmate Type 2 Crew”.
The BOTTOM LINE here is AZ Forestry ICT4 Russ Shumate MUST have been expecting the Type 2 Crews that he ordered to be ABLE to hike out to the fire. He had every RIGHT to have those expectations.
The ‘Game Changer’ for Saturday, June 29, 2013 was when the Crew Boss of the Lewis Crew came back from his HOUR-AND-A-HALF recon mission and told Shumate “We can’t hike out there”.
Now Shumate had to start juggling all sorts of ‘alternative options’ like how many people am I now even ABLE to send out there ( and still be able to extract them quickly later on if lightning became a threat ), and HOW am I even going to be ABLE to get them out there ( since he hadn’t actually ‘Ordered’ a transport chopper via ADC the night before ).
He got ‘lucky’.
Bruce Olsen of BLM had already decided that their N14HX should be around that morning and, as it so happens, it WAS at least ABLE to also be used as a transport chopper.
What if that hadn’t been true?
What if Bruce Olsen had never showed up the night before and decided himself that since there was a credible BLM Land thread here… that it would behoove BLM to move N14HX closer to the scene?
It would have been 10:00 AM on Saturday… and Shumate would have had TWO full Type 2 Crews now just sitting in the Yarnell Fire Department parking lot doing nothing at all and unable to even get OUT to the damn fire.
I am, of course, assuming that if the CRWB of the Lewis Crew decided that his crew was “unable to achieve the hike” that the OTHER Yuma CRWB would have probably told Shumate the same thing.
How LONG would it have then taken Russ Shumate to get a Crew-Shuttle capable Helicopter there to Yarnell via the usual ADC Dispatch Ordering System if he had ended up not even placing the order until 10:00 AM Saturday morning following the “We can’t achieve the hike” report from Lewis CRWB?
1 Hour? 2? 3 Hours? 4 Hours? – UTF?
Given the situation as he saw it on Friday night ( regardless if he had ANY doubts about the DOC Crews being able to hike out to that fire ) he should have gone directly for 2 Type 1 Crews. No question.
The report from the Air Attack RECON on Friday night had also already informed Shumate that it was STEEP, ROCKY terrain.
That screamed for ‘Type 1’ Crews and NOT ‘Type 2’ regardless if they were DOC level or not.
Followup… I really don’t think the “Unable to achieve the hike” report from the Lewis CRWB at 10:00 AM had all to do with ‘physical capabilities’.
BOTH those Lewis and Yuma crews worked their bloody asses off that entire weekend and there were no reports of anyone dropping dead of a heart attack, or anything.
I believe this had more to do with some kind of TOTAL FAIL with regards to Shumate himself talking to the ‘locals’, or studying the maps properly himself, OR doing his OWN RECON(s).
Shumate had been there the day before when it was still broad daylight.
He had STAYED there until at least 2100 ( 9:00 PM ) when he says he saw a ‘flare up’ out there with his binoculars.
In all that time he was in Yarnell on Friday ( both broad daylight and on into the evening )… he didn’t take a moment to determine exactly HOW he was going to get people out there in the morning?
He had complete access to all the local YFD and PVFD people.
He had complete access to updated MAPS ( including Google Maps ).
The Yarnell Fire Department had their own ATV. That’s the one that BR Hotshot Cory Ball was going to ‘borrow’ on Sunday.
Even if ( for some inexplicable reason ) no one with YFD knew how a crew could easily hike out there… He could have borrowed their ATV himself while it was still daylight and found the exact same two-tracks that led all the way to the fire.
Apparently… NONE of that happened.
Russ Shumate goes home to Prescott, comes back in the morning, and even though his two Type 2 Crews are now THERE ( at 8:00 AM ) and ready to go to work… he STILL has to first assign the Lewis CRWB the job of finding out if there is a way to hike to the fire.
TOTAL FAIL.
And not only that… the Lewis CRWB is now in the ‘FAIL ZONE’ and now HE spends an HOUR AND A HALF ( 8:30 to 10:00 AM ) just trying to find a way to hike out there… and all he comes up with is “Sorry… can’t do it”.
Apparently… even the Lewis CRWB wasn’t talking to anyone local and asking for any advice or fully looking at the maps OR bothering to borrow that ATV from the YFD to help check things out.
Once again… TOTAL FAIL.
One more followup to above…
As it turns out… Shumate was even there in Yarnell ( with daylight ) on Saturday morning a full HOUR AND FIFTEEN minutes before the Lewis and Yuma crews themselves would even arrive.
From Shumates Unit Log, Saturday morning…
———————————————————–
Saturday 29 June 2013
In service, enroute to Yarnell Hill Fire at approximately 0530 ( 5:30 AM ).
On scene at Yarnell FD 0645 ( 6:45 AM ).
Cannot give size up, but I can see a small smoke, so I could now determine the location of the fire on the ridge. Ordered a spot weather for the day.
——————————————————
Shumate now says that regardless of any confusion from the night before about exactly WHERE the fire was out on that ridge… he could NOW tell EXACTLY where it was.
So there is yet ANOTHER HOUR AND A HALF prior to the arrival of either of the Type 2 Crews when Shumate apparently FAILED to even take a moment to figure out HOW he was going to get people ‘out there’… or to seek any advice from anyone local about how to do that.
Shumate still waited until the Lewis and Yuma crews arrived ( at 8:00 AM ) and then he let them stand around for yet ANOTHER HOUR ( until 9:00 AM ) and only then, during his 9:00 AM briefing, did he give his first assignments which were as follows…
Assignments…
Yuma (DOC); STAGE at YFD for response to additional smokes.
Lewis (DOC); CRWB determine if there is a route to drive or hike to fire.
So Shumate had been there since 6:45 AM… doesn’t even brief the Crews until 9:00 AM ( TWO HOURS AND FIFTEEN MINUTES LATER ) and Shumate STILL has no idea how anyone is going to get out to the fire so that becomes the Lewis CRWB’s first assignment.
The rest is ‘history’.
Yet ANOTHER TWO HOURS go by and all the Lewis CRWB comes back with ( at 10:00 AM ) is “We can’t hike to the fire”.
From Russ Shumate’s Unit Log for Saturday, June 29, 2013
—————————————————————-
1000 ( 10:00 AM ) – Lewis CRWB ( Crew Boss ) reports that
none of the roads are drivable and that a hike would NOT
be achievable with the crew.
I determine the best course of action would be to fly in a
half crew to coldtrail and mop up.
—————————————————————–
Just for gags… I checked one more time how quickly I could bring up Yarnell, Arizona in Google Maps in Satellite mode and see clearly ALL the ‘trails’ and ‘two-tracks’ that would have taken anyone DIRECTLY to the location of that fire as it was that Saturday morning.
Once again… the answer was ‘about 20 seconds’.
Correction for above.
The Lewis Crew was THERE in Yarnell at 8:00 AM… but stood around doing nothing for an hour until Shumate got around to briefing them at 9:00 AM.
It was NOT until even 9:00 AM that the Lewis CRWB was even told the first thing he needed to do was figure out if there was a way to hike to the fire.
That means it was only ONE hour between when he was actually first given that task and when he came back with just “Sorry… can’t be done”.
So that paragraph above should have read like this…
Yet ANOTHER HOUR goes by and all the Lewis CRWB comes back with ( at 10:00 AM ) is “We can’t hike to the fire”.
WTKTT—Just wanted to say there are varying types of type 2 crews
FS regulars–20 person crew of FS fire fighters from a forest.
Contract crews that are trained by FS and BLM or other agencies that are trained and Fit Fire fighters. They would have no problem getting to and fighting the Yarnell fire. You do not always get type 1 Crews because they are always in demand.
The inmate crews can very in ability as they are not 20 to 40 years old but can very up to 60 they are used on state projects and trained in fire suppression. Depending on the crew you get they may not be a crew that dose more than mop up and do not have a lot of hiking experience so the State uses them in different ways on State Fires only. They could possibly not be Qualified for Federal Fires although some may be. It would be a State thing or State Crew only with restrictions.
So I am saying that there can be a difference between Type 2 crews on a 1 to 10 scale.
There have been Hot shot type 1 crews downgraded to type 2 for severial reasons. There Funding, There Supervision, Not a full 20 person crew the missing filled by regular fire fighters.
My point here is there are many type 2 Crews that can fill any line assignment and do the job well. If you go to a lot of Fires in a Region you tend to know the crews and their capabilities.
Some times you have to depend on the State Crew Bosses to tell you what they can and cant do as a Crew.
>> Bob Powers said…
>>
>> So I am saying that there can be a difference
>> between Type 2 crews on a 1 to 10 scale.
So where, in the ordering process, is the moment when you SPECIFY how GOOD of ‘Type 2’ crew you need?
All I see in Shumate’s order for 2 Type Crews is…
“Resource Requested: Crew, Type 2”
and the ‘Fulfillment’ record for both crews just says…
“Resource Assigned: CREW – T2”
I don’t see any ‘1-10’ skill level designators in either the requests or the fulfillment records.
I totally understand what you are saying… but I’m not understanding how you get the right ‘skill level’ of Type 2 crews when you know what you need.
Is there a “Can also do hikes” checkbox on a form somewhere?
>> Bob Powers also said…
>>
>> Some times you have to depend on the State
>> Crew Bosses to tell you what they can and
>> cant do as a Crew.
Okay. I guess that’s the ‘reality’… but I’m still not understanding where in the ORDERING process you get the opportunity to do that?
Are you saying that no one ever gets a Type 2 crew that is going to match their actual needs unless they have already talked to the Crew Boss BEFORE placing an order?
That just seems like a game of Russian Roulette, or something.
Or maybe the ‘Forest Gump’ approach to resource ordering.
“Ordering Type 2 Crews is like a box of chocolates… you never know what you’re gonna get.”
All of the above being said… I still think Russ Shumate himself was perfectly aware of what both the Yuma and Lewis DOC crews could or couldn’t do.
I still think the “Unable to achieve the hike” report that came back from the Lewis CRWB had more to do with just not talking to the locals or doing a good enough job looking at maps that morning.
In other words… it wasn’t that they couldn’t have pulled it off physically… it’s just that no one ( Shumate included ) had done a good enough job simply ‘figuring out the route’.
IMPORTANT followup to above.
I just found something in Justin Smith’s ADOSH interview that is directly related.
Justin Smith was Russ Shumate’s ICT4(t) on Saturday.
As it turns out… Justin Smith ‘let it slip’ in his first of TWO separate ADOSH interviews.that they WERE ‘aware’ of these trails and two-tracks that led up to the fire… regardless of whether the Lewis CRWB was or not.
Smith says SOMEONE ( he doesn’t remember who ) employed by Yarnell Fire Department WAS telling them ( He and Shumate ) about these ‘trails’ and ‘two-tracks’ out there but that person was also downplaying them as ‘not usable’ for UTV or ATV traffic because that person believed they had all ‘washed out’.
Justin uses the word ‘not drivable’… as if that is all they were concerned about. Ability to DRIVE to the fire.
There is still no mention whether anyone ( including Shumate ) discussed whether they were simply ‘hikable’ or not.
From Justin Smith’s first ADOSH interview…
Q4 = Dave Larsen ( Rest in Peace )
A = Justin Smith, ICT4(t) on Saturday
—————————————————
Q4: Were you – were you uh, kind of surprised when you – when you flew up there and found that there was a couple of two tracks uh, almost right to it. Well I guess you knew it was jumping the two track.
A: Yeah I knew it was jumping a – a two track um, you know, we did – we did know that there was – there was miscellaneous um, you know, quad roads out there but we had talked to uh, I believe it was one of the personnel from the Yarnell Fire Department and they said that, you know, none of those roads were – were drivable even with an ATV or UTV. They said they had been, you know, so washed out and eroded that, you know, they were unsafe to drive.
—————————————————
That was NOT the case.
Brian Frisby and Trueheart Brown proved that the next day at 11:30 AM when they drove their Polaris Ranger all the way up to the anchor point for that face-to-face meeting with Eric Marsh.
Regardless… the Lewis Crew just needed a way to HIKE to the fire… not drive.
It would be astounding to think that just because someone from YFD might have been telling Smith and Shumate that the roads were not ‘drivable’ that they would also assume that meant there weren’t even ‘hikable’.
I’m confused here. I thought that all Type 2 crew members had to pass the arduous level pack test walking 3 miles in 45 minutes carrying 45 pounds (page 13-10 of the red book, Interagency Standards for Fire and Fire Aviation Operations). There is a little more info on page 13-16 about interagency type 2 crews, but nowhere have I seen anything (in the field or in the red book) about having a type 2 crew that doesn’t meet the basic physical requirements for its members (or that it can vary in size — I thought they had to be pulled off ROSS if they had fewer than 18 members available).
Maybe there are differences in state run fires, but I figured if they are using an interagency dispatch, then they are supposed to play by the rules in the red book.
SITTA–While you are right with Federal Dispatch requirements the State Doc Crews can be used on State Fires and not put on the Interagency rosters as available they can only be used within state.
If you are ordering from the national dispatch you will get qualified type 2 Crews.
I have never worked with Arizona State DOC crews so I am only guessing from past experience with California crews. California has cleared that up a lot and meets the type 2 now. You have to realize who they are where they come from what they are paid and their age differences. They volunteer to go to work camps but they are inmates with varying skills and not seasonal FF. Trained yes but on a scale of 3 to 5 in performance.
WTKTT–If the fire orders go in the Dispatch can make sure they are getting Type 2 crews and know what they want yes there is some cherry picking.
People who go to fires a lot can tell you what crews can do what and there abilities.
The Vast Majority are at the 6 to 10 scale in suppression. State using their resources on State Fires those Resources may not meet Federal Specifications and they do not have to States Choice. Also not all inmates in a work camp meet Fire suppression classification Their first job is State work projects and some are trained for Fire Crews.
First and foremost This was a State Fire.
Shumate was a State Employee he could not refuse the DOC Crews If the State wanted to send them first.
Shumate was a Type 4 IC basic IA but also probably knew what he was getting although maybe not.
When a Crew Boss of a DOC crew tells you the crew can not hike to the Fire Roads Trails or otherwise that’s what they mean. The crew is not capable of a steep hike at night or in that terrain.
Bob, thank you for the clarification. I never cease to be amazed at what I learn here.
From what I just read (Shumate’s August 2013 ADOSH interview) it was all about how the roads and two-tracks (that GM navigated handily) were all “washed out” and, therefore “unreliable” and OMG how could we put (via a ground route) a crew in there via those un-navigable roads and two-tracks and risk (in case a thunderstorm came in) them having to risk running downhill in all of that (including falling and stuff) thru all that potentially burning chaparral.
I mean, really, that’s what he says.
AND he says nothing about “Aviation” limiting the number of flights to put crews in.
AND he says that after the fire blew over the road and escaped, he put TWO crews in.
AND he says that because the helicopter could only deliver 50 gallons of water via a Bambi bucket, it was better to fly in ONE load of 60 gallons worth of bladder bags.
Something’s just seriously wrong with all of this.
A new note———–Dailey Courier artical on the 21st A judge sided with Ashcraft in her Favor siding with the Retirement boards decision to grant Retirement benefits to Ashcraft, against the City Councils Appeal.
That’s VERY good news.
Reply to Bob Powers post on January 22, 2015 at 5:15 pm
NOTE: Continuation of the thread below about the ‘Initial Attack’ on the Yarnell Hill Fire that was running out of room.
>> Bob Powers said
>>
>> The Lewis Crew
>> If they are rated type 2 should have been physically fit to hike 2 miles to the fire
>> what was that all about.. Why were they classed as a crew if they could not
>> physically do the work?
We are not even talking about 2 miles.
From the point at the top of the Sesame Clearing area, WEST on that two-track road to the old-grader, and then on up again to the spot where the fire was ( also ALL on two-tracks that UTVs were easily negotiating the next day ) the total distance was 1.4 mile(s).
If they had taken the ‘shorter’ jeep trail that heads NORTH from the old-grader instead of the same route above ( easily walked the next morning by Granite Mountain )… then it was only 1.2 mile(s) with the last 100 yards up a drainage.
Since we know now that the number of firefighters actually ‘on scene’ up there on that ridge for most of the day on Saturday was the crucial factor in whether that fire was going to be ‘put out that day’, or not… then this limitation on the part of the DOC crew(s) itself and the complications it caused ICT4 Shumate are also a critical part of ‘the story’.
it is really not ‘credible’ that both ICT4 Russ Shumate and ICT3 Dean Fernandez could NOT have seen all these same two-tracks and trails that anyone with a browser could also see.
There is actually PROOF of this.
In the ‘Fernandez photos’ folder in the SAIT ‘Photos and Videos’ Dropbox… there are actually some pictures that Dean Fernandez himself took Saturday MORNING ( as early as 10:54 AM ) of the exact TOPO maps that he and Shumate were looking at THAT morning.
The same two-tracks and trails that Granite Mountain would use the NEXT day to reach the fire location are CLEARLY visible there in Fernandez’s own photos of his own TOPO maps.
Those ‘Fernandez’ photos are here…
SAIT / Photos and Videos / Fernandez photos
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/02ue6bnjp6nazkm/AAB_59PXlAuhlkl2-quFH5_Oa/Photos%20and%20Video/Fernandez%20photos?dl=0
The photos he took of his OWN TOPO maps ( about 35 seconds apart at 10:54 AM on
Saturday morning ) are these…
“2013-06-29 10.54.27.png”
“2013-06-29 10.55.02.png”
They are the last two photos ( on the right ) in the THIRD row of photos from the top.
The second one is actually a clear CLOSEUP of his TOPO map… and the two-tracks and trails are clearly marked.
>> Bob Powers also said…
>>
>> I could not believe I read that. While Type 2 crews do not have the organization
>> and rigorous Physical training they are Carded Fire Fighters I have seen some
>> and crew bossed some that could almost stick with a Hot Shot Crew. They are
>> expected to climb mountains and cut line maybe that was the problem with
>> containment as well. The crew was not a performance crew?????????
According to Shumate’s own log…
At the 8:30 AM briefing Saturday morning… the DOC crews were given the following assignments…
Assignments…
Yuma (DOC); STAGE at YFD for response to additional smokes.
Lewis (DOC); CRWB determine if there is a route to drive or hike to fire.
An HOUR AND A HALF LATER ( at 10:00 AM )… Shumate’s Unit Log says the
Lewis DOC Crew Boss came back and told him this…
1000 ( 10:00 AM ) – Lewis CRWB reports that none of the roads are drivable
and that a hike would NOT be achievable with the crew.
Okay. Whatever. What about the OTHER Crew, then?
If the CRWB of the Lewis Crew didn’t think his men could not ‘achieve’ a less-than-two-mile hike… then what about the Yuma crew? Maybe they were in better shape and/or better trained.
Why didn’t Shumate just check with the Yuma crew and use them instead… and then just let the ‘unable-to-hike’ Lewis crew be the ones sitting in the Yarnell Hill Fire Department parking lot for the rest of the day?
It didn’t happen.
Shumate just went along with this ‘explanation’ and started arranging for the chopper flights.
It also appears now that no matter how many people Shumate really did WANT to be up there fighting the fire… the ‘Aviation People’ were going to put their own limit of just ONE chopper load ( 1 Helitack and 6 FFs ) onto Shumate’s plate… and Shumate was just going to go along with THAT limitation as well.
It is still a mystery why even those 6 FFs could not have put the nails in the coffin on that fire for the upwards of FIVE HOURS they were working on it prior to the ‘escape’… but now the fact that only 6 FFs were ever up there in the first place ( when three times that many were just sitting around in the Yarnell Fire Departmant parking lot all day ) remains an even greater mystery.
Just a Follow up here The Lewis crew in order to be Fire Fighters must meet and pass a physical test of a 1.5 mile hike with 40 pound pack in I believe in 12 Min. and meet some other requirements to be Carded as Fire Fighters. To be a type 2 crew available for dispatch they had to be physically fit. Very strange that they could not have hiked to the fire that night. and worked on it all night. Shumate should have used the BLM Tanker crew and sent them up that night there could have been a different story here. Again a lack of using the tools you have and getting IA on a small fire before the next burn period. The Home owners may have a good case against the State………
See the new post just below about new proof that the 6 Lewis DOC Crew could NOT have been ‘inserted’ on the fire at 10:45 AM, as Russ Shumate claims.
There are ‘Fernandez’ photos ( taken with a Network-connected iPad and with accurate timestamps ) that seem to prove Shumate could NOT have gotten any of those guys out there any earlier than about 11:30 AM.
That’s a BIG time discrepancy… and puts no firefighters even working on the Yarnell Hill Fire until almost NOON that day.
If there was no ‘air shuttle’ to the fire until 11:30 AM, that means BOTH the Yuma and Lewis DOC crews had been sitting around the Yarnell Hill Fire Station for more than THREE AND ONE HALF HOURS that morning ( since they BOTH arrived at 8:00 AM ).
That means they should have been able to HIKE out to that fire ( and back ) at least FOUR TIMES while they had been sitting around doing nothing at the Fire Station and just waiting for Chopper N14HX to show up.
Granite Mountain made that SAME hike out to that SAME spot ( one-way ) in just 45 minutes the very next morning.
There has to be some real underlying facts about the Lewis crews physical fitness.
Why could they not hike to the fire?
Why could they have not been on the fire by say 0100 in the AM?
A entire crew at the Fire and constructing line and mop up of the perimeter by Day light?
By Noon this fire should have been cold with a 12 man crew on the ground.
a couple of Helicopter Water drops in the hot areas and there would have been no flare ups by the 1300 burn period.
If the crew was not a suppression crew then that may be the answer to the escape of the fire. Some one should be interviewing Shumate on what the refusal was about to not hike in?????
** FOLLOWUP
**
** LEWIS DOC CREW INSERTION ON SATURDAY COULD NOT HAVE
** BEEN AT 10:45 AM… AS REPORTED BY ICT4 RUSS SHUMATE
In the “SAIT / Photos and Videos / AZFS photos videos” folder there have always been at least 2 MOVIES that appear to show the actual ‘insertion’ of some of the Lewis DOC Crew out onto the ‘helispot’ near the Yarnell Hill Fire.
They have filenames of…
“USB YARNELL HILL 002.AVI”
“USB YARNELL HILL 003.AVI”
The FIRST one was filmed from the air and ‘on approach’ to the Helispot, and is another clear view of the actual reality of the fire at that time. Quiet. No flame. No real smokes.
The SECOND one was filmed at the Helispot itself about 1/4 mile north of where the fire was along that Weaver Mountain Ridgeline and actually shows some of the Lewis DOC Crew disembarking from BLM Helicopter N14HX.
The problem with these two videos is that we have never really been able to trust the TIMESTAMPS embedded in these AVI videos.
There were both taken with a Canon Powershot running the CanonMVI06 software, but not only is the DATE stamp obviously way off… it appears the TIME was also not set anywhere near correctly on this device.
Here is just a portion of the EXIF metadata embedded in these two videos…
File Name: USB YARNELL HILL 002.avi
Date/Time Original: 2011:03:05 23:36:13
Software: CanonMVI06
Duration: 8.78 seconds
File Name: USB YARNELL HILL 003.avi
Date/Time Original: 2011:03:05 23:39:28
Software: CanonMVI06
Duration: 8.27 s
Obviously the ‘March 5, 2011’ DATE stamp is wildly WRONG.
As for the TIME… even if you assume it was just a ‘no time zone’ setting issue and then subtract the standard minus 7 hours from the GMT time for Arizona… that still puts the TIME values at…
16:36:13 ( 4:36:13 PM )
16:39:28 ( 4:39:28 PM )
If that is in any way accurate… then these two videos could ONLY possibly be showing some kind of insertion of FFs to the Helispot that was happening much later in the afternoon… and AFTER the fire had already ESCAPED.
So even though the TIME values might have no relation to anything and are just ‘way wrong’ altogether… and these videos *MIGHT* still really show the actual FIRST insertion of Lewis DOC Crew members that happened Saturday morning… there is no way to really prove that from any information embedded in the videos themselves.
For that reason… we have always just been ‘trusting’ Russ Shumate’s own Unit Log entries for the actual TIME when this FIRST insertion of Lewis DOC Crew members took place Saturday morning. Shumate says it happened at 10:45 AM, right after the RECON mission.
Even the ADOSH Investigators have always been ‘trusting’ this 10:45 AM time that Shumate gave for the initial ‘insertion’ of only those 6 Lewis DOC Crew members.
Russ Shumate’s official Unit Log says…
—————————————————————————————–
1045 ( 10:45 AM ) – 6 Lewis DOC crew members are inserted at helispot
and hike approx 1/4 mile down the jeep trail to the fire. Size up remains
2 ( TWO ) acres and very little heat. Will coldtrail and mop up. They plan
on being flown off at around 1600.
—————————————————————————————–
Well… as it turns out… there actually is some OTHER ‘photographic’ evidence with TRUSTED TIMESTAMPS which proves this TIME of 10:45 for the actual ‘insertion’ CANNOT be correct.
It MUST have happened LATER than that. Perhaps even a LOT LATER than that.
Here is why…
BLM Rep ( and ICT3 ) Dean ‘Dino’ Fernandez actually ARRIVED in Yarnell on Saturday morning aboard that Yellow/White BLM Chopper N14HX.
He says in his own SAIT interview that he reported to the Helibase for N14HX down near Congress… and he flew with it to Yarnell that morning. Even his own RED HELMET with his NAME on it is shown in two of his own photos being ‘loaded’ into the N14HX Chopper that morning BEFORE it ever even lifted off from its own Helibase down there near Congress.
Before N14HX landed at the Yarnell Hill Fire Station Helipad that morning… it FIRST flew out over the Yarnell Hill Fire to do the RECON that Shumate had been waiting for all morning.
Dean Fernandez had his Network-connected iPad with him aboard N14HX and he began shooting pictures with it before N14HX even arrived over the Yarnell area. He CONTINUED to shoot pictures with his iPad all during the RECON mission… and right on up to when N14HX was now ‘on approach’ to the Yarnell Hill Fire Station Helipad, where it was going to land and ( only then ) begin to prepare to shuttle any Lewis DOC Crew out to the fire.
It was NOT a ‘Hot-Load’ of the Lewis DOC crew, either.
After the RECON mission and after LANDING at the YFD Helipad… Fernandez’s photos also show it was full ‘engine stop’ for N14HX so any Crew Loading at that point was a ‘cold load’. which, of course, adds even more TIME to a ‘turnaround’.
THOSE Fernandez iPad pictures have all been made PUBLIC and have always been sitting in the following folder…
SAIT / Photos and Videos / Fernandez photos
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/02ue6bnjp6nazkm/AAB_59PXlAuhlkl2-quFH5_Oa/Photos%20and%20Video/Fernandez%20photos?dl=0
Here is a quick ‘index’ of the photos Dean Fernandez took that specifically relate to this Saturday morning flight aboard N14HX, the RECON, and then the landing at the Yarnell Fire Station Helipad…
NOTE: These are all JPEG images taken with his Network-connected iPad and so the DATE/TIMES in these photo FILENAMES can be considered ACCURATE.
ALSO NOTE: Whenever it says ‘Looking at fire site’ in the photo descriptions below that just means Fernandez was photographing the ‘Yarnell Hill Fire’ site itself out on the ridge. At NO TIME, in ANY of these photos, is there ever any actual FIRE of FLAMES showing. Barely even any smoke anywhere. The ‘fire’ looks pretty much like it is OUT… and THESE are most likely the photos that Fernandez immediately shared with ICT4 Russ Shumate when N14HX finally landed at the YFD Helipad.
“2013-06-29 10.13.36” – Pre-flight at BLM Helibase near Congress. Helmet.
“2013-06-29 10.13.40” – Pre-flight at BLM Helibase near Congress. Helmet closeup.
“2013-06-29 10.24.32” – Chopper is now airborne and about halfway to Yarnell.
“2013-06-29 10.24.39” – 7 second later. About halfway to Yarnell.
“2013-06-29 10.28.44” – Nearing Yarnell. Over Highway 89 coming up from the south.
“2013-06-29 10.29.41” – Over Yarnell now. Approaching actual site of the fire.
“2013-06-29 10.29.51” – 10 seconds later. Looking at fire site from the EAST.
“2013-06-29 10.30.27” – 35 seconds later. Looking at fire site from the WEST.
“2013-06-29 10.31.11” – 44 seconds later. Looking at fire site from the SOUTH.
“2013-06-29 10.31.53” – 42 seconds later. Looking at fire site from the NORTH.
“2013-06-29 10.32.14” – 21 seconds later. Looking at fire site from the WEST again.
“2013-06-29 10.41.26” – Chopper has LANDED at potential Helispot on the ridge.
“2013-06-29 10.50.19” – Airborne again. On APPROACH to Yarnell Fire Station.
“2013-06-29 10.54.27” – First photo of TOPO map showing Helispot location.
“2013-06-29 10.55.02” – Second CLOSEUP of Fernandez’s own TOPO MAP.
“2013-06-29 11.00.23” – Chopper has now LANDED at YFD Helipad.
“2013-06-29 11.18.31” – Chopper STAGED at YFD Helipad. Doors open. Engine off.
“2013-06-29 11.18.44” – Closeup of someone ( not pilot ) sitting in the Chopper.
“2013-06-29 11.18.46” – 2 seconds later. Another photo of same person in Chopper.
So… as you can see from the known/trusted TIME stamps above… there is NO WAY that Chopper N14HX could have been ‘inserting’ any of the Lewis DOC Crew out at the Yarnell Hill Fire at 10:45 AM as Shumate said in his Unit Log.
At 10:45 AM… Chopper N14HX ( with Fernandez onboard ) was still performing the RECON mission out at the site itself, and was still at least another 15 minutes away from actually landing at the Yarnell Hill Fire Station Helipad for the first time that day.
The Fernandez photos prove that Chopper N14HX did, in fact, fly directly out to the site of the fire to do RECON as it first flew up from its own Helibase down near Congress. There is no TIME ( as per the photo timestamps ) for it to have first landed at the YFD Helipad, and THEN headed out towards the site. It did the RECON first… THEN it went to YFD.
So the LANDING at YFD Helibase took place right about 11:00 AM… and then we still see Chopper N14HX ‘staged’ there as late as 11:18 PM… when Fernandez was snapping those photos of someone sitting in the Pilot’s seat of N14HX and just sort of ‘goofing around’. That can’t be the actual ‘pilot’ of N14HX seen ‘goofing around’ in those photos. He’s not wearing the right ‘gear’. It was probably one of the Lewis DOC guys asking for the ‘photo op’… maybe even ‘Peck’.
That now puts the TIME when that first insertion of any of the Lewis DOC Crew out to the fire took place to ( at least ) more than 45 minutes LATER than Shumate says it happened.
The photos prove that the ‘flight time’ ( one way ) between the Helispot and the YFD Helipad was a minimum of 10 minutes… so even if the 6 Lewis DOC Crew had literally ‘jumped’ aboard N14HX after the last two ‘goofing around’ photos that Fernandez took at 11:18 AM that means they couldn’t have been ‘arrived’ out at the Yarnell Hill Fire Helispot any earlier than 11:30 AM.
45 minutes is a pretty big time discrepancy for such a critical event that day.
If there really weren’t any FFs ‘inserted’ out there at the Yarnell Hill Fire site on Saturday morning any earlier than 11:30 AM that means that both the Yuma and the Lewis DOC crews had been sitting around doing NOTHING for more than THREE AND ONE-HALF HOURS ( since they both arrived at 8:00 AM that morning ).
It only took Granite Mountain 45 minutes to HIKE all the way out to that ‘anchor point’ the following day from the ‘Sesame Clearing’ area.
That means that BOTH the Yuma and the Lewis DOC crews should ( according to their red card requirements and minimum qualifications ) have been able to do almost the same thing that morning ( via the same route )… and they could have walked back-and-forth to/from the fire at least FOUR TIMES that morning just in the time between they arrived at 8:00 AM and anyone was finally being ‘flown’ out to the Helispot.
That was a MASSIVE ‘waste of time and resources’ that morning during the BEST time to be out there putting the nails in the coffin on that fire. Early day, little wind, lower temps, lower, RH, etc.
Maybe ICT4 Russ Shumate really wasn’t remembering any times anywhere near correctly from Saturday morning… or *maybe* he was a little afraid to admit ( in his official Unit Log ) that he didn’t get ANY firefighters even OUT to that fire any earlier than 11:30 AM ( or LATER? ) that Saturday morning.
Still another amazing fact in regard to when the boots really hit the ground! Totally unacceptable in my opinion – one full crew hiking in at first light would have had a wrap on it and been hiking out at the time of the first arriving FF’s, even if it took the DOC crew two hours to hike in. Terrible utilization (or lack of) resources.
WHEN IN CHARGE TAKE CHARGE!
More about that ‘first flight’ of BLM Chopper N14HX…
There has always been the following in the SAIT ‘Investigation Notes’ document from their ‘interview’ with Dean Fernandez.
Fernandez does say he was aboard N14HX and ‘scouting the fire’ that morning.
Fernandez also CONFIRMS the scenario outlined above, which his photographs PROVE.
1) Fernandez DID fly to Yarnell aboard N14HX from its base near Congress.
2) N14HX DID do the RECON before ever landing at YFD Helipad.
This is also that entry where we learn that Fernandez had supposedly been encouraging Shumate ( several times that day ) to get a ‘pumpkin’ set up for (supposedly) bucket drop support out on that ridge… but Shumate wasn’t listening to him.
From the SAIT Investigation ‘notes’…
———————————————————————————
BLM REP Dean Fernandez
Interviewed by Jim (Karels) and Mike (Dudley), 07/14/2013
Saturday morning went to Weaver Mtn Helibase and went in the helo and scouted the fire,
It looked good, innocent.
They landed and picked people up and took the crew members out
—————————————————————————-
So according to Fernadez’s own photos… we CAN put an EXACT time to…
“They landed” ( At 11:00 AM ).
Fernandez photos then show ‘Engines off’ and ‘Doors open’ ( with no one loading up ) from 11:00 AM to at least 11:18 AM.
More questions about resource utilization – What about the crew from the Helicopter? Did it come with one or just Hernandez? Why didn’t that crew get inserted on the fire before any shuttle operation began? I know that support is needed to establish a Helibase and set up the Bambi bucket operation, but the agency helicopters I have been around usually come with a crew on the ship and a crew on the support vehicle. Just wondering if we had more FF’s sitting around that just the DOC crews.
Sorry, that should read did it come with a crew of just Fernandez?
On an airplane at the moment so have to make this quick. Bottom line on possibly even MORE resources being there Sat morning is YES. Shumates own Unit Log says he later sent (quote) “Half the Helitack crew… 7 guys… out to the ridge along with supply flight. It was the OTHER planned shuttle of the rest of Lewis crew that got cancelled because fire was then NEAR and BELOW the Helispot itself. It is NOT known how this supposed 14 member Helitack crew got to Yarnell… or WHEN they actually got there.
As with a lot of things related to YHF… there is conflicting evidence that really does still need to get ‘sorted out’ once and for all… which is why this whole IA failure needs this kind of ‘revisit’.
Example: There is actually a time stamped Dispatch Log entry coming from AA ( Air Attack Rory Collins ) with an exact time of 10:55 AM where AA is telling Dispatch that Helo N14HX has just now dropped 6 HELITACK off up on the ridge next to Yarnell Fire.
Dispatch entry specifically says HELITACK and NOT Lewis DOC crew people.
So what is up with that little gem?
Does that mean it really is possible N14HX came up from its own Weaver helibase near Congress that morning with both Dean Fernandez AND half of a Helitack crew… and when it made that test landing out at the ridge Helispot… the onboard Helitack actually got OUT right then and there?
Does that mean that when the Lewis crew shuttle then happened after the recon flight that really were now TWELVE GUYS up there to ‘cold mop’ instead of just the SIX guys from the Lewis Crew?
This definitely needs to get ‘sorted out’.
More later.
And the statement from the Fernandez interview that ” they landed and picked people up and took the crew members out” really confuses things even more. Sounds to me like the crew was removed from the ship at the helibase – which again drives the question why not insert them on the incident on the first fly over?
And what was AA seeing at the exact time of 10:55? If I had to guess I would say the on the initial fly over they maybe left a crew member to work the helispot and maybe that’s what AA was seeing.
Realize helitack modules need to stay together, they’re an IA resource. That ship was borrowed from the Tonto NF out of Payson to “take a look at the fire” (paraphrase) and 4HX isn’t on a resource order and neither is Nate Peck. And Peck, who was the IC on the fire on the 29th (because Justin Smith was a ICT4 trainee) was a part of that helitack module. For Peck to be the only one from the group left on the hill makes sense, the modules usually have more than one qualified IC for Initial Attack split up capabilities. Peck was committed for the night to ‘help’ by maintaining a qualified IC on the fire. Remember Shumate made a grand assumption there would be more IA’s the next shift…he REALLY wanted to hold on to those IA resources and have them accessible, especially the AC. Also Bob Powers, dig deeper, the initial attack dispatch logs are there from the 28th.
Only have a moment… but basically just CONFIRMING what Fire20+ has said above.
Helo N14HX was in ‘Payson’ at ‘start of day’ on Saturday, and first it flew down to the BLM Weaver Helibase near Congress to ‘tie in’ with BLM Rep ( ICT3 ) Dean Fernandez… and THEN it flew to Yarnell for the ‘recon’ mission.
It really is still unknown WHO was onboard N14HX for either the flight from Payson or who might have gotten onboard ( other than Fernandez ) when it stopped at the BLM Weaver Helibase.
I’m almost ready to believe that AA was simply mistaken about WHO he saw getting OFF N14HX down at the Helispot. AA might have seen 6 guys exiting the ship… but that really might have been the 6 Lewis DOC guys. Maybe AA was just ‘assuming’ since he saw 6 yellow shirts coming out of a Helo that these were all ‘Helitack’.
Problem with that is the TIME is still way off.
Whoever those 6 people were AA says he saw disembarking from N14HX up at the Helspot at 10:55 AM… if the TIME is absolutely accurate there then they MUST have been already ‘onboard’ N14HX when it first arrived in Yarnell airspace.
One minor point, though… about ‘Nate Peck’.
Yes… he was a ‘carded ICT4’… but Shumate says he made him OPS out on the ridge for the night. Shumate remained IC that evening/night… and Shumate was about to be awake all night ordering resources and meeting with Gary Cordes and Darrell Willis in the wee hours of Sunday morning. Shumate didn’t leave Yarnell ( after the fire ‘escaped’ on Saturday ) until after the 9:00 AM briefing Sunday morning for Hall’s Type 2 Short team.
From Russ Shumate’s Unit Log Notes for Saturday, June 29, 2013…
————————————————————————–
1800 ( 6:00 PM ) – Send J. Smith ICT4(t) up to the fire, and prep the rest of Lewis crew to fly up as well. Changed command structure to the following; J. Smith no longer ICT4(t), he will be Div A on the hill. Peck, a carded ICT4 from 4HX helitack, will be Operations on the hill.
————————————————————————–
What Shumate FAILS to mention here is that ( apparently ) on the same ‘supply’ flight following the ‘escape’ when he sent Justin Smith out to the ridge… Shumate ALSO then sent the ‘other half’ of this mysterious ‘Helitack’ crew.
The flight that got CANCELLED because the fire was now too close to the Helispot to continue shuttle flights was the planned deposit of the rest of the Lewis crew ‘up there’ as well.
I’m putting together the ‘411’ skinny on all this based on the available evidence to see if we can REALLY figure out (once and for all ) WHO was really up there on Saturday morning versus afternoon… and WHEN everyone actually got there.
Followup…
I’m still putting together more ‘detail’ on this… but shown above is that one line of evidence from Shumate himself that there definitely WAS a ‘Helitack Crew’ there on Saturday that WAS associated with Helo N14HX.
Shumate said…
“Peck, a carded ICT4 from 4HX helitack,”
The ‘from the 4HX Helitack’ part seems to CONFIRM that at least a partial ( or even a FULL? ) Helitack Crew ‘from N14HX’ was, indeed, there at some point on Saturday.
Still not enough time for a FULL update… but I thought it important to point out that Nate Peck of the Moki Helitack crew WAS interviewed by the SAIT.
His interview is on page 48 of the SAIT Interview Notes document.
For now… here is just the FIRST part of those Nate Peck interview notes covering WHEN he ‘got there’…
—————————————————–
SAIT Interview with Nate Peck,
ICT4 and FFT1 with Moki Helitack NE Washington;
Interviewed by SAIT Co-leads Mike (Dudley)
and Jim (Karels) 07/13/2013
– On the morning of the 29th we were up in Payson for severity. 1st thing he heard the assignment was coming. Flew to Weaver Mountain helibase. Plan was heli for overhead recon. Fire at the time was very minor.
– Approaching Yarnell Hill, working fire with SEATS.
– Making contact w/ IC in Yarnell, requests placement of firefighters on the fire.
– He ( Peck ) gets dropped off at helispot around 1000.
– Informed of 3 loads of firefighters coming up and he was to stay w/ the crew to assist. By 1030 everyone on the hill. Little to no activity on the fire. Perfect fire for an
ICT5 trainee. Safety zone was the black. Using Tac 1 channel.
———————————————————
So I suppose that is PROOF that at least Nate Peck himself had flown all the way from Payson with Helo N14HX that morning… and that he WAS ‘dropped off’ at the Helispot by N14HX DURING the recon mission and BEFORE N14HX first landed at the YFD Helipad.
Still not clear if Peck was the ONLY one dropped off then… or wether there were also another 5 Helitack injected along with him during the RECON as AA seems to have been telling Dispatch happened at 10:55 AM.
Also IMPORTANT to NOTE that Peck himself is now saying that the IC ( Russ Shumate ) had first advised that there were going to be THREE LOADS of FFs heading up to the Helispot.
So when did THREE LOADS of FFs turn into just ONE load with just 6 Lewis DOC guys?
Is that more proof that ICT4 Russ Shumate really did want a WHOLE LOT MORE people up there… but it was ‘Aviation’ itself that was then limiting him to just ONE delivery flight that morning?
More later.
Did not see much in the Dispatch Logs for the 28th but will re look. The Resource Orders did not have a lot on the 28th but the 29th got busy Early.
Darn, I really thought this “borrowed” helicopter scenario might answer some questions. Like why no bucket drops, and what we believed earlier of no crew on the fire (maybe still believe that). As a borrowed resource I can understand limiting flight time /hours etc., and I understand the IA module concept – so it made sense to me that maybe with a “loaner” ship you wouldn’t/couldn’t commit it to a more serious mission.
However, if that were the reality, and we play the what if game – what if the ship got committed to a new start mid afternoon, T-storms came in and we could not extricate the FF’s on the hill ( even though we only have somewhere between 7 and 14). What about their safety?
So okay, I am being a dick – but I think the point is if you order a resource you need to get it or get a UTF. If I were the IC, once that ship showed up I would have considered it my resource. I am sure there was more communication on this that we don’t know about, but come on, this is an IA fire and that is an IA resource, utilize it to its fullest.
Hey 38, hell no you’re not being a dick, request the resource, fill or UTF is how it should be for real tracking purposes. The whole loaning of air resources has never sat well with me. YHF is an extreme example and we have access to know all this, but this goes on everyday during fire season. And considering there were many cooperators involved with that one IA ship, who wanted to pay for it? Hell, leave it on the severity code and we have no charge.
As far as extracting firefighters off the hill, I would fully assume those firefighter could walk off the hill almost faster than waiting for a ride. Not relying on aircraft for really anything (because fire is so dynamic) is the smart way to be. Walk.
Reply to ‘Retired with 38’ ( RW38 ) post on January 21, 2015 at 12:48 am
>> RW38 said…
>>
>> Sorry to change direction here, but I continue to think about
>> the FAILED initial attack on this tragic fire.
I don’t think it is ever a ‘change in direction’ to discuss this at any time.
It’s a major part ‘the whole story’ now… and WILL be talked about for years ( decades ) to come.
>> RW38 also said…
>>
>> We want to learn from this tragedy but we also need to look at the actions on
>> initial attack, not just the movements of the GMHS. I know it has been discussed in
>> earlier chapters, but I can’t get past that. So, maybe there are some lessons to be
>> learned here, or maybe (hopefully) more questions to be asked..
I would say BOTH. Even if there had ultimately been no fatalities ( or even injuries ) at the Yarnell Hill Fire… there are still a ‘slew’ of ‘lessons to be learned’ here AND a lot more questions that still need to be asked in order to avoid a repeat of this same situation in the future.
These are VERY good questions ( and observations ) you have posted… and some of them actually DO have ‘documented’ answers in the evidence record.
Some/most of these ‘answers’ are below.
Apologies in advance for how LONG this response might be… but wherever possible I am including the ACTUAL cuts from ‘Unit Logs’ and ‘Interviews’ in the PUBLIC evidence record that seem to answer some of the questions.
>> RW38 also said…
>>
>> At 1736 Dispatch documents incident as Yarnell Hill Fire
>>
>> At 1940 a IC type 4 is assigned – fire is reported as less than 1/2 acre , 80 % out,
>> only active in one corner, steep rocky terrain on a W facing slope.
>>
>> Based upon these facts alone this fire should have been aggressively attacked.
According to Russ Shumate’s own official ‘Unit Log’… the reasons HE decided that an ‘aggressive attack’ Friday evening was NOT warranted basically came down to 3 things…
1) It was small and basically inactive. The Air Recon he had ordered and whom he was in direct contact with said he was having trouble even LOCATING the fire.
2) Shumate was being told by various other contacts that the area was basically ‘inaccessible’. He was NOT made aware by any local YFD or BLM Fire personnell that there were, in fact, jeep trails and two-track roads leading pretty much all the way to where the fire actually was.
3) It was starting to get dark.
It is also not simply a ‘rumor’ that the Peeples Valley Fire Department ( PVFD ) knew exactly where the fire was… and how to get to it… and they were ready and able to ‘go up there’ and try to take care of it while it was still basically nothing at all ( and even offered to do exactly that ) but were CALLED OFF that Friday evening by ICT4 Russ Shumate.
Shumate himself admits to doing this in his own official Unit Log.
Even though this is going to be a bit VERBOSE… I think it is important to just reprint the first part of ICT4 Russ Shumate’s own official Unit Log where he describes his own ‘situational awareness’ and the decisions he was making from the moment he heard about ‘The Yarnell Fire’ to when he headed down to Yarnell himself, and then up to the time he ‘called it a night’ and drove back to Prescott.
———————————————————————————–
Document name: Unit_Logs-provided-on-2-27.pdf
On page 33 ( of 51 pages )…
Yarnell Hill Fire – IA Action Log
Compiled from handwritten notes and recollection by Russ Shumate
July 19, 2013 – All timeframes are approximate.
Friday 28 June 2013
Mid afternoon Friday a large lightning bust started around Mingus Mint and moves SW over Prescott towards Congress. Multiple fires were reported over 911 and by USFS lookout towers.
Very confusing time as many reports were coming in, and resources being directed to respond. There were many reports through different dispatch centers of multiple fires. I headed toward Skull Valley to look for any smokes in the State Trust Lands west of Prescott.
I located a smoke east of Skull Valley that was previously unreported. 911 started receiving calls also on this smoke. ( This was named West Spruce fire eventually ) Due to the number of fires, and the number of multi agency responses, I determined I should go to the Prescott Fire Center and assist in coordinating the location, prioritization, and response of the many smoke reports. As I got there Darrel Willis from Prescott Fire Department (PFD) was there with the USFS fire staff. Eventually at least 8 smokes were identified on Prescott National Forest (PNF).
All smoke reports in the fire districts or departments were contained quickly and at small sizes. I reviewed the lightning map to see that the lightning extended down toward Congress.
Around this time reports of fires in and around Yarnell reached me. I left the fire center to respond to the Yarnell area to size up the situation. ADC advised me Yarnell FD was seeing a fire above town, but could not access it. ADC advised me Congress FD was also responding to a fire above Yarnell, but had no access. It was unclear if it was the same or different fires.
I ordered Air Attack (AA) to recon the Yarnell area. I was advised that BLM was in the area as well and was looking at what would be named the Yarnell Hill Fire. The BLM engine was advising that the fire looked to be inaccessible by road. Air Attack from the Doce Fire was lent to ASFD for a recon as it finished a recon of the PNF. I was able to talk direct with AA on Air to ground frequency (A/G), and he gave me a size up of the Yarnell Hill fire.
AA had a difficult time finding the fire.
When AA did find it the size was approx. 2 acres, no smokes, on a ridgetop, no direct threats, a jeep trail on the east side of the fire. A recon of the surrounding area turned up no sightings of additional smokes.
During this time, I had ARRIVED AT YARNELL and tied in with the BLM Duty Officer Bruce Olsen and BLM Engine 1660. Through discussions with BLM and ADC and Yarnell FD (YFD) and Peeples Valley FD (PVFD) it was determined that 4 fires had been seen. 2 were named, Yarnell Hill and Oso. A third was seen east of Peeples Valley, and heavy rain was observed to put it out by PVFD.
A fourth was reported to be somewhere on Weaver Peak, and PVFD was planning to hike 3 miles into it. I asked them not to hike folks into that country in the dark. Due to past experience in this area, I understood the steepness of the terrain and fuels conditions would not allow for safe nighttime operations by Volunteer Fire Department engine crews.
PVFD had a visual on the smoke. I could not see the Yarnell Hill fire at this time, as there were no smokes showing. I directed BLM engine 1660 to suppress the Oso fire, as they had a visual on it and could gain access for a short hike. The Oso was .1 acres and fully suppressed that night.
I coordinated with BLM for our next day’s actions. It was thought that multiple smokes would show in the morning in this area. I ordered 2 AZ State Forestry Division (ASFD) crews (Lewis and Yuma), and ASFD engine 151 to report to Peeples Valley store at 0800 to stage. I ordered Air Attack to show up as soon as they came on duty Saturday morning. SEATS were in SE AZ at the time, and I talked with dispatch about timeframes for getting them in play Saturday morning.
BLM would have eng 1660 and a T3 helo as well as overhead report to Yarnell in the morning as well. We planned on having a collection of resources in hand to divide as needed as smokes showed in the morning.
I determined that Yarnell FD and Congress FD were back in quarters. I had BLM Eng 1660 report to me after they left the Oso fire and then go back to Wickenburg to go out of service. I had PVFD report to me before going OOS. All resources that had responded were accounted for and off the line by 2130, and enroute back to quarters, except myself.
I place and order for a spot weather forecast for Yarnell at approximately 2100.
At approximately 2100 the Yarnell Hill Fire flared up. Through binoculars, I determined it was a single bush flaring up. This was the first sight of the fire I had, but due to darkness, was still unable to pinpoint the location on the ridge. I advised ADC to contact YCSO to inform them that calls might come to them through the night as the fire glow was very visible.
I started back to quarters at approximately 2200. Back in Quarter at approximately 2300.
END of Russ Shumate’s Log Entries for Friday, June 28, 2013.
—————————————————————————————
>> RW38 also said…
>>
>> Other fire activity shows that conditions are right for new starts to become
>> established and large if not attacked. Resources will continue to become
>> limited as fire activity increases. Although small in size, this fire screams for
>> a type 1 crew – steep, rocky terrain and inaccessible.
Yes… but if you read Shumate’s account up above… I think he was ‘fooled’ by the whole ‘no smokes’ situation and his inability to even see any FLAME. It wasn’t until 2100 that he, himself, says he ever saw any FLAME and even then he says he ‘glassed it up’ and it was just a single bush.
Bottom line is that even though the area WAS ‘accessible’ ( by anyone who knew that area well )… Shumate just didn’t think he was seeing anything that couldn’t wait until the next work day.
>> RW38 also said…
>>
>> Okay, here is where I start to questions things – Dispatch assigns the
>> fire name at 1736, yet it does not get an IC until 1940? Must of been busy
>> worrying about other starts?
Apparently so. See the first paragraph of Shumate’s Unit Log. There WAS a lot of confusing stuff happening in that timeframe. He even met Darrell Willis at the Prescott Fire Center who was already there worrying about the 11 strikes in the Prescott National Forest.
>> RW38 also said…
>>
>> Maybe we need to address what we know we have instead of what we think we
>> might get! If you are in charge of a large area, once you have a known fire assign
>> an IC for that incident – instead of trying to manage the “district’ and the known fire.
Good point. There was, in fact, a LOT going on that evening due to all the ‘lightning’ strikes… and there WERE ‘eyes in the air’ being employed that evening to try and figure out what was important and what wasn’t… but somehow the SERIOUS POTENTIAL of the Yarnell ‘smokes’ was not sinking in to the ‘powers that be’.
Faster reaction times, and better analysis are two things that can ( and should ) ALWAYS be improved and this incident is going to remain a CLASSIC example of what can happen if you ‘drop the ball’.
>> RW38 also said…
>>
>> The IC is worried about FF safety and logistical support HUGE ISSUE here, the
>> simple part is all crews are self supporting for at least 24 hours so logistical
>> support should not be a concern(especially with a T1 crew).
Alas… Shumate didn’t order Type 1 for Saturday. He ordered the DOC crews.
Not only where they NOT even capable of ‘hiking’ into the area under their own power ( DOC Crew Boss told Shumate directly they didn’t have that capability )… they were NOT ‘self supporting’.
Once Shumate realized they were going to be STAYING up on that ridge where he sent them… he then had to get a ‘supplies list’ together and try to fly that stuff up to them so they could even just spend the night.
From Russ Shumate’s Unit Log for Saturday, June 29, 2013
————————————————————————————
1000 ( 10:00 AM ) – Lewis CRWB ( Crew Boss ) reports that none of the roads are drivable and that a hike would NOT be achievable with the crew. I determine the best course of action would be to fly in a half crew to coldtrail and mop up.
————————————————————————————
Then, at 1800, Shumate desrcibes needing to ‘supply’ this crew
just so they can spend the night up there…
————————————————————————————
1800 ( 6:00 PM ) – I am now expecting the forces on the hill to stay up all night, and I ask Peck to get a supply list together so supplies can be delivered as the rest of Lewis Crew is shuttled up.
1830 ( 6:30 PM ) – Shuttle up supplies, but fire is below helispot so helitack person at helispot is picked up and crew shuttle cancelled. Start ordering up forces for tomorrow. Operations expected to last all night, so a replacement ICT3 ordered. Paul Musser was going to be the one to fill this order.
————————————————————————————
>> RW38 also said…
>>
>> Okay, so lets go with FF safety, based on the givens/known’s listed above lets get
>> our resources out there at first light, that time of year first light is about 5;30 ish..
>> Oh, that didn’t happen either – the first boots on the ground didn’t arrive until 1048,
>> with seven FF’s. The order was for two crews ( type 2), that indicates to me that there
>> should be at least 36 FF’s, did they ever arrive?
Yes. BOTH the Yuma and Lewis DOC crews were there by 8:30 AM on Saturday morning.
Shumate was, apparently, VERY worried about ‘additional smokes’ appearing in the area and he incorporated that concern into his entire plan for the day. He was keeping the ENTIRE ‘Yuma’ DOC Crew ‘staged’ at the Yarnell Fire Station just in case any ‘new smokes’ popped up that day.
While they were waiting for the BLM Helicopter N14HX to show up ( circa 10:00 AM ), the Lewis Crew Boss was sent to check out ‘access’ to the known/visible ‘Yarnell HIll Fire’ and he reported back that there WAS no ‘road access’ and that his crew would NOT be able to achieve a ‘hike’ to the site.
So nothing at all happened until the BLM Chopper showed up at 10:00 AM and they could start flying just HALF the Lewis crew out there at around 10:30 AM.
The entire Yuma DOC crew just ‘staged’ at the fire station pretty much all day and were basically never used at all since no ‘new smokes’ ever popped up.
From Russ Shumate’s Unit Log for Saturday morning…
——————————————————————————
By 0830 ( 8:30 AM ), on scene resources included Lewis (DOC) Crew, Yuma (DOC) Crew, ENG 1660, a ICT4(t) ( Justin Smith ), ICT3 ( myself ), BLM Duty Officer ( Dean Fernandez ). Peeples Valley Fire Department ( PVFD ) and Yarnell Fire Department ( YFD ) were tied in with command as well.
0900 – ( 9:00 AM ) – Briefed (all) on scene resources with weather and the PLAN for the day.
Plan for the day…
Assess access to Yarnell Hill fire.
Prep to fly crew if feasible.
Risks identified: Being on a ridge top when lightining came in afternoon. ( Big concern is having folks stuck on the hill as the afternoon T-storms set up ), Change in fire behavior, as Doce fire showed extreme fire behavior, and this area is same fuels and similar topo.
AA will determine best retardant use, but the plan is to have retardant drops ASAP, and then get folks up there to coldtrail and mop up.
AA will recon area for new smokes.
Helo will recon Yarnell Hill and find Helispots to insert folks, then STAGE to support ongoing ops, and respond to any new starts in the area.
Russ Shumate and Dean Fernandez (BLM IC) will coordinate responses to new smokes with resources on scene.
YFD will be helibase.
State crews would RON ( Rest Overnight ) in Prescott at Armory.
Assignments…
Yuma (DOC); STAGE at YFD for response to additional smokes.
Lewis (DOC); CRWB determine if there is a route to drive or hike to fire.
1000 ( 10:00 AM ) – AA now on scene as well as Helo N14HX.
1045 ( 10:45 AM ) – 6 Lewis DOC crew members are inserted at helispot and hike approx 1/4 mile down the jeep trail to the fire. Size up remains 2 ( TWO ) acres and very little heat. Will coldtrail and mop up. They plan on being flown off at around 1600.
——————————————————————————————
>> RW38 also said…
>>
>> Okay, even with seven firefighters and HELICOPTER support with water drops
>> it was still controllable. In my opinion, the helicopter flight time was being
>> “saved” in case of another start.
Bingo.
That appears to be exactly what Russ Shumate was saying in his own Unit Log entries for Saturday morning. ( See above ).
He was STAGING both the BLM N14HX Helicopter AND the ENTIRE Yuma DOC Crew there at the Yarnell Fire Station because of his fear of ‘new smokes’ that morning… and throughout the day.
What he actually said his PLAN for that drop-capable Helo N14HX was…
“Helo will recon Yarnell Hill and find Helispots to insert folks, then STAGE to support ongoing ops, and respond to any new starts in the area.”
Notice the ‘support onging ops’ part of that.
Apparently… ‘support ongoing ops’ did NOT mean ( in Shumate’s mind ) doing any ‘bucket work’ on the ACTUAL ‘already active’ fire up on that ridge.
It SHOULD have.
If N14HX really had been ‘supporting the ongoing ops’ up at the only KNOWN smoke ( The Yarnell Hill Fire )… we probably wouldn’t even be here having this ongoing discussion and the now infamous ‘Yarnell Hill Fire’ would have been just a 2-4 acre black smudge mark up on that ridge.
There’s never really been a good explanation as to WHY Shumate seemed so ‘spooked’ about possible ‘new smokes’ that Saturday that he would be holding HALF of his resources ( and his only drop-capable chopper ) in ‘reserve’ just for that ‘possibility’… instead of just using everything he had there that day to try and put out the actual visible ‘Yarnell Hill Fire’ up there on that ridge.
>> RW38 also said…
>>
>> This happens, the costs is still experienced , however the flight time for the pilot
>> is saved (only allowed a certain number of hours per day).. So, on a “nothing fire”
>> you shuttle seven crew members – probably two flights or 30/40 minutes,. you
>> still have plenty of flight time for any fires you “might have”.
Really GOOD point… and you probably just hit on something VERY important here that hasn’t been discussed before.
It’s already been determined that ‘bucket drops’ would have been included in the COSTS of the chopper so that really wasn’t a good reason to NOT be using it for that… but if Russ Shumate was so sure about the ‘afternoon Thunderstorms’ that he was anticipating a whole bunch of ‘new starts’ LATER that day… in that SAME area he was now assigned… then YES… that MIGHT have been the reason he was NOT spending ‘pilot hours’ for bucket drops on the fire that was already burning ‘out there’.
He was trying to ‘stretch his resources’ into the FUTURE instead of just using them to fight what he had on his hands in the PRESENT.
Shumate WAS sort of ‘pre-occupied’ with this ‘inevitability’ of afternoon thunderstorms that day.
He says so himself in his Unit Logs.
That’s the reason he only sent HALF the Lewis Crew up to fight the KNOWN ‘Yarnell Hill Fire’. He wanted to be able to do a quick extraction ( with one chopper flight ) if a Thunderstorm popped up and he had to get them off that ridge.
So perhaps this same pre-occupation with what MIGHT happen later in the day was also the reason he was ‘holding back’ on using the chopper to help the Lewis Crew up on the ridge.
>> RW38 also said…
>>
>> Okay, so everything goes south and at 1821 the IC orders type 1 crews for 0600
>> hours at Yarnell. GMIHC arrives and gets assigned, but BR doesn’t arrive until
>> 0800, so what’s up with that?! they are pretty much local, so why not be on
>> time ( sorry, more old school).
They ( Blue Ridge ) were SUPPOSED to be there at 0600.
Their Dispatch Order had an RON ( Rest Overnight ) in Camp Verde, but their ETA in Yarnell was still supposed to be 0600.
They stayed at a ‘Comfort Inn’ in Camp Verde… but then didn’t even LEAVE that ‘Comfort Inn’ for Yarnell until 6:30 AM.
Camp Verde is at least an hour drive from Yarnell’ and is the same place that IC Roy Hall was coming from that morning.
Here is the first entry from BR Captain Trueheart Brown’s Unit Log…
—————————————————————————————
0630 – Blue Ridge IHC departs Comfort Inn, Camp Verde, AZ.
—————————————————————————————
The Blue Ridge Hotshots AND the ‘Type 2 Short Team’ IC Roy Hall both actually arrived at the Model Creek Elementary School at pretty much the exact same moment… which Roy Hall said was right around 7:30 AM.
Roy Hall says he actually ‘followed them’ into the parking lot…
From Roy Hall’s first ( of two ) ADOSH interviews – 8/16/13
———————————————————————————————
203 A: So we’re at about – now at about 7-7:15, uh, 7:00 pull over and make a couple
204 of calls, 7:30 ish, uh, by the time I get down to Yarnell, uh, to the, uh, Model
205 Creek School, that was – that was what the resource order was for. To go to
206 Model Creek School. I pulled in there, it was obvious that some of the
207 resources were coming in there. As I went through Kirkland Junction, the
208 Blue Ridge Hotshots came by. Uh, when I hit the T in the road there. And I
209 followed them in. And, uh – and they actually, uh, stopped at the school – I –
210 as I did.
———————————————————————————————
>> RW38 also said…
>>
>> At 1022 a formal transfer of command was made via radio.
>> Has anyone seen any formal delegation of authority to the type 2 team?
There was no such thing. Roy Hall himself said so.
ADOSH specifically asked Roy Hall about this right after they asked him to say what he did following the 9:00 AM briefing up at the Model Creek School ICP.
Roy Hall told them (quote) “There was NO written delegation of authority.”
From Roy Hall’s first ( of two ) ADOSH interviews – 8/16/13
———————————————————————————-
611 Q2: What began to happen, as, uh, you progressed?
612
613 A: Um, I – I do know that – that I did check on transfer of command. That’s
614 something that’s pretty formal that needs to be well documented and I – I
615 visited with Russ. Uh, he was getting ready to leave and I asked him, have
616 you, uh – have you done the proper, uh, communication on the radio, on the
617 phone, uh, for transfer of command so that people on the fire know and the
618 dispatch center and everybody associated with the fire knows that there’s been
619 a trans…
620
621 Q2: Right.
622
623 A: …transfer of command. He said yes, he’d just done that. I looked at my – my,
624 uh, cell phone and the time on my cell phone was 10:24. Now, evidently the –
625 the official transferred of command occurred at 10:21, which makes total
626 sense.
627
628 Q2: Yeah.
629
630 A: There’s a little gap there, but it’s just between the time that Russ did I and the
631 time that we had the conversation.
632
633 Q2: Mm-hm.
634
635 A: So the transfer of command occurred at that time and, uh, – and Russ departed
636 shortly thereafter. Uh, things were – and he – he had been there a while and –
637 and so he was in need of some rest.
638
639 Q2: Yeah.
640
641 A: And returned to Prescott.
642
643 Q2: Uh, did – and you don’t need any kind of delegation of authority from, uh, uh,
644 Arizona, uh, State Forest Service to – to do a fire because you’re an employee
645 anyway, uh, and, uh, uh – and Russ didn’t need a delegation of authority
646 because of his position. So there was no official hand off delegation of
647 authority (unintelligible).
648
649 A: There was – there was no written delegation of authority.
650
651 Q2: Okay.
652
653 A: And there were times on many incidents that a written delegation of authority
654 doesn’t occur immediately. It may – it may be at 24, 48, even 72 hours.
655
656 Q2: Mm-hm. Uh…
657
658 A: After a team had taken a fire.
———————————————————————————-
>> RW38 also said…
>>
>> Any set goals and objectives for the team?
Yes. For Roy Hall… it was all about the AIR resources, and getting those ‘orders’ all sorted out. He told ADOSH that was his NUMBER ONE priority as IC after arriving in Yarnell… and he specifically stated that during the 9:00 AM briefing at the Model Creek ICP.
From Roy Hall’s first ADOSH interview 8/16/13…
——————————————————————————————
224 Um, I made a, uh – gave – gave clear instructions to the
225 two ops chiefs, Todd Abel and Paul Musser, and Russ Shumate that the
226 highest priorities at that point for me were number one to resolve the aircraft
227 order, because I had a list of aircraft that had been ordered for that fire. And I
228 knew that, that order had been placed the night before. And that, that order
229 had to be replaced the next morning. And so confirming that, that resource –
230 that aircraft resource was a high priority to me based on – based on the activity
231 of the fire and the position of the fire.
——————————————————————————————-
That being said… here is ALSO the part of Roy Hall’s first ADOSH interview where he says he did NOT discuss any ‘objectives’ at all with Russ Shumate’s boss Jim Downey ( even though he did talk to him ) after David Geyer called Hall the night before to ask Hall to show up as ICT2 Short in Yarnell the next morning.
Roy Hall said (quote) “There was NO discussion on objectives except for, go take the fire and suppress the fire.”
From Roy Hall’s first ADOSH interview 8/16/13…
——————————————————————————————
660 Q2: And – and, uh, did you have any conversations with, uh, Russ’s boss, I’m
661 trying to think of his name…
662
663 A: Jim.
664
665 Q2: Jim, yeah. Uh, did you have any conversation with him about the objectives
666 were or, uh, about the fire? Was all those conversations with just Russ? Uh…
667
668 A: I never did have any definitive conversations with Jim about objectives on the
669 fire. Now the night before I know he was on the conference call when we
670 decided that we were going as a type 2 short team at that time. Because a long
671 team you have to have at least 27.
672
673 Q2: Right.
674
675 A: And, uh – 27 members. Now once we got organized, if you go to the division
676 level and count backwards to the top, we got very close to that 27 number.
677
678 Q2: Yeah.
679
680 A: But it was, uh, fill in. At that time I had only identified 17, plus two safety
681 officers.
682
683 Q2: Right.
684
685 A: And, um, so the conversations on objectives the night before, if Jim was pres –
686 and – and I think Jim was present when we were talking about the team – uh,
687 team members and team order. There was – there was no discussion on
688 objectives except for, go take the fire and suppress the fire. And, uh – and the
689 – the – those that had been on the fire were – had been there a couple of days
690 and – and they’d been working on the fire and so that – that was, uh – that was
691 the expectation.
——————————————————————————————–
>> RW38 also said…
>>
>> Any formal in brief?
Supposedly, yes. Roy Hall says that was the 9:00 AM briefing at the Model Creek ICP.
There was no ‘plans chief’ there that morning because of the ‘Short’ team thing, so Roy Hall said he played both IC and ‘Facilitator’ for this ‘briefing’…
From Roy Hall’s first ADOSH interview 8/16/13…
———————————————————————————————-
246 A: At that point and time I did not have a plans chief present and so I facilitated
247 that briefing. I – I was actually the facilitator of that briefing.
248
249 Q2: Did you remember how to do it?
250
251 A: You know what, probably not like a plans chief. And probably not in its, uh –
252 in its greatest sequential order, as they maintain.
253
254 Q2: Uh-huh.
255
256 A: But, uh – but we covered – we left no stone unturned on that briefing.
————————————————————————————————-
>> RW38 also said…
>>
>> I know things were expanding rapidly, but the purpose of the team is to gather
>> intel and try to organize the chaos of a rapidly expanding incident.
No matter what else Roy Hall THOUGHT he was going to be doing that Sunday morning in Yarnell… as soon as he arrived he realized the whole ‘Type 2 Short’ team thing he had agreed to the night before just wasn’t going to cut the mustard. So from the moment on… Hall’s absolute priority became just trying to get a ‘handle’ on exactly WHAT ‘Type’ of team should be in place and functioning there.
So he WAS ‘gathering intel’ and he WAS able to give Jim Downey enough input over the phone that Downey, David Geyer and Scott Hunt would eventually watch their own computers come up and say it SHOULD be classified as a ‘Type 1’ incident…. but as far as actually fighting the fire that was already burning there… Roy Hall was almost completely ‘hands off’ on that.
Hall himself said he was just taking a ‘hands off’ approach to all that and was completely trusting OPS1 Todd Abel and OPS2 Paul Musser to actually ‘run the fire’ while he just spent his time on the phone with people most of the day.
There actually is no real evidence that IC Roy Hall was even AWARE, in any way, that a Type 1 Hotshot Crew named ‘Granite Mountain’ was even THERE working HIS fire that day… until around the time of the actual deployment. That’s how ‘hands off the OPS stuff’ Roy Hall was.
>> RW38 also said…
>>
>> And my final question for now is if this team transition really did
>> occur at 1022 WHY did the ICT 4 request a type 1 IMT at 1402?
That wasn’t Roy Hall’s decision.
That is what Roy Hall was TOLD was going to happen.
After that 9:00 AM briefing… Roy had been on the phone with Jim Downey and was only trying to get approval for a FULL ‘Type 2’ incident so Roy ( with Bea Day’s help ) could just keep ‘adding’ all kinds of people he knew he was now ‘missing’ because of the whole ‘Type 2 Short’ thing.
Downey wanted a ‘complexity analysis’ right then and there but Hall said he didn’t have time for that ‘computer stuff’.
So Jim Downey actually did the ‘computer stuff’ on his end just by running through the standard ‘checklist’ on his computer screen and asking Roy Hall questions over the phone.
A little later… Jim Downey ( and David Geyer and Scott Hunt ) called Roy Hall back and instead of just ‘approving’ Roy’s request for the full Type 2 status… Downey INFORMED Hall that THEY ( He and Geyer and Hunt ) had decided, themselves, that it needed to go up to a full Type 1 Incident.
So now Roy was caught off guard and kinda screwed.
Roy had ALREADY been ‘calling up’ a whole bunch of ‘off the radar’ Type 2 people with Bea Day’s help and has just been ‘assuming’ he would get the Full Type 2 status if he asked for it… but now he was NOT just getting the ‘Type 2 Team’ approval he wanted and most of these people that he already had heading to Yarnell were NOT qualified for the ‘Type 1’ positions.
That includes the ‘Three Prescotteers’ Jason Clawson, Aaron Hulburd and KC ‘Bucky’ Yowell, who were still allowed to take an active part in the fire even though their actual ‘off-the-radar’ work orders were obsolete by the time they even arrived in Yarnell.
Since NONE of these three key witnesses to the events leading up to ( and following ) the deployment have ( as far as anyone knows ) ever been INTERVIEWED… it’s hard to say how much even THEY knew about their own status. In other words… as they found themselves there on Shrine Road and ‘directing traffic’ and whatnot… and then even being ALLOWED to participate in a fairly dangerous GROUND RESCUE mission… did they really have any idea their own work orders had been ‘obsoleted’ by the Type 1 Team order… and they were now just basically ‘freelancing’ on this particular fire?
From Roy Hall’s first ADOSH interview 8/16/13…
———————————————————————————————-
1115 Q2: So did you – when did you – or, uh, when did they resolve, uh – the, uh,
1116 Arizona type 2 team order, uh, or did they ever get back to you on…
1117
1118 A: Oh the central west zone team.
1119
1120 Q2: Yeah I mean the central west zone team order?
1121
1122 A: Um, I don’t recall what time it was. But it’s somewhere after 2 o’clock, I got a
1123 call from Jim Downey, and this is after we’d gone through the complexity
1124 analysis.
1125
1126 Q2: Uh-huh.
1127
1128 A: And Jim Downey and Scott Hunt were – and David Geyer were on that call
1129 and they said, we have looked at this complexity analysis and – and Scott
1130 explained to me we’re gonna go ahead and order the type 1 team.
1131
1132 Q2: Oh a type 1 team not – not the central Arizona team?
1133
1134 A: Nah-uh. And at that time we were starting to get members – different members
1135 of the central west zone team.
1136
1137 Q2: Showing up.
1138
1139 A: From my call they were showing up.
1140
1141 Q2: Showing up.
1142
1143 A: They were showing up.
1144
1145 Q2: So – so your complexity – who – who did the complexity analysis, did you do
1146 it yourself or…
1147
1148 A: No, Jim – Jim and, uh, I talked – I talked him through it on the phone and I –
1149 and I…
1150
1151 Q2: Oh, you actually talked him through, uh, uh, the issues that you were seeing
1152 and – and he did it?
1153
1154 A: Yes.
1155
1156 Q2: Oh, okay.
1157
1158 A: Yes. And he actually did – he’s – I never got a copy of that. But I do know
1159 that it was done.
1160
1161 Q2: Okay.
1162
1163 A: But I can remember this, that I had him go down through and count. And what
1164 it is, is a yes, no deal.
1165
1166 Q2: Mm-hm.
1167
1168 A: And it’s, uh, right out of the red book. You – you guys can look at it. There
1169 were eight yes, 12 no, with two or three non-applicable.
1170
1171 Q2: Hm.
1172
1173 A: That’s where – that’s where it was.
———————————————————————————————-
>> RW38 also said…
>>
>> Just a bunch of stuff I can’t let go of!!!!!!
No reason to. Exactly HOW and WHY the IA failed is a VERY important ‘part of the story’ now… and will forever remain so. It should still be ‘studied’ and fully understood.
WTKTT,
Thank you much for you detail (as usual). I still don’t understand how they could have screwed that up – Shumate had the proper concerns on Saturday, he just didn’t apply them to HIS incident! And why is he concerned about new starts, as the IC he needed to focus solely on HIS fire and let someone else worry about new starts. Actually, he was so worried about more T-storms he should have realized that is also associated with strong and unpredictable winds. So, you have a seemingly docile fire, unlined for a certain percentage and most likely understaffed with 6 inmates that couldn’t walk to it and your not worried about winds associated with T-storms. Hmm.
The entire DOC crew debacle is exactly the reason a type 1 crew should have been ordered and utilized at first light on Saturday. Let me get this straight, the DOC crew can fight fire, they just can’t hike to get there. Seems to me there is a National Standard for fitness that FF’s need to pass in order for the crews to be qualified as Type 2 – or maybe the Supervisor just wanted to get his inmates a little perk of a helicopter ride!
In regard to the “Team”, having yours OSC (planning) in the field is a disaster in itself. He should of been the one on the phone ordering resources, not the IC! Just a total confusing cluster. To have two OPSC in the field is confusing for the other resources, and usually you find the Planning OPS getting involved with on the ground tactics – which I believe happened here.
Anyway, thank you again for your continued diligence on this site. I sincerely hope our current and future wildland firefighters take some valuable lessons away from this.
Couple more things, did Shumate ever get his boots on scene? Maybe just a fly over? Another comment on the “what if”, I totally played this on every incident I have been involved with – but not what if we get more starts, but what if WE get a wind event, what if WE get roll out that starts fire below us, what if WE get an injury, do WE have adequate resources to handle the situation? Okay, now that WE have worried about OUR incident – what if there are more starts, what if any resources can be reassigned and maintain MY incident during any of the above mentioned events.
Just more thoughts
Reply to Retired with 38 ( RW38 ) post on January 21, 2015 at 7:09 pm
>> RW38 said…
>>
>> Couple more things, did Shumate ever get his boots on scene?
No. There is absolutely no evidence that ICT4 Russ Shumate was EVER actually ‘on the ground’ up there near the Yarnell Hill Fire.
Shumate was also letting ICT4(t) Trainee Justin Smith sort of ‘run things’ that day as well… but the only evidence that even this ICT4(t) Trainee ever had ‘boots on the ground’ near the fire itself was LATER in the day… after it had ESCAPED… and Shumate then changed Justin Smith’s designation from ICT4(t) to ‘Division A’ and sent him up there on the chopper.
From Russ Shumate’s Unit Log Notes for Saturday, June 29, 2013…
————————————————————————–
1800 ( 6:00 PM ) – Send J. Smith ICT4(t) up to the fire, and prep the
rest of Lewis crew to fly up as well. Changed command structure to
the following; J. Smith no longer ICT4(t), he will be Div A on the hill.
Peck, a carded ICT4 from 4HX helitack, will be Operations on the hill.
————————————————————————–
>> RW38 also said…
>>
>> Maybe just a fly over?
It is not CLEAR if ICT4 Russ Shumate was even onboard Helicopter N14HX circa 10:00 AM on Saturday when it performed its first RECON of the Yarnell Hill Fire.
Here is all Russ Shumate says about that in his own Unit Logs…
—————————————————————————-
1000 ( 10:00 AM ) – AA ( Air Attack ) on Scene as well as Helo N14HX.
Recon the fire, size up 2-8 acres from air found a helispot. AA will
work SEATS to surround fire with retardant.
—————————————————————————-
Nothing definite there about Shumate actually being ONBOARD N14HX during that recon… only that it happened.
What is much more likely ( and has evidence to back it up ) is that BLM Rep Dean ‘Dino’ Fernandez was actually the one who was onboard N14HX for that ‘recon’ flight Saturday morning, and Fernandez then just reported what he saw back to Shumate… and also probably just showed Shumate the pictures he took ) during the recon flight which are now PUBLIC.
There has always been the following in the SAIT ‘Investigation Notes’ document from their ‘interview’ with Dean Fernandez.
Fernandez does say he was aboard N14HX and ‘scouting the fire’ that morning. This is also that entry where we learn that Fernandez had supposedly been encouraging Shumate to get a ‘pumpkin’ set up for (supposedly) bucket drop support… but Shumate wasn’t listening to him.
—————————————————————————–
BLM REP Dean Fernandez
Interviewed by Jim (Karels) and Mike (Dudley), 07/14/2013
ICT3 qual’d brought in as a Rep for BLM because the fire was a threat to BLM land as a T3 IC, Engine Captain in Phx/BLM
Dean is AA on Reinartz T1 Team
Went to the fire station Saturday morning also because there was a BLM threat.
Saturday morning went to Weaver Mtn Helibase and went in the helo and scouted the fire,
It looked good, innocent.
They landed and picked people up and took the crew members out
Russ the IC said go down there and get 6 people and fly them to the top.
SEATS were dropping on top but it didn’t look to be boxed in completely and rough terrain. Dean was acting as a Rep and suggested several times to get a pumpkin set up, but it wasn’t happening…later on the fire picked up which was a surprise. It jumped the line, they ordered SEATS the Moki helicopter crew couldn’t catch it the night before. Working the SEATS with Bruce Olsen do you want me to take over the fire? Dean asked Rus. Rus replied, “Am I doing something wrong? No, I just wanted to make sure.”
—————————————————————————–
>> RW38 also said…
>>
>> Another comment on the “what if”, I totally played this on
>> every incident I have been involved with – but not what if we
>> get more starts, but what if WE get a wind event, what if WE
>> get roll out that starts fire below us, what if WE get an injury,
>> do WE have adequate resources to handle the situation?
>> Okay, now that WE have worried about OUR incident – what if
>> there are more starts, what if any resources can be reassigned
>> and maintain MY incident during any of the above mentioned
>> events.
>>
>> Just more thoughts.
Regarding ‘adequate resources’… you DO have to wonder exactly WHY Shumate had TWO full DOC crews there as early as 8:00 AM… yet only SIX guys got sent up to put the nails in the coffin on this Yarnell Hill Fire.
Yes… I know… Shumate has SUPPOSEDLY explained WHY he only chose to send 6 FFs up there and let the entire other Crew-and-a-half just sit around in the Yarnell Hill Fire Department parking lot.
Shumate SAID it was because of HIS fears about ‘lightning’ later in the day… and he wanted a ‘minimum of folks out on the hill’ so they could all be extracted quickly if needed.
But something has never been quite ‘right’ with that (simple) explanation.
For example… in the SAIT Interview Notes for Shumate… there ends up this curious ‘discrepancy’ as to the WHY only SIX FFs got sent up there to fight the Yarnell Fire… when many, many more were sitting right there in the YFD parking lot doing nothing all day and a perfectly good shuttle chopper just sitting there idle most of the day as well.
On page 52 of the SAIT Investigations Notes we find the following (cryptic) entries from their interview with ICT4 Russ Shumate…
————————————————————————-
AA from Tonto – Sized up fire, no smoke
Order SEATS – About 2 acres still
Balefire fly crews in
Aviation didn’t want to have guys caught there – due to monsoons – aviation commitments
To fire…
1 helitack type 4
2 AFS crew boss, crew boss(t)
4 inmates
Size up – not much heat – can cold trail
————————————————————————-
Notice this entry ( supposedly Shumate talking to SAIT investigators )…
“Aviation didn’t want to have guys caught there – due to monsoons – aviation commitments.”
So this would suggest that the reason ONLY SIX FFs were sent up there to fight the Yarnell Hill Fire Saturday morning was not really ICT4 Russ Shumate’s ‘decision’ at all.
It seems to be suggesting those terms were being ‘dictated’ to Shumate by the ‘Aviation guys’ themselves. THEY were the ones who didn’t want to have ‘a lot of folks on the hill’ in case they had to suddenly get them out of there… OR in case they got called away for ‘other assignments’ or ‘other commitments’ that day… and Shumate was just ‘going along with that’.
Small point, maybe… but also perhaps important since the actual number of people delivered up there that day ended up being crucial to their ability to contain ( and STOP ) that fire.
So was it really ICT4 Russ Shumate making that ‘decision’ about only sending ONE chopper load of guys up that morning?… or was it something the ‘Aviation guys’ were, themselves, limiting him to?
Either way… this SAIT Interview statement does NOT really match what Russ Shumate was saying in his own official ‘Unit Log’.
SIDENOTE: I have no idea what ‘Balefire fly crews in’ means.
That is not the name of the company that owned Helo N14HX, nor does it appear to be the name of any pilot that worked for them.
Followup…
Obviously the fire ‘escaping’ over that two-track late Saturday afternoon was a ‘game changer’… and there is no doubt that when THAT happened… Shumate was then frantically scheduling more ‘flights’ out to the ridge to try and ‘beef up’ the support… and ‘Aviation’ seemed to then be ‘onboard’ with those plans.
But this statement ( supposedly made by Shumate )…
“Aviation didn’t want to have guys caught there – due to monsoons – aviation commitments.”
…still seems to suggest that BEFORE this ’emergency’… it was ‘Aviation’ that didn’t want more than 1 chopper load of guys up there ( 1 Helitack and 6 FFs to actually fight the fire ).
Almost as if it was ‘Aviation’ deciding how MANY FFs were ‘necessary’ to be out there… instead of ICT4 Russ Shumate.
Maybe Shumate really did want at least ALL of one of the TWO DOC crews he had to be out there… but that morning he couldn’t get ‘Aviation’ to fully cooperate with his wishes… or something.
And you also have to wonder… WHO is Shumate referring to when he just says ‘Aviation’.
When Shumate says…
“Aviation didn’t want to have guys caught there.”
…WHO ( exactly ) is Shumate talking about?
Air Attack Rory Collins?
The pilot of the BLM Contract Chopper N14HX?
Someone else?
ALL of the above?
It still would be nice if there had ever been a GOOD interview with this elusive ‘Rory Collins’ guy. He was a MAJOR player on BOTH Saturday and Sunday… and I don’t believe he has EVER been properly ‘interviewed’ by anyone.
Wow, every ORG chart I have even seen puts the IC at the top- not aviation. Although I totally support input in the command structure, the bottom line is the IC is responsible in the end, not aviation (whoever that is).. Seems like more people on site would have gotten the job done sooner and gotten them off the hill before the potential lightning arrived. Guess I call BS to that whole statement – something I learned long ago, “when in charge, take charge”.
So all the Topog Maps Show a 4×4 trail to the top of the mountain near the Fire and the IC was not even referencing them?
Also the locals seemed to know where the trails and 2 tracks were why not the Yarnell Fire department.
It seems some one was not taking advantage of the local information..
I am wondering what the actual Qualifications of the Type 4 IC are? ST leaders or Crew Boss basic IA FF??
Is there a problem between AZ Fire and the County and City Fire people?
Then we switch to a Type 2 IC who dose not understand his responsibilities Qualified Type 2 OPS, and turns the fire over to 2 Type 2 OPS. There Qualifications are Division Boss Level.
We have 2 OPS pulling against each other and doing there own thing not under any supervision by the IC who has no clue there is a Type 1 crew on the fire much less
Two Type 1 crews.
The entire fire has no basic plan or objective and man power and equipment are all doing their own thing.
Now we wonder why the Fire chased the crews all over the place and many came close to entrapment, And in the end 1 Crew was entrapped and died.
As ADOSH turned up this Fire was a real Cluster Fuck and the people in charge were not in control, operating with a organized plan of attack or utilizing their resources to accomplish the task.
The Team should have estimated the problem of coordination pulled every one off the line by or before noon and reevaluated there options and strategies.
I do not believe the overhead really knew what the potential of this fire was. They had a lot of people hung out to dry with no reason for what they were doing and no close safety zones. The Restaurant on the Highway are you kidding me. They had a Cat on the North side of the fire For Christ sake build Safety Zones as you build line. Hand Crews strung out in unburned fuel building line they have to run back to their trucks and drive to the Restaurant for safety. A hand crew walking thru unburned fuel to a Safety zone 1 and a Half miles from there assignment. Their SZ was and should have always been the Black and the Overhead should have made that plain..
Again– When in charge take charge—————-
I have seen Teams come in and take over a fire and pull every one off the line and start from scratch because of organization and a operating plan that was not working.
Bob, the qualifications for a Type 4 Incident Commander are as follows –
Required Training
Annual fireline safety refresher (RT 130)
Initial Attack IC (S 200)
Required Experience
Satisfactory performance in any single resource position (CRWB, HEQB, ENGB, FELB ,FIRB, HMGB)
and
Completion of ICT 4 task book
Pretty minimal quals!
Just a bit more, not only does the Topo show jeep trails the initial report from AA stated a Jeep trail on the east side of the fire.
In fairness to Shumate I looked at his qualification record – He far exceeds the “basic quals” for a type 4 IC. (at least on his qualification records)
Reply to Bob Powers post on
January 22, 2015 at 12:26 pm
>> Bob Powers said…
>>
>> So all the Topog Maps Show a 4×4
>> trail to the top of the mountain near
>>> the Fire and the IC was not even
>> referencing them?
Apparently NOT.
Shumate had been in Yarnell the day before (Friday afternoon, evening and night) ‘evaluating’ the situation… yet even the next day when he came back he was still relying on the Lewis Crew Boss to do his own recon about whether there was any way to ‘get to the fire’.
The Lewis Crew Boss himself then, apparently, didn’t even consult with anyone local ( or even look at a Google map ) and reported back to Shumate there were NO ‘drivable roads’ up to the fire… and that his own crew was in no way capable of ‘achieving’ any kind of HIKE out there.
So that’s when they all just sat on their hands until 10:30 AM and the N14HX chopper was done with its recon and able to ‘fly them out there’.
Dean Fernandez himself is now famous for having had his ‘iPad’ with him since the moment he showed up on Saturday morning… yet it would still appear they ( He and Shumate ) didn’t even look at a Google Map which would have clearly shown ALL those trails leading right to where the fire actually was.
>> Bob Powers also said…
>>
>> Also the locals seemed to know where
>> the trails and 2 tracks were why not
>> the Yarnell Fire department.
I would be astonished if YFD ( including Chief Koile ) were not FULLY aware of ALL of those trails and two-tracks out there… especially the one that runs along the ridge of the Weaver Mountains itself.
How could they NOT be ‘aware’ of all that ‘access’.
It was THEIR TOWN and THEIR boondock.
>> Bob Powers also said…
>>
>> It seems some one was not taking
>> advantage of the local information..
Sure does. Even when the Lewis Crew boss was actually ASSIGNED ( by Shumate ) to do a full evaluation of how to access the fire… it appears he didn’t even bother ASKING anyone local to help him with that.
Unbelievable.( AND ‘negligent’ ).
>> Bob Powers also said…
>>
>> Is there a problem between AZ Fire
>> and the County and City Fire people?
Probably the USUAL ongoing friction that you see everywhere with State Forestry plans like ‘prescribed burns’ constantly ‘butting heads’ with ‘Top Dogs’ in both County and Municipal Fire departments and whatnot… but there is no direct evidence Shumate or Fernandez were personally ‘ignoring’ or ‘not including’ PVFD and YFD on Friday or Saturday.
Shumate’s own Unit Log for Saturday morning DOES say they were both ‘tied in’ to command…
————————————–
By 0830 ( 8:30 AM ), on scene resources included Lewis (DOC) Crew, Yuma (DOC) Crew, ENG 1660, a ICT4(t) ( Justin Smith ), ICT3 ( myself ), BLM Duty Officer ( Dean Fernandez ). Peeples Valley Fire Department ( PVFD ) and Yarnell Fire Department ( YFD ) were tied in with command as well.
————————————–
I don’t know what Shumate meant by ‘tied in’… but you would think the simple task of determining how best to even ‘access’ the fire would have been something they were using the ‘locals’ to determine.
But alas… there really is no evidence that happened.
Also… don’t forget what is still totally MISSING from the evidence record for this weekend.
We KNOW that the PVFD personnel were EXTENSIVELY interviewed by Arizona Forestry within 48 hours of the tragedy. They took depositions, photos, cellphone records from ALL of them.
There is also indirect evidence this same round of evidence gathering took place with ALL YFD personnel involved that ENTIRE weekend.
Yet… NONE of that ‘evidence’ has ever seen the light of day… even after multiple FOIA and Arizona Open Records request.
Maybe there is testimony in this ‘vanished’ evidence from the locals that ICT4 Shumate was, indeed, IGNORING them and not even lifting a finger to consult with ANY of them about ANYTHING.
>> Bob Powers also said…
>>
>> Then we switch to a Type 2 IC who dose
>> not understand his responsibilities
>>
>> We have 2 OPS pulling against each other
>> and doing there own thing not under any
>> supervision by the IC who has no clue
>> there is a Type 1 crew on the fire much
>> less Two Type 1 crews.
To be precise… there is actually NO DOUBT that IC Roy Hall was ‘aware’ that at least Blue Ridge was THERE on HIS fire. See above. Roy Hall actually FOLLOWED their Buggies into Peeples Valley all the way from Kirkland Junction ( a few miles north of Hays Ranch Road where he ‘met up’ with them on Highway 89 ) and then on into the Model Creek Elementary School parking lot itself.
He also recalls ‘thinking’ he might have seen Blue Ridge at his 9:00 AM briefing at the ICP.
But as for ‘Granite Mountain’… it is, in fact, totally unclear in ANY of Roy Hall’s interviews if he really was even aware they were THERE on HIS fire until there started to be radio traffic about some unit having to ‘deploy’ on the south end of the fire.
What IS clear in Roy Hall’s interviews is that he was totally unconcerned with that kind of OPS level detail like WHO was actually THERE and actually fighting the fire. He says specifically (quote) “I leave that sort of detail to other people”.
>> Bob Powers also said…
>>
>> The entire fire has no basic plan or
>> objective and man power and equipment
>> are all doing their own thing.
It really does seem that way, doesn’t it?
Just a series of deployed forces all ‘freelancing’.
There were 3 Structure Protection Groups operating ( Yarnell, Model Creek, Peeples Valley ) and they were all just head-down and ‘Structure Protecting’. No big whoop. Just another workday.
There were Hotshot groups ‘out there somewhere’.
One was busy having all their plans being reversed by some Air Attack Yahoo dumping retardant all over their indirect burnouts… and the other one was basically doing nothing at all until late in the afternoon.
Then there was Aviation… basically unaware of ANY ground plan whatsoever and just ‘doing their Aviation thing’ with almost near-miss air-collisions between choppers and VLATS and guys dumping shit all over planned indirect burnouts and then other Air Jockeys deciding on their own that some massive retardant line laying in the middle of explosive unburned fuel was the way to protect Yarnell…
…and throughout ALL of this… the ‘Incident Commander’ is just sitting in the principal’s office at an Elementary School ( without even listening to a radio ) and just frantically using his cellphone and trying to make the paperwork come out right for TOMORROW.
First I believe Shumite was a Type 2 IC Maybe even close to a Type 1 what I do not understand is his lack of Supervisory control. Most type 2 and Type 1 IC’s are a very control type Individual with lots of Fire Supervision under their Belts They like to know what’s going on and what’s not working.
There just seems to be no coordination here.
A lack of supervision and span of control (who’s working for who)?
While the SAIT said nothing about this I think ADOSH spoke volumes in their assessment of the lack of supervisory control.
The Deaths of GM dose in many ways lay squarely on the shoulders of the OPS and IC. Even though the crew was responsible for the decisions they made in leaving the Black. Choosing the path they took.
Bob,
I didn’t see type 1 or 2 quals for Shumate – could of missed it though. Regardless, you are absolutely right, no supervisory control from the start – never saw HIS fire first hand. I think he believed he had a “nothing” event on his hands and was gearing up the next fire.
Do you think he even realized that when the bush flared up on Friday night that there was still significant heat in his “nothing” fire to create that effect? Apparently not.
Got screwed up meant Roy Hall. Sorry
Thanks for catching that….
Some other problems I forgot to mention.
The Lewis Crew if they are rated type 2 should have been physically fit to hike 2 miles to the fire what was that all about.. Why were they classed as a crew if they could not physically do the work?
I could not believe I read that. While Type 2 crews do not have the organization and rigorous Physical training they are Carded Fire Fighters I have seen some and crew bossed some that could almost stick with a Hot Shot Crew. They are expected to climb mountains and cut line maybe that was the problem with containment as well. The crew was not a performance crew?????????
I don’t understand the crew situation either, totally agree that if they were a type 2 crew they should be able to hike to the incident. AND, as the IC if the crew supt told me they could not, it would certainly raise a safety concern and most likely have them travelling home with another crew (type 1) ordered. Just keeps bringing up more and more concerns on what did or didn’t happen and why?
Sorry to change direction here, but I continue to think about the FAILED initial attack on this tragic fire. We want to learn from this tragedy but we also need to look at the actions on initial attack, not just the movements of the GMHS. I know it has been discussed in earlier chapters, but I can’t get past that. So, maybe there are some lessons to be learned here, or maybe (hopefully) more questions to be asked..
As a firefighter/ supervisor here is what was known prior to ignition –
Fuels alert issued on June 16th including fire behavior potential and weather
Multi year drought
Heat warning issued (June 25)
Multiple fires statewide
Eight large fires across the state – this says to me that conditions are right for large fires to occur.
No fire in the area since 1966 (maybe not known but the fuel loading would be apparent)
At 1736 Dispatch documents incident as Yarnell Hill Fire
At 1940 a IC type 4 is assigned – fire is reported as less than 1/2 acre , 80 % out, only active in one corner, steep rocky terrain on a W facing slope.
Based upon these facts alone this fire should have been aggressively attacked. Other fire activity shows that conditions are right for new starts to become established and large if not attacked. Resources will continue to become limited as fire activity increases. Although small in size, this fire screams for a type 1 crew – steep, rocky terrain and inaccessible.
Okay, here is where I start to questions things – Dispatch assigns the fire name at 1736, yet it does not get an IC until 1940? Must of been busy worrying about other starts? Maybe we need to address what we know we have instead of what we think we might get! If you are in charge of a large area, once you have a known fire assign an IC for that incident – instead of trying to manage the “district’ and the known fire.
The IC is worried about FF safety and logistical support.
HUGH ISSUE here, the simple part is all crews are self supporting for at least 24 hours so logistical support should not be a concern(especially with a T 1 crew). The bigger discussion comes with FF safety (which I totally support), but is it safer to attack a fire in conditions of lower RH’s, temps, and winds or when the fire has prime burning conditions in mid afternoon. I know which situation I would rather have!! The IC orders two Type 2 DOC crews, light helicopter, and 1 AZ state engine for the morning. So, I hate to go with the “old guy ” thing , but I believe (only my opinion) at this point (1/2 acre) Bob Powers and I could have handled this fire, with some helicopter support in the AM, done deal by noon.
Okay, so lets go with FF safety, based on the givens/known’s listed above lets get our resources out there at first light, that time of year first light is about 5;30 ish.. Oh, that didn’t happen either – the first boots on the ground didn’t arrive until 1048, with seven FF’s. The order was for two crews ( type 2), that indicates to me that there should be at least 36 FF’s, did they ever arrive? Okay, even with seven firefighters and HELICOPTER support with water drops it was still controllable. In my opinion, the helicopter flight time was being “saved” in case of another start. This happens, the costs is still experienced , however the flight time for the pilot is saved (only allowed a certain number of hours per day).. So, on a “nothing fire” you shuttle seven crew members – probably two flights or 30/40 minutes,. you still have plenty of flight time for any fires you “might have”.
Okay, so everything goes south and at 1821 the IC orders type 1 crews for 0600 hours at Yarnell. GMIHC arrives and gets assigned, but BR doesn’t arrive until 0800, so what’s up with that?! they are pretty much local, so why not be on time ( sorry, more old school).
At 1022 a formal transfer of command was made via radio – has anyone seen any formal delegation of authority to the type 2 team? Any set goals and objectives for the team? Any formal in brief? I know things were expanding rapidly, but the purpose of the team is to gather intel and try to organize the chaos of a rapidly expanding incident.
And my final question for now is if this team transition really did occur at 1022 WHY did the ICT 4 request a type 1 IMT at 1402?
Just a bunch of stuff I can’t let go of!!!!!!
Sorry I got it wrong – I meant to say higher RH, lower temps and less wind compared to prime burning conditions experienced mid day,
Some really good Questions.
I have not seen any written decisions on the IA, or reasons for not using Helicopter Water Drops on the Hot spot.
Decision to transfer the fire to a type 2 short team.
No written record of the directions from the State Office for Suppression and objectives, Cost and additional resources.
The Fire Files should have the decisions for attack and control at the State level.
.
Was the decision full suppression or Low cost containment at first attack?
What were the directions to the IC? There were addition resources close enough to the fire they could have been flown in from Yarnell including BLM.
My understanding some where in the first 24 Hrs. the BLM offered to take over the fire and was turned down by the State, I remember reading that way back at the beginning.
The Fire Had a Helicopter assigned and A helispot close to the Fire, the Helicopter had bucket capability as well. The ability to add manpower as well.
This fire should have been contained by noon the first day.
Maybe we can dig up some information in records from the first 24 as to what the State was doing and directing in the IA. There should be recordings of Radio from the State Dispatch to the IA on the FIRE.
Also just checking I saw NO Dispatch records for the 6/28 Yarnell Hill Fire
Where are those records? Classed as a ABC Misc. Lightning as of 6/29 AM
Dispatch State had to be keeping records on all their Fires on the 28th where are these records?
**
** DRAFT MINUTES OF JAN 6, 2015 YARNELL HILL MEMORIAL BOARD MEETING
The minutes from the last Yarnell Hill Memorial Board meeting were NOT made available within 3 business days following the last meeting of this PUBLIC board ( as required by law )… but unlike the last minutes published… this time they have NOT waited until the next meeting before publishing the minutes of the previous one.
The DRAFT minutes ( complete with spelling mistakes ) of the January 6, 2015 meeting are now available online via the Arizona State Parks website.
The PDF document is here…
http://azstateparks.com/committees/downloads/minutes/2015/Yarnell_Minutes_Draft_01-06-15.pdf
Here are some things that are now clear which were NOT really made clear in any of the media articles that reported about this January 6 meeting.
1) The VOTE that was taken ( which was unanimous ) that authorizes the Arizona Parks Department to begin the due-diligence process involved with purchasing the land was NOT the ‘final vote’ about whether the Board will actually purchase the land. The due-diligence process will be reported back to this Yarnell Hill Memorial Site Board as it goes along… along with an actual dollar amount for the land they intend to purchase. Only THEN will this Board vote on whether or not to actually make the purchase.
From the January 6, 2015 meeting ‘draft’ minutes…
—————————————————————————-
State Representative (Karen) Fann wanted to refocus a moment on sole purpose and intent of bill was to preserve the site and keep it from being developed. It may be that the board opts to only purchases the site and not even build a memorial or just erecting a single cross. The number one purpose was to preserve the site. Mr. Martyn agreed that that is the committee’s number one priority—to preserve the land.
Miss Nelson asked if that was what was just voted on.
Mr. Martyn replied that the committee decided that State Parks should handle due dilligence of the process and that the vote for the actual purchase will be brought back to the committee once we are given a dollar amount.
—————————————————————————-
2) An ‘access’ sub-committee WAS officially formed at this meeting… and Board Director Martyn did put out a call to the PUBLIC hoping that ANYONE who has ANY ‘knowledge or expertise’ of the local area would volunteer to serve on this PUBLIC sub-committee.
From the January 6, 2015 meeting ‘draft’ minutes…
—————————————————————————-
3. Access and right of ways to the Yarnell Hill Memorial Site – Discussion of motorized, non-motorized access, parking, trail or road size and distance, feasibility, cost, eminent domain and consideration for adjacent land owners and whether to form a sub-committee.
Mr. Martyn stated that in addition to preserving the site the Board must decide on access options to get to the site. This sub-committee will research the potential to access the site and recommends they work closely with State Trust Land Department and local property owners such as Mr. Rex Maughan and the local community.
Mr. Martyn asked the Board members to volunteer to serve on the access subcommittee.
Chief Ben Palm volunteered as well as Ms. Lenora Nelson.
Mr. Martyn asked for PUBLIC involvement for ANYONE that has knowledge or expertise in this area.
—————————————————————————–
A look at the bottom of the news article attached.
Related Stories has the article I mentioned earlier from the Retirement Board.
This looks like a serious 3 to 4 day hearing to determine Misner and Warneke clams to full coverage from Prescott City.
http://dcourier.com/main.asp?FromHome=1&TypeID=1&ArticleID=140696&SectionID=1&SubSectionID=1
This is from the SR posting
http://www.investigativemedia.com/yarnell-hill-fire-chapter-xi/#comment-237393
NOTE the Lawyers intend to add more information for the Plaintiff’s at this Hearing’
Which could mean a lot of Information that has not seen the light of day.
This could be what we have been looking for out side the court, and more OSHA based work place violations
Prescott city Retirement and benefits for the above Plaintiff’s from the Yarnell Hill Fire.
This may be worth keeping an eye on.
Reply to Bob Powers post on January 19, 2015 at 8:59 am
>> Bob Powers said…
>>
>> NOTE the Lawyers intend to add more information for the Plaintiff’s
>> at this Hearing’ Which could mean a lot of Information that has not
>> seen the light of day.
>>
>> This could be what we have been looking for out side the court, and
>> more OSHA based work place violations.
Perhaps… but since this is just a ‘repeat’ of the same sort of ‘presentation’ that took place before to establish Andrew Ashcraft’s ‘eligibility’ for the pension and retirement benefits… I’m not sure ‘workplace violations’ will enter into the picture at all.
As I understand it… the plaintiff’s petitioned to have the ‘elgibility’ for both Sean Misner and William Warneke simply ‘stipulated’ since their working situation so closely matched Andrew Ashcraft’s ( who was deemed ‘eligible’ already ) so there was no need to ‘go over all that again’.
The Prescott City Council decided to NOT ‘stipulate’ anything… so that is why all the same witnesses are going to be called back and all the same ground is going to be covered again.
There is also the ‘reason’ that there are at least TWO new City Council members who were NOT there for the Andrew Ashcraft hearings and they themselves have expressed the desire to hear all that ‘testimony’ again.
So more than likely… the same ‘former GM Hotshots’ that testified during the Ashcraft hearings will be called back again… but also more than likely they will just be asked the same questions again.
Who knows, though.. because this time it is TWO GM Hotshots they are trying to establish ‘eligibility’ for and not just one. That could change the ‘presentation’ altogether and even MORE witnesses could be called.
And… since there ARE actually TWO new members on that Prescott City Council… they, themselves, might have completely different ‘questions’ they would like to see answered than anything that might have been asked during the previous Ashcraft hearings.
**
** ADOSH PHOTO SHOWING POSSIBLE USGS LAND SURVEY MARKER?
**
** MIDPOINT OF THE SOUTHERN BOUNDARY OF SECTION 9, TOWNSHIP 10N, RANGE 05W
At 8:56 AM on the morning of July 18, 2013… one of the ADOSH investigators was in Yarnell and up on the western ridge above the box canyon. He was to the SOUTH on that two-track road and walking along what is now known as the ‘Alternate Escape Route’. That’s the continuation of that two-track which headed SOUTH along the ridgeline, and then turned more into just a ‘trail’ that headed due EAST and could have taken Granite Mountain all the way to the Boulder Springs Ranch without having to ‘bushwhack’.
The ADOSH investigator was about at that point where the ‘Alternate Escape Route’ turned from heading SOUTH along the Weaver Mountain ridgeline to then heading due EAST towards the Boulder Springs Ranch.
He turned around at that point, faced back towards the box canyon and the deployment site area, and he then took TWO pictures, 14 seconds apart.
His FOCUS was a ‘pile of rocks’ that were right there near where he was standing and did NOT look like a ‘natural’ formation. There are three large overlapping ‘ground’ rocks which then have other rocks ‘piled up’ on top of them which looks for all the world like some kind of manually-made MARKER of some sort.
As it turns out… this ‘pile of rocks’ he was photographing appears to be at about the exact MIDPOINT of the SOUTHERN boundary’ of Section 9, Township 10 North, Range 05 West.
So it DOES appear that this ‘pile of rocks’ could, in fact, be an actual USGS Survey marker.
The two images of this ‘pile of rocks’ I am talking about are in the following folder in the ADOSH Online Dropbox…
ADOSH Yarnell Hill Investigation / Photos and Videos / ADOSH 7-18 photos w GPS
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/20inrene9tcx74a/AAAn9-D4c5U9Kbh2BHFt2c7ba/ADOSH%20Yarnell%20Hill%20Investigation/Photos%20and%20Video/ADOSH%207-18%20photos%20w%20GPS?dl=0
They are the FIRST TWO images in that folder.
IMGP0241 and IMGP0242
The first is a ‘wide shot’ of that ‘pile of rocks’ showing parts of the box canyon in the background, and the second is a ‘closeup’ of the actual rockpile itself that he was purposely photographing.
The actual ‘spot on the ground’ for this ‘pile of rocks’ appears to be…
34.216131, -112.780900
That is just a few FEET away from the actual MIDPOINT of the SOUTH boundary of Section 9, Township 10N, Range 05W.
By MIDPOINT I mean… it is standard practice to divide ( and subdivide ) any USGS ‘Section’ of land into ‘quarters’ for legal land descriptions.
So if you just divide ALL of the full Section 9 into quarters ONE time you get the following configuration for the interior of the section and the following four-letter descriptions
for those ‘quarters’…
—————————-
NW quarter | NE quarter | — The TOP ( NORTH ) half of Section 9 – MAUGHAN TRUST LAND
—————————-
SW quarter | SE quarter | — The BOTTOM ( SOUTH ) half of Section 9 – Closed to public access
————-+————–
The MIDPOINT of the SOUTH boundary of Section 9 would be the point marked above with the ‘plus’ sign, in-between the SW and SE ‘quarters’.
The PENTAX camera that the ADOSH investigator was using had GPS turned on… so that is how we know EXACTLY where he was standing when he took these two pictures.
Folder: ADOSH 7-18 photos w GPS
IMGP0241
Date/Time Original: 2013:07:18 08:56:41
Camera Make: PENTAX RICOH IMAGING
Camera Model Name: PENTAX WG-3 GPS
GPS Position: 34 deg 12′ 56.15″ N, 112 deg 46′ 51.40″ W
GPS Decimal: 34.215597, -112.780944
IMGP0242
NOTE: Photo was taken from exact same spot as IMGP0241 but
with maximum ZOOM onto the rock pile from that camera location.
Date/Time Original: 2013:07:18 08:56:55
Camera Make: PENTAX RICOH IMAGING
Camera Model Name: PENTAX WG-3 GPS
GPS Position: 34 deg 12′ 56.15″ N, 112 deg 46′ 51.40″ W
GPS Decimal: 34.215597, -112.780944
About 20 feet to the WEST of this ‘pile of rocks’ is the approximate point of the southwest corner of the piece of land that the Yarnell Hill Memorial Board is interested in purchasing, as per the map they showed at their last Board meeting.
That is the point where the ‘Ridgeline’ of the Weaver Mountains meets the SOUTH boundary of Section 9, Township 10N, Range 05W.
So if this pile of rocks really is a USGS marker for the approximate midpoint of the SOUTH boundary of Section 9… then there are probably OTHER similar ‘rockpiles’ out there marking the OTHER ‘corners’ and ‘quarters’ of Section 9.
Reply to “Reply To SR” ( RTSR ) post on January 16, 2015 at 1:53 am
>> RTSR said…
>>
>> They did learn today that no docket of this case will be online for the public.
>> You can go in person only on the case.
Well… if that means someone has actually made a DECISION to prevent this particular case from ever appearing in the standard electronic PUBLIC Case Lookup systems ( even though the case has not been officially and legally SEALED ) I would love to know which part of Arizona Law is being ‘cited’ and/or ‘relied upon’ for that decision… or what part of “Rule 123” of the Arizona Supreme Court is allowing such a specific decision to be made.
If you can go ‘in person’ and actually just access the records… then that automatically means the case has NOT been officially/legally SEALED.
If the case has NOT been SEALED… then according to “Rule 123” of the Arizona Supreme Court… it is SUPPOSED to also be showing up in the online records search systems commonly used by the Arizona Courts system(s).
Sounds like some kind of ‘special effort’ is actually being made here with regards to this particular case to specifically PREVENT it from showing up in the online system(s).
Very strange.
>> RTSR also said…
>>
>> The cd is public records the clerk stated and can be shown to anyone.
>> Cd is public information.
>> I guess Sonny can give it to John Dougherty.
>> Yet John said he is getting a copy.
>> It is not viewable and its in a certain court file format.
>> Any help on trm files?
TRM files are usually associated with recording systems used in courtrooms.
There a number of FREE TRM file ‘players’ out there on the Internet.
Most of them also have a ‘Save As’ option that then allows you to SAVE the TRM recordings back to disk in other standard, common audio formats like WAV audio.
Here’s a download link for a really good FREE TRM file player ( for Windows machines ) called FTR, which is an acronym for “For The Record”…
* FTR Player(TM) – Free Audio and Video Player for Court Recordings
http://www.fortherecord.com/products/player/
From the page above…
———————————————————————-
FTR Player(TM) (current release 5.6.2) is the free audio & video player created for full playback control of the record. Adjust individual microphone volumes and speech speed, and increase productivity with foot pedal support and Log Notes™ integration.
[ Download FTR Player™ 5.6.2 ]
Free download for Windows XP, 7 and 8.
———————————————————————-
>> RTSR also said…
>>
>> The only thing that is not allowed is to let defendant talk
>> about plaintiff and two others.
I’m still confused.
‘Defendant’… and TWO OTHERS?
Were these ‘TWO OTHERS’ actually NAMED in the original ‘Injunction against Harassment’?
*OR*
Did these ‘TWO OTHERS’ file their OWN ‘Injunctions for Harassment’ complete with ( as required by law ) their OWN sworn affidavits of ‘Multiple’ ( more than one ) instances of ‘Harassment’?
*OR*
Were these ‘TWO OTHERS’ physically present in the courtroom themselves… as would normally be required by LAW for them to become co-party to any ‘Injunction against Harassment’ filed by someone OTHER than them?
I’m having trouble understanding how anyone could be ORDERED to ‘not talk about someone’… especially when one ( or more ) of those ‘someones’ never even filed their own ‘Injunctions’ or were ever even THERE in a courtroom during the required ‘hearing’.
Very, VERY strange.
Typo above. I typed ‘Defendant’ where I should have typed ‘Plaintiff’.
Section above should have read like this…
>> RTSR also said…
>>
>> The only thing that is not allowed is to let defendant talk
>> about plaintiff and two others.
I’m still confused.
‘Plaintiff’… and TWO OTHERS?
Were these ‘TWO OTHERS’ actually NAMED in the original ‘Injunction against Harassment’?
Reply to ‘The Truth Will Always Remain Elusive’ ( TTWARE ) post
on January 17, 2015 at 4:04 pm
>> TTWARE said…
>>
>> I think the only logical reason for “global mediation” is their attempt at “one fell swoop”!
Well… as it turns out… ‘global’ does NOT mean it applies to ALL of the litigation pending against the State of Arizona and Arizona Forestry.
AZCENTRAL did a better job of ‘digging into’ what is behind this ‘Motion for Pause’ that has been filed.
According to Craig Knapp ( one of the attorneys representing the families ) it does NOT have anything to do with the ‘Property Damage’ cases with 167+ plaintiffs seeking damages from the State of Arizona and Arizona Forestry. Not even close.
THOSE cases, which are also seeking ‘clarity’ about what happened that ENTIRE weekend, will, apparently, continue regardless of what this newly announced ‘global mediation’ produces.
From the AZCENTRAL article…
————————————————————————-
In addition to the wrongful-death claims, about 100 Yarnell-area residents are suing the Division of Forestry for property losses in the fire. Attorney Craig Knapp, who also represents those plaintiffs, said mediation efforts will have NO IMPACT on THAT case.
————————————————————————-
Here is the AZCENTRAL article itself…
http://www.azcentral.com/story/news/local/arizona/2015/01/16/yarnell-hotshots-death-case-going-mediation/21901207/
Apparently… the families have ALREADY agreed ( amongst themselves ) to some kind of ‘list’ of CHANGES and REFORMS they want to see take place… and those ‘demands’ WILL be ‘up-front-and-center’ in ANY ‘mediation’ that takes place.
Good for them. That’s what I was hoping.
I want them to realize THEY are in the “driver’s seat” here and ( apparently )… they DO.
Also from the article…
——————————————————————————-
Twelve hotshot family members are plaintiffs in the federal lawsuit, and three more filed their case in county Superior Court. In addition to the Division of Forestry, defendants include Yavapai County and Central Yavapai Fire District.
Dan Parker, a plaintiff and father of deceased hotshot Wade Parker, said the families have agreed on a set of reforms they would like the state to adopt, including the use of global positioning devices by wildland firefighters.
Parker said the mediation is an attempt to give the state a chance to meet demands outside of the adversarial setting of a courtroom, without admitting fault.
“The families involved in this have gotten together and said we’d like to make some policy changes on how the state does their job,” he said in a Friday phone interview. “Instead of worrying about how much it’s going to cost the state, worry about the lives and property of the people they’re supposed to be protecting.”
Knapp, who represents hotshot families in the Superior Court case, said he’s prepared to go to trial, but willing to seek a resolution. “Our clients want change,” he added. “They want answers. They want to make sure this doesn’t happen to anyone else. And they want the state to take responsibility for what happened. Too many people died.”
——————————————————————————-
AZCENTRAL also did more than the AP News Wire Service did to find out more about the whole ADOSH component here in these new ‘mediation’ efforts… but even they couldn’t really discover what that is all about (yet).
Also from the article…
———————————————————————————
It is unclear why ADOSH has agreed to participate in the mediation, and whether there is a potential to resolve the Industrial Commission litigation along with the wrongful-death complaints. An ADOSH spokeswoman said she could not comment on pending legal issues.
——————————————————————————–
So the ‘bottom line’ here is that even if the State of Arizona is able to agree to the families TERMS and adopt their recommended REFORMS and CHANGES… the ‘Property Damage’ cases will STILL continue… and calling certain witnesses to the stand such as Brendan McDonough, Todd Abel, Paul Musser, Gary Cordes, Russ Shumate, Roy Hall and any/all of the Blue Ridge Hotshots ( if the FEDS will allow them to testify ) will be JUST as important to getting those cases settled as they would have been in the ‘Wrongful Death’ cases.
It will still be important to find out what these ‘witnesses’ really KNOW… and to discover as best as possible what REALLY happened that ENTIRE weekend in order to properly resolve the ‘Property Damage’ cases.
WTKTT,
The property owner’s lawsuit, if it continues on, probably won’t have to dig into intricacies such as every specific radio conversation that occurred between GM and others.
That case will more than likely hinge on the grand-scale, overall strategies and tactics, along with management of the incident, and while what happened to GM will likely be factored into the equation, investigating the why’s of the loss of the crew will not be critical to a property damage case.
I still think that if ‘global mediation’ produces a ‘one fell swoop’ result, the courtroom search for the full truth of the loss of GM will be done.
You may be right.
It is all going to depend on what is deemed ‘admissible’ during the proceedings.
I could still imagine, however, that if the point of the proceedings is to show how very, very badly that whole thing was managed from the get-go… and on into the fatalities that resulted… that EVERYTHING to do with what management did or didn’t know… or was or wasn’t doing… would be considered ‘admissible’.
That would including knowing not only exactly HOW a small fire that was in ‘mop up’ mode for more than FIVE hours on Saturday ( with a drop-capable Helicopter on-scene but NOT being used ) could have turned into the mess it did…
It could ALSO include knowing EXACTLY how/why a team of WFF firefighters who are supposed to know their business broke almost every rule in their own ‘book’ and died in a box canyon.
It will all depend on how the plaintiffs attorneys decide to ‘present the case’.
** NEW ‘CROSSFADE’ AND 3 DIMENSIONAL ‘FLY-AROUND’ VIDEO
**
** THE BOTTOM HALF OF SECTION 9, TOWNSHIP 10 NORTH, RANGE 05 WEST
**
** STATE LAND CLOSURE AREA VERSUS LAND BEING CONSIDERED FOR PURCHASE
There’s been a lot of conversation of late about this ‘land closure’ on the part of Arizona Land Management versus the actual land area that the Yarnell Hill Memorial Site Board is looking into purchasing.
Once again ( just for clarity’s sake )… here is that initial Land Closure Order that was issued on July 12, 2013 just 12 days after the tragedy and SIGNED by Vanessa P. Hickman, the Arizona State Land Commissioner.
———————————————————————————————
IN THE MATTER OF CLOSING THE FOLLOWING DESCRIBED STATE TRUST
SURFACE AND SUBSURFACE LAND
SOUTH HALF OF SECTION 9 IN TOWNSHIP 10 NORTH, RANGE 5 WEST,
320 ACRES, YAVAPAI COUNTY, ARIZONA
IT IS ORDERED that effective at 8:00 o’clock a.m. on the date of this Order ( July 12, 2013 ), the subject land is closed to any and all access and use, EXCEPT to the FAMILIES OF THE FALLEN, those public safety officials charged with investigating the fire and protecting the public and rights of entry to be issued for official purposes. No applications will be accepted for surface and subsurface leases, permits, sales, minerals, oil and gas exploration and right-of-way applications until further Order of the State Land Commissioner.
Commissioner Order No. 006-2013/2014
Given under my hand and the official seal of the Arizona State
Land Department this 12th day of July, 2013.
Signed: Vanessa P. Hickman
Arizona State Land Commissioner
——————————————————————————————–
That ‘Land Closure’ order was then ‘modified/updated’ on April 1, 2014, but only for the purpose of allowing OTHER people automatic access to that closed SOUTH HALF ONLY of Section 9, T10N, R05W. It granted additional access to attorneys, witnesses and ‘experts’ involved in BOTH sides of all the pending litigation. Complete ‘automatic access’ for any FAMILY member of the deceased was still left fully in place, as established in the original closure order.
However ( and I think this has been a point of confusion )… the Arizona State PUBLIC Board known as the ‘Yarnell Hill Memorial Site Board’ has NEVER been considering purchasing ALL of the SOUTH HALF of Section 9.
They have neither the funding nor the inclination to purchase all 320 acres of this ‘closed area’.
They have ONLY ever been considering purchasing PART of that SOUTH HALF of Section 9 for the actual ‘Memorial Site’.
I thought it might be helpful to do a VISUAL on this… so here is another one of those ‘through the looking glass’ crossfade videos which ALSO then contains a 3-dimensional ‘fly-through’ and ‘fly-around’ of the proposed land purchase and where the boundaries of it ACTUALLY are.on the ground itself.
The VIDEO starts with that same Power-Point Presentation SLIDE MAP of the proposed purchase area that was displayed at the most recent PUBLIC Yarnell Hill Memorial Site Board meeting on January 6, 2015.
A few ‘text boxes’ then appear overlaid on this ‘map’ that explain a few things about what it is showing. The BLACK OUTLINE on that map they were looking at is the ENTIRE 1 mile square Section 9 of Township 10 North, Range 05 West.
The NORTH half of that section is NOT Arizona State Trust Land.
It is PRIVATE land that is part of the MAUGHAN TRUST LAND.
It is ONLY the SOUTH HALF of that ‘Section 9’ that has been ‘closed’ to public access by the Arizona Land department and that SOUTH HALF totals 320 acres.
The Yarnell Hill Memorial Site Board does NOT intend to purchase ALL 320 acres of this SOUTH HALF of Section 9. It is ONLY considering purchasing land in the EASTERN HALF of that SOUTH Section from a point on the eastern boundary of Section 9 ( which runs north/south along the fence at the western edge of the Boulder Springs Ranch ) out to a WESTERN boundary that is defined by the PEAK of that part of the Weaver Mountain ridge that cuts through Section 9.
They are ONLY considering ‘purchasing’ about +/- 250 acres of the total 320 acres.
The VIDEO makes this clear.
After the TEXT boxes appear on the topographic map that the Yarnell Hill Memorial Site Board was using are done… that map will CROSSFADE into the equivalent boundaries of just the SOUTH HALF of Section 9 as shown in Google Earth.
Then the display switches to a 3 dimensional view… and the ‘fly-through’ and ‘fly-around’ begins.
The ‘fly-around’ starts at the SW corner of the proposed land purchase and then goes to each successive CORNER and pauses there for a moment so the boundaries can be clearly seen in 3 dimensional space.
The VIDEO ends back at the SW corner of the proposed purchase again and then ‘zooms back’ to once again show the entire SOUTH HALF of Section 9 as it actually is ‘on the ground’ in 3 dimensions.
So even though the Yarnell Hill Memorial Site board only seems interested in that EASTERN part of just the SOUTH HALF of Section 9, it is more than likely that the ENTIRE SOUTH HALF of Section 9 will still remain ‘closed’ to public access even after any purchase is made by the Yarnell Hill Memorial Site Board.
So here is the new crossfade/fly-around VIDEO sitting up at YouTube.
http://youtu.be/WKrqjVUznLM
NOTE: This video is a little long ( 7+ minutes ) because of the TEXT information appearing in it and it is also a SLOW fly-around. If anyone wants to ‘skip’ the TEXT boxes… the 3 dimensional fly-around begins about halfway through the video itself.
** SOME THINGS TO NOTICE IN THE VIDEO
– The WEST boundary of the land being considered for purchase does, in fact, extend all the way up onto the RIDGE of the Weaver Mountains and would include the two-track and the point known as the ‘Descent Point’ up there on that two-track… but I don’t believe there has been any actual SURVEY done yet to determine EXACTLY where this WEST boundary might be. Everyone is just assuming ‘the ridgeline’… but that is obviously open to interpretation until an actual SURVEY has been done and that WEST boundary is MARKED on the ground with either fencing, signage, or BOTH. I believe this actual SURVEY will/should be part of the process that has now been requested by the Yarnell Hill Memorial Site Board as of January 6, 2015.
– The NORTH boundary of the land being considered for purchase does NOT contain ALL of that northern ridge of the box canyon. It barely even captures the ‘tops’ of that ridge, which will still then belong to the NORTH HALF of Section 9 and still be part of the MAUGHAN RANCH property, which is NOT ‘closed’ to the public.
In other words… if you were to stand on the very TOP of that large ‘pile of rocks’ that makes up the NORTH Ridge of the box canyon ( where some of the unburned trees are seen in many of the deployment site photos ) you would NOT be standing inside the SOUTH HALF of Section 9. You would still be standing on the MAUGHAN RANCH TOP HALF of Section 9 which has NOT been ‘closed’ to public access.
– The EAST boundary of the land being considered for purchase comes RIGHT UP to the western edge of the Boulder Springs Ranch and, indeed, that ‘wire fence’ that was there on the western side of the BSR prior to deployment was, in fact, exactly defining that EAST boundary of the SOUTH HALF of Section 9.
– The SOUTH boundary of the land being considered for purchase does NOT even capture most of that other ‘trail’ which has become known as the ‘Alternate Escape Route’. You would ( and can today ) still be able to traverse much of that ‘trail’ with any standard AZ State Land ‘hiking’ permit and NOT be ON any of the ‘closed’ land ( which is ONLY the SOUTH HALF of Section 9 ).
** ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
**
** GPS FOR THE ENTIRE SOUTH HALF OF SECTION 9, T10N, R05W
NOTE: Matches points contained in the BLM’s own Land Management system and can be considered accurate to within 4-10 feet.
The four corners of the actual 320 acres that make up the ENTIRE SOUTH HALF of Section 9, and the ENTIRE area that has been ‘closed’ to public access by Arizona State Land department are as follows…
SW Corner
GPS Decimal: 34.216144, -112.789052
GPS Degrees, Decimal Minutes: 34 deg 12.969′ N, 112 deg 47.343′ W
GPS Degrees, Minutes, Seconds: 34 deg 12′ 58.12″ N, 112 deg 47′ 20.59″ W
NW Corner
GPS Decimal: 34.223457, -112.789004
GPS Degrees, Decimal Minutes: 34 deg 13.407′ N, 112 deg 47.340′ W
GPS Degrees, Minutes, Seconds: 34 deg 13′ 24.45″ N, 112 deg 47′ 20.41″ W
NE Corner
GPS Decimal: 34.223461, -112.771542
GPS Degrees, Decimal Minutes: 34 deg 13.408′ N, 112 deg 46.292′ W
GPS Degrees, Minutes, Seconds: 34 deg 13′ 24.46″ N, 112 deg 46′ 17.55″ W
SE Corner
GPS Decimal: 34.216232, -112.771513
GPS Degrees, Decimal Minutes: 34 deg 12.974′ N, 112 deg 46.291′ W
GPS Degrees, Minutes, Seconds: 34 deg 12′ 58.44″ N, 112 deg 46′ 17.45″ W
** GPS FOR THE ONLY LAND BEING CONSIDERED FOR PURCHASE
The four corners of the actual +/- 250 acres contained within just the SOUTH HALF of Section 9 that the Yarnell Hill Memorial Board plans to purchase are as follows…
As NOTED above… there is no indication any actual LAND SURVEY has been done to determine exactly where this WESTERN boundary is for the proposed land purchase. Everyone is still just using the term ‘ridgeline’… but that is obviously open to interpretation until some kind of ACTUAL survey is done. These points simply match what has appeared in the only MAP produced by the Yarnell Hill Site Memorial Board indicating APPROXIMATELY where the proposed WESTERN boundary is to be.
SW Corner
GPS Decimal: 34.216176, -112.781156
GPS Degrees, Decimal Minutes: 34 deg 12.970′ N, 112 deg 46.869′ W
GPS Degrees, Minutes, Seconds: 34 deg 12′ 58.23″ N, 112 deg 46′ 52.16″ W
NW Corner
GPS Decimal: 34.223456, -112.785146
GPS Degrees, Decimal Minutes: 34 deg 13.407′ N, 112 deg 47.109′ W
GPS Degrees, Minutes, Seconds: 34 deg 13′ 24.44″ N, 112 deg 47′ 6.52″ W
NE Corner
GPS Decimal: 34.223461, -112.771542
GPS Degrees, Decimal Minutes: 34 deg 13.408′ N, 112 deg 46.292′ W
GPS Degrees, Minutes, Seconds: 34 deg 13′ 24.46″ N, 112 deg 46′ 17.55″ W
SE Corner
GPS Decimal: 34.216232, -112.771513
GPS Degrees, Decimal Minutes: 34 deg 12.974′ N, 112 deg 46.291′ W
GPS Degrees, Minutes, Seconds: 34 deg 12′ 58.44″ N, 112 deg 46’ 17.45″ W
Some clarification following the post above.
That TOP ( NORTH ) HALF of Section 9, Township 10 North, Range 05 West is the
part of Section 9 that is NOT ‘Arizona State Trust Land’.
Wherever it says things above like…
“You would still be standing on the MAUGHAN RANCH TOP HALF of Section 9 which has NOT been ‘closed’ to public access.”
…what that means is that it is certainly NOT ‘closed to public access’ in the sense that that decision is NOT up to the the Arizona Land Department.
It is, however, still MAUGHAN TRUST LAND and certain ‘permissions’ are still necessary to be freely accessing that property.
But I don’t think that has ever been much of a problem and there is no indication it would become one in the future. Not yet, anyway.
Bottom line is that ANY ‘hiking’ access to ALL of that TOP HALF of Section 9 is NOT a decision that is up to the State of Arizona’s Land department.
Just picked up some additional information from the Daily Courier that there is another meeting in Prescott .
There will be another Hearing in front of the Fire Retirement Board on Misner and Warneke Cases
January 28/29/30/ February 2 which is a redo of the last hearing and additional information to be added. Full blown Lawyers and all to get City coverage retirement and Benefits for the 2 members of the crew. We still may see some more info yet to see the light of day.
STUNNING DEVELOPMENT
The term “Global mediation” doesn’t necessarily bode well for the truth EVER getting out!
http://dcourier.com/main.asp?FromHome=1&TypeID=1&ArticleID=140696&SectionID=1&SubSectionID=1
That’s not good. The only hope will be the Families efforts to get all the information that caused the Fatalities. And so we wait some more.
Reply to The Truth Will Always Remain Elusive (TTWARE)
post on January 16, 2015 at 2:45 pm
>> TTWARE said…
>>
>> STUNNING DEVELOPMENT
>> The term “Global mediation” doesn’t necessarily bode well for
>> the truth EVER getting out!
I’m not so sure about that. By all accounts… the ‘Wrongful Death’ suits have NEVER really been about the money at all… though a LOT of fatherless kids can/should be FULLY taken care of here no matter what happens. That’s just the RIGHT thing to do.
For the families… it really has been about ‘what really happened’ and doing as much as humanly possible to see the agencies involved doing EVERYTHING they can to make SURE it never happens again.
No matter how much these ‘agencies’ would just like everyone to ‘move along… nothing to see here’… I don’t think the families are going to go ‘quietly into the night’.
It would NOT surprise me at all if the consolidated ‘Wrongful Death’ plaintiffs all AGREE that ANY settlement MUST include ‘action items’ regarding more disclosure and more visible practices and procedures being put into place by the responsible agencies to prevent future similar tragedies… as much as humanly possible.
They ( the plaintiffs ) really SHOULD ‘hold out’ for these kinds of ‘action items’.
They are in the “driver’s seat”, legally speaking, and it IS possible to arrange for ‘action items’ to be part of any ‘settlement’ in addition to agreed-upon monetary settlements.
By the way… I am not ‘doubting’ the article… but as of this afternoon there have been no official ‘motions’ filed in ANY of cases reflecting this ‘motion for pause’ or ‘motion for arbitration’.
There are ‘Oral Arguments’ ( in OPEN court ) still showing up on the calendars for some of these cases as early as 11 days from now ( January 27, 2015 ).
Maybe that’s why this ‘move for arbitration’ and ‘pause the court calendar’ stuff is now moving to the ‘front burner’. Maybe the defendants don’t even want to have to enter into the ‘Oral Arguments’ phase and have to start revealing ANYTHING in OPEN COURT ( since that will then automatically become part of the PUBLIC RECORD ).
The ‘Property Damage’ and ‘Wrongful Death’ suits against the State of Arizona, Arizona Forestry and OTHERS are actually NOT ‘showing up’ in that top-level MASTER online Court Case lookup system for the State of Arizona.
You have to actually search the Maricopa County Superior Court online lookup system.
The CORRECT URL is as follows…
Arizona – Maricopa County Case Search Page – Civil Court Cases
https://www.superiorcourt.maricopa.gov/docket/CivilCourtCases/caseSearch.asp
Enter ‘Arizona State Forestry’ in ‘Search by Business Name’ field ( the second
input box in the middle of the page ).
Click ‘SEARCH’.
SIX ‘Case Numbers’ will appear. These are ALL ‘Yarnell’ related.
Case Number, Party / Business Name
————————————————————————
CV2014-007698, Arizona State Forestry Division
CV2014-009068, Arizona State Forestry Division
CV2014-009069, Arizona State Forestry Division
CV2014-009070, Arizona State Forestry Division
CV2014-009071, Arizona State Forestry Division
CV2014-009160, Arizona State Forestry Division
————————————————————————
Here is what each individual ‘case’ file represents…
CV2014-007698, ‘Property Damage’ case(s). 167 ‘plaintiffs’ listed against
The State of Arizona and Arizona Forestry Division.
33 (dated) ‘case events’ are on file so far.
Case Calendar
Date, Time, Event
1/27/2015, 13:30, Oral Argument
CV2014-009068, Steinmetz, McCarty, Federwisch and Marica McKee against
The State of Arizona and Arizona Forestry Division.
26 (dated) ‘case events’ are on file so far.
Case Calendar
Date, Time, Event
1/27/2015, 9:30, Oral Argument
5/22/2015, 13:30, Oral Argument
CV2014-009069, Herman O Federwisch against
The State of Arizona and Arizona Forestry Division.
25 (dated) ‘case events’ are on file so far.
Case Calendar
Date, Time, Event
There are no upcoming scheduled calendar events on file at this time for this case.
CV2014-009070, Marcia McKee against
The State of Arizona and Arizona Forestry Division.
24 (dated) ‘case events’ are on file so far.
Multiple SUMMONS ( to witnesses? ) served in July, 2014.
Case Calendar
Date, Time, Event
There are no upcoming scheduled calendar events on file at this time for this case.
CV2014-009071, Chuck Overmyer and Nina Bill Overmyer against
The State of Arizona and Arizona Forestry Division.
15 (dated) ‘case events’ are on file so far.
Case Calendar
Date, Time, Event
1/27/2015, 9:30, Oral Argument
CV2014-009160, Consolidated WRONGFUL DEATH cases.
Juliann Ashcraft, Claire Caldwell, Krista Carter, Michael McKenzie,
Grant McKee, Daniel Parker, John Percin, Desiree Steed,
Stephanie Turbyfill, Roxanne Warneke, Carl Whitted, Joseph Woyjeck,
* AGAINST *
The State of Arizona, Arizona Forestry Division, County of Yavapai,
Central Yavapai Fire District, Todd Abel, Roy Hall, Russ Shumate.
15 (dated) ‘case events’ are on file so far.
Case Calendar
Date, Time, Event
There are no upcoming scheduled calendar events on file at this time for this case.
For ALL SIX of these case ( both Property Damage AND Wrongful Death ),
the current ‘Judge of Record’ is Richard J. Gama.
WTKTT
My concern with the “global mediation” is that due to there being a new sheriff (governor) in town, his administration may be applying pressure to ADOSH to make the Arizona vs. Arizona (ADOSH vs. Forestry) component, just go away.
Hence, the only official entity that found and documented significant problems and issues with the management of the YHF, could disappear from the scene.
Reply to TTWARE post on January 17, 2015 at 8:44 am
>> TTWARE said…
>>
>> My concern with the “global mediation” is that due to there
>> being a new sheriff (governor) in town, his administration
>> may be applying pressure to ADOSH to make the
>> Arizona vs. Arizona (ADOSH vs. Forestry) component,
>> just go away.
Copy that. It’s hard to tell what ( yes ) might be going on in the background in the ‘smoke filled rooms’, as they used to say.
It’s a very unusual situation.
One Arizona State Agency ( Forestry ) against another Arizona State Agency ( ADOSH ) locked in a battle with ‘investigations’ that are the polar opposite of each other. One ( Forestry ) found no ‘wrongdoing’ whatsoever… not even at the management or workplace safety levels… and the other found SO much wrong at BOTH the management and workplace safety levels they were ‘pegging the meter’ on the maximum fines they were allowed to impose before they even finished their initial investigation.
And now… with regards to the OTHER litigation… most of that was ‘allowed to proceed’ because the ADOSH report provided the published evidence of ‘negligence’ to exceed the ‘exclusive remedy’ clause of workers compensation death benefits.
So yea… Arizona Forestry has ALWAYS needed to ‘attack’ and ‘mitigate’ those ADOSH findings and try to get back to where the ‘exclusive remedy’ clause of worker’s comp is in full effect again… and the ‘wrongful death’ suits can be ‘dismissed’ on those grounds.
Problem there for Arizona Forestry is that their original ‘attack’ on the ADOSH findings stated that they believed their conclusions were wrong because they were ‘not based on substantive evidence’…
…but SINCE that original filing… it has become obvious that ADOSH was never even GIVEN the ‘full substantive evidence’ they needed in the first place.
There is even MORE ‘evidence’ available now to ADOSH that they didn’t have in the first place to ‘back up’ their original conclusions.
So it’s going to be really, really hard for Arizona Forestry to make those ADOSH findings just ‘go away’.
In addition… there have now obviously been OTHER ‘investigations’ taking place on the part of the attorneys representing the families.
They have obviously been ‘busy’ since back in April of 2013 the ‘land closure’ order from Arizona State land department had to be AMENDED to allow proper investigative access to the deployment area for the lawyers, witnesses and ‘experts’ for the plaintiffs ( the families ).
So even if the ADOSH findings get ‘mitigated’… the attorneys for the families probably have their own FULL body of ‘evidence’ to present now to support the ‘wrongful death’ claims… even if the original ADOSH report ‘goes away’.
VERY complicated.
It still would be in Arizona Forestry’s best interest to just ‘settle’ the case, especially since probably one of the most important things to them is to simply NOT have any more ‘evidence’ come out’ or any more of this ‘story’ be told.
I do hope the families stick to their original statements and regardless of what monetary settlement amounts are agreed to that they ALSO include ‘action items’ regarding ‘telling the FULL story’ and requiring tangible and visible industry/management changes that make sure ( as much as humanly possible ) that no similar incident EVER happens again.
Followup…
What the article fails to mention is whether this ‘Motion to Pause’ the ongoing court calendar so the can ‘focus on settlement issues’ applies to ALL of the cases pending.
In other words… is the State of Arizona now interested in ‘settling’ BOTH the ‘Property Damage’ cases ( with 167 plaintiffs against the State )… AND the ‘Wrongful Death’ cases in one fell swoop?
Also… the article fails to mention whether these ‘resolution discussions’ on behalf of the State of Arizona would be including ALL of the ‘defendants’ named in the cases… or just themselves.
In the case of just one of the ‘Wrongful Death’ cases… there are actually SEVEN separate (named) ‘defendants’…
1) The State of Arizona
2) Arizona Forestry Division
3) County of Yavapai
4) Central Yavapai Fire District,
5) Todd Abel
6) Roy Hall
7) Russ Shumate.
So is ‘State of Arizona / Arizona Foresty’ only want to ‘pause the court calendar’ to focus on resolution for THEMSELVES… and the OTHER named defendants would ‘automatically’ be included in this ‘negotiated resolution’…
…or is the State of Arizona read to throw the OTHER defendants ‘under the bus’?
Arizona is NOT one of those states where all the employees of the State have automatic ‘Sovereign Immunity’
So even if the ‘entities’ known as State of Arizona and Yavapai County and Central Yavapai County Fire District get ‘negotiated out’ of the litigation… there are still THREE ‘individuals’ named as ‘defendants’.
Todd Abel, Roy Hall and Russ Shumate.
Is Arizona State / Arizona Forestry going to make SURE and get THEM ‘negotiated out’ of the litigation… or are they actually ( at this point ) willing to ‘throw them under the bus’?
The article doesn’t get into ANY of this… so it all remains to be seen.
From the Maricopa County Superior Court online case lookup system…
CV2014-009160, Consolidated WRONGFUL DEATH cases.
Juliann Ashcraft, Claire Caldwell, Krista Carter, Michael McKenzie,
Grant McKee, Daniel Parker, John Percin, Desiree Steed,
Stephanie Turbyfill, Roxanne Warneke, Carl Whitted, Joseph Woyjeck,
* AGAINST *
The State of Arizona, Arizona Forestry Division, County of Yavapai,
Central Yavapai Fire District, Todd Abel, Roy Hall, Russ Shumate.
I think the only logical reason for “global mediation” is their attempt at “one fell swoop”!
See a longer reply up above as a new parent comment.
Apparently ‘global’ doesn’t mean ‘global’ at all.
Attorney Craig Knapp ( one of those representing the families ) said on Friday that this new ‘global mediation’ effort has NOTHING to do with the cases where 167+ Arizona Citizens are seeking PDC ( Property Damage Compensation ) from the State of Arizona and Arizona Forestry.
So even if the ‘Wrongful Death’ cases get ‘settled’… any WITNESS who was going to be called in THOSE cases will be just important to call to the stand for the ‘Property Damage’ cases to resolve.
WTKTT
A Note my understanding is the case against the State by the Families is still going forward.
Though I got no info on the next Hearing date. Have you seen any thing?
There is still quite a bit of behind the scenes going on. I herd the City had failed to reply to a suit for compensation to some family members and replied late and the city is now paying some compensation. The Lawyers for the Families are still heavily involved. Hopefully we will see some more this year.
Only have time for a quick reply… but see links down below to Arizona Master case lookup system ( not just Prescott system ).
Just type ‘Arizona Forestry’ as the ‘business name’ for case lookups.
It’s all there… BOTH property damage and wrongful death cases.
Case status… motions filed… scheduled hearings, etc.
In a liitle more than a week… oral arguments in AZ State’s motion for dismissal of wrongful death suits are scheduled to take place in open court.
More later.
Correction for post above. I posted the WRONG URL.
The ‘Property Damage’ and ‘Wrongful Death’ suits against the State of Arizona, Arizona Forestry and OTHERS are actually NOT ‘showing up’ in that top-level MASTER online Court Case lookup system for the State of Arizona.
You have to actually search the Maricopa County Superior Court online lookup system.
The CORRECT URL is as follows…
Arizona – Maricopa County Case Search Page – Civil Court Cases
https://www.superiorcourt.maricopa.gov/docket/CivilCourtCases/caseSearch.asp
Enter ‘Arizona State Forestry’ in ‘Search by Business Name’ field ( the second
input box in the middle of the page ).
Click ‘SEARCH’.
SIX ‘Case Numbers’ will appear. These are ALL ‘Yarnell’ related.
Case Number, Party / Business Name
————————————————————————
CV2014-007698, Arizona State Forestry Division
CV2014-009068, Arizona State Forestry Division
CV2014-009069, Arizona State Forestry Division
CV2014-009070, Arizona State Forestry Division
CV2014-009071, Arizona State Forestry Division
CV2014-009160, Arizona State Forestry Division
————————————————————————
Here is what each individual ‘case’ file represents…
CV2014-007698, ‘Property Damage’ case(s). 167 ‘plaintiffs’ listed against
The State of Arizona and Arizona Forestry Division.
33 (dated) ‘case events’ are on file so far.
Case Calendar
Date, Time, Event
1/27/2015, 13:30, Oral Argument
CV2014-009068, Steinmetz, McCarty, Federwisch and Marica McKee against
The State of Arizona and Arizona Forestry Division.
26 (dated) ‘case events’ are on file so far.
Case Calendar
Date, Time, Event
1/27/2015, 9:30, Oral Argument
5/22/2015, 13:30, Oral Argument
CV2014-009069, Herman O Federwisch against
The State of Arizona and Arizona Forestry Division.
25 (dated) ‘case events’ are on file so far.
Case Calendar
Date, Time, Event
There are no upcoming scheduled calendar events on file at this time for this case.
CV2014-009070, Marcia McKee against
The State of Arizona and Arizona Forestry Division.
24 (dated) ‘case events’ are on file so far.
Multiple SUMMONS ( to witnesses? ) served in July, 2014.
Case Calendar
Date, Time, Event
There are no upcoming scheduled calendar events on file at this time for this case.
CV2014-009071, Chuck Overmyer and Nina Bill Overmyer against
The State of Arizona and Arizona Forestry Division.
15 (dated) ‘case events’ are on file so far.
Case Calendar
Date, Time, Event
1/27/2015, 9:30, Oral Argument
CV2014-009160, Consolidated WRONGFUL DEATH cases.
Juliann Ashcraft, Claire Caldwell, Krista Carter, Michael McKenzie,
Grant McKee, Daniel Parker, John Percin, Desiree Steed,
Stephanie Turbyfill, Roxanne Warneke, Carl Whitted, Joseph Woyjeck,
* AGAINST *
The State of Arizona, Arizona Forestry Division, County of Yavapai,
Central Yavapai Fire District, Todd Abel, Roy Hall, Russ Shumate.
15 (dated) ‘case events’ are on file so far.
Case Calendar
Date, Time, Event
There are no upcoming scheduled calendar events on file at this time for this case.
For ALL SIX of these case ( both Property Damage AND Wrongful Death ),
the current ‘Judge of Record’ is Richard J. Gama.
**
** NEW “THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS” CROSSFADE
**
** AIR ATTACK RORY COLLINS’ IPAD PHOTO TAKEN AT
** EXACTLY 1539 ( 3:39 PM ).
There are a number of fascinating aerial photos taken by Air Attack Rory Collins on June 30, 2013… but one of the most interesting is the one he took at exactly 1539 ( 4:39 PM ) just before his pilot was about to ‘timeout’ and Collins would need to leave the Yarnell area.
This photo is named “Headchangingdirectionsouth.JPG”, and it is in the SAIT FOIA release in the following folder…
SAIT / Photos and Videos / RoryCollins Photos.
It is the 2nd sequential photo in that folder, 2nd image from the left in very first row of photos.
Rory Collins took this photo with his iPad and it also has GPS information embedded in the EXIF data.
Some of the EXIF data from this Rory Collins photo is as follows…
————————————————————————-
File Name: Headchangingdirectionsouth.JPG
Camera Make: Apple
Camera Model Name: iPad
Camera Software: 6.1.3
Date/Time Original: 2013:06:30 15:39:46
Create Date: 2013:06:30 15:39:46
GPS Latitude Ref: North
GPS Longitude Ref: West
GPS Altitude Ref: Above Sea Level
GPS Time Stamp: 22:39:45.82
GPS Img Direction Ref: True North
GPS Img Direction: 139.3157025
GPS Altitude: 2410.1 m Above Sea Level
GPS Latitude: 34 deg 16′ 37.80″ N
GPS Longitude: 112 deg 46′ 52.20″ W
GPS Position: 34 deg 16′ 37.80″ N, 112 deg 46′ 52.20″ W
———————————————————————————
The exact GPS Decimal coordinates for the spot on the ground directly beneath Collins’ airplane when he took this photo are as follows…
34.277167, -112.781167
At this particular moment… he was flying over the west end of Peeples Valley ( almost directly over the ‘Miner’s Camp Road’ area ) and the photo was taken looking SOUTHEAST towards Yarnell. The ‘Double Bar A Ranch’ was just out of frame at the bottom right and is marked with a red ‘balloon’ marker on the Google Earth imagery following the crossfade.
Yarnell is in the distance at the upper right and is also marked on the Google imagery following the crossfade.
The fire has already CHANGED DIRECTION and is still in the process of ‘rotating around’ towards Yarnell and would quickly be heading due SOUTH, as Collins noted in the filename he chose for this 1539 photo.
The ‘old-grader’ location and/or Brendan McDonough’s lookout mound are NOT visible in the distance in this photo.
Both of those things would be just ‘out of frame’ to the right off in the distance but the ‘firefront’ that would be photographed in the MacKenzie cellphone and CANON images can still be seen extending to the WEST and out towards he ‘anchor point’ area down there in the distance.
Just moments before taking this photo… the following conversation took place over the Air-To-Air channel ( as captured in one of the Panebaker Air Study Videos ) between Rory Collins and Thomas French in Bravo 33…
———————————————————————-
(AA – Rory Collins): Bravo three three… Air Attack.
(B33 – Thomas French): Go ahead Air Attack.
(AA – Rory Collins): Okay… if ya haven’t noticed they got a heck of a wind shift here… ah… we’ve got a lot of fire headed over towards… ah… Yarnell. Ya wanna swing around and take a look at that we’re gonna have to check somethin’ there… either… shortly… I think. And also… uh… nine one one, I believe, is off… uh… about 20 minutes out.
(B33 – Thomas French): Copy… we’re headed that way.
(AA – Rory Collins): Ground contact out there… ahhhh… I was talkin’ to… Alpha
(B33 – Thomas French): Ground contact Alpha.
———————————————————————–
Here is the new ‘Crossfade’ video for this Rory Collins aerial photo taken at about the same moment he was reporting this ‘wind shift’ to Thomas French in Bravo 33…
YouTube Video Title: Collins-1539-crossfade
Youtube Video Link…
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LchaQ3C-wnw
YouTube About information…
—————————————————————-
At exactly 15:39:46 ( 3:39:46 PM ) on June 30, 2013, Air Attack Rory Collins took this photograph with his iPad while flying over the west side of Peeples Valley and looking back to the southeast towards Yarnell.
Collins’ pilot was about to ‘timeout’ and Collins had just radioed Thomas French in Bravo 33 over the Air-To-Air channel that there was a “heck of wind shift” taking place and the fire was now “headed for Yarnell”.
The title for this photograph from the SAIT FOIA release is…
Headchangingdirectionsouth.JPG
This video ‘crossfades” ( twice ) from Collins’ photo down into the exact equivalent Google Earth ground imagery and then back ‘up’ to the photo again.
———————————————————————
Correction. Typo in the first paragraph above.
I type ‘4:39 PM’ instead of ‘3:39 PM’.
First paragraph above should have read…
There are a number of fascinating aerial photos taken by Air Attack Rory Collins on June 30, 2013… but one of the most interesting is the one he took at exactly 1539 ( 3:39 PM ) just before his pilot was about to ‘timeout’ and Collins would need to leave the Yarnell area.
Followup… it should be noted that in addition to his 15:39:46 photo named ‘Headchangingdirectionsouth.JPG’… Air Attack Rory Collins snapped ANOTHER photo with his iPad from the exact same aerial location and looking in the exact same direction ( towards Yarnell from Peeples Valley ) just 5 ( FIVE ) seconds later.
That would be his IMG_0289, taken at exactly 15:39:51.
There are actually TWO sequentially numbered ‘IMG_xxxx’ images MISSING from that folder just prior to IMG_0289. The image preceding that one is named IMG_0286… so that means his IMG_0287 and IMG_0288 photos are MISSING from that folder.
Obviously ONE of those TWO images must have been the one that was ‘renamed’ ( by Collins? by someone else? ) to ‘Headchangingdirectionsouth.JPG’… but that still means either the original IMG_0287 or IMG_0288 image is still ‘missing’ from the folder.
That second IMG_0289 image with the same view of the fire at 1539 ( 3:39 PM ) as the ‘Headchangingdirectionsouth.JPG’ photo are both in the same ‘RoryCollins Photos’ folder… which is HERE…
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/02ue6bnjp6nazkm/AABm0byZTHSeaZBY2TyiwJjya/Photos%20and%20Video/RoryCollins%20Photos?dl=0
I guess there are always surprises out there. With a little research I learned that Amanda Marsh has not evolved the widows or families or at least all of them she supposedly represents in any of the Memorial information..
She has been acting on her own until 2 family members volunteered to join on sub committees this last meeting so their thoughts could be represented.
There are some extremely different views about the Memorial between the Widows and Amanda
which need to be discussed and supported by all. If Amanda is their representative then she needs to represent all of the families and not just her personal opinions.
That is Harsh but it needs to be said—————
When you read the actual State of Arizona legislation that created this ‘Yarnell Hill Memorial Board’ and also allocated the half-million dollars of taxpayer dollars for that Board to use… it is still not exactly clear where the authority and/or responsibility was for choosing WHO would fill some of the designated positions.
Some designated Board positions were clear.
“The head of Arizona Forestry” is non-ambiguous and a no brainer.
Ditto for “A surviving member of the Granite Mountain Hotshots”. Also a no-brainer. There was only ONE person that was ever going to be… provided he was willing to volunteer for that PUBLIC position.
Other “designated Board member” positions were not so clear.
“A representative of the families of the fallen” automatically implied some kind of additional fair ‘selection process’ had to then take place.
As far as I know… there is no PUBLIC record of how that ‘selection process’ then took place.
One would ASSUME that all eligible persons were then informed and there was then some fair process required to take place so that there would at least be a consensus amongst the eligible candidates that the person chosen really does have the authority to represent that specific ‘group’.
Again… there doesn’t seem to be any documentation that anything even resembling a ‘fair’ selection process like that ever took place.
So that DOES beg the question… how WAS that Board position member ACTUALLY chosen?
WHO decided it was GOING to be Amanda Marsh?
Was it State Rep Karen Fann herself… and no other names were even considered? If so… was that even a LEGAL way to fill that PUBLIC Board position?
There was no consensus election or meeting to decide the representative.
according to my sources.
Amanda was out there operating on her own and other widows wanted to be involved to insure their ideas were herd.
The widows and families should be the charter members in this decision process
at least that is my take……………………
I was about to post a ‘followup’ thought to my post above and suggest that I suppose it is possible someone ‘polled’ all the eligible candidates for that Board position… and no one really WANTED to take on that PUBLIC Board position other than Amanda Marsh…
…but it sounds now like that was definitely NOT the case.
Correction for my post above.
There actually IS documentation about how each member of that Arizona State Parks Board SHOULD be selected. The actual House Bill itself has a ‘default’ indication for each member of the Board as to WHO should make the final decision about who it is going to be.
Arizona House Bill HB2624 is here…
http://www.azleg.gov/legtext/51leg/2r/bills/hb2624p.pdf
For Board position 7… from the Bill itself…
———————————————————–
7. A RELATIVE OF A MEMBER OF THE GRANITE MOUNTAIN HOTSHOT CREW WHO LOST HIS LIFE FIGHTING THE YARNELL HILL FIRE, WHO IS APPOINTED BY THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.
———————————————————–
Notice that it does NOT simply say ‘widows’ or even ‘direct family member’. It says that ANY ‘relative’ of any of the Hotshots was/is ‘eligible’ to fulfill that position number 7 on that PUBLIC board.
So… ultimately… the choice was up to Arizona State Speaker of the House Andy Tobin.
SIDENOTE: Republican Tobin ran for US Congress in 2014 but he lost to Democrat Kirkpatrick 52.5%-47.5%.
Andy Tobin was also ultimately responsible for ‘selecting’ 6 other positions on that Arizona State Parks Board… and there was a PRESS release from his office after making his final selection ( Brendan McDonough ).
That press release is here…
http://www.azleg.gov/press/House/51leg/2R/2014_08_26_YARNELLAPPOINTMENT.PDF
From the press release…
————————————————————
SPEAKER TOBIN APPOINTS FINAL MEMBER TO
YARNELL MEMORIAL BOARD
STATE CAPITOL, PHOENIX (Aug. 26, 2014) – Speaker of the House Andy Tobin appoints Brendan McDonough, the surviving member of the Granite Mountain Hotshots crew, to serve on the Yarnell Memorial Site Board.
“I am elated that Mr. McDonough agreed to accept the appointment,” said Speaker Andy Tobin. “It is so important that we memorialize the spirit and valor of these firefighters for their families, their communities and our state.”
McDonough marks the seventh and final appointment to the Board by Speaker Tobin. Last June the Speaker made the first six appointments:
1. Former Prescott Fire Chief Dan Fraijo
2. Hotshot Commander’s widow Amanda Marsh
3. Yarnell Fire District Chief Ben Palm
4. Yarnell Chamber of Commerce President Chuck Tidey
5. Prescott Fire Department Wildland Division Chief Darrell Williams
6. Arizona House Representative Karen Fann, as a non-voting advisory member
House Bill 2624 established the board to oversee the creation of a memorial site for the 19 wildland firefighters that perished one year ago June 30 battling the Yarnell Hill fire.
————————————————————
There don’t appear to be any press releases from his office prior to this one detailing how ANY of the other ‘selections’ were made… or whether even any/all of the other eligible candidates for those positions were ever considered.
Another followup.
Sorry… not having a good ‘Google’ day.
I was searching for press releases from Tobin’s office and didn’t see any regarding his first SIX selections… but there WAS a press release from the AZ Legislature press office itself about those when they happened in June of 2014.
http://www.azleg.gov/press/House/51leg/2R/2014_06_28YARNELLAPPOINTMENTS.PDF
From the AZ Legislature Press Release…
—————————————————–
NEWS RELEASE
ARIZONA HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
1700 West Washington – Phoenix, Arizona, 85007-2844
PHONE: (602) 926-3233 – FAX: (602) 417-3043
Speaker of the House Andy Tobin, R-Prescott (Dist. 01)
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
TOBIN APPOINTS MEMBERS TO YARNELL
MEMORIAL SITE BOARD
STATE CAPITOL, PHOENIX (June. 28, 2014) – Speaker of the House Andy Tobin makes six of his seven appointments to the Yarnell Memorial Site Board.
House Bill 2624 setup the board to oversee the creation of a memorial site for the 19 wildland firefighters that perished one year ago June 30 battling the Yarnell Hill fire. “It is with both a deep sense of loss and a desire to preserve the memory of these men that I fulfill my duty,” said Speaker Tobin. “My heart goes out the families of these firefighters and my hope is the memorial will serve to remind us of the spirit and valor of these men.”
The six appointments by the Speaker are:
* Former Prescott Fire Chief Dan Fraijo
* Hotshot commander’s widow Amanda Marsh
* Yarnell Fire District Chief Ben Palm
* Yarnell Chamber of Commerce President Chuck Tidey
* Prescott Fire Department Wildland Division Chief Darrell Williams
* Arizona House Representative Karen Fann, as a non-voting advisory member
END OF PRESS RELEASE
—————————————————–
Once again… absolutely NO detail about how these ‘appointments’ actually came to be… or who ELSE was considered for ANY of the positions.
There seems an odd aspect of social rank going on here. Clearly EM led Granite Mountain, subject to Willis. It is not so clear to me that, among the survivors, social rank and leadership need to be given in accordance with the rank and leadership that the decedents had. It also is not clear to me why Willis should have any special standing currently with the court system. I understand that, socially, he is still quite plugged-in. But, substantively, he had a huge mess occur on his watch. Does that give him special rights to be listened to about who should be able to say what, where? It would seem from my perspective that anyone in his shoes would, simply due to the experience they had been through, be prone to being anything but impartial. We don’t let involved doctors decide who gets to talk regarding discussion of operating room “:incidents.”
Prescott is a SMALL TOWN with the equivalent SMALL TOWN culture.
There really is no doubt about that.
Darrell Willis is also, no doubt, has PLC status in that area ( Prominent Local Citizen ).
Heck, he was actual ‘Fire Chief’ for 14 years and also served as stint as the actual ‘City Manager’ of Prescott during that time and somewhere in there is also a stint as ‘Emergency Services Manager’ before he officially ‘retired’ and then started ‘double dipping’ with both full pension and full salary as ‘Prescott Wildland Division Chief’.
What adds to the confusion about this whole thing now is what Sonny seems to be saying about his presence at the hearing. Somewhere in there he starts talking about OTHER ‘widows’ and relating his own third party ‘hearsay’ to the Judge… and ( somehow? ) some stuff about wether ‘Psychics’ should be allowed to get anywhere near the deployment site.
What in the hell does that have to do with whether or not some ONE ( single ) individual has any reason to fear ‘bodily harm’ from some other person… which is the TOTALITY of what that hearing was supposed to be about.
It almost sounds like the hearing devolved from just trying to verify/settle one very specific ( and very serious ) claim of ‘potential bodily harm’ from one person to another into some kind of “Please stop this person from doing all kinds of things we don’t want her to be doing… now and in the future”.
If the frickin’ CASE information ever appears in the PUBLIC Court records ( as is it required by LAW to appear )… then I suppose anyone can just go look at the specifics of the case itself and the ‘results’… but there are aspects of this that just sound like they are ‘off the reservation’, legally speaking.
From Darrell Willis’ BIO from the ‘talk cirucuit’ when he was the invited ‘keynote speaker’ at the 2014 Roseville, CA ‘Police and Fire Awards Ceremony’…
http://www.rosevillecityawards.com/?page_id=266
——————————————————————-
Darrell Willis is an Arizona native who grew up in a fire service family. Darrell is currently the Wildland Division Chief for the City of Prescott, AZ. Prior to that, Darrell was the Fire Chief of Prescott for 14 years. Prior to being promoted to Fire Chief Darrell spent 9 years as Deputy Chief in Prescott. Darrell started his career in the fire service in 1975 as a volunteer firefighter in Bullhead City, Arizona then moved to the Mesa Fire Department for a 9-year stint before moving to Prescott. During his 14 years as chief, Darrell was appointed as interim City Manager for a 4-month period while a search for a permanent manager was conducted. Darrell is a member of the IAFC, AFCA serving two terms as president, NFPA, Governor’s Forest Health Committee, and Prescott Area Wildland Urban Interface Commission. Darrell is an Operations Section Chief on the Central West Zone Incident Management Type ll Team and has served as a Division Supervisor and Structure Protection Specialist on one of the Southwest Regions Type l teams. Under Darrell’s leadership the Wildland Division and Granite Mountain Hotshots were established.
Darrell is married to his High School sweetheart, Judy, they have 3 grown children and 5 grandchildren. Darrell’s son Jared, is a six year veteran with the Prescott Police Department as a patrol officer and SWAT team member. Darrell is a member of the Board of Directors with the Prescott Salvation Army.
—————————————————————————–
Ms. Marsh has gotten on with her life personally, and we should congratulate her for her new/ old relationship and living arrangements. More crucially, predating Yarnell, Ms. Marsh was on the board of a non profit 501 3c for equines, and her role was destructive at best for the residents. What this means for this discussion is that her appointment to these boards were not an accident, and seems to be typical of the local “good old boys” strategy of co-opting potential opposition by a few well placed honorifics to the “squeaky wheels” . As readers may recollect, Amanda threw a pretty high profile melt down at the Prescott City Council meeting. The “appointment” was perhaps an effort of Mr. Tobin and Ms. Fann to keep her both quiet and in the tent….An interesting tale.
A update from sonny this morning is much better and more info.
Joy can hike to the area, She can go to meetings.
She can converse here or any where just not about the plaintiff or the other spouses.
The letter was fairly long but that is the basics.
Ted Putnam actually showed up on Joys Behalf.
So way better than last night.
Hopefully we will get more from Sonny or Joy They spent most of the day in court.
Reply to Bob Powers post on January 9, 2015 at 8:56 am
>> Bob Powers said…
>>
>> Joy can hike to the area, She can go to meetings.
>> She can converse here or any where just not about the
>> plaintiff or the other spouses.
Wow. Okay. So… this really was just some sort of ‘scare tactic’ because someone just wanted someone else to stop talking about them?
In Amanda Marsh’s case… I’d say that is still a bit problematic.
Amanda Marsh is NOT just ‘one of the spouses’ anymore.
She, herself, has chosen to go “all in” with any number of highly PUBLIC roles in an attempt to honor the Granite Mountain Hotshots. Admirable… but that comes with its own responsibilities on HER part to be tolerant of what others might have to say.
She has CHOSEN to make herself a PUBLIC figure in any number of ways by creating her own media-launched “Eric Marsh Wildland Firefighters” FOUNDATION with a very PUBLIC ‘mission’… and a NATIONWIDE scope… and then listing herself ( publicly ) as the ‘sole contact’ for that organization.
She has also CHOSEN to accept a very PUBLIC role on the Arizona State Board as the representative of the families of the fallen Hotshots. That position alone means she IS now ‘answerable to the public’ for her decisions and actions with regards to the activities of this PUBLIC Board.
AND (additionally) she (supposedly) has now agreed to be on that Board’s sub-committee that will be doing all the PUBLIC FUNDRAISING. That, itself, is not for the timid and about as PUBLIC a role as anyone can take on.
I wonder if the final ‘court order’ contains any kind of specific CONTEXT regarding what can be said or not said?
In other words… did an Arizona Citizen named Joy Collura just lose her constitutional RIGHTS to even say anything about the activities of a certain Arizona PUBLIC Board member… or is it just more in the “no personal comments, please” category?
Evidently the Memorial Board made some decisions about the site that were
released to the Daily Courier’
Board wants State to buy Hotshots site.
WTKTT may be you can check and post for us.
There was a large MEDIA presence at the January 6, 2015 meeting of the Yarnell Hill Memorial Site Board… including DCOURIER and AZCENTRAL.
It went mainstream and so there are also many MSM articles.
Just Google “Yarnell memorial” and they will fill the search results.
The DCOURIER article is here…
http://dcourier.com/main.asp?SectionID=1&SubSectionID=1086&ArticleID=140375
Yes… there apparently WAS a VOTE with regards to whether the Board should pursue the options for purchasing the land where the deployment site is… and that vote was (apparently) unanimous and included ‘Yes’ votes from both Amanda Marsh and State Rep Karen Fann.
However… none of the media articles actually make it clear whether this vote was to simply go ahead an ‘research’ the purchase… or whether this was the actual commitment vote on the part of the Board to actually MAKE the purchase.
Regardless… it was also made clear at this meeting that no matter what this Board decides… those are ‘State Trust’ lands being held for the benefit of the Arizona Public School System… and so there MUST eventually be a public AUCTION for the land. The State can’t just say “it’s ours now”. So I suppose if that small group of widows really still does want to purchase the same land and control any/all access to the deployment site… they could still show up at the eventual AUCTION and be actually ‘bidding’ for it against the State of Arizona.
They also decided to create at least FOUR different sub-committees during this meeting and they were allowing members of the board to volunteer to head up and/or be on these sub-committees.
According to Arizona Law… now that this State Board has created these specific sub-committees… ANY Arizona citizen is welcome to ‘apply and serve’ on ANY of them. There’s even a phone number to call to ‘volunteer’ to serve on these sub-committees.
In addition to her regular responsibilities on the Board… Amanda Marsh volunteered to also be on the PUBLIC FUNDRAISING sub-committee.
From the DCOURIER article…
————————————————————–
The board created four subcommittees.
Citizens are welcome to apply to serve on the subcommittees by emailing Martyn at [email protected] or calling 602-542-7107.
Roxanne Warneke, widow of Granite Mountain Hotshot Billy Warneke, agreed to serve on the fundraising subcommittee.
Amanda Marsh, a board member and widow of Granite Mountain Hotshots Superintendent Eric Marsh, also volunteered to serve on the fundraising subcommittee alongside Arizona Fire District Association Director John Flynn.
Yarnell Fire Chief Ben Palm will serve on the access subcommittee that will recommend whether the public should have access to the site and, if so, whether the access should be a trail or road. Right now the site is closed to the public.
Yavapai County Supervisor Rowle Simmons, former Prescott Fire Chief Dan Fraijo, and the State Forester will serve on the site maintenance subcommittee. State Forester Scott Hunt recently retired.
————————————————————–
The MINUTES from this meeting still haven’t been published, but according to Arizona Law they still have until the end of TODAY to do that.
There is, however, a PRESENTATION document that was published just before the meeting that was simply a Power-Point slide presentation that was reflecting the major items from the also pre-published agenda.
This ‘Power Point’ slide show was played DURING the Jan 6 meeting and you can see some of the slides being shown at the meeting in some of the photos taken by the MEDIA at the meeting itself.
The important thing about this PowerPoint document is that it DOES contain an actual MAP of the entire 250 acres the Board is considering purchasing.
The map shows that the area under consideration goes RIGHT up to the Boulder Springs Ranch fenceline, to the EAST… and that it does go all the way up to the actual ‘ridgeline’ to the WEST… which means the two-track where the ‘Descent Point’ is located would, in fact, be part of the purchase.
There’s already a LINK in this message so I’ll post the direct link to that PDF file and MAP as a ‘Reply’ to this message.
The online link to that exact PRESENTATION document ( a PDF file ) that was posted just before the meeting ( and contains the MAP ) is here…
http://azstateparks.com/committees/downloads/Yarnell_Memorial_Cmte_PowerPoint_01-06-15.pdf
**
** SAIT INVESTIGATOR WACHTER SITE VISIT PHOTOS CONTAIN ALL OF THE FOLLOWING…
**
** ACTUAL CLOSEUPS OF BSR FRONT GATE SECURITY CAMERA
** ACTUAL PHOTOS SHOWING SAIT INVESTIGATORS COPYING CAMERA DATA
** ACTUAL PHOTOS OF THE PUMPKIN THAT WAS SET UP AT BSR
In THIS folder in InvestigativeMEDIA’s SAIT online Dropbox…
SAIT-FOIA\Photos and Video\Wachter Site Visit Photos\July 7 visit
Actual CLOSEUPS of the Helm’s front gate security camera…
IMG_1012
IMG_1013 ( Best closeup view of Helm’s front gate security camera )
IMG_1014
What SAIT investigator Wachter actually seemed to be doing here was taking closeups of parts of the Boulder Springs Ranch that were showing how the EMBERS and ASH got all over everything. He was particularly fascinated with this as he was walking around the compound photographing windows, sides of buildings… and the actual front gate SECURITY camera itself ( covered with ASH ).
IMG_1015 through IMG_1019 also show the camera mounted on the corner of the building and pointed at the main gate.
If you zoom in on the camera lens… it says ‘spec technologies’ in an oval around the camera lens.
* SPECO TECHNOLGIES
This is the ‘product info’ page for the exact camera used at the Helm’s Ranch…
http://www.specotech.com/index.php/products/video/cameras/analog/item/106-ht7048irvf
Product information…
————————————————————————-
Analog Camera: HT7048IRVF
Day/Night Weather Resistant Bullet Cameras
with Digital Noise Reduction, 2.8-12mm Lens, Dark Grey Housing
Oval shape – Two spotlights attached.
————————————————————————-
** INVESTIGATORS COPYING SECURITY CAMERA FOOTAGE TO LAPTOPS
IMG_1023 shows someone actually accessing ( and copying? ) the security camera footage ( with a laptop ) right there in the Helms’ garage.
You can see the front gate video footage being displayed right on the guy’s laptop as he is ‘accessing’ it and ( presumably ) just copying the data to that laptop.
This looks like the guy from the USDA ‘San Dimas Technologies’ lab… same people that processed the Panebaker videos for the SAIT.
Ditto for IMG_1024. Another guy in an orange shirt is accessing the security camera footage right there in the Helms’ garage.
NOTE: This does NOT appear to be Mr. Lee Helm himself. Mr. Helm is president of the Peeples Valley Historical Society and there are a number of PUBLIC photos of him online and this guy in the orange shirt does NOT appear to be him.
They are using a DC-to-AC power converter plugged into the red ‘Wrangler ER’ jeep. It’s sitting on the passenger side car seat and a white extension cord is running to the equipment set up there next to the jeep on a rolling cart.
** WHERE THE PUMPKIN WAS ACTUALLY SET UP AT THE RANCH
IMG_1149 clearly shows the ‘pumpkin’ that was set up there at the Helms Ranch the afternoon of Saturday, June 29, 2013… when ICT4 Russ Shumate was still in charge of the Yarnell Fire.
IMG_1016 through IMG_1019 actually show the orange pumpkin as well, but not as good as IMG_1149.
It was in an ODD spot. VERY close to the Llama barns. If ICT4 Russ Shumate really did intend for this pumpkin to be used as a chopper dip site AFTER he got into deep tapioca on Saturday afternoon… it looks like it would have been very difficult for a chopper to access it at all.
Regardless… these are the FIRST PHOTOS I’ve seen of exactly WHERE that orange pumpkin was actually ‘set up’ at the Boulder Springs Ranch ( and remained throughout the tragic following day… Sunday, June 30, 2013 ).
Here is a direct link to that July 7, 2013 ‘Wachter Site Visit’ Folder containing all
the images referenced above…
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/02ue6bnjp6nazkm/AAAgEpvfyRH_vfGLvtOaswV9a/Photos%20and%20Video/Wachter%20Site%20Visit%20Photos/July%207%20visit?lst
Followup… IMG_1022,JPG in that same ‘Wachter’ folder also appears to show that ‘burned up air conditioning unit’ at the Boulder Springs Ranch which is also mentioned in the over 7 million dollars worth of damages being claimed by Lee and DJ Helm as a result of the Yarnell Hill Fire.
SAIT Co-Lead ( and USFS Employee ) Mike Dudley actually mentions this ‘air conditioning unit’ in his public speech to those Utah firefighters on June 20, 2014.
Dudley was trying to say that was the ONLY damage whatsoever at the Boulder Springs Ranch that day as the fire burned around it.
That is NOT the case ( Lee and DJ Helm are claiming more than 7 million dollars in damage in their own lawsuit against Arizona Forestry ) but here is what Dudley actually said to that roomful of firefighters…
Mike Dudley
—————————————————
The Yarnell Ranch… or.. the Boulder Creek Ranch, that we call it…
that was a place that was put in and the owners of that ranch had the
capability to defend it and build it to a standard that they knew they
would never have to worry about leaving it… and they were in place
when the fire ran all the way around them… and the only problem they
ran into… they lost one air-conditioning unit off of a… uh… warehouse.
That’s it. They were totally fine.
—————————————————
Another followup… regarding the SECURITY CAMERA.
These Wachter photos are some of the best ones available showing different ‘closeups’ and ‘angles’ on the actual BUILDINGS there at the Boulder Springs Ranch.
He appears to even be the only person with a camera that bothered to go up onto the ‘patio’ attached to the residence and take pictures from there… including ‘closeups’ of the ASH residue all over the WINDOWS of the residence itself.
However… even with these ‘better’ photos of the buildings… I am still not seeing any definite proof that there was more than just the one SECURITY CAMERA there at the compound. The one on the corner of that building focused on the front gate.
There are still some strange little ‘black boxes’ there near the corners of the garage attached to the residence that SEEM to be facing WEST ( and out towards the box canyon and deployment site ) and they do NOT appear to be ‘lighting fixtures’…
…but there is no doubt now that they do NOT resemble that security camera that was installed near the front gate. That SPECO camera was actually quite large and fitted with those two spotlights as well.
So if there really were any OTHER ‘Security Cameras’ installed there at that Ranch… I think it is safe to say they were NOT additional ‘SPECO’ brand cameras like the one used at the front gate. We would definitely be seeing them since they are large.
If there were any other cameras there… they must have been SMALLER and a different make/model than what was being used at the front gate.
**
** POSSIBLE REAL LOCATION OF WHITE ‘FUSEE’ SLAG
NOTE: This is a continuation of a thread from down below.
>> On January 6, 2015 at 10:37 pm, WTKTT said…
>>
>> Mr. Powers…
>> Just to be CLEAR, though… you are talking about THIS ‘Petrilli Site Visit’ folder…
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/02ue6bnjp6nazkm/AADARLUWUwoIm5q5vJundOQJa/Photos%20and%20Video/Petrilli%20Site%20Visit%20Photos%20%281%29#/
>> and IMG_0284 in that folder, yes? ( 11th sequential image, 1st image on 3rd row down ).
>>
>> That’s the photo with the guy’s shoes in the bottom and that squiggly
>> piece of white crap lying there on the ground at the TOP of the photo?
>>
>> THAT is ‘fusee slag’?
>>
>> On January 7, 2015 at 9:06 am, Bob Powers responded…
>>
>> Yes that is correct I have seen it in some other pictures but could not tell you where
>> this one would indicate it was thrown or dropped during burn out and deployment
>> as it is all in one place or a large portion of it. Nothing else around it would say
>> thrown or dropped out of the deployment area.
>>
>> On January 7, 2015 at 10:37 am, WTKTT responded…
>>
>> Thank you. I’m seeing if I can nail down exactly where that particular piece of
>> ground is relative to where the shelters were actually deployed.
As it turns out… the very next Petrilli image seems to show the same ‘white slag’ on the ground but from a wider perspective.
This image… IMG_0285.JPG
It’s a little hard to describe where it is on the ground in this image but stick with me for a moment and I think you will easily see it.
This is the image that shows a ‘cut staub’ in the dead center of the photo that has a small orange FLAG attached to it… and in the upper left quadrant of the photo ( in the background ) we are seeing one of the chainsaws left at the site. Just in front of that ‘chainsaw’ there in the upper left quadrant is also a pile of debris that represents just another melted field pack with exposed SIG fuel containers, etc.
Just to the RIGHT of that field pack debris is what looks like a small grey aluminum ‘cup’ sitting on the ground. It’s probably not ‘actually’ a ‘cup’ and just some of the same kind of ‘circular metal flange’ material seen in other photos… but for all intents and purposes in THIS photo it really does look like a metal ‘cup’ just sitting there.
Directly in FRONT of that ‘metal cup’ in this photo is a small WHITE ‘slash’ on the ground.
THAT appears to be the same ‘fusee slag’ seen in the previous image IMG_0284.
If you can ZOOM on that spot… you will see two things in addition to the ‘white slag’.
At the RIGHT of the slag line is a small cylindrical ‘cap’ that looks very much like the ‘cap’ that would be on the end of a fusee. That ‘cap’ is seen there at the end of the slag mark in both IMG_0285 and IMG_0284.
Ditto for that ‘triangular rock’ that is on the ground just above the slag mark. That same rock is seen in both photos. In the IMG_0284 ‘closeup’ of the slag… that triangular rock is there at the very top right corner of the photo.
SIDENOTE: Petrilli’s IMG_0283, taken just BEFORE the IMG_0284 closeup of the slag, shows the same ‘field pack’ debris as IMG_0285… in closeup. That ‘metal cup’ also seen in IMG_0285 is there on the very left frame of IMG_0283, in the lower left corner. So given the sequence of these photos it appears that Petrilli was photographing that field pack in IMG_0283, then he stepped just slightly to his LEFT and past that ‘little grey metal cup’… and THEN he pointed his camera DOWN to take that IMG_0284 closeup of that white slag and that little metal ‘cap’ right by it. Then Pertrilli moved slightly away from both the pack debris and the white slag and took that ‘wider view’ image IMG_0285 showing the same pack now in the background.
** So where is that ‘white slag’, really, in relation to the SHELTERS?
Unfortunately… there is no GPS data embedded in Pertrilli’s CANON Powershot G15 photos… but with that field pack debris and that chainsaw to reference… it’s pretty safe to say this ‘slag mark’ was on the WINDWARD side of the deployment site… about 20 feet northeast of where the cluster of shelters was found.
It looks like that chainsaw and that particular field pack was purposely left OUTSIDE the spot where the actual deployment was going to take place. Almost as if whoever was using that saw put it down near the edge of the WINDWARD side of the clearing, then took their pack off and also put it down near that same WINDWARD edge… and then they just dropped a fusee right there on the ground and moved southwest to center of the area where everyone was deploying.
If that really is ‘fusee slag’ on the ground there in Petrilli’s IMG_0284… then there are actually any number of these little pieces of ‘slag’ on the ground and a pattern seems to be emerging for them.
They ALL seem to be on the WINDWARD side of the deployment area.
I suppose that would make sense, yes? If you are doing an emergency ‘burnout’ like that to try and improve the size of your deployment area… would you normally do that on the WINDWARD side of the area… or the LEEWARD side?… or BOTH at the same time?
Try to burn behind you and he deployment site fine fuels then set fire between you and the fire coming at you in hopes that the main fire would pull your fire to it If your to late the larger fire would just run at you any way.
1. burn out the fine fuel in the deployment area
2. set fire behind you and to the sides
3 set fire in front of the fire coming
Because of the small area they may have compounded their problem and caused a swirl or
a micro oven effect. sucked the main fire into the canyon pulling fire in all around them.
It is hard to say what happened in that canyon except there was a natural chimney that affected every thing.
The Firing out did not improve their situation or the safe area they were trying to increase.
Heat, Slope, Wind and a natural funnel.
Thank you. I certainly haven’t launched on any kind of ‘definitive study’ of where ALL of this ‘fusee slag’ might be seen in ALL of the photos… but from what I’ve looked at so far I would say there is definite evidence of your number THREE…
3) set fire in front of the fire coming.
The ‘slag’ I’m seeing so far definitely seems to be ‘in a line’ from the northwest to the southwest and definitely on the WINDWARD side of the deployment site.
That WOULD indicate a definite attempt to ‘ignite’ the WINDWARD side of the area that was directly facing the oncoming firefront. It was coming at them from an ANGLE at 90 degrees to the slag marks I’m seeing. ( Fire was coming into the canyon via that ‘draw’ and roughly moving at them FROM the northeast and TOWARDS the southwest. At least prior to deployment, anyway.
I agree with you that this ‘burnout’ might have actually CAUSED them more problems that it solved. The whole plan might have (excuse the pun) ‘backfired’ on them and the results were not what they intended.
In other words… the way the winds were picking up every second… the area might have just ‘ignited’ and robbed them of whatever precious little TIME they had left to finish improving the site and getting into their shelters.
As for your steps ‘1’ and ‘2’… I believe the best chance to determine if they took those steps was when the site was first examined. They could have ‘tested for accelerants’ all around that site and had a pretty good idea where they might have been used. Unless that was ACTUALLY done ( and we still simply don’t even know about that and that information is just more being withheld from FOIA requests ) I think that opportunity is now long lost.
Maybe all the photos could still provide more of ‘the story’ there. I don’t know.
All I know is that I still think it WAS and IS important to try and reconstruct, as best as possible, what actually happened out there.
Example: If there is evidence that they really did have the TIME to execute ALL of the ‘burnout your safety zone’ steps that you list above… then that just adds more ‘minutes’ to the TIME they must have had that day between when they sensed the danger and when they finally deployed.
More later.
Whoops. Typo above near the start of the Reply. Got my ‘directions’ messed up.
Meant to say…
The ‘slag’ I’m seeing so far definitely seems to be ‘in a line’ from the NORTHWEST to the SOUTHEAST and definitely on the WINDWARD side of the deployment site.
In other words… at a 90 degree angle to the approaching fireline.
**
** MINUTES FROM YARNELL HILL MEMORIAL SITE BOARD MEETING
Well… the Yarnell Hill Memorial Site Board has finally complied with Arizona Law ( sort of ) and has finally published detailed minutes from one of their meetings… but they have ONLY done so for the FIRST meeting they held back on November 24, 2014.
Apparently… someone on this ‘Board’ thinks that they are not required to publish the minutes of their meeting until the NEXT meeting… and those minutes from the PREVIOUS meeting are then ‘approved’ as part of the normal meeting process.
That is NOT the case.
Regardless of whether the minutes of an ‘Arizona Open Meeting’ will be approved and/or amended at the START of the NEXT meeting… those (required) minutes from ANY meeting are supposed to be made PUBLIC within 72 hours folllowing ANY meeting.
Once again… the official link to ALL of the RULES that must be observed by this ‘Yarnell Hill Memorial Site Board’ is here…
https://www.azag.gov/sites/default/files/sites/all/docs/agency-handbook/ch07.pdf
The following excerpt from that (legal) document concering the rules and regs that any ‘Arizona Open Board’ must follow actually goes out of its way to make SURE these Boards understand that they are NOT supposed to wait until their NEXT meeting to publish the minutes of any meeting that is held. You can mark them as ‘draft minutes’… but they still have to be published within 72 hours.
From that document…
————————————————————————
7.8.1 Form of and Access to the Minutes. Minutes may be taken in writing or may be recorded by a tape recorder or video tape recorder. A.R.S. § 38-431.01(B); see Forms 7.10, 7.11. The minutes or a recording of a public meeting MUST be available for public inspection within THREE working days AFTER the meeting. A.R.S. § 38-431.01(D).
Public bodies concerned about distributing minutes before they have been officially approved at a subsequent meeting should mark the minutes “draft” or “unapproved” and make them available within three working days of the meeting. If the minutes have been recorded by a mechanical recorder, allowing the public to have access to that recording is sufficient. However, if the minutes were taken in shorthand, those minutes must be typed or written out in longhand in order to comply with this requirement.
————————————————————————
So here is a direct link to the only ‘minutes’ they have only now gotten around to publishing.
They are from last year’s 11/24/13 meeting…
http://azstateparks.com/committees/downloads/minutes/2014/YARNELL_DRAFT_MINUTES_11-24-14.pdf
There some pretty important information in here for anyone concerned with how this whole process is going to take place, and WHY some things are going to go down in a certain way.
Examples…
1. Even if this Board decides that the State of Arizona itself should ‘purchase’ the ‘State Trust land’ ( and not allow the small group of widows who want to buy the land to have it )… that process could take up to a YEAR and, even then, Arizona law says there must be a PUBLIC AUCTION. So even if that small group of widows gets ‘shut out’ of the official process of acquiring the land for the memorial site… they could still show up at this PUBLIC AUCTION and be ‘bidding’ against the State of Arizona itself.
2. A lot of the land being proposed for acquisition belongs to private property owners… but NONE of the State allocated money can be used to settle those issues. Whatever monies are needed for THOSE acquisitions must come from ‘additional fundraising’.
3. They have to decide what to do with the FLAG that is out there. Some Board members suggest it just be removed back to the highway. Others were concerned about the impact its been having on the Helm’s Ranch. Board Director Bryan Martyn ( with Arizona State Parks Division ) reminded them all that while they might consider it… it’s not really their job to worry about Lee and DJ Helm at all.
That section of the ‘minutes’ looks like this…
——————————————————————–
4. Discussion of the Flagpole Currently Erected on the Site.
Mr. Tidey had requested this item be placed on the agenda. Mr. Martyn said the board does not have authority to take down the flagpole currently on site, but the board does need to discuss it. Mr. Tidey stated that his concern with the flagpole is the Helms family as they see the flag every day and the light that is lighting it. He suggested that the flagpole be moved back to hide from their view or even move it to the memorial park in town with a plaque stating where the flag was flown previously. The Yarnell Hill Recovery Group owns the flagpole that was erected by APS. The State Land Department didn’t comment on the flagpole, but did issue a Right of Entry for the Yarnell Fire Department to maintain the area.
Director Martyn reminded the members that helping the plight of the Helms family is not in the purview of the body.
———————————————————————–
There is a lot of other VERY interesting information in this document for anyone interested.
A LOT more was talked about and decided in the most recent January 6, 2015 meeting.
Apparently… there was a ‘unanimous’ vote by this Board to go ahead and BEGIN the process of researching the State of Arizona purchasing the land… but information is sketchy in the media articles about the meeting as to whether this is a definite COMMITMENT to buying the land.
They have also now decided to break into 4 different sub-committees to handle specific issues like ‘design of the memorial’, ACCESS to the site, additional fundrasing, etc.
Yarnell Fire Chief Ben Palm is now actually in CHARGE of the sub-committee that is supposed to make recommendations to the Board regarding ‘site access’.
The other interesting thing is that now that this Board has formed official ‘sub-committees’ with specific tasks… Arizona law says that ANY citizen of the State of Arizona could now request to be part of that ‘sub-committee’.
In other words…. even if they don’t want Joy Collura to attend any of these Board meetings… Joy Collura has the right to actually now SERVE on the ‘Site Access Sub-Committee’ that was just created by this Board.
I actually can’t think of anyone better who SHOULD serve on that ‘site Access’ committee than someone who has been HIKING that very same area for years now.
I guess we’ll see if they follow Arizona Law this time and make the minutes for THAT most recent meeting immediately available… or whether they are going to do what they just did and wait until the NEXT meeting before they release minutes form the PREVIOUS meeting.
I have a question concerning a Rory Collins photo that is numbered 45 of 49 and is titled LookingSE.jpg.
There appears to be two trucks in the lower right corner of the image. There also appears to be a freshly cleared area around those two trucks.
Are those the GM Supt and chase trucks?
Correct, Calvin.
Thanks.
Why is the Supt truck in Mcdonough;s photos taken at 1549 facing away from town toward the old grader/ and his lookout spot? Obviously the Supt truck is not parked in the same place at 1549 as it is in Rory Collins’s photo.
Is the GM Supt truck closer to the old grader area (away from town) in Mcdonough’s photo than earlier in Collins photo?
I guess what I am saying is that it doesn’t appear that Mcdonough just opened the door of the Supt truck, started the engine and snap some photos.
The GM Supt truck had been moved from its location in the Rory Collins photo before the pictures were taken by Mcdonough.
How far was the truck moved, and how does that affect the timeline for when Mcdonough actually arrived at the Supt truck?
Reply to calvin post on January 8, 2015 at 8:55 pm
>> calvin said…
>>
>> I guess what I am saying is that it doesn’t appear that
>> Mcdonough just opened the door of the Supt truck,
>> started the engine and snap some photos.
That’s what I was actually just about to point out myself.
I would AGREE that those two vehicles on the ground there in that Rory Collins photo *appear* to be the GM Supt and Chase trucks… but that is NOT where they were when Brendan McDonough stood on the gunwale of one of them and snapped his photos of that ‘smoke devil’ just after being dropped off at the vehicles by Frisby.
By all accounts… the GM Supt and Chase trucks were driven some distance WEST along that east-west trail that connects to the Sesame area before they were ‘parked’ right there on the two-track.
They are seen THERE in Joy Collura’s photos and NOT at this point shown in Rory Collins’ photo.
That point in Collins’ photo showing vehicles is simply the top end of the Sesame clearing area where that east-west two track out to the old-grader actually BEGINS. That ‘intersection’ is seen clearly there in Collins’ photo.
So YES… a bit of a mystery here.
>> calvin also said…
>>
>> The GM Supt truck had been moved from its location
>> in the Rory Collins photo before the pictures were
>> taken by Mcdonough.
That would appear to be the case… but if those really are the GM vehicles also seen in Joy Collura’s photos from that morning… then they were ALREADY out where Brendan would take his photos even early that morning.
>> calvin also said…
>>
>> How far was the truck moved, and how does that affect
>> the timeline for when Mcdonough actually arrived at
>> the Supt truck?
Good question. Even better question would be WHO ‘moved them’?
More later.
Something else to NOTE in that Rory Collins photo is exactly what the VLAT is doing.
It shows that when ‘Bravo 3’ ( Warbis and Lenmark ) arrived on the scene circa NOON and ( after using VLAT for a drop near the Double Bar A Ranch )… and then they flew around the fire and determined that the fire WAS going to head into Yarnell THAT day… during that THAT burn cycle… the ‘plan’ they came up with ( on their own ) wasn’t just ‘dump retardant in the fuel’.
Warbis and Lenmark determined that Granite Mountain was already ‘out of the game’ ( as early as 12:30 PM ) and that Blue Ridge was doing NOTHING but sitting around their Crew Carriers.
They decided SOMEONE had to SOMETHING to try and protect Yarnell from what they were sure was going to happen THAT afternoon.
But as Rory Collins’ photo shows… there was still a ‘method to their madness’. They KNEW that just dumping retardant into the unburned fuel didn’t stand much of a chance… so they really were trying to increase the chance of it meaning anything by following that other TRAIL that is clearly visible there on the ground in Rory Collins’ photo.
Problem was… that is NOT the ‘two track’ that had already been ‘improved’ with the dozer… nor was it the ‘two-track’ that SPGS1 Gary Cordes seemed to think they had a chance to ‘burn out’ even later that afternoon.
That two-track that Warbis and Lenmark were trying to ‘follow’ with the west-to-east retardant drops was NORTH of Brendan’s lookout mound…. and hadn’t been ‘improved’ at all that day.
I still find it hard to believe that Division ‘A’ Eric Marsh would not have either been involved in this massive retardant line that Warbis and Lenmark decided needed to be done… or that he wouldn’t have even had the chance for any INPUT about it… but that really does appear to be the case that day.
There is still NO record of Warbis or Lenmark consulting with ANYONE on the ground before they willy-nilly decided to start laying that massive retardant line out there in that bowl ( as they are seen doing in these Rory Collins photos ).
WTK
Which Collura photo are you referring to?
Reply to calvin post on January 9, 2015 at 4:28 am
>> calvin said…
>>
>> WTK.
>> Which Collura photo are you referring to?
In this folder…
SAIT / Photos and Videos / Hiker Photos / Reduced Photo Images
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/02ue6bnjp6nazkm/AAAQHmeW4AtE4acHagKGrrcSa/Photos%20and%20Video/Hiker%20Photos%20Videos/Reduced%20Photo%20Images?dl=0
Image “1 (40).JPG” ( 8th row down… middle image on that row ).
That is the GM Superintendent truck dead bottom center there and just to the right of the dozer, yes?
I was pretty sure ( way back when ) that there was a consensus ( including some input from Joy ) that this was actually a spot a little WEST of the Sesame clearing area on that east-west two-track leading out to the old-grader… which would actually match where Brendan seems to have stood on the gunwale of one of those vehicles and took his photos ( looking to the northwest ).
Maybe it really isn’t.
Maybe this photo itself is really of that ‘top of the Sesame clearing’ area shown in Rory Collins’ photo.
Followup… here is that exact part of SPGS1 Gary Cordes’ ADOSH interview where he was telling them WHERE he led Marsh to that morning before he started his hike out to the western ridge.
It SEEMS to suggest that they did go ‘about a half mile’ in on that east-west two-track that leads out to the old-grader… but now that I read it again… perhaps the ‘half-mile back’ that Cordes is referring to really was just the distance from the TOP of the Sesame clearing area back SOUTH to where the GM buggies themselves came to be parked.
A = SPGS1 Gary Cordes
————————————————–
A: Yeah, and the only reason I was involved in taking them in to work, was because I knew the roads and I know how to get them into that, in to access where they were gonna be working.
Q2: Right. So your responsibility basically, structures in Glenn Ilah and Yarnell?
A: Yes.
Q2: …where, where did you let ‘em off at? What…
A: They…
Q2: …(unintelligible) go ahead.
A: Yeah, we went up Sesame Street Road to where that section, about where that section line crosses, there’s a little loop in the road right there, um, they parked the buggies just to the – that’s as far as I could take them with the sup vehicle and the chase truck that they had. The two pick-ups were parked on the um, northeast side of that. Uh, about a half mile back, um, there was a clearing that they parked the buggies in. Uh, and that would be on the south side of the road.
Q2: Okay. This is uh, very northeast corner of uh, of section nine?
A: Ten. Section 10. It would be the…
Q2: Uh…
A: …it would be the uh, well it’s real close, yeah, it’s the uh, it would be the northwest corner of section 10.
—————————————————
Regarding the TRO business, I think the advice to get an attorney and follow their advice is spot on. While no one here is in a position to give the same advice, I do note as a general matter that TROs and final orders can be serious business. For instance, even if the order seems ludicrous, it can impact ability to own or possess a firearm, impact all sorts of employment, and otherwise has the potential to be a very serious thing. So getting good legal advice and not necessarily being conciliatory on the matter if there’s no reason to be, could be in one’s interests even if digging heels in like that is not pleasant to do. Positive vibes going out that this all gets gone quickly.
Reply to SR post on January 7, 2015 at 4:06 pm
>> SR said…
>>
>> Regarding the TRO business, I think the advice to get an attorney
>> and follow their advice is spot on. While no one here is in a position
>> to give the same advice, I do note as a general matter that TROs
>> and final orders can be serious business.
Yes, they can. Arizona is unique in that there is pretty much the same ‘low bar’ set for anyone just walking into any County Clerk’s office and APPLYING for a TRO… but unlike other states… there is no fixed 21 or 30 day term whereby there MUST be a hearing to even determine if the application is totally bogus… or not.
In Arizona… once you swear out your required affadavit and get your appearance before a Judge… if he thinks you are telling the truth… he grants the ‘Protective Order’ and it is now ‘in effect’ for a whopping ONE YEAR. That’s not what other states do.
The Courts usually err on the side of caution in these cases… so the bar really is set very low as far as you having to actually PROVE anything at all when you apply for one of these things. If you come across as believable… the Judge usually errs on the side of caution and just grants the thing.
In Arizona… the Judge can also immediately go one step farther and immediately order that the person whom this TRO is targeted against MUST turn over any/all firearms immediately… upon being ‘served’… even though that person wasn’t even there in court to tell their side of the story and has no idea this TRO is even headed their way.
So in Arizona… you can lose your second ammendment rights IMMEDIATELY just because someone walked into a Clerk’s office and filled out some paperwork. No hearing has to take place and you never even get the chance to tell your side of the story and/or prove that the allegations might be totally baseless.
But is STILL is, in fact, a serious thing.
Once that TRO puppy has been created… and even while you try and get the frickin’ chance to even tell your side of the story… anything you do that might actually violate this order can result in other, separate, ‘contempt of court’ charges which can then carry their own fines and/or jail time.
>> SR also said…
>>
>> For instance, even if the order seems ludicrous, it can impact ability
>> to own or possess a firearm,
See above. In Arizona… there doesn’t even have to be the usual transition from TRO ( Temporary Restraining Order ) to PRO ( Permanent Restraining Order ) as most other states have. In Arizona… the moment that ‘Temporary’ deal is issued… and before you EVER get the chance to prove that it might be totally baseless… the Judge can also IMMEDIATELY do away with your second ammendment rights and order you to turn over ALL of your firearms even on the day you get ‘served’ and it’s the first time you find out someone just filed the paperwork.
>> SR also said…
>>
>> impact all sorts of employment, and otherwise has the potential to be a
>> very serious thing. So getting good legal advice and not necessarily
>> being conciliatory on the matter if there’s no reason to be, could be in
>> one’s interests even if digging heels in like that is not pleasant to do.
Agree… but since Arizona’s idea of a ‘Temporary Protective Order’ seems to be a FULL YEAR… it’s hard to say when that ‘Temporary’ order switches to ‘Permanent’. Even for that full YEAR it can be in effect just because someone walzted into a Clerk’s office and filled out some form is a LONG time when it comes to it ‘appearing on your record’ and affecting your life.
So yea… it NEEDS to be taken seriously and no one ( especially someone falsely accused ) should just play ‘nicey-nice’ and ‘let it go’.
There is, however, the ‘other side of the coin’.
For the person who THOUGHT they could just waltz into some office, fill out some paperwork, and get a ‘Protective Order’ just to keep someone from contacting them… there could ALSO be some pretty SERIOUS consequences.
If the whole thing turns out to be made up from whole cloth… or it is discovered there really were ‘ulterior motives’ involved on the part of the plaintiff… the FIRST ‘bad boomerang’ coming back at you COULD be a charge of ‘filing a false affidavit’.
That’s a FELONY.
Number TWO ‘bad boomerang’ could be that if the original filing is found to have been ‘baseless’ or ‘concocted’ in any way… the ‘defendant’ then turning around and suing your ass in civil court for ‘defamation of character’.
You can’t just play this game because you just don’t want to ‘run in’ to someone you don’t like or who you don’t want to deal with.
You have to SWEAR that there really, really, really is some reason for you to be ‘afraid’ of that person… and you better be really, really, really right… or you have just filed a false affidavit and you are now in pretty deep tapioca yourself.
In the particular case of what seems to have been filed against Joy… the INTERESTING part is this business where Amanda Marsh seems to want to be SPECIFICALLY preventing Joy from attending what is an otherwise totally OPEN Arizona ‘Board’ meeting… even if she happens to NOT be there.
It would be an interesting legal case if the gloves came off.
Can a TRO ( which is basically assuming ‘guilt before innocence’ ) actually automatically deprive an Arizona Citizen of their constitutional right to attend any/all OPEN Arizona State Board meetings… ( no matter who is going to be there ) even before there has been any kind of hearing to prove the validity of the initial claim made against her?
And what does State Respresentative Karen Fann have to do with this… as far as ( according to Joy ) ALSO being NAMED in this ‘stay away from Board meetings’ thing?
Is that some kind of allegation that Karen Fann also doesn’t want to run into Joy… but Fann didn’t bother to fill out her own paperwork?
Very strange.
After talking to JOY the main problem for her is the high cost to secure a lawyer
And I would say it is Very high I would even think twice about a Lawyer at those prices .
Here we have a 7 day temporary and a hearing to determine a longer period or dropping the order. If the order is extended for a year or longer then you lose the right to have guns in your possession even if there was never a gun involved in the
Domestic. The person can no longer posses a gun or Hunt.
Once is forever unless you can win a court case.
Another strange thing with Amanda is she used a number of statements Joy made here on IM as part of her TRO.
I think Joy May be stuck in a Catch 22. Defending herself will be difficult.
It is a mess for sure.
Reply to Bob Powers post January 8, 2015 at 9:21 am
>> Bob Powers said…
>>
>> After talking to JOY the main problem for her is the high cost
>> to secure a lawyer And I would say it is Very high I would even
>> think twice about a Lawyer at those prices .
Yes… that’s one of the ‘dastardly’ things about these TROs pretty much all over the country. Not only do they take the “guilty until proved innocent” approach… they are specifically EXCLUDED from the process whereby “if you cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for you” which is codified in Miranda rights.
They really DO favor the first one to get to court and file the documents, and they place MOST of the ‘burden’ of both ‘proof’ and ‘defense’ on the target person who isn’t even required to be told it’s all happening until after it’s all been approved and is ‘served’ the injunction.
It has proved to be a good thing for MOST domestic abuse situations… but these TROs can, themselves, REALLY be abused and there are few ‘checks and balances’.
>> Bob Powers also said…
>>
>> Here we have a 7 day temporary and a hearing to determine
>> a longer period or dropping the order. If the order is extended
>> for a year or longer then you lose the right to have guns
>> in your possession even if there was never a gun involved
>> in the Domestic.
Copy that. From I read on the Yavapai County Court website, however, it seems to say that in Arizona… once a Judge simply ‘believes your story’ and he/she actually issues the ‘Protective Order’… it is AUTOMATICALLY in effect for a full YEAR. In other states… a TRO is only good for 21 to 30 days before there MUST be a hearing to decide if it should be dismissed OR changed to a PRO ( Permanent Restraining Order ).
I guess a Judge can actually ‘shape’ the thing pretty much any way he/she sees fit.
>> Bob Powers also wrote…
>>
>> The person can no longer posses a gun or Hunt.
>> Once is forever unless you can win a court case.
It will also then PERMANENTLY appear on your ‘record’ and you could be denied loans or denied ability to rent apartments, etc. It’s not SUPPOSED to show up on your ‘credit’ rating unless the courts also decide that YOU are the one who was supposed to pay all the court fees… and then you default on that financial obligation.
Messy stuff all around… and not to be taken lightly.
>> Bob Powers also wrote…
>>
>> Another strange thing with Amanda is she used a number of
>> statements Joy made here on IM as part of her TRO.
I ( myself ) cannot recall ANY statement that Joy Collura has EVER made as part of this ongoing PUBLIC discussion forum that could be, in any way, even remotely construed as any kind of ‘threat of domestic violence’ against ANYONE. Far from it.
Whenever Joy Collura has had an issue with someone… she seems to just take the “Irish” approach. She specifically states “I’m not MAD at you… I’m just DONE with you”. That, in no way, can be taken as any kind of ‘threat of domestic violence”. Not a chance.
>> Bob Powers also said…
>>
>> I think Joy May be stuck in a Catch 22. Defending herself
>> will be difficult.
It shouldn’t be. Not really.
You really, truly CANNOT just use these TRO’s simply because you, yourself might be paranoid or suffering from your OWN delusions.
The (legal/binding) affidavit you have to sign to obtain one of these things really, truly is supposed to contain some kind of EVIDENCE to back up your ‘fears of imminent danger’.
You also CANNOT be denied access to that full ‘affidavit’ to see what actual arguments or evidence really was ‘presented’…. so you even have a chance to refute it.
I’m talking, however, about the way it is all SUPPOSED to work.
How things ACTUALLY work in Prescott might very well be a totally different story.
Here’s a link to an online article that details a lot of the blatant ‘cronyism’ that is rampant in Prescott…
Article: Cronyism, Nepotism and Favoritism in a Small Town Courthouse
By Bill Williams
http://www.examiner.com/article/cronyism-nepotism-and-favoritism-a-small-town-courthouse
Turns out this JUDGE that supposedly issued this TRO is a real piece of work.
Judge Arthur Markham shows up in MANY online articles about the state of the Justice System in Prescott ( and Yavapai County in genera ).
From the 2007 article linked to above…
——————————————–
Judge Arthur Markham is down the hall from County Court Clerk Sandra Markham, who used to be Judge Brutinel’s court reporter.
——————————————–
SIDENOTE: County Court Clerk Sandra Markham was, in fact, Judge Markham’s wife until recently. She passed away April 2014.
The other thing that is ‘strange’ about all this is that I really doubt this was all Amanda Marsh’s idea. She doesn’t even seem like the kind of person who would think of doing something like this all on her own. It tends to indicate some kind of ‘coaching’ or ‘here is what I think you should do’ advisement taking place ‘behind the scenes’. If that is true… I wonder WHO is doing this ‘coaching’ and/or ‘advising’.
They seemed to leaning more to a stalking situation whit possible Violence in mind.
This is much harder to prove you had no intent.
What Joy said on here about being on the mountain and feeling close to Marsh and the 18 seems to be some of it with the people she took to the mountain and her need for clarity those types of things stated here seem to be what Amanda is referring to. That joy won’t let the deaths go and move on. We all know Joy as a very loving person and that seems to be what Amanda is using against her to indicate Stalking or harassment.
Some points Joy offered to go to the site with her if she needed to have someone there.
also signed of on emails with I Love You Joy C.
Amanda seems to take offence to those things and dose not want Joy near the Deployment site or any meetings
A Hell Of A Mess—————–
Sounds crazy but that seems to be the inside line on the Restraining order. Hopefully they had some luck to day.
Reply to Bob Powers post on
January 8, 2015 at 4:24 pm
>> Bob Powers said…
>>
>> Amanda seems to take offence to those things and
>> dose not want Joy near the Deployment site or
>> any meetings.
Taking offense at comments people might make in your direction and/or not wanting to ‘run into someone’ are one thing.
‘Fearing bodily harm’ and filling out paperwork for a serious restraining order is something else altogether.
I repeat… you CANNOT use the TRO capabilities just to simply try and make sure you don’t ‘run into’ someone you don’t like or don’t understand.
There are, in fact, ‘harassment’ ordinances that cover that sort of thing IAIO ( If And Only If ) things can be proven to have risen to that trip-wire.
TRO’s for a potential ‘act of domestic violence’ are a huge step above that trip-wire and NOT to be either attempted lightly or taken lightly. That’s a serious accusation with serious consequences for the targeted person.
Amanda Marsh just isn’t the ‘widow of one of the Hotshots’ anymore. She has now taken on any number of decidedly PUBLIC roles as related to the Yarnell Hill Fire and its aftermath.
She has CHOSEN to make herself a PUBLIC figure’… which actually changes the parameters when it comes to who can or should be allowed to contact her.
Example: In October of 2014… Amanda Marsh created her OWN not-for-public PUBLIC Wildland Firefighter support group which says it is ready to serve the ENTIRE ( Nationwide ) WFF community… and on her website she is listed as the SOLE contact point for this this entire PUBLIC not-for-profit organization.
It wasn’t until the first week of November, 2014, when she was ready to announce her new ‘Eric Marsh Foundation’ to the mainstream media… but when she did… any number of MSM articles appeared and she was happy to grant interviews to anyone who wanted to talk to her about it.
Here’s just one of those articles with a link to the actual foundation website AND its new Facebook page…
Article: Hotshot widow Amanda Marsh launches Eric Marsh Foundation for Wildland Firefighters
abc15.com staff
Published: 9:08 PM, Nov 9, 2014
http://www.abc15.com/news/region-northern-az/prescott/amanda-marsh-launches-eric-marsh-foundation-for-wildland-firefighters
Her other PUBLIC role(s) now include her agreeing to be the ‘Hotshot families representative’ on the newly formed Yarnell Hill Memorial Site Board.
According to mainstream media reports from the last January 6 meeting ( we still haven’t seen the minutes for the meeting )… Amanda has also now volunteered to head up the actual FUNDRASIING sub-committee that has been created by that Board to try and raise money for all the things that are not covered by the half-million dollar allocation from the State.
Heading up any PUBLIC FUNDRAISING effort is NOT for the timid and it is NOT a role where you can expect to have complete control over who is trying to contact you. It’s about as PUBLIC as you can get.
Of course no one should ever be subject to bona-fide ‘stalking’ or ‘harassment’… but when you put yourself out there as a very PUBLIC persona… the bar is raised for proving if/when that is actually happening at any kind of level where a TRO is either appropriate… or required.
So Amanda Marsh is no longer someone who is trying to ‘move on with her life’ and leave the Yarnell incident fully in her rear view mirror… and that is now PUBLIC knowledge.
Amanda Marsh has decided ( voluntarily ) to go ‘all in’ with several highly PUBLIC profiles to try and be the figurehead for several efforts to honor the men who died.
That’s admirable… but she has to realize that she is now a PUBLIC figure ( by her own choosing ) and her acceptance of just even the role on the Arizona State Board itself makes her now ‘answerable’ to the PUBLIC for the decisions and the actions that SHE makes.
>> Bob Powers also said…
>>
>> Sounds crazy but that seems to be the inside line on the
>> Restraining order. Hopefully they had some luck to day.
Yes. Hopefully this all works itself out in a civil manner… which is ALWAYS the goal of any ‘Protective Order’. The courts have enough on their hands as it is to be bogged down with complaints that can/should be resolved by two reasonable people just working something out between themselves.
As far as the Yarnell Hill Memorial Site Board meetings go… the simple solution there is that CHAIR of that Board has control over what PUBLIC questions/comments are to be allowed at any particular meeting… and if any one goes off on any ‘tangents’ the CHAIR can shut that down. No one is ever allowed to be ‘disruptive’ or even all that ‘confrontational’ at these kinds of meetings.
I am NOT even saying Joy Collura would EVER even do that… but if that is what they fear the control still lies in the CHAIR of the Board. He can even ‘refuse to recognize’ a speaker if he so chooses and provided he has what he feels are legitimate reasons to do so. That is HIS right as CHAIR of the Board.
Huge correction for above.
Amanda Marsh has, in fact PUBLICLY announced her new ‘Foundation’… but I was wrong about its charter. It is NOT, itself, a PUBLIC entity in that it was created or operates with any PUBLIC funding.
It is a standard not-for-profit FOUNDATION.
It has a very PUBLIC mission… but the FOUNDATION itself is not a PUBLIC ORGANIZATION. It’s just another duly registered not-for-profit entity in the State of Arizona.
Followup…
On the MEDIA page on Amanda Marsh’s new PUBLIC website for her new not-for-profit Foundation… she lists HERSELF as the ONLY contact for the ENTIRE MEDIA world… and she has publicly printed her phone number there on that page and is encouraging people ( anyone ) with questions to call her.
That MEDIA page on her Foundation’s website is here…
http://www.ericmarshfoundationforwildlandfirefighters.org/media.html
And it simply says this…
————————————-
All media please contact Amanda Marsh only (928) 899-4647.
————————————-
Had a short email from Sonny it dose not sound like it went
well. He may or may not post here.. Joy is shut down from any comments. Not good and a shame.
That’s the courts/Judges????????
Shut down from making any comments… about WHAT? Photography? Hiking? Helping to build defensive space?
This story seems to be ‘writing itself’.
It just gets crazier by the moment.
If I understand that correctly, it’s similar to telling someone they can’t talk in the town square, period.
It may be worth giving the ACLU a ring. At least if it’s still legal to talk to the ACLU in AZ.
Here is the corresponding, totally PUBLIC Facebook page for Amanda Marsh’s new foundation.
There are some VERY personal posts her on the part of Amanda Marsh which she is allowing to be totally PUBLIC.
https://www.facebook.com/ericmarshfoundationforwildlandfirefighters
This is a YouTube link of the Australian bushfire training video titled “The Dead Man Zone.” It is especially instructive in that the ‘Dead Man Zone’ is basically when you are ‘away from the fireline’ in any UNBURNED FUEL with WIND CHANGES, and the resulting EXTREME FIRE BEHAVIOR. They speak quite a bit of rates of spread increasing 40-50 times under certain conditions. Very interesting.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uMGuiv2SYeg
Great video/tutorial. Thanks to RTS for posting.
The GRAPHICS and CHARTS of all the known incidents and how they really happened are really well done and all make it crystal clear how ANY position ANY distance away from the ‘safe black’ with an ‘active, wind driven fire’ anywhere near you is NOT the place to be.
This one deserves a published ‘transcript’… so here it is…
YouTube Video Title: The Dead-Man Zone
Video Length: 6 minutes and 54 seconds
————————————————————————–
* Phil Cheney – VESTA Project Team Leader.
The head fire is the fastest moving part of the fire.
Temperatures can be over one thousand degrees celsius.
The flames might be 40 meters high.
Even after the flames have gone, you can’t survive in the headfire zone for maybe an hour after it has passed.
It’s an ENORMOUSLY dangerous place.
It’s like walking into hell.
* Narrator
From their research into wildfire behavior, the project VESTA’s scientific team coined the term “The Dead Man Zone”.
* Phil Cheney
We simply said… look… the area that a fire can travel in 5 minutes, if the wind changes and turns a flank fire into a head fire, is an EXTRAORDINARLY DANGEROUS AREA.
The thing that can ALWAYS change in a fire is the wind direction.
The firefighter HAS to be EXPECTING that the fire behavior can suddenly change if the wind switches to right angles to the direction that it is blowing and change the flank fire into a head fire within a few minutes.
When a fire moves away from a line… it moves away at a maximum rate of spread instantaneously from a few meters per minute to literally hundreds of meters per minute.
* Narrator
Victoria’s 1998 Linton Fire had been contained. After burning under a north/northwesterly wind and a fire danger rating of HIGH.
On the eastern flank control lines were approaching each other as a strong southwesterly wind change arrived gusting over 60 kilometers per hour.
Two crews were in the remaining unburned forest, some 70 meters from the fire edge. The uncontrolled section of flank fire suddenly became a head fire
A wall of flame engulfed the firefighters in less than two and a half minutes.
Five firefighters died.
* Phil Cheney
When the wind change came through… the first thing that happened was this fire turned from flames a couple of centimeters deep, 30 centimeters high, to a meter of flame 40 meters deep just spreading across the tops of the litter… and then as the convection built up the flames went into the tops of the trees and you had flame heights in excess of 20 meters.
These shifts REALLY can occur WITHOUT WARNING… and THAT is what firefighters MUST prepare for.
When this wind change occurs you have to drop what you are doing and go IMMEDIATELY to a SAFE area.
It’s been a long standing practice that people attacking a wildfire in the forest go to an anchor point… which is a safe point at the rear of the fire… and then work systematically up along the flanks of the fire.
If we progressively control the edge of the fire we’ve ALWAYS got a safe place to fall back to in the burned out area.
You have to be watching the fire ALL the time.
If there is ANY change… and the most usual change is the smoke starts coming towards you… then that’s an indication that the conditions have changed… and I’m OUTTA here. If you do NOT react IMMEDIATELY you could be in BIG trouble.
* Narrator
Under a light westerly wind and a fire danger rating of VERY HIGH, the 1998 Johnstones Creek fire in the New South Wales Wingello State Forest had burned out some five hectares. Fire crews were back-burning to the south of the fire when the wind switched to the north and the fire behavior intensified.
The fire is estimated to have taken less than two minutes to cover over 100 meters of unburned country and overrun the fire crews as they attempted to evacuate up a slope of 15 degrees.
One firefighter was killed and seven were injured.
* Phil Cheney
On the Johnstones Creek Fire… the fire was small but the fire was below them. When the wind change occurred, not only did you get the immediate development of the fire after the wind change but you also had it running up a slope that was between 15 and 20 degrees.
This combination of wind change and slope really does make a deadly combination.
* Narrator
A fire danger rating of EXTREME and north/northwesterly winds had carried the New South Wales Grays Point fire all day. At around 3 PM, crews were on a hill to the east of the flank fire when the wind changed some 20 degrees to a nor’westerly.
Before the wind change, the flank fire had been burning slowly downslope. This may have deceived the firefighters on the opposite slope about its potential rate of spread.
Now, with the wind change, the head fire crossed the creek and rapidly accelerated up the hill, trapping the firefighters in barely more than a minute.
Three firefighters died and six were seriously burned.
* Phil Cheney – VESTA Project Team Leader.
As soon as it crosses a creek line and goes onto the upslope with the wind behind it the change of spread might be 40 or 50 times.
The firefighter really has to work as close to the fire edge as he possibly can. As soon as he moves off the flank… he is in the “Dead Man’s Zone”. That’s a very dangerous position to be in.
Under very high fire danger conditions, on level ground, a fire running at its potential rate of spread will cover 150 meters in 5 minutes.
If the firefighters are working on a 20 degree slope and the fire is below them, that fire can cover 600 meters in 5 minutes.
That’s over half a kilometer.
In extreme fire danger conditions… here we have on level ground… a fire will cover 250 meters in 5 minutes. Again… if the slope is 10 degrees that rate of spread doubles. If we go on a 20 degree slope it doubles again and we’re up to 1000 meters.
So that’s a fire traveling 1 kilometer in 5 minutes.
When you’re in front of the fire, and you know the head fire is running towards you, very often it’s not clear which way you should go to get out of it. You can only see a few meters through the forest, in many cases, and so unless you know where to go to a safe location… you could be caught SO easily.
END OF VIDEO
Credits: FESA
Fire and Emergency Services
Authority of Western Austrailia
———————————————————————————-
Followup… the video above is a FAMOUS report about how ANY wind-driven fire MUST be respected ( or you can EASILY die )… and there are a number of published PDF files that accompany this training video.
Here is one of those ‘Dead Man Zone’ PDF files ( great graphics )…
http://gungahlinruralfirebrigade.files.wordpress.com/2011/10/the-dead-man-zone1.pdf
While some have said GM Steed and Marsh must have saw something that made them believe they could move to the BSR.
RTS myself and other FF have continued to say GM moved into the Dead man zone unburned fuel not only that but double the trap with walking down into a canyon with slope and then wind. Looking at the heat produced at the deployment site is truly humbling in the pictures we have been looking at.
And that is exactly why the shout watch outs were produced to warn Fire Fighters of the problems. We as Fire Fighters have trained in the same information as the above film the film just adds the clarity that some have seemed to have lost recently. Lookouts and safe Black win every time.
Most of the examples in the video are also targeted towards how absolutely CAUTIOUS you have to be when your own visibility is ‘limited’ such as the incidents documents where the FFs were in ‘deep forest’ and had no long-range clear view of what the fire was doing.
That’s what makes Yarnell so unique and confounding.
The men who ended up dying had ( other than they guys in the airplanes ) the absolute BEST view of what that fire was doing, and the best chance at seeing what was it was GOING to do.than ANYONE else on the ground that day. No question.
Until they dropped into a blind box canyon with no lookout, that is.
It still defies all logic… and ( so far ) all explanation.
It’s like they were a bunch of college kids out for a hike who had never even seen a fire before… or had any idea what MIGHT happen that day.
WTKTT,
Thanks for doing your usual thorough work and carrying through on what I posted on the Dead Man Zone. I kinda figured it would pique your interest and you would carry on where I left off. Good job and thanks again.
You also posted “The men who ended up dying had ( other than they guys in the airplanes ) the absolute BEST view of what that fire was doing, and the best chance at seeing what was it was GOING to do.than ANYONE else on the ground that day. No question.”
“Until they dropped into a blind box canyon with NO LOOKOUT, that is. (emphasis added). A violation of LCES and the Fire Orders AND one of the 18 Watch Out Situations. Was this one also “HILLBILLY?’
It still DEFIES ALL LOGIC AND (SO FAR) ALL EXPLANATION.” (emphasis added) …
It also strongly suggests that MAYBE, JUST MAYBE they had done this kind of stuff before AND gotten away with it. You know like – BAD DECISIONS WITH PRIOR GOOD OUTCOMES.
Reply to Robert the Second (RTS) post on
January 7, 2015 at 10:44 pm
>> RTS said…
>>
>> It also strongly suggests that MAYBE, JUST MAYBE
>> they had done this kind of stuff before AND gotten
>> away with it. You know like – BAD DECISIONS WITH
>> PRIOR GOOD OUTCOMES.
I still want to know what that ‘Nevada Safety Zone burnout’ was all about and WHY Andrew Ashscraft was so relieved that it (quote) “all turned out ok in the end”.
Ashcraft was so proud of himself for keeping a ‘cool head’ during THAT ’emergency’ situation that he was using it as a story to tell that demonstrates his leadership capabilities in March of 2013 when Eric Marsh and 3 others were interviewing current GM Hotshots to replace departing crew boss Philip Maldonado.
Ashcraft didn’t even have the second highest ‘point score’ out of all the interviewees following those interviews ( Travis Turbyfill’s point score far exceeded Ashcraft’s )… but Ashcraft got the ‘crew boss’ promotion anyway.
Was it mostly BECAUSE of the ‘Nevada Incident’… and Eric Marsh WAS impressed that he kept his head during a safety zone burnout?
How did they even GET into that ’emergency’ situation in Nevada? No lookout? More ‘bad decision with good outcome’?
All FOUR of the interviewers made similar notes as Ashcraft was relating the story of the ‘Nevada safety zone’ burnout and how ‘proud’ he was of himself for ‘keeping a cool head’… but here is interviewer Melissa Fousek’s note…
————————————————————
Committee Member: Melissa Fousek
GM Hotshot being interviewed: Andrew Ashcraft
PDF page: 10
(3) Nevada – burn out safety zone. Kept a cool head.
Turned out ok.
————————————————————
WTKTT,
Based on what I have read about the NV Incident, I would say they did NOT have a Lookout because IF they did have one, then they would have had plenty of lead time to make a decision to get out of there, i.e. use a real Escape Route to get somewhere safer. USUALLY, if you have to BURN OUT A SAFETY ZONE, then something went awry, like NO lookout to warn you of impending danger. The only NV fire that I know of that the GMHS was on was the Holloway Fire, the one where the Type 6 Engine Crew videoed themselves “saving the GMHS buggies.” And even that situation was one where it would be safe to say that there was NOT a posted GMHS Lookout. IF there WAS a Lookout, then the one Crew member that is visible in the Holloway Fire video clip running down the hill toward the buggies would NOT have been needing to run because a Lookout would have warned them in time to get someone there to move them. The one running down the hill toward the buggies just MAY have been their lookout.
Better yet, how about parking them in a MUCH SAFER AREA OR LEAVE A DRIVER OR TWO THERE. They parked in the GREEN, THE UNBURNED! I heard that a similar near-miss occurred on the Sunflower Fire in 2011.
http://www.investigativemedia.com/yarnell-hill-fire-chapter-xi/#comment-226541
# 11 in these photos is the slag I talked about
Ah… okay… thank you.
Just to be CLEAR, though… you are talking about THIS ‘Petrilli Site Visit’ folder…
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/02ue6bnjp6nazkm/AADARLUWUwoIm5q5vJundOQJa/Photos%20and%20Video/Petrilli%20Site%20Visit%20Photos%20%281%29#/
and IMG_0284 in that folder, yes? ( 11th sequential image, 1st image on 3rd row down ).
That’s the photo with the guy’s shoes in the bottom and that squiggly piece of white crap lying there on the ground at the TOP of the photo?
THAT is ‘fusee slag’?
Yes that is correct I have seen it in some other pictures but could not tell you where
this one would indicate it was thrown or dropped during burn out and deployment as it is all in one place or a large portion of it. Nothing else around it would say thrown or dropped out of the deployment area.
Thank you. I’m seeing if I can nail down exactly where that particular piece of ground is relative to where the shelters were actually deployed.
Followup… see a longer ‘Reply’ about this posted as a new parent comment up above. The same ‘slag’ appears to be right there on the ground in the very NEXT Petrilli photo… but with a ‘wider’ view showing exactly where it was in relation to the deployment site and shelters.
It appears to have been on the edge of the WINDWARD side of the deployment area.
**
** EXACT MATCH FOR ‘BATTERIES’ SEEN AT DEPLOYMENT SITE?
This is just a ‘followup’ to the discussion below about those ‘cylindrical objects’ discovered in a lot of deployment site photos ( Petrilli photos, Okon, Waldock, etc. ).
I found this while searching the US GSA Widland Fire Product catalog for an ‘exact match’ for that ‘Compact Drip Torch’ Caldwell is seen using in MacKenzie CANON photo IMG_0876.
The following is the online version of the US Government’s ( GSA ) Wildland Firefighting
Equipment Catalog…
http://www.gsa.gov/graphics/fas/Interactive_PDF2012_Wildland_Fire_Catalog.pdf
On page 19 of this 74 page document ( that’s the actual document page 19 and not the PDF page indication ) is the ‘Batteries’ page.
Item D ( as in David ) on that page appears to be an EXACT MATCH for the ‘batteries’ seen lying around the deployment site… right down to that strange little FLANGE on the bottom ( negative pole ) end of the batteries.
You can order these GSA 1.5 volt batteries in HUGE quantities.
They basically come with NO MARKING or BRAND NAME on them… which also matches what is being seen in the photographs from the deployment site.
Product information ( 12 pack )…
————————————————————————
D. Cylindrical battery has flat terminals; nominal voltage is 1.5V.
36-month maximum shelf life (not extendable)
6135-00-826-4798 Size: AAA PG(contains 12 EA) $3.39
————————————————————————
Reply to calvin post on January 5, 2015 at 6:36 pm
>> calvin said…
>>
>> image 0071 by YCSO Waldock from 7/3 seems to show a close up of what
>> would be the positive end of the cylindrical cartridge if they were indeed a battery.
>> Maybe this image could help identify what they actually are?
Thanks for that link, to Waldock image 0071, calvin.
NOTE: The ‘YCSO Waldock’ photos are in the following folder in the SAIT Dropbox…
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/02ue6bnjp6nazkm/AAArgU431CvSi-rzU2wpYCg4a/Photos%20and%20Video/YCSO%20Waldock%20Photos?dl=0
Actual image name: IMG_0071.JPG
( First image on the left in the 15th row of images ).
In this case ( and now probably in all other cases ) it’s pretty obvious we really are talking about just BATTERIES here… even though they still don’t quite fully match the config of most standard ‘cylinder’ style batteries.
If you look closely at that Waldock image 0071… what we are really looking at here is a almost totally melted Bendix King radio body… but the ‘clamshell’ battery attachment on the bottom is pretty much COMPLETELY melted away and the ‘batteries’ are right there (visible) where they should be, at the bottom of the radio.
These CLAMSHELL battery attachments are really nothing more than a plastic BOX with a sliding cover. On the INSIDE are two back-to-back arrays of receptacles for standard AA batteries… usually just 4 to a side.
The key here in this photo is that amidst the ‘tubes’ we can now clearly see what can only be standard style battery contact ‘clips’ just lying there amidst them.
In particular… the little ‘clip’ sitting there just to the upper right of the yellow ’17’ tag that the investigators placed in front of the pile. That is definitely a battery contact clip.
That indicates the thin plastic clamshell on the bottom of this BK radio just basically totally melted away… leaving only the ‘clips’ and the remnants of the batteries.
The BODY of the radio ( that square looking melted BOX in the center of photo ) is fried and to the LEFT in the photo is the burned antenna for this radio… right where it should be… coming into the top of the melted radio BODY.
Here is a link to an ‘exploded’ view of a typical BK radio ‘clamshell’ battery pack. It shows how the batteries are stored in an array inside the box… 4 to side… and the cover just ‘slips down’ over the batteries.
I thought these clamshells were just big NICAD batteries inside of them these day and that’s why I was doubting that these ‘cylinders’ might be simply standard batteries… but apparently that isn’t the case. These ‘clamshells’ don’t have to be NICAD. They CAN contain up to 8 or 10 standard ‘cylinder style’ batteries and are still sold that way.
( Link to photo of exploded BK Clamshell battery holder is down below as a REPLY )
NOTE: There is also a ‘chainsaw bar’ ( looks like a spare one ) visible in this photo running from the left side of the photo and UNDERNEATH the melted radio.
ALSO: I’m not sure whether that large number ’17’ on that YELLOW card in the photo correlates to the numbers that were used by the YCSO detectives when they first arrived on the scene. The Waldock photos are showing the first visit to the site by SAIT investigators… escorted by YCSO deputies. We’ve never been sure if the SAIT team started assigning their OWN numbers to things at the site… but I think it’s safe to say these YELLOW cards and numbers were still the ones used by the YCSO detectives and would correspond to the following LIST…
From YCSO Detective McDormet’s official case report document…
———————————————————————————-
A numbering system was devised in order to recall the positioning of the
individual firefighters for accuracy, historical use, tracking, and
investigative purposes. It was evident that not all the men were in shelters,
although all or most of the shelters appeared to have been deployed.
What follows is an accounting of the numbers assigned to the decedents while on
the hill, the Maricopa Medical Examiner number, and the name of the firefighter
associated with each:
#1/13-04442/ Wade Parker
#2/13-04425/ Sean Misner
#3/13-04443/ Travis Turbyfill
#4/13-04428/ Kevin Justin Woyjeck
#5/13-04427/Clayton Whitted
#6/13-04426/ Christopher MacKenzie
#7/13-04431/ Dustin DeFord
#8/13-04430/ William Warneke
#9/13-04435/ Eric Marsh
#10/13-04429/ John Percin Jr
#11/13-04434/ Andrew Ashcraft
#12/13-04433/ Travis Carter
#13/13-04438/ Anthony Rose
#14/13-04432/ Joe Thurston
#15/13-04436/ Jesse Steed
#16/13-04437/ Grant McKee
#17/13-04441/ Scott Norris
#18/13-04440/ Garret Zuppiger
#19/13-04439/ Robert Caldwell
Date, Time, Reporting Officer:
Tue Jul 16 10:43:08 MST 2013 Det J McDormett #5472
———————————————————————
That would mean that this ‘YCSO Waldock’ image 0071 is showing the debris from the deployment spot for #17 Scott Norris.
Many online articles have said that Scott Norris was, indeed, one of the SAWYERS for Granite Mountain and was in his fifth season as a hotshot when he was killed in Yarnell.
So I guess that really probably is Scott Norris’ melted BK radio there in this 0071 image.
Here’s that photo of a BK radio Clamshell showing the INSIDE of it and how all the cylindrical batteries are ‘stored’ inside that Clamshell casing.
The ‘contact clips’ for this particular BK Radio Calmshell pretty much match all these little ‘metal clips’ we are seeing near these ‘cylindrical objects’ in the Petrilli, Okon and now the Waldock photo(s)…
http://www.osibatteries.com/images/Product/large/212.jpg
Here is another link to a BK compatible ‘clamshell’ battery attachment that
has has the capacity for 10 ( TEN ) ‘cylindrical’ batteries… FIVE (5) to a side.
This is also an ‘exploded’ view so you can see the battery storage configuration
inside along with all the metal ‘contact clips’…
http://i.ebayimg.com/00/s/Mjk2WDUwMA==/z/fwgAAOxyCepScn0Y/$T2eC16JHJHEFFl1d5l,JBScn0(fefQ~~60_12.JPG
So I guess we are still left to wonder exactly how GM went about the burnout operation. I only see two Sigg bottles outside of the DZ and most of the Sigg bottles in the DZ seem to have been full and have exploded right by the men inside their shelters.
Reply to calvin post on January 6, 2015 at 4:07 am
>> calvin said…
>>
>> So I guess we are still left to wonder exactly how GM went
>> about the burnout operation.
I suppose so, yes.
I really wish a good attempt had been made to determine that, when it was still (perhaps) possible to do so. Testing for accelerant usage at site, etc.
It would STILL be very interesting to know if Granite Mountain had that kind of capability with them on June 30, 2013… and/or if it was employed in any way during that desperate attempt to “burn out around themselves” as Marsh himself said they were doing.
Brendan McDonough certainly can’t be expected to know what actually went on in those last minutes… but he would still probably know if they really did even have that capability ‘onboard’ that day.
>> calvin also said…
>>
>> I only see two Sigg bottles outside of the DZ and most of
>> the Sigg bottles in the DZ seem to have been full and have
>> exploded right by the men inside their shelters.
Looking at the damage patterns in all the ‘site’ photos ( especially the YCSO closeups ) tends to suggest ( I think ) that a lot of the ‘melted packs’ might have been more to do with what happened when the fuel bottles in them BLEVE’ed ( vented/exploded ) than perhaps from any damage from firefront flames.
Or a mix of damage from BOTH cases.
Again… should have been more ‘testing’ done to determine what really happened.
I wonder if all these ‘piles of debris’ we see in the photographs were just scooped up and thrown in a dumpster… or whether they were all bagged/boxed up and still actually exist somewhere?
Followup… I didn’t really make myself clear in comment above. What I meant to say was that even though most of these small ‘cylinders’ seen scattered around the deployment site do, in fact, appear to be the remnants of batteries and/or melted clamshell boxes… it would still be interesting to know if Granite Mountain really did have any ‘flare gun’ or ammunition with them that day… and if there is any evidence they might have been using that option in that last-ditch effort to ” burn out around themselves” that day.
Calvin And WTKTT
You can see a lot of Fusee slag white hard material in a line in a lot of the photos I would say they used Fusee’s and Gas to start Back Fires.
The really had nothing else if there were no drip torches with them.
Reply to Bob Powers post on January 6, 2015 at 3:22 pm
>> Bob Powers wrote…
>>
>> Calvin And WTKTT
>> You can see a lot of Fusee slag white hard material
>> in a line in a lot of the photos I would say they
>> used Fusee’s and Gas to start Back Fires.
Copy that. Can you give the actual filename of at least one of the photos you are referring to… and the location in the photo of this ‘Fusee slag’ as well?
>> Bob Powers also said…
>>
>> The really had nothing else if there were no
>> drip torches with them.
Well… we KNOW they had at least ONE drip torch.
Christopher MacKenzie’s CANON image named IMG_0876 is that photo taken the morning of June 30, 2013, after they were out on the ridge working and it shows Robert Caldwell smiling directly at MacKenzie’s camera… and holding that red-bottle drip torch in his hand.
This is also the photo that clearly shows that Oregon 450 handheld GPS unit clipped to Caldwell’s pack strap.
That’s the GPS unit that mysteriously disappeared from the deployment site and never entered the ‘chain of evidence’.
SIDENOTE: Brendan McDonough also told ADOSH investigators that Granite Mountain normally had at least FOUR GPS handheld units with them in the field… but NONE of them have ever been accounted for with regards to June 30, 2013.
As far as we know… no one ever even asked Brendan how many actual ‘drip torches’ they might have had that day and been able to use in that last-ditch effort to “burn out around themselves” as Eric Marsh reported they were doing.
The ONLY ‘drip-torch’ we know for SURE was with them is that one that Robert Caldwell was holding in his hand that morning.
That photo shows a SIG bottle with a drip torch attachment. Although similar, not truly a “drip torch” , limited fuel capacity and not totally sure of the mix you would use. Would probably work better than fuse’s in a pinch.
RW38,
You got it! The modified Sigg bottle “drip torch’ was what the GMHS somewhat favored for burning devices. They are pretty gay but they work in a pinch, definitely NOT what you would want to use to any type of major burnout operations.
This is from a May 26, 2002 They Said post: “05/26 Hey Ab, I saw a couple of posts about the sigg drip torch I have to say they are nice and small and fit in your pack pretty good they also work in a jam however we sent them back because we just didn’t like them because of too many parts to loose and you have add more bar oil to the mix because the fuel burns to hot so we keep it simple just pack a few drip torches. I reckon my biggest bitch is too many parts to loose. EH”
Reply to Retired with 38 post on
January 6, 2015 at 6:30 pm
>> Retired with 38 said…
>>
>> That photo shows a SIG bottle with a drip
>> torch attachment. Although similar,
>> not truly a “drip torch” , limited fuel capacity
>> and not totally sure of the mix you would use.
>> Would probably work better than fuse’s in
>> a pinch.
If you zoom in on Mackenzie’s IMG_0876, all the writing on that red bottle that Caldwell is holding is readable.
Here is the exact red fuel bottle he is holding in his hand.
It’s a standard item in the Wildland Fire ‘National Supply Cache’ online catalog…
http://www.supplycache.com/Aluminum-Fuel-Bottle-1-liter-Vallfirest/productinfo/750-64751/
———————————————-
Product information…
Aluminum Fuel Bottle–1 liter, Vallfirest
Item Number: 750-64751
Unit Price: $24.75
In Stock
———————————————–
Drip-torch attachment can be ordered separately.
Yep, but the concerns stated still remain. Not enough fuel for significant firing operations and the mix maybe be somewhat difficult. Probably still better than fuse’s in a pitch, but limited.
See below. The EXACT product that Caldwell seems to be holding was not JUST a SIG fuel bottle. Seems already modified with that brass air-valve for specific use as ‘Compact Drip Torch’.
If that was the case… wouldn’t it stand to reason that this would be carried with the RIGHT mix for best ‘drip torch’ operation… and just filled with chainsaw gas/oil mixture?
Correction to my own post above.
Meant to say…
If that was the case… wouldn’t it stand to reason that this would be carried with the RIGHT mix for best ‘drip torch’ operation… RATHER THAN just filled with chainsaw gas/oil mixture?
I’m sure Brendan McDonough could have supplied more information about what they were carrying ( and using ) that day… if any investigator had actually even bothered to ask him.
Actually.. this is more likely the EXACT product that Caldwell is holding in his hand in the MacKenzie photo.
The standard Vallfirest 1 liter (red) fuel bottle does NOT normally come with the brass air-valve sticking out of the side as seen in what Caldwell is actually holding.
This ‘Compact Drip Torch’ product from the same WFF National Supply Cache site DOES have that same brass valve and it uses the same Vallfirest red bottle ( with the same writing ) seen in Caldwell’s hand…
http://www.supplycache.com/Compact-Drip-Torch-1-Liter-Vallfirest/productinfo/770-64701/
NOTE; Yes… a lot of PARTS to keep track of with this thing.
Yes, you are probably right on. I was just saying from an operational standpoint it is limited compared to the old standard drip torch.
Reply to Retired with 38 post
on January 6, 2015 at 8:42 pm
>> Retired with 38 said…
>>
>> Yes, you are probably right on. I was
>> just saying from an operational
>> standpoint it is limited compared to
>> the old standard drip torch.
Copy that. That DOES seem to be the ‘product complaint’ with the ‘Compact Drip Torch’ offerings if you Google around about them.
I wonder how MANY Granite Mountain really had that day… and how effective they were at the time they needed them most?
Perhaps another lesson learned?
Maybe they TRIED to burn out around themselves as fast as they could but these ‘cheaper’ drip torches just really weren’t what they needed in an emergency like that.
Another ‘Lesson Learned’ for future teams in the field, perhaps?
Don’t try to ‘save a buck’… use what WORKS?
Your life might depend on it?
I would still like to see HOW they fired their deployment zone, regardless of tools (although that information would be helpful). I think knowing how and where they fired would be a valuable learning experience, hopefully this never happens again but I think there might be some lessons learned.
** CALDWELL’S DRIP TORCH AT DEPLOYMENT SITE
Followup to ‘Caldwell Drip Torch’ discussion.
There is actually a YCSO Police ( Waldock ) photo from the deployment site which shows us where that ‘red bottle’ drip torch that Robert Caldwell was seen holding that morning ended up at the deployment site.
NOTE: The ‘YCSO Waldock’ photos are in the following folder in the SAIT Dropbox…
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/02ue6bnjp6nazkm/AAArgU431CvSi-rzU2wpYCg4a/Photos%20and%20Video/YCSO%20Waldock%20Photos?dl=0
Look at photo IMG_0080 in this folder.
It’s a closeup of the ‘debris pile’ for where the body that YCSO numbered as ’19’ was found. Those are the numbers on the YELLOW cards with the black numbers they placed at the deployment site.
Number ’19’ was the YCSO on-site body number that was eventually determined by the Medical Examiner’s office to be ‘Robert Caldwell’.
In that photo ( and in the debris ) is that same small SIG fuel container with the special ‘air-bleed’ valve sticking out of the side which matches the configuration for the ‘Compact Drip Torch’ seen in Caldwell’s hands earlier that morning.
This SIG bottle with the special ‘valve’ sticking out of it is right at the top center of the photo… just above the melted remnants of Caldwell’s BK radio.
Minor ‘directional’ correction for above.
I was looking at this photo in ‘landscape’ mode but the original ( in the Dropbox ) is in ‘portrait’ mode.
So… in the photo in the Dropbox ( portrait mode ) the SIG bottle with the valve sticking out is actually there on the LEFT CENTER of the photo ( and not the TOP CENTER ).
Caldwell’s melted BK radio is in the CENTER.
ALSO NOTE: There is a visible rupture/tear even in this small SIG bottle used for Caldwell’s ‘Compact Drip Torch.
Also NOTE that in the Waldock IMG_0080 photo… the actual ‘drip torch’ TUBE itself ( the one that would have had that little circular bend in it ) is NOT attached to that SIG bottle with the bleeder valve… nor is that distinct looking ‘drip tube’ anywhere in the photo.
That *might* be a good indication that even though Caldwell was known to be carrying this ‘Compact Drip Torch’… it was NOT used as part of the “burning out around ourselves” operation in the final moments.
I think if Caldwell HAD been using that ‘Compact Drip Torch’ in those final moments… we WOULD be seeing it ‘fully assembled’ there on the ground.
He probably dis-assembled it earlier in the day after Air Attack Rory Collins had dumped retardant all over their indirect burnout operations and forced them ‘go direct’… and then he stowed the thing in his pack and then just didn’t even have time to re-assemble it and use it in those final moments on the floor of the box canyon.
Just a guess… but it would explain why we see the ‘Compact Drip Torch’ bottle lying there WITHOUT the actual ‘drip torch’ tube attached to it.
Could the lack of drip torches be an indication that GM were not going to be doing much in the way of burn out operations that day? I mean, would it be usual for a group of 20 hotshots to only carry one miniature drip torch on any given assignment. Or does the equipment list change based on the given assignment for the day?
By all accounts… INDIRECT attack was exactly what Marsh had PLANNED all along that morning… perhaps even as he and Todd Abel stood in the Yarnell Fire Station parking lot and even decided GM should go out there in the first place.
That’s also what they WERE doing until Air Attack Rory Collins just dumped retardant all over their ‘indirect burnouts’ and then FORCED them to go DIRECT.
So that’s a good question.
We probaly SHOULD be seeing evidence of more ‘drip torches’.
I suppose there might have been all kinds of equipment there in that GM Superintendent Truck ( and Chase truck and 2 Crew Carriers )..
Brendan McDonough would know what they really carried up there to that ridge that day… if anyone had even bothered to ASK him.
Calvin and WTKTT
normally every one carries Fusee’s
I carried 6 all the time I was on fire assignments.
If we expected burn outs we would Cary a couple of drip torches the regular kind.
Burn out teams carried a verity of fire starting equipment. Those certified could use the Napalm canisters they were fuse operated you thru them into the brush and they had a 1 min. fuse then exploded sending Napalm in a 10 ft area very effective to get a fire going.
I would say the drip torches may have been left at the helispot as they were not in the deployment site.
or they never had the larger ones on the line at all and relied on Fusee’s. Regular drip torches carry 2 Galion’s of fuel and are of a fare size. You would see them if they had them.
Looks like the drip torch bottle in question in the Photo is not in set up mode the torch is inverted in the bottle with the cap up. So I would say never used at the Deployment site.
At $167.00 per torch with bottle they would not have had many that’s expensive for a crew on a tight budget..
Agree. I just checked the product description again for what appears to be the exact ‘Compact Drip Torch’ that Caldwell had that day and you are exactly right. One of the ‘selling points’ is that the drip tube can just be unscrewed, inverted and be stored inside the bottle itself. The part that now ‘sticks up’ out of the bottle is called the ‘Discharge Sealing’ and that matches exactly what is seen in the Waldock photo from the spot where Caldwell deployed.
So yes… pretty safe to say that Caldwell did NOT have the TIME on the floor of that box canyon to either set up or use his drip torch in those final moments.
Calvin:
You’ve probably heard of the 10 Welding Commandments. The very foremost commences: “Thou shalt not weld on an un-purged tank…”. By purge is meant the welder is expected to empty the fuel tank, then purge it with an inert gas; nitrogen is typically used. Exploding “empty” fuel tanks have killed innumerable welders; the atomized vapor (and air) mixture within an empty, or partially empty tank is a virulent explosive.
And a hermetically sealed thin-walled fuel-vapor-filled container is more likely to rupture if subjected to an appreciable external heat source, as compared to an identical container filled with liquid fuel; depending upon the stopper design; i.e. blow-out plug, versus melt-out.
A lot of people used to get killed by metallic shrapnel, after tossing “empty” aerosol spray paint cans into open incinerators.
The question that needs to be addressed is not how Granite conducted their deployment burnout; but rather how much fuel reserve they actually had remaining to competently (and quickly) perform any such task. Consider their consumption:
a) Mackenzie image 0876 of Robert Caldwell with the drip torch – well was this the sole device – how much fuel was expended in total;
b) Collura’s photograph 1(61) of Granite ascending the saddle trail indicates a total of four saws, and quantity two red fuel containers, of capacity 2 or 2.5 gallon (?);
c) Mackenzie’s image 0882 (time-stamp corrected to 11:36) depicting the SEAT drop, forcing Granite into direct mode;
d) Mack’s images 0886 and 0887 (corrected to 15:43) depicting members of Granite moving laterally up a switchback in the handline to the black safe zone.
Assuming the saws were engaged at 11:40 to commence the handline, and a 30 minute lunch break, then four two-cycle engines could have continuously reverberated for up to 3.5 hours, according to duty cycle. Whereas Collura’s image 1(1), showing crew members cleaning off the two-track north of the saddle, implies saws were active even before the handline.
Their fuel consumption had to have been considerable. The question of how much remained at deployment necessitates a determination of the saw type (i.e. the fuel burn rate), a guesstimate of the actual sawyer duty cycles, and some knowledge pertaining to exactly how much fuel they hiked in with.
Might their fuel reserve have been practically exhausted prior to deployment?
*
* MORE CARTRIDGES IN A SECOND BACKPACK
On airplanes again today and using a smartphone again (yuk) so have to keep this short but have found a SECOND set of these mysterious cartridges in a SECOND backpack that was not thrown clear from the deployment site.
They are seen clearly amongst the remnants of a field pack photographed on the ground by SAIT investigator Randy Okon.
His photo named IMG_0546.JPG in SAIT folder “Photos and Videos / Okon Site Visit Photos”.
It’s a little hard to describe where to see them in this photo so I’ve created a little ‘zoom down’ video of this IMG_0546 photo to show exactly where to see them in this photo.
In THIS photo and in THIS field pack they are not ‘scattered’ as seenbin the Petrelli site photo(s). This time they appear to be still sort of ‘in the packaging’ that they actually come in. The packaging wrapper is destroyed but they are all still ‘side by side’.
Also NOTE in this photo that this definitely appears to be one of the SAWYER’s packs. Proof is a few inches above the cartridges. There is clearly an aluminum CHAINSAW WRENCH right there. The kind only used for adjusting chainsaw bars. I have five of these specialized wrenches myself.
Here is the video that ‘zooms down’ into OK on image IMG_0546…
http://m.youtube.com/watch?v=vkiyQdxCaJs
Also notice that about dead center in this Randy Okon IMG_0546 photo is an obviously ‘ruptured’ SIG fuel canister which was right in the middle of the deployment.
Severe ‘rupture’ tear there near the bottom of the fuel canister.
Looks like a classic BLEVE
Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapors Explosion.
Classic example of WHY you are supposed to throw all field packs WELL CLEAR of your chosen deployment site.
WTKTT
Sorry to say they are Batteries AA not shells they expanded a little but you can see the positive center of the battery and no flange at heel to indicate a shell.
the primer would not protrude as dose the Positive nob on the Battery in the Pictures
Just batteries this last picture looks like the Batteries were in some device that burned or melted..
Also on the left two batteries at there top you can see the negative connectors
that would have had springs attached.
Also looks like a sawyer pack as there is a Chain saw tool at the top and to the left of the batteries.
Should be right two batteries at top negative clips.
Don’t suppose the investigations were able to put together equipment lists for the crew? So no one has to go guessing about what’s seen in these pictures, it feels like energy wasted on something that should also have been (as you say) “Investigation 101”. But I guess a lot of the discussion here is like that.
Onward and upward! Seems like some cages have been rattled and that those that have contributed a lot on here are maybe uncovering some uncomfortable truths. Such a shame it’s like that and that the whole story wasn’t told, unedited and uncensored in the first place.
The First Big Problem was a federal fire investigation team that is use to fatality fire investigations was not called in.
This investigation was done by the Sheriffs office who had no idea what was really needed.
The location of the fire shelters and how they burned and what did and did not protect the person in them.
location of every thing with in the deployment area.
Finding and accessing the GPS systems would have been huge.
Just a lot of helpful information lost at the scene.
With what just happened to JOY I think there are sirens going off saying there is some cover up here to protect the crew and their supervisors. There is more than meets the eye with this latest move. Joy is Harmless but she has a lot of information from here that is harmful to Amanda Marsh’s Husband.
If you are going to dedicate a Memorial to Hero’s they best be Hero’s.
She would be better served helping all the Families be compensated for there loss and help those in need.
There is something very strange here.
Whatever information might remain to be discovered about the events of that entire weekend in Yarnell should NOT, in any way, be viewed as any kind of ‘threat’ to anyone who has agreed to sit on this ‘Yarnell Memorial Site Board’.
It doesn’t matter what eventually ‘comes out’ ( or, does not ). That site STILL needs to be ‘preserved’ and ‘open to the public’ and these men STILL deserve the best memorial site that the State of Arizona can come up with.
That is the only JOB of this ‘Yarnell Memorial Site Board’.
To decide HOW to spend a half-million dollars of Arizona taxpayer dollars to accomplish the task they have volunteered to undertake.
If it did NOT really dawn on any of the ‘Board’ members that this is a PUBLIC ‘Board’… and that everything they do is required by LAW to be ‘above board’ and ‘out in the open’…. I have no sympathy for them.
If the fact that this IS required by LAW to be a PUBLIC process ( and that the PUBLIC really might show up at some of their meetings ) really bothers anyone who volunteered to serve on that PUBIC board that much then the answer is simple.
They need to just RESIGN and let someone else take their place.
Reply to Otis post on January 5, 2015 at 1:54 pm
>> Otis said…
>>
>> Don’t suppose the investigations were able to
>> put together equipment lists for the crew?
>> So no one has to go guessing about what’s
>> seen in these pictures?
Nope. Not as far as we know.
Might exist. Might not.
It’s a know fact now that Arizona Forestry has always been playing ‘fast and loose’ with legal FOIA / FOIL requests so there really is no telling what they might still have in their possession that has never seen the light of day.
We can even SEE in the photographs that the investigators at the site all had spiral notebooks with them at the deployment site for ‘note taking’… but those notebooks and/or scanned copies of them have NEVER been released.
ADOSH did. When the FOIA / FOIL requests came in to ADSOH for ‘all documents, emails, notes and other material related to the Yarnell Hill Investigation’… ADOSH did its best to comply. There are many files in the material released that ARE, in fact, scanned copies of even the most incidental handwritten NOTES that the ADOSH investigators themselves had been taking during their official investigation.
No such thing has ever been seen from Arizona Forestry, even though such ‘note taking’ most probably took place throughout their own investigation.
Heck… we still have NO IDEA what ever happened to all the notes and depositions and testimony and cell phone records and photos and videos that Arizona Forestry collected from the Peeples Valley Firefighters ( Bob Brandon, etc. ) who also almost died that day.
ALL of that material seems to have just VANISHED and has never been released in response to any valid FOIA / FOIL or ‘Arizona Open Records’ request.
>> Otis also said…
>>
>> it feels like energy wasted on something that
>> should also have been (as you say) “Investigation 101″.
>> But I guess a lot of the discussion here is like that.
Yes. Unfortunately it is.
The list of things that have been ‘discovered’ here during this public discussion that SHOULD have been included in either one or both ‘official’ reports goes on… and on… and on.
>> Otis also said…
>>
>> Onward and upward! Seems like some cages
>> have been rattled and that those that have
>> contributed a lot on here are maybe uncovering
>> some uncomfortable truths. Such a shame it’s
>> like that and that the whole story wasn’t
>> told, unedited and uncensored in the first place.
Agree. If anyone at all now has a ‘problem’ with this historic incident still being ‘discussed’ in public… then most of their frustration and anger needs to be directed BACK to where it really belongs… to the people who were CHARGED ( and highly paid, I might add ) to investigate the incident and publish reports about it.
THAT is when the ‘mysteries’ began.
THEY had they opportunity to just ‘get this all over with’… but they declined that opportunity and chose to just report…
“Nothing to see here. Move along. Leave us alone.”.
History doesn’t like these kinds of ‘mysteries’… and they tend to get ‘solved’ no matter how long it takes.
Reply to Bob Powers post on January 5, 2015 at 11:21 am
>> Bob Powers said…
>>
>> Sorry to say they are Batteries AA not shells they expanded
>> a little but you can see the positive center of the battery and
>> no flange at heel to indicate a shell. The primer would not
>> protrude as dose the Positive nob on the Battery in the Pictures
Copy that… thanks… and certainly no ‘apologies’ necessary.
I, personally, am not SURE what they really are. Not yet, anyway.
They certainly don’t look like any ‘ammunition’ I am familiar with the way that ‘knob’ protrudes from one end ( similar to battery pole ). That doesn’t make any sense for either the primer or the business end of ammunition I know of.
Yet… the other end still appears to have some kind of ‘metal cap’ on the end which doesn’t match standard battery config(s). Maybe they were some kind of ‘rechargeable’ batteries that tend to look a little different.
I’ve only been CALLING them ‘cartridges’ because that’s faster than saying ‘cylindrical objects’. I really am not sure yet WHAT they are.
It could even be that the ‘cylindrical objects’ in the Pertrilli photos are not even the same thing as the ones now seen in the Randy Okon photo(s).
Maybe they just LOOK like the same thing being carried by two different GM Hotshots in their field pack(s).
>> Bob Powers also said….
>>
>> This last picture looks like the Batteries were in some device
>> that burned or melted..
Yes. They do. That would account for them all still being ‘side by side’ like that and would also account for those strange little square ‘clips’ also seen near the top of them. Those could have been the ‘contact plates’ from the battery compartment… if that’s what this really was that got ‘melted’.
It’s hard to say what kind of device might have required what looks like SIX batteries, though. I really doubt any Hotshot would have been carrying any kind of ‘boom box’ or anything of that sort.
I also don’t think ( if these really are batteries and that is the remnants of an electronic device ) it could be either the Oregon 450 GPS Unit that we KNOW Robert Caldwell was wearing that day ( which DISAPPEARED from the deployment site and was, apparently, never found ).
Nor do I think it could have been one of the THREE other handheld GPS devices that Brendan McDonough told ADOSH the group normally carries ‘in the field’. ( which, if they had them, have all ALSO disappeared and never entered into the chain of evidence ).
No handheld GPS unit I know of would require SIX batteries. They are even too small for that much battery compartment capacity.
Just one more thing that Brendan McDonough could possibly shed more light on, I suppose. He would know if GM always had flare or very pistol capability and the phosphorous cartridges ‘onboard’ for all assignments, or not. So would any recent former GM Hotshot like Philip Maldonado, who left GM in Marsh of 2013 after years as a Crew Boss.
You would even think anyone calling themselves a ‘Wildland Division Chief’ would know for sure what kind of ‘capability’ his one and only Type 1 Hotshot Crew usually had with them ‘in the field’… but in this case… perhaps not.
If Willis couldn’t even tell reporters ( when asked ) at the press conference from the deployment site what the ‘upper temperature limit’ was for a standard WFF fire shelter… then maybe he wasn’t all that knowledgeable about other ‘equipment’ his own IHC crew was using in the field.
I would hazard a guess that the Batteries could have been in a quick change box for the portable radio. just a guess and rechargeable batteries is a good guess. as well..
A 12 gauge shot gun shell is bigger and has a base with a primer that is seated into the shell it would not pop out like the pictures show. Also that much heat would have exploded a loaded shell or the phosphorous in side would have ignited..
Normally a Very Pistol and ammunition would be issued to a certified user if they were assigned to a firing out mission.
There are a lot better devices out now that have made the Very Pistol obsolete. I would be surprised if crews actually Carrie the pistol and shells. Fusses are much easer to Carrie and function in a verity of situations.
Reply to Bob Powers post on January 5, 2015 at 2:55 pm
>> Bob Powers wrote…
>>
>> I would hazard a guess that the Batteries could
>> have been in a quick change box for the portable
>> radio. just a guess and rechargeable batteries is
>> a good guess. as well..
See new post above.
calvin found yet another photo showing these ‘cartridges’ and it is in the SAIT Dropbox ‘YCSO Waldock’ folder ( Image IMG_0071 ).
The YCSO photos were taken BEFORE the SAIT people had a chance to start ‘sifting through’ this deployment site and disturbing things… so Waldock photo 0071 really does show the cylinders exactly where they should be if they are simply ‘batteries’ stored inside of a melted BK clamshell.
I was under the impression that these clamshells were just big NICAD batteries. I didn’t realize they can still contain a whole mess of standard cylinder batteries. They ARE still sold like that.
The image 0071 that calvin just found is of the debris near the spot where GM SAWYER Scott Norris deployed.
His BK radio is there… all melted… and the clamshell seems to have totally melted away leaving the ‘batteries’ there at the base of the radio right where you would expect them to remain along with visible metal ‘contact clips’.
So mystery solved? Definitely ‘batteries’ in all these photos and NOT any kind of ‘ammunition’? I would now say MOST LIKELY.
>> Bob Powers also said…
>>
>> Also that much heat would have exploded a loaded
>> shell or the phosphorous in side would have ignited..
Most probably, yes.
>> Bob Powers also wrote…
>>
>> There are a lot better devices out now that have
>> made the Very Pistol obsolete.
>>
>> I would be surprised if crews actually Carrie the pistol
>> and shells. Fusses are much easer to Carrie and
>> function in a verity of situations.
It would STILL be very interesting to know if Granite Mountain had that kind of capability with them on June 30, 2013… and/or if it was employed in any way during that desperate attempt to “burn out around themselves” as Marsh himself said they were doing.
Brendan McDonough certainly can’t be expected to know what actually went on in those last minutes… but he would still probably know if they really did even have that capability ‘onboard’ that day.
image 0071 by YCSO Waldock from 7/3 seems to show a close up of what would the positive end of the cylindrical cartridge if they were indeed a battery. Maybe this image could help identify what they actually are?
Thanks for that link, to Waldock image 0071, calvin.
In this case ( and now probably in all other cases ) it’s pretty obvious we really are talking about just BATTERIES here… even though they still don’t quite fully match the config of most standard ‘cylinder’ style batteries.
If you look closely at that Waldock image 0071… what we are really looking at here is a totally melted Bendix King radio… and the ‘batteries’ are right where they should be.
These CLAMSHELL battery attachments are really nothing more than a plastic BOX with a sliding cover. On the INSIDE are two back-to-back arrays of receptacles for standard AA batteries… usually just 4 to a side.
The key here in this photo is that amidst the ‘tubes’ we can now clearly see what can only be standard style battery contact ‘clips’ just lying there amidst them.
That indicates the thin plastic clamshell on the bottom of this BK radio just basically totally melted away… leaving only the ‘clips’ and the remnants of the batteries.
The BODY of the radio ( that square looking melted BOX in the center of photo ) is fried and to the LEFT in the photo is the burned antenna for this radio… right where it should be.
Here is a link to an ‘exploded’ view of a typical BK radio ‘clamshell’ battery pack. It shows how the batteries are stored in an array inside the box… 4 to side… and the cover just ‘slips down’ over the batteries.
I thought these clamshells were just big NICAD batteries inside of them these days… but apparently that isn’t the case. They CAN contain up to 8 or 10 standard ‘cylinder style’ batteries.
Here’s that photo of a BK radio clamshell showing the INSIDE of it…
http://www.osibatteries.com/images/Product/large/212.jpg
Followup… see another (longer) response up above as ‘new’ post with more pictures of the ‘insides’ of these BK Clamshell battery attachment(s).
For Joy and all here
Dose Amanda Marsh know more than we do? Is she trying to protect her husbands memory.
She has the Cell Phone, She has talked with Willis and McDonough and Maybe others.
Has she talked with the ones who Filed the law suit or is she acting on her own?
Why attack Joy with a phony restraining order unless she is afraid of the real facts surfacing.
There is something really wrong here. What the hell is going on in Yarnell?
Reply to Bob Powers post on January 4, 2015 at 10:31 pm
>> Bob Powers said…
>>
>> For Joy and all here
>> Dose Amanda Marsh know more than we do?
On a certain level… I would certainly HOPE that she does.
If Arizona Forestry and the US Forestry service are still withholding information from even the families of the fallen as they seem to be doing for their own employers ( the PUBLIC )… then that really is beyond despicable.
>> Bob Powers also said…
>>
>> Is she trying to protect her husbands memory?
IAOI ( If And Only If ) she actually is… someone needs to tell her it’s not necessary.
Even if it one day turns out this really was ALL just on Eric Marsh… and that it was just all a stupid, terrible mistake… I don’t think that will, in any way, ERASE the tremendous respect that everyone who knew him seemed to have for Eric Marsh.
>> Bob Powers also said…
>>
>> She has the Cell Phone,
Yes. She does. ( Unless she ever says that the reports about that are NOT true ).
Beyond the condition of the phone and what *might* actually be on it ( photos with GPS time stamps, perhaps? More vidoes? Call History?, etc. )…. one of the most interesting things to learn would be exactly HOW it ended up in her possession.
WHO actually GAVE it to her?… and what ‘chain of possession’ took place even BEFORE that?
HOW and WHY did it seem to actually NOT have entered into the possession of the YCSO Police investigators who made no bones about the fact they wanted to examine EVERY smartphone, cellphone or any other electronic recording devices present at the deployment site?
>> Bob Powers also wrote…
>>
>> She has talked with Willis and McDonough and Maybe others.
Again… as I said above… even if the PUBLIC never hears a word of it… if anyone she has talked to knows more about what happened that day than the PUBLIC ( or even any of the investigators ) has been allowed to know so far… I would certainly HOPE that at least Amanda Marsh has heard it. She DESERVES to know whatever there is to know about that entire weekend when her husband died.
Ditto for anyone else who lost someone that terrible weekend in Yarnell.
They all DESERVE to know all there is to know.
JOY
From my view point as a son of a Wild Land Fire Fighter.
The Memorial should always be open to the Public, Owned by the State Parks, providing full access parking and trails with plakes expanding the entrapment and noting each individual.
If the widows have a say then it must also be 100%. No widows the an immediate family member there should be 19 family members representing each fallen hot shot
A note—-All current Wild Land Fire Memorials are public
The Privacy of the Family should be left at the Cemetery.
The Memorial is for the public and fire fighters for lessons learned
The Rattle Snake Memorial Mendocino NF is quite nice you might pull it up and take a look. I was never consulted but had no problem with what the Forest Service did. It is a vey peaceful and wonderful setting. The view from the Memorial of the crosses where each fire fighter died is quit a striking and peaceful feeling.
The Forest Service / Government would not allow crosses or memorials until the 1990’s
The Mendocino Hot Shots at night took a big wood cross and erected it without permission on the site in the late 1980’s. I also gave them my dads Badge that was found with him and asked them to burry it at his cross. I hope the committee looks very hard at the positives of a State Memorial.
Added Comment posted at the Rattle Snake Memorial and should be posted at every Memorial.
THIS PLACE IS SACRED TO THE MEMORY OF THOSE WHO DIED HERE.
WE BY REMEMBERING THEM AND LEARNING FROM THEIR TRAGEDY
GIVE MEANING TO WHAT HAPPENED HERE.
THAT THEIR DEATHS GIVE THE GIFT OF LIFE TO OTHERS WHO COME AFTER.
Lessons Learned——————
WTKTT
The Tubes you asked about are a shot gun Shell used in Backfiring with either a small hand gun single cartridge break open type or a hand held type Pipe with a spring pull devise to hit the primer That you can see in the middle of the cartridge. They are similar to signal flairs but have a phosiferious type cartridge that burns longer. They are used to ignite fire further away from the line 20 or 30 Yards.
That’s what I see laying there.
Mr. Powers… Thank you.
Can you confirm that using these cartridges would be similar to the following photo?
This is a famous National Geographic photo showing a Hotshot actually using a ‘Berry Pistol’ to help ignite a ‘burnout’.
http://yourshot.nationalgeographic.com/photos/1909785/
Photo caption…
Photograph by Kyle Miller
The Berry Pistol #wildlandfire
A member of a hotshot firefighting crew firing a berry pistol to help ignite a night burnout in Oregon.
Yes That is the use.
2 Things…………The use is to send fire out into the fuel and start fires then ignite close to line with torches or fuses to add to the heat build up.
Also I would say this pack was probably one of the supervisors Maybe Marsh or Steed as crewmen would not carry or use this type of equipment..
Normally this equipment was only carried if you were assigned to a firing operation.
I was somewhat surprised to see the shells in the photo. But maybe that’s a new accessary crews carry now?
One other thing I believe the shells are metal copper and not plastic so that is why they did not burn or melt.. They use to be maybe they are still made like that?
Clarify a couple of more things.
The Sig bottles are carried by all the crew so there is plenty of gas for 4 chain saws( Chainsaw gas and oil.)
They are aluminum and have no venting ability so you can not spill gas in your pack. That would make them explode in a heat situation.
The shells are not as you would say flairs they are not the same as a flair and I doubt could be seen as a flair in any use. They all burn white phosphorous.
I guess they could be used to ignite gas spread in brush but fusses could as well.
It is also very hard to ignite brush with them you need a grass understory to start the process.
WTKTT
I am going to back up after blowing the picture up.
I have changed my mind I think they are Radio Batteries AA
The ends do not resemble Shot gun shells they look like they expanded in the heat I could see 8 they would be spare Batteries.
so back to square 1……………
Mr. Powers is correct, normally not carried unless assigned a firing operation. Since no pistol is on site (at least unknown to us), maybe the devices were in the pack from the Doce fire assignment – just a thought.
As 1 FF to another do I know you?
just curious —also you can call me Bob
Never been use to MR.—-Just Powers or Bob
Hi Bob,
Don’t think so, my career has been in the R-5/ western side of R-4 I think we are about the same generation of FF, I started in 1976.
I left R5 in 76 to R4 Sawtooth Worked for Dale Jarrel He also ran a Type 1 Team in R4 One of the main teams on the Yellow stone fires retired in 1994. I started in 1962.
Have you posted your email address on this blog? If not, are you willing to throw it on here?
I have posted before here it is
[email protected]
Might know a few of the same people if not each other.
WTKTT,
They are VERY pistols and NOT Berry. They are used for sending signal flares from boats. Pretty effective in most fuel types and they leave a visible tracer so you can see where they go once you fire them. These very pistol rounds are extremely expensive and so not used much any more. We use ‘Quickfire’ rounds and hand=thrown canisters now, basically just fusees (similar to road flares but last longer) shot from a pistol or hand tossed. The downside of these Quickfire rounds is that they leave no tracer so you cannot track them until they hit the ground. These do work better in brush than the very pistol rounds.
Decided what we were looking at are Batteries what do you think???
After enlarging the photo I think you could be right – not sure about the other debris, looking for a clam shell (or what’s left of one).
Reply to Otis post on December 30, 2014 at 9:59 am
NOTE: This was brought up from down below so it doesn’t get ‘lost in the weeds’.
Important information being supplied here by ‘Otis’.
>> Otis said…
>>
>> Hi all. I’ve been reading this discussion for a while now, and have tried a
>> couple of times unsuccessfully to post replies to comments. For now not
>> wishing to put anything out of sequence, simply put these are the two
>> (small) things that I have wanted to contribute.
>>
>> Re video/helmet cam footage: some digital cameras and mobiles take
>> small jpeg images to be used as thumbnails for the movies.
>> These thumbnails should contain a standard set of exif data.
>> This is relevant because the thumbnails will help determine the camera,
>> or narrow down the cell phone…i.e. is it one that only records for 30
>> seconds? Maybe even have gps co-ords, but may also help in proving
>> the existence of ‘missing’ footage.
Exactly correct. Thank you.
These are often called THM ( Thumbnail ) files, even though they really are just JPEG images capable of storing all kinds of standard EXIF metadata.
Matter of fact… if you ever actually have a THM file on your hard drive you can just RENAME the file from XXXXX.THM to XXXXX.JPG and then just look at the image with any standard photo viewer.
Most cameras that use the Apple Quicktime movie format and create files with the three letter MOV extension will also take the first frame from the video and create these separate THM ( JPEG ) images and store EXIF data there instead of in the MOV file itself. Apple is one of those companies that doesn’t like to add standard EXIF data to their ‘Apple Quicktime’ movie format.
This was exactly the case with the TWO short ( 9 second ) movies shot by Granite Mountain Hotshot Christopher MacKenzie ( Rest in Peace ).
Those two movies he shot were ( as far I know ) the ONLY time the SAIT investigators actually bothered to include the accompanying THM files for ANY video(s) they realeased via FOIA / FOIL requests.
Those two THM files for Christopher’s movies are sitting right there in the InvestigativeMEDIA public Dropbox which contains what Arizona Forestry has ( so far ) decided to release.
There are a LOT of other Apple Quicktime MOV files in that SAIT release where they did NOT bother to also obtain and/or release the accompanying THM ( thumbnail/JPEG ) file(s).
It is NOT KNOWN whether all the videos taken by Prescott National Forest off-the-radar hire Aaron Hulburd ever had any of these THM files associated with them.
US Forestry released no such thing for ANY of their PNF employee Aaron Hulburd’s videos.
They might actually exist ( somewhere ).
>> Otis also wrote…
>>
>> Re Individuals locations and timings: cell phone triangulation and call records.
>> Depending on cell phone masts and location geography triangulating someones
>> position can be pretty accurate and could/should have been used to work out,
>> even to within a ball park, where everyone was for the whole day. And call
>> records…fundamental. These may have given the investigations some leads on
>> what questions they should have asked… but probably wouldn’t have bothered
>> anyway.
If there is anything we have learned from examining all this evidence… it’s that the use of cellphones and smartphones is now no longer OPTIONAL amongst these people that are hired to work fires.
Cellphones and Smartphones are now ESSENTIAL to ‘firefighting’… whether any State or Federal level Forestry agency either likes it or wants to acknowledge the fact.
It is perfectly OBVIOUS that EVERYONE involved with ‘fire management’ at the Yarnell Hill Fire was freely and actively using their cellphones and smartphones as an ESSENTIAL tool in the performance of their responsibilities.
In some cases… it was even MORE important than using standard radio.
So all of that being said… it is still UNBELIEVABLE that the investigators assigned to this incident did not IMMEDIATELY acquire all relevant cell phone data and call records in the course of performing THEIR job(s).
In this day and age… that is now like “Investigations 101”.
It also seems to be the case that most of these fire guys with cellphones and smartphones are actually either just using ones that were ‘issued’ to them by their own departments or ( as was the case with at least ONE of Eric Marsh’s multiple cell/smartphones ) they are being paid a STIPEND by their department to help cover the costs of the phone.
In both of these cases… it is NOT necessary for any investigation body to ask any of the surviving family for any kind of ‘permission’ to obtain call records.
Example: When ADOSH requested both Willis’ and Marsh’s cellphone records via the City of Prescott… the Prescott attorneys gave up Willis’ records immediately… but then said they could not supply Eric Marsh’s records without the permission of his widow, Amanda Marsh.
That has always been total horseshit… and the Prescott Attorneys knew that.
Eric Marsh was being paid a STIPEND by his employer to cover the costs of that phone.
That means the EMPLOYER has every right to request the call records for that phone.
It doesn’t matter what Amanda Marsh might have to say about it.
**
** AGENDA PUBLISHED FOR YARNELL MEMORIAL BOARD JAN 6, 2015 MEETING
**
** PURCHASE OF LAND BY WIDOWS AND ACCESS/HIKING RIGHTS TO BE DISCUSSED
Reply to joy post on January 2, 2015 at 2:05 pm
>> joy said…
>>
>> Just today retired cop drove us around since Sonny’s jeep is down and we
>> reserved and paid for a rental to MAKE SURE we get to that January 6th 3pm
>> meeting to record it for you all to listen to it.
Thank you, Joy.
Be advised of a few things…
** THIS MEMORIAL BOARD MUST FOLLOW ARIZONA LAW
This Yarnell Memorial Board is absolutely subject to ALL the laws pertaining to the ‘Arizona Open Meetings’ legislation.
Everything they are tasked to do is coming straight from a bill passed by the Arizona State Legislature and they are only required to decide what to do with about a half-million dollars of Arizona taxpayer dollars… so they can’t just “make this up as they go along”. They MUST follow ALL the rules pertaining to “Arizona Open Meetings”.
The official link to ALL of the RULES that must be observed is here…
https://www.azag.gov/sites/default/files/sites/all/docs/agency-handbook/ch07.pdf
This Yarnell Memorial Board is ALREADY violating the law by NOT having released or posted in PUBLIC any MINUTES from their previous meeting.
The LAW requires them to either release their own RECORDINGS or ALL meetings… OR a detailed transcription of EVERYTHING that took place during the ‘open’ parts ( non-executive session ) of the meeting within THREE DAYS ( 72 hours ) following a meeting.
It has been more than a MONTH since the last meeting of this Yarnell Hill Memorial Board ( on November 24, 2014 ) and there is still no sign of any ‘recordings’ or ‘minutes’ of the previous meeting.
SIDENOTE: They ALSO violated Arizona law right out of the gate last November by ONLY publishing notice of their meeting a few hours before it was going to take place. The ‘public notice’ only appeared the morning of November 24 and the meeting took place just a few hours later. Arizona law ( see link above ) says that unless at least 24 hours PUBLIC notice is given for a meeting… then that meeting is unlawful and should NOT even take place.
Anyone who might say that ‘minutes’ for a previous meeting do NOT have to be publicly posted until those minutes are ‘approved’ at the NEXT meeting is DEAD WRONG.
Regardless of whether the ‘minutes’ of a meeting will end up being ‘approved’ the next time the Board meets… those ‘minutes’ are still REQUIRED by LAW to be publicy posted within 3 days following the meeting. They can be labelled as ‘draft’ minutes or labelled ‘unapproved’… but they are STILL required to be posted publicy within 72 hours of any meeting.
So, technically, you should not HAVE to RECORD this meeting yourself.
THEY are REQUIRED by LAW to publicy publish recordings and/or detailed minutes within 72 hours following ANY of their meetings.
Here is the part of the ‘Arizona Open Meetings’ law about that…
———————————————————–
7.8 Minutes.
Minutes MUST be taken of all public meetings and executive sessions.
7.8.1 Form of and Access to the Minutes. Minutes may be taken in writing or may be recorded by a tape recorder or video tape recorder. A.R.S. 38-431.01(B); see Forms 7.10, 7.11.
The minutes or a recording of a public meeting MUST be available for public inspection within three working days after the meeting. A.R.S. 38-431.01(D).
Public bodies concerned about distributing minutes before they have been officially approved at a subsequent meeting should mark the minutes “draft” or “unapproved” and make them available within three working days of the meeting.
If the minutes have been recorded by a mechanical recorder, allowing the public to have access to that recording is sufficient. However, if the minutes were taken in shorthand, those minutes must be typed or written out in longhand in order to comply with this requirement.
——————————————————-
So there is no ‘wiggle room’ there. They MUST provide public ‘minutes’ and/or ‘recordings’ of each and every meeting.
However… since the Yarnell Hill Memorial Board is (obviously) currently in violation of Arizona LAW for NOT meeting this requirement even for the previous meeting… recording it yourself might not be a bad idea.
Since they haven’t even posted any minutes from the previous meeting ( even though they were required by LAW to do so within 72 hours ) then they might not have any intentions of publicly posting any minutes for THIS upcoming important January 6 meeting, either.
I don’t know what actually happens if a ‘Board’ like this CONTINUES to violate the Arizona Open Meetings laws as it has more and more meetings. I suppose the Arizona Attorney General’s office would have to come down on them like a hammer… and it’s possible that even the decisions they think they are making could be deemed ‘null and void’ if it is determined they were violating Arizona law while making those decisions.
** JANUARY 6 AGENDA HAS FINALLY BEEN PUBLISHED
Just a few days ago… the ‘agenda’ for the January 6 meeting was finally posted publicly ( as required by law ) and here is a direct link to it…
http://azstateparks.com/committees/downloads/agendas/2015/YARNELL_AGENDA_01-06-15.pdf
TWO things to make note of in this agenda for January 6.
** (1) They absolutely ARE now going to discuss during THIS meeting whether that small group of widows should ( or should NOT ) be allowed to PURCHASE the land where the actual deployment took place… or whether that specific spot should be purchased by the State of Arizona. This is still the FIRST thing the Arizona Bill that created this Board says they are supposed to decide… and it was Arizona State Representative Karen Fann ( who represents Prescott voters ) who made SURE that provision was in the bill. Representative Fann is on the Board herself and has already said she thinks this small group of widows SHOULD be allowed to purchase the land and decide for themselves who ever gets to set foot on it.
SIDENOTE: Given the fact that Representative Fann is on the Board and was the ADVOCATE of this provision in the Bill itself… and the fact that Amanda Marsh is ALSO on the board and is ( apparently ) one of the ‘widows’ who wants to buy the land… I can’t image that these two would still be able to VOTE on this and not have to ‘abstain’ from the Board vote due to ‘conflict of interest’ issues… but I guess we shall see how THAT is going to go down.
The agenda also says they might actually go ahead and VOTE on this right there during this January 6 meeting.
It is item 2 under “Board Action Items” for this meeting… which says…
“2. Discussion and possible vote concerning the determination required by A.R.S. 41-
519.01(C)(2) whether the Arizona Parks Board should make the purchase of the land for the Yarnell Hill Memorial site.”
** (2) The agenda also says they ARE going to discuss ‘access rights’ and ‘right of ways’ during this January 6 meeting.
It is supposed to be item 3 under ‘Discussion Items’ for this meeting, which says…
“3. Access and right of ways to the Yarnell Hill Memorial Site – Discussion of motorized, non-motorized access, parking, trail or road size and distance, feasibility, cost, eminent domain and consideration for adjacent land owners and whether to form a sub-committee.”
** PUBLIC COMMENTS / QUESTIONS COULD BE LIMITED TO 3 MINUTES
The agenda for the upcoming January 6 meeting says there WILL be a ‘Call to the public’ during the meeting for comments/questions. It is item ‘F’ on the agenda and is as follows…
(F) CALL TO THE PUBLIC – Those wishing to address the Committee must state their name for the record and be recognized by the Chair. Presentation time may be limited to three minutes at the discretion of the Chair; the Chair may limit a presentation to one person per organization.
NOTE: What they don’t say here is that not only can the Board limit any comment/question to just 3 minutes ( 180 seconds )… they can also refuse to acknowledge the comment or question if it does not specifically relate to a specific item on the AGENDA for that meeting.
Here is the part from the ‘Arizona Open Meetings’ LAW about that…
—————————————————————————
7.7.7 Calls to the Public.
In 2000, the Arizona Legislature clarified the limitations on open calls to the public during public meetings. A.R.S. 38-431.01(H) now provides that a public body may make an open call to the public to allow individuals to address the public body on any issue within the jurisdiction of the public body. Members of the public body may not discuss or take action on matters raised during the call to the public that are not specifically identified on the agenda. Id. Public body members may, however, respond to criticism made by those who have addressed the public body, ask staff to review a matter, or ask that a matter be put on a future agenda. Id. See also Ariz. Att’y Gen. Op. I99-006.
——————————————————————-
However… since the AGENDA for the upcoming meeting definitely says they are supposed to discuss things like “the purchase of the land” and “access rights”… then any question about “hiking rights’ would be directly relevant to THIS meeting and they would pretty much have to allow any/all comments/questions about that.
Here is the complete AGENDA for the upcoming January 6, 2015 meeting…
————————————————–
NOTICE OF PUBLIC MEETING OF THE
YARNELL HILL MEMORIAL SITE BOARD
Notice is hereby given to Members of the Yarnell Hill Memorial Site Board (Board) and the general public that there will be a General Board Meeting, to begin on Tuesday, January 6, 2015 at 3:00 PM, pursuant to A.R.S. § 38-431.02 and A.R.S. § 41-511 et. seq. at the Yavapai County Board of Supervisors’ Hearing Room, First Floor Yavapai County Administrative Services Building 1015 Fair Street, Prescott, Arizona.
The Board may elect to hold an Executive Session for any agendized item at any time during the meeting to discuss or consult with its legal counsel for legal advice on matters listed on this agenda pursuant to A.R.S. §38-431.03 (A) (3). Items on the Agenda may be discussed out of order, unless they have been specifically noted to be set for a time certain. Public comment will be taken. The Board will discuss and may take action on the following matters:
AGENDA
(Agenda items may be taken in any order unless set for a time certain)
A. CALL TO ORDER – Roll Call
B. PLEDGE OF ALLEGIANCE
C. INTRODUCTIONS OF BOARD MEMBERS
D. BOARD ACTION ITEMS
1. Delegating to the Arizona State Parks Board the administrative tasks related to the Yarnell Hill Memorial Fund authorized by A.R.S. 41-519.02, including establishing the fund with the Arizona State Treasurer’s Office, assisting with the collection and deposit of donations to the Yarnell Hill Memorial Fund, maintaining an appropriate accounting of all monies in the Yarnell Hill Memorial Fund and assisting with disbursements of those funds as further authorized by the Board.
2. Discussion and possible vote concerning the determination required by A.R.S. 41-519.01(C)(2) whether the Arizona Parks Board should make the purchase of the land for the Yarnell Hill Memorial site.
E. DISCUSSION ITEMS
1. Fund Raising for the Yarnell Hill Memorial Donations Fund – Discussion of memorial design and construction, preservation and maintenance, fund raising activities, access trails, roads and parking and whether to form a sub-committee.
2. Memorial Design and Construction of the Yarnell Hill Memorial – Discussion of memorial design and construction, materials, cost and location and whether to form a sub-committee.
3. Access and right of ways to the Yarnell Hill Memorial Site – Discussion of motorized, non-motorized access, parking, trail or road size and distance, feasibility, cost, eminent domain and consideration for adjacent land owners and whether to form a sub-committee.
4. Maintenance and preservation of the Yarnell Hill Memorial Site – Discussion of agency or group responsible for the maintenance and preservation of the site, funding if any needed for the perpetual upkeep, equipment, staffing and whether to form a sub-committee.
F. CALL TO THE PUBLIC – Those wishing to address the Committee must state their name for the record and be recognized by the Chair. Presentation time may be limited to three minutes at the discretion of the Chair; the Chair may limit a presentation to one person per organization.
G. TIME AND PLACE OF NEXT MEETING AND CALL FOR FUTURE AGENDA ITEMS
1. The next Yarnell Hill Memorial Site Board Meeting will be held on TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 3, 2015. Time and location to be determined.
2. Board members may wish to discuss issues of interest to the Yarnell Hill Memorial Site Board and request staff to place specific items on future Board meeting agendas.
H. ADJOURNMENT
Bryan Martyn, Chairman
Posted at: Arizona State Parks 1300 W. Washington Street Phoenix, AZ and h t t p : / / azstateparks.com/committees/Yarnell.html Arizona State Forestry Division 1110 W. Washington Street #110 Phoenix, AZ and h t t p s : / / azsf.az.gov Arizona State Capitol 1700 W. Washington Street Phoenix, AZ and w w w.azleg.gov Arizona Department of Administration 100 N. 15th Ave. Phoenix, AZ and h t t p s : / / doa.az.gov/meeting-notices
Yarnell Hill Memorial Site Board – Committee Members
Bryan Martyn, Chairman
Arizona State Representative Karen Fann
Arizona State Senator Steve Pierce
Arizona State Forester Scott Hunt
Others members…
John Flynn, Brendan McDonough, Dan Fraijo, Lenora Nelson, Glen Hopkinson,
Ben Palm, Mayor Marlin Kuykendall, Supervisor Rowle Simmons, Amanda Marsh,
Chuck Tidey, Darrell Willis
————————————————–
**
** ANYONE IS ALLOWED TO RECORD THESE ‘PUBLIC’ MEETINGS
Followup… I forgot to make something perfectly CLEAR up above.
Even though this Yarnell Memorial Board is REQUIRED by LAW to ALWAYS provide either recordings and/or detailed minutes of ANY of their meetings within 72 hours ( which they have so far failed to do )…
…ANY member of the public is also allowed to RECORD these meetings.
They ONLY part of these public meetings that can NOT be ‘electronically recorded’ by the public would be if the Board officially voted to go into an ‘executive session’ to discuss something specifically exempt from public consumption.
In that case… they first have to CLEAR THE ROOM and make sure no one from the public has either accidentally ( or intentionally ) left some ‘recording device’ behind.
Other than that… the public is free to bring their own recording devices ( even video cameras ) and USE them for the entire ‘public’ part of the meeting.
This is stated specifically in the Arizona LAW that governs these ‘public meetings’.
From the ‘Arizona Open Meetings’ RULE book at…
https://www.azag.gov/sites/default/files/sites/all/docs/agency-handbook/ch07.pdf
————————————————————-
7.10.3 Record of the Proceedings.
All or any part of a public meeting . . . may be recorded by any person in attendance
by means of a tape recorder or camera or other means of sonic reproduction.” A.R.S. 38-
431.01(F). A public body may prohibit or restrict such recordings only if they actively
interfere with the conduct of the meeting. Id.
———————————————————-
So there it is… in black and white.
The ONLY ‘objection’ one of these public Boards can EVER make to any member of the public using their own recording devices during the PUBLIC part of any of their meetings is if they try to cook up some argument that it would be ‘disruptive to the meeting’, or something.
**
** QUESTION FOR ANYONE WITH WFF EXPERIENCE
**
** STRANGE CARTRIDGES AT DEPLOYMENT SITE?
In the SAIT ‘Photos and Videos’ folder named ‘Petrilli Site Visit Photos (1)’ there is an image of one of the burned-up packs that was NOT thrown clear from the deployment site.
A bunch of strange ‘cartridges’ have ‘spilled’ out of the pack onto the ground.
There are the exact size, shape and appearance as ‘shotgun shells’ but I don’t think that’s what they are. They also don’t appear to be any known type of ‘fusee’.
There are at least SEVEN of these ‘cartridges’ there on the ground, and they are all centered around what is obviously also a metal FILE that has spilled out of the same pack.
Does anyone with WFF experience recognize these ‘cartridges’?
DIRECT links to images in the SAIT Dropbox don’t seem to be working too well anymore… so here is a link to the ‘Petrillis’ photos folder itself and a description of which photo in that folder I am talking about…
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/02ue6bnjp6nazkm/AADARLUWUwoIm5q5vJundOQJa/Photos and Video/Petrilli Site Visit Photos (1)
IMG_0283.JPG
( 10th sequential image in that folder, last one to the right, second row down )
Okay… sorry… WordPress even screwed up that link to the “Petrilli” photos folder itself.
Trying again below… but if that doesn’t work then the exact PATH into the SAIT Dropbox itself is as follows…
SAIT Dropbox / Photos and Video / Petrilli Site Visit Photos (1)
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/02ue6bnjp6nazkm/AADARLUWUwoIm5q5vJundOQJa/Photos%20and%20Video/Petrilli%20Site%20Visit%20Photos%20%281%29
Okay… that link above seems to work fine. That’s the “Petrilli” folder where IMG_0283.JPG is located.
( 10th sequential image in that folder, last one to the right, second row down )
WTKTT,
I am not able to open the dropbox but my guess would be rounds for the firing pistol – a common tool used by Hotshot crews.
You SHOULD be able to access any of InvestigativeMEDIA’s online DropBoxes.
They are PUBLIC sites and no login or password is required.
Did you try clicking that SECOND link posted above?
This one?…
SAIT Dropbox / Photos and Video / Petrilli Site Visit Photos (1)
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/02ue6bnjp6nazkm/AADARLUWUwoIm5q5vJundOQJa/Photos%20and%20Video/Petrilli%20Site%20Visit%20Photos%20%281%29
That really should work in any browser.
If it doesn’t… then try this…
Use the links to the right at the top of this page to manually navigate to the InvestigativeMEDIA site for the SAIT ‘Supporting Documentation’. That should get you all the way into the Dropbox list of folders.
Once you have done that… try the link above again.
It might have to do with having some kind of ‘cookie’ stored in your browser that you only get if you have ever navigated to that Dropbox in your browser at least once manually.
They look like AA batteries, near a pair of a tweezers that give you some indication of scale.
I see the tweezers you are talking about… but I think they would have to be pretty BIG tweezers. They are sitting there on top of that standard-size metal file.
I don’t think they are batteries. Not standard ones, anyway.
One of the ‘cartridges’ stuck in the dirt to the bottom left appears to have that sort of ‘positive pole’ on the end… but the cartridges don’t really match the size of shape of any ‘off the shelf’ batteries.
I would believe ‘cartridges for a flare gun’ or some kind… but than that begs a few questions.
1) Did GM even carry any kind of ‘flare guns’ or ‘berry pistols’? Any number of people should be able to answer that including Prescott Wildland Division Chief Darreel Willis and/or Brendan McDonough.
2) If those are FLARE cartridges… WHO would have been carrying them? The metal file already indicates this might be the pack remnants of one of the SAWYERS.
3) If this are FLARE cartidges… then where is the GUN? It doesn’t appear to have ever made it into the evidence record to determine if it was even ever FIRED that day.
Followup… here is an amazing National Geographic photo showing a Hotshot actually using a ‘Berry Pistol’ to help ignite a ‘burnout’.
http://yourshot.nationalgeographic.com/photos/1909785/
Photo caption…
Photograph by Kyle Miller
The Berry Pistol #wildlandfire
A member of a hotshot firefighting crew firing a berry pistol to help ignite a night burnout in Oregon.
Reply to Otis post on January 3, 2015 at 3:21 pm
>> Otis said…
>>
>> They look like AA batteries, near a pair of a tweezers
>> that give you some indication of scale.
Followup… I actually think I’m seeing TWO pairs of tweezers in that photo.
One is, in fact, resting on that standard ‘metal file’ in the center of photo.
The OTHER pair is down there outside the pack in the lower left.
I’m not seeing a whole lot of other visual clues as to WHOSE field pack this really might have been… except maybe for the climber’s style ‘metal clip’ lying on the ground in the upper right. I believe we’ve been here before with these kinds of ‘metal clips’ and while common… I think only a few of the GM crew were actually using those either on their belts or packs.
Verifying this with other photos. Also determining exactly WHERE this pack is at the deployment site to see if it matches anything in other photos or the SAIR chart of where everyone deployed.
Actually… there are at least TWO other photos in that same Petrilli folder that verify exactly WHERE this pack was physically located at the deployment site.
In the same Petrilli folder…
IMG_0282 is a ‘wider view’ of the area and the same pack with the spilled cartridges is now on the upper left edge of the that photo which is still showing two of the chainsaws as found at the site.
IMG_0281 is an even wider shot and Pertilli stepped about 10 feet to the left. The pack with the spilled cartidges is now about mid-top-dead-center in the photo but still closer to the camera than the chainsaw that is also now top-dead-center.
I do not think they are batteries. But did you notice the size of the breach on the sign fuel bottle. Must have been one hell of an explosion.
Reply to calvin post on January 3, 2015 at 3:51 pm
>> calvin said…
>>
>> I do not think they are batteries.
Neither do I. Not any batteries I’m familiar with, anyway.
>> calvin also said…
>>
>> But did you notice the size of the breach on the sign fuel bottle.
>> Must have been one hell of an explosion.
Yep. That’s why you are SUPPOSED to THROW YOUR PACK away from
the deployment site. Most of the GM Hotshots did NOT ‘follow their training’
and do that important thing.
Even if that is the only “Lesson Learned” that Arizona Forestry and US Forestry might ever be willing to acknowledge from this entire incident… that’s still an IMPORTANT one and deserves its own ‘training alert’ bulletin.
If those really are FLARE cartridges… and someone really did have a FLARE gun or a ‘berry pistol’… I wonder if it was actually USED that day?
Is it possible one of the final acts of their lives was to try and fire off some FLARES since they were told the VLAT was coming?…. and that would also explain some of the reports Joy is talking about of people thinking they say FLARES being fired that afternoon?
Key to this would be: Where is the damn GUN, then?
Did it ever make it into the ‘chain of evidence’… or is that just one more important thing ( like Eric Marsh’s cellphone ) that seemed to have just ‘walked away’ from the deployment site?
Hi all. I’ve been reading this discussion for a while now, and I think it is finally getting to a reaching an answer that no-one wanted to vocalise…namely the leadership or the GMHS may actually have been at fault. Not wishing to put anything out of sequence, simply put these are the two (small) things that I have wanted to contribute.
Re video/helmet cam footage: some digital cameras and mobiles take small jpeg images to be used as thumbnails for the movies. These thumbnails should contain a standard set of exif data. This is relevant because the thumbnails will help determine the camera, or narrow down the cell phone…is it one that only records for 30 seconds? Maybe even have gps co-ords, but may also help in proving the existence of ‘missing footage.
Re Individuals locations and timings: cell phone triangulation and call records. Depending on cell phone masts and location geography triangulating someones position can be pretty accurate and could/should have been used to work out, even to within a ball park, where everyone was for the whole day. And call records…fundamental. These may have given the investigations some leads on what questions they should have asked… but probably wouldn’t have bothered anyway.
For the record I have never been involved in Fire Fighting of any description and I’m from the UK, so this is not a personal fight for me, I read about the incident at the time, and found it incredibly sad. But I think it important that the root cause for the deaths of the GMHS is found to prevent a repeat, maybe there will be more next time.
Reply to ‘Retired with 38’ post on December 30, 2014 at 3:01 pm
>> Retired with 38 said…
>>
>> WTKTT… Adding to your comments the comments
>> made by DC Willis (as listed below) and the additional
>> comment of “following them anywhere”, you begin to
>> wonder the “culture” that the City of Prescott has created
>> within their organization, especially within the Wildland Division.
I would say it’s more than BEGIN to wonder.
I would say you HAVE to wonder.
And you are right… I missed at least that one other little ‘gem’ Willis spouted just in that one deployment site press conference alone.
So my 3G list ( below ) for the ‘philosophy’, ‘culture’ and ‘mindset’ that Willis was revealing just in that one public speech actually could have been more in the 4G category…
G1 ( God ) Willis: “God had a different plan for those men”
G2 ( Guts ) Willis: “No WFF ever wants to sit in the black”
G3 ( Glory ) Willis: “Rest assured… they died with honor”
G4 ( Giddyup ) Willis: “I would have followed them anywhere”
Actually… ‘Giddyup’ might have been more like another well known acronym that ITSELF has 4Gs in it…
GAGG = “Go Along or Get Gone”.
Only some former GMHS can tell us what the ‘culture of obedience’ might have REALLY been like in that public funded organization. McDonough can even tell us what it was like THAT DAY.
I don’t know what might be scarier to learn…
1) If anyone ever disagreed with management there was always hell to pay.
OR
2) No one ever disagreed with management. Not once. Not EVER. Just didn’t happen.
As far as ‘insight into the management mindest’… there is also the following gem from Darrell Willis’ person-to-person interview with a reporter from “The Atlantic’… sometime AFTER the tragedy and AFTER Marsh had actually moved over to Granite Mountain Station 7 and into Eric Marsh’s old office itself.
Notice how Willis ENDS his description of WHY ( even months after the tragedy ) he still thinks the men attempted that risky move.
It has nothing to do with SAFETY.
It has nothing to do with FOLLOWING ALL THE RULES.
It doesn’t even have much to do with whether they would have been able to accomplish jack shit with just shiny helmets, some hand tools, and some chainsaws… but no actual structural protection fire gear or PPE.
Willis ENDS his comments with the classic “all politician, all the time” approach to ‘actions in the field’…
“What would the PUBLIC think?”
The Atlantic
http://www.theatlantic.com/features/archive/2014/05/fire-on-the-mountain/361613/
From the article…
————————————
On a frosty autumn morning last year in Prescott, three seasonal workers gathered at Fire Station 7, the former home of the Granite Mountain Interagency Hotshot Crew, and then headed out to clear brush on the southern outskirts of town. They represented what was left of the city’s wildland firefighting program. The city, mired in lawsuits filed against it by family members of dead hotshots and Yarnell homeowners, has no plans to rebuild its hotshot crew. The chain-link fence around the station house was bare, no longer the locus of the community’s shock and grief. The posters and T-shirts and trinkets had all been taken down, cataloged, and stored in boxes.
The parking lot was empty, save for a few city fire trucks.
Inside, Darrell Willis, now a chief without any hotshots, sat in his office, first door on the right, behind what had been Eric Marsh’s desk. Before the fire, Willis had worked out of another station, but afterward he moved here, to feel closer to his men and to be available if widows and family members needed something. “I live it every day,” he said. “I relive it every day.”
Like many others who fought the Yarnell Hill Fire and who knew the hotshots who died, Darrell Willis has spent a lot of time asking himself why they did what they did. Part of the answer he’s come up with involves the very natural urge to fight and protect our own.
“They wanted to reengage,” he said…
“Sure, they could sit up there in the black. But if they could try to get back in the game, they were going to. What they had been doing was lost. And that happens a lot. You put a day’s worth of work into something, and all of the sudden it’s gone, and you have to have a new starting point somewhere. There’s a lot of sweat and expended energy.
So what do we do, just sit up here and watch it go by?
They knew there was an evacuation going on, they knew there were people staying in their houses. So what would the public think?
‘You’re not going to help us? Why did you even show up?’ ”
————————————
Unbelievable.
Willis ENDS his statement to the Atlantic reporter with the impression that ‘Public Relations’ actually *might* have been in the forefront of their mind when they decided to embark on the last hike of their lives that day.
The only thing more telling might have been if Willis might have actually ‘slipped up’ when he started to make the statement and the words “City Council” came out first… which he then might have quickly corrected to “the PUBLIC”.
I’d love to see a SURVEY on what Willis is asking us to believe here.
What OTHER Type 1 Hotshot crew… anywhere in the country… would list “What the PUBLIC might think” as one of their decision making considerations when out in the field and their lives are on the line?
Something tells me the tally on THAT survey would be…
Zero. Zip. Nada.
Whoops. Bad typo above.
I typed “Marsh’ in a crucial place where it should have been ‘Willis’.
It was (obviously) Darrell Willis who had ‘moved into Marsh’s office’ after the tragedy.
That paragraph above SHOULD have read like this…
As far as ‘insight into the management mindest’… there is also the following gem from Darrell Willis’ person-to-person interview with a reporter from “The Atlantic’… sometime AFTER the tragedy and AFTER Darrell Willis had actually moved over to Granite Mountain Station 7 and into Eric Marsh’s old office itself.
I totally agree, when the fire is on the run no one is wondering what the public might think of their actions or lack of. I held a similar position to Willis, and I have had a bad feeling about his interviews since the first time I saw them. I understand the “want to reengage” comment, but it is still the responsibility of the crew to do so when safe. So, stay in the black, let the “Big Dog Eat” and move to reengage when safe to do so. I get it, that’s what I would expect my crews to have done, regardless of who might be asking for there help. We will move when safe to do so, that simple.
So, on a different note, as 2014 moves into its final night shift I want to put out a THANK YOU to all the mainstays on this site. Although I am a late and infrequent poster I have followed this site since day one. The drive and tenacity for all to stay involved and stay the course is incredible! It is safe to say we have all learned more on this site than either of the “Official” reports have found or reported. Thank you all again, hopefully 2015 provides some final answers we can all learn from.
Reply to Robert the Second (RTS) post on December 30, 2014 at 7:23 pm
>> RTS said…
>>
>> Good points one and all,
>>
>> WTKTT – I’m with you on the LACK of former GMHS coming
>> forward. I’m still tracking down two former GMHS from the
>> 2011 and 2012 fire seasons respectively, that told their parents
>> at the end of those respective seasons that they were NOT
>> coming back to the Crew the next year because of safety
>> concerns they had.
>>
>> One needs to look at and consider the TOTALITY OF
>> CIRCUMSTANCES in these matters. There is certainly an
>> indication of Bad Decisions With Good Outcomes and an
>> attitude of higher risk and more on the GMHS, that started
>> at the top.
Agree.
Duane Steinbrink was the first Prescott Wildland Division Chief… and in Marsh’s personnel files we learn that Marsh thought HE would be Steinbrink’s replacement.
It didn’t happen. Prescott chose to let Darrell Willis ‘double dip’ out of retirement as the next “Wildland Division Chief” instead of Eric Marsh.
Now it was Darrell Willis that Eric Marsh had to ‘prove himself’ to… in order to achieve his own stated goal of becoming ‘Wildland Division Chief’ one day.
See more about Willis below.
>> On December 28, 2014 at 2:50 pm, RTS also said…
>>
>> SR and WTKTT,
>>
>> While an OPS Chief on the 2013 Thompson Ridge Fire on
>> the Santa Fe NF in New Mexico, many WFF, including
>> the GMHS, heard OPS (Darrell) Willis give a radio briefing one
>> evening referring to the evening’s strategy regarding a dozer
>> line around some threatened structures.
>>
>> OPS Willis broadcast over the radio to the night resources
>> to “HOLD THAT LINE AT ALL COSTS …”
>>
>> AT ALL COSTS? REALLY? WTF!
>>
>> That;s what the military does in combat situations by
>> having ‘ACCEPTABLE LOSSES’ as part of their overall plan.
>> However, in WFF there is NO such thing as ‘acceptable losses’
>> for WFF For structures themselves MAYBE but NEVER for WFF.
>>
>> No WFF that I know engages in a wildland fire knowing or planning
>> on losing “X-number of WFF” that day and just chalking it off as
>> acceptable.
>>
>> They just do NOT do that!
>>
>> So, this appears to have been another PFD tacit, yet unwritten
>> policy that was held by certain members of the PFD and it MAY
>> be that this unwritten PFD attitude had an influence on the
>> decisions and actions of Marsh and possibly the GMHS that fatal day.
I can find no public record of Darrell Willis ever having actually served in the military himself… but perhaps he’s one of those guys that always WANTED to.
One of the first media interviews Darrell Willis gave following the tragedy was to MILITARY.COM… and he seemed to be pleased to be talking about Hotshots ( and firefighting in general ) in ‘military’ terms.
It also appears that ( even now ) Willis still maintains that no firefighter would ever want to just ‘sit in the black’.
There was an article in the ‘Atlantic’ that contains a person-to-person interview with Darrell Willis at the ‘Granite Mountain 7’ station itself, long AFTER the deployment.
The article was written in May of 2014 ( and is stored in the /2014/05/ archive directory on the ‘Atlantic’ Server ) but the article itself says it wasn’t actually published until June, 2014, near the date of the first anniversary.
Even in this article, published near the first anniversary, Darrell Willis is reiterating his belief that “No firefighter would ever want to just sit in the black”.
The Atlantic
http://www.theatlantic.com/features/archive/2014/05/fire-on-the-mountain/361613/
From the article…
————————————
On a frosty autumn morning last year in Prescott, three seasonal workers gathered at Fire Station 7, the former home of the Granite Mountain Interagency Hotshot Crew, and then headed out to clear brush on the southern outskirts of town. They represented what was left of the city’s wildland firefighting program. The city, mired in lawsuits filed against it by family members of dead hotshots and Yarnell homeowners, has no plans to rebuild its hotshot crew. The chain-link fence around the station house was bare, no longer the locus of the community’s shock and grief. The posters and T-shirts and trinkets had all been taken down, cataloged, and stored in boxes.
The parking lot was empty, save for a few city fire trucks.
Inside, Darrell Willis, now a chief without any hotshots, sat in his office, first door on the right, behind what had been Eric Marsh’s desk. Before the fire, Willis had worked out of another station, but afterward he moved here, to feel closer to his men and to be available if widows and family members needed something. “I live it every day,” he said. “I relive it every day.”
Like many others who fought the Yarnell Hill Fire and who knew the hotshots who died, Darrell Willis has spent a lot of time asking himself why they did what they did. Part of the answer he’s come up with involves the very natural urge to fight and protect our own.
“They wanted to reengage,” he said…
“Sure, they could sit up there in the black. But if they could try to get back in the game, they were going to. What they had been doing was lost. And that happens a lot. You put a day’s worth of work into something, and all of the sudden it’s gone, and you have to have a new starting point somewhere. There’s a lot of sweat and expended energy.
So what do we do, just sit up here and watch it go by?
They knew there was an evacuation going on, they knew there were people staying in their houses. So what would the public think?
‘You’re not going to help us? Why did you even show up?’ ”
————————————
SIDENOTE: The ‘Atlantic’ article above is the first PUBLIC confirmation I’ve seen that the ‘addiction’ problem mentioned in Eric Marsh’s own personnel files was, in fact, alchohol related.
Also from the article…
————————————
Marsh took the lead in hiring new recruits, and focused as much on character as on stamina. “When was the last time you lied?” he asked in every interview. “Tell me about that.” Truth telling was a guiding principle for Marsh. He had quit drinking more than a decade earlier, and being honest with himself and others had become a big part of his sobriety. When a young guy named Brendan McDonough interviewed for a job with Granite Mountain in 2011, he told Marsh that he’d been busted for underage drinking and breaking into a car, and had dabbled with drugs. But he added that he was ready to move past that and had been taking EMT and fire-science classes at a local college. Marsh offered him a job that day. He wanted good men, not just good firefighters.
————————————
By the way…
Darrell Willis is ‘semi-famous’ now in firefighting circles and he is still accepting ‘speaking engagements’.
He was the ‘keynote’ speaker for the Roseville, California City Awards Banquet held each year to honor all Roseville Police and Fire Department personnel.
On the home page for that Awards ceremony is one of the most complete BIOS for Willis that is available online. It also does NOT list any actual ‘military service’ but its the first PUBLIC BIO for Willis I’ve seen that says he comes from a ‘family of firefighters’… and also openly verifies that one of his sons ( Jared Willis ) is a Prescott Police Officer and SWAT team member.
From the Roseville 2014 City Awards home page…
———————————————————————-
Roseville, California, City Awards – May 9, 2014
Honoring Roseville Police and Fire Departments…
Roseville, California
( Web Link will be provided as a Reply )
Darrell Willis,
Special Guest Speaker
Wildland Division Chief
Prescott, AZ
————————————————————————-
2014 Speakers
Darrell_Willis_profile
Darrell Willis is an Arizona native who grew up in a fire service family. Darrell is currently the Wildland Division Chief for the City of Prescott, AZ.
Prior to that, Darrell was the Fire Chief of Prescott for 14 years. Prior to being promoted to Fire Chief
Darrell spent 9 years as Deputy Chief in Prescott. Darrell started his career in the fire service in 1975 as a volunteer firefighter in Bullhead City, Arizona then moved to the Mesa Fire Department for a 9-year stint before moving to Prescott.
During his 14 years as chief, Darrell was appointed as interim City Manager for a 4-month period while a search for a permanent manager was conducted.
Darrell is a member of the IAFC, AFCA serving two terms as president, NFPA, Governor’s Forest Health Committee, and Prescott Area Wildland Urban Interface Commission.
Darrell is an Operations Section Chief on the Central West Zone Incident Management Type ll Team and has served as a Division Supervisor and Structure Protection Specialist on one of the Southwest Regions Type l teams. Under Darrell’s leadership the Wildland Division and Granite Mountain Hotshots were established.
Darrell is married to his High School sweetheart, Judy, they have 3 grown children and 5 grandchildren. Darrell’s son Jared, is a six year veteran with the Prescott Police Department as a patrol officer and SWAT team member. Darrell is a member of the Board of Directors with the Prescott Salvation Army.
———————————————————————-
SIDENOTE: This PUBLIC verification on Willis’ part that his son, Jared, is a Prescott Police officer is also PUBLIC verification that this is the same Prescott Police Officer who was involved in the shooting of an armed assailant in Prescott in November of 2013, in-between when the SAIR and ADOSH reports were released. It was all over the Prescott papers. Jared Willis was confronted by an intoxicated man who was threatening to kill himself and was holding two kitchen knives. When Willis got on scene the man started just walking towards Willis saying “Let’s do this… I’m not afraid to die”. Willis gave at least 3 orders for him to stop and drop the knives. When the man was 10 feet from Willis… he fired three shots with his 40 caliber service revolver into the man DCM ( Dead Center Mass ). He was blown backwards and died. The resulting investigation declared it was a ‘clean shoot’… and Willis was quoted from his interview as saying “It was either him or me”.
I interpret Willis’s at all costs comment to mean use all available resources.
Obviously Willis didn’t really mean there could be ‘acceptable losses’… which is what it means in the military when you say “HOLD AT ALL COSTS”…
…but with regards to ‘culture’ and ‘mindset’ possibly present within any organization that Darrell Willis might have been in charge of… it could indicate something.
I have never herd in all my years as a Wild land FF.
HOLD THE LINE AT ALL COSTS
Maybe use all the resources at our disposal to maintain the containment/control lines. If you lose containment fall back to Identified safety zones, if you can’t contain slop overs. Work Safely and keep Safe.
Never ever hold line at all costs and I have worked with some of the best IC’s and OPS on some very active fires.
The Only thing I can say is.
ESPERANZA FIRE never put structures above your safety. Fire Lines are won and lost all the time it is part of Wild land Fire. You just don’t stand your ground with hell all around you. You can get entrapped way to easy.
Fall back and start new line…
Any ‘crew’ that is employed on a fire could have all kinds of weird internal ‘mindsets’ or ‘attitudes’ going on… but that’s why ‘chain of command’ was invented.
It might even be all well and good that some crew that camps out together for months every year develops some kind of “we are on our own’ combined with some kind of “God, Guts and Glory’ mentality… and THEY don’t have a problem with ‘dieing with our boots on’ or some such bullshit…
…but that’s where MANAGEMENT is supposed to step in.
There are SUPPOSED to be enough ‘Safety Officers’ or ‘Safety minded’ supervisors in place to keep people like that from freakin’ KILLING themselves.
…or at least making sure that just one or two individuals prone to that kind of thinking don’t take 17 others with them.
There are LESSONS TO BE LEARNED here… and that’s all the families of the fallen really want. They want to SEE the organization(s) responsible for these situations ACKNOWLEDGING that that might be what happened that day and taking steps to make SURE ( as much as humanly possible ) that it never happens again.
WTKTT,
You posted “There are SUPPOSED to be enough ‘Safety Officers’ or ‘Safety minded’ supervisors in place to keep people like that from freakin’ KILLING themselves.”
I will agree with the ‘Safety minded supervisors.’ Actually it is the responsibility of each and every supervisor to ensure their Crew’s safety. It is NOT the responsibility of the Safety Officer to do that.
You should do things safely because it is the right thing to do and NOT because a Safety Officer is there. Safety is the OUTCOME OF FOLLOWING PROPER PROCEDURES. Nor would tracking devices, airtanker drops on Crews, or better fire shelters have saved them. Only in the movies and fictional novels are those a reality.
WTKTT
I will go back a little and talk Safety from my experience with the Forest Service..
As a beginning Fire Fighter your introduction to work projects and Fire starts with Safety. Your first introduction to Fire safety is the basic 40 hours requirement which yes includes the 10 & 18. but much more safety in tool operations, carrying and sharpening.
Proper equipment PPE and the use of fire shelters. Walking in line and how you carry tools.
As you move forward in your carrier and learn all aspects of how fires burn weather, fuels, topography and the use of other suppression equipment, Helicopters, Dozers, Air tankers, Engines, Hand Crews, Fallers, Back Firing equipment and even Fire line construction with explosives you learn the Safe way to manage and use each. By this time you should be a Strike Team Leader and even a Division Supervisor.
In every Phase you operate under safety practices.
So once you reach Crew Boss and above you should have a solid background not only in Fire but in Safety.
The most important thing in all of this is each person individually should be using all of the training to make safe decisions. Thus a crew is responsible for its safety as are the supervisors.
At no time is any body trained from the ground up in God, Guts and Glory—–Or they will be hero’s if they die with there boots on.
Fire Fighters are taught to be safe and never have a injury.
Each supervisor carries that responsibility for those that work under them.
All I can really say is Granit Mountain was not the norm.
You must factor in– 90 Hot Shot Crews each seeing a 100 fire a season. and many more non Hot Shot Crews that also see many fires per year.
Yarnell is the first time a entire Hot Shot crew has Died on a Fire. Actual Burn over Fatalities of a hot shot crews are few and rare.
1966 Loop Fire, 1994 Storm king mountain. 2013 Yarnell Hill.
I think one of the key problems with Marsh and maybe Steed.
They were not a Federal crew. Out side the internal organization and structure of Federal HS.
In my carrier I saw severial Foreman and 2 Superintendents remove from Hot Shot Crews because of Supervision and Safety Problems. One Superintendent on the Sawtooth Hot Shots Lasted 5 months and had to be replaced. Supervission problems and bad decisions. The assistant and Foreman managed to keep the crew safe until he was removed by the Forest FMO.
I would say internally the Forest Service Superintendents are out spoken about there own. This at least from my own experience.
THERE ARE NO HERO’S WHO DIE IN A FOREST FIRE.
Only Fire Fighters who make bad decisions.
Which I am able to say now. My Father made that bad decision of not posting a lookout. Even though he was not the supervisor he had the chance to suggest a look out or became one himself. I can safely say no one would have died on the Rattle Snake fire had they had a lookout at the dozer line.
WTKTT,
Good article for sure. Thanks.
Some of the most telling quotes in it for me were from a sidebar from SAIT Co-Team Leader Mike Dudley:
” … Dudley, …. did have one telling insight: the firefighters hadn’t asked for help until it was too late. “THEY DIDN’T REACH OUT AND CALL TO AIR SUPPORT UNTIL THEY WERE TRAPPED … THAT TOLD US THAT THEY PERCEIVED NO RISK IN THEIR DECISION.” (EMPHASIS ADDED)
Actually, this was ‘classic Marsh -‘ to be disingenuous over the radio about what the GMHS was doing, their location, or their intentions. Many of us experienced this with him on past fires, so this came as no surprise.
“NINETY-NINE TIMES OUT OF 100, WHAT THEY DID COULD HAVE BEEN FINE. … MOST OF THE TIME YOU CAN GET AWAY WITH SOMETHING LIKE THAT.” (EMPHASIS ADDED)
Yes, we call that “THE RULE OF 99.” It means that you can ‘get away with’ something 99 times, but that 100th time will get you.
It all boils down to BAD DECISIONS WITH PRIOR GOOD OUTCOMES and NORMALIZATION OF DEVIANCE.
“This was the final fatal link in a long chain of Bad Decisions With Good Outcomes. We saw this coming for years, said one Hot Shot Superintendent.
Reply to Robert the Second (RTS) post
on December 31, 2014 at 10:44 am
>> RTS said…
>>
>> Good article for sure. Thanks.
Yes. It’s one of the ONLY online media articles that actually quotes from the June 20, 2014 public statements made by Mike Dudley as he was talking to that roomful of FFs in Idaho…
…and ( as you caught ) they DID reprint some of the ‘gems’ from that public speech and Q/A session with Dudley.
>> RTS also wrote…
>>
>> Some of the most telling quotes in it for me were from
>> a sidebar from SAIT Co-Team Leader Mike Dudley:
>>
>> ” … Dudley, …. did have one telling insight: the firefighters
>> hadn’t asked for help until it was too late. “THEY DIDN’T
>> REACH OUT AND CALL TO AIR SUPPORT UNTIL THEY
>> WERE TRAPPED … THAT TOLD US THAT THEY PERCEIVED
>> NO RISK IN THEIR DECISION.” (EMPHASIS ADDED)
Actually… I think there IS proof that they defintely perceived SOME risk about that making that move, even at 1555. If Brendan ever tells us what that “discussing their options” conversation ( which both official reports say he definitely HEARD ) was all about… and it turns out that “comfort level” pertained to the move itself… then that means they DID perceive risk. Why else would you ask someone if they were ‘comfortable’ with what you wanted them to do unless you were already perceiving there was some ‘risk’ involved?
>> RTS also wrote…
>>
>> Actually, this was ‘classic Marsh -‘ to be disingenuous
>> over the radio about what the GMHS was doing, their
>> location, or their intentions. Many of us experienced this
>> with him on past fires, so this came as no surprise.
Also classic “What they don’t know won’t hurt us ( or our plans )” and “It’s easier to ask forgiveness than permission” management style.
>> RTS also wrote…
>>
>> “NINETY-NINE TIMES OUT OF 100, WHAT THEY DID
>> COULD HAVE BEEN FINE. … MOST OF THE TIME YOU
>> CAN GET AWAY WITH SOMETHING LIKE THAT.”
>> (EMPHASIS ADDED)
>>
>> Yes, we call that “THE RULE OF 99.” It means that you
>> can ‘get away with’ something 99 times, but that 100th
>> time will get you.
It’s still astounding that one of the highest level officials in the US Forestry Division was making that sound AOK. Just business as usual.
You can ‘win’ against the fire those 99 times… and you can laugh about it later… but the fire only has to win ONCE… and your laughing stops.
FOREVER.
>> RTS also said…
>>
>> It all boils down to BAD DECISIONS WITH PRIOR GOOD
>> OUTCOMES and NORMALIZATION OF DEVIANCE.
>>
>> “This was the final fatal link in a long chain of Bad Decisions
>> With Good Outcomes. We saw this coming for years, said
>> one Hot Shot Superintendent.
There simply HAS to be some ‘better way’ for when people who ARE following all the rules see others who are NOT… to make it stop.
As I have said before… in my years in the construction industry… NO ONE ever let a situation where a crew that was obviously ‘freelancing’ on sites where others were just trying to do thier job safely go unnoticed or unresolved for any length of time… let along “YEARS.
But the solution there was simple.
You just REFUSE to work with them. Period. End of Story.
That gets management’s attention REAL quick.
Followup… link to Willis’ Roseville City Awards ‘keynote speaker’ BIO…
Roseville, California, City Awards – May 9, 2014
Honoring Roseville Police and Fire Departments…
Roseville, California
http://www.rosevillecityawards.com/?page_id=266
‘Roseville Public Safety’ Facebook page also mentioning Willis as ‘keynote speaker’…
https://www.facebook.com/rosevillepublicsafety/posts/738051796247208
Also… link to an article about Jared Willis… who Willis identified in his PUBLIC Roseville BIO as one of his three sons.
There were MANY articles about this ‘officer involved shooting’ in November of 2013… but this is the one reporting the results of the investigation. It also contains a photo of Jared Willis that the Prescott Courier already had on file from a previous article about him using dog to sniff for drugs at Prescott High School…
The investigation concluded it was a ‘clean shoot’.
Prescott Daily Courier
Published: 5/22/2014 6:00:00 AM
Investigation into fatal officer-involved shooting complete, officer cleared
It was ‘either me or him,’ officer said.
http://dcourier.com/main.asp?SectionID=1&SubSectionID=1086&ArticleID=131980
Hi all. I’ve been reading this discussion for a while now, and have tried a couple of times unsuccessfully to post replies to comments. For now not wishing to put anything out of sequence, simply put these are the two (small) things that I have wanted to contribute.
Re video/helmet cam footage: some digital cameras and mobiles take small jpeg images to be used as thumbnails for the movies. These thumbnails should contain a standard set of exif data. This is relevant because the thumbnails will help determine the camera, or narrow down the cell phone…i.e. is it one that only records for 30 seconds? Maybe even have gps co-ords, but may also help in proving the existence of ‘missing’ footage.
Re Individuals locations and timings: cell phone triangulation and call records. Depending on cell phone masts and location geography triangulating someones position can be pretty accurate and could/should have been used to work out, even to within a ball park, where everyone was for the whole day. And call records…fundamental. These may have given the investigations some leads on what questions they should have asked… but probably wouldn’t have bothered anyway.
Hi all. I’ve been reading this discussion for a while now, and have tried a couple of times unsuccessfully to post replies to comments. For now not wishing to put anything out of sequence, simply put these are the two (small) things that I have wanted to contribute.
Re video/helmet cam footage: some digital cameras and mobiles take small jpeg images to be used as thumbnails for the movies. These thumbnails should contain a standard set of exif data. This is relevant because the thumbnails will help determine the camera, or narrow down the cell phone…i.e. is it one that only records for 30 seconds? Maybe even have gps co-ords, but may also help in proving the existence of ‘missing’ footage.
Re Individuals locations and timings: cell phone triangulation and call records. Depending on cell phone masts and location geography triangulating someones position can be pretty accurate and could/should have been used to work out, even to within a ball park, where everyone was for the whole day. And call records…fundamental. These may have given the investigations some leads on what questions they should have asked… but probably wouldn’t have bothered anyway.
Referring to the number 19 in the photo that Joy took with her cell phone as I sat by the campfire–I mentioned it to a local Psychic–she said she got goose bumps from that. We were just above the two track in full view of the deployment sight. We were honoring the 19 with a nice cowboy campfire on Christmas night and me with a few Guinness beers when Joy snapped the photo, The small, almost unnoticeable number 19 appears dimly illuminated just above my head in the background. Now this lady psychic believes there are some things not yet said and there are those trying to reach us about those things..
Well cops use psychics to solve things, so Joy and I wondered what she might reveal about this, and considering that this person has a Master’s degree, and believes strongly in what she does, we offered to hike her up there above the area to get her take on things. Whew, I never used to believe in much of the other world stuff, but then when I see the number 19 in that photo I wonder. It seems that police and FBI have used such sources with some degree of success.
I think because there has been a lot of resistance to our continued inquiries into this incident, we have ramped up a bit. Joy especially is not letting up. This JD site is working hard at getting to the truth because those loved ones and friends, as well as firefighters and the nation need to know what really went down that day. So we like those of you working on JD will do our humble best to contribute where we can.
Sonny says
Reply to Sonny post on December 29, 2014 at 3:26 pm
>> Sonny said…
>>
>> Referring to the number 19 in the photo that Joy took with her cell phone
>> as I sat by the campfire–I mentioned it to a local Psychic–she said she
>> got goose bumps from that. We were just above the two track in full
>> view of the deployment sight. We were honoring the 19 with a nice
>> cowboy campfire on Christmas night and me with a few Guinness
>> beers when Joy snapped the photo, The small, almost unnoticeable
>> number 19 appears dimly illuminated just above my head in the
>> background.
Sonny… just for clarity’s sake… you are talking about THIS photo, right?…
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/gb0ax9cykwvrsav/AAD-eQ2uss8FqHAT3C8CLCzsa/dec242014weavertop%20%287%29.jpg?dl=0
I think I DO see exactly what you are talking about… but at the same time… I’m not sure I’m ‘seeing it’ in the same place you are describing above.
If we ‘divide’ the photo into 4 even quarters… I am talking about the UPPER LEFT quarter.
Is that YOU ‘standing’ there, sort of in the shadows?
You said you were ‘sitting by the campfire’… but the ‘figure’ I seem to see in that UPPER LEFT quadrant seems to be STANDING.
If that really is you STANDING there… then YES… I see what you are talking about ‘dimly lit’ there in the rocks just above your head.
At first glance, however, ( to me, anyway )… it simply looked like a FACE there in the rock… with two eyes, a nose and mouth.
But if you ‘squint’ at it… then “YES… the ‘right side of the face’ could also be construed to look like the number 9 ( NINE )… and the ‘shadows’ of the left side of the face could be construed as the digit 1 ( ONE ).
I see the 19 clear left side of the Picture.
There is a vertical fire reflection on the rock at the top of it and just to the left
a very clear 19 in a light gray color.
Interesting– A note in 2010 & 2011 I was investigator with the Local TAPS affiliate here in Idaho. There are some very interesting things out there in the Paranormal world.
There are things that happen and may never happen again. For what ever reason
it is a communication from another realm. The communication could be good or bad you may never know. Thanks Joy and Sonny.
Bob Powers says
Reply to Bob Powers post on December 30, 2014 at 8:57 am
>> Bob Powers said…
>>
>> Interesting– A note in 2010 & 2011 I was investigator with
>> the Local TAPS affiliate here in Idaho. There are some
>> very interesting things out there in the Paranormal world.
Yes. I have heard of TAPS.
TAPS = The Atlantic Paranormal Society
Legitimate group that tries to investigate paranormal events in a professional manner…. AND teach others ( including law enforcement agencies and officers ) how to do so as well.
From the TAPS website…
http://www.the-atlantic-paranormal-society.com/
The Atlantic Paranormal Society (TAPS). TAPS was founded in 1990 by Jason Hawes with the sole purpose of helping those experiencing paranormal activity by investigating its claims in a professional and confidential manner, and using the latest in paranormal research equipment and techniques. TAPS brings decades of experience in investigating with its pioneering equipment and techniques that has changed the field of paranormal investigating.
The Atlantic Paranormal Society (TAPS). TAPS was founded in 1990 by Jason Hawes with the sole purpose of helping those experiencing paranormal activity by investigating its claims in a professional and confidential manner, and using the latest in paranormal research equipment and techniques. TAPS brings decades of experience in investigating with its pioneering equipment and techniques that has changed the field of paranormal investigating.
Whoops… that paragraph from the TAPS site got ‘pasted’ into the message above TWICE. Both paragraphs above are identical.
Yes they are a very professional group. And any findings are double checked at the State level. It changed my mind on Paranormal activity.
For 2 years I was a investigator and the main person that went thru all the recording tapes. Found a few things that would make your hair stand up on your neck. So Sonny’s picture is quite interesting.
“There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio, than are dreamt of in your philosophy”.
Hamlet (1.5.167-8) – Author: William Shakespeare
i will try sonny to get the other photos on—my mifi and pc was acting up but you are right there are more pics and one of you sitting with skeeter with the 19 yet this one has the image but not like the other pic-
also, thank you to Raul and Theresa for the surprise and we know one of the GMHS loved ones want to be a part in all hikes and we apologize for not inviting you to the tribute one on Christmas and I know the psychic lady wanted to hike today but we had plans so we are heading there now to schedule that yet I have to let you know again she stated she wanted to hike ahead or way behind us to be away from any energies so let me ask if you can go because she said no last time because she just wants the people who were on that hill 6-30-13 so I will let you know on that too.
RTS had made an important point a good ways down now that I didn’t want to lose:
“SR,
Yes, but SAFELY hanging out like everyone else . It’s not so much that they were lacking in situational awareness because the GMHS had the best SA of anyone on the entire YHF. They had the best view of the incoming weather, subsequent fire behavior, and the overall YH Fire. Notwithstanding their SA, that seems to have been overridden by their Leader’s habit of Bad Decisions With Prior Good Outcomes.”
I agree with this, in that GM’s objective circumstance afforded them the CHANCE for the best SA of anyone on the fire, in terms of having access to a superior set of facts. RTS addresses a lot of issues in terms of failure to have SA that they can utilize, however, with the bad decisions/good outcomes summary. Subjectively, GM did not seem to have been in the habit of cultivating mindfulness or sensemaking, which are important components of utilizing the facts of SA. It is unclear to me if they had the mental models in place to even understand, for instance, that were they to have successfully worked their way “down to the structures” as they had stated their intention was, that they weren’t going to be saving many structures. Based on their actions earlier as regards the lookout, nor does there even seem to be mindfulness of what a pain even in terms of administrative tasks that a survived burnover of their lookout would have entailed. Let’s assume they were in part overconfident in their fire shelters, so figured he would be fine — surely they would not have wanted all the hassle, anyway? I think the calm manner in which news that McDonough was evaluating deployment sites was received reflected not callousness, at all, but instead simply not perceiving what would be coming down the road had McDonough not been picked up by Frisby. Mindfulness is a mental skill that can be developed through practice, but one has to practice it on an ongoing basis. And it has to be valued.
SR—Some very good observations. There are things that Happened with McDonough and things that he said that are clues to this tragedy.
Also things he has not said that would clarify a lot.
In an investigators world when paths keep leading back to a person that person needs to be interviewed to clarify what they really know. Not only what they herd on the radio but what the internal make up of the crew was and how the supervisors functioned.
There seems to be a mind set with in this crew that is different than Hot Shot Crews that I have known. There is something to be learned here but can we ever find out the answer???????
In the end… the “human factors” aspect will probably remain the most important thing to understand with regards to preventing a similar tragedy in the future… which is (and shall remain) the ultimate goal.
Yes… there seems to have been a particularly ‘weird’ mindset within this organization. Something quite ‘insular’… Something quite ‘over the top’… Some element of taking themselves and the civil service jobs they had WAAY too ‘seriously’.
I don’t know if the Latin mottos Marsh was borrowing from his college has anything to do with it… or even the baptizing crew members in the field ( McDonough, just two weeks before the tragedy ).
ALL of it is relevant to fully understanding what eventually happened on June 30, 2013.. and making sure it never happens again.
The SILENCE from former GMHS is still quite deafening.
It remains part of the ongoing mystery surrounding this public funded organization that no one associated with it seems to have ANYTHING to say about it… good, bad or ugly.
There has only been SILENCE. That’s still weird.
If the lack of safety observed from other hotshot crews (sleeves up while working ) is any indication, their will be more fatalities. Look at current you tube videos from 2014 hotshot crews. Many people have their sleeves rolled up. If the hotshot crews and their overhead aren’t addressing that simple, important safety practice, then who knows. I guess we will just wait until it happens again and then go look at those videos and say, yep, we knew this was coming. Everybody knew they were an unsafe crew. Yada yada
Rolling up sleeves are first just a small indication that there may be other safety being overlooked. Or there maybe no other safety infractions.
Another thing to consider is where and when pictures are being taken.
on the fire line or other situations outside of work or Fire Line Work.
On my crews and others I trained or required the sleeves were down while working. First and second degree burns, Scratches and cut from branches, Poison oak exposure are common injuries to rolled up sleeves.
Also sleeves down and gloves on for deploying shelters is a must, so being already prepared is a safety concern.
Just the beginning of all safety habits.
WTKTT,
Adding to your comments the comments made by DC Willis (as listed below) and the additional comment of “following them anywhere”, you begin to wonder the “culture” that the City of Prescott has created within their organization, especially within the Wildland Division.
Totally agree. Longer response to this comment posted above.
Agreed re McDonough. I don’t think the “hillbilly” and “we’re smarter…we’re a lot smarter” comments from him were spontaneous, for instance. And, just for me, after a serious accident, it’s probably not the time to stress how hillbilly safety rules are, or how smart the people involved in the accident are or were. I don’t think people should be critical of McDonough himself in that case, but rather view his statements as suggesting the views of the crew towards those issues. To be fair, it is also frequently the case that those involved in accidents stress their experience as a way to ward off criticism. But normally they’re not dismissive of established norms in the process.
True again there are some serious underlying factors with in the crew that
may just be attitude training or philosophy that was involved with safety attitude.
those things can be traced with some past crewmembers if they are willing to talk. and may be connected to Bad decisions that were more like lack of safety rule ingrained in the thought process. in other words a lack of use of the 10 and 18 as a guide and more of a acceptable risk based on personal concept.
If you get where I am going here???????
Again gest personal thoughts.
I guess where I was going with my last comment is the “culture” sometimes is driven from the top down. In this case from Willis, and the specific mindset/comment that he would have followed them anywhere suggest to me that the culture was one of follow instructions and don’t question. In my career I worked with some excellent fire folks, but I would not follow any one of them without asking some questions when needed.
I always encouraged questions being asked from crew members (tactfully and respectful), especially in critical situations.
Well Said. I am beginning to wonder if that’s an old attitude from the past and no longer followed with some of todays crews?????
I truly believed that todays wildland firefighters were/are doing a better job than we ever did at questioning assignments. The days of “don’t ask just do it ” seemed to have become few and far between, until this event. There are just too many factors that seem to indicate that the decision to leave the black wasn’t questioned, or if it was the reply may have been the old school “don’t ask just do it!”
We need to learn from this tragic event and somehow assure that the “culture” among wildland firefighters (from ALL agencies) is a learning, questioning, communicating culture. It does not matter if your are a first day firefighter or a seasoned veteran you should be encouraged to ask questions and speak up if you don’t feel right about the assignment.
It is not only your right to refuse an assignment, it’s YOUR RESPONSIBILIT:Y!
Totally agree. Well said. Thank you.
Good points one and all,
Yes, the Human Factors issue is KEY as far as I’m concerned, and an issue NOT investigated in detail by the SAIR or ADOSH. Truly a shame! But I guess IF you do NOT want to know the answer, then you don’t investigate it very far.
As far as the safety infractions issue. these are SMALL, BUT SIGNIFICANT, safety issues in my view because they point to the overall ATTITUDE of the Crew, beginning with the Supervisors. Good, safety-minded supervisors would not have condoned it AND certainly would have set a proper example for their Crew members by properly wearing their PPE. Instead, photos of the GMHS supervisors reveal they were NOT setting a good example for others. And just because nothing happens doesn’t mean anything because just because you have no incidents on your Crew does NOT mean you are running a safe operation – It just means you had no incidents and you got away with it all that time. It’s just Bad Decisions With Good Outcomes, the Normalization of Deviance – no matter what anyone else says or thinks.
As far as the Fire Shelter Deployment, Deployment Zone VERSUS Escape Routes and Safety Zones, there are MANY examples from PFD sources and/or GMHS experiences. Brenden McDonaugh was looking for areas as to DEPLOY his fire shelter near the grader, instead of a Safety Zone where you need NO fire shelter, when his ‘cutting-it-way-too-close trigger point’ was hit Plus, someone on the GMHS with a MUCH BETTER view from their perfectly good Safety Zone should have warned him that he should get moving to a better and safer area MUCH earlier than he did. That suggests a mind-set that fire shelters were an acceptable alternative.
Then there was the Model Creek? Tennis Court Safety Zone where STPS Willis had for a STRIKE TEAM OF ENGINES (at least 5-7 vehicles) PLUS AT LEAST 30 WFF SURROUNDED BY ABOUT 4 FOOT TO 5 FOOT CHAPARRAL (based on Google Earth views). WTF!? Maybe for 2-3 WFF using vehicles as heat sinks and eventually having to seek shelter inside them. The tennis court would have been more like a Deployment Zone. This also suggests that fire shelters were an acceptable alternative.
Then there was the August 12, 2012 Nevada/Oregon Fire Shelter Deployment of a NM Zuni IHC Crew member (filler) on the Holloway Fire where GMHS was assigned and saw the incredible results. She came away with second degree burns.
Link below. Look on pages: COVER PAGE, page 22 Illustration #1, page 26 Deployment Site overview, page 27 – Fire Shelter, and page 28 – Fire Shelter and Misc. PPE for the deployment site and the brush and all – definitely NOT as thick or burned as intensely as the YH Fire. In fact,SEVERAL experienced WFF, including SEVERAL IHC SUPERINTENDENTS commented that this Zuni IHC ‘filler’ should NOT have survived under those fire behavior conditions with direct flame contact. SO, was the Holloway Fire Deployment kind of an indication to the GMHS that they worked there in fuel conditions somewhat similar to the YH Fire and so they might work in Yarnell? Definitely something to think about.
https://higherlogicdownload.s3.amazonaws.com/WILDFIRELESSONS/Holloway_Fire_Accident_Investigation.pdf?AWSAccessKeyId=AKIAJH5D4I4FWRALBOUA&Expires=1419994903&Signature=AI54Jy28s5bVC3hJI9nKFVi%2Byr4%3D
Look at the heat damage to these fire shelters and WFF PPE on pages 27 and 28. That fire shelter sustained DIRECT FLAME CONTACT and she still survived with only second degree burns. This is an indication that they performed beyond their capabilities and suggest that MAYBE, just MAYBE, fire shelters are actually better than we are told about. Something more to think about.
WTKTT – I’m with you on the LACK of former GMHS coming forward. I’m still tracking down two former GMHS from the 2011 and 2012 fire seasons respectively, that told their parents at the end of those respective seasons that they were NOT coming back to the Crew the next year because of safety concerns they had.
One needs to look at and consider the TOTALITY OF CIRCUMSTANCES in these matters. There is certainly an indication of Bad Decisions With Good Outcomes and an attitude of higher risk and more on the GMHS, that started at the top.
SR. Remember back 2013 when McDonough himself posted on Facebook and asked all his friends and family to not talk to the media about him? I can’t believe that he himself was actually thinking like that. It seems to me that this was the result of someone else who only had McDonough’s best interests in mind, right? So it really is hard to understand why McDonough made the comment about hillbilly rules, but I can’t believe it was spontaneous. And it seems quite inappropriate. All things considered.
Joy asked me to hike up to camp above the disaster area on Christmas Night– our tribute to the GMHS crew, we did spend the night on that mountain just above the site, Skeeter’ my dog was our look out.. Their Spirits haunt the mountain as you can see the number 19 in one of her cell phone photos made that night. No we did not do as SAIR and others, redact or add to the photo. The number 19 is right above my head in the photo, an omen letting us know they are there and wanting the whole truth out. They will haunt those people withholding information until the truth is out.
These men after all are National Heroes–Joy and I put together a letter stating our feelings about that. I told her that those men belong to the nation–they fought wildfires not only in Arizona but also in other states–and as far as I know could have been called to any fire anywhere in the USA. To deny access to that flag pole and the fence of the small area they died would be like denying people the right to go to the Viet Nam memorial. Many of those men were veterans, and they have that added their service to the nation. To my way of thinking those men are National Heroes–as are all wild land firefighters whom have lost their lives in the line of duty.
People need to be able to enter that basin right to the incident site as it is called here. They need to know how things were—that manzanita will soon be back just like it was. The growth is already coming back strong–The boulders on each side of the canyon are not going anywhere and that flag pole and plaque just below that small fenced area of deployment begs for people of the nation to come and pay their respects to those men–to see the dire situation they were in and to feel the actual pain those men felt attempting to do what they felt was the right action in their minds.
To deny access there as the state is attempting to do is to deny the respect those men are due.
That brings me again to the idea that the feds should get involved in this matter. Without outside help, I believe this investigation will continue to have too many omissions.
Sonny since you never go to email anymore and I know you read this area at Yarnell library– I will try and make time to dropbox photos of Christmas Cowboy Campfire for you and link it here—must be cold up there; nice day in Congress/Wickenburg; been BUSY up to this point—busy right now doing home stuff.
I am not sure about dropbox that John Dougherty and Marti Reed mentioned because does it mean they can see just the link shared or all photos in file box? do I have to make separate link for each photo and comment on this page? I have no clue how it works yet Sonny but try to share—
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/gb0ax9cykwvrsav/AAD-eQ2uss8FqHAT3C8CLCzsa/dec242014weavertop%20(7).jpg?dl=0
Sonny, When running errands I ran into one of my ol’ hiking pals that stated Amanda Marsh addressed my hiking pal in first asking WHEN the last time my hiking pal hiked with me and when my hiking pal replied before starting her job (ANSWER IS ON w w w . zazzle .c o m / congress_arizona* as I journal my hikes there but been years Amanda Marsh you inquisitive natured woman) then Amanda Marsh implied it is good because she (JOY) is not allowed up there.
Hello Amanda being I won’t include you in corresponding any other way but here public. Stop the horse shit. I hiked the Weavers loooonnnnggggg before the fire and way many times after the fire and you have no facts to state I am not allowed up there. I am legal to be up there. You know what I may not be a salutatorian/valedictorian under my belt like its been shared to me you were but your behind the scene tactics to call here or comment there making people think your way about me on slander misinformation—people who “know me find it sad you feel like you do towards me. I graduated high school and you would be surprised by the further education/college I attended and to me “who cares’…like Sonny who has many college degrees he could of been anything yet he remained an ol’ logger and miner for the most part…”who cares”
I had to grow up really fast Amanda Marsh. I’ve seen things that kids or even adults wouldn’t ever see in their lives..too many very tough to imagine moments. I don’t take anything for granted any more. Very few knew about my life as I grew up.I have never let anyone tell me that I can’t do something, because I’ve been told that all my life. I am a legal beagle gal. People like you tell me and everyone they can : “JOY IS NOT ALLOWED UP THERE”…who are you? The mountain queen who waves her wand and says who can or cannot go… Reminds me of the 3 billy goats gruff song as I kid with a troll–Norwegian Fairy Tale— I am legal and I can and will go on the Weavers—
People would tell me I wasn’t smart enough or I talk in circles or I believe in the spiritual beyond and you know what—no, I am not a believer in any such but yet odd things have been shown to my life. Yet I do share how life is shown to me and it is strange to this day that I told my brother he would go on a cruise than 9 months later have his first born to than have him say “bullshit, I don’t go on ships and I have no time. I work all the time overtime just to make it and I have no time to have kids.” Spring of that year my mother tells me my brother won at work a trip on Disney Cruise Line and well, the rest is history…nine months later the first born. It is not the only time in my life those times have happened. For you Amanda Marsh to tell my hiking pal someone I know not you that stuff about me seeing things…your implying what? I have shared in the purest form. That is right Amanda– my strength even when ill or at my lowest points in its pure state which rests on the ground and is well anchored to Above…If you ever decide to stop sharing slander and misinformation to people all over that know me or do not know me—my door is open to you. Yet, reminder I am sound recording at this point all events pertaining to the YHF topic and if I get enough horse shit I will use the legal representation that goes up against State and Federal that wins cases that G.E. was generous enough to share to the hikers such details—if I have to I will legally shut your slander misinformed vocals—You can sway some to your way of thinking but for the MOST part as you told my ol’ hiking partner when you told her I need to stop and she replied she doubts I would until clarity is reached—you are spot on there because I won’t stop looking until clarity is reached and you know what Amanda Marsh had the nerve to state to my friend—
“THERE IS NO OTHER INFORMATION TO BE SHOWN ON THE YARNELL HILL FIRE!”
really Amanda? The lady who mysteriously acquired pieces that were on Eric Marsh and how come out of respect to this investigation you never shared that cell phone details? You have to be kidding…too many and too much details still yet to come sweet Amanda—too much with or without your help or Donut’s or others on that fire that day!!! God has the plan not you— yet orchestrate away— He will protect me.
Also Amanda. You like me; great. If you don’t; great. I don’t mind either way how you want to live your life or views yet when your views about me become tainted and slander and misinformation is getting out causing YCSO to reach me or my hiking pals telling me what you are stating—we got a serious problem because that is harmful not harmonious. Get the facts out! Better yet stop on the belief that ALL the information is out on the YHF and gather more information too…shit, really! You have to be kidding. Anyone knows all the facts and information is not out on that fire—maybe all that you want out….
Am I wrong people that post here? Do you all feel like Amanda Marsh that all the details to the YHF is out already and I am out of place to try and see if there is more because 19 people died on the very mountain I have gone blindfold up and know that terrain and I am sorry 19 men do not just die and end of story…I have to look in every nook I can…
as wwtktt said “Tuesday, January 6, 2015 at 3 p.m. It will be held at the Yavapai
County Supervisor’s Office located in the County Administration Building at 1015 Fair
Street in Prescott.”
—————————–
I sent an email to them (
“Willis,Darrell” ,
[email protected],
[email protected],
[email protected],
[email protected],
Patti Crouse ,
[email protected],
[email protected],
[email protected],
[email protected],
[email protected],
[email protected],
[email protected]
date: Sat, Dec 27, 2014 at 12:50 PM)
we will do our best to be present. If not, here is our citizen concern(s) email.
It is so lengthy I am not posting it here yet anyone is welcome to ask for a copy but yes Sonny is right we did state “
Joy A. Collura says
DECEMBER 28, 2014 AT 7:47 PM
Your comment is awaiting moderation.
Sonny since you never go to email anymore and I know you read this area at Yarnell library– I will try and make time to dropbox photos of Christmas Cowboy Campfire for you and link it here—must be cold up there; nice day in Congress/Wickenburg; been BUSY up to this point—busy right now doing home stuff.
I am not sure about dropbox that John Dougherty and Marti Reed mentioned because does it mean they can see just the link shared or all photos in file box? do I have to make separate link for each photo and comment on this page? I have no clue how it works yet Sonny but try to share—
h t t p s : / / w w w.dropbox.c o m/sh/gb0ax9cykwvrsav/AAD-eQ2uss8FqHAT3C8CLCzsa/dec242014weavertop%20(7).jpg?dl=0
Sonny, When running errands I ran into one of my ol’ hiking pals that stated Amanda Marsh addressed my hiking pal in first asking WHEN the last time my hiking pal hiked with me and when my hiking pal replied before starting her job (ANSWER IS ON w w w . zazzle .c o m / congress_arizona* as I journal my hikes there but been years Amanda Marsh you inquisitive natured woman) then Amanda Marsh implied it is good because she (JOY) is not allowed up there.
Hello Amanda being I won’t include you in corresponding any other way but here public. Stop the horse shit. I hiked the Weavers loooonnnnggggg before the fire and way many times after the fire and you have no facts to state I am not allowed up there. I am legal to be up there. You know what I may not be a salutatorian/valedictorian under my belt like its been shared to me you were but your behind the scene tactics to call here or comment there making people think your way about me on slander misinformation—people who “know me find it sad you feel like you do towards me. I graduated high school and you would be surprised by the further education/college I attended and to me “who cares’…like Sonny who has many college degrees he could of been anything yet he remained an ol’ logger and miner for the most part…”who cares”
I had to grow up really fast Amanda Marsh. I’ve seen things that kids or even adults wouldn’t ever see in their lives..too many very tough to imagine moments. I don’t take anything for granted any more. Very few knew about my life as I grew up.I have never let anyone tell me that I can’t do something, because I’ve been told that all my life. I am a legal beagle gal. People like you tell me and everyone they can : “JOY IS NOT ALLOWED UP THERE”…who are you? The mountain queen who waves her wand and says who can or cannot go… Reminds me of the 3 billy goats gruff song as I kid with a troll–Norwegian Fairy Tale— I am legal and I can and will go on the Weavers—
People would tell me I wasn’t smart enough or I talk in circles or I believe in the spiritual beyond and you know what—no, I am not a believer in any such but yet odd things have been shown to my life. Yet I do share how life is shown to me and it is strange to this day that I told my brother he would go on a cruise than 9 months later have his first born to than have him say “bullshit, I don’t go on ships and I have no time. I work all the time overtime just to make it and I have no time to have kids.” Spring of that year my mother tells me my brother won at work a trip on Disney Cruise Line and well, the rest is history…nine months later the first born. It is not the only time in my life those times have happened. For you Amanda Marsh to tell my hiking pal someone I know not you that stuff about me seeing things…your implying what? I have shared in the purest form. That is right Amanda– my strength even when ill or at my lowest points in its pure state which rests on the ground and is well anchored to Above…If you ever decide to stop sharing slander and misinformation to people all over that know me or do not know me—my door is open to you. Yet, reminder I am sound recording at this point all events pertaining to the YHF topic and if I get enough horse shit I will use the legal representation that goes up against State and Federal that wins cases that G.E. was generous enough to share to the hikers such details—if I have to I will legally shut your slander misinformed vocals—You can sway some to your way of thinking but for the MOST part as you told my ol’ hiking partner when you told her I need to stop and she replied she doubts I would until clarity is reached—you are spot on there because I won’t stop looking until clarity is reached and you know what Amanda Marsh had the nerve to state to my friend—
“THERE IS NO OTHER INFORMATION TO BE SHOWN ON THE YARNELL HILL FIRE!”
really Amanda? The lady who mysteriously acquired pieces that were on Eric Marsh and how come out of respect to this investigation you never shared that cell phone details? You have to be kidding…too many and too much details still yet to come sweet Amanda—too much with or without your help or Donut’s or others on that fire that day!!! God has the plan not you— yet orchestrate away— He will protect me.
Also Amanda. You like me; great. If you don’t; great. I don’t mind either way how you want to live your life or views yet when your views about me become tainted and slander and misinformation is getting out causing YCSO to reach me or my hiking pals telling me what you are stating—we got a serious problem because that is harmful not harmonious. Get the facts out! Better yet stop on the belief that ALL the information is out on the YHF and gather more information too…shit, really! You have to be kidding. Anyone knows all the facts and information is not out on that fire—maybe all that you want out….
Am I wrong people that post here? Do you all feel like Amanda Marsh that all the details to the YHF is out already and I am out of place to try and see if there is more because 19 people died on the very mountain I have gone blindfold up and know that terrain and I am sorry 19 men do not just die and end of story…I have to look in every nook I can…
as wwtktt said “Tuesday, January 6, 2015 at 3 p.m. It will be held at the Yavapai
County Supervisor’s Office located in the County Administration Building at 1015 Fair
Street in Prescott.”
—————————–
I sent an email to them
date: Sat, Dec 27, 2014 at 12:50 PM)
we will do our best to be present. If not, here is our citizen concern(s) email.
It is so lengthy I am not posting it here yet anyone is welcome to ask for a copy but yes Sonny is right we did state “
we did state “Consider that those men were employees of the state; therefore, all people of this state have the right to go to that memorial to honor and pay their respects. Know that the loved ones of the GMHS are not the only people that have that right. They had many friends and people that have been refused that right.
We found it strange that access was given to many firefighters who never knew the men personally yet people who did know them have been refused as well as the nation’s top lead fire fatality investigator Dr. Ted Putnam. YCSO Sgt. Ashby stated as Joy A. Collura expressed this “grey” area that Chief Ben Palm is operating under and we need to make it clear. Know that these men have been universally publicized as heroes to the nation. They are recognized as and are definitely heroes to the nation. To limit the access to all citizens to honor those men is to deny the national honor they deserve. It would be like restricting the Vietnam Memorial to only the loved ones when those men served for all of us. So too, the GMHS have served for all the people. To limit access to the very area they died and flagpole would be a dishonor to those men and their right to national recognition. If you cannot give proper road entry to site, many have come to us to be their voice even though we have no interest in the matter because we don’t hike the bowl but for them we are expressing that the people be allowed to hike the Weavers in its completion and going the legal Congress side way that does not intrude on the privacy of the Helms/Whitehead/Baluco/S&P/Maughan parcels out there. If they choose to walk on private land than do as we have and get written permission from land owners and have your proper state land permit on you when in that area. We the hikers think the area should be sacred and restricted yet properly signed and feel the maintenance should be done by the firefighting community to keep the money rolled into supporting the firefighter community and make something simple and elegant but we also represent the people who cannot speak due to small town politics and for them we spoke here.
We understand a highway 89 Memorial is being made yet us the hikers understand the sensitivity of the people who desire to go to the actual area without having to get on a roster list of Chief Ben Palm’s on who can or cannot access such visit. Many we have hiked state they just want to go when they want to go without having to go through the ropes. As the hikers, we did not enter the site (bowl canyon) before the fire and after the fire except once with OSHA Bruce Hanna and Brett Steurer yet we were at the same exact gps location of where the men died the very morning taking photos on June 30, 2013. It is not an area of interest to the hikers due to the treacherous steep grade terrain and before the fire due to its maze-like density quality of that bowl canyon we did not hike that area but Joy A. Collura along with Thomas Maiden and Frank Serros relocated many rattlesnakes and skunks to that very area nearing the 2 track ridge. You are going to have to set aside the same land restrictions to previous fire fatalities if you plan to do it for here. Selling the land to the widows? The men were not employed by the widows rather they worked for the people and the state.
Are we comprehending correct that the 320 acres that partial is belonged to a private landowner will be taken by eminent domain?
Reply to calvin post on December 26, 2014 at 10:49 am
NOTE: Just a continuation of the most recent exchange down below.
>> calvin said…
>>
>> But the one million dollar question is this. When Marsh tells
>> Steed “I knew this was coming”, what was he referring to? Not
>> the weather change, not the fire direction change. It sure would
>> be nice to know what he was referring to. It seems to me that
>> this was the plan changer. Imo
Just for reference… Marsh said TWICE that he both KNEW it… AND that he could FEEL it.
( Whatever IT really is ).
Here is what Marsh ACTUALLY said ( to Steed )…
Eric Marsh ( to Jesse Steed, over the radio, with modulation ): “Ah… I jus… I was just sayin’ I knew this was comin’ when I called ya and asked how… what your comfort level was. I could just feel it… ya know.”
1) I KNEW this was comin’
2) I could just FEEL it.
I agree with Calvin that whatever THIS / IT was that Marsh was referring to is most likely the core of what led to the decision to leave the black.
In other words… ( as Calvin said )… “the plan changer”.
Both the Arizona Forestry SAIT report AND the Arizona ADOSH report stated ( uneqivocally ) that Brendan McDonough “heard Marsh and Steed discussing their options about whether to leave the safe black”.
There really is no doubt ( unless he someday denies what both public reports say and actually says he doesn’t ) that Brendan McDonough KNOWS what the ‘IT’ was that Marsh was talking about to Jesse Steed.
>> On December 26, 2014 at 3:16 pm, Bob Powers said…
>>
>> Calvin——I am still of the opinion that Steed is the one talking
>> to some of the crew not on the Radio that was recorded saying.
>> I KNEW THIS WAS COMMING.
There really is no question that it was Eric Marsh ( on the radio ) talking TO Jesse Steed.
Even Brendan McDonough CONFIRMED this to ADOSH in one of his interviews with them.
See the transcript of that interview/confirmation below.
>> On December 26, 2014 at 3:26 pm, calvin said…
>>
>> No. That was marsh who says I knew this was coming.
>> I have never thought it was steed. Am I wrong?
Nope. You are not wrong.
It was Marsh talking TO Steed. Always has been. Always will be.
>> On December 26, 2014 at 6:50 pm, Robert the Second said…
>>
>> Calvin and Bob,
>>
>> I have to agree with Calvin because I always thought it was
>> Marsh saying “I knew this was coming” because of the Southern drawl.
>>
>> On December 26, 2014 at 10:16 pm, Bob Powers replied…
>>
>> Guess I am a loner on that one. Nothing more than a feeling.
>> anyway you herd him more than I ever have RTS so Ill go
>> with you MAYBE right. I don’t give up easy.
Brendan McDonough himself CONFIRMED to ADOSH that this exchange captured in Christopher MacKenzie’s video was, in fact, Eric Marsh talking on the radio in that movie clip… and that he was talking TO Jesse Steed.
During that interview… the ADOSH investigators got Brendan to confirm SPECIFICALLY whose ‘voice’ that was on the RADIO half of that exchange.
Brendan CONFIRMED it was Marsh’s voice coming ‘over the radio’ there.
The reason ADOSH wanted that firm confirmation ( from Brendan ) about WHO was actually ‘on the radio’ in that conversation is that they still thought it *might* have been Brendan himself. It wasn’t. Brendan CONFIRMED that to them.
Q2 = Marshall Krotenberg – Lead ADOSH investigator
A = Brendan McDonough
——————————————————————
Q2: Yeah, and who was on the radio talking?
That was coming through the radio. Was that you?
A: No. That’s Eric Marsh.
—————————————————————–
Here is that entire moment from Brendan’s second interview when they played him one of the MacKenzie videos and Brendan CONFIRMED who the ‘speakers’ were…
Q2 = Marshall Krotenberg – Lead ADOSH investigator
A = Brendan McDonough
———————————————————————
Q2: Oh. Um, and then we – I just wanted to show one video and a question about who was talking and – and, uh…
A: Eric and Steed. That was, yeah, that…
Q2: …on the, uh…
A: I’m pretty much…
Q2: …on the radio. And it’s – it’s not this person that’s on – on the other end of the radio.
A: It’s the only one I know of. But I can do my best.
Q2: I know it’s gonna work.
(( CHRISTOPHER MACKENZIE VIDEO RECORDING PLAYS))
A1: Oh I just – I was just saying I knew this was coming when I called you and
asked how – what your comfort level was. I could just feel it, you know?
((END OF RECORDING))
A: That’s Eric Marsh and Jesse Steed.
Q2: Yeah, and who was on the radio talking? That was coming through the radio. Was that you?
A: No. That’s Eric Marsh.
Q2: That’s Eric talking to…
A: Jesse Steed…
Q2: Okay.
—————————————————————–
NOTE: The ADOSH investigtors then moved right on and never asked Brendan even one single other question about this critical “discussing their options’ conversation.
That is still simply UNBELIEVABLE to me… unless Brendan had already walked into that interview with his attorney and had made it clear he might verify WHO was speaking in a recording… but he would REFUSE to answer any further questions about the content of any radio conversations he might have heard.
Brendan had ALREADY done that very thing with some MEDIA inteviews he had given prior to this SECOND ADOSH interview. He had set ‘preconditions’ of his own for the interview and made it clear that there would be things ( like the content of radio conversations ) that he was going to REFUSE to talk about.
It’s possible that those were some ‘preconditions’ for Brendan’s SECOND ADOSH interview… ( where they finally PLAYED the MacKenzie recordings in front of him ) and that’s WHY no further questions were asked about this ‘discussing their options’ conversation between Marsh and Steed.
I would actually sort of HOPE that was the case.
I find it ‘not credible’ that the ADOSH investigators simply could have been so incompetent ( or so stupid ) as to ‘forget’ to ASK him what that conversation was really ABOUT when they had him right there in the room for the SECOND time… or what ELSE Brendan might have heard… even during the 26 seconds between the two Christoper MacKenzie video clips when Marsh and Steed were obviously still “discussing their options about whether to leave the safe black”.
He may have been able to pursue his own agenda and set his own ‘preconditions’ for MEDIA interviews and SAIT / ADOSH interviews… but that’s not going to fly on the witness stand.
If he refuses to answer ‘reasonable’ questions on the witness stand that would NOT, in any way, contribute to ‘self-incrimination’ for any reason… then he can be slapped with ‘contempt of court’ charges ( and possible jail time ).
And after putting both sets of Mackenzie’s photos in chronological order along with mackenzie’s 2 videos and Caldwell’s video. We do see that the exchange between Marsh and Steed comes immediately after the air support asap promise. I think the conversation that we hear part of (recorded by Caldwell) contains the “plan changer”. The same exchange that contains working my way off the top (Marsh) that Todd Abel doesn’t remember having. But does admit that it is him in the audio from Caldwells video. And I am curious how/if this changes Bob’s observations, now that he can see it was Marsh and not Steed making the comments?
I am fully corrected and stand corrected. Would still like to hear the rest of that conversation. Getting brain overload I guess.
Again from way back this is the conversation that was reported to me as being herd by a person that reported it and it is in the redactions.
Also was recorded and sent to a family member from one of the GM crew.
That covers the argument/discussion between Marsh and Steed.
There is some pre and post discussion here that McDonough had to have herd along evidently with some one else?????
I agree with both of you it is the point that the decision is made to head to the BSR
What is still fascinating about that one radio capture of Marsh ‘discussing options’ with Steed is that not only do we still need to find out EXACTLY what Marsh was ‘referring’ to as THIS and IT… but that this radio capture is the SECOND time he was ‘discussing’ this with Steed.
Again… the full radio capture from Marsh is…
Eric Marsh ( to Jesse Steed, over the radio, with modulation ): “Ah… I jus… I was just sayin’ I knew this was comin’ when I called ya and asked how… what your comfort level was. I could just feel it… ya know.”
Notice the following ‘breakdown’…
1) “I knew THIS was comin'”
What is THIS?
2) “when I called ya”
PAST tense. That means Marsh had ALREADY called Steed at least once ( prior to this 1555 moment ) to talk about the SAME THING.
3) “and asked how”
Marsh reveals what the PRIOR conversation was ‘about’ and he uses the specific word HOW. So he had ALREADY called Jesse prior to this moment and the subject was about HOW ( something ). That could either mean “HOW Steed FELT” about something… or it could mean Marsh was asking Steed HOW they might ‘accomplish’ something ( like getting back to town ).
It’s really a damn shame Marsh didn’t just complete that one sentence.
Possibilities are…
“When I called ya and asked HOW ( we get the hell out of here )”
“When I called ya and asked HOW ( you felt about making a move )”
“When I called ya and asked HOW ( we get back to the buggies )”
etc.. etc…
If Brendan heard this PRIOR radio exchange between Marsh and Steed when Marsh was asking Steed this ‘HOW’ question… then that might really tell the missing part of the story all by itself.
4) “what your comfort level was.”
Since Marsh STOPPED and didn’t complete his “and asked how” statement… and then ‘changed his mind’ and said THIS instead… I guess it can be construed that the HOW he was talking about in his PREVIOUS conversation was also more how he FELT about something that HOW (specifically) to accomplish something… but we don’t know for sure. Only someone who heard the PREVIOUS intra-net conversation that Marsh is referring to could clear that up.
5) I could just feel it… ya know.”
Still the best indication we have of what the hell Marsh was really trying to say at this point. It indicates a GENERAL “I had a feeling all day this was going to go south” ( literally ) or “I had a feeling all day that no one had a handle on the situation” or something like that.
This was only about the second time in his life this 43 year old man who was still just a Hotshot SUP was being allowed to be a DIVS on a fire. He had already been told to just accept the fact that he was now “out of the game” ( ‘Hunker and be safe’ ) which is what Rusty Warbis and Paul Lenmark in ‘Bravo 3’ had already figured out HOURS earlier.
Maybe HE ( Marsh ) was just simply not going to accept the fact that his DIVSA performance that day would end up such a dismal failure.
Maybe that’s what Brendan is (still) trying to not reveal.
My first thought is that what GM did was not a failure they put in their line though not tied in and the other division was where the fire escaped and crossed over to Marsh’s Division.
So there was no real Failure on the part of GM that kind of thing happens all the time. The fire escaping containment and readjusting fire lines.
That’s true… but you are describing GM’s work in general. Maybe Marsh had ‘higher expectations’ for himself as DIVSA, or something.
It’s also all about how Marsh might have FELT about the workday. If HE was disappointed… and thought he was ‘failing’ as DIVSA… then that is what would have been influencing HIS thinking.
That being said… we still don’t know the following, either…
1) WHEN did DIVSA Marsh know that the THIRD Type 1 IHC Crew ( Arroyo ) wasn’t even going to show up? That alone should have influenced this DIVS’s plans as to completing that massive line work that day.
2) WHY ( even after a face to face with Blue Ridge management Frisby and Brown ) were the BR Hotshots still basically just sitting on their asses by their Carriers in the Sesame area and doing nothing at all? If there was even a CHANCE that long two-track could have been ‘improved’ then it should have been being worked on all day. It wasn’t.
For some reason… BR SUP Frisby and BR Captain Brown just continued to ‘bomb around’ in their Polaris Ranger and weren’t ‘committing’ their crew to doing anything at all… until later in the afternoon when Cordes came up with this ‘backup plan’ to improve that Cutover Trail to the Youth Camp.
As Warbis and Lenmark realized as early as 12:30 PM… did everyone KNOW by about NOON or 1:30 PM that this massive west-to-east line building effort just wasn’t going to come together that day?
If so… then WHY was GM still “committed to the ridge work” even as late as 1542 when Musser made his ‘availability check’?
GM ( and DIVSA Marsh ) really should have been gone from that position long before that. The plan developed at 7:00 AM was pretty much ‘obsolete’ by NOON… yet GM still stayed up on that ridge.
There’s still an ‘untold story’ here about why that ‘plan’ was being still considered to be ‘viable’ for the entire afternoon… when others knew by NOON that it was already pointless.
The fact that mackenzie catches the exchange just moments after the conversation between Marsh andable could have been what the conversation was about. I agree that the “when I called you” was past tense. It could possibly have been a cell callthat occurred after the initial turndown. And I just have to think the air support comment weighed into their decision. Whether that was appropriate or not. How many gallons of retardant were dropped between the 1550 promise of air support and the time of deployment. How many VLAT’s were overhead in that period of time. And remember there was an attempt to obtain more aircraft at the circa 1600 hour. Right?
WTKTT,
Harken back to the YH Fire deployment site news conference (link below) with PFD Wildland Chief Willis and his comments about the GMHS being in a good SZ in the black yet unbelievably states that “no WFF is satisfied sitting in the black watching the fire progress below them as they sit and do nothing …” Then he immediately segues into the structure FF world by stating “And that’s why firemen run into burning buildings.”
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J1lBgicPq5A
WTF.! There are thousands of WFF that would be and are, COMPLETELY SATISFIED sitting in the black watching the fire progress below them while they sit there and do nothing. Then once the fire pulses and it is safe, THEN AND ONLY THEN do you leave your perfectly good SZ and re=engage.
That troubles me to hear someone in authority like that, the GMHS supervisor, immediately jump from a WFF worldview to a Structural/Municipal worldview without any clarification and/or qualification of why you said that. I think there was some tacit mindset in the PFD regarding wildland fire when structures were being threatened that just MAY have had SOME influence on Marsh’s decisions that day.
Yep, it does suggest that mindset. Though the mindset is particularly disturbing insofar as it suggests that Willis would have viewed as natural, even admirable, a desire on the part of GM to engage in activities for which they were neither trained nor equipped. The reality of course is that GM likely would have had to deploy had they reached the BSR, because it wouldn’t have worked as a SZ, and then likewise would not have been able to be effective in protecting structures.
Willis’ GGG ( God, Guts and Glory ) stuff that he was slinging at that initial press conference held at the deployment site on July 23, 2013…
G1 ( God ) Willis: “God had a different plan for those men”
G2 ( Guts ) Willis: “No WFF ever wants to sit in the black”
G3 ( Glory ) Willis: “Rest assured… they died with honor”
Even after being heavily criticized for his performance in that press conference ( he explained NOTHING and ended up just making a bunch of stupid statements ), Willis still reiterated his GGG philosophy to the ADOSH investigators a month later in his first ADOSH interview.
He really DOES believe this stuff… and he was allowed to double-dip out of retirement and be a “Wildland Division Chief”.for a Municipal Fire Department.
Reply to Robert the Second (RTS) post
on December 27, 2014 at 1:22 pm
>> RTS said…
>> Harken back to the YH Fire deployment site
>> news conference with PFD Wildland Chief
>> Willis and his comments about the GMHS
>> being in a good SZ in the black yet unbelievably
>> states that “no WFF is satisfied sitting in the
>> black watching the fire progress below them
>> as they sit and do nothing …”
That press conference with Willis giving his ‘speech’ and then answering all the questions was held at the deployment site on July 23, 2013.
It’s still really quite a mystery why HE ( Willis ) was even allowed to be the official spokesperson for that first time the media was allowed to get close to the deployment site, versus either Jim Karels or Mike Dudley who were the Co-Leads of the actual in-progress SAIT investigation.
I ( personally ) still think it was a mistake to allow Willis to be the ‘mouthpiece’ for that first on-site press conference. He explained NOTHING and just ended up making a bunch of very stupid and controversial statements.
About a MONTH later, even after some pretty heavy criticism for a lot of his statements in that press conference ( including the “No WFF is satisfied to sit in the black” and “God had a different plan for these men” and the “They died with honor” stuff )… Willis was still “sticking to his story” in his first ( of two ) ADOSH interviews.
Here is Willis still reiterating ( even after all the criticism ) his firm belief to ADOSH that “No crew in the nation would ever want to just sit in the black”…
From Darrell Willis’ ADOSH interview on August 19, 2013
Q1 = Barry Hicks – ADSOH investigator
A = Darrell Willis – SPGS2 in Yarnell and Prescott Wildland Division Chief
———————————————————–
1324 Q1: Mm-hm. Um, so your – your best guess is they see the structures down there
1325 and they figure they need to go….
1326
1327 A: And they had the time and the distance.
1328
1329 Q1: Figured.
1330
1331 A: They figured. I – I don’t know that. Only Eric can tell you that. And Jesse. But
1332 I also understand that they’re, ah, they wouldn’t want to sit around and watch
1333 the town burn down.
1334
1335 Q1: Yeah.
1336
1337 A: In the black. If they could help.
1338
1339 Q1: Yeah.
1340
1341 A: That’s my feeling. I don’t think there’s any crew in the nation that would want
1342 to do that. Just sit on a – on a black spot.
——————————————————–
>> RTS also said…
>> Then he immediately segues into the
>> structure FF world by stating “And that’s why
>> firemen run into burning buildings.”
>>
>> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J1lBgicPq5A
>>
>> WTF.! There are thousands of WFF that would
>> be and are, COMPLETELY SATISFIED sitting in
>> the black watching the fire progress below them
>> while they sit there and do nothing.
No question. Willis has always just been demonstrating that he doesn’t have the faintest idea what he is talking about and is probably was not even qualified to be ANYONE’s “Wildland Division Chief”… retired and “double dipping” or not.
>> Then once the fire pulses and it is safe, THEN
>> AND ONLY THEN do you leave your perfectly
>> good SZ and re=engage.
The ONLY actual in-field IFC Hotshot experience that Darrell Willis had was ‘tagging along’ a few time with Granite Mountain as the ’20th man’ when they were short on the roster. He didn’t even have THAT ‘tagging along’ time before he was actually ‘appointed’ as Prescott Wildland Division Chief.
It can probably he said that Willis wasn’t even really QUALIFIED to be ‘double dipping’ ( following his retirement ) with that ‘Widlland Division Chief’ position.
So it really might have been a case ( in Prescott ) where you had some retired Structure FF guy with a “God, guts and glory” mentality ( Willis also said they ‘died with honor’ during that press conference ) actually RUNNING the entire Wildland Division who wasn’t really qualified for that job… supervising the only Type 1 IHC crew sponsored by a City Fire Department with an IHC Supervisor who was, himself, probably not fully qualified for the IHC Superintendent’s position and was only ‘grandfathered in’ to that IHC SUP position when the Fuels Crew he was hired ( by Prescott ) to run just happened to pass some ‘Type 1 IHC’ eligibility phase.
A VERY strange situation, to say the least… and I still don’t think this has all been fully factored into what happened in Yarnell on June 30, 2013.
I fingers it not crwdib8that Willis didnt know why GM did what they did as late of date as at the deployment site interview. All he had to do was ask Cordes, and I am sure that he knew exactly why they moved before the bodies were removed from the deployment siite. I say BS, Willis was not being truthful.
I find it not credible that Willis. ….
It has also always been “less than credible” that when Darrell Willis first went up to Brendan McDonough in the Ranch House Restuarant to ( as Willis said in his own Unit Log ) “check on his welfare”… that Willis did NOT ask McDonough one single QUESTION about the circumstances such as WHY was McDonough standing there in the parking lot and the others were NOT… or WHY they might have gotten themselves into an entrapment situation when everyone had assumed they were in the safe black.
It just doesn’t make any sense that he would have NOT asked Brendan any questions at all…
…especially since ( at that very moment ) the most IMPORTANT thing to know was exactly where the men might be located.
Willis really does seem to want us all to believe that he ( The Wildland Division Chief for Prescott ) had his ENTIRE ‘Wildland Crew’ missing and possibly hurt or dead… and he comes across one of that same crew just standing there in a parking lot… and he doesn’t ask him any questions?
Not credible.
SR and WTKTT,
The GMHS certainly WERE trained and qualified to do STRUCTURE PROTECTION that day, but NOT fighting structure fires. You correctly pointed out that they were neither trained nor equipped to fight STRUCTURE FIRES.
While an OPS Chief on the 2013 Thompson Ridge Fire on the Santa Fe NF in New Mexico, many WFF, including the GMHS, heard OPS Willis give a radio briefing one evening referring to the evening’s strategy regarding a dozer line around some threatened structures.
OPS Willis broadcast over the radio to the night resources to “HOLD THAT LINE AT ALL COSTS …”
AT ALL COSTS? REALLY? WTF! That;s what the military does in combat situations by having ‘ACCEPTABLE LOSSES’ as part of their overall plan. However, in WFF there is NO such thing as ‘acceptable losses’ for WFF For structures themselves MAYBE but NEVER for WFF.
No WFF that I know engages in a wildland fire knowing or planning on losing “X-number of WFF” that day and just chalking it off as acceptable. They just do NOT do that! So, this appears to have been another PFD tacit, yet unwritten policy that was held by certain members of the PFD and it MAY be that this unwritten PFD attitude had an influence on the decisions and actions of Marsh and possibly the GMHS that fatal day.
That “hold at all costs” comment is further disturbing.
In terms of structure protection, given the situation in Yarnell one of the things that GM should also have understood was that if they reached town, they would have ended up sitting and watching, like everyone else. They seem to have been lacking in multiple levels of awareness.
SR,
Yes, but SAFELY hanging out like everyone else . It’s not so much that they were lacking in situational awareness because the GMHS had the best SA of anyone on the entire YHF. They had the best view of the incoming weather, subsequent fire behavior, and the overall YH Fire. Notwithstanding their SA, that seems to have been overridden by their Leader’s habit of Bad Decisions With Prior Good Outcomes.
JOY — wanted to go back to what you went thru on the 10 & 18.
The crew is in the black before 1600 watching the fire below them and to the NE. Looking at Yarnell.
There is a solid line of fire from where Doughnut’s lookout spot to Yarnell about 3/4 of a mile from the crew. Below them across an area to the BSR is heavy brush 6 to 10 foot tall no breaks no line other than the 2 track Dozer line pushed to the old dozer. and a dried retardant line. The dozer line is close to being compromised.
Marsh and Steed discuss moving.
Evaluation—-
We are in the black and meeting all the 10 & 18. There is a front moving in with erratic winds predicted and seem to be hitting the North end of the fire. people are moving to safety.
Marsh wants to move to reengage/Marsh wants to move so they can get the trucks to pick them up/Marsh wants to move to the BSR Safety Zone.
Evaluate the move to BSR———–
#14,#15,#16 Weather Wind and spot fires as you look to the line of fire to the North and East.
If you move to BSR
#11unburned fuel between you and a very active fire 3/4 of a mile from you.
#17 Terrain and fuels make escape or the hike to BSR difficult
#12 If you drop into canyon or even follow the 2 track you lose site of the fire.
#3 The escape route is not Identified or scouted thru heavy brush with no open path.
Every one of those or even one should have told Marsh and Steed to stay where they were.
in the Black where none of the 10 and 18 were compromised.
The move was so tricky that at some point a lookout left behind would not have been able to get them out at a certain point.
Leaving a lookout would have also put the lookout in a position of being left on the mountain and not with the crew. in other words move the entire crew at the same time.
With out LCES not a good plan. Communications– The crew needed and should have had a communication link continually with some one who could tell them the fire activity.
They should have notified every one about the plan to move.
ALL OF THE ABOVE WOULD TELL MOST TO STAY IN THE BLACK AND REEVALUATE LATER.
18 SITUATIONS THAT SHOUT WATCH OUT ARE ALL TOOLS THAT NEED TO BE RECOGNIZED TO KEEP YOU SAFE.
But the one million dollar question is this. When Marsh tells Steed “I knew this was coming”, what was he referring to? Not the weather change, not the fire direction change. It sure would be nice to know what he was referring to. It seems to me that this was the plan changer. Imo
Calvin,
Brenden McDounough knows what it meant and in hwht context it was. Ask him.
Calvin— you can change plans all day you just have to plan the safety to meet the plan what ever it is.
Your responsibility to move the crew to initiate a new plan is ALWAYS
Safety First…… To move or to fight Fire.
Every thing I said above and below says it was unsafe to move.
So if GM took risks and beets the odds in the past. Did they try to do it here??????
There is no other reason to violate the basic rules and do what they did.
I think Steed was satisfied in the black and planed to stay right there……
I believe Marsh Ordered him and the crew to go to the BSR.
Steed tried to argue and lost. The entire crew heard it and followed Marshes Orders.
Who else could get them to ignore the 10 and 18. While there might have been a plan there was never an order to violate their safety to move off the mountain, By any overhead OPS or IC.
They made a initial turn down they were in the black.
Hunker and be safe.
They did the most unsafe move into unburned fuel that any crew could have done. Temp., Humidity, Fuels and possible erratic winds. All against them along with the 10 and 18.
Bob. The statement hunker and be safe comes immediately following marsh’s comment that he is working his way off the top. Marsh was not in the black at that time so the hunker statement seems quite insignificant. Imo. It seems like marsh was saying that he was coming off the top as early as 1550. And the other speaker (able) promises air support asap. If marsh was still on the top and planning on staying there, why would able (?) Promise him air support “down there”?
The crew did not move till 1604. after the turn down Marsh we assume was ahead of the crew but still unconfirmed.
Moving without safety still the problem here.
Rts. Do you know what Brendan heard? If so can you share?
We would all like to hear what McDonough heard. Still the Million Dollar Question.
Calvin——I am still of the opinion that Steed is the one talking to some of the crew not on the Radio that was recorded saying.
I KNEW THIS WAS COMMING.
Referring to the possibility of moving out of the black???
Moving to Yarnell???
Something changed the crew status right at this point??????
No. That was marsh who says I knew this was coming. I have never thought it was steed. Am I wrong?
I have felt Steed from the beginning and Not Marsh. But that is my take
Your take is the opposite along with some others.
So I am just sticking to my hunch or felling. no proof????
I knew this was coming —– Steed or Marsh?
The statement could also have to do with BR not being able to tie the line into theirs. Just another thought. as to meaning??????
Calvin and Bob,
I have to agree with Calvin because I always thought it was Marsh saying “I knew this was coming” because of the Southern drawl
Guess I am a loner on that one. Nothing more than a feeling.
anyway you herd him more than I ever have RTS so Ill go with you MAYBE right. I don’t give up easy.
OK NOW THE TEN STANDARD ORDERS.
#1 The crew had Fire weather forecasts and actual on the ground from McDonough.
#2 At the rest spot in the Black they could see the fire.
#3 They could see what the fire was doing and had a for cast that there was expected erratic winds with a weather cell.
If they moved at some point they would be blind to the Fire activity.
#4. The escape route and safety zone they were in was the black.
They had no other identified escape route.
#5 In the black they could all see the Fire no Lookout needed
If they moved to the BSR they needed a lookout due to the shout watch outs.
#6 Were they ALERT, Were they thinking CLEARLY?
#7 Communications little to none with supervisor or adjoining forces to discuss the move. They had full communications in the black
#8,9,10 were all covered in the black.
#10 When they moved they provided for no safety ignored severial of the 18 and failed to follow severial of the 10.
Had they simply paid attention to the warning signs they would not have moved out of the black.
Past bad decisions with good out comes. Group think. Lack of situational awareness.
CALCULATED RISKS The percentages of entrapment were just to high.
No matter the reason they moved the crew supervisors were responsible for the safety of each person and the crew. Marsh and Steed hold the ultimate responsibility.
They would tell you the same thing as leaders they screwed up.
RTS—-I think I clarified the Lookout above under #5
If they moved to BSR they needed a lookout
Just going back an rereading above unless I miss stated some where else????
Bob,
I am going to have to disagree about leaving/not leaving a LOOKOUT at the GMHS perfectly good SZ It would have been perfectly safe to LEAVE a Lookout in place as long as he had a radio (and the GMHS had PLENTY of radios, more than most Crews). So, he would have met all the LCES requirements. This is a common tactic that is safe as long as the Lookout complies with LCES.
Not a problem—- but the further the crew got the less chance they had to retreat.
There were just to many other things that said stay in the Black.
if the lookout moved after they got out he was hung out as far as getting to the crew.
My contention it was the wrong way to go to began with.
Stay in the Black and move in the Black you did not need a Lookout to began with..
The whole crew stayed together..
If a Lookout could have pulled them out by 1625 they may have got back to the saddle and maybe the Black. At some point they hit a point of no return. even with a lookout.
It is a good possibility that there Bush Wake trail was not sufficient for a fast retreat.
The route they chose (escape Route) Said return to safe Black and reevaluate.
In other words they still had severial problems even with a lookout
LCES also lacked the E. No clear and scouted quick route to the BSR.
The further they got from the saddle the longer it would take to get back.
Also not positive on time but 1630 to 1635 the fire projection chart showed the fire had crossed above them above the saddle.
Had there been a lookout I would think they would have been pulled out before they got to far off the saddle.
Just another indicator that the fire was to active to leave the black.
here is the link for you Sonny:
https://www.dropbox.com/sc/er0oa25hdqu5cm7/AADN9UEHjCV3_Fs9n5s54n_Ga
gearing up over here for us to do our mountaintop hike sleepover…spend the Holidays with the men…looking forward to it…thank you for going with me…I know you don’t like the cold…
Sonny- it is strange that over a year passed and we really do not see anyone coming public from people who knew the men to people on the fire to the homeowners—always will feel strange to me…like pat mccarty former gmhs left june 30 2010 and how eery he left the day they died 3 years before they died. I wish more folks would share about them…earlier I posted my opinion based on not much but thoughts…kind of like what people have been doing here when there is no evidence and many of us typing do not even know the men professional or personal…
good night Sonny…trying to find fire photos to get on dropbox. Such a pain…
Below is a link for an article by Arizona Assistant US Attorney Mike Johns titled “FIRE LAW.” It has a lot of references to decision making, the Ten Standard Orders and 18 Watch Out Situations and much more.
http://www.iawfonline.org/summit/2005%20Presentations/2005_pdf/Johns.pdf
RTS- based on that link-
good information
thank you
I am not a firefighter just a gal who wants more details to be shown on the fire that day so at times I have been wrong to state no to the 10 & 18 and stuff like this until I get more details I just did not want to open that door to that information and now that I did I can see why firefighters say what they do but my hope is once you see this firefighter near Bernard’s…I mean there is details lacking and people being hush and I get it but this fire can never be properly assessed until that day arrives is all.
Merry Christmas RTS…I am sure I am just some kid like Sonny says but my heart is in it for the hope for more details and clarity-
when on the mountaintop and I think how Billy placed himself dead center for the flame front …that is the Leo in him…I just cannot imagine when they deployed they thought that fire was going to do what it did and it just tears me up. Anyone that knows the men…did the position they laid have any significance in any of this?
Joy,
Merry Christmas!
You posted “I just cannot imagine when they deployed they thought that fire was going to do what it did and it just tears me up. Anyone that knows the men…did the position they laid have any significance in any of this?”
It did NOT matter what position they deployed in, it was WHERE they deployed that resulted in their deaths. First off, it should have been very obvious to the GMHS what the fire was going to do that day. Second, they deployed their fire shelters in a BRUSH-FILLED BOWL, NEVER A GOOD PLACE TO DEPLOY OR EVEN BE WITH THE INTENSE FIRE BEHAVIOR THAT DAY. And third, fire shelters are designed for RADIANT HEAT AND WILL BREAK DOWN VERY QUICKLY WITH DIRECT FLAME CONTACT. NO FIRE SHELTER, NOW OR DESIGNED IN THE FUTURE, WOULD HAVE SAVED THEM THAT DAY. They should have stayed put in their perfectly good Safety Zone, let the fire pulse and make its run and then hike down through the newly created black. Or they could have hiked down through cold black all the way to Yarnell from where they were.
Reply to Robert the Second post on December 25, 2014 at 11:16 am
>> RTS said…
>>
>> It did NOT matter what position they deployed in, it was
>> WHERE they deployed that resulted in their deaths.
Agree. Some of them also either didn’t even remember their training OR didn’t even have TIME to ‘throw their packs clear’ of the deployment site.
Many packs were found right there amidst the shelters.
So I doubt there was any consternation at all about WHO should deploy WHERE. They barely had time to do it at all.
I also think it is still possible their own attempts ( as Eric Marsh SAID they were attempting ) to “burn out around ourselves in the brush” may have CAUSED them more problems than it solved. The way the winds were at that moment…. whatever fires they might have purposely set near themselves may have ended up depriving them of even what little time they had left before the real fireline reached that location. The whole area might have ‘ignited’ around them the minute they set their own fire(s).
There really hasn’t been any good study about this aspect alone.
Probably because it would be hard to do… but nothing about this has been easy. It might have been POSSIBLE to determine what actually happened in the final moments if better investigators had been involved. ( E.g. EXACTLY where ‘accelerants’ were used at that location, and where they were NOT ).
There’s never been ANY real information about that.
>> RTS also said…
>>
>> They should have stayed put in their perfectly good Safety Zone,
>> let the fire pulse and make its run and then hike down through
>> the newly created black. Or they could have hiked down
>> through cold black all the way to Yarnell from where they were.
See the new information down below that appears to establish a credible time when the fireline actually “crossed by the old grader”.
According to the photographic evidence from GM crew members themselves… it happened MUCH earlier than the SAIT fire progression charts would indicate.
The SAIT charts seem to indicate it didn’t happen until 4:20 PM.
The actual photographic evidence puts the moment at between
4:02 and 4:05 PM… a full 15 to 18 minutes EARLIER than 4:20 PM.
If that is the case… then (theoretically), they would have only had to wait about 8-10 minutes after that ‘picture taking’ session up near the anchor point before they could have actually started to ‘come down’ the exact way that Brian Frisby and Trueheart Brown THOUGHT they were coming down.
That is… using that same -two-track they hiked up there on and the same one Frisby and Brown had used to come up for the NOON face-to-face.
It only took Granite Mountain about 45 minutes to hike IN on that east-west two-track that morning. That means if it had all ‘burned over’ by 4:05 or 4:10 PM… then even at the same pace they used in the morning they could have reached the ( black ) Sesame area near town by 4:50 PM… which is no sooner than they would have reached the BSR, anyway, had they not been killed in the attempt.
I think that might be just even more evidence that the ‘move’ wasn’t about reaching a ‘Safety Zone’ at all. No way.
As has been said… you don’t use an ‘Escape Route’ to get to a ‘Safety Zone’ when you are already IN the best ‘Safety Zone’. you could be.
The Boulder Springs Ranch seems to have been the ‘target destination’ because someone ( SPGS1 Gary Cordes? ) was already EXPECTING them to be there for a predetermined ( and agreed to ) reason.
WTKTT,
Thanks for the insight above. The fact that the GMHS actually spent precious minutes attempting to futilely BUILD A SAFETY ZONE BY HAND WITH CHAINSAWS IN DENSE BRUSH still boggles my mind. You should NEVER build a Safety Zone by hand but instead with a drip torch or a dozer. Those precious minutes would have been much better spent hauling ass to the BSR into somewhat lighter fuels and/or utilizing the buildings as heat sinks and/or to seek refuge inside.
There is also a noticeable and significant LACK of radio traffic from Cordes once everyone is aware of the GMHS deployment based on radio traffic. We NEVER hear Cordes talking to anyone on the radio – Air Attack, BRHS, the DPS helicopter – NO ONE – that they should concentrate their search efforts in the BSR area. Cordes KNEW they were headed that way, but made NO effort to direct others there to search for them . WTF was that all about?
GM could have done severial things that day and evaluated each one
before deciding on the move for what ever reason.
Off the back side into the desert or down thru the black as it became safe.
They for some reason or maybe just marsh decided that BSR was where they had to go.
The plan became so self motivated and self driven that that was where they needed to be .
It was not planed for a safe move. no evaluation of safety at all.
This is where the mind takes over common science. For severial reasons and Safety seems to be secondary or a calculated risk for what ever reason. You would think some one in 19 people would say wait a minuet but crew make up may have been the key to no questions asked Marsh and Steed know what they are doing. And they walked into a wall of brush that really slowed them down. Again no planning????????
It did NOT matter what position they deployed in, it was WHERE they deployed that resulted in their deaths.
Joy’s reply: I agree WHERE bewilders me to this day—-hauntingly
I will never understand the end result and where it is—it does not add up
except Steed or Marsh felt like many do and that at the 2 track ridge the Helm’s looks so darn close but why not ride the boulders down with fire in sight UNLESS the rumors and footage I saw that shows a possible back burn cut that off which would be blinded to the men and was it communicated to the men if it was done. Who was in the Sesame area late day near Bernard’s that can answer it purely? I think there is some real areas that need to come public that can come public if the investigators gave a hoot for the truth—I cannot keep going to that area and asking over and over to these people as Dr. Ted Putnam & Jerry saw me point out the two important accounts before I hiked you…I think being the father to one of the fallen can get you in for more clarity better than me or Dr ted Putnam or John Dougherty.
First off, it should have been very obvious to the GMHS what the fire was going to do that day.
Joy’s reply: It was obvious…Sonny said too obvious. I agree.
Second, they deployed their fire shelters in a BRUSH-FILLED BOWL, NEVER A GOOD PLACE TO DEPLOY OR EVEN BE WITH THE INTENSE FIRE BEHAVIOR THAT DAY.
Joy’s reply: I agree. It is strange-
And third, fire shelters are designed for RADIANT HEAT AND WILL BREAK DOWN VERY QUICKLY WITH DIRECT FLAME CONTACT. NO FIRE SHELTER, NOW OR DESIGNED IN THE FUTURE, WOULD HAVE SAVED THEM THAT DAY. They should have stayed put in their perfectly good Safety Zone, let the fire pulse and make its run and then hike down through the newly created black. Or they could have hiked down through cold black all the way to Yarnell from where they were.
Joy’s reply: Or go the way Sonny took me with less vegatation…just will never mke sense to me—never.
as for EN, she has respected my wishes to not communicate privately so I cannot say she is a stalker…so I omit the signature part you use…I hope you don’t mind. ENjoy your day. I am just packing up ready to hike…just got done cleaning the Holiday dishes…and ate some yummy scrumptious vittles…
Elizabeth/Logical Fallacy,
You posted on December 22nd at 6:45 PM that “There are some fires that turn on you so explosively and unpredictably that you are left with precious little time to get out of the way…..”
REALLY? And just what fires were those? Only in your wildest imagination. NEVER HAPPENED. There has NEVER been a fire that turned “so explosively and unpredictably that you are left with precious little time to get out of the way.” NEVER! UNLESS you did NOT have a LOOKOUT to warn you as the GMHS had on June 30, 2013. The GMHS TRAVELED DOWN INTO THE UNBURNED INTO THE FIRE AS IT RAN INTO THE BSR BOWL WITHOUT THE BENEFIT OF A REQUIRED LOOKOUT TO WARN THEM. THEY VIOLATED MANY OF THE TEN STANDARD FIRE ORDERS AND FAILED TO RECOGNIZE, HEED, AND MITIGATE MANY OF THE WATCH OUT SITUATIONS.
Hey kid. Joy, I know what you are getting at but the men broke all the rules. Didn’t you hear Bob Powers and Dr. Ted Putnam? The rule that they broke most important was dropping off into a green canyon with a fire below. Joy, you mean well but you are not looking at the common sense part. You are just a wee bit green behind the ear on firefighting in the mountains.
Oh is that right Sonny. I am laughing. We have paused our knowing each other in the past on this very topic because I feel the missing information as to why they left the black is so important…you say an order and the 2 leaders led them all to their deaths than I say some sudden action of meeting up with that black bear we saw near Helms on 6-29-13 or what about Kari Flippen who had seen the mountain lion and her cubs that you and I know as well as my husband and a few locals that one lion is the size of an African lion…then there is that rumored alien theory and the drug cartel and so many other rumors and all I meant without some more missing information why jump ahead on the conclusion based on what is shown. I truly believe after hearing that man very angry at the fire management that Bruce and Laura Corbin as well as the Bennetts/Helms come public and so many that until we hear that lets not calculate the 10 and 18 based on what is currently shown…be just and fair to all the 19 because there was too many leader independent thinkers in this bunch…it could be wildlife ..it could be the abundance of datura burning making poor decisions and just too many areas that still there is a need like covering like publicly interview about the other phone records not yet shown, interview all previous gmhs, speak to Natalie who knows Brendan, re-interview Downey Fernandez cordes brown and frisby…interview tim tillich…too many areas to name to interview but first off all on that fire that day and the homeowners…merry Christmas sonny but we will always disagree here..i am not a big fan on what appears and that is why I am a straight shooter even it may disgrace me or another …at least you know where you stand with me if you know me…I reckon as a child what I faced makes me very observant and aware…think about Tammy mother of Sean..the daughter and granddaughter of firefighters, sister to one, and aunt to another. She married a former hotshot. She’s a medical assistant and worked as an EMT. Sean is a very thoughtful person with a fussy side. He is an individual, a leader, a need to understand others viewpoints, independent, likes his time alone, loves nature & outdoors, stimulated by group interaction, think about Jax how he entered this world after the death of his father and think about how one places the 10 & 18 without exhausting every tiny detail before saying this one did this or that…than there is the tiger…”Turby”…very social,bold, can be stubborn, and internally not publicly a emotional sensitive man with a disobedient side (WHY WOULDN’T HE SIGN OFF AND GO HIS OWN WAY…he was not one who needed to be led…had a mind of his own…think of how he was born in Prescott and knew the type of fuel he was dropping down in…think about David or Coleen who may still come visit this page or his 2 girls eventually…he was a Marine…Semper Fi…he was a thinker and his way and style he had reasoning ability and loved the outdoors and very sensitive inner nature that Stephanie can confirm…he does get disturbed by turmoil…he can live in his own thoughts and be reserved but he was about truth and happiness….stubborn side so I do not see this Marine being led to his death. Oh how I remember Grant McKee as if it was yesterday—your eyes…reminded me of the Collura family. I remember you on 6-30-13 so fresh to this very day. The happy humorous magnetic soul who enjoyed conversation as I watched you on the mountain top talking away…Grant was a leader and not to be led. He was a person who would not be a gmhs long because he had a need for his own authority & control in decision making. He was born to serve humanity and was robbed of it too early. His spirit is so strong for me—the connection to seek justice because Grant was not a sub-servant to another and I believe had he stayed alive he would be wealthy and shared that wealth all around. Than there is Garret who I found to be a loyal honest man and not very flexible in some areas and I can’t see him being led to his death. Yeah Sonny, you label them YOUNG and they FOLLOWED yet I got in touch with the spiritual realm in this and I bet their family members if they read this GET WHAT I AM WRITING or they won’t like my husband doesn’t get it…Garret had a scientific rhythm to him and I believe a person who knows him will one day write about him…he liked a stable nurturing secure home and outdoors adventure so I don’t think he would be led into that either…he liked consistency, orderly and was independent thinker and doer and mentally and physically had to be active outdoors yet needed his alone time. Than there is Billy who was thoughtful yet could be a bit fussy at times. He was all about individuality & a leader. Independent. He needed to develop understanding others viewpoints…generous but could be stubborn…his lesson in life always was to be aware not to listen to others and use his gut for it could be hazardous. He liked his time alone. Nature. He was stimulated when in a group setting. Another person who was in the service and understands orders but he would not be led to his death. Ohhhh Clayton, your spirit is the strong one still among the Weavers…so loyal and honest and narrow-minded and not flexible on some things…you were the peacemaker…you wanted to help others reconcile their minds and hearts together…you faced issues with such a finesse that fascinates me. You were a team player. Your strength was nature and still is as I feel you on the Weavers…you wanted the best outcome in a shitty situation so I do not see you being led either. Shit Kevin. You were the reason loved ones of the GMHS and Wade Ward clasped on to me on June 30 2014 as I looked you in the eye at the Prescott Memorial. BAM! I lost it. I wept. Jesus wept. You were smart and creative and so very warm and kind and sensitive—insecure in some areas and dependent and a fussy one. I am so very sorry you all were on the Weavers…Kevin, you were placed on Earth for the deeper reasons for life. The depth of your love for outdoors and nature – the equilibrium that is expressed in a natural environment. Your deep and I mean DEEP sensitive inner nature connected to mine on 6-30-14. I am so sorry you get so disturbed by turmoil like you do- withdrawing—living in your own thoughts—reserved but so flexible. You I can see being LED! So that is NUMBER ONE. Christopher, Christopher; devoted man…honest but a lil on the cynical side and can find yourself in negative holes yet so practical and analytical and so very giving that when you GIVE it brings you joy and happiness and at times fills those negative holes. Scott another generous soul and quick wit too yet calculative and can keep thoughts to self…you are a natural born leader. If you were still alive you would be on your way to better financial situation and as much as you are a leader you are underdeveloped in some areas that you are on the fence if you would of been led…maybe for you…Wade would of never been LED. he is .friendly, independent and impatient at times and such a rare zest for living life and his spirit seeks TRUTH in this all. He wants JUSTICE. He has a tendency to develop the role of being impatient in this all versus relaxing and knowing he is transforming his inner self but Wade is one STRONG spirit on the Weavers and would never be led. John is resourceful and adaptable and original and can have a temper and be critical and unpredictable…John was born to serve humanity and he was not understanding what happen…he wants the truth to his life’s ending to be shown for all…he had a concern that he could be drawn into others things so I think he is on the fence for me and a maybe to be led. Oh Anthony…I have to plant me a willow tree in your honor…you hold innerly alot of pride and are subtle…a peacemaker and innerly sensitive and very much would want co-bros to get along..your strength is in nature. Joe was a hardworker and definite in his decision making so I doubt he would be led- he spoke his mind and was practical and logical. Excellent man. Level-headed and flaw would be impatient and a bit bossy at times. He was born a leader and self sufficient. Quick-minded and stable and deep rooted to nature. He was not led. Dustin was one of a kind even though he came from a huge family. He was born to serve Him and humanity. Very stable. He was born to be a firefighter. A leader. He was very in tune to human nature and the human mind. Dustin did not like others mental turmoils and yet he would try and be there for them. A strong sense of obligation to others. He was independent yet Faith and Family and Friends was Dustin – Travis Carter—you knew this Yarnell terrain so I know you were not led…your family history goes back hundreds of years with the MacKenzie family…you are independent…deep…loved to be by the strength of your elders and loved the outdoors/nature—innerly sensitive and disturbed by turmoil and for that I think you are on the fence to follow but I would hope not because out of all the men you knew this very area—Robert comes off a thinker and subtle and proud…a leader..independent…yet innerly did not like the mental challenges of others mental pressures and worries. He was born to be a firefighter…a hero…and for this man he had to have a job that challenges both his mental and physical and he felt a balance to his life when he met his wife- He is probably the most unique spirit in them all. Now we have three men left; Jesse, Eric and Andrew. When you all read their job evaluations WHO DO YOU THINK WAS TRULY NEXT IN LINE TO GET WILLIS JOB? Did anyone find it odd that Willis stated very well remarks for Marsh in writing yet in the checkbox areas Willis really damaged him for when it truly came time to get that position than you look at Jesse and Andrew’s…Jesse was born a leader that people just naturally trusted and looked up to—he was responsible and looked for intelligent lasting effect solutions and spot on decisions. Very rare he was weaker on mental pressures of another. He was in the right job for he needed a position that challenged his physical and mental. Jesse was resourceful and like most Marines “adaptable” and one of a kind yet he can have a hot-headed way and be critical and unpredictable like the wind. Andrew from the get go caught the tv screen as magnetic to us all and inspirational and the things his family does for him still is fantastic and he was so good-natured and respected and a natural born teacher. He was intelligent and quick-witted and naturally was very popular and generous…he at times was acquisitive and calculated things out. I think to this day Marsh was never going to be the next Willis—just the founder of the GMHS—I believe Steed and Ashcraft were seriously being weighed in for that position and maybe due to small town politics it would of been done discreet over time…I do not believe Marsh would of been the next Willis. Now for the man we met a few times on the Weavers; Eric Marsh. Number one, I am so sorry Amanda Marsh’s article of her young life tragedy came out in the Chino paper that week of the death of Eric. Double Wam. Eric was dedicated to his job and was a very hard-worker. He was definite in decision making and he spoke his mind in that neat Southern drawl and was polite in manners and he had a way he could attract attention if needed and people admired this man. If he sees someone is stealing his thunder- he can get innerly angry and speak his mind. I found him to be practical and logical and excellent discrimination and discernment and he had high standards of excellence. I found him to be loyal and level-headed but if his feathers were ruffled impatient and leaning on the bossy side for I did hear his father tone that 6-30-13. Eric Marsh was born to teach and counsel yet he had innerly to learn how to govern his emotions and reactions and still needed to seek development there. Sometimes his feelings could override a proper analysis as well as good judgement and his biggest flaw would be to let others decisions involve himself in them because it could be a hazardous thing. He was very deep in the soul with music and art and he loved his home base and Amanda as much as he loved his outdoors and he was the kind of guy who could know all walks of life. I have had deep connections as Holly Neill and A. Sinclair can share as well as some locals because Eric has come to me on the Weavers thanking me for the generous effort to not let anyone make theories on him or any of his men including Willis and he has told me he understands how Joy needs to develop her emotions as well as reactions yet draw closer to nature and the outdoors and hold strong to my inborn independence and heart for freedom and keep expressing just as I am—understood or not—people seeking the truth will sift and skim through the rambles.
So you see until we get every tiny detail to that day Sonny I just cannot think of the 10 & 18 but I am reading them tonight for you…
http://www.fs.fed.us/fire/safety/10_18/10_18.html
Standard Firefighting Orders
Keep informed on fire weather conditions and forecasts.IT WAS OBVIOUS IN THE SKY.
Know what your fire is doing at all times.THEY BROKE THIS RULE BY WHAT HAS BEEN PUBLICLY SHOWN BUT MORE DETAIL MAY DISSOLVE THAT
Base all actions on current and expected behavior of the fire.THEY DID NOT DO THAT BY DROPPING DOWN THE BOWL YET MISSING MORE INFORMATION HERE SO AWAITING MORE DETAIL BUT “AS IS”- THIS WAS BROKEN.
Identify escape routes and safety zones and make them known. BECAUSE I HAVE SEEN SOME VIDEO FOOTAGE FROM HOMEOWNER THERE IS STILL NO CLARITY ON WHAT WAS GOING ON NEAR PAT BERNARD’S PLACE BETWEEN SESAME AND HELMS SO UNTIL MORE CLARITY JUST WAITING…
Post lookouts when there is possible danger.SHIT WE HAVE NO PUBLIC EVIDENCE OF THAT SO RIGHT NOW IT SEEMS BROKE SONNY BUT AGAIN MAYBE THERE WAS A PERSON DEPENDS WHO DID THE START OF ORCHESTRATING THE SAIR BECAUSE STILL MAYBE A POSSIBILITY FOR MORE DETAILS HERE
Be alert. Keep calm. Think clearly. Act decisively. NO WAY—THIS WAS OBVIOUSLY BROKEN SO TO ME OKAY THERE IS STARTING TO BE AN IMPORTANCE IN THIS 10 & 18 EVEN WITHOUT ALL THE INFORMATION BECAUSE OBVIOUSLY THEY BROKE THIS ONE.
Maintain prompt communications with your forces, your supervisor, and adjoining forces. WE ARE NOT SURE THE PUBLIC HAS GOT ALL THE DETAILS HERE—AWAITING—
Give clear instructions and insure they are understood. SEEMS MARSH WAS SAFE IN THE BLACK- SEEM CLEAR TO ME BUT THE QUESTION WAS WHAT CHANGED HIS MIND AND STEED TO CHANGE THEIR POSITION—AWAITING DETAILS…OKAY SONNY YOU ARE RIGHT THAT THESE RULES ARE IMPORTANT BUT SO IS MORE DETAILS…
Maintain control of your forces at all times. ????? WOW. SO VERY SAD. BY READING THIS AND WHAT HAS BEEN SHOWN THE GMHS REALLY MESSED UP AND THIS IS SAD AND MAY BE BENEFICIAL TO TEACH CURRENT FIREFIGHTERS—THANK YOU FOR SHARING SONNY..I AM THICK-HEADED AT TIMES AND LOCK IN ON DON’T FOLLOW 10 & 18 UNTIL MORE DETAILS COME IN YET IT IS OBVIOUS HOW IMPORTANT THEY ARE FOR SAFETY AND SAFETY MATTERS!!!
Fight fire aggressively, having provided for safety first. THEY DID NOT DO THIS…SAD…MAYBE I NEEDED TO FINALLY READ THIS…UGH…
18 Watchouts Situations
Fire not scouted and sized up.WE SAW MARSH DOING THAT ALL DAY!
In country not seen in daylight. HUH?
Safety zones and escape routes not identified. ???? HUH???
Unfamiliar with weather and local factors influencing fire behavior. YOU COULD VISUALLY SEE THE WEATHER ON WEAVER MOUNTAIN TOPS
Uninformed on strategy, tactics, and hazards. EXPLAIN???
Instructions and assignments not clear. THIS SEEM BROKEN TO ME.
No communication link with crewmembers/supervisors. THAT WE DO NOT HAVE ALL THE TRUTH AND DETAILS DUE TO LEGAL BS
Constructing line without safe anchor point. SONNY- ISN’T THAT WHAT MARSH DID?
Building fireline downhill with fire below. ??? EXPLAIN.
Attempting frontal assault on fire. THIS AREA CONFUSES ME
Unburned fuel between you and the fire. THAT IS THE CRAP I DON’T GET- THEM DROPPING DOWN THERE…OKAY SONNY…YOU ARE RIGHT.
Cannot see main fire, not in contact with anyone who can. THERE WAS A FIREFIGHTER IN THAT 1 VIDEO BY SESAME SO WE NEED THAT PERSON TO SPEAK UP BECAUSE HOMEOWNER HAS YOU ON VIDEO. YOU WERE HIGH ENOUGH ON HILL TO ALERT MEN SO THIS COULD OF BEEN THE MISSING LOOKOUT NOT YET PUBLIC…
On a hillside where rolling material can ignite fuel below. HUH???
Weather is getting hotter and drier. IT WAS INDEED HOT…MY TEMPS READ 93-107 THAT DAY AND MY KESTREL GOT UP T 43MPH IN WINDS.
Wind increases and/or changes direction. DUD. THAT HAPPEN DIFFERENT TIMES THAT DAY
Getting frequent spot fires across line. ALL DAY WE SAW IT
Terrain and fuels make escape to safety zones difficult. NOT IF THEY STAYED IN THE BLACK ???
Taking a nap near the fire line.
all the above is how I saw the men on the Weavers on 6-30-13 and how I view them; my opinion of them—people write and talk opinions on me since the fire; some accurate and some not—if you know the men…write about them here and tell me where I was wrong…my husband thinks writing about them is wrong but hey I will never forget 6-30-13 and I just won’t accept Marsh and Steed led them to their deaths—just what is being shown but it is obvious more details is yet to come…
Merry Christmas Sonny and Skeeter. I hope you are enjoying the mountain tops…
Merry Christmas to all-
I hope you got the message as I wrote about the men I only met once and never knew professional or personal and I gave my opinion on them…I have no blazing clue if these men are what I state and so I guess my message is when we all write about the 19 and they did this or that or they must of did this or could of did that…I just simply say until more fact based information come forward this fire will not be properly assessed—simple. To say 2 men led 17 men to their death- that is pretty heavy especially it is obvious the SAIR has not lived up to the information it provided and we all have proven there IS more details still due…I hope you all have a Merry Christmas. If you see a blaze on the mountain top—it is our blazing honor for the 19 as we camp out with them this Holiday week. We will be singing by a cowboy campfire and just celebrating it with the 19—-off I go to finish home cooking for Nick and John and take some up to Sonny and Skeeter.
For those of you who want to discuss Fire safety if you have not already copied
the10and18.com
is a good place to start on a copy of the basic safety rules refer to them when discussions arise.
If you are a non Fire Fighter and do not already have a copy
study them and then apply them to the discussion on Yarnell as the Fire Fighters on this blog do.
This is where I have a problem understanding. How could you force 18 or 19 people to go against their training and descend out of the view of the fire without a lookout? While these men were working for the same employer, they were trained by different institutions, right? I am sure they had all heard stories of near miss situations. They all knew the potential consequences if rules were not followed. I do not believe anyone was physically forced to leave the black, so what made them feel safe in what they were doing? And to me it seems very important that there was no one person who didn’t feel unsafe enough to retreat up the slope before it was to late. No matter what. It seems to me that they were confident enough in what they were doing that they continued until it was too late to retreat. What made them feel so comfortable? What gave them this false sense of security?
I think it depends largely on there training and absolute leader control.
If they never questioned or were allowed to question Marsh or Steed then
a crew structure was formed and followed with out question.
They may have felt concerned but not strong enough to baulk at doing what they were told.
You are right some should have questioned the sanity of the move.
If Marsh did take control and ordered them/Steed to go down into the Canyon
Then maybe they just shut up and followed Steed as he followed the order from Marsh. I do not know that I would say they felt safe I would say most trusted there leaders and the rest were uncomfortable in speaking up.
If there was an argument at this point an Steed lost or gave up then who would take up the order to come down the Canyon????????
How much absolute power did Marsh have over the crew?
Was Steed willing to buck him and lose his chance to be the new Superintendent?
There were some things at play here that we may not have all the facts on.
It is becoming a new norm on Fire crews that Crewman and Supervisors that are x military Iraqi follow orders with out question. Even though HS crews are not military.
All or none of which makes any science, but is a real factor in Supervision control.
On cell so sorry for typos ahead of time. i have not yet looked at 10 and 18. Yet as we all know lets put aside the 10 and 18 and simply look at this from human factor and only that for now..
the 10 and 18 can be pieced in when more details come public but to narrayebbabased on what is shown now would be a disservice like the sair…noway we can introduce the 10 and 18 until you hear some more accounts and see some more footag..now human factor numberoone…one of the gmhs family has been in this area for a couple plus hundred years and that gmhs was born a leader sign and was a leader and i can’t believe this one man knowing that terrain would take his saw into that bowl knowing that fuel..that manzanita..and how hard it is to saw that density of manzinita…human factor. is 19 men ended up down there and a lot were young yet knowing the familiesnnonowi see many had leadership qualities and human factor it does not add up when they were allvin the black so maybe marsh was where i said..maybe at some point thqt afternoon and if the half dozen accounts say marsh was atbhelms…no evidence to date places marsh there…just people stating it…so there is no without adoubt public evidence places marsh at helms so going on public evidence the bottom line is more people must come forwardtto properly assess the yhf. yet in it human factor is it does not make sense a mab whp knew that terrain would go down there…i am going to sleep up thwre withthe men soon on mountaintop and will take photos what i mean…the tree..thevview…the tree is not by old. grader but close to deployment site
Try again..cell is not working.On cell so sorry for typos ahead of time. i have not yet looked at 10 and 18. Yet as we all know lets put aside the 10 and 18 and simply look at this from human factor and only that for now..
the 10 and 18 can be pieced in when more details come public but to narrayebbabased on what is shown now would be a disservice like the sair…noway we can introduce the 10 and 18 until you hear some more accounts and see some more footag..now human factor numberoone…one of the gmhs family has been in this area for a couple plus hundred years and that gmhs was born a leader sign and was a leader and i can’t believe this one man knowing that terrain would take his saw into that bowl knowing that fuel..that manzanita..and how hard it is to saw that density of manzinita…human factor. is 19 men ended up down there and a lot were young yet knowing the familiesnnonowi see many had leadership qualities and human factor it does not add up when they were allvin the black so maybe marsh was where i said..maybe at some point thqt afternoon and if the half dozen accounts say marsh was atbhelms…no evidence to date places marsh there…just people stating it…so there is no without adoubt public evidence places marsh at helms so going on public evidence the bottom line is more people must come forwardtto properly assess the yhf. yet in it human factor is it does not make sense a mab whp knew that terrain would go down there…i am going to sleep up thwre withthe men soon on mountaintop and will take photos what i mean…the tree..thevview…the tree is not by old. grader but close to deployment site
Yes.
Google heuristic traps for some academic-speak on this. Basically, the larger the group, the EASIER it is to get everyone in the group to do really stupid things if the leader(s) of the group decide on it. We are all social animals, and I can say, having been on the wrong end of going against group consensus in the outdoors, that even in a non-work situation it can be incredibly painful to do. Even when it is clearly the “right” thing to do. RTS had linked to some reports on avalanche accidents a while back, and those likewise often involved group decisions where people are afraid to lose social acceptance, and defer to one or two designated leaders/”experts.” Since EM’s communication style clearly needed work and there are accounts that junior crew in particular were intimidated by him, those group dynamics would play even more strongly. And, with the contempt for “rabbits” displayed in, for instance, Dudley’s talk, you can imagine the spot someone would be in if they’d thought and acted for themselves and survived. Not good.
Also there is a Powder Magazine multi-media piece called “The Human Factor” that came out this fall, but that I can’t find right now. They are somewhat subtle in terms of the mistakes made, but do go into some of the heuristic traps that we are all subject to. — these can be applied to work, to boyscout trips, and all sorts of other contexts involving decision-making in environments where risk management is important.
SR,
Good post. I located the link for the Powder Magazine article titled ‘The Human Factor’ if it’s the same one you referred to.
It is a bit of a challenge at times to wend your way through it, but informative and interesting nonetheless.
http://www.powder.com/stories/the-safe-zone/introducing-human-factor/
WARNING: DO NOT GIVE ELIZABETH/LOGICAL FALLACY YOUR EMAIL ADDRESS. YOU WILL BE SORRY BECAUSE SHE WILL USE IT AGAINST YOU. SHE WILL STALK YOU.
Groupthink was clearly in force that June 30th or else there would have either been some ‘rabbits’ that refused to go or else there would have been some, even one, that would have refused the order to leave their perfectly good Safety Zone and just stayed put. At a bare minimum, suggesting to leave a required Lookout to warn them of the impending danger that SHOULD HAVE BEEN EVIDENT.
http://www.powder.com/stories/the-safe-zone/introducing-human-factor/
Thanks for the link! I keep on hoping I’ll get the gift of being more technical for the holidays, but no luck yet. 🙂 Happy Holidays to all today.
In terms of culture and groupthink, I think the ability to dissent is very crew, i.e. small-group, specific right now.
Bob Powers said: “Pure and simple had they had a lookout they would be alive today.”
I am pretty sure that they did have a lookout, and, if I were a betting woman, I’d guess that it was Eric Marsh. That’s how he knew that it had spotted over by the grader at roughly 4:20 or so, for example.
There are some fires that turn on you so explosively and unpredictably that you are left with precious little time to get out of the way…..
After speaking with different meteorologists and hearing the one spot of EN…I agree on explosive way of the fire yet again until Brucr annd the Bennett and Laura Corbin and the Helms share public their accounts I will state it is very possible more details can give us all more clarity to that very area between Sesame and the Helms. Aldo Bob Powers your contact says Marsh was ahead and not as I wrote it and I have heard that too from half dozen folks too and i plan to spend the holiday week with the men from mountaintop and I will take photo’s. of. the views for you…typos due to cell
True EN. After speaking with different meteorologists and hearing the one spot of EN…I agree on explosive way of the fire yet again until Brucr annd the Bennett and Laura Corbin and the Helms share public their accounts I will state it is very possible more details can give us all more clarity to that very area between Sesame and the Helms. Aldo Bob Powers your contact says Marsh was ahead and not as I wrote it and I have heard that too from half dozen folks too and i plan to spend the holiday week with the men from mountaintop and I will take photo’s. of. the views for you…typos due to cell
This Fire was not UNPREDICTABLE…
1600 in the afternoon , over 100 degrees Temperature, Low humidity, Low fuel moisture,
a flaming burning fire front running almost a mile from above the grader into Yarnell
.
Predicted erratic winds that were already hitting in peoples Valley and already hit the trigger points there, The fire was already showing that it could become explosive,
whirl wind flames along the fire line, spotting across Dozer lines and Retardant lines.
That is what happens in Arizona at this time of year and at this time of day.
Very predictable if you were actually standing there looking at the Fire.
18 Situations telling you watch out.
#14
#15
#16
So the crew is moving any way down the ridge.
#11
#17
#12
#3 Escape route not Identified. Scouted Marked or otherwise.
All of the above tell you to Fall back to the 10 Standard orders.
The 10 are telling you to fall back to a scouted Safety Zone
THE BLACK
Reassess your safety Options before proceeding.
Posting a look out with all the above going on so you can move down thru unburned fuel
to reach a Safety Zone over a mile away with out a fast route means you are fulfilling
ONE LAG of the LCES.
SAFETY—IF a safety problem arises at this point NOTE ALL OF THE ABOVE SIGHNS
THEN YOU MUST DISENGAGE—-Based on the 10 &18 and reassess your options.
Marsh Steed and GM did not use the tools they had and moved anyway.
They put themselves in the position that allowed the fire to turn on them
When they left the black.
The Black was close— hell they were in it.
The BSR was Over a mile away thru dense brush with no open route—-
18 watch outs #3 & #11.
Totally ignored.
A look out finds a good location and directs his men out and notifies them of ANY change in the Fire by RADIO
Staying at his position until the crew is safe. (as Kenny Jordon did)
I believe by 1620 the entire crew including Marsh and Steed were in the canyon and could not see the fire only 23 minuets before the mayday call..
The Fire moved over 3/4 of a mile in 25 minuets to the mouth of the canyon the crew was in.
Any lookout at 1620 would have seen that movement starting across the valley it was spotting with wind by 1600 to 1615…………………………..NO LOOKOUT betting woman………………………..
10 & 18 I purposely used Numbers so you would look them up and read them
if you are so inclined to actually know what Fire Fighters study and LIVE by.
True bob powets as thiw fire showed predictable that late morning and you saw the prediction coming in from the sky and you ddid not need. Aa radio weather…depends how you look at it…it wasvpredictable that it was unpredictable …you could predict that it was unpredictable early on without a radio or not. the sky and the hill going upfrom 1224-1238pm 6-30-13 showed us all on. weavers this storm met up with this fire and the men should of went out a lot earlier from that area and scared Sonny to get the hell out of there. You can use predcitabe you are right and if ypu thought it was unpredictable you are right..just how you look at it. once that storm met the fire iy was predictable that the unpredictable winds and wind changing the direections…please refrain with 10 and 18 until you reach out and hear more details and see more photos and video from Shrine to Helms…on what is shown current as public information please remember this is much more information that is so important to this fire andvproperly assessing it. listening to meteorologists and firefighters expert opinion is a good tool yet remember this fire has more details and some placed Marsh at the. Helms and that account has.not yet been publicly cconfirmed by the Helms. sorry cell typoss. many missing details yet that did not die with the 19…still alive anf awaiting for us to reqch it.
JOY
I am sorry but I can not refrain from the 10 and 18 they are the basics of all Wild Land Fire Fighters and there is much than just weather and extreme fire behavior to consider in SAFETY. as you say what Sonny saw was a combination of several things that told him to get the hell out of there.
I can simply look at the pictures taken by the crew looking down on Yarnell and tell you I immediately had warning signs that the crew should have had and seen. That was before I spent the last year looking at and reading all the info and the things we have found those only make it clearer that the crew
failed to use Safety in a decision to move off the mountain. The 10 and 18
still stand as evidence of that bad decision regardless of every thing else.
What I stated up above are the mistakes they made. In Fatality Fires those mistakes stand out and should be referred to showing others what happened and why nothing new to learn here just a hard lesson on total failure to Identify the problem with situational awareness.
Moving to reengage, Moving fro 1 safety zone to another putting the Crew at risk, Moving to work with a dozer to put line in , Moving to save Yarnell or Glen Isla Homes.
None of the above is worth the loss of 1 Crewman when the evaluation of doing it safely did not meet 100% Achievability.
Some place Some where Acceptable risk became their Norm. Bad Decisions with good outcomes gave them the we can do this with out the proving safety all wild Land Fire Fighters rely on. It is a fact on some fire you can get away with bending or braking the rules but sooner or later it will catch up with you.
The real question here is WHY DID THEY NOT USE THE 10 & 18 AND LCES TO STAY SAFE?
The answer lies in the past and present of the crew. Possibly no mentors of the past as a Municipality with out the years of experience of federal Hot Shot supervisors. Engrained teachings and invaluable experience. The statements By McDonough about the 10 & 18 should send a huge warning sign to every one here.
RTS has said it for R3 I will say it for R4 biased on my info this crew was known for taking Safety risks way beyond what normal Hot Shot Crews do.
I ask you after all of this– WHY ELSE WOULD THEY TURN THERE BACK ON THE SAFETY RULES AND LEAVE THE BLACK TO WALK THRU A BRUSH FILLED VALLEY WITH THE FIRE LESS THAN 3/4 OF A MILE AWAY??????
Elizabeth/Logical Fallacy,
You posted “I am pretty sure that they did have a lookout, …that it was Eric Marsh. That’s how he knew that it had spotted over by the grader at roughly 4:20 or so, for example.”
Marsh was down at the Ranch in the brush around that time, so there is NO way he could have seen spotting “over by the grader.”
You posted that “There are some fires that turn on you so explosively and unpredictably that you are left with precious little time to get out of the way…..”
REALLY? And just what fires were those? Only in your wildest imagination. NEVER HAPPENED. There has NEVER been a fire that turned “so explosively and unpredictably that you are left with precious little time to get out of the way.” NEVER! UNLESS you did NOT have a LOOKOUT to warn you as the GMHS had on June 30, 2013. The GMHS TRAVELED DOWN INTO THE UNBURNED INTO THE FIRE AS IT RAN INTO THE BSR BOWL WITHOUT THE BENEFIT OF A LOOKOUT TO WARN THEM.
There is an old saying that dates back along ways.
ON INITIAL ATTACK ALWAYS HAVE 1 FOOT IN THE BLACK… THE BLACK IS YOUR SAFETY ZONE AND ESCAPE ROUTE. as the fire grows so grows your safety zone.
A lookout and communications gives you the time to move to safety.
GM had a problem they had moved into no mans land between 2 SZ with no quick access thick brush in front of them and a serious run uphill behind them.
It is quite similar to building indirect line if you do not build safety zones as you move you end up in a bad situation a lookout is there to give you enough warning to get out but you still need time to reach a SZ. Planning, Planning, Planning for
#10 ……………………..
Does anyone know if any of the investigations tried to use Cell Phone Triangulation to determine where anyone was? Maybe it would have been too innacurate due to lack of antennas and geography… but worth a try right? And might have cleared some questions up?
Reply to calvin post on December 22, 2014 at 3:09 pm
NOTE: Brought up from a thread down below.
>> calvin said…
>>
>> I think it is a pretty solid guesstimate that when marsh tells abel, at 1550, that
>> he is working his way off the top… that means the drip into the canyon. But that
>> is just my opinion
Very well could be… but that just returns to the ongoing discussion of what REAL ‘evidence’ there is about Marsh being in any particular physical location at ANY time that day.
There is actually some evidence that MIGHT tell us just a little bit more about where Marsh REALLY was just after all the Christoper MacKenzie photos/videos were taken circa 1550 to 1555… and I don’t think this has been talked about much.
It has to do with the TWO ‘different’ times ( in the evidence record ) when Marsh supposedly made TAC channel radio transmissions about exactly WHERE the fireline was.
NOTE: Don’t forget ( I’m sure you haven’t ) that we know for SURE now that the last photo any GM crew person took at that ‘rest spot’ was no later than 1555… so there is now that NINE minute gap between the last known photograph and when the SAIT said they ‘headed south’ ( at 4:04 PM ).
According to the evidence record…
* Marsh made a radio update when the fireline jumped that long line of retardant that ‘Bravo 3’ ( Warbis and Lenmark ) had decided to lay across that ‘bowl’ a few hundred yards NORTH of Brendan’s lookout mound.
* Marsh also made a radio update when the fireline actually ‘crossed by the old-grader location… which was SOUTH of Brendan’s lookout mound.
I think for some time now… we MAY have been just assuming these were one and the same event… but the evidence record says different. It establishes pretty clearly that these were TWO different ‘events’ and TWO different ‘radio broadcasts’ from Marsh.
Neither one of these ‘updates’ tells us EXACTLY where Marsh WAS when he made them… but it’s a given that he MUST have been in a position to SEE both of these ‘events’ at the time he made his radio broadcasts.
I’m afraid this has to be a fairly long post to really show what I mean… and why the SECOND ‘broadcast’ from Marsh MIGHT establish where he was circa 1605, which ( as you will see below ) is pretty much the earliest possible time that the fireline could have “crossed the old-grader” and have been seen/reported by Marsh on the radio.
I’ll try to do this in the ‘SHORT STORY’ and ‘LONG STORY’ format with the latter having all the ‘math’ in it. ( Yes… sorry… there WILL be ‘math’ involved here, ROFL ).
** THE SHORT STORY
The FIRST part of this ‘story’ is the part where SPGS1 Gary Cordes told ADOSH, for sure and certain, that he HEARD an announcement from Eric Marsh at the moment the fireline supposedly “crossed by the old-grader”. Cordes is defintely NOT referring to the earlier (1542 ) announcement from Marsh about the fire crossing the “retardant line”.
Cordes also seems to say that he thought this is where the fire was ‘popping through’ the line work that had been done. He was wrong. It was ‘popping through’ everywhere at that point… but as with most things to do with the Yarnell Fire… it didn’t matter what was REALLY happening as much as what people THOUGHT was ( or was NOT ) happening.
Here is that whole section from his interview… with a ‘breakdown’ following it…
From Gary Cordes’ ADOSH interview…
Q2 = ADOSH / WFA investigator Dave Larsen ( Rest in Peace )
A = SPGS1 Gary Cordes
NOTE: At this point in the interview the ADOSH investigators are still just going over Gary Cordes’ own Unit Log… line by line… and asking him to explain the entries he made.
Notice that even though Cordes says he remembers giving an order to TFLD2(t) Tyson Esquibel to ‘get out’… he was just assuming that all the other crews heard the same thing and he made no attempt to verify that they did. He did not ask for all crews to ‘Copy’ the order.
The NEXT day… he SAYS he found out that they had all “heard the order”… but that was still the NEXT day. At the time he gave the order, he made no attempt to make SURE they had all heard it.
Obviously Cordes’ crew working at the west end of Harper Canyon did NOT hear it… ( nor did the message seem to have been relayed to them from Esquibel ) and that’s why THEY stayed there way too long and almost died that day.
Page 29 of SPGS1 Gary Cordes’ ADOSH interview…
——————————————————————————-
1279 Q2: …1540 Yarnell, Yarnell evacuation trigger point met and you requested that,
1280 so…
1281
1282 A: Right, and Of – Musser showed up and, and met with me where I was parked
1283 on the road, asked me what I thought and I basically said this thing’s gonna
1284 move, it’s moving pretty aggressively towards town. Um, during…
1285
1286 Q2: Okay.
1287
1288 A: …that time, within that time frame, as you drop to the next line, the trigger
1289 point for crew rem- uh, removing the crew was met so I, I got on the, uh, told
1290 the guys to start picking up and, and getting ready to get out of the area.
1291
1292 Q2: Uh, and you told that to your guys?
1293
1294 A: To, Tyson and then of course I’m sure all of our guys were – heard that, I got
1295 feedback from the crews the next days after I debriefed ‘em and they had all
1296 heard that order.
1297
1298 Q2: Blue Ridge, uh, you think, uh, Eric heard that?
1299
1300 A: Um, it’s, it’s a possibility he did. Um, I believe, I’m trying to look at where, I
1301 don’t think I documented hearing, I’m not seeing where I heard Eric. There
1302 was a point where Eric said he was headed to the safety zone, his designated
1303 safety zone and I think that had already occurred, or maybe not, I’m trying to
1304 think here, looking. Yeah, I don’t think I documented that, but um, the – I
1305 know there was some, there was conversation between um, where I was trying
1306 to get a hold of Eric and this is about the time, right about this time, in this
1307 1445 to 50 timeframe is when I was having a radio problem with my King
1308 radio. My transmissions weren’t getting out. I had a problem with my, uh, the
1309 switch to my mike went out and uh, so I had to switch over to a Motorola, it
1310 was a mobile unit mounted in my truck. Um, I lost, because of that, the group
1311 programming that I had I lost air to ground. I had all the other Tacs and the
1312 command channel and I just lost the air to ground frequency. Um, but during
1313 that timeframe when I was having radio problems, I was trying to get a hold of
1314 alpha and ask them, because I had heard that, that the fire had crossed the
1315 dozer line by the grade, by, well by the – it had crossed the dozer line so I
1316 then, I couldn’t get through to Eric direct so I got through to, to Blue Ridge,
1317 asked where, and I heard that uh, Eric announced that it had crossed by the
1318 grater. So that was that area that hadn’t been improved uh, is where it popped
1319 through.
1320
1321 Q2: So that message came from Eric?
1322
1323 A: That came from Eric, I believe, um, or I heard it direct from Eric and, and then
1324 Blue Ridge may have relayed it back to me but I did, I remember hearing it
1325 from, from Eric.
1326
1327 Q2: Okay. Uh, so you’re not sure if he ever heard, if I, if I (unintelligible), you’re
1328 not sure if he ever heard your uh, command for your people to, to pull out?
1329
1330 A: Yeah, I don’t know if he did or not. Uh, I believe my order came um, uh, my,
1331 I, I’m not clear, clear on that so I probably ought to not make that statement.
1332
1333 Q2: Okay. You, you made an announcement that trigger point and, and your, your
1334 calling uh, on your Tactical, telling your people pull out and you’re thinking
1335 your people are uh, strike team of uh, engines?
1336
1337 A: Right. Right, task the task force which had the…
1338
1339 Q2: Task…
1340
1341 A: …tenders were already staged up at the, at the Ranch uh, Restaurant, but that
1342 would be the type 6s that were doing work and then uh, Blue Ridge was aware
1343 of the situation as well.
————————————————————————————
The important part from above is when Cordes is telling ADOSH he heard that Marsh had reported the fire had reached ( “crossed by” ) the old-grader. Cordes has already stated that the ‘timeframe’ he is now talking about here was (quote) “1445 to 50’… but he must have really meant 1545 to 1550.
1312 …Um, but during
1313 that timeframe when I was having radio problems, I was trying to get a hold of
1314 alpha and ask them, because I had heard that, that the fire had crossed the
1315 dozer line by the grade, by, well by the – it had crossed the dozer line so I
1316 then, I couldn’t get through to Eric direct so I got through to, to Blue Ridge,
1317 asked where, and I heard that uh, Eric announced that it had crossed by the
1318 grater. So that was that area that hadn’t been improved uh, is where it popped
1319 through.
So here we have SPGS1 Gary Cordes trying to say that the very MOMENT he heard ( from Eric Marsh ) that the fire had now actually “crossed by the old-grader”… he felt the need to TALK to Marsh… and was immediately trying to contact him DIRECTLY. He says he wasn’t successful at that time… but he WAS able to then contact Blue Ridge and confirm what Marsh had just said about the fire now “crossing by the old-grader”.
So when Cordes heard that ‘news’ that the fire was now “crossing the old-grader”… did Cordes feel the need to talk to Marsh directly just to CONFIRM that piece of news… or was there also something ELSE Cordes wanted to talk to Marsh about at that time?
Cordes didn’t elaborate on that… NOR does he say he ever actually did get in touch with Eric Marsh to TALK about whatever he wanted to TALK to him about at that point.
Could THIS have been the moment ( when the fire had now actually crossed the old-grader ) that Cordes himself now had ‘other ideas’ for additional ‘defensive strategies’ ( like other emergency dozer lines or whatnot ) and Cordes wanted to talk to Marsh about them… or even see if Marsh himself had any ‘last-ditch-effort ideas’ for trying to keep the fire out of town?
NOTE: Even if Cordes really did mean the 1545 to 1550 timeframe in his testimony… he must have been mistaken about the time during his ADOSH interview.
We can see for ourselves in all the Christopher MacKenzie photos and videos that the fire had NOT even reached Brendan’s lookout mound as late as 1555, much less the dozer line or the old-grader.
The IMPORTANT thing, however, is that Cordes does seem to be absolutely sure that he heard ( at some point ) that Eric Marsh had ‘announced’ that the fire had (quote) “crossed by the grater”… and that this was some time AFTER Marsh had also made a previous ‘announcement’ about the fire crossing the “retardant line”.
So let’s assume that is TRUE. That Eric Marsh did make this ‘announcement’ over the radio just after the fire actually “crossed by” the old-grader.
The FIRST question is WHEN did that REALLY happen?
The SECOND question would be… does this give us a better indication WHERE Eric had to actually BE when that happened… in order for him to SEE that (clearly) and then ANNOUNCE it over the radio?
The THIRD question would be… once it was now common knowldeged that the fire had, in fact, “crossed by the old-grader”… was THIS now the moment where there might have been ideas and/or conversations being exchanged about ‘last-ditch efforts’ to try and keep the fire out of town such as other ’emergency’ dozer lines somewhere?
Gary Cordes DID testify that the moment he ‘heard this news’ he tried several times to contact Marsh DIRECTLY to TALK to him about ?? ( something? ).
As ( I hope ) becomes clear below… ALL of these ‘moments’ were actually coming together right in the following KNOWN timeframe…
1555 – Granite Mountain is ‘tools up’, at rest in safe black, just taking pictures.
1600-1605 – FOUR things (apparently) happen in this timeframe…
1) Fireline actually reaches/crosses the old-grader location.
2) Marsh reports ( to Cordes ) that the fireline has “crossed by” the old-grader
3) SPGS1 Gary Cordes tells Cory Ball to scout new dozer line near BSR.
4) GM is suddenly UP and hiking SOUTH to the BSR.
Since we don’t have any actual radio capture of this (supposed) ‘announcement’ from Marsh at the moment the fire had “crossed by the old-grader”… we have to rely on other evidence for when that actually happened.
For that we have…
1) The SAIT’s own ‘official’ fire progression charts ( also used by ADOSH ).
2) The Robert Caldwell video.
3) Wade Parker’s photo that he texted to his mother.
4) The Christopher MacKenzie cellphone and Canon photos/videos.
Unfortunately… the SAIT ‘fire progession charts’ seem to be wildly WRONG as far as figuring this out. They have NEVER really matched the (better) photographic evidence recovered from some of Granite Mountain’s crew.
According to calculations ( see THE LONG STORY below ) based on the SAIT’s fire progression charts for this timeframe… their ‘charts’ show that the fire didn’t actually “cross over” the old-grader until 1620 ( 4:20 PM ) that day.
That differs wildly from the calculations based on Grainte Mountain’s own photographic evidence from up on the western ridge. Those calculations ( based on the entire range of photos and videos they took ) put the fire actually “crossing over” the old-grader location somewhere between 4:02 and 4:05 PM.
That is a full 15 minutes earlier than the official SAIT ‘fire progression’ charts.
So let’s say that the TIME based on actual photographic evidence is correct.
That means that between 4:02 and 4:05 PM… Eric Marsh still had to be in a position somewhere up on that ridge to be able to SEE that event clearly and then ‘announce’ it over the radio.
Yes… Marsh could have STILL been already hiking SOUTH ahead of the men even by 4:00 PM… and he could have been ‘looking back north’ and seen the fireline crossing the old-grader ( and then informing Cordes ) circa 4:02 to 4:05 PM… but I doubt it.
To me… the more LIKELY scenario is that when Marsh told Abel he was ‘making his way off the top’ at 1550… what Marsh meant THEN is that he was, in fact, working his way ‘off the top’ of the Weaver Mountains themselves where he had been observing the fire go through the retardant line… and he was now making his way back SOUTH to where Steed and the Crew were AND to the point where he had thought Frisby was headed for his requested face-to-face.
So Marsh ARRIVED at where Steed and the men were… but was then continuing the ‘discussing their options’ conversation(s) with Steed face-to-face instead of over the GM intra-net radio channel as we hear him doing in the MacKenzie videos.
When the fire did, in fact, then “cross by” the old-grader… Marsh could, of course, SEE that clearly from there where everyone else was… and he reported this event to Cordes over the radio.
What happened then would still be a ‘mystery’… but it SEEMS as if the fire “crossing by” the old-grader and Cordes then thinking that is where the fire was “popping through” the line work might have then CAUSED the following two events…
1) Cordes suddenly tells Ball to ‘scout dozer line’ SW of Yarnell near BSR.
2) Granite Mountain suddenly ‘gaggles up’ and heads south towards the BSR.
** THE LONG STORY
In addition to the part of Cordes’ ADOSH interview above where he said he heard Eric Marsh report that the fire had “crossed by the old grader”… the ADOSH investigators RETURNED to this a little later in the interview.
We then got the following testimony from Cordes.
THIS time… first he says (unequivocably) that Eric Marsh had let HIM know (directly) that the fire had (quote) “crossed the dozer line, uh, by the grater”.
Cordes said…
“…I’m not really sure, um, when that actually happened and how that correlated with HIM (Eric Marsh) letting ME know that it had crossed the dozer line, uh, by the grater.”
Then, when ADOSH investigator Q1 Barry Hicks was trying to nail him down on this… Cordes then ‘backpedaled’ and then started saying he did NOT hear it from Marsh directly… but that he *might* have overheard Marsh saying it to ‘Blue Ridge’.
Cordes then said…
——————————————————————————
1486 Q1: And, and he told air attack that it had crossed the dozer line as well?
1487
1488 A: He, uh that, that transmission, I believe, came, I was trying to get that
1489 information and, and I believe I heard it direct from Eric. I was unable to hook
1490 up with him and I was, and I was communicating through Blue Ridge trying
1491 to get that information from Blue Ridge and then I heard it, when he was
1492 answering Blue Ridge, I heard it direct from…
1493
1494 Q1: (Unintelligible)
1495
1496 A: …from Eric. Right. That it has crossed by the grater.
———————————————————————————–
For the sake of completeness… here is that entire section from Cordes’ ADOSH interview where Barry Hicks wanted to REVISIT Cordes’ “Marsh told me it had crossed by the old grader” testimony and also try to distinguish what Cordes was saying Marsh told HIM and what Marsh told ‘Air Attack’.
Page 33 of Gary Cordes’ ADOSH interview…
Q1 = ADOSH investigator Barry Hicks
A = SPGS1 Gary Cordes
———————————————————————————————-
1446 Q1: Hey Gary, could we back up just a minute to…
1447
1448 A: Sure.
1449
1450 Q1: …you said you were having some radio trouble and, and at some point you
1451 lost your air to ground, prior, prior to losing your air to ground, were you able
1452 to hear air Tac and, and uh, if so, what were you hearing from air Tac?
1453
1454 A: Yeah, what I had actually heard, and that’s what I was touching on a little bit
1455 earlier, but I didn’t wanna get too, too far into it, ‘cause I’m not sure of the
1456 timeframe and what had actually occurred, but I did hear Eric say that he was,
1457 he was headed to his pre-designated safety zone. And, and so my assumption
1458 was that he was headed to the um, to the Boulder Springs Ranch.
1459
1460 Q1: So that was your assumption is that he was going to the Boulder Springs
1461 Ranch and not the black, is that right?
1462
1463 A: Yeah, exactly.
1464
1465 Q1: Um, okay.
1466
1467 A: And I was…
1468
1469 Q1: But you don’t know what that time frame might’ve been or…
1470
1471 A: No, that’s what I was trying, that’s what I was trying to fi – you know, jumble
1472 that in to what I had here and I’m not really sure, um, when that actually
1473 happened and how that correlated with him letting me know that it had
1474 crossed the dozer line, uh, by the grater. So I’m not sure which came first.
1475
1476 Q1: Okay, so then somewhere in there he, and he actually called you rather than
1477 somebody else…
1478
1479 A: No, he did not call me, he, he made the announcement to air attack on air to
1480 ground.
1481
1482 Q1: Oh.
1483
1484 A: That, that he was going to the pre-designated safety zone.
1485
1486 Q1: And, and he told air attack that it had crossed the dozer line as well?
1487
1488 A: He, uh that, that transmission, I believe, came, I was trying to get that
1489 information and, and I believe I heard it direct from Eric. I was unable to hook
1490 up with him and I was, and I was communicating through Blue Ridge trying
1491 to get that information from Blue Ridge and then I heard it, when he was
1492 answering Blue Ridge, I heard it direct from…
1493
1494 Q1: (Unintelligible)
1495
1496 A: …from Eric. Right. That it has crossed by the grater.
1497
1498 Q1: Uh, he tells air attack that he’s going to his designated, pre-designated safety
1499 zone…
1500
1501 A: Right.
1502
1503 Q1: …and he doesn’t say where that is, he just says, safety zone?
1504
1505 A: Right.
1506
1507 Q1: And so your assumption is…
1508
1509 A: He had plenty of time to get there and, and he was headed to the Boulder
1510 Springs Ranch.
1511
1512 Q1: Okay.
1513
1514 Q2: Did he say that on air attack, air to ground, the air attack…
1515
1516 A: I’m sorry, air to ground, he said it to air attack, yes.
—————————————————————————————-
Bottom line here is that TWICE during his ADOSH interview… SPGS1 Gary Cordes said that Eric Marsh definitely made this specific ‘announcement’ over the radio about the fire having just “crossed by the old-grader”. The only thing he was ‘waffling’ on was whether that was something Marsh was telling HIM directly… or whether he just happened to overhear Marsh saying it to someone in Blue Ridge.
**
** SO WHEN DID THE FIRELINE ACTUALLY ‘CROSS BY’ THE OLD-GRADER?
**
** ACCORDING TO SAIT FIRE PROGRESSION CHARTS…
In the SAIT’s official 1615 ( 4:15 PM ) ‘fire progression chart’… they have the fireline heading due SOUTH but only crossing BETWEEN Brendan’s McDonough’s lookout mound and the ‘old-grader’ location. In other words… the SAIT believed that at 1615 the fire had already crossed OVER the peak of Brendan’s lookout mound but had not YET made it to the old-grader location.
To be precise… the SAIT’s 1615 fireline estimate shows the fire as being…
127 feet / 42.2 yards due SOUTH of the peak of the lookout mound.but still…
354 feet / 118 yards due NORTH of the actual old-grader location.
They also show the fireline ONLY having crossed just a small portion of the entire east-west dozer line from the old-grader all the way back to where that east-west two-track that had been ‘improved’ with the dozer actually meets the Sesame area where all the buggies had been ‘staged’ that day.
In the SAIT’s official 1630 ( 4:30 PM ) ‘fire progression chart’… they have the fireline now exactly 707 feet / 236 yards due SOUTH of the old-grader location.
So in a LINE that extends DUE SOUTH from where the SAIT has the fireline at 1615 to where they have it 15 minutes later at 1630 and which passes directly OVER the old-grader location… that ‘line’ totals 1,061 feet / 353.6 yards.
That means the SAIT believes that between 4:15 and 4:30 PM the fire was traveling due south at an average rate of 0.822 mph ( 70.59 feet per minute and/or 1.17 feet per second ).
So given that average ‘due-south speed’ over that distance and that 15 minute time period… since they had the fireline as being still 354 feet NORTH of the old-grader at 4:15… it would have taken the fire another 302.56 seconds ( 5 minutes and 2.56 seconds ) to cover that final 354 feet and actually reach the exact old-grader location.
That means ( according to SAIT fireline charts )… the fire didn’t actually REACH the old-grader location until 1620 ( 4:20 PM ).
That matches exactly the time the SAIT says Granite Mountain reached the ‘descent point’ and were about to leave the two-track and drop into the box canyon.
** ACCORDING TO GRANITE MOUNTAIN PHOTOS / VIDEOS.
The BEST earliest view of the ‘fireline’ ( circa 1545 and beyone ) in any photo or video taken by Granite Mountain crew members that day while they were assembled at that final ‘rest’ location is Christopher MacKenzie’s cellphone photo IMG_2736. It shows clearly where the fireline was at 3:51:58 PM in relation to the lookout mound and the old-grader BEST FIRST: MacKenzie cellphone IMG_2736 taken at 3:51:58 PM.
The LAST view of the ‘fireline’ ( circa 1555 ) in any STILL photo taken by Granite Mountain crew members that day while they were assembled at that final ‘rest’ location is Christopher MacKenzie’s cellphone photo IMG_2738 which was taken at exactly 3:55:31 PM. It was a view looking back towards Yarnell so the LAST photo taken that shows us the fireline in its relation to the old-grader is MacKenzie cellphone photo IMG_2737 taken just 11 seconds earlier at 3:55:20 PM.
So if we compare the fireline progression out there near the lookout mound and the old-grader location in both the very FIRST glimpse we have of it from Granite Mountain’s rest location to the very LAST glimpse we have from there… we get the following…
FIRST VIEW OF FIRELINE: MacKenzie cellphone IMG_2733 taken at 3:49:59 PM.
LAST VIEW OF FIRELINE: MacKenzie cellphone photo IMG_2737 taken at 3:55:20 PM.
That’s a time difference of 5 minutes and 21 seconds between IMG_2733 and IMG_2737.
* IMG_2733 – 3:49:59 PM
Fireline is approximately 1,105 feet / 368 yards due north of old-grader
Fireline is approximately 637 feet / 212 yards due north of top of lookout mound
Fireline is approximately 383 feet / 128 yards north of where it will be in IMG_2737
* IMG_2737 – 3:55:20 PM ( +5 minutes 21 seconds )
Fireline is now approximately 703 feet / 234 yards due north of old-grader
Fireline is now approximately 249 feet / 83 yards due north of top of lookout mound
Fireline is now approximately 383 feet / 128 yards south of where it was in IMG_2733
So in 5 minutes and 21 seconds… the fire has traveled 383 ( to 404 ) feet further south.
That means its travel rate for those 5 minutes and 21 seconds was…
0.8156 mph
1.3126 kmh
0.3646 meters/sec
71.7756 feet/minute
1.19 feet/second
If the fire was still 703 feet due north of the old-grader at 3:55:20 PM and it continued to travel at approximately 1.19 feet per second, then it was going to take another 590 seconds ( 9 minutes and 50 seconds ) to reach the old-grader location.
That would put the fire reaching the old-grader at approximately 4:05:10 PM.
4:05 PM is the time the SAIT estimated that the men left the rest spot and began hiking south towards the Boulder Springs Ranch. ( One minute after Wade Parker texted his photo to his mother at 4:04 PM ).
** THIS WAS NOT THE ‘RETARDANT LINE’ TRANSMISSION
Just to be clear… NONE of what is being discussed above about Eric Marsh ‘announcing’ that the fire had “crossed by the old-grader” can ( or should ) be confused with Marsh’s known PRIOR announcement about the fire blowing through that long ‘retardant line’ that ‘Bravo 3’ ( Warbis and Lenmark ) had chosen to lay down across the open fuel to the north of Brendan’s lookout mound.
That happened EARLIER than these other reports about Marsh saying the fire had “crossed by the old-grader”.
Eric Marsh made that PREVIOUS announcement about the fire blowing through the ‘retardant line’ at exactly 1542 ( 3:42 PM ) that day… and that ‘announcement’ from Marsh WAS captured over the radio by one of the Panebaker Air-Study videos.
————————————————————————————–
PANEBAKER VIDEO 154232 STARTS AT 1542.08 ( 3:42.08 PM )
+0:00 ( 1542.08 / 3:42.08 PM )
(Eric Marsh?): …towards the structures… uh… (pause) southern… uh… (pause) into Yarnell.
+0:02: ( 1542.10 / 3:42.10 PM )
(Foreground person 1): (It) burned through the retardant line!
(Foreground person 2 – Eric Panebaker): Um-hmm.
NOTE: As soon as Marsh finished answering whoever he was talking to… OPS2 Paul Musser calls him directly…
+0:06 ( 1542.14 – 3:42.14 PM )
(Paul Musser): Division Alpha, Operations Musser.
NOTE: Silence for a moment, then someone comes on and appears to simply say “Thank you” to (Marsh?) for his previous report a few seconds ago about what the fire is now doing ‘down south’ and how it is now moving “…towards the structures… southern… into Yarnell”.
+0:13 ( 1542.21 / 3:42.21 PM )
(Unknown): Thank you.
NOTE: We NOW hear the two fellas in the foreground (nervously) joking about where they ‘document’ this ‘piece of news’ that the fire has ‘burned through the retardant line’ and is now ‘heading SOUTH… into the Yarnell structures’…
+0:16 ( 1542.24 / 3:42.24 PM )
(Foreground person 1): Where do we document that at?
(Foreground person 2 – Eric Panebaker): ( Laughs ) Somewhere in the notes?
(Foreground person 1): Which draft?
(Foreground person 2 – Eric Panebaker): ( Laughs again ).
NOTE: There is no other background traffic in the remaining seconds. ‘Division Alpha’ Eric Marsh does NOT respond to ‘OPS2′ Paul Musser by the time the video ends at 1542.32
PANEBAKER VIDEO 154232 ENDS AT 1542.32 ( 3:42.32 PM )
__________________________________________________________________
**
** YARNELL MEMORIAL COMMITTEE NOW HAS A WEBSITE
This ‘Yarnell Hill Memorial Committee’ that was created by the Arizona State Legislature ( AZ House Bill 2624 ) to oversee the expenditure of State funds to create a memorial for the Granite Mountain Hotshots now has its own website…
http://www.yarnellhillmemorialfund.org/home.html
However… they are being a little schizophrenic about what they are calling themselves.
The title banner of the page matches the domain name they are operating under of “Yarnell Hill Memorial Fund”… but the splash screen on the home page just says “Yarnell Hill Memorial Site” and the text on the Home page says “Yarnell Hill Memorial Site Board”.
There has only been one meeting of this ‘committee’ so far ( on November 24, 2014, in the Prescott City Council Chambers ) and the SECOND meeting was scheduled for sometime in December… but a press release from this committee on December 11 now says the next meeting won’t be until January 6, 2014.
This SECOND meeting will also be in the Prescott City Council Chambers. The Prescott City Council Chamber meeting schedule is NOT showing ANY of these meetings ( past or future ) so I guess this website is the only place they will be announced beforehand.
The BOTTOM of their Home page says…
“You will find calendars of meetings, agendas, minutes and other information on this site. We encourage you communicate with us if you have questions.”
…but there are no LINKS (there) to any of this information.
Under the “WHAT WE DO” Tab… there is a ‘PRESS’ section and there is a link there about the previous meeting on November 24, 2014… but there are still no links there to any MINUTES from this previous meeting almost a month ago.
There is also a new press release announcing the NEXT meeting ( on January 6, 2015 )…
PRESS RELEASES
12-11-2014 – Yarnell Hill Memorial Site Board Meets in Prescott on January 6
Read the press release here
That December 11, 2014 press release says…
—————————————————————————-
ARIZONA STATE PARKS
For Immediate Release
Managing and conserving Arizona’s natural, cultural and recreational resources for the benefit of the people, both in our Parks and through our Partners.
CONTACT: Ellen Bilbrey at (602) 542-1996 or (602) 228-8518 or Monica Enriquez at
(602) 542-6997 or email pio (at) azstateparks.gov
Yarnell Hill Memorial Site Board Meets in Prescott on January 6
(Phoenix, AZ – December 11, 2014) – The Yarnell Hill Memorial Site Board’s next
meeting will be on Tuesday, January 6, 2015 at 3 p.m. It will be held at the Yavapai
County Supervisor’s Office located in the County Administration Building at 1015 Fair
Street in Prescott. The public is invited and the agenda for this meeting will be posted at
azstateparks (dot) com/committees/Yarnell.html.
The Arizona Legislature passed House Bill 2624, the Yarnell Hill Memorial Site Board,
and signed by Governor Jan Brewer. The bill set aside $500,000 for the purchase of State
Trust Land at the deployment site in Yarnell. The land would be designated for a
memorial for the 19 Granite Mountain Hotshots who died in the Yarnell Hill Fire on June
30, 2013.
—————————————————————————-
While there are still no published MINUTES from that first ( PUBLIC ) meeting of this committee, there is now (finally) at least a published AGENDA of what they were SUPPOSED to discuss during that very first meeting back on November 24, 2014.
From the published agenda for that November 24, 2014 meeting…
——————————————————————————–
AGENDA
(Agenda items may be taken in any order unless set for a time certain)
A. CALL TO ORDER – Roll Call
B. PLEDGE OF ALLEGIANCE
C. INTRODUCTIONS OF BOARD MEMBERS
D. DISCUSSION ITEMS
1. Discuss Compensation of the Yarnell Hill Memorial Site Board Members.
2. Discuss the Yarnell Hill Memorial Site Board delegated authority.
i) Establishing a memorial dedicated to the fallen members of the Granite
Mountain Hotshot Crew at the location where they lost their lives
ii) Purchase of land by Arizona State Parks Board, or private entity, for the
purpose of establishing a memorial site
iii) Location and access of site
iv) Design and construction of memorial
3. Discuss the Yarnell Hill Memorial Fund.
4. Discuss the Yarnell Hill Memorial Site Board Reporting Requirement.
5. Discussion of the Flagpole Currently Erected on the Site.
E. CALL TO THE PUBLIC – Those wishing to address the Committee must state their
name for the record and be recognized by the Chair. Presentation time may be
limited to three minutes at the discretion of the Chair; the Chair may limit a
presentation to one person per organization.
——————————————————————————–
So according to the AGENDA for that first meeting… the very first thing they were going to talk about is what everyone is getting PAID ( or not )… and then they WERE supposed to discuss the most pressing issue of whether or not that small group of widows will or will not be able to purchase the actual deployment site land themselves, instead of the State of Arizona.
None of the media reports about this first meeting said much about this… or whether they actually decided anything… and since there are still no MINUTES available ( almost a month later ) from this meeting we still don’t know if they even bothered to discuss this at that first meeting.
There is also now a PUBLIC copy of a ‘Notice of Executive Session’ associated with that first meeting of the board, as required by Law.
Just like ADOSH… a State sponsored Committee like this can CHOOSE to go into ‘Executive Session’ for any number of reasons and that part of the ‘meeting’ is then NOT open to the public.
The very FIRST thing this ‘Yarnell Memorial Committee’ did at 3:00 PM on November 24, 2014, was to go into ‘Executive Session’ and the very first thing they were going to talk about in that ‘private’ session was, apparently, whether or not they even had to make ANY of their own meetings open to the public as per Arizona’s ‘Open Meeting’ laws.
The way the ‘Executive Session’ thing works is that a committee can decide to ‘go private’…. but you still have to publicly state WHY you are doing that and WHY that part of the ‘public’ meeting is not ‘open to the public’.
————————————————————————————————-
NOTICE OF PUBLIC MEETING OF THE
YARNELL HILL MEMORIAL SITE BOARD
Notice is hereby given to Members of the Yarnell Hill Memorial Site Board (Board) and the general public that there will be an Executive Session, to begin on Monday, November 24, 2014 at 3:00 PM pursuant to A.R.S. §38-431.03 (A) (3) at the Prescott City Council Chambers located at 201 South Cortez Street.
AGENDA
(Agenda items may be taken in any order unless set for a time certain)
A. EXECUTIVE SESSION – Upon a public majority vote, the Board may hold an
Executive Session pursuant to A.R.S. §38-431.03(A)(3)that is not open to the public
for the following purposes:
1. Obtain legal advice on the application of Open Meeting Law.
2. Obtain legal advice on the authority of the Yarnell Hill Memorial Site Board
———————————————————————————————
Apparently the ‘results’ of this very first ‘Executive Session’ were that this committee MUST abide by all the rules of ‘Arizona Open Meetings’ laws since they have now issued a press release for the SECOND meeting and it still says the public is invited to attend.
About the only other thing on this new ‘website’ is just another list of the members of
this committee… which is as follows…
——————————————————————————–
The members of the Memorial Site Committee include:
Bryan Martyn, Executive Director of Arizona State Parks (Chairman)
Representative Karen Fann – (R) AZ
Senator Steve Pierce – (R) AZ
John Flynn – Public Safety non-profit representative
Chief Dan Fraijo – Public Firefighters representative
Glen Hopkinson – Arts community representative
Scott Hunt, State Forester
Mayor Marlin Kuykendall, Prescott
Amanda Marsh – Relative of fallen Hotshot
Brendan McDonough – Surviving Hotshot crewmember
Lenora Nelson – Yavapai County Resident
Chief Ben Palm – Yarnell Fire District
Supervisor Rowle Simmons, Yavapai County Resident
Chuck Tidey, Yarnell Chamber of Commerce
Chief Darrell Willis – Prescott Fire Department
———————————————————————————-
Correction for above…
The upcoming January 6, 2015 meeting of the Memorial Board will be in Prescott… but NOT in the Prescott City Council Chambers like the first meeting.
It will be held at the Yavapai County Supervisor’s Office located in the County Administration Building at 1015 Fair Street in Prescott.
https://www.dropbox.com/s/kxif2ti5cm5ifa5/100_0238%282%29.JPG?dl=0
Marti Reed
this is the exact spot the burnt roll was found with John MacLean by Sonny
can the photo be gps coded?
Joy… way back in basicially the first chapter of this ongoing discussion Tex (Sonny) Gilligan posted about finding that roll of pink flagging/tape and he also supplied GPS coordinates at that time. Those coordinates do, in fact, match the point up on the two-track that even the SAIT investigators were calling the ‘Descent Point’.
We’ve been assuming ever since that those GPS coordinates are correct.
Is there some doubt about that, now?
Here is when Sonny first reported the GPS coordinates for where the burned up roll of pink flagging/tape was found…
>> On November 27, 2013 at 1:53 pm, Tex (Sonny) Gilligan
>>
>> On November 11 we hiked with John McCain author of Esperanza Fire.
>> I noticed a small round object that appeared to be a meteorite at first.
>> It turned out to be the cooked remnants of the pink tape the Hot Shots
>> were using to mark their trail. Apparantly it was what was left of a small
>> roll of tape thrown down on the jeep trail just above where they
>> descended down into the bowl. Joy recorded the coordinates, informed
>> OSHA of the location and we left the evidence there in a rock pile so
>> it could be found. So either Eric Marsh stood at that very point or one
>> of the other Hot Shot Crew. I would think it came from Marsh since he
>> was busy marking trails all the way up and this would seem to fit considering
>> how much would have been left to melt into that small round ball about 3/4 inch
>> diameter. Photos can be seen on Joy’s private website and the coordinates
>> are 5510ft elevation N34*13.290W112*46.931. Anyone interested can google
>> earth that one and know now exactly where at least one of the Hot Shots were
>> immediately before the descend into that trap below.
>> On November 27, 2013 at 3:51 pm, WantsToKnowTheTruth ( WTKTT ) replied…
>>
>> Mr. Gilligan… THANK YOU!
>>
>> It might not seem like much to some people… but over here
>> on this forum we are taking the ‘no detail is too small’ approach
>> to trying to figure out exactly what happened that day.
>>
>> I believe this information is VERY important
>>
>> It might help determine whether Eric Marsh was really out AHEAD of
>> that crew, or not, and whether it was Eric Marsh ( alone ) who made
>> the decision that Steed and the rest of the crew should drop into
>> that box canyon.
>>
>> The GPS coordinates you have provided are also an EXACT
>> match for the point where the SAIR report says Granite
>> Mountain left the high ridge two-track road and began their
>> descent into the fuel-filled box canyon.
>>
>> By the way… here are the actual DECIMAL values
>> for the GPS coordinates supplied by Mr. Gilligan for
>> where he found the burned roll of tape…
>>
>> Latitude: 34.2215
>> Longitude: -112.78218
34.2215, -112.78218
>> Just cut-and-paste the line above with the comma between
>> the decimal latitude/longitude values into the search bar
>> of Google Maps, hit RETURN, and the exact location
>> will appear. A GREEN ARROW will be pointing to this
>> exact point on the high ridge road.
Joy… way back in basically the first chapter of this ongoing discussion Tex (Sonny) Gilligan posted about finding that roll of pink flagging/tape and he also supplied GPS coordinates at that time. Those coordinates do, in fact, match the point up on the two-track that even the SAIT investigators were calling the ‘Descent Point’.
We’ve been assuming ever since that those GPS coordinates are correct.
Is there some doubt about that, now?
Here is when Sonny first reported the GPS coordinates for where the burned up roll of pink flagging/tape was found…
>> On November 27, 2013 at 1:53 pm, Tex (Sonny) Gilligan
>>
>> On November 11 we hiked with John McCain author of Esperanza Fire.
>> I noticed a small round object that appeared to be a meteorite at first.
>> It turned out to be the cooked remnants of the pink tape the Hot Shots
>> were using to mark their trail. Apparantly it was what was left of a small
>> roll of tape thrown down on the jeep trail just above where they
>> descended down into the bowl. Joy recorded the coordinates, informed
>> OSHA of the location and we left the evidence there in a rock pile so
>> it could be found. So either Eric Marsh stood at that very point or one
>> of the other Hot Shot Crew. I would think it came from Marsh since he
>> was busy marking trails all the way up and this would seem to fit considering
>> how much would have been left to melt into that small round ball about 3/4 inch
>> diameter. Photos can be seen on Joy’s private website and the coordinates
>> are 5510ft elevation N34*13.290W112*46.931. Anyone interested can google
>> earth that one and know now exactly where at least one of the Hot Shots were
>> immediately before the descend into that trap below.
>> On November 27, 2013 at 3:51 pm, WantsToKnowTheTruth ( WTKTT ) replied…
>>
>> Mr. Gilligan… THANK YOU!
>>
>> It might not seem like much to some people… but over here
>> on this forum we are taking the ‘no detail is too small’ approach
>> to trying to figure out exactly what happened that day.
>>
>> I believe this information is VERY important
>>
>> It might help determine whether Eric Marsh was really out AHEAD of
>> that crew, or not, and whether it was Eric Marsh ( alone ) who made
>> the decision that Steed and the rest of the crew should drop into
>> that box canyon.
>>
>> The GPS coordinates you have provided are also an EXACT
>> match for the point where the SAIR report says Granite
>> Mountain left the high ridge two-track road and began their
>> descent into the fuel-filled box canyon.
>>
>> By the way… here are the actual DECIMAL values
>> for the GPS coordinates supplied by Mr. Gilligan for
>> where he found the burned roll of tape…
>>
>> Latitude: 34.2215
>> Longitude: -112.78218
34.2215, -112.78218
>> Just cut-and-paste the line above with the comma between
>> the decimal latitude/longitude values into the search bar
>> of Google Maps, hit RETURN, and the exact location
>> will appear. A GREEN ARROW will be pointing to this
>> exact point on the high ridge road.
**
** CROSSFADE FROM BLUE RIDGE HOTSHOT WARDEMUPS IMG_3957
** TO JOY COLLURA’S PHOTO TAKEN LATER FROM SAME LOCATION
This is actually a quick ‘followup’ to an exchange from the other day…
>> Marti said…
>>
>> When I looked, in Google Earth, at the evidence of the “path” of
>> what burned, it really looks to me like the fire came down into
>> Glen Ilah from the northeast. Which actually fits how the fire was
>> actually burning.
>>
>> WTKTT responded…
>>
>> Those two Blue Ridge Hotshot Wardemups photos that he took
>> at exactly 4:35 PM from the passenger seat of one of the BR
>> Carriers as it was pulling into the Ranch House Restaurant have
>> always proved that. The ‘column’ seen in those photos is, in fact,
>> pushing into Glen Ilah from that NORTHEAST direction, at that point.
>>
>> ** Blue Ridge Hotshot Wardemups’ IMG_3957 and IMG_3958
>>
>> Both were taken out passenger side of Blue Ridge Crew Carrier
>> at 4:35 PM looking WEST out towards deployment site from a point on
>> Highway 89 just before Carrier was about to pull into the Ranch
>> House Restaurant.
>>
>> The exact point where Waredemups IMG_3957 was taken is
>> 34.213872, -112.755529
>>
>> One of those is also the one that got ‘annotated’ by someone and
>> has the little YELLOW circle drawn on it which is approximating
>> where the deployment site was out there in the distance.
There were MANY ‘strange coincidences’ that day in Yarnell… and one of them has always been the fact that not long after Blue Ridge Hotshot Wardemups took his IMG_3957… Joy Collura took an identical photograph looking in the exact same direction and at the EXACT same point on Highway 89.
And I mean EXACT.
Joy’s shutter basically ‘clicked’ at the EXACT same point on the asphalt of Highway 89 that Wardemups did.
Unbeknownst to either of them as they took these separate photos… the CENTER ot BOTH Wardemups and Joy Collura’s photos also happened to be focused on the exact same point in the distance… which was the area of the deployment itself.
The following is a CROSSFADE between these two photographs that shows how ‘uncanny’ it was that two different people would take basically the SAME photograph from the EXACT same spot… separated only by maybe a dozen minutes.
In Wardemups’ photo… the TIME is 4:35 and the fire is entering Glen Ilah.
In Joy Collura’s photo… exact TIME is unknown but fire has engulfed Glen Ilah.
The CENTER of each photo ( indicated with that YELLOW CIRCLE annotation that was actually added to Wardemups’ photo by the SAIT investigators ) is actually focused on the place in the distance where the deployment took place.
In the following PUBLIC YouTube video… Wardemups IMG_3957 is shown first… and then the video slowly CROSSFADES into Joy’s Collura’s photo.
The CROSSFADE repeats TWICE in this video…
http://youtu.be/6XRDeeq832M
Here is the ABOUT information for this YouTube video…
————————————————————————–
This is a CROSSFADE between Blue Ridge Hotshot Wardemups IMG_3957 taken at exactly 4:35:06 PM from the passenger side of one of the Blue Ridge Crew Carriers as it was about to pull into the parking lot of the Ranch House Restaurant… and a photo taken by Joy Collura from the EXACT same location not long after Wardemups took his photo. These two photos shows the dramatic progression of the fire into the Glen Ilah area. The YELLOW CIRCLE was added by SAIT investigators and does, in fact, show the general location in the distance of the deployment site area. The CROSSFADE will repeat TWICE.
————————————————————————–
Followup…
The CROSSFADE just posted above is really just one more example of how EVERY photograph that was taken that day ( by ANYONE ) could be very important.
Someone might not even think a photograph they have is, in and of itself, important… but it actually MIGHT end up matching OTHER photographs as to either TIME or LOCATION ( or both )… and then taken together with OTHER photographs… ends up telling ‘more of the story’.
THANK YOU to Joy Collura for ALL the photographs she took that day and her willingness to share them. They have ALWAYS been helping to ‘tell the story’.
oh and you are welcome. My pleasure to help piece this together-
pretty neat. I will ask Penny because she was on the phone when I took the photo and if she can look at phone record for that month we may be able to narrow down the time on it. Poor Fred Brown’s house in photo. They never rebuilt his home. He lives behind McDonald’s in Wickenburg and goes to church at the Assembly of God every Sunday and just seems fair that an intelligent deaf man- Fred Brown- has no home yet still…many elderly folks do not — never seen assistance or a dime some of them— very sad.
I agree everyone’s photos are important!
unfair not fair
typo
Reply to joy post on December 21, 2014 at 1:22 am
>> joy said…
>>
>> I will ask Penny because she was on the phone when I took
>> the photo and if she can look at phone record for that month
>> we may be able to narrow down the time on it.
I would say it had to be no more than 20 or 25 minutes after Blue Ridge Hotshot Wardemups took his photo at 4:35 PM… so right around 5:00 PM, maybe?
It COULD have been no more than a dozen to 15 minutes after Wardemups’ photo.
>> joy also said…
>>
>> Poor Fred Brown’s house in photo. They never rebuilt his home.
>> He lives behind McDonald’s in Wickenburg and goes to church at the
>> Assembly of God every Sunday and just seems unfair that an intelligent
>> deaf man- Fred Brown- has no home yet still…many elderly folks
>> do not — never seen assistance or a dime some of them— very sad.
Sadder still is that if you are talking about that small blue house with the green roof that is in the foreground… that is one of the houses that burned to the ground right there across from the Ranch House Restaurant parking lot while it was stilled filled with dozens of firefighters and multiple Type 6 Engines.
It’s one of the house right there across the street that they all just stood around and let it burn and did NOTHING.
The Yarnell Hill Memorial site actually has a picture of this house after it has burned to the ground. In the picture below… you can see how close all the firefighters were to it and still they did NOTHING.
In the photo below… the Ranch House Restaurant is just to the LEFT of where this picture was taken…
http://www.yarnellaz.com/yarnell_hill_fire/image2.html
Followup…
Here is another photo of that small blue house with the green roof taken AS it was burning to the ground.
The photo is one of many that were taken by Associated Press photographer David Kadlubowski.
David Kadlubowski took all those ‘now famous’ photos of the “Welcome to Yarnell” sign there on the north edge of the Ranch House Restaurant parking lot showing the sign and structures burning all around in the background.
THIS one shows houses burning just across the street from the Ranch House Restaurant. The small blue house with the green roof can actually be seen burning BEHIND the “Welcome to Yarnell” sign itself.
At the time this photo was taken… there were still lots of firefighters standing right there in the Ranch House Restaurant parking lot and the Sun City West Type 6 Engine was at least one of the Engines that was also still there.
They were doing NOTHING about any of the structures that were burning even just a few hundred feet away from the parking lot.
The photo is at the top of this article. Just click the photo for the LARGER version…
http://sedonaeye.com/give-online-to-yarnell-fire-disaster-relief-fund
OR… here is DIRECT link to the photo.
Again… the blue house with the green roof can be seen burning directly BEHIND the “Welcome to Yarnell” sign…
http://sedonaeye.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/yarnell-fire-3.jpg
The following online article contains the same photo above showing the house(s) burning… but it ALSO contains a photo taken just before that showing just some of the Firefighters and Engines that were sitting right there in the parking lot of the Ranch House Restaurant as the houses just across the street caught fire and burned.
The SECOND photo down shows the parking lot. The Engine sitting there is the Sun Cit West Type 6 Engine.
The THIRD photo down is the same David Kadlubowski.photo linked to above showing the burning houses across the street.
The Guardian
Article: Crew of 19 elite firefighters killed in Arizona wildfire
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/01/crew-firefighters-die-arizona-wildfire
Another incredible job from wtktt. Thanks
update. I have been home a few hours from Yarnell and TRYING to upload JUST fire photos I can find and my MIFI goes “searching”, “dormant”, locks up, battery gets hot…my laptop gets fugly and it is doing what google drive and the other private link area did and its frustrating to me. I do not have time to try and upload as well as delete ones I don’t want public plus do home projects and stuff so whatever is there and whatever should not be there and whatever should be there—try again on Christmas. I will be in Yarnell from 10:30-5:30 tomorrow doing defensible space and then again Monday thru Wed. so next time I will try if I am not frustrated will be Christmas.
Merry Christmas all.
If anyone’s photo ends up on there that was not intended remove it later…I am just so darn frustrated with pcs…walking away and letting it do whatever file it is trying to upload now but have no clue on this pc crap nor do I want to learn—
https://www.dropbox.com/s/pxdme30gf9jevwv/Yarnell%20Hill%20Fire%20%282%29.tif?dl=0
Joy A. Collura says
DECEMBER 20, 2014 AT 5:45 PM
Your comment is awaiting moderation.
I posted this link the other day when I rushed labels on photo
https://www.dropbox.com/s/f8eho6qlhyreufk/hunter.jpg?dl=0
yet redid the labels to show Hunter’s property is not in this photo
https://www.dropbox.com/s/jpxtt7esun7jljo/hunternotinphoto.jpg?dl=0
but is in this one is Hunter’s property
https://www.dropbox.com/s/mifv6d8mhfb4q78/hunterinphoto.jpg?dl=0
locally there is such a strange division I am really wondering if its worth my energy to keep going on helping and I got the back up plan if I do go forward and be strong and get this all figured out and worst case scenario Sonny is asked to leave place he is trying to buy but the man who owns it had heart attack and is in the hospital so if he ends up losing spot I have a few back up spots now lined up…If I do this I have to do it full attention and I will knock door to door and so that is where I am not sure about the way Sonny is not into that so I have to figure on best way that gets it done but maybe works for Sonny as well.
you are funny KKT—She said in email to me Sat, Dec 20, 2014 at 1:53 PM:
What you are doing for this entire fire aftermath is God’s gift to you. What you do with it is your gift back to God. Keep the strength. I love you. You hiked with me and it inspired me to this day to watch how far you come with your health and how you always think about others before self. Do not lose faith in adversity! God is great! Stay away from people who try to shift you from doing God’s gift-
I needed that about now because I have talked to locals and you see alot wondering about their tamale orders but none even think of the YHF too much…you got 3 sets of folks…the ones who want to move on and just entrust what will be will be…the others wanting every detail and the ones who fear the small town politics and ask us to be a voice yet will not stand beside us publicly in being their voice…strange situation…my husband is so done with it all…Frank Ryan was at the Congress laundry mat when we washed Sonny’s laundry. He said he keeps away from the politics and so in talking with him he did give me clarity on his ex wife Carol Ryan who I like and is on the YFD board. It helped me understand that area. Thank you for that.
also the photo with Hunter’s property in it…Kathy Hunter Glover was sent link to confirm if that is the bulldozer marks in photo.
actually the corner is in photo of Hunter’s property but barely under the name wilson at bottom of page
I posted this link the other day when I rushed labels on photo
https://www.dropbox.com/s/f8eho6qlhyreufk/hunter.jpg?dl=0
yet redid the labels to show Hunter’s property is not in this photo
https://www.dropbox.com/s/jpxtt7esun7jljo/hunternotinphoto.jpg?dl=0
but is in this one is Hunter’s property
https://www.dropbox.com/s/mifv6d8mhfb4q78/hunterinphoto.jpg?dl=0
locally there is such a strange division I am really wondering if its worth my energy to keep going on helping and I got the back up plan if I do go forward and be strong and get this all figured out and worst case scenario Sonny is asked to leave place he is trying to buy but the man who owns it had heart attack and is in the hospital so if he ends up losing spot I have a few back up spots now lined up…If I do this I have to do it full attention and I will knock door to door and so that is where I am not sure about the way Sonny is not into that so I have to figure on best way that gets it done but maybe works for Sonny as well.
I have hiked those Weavers before and after the yhf more than anyone including Tex because I did it years before he come around and I have slept on the Weavers and put myself in what I saw that day of Eric Marsh in his rabbit ways up and down the Weavers always staying high and Donut I watched you that day too and Frisby and you both know I am right on that and when I went to sleep on the Weavers it hit me trying to understand every tiny details God showed me and when I fell near that. pink ribbon and did not see it until on hike with John MacLean and Sonny discovered the burnt pink ribbon roll…it is very possible that Eric Marsh was under the tree on top of the Weavers because I sat there a long time…fell asleep…and bam…now for an opinion theory of Joy A. Collura’s…Marsh was on that mountain top above the burnt pink ribbon roll watching all the fires as a lookout as Steed made final move to drop down there near saddle where the loose steep old wash and game trails and when Marsh saw the slow going difficulty of the 18 and saw the fire he felt to catch up to them not realizing he dropped the roll as he was sliding at quick pace down that steep mountain top but not at all too concerned they won’t make the Helm’s but then once down and asking for help then faced the flame front and that was it. No demand or order but maybe encouragement firmly from some areas because it did not make sense Marsh was ahead because than he would know how slow going that maze was but it also did not make sense no lookout and Marsh was always up and down the Weavers so it to me is how I think of that final moment before setting area as the deployment site. Some pf the most prettiest rattlesnakes I let out there. one was a soft pink tiger rattler with the prettiest snake eyes. My files are permanently gone but I will ask family if they have any where I released some in the area with Tommy Maiden and Frank Serros back in 2009. Well I hope for more clarity some day because I will never get dropping down in that elite men or not…please anyone who was there on the fire…share..we ran into Leonard Hunter on walk today and I put in dropbox the business cards of the folks qhen qe talked about them..sorry for any cell typos
reply to recent UK photo—as the desert walker and Sonny and I helped many since the fire please relook at photo here
https://www.dropbox.com/s/f8eho6qlhyreufk/hunter.jpg?dl=0
helps you understand street names and where folks live and PLEASE Laura Corbin…come forward with your accounts…
Thank you, Joy! All the labels on the photo are really helpful.
I think it should be noted that at the very bottom left of this HUNTER.JPG photo, where
Deertrack Rd. actually instersects with Ridgeway Drive, is the only road access out to the Boulder Springs Ranch. Ridgeway just goes for a few dozen more yards past that intersection and that’s when you reach the start of that long private driveway out to the Boulder Springs Ranch.
In other words… even if Granite Mountain had actually had any thoughts of making it all the way into Glen Ilah to do structure protection work… THIS photo Joy just posted is the first part of Glen Ilah they would have encountered and would have also had to walk through after the additional hike east on the (long) Boulder Springs Ranch driveway.
Followup…
This really is a fascinating photo that Joy just posted since it DOES show the actual ‘neighborhood’ where Granite Mountain would have ‘ended up’ had they even had the time that day to actually MAKE it all the way into Glen Ilah…
…but its also worth reiterating how FAR this neighborhood seen in Joy’s photo really still was from the Boulder Springs Ranch itself.
From the start of that dozer push on the western edge of the Boulder Springs Ranch ( that now leads out to the deployment site ) all the way east down the BSR driveway and to the intersection of Deertrack Rd. and Ridgeway Drive ( shown in the bottom left corner of Joy’s recently posted photo ) the full distance would be…
2,644 feet / 881 yards.
From that same point on the western edge of the BSR out WEST to the center of the deployment site… the total distance is…
1,905 feet / 635 yards
So even if Granite Mountain had been able to reach the western edge of the Boulder Springs Ranch… in order to then reach this very first ‘neighborhood’ of Glen Ilah via the BSR driveway ( the exact neighborhood shown in Joy’s photo above )… they would have had to cover the SAME distance they had already come from the deployment area to the BSR… PLUS an additional 739 feet / 246 yards.
NOTE: There was also some discussion down below about how WIDE this absolutely CLEAR, graded Boulder Springs Ranch driveway was. Turns out you can’t even really call it a driveway. It was pretty much a graded ROAD and the AVERAGE width for its entire length was 24.7 feet.
However… there ARE a few sections where it was as wide as 30 feet.
That is WIDER ( and much cleaner/clearer ) than any other ‘dozer push’ that Arizona Forestry employees were working on all day Sunday… but Google post-fire satellite imagery shows that the fire itself went right over that BSR driveway/road like it wasn’t even there.
I COULD still imagine, however, that anyone looking at a satellite image of the Glen Ilah area could have THOUGHT that ‘tying in’ to that BSR driveway/road from somewhere to the east of it might have APPEARED to have been a ‘good idea’ as part of an ’emergency fire break’ to try and make the fire ‘go around’ the Glen Ilah subdivision.
If the same people who thought the other ‘dozer pushes’ being constructed that day were going to make any difference at all were then the ones thinking about some ’emergency firebreak’ to the southwest of Yarnell proper… then they WOULD have thought this BSR driveway/road would have been ‘adequate’.
Something else to NOTE about the photo Joy just posted.
At the top-left-center of the photo is a label that says ‘Burkhardt’ and there is a structure with a white roof just above that label.
Just a mere 616 feet / 205 yards due north of the center of that ‘structure’ in the photo Joy just posted is the exact spot where the bulldozer ‘loboy’ had been staged all day… and the spot where it is believed the dozer operator ( assumed first name of Justin ) had to ‘ride out’ the fire and ended up one of the ‘missing persons’ that DPS Helicopter Ranger 58 was told to be looking for that day.
In other words… if the camera had been tilted UP only ever so slightly when this photo was taken… we would be SEEING that ‘area’ where Justin had to (supposedly) ‘ride out’ the fire in (presumably) either the cab of the dozer or the cab of the loboy trailer.
That.is also the very area I have to emphasize the locals telling me their account in private is very veryimportant to you all on the topics you are talking about because I promise some to keep it to me but yes there is names on there thatcan offer clarity to the yhf and I did talk to the ones who were gonna give account tomorrow postpone after the Holidays and so my frustrations are not for all local because some work and.some try to show effort but like I said some please just talk….I heard it and it deserves being shared…
now to answer bob powers
Bob Powers says DECEMBER 19, 2014 AT 3:32 PM
Sonny———-Unless there was somethin wrong with the Bambi bucket and that is possible things like the electric box that operates them sometimes have problems. Otherwise it should have been used it costs no more than flight time pe hour.
ALREADY ASKED PEOPLE DIRECT THIS AND AWAITING ANSWER.
I would suggest a citizens committee working with the Fire department especially on city regulations to improve Clearance around homes SINCE THE FIRE THAT’S WHAT WE HAVE BEEN DOING AND VERY DELICATE TOPIC SO WE SHIFTED AND THE PLACE SONNY IS AT I SOLD MY BAYONET AND AMMO AND MY MOM HELPED FINANCIALLY TOO BECAUSE SONNY WAS.NOT GONNA AND MY HUSBAND’S HOURS WERE REDUCED SO HE COULD NOT BUT I STILL HAVE AD ON CRAIG’S LIST ABOUT DEFENSIBLE SPACE AND JOB WAS COMPLETED AND PAID TO LEWIS CREW PRISON CREW FIREFIGHTER ANDREW WILLIAMS AND FAMILY AND POST THAT SUNDAY THE PAYMENT WAIVER TO SHOW HOW GOD GUIDES THIS….AND IT MAY OF COST ME $366.60 OF MY OWN FUNDS I KNEW IT WAS THE RIGHT THING TO DO…IF YOU THINK I AM GOING TO BE CHEERLEADING CHIEF BEN PALM…NOPE…YET I AM HOUSE TO HOUSE EDUCATING THE TOWN THE IMPORTANCE THAT IT BEGINS AT HOME…SO YES BOB…YOU AND I ARE ON THE SAME PAGE THERE..and construction of homes with fire resistance materials. Work as well on defensible space around the out skirts of town and the homes in the urban interface those are all good starts. I LEARNED A LOT FROM FIRE HISTORIAN STEPHEN PYNE IN REGARDS TO DEFENSIBLE SPACE. HE IS AMAZING !!!The Chief and Fire department can host instructors in Wild land fire.I SUPPORT THIS YET WE JUST LEARNED THE CHIEF IS A KID WHO CAME TO BE CHIEF COMING FROM EMT BACKGROUND AND NO FIREFIGHTING…PLEASE TELL ME AFTER THE MOST HORRIFIC TRAGEDY HOW IS IT THE ONE CHIEF VANISHES.TO GET A MAN WHO HAS ZERO HISTORY ON FIRES AFTER WHAT THE FIRE JUST FACED AND HOW IS IT THE FIRE BOARD HAS …ARE YOU READY…KEVIN O DONNELL AND CAROL RYAN AND RICHARD MAYER…WOW DID YOU SEE THAT THREE NAMES YOU SEE ON DESTROYED HOME LIST.ON YAV COUNTY ASSESSOR LIST…FRANCES LECHNER BECAME AN EMPLOYEE OF YFD SO SHE STEPPED DOWN AND THIS FALL THE CHIEF LET GO SOME FOLKS AND I LOOK FORWARD TO THE LEGALITY FIREWORKS ON THAT ONE BECAUSE THE NEW ONE ON BOARD JUST HAPPENS TO BE HIGHLY LIKED BY CHIEF AND.PREVIOUSLY WORKED WITH HIM AT.LIFELINE PARAMEDICS…YOU ARE CORRECT BOB THEY SHOULD BE FOCUSED TO THAT BUT THIS LAST MEETING FILLED WITH A HUGE ASS BOX OF BASHAS DONUTS NEVER OFFERED TO ANY GUESTS JUST MEMBERS ONLY…LIKE WE CARE JUST SHOWS THE HOSPITALITY OF THEM…OKAY SO THERE MEETING IS IN MY DROPBOX AND IT TALKS ABOUT BRAND NEW TIRES NEEDED FOR THEIR DONATED HUMMER WHICH SO FAR STATED COST THEM $800…LOCALS WANT IT SOLD AND BUY A 3/4-1TON PICKUP WITH A SLIDE IN PUMP UNIT THAT’S SELF CONTAINED AND CARRIES 125G OF WATER AND SMALL PUMP WITH HOSE AND BASIC WILDLAND TOOLS TO CONTAIN SMALL FIRES AND MY HUSBAND KNOWS SOMEONE THAT IS SELLING A BOBCAT THEIR OTHER NEED SO TO ME NO REASON TO KEEP HUMMER…IT IS NOT SCOTTSDALE OR VAIL COLORADO…MEET THE TOWNS NEEDS NOT LOOKS…ALSO THE CHIEF PLANS TO HAVE CLASSES THERE SO I ASKED AND AWAITING ANSWER IF THE INSTRUCTOR IS CERTIFIED BY ARIZONA STATE FIRE MARSHALL ON THE COMPLEXITY OF THE CLASSES OFFERED. I MEAN THE CHIEF IS A KID WITH NO SERIOUS FIREFIGHTING BACKGROUND SO TO ANSWER YOU THEY NEED MUCH TRAINING ESPECIALLY WHO OWNS WHAT BECAUSE I HAVE MORE WRITTEN PERMISSION SLIPS TO BE OUT IN THAT TERRAIN YET THEY BELIEVE TO BE ABOVE THE LAW… …. oI do believe the Chief would have access to Federal Wild Land Fire Training at the Regional Level or at the National Interagency Fire Center in Boise Idaho where they are training year around.HE SURE SHOULD GO GET TRAINED…VERSUS TALKING ABOUT CLASSES BEING TAUGHT AND NEW TIRES FOR THE HUMMER There is also a training center in southern Arizona. Again City and County Councils is a grea place to start to make Yarnell Fire safe and right now is a good time to start on new regulations and defensible space codes CAN WE ASK FOR IT OR DOES IT HAVE TO BE CHAIN OF COMMAND…FIRE CHIEF?requiring Things like metal roofs and siding or other fire resistance material. It will surprise you how fast the fuels will grow back and become aAS YOU CAN SEE WE NEED ALL THE LUCK…BOB POWERS, CAN WE ASK IN A FOIA FORMAT ON THE YFD PAST THREE YEARS OF FUEL ABATEMENT PROJECTS AND AS WELL EVALUATIONS OF EMPLOYEES AND HOW MANY WERE THERE BEFORE THE FIRE THAN AFTER THE FIRE…WHO GOT FIRED OR HOW MANY STATISTICS WISE….HOW MANY HIRED…WHAT CAN WE REQUEST BY PUBLIC INFORMATION LAWS? CAN WE FIND OUT WHY THEY DID NOT HAVE A NATION WIDE POST FOR THE CHIEF POSITION AND HOW COME HE WAS JUST MANEUVERED IN. WE WANT TO KNOW WHAT WE THE LOCALS ARE ABLE TO OBTAIN TO PROPERLY ASSESS THE CURRENT YFD AS WELL CAN WE ASK HOW LONG THE FIRE BOARD MEMBERS BEEN ON AND AS WELL JUST THE OTHER DAY IN THE HEAVY FOG HAIL RAIN ONE OF THE BOARD MEMBERS HAD FAULTY SHORTED CHRISTMAS LIGHTS ON DURING THE STORM INSIDE AND OUT OF HIS HOME AS HE WAS PARKED NOT AT HOME BUT AT THE FIRE DEPT ADMINISTRATION BLDG THAN WE HAVE ANOTHER MEMBER WHO HAS HIS BUSINESS SETUP THAT’S A FIRE HAZARD YET THESE ARE THE FIRE BOARD MEMBERS THAT ARE ABOVE THE LAW OF FIRE REGULATIONS …THEY SEEM TO BE ABLE TO DO AS THEY PLEASE YET I HAVE TO FOLLOW THE LAW…HELP ME UNDERSTAND THIS…LIKE AS A VOLUNTEER FIRE DEPT. WHO IS ABOVE THE CHIEF AND FIRE BOARD IF I DO NOT GET A REPLY ON MY PUBLIC INFORMATION STUFF? new threat. Good Luck………….
On cell hard to do but Sunday i will be home and redo that photo because on cell it shows the name hunter in wrong spot but may be different on pc and if you see bruce’ss nameon photo ..the next inlet culdesac type street next to bruce that leads to the helms entry gate.
I have hiked those Weavers before and after the yhf more than anyone including Tex because I did it years before he come around and I have slept on the Weavers and put myself in what I saw that day of Eric Marsh in his rabbit ways up and down the Weavers always staying high and Donut I watched you that day too and Frisby and you both know I am right on that and when I went to sleep on the Weavers it hit me trying to understand every tiny details God showed me and when I fell near that. pink ribbon and did not see it until on hike with John MacLean and Sonny discovered the burnt pink ribbon roll…it is very possible that Eric Marsh was under the tree on top of the Weavers because I sat there a long time…fell asleep…and bam…now for an opinion theory of Joy A. Collura’s…Marsh was on that mountain top above the burnt pink ribbon roll watching all the fires as a lookout as Steed made final move to drop down there near saddle where the loose steep old wash and game trails and when Marsh saw the slow going difficulty of the 18 and saw the fire he felt to catch up to them not realizing he dropped the roll as he was sliding at quick pace down that steep mountain top but not at all too concerned they won’t make the Helm’s but then once down and asking for help then faced the flame front and that was it. No demand or order but maybe encouragement firmly from some areas because it did not make sense Marsh was ahead because than he would know how slow going that maze was but it also did not make sense no lookout and Marsh was always up and down the Weavers so it to me is how I think of that final moment before setting area as the deployment site. Some pf the most prettiest rattlesnakes I let out there. one was a soft pink tiger rattler with the prettiest snake eyes. My files are permanently gone but I will ask family if they have any where I released some in the area with Tommy Maiden and Frank Serros back in 2009. Well I hope for more clarity some day because I will never get dropping down in that elite men or not…please anyone who was there on the fire…share..we ran into Leonard Hunter on walk today and I put in dropbox the business cards of the folks qhen qe talked about them..sorry for any cell typos
https://www.dropbox.com/s/twdj16lc1jc199d/1%20%283%29.JPG?dl=0
tree I speak of in last comment
Thank you, Joy.
Your ideas in your comment above about how things went down that day are plausible. It actually MIGHT have happened that way.
We know for sure that it was Captain Jesse Steed ( and NOT Eric Marsh ) who made the first MAYDAY call at 1639. We also know for sure that wherever Eric Marsh was when Steed’s emergency call hit the radio… he could not have been more than 1 minute and 58 seconds away ( at a hard run, if needed ).
That’s the separation time between Steed’s first MAYDAY and Eric Marsh himself finally ‘appearing’ on the radio ( out of breath ) and reporting that he was now ‘with’ Granite Mountain… and they were deploying.
As for the photo above… that ‘tree’ is right there in that vegetation on the WEST side of the two-track up there right by the ‘Descent Point’, correct?
By the way… as photographs go… the one you just linked to is a really a beauty.
I mean it. It’s a work of art. Composition, framing, angle, exposure, etc.
It’s really quite beautiful.
Joy while I understand your concern If there had been a look out the fire activity by 1625 would have changed every thing.
My only concern with Marsh being a Lookout and above the crew he would have most certainly seen the fire progression at 1630 and would have pulled the crew out
So he had to be in the canyon with them.
I still go on my contacts statement that Marsh was in front of the crew.
Either way I do not believe he was in a place to see the fire until it was to late 58 seconds is not a lot of time to get to the crew. Above or below them .assess the situation start clearing with saws and call on the radio.
He had to be really close.
Bob Powers says
Reply to Bob Powers post on December 22, 2014 at 12:59 pm
>> Bob Powers wrote…
>>
>> My only concern with Marsh being a Lookout and
>> above the crew he would have most certainly seen
>> the fire progression at 1630 and would have
>> pulled the crew out
You would think so, yes… but the part of Joy’s idea above that I still find in the ‘plausible’ range is where she describes Marsh getting ‘concerned’ that the men were not making the kind of forward progress they needed to… but instead of pulling them out… he decided to ABANDON that elevated lookout position and hustle down to see if he could ‘hurry them up’. He only made it to within 1 minute and 58 seconds of the ‘point man’ ( Jesse Steed? ) before they were ALL ‘out of time’ that day.
Maybe Marsh was ‘playing lookout’ and DID start to see conditions ‘out there’ that concerned him… but rather than do the sensible thing of telling the men to RETREAT back up to his position… he thought he could haul ass down there, catch up with them, and then ‘hurry them along’.
Fatal decision ( for everyone ).
As insane as ANY other scenario is for that final leg of this ‘mission’ and those final 15 to 25 minutes… that strikes me as just about as ‘plausible’ as any other explanation.
I think it is a pretty solid guesstimate that when marsh tells abel, at 1550, that he is working his way off the top., that means the drip into the canyon. But that is just my opinion
Pure and simple had they had a lookout they would be alive today.
A lookout dose not leave there post till the crew is safe unless forced to by the fire for there own safety.
Again WTKTT if the fire was showing the activity that would have made Marsh move to the crew then it was critical enough to get the crew to safety. via the Radio
Marsh with 20 years experience if he saw that Fire front laying down and moving toward the crew would have a fear for safety you could not imagine pure and simple He would have known what the fire was doing. He never saw that change. I do not believe he would have ignored that change if he saw it .
No one did they were all in the canyon at 1620 the Fire front made its move and in 20 min. was in front of the crew.
We have been here before and had no agreement so it would be nice to have more info???????
Remember…remember…the 30th—never forget!
Let me sit down with you locals here and have a little online chat.
There are of course those who do not want us to remember or for us to speak-
that are looking at their screen now thinking “enough from the hikers”-
PLAN B
I know you are scheming how to arrest the hikers…right.
Locals- you should not be afraid of the government. I saw your photos and some of your videos and I get your concerns and wanting to just go on with life and leave the 19 alone EVEN Amanda Marsh stated to me Tue, Oct 14, 2014 at 2:48 PM “Let them go. It’s ok.” Sent from iPad and at 3:10pm she said “You have the choice to step away from this. I don’t. You have the choice about your life. Don’t spend it stuck in this. The media, the strangers, the weird people who think they know the guys, it just all has to go away now. You can walk away. ” (by the way I have no clue who you are EN but I can tell you I have not given AM emails to anyone so do not feel left out there and its not hiding it from the public but respecting a person in grief & have her privacy yet the parts I just shared is how she feels on Joy letting this all go..and let the 19 be.) I will go with the original grieving process a year before from Amanda Marsh when she stated on Tue, Oct 8, 2013 at 3:34 AM “If you want to carry this on your shoulders, I support that. I will tell you that it isn’t your job. I appreciate you wanting to help and be of service to such a great man.” I will go with that because less people were in her heard at that point and as well she was away from the scene at that point grieving and so I will do what I am doing…
This goes back to Ms. Ferguson my government teacher who tossed me to the Dean whenever we had to speak oral and here comes bubbly smiling Joy where I had everyone at the edge of their chairs LISTENING and I explained the whole package system of organizations of all kinds and how it cores to the UK and other continents extended …how well its been orchestrated over time to the USA and yet no matter the bloody telly or the shit fed on the radio or stuff taught in school systems…you are SEEING being different in this modern world is made out to be dangerous. If you are not that programmable person then you must have issues…Shit, we all like the comforts of our routine, the security of familiar and the tranquility of repetition…I think of you Otis…”Bloody Hell” How did this happen? How did 19 men die? Or for the people like Sonny working on not fact base information and flow on the theory of “who to blame?” and there is some order…I think there is obvious information not yet out but not 100% on any order and even then WHO IN THE HELL would with an order DROP DOWN IN THAT BOX CANYON???? Just does not add up. I agree Sonny that there is certainly more responsible than others yet accountable? How about just getting the facts out so it can be properly assessed and it never happens again….but again truth be told if you are looking for the guilty locals who have more information and ones on that fire that have more information—LOOK IN THE MIRROR—you trade freedom for so call safety—yet you live in a prisoner mentality when I know YOU have more facts to give this YHF clarity—if you see someone does not have a dog license you call YCSO or if you see it off a leash you call YCSO…if you do not have a state land permit pass you call YCSO unless of course you are in the grey area like Chief Ben Palm then you do not need one because the law does not apply to him and who he takes on state land. I reckon I got this whole life thing wrong…I should be kissing EN’s ass and having a law professor as my sweet friend and I should be kissing any lawyer, judge or cop’s ass but hey you won’t see me do that. Still to this day I asked things of EN she states she gave but I took the energy to learn dropbox even though this Summer John Dougherty wanted me to do it and Marti Reed as well in recent times but until I wanted to show EN the easiest way to prove a claim—show it…Sunday I will upload the envelope but I do have the photos the locals asked for– like
https://www.dropbox.com/s/92b0cfeple10s7h/Gilligan_OECA-15-000-3035.PDF?dl=0
I know why you locals do not come forward. I know you are afraid or just do not want to bother. Who wouldn’t be caught up in the programmable way of thinking…just move on Joy is all I ever hear anymore…even offered a free r&r respite away from Yarnell yet declined because I am going to be available for the locals that finally come forward…Somehow the media allowing 19 men to just die and not take the initiative to find the answers…it is so nice to have INVESTIGATIVE MEDIA…so very nice…so very healing…so wonderful. Thank you John Dougherty and I hope you WIN accolades in the end over this versus what we saw the ones who did get them in reference to the YHF. Somehow it corrupted the ones who have more information of their reason and robbed them of common sense. Fear got the best of them. If you listen to the YFD meeting—in the end you can state your laws and hand them to me and I can place them in the dropbox for the nation to see but nothing you can do as it is currently set up. Yet, I have NO INTEREST to even be in that area…the POINT was to STOP THE SLANDER…duh.
If the crimes of the fire remain unknown to us all….IT WILL NEVER CHANGE. I am sorry for the 19 and all previous fallen but IT IS TIME TO CHANGE THE WAY THEY FIGHT WILDFIRES!
Eventually 6-30-13 will pass unmarked but if you see what I see—if you FEEL what I FEEL and seek what I seek—I hope you’d be standing beside me AND NOT IN FEAR!
Remember this about living life…artists and creative folks use lies to tell the truth yet politicians USE LIES to COVER UP THE TRUTH UP!!!!
Would you really want to know who it was? Can we handle the truth? They want arrests for the ones seeking the truth yet in the end I want RESULTS! All I have to do is cooperate to their ways or do what I am doing- live a just way and if they do the wrong or if I disappear as retired cop told us—that is on them not us. All my life since a toddler I have always been different but not dangerous–
Reply to Joy A. Collura post on December 19, 2014 at 2:49 pm
>> Joy said…
>>
>> Sunday I will upload the envelope but I do have the photos
>> the locals asked for– like…
>> https://www.dropbox.com/s/92b0cfeple10s7h/Gilligan_OECA-15-000-3035.PDF?dl=0
Just in case some might not have the Adobe PDF plugin in their browsers… the following is the full content of the PDF file Joy linked to.
It’s not very long.
It’s a copy of a response that Sonny got to an email he sent to the Environmental Protection Agency…
————————————————————————————-
UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY – REGION IX
75 Hawthorne Street, San Francisco, CA 94105-3901
Document Received: (Stamped) DEC 18 2114
Dear Mr. Gilligan:
Thank you for your e-mail dated December 5, 2014. We are so sorry for the loss of life that took place in the Yarnell area a year ago and the subsequent losses in the area since the fire.
We are also very sorry that you, Ms. Collura, and some of your neighbors have developed respiratory problems. Because we are not doctors, we cannot speculate on what is causing your specific problems. For these health-related concerns, we encourage you to continue working with your medical provider. You may also wish to discuss your concerns with the Arizona Department of Health, Office of Environmental Health. Their phone number is (602) 364-3118.
We can tell you that EPA’s scientific data shows that exposure to smoke can cause respiratory issues, especially in people with asthma and COPD. With regard to potential health impacts from the aerial application of fire retardant, the U.S. Forest Service has prepared an Environmental Impact Statement on this type of activity. This document and the associated analyses are available on the internet at ( link posted below ).
We encourage you to contact the U.S. Forest Service, Southwestern Region with any questions you have on this document or potential impacts from the Yarnell Hill fire. Their phone number is (505) 842-3292.
Regarding pollutants from old mines and manufacturing operations, the Arizona Department of Environmental Quality is responsible for the oversight of those facilities. If you feel pollutants are getting into the environment, please lodge a complaint with the Arizona Department of Quality’s complaint site at www azdeq gov or call them at their Phoenix office at 602-771-2300 or the Tucson office at 520-745-4536.
Thank you for alerting us to these issues. Again, we are sorry for the loss of life and the continuing impacts of the Yarnell fire.
Sincerely,
Colleen McKaughan
Associate Director
Air Division, Region 9
—————————————————————————————
Because of the ‘one link per post’ rule on this Forum… the paragraph above that had that link to the US Forestry’s own ‘Retardant Study’ is reproduced here as a ‘Reply’, but this time with the actual ‘link’ still in it…
———————————————————-
We can tell you that EPA’s scientific data shows that exposure to smoke can cause respiratory issues, especially in people with asthma and COPD. With regard to potential health impacts from the aerial application of fire retardant, the U.S. Forest Service has prepared an Environmental Impact Statement on this type of activity. This document and the associated analyses are available on the internet at…
http://www.fs.fed.us/fire/retardant/eis info.html.
We encourage you to contact the U.S. Forest Service, Southwestern Region with any questions you have on this document or potential impacts from the Yarnell Hill fire. Their phone number is (505) 842-3292.
———————————————————-
Whoops… that URL ‘link’ didn’t ‘cut and paste’ properly from the original PDF document into the post up above.
There is supposed to be an UNDERSCORE character in the ‘eis_info.html’
filename.
Here is a link to that US Forestry Retardant Study that actually works…
http://www.fs.fed.us/fire/retardant/eis_info.html
And, as long as I am sitting here falling asleep while posting stuff. ‘
Joy wrote about that guy’s home being bulldozed. Which totally sucks, I agree.
However.
On July 1, the UK-based Daily Mail posted a series of aerial photographs in an article called “The devastation left by ‘firestorm’ that killed 19 Arizona firefighters: Shocking aerial images show town burned to the ground by blaze”
By ASHLEY COLLMAN and BECKY EVANS and LYDIA WARREN and HELEN POW
PUBLISHED: 22:57 EST, 1 July 2013 | UPDATED: 05:29 EST, 2 July 2013
I have absolutely no friggin clue how they managed to get those photos they posted in that article. I’ve seriously wondered about that.
The second photo in their awesome article shows the area of that home. It’s just west of the intersection. It hasn’t been bulldozed in that photograph.
So whoever bulldozed it did it after July 1 (or even July 2?).
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2353353/Arizona-wild-fires-pictures-Shocking-aerial-images-utter-devastation.html
And as long as I’m sitting here while falling asleep posting stuff, I agree with WTKTT’s idea of where a likely dozer line might have been, in Gary Cordes’ head, placed.
On the other hand, even if it had been placed there in time to actually get placed there, I don’t think it would have done much good.
When I looked, in Google Earth, at the evidence of the “path” of what burned, it really looks to me like the fire came down into Glen Ilah from the northeast.
Which actually fits how the fire was actually burning.
That imagined dozer line, although imaginably possible (if there had been time to put it in–which there wasn’t), wouldn’t have been in the right PLACE to protect anything much of Glen Ilah from the actual fire that actually consumed it.
So now that I wrote all of that, I’m sitting here thinking about the Ye Ole Controversy regarding the reliability of the 10 and 18 and someone’s attempts to use Ken Jordan’s fire shelter deployment to discredit them.
Maybe tomorrow morning I will post what he said on that person’s blogsite about them.
And maybe I will also post the most high profile (as far as I’ve seen) rumination of the most high profile firefighter who has, supposedly, criticized them, i.e. Ted Putnam. Whom, I am sure, the Administrator of that blogsite is using as her anchor in this controversy.
I don’t believe, after reading all of those things, that the Administrator of that blogsite actually understands what she is talking about.
Reply to Marti Reed post on December 18, 2014 at 11:01 pm
.>> Marti wrote…
>>
>> The second photo in their awesome article shows the area of that home.
>> It’s just west of the intersection. It hasn’t been bulldozed in that photograph.
>>
>> So whoever bulldozed it did it after July 1 (or even July 2?).
>>
>> http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2353353/Arizona-wild-fires-pictures-Shocking-aerial-images-utter-devastation.html
Absolutely correct.
Just confirming you are RIGHT… that IS the same exact intersection in Glen Ilah. Current Google Earth shows ALL three lots on the NE, SE, and SW corners of that intersection were ‘bulldozed’ at some point AFTER the photo you just linked to.
>> Marti also said…
>>
>> And as long as I’m sitting here while falling asleep posting stuff, I agree
>> with WTKTT’s idea of where a likely dozer line might have been, in
>> Gary Cordes’ head, placed.
Well… since Gary Cordes didn’t see fit to ever mention this in (apparently) ANY of his interviews or in his own Unit Log… we still have to guess WHERE he really wanted Ball to ‘scout’ that ‘dozer line’… but Ball himself definitely said Cordes wanted it to the SOUTHWEST of town.
Hard as we might ever try… we CANNOT make the following official Unit Log entry from Blue Ridge Hotshot ( and acting HEQB for the dozer ) Cory Ball just ‘go away’…
1600
Structure group one assigns me and ONE OTHER to locate possibility
of DOZER LINE to southwest of Yarnell”
>> Marti also said…
>>
>> On the other hand, even if it had been placed there in time to actually
>> get placed there, I don’t think it would have done much good.
Very unlikely. The SPOT-AHEADS were tremendous as it started rolling into Glen Ilah. That scary video filmed by that resident WHILE he was evacuating from deep in the west end of Glen Ilah has always proved that.
Even as CLEAN and as WIDE ( maybe even THREE dozer blades wide? ) as that very long Boulder Springs Ranch driveway was… post-fire Google Earth images prove it did NOTHING to stop the fire that day from ‘hopping’ right over it from north to south.
>> Marti also said…
>>
>> When I looked, in Google Earth, at the evidence of the “path” of what burned,
>> it really looks to me like the fire came down into Glen Ilah from the northeast.
>> Which actually fits how the fire was actually burning.
Those two Blue Ridge Hotshot Wardemups photos that he took at exactly 4:35 PM from the passenger seat of one of the BR Carriers as it was pulling into the Ranch House Restaurant have always proved that. The ‘column’ seen in those photos is, in fact, pushing into Glen Ilah from that NORTHEAST direction, at that point.
** Wardemups IMG_3957 and IMG_3958
Taken out passenger side of Blue Ridge Crew Carrier at 4:35 PM looking WEST out towards deployment site from a point on Highway 89 just before Carrier was about to pull into the Ranch House Restaurant.
The exact point where photo were taken is
34.213872, -112.755529
One of those is also the one that got ‘annotated’ by someone and has the little YELLOW circle drawn on it which is approximating where the deployment site was out there in the distance.
>> Marti also wrote…
>>
>> That imagined dozer line, although imaginably possible (if there had
>> been time to put it in–which there wasn’t), wouldn’t have been in
>> the right PLACE to protect anything much of Glen Ilah from the
>> actual fire that actually consumed it.
Probably not… but as I said in the last chapter… if they had actually gone ‘full bore’ working on that ’emergency’ dozer line to the ‘southwest’ of town… it wouldn’t have been the first time that day men were working very hard on something that actually never had a chance in hell of succeeding.
It would have just been one more FAILED attempt at defensive work that day.
>> Marti also said
>>
>> I don’t believe, after reading all of those things, that the Administrator
>> of that blogsite actually understands what she is talking about.
Something to keep in mind regarding ‘blogsites’ about the Yarnell Hill Fire is that the authors might be very much aware that they NEED to be associated with a BLOG or some other kind of online ‘publication’ in order to simply have a chance at making FREE FOIA requests.
If you can prove you are a member of the MEDIA… or working for any kind of ‘publisher’… then you don’t have to PAY for your FOIA requests.
Online BLOGS and other Ezines have recently been added to the Government’s list of ‘media outlets’ that don’t have to pay for FOIA requests.
Pretty neat trick, actually.
Just fire up a BLOG that is PRETENDING to be some kind of ‘journalistic or investigative effort’ and you get out of having to pay for FOIA requests.
Marti Strikes again……………..Take time evaluate what you read and see and then state the facts bringing every thing back into focus,
Back on the Fire and the dozer line.
Dozer lines put in on indirect line are not them selves sufficient to stop fires even 3 blades wide with out some help from other resources and the fire its self.
If the fire backs into dozer lines or roads then there chance of holding are Higher as well as stationing resources to keep the fire on the fire side of the line.
Once a fire decides to run at a road or dozer line before back fires can be set then
Its chance of jumping the line is 90% and you just can not put resources in front of it
to protect the line. So as seen the Fire went across the road that went to the BSR as if it wasn’t there, and no one could have stopped it.
On June 30th the biggest problem of the fire team was not enough resources and then spreading them to thin to contain the fire. Lack of foresight to have started a evacuation the first thing in the morning which absolutely should have been done.
Then concentrating the forces on achievable objectives. Building lines and protecting structures in Yarnell and Glen Isla.
The Suppression forces were strung too thin to accomplish the containment of the Fire that day. Putting a Crew on the mountain to contain the fire where it had laid down was a good idea but a quick look at the line construction charts would have shown one crew was not enough to complete the task and two crews would have not made it either. If the fire had laid down and stayed quiet for 24 hours then maybe the resources would have had a chance. They were to far behind the power curve to keep the fire from doing what it wanted to do. Jumping around from one emergency to another and not taking care of the Fire Fighters and the community by getting them out of the way long before the crises hit was a serious miscalculation of the Overhead team.
Once the fire started building steam by 1400 no amount of Hand crews or dozers were going to stop the head of the fire from doing what it wanted a frontal attack even then would have trapped more Fire Fighters.
By 1600 every one should have been out of the way and in safety zone’s.
NEED I SAY THAT AGAIN?????????????
Bob, if you say that there is 90%chance a fire would jump a dozer line, here in particular, considering the terrain and wind factor, then it would have added in the other 10% to make it a sure thing it would cross the dozer line. The fire did a good job of crossing paved streets all over Yarnell–and I suppose the blowing embers did knock out plenty houses as well.
You thought by 1600 or 4PM things should have been pulled out. What we saw from the mountain top at 11:30 AM looked to be the time those fellows should have been thinking of pulling out. What they were doing still hanging around up there past noon is anyone’s guess– unless they just did not want to hike out or had other plans for air evacuation. Joy has plenty of time stamped photos showing that wildfire gone wild before noon–truly spectacular photos of how fierce a wildfire can be–500 men couldn’t have stopped what I saw.
To Otis in UK thanks for the encouragement. Doing the right thing, is not always easy as we have found out by those you would think would do the most to get at the truth of this thing. I suspect JD won’t be too popular in a few people’s eyes either– He is a brave soul to stand his ground and expose things as he has.
We have been looking into our new Fire Chief since he has been looking into us. The last one here seems to have let the town down. Several past firemen that are locals are talking of forming an emergency crew that can immediately take care of a lightening strike such as that one should have been a priority emergency considering conditions that were well known by all local firemen.
There still lies the question of the Bambi and Helitac crew photographed in plain sight and on ready with local Chuck Tidy in photo–yet were told to refrain from dumping water? I bet Chuck has his thoughts about that one seeing he is a retired helicopter pilot himself. I have to think an early morning attack with that copter and Bambi would have dampened things enough that fire crews could have mopped up.
Considering that it was allowed to burn until Sunday morning before retardant drops started, I have to ask Bob–why would they not want the Bambi and why would they wait until Sunday to start attempts to retard the fire. Being a non-fireman I have to ask these questions–My own limited experience but relying on common sense- This was a hot dry dense situation just below those boulders–That copter would have been in action as much as possible.
Is it that some bosses only like to award jobs to certain individuals? Or could they be guilty of allowing a situation to escalate just so they can call in more troops and create situations where more dollars and resources are expended? I would like to think not, but it seems to me that I would look bad if I had a way to dampen that fire and did not.
OK I have heard there is going to be a training school here or at least it is in the wind. We know the new chief has learned his fire fighting in school. I don’t have a record of his firefighting experience–seems it is limited–Joy is looking into that aspect. Well we hope we can get Bob Powers, Dr. Ted Putnam, Murray Taylor, Wayne and Holly Niel , et. al. these people of proven reputation to come down and help him out if he does start a school. I could use a few lessons myself, but I want someone like Bob to inform me and those locals that intend to protect this town in the future.
Enough said, Joy I am sure is posting plenty–she has been on the warpath for a few days. Just wanting things to go right–the best laid plans sometimes go to plan B, maybe even C or D.–F too.
Sonny———-Unless there was something wrong with the Bambi bucket and that is possible things like the electric box that operates them sometimes have problems. Otherwise it should have been used it costs no more than flight time per hour.
I would suggest a citizens committee working with the Fire department
especially on city regulations to improve Clearance around homes and construction of homes with fire resistance materials. Work as well on defensible space around the out skirts of town and the homes in the urban interface those are all good starts.
The Chief and Fire department can host instructors in Wild land fire. I do believe the Chief would have access to Federal Wild Land Fire Training at the Regional Level or at the National Interagency Fire Center in Boise Idaho where they are training year around. There is also a training center in southern Arizona.
Again City and County Councils is a great place to start to make Yarnell Fire safe and right now is a good time to start on new regulations and defensible space codes requiring Things like metal roofs and siding or other fire resistance material. It will surprise you how fast the fuels will grow back and become a new threat. Good Luck………….
Marti,
Thanks for the UK article link. Very informative. I picked up on this quote by PFD mouthpiece Wade Ward: ” It had to be a perfect storm in order for this to happen,’ Prescott Fire Department spokesman Wade Ward told the Today show. ‘Their situational awareness and their training was at such a high level that it’s unimaginable that this has even happened.”
This fatal incident did NOT have to be a ‘perfect storm’ for this to occur. It was extreme fire behavior to be sure but actually very common for the Southwest on June 30th.
And their ‘situational awareness and training’ SHOULD have been at the highest level but the GMHS supervisors did NOT apply all that at the time on June 30th or else they would all still be alive. They should and would have remained in their perfectly good Safety Zone in the black.
Reply to Robert the Second (RTS) post on December 19, 2014 at 9:25 am
>> RTS said…
>>
>> I picked up on this quote by PFD mouthpiece Wade Ward: ” It had
>> to be a perfect storm in order for this to happen,’
Ever since that movie “The Perfect Storm” came out… we ALL hear people using that phrase to somehow describe situations where things can ‘come together’ that are totally beyond people’s control.
That is NOT what that movie was about… or what actually happened.
What happened to the swordfishing boat Andrea Gail was as much THEIR fault as it was anything that was happening with the weather.
1) Captain Billy Tyne DECIDED to take his crew much farther offshore than their usual fishing grounds that day.
2) They KNEW there was a storm developing between them and the shore.
3) Again… Captain Tyne DECIDED to head back right through the storm because their ice machine broke and HE wanted to take the shortest route back to port so their catch wouldn’t spoil.
4) There were TWO powerful storms now, converging in their path, but even after repeated warnings from other ships… they still stayed on the ‘short’ course.
5) Everyone died.
The movie “The Perfect Storm” should have actually been called…
“Bad Decisions with No Good Outcome”.
WTKTT,
The same could be said on June 30, 2013 for the GMHS supervisors and their fatal decision(s).
Exactly.
Some people still want to think it was just the ‘big bad fire’ ( Sic: Perfect Storm ) came and got them and there was nothing they could do about it’.
Nothing could be further from the truth.
WTKTT,
It’s difficult to make ‘heroes’ out of those that messed up. They were victims of their supervisors’ bad decisions.
**
** VOICES IN THE STATIC – 2 – REDUX
**
** SOMEONE ( APPARENTLY SPGS1 GARY CORDES ) IS MAKING A REPORT ABOUT
** GRANITE MOUNTAIN AT 4:35 PM IN AARON HULBURD’s M2U00264 VIDEO.
NOTE: This is a CONDENSED version of one of the final postings to the previous ‘Chapter X (TEN)’.
Some great observations/comments were made by Marti, FIRE20+ TTWARE, (etc) and those are also included in this ‘condensed’ version of this previous post to Chapter X.
I didn’t want those great observations/comments to get ‘lost in the weeds’ and I also don’t think we were quite done with this thread before the previous chapter ended and this one began.
Below is a NEW ‘transcript’ for this moment in Aaron Hulburd’s M2U00264 video where we hear a loud HUM… and then a ‘voice in the static’ that seems to be reporting about Granite Mountain.
This NEW ‘transcript’ reflects the good observations/comments made following the original posting.
Here is a SHORTENED version of the original post ( with updates )…
—————————————————————————————–
On December 15, 2014 at 11:11 pm, WTKTT said…
At +2:29 in Aaron Hulburd’s M2U00264 video… there is a loud HUM followed by ‘static’ that has a voice in it. The ‘real’ time is 4:35 PM.
This ‘static with a voice in it’ transmission takes place just 4 minutes before the first MAYDAY call from Jesse Steed.
In the foreground and DURING this 4:35 PM background radio transmission both KC ‘Bucky’ Yowell and Aaron Hulburd say what apears to be one of the following…
1) They agree with each other that it might be Eric or Jesse transmitting.
OR
2) They agree with each other that some headlights approaching are ‘Blue Ridge’.
DURING the ‘voice in the static’ transmission in the background… we hear them say the following…
Aaron Hulburd says ( during the transmission ): “That’s gotta be… ???”
Then KC ‘Bucky’ Yowell immediately replies with: “That’s gotta be them, yea.”
The ‘???’ part appears to be either “Eric or Jesse” or “Blue Ridge”.
If it was “Eric or Jesse”… then they were probably referring to the transmission.
If it was “Blue Ridge”… then they were probably referring to the oncoming headlights.
Regardless… The ‘voice in the static’ transmission in the background DOES, contain a conversation ( apparently coming from SPGS1 Gary Cordes ) first about them ( Granite Mountain ) not needing to do something because they didn’t finish the work they were doing… and then about how they were told to ‘pick it up and monitor the weather’.
What is actually being said inside that static appears to be this…
——————————————————————————-
Because they didn’t need to. They didn’t complete the work that..
uh… they was doin’ this morning… then they got directed to pick
it up and monitor the weather.
——————————————————————————-
NOTE: The ‘consensus’ following the original posting is that the person speaking here was, in fact, SPGS1 Gary Cordes. See comments about this reproduced below.
It is not clear WHO SPGS1 Gary Cordes was responding TO since the radio only locked onto the channel in mid-conversation and the first thing we hear is simply the first part of his response… which was “Because they didn’t need to”.
One of the possibilities regarding who could have initiated the call is that it could have been OPS2 Paul Musser ( who was still there in the St. Joseph Shrine parking lot ) calling out to SPGS1 Gary Cordes ( who was NOT there in the parking lot and was over on Highway 89 ) with some kind of query as to why Granite Mountain did NOT ‘stay up on the ridge’ as he believed they were supposed to.
This HUM and STATIC ( with conversation in it ) comes just after SPGS1 Gary Cordes had instructed TFLD2(t) Tyson Esquibel to send at least one Engine to the Boulder Springs Ranch and to tell that Engine to get with Granite Mountain there and make sure they get out safely.
SPGS1 Gary Cordes was, apparently, SURE ( circa 1635 ) that Granite Mountain was either ALREADY there at the Boulder Springs Ranch… or just about to ARRIVE there.
So whoever initiated this radio exchange ( OPS2 Paul Musser? ) COULD have just then heard Gary Cordes telling Esquibel to meet up with Granite Mountain at the BSR… and since that didn’t match his mental picture of where GM was supposed to be ( up on the western ridge and in the safe black )… he was now immediately calling Gary Cordes and wondering why GM didn’t just stay up on the ridge. Hence… Cordes’ reply “Because they didn’t need to”.
A similar explanation for this radio call to Cordes might be found in the YARNELL-GAMBLE radio exchange just a few minutes before at exactly 4:27:12 PM. That is where Eric Marsh himself CLEARLY announced ( over a public TAC channel ) that Granite Mountain was NOT ‘in the safe black’ and was definitely “Coming from the heel of the fire”. Anyone who heard THAT exchange could have also now felt the need to call Gary Cordes for clarification about why GM didn’t ‘Stay up on the ridge’.
Before I post the link to the new LOOP on this particular radio transmission… here is a NEW transcript that covers the full timeframe as the LOOP itself from Hulburd’s M2U00264 video.
NOTE: This NEW transcript incorporates some changes suggested by all the good comments and observations posted as replies to the original version.
From Aaron Hulburd’s Helmet-Cam video clip M2U0064
————————————————————————
VIDEO M2U00264 STARTS AT 1633.23 ( 4:33.23 PM )
+2:29 ( 1635.51 / 4:35.51 PM )
(Very loud HUM followed by STATIC with a voice in it reporting to someone )
+2:31 ( 1635.54 / 4:35.54 PM )
( VOICE in the STATIC – Consenus seems to indicate it is SPGS1 Gary Cordes):
Because they didn’t need to. They didn’t complete the work that..
uh… they was doin’ this morning… then they got directed to pick
it up and monitor the weather.
+2:36 ( 1635.59 / 4:35.59 PM )
(Foreground: Aaron Hulburd): That’s gotta be… (Eric or Jesse?) (Blue Ridge?)
+2:37 ( 1636.00 / 4:36.00 PM )
(Foreground: KC ‘Bucky’ Yowell): That’s gotta be them, yea.
+2:41 ( 1636.04 / 4:36.04 PM )
(Foreground: More COUGHING. Sounds like KC ‘Bucky’ Yowell coughing. )
—————————————————————————-
** THE AUDIO LOOP…
This PUBLIC excerpt from Aaron Hulburd video M2U00264 LOOPS 4 times on just this particular ‘static filled transmission’ and it matches the transcript above.
It ENDS with the COUGHING and then LOOPS ( 4 times ) again back to the HUM and then the STATIC filled transmission…
http://youtu.be/EgXir-JV3rw
Again… there is no way to know from the recording what exact QUESTION that (apparently) SPGS1 Gary Cordes was answering when he says “Because they didn’t need to”… but my guess would be that someone ( possibly OPS2 Paul Musser ) had just asked him something like “Why didn’t they (GM) stay up on the ridge?”.
** RESPONSE(S) TO ORIGINAL POST
**
** RE: WHO WAS MAKING THIS ‘REPORT’ ABOUT GRANITE MOUNTAIN?
On December 16, 2014 at 6:38 am, Marti Reed said…
I just don’t know the voices all that well. But the voice that is saying that sounds more like Cordes than Frisby to me. Especially given how their voices sound in those segments when you can hear them communicating more clearly. Cordes’ voice has a lower pitch than Frisby’s. And the same pitch as I’m hearing in this communication.
On December 16, 2014 at 10:40 am, FIRE20+ said…
As far as the background radio traffic, I agree with Marti it’s Cordes. He was doing all the talking as OH during that recording, at the end you can hear him talking to Abel about starting to lose structures too.
On December 16, 2014 at 8:26 am, WTKTT said…
I agree. SPGS1 Gary Cordes WOULD be the more likely candidate for the one making this ‘report’ about Granite Mountain in this transmission.
So there seems to be a ‘consensus’ that it is, in fact, SPGS1 Gary Cordes making the ‘report’.
The more I think about it… it’s actually doubtful this could have been Brian Frisby because of the actual MOMENT when this transmission takes place.
Remember… Frisby and Brown are just about 100 yards WEST of Hulburd at this moment and they are hauling ass OUT of the Youth Camp area in the Polaris Ranger and ‘bringing up the rear’.
They ( Frisby and Brown ) are just moments away from pulling up to Hulburd, Clawson and Yowell right there where they are standing in the Shrine parking lot.
I don’t know who was actually DRIVING the Polaris Ranger at that moment… but if it was Frisby himself then he really couldn’t have been the one making this transmission at this moment in time. Well… I suppose it’s possible… but not really likely.
As far as WHO SPGS Gary Cordes was reporting TO… I still think the most likely candidate might be OPS2 Paul Musser.
Remember… this is just SECONDS after we have already heard SPGS1 Gary Cordes telling TFLD2(t) Tyson Esquibel to arrange for that Engine to go and ‘get’ Granite Mountain at the Boulder Springs Ranch.
So here is what we might really be hearing at this point…
1) SPGS1 Gary Cordes tells TFLD2(t) Tyson Esquibel to arrange for Granite Mountain to be ‘picked’ up’ at Boulder Springs Ranch.
2) OPS2 Paul Musser HEARS this directive to Esquibel and that doesn’t match his mental picture of where GM really is. Musser still thinks they are ‘committed to the ridge’ as they told him earlier they would be.
3) So Musser immediately calls Cordes to get some ‘clarification’.
4) Musser asks Cordes something like… “Hey Gary… I heard what you just told Esquibel to do. What is Granite doing at the Boulder Springs Ranch? Why didn’t they just stay up on the ridge?”
5) Cordes answers… “Because they didn’t need to. They didn’t complete the work that.. uh… they was doin’ this morning… then they got directed to pick it up and monitor the weather.”
** RE: “PICK IT UP”
On December 16, 2014 at 6:38 am, Marti Reed said…
I find this interesting: “then they got directed to pick it up and monitor the weather.” I don’t know what “got directed to pick it up” means. Or by whom. But Abel seems to have been most involved in talking with Eric regarding watching the weather.
On December 16, 2014 at 10:01 am, TTWARE said…
“then they got directed to pick it up” could also mean ‘pick-up the pace’, IF they were already moving.
On December 16, 2014 at 8:26 am, WTKTT responded…
I believe the phrase “pick it up” ( in the context of this transmission ) just means ‘TOOLS UP’, “Stop working on current assignment”, etc.
SPGS1 Gary Cordes seems to just be informing the caller ( OPS2 Paul Musser? ) that they (GM) really were TOLD to ‘stop working’. Hence… ‘pick it up’.There is also a chance that phrase could be ‘pack it up’… but I listened very, very carefully there and I’m almost sure it is ‘pick it up’… which still makes sense given the context of the rest of that transmission.
Like FIRE20+ just said above… I believe the ‘they got told to pick it up’ is actually referring to that radio conversation between OPS1 Todd Abel and DIVSA Eric Marsh that was partially captured in the 1550 ( 3:50 PM ) Caldwell video.
In other words… whoever is reporting to someone in THIS transmission ( most likely Gary Cordes ) might be referring to the ‘directives’ he actually DID hear OPS1 Todd Abel giving to DIVSA Marsh earlier over one of the public TAC channels…
1. Keep ME informed.
2. Hunker and be safe.
3. We’ll get some Air Support down there ASAP.
The ‘Hunker and be safe’ directive from OPS1 Todd Abel to Marsh/Steed could be what is being referred to in THIS transmission as ‘they got directed to pick it up and monitor the weather”.
** RE: WHAT AARON HULBURD MIGHT HAVE ACTUALLY SAID
On December 16, 2014 at 10:40 am, FIRE20+ said…
WTKTT said:
–Aaron Hulburd says ( during the transmission ): “That’s gotta be… Eric or Jesse.”
Then KC ‘Bucky’ Yowell immediately replies with: “That’s gotta be them, yea.”
I went and watched/listened to this again to reconfirm what I believe is going on here.
I disagree that Aaron said “That’s gotta be..Eric or Jesse” I hear “That’s gotta be Blue
Ridge”. AND, they’re watching for the last rig out of Shrine, which is Frisby/Blue Ridge
then they show on the razor.
On December 16, 2014 at 1:18 pm, WTKTT responded…
FIRE20+… Thanks for reviewing this.
Once again… great observations on your part.
Yes. Could be. At the moment they are saying these things, Tyson Esquibel has just passed the camera in that long yellow/white GLENDALE pickup truck… but the pair of headlights now approaching the Shrine parking lot pretty much has to be the Blue Ridge Polaris Ranger about to reach their location.
So yea… Yowell and Hulburd might have been focused on those approaching headlights and agreeing “That’s gotta be them”.
Yowell and Hulburd had already heard Frisby say ( at the start of this same video ) that they would be the ‘last ones out’… so they KNEW they were about to arrive where they were.
If anyone ever gets a chance to actually interview “The 3 Prescotteers” ( or we ever see the transcripts of interviews they HAVE already given )… maybe what they were referring to there will become crystal clear.
>> On December 16, 2014 at 10:40 am, FIRE20+ also said…
>>
>> As far as the “then they got directed to (pick it up) (pack it up),
>> whatever, somebody directed them to do something. I’m not
>> 100% sure of exactly what I hear here. Abel’s the “hunker and
>> be safe and I’ll get you air support down there asap” comment,
>> that’s the closest direction we have and it sounds right on.
On December 16, 2014 at 1:18 pm, WTKTT responded…
Well… whether it was Musser who ‘asked the question’ that (apparently) SPGS1 Gary Cordes was ‘answering’ there… the content of his response indicates ( just like Marsh’s response to someone in the YARNELL-GAMBLE video ) that the caller had asked a QUESTION and it was related to Granite Mountain.
In the case of the YARNELL-GAMBLE video… it must have bee a query about where GM was at that moment ( 4:27 PM ) and what was taking them so long to get somewhere where someone already expected them to be. Marsh’s response indicated to the caller that they were “coming from the heel of the fire” ( which was quite some distance away ) and that’s why they hadn’t arrived yet.
In the case of THIS ( 4:35 PM ) M2U00264 video transmission… whoever asked the question was (apparently) getting an ‘explanation’ ( apparently from SPGS1 Gary Cordes ) as to why Granite Mountain didn’t ‘stay up on the ridge’.
If that really is SPGS1 Gary Cordes making this ‘report’ at this moment in time about what went on earlier with Granite Mountain, and why they were no longer ‘on the ridge’ and were currently “coming from the heel of the fire”…
…then that is just more proof positive that SPGS1 Gary Cordes heard pretty much ALL of the radio traffic concerning Granite Mountain that afternoon… including that conversation Marsh had with OPS1 Todd Abel about ‘the weather’ ( circa 1550 ) that resulted in Abel telling Marsh to “Hunker and be safe”.
So something really isn’t ‘matching’ with regards to how much SPGS1 Gary Cordes really did KNOW about Granite Mountain’s situation and activities leading up to the deployment… and what Cordes was choosing to share in his ADOSH interview.
Apparently… Cordes knew enough about what was going on with Granite Mountain to share this ‘report’ with someone over the radio just minutes before the first MAYDAY… but then makes no mention to ADOSH of having had this kind of knowledge OR of having had any of these multiple ‘Granite Mountain’ related conversations we can now hear for ourselves in just the one Aarron Hulburd M2U00264 video alone.
Something not quite right there.
WTKTT
Remember way back at the first of this after the report was released I believe that RTS and I am not sure it was him said.
Several of the overhead team were up set because several things they had told the investigation team had not shown up in the official SAIR and they were upset about that.
I wonder if you are stumbling onto some of that now??????????
Maybe finding is a better term. Cordes knew what GM was doing but when he gave that information to the SAIT they left it out of the report.
Just thinking out loud here as a possible??????
Reply to Bob Powers post on December 17, 2014 at 10:13 pm
>> Bob Powers said…
>>
>> Cordes knew what GM was doing but when he gave that
>> information to the SAIT they left it out of the report.
Mr. Powers… yes… that might be the case.
Even during his speech on June 20, 2014 in front of that roomful of Utah firefighters… SAIT Co-Lead and USFS employee Mike Dudley let some things ‘slip’ about what people were telling them ( the SAIT )… but that information he was now talking about in public was NOWHERE in either the official SAIR document OR in the SAIT interview notes released via FOIA/FOIL request(s).
Best example would be the ‘alleged’ argument between Marsh and Steed.
Mike Dudley said that even MORE than one person the SAIT talked to had said they heard this ‘argument’….
…but there are no such quotes reported in either the SAIR or the YIN notes.
So yea… Something tells me a LOT of what FFs who were in Yarnell that day told Dudley, Karels and the other SAIT people has still never seen the light of day.
I also think that there might be LOTS of things these Firefighters told their ‘fire brothers’ on the SAIT… but then did NOT tell ADOSH even though ADOSH had WFA ‘fire guys’ asking them the questions.
A lot of FFs still have a bad attitude about OSHA and ADOSH… and you can sense their reluctance to even be talking to them in SOME of the ADOSH Yarnell incident interviews.
I’m not saying SPGS1 Gary Cordes was one of those. He seemed pretty comfortable with the whole ADOSH thing… and mature enough to know that these men were doing a job that they were required by LAW to be doing…
…but YES… I think there is a high likelihood that Gary Cordes was more ‘forthcoming’ with Karels and Dudley and the AZ Forestry team than he might have been in his ADOSH interview.
Just like some others during their ADOSH interviews… Cordes might have been in that mode of “Ask me the right question and I’ll give you the right answer”… but he wasn’t inclined to really VOLUNTEER a whole lot of information to ADOSH.
It’s always a lot harder to be accused of ‘obstructing an investigation’ when you are simply not VOLUNTEERING what you might know than it is to simply tell investigators something that isn’t true.
In his ADOSH interview… just about every time Cordes was asked if he heard something directly from Eric Marsh or not… Cordes tended to launch into these explanations of how he ‘couldn’t remember’ or he started reiterating about how he was having all kinds of ‘radio problems’ that day and that he might have heard something directly or he might have been using Blue Ridge as a relay and that’s how he heard something… yada… yada… yada.
In all the radio captures we can now hear with Cordes participating… we are NOT hearing someone having too many ‘radio’ problems. He seemed to be able to talk to whoever he wanted to… any TIME he wanted to… anywhere on the fire.
Bottom line here is that just like Darrell Willis… Gary Cordes had been there since about 11;00 PM the night before and now he was pulling the full day shift.
Willis gave the real ‘updates’ at the morning briefings up north.
Cordes handled all the ‘updating’ for inbounds on the south side.
He personally showed GM where to park their vehicles and he was personally running the dozer for hours that morning.
SPGS Willis was pretty much ‘running the show’ on the north end.
SPGS Cordes was pretty much ‘running the show’ on the south end.
SPGS Cordes really was, for all intents and purposes, the “Division Supervisor” on the south end of the Yarnell Fire all day Sunday, June 30, 2013.
That’s just the way it was that day.
Gary Cordes was on top of EVERYTHING that was going on that day on his end of the fire. He even said he was using binoculars and ‘glassing up’ Granite Mountain throughout the day to check on their progress.
Pretty much EVERYTHING that was happening on that south end of the fire was either originally HIS idea… or was happening under his DIRECT supervision.
For him to try and then pretend to ADOSH that he ‘doesn’t remember’ a lot of things or that he had all kinds of radio problems ans so he wasn’t quite sure who was working for who or what they might have been doing on his end of the fire or when certain critical things happened is… how shall I say it?…
…simply NOT CREDIBLE.
Followup…
This is just some more information about the phrase “they got directed to pick it up and monitor the weather” being heard in that M2U00264 radio transmission and is just one more bit of possible evidence that the person giving that ‘report’ about Granite Mountain at 4:35 PM was, in fact, SPGS1 Gary Cordes.
From the transcript of Hulburd video M2U00264…
——————————————————————
+2:31 ( 1635.54 / 4:35.54 PM )
( VOICE in the STATIC – Consenus seems to indicate it is SPGS1 Gary Cordes):
Because they didn’t need to. They didn’t complete the work that..
uh… they was doin’ this morning… then they got directed to pick
it up and monitor the weather.
——————————————————————-
TWO different times in his ADOSH interview, SPGS1 Gary Cordes uses the term ‘pick up’ when he is describing moments when triggers points were being met and fire crews had to stop working and evacuate.
In the first case, with Blue Ridge, he uses the phrase “picked up”.
“Cordes: …this fire had uh, blown up and changed direction on us.
And then Blue Ridge had picked up…”
In the second case, with his other crews, he uses the phrase “picking up”
“Cordes: …the trigger point for crew rem- uh, removing the crew was met so I,
I got on the, uh, told the guys to start picking up and, and getting ready
to get out of the area.”
So Gary Cordes was definitely someone who regularly uses the phrase ‘pick up’ when describing ‘work stoppage’ on the part of a fire crew.
This would be just one piece of additional evidence that it is most likely him giving that ‘report’ about Granite Mountain at 4:35 PM in Hulburd video M2U00264.
Here are the full quotes from Cordes…
From SPGS1 Gary Cordes’ ADOSH interview 9/11/2013
Q2 = ADOSH / WFA contractor Dave Larsen ( Rest in Peace )
A = SPGS1 Gary Cordes
Page 25
—————————————-
1108 A: …that was an only masticated area in there, I guess it was cleaned up about
1109 three years ago so we had, we did good on that, uh, we tied it into um, into
1110 Shrine, back in there, uh, cut it across between, I’m guessing it’s between
1111 those, what looks like those two roads in there and we actually were able to
1112 um, it was a couple hundred feet that they had to go in and, and I had three
1113 engines doing saw work in there to tie it into the rock pile up in there. And
1114 that was actively just about done when this fire had uh, blown up and changed
1115 direction on us. And then Blue Ridge had picked up, my guys were tying into
1116 the, into the rock pile, um, and Blue Ridge was improving that dozer line back
1117 on that, on that road going back to Sesame Street from Shrine.
1118
1119 Q2: Blue Ridge was uh, working for Eric?
1120
1121 A: Um…
1122
1123 Q2: (Unintelligible)?
1124
1125 A: …you know, it initially sounded like he was assigned to alpha. Um, Eric told
1126 him he didn’t need him up there and so Blue Ridge was kinda just, kind of
1127 um, I guess just, they, they jumped over and started helping me for the most
1128 part. They weren’t technically assigned to me but they were, they had jumped
1129 in looking, you know, looking for work, so we identified the need in there to
1130 improve this dozer line so that was their primary uh, primary goal.
——————————–
Page 29…
——————————–
1274 Q2: …uh, okay. Uh, 1545 so okay, so you requested the evacuation of town? Is
1275 that, am I still (unintelligible) excuse me, I’m back up at uh…
1276
1277 A: Yeah…
1278
1279 Q2: …1540 Yarnell, Yarnell evacuation trigger point met and you requested that,
1280 so…
1281
1282 A: Right, and Of – Musser showed up and, and met with me where I was parked
1283 on the road, asked me what I thought and I basically said this thing’s gonna
1284 move, it’s moving pretty aggressively towards town. Um, during…
1285
1286 Q2: Okay.
1287
1288 A: …that time, within that time frame, as you drop to the next line, the trigger
1289 point for crew rem- uh, removing the crew was met so I, I got on the, uh, told
1290 the guys to start picking up and, and getting ready to get out of the area.
1291
1292 Q2: Uh, and you told that to your guys?
1293
1294 A: To, Tyson and then of course I’m sure all of our guys were – heard that, I got
1295 feedback from the crews the next days after I debriefed ‘em and they had all
1296 heard that order.
1297
1298 Q2: Blue Ridge, uh, you think, uh, Eric heard that?
1299
1300 A: Um, it’s, it’s a possibility he did.
—————————————————-
I copy all that WTKTT. I went and listened to this again over and over this morning. I’m going to throw a wrench here (this audio is a bugger). I listened to who Cordes spoke with sequentially on M2U00264 and who all the players were and also how the radio transmissions sound. We know Frisby first, then TFLD3 Rob Beery, then TFLD2 Esquibel (both are Trainees), here is the over modulated static traffic, then Cordes abruptly says “go ahead” and this is in response to Abel.
It could be possible the static traffic is TFLD3 speaking. Considering Cordes had just mentioned GM being at BSR, then we potentially hear a resource talking about GM mere moments after the TFLD3 resources were asked to move into Yarnell. THEN, when Cordes breaks in on, almost on top of that static and says to Abel “Go ahead”….see where I’m going? Is this basically a fluid break in whomever Abel was talking to in the static? The helmet cam picked up one side of the static conversation, was the other person in a bad line of sight (we know Abel was N and not in good line of sight) to the Prescott guys or it could be wide/narrow banding of various resources radios. The wide/narrow banding discrepancy can cause garble sounding transmissions or extremely weak sounding transmissions. Cordes still may be involved with this static radio traffic then gave it up when he heard Abel calling? Cordes was communicating with TFLD3 at that time and it would make sense if TFLD3 was talking on the radio, the Task Force (T2 crew) were asked to bump down to N end of town by Cordes. I’m also questioning myself on the sound of the voice on your loop, I hear the “pick it up” similarities in overall comms but how the voice sounds, doesn’t sound like Cordes. Also, if it was Cordes in the static traffic, why would it be over modulated when we can hear him plain as day throughout the entire video? This is sort of maddening.
Reply to FIRE20+ post on December 18, 2014 at 10:11 am
>> FIRE20+ said…
>>
>> I copy all that WTKTT. I went and listened to this again
>> over and over this morning. I’m going to throw a wrench
>> here (this audio is a bugger).
Yes… it is. One of the harder ones.
No worries about ‘wrenches’.
That’s what ‘open discussion’ is all about.
There are a LOT of ‘nuts and bolts’ to tighten ( or loosen ) with all this stuff and it always take more than one ‘wrench’ to get this kind of job done.
>> FIRE20+ also said…
>>
>> I listened to who Cordes spoke with sequentially on M2U00264
>> and who all the players were and also how the radio transmissions
>> sound. We know Frisby first, then TFLD3 Rob Beery, then TFLD2
>> Esquibel (both are Trainees), here is the over modulated static
>> traffic, then Cordes abruptly says “go ahead” and this is in
>> response to Abel.
Yep. I would agree with all that. That’s what I think I’m hearing as well.
>> FIRE20+ also said…
>>
>> It could be possible the static traffic is TFLD3 speaking.
>> Considering Cordes had just mentioned GM being at BSR,
>> then we potentially hear a resource talking about GM mere
>> moments after the TFLD3 resources were asked to move
>> into Yarnell. THEN, when Cordes breaks in on, almost on
>> top of that static and says to Abel “Go ahead”….see
>> where I’m going?
Yes. The CLEAR “Go ahead” from (obviously?) SPGS1 Cordes just after this HUM and STATIC is part of the head-scratcher here.
>> FIRE20++ also said…
>>
>> Is this basically a fluid break in whomever Abel was talking
>> to in the static?
Well… at the moment… I’m assuming it is.
Keywords: “at the moment” and “assuming”.
>> FIRE20+ also said…
>>
>> The helmet cam picked up one side of the static conversation.
>> Was the other person in a bad line of sight (we know Abel
>> was N and not in good line of sight) to the Prescott guys or
>> it could be wide/narrow banding of various resources radios.
Not sure. Once again… my ‘assumption’ at the moment ( until we know more ) is that since Hulburd’s radio was (apparently) in total SCAN mode… the reason we hear the HUM and then the STATIC is that whatever his squelch was set to was only causing him to ‘lock on’ to this particular conversation when the signal finally met the low threshold of his ‘squelch’ setting to cause it to recognize the transmission as valid and then ‘lock on’ to it.
It might have been a combination of BOTH going on there.
Bad lines of sight plus squelch/lockon settings in ‘scan mode’.
Obviously ‘position mattered’ a lot of times that day.
Hulburd’s handheld only ‘locked on’ to whoever was ‘responding’ ( because they were nearer to his position in the St. Joseph Shrine parking lot? ) but obviously whoever WAS responding had heard the ‘question’ itself ( whereas Hulburd’s handheld did NOT lock onto THAT ).
So does that indicated the ‘caller’ was FAR away from Shrine road… but the responder was CLOSE to Shrine Road but in a ‘clearer’ position… such as out there on Highway 89 where we know Cordes was staged?
I don’t know. Maybe.
>> FIRE20+ also said…
>>
>> The wide/narrow banding discrepancy can cause garble
>> sounding transmissions or extremely weak sounding
>> transmissions.
Yes… and don’t forget the fire and heavy ash-filled smoke cloud was moving in on Hulburd’s position very quickly at this moment. All comms to/from the north might now have started to ‘drop out’ just because of that basically ‘solid object’ of a smoke cloud that was starting to ‘lay down’ on the Shrine area.
>> FIRE20++ also said…
>>
>> Cordes still may be involved with this static radio traffic then
>> gave it up when he heard Abel calling?
Again… I’m ‘assuming’ that is probably what happened.
The ‘report’ in the static seems to END logically as ‘end of report / question answered’ and whoever was responding to THAT could have quickly moved to that ‘next’ conversation and been the same person in both.
Doesn’t explain the over-modulation from one moment to another but ( as you know ) comms conditions CAN change from ‘second to second’ in a situation like that. First you get ‘garble’… then next ‘keyed mic’ you are clear.
Example: At the very START of this M2U00264 video we hear Frisby ( back at the Youth Camp ) calling Cordes ( out on Highway 89 ).
Hulburd was right in the MIDDLE of that ‘line of sight’ communication attempt ( standing in the Shrine parking lot ) and we can hear BOTH Frisby AND Cordes loud and clear…
…but Cordes’ first response to the clear transmit from Frisby was just this…
“Real Garbled”.
Frisby does a comms check with Cordes… then Cordes says “Go ahead” and Frisby repeats his entire initial transmit.
So we hear ALL of this ‘loud and clear’ over Hulburd’s handheld… but somehow Gary Cordes got a ‘garbled transmission’ at first from Frisby… but next ‘keyed mic’ was apparently now NOT garbled.
It was only 3,537 feet from the center of the Youth Camp ( where Frisby was calling Cordes from at the start of video M2U00264 ) to where Cordes was out there where Shrine Road meets HIghway 89.
Yet… even over that short distance… we hear Frisby having to REPEAT his transmit to Cordes because Cordes says his first transmit was “Real garbled”.
>> FIRE20++ also said…
>>
>> Cordes was communicating with TFLD3 at that time and it
>> would make sense if TFLD3 was talking on the radio,
>> the Task Force (T2 crew) were asked to bump down to N end
>> of town by Cordes.
Robb Beery was NOT interviewed by ADOSH.
The only indication we have of ANY testimony from Beery is that short section in the Arizona Forestry SAIT ‘Investigation Notes’. They misspelled his name as ‘Robb Berry’… but the SAIT did actually interview him.
Those SAIT interview notes are WORTHLESS.
Just total generalities and full of “He said this” and “He said that” and pretty much just all his ‘weather’ observations from that day as a certified LTAN/FBAN and practically NOTHING about his actual role on the fire that day and what he did or didn’t do… or did or didn’t SAY or HEAR on the radio.
It would have been nice if would could have seen what he was ACTUALLY saying insted of these piss-poor SAIT interview notes.
>> FIRE20++ also said…
>>
>> I’m also questioning myself on the sound of the voice on
>> your loop, I hear the “pick it up” similarities in overall comms
>> but how the voice sounds, doesn’t sound like Cordes.
I understand. As you said… this is a tough one.
When I used the word ‘consensus’ up above in relation to there being some ‘agreement’ that it is SPGS1 Gary Cordes… ‘consensus’ doesn’t even mean ‘absolutely for sure’. Actual definition of ‘consensus’ is just ‘general agreement based on what is known at a certain point in time’.
‘consensus’ never means ‘unanimous’ or ‘written in stone’.
>> FIRE20++
>>
>> Also, if it was Cordes in the static traffic, why would it be
>> over modulated when we can hear him plain as day
>> throughout the entire video?
Exactly… but see above. In the same way Cordes had to get Frisby to repeat his transmit at the start of M2U00264 because it was ‘Garbled’ on first attempt ( even though Cordes was only 3,537 feet away from Frisby )… the opposite might have taken place as far as Hulburd hearing Cordes just 1 or 2 minutes later. Hulburd might have gotten a bad lock on ( at THAT later time ) even though Cordes was still right there at the end of Shrine road.
>> FIRE20++ also said…
>>
>> This is sort of maddening.
The REALLY ‘maddening’ part of all this is that TWO separate, official investigations have failed to either identify a lot of these transmissions OR use the interviewing process to provide clarity.
Nobody really did their homework here.
When you have this kind of ‘evidence’ with radio captures… it’s pretty much ‘Investigations 101’ that you get the best transcripts you can BEFORE you have all the possible involved parties in front of you for interviews.
THEN you ASK THEM if they can identify their own voices or whether they remember the conversations.
The ONLY recording we know of that the SAIT played during ANY interview was when Mike Dudley ‘let it slip’ in public on June 20, 2014 that they actually DID play the Robert Caldwell “Hunker and be safe” audio clip for OPS1 Todd Abel DURING his SAIT interview. There was NOTHING about them doing that in either the SAIR or the SAIT notes… but Dudley stated flat-out ( almost a year later, on June 20, 2014 ) that this IS what happened.
Dudley said ( on June 20, 2014 )…
———————————————————
But… prior to that… by like five minutes… there is a discussion that
takes place between OPS and Eric Marsh… and all you hear is
Eric saying “I’m making my way off the top”. Top a what? Top of
that box canyon? Top of to the north end?
And OPS says… “Copy that. You guys hunker and be safe.
Let me know if you need air support.”
You don’t hear the front-end of that conversation. You don’t hear
the tail-end of that conversation. You just hear that clip.
We replayed that audio for OPS and said… “Is this you?”… and
he goes “Yup… that’s me. I do NOT remember that conversation.”
——————————————————–
NOTE: Obviously the OPS person Dudley is talking about to that roomful of Utah firefighters was OPS1 Todd Abel.
This was the FIRST we ever learned that the SAIT actually played ANY of the myriad of radio captures we know they had in their possession to ANYONE during ANY of their interviews.
As for ADOSH… the ONLY evidence we have that THEY ever played ANY of these many, many radio captures for ANYONE during their interview(s) is during their second interview with Brendan McDonough on October 10, 2013, two months AFTER their first interview with him.
During that SECOND interview with Brendan… they now (finally) had copies of the two 9 second Christopher MacKenzie videos loaded onto an iPhone and they played them for Brendan during this second interview.
However… the ONLY QUESTION they had for Brendan about these 2 video clips was if Brendan could confirm that really was Eric Marsh and Jesse Steed talking about ‘comfort levels’ there in that radio exchange.
Brendan verified it was Marsh and Steed talking. That’s it. Nothing else.
ADOSH moved right on with their interview and NEVER asked Brendan even one single other question about that ‘discussing their options’ conversation such as what ELSE might have been said and what ELSE he ( Brendan ) might have said.
Not even about the 26 seconds in-between the two 9 second videos when Marsh and Steed had obviously still been ‘discussing their options’.
Here is that entire moment from Brendan’s second interview when they played him one of the MacKenzie videos…
Q2 = Marshall Krotenberg – Lead ADOSH investigator
A = Brendan McDonough
———————————————————————
Q2: Oh. Um, and then we – I just wanted to show one video and a question about who was talking and – and, uh…
A: Eric and Steed. That was, yeah, that…
Q2: …on the, uh…
A: I’m pretty much…
Q2: …on the radio. And it’s – it’s not this person that’s on – on the other end of the radio.
A: It’s the only one I know of. But I can do my best.
Q2: I know it’s gonna work.
(( CHRISTOPHER MACKENZIE VIDEO RECORDING PLAYS))
A1: Oh I just – I was just saying I knew this was coming when I called you and
asked how – what your comfort level was. I could just feel it, you know?
((END OF RECORDING))
A: That’s Eric Marsh and Jesse Steed.
Q2: Yeah, and who was on the radio talking? That was coming through the radio. Was that you?
A: No. That’s Eric Marsh.
Q2: That’s Eric talking to…
A: Jesse Steed…
Q2: Okay.
—————————————————————–
ADOSH moved right on and never asked Brendan even one single other question about this critical “discussing their options’ conversation.
Unbelievable.
Unless I have missed something… that is the ONLY time that ADSOH ever even attempted to get ANY of the many, many people they interviewed to even listen to ANY of these radio captures that were already know to exist just to see if they could identify themselves ( or others ) speaking.
What was that word again?
Oh yea… “maddening”.
Thank you both for this (to me, maddening–because of what we’re dealing with) conversation.
I really appreciate what FIRE20+ is saying here, given that I have mostly no clue how firefighters hear/listen to these kinds of noise-filled radio signals.
FWIW, in this conversation, I’m pretty sure Gary Cordes was NOT at the intersection of Shrine Road and 89 when this was happening.
He was, according to his ADOSH interview, further northeast of there, in the Norton Way area, where the fire was moving in and thus they were involved in last minute (GRRRR) evacuations, thus his saying they might be starting to get structures burning.
So I’m thinking that THAT factor (his not being on a clear “line of sight” line and his being in an area impacted by the column collapse and fire moving in) might be part of the reason why his radio “sounds” may be going in and out and his communication with Frisby was garbled.
And thanks FIRE20+ for catching that the “up north” firefighter commenting on the crew coming in would have been Bob Beery. He was interviewed in (slightly) more depth by ADOSH.
I’m still actually fairly confused about what you two are talking about (especially that part about Abel). All of this stuff is just so “noisy” to me, I’m dependent on what you are “hearing.”
But in spite of that, and given that I disagree on Cordes’ location, I’m hoping my two cents here might be worth something.
Reply to Marti Reed post on December 18, 2014 at 10:13 pm
>> Marti said…
>>
>> FWIW, in this conversation, I’m pretty sure Gary
>> Cordes was NOT at the intersection of Shrine Road
>> and 89 when this was happening.
>>
>> He was, according to his ADOSH interview, further
>> northeast of there, in the Norton Way area, where
>> the fire was moving in and thus they were involved
>> in last minute (GRRRR) evacuations, thus his saying
>> they might be starting to get structures burning.
The Norton Way area was, in fact, ‘further northeast’ of where Shrine road actually intersects with Highway 89… but that area was actually CLOSER ( as the bird flies ) to the center of the Youth Camp than even the intersection of Shrine and Highway 89.
Youth Camp to intersection of Shrine and Hwy 89: 3,537 feet.
Youth Camp to Norton Way area: 2,975 feet.
The ‘edge’ of that high ridge on the north side of Shrine Road starts to come into play… but the actual ‘distance’ was about 562 feet CLOSER than intersection of Shrine and Hwy 89.
>> Marti also said…
>>
>> And thanks FIRE20+ for catching that the “up north”
>> firefighter commenting on the crew coming in
>> would have been Bob Beery. He was interviewed
>> in (slightly) more depth by ADOSH.
Marti… I’m still not seeing any actual ‘face to face interview’ with Rob Beery on ADOSH’s part. All I’m seeing is that really short Rob Beery ‘Unit Log’ that was included in the ADOSH FOAI/FOIL release.
This one…
ADOSH Yarnell Hill Investigation/AZ Forestry Division/
Unit Activity Logs/
Rob Berry Structural Group Supervisor/
Rob Beery Narrative.pdf
( Notice the mispellings even in the directory names for ‘Rob Beery’ )
Not much in that ‘Rob Beery Narrative’ PDF document.
It’s actually even sparser than the SAIT Investigation notes for Beery.
Is there really some other actual ‘interview’ ADOSH had with him and I am just missing it somewhere in the ADOSH package?
>> Marti also said…
>>
>> I’m still actually fairly confused about what you two
>> are talking about (especially that part about Abel).
Near the end of the video.. it is Todd Abel himself talking to Cordes about how the winds are also picking up really bad up north where he is ( on Miner’s Camp Road ).
It’s the transmission that ends with Todd Abel telling Cordes to be ‘heads up’ about that ( since if Abel is seeing winds picking up where he is then they are probably also about to hit down in Yarnell where Cordes is ).
>> Marti also said…
>>
>> But in spite of that, and given that I disagree
>> on Cordes’ location, I’m hoping my two cents
>> here might be worth something.
Marti… your 2 cents is always more like a buck and a half.
Thank you.
Reply to Marti Reed post on December 18, 2014 at 10:13 pm
>> Marti also said…
>>
>> I’m still actually fairly confused about what you two
>> are talking about (especially that part about Abel).
Marti… here’s what I have here for that part from the HUM and the STATIC right through to when Frisby and Brown pull up to Yowell and Hulburd in the BR Polaris Ranger…
Right after the HUM and the STATIC is the part where Cordes is telling Abel they are about to lose structures in Yarnell… and Todd Abel says “Copy’ and then tells Cordes to be ‘heads up’ because Abel is seeing the wind pickup where he is up north at this same moment there on Miner’s Camp Road.
AARON HULBURD VIDEO M2U00264…
——————————————————
+2:29 ( 1635.51 / 4:35.51 PM )
(Very loud HUM followed by STATIC with a voice in it reporting to someone )
+2:31 ( 1635.54 / 4:35.54 PM )
( VOICE in the STATIC – Possibly SPGS1 Gary Cordes ):
Because they didn’t need to. They didn’t complete the work that.. uh… they was doin’ this morning… then they got directed to pick it up and monitor the weather.
+2:36 ( 1635.59 / 4:35.59 PM )
(Foreground: Aaron Hulburd): That’s gotta be… (Eric or Jesse?) (Blue Ridge?)
+2:37 ( 1636.00 / 4:36.00 PM )
(Foreground: KC ‘Bucky’ Yowell): That’s gotta be them, yea.
+2:41 ( 1636.04 / 4:36.04 PM )
(Foreground: More COUGHING. Sounds like Yowell coughing )
+2:44 ( 1636.07 / 4:36.07 )
(SPGS Gary Cordes): Go ahead.
+2:46 ( 1636.09 / 4:36.09 )
(Unknown): This… (Dell’s?) comin’ over (??) winds ??.
+2:51 ( 1636.14 / 4:36.14 )
(Unknown): ( Keyed mic. Only static )
+2:52 ( 1636.15 / 4:36.15 )
(Unknown): ( Keyed mic again. Only static )
+2:53 ( 1636.16 / 4:36.16 )
(Unknown): ( Keyed mic once again. Only static )
+2:53 ( 1636.16 / 4:36.16 )
(Foreground: Unknown): ( Two loud, deep coughs. Yowell again? )
+2:54 ( 1636.17 / 4:36.17 )
(SPGS1 Gary Cordes): …and that’s what’s been happenin’ the last twenty minutes here. Just poundin’ us hard right now. I think we’re gonna start losin’ some structures here in a few minutes.
+3:02 ( 1636.25 / 4:36.25 )
(OPS1 Todd Abel?): Copy… and the wind’s definitely pickin’ up over here on ( Camp? ) so heads up.
** NOTE: STRANGE TRANSMISSION HERE
+3:06 ( 1636.29 / 4:36.29 )
(Unknown): ?? AND drop ??
+3:07 ( 1636.30 / 4:36.30 )
(Foreground: KC ‘Bucky’ Yowell): (Greeting the Blue Ridge Polaris Ranger UTV as it arrives at the St. Joseph Shrine parking lot with BR SUP Brian Frisby and BR Captain Trueheart Brown onboard. Brown appears to be driving and Frisby is on passenger side.)
What time is it? Is it dark, or what?
+3:08 ( 1636.31 / 4:36.31 )
(Foreground: BR Captain Trueheart Brown): It IS dark ( up here ).
+3:09 ( 1636.32 / 4:36.32 )
(Foreground: KC ‘Bucky’ Yowell): How ya doin’, guy?
+3:12 ( 1636.35 / 4:36.35 )
(Foreground: BR Captain Trueheart Brown): Fuckin’ makin’ sure idiots aren’t burnin’ themselves out. God DAMN.
+3:14 ( 1636.37 / 4:36.37 )
(Foreground: Aaron Hulburd): We figured you guys were bringin’ up ( the rear ).
+3:16 ( 1636.39 / 4:36.39 )
(Foreground: Jason Clawson?): ( To Frisby): Where’s Jesse?
We didn’t seem ’em in the buggies.
+3:18 ( 1636.41 / 4:36.41 )
(Foreground: BR SUP Brian Frisby): They’re in the black right now tryin’ to ( get safe? ).
————————————————————
I’m still having a hard time with the IRONY of what Blue Ridge Captain Trueheart Brown said to KC ‘Bucky’ Yowell there just about 150 seconds before Jesse Steed’s first MAYDAY was going to hit the radio.
+3:12 ( 1636.35 / 4:36.35 )
(Foreground: BR Captain Trueheart Brown): Fuckin’ makin’ sure idiots aren’t burnin’ themselves out. God DAMN.
** FOLLOWUP – For this ‘voice in the static’ thread – Hulburd video M2U00264
**
** IT APPEARS BR CAPTAIN BROWN WAS DRIVING THE BR UTV?
There was a question up above on this thread with regards to who MIGHT have been making that radio call in the static and also with regards to Brian Frisby… and a secondary question as to whether Frisby was actually DRIVING the BR Polaris Ranger as they evacuated the Youth Camp and pulled up to Hulburd and Yowell’s location in the St. Joseph Shrine parking lot.
Hulburd’s video camera was apparently down on his BELT for the duration of this M2U00264 video so when the BR Ranger actually pulled up to Yowell and Hulburd the video gets all ‘dark’ and the camera is just capturing vague waist-level shots of the huddle that then took place around the Ranger.
So it’s almost impossible to tell who was driving the Ranger as it came up to the men, turned around, and actually ended up parked in front of them with the headlights shining back to the WEST.
However… there are two small ‘accidental’ shots in that sequence which would tend to prove that it was BR Captain Trueheart Brown that actually drove the Polaris Ranger out of the Youth Camp, and NOT BR SUP Brian Frisby.
Frisby appears to have been in the passenger seat of the UTV for that trip out of the Youth Camp and he also appears to have exited the Ranger when it pulled up to Yowell and Hulburd and he was standing in front of it with his hand on his hip.
Captain Trueheart Brown ( driving the Ranger ) appears to have stayed sitting in it behind the wheel for this entire face-to-face meetup with Hulburd and Yowell.
** SOME PROOF?
At exactly +3:23 into video M2U00264, Hulburd’s camera suddenly captures a ‘torso’ shot of the person who was driving the BR Polaris Ranger. He has not exited the UTV and is still sitting behind the wheel.
His LEFT hand is resting on his LEFT leg… and he is wearing a thin silver wedding band on his left ring finger.
Blue Ridge Hotshot Cory Ball’s still photo with filename IMG_1882.JPG is that photo of Blue Ridge Captain Trueheart Brown ( taken earlier that day ) standing on the dozer line with his back to the camera.
Brown has left hand is on his hip in that photo and his fingers are exposed.
Brown is wearing the same wedding ring on his left hand.
Also in video M2U00264… at exactly +3:35 into the video… Hulburd’s camera captures another quick ‘torso shot’ of a person who is now standing in FRONT of the Polaris Ranger with his hand on his hip and talking to Hulburd and Yowell.
This person has his hand on his hip the exact same way Brian Frisby is seen in that position in other photos… with his wrist bent as it rests on his hip.
Probably not POSITIVE proof that Trueheart Brown was the one actually driving the UTV out of the Youth Camp area ( leaving Frisby’s hands free to make radio calls )… but I’d say it’s a pretty good bet that was the case.
hummm…I cannot imagine a better one to talk about this but the ONE girl who traveled it more than anyone in the past decade; oh that would be me…you had the rancher on his horse with many dogs use the 2 track ridge above but you did not see him in the box canyon. You saw a runner on the 2 track ridge but not in the box canyon. I saw affairs on the Weavers but not in the box canyon. I saw an atv enthusiasts very rare over by Harper Canyon area/old grader not the box canyon. I seen prospectors and geologists and herp enthusiasts and some hunters over time yet again not in the box canyon. Even I avoided the box canyon but that was because it was the spot I would let go right below the 2 track ridge area on that 60% grade MANY and I mean many of rattlesnakes and skunks for I relocate them for free in Congress/Wickenburg/Peeples Valley and Yarnell. You did not see folks in the box canyon yet you did see a bounce of a deer in some spots or a fox or for the most part WILDLIFE…it was odd because I was suppose to be in Montana 6-30-13 yet that very “cracker” (CRACKER IS MY EMPHASIZED WORD FOR THE F WORD) morning and yet I got photos exactly in the area the men died. We argued by gps coordinates in the spot the men died because Sonny wanted to go up and when it was not yet day break and I was not in mood to go that 60% grade that early and because HOW MANY rattlers I let go in that area I was not going to fight the maze intertwined chaparral/scrub oak/cat claw/etc and I wanted to scale boulders yet look at the map I gave Bob Powers in last chapter and walk the year 2012 and see the boulders are not the same as satellite images 2014- facts! Now to sit and analyze the Helm’s being it was their safety zone- deception plays a role here because of the maze like terrain and I do not care how everyone comes up with their views who never hiked it… I have lived and breathed that area and I can do it blind fold then and now and I can tell you if you are a “trained” wildland firefighter you are not going to drop down there period for so many reasons and I have hiked it so many times and you are going to ride the very narrow tight knit areas of washes and old game trails not drop down there…it will bewilder me when you had less vegetation on the boulders of both sides of that bowl. PLUS the easiest way to the Helm’s before the fire screwed that area up was not the bowl area but where I saw Eric Marsh for the very first time that morning on the old grader side not the 2 track ridge.
Hi Joy,
Thanks for this comment. I think it is very helpful to hear from you and Sonny on all fronts, but particularly on the realities of trying to hike through that area, among other things.
YOU ARE WELCOME SR!
I am not someone you want to know nowadays…kind gentle me has seem to went into hiding after the horse shit with YCSO and Chief Ben Palm. I have been told I give a pierced look nowadays that can cut you up without words and you know what it’s a general look for the “cracker” world (CRACKER means the F word by ten folds in my world) …I cannot tell you HOW MANY TIMES I have SEEN FOR MY OWN EYES photos/videos and just let them know the IMPORTANCE of their accounts yet “wah” for whatever horse shit reason …maybe just LIFE….but I am sorry how about the nineteen lives…LIFE by 19 WHO can’t go forward and do what the hell we all are doing piecing this together. “CRACKER” the higher ups and the shit I just heard this week—Yes, believe it or not Joy has to follow every CRACKERING law but there is individuals in this that YCSO can lay it in the grey area as they are ABOVE THE LAW like Chief Ben Palm. I have the MAPS you CRACKERING idiots to the extent I KNOW YCSO and YFD is out of jurisdiction and State Land needs to do more to enforce any law there. I KNOW the law…I abide them…you guys are just trying to stir it up to get us arrested any way possible because YOU have something to HIDE because WHO would torment me like I have seen…you know what…just the other day I got word from History Channel producer about our show and today I came up with a great idea after my hike/walk in the foggy hail yesterday…How about them doing our tv show on this…think of National Geographic’s Survival Alaska but have the teams be not military/endurance/mountaineers/woodsmen but YCSO team players Sgt Ashby and Deputy Brickner) vs. THE HIKERS (Sonny and Joy) vs the GMHS (Donut and Phil Mando) vs. YFD (Chief Ben Palm and that blonde firefighter or one of their others that are more emt than firefighters that love doughnuts)…drop our ass off in that dense terrain and do the same survival stuff like Alaska—shit drop our ass in Alaska and I will still beat ALL of them even the one who is a challenge in my eyes MANDO…That is a reality show I’d like to see versus the negotiations and shit I am seeing…I bet your ass we would be 100% transparent in the journey EVEN saving the lives of the ones we are up against or feeding them because they would starve if we did not yet I doubt they would do the same you arrogant sons of whatever…I am on a hunt these hikes lately…I see lots of locals but none of you GET IT…you don’t! 19 men died. Your accounts and photos and videos DO MATTER! Shit, I had a person say this week to me would you understand these men are not your family Joy or husband or noone to you so why you carrying on…That was the first thing to slide me into a piercing mode than the one this week from herp man who was letting me know he will be on 3 episodes of National Geographic …Date: Tue, 16 Dec 2014 06:52:54 -0700…people who know me know I had a fear of rattlers because as a kid I had one in my sleeping bag with me in it at Lake Pleasant one Summer night and few other very close calls so this herp man came with his great pal Meredith and himself and he hiked with me to teach me to overcome the fears and even after SHOWING him and their family my medical records as it was always posted “live” my results they hiked with me then we went to eat and they said the ENDURANCE I have is awesome yet no way I can be all it says in my blood labs and mri/scans…no way…THAT IS MY POINT!!! How come I MAKE THE TIME to help these 19 and all affected? BECAUSE IT IS THE MOTHER CRACKERING RIGHT THING TO DO!!!! Years later with not much communication because I am in person gal I get a HOLIDAY CHRISTMAS GREETING this week from him/his family and the reply I got was this: “On another side of the coin, there is no way in hell Joy, that you are a sick as you say. There is no way (if you were THAT BAD) that you could even possibly do what you have been doing since I saw you last. This is a good thing though. Glad you are out fulfilling your life! The way you spoke when Meridith and I were there, you had yourself dying in he next few years. How long has that been? Just making a point. I am so glad you are still with us but more communication would be appreciated! Take your laptop with you!!!!!!”…This is the SHIT I use to get from the limelight celeb/govt folks over time that I just did my thing and ignored them but lately my pure anger is core deep because I do feel because I SAW it (THOSE IMPORTANT PHOTOS) that why is the 2nd Christmas to go by but still no more accounts just some in passing say “we have to get together” but due to SENSITIVITY and POLITICS I have to watch not to be pestering and let God handle it but hey me and God we have our moments because I do not GET IT. Yes, I am in a very toned spot yet I am not going to allow another’s agenda dictate my actions…I am still going to be law abiding and do the right thing…shit, maybe since it is rumor I should do a craigslist ad and do tour guides…but I won’t because God guides the people to us…I don’t need an ad but I DO NEED more people locally and on that fire to be more public and TRANSPARENT.
Oh and if anyone sees I am in a mood and feel good time to let it out on me…seen it this week…I ignore those kind of CRACKERS…have at it…tee it up…I do not mind it at all…maybe that is what we all need is a RELEASE from this horse shit because here we are all typing about Cordes and I am going direct and I am going IN direct…There is 7 folks on the fire I now know what and how to ask on FOIA or public records and I am on fire to get it especially on YFD and State currently.
Thanks again SR…for seeing it DOES MATTER everyone’s accounts even silly ass fat ass housewife/hiker and that vintage mountain man Sonny…
Mon, Dec 15, 2014 at 1:55 PM
I did inquire on hiring a private investigator that goes up against state and feds-
and soon will meet with Bill Lee and another. That is how far the YCSO and Chief Ben Palm went with me singling us out but GREY area for Chief—we will see how grey the area is—You should of never welcomed me to your world…I am out to get the fact based shit even more now—
deaths in the Glen Ilah/Yarnell/Peeples Valley/Congress/Wilhoit since the fire?
Stephen Tullos Wed, Dec 10, 2014 at 11:47 AM
To: “[email protected]”
Cc: Barbara Fox-Thomas
The Board of Supervisors passed on your inquiry dated Dec. 5th 2014 regarding the number of deaths in the Glen Ilah/Yarnell/Peeples Valley/Congress/Wilhoit area since the fire. To date we have not received any information to raise our concerns regarding the number and types of deaths in this area.
We are pulling data for that area to see if there is a reason for additional study.
I want to thank you for your concern, and we will keep you posted on the outcome.
Stephen C. Tullos
Director/Health Officer
Yavapai County Community Health Services –
1090 Commerce Drive
Prescott, AZ 86305
Office: 928-442-5966
http://www.YavapaiHealth.com
As I just posted that I just saw Sonny’s email has a lengthy letter to the FBI as well…Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 6:10 PM…[email protected]…
https://www.dropbox.com/s/otrhdsabdcrk2uc/141215_0005.MP3?dl=0
locals —you can see the meeting and tires and shit here on link above
http://www.investigativemedia.com/yarnell-hill-fire-chapter-x/#comment-208488
Joy A. Collura says
DECEMBER 15, 2014 AT 12:49 PM
today’s meeting:
https://www.dropbox.com/s/otrhdsabdcrk2uc/141215_0005.MP3?dl=0
Bob Powers suggested to Sonny to look into some areas…here is that reply:
Tue, Dec 16, 2014 at 9:54 AM
McDaniel, Doug Tue, Dec 16, 2014 at 9:54 AM
To: “[email protected]”
This is in response to your December 5 email to EPA’s enforcement headquarters office. They forwarded it to Region 9 recommending referral to the state. I have referred it to the Arizona Department of Environmental Quality. At a minimum they should be familiar with the area and may be able to explain the old drums and the signs put up by the state. Perhaps they will be aware of an agency that can address your concerns about health impacts and risk. I expect they will contact you.
Douglas K. McDaniel
Chief, Waste and Chemical Section
Enforcement Division
U.S. EPA Region 9
(415) 947-4106
Sounds like you are getting some movement. Keep plugging away.
“WTKTT said in
WantsToKnowTheTruth says
December 16, 2014 at 3:13 pm
I wish they had ( picked up the pace ). It is still astounding that regardless of why 2 men decided to lead 17 others out of a safe area and into a ‘risky’ situation that ( once the decision was actually made ) they weren’t doing ‘double-time’ the whole way”
It might have made all the difference that afternoon.”
This was one of the last comments in the Ch X comments.
The vegation and surface in the bowl wouldn’t have allowed for double-time. Sorry to seem obsessive on the point. But, local crew or not, either they went into that bowl figuring they’d probably beat the fire by 15 minutes or so at most if everything went their way, or simply had never, even as a local crew, been on a sustained bushwhack through that kind of brush, they weren’t going to be double-timing it.
The faster route would have been the rocks to their north. Obviously that would have been more exposed, and entailed a higher risk of serious injury from a fall. But, in that kind of terrain/topography and vegetation, the rocks are going to be faster if you can pick your way through. That route would have even allowed a better view of the fire’s progress. And some trees in the rocks survived. But, the fall risk would have been scary. All the more reason for them to conclude they should have reversed and gone back to the black.
Sr. Are you saying that rock hopping on the boulders (down the spine of the north rim of the deployment valley) within view of the fire in the middle bowl, would have been faster/safer than taking the loosely connected game trails that the SAIT claims they took?
Hmm… I would think that those boulders would be pretty tough to get through. It’s one thing when one is scrabbling around unburdened. It’s another with (for some) a saw in hand, and a low, wide backpack hanging at butt level from long straps. Not that the vegetation route was easy, but perhaps chosen for being less awkward.
The vegetation route also didn’t have the risk of a serious fall.
While the boulders on the spine would clearly be the faster way to go for one or two people with less gear, I agree they would not have been acceptable for GM as a crew, simply a better option given facts than the route they chose, IF they felt some compelling need to get down to “structures” without choosing a safe way to get there.
I agree with what RTS says below about game trails usually being sidehill or countour, and further note that in that kind of vegetation, any game trails such as they are will normally not allow easy human passage.
I also agree with RTS’ statement that the mid-slope road would have been better than either the boulders or the middle of the bowl.
Simply, for me, the middle of the bowl doesn’t compute even relative to other options for making a relatively straight descent towards BSR while biting off a big chunk of risk.
SR… great phrase you just used.
“compelling need”
THAT is what we still don’t know.
Did these men feel some “compelling need” to make the decisions they were making… or were they “just moving” as Eric Marsh himself supposedly reported to Air Attack Bravo 33?
What still doesn’t match at all here is if there really was some kind of “compelling need” that could have possibly justified that risky bushwhack ( in their own minds )… then why were they just ( apparently ) strolling along at an average person’s walking pace for the entire 15 minute ‘first leg’ of the trip up on the two-track.
That still just doesn’t make ANY sense.
Regarding “compelling need,” it’s possible that any qualitative info on the nature of the supposed disagreement between Steed and Marsh might also shed some light on this. But, I suspect a desire for relevance might at the end of the day be the main story.
As for the slow pace, I don’t find it that surprising. The most arduous part of that trip was ahead of them, and then after making it to the BSR, while the reality would have been there wouldn’t have been much constructive to do (and in fact they likely would have had to deploy, there) they likely had thoughts of more exertion once there. They weren’t actively running FROM something. So, they paced themselves.
Reply to SR post on December 17, 2014 at 12:37 pm
>> SR said…
>>
>> Regarding “compelling need,” it’s possible that
>> any qualitative info on the nature of the supposed
>> disagreement between Steed and Marsh might
>> also shed some light on this.
I would imagine so, yes. Even if there is no ‘video’ or capture of any of the radio traffic… if people even just RECALL hearing this ‘argument’ it would be hard to have not gotten the ‘gist’ of what it was ABOUT… unless the only thing people still living heard was two men cussing at each other ( doubtful ).
>> SR also said…
>>
>> But, I suspect a desire for relevance might at
>> the end of the day be the main story.
Agree. It’s also a fact that MANY people see no need to either seek or discover ANY ‘relevance’ to take away from this tragic incident at all.
To them… it’s simple.
“Firefighters died. Build the memorial. Move along.”
>> SR also said…
>>
>> As for the slow pace, I don’t find it that surprising.
>> The most arduous part of that trip was ahead of
>> them,
Interesting point you just made that really hasn’t been discussed much or in any way resolved.
Did Capation ( Acting Superintendent ) Jesse Steed KNOW what the whole planned ‘escape route’ was BEFORE he ordered Granite Mountain to ‘gaggle up’ circa 4:00 PM… or did he consent to the ‘mission’ without having ever scouted the route or any idea how they were really going to reach the destination.
Were he ( and the men ) somehow ‘saving their energy’ on that first leg of the trip because they KNEW they had a steep-grade bushwhack coming… or were they clueless?
When Steed reached that piece of pink flagging tape at the ‘descent point’… had it been ‘advertised’ to him already over the radio by Marsh… or was it truly a WTF moment for Steed?
If there was an ‘argument’… it might have been over THIS ‘decision point’ alone… and it might have happened right then and there when Steed encountered Marsh’s ‘go this way’ pink flagging.
Steed might have jumped on the radio and said “Hey Eric… I lowered my ‘comfort level’ for you and consented to ‘the move’ you were pitching… but I sure as hell didn’t consent to THIS”.
>> SR also said…
>>
>> …and then after making it to the BSR, while the reality
>> would have been there wouldn’t have been much
>> constructive to do (and in fact they likely would
>> have had to deploy, there) they likely had thoughts
>> of more exertion once there.
Perhaps. I still believe the idea that they were somehow expected to be the ‘improvement crew’ for any emergency dozer line that might have been able to come togther near the BSR could have been the reason for THIS timing…
1555 – All of GM at rest and taking pictures in safe black
1600 – Cordes tells Ball to scout dozer line near BSR
1604 – GM is up and moving south to the BSR.
Even if that isn’t the case… you have to wonder if the new transmission from Cordes where we (apparently) hear him arranging for a ‘dust off’ of Granite Mountain from the BSR ( via Esquible and one or more engines ) wasn’t part of some PROMISE that Cordes himself had made to Marsh.
Something along the lines of…
“I don’t know if the dozer push near that ranch is going to come together or not… but if it does we’ll need you guys to improve it ASAP. So if you can just get to that ranch you’ll either be in place to do that just as it is ready for you… or else I’ll just make sure you have transport OUT of there.”
>> SR also wrote…
>>
>> They weren’t actively running FROM something.
No, they weren’t
The were not ESCAPING. They were already ESCAPED.
The ‘new move’ was more RENGAGING than ESCAPING.
RENGAGING for WHAT? And on whose suggestion?
>> SR also said…
>>
>> So, they paced themselves.
Perhaps… and that means PRIOR KNOWLEDGE of not only what they were moving FOR… but what route they were going to take to get there.
If/when you are ‘saving yourself’ for some work at the end of a hike… you usually know WHAT that ‘work’ is supposed to be when once you get there.
No ‘answers’ here, really. Just more interesting questions.
Sr is right on that rock hopping–likely as slow though as the brush but what you could look at was the sparse to no vegetation in that area– an area to the south and to the north as well that was greater in area than the Helms bombproof area. Note that the Helms had tires burn off some old truck there so it got damn hot right outside their place–likely you were safer inside than out for a time. Right again Sr since you would have never experienced bushwhacking or else you were confident someone was going to unload retardant or water on your head and those flimsy fireblankets would do the job–or you thought someone needed rescuing at the helms. Willis did say ordinary people couldn’t transverse that maze of brush. And i suppose that makes Joy and I extraordinary–we did in the morning at the area they died==but it was indeed slow and treacherous and took us from near day break to 9;38 to get about a mile and a half. There was definitely no way to double time in that type brush. Another tip off was when Willis said that is what they do–protect structures–he couldn’t see them sitting there safe in the black but saw them doing what they do and the reason they died according to his words was because God had another plan for the,m. He almost had another plan for Joy too since she was headed for certain disaster as well. Yet how could one know the wind would change unless you had lived in that kind of weather outdoors or else someone had trained you to be wary of wind changes during thunderstorms.
Joy will tell you I kept her near the boulders and in them dropping off the other side since we did not have fireblankets or copters to drop coolant, or rescue teams to fly in to retrieve us.
Seems like you guys are getting closer to the truth every time i come on this site.
We do have some state peiople going to be looking at the deaths of so many Yarnell rersidents since the fire. Maybe they will let us know the 8% secret ingredients dropped here by the ton next to Yarnell. We know the nitrates are bad for health, and rivers and oceans are getting dead zones from that shit, but what are those 8% ingredients– Their paperwork on LC95A says there has never been a study on mice or men as to the health effects. They assume that this stuff is good ;for health, after all it makes plants grow fast while it kills fish and makes dead zones in rivers, etc–but so does shit. Makes me think of depleted uranium bullets–if they kill the enemy they also kill you over time. . .
Anyhow we will keep pounding at this and i feel comfortable with what Joy does. Her heart is in this to get the truth, but you need to know the local fire people are no too happy, and neither is the sheriff department. I don’t think they had any wrong doing except I think maybe they know more than they want to say. Seems they have to dance a fine line to keep their jobs in this state. Maybe being a miner wasn’t such a bad job all those years. You were free of the bull shit that way–or just turn on a Jack Leg in your drift and see how fast everyone scatters.
Still more, maybe the FBI is looking at this as well–I know at least one fellow is watching closely. So keep up the good work. I think those feds could tie up the loose ends if they did get involved. I did send in a request–who knows they might.
Reply to SR post on December 16, 2014 at 5:45 pm
>> SR said…
>>
>> The vegation and surface in the bowl wouldn’t have allowed for double-time.
Probably not… but the FIRST LEG of the journey ( up on the clear high-ridge two-track ) was an ideal place for ‘double-time’..
On page 26 of the SAIR is that ‘table of time estimates’ that the SAIT came up with. ADOSH never did their own and was trusting these ‘numbers’ in the SAIR.
Lunch Spot to Descent Point: 0.95 Mi. / 1,678 Yd.
Descent Point to Deployment Site: 0.27 Mi. / 470 Yd.
Deployment Site to Boulder Springs Ranch: 0.38 Mi. / 677 Yd.
Lunch Spot to Boulder Springs Ranch: 1.6 Mi. / 2,825 Yd.
The distance that the SAIT did NOT inlcude in their table ( even though the report heavily mentions the possible route ) was the total distance from where they were ‘at rest’ circa 1555 and the Boulder Springs Ranch via the ‘alternate escape route’… which was the two-track/trail that went all the way there.
That ‘total distance’ was just a little more than 2 miles.
So the place where they could have easily ‘double-timed’ was obviously the first leg of the journey…
Lunch Spot to Descent Point: 0.95 Mi. / 1,678 Yd.
The SAIT had them leaving what they chose to call the ‘Lunch Spot’ at about 4:05 PM ( A minute after Wade Parker texted that photo to his mother at 4:04 PM ).
The SAIT also had them then ‘arriving’ at the ‘descent point’ at approximately 4:20 PM.
So the SAIT was establishing that it took them 15 minutes for the first leg of the trip ( 1,678 yards ).
That would be a ‘travel speed’ of…
3.8136 mph
6.1374 kmh
1.7048 meters/sec
335.5999 feet/minute
That’s just slightly faster than the ‘average walking speed’ for just about anyone.
From Wikipedia…
————————————–
Although walking speeds can vary greatly depending on a multitude of factors such as height, weight, age, terrain, surface, load, culture, effort, and fitness, the average human walking speed is about 5.0 kilometres per hour (km/h), or about 3.1 miles per hour (mph).
————————————–
If the SAIT’s time/distance numbers can be trusted at all… then it is obvious they were in NO kind of hurry for that entire first leg of the journey.
They SHOULD have been. TIME was very much their enemy on that ‘journey’.
If the theory is correct that Marsh went AHEAD of Steed/Crew and was the one ( and ONLY one ) who decided the men should bushwhack and left that pink flagging tape up at the descent point to indicate where HE wanted them to drop into the canyon…
…then I still think this idea that just one person making their way through that tangled mess could be far faster than a line of 18 men trying to do the same thing factors in here.
Marsh might have had the “If I can do it quickly… then so can they” mindset and really was totally forgetting what the drastic difference would be for 18 men trying to ‘stay together’ in a line and negotiate the same terrain.
Marsh might have ‘waved them down’ thinking they had plenty of time ( because he did it quickly ) when nothing could have been further from the truth.
It still disturbs me a LOT to think that Eric Marsh really was out ‘ahead’ of those men that day and was the one urging them to come ‘forward’ on the bushwhack. If Eric Marsh was anywhere east of the mouth of that box canyon at any time prior to 1639… then that means he SHOULD have been able to see the fireline approaching… but he STILL let those men continue their descent and walk right into a deathtrap.
It really doesn’t add up. The story is that GMH sat in the black for a full 14 minutes watching the fire progress toward them and their pre determined SZ, 1550-1604. Then walked along a Two track road watching the fire progress toward them. And then drop out of view of the oncoming fire with no view or safety in place. And deploy fire shelters where there wasn’t a chance of survival, without one person breaking ranks and trying to outrun the fire. No, it just does not make any sense. And especially, common sense.
Yes, exactly. What the GMHS did that fateful day unequivocally DEFIES LOGIC, DEFIES COMMON SENSE, DEFIES TRAINING, AND DEFIES THE BASIC TENETS OF WFF RULES.
As far as the GMHS traveling through the brush and/or boulders, you at least have GRAVITY on your side when going DOWNHILL through the brush AND you have something to grasp and hold onto as you travel downhill, very much quicker than traveling uphill in steep terrain.
And there are USUALLY animal trails through the brush but GENERALLY SIDE-HILL AND/OR CONTOUR trails and NOT straight up or down.
I’m not so certain that the boulders would have been a quicker route and must agree with Calvin that ‘boulder hopping’ would NOT have been feasible, quick, or safe. It’s very difficult and tough walking in, and working in and around boulders like that. Yes, you have the boulders to utilize as natural barriers to anchor your firelines to, but the boulders are also WFF travel barriers that restrict your movement and speed of travel. Watch Out # 17 “Terrain and fuels make escape to safety zones difficult.” I use this one even when NOT traveling to a SZ just because of the travel limitations.
The fact that some trees did NOT burn in and among the boulders is NOT an indication that this would have been a safe route or even an indication of a safe route because the DEADLY HOT GASES would have been ubiquitous. And there are all kind of wind eddies and swirling going on amongst the boulders since they act as miniature chutes and chimneys. It’s very difficult and unsafe fighting fire in and amongst boulders during active fire. IF the fire is INACTIVE or just ‘skunking around’ in the duff and leaves then it’s more doable, otherwise not because it requires water by fire hose and.or helicopter bucket drops to cool the flames down in order to construct firelines.
I think their quickest speed SHOULD HAVE BEEN on the mid=slope road, free of any obstacles. They had NO view of the fire once they left their perfectly good SZ and they posted NO lookout as required to warn them of the fire. They did NOT inform AA of their intentions and/or their actions so they were virtually traveling blind.
Reply to calvin post on December 16, 2014 at 8:30 pm
>> calvin said…
>>
>> It really doesn’t add up.
No, it doesn’t…. and very well said up above, calvin.
There is Something. We. Don’t. Know. ( YET ).
Whatever that is… I’m afraid it won’t add any ‘sanity’ to the situation… but for the sake of kids now growing up without their fathers and who will one day be wondering why that happened to THEM…
…it will at least add some CLARITY.
Calvin said…
“Then walked along a two track road watching the fire progress toward them”…
…for (supposedly) a full 15 minutes at a walking pace not really much faster than any average person out for a stroll.
Makes no sense (yet).
Not wishing to drag all this up again, but in the interest of completeness thought I could contribute to this;
I’ve been researching the source of m2u*mpg files, and while having nothing conclusive, everything points towards them being from a Sony camera (as I believe has been previously discussed).
It’s also worth noting that some cameras/phones (even old ones) create thumbnails (*.thm) when shooting movies, that are essentially JPEG (.jpg) images, AND that these thumbnail images will contain EXIF data (as JPEG’s have EXIF meta data attached as standard).
These thumbnails are created at the start of the movie and/or at intervals throughout. These may give extra EXIF data, but also, may give clues to any ‘missing’ movie segments.
Is it worth revisiting the “Freedom of Information” request to see if they should/could have supplied these ‘digital’ media files as well (if they existed either on the phone or camera)?
Thank you all, for all your research time and effort to get to the truth.
Much is now known that wasn’t previously known… but there are still many mysteries that remain to be solved. Slowly ( but surely ) we will get there. As we like to say around here… even the biggest trees eventually fall… but it still takes every swing of the axe… one at a time.
It should have NEVER been this hard to simply get to the real truth about what happened that terrible day.