Investigative MEDIA

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  1. Joy and I attended the rearranged fence showing: by invitation only and I believe it is to be closed now to the general public. Ered Matthews produced the play called “The Fence”: and Katy Cornelius, who was in charge of re arranging the artifacts from the fence have done an excellent job of honoring those men, The pieces of the original fence are about 4×7 feet and now arranged by three in a triangle so that you can walk around them. On each piece of fence is a photo of a GMHS with commentary and a brief history of their personal life. There are two large rooms of mementos and gifts left that honor the men.

    It was good to see the Mayor of Prescott, Marlin Kuykendall there to honor the men as well. He wants to hike with us the route the men took, which in distance is coincidentally comparable to the route he takes yearly at the White Sands Proving Ground near Alamogordo, NM. He tells me that one is 15+ miles long and over 5000 people hike it each year, mostly veterans, to commemorate the Bataan Death March. We certainly will hike the Mayor and perhaps Dr. Ted Putnam. I personally enjoy the hikes where Ted comes along since he has the expertise from 11 years of smoke jumping to understand what actions firefighters take and the whys, wheres, and whens of firefighting actions

    Joy has come up with more photos she has talked out of people here. One has a blue ridge helmet in it and the other shows two clear smoke columns. These are time stamped photos and will add to the understanding of events for that day. Ted is looking at the photos now and seeing their significance concerning the fire. She of course will share those photos with you and I think has to some already. .

    I am told that there are already some undercurrents to settling the suits out of court. I think it is inevitable considering the weight of evidence against the state. et. al, . When that happens much will never come to light except that which John Daugherty and others looking at this will let be known.

    In studying books on past fires such as those put out by John McClain, I have come to a conclusion that the old crony system is still at work. Seems that there is more concern for saving a crony’s job than there is for the safety of the lives of future firemen. I haven’t heard of even one boss being fired in this instance, yet we did hear that one Osha boss was transferred to a different position. I thought they would have started with the guy that told the Congress and Yarnell to stand down on the first day that lightening struck–especially considering the extreme fire alert we were on in the Yarnell area. Large signs posted at each end of the town warned of this danger and fires had to be put out immediately under the conditions of drought we were in. Shame on the bosses of bosses that ran this show–and as far as I can see–only cronyism, nepotism or plain stupidity would prevent a cleaning of house in this tragedy. Some ought to step down on their own in good conscience, but I suppose 19 deaths and a bumbled event hasn’t prodded them well enough yet Time may take care of that as more evidence appears.

    Thanks for all you do. I never really got closure on the death of my 29 year old son who was dear to my heart. His mom refused to let him learn mining with me–she said it was too dangerous–so he took up underwater welding. His death came in August of 99 after a tragic accident some years before left him without the use of his right arm. I have always believed he was murdered, but then I never got closure on that case. I got every detail I could but never really could get the information that I needed. These loved ones of the firemen who died deserve every piece of evidence they can get if they want it. I am told that some do not want it, and that too is their right. They can just keep their eyes closed and let those who want to know all the facts do exactly that. Joy and I will continue to reveal all we can find out–part of it is in honor of my son Ted, whom I will always consider a hero along with those who perished that terrible day of June 30, 2013..

    Reply

    • reply to “Joy has come up with more photos she has talked out of people here.”

      I posted on bulletin flyers…I did not talk anyone out of their photos. We were at the legion. Sonny talked about the fire and then KHG stated she usually does not have her laptop on her but she did that day and she has a massive file of fire photos from Friday thru Sunday but scattered and not easily to view as she has private mixed with fire and just could not search pulling up the date so it is a chore but I did grab a few with a Blue Ridge helmet firefighter and the smoke stacks from Glen Ilah, near the Helms and Peeples Valley view.

      I doubt Dr Ted Putnam will be joining the hike with the mayor-

      The statement on court stuff—there has been so many discussions on that area but I hope it goes to court…my hope…

      Reply

  4. **
    ** ANNIVERSARY 1 – NEW INFORMATION COMES OUT – PART 3

    This one doesn’t actually qualify as ‘new information’ coming out, but it was still and interesting ‘piece’ that got air-time DURING the coverage of the anniversary events from the Prescott Court House.

    It contains an on-camera interview with Elizabeth Nowicki.

    WMBF NEWS ( YARNELL, CBS5 )
    Article: State keeping Yarnell Hill Fire secrets, say critics
    Posted: Jun 30, 2014 7:13 PM CDT
    Updated: Jul 01, 2014 9:34 AM CDT
    By Morgan Loew

    http://www.wmbfnews.com/story/25909911/state-keeping-yarnell-hill-fire-secrets-say-critics

    The written part of the article does a poor job of reporting what was actually said in the real VIDEO interview(s)… so here is a ‘transcript’ of just the actual VIDEO that accompanies the article…

    TRANSCRIPT OF VIDEO PART
    ————————————————–

    The video was introduced by CBS5 anchorman Sean McLaughlin who was sitting with co-anchor Catherine Anaya in the Prescott Courthouse Square and covering the actual first anniversary events at that location.

    Sean McLaughlin: And a growing number of critics are now saying that part of the blame goes on the investigators themselves. Investigative reporter Morgan Loew joins us live back at the studio in Phoenix with that part of our story tonight. Morgan?….

    Morgan Loew: Sean and Catherine… when the State Forestry division released its investigation it met with some harsh criticism for glossing over some of the biggest questions.

    ( Audio clip is played of a female dispatcher saying “There are confirmed 19 fatalities.” )

    Morgan Loew: The immediate question after any tragedy is… what went wrong?
    The report released by the Forestry Division left that question largely unanswered.

    ( Video cuts to an on-camera interview with Scott McKee, Grant McKee’s father )…

    Scott McKee: There’s a lot of things that have been withheld… and lied about… and… ( He shakes his finger at the camera and adds… ) you cannot lie to somebody about how their child died.

    Morgan Loew: Scott McKee’s son Grant was one of the Granite Mountain Hotshots. He and others refer to the State’s report as ‘a whitewash’. It blamed communications problems but did not hold anyone accountable.

    One year after the tragedy and the number of people accusing the State of ‘keeping secrets’ is growing.

    ( Video cuts to an on-camera interview with Elizabeth Nowicki )…

    Morgan Loew: How open has this investigation been, in your experience?

    Elizabeth Nowicki: The investigation hasn’t been particularly open at all.

    Morgan Loew ( narrating ): Elizabeth Nowicki is a law professor who has tried for months to get access to the investigative records that were not included in the State’s report.

    EN: The investigation team members, for example, uhm… withheld their notes from uhm… their interviews of key players on the Yarnell Hill Fire.

    Morgan Loew ( narrating ): Some of those interview notes allegedly taken during interviews with the Blue Ridge Hotshots working nearest the firefighters who died and among the last to speak to them on the radio. Investigators were also not allowed to interview everyone they wanted to.

    Morgan Loew: Why is it important that all of the records that SHOULD be released ARE released… in an investigation like this?

    Elizabeth Nowicki: What I have seen is that the withholding of information, the ‘circling… uhm… of the wagons’, can be incredibly damaging. It’s not the right thing to do. It’s not the way to move on. It’s not the way to make the fireline safer.

    Morgan Loew: Nowicki says in her experience that two of the side-effects of secrecy in an investigation are lawsuits and conspiracy theories.

    Last week we saw the first lawsuit arise from neighboring landowners against the State… and there are lots and lots of conspiracy theories making rounds on the Internet about what really happened on the mountain that day.

    Sean and Catherine ( back to you )…

    ————————————————–

    It’s nice to see even this kind of ‘acknowledgement’ on the part of the MSM of the immense problems that are now ‘common knowledge’ regarding the poor handling of the YHF investigation(s)…

    …but all-in-all it’s still really a piss-poor piece of reporting in that despite its title… it doesn’t even get into WHAT information might be being ‘kept secret’ other than some quick comment on Nowicki’s part about about the Blue Ridge interview notes being ‘withheld’.

    It is, essentially, just its own brand of ‘conspiracy theory’ reporting because all it does is say there are ‘secrets being kept’… but doesn’t explore the topic in any realistic way.

    Reply

  5. So the major thing I’ve been working on is a number of IMHO important Vehicle Timelines. And here’s what I have so far.

    RHR tag indicates visibility in photos/videos of RHR parking lot after deployment.

    Air2Air STARTS

    1510: 2:48:31 (ends 3:10)
    1544: 3:16:14 (ends 3:44)
    1628: 3:47:58 (i.e.3:48) (ends 4:28)
    1643: 4:30:50 (i.e. 4:31) (ends 4:43)
    1716: 4:45:19 (ends 5:16)

    SEEN BY AIR2AIR camera:

    Red Dbl-cab Wickenberg:
    1544+8:30 = 3:24:30 east/out
    1544+27:27 = 3:43 west/in goes back into Model Creek area. Right about when Musser was supposedly with Gary Cordes and contacting Granite Mountain about commitment to the ridge.
    1628+1752 = 4:06 east/out of Model Creek.
    4:30 Minimart v/Rick Thams
    RHR: RickTams-4:51, TomGarrigan-4:56 (? Rebel T3), ReasonVid, Story 5:07, Swartz-6:37, 6:38 and 6:44.
    (Paul Musser?)

    State Fire Panels: 1544+1 = 3:17 east and 1544+10:44 = 3:27 west
    (ICP and Blues videos)

    White Truck Pulling Big UTV: 1544+5:38 = 3:21:38 west (related to Bea Day?)

    Blue Truck: 1628+3:22 = 3:51 east
    RHR: Story 5:12:26
    (Has to be Rance Marquez but makes almost nada sense to me.)
    If Rance is telling the truth in his interview about post-deployment, his truck has to be heading east somewhere in the same video same time-frame as Darrell Willis — 1716 + 10 = 4:55, since his truck is in Story’s first pano at 5:12:26, four minutes after Willis appears. If he’s four minutes behind Willis, which fits his narrative, he would pass at 1716+14 = 4:59. And that video runs til 5:16. But there’s no blue Rance truck in that video.

    Also, if he’s telling the truth, Cougan’s truck would have to be there/then too, but that wouldn’t work. Cougan’s probably-just-pulled-in truck is in the Reason video, around 4:45-4:55, so Cougan would have had to have passed the video camera about 4:30 the same time as Coles (1643+1:25 = 4:31:20), the Black Ram (1643+2:47 = 4:34), and the BLM Engine and it’s accompanying white pickup (1716+:6 = 4:46). I suppose he could have passed the video before it started. But none of this timeline fits Rance’s story.

    I have seen neither of these trucks in either of these required times in the Air2Air video.

    StateFire: 1628+6 = 3:54 east
    RHR: Rich Tham 4:51, thru Tom Story
    (who??)
    (another with a rack passes west at 1628+35:39 = 4:24)
    (my last comment about this on June 16 was that I was beginning to think this might be Byron’s truck. That doesn’t match his story, tho. but parts of his story don’t make sense anyway).

    Prescott FD SUV: 1510 = 2:48:31 west and 1628+9:42 = 3:58 east
    RHR Story 1692 5:12:26 (I just id’d that, it’s the truck on the far left edge of Story’s panos).
    (Tony Sciacca)

    PrescottThreeTeam: (from PB 1616VLAT split)
    ClawsonTowingATV: + 8 sec = 4:13
    HulburgTowingATV: +11 sec
    Yowell: + 19 sec

    BLM Dan Philbin: 1628+36 = 4:14
    RHR Story 5:08, Swartz 6:44.

    StateFire IncidentManageTeam: 1628+40 = 4:28 east
    RHR Story 5:06
    (who??)

    White Tacoma “Fire”: 1643+1:25 = 4:31:20 east
    RHR: Rick Thams 4:51, Reason Video, Story 5:06.
    (Marty Cole)

    Black Ram Match: 1643+2:47 = 4:34 east
    RHR: Swartz 6:38:10 and 6:44:21
    (who??)

    WhiteTruck BLM Engine Companion 1716+:6 = 4:46 east
    BLM Engine: 1716+ :11 = 4:46 east
    I just realized if the BLM crew passed the camera at 4:46 they maybe couldn’t have made it to the 89/RHR any earlier than (if it took Willis 12:27 to do it abt the same time at about 23 mph) than 4:58. So Reason video might be about 4:56-4:58. They could have maybe done it faster than Darrell, but not by a lot, judging by the traffic.

    Prescott FD NoLightsOnTop: 1716+10 = 4:55 east
    RHR: Story 5:08 Swartz
    (Darrell Willis)
    So according to WTK on June 8, the time between Willis passing the cam and pulling up to the RHR (at 5:08) is 12:27. At avg 23 mph.

    Grey Dbl-cab “Fire”: 1716+25 = 5:10 east
    RHR: Swartz 6:44
    (Todd Abel)

    PS Also, regarding Musser. Calvin’s comment, that Musser was that that tall thin guy in the MiniMart photo made me chuckle. I hadn’t even thought of him as being tall, given how short the guy is that we think is Musser in the Story photos of prepping the Blue Ridge UTV.

    However, in the USFS photo IMG_0605, the overhead shot of the procession, the red Wickenberg truck is there, and so is a tall thin guy holding a white cowboy hat.

    Reply

    • Wow.. a LOT of GOOD ’roundup’ work there… Marti. Thank you.
      I’m reading / re-reading it all but it all looks pretty accurate to me.

      I know a lot of people don’t understand this focus on the vehicles, their owners,
      and their exact locations/whereabouts at various times… but there have been
      any number of times now where this exact information has led to OTHER
      discoveries with regards to how ACCURATE the ‘testimony’ is… and who
      is ( or is NOT ) giving good testimony about their activities that day.

      More later.

      Reply

      • I agree and thank you.

        The narrative of all of what happened via/out of that Ranch House Restaurant Parking Lot has never been written and I believe it’s extremely important.

        And I’m seriously troubled by the fact that Rance Marquez’ narrative, which he so carefully put together for the ADOSH interview, isn’t supported by the visual evidence. Maybe that’s just “the fog of war.” But it’s just not “making science” to me.

        Reply

        • Reply to Marti Reed post on July 2, 2014 at 9:36 pm

          >> Marti said…
          >> The narrative of all of what happened via/out of that Ranch House
          >> Restaurant Parking Lot has never been written and I believe it’s
          >> extremely important.

          Agree.

          By the way… I just finished re-reading Tyson Esquibel’s entire ADOSH interview to see if there really was any place in there where he describes
          the ‘near death’ experience we are only now hearing about from the
          Peeples Valley crew that was under his command ( there is, actually, NOTHING from Esquibel in his interviews to support the recent testimony from these Peeples Valley fireman )… and I found something I hadn’t seen before with regards to that pickup in the Tom Story photos that had all the EMT boards in the back of it.

          That MIGHT be Esquibel’s truck.

          He says the first ‘plan’ was to (quote)
          “…get all the ALS gear into the pickup that I was in.”

          SIDENOTE: ALS stands for “Advanced Life Support”.

          Page 62 of his ADOSH transcript is where they started asking
          him about what he was doing after the deployment.

          ———————————————————————————
          Q: Okay. So we hear about a deployment, and then does Gary Cordes give you some specific directions as to what he wants you to do?
          A: Uh, right after we heard the deployment, uh, yeah. We met at the, uh – we were all at the café.
          Q: Right.
          A: Uh, we got together with Blue Ridge.
          Q: Okay.
          A: And, um, the plan was to, um, get all the ALS gear into the pickup that I was in.
          Q: Mm-hm.
          A: And we were gonna take, um, uh, four additional medics with myself. I’m an EMT.
          Q: Okay.
          A: They were – they were gonna take the 4 medics, um, and then we were gonna, uh, either try to locate them or treat them when they were located. Uh, my truck was gonna go in with the Blue Ridge, um, supt, and, uh, they had a Rhino, and then they were gonna take their sup truck along with us; so it was gonna be those 3 vehicles that were gonna go – either try to locate them when it cooled down enough or, um, start treatment whenever they were able to find ’em.
          ———————————————————————————-

          >> Marti also wrote…
          >> And I’m seriously troubled by the fact that Rance Marquez’ narrative,
          >> which he so carefully put together for the ADOSH interview, isn’t
          >> supported by the visual evidence. Maybe that’s just “the fog of war.”
          >> But it’s just not “making science” to me.

          Also with regards to Tyson Esquibel’s interview… there seemed to be no doubt in his mind that Gary Cordes wasn’t just SPGS for Yarnell. Esquibel seemed to be sure that Cordes was a ‘Division Supervisor’ there on the south end of the fire since he was (quote) “doing all the things a Division Supervisor would do.”

          Esquibel was never even really aware that someone named ‘Marquez’ had showed up earlier and was declaring that HE was ‘DIvision Z’ Sup.

          To Esquibel… DIVSZ was Gary Cordes and no one ever gave him any reason to think otherwise. Interesting.

          Reply

          • I wrote an earlier response, but it got lost in moderation (typod my email address……)

            That white State Fire truck goes east by the videocam at 3:54 PM. So it can’t be Tyson.

            I’ve always thought Tyson was driving the big Glendale Special Ops van with the gold stripe. It’s out at the Youth Camp in one of the Blue Ridge photos. And that’s what he meant by “his pickup.” It was extremely specially outfitted for hazardous EMT kinds of stuff.

            It was dispatched that morning, and, I think, assigned to him. He had to catch a ride to the fire (don’t have the dispatch stuff open atm) with somebody else.

            Reply

  6. I just posted a video to You Tube called “Yarnell Fire Behavior Timelapse.”

    As I was, yesterday, still working on cleaning up my “Vehicle Timeline,” I found myself mesmerized and screen-snapped these. They’re not carefully calculated, time-wise, so I put the timestamps on the images, along with a few notations of what was happening.

    It starts a bit before the deployment, when you can see the big flames over the Shrine Road/Youth Camp area. It ends at the final frame of the final Panebaker Air2Ground video.

    Here’s the link. I hope it works. (I’m having a REALLY hard time posting comments here, as if I haven’t already paid my dues).

    I’m gonna put this up via Dropbox, also, but I only have so much bandwidth.

    http://youtu.be/6Il4vUrOYHU

    Reply

    • Well done, Marti.

      About a week before the anniversary… while we were ‘chasing cars’ on Hays Ranch Road, I also found it useful to SPEED UP these Panebaker Air-To-Air channel videos.

      I uploaded everything to YouTube and they do come in handy for TWO reasons…

      1) Finding vehicles without re-watching the LONG versions of the videos.

      2) Getting a full sense of the SPEED and the POWER with which that fire headed SOUTH.

      I uploaded them to the following PUBLIC YouTube account…

      YouTube Account Page for: WantsToKnowTheTruth…
      http://www.youtube.com/channel/UChknok8ZdSi8mPJ9nAK2L7A

      As of June 23… that account contains the following ‘sped up’ versions of the Panebaker Air-To-Air channel videos…

      NOTE: Your time-lapse is superior to these since you put the TIMES of the image
      captures right on the screen. These videos don’t have that. They are just pure
      SPED UP versions of the original videos… but they are, in fact, ‘continuous’ speed-ups
      and are now similar to the Matt-Oss video taken of the same timeframe from the
      the Congress side of Yarnell. They give you the FEEL of how fast that fire was moving.

      Panebaker Air-To-Air Channel videos 6 times faster than normal…

      1510-EP-X-6
      1544-EP-X-6
      1628-EP-X-6
      1643-EP-X-6
      1716-EP-X-6

      Panebaker Air-To-Air Channel videos 35 times faster than normal…

      1643-EP-X-35

      ** DETAILS ON EACH VIDEO

      1510-EP-X-6
      Published on Jun 23, 2014
      Panebaker Air-To-Air channel capture video 20130630_1510_EP at 6 times normal speed.
      Original video length: 22 minutes and 10 seconds (1,330 seconds).
      6x video length: 3 minutes 41 seconds (221 seconds).
      Each second of THIS video equals 6 seconds in the original.

      1544-EP-X-6
      Published on Jun 22, 2014
      Panebaker Air-To-Air channel capture video 20130630_1544_EP at 6 times normal speed.
      Original video length: 28 minutes 12 seconds (1,692 seconds).
      6x video length: 4 minutes 42 seconds (282 seconds).
      Each second of THIS video equals 6 seconds in the original.

      1628-EP-X-6
      Published on Jun 23, 2014
      Panebaker Air-To-Air channel capture video 20130630_1628_EP at 6 times normal speed.
      Original video length: 40 minutes and 14 seconds (2,414 seconds).
      6x video length: 6 minutes 42 seconds (402 seconds).
      Each second of THIS video equals 6 seconds in the original.

      1643-EP-X-6
      Published on Jun 22, 2014
      Panebaker Air-To-Air channel capture video 20130630_1643_EP at 6 times normal speed.
      Original video length: 12 minutes and 22 seconds (742 seconds).
      6x video length: 2 minutes 3 seconds (123 seconds).
      Each second of THIS video equals 6 seconds in the original.

      1716-EP-X-6
      Published on Jun 23, 2014
      Panebaker Air-To-Air channel capture video 20130630_1716_EP at 6 times normal speed.
      Original video length: 31 minutes and 25 seconds (1,885 seconds).
      6x video length: 5 minutes 14 seconds (314 seconds).
      Each second of THIS video equals 6 seconds in the original.

      1643-EP-X-35
      Published on Jun 23, 2014
      Panebaker Air-To-Air channel capture video 20130630_1643_EP at 35 times normal speed.
      Original video length: 12 minutes and 22 seconds ( 742 seconds ).
      21x video length: 21 seconds
      Each second of THIS video equals 35.3 seconds in the original

      Reply

      • Awesome! Thank you! I”ll definitely be checking these out, when I’m not as brain-dead as I currently am.

        I’ve been watching these videos for weeks, as I’ve searched for VIV (Very Important Vehicles).

        Watching the Panebakers, you really see that fire turn around with incredible power. And in the images that I”ve used, it seems you see the flaming front, or actually two of them, burning at the bottom of the “big bowl” (which it had come down) and also at the bottom of the “little bowl” which was filled with unburned fuel and would, thus become a chimney.

        And then the Mayday and then the smoke drops down and covers the flaming front. And then you see it all rising, intensifying, until eventually it bends over and over, and draws all the smoke down into Yarnell as Yarnell burns.

        Maybe there were back-burns which contributed to some destruction somewhere. But, to me, these images show a fire which was it’s own Master, which didn’t need anything, by then, from any miniscule humans to pursue the course it was bent on pursuing.

        Reply

        • >> Marti said…
          >> Maybe there were back-burns which contributed to some destruction
          >> somewhere.

          It is, of course, possible. The new Dakota Slone videos almost seem to support that theory… but ONLY on the EAST side of the fire towards
          Highway 89. They shed no light on what might have been happening
          out there in the Sesame area or near the Boulder Springs Ranch.

          >> Marti also said…
          >> But, to me, these images show a fire which was it’s own Master, which
          >> didn’t need anything, by then, from any miniscule humans to pursue
          >> the course it was bent on pursuing.

          Also agree.

          In the ‘sped up’ version of the 1643 video… it’s really quite clear that the same situation that was easily seen from the FRONT in all of the photos taken by Granite Mountain itself just increased in intensity and the only ‘help’ it needed was contact with that massive amount of ‘gasoline on a stick’ in that middle bowl and some wind behind it.

          The Panebaker videos show that the WESTERN edge of that same fireline photograhed so clearly by Christopher MacKenzie himself was ALREADY pushing DUE SOUTH when he took his photos… and simply CONTINUED to do that with no ‘backburns’ needed to help it reach that box canyon.

          That western edge of the fireline as seen clearly in Christopher’s own photos was only 4,400 feet from the mouth of the box canyon… even before they decided to take ‘the hike’.

          The Panebaker videos just show that WESTERN part of the fireline continuing to charge straight south…. and meet them at the mouth of the box canyon.

          Watching both the Matt Oss vide ‘time lapse’, taken from the Congress side, and now these ‘other side view’ time lapses running at the same (fast) speed but taken from the Peeples Valley perspective…

          …it is still inconceivable to me that they could not have known they were getting into deep tapioca just by LOOKING UP.

          YES… they lost sight of actual ‘flames on the ground’ when they dropped into that canyon… but both video perspectives now show that if they couldn’t see what was happening up in the AIR around them, and ahead of them… then they either had sun-blindness… or they were staring at the ground and not even LOOKING UP.

          Reply

      • These really are excellent!! Everybody should see them.

        I wrote awhile back that I thought everybody should watch the Air2Air videos, but it it does take a lot of time, watching the grass grow and blow in front of the conflagration.

        No more excuses. WTKTT you have made the whole fire and its changing nature and direction available for everyone to see.

        Great guitar meditation, also. I was having enuff trouble getting Lightroom to put the slideshow together right, and I thought about music, but couldn’t quickly think of anything appropriate.

        And it is so fortunate the Panebaker Crew went out and took these videos. For sure they were intended to analyze the effectiveness of aerial fire suppression, but they really documented the whole fire behavior and these videos are priceless.

        Reply

      • This version isn’t working well out of Dropbox. I’m going to re-export it in a smaller version and repost it. I just hate losing too much resolution.

        Reply

  7. **
    ** ANNIVERSARY 1 – NEW INFORMATION COMES OUT – PART 2

    As I was hoping might happen… the local Arizona Media Outlets returned to the their ‘raw footage’ archives from a year ago and some of the ‘anniversary’ reports featured video that either hasn’t actually been seen before or only appeared briefly ‘on the air’ and then was ‘pulled’ from their sites and sent to their archives.

    SIDENOTE: Why neither investigative team ( SAIT or ADOSH ) ever made ‘official’ requests for ALL of the raw video from these local media outlets is yet another mystery. They SHOULD have.

    One of those videos that showed up a few days ago that I don’t think ever made it ‘onto the air’ is footage taken on July 4, 2013 showing ‘Patrick Bernard’s’ property.

    Patrick Bernard is the guy who owns that property out at the FAR end of ‘West Way’. He is an artist and he was/is building a large home on that site.

    That is where Jerry Thompson and his ‘Sun City’ crew ( and brush truck(s) ) had been working doing ‘structure protection’ about 1/2 mile due south of the Shrine Road Youth Camp… and the location for ALL of Jerry Thompson’s photos and videos taken June 30, 2013.

    The REASON this ‘new video footage’ is important is that since the discussion leading right up to the first anniversary was including BACKBURN possiibilites… and the Jerry Thompson / Sun City crew was the crew that was working further WEST of town that day than anyone else, except for Tyson Esquibel’s crews over in Harper Canyon… any new evidence about what the Sun City Crews were actually DOING out there WEST of Yarnell remains totally relevant.

    This is the ‘video’ that ‘resurfaced’ a few days ago.
    The ‘Bernard Compound’ ( Jerry Thompson’s work location ) is featured in the second part…

    http://archive.cincinnati.com/VideoNetwork/2535192898001/Yarnell-residents-return-to-charred-homes

    The compound itself where they were working out there at the extreme western end of ‘West Way’ was similar in size to the ‘Boulder Springs Ranch’ ( 2 – 2.5 acres ) and was fairly ‘free’ of vegetation, so it is not exactly clear WHY they were out there doing a lot of work on it… or who even TOLD them to be out there working on it. Jerry Thompson and the Sun City trucks were apparently NOT ‘officially’ part of Tyson Esquibel’s ‘Task Force’ on the south end of the fire so they may have been getting their ‘work assignments’ directly from SPGS Gary Cordes.

    NOTE: Apparently… if you also drove out to the extreme western end of ‘Juniper Way’ you would also see this compound just a few hundreds yards west.

    The VIDEO shows that ( just like the Boulder Springs Ranch ) the compound mostly SURVIVED the intense burnover/burnaround… but there WAS some damage. Some vehicles that were ‘outside’ burned up, etc… but all in all the structures survived.

    So even though ‘Jerry Thompson’ and the ‘Sun City’ crew/trucks were working out there on structure protection pretty much farther WEST than any other crew in the Yarnell area ( except for Tyson Esquibel’s crews over in Harper Canyon ), there is NO EVIDENCE in either Thompson’s own videos or the newly released post-fire video footage of the Bernard compound that they did ANY BACKBURNING at all that day. At least not at THAT location… which is where they were right up until the moment they had to evacuate to the Ranch House Restaurant like everyone else did.

    As the fireline was approaching… they barely had time to get out of there themselves. Just one more ‘too close for comfort’ evacuation of firefighters that day in Yarnell. The ’embers’ were already falling on them in the last part of Thompson’s last video when he says “We need to get the hell out of here”. So it is VERY doubtful they would then pause to initiate ANY kind of ‘backburn’ as they were evacuating. It doesn’t appear that they had time for that, even if they had considered doing it.

    ** THE JERRY THOMSPON VIDEOS TAKEN AT THIS ‘PATRICK BERNARD’ COMPOUND…

    The BOULDER PILE seen in the new video footage just behind the ‘barn’ structure at the Patrick Bernard compound is exactly where Jerry Thompson and his crew were standing when Jerry Thompson shot all his photos and videos that ended up in the SAIR FOIA/FOIL package.

    They had ‘climbed up’ onto that boulder pile just west of the ‘barn’ specifically to see where the fireline was and to take those pictures and videos.

    ** IMG_1101.3gp – 1524 ( 3:24 PM )

    ** IMG_1134.3gp – 1627 ( 4:27 PM ) – Contains same sirens heard in YARNELL-GAMBLE video

    Shot from the same location as his still photo IMG_1898 that he took at 1624 ( 4:24 PM ).

    It has the same ‘loaf of bread’ rock formation in the close foreground.

    The center of THAT rock formation is exactly here…

    34.224534, -112.755400

    We can’t actually ‘see’ where Jerry Thompson was really standing when he shot this photo… but based on his apparent distance from the ‘loaf’ rock formation, his slightly ELEVATED position, and the TREE that is seen on the very left side of the panorama… it would appear that he had just worked his way down the north side of that large rock pile and was standing on a ‘ledge-like’ flat rock that is exactly here…

    34.223798, -112.756362

    Reply

    • **
      ** THE PATRICK BERNARD LAND PARCEL

      SIDENOTE: I’m not sure everyone was aware of this… but Yavapai County is using one of the new highly sophisticated online ‘Property Information’ systems that can tell you about ‘Land Parcels’ in Yavapai County, who owns them, and what the ‘assesed’ value is for tax purposes.

      It even accepts simple Latitude, Longitude coordinates.

      All you have to do is use plain old Google Maps to find the Lat/Long of any spot on the ground in Yavapai County… then just drop those coordinates into the online ‘Property Information’ system and you get information like the following…

      Lookup on the exact spot in that ‘Boulder Pile’ just west of the Patrick Bernard compound where Jerry Thompson shot his photos/videos…

      34.224534, -112.755400

      Land Parcel Search results…

      ** Yavapai County Land Parcel Interactive Search Page

      http://gis.yavapai.us/v4/

      The Yavapai County Land Parcel number that this compound is
      located on is 203-03-067E.

      Information for Yavapai County Land Parcel 203-03-067E
      ——————————————————————————————–

      * OWNER INFORMATION…

      Owner: BERNARD PATRICK J & MILLSSA REV TRUST
      Mailing address: PO BOX 865, YARNELL, AZ 853620865
      Secondary Owner: N/A
      Recorded Documents & Sales (1)
      Date: 08/08/2003
      Book/Page: 4061/3
      Type: Other
      Cost: $0

      * PARCEL INFORMATION…

      Check Digit: 1
      Physical Address: 17070 W West Way
      Incorporated Area: N/A
      Assessor Acres: 13.17
      Subdivision: N/A
      Subdivision Type: N/A
      School District: Yarnell Elementary SD #52
      Fire District: Yarnell FD
      County Zoning Violation: No Zoning Violation

      * IMPROVEMENTS

      Improvements (1)
      Type: Barn
      Floor area: 1800
      Effective/constructed: 1980

      * ASSESSMENT

      Note: Starting with the 2015 tax year, the Limited Property Value is the only value considered for taxation purposes, the Full Cash Value is no longer used for taxation.

      2014 Assessment
      2014 Assessed Limited Value: $9,497
      2014 Limited Value: $59,358
      2014 Full Cash Value: $59,358
      2014 Net Assessment Ratio: 16
      2014 Legal Class: Vacant or Other

      2015 Assessment
      2015 Assessed Limited Value: $9,497
      2015 Limited Value: $59,358
      2015 Full Cash Value: $59,358
      2015 Net Assessment Ratio: 16
      2015 Legal Class: Vacant or Other

      * TAXES

      Tax Area Code: 5270
      2013 Taxes Billed: $1,501
      ———————————————————————————————–

      Reply

    • I bet the people I just hiked the past few days if they read your comment would love to see that link because that is spot on to the area I speak about that people need to come forward—-with all documentation—Pat Bernard as well has some fine videos—however, I have to state when I sat on that spot on boulder angle towards Bernards and Helms—I just am sorry I cannot conceive any human being going through Doug’s extended area BEFORE the fire—there was such a jungle of catclaw/scrub oak/and vegetation that would just rip you to shreds and a year later you can experience the torn skin but not like BEFORE the fire—let me go see the link you posted even though I am over my bandwidth until the 17th—

      Reply

  8. There are three videos that have been posted on Facebook that are very relevant (IMO) to the discussions that have been had here at IM. These videos say they were taken at the Ash Creek Fire in 2012. They show a fire trap (?) a large group of WFF’s including a USFS hotshot group. These videos are very impressive as they show extreme fire behavior, the use of a safety zone, and you can hear in real time the response of the people involved.

    These videos were posted by a volunteer firefighter in Oregon. You can find these videos by looking at Trenton Snyder’s Facebook page. He posted these videos Saturday and Sunday.

    WTK… Could you provide a link to these videos like you did the Dakota Sloan videos? Thanks

    Reply

    • Reply to calvin post on July 2, 2014 at 2:43 am

      >> calvin said…
      >> There are three videos that have been posted on Facebook that are very
      >> relevant (IMO) to the discussions that have been had here at IM.

      Fascinating videos. Thanks for pointing them out.

      My take on these videos…

      Definitely not a ‘sit in a lawn chair and drink a beer’ kind of safety zone. It was large… but so was the fire. ALL fireman were ORDERED to get into their vehicles and ‘ride it out’ inside the vehicles. The ‘roll calls’ to verify ‘all crew accounted for’ took place over the radio after everyone was INSIDE their vehicles with all windows rolled up.

      No injuries ( thank goodness )… but after the ‘burnaround’…. EVERYONE was complaining of their ‘eyes burning’ and a lot of joking about the ‘crying’ ( everyone tearing up ). So it wasn’t a picnic. There might actually have been some ‘smoke inhalation’ issues for some of the FFs following this incident.

      These 3 videos are an illustration of what I was saying down below about it now being the ‘TwitBook’ generation that is ‘out on the fireline’. They have this overwhelming need to photo/video document their lives.

      At one point… a captain or supervisor actually put his HAND over this guy’s camera lens and said ‘no more pictures’. He followed it up with an order to EVERYONE ‘put the cameras away, fellas’.

      They didn’t.

      As soon as this captain/supervisor walked away the video was rolling again and also captures some others resuming their ‘picture taking’.

      I don’t think the guy was trying to ‘censor’ anyone. From his ‘tone’ it sounded like he was just trying to impress upon them that they were now entering an ’emergency’ situation and he just wanted them all focused and paying attention to what they might have to do and stop playing ‘tourist’. That’s hard for the TwitBook generation to do. These smartphones are now an extension of themselves and some of them NEVER actually turn them off. Not even when they are sleeping.

      The other fascinating thing ( to me, anyway ) about these videos is what they show with regards to the SKY and the HORIZON when you are on the ‘receiving end’ of an advancing firefront that you ARE going to let ‘go around you’.

      It has always bothered me that YES… Granite Mountain was apparently not even aware of the rapid advance of the fireline out in the ‘bowl’ even BEFORE they reached the saddle at 4:20… and YES… they certainly lost sight any chance to actually see FIRELINE for those 19 minutes after dropping OFF the saddle and descending…

      …but as these videos show… it still seems like they SHOULD have been able to discern a LOT about the proximity of the fire and what it was doing just by looking UP.

      Every step down that decent…. the smoke cloud up above ( and on the horizon that they COULD still see ) was building and building and getting bigger and bigger and I still can’t believe they didn’t SEE that and realize something ‘wicked this way comes’…. or at least take a moment to CHECK with ‘someone else’ about what was happening ‘out there’.

      They didn’t. They just kept going… and going… and going… until it was too late.

      Some kind of absolute inability to even ADMIT they might be making a mistake?

      Some kind of level of hubris that didn’t allow them to even consider they might
      have been wrong about their ‘assumptions’ and the ‘parameters of the mission’?

      They must have been able to see SOMETHING ‘out there’…. unless they were so
      focused on the ‘bushwhack’ that not even one of 19 men who are supposed to
      be fire experts even bothered to LOOK UP…. until it was too late.

      Reply

      • Thank You WTKTT.

        1. What is the correct way to describe what happens in these videos? near miss, burnover, entrapment, SOP?

        2. The guy in the driver seat says he has deployed his fire shelter once and almost a second time (if I hear him correctly)

        3. The other guy talking a lot says he hasn’t experienced anything quite so bad (as what is happening in the video)

        4. The radio(s) seem to stop working just as the fire approaches/ surrounds the SZ

        5. Are events like this reported ?

        6. Thanks again WTKTT

        Reply

        • That first video ( the one that captures the actual burnover ) is pretty crazy.

          Sad part is watching that entire group of cows run directly off into
          the approaching fire.

          What’s really unbelievable is that while they are ‘closing up’ the vehicles
          you get a good look at what’s in the BACKS of all of them and there
          are GAS cans all over the place… from the ones in the backs of the
          Hotshot chase trucks to the ones that appear to be just sitting in people’s
          PACKS that were all thrown into the backs of pickups…

          …and then you see the hot, flaming embers falling everywhere even
          down past the windows of the vehicles themselves.

          They are lucky they all didn’t die in a massive explosion with all
          those gas cans exposed to the flaming embers.

          So I would add a question to Calvin’s list.

          Are there no procedures for making sure the gas cans are all offloaded
          into one vehicle… and then THAT vehicle needs to be AWAY from all
          the others?

          What about fusees?

          It also looks like they are lucky one of those packs just piled into the back of the pickups didn’t ‘go off’.

          Reply

  9. The Prescott City Council voted to appeal the Ashcraft decision today, so apparently there was no deal to keep Prescott out of the lawsuit.

    Also, in the recent flury of articles the Courier published for the one year anniversary, there were some facts provided regarding the rumored, but only very briefly documented story of the crew that was running for their lives in the Shrine area, only to find their vehicles gone from where they parked them.

    This paricular incident envolved members of the Peeples Valley Fire Department, and the article was about them. Their leader was ordered by an overhead supervisor to move the vehicles, and when he resisted because the crew was still out on the line at the time the fire was blowing up, he was then absolutely ordered to move them, there-by abandoning the rest of the crew and leaving them to fend for themselves. The superior giving the order was not identified in the article.

    That overhead supervisor apparently was not concerned enough to go out and make direct contact with the crew and let them know he was ordering their vehicles be moved, along with assuring that they were going to be indeed, safe. Not a nice suprise to find out when you’re running for your lives to the vehicles you’re hoping will deliver you from death.

    The link to the article is here:

    http://dcourier.com/main.asp?SectionID=1&SubSectionID=1086&ArticleID=133345&TM=83850.59

    Reply

    • Reply to TTWARE post on July 1, 2014 at 8:24 pm

      >> TTWARE said…
      >>
      >> The Prescott City Council voted to appeal the Ashcraft decision today, so
      >> apparently there was no deal to keep Prescott out of the lawsuit.

      Um… yea… I would say that’s a given ( unless it’s one of the dirtiest legal tricks the world has ever seen… negotiate for something that has a deadline and then 24 hours after the deadline that the other side was up against… go back on your promise ).

      The articles never said the ‘negotiations’ over this were ever completed and they seemed to indicate that even all discussion about it stopped around June 20.

      So it looks like the REAL reasons why Prescott might have been removed from the wrongful death suits will remain a mystery for a while.

      Maybe the plaintiff’s lawyers really do believe that Prescott’s claim that they could never possibly be held liable for anything that happened with ( or because of ) any of their own employees that day really will ‘hold water’ in court.

      Reply

      • Following up my own post above with more about the other ‘possible’
        reason why Prescott was dropped from the ‘wrongful death’ lawsuits.

        We now KNOW there was no ‘quid pro quo’ deal in place that had anything to do with Andrew Ashcraft’s benefits… since Prescott didn’t even let 24 hours go by after ‘Remembering the Hotshots’ to prove they have every intention of ‘Forgetting the Hotshots’ by voting 4-2 in the City Council to fight every ruling that says they owe full-time employee benefits for Andrew Ashcraft.

        So there was no ‘deal in place’. That’s obvious now.

        But here is that original article, anyway, that appeared at 6:00 AM on the morning of the one year anniversary.

        It has the ‘other possible explanation’ in it.

        Prescott City Attorney John Paladini is saying flat-out that NO action on the part of ANY City of Prescott employee that leads to a death can make the City itself ‘liable’ for damages. Period. End of story. Even if it could be proved that Darrell Willis was ‘telling’ Eric Marsh to ‘get to town’… or that Darrell Willis was ‘one person removed’ from that and was telling someone like Jason Clawson to call them and ‘tell them that’….
        .
        …the City of Prescott would still in no way be ‘liable’ for the actions of that employee OR the other two employees ( Marsh and Steed ) that made the actual decision to lead 17 other ’employees’ into a potential death trap.

        Paladini is sure of Prescott’s ‘position’ and it is…

        “The reality is the city has statutory immunity (through Workers Comp), and can’t be held liable for wrongful death,” Paladini said.

        Maybe he’s actually right… and maybe the attorneys for the plaintiffs realize it.

        Prescott Daily Courier
        6/30/2014 6:00:00 AM
        Prescott City Council: Appeal of Ashcraft retirement decision up for review
        http://www.prescottaz.com/main.asp?SectionID=1&SubsectionID=1&ArticleID=133343

        PRESCOTT – A decision is expected this week on whether the City of Prescott will appeal a May ruling by its Public Safety Retirement Board to grant retirement benefits to the family of fallen Granite Mountain Hotshot Andrew Ashcraft.

        In a special meeting that will take place after the Prescott City Council’s regular workshop at 3 p.m. Tuesday, council members will discuss and possibly act on an appeal of the local Public Safety Personnel Retirement System (PSPRS) board’s decision regarding the application by Ashcraft’s widow Juliann Ashcraft.

        UPDATE: That meeting has already taken place. The Prescott City Council voted 4-2 to fight ANY requirement to pay full benefits to Juliann Ashcraft regardless of what Prescott’s own ‘Public Safety Retirement Board’ has to say about it.

        The council has conducted several discussions on whether to appeal that decision to Superior Court, as well as whether to accept a settlement proposal from Ashcraft’s attorney.

        This week, City Attorney Jon Paladini explained that Ashcraft’s attorneys earlier proposed dropping the city from the wrongful death lawsuits that were pending from the families of 12 of the fallen Hotshots. In exchange, the city would agree not to appeal Ashcraft’s decision, and would not oppose the similar retirement claims by the families of fallen Hotshots William Warneke and Sean Misner.

        Meanwhile, however, the one-year deadline for the wrongful death lawsuits was approaching on June 30, and the attorneys for the 12 Hotshot families ultimately filed their wrongful complaint this past Wednesday, without naming the City of Prescott as a defendant.

        Paladini said that leaves the city with the remaining decision on whether to appeal the board’s decision. And he maintains that the city did not delay its own decision to do an “end run” around the settlement offer.

        Rather, he said the city was awaiting “actuarial” figures on the estimated cost of adding the three Hotshots to its retirement program. The city has since learned that the increased retirement cost would be about $1.9 million, spread out over coming years.

        And Paladini says the decision to remove the city from the wrongful death lawsuit was likely based on the strength of the plaintiffs’ case, not on the settlement offer.

        “The reality is the city has statutory immunity (through Workers Comp), and can’t be held liable for wrongful death,” Paladini said.

        He added that two Yarnell Hill fire investigation reports that came out previously “exonerated the city.”

        “Our exposure was really, really minimal,” Paladini said.

        Ashcraft’s attorney Patrick McGroder said Friday afternoon that he had initially proposed the settlement agreement to the city, but later withdrew it in a June 20 letter.

        The letter states: “I have consulted with my clients regarding the efficacy of their wrongful death claims against the city. They agree with me that we will not pursue wrongful death claims against the city period, irrespective of any of the other terms of our settlement proposal.”

        McGroder said on Friday that he and his clients agreed that there should be no suggestion of a “quid pro quo” in the matter.

        Reply

    • Reply to TTWARE post on July 1, 2014 at 8:24 pm

      >> TTWARE said…
      >> Also, in the recent flury of articles the Courier published for the one year
      >> anniversary, there were some facts provided regarding the rumored, but only
      >> very briefly documented story of the crew that was running for their lives in the
      >> Shrine area, only to find their vehicles gone from where they parked them.

      That’s an amazing article. Lots of detail… and it significantly changes the ‘picture’
      of what was actually happening circa 4:15 to 4:30 in the Youth Camp area at the
      end of Shrine road.

      According to THIS account… those men were all still BACK THERE at the Youth Camp
      at the moment that PNF ‘off the radar’ hires Jason Clawson, Aaron Hulburd and KC ‘Bucky’ Yowell were filming the ‘Helmet Cam’ video from the St. Joseph Shrine parking lot.

      >> TTWARE also wrote…
      >> This particular incident involved members of the Peeples Valley Fire Department, and
      >> the article was about them. Their leader was ordered by an overhead supervisor to
      >> move the vehicles, and when he resisted because the crew was still out on the line
      >> at the time the fire was blowing up, he was then absolutely ordered to move them,
      >> there-by abandoning the rest of the crew and leaving them to fend for themselves.
      >> The superior giving the order was not identified in the article.

      It had to be Tyson Esquibel.

      Esquibel says basically NOTHING about this ‘almost fatal’ story in his interviews with both the SAIT and ADOSH investigators.

      >> TTWARE also wrote…
      >> That overhead supervisor apparently was not concerned enough to go out and
      >> make direct contact with the crew and let them know he was ordering their vehicles
      >> be moved, along with assuring that they were going to be indeed, safe.

      It’s worse than that.

      According to the article… the reason he ( Esquibel? ) was ORDERING the guys with the vehicles to MOVE OUT NOW was because he was already convinced the crew that was working out there at the WEST end of Harper Canyon were ‘goners’.

      The article suggests that the reason he ( Esquibel ) insisted they go ahead and leave RIGHT NOW is because ( quote ) “Those men can’t run that fast’.

      In other words… no use waiting for them because they won’t be able to outrun the fire at that point and might as well just let them ‘deploy’… .or something.

      Esquibel was actually ABANDONING them…. and even the local FF in the article says he ‘couldn’t believe it’.

      >> TTWARE also said…
      >> Not a nice suprise to find out when you’re running for your lives to the vehicles
      >> you’re hoping will deliver you from death.

      The article says the men were, in fact, ANGRY to discover their comrades had just driven off and left them… but then they add some ‘spin’ to the story saying that the absence of the vehicles *might* have helped saved their lives because they might have all been burned over at that location if they had actually stopped to get into vehicles. That’s how close it was. They credit their survival to being forced to get on the asphalt road by the Youth Camp at the point and literally ‘haul ass’ EAST to the St. Joseph Shrine parking lot where they say the vehicles were staged… and where they ALSO then say they witnessed the actual ‘burnaround’ over at the St. Joseph Shrine itself.

      That’s why I say that if the details here are correct… then when PDN ‘off the radar’ hires Jason Clawson, Aaron Hulburd and KC ‘Bucky’ Yowell were shooting the ‘Helmet-Cam’ video… then those vehicles MUST have still been ‘back there’ at the Youth Camp and hadn’t even made it to the Shrine Parking Lot yet… where they were going to ‘stage’.

      If they HAD… then would SEE THEM in the ‘Helmet Cam’ video.

      We don’t.

      All we see in the Helmet Cam video is Clawson, Hulburd and Yowell ( and their 3 vehicles ) in the actual parking lot of the St. Joseph Shrine even as late as 1640… DURING Steed’s and Caldwell’s repeated attempts to get John Burfiend to pay attention to them up in ‘Bravo 33’.

      I think even this one ‘new’ video alone is reason enough to call everyone back in for more interviews to get of this ‘straightened out’ since he piss-poor investigation(s) failed to do so.

      And THIS time… Prescott PNF ‘mystery men’ Jason Clawson, Aaron Hulburd and KC ‘Bucky’ Yowell need to be INCLUDED in that round of ‘interviews’.

      Reply

      • Correction for above:

        I said…

        >> I think even this one ‘new’ video alone is reason enough to call everyone
        >> back in for more interviews to get of this ‘straightened out’ since he piss-poor
        >> investigation(s) failed to do so.

        There is no VIDEO associated with the article posted by TTWARE.
        It’s just an article containing ‘testimony’ from the men involved…

        …but my opinion still stands. I think this one newly-surfaced accounting is enough to justify a complete new set of ‘interviews’…. including Clawson, Hulburd and Yowell this time.

        Reply

        • The investigations are over. The reports are written and there is no one clamoring to reopen the process that matters. The families are committed to the lawsuits now. The only ones who will be asking questions now are plaintiff and defense attorneys. I was surprised by some of the reported chatter by firefighters there that day around the one year mark, but I suspect that will get shut down when notices for depositions start going out.

          I have no idea what to expect from the legal process. If it goes to trial, I fear it will be brutal – defense attorneys are not known for caring about feelings. I suspect the GMHS will get savaged for their actions that day. I am sure the families were told this and decided to go ahead anyways. – not out of greed, but because they want the truth. Somehow I feel this is all going to end very badly.

          Reply

          • mike… of course it’s going to be brutal.

            Once Arizona Forestry decided not to do a real investigation… that was pretty much inevitable.

            As far as the ‘investigations are over’… I’m not so sure.

            One of the articles last weekend also said that there is actually ANOTHER ‘active investigation’ in progress being conducted by the Boise Idaho Fire Center experts. Not sure who contracted that. Might have been either the plaintiffs or the defendants in this case.

            Something tells me if it’s the Boise people it would have to be on behalf of the defendants. I don’t think the Boise people would take the side of the plaintiffs for any amount of money.

            Also… you said it yourself in your last sentence.

            One of the OUTCOMES for the upcoming BRUTAL court fight is that if the plaintiffs win… they WANT a NEW INVESTIGATION to finally to be done and done right.

            So even that is ‘on the line’.

            If Arizona Forestry really doesn’t want this ‘accident’ to EVER be fully and properly investigated… then they better WIN.

            Reply

            • Not sure the idea of winning so as to get a proper investigation is really meaningful. I think in order to win, the plaintiffs are going to have to pretty much uncover what happened that day on heir own, and the narrative is going to have to be different than what is out there now. If what is known remains as is now, I think the plaintiffs are behind. But, then again, they may know more than is publicly known. And I am not a lawyer either.

              Reply

      • Yikes.

        Just passing thru while posting a bunch of stuff, but reading this made me want to throw up.

        Remember, this is the guy who, in his ADOSH interview, blew everybody’s minds when he said he absolutely for sure knew he saw the Granite Mountain Buggies at the Boulder Springs Ranch that morning.

        Reply

        • Tyson Esquibel is also the guy who took all the air out of the room during his ADOSH interview when he basically told the ADOSH investigators that given the same set of circumstances… he would have ordered his crews to do exactly what GM did.

          Esquibel told them that in his mind… there is little to no separation between Wildland firefighting and protecting structures. It’s all the same.

          He was telling them that if he had the opportunity to do either… he would still feel an obligation to ‘move’ and ‘re-engage’… just like Marsh did.

          Reply

    • Reply to TTWARE post on July 1, 2014 at 8:24 pm

      >> TTWARE wrote…
      >> The link to the article is here:

      http://dcourier.com/main.asp?SectionID=1&SubSectionID=1086&ArticleID=133345&TM=83850.59

      Also in this article about this ‘near death’ experience on the part of Tyson Esquibel’s crew(s)… DOZER Operator ‘Justin Hernandez’ enters the picture once again… even though Justin Hernandez ( like PNF mystery men Jason Clawson, Aaron Hulburd and KC ‘Bucky’ Yowell ) was never interviews by ANYONE.

      From the article…
      ———————————————————————————————–
      The Blue Ridge Hotshots and the eight men from Yarnell, Wickenburg and Sun City came together from different directions at about 2:30 p.m. and followed a bulldozer to improve the line behind it.

      The dozer apparently was unable to cross a deep ravine and turned around. The eight men from Yarnell, Wickenburg and Sun City had to cut through the last quarter-mile or so of dense oak, catclaw and manzanita on their own. Brandon said he later found out from the dozer operator that he left not because of the ravine, but because he had been warned that the fire changed course.
      ———————————————————————————————–

      So bad enough that Justin Hernandez didn’t even pass along what he was hearing on the radio to the firefighters working right here WITH him… we now hear FF Bob Brandon say that he actually ‘talked to him ( Hernandez ) later’

      What does ‘later’ mean?
      Later that day?

      Hernandez ended up MISSING and DPS Helicopter Ranger 58 was actually ‘looking’ for him from the Air following the deployment.

      If this Peeples Valley FF Bob Brandon ‘talked to him later’… then was that BEFORE or AFTER someone found out that Hernandez was still alive?

      It’s not a pretty picture of this ‘evacuation’ that is ( had has been ) emerging ever since this fire. Talk about ‘lessons learned’. This is NOT the way to evacuate firefighters under ANY circumstances.

      The Peeples Valley firefighters were (apparently) abandoned ( by Tyson Esquibel? ) and ‘on their own’… almost died… then DOZER operator Justin Hernandez was, in turn, (apparently) ‘abandoned’ and left ‘on his own’ by both Blue Ridge and Gary Cordes and ended up on the ‘missing persons’ list for a police helicopter… also probably almost died.

      Not good.

      The article also features that picture taken by FF Bob Brandon at the Youth Camp while the fire was approaching. Makes you wonder how many OTHER photos Mr. Brandon might have that have never seen the light of day.

      If he stopped at that critical moment to take that picture… then I’ll bet he was taking pictures ALL DAY.

      Reply

      • Typos above….

        Should have read…

        It’s not a pretty picture of this ‘evacuation’ that is ( and HAS been ) emerging ever since this fire. Talk about ‘lessons learned’. This is NOT the way to evacuate firefighters under ANY circumstances.

        Oh… sorry… I forgot… Arizona Forestry spent a shitload of taxpayer dollars and has already diligently concluded that ‘no one did anything wrong that day’.

        My bad.

        Reply

  11. this comment never made it to a reply to Bob Powers when he said 6-30 was silence day—

    see:
    I will not be here 6-30-14 and today at the Yarnell Memorial I met some real fine folks—firefighters- just the best people and saw Holly Neill— I left the Memorial after a short bit to see Doug and see if I can peak out on his property to where the back burn area was suppose to happen and until I review the photos and videos again after sitting on top of Doug’s area—I just cannot conceive it so PLEASE I ask all people that have photos and videos from 6-30-14 lawyered up or not SHOW THE RIGHT PEOPLE and that are investigative firefighters who feel as STRONGLY as me that the SAIR and the recent video on youtube by Mike Dudley just does a great disservice of the men and I am not wanting to think there was a back burn until you all realize YOUR information MATTERS!!!! Any media can write what they want but its YOUR information NEEDED to properly assess the YHF so PLEASE share—

    Oh my it was hard to meet one person today who knew one of the GMHS dearly and I don’t want to get into but it was eery for me yet I understand WHY God led it that way- just so torn up this weekend with the losses, seeing Yarnell faces and Sonny/my properties in Vernon still in threat of loss—but AH is ok.

    Also I miss my hiking pal. He seems so far away. I am going again to Glen Ilah and Yarnell tomorrow then to the Prescott 19 memorial at 4pm….it is just too hard to see the t-shirts sales and crap like that on this kind of weekend—seems insensitive but remember I am born July 1st so I am the extra-sensitive kind—keep you posted if I learn anything.

    Reply

    • Joy – when you say things like this that make it seem like there was a burn out when there really wasn’t it causes agony and pain to the families of the deceased GM they actually believe what you are saying. If there was a burn out it is pretty likely that people would know about it by now. Somebody would have said something. The fire that killed GM ws most probbly a spot fire that got out of control. Look at the way Glen Ilah burned. That was all spot fires from the ember wash.
      You have already asked people to come forward with their pictures and they will not. Unless you are willing to name names and tell people who to approach to ask for more information I am not sure why you keep posting rumors that only upset and confuse the families of the deceased GM guys. No offense intended Joy.

      Reply

      • Information-

        I just read this now

        I stand firm about the words I write

        As far as naming names … I have in my best way pointed and guided where people can search yet I know the behind the scenes too so yeah I will do it in the best way that gets final results versus toss names out and then it vanishes the data and it has happened in prior times so I am more aware but the family members should know I would not place out information to hurt or harm but to get those people to SPEAK UP! That is facts!

        Reply

        • One thing now is certain–there was a burn out define–there were drip torches working at the Shrine–and who would be so callous to tell a lie as to what was seen–there were more than one witness to that burnout. Now add to that the testimony of DND and you have another burn out to contend with. DND has no reason to mislead the loved ones, nor does anyone else. The loved ones deserve the truth and certain Joy is not playing games but will have to give out information that her witnesses have given her–They will either have to back up and say they lied to Joy or stand behind their statements. I can not in any way imagine anyone has any reason to state the truth knowing that is the only solution for the loved ones and exposing the
          actual events and causes that led up to the deaths of 19 GMHS wild land fire fighters. It is when the truth comes out that certain people are fearful–their reputations are at stake when major mistakes were made to kill 19 young men in such a careless manner and needless manner. The folks that lost loved ones deserve the absolute truth and not a cursory watered down investigation full of redactions, deleted films, threats and mum orders. Even as much is the concern of the safety of future wild land fire fighters. Add to that the rights of citizens to know what is going on to kill 19 of America’s finest.

          So Information–if you want more stay with IM–you are hearing mostly from unbiased wild land fire fighters that have managed crews until their retirement. They speak loudly and boldly since lives depend upon their evaluations of what happened. I can only testify to what I saw that day and the video of firemen lighting fires in the Shrine area and that I did with Joy and others at the Yarnell Library see on line copies of how the very area they were killed in had an official seal on a document setting it aside as the highest restricted fire danger area. That document dated June 16,2013 was a Forest Service document and when we went back to refer to it, like the video it also was removed from viewing.

          That type thing you would think would be front page on an investigation–so you decide what is up with that kind of avoidance action? I am too old and have no interest in putting out information for self aggrandizement or to cause harm to loved ones. I have before lost a son and attempts were also made to change a dirty situation into a clean one–but truth won out when people had to get up on a stand under oath.

          My opinion is that the State of Arizona and the Forest Service covered this up because they could get away with paying the loved ones a pittance this way, save face to the honchos involved and protect the status quo–no changes to rock the boat since some might be fired or demoted

          And examples of this behavior are not scarce if you look into the history of how these deaths have been treated. Check with Dr. Ted Putnam on his revelations of what went on when he was Chief Fire Investigator of the Storm King Deaths of 14 young souls. Also his long investigation of the Mann Gulch where 13 were killed and actual events, locations, etc. were somehow distorted so the actual causes of these deaths were minimized and unknown to the general public.

          It is a disservice to all fire fighters and loved ones as well as the tax payer and concerned citizens to allow shoddy investigations into the deaths of so many and some are not so gullible to swallow what we know to be outright lies.

          .

          Reply

          • To Joy’s credit she records every testimony–so you can have confidence in her reports–she knows the legalities.

            Reply

  12. The past 2 days were difficult turning down many media requests and I saw Sean—CBS Morgan Loew camera guy coming out from my medical massage yesterday and because Morgan and Sean hiked both the GMHS trail areas and the way Tex (Sonny) took me and saved our lives but 19 men—correction; heroes did not make it out and we did—I honored Sean’s request to speak to Greg but I noticed Sean you did not air that but you did get my first time break down and I am sorry it was publicly shown but the past annual I saw the faces of these men from 6-30-13 not ever looking at media pics of the men really. Walking by and seeing the faces just brought it all back to the very spots I saw them 6-30-13 throughout the day. I just had a real decent medical massage and felt very balanced and in control especially my emotions until the end of the memorial as I passed the faces—I do not know HOW the families and loved ones who knew them do it—I am so heart broken. After walking away numerous stations wanted to talk and I was so in a daze I just answered their questions but I am very blessed to have spent the evening around love— the first person I ever met who told me the photos I had taken were of the GMHS Joanna Dodder and her husband Bruce and my last ever hike that had author Michael Kodas present as well as the Prescott Mayor and his family and some loved ones/friends of the GMHS—in honor of the 19 and Sonny who was not present we all drank Tullamoore Dew/Jameson/Jack Danielson and I had as well 3 Shirley Temples and many had guiness beer! Today is my birthday so I am not going to be online but I had to say thank you to all the support I saw from the Prescott Firefighting Community and thank you Wade Ward for I needed you at that very moment. It helped me a lot. I just looked at the photos and bawled—and kept thinking this should of never happened. I know I got the calls that people saw me on tv for that raw emotion and I am sorry for that because I hiked so many this past annual to the 19 area and all my tears were shed alone at the spot area the died not in some Courthouse public area and that was humiliating for me but I guess I just unraveled as I saw their faces. I wish people did not think about “lawyers” and “book sales” and there was a public area people can share their photos/accounts/videos freely so this YHF can be properly assessed because as much as I like Mike Dudley as a speaker on that recent youtube video—what a disservice him and Karels are doing—as I said to Storm King Technologies Jim Posh and his wife yesterday—it is about science and safety and common sense and as well people building in dense vegetation to carefully design their landscape look with some sort of defensible space in mind. I am very hurt deep inside that these children, widows and loved ones no longer have them yet until I pass on anyone who meets me will know about these heroes; the GMHS…I hope in God’s time for clarity and for the GMHS to continue on—and less politic rivalry in the firefighting community. Those are my hopes—
    Thank you to the loved ones of these fine men who came up to me and spoke to me or I recently hiked privately—that was a God thing—every day you all are on my mind— every second and not just the 19 but all affected by the YHF as well as all fallen heroes—

    Reply

    • Joy don’t fell humiliated its a human emotion and a love felt to cry. I have done it at my fathers memorial site and in public. I have also lost FS friends to fire accidents including 2 Smoke jumpers on storm king its always the remembrance to me of people I knew,
      You are a great Lady and add so much to this discussion.

      Reply

  13. **
    ** ANNIVERSARY 1 – NEW INFORMATION COMES OUT – PART 1

    There were a bunch of articles appearing all day yesterday regarding the first anniversary of the 19 fatalities at the Yarnell Hill Fire last June 30, 2013.

    Some important *new* information was coming out in these ‘articles’… mostly from the actual numerous interviews with family members and firefighters.

    I will post more about some of these later ( with more links ) but here is just a sampling…

    * AMANDA MARSH HAS ERIC’S CELLPHONE

    Amanda Marsh has been avoiding the press completely for a full year… but she now says she has had a ‘change of heart’ and wants to share more of what she knows and her experiences with ‘the community’ that she says has been ‘so kind to her’.

    The LONG interview she gave just prior to the anniversary is here…

    The Daily Courier
    Article: Amanda Marsh One Year Later
    Published: 6/30/2014 6:01:00 AM
    By Joanna Dodder Nellans
    http://www.dcourier.com/main.asp?SectionID=1&SubSectionID=1&ArticleID=133327&TM=8656.991

    From the article…
    ______________________________________________________________

    For Amanda Marsh, the one-year anniversary of the death of her husband
    Eric Marsh began a few weeks early on her birthday.

    June 17, 2013 was the last day she and Eric rode their horses Suzie and
    Shorty together. They were in Granite Basin, at the base of the mountain
    that gave the name to the Granite Mountain Hotshots that Eric had
    always led as a superintendent.

    “Then she said, ‘Eric and his crew are missing and I think they deployed their
    shelters,” Amanda recalled. She tried to call Eric but got no answer. She was
    hysterical when she called her mother. A neighbor heard her screaming and
    came to help. She asked the neighbor to go get their other neighbor, Prescott
    firefighter Duane Steinbrink. Duane and his wife picked her up and drove
    toward Prescott.

    Days later, officials told her they needed Eric’s dental records and a description
    of any tattoos. She wasn’t sure why.

    “About five days later it hit me,” she said. “Eric was unrecognizable.”

    Fearing the media would show up at Eric’s funeral, she didn’t tell anyone the
    funeral time until the night before. Eric had protected Granite Basin from the
    Doce wildfire just weeks earlier, so she wanted his funeral to be there.

    Eric’s non-working phone, signal mirror, Granite Mountain Hotshots belt
    buckle and wedding ring were returned to Amanda.
    ______________________________________________________________

    So Amanda Marsh DID receive at least ONE of Eric’s cellphones back ( he has been reported by those that knew him to have always carried TWO cellphones… one totally personal phone and another one being paid for by the City of Prescott ).

    The simple phrase ‘non-working phone’ doesn’t really indicated the real level of ‘damage’ and could mean a lot of things. It could simply have the ‘battery leads’ melted and other wise be in good working order… or it could be a mess.

    Even if it was a ‘mess’… it would still have been possible to retrieve data ( pictures, videos, call history records, text messages, emails, etc. ) from it IF it had been submitted to ACTIC ( Arizona Counter Terrorism Information Center ) like the YCSO police investigators did with EVERY other ‘damaged’ phone that entered the ‘chain of evidence’.

    There is no indication WHO gave this ‘non-working’ cellphone to Amanda Marsh… or if it ever did enter the official ‘chain of evidence’.

    One thing you can be sure of… ‘non-working’ probably does NOT mean ‘melted’.
    I doubt that anyone would have given a totally ‘melted’ hunk of plastic back to Amanda Marsh.

    ** CORY MOSER SAYS 25 TO 30 FIREFIGHTERS ‘SPENT THE NIGHT’
    ** AT THE BOULDER SPRINGS RANCH… AND THEY FORMED A ‘PACT’
    ** TO NEVER TALK ABOUT WHAT WENT ON THAT NIGHT.

    Cory Moser ( Prescott FF who was Willis TFLD1 and ‘right-hand-man’ that day on the north side of the fire ) granted an exclusive interview for the anniversary.

    In the VIDEO ( link will follow this message ) he says that he, himself, eventually DID go down to the south end of the fire and that he and up to 25 or 30 firefighters ‘spent the night’ out near the deployment site and were ‘awake all night’ apparently doing things like putting BOTH tarps AND American flags all over the deployment site hours before the YCSO police investigators ever got there.

    He also said something very strange to the reporter.

    He says that ALL of the firefighters who were ‘out there’ all night long near the deployment site formed a PACT amongst themselves to NEVER talk about what they were doing out there all night long.

    ** PRESCOTT APPEARS TO HAVE MADE A DEAL WITH ATTORNEYS FOR
    ** THE FAMILIES TO NOT CONTEST ASHCRAFT BENEFITS IN EXCHANGE
    ** FOR NOT BEING NAMED IN ANY LAWSUITS.

    Yesterday morning… at about 6:00 AM… the Prescott Daily Courier publshed an
    article ( link will be posted ) that says the Prescott City Council will review their decision
    to contest benefits for Andrew Ashcraft.in just a few days.

    The article contains interviews with Prescott City attorneys and the attorneys representing
    the families and they all acknowledge that up until June 20… a ‘deal’ was being actively
    discussed for the City of Prescott to NOT contest Ashcraft’s benefits so long as Prescott
    was not named in any ongoing lawsuits coming from family members.

    ** JULIANN ASCHCRAFT ( AND THE OTHER FAMILY MEMBERS )
    ** SAY THEY ‘STILL NEED TO KNOW THE WHOLE TRUTH’.

    A surprising number of family members granted full ‘interviews’ for the first anniversary.

    Juliann Ashcraft herself summarized all their feelings at this point.

    Station KESQ did an interview with Juliann Ashcraft.

    From the video / article ( link will be posted )…

    At 4:45 p.m., firefighters across the country and in the Coachella Valley took
    a moment of silence to honor the fallen heroes.

    “We’ve also taken the time to discuss the tragedy … and some of the lessons
    we can learn from that and how we can improve our delivery of services,
    and our response to wildfires,” said Griggs.

    The deaths sparked many questions, which are still unanswered to this day.

    “The thing I need to know most to heal are ANSWERS,” said Juliann Ashcraft,
    widow of hotshot Andrew Ashcraft. “I need the TRUTH. I need to know WHY my
    husband didn’t come home. I need to know WHY he died in that fire.”

    More later…

    Reply

    • Re: Eric Marsh’s cell phone

      I interpreted “non-working phone” to mean his personal cell (as opposed to his PFD-supplied cell phone). I hadn’t understood “non-working” to mean condition. Interesting.

      Reply

      • Marsh did not have a ‘PFD supplied’ cellphone, like Darrell Willis did. Marsh was simply receiving a stipend of about $37 per month to cover the costs of using one ( of two? ) of his personal phones for job related things. ADOSH knew this. They requested cellphone records from Prescott for BOTH Willis AND Marsh. Prescott supplied all of Willis’ records but Prescott attorneys told ADOSH that they would have to contact Amanda Marsh about Eric’s cell records. We now learn that Amanda had left the country. She was in Turkey.

        Reply

        • Followup… it was actually a ‘dodge’ on the part of the Prescott attorneys to ‘punt’ ADOSH off to Amanda Marsh. With a ‘stipend’ being paid for the phone… any employer has the right to request / obtain cell records for that employee’s phone directly from the carrier.

          Reply

        • D’oh. I should have remembered that Marsh had a stipend, not a company phone. Thanks for clearing that up.

          Reply

          • WTKTT
            There is so much destroyed when a accident scene is destroyed by people thinking they are helping. The immediate ceiling off of the site by professionals and no one connected to them or the fire left to secure the site from all. If this had been a Federal fire no one but fire fatalities investigators along with the Sheriff would have been allowed near the site.
            That is standard procedure. A really lot of information was lost that day because of the way the scene and the evidence was handled. by people that did not know what was important. As such there is a lot we will fail to learn from the entrapment.

            Reply

      • Reply to Sitta post on July 1, 2014 at 8:44 am

        >> Sitta said…
        >> I interpreted “non-working phone” to mean his personal cell (as opposed
        >> to his PFD-supplied cell phone). I hadn’t understood “non-working”
        >> to mean condition. Interesting.

        You might actually be right. If Marsh really did ‘always carry two phones’,
        then the phrase ‘non-working’ *MIGHT* actually mean the only phone that
        Amanda got back was the ‘personal’ one. It’s possible, I suppose….

        …but I don’t know which scenario is more ‘disturbing’…

        1) ‘Non-working phone’ mean Marsh only had ONE phone that day and SOMEONE ( Who? ) go it back to her somehow without it ever having
        gone through the YCSO police official ‘chain of evidence’. WHO would
        do that… and ( more importantly ) WHY? The YCSO investigators made it
        absolutely clear that cellphones were of the HIGHEST priority in their
        investigation… so who would then keep such an important piece of evidence
        ‘outside’ the ‘evidence chain’… and for what ulterior motives?

        2) ‘Non-working phone’ means Marsh WAS carrying TWO phones and SOMEONE ( again, Who? ) made sure she got his ‘personal’ one back. Whether that now means that it WAS ‘in working order’ would just be the next mystery…

        …but if (2)… then WHERE is the OTHER PHONE?

        WHO decided to ‘keep it’ even though only a ‘stipend’ was being paid for it and even that ‘other’ phone should have been ‘returned’ to Amanda Marsh… and why would NEITHER of these phones seem to have ever entered the official YCSO police investigator’s ‘chain of evidence’.?

        Now that Amanda is known to have at least ONE ( or perhaps the ONLY ) phone that Eric was using that day… and she is now in a position to talk about June 30, 2013 in a more open manner… we will find out more ( Like WHO gave it to her and WHEN ).

        Reply

        • From what I’ve seen, the whole YCSO “chain of evidence” narrative/mythology/whatever line is bogus. There was absolutely nothing to it, except for a bunch of words.

          Reply

          • Until the coroner issued their ‘official’ report on the actual cause of death for ALL 19 of those men… then for all intents and purposes… it WAS a ‘crime scene’ and is always treated that way… and all the standard rules of evidence collection applied and were in full legal force.

            It was DURING that time ( before the Coroner’s report was issued ) that (apparently) a lot of this evidence ‘went missing’.

            That’s pretty serious…. and some pretty serious ‘impeding an investigation’ or ‘tampering with evidence’ charges could be brought against anyone who was REMOVING things from that site and NOT handing them over to the police.

            Reply

    • Just watched Amanda Marsh’s video. It struck me as very brave and thoughtful, with some good advice for all of us at the end. I should have been more aware of how intrusive the publicity was/is for the survivors, but I suppose I thought that Yarnell was largely forgotten outside of the fire fighting community.

      Reply

      • Yarnell was ( as Gary Olsen pointed out many times ) the first major WFF fatality incident of the TwitBook age. Of course it ‘went viral’. Of course Amanda was ‘recognized’ even in Turkey. To think that wasn’t going to happen was just simply unrealistic. Perhaps that is yet another lesson that needs to sink in for all firefighters and anyone else on the public payroll and actively engaged in the ‘hero” business. The world is a smaller place… and the cameras are EVERYWHERE now. If you look at just the collection of photos and videos from June 30, 2013 coming from firefighters alone you see the new TwitBook generation ‘doing what they do” and photo/video documenting their lives. That isn’t going to change. So anyone in the ‘hero’ business these days ( and yes… their loved ones as well ) needs to be fully aware that nowadays… CELEBRITY status ( wanted or not ) is often just one Tweet or one free YouTube video clip away. The ‘world’ is ( quite literally ) ‘watching’ now.

        Reply

      • I was really really moved by Amanda’s video. So courageous, so honest, so powerfully articulated, and so hopeful.

        As someone who graduated from Prescott College and has served as sort of a “field mentor” for several of their students in New Mexico, I am inspired by her decision to work on a PhD there on dealing with grief, with a particular focus on those who have to do it “in the limelight,” so to speak.

        Our society doesn’t deal at all well with death and grief, much less when it involves a public event. My brother died in such a public event (altho much smaller but still really so for its time), and that public-ness added to the dysfunctionality of my family’s aftermath.

        I agree objectively with WTKTT’s statement about how this is where we are in the age of the Internet. But…..on the other hand……

        It was so important when the helmet-cam video was released in December. But, all things considered, could that have waited until January??? I was in quite a bit of agony about that.

        I think it’s really a challenge to discern how to write what we see, honestly, via the evidence, and yet be still conscious of and sensitive to the feelings of the family members. I really believe they should be our allies, and we should be theirs, even if that is really really difficult. We all need the truth, even if it’s hard. But I believe it’s in all our best interests, all things considered, to try to not be brutal in that quest.

        And we still don’t have the truth. The truth is still being hidden. For all kinds of various personal and institutional reasons. How do we ascertain how to access that truth while also respecting the dignity and reality of the central characters and their beloveds?

        I really don’t know. And it may be that Amanda Marsh will be able to turn on her flashlight in the smoke and mist and darkeness of all of this and help us all begin to discern a path.

        Reply

  14. The comment posted by Robert at Wildfire Today * What have we learned from Yarnell* should be read by all followers of Yarnell here at IM

    Thanks Robert! Many thanks!

    Reply

    • Yes I read it. Doable should always be done with safety in place
      LCES—A simple lookout could have averted the whole incident.

      Reply

  15. I will not be here 6-30-14 and today at the Yarnell Memorial I met some real fine folks—firefighters- just the best people and saw Holly Neill— I left the Memorial after a short bit to see Doug and see if I can peak out on his property to where the back burn area was suppose to happen and until I review the photos and videos again after sitting on top of Doug’s area—I just cannot conceive it so PLEASE I ask all people that have photos and videos from 6-30-14 lawyered up or not SHOW THE RIGHT PEOPLE and that are investigative firefighters who feel as STRONGLY as me that the SAIR and the recent video on youtube by Mike Dudley just does a great disservice of the men and I am not wanting to think there was a back burn until you all realize YOUR information MATTERS!!!! Any media can write what they want but its YOUR information NEEDED to properly assess the YHF so PLEASE share—

    Oh my it was hard to meet one person today who knew one of the GMHS dearly and I don’t want to get into but it was eery for me yet I understand WHY God led it that way- just so torn up this weekend with the losses, seeing Yarnell faces and Sonny/my properties in Vernon still in threat of loss—but AH is ok.

    Also I miss my hiking pal. He seems so far away. I am going again to Glen Ilah and Yarnell tomorrow then to the Prescott 19 memorial at 4pm….it is just too hard to see the t-shirts sales and crap like that on this kind of weekend—seems insensitive but remember I am born July 1st so I am the extra-sensitive kind—keep you posted if I learn anything.

    Reply

  16. I would like to remember the Granit Mountain Hotshots tomorrow.
    I am asking all here to have a silent remembrance of the crew and make no comments here
    from midnight tonight till midnight tomorrow night 24 hours on June 30th.
    I plan to do just that. Remember their families on this first year, may they rest in peace.

    Reply

    • I will not be here 6-30-14 and today at the Yarnell Memorial I met some real fine folks—firefighters- just the best people and saw Holly Neill— I left the Memorial after a short bit to see Doug and see if I can peak out on his property to where the back burn area was suppose to happen and until I review the photos and videos again after sitting on top of Doug’s area—I just cannot conceive it so PLEASE I ask all people that have photos and videos from 6-30-14 lawyered up or not SHOW THE RIGHT PEOPLE and that are investigative firefighters who feel as STRONGLY as me that the SAIR and the recent video on youtube by Mike Dudley just does a great disservice of the men and I am not wanting to think there was a back burn until you all realize YOUR information MATTERS!!!! Any media can write what they want but its YOUR information NEEDED to properly assess the YHF so PLEASE share—

      Oh my it was hard to meet one person today who knew one of the GMHS dearly and I don’t want to get into but it was eery for me yet I understand WHY God led it that way- just so torn up this weekend with the losses, seeing Yarnell faces and Sonny/my properties in Vernon still in threat of loss—but AH is ok.

      Also I miss my hiking pal. He seems so far away. I am going again to Glen Ilah and Yarnell tomorrow then to the Prescott 19 memorial at 4pm….it is just too hard to see the t-shirts sales and crap like that on this kind of weekend—seems insensitive but remember I am born July 1st so I am the extra-sensitive kind—keep you posted if I learn anything.

      Reply

  17. In the 6/26 article by Fernanda Santos in the NYT, she states the lawsuits of the 12 families specifically reference a back burn by CYFD firefighters that may have trapped the GMHS. I have not looked yet at the actual suits to see if there is more there. Apparently though, this may become an issue. This may explain why the CYFD is named in the suit (also Todd Abel works for CYFD). Hall, Shumate and Abel were all named in the suit, however Darrell Willis (as well as the City of Prescott) were not.

    Reply

    • I read the lawsuit. Says they recently discovered evidence of this and need to investigate further. Basically reserves the right to make this claim. Apparently does involve specifically the CYFD, not some property owner.

      Reply

      • My main conclusion on a back burn or burn out.
        If it was in the city of Yarnell or glen ilah it probably would not have affected the main fire moving WNW across the brush. no one would have been out in the brush setting back fires. While the could have been doing burn outs in town to protect individual structures. It would have been ill advised with the erratic winds.. Again the burnouts should not have affected the main fire and would have been short runs with in the towns them selves if such fires occurred. The main fire was already well established and spotting so other set fires would have had little effect on the main fire at that time.
        My observations we will have to see what the facts are.

        Reply

        • My main conclusion on a back burn or burn out.
          If it was in the city of Yarnell or glen ilah ANGLES SHOWN TO US WHERE BETWEEN SESAME AND SHRINE OUT BY BALUCO AREA RIGHT BEFORE MAUGHAN AREA NEXT TO HELMS AS WELL AS ACROSS THE HWY 89 NEAR THE RANCH HOUSEit probably would not have affected the main fire moving WNW across the brush. THE MAIN FIRE WAS SEPARATE ACCOUNT IN WHAT WE WERE SHOWN AND NOT NEAR THE MAIN FIREno one would have been out in the brush setting back fires.IN GOD’S TIME PEOPLES ACCOUNTS MAY BE SHOWN PUBLICLY BUT FOR NOW I JUST LAY LOW AND LET GOD HANDLE THIS UNTIL THE PEOPLE COME OUT WITH THE VIDEOS AND PHOTOS ( I CAME OUT FROM DAY ONE WITH MINE AND CAN JUST HOPE THE REST DO TOO FREELY) BUT AGAIN I WILL NOT BE SHOCKED OR SURPRISED BY ANY NEW REVELATION OF A BACK BURN AND WHEN I HIKED WITH SANTOS THAT LADY HAD THE HEART FOR THE GMHS AND SEEING THIS FROM A RELIGIOUS CULTURE AND SHE EVEN WENT AND PAID FOR FIREFIGHTING TRAINING—SHE REALLY HAS GONE DEEP INTO LEARNING IT ALL—FINE WOMAN. I ADORE HER STYLE AND LIFE HISTORY AND DRIVE- While the could have been doing burn outs in town to protect individual structures. It would have been ill advised with the erratic winds..AMEN THERE Again the burnouts should not have affected the main fire and would have been short runs with in the towns them selves if such fires occurred. The main fire was already well established and spotting so other set fires would have had little effect on the main fire at that time.YES BUT WAS IT FACTUAL THAT THE MAIN FIRE KILLED THE 19 OR ONE SET SEPARATE—THAT IS THE CONCERN ALOT OF LOCALS WHO WERE THERE SAY—
          My observations we will have to see what the facts areIN GOD’S TIME!

          Reply

            • Bob Powers says

              June 28, 2014 at 3:21 pm

              Joy
              I would suggest that people mistook spot fires for set backfires. we will have to see
              —- reply: it is possible yet there is photos/videos with equipment as I have stated here before that these accounts need to be public to properly assess it being I am not a firefighter and a firefighter can explain the vehicles/equipment. simple. SHOW the public the photos and videos so people can properly assess this YHF!

              Reply

              • Yes it is hard to comment on something we are not looking at to evaluate it.
                Back burns in town on specific pieces of property would I do not believe affect the main fire out in the brush nor would there be any reason to back fire with no other reason than the protection of structures or equipment. I don’t believe regular fire personnel would just start lighting fires without some goal and with no direct orders.
                To light fires to protect houses would also put other houses in danger so still makes no sense to me. The men and equipment could again be putting out a spot fire rather than lighting a fire just a thought.

                Reply

                • for an example—the one photo/video and that person knows who they are— they are on the hill next to the Ranch House with a torch lit and fire in background and when we were in evacuation we were told the fire jumped the highway but in the past annual people have shown us so many accounts and there is a photo/video out there that shows the fire did not jump the highway and yet it is not in any reports about that back burn and as well that burn took out homes—so I just have to keep laying low and be patient that in His time the stuff finally surfaces so people can FINALLY properly assess this fire-

                  Reply

                  • Again hard to say the person with the torch could have been waiting for the fire to get close to the highway to back burn and hold it to one side of the highway.
                    Again a very critical use of fire against fire in a structure area a highly questionable decision. If that is what was happening. Definitely should have been investigated by one of the 2 teems another misstep that could have given clarity. The pictures might help to tie down the crew and what was going on location and other facts. It is very interesting. Again in town and firing back into the fire would not effect the location GM was at. I would be more concerned with any kind of a back fire at the Bolder springs ranch that would have been critical. No such info has turned up on that so far.

                    Reply

    • This is what I was saying Mike—I have seen things others have not so like I stated to Bob Powers I would not be surprised to see this surface—
      I have not heard from Santos in a few month—Hope to see her this weekend if she comes up-

      She along with John MacLean/Holly Neill have some very good solid sources.

      Sonny- about our 3 properties— the fire is under 10 miles away now and and there is 0% containment. Because of what happened at Yarnell last year, they are keeping everything really hush hush and they have sent an insane amount of resources out here to fight this thing. Hopes are high!!!!! Absolutely crazy that this is all going on on the anniversary of last years tragedy. So scary!!

      Willis told me it began on the reservation but no source to how yet-

      Reply

    • Reply to mike post on June 28, 2014 at 5:40 am

      >> mike said…
      >> Hall, Shumate and Abel were all named in the suit, however
      >> Darrell Willis (as well as the City of Prescott) were not.

      What is really *odd* about these ‘new filings’ is not simply that the City of Prescott and its employees ( Willis, Marsh, Steed ) are no longer being mentioned as direct ‘defendants’…

      The ‘new filings actually go OUT OF THEIR WAY to establish that not only was there no wrong-doing or negligence on the part of the two City of Prescott employees ( Marsh and Steed ) who led the other 17 employees under their care to their deaths..or on the part of their direct supervisor(s) ( Willis, others ) responsible for their training and their ‘culture of decision making’… the new filings actually say there was ‘total competence’ at all times… even up to the moment of death.

      That is the exact polar opposite of what the original ‘notice of claims’ ( from the same attorneys ) were trying to establish.

      Somehow… that smells of a ‘deal’ made with the City of Prescott.

      In cases like this… it is POSSIBLE that the City of Prescott reached its own ‘back-room’ deal with the attorneys representing the families who filed the original ‘wrongful death’ claims.

      As part of that deal… one of the ‘action items’ could have been the promise of certain statements like the ones we now see appearing in the re-filed petition(s) that basically ABSOLVES the City of Prescott ( and its employees working the Yarnell Fire and their inline supervisors ) of any hint of negligence.

      It’s possible. Happens all the time in cases like this.

      If there was no such ‘deal’ made with the City of Prescott… then the ‘turn around’ as represented by these new ‘statements’ is rather unexplainable.

      There is even MORE actual ‘evidence’ now than there was back in December when the ‘wrongful death’ notice of claims were originally filed that these City of Prescott employees ( Marsh and Steed ) WERE intentionally dis-regarding the rules of their profession AND the safety of the 17 men under their care in the pursuit of their own agenda(s)… and even more evidence now that this sort of of ‘bad decisions with good outcomes’ behavior and the pursuit of personal agendas while ‘on the job’ was not all that unusual for this City of Prescott organization.

      The case for ‘negligence’ on their part ( and, hence… direct responsibility going back to their own employers… the City of Prescott ) has never been stronger… so for the newly filed ‘suits’ to ‘not go there’ without there being some sort of ‘back-room deal’ in place to explain it would be a real mystery.

      Here is just one article that appeared about the newly re-filed suits and some ‘cuts’ from them that show the complete ‘turnaround’ with regards to City of Prescott employees Marsh and Steed… and their direct supervisors and employers… Darrell Willis and the City of Prescott itself…

      Prescott Valley News
      State of Arizona Sued by Yarnell Residents, Granite Mountain Hotshots Praised

      http://www.prescottvalleyenews.com/news/current-news/state-of-arizona-sued-by-yarnell-residents-granite-mountain-hotshots-praised

      From the article…
      _______________________________________________________________

      The lawsuit starts out by stating:

      “1. From June 28 to June 30, 2013, the Arizona State Forestry Division tried to contain, manage, and suppress the Yarnell Hill fire. It failed miserably.

      “2. Because of the Arizona State Forestry Division’s negligence, 19 firefighters died and much of Yarnell was destroyed.”

      The lawsuit continues to detail a perspective of the failure of the State of Arizona to effectively manage the fire. On page 5, however, the tone changes:

      “8. The brightest spot in this story of incompetent mismanagement was the Grainte Mountain Interagency Hotsot Crew’s unselfish, exemplary and courageous performance.

      “9. When most units under the Arizona State Forestry Division’s inept direction were doing little to contain the fire and to protect Yarnell, the Granite Mountain Interagency Hotshot Crew tried to initiate a burn-out and to protect Yarnell, the Granite Mountain Interagency Hotshot Crew tried to initiate a burn-out and tried to construct and improve firebreaks to contain the southern and eastern part of the Yarnell Hill Fire…

      “16. Despite getting no reliable information, support, and protection from the Arizona State Forestry Division just when it was most neded, the Granite Mountain Interagency Hotshot Crew continued to try to contain the fire and to protect themselves and Yarnell’s homes and people.

      “17. In fact, the Granite Mountain Interagency Hotshot Crew was moving into a new position where it could contributer its skills and efforts to containing the Yarnell Hill Fire when the fire unexpectedly advanced into its location.

      “18. Even then the members of the Granite Mountain Interagency Hotshot Crew did not shirk their duty and did not panic.

      “19. They prepared an area for their fire shelters and deployed them.

      “20. The Granite Mountain Interagency Hotshot Crew, unlike the Arizona State Forestry Division, consistently displayed exemplary competence, dedication and bravery.

      “21. Unlike the Division Zulu Supervisor and unlike the Air Tactical Group Supervisor, the members of the Granite Mountain Interagency Hotshot Crew did not abandon their duty. With the exception of one lookout, who himself was nearly cut off from rescue and killed, the entire Granite Mountain Interagency Hotshot Crew died in the unselfish service of others, including in the unselfish service of the grateful people of Yarnell.

      “22. If the Arizona State Forestry Division had competently managed, contained and suppressed the Yarnell Hill fire, no member of the Grainte Mountain Interagency Hotshot Crew would have died – and Yarnell and its people wouldhave escaped devastation.”

      _______________________________________________________________

      So even though there is now just as much evidence to prove that City of Prescott employee/supervisors Eric Marsh and Jesse Steed WERE guilty of ‘gross negligence that day’as there is now new evidence to prove that DIVSZ Rance Marquez was NOT…

      …Marsh and Steed get a ‘free pass’ now in the new filing… but Marquez is still getting thrown under the bus and is still ‘the bad guy’ who ‘broke the rules of his profession’ and ‘abandoned his position without properly notifying others of his whereabouts’ ( Marsh and Steed certainly did BOTH of those things ).

      It’s all a little ‘over the top’ in its ‘absolution’ being granted to Marsh, Steed ( and, consequently, the City of Prescott ). Almost as if the lawyers were being TOLD what to say by the City of Prescott itself to fend off further litigation(s) in exchange for ‘the deal’ that might have been made.

      Very strange.

      If that really is what is ‘going down’ ( a negotiated ‘deal’ between the planitiff’s lawyers and the City of Prescott itself )… then it is also *most* probably one of those things where NO ONE will EVER really know ‘the details’. As much as the ‘deal’ could stipulate that further litigation include statements like the ones we now see above ‘absolving’ the City of Prescott and its employees ( Willis, Marsh, Steed, etc. ) from any suggestions of ‘negligence’… there could be further stipulations that NO ONE ever DISCUSS the terms of whatever ‘deal’ was reached between the lawyer’s and the City of Prescott.

      If it turns out that *is* what we see happening now… you really can’t blame the Prescott City Manager and City attorney(s) for trying to cut *SOME* kind of ‘deal’ here and remove themselves from the litigation(s). Worst-case-scenario to avoid would be having a jury decide in favor of the plaintiffs and ALSO decide to double or triple the financial penalties.

      ALL the other defendants in the original ‘wrongful death’ notice of claims can absorb tremendous financial hits… but it was the City of Prescott that stood the best chance of showing up for SALE on Ebay if they lost any/all of the lawsuits.

      Reply

      • Of course if it goes to court the states side could provide a different conclusion of facts. The families suing would not want the City and there employees put in a bad light. Making the crew and supervisors heroes is an attempt to make it hard for the Defense to attach blame to them after creating sympathy with the jury.
        some of what I learned being a court bailiff for 8 years.

        Reply

        • Mr. Powers… see post above about ‘new things’ that emerged in articles/interviews published the day of the 1 year anniversary.

          Early in the morning on June 30, 2014… an article was published that says the attorneys for the City of Prescott HAD been ‘talking’ to the attorneys for the families about a ‘deal’..

          The City of Prescott hasn’t decided yet whether they are going to challenge/appeal the decision that Andrews Ashcraft deserves full benefits..

          The article suggests that the ‘deal’ that was being discussed as late as June 20 ( last week ) was that if the families would agree to remove Prescott from defendants in the wrongful death suits… then Prescott *MIGHT* decide to not ‘challenge’ the decision about Ashcraft’s benefits.

          The suits have been filed.
          They HAVE ‘removed the City of Prescott’ from the list of ‘defendants’.
          Whether that is a direct result of this ‘deal’ that was being discussed remains to be seen.

          The City of Prescott is expected to decide whether to ‘challenge’ the Ashcraft’s benefits ruling within the next few days.

          I suppose we will know more then whether there really is some ‘quid pro quo’ going on here.

          Reply

          • Scratch the comment above. Moments after I posted it… TTWARE posted his message saying the Prescott City Council did, in fact, vote TODAY to go ahead and contest ( appeal ) the Andrew Ashcraft benefits.

            So either there never was any ‘deal’ in place about that… or we are looking at one of the biggest legal back-stabs in history.

            I think it must be the former.

            Reply

  18. **
    >> Reply to Bob Powers post on June 27, 2014 at 6:52 am
    >>
    >> Bob Powers said…
    >>
    >> If I Am not mistaken Mcdonough Called Marsh on the intra
    >> crew to tell him the trucks were at the restaurant.
    >> Cant remember the exact words.

    You are not mistaken.

    See below for ‘the exact words’ from Brendan himself in his various testimony and video interviews.

    Both the official SAIR and the WFAR Yarnell Hill Fire reports state unequivocally that Brendan McDonough did, in fact, hear Eric Marsh and Jesse Steed ‘discussing their options about leaving the black’ over the Granite Mountain intra-crew radio frequency. ( See below ).

    As for when Brendan made his radio call ‘telling them the vehicles were now SAFE’…

    In BOTH his ABC NEWS interview with Brian Ross AND his interview with author ( and former Hotshot ) Kyle Dickman… Brendan says he called ‘his captain’ Steed to tell him the vehicles were ‘safe’ AFTER they were already ‘moved’ out of the Sesame area and PARKED in a (new) safe location.

    It is not clear from the either interview whether this meant Brendan called them from the Shrine area where the GM vehicles were initially ‘moved’ to after leaving the threatened location in the Sesame area… or whether PARKED meant when they were all finally moved to the Ranch House Restaurant.

    However.. in his hour-long video interview with the PRESCOTT DAILY COURIER… Brendan states that he made this ‘call’ to Captain Jesse Steed telling him the ‘vehicles were safe’ only AFTER all the GM vehicles had arrived all the way down at ( in Brendan’s own words ) “the cafe'”. ( The Ranch House Restaurant ).

    NOTE: It has since been determined that if Brendan really did make a radio call out to Jesse Steed to report that the GM vehicles were now ‘safe at the Ranch House Restaurant’… then that radio call had to have taken place almost exactly at the same time ( 1639 ) that Jesse Steed was making his first MAYDAY call on the Air-To-Ground channel.

    In BOTH of the video-taped interviews ( ABC NEWS and the PRESCOTT DAILY COURIER )… it is also made clear that Brendan was talking with Steed over his radio WHILE he was riding with Frisby in the UTV and AFTER the reported discussions between Frisby and Marsh/Steed about ‘moving the vehicles’… which means Brian Frisby MUST have handed Brendan his portable radio BACK after talking to to Marsh/Steed.

    So even BEFORE McDonough was dropped off by Frisby at the GM Superintendent truck and now had full access to that vehicle’s onboard radio ( and the GM intra-crew frequency ) Brendan had his portable back from Frisby which Brendan has testified to ADOSH had the GM intra-crew frequency set as its PRIORITY channel that day so that Brendan would not MISS any/all traffic on that frequency.

    ** SAIR – PDF page 30 ( of 122 pages )…

    BR Supt drops GM Lookout off at the Granite Mountain IHC Supt truck at about 1555 and then heads around the corner to get some of his crew to help move the Granite Mountain crew carriers. On the Granite Mountain intra-crew frequency, GM Lookout hears DIVS A and GM Capt talking about their options, whether to stay in the black or to come up with a plan to move.

    ** Wildland Fire Associates Report (WFAR) – PDF page 15 ( of 73 pages )…

    At 1555, fire was burning along the ridge north of Yarnell. The SPGS1 lost use of an air-to-ground radio frequency, and communication was interrupted. The BRIHC Superintendent dropped the GM Lookout off at the GMIHC Superintendents truck. The GMIHC crew carriers were moved. On the GMIHC intracrew frequency, GM Lookout heard the DIVS A and GMIHC Captain discussing the options of whether to stay in the black or to move (5).

    WFAR Footnote (5) says: From ADOSH Interview with GM Lookout.

    ** SAIT Yarnell Investigation Notes ( YIN ) – PDF page 42 ( of 60 pages )…

    They ( Brian Frisby and Brendan McDonough ) got back to trucks seem a little more hurried at this point. Blue Ridge supt is going to get some drivers. I ( Brendan speaking ) started the truck turned on the AC and made sure the truck radios were on the right Channel and volume UP.

    ** KYLE DICKMAN ARTICLE BASED ON INTERVIEW WITH BRENDAN MCDONOUGH

    Outside Magazine
    Article Title: The Yarnell Hill Fire
    By: Kyle Dickman ( former Type 1 Hotshot )
    Published September 17, 2013

    http://www.outsideonline.com/outdoor-adventure/YarnellFire.html

    From the article ( based on face-to-face interviews with Brendan McDonough )…

    On the morning of June 30, all 20 members of Prescott, Arizona’s Granite Mountain
    Hotshots headed into the mountains to protect the small town of Yarnell from an
    advancing blaze. Later that day, every man but one was dead. Through interviews
    with family, colleagues, and the lone survivor ( Brendan McDonough ), a former hotshot
    pieces together their final hours—and the fatal choices that will haunt firefighting forever.
    …
    …
    Donut drove Eric’s supe truck to the edge of Yarnell. There, he and the Blue Ridge
    hotshots joined a few engine companies who were wetting and widening a contingency
    dozer line—a last effort to stop the fire from burning straight down Highway 89.

    Donut radioed to Steed. “Buggies are PARKED.. I’m with Blue Ridge. If you guys need
    anything, let me know.”

    “Copy. I’ll see you soon.” It was the last time Donut spoke to Steed.

    ** ABC NEWS INTERVIEW WITH BRENDAN MCDONOUGH

    Brendan McDonough was interviewed in-person ( inside the Granite Mountain 7 Station building in Prescott ) by ABC News’ investigative reporter Brian Ross on August 7, 2013.

    ( NOTE: The actual link to the ABC interview is in a ‘Reply’ down below to prevent this posting from violating the one-link-per-posting rule and fall into ‘moderation’ ).

    From the (video) interview…

    Brendan McDonough: At that point… I could see the fire already… instead of moving
    NORTH… it started moving SOUTH.

    Brian Ross: Toward you?

    Brendan McDonough: Yea. Instead of BACKING towards us… it was… it had already
    become a HEAD.

    Brian Ross: Racing toward you.

    Brendan McDonough: Yes.

    Brian Ross: So… they could see this as well?

    Brendan McDonough: My-hmm. Yes sir… and… they said “If you need to get outta there go ahead and get outta there. We can see what’s goin’ on… we want you to be safe, too.” I just wanted to keep it short and simple… “If you need anything, CALL me. I’m on the other end of the fire. Whatever you need, I’m here.The buggies are PARKED”… then he said “Ok… see ya soon.”

    Brian Ross: Who was that?

    Brendan McDonough: Uh… Jesse Steed. My captain. I said “Allright… I’ll see ya soon.” He said “Ok”.

    * PRESCOTT DAILY COURIER VIDEO INTERVIEW
    * WITH BRENDAN MCDONOUGH

    Prescott Daily Courier
    Brendan McDonough believes everything happens for a reason
    By: Joanna Dodder Nellans – 8/7/2013 6:00:00 AM

    Both parts of the video interview are posted along with the article…

    ( NOTE: The actual link to the PRESCOTT DAILY COURIER interview is in a ‘Reply’ down below to prevent this posting from violating the one-link-per-posting rule and fall into ‘moderation’ ).

    From video interview…

    I was spinning my weather… and… my captain had reached me on the radio saying that we were gonna expect 180 degree wind shift and that we could expect gusts up to 50 to 60 miles per hour… and… once I heard that I knew the fire was gonna change rapidly and he understood that too… and at that point I was closer to the fire than the crew was… the actual active fire.

    At that point I continued to spin my weather… and… my captain was heads up for what was goin’ on… and could see what was goin’ on… and could see me… and… as I looked back to see how they’re doing I turned around and I could already see that the wind had shifted… and it had met my trigger point to re-evaluate where I was and I needed to find a different position.

    So I relayed to my captain and my sup that I needed to find a different position to be a lookout at… and they told me that they… they could see what was coming… they could see the fire’s edge and they were aware of what was happening with the fire and where I was at… and how close I was.

    So I started making my way back into this road that the other hotshot crew had dropped me off on… on an ATV… and… soon as I arrive at this road I turn around and I look back at the fire and I can just see a huge… just the smoke building… and it startin’ to gain a lot of potential to move towards us.

    I, ah, relayed this information back to my captain and he… he told me… “No… I can see what’s goin’ on Brendan… just… make sure you’re safe… make sure everything’s good for you.”… and… I’m startin’ to walk down this road and I’m switchin’ over my radio to call the other hotshot crew if I can get a ride and… as soon as I’m in the process of tryin’ to talk to them they’re already right there around the corner ready to pick me up.

    So at that point I loaded my stuff up… and… as I’m loading my stuff up… I hand my radio to the… the sup off of the other hotshot crew and… he’s relaying information to my superintendent and captain about where our vehicles are parked, that they’re gonna move ‘em for us, that they have me with them… and it’s safer for me to go out with him, back to the vehicles, back to the main road in Yarnell than to try and meet up with them… and he relayed information on what the fire’s doing and kinda what their goal was.. and… just giving them as much information as he could… on what was goin’ on… and… at that point.. um… I was already in the ATV and we’re on our way and I’m just… on the radio… I tell… uh… my superintendent and captain that if they need anything, give me a call, and that I’ll see ‘em soon.

    We had arrived at the vehicles… and Blue Ridge hotshot crew… they helped us bump those vehicles around to a different side of the fire, in a safer area… um… for them to be in… and at that point… I was pretty much with them… and… I mean… in this job you’re supposed to always remain flexible… and… uh… when I had left… my position was compromised… and my safety… and my crew understood… and they were comfortable with me leaving knowing that they could see the fire… and… um…

    I mean… as any… any crew member they always wish they could be with their crew… those are the guys ya love and ya wanna work with… and… when I was with Blue Ridge I felt very comfortable, ya know. It was.. It was almost like being… ya know… with a… it was at home. Good feeling… um… but our goal was to prep a dozer line which means to get ready to burn it… possibly… so we were gonna clear out a lot of the fuels that’s on this line that a dozer has pushed… heavy equipment has pushed… and within minutes of getting there… uh… the fire activity was just picking up and keep picking up from when I had left… and… around that time… this had to been around 4… 4:15, 4:30 ish… I’m guessing… my times on that day are really hazy… um… we ended up going… they kinda pulled the resources off and the divisions and… jus cus of what was goin’ on and people on their own were doing it jus… wasn’t… uh… safe area… cus at that point when we had moved we were even closer to the fire… and…

    We pulled off, we PARKED at a CAFE’, ( the Ranch House Restaurant ) and during the time, ya know, told my superintendent and captain that we had the VEHICLES in a SAFE area… and… once again… if they needed anything just give me a call and I’ll see ‘em soon… and that’s the last time that I talked to ‘em.

    Reply

    • ** ABC NEWS INTERVIEW WITH BRENDAN MCDONOUGH

      Here is the link to the ABC NEWS interview quoted in the post above.
      It is posted down here because only one link is allowed per post or a comment
      will fall into ‘moderation’…

      Brendan McDonough was interviewed in-person by ABC News’
      investigative reporter Brian Ross on August 7, 2013.

      http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/brendan-mcdonough-sole-survivor-arizona-hotshot-firefighting-tragedy/story?id=19881553&singlePage=true

      Reply

    • * PRESCOTT DAILY COURIER VIDEO INTERVIEW
      * WITH BRENDAN MCDONOUGH

      Here is the link to the PRESCOTT DAILY COURIER interview quoted in the post above.
      It is posted down here because only one link is allowed per post or a comment
      will fall into ‘moderation’…

      Prescott Daily Courier
      Brendan McDonough believes everything happens for a reason
      By: Joanna Dodder Nellans – 8/7/2013 6:00:00 AM

      NOTE: Both parts of the video interview are posted along with the article…

      http://dcourier.com/main.asp?SectionID=1&SubsectionID=1&ArticleID=122030

      Reply

      • Also. Picture #219 of 220 from Rick Tham seems to have been taken before the Russ Reason Video. It also appears that the Russ Reason video actually captures Rick Tham driving by the Ranch House, Reason and the reporter walk behind Tham’s truck.

        Marti. Thanks for bringing my attention to Tham’s set of photos

        Reply

        • OK I found the photo. It’s actually Yarnell Hill Fire June 28-30 2013 271.jpg Great catch! It was so dark I hadn’t caught it.

          To me, the vehicles in the photo don’t sync with the vehicles in the video, either in the parking lot or passing by on the road. Especially the ones passing by. Which passing-by vehicle are you suggesting Rick Tham is driving?

          The photo is time-stamped 4:51:19 AM.

          When I was synching his photos of the big red truck (Musser’s.) at the mini-mart, since he took one with his iPhone and the rest with this Minolta, it looked to me like the Minolta has the correct time, just says AM instead of PM.

          To me it looks like the guy standing by the drivers side door has a blue helmet on.

          My comments are getting stuck in moderation and I can barely see the type in the comment box on my iPad.

          Thanks again for catching this!

          Reply

        • Test. I”ve been trying to post replies to this convo, but I keep first getting stuck in moderation, and then my posts don’t show up at all. Hello?????

          Reply

      • No. That has been an ‘ongoing task’ ( to come up with an exact time for that ) since it was first discovered in the ‘raw footage’ archive of the Arizona Republic.

        The AZREPUBLIC archive does not have a ‘download’ option… so that video can only be ‘screen recorded’ which doesn’t give you any original metadata.

        Only the AZREPUBLIC has the ‘original’ and would be able to extract any metadata from it… or check the logs to see if the camera ( or the operator ) recorded an exact time for this video.

        It’s down to pretty narrow timeframe, however.

        It was definitely AFTER Marty Cole ( the WHITE TACOMA with its door open ) arrived at the RHR… which is now predictable since we see Cole’s white Tacoma passing the Panebaker camera at a fixed time….

        …and it was definitely BEFORE the Blue Ridge crew was told to go back to the rear of the parking lot and away from the press…

        I actually think it was just moments after Marty Cole arrived at the RHR in his white Tacoma pickup.

        Also… if you look carefully while Russ Reason is being interviewed… a WHITE pickup passes behind him and is immediately followed by a large LIME-GREEN firetruck/engine with a BLM logo on the driver’s side door.

        These SAME TWO vehicles are also seen passing the Panebaker camera at the very start of the 1716 A2A video. They both ‘stuck together’ with the LIME GREEN engine following that white pickup all the way down to the RHR.

        Since the ‘travel’ time from the Panebaker camera down to the RHR was staying pretty consistent for all the vehicles seen passing it ( about 8 to 10 minutes to reach RHR from Panebaker camera setup because of smoke and road conditions at that time of the day )… then just based on that white pickup and the LIME GREEN engine passing behind Russ Reason while he is being interviewed it should be pretty easy to further nail down the exact time of the Russ Reason interview.

        That ‘orange glow’ seen over Russ Reason’s left shoulder during the interview has already been determined to be pretty much directly over the actual deployment site out there beyond the Boulder Springs Ranch. The ‘line of sight’ ( as the bird flies ) from where the camera was filming Reason directly out over the Boulder Springs Ranch matches exactly where that ‘orange glow’ is under the smoke cloud.

        There was a time when I thought the Russ Reason interview was taking place at the exact moment of the ‘burnover’ ( 4:42 to 4:45 PM ?? )…. but I’m not so sure about that anymore. It MAY have been just a few minutes after that ( 4:46 to 4:50 ?? ).

        However… it most certainly was ‘right around that time’.

        Reply

        • Rick Tham image #199 appears to have bee take before the Reason video. The camper top back of the white Tacoma (Cole?) is open and someone is standing beside the driver door possibly speaking with the driver. Mcdonough?

          Reply

          • You are talking about the Rick Tham photo that he took while he was ‘stuck in traffic’ a few hundred feet north of the Ranch House Restaurant, right? It’s a very DARK photo that shows all the cars lined up in that ‘curve in the road’ just before the RHR?

            Yes… you are right.. it shows part of the RHR parking lot, Marty Cole’s White Tacoma seems to already be there and the ‘back of the camper top’ is, in fact, UP ( open ).

            But I’m not seeing a number of ‘199’ for that photo..

            The photo I’m seeing is the second to last one in the set and it
            has this full filename….

            “Yarnell Hill Fire june 28-30 2013 271” ( JPEG photo )

            Direct link to the photo I’m seeing…

            https://www.dropbox.com/sh/02ue6bnjp6nazkm/AAAa-lsvLUB16n0wjQpatZlPa/Photos%20and%20Video/Rick%20Tham%20Photos#lh:null-Yarnell%20Hill%20Fire%20june%2028-30%202013%20271.JPG

            There IS someone ‘standing by the open driver door’ of Marty Cole’s white Tacoma. It MAY be Brendan… but it also might just be Marty Cole himself.

            Extreme ehancement on that part of the picture becomes sort of a ‘Rosarch test’. One moment it looks like someone with short hair with his back to the camera talking to the driver in the Tacoma ( Possible Brendan? )… but if you blink twice… it then looks like someone with a mustache and a hat on FACING the camera ( Marty Cole has a mustache ).

            Other things to note in this photo…

            Yes.. it APPEARS as if the ‘reporter’ who is ABOUT to catch Russ Reason and ask him if he wants to be interviewed is already standing out there on Highway 89 and talking to people in their cars.

            It also appears as if the fellow just to her left standing on the shoulder of the road is the camera guy who will then be ‘shooting’ the Russ Reason video in just a few minutes.

            Also… we can finally see the LOGO on the passenger door of that ALL-RED pickup truck ( with flashing lights ) that also is seen in all of Tom Story’s photos. The door logo on the driver’s side is ‘blocked’ in all of the Tom Story photos but now… in this Rick Tham photo… we have a clear shot at seeing the logo on the OTHER ( passenger side ) door.

            It says “Wickenburg Fire” in GOLD letters.

            So that really is the same ALL-RED pickup seen parked earlier up at the ICP just west of the vehicles belonging to PNF ‘off the radar’ hires Jason Clawson, Aaron Hulburd and KC ‘Bucky’ Yowell.

            Best shot of it up that at the ICP is in that video filmed from that truck that was LEAVING the ICP and captured close-ups of all the vehicles parked up there more than an hour before the deployment.

            Question still is… WHO was actually DRIVING that ALL-RED pickup that says “Wickenburg Fire” in GOLD letters on the door(s)?

            Marti has floated the theory that OPS2 Paul Musser might have BORROWED this ALL-RED “Wickenburg Fire” pickup when he launched out onto the fire as the second fully-functi0ning Field OPS that day.

            I still think that is perfectly possible… especially since we now know that IS the same ALL-RED pickup down in the parking lot of the Ranch House Restaurant and the same vehicle where the Tom Story photos seem to indicate a ‘meeting’ was taking place and FFs ( including McDonough? ) all seem to be looking at a MAP.

            Reply

            • The guy driving the red pick up appears to be the tall slim FF in the white helmet that was photographed earlier by Tham (gas station parking lot) when he was wearing a cowboy hat. Possibly the same cowboy hat seen on the dash of the red truck in the Reason video as well as in the Swartz photos from the Town of Yarnell folder.

              The #199 was the sequential order number, sorry for the confusion.

              Reply

            • OK now that I’ve determined I can FINALLY post from my computer but not my ipad, and now that I’ve lost five comments I made before, and now that I’m really tired and have turned off LIghtroom.

              And so I’ll turn Lightroom back on and post this before the silence-vigil I agree with Bob Powers we might choose to observe.

              I’m not seeing the photo even remotely synching with the video, (and I could be wrong) regarding either the vehicles in the parking lot or, even especially more, the vehicles passing by in the road.

              Which vehicle do you, Calvin, think Thams is driving in in the video?

              The photo is time-stamped 4:51:19 AM. When I was looking at his photos of the red truck (Musser’s?) at the Mini-Mart, of which he has several shots with this Minolta and one with an iphone 4s, it looked to me that the Minolta is pretty accurate except for the AM part.

              So if that’s the case, this photo would have been taken at 4:51, and given that I don’t see the sync between it and the video (please feel free to correct me) I’ve been estimating it was taken after the video.

              And I’ve been consumed with some classes for the past five days so haven’t been able to post until today. But I want to say, thank you to WTKTT for finding Todd Abel’s truck on his FB page. I spent quite awhile there, but wasn’t focused on the truck, because I was then just trying to figure out his face.

              The lateness of that truck passing by the Air2Air camera threw me. I really thought, via what Willis (and TBH some others) said, that Todd was at the RHR parking lot before Willis got there.

              And also, over the past several days, I’ve been still thinking the red truck in the parking lot was the Ponderosa one (with the white banner behind it) and not the Wickenberg (without the banner behind it). Will go back and look at these all some more tomorrow in LIghtroom where I can sometimes gain more clarity.

              But I may not post until Tuesday, because I’m in the mood to honor that silence.

              Also I agree, after reading a whole bunch of recent articles about the lawsuits, that they are written pretty “strangely,” all things considered. Much more strangely than I anticipated.

              Reply

              • And thank you Calvin for catching this photo. I had downloaded it but not really looked at in in relationship to the parking lot because it was so dark.

                Great Catch!!!

                Reply

              • And PS. AFter messing around with a bit in LIghtroom, I’m seeing someone in a blue helmet near the driver’s side window of Marty Cole’s truck.

                Reply

              • Including the fact that CYFD is targetted when PFD isn’t. I guess that’s because of the backfire possibility?

                But I’m wracking my brain and can find nothing in it that substantiates a charge that any of the three major CYFD players, Todd Abel, Gary Cordes, or Cougan Carothers, had anything to do with a backfire in the area that would have impacted this fire in this way.

                Reply

                • And the CYFD engine, at the time involved, was up at the Youth Camp, if I recall correctly.

                  (I could be wrong, I’m just working out of my brain. But I’m pretty sure that’s correct)/

                  I really can’t recall anybody from CYFD on this fire being at the right place at the right time to have done a burnout that would have impacted this fire in this way.

                  Reply

                  • And the wording definitely throws Rance Marquez and Rory Collins (whom I’m po’d at for other reasons) totally under the bus in a really unjustifiable way, IMHO.

                    Where is this coming from????

                    Reply

                    • I agree with you Marti. Again if the Back Fires were in the Town of Yarnell they would have been short runs, if along the highway in town as joy said a picture across from the Restaurant showed that could have been done once the fire was close to keep it from jumping the highway.
                      Again though with all the houses that could have been affected along with fire personnel it just dose not seem some one would be doing back fires in town. We definitely need more info.

              • Rick Tham image #115, 122, 177, 215, and 216 seem to show parts of a dark red Toyota Tacoma that I think Tham was driving. It passes the camera at the beginning of the Reason video.

                Reply

        • The Russ Reason timestamp of video–
          when I hiked with some reporter
          we ran into Russ and I know I posted this awhile back but Russ said quarter to 5 but the waitress said it was more like 5pm so that is as close as they could help—

          Reply

          • Thank you, Joy.

            That ‘timeframe’ is actually accurate. It WAS somewhere right in there and we are about to nail down EXACTLY when.

            I don’t think I ever really expected Mr. Reason to know exactly when he was giving that interview. The poor man had only moments before realized that he was losing his ‘paid for’ home… and everything he owned but what he was able to throw in his vehicle.

            Reply

    • Thanks WTKTT
      So was Dudley covering for what McDonough actually heard, or just not up to the facts.
      he seemed to be covering the investigation rather than allowing open discussion.
      I am wondering if any thing was cut from the videoed discussion. Like hard questions?
      Just my thoughts but it seemed to generic and non confrontational. A room full of wild land fire fighters would have asked some hard questions after some of Dudley’s statements.
      At least in my day we never pulled any punches.

      Reply

      • Reply to Bob Powers post on June 28, 2014 at 6:01 am

        >> Bob Powers said…
        >> So was Dudley covering for what McDonough actually heard,
        >> or just not up to the facts.

        Good question. I would say BOTH.

        For all we know… it is perfectly possible that during his interview with the SAIT investigators… they might have actually ASKED Brendan if he ‘heard them discussing their options’… but when Brendan said “Yes… I did”… that was the end of it. They might have actually MOVED ON in the interview and NEVER actually asked the obvious followup question “What did you hear, Brendan”?

        They might not have WANTED to know.

        It might have messed up their pre-determined narrative and they didn’t
        want that to happen.

        So they just published what Brendan said he said ( That he heard them ‘discussing their options about leaving the black’ )… and that was that.

        Even as I type these words I find it totally unbelievable that they would have NOT then asked Brendan what he really heard… but then again… my 92 year old grandmother could have done better interviews than these SAIT guys did so I suppose nothing would really surprise me there.

        IMPORTANT: Did you know that the ‘SAIT Investigation Notes’ for Brendan McDonough’s official interview with them are the ONLY ones that do NOT
        say WHO actually conducted the interview? It is VERY strange ( and suspicious ) that ONLY this one set of interview notes would not be saying WHO was conducting and/or present for that interview… when EVERY other set of interview notes does.

        ALSO: There is still a huge mystery surrounding this same statement in the ADOSH contracted Wildland Fire Associates Report. ( WFAR ).

        The WFAR has pretty much the same exact statement as the SAIR report about Brendan definitely ‘hearing them discussing their options about leaving the safe black’… but the WFAR report then has the ‘Footnote 5’ symbol at the end of the sentence.

        The WFAR ‘Footnote 5’ at the bottom of the page says this statement from Brendan about him definitely ‘hearing them discussing their options’ was ( quote ) “taken from ADOSH interview with Brendan McDonough”.

        However… NOWHERE in EITHER of the TWO interviews that ADOSH actually did with Brendan does he ever make such a statement. Incredibly… the ADOSH investigators didn’t even ask him about it. The closest we get in the ADOSH interviews is when they ask Brendan if… while moving the vehicles… he was then AWARE of ‘what the crew was doing or what their plans were’. Brendan hesitates and then doesn’t really answer the question. All he says in reply is… “That wasn’t RELAYED directly TO me”.

        That is a DODGE of the question. It is not a YES and it’s certainly not a NO.
        It’s Brendan saying that even if he did hear something… it wasn’t DIRECTED
        at him and it even seems like he’d been coached by his lawyer ( who was sitting right next to him during both ADOSH interviews ) to make that ‘legal’ distinction about what to talk about and what NOT to talk about. The ‘coaching’ seems to have been “only talk about radio traffic directly related to YOU and what YOU were doing… nothing else.”

        Incredibly… the ADOSH investigators took Brendan’s DODGE of the question as a valid answer and didn’t ‘follow up’ about it.

        Brendan repeats this ( apparent ) ‘only talk about radio traffic directed AT you’ coaching just a few moments later in his interview when Dave Larsen ( Rest in Peace ) then asks Brendan if he heard the ‘deployment radio traffic’ in real time.

        Brendan hesitates again… and then tries the same kind of ‘that wasn’t relayed to me’ dodge that he did a few moments before. Brendan refuses to answer with a simple YES or NO and says… “That was on the command channel”.

        This time… Dave Larsen catches the attempt to ‘dodge’ the question and he REPEATS ( and clarifies ) the question. Larsen asks Brendan again… “Yea… but did you HEAR any of that?”. Brendan hesitates again ( probably looked at his lawyer for a moment ) and then pretty much admits he DID hear the deployment traffic in real time that day.

        I only wish Larsen had done the same thing in the interview a few moments before when Brendan ‘dodged’ the question about whether he heard them ‘discussing their options’. I wish Larsen had done the same ‘followup’ at that time and said “Yes… Brendan… I know that conversation was not being RELAYED specifically TO you… I am asking you if you HEARD any of it?”.

        Anyway… my POINT was that the ADOSH contracted WFAR report has the same claim in it that the SAIR does about Brendan ‘definitely hearing Marsh and Steed ‘discussing their options to leave the black’… and the WFAR report says it was ‘based on ADOSH interview with Brendan McDonough’… but there is no such statement from Brendan in any of the ADOSH interview audio recordings or transcripts.

        So what does that mean?

        Does it mean that the WFAR guys were just reproducing shit from the SAIR report and then ‘attributing’ it to statements in ADOSH interviews that don’t actually exist? Was all this intentional… or just more incompetence?

        I don’t know.

        There would now have to be full-blown ‘investigations of the investigations’ to probably clear things like this up.

        >> Bob Powers also wrote.
        >> he ( Mike Dudley ) seemed to be covering the investigation rather than
        >> allowing open discussion.

        Yes. He said it was ‘totally open to questions’ but when one fairly smart fellow in the audience started asking certain pertinent questions… Dudley just got more and more ‘annoyed’ that his ‘narrative’ was being ‘interrupted’.

        Example: One person in the audience who said he was a Hotshot supervisor started asking very relevant questions about the ‘intra crew’ conversations that Dudley has just said they KNOW took place. Dudley had ‘moved on’ in his presentation and was really just annoyed at being asked any questions about something he just said was a ‘done deal’. ( That no one recorded or heard those intra-crew conversations. Period. End of story ).

        >> Bob Powers also wrote…
        >> I am wondering if any thing was cut from the videoed discussion.
        >> Like hard questions?

        I actually don’t think so. It was just a ‘soft’ audience.

        No one wanted to even challenge the ‘loud talking US Forestry Service’ guy
        about anything. That’s too bad.

        >> Bob Powers also said…
        >> Just my thoughts but it seemed too generic and non confrontational. A room
        >> full of wild land fire fighters would have asked some hard questions after
        >> some of Dudley’s statements.

        There WAS a ‘Wildland Division’ section in the audience.
        Dudley pointed to them as soon as he took the stage saying…
        “Well… I can see the Wildland folks”.

        Even the fellow who wanted clarification on why the Arroyo crew didn’t get there and wanted to know more about the intra-crew communications was being very ‘careful’ talking to this ‘big dog’ from USF.

        He had valid questions… but Dudley just seemed annoyed with him.

        >> Bob Powers also wrote…
        >> At least in my day we never pulled any punches.

        Except for that one guy asking questions… I didn’t get any sense there was anyone in the room who knew enough about what happened in Yarnell to even begin to challenge some of the BS that Dudley was slinging from the stage.

        Even now… a full year later… I don’t think the Wildland Firefighting community knows very much at all about the ‘details’ of that day. What that says about there even being a chance of preventing more incidents like this in the future… I don’t know. Unless there is some renewed interest in the WFF community to actually KNOW what REALLY happened and to LEARN from it… then it’s just full speed ahead… business as usual.

        I am actually almost finished with a full transcript of this Mike Dudley dog and pony show from a few days ago. I think it’s important that there be a written record of what this US Forestry robot is out there saying to rooms full of firefighters. He’s almost just ‘telling his own story’ and in many ways isn’t even being consistent with what’s in his OWN report ( that he was co-leader on ).

        Example: He told this room full of firefighters that BOTH ICT4 Russ Shumate and BLM Dean Fernandez where physically THERE in Yarnell on Friday night, shortly after the fire was reported, and were ‘evaluating the fire in-person’ before deciding TOGETHER not to do anything about it until the next day.

        Complete horseshit.

        Reply

        • While there will be no “investigation of the investigations”, this is about to be all reopened, starting essentially from scratch. First, the defendants will get to respond to the suits, then discovery will begin. That means depositions galore. Question for you all. Does Brendan McDonough get deposed? If so, by whom?

          Reply

        • WTKTT and every one else out there——
          I am at least at ease knowing from My friend who is the Sawtooth Hot Shot Superintendent that he and his supervisors have heavily reemphasized the 10 and 18 and LCES as Identified Failures that occurred in the Yarnell hill fire
          That to me says the people on the ground know what happened and the basics were violated. Lessons learned The 10 standard FF Orders will keep you safe use them.
          While every thing else swirls around and around the people on the ground are focused.

          Reply

  19. Fri, Jun 27, 2014 at 8:26 PM she replied by email/phone
    Sonny: AH is ok— her husband is assigned to the fire too.
    Good to know she is safe!

    Reply

  20. is this the only source to see if AH my banker is ok?
    https://safeandwell.communityos.org/zf/safesearch/search
    Thank you Barbara Buchanan for that link
    as the weekend unfolds if anyone gets any information please let me know in regards how this fire started-
    I am not worried about the ghost town or the garden or any of the 3 properties yet I am concerned for A.H.
    simple.
    Any info. to this fire I will appreciate it.

    Reply

  22. Sonny- look at these links to keep informed if the 3 places are in threat—I called Apache County Sheriff and so far its not quite there— shew.
    http://311info.net/—instaweb—Apache County Management—they are focused to 3144—we are at the y remember near 3-d storage—if it crosses hwy 60 Sonny good chance though because we are off huff puff—“Huff Puff” the magic dragon—go with your fire—ugh. I am not happy.
    Sonny, google the google map and put 3144 Vernon County Road, Vernon, Arizona and you can see how very close it is to our 3 properties. I already contacted the banker to make she is okay- nothing yet. How did this fire start? Anyone here know?

    Reply

  23. http://www.wfsb.com/story/25882311/san-juan-fire-explodes-to-2000-acres-in-northeast-az

    What the hell. I will have to call/email our banker who is buying the property but what are the chances that a year later we face another fire —the 3 properties Sonny and I bought cash together in 2012 are in evacuation/fire risk —???— and we are not even there. You see this Sonny? They should write a book about how much fire b.s. we see—all unavoidable b.s. fires. Geez. I just am shaking my head right now when my brother-in-law broke the news to me. Really? That was the property we did the septic, teepee, made the ghost town and cute little signs and sheds and the garden—

    Really? Last year on a Friday I had to spend the weekend assessing if the fire would be bad or not and possibly take homes and now I have to worry about another area—well, I say if my area burns—I had the permit and stupid case proving we did our defensible spaces and we have not been there since the banker took over in Fall 2012. Fudge.

    In Nevada they have gobs of signs that say “call this number to report a wildfire” and I just feel like saying under it WAIT 3 DAYS FIRST since that is our modern world of fighting fires. I am not pleased to see this especially when I have my plate full of events for the anniversary all the way until July 14th I am busy with GMHS/Yarnell Fire events—geez.

    Reply

  24. Ha, Joy sent me the video by Mike Dudley, Fed. Investigator. It was hard to believe he would start of saying that the GM hotshots were not dually trained and did not do structures. Apparently he did not listen or see the Willis Videos where Willis says protecting structures is what they do and more than once mentioned it. Now if Willis trained them who is telling the truth? It was so much hype I couldn’t waste much more time listening to in since we only get an hour here in Helena at the library. It is obviously a cover up and I for one can’t see why they don’t just say they screwed up. I did not see him mention that two fire departments were told to stand down when they wanted to put the fire out immediately. We don’t have the name of who told them to stand down but someone knows and should get that information public. . Joy and I knew that from talking directly to firefighters on both the Congress and Yarnell departments. We were told by several people that two different ranchers had retardant planes ready and they also were told to stand down the first day and without regard that the fire was on one of the rancher’s land. That information might be able to be verified by Joy as to the sources since she has an impeccable memory. Who told those ranchers to stand down if that information can be proven? It was absolutely a no burn and big signs at the beginning of each end of Yarnell said that. Buford in Yarnell said it was totally illegal to have any kind of fire around there and any fire at all had to be immediately attended to. He said he has been following these lightening strikes and seems they wasn’t to let them linger for some time. He told me he believes one should follow the money–there is big money, more federal grant money, more machinery to be produced, not to mention huge sums put out to battle these wildfires. Seems that lives come secondary in some of these cases and this seems to me to be one of those. I see firemen taking awards when they should be hanging their heads if they had anything at all to do with this mess. I sometimes have wondered because as a miner I sometimes opted out of situations that were life threatening–even when it cost my job. Miners don’t have the comraderie that firemen would because we worked alone and with maybe only a helper. Yet when 7 of us left our working spot to go home and I noticed that 12×12 timbers were mushrooming, I had my check written out. Six others did not and went back not sensing the danger and soon after I had quit were trapped by a cave in at that very spot. So is there group think on some of this stuff, and I think Dr. Ted Putnam works the psychological problem somewhat to that idea. Maybe training in independent thinking would help there, Young mens lives were at stake here and sacrificed to some damn stupid actions all the way around. I disagree with Willis who says there is no fault here. It is too obvious that there is plenty fault. There are plenty of good firefighters risking it all out there to let this go. They think the dead do not talk but I think they have said plenty and I think those men who are putting politics, profit and glory ahead of safety need to at a minimum be relieved of their duties. I do believe that Mr. Dudley as intelligent as he is, knows that he has fed us a line.

    I am glad that Osha saw fit to fine the forest service, although what difference does that make. It only says that someone was careless. That money they pay with tax money anyway. It does not make sense to me, rather, clean up the mess and retire or fire those involved.

    Reply

  25. **
    ** TODD ABEL’S VEHICLE IDENTIFIED

    * THE SHORT STORY

    Todd Abel was driving his own personal vehicle that day.

    It is an all-silver extended cab 4 door pickup truck that had small white signs on both the driver and the passenger side doors that simply said ‘FIRE’ in red letters.

    Todd Abel’s pickup truck is seen heading EAST on Hays Ranch Road at +26:25 in Panebaker Air-To-Air channel capture video 20130630_1716_EP.

    The 20130630_1716_EP video STARTS at 1645.19 ( 4:45.19 PM ) and is 31 minutes and 25 seconds long… so that means Todd Abel was passing the Panebaker video camera there up on Hays Ranch Road at 1711.44 ( 5:11.44 PM ).

    This Panebakger 1716_EP video is the SAME one that shows Darrell Willis ALSO moving EAST on Hays Ranch Road and headed for the Ranch House Restaurant at around +10:14 into the same 1716_EP video which means Darrell Willis preceded Todd Abel down to the Ranch House Restaurant and passes the same camera 16 minutes and 11 seconds EARLIER than Todd Abel at exactly 1655.33 ( 4:55.33 PM ).

    So even though Darrell Willis has stated to investigators that the first thing he did when arriving at the Ranch House Restaurant was ‘tie in with Abel’… that is not actually possible. More about this below in ‘THE LONG STORY’.

    This also means that there is no need even ‘looking’ for Todd Abel in any of the Tom Story photos taken at the Ranch House Restaurant. He wasn’t there yet. Again… more about this down below in the ‘LONG STORY’ section.

    **
    ** THE PROOF REGARDING TODD ABEL’S VEHICLE

    The proof that this 4-door Silver pickup with the small ‘FIRE’ signs on the side belongs to Todd Abel comes in 2 parts…

    1) Todd Abel has a Facebook page. His photos are all totally PUBLIC and viewable by ANYONE. They even show up just using ‘Google’. THREE photos on his Facebook page show him at a ski resort with his wife and driving that exact same Silver 4 door pickup.

    I will post direct links to these photos in ‘Replies’ down below so this comment doesn’t get hung up in moderation.

    2) That same Silver pickup is then seen in photos from the Operations center of the ‘Crown King Gladiator Fire’ where Todd Abel was known to be working as a DIVSUP.

    Again.. .direct link to this photo will be posted below in a ‘Reply’ to keep this comment from going into moderation.

    ** THE LONG STORY

    Darrell Willis arrived at the RHR parking lot about 11 minutes BEFORE Todd Abel even arrived there and the Tom Story photos show Willis participating in ‘other’ meetings outside of his vehicle BEFORE Todd Abel was even there.

    From Darrell Willis’ Unit Log notes in the same February 27, 2014 document…

    Page 42 ( of 51 pages )…
    ____________________________________________________________________________
    1640 – Heard radio conversation about deployment.
    1647 – Operations Able calls me on my cell phone and asks if I heard what is going on. He told me what he knew.

    NOTE: This is actually incorrect. According to Todd Abel… it was definitely Darrell Willis who called HIM circa 1647.

    1655 – I called TF Moser and informed him that I wanted him to take the Division, to hold the fire with resources on Model Creek Road and to pick up any slop overs.
    1715 – I responded to Yarnell and tied in with Operations Able and monitored radio traffic on Incident within an Incident.
    1745 – Tied in with GMIHC lookout McDonough to determine his welfare.
    _________________________________________________________________________________

    So while Willis certainly DID ‘tie in’ with Abel *eventually*… it certainly wasn’t the FIRST thing Willis did when he arrived at the RHR. Photographic evidence now shows that Willis ‘tied in’ with many ‘others’ much earlier than he did with Todd Abel… who only arrived some time AFTER Willis did.

    There is now also a good explanation as to why we do NOT (apparently) see Todd Abel ( or his vehicle ) in any of the Tom Story photos that cover the timeframe before Mr. Story moved to the BACK of the RHR parking lot.

    Todd Abel wasn’t even there yet.

    He was still ‘on his way’ down from the NORTH side of the fire at the time Tom Story took that entire first set of photos at the RHR.

    A previous post ( reprinted from down below ) establishes the time ( within 30 seconds ) that Darrell Willis himself actually arrived at the Ranch House Restaurant.

    _____________________________________________________________________
    WantsToKnowTheTruth on June 8, 2014 at 5:39 pm said:
    **
    ** PHOTO AND VIDEO PROOF OF WHEN DARRELL WILLIS
    ** ACTUALLY ARRIVED AT THE RANCH HOUSE RESTAURANT
    _____________________________________________________________________
    It was sometime in-between Tom Story photos 1681 and 1682 that Darrell Willis
    white-with-red-stripe pickup actually arrived at the Ranch House Restaurant and
    parked there ( facing north ) where the firefighter in the red helmet was seen
    standing in photo 1681.

    Tom Story photo 1681 was taken at 1707.45 ( 5:07.45 PM )
    Tom Story photo 1682 was taken at 1708.18 ( 5:08.18 PM )

    That is only 33 seconds between the 2 photos.

    Somewhere is those 33 seconds is when this Prescott Fire
    Department F-250 ( Darrell Willis ) ARRIVED at the Ranch House
    Restaurant and parked where that firefighter with the red-helmet was standing.

    For the sake of a ‘good guess’ as to when during those 33 seconds
    Darrell Willis actually ARRIVED and parked the truck… I am going to go
    with the ‘mid-point’ of the 33 seconds and just call Willis’ exact arrival
    time 1508.00 ( 5:08 PM ).

    The reason that F-250 is pointing NORTH when it is parked is ( I believe ) simply because Darrell Willis just approached the RHR from the NORTH, and then did sort of a ‘U-Turn’ as he pulled into the driveway and parked on the shoulder of the highway were that firefighter with the red-helmet had been standing.
    _________________________________________________________________

    So at the moment Willis was ‘arriving’ all the way down at the Ranch House Restaurant parking lot ( 1508.00 / 5:08.00 PM ) OPS1 Todd Abel hadn’t even passed that Panebaker camera heading EAST on Hays Ranch Road yet.

    It would still be ANOTHER 3 minutes and 44 seconds before Todd Abel would actually even pass that camera up north at 1711.44 ( 5:11.44 PM ).

    So when did Todd Abel actually ARRIVE at the Ranch House Restaurant, and how long had Willis already been there BEFORE Abel actually arrived?

    Well… when that white-with-red-stripe PFD pickup seen passing the Panebaker camera up north was first identified as the moment Darrell Willis was seen heading EAST on Hays Ranch Road… some calculations were done to determine how long it then took WILLIS to cover the remaining 4.7 miles from the Panebaker camera to the RHR parking lot.

    Again… information from a previous post reproduced HERE…

    _____________________________________________________________________
    WantsToKnowTheTruth on June 8, 2014 at 5:39 pm said:

    ** PHOTO AND VIDEO PROOF OF WHEN DARRELL WILLIS
    ** ACTUALLY ARRIVED AT THE RANCH HOUSE RESTAURANT
    ______________________________________________________________________

    PANEBAKER VIDEO 20130630_1716_EP STARTS AT 1645.19

    This video is 31 minutes and 25 seconds long.

    +10:14 ( 1655.33 / 4:55.33 PM )
    The white F250 pickup with the red stripe ( Prescott National Forest ) pickup seen in the Swartz photo(s) first appears at the right side of the camera frame heading EAST ( pretty quickly ) on Hays Ranch Road. This pretty much must be Darrell Willis now headed down to Yarnell where the same pickup will soon be seen ( in the Tom Story photographs ) arriving at the Ranch House Restaurant between 1707.45 and 1708.18 ( 5:07.45 and 5:08.18 PM ).

    Distance from video camera point to…

    U-Store-It in Yarnell: 3.19341 mi
    Point where Shrine Road meets Highway 89: 3.90369 mi
    Ranch House Restaurant: 4.76341 mi

    The TIME difference between when Willis’ pickup is seen crossing in front of the video camera on Hays Ranch Road and when it appears to have ARRIVED at the Ranch House Restaurant is…

    1708.00 – 1655.33 = 12 minutes and 27 seconds.

    In order for Darrell Willis to have covered the distance from the camera all the way to the Ranch House Restaurant in those 12 minutes and 27 seconds ( without stopping anywhere else on the way? ) means he would have needed to maintain an average speed of 22.93 mile per hour.

    This sounds just about right… since even Darrell Willis has said in his interviews that as he made that trip down into Yarnell… Highway 89 was ‘covered with smoke’ and the visibility was BAD. Darrell Willis himself has said he had to be ‘careful’ and the he ‘almost hit two horses just running down the Highway’. So it was SLOW GOING there on Highway 89 at that time when he was driving south towards the RHR.

    The same ‘visibility’ and ‘road conditions’ would have been in place when Todd Abel made the same trip down to Yarnell and Abel would have to have been driving just as carefully as Willis did… so if you add the same 12 minutes and 27 seconds that it took Willis to reach the RHR from the Panebaker camera setup to the time when Todd Abel passed the same Panebaker setup ( 1711.44 ) then that means Todd Abel could not have arrived at the RHR any sooner than 1724.11 ( 5:24.11 PM ).

    **
    ** TODD ABLE CAN’T BE IN ANY TOM STORY PHOTOS?

    So at the moment Willis was ‘arriving’ all the way down at the Ranch House Restaurant parking lot ( 1508.00 / 5:08.00 PM ) OPS1 Todd Abel hadn’t even passed that Panebaker camera heading EAST on Hays Ranch Road yet.

    It would still be ANOTHER 3 minutes and 44 seconds before Todd Abel would actually even pass that camera up north at exactly 1711.44 ( 5:11.44 PM ).

    Tom Story’s first photo set taken at the Ranch House Restaurant are photos 1677 through 1687, covering a 3 minute time period from 5:06 PM to 5:08 PM.

    1677 was taken at 5:06 PM
    1687 was taken at 5:08 PM.

    Tom Story then moved to the BACK of the Ranch House Restaurant parking lot, climbed a small set of stairs back there that used to go up to a trailer, and then took his SECOND set of photos there. This set of photos ( 1688 through 1702 ) covers the ‘next’ FOUR minute time period from 5:09 PM to 5:13 PM.

    Photo 1688 was taken at 5:09 PM ( 1 minute after the end of his first photo set ).
    Photo 1702 was taken at 5:13 PM. ( The last photo Story took at the RHR )

    So if Todd Abel was only passing the Panebaker camera up NORTH at 5:11.44 PM… it’s really not possible for him to be in ANY of the Tom Story photos taken at the Ranch House Restaurant.

    That means Todd Abel was NOT physically there in the RHR parking lot even when Frisby and Brown ‘launched’ on their ‘ground rescue mission’.

    Links to other photographs of Todd Abel’s Silver pickup will be posted as ‘Replies’….

    Reply

      • One more post…

        This is the ‘confirmation’ that Todd Abel was, in fact, a DIVSUP on the Crown King Gladiator fire ( along with his old engine crew buddy Dean Steward ) and so that really is Abel’s Silver pickup seen in the photo above taken by the Crown King Fire Operations center…

        ** Prescott Valley Tribune Article confirming Todd Abel
        ** was a DIVSUP at the Crown King Fire…

        5/23/2012 11:29:00 AM
        Article: Firefighters battle heat, wind in efforts to douse Gladiator blaze
        CYFD lends expertise, manpower in fight

        http://pvtrib.com/Main.asp?SectionID=1&SubSectionID=1&ArticleID=56054

        From the article…

        Central Yavapai Fire District has several personnel helping to fight the nearly 15,000-acre Gladiator Fire, including several who are members of the Southwest Type I Incident Management Team that is overseeing firefighting efforts. CYFD Acting Fire Marshal Rick Chase said the Type I team members include Asst. Chief of Operations Scott Bliss, who is a task force leader on the fire and Battalion Chief Jeff Polacek, serving as a task force leader trainee.

        Division Supervisors Capt. Todd Abel, and Capt. Dean Steward,

        Strike Team Leader trainee Capt. Doug Niemynski are also serving on the fire, as are Engineer J.W. Seets and Firefighter Jaron Kirk, who are manning a water tender.

        Reply

    • WTK.

      I find it hard to believe that Willis did a U turn in a 2 lane road and was able to park perfectly with the front tires perfectly straight with a F250 4×4 extended cab pick up truck.

      It is possible, but unlikely (IMHO). And there is no actual photographic evidence that he did a U turn

      Reply

      • Calvin… maybe he went PAST that first driveway entrance to the RHR… pulled in the OTHER driveway… and than had a ‘straight shot’ at parking where he did with the vehicle facing north.

        There are Tom Story photos that precede that one which show other vehicles LEAVING that parking lot around that time via that closer driveway… so maybe that close driveway had a vehicle in it when Wills arrived and he HAD to go to the ‘next driveway’ and then ‘come back’ to where we see him parked.

        Regardless… there really is no doubt that is Willis’ truck.

        How he accomplished the ‘turn around’ to be facing north when parked
        is something only he could answer.

        Reply

  26. John Dougherty-
    there was a comment I posted that was awaiting moderation then vanished
    ????
    just letting you know if you need to edit anything out—feel free—
    maybe it did not get posted due to email addies
    ?????

    Reply

    • Thanks Joy I had some info on him already.
      He is another one of the overhead that dose not put much emphases on the 10 & 18 or LCES.
      Not making safety Training easy on the ground pounders.

      Reply

  28. when I posted I inserted my talk in the middle of Mike Dudley’s email—
    oops.
    blunder.
    soft smiles.

    Reply

    • Bob Powers—you are too funny…

      you sound like the email I got from Sonny.

      I had to educate Sonny as I will you too—

      the speaker in that video led the SAIR investigation- his name is Mike Dudley.

      I thought it was a decent video but it did not teach these firefighting community the proper assessment to the YHF was all—

      I sent him an email Sent: Sunday, August 11, 2013 7:50 PM
      (content of email:
      we were at the fire line and curious to know why you all have not contacted us as witness’ as well as for the footage you can see on my hiking partner’s hiking page in comment wall she has a lot of photos from that day-
      not from highway or home backyard but there where the Hotshots were-
      we had meter readings at 43mph not 80-90 like Willis states
      and we know for fact that area did not have 10 ft chaparral but maybe wide intertwined and realistic it was 6ft max and the saddest part was the low altitude hovering/observing aircrafts that were not putting out any fires yet we did see indeed much fanning of the fire-
      We have much detail to that morning and afternoon- )

      and he replied Tue, Aug 13, 2013 at 6:35 AM
      (content of his email: Good morning Tex and Joy,
      Thanks for making contact with me. We had been alerted to your presence that day by the reporter from the Prescott paper and she gave us the pictures that were used in the article. However, we did not get a contact number to reach you. We would like to interview you and your hiking partner as to what you encountered and your observations. More importantly, what route you took to leave the area.)
      Then phone conference 8/13/13 2:04pm-2:48pm- Washington- Tim Foley (
      [email protected]
      ) ,incident meteorologist Brent Wachter , Richa Wilson ([email protected]) & Wildland Fire Leadership- retired US Forestry-
      ( Tom Zimmerman (his link), Mike Dudley- (Tue, Aug 13, 2013 at 6:35 AM)
      USDA Forest Service
      [email protected]
      801-540-4881
      That was our dealings with that speaker. I just wish because he is so at ease and comfortable and easy to listen to that he said a little more on the golden rules being broken and the cardinal rules too that were broken because that is unfair to the men and women listening to him. See how I use to say Jim Karels backing up the SAIRS did a great disservice — I now think this kind of speaking does too.

      I’d like to schedule a time to call you tomorrow if possible. Please let me know what time works for you.

      Thank you.

      Mike Dudley

      USDA Forest Service

      [email protected]

      801-540-4881

      Reply

    • If in fact the spread charts in Dudley’s video are correct which are the same as the investigation report. I want to reemphasize that the main fire had crossed the saddle above the crew close to the same time 1640 they confronted the fire in front of them. That would have cut off any retreat back to the saddle. Also the charts indicate that the ridge to their left NE ridge line with some slop over. The fire engulfed the canyon and deployment site in less than 10 min.
      Again that is why we learned along time ago crews should never go into a canyon or a Shute
      from the top with an active fire uncontrolled close to them.
      Regardless of what Dudley said Fire fighters do not do that a hundred times with out a problem. With out LCES and several other safety factors in place you just do not do that.
      Mr. Dudley don’t give false information to fire fighters.

      Reply

  30. John——
    Looks like we lost some stuff from the 24, 25, and this morning can we get that back?
    like the new site.

    Reply

    • The you tube video that Joy posted June 20 2014 this morning and comments was part of the issing,

      Reply

  31. **
    ** CONFIRMED?
    ** THE WHITE TACOMA BELONGED TO MARTY COLE

    Marti… I was re-reading some of the posts below and wanted to point out that it DOES seem as if we have ‘confirmed’ that the WHITE TACOMA seen in all of Tom Story’s photos taken at the Ranch House Restaurant did, in fact, belong to Marty Cole. ( Marty Cole was the Safety Officer from Prescott that didn’t arrive in Yarnell until just shortly before the deployment ).

    The only ‘lingering’ head-scratcher I had was that it seemed like the white Tacoma passing the Panebaker A2A camera setup on Hays Ranch Road was a little too ‘early’ to be Marty Cole.

    I was mistaken. I was misremembering Cole’s testimony and thought that he had said he was at the ICP when he heard the deployment radio traffic.

    That is NOT the case. Marty Cole testified that he left the ICP at Model Creek School BEFORE the deployment traffic appeared on the radio. Cole was headed to Yarnell already, and only heard the deployment traffic when he stopped on the side of the road to try and obtain a ‘radio clone’ that he was UNABLE to obtain back at the ICP.

    So that does, in fact, match the ‘timing’ as seen in the Panebaker A2A video.

    Cole says he ‘saw some AZ State guys on the side of the road’ on his way to Yarnell and that is where he stopped to see if he could get a radio clone from THEM. They told him to ‘hold on’ because it was at that moment that that Steed’s first MAYDAY call was hitting the radio.

    We know that these ‘AZ State guys’ Cole is referring to were probably NOT the ‘Panebaker’ crew itself or we would be seeing Cole’s white Tacoma either stopping or slowing down in the video itself. It *could* have been the people we now see assembled at that ‘checkpoint’ where Hays Ranch Road meets Highway 89. That would also match the ‘timing’ as seen in the Panebaker video when Cole’s white Tacoma was passing THAT camera.

    So all the known photographic and video evidence is actually ‘in alignment’ for us to conclude that that pretty much HAS to the Marty Cole’s white Tacoma with the single word FIRE on the passenger door in RED letters.

    Now… as to why we are apparently *not* actually seeing Marty Cole himself in any of the Tom Story photos… I think Cole’s testimony explains that as well.

    Cole says that as soon as he got to the Ranch House Restaurant and was informed that Brendan McDonough was actually THERE over by the GM vehicles… Cole got with Brendan right away.

    NOTE: There is no evidence that anyone ever ‘announced’ over the radio that Brendan McDonough was at the RHR. It appears that people ( including Cole and Willis and Abel ) only found out about this in-person as they ARRIVED at the RHR.

    So it would appear that Cole just ‘got with Brendan’ over there between the GM vehicles right away and then probably wasn’t leaving him alone for even one second… which is why we don’t actually SEE him in the Tom Story photos. He was over there ‘in-between’ the GM vehicles or perhaps even inside one of the crew carriers with Brendan.

    Cole also says that at some point he ‘off loaded’ Brendan, but never explained what he meant by that. I’m assuming that means that later on, after the fatalities were reported, Cole ended up driving Brendan up to the ICP at Model Creek School. There is some other testimony that amounts to ‘Brendan sightings’ up at the ICP later that evening so I’m assuming that is how Brendan got to the ICP. Marty Cole drive him there and that is what Cole meant by ‘off loading Brendan’ in his testimony.

    With regards to Abel and Musser… and the vehicles THEY were driving… I’m putting another post together that will appear shortly.

    I believe I have found Abel’s vehicle. Todd Abel was driving his own personal pickup truck that day which is why it has been so hard to ‘spot’ in the photos / videos.

    As for Musser… it turns out that the Panebaker videos DO capture some vehicles coming OUT of Sickles Road itself and then making a RIGHT turn and heading directly EAST on Hays Ranch Road. Musser has said in his testimony that as soon as things were ‘under control’ over on Sickles Road is when he headed straight for Yarnell… so one of those vehicles seen actually coming OUT of Sickles Road and then heading EAST on Hays Ranch Road is probably Musser.

    More later.

    Reply

    • Yikes!!!

      I posted a reply yesterday to this that seems to have completely disappeared in this site translation.

      It was about how you once earlier posted that you thought Marty Cole was in the first of Tom Story’s photos. And I wrote that I thought that red bag he was holding might have been (as I had researched such things) might have Brendan’s “overnight bag.”

      Reply

      • And I also said I was very very interested in what,you,we’re finding out about Todd Abel’s vehicle

        Reply

        • Marti… yes… at one point I thought that guy with the mustache in Tom Story’s first photo who is ‘holding his hand out’ and the other guy is copying something that is written on the palm of his hand onto the palm of his OWN hand was Marty Cole. Now I am not so sure. The fellow in Tom Story’s photo looks ‘younger’ that the ‘retired’ Marty Cole ought to look.

          Still could be him, though… and yes.. he could already be holding a piece of Brendan’s gear since his testimony also says he ‘stowed Brendan’s gear in my vehicle’.

          Re: Todd Abel. The post is coming. It has ‘math’ in it and I have to be sure
          about some times in the Panebaker videos… but I am getting some wildly
          different ‘times’ when just trying to use the min/sec indicator in Windows
          Media Player. Standby. Solvable problem.

          Reply

  32. On a side note I would like to mention that Dakota Slone, who took the Facebook videos of the fire, received a 4 year prison sentence for looting homes during the evacuation. Classy individual.

    Reply

    • First off— I love this new look John Dougherty to the site—easier for my eyes.

      To reply to John ? (no last name on comment; not Dougherty I do not think)

      — true Dakota did get such sentence and let us not forget this individual spent that day helping so many elder and locals to get out and it was not to steal from them and those people were not stolen from and will confirm that they would of not got out alive and their pets without Dakota. He ended up talking and hanging out that night with a few guys—the wrong crowd—and it is one of those wrong place moments — yet let’s make a strong example of the group but not really look at the facts and all of it and he was served a heavy sentence not really hearing his story may be due to appearance and that Southern mouth of his— I also feel it DOES NOT matter WHO brings their photos and videos to the public because it is not about the person but the information on the photo to properly assess this fire— There is more about the Slone boy I cannot share but he was in a bad spot—wrong moment.

      Photographers: Monica Mine area of Yarnell looks very stunning with the wildflower patch and the burnt background.—-off Hayes Rd. Private Property but Neb said it is absolutely beautiful. I have a serious left foot injury so I cannot walk it yet but I hope to see it. There is a cavewoman up there—if she does not have a shotgun in hand—she says whatever it takes she will not allow you to see it so good luck but it is suppose to be stunning—

      Penny who shared the photos/videos to me last week asked me this week to not share it and I explained that I only shared it to investigativemedia.com blog area and she has concerns to money rights so if anyone ever used and photo or videos of Dakota Slone for a publication she wants to be contacted first because she only gave me a sole right to get the photos a proper look out to properly assess fire—her email is [email protected]—

      Next, locals keep telling me to find Flame Propane guy Mike Fitz for he has the photos that has all we need to properly assess this fire and some guy name Sean. I have not located him but meanwhile a man name Carter and his wife Ann on Lakewood Court is sharing his account here at the Yarnell library (SAD–VERY SAD account) with me , Don Mason, Kari Flippen & Christina Cooper and how they did a slurry drop in Glen Ilah—was this ever in any reports? This drop. We never heard of a drop THAT close to the GMHS. He said that drop saved his and 3 other homes and that is the Manzanita/Lakewood area of Glen Ilah. Locals say B-Wear Boutique Pizzirusso family has good photos too. I have not seen her yet. He also said he has a photo from the source terrafirm something satellite photography that shows that slurry drop.

      Shew, I am trying to REMEMBER every detail thrown to me today—-oh do not forget to watch the History Channel spot done here on my birthday July 1st at 10pm in regards to Yarnell.

      Wilhoit; Neb is retired from many areas of firefighting world and even met someone who was fighting the fire that day and their topic of discussion as we ate at the senior center today was Friday the 28th they did not assess with air or hand crew that fire at all—binoculars ???
      Saturday night was misdiagnosed and they broke all fire rules—the fire was at that point burning down a hill—Sunday the fire created a firestorm which created that unusual thunderstorm/wind. However it was not all MOTHER NATURE because if that fire was put out earlier that storm was in a sense created due to the fire activity. The firefighter Neb and the others felt all Golden rules were violated—The way they pinched the skunked fires to head in the direction of the incident command post was questioned—Cardinal rule broken when there was no command setup already- Poor communication as this men Neb was there all 3 days listening to radio frequencies. The drops were made to funnel and the bucket drops to support that line to make it create a small area but why near the IC post. I AGREE with this comment he made and I support this 100%: –>WHY is Yarnell being given THAT MUCH money for a memorial that should go to Turbyfill’s fire shelter project and the GPS program. I agree.

      Errors were made and this fire still has not got the proper assessment it deserves for the ones affected by it. It is not a MOVE ON type situation when there IS answers still to unfold….I heard today that some people are not coming this weekend and some are not even living here again. I hope to hear more accounts this week. I look forward to seeing everyone this week because after July 14th this gal will not be available like I have been the past annual may I hit the trails again or get a job finally full time—not made my decision yet.

      Keep you updated as I get it even if it means not much to the investigation—its all a process…

      Oh Bob Powers— I am not a firefighter and I always give my culinary artistic flair vs. a firefighter terminology so I thank you dearly for always making the comments you do because I read your comment again now that I am AWAKE and I do in general know we do not look favorably upon things that are bitter yet its one of our basic tastes—yet in the cooking world bitter green foods most turn their nose up to it- DISGUSTING—EWWW—yet to me it is a delight to wake up the taste buds and very healthy. SO my hopes is to keep my voice going and may it seem bitter to hear that there may be a back burn yet not shown—I seriously seen these photos and I would not put out there anything to mislead or misinformation and that is why I express it is IMPORTANT these people show all their accounts so it can be properly assessed—I do not want to conceive that not yet announced back burn with documentation yet after all I have seen to date I would not be shocked if it came to light—so when something comes off foreign or bitter—do what Bob Powers–ask the questions because I will answer you or ramble in detail where I came to such statement—oh and on a culinary note, look for the young when getting your bitter greens—much more mild. I am hoping the young will come forward that was on this YH fire and share their accounts too. It does matter their accounts—

      DARN the lawyer up bs—

      The Hart Family is in the LA Times and they were tricked for a story—they did not want any part of the article and they are terribly frightened. I enjoy the freedom of speech and the media outlets but this family told a local they did not permit this insert of them—

      Reply

    • I don’t care if Al Capone himself was there in Yarnell that day. If he was taking photos and/or videos… I would like to see them.

      Reply

      • I agree. Actually I am in the process of taking the photos we had on Sonny’s truck and putting it in a frame and this whole weekend I will be bannering publicly that ANYONE even if Capone was there too to send their accounts to PO BOX 42 YARNELL ARIZONA 85362—this is the time for remembering but it is also the time for people not to forget these men deserve YHF to be properly assessed

        Reply

    • Just to be clear… the link above is actually Dakota Slone Movie 6 on his Facebook page.

      Movie 6 – Sunday, June 30, 2013
      Talking to people up on Crest Way.

      NOTE: Road sign in video says intersection of ‘Crest Way’ and ‘Happy Way’… so it would appear THIS video was shot BEFORE they were evacuating out the NORTH end of Crest Way and BEFORE his previous two videos.( 4 and 5 ).

      Reply

  35. Joy—
    Need more info on the suggested back fires.
    Were they started by citizens?
    Were they started by Fire personnel on the fire?
    I am some what confused by this if a law suit is saying it I would not hold a lot of belief that it is fact with out proof.
    2 Investigations did not turn up any information on backfires or burn outs.
    If Blue ridge had any knowledge of any thing like that they would have been screaming to high heaven that a back fire trapped the hot shots. That would have been made clear to the investigation and at the walk thru by the superintendents after the fire. Fire personnel would not have ordered a backfire with the winds and erratic fire activity. So the home owners may have but would need more than hearsay for proof. any firing out in town would not have affected the location of GM. They already had a well established fire front.
    None of the fire crews or engines talked about a burn out in the investigations.
    After everything I am skeptical of this info. need a lot more facts.

    Reply

    • Good Morning Bob Powers- I just walked in the door—need much rest but it was important to answer you this as I have been gone in Flagstaff/Prescott since Saturday—also took someone the legal area to the 19 area—very long weekend that just ended (thank God too) but on Tue, Jun 24, 2014 at 9:42 PM email—Holly Neill educated me with a K&R Lawsuit PDF file- she said: You might want to read this, it came out today. There is no mention of a burnout in Yarnell, but they are saying that due to a lack of burnout, this is why Yarnell burned up.

      It seems as if they do not have video or photo evidence showing a burnout that could have affected GM. I don’t know why Yarnell folks are referring to the lawyers having a video to prove a burnout, do you?”============

      I will keep looking into this topic but as I hear the information I share it raw and to answer you I have no clue about the backburn except that Buford stated it was mentioned in a 90 page lawsuit that Wendy read and I have seen photos/videos of areas and angles that the folks need to post publicly to properly assess this fire. I can tell you with expertise how to do culinary artistic stuff or even airbrush ladies before a photo shoot to make a plain jane look hot—stuff like that but seeing things in a photo foreign to me needs to be seen by people who can properly assess this and no I personally do not want to conceive the theories of backburns yet I share it as it has been shown to me or spoken to me—I am up there a lot this week so keep you posted—helping United Way and so much the next few days so please Bob know I am trying to get more information/photos/videos yet a lot of the folks may resurface for the anniversary weekend is a hope of mine.—let you know Bob, ok. I am sorry for the delay. I did not have a way to reply until just now.

      Reply

      • Not a problem Joy thanks for the info I thought it sounded a little off but people say a lot and things get turned around.
        It has been almost a year and There are still some unanswered questions
        Take care BOB

        Reply

      • In his ADOSH interview… Gary Cordes told investigators that around the time that the fire was ‘coming into town’. it was “spotting ahead almost a half mile”.

        To people who are not even aware that fires can do that sort of thing… it might have actually *looked* like someone was ‘manually’ setting ‘backfires’ in places that were forward of the actual fireline.

        I am *not* discounting the possibility that some ‘manual backburns’ *might* have actually been initiated that day at the last minute… I am only passing on what Gary Cordes himself has told investigators.

        Matter of fact… if Cordes is right… then one ( or more ) of these ‘spot aheads’ could have been how the fire advanced so quickly across that ‘bowl’ and ended up being the fire that filled the box canyon and killed the 19.

        At the time the MacKenzie photos were taken and GM was still in the ‘safe black’…. the fireline is seen already advancing DUE SOUTH and it was only about 4,400 feet from the mouth of the box canyon. That’s only 0.83 miles ( a little more than two-thirds of a mile )… and that was even 20 to 30 minutes earlier than what Cordes is reporting about the ‘half mile’ spot-aheads. In another 20 minutes or so… the fireline was most certainly within a ‘half-mile’ of the box canyon and even a shorter ‘spot ahead’ event could have put fire right there at the mouth of that canyon. GM would have been already descending and unable to even see this ‘spotting ahead’ that Cordes is reporting.

        That’s why LOOKOUTS are so IMPORTANT.

        The following Dakota Slone movie actually seems to support what Gary Cordes has told investigators. It is the one where Dakota is heard yelling “The fire is now entering town”. It was taken from an elevated position up on ‘Crest Way’ to the EAST of Highway 89 and the video was shot looking WEST at the fire as it was, indeed, ‘coming into town’.

        There are fires ALL OVER the horizon and some do, in fact, look like they are out ‘ahead’ of the fireline and might be the result of the ‘spotting ahead’ that Gary Cordes was talking about.

        Dakota Slone – Movie 3 – Sunday, June 30, 2013
        “It’s now entering town!”.

        http://www.facebook.com/video/embed?video_id=483080561774400

        Reply

        • I was surprised that the video that was posted this morning
          The speaker just brushed over the crew and LCES as if it was no big deal. He also made a statement that you could do what GM did 100 times with out any problems are you F****** kidding me that is why we are killing fire fighters. Some one there should have called him on that one.

          Reply

          • This ‘presentation’ a few days ago by SAIT co-leader Mike Dudley just reminds me again of that Mark Twain quote….

            “It isn’t what he doesn’t know that scares me.
            It’s what he knows fer sure… that just ain’t so.”

            Even now… almost a full YEAR later… Dudley is simply plain WRONG about a number of ‘facts’ he is reporting to rooms full of firefighters.

            Example 1: Dudley says that that Granite Mountain would have had a ‘clear view’ of the fire for the entire time they were on the ‘alternate escape route’…. if they had only chosen to go that way.

            Nothing could be further from the truth.

            Example 2: Dudley says that the REASON Brendan McDonough doesn’t ‘know anything’ about the decisions being made by Marsh and Steed up on the ridge is simply because after he was picked up by Blue Ridge Supt. Brian Frisby… Brendan handed Frisby his radio… and never got it back.

            Complete horseshit.

            Here is that actual exchange from the video itself…

            +40:18
            Dudley says the reason that Brendan McDonough could not tell them anything about any of the decisions made was simply because “He gave his radio to the Superintendent of Blue Ridge”. Dudley left this audience with the impression that Brendan never got the radio BACK… and THAT is why he doesn’t know anything.

            A member of the audience then raised his hand to ask a question. Dudley stops… points at him… and says “Go ahead”…

            Question: “So he (Brendan) no longer had access to the CREW channel.”

            Dudley: BINGO!. That’s it.

            Then Dudley continues and says…

            “We KNOW there were communications taking place ( about the decisions ), but that was all taking place on the intra-crew channels. No one recorded any of that and no one heard any of that.”

            Bzzzzt. Sorry Mike. Not buying your BS there.

            Your own SAIR document states unequivocally that Brendan DID ‘hear them discussing their options’. You just wouldn’t print what he heard.

            Besides… you forget that there were FOUR Granite Mountain vehicles with FOUR onboard radios that had the GM intra-crew frequency… so there are potentially FOUR people right there that ‘probably’ heard the GM intra-crew conversations while the vehicles were being moved. ( Brendan and at least 3 other Blue Ridge Hotshots ).

            Frisby dropped Brendan right off at the GM Supt truck… and Brendan has always said the first thing he did there was fire up the truck… crank up the air-conditioner… and turn the RADIO volume up ‘all the way’ so he could be sure and hear if Steed and Marsh were ‘calling him’ on the GM intra crew. From that moment on… Brendan was ‘listening’ to ALL the conversations on the GM intra-crew. There is no doubt about that.

            Besides… even if someone were to believe Dudley that Brendan ‘gave his radio to Brian Frisby and didn’t get it back’….

            …then what about Brian Frisby?

            Now Brian Frisby has a radio with ( as Brendan has stated in his ADOSH interviews ) actually had its PRIORITY channel set to the GM intra-crew so as to never ‘miss’ any traffic on that channel.

            So what did Brian Frisby hear, then?

            This Mike Dudley video from a few days ago really deserves a published transcript… and I’m currently working on that.

            Reply

            • If I Am not mistaken Macdonough Called Marsh on the enter crew to tell him the trucks were at the restaurant. Cant remember the exact words.

              Reply

              • See new ( parent ) comment about this up above.
                It has the ‘exact words’ in it.

                In THREE separate interviews… Brendan states that he called Steed to tell him when the vehicles were ‘safe’. In two of those interviews only the word PARKED is used and it is not clear whether Brendan called Steed when they were ‘parked’ at the Shrine Youth Camp or ( eventually ) ‘parked’ at the RHR…

                …but in Brendan’s hour-long video interview with the Prescott Daily Courier he definitely seems to be saying that called Steed to tell him the vehicles were PARKED and SAFE only after reaching ( in Brendan’s own words ) “…the cafe’….”.

                Only problem with THAT, however, is that we now know that if Brendan waited until all of the GM vehicles were fully PARKED at the RHR before attempting to call Steed and inform him of this… then there was no one to answer the call. Steed was most probably already dead by then.

                So Brendan has testified over and over that he DID make this call to Steed and told him the GM vehicles were now PARKED and SAFE… but it’s still not clear EXACTLY when he did that.

                Reply

          • Video was a classic case of PC. Lot of talk about certs and quals, in a deep voice to make clear anyone contradicting this better be the President or even more senior. Lot of talk about pure wildland quals.

            No examination of actual culture, or the strange coincidence of the fact that a municipal crew didn’t seem familiar with local conditions, at very least, without even getting to LCES or past decisions.

            Reply

  36. **
    ** THE DAKOTA SLONE VIDEOS
    **
    ** HOW TO VIEW THE DAKOTA SLONE YFH MOVIES
    ** WITHOUT HAVING A FACEBOOK ACCOUNT

    Contrary to popular belief… you can either VIEW or DOWNLOAD pretty much ANYTHING from anyone’s ‘Facebook’ account without even ever having signed up for Facebook.

    Facebook’s ‘security policies’ are an absolute JOKE.

    In the case of ‘movies’… all you have to do is know what the URL is that Facebook has assigned for this ‘movie’… and then just replace the ‘www’ prefix in the URL with the letter ‘m’.

    This is NOT HACKING.

    It’s just a ‘common knowledge’ way to access content on Facebook WITHOUT even having an ‘account’ there.

    What is actually happening is that by replacing the ‘www’ prefix in the URL with the letter ‘m’… you are ‘fooling’ Facebook into thinking you are requesting the material from a MOBILE device.

    Facebook is too stupid to know whether you really ARE on a ‘Mobile’ device or not… so it coughs up the content with no further checking as to whether you are a valid Facebook user or if you are currently ‘Logged in’ to your Facebook account.

    So what follows are the DIRECT LINKS to the videos that are sitting in Dakota Slone’s Facebook account.

    They should all appear ‘straight away’ in your Browser regardless of whether you have a ‘Facebook’ account.

    The only drawback is that because Facebook really now thinks you are using a SMARTPHONE or some other MOBILE device… the videos that appear will be totally without any standard ‘Facebook’ formatting and will look like they were intended to appear on a ‘small device’.

    If you want to actually SAVE a copy of any of these movies to your own hard drive… all you should have to do is RIGHT-CLICK any of the links below and then select the ‘Save Link As’ option that should appear on the POPUP menu in your Browser.

    Dakota Slone currently has EIGHT videos from the Yarnell Hill Fire sitting in his Facebook album… so I am going to post the first link in THIS message and the other SEVEN in ‘Replies’ to this message in order to obey the WordPress rule of only having one active LINK in any one ‘comment’ so that the ‘comments’ don’t fall into ‘moderation’.

    Here is Dakota Slone’s FIRST video…

    Dakota Slone Movie 1 – Saturday evening, June 29, 2013

    This was taken right after SUNDOWN and shows the fire progression a few hours after it had (unfortunately) ESCAPED across that two-track road fire break…

    https://fbcdn-video-a.akamaihd.net/hvideo-ak-xpf1/v/t42.1790-2/1031708_483082561774200_351749994_n.mp4?oh=af99c2eaea6d413e2fd48ac7b9555b24&oe=53A54B2F&__gda__=1403341861_93cda54252083105cf0a66e133090b3e

    Reply

  37. As we discuss events happening around the time of the burnover, including the possibility that someone (I have no clue as to who) might have started a burnout that may have contributed to the fire that killed the GM 19, I would highly recommend that people watch the longer Panebaker videos that include the Air2Air communications. (Can’t post the link because I’m posting from my iPad while I’m recording on my computer)

    Whoever is interested in the fire behavior on this fire will be studying these videos for years.

    You can really see the whole fire turning around, clockwise, the column lowering and pushing towards Yarnell, and that location where GM was located. just glowing with fire. I’ve said to people that I’m currently watching (while trying to identify vehicles passing in front of that camera) the grass growing in front of a conflagration turning into a holocaust.

    Maybe there was a backburn. I’m totally open to that.

    But IMHO these videos show this fire turning around (just as Byron Kimball’s passing on of the NWS forecast/warning that it would) and pushing into that area with such a powerful force that it would, by itself, explain what happen in it’s wake.

    Reply

  38. **
    ** CORY MOSER’S WHITE-WITH-RED-STRIPE
    ** PRESCOTT FIRE DEPARTMENT PICKUP TRUCK

    Reply to calvin on June 19, 2014 at 3:42 am said:

    >> calvin said…
    >> The truck with the tag G-039EJ is not the same truck seen in
    >> Swartz photos or Tom Story photos. It does not have the same
    >> toolbox and it has a light bar mounted on the top of the cab.

    Thank you, calvin… YES… I was ‘looking too fast’.

    That is NOT a ‘close up’ of Darrell Willi’s white-with-red-stripe Prescott Fire Department pickup seen up there at the intersection of ‘Model Creek Road’ and ‘Double Bar-A ( Hays ) Ranch Road’.

    It’s Cory Moser’s.

    NOTE: For reference… THIS is the photo being discussed.
    It’s the one that shows all those fire vehicles assembled in
    the ‘smoke’ and making that ‘last stand’ up there at the
    intersection of ‘Model Creek Road’ and ‘Double Bar A ( Hays )
    Ranch road. The ‘road sign’ for this intersection is clearly seen
    in the photo as are the license plate numbers of at least
    TWO of the vehicles… including Cory Moser’s…

    https://www.dropbox.com/sh/20inrene9tcx74a/AACltJPUFfvmZqibRwGSJwWLa/ADOSH%20Yarnell%20Hill%20Investigation/Photos%20and%20Video/ASFD%20Photos/Miscellaneous%20Photos#lh:null-28.JPG

    All of the official ‘resource orders’ release in the FOIA/FOIL packages
    have a ‘Travel Mode’ field that may or may not contain the actual license
    number of the vehicle that the individual filling the order will be traveling in.

    Cory Moser’s DOES.

    His resource order ‘Travel Mode’ field says this…
    Travel Mode: AOV G039EJ ( License plate number )

    Moser was Willis’ TFLD trainee that Sunday in Yarnell and is also from Prescott.
    Moser is actually employed by the Prescott Fire Department itself.

    Moser was (apparently) NEVER interviewed by either the SAIT or by ADOSH and never even submitted any ‘Unit Log’ of his own from that day… but Moser IS mentioned other people’s ‘Unit Logs’ from Yarnell that DID in that document with ‘additional unit logs’ released ‘late’ by Arizona Forestry on February 27 2014.

    Document name: Unit-Logs-provided-on-2-27 ( PDF file ).

    Todd Foster’s ( Task Force 1 Leader ) ‘Unit Log’ is at the very top of that February 27, 2014 collection of log files.

    According to Foster… Cory Moser is the one who actually ‘implemented’ Willis’ ‘burnout’ plan out at the Double Bar A Ranch.

    In these same Unit Logs… Todd Foster is listed as the ACTUAL Task Force 1 LEADER and Cory Moser is simple listed as a ‘Trainee’.

    Todd Foster says he doesn’t know where Willis and Moser went after they left the Double Bar A ranch… but he THINKS that Moser went down to Yarnell with Willis…

    From the Unit Logs ( Todd Foster speaking )…
    __________________________________________________________________
    TFLD(t) Moser was asked to make contact with resources ( TNF E58 and BLM E3665 ) at Double Bar A Ranch that I had not been able to meet face-to-face yet. Assignment was to brief them on assignment to Task Force, ensure we had LCES, and assist Chief Willis with prepping the ranch. He was asked to get back to me with any additional needs or concerns.

    I met face-to-face with him ( Moser ) mid-day and he indicated he was comfortable with the plan and operations and briefed me on the ranch defence plan. Later Chief Willis, TLFD(t) Moser and the resources at the Double Bar A Ranch would implement their burn plan and leave the site as the fire moved around and through the ranch.

    In general, I did not work with TNF E58, BLM E3665, or Yuma DOC. They were at all times with Darrell Willis and Cory Moser in the Double Bar A Ranch. I did meet with them at the ranch at one point, and both indicated they were fine, had a plan in place and needed nothing further. Once the main fire impacted the ranch, they implemented their (burn) plan and departed the ranch area. Those resources departed with Willis to my knowledge, and I did not interact with them the rest of the day. I believe they went into Yarnell with Chief Willis to assist with structure protection there.
    __________________________________________________________________

    So Task Force 1 Leader Todd Foster didn’t know that Willis and Moser then took on that NEXT assignment of ‘making a stand’ up on Model Creek Road ( as shown in the Swartz photos and backed up by captured radio traffic )… and Foster also seems to be saying that Cory Moser DID go down to Yarnell with Willis… but in Willis’ own ‘Unit Logs’ in that same document we learn that was NOT the case…

    From Darrell Willis’ Unit Log notes in the same February 27, 2014 document…

    Page 41 ( of 51 pages )…

    1030 – TFLD Foster and Moser Arrived. Foster assigned to Model Creek, Moser to Double Bar A Ranch.
    1300 – Gave command to fire around ranch, resources holding around firing operation.
    1430 – Gave command for resources to leave ranch.
    1445 – Gave command to fire out along East side of main road as the resources evacuated.

    Page 42 ( of 51 pages )…

    Here is where Willis then describes how he arranged for the resources that WERE with him at the Double Bar A Ranch ( Moser included ) to now be used for his ‘new idea’ of ‘burning out’ along Model Creek Road.

    1515 – Discussed tactics with Operations Musser about firing south of Model Creek road to protect south. Approval granted. Assigned Ranch resources to begin firing from the Intersection of Double Bar A Ranch ( road ) WEST along Model Creek Road. Several slop overs occurred but were picked up.
    1600 – Task Force 1 requesting resources to conduct firing operations with Operations in Model Creek Subdivision. E-58 assigned due to their experience level.
    1630 – Firing completed to top of hill towards Model Creek. Fire behavior is moderating.
    1640 – Heard radio conversation about deployment.
    1647 – Operations Able calls me on my cell phone and asks if I heard what is going on. He told me what he knew.

    NOTE: This is actually incorrect. According to Todd Abel… it was definitely Darrell Willis who called HIM circa 1647.

    The NEXT entry ( 1655 ) is where Willis mentions Moser again…

    1655 – I called TF Moser and informed him that I wanted him to take the Division, to hold the fire with resources on Model Creek Road and to pick up any slop overs.

    1715 – I responded to Yarnell and tied in with Operations Able and monitored radio traffic on Incident within an Incident.
    1745 – Tied in with GMIHC lookout McDonough to determine his welfare.
    _________________________________________________________________

    So there’s some PROOF that Cory Moser ( and his white-with-red-stripe ) pickup did NOT go down to the Ranch House Restaurant Parking lot along with Willis… as Task Force 1 Leader Todd Foster suspected.

    Cory Moser is the one who ‘took over’ Willis’ ‘Division’ after deployment so that Willis could head down to Yarnell.

    So it is UNLIKELY that Moser’s ‘white-with-red-stripe’ Prescott vehicle could be any of those ‘white-with-red-stripe’ pickups seen in the Tom Story potos from the Ranch House Restaurant.

    Cory Moser’s complete ‘Resource Order’…

    From the “J – Resource Orders” document…
    Page 135 ( out of 213 )
    ________________________________________________________________
    Request Number: O-9
    Ordered Date/Time: 06/29/13 – 1935 PNT
    From: AZ-ADC (Dispatch) 800-309-7081
    To: AZ-ADC
    Qty: 1
    Resource Requested: TASK FORCE LEADER (TFLD) (T-A)
    Needed Date/Time: 06/30/13 – 0600 PNT
    Deliver To: YARNELL HILL
    From Unit: AZ-ADC
    To Unit: AZ-ADC
    Assigned Date/Time: 06/30/13 – 0755 PNT
    Resource Assigned Unit ID: AZ-PRC
    Resource Assgined: MOSER, CORY (AZ-ADC) (T)
    M/D Ind: M
    Estimated Time of Departure: 06/30/13 – 0800 PNT
    Estimated Time of Arrival: 06/30/13 – 0930 PNT
    Travel Mode: AOV G039EJ
    Financial Code: AZ-A1S-130688
    Special Needs REPORT TO YARNELL FD 22558 S.
    LOOKA WAY, YARNELL AZ. 85362
    Reporting Instructions: ( No entry )
    ________________________________________________________________

    Order confirmation NOTE on page 173 ( of 213 pages )…
    ________________________________________________________________
    Request Number: O-9
    Documentation: Request O-9 – TASK FORCE LEADER (TFLD) – [AZ-A1S 130688] YARNELL HILL has been filled with MOSER, CORY (AZ-ADC) by Robin Hansen (at) AZ-ADC – ROSS.
    Entered By: Robin Hansen (AZ-ADC) 06/30/2013 – 0755 PNT
    ________________________________________________________________

    Reply

    • Followup…

      In that photograph linked to above in the parent comment… the OTHER ‘License Plate’ number that is clearly readable is on that All-Red with white stripe truck with the RED light bar on the roof parked directly in front of the vehicle where the photo was taken. It has the Unit designator ‘C-81’ on the back.

      That is definitely Mark Sachara’s vehicle.

      His ‘Travel Mode’ entry in his ‘Resource Order’ ALSO happens to list the license plate number of the vehicle he was using that day…

      Travel Mode: AOV G541FG ( License plate )

      Mark Sachara is the Fire Chief of the Ponderosa Fire District and he was hired as yet another “Division Supervisor” ( DIVS ) that day.

      He is the one who will ‘take over’ DIVS Z from Rance Marquez following the deployment.

      Here is Mark Sachara’s actual ‘Resource order’ from the ‘J – Resource Orders’ document in the SAIT FOIA/FOIL release ( including the License Plate number of that RED truck he was drving in his ‘Travel Mode’ entry )…

      Mark Sachara was actually ‘ordered up’ as yet another DIVISION SUPERVISOR ( DIVS/SUP ) and part of the Type 2 SHORT team about 8:20 PM on SATURDAY NIGHT…

      …but apparently didn’t show up in Yarnell until about NOON on Sunday, June 30.

      ( That’s about a half hour after Rance Marquez showed up and was assigned DIVS Z ).

      J – Resource Orders
      PDF page 136 ( of 213 pages )…

      Request Number: O-11
      Ordered Date/Time: 06/29/13 – 2020 PNT
      From: AZ-ADC (Dispatch) 800-309-7081
      To: AZ-ADC
      Qty: 1
      Resource Requested: DIVISION/GROUP SUPERVISOR (DIVS) (T-A)
      Needed Date/Time: 06/30/13 0600 PNT
      Deliver To: YARNELL HILL
      From Unit: AZ-ADC
      To Unit: AZ-ADC
      Assigned Date/Time: 06/30/130948 PNT
      Resource Assigned Unit Id: AZ-PND ( Ponderosa Fire )
      Resource Assighed: SACHARA, MARK (AZ-ADC) [EFF/AD] (T)
      M/D Ind: M
      Estimated Time of Departure: 06/30/13 1000 PNT
      Estimated Time of Arrival: 06/30/13 1200 PNT
      Released Date: (No entry)
      Released To: (No entry)
      Travel Mode: AOV G541FG ( License plate )
      Financial Code: AZ-A1S-130688
      Special Needs: MIDDLE CREEK
      Reporting Instructions: ( No entry )

      Then… on Page 173… Order confirmation note is entered
      at 9:48 AM Sunday morning…

      Request Number: O-11
      Documentation: Request O-11 – DIVISION/GROUP SUPERVISOR (DIVS) – [AZ-A1S-130688] YARNELL HILL has been filled with SACHARA, MARK (AZ-ADC) by SUSAN BURGER (at) AZ-ADC ROSS.
      Entered By: SUSAN BURGER (AZADC) 06/30/2013 0948 PNT

      Then… down on page 210 in the AZ-ADC WildCad printout… it
      gives a ‘Demob date/time’ of July 4 for Mark Sachara which means
      he was on the fire for 4 days and demobbed the morning of July 4.

      Page 210…

      Req Number: 0-11
      Filled Catalog Item Code: DIVS
      Filled Catalog Item Name: DIVISION/GROUP SUPERVISOR
      Filled by Org Unit Code: AZ-ADC
      Res Prov Unit Code: AZ-PND ( Ponderosa Fire District )
      Assignment Name: SACHARA, MARK ( AZ-ADC )
      Mob ETA: Jue 30, 2013 – 12:00:00 PM
      Demob ETD: Jul 4, 2013 – 8:00:00 AM

      Reply

      • I confess, I’m currently entertaining an imaginative possibility that Musser WAS driving that bigger red Ponderosa Fire truck in the RHR parking lot, after all.

        It’s in all the right places at all the right times.

        Not only does it pass Air2Air at 3:24 PM, it also is, I think, photographed by Rick Tham four times at the Mini Mart (including once with a smartphone, and once leaving) at abt 4:30. If that’s him, he could have made the five miles to the Youth Camp at, say 30 mpg, by 4:36ish.

        He said that by time he got to the Youth Camp, he figured the BR-GM convoy had reached 89. The photo of the convoy driving past the Oak Park Lodge is at 4:32.

        Ponderosa is just a hop skip jump from the west side of Flagstaff, where I used to live. Maybe, for some reason, he was borrowing that truck?

        Reply

        • Typo Alert. 30 mph.

          And he could have made the 1.72 miles to the RHR parking lot by 4:47 (slipping him right in there between Papich’s photo of Brian, Trew etc getting the news at 4:39 and the beginning of the Reason video at maybe about 4:50.

          Reply

        • PS The need to map out these (and other) images finally drove me to look at my Google Earth map. Which I had seriously been avoiding since the news that they had put the January post-fire images there.

          Looking at Glen Ilah, which I had spent quite a bit of time exploring and plotting images and locations to, was really heart-breaking.

          But getting over that hurdle is paying off.

          Reply

  39. John Dougherty and people here-
    ok. Here it goes. I went to the 19 area and Glen Ilah community and parts of Yarnell.
    First off I owe all an apology telling you to go there not knowing anyone because I do know so many and it was a near ghosttown and first attempt alot are on vacation, relocated until home is built, relocated forever, or died. I am so sorry to see the losses. I have heard the divisions and depression amongst some there—too bad too. I know some want to just move forward so I guess it is better someone that knows the people reach out versus a stranger. I will do that too. I am focusing to Glen Ilah first then Shrine area then Sickles area. Again, I am so sorry for the 19 who lost their lives and for the homes lost but it was hard to hear the division of how deep their grief is and good to see Kevin is getting along with his home built. He had some very nice things yet he does not reflect on his loss of stuff and home but a very special person in his life; that person he told he would always take real good care of their stuff and it was safe with him so he has guilt in that way. I wish I could introduce folks and so they had a personal feel as well to the aftermath of the YHF to these special folks as I wish I could bring the community to the loved ones who lost those 19 because I wept so deep for Sparkey up there because he cannot visit the area; tears him up (meaning crying and tore; both)
    Looks like I can tell you now WHY noone has come forward in the community with their photos—called “lawyered up” as Buford shared to me today that a 90 page lawsuit is set in action and in that shows the backburn in the pages so the fireworks will come—I just wish and hoped it was out of court. I will keep going up there and spending my hikes there this Summer and let you all know all I learn—LIKE I learned from Sparkey that Amanda Marsh is still hoping to recover Eric Marsh’s wedding ring. Why don’t they let me the desert walker just metal detect that area and tell them what else they forgot to do—I mean you would think an investigator would of done that already—I am so tired. I had a long week last week of many miles and today was just 13 but up and down steep terrain- I feel truly broke up for the 19’s loved ones—sorry, it just hard to go up there and I will be there 3 times this week most likely if the folks who wanted to go show up—and I can tell you I never met the men and its hard for me so I can just imagine folks who did know them or are in the firefighting community. So, I am not a hugger but ({}) HUGS…this is a “big hug” that can be used to add some extra enthusiasm to the standard {} emoticon. I hope anyone locally who does not know let me share this— http://www.changeinthewind.org/the-fence.html — I will be there for sure on the 8th and do my best to be at the 10th and 11th. Does anyone know if they are doing an anniversary celebration—Jolene told me Tom with the old ghosttown is having something on top of the hill so I will have to look into it. Again, the backburn is in the 90 page lawsuit reported to me by Buford—so that may be why noone is showing photos. It does not mean I won’t stop trying—I just noticed because I don’t come by too much but where is Gary Olson and Elizabeth? anyone know?

    Reply

    • Thank you, Joy. ( ongoing thanks, of course ).

      It seems inconceivable that anyone would have been stupid enough to light a backfire that late in the afternoon with the WINDS doing what they were doing… but I suppose it has always been ‘possible’.

      It certainly would explain a lot… such as people like Gary Cordes always believing they had ‘plenty of time’ to reach the Boulder Springs Ranch ( since Cordes knew exactly what they were doing ) and then being ‘absolutely shocked’ that they ‘didn’t make it’.

      In fact… when Cordes was first ‘informed’ by Engine 59 boss Charlie Reyes that Granite Mountain had deployed he says himself in his interview that his very first reaction was… (quote) “Bullshit!”

      From Gary Cordes’ ADOSH interview…

      Q1 = Barry Hicks
      Q2 = Dave Larsen ( Rest in Peace )
      A = Gary Cordes
      _____________________________________________________
      Q1: Uh, he ( Eric Marsh ) tells air attack that he’s going to his designated, pre-designated safety zone…

      A: Right.

      Q1: …and he doesn’t say where that is, he just says, safety zone?

      A: Right.

      Q1: And so your assumption is…

      A: He had PLENTY OF TIME TO GET THERE, and he was headed to the Boulder Springs Ranch.

      Q1: Okay. Um, so uh, at, at some point um, air uh, during all of this, um, um, how did you uh, how did you hear of the uh, deployments?

      A: That was back when I met with the group uh, before I went in to do the rescues, uh, when I met with Engine 59. It was Engine 59 that told me that they had transmitted over the radio, over air to ground that they had deployed and I, and I, it was Charlie Reyes whose the, whose the engine boss down there and I told him BS, that uh, they didn’t need to deploy ‘cause the safety’s, they were in their safety zone and it was BOMB PROOF and he said NO, they NEVER MADE IT THERE, they got CUT OFF. And that’s when I knew obviously something bad had most likely occurred.

      Q1: Okay. Um, so there was no, there was no question in your mind though that when, when Eric indicated he was going to the safety zone, he wasn’t talking about the black, he was talking about the, the Helm Ranch?

      A: Yes, that would, that was my interpretation, yes.
      ______________________________________________________

      Also… not only is the 1 year ‘anniversary’ of the tragedy approaching… the date is complicated by the fact that June 30, 2014 is also ( apparently ) the cutoff date for when the ‘wrongful death’ claims already filed can actually be re-filed as full lawsuits.

      Since it’s already June 19… something tells me that if ANY of the multiple ‘wrongful death’ claims filed were going to be ‘settled out of court’ according to even the guidelines put forward in the claims themselves for doing so… that would have happened by now.

      Reply

      • my reply to that comment above and on Gary-
        Gary probably never hiked the maze-like terrain and did not know how dense it was so his BS comment to the deploying moment—reckon he had to be there to know what the men were up against. I knew that area. It haunts me what they were up against- now as for the photos and the backburn being in the 90pg lawsuit claim; I am still not going to wait for court. I am going to hike and as time goes by hope I get some to show—
        today I should have Jimmy’s photo—heading out soon for my Congress hike today- keep you posted as I learn it. have a great day.

        Reply

        • Reply to Joy A. Collura post on
          June 19, 2014 at 12:30 pm

          >> Joy said…
          >> Gary probably never hiked the maze-like terrain and
          >> did not know how dense it was

          I am sure you are right. There is still no definitive proof that Cordes was ever even AT the Boulder Springs Ranch before he told the first Hotshot crew that arrived ( but NOT the second Hotshot crew who would be working the same area ) that the Boulder Sprints Ranch was the ‘pre-determined safety zone’ for people working ‘that area’ west of Yarnell.

          It stands to reason that Cordes MUST have visited the place at least once… since he had been there since 11:30 PM the night before ‘scouting’ that entire area that he was being asked to be SPGS for…

          …but perhaps he only visited the BSR when it was DARK. The BSR itself is on its own little ‘rise’ out there and when you are standing in the cleared area of the ranch itself you do, in fact, have a pretty good ‘view’ of what the vegetation situation is ‘out there’ to the west in that canyon. All the photos taken at the BSR prove this is the case…

          …but if Gary Cordes had ONLY ever been out there to ‘check it out’ in the DARK… then he would still have had no frickin’ idea what things looked like due west of the compound. That might also help explain how he could been SO wrong about the actual SIZE of the ‘safety zone’. He said ( to ADOSH investigators ) that he thought it was 20-30 acres when it was, in fact, no more than 3 to 3 1/2 acres.
          That is not just ‘missing it by a little’. That is WILDLY WRONG.

          Regardless of his failure to be aware of the terrain out in the canyon or the ACTUAL size of the ‘safety zone’… I think Cordes might have never even considered they would be taking that ‘shortcut’.

          When Cordes testified that he was ( himself ) SURE what Marsh meant on the radio and that Marsh WAS headed SOUTH towards the Boulder Springs Ranch… I believe he ALSO was assuming they would be staying on that hiking trail that even Google Maps clearly shows heading all the way to the BSR.

          It’s a shame that the ADOSH investigators did not CLARIFY that with Cordes… but I guess it can be assumed that is what he was thinking. Part of the ‘shock’ for Cordes was probably ALSO learning that they did NOT ‘stay on that hiking trail’ and that they HAD elected to try and ‘cut through that canyon’.

          In all truth, however, we still do NOT know EXACTLY what Cordes ‘showed’ Marsh that morning… even when they WERE ‘looking at a Google Map on an iPad’. It is still perfectly possible that in those brief moments when they WERE doing that… that either Marsh or Cordes just ‘drew their finger’ across the map on the very route that GM ended up taking and agreed that was a legitimate ‘escape route’ to the ranch… without having ANY knowledge of what that ‘route’ would really entail.

          Again… no investigator bothered to ‘clarify’ that with Cordes.

          So you are right, Joy.

          Gary Cordes’ ‘assumption’ that Marsh/Crew had ‘plenty of time’ was (apparently) NOT based on any first-hand knowledge of the very ‘routes’ that he himself had pointed to that morning on a Google map and said ‘those are your pre-determined escape routes’.

          Just one more ‘missed opportunity’ for an intervention that day. Gary Cordes is the only one in fire command who apparently FULLY understood what Marsh MEANT when he announced ( on the radio ) “We’re making our way out our pre-determined escape route”…

          …but Cordes’ own unfamiliarity with the very routes he had told that person were his ‘pre-determined escape routes’ is what caused him to NOT jump in with a radio call along the lines of..

          “DIVSA… this is SPGS2, Cordes… are you SURE you have the TIME to do what you just said you’re planning on doing? I’m not sure you actually DO.”

          That never happened.

          Cordes simply thought they had ‘plenty of time’ and he never bothered to consult with Marsh about ‘the hike’ that he just heard ( over the radio ) was about to be attempted.

          So that’s the tragic ‘irony’ of that day.

          Everyone else in fire command turned out to be simply ‘confused’ about what Marsh ACTUALLY meant with his various ‘announcements’ over the radio… but the one person who was NOT CONFUSED at all… and knew EXACTLY what Marsh meant… was simply assuming ( just like Marsh/Steed and Crew ) that they had ‘plenty of time’… and so no further ‘consultation’ or ‘intervention’ was even attempted.

          Reply

          • “…think Cordes might have never even considered they would be taking that ‘shortcut’.”
            The shortcut was walking the boulders to the Helm’s with fire in sight hence why it haunts me HOW nineteen men dropped in a canyon that was an unusual maze-like dense terrain but there were 4 shortcuts better than that if someone from the fire dept. would share and confirm the photos I saw and is now in Craig Knapp’s 90 page suit—if that area was on fire due to firefighters and not original fire then the 4 shortcuts became none to the Helm’s from the black area. I just have a hard time thinking Marsh decided to drop vs staying high and walking the boulders right to the Helm’s—Donut? Willis? Blue Ridge? Would love your thoughts there. Oh yeah, “lawyered up” seems to be for the homeowners so I am sure its the same for you all-

            Reply

            • Are you talking about splitting the second saddle in the boulders, and then flanking down roughly where the east-facing trees survived in boulders close to the BSR? It’s a valid point. There are so many points throughout the day where people who should have been familiar with local conditions didn’t seem to base their decisions on them. I have irritated people already by talking about standards, but to do it again, if the “escape route” (which, as Marti correctly notes, wasn’t an escape route and was not being used to escape) had been scouted at all earlier in the day, it would have been quickly apparent that it was very rough going.

              I would say I am mystified that GM also didn’t reverse after the first few minutes of the slog, but have seen numerous people in numerous contexts stay committed to similar misadventures. People don’t like to admit mistakes and don’t like to walk back uphill, and since GM wasn’t looking to escape but rather to get to the “structures,” they were probably also reluctant to use the time to reverse.

              Reply

              • SR–I fully agree with all that you said above.
                Also Joy there was no back firing or firing out according to the investigation and several statements they had planed to but the fire jump containment lines before they could burn out lines. Could not tell you where those statements are but I read them way back.

                Reply

                • I read them too—right but I saw photos and videos and Buford states in the 90pg lawsuit the back burn not just one is in there so that means Knapp has documented information that supports that—otherwise he’d not put it in there—right?

                  Reply

              • Agree SR. People get stuck on “the plan” and feel the need to stick with it no matter what. Sticking with “the plan” is tunnel vision, like there’s no other option. Similar to prescribed fire…all the time and energy is spent on planning but the implementation feels like it’s secondary, and yet it is the most important phase.

                And Bob, each investigation did not interview every single firefighter assigned to YHF, nor the public. I’ve always believed a burnout was/is possible and will not be surprised if this comes to the surface. This is a normal tactic on wildfires and if the commo wasn’t in sync across the board, well…

                Reply

                • You would have thought some body would have turned that up or crews like BR would have said something if they had seen or heard any thing they were running all over the place. You may be right though. I would have thought the investigation would have searched that out as there were rumors early on.

                  Reply

          • I met with Jimmy today. I do not discount anyone’s account or photos but they are from 6-29-13 and I am looking for either the earliest first pics on 6-28-13 or 2-9pm on 6-30-13—oh geez…silly Joy. Be right back. When I was in Yarnell I was handed a link to photos from that time from the mother of the kid that went to jail–he took lots of pics those last hours so let me go figure out how to do her personal info to see them. duh. I forgot all about it.

            Reply

          • Correction for part of that post up above.

            I said…

            >> So that’s the tragic ‘irony’ of that day.
            >>
            >> Everyone else in fire command turned
            >> out to be simply ‘confused’ about what
            >> Marsh ACTUALLY meant with his various
            >> ‘announcements’ over the radio… but the
            >> one person who was NOT CONFUSED
            >> at all… and knew EXACTLY what Marsh
            >> meant… was simply assuming ( just like
            >> Marsh/Steed and Crew ) that they had
            >> ‘plenty of time’… and so no further
            >> ‘consultation’ or ‘intervention’ was even
            >> attempted.

            I didn’t mean to suggest that there isn’t ample evidence people OTHER than Gary Cordes KNEW that Marsh/Steed/Crew were ‘coming down’ and trying to get to Yarnell and/or were ( indeed ) ‘urging him to hurry’ ( as we perhaps hear in the YARNELL-GAMBLE video ). There is such evidence…

            …we just still don’t know WHO any of those ‘other people’ might have been. When I said ‘fire command’ I was only referring to the other members of the ‘official’ Type 2 (Short) team that was ‘officially’ running the fire that afternoon. All of THOSE other ‘fire command’ people ( IC Hall, OPS1 Abel, OPS2 Musser, etc. ) have already testified they thought something OTHER than what Gary Cordes KNEW ( that Marsh WAS ‘coming down’ ).

            It’s tricky to use the phrase ‘fire command’ for what went on that day… because the reality is that that is what was all messed up. There was the ‘Type 2 (Short) Team’ in place that morning… but the rest of the day was this mess involving them trying to ‘ramp up’ the ‘fire command’ to a True Type 2 team… but then punting that attempt and dialing all the up to ‘Type 1’ Incident before the ‘off the radar’ hires even got to Yarnell.

            There are a LOT of people who can be considered active ‘fire command’ circa deployment time that have NEVER been interviewed at all… so we don’t know WHAT they may have known, or thought about Marsh’s radio transmissions or what his intentions really were.

            Maybe some of them knew what Cordes knew and weren’t ‘confused’ at all.

            Reply

            • And remember Willis’s statement (from the DZ) about…. we knew they were coming in a southerly direction.

              After seeing where Willis is (Model Creek with Sciacca cloning radios?) at the approximate time Marsh tells Able he is moving off the top; I just have to wonder two things.

              1. Was Willis referring to he and Sciacca knew they were headed in a Southerly direction?

              2. Is the conversation Willis overheard ( where GM says they are headed in a Southerly direction) the same conversation we hear part of between Able and Marsh?

              Reply

              • Yes… definitely… and perhaps some other points…

                1) Is that part of ( or even the SOLE reason ) Sciacca then headed straight down to Yarnell ended up out on Shrine Road?
                Sciacca was on the fire now as ‘Safety Officer’. When he heard ( with Willis ) they were headed SOUTH… perhaps he thought he better go down there and monitor their progress. Remember… by the time Sciacca got down there and saw the GM Crew Carriers coming out with the BR Carriers… Sciacca MISTAKENLY thought the GM crew were already INSIDE the Crew Carriers and he then never bothered to VERIFY his own assumption.

                2) In one of the Panebaker videos… Willis is heard asking OPS1 Todd Abel “Any progress yet?”. This is right around the time of the YARNELL-GAMBLE video. It has never been clear what ‘progress’ Willis was asking about. GM’s ‘hike’ into town?

                3) In the Panebaker video that captures Jason Clawson passing by the camera… he is actively TALKING on his RADIO as he passes the camera right around the exact moment of the YARNELL-GAMBLE video.

                WHO was he talking to? There is no corresponding background radio capture in that same Panebaker video at that moment that might match him actually ‘speaking’ on a TAC channel… so was he talking on the GM ‘intra-crew’ at that point?

                OR… (perhaps) that specific TAC channel transmission was simply not captured in the background of that same Panebaker video… but that really IS Jason Clawson we hear asking Marsh if he could ‘hurry to town’ in the YARNELL-GAMBLE video?

                Reply

                • WTKTT said:
                  “1) Is that part of ( or even the SOLE reason ) Sciacca then headed straight down to Yarnell ended up out on Shrine Road?
                  Sciacca was on the fire now as ‘Safety Officer’. When he heard ( with Willis ) they were headed SOUTH… perhaps he thought he better go down there and monitor their progress. Remember… by the time Sciacca got down there and saw the GM Crew Carriers coming out with the BR Carriers… Sciacca MISTAKENLY thought the GM crew were already INSIDE the Crew Carriers and he then never bothered to VERIFY his own assumption.”

                  Please read SAI Sciacca interview for what it’s worth. Because of the layout of the SAI interviews the time lines are difficult to ascertain the true meaning. From Sciacca SAI “BR was milling around and then loaded in the buggies. The fire clearly was coming into town.” “I didn’t know BR and GM were there.” “DIVS Chief Daryl Willis painted the picture about what was going on.”
                  OK, which is it? Did he know anything about T1 crews being there at all? If Chief Willis painted a true picture then I sure would think he wouldn’t leave out GMIHC. Just saying.

                  Reply

    • oh and yes it does seem inconceivable —
      the winds were skunky like the fires and definately squirrely as my kestrel readings were up and down that day—yet at one point it hit 43mph yet keep in mind that I was on mountain top not down in any canyon for that reading

      Reply

    • Thu, Jun 19, 2014 at 8:11 PM I received an email from the lady we saved and her pets in regards to her son that is in jail for the YHF theft and she stated to go to his facebook page but I don’t have an account and it does not allow me access so let me know if anyone who has access to facebook can see the videos and photos because Dakota was there the entire day and night on 6-30-13 and he may be a great place to go and ask ?s to in regards to what he saw when he was not in someone’s burning home—I know you all here never heard but Diane in town had her home on fire and she was gathering all she could and it was getting to be where she HAD TO LEAVE the burning home and she left the safe open not taking it all and well the ones who stole ended up cleaning her home so to speak while it was burning so when she told me about her safe open & at one 1 town meeting this investigator said if you know about a home with a safe open and explained the contents & I raised my hand “yep, Diane”…it was weird to have thought your stuff burned but it was in the evidence dept. of things found on the men—anyways here is a link to Dakota and let’s thank him for the link to his photos while he is in jail. It might b helpful. Who knows. I cannot access them.
      https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100002173805540
      Got to Dakota’s site above and click on his album you can download pictures and video.

      Reply

      • **
        ** THE DAKOTA SLONE PHOTOS AND VIDEOS

        ** THE PHOTOS

        The photos in his Facebook account taken sometime during the early afternoon on June 30, 2013, were all taken from the south side parking lot of a small BUSINESS building right there on Highway 89 in Yarnell at this address…

        152 White Spar Hwy, Yarnell, Arizona

        There is a ‘red’ building there on the WEST side of Highway 89 with a flat, tin roof and gravel parking lots on both the north and south side of the building.

        There is also a large, shiny ‘aluminum can’ style roof vent on the roof of this business which is clearly visible on the right side of some of Slone’s photos.

        The photos were taken from that gravel parking lot just on the south side of the building, and looking NORTHWEST. It appears that someone had just parked their car there in that gravel lot on the south side of the business… and had then gotten up onto either the ROOF of the car/truck or they were simply standing on the hood or the trunk of the vehicle as the took the photos.

        The camera was exactly here…

        34.224053, -112.745824

        Regarding the SMOKE seen in these Dakota Slone photos…

        The smoke cloud seen on that other side of that ridge ( which runs along the north side of Shrine Road ) is exactly where the fire’s smoke cloud should be seen about the middle of the day on June 30. There is really nothing unusual about these photos at all and they match the smoke cloud seen in other photos taken about mid-day in Yarnell and looking to the NORTHWEST.

        There is no EXIF metadata available for these Facebook photos since they are NOT the ‘originals’ and they are simply Facebook ‘reformats’ of the original upload(s)… but the TIME is definitely about mid-afternoon just based on the ‘light-levels’ and the angle of the sun as seen in the photographs.

        The wind had not yet changed direction and that smoke cloud is coming from the HEAD of the fire that was still pushing towards Peeples Valley around that time.

        ** THE VIDEOS

        Taken at various places and times from Saturday
        evening, June 29… through Sunday, June 30, 2013.

        ** FIRST VIDEO – Saturday, June 29, 2013

        Taken the night of Saturday, June 30, shortly after sundown and looking WEST from Yarnell. The progress of the fire matches other photos and videos taken Saturday evening.

        ** SECOND VIDEO – Sunday, June 30, 2013 – circa 4:30 PM

        In the SECOND video at the top of his page… that is a ‘distance view’ of when the fire was cresting the ridge(s) over near Shrine road and perhaps the same moment that all fire resources were evacuating the Shrine area. You can apparently hear that same ‘siren’ that was being sounded by Tyson Esquibel over at the Youth Camp to ‘recall’ his crews from the end of Shrine road ( the Harper Canyon end ) that is ALSO heard in the Jerry Thompson videos AND in Blue Ridge Hotshot McCord’s YARNELL-GAMBLE video shot at exactly 1627 ( 4:27 PM ). He was standing in the driveway of a house at 11128 Crest Way in Yarnell… which is actually just one block EAST ( up the hill ) and one block SOUTH of the Yarnell Fire Station on ‘Looka Way’. He appears to have been standing exactly HERE at the top of the driveway at this address when he shot this video…

        34.220900, -112.744835

        NOTE: When he ZOOMS in to the NORTHWEST and towards the Shrine Road area in this video… you will see the white ‘church spire’ of the ‘Community Presbyterian’ church where he is going to stop and shoot his NEXT video not long after this one.

        ** THIRD VIDEO – Sunday afternoon – circa 4:40 PM

        His THIRD video… where he is shouting “It’s now entering town” is downright scary. There are firefronts EVERYWHERE on the horizon as he shoots due WEST.
        This video was shot at pretty much the same location as his SECOND video… up there near that driveway on Crest Way.

        ** FOURTH VIDEO – Sunday afternoon – circa 4:45 PM

        His FOURTH video ( the one where he never holds the camera still ) is equally scary. It looks like he probably WAS up there on ‘Crest Way’ on the EAST side of Highway 89 for the previous video… since they now appear to be ‘evacuating’ via the north end of Crest Way and they have stopped on the road right where the ‘Community Presbyterian’ Church is to shoot this video. They are shooting to the SOUTHWEST, towards the box canyon and across the parking lot of the church. This could actually be right around time of deployment. The camera is too shaky and the footage too ‘blurry’ to really make much of anything out in the VIDEO itself but some ‘still’ shots taken from the video frames might actually be ‘in focus’. The video camera was exactly HERE when this video was taken…

        34.223003, -112.744509

        That’s right at that point where Crest Way turns into Tabletop Way as it curls east and meets Highway 89.

        There are more videos… but they appear to all be AFTER the time of deployment.

        More later…

        Reply

        • Forgot to mention…

          All in all… the *new* Dakota Slone photos don’t seem to be all that significant… but the VIDEOS are actually quite important.

          They show the fire progression into Yarnell from an ELEVATED vantage point to the EAST of town… and a lot of the actual FIRELINES are now clearly visible instead of just a bunch of ‘smoke clouds’ as seen in most of the other photos/videos taken from ‘in town’ that afternoon.

          They really need to be studied further.

          Reply

        • OK. great comment.

          I also was told he has more photos/videos on his phone so if I get those—let you know

          Reply

  40. **
    ** THE VIDEO THAT SHOWS CLAWSON, HULBURD AND YOWELL
    ** VEHICLES UP AT THE ICP CIRCA 3:15 PM

    Marti… that video that we thought only existed on YouTube is, in fact,
    in Mr. Dougherty’s online folder.

    It is sort of ‘hidden’ ( along with the other one with ‘blues’ song playing )
    in the following Dropbox folder…

    In the ADOSH Yarnell Hill Investigation folder…
    / Photos and Video / ASFD Photos / Miscellaneous Photos

    Here is a direct link to it…

    https://www.dropbox.com/sh/20inrene9tcx74a/AACltJPUFfvmZqibRwGSJwWLa/ADOSH%20Yarnell%20Hill%20Investigation/Photos%20and%20Video/ASFD%20Photos/Miscellaneous%20Photos#lh:null-VID_20130630_151521_240.wmv

    The other video we also thought only existed on YouTube with the ‘blues’
    song playing and filmed from inside that engine going WEST on Hays
    Ranch Road is also in this same ‘Miscellaneous Photos’ folder.

    Also… There IS a Panebaker video that captures Clawson, Hulburd and
    Yowell heading EAST on Hays Ranch Road and going down to Yarnell.

    It is one of the ‘regular’ Panebaker ( shorter ) videos and it does, in fact,
    ‘shoot the gap’ when there was a battery swapout in-progress with
    the Air-To-Air video setup.

    Panebaker ( Non-Air-To-Air channel ) video…

    20130630_161620_VLAT_split_1_EP

    At the very START of the video… Jason Clawson has already
    come over the hill in that aquamarine PNF Pickup towing a
    trailer and his UTV. Hulburd and Yowell are on the road behind him.

    At +9 seconds… Clawson is dead-center in the video.

    Then Hulburd passes the camera also towing his UTV… and
    KC ‘Bucky’ Yowell follows Hulburd in the white pickup with no
    trailer or UTV. They all have their lights on.

    They are going pretty slow because as the previous Panebaker
    video showed… there was some mobile home heading EAST that
    was backing up traffic on Hays Ranch Road.

    KC ‘Bucky’ Yowell falls behind a bit and actually doesn’t exit the
    left side of the video until +36 seconds.

    NOTE: This is the video that contains all the background communication
    with Eric Marsh and Jesse Steed. At +48 seconds in this video is when
    we here SOMEONE in fire command ( DIVS Mark Sachara? ) say on
    the radio…

    “Granite Mountain… what’s your STATUS right now?”

    …and then he gets that ‘dodgy’ status report back from both Marsh and Steed.

    More later…

    Reply

    • Ahhhhhhhh

      I was in the wrong Photos and Videos folder!! I was in just the basic one and hadn’t even see this in the ADOSH FOIA collection.

      Again, a site map of those Dropbox folders would come in very handy, because they’re posted in different reports.

      Thank you!!

      Reply

    • So. I found their truck on Panebaker Air2Air. It’s on 1544_EP. It goes by at +10:44,03 or 3:26PM. It’s the white double-cab State Fire truck with panel-type boxes on the sides. It had previously passed in the opposite direction in 1544_EP at + 1:18,26 or 3:16OM.

      Who would think that plain buttoned-up truck had such perfect taste for the appropriate music for the day?

      Reply

      • The two videos are really a great and useful video “panorama” of that whole Hays Ranch Road Scene, from the Incident Command Center to 89 and back again.

        Reply

        • Speaking of ‘panoramas’…

          ** PANORAMA PHOTO SHOWING
          ** PNF VEHICLES AT ICP CIRCA 3:22 PM.

          In the same ADOSH ‘Miscellaneous photos’ folder…

          / Photos and Videos /
          ASFD Photos / Miscellaneous Photos /

          Photo 26.JPG….

          https://www.dropbox.com/sh/20inrene9tcx74a/AACltJPUFfvmZqibRwGSJwWLa/ADOSH%20Yarnell%20Hill%20Investigation/Photos%20and%20Video/ASFD%20Photos/Miscellaneous%20Photos#lh:null-26.JPG

          This one is fascinating.

          It’s a FULL PANORMA basically totally ‘EAST to WEST’ and taken in the parking lot of the Model Creek School ICP itself at (supposedly) 3:22 PM.

          At the extreme far left of the photo… you can see ALL those vehicles that are also seen in the ‘video’ shot from the truck that was leaving the ICP. They are all ‘assembled’ over there on the side of the road just as you see them being ‘passed by’ in the video.

          Those 3 vehicles also seen in the ‘Helemt Cam’ video belonging to Bea Day Type 2 team PNF hires Jason Clawson, Aaron Hulburd, and KC ‘Bucky’ Yowell are all right there on the side of the road.

          Also… that ‘red pickup’ ( that says Ponderosa Fire on the door and belongs to Mark Sachara ) is also there… it’s just ‘hiding’ a little. It is actually ‘underneath the tree’ that there over on the left side of the panorama.

          There are actually TONS of photos in this particular folder that you won’t see anywhere else. Some VERY interesting shots ( like the one taken of Willis’ truck up-close and personal while it was up there at the intersection of Model Creek Road and Double-Bar-A Ranch ( Hays Ranch ) road. )

          Also TONS of photos from the memorial ‘processions’ with vehicles lined up all over the sides of the roads. Most of the same vehicles seen in Yarnell on Sunday are in these photos as well.

          More later.

          Reply

          • Forgot to mention… the PANORAMA photo above is *extremely* high-res so if you ‘view original’ you can see amazing detail even in the vehicles that appear ‘far away’.

            Correction: That ‘red pickup’ isn’t actually ‘under’ the tree at the far left… it is simply being ‘hidden’ by the tree. It is actually parked in the open some yards beyond the tree.

            Also… look to the EXTREME RIGHT of this PANORAMA. It actually captures the ‘vehicles’ that were parked under that limited ‘roofed parking garage’ outside the ICP.

            I would imagine these were the ‘primo’ parking spots since they are right there near the door of the ICP and the ‘roof’ was providing ash protection… so anyone allowed to park UNDER that tin roof was probably a ‘big dog’.

            One of the AZ State Fire trucks that appears later in the RHR parking lot is there under that parking roof…. down on the end.

            Also… that *might* be Todd Abel standing out there in the field next to that BLACK pickup.
            Looks like the same fellow that is seen later with the ‘famous mustache’ and the yellow helmet walking towards the Brush Truck in the Tom Story photo(s) taken at the RHR parking lot.

            Reply

            • Re Todd and the black truck via the pano.

              This photo was taken at 3:22:30 PM.

              There are a number of black double cab trucks on this fire. Some have chrome door handles, some don’t. The one in the RHR parking lot has chrome door handles.
              as this one does.

              There’s another photo that was taken at 3:00.50 PM that has this truck in it also, in the same spot. This photo has Tony Sciacca’s truck front and center. I don’t remember which folder I found it in ATM but it is IMG_20130630_150050_919.jpg.

              I don’t know ATM if Todd Abel was at the ICP during this time.

              The only similar black truck to pass the Air2Air camera does so in 1716 at + 2:47,01 or 4:47. Nine minutes before Darrell Willis passes it.

              Reply

              • I just don’t think, via his interview, that Todd Abel was at the ICP during that time framework.

                Reply

            • Reply to Marti Reed post on
              June 18, 2014 at 7:38 pm said:

              >> Marti said…
              >> Copy!

              I am also just going to ‘rattle off’ a number of other ‘fascinating’ photos in that ‘ASFD Photos / Miscellaneous Photos’ folder just in *case* you hadn’t spotted them.

              Apolgies in advance if you have ( spotted them already ).

              Here’s the first one…

              Byron Kimball (??) actually leaning on the back of his ‘blue pickup’ with a pretty good profile of him. If that really is him… he is OLDER than I thought…

              https://www.dropbox.com/sh/20inrene9tcx74a/AACltJPUFfvmZqibRwGSJwWLa/ADOSH%20Yarnell%20Hill%20Investigation/Photos%20and%20Video/ASFD%20Photos/Miscellaneous%20Photos#lh:null-IMG_20130630_141459_148.jpg

              Dark Navy Blue short-sleeved shirt.. TAN Khakis, sunglasses, grey hair and what’s looks to be YACM…

              ( Yet Another Cowboy Mustache )

              Reply

                  • Marti… sorry… I missed this one yesterday.

                    My bad. I’ve been deferring to what you have researched on ‘the blue truck’ but I totally mis-remembered who you were assigning it to.

                    Yes. Probably Marquez’s and not Kimball.

                    BTW: I can’t find a reference picture of Marquez anywhere. We still really don’t know what he looked like.

                    So that COULD be him leaning on that truck up there at the ICP.
                    Dunno.

                    Reply

                  • I hate these narrow thread. So I’ll try 2 keep it short.

                    I’ve always started with IMG_3952 and Yarnell-Papich006 from the Papich folder. That has to be Cougan and Rance meeting with Cordes near the dozer line. Ties with two of Joy’s pix.

                    Then the video USB YARNELL HILL 21 from the Forest Service folder in the earlier Dropbox mix.

                    They’re from the back, but they stay together most of the day.

                    Googled Rance enuff to know he was in Phoenix. Found a pic of a Rance Marquez on one of those Google directory sites. Don’t know if that’s him, tho. But a resemblance.

                    That grey-haired guy doesn’t even come close.

                    Big problem I discovered Wednesday, tho.

                    That blue truck passes the Air2Air around 4PM.

                    Who knows???

                    Reply

                  • Also, in the Forest Service Photo 0605, from above the van procession, the Rance and Cougan trucks are together.

                    Reply

              • And, yeah, once I finally found that whole collection, I downloaded the photos you’re describing. That Miscellaneous folder seems to be a combination of some of the others with a few thrown in that aren’t in the other folders (like the pano). Quite a jumble.

                I’m screen recording right now, so can’t look, but that red truck that looks like the one in the RHR parking lot isn’t actually it. It says Yavapai Fire, not Ponderosa Fire. At least it does in the video as that crew passes by it.

                Reply

            • Next one…

              Close-up of Willis’ truck taken at 3:47 WHILE he was up on Model Creek road as shown in the Swartz photo(s).

              This was taken AS the retardant drops were happening and Willis and some engines were trying to ‘make a stand’ up there on Model Creek Road.

              https://www.dropbox.com/sh/20inrene9tcx74a/AACltJPUFfvmZqibRwGSJwWLa/ADOSH%20Yarnell%20Hill%20Investigation/Photos%20and%20Video/ASFD%20Photos/Miscellaneous%20Photos#lh:null-28.JPG

              Willis’ ‘Prescott Fire Department’ pickup is right there front and center.
              License plate can be clearly read…
              G-039EJ

              There’s a road-sign in the photo. Clearly readable.
              It says…
              MODEL CREEK RD
              DOUBLE BAR A RANCH RD

              They are at the INTERSECTION where these roads meet and where they are also shown ‘making a stand’ in some of the Swartz photos.

              NOTE: ‘DOUBLE BAR A RANCH RD’ is the old name for ‘Hays Ranch Road’. The name of the road changed after the last purchase of the Ranch but street signs hadn’t changed yet as of June 30, 2013.

              OTHER engines in this photo…

              Another vehicle in front of Willis.
              BIG LINE GREEN Engine in front of THAT vehicle. That might be the same ‘green engine’ seen in the Swartz photo.

              Red Ford Pickup with white stripes
              C-81 Unit ID on the back.
              ‘Ponderosa Fire’ logo on back.
              Is this the same ‘Mark Sachara’, Ponderosa Fire Chief? red-truck… or someone ELSE who was there from ‘Ponderosa Fire’ that day? Dunno.
              red / white / red light bar on top.
              License plate clearly readable…
              G-541FG

              BIG TRUCK ( ENGINE? )
              Photo was taken from inside cab of ‘International’ (BIG) truck,
              which matches a photo from the other ‘Larz Garcia’ folder one
              directory back from this ‘Miscellaneous Photos’ folder.
              The radio mounted on the dash is identical to what is seen in the ‘Larz Garcia’ photo(s) and the coaxial cable and connectors are identical.

              Reply

              • The truck with the tag G-039EJ is not the same truck seen in Swartz photos or Tom Story photos. It does not have the same toolbox and it has a light bar mounted on the top of the cab

                Reply

                • Yes… thanks calvin.
                  I was ‘looking too fast’.

                  That isn’t Willis’ pickup.

                  It’s Cory Moser’s.
                  License plate matches
                  his ‘resource order’.

                  See new post above about Cory Moser.

                  Reply

              • Followup…

                In that photograph linked to above in the parent comment… the OTHER ‘License Plate’ number that is clearly readable is on that All-Red with white stripe truck with the RED light bar on the roof parked directly in front of the vehicle where the photo was taken. It has the Unit designator ‘C-81’ on the back.

                That is definitely Mark Sachara’s vehicle.

                His ‘Travel Mode’ entry in his ‘Resource Order’ ALSO happens to list the license plate number of the vehicle he was using that day…

                Travel Mode: AOV G541FG

                Mark Sachara is the Fire Chief of the Ponderosa Fire District and he was hired as yet another “Division Supervisor” ( DIVS ) that day.

                He is the one who will ‘take over’ DIVS Z from Rance Marquez following the deployment.

                See a longer post about this not too far above that goes with the one identifying the Prescott Fire pickup in this photo as definitely Cory Moser’s vehicle.

                Reply

            • Next one…

              This is actually one child directory back in the ‘Larz Garcia’ folder but appears to be the same ‘engine’ as the ‘Willis truck’ photo above and in the same location.

              Same radio and coax cables on dashboard.

              https://www.dropbox.com/sh/20inrene9tcx74a/AADbR2wJoDMODyRNy4GvkhiZa/ADOSH%20Yarnell%20Hill%20Investigation/Photos%20and%20Video/ASFD%20Photos/Larz%20Garcia#lh:null-Picture%20009.jpg

              He appears to be CLIMBING up to that same ‘Model Creek Road’ and ‘Double-Bar-A Ranch Road’ intersection where the previous picture will then be taken.

              He is FOLLOWING that red pickup ( Mark Sachara? ) that will also then be seen at the intersection.

              Reply

              • Followup on photo above…

                For a moment… I thought this ‘big truck’ with pics being taken from the ‘inside’ was the same one as the one with the ‘blues’ playing and heading WEST on Hays Ranch Road…

                …but the radios mounted on the dashboards don’t seem to quite match. Same make/model, maybe… but the coax connectors are different.

                Then I saw that you had already ‘found’ that ‘blues’ truck heading west on Hays Ranch Road…

                On June 18, 2014 at 11:37 am
                Marti Reed said:
                ________________________
                So. I found their truck on
                Panebaker Air2Air. It’s on
                1544_EP. It goes by at
                +10:44,03 or 3:26PM. It’s the white double-cab State Fire
                truck with panel-type boxes on
                the sides. It had previously
                passed in the opposite direction in 1544_EP at +
                1:18,26 or 3:16OM.

                Who would think that plain
                buttoned-up truck had such
                perfect taste for the
                appropriate music for the day?
                _________________________

                So I don’t think that IS the same ‘truck’ we then see up fighting the fire on Model Creek Road. That one says ‘International’ all over the Glove Box and would indicate a LARGER vehicle.

                Reply

                  • Copy.

                    BTW: That ‘red’ vehicle with Unit ID of C-81 in this ‘smoky photo’ is most definitely Mark Sachara… who would take over DIVSZ from Marquez later that day.

                    The license plate number matches exactly what is on Mark Sachara’s actual resource order in that “J – Resource Orders” document.

                    Page 136…
                    Request Number: O-11
                    Mark Sachara
                    Travel Mode: AOV G541FG ( License plate )

                    Reply

  41. **
    ** MARK SACHARA – ADDITIONAL TYPE 2 SHORT TEAM DIVS ON
    ** SUNDAY AND OWNER OF THAT RED DOUBLE-DOOR PICKUP.

    I’m floating this one to the top since no more room down below to
    add additional information…

    >> WantsToKnowTheTruth on June 17, 2014 at 10:12 pm said:
    >>
    >> Marti… again… apologies for NOT making it clear that the video
    >> with the ‘Clawson, Hulburd and Yowell’ vehicles was, in fact, that
    >> one sitting on Youtube in EN’s account.
    >>
    >> It appeared BEFORE the Dropbox even came online.
    >>
    >> And YES… there are TONS of vehicles seen in this video… including
    >> EXACTLY who is parked right up there next to the Model Creek School.
    >>
    >> We also see that ‘red truck’ in this video…
    >>
    >> At exactly +33 seconds ( and before we get to see Clawson, Hulburd and
    >> Yowell’s vehicles )… I believe that is the same exact red double-door pickup
    >> we are GOING to see later at the RHR with that group of FFs ( apparently )
    >> consulting with Brendan McDonough and looking at a MAP spread out on the
    >> hood of it.
    >>
    >> It appears to say ‘Ponderosa Fire’ in GOLD letters on the driver’s side door.
    >>
    >> Mark Sachara is the current ‘Fire Chief’ of the ‘Ponderosa Fire Distrcit’ in
    >> Bellemont, Arizona ( Cococino County ).
    >>
    >> Mark Sachara was THERE in Yarnell that day… and is the one who took over
    >> Division Z from Rance Marquez after the burnover.
    >>
    >> Mark Sachara went on to be officially listed as ‘DIVS Z’ for Yarnell in the
    >> following day’s Incident Action Plan ( IAP ).
    >>
    >> In that IAP… Mark Sachara is also officially listed as having been part of Todd
    >> Abel’s “Incident Within An Incident” management team from the previous day,
    >> after the burnover.
    >>
    >> From just one ( of many ) lists of current Arizona Fire Departments/Districts…
    >>
    >> Ponderosa Fire Department
    >> P.O. Box 16359, Bellemont, AZ 86015
    >> (928) 773-8933
    >> Mark Sachara, Fire Chief

    And here is Mark Sachara’s actual ‘Resource order’ from the ‘J – Resource Orders’ document in the SAIT FOIA/FOIL release.

    Mark Sachara was actually ‘ordered up’ as yet another DIVISION SUPERVISOR
    ( DIVS/SUP ) and part of the Type 2 SHORT team about 8:20 PM on SATURDAY
    NIGHT…

    …but apparently didn’t show up in Yarnell until about NOON on Sunday, June 30.

    That’s about a half hour after Rance Marquez showed up and was
    assigned DIVS Z. Sachara would then replace Marquez as DIVSZ after the
    deployment… ( and also be part of Abel’s IWI team? ) but we still have no frickin’ idea what Sachara’s real assignment was up UNTIL that time… or what level of ‘engagement’ he had with anyone else that day.

    At least we KNOW that DIVS hire Rance Marquez showed up around 11:30 and was at least given an assignment that day ( Division Z ). Marquez then simply DISAPPEARED, without ever being ‘relieved’ of that position…

    …but in Sachara’s case… we still have NO IDEA what he was even SUPPOSED to be doing that day… yet there is his red pickup right in the thick of things at the Ranch House Restaurant and (apparently) the place where the ‘map meeting’ with Brendan McDonough actually took place ( on the hood of his truck ).

    Also… could HE be the mysterious voice that actually asks ( circa 4:16 PM )…

    “Granite Mountain… what’s your STATUS right now?”

    …smack in the middle of the 30 minute ‘blackout’ when the SAIR said no
    one in management had ANY ‘verifiable contact’ with Granite Mountain?

    SOMEONE kicked right in at 4:16 PM after Bravo 33 said to Ground command…
    “CALL them and see if DIVSA is actually WITH them ( Granite Mountain )” and did just that. They called GM and asked for status… and THEN fulfilled B33’s request and asked Marsh directly (quote) “…are you WITH Granite Mountain right now?”.

    That’s when Marsh DODGED the question and answered with something like…
    “Just checkin’ it out to see where we gonna jump out at”.

    Could that have been the free-floating DIV/SUP Mark Sachara asking
    Marsh those questions?

    Here are Mark Sachara’s ‘resource orders’…

    J – Resource Orders
    PDF page 136 ( of 213 pages )…

    Request Number: O-11
    Ordered Date/Time: 06/29/13 – 2020 PNT
    From: AZ-ADC (Dispatch) 800-309-7081
    To: AZ-ADC
    Qty: 1
    Resource Requested: DIVISION/GROUP SUPERVISOR (DIVS) (T-A)
    Needed Date/Time: 06/30/13 0600 PNT
    Deliver To: YARNELL HILL
    From Unit: AZ-ADC
    To Unit: AZ-ADC
    Assigned Date/Time: 06/30/130948 PNT
    Resource Assigned Unit Id: AZ-PND ( Ponderosa Fire )
    Resource Assighed: SACHARA, MARK (AZ-ADC) [EFF/AD] (T)
    M/D Ind: M
    Estimated Time of Departure: 06/30/13 1000 PNT
    Estimated Time of Arrival: 06/30/13 1200 PNT
    Released Date: (No entry)
    Released To: (No entry)

    Then… on Page 173… Order confirmation note is entered
    at 9:48 AM Sunday morning…

    Request Number: O-11
    Documentation: Request O-11 – DIVISION/GROUP SUPERVISOR
    (DIVS) – [AZ-A1S-130688] YARNELL HILL has been filled with
    SACHARA, MARK (AZ-ADC) by SUSAN BURGER (at) AZ-ADC ROSS.
    Entered By: SUSAN BURGER (AZADC) 06/30/2013 0948 PNT

    Then… down on page 210 in the AZ-ADC WildCad printout… it
    gives a ‘Demob date/time’ of July 4 for Mark Sachara which means
    he was on the fire for 4 days and demobbed the morning of July 4.

    Page 210…

    Req Number: 0-11
    Filled Catalog Item Code: DIVS
    Filled Catalog Item Name: DIVISION/GROUP SUPERVISOR
    Filled by Org Unit Code: AZ-ADC
    Res Prov Unit Code: AZ-PND ( Ponderosa Fire District )
    Assignment Name: SACHARA, MARK ( AZ-ADC )
    Mob ETA: Jue 30, 2013 – 12:00:00 PM
    Demob ETD: Jul 4, 2013 – 8:00:00 AM

    Reply

    • Rance Marquez didn’t just DISAPPEAR.

      His assignment was to go “do situational awareness” in preparation for the next day and, then, to report back to Incident Command. Which is exactly what he did.

      He checked out the scene, reached a stalemate with Eric, and then went back to ICP to report to either Roy Hall or Paul Musser. That’s exactly what he was supposed to do.

      Problem was, when got to ICP, the place was in a state of chaos, and neither Hall nor Musser were remotely interested in what he had to report. So he and Cougan went “free-lancing” as mostly EVERYBODY on that side of the fire was also doing, according to several people.

      And I’m not even particularly all that upset with Bea Day and “her” crew. Especially given the whole context. I did a bit of research on her. She, and her team, are extremely highly regarded. They were the Incident Management Team on the Thompson Ridge Fire (which GM fought), just before Tony Sciacca was Incident Commander on the Doce Fire (which Granite Mountain fought), just before the Yarnell Fire.

      They were, as a team, assigned to this fire, and then that assignment was cancelled, (while Glen Joki was having to get help from them anyway because the ROSS System was failing them) without, apparently, them knowing it, as they were putting themselves together.

      That whole day was just chaos. That’s not Bea Day’s Team’s fault. And then, she and some of her team stayed on in Prescott and managed the whole aftermath there. For which they were duly beloved. I haven’t witnessed that there were any hard feelings among members of either team towards the other in any of that day or afterwards. (She’s from Rio Rancho, New Mexico, so now I know she’s a neighbor…more small world stuff).

      On the other hand, they definitely should have been interviewed, by both the SAIT and ADOSH. That was a HUGE oversight, given the importance of their activities on this fire. And it does give their presence the appearance of flying somewhat undercover. But I don’t think they really were. And a LOT of people on that fire were used to working with that team, so they just started doing it when they showed up.

      And it may very well be that the “back-ordering” paperwork-filling-out was somewhat chaotic and sketchy, because the whole dispatch process, by that time was hugely focused on getting the relatively HUGE Type 1 Team dispatched and up and running.

      That’s my two cents anyway. And I still agree, the Clawson part of that crew was very likely waiting for Granite Mountain to show up over there on Shrine Road, needing a lift out, when they didn’t and the deployment did, instead.

      More Shakespeare.

      Reply

      • Marti… agree totally. No one was ‘pissed off’ when Bea Day’s people started to show up and were jumping in.

        Not really.

        Even ‘big dog’ Roy Hall told incoming ‘big dog’ Tony Sciacca everything was ‘a mess’ as Bea’s people started showing up.

        From Tony Sciacca’s ADOSH interview…
        ________________________________________________
        Tony Sciacca: Came in and tied in with Roy. And I said, you know, asked him what he had and he said, “Well look it, I got a mess.”
        ________________________________________________

        It is ASTOUNDING, however, to keep discovering ( as we chip away at the details ) how fully ‘engaged’ Bea’s ‘people’ were as we lead up to deployment… even though their actual work orders ( and reasons for officially/legally being involved ) had either ‘never gone through’ or were outright ‘cancelled’ before they even started showing up.

        They were ALL ( technically ) ‘freelancing’ at that point.

        Whether they were AWARE of that, or not, ( that they were ‘at work’ without valid ‘work orders’ in the system ) remains a big part of the total mystery.

        They were ‘doing their own thing’… and yes… they WERE certainly trying to ‘help’. Everyone was… but that’s not really the point.

        The BIG question is… in the course of ‘doing their own thing’ and ‘just trying to help’… did this ‘skunk team’ have their OWN contact with Granite Mountain and/or try to exert their OWN ‘influence’ over Marsh and Steed that day.

        Given who they were ( and where they were from ) and their familiarity with Marsh / Steed… it is MOST likely that Jason Clawson ( and/or ALL of them? ) had BOTH the GM private intra-crew frequency AND Marsh’s cell phone number ( perhaps even BOTH of Marsh’s cellphone numbers since their is testimony that Marsh ALWAYS carried TWO cellphones with him ).

        We are looking at a situation here where suddenly there was a THIRD fully functional and engaged ‘Field OPS’ working the fire ( Clawson ) who THOUGHT he had full authority to act in that capacity.

        We don’t even know if Clawson heard Musser talking to Marsh about GM’s ‘availability’. If he didn’t… he most certainly might have done exactly what Musser did and make his own ‘availability check’ directly to Marsh.

        Difference being… the inbund Bea Day people really didn’t receive any inbound breifings to speak of so they were ALL even more clueless about actual crew locations on the south end than Musser was when he made is ‘availability checks’.

        In other words… Clawson might have known that GM was ‘back there somewhere’ and under the impression they had been working side-by-side with Blue Ridge…

        …but Clawson probably had NO IDEA how ‘far away’ they really where.

        That’s why Clawson *MAY* have made his own request for Marsh to get GM ‘back to town’ ASAP… and then at 1627 ( 4:27 PM ) was calling him again ( in the YARNELL-GAMBLE video ) and wondering ‘where they were’ and why they hadn’t shown up in town yet.

        Marsh’s exasperation when he responds with “They’re comin’ from the heel of the fire” has ALWAYS sounded like he was frustrated with whoever was doing this URGING to ‘hurry up’ at 1627 NOT knowing that the original request for them to move involved a loooong hike. It might also have been just confusing to Marsh ( or he didn’t consider the fact ) that a THIRD OPS would now be working Yarnell and would NOT have been fully briefed about actual crew locations…. but that (seems to have been ) the reality with Clawson, et. al.

        I mean… this is like researching a plane crash where no one can figure out why the pilot might have made some choices that led to the crash… and then suddenly discovering there *MIGHT* have actually been another set of ‘air traffic controllers’ talking ( privately? ) to the pilot…

        …but NONE of those ‘other people’ were ever interviewed about their involvement that day.

        It’s really quite unbelievable.

        Maybe none of the ‘skunk team’ ( Bea Day’s obsoleted people ) had any contact with Marsh at all…

        …but given a lot of the evidence… it seems VERY likely that they did… and that itself should have warranted a FULL set of interviews of ALL of these ‘off the radar’ hires.

        More later…

        Reply

        • I’m gonna respond a little bit. but only a little, because I’m listening to, while re-reading, a BUNCH of related interviews.

          I just don’t want to use, at this point, pejoratives like “skunk team.”

          We still don’t know, exactly, what kind of team they were. i don’t think anybody does.

          Three things I’ve been thinking about.

          No team can actually “take charge” until they have officially transitioned into command. Roy Hall’s team wasn’t officially “in charge” until 10 AM-ish (not looking at notes). Although his newly chosen (before 10AM) Field Ops was briefing Eric about the strategy before then. So I guess it can be a bit fuzzy. But Eric was still not officially DivS until that 10AM transfer.

          There wasn’t even that level of clearness about Bea Day’s team taking command of the fire at the time they started arriving. There was no time determined about when that would happen. That order could have even meant “tomorrow,” or even later, since, even after the Type 1 Team was ordered, it didn’t even transfer into command until 1800 on TUESDAY. But Roy Hall is clear he wanted it ASAP.

          So you are correct that, even as that
          central West Team Zone team was showing up because Roy Hall realized early on that this fire needed more resources, they hadn’t officially been authorized to assume any POWER or AUTHORITY.

          And even though, apparently, there was a lot of “free-lancing” going on on the east side, any kind of “pressure” placed on a hotshot crew on the west side, or it’s DivS, to leave its “assignment” (even a pretty fruitless one at that point) without even knowing it’s relative location would be pretty beyond-the-pale. That’s pretty different from “Let’s move this enfpgine over here.” Of course, we don’t even KNOW if that even HAPPENED. They weren’t interviewed.

          Which leads to my second thought. Both Bea and the Clawson crew work for the US Forest Service. If ADOSH wanted to interview them, they would have most likely come under that gag order. I don’t see any record of ADOSH trying to interview them. But who knows??

          Third. I only remember seeing somewhere that someone saw Bea Day on a UTV. I don’t remember where that was. She lives near Albuquerque. It would have taken quite awhile for her to get there, unless she happened to have been closer. So I’m currently pretty dubious she was even there, yet.

          Back to the interviews.

          Reply

          • Reply to Marti Reed post on
            June 18, 2014 at 6:11 pm

            >> Marti said…
            >>
            >> I just don’t want to use, at this point,
            >> pejoratives like “skunk team.”

            You are right. My apologies. I was typing way too fast and that is just what ‘came out’.
            I’d gotten tired of referring to them as ‘freelancers’ ( because that isn’t really the correct way to describe them either )… so I guess I was just search for a new generic term to use for all these ‘Type 2’ off-the-radar hires whose orders either never went through or were actually cancelled by the time they even ‘got there’ that day.

            >> Marti also said…
            >> We still don’t know, exactly, what kind of
            >> team they were. i don’t think anybody
            >> does.

            I don’t even think THEY really knew, to be honest. It was all such a cluster f**k as they were showing up and NOT what they expected to find that I think they were all just as confused as anyone else that day.

            But they were still firemen… and they were THERE. They were just trying to find a way to ‘help’. Example: There is no evidence that anyone who was part of that morning ‘off the radar’ backfill hiring by Bea Day who showed up later and found out their orders never ‘went through’ said ‘f**k it’… and just LEFT.

            There is still evidence in the Dispatch logs that Bea Day DID send Roy Hall an email with ALL of the ‘off the radar’ people she had told to ‘head for Yarnell’… but I don’t think anyone ( investigators included ) has ever seen that email… or that full list of names.

            So no… we don’t know WHAT to call this ‘team’ that was assembling all afternoon becuase of Bea Day’s ‘off the radar’ hiring.

            You can’t say they were TRULY ‘self-dispatching’ ( they were ASKED to be there ) and you can’t say they were TRULY ‘freelancing’ ( some of them WERE given ‘official’ assignments and they performed them ) but we also still don’t know if we can say they were officially ( and from a legal perspective ) ‘working the fire’ if their work orders had actually been CANCELLED by the time they got there.

            They were just THERE… and actively ‘engaged’ in running the fire… whether they were ‘supposed to be’ or not.

            My biggest concern with all this is obviously Jason Clawson… and what HE was ACTUALLY doing. He was being considered by ‘the others’ to be an ‘Operations Section Chief’ that day ( the THIRD ONE on the same fire?? ).

            We still have NO IDEA what he was doing down there on Shrine road… WHO told him to be there… or if any of the other TWO OPS people running the fire even KNEW he was down there and actively engaging.

            What if Clawson really did make his own ‘availability check’ out to Marsh / GM like Musser did?

            I think that could be a game-changer… and here is why.

            Marsh didn’t working with Todd Abel or Paul Musser all the time…. but Clawson?… different story.

            Clawson was PNF and an ‘Ops Chief’ on Bea Day’s team roster which included a WHOLE lot of other ‘Prescott people’.

            Doing a TDWA ( Turn Down With Alternative ) might have been easy for Marsh to do when it was either Abel or Musser doing the ‘asking’… but if it was PNF Bea Day team OPS Jason Clawson himself doing the ‘asking’ it might have been a different story altogether.

            If it happened at all… then it’s possible there *MIGHT* have been an elevated level of ‘pressure’ on Marsh to try and do what he might have been being asked to do if it was coming from his ‘own people’ ( PNF Bea Day OPS Chief Jason Clawson ).

            All conjecture… unless there is ever a good round of interviews with these ( I don’t know what to call them ) people that have never been interviewed but were fully participating in what was happening that day.

            Reply

      • Reply to Marti Reed post on June 18, 2014 at 2:29 pm

        >> Marti said
        >> Rance Marquez didn’t just DISAPPEAR.

        Well, no… of course not.
        As they say in the NAVY… unless you have fallen overboard,
        then ya gotta be SOMEWHERE.

        However… Todd Abel ( The ONLY ‘Field OPS’ for most of the day ) went to great lengths in his ADOSH interview to label Marquez as (quote) “missing in action”.

        For whatever reason… people could not FIND him ( Abel included ) when they wanted to.

        OPS1 Todd Abel says he had no idea where Marquez was all afternoon until he ran into him again AFTER the deployment in the parking lot of the Ranch House Restaurant.

        That’s screwed up.

        Here you have the primary ‘Field OPS’ telling investigators he had NO IDEA where his own designated ‘Division Z’ Supervisor was even when ‘Division Z’ became the target of the fire and was ‘blowing up’.

        Wherever Marquez was most of the afternoon… he most certainly was not doing the things a designated Division Supervisor is SUPPOSED to be doing within the division he was assigned.

        For all intents and purposes… SPGS Gary Cordes was the defacto DIVSZ down there in Yarnell that day… making all the decisions about when the town should evacuate, when ALL resources should evacuate, and even when it was time for Air resources to ‘drop at will’ in Division Z.

        Rance Marquez made NONE of those crucial decisions.
        Gary Cordes did.

        Reply

        • I don’t want to belabor the point, so this is the last time I will do it. Rance was ASSIGNED to do a situational analysis of Div Z for RESOURCE ORDERING for the NEXT DAY. Period. He wasn’t ASSIGNED to stay there and fight the fire there. Especially without any RESOURCES assigned to him. He was ASSIGNED to then report back to Incident Command with that Intel. Which he tried to do.

          He says, “I tied in with Musser. I didn’t find Todd. Explained to him what I — what I’d found and that there just wasn’t any good options…and about that time, things started to get really busy…”

          So he and Cougan went to Sickles Road where the fire had just turned to. “We had to…move people out…

          “We basically went to point protection after that. It was forced on us.

          Q “did you and–Musser have that discussion….

          “…he understood what I was saying, but he had about two other radios going off in his ear plus other things going on, so he just said ‘Yeah, Um, we’re off — we’re going to have uh , at a later — later time,’

          OK he also says he saw Bea Day there herself at ICP, so I guess she was there.

          So it is true, Abel says he tried to get hold of Rance. And that, for some reason, was not possible. And that happened on this fire.

          And even you honor what Musser says, in spite of what Abel says Musser says. So just because Abel says Rance went AWOL, that doesn’t mean it’s true. It’s just Abel’s perception.

          But Rance did, in fact, do what he was ASSIGNED to do. Amd then some. For a long time. He did not even remotely DISAPPEAR.

          Reply

          • Reply to Marti Reed post on
            June 18, 2014 at 6:45 pm

            >> Marti said…
            >>
            >> I don’t want to belabor the point,

            We are not ‘belaboring’ the point at all.
            Your point is well taken.

            Yes… in RETROSPECT ( and with after-the-fact testimony ) it is now possible to ‘piece together’ what Marquez was doing and why it was ‘perceived’ ( that day ) by his co-workers that he was a ‘missing person’ and/or ‘left his Division’.

            So there is no ‘belaboring’.
            Just ‘clarifying’.

            >> Marti also said…
            >> Rance was ASSIGNED to do a situational
            >> analysis of Div Z for RESOURCE
            >> ORDERING for the NEXT DAY. Period.
            >> He wasn’t ASSIGNED to stay there and
            >> fight the fire there.

            Again. Point taken. That IS what happened.

            But being ‘assigned to do a situational analysis for tomorrow’s resource ordering’ for DIVSZ… and then just ‘reporting back’… and being ACTUALLY ‘assigned’ to BE Division Z Supervisor and remain actively engaged in RUNNING that Division are two different things. Rance knew he was fulfilling assignment (1)… but others ( THAT DAY ) were wondering why he wasn’t ALSO even trying to do task (2).

            But see FIRE20+ comments as well.

            This is ( apparently ) NOT what NORMALLY happens when someone is ‘officially’ designated a ‘Division Supervisor’ for a specific area of an ACTIVE fire.

            There was no IAP for June 30, as there was for the next day… where we can then see clearly that ‘Division Z’ included ALL of the town of Yarnell.

            Marsh officially became DIVSA circa 10:30 AM on Sunday when Shumate ‘handed the fire over’ to Type 2 (short) team ICP Roy Hall… but even then… that was just a ‘title’. I don’t think ANYONE had even stopped to do that kind of standard ‘Division Map’ which shows where even Incident Command ‘thinks’ one division starts and another one stops.

            So that’s what is truly weird.

            Marquez shows up ( later ) and someone says… “You’re Division Z… and only then Marquez himself discovers that no one has even bothered to figure out what his own Divison boundaries are (yet).

            So he goes off to do that himself.
            Gets into arguments with Marsh about it.

            He continues his ‘assignment’ and then reports back to ICP… but the only impression he left down on the south side was he was supposed to be Division Z… and determine its boundaries down there… but then no one on the south side of the fire ever hears from him again the rest of the afternoon.

            The actual ‘ground forces’ that WERE trying to ‘fight the fire’ down there must have been MIGHTILY confused by all this.

            Their ‘expectation’ when someone shows up and says “I’m DIVS X” is that they will, in fact, now be available to actually ‘manage’ DIVS X.

            That didn’t happen ( because that was never really Marquez’s real assignment in the first place? ).

            All they were left with was a geographical section of the incident area that was GOING to become the dead-center target of the active flamefront in a few hours… but there was no consensus as to WHO the ‘Division Supervisor’ for that targeted area really was.

            There was some guy who showed up earlier in the day and SAID he was ‘DIVS Z’… but no one DOWN THERE had seen or heard from him again after that.

            So the THEM… he was a ‘missing person’.
            That is all I am saying.

            They all jumped in and managed their situation as best they could ( Frisby playing DIVS, Cordes playing DIVS, etc, Even Esquibel making some decisions that probably SHOULD have gone through
            a DIVS ).

            This is called ‘total confusion’.

            It was present that day, on that south side of the fire… and *MAY* have been a major contributing factor to the tragedy that took place at 1645.

            It was a seriously chaotic and mismanaged
            workplace that day… with misplaced priorities… and people died.

            ADOSH has already concluded that this WAS the case.

            Reply

            • Copy.

              Good point, the difference between looking at this via hindsight while sitting here reading interviews vs what FFs in that area were dealing with. Blue Ridge was never “assigned” to anybody, and it appears, given the timing, they sorta kinda included themselves in DivA, and then sorta kinda had to become their own DivZ working in conjunction with Gary Cordes in terms of tactics.

              My sense regarding Esquibel is that he was considering Cordes his “supervisor” as he was assigned to his Structure Group, I think.

              It really is quite messy, and I have no idea, as I’m no FF, if this is unusual or usual or what.

              Reply

        • Please recognize the Supt for Blue Ridge, Brian Frisby basically assumed the role of DIVS in the Zulu area (which was never officially engaged/named), because that’s what Supt’s do when there is a lack of leadership. Cordes, I recall him being on HWY 89 acting as LO…eventually tying into Musser & Sciacca. Brian literally saved the lives of firefighters that day. Recall in someones (sorry I can’t recall exactly who) interview a member of a strike team of engines asked if they needed to evacuate from the Shrine area and Brian yelled YES!! Cordes called for drops at will via Todd Abel because his radio stopped functioning on Air to Ground, for what reason I don’t comprehend. Never seen a King radio just randomly stop transmitting on A-G but for the user hitting a random key on the keypad. And this happened while on HWY 89 when he was with Musser and Sciacca.
          And as far as Marquez goes with his supposed assignment of only going out to the field to gather intel on resources needed, well that drives me a little crazy. When does a DIVS show up on a fire in the morning/afternoon and an OPS tells them to just go gather intel on resources needed and not engage? Really?! Marquez clearly tried to engage with Eric over and over but was beyond confused and felt he was handed bad ground so he went to ICP to tie in with OPS and still couldn’t make it work. Or look at Blue Ridge’s account of when Marquez left..he saw a column to the N and they never saw him again. And no Marquez didn’t disappear he moved to another area of the fire with Cougan and was still engaged while Brian Frisby tried to manage the no named DIVS and keep people safe.

          Reply

          • Reply to FIRE20+ on June 18, 2014
            at 8:26 pm

            >> FIRE20+ said…
            >>
            >> Cordes called for drops at will via Todd
            >> Abel because his radio stopped
            >> functioning on Air to Ground, for what
            >> reason I don’t comprehend.

            Gary Cordes explained this in his ADOSH interview.

            What REALLY happened is that the actual physical ‘transmit’ switch on his BK took a dump… and Cordes was forced to use the Motorola mounted in his truck. Problem there was that the Motorola has the right (standard) incident TAC frequencies programmed in… but it did NOT have the current incident A2G frequency. So Cordes still could not TRANSMIT over A2G and either didn’t have the time ( or didn’t know HOW? ) to plug that day’s correct A2G frequency into the Motorola… so he just limped along with it.

            From Gary Cordes’ ADOSH interview…
            ____________________________________
            I was trying to get a hold of Eric and this is about the time, right about this time, in this 1445 to 50 timeframe is when I was having a radio problem with my King radio. My transmissions weren’t getting out. I had a problem with my, uh, the switch to my mike went out and uh, so I had to switch over to a Motorola, it was a mobile unit mounted in my truck. Um, I lost, because of that, the group programming that I had I lost air to ground. I had all the other Tacs and the command channel and I just lost the air to ground frequency.
            ____________________________________

            >> FIRE20+ also said…
            >> When does a DIVS show up on a fire in
            >> the morning/afternoon and an OPS tells
            >> them to just go gather intel on resources
            >> needed and not engage? Really?!

            Exactly. The REAL mystery is not where Marquez went after showing up on the south side of the fire and ‘announcing’ that he was ‘Division Z Supervisor’.

            The REAL mystery is why he was even told to say that to them in the first place if he knew he wasn’t even TOLD to ‘hang around’ and actually BE the ‘Division Sup’ for that piece of ground.

            Having someone ‘assigned’ to just go do some INTEL so we can plug some shit into the computer for TOMORROW is actually FINE ( someone has to do that )…

            …but to call someone a ‘Division Supervisor’ for a section of the fire… and then not REQUIRE him to REMAIN there and fulfill that function is just ‘crazy land’.

            It confused the CRAP out of everyone there on the south side of the fire and *MAY* have been a major contributing factor to the tragedy that was to take place later in that ‘Divison without an active Supervisor’.

            If you KNOW the guy you send to a ‘Division’ to act as a SUP is really just going to be coming back and issuing a ‘report’… and then take off ‘freelancing’ on the fire…

            …then send someone ELSE down there as ‘active DIVSUP’ and make sure that Division really DOES have someone actually THERE and actively fulfilling that role.

            If you don’t… bad things could happen.

            Reply

            • Followup… regarding Cordes’ radio.

              They actually revisit the topic a few times in his ADOSH interview and the second time they do we hear Cordes explain why he could not REGAIN Air-To-Ground transmit capability.

              It wasn’t that he didn’t know the frequency ( or how to program a radio )… he says that the Motorola radio mounted in his truck that was now his only way to TRANSMIT ( on ANY channel ) was ‘not programmable’.

              From later on in Cordes’ ADOSH
              interview…

              Q1 = Barry Hicks
              Q2 = Dave Larsen ( Rest in Peace )
              A = Gary Cordes
              ______________________________
              A: I’m, I’m without air to ground um, the – I had two additional radios. I, normally I go in an off-district uh, vehicle that has multiple King uh, uh, mobile units and then I, I carry a portable. Because of the initial response, I was at home and they wanted immediate response, I took my duty truck which I had my King portable and then I had a um, Motorola um, which is NOT programmable uh…

              Q1: Right.

              A: …but did have the State groups in it and then I had a Motorola handheld as well, so I used the two Motorola’s um, for my communications but neither had the air to ground frequency in it.
              ______________________________

              Reply

            • I think you need to look at Marquez from the perspective of looking for convenient places to assign blame. Given conflicting accounts, he may have fully done everything he was asked to do and more, along with accurately assessing the situation (which others weren’t and didn’t) and suggesting different tactics. Or, he may have accurately assessed the situation, accurately suggested different tactics, and faced with flak from EM among other things not disengaged elegantly. But, he never made the decision to sit on hands regarding evacuation until it was way too late, he never made the decision to keep resources at tasks that were pointless and dangerous, and he was not involved in id’ing bombproof SZs that weren’t bombproof by existing standards, nor in many of the other issues that day. Also, as someone who DID accurately identify some real problems, he is in some ways a threat to others who didn’t, just by virtue of that. He hadn’t broken bread with some of these people, and he also wasn’t visible during key moments so there’s not a natural safety check of saying “Rance was there with us and did his share.”

              IMO, as regards the reasons people talk about this fire, he is a non-issue. Had people listened to his input, his input may have had positive effects that day. Had he stayed active and worked with Blue Ridge, though, there’s no reason to assume GM would have done anything differently.

              Reply

          • Is it usual or unusual to assign someone to be a DivS without assigning them any “resources”?

            Reply

    • Shhh, I’m whispering here .

      The possibly totally completely mistaken thought that has been developing all day in my mind today is that…

      The smaller Ponderosa FD truck is Sachera’s, and he was with the PFD truck that was doing structure protection (and in that photo with both of them) thru the deployment and later, and only then came down to the RHR parking lot. There are no Air2Air videos of either of these vehicles. And that would fit with the narrative that they drove down to Yarnell later.

      And the larger double-cab red pick-up that has the banner “Ponderosa Fire” was somehow borrowed or otherwise attained by Musser. I’ve been going around and around this all day.

      That larger red truck is repeatedly where Musser needs to be when he needs to be there. The smaller one isn’t.

      Ponderosa FD is just a hop skip jump west of West Flagstaff, barely beyond where I used to live.. Musser lives in Flagstaff. but I’m not sure exactly where.

      I’m currently thinking it’s possible (and I currently find myself mystified how people aquifer the vehicles they acquire) Musser somehow acquired that larger Ponderosa Fire truck and was using it that day, while Sachara was using that smaller Ponderosa truck seen with that other Prescott FD crew that was on the fire way after the deployment, and only then came down to Yarnell and then participated in the Prescott Honor Guard Team.

      Does this make sense? It’s pretty complicated.

      Reply

      • Marti.. I hear ya.

        By the way… it is absolutely confirmed that the ‘other’ red ‘Pondersa Fire’ truck with the C-81 Unit Designator on the back of it seen in that ‘smoky’ photo taken up there at the intersection of ‘Model Creek Road’ and ‘Double Bar A Ranch Road’ is, in fact, the vehicle that Pondersa Fire District Chief Mark Sachara was driving that day.

        The LICENSE PLATE ( G541FG ) matches exactly what is listed in Mark Sachara’s actual ‘Resource Order’.

        The ‘Prescott Fire Department’ white-with-red-stripe truck in same photo is also definitely ‘Cory Moser’. Same story. license plate ( G039EJ ) matches the one listed in Moser’s actual resource order.

        When the deployment took place… Willis asked Cory Moser to ‘take over the Division’ so Willis could scoot down to Yarnell… and Sachara was PART of that Division still fighting the fire there on Model Creek Road… so YES… that is additional ‘proof’ that Sachara’s RED truck should NOT be expected to be seen any of the Tom Story RHR photos.

        So that leaves the ‘other’ red truck.

        You might be exactly right.

        Musser might have come to Yarnell in his PERSONAL vehicle… never really expecting that he would be ‘Field OPS’ and out actually fighting the fire… so he may have NEEDED to borrow someone’s truck when he launched onto the fire as the second active ‘Field OPS’ and his first ‘battle’ was over there on Sickles Road.

        It would then also make sense that that ‘red truck’ now seen in the Tom Story photos is where we ( apparently ) see that group of FFs ‘huddled’ either going over the GM manifest and/or ‘looking at a map’.

        Unfortunately… Paul Musser’s ‘Travel Mode’ entry in his resource order is one of those that does NOT list the license plate number of his vehicle… but it also DOES say something a little interesting.

        It says he was driving a ‘Rental Car’ that day.

        O-16.12
        Paul Musser
        Travel Mode: AOV/POV/RENTAL

        So maybe ( just maybe ) that explains something.
        Instead of him using a ‘rental’ car to get out onto the fire ( and risk ash damage )… he BORROWED a ‘truck’ more suited to the task when he ‘launched’ out onto the fire as the second fully active ‘Field OPS’.

        I wish we had some photos of the vehicles that were actually at the 7:00 AM briefing at the Yarnell Hill Fire station. That would help identify what Musser was driving.

        Of course… all that might tell us is what the ‘Rental’ car his resource order says he was driving looked like. That still doesn’t mean he didn’t ‘borrow’ someone else’s vehicle later that day to be ‘Field OPS’ with.

        Swings of the axe.
        The tree will eventually fall.

        Reply

        • I don’t interpret AOV/POV/Rental to mean he was renting a vehicle. I interpret it as meaning he was authorized to do any of the above. So it’s really inconclusive. Unfortunately.

          Reply

  42. “It’s always irritated, people saying GM had no lookout, the ER wasn’t scouted, nobody knew what the ‘code’ EM used meant, on and on. ”

    Well, GM had no lookout. Fact. Seemingly, though they knew, as we now know clearly, that the winds were blowing the fire their way, no felt need for a lookout on their part. No felt need even to communicate their intentions to others so that other could step in as lookout.

    As far as what EM meant, well, midslope in the usage that everyone uses means one thing. Based on what we can here, EM seems to have meant either something else, or ??? You want to volunteer some unique meaning to midslope, Fire20+? Because I’ve never heard it used in anything other than its normal meaning. Not by skiers, not by chukar hunters, nor by people in this context. The language used was, fuzzy or foggy. The person on the other side of the conversation certainly should have pressed for specificity. Certainly EM should have given, without being asked, specificity, since the welfare of his crew may well have rested on it.

    You going to claim the ER WAS scouted? Give me a break,. Fire20. It wasn’t scouted, so far as any info available indicates. Fact.

    Reply

    • Taking pieces of radio traffic when your not hearing the whole conversation or the other side is not to come to the conclusion that the wording your hearing is some how a code talk turns into a poor excuse for investigating the facts.
      No one has said the ER was scouted not me not Fire20+.
      Get back to facts and we will all try to move forward.

      Reply

      • Facts would include noting that I never said EM was talking in code. Please don’t put words in my mouth. You and Fire20+ have both suggested that perhaps the person on the other side of the conversation understood what EM’s meaning was. I had asked, at that point, if EM was then talking in code or something, in a context which should make clear I don’t think he was doing so.

        Back up for a second. Code, or whatever other way that EM’s communication would be understood clearly by the person on the other side of it, would mean that people WERE informed with some specificity that GM was going to drop off of the 2-track and bushwhack to the BSR. Without a lookout, with the wind blowing the fire their way. That would be a heck of a story, but I have seen nothing to suggest that GM’s specific plans were communicated in that way.

        EM’s communication seem to us to be at best fuzzy on specifics, and seems to have been received that way on the other end, too, given seeming lack awareness of what GM was doing. This is what we know.

        If you know something more, suggesting to you that GM had relayed its specific route with clarity, please state those facts Bob, rather than trying to put words in my mouth.

        Reply

        • I refer to other statements below and leave it at that.
          No I do not nor have I ever thought that they told any body what they were doing that we have any reference to. But some may have heard a discussion on crew net as to what they were doing, but that has yet to be nailed down as fact.

          Reply

          • Other statements below would include this specific statement from me, when I asked in the theory sense if they were talking in code: “…I don’t think this code of any sort, fwiw. Whatever the reason, just a very unclear use of language when clarity would have been easily achieved… ”

            I left out an “is” in that sentence, so you can fault my typing, but I do think it quite clear that I was specifically stating I didn’t think this was, in Bob’s words, some kind of “code talk.”

            Thank you Bob for clarifying that you don’t presently think GM told anybody what they were doing. That is consistent with EM’s transmission lacking specifics, and consistent with the person on the other end likewise not understanding the words used in a way indicating GM’s specific plans and route. In terms of takeaways here, in any type of high-pressure environment, being clear and feeling free on the other end to ask for clarity is a good thing.

            Reply

            • I concur SR, clear, concise delivery of intent is the best protocol, and if the receiving party doesn’t understand–ask! But nor have I ever said that EM, to my knowledge, told anybody their plans and the receiving party understood. Fact. My point is it’s possible. Crew net, cell phones and the fact the Air Study has revealed various voices talking to GM on the radio…to me possibilities are there. I don’t have proof of who said what to who but I do know the Air Study shows us it’s possible people knew. Same with the ER. Anything is possible, and just because the SAI doesn’t acknowledge this possibility does not mean a thing to me. Remember that investigation didn’t even find the burned pink roll of flagging? The LO…agree it would have been suicide to be acting as a LO and not see the imminent fire heading their way. Scenario: Is it possible EM was acting as LO and ran from some direction to save his crew? I say yes, certain death or not. Other LO’s? You ever heard of the Prescott Mining Co?
              And midslope, check out Brendan M’s ADOSH interview, pg 33 (12/26/13). Not saying this is everything, but I believe it’s possible he was briefed on this by EM in the morning. Not what I would say is mid slope, but perception is everything and I haven’t actually been to the site to say for myself.

              Reply

              • There is no evidence that SPGS Gary Cordes ever specifically consulted with GM about this ‘move’… but there is also all the evidence in the world that Gary Cordes had NO DOUBTS about what Marsh was ‘doing’ and where he was going.

                Cordes is the ONLY one in fire command who has admitted to this in his ADOSH interviews.

                Cordes KNEW.

                He even said he was sure they had (quote) “all the time in the world to get there… and they should have (gotten there)”

                In BOTH his SAIT and ADOSH interviews… Gary Cordes said he was not ‘surprised’ in any way that they died where they did. He was ONLY ‘surprised’ that they ‘didn’t make it to the BSR’.

                Reply

        • >> SR said…
          >> EM’s communication seem to us to be at best
          >> fuzzy on specifics,

          You are being too generous.

          There is all the evidence in the world that even when asked DIRECT questions like “What’s your STATUS right now?” and “Are you WITH Granite Mountain?”…

          …Marsh did nothing but either supply MINIMAL information or actually totally DODGE the question.

          It wasn’t ‘code talk’. It was someone who either didn’t even KNOW how to ‘Communicate effectively’… or was PURPOSELY choosing NOT to do so.

          Again… just take this ONE crucial exchange captured in the background of an Air-Study video at 4:16 PM… right smack in the middle of that 30 minute (supposed) ‘blackout’ period…

          (Someone in fire command): Are you WITH Granite Mountain right now?

          (Eric Marsh): Ah… just checkin’ it out to see where we’re gonna jump out at.

          That is a TOTAL DODGE of the question.

          He does NOT answer the question he was asked.
          He was either DEAF or he didn’t WANT to answer
          that question CLEARLY.

          Whoever was asking the question ( which we also now know was in response to Bravo 33 ASKING someone on the ground to ask that specific question since Bravo 33 wasn’t sure WHERE Marsh was )
          should have come RIGHT BACK with…

          “Copy that… but please VERIFY. Are you WITH Granite Mountain right now… or are you NOT?
          If NOT… then WHERE ARE YOU?”

          THAT is the question that Bravo 33 needed an answer to at that time… but never got it.

          >> SR also wrote…
          >> and seems to have been received that
          >> way on the other end, too, given seeming lack
          >> awareness of what GM was doing. This is
          >> what we know.

          Yes… however… we ALSO know that Gary Cordes never had ANY doubts ‘where they were’ or ‘what they were doing”. He said so in his own inteviews.

          Gary Cordes was NOT ‘suprised’ ( in any way ) that they deployed where they did. That is EXACTLY where he thought they might have done it.

          The ONLY thing Gary Cordes was ‘suprised’ about is that they ‘didn’t make it to the BSR’.

          Cordes was FULLY aware of what Marsh was doing but was also FULLY convinced they had all the time in the world to ‘pull it off’… and said so in his interviews.

          So this was all about ‘Situational Awareness’ on fire command’s part and the use of certain ‘words’.

          Whenever Marsh said ‘escape route’ or ‘ranch’… Marsh seemed to have been ASSUMING that whoever he was talking to was fully ‘up to speed’ on what those ‘words’ meant.

          Marsh simply didn’t realize that NONE of that had really ever been communicated to people that he was now interacting with on the radio ( Abel, Musser, others? ).

          ONLY Gary Cordes really knew what the ‘code words’ “escape route from this morning” and “ranch” ACTUALLY meant.

          Even Blue Ridge Firsby and Brown had no friggin’ idea what those ‘code phrases’ meant. They were LATE that morning and had missed ALL the official briefings and no one gave them ‘additional’ ones.

          Even with all their dealings with SPGS1 Cordes… apparently Cordes never even bothered to explain to Frisby or Brown what he had told GM that morning about ‘escape routes’ and ‘ranchs’ and whatnot.

          That all remained only ‘privately understood’ that day between Eric Marsh and Gary Cordes.

          Reply

          • Sorry about all the ‘typos’ above. That was from a mobile Android.

            It is not ‘Firsby’… his name is ‘Brian Frisby’.

            Speaking of which ( with regards to point being made above )… even though Cordes had decided that morning that the ‘Boulder Springs Ranch’ qualified as an adequate ‘safety zone’ for resources that WOULD be working the south end of the fire that day…

            …I can find NO EVIDENCE that the those ‘forces working the south end of the fire’ WERE ever told about it ( As in… Blue Ridge, Jerry Thompson and crew, etc. ).

            It would seem that ONLY Marsh was told about it when Cordes led him out to the Sesame Area that morning.

            Blue Ridge was eventually ‘right there’ in that same Sesame are all day… ( until they moved over to Youth Camp and THAT became their own self-appointed ‘safety zone’ )… but apparently had NEVER been told by ANYONE that they were supposed to consider the Boulder Springs Ranch to be a ‘safety zone’.

            Hence the confusion.

            If Brian Frisby and Trueheart Brown had received the SAME information about this ‘Boulder Springs Ranch as a safety zone’ thing… then later in the day… when Marsh started his ‘obtuse talk’… maybe Frisby and Brown would NOT have been confused at all about what Marsh was saying.

            And if they hadn’t been… maybe an ‘intervention’ would have taken place right there and then. A missed opportunity because Frisby and Brown hadn’t been told what Marsh had been told that morning.

            Reply

            • Sorry… one more followup…

              It’s not like Gary Cordes just ‘disappeared’ after he showed Eric Marsh where the Sesame area was and (supposedly) told him about the Boulder Springs Ranch right then and there.

              We KNOW that when Blue Ridge finally showed up out there later that morning that they WERE interacting DIRECTLY with Gary Cords. They even had to physically ‘relieve’ him of the dozer duties so that he could get back to town as SPGS1.

              So even though Gary Cordes was apparently standing right there in/around the Sesame area with Blue Ridge… it looks like Cordes NEVER did the same ‘Boulder Springs Ranch’ briefing with THEM that he did with the other Type 1 Hotshot Supt ( Marsh ) earlier that morning in the exact same place.

              Cordes chose to tell the FIRST Type 1 Hotshot crew that went to work ‘out there’ about the ‘Boulder Springs Ranch as a safety zone’… but then totally neglected to tell the same thing to the SECOND Type 1 Hotshot crew showing up to work in the exact same place.

              At least… that’s what the evidence shows ( or fails to show ).

              Only a GOOD ( complete ) set of interviews with Blue Ridge could clear up the ( important ) question of WHY the Supt. of one Type 1 Hotshot team working an area was fully briefed about that ‘ranch as safety zone’… whereas the OTHER Type 1 Hotshot Supt. was NOT ( which led to a crucial mis-communication and missed opportunity for a ‘sanity check’ later that afternoon ).

              Reply

              • Good one WTKTT. This has been heavily on my mind today. ALWAYS doubted if BRIHC received the ‘bomb proof SZ’ briefing the GM received. This could lead to a direct communication breakdown. Blue Ridge didn’t receive a briefing and Brian & True scouted like normal with or without a briefing from anybody, being proactive. So BRIHC dropped Ball off to be HEQB, I am not believing Cordes stopped midstream to brief. Cordes has maintained the only reason he had anything to do with GMIHC was because he knew the roads–they were not his resource and neither were BRIHC–therefore not his resource to brief. Did OPS forget? Sure, Abel wanted to keep BR in his back pocket and Musser was busy doing something. Like they assumed the other guy was doing what they should’ve been doing. No assumptions in fire.

                Reply

                • Exactly.

                  From the moment I first read the SAIR report and started reading bullshit like “But Frisby thought they meant the road they walked in on” or “But Frisby thought they meant a ranch to the north” ( Which was totally false… the SAIT was ‘putting that thought’ in Frisby’s head to justify their own narrative. )…

                  …my WTF alarms were going off.

                  How could ONE Type 1 Hotshot crew working an area have been given some ‘instructions’ about where a ‘pre-determined safety zone’ was for that workplace… but then just 90 minutes later ANOTHER Type 1 Hotshot crew shows up to work ( basically ) the SAME AREA and then have no idea later what the other guy was talking about with regards to ‘escape route’ and ‘safety zone’?

                  What kind of frickin’ ‘ball drop’ does THAT represent all by itself?

                  You are right. Gary Cords felt like he was just ‘doing them a favor’ by showing them where the Sesame Area was ( and where this stupid BSR was ).

                  He did not feel like it was ‘his job’ to be doing any of that… he only agreed to do it because he’d been driving around there all night and knew the shortcuts out there.

                  So right from the get-go… even though Yarnell would be totally included in DIVSZ… there was no ‘Division Z’ supervisor to feel like it WAS ‘his job’ to make sure all the resources working his division had ‘the same information’ with regards to IMPORTANT stuff like ‘designated safety zones’ and ‘escape routes’ and whatnot.

                  Blue Ridge shows up later… but then Cordes ( since he wasn’t DIVS… just SPGS for town ) felt no obligation to give THEM the same briefing he gave the other Type 1 Hotshot Supt. just 2 hours earlier?

                  Again… WTF?

                  I think the Blue Ridge notes establish that at one point… while they were ‘staged’ in the Sesame Area and just twiddling their thumbs waiting for someone ( anyone? ) to ‘give them something to do’… there was actual discussion amonst themselves that ONE of their possible ‘safety zone’ possibilities was to just ‘burn off the grass’ in that clearing where they found themselves… if they had to.

                  I think that indicates pretty clearly that they were NOT told by Cordes ( or anyone ) what Marsh was told just 2 hours earlier.

                  The ‘crazy time’ here is not that all Hotshot crews aren’t responsible for determining ( for themselves ) what their own ‘escape routes’ and ‘safety zones’ should be. They ARE supposed to do that…

                  …but in this case we have some guy named Cordes telling a Hotshot 1 Sup what his ‘pre-determined escape route and safety zone’ were supposed to be ( and hence, where they would DIE later )…

                  …but then 2 hours later another Type 1 Hotshot crew is right there in the same place and he doesn’t even bother to tell them the same thing.

                  I wish he had.

                  I believe that Brian Frisby was smart enough and ‘safety minded’ enough that if he had received the SAME briefing about ‘pre-determined escape route and safety zone’ that Marsh got from Cordes…

                  …that Frisby himself would have automatically understood what Marsh later SAID he was attempting to do and Frisby would have CHALLENGED his co-worker’s decision at THAT time… given the fire behavior HE was now seeing up close and personal.

                  So this one is back on Cordes again. If he told Type 1 Hotshot leader Marsh all about the BSR… then WHY would he not then make sure the SECOND Type 1 Hotshot leader working the SAME area had the SAME information?

                  Reply

  43. **
    ** ANOTHER PHOTO SHOWING BEA DAY’S TYPE 2 PNF PEOPLE
    ** CLAWSON, HULBURD AND YOWELL WERE DEFINITELY THERE
    ** AS EARLY AS 3:18 PM

    In the ADOSH release package…

    Photos and Videos ASFD Photos Johsua Hudson

    https://www.dropbox.com/sh/20inrene9tcx74a/AABiUo5Swnmd89-Gdfg7-lupa/ADOSH%20Yarnell%20Hill%20Investigation/Photos%20and%20Video/ASFD%20Photos/Joshua%20Hudson#/

    Photo 25

    Shows same group of PNF vehicles up at ICP as seen in that video as it
    passes them… but this is EARLIER than that video.

    This photo has an internal timestamp of 6/30/2013 – 3:18 PM

    Based on Hudson’s other photographs in that folder such as photos taken at sundown the previous day… his timestamp on his ‘iPhone’ seems to have
    been accurate, even if it wasn’t connected to the network on Sunday.

    According to when the Dispatch logs actually say that Clawson, Hulburd and
    Yowell were ‘on their way’ to Yarnell… they COULD have arrived as
    early as 2:30 PM… but since the whole check-in process was screwed
    up and we still don’t have any real hard documentation on that ( not even
    from Rob Berry who says he was he one handling all the check-ins ) it’s
    not definite WHEN these 3 ‘Type 2’ Bea Day PNF hires actually arrived…

    …but this photo shows that they were at least definitely there as early
    as 3:18 PM that day. There is no one by their trucks and BOTH UTVs
    are unloaded and ‘missing’… so all three of them could have been
    out ‘bombing around’ the fire in their UTVs as early as 3:00 PM.

    Reply

    • Which “that video” are you referencing here? I know what you mean but I don’t have it. Where is it?

      Reply

      • Reply to Marti Reed on June 17, 2014 at 11:52 am

        >> Marti asked…
        >> Which “that video” are you referencing here?
        >> I know what you mean but I don’t have it. Where is it?

        ** THE SHORT STORY

        VID 20130630 151521 240

        Yarnell Hill Fire video provided by AZSF crew

        I was actually wrong. I thought the timestamp on this
        video was 3:30 PM. It was actually shot around the
        same time as the new photo found up above.

        ** THE LONG STORY

        Original post from Chapter IV ( 4 )…

        On February 8, 2014 at 4:44 am, WTKTT said:

        **
        ** THE REAL STORY OF THE HELMET-CAM VIDEO
        ** AND THE VEHICLES / OWNERS

        Jason Clawson, Aaron Hulburd and KC ‘Bucky’ Yowell.
        All Bea Day ‘Type 2’ team hires from Prescott National
        Forest. The actual ‘Type 2’ team order never ‘went through’
        that day so all these guys were basically ‘freelancing’.

        The real key to identifying these men in the Helmet-Cam video was first identifying all the VEHICLES that are clearly seen in the video.

        A lot of ‘official markings’ including license plate numbers are clearly seen in the Helmet-Cam video itself… but it was when this same group of THREE vehicles was also found in that other video parked on the side of the road at 1515 up at the ICP that identification became really simple.

        The TITLE of that video is…

        VID 20130630 151521 240
        Yarnell Hill Fire video provided by AZSF crew

        The crew that took the video is NOT the crew that takes the Helmet-Cam video. This video simply accidentally captures the vehicles of the crew that WILL take the Helmet-Cam video ( Clawson, Hulburd and Yowell ).

        At exactly +0:36 seconds into the video… it accidentally captures the entire ‘Helmet Cam Video’ crew VEHICLES ( all 3 of them ) parked there on the side of the road up by the ICP.

        They are the EXACT same vehicles that are GOING to be seen in the Helmet-Cam video shot at the St. Joseph Shrine parking lot one hour and twenty three minutes from now… trailers and all.

        Only the vehicles are there. No crew. So they all must have been INSIDE the Incident Command Post at the moment THIS video was shot OR ‘bombing around’ in their UTVs since they are not in their trailers at 1515.

        In the video… vehicles are passed by in this order…

        1) First seen is the regular-size aquamarine standard pickup ( minimal access-cab style with hard-enclosed bed ) with the white UTV trailer.

        This one appears later in the Helmet-Cam video just beyond the 2 firefighters ( Clawson – White helmet, Yowell – Black helmet ) seen when the Helmet-Cam operator ( Hulburd ) pans just east in the Shrine parking lot for a moment. The white UTV trailer ride-out is DOWN in this video and the UTV is not there so they might not have been in the ICP at this point. They might have been out ‘bombing around’ Model Creek in there UTV’s up NEAR the IC in this 1515 timeframe. Standard USFS Forestry ‘Shield’ logo is on the door. White stripes on side. Says ‘Fire’ in the stripes and Vehicle ID ( In big white letters on front ) is DV-93.

        DV stands for ‘Division Chief’.
        The 9 in 93 means ‘Prescott National Forest (PNF)’.
        The ’3′ in 93 means ‘PNF Ranger District 3′.

        That would be Jayson Clawson.

        Matches his job description AND his ‘Unit code’ ordering designation in the ‘WildCAD’ system at the Prescott Interagency Dispatch Center (AZ-PDC) Resource Status Availability page… which looks like this…

        ID, Resource, Status, Location
        DIV-93, Jason Clawson – PNF, DO OutSvc,
        District Office (Bradshaw)

        There is also a moment when Clawson walks by Hulburd in the Helmet-Cam video itself and once I had a name to search I found photos online that verify it is, in fact, him.

        2) Next ( at +0:37 in this video ) comes the first white extended cab pickup truck that will be seen in the Helmet Cam video. This one is has the ‘access cab’ configuration ( big side window but no double doors ) and ALSO has a UTV trailer attached. Same standard USFS Forestry ‘Shield’ logo on passenger door.

        The markings on the side door clearly say…

        FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
        US GOVERNMENT
        ( SHIELD LOGO – TOP: FOREST SERVICE )
        ( SHIELD LOGO – MIDDLE: U (Picture of Tree) S )
        ( SHIELD LOGO – BOTTOM: DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE )
        EQUIPMENT NUMBER: 2038

        This is KC (Casey) ‘Bucky’ Yowell’s vehicle.

        Yowell is the one most clearly seen in the Helmet-Cam video itself standing in the middle of the road with his portable radio in his hand.

        Other pictures found online with a simple Google search for the words ‘Casey’ and ‘Prescott National Forest’ match exactly.

        His ‘Unit code’ ordering designation in the ‘WildCAD’ system at the (AZ-PDC) Prescott Interagency Dispatch Center Resource Status Availability page looks like this…

        ID, Resource, Status, Location
        CAPT 2, KC ‘Bucky’ Yowell, Out of Svc,
        District Office (Chino)

        3) Next VEHICLE… ( at +0:38 in the video )

        This one is same exact white extended cab pickup configuration as (2) but this one has forest green double stripes on the side. This is also the one that has the flat-style emergency lights rack mounted on the cab roof. The other white pickup does not have this. This one also has the black-metal ‘deer chucker’ mounted on the front whereas the other white pickup has no ‘deer chucker’. Green stripes on side have the word ‘Fire’ inside them right over the rear wheel cowlings. Same standard USFS Forestry ‘Shield’ logo on passenger door. Vehicle ID ( In Forest green letters on front ) is AZ-PNF (Prescott National Forest ).

        This is Aaron Hulburd’s vehicle.

        He is clearly seen in the Helmet-Cam video in a full frontal close-up after he takes the Helmet-Cam off and goes to place it on top of the cab of this vehicle.

        Reply

          • I remember seeing that video when you first posted it but I didn’t download it. And now in the AZSF folder of the Photos and Videos Folder via the dropbox link, there’s nothing like that there.

            Reply

          • I seriously have no clue where these videos are, other than Elizabeth’s YouTube account. Did they ever get posted to John Dougherty’s collection on Dropbox????

            Reply

            • Marti… I apologize. I didn’t make it clear where that video was. I was about to post all about it but I see that you found it.

              Yes… I was talking about that video that EN uploaded to her YouTube account even before Mr. Dougherty’s Dropbox came online.

              That filename ( with space characters ) is the name SHE gave to it. Still not sure if that’s the original filename or not…

              …and NO… I am searching my brains out at the moment and I can’t find the corresponding video in the actual Online Dropbox.

              Nor does there seem to be a match for this other ‘fascinating’ video that EN uploaded to her YouTube account…

              https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jfWi4WxBS98

              The video title EN gave this one is…

              VID 20130630 152616 965 – Yarnell Hill Fire Video Provided by AZSF crew

              It shows some ‘engine’ ( still not sure who ) pulling into Hays Ranch Road and then traveling WEST and headed TOWARDS the Model Creek School ICP. They are shooting video from inside cab of truck the whole time they proceed west. Only video like this I’ve ever seen. It was shot (supposedly?) at 1526.

              This is the known images of the ‘Panebaker’ setup itself there on the north side of the road as they pass by it.

              There are TONS of vehicles in this one and we finally get to see the ‘checkpoint’ that was set up where Hays Ranch Road meets Highway 89.

              Also… in this video… there are two HELMETS sitting on the dashboard.

              One is black and the other is red with yellow tape. They BOTH look like helmets we are going to see FFs wearing later in the Tom Story photos.

              Again… apologies for not making the location of that video clear. You should not have had to go on an Easter Egg hunt.

              Reply

              • Yep, I caught that one too. And no apologies needed.

                Somehow Dougherty just doesn’t have these and Elizabeth does, and I’ve figured out how to work around this.

                Reply

        • Ok so I did the google machine and found the way to download from YouTube, something I should have done long ago. So I can put it in lightroom and keyword it.

          Especially since it not only has that crew’s trucks in it, but also the big red truck that I’m pretty sure is Paul Musser’s (although I can’t for the life of me read the insignia on the door).

          I discovered several other photos of it, while sifting through photos that I hadn’t found yet in the Dropbox collection. Including one that is really early on in the RHR parking lot, and also two of it at the mini-mart and one of it leaving the mini-mart just at the right time.

          Reply

          • Marti… again… apologies for NOT making it clear that the video with the ‘Clawson, Hulburd and Yowell’ vehicles was, in fact, that one sitting on Youtube in EN’s account.

            It appeared BEFORE the Dropbox even came online.

            And YES… there are TONS of vehicles seen in this video… including EXACTLY who is parked right up there next to the Model Creek School.

            We also see that ‘red truck’ in this video…

            At exactly +33 seconds ( and before we get to see Clawson, Hulburd and Yowell’s vehicles )… I believe that is the same exact red double-door pickup we are GOING to see later at the RHR with that group of FFs ( apparently ) consulting with Brendan McDonough and looking at a MAP spread out on the hood of it.

            It appears to say ‘Ponderosa Fire’ in GOLD letters on the driver’s side door.

            Mark Sachara is the current ‘Fire Chief’ of the ‘Ponderosa Fire Distrcit’ in Bellemont, Arizona ( Cococino County ).

            Mark Sachara was THERE in Yarnell that day… and is the one who took over Division Z from Rance Marquez after the burnover.

            Mark Sachara went on to be officially listed as ‘DIVS Z’ for Yarnell in the following day’s Incident Action Plan ( IAP ).

            In that IAP… Mark Sachara is also officially listed as having been part of Todd Abel’s “Incident Within An Incident” management team from the previous day, after the burnover.

            From just one ( of many ) lists of current Arizona Fire Departments/Districts…

            Ponderosa Fire Department
            P.O. Box 16359, Bellemont, AZ 86015
            (928) 773-8933
            Mark Sachara, Fire Chief

            ** RE: YOUTUBE DOWNLOADS

            NOTE: The ‘YouTube’ video downloader that has always worked like a champ for me is..

            http://www.clipconverter.cc/

            Reply

            • Correction for above…

              That ‘red truck’ seen just before we see the Jason Clawson, Aaron Hulburd and KC ‘Bucky’ Yowell vehicles in the video mentioned above does NOT say “Ponderosa Fire” on the door.

              It actually says “Wickenburg Fire”.

              Mark Sachara’s red truck is the one that has the vehicle Unit ID number “C-81″ on the back and is seen in that ‘smoky’ photo of the vehicles up at the intersection of ‘Model Creek Road’ and ‘Double Bar A (Hays) Ranch Road”.

              As of this writing… it is still not known WHO was driving the red pickup that says “Wickenburg Fire” on the door.

              Reply

        • Something I’m finding interesting. I haven’t seen that bunch of vehicles cross the Air2Air camera so far. And I’ve been looking for them.

          But if the filename indicates an accurate beginning timestamp (PROTIP: name your files for the BEGINNING not the ENDING of a video!!) of 1515, that could be in the 6 minute timegap of (via the Air2Air videos) the 1510 video and the 1544 video (which starts at 1516).

          Thanks for bringing this back into the mix (at least, back into MY mix)!

          Reply

          • Oh doh!! We don’t know when they left the Incident Command Center. So I will go back and look to see if I can find them exiting.

            Reply

          • Marti…

            You probably already caught the new post
            above about this… but here is the same
            information down here.

            There IS a ‘Panebaker’ video that shows
            Clawson, Hulburd and Yowell headed
            to Yarnell… and it DOES ‘shoot the gap’ between ‘battery swapouts’ on the Air-To-Air channel video camera.

            Panebaker ( Non-Air-To-Air channel ) video…
            20130630_161620_VLAT_split_1_EP

            At the very START of the video… Jason Clawson has already come over the hill in that aquamarine PNF Pickup towing a trailer and his UTV. Hulburd and Yowell are on the road behind him.

            At +9 seconds… Clawson is dead-center in the video.

            This is the same Air Study video that captures the 4:16 PM radio exchanges with Eric Marsh and Jesse Steed.

            At about +33 is when we hear that first “Granite Mountain… what’s your STATUS right now?” query from someone in fire command ( Sachara? )… and then Marsh starts his ‘obtuse talk’ and never fully answers any of the questions.

            Reply

  44. **
    ** PHOTOS OF MARTY COLE ( MARTIN C. COLE )

    Marty Cole ( Full name Martin C. Cole ) is (apparently) 53 years old.
    He retired with a full pension from Prescott Fire Department 3 years
    ago, in 2011.

    When he retired… the Chino Valley Review ( he lives in Chino Valley )
    did a story about him and it has a really good picture of him.

    It shows him full face-front to the camera along with his son, Tyler Cole,
    who at the time the article was written has just been hired as a firefighter
    by the Prescott National Forest.

    The Chino Valley Review
    Article Title: Into the heat with my dad

    ( NOTE: I can’t seem to post the URL for this article. I will see if it posts
    as a ‘reply’ below. If not… this article is easily ‘Goggled’ using info above ).

    Marty Cole appears to be ‘just another guy with a mustache’.

    I believe he is the one on the left side of that Tom Story photo which shows an FF in a yellow helmet holding his ‘palm’ open for another guy with a CAMP ball cap on.

    What is happening there is that the FF with the yellow helmet ( Marty Cole? ) has something written on the palm of his hand and the guy in the CAMO ball cap is, in turn, reading that and writing it down on the palm of his OWN hand.

    I’m talking about the very first photo that Tom Story took in the RHR parking lot.
    Photo 1677. I believe that might be Marty Cole in the ‘bright yellow’ helmet on the left side. The WHITE TACOMA is already there with its door already open.

    Reply

    • Ok… I tried like 20 times to get that Chino Valley Review article
      URL to post… but no joy. WordPress is puking on SOMETHING in the URL itself.

      So to find that article ( and that picture of Marty Cole ) just use
      ‘The Google’ and search for all the following words…

      Marty Cole Chino Valley Review

      That article with that picture of Cole should be the very first
      HIT at the top of the Google search results.

      Reply

  45. **
    ** FOLLOWUP TO THE CANADIAN UPSLOPE TESTING
    **
    ** ESTIMATED RATES OF UPSLOPE TRAVEL APPLIED TO EACH
    ** SEGMENT OF THE ‘JOURNEY’ FROM DEPLOYMENT SITE BACK
    ** UP TO THE ‘DESCENT POINT’.

    Here is that ‘followup’ mentioned above which DOES show how the ‘rates of upslope travel’ in the Canadian study apply specifically to the ACTUAL 16 different ‘segments’ of any ‘return trip’ through the drainage that might have been attempted by Granite Mountain.

    I had to make this a ‘followup’ parent comment to get the maximum WordPress display width for the TABLES included below, so they wouldn’t be ‘messed up’.

    Again… those ‘meter per minute’ upslope travel rate values in the Canadian WFF study translate to…

    Gentle slopes ( 10 to 20 percent slope )…
    55 m/min = 2.05 mph / 180.446 feet per minute

    Steeper slopes ( 20 to 40 percent slope )…
    37 m/min = 1.37 mph / 121.391 feet per minute

    VERY Steep slopes ( 40 to 60 percent slope )…
    18 m/min = 0.67 mph / 59.0551 feet per minute

    So.. just using the ‘brute force’ approach here for the ‘slope rates’ versus ‘travel rates’ quoted in the Canadian study… here is each 100 ‘segment’ of the ‘Descent Point’ to ‘Deployment’ site trip ( in the drainage area ) with the corresponding ‘could be expected’ baseline travel rate now added to the end of each line…

    TABLE columns…
    Point#, Lat, Long, Run (ft), Elevation ( Rise ), Slope percent, Slope angle (degrees)

    ** NEW Column on the end: Estimated TIME to travel each 100 foot segment.

    01) 34.221838, -112.782458, +000.000 ft, 5492 ( -00 ft ), 00, 00.00 – On two-track

    NOTE: These next four 100 foot ‘segments’ of the ‘journey’ fall in the Canadian study ‘Steep slopes’ category ( 20 – 40 percent slope )… but even though they are all in the LOWER end of that category I just used their estimated 37 m/min = 1.37 mph / 121.391 feet per minute travel rate for ALL 20-40 percent slopes.

    That comes out to 2.02 feet per second which means it would (supposedly) would have taken 45.45 seconds to travel each of these FOUR 100 foot segments…

    02) 34.221864, -112.782120, +100.834 ft, 5468 ( -24 ft ), 24, 13.49, 45.45 sec
    03) 34.221886, -112.781779, +100.027 ft, 5442 ( -26 ft ), 26, 14.57, 45.45 sec
    04) 34.221873, -112.781431, +100.521 ft, 5414 ( -28 ft ), 28, 15.64, 45.45 sec
    05) 34.221844, -112.781109, +100.185 ft, 5390 ( -24 ft ), 24, 13.49, 45.45 sec

    Total time to travel these FOUR 100′ segments = 181.81 sec ( 3 mins 1.81 sec )

    The NEXT FOUR 100 foot segments of the journey fall into the VERY STEEP category ( 40 to 60 percent slope ) in the Canadian study. That reduces the ‘expected’ travel rate to 18 m/min = 0.67 mph / 59.0551 feet per minute. That comes out to just under 1 foot per second ( 0.98 ft per sec ) which means it (supposedly) would have taken 102.04 seconds ( 1 minute 42.04 seconds ) to travel each of these FOUR 100 foot segments…

    06) 34.221717, -112.780819, +100.352 ft, 5350 ( -40 ft ), 40, 21.80, 1:42.04
    07) 34.221580, -112.780543, +100.028 ft, 5308 ( -42 ft ), 42, 22.78, 1:42.04
    08) 34.221460, -112.780235, +100.365 ft, 5260 ( -48 ft ), 48, 25.64, 1:42.04
    09) 34.221378, -112.779915, +100.942 ft, 5220 ( -40 ft ), 40, 21.80, 1:42.04

    Total time to travel these FOUR 100′ segments = 408.16 sec ( 6 mins 48.16 sec )

    The next THREE 100 foot segments fall back into ‘category 2′ of the Canadian study… but this time on the HIGHER end of the 20-40 percent slope range. Regardless… according to the study that still comes out to 2.02 feet per second which means it would (supposedly) would have taken 45.45 seconds to travel each of these next THREE 100 foot segments.

    10) 34.221267, -112.779607, +100.509 ft, 5186 ( -34 ft ), 34, 18.77, 45.45
    11) 34.221052, -112.779398, +100.822 ft, 5150 ( -36 ft ), 36, 19.79, 45.45
    12) 34.220961, -112.779092, +100.028 ft, 5120 ( -30 ft ), 30, 16.69, 45.45

    Total time to travel these THREE 100’ segments = 136.35 sec ( 2 mins 16.35 sec )

    We are now getting down into the FLATTER areas, but for the next TWO 100 foot segments was are still ‘officially’ in the LOW end of category 2 as far as the Canadian study goes… so that still comes out to 2.02 feet per second which means it would (supposedly) would have taken 45.45 seconds to travel each of these next TWO 100 foot segments.

    13) 34.220923, -112.778767, +100.470 ft, 5097 ( -23 ft ), 23, 12.95, 45.45
    14) 34.220808, -112.778464, +100.366 ft, 5072 ( -25 ft ), 25, 14.03, 45.45

    Total time to travel these TWO 100′ segments = 90.9 sec ( 1 min 30.90 sec )

    For the next THREE 100 foot ‘segments’ we are now definitely down in the FLAT areas where there was basically no appreciable SLOPE at all.

    Just BEFORE the paragraph above from the report that establishes rates of travel for SLOPES… the Canadian report also establishes an estimated travel rate for ‘rough but flat’ terrain.
    __________________________________________________________________
    On the basis of the reconstructed travel rates of firefighters involved in the Mann Gulch and South Canyon fires, Butler et al. (2000) suggested that the average sustainable travel rates for firefighters over rough but flat terrain would average about 80 m/min, with faster rates as high as 128 m/min possible given stable footing.
    __________________________________________________________________

    Since there is hardly any ‘slope’ at all in the next THREE segments… but they could definitely be considered ‘rough’ terrain because of the manzanita… I am going to just use the travel rates established above in the report for this ‘kind’ of terrain. Since we are also talking about an ’emergency’ situation here… I am also going to assume that if there were ANY sections where they men MIGHT have been able to achieve the ‘faster rates’ quoted above in the report… it would be these three ‘relatively flat’ sections before they started really hitting the ‘sloped’ sections and started ‘losing time’.

    128 m/min = 4.772 mph / 419 feet per minute / 6.99 feet per second.

    That means it could have only taken 14.30 seconds to cover each of these 100 foot segments in ‘rough but flat’ terrain and they would have only had to maintain that ‘maximum speed’ for 31.30 seconds before reaching the SLOPED area(s).

    15) 34.220699, -112.778161, +100.431 ft, 5062 ( -10 ft ), 10, 05.71, 14.30 sec
    16) 34.220595, -112.777847, +100.630 ft, 5056 ( -06 ft ), 06, 03.43, 14.30 sec
    17) 34.220469, -112.777614, +084.641 ft, 5052 ( -04 ft ), 04, 02.29, 14.30 sec

    Total time to travel these THREE 100′ segments = 42.91 sec

    ** THE TOTALS

    Here are the ‘totals’ for each of the ‘group’ of segments above that fell into varying ‘slope rates’ and varying ‘estimated rates of travel’…

    STEEP ( Low end )
    Total time to travel these 4 100 foot segments = 181.81 sec ( 3 min 01.81 sec )
    VERY STEEP ( Low end )
    Total time to travel these 4 100 foot segments = 408.16 sec ( 6 min 48.16 sec )
    STEEP ( High end )
    Total time to travel these 3 100 foot segments = 136.35 sec ( 2 min 16.35 sec )
    STEEP ( Low end )
    Total time to travel these 2 100 foot segments = 090.90 sec ( 1 min 30.90 sec )
    ROUGH BUT RELATIVELY FLAT
    Total time to travel these 3 100 foot segments = 042.91 sec ( 0 min 42.91 sec )

    Total time to travel all 16 100 foot segments = 860.13 sec ( 14 min 20.13 sec )

    ** SUMMARY

    So… one more time for good measure… HERE is the full ‘segment’ table for the ‘journey’ without all the ‘explanatory’ notes from above. It just has the ‘expected travel time’ on the end of each line, according to the Canadian ‘upslope travel’ study… and then the TOTAL TIME again at the bottom of the table…

    TABLE columns…
    Point#, Lat, Long, Run (ft), Elevation ( Rise ), Slope percent, Slope angle (degrees)

    ** NEW Column on the end: Estimated TIME to travel each 100 foot segment.

    01) 34.221838, -112.782458, +000.000 ft, 5492 ( -00 ft ), 00, 00.00, On two-track
    02) 34.221864, -112.782120, +100.834 ft, 5468 ( -24 ft ), 24, 13.49, 0:45.45
    03) 34.221886, -112.781779, +100.027 ft, 5442 ( -26 ft ), 26, 14.57, 0:45.45
    04) 34.221873, -112.781431, +100.521 ft, 5414 ( -28 ft ), 28, 15.64, 0:45.45
    05) 34.221844, -112.781109, +100.185 ft, 5390 ( -24 ft ), 24, 13.49, 0:45.45
    06) 34.221717, -112.780819, +100.352 ft, 5350 ( -40 ft ), 40, 21.80, 1:42.04
    07) 34.221580, -112.780543, +100.028 ft, 5308 ( -42 ft ), 42, 22.78, 1:42.04
    08) 34.221460, -112.780235, +100.365 ft, 5260 ( -48 ft ), 48, 25.64, 1:42.04
    09) 34.221378, -112.779915, +100.942 ft, 5220 ( -40 ft ), 40, 21.80, 1:42.04
    10) 34.221267, -112.779607, +100.509 ft, 5186 ( -34 ft ), 34, 18.77, 0:45.45
    11) 34.221052, -112.779398, +100.822 ft, 5150 ( -36 ft ), 36, 19.79, 0:45.45
    12) 34.220961, -112.779092, +100.028 ft, 5120 ( -30 ft ), 30, 16.69, 0:45.45
    13) 34.220923, -112.778767, +100.470 ft, 5097 ( -23 ft ), 23, 12.95, 0:45.45
    14) 34.220808, -112.778464, +100.366 ft, 5072 ( -25 ft ), 25, 14.03, 0:45.45
    15) 34.220699, -112.778161, +100.431 ft, 5062 ( -10 ft ), 10, 05.71, 0:14.30
    16) 34.220595, -112.777847, +100.630 ft, 5056 ( -06 ft ), 06, 03.43, 0:14.30
    17) 34.220469, -112.777614, +084.641 ft, 5052 ( -04 ft ), 04, 02.29, 0:14.30 Deploy

    Total time to travel all 16 100 foot segments = 860.13 sec ( 14 min 20.13 sec )

    The ADOSH fire progression charts ( which were simply borrowed from the
    SAIT investigators ) show the fireline reaching the crest of the ridge near
    the SAIT’s chosen ‘Descent Point’ at approximately 1650 ( 4:50 PM ).

    Even the SAIT investigators never fully said WHERE they got this exact 1650 time from for the fireline ‘cresting the ridge’… but it can be assumed that this was solely based on a study of that ‘Matt Oss’ time lapse video taken from the Congress side of the fire that day.

    Figure 19 on PDF page number 84 of the SAIR document is an enlarged section of a still from from the Matt Oss video that shows the fire ‘cresting the ridge’ near where the SAIR also chose to define the ‘Descent Point’.

    There is no TIME given for this particular stillframe from the Matt Oss video, but it can be assumed they measured the frames of the Matt-Oss ‘speeded up’ time lapse video and concluded that this image of the fire cresting the ridge represents the 1650 time frame.

    I’m not going to argue that 1650 ‘timestamp’ in the SAIR for that ‘cresting event’ as per the Matt Oss video at this time ( even though there IS evidence to suggest they didn’t get that time quite right. It could have happened slightly LATER than 1650 ).

    So… if we assume that the 1639 MAYDAY call from Steed was, in fact, the exact moment when they first even REALIZED the trouble they were in, and we assume that 1650 is, in fact, the correct minute when the fire was GOING to reach the two-track road and the crest of that ridge…

    Then that only gave them 11 minutes to reach the two-track before
    being ‘caught’ by the fireline ( assuming there was no total area ignition at
    some point before 1650 ).

    I believe it has been established pretty clearly, however, that SOME amount of time had actually passed between when they first realized they were in trouble and the time when we hear Steed’s first MAYDAY. The primary evidence there is that at least TWO chainsaws are heard ‘at work’ right there next to Captain Jesse Steed DURING his FIRST MAYDAY call, which means enough time had already passed for them to…

    1) Realize they trouble they were in
    2) Decide to deploy
    3) Find a deployment site
    4) Pass out instructions to Crew
    5) Pull ropes on chainsaws
    6) Steed selects A2G channel and makes first MAYDAY call

    If we assume that the first FIVE events in the list above must have taken at least 120 seconds ( they MAY have even taken LONGER ) and we still ALSO assume that 1650 is when the fire was GOING to reach the two-track road ( according to the SAIT’s own fire progression chart )…

    Then that gave them at least 13 minutes to reach the two-track before
    being ‘caught’ by the fireline.

    That’s only 80 seconds less than the estimated travel times above based on that Canadian WFF ‘upslope’ travel study.

    ** FINAL NOTE ABOUT THIS STUDY

    While the firefighters who were being ‘tested’ were, in fact, aware that this was an ‘escape route’ upslope/sideslope timing test ( As in… an emergency situation ), and they were being asked to try and maintain a ‘max effort’ for the testing… there was certainly no ‘life or death’ immediacy ( or the corresponding adrenaline boost and/or performance increases that could probably be expected ) included in the study itself.

    They also were most certainly NOT trying to ‘kill’ any of the WFFs participating in the testing OR cause any heart attacks.

    They did NOT attempt to measure the ‘maximum distance’ that the test participants might have been able to maintain the travel rate(s).

    From the report itself…
    _________________________________________________________________
    This study did not set out to determine the maximum distance that firefighters could sustain without resorting to a brief rest period to recover and thus a corresponding reduction in the overall rate of travel. At some point, firefighters will experience an anaerobic collapse where they are physically not able to move any further.
    __________________________________________________________________

    This really is a totally RELEVANT report… and VERY well done… and
    should be REQUIRED READING for all WFFs. It has invaluable information
    and results for CHOOSING ‘Safety zones’ and ‘Escape routes’ in the first place.

    One more interesting set of ‘quotes’ from the ‘Conclusions and Implementation’
    section at the BOTTOM of the report…
    __________________________________________________________________
    Although the concept of escape routes has been a formally recognized element of wildland firefighter safety for almost 50 years (McArdle 1957; Moore 1959), there is little quantitative data or information available on firefighter travel rates using escape routes. This report and Dakin (2002) represent the first formal quantification of firefighter travel rates not only in Alberta but also in Canada.

    Traveling with packs and tools slows the firefighters whether they are on an improved escape route or in a standing timber cover type. Dropping packs and tools to reach the safety zone was shown to improve travel rates of firefighters by an average of 20% under the conditions tested. Roughly the same relationship exists on level ground as well as on slopes.

    ITALICIZED ( EMPHASIZED ) PARAGRAPH…

    Firefighters should IMMEDIATELY drop their packs and tools once they have made the decision to use an escape route to reach a safety zone—it could mean the difference between life and death.
    __________________________________________________________________

    So even though Eric Marsh kept referring to their decision to leave the black as some kind of ‘making our way out our escape route from this morning to our pre-determined safety zone’…

    …it’s perfectly obvious that is NOT really what he ( they ) were doing.

    In fact… it was their very LACK of any sense of ’emergency’ that killed them.

    If they HAD truly decided their ‘situation’ was urgent enough to ‘take an escape route to a safety zone’… then ( as the report suggests above )… they SHOULD have been HURRYING… possibly even HAULING ASS… even if just up on the two-track for the first part of the ‘hike’.

    They were not ( in any great hurry )… but they SHOULD have been.
    They thought they had all the time in the world to get where they were going.
    This was NOT an ‘escape’ to a ‘safety zone’ at all.

    It was simply Marsh/Steed deciding to abandon their Division assignment without fully discussing that decision with people who might have said “No… don’t do that… stay where you are and be safe”… and move themselves OUT of their assigned division to a completely DIFFERENT ‘Division’… ‘where the action was’.

    Reply

    • I agree with Bob. Picking at the decisions made after confronting the flaming front serves no good purpose. Every situation like this is different, “lessons” from this one probably won’t apply the next time. People have run and lived, people have run and died. People have gotten in their shelters and lived, others have done so and died. No one here (including Bob) knows what those few minutes were really like, what they could see, etc. You can calculate until the cows come home – they did not know how much time they had. They knew it wasn’t much. I am sure they were terrified. We do not know if they had done something else that they would have lived. I suspect that they thought (hoped) there was a chance what they were doing was going to work. In these type of situations you have to make what you think is the best decision and go with it. There is usually no second chance. I think when it comes to this part of the Yarnell tragedy, it would be best to just let it go.

      Reply

      • I pretty much agree with you here.

        Once they got here — and to me the REAL question is STILL why and how they got here — their options were so limited (but maybe if they had run maybe some of them would have survived) that it is counting the angels on the head of the pin at this point.

        But I think where WTKTT is trying to go is that maybe, in their training re deployment sites and such, the wildland ff folks need to take some of what this Canadian study is saying into account.

        Reply

      • Reply to mike post on June 16, 2014 at 9:39 pm

        mike…

        The ‘numbers’ above are nothing more than the conclusions coming out of some VERY good Canadian WFF research as it applies to what is now one of the greatest losses of life in the history of Wildland Firefighting.

        They are only numbers… but very well researched numbers.

        >> mike said…
        >> In these type of situations you have to make what you
        >> think is the best decision and go with it.

        Yes. You do. ( Keyword = BEST decision ).

        GOOD / BEST decisions are based on knowledge, experience, and knowing what DID or DIDN’T work before.

        >> mike also wrote…
        >> I suspect that they thought (hoped) there was a chance
        >> what they were doing was going to work.

        No need to suspect. They MUST have… or else they would have all RUN. Whether they should have even entertained the possibility that ‘what they were doing was going to work’ is what remains part of the story.

        >> mike also wrote…
        >> I think when it comes to this part of the Yarnell tragedy,
        >> it would be best to just let it go.

        If you actually stop and read the full Canadian research document… you will see that for some opportunities to ‘learn’ something that COULD end up saving lives… there is NO ‘CUT OFF’ point on the timetable.

        Some of the detailed research included in the recent research above revisits fires that happened more than 50 years ago.

        50 years from NOW… I imagine a similar document might actually be referencing what did ( or did not ) happen in Yarnell on June 30, 2013. I actually hope so.

        When it comes to learning something ( ANYTHING ) that might end up saving a life in the future… there is no need to ‘let it go’. Quite the opposite, actually. Hang on to it tight and learn EVERYTHING it is possible to learn.

        Reply

        • The study is interesting as it put #’s on this in way that apparently was not available before. But how it will really be more than an academic curiosity, I just do not see. In each situation like this, the question is whether to run or not. And that means deciding whether you have enough time in fact to run. Too many unique factors impact that in any given situation like this to allow it to be reduced to accurate calculation. And some of those factors are not known until afterwards (most obviously, how much time do you have). The decision to run or not will always be a judgment call, made hastily with limited, imperfect information. Not much to be gained second-guessing those types of decisions.

          Reply

          • Mike you absolutely have it nailed.
            No body is calculating distances at that point there estimating time to do what ever is best. Estimated time to retreat isn’t calculated but a guess. They were so far committed in that canyon and the time it took to get there. running back up it was not feasible. We also do not know for sure if the fire had lapped over the ridge above them as some progression charts have shown.
            I wanted to reference a posting that WTKTT made on June 13 @1219 am. Crew recount of recovery of bodies USA Today video
            2min 52sec. into it is a areal view of the road an pickup site at the deployment site.
            Boulder piles on either side and above site.
            Look at the truck parked and then the size and compactness of the boulders Many are the size of the truck or bigger trying to climb up thru those to me would have been a herculean feat to accomplish any kind of safety. They were at least well trained and experienced FF if they had thought there was any place that provided a better location for safety they would have taken it.
            They were in a trap and did the only thing they had left to do, dig in and deploy.
            A slim chance of survival but I think the only one they had. The only thing that stands out is why the hell were they there in the first place? Would have , could have , should have 20/20 hind site.
            Still the only lesson here is failure to follow the rules.
            Failure of the equipment that should give you better protection (Fire Shelters).

            Reply

            • You are stating a conclusion, that they were well-trained, to justify a decision, when the same point can be made regarding the original bushwhack — they were well-trained, we should defer to their judgment — to no lookout (well, they were well-trained, maybe they knew they didn’t need a lookout) — to what happened with their lookout when they did have one earlier in the day, to even the sleeves (well, they were well-trained, so knew when they could roll their sleeves up).

              The fire shelters performed as they were expected to.

              Reply

              • And you have persisted in harping on their decisions made after entrapment as evidence of some perceived training deficiencies or incompetence or naivety about using fire shelters – when those were really just horribly difficult decisions made under the most awful of circumstances that had to be made with limited information.

                If they had run and died, someone would be criticizing that. If they had a few more minutes, maybe they could have created an adequate area – I do not know, I was not there.

                Comparing this decision to ones that involved following established firefighting principles, where they had more than enough time to consider the alternatives, is simply inane.

                Reply

                  • SR
                    My only reference was GM had enough experience to Identify areas that might have provided a better location for survival if they had passed an open area or rock/bolder area that could have provided a better location evidently they did not see or identify a place they could retreat to.
                    I was not referring to the other mistakes they made that day as we have been thru them and you know my stand on each and every one. The one thing relivent in there mind would have been any place that could have provided a better place to deploy, evidently they did not mentally identify one.
                    Refer to the picture I noted in the video and tell me where you think they could have possibly gone to in any of the bolder piles visible from the deployment site.
                    Huge boulders you can not climb over and from what I see most are 95% black. Not survivable if you could get into them. I rest my case.

                    Reply

                    • Saw the video. Didn’t see any lack of ability to access the boulders.

                      Also, as Frisby’s pickup of McDonough showed, there were ample options in that case, too, for escape, when deployment was being considered instead.

                      We are left with a deployment in an area that could be out of training materials in terms of an example of a bad place to deploy. It’s fine to have differences of opinion as to whether that was the best option for this crew. The takeaways that I hope others to get is that escape often is possible if you stay mindful of options and act early enough, and that deployment in a situation that is likely not survivable is not a good option.

                      Contrary to Mike’s assertion, those are in fact already established principles as well, and part of current training.

      • You could just as easily say that picking at the decisions after the first day of the fire fails to serve any purpose. No need to learn anything, wipe the slate clean at the end of each fire.

        As regards decisions made once the risk of entrapment became imminent (several minutes before Steed’s transmission) they are relevant to others for training purposes. They are also very relevant in assessing the origins of other decisions. Decisions seldom happen in a vacuum. GM deployed in an area of dense fuels where there sustained direct flame contact on their shelters was basically assured. Earlier in the day, at a time of relative calm, their lookout assessed deployment options in front of them that may well have also not been survivable. With time to seek other options, and with a variety of resources available to him…had Frisby NOT happened upon him, it’s not clear to me if any effort was intended to help him escape. As discussed, SZ standards also were played a little fast and loose with. There is the matter of the tennis court. From a training perspective, there’s the specific issue of whether there was overreliance on fire shelters in situations they were not intended to be used in (to the exclusion of seeking other available options), and the general issue of whether there were or are any broader organizational tendencies to not observe standards.

        Reply

        • >> SR said…
          >> As regards decisions made once the risk of
          >> entrapment became imminent (several minutes
          >> before Steed’s transmission) they are relevant to
          >> others for training purposes.

          I could not possibly AGREE more STRONGLY.

          I still wonder what the ‘training walk-thrus’ at this deployment site ( for YEARS and YEARS to come? ) are going to say on the ‘handouts’.

          “Just cut a little more manzanita and everything will be fine?”

          Reply

            • Okay… what do YOU think the ‘training walks’ are going to emphasize for YEARS to come?

              Simply ‘Don’t ever be here in a situation like this. Nothing else to say?”

              I would certainly hope that whether or not the training walks EVER even have a moment where ‘other options’ they *might* have had will be freely discussed…

              …that the obvious FAILURES at the moment of deployment itself would be ‘reviewed’ for training purposes.

              Only SOME packs were ‘thrown clear’.
              Shirt sleeves still rolled UP.
              Only SOME wearing gloves.
              FEET not facing the oncoming fire.
              Etc., etc.

              And the carte-blanche answer should NOT be “well… they didn’t have time for any of that”.

              The ‘training’ takeaway should be that WHENEVER you are moving cross-country you MIGHT get ‘surprised’ just like they did… so your sleeves should ALREADY be down and your gloves ALREADY on…

              …and as for the pack thing… even the Canadian Deployment study points out that it should not even be POSSIBLE for you to ‘forget to throw your pack’. You should train, and train and train and train doing this so that the moment of pulling your fire shelter AND the moment you ‘throw your pack’ clear of the site is simply one CONTIGUOUS motion. Muscle memory.

              What would YOU add to the ‘training takeaway’ if YOU were standing right there where they died?

              Reply

  46. **
    ** ACTUAL SLOPE VALUES FOR THE BOX CANYON

    >> On June 15, 2014 at 9:31 am, SR said…
    >>
    >> Good discussion of travel rates, with an eye to objective
    >> discussion of escape/ retreat.
    >>
    >> http://training.nwcg.gov/pre-courses/S390/Advantage%20Article.pdf

    That’s a very RELEVANT study… professionally done with REAL WFFs
    under REAL upslope and sideslope conditions / considerations.

    From the report…
    __________________________________________________________________
    They pointed out that as the slope steepens, a firefighter’s rate of travel
    decreases proportionally. They considered an average rate of travel for a
    relatively gentle slope (i.e., 10–20%) to be approximately 55 m/min, and the
    average sustainable rate for slopes of 20–40% to be approximately 37 m/min.
    For slopes greater than 40%, they suggested that travel rates would diminish
    to less than 18 m/min.
    _________________________________________________________________

    Those ‘meter per minute’ values translate to…

    Gentle slopes ( 10 to 20 percent slope )…
    55 m/min = 2.05 mph / 180.446 feet per minute

    Steeper slopes ( 20 to 40 percent slope )…
    37 m/min = 1.37 mph / 121.391 feet per minute

    VERY Steep slopes ( 40 to 60 percent slope )…
    18 m/min = 0.67 mph / 59.0551 feet per minute

    The SAIT investigators never bothered to figure out the exact ‘slope’ of this ‘Descent Point’ down to the ‘Deployment Site’… or… if they did… they never
    bothered to PUBLISH that information.

    There was only a ‘general’ description of the topography in the SAIR…
    _________________________________________________________________

    PDF page 71 of the SAIR…
    Appendix B: Fire Environment & Behavior Analysis
    ENVIRONMENT
    Topography: The Yarnell Hill Fire occurred on a plateau in west central Arizona with elevations ranging from 4,500 to 6,052 feet above sea level. The fire area is characterized by a mountainous ridge that runs north-south through the western third of the fire area with more rolling terrain to the east (Figure 1). A one-mile long spur-ridge projects WNW-ESE from the main ridge at about the mid-point of the fire. Slopes vary from flat on the east side to 50%, with isolated steeper sites in the mountains on the west side. Numerous rocks and rock outcroppings are scattered through the fire area (Figure 2).
    __________________________________________________________________

    NOTE: There actually DOES appear to have been at least one 100 foot segment of Granite Mountain’s descent where they WERE dealing with an ‘almost 50 percent slope’ ( 48 percent )… but that was only for 100 feet. See below.

    So let’s do the ‘homework’ that the SAIT didn’t bother to do with regards to the ACTUAL ‘slope’ values present in that box canyon where the deployment took place.

    NOTE: For all of the calculations below… we are using the actual data published by the SAIR for the ‘Descent Point’ ( the point where they left the two-track road ) and their own published coordinates for the CENTER of the ‘Deopoyment Site’. The latter has proved to be accurate but their actual choice for the ‘Descent Point’ has never really been totally verified. Regardless… we will use what the SAIT published as ‘fact’ for this evaluation.

    The elevation at the Descent Point was 5492 ft.
    The elevation at the Deployment site was 5052 ft.

    That’s a change in elevation of 440 feet.

    As far as the DISTANCE goes… it turns out that that the 470 yards ( 1,410 feet ) published by the SAIT as the actual ‘distance’ from their chosen ‘Descent Point’ to the center of the ‘Deployment site’ was a straight line… and measured ‘as the bird flies’ to be 470 yards.

    That does NOT match the ACTUAL ‘ground distance’ covered as represented by their own ‘yellow squiggly line’ that (supposedly) shows the exact route GM took ‘in the drainage’ coming down from the two-track to the deployment site. THAT distance turns out to be 181 feet longer and 1,591 feet of actual ‘distance traveled’.

    Just for gags, though… and before I get into the actual ‘point by point’ trace of that ‘yellow squiggle line’ published by the SAIT… let’s just see what the ‘travel rates’ in the report above say regarding the ‘straight line’ distance measurement published by the SAIT.

    According to the SAIR…

    Distance ( a straight line ) from Descent point to Deployment site is…

    0.27 miles / 470 yards / 1,410 feet.

    At 55 m/min ( slope = 10-20 ) it would have taken 07.81 mins to travel 1,410 feet.
    At 37 m/min ( slope = 20-40 ) it would have taken 11.61 mins to travel 1,410 feet.
    At 18 m/min ( slope = 40-60 ) it would have taken 23.87 mins to travel 1,410 feet.

    ** THE REAL DISTANCE ( AND THE REAL SLOPE VALUES )

    The SAIR shows a ‘yellow squiggly line’ on one of their topo maps of the box canyon that (supposedly) represents the EXACT route that GM took for the Descent.

    That ‘yellow squiggle line’ comes off the two-track almost due east, then shows them turning southeast and coming down in a defined ‘drainage’ all the way to the floor of the box canyon, where it then ‘leveled off’. It then shows the ‘deployment site’ just a few hundred feet away across basically ‘level’ ground after they finished their descent in the drainage.

    I took that ‘yellow squiggly line’ from their TOPO map and ‘overlaid’ it onto an actual satellite image of the same route. I then plotted 17 different ‘points’ along that ‘yellow squiggly line’ each almost exactly 100 feet apart from each other… all the way from where they say GM exited the two-track down to the center of the deployment site.

    For EACH of these 17 ‘parts’ of their descent journey in that drainage… the actual GPS points AND the actual ‘Run’ and ‘Rise’ values ( used to calculate standard SLOPE values ) between each point are shown in the table below.

    ** THE DESCENT JOURNEY ( WITH SLOPE VALUES )…

    From ‘Descent Point’ down to ‘Deployment Site’, starting with estimated point where they exited the two-track road AND following exactly that ‘yellow squiggly line’ published in the SAIR as the actual path GM took down to the Deployment site ( via the drainage that was there )…

    TABLE columns…
    #, Lat, Long, Run (ft), Elevation ( Rise ), Slope (percent), Slope angle (degrees)

    01) 34.221838, -112.782458, +000.000 ft, 5492 ( -00 ft ), 00, 00.00 – On two-track
    02) 34.221864, -112.782120, +100.834 ft, 5468 ( -24 ft ), 24, 13.49
    03) 34.221886, -112.781779, +100.027 ft, 5442 ( -26 ft ), 26, 14.57
    04) 34.221873, -112.781431, +100.521 ft, 5414 ( -28 ft ), 28, 15.64
    05) 34.221844, -112.781109, +100.185 ft, 5390 ( -24 ft ), 24, 13.49
    06) 34.221717, -112.780819, +100.352 ft, 5350 ( -40 ft ), 40, 21.80
    07) 34.221580, -112.780543, +100.028 ft, 5308 ( -42 ft ), 42, 22.78
    08) 34.221460, -112.780235, +100.365 ft, 5260 ( -48 ft ), 48, 25.64
    09) 34.221378, -112.779915, +100.942 ft, 5220 ( -40 ft ), 40, 21.80
    10) 34.221267, -112.779607, +100.509 ft, 5186 ( -34 ft ), 34, 18.77
    11) 34.221052, -112.779398, +100.822 ft, 5150 ( -36 ft ), 36, 19.79
    12) 34.220961, -112.779092, +100.028 ft, 5120 ( -30 ft ), 30, 16.69
    13) 34.220923, -112.778767, +100.470 ft, 5097 ( -23 ft ), 23, 12.95
    14) 34.220808, -112.778464, +100.366 ft, 5072 ( -25 ft ), 25, 14.03
    15) 34.220699, -112.778161, +100.431 ft, 5062 ( -10 ft ), 10, 05.71
    16) 34.220595, -112.777847, +100.630 ft, 5056 ( -06 ft ), 06, 03.43
    17) 34.220469, -112.777614, +084.641 ft, 5052 ( -04 ft ), 04, 02.29 – Deployment

    Totals…

    Ground distance actually traveled = 1,591.151 feet

    That’s 181 feet farther than the straight line 1,410 ‘as the bird flies’ distance reported by the SAIR from the ‘Descent Point’ down to the ‘Deployment Site’.

    Total elevation drop from two-track to center of
    deployment site = 440 feet ( 5492 feet minus 5052 feet ).

    For an overall ‘Rise divided by Run’ Slope percent value from the Descent Point all the way to the center of the Deployment Site… we get these ‘Slope’ values…

    Rise ( 440 ft ) divided by Run ( 1591 ft ) = 0.27

    Overall Slope = 27 percent.
    Overall Slope Angle = 15.45 degrees

    So as you can see from these REAL ( actual ) SLOPE values for their journey down from the two-track ( if they really did come down in that drainage as the SAIT says they did )… you can’t just apply one single ‘rate of travel’ from the Canadian study to the the entire journey.

    The SLOPE values kept CHANGING… and some parts of the ‘journey’ took place where there was basically no SLOPE at all… and for SOME 100 foot segments of the ‘journey’ the slope was in the 40 percentile. VERY steep.

    That’s all I have time for at the moment.

    I am going to come back to this and try to use the estimates from the Canadian study to put a more exact ‘possible’ (return) rate of travel on these slope values, given each 100 foot ‘part’ of the journey… just to see what that looks like.

    More later…

    Reply

    • Good stuff.

      In terms of the rates of travel used in the Canadian study for uphill travel, I’d note in terms of slippage of rate that the brush etc. that slowed GM going down would have likewise been a factor on the way up.

      It’s also relevant to note the ratio and grade for, for instance, the distance from the deployment site to possible places of intermediate refuge, such as the knolls to looker’s right, which end up being moderate grades overall, with steeper pushes once the angle kicks at the more-rocky ground.

      Reply

      • Reply to SR post on June 16, 2014 at 8:05 am

        >> SR said…
        >> In terms of the rates of travel used in the Canadian
        >> study for uphill travel, I’d note in terms of slippage of
        >> rate that the brush etc. that slowed GM going down
        >> would have likewise been a factor on the way up.

        Probably so… but we still don’t know if they actually had the saws running on the way down and there really, truly was some ‘bushwacking’ going on by the fellas up front to try and make it easier travel for the fellas behind them. If that was the case… then there *MAY* have been a much clearer path *BACK* than there was going down.

        Plus… they had already come that way.

        Just that little bit of ‘familiarity’ of the route they gained on the way down could have offset the ‘slippage’ on the time estimates for a ‘return trip’. As in… they had already see the route and knew where the ‘clearest’ parts were.

        Some people call that ‘scouting’.
        Having first-hand knowledge of what a route looks like before you have to travel it again.

        See the new post above with the promised ‘segment by segment’ travel rates… based on the Canadian study.

        Somewhere in there… they actually might have only been missing about 80 seconds… which a full-blown life-or-death adrenaline performance boost *MIGHT* have easily
        supplied.

        >> SR also wrote…
        >> It’s also relevant to note the ratio and grade for, for
        >> instance, the distance from the deployment site to
        >> possible places of intermediate refuge, such as the
        >> knolls to looker’s right, which end up being moderate
        >> grades overall, with steeper pushes once the angle
        >> kicks at the more-rocky ground.

        I don’t think there’s any question that they had the TIME to reach any number of other ‘places’ to their left, right, and yes… even FORWARD of their position. The fireline was NOT coming ‘right at them’ even at 1639. It was coming AROUND the corner of that north-side rock ridge and still just ‘swinging around’ circa 1639. Even the officially published SAIT and ADOSH fire progression charts show this to be the case.

        It was all about Situational Awareness
        ( or, actually, the total LACK of it )

        They had no maps.
        They had done no scouting.
        They had no frickin’ idea what the terrain AHEAD of
        them even really looked like… or that once past that small knoll just ahead of them to their right there was that open draw just ahead of THAT which led AWAY from the fire and towards the Candy Cane Lane area.

        Regardless of what all the ‘contributing factors’ were that led them ( Marsh / Steed ) to even make this decision to break almost every rule in the book just for the sake of some perceived ‘higher purpose’… the ACTUAL ( tactical ) way they went about it really, truly is…

        “One of the greatest ( if not THE greatest ) blunders in the history of Wildland Firefighting”.

        Reply

        • Having just recently read Byron Kimball’s interview (and I’m writing this off the top of my head so I can’t directly quote him).

          He talks about how, in stressful/fearful situations, people — including firefighters — kind of “fall back” in their thinking (and I know I do). We kind of “close the ranks” to simplify the factors we are dealing with. Which can turn around and bite us.

          He talks about how, say, a DIVS will “become” a crew supervisor, a crew supervisor will “become” a captain, a captain will “become” a squad boss, and so on. People will “revert” to a level below where they are supposed to be (and normally are capable of) operating. And how, sometimes, in doing that, they “close off” to exactly the information they need. It’s just too overwhelming.

          He talks about how he thinks that really needs to be addressed. And he was very, very serious about that. And I think he was spot on.

          I really appreciate this analysis of those slope factors. It makes a lot of sense to me. Including from my own experience from ten years of backpacking and leading groups in the Grand Canyon. Including once on a broken foot. Going both up and down. When I learned the hard way that going up was, actually, relatively faster and easier than going down. That doesn’t “make any sense”, but it is true. Gravity can actually be a problem, relatively speaking.

          And I’m sitting here comfortably in front of a computer. Not suddenly realizing there is a fire headed in my direction.

          I think you have demonstrated that, if GM had accurately analyzed their situation at the very beginning of their encounter with the fact that the fire had looped around that point and was entering that canyon, it would have been possibly relatively better for them to drop their packs and scramble back up that canyon. They might have not all made it. But they might have.

          But what they did was commit together to something that really had no chance of succeeding, all things considered. Hunkering down in the relative bottom of a bowl that had a really fast hot fire aimed right at it.

          And that’s where Byron’s reflections come in. When they saw that fire coming at them from under them, and realized their situation, they probably “shut down” their ability to analyze it all really quickly, to calculate the relative values of scrambling back up vs hunkering down, and made something of a bet, and it was a losing bet.

          It’s just pretty hard to do that “math” when you realize you’re in a chimney and there’s a fire burning right underneath you.

          Reply

          • And also, Bob Powers’ envisioning an area ignition effect needs to be taken into consideration.

            All things considered, the absolute fact of the matter is they should have never ever been there in the first place.

            I guess quite a bit more training truly should be done regarding analyzing deployment sites vs just “drop the packs and run” and such if a crew finds itself in an extremely dangerous situation, but the fact of the matter is that this was NEVER an “escape route” to a “safety zone” from the get go. And that is what really needs to be DEALT WITH.

            Reply

            • Yes. It does.

              Even some people being interviewed said they were ‘pretty sure’ they thought they heard Marsh say something about ‘making our way out our escape route to our safety zone’… and then they indicated that even upon hearing THOSE WORDS they didn’t sense any kind of ’emergency’ or the need to even ‘pay attention’.

              That’s bullshit.

              Making a MOVE ( and using words to THAT effect ) is one thing.

              ‘Making our way out our ESCAPE route to our SAFETY zone’ should ALWAYS make people ‘sit up and pay attention’.

              WHENEVER those words ( ‘Escape’, ‘Safety Zone’ ) hit the airwaves… that SHOULD automatically be considered a ‘serious situation’ and a LOT of people should drop what they are doing and pay full attention at that point.

              If it is NOT an ’emergency’…
              then for chrissakes… don’t use
              those WORDS ( ‘Escaping’, etc. ).

              Those WORDS should be ‘reserved’ for situations as described ( and tested ) in the Canadian report. Whenever you are ‘escaping’ to your ‘safety zone’… it should be considered an ’emergency’ broadcast and all kinds of support calls and monitoring should then ‘kick in’ to make sure…

              1) Everyone knows WHERE you are
              2) Everyone knows your situation
              3) You are closely MONITORED
              until you do ‘escape’ to your ‘safety zone’.

              The general reaction to hearing words on the radio like “We’re making our way out our ESCAPE route to our SAFETY zone” should NEVER be treated with indifference or responses like…

              “Copy that. Whatever. Catch ya later”.

              Reply

  47. WTKTT said “The math as to whether running/climbing directly AWAY from the fire for those 7 minutes would have been ‘maintaining’ a time/distance factor enough to achieve a survivable result ( up on the two-track? ) is complicated and is totally based on the real speed of the fire and whether there really was, circa 1650, total ‘area ignition’.” I don’t think that’s the relevant math. Sustained retreat directly upslope isn’t physically doable in that situation. However, sidehill travel with only a short push uphill is doable at a good sustained clip. And, there was time for this, and available real estate to do this.

    Reply

    • Yes. There was. Standby for a post showing the ACTUAL ‘slope’ values at play here combined with information from that ( excellent ) Canadian study regarding what ‘rates of travel’ CAN be expected in ‘upslope/sideslope’ conditions… done with REAL testing with REAL WFFs under REAL conditions.

      The SAIT never even bothered to measure the actual SLOPE factors in that area, or publish any data about that.

      Well… I took their published ‘squiggly line’ and turned it into GPS coordinates complete with actual ‘slope’ values.

      I will post those results shortly.

      Reply

      • TABLE has been posted just above with that ‘yellow squiggly line’ from the SAIR reported plotted as 17 different GPS points exactly 100 feet apart… with the ‘Rise divided by Run’ standard SLOPE percents and SLOPE angles.

        There WERE places where the SLOPE percent they had to deal with was in the 40 percentile range… but then there are other places where it wasn’t near that bad…. and some 100 foot segments were basically on ‘level ground’.

        Reply

        • The real question that no one answered was the trail they cut and how open was it for a run back up hill thru brush around rocks or over them. In a bush whack you cut just enough to move thru it not necessarily a 4 ft. wide path so some areas would slow you down from a full run or fast retreat.
          Just remember they were cutting a path not building a trail or a “fire break” as at storm king MT. they retreated up a fire line wide and well defined only one made that run safely, and he had some bad burns.
          Also based on the looks of the moon scape burned area I would say there is a better than average chance that the canyon experienced area ignition with the collapse of the smoke column, again my guess with no proof. If so there was no flaming front to out run but a fire ball engulfing the entire canyon to the saddle. Again that is why canyons and draws are not a good place to be. The (loope Fire 1966) with fire below you. It is a flash over or area ignition of gasses coming off of preheated fuels like Brush in a contained environment.

          Reply

          • I can answer a portion of this comment. I can share to you depending the location of their true descend down—there are areas you can move down in a swift movement but not move up before that fire. the maze-like effect was on the steep way up but you could maneuver in certain areas without any bushwacking at all going down depending how the crew were led down-

            Reply

            • Joy thanks
              I am not sure you can help with where they descended as that to my knowledge was never determined and would have been obliterated by all that went up and down from the saddle to the site. You may be able to help WTKTT with the possible areas where there would have been less resistance.

              Reply

              • Bob, you recall the audio caught on the Air Study? “The guys, uh Granite is makin their way down (predetermined escape route) from this mornin, it’s uh, south, mid slope, cut vertical. (We’ll) be makin our way down into the structures. (Are you on the ER) with Granite Mountain right now? Nah, I’m at the (house) where we’re gonna jump out at.”
                Barring all debatable words in this BUT the “south, mid slope, cut vertical”…what do you make of those words? “South” to me is S of the heel of the fire from their known location. “Midslope”, well that ones always bugged me. If I used that word in fighting fire I can picture what it means, but looking at GM’s movements I don’t get it. Is Eric calling the 2 track GM walked out on as mid slope? And “cut vertical”, well that has a few different possibilities that could’ve/should’ve left evidence behind. And in regard to your comment above “Just remember they were cutting a path not building a trail or a ‘fire break’ as at storm king MT.” That’s for sure, this path on Yarnell would have been rocky, steep and “vertical cut” leaving behind stobs that are pointed and not flush. Joe pokes. One person couldn’t have moved through that p-line quickly, let alone 19 people.

                Reply

                • I think the whole “cut vertical” thing was window dressing; this was also a crew with a reported culture of secrecy as to crew movements. At the moment their route was described as “cut vertical,” it wasn’t cut, so at best this then would seem to have been a forward-looking statement. Cutting a well-cleared path would have led to an even slower pace than they had, so maybe they did a little cutting here and there, but emphasis on the little.

                  “Mid-slope” is also a little fuzzy in context.

                  Making their way down into “structures” is also fuzzy.

                  Same number of words could have told people exactly where they were and were headed.

                  Reply

                  • Who’s to say that the person who asked if Eric was “on the escape route with Granite Mountain right now” didn’t know what those words meant? We still don’t know who this person is Eric is speaking to and to assume that NOBODY knew what Eric meant, well I disagree.

                    Reply

                    • Were they talking code then? Because with your 20+ years experience, you legitimately find what was said…unclear. And rightly so. Midslope normally means mid-slope, not a vertical line. Cut vertical implies, well, cut. When there is no evidence that route was scouted, much less improved, earlier in the day.

                      I don’t think this code of any sort, fwiw. Whatever the reason, just a very unclear use of language when clarity would have been easily achieved. Sort of like asking someone what they did yesterday and they respond, “a little of this and a little of that.”
                      One takeway on this point is the person on the other side of the conversation SHOULD have pressed for clarity.

              • well we did find that burnt pink tape roll on the ridge and you can take OSHA and SAIR’s reports and know general area they descended but noone knows exact location—unless the YCSO took photos of the area and it shows in that the very first pis of area but I can tell you from the saddle to the other side of boulders it was a maze-like terrain and the men dropped somewhere between in and yes there were areas before that going down was areas you did not have to bushwack and yes, going up was not the same as going down not because of the steep terrain but how that dense area was intertwined in vegetation—but nobody can make pure calculations just guesses based on facts shown to date- I am excited- not because ABC will be here tomorrow but because I have to meet with 3 people who want to go over their photos this week—and I did not have to go to them just by running today I ran into them on the highway; sweet.

                Reply

                  • Fire20+
                    I agree I have been confused by much of what you referred to. The only thing I could figure was the 2 parties knew what they were saying to each other and not being a part of the whole conversation with maybe parts missing we are left with some confusion here.

                    Reply

                    • Again SR making statements like you know the guy on the other end of EM’s transmission first didn’t know what he meant, second they SHOULD have pressed for clarity. How do you know they didn’t? The whole damn fire wasn’t recorded on anyones phone/camera! It’s hard to believe that you think you know all this or at least write like you do. Your effort at take aways have good intent but I am not sure of the wholeness of them. It’s always irritated, people saying GM had no lookout, the ER wasn’t scouted, nobody knew what the ‘code’ EM used meant, on and on. You’re beginning to sound like one of the SAI Investigators.
                      P.S. Bob you might need to referee this one.

          • Reply to Bob Powers post on
            June 16, 2014 at 8:04 am

            >> Mr. Powers said…
            >> The real question that no one answered
            >> was the trail they cut and how open
            >> was it for a run back up hill thru
            >> brush around rocks or over them.

            Yes. I don’t think it has ever been determined with any real certainty whether these fellas were ‘cutting their way’ down, or not.

            If the four chainsaws were ‘up front’ and ‘running’… then they could have been ‘clearing the way’ for the others behind them.

            >> In a bush whack you cut just enough
            >> to move thru it not necessarily a 4 ft.
            >> wide path so some areas would slow
            >> you down from a full run or fast retreat.

            Again… not a good enough investigation took place and not enough hard evidence to know about this. They might have been taking out every single impediment to a return trip while on the way down… OR… they might have been doing nothing of the sort. We still don’t know for sure.

            >> Just remember they were cutting a path
            >> not building a trail or a “fire break” as at
            >> storm king MT.

            See above. We can’t say for sure WHAT they might have been doing… or how WIDE a ‘path’ they were cutting, if they were cutting at all.

            >> Also based on the looks of the moon
            >> scape burned area I would say there is a
            >> better than average chance that the
            >> canyon experienced area ignition with
            >> the collapse of the smoke column, again
            >> my guess with no proof.

            Based on the ‘moonscaping’ and the photos… yes… I would also say that probably happened… but the BIG question would be WHEN it happened. What TIME?

            Reply

            • WTKTT, by pace you actually can infer that they weren’t cutting that much, and by extension that going back straight uphill would still be pretty obstructed. The type of brush they were moving through is pretty tangled, so removing a limb still leaves other limbs.

              Reply

              • Simple area ignition is at the point of Colum collapse. my guess 1649/1650.
                Again I have bush wacked with a crew thru thick brush cut enough for a person to walk thru when it is really thick only 1 saw can cut at a time we used brush hooks a lot for the same thing stuff the brush cut in a hole and move forward not any thing that would be a wide cut and some time just a couple of branches between bushes. Running would be greatly slowed by the open area. They were not expecting to go back up the way they came down.

                Reply

  48. Having reread some thing and have Fire20+ put me back on track I will first say what I have said before I hate trying to communicate thru typing what I think and feel.
    First let me say in no way was I insulting or attempting to ether SR or WTKTT.
    I was attempting to say my experience in wild land fire and training was much more than yours.
    My thoughts on the bolder fields were and still are different than yours, I will try again to explain further.
    From what I saw of the boulder fields on either side of the deployment site and for some distance above in the canyon, both pre and post burn. With my experience they did not look survivable, my evaluation. So I look at what GM overhead saw they walk down thru that canyon had any of them saw a location that they could have retreated to clearing or rock pile I believe they would have done so. Again that leads me to a conclusion they were where they were and dug in and deployed.
    Based on the things we have discussed over the past few months I would again ask the question. Did GM rely to heavily on deployment sites and the fire shelter? Even falling back to any other area where they were they were still faced with digging in and deploying.
    So these are my thoughts– hopefully with my understanding and experience. and not to assume that I am putting thoughts into GM overhead as to what they may or may not have thought.
    What did they believe the time estimate was to find a location, prep it and deploy? WTKTT has a couple of estimates even 7 min. is a very short time to burn over.

    Was there any place they could have retreated to in the time they felt they had that was any better? If there was they would have past it and had a mental note of it.

    I still do not believe that they thought when they deployed that any of them would die and they were sure most would survive.
    thus my statement on shelters 50/50 has nothing to do with percentage and only a death or survival- critically burned survival which none of us would wish for but happens.
    So some of you misunderstood my statement. Deploying where they were or some where else was of little difference. The out come was not good.
    I never said I would keep every body together so they could all die together.

    To try to retreat to a rock pile with little or no space to deploy would have at least meant certain death from preheated air in the time they had. Whit out a flat spot in dirt big enough for each shelter the preheated air would take you.
    Shelters must have an area to deploy and seal in oxygen put your face in the dirt where there is oxygen to breath.
    I saw nothing in the boulders to indicate that kind of area. The crew would have had to fight their way to the boulders and then climbed up and over them to find a place again I just do not believe there was time or location to deploy.
    They dug in and deployed, was it a good location, could they have found another, If they had no place to retreat to dropping packs and running was even a worse than deploy idea.
    So maybe I can say this right I believe they deployed where they were because they were out of options, trapped, and dug in and deployed. Others have done the same and survived and some have not.
    I believe they had a hope that they had done enough and would survive, they were scared as any of us would be but they stayed together and made that decision. Good or bad I am proud they stayed together and at least had a very small chance to survive. I say that believing at that point there was no other choice. that is my personal thoughts only.

    Reply

    • Bob Powers on June 15, 2014 at 1:03 pm said:

      Thank you (again) for detailing your experienced thought
      process on this. It matches all your previous descriptions
      and I can see that the more you revist it and rethink it you
      stand by even your original conclusions.

      They are VALID conclusions.
      You MAY be duplicating their own thinking process exactly.

      Every time there has been a WFF fatality… there has been a LOT
      of discussion about whether the decisions made on the part of
      those who died were the ‘correct’ ones… or if they had other
      ‘options’ that they did not consider which *MAY* have produced
      different results.

      There is nothing different going on here now… except, perhaps, for
      the fact that this is the first MAJOR fatality incident of the ‘new internet age’ and it is accompanied by TONS of photographic evidence that CAN be looked at and examined.

      I don’t think any other WFF fatality incident has had this same amount of photographic evidence available to the public.

      That availability of evidence is, of course, going to lead to varying opinions… even amongst ‘professionals’.

      >> Mr Powers wrote…
      >> What did they believe the time estimate was to find a location,
      >> prep it and deploy? WTKTT has a couple of estimates
      >> even 7 min. is a very short time to burn over.

      Yes. It is. That 7 minutes is even based on a LOT of ‘guessing’ such as WHEN they actually realized how much trouble they were in… and it also includes the ‘assumption’ that at least TWO of the keyed-mic static transmissions were a direct response to Bravo 33’s questions and *might* indicate that someone was at least still alive enough to key their mic and TRY to respond.

      We KNOW they ‘didn’t have much time’. Not much cutting was actually accomplished, many packs weren’t even thrown clear of where the men that owned them deployed, shirt sleeves were still fully ROLLED UP when they went into shelters, only some even bothered ( or had time ) to put their GLOVES on, some evidence showed that some men died WHILE they were still trying to get fully INTO their shelter… etc., etc.

      Even 7 minutes isn’t even half of the 19 minutes it (supposedly) took them to descend from the two-track to where they died… and any attempt to full-reverse full-retreat would have been uphill. The math as to whether running/climbing directly AWAY from the fire for those 7 minutes would have been ‘maintaining’ a time/distance factor enough to achieve a survivable result ( up on the two-track? ) is complicated and is totally based on the real speed of the fire and whether there really was, circa 1650, total ‘area ignition’.

      Plus… they were EXHAUSTED. Even Tex ( Sonny ) Gilligan said they all looked ‘spent/exhausted’ when they even first saw them that morning… and as an ex-miner who used to work two shifts in the mines… I think we can trust when a man like Mr. Gilligan says he saw ‘exhausted’ men. I think he knows exactly what that looks like. Add to that an entire day’s work in 100+ temperatures and their ability to even accomplish some of the physical feats that might/could be imagined at deployment time was already seriously compromised. Maybe they all simply knew that, too.

      As for the 50/50 chance… and what THEY might have been thinking… it is perfectly obvious that they KNEW the site they had chosen was way too small. They KNEW they had to ‘enlarge/improve’ it and tried to employ both cutting AND burning out around it. So I think they KNEW they weren’t looking at 50/50.

      Again… it all came down to time. If they had another 10 minutes… I am sure those 4 chainsaws could have turned that area into a good-sized parking lot… but any amount of TIME that gets added for ‘improving the site’ would just ALSO be added to the debate about why they weren’t trying to get OUT of there, instead.

      My only point when I responded below and quoted the ACTUAL online USDA Forestry Service Deployment training video was that even a photo that appears in the ‘official’ video looks pretty similar to that boulder field that was only 300 feet away from them… and it looks as if it was meeting the criteria spelled out in the ‘official’ ‘Selecting a Deployment Site’ section of the USDA video for a *possible* deployment site ( keyword = possible ).

      It was the ‘closest area where FUELS were SPARSE ( as compared to anywhere on the floor of the canyon ). As for the ‘super-heated’ gas argument… there simply wasn’t a good enough site investigation done to determine whether there was any spot above that visible scorch line on the boulder field where that *might* not have been as bad as people tend to think.

      As Tex ( Sonny ) Gilligan has said… that entire area was about the size of TWO football fields. If they could have gotten into the center of it… and buried their faces in the gaps between the rocks themselves… they *might* not have even needed their shelters draped over them for extra protection.

      More conjecture… I know… but one does have to wonder.

      It is too late now to REALLY go back and examine where ( if anywhere ) in those close boulder piles the conditions *might* have remained ‘survivable’. The only time that could have been done would have been with competent investigators and immediately after the incident.

      So the debate about whether they really made the ‘right choice’ will continue for YEARS to come. Maybe forever.

      Reply

      • WTKTT
        After thinking about what you said I wanted to re touch on something.
        The visible scorch line and gases or superheated air.
        There is a difference the scorch line is direct fire contact.
        the superheated air 600 to even 1500 deg. moves in front of the fire or flames in a canyon it is like a chimney in a fire place the flame dose not go up but the heat dose.
        A very hot fire with wind pushes that heat out in front of it covering the land scape. being on a rock pile with the heat hitting you one intake of breath and your lungs shrivel no more oxygen you die no fire ever touches you if your in a non fuel area. The shelter is to help you maintain oxygen within the shelter. Breathing air thru the crevices just wont get it in that situation. That is what I was getting at with the need for the proper use of the fire shelter. I am not trying to lecture you but explain wild land fire and what happens when you are caught in the middle of it. Dose that make sense to you?

        Reply

        • Yes. It does ( make sense ).

          At NO time have I ever been suggesting that just because they might have been able to make it somewhere where there was no ‘direct flame contact’ ( such as above the visible scorch lines ) that that would mean they were ‘safe’ or that that would automatically have been a ‘survivable’ area that afternoon.

          Yes… either *radiant* or *convective* heat or will kill you just as dead as direct flame contact… and if you can’t hold your breath long enough.. just the *superheated gases* will get you too. ( See the WFF who survived the burnover in Florida in the cab of his dozer. 3rd degree burns almost everywhere… but he survived because he WAS simply able to hold his breath long enough and not fry his lungs ).

          Unfortunately… the actual EVIDENCE that *might* have been able to prove what the *convective heat* and/or AIR TEMPERATURE(S) really were at various places other than the deployment site ( such as up in the boulder piles ) has been LOST.

          Example: There might have been lichens, molds and even insect evidence there in those Boulder Piles even just above the scorch lines to prove whether convective heat or superheated gases ever reached ‘non-survivable’ levels at those places… and for HOW LONG ( seconds? minutes? ) but that evidence would have to have been gathered as soon after the incident as possible… and certainly before the first ‘new rain’ following the incident.

          None of that was done. We’ll never know what that kind of evidence might have shown.

          For all we know… if that ash cloud also really did totally ‘collapse’ into that area like some kind of Pompeii effect as suggested by that one independent meteorologist… then even if they had made it to a place free from direct flame contact and fatal convective heat and gases… all the oxygen around them could have disappeared when the cloud collapsed and they might have suffocated just because of that event.

          Again… not enough EVIDENCE was collected to really KNOW whether any of these things were TRUE or not.

          It was a piss-poor investigation… and it’s too late now to go back and try and collect this kind of crucial physical evidence.

          Reply

          • When you look at the past investigation on fires this one just dose not meet what should be expected by the wild land fire community.
            Maybe because it was not a federal fire with the federal fire lab involvement. I had expected a full study of the fire shelter failures and why as well as accurate heat studies of the deployment site. The GPS units that were carried by the crew would also have been valuable for specific time and location. There is just a lot of open holes here that do no speak well for a thorough investigation to follow up on future safety for wild land FF. I ask the Fire Community why?

            Reply

  49. Some day my path may cross with Sonny but he is no longer to my days 24/7 since the 11th when he headed North. This 19 dying and the fire has taken him down a path where he needs to separate himself because it has affected him deeply reminding him too much of the loss of his own son. I understand where he stands. I am back in Congress and finally accepted the major news channel’s invite in person to my hometown so here I am back near Yarnell. I had told the lady I was in Northern Nevada so any ?s would have to be via phone/email for interview but God has THIS plan you see…and here I am. Since I am here minus Sonny then that means I can now kick it into action of going deeper then I did before and that begins after my medical massage with Dee Sickles tonight- much needed- on just one day in the week I did a run/walk/hike of 49 miles and I am sore so I do plan to hike the legal areas and as well walk the neighborhood pen in hand and camera and go back to the ones I helped and see if any of them may not share publicly their pics afraid of folks who can gps it and such but it is a huge start if they let me take photo of their photo then cut out their home or private spot and share the “important” spots that need to be shared- enough on there is stuff out there and noone coming forward yet—I am taking the next step and putting one foot in front of another to see where it will lead me—maybe by the anniversary God’s plan will have revealed more from the axe cutting on that wood—
    I will bring my wood splitter and maul too—time to chop, chop, chop
    and bring out some more clarity.
    I wish Sonny the best wherever God leads him. I miss the dog and him greatly. A fine man. I had people on the way home come up to me and ask me if I was the lady that was on tv for the 19/YHF and that was the first time I am with my husband in normal vehicle and still be asked that away from the unlikely pair of me and Sonny always- I said “yes”—they said THANK YOU to us both but not to hurt my feelings but to Sonny more for making sure to educate the people that kestrels, temp, weather updates, machines of this or that never compare to the true experience that he had that day and took me away from the fire in the manner he did. She said I was blessed and lucky to have such a knowledgeable person and when she and her husband saw our accounts she had goose bumps knowing when I said in His time the truth will be revealed she said she felt that “hope”…I have no clue what I am going to appear like on tv because all my belongings are with Sonny and I mean makeup to clothes to important ids/documents. I think the shirt you see on my hike with Wayne and Holly Neill, Ted Putnam and MacLean- they honored me with a shirt and I may have Lois Porowski try and add patch on with her machine and wear that. I have to go buy a hair brush and stuff still—but barely can walk so wait for the massage first-
    As the week unfolds I will crack this out—no, you won’t hear me say back on the trails with Sonny right now—I am focused to here, my health and his healing of the 19 men and his son. Yet there may be a day we travel and pioneer and hike again— Happy Father’s Day to all Dads out there. good night.

    Reply

    • Thank you, Joy.
      Good luck to Sonny…

      and YES…

      To all Fathers who have lost sons or daughters…
      and all sons and daughters who have lost Fathers…

      …a very respectful Father’s Day to you all.

      Reply

    • You are one of my heros and yes to chop chop chop and one foot in front of the other on the path of both walking our prayers and seeking the truth and taking care of our bodies and healing ourselves and yes to the dads both living and beyond (including mine) and their children who need them and love them and miss them, and their partners/spouses/parents who do, too.

      Blessings.

      Reply

      • And blessings also to Sonny, who lost his son, as did my father when I lost my brother.

        May we all walk the path of Blessings and Gratitude.

        Reply

  50. I’m scrolling way down to the bottom of the page so I can repost this to the top of the page, because, given all the time and energy some of us have paid to analyzing/describing what’s going on in the Ranch House Restaurant parking lot after the deployment, I think it’s important:

    YAY!!!!

    I just found something in an Air2Air video that might be a possible match for that State Fire truck in the Story photos with the emt pallets in back.

    And, thus may be the truck Todd Abel was driving. (Because he had to come out somehow/sometime/somewhere.)

    In the _1628_EP video, at 0:06:09,13 (i.e. 3:54ish PM) realm, a truck passes the camera that looks like that one in the parking lot, sans all the stuff they’ve put into it in the parking lot.

    It’s the nearest match I’ve found in these videos, and it seems to be the “right” time. It’s about three minutes before we see Tony Sciacca pass in front of that camera.

    I haven’t found anything anywhere else that resembles it.

    Reply

    • And I’m gonna pull this comment up out of the weeds v
      below (where I describe Byron Kimball appearing in Tom Story’s photos, Swartz’s photos, and the Reason video) because I think it’s important, also:

      Marti Reed
      on June 13, 2014 at 8:27 pm said:
      Yikes.

      Reading Byron Kimball’s ADOSH Interview. Totally changing my picture. He was in Glen Illah when the fire began to come thru it. And then went to Ranch House Parking lot.

      (I now really think he’s who I’ve written above he is).

      But his vehicle isn’t in that mix. He says he had to keep moving his vehicle because it was “on the wrong side of the road.”

      Also he says, “And…watching the guys…talk…to Brendan three or four times where was the last time you saw him…where was, you know, trying to get reference as to how they could get set up to go in….”

      This is a REALLY interesting interview.

      Reply ↓

      Marti Reed
      on June 13, 2014 at 8:38 pm said:
      And he continues (for you WTKTT who said you thought that might be Brendan and others looking at a map):

      “And – where was that on the map and ah, versus, you know, did he know where they were planning on going…

      …I do not know if he was aware of what they planned to use as their access route….

      …down from – from where they were.

      Um, at the time I didn’t realize that’s who it was…

      …or what his job was.”

      Reply

      • I believe only a PROPER interview of the Blue Ridge Hotshot crew will reveal what Brendan really *KNEW* when he was being queried about WHERE they might have deployed.

        Brendan has had every opportunity to offer more information about what went on in that RHR parking lot… but he has declined to talk about any of that.

        I believe he DID know… and told Frisby and Brown.

        Remember… when Frisby and Brown left the Shrine area… they were still sure that even they had heard something about them ‘coming down’… that the route they were taking was that same road they walked in on and the same one Frisby and Brown had used to go up and meet with them.

        Blue Ridge also says they ‘stopped’ on the way out and met with ( redacted ) in the Shrine parking lot and ‘shared with him the INTEL we had.”

        That ( redacted ) person pretty much has to be Jason Clawson and that might explain WHY Clawson, Hulburd and Yowell are seen standing there in the Shrine parking lot and apparently WAITING for something. Based on the INTEL that Blue Ridge had ‘passed on’… Clawson might have thought that GM was SUPPOSED to ALSO come marching out from that Youth Camp area at any moment… and THAT is why we see them WAITING there ( for waaaaay too long ) in the Helmet Cam video.

        Not long after Blue Ridge ‘assembled’ in the Ranch House Restaurant parking lot… we see Frisby and Brown headed out in the UTV for the ‘ground rescue mission’… but they are now FIRST headed back through Glen Ilah and trying ( apparently ) trying to find a way back to the Boulder Springs Ranch.

        I still think that indicates that when they DID ask Brendan in the RHR parking lot if he knew where they might be… Brendan DID tell them it was most likely somewhere out there near the Boulder Springs Ranch.

        During all this… Clawson, Hulburd and Yowell remained up on Shrine Road with their vehicles and their UTVS. Why? Did THEY still believe that GM was supposed to come out THAT way… and they were still waiting for them there?

        Reply

          • Followup… if Frisby and Brown really did still think that GM had been ‘coming down’ on that same road they walked in on… then the ground rescue mission would have STARTED back up on Shrine road where they knew that had ‘dozer cleared’ roads and ‘black’ to work with just beyond the fireline.

            It did NOT.

            By the time they left the parking lot… their FIRST goal was to try and find a way back to the Boulder Springs Ranch through Glen Ilah.

            I believe that is because Brendan TOLD them that is where they should probably start looking. Brendan HAD heard all the intra-crew traffic and decision making. He KNEW where they ( Marsh/Steed/crew ) were actually going ( and WHY?? ).

            Frisby and Brown got ‘beaten back’ just on Lakewood / Manzanita and never found that other road that turned into the actual driveway out to the BSR…. but then they even went as far south as the Candy Cane Lane area in their UTVs trying to find a way ‘back there’ before giving up.

            I believe it was only then that some communication with Clawson took place.

            Clawson and Hulburd and Yowell had probably already unloaded their UTVs up there on Shrine road… but they had NO IDEA where any of those roads went past the parking lot of the St. Joseph Shrine.

            They needed Frisby and Brown to come up there to Shrine Road and SHOW THEM how to get back into that area where GM had been known to be working most of the day.

            So that’s what Frisby and Brown did. No other choice at that point. Try to ‘break through’ back up north by the Youth Camp and get back up to where they had met them earlier in the day… and then take the search from there. Clawson, Hulburd and Yowell were just ‘following’ Frisby and Brown because they were CLUELESS about all that and where ANY of those roads were back there.

            Only some ACTUAL ( professional ) interviews with a Blue Ridge crew that is free to talk without losing their jobs AND some ACTUAL ( professional ) interviews with the heretofore totally ignored Jason Clawson, Aaron Hulburd and KC ‘Bucky’ Yowell will clear all this up… as WELL as reveal what Brendan McDonough actually TOLD them in that RHR parking lot…

            …unless Brendan decides to talk about it some more in the meantime.

            Reply

            • I agree with what you are laying out here. I’ve ALWAYS thought the attempt to find them via the west side of Glen Ilah indicated they believed GM was in the Boulder Springs Ranch area. And I believed their belief had something to do with them having Brendan/intracrew frequency in their midst.

              As a matter of fact, when I was first looking at Ball’s photos, I thought HE was trying to find a way over to Boulder Springs Ranch because he believed that’s where GM was headed.

              AND

              It could be the case that they weren’t really sure (and were still thinking GM had headed down the road they had gone in on) until that gathering around the map in front of that red truck. I’m guessing when they were fleeing the Youth Camp (and Brian and Trew were busy trying to get engine crews out) no-one was paying that much attention to what Brendan was listening to.

              Until the deployment came over the radio.

              I always believed someone at the Ranch House Restaurant Realm HAD to have interrogated Brendan about what he had heard of Granite Mountain’s actual route. It was very frustrating that none of that was included in any investigations or anything.

              And until FINALLY NOW, via poring over those photos, and you seeing something that I can still barely see, and then FINALLY reading Byron Kimball’s ADOSH interview (who woulda thunk of THAT), that we now know they WERE trying to find out, via Brendan, where that crew had actually headed.

              And so, YES, the Prescott Three were up there on Shrine Road, expecting Granite Mountain to appear, via Brian’s INTEL, when BOOM the deployment came over the radio.

              And maybe they did have the intracrew frequency, but maybe it wasn’t working all that well?

              I was struck, when watching the Air2Air 1716 video, there’s almost nothing but static on the Air2Air frequency. Once those planes are in that smoke and ash that frequency is plugged, when it comes to the outside world listening in. It’s as if NOTHING is communicating out of that bowl except Air 2 Ground.

              PS I think I’ve spotted that red truck on Air2Air 1544 at +8:30, I.e. 3:24:30 PM.

              And, the truck I thought was Byron Kimball’s isn’t. It goes back west on Hays Road at 3:42 PM.

              And I still haven’t “found” Musser. He should be right there somewhere in 1544. Unless maybe he was driving that big red truck?

              Reply

              • Re the hunt for Todd Abel:

                In Swartz photo at 18:44, there’s a grey truck with a sign saying “Fire.” That truck passes the Air2Air 1716 at +25:19 or 5:10 PM. Seems a little bit late, but it’s the closest thing I can find, so far. That’s 15 minutes after Willis passes it.

                Reply

              • Also in that Swartz photo there is a black double-cab Dodge Ram in between what I think is Paul Musser’s truck and what may be Darrill Willis’s truck at 6:44 PM.

                That truck passes the videocamera at 4:34 PM

                Reply

              • But I still haven’t found anything definitive for Todd Abel. Darrell says in his ADOSH interview that when he got to the parking lot Todd Abel is already there. I’m seeing a variety of trucks between 4:40ish and Darrell’s truck at 4:55, but nothing definitive. There’s a two-minute break between the end of 1643 and the beginning of 1716 (which starts at 4:45), so it’s possible Todd Abel was that far ahead of Darrell, since the deployment is announced at 4:40 in that video. But I think I’m going to hang up my hat on this one.

                Reply

              • I never said, I guess why I think the big red truck is Paul Musser’s.

                It passes the air2air camera at 3:24:30, which is reasonable. It is in the Reason video, sitting over there on the left side. You can’t see it in that spot in the Tom Story wide-angle photos, but trucks got re-arranged between the Reason video and the Story photos (including the GM Sup Truck). And it’s in Swartz’s photo stamped 18:44.

                Musser doesn’t say in his interview when he left the Ranch House Restaurant. But, all things considered, I think it’s pretty safe to assume it wasn’t before 6:44.

                Reply

                • And also that’s the truck the folks are gathered around the front of probably asking Brendan where he thought GM might be.

                  Reply

              • I’m also starting to think it might be possible that the State Fire truck with the emt panels could be Byron Kimball’s truck.

                I think I”m wrapping this, unless someone has anything either really useful or countervening to add. I need to get back to my real life.

                Reply

            • And I REALLY think the Incident Management Team truck “belongs” to the incoming Type 1 Team. Two trucks with that insignia are headed west around 4:36 PM.

              I have NO CLUE, however, who from that team was at the Ranch House Restaurant Parking Lot after the deployment. ADOSH didn’t bother to interview any of them.

              Reply

    • BTW for a reference point:

      When Musser also passes that camera (via the Air2Air video 1628_EP) is at 0:40:06 from the start of the video (which was at 3:47:58 PM) , or about 4:30 PM. (I’m totally welcome to people fixing my math if I just screwed that up).

      Reply

    • And so what I am essentially saying, regarding that State Fire truck that we see with the emt pallets and the open door in Tom Story’s photos, is that that almost probably is the truck Todd Abel was driving.

      Reply

    • So, waking up and looking at the times, after finding two other “Vehicles of Interest” last night, I have the following times when they passed in front of the Air2Air video camera:

      Cougan Carothers: 3:51 PM
      State Forest/Todd Abel? 3:54 PM
      Paul Musser: 4:28 PM
      Darrell Willis: 4:55 PM

      There is another State Fire truck with the same markings as the one I’m connecting to Todd Abel, but with a rack and a bunch of stuff in the back bed, that is 30 seconds behind “Todd Abel Truck” coming out, so I thought that might be Byron Kimball. But it goes back “in” at 4:24 PM. And, unfortunately, there’s a critical 20 minute gap in coverage in these videos from 4:28 PM until 4:45 PM. So I don’t know if it came back “out.”

      Reply

    • Reply to Marti Reed post on June 13, 2014 at 9:26 pm

      Marti… I had a LONG post assembled in response to all the
      things you worked on yesterday… but I haven’t been able to
      get it to post since yesterday.

      So I’m going to try ‘breaking it up’ into a number of shorter
      ‘replies’ in order to find out which ‘section’ is causing WordPress
      to reject that section.

      I hope this isn’t too confusing… but here they come…

      >> Marti said…
      >> In the _1628_EP video, at 0:06:09 – 13 (i.e. 3:54ish PM) realm,
      >> a truck passes the camera that looks like that one in the
      >> parking lot, sans all the stuff they’ve put into it in the parking lot.

      Panebaker Air-To-Air channel video 20130630_1628_EP
      is exactly 40 minutes and 14 seconds long. It’s ACTUAL ( down
      to the second ) END time is 1628.12.

      The CREATION TIME in the EXIF data for this video is 1547.58.
      That also matches EXACTLY the ‘simple math’ of subtracting
      40 minutes and 14 seconds from 1628.12.

      So 1547.58 plus 6 minutes and 9 seconds is 1554.07 (3:54.07 PM).

      So you are spot on. We have already verified that that Contour 2 video camera had the EXACT ‘right time’ that day so that white double-door ‘STATE FIRE’ pickup with the red stripe, red/blue light bar on top, and silver metal toolbox mounted in the bed is passing that camera on Hays Ranch Road at exactly 3:54.07 PM.

      However… that means it CANNOT be Todd Abel’s vehicle heading down to the Ranch House Restaurant. It’s too early.

      Almost an HOUR too early.

      Todd Abel was still working some structure protection on the NORTH end of the fire all the way up through 1639 ( 4:39 PM ) when Steed’s MAYDAYS hit the radio. That is where Abel was when he jumped in during those MAYDAYS and told Burfiend to ‘wake up and pay attention’ and ANSWER those guys trying to contact him.

      Todd Abel immediately stopped what he was doing up on the NORTH end of the fire after the deployment transmissions and then headed directly down towards Yarnell… but that was in the 1645 ( 4:45 PM ) timframe. Maybe even a few minutes later than that.

      NOTE: There is no doubt, however, that that is the pickup seen later in the Tom Story photos. A super-enhancement from one of the video frames even shows that the LID of the silver-metal toolbox as not closed ‘all the way’ just the way we see it later in the Tom Story photo(s). The lid is not fully ‘flatly’ closed and is about an inch or two higher on the latch end than it is on the hinge end.

      BTW: There is yet ANOTHER white pickup with red stripe and almost identical configuration just behind this one and it passes the video camera about 2 minutes later… HOWEVER… it is DIFFERENT from all the others because it has that black steel mesh thing mounted at the top of the bed behind the pickup’s rear mirror. I don’t see any white pickup with that kind of black-metal screen in the truck bed anywhere in the Tom Story photos. Only other place I’ve seen THIS pickup with the black metal screen is in some of the AZ Forestry photos in the SAIT release showing all those vehicles that were assembled in that field across from the ICP ( until they moved them all to behind the ICP as the fire closed in on the School ). It was parked in that field right next to the Crew Carriers that say ‘Wildland Fire’ on them and being used to transport the DOC Lewis Crew around that day.

      Reply

      • WTK, what is your timestamp for the Reason video? I have yet to download/install Exif tools and my software isn’t reading a timestamp for that.

        Reply

        • Oh, doh. The reason I don’t have a stamp for it is because I screen-recorded it. So anyway, my question still stands….

          Reply

          • Marti… I ‘screen recorded’ it as well… so since day one I have been wondering what the EXACT timestamp is for that myself.

            We keep getting closer and closer to an EXACT time… but we are not there yet.

            It was obviously BEFORE the Blue Ridge Hotshots were told to get away from the press and re-assemble there at the BACK of the parking lot.

            It was also obviously AFTER that photo of Frisby and Brown taken by McCord right after they arrived at the RHR with Frisby and Brown looking very concerned… because ( Marty Cole’s? ) WHITE TACOMA isn’t there yet.

            I believe the Russ Reason video was shot just moments after that WHITE TACOMA pulled into the parking lot.

            Reply

        • I just had a head turnaround looking at that video. I just realized that the blue truck we see in Tim Story’s photos must be Rance’s and the red truck with the white camper we see in Joy’s and Papich’s photos must be Cougan’s because Cougan works for Central Yavapai Fire Dept and Rance doesn’t. I’ve been mis-identifying those trucks (and maybe those guys) all along. And the cognitive dissonance just caught up with me.

          The two and their trucks are seen in the USB YARNELL HILL 020 video in the Forest Service photos and Videos folder.
          So I’m still not sure we are ID-ing these two correctly.

          And what started this was looking at the Reason video. The red Central Yavapai truck w/the white camper is parked in front of the State Fire truck and in front of the Ranch House Restaurant. I don’t see the blue truck anywhere in that video.

          Also that big red truck on the north side of the parking lot with flashing lights is the same one as the one the possible “mapping with Brendan” group is gathered in front of. It has disappeared by the time Story takes his series of wide-angle shots. And it’s also seen in two of Swartz’s 6:38-ish PM photos. It has a white-ish cowboy hat sitting on the dashboard.

          Reply

    • **
      ** THE PICKUP SEEN AT +40:06 IN AIR-TO-AIR VIDEO

      Also spot-on regarding the OTHER singe-door access-cab style white pickup with the big square ‘Incident Management Team’ logo under the access cab window. That is ALSO the other ‘white pickup’ that we are then GOING to see in the Tom Story photos.

      It is definitely passing the camera on Hays Ranch Road as you said, going EAST at +40:06 into the video which means it is headed for Yarnell at exactly 1628.04 ( 4:28.04 PM ) ( 1628.12 end time minus 8 seconds ).

      There is also just a brief moment when the driver of that second white pickup sticks his head sort of out the window. It’s only for a few frames, but the driver of THAT truck definitely has a bright YELLOW helmet on.

      So as far as that being Paul Musser’s vehicle… I think we have the OPPOSITE issue as the other vehicle possibly being Todd Abel’s. This one is passing the camera TOO LATE to be Paul Musser and again… almost a full too late just as the other one is almost a full hour too SOON to be Todd Abel.

      We KNOW that Paul Musser was done with structure protection work on Sickles Road and had already headed down to Yarnell in the 1530 timeframe. Musser makes his 1542 ( 3:42 PM ) ‘availability’ radio call out to DIVSA Eric Marsh just before he met with Cordes down near Shrine Road in Yarnell ( or perhaps even right then when he was first standing there with Cordes ). When Musser made it to the Yarnell area circa 1542… there is no evidence he ever went BACK to the north again up to the time of deployment ( and beyond ).

      It is ALL GOOD, though, that you have spotted these 2 white ‘STATE FIRE’ pickups in this Panebaker video.

      These ARE the same pickups that are seen later in the Tom Story photos and they belonged to SOMEONE. We are just that much closer to finding out WHO.

      Reply

      • So I have looked at every vehicle traveling east on Hays during the first 15 minutes of 1544_EP which starts at 3:27 PM.

        Unless he’s driving stealth in a black Volkswagon or a UTV or one of two school buses or a grey pickup truck that you see various clones of in some places, or the almost not-labeled Arizona State Forestry (not Arizona Fire) truck that I think might be Byron’s (even tho I have problems even with that), or a red fire truck, or a horse-trailer or some just basic car, I can’t see anything that looks like it could be Paul Musser.

        Reply

        • And I just finished watching 1643_EP (which starts at 4:31 PM) and 1716_EP (which starts at 4:45 PM) and, other than the white Tacoma, I haven’t seen anything we see in the parking lot (other than Darell Willis’s truck) or anything I would connect even remotely to Todd Abel.

          Something is just not connecting here regarding either Paul Musser’s or Todd Abel’s heading out of the northern area down to Yarnell visual narrative scenario.

          Reply

          • Copy that. Sickles road is even WEST of where the Panebaker cameras were set up on Hays Ranch Road… so that eliminates the possibility that Musser could have been down on Sickles Ranch road earlier and then his move down to Yarnell would have been ‘missed’ by the cameras.

            Unless he hit one of the 2-3 minute ‘battery swapout’ moments for the Air-To-Air video captures… even if Musser was on Sickles road he HAD to still pass by the Panebaker setup whenever he headed to Yarnell.

            There was only ONE way out of that area and down to Yarnell from the ICP, Model Creek Road, or Sickles Road area… and that was EAST on Hays Ranch Road and past that Panebaker setup.

            Even Marty Cole went to the ICP… as late as he was that day. He heard the deployment transmissions from up on the NORTH end and only then ‘went directly down to the Ranch House Restaurant’.

            From Marty Cole’s SAIT interview…
            ____________________________________
            1600 I arrived at ICP at the school and check in. They were dropping helos at the back door of the school. There was no one to clone the radios. There was a large volume of fire coming off of the hill. Between ICP and Yarnell a little bit of raindrops were hitting the windshield. I came across a State of Arizona guy and thought that he might be able to clone my radio. He had ghostly look on his face. I could hear screaming in the radio and the pilot telling him to calm down. Shortly, I heard Eric say they were going to deploy and that he would call when they were in their shelters. I know Eric, he is very excitable but he was calm. About 16:40 Granite 7 called. I didn’t know who it was. Heard TA try to get intel. I left there and went to the restaurant.
            ____________________________________

            So I am back to thinking that the WHITE TACOMA is Marty’s Coles. His interview also says that he was waiting AT HOME for his official ‘order’ to show up ( email? ) before he ever left Prescott… so if he left directly from his home and came to Yarnell that would explain him using his ‘personal vehicle’ that day ( the WHITE TACOMA? ).

            There is also that Blue Ridge Hotshot McCord still photo that he took just moments after they all pulled into the RHR parking lot, and had JUST finished hearing the MAYDAY calls. It’s the one with Frisby and Brown looking very concerned and Brown with his ear glued to the radio.

            That WHITE TACOMA is NOT THERE yet.

            So that might also match Marty Cole saying he was still up NORTH ( at ICP? ) when he heard the MAYDAYS and only then headed directly down to the RHR.

            Again… that means that unless it happened during one of the 2-3 minute battery swapouts on the Panebaker A2A cameras… we SHOULD be seeing that WHITE TACOMA headed EAST on Hays Ranch Road just shortly after 1640 ( 4:40 PM ).

            More later.

            Reply

            • LOL!!!

              I just posted how it could be possible that white Fire Tacoma could be Marty Coles and then I found this!

              So we’re making great progress, and/but our two biggest subjects, Paul Musser and Todd Abel, are still missing in action (along with their vehicles) as far as showing up on their way to Yarnell.

              Reply

              • Yikes. The smell of smoke is coming into my house.

                I hope that doesn’t mean the Bosque is on fire.

                Reply

      • OK starting on 1643_EP, and guess what the FIRST vehicle to pass by is:

        The mysterious and elusive white Toyota Tacoma “van” sitting in the middle of all the action in the parking lot!!

        It’s at +1:23;20, which means 4:31:20 PM. Tantalizingly close, but still too early to be Todd Abel?

        Reply

          • Totally typo-ing here. Sorry. 1543_EP starts at 4:30. My brain is circling a mile a minute wondering if it’s still possible this could be Todd Abel.

            Reply

        • Just saw an Incident Management Team truck going IN pulling a big trailer. At + 5:45.

          So I’m wondering, is it possible that Incident Management Team truck we’re seeing in Story’s photos is connected to someone from the Type 1 team that’s preparing to take over the fire?

          Reply

        • So now I’m reading Marty Cole’s SAIT interview notes. (I can’t find him interviewed by ADOSH).

          He arrived at ICP at 4:00 PM. Next thing he says is “Between ICP and Yarnell a little bit of raindrops were hitting the windshield.”

          Then “I could hear screaming in the radio.”

          Then “I left there and went to the restaurant. I saw Blue Ridge and found out Granite Mountain had deployed. Blue Ridge had Brendan. I put his gear in my truck and said I would take care of him.”

          And it goes on. Point being, given the timing, and the interview (however sketchy it is), that white Toyota Tacoma in the middle of the action, that says “Fire,” could possibly be Marty Cole’s.

          Reply

          • Regarding Marty Coles context/SA.

            “I retired two years ago. I have 24 years in wild land fire. Eric Marsh and I started the Granite Mountain Hotshots.”

            Reply

          • This interview is pretty sketchy and needs fleshing out. I can’t believe ADOSH didn’t interview him, seeings to how he was the other Safety Officer who showed up via those back channels.

            But the importance, for us, being, his timing, via his interview, could connect him to that white,Toyota, and his relationship to what was going on regarding Brendan,

            Reply

            • Marti… a lot of posting regarding the WHITE TACOMA were ‘crossing the wires’ up above… but the bottom line is YES… I believe that WHITE TACOMA must belong to Marty Cole.

              He says in his interview that as SOON as he heard the MAYDAY calls he headed down to Yarnell from the ICP… but that’s creates a bit of weird timing with regards to when we actually see that WHITE TACOMA passing the Panebaker videos.

              According to that time when it is seen passing the camera… the MAYDAY calls hadn’t actually happened yet.

              I still think that is Marty Cole.
              Perhaps his recollection is fuzzy and he really was on his way to Yarnell ( as seen in the video ) just BEFORE the MAYDAY calls went out.

              That ‘open door’ on that WHITE TACOMA in the big middle of everything has always been curious to me. It was even seen ‘already open’ in the Russ Reason interview… which must have been moments after it arrived.

              It looks like the engine is still running and the lights are on… but someone still got out of the thing ( and is SOMEWHERE there in those groups of FFs ) that they forgot to even close the door on vehicle that still had its engine running.

              That means someone was in a HURRY the minute they hit that parking lot.

              Marty Cole did NOT find out that Brendan was with Blue Ridge until he actually arrived at the RHR parking lot… but the evidence indicates that once he did… then he was sticking with Brendan and ‘taking care of him’.

              Cole says he even ‘put Brendan’s gear in my vehicle’.

              Cole later says he ‘off-loaded’ Brendan to take care of other things… but he has never said WHERE he off-loaded him.

              We know that Brendan ended up at the ICP up north at some point. One of those Prescott FFs in that “How we removed the bodies” video said he was just sitting at the ICP and suddenly looked up… and there was Brendan standing over him.

              So yea… looking VERY much like that WHITE TACOMA belongs to Marty Cole.

              Swings of the axe…

              Reply

        • Reply to Marti Reed post on
          June 15, 2014 at 6:33 pm said:

          >> Marti said…
          >> Do we for sure know exactly when
          >> Musser made that call?

          ** SHORT STORY

          Yes. 1542.12 ( 3:42.12 PM )

          ** LONG STORY

          Musser’s callout to DIVSA Marsh comes at +0:06 seconds into this Panebaker video…

          20130630_154232_fire_behavior_EP

          Here is the EXIF metadata for that video…

          NOTE: We already KNOW we need to subtract 2 hours from any internal timestamp to get the correct time for this camera…

          File Name: 20130630_154232_fire_behavior_EP
          Creation Date: 2013:06:30 17:42:06
          Duration: 0:00:24.79
          Camera: NIKON COOLPIX P520
          GPS Time Stamp: 22:42:01.29 UTC
          GPS Time Stamp 2: ( AZ 15:42:01.29 PM )
          GPS Date Stamp: 2013:06:30
          GPS Position: 34 deg 16′ 19.82″, 112 deg 43′ 51.83″

          We also know that based on the ‘simple math’ of ‘Creation Time’ versus ‘Duration’… only 2 seconds were ADDED to that math result to come up with the filename END TIME timestamp of 154232…

          Seconds added, Creation Time, Duration, End Time, Subtraction, Filename
          +02, 17:42:06, 0:00:24.79, 1742.30, -2, 20130630_154232_fire_behavior_EP

          From the video…
          __________________________________________
          +0:06 ( 1542.12 – 3:42.12 PM )
          (Paul Musser): Division Alpha, Operations Musser.
          __________________________________________

          In his ADOSH interview… Musser said he was ‘almost certain’ that was the ONLY time he talked with Eric Marsh that day on the radio, so this pretty much MUST have been his ‘availability check’ radio call. The call was NOT answered right away by Marsh ( nor was it answered before the 24 second Panebaker video actually ENDS ) because we also know that at that exact moment he was ‘finishing’ some other radio conversations with Blue Ridge about moving the vehicles. Brendan had JUST been picked up by Frisby at that point.

          The moment just BEFORE Musser makes his radio call… we are hearing Eric Marsh finish his ‘report on the fire’ to someone where he has just informed whoever he was talking to that the fire had blown through the retardant line and was headed for Yarnell, which Eric Panebaker then jokes about with his quote “Where do we record THAT in the notes?”.

          Reply

          • Thanks!

            And I’ve been circling that panebaker callout and thinking Eric would most likely have been reporting that to Todd Abel.

            Reply

            • Most likely, yes.

              We KNOW Marsh wasn’t making that ‘fire report’ to Musser since Musser is the one who was just waiting for Marsh to finish talking and then Musser came on with his attempt to talk to Marsh.

              Also… even though we now have evidence that Jason Clawson was fully engaged at this point and considered by other ‘later arriving’ Bea Day Type 2 team members to be THEIR ‘Operations Section Chief’… I think the ‘Bea Day’ gang was also, at that point, the ‘CELLPHONE gang’.

              I think Jason Clawson was staying off the other team’s TAC frequencies and basically ‘doing his own thing’ via cellphone contact with his own DIVS ( Hulburd, Yowell, Phibin, etc. ).

              That’s why we don’t really ever HEAR Jason Clawson in any of these radio captures… yet we have more than a half-dozen documented cases of people saying they were ‘tieing in with Jason’ or otherwise ‘communicating’ with him as we lead up to the deployment timeframe.

              Reply

      • I’m really, really increasingly mystified about this “Incident Command Team” truck.

        That’s because I saw (via the Air2Air videos) several trucks approaching the Incident Command Center that had that same logo and, given the timing, seem to be connected to the Incident Command Type 1 team that is setting itself up to take over the fire.

        So I was wondering rtoday, is there possibly someone connected to that Type 1 Incident Command Team, organizing itself to take over the fire by Monday night, that might have been both video-recorded by Panebaker on the way down into Yarnell and then photographed by Tom Story in that whole sequence of images we are looking at.

        So I went to look at the Type 1 Incident Command Team Roster that is setting itself up to take over that fire by Monday evening, and I can’t find anybody that is connected to being close to this scenario at this time.

        Sorry. Reality is continuing it allude us.

        Reply

    • **
      ** BYRON KIMBALL’S PHOTOS

      In the online folder with Bryan Kimball’s photos… there is this
      one particular photo he took circa 5:05 PM…

      Filename: Column as Fire Moves into Yarnell 06_30 ( JPEG )

      This photo was taken by Byron Kimball at 5:05.26 PM and ( if his timestamp can be trusted ) he was still NOT at the Ranch House Restaurant just 2 minutes before Tom Story would start shooting his photos there.

      EXIF METADATA…

      Camera: Canon PowerShot SD600
      Camera 2: Also known as: Canon IXY Digital 70 (Japan);
      Camera 3: and Canon Digital IXUS 60 (Europe)
      Lens: 5.8 – 17.4 mm
      Shot at 5.8 mm (shot wide open)
      Exposure: Auto exposure, 1/50 sec, f/2.8, ISO 233
      Flash: Auto, Did not fire, Red-eye reduction
      Focus: Single, Auto AF point selection, with a depth of field of from 65.53 m to infinity.
      Date: June 30, 2013 – 5:05:26 PM
      File: 2,112 X 2,816 JPEG (5.9 megapixels)
      Color Encoding: Color space tagged as sRGB, without an embedded color profile.

      LOCATION…

      There is no GPS data embedded in the photo… but I can
      you exactly where he was standing when he took the picture.

      It was on the NORTH end of Yarnell itself, 1,372 feet south of the
      U-Store-It facility but still 2,350 feet north of where Shrine road
      meets Highway 89.

      Approximate address where he took photo would be
      127 White Spar Highway ( Highway 89 ), Yarnell, AZ.

      He is standing on the EAST side of the road so it looks like as
      he was heading SOUTH on Highway 89, he took a LEFT across
      the oncoming traffic and pulled his vehicle into a dirt road and
      parked his vehicle exactly here…

      34.227646, -112.741970

      He then appears to have gotten out of the vehicle and walked about 20 feet south on the shoulder of highway 89 and took the photo from exactly here…

      34.227568, -112.742083

      The center of that ‘blue’ house with the ‘brown’ roof seen on the right side of this photo is here…

      34.227568, -112.742600

      He was NOT DRIVING his vehicle at this point in time.

      It looks like he was definitely STOPPED at this location and was OUT of his vehicle and standing on the EAST shoulder of Highway 89, facing south.

      So Byron may have been HEADED to the Ranch House Restaurant… but at 5:05.26 PM he was still ‘stationary’ and not moving in that direction as yet. This makes it even less likely he could have then been ‘in place’ in the Ranch House Restaurant parking lot just 180 seconds later ( 3 minutes ) when Tom Story began shooting his photos there.

      Reply

      • That timestamp is not accurate.

        In his interview Byron says that Canon was seventeen minutes ahead, and he didn’t realize that at the time (is this a common theme yet?)

        He talks about how, he realized later, this was taken at the time of the deployment, when the fire was laying over and headed right towards the Ranch House Restaurant. He hadn’t heard about the deployment yet. As soon as he did, right after he took this photo, he drove to the Restaurant.

        And THANK you for your responses!!! I didn’t have those times at hand, so I was hoping you would connect this to those!

        Back to work! And I’ve now finally downloaded the 1643_EP video, so I can check it out.

        Reply

        • Marti’s Repeated-ad-Nauseum Moral of the Visual Narrative:

          Never ever ever ever ever EVER assume the timestamp on a camera is accurate. Unless they’re connecting somehow to a wireless network, they almost always are NOT ACCURATE.

          Reply

          • Copy that. I knew it couldn’t have been too far off, though, since the picture he was actually taking ( that enourmous ash cloud ) puts the photo into the ‘deployment’ timeframe.

            You are absolutely right, though. This really is more of a picture of the ash cloud COMING into Yarnell ( circa 1640 – 1650 ) than it is of the ‘after 5 PM’ timeframe.

            I REALLY wish Byron Kimball had also turned to the NORTH at that moment and taken one more picture of the sky in THAT direction… and I am sure we would be seeing the vehicle he was driving about 18-20 feet in front of him and parked in that driveway there.

            Reply

            • I was just about to ask “How do you know that?” when I figured that out. Oh Great Google Map ninja. I confess I still haven’t had the stomach to visit my Google Earth map since the new images came out.

              Totally agree.

              I really wish he had photographed his truck. And even a selfie would come in handy.

              Reply

              • Oh God… yes. Too bad all these guys weren’t ten year younger… or that Windows Mobile hadn’t caught on when it was fully available 10 years before all this iPhone and Google Android crap.

                I wish ALL of these guys had the ‘selfie’ instincts that the tweens/teens do now.

                That would have been REALLY helpful.

                Reply

              • BTW… it’s not martial arts… but there are some ‘tricks’.

                For a LOT of these photos… just use Google ‘Street View’… but LOOK UP.

                Power poles and power lines.

                They are always a little bit different and even if you don’t recognize the landscape… you can easily spot the subtle details in power poles and power lines.

                Example: That’s how I quickly found where Byron took that picture. There’s a 4-line drop gang of wires between poles on the left side of his photo.

                That means he had to be SOUTH of where those 4 line drops are actually entering the town of Yarnell… which happens to be just about 1/4 mile north of where he took the photo.

                Drive down the road just a bit with Google maps Street View… and watch for that 4-line gang drop in Bryon’s photo and the right matching poles… and Voila!… “you are there”.

                Reply

    • **
      ** DEFINITELY DAN PHILBIN IN THE RED HELMET

      >> Marti said…
      >> I decided the other night I think the tall guy with
      >> the red helmet and shoulder holster may be Dan
      >> Philbin. He seems super tall, relatively speaking.

      More GOOD news… we can scratch one more truck and its owner off the list. Definitely confirmed that that is Dan Philbin in the Red Helmet with the BLM logo and that is definitely HIS yellow stripe BLM truck parked across Highway 89 in the Tom Story photos.

      Tom Story photo 201303_Yarnell_Hill_1682 is the only one that clearly shows the vehicle ID number on the front fender of this white double-door BLM pickup parked on the other side of Highway 89.

      The number on the front driver-side fender is U-2311.

      NOTE: Only photos 1682 and 1682 clealy show the U-2311 Unit Designator on the front fender of that BLM truck. The full number is BLOCKED by Willis’ pickup in photos 1684 through 1687 and only the last two digits ( ’11’ ) are visible in those photos. In photos 1688 and 1689, the U-2311 number is blocked completely by Willis’ pickup. In photos 1690 and 1691 we can now see right through the open windows of Willis’ pickup over to the front fender of the BLM truck but only the last 3 digits ( ‘311’ ) of the U-2311 number are visible.

      Here is an external FLICKR photo of AZ-PHD U-2311 itself…

      https://www.flickr.com/photos/garciarf/7171650435/

      Photo title: BLM Fire Dodge Power Wagon
      Information posted about this photo…
      AZ-PHD U-2311
      Bureau of Land Management FireArizona Wildfire & Incident Management Academy
      Prescott, AZ, March 2012
      Felipe Garcia
      Flickr Username: FelipeGR90 – FLICKR Member since 2006
      Taken on March 12, 2012
      Canon EOS 7D
      262 Views

      And the LARGE firefighter with the red-helmet and the same ‘blue triangle’ BLM logo in photo 1682 who, at that moment, is staring directly at Tom Story when he took this photo is definitely Dan Philbin. Matches that photograph I found of him in that Bureau of Indian Affairs newlsetter when he was Superintendent of the Fort Apache Hotshots.

      Dan Philbin has already exited his BLM pickup parked across the street and is now standing in the Ranch House Restuarant parking lot in-between that single-door access-cab style white pickup with the red-stripe and the square AZ STATE logo under the access cab window… and that long double-door all-white pickup with the door open that just says FIRE on the closed passenger door.

      Given that there are only 33 seconds in-between Tom Story photos 1681 and 1682… I would say that Dan Philbin had to ‘pull up’ and park there on the WEST side of Highway 89 just seconds after Tom Story shot his photo 1681, in order for Dan Philbin to exit his vehicle, cross Highway 89, and then be seen standing there where he is in the parking lot just 33 seconds later when Tom Story would shoot his next 1682 photo.

      Tom Story photo 1681 was taken at 1707.45 ( 5:07.45 PM )
      Tom Story photo 1682 was taken at 1708.18 ( 5:08.18 PM )

      Given that… I would put Dan Philbin’s ‘arrival time’ there on the WEST side of Highway 89 about 10 seconds after photo 1681 was taken, which would be 1707.55 ( 5:07.55 PM ). That leaves him 23 seconds to throw it in PARK, exit his vehicle, cross Highway 89, and then be seen where he is standing in photo 1682. He must have been moving pretty quickly once he got out of his vehicle. He probably RAN across Highway 89.

      ** OTHER DAN PHILBIN INFO

      In the PUBIC part of the WildCAD computer system…
      Dan Philbin has the following ID and information…

      http://www.wildcad.net/WCAZ-PHCresources.htm

      ID: DC 2101
      Resource: Dan Philbin, AFMO

      ** DAN PHILBIN ‘BACKFILL’ ORDER

      Oddly enough… Dan Philbin DOES also have an entry in the ‘J – Resource Orders’ documents… but it is described by whoever entered it as just a ‘backfill’… and it wasn’t entered into THIS system until July 3, 2013, 3 days AFTER he was actually ‘ordered up’ for Yarnell.

      The ‘Ordered From’ column also does NOT have anything
      but what appears to be a ‘phone number’. ( No valid Dispatch
      Unit ID ).

      However.. the 623-445-0288 phone number being listed instead
      appears to be the Main FAX number for the ‘Arizona Interagency
      Dispatch Center’… according to this public website…
      http://www.aidc.az.gov/contact.asp
      Arizona Interagency Dispatch Center
      2901 W. Pinnacle Peak Road
      Phoenix, Arizona 85027
      Business Line: 623-445-0274
      Main Fax Line: 623-445-0288
      Logistics Fax Line: 623-445-0289
      To Report a Fire: 1-800-309-7081 / 623-582-0911

      Huh? Why list a FAX number as the ‘origin’ for the order?

      Unlike the other orders that also say ‘backfill’ for Hulburd and Yowell… MOST of the ‘order form’ fields ARE filled out for Dan Philbin including the ‘Released Date’ and ‘Released To’ fields.

      It also has the same ‘Special Needs’ note as Hulburd and Yowell’s entries that says ‘Dan helped secure the accident scene’… but this is not really the case. Only Clawson, Hulburd and Yowell were out at the ‘accident scene’… unless Philbin is actually one of the three ‘Incident within an Incident’ commanders that DPS Ranger 58 testimony says were also ‘allowed to enter the accident scene’ that afternoon.

      Page 171 of ‘J – Resource Orders’ document…

      Request number: O-159 ( There is NO corresponding order for Dan Philbin in other ROSS resource report. Only this one. )
      Ordered Date/Time: 07/03/13 – 1029 PNT
      From: 623-445-0288
      To: AZ-ADC
      Qty: 1
      Resource Requested: DIVISION / GROUP SUPERVISOR (DIVS) ( Philbin, Dan ( AZ-PDC ) )
      Needed Date/Time: 07/01/13 – 1300 PNT
      Deliver To: YARNELL HILL
      From Unit: AZ-PHC
      To Unit: AZ-ADC
      Assigned Date/Time: 07/03/13 – 1106 PNT
      Resource Assigned Unit ID: AZ-PHD
      Resource Assigned: Philbin, Dan ( AZ-PHC )
      M/D Ind: D
      Estimated Time of Departure: 07/03/13 – 1400 PNT
      Estimated Time of Arrival: 07/03/13 – 1700 PNT
      Released Date: 07/03/13 – 1332 PNT
      Released To: PHOENIX SKY HARBOR INTL ( PHX )
      Travel Mode: AOV
      Financial Code: AZ-A1S-130688
      Special Needs: This is a backfill. Dan helped secure the accident scene
      Reporting Instructions: ICP MIDDLE CREEK SCHOOL IN PEEPLES VALLEY 18912 HAYS RANCH ROAD, PEEPLES VALLEY, AZ.

      There is then this ‘followup’ NOTE regardig Phiblin’s ‘backfill’ order which appears on page 205…

      Req. No.: O-159
      Documentation: Request O-159 – DIVISION/GROUP SUPERVISOR
      (DIVS) – [AZ-A1S-130688] YARNELL HILL has been filled with
      Philbin, Dan (AZ-PHC) by Georgia Burns (at ) AZ-PHC ROSS
      Entered by: Georgia Burns (AZ-PHC) – 07/03/2013 1106 PNT

      However… there is NO entry for Philbin in the other ‘ROSS’ document at the bottom of this ‘J Resource Order’ document, as there also is for Willis’ order.

      SPECIAL NOTE: Even though there are these mysterious ‘backfill’ orders for PNF people Aaron Hulburd, KC ‘Bucky’ Yowell, and BLM buy Dan Philbin… there is NO SUCH BACKFILL order for Jason Clawson… who Dan Philbin says was his ‘Operations Section Chief’ at Yarnell that afternoon.

      Jason Clawson played a CRUCIAL management role in Yarnell from the time he arrived circa 2:30 PM until the time he himself was the one that confirmed there were 19 dead at the deployment site… and Dan Philbin says 2 or 3 times in his interview that Jason Clawson was HIS ‘Operations Section Chief’ on the fire that afternoon…

      …but there is no existing resource order in the publicly released documents for Jason Clawson ( Now possibly the THIRD fully active OPS on the fire that afternoon )… and Jason Clawson was NEVER interviewed by either the SAIT or by ADOSH.

      With regards to the resource ordering itself… it’s like someone is trying to pretend he was never really there.

      It is actually ALSO looking very much like the entire ‘Bea Day’ team that was being ordered up ‘off the radar’ by IC Roy Hall that morning didn’t care that they were ‘obsolete’ by the time they all started showing up in Yarnell. As unbelievable as it may seem… it looks like the ‘Bea Day’ Type 2 team just jumped into the fire ( without some of them even bothering to check in at the ICP at the School ) and started ‘running parts of the fire’ as if they WERE in charge… and not even checking with the existing command team.

      They had their own fully functioning ‘Field OPS’ ( Jason Clawson ) and their own functioning DIVS ( Hulburd, Yowell, Philbin, Others? ) and they were going where THEY wanted do and doing what THEY thought was ‘needed’.

      Since he seemed to be his own self-appointed ‘Field OPS’ that day … it is even possible that Jason Clawson might have made his own independent ‘availability check’ with DIVSA Eric Marsh ( just like Paul Musser did ) and it might even be Jason Clawson himself who issued his own request/directive for Granite Mountain to ‘get to town ASAP’… and it might even be Jason Clawson we hear in the YARNELL-GAMBLE video and (apparently) urging Marsh to get GM to town ‘as fast as possible’ circa 1627.

      So it really does *look* like Bea Day’s ‘off the radar’ Type 2 team people were ‘freelancing’ in Yarnell that day… and that is IMPORTANT… since NONE of these people ( including Bea Day herself ) have ever been interviewed by ANYONE.

      Reply

      • Mr. Dougherty…

        The entire comment above with date/time…

        WantsToKnowTheTruth on June 14, 2014 at 2:38 pm said:
        Your comment is awaiting moderation.

        …and title…

        ** DEFINITELY DAN PHILBIN IN THE RED HELMET

        …can be DELETED. It got stuck in ‘moderation’ since I broke the ‘only one link per post’ WordPress rule and the entire comment above has already been reposted below with only ONE active hyperlink in it.

        Reply

    • **
      ** DEFINITELY DAN PHILBIN IN THE RED HELMET

      NOTE: This is a repost since the first attempt fell into ‘moderation
      land’ because it had more than one link in it. This is an attempt
      to repost with only ONE active link in the same comment.

      >> Marti said…
      >> I decided the other night I think the tall guy with
      >> the red helmet and shoulder holster may be Dan
      >> Philbin. He seems super tall, relatively speaking.

      More GOOD news… we can scratch one more truck and its owner off the list. Definitely confirmed that that is Dan Philbin in the Red Helmet with the BLM logo and that is definitely HIS yellow stripe BLM truck parked across Highway 89 in the Tom Story photos.

      Tom Story photo 201303_Yarnell_Hill_1682 is the only one that clearly shows the vehicle ID number on the front fender of this white double-door BLM pickup parked on the other side of Highway 89.

      The number on the front driver-side fender is U-2311.

      NOTE: Only photos 1682 and 1682 clealy show the U-2311 Unit Designator on the front fender of that BLM truck. The full number is BLOCKED by Willis’ pickup in photos 1684 through 1687 and only the last two digits ( ’11’ ) are visible in those photos. In photos 1688 and 1689, the U-2311 number is blocked completely by Willis’ pickup. In photos 1690 and 1691 we can now see right through the open windows of Willis’ pickup over to the front fender of the BLM truck but only the last 3 digits ( ‘311’ ) of the U-2311 number are visible.

      Here is an external FLICKR photo of AZ-PHD U-2311 itself…

      https://www.flickr.com/photos/garciarf/7171650435/

      Photo title: BLM Fire Dodge Power Wagon
      Information posted about this photo…
      AZ-PHD U-2311
      Bureau of Land Management FireArizona Wildfire & Incident Management Academy
      Prescott, AZ, March 2012
      Felipe Garcia
      Flickr Username: FelipeGR90 – FLICKR Member since 2006
      Taken on March 12, 2012
      Canon EOS 7D
      262 Views

      And the LARGE firefighter with the red-helmet and the same ‘blue triangle’ BLM logo in photo 1682 who, at that moment, is staring directly at Tom Story when he took this photo is definitely Dan Philbin. Matches that photograph I found of him in that Bureau of Indian Affairs newlsetter when he was Superintendent of the Fort Apache Hotshots.

      Dan Philbin has already exited his BLM pickup parked across the street and is now standing in the Ranch House Restuarant parking lot in-between that single-door access-cab style white pickup with the red-stripe and the square AZ STATE logo under the access cab window… and that long double-door all-white pickup with the door open that just says FIRE on the closed passenger door.

      Given that there are only 33 seconds in-between Tom Story photos 1681 and 1682… I would say that Dan Philbin had to ‘pull up’ and park there on the WEST side of Highway 89 just seconds after Tom Story shot his photo 1681, in order for Dan Philbin to exit his vehicle, cross Highway 89, and then be seen standing there where he is in the parking lot just 33 seconds later when Tom Story would shoot his next 1682 photo.

      Tom Story photo 1681 was taken at 1707.45 ( 5:07.45 PM )
      Tom Story photo 1682 was taken at 1708.18 ( 5:08.18 PM )

      Given that… I would put Dan Philbin’s ‘arrival time’ there on the WEST side of Highway 89 about 10 seconds after photo 1681 was taken, which would be 1707.55 ( 5:07.55 PM ). That leaves him 23 seconds to throw it in PARK, exit his vehicle, cross Highway 89, and then be seen where he is standing in photo 1682. He must have been moving pretty quickly once he got out of his vehicle. He probably RAN across Highway 89.

      ** OTHER DAN PHILBIN INFO

      In the PUBIC part of the WildCAD computer system…
      Dan Philbin has the following ID and information…

      ID: DC 2101
      Resource: Dan Philbin, AFMO

      ** DAN PHILBIN ‘BACKFILL’ ORDER

      Oddly enough… Dan Philbin DOES also have an entry in the ‘J – Resource Orders’ documents… but it is described by whoever entered it as just a ‘backfill’… and it wasn’t entered into THIS system until July 3, 2013, 3 days AFTER he was actually ‘ordered up’ for Yarnell.

      The ‘Ordered From’ column also does NOT have anything
      but what appears to be a ‘phone number’. ( No valid Dispatch
      Unit ID ).

      However.. the 623-445-0288 phone number being listed instead
      appears to be the Main FAX number for the ‘Arizona Interagency
      Dispatch Center’… according to this public website…

      Arizona Interagency Dispatch Center
      2901 W. Pinnacle Peak Road
      Phoenix, Arizona 85027
      Business Line: 623-445-0274
      Main Fax Line: 623-445-0288
      Logistics Fax Line: 623-445-0289
      To Report a Fire: 1-800-309-7081 / 623-582-0911

      Huh? Why list a FAX number as the ‘origin’ for the order instead
      of a valid ‘Dispatch Unit ID’? Whatever.

      Unlike the other orders that also say ‘backfill’ for Hulburd and Yowell… MOST of the ‘order form’ fields ARE filled out for Dan Philbin including the ‘Released Date’ and ‘Released To’ fields.

      It also has the same ‘Special Needs’ note as Hulburd and Yowell’s entries that says ‘Dan helped secure the accident scene’… but this is not really the case. Only Clawson, Hulburd and Yowell were out at the ‘accident scene’… unless Philbin is actually one of the three ‘Incident within an Incident’ commanders that DPS Ranger 58 testimony says were also ‘allowed to enter the accident scene’ that afternoon.

      Page 171 of ‘J – Resource Orders’ document…

      Request number: O-159 ( There is NO corresponding order for Dan Philbin in other ROSS resource report. Only this one. )
      Ordered Date/Time: 07/03/13 – 1029 PNT
      From: 623-445-0288
      To: AZ-ADC
      Qty: 1
      Resource Requested: DIVISION / GROUP SUPERVISOR (DIVS) ( Philbin, Dan ( AZ-PDC ) )
      Needed Date/Time: 07/01/13 – 1300 PNT
      Deliver To: YARNELL HILL
      From Unit: AZ-PHC
      To Unit: AZ-ADC
      Assigned Date/Time: 07/03/13 – 1106 PNT
      Resource Assigned Unit ID: AZ-PHD
      Resource Assigned: Philbin, Dan ( AZ-PHC )
      M/D Ind: D
      Estimated Time of Departure: 07/03/13 – 1400 PNT
      Estimated Time of Arrival: 07/03/13 – 1700 PNT
      Released Date: 07/03/13 – 1332 PNT
      Released To: PHOENIX SKY HARBOR INTL ( PHX )
      Travel Mode: AOV
      Financial Code: AZ-A1S-130688
      Special Needs: This is a backfill. Dan helped secure the accident scene
      Reporting Instructions: ICP MIDDLE CREEK SCHOOL IN PEEPLES VALLEY 18912 HAYS RANCH ROAD, PEEPLES VALLEY, AZ.

      There is then this ‘followup’ NOTE regarding Phiblin’s ‘backfill’ order which appears on page 205…

      Req. No.: O-159
      Documentation: Request O-159 – DIVISION/GROUP SUPERVISOR
      (DIVS) – [AZ-A1S-130688] YARNELL HILL has been filled with
      Philbin, Dan (AZ-PHC) by Georgia Burns (at ) AZ-PHC ROSS
      Entered by: Georgia Burns (AZ-PHC) – 07/03/2013 1106 PNT

      However… there is NO entry for Philbin in the other ‘ROSS’ document at the bottom of this ‘J Resource Order’ document, as there also is for Willis’ order.

      SPECIAL NOTE: Even though there are these mysterious ‘backfill’ orders for PNF people Aaron Hulburd, KC ‘Bucky’ Yowell, and BLM buy Dan Philbin… there is NO SUCH BACKFILL order for Jason Clawson… who Dan Philbin says was his ‘Operations Section Chief’ at Yarnell that afternoon.

      Jason Clawson played a CRUCIAL management role in Yarnell from the time he arrived circa 2:30 PM until the time he himself was the one that confirmed there were 19 dead at the deployment site… and Dan Philbin says 2 or 3 times in his interview that Jason Clawson was HIS ‘Operations Section Chief’ on the fire that afternoon…

      …but there is no existing resource order in the publicly released documents for Jason Clawson ( Now possibly the THIRD fully active OPS on the fire that afternoon )… and Jason Clawson was NEVER interviewed by either the SAIT or by ADOSH.

      With regards to the resource ordering itself… it’s like someone is trying to pretend he was never really there.

      It is actually ALSO looking very much like the entire ‘Bea Day’ team that was being ordered up ‘off the radar’ by IC Roy Hall that morning didn’t care that they were ‘obsolete’ by the time they all started showing up in Yarnell. As unbelievable as it may seem… it looks like the ‘Bea Day’ Type 2 team just jumped into the fire ( without some of them even bothering to check in at the ICP at the School ) and started ‘running parts of the fire’ as if they WERE in charge… and not even checking with the existing command team.

      They had their own fully functioning ‘Field OPS’ ( Jason Clawson ) and their own functioning DIVS ( Hulburd, Yowell, Philbin, Others? ) and they were going where THEY wanted do and doing what THEY thought was ‘needed’.

      Since he seemed to be his own self-appointed ‘Field OPS’ that day … it is even possible that Jason Clawson might have made his own independent ‘availability check’ with DIVSA Eric Marsh ( just like Paul Musser did ) and it might even be Jason Clawson himself who issued his own request/directive for Granite Mountain to ‘get to town ASAP’… and it might even be Jason Clawson we hear in the YARNELL-GAMBLE video and (apparently) urging Marsh to get GM to town ‘as fast as possible’ circa 1627.

      So it really does *look* like Bea Day’s ‘off the radar’ Type 2 team people were ‘freelancing’ in Yarnell that day… and that is IMPORTANT… since NONE of these people ( including Bea Day herself ) have ever been interviewed by ANYONE.

      Reply

      • Did you read Glen Joki’s interview? He describes in detail when and how and why that team got put together. And how that kind of stuff works.

        Reply

        • Also, according to his interview, Dan Philbin took over Structure Group 2 for Gary Cordes, so Cordes could get some sleep, at 2030/8:30 PM.

          Reply

          • Yes… he did… but Dan Philbin’s actual resource order in the official “J – Resource Orders” document doesn’t reflect this reality at all.

            The ONLY resource order for Dan Philbin that was made public was that ‘backfill’ order I showed above entered into the computer some days AFTER June 30.

            This order was officially labelled ‘backfill’ and the only explanation for it was a NOTE on the backfill order that said…

            “Special Needs: This is a backfill. Dan helped secure the accident scene.”

            ( Which is even false. I don’t believe he actually DID help do that. That was Clawson, Hulburd and Yowell ).

            Nothing about officially becoming SPGS and ‘taking over’ for Gary Cordes.

            Very strange.

            Reply

      • Hmmmm looking at Dan Philbin’s interview. He says:

        Dan “…I’m tied in with the…Central West Zone Team which is a Type 2 Team…they originally thought they were gonna get ordered for this fire…”

        Q3: “…There was another team thought they were gonna get the fire…?”

        Dan “Yeah. They thought uh, Central West Zone Type 2Team was gonna tak over. That was, uh, the word they were getting originally, But the order — the order never went through ’cause they bumped it to a — a Type 1 Team.”

        Plot Thickens.

        Reply

        • Reply to Marti Reed post on
          June 14, 2014 at 4:18 pm said:

          >> Marti said…
          >> Dan “Yeah. They thought uh, Central West Zone
          >> Type 2Team was gonna tak over. That was, uh,
          >> the word they were getting originally, But the
          >> order — the order never went through ’cause
          >> they bumped it to a — a Type 1 Team.”
          >>
          >> Plot Thickens.

          Yes…. it does.

          Unbelievably… even though Dan Philbin seems to be saying ( in retrospect? ) that he ( himself ) ‘knew’ this was what was happening circa 2 PM to 5 PM ( that the Type 2 was already obsolete and the whole incident was going up to Type 1 )…

          …I can’t find any real evidence that ANY of these ‘Bea Day’ Type 2 people were ever officially INFORMED of this fact as they ARRIVED in Yarnell.

          Some of these ‘Type 2’ people either got totally blown off at the ICP by Roy Hall and Paul Musser ( like Sciacca… he had to go find Willis just to get a clone and find out what was really going on )…

          OR… they never even ‘checked in’ at the ICP at all.

          They just started showing up… discovered their usual Type 2 OPS Chief Jason Clawson was already there and ‘actively engaged’… and they just started ‘tieing in’ with Clawson and taking ‘orders’ from him instead of from the actual in-place Yarnell Incident Command structure.

          That is why I say it now *appears* to be possible that Jason Clawson was the THIRD ‘fully functional’ Operations Section Chief on the fire that afternoon for a few hours before the deployment.

          Jason Clawson, himself, might have made his OWN ‘availability check’ with Eric Marsh… just like OPS2 Paul Musser did…

          …but I will also bet you a dollar to a donut that Jason Clawson ( Prescott National Forest ) had Granite Mountain’s private intra-crew frequency number.

          Clawson could have been talking DIRECTLY to Steed or Marsh over the private intra-crew and that’s why we don’t hear those conversation(s).

          If that is the case… then that is just MORE ‘conversation’ that Brendan McDonough might have overheard that day but still doesn’t want to talk about.

          Obviously… a full interview with Jason Clawson would clear up a lot of this. It never happened, and then Clawson doesn’t even end up with even a ‘backfill’ resource order for this incident.

          Like he wasn’t even there… much less the one that actually confirmed there were 19 dead and was one of the first persons to SEE the deployment site.

          Reply

          • And, don’t forget. Bea Day was there, herself, with her own UTV, at the Incident Command Center, according to something I am remembering off the top of my head.

            Reply

          • Sure would be nice if, in honor of the first anniversary of this horrific event and the wonderful young men who died within its inferno, there would be, at the very very least, a real investigation of it.

            Hey, all you folks out there who showed up at all those memorials and parades and such with all those signs saying “We Will Never Forget.”

            Don’t you agree it’s way past time there should a real investigation?

            Reply

            • Followup to above…

              Even if I lost the bet about Jason Clawson knowing the Granite Mountain intra-crew frequency ( either from the Doce fire two weeks earlier OR because he cloned off Willis’ radio )…

              …I would be a DOZEN donuts to a DOZEN dollars that Jason Clawson had Eric Marsh’s cellphone number.

              Clawson might have just CALLED Eric Marsh directly ( without having ANY idea how far away he really was ) in even the infamous ‘discussing their options’ timeframe and said… “Hey Eric… we could REALLY, REALLY use you guys down here ASAP. Whadda ya say?”

              That MIGHT actually explain a lot if that is, in fact what happened.

              Eric Marsh would have now been ‘moving’ his men at the request of the THIRD functional Field OPS on the fire ( and just trying to help his Prescott buddy Clawson )… so Marsh would have wanted to be OBTUSE about the move and maybe would not have wanted EITHER of the OTHER two Type 2 SHORT teams OPS ( Abel AND Musser ) to be ‘fully aware’ that he was not only moving his men under unsafe conditions… that he was abandoning his Division assignment from THEM, as well.

              Could Marsh just have been trying to please his buddy Clawson?

              Could it be that simple?

              It might also explain who people are trying to PROTECT.

              If that really is Clawson we hear asking Marsh if he could please ‘get to town a little faster’ in the YARNELL-GAMBLE video… I could see where some ‘powers that be’ would NOT want that to come out.

              Also… think about this.

              WHY do we see Clawson, Hulburd and Yowell hanging around in the Shrine parking lot for so long… even AFTER everyone else had evacuated that area.

              It’s almost like they were standing there WAITING for something.

              Waiting for WHAT?

              Someone ELSE to suddenly ‘come out of there?’ Someone who they knew were now separated from their trucks and would need ‘rides’… like Granite Mountain?

              When Blue Ridge was evacuating… they stopped right there at the Shrine parking lot for a moment.

              The Blue Ridge notes even say they “ran into (redacted) in the Shrine parking lot and we shared with them the INTEL we had before moving on.”

              Well… what if that (redacted) is
              “Jason Clawson”… and what if the
              INTEL they shared with Clawson was what Blue Ridge had testified they actually BELIEVED…

              …that Eric was ‘coming down’ and they thought he meant the exact same road they had hiked in on and that Frisby and Brown has used to go up and see them earlier.

              Jason Clawson would have then perhaps ( mistakenly ) believed that Eric and Granite Mountain were SUPPOSED to appear coming out of that same Youth Camp area at any moment…

              …and THAT is why we see them just ‘waiting’ there for waaaaay too long in the Shrine parking lot.

              If they were NOT just sitting there waiting for GM to suddenly ‘appear’… then what WERE they standing there waiting for? Everyone else ( civilians included ) was already long gone.

              There is a BIG STORY here that simply hasn’t been told yet.

              It is ALSO curious that even though in the Helmet Cam video… KC ‘Bucky’ Yowell clearly calls Aaron Hulburd by his first name at one point ( He yells “Hey Aaron” at one point ) and then ‘Bucky’ also clearly uses Jason Clawson’s first name when he is filmed by Aaron standing in the road with his radio.

              At that point… KC ‘Bucky’ Yowell turns right to Hulburd’s camera and asks Aaron… “What TAC frequency is JASON on?”.

              But NEITHER of those two direct name references ended up in the TRANSCRIPT of the Helmet Cam video that was released to the public.

              The transcript includes some VERY hard to hear phrases… but the CLEAR pronunciation of both Jason Clawson and Aaron Hulburd’s first names by KC ‘Bucky’ Yowell were completey ELIMINATED from the published transcript.

              Why?

              WHO didn’t want anyone to know that Jason Clawson, Aaron Hulburd and KC ‘Bucky’ Yowell were even THERE that day… or at least make it very difficult to ‘figure that out’.

              More later…

              Reply

        • Reply to Marti Reed post on
          June 14, 2014 at 4:18 pm

          >> Marti said…
          >> Hmmmm looking at Dan Philbin’s interview.
          >> He says:

          Dan “…I’m tied in with the…Central West Zone Team which is a Type 2 Team…they originally thought they were gonna get ordered for this fire…”

          Q3: “…There was another team thought they were gonna get the fire…?”

          Dan “Yeah. They thought uh, Central West Zone Type 2Team was gonna tak over. That was, uh, the word they were getting originally, But the order — the order never went through ’cause they bumped it to a — a Type 1 Team.”

          >> Marti also said…
          >> Plot Thickens.

          This line from Philbin’s interview / testimony
          is crucial…

          “But the order — the order never went through ’cause they bumped it to a — a Type 1 Team.”

          I the actual ORDER for the FULL ‘Type 2’ team never actually ‘went through’… then all these ‘Type 2’ team people that Bea Day had been ordering ‘off the radar’ and who were showing up in Yarnell were truly ‘freelancing’ that afternoon.

          That would include Jason Clawson… who we now KNOW was actively engaged in the ‘management’ end of the fire that afternoon… and who Dan Philbin himself says was his “Operations Section Chief”.

          That creates a situation where someone ( Clawson ) just inserted himself into the command structure ( without his ‘work order’ ever even really being ‘official’ )… and then went on to play a crucal role in the rest of the events that afternoon.

          He *MAY* have even made his OWN ‘call’ ( either radio or cellphone ) to Eric Marsh and asked him to ‘please come down, we need you here’… and then *MAY* also be the one heard urging Marsh to ‘hurry up’ at 1627 in the YARNELL-GAMBLE video.

          The consensus seems to be that that voice that is heard asking Marsh to ‘please hurry to town’ in the YARNELL-GAMBLE video is neither Musser nor Abel. So who else would be making this kind of request to a DIVSA on the fire?

          Possibly the THIRD fully functional ( but self-appointed? ) Operations Section Chief?
          ( Jason Clawson ).

          If Clawson was there and jumped in as a THIRD fully functioning OPS chief on a fire that already had TWO active ‘Field OPS’… then things really were in la-la-land at that point…

          …and if Clawson did that without any actual AUTHORITY to do so ( as in… his actual work order had never really gone out OR was actually CANCELLED )… then we are TRULY talking about ‘unauthorized freelancing’ here on his part.

          Reply

    • **
      ** OTHER STUFF

      I finally found the evidence of WHO the actual firefighters were that DPS Officer Eric Tarr says ‘came over to the Boulder Springs
      Ranch’ and then accompanied him back to the deployment site.

      According to Todd Abel ( Now Incident Within An Incident commander ), one of them was NOT Darrell Wills ( as previously thought ).

      DPS Officer Tarr said that when he first walked over to the BSR and was talking with the owner… THREE firefighters showed up and identified themselves as the ‘Incident Within an Incident’ command team. According to Todd Abel… there were actually FOUR of them showing up at BSR at that time…

      Todd Abel ( Incident Within Incident IC )
      Dean Stewart
      Cougan Carothers
      Steve Emery

      DPS officer Tarr also stated that these THREE FFs accompanied him and the other FIVE original FFs that had already been out at the site ( Frisby, Brown and PNF hires Clawson, Hulburd, Yowell ) back out to the deployment site and the only let these THREE FFs who said they were IWI commanders back ‘under the tape’ to confirm the body counts.

      Now that Abel says there were FOUR of the showing up at the BSR… it is unclear whether then only THREE of them walked out to the deployment site like DPS Officer Eric Tarr says in his notes, or whether all FOUR of them went out to ‘confirm body count’.

      Here is where Todd Abel describes WHO actually went out to the Helms Ranch and then walked out to the site with DPS Officer Eric Tarr…

      ______________________________________________________
      A: When – when the fire hit the – his trigger point. Um, and he bailed off and, uh, it – so we – we were able to get a manifest from – from, uh, Brandan. Um, and at the same time Jason Klasen calls me on my phone, gives me an address to Helms’ place. Myself, Dean Stewart, Cougan Carothers and Steve Emery start working our way back in here to go tie in with these guys. Um, obviously, you can imagine it’s pretty chaotic in there. We get through and, uh, go out to the ranch. Walk out there, you know, once again confirm that we had 19. The manifest was only showing an 18. So…
      Q1: Right.
      A: Yeah, so now I’m scrambling trying to figure out who the nineteenth person is and we eventually figure it out.
      _____________________________________________________

      NOTE: According to this… that ‘group’ seen in the Tom Story photo in the background that appears to contain Brendan McDonough might not only have been looking at a MAP… Tom Story might have also captured this moment when Captain Brown was obtaining and going over the GM crew manifest with Brendan there in the parking lot and before launching on the ‘ground rescue mission’.

      **
      ** BSR SECURITY VIDEOS AND TRUCKS FROM RHR

      I also checked the Boulder Springs Ranch security camera videos to see which vehicles might be seen passing through the gate so they could then be matched with these FFs from the parking lot… but I don’t actually see ANY of these ‘vehicles’ entering the BSR gate at the time they are supposed to.

      I may have missed them. ( Didn’t have much time today ).
      I will check again.

      **
      ** THE MYSTERIOUS WHITE TRUCK THAT SAYS ‘FIRE’
      ** IN THE MIDDLE OF EVERYTHING AT THE RHR

      It actually says ‘TRD Sport’ on rear fender, so that makes it a ‘Toyota Tacoma RD Sport’. Looks like 2013 model. Brand new.

      I believe that means it will turn out this is someone’s PERSONAL vehicle brought to Yarnell that day… since it would be highly unusual if a Toyota Tacoma was part of any official Arizona Fire Agency ‘fleet’ of loaners.

      The GOOD news there is that a super-enhancement on that FIRE word on the passenger door reveals that it is NOT one of those ‘stick-an-go’ refigerator magnet type signs for vehicles. That word FIRE appears to be permanently PAINTED onto that passenger door which should make it easier to spot this vehicle in some other photo at some point.

      So for clarity’s sake… I suggest we just start referring to that all-white ‘mystery truck’ as the WHITE TOYOTA or the
      WHITE TACOMA ( until we find out who was driving it ).

      That’s about it for now.
      More later…

      Reply

      • I know this is way down in the weeds, and I know you will find it so…..

        Do you know who Dean Stewart and Steve Emery are??

        Reply

        • OK. Dean Stewart is a Fire Specialist with Central Yavapai Fire District. I have no clue why he was there at that time or doing what or why he became part of the Incident Within the Incident OPS.

          Steve Emery was a Type 2 Fire Fighter on that Central Yavapai Fire District Engine we see in the Parking Lot. I’m guessing he may be the guy in the shirt that says “Central Yavapai Fire.”

          Still trying to connect people, vehicles, and the events after the deployment.

          Reply

          • I would write this all up more coherently, but it’s such a jumble in my head and in my notes that I don’t even know where to begin. It’s an important story, with still a bunch of question marks, and somebody should write it.

            Reply

    • Marti… the last comment just above entitled ‘OTHER STUFF’ was the last part of that LONG comment I couldn’t get to post yesterday.

      Every section from that one LONG comment posted OK just now as individual ‘replies’ so I guess the reason I couldn’t get it all through yesterday is that it was simply TOO LONG to all fit into one comment.

      I hope that isn’t too confusing above but each ‘section’ relates to something that I know you’ve been working on and they all relate to the current task of still nailing down all those vehicles ( and FFs ) seen in the Tom Story photos.

      More later.

      Reply

  51. Moved to the top so not lost….
    SR and WTKTT
    You can not be serious a safety spot to survive is a boulder area where not all 19 Fire fighters may have servived that would be a choice a crew boss would make are you serious. I am now going to ask questions of SR that have been asked before .
    Have you ever been a wild land fire Fighter?
    Have you ever been a crew boss, strike team leader or Division boss?
    You are responsible for every individual under you not just those that might survive in a bolder field. If you are responsible for your self then go for it.
    I am proud this crew did not panic and stayed together did what they were told it could have gone either way it just went the wrong way. I always said when you HAVE to deploy you have a 50/50 chance. Fire factors change in wind, no direct flame, less heat at there location one lucky change an they all may have survived. #9–Maintain control of your forces at all times.
    So I’ll agree to disagree with you both, but you will never change my perception of this or the code of ethics I have held to.

    Reply

    • Bob,

      Candidly, this is a bit ridiculous. You seem to think that I said the boulders were a SZ. I have said, explicitly, that they were not.

      It is simply fact that boulders and rock outcroppings do offer a form of refuge, for very valid reasons. This is part of current training, for a reason.

      You seem to be asserting that, because Marsh and Steed couldn’t assure the survival of every last man if they tried to retreat to a potentially survivable place to deploy and hunker down, namely the boulders, that they acted properly and chose the best course by preserving unit cohesion, but with the near-certainty that the whole crew would die. I disagree. Also, there is no requirement that a crew not allow any physical separation if they are forced to retreat. Drop packs and tools, and where possible run, allows for some physical dispersion and separation of crew in that case.

      If you’re upset that I refer to current training, I’m sorry. The only thing I’ve said that might raise some eyebrows I believe is actually iimplicit in current training, namely fastest to the front in this type of retreat, so that the whole crew isn’t limited to the speed of its slowest members.

      Reply

      • SR you have no clue if you think that any fire crew would be trained every man for there selves accept that some will die. No government organization will train to accept that. I never said SZ I said a boulder field in a canyon is not a safe area and the crew would have been no more safe there than they were where they were.
        Yours and WTKTT assumption of a safe area are not based on fact or practical information and wild land experience and there in I rest my case. You have not set thru years and years of training and hundreds of fires.
        GM put there self’s in a position where they had no other choice and I stand on that and their decision they took the only choice they had left. Searching for some place else was time they just did not have, clear an area and deploy.
        Or find a open area clear it and deploy, which may have been where they were. GM put them selves in a position where they had few options in the brush filled canyon they walked into. Had they run with the same out come what would have been said then. If you want the last word you are welcome to it.

        Reply

        • Bob,

          I would have hoped you would have engaged existing doctrine and training, rather than continue to try to move what should be a technical discussion towards a personal one.

          You also continue to try to insert the misrepresentation that either of WTKTT or me said the boulders were a “safe area.” I said no such thing, and I don’t think WTKTT did. They were not, however, areas of dense fuel, in the middle of a bowl, with a certainty of sustained direct flame contact. GM’s deployment site, however, was. Depending on how far one progressed on those boulders, in some places they even offer flat, broad shoulders well elevated from the bowl, as well as other places of refuge.

          Likewise, a retreat to a place of intermediate refuge is not a panicky, every-man-for-himself thing, or at least doesn’t need to be that. The ability to retreat is in fact a sign of good leadership when faced with the possibility of burnover. The converse would seem to be the idea that, If one of the crew can’t escape, we’ll all get burned over…which, to me, is a very disturbing idea and a sign of emotional and ineffective leadership.

          I again refer you to among other things, Figure 8 on page 4 here, http://www.fs.fed.us/t-d/lessons/documents/Avoid_Flames/page4.html . And to the IRPG.

          Would the boulder have been a SZ? Let me say again, since you keep talking about safe areas, no. I wasted a good bit of internet ink noting, along with TTWARE, that even the BSR was not a SZ given fire behavior. Would the boulder have been a preferable place to deploy? Yes.

          Reply

            • You are reading an awful lot into a training statement that says deploy behind dirt piles and large boulders.
              Did you read the also stay out of draws and canyons that funnel heat and flame. If you had ever given or been to a Shelter training session you would know there is a lot more discussion and training involved than just the pictures you refer to.
              You are not even in or near my training and qualifications to lecture me on Fire shelter training and safe areas for deployment much less crew supervision. So here I will stop trying to lecture a person with no practical fire experience.

              Reply

              • Again, you continue with insults rather than analysis.

                Where GM deployed was in the middle of a draw. The boulders, not so much. Where GM deployed was in the middle of dense fuels. The boulders? No.

                Fact is, the boulders would have been a preferable choice for a deployment site. There is no comparable doctrine and no comparable training suggesting to deploy in heavy brush in the middle of a draw with a certainty of sustained direct flame contact. There is a reason for this. These are not two roughly equal options, not even close.

                Not close, and very basic.

                Reply

                • Fellas, I apologize in advance because what I say may anger each of you…this is a sample of your back & forths and I’m not even getting into the boulder field topic.

                  Bob said: “#9–Maintain control of your forces at all times.”

                  SR said: “The ability to retreat is in fact a sign of good leadership when faced with the possibility of burnover. The converse would seem to be the idea that, If one of the crew can’t escape, we’ll all get burned over…which, to me, is a very disturbing idea and a sign of emotional and ineffective leadership.”

                  Bob I hear you, one school of thought advocates sticking together at all costs, because that is interpreting maintaining control of your forces.

                  SR, another school of thought is every man for himself when the time comes when one realizes ‘this is it’.

                  Bob is correct in saying no agency would train for this, it would be politically wrong and somewhat of a liability. Also SR is correct in the assessment of why would I as a supervisor want to see my whole crew burn up, because this is how we have been trained? You both are supporting your own opinions.

                  I must say though, I put myself in each of GMIHC’s shoes and I say cut and run, think for yourself when you realize you might die. Because of the training this isn’t an option, especially for young, inexperienced firefighters. A supervisor can still have control of their forces by yelling RUN RUN RUN when the time comes. I don’t know Bob and SR, it’s a difficult topic because it boils down to human factors and what’s gonna happen when the time comes, regardless of all the training. Of course, like Deborah said earlier on this site, none of us can be in GMIHC’s mind frame and what exactly was happening in their minds, and I don’t pretend to.

                  Reply

                  • We have been thru this before with SR he is fixated on the bolder field and as in the past refuses to move.
                    I can only say I have faith that 99.9% of crew bosses would never venture into a brush field canyon with there crew and limit there ability to survive. clearings and Bolder fields aside it is a death trap that few would be lucky enough to live to talk about.
                    Most deployments have one thing in common they are in a place with very few options and most with poor to fair survivable locations. Not ever putting yourself there is the preferable alternative and is totally achievable if the rules are followed. A large majority of us who have fought 100’s of large fires can attest to never being in a deployment situation. Again when you have to deploy your chances of survival drop drastically. A lot has to do with location. Variables are–
                    Oxygen
                    Heat
                    Direct flame

                    Reply

                    • Bob,

                      I have always agreed 100% that not putting themselves there was the best option. You seem to have issues with the idea of seeking potentially survivable places to deploy, once in a bad situation. Again, it is part of training. I do think you and I agree 100% though that not being there was better. I am not in any way saying relying on retreat into the boulders/spine would have made that bushwhack reasonable.

    • Reply to Bob Powers post on June 13, 2014 at 7:18 am

      Chiming in late here… but I honestly missed this comment yesterday but still wanted to respond.

      >> Mr. Powers wrote…
      >> Moved to the top so not lost….
      >> SR and WTKTT
      >> You can not be serious a safety spot to survive is a
      >> boulder area where not all 19 Fire fighters may
      >> have survived that would be a choice a crew boss would
      >> make are you serious.

      SR has already replied but let me also assure you I ( me, personally ) have NEVER said the boulder piles were ANY kind of ‘safe’ place that day. There WAS no SAFE PLACE at that moment in time ( As in… somewhere where they were all *guaranteed* to survive ).

      As for ‘choice a crew boss would make’… YES… I can *imagine* it in those circumstances since that same crew boss pretty much SHOULD have known that anywhere on the floor of that canyon was about to be CERTAIN death ( for ALL the crew ).

      The official USDA Forestry Training video for ‘deployments’ has a moment in it when it actually shows a PICTURE of a ‘slope with large boulders’ and is actually RECOMMENDING it as a possible place to deploy. The pros and cons that even this official USDA Forestry Service produced video gives for making the choice are…

      PROS
      1. Large Boulders can provide protection from direct heat, flame contact, AND convective heat.
      2. Boulder piles/fields sometimes represent the largest available area with sparse fuels in a moment of emergency.

      CONS
      1. It can be very difficult ( if not impossible ) to actually deploy a shelter in a Boulder field or Boulder pile…. even if you try to stand vertically in the shelter and try to ‘seal the edges’ AGAINST a large boulder. Death from super-heated air and gases can be increased in such a situation, even if all direct heat or flame conact is being averted because of the Boulders.

      Here is that ACTUAL ( *current* ) USDA Forestry Service Deployment Training video…

      ** THE NEW GENERATION FIRE SHELTER

      Official fire shelter deployment instruction video produced
      in May, 2010 by the USDA Foresty Department in conjunction
      with the National Wildfire Coordinating Group.

      http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QJsY6foLh8o&list=SP3D911BCBF3DDF303

      And here is the complete transcript from one of the ‘sections’ of this official shelter deployment training video that concerns ‘choosing’ a deployment site.

      Notice the section(s) below where it talks about ‘Boulder fields’
      and/or ‘Boulder piles’…

      “It can be difficult to seal the edges of the shelter in large,
      jumbled rocks… but SOMETIMES (they) offer the
      LARGEST AREA FREE OF FUELS and MAY BE THE
      BEST OPTION for deployment.”…
      “Objects such as LARGE ROCKS… can act as
      BARRIERS to HEAT.”
      _____________________________________________________
      USDA FORESTRY DIVISION OFFICIAL TRAINING VIDEO

      +7:35 – SECTION TITLE: SELECTING A DEPLOYMENT SITE

      The properties that make an effective deployment site have
      not changed ( since the old shelters were in use ).

      You must still find a site in which HEAT… especially
      FLAME CONTACT… is minimized.

      Practice evaluating deployment sites so that YOU can
      recognize them quickly under stress.

      Identify effective sites WHENEVER you are on the fireline
      so you know where they are BEFORE you need one.

      Let’s rate some potential deployment sites.

      ( Video shows a typical CHIMNEY )

      This is a chimney.
      Chimney’s are some of the WORST places to
      deploy a fire shelter because they funnel flames
      and hot gases… which can quickly damage your shelter.

      ( Video shows a typical SADDLE )

      Saddles also funnel heat.
      They are also DANGEROUS places to deploy.

      ( Video shows a WIDE STREAM BED )

      A wide stream bed like this can work…

      ( Video shows a NARROW STREAM BED )

      …but narrow ones like this can funnel hot gases.

      ( Video shows a ROAD CROSSING A SLOPE )

      A road crossing a slope can be effective because the
      flames rise upward from the slope and tend to miss
      the road itself. Don’t deploy in the middle of the road
      if there is a possibility that vehicles may be passing.

      ( Video shows a ROCK SLIDE on a STEEP SLOPE )

      Large rock slides can be effective places to deploy, but
      you must stay away from brush and trees and from fuel
      scattered in the rocks.

      It can be difficult to seal the edges of the shelter in large,
      jumbled rocks… but rockslides SOMETIMES offer the
      LARGEST AREA FREE OF FUELS and MAY BE THE
      BEST OPTION for deployment.

      ( Video shows a field of SHORT, SPARSE GRASS )

      Short, sparse grass like this can work because the flames
      would be of low intensity and would pass quickly…

      ( Video shows a field of TALL GRASS )

      …but taller grass like this can produce large flames that
      can quickly damage a shelter.

      ( Video shows piles of cut-down trees and branches )

      Any concentration of fuel should be avoided, whether it’s
      a pile of slash or a collection of firefighter packs or supplies.

      Thick timber or BRUSH should be avoided since FLAME CONTACT
      is LIKELY in these areas.

      +9:30

      ( Video shows a BOULDER FIELD ON A SLOPE )

      NOTE: What is shown in the video at this point looks a
      lot like what is seen in Yarnell… and near the deployment site.

      Objects such as LARGE ROCKS, dozers, or even structures
      can act as BARRIERS to HEAT… but if the objects themselves
      ignite… you may have to move.

      Testing has shown that flames can funnel UNDERNEATH
      vehicles that are in their path. Do NOT deply UNDER your vehicle.

      Don’t deploy in an area where rocks or logs could roll on you or
      snags could fall on you.

      ( Video shows a RIDGETOP )

      A bench or a ridgetop like this are recommended because
      the flames and hot gases tend to rise above them.
      Fire intensity usually drops when fire reaches a ridge…
      but be alert for the possibility of the fire spotting and
      running up the lee side of the ridge.

      A large, natural or man-made opening can be a good
      deployment site depending on its size and the behavior
      of the fire. Burned out areas work well, too, as long
      as they are truly ‘black’. If an area can re-burn it may
      not serve well as a deployment site. The area must
      be COOL. Areas with light fuels can cool within minutes
      after burning, while areas of heavy fuels can remain
      hot for hours.

      END OF VIDEO SECTION: SELECTING A DEPLOYMENT SITE
      _____________________________________________________

      There was no good place to deploy that afternoon.

      Mr. Powers has ALWAYS been 100 percent correct that the only real cure that day was prevention.

      Even Brendan McDonough, at the end of his ADOSH interview, was asked the same question that was being posed to every interviewee about what they thought the ONE single most important thing might have been that day to change the outcome.

      Brendan paused for a LOOOONG time when asked this question… but finally said ( quietly )…

      “To have never of been there.”

      Well… we can all agree on that… but they WERE *there*.

      It happened.

      They found themselves face-to-face with making the kind of
      hard decisions involving potential life or death that no WFF
      ever wants to HAVE to make.

      We know the choice they DID make.
      We know the outcome.

      It is still valid to continue to discuss whether that really was the ‘right’ choice that day.

      >> Mr. Powers also wrote…
      >> Have you ever been a crew boss, strike team leader or
      >> Division boss?
      >> You are responsible for every individual under you not just
      >> those that might survive in a bolder field.

      Yes. You are responsible for ALL of them… but does that include not actually acknowledging you might actually be in a situation where the best you are going to do is save just SOME of them?

      It can happen ( and did, on June 30, 2013 ).

      This actually brings up an interesting question.

      The OFFICIAL USDA Forestry Service deployment training video cited above ALSO has section in the video entitled ‘ESCAPE’. Here is a partial transcript.

      NOTE: Emphasis below is not mine. It is coming from the narrator of the USDA video himself emphasizing certain things…
      ______________________________________________________
      +5:00 – SECTION TITLE: ESCAPE

      Deploying a fire shelter is a LAST resort.

      If entrapment seems likely… try FIRST to escape.

      You should ALWAYS know the location of your safety zones and escape routes. Remember… in a true safety zone you do NOT need your shelter to protect you from heat and smoke. Carrying a fire shelter should NEVER be considered an alternative to safe firefighting.

      If you are considering… or are ASKED to take on a risky assignment because you have a fire shelter… it is YOUR OBLIGATION to insist that the plans be changed. If entrapment is imminent, you must quickly decide if you have time to escape.

      YOU will have to recognize when using your shelter
      is your ONLY option.

      Watch for deployment areas AS YOU MOVE.

      If you can’t reach a safety zone… do NOT pass through an effective deployment area only to get caught in a more hazardous area.

      TIME is critical during escape.

      As SOON as you realize your escape may be compromised DROP YOUR GEAR.

      Take your fire shelter with you, keep your tool, drop packs, chainsaws, ANYTHING that may slow you down. Firefighters have died carrying their gear while trying to escape a fire.

      You can move up to 30 percent faster WITHOUT your gear.
      This can EASILY mean the difference between life or death.

      Drop fusees. They are the most dangerous items you carry.
      They ignite at 375 degrees farenheit, a temperature common
      in escape conditions. Fusees burn initially at THREE THOUSAND
      degrees farenheit. This can quickly be FATAL to a person
      inside a shelter.
      _____________________________________________________

      Well… we know they MUST have considered ‘escaping’.

      From what they could see ( and since they had never scouted the area and didn’t even know if a ‘forward escape’ parallel to the fire and out towards Candy Cane lane area was even possible ) they must have eliminated that ‘option’ very quickly.

      We also know that they had ALREADY violated almost every rule in the book ( and the advice in the training video ) in order to just be where they found themselves.

      My QUESTION, however, is this.

      Even the training video above says that ‘Drop packs and RUN’ is actually one of the FIRST things to do. ( This section in the video comes even BEFORE the section ‘Selecting a deployment site’ ).

      If / when ‘Drop packs and RUN’ really does represent the only chance of survival… how is that actually done?

      When a ‘Drop packs and RUN’ order is given by a supervisor… is it still qualified by ‘but only run where I TELL you to run?”.

      Is there ever a time when the training acknowledges the reality that (sometime, someday) ‘Drop packs and RUN’ really will mean…

      “Save YOURSELF as best as you possibly can.
      That’s an ORDER. Do it NOW.”

      …or is it ALWAYS implied that even a ‘Drop packs and RUN’ order means ‘but do it in an orderly way and stay together’?

      >> Mr. Powers also said…
      >> I am proud this crew did not panic and stayed together
      >> did what they were told.

      I am not. I cannot use the word ‘proud’ to describe anything
      that happened in Yarnell almost that entire weekend.

      The decision that was made was not survivable.

      Marsh and Steed might as well have told them all to just
      stand there and take deep breaths and gotten it over with.

      Some/all of those men SHOULD have tried to ‘save themselves’
      and SOME of them might have made it ( somehow, someway ).

      That is what I believe.

      >> Mr. Powers also wrote…
      >> it could have gone either way it just went the wrong way.
      >> I always said when you HAVE to deploy you have a 50/50
      >> chance. Fire factors change in wind, no direct flame,
      >> less heat at there location one lucky change an they
      >> all may have survived.

      See above. I don’t think anyone would have given them anything
      near 50/50 by just laying down on the floor of that particular canyon at that particular time. Not even close… and they should have KNOWN that was the reality of their situation.

      The only ‘luck’ that might have come into play that day is if they had tried ( keyword = tried ) to get the hell out of there… as fast as the fear of death can carry a man.

      >> Mr. Powers also wrote…
      >> #9–Maintain control of your forces at all times.
      >> So I’ll agree to disagree with you both, but you will never
      >> change my perception of this or the code of ethics I have held to.

      Mr. Powers… I don’t think anyone is, in fact, trying to change ‘your perception’ here. Your views on their final (fatal) decision are well known and you are NOT WRONG to hold those views.

      They come from knowledge and experience.

      But others ( like myself, SR, and ANYONE else ) still have the right to question these decisions and, indeed, this very ‘code of ethics’ that is being applied to a non-military place of employment.

      “Stay together and die” just for the sake of upholding some sort of quasi-military ‘code of ethics’ deserves a LOT more than 10 bucks an hour, seasonal employment, and no benefits.

      Even in the ACTUAL military… when you are being given an ORDER that is OBVIOUSLY going to lead to your DEATH… you are allowed to DISOBEY it and not suffer any repercussions. You won’t end up in Leavenworth, Kansas… and no one will be any less ‘proud’ of you because you didn’t die.

      We ( ourselves ) are not going to settle this ‘did they make the right decision?’ with regards to the actual ( totally fatal ) deployment.

      This will be talked about ( hopefully objectively ) for YEARS.

      Reply

      • http://training.nwcg.gov/pre-courses/S390/Advantage%20Article.pdf good discussion of travel rates, with an eye to objective discussion of escape/ retreat.

        –Also, WTKTT, as a minor nit, I wouldn’t articulate military discipline in the manner you have. As regards WFF, I think the point is sound that they’re not expected to risk entrapment, though. As a practical matter for junior crew, there is some risk to thinking for oneself that probably goes with humans being social creatures, and there have been cases of retribution where a crew member acted on their own initiative to find a safe area to deploy, judging entrapment to be imminent.

        Reply

  52. Panebaker’s 154332 fire behavior photo shows possibly another PFD truck approaching Willis’s truck. That same truck can be seen in Panebaker’s 155726 Video and 155752 Video. It appears that the driver is wearing a white helmet. This truck also appears at the Ranch House photos by Tom Story.

    Sciacca?

    Reply

    • Calvin, could you please say which white truck in
      story’s photos you are talking about? I’m trying to close a gap and you may be about to help me…….

      Reply

      • Far left, behind the ambulance. Only the right half of tailgate, bumper and camper cover are visible.

        Reply

        • Reply to calvin post on June 12, 2014 at 4:33

          >> calvin said…
          >> Far left, behind the ambulance. Only the right half
          >> of tailgate, bumper and camper cover are visible.

          There is a ‘better’ view of this same white-with-red-stripe and camper-back pickup in Tom Story photos 1700 and 1701.

          You can see much more of the SIDE of the vehicle and the camper top in 1700 and 1701.

          I don’t think that’s the same Prescott FD pickup with camper back seen in the Panebaker videos as described above.

          The camper top isn’t matching.

          In the Panebaker videos… the camper top has more of an ‘angled’ edge to the rear of the side camper window than is seen in the Tom Story photos.

          Also… the Panebaker videos show that the side window of the camper top has an additional ‘sliding window’ in the center of it.

          If you zoom way far down on the side window of the camper top in Story photos 1700 and 1701… you don’t see this same ‘sliding window’ in the camper top. It’s more of just a ‘contiguous’ side window on the camper in those ( Story ) photos.

          They are BOTH definitely white pickups with red stripes on the side and ‘camper tops’, though.

          Still checking this out… more later.

          Reply

          • Confirming what calvin said above about the white Prescott Fire pickup with the camper seen heading EAST in Panebaker video
            155752. The driver appears to be wearing a WHITE helmet. ( Sciacca? )

            It also says “Wildland Division” on the driver side door right underneath the Prescott Fire Department logo.

            Reply

          • Tony Sciacca definitely DID ‘tie in’ ( physically ) with Darrell Willis after he had checked into the ICP and talked to Roy Hall.

            Sciacca actually ‘cloned’ his radio off of Darrell Willis’… so they were definitely ‘together’ at some point there on Model Creek Road.

            In his ADOSH interview… Siacca said he got to the ICP about 1455 ( 2:55 PM ) that day.

            Sciacca had talked with Willis via cellphone as he was driving down from Prescott, and Sciacca already knew that Willis was up on Model Creek Road.

            Roy Hall told Sciacca he was ‘too busy’ to talk to him and punted him over to Paul Musser. Musser was busy too and the only briefing Sciacca got was to copy some scribblings about where the 3 structure groups were off some hand-written piece of paper Musser had that he was calling is IAP ( Incident Action Plan ). This IAP didn’t even have any reference to any Hotshot crews even working the fire that day… so Sciacca didn’t even know GM and Blue Ridge were there until he saw their buggies in Yarnell.

            Pretty piss-poor briefing for someone who is supposed to be our in-bound Safety Officer.

            From Sciacca’s ADOSH interview…
            ____________________________________
            A: Tied in with him and, uh, Darrell had a, oh probably a half a dozen engines working. I mean I was just trying to get essay, new – new on the – new on the fire, you know, what you see is what you get out in front of you, so tied in with Darrell, making sure I had good frequencies. I cloned my radio off of his radio right then, making sure we had all the quality frequencies so I could, uh, discuss, uh, uh, what was going on back and forth.
            ____________________________________

            Sciacca then DID head down to Yarnell, found Gary Cordes, saw the BR and GM buggies coming out of Shrine area, etc.

            So this would match what is being seen in the Panebaker videos ( timewise ) for that Prescott Fire Department pickup with the camper top and says “Wildland Division” on the driver’s door under the PFD logo.

            Looks like the Panebaker videos definitely capture Sciacca heading down towards Yarnell after having gotten a clone from Darrell Wills up there on Model Creek Road.

            Reply

          • Also, the one in the video has what looks like little black handles sticking out of that side window. They’re not reflections, and the one in the photos doesn’t. And I can’t tell if the one in the photos has just a red stripe or a red stripe with white stripes on both sides of it. But still a great catch– I hadn’t even noticed that truck in that jumble of leaves. But I’m still not clear enuff to be definitive it’s a PFD truck just yet.

            And agree, that’s definitely Tony Sciacca in the video. Totally fits his interview, and I knew he would have been driving either a PFD truck or one of his own. Which is why I had kinda sorta been wondering if that “van” that just says “Fire” on it, sitting in the middle of everything from the get-go, might have been his.

            And the thing about helmets. I didn’t really think Tony would have been wearing a white “Incident Command” helmet on this fire, because he was just kinda called in the last minute via back channels to fill that role. That didn’t signify to me “Put your Incident Command Helmet on.”

            Until I read, today, Glenn Joki’s ADOSH “Interview 8-15-13.” RUN, don’t walk to read that interview NOW. It’s an eye-opening jaw-dropper.

            Joki went around and around and around and around trying to get a Safety Officer on this fire. He describes in great detail how the ROSS system repeatedly and totally failed him.

            So that’s when Roy Hall finally turned to Bea Day, the “IC of the Central West Zone team.” And they didn’t want to ask her for help, because for her to help by sending out her resources, she was compromising her team’s ability to respond to other things.
            As Joki says, “once you start to release people out of your void, out of your control…and have now starting to compromise your efficiency…”

            Joki goes on:

            “So what Bea Day did – she says, “Yeah. Roy, I’m gonna help you out immediately, I’m gonna start sendin’ people your way.”

            And the “word went out.”

            And then Joki got “a call or a text from Tony Sciacca.”

            “Wonderful person Type one IC I see runnin’ the Southwest area team.

            “He is…he’s a Type One IC, a Type One officer.

            “He immediately got in his truck and he came…to assist us.”

            So this is, apparently, the beginning of the whole “Is Bea Day gonna take over this fire?” – “Maybe” scenario.

            Which also speaks volumes to me (and maybe it shouldn’t all things considered), and not in a good way, about the essential “brushing off” Sciacca got from both Hall and Musser when he arrived and was trying to tie in. E wouldn’t even had been there if Joki hadn’t been insistent that the fire needed a Safety Officer and Bea Day hadn’t responded to Hall’s request for one by compromising her own team on behalf of his need.

            So, now, given all that, I can see why Tony Sciacca would have shown up with a white helmet on, all things considered.

            And so now it looks like the guy you can barely see in that white helmet way over on the right in the huddle with Paul Musser most likely is Tony Sciacca.

            And that white-helmet guy is the one I spent all day trying to figure out, and thought I had wrapped……until I read Calvin’s post and looked at that video.

            And realized my sureness that the guy in the red helmet was Sciacca and my day-long quest for the guy in the white helmet were in vain.

            But I’m happy to move forward!!!

            Reply

            • And so now we’re back to “who is the guy in the red helmet?” and “who is the guy in the yellow helmet and the shoulder-holster?” question, both of them seeming to be central characters in this scene.

              I really wish I knew what the “meaning” of a yellow helmet is. I’m not sure I can proceed without knowing that.

              Help?

              Reply

              • LOL… as I was typing “And now we’re back to who the heck is the guy in the red helmet”…

                …your post appears.

                Good post, Marti… and BTW… I DO agree with your previous observations about ‘red-helmet-with-mustache-and-two-radios’ guy.

                His FACE looks like Todd Abel… but not the body.

                So.. not Sciacca, not Abel, not Musser, not Cordes???

                We’ve got a FIFTH guy with a mustache and the typical ‘western cowboy’ look?

                Yikes.

                This really is like Joy Collura has said… though. The tree only falls after a certain number of hits with the axe.

                Just keep swingin’… and takin’ chunks out… and eventually the whole thing comes down.

                Re: Bea Day’s team.

                Yes… it’s starting to make more sense now what was REALLY happening that day. The more people from Bea Day’s time showed up that day… they didn’t give a damn whether Roy had already bumped up to Type 1 incident ( and took the Templin team straight out of rotation ) WHILE they were still headed to Yarnell.

                As the ‘Bea Day’ people all kept arriving ( Clawson, Hulburd, Yowell, Sciacca, Cole, yada, yada )… they all just looked to each OTHER and formed their own sort of ‘command’ team operating within the existing YFH structure.

                Sciacca gets blown off by Hall and Musser at the ICP so what does he do?… He immediately ties in with Willis for his clone and then heads to Yarnell to ‘tie in’ with Jason Clawson.

                I’m still finishing a longer post about all this. It’s complicated… right down to there being ‘shadow orders’ for just Hulburd and Yowell entered into the resource system 3 days later on July 3 with special notes saying they ‘assisted in securing the deployment site’ ( and so they could actually get paid for doing something that day )…

                …but there is no such ‘shadow’ or ‘backfill’ order for Jason Clawson. It’s like Clawson wasn’t even there.

                Backfill orders for Hulburd
                and Yowell… but not Clawson?
                Mistake?… or on purpose?

                Reply

                • LOL Backatcha!!

                  I’m realizing this whole “Bea Day’s Team” thing is a really a very crucial story within the story.

                  And it has

                  Reply

                • Yay iPad for screwing this up.

                  As I was saying…

                  And it has also added exponentially to our confusion.

                  It was really short-sided for ADOSH to have missed the importance of all this and not interviewed her or significant members of that team.

                  Especially after their interview with Glenn Joki. That interview was just screaming, “LOOK INTO THIS!!!”

                  Reply

                • So here is where I am at with the red helmet guy etc.

                  I have a hard time believing that is Todd Abel, because of his body.

                  On the other hand. Todd Abel showed up dispatched as a DIVS. No more and no less. Would he therefore have shown up with a red helmet?

                  Eric kept his red helmet on when he was acting as
                  DIVS. Although someone somewhere said that red-helmet thing should have been “passed down.”

                  I really wish someone who knows this stuff would weigh in here.

                  That’s why I called out my Help???

                  And just to be perfectly honest, I spent my whole day wondering who that guy in the white helmet (not Musser but with him) was, and thinking it might be Byron Kimball, because as FBAN he was a part of Incident Command and he did make it to to the Ranch House Cafe parking lot (ala his
                  ADOSH interview).

                  And because, in that video of Rance and Cougan and their trucks, there’s also a white-helmeted guy in that, too!

                  Problem was, in spite of the fact that Byron Kimball has done lots of stuff over his so-far quite productive career, I couldn’t find a single photo of him ANYWHERE!

                  Byron Kimball, keep in mind, is currently employed by AFD. So he would probably be associated with one of their trucks.

                  And since Musser was still doing the fire itself (not the incident within incident) it made a lot of sense to me that Byron Kimball would have been meeting with him in that huddle. Actually that makes more sense than Tony Sciacca being there, but…….

                  Who Knows???

                  Reply

              • Marti, I have not had time to look at the photos you two are referring to. Just a guess, the yellow helmet could be BLM? I remember a time ago when I saw the T Story photos and seeing a BLM rig, and maybe the yellow helmet is issued by them? I don’t know for sure though.

                Reply

          • OK so comparing the Tom Story photo with a media photo by David Kadlubowski/AP that I’m pretty sure includes the back of Willis’s truck. I’ve never done this kind of linking to my Dropbox before so I hope it works. The red stripe is much lower on Willis’s truck. And in the video of Tony’s truck, it looks pretty similar to Willis’s truck on the side.

            So this is why I’m not totally convinced that truck on the left of Tom Story’s photo is a PFD truck:

            https://www.dropbox.com/s/tobpzup91lezcgq/WillisPFD-Unknown.jpg

            Reply

            • Reply to Marti Reed post
              on June 12, 2014 at 10:38 pm

              >> Marti said…
              >> I’ve never done this kind of linking
              >> to my Dropbox before so I hope it
              >> works

              The link works fine, Marti.
              Thank you.

              >> Marti wrote…
              >> OK so comparing the Tom Story
              >> photo with a media photo by David
              >> Kadlubowski/AP that I’m pretty
              >> sure includes the back of Willis’s
              >> truck.

              Regarding that white pickup in the
              AP photo… it obviously says ‘Prescott Fire Department’ on the rear tailgate… but it really can’t be Willis’ white PFD pickup. There is no ‘toolbox’ in the bed of the truck, as there is in Willis’ truck. We also know Willis didn’t ‘remove’ that white toolbox at any time on Sunday because it is also still mounted in the bed of his pickup out at the deployment site the next morning as his truck was one of THREE being used to get the bodies out of there.

              Don’t forget that we know of at least TWO other Prescott Fire Department personnel who were there on Sunday ( and also part of Bea Day’s team? ).

              Conrad Jackson
              Mark Matthews

              We also know that these two PFD also ‘stayed the night’ there in Yarnell and were part of the honor guard the next morning ( which consisted of ELEVEN Prescott FFs and 1 Chino valley captain Dan Parker… who was Wade Parker’s father ).

              Conrad Jackson and Mark Matthews were ‘partners’… and they were BOTH working in the same project of setting up some sprinkler protection system(s) on the north end of the fire when the deployment took place… so maybe they were traveling together that day and this PFD white pickup in the AP press photo was THEIRS.

              Here is the ‘story’ of Conrad Jackson and Mark Matthews…

              In the article below… the reporter says that ALL THREE of the ‘white pickups’ used to transport the bodies away from the deployment site first thing in the morning were Prescott Fire Department pickups.

              Article Title: Crew recounts recovering bodies of 19 hotshots who died fighting Yarnell Hill fire.

              http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/07/08/crew-recovery-yarnell-hill-hotshots-bodies/2497831/
              ______________________________
              PRESCOTT, Ariz. — Half a mile beyond the nearest home, THREE white Prescott Fire Department pickups rolled up the south side of Yarnell Hill, into the wasteland.
              ______________________________

              >> Marti also said…
              >> The red stripe is much lower on >> Willis’s truck. And in the video of >> Tony’s truck, it looks pretty similar
              >> to Willis’s truck on the side.

              Yes. That ‘red stripe’ is there on the pickup in the Story 1700, 1701 photos… but it looks ‘higher’ than the normal PFD red stripe.

              >> Marti also said…
              >> So this is why I’m not totally
              >> convinced that truck on the left of
              >> Tom Story’s photo is a PFD truck:

              Agree. It’s really looking like that white pickup with red-stripe and camper at the extreme left edge of some of the Tom Story photos is NOT PFD…

              …but it was someone’s.

              I don’t think there were really any ‘civilians’ being allowed to park or linger in that north half of the RHR parking lot at that point in time. It was totally a ‘fire command’ staging area by then.

              I wish it WAS the same PFD ‘camper back’ vehicle seen in the Panebaker video… because if it’s not… then where the heck was Tony Sciacca’s white-pickup-with-camper parked?

              Are we even sure Sciacca had made it to the RHR parking lot by 5:08 PM, when Story started shooting all these photos? Maybe Sciacca was still up near Shrine road where Clawson, Hulburd and Yowell were?

              It has always seemed like Sciacca was there at RHR before Willis arrived there… but maybe that’s not even the case?

              One more point about the white truck in the AP photo. At the time that AP photo appears to have been taken… DPS Officer Eric Tarr’s notes say that THREE firefighters who said they were the ‘command’ for the ‘Incident within an Incident’ had already arrived out at the Boulder Springs Ranch and DPS Medic Tarr had ALREADY taken them back out to the deployment site and allowed them to go ‘under the tape’ with him to confirm body count(s). They all walked back to the BSR and DPS Medic Tarr got a ‘ride back to town’… but the 3 FFs who said they were the IWI ‘command’ ( Abel? Willis? Someone else? ) all STAYED out at the BSR and thus began all the planning for pushing the dozer line and arranging the ‘honor guard’ body removal.

              I am now going back to those Boulder Springs Ranch security videos to see if this moment that DPS Officer Tarr describes was captured in the videos.
              According to TARR… some ‘convoy’ of vehicles should have entered the BSR gate. If Willis’ pickup was one of them… then it can’t be his in that AP photo.

              More later.

              Reply

              • Wow. That’s a tough video/story to watch/read.

                Swartz’ photo of the three pick-up fronts in the parking lot FB_3_G has what looks like a PFD truck on the right side of the image. I bet that’s Jackson’s and Matthews’ truck.

                Reply

    • I may have to eat every word I’ve said about Tony Sciacca being the guy in the red helmet….

      But I guess that’s the way this thing goes……

      And now I have to go to a dinner party….

      Great catch, Calvin!!!

      Reply

      • OK I’m back from dinner and ready proceed. I just have to say this completely blows a theory I spent most of the day working on, but, hey, that’s how the scientific method works!!

        Reply

        • …and as Joy Collura has said… not every swing of the axe takes a bite out of the tree… but just keep swingin’ and eventually the tree falls.

          My big thing now is… who in the HECK was driving that all-white double-cab camper-top monster truck with just the work FIRE on the side that is sitting there right in the middle of everything throughout ALL of these pictures?

          That puppy is even sitting right there front and center in the Russ Reason interview video… while the Blue Ridge guys were still all huddled in the FRONT of the parking lot.

          Cordes’ personal vehicle? Non-Yavapai?

          Reply

          • Totally agree! About the chopping (which I did for ten years) and that dang truck!

            For awhile I thought it might be
            Tony Sciacca’s, all things considered, but today’s revelation nixes that.

            NOT Gary Cordes, because his truck is Central Yavapai, in Papich’s photo and one of Tom Story’s also.

            Todd Abel? He also works for Central Yavapai so maybe he would have arrived in a truck that may have looked like Gary Cordes’s?

            Could he have been “issued” an Arizona Fire truck when he was promoted to Incident Command?

            And whose truck is that Arizona Fire truck with the emt pallets in it that is also so prominent?? I don’t know how those trucks are “issued,” even though I spent a good portion of today studying the Equipment Resource Logs, I couldn’t find anything.

            Except for the fact that that specially modified Glendale FD truck that Esquibel was driving was, in fact, “officially dispatched.”

            Reply

            • >> Marti wrote…
              >> For awhile I thought it might be
              >> Tony Sciacca’s, all things
              >> considered, but today’s
              >> revelation nixes that.

              Agree. I was holding out hope that would just turn out to be Sciacca’s ‘bid dog’ tricked-up fire wagon.

              Not the case.

              That pretty much HAS to be Sciacca in the PFD white pickup that says ‘Wildland Division’ on it captured heading down to Yarnell in the Panebaker video ( thanks again to calvin for catching this today! ).

              SIDENOTE: Funny that Sciacca’s pickup would say ‘Wildland Division’ on the side… but the actual Wildland Division Chief’s pickup ( Willis’ ) does NOT say that. There is NO WRITING at all under the PFD logo on the side of Willis’ truck. Not even in the Scott Ash photos of it where we DO see the driver’s side door.

              >> Marti also said…
              >> Todd Abel? He also works for
              >> Central Yavapai so maybe he
              >> would have arrived in a truck that
              >> may have looked like Gary
              >> Cordes’s?

              I actually don’t think that ‘big white pickup’ that says FIRE on the side could be Abel’s, either… and here is why…

              I’ve already watched ALL the long-running Panebaker videos and have kept an eye out for this specific white pickup truck being seen coming EAST on Hays Ranch road.

              Anyone who is known to have come down to Yarnell from the ICP or anywhere up in Peeples valley HAD to have passed in front of those video cameras, unless they fell into one of the 2-3 minutes gaps between battery swap-out.

              The time that Todd Abel is SUPPOSED to have come down to Yarnell IS captured in the Panebaker video(s)… but there is no way I see that big-long white pickup with the word FIRE on the side passing the camera. Anyone heading EAST would also have the driver’s side facing the camera… so that word FIRE should be easily spotted on a white truck.

              I’m just not seeing it.
              Maybe I’ll go check again.

              Matter of fact… even if Abel wasn’t driving THAT white pickup… then one of the vehicles passing the Panebaker video camera in that timeframe MUST be his ( because we KNOW he headed down from the north to Yarnell in a specific timeframe ) so let me see if I can nail that down as well.

              More later…

              Reply

              • Typo above…
                Meant to say ‘big dog’,
                not ‘bid dog’

                First paragraph above should
                have read…

                “Agree. I was holding out hope that would just turn out to be Sciacca’s ‘BIG DOG’ tricked-up fire wagon.”

                Reply

              • Awesome, thank you! It’s miles past my bedtime….

                I just really think, all things considered,
                Todd Abel would probably have been driving a Central Yavapai – related,something.

                Reply

              • PS the photo with the flags over the bodies also has a completely extended white truck also, but it’s different from the one in the parking lot.

                Reply

              • Just to toss in some more interesting complexity or whatever.

                I think we are seeing Byron Kimball in some of these various photos and also in the Reason video.

                Sciacca says Byron was with Musser when Sciacca tied in with him.

                I think in Story’s 1678, he’s the guy on the right side of the image with the white helmet on and the safety goggles. As FBAN, he was part of Incident Command.

                I think it makes “science” that he would have come down to Yarnell at the same time as Musser.

                And that’s why he shows up at the same time we see Musser.

                And I think in the Reason video, we see him crossing the parking lot.

                In the huddle near the exasperating white van, there are two other white (or maybe a yellow) helmets, also. Probably one of them is Musser.

                Also, I think we see him in Swartz’ photos taken at 18:43 and 18:44 (although in 18:44’you can barely see him behind the Blue Ridge blue helmet. But in 18:43 he’s really clear.

                So that throws him into the vehicle mix also. He’s employed by Arizona Fire.

                Reply

                • Yikes.

                  Reading Byron Kimball’s ADOSH Interview. Totally changing my picture. He was in Glen Illah when the fire began to come thru it. And then went to Ranch House Parking lot.

                  (I now really think he’s who I’ve written above he is).

                  But his vehicle isn’t in that mix. He says he had to keep moving his vehicle because it was “on the wrong side of the road.

                  Also he
                  says, “And…watching the guys…talk…to Brendan three or four times where was the last time you saw him…where was, you know, trying to get reference as to how they could get set up to go in….”

                  This is a REALLY interesting interview.

                  Reply

                • And he continues (for you WTKTT who said you thought that might be Brendan and others looking at a map):

                  “And – where was that on the map and ah, versus, you know, did he know where they were planning on going…

                  …I do not know if he was aware of what they planned to use as their access route….

                  …down from – from where they were.

                  Um, at the time I didn’t realize that’s who it was…

                  …or what his job was.”

                  Reply

              • I just watched the two Air2Air videos – 1628_EP and 1716_EP.

                Sigh.

                I saw Sciacca come out, Musser come out, and Willis come out. And, frankly, none of the vehicles we’re scratching our heads over. No Central Yavapai truck, none of that State Fire that we see with the emt panels, no white van that says fire, nada.

                Reply

                • YAY!!!!

                  I just found something in the Air2Air video that might be a possible match for that State Fire truck in the Story photos with the emt pallets in back.

                  And, thus may be the truck Todd Abel was driving. (Because he had to come out somehow/sometime/somewhere.)

                  In the _1628_EP video, at 0:06:09,13 (i.e. 3:54ish PM) realm, a truck passes the camera that looks like that one in the parking lot, sans all the stuff they’ve put into it in the parking lot.

                  It’s the nearest match I’ve found in these videos, and it seems to be the “right” time. It’s about three minutes before we see Tony Sciacca pass in front of that camera.

                  I haven’t found anything anywhere else that resembles it.

                  Reply

  53. **
    ** JEFF ANDREWS AT THE YARNELL FIRE

    Reply to FIRE20+ post on June 10, 2014 at 11:18 am

    >> FIRE20+ said…
    >>
    >> Jeff Andrews is a former Supt off the Prescott IHC and I can
    >> understand his TFR request…for the dispatch office to say no
    >> well I do not understand that. TFR’s can be manipulated for
    >> any size, shape, AGL, etc…and there are different types.
    >> The 30 mile wide request could have been shaved down on
    >> whatever angle was encroaching on Phoenix airspace. The
    >> denial of the TFR only sped up the moving of GMIHC and
    >> hence the whole ‘investigation’. I would bet if a wildland
    >> investigation team was called FIRST the TFR would have been
    >> approved. And the media, well perhaps a few phone calls from
    >> the Governor or somebody of that sort could have convinced
    >> them of not trying to get close. And TFR airspace is protected,
    >> aircraft flying into that airspace would receive some sort of
    >> consequences.

    According to the WildCAD dispatch logs… at the time Jeff Andrews was asking for that 30 mile carte-blanche TFR ( Temoporary Flight Restriction ) zone at around 9:00 PM Sunday evening… this former Prescott IHC Supt. was already an OPS at the Yarnell Fire.

    They offered him a 15 mile TFR and he still said…
    “Negative… I want 30 miles”.

    AZ Dispatch actually didn’t ‘turn him down’… he just didn’t get what he was asking for. People at AZ Dispatch thought the request was unreasonable ( and unworkable ) and they ‘worked it out’. According to the Dispatch logs ( reprinted below ), someone named Padilla suggested a 10000 foot limit so as not to totally screw with Phoenix Airspace. A ‘Polygon’ was also eventually worked out.

    The actual request from Jeff Andrews ( and the ensuing conversations ) are reprinted below from the Dispatch logs… as well as the part from Darrell Willis’ ADOSH interview where he was telling the investigators how ‘worried’ everyone was that the media might get pictures of the deployment site, which was the top concern for ‘hurrying things up’ with regards to Sheriff’s office site investigation.

    ** DISPATCH LOGS ( FROM ADOSH FOIA/FOIL RELEASE )

    ** Dispatch Log Filename: AZ Dispatch WildCAD Log,
    ** Incident within the Yarnell Incident Burn Over ( PDF file )

    NOTE: This is also the Dispatch Log where ‘Bravo 3’ at the fire was officially reporting to someone named ALLI at AZ Dispatch that they ( Bravo 3 ) had been informed there were at least 25 ( TWENTY FIVE ) ‘personnel’ involved in the deployment.

    06/30/2013 – 17:15:27 ( 5:15.27 PM )
    From: BRAVO 3 ( B3 )
    To: ALLI
    B3: Air supervision… is there medical response reporting to this fire?
    ALLI: Yes. they are on standby.
    B3: A couple of Life Flights?
    ALLI: Yes… if we can get a fifteen minute when they can get in there
    and a good contact. Yes. Also… can we get an updated Lat/Lon to
    give to Life Flight?
    B3: Possibile Life Flight have them report to fire now please and have
    them come up on Air To Ground. Smoke is clearing.
    ALLI: Need a Lat/Lon?
    B3: Report to have Life Flight lift NOW and we will have the Lat and Long
    when they launch.
    ALLI: We are currently getting them launched. Do you have a number
    of personell involved?
    B3: HELO is to report 34 16×19 X 112 44.146 and come up on
    FREQS 134.175 and have them have Air to Ground.
    25 PERSONELL ARE INVOLVED.

    ** Dispatch Log Filename: AZ Dispatch WildCAD Log, Aircraft Log ( PDF file )

    https://www.dropbox.com/sh/20inrene9tcx74a/AADcKA8OPYRfLTM_Z1CR6dfRa/ADOSH%20Yarnell%20Hill%20Investigation/AZ%20Forestry%20Division/Dispatch%20Logs/AZ%20Dispatch%20WildCAD%20Log%2C%20Aircraft%20Log.pdf
    __________________________________________________________________
    06/30/2013 – 21:01:40 ( 9:01.40 PM )
    From: JeffAndrew
    To: WR
    JeffAndrew: We need to get a TFR as big as possible.
    WR: Talking here with Geyer and Tyler. We are planning at 15 miles.
    JeffAndrew: Negative. I want at least 30 miles and work with FAA.
    WR: Copy. We will work something out.

    06/30/2013 – 21:05:17 ( 9:05.17 PM )
    From: WR
    To: SWCC
    WR: OPs Chief order the TFR to a 30 mile but it will go into PHX airspace
    SWCC: Who is the OPs Chief?
    WR: Jeff Andrews
    SWCC: Copy. We will call you back.

    06/30/2013 – 21:10:50 ( 9:10.50 PM )
    From: WR
    To: Padilla
    WR: Giving you a heads up that Ops Chief order a 30 mile TFR
    and does not want any aircraft flying in it.
    Padilla: Well, that is pretty extensive.
    WR: Well, I’m thinking they don’t want any aircraft other than fire
    aircraft near the incident.
    Padilla: I understand that, and we can’t cease all operations.
    WR: Copy. I’m just giving you a heads up of what is going on.
    Padilla: Ok. How about this… we will fly above 10000 MSL on
    the Gladden MOA and on low levels I’ll try to cease on those.
    WR: Copy. Also… we are still working on decon and will let you
    know what MTRs are affected.
    Padilla: Yeah… send me an email and I’ll get on it tomorrow
    when I get in.

    06/30/2013 – 21:17:44 ( 9:17.44 PM )
    From: Kim
    To: WR
    Kim: Can’t impact that airspace so a polygon will have to work
    on this and also would recommend a 24 TFR.
    WR: Copy. We will get started on that.
    _________________________________________________________________

    ** DARRELL WILLIS’ ADOSH INTERVIEW…

    Apparently… at some point Willis was informed by Jeff Andrews that the carte blanche 30 mile TFR wasn’t going to be implemented and they would have to settle for a 10,000 foot limit polygon over site. Willis seemed to know that they could expect media choppers in the morning but that they wouldn’t be able to get any ‘good shots’.

    From Darrell Willis’ first ( of two ) ADOSH interviews on 08/19/2013…

    Q1 = Barry Hicks
    A = Darrell Willis
    _________________________________________________________________
    A: So a few of us stuck around and went to the Helms Ranch. Parked there and, ah, waited until the Sheriff’s investigation team came in the next morning. After they put that dozer line in.

    Q1: Yeah. So you guys stayed right there at the Helm Ranch out there.

    A: Mm-hm.

    Q1: Um, and they put the dozer line in during the night?

    A: During the night. Wanted to have it – there was a couple thoughts that was going through our mind. One, we didn’t want – we wanted to get the Sheriff in and out of there. He said he could do that really quick.

    Q1: Yeah.

    A: That we wouldn’t have news helicopters videoing all that. We wanted to get
    that done early, early. So the decision was made to put a dozer line so we
    could get the Sheriff in and get the body removal team out. In and out before
    the helicopters. The other thought was that we get air attack up at first light to
    keep all the news helicopters out of there. We knew we couldn’t keep them
    height-wise but we could keep them from getting a really good shot at them.
    __________________________________________________________________

    Reply

    • OK WTKTT, the TFR was not denied but reshaped and manipulated with a polygon…From your post above it looks as if the military training routes played a big part in the TFR size too. Padilla, I’m not sure who that is but seems as if they’re military and in charge of the MTR/MOA, hence the 10,000 MSL and not continuing the low level. In AZ MTR’s are a serious concern and need to be deconflicted asap, that’s normal ops.
      As far as Willis’ repeated remarks about getting the Sheriff in and out as quick as possible, well that’s just f*+#*d up. Reiterates the point of rushing the Sheriff’s part in the ‘investigation’. Ya ya ya they took 3D photos, it wasn’t the real thing. I get that he wanted to respect GMIHC and not allow the media to get footage, but again this wasn’t a crime scene as far as what the traditional meaning is. Does the Sheriff rush through all his investigations in fear of the media getting footage?? Does the Sheriff get pressured from the PFD to rush through investigations on the regular? BS And I really hate to say this, what’s the worse that would have happened if the media did get something? Just throwing it out there. Having no protocol for investigations when firefighters get killed rears it’s ugly head again.
      And the dozer line construction, well that’s a whole other topic.

      Reply

      • As far as the Sheriff trying to get things done quickly, yes, at the time of any accident, particularly one involving fatalities, the interests of those directly involve diverge, sometimes sharply, from either knowing what happened, or from the interests of the families of the deceased, in this case including the families of lowly paid seasonal employees who had no real say in where things ended up that day. The Sheriff couldn’t even rule out a crime until it was assured that, e.g.,, no chemical impairment or other similar issues were involved.

        As far as what happened if pictures made it into the press, yes it would have been unfortunate, but not so unfortunate to warrant a very non-thorough investigation. The reality is the day of the YHF itself was pretty informal, and that informality continued at the expense of any investigation after the burnover… and then some of the group debriefing techniques used later were even worse in terms of making clear information difficult to get.

        Reply

      • Reply to FIRE20+ post on June 11, 2014 at 4:56 am

        >> FIRE20+ said…
        >> Padilla, I’m not sure who that is but seems as if they’re
        >> military and in charge of the MTR/MOA,

        My best guess on the ‘Padilla’ that didn’t take kindly to the 30 mile TFR request from Jeff Andrews would be ‘Troy Padilla’, general manager of the Scottsdale Air Center.

        The Scottsdale Air Center is a ‘traffic control’ center for that area and they have online lists of active TFRs so it would make sense that ADC Dispatch would be ‘notifying’ him.

        The Scottsdale Air Center also handles a lot of work for the Border Patrol… so that would explain the military references/concerns.

        When Padilla says THIS to ADC Dispatch…

        Padilla: I understand that, and we can’t cease all operations.

        …I think his ‘all operations’ meant all the things that the Scottsdale Air Center that he is in charge of was responsible for.

        ** SCOTTSDALE, AZ, AIR CENTER
        http://www.scottsdaleaircenter.com/

        >> FIRE20++ also said…
        >> As far as Willis’ repeated remarks about getting the
        >> Sheriff in and out as quick as possible, well that’s just
        >> f*+#*d up. Reiterates the point of rushing the Sheriff’s
        >> part in the ‘investigation’.

        Personally… I don’t think Darrell Willis ( or any other Prescott Firefighters ) should have been part of that ‘Incident within an Incident’ team… or even allowed anywhere near the incident site… as soon as the magnitude of the event became known.

        Even people who described Willis following the deployment have stated he was ‘having a really, really hard time’.

        He should have been relieved of his duties and sent home.

        Ditto for all the other Prescott personnel that were there.

        They could have come back for some kind of honor guard thing when it was time to move the bodies the next day… but they really should have made sure all the Prescott FFs were NOT ‘spending the night’ out there… much less walking that deployment site before the police investigators arrived.

        >> FIRE20++
        >> I get that he wanted to respect GMIHC and not allow the
        >> media to get footage, but again this wasn’t a crime
        >> scene as far as what the traditional meaning is.

        Well… contrary to popular belief… whenever that ‘police
        tape’ goes up around a site where people have died… It IS considered a ‘crime scene’ for all intents and purposes.

        It is up to the INVESTIGATORS to decide whether any ‘foul play’ was involved… but until they show up to do their job the standard default assumption is that it IS a ‘crime scene’ and MUST be treated that way.

        It has to be that way. No one should be allowed to cross that ‘tape’ until the police detectives/investigators have had a chance to do THEIR job.

        If it DOES turn out that ‘foul play’ was involved… but you had people walking all over the scene and possibly ‘contaminating’ or ‘removing’ evidence… then good luck trying to prosecute that case in court.

        I don’t know WHO let the Prescott guys go ‘under the tape’ that night in advance of the real police investigators and walk all over that ‘crime scene’ putting their own tarps all over everything ( or doing other things ? ) just because they were worried about news helicopters…

        …but that should have NEVER happened.

        The scene was basically ‘contaminated’ before the real police investigators ever even got to do THEIR job.

        Reply

        • Copy on who Padilla is…thanks

          WTKTT said:
          “Well… contrary to popular belief… whenever that ‘policetape’ goes up around a site where people have died… It IS considered a ‘crime scene’ for all intents and purposes.”
          I understand this completely. My point was GMIHC didn’t get shot and killed by anybody, or were in a car wreck, or stabbed. They got burned over in a wildfire and like you said, this wasn’t even really a ‘crime scene’ until the Sheriff arrived at daybreak and threw up his crime scene tape.
          The ‘crime scene’ had been seriously compromised from the moment they were found. And I 1000% agree, like so many other people, that Willis and all close people tied to GMIHC should have been removed from the site. This would go back to the IC, Roy Hall…but then again this treatment of the deployment sight does mirror the entire YHF. And I quote SR’s post from above “The reality is the day of the YHF itself was pretty informal, and that informality continued at the expense of any investigation after the burn over”. Hindsight yes, hugely disappointing and could have been prevented. I can only hope that agencies realize dead firefighters deserve the most complete, thorough, HONEST investigation possible. I’m not holding my breath though.

          Reply

          • Industrial accidents are investigated as a crime scene. to insure there was no other influence involve with the deaths other than a fatal accident. the Sheriff dose not have the expertise to investigate a wild land fire burn over. I totally agree with every thing you said Fire20+.

            Reply

          • Reply to FIRE20+ post
            on June 12, 2014 at 4:45 am said:

            Totally agreeing with everything you have said above… including the idea that even with all the ‘big brass’ showing up in Yarnell that day… the screw-ups in the transitioning process gave a whole sense of ‘informality’ to the actual firefighting that day… like the actual command structure was ‘stuck on the runway’ and never really got ‘off the ground’, or something. Everyone was jockeying for position for the NEXT DAY and they were forgetting to keep tight control THAT day.

            There was confusion and chaos at the command level all day… and people died.

            However… I just wanted to clarify something about WHEN the site was first ‘taped off’ by law enforcement…

            >> FIRE20+ said…
            >> They got burned over in a wildfire and like
            >> you said, this wasn’t even really a ‘crime
            >> scene’ until the Sheriff arrived at daybreak
            >> and threw up his crime scene tape.

            I forgot to make myself clear up above.
            The ‘police tape’ was in place the moment DPS Eric Medic Tarr put it there just after confirming 19 dead at the site. It didn’t have to wait until the next morning when investigators arrived.

            There are MANY notes in DPS officer Tarr’s interviews about him doing this. He even borrowed some more tape from Prescott free-lancers Clawson, Hulburd and Yowell who were there at the site with Frisby and Brown in order to get the site ‘taped off’ as soon as he realized there were fatalties.

            Eric Tarr was a police officer. He was doing his job. He knew the moment he found the bodies that it was a potential ‘crime scene’ and it needed to be taped off… and he proceeded to do just that… right away.

            Those 6 men who were the first ones there at the site ( DPS officer Tarr and FFs Frisby, Brown, Clawson, Hulburd and Yowell ) were VERY aware that some of the men might have tried to RUN… or that there might be crucial evidence out from the deployment cluster itself… so they walked the area quite well out from the deployment site in order to make sure no bodies ( or other visible evidence ) was off somewhere else.

            Once they were sure what the ‘outer boundaries’ of the ‘incident site’ were… that’s when Eric Tarr started ‘taping it off’.

            The ‘pink’ tape seen strung along burned bush staubs in the YCSO photos is the same tape that was put in place immediately by DPS medic Eric Tarr on Sunday, before the sun even went down.

            So the site was ‘taped off’ by a legitimate YCSO DPS police officer just minutes after the bodies were found.

            But here is what is NOT clear, even from all the notes ( Eric Tarr’s included ).

            It is NOT clear WHEN an actual YCSO officer was posted at the site to keep others from ‘visiting’ or ‘fooling’ with the site.

            According to DPS officer Tarr… once he had taped off as much as he could… EVERYONE walked to the Ranch. Then 3 “Incident Commanders” show up at Ranch ( ?? Abel, ?? Willis, ?? A third guy ). Then ALL of them walked back to the site ( Tarr and now EIGHT firefighters ). Tarr borrowed more tape, taped off the south side, Ranger 58 shows up and takes those photos and videos of the site, then Tarr re-entered the TAPED OFF site with the 3 Incident Commanders to confirm the count again. Frisby, Brown, Clawson, Hulburd and Yowell then continued on WEST and back up the ridge to their UTVs… while Officer Tarr and the 3 “Incident Commanders” hiked back to the Ranch again and the deployment site was once again absent of any living person.

            Then that’s it ( as far as Officer Tarr’s notes ).

            Tarr says he got a ride back to town, but the 3 “Incident Commanders” stayed at the Ranch with no additional YCSO police presence either there at the Ranch or out at the ‘TAPED OFF’ site for an unknown amount of time.

            That’s just a summary. Don’t have to take
            my word for it. Here are Eric Tarr’s own notes about this from his signed testimony.
            ( EMPHASIS / ( Notes ) are mine )…

            DPS Officer Eric Tarr said…
            ____________________________________
            I obtained a roll of marking TAPE from one of the Firefighters who had arrived on the scene ( those 5 FFs would be Frisby, Brown, Clawson, Hulburd and Yowell ) and a second roll that I had with me and marked off the north half of the scene.

            I hiked out to the ranch house with the Firefighters and made contact with a female resident of the Ranch House.

            Three Firefighters arrived at the Ranch in trucks and they advised me they were Incident Commanders for this “incident within an incident.” ( No names given. Abel?? Willis?? A third guy? ). I briefed them on what I knew and had observed up to this point.

            As darkness was approaching… I hiked back to the scene with the original Firefighters ( Frisby, Brown, Clawson, Hulburd and Yowell ) AND the 3 Command Firefighters ( ?? Todd Abel, ?? Darrell Willis, ?? Third guy? ). This was approximately 1929 hours ( 7:29 PM ).

            I took marking tape from them and FINISHED TAPING OFF the south half of the scene.

            The Command Officer ( Todd Abel ?? ) asked me to confirm my count of 19 since his roster was only showing 18 names. I went back into the scene that I had TAPED OFF and confirmed my count of 19 deceased Firefighters and 19 deployed fire shelters.

            The THREE Command Officers FOLLOWED ME IN ( under the TAPE ) and also confirmed the count of 19.

            While I was TAPING OFF the south side of the scene, (Helicopter) Ranger 58 arrived back over the scene and advised me they had a Yavapai County Sheriff Deputy on board and were taking aerial photographs ( and video ) of the scene. I relayed THIS information to the COMMAND OFFICERS.

            I hiked back out to the Ranch with the Firefighters. I was given a ride out from the Ranch through Yarnell.
            I was the first person to arrive at the scene on foot. The Firefighters that hiked down from the ridgeline ( Frisby, Brown, Clawson, Hulburd and Yowell ) and the 3 Incident Commanders ( ?Abel, ?Willis, ? ) that arrived at the Ranch were the only personnel to enter the scene area that I had TAPED OFF.
            ____________________________________

            So we know that the entire ‘crime scene’
            had been totally TAPED OFF even before sunset that day… and when Officer Tarr and the 3 Command officers were done confirming the count and walked back to the Ranch… that should have been it for the ‘officially allowed’ visits to the ‘crime scene’ until the investigators arrived.

            The ‘crime scene’ had been TAPED OFF… but no TARPS had been placed over anything ( not by any police officer, anyway ).

            But here is what we still do NOT know…

            1) WHEN did another YCSO Deputy arrive on the ground to make sure the integrity of the TAPED OFF ‘crime scene’ was protected?

            2) WHEN did Willis and others decide that they were going to ‘alter the scene’ and place tarps all over everything ( and do other things at the site? )

            3) Was there EVER really a YCSO deputy out there at the scene even while the dozer line was being pushed later that night?

            4) If there WAS… then WHY did he let Willis and others go ‘under the tape’… and walk all over the ‘crime scene’ before the investigators had even arrived?

            Reply

  54. Tom Story image 1691 appears to show Chief Willis standing in front of his truck just to the right of the Yellow helmeted FF (with a black ball cap on) and facing the camera

    Reply

    • Reply to calvin post on June 10, 2014 at 6:29 pm

      >> calvin said…
      >> Tom Story image 1691 appears to show Chief Willis
      >> standing in front of his truck just to the right of the Yellow
      >> helmeted FF (with a black ball cap on) and facing the camera

      I would say definitely… yes.

      For 3 reasons…

      1) It looks like him ( Darrell Willis ).

      2) Whoever WAS sitting in that Prescott F-250 pickup has exited the vehicle. There is no one sitting in it when this photo was taken… because you can see right through the passenger side window to the inside of the driver’s side door and also straight over to the little orange light on the BLM truck sitting across the Highway.

      3) Willis was KNOWN to be wearing a BLACK ball cap that day.

      In Story photos 1684, 1685, 1686 and 1687 we see the FF with the red-helmet who WAS previously standing where Willis was about to park now standing by Willis’ open passenger-side window and interacting with Willis inside the pickup.

      If you ZOOM way far down in these photos onto that part of the photo… you can actually SEE Willis sitting inside the pickup… and he does, indeed, have a BLACK ball cap on.

      What also seems to be happening in this series of 4 photos is the that red-helmeted FF has apparently given Willis the radio that he was holding in his right hand… and you can actually see Willis fooling with that handheld radio inside the truck. Willis seems to actually be replacing the antenna on it with a longer, 16 inch extension antenna. It’s hard to tell… but that certainly would be my guess as to what Willis was doing with that handheld radio inside the truck, at that point.

      Photo 1691 is definitely the ‘clearest’ view of Darrell Willis standing there with those other men in front of his pickup… but Tom Story seemed to have captured Willis’ actual first EXIT from his truck a few photographs BEFORE that one.

      Tom Story photo 1688 seems to the FIRST photo in that series which shows that Willis has exited his pickup and is now standing with that ‘group’ that has formed right in front of his F-250 pickup. Willis is mostly hidden behind the FF with the yellow helmet and the black back-straps… but you can still see MOST of Willis’ BLACK ball cap and some of his face there behind the other FF. Willis also seems to be holding the same BK radio with a red clamshell battery extension that he was fiddling with a minute ago when he was sitting in his truck.

      Photo 1688 was taken at 5:09 PM… just one minute after Willis actually pulled into the parking lot. So Willis only sat in his truck talking to that FF with the red-helmet for about a minute before he got out of his truck and walked to the front of it.

      Photo 1688 also now shows the ‘red-helmet’ FF that was previously talking to Willis through the window of his truck ( and the one that has the LCES sticker on the back of his red helmet ) with a water-bottle in his hand and walking SOUTH in the parking lot, passing in front of the passenger door of Willis’ F-250 pickup.

      By the time Tom Story ‘re-positioned’ to the back of the Ranch House Restaurant parking lot and began taking that next series of photos at that location… this ‘meeting’ that was taking place in front of Willis’ pickup has apparently ‘broken’ up… but we can see the same ‘yellow helmet’ FF with the black backstraps AND the same FF that has ‘Central Yavapai’ writting in block letters on the back of his Nomex shirt now LEANING against the side of Willis’ pickup truck. The FF with the yellow helmet appears to be interacting with someone sitting in the truck again ( so maybe Willis returned to his vehicle and is sitting in the driver’s seat again at this point )… but the other FF with ‘Central Yavapai’ on the back of his shirt is just ‘leaning’ on the hood of Willis’ truck.

      HOWEVER!… it is ALSO possible that right after that ‘meeting’ that took place in front of Willis’ truck… Willis did go right over to ‘find Brendan McDonough’ over there on the right side of the photo.
      That actually would now match Willis’ own description in his own ADOSH interview of what he did. He told ADOSH investigators that it was Todd Abel himself who told Willis “You know… you’ve got one of your crew standing over there” and he gestured over to where the GM vehicles were parked. Willis said he then did, in fact, “go over to check on Brendan McDonough”.

      When I originally thought I saw Brendan McDonough ‘appearing’ in the gap between the GM vehicles in these Tom Story photos… I also was taking Willis’ word for when he arrived at the Ranch House Parking lot. Willis said it wasn’t until 1715 ( 5:15 PM ),
      which would have been AFTER the end of Tom Story’s photos.

      Now that we know that isn’t true… and that Willis and his pickup ARE really ALREADY THERE circa 1508 ( 5:08 PM ) and in most of these Tom Story photos… then it now is perfectly possible that the person Brendan McDonough ( if that really is him ) *might* be having a conversation with there between the GM trucks is Darrell Willis himself. The timing would now ‘match up’ for this to be the case and Tom Story really did capture that moment when Darell Willis first ‘met’ with Brendan McDonugh following deployment.

      Anyway… back to Tom Story’s SECOND sequence of photos
      taken from the BACK of the parking lot…

      A ‘new’ meeting has now formed at the front of the AZ Forestry pickup with the square logo under the access cab window… and THIS meeting now has TWO FFs with WHITE helmets talking to a very tall FF with a RED helmet and black backstraps. There is also a fourth FF at the left side of this ‘meeting’ with a black ball cap… but THAT FF does not appear to be Willis. He’s a little too ‘small’ in stature to be Willis but that might only be appearances since he is standing to the left of that FF with the RED helmet who appears to be VERY tall.

      This first Tom Story photo in that ‘next’ series taken from the BACK of the parking lot is photo 1692. It was taken at 5:12 PM… 3 minutes after the ‘other’ meeting that took place in front of Willis’ truck circa 5:09 PM.

      ** Summary of photo 1691…

      So… can we really ‘identify’ that GROUP standing in front of Willis’ pickup truck now? I hope so.

      From left to right ( in 1691 )…
      _____________________________________________________
      (1) FF with yellow helmet and black harness straps over shirt.

      OPS1 Todd Abel?

      (2) FF with black ball cap, clean shaven

      SPGS2 Darrell Willis. ( Confirmed now? )

      (3) FF with his left hand in the air and “Central Yavapai Fire” written in block letters on the back of his shirt

      ?? I still have no idea

      (4) FF with no headgear on… and a mustache… looking at FF 3.

      SPGS1 Gary Cordes?

      (5) There is a FIFTH firefighter in this ‘meeting’ at the front of Willis’ pickup but he is completely obscured by FF (3) and FF (4).

      OPS2 Paul Musser?
      ______________________________________________________

      Marti has said…

      “To me, the guy in a yellow helmet walking towards the camera between the ambulance and Brush 103 looks like a dead ringer for Todd Abel”.

      That would be Tom Story photo 1700… and I AGREE.
      THAT FF really does look like Todd Abel.

      So YES.. that would mean Todd Abel was wearing a ‘yellow’ helmet that day… but now I’m not sure we can say that ‘yellow helmeted’ FF next to Willis in 1691 is Todd Abel. I am not seeing any evidence in photo 1700 that Todd Abel was wearing the same ‘black straps’ that we see the ‘yellow helmeted’ FF wearing ( on his back, anyway ), in photo 1691.

      So if we can’t really say the FF with the yellow helmet in 1691 standing next to Willis is Todd Abel ( because of the black backstraps inconsistency ), then one big remaining question is WHO would that yellow helmeted FF in 1691 be, OTHER than Todd Abel? I haven’t a clue.

      Could it be that the ‘yellow helemted’ FF in both photos 1691 ( standing next to Willis ) and in photo 1700 ( walking face-front towards Brush 103 ) really are BOTH Todd Abel… but at some moment between when 1691 and 1700 was taken… Todd Abel simply ‘removed’ whatever it was that is showing thost ‘black harness straps’ on his back in photo 1691?

      ** Additional NOTE regarding Tom Story photo 1691…

      The ‘red helmeted’ FF that WAS standing where Willis would park and WAS talking to Willis through the passenger window of his truck just after Willis pulled into the lot is (apparently) now seen on the very left side of photo 1691… taking a drink from a water bottle.

      When we saw him standing right where Willis was about to park… he was holding TWO radios ( one in each hand ).

      In the photos where he is talking to Willis through the window of the truck… he appears to have already given one of those radios to Willis and Willis can apparently be seen attaching a 16 inch antenna extension to it while he was still sitting in the truck.

      In THIS photo… that same red-helmeted FF taking the drink from the water bottle now appears to only have ONE radio… and it is now sitting in his left-rear pants pocket… so Willis must still have the one he gave him right after Willis pulled into the parking lot.

      ** Additional proof that the F-250 was being driven by Darrell Willis

      BTW: If there needs to be anymore proof that this white-with-red stripe F-250 pickup with the white toolbox and the ‘Prescott Fire’ logo on the door WAS the vehicle that belonged to Darrell Willis that weekend…

      …the extra proof lies in that now famous photograph taken the next morning of all of the body-bags containing the 19 dead Hotshots draped with FLAGS out at the deployment site.

      THAT photo was taken by someone in the 12 man ‘honor guard’ that had already driven out to the deployment site and was preparing to load the bodies into 3 pickup trucks. It was then originally posted to a public Facebook account later that morning and then published by the mainstream media ( Including AZCENTRAL ).

      Darrell Willis was ‘leading’ that honor guard the next morning and his vehicle was the ‘lead pickup truck’ used for body removal.

      This very same F-250 pickup with the white toolbox is right there in that photograph as the ‘lead pickup’ with its tailgate down and ready to receive the first set of body bags.

      Here is that original photo published by AZCENTRAL showing the flag-draped body bags AND Willis’ pickup at the deployment site…

      The Arizona Republic ( AZCENTRAL )
      Title: Yarnell fire photo of fallen firefighters stirs controversy
      By Shaun McKinnon and Rebecca McKinsey – Fri Jul 5, 2013

      http://www.azcentral.com/news/arizona/articles/20130704yarnell-fire-photo-fallen-firefighters-controversy.html

      NOTE: The photo taken at the deployment site the morning
      of July 1, 2013 is at the BOTTOM of the article.

      Reply

      • Followup…

        That photograph of the flag-draped bodies at the link above still seems very poignant to me… because it is STILL one of the best pieces of photographic evidence that vegetation over in that boulder pile just 100 yards to the north of them never burned at all that day… and that the ‘scorch lines’ on the boulders STOPS not too far from the floor of the canyon itself.

        In the upper left corner of the photo… there is even a TREE that remains silhouetted against the sky like some kind of silent witness to the tragedy… and totally undamaged by the fire.

        Reply

          • WTKTT–
            The real facts are they would have had to almost crawl through the brush to get to the boulders and then crawl over and around them. You are looking at a burned land scape that is easy to say they could have gone here or there, that is not the reality they faced, with no time to find a better location.

            Reply

            • I have to partially dissent as regards time. They had several minutes. Without packs and tools, some of the crew at least could have made it to the boulder. Whether they would have survived there, or perished there, I don’t think can be known. I agree that pre-burn a “normal” time to travel that distance might have been much longer, as witnessed by GM’s own painfully slow pace through that ground before they knew they were entrapped. For a short distance, primarily sidehill, it may have been painful and disorderly, but still likely doable. To me that is why the “they chose the best spot to deploy” comment from Willis after is so grating — no, they did not, and a better spot(s) could have been sought.

              Reply

              • SR I can only say if your not planning as you move and Identifying safe locations to move to or stay close to you are steadily making your situation worse. They should have never been where they were. That being said they should have been paying much more attention to their surroundings. They were just not planning a safe route or anticipating a need to retreat to open areas. If as we have discussed over the past months they were relying on deployment in an emergency then they were in deep trouble and not thinking about other locations when faced with the Fire they simply cleared and deployed. No situation awareness, no plan, no safety
                just move from point A to point B. Just a walk in the park………….

                Reply

                • I regularly follow this site. I have several comments that I keep to myself. I am glad that all of you are passionate about finding the truth of what happened that day. But please be careful at assuming you know what the boys were thinking, planning, doing, had done, knew or were capable of. Some of the assumptions make me sick with anger. You were not there. You did not know them. You are working on finding out the truth – please do this without condemning those you did not know or work with. I only want to hear you opinion of what they thought or did from those who did work with GMIHS. This will led to the truth faster if we do not have to swamp threw your personal misleading comments.

                  Reply

                  • Debora I am sorry for my statements as I know they do not sit well with the survivors But with over 30 years of wild land fire fighting and what I have seen read and lived I can come to no other conclusion. There was no safety plan the 10 standard orders were violated where they were broke every rule in the book it was simply not safe. Their supervisors put them there and for all of me I do not know why they made that decision. Critical decisions were made and safety was not followed, that’s the simple truth. I find no other answers to change those facts. What I said above I stand by. Based on my knowledge and back ground. They are not misleading comments they are simple fact.
                    worked with thousands of Fire fighters I am not condemning them I am stating what happened not why it happened. They should have never been where they were and every thing else is for others to not end up in the same place.

                    Reply

                  • Amen-
                    =====
                    adventures with Tex (Sonny) are final and he travelled North today and like others say—the saga continues just a respite.

                    Reply

            • Reply to Bob Powers post
              on June 11, 2014 at 11:01 am

              >> Mr. Powers wrote…
              >> The real facts are they would
              >> have had to almost crawl through
              >> the brush to get to the boulders

              No doubt… but as far as we know… they had to do the same level of ‘crawling’ just to find the deployment site… unless they actually just happened to be standing in it at the moment they realized the danger they were in.

              >> and then crawl over and around >> them. ( the boulders ).

              Yes. There would have been nothing EASY about it. Maybe even only the youngest and/or the strongest would have had any chance of survival.

              >> You are looking at a burned land
              >> scape that is easy to say they
              >> could have gone here or there,
              >> that is not the reality they faced,
              >> with no time to find a better location

              I am going to echo SR’s comment above about TIME. This really is the one single factor that governs even the possibility that they had any other ‘options’ than what they did.

              So what do we REALLY know about that, even now?

              In the Helmet Cam video… the TIME SPAN from the start of Steed’s very first “We are in front of the flaming front” radio call to the last known ( clear ) transmission from Eric Marsh saying “Affirm” is exactly 2 minutes and 28 seconds.

              Following that… there is nothing but Bravo 33 calling out to them and then just ‘keyed mics’ and patches of static in response.

              If you *assume* that these patches of static that immediately follow each of Bravo 33’s calls to them are, in fact, some attempt to respond to Bravo 33 then that still only adds the following amount of time…
              ______________________________
              1 minute 49 seconds after “Affirm”…
              B33: …it’s gonna be tough to see ya.
              GM?: ( Immediate keyed mic + static )

              2 minutes 14 seconds after “Affirm”…
              B33: …do you hear a helicopter?
              GM?: ( Immediate keyed mic + static )
              _______________________________

              So even if BOTH of those ‘keyed mic’ followed by ‘static’ events were, in fact, GM’s attempt to respond to the direct callouts to them from B33… that only adds a maximum of 2 minutes and 14 seconds to the overall time they *might* have still been able ( and trying ) to respond.

              So without assuming ANY of the ‘static’ was actually from GM… the Helmet Cam only establishes a time of 2 minutes and 28 seconds that they were ‘known to have’.

              WITH the ‘assumption’ that the static was ALSO them ‘trying to respond’… that still only establishes a maximum time of 4 minutes and 42 seconds that they were ‘known to have’.

              ( 2:28 plus 2:14 equals 4:42 ).

              We still do NOT have any actual TOD ( Time of Death ) for ANY of these men… and it’s no use even speculating about that… but we also NOW know that even when Steed made that first MAYDAY call… the saws were already running.

              That means that some time HAD already passed between when they first realized the danger they were in and Steed got around to calling Bravo 33.

              It means they had to have already done all of the following…

              1) Realize they were in deep trouble.
              2) Consider options.
              3) Decide to deploy.
              4) Line of 19 assembles into a group.
              5) Find deployment site.
              6) Assemble crew at chosen site.
              7) Directions given to all crew.
              8) Ropes pulled on saws. Get to work.
              9) Steed makes first MAYDAY call.

              I would say there is no way steps 1-8 above could have taken place in anything less than about 120 seconds ( 2 minutes ). It might have been much more ( in the 3-4 minute range ).

              So let’s say it was *only* 120 seconds for steps 1-8 above to have taken place before Steed’s first MAYDAY.

              That adds 2 minutes and now leaves us with…

              Not counting ‘static’ as ‘real transmits’
              4 minutes and 28 seconds.

              Counting ‘static’ as ‘real transmits’
              6 minutes and 42 seconds.

              So I would say that is ‘all we really know’ when it comes to factoring in how much TIME they really had to do anything at all.

              Unless some ‘new’ evidence comes to light… it was only somewhere between a minimum of 4 minutes and a maximum of 7 minutes.

              One more point on this, however.
              There is STILL that evidence from Blue Ridge’s testimony to SAIT investigators that they FIRST heard ‘yelling’ on the TAC 1 frequency… and only some time AFTER that did they begin to hear Steed’s MAYDAY calls to ‘Air Attack’ over the A2G channel.

              The SAIT investigators did not ‘follow this up’… and ADOSH was never allowed to interview Blue Ridge at all. In addition… the BR written logs that were given to ADOSH at the last moment were so heavily redacted that ALL potential references to this sequence ( and the timeframes )
              were TOTALLY redacted ANY time one of the BR Hotshots was obviously recalling these moments in their notes.

              So if that actually DID happen ( Steed first tried to contact someone on TAC 1 and advise of the emergency )… we have no idea WHEN that might have happened… or how much TIME that would add to the overall timeframe for decisions/action out in the canyon.

              Maybe someday we will actually see the UNREDACTED versions of all those Blue Ridge unit logs… or Blue Ridge will someday be given ‘permission’ to discuss this incident freely without losing their jobs.

              Reply

          • Reply to TTWARE post
            on June 11, 2014 at 8:50 am

            >> TTWARE said…
            >> The tree in question is burned,
            >> just not nuked.

            Copy that. Definitely NOT ‘nuked’… but the
            level of ‘burn’ is hard to make out. Could have been minimal.

            I really wish SOME investigator ( out of all the ones that were involved ) would have had the good sense to go into those boulder piles and take some GOOD ( close-up ) pictures of the vegetation that obviously remained there even after the fire passed by.

            For no other reason… you would think the ‘Fire Behavior’ people would have thought to do that… but they didn’t.

            There is still the chance that if we ever get to see the photos ( and VIDEOS ) of the area that WERE taken from the AIR from DPS chopper Ranger 58 just 2 hours after deployment by that YCSO Police Captain and his iPhone… we might get a better idea of where the fire really did ( or did NOT ) encroach on those boulder piles.

            Reply

            • WTKTT and SR
              I am going to say this one more time and then I am going to move on.
              Fires always burn in erratic behavior.
              Fires leave un burned fuel and even islands of unburned areas.
              Try to guess where the fire wont burn and run there because some areas might not burn, what’s the percentage of being in the right spot if there is one. We trained to not go into boulder areas why? Increased and reflective heat especially Bolder areas mixed with fuel. that is why they did not retreat to the boulders.
              Again I will say they were in the worst place they could have been and should never have been there. They had no choice of a safety zone only deployment in the worst place for a deployment. Would of should of could of dose not change the facts.
              when your caught in a burn over it is not normally a place of your choosing, you made a big mistake and hear you are. you have one choice left get in the fire shelter and pray. In some cases the fire shelter is survivable in others????
              Some day I hope there will be better fire shelters until then never put yourself in a place you may have to use them. And I can attest along with many others that can be accomplished and still fight fire.

              Reply

              • Bob,

                Regarding boulders, I have to disagree again. Training in fact references boulders and large rocks as places of potential refuge. In GM’s case, they weren’t choosing between an open, flat clearing on a shoulder than wasn’t quite an SZ, or some boulders. Had that been the case, I agree the boulders would not have been the preferred choice. GM, rather, had 1) features on either side — boulders and rock outcroppings — which training in fact identifies as places of refuge, and 2) deploying in the middle of dense fuels with a certainty of sustained direct flame contact, with the idea that they would take time to burn out, but where the dense fuels meant that burning out could not be effective given the time they had.

                I completely agree they never should have been where they were to begin with. I believe that the same decision process that led to their bushwhack likely caused them to feel comfortable not staying mindful of possible places of refuge as they made their way through the green. I do believe there are a couple training takeways there for others. But, certainly agree there’s no assurance what would have happened had they made they way into the boulders instead in GM’s case. Perhaps most relevant in their case as one more in a long list of decisions or lack of action that were counter to established guidelines.

                Reply

                • Large rack slides and large bolder fields with a lack of vegetation if there is time to get to the middle of them are good places but training for 1 or 20 men is a huge difference crawling into boulders to save 20 verses 1 or 2 is a huge difference. The bolder fields I saw on before and after photos were not survivable for a crew and maybe not even 1 person the pre heated air would have moved thru them if not the fire until it reached the top of the ridges, the fire may not have scorched the rocks but the preheated air would have taken there lungs what of that do you not understand in that canyon there was no place to hide 600+ degrees will take your lungs out with out the flames burning you. Think about more than the flames. with out a big enough area and a shelter completely deployed and sealed you could not survive in a rock crevice, it just dose not work that way.

                  Reply

                  • Large rock slides with no vegetation can actually make SZs. I agree the boulders/ridge outcroppings in question were not SZs. Your point about heated air (and by extension possible lack of O2 even if air temps in a given area were not too high otherwise) is a good one. But, those rocks still offered far more shelter than where GM chose to deploy. Remember, the boulders didn’t have to offer assurance that all 19 would survive, or even make it to a place of intermediate shelter, to be a far better choice than dense brush with sustained direct flame contact in the middle of the bowl. There is a ranking of last-resort options here. I think the training takeaway here is the general principle of mindfulness, and the specific issue of being mindful of, and analyzing, last-resort options.

                    Reply

      • I think you’re getting really close here! Especially now that we no longer have to argue about Gary Cordes!! And thanks to you and Calvin for catching Darryl Willis in these.

        When I wrote my comment about the Cougan/Rance video, I commented that I was re-thinking Todd Abel. I didn’t go further about that. I still wasn’t sure.

        But I was starting to think, because of his significance/centrality in these photos, that the guy in the yellow helmet with the shoulder harness could be Todd Abel. And the deal is, the photo (1700) of the guy whose face is a “dead-ringer for Todd Abel” also has the yellow-helmet guy with the holster. So I knew they couldn’t be the same guy. And the problem is, there are no photos that show the holstered yellow-helmeted guy’s face. (It is SO HARD to ID people in photos when all you see are their backsides…..). And he still seems to me to be a little bit short, relatively speaking, but I’m willing to concede on that. He doesn’t seem as not-Todd-Abelish and seriously Tony-Sciacca-ish as the guy in the red helmet.

        But I kept thinking, all things considered, Todd Abel had to be more present in all this stuff that’s going on! And you don’t see the other yellow-helmeted guy in all these important “meetings.”

        I’m guessing the guy with “Central Yavapai Fire” on his back might be connected to that Central Yavapai Fire Engine.

        Which leads back to the issue of vehicles, which I’m always trying to figure out. Since Todd Abel came on to the fire as a DivS, he would, I assume, not be connected to one of those State Fire trucks. I would think he would be driving a Central Yavapai truck (but I doubt the engine, but who knows??)

        I’ve been really wondering whose truck that white covered truck that just says “Fire” is that’s in all the Tom Story photos from the get-go. I’m currently thinking that is Tony Sciacca’s given his relative agency-independence on this fire. And since I’m about 90% positive the red-helmeted guy is Tony Sciacca, I find it intriguing that he would have handed off a radio to Darryl Willis. Hmmmmm

        I decided the other night I think the tall guy with the red helmet and shoulder holster may be Dan Philbin. He seems super tall, relatively speaking. He’s seen in 1682 and 1683 walking in right after the BLM truck arrives, with a decal on his helmet that corresponds to the sign on that BLM truck.

        I think it’s also helpful to remember, as we examine these priceless photos, that, by this time, Todd Abel is coordinating the Incident Within the Incident, I.e. the deployment, and Paul Musser is coordinating the rest of the on-going fire management. There’s probably a bit of overlap, but I would guess those “huddles” had specific — and, thus, different, purposes.

        Reply

        • Reply to Marti Reed post on June 11, 2014, 7:55 pm

          >> Marti said…
          >> I decided the other night I think the tall guy with
          >> the red helmet and shoulder holster may be Dan
          >> Philbin. He seems super tall, relatively speaking.

          Here’s a clear picture of Dan Philbin.

          Only one I could find via ‘The Google’.

          It’s from back in 2006 when he was the Superintendent of the Fort Apache Hotshots.

          His picture is on page 5 of this Bureau of Indian Affairs PDF newlsetter date March, 2006.

          He’s standing in the back row, second from left.
          Yes… it seems he’s a pretty TALL guy.

          http://www.bia.gov/cs/groups/xnifc/documents/text/idc012097.pdf

          >> Marti also wrote…
          >> He’s seen in 1682 and 1683 walking in right after
          >> the BLM truck arrives, with a decal on his helmet
          >> that corresponds to the sign on that BLM truck.

          Yes. That would match his ‘real job’ with
          Arizona BLM.

          Here is Dan Philbin describing his OWN current job with Arizona BLM during the opening of his ADOSH interview. Philbin was accompanied at his ADOSH interview by John Guadio.. an attorney for the US Department of the Interior…
          __________________________________________
          A: And I’m Assistant Fire Management Officer Phoenix District BLM Dan Philbin.

          A1: This is John Gaudio from the Interior Department Solicitor’s Office.
          __________________________________________

          Reply

  55. I wanted to go back and clarify a couple of things I said about the number of fire fatalities over the past 100 years 1910 to 2013
    From the inception of the 10 standard orders Nationally 1957 to 1987 30 years.
    132 burn over’s or entrapments includes the Loope fire of 12 fatalities.
    That’s 4.5 fire/burn fatalities per year est. of less than 1% of total fire fighters.
    So I still bet on the 10 standard orders saving lives.
    In 1972 I was on and established the Safety First program and direction for Region 5 California Fire Safety Program.
    1973 to 1993 California experienced only 15 fire burn fatalities that is a testament to the recommendations we made which also included reemphasizing and retraining on the 10 and 13/18.
    Again this tells me that following the basics (TEN STANDARD ORDERS) saves lives and are as good today as 30+ years ago.
    During the period 1957 to 1993 there were very few actual shelter deployments
    Which says maybe we are relying to heavily on them scene 1994.
    They are only a tool and a tool is only as good as the person that uses it and its development for the use it was intended. Safety is always the best accident prevention.

    Reply

    • we met just now the grandfather to a CALfire firefighter and he states Bob Power is spot on—
      follow the rules and these men did not but for me I want to learn how come they did not—
      especially when Marsh was SET and AT EASE staying in the black.
      Sure, they made the decision to lead the crew down the canyon but until the day I pass on I will always hope for more clarity to the YHF.
      Simple.
      like I said on this page once…
      does the sun rise and does the sun set?
      Most think YES—sure yet facts are it appears to rise and set because of the Earth’s rotation on its axis but it really cores down to appears—
      it appears the SAIR stands by their report from THEIR position in this yet I know better that it sets different among others yet in it all we all state facts. I can tell you the facts from my position like it is hot today right here and from your position of where you are you may say it is hotter or colder yet it still remains we both just stated a fact. Karel can state he stands behind it but I along with others will always seek the truth and clarity to the YHF. Simple.

      Reply

      • Joy for my whole life I wondered why
        1. My Father volunteered to pack lunches to the crew?
        2. Why my father decided to stay and eat lunch with the crew?
        3. Why when he went to look at the main fire he or someone else did not stay as a look out?
        4. Why he was not one of the 9 or the first to get out and the rest died?
        Joy there are just some things we will never know……….
        Choices are made in life and we who are still here move on.

        Reply

        • Joy there are just some things we will never know……….
          Choices are made in life and we who are still here move on.
          ============
          Me; someone who as well has lived through severe trauma before to my life—get your comment yet without the homeowners who showed us the information they did then you all and others cannot properly assess this as well as the ground to aerial folks because this Yarnell fire is not the fire you faced and are left with questions that cannot be answered— THIS fire can be answered if people would just start showing and speaking their accounts- That is a for sure. I am very sensitive to your loss but this is Yarnell Hill Fire where there are details just not yet shown is all and as well my stolen sd card from the cabin that has more information. Are you the same Bob Powers from New York? If so, when I lived in New York in the 80/90’s I think we met. I was in the Manhattan-Albany-Hyde Park areas.

          Reply

          • No never been there born in Oklahoma and Raised in the mountains of California. Lived half my life here in Idaho.
            I hope there are more answers to come but I am afraid most have been uncovered.
            Maybe some where down the road we will learn more.

            Reply

        • Reply to Bob Powers post
          on June 10, 2014 at 2:32 pm

          >> Mr. Powers wrote…
          >> Joy for my whole life I wondered why
          >> 1. My Father volunteered to pack lunches
          >> to the crew?
          >> 2. Why my father decided to stay and eat lunch
          >> with the crew?
          >> 3. Why when he went to look at the main fire he
          >> or someone else did not stay as a look out?
          >> 4. Why he was not one of the 9 or the first to get
          >> out and the rest died?

          Mr. Powers… THANK YOU for reminding us
          ALL that what we are trying to accomplish here
          is IMPORTANT.

          Yes… the details DO matter… ( and will ALWAYS
          matter )… especially to the CHILDREN who have
          lost their fathers.

          The DIFFERENCE here would be that suppose one of the survivors from your father’s tragic incident told investigators that he had ‘overheard’ conversations that might answer ALL of these ‘questions’ you have had for ‘your whole life’… but then didn’t say anything other than that… ( and no one asked him to? )… and all the ‘official report’ said was that he definitely DID ‘hear these conversations’.

          That’s what ended up in the SAIR report.

          That’s the way the SAIT decided to ‘leave it’ for the children of THESE men for THIS tragic incident.

          They officially published statements that the lone survivor of this incident ‘heard certain conversations’ that might explain a LOT of things about why 19 men died tragically… but then there is no detail whatsoever.

          >> Mr. Powers also said…
          >> there are just some things we will never know.

          Perhaps…. but see above. The official report from the Arizona Forestry Commission for THIS incident has already said that it is HIGHLY LIKELY that at least 1 person who is still alive DOES ‘know some things’ that the children of THESE men might, themselves, be ‘wondering about for the rest of THEIR lives’.

          Reply

          • WTKTT
            The decisions made by my Father and the Crew boss died with them the survivors 9 had no idea why the thing I stated happened.
            Decisions made by supervisors in the emergency of the moment will never be known. Like Why they GM deployed where they were and decided to cut a larger area rather than look for another area. I am sure there was no radio traffic on that decision as they were all together and planning directly with each other. For what ever reason they made the decision to dig in and deploy there. Ignoring all training on Fire shelters and deployment locations. Along with all the other safety violations that put them in that canyon. Maybe McDonough knows why they left the black and went where they went and maybe he doesn’t. We may never know.

            Reply

            • Reply to Bob Powers post
              on June 12, 2014 at 7:45 am

              >> Mr. Powers said…
              >> The decisions made by my Father
              >> and the Crew boss died with them
              >> the survivors 9 had no idea why the
              >> thing I stated happened.

              Yes. I know… and I am sorry that is why YOU have had these ‘unanswered questions’ ( as you said ) ‘your whole life’.

              The point I was making was that what if that was NOT the case. What if one ( or more ) of those survivors DID hear certain conversations that contained partial/complete answers to these things you have ‘wondered about all your life’… and the official report for your father’s incident came right out and SAID they ‘heard these conversations’.

              THAT is what makes THIS incident different from your father’s.

              The SAIT did exactly that.

              They PUBLISHED statements that say at least one person who survived DID hear them ‘discussing their options’ before deciding to ‘leave the black’… and die.

              >> Mr. Powers also said…
              >> Decisions made by supervisors in
              >> the emergency of the moment will
              >> never be known. Like Why they
              >> GM deployed where they were and
              >> decided to cut a larger area rather
              >> than look for another area. I am
              >> sure there was no radio traffic on
              >> that decision as they were all
              >> together and planning directly with
              >> each other.

              And I am sure you are right.

              Most of the decisions made on the floor of the canyon… or why some things ended up where they did… will never be known.

              Another example: We will never know WHY some of the field packs were ‘thrown clear’, according to training, and other packs ( some still containing fuel and fusees ) were right there next to ( or even under ) some firefighters.

              ALL of the ‘official’ USDA training videos for deploying show that this ‘throw your pack as far away as possible’ moment is SUPPOSED to come IMMEDIATELY after you get your shelter OUT of the field pack.
              Almost like one continuous motion.

              We know ALL of the men had time to do that ( get their shelters out )… but only SOME remembered the ‘throw your pack away’ step.

              That’s another ‘lesson learned’ from Yarnell right there. Make SURE that part of the deployment procedure is so ingrained into the men that it is not possible for any of them to FORGET to ‘throw your pack’ outside the deployment area.

              >> Mr. Powers also said…
              >> Maybe McDonough knows why
              >> they left the black and went where
              >> they went and maybe he doesn’t.
              >> We may never know.

              Yes. We *MAY* never know all that Brendan *MIGHT* know.

              I just wish ( and I have said this about 3 times before ) that Brendan himself would realize the situation the SAIT has put him in.

              THEY have PUBLISHED official statements that he DOES know more than he will say.

              If that is a FALSE statement… I wish Brendan ( through his attorney ) would issue a correction and state clearly that he did NOT hear anything more than he has already admitted to hearing that would shed any more light on why they decided to leave the black.

              If it is NOT a FALSE statement… then I wish Brendan ( also through his attorney ) would tell everything he knows and be done with it before this thing follows him for the rest of his life.

              Reply

              • you tube what a 1liter gas explosion looks like and then imagine if that gas was being boiled in a Sigg fuel bottle.

                I really just do not understand!

                Reply

  56. I have been travelling Arizona/Utah/Nevada the past month+ and in it we find it odd we are more approached here in Nevada. I asked someone directly involved in the fire management or was there 6-30-13 and they like my encouraging words yet did not define or answer my question and its understandable and okay by me yet now I am redirecting the question here to the fire community so let me go copy/paste the question I asked and I did not get the answer that maybe someone here can—
    “I want to say I have been approached by too many on hwy 80 gas stations, Elko Walmart, Manhattan, Austin, Tonopah, Fallon areas—people come right up to us and thank us for taking the photos that weekend and that they are either in the firefighter community/smokejumper/federal forestry/first responders or retired from it. They keep telling us people like Willis and the management are not the ones to reem on but the even higher ups of them”
    ——-How do I answer folks when they come up to me——
    Also—I noted in NV ALOT of DOC Fire Crew areas and nice new vehicles—that was weird too —see so many of them yet Caliente, NV has beat up old rugged vehicles for fighting fire and yet there is shiny new DOC fire crew ones—weird world we live in—
    again how do I reply???
    I have been just stating on the topic of defensible space as my reply but I am willing to learn and understand what information is being told to me but just foreign to me. What do they mean? I also am surprised how many are affected in Nevada by that Arizona fire and how many just come right up to us and start talking about the fire not knowing where we are headed or going; as many times I cross my legs hoping I can hold on to the every last word because I was heading to the restroom- soft smiles.

    Reply

    • Joy—-
      My answer would be………Willis was the direct supervisor of the crew and had a responsibility to insure the crew was.
      1. preforming according to national requirements for a Hot Shot crew. and meet all requirements yearly.
      2. Crew Training and Supervision were meeting all Safety training and operating under safe Wild Land Fire Suppression Tactics and Safety.
      3. Willis was not insuring the crew was Fighting Fire Aggressively but providing for Safety First.
      Pushing the envelope to have the crew recognized, lack of good Safety practices by Marsh. Back to the Gloves and Shirt sleeves not setting examples could have well been other things we don’t know about.
      4. The basic Safety of the crew dose not totally fall on any one else but Willis and Marsh and his Foreman.
      5. The supervisors on the Fire should take some blame for the total mess this fire produced.

      So the Higher ups in the fire department and Council had no real knowledge of WLF suppression and it is hard to put blame there except in funding and positions.

      Will That Help?

      Reply

      • Bob-

        Okay. Now, my next question. If Willis was not assigned to the GMHS that fire and Marsh was verbally given a new role and we saw him away from the crew more then with the crew 6-30-13 and Steed was speaking to someone as we viewed it that day—is there any possibility of separating Marsh from the role since he was not with the men and as well as Willis and whoever Steed was speaking to may have more details to share on that weekend. I understand being responsible for crews— yet also if I am in the work force and I am the boss and my crew was put in a spot that air support could not reach and my crew died, isn’t the deaths enough to absorb that hearing voices speak aloud that I the boss is responsible when I was not even the boss for that fire (Willis) or given a verbal role ( Marsh) when in fact this fire lacks much detail and documented facts (and all I have is God’s Assurance in His time it will be…) Yet for me to hear this one is responsible as Tex (Sonny) has wrote on here about that the whole fire management to that fire needed a serious looking into and cleaning out moment yet I differ and maybe I am lacking some information but I feel there is just more information out there being on the trails we met a firefighter and he stated what one YCSO Sherriff guy said “chaotic afternoon- bad thing happened” yet none state DETAILS of the chaos or how a bad thing happened and for that I just am not a “cheerleader” for Marsh or Willis but I need someone to EDUCATE me how they become in the end the responsible party of how that day unfolded? Again, I do not know what you mean about sleeves yet if you mean about the sleeves up—seen it myself and I know that day was 93 in the morning reaching late afternoon 106/107 and that sun was brutal. Donut can share that as facts as well as there was a hit or miss breeze and also no trees to rest on and the sun on top of the mountain was more intense then down in the canyon. I feel after walking with firefighters and seeing the work the DOC crew did Saturday and the work GMHS did that when we saw them at rest that day—our angle showed that yet firefighters showed us the way it happen at another angle hidden from ours so I feel there is much still hiding to this fire because NO WAY will I accept 19—all 19—decided to descend in the most dense-tight maze-like terrain and Willis and someone stated here there was 10ft. growth–YES, by the base of the mountain but not much in where they died—maybe 4-6foot tops but not much of it but very very dense so I just cannot understand dropping out of any of the fires views with the squirrely wind we saw and Marsh reported. And to reread your reply then these people coming up to me says folks should not reem Willis and the fire management yet you are saying it is them that is responsible and there is no higher ups then them that can be a factor to that weekend? I am needing to really GET how that all works because Sonny here feels that he agrees to your comment but also the higher ups who told the ranchers & fire depts. to stand down and the 2 fire dept ordered not to put fire out allowed this fire to become a tragic wildfire so for that those people he said have culpability as well and he said I am ignorant to the firefighting comments we here on the trails but Sonny said he fought fires with his pops and he now gets what the community is telling us—MORE DETAIL is needed not just by the homeowners but others. Did you read this awful article—I had to comment on it:
        story by Courier:
        http://dcourier.com/main.asp?Search=1&ArticleID=132579&SectionID=1&SubSectionID=1086&S=1

        Reply

        • First Marsh was The Division boss for the crew, ad the Superintendent. He was always in charge of Steed under the chain of command. Steed would not have made decisions with out Marsh.
          Second we still have no clue that Willis interjected himself into the decision to move, so we have no way to put the blame on him at this time. Willis was still responsible for the crew as head of the wild land fire section in Prescott. If Marsh and crew were not doing things right up until Yarnell then he still holds the supervisory responsibility for correcting safety problems.
          The IA not getting the job done lead to a lot more problems which continued to snowball but in the end responsibility for the crew still fell to Marsh and Steed they made the bad safety decisions that produced the final outcome.

          Reply

          • Yes, Marsh had a verbal of increased role in that fire and he was the Division Boss/Superintendent. Got that. Saw it too. Yet Marsh also had a man he met with on the mountain top NEVER shown in any reports YET is in my photos to be there that man on top of the mountain so to me Marsh may of been titled to be over them yet watching him “live” that day morning to afternoon I do think there is more someone can share as to WHY Marsh stated his comfort in the black and he was not with the crew at that point to then laying aside 18 others and died???
            Steed would take a command though of someone above Marsh—a possibility. There are areas the cell or radios were not working correctly up there—I am one that knows for I hike the area that its spotty so who is to say Steed had poor communication at that hour or few and went and redirected to another—That we learned from your firefighting community so to narrow it that Steed would not make a decision without Marsh—we have been told it is a fire fighting perceptive view (say you as a smokejumper see it different than say the GMHS we hiked with or say a local structure firefighter—they state they have many styles to the firefighting ways but follow kind of the same safety guidelines but to me if people keep dying and breaking the safety guidelines without sharing the proper information and details to properly assess the fire—it will keep having a chance to happen again—)
            In regards to Willis- I have asked direct questions to him and he replies to my email professionally and prompt where he can help out. We may not know details or have a clue to Willis’ accounts that day yet I always will state no blame is needed to the chaos/bad thing happened last few hours but we do need exact precise accounts from all that day to properly assess it. So say Willis did—this is not about blame but getting facts out to get this fire straight because as is—not right for the fallen 19 and all men lost to fires.
            So if Willis is still responsible of his crew yet he was not on that fire such way—that is terrible to think he had to focus to structure protection PLUS focus to the GMHS crew who was under someone else’s command for that fire.
            I do hope this fire does change how Willis does safety for future training of hotshots.
            Yes, Marsh and or Steed—one or both of them brought the crew down the canyon yet that I will never GET but they did and I lay each night because I KNOW that area (blinded) and I think if I did not know it or how was it when I first hiked the area—I felt I had to go through every inch of that terrain so I learned the area and the only thing I can come up with is the deception of distance from the ridge and that it appeared a hop, skip away but unless you KNOW that very snake infested tight knit terrain they dropped down in and not only went down into but choose that area as a deployment site—oh my—makes my tummy ill. If they just scaled the boulders once down to the cattle pond area that was a level flat area vs the explosive ways of the dense terrain—I understand family members of the fallen thinking why is this hiker still here writing about our loved ones and all kinds of folks in many areas of firefighting are like she is just some small town gal and that I am but I also know that area they perished and how there is no way these 19 men would go down there as the SAIR states and I do feel there is more information to come out—to properly assess this fire. Thank you Bob for the 2nd comment. I just feel safety is more important then structures and breaks me up the kids have no dad and the wives have to go on without their sweethearts—yet in the end those men should of NEVER had that area as a safety zone and that person who made it such—they are way off base as well as the people who told ranchers/ fire folks to stand down; way wrong—if they handled it early on the 19 would still be here. That is how I feel yet I do not know who was the one that stated stand down as we hear but that person and Jim Karels standing behind the SAIRS—what a sad disservice to these men and their loved ones.

            Reply

  57. **
    ** PHOTO AND VIDEO PROOF OF WHEN DARRELL WILLIS
    ** ACTUALLY ARRIVED AT THE RANCH HOUSE RESTAURANT

    Reply to calvin post on June 6, 2014 at 2:22 am

    >> calvin said…
    >> Thanks WTKTT. I looked at the images that you provided links to.
    >> Both images taken by Ash show a truck WITHOUT a tool box in the bed.
    >> The Swartz image above as well as the Story photos from the Ranch House
    >> show seem to show the same truck that Ash took photos of, minus the
    >> tool box (that is removable)

    Yes. No doubt Scott Ash has photographed the same Prescott Fire Department vehicle back in Prescott itself… but WITHOUT the toolbox that was in place when it was present at the Yarnell Hill Fire.

    I also don’t think there is any doubt that THIS was the Prescott Fire Department vehicle that Darrell Willis was driving down in Yarnell that weekend.

    >> calvin also said…
    >> Image 1690.jpg from Tom Story is the best image (no obstructions)
    >> of what could be the same truck. Note it appears to have entered
    >> the highway from the South

    Yes. That is definitely the same F-250 pickup seen sitting up on Model Creek Road in the Swartz photo(s).

    The Tom Story photos also seem to nail down the exact time ( within 30 seconds ) when this pickup actually ARRIVED at the Ranch House Restaurant.

    In the Tom Story photos in his 201303_Yarnell_Hill_02 folder, the photos 1677 through 1681 do NOT show this F-250 pickup.

    Photos 1679, 1680 and 1681 show a firefighter in a red helmet talking on a radio standing right where this F-250 pickup is GOING to be parked just moments after 1681 was taken. Note that this firefighter has TWO radios. One in his RIGHT hand ( which he is actively using ) and he is also holding a Bendix King radio with a red clamshell battery pack in his LEFT hand, but not using that one in these photos.

    In photo 1678, this firefighter with the red helmet who WILL be standing where the pickup is going to park is seen walking SOUTH along the side of highway 89 to that spot where he will be seen standing in photos 1679, 1680 and 1681.

    It is sometime in-between photos 1681 and 1682 that the pickup actually arrived and parked there ( facing north ) where the firefighter in the red helmet was seen standing in photo 1681.

    Tom Story photo 1681 was taken at 1707.45 ( 5:07.45 PM )
    Tom Story photo 1682 was taken at 1708.18 ( 5:08.18 PM )

    That is only 33 seconds between the 2 photos.

    Somewhere is those 33 seconds is when this Prescott Fire Department F-250 ( Darrell Willis ) ARRIVED at the Ranch House Restaurant and parked where that firefighter with the red-helmet was standing.

    For the sake of a ‘good guess’ as to when during those 33 seconds Darrell Willis actually ARRIVED and parked the truck… I am going to go with the ‘mid-point’ of the 33 seconds and just call Willis’ exact arrival time 1508.00 ( 5:08 PM ).

    The reason that F-250 is pointing NORTH when it is parked is ( I believe ) simply because Darrell Willis just approached the RHR from the NORTH, and then did sort of a ‘U-Turn’ as he pulled into the driveway and parked on the shoulder of the highway were that firefighter with the red-helmet had been standing.

    As it turns out… there is also a VIDEO CAPTURE of this same vehicle ( with Darrell Willis assumed to be driving it ) heading TOWARDS the Ranch House Restaurant from up north in Peeples Valley, where Darrell Willis was working when he heard the deployment traffic appear on his radio.

    This vehicle was captured heading EAST on Hays Ranch Raod ( and towards Yarnell ) in one of the longer Air-To-Air channel videos.

    ** AIR-TO-AIR CHANNEL VIDEO 20130630_1716_EP
    ** CAPTURES DARRELL WILLIS HEADED TO THE
    ** RANCH HOUSE RESTAURANT

    This video is 31 minutes and 25 seconds long.

    VIDEO 20130630_1716_EP STARTS AT 1645.19

    +10:14 ( 1655.33 / 4:55.33 PM )
    The white F250 pickup with the red stripe ( Prescott National Forest )
    pickup seen in the Swartz photo(s) first appears at the right side
    of the camera frame heading EAST ( pretty quickly ) on Hays Ranch Road.
    This pretty much must be Darrell Willis now headed down to Yarnell where
    the same pickup will soon be seen ( in the Tom Story photographs ) arriving
    at the Ranch House Restaurant between 1707.45 and 1708.18 ( 5:07.45 and 5:08.18 PM ).

    Distance from video camera point to…

    U-Store-It in Yarnell: 3.19341 mi
    Point where Shrine Road meets Highway 89: 3.90369 mi
    Ranch House Restaurant: 4.76341 mi

    The TIME difference between when the pickup is seen crossing in front of the video camera on Hays Ranch Road and when it appears to have ARRIVED at the Ranch House Restaurant is…

    1708.00 – 1655.33 = 12 minutes and 27 seconds.

    In order for Darrell Willis to have covered the distance from the camera all the way to the Ranch House Restaurant in those 12 minutes and 27 seconds ( without stopping anywhere else on the way? ) means he would have needed to maintain an average speed of 22.93 mile per hour.

    As for how FAST he is actually seen ‘passing the video camera’…

    That F-250 ‘SuperCab’ has an overall length ( bumper to bumper ) of 19.31 feet.

    The video is running at 30 frames per second and the pickup is visible moving from west to east for exactly 62 frames. That means it covers the visible asphalt in the video in exactly 2.06 seconds.

    There is approximately 81.24 feet of ‘road’ ( 27.08 yards ) showing in the video and so, in order to cover these 81.24 feet in 2.06 seconds means the truck was traveling approximately 27.71 mph as it passed by the video camera.

    ** SUMMARY

    So between the Air-To-Air channel video which captures Darrell Willis leaving the north side of the fire and heading south to Yarnell.. and the Tom Story photos which capture him ARRIVING at the Ranch House Restaurant… we now know that Darell Willis arrived at the parking lot some 7-8 minutes EARLIER than has reported in his own unit log notes.

    From Willis’ own original ‘Unit Log’ notes ( released on February 27, 2014 )…
    __________________________________________________________________
    1640
    Heard radio conversations about deployment.

    1647
    Operations Able calls me on my cell phone and asks if I heard what is going on, he told me what I knew.

    NOTE: This is actually incorrect. It was Willis who called Abel at this time.

    1655
    I called TF Moser and informed him that I wanted him to take the Division, to hold the fire with the resources on Model Creek Road and to pick up and slop overs.

    1715
    I responded to Yarnell and tied in with Operations Able and monitored radio traffic on Incident within an Incident.

    NOTE: We now know that Willis was seen heading EAST on Hays Ranch Road at exactly 1655.33 ( 4:55.33 PM ) and that he acutally arrived at the Ranch House Restaurant at 1708 ( 5:08 PM ).

    1745
    Tied in with GMIHC lookout McDonough to determine his welfare.
    __________________________________________________________________

    Reply

    • ** FOLLOWUP: TOM STORY PHOTO 1679

      Tom Story’s photo 1679 is one of the ones mentioned above that was taken just BEFORE Darrell Willis arrived at the Ranch House Restaurant parking lot at 5:08 PM…

      …but photo 1679 by itself shows some pretty interesting things.

      Photo 1679 was taken at 5:07 PM ( Just 1 minute before Darrell
      Willis arrived ).

      It shows…

      1) The firefighter with the red-helmet standing on the shoulder of Highway 89 right where Willis’ F-250 pickup is about to be parked… with TWO radios. One in each hand. He is actively using the one in his RIGHT hand. He is standing exactly where Darrell Willis is GOING to park his F-250 pickup just one minute later.

      2) To the right of the firefighter in the red-helmet is a white double door pickup with a red stripe that is ‘interrupted’ on the front left fender with the words ‘STATE FIRE’. It also has a half-blue / half-red emergency light bar mounted on roof of the cab. There is a SILVER toolbox mounted in the bed of this pickup. The bed also seems to contain two yellow ‘lift boards’ for carrying injured stacked on top of each other near the tailgate. There is no one inside the truck. The door is open and a full-zoom gives a clear view of the small round LOGO on the driver side door.

      The LOGO on the truck door is the official ‘Arizona State Forestry Division’ logo with the red/yellow sunbursts behind an outline of the State of Arizona with a cactus and a tree overlaid on top of that outline.

      3) Just beyond this white-with-red-stripe ‘State Fire’ double-door pickup is another white-with-red stripe pickup parked on the very shoulder of Highway 89. It also has the interruption in the ‘red-stripe’ and it says ‘STATE FIRE’ in the front-right fender. This pickup is only a ‘single door’ ‘access cab’ style, and has a WHITE toolbox mounted in the back bed.

      NOTE: ONE of these ‘white pickups’ that say ‘STATE FIRE’ is most probably the vehicle that OPS2 Paul Musser was driving that day. My guess would be (2) above… the one with the ‘double-door’ with the door open and the visible ‘Arizona State Forestry’ logo on the driver’s side door.

      3) Just to the left of the Blue Ridge Polaris Ranger in the photo, there is a firefighter with a BLACK helmet… but it is definitely NOT Brendan McDonough.

      He is holding a radio with a ‘yellow’ battery extension in his left hand and appears to be actively listening to it and looking at the other group of firefighters gathered at the rear of the Polaris Ranger.

      4) Just to the right rear of the Blue Ridge Polaris Range… we see a Blue Ridge Hotshot with his back to the camera talking with an older firefighter in a WHITE helmet, grey hair… and a wide gray mustache. That has to be Gary Cordes in the white helmet and the mustache. That WHITE helmet also has a ‘yellow’ band around it, with some kind of square LOGO in the center front of the helmet… and a ‘black’ band across the visor of helmet.

      The Blue Ridge Hotshot ( talking directly to Cordes? ) does NOT appear to be Captain Trueheart Brown because we already know Brown had a piece of tape on the back of his Helmet with his name written on it and that piece of tape is NOT on the back of the Helmet for the Blue Ridge Hotshot in THIS photo.

      The face of the firefighter in the WHITE helmet also matches this online picture of Gary Cordes on a Central Yavapai ‘Staff’ page…

      http://www.centralyavapaifire.org/index.cfm?Section=15&pagenum=232&titles=0

      NOTE: There is also a good picture of Cougan Carothers at the same ‘Central Yavapai Fire’ staff page above.

      Reply

      • I’m currently disagreeing with some of your ID-ing here. but thanks for pointing out the guy In the white helmet.

        I now think the guy in the white helmet is Paul Musser. Which means they guy in the red helmet is, I tnink, after all, Tony Sciacca — this photo I’d-ing is really HARD).

        If you look at Tom Story’s 1682 image, that truck in front of where Daryll Willis pulled in has an easy-to-see patch that says “Incident Management Team.” I’ve been assuming that would mean it might be associated with Paul Musser.

        Now that you pointed out the guy in the white helmet, the patch on it looks like the one on that truck. So I’m now thinking that is Paul Musser.

        That is NOT Gary Cordes. Gary Cordes is BIG. Bigger than Tony Sciacca (who I think is the same size as Paul Musser), and he’s the biggest person in Papich’s photo IMG_3952, which shows him on the left and his truck in front of all the others.

        And, via a photo of Cordes (that I have no idea of where I found), during the parade of the vehicles coming into Prescott soon after, in which he’s standing next to Willis, he has a bit of a beard, which in later 2014 photos he no longer has.

        I really think the relatively big wide guy you see in a whole lot of Tom’s parking lot photos, with no helmet, a gold shitrt and khaki pants (and with glasses, which you don’t see in any other photos of him but who knows?) is Gary Cordes. Look at Tom’s image 1685. I really think that’s Gary Cordes.

        Also I’ve been wondering who that gold-banded BLM truck is associated with. I think now that that is associated with Dan Philbin. I think, if you look at Story’s image 1682, the guy in the red helmet has a turqoise triangular patch that looks the turquoise triangle on the BLM. So I think that could be Dan Philbin.

        And, thus, I’m back to my original opinion that the guy in the red helmet is, after all, Tony Sciacca.

        Reply

        • Reply to Marti Reed post on June 9, 2014 at 8:27 am

          >> Marti said…
          >> I’m currently disagreeing with some of your
          >> ID-ing here. but thanks for pointing out the guy
          >> In the white helmet.

          This ‘older guy in the white helmet with all-gray mustache’ is also seen THROUGH the windshield of the Polaris Ranger in Tom Story’s photo 1678, but more about that below.

          >> Calvin also said…
          >> I now think the guy in the white helmet is Paul
          >> Musser. Which means the guy in the red helmet
          >> is, I think, after all, Tony Sciacca

          Yes. You may be right. When I look at that photo of Gary Cordes at the Yavapai County staff page… the mustache looks similar but Cordes’ mustache is not ‘all gray’ ( if that is really a recent photo at that site ).

          As for the FF in the red-helmet… Tom Story’s photo number 1678 actually shows this guy fully face-front to the camera and walking ‘towards’ where we will then see him standing where Willis’ truck will soon park. Photo 1678 has a good clear shot of his face and he, too, has a mustache that looks just like Gary Cordes’.

          So now I’m thinking the red-helmet FF is Gary Cordes, and not the white helmet older FF. That would even make sense. Cordes was just SPGS1 and if WHITE helmets really are meant for OPS level people… Cordes would have a RED helmet and not a WHITE one.

          Tom Story’s 1678 photo is pretty fascinating all unto itself with regards to WHO is in it. I believe I might have just found another ‘Brendan McDonough’ sighting in it as well.

          So here is the ‘skinny’ on Tom Story’s 1678 photo and at least a list of the all the FFs photographed.

          It would be good to identify ALL these FFs…

          ** Tom Story photo 201303_Yarnell_Hill_1678

          The PEOPLE in this photo ( from LEFT to RIGHT )…

          (1) The FF with the red-helmet who is ABOUT to be the one standing on the shoulder of the Highway where Willis’ F-250 pickup will soon be parked is seen full-face in this photo.

          He is already out there on the edge of the Highway, at the rear of that white STATE FIRE ( single-door / access cab ) pickup truck with its tail-gate down… and he is walking SOUTH with BOTH radios in his hands. He is actively using the one in his LEFT hand.

          He definitely has a mustache… but no apparent beard. This actually COULD be Gary Cordes… now that I look at that Central Yavapai staff photo of him again. In that staff photo… Cordes’ mustache is not really ALL GRAY and that now matches this FF in the red-helmet with the 2 radios.

          If you do a FULL ZOOM on this photo… it really is a good full-frontal shot of this FF’s face and anyone who knows these people should be able to easily identify this FF via this photo.

          Identity: Still unknown ( Looks like Gary Cordes? )

          Moving on in the photo ( from left to right )…

          (2) FF in FOREGROUND with DARK OLIVE ( almost black ) pants, a fairly clean Nomex shirt… and a BRIGHT YELLOW helmet with some kind of yellow silica cloth or Nomex ‘neck protector’ also attached to the helmet and apparently being ‘blown by the wind’. There is also some YELLOW tape on the right side of his yellow helmet. He also has the typical ‘black X-strap harness’ on over his shirt with the black straps going under his armpits.

          Identity: Still unknown ( Cougan Carothers? Tyson Esquibel? )

          (3) The FF with the BLACK helmet who is seen in most of this sequence of photos. In this photo… he has his back to the camera. His LEFT arm is stretched out and grasping the left-rear of the white double-door STATE FIRE pickup right above where it says ‘4×4’ on the left-rear fender. His shirt is VERY dirty… both of his SLEEVES are ‘rolled up’… and in this photo he appears to be reaching around with his own right arm to retrieve his Bendix King with a 16 inch antenna extension from where it is apparently clipped to his belt in the center of his back. His radio appears to have either a yellow clamshell battery extension… or just a piece of rectangular yellow tape on the bottom of the radio.

          Identity: Still unknown

          Now we move on to the Blue Ridge Polaris Ranger sitting there with its lights on. There is at least one FF that can be seen THROUGH the folded-down plexiglass windshield of the Polaris Ranger itself.

          (4) Looking THROUGH the grating of the Polaris Ranger… we can see the same older FF with the WHITE helmet and the distinct ALL GRAY mustache that will soon be seen talking with that Blue Ridge Hotshot at the rear of the Polaris. He doesn’t appear to be talking with anyone yet and just appears to be coming around the back end of the Polaris at this point. It also appears that he MAY have just exited that long, white extended cab pickup with the full bed enclosure and the word FIRE ( in red ) on the door. The driver’s side door remains OPEN on this vehicle in all subsequent photos.

          Identity: Still unknown ( This is the older FF with the GRAY mustache I thought might be Cordes… but would now be inclined to believe is Paul Musser ).

          (5) Next FF moving from left to right is in clear view standing at the back of the Polaris Ranger. BLUE helmet. He is facing towards the camera but his head/face are seen in PROFILE. He is holding a Bendix King radio with a RED clamshell battery extension in his LEFT hand and appears to be TALKING into it. He is holding a water bottle in his RIGHT hand and also appears to have a large BLACK watch on his left wrist. His sleeves are both rolled all the way DOWN. He also appears to be wearing sunglasses or safety glasses.

          Identity: Still unknown

          (6) Next FF is standing with his back to the camera and his hands on his hips. No helmet. His Nomex shirt is EXTREMELY DIRTY on the back. He is looking to his right towards the group I will get to in a moment that appear to be huddled over a MAP, or something.

          Identity: Still unknown

          (7) Next FF also has his back to the camera. He has a VERY clean yellow Nomex shirt on. No helmet. He is a LARGE guy and I would almost characterize him as being a little ‘overweight’ for a firefighter. He *appears* to be holding a radio up to his right ear with his left arm and is ‘leaning into it’ and listening to it. There is a Blue Ridge Hotshot with sunglasses on and holding something ‘white’ just to this FF’s right and seems to be interacting with him… but more about this BR Hotshot with the sunglasses ( Number 9 below ) in a moment.

          Identity: Still unknown

          (8) Okay… IN-BETWEEN FF (7) and FF (9)… there appears to be a group of men gathered near the hood of that red vehicle in the background. They appear to be ‘huddled over a map’ or something. There is only ONE FACE that can be seen in-between FF (7) and FF(9). It is someone with close-cropped hair, no beard, and no helmet. If I had to guess… I would say this looks just like Brendan McDonough leaning over the ‘map’ or whatever it is that group of men is looking at back there.

          Identities: Still unknown

          (9) This is the ( tall ) Blue Ridge Hotshot with the sunglasses who is holding something WHITE with his left arm and is looking at FF (7) who is listening to his radio. This BR Hotshot’s face can be seen pretty clearly and should be easily identified by anyone who knows the BR Hotshots.

          Identity: Still unknown

          (10) At the far right of the photo is a FF with a white helmet with his face turned to the left and a piece of light yellow tape on the side of his white helmet. He appears to have either regular glasses or thin-profile safety glasses on. We can also see that he is wearing a black ‘harness’ deal because of the X pattern on his pack with the straps running under his armpits.

          Even though Jason Clawson was also known to be wearing a white helmet… I am sure that is NOT Jason Clawson. At +4:13 in the Helmet-Cam video… Jason Clawson walks right by Aaron Hulburd’s Helmet Camera and we get a good view of him. There is no ‘yellow tape’ on the side of his white helmet and Clawson is NOT wearing any kind of ‘black-strap harness’ deal over his Nomex shirt.

          Identity: Still unknown ( but definitely NOT Jason Clawson ).

          NOTE: This last FF with the white helmet COULD actually be Aaron Hulburd. The NOSE of this firefighter is seen in profile and Aaron Hulburd has the same distinct NOSE, but that is just a guess at this point.

          Reply

          • Followup…

            Here’s a good picture of Todd Abel taken at the Prescott Wildfire Academy awards ceremony on March 14, 2013. Tony Sciacca is also in this photo ( Abel is on the far left of the group and Sciacca is on the far right )…

            ** Picture of Todd Abel ( and others )…

            Prescott Daily Courier
            3/14/2013 – 10:00:00 PM
            Wildfire Academy honors firefighter for going beyond the call of duty

            http://www.dcourier.com/main.asp?SectionID=1&SubSectionID=1086&ArticleID=117057
            ____________________________________
            ( photo ) By Joanna Dodder/Courier
            Pictured at the Arizona Wildfire and Incident Management Academy’s
            awards ceremony Tuesday are (left to right):
            Academy Deputy Incident Commander Todd Abel,
            Wildland Firefighter of the Year Scott Glaspie,
            former Academy IC Don Howard,
            Arizona State Fire School Firefighter of the Year Jim Kennedy,
            Academy IC Pete Gordon,
            Herb McElwee Loyalty Award winner Tim McElwee,
            U.S. Forest Service Regional Training Officer James Villard,
            and Academy Coordinator Tony Sciacca.
            ____________________________________

            If you ZOOM IN on the full-face frontal shot of the ‘red-helmet’ firefighter in Tom Story’s 1678 photo ( just before he will be standing where Willis will park his pickup )…

            …It sure looks like a match for Todd Abel.

            When Willis actually pulls into the parking lot at 1508… this same red-helmeted FF is the one seen leaning in the window and talking to Willis just after he arrived. This would also match reports from Willis that one of the first things he did when arriving at the Ranch House Restuarant was ‘check in with Todd Abel’.

            SIDENOTE: This same ‘red-helmeted firefighter has a rectangular label on the back of his red helmet, and when he is leaning into the passenger side window of Willis’ pickup and talking to Willis… a full enhancement of the photo reveals that this label on the back of his helmet says… “LCES”

            Since Tony Sciacca is ALSO in that photograph above… I tend to agree now that the ‘older firefighter’ in the WHITE helmet and the all-gray mustache seen in other Tom Story photos in the sequence appears to be Tony Sciacca. Sciacca has a ‘big head’ ( physically speaking ) and that also matches the FF with the white helmet seen in the Tom Story photos.

            So where is Cordes, then?
            He’s got to be right there somewhere.

            I wonder if he is the fellow that has ‘Central Yavapai’ written in block letters on the back of his yellow Nomex shirt?

            Reply

            • Same ‘group shot’ as above but with everyone in a different ‘pose’. This is probably an even better shot of Todd Abel. He is still on the far left and Sciacca is still on the far right.

              NOTE: The photo is at the very
              BOTTOM of this page…

              Arizona Wildfire and Incident Management Academy
              2013 Final Report

              http://www.azwildfireacademy.org/2013-Final-Report.html

              Photo caption ( bottom of page )…
              ______________________________
              Todd Abel, Scott Glaspie, Don Howard, Jimmy Kennedy, (Structure FF of the Year) Pete Gordan, Tim McElwee, James Villard, Tony Sciacca
              ______________________________

              Reply

            • Another picture of Todd Abel.
              This time in PROFILE.

              Todd Abel participating in a ‘hose battle’ at a Prescott ‘Frontier Days’ event in 2009…

              Prescott Daily Courier…

              http://www.dcourier.com/main.asp?SectionID=1&subsectionID=1&articleID=70078

              Todd Abel is the guy in the white T-shirt and ball cap in BOTH of the photos at the top of the article. In the TOP photo he is helping to pull the ‘hose cart’… the bottom photo shows his full profile as he is kneeling behind the guy manning the firehose.

              Reply

            • I can see how you might think the guy in the red helmet in 1678 might be Todd Abel, via the face. But that’s not Todd Abel’s body. Todd is too lanky to be in that shorter more compact body in any of those pictures.

              I’ve seen a lot of Tony Siacca lately via photos and videos of the Slide Fire, for which he was Incident Commander. The first couple of days he way out in the public, and he did some awesome slide-show demonstrations of the fire behavior and their strategy for fighting it.

              The body of the guy in the red helmet totally looks like that of Tony Sciacca. And so does the face.

              Reply

          • **
            ** PHOTO OF PAUL MUSSER

            And here is about the only picture I can find ( so far ) of OPS2 Paul Musser.

            This one is over TEN years old and was taken before his retirement so I’m sure he looks older now. His mustache is probably all gray by now.

            So ( actually ) the FF seen through the windshield of the Polaris Ranger and then standing at the back of it could be EITHER Tony Sciacca OR Paul Musser.

            I am starting to thing that FF with the WHITE helmet is Paul Musser because ( as Marti pointed out ) the logo on his helmet seems to match the same logo on the door of the Arizona Forestry STATE FIRE white pickup that is parked nearby.

            Arizona Daily Sun
            March 09, 2003 11:00 pm
            Local man fights fire in Australian Outback
            By TAYLOE McCONNELL- Sun Staff

            http://azdailysun.com/local-man-fights-fire-in-australian-outback/article_09b94202-9c72-5ce6-a92b-acb3d17f5169.html

            ( Photo of Paul Musser with a Red Helmet )
            Photo caption…
            Courtesy Photo: Hot Shot Firefighter, Paul Musser, stands in front
            of the large fire him and his team were fighting in Australia.

            Reply

        • LOL! I totally disagree with you, and I’ve already written who I think is who, and you haven’t changed my mind yet, and I don’t have time to keep going round and round.

          I still think you’re way off on Gary Cordes. He IS big (see Papich’s IMG_3952 and yarnell-papich-006 for relative heights), and WAY bigger than Tony Sciacca (there are pix of the two together on the intertubes) , he IS “overweight for a fire-fighter”, and that’s why I think the BIG guy in those photos is Gary Cordes.

          I think you are also incorrect on Todd Abel. To me, the guy in a yellow helmet walking towards the camera between the ambulance and Brush 103 looks like a dead ringer for Todd Abel, and neither the SHORTER guy in the red helmet or the SHORTER guy in the white helmet with the patch that corresponds to the one on the Incident Management Team truck (which is why I think he’s Paul Musser) has the famously oversized mustache of the taller (in every photo I’ve seen) Todd Abel.

          I still think the SHORTER guy with the red helmet is Tony Sciacca.

          But, unless somebody who actually knows them in person and/or knows what those helmet colors actually MEAN (and if they’re MEANINGFUL for these id’s) weighs in to correct me/us, I guess “we just disagree.”

          Reply

          • I just discovered something interesting. (cuz I’m still wandering around re-thinking Todd Abel…while I should be working on my 94-year-old mom’s back tax returns).

            The guy with the cross-sweat shadow in the black helmet is either Rance or Cougan.

            There’s a video in the Forest Service folder that has Rance and Cougan and their two trucks in it.

            It’s USB YARNELL HILL 020.avi. I’m still not sure which is which.

            The guy on the left in the video has the exact same sweat-stain and his radio is in exactly the same place on the back of his belt.

            There’s a white-helmeted guy to his right, and to HIS right is the other Cougan/Rance.

            Both of them are in Papich’s photos that I’ve referred to several times. The one that also has
            GARY CORDES in it.

            If one assumes (naturally but possibly incorrectly) that each would be standing closer to their own truck, that would mean that the guy with the cross-sweat-stain would be Cougan, and the other with the black baseball cap would be Rance.

            It’s also important to remember, I think, that, normally, Cougan is Todd Abel’s boss.

            Reply

            • Marti said:
              “It’s also important to remember, I think, that, normally, Cougan is Todd Abel’s boss.”

              Agree…you also realize that Cougan Carothers was NEVER interviewed by the SAIT? They tried and tried and he just was not cooperating. And considering he was working directly with Rance Marquez who was a DIVS and Cougan was a STEN-Trainee??? Not normal ops, shorthanded or not. Cougan should have been tied to a Strike Team of Engines somewhere yet he was with a DIVS freelancing? Huge Red flag for me. Perhaps Todd Abel enabled this and promoted Cougan working with Marquez…I don’t know this but have always suspected this played in. He has been flying under the radar this whole time and never asked any tough questions.

              Reply

              • I’m reading this really late at night. Gotcha.

                I’ve been thinking you may know some of these people. Can you help me and WTKTT identify them in Tom Story’s photos?

                We’re kinda going round and round, having never seen them in person.

                Reply

          • Reply to Marti Reed post on
            June 10, 2014 at 7:20 am.

            >> Marti said…
            >> LOL! I totally disagree with you, and I’ve
            >> already written who I think is who, and
            >> you haven’t changed my mind yet, and
            >> I don’t have time to keep going round
            >> and round.

            Marti.. I wouldn’t even use the word ‘disagree’ here because if you read between the lines of my posts on these Tom Story photos… I really don’t have a frickin’ clue who any of these people are.

            I am actually much more SURE about some things I am hearing in the backgrounds of the Air Study videos than I am sure about the exact ID of some of these people in these parking lot photos. I am still just guessing.

            Now that I have found actual pictures online of Sciacca, Abel, Cordes AND Musser… it’s like it’s some kind of Rosarch test now when looking at fuzzy enhancements of parts of these photos.

            They ALL have mustaches!

            One minute one of the photo enhanced faces looks like Sciacca… but if you blink fast it suddenly looks like Cordes.

            Only someone who was really there in that parking lot is probably going to be able to ultimately identify ALL of these people seen in ALL of these photos.

            We have some good ‘non facial recognition’ evidence to go on like clothing, extra gear, helmet colors, and even labels on the helmets like the yellow tape and logo on the older FFs white helmet… and the “LCES” sticker on the back of the red-helmeted FFs headgear…

            …but it’s still going to take someone with some personal knowledge of these people to match this kind of ‘gear evidence’ with actual identities.

            But let’s keep trying.

            See my post above in response to calvin noticing that, in photo 1691, Willis is actually OUT of his truck and participating in that 5-person meeting that took place in front of his pickup truck.

            If nothing else… that’s an important 5 person ‘group’ to try and nail down.

            Also… FWIW… I no longer believe that the Prescott National Forest guys ( Jason Clawson, Aaron Hulburd and KC ‘Bucky’ Yowell ) who were apparently ‘freelancing’ that afternoon and just happened to become KEY players in the events are even candidates for being seen in any photos in the parking lot.

            I’m now pretty sure that NONE of them actually arrived there in the parking lot at any time. I believe they STAYED where they were following the filming of the Helmet-Cam video and they actually launched on the ‘ground rescue mission’ with Frisby and Brown from right there up on Shrine road.

            So even though we KNOW Jason Clawson was wearing a WHITE helmet that day… I no longer believe that ANY of the WHITE helmets seen in Tom Story’s photos are going to turn out to be Jason Clawson.

            More later…

            Reply

            • Agree!!! And yet I think we’re getting closer! See my comment upstream, which I know you will.

              I was having enough trouble trying to ID the GM Hotshots on all those photos. Unless they had really unique features! You take these guys, put them in helmets and sunglasses, then add three layers of grime and two layers of smoke, And VOILA! They all look alike!

              And, originally, as I looked at that Papich photo, I keyworded who I finally decided was Cordes “Bald Guy.” That was (and still is) my biggest disconnect between him in that photo and him in the parking lot so many hours later (and him in other media photos). But lighting can really have an impact, as I know as a photographer.

              Or, in the case of Rance vs Cougan, they’re seen from the backside I have in everything. How do we figure that out! And they get dirtier and dirtier as the day progresses.

              And I’m still struggling with my ID of who I think is Cougan in the parking lot. That guy seems so much smaller than I expect him to be. But we’re also looking through a really wide-angle lens, which also distorts things.

              And look at him in 1679! Yikes! I was looking at these closely yesterday when I came across this one. I know FF20+ is rightfully p*ssed as h*ll at him right now. But I just sat there and looked at this image. The look on his face as he bites his lower lip is what a photographer calls “the moment.”

              That’s what gets me about doing this. Yes, it’s difficult. But it also can be just frigging gut-wrenching.

              And I totally lolled when you wrote about that group you “saw” huddled over a map in that photo that you thought might include Brendan. I was like “You’ve got to be kidding me!!” The resolution on that it tiny little bit on that picture is so terrible, I wouldn’t ever believe anybody could determine anything about that. Bit you may actually be right all things considered.

              And then Calvin sees who he thinks is Daryll, and you see Daryll in his truck (and I hadn’t gotten to looking close up and lightened up through that truck window, and it was all dependent on you bringing in those Ash photos, and so it goes.

              I do think we are slowly building up a better and better understanding of who is who in that parking lot.

              And I’m not even mentioning a media photo of that parking lot in my collection that is really truly weird.

              Reply

            • And actually what first stimulated me to reply to this was what you wrote about Jason Clawson and crew. I’ve been really wondering if they ever even landed in the Ranch House Cafe parking lot. There’s just nothing anywhere about that, that I’ve found.

              Reply

              • Marti… there’s still a BIG story to be told regarding ‘Clawson and crew’. I’m putting a longer post together.

                As it turns out… it is now looking very much like Jason Clawson was the THIRD ‘fully functional’ ‘Field OPS’ person on the fire that afternoon… and acting as such.

                Even Dan Philbin, in his ADOSH interview, describes taking orders from Clawson and called him ‘My OPS’.

                Yikes.

                Reply

                • Thx!

                  I found Philbin’s interview really confusing. There’s obviously a “whole nuther” story here about “Bea Day’s Team.”

                  Reply

            • And I think, “Jeebus, How many different color-coded helmets do these guys travel around with, anyway???”

              Reply

    • Typo in the original post above. I type 1508 instead of 1708.

      That paragraph above should have read like this…

      For the sake of a ‘good guess’ as to when during those 33 seconds Darrell Willis actually ARRIVED and parked the truck… I am going to go with the ‘mid-point’ of the 33 seconds and just call Willis’ exact arrival time 1708.00 ( 5:08 PM ).

      Reply

  58. Mr. Turbyfill’s comment below brings into focus that there seem to be 2 schools of thought when it comes to the 10 & the 18. One is that the 10 are virtually inviolable rules and the 18 should nearly always be accounted for – in order to ensure safety. The other is that they are good safety principles, but are more to provide cover for fire command and to always place the onus on the firefighters themselves. Implicit in that is the 10 & 18 either will not or can not always be followed and that fire commands need to understand that and account for it in order to keep people safe. This would shift more of the safety burden onto fire command.

    So is it reasonable to expect the 10 always be followed and the 18 always accounted for? If not, why not? Are they too complex? Are there too many competing priorities? Is nonadherence too often excused or overlooked? How do WUI fires impact on this? Are the 10 and the 18 real world or just something to pay lip service to?

    I know Monday morning quarterbacking is unpleasant and the term has a negative connotation. Done in the spirit of “look how smart I am” or “how could they be so dumb” it is decidedly unhelpful. But done to learn and improve practices it is not only useful, it is necessary.

    Reply

    • Mike I think you know where I stand.
      The 10 and 13/18 served me and many others well for 50 years.
      They are as viable today as yesterday WUI dose not change the safety approach.
      The 10 and 18 starts at IA at the very ground level where you are in charge of your safety from a 1 person to engine crew attack.
      It never changes your responsibility or the responsibility of fire overhead. If you follow the 10 standard orders you will never find yourself in trouble. Pure and simple they work and have for many of us who have never had to deploy shelters. The 18 warn you to wake up and pay attention to safety. The Over head I knew and worked for always checked your safety emphasized the 10 and 18. Maybe that’s what is wrong today no emphases on the 10 and 18 by anyone?????

      Reply

  59. WTKTT and SR
    First you are laying a lot of emphasis on the equipment found in the deployment site.
    Photographs that we are see are after the bodies were removed.
    Radios would have been in the shelters even under the bodies,
    as well as some of the other equipment that did not burn or melt’
    The investigation of the deployment site was poor at best leaving much that could have been done by experts to answer many questions.
    So we are stuck with assumptions that may not be fact.
    1. Where were items at each shelter location.
    2. Did all of the shelters lose their metal material cover.
    3. Did all deploy? if not who deployed and who got caught before full deployment?
    4. The deployment scene was totally mishandled and many items were moved before documentation.
    5. The Sheriff’s department had no idea of what a Wild Land Fire fatality investigation consisted of or what information they would have documented.

    The things above plus others to me make it difficult to make accurate statements about the deployment site. There is no methodical investigation of each single fatality site. What occurred to each body, fire shelter, equipment in or out of the shelter. The Sheriff’s did not understand the things and information wild land fire needed to evaluate what occurred and the extent of the damage for further analyses.
    SR—- When you look at the rock piles after the burn they look easy and accessible. They were not moving thru that brush crawling and moving around rocks to get to those rock piles would have been more difficult than cutting trail to get to where they deployed. It looks easy after the burn than it would have been. If they had stayed close to those rock piles Maybe? I believe they would have had to work very hard to get to a large rock area and would have run out of time again. The rock piles look like a good area but they were not looking at them or staying close to them for safety. It is like cutting line, when you move you still need to ID safety areas to retreat to they I believe were moving out and not thinking about retreat to safety. Your thoughts are good they just were not using the basic LCES or they would have stayed on top of the ridge where they could have dropped off the back side
    Pure and simple look at the training about not deploying in canyons draws tops of chimneys hey simply should have known better. My thoughts!!!!!

    Reply

    • After spending a bit more than a month examining the deployment site photos, I pretty much agree with what you describe above, Bob.

      Those radios that look unscathed were in that condition because, IMHO, they were pulled out of the shelters because YCSO was, at that point, recording/listing them as “evidence.”

      Cnris’s camera survived looking the way it did, and with a memory card in it that was able to be read, because there was a plastic canteen over it that melted, releasing the water in it over the camera. I still consider that kind of a miracle, all things considered.

      I pretty much decided that most of the stuff we see in those photos of the site, those things that look pretty intact, ended up that way because they were under people, or in other ways “protected” from the full power of that burn over. Or they may have even been repositioned before they were photographed.

      With that being said, there were things that weren’t “protected” that still seem to have withstood the power of the fire relatively un-scathed, without being In a position that would have indicated being “protected,” in some way.

      I agree with WTKTT (although I don’t agree with some of his reasons for saying so) that what we see on the ground in the deployment site doesn’t seem to me like a 2000 degree fire.

      But it was definitely hot enough to kill them, no doubt about that.

      And I totally agree there was no real investigation of the deployment site, Heck, there was never even a map made of it! I have probably done more of an investigation of it than anybody.

      Reply

    • Supposedly at Storm King, the governor of Colorado at the time was trying to expedite removing the bodies off the mountain. The official in charge there was resisting, knowing how much information would be lost. Told what the governor wanted, he basically said “the governor can go **** himself”, not realizing the governor was in earshot. But the bodies stayed until the investigation could be done. The desire to move the bodies from Yarnell was great I am sure, but the investigation should have come first. We may never know what important information was lost.

      Reply

      • The 2000 deg. heat seems to be biased on some ones assessment at the site. It may not have any scientific value. How ever w can all agree the heat was above the 550 deg. protection of the shelter and high enough to destroy the outer layer of tinfoil so I am ok with between 600 and 2000 deg. fuel ignition takes place at 400 deg..
        it was hot enough and concentrated to burn the fire retardant shirts warn by fire fighters. In what was described as a blow torch. Superheated air outside the shelters of above 400 deg. was enough to destroy lungs immediately and the destruction of the shelters would have been at least 1000 deg. or higher for a period of time.
        I had hopes that the fire lab would have done some investigation to determine the heat and destruction at the site and to the safety equipment. Maybe they have or are.
        Because this was not a Federal Fire the investigation was not as thorough as many of the Fires I am use to.

        Reply

        • Reply to Bob Powers post
          on June 7, 2014 at 7:03 am

          >> Mr. Powers said…
          >> The 2000 deg. heat seems to be biased on
          >> some ones assessment at the site. It may
          >> not have any scientific value.

          Apparently.. that entire ‘2000 degree heat’ estimate
          was based almost primarily on the fact that SOME parts of the silica lining on MOST of the shelters appears to have become ‘brittle’ during the burnover.

          In the SAIR report… in that section where they describe the ‘condition’ of the firefighter’s clothing and shelters… pretty much every single shelter description had the phrase ‘silica cloth brittle in some areas’ included… but there was no explanation of what ‘some areas’ meant ( Tops? Edges? Only small sections? Side toward fire? Side away from fire? ).

          There was only ONE of the 19 shelters that had a description of the ‘Silica Cloth’ becoming ‘brittle’ ALL OVER ( throughout )…

          From the SAIR…
          __________________________________________
          Grant McKee, Granite Mountain #29 (believe manifest has typo error, should be #19)
          1. Shelter Condition:
          a. Outer Shell: 95% of foil burned away; silica cloth brittle throughout.
          __________________________________________

          The ‘nest step down’ from the high estimate of 2000 degrees drops almost 500 to 600 degrees and it had to do with the ‘fiberglass cloth’ and when that might tend to become ‘brittle’.

          After that… things drop down to a max of 1000 degrees as related to manufacturer’s info about the aluminum foil.

          So that ‘ultra high end’ of 2000 degrees was really ALL based on that ‘silica cloth’ data and how they thought that was matching up with shelter evidence.

          >> Mr. Powers also wrote…
          >> How ever w can all agree the heat was
          >> above the 550 deg. protection of the shelter
          >> and high enough to destroy the outer layer
          >> of tinfoil.

          Yes. There is no doubt that most of the shelters lost almost all their foil… regardless of where they were in the deployment area or which way they were facing.

          The temperatures at the deployment site ( regardless of whether they really hit 2000 degrees ) exceeded the limits of the safety equipment those men trusted their lives to.

          Reply

        • I can’t access the reports right now, but I believe 2000 degrees + came from the combination of the fact that this was a chaparral burn, and the degradation of the materials in the shelters themselves. The silica gets brittle at about 2000, the thread used also fails thereabouts, and the aluminum foil melts at a bit north of 1000. Given the failures of GM’s shelter materials, it’s pretty clear just from that alone that temps were north of 2000 at least briefly, in the areas where those shelters were. That’s not surprising. Given the fact that GM deployed in an area that guaranteed direct flame contact with their shelters and in an area with a fair amount of fuel, it would be surprising if the temps hadn’t been that high.

          It doesn’t mean the entire area experienced uniform temps, nor that the boulder fields or ridges would be anywhere near those temps.

          Reply

          • Reply to SR post on June 9, 2014 at 7:41 pm

            >> SR said…
            >>
            >> I can’t access the reports right now, but I
            >> believe 2000 degrees + came from the
            >> combination of the fact that this was a
            >> chaparral burn, and the degradation of
            >> the materials in the shelters themselves.

            The SAIR mentions ‘2000 degrees plus in the deployment area’ a number of times in the ‘narrative’ before they finally get to the section where they talk about where they were really getting that number.

            That section doesn’t really mention the topography at all. It’s all about the ‘silica cloth’ and what they say the manufacturer is telling them about when it gets ‘brittle’.

            >> SR also said…
            >> The silica gets brittle at about 2000.

            Yes. That is what the SAIR is saying they were told. SOME other studies online of the same material say that it begins to undergo ‘physical changes’ such as ‘brittleness’ as low as 900 degrees… but other studies online support the 2000 degree claim for that.

            >> SR also wrote…
            >> the thread used also fails thereabouts,
            >> and the aluminum foil melts at a bit north
            >> of 1000.

            Yes. Also matches what the SAIR says manufacturers were telling them and also matches other reports online.

            >> SR also said…
            >> Given the failures of GM’s shelter
            >> materials, it’s pretty clear just from that
            >> alone that temps were north of 2000 at
            >> least briefly, in the areas where those
            >> shelters were. That’s not surprising.
            >> Given the fact that GM deployed in an
            >> area that guaranteed direct flame contact
            >> with their shelters and in an area with a
            >> fair amount of fuel, it would be surprising
            >> if the temps hadn’t been that high.

            Don’t forget that the SAIR also reports that not ALL of the ‘packs’ where ‘thrown clear’ of the site at all. Some of the ‘packs’ were sitting right in the middle of the deployment area and right next to deployed firefighters… and some still had both FUEL and FUSEES in them. The SAIR does not say how this might have contributed to any ‘explosions’ or fires right in the middle of the deployment itself.

            >> SR also said…
            >> It doesn’t mean the entire area
            >> experienced uniform temps, nor that
            >> the boulder fields or ridges would be
            >> anywhere near those temps.

            Exactly. The ‘spawling’ on some of the rocks in and around the deployment area tells its own story… but there is also a visible END to the ‘scorch lines’ on almost ALL of the boulder piles near the deployment site… and these visible ‘ends’ of the ‘scorch lines’ aren’t even that far up on the boulders.

            Reply

            • Yes, first, sorry for being partially redundant with the earlier post — hadn’t seen yours when I posted. Regarding temps and the scorch line, there’s even a big temperature shift from base of flame to max flame height. The thing with chaparral is you are right there at the base of the flame if you are in the chaparral. But, the boulders by definition aren’t right there at the base of the flame. Given the way the fire burned, whether there would have been sufficient oxygen in/on the boulders certainly is a question, and with the wind blowing some areas on the boulders still would have had direct flame contact. But, some wouldn’t have.

              Reply

      • This is true, a jumper from Missoula said this within ear shot of the Governor and he obliged, and realized it was the right thing to do. Bring in wild land fire investigators!! Moving the GMIHC from where they deployed is another factor of them being tied to the Prescott Fire Dept, they just do things differently than wild land agencies. Totally managed this site as a crime scene–seriously? I am curious if Mascher is trained in wild land firefighting at all??? Believing they were doing the right thing the whole time by moving GMIHC…how could ‘they’ not realize it screwed up the investigation if they weren’t trained in what to look for? I sort of feel for them because they thought it was the right thing to do, move GMIHC out of respect.

        Reply

        • I believe one of the ‘contributing factors’ to the RUSH to ‘get them out of there’ was also the fact that shortly after the deployment… Fella named ‘Jeff Andrews’ ( from Prescott and also on the Resource Order list for Yarnell that day ) appears in the actual Dispatch Log requesting a TFR ( Temporary Flight Restriction ) area of 30 miles all around the deployment area.

          Arizona Dispatch responds ( in writing ) to Jeff Andrews in the Dispatch log and says there is no way that’s going to happen. Dispatch notes remind him that a 30 mile TFR would actually begin to encroach on Phoenix Airspace… but would also totally inhibit efforts to keep fighting the fire.

          EVERYONE was afraid of news choppers getting pictures of the bodies.

          They actually WANTED to get them out of there before the sun even came up.

          When the requested 30 mile TFR was rejected by Dispatch… that’s probably when they decided to sort of ‘tamper’ with the scene BEFORE the investigators got there and during the night… some group of men ( probably Willis and the two others who were spending the night near the site ) decided to COVER all the bodies with TARPS… even before the police investigators got there.

          When the police arrived… they discovered all the bodies covered with tarps ( without their permission ) and they then used their 3D FARO imaging system to first photograph the scene ‘as found’ ( which is what they are supposed to do )… and only then they had to REMOVE all the tarps placed on the bodies and re-photograph the scene ‘as it was’ before the tarps were all placed over everything.

          We know that a YCSO police captain returned to the scene in Helicopter Bravo 33 and took both pictures and videos of the site ‘as is’ before sunset on June 30… but those photos / videos have never been seen.

          There also has never been a media photo of the site from daybreak ( with or without the TARPS )… but the story here is that THAT is what they were really concerned with throughout the night They ( Prescott Fire? ) didn’t want the media to be able to shoot ANY pictures of the bodies.

          Even when they finally got all the body bags lined up over by the bulldozed access road and then put those American flags over them… some people were horrified when THAT picture was released and went viral on the Internet.

          Reply

          • Sorry.. brain fart up above.

            It was DPS chopper Ranger 58 ( and not fixed wing Bravo 33 ) that flew the YCSO police captain over the deployment site just before sunset on June 30 so that he could take both photos and videos of the site ( both with his iPhone ) as it was even BEFORE Darrell Willis and other PFD FFs walked the site and put TARPS all over the bodies sometime later that evening / night.

            So the paragraph above SHOULD have read…

            We know that a YCSO police captain returned to the scene in Helicopter Ranger 58 and took both pictures and videos of the site ‘as is’ before sunset on June 30… but those photos / videos have never been seen.

            Reply

          • Jeff Andrews is a former Supt off the Prescott IHC and I can understand his TFR request…for the dispatch office to say no well I do not understand that. TFR’s can be manipulated for any size, shape, AGL, etc…and there are different types. The 30 mile wide request could have been shaved down on whatever angle was encroaching on Phoenix airspace. The denial of the TFR only sped up the moving of GMIHC and hence the whole ‘investigation’. I would bet if a wildland investigation team was called FIRST the TFR would have been approved. And the media, well perhaps a few phone calls from the Governor or somebody of that sort could have convinced them of not trying to get close. And TFR airspace is protected, aircraft flying into that airspace would receive some sort of consequences.

            Reply

  60. Fire Shelters——–
    I am struggling with some of the concepts here.
    If deployment is not survivable—don’t Deploy–run like hell.
    Makes no common sense to me. Deployment has never been a sure thing
    when you are caught you are usually in the worst place you could be.
    The current shelters are not full proof. The low level of heat they will withstand 550 deg. no available oxygen and your location may dictate there use like it or not.
    Run like hell without a destination is also a poor choice. The odds are not in your favor at that point with out a plan.
    So I am back to follow the rules plan ahead and bring you safety zone with you.
    would much prefer eliminating the shelter as Canada has done and train to never have to think about deployment. Make the 10 and 18 the Bible of wildland Fire. As we did in the 60’s thru the 80’s Safety Zones were priorities along with qualified look out’s. 90 of the Fires we Fought were bringing the black with us SZ and Escape Route’s were the black. No more indirect Fire line. The new large fire are dictating a whole different approach to suppression.
    Had GM had a deployment site 4 or 5 times the size they had I do not believe they would have survived with 2000 deg. temperatures.
    Drop your tools and run has never been one of my options. My crews were taught that their tool was their best friend never drop it or your water.
    Then again I never put myself or my crews in a position where we ever had to consider deployment. You have to also remember I fought fire before Fire Clothes and Fire Shelters were invented. 1961 to 1966 and fire pants not available till 1971/72. So fighting fire without Fire shelters can be done but you must totally rely on the 10 Standard Orders. Which LCES was always a part of the whole.
    So I am still stuck in the old days but they weren’t that bad, and we fought a lot of FIRE.

    Reply

    • Bob Powers-
      Common sense again- I think you have a point there. Ted Putnam on our hike stated that those shelters require a level space to work properly. Now, consider that those men had less than 100 yards either way north or south to run into the boulders that have what you said was 5-10 times the area clear enough for safety. Actually it would of been more than that. I wonder if those shelters would have added a little more safety in that boulders large area. For sure, without those shelters they would have dashed for the boulder area since that would of been their only option. My thoughts when we were escaping the fire were to stay near boulder areas as we did. Joy is still complaining about having to slide down 14ft. boulders or better yet her medical massager is—Yet I saved her life. Joy states there is even cave-like sections in that area where they could have hunkered into- Joy feels that if you have to cover an area to fight a fire you may want to satellite the area and talk to locals before heading in to a foreign area because Joy feels had they known it was a maze-like tight dense terrain they may of never even made that any option that day even if they were spent and the heat may of been a factor in their decision or not. Joy hopes future fires they have a solid knowledge of the terrains they have to fight wildfires. So maybe instead of hunkering down and doing their runs around Prescott town they go on field trips and get to know the very area they fight fires—

      Reply

        • Reply to SR post on June 5, 2014 at 5:12 pm

          >> SR said…
          >> http://www.fs.fed.us/t-d/lessons/documents/Avoid_Flames/page4.html

          My general reaction to this ‘official’ USDA Forestry Service – Wildland Fire Safety – Fire Shelter Deployment *infomercial* would be…

          Really? That’s it?
          That’s the TOTALITY of the ‘official advice’?

          Not one mention of the ACTUAL ‘survivable’ temperature limitations.

          Not even one mention to be SURE and roll your sleeves down and put your gloves on, either.

          You also have to love this ( on page 1 )…
          __________________________________________
          Page 1 of 6
          Figure 1: When direct flame contacts the fire shelter, glue in the shelter material can form gases that can ignite inside the shelter
          __________________________________________

          Really? Charming.

          So use a different f**king GLUE
          ( or contact Mr. David Turbyfill ).

          SIDENOTE: For what it is worth… Figure 5 on page 3 shows a situation that ABSOLUTELY transpired in Yarnell that day with regards to the ‘convective heat’ of a rising fire ‘skipping over’ road breaks on the upslopes.

          That ‘yellow arrow’ in Figure 5 could have been used with a photo from the exact place where Granite Mountain actually decided to leave the two-track road.

          If you look carefully at the ‘post fire’ pictures at that exact location… you will see sort of an ‘island’ of scrub trees on the western side of the two-track that were obviously ‘scorched’… but not incinerated or ‘moon scaped’ like the eastern slopes of the ridges themselves. That is because of exactly what Figure 5 is showing. As the fire came up to the two-track… it sort of ‘jumped over’ it, and the direct fire damage on the western side of the two-track was considerably less than in other places.

          Figure 5 ( at the link above ) also mentions that it is a photo of EXACTLY where 4 firefighters deployed during a similar ‘upslope burnover’… and they did, in fact SURVIVE with only minor burns.

          I am not suggesting they all had time to get back up to that two-track on the afternoon of June 30, 2013… but if they HAD… the post-fire pictures show that exactly what Figure 5 at the link above is suggesting CAN happen is exactly what DID happen there, at that two-track road, that day in Yarnell.

          >> SR also said…
          >> At the end of the day Bob is also correct that
          >> this was a very hot fire

          There is still no evidence to support any claim ( or belief ) that the entire deployment area was subject to anything near 2,000 degree temperatures.

          It was SPOTTY. There were PLACES in/around the deployment site where the temperature MAY have spiked to that point… but the photographic evidence from the site indicates that, in general, most places at the deployment site never got anywhere near 2,000 degress.

          Indeed… there is some evidence in the photographs that some places at the deployment site never even got hotter than hitting things with a blowdryer.

          Tape on radios intact ( writing on that tape still perfectly readable ) thin plastic bottle rings not even damaged in any way, electronic devices still powering on after burnover and still fully functional ( which means the ultra-thin and fragile battery leads didn’t even melt ), some plastic sunglasses found and not damaged in any way, some boot laces not even singed, contents of wallets not damaged, etc, etc.

          The list goes on.

          It looks like it was ‘spotty’ in the sense that on that day… it was really all about direct flame contact, and WHERE that was happening… and for HOW LONG.

          Obviously a lot of the men sustained non-survivable burns… but since no one has ever seen the autopsy reports we don’t know exactly WHO those men were, how MANY of them died for that specific reason ( versus inhalation issues ), or WHERE they were positioned in the deployment.

          Reply

            • Yes. Very relevant.

              As a matter of fact… add a whole bunch of highly explosive manzanita to the ‘draw’ shown in that Figure 8… and it looks VERY much like an aerial photo taken from the east of the ORIGINAL ‘proposed escape route’ where the two-track/hiking trail dropped down in-between those other two ridges as it wound down towards the BSR and Candy-Cane lane areas.

              If there had been ANY scouting involved that day… the ‘red flags’ SHOULD have been popping up all over the place telling them “even that proposed escape route sends us into a blind draw with highly volatile fuel and no good deployment options”.

              Their only real ‘by the book’ viable ‘escape route’ that day if/when the fire turned SOUTH was the one most people assumed they took. A short hop into the black.

              Reply

              • And now you know why My generation of WFF planed to never have to use the shelter.
                Follow the rules and never deploy a potato baker. Those people are now retired and only a few we trained are still using the advice we gave them.
                Find a new shelter that is truly survivable. In any condition and most locations. It has not happened yet.

                Reply

    • Bob,

      I agree with everything you say above.

      In the case of YH it’s quite possible that they did quickly consider ALL of the options available, and all things considered, deployment was still the best one.

      My comments below agreeing with SR’s statement, “don’t deploy if deployment won’t be survivable”, are in agreement with what I think his supposition was, that if one finds themselves in a predicament that is unsurvivable in a shelter, then make a different choice.

      I simply think this is a topic worthy of discussion within the fire community itself as we look at things like potentially creating new fire shelters, as well as other measures, we could also re-examine how, and where, we use them, as well.

      Reply

      • Regarding deployment, there’s some basic math, much like SZs. Where GM was, deployment was a fail in the case of YHF, and it wasn’t at all close. Given what we saw from GM’s lookout and even from the earlier discussions here concerning the view that the BSR was a “bombroof” SZ when it may not have met SZ standards, one of the factors at work that day seems to have been a very casual to non-existent use of analysis or measurement in terms of ensuring that SZ or related standards were met. I’d again point to McDonough, who was casually evaluating, also likely non-survivable, places to deploy while watched by his crew. So even earlier in the day, when there was time to do things right, existing standards were not being used.

        So, if we had an isolated failure involving the actual deployment, you could say that though GM had several minutes spent trying to burn out — when burning out was not going to work in those conditions — there was possibly a one-off decision that, though it didn’t work, was their best guess. Viewing the day as a whole, it seems there was simply not mindfulness, on the part of multiple decision makers throughout the day, of applicable standards.

        “Run like hell” doesn’t sound appetizing, or orderly. However, drop tools and packs, take water and shelter, and get moving to an objective in what can even be a forward retreat to a viable deployment site doesn’t sound nearly so undisciplined. This is already there in current training, though I don’t believe fastest to the front, an important element, is formally there. Lack of ability to retreat any meaningful distance upslope constrained GM’s choices, to be sure, but there were other choices they could have made.

        I think the elements that the fire community should be concerned about are not so much a change in guidelines, at all, but the issues of mindfulness and accountability here. The skill here is simply learning mindfulness of standards during times of stress, and it can be learned. Even with the hype given fire shelters in some cases, simple mindfulness of, We are in dense fuels, we can’t deploy here, would have taken 3 seconds. Yes, there are decisions that are close calls, such as an otherwise viable deployment site with a little brush between rocks, but that wasn’t what GM was facing.

        Reply

        • The real problem here with GM is they should never have been where they were. You do not have a lot of time to search out another location if you were not observant of the areas around you as you move thru the brush then you have already lost the mental game. A large rock field is good but did they even see any that they past in 6 to 10 ft. brush.
          I still believe that the fire flashed over them (area ignition right up the canyon. It was the worst place on earth to be with all the burning factors at play.
          Once committed to that canyon there was no way out on that day. Even if the fire never touched them the superheated air would have taken their lungs, The canyon was a death trap as has been taught to fire fighters for years. The black was their safest option and meet every safety rule.
          Why trade that for what they decided to do?????

          Reply

          • They would have been able to see the boulders/ridges to either side of the them. They may not have been mentally aware that they were a viable choice, though, but that goes back to mindfulness, and to training.

            Reply

    • Bob, sorry that you and others are stuck in the past, please join the rest of us in the 21st Century. The fact that some current, veteran, and retired wildland firefighters have the idea that there is not an issue with the current fire shelter, this is a laughable thought. According to statistics from the US Forest Service, from 1910 through 2013 there were approximately 1091 total fatalities due to all wildland firefighting operations. During that same period 504 of them were due to burn over or entrapments. That is approximately 50% of all fatalities. Since 1994, the burn over fatality rate has dropped to approximately 20% of all fatalities. With the events of 2013, is now nearly 25%. The fire shelter most certainly is a problem
      I want to give you an opportunity to see a test that I conducted at my facility. Here is a link to the YouTube video http://youtu.be/Ps-0cG70hps . Recently I received a copy of a memorandum from Dan Smith, Chair, National Wildfire Coordinating Group Executive Board, with the announcement of Fire Shelter Project Review based on a request from the Forest Service Washington Office of Fire and Aviation Management. They are directing that the US Forest Service, Technology and Development Center in Missoula, Montana initiate a review of the fire shelter system in 2014 instead of 2015.
      I am reasonably happy that the US Forest Service is conducting a review on their Fire Shelter Systems. Although with that being said, they are only accelerating the review process and it could be another 3 to 4 years before anything comes of it. I do not believe that it needs to take a three-year study to find a suitable replacement of fire shelter materials and implementation. The materials shown in my video were procured within 30 days of the Yarnell Hills fire. The fire shelter system and materials should be a constantly changing and improving as material science progresses, not once a decade.
      I have the belief that all Wildland Firefighting Agencies, with emphasis coming from USFS, BLM and the BIA, which set the standards for all the other wildland firefighting agencies, should more aggressively attack fires in the early stages. Here is a link to information supporting my belief that the Governing Agencies, Wildland Fire Commanders, Wildland Firefighters themselves, and Private Contractors are not aggressively taking action when the opportunity is there. https://www.facebook.com/media/set/?set=a.1427341110837674.1073741832.1425471334357985&type=3
      The photos, noting the timestamps, and the subsequent loss of containment later in the day, makes me wonder how a crew that was flown in at approximately 10:30 AM on Saturday morning, the 29th with the fire barely showing smoke could lose a handle on this unless they were not effectively working or intentionally left the fire to burn fuels in an effort to effect a Fuels Reduction Policy in the wildland environment. This is where I believe that Wildland Fire Management and Policy cost the lives of the 19 Granite Mountain Hotshots.
      My professional background is manufacturing. In the manufacturing world, as a part moves through the shop and a defect is found during inspection or if a part fails in the field, as in an auto or plane crash, we have corrective action policies in place that look for and assess, Root Cause Analysis. In my opinion, the Root Cause of why the Granite Mountain Hotshots perished on June 30.
      • Ineffective Initial Attack and Wildland Management on June 29.
      • Inadequate Fire Shelters
      In addition, there are other factors that did play a role in the outcome of Yarnell fire. For example, fire behavior, weather conditions, Incident Command, communications, locations of the crew, etc. for the outcome to be different. All these other factors would need to be removed. The two critical points named above remain the Root Cause

      Reply

      • Reply to DAVID TURBYFILL post on June 5, 2014 at 4:10 pm

        >> DAVID TURBYFILL said…
        >> I want to give you an opportunity to see a test
        >> that I conducted at my facility. Here is a link to the
        >> YouTube video…
        >> http://youtu.be/Ps-0cG70hps

        The difference between life… or death.

        There is NO EXCUSE for there not to be commercially available fire shelters made from this same material RIGHT NOW.

        To supply men with ‘safety equipment’… and then train them to use it under conditions that won’t even produce a survivable result… borders on criminal negligence.

        Reply

      • Dave first I support your efforts.
        Second I am not stuck in the past.
        Canada recently made the decision to not carry shelters because there was to much reliance on them.
        Burn overs happened thru the 50’s and had reduced during the 70’s and 80’s 1994 was the first big on after the loop fire in 1966.
        To train crews to never have to deploy is a top priority. I did it thru the 60’s, 70’s, and 80’s.
        If we need to develop a fail safe option called the fire shelter then make it fail safe. Not the shelters we have today. Fire fighters are packing 8 pounds of weight that is not there fail safe option when they F*** up and things go to hell.
        As you can see I have always had issues with the fire shelter And I am definitely in the 21st. century.
        My bottom line is if a fire shelter is developed that would with stand 1500 to 2000 deg. would the fire fighter have enough oxygen to survive inside? The problem has always been extra weight ( heavy shelter + maybe an oxygen bottle) it just gets to a point of no return.
        I do not want to see another fire fatality, but it will happen again. Unsafe decisions are made by people who do not follow safety rules. Safety equipment will never change that, its human nature.

        Reply

        • Seals are a big problem, too.

          In response to WTKTT, no one is being trained to utilize current shelters in situations involving direct flame contact. This is in fact cautioned against. All protective equipment that I’m aware of has limitations. Nothing wrong with better gear either, but for the gear people have today, knowing its proper use and limitations in effectiveness are responsibilities.

          Reply

          • Reply to SR post on June 6, 2014 at 5:46 am

            >> SR said…
            >> In response to WTKTT, no one is being
            >> trained to utilize current shelters in
            >> situations involving direct flame contact.
            >> This is in fact cautioned against.

            Yes… it is *cautioned against*… but even the official training video for the ‘new’ fire shelters produced by the USDA Forestry Service itself STATES that the new shelters are much better at handling ‘convective heat’ and ‘direct flame contact’ than the ‘old shelters’.

            The official training video only emphasizes ‘minimizing’ direct flame contact.

            The IMPLICATION from this training video is that the shelter CAN be ALWAYS be used in ‘situations involving direct flame contact’… but just try to keep that to a minimum.

            The National Interagency Fire Center website has only one ”official’ video entitled ‘Fire Shelter Training’.

            It is a link to a YouTube video that was specifically produced and published by the USDA Forest Service…

            The New Generation Fire Shelter
            Produced by the USDA Forest Service and the National Wildfire Coordinating Group

            http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QJsY6foLh8o&list=SP3D911BCBF3DDF303
            ____________________________________
            +13:58
            If you have time… clear an area at least 4 x 8 feet down to mineral soil to limit flame contact with the shelter. Though the new shelter offers improved protection from direct flame (contact), survival is more likely if flame contact is avoided.
            +23:39
            Always deploy the shelter so that flame contact is minimized.
            +23:55
            The new fire shelter offers improved protection against radiant heat and flames… but like its predecessor… it is still a last resort.
            ____________________________________

            >> SR also wrote…
            >> All protective equipment that I’m aware
            >> of has limitations.

            Absolutely… and it is ESSENTIAL that the people being asked to USE the equipment are all FULLY aware of those ‘limitations’.

            >> SR also wrote…
            >> Nothing wrong with better gear either,
            >> but for the gear people have today,
            >> knowing its proper use and limitations
            >> in effectiveness are responsibilities.

            Totally agree… and when people are beginning to demonstrate that they do NOT fully understand those limitations ( such as a tendency to consider deployment an ‘easy’ thing or a ‘first option’… as Brendan McDonough seem to when he evacuated his lookout position )… it is up to managers to NOTICE and CORRECT that ‘thinking’ toot sweet.

            I also can’t help but remember what Prescott Wildland Division Chief Darrell Willis said standing at the very spot where 19 of his own men died.

            A reporter asked him what the ‘upper limits’ were for the ‘new fire shelters’… and the Wildland Division Chief that was in charge of these 19 men who died said…

            “I don’t know the answer to that question.”

            Reply

  61. Can anyone identify the two fire vehicles in the last image from Swartz’s Nikon picture folder of Seat drop 4? The ones up on the hill, in the middle of the picture.

    Thanks in advance

    Reply

    • Can’t do it right now becuz I’m backing up my Lightroom catalog. And also I have a really hard time identifying engines. But I will take a look in the morning.

      Reply

    • calvin…

      Not sure about an ID on either one of the vehicles… ( the white pickup with the contiguous red stripe on the side looks familiar ) but I can tell you EXACTLY where they are and what was happening at the time this photo was taken.

      They are up on Model Creek Road and this was all about
      ‘making a stand’ on Model Creek Road at that time. OPS1 Todd Abel and SPGS2 Darrell Willis were fully engaged with this at that time ( 3:58 PM ).

      The white pickup with the red stripe seems to be exactly here…

      34.270943, -112.757318

      That is up on Model Creek Road, just 2,560 feet SOUTHWEST of the ICP at the Model Creek Elementary School in Peeples Valley.

      This Swartz photo was taken at exactly 3:58.26 PM, which is only about 60 seconds after Air Attack Rory Collins said ‘goodbye’ to Thomas French in Bravo 33 and ‘left the fire’.

      There is no Panebaker Air Study video that captures any TAC or A2G radio traffic at this exact 3:58.26 PM moment.

      However… in the 160808 Panebaker video shot just about 9 minutes after this photo was taken ( Panebaker Air Study video 160808 begins at 1607.00 ), the background radio traffic is all about ‘Model Creek Road’ and (apparently) features both OPS1 Todd Abel and SPGS2 Darrell Willis in the background… so that could easily be either Abel’s or Willis’ white pickup with the red stripe there on Model Creek Road in this Swartz photo. See below for full transcript of video 160808.

      NOTE: As the FOREGROUND traffic in the Air Study video below shows… French in B33 *was* ‘lining up a drop’ with Tanker 810 but his instructions were just to go ‘between the fire and the house’ and there is no Air-To-Air talk whatsoever about protecting any firefighters or vehicles on Model Creek Road.

      The Swartz photo itself…

      Online Dropbox Folder…

      Photos and Video / AerialFirefightingstudy /
      Swartz / Pictures / Nikon / North of Fire / Seat Drop 4

      Last photo in this folder…

      20130630_1558_AZ-A1S-000688_T830___8_G_RS.JPG

      EXIT Metadata…

      Camera: Nikon COOLPIX P520
      Lens: 77.5 mm (Max aperture f/3)
      Exposure: Auto exposure, Program AE, 1/160 sec, f/4.9, ISO 400
      Flash: Off, Did not fire
      Focus: AF-S, Lower-right
      Focus 2: AF Area Mode: Dynamic Area
      Date: June 30, 2013 – 3:58:26 PM
      Location: Latitude/longitude: 34° 16′ 19.6″ North, 112° 43′ 52″ West
      Location Decimal: ( 34.272103, -112.731100 )
      Altitude: 1,374.2 m
      File: 3,672 × 4,896 JPEG (18.0 megapixels)

      NOTE: The GPS data in this Swartz photo is CORRECT.
      That is exactly where HE was standing when he took the picture.
      It was at that same location on Hays Ranch Road where the Panebaker Air Study videos were taken and he was looking WEST.

      ** PANEBAKER AIR STUDY VIDEO 160808

      Contains background radio conversation from just 9 minutes after the Swartz photo was taken. It is all about getting some more retardant drops to help fight the fire where OPS1 Todd Abel and SPGS2 Darrell Willis were at this time ( on Model Creek Road )…

      ** 20130630_160808_SEAT_EP.MOV

      This video is 1 minute and 8 seconds long

      NOTE: Here is what French and Tank 810 were discussing about this upcoming drop just BEFORE this video begins. The drop was to be between the fire and a house… and no mention of targeting any firefighters or any vehicles there on Model Creek Road…

      (B33 – French): Okay… uh… eight ten.. ya got me in sight? It’s gonna be between the fire and the house right through here… ya got it?
      (Tanker 810): Got it.
      (B33 – French): Zero eight zero on the heading four thousand six hundred… SHARP left turn on the exit. There’s a helicopter out my twelve so good left on the exit.
      (Tanker 810): Okay… understand hard left on the exit and… start the drop?

      ** AIR STUDY VIDEO 160808 BEGINS AT 1607.00 ( 4:07.00 PM )

      FOREGROUND

      +0:00
      (B33 – French):That’s affirmative… You’re clear to drop. That line’s clear.

      BACKGROUND

      +0:00
      (Unknown): ( Background conversation already in progress. )
      ( Hard to make out… sounds like…) No… what we need is to find a punch out.

      +0:05
      (Unknown): Copy that. ???. Be okay to (start?) right behind that ???

      FOREGROUND

      +0:06
      (5KA): Bravo 33… Five Kilo Alpha.
      (B33 – French): Go ahead, sir.
      (5KA): Uh… was that my mistake? I was off your twelve there. Did you want me a little bit further around the inside?
      (B33 – French): No.. no mistake. That’s where I wanted ya. No worries. Yea… we’re gonna do a sharp left on the exit and you continue.

      BACKGROUND

      +0:11
      (Unknown – Sounds like OPS1 Abel?): ( Nooo?? )…
      I don’t wantcha out there unless my (Alpha?) is ???

      +0:17
      (Unknown): Copy that… but we could fire off at a ?? here ??? (on the?) alongside of the road… ??? retardant ??? north side ?? road.

      FOREGROUND

      +0:28
      (B33 – French): Okay… eight seven four… how many miles out?
      (B33 – French): Hold at five please at five thousand five hundred. two nine eight zero on the altimeter.

      BACKGROUND

      +0:34
      (Unknown): ( More background conversation here. Hard to make out ).

      FOREGROUND

      +0:41
      (5KA): Five Kilo Alpha off the drop… and I’ll just go sit down and wait for ya to get finished.
      (B33 – French): Awesome… thanks a lot Kilo Alpha… and eight one zero… you’re uh… clear to drop, sir.

      BACKGROUND

      NOTE: At the following point in the video the FOREGROUND conversation dies out and the background can be heard pretty clearly…

      +0:44
      (Unknown – Sounds like OPS1 Abel?): (?) Lightin’ ??? (Alpha? OPS?) called and he’s tryin’ to do a (visit?)… but uh… I think if we can tell that house’ll be secured then we can be tryin’ to hook back to it.

      +0:56
      (Unknown): It’s makin’ a push right now.

      +1:03
      (Unknown – Sounds like SPGS2 Darrell Willis?):
      ( Foreground talk resumes so this is hard to hear but someone is saying something on TAC channel. Sounds like… ) Yea… we saw the difference ?? ( more conversation, hard to make out ).

      FOREGROUND

      +1:05
      Tanker 810): Eight one zero’s off the drop.
      ( B33 – French): Perfect, man… that was right on.

      ** AIR STUDY VIDEO 160808 ENDS AT 1608.08 ( 4:08.08 PM )

      Reply

      • Looking at Panebaker’s photo and video information document, it contains no mention of T810 in the 1600 hour. The last drop from T810 (that was documented on Panebaker’s document) occurred at 1523.

        Reply

        • Copy that. There is no question, however, that B33 French was dealing with Tanker 810 in this timeframe and that there ‘was’ a drop at this time… and that French thought it was ‘perfect’ ( Went right between the fire and the house being protected ).

          The exchange that then takes place right after this video ends ins 810 asking French “Load and return?” and French says “Yes. Load and return”.

          Reply

      • The 154940 Panebaker seat drop video shows what appears to be a direct drop on the green crew carrier(?) (that needs ID) that is in the final Swartz photo from Seat drop 4.
        The audio from B33 says “tie into the road just to the right of the white vehicle.” This is the same white vehicle I asked about earlier.

        Reply

        • Calvin,

          The “green crew carrier” you refer to is more likely an engine. The only green crew carriers on the fire at that time belonged to Blue Ridge, and we know where they were at this moment. The ‘engine’ is seen in the previous photos substantially to the left and out of the drop area. It looks like the road they were on hooks over and lines up with the drop, which is where they ended up in the last photo. The pick-up looks like a PFD vehicle.

          Reply

          • Reply to TTWARE post
            on June 4, 2014 at 7:58 am

            >> TTWARE said…
            >> The pick-up looks like a PFD vehicle.

            Exactly right. See post just below of TWO other photographs of this same F-250 white pickup with a red stripe and the large chrome deer chucker on the front.

            It belongs to the Prescott Fire Department and would also appear to definitely be the PFD vehicle normally driven by Darrell Willis.

            Reply

    • Reply to calvin post on June 3, 2014 at 5:46 pm

      >> calvin said…
      >> Can anyone identify the two fire vehicles in the last image
      >> from Swartz’s Nikon picture folder of Seat drop 4? The ones
      >> up on the hill, in the middle of the picture.
      >>
      >> Thanks in advance

      calvin… UPDATE on ‘identifying’ these vehicles.

      I believe I have found the proof that the white pickup with the
      red stripe in the Swartz photo is definitely a ‘Prescott Fire’
      vehicle and is almost assuredly the one being driven that
      day by SPGS2 Darrell Willis.

      I searched the existing photos from YFD and it doesn’t seem to
      have been captured in any other photo… HOWEVER!… I still
      was pretty sure I had ‘seen’ this pickup truck before.

      Then I remembered that there is this fellow named Scott Ash
      who lives in Prescott and is a semi-professional photgrapher
      who is famous for his picture-taking of FIRE vehicles. He has
      taken TONS of them and he posts all his photos to a public
      FLICKR page. ( User name: Scott Ash Tagname: ashman 88 ).

      A super-enhancement of that white pickup with the red stripe in
      the Swartz photo is still kind of blurry but here are the identifying
      characteristics that CAN be seen in an ehancement…

      1) White Ford F-250 pickup with ‘access’ cab configuration
      meaning it only has 2 actual doors but there is a ‘back window’.

      2) The red-stripe along the side is contiguous ( No breaks in it
      and no WORDS appearing in the stripe as seen with many
      other vehicles on the fire ).

      3) A LARGE Deer-Chucker attached to the front that appears
      to be CHROME. It is reflecting light in the photo.

      4) Large ( BLACK ) over-sized side-view mirrors like the ones
      used for hauling trailers ( large and extendable ).

      5) A LOGO on the side door under the red stripe that is
      ‘yellowish’ or ‘gold’ and does not ‘break’ into the stripe itself.

      So then I went and searched Scott Ash’s comprehensive set
      of ‘Prescott Fire Vehicles and I am sure I have found at least
      TWO better photographs of this exact same vehicle.

      I also believe the *circumstances* of when and where Scott Ash
      took these TWO photos pretty much proves that this is the PFD
      vehicle normally driven by Darrell Willis.

      ONE of them shows it parked in front of Prescott City Hall.
      The OTHER shows it parked INSIDE Granite Mountain Station 7.

      I am going to post direct links to BOTH of the photos as two
      separate ‘Replys’ to THIS posting, so that I don’t break the
      ‘one link per post’ rule and messages don’t fall into ‘moderation’…

      …but here is the link to the overall Scott Ash ‘Fire Vehicles’
      folder at FLICKR where BOTH of these photos are…

      https://www.flickr.com/photos/scottash/sets/

      That is his ‘home’ page and you will see that he has
      MANY folders full of fire vehicle pictures.

      The one that contains the TWO pictures of this pickup truck seen in
      the Swartz photo is the second one on top row of folders entitled…

      “Fire Department/EMS” ( 278 photos )

      If you click and ‘view’ that folder… the two photos of this
      pickup ( which I will post direct links to below ) are…

      4th row of photos… first photo in that row.
      This is the one that shows it parked in front of Prescott City Hall.

      7th row of photos… first photo in that row.
      This is the one that shows it parked inside the parking lot of
      of Granite Mountain Station 7… on July 30, 2013.

      Reply

      • ** WHITE PICKUP WITH RED STRIPE AND CHROME
        ** DEER CHUCKER SEEN IN SWARTZ PHOTO
        **
        ** Scott Ash photo 1 ( of 2 )

        Here is a direct link to Scott Ash’s FIRST ( of TWO ) photos of that same white-with-red-stripes pickup truck seen in the Swartz photo…

        https://www.flickr.com/photos/scottash/14207819533/

        Title he gave to this photo is…
        “Prescott Fire Department: Prescott, Arizona”.

        Logo on the door says ‘Prescott Fire’.
        Same chrome deer-chucker mounted on the front.

        EXIF DATA FROM THIS PHOTO…

        Camera: Sony DSC-W220
        Lens: 5.4 mm (Max aperture f/2.8)
        Exposure: Auto exposure, Program AE, 1/640 sec, f/7.1
        Flash: Auto, Did not fire
        Focus: AF-C – AF Area Mode: Default
        Date: May 14, 2014 – 2:30:29 PM
        Date/Time Original: 2014:05:14 – 14:30:29
        Create Date: 2014:05:14 – 14:30:29
        Sony Date Time: 2014:05:14 – 14:30:29
        File: 2,522 × 3,514 JPEG (8.9 megapixels)
        Color Encoding: Embedded color profile: “sRGB”
        Software: Microsoft Windows Photo Gallery 6.0.6001.18000

        NOTE: Original photo is ‘digitally signed’ by Scott Ash in
        the lower right corner where it says ( in black letters )…
        “Scott Ash 2014”.

        ** VEHICLE INFORMATION

        Ford F-250 ‘Super Duty’ Pickup. 2-door access style
        cab with rear windows. ‘Prescott Fire’ Shield and Logo on
        both the passenger and driver side door(s).
        Extendable side-mirrors for trailer towing.
        Chrome-plated full-size Deer Chucker mounted on the front.

        ** WHERE THE PHOTO WAS TAKEN

        Assuming this photo was taken somewhere in Prescott, Arizona, the ‘giveaway’ to finding the exact location in Prescott are the two microwave towers seen in the background of this Scott Ash photo.

        All microwave towers are registered with the FCC ( along with exact location ) and this information is always included with other general information about any ‘city’ in the US at the ‘City-Data’ online web service.

        So I just used the public ‘City-Data’ site to find the location of microwave towers in Prescott, Arizona. There are only a few and it didn’t take long to nail down the location of this particular photo.

        It was easy to see, then, that this photo was including the microwave tower(s) located on Cortez Street in downtown Prescott.

        Scott Ash took this photo standing on the sidewalk
        at 201 South Cortez Street, in downtown Prescott, AZ.

        He was standing on the sidewalk on the EAST side of
        Cortez and facing SOUTHWEST when he took the photo.

        BEHIND him ( as he is taking the photo ) is the entrance to the Prescott City Hall building ( the one with the big metal statue of a guy on a horse rearing up sitting out front ). That ‘Prescott City Hall and Municipal Services Building’ occupies the SOUTHEAST corner of the intersection of East Goodwin Street and Cortez Street, and is right across the street from the Yavapai County Courthouse Square / Park.

        SIDENOTE: The white building with the light-brown canvas awnings just south of the Prescott City Hall building ( and just out of frame to the left in the Scott Ash photo ) houses the City of Prescott Legal Department.
        221 S. Cortez Street
        Prescott, AZ, 86303
        Phone 928-777-1274 (Attorney)
        Phone 928-777-1283
        That is where City Attorney John Paladini’s office(s) are.

        The white pickup with the red strip ( and logo that says Prescott Fire ) is parked there in one of the parking spaces in front of the City of Prescott City Hall and Municipal Services Center on the Cortez Street side of the building.

        If you actually just use Google Maps ( as of today ) and enter ‘Street View’ at that exact location… the pickup in the Scott Ash photo is parked in the exact same parking spot where the current Google ‘Street View’ imagery shows the GREEN jeep / landrover ( with the almost brand-new BF Goodrich tires ) parked there in front of that ‘2 hour parking’ sign.

        The exact center of that actual ‘parking spot’ is HERE…

        34.539542, -112.468676

        Scott Ash was standing exactly HERE on the sidewalk ( and facing SOUTHWEST ) as he took the photograph of the pickup sitting in that parking spot…

        34.539584, -112.468637

        ** PRESCOTT CITY COUNCIL MEETING IN-PROGRESS
        ** WHEN PHOTO WAS TAKEN?

        Scott Ash took this photo of the white-with-red-stripe Prescott Fire Department vehicle parked right out in front of the Prescott City Hall at exactly 2:30.29 PM on May 14, 2014.

        No official City Council Meetings seem to have been scheduled for the afternoon of May 14, 2014.

        ** CITY COUNCIL CHAMBERS

        The Prescott City Hall also houses the ‘City Council Chambers’.

        The recent ‘hearings’ regarding Andrew Ashcraft’s situation were held in these exact same ‘City Council Chambers’ there at the Prescott City Hall at 201 South Cortez.

        The dates for these Ashcraft ‘hearings’ were May 21 and 22, 2014… just seven days after Scott Ash photographed that Prescott Fire Department pickup parked outside Prescott City Hall at 2:30.29 PM on May 14, 2014.

        Reply

      • ** WHITE PICKUP WITH RED STRIPE AND CHROME
        ** DEER CHUCKER SEEN IN SWARTZ PHOTO
        **
        ** Scott Ash photo 2 ( of 2 )

        Here is a direct link to Scott Ash’s SECOND ( of TWO ) photos of that same white-with-red-stripes pickup truck seen in the Swartz photo…

        https://www.flickr.com/photos/scottash/9420654806/

        Scott Ash photographed this SAME Prescott Fire Department F-250 pickup AGAIN ( actually, earlier than the other photo taken at City Hall ) on July 31, 2013.

        This is the photo that shows this pickup parked INSIDE the fence at the Granite Mountain Station 7… so whoever was driving it had ‘business’ there at the Prescott Station 7. This would most likely have been Wildland Division Chief Darrell Willis.

        NOTE: When the EXIF data is extracted for this photo… it reveals that there is MORE to the photo than is being displayed by FLICKR. The ‘preview thumbnail’ generated by the EXIF viewer shows much MORE on both the left and right sides of the photo. We see the ‘Spirit of the Wildland Community’ Hotshot statue that was installed into the Station 7 parking lot prior to July 31 on the left side of the photo… and more of the fencing on the right side ( along with a full American flag on the fence not seen in original )… both of which help to identify the photo’s exact location AND establish that the pickup is definitely photographed sitting IN the parking lot of Station 7, and not outside the fence.

        EXIF DATA FOR THIS PHOTO…

        Camera: Nikon D40
        Lens: AF-S DX Zoom-Nikkor 18-55mm f/3.5-5.6G ED II
        Lens 2: Shot at 55 mm
        Exposure: Auto exposure, Not Defined, 1/400 sec, f/10
        Flash: Off, Did not fire
        Focus: AF-A, Mid-left, at 2.7m, depth of field of about 94cm
        Focus 2: AF Area Mode: Dynamic Area (closest subject)
        Date: July 31, 2013 – 12:57:18 PM
        File: 1,334 × 2,006 JPEG (2.7 megapixels)
        Color Encoding: Embedded color profile: “sRGB”

        LOCATION FOR THIS PHOTO…

        As with the previous Scott Ash photo.. there is no embedded GPS data… but the location for this photo is obvious from what is seen in the photo itself.

        THIS Scott Ash photo of the white-with-red-stripe F-250 Prescott Fire Department pickup shows it parked INSIDE the fence that surrounds the ‘Granite Mountain Hotshots’ headquarters in Prescott, Arizona officially known as ‘Prescott Fire Station 7’, 501 6th Street, Prescott, AZ.

        The building with the ‘rose’ colored awnings seen in the background behind the pickup ( and beyond the chain link fencing with the memorials on it ) is actually the main building for the Propane Company that was/is located due south and directly across EZ Street from the ‘Granite Mountain Station 7’.

        The memorabilia on the fence is seen from the ‘inside looking out’. The ‘Spirit of the Wild Community’ bronze statue of a wildland firefighter is also seen on the left edge of the ‘preview version’ of this photo. It had been moved to Granite Mountain Station 7 by July 31, 2013, and was ‘installed’ INSIDE the fenced compound, near the front door of the main Station 7 building.

        I don’t think the general public was EVER being allowed to enter the Station 7 parking lot, and Scott Ash would have been no exception… so it appears that he took this photo THROUGH the fencing on the NORTH side of the Station 7 parking lot.

        At the extreme left edge of the ‘preview version’ of this photo, there is also a distinct ‘blue line’, like the edge of some ‘blue’ object.

        As it turns out… there is a BLUE dumpster sitting on the northern edge of the Station 7 parking lot, so it would appear that Scott Ash was either INSIDE the parking lot and went all the way back to the side of the BLUE dumpster to take this photo… OR… Scott Ash was still actually OUTSIDE the compound fence, but simply on the northern side of the compound and shot this photo THROUGH the chain link fence ( thus capturing the side of the BLUE dumpster and the Wildland Firefighter statue on the left of his frame ).

        I believe it’s the latter ( He was outside the fence ).

        The other evidence that this is the case ( Scott Ash was outside the fence and shooting THROUGH it ) is the ‘out of focus’ GRASS in the very bottom of the photo.. and also what appears to be an ‘out of focus’ piece of the chain link fence in the very bottom left corner of the photo. That tall GRASS was OUTSIDE the northern fence of the compound.

        On July 31, 2013… the Wildland Firefighter statue was sitting exactly here… in the corner of the parking spot located at the southwest corner of the main Station 7 building…

        34.548678, -112.465222

        The F-250 white-pickup-with-red-stripe was parked two spaces away from the statue to the west. The center of that parking spot is exactly here…

        34.548668, -112.465287

        Reply

        • Followup…

          The only way to actually SEE the ‘full’ Composite
          Preview version of the SECOND of Scott Ash’s photos detailed above is to use an EXIF metadata viewer.

          The images that appear in his FLICKR account are ‘cropped’ and won’t show the full WIDE version of the photo including the ‘Spirit of the Wildland Community’ WFF statue on the left side of the photo.

          Just click the link below to actually ‘see’ this FULL WIDTH version of Scott Ash’s original photo.

          The EXIF viewer will be showing what is called the ‘Composite Preview’ image that is also EMBEDDED inside the original metadata for this photo.

          http://regex.info/exif.cgi?imgurl=https%3A%2F%2Ffarm6.staticflickr.com%2F5479%2F9420654806_cc92a328b9_o.jpg

          Reply

          • Thanks WTKTT. I looked at the images that you provided links to. Both images taken by Ash show a truck WITHOUT a tool box in the bed. The Swartz image above as well as the Story photos from the Ranch House show seem to show the same truck that Ash took photos of, minus the tool box (that is removable)

            Image 1690.jpg from Tom Story is the best image (no obstructions) of what could be the same truck. Note it appears to have entered the highway from the South

            Reply

            • Reply to calvin post on
              June 6, 2014 at 2:22 am

              >> calvin said…
              >> Image 1690.jpg from Tom Story
              >> is the best image (no obstructions)
              >> of what could be the same truck.

              Yes. There is no doubt that is the
              same F-250 PFD truck seen up
              on Model Creek Road in the
              Swartz photos ( and also photographed back in Prescott by Scott Ash ).

              See a longer post above about this all now proving exactly when Darrell Willis arrived at the Ranch House Restaurant.

              This SAME PICKUP ( with Darrell Willis in it ) is also captured in one of the Air Study Videos coming down from Peeples Valley at the same time Darrell Willis’ own Unit Log notes say that is what he was doing.

              The video and the photos simply prove it was all happening about 7 or 8 minutes sooner than Willis’ says it was in his Unit Log notes.

              Reply

  62. I want to post this to the top, because I want to make sure FIRE20+ and WTKTT see it and everybody else does, too.

    A single-letter-per-column slightly heated conversation ensued way down below when I wrote “Is that Shakespearean or what?” after FIRE20+ wrote about the last minutes before the deployment and burn-over when Granite Mountain was trying to communicated out of the fire-filled bowl they had walked down in, and everybody else was trying to communicate in to them, but the canyon and smoke blocked most of those attempts.

    FIRE20+ didn’t understand what I meant, and thought i was joking. And he was, understandably, offended, and, thus, angered by that.

    And this is what I meant by what I said:

    Marti Reed
    on June 2, 2014 at 7:02 am said:
    I’m sorry, FIRE+20, I truly didn’t mean to offend or cause a long single-letter-per-column-wide kerflufflle.

    It was a late-night powerful gut feeling I was having as I finished reading what you wrote.

    What prompted me to say that was the incredibly tragic climaxing of the combination of complexity and futility in the situation as you were describing it.

    That’s exactly the kind of human circumstances Shakespeare constantly wrote about.

    With Shakespeare, the difference between comedy and tragedy is not that comedy is funny and tragedy is not funny.

    The difference is that, in comedy, the subjects manage to survive and evolve through and because of those complex situations.

    Whereas, in tragedy, they don’t.

    When I was reading what you were describing, that similarity just blew me away.

    The bard himself could have written this fire. Every single little bit of it.

    Reply

    • Reply to Marti Reed post on June 2, 2014 at 7:13 am

      The way I read that particular exchange about a mile below was that it somehow got tangled up with the exchange BEFORE that where you were asking about the ‘WHY’ with regards to something.

      Things just got ‘crossed up on the wires’, or something.

      FWIW… I agree that there are ‘Shakespearean’ aspects to the ENTIRE weekend… and not just what happened Sunday.

      I’ll even repeat the quote I chimed in with on that same exchange down below… because it’s the one that keeps sticking in MY head as I continue to read this evidence record…

      “My words fly up, my thoughts remain below.”
      William Shakespeare, Hamlet. Act III. Sc. 3

      I’ll also repeat my ‘explanation’ of why this Bard quote just seems so relevant ( to me ) regarding this tragic incident…

      It really is quite extraordinary how MUCH radio traffic and ‘communication’ was actually captured that Sunday… yet we
      still don’t really have ANY frickin’ idea why those men died
      where they did.

      Their ‘words flew up’ ( on the radio )… but their ‘thoughts
      remained below’ ( obtuse and unclear ).

      If ONLY Caldwell, MacKenzie and BR Hotshot Ian McCord had
      pressed RECORD a few moments sooner… and held down their
      RECORD buttons a while longer… we might know a LOT more
      about the actual motivations/decisions involved with this tragedy.

      Same Bard quote actually applies to all the interviews, I suppose.
      There is a LOT of ‘testimony’ and ‘information’ there… but you still can’t help but get the feeling that people’s ‘words are flying up’… but their ‘thoughts remain below’… and that most people interviewed are simply not telling all that they know about that day.

      In ALL of the ‘interviewing’ ( SAIT and ADOSH ) you also can’t help but feel the real ‘dropped-balls’ were the questions that were NOT being asked.

      Reply

    • Crossed wires, copy. Bound to happen on a site where tone or personal experience can’t be heard. Sounds like I need to read this book, and in my own defense I haven’t read much Shakespeare. I do understand the comedy/tragedy comparison now, thanks for explaining. More kerfluffles are bound to happen but we’ll work through those too.
      I also believe working together here is important, it’s difficult to REALLY know what each of us is after…I’m after the truth and using that to prevent this from happening again. All of our time is valuable and right now is fire season, tick tock tick tock.

      Reply

    • I just wrote a really long response here and somehow, via doing it on my iPad (cuz I’m screen recording a class on my computer while also trying to pay attention to it,also), I lost it. So I’ll try it again.

      To WTKTT and FIRE20+ I really honor and trust you both.

      I don’t actually have the kind of memory that remembers things like specific Shakespeare quotes. But when you quoted that quote, WTKTT, I thought, “Absolutely, that’s exactly right!”

      OTOH, my reaction to FIRE 20+’s description of that particular situation was more general, more cumulative, more about the entire fire.

      My most valuable interpreters of Shakespeare write about how he, for the first time in history, observed and wrote about how individuals either evolved into the complex situations they either found themselves in or even created and thus SURVIVED (in his traditionally formally labeled “Comedies”), or didn’t, and thus PERISHED (in his traditionally formally labeled “Tragedies”). It was his prime contribution to not only literature, but also our understanding of human nature. It was a huge contribution to our “modern” understanding of who we are as human beings.

      I understand this is totally off-topic, and I respect that. However, when FIRE 20+ wrote what he wrote, and it all hit me, so I wrote what I wrote, and then WTKTT wrote what he wrote, it was like this entire fire, including its aftermath, including the three faux-investigations, all just came together for me and hit me like a tsunami (when I actually became kind of speechless, and it’s taken me some time to explain it).

      The point of this fire, ala Shakespeare, who I wrote “could have written every bit of it,” my the take-away, as we struggle to understand it, would have been that the whole fire, as various main and subordinate players responded to it and thus re-shaped it, including the 19 who died, but also everybody else, including the “investigators,” never evolved to meet the challenges the complex circumstances required. And, thus, it became a Tragedy.

      Everything thus became increasingly exponentially futile, in spite of all the efforts to control it, culminating in those last-ditch attempts by GM to communicate out of it and everybody else’s last-ditch attempts to communicate into it, with the irony of Gary Cordes not being at all surprised when he found it where they were, and Todd Abel being completely blown away by the same thing.

      THAT is the exactly the kind of content Shakespeare wrote EVERYTHING he wrote about.

      And so, given how off-topic this is, what does this mean for us? I can’t say. Maybe what WTKTT is saying by quoting that specific quote that jumped out to him “my words fly out but my thoughts remain below,” especially as it relates to so much of this, has to do with that delicate and complicated noise-to-1signal ratio that keeps rearing its difficult head?

      We can’t ignore the “noise” (AA to GM stop being noisy!!), until we know for sure it’s noise. And yet we have to discern the signal amongst the noise. And then, respond to and re-communicate that. That seems to be what was not happening on that fire, in so very many ways. And what was, also, not happening in the three “investigations.”

      How do we contribute to this situation In order to evolve and thus help it evolve so as to not end in more Tragedy? I think, personally, the fact that (IMHO) Shakespeare could have written every little bit of this fire leads me to think he may have more wisdom than we may be aware of concerning the answer to that question.

      And now, I promise, I’m done “off-topically” writing about Shakespeare and the Yarnell Hill Fire.

      Reply

      • Except as a corollary, regarding our convo a few miles down, FIRE20+, regarding those radio frequencies and the blank look you were given when you asked about them.

        There’s a long way we have been able to go regarding the “Lessons Learned” from this fire, based on the information that has been wrestled from various agencies via FOIA requests. And that’s good.

        However.

        There is definitely “evidence” being carefully with-held.

        And that has been the case from the very get-go. And that’s not a speculation. That is a fact.

        Cameras with important data — diverted. Cellphones lost into a black hole, even after being “read.” GPS Units diverted. Radios — even tho SAIT told the press they would investigate radio logs, they didn’t.

        Y

        Reply

        • Continuing, with more iPad woes.

          And the most obvious and spot-on glaringly clear.

          Brendan McDonough was listening in to the whole conversation GM had about what they were going to do and what they did.

          Someone is still protecting someone. And, according to Shakespeare’s way of observing/describing human affairs, all things considered, that is another factor contributing to……..Tragedy.

          Reply

          • MARTI SAID:
            “There’s a long way we have been able to go regarding the “Lessons Learned” from this fire, based on the information that has been wrestled from various agencies via FOIA requests. And that’s good.
            However.
            There is definitely “evidence” being carefully with-held.
            And that has been the case from the very get-go. And that’s not a speculation. That is a fact.”

            —I say be careful with “Leasons Learned” and using that term dealing with Yarnell. Just because evidence was obtainable and any American could request it I don’t see that as an advantage but a right. “Leasons Learned” need to be factual and the release of that information wasn’t all the facts. Hence we go round and round.

            Reply

            • It would be interesting if we all wrote our own versions of “Lessons Learned” and see what we come up with.

              Reply

              • I think the central lesson is that safety is still not ranked that highly relative to other concerns when fighting wildland fire. A year later, after a massive failure at multiple levels, there have been no real changes.

                Beyond that, there are lots of little lessons that should be almost at the level of motor skills: for instance, don’t deploy if deployment won’t be survivable.

                There are also even hiring lessons if people want to look for them.

                One stealth lesson that does seem to have been learned, at least for the moment, is that given the contingent liabilities, a hotshot crew shouldn’t be looked at as a moneymaker and is also not a good way to seek municipal prestige. Not that those were dominant drivers before, but they may have been factors to some people.

                Reply

                • Oh, and a big emphasis on secrecy in contexts, such as crew movements, that don’t make sense should be viewed as a red flag is another potential lesson.

                  Reply

                • SR said:

                  “Beyond that, there are lots of little lessons that should be almost at the level of motor skills: for instance, don’t deploy if deployment won’t be survivable.”

                  Wow, I think you have hit on something that should be aggressively stressed during shelter training/refreshers:

                  “..don’t deploy if deployment won’t be survivable.”

                  I agree with that philosophy 110%.

                  The problem in getting people to abide by that, will be the many human factors that will always fight against it. These include the unit’s desire to ‘stay together as a team’, as well as, the leader not wanting to give up the authority of maintaining control, amongst other things.

                  The ‘run for your lives’ command, goes counter to the whole cohesiveness thing that is imprinted, starting from the first day of one’s carreer.

                  Reply

                • It would seem that with most fire shelter ‘training’, the assumption is always that you will be deploying in a ‘proper’ deployment zone, so we just need to make sure you can get into your shelter quickly. Perhaps, some additional training needs to be done on quick assesment and rejection of unacceptable zones, and finally, acceptance of the LAST, last resort, “run for your lives”.

                  Reply

                  • AND YES I KNOW, properly trained and supervised crews shouldn’t get themselves in this situation in the first place, BUT, human nature being what it is, this will NOT be the last time it happens.

                    Reply

  63. **
    ** DROP-CHOPPER FIVE KILO ALPHA HAD *ELEVEN*
    ** SUPPORT CREW ( PLUS PILOT )?

    >> On June 1, 2014 at 8:13 am, FIRE20+ said:
    >>
    >> Helicopter pilots do not get individual resource orders, just the aircraft and the
    >> accompanying crew. The vendor and the helicopter manager(s) would be
    >> aware of who the pilot was for that time frame. A-9 resource order is for 5KA
    >> which is a Type 2 Standard. This aircraft had A-9.13 (dot numbers) through
    >> A-9.23 resource orders. A-9.13 is HMGB Todd Pederson and A-9.23 is HMGB
    >> Greg Smith and all the other dot numbers are for HECMs. The pilot for this
    >> aircraft probably unloaded what he heard to these Managers.

    FIRE20++… Thank you!

    Quick question, though…

    What in the heck were those ELEVEN ‘support’ guys for the single drop-chop
    Five Kilo Alpha ( other than the pilot ) actually DOING?

    Do you think they were ALL actually THERE ( in Yarnell )?

    Five Kilo Alpha didn’t even bring its own fuel truck like DPS Ranger 58 did. 5KA had to return to Wickenburg when it needed fuel… so what the heck were ELEVEN support guys ( other than pilot ) actually doing ( and getting PAID for? ).

    Does EVERY helicopter ordered up come with ELEVEN other guys?

    Do they all actually show up or are you ‘buying’ the entire ground crew back at its home base the minute you ‘order up’ one of these puppies?

    I don’t think 5KA could even HOLD ‘eleven’ people ( plus pilot ).

    Big reason I ask is that if there really were ELEVEN other guys there in Yarnell that day whose only (paid) job was to support this one, single drop-chop… then there’s ELEVEN more people who were potentially hearing ALL of the radio traffic that day ( on TAC and A2G ) who have never been interviewed by anyone.

    Reply

    • I might be able to help on this. The helitack crew could have been a IA crew of 10 Fire Fighters with a Helitack Foreman.
      would go where ever chopper went and either do line construction or manage helispots on the fire and load water, hose, and supplies to be flown to fire line would have also set up pumpkin bags and picked up equipment from helispots. They could have been Helicopter Repellers as well, I do not know on that.
      generally helitack is a 4 or 5 person crew unless they are a IA type Crew. The crew generally stays with the Helicopter. The could have also been assigned to the other Helicopter.
      .

      Reply

      • Mr. Powers… thanks… makes perfect sense.

        However… therein lies the mystery.

        ALL of the NAMES of these ELEVEN other guys are listed in the resource order for chopper Five Kilo Alpha… but there is NO mention ( that I can find ) in any official documentation of any of these guys ever being ‘put to work’ or given any kind of assignment that day in Yarnell.

        AFAICT… 5KA was doing nothing but bucket drops all day long. Until I saw that resource order for 5KA… I was sure it was just the chopper and ONE pilot there in Yarnell all day.

        No ‘Helitack’ crews are listed as having been assigned to ( or working with ) ANY ‘Task Force’ that day… especially not on the NORTH side of the fire. That was all ‘Engine’ work with whatever crews came with the Engines.

        So I still wonder… WHERE were these ELEVEN other guys that were ‘ordered’ and seemed to be on payroll that day?
        What were they doing?
        What radio traffic did THEY hear ( if anything )?

        Reply

        • They were attached to the Helicopter as a single rescore would be my guess.
          Working on all the assignments the helicopter was assigned to.
          As to hearing any thing most would have been on a working Freq. with the pilot and not the tac. channels.
          Just a guess based on prior experience.

          Reply

          • Copy that. Actually… it looks like they ( some of them, anyway ) MIGHT have been involved over in the Sickles Road area ( where Musser was directing things once he switched from ‘Planning OPS’ to being the second fully-active ‘Field OPS’ on the fire that day ). I am looking into this.

            Reply

            • Mr. Powers… I found evidence that the Helicopter Crew Boss Todd Pederson ( the first resource order after the chopper itself ) seems to have defintely been there Sunday and he DID hear radio traffic.

              He was being interviewed by the Arizona Republic on-site in Yarnell on July 4 and he was describing the MAYDAY calls from Granite Mountain that HE heard that Sunday… when an Arizona Forestry person who was accompanying the reporters apparently told Todd Pederson to SHUT UP about that and make ‘no further comment’.

              See the actual article below.

              Reply

            • I will call my medical massager and see what she knows—it’s her family’s road & I never even thought to ask her if they have any photos or documents—wow, you’d think I would of already checked that area—we have been out of communication a bit—since on the road. Oh, eery thing happened at the cowboy café in Montello. A woman looked at the area we were driving to and she said maybe you will run into the lonely one, Brenden who is the last of his brothers (Bailey, Billy & Bubba)—he is 19 miles from Granite Mountain and too many weird things happen on our travels but imagine some stranger who does not know us tells us facts like that—that is irony–to top it off 333 was on th clock and we were headed down 233 to section 33 so Joy’s numbers are 333s so it was odd. Since I was a kid those numbers are to my daily—but how weird a man named Brenden; 19 miles from Granite Mountain and last of his brothers—we just shook our heads in awe. We also travelled the other day looking for him—all we saw was 1940’s broken down pickup.

              Reply

              • I finally called Dee—she was at a mixer. She stepped out to answer my ?—Sickles Road. Any documents or photos or videos? Mrs. Sickles is in her late 80’s and she stayed Friday and Saturday but due to the thick smoke by Sunday mid-morning they got her out and that is it. Due to her age there was no thought to taking videos or photos just her safety. I will keep looking into this road though for anyone who was in the area. Oh and YES to an earlier comment Sonny made about the 14 foot boulders—Dee is forever praying I go home so I can be more focused to my medical massages that the 14ft. boulders screwed me up but Tex said she probably just needs the cash but since I am typing this Dee has always gone above and beyond in time and cash for my medical massages but Sonny loves to humor Dee. He is laughing. Ok, I will keep my ears and eyes open for the Sickles Road area. good night.

                Reply

                • Joy… thank you.

                  There isn’t much information at all in the public evidence record of what really went on in the ‘Sickles Road’ area.

                  All we know, really, is that when the fire started ‘rotating around’ from first burning to the NORTH most of the day to then burning to the SOUTH… the Sickles Road area became a ‘hotspot’ as the fire was ‘rotating around’ and blowing hard to the EAST at some point during that ‘rotation’ period.

                  OPS2 Paul Musser supposedly ‘jumped in’ and got some engines that were at the ICP to go over there and ‘take care of things’. No real detail on what that means.

                  If there actually were ELEVEN Helitack guys just hanging around up there on the north end of the fire ( attached to Helicopter 5KA )… Musser *may* have enlisted their help for Sickles Road as well. This is what we do NOT know. WHO was fighting the fire on Sickles Road that day?

                  It was after OPS2 Paul Musser ‘took care of things’ in the Sickles Road area that Paul Musser headed down south towards Yarnell proper.

                  It is possible ( most likely? ) that OPS2 Paul Musser made his 1542 ( 3:42 PM ) ‘availability check’ over the radio with DIVSA Eric Marsh WHILE he was driving down from the Sickles road area to Yarnell itself, and just before meeting up with Gary Cordes there on Highway 89 right about where Shrine Road meets the highway.

                  Reply

    • WTKTT & Bob,
      look at this link, it’s the IHOG from 2013 that explains the requirements for each type of helicopter. Chapter 2 explains it best. Seems as if this helicopter was over staffed, and wherever the helibase was would be where the crew would’ve been, with their own vehicles, not transported in the helicopter. The HMGB’s could have been in the aircraft though. NO rappellers Bob, not on this ship but I Iike how you think. On a typical IA fire the crew would have been dropped at a helispot/helibase and engaged in fighting the fire…or delivering supplies, putting the bucket on/off, etc… but I am not sure where these people were physically located.

      http://gacc.nifc.gov/sacc/logistics/aircraft/IHOG.pdf

      Reply

      • Just for clarity’s sake… HERE are the ELEVEN
        other people that were ordered up along with
        Helicopter ‘Five Kilo Alpha’…

        The resource order for Chopper ‘Five Kilo Alpha’ itself
        placed at 1824 on Saturday night…

        A-9 06/29/13 1824
        Helicopter, Type 2 Standard
        T2S – 215KA M
        06/30/13 0845 MST, 06/30/13 1245 MST
        Special Needs: Type 2 with long line capabilities and crew shuttle transport Reporting Instructions

        And here are the ELEVEN ‘additional resources’ ALSO ordered up along with helicopter ‘Five Kilo Alpha’. These ‘additional resources’ seem to have been ‘ordered up’ at 8:16 AM on Sunday morning… but they ALL have a required ‘start time’ of just 30 minutes later with an ‘estimated arrival’ time of 12:45 PM Sunday…

        A-9.13 06/30/13 0816 MST
        HELICOPTER MANAGER, SINGLE RESOURCE (HMGB)
        Pederson, Todd (ID-PAC)
        06/30/13 0845 MST, 06/30/13 1245 MST

        A-9.14 06/30/13 0816 MST
        HELICOPTER CREWMEMBER (HECM)
        Moy, Marshell (ID-PAC)
        06/30/13 0845 MST, 06/30/13 1245 MST

        A-9.15 06/30/13 0816 MST
        HELICOPTER CREWMEMBER (HECM)
        Glaisyer, Preston Dollard (ID-PAC)
        06/30/13 0845 MST, 06/30/13 1245 MST

        A-9.16 06/30/13 0816 MST
        HELICOPTER CREWMEMBER (HECM)
        Barrett, Paul J (ID-PAC)
        06/30/13 0845 MST, 06/30/13 1245 MST

        A-9.17 06/30/13 0816 MST
        HELICOPTER CREWMEMBER (HECM)
        Lofswold, Ryan (ID-PAC)
        06/30/13 0845 MST, 06/30/13 1245 MST

        A-9.18 06/30/13 0816 MST
        HELICOPTER CREWMEMBER (HECM)
        Campbell, Martin (ID-PAC)
        06/30/13 0845 MST, 06/30/13 1245 MST

        A-9.19 06/30/13 0816 MST
        HELICOPTER CREWMEMBER (HECM)
        Chamberlain, Travis Ray (IDPAC)
        06/30/13 0845 MST, 06/30/13 1245 MST

        A-9.20 06/30/13 0816 MST
        HELICOPTER CREWMEMBER (HECM)
        Meserth, Morgan Alois (ID-PAC)
        06/30/13 0845 MST, 06/30/13 1245 MST

        A-9.21 06/30/13
        HELICOPTER CREWMEMBER (HECM)
        Biggerstaff, Jason Allen (IDPAC)
        06/30/13 0845 MST, 06/30/13 1245 MST

        A-9.22 06/30/13 0816 MST
        HELICOPTER CREWMEMBER (HECM)
        Becker, Brandon (ID-PAC)
        06/30/13 0845 MST, 06/30/13 1245 MST

        A-9.23 06/30/13 0816 MST
        HELICOPTER MANAGER, SINGLE RESOURCE (HMGB),
        Smith, Greg (IDPAC)
        06/30/13 0845 MST, 06/30/13 1245 MST

        Reply

        • There still isn’t any evidence I can find in the ‘official’ documents that any of these ELEVEN people ordered along with Helicopter Five Kilo Alpha were ever actually in Yarnell on Sunday, June 30, 2013 ( even though all their resource order ETAs say they were supposed to be )… but as for the first person on the list ( HELICOPTER MANAGER, SINGLE RESOURCE (HMGB) Todd Pederson ) there is PLENTY of evidence he was there in the days FOLLOWING the deployment… and SOME
          evidence HE was there on Sunday and heard
          the MAYDAY radio traffic.

          Todd Pederson is featured in a least half-a-dozen mainstream media articles talking about his work on the fire, and the aftermath of the tragedy.

          If you simply Google “Pederson Yarnell”… the first
          FIVE ‘hits’ are all MSM articles featuring ‘quotes’ from Todd Pederson.

          The very first one on the list has Pederson being interviewed… but he is ALSO ‘featured’ in the video clip that accompanies the article. He’s a tall guy with a beard that is so close-cropped it looks fake. He is seen in the video (apparently) helping some others ‘attend’ to the same ‘Five Kilo Alpha’ helicopter also seen lifting a bucket in the video. The report says that Todd Pederson was ‘one of the first reponders’ and had ‘been on the fire since Friday’… but that can’t be correct. Pederson’s clothes aren’t dirty in any way so it doesn’t look like he’d ever been doing any ‘line work’.

          Yarnell Hill Fire: Wildfire firefighters battling
          flames and emotion… by Greg Argos

          http://wnow.worldnow.com/story/22758819/yarnell-hill-fire-wildfire-firefighters-battling-flames-and-emotion

          Todd Pederson… talking to reporters…
          __________________________________________
          YARNELL, AZ (CBS5) –

          On the first tour of some of the destruction near Yarnell, you get an idea of how firefighters are balancing the emotions of losing 19 of their own, while also working to put out the blaze.

          “I feel like you know, we’re winning,” said firefighter Todd Pederson, who is in Arizona from Idaho.

          “It’s tough on everybody. You know incidents like this happen to us occasionally, and it’s always tough for everybody,” said Pederson.

          “There is a lot of talk among the firefighters. That’s one of the methods of dealing with it. To process it and move forward. It’s nice to have the opportunity to stop, and reflect on what’s occurring, and it feels that there is more impact that way,” explained Pederson.
          __________________________________________

          See the next ‘followup’ for the SECOND MSM
          article in the Google list that appears to establish
          that Todd Pederson WAS there on the NORTH
          end of the fire on Sunday… and heard radio traffic.

          Reply

        • Followup 2…

          Here is some evidence from the Arizona Republic that Todd Pederson WAS in Yarnell on Sunday, June 30, 2013… and that he DID hear ‘radio traffic’.

          In THIS article… Todd Pederson was apparently describing to AZREPUBLIC reporters the radio traffic that he heard… but then someone from the Arizona Forestry department ( who was apparently nearby ) SHUT HIM UP during the interview and told Todd Pederson not to comment any further about the TIMING of the radio calls that Todd Pederson was telling reporters he heard.

          Arizona Republic
          Investigators journey to scene
          Experts: Team’s distress call too late for rescue
          By JJ Hensley and Yvonne Wingett Sanchez
          Thursday, Jul 4, 2013 12:53 PM

          http://www.azcentral.com/news/arizona/articles/20130703investigators-journey-scene.html

          From the article…
          __________________________________________
          Todd Pederson, a trainee with a helicopter firefighting team working on the northern end of the blaze, said the commander got on the radio and had an aerial-support team double-check information about the crew and its plight. Pederson remembers the wind changing within minutes around the time of the distress call.

          Local, state and federal officials would not comment on the timing and sequence of events.

          “We haven’t been privy to radio calls made or not made by the hotshot crew itself,” said Matt Benson, a spokesman for Gov. Jan Brewer. “Everybody wants to have a better understanding of what happened and how this tragedy occurred.”

          Woody Grantham, a Yarnell ranch owner who said he piloted firefighting air tankers for 35 years, said he didn’t understand how the blaze got out of control.

          “They didn’t respond with any urgency,” he said. “They should have put an air tanker up there on Friday night and doused that fire, then put a firebreak around it safely.”

          He also was critical of the nature of aerial support provided to the hotshots.

          “Somebody was reading from the wrong manual. I’ve dropped a lot of loads on people in shelters. We saved them all, maybe 50, maybe 70 of them,”

          Todd Pederson, from central Idaho, was working on the fire’s northern end when he also heard a distress call from the Granite Mountain crew Sunday afternoon. The timing of the call was unclear, and Pederson was NOT ALLOWED by Forest Service officials to elaborate on his comments.

          Pederson said he could hear the hotshots trying to contact a supervisor who could order aerial assistance for the crew, including helicopter support.

          “They were in trouble,” he added.

          Pederson said operations personnel checked with air-unit supervisors to verify information on the distressed hotshots.

          Jim Paxon, information branch chief for the Arizona Game and Fish Department and a former wildfire spokesman for the U.S. Forest Service, declined to comment on the distress calls from the hotshot crew. But he said if they put out a mayday call announcing they were deploying their shelters, there was no hope for a rescue mission.
          __________________________________________

          Reply

          • SIDENOTE…

            From the same article quoted above…
            ____________________________________
            Woody Grantham, a Yarnell ranch owner who said he piloted firefighting air tankers for 35 years, said he didn’t understand how the blaze got out of control.

            “They didn’t respond with any urgency,” he said. “They should have put an air tanker up there on Friday night and doused that fire, then put a firebreak around it safely.”

            He also was critical of the nature of aerial support provided to the hotshots.

            “Somebody was reading from the wrong manual. I’ve dropped a lot of loads on people in shelters. We saved them all, maybe 50, maybe 70 of them,”
            ____________________________________

            Really?

            Sooo… according to someone who piloted a WFF Air Tanker for 35 years…

            WFFs are going into shelters and getting retardant dropped on them to ‘save their lives’ like… ALL THE TIME?

            No big whoop?

            If you divide the number of WFFs he said he ‘saved’ by dropping retardant all over them into his 35 year career…

            That’s an average of 2 WFFs he personally saved this way EVERY YEAR for ALL 35 years of his career.

            Does it REALLY ‘happen all the time’ and we are simply not hearing about it as long as no one actually burns to death?

            2nd and 3rd degree burns don’t even rise to the level of newsworthy? Only deaths?

            I surely hope this Grantham fellow is ‘exaggerating’.

            Reply

            • Thanks for unearthing this new information.
              Last summer when I was reading every available article I could find regarding Granite Mountain I came across an article from the Doce fire and there was a description of a structural (I believe) firefighter being saved from death from a retardant drop. I cannot find the link to that article, but I believe the story was being told by Sciacca.

              The split Vlat drop captured circa 1615-1617 shows a minimum of four rescue vehicles (with emergency lights flashing) in various positions within the fire area. I am not sure if this has been discussed before.It seems that the first VLAT drop helped dampen the large flames. Just wondering if these 2 drops were somehow involved with providing safety for the rescue vehicles that appear they could be in trouble.

              Reply

            • Regarding dropping loads for shelter deployments, 2 crews (= 2 incidents) could account for 40 people, so it’s not necesarily something that occurs every season.

              I think it’s standard (unwritten?) procedure that if someone goes into shelter, every effort will be made to give them a load or two, or three, EVEN if they’re in a GOOD deployment spot providing superior survivability odds.

              The people Woody refers to may have all survived anyway, but I’m sure they were ALL very happy to get every bit of that retardant dumped on them!

              Reply

              • TTWARE… Copy that.

                I actually went off and tried to see if there is a LIST somewhere of all DEPLOYMENTS ( even if no injuries occurred ) during any/all fire seasons.

                I can find no such list.
                Checked in Boise ( NIFC )
                and with the feds ( USDA FS ).

                Do you know of any such
                ‘list’ sitting somewhere else?

                Is it even REQUIRED to report when people use their shelters… if there were no injuries?

                Reply

                • At some point in time it was deemed important to have an official inquiry for EVERY deployment, injuries, or not. I don’t know how many years back that was started, but those investigations are done today, and I’m confident there is probably a significant amount of paperwork generated from each of those incidents.

                  Reply

                • WTKTT,
                  I keep trying to post this link to the Wildland Fire Lessons Learned Center, but for some reason or another I can’t (if i post this now and there are three or so comments of the same tune, please forgive). Go to this site and under incident reviews you can go from there and filter to entrapments, or whatever you want to look at. Very useful tool in reading past reports.

                  Reply

          • Followup to my own last post about the MSM article where Todd Pederson was telling reporters all about the radio traffic he DID hear on Sunday afternoon… but was then ‘cut off’ by some unknown ‘Forestry Official’ and asked to make no further comment.

            So regardless of whether ‘Forestry Officials’ were already aware on July 4, 2013, that the Aaron Hulburd ‘Helmet-Cam’ video even existed…

            …here you have someone who WAS there on Sunday starting to tell reporters he heard this MAYDAY traffic… and they told him to SHUT UP about it ( to reporters, anyway ).

            So… THEN you don’t even bother to officially INTERVIEW this person? ( Todd Pederson ).

            Someone admits freely they HEARD this kind of important radio traffic… and you don’t even bother to interview him as part of your own ‘investigation’?

            What’s wrong with THAT picture?

            Reply

            • I think the Air Tanker Pilot is delusional very few Air tanker drops have been put on deployment sites.
              On fire lines where Crews are working with flair ups yes.
              Fire shelter deployments are not the norm and never have been.
              All deployments are investigated and noted thru the years.
              I Am not sure where the information is
              But it might be at NIFC.
              Again I am not familiar with any drops on deployment sites in my 33 years. The past 20 I have not heard of any but I have been out of the loop.
              Any body else out there jump in.
              If you are deployed under smoke and flame air tankers are not going to see you, if in fact they are dropping it would be a slim chance of a exact spot hit. Also down force air from the air craft creates all kinds of other problems when they miss the spot.
              been there seen that lost line because of it. No drop is a 100% guarantee. Especially blind ones.

              Reply

  64. we stopped in Wendover, NV at McD’s—oh and everyone the locals say it says “keep out” but it is okay to go to Warm Springs for a sweet dip and a great arrowhead hunting area. I thought it was important to post this:
    Sun, Jun 1, 2014 at 11:43 AM
    Darrell Bailey stated a reply to our comment—
    “I agree. I was there that day fighting the fire. it’s bs.”
    go to this link to read it and you all that are doing the investigative part; John Dougherty and the folks here and the MacLean team/Morgan Loew—we have a public display of someone fighting the fire—go see:
    http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BbrlWTng2JU

    Reply

  65. **
    ** TWO OPS ORDERED FOR SUNDAY?

    TTWARE ( The Truth Will Always Remain Elusive ) made some important points down below that fell victim to the ‘columnizing’ when thread nesting gets deep… so I thought they should be ‘reformatted’ up here and be easier to read…

    >> The Truth Will Always Remain Elusive on May 30, 2014 at 7:34 pm said:
    >>
    >> If Musser was indeed already the OSC, then he WASN”T short an OPS.
    >> There is only ONE OSC per shift (except at clusters where people usually
    >> start freelancing). What they WERE short on was a Planning Chief and a
    >> Safety Officer, and if someone had been designated as Safety instead of
    >> a 2nd OPS, then perhaps a good bit of the cluster could have been mitigated,
    >> along with some lives saved.
    >>
    >> WTKTT replied on May 30, 2014 at 9:48 pm
    >>
    >> I agree… but see the resource order for the Type 2 short team placed the
    >> night before. It includes orders for TWO ( identical ) OSC/OPS positions…
    >> and both orders were FILLED ( one with Paul Musser, the other with
    >> Robert Arthur ).
    >>
    >> TTWARE replied on May 31, 2014 at 8:44 am
    >>
    >> Most I & II teams have 2 OPS. 1 – day shift, 1 – night shift, so nothing unusual
    >> about the order, just the way it was all implemented.
    >> Perhaps Arthur had been advised that he was going to be night shift.

    Possible… but there is no indication of that in his ‘Resource Order’.
    He was ‘ordered up’ at the same time as Paul Musser and had the same exact
    ‘Estimated Time of Arrival’ as Musser did. ( 6:00 – 8:00 AM Sunday morning ).

    >> TTWARE also said…
    >> If so, he shouldn’t be faulted for not arriving in the AM.

    We have no idea what happened with Robert Arthur. He was NEVER mentioned in ANY official report. For all we know his car broke down like Arroyo Hotshots truck did.

    My *impression* here is that having TWO ‘active’ OPS was just the way that Big-Dog Roy Hall was used to doing things, since he’s the one who submitted the Type 2 (short) team order the night before. It just simply looks like Roy Hall himself ( old school? ) was the one who expected there to be both a ‘Planning OPS’ and a ‘Field OPS’ available to HIM that day ( working the SAME shift together ).

    I don’t think even Roy Hall had any idea that there was going to come a point on Sunday afternoon when BOTH of these ‘OPS’ were going to suddenly be fully functioning ‘Field OPS’ at the same time… and the resulting confusion THAT was going to cause.

    We still actually don’t know how THAT came to be.

    Did Musser just ‘jump in’ and switch from background ‘Planning OPS’ to the SECOND fully active ‘Field OPS’ on the fire completely on his own initiative… or was he ASKED to do that by ?? ( someone? Todd Abel? Roy Hall himself? ).

    Musser himself doesn’t even really describe this ‘transition’ in his own ADOSH interview and the ADOSH investigators didn’t even think to clarify this.

    In his ADOSH interview… one minute Musser is still just ‘Planning OPS’… and the next moment he’s out there on the fireline at Sickles Road and acting as the SECOND fully functional ‘Field OPS’ on the fire. WTF?

    >> TTWARE also said…
    >> By the time the night shift occurred, a different Team had the fire,
    >> using their own OPS people.

    Correct. The way this schizophrenic fire command thing was happening that day… people that were ordered as late as NOON on Sunday were already ‘obsolete’ by the time they got there at 2:00 PM.

    Examples: Jayson Clawson, Aaron Hulburd and KC ‘Bucky’ Yowell… all from Prescott National Forest. By the time they got there, the fire was moving up the ladder and no one had any real assignments for them. They happened to go on and be three of the most important people involved with the deployment, and the recording of the final MAYDAY calls… and the ground rescue mission itself and the discovery of the bodies… but they still had no ‘official’ assignments on that fire, as far as we know.

    One of the reasons we don’t know ( if they had any official assignments ) is that these three VERY important individuals were NEVER interviewed by ANYONE.

    SIDENOTE: If Clawson, Hulburd and Yowell were actually NOT given any official ‘assignments’ when they ‘showed up’… or were, in fact, told they were ‘no longer needed’… I wonder how that works in terms of ‘insurance coverage’ on an incident like this? The THREE of them obviously decided to ‘hang around’… but what if they had actually DIED themselves on that attempt to ‘bust through’ the fireline and get out there to search for Granite Mountain.

    What if one of those propane tanks out on Shrine Road HAD ‘gone off’
    right next to their heads?

    Would they have been considered totally ‘self-dispatching’ and ‘freelancing’ and NOT been covered by ANY insurance policy or benefit coverage?

    If they had no ‘official’ assignments on that fire… then who the hell was LETTING them undertake a ‘rescue mission’ under dangerous circumstances?

    Reply

    • RUSS SHUMATE SAIT:
      “Ordering- Heavy AT, Helios, SEATS, crews, etc.
      Approximately 10-15 acres at sunset
      Didn’t get helicopter from Prescott due to weather.
      About 2-3 fires spots across the road
      0301 SW winds – about dies
      Causing run backup
      0300 Acreage 150-200
      Ordering for next day – 1900-2030 ASF002334-INV
      State has what kind of type 3 team. All risk
      Complex analysis – showed type 2
      Core guys
      Ordering heavy for morning for structure protection”
      —A few things here…Shumate tried to order heavy for the next shift. The Complexity Analysis showed Type 2 already, but he implied the STATE Type 3 team would be enough? Hence the O# ordering before Roy Hall’s team was ordered, under the O-16 with all the dot numbers. Also the core guys statement…name requested on predetermined roster somewhere.

      DISPATCH SAIT INTERVIEW:
      “On Saturday they flew SEATS: T-810, T-830, T-417 and helicopters. They were competing for resources nationally and in the GACC. The T2 SHORT team Hall was ordered and in brief was Sun morning.”
      —Major component to resource ordering ALL the time, competing for resources nationally. Rat hole them and they’re yours for at least 2 weeks.

      “Sunday morning orders for Heavy air tankers, T1 Helo’s were placed w/ SWCC and all UTF’d. Kim @ SWCC suggested the VLAT since they were competing for resources. Once the team took over, there wasn’t a lot of information being relayed to dispatch…”
      —Competing for resources again, not just aircraft either.

      “Sun 8-1000 ordered T2 short team, no T3 team ordered transitioned from T4 to T2 incident. When the team took the incident it changed to an aircraft and logistics for dispatch. Pushed against T2 long for T1 based on potential.”
      —No T3 team ordered…ok, Musser WAS ordered as a T3IC originally, O-5 and O-6, under Special Needs is Paul Musser, basically a name request. Then in Documentation says Resources cancelled due to moving to team order.

      “Pete had a meeting between 1200-1300 w/ agency administrators. Pete stressed his strong feelings for them to go with a T1 team order. Order was placed around 14-1430. There was a problem with T1 order, redid it around 15-1600.”
      —What the hell WAS the problem? To say there was a problem ordering a Team and having that problem take that many hours to figure out IS a real problem. Was it Roy Hall’s backdoor deal (not uncommon) to Day’s team to move without O#’s that upset SWCC? Who was in the Team rotation again? Roy Hall say’s he doesn’t pay attention to the rotation. Understand using closest resources though.

      ROY HALL SAIT INTERVIEW:
      “Let’s start with Saturday night. When I got the first call, I was in a meeting. Div. Sup. I was surprised because it was Yarnell Hill.”

      “7:30 – 7:48 I think we want a Type 3 team. That call was to select a few team members and go to Yarnell”

      “8:00 – 8:30 I called back and went through the roster. I said “I’ll talk, you check”. We checked 12 team members. He said he thought that was too many. I said I got another report that it was now 160 acres. I ordered two safety officers Saturday night. I don’t know what happened to that order. So we are critical. Byron Kimball was ordered as the fire behavior specialist. He was the most worried when it happened. Then he looked at me and said “what could I have done”.
      The team order was placed, don’t know when. It should have been 10:00-10:30.”
      —“What could I have done”? “He was the most worried when it happened”? What do you mean Roy when you say you don’t know what happened to the two Safety Officer orders? “I don’t know what happened to that order”? I see it the State wanted one thing and Roy Hall wanted something else.

      “At the 7 a.m. briefing – Leader intent. I asked “where are the aircraft that were ordered? because there was a long list . Defer to dispatch center. There were a boat load ordered. The comment from the Safety Officer was “Because orders got placed out of region and you violated the ordering system. I called Prescott and ordered Tony Sciacca and Marty Cole (safety officers).”
      —Competition for resources. Ordering your Safety Officers from out of region and violating the ordering system? Not sure if this is that unusual but seems it matters here with hindsight.

      “Will Brewer was cloning”

      “11:00 Placed a call to David Geyer to go forward with the Central West Type 2 team full blown order.”
      “11:07 Placed a call to Bea Day and asked her to send, outside of the system, 2-3 of her best logs people and any ops people.
      11:10 Called Jim Downey and strongly urged him to order the type 2 team. His comment back “how do you know it’s not a type one incident?” and requested that I do a complexity analysis. I responded that I was too busy to do that computer stuff and if he wanted to send it over, I would go over it with him.”
      “12:05 Gathered Command in General Staff for stand up. Buckhorn evacuation had started. Asked Musser about feelings of help. Paul Musser said “still type 2, we are alright”.
      13:00 Received PDF of complex analysis. Went over it 8 yes, 12 no and several N/A. 5 minutes after that the Type 1 team was ordered.”

      PAUL MUSSER ADOSH INTERVIEW:
      “Yeah, I think they were already on 89 at that time. I – uh, maybe on Shrine, but I think 89. Uh, pulled in, everybody was coming out. Uh, met up with Jason Klasen first. I said is everybody accounted for? And he says we’r having – we’re – there was a problem accounting for one person on one of the engines. And so I pulled around the corner, I parked my truck, got out. Uh, Tony Sciacca was there. Um, started going over with everybody to make sure that we had the count.”
      —Musser ‘briefed’ by Jason Clawson, seems like he’s engaged… Same with Sciacca, engaged.

      TONY SCIACCA ADOSH INTERVIEW:
      “1600-1615 While driving to Yarnell, there was a lot of people and traffic. I felt we needed to close the road. The intensity of the flank was building. The wind was building. I thought all houses were were evacuated and I parked on Shrine rd and followed it back. There was a big wind at 20-25 mph and the column was laying over deep. There was a line of fire from Shrine to 89.
      Got a call from J. Claus on and tied in with them.
      Blue Ridge was milling around and then loaded in the buggies. The fire clearly was coming into town.”
      —Engaged, aware of resources on scene. BRIHC milling around their buggies and weren’t GMIHC’s buggies there too?

      “I didn’t know Blue Ridge and Granite Mountain were there.”
      —Huh?

      Reply

      • I’m not an expert on complexity analysis, but it would seem to me that if a fire had already been deemed Type II complexity, AND it had a significant amount of potential to negatively effect life and property, that a Short Team would be ABSOLUTELY INAPPROPRIATE (and that thought holds true even IF they had actually been able to bring together a FULL Short Team, which they couldn’t!).

        Reply

        • I would agree….
          and again the Arizona state was behind and short on getting more resources and the right ones.
          Bad things gust keep happening when you don’t order the right resources.

          Reply

          • Difficult to predict of course but why second guess a Complexity Analysis? I’m not an expert either, but it’s a tool to be used for a reason and why ignore it. Like I said I see it as R. Hall wanted one thing and the state of Arizona wanted another or at least saw the Complexity Analysis differently. Filling the holes as they went and sticking to the “can-do” attitude of believing YHF was still in IA and catchable.

            Reply

        • The whole concept of a ‘short team’ was (I think) developed as a resource to be used mostly in other ‘all-risk’ situations such as floods, hurricanes, etc., where you need all the command and section functions, but the operations end of things does not have such a heavy load, like it does with wildfires.

          When one thinks about it a bit, in actuality, fires are either Type I, Type II, or Type III, etc. THERE ARE NO ‘TYPE II SHORT’ FIRES.

          The sooner the bean-counters get that through their thick skulls, the better off everyone will be.

          Reply

      • Reply to FIRE20+ post on June 1, 2014 at 11:17 am

        FIRE20+… Thank you for that ‘synopsis’ from various
        places in the public evidence record.

        It really is ‘revealing’ to do exactly what you just did and
        just take various people’s ‘testimony’ about certain things
        and then ‘show them all together’.

        It really does reveal what a CLUSTER F**K was actually in-progress that entire weekend.

        A couple of things, though… some of which you might
        know the answers to…
        ________________________________________________
        “At the 7 a.m. briefing – Leader intent. I asked “where are the aircraft that were ordered? because there was a long list . Defer to dispatch center. There were a boat load ordered. The comment from the Safety Officer was “Because orders got placed out of region and you violated the ordering system. I called Prescott and ordered Tony Sciacca and Marty Cole (safety officers).”
        ________________________________________________

        Regarding this statement from above…

        ‘The comment from the Safety Officer was “Because orders got placed out of region and you violated the ordering system.”‘

        WHO is this ‘Safety Officer’ being referred to that was explaining WHY the resource order was ‘screwed up’ and apparently got ‘rejected’?

        It that referring to some ‘Safety Officer’ with ADC or SWCC that ‘reviews’ these orders from a ‘Safety’ or a ‘Correctness’ perpective… and has the authority to ‘bounce them back’ when something isn’t ‘Safe’ or ‘Right’?

        >> FIRE20++ also wrote…
        >> Musser ‘briefed’ by Jason Clawson, seems like he’s
        >> engaged… Same with Sciacca, engaged.

        Exactly. It most CERTAINLY seems like Jason Clawson not only decided to just ‘hang around’.. he was VERY actively
        involved in the management of the fire that afternoon ( even though his order was already obsolete by the time he got there and there is no evidence he was ever given ANY official position on the fire ).

        Even in the Blue Ridge Hotshots SAIT interview notes… they commented how THEY were hearing Jason Clawson
        ‘on the radio’ reporting from the ICP…
        _______________________________________________
        On the nth end they hear confusion and this is before the column starts to rise. There seeing black smoke, it’s dark, fl are impressive, spotting to the nth the fire is running towards ICP. Jason Clawson says, “another western day” they say they have an hour before the trigger point to start evacuating. BR knows they don’t have an hour.
        _______________________________________________

        I have no idea what the circumstances were, there, but Blue Ridge still reports someone named Jason Clawson as the one reporting back to THEM from the ICP itself at a critical time. So what ‘position’ was Jason Clawson ‘pretending’ to hold at that time?

        If Jason Clawson really was that ‘engaged’ in a management capacity that afternoon ( Position? Unknown ) then I wonder if it’s possible to add HIS name to the list of people that might have been initiating some of these radio calls we hear captured in the Air Study ( and other ) videos.

        Example: If Jason Clawson really was functioning in some kind of official ‘management’ position that afternoon… then it is NOT a far reach to simply add HIS name to the ‘short list’ of people that might be the one heard speaking at the start of the YARNELL-GAMBLE video.

        Maybe it was Jason Clawson who was the one urging Eric Marsh to ‘get to town a little faster’ at exactly 4:27 PM that day… without really having any idea how far away they were… which (apparently) caused Eric Marsh to respond with his ( exasperated ) response of “They’re comin’ from the heel of the fire.”

        WHO actually TOLD Jason Clawson, Aaron Hulburd and KC ‘Bucky’ Yowell ( all from Prescott National Forest ) to even be there on ‘Shrine Road’ that afternoon?

        Were all three of them just ‘freelancing’ themselves at that point and just going wherever the hell they wanted and getting on the radio and talking to whoever they wanted to?

        Reply

        • WTKTT,
          WTKTT said: “It that referring to some ‘Safety Officer’ with ADC or SWCC that ‘reviews’ these orders from a ‘Safety’ or a ‘Correctness’ perpective… and has the authority to ‘bounce them back’ when something isn’t ‘Safe’ or ‘Right’?”
          No, definitely not a ‘Safety’ or ‘Correctness’ perspective, I honestly don’t know who Roy Hall is talking about. The only Safety Officer position is the one you are imagining, a REAL Safety Officer assigned to YHF with an O# and everything. Is he talking about Sciacca? Marty Cole? I was hoping you could tell me.

          WTKTT said: “Maybe it was Jason Clawson who was the one urging Eric Marsh to ‘get to town a little faster’ at exactly 4:27 PM that day… without really having any idea how far away they were… which (apparently) caused Eric Marsh to respond with his ( exasperated ) response of “They’re comin’ from the heel of the fire.”

          WHO actually TOLD Jason Clawson, Aaron Hulburd and KC ‘Bucky’ Yowell ( all from Prescott National Forest ) to even be there on ‘Shrine Road’ that afternoon?

          Were all three of them just ‘freelancing’ themselves at that point and just going wherever the hell they wanted and getting on the radio and talking to whoever they wanted to?”
          Excellent question, I haven’t been able to find where those three PNF employees got direction from…and yes I would say they were building Situational Awareness, just like what Sciacca says in his ADOSH interview, but STILL freelancing. I would definitely say their voices are in the helmet cam video though, same with towards the end the guy with the goatee wanting his handheld cloned…definitely PNF…just look at their truck logo and they had a UTV. The comment about these guys being in the audio “appreciate it if you’d go a little faster but you’re the supervisor”, I just don’t believe this is them. They know Eric and just the part in that audio “…but you’re the supervisor” well I’ve always believed (my opinion) this to be a lesser role than Eric Marsh that day. And these three were equal or more–DIVS or OPS trainees. And yes, why wouldn’t they be talking on the radio to whomever? Being in the Shrine area with a lot of activity I just can’t see them just standing around not speaking to ANYBODY.

          Reply

          • Reply to FIRE20+ post
            on June 1, 2014 at 10:48 pm

            FIRE20+…

            There really is no doubt that the 3 individuals we ‘see’ ( and hear in the foreground ) in the ‘Helmet-Cam’ video are, in fact, Jason Clawson, Aaron Hulburd and KC ‘Bucky’ Yowell… all from PNF.

            They were all ‘traveling together’ that day as sort of their own ‘Task Force’. They all drove down from Prescott together and they ‘stayed’ together as they moved around Yarnell that afternoon. Their same 3 trucks ( 2 with trailers and UTVs ) are also seen on the side of the road up near the ICP about 30 minutes before the Helmet-Cam video.

            When they moved… all 3 of them ‘moved’ together that day ( like a Task Force of their own making… but WITHOUT even that kind of ‘official’ TF designation, or authority ).

            Aaron Hulburd
            The actual Helmet-Cam operator.

            Jason Clawson
            In the white helmet

            KC ‘Bucky’ Yowell
            The guy with the beard standing in the road.

            Regarding the YARNELL-GAMBLE video…

            That’s the second time that you have stated that you base a good percentage of your evaluation of WHO might be speaking at the start of the video based on the fact that he *seems* to say “…but you’re the supervisor”.

            I’m not really sure where you are getting that for the last few words of what is being said.

            I ( me, personally ) believe the last few words of that transmission are “…but you’ll figure it out” and not “…but you’re the supervisor”.

            Here is what I ( me, personally ) originally posted about this YARNELL-GAMBLE video including my best interpretation of the last part of the first transmission ( the only part that isn’t really clear ). I ( me, personally ) still maintain this is an accurate transcript of the YARNELL-GAMBLE video.

            NOTE: Sirens are heard in background at the start and the first bit of audio appears to be ‘Unknown 1’ acknowledging something
            ( Eric Marsh? ) just said to him with ‘Copy’ and then urging him to get GM to town faster.

            So the (apparent) ‘Copy’ right at the start of the video means we are coming in on a conversation already in-progress and there was ‘more to it’ than can be heard in this video capture…

            YARNELL-GAMBLE VIDEO STARTS AT 1627.16 ( 4:27.16 PM ) ( CONFIRMED )

            +0:00 ( 1627.16 / 4:27.16 PM )
            (Unknown 1): Copy… ah… ah… come down… and appreciate if ya could get to town a little faster, but you’ll figure it out.

            +0:12 ( 1627.28 / 4:27.28 PM )
            (Eric Marsh (confirmed) ): Ah… they’re comin’ from the heel of the fire.

            +0:15 ( 1627.31 / 4:27.31 PM )
            (Brian Frisby (confirmed) ): Structure Group Core, Blue Ridge Hotshots on TAC 1.

            YARNELL-GAMBLE VIDEO ENDS

            NOTE: ‘Core’ is not a typo above. That appears to be exactly what Brian Frisby says even though it seems to be obvious he meant to say ‘CorDES’. Maybe Frisby actually still wasn’t even exactly sure what Cordes’ name was, even at that point in the day ( and/or how to actually pronounce it ).

            AFAIK… we don’t have a captured recording of Jason Clawson’s voice to compare to as to whether or not HE could actually be the one speaking at the start of this video.

            Jason Clawson, Aaron Hulburd and KC ‘Bucky’ Yowell played a critical role in the events of that day… including the ground rescue mission and identification of the bodies… but NONE of them have ever been interviewed by ANYONE.

            Even if that isn’t Jason Clawson as the one who is ( apparently ) urging Eric Marsh to ‘get to town a little faster’… there is a good chance that any/all of these PNF guys may have ALSO heard this 4:17.16 PM transmission and DID hear the ‘call signs’ that were involved ( and what else was said ).

            Reply

          • Reply to FIRE20+ post on
            June 1, 2014 at 10:48 pm

            >> FIRE20++ said…
            >>
            >> The only Safety Officer position is the
            >> one you are imagining, a REAL Safety
            >> Officer assigned to YHF with an O#
            >> and everything.

            Ah… okay. Thank you!

            I guess I’d just been believing that if that ‘Safety Officer’ reference is correct at that point in the notes… that it was referring to some ‘high level’ ‘Safety’ oriented person up at the ‘ordering’ level.

            >> FIRE20++ also said…
            >> Is he talking about Sciacca? Marty Cole?
            >> I was hoping you could tell me.

            Well… based on what you just established… my best guess would be that maybe Roy Hall WAS talking to Sciacca at that point… and that’s when Roy Hall found out that his ordering from the night before was all ‘screwed up’ with regards to ‘going out of region’ for the air-resources and whatnot.

            Maybe ( in that sentence, anyway ) ‘Safety Officer’ DOES mean he was talking to Sciacca and Sciacca already knew why the ordering was screwed up ( because Hall decided to go ‘out of region’ for a lot of things such as ‘air resources’ ).

            But in his interview… Hall might have just said ‘Safety Officer’ instead of ‘Sciacca’.

            Again… that’s just a ‘guess’.
            Maybe that’s not even what he said at all
            and whoever was taking those SAIT notes just screwed it up.

            Reply

  66. **
    ** WHEN WAS IT ACTUALLY *DECIDED* THAT
    ** ERIC MARSH WOULD BE DIVSA THAT DAY?

    Running out of room down below in this recent discussion of the (valid)
    confusion about when / where / why / how it was actually DECIDED
    that DIVS Abel would bump up to be the SECOND OPS on the fire…
    and that Eric Marsh would then ‘bump up’ to replace Abel as a DIVS and
    would also be ‘DIVS A’ that day… so starting a new parent thread to
    continue this discussion. It’s important.

    >> Bob Powers on May 31, 2014 at 7:29 am said:
    >>
    >> Lack of clarity in the investigation seems to be the problem here.
    >> If Able was briefing GM Marsh for the assignment He would have then been
    >> designated as the Division Supervisor. When switch occurred and he bumped
    >> up to OPS he was able to bump Marsh up to fill his position as DIV-A
    >> That’s what I am reading into this.

    I think that’s pretty close to how it *actually* happened.

    Here’s what we DO know…

    1) There was a point that morning, DURING this ‘meeting’ at the Yarnell Hill Fire Station, when arriving GMIHC Superintendent Eric Marsh and arriving DIVS Todd Abel ( who both knew each other prior to this fire )… were by themselves and just looking out from the parking lot at the fire itself. They were discussing the situation ( as Todd Abel described it ) as just “one fireman to another”.

    2) SOMEWHERE in that discussion there was mutual agreement that the heel of the fire did not look ‘anchored’ or fully ‘secure’… so it became obvious that a ground crew should go up there and take care of that assignment. Eric Marsh obviously agreed and ‘accepted’ that ‘assignment’ for his GMIHC.

    3) SOMEWHERE ‘else’ in that discussion was a more general ‘plan’ about also improving some two-tracks out there and perhaps being able to use those as ‘containment’ lines for the fire. According to Todd Abel… the ‘initial’ discussion about this included the possibility of using that primarily south-to-north series of two-tracks ‘out there’ to (perhaps) create a new EASTERN flank containment. These would be the same south-to-north two-tracks that BR Supt. Frisby and BR Capt. Brown would ‘scout out’ later in their UTV and determine were ‘not workable’ for such a plan ). Whether this moment in the YFD parking lot is when the ‘full’ plan of improving those two-tracks with a DOZER… and then attempting some kind of ‘burnout’ later that evening is NOT known.

    4) Once they both agreed their ‘fireman to fireman’ ideas were a good approach… Marsh and Abel went over to the other group standing in the parking lot that included CURRENT ICT4 Russ Shumate, INCOMING ICT2 Roy Hall, and OPS Paul Musser. Abel and Marsh then presented this ‘general plan’ to them in sort of a ‘Whadda ya think, guys?” fashion.

    5) THAT group ( current and incoming top-level fire command ) seemed to ‘approve’ of Marsh’s and Abel’s ‘general plan’.

    6) This is where it gets fuzzy. SOMETIME in this timeframe… DIVS Todd Abel either ‘asked’ or ‘was asked’ to become the SECOND designated OPS for the fire. It is still UNKNOWN whether that was because the other ‘ordered’ Type 2 OPS Robert Arthur was a ‘no show’ ( or they already knew Robert Arthur could NOT make it for whatever reason )… or whether Paul Musser just decided himself that if Todd Abel was the ‘one with a plan’… he might as well just be ‘Field OPS’ and Musser would just continue as ‘Planning OPS’ ( which, in Musser’s own interview, he says is what he had already been doing that morning ).

    7) We also do NOT know if the idea to ‘bump’ Eric Marsh up to DIVS level first arose during Abel and Marsh’s ‘fireman to fireman’ chat… or whether the moment Abel was ‘asked’ to ‘bump’ up to OPS… it became necessary to figure out who was going to replace Abel as ‘DIVS’.

    I am thinking it is the latter ( which matches what Mr. Powers just suggested ).

    In his ADOSH interview… Todd Abel describes the ‘decision’ to ask Marsh to be DIVSA as part of his thinking that he knew ‘other’ resources were going to be arriving and he ( Abel ) wanted that ‘command level’ position established for the south end so that he could assign ‘other resources’ as they arrived.

    That sounds like an OPS talking / way of thinking… so I think that indicates that the idea to make Eric Marsh a DIVS didn’t occur to Todd Abel until AFTER he knew he, himself, was bumping ‘away’ from that DIVS assignment and WAS going to become ‘Field OPS’.

    In other words… Abel didn’t realize he needed a new DIVS for the south end of the fire until he realized that he, himself, was moving up to the OPS level.

    I also believe that by this time in the morning… with all the ‘no shows’ taking
    place… no one was really sure who else was ever going to show up that day and since Marsh was right there ( and Type 2 Incident DIVS qualified )… it just made sense to all of them at that time to ‘bump’ Marsh up to DIVSA and be done with it.

    He was going to be ‘out there’ where the fire was… and more resources might be getting assigned out there ( if/when they ever frickin’ showed up )… so having Marsh be DIVSA out on the ridge itself just seemed like a good idea at the time.

    We ALSO know that this was all just ‘planning’ for the Incident command transition that was GOING to take place shortly… and NONE of these ‘positions’ being decided upon were taking effect immediately.

    Bottom line ( at that point in the morning ) is that ICT4 Russ Shumate was STILL ‘in charge’ of the fire… and would remain so until the ‘official’ announcements went out about Roy Hall being the new IC for the newly established Type 2 Incident level.

    That DOES explain other small things like Marsh NOT identifying himself as ‘DIVSA’ just yet on the 4490red video shot around 10:00 AM.

    Marsh wasn’t using the ‘call sign’ of DIVSA yet in that radio transmission because he really wasn’t ‘officially’ DIVSA yet. He was still just GMIHC Superintendent.

    ** DID IT REALLY MATTER THAT MARSH WAS HIS OWN ‘DIVS’ THAT DAY?

    Some have said that it matters very much ( with regards to what was going to happen later that afternoon ) whether this moment when Marsh agreed to be DIVSA and the resulting automatic ‘bump’ of Jesse Steed up to GM Superintendent played some role in the tragedy that would happen later ( especially since it also meant that Marsh would remain physically separated from Steed and the Crew most of the day and his primary job was now going to be ‘scouting’ for fire command ).

    I ( me, personally ) believe that it DID make a difference… but with regards to the ‘physical separation’ part of that… I’m also going to argue AGAINST myself for a moment.

    The question that remains would be “Even if Marsh was never ‘bumped up’ to DIVSA that day… would he have then automatically remained WITH the crew all day and things might have turned out differently?”

    I now believe the answer to THAT part of the equation is “Probably not”.

    Here is why.

    Just because Marsh might have remained just GMIHC Superintendent that day does NOT mean he wouldn’t have been ‘physically’ doing exactly the same things he ended up doing that day, anyway… such as ‘physically’ removing himself from where the men were working… and ‘scouting’ all the way to top of the Weaver mountain… and then having to ‘catch back up to them’ later at a critical time.

    We can already see from what Brian Frisby with Blue Ridge was doing all day that just because you are the Superintendent of a Hotshot Crew… that doesn’t mean there is any REQUIREMENT for you to stay physically WITH your men at all.

    The evidence record already shows that Blue Ridge Superintendent Brian Frisby ( and, indeed, even BR Captain Trueheart Brown ) were ‘bombing around’ the fire all day in that UTV and were actually SELDOM where the rest of the BR crew were.

    There didn’t seem to be any hesitation on Frisby’s ( or Brown’s ) part to NOT stay ‘physically’ with their own crew. They, themselves, were ‘scouting’ all over the damn place all day and, at some times, were MUCH farther away from their own BR crew than Marsh ever was separated from GM. At one point… Frisby and Brown even used one of the regular BR chase pickups to actually LEAVE
    Yarnell and go almost all the way up to Peeples Valley.

    So I think that regardless of whether Marsh was a DIVS or just GMIHC Superintendent that day ( officially )… Marsh would have still been ‘off by himself’ most of the day and would have still made those hikes north to the top of the Weaver Mountains and been that ‘physically’ separated from Steed/Crew.

    If there is any answer to the ‘did it make a difference that Marsh was made DIVSA that day?’ question… I believe that answer has to lie in the ‘command/control’
    space and what changes that would have made to WHO Marsh was ‘answerable’ to that day… but the ‘physical separation’ would still have been present.

    I guess it comes down to ‘permissions’.

    If Marsh had simply remained GMIHC Superintendent… then there would have been ANOTHER layer of ‘decision making’ between him and the OPS level.
    Marsh would have had to ‘answer’ to whoever had remained his DIVS and
    his direct supervisor and only HE ( Marsh’s DIV ) would have then been
    directly answerable to the OPS level.

    Once Marsh ‘became’ DIVS… he was ( for all intents and purposes ) still the GMIHC Superintendent AND the DIVS that GM was ‘answerable’ to… and
    was now ‘his own boss’ in a way that would NOT have been true if he
    hadn’t been ‘bumped up’ to DIVS level that day.

    Could Marsh and Steed still have made their ‘own’ decision about trying to get ‘down where the action’ was and made the same attempt regardless of whether Marsh had a ‘DIVS’ sitting between him and the OPS level?

    Well… sure… I suppose. If that DIVS that would have been sitting ( command chain-wise ) between them and the OPS level wasn’t out there with them then they could have been just as ‘obtuse’ with him as they ended up being with OPS Abel…

    ( Actually… all things being equal… that DIVS might still have been Abel himself )

    …but it MIGHT have been ‘harder’ to pull off the move on their own if there
    HAD been at least that one other person sitting between Marsh and OPS level.

    Reply

    • Thanks so much for writing this up! And it totally makes sense to me. And the deal about all of this not being Officially Announced until later makes sense in this context also.

      Also I agree with your conjecturing that it MIGHT have made a difference if Eric had had a DIVS over his head when GM decided to head down to Yarnell at that point. At that time Abel was much more focused on what was going on with the north/east side and the overall effects of the wind shift, than what was going on in DIV A. He was counting on Gary Cordes to take care of his crews (which Gary did, while maintaining close contact with Todd Abel).

      Abel was counting on Eric/DivA/GM being smart enough to not do something stupid. I think someone more closely focused on Div A would have been more in touch with Eric/Granite Mountain and would have nixed any plan they came up with to head in the wrong direction at the wrong time.

      I’m having a hard time pinning lotsa blame on either Musser or Abel for this. I listened to Musser’s ADOSH interview this morning and wanted to throw my shoe at my computer for how, I believe, they threw Musser “under the bus” in December.

      PS Just want to also say, I agree with you that we still have NO EVIDENCE Eric knew the crew had decided to cut down thru the bowl before it was too late. Yes, it was a terrible decision to leave the awesome black with the best view of the fire except Air Attack. And yes, it was a terrible decision to head from there out on a two-track that, apparently, no one had scouted. But we don’t know who decided to take that “shortcut.”

      Sure would be nice if the folks who probably/might have overheard those intracrew conversations had been interviewed about them.

      Reply

      • >> Marti wrote…
        >> Sure would be nice if the folks who probably/might have
        >> overheard those intracrew conversations had been
        >> interviewed about them.

        One of them WAS… THREE times ( 1 SAIT interview, 2 ADOSH interviews ).

        That would be Brendan McDonough.

        The SAIT interview produced nothing ( as far as is publicly known ) but the *FACT* that he really *DID* overhear the critical Marsh/Steed ‘discussing their options’ conversation(s)… but no detail whatsoever. This *FACT* was published in the Arizona Forestry public report… and Brendan has never contested it.

        The closest we ever got to finding out MORE about what Brendan told the SAIT investigators he *DID*, in fact, overhear was this exchange in his first ADOSH interview…

        NOTE: Brendan’s private attorney Emily Dolan was sitting right beside him for both ADOSH interviews.

        Brendan McDonough ADOSH interview 8-20-2013
        _______________________________________________
        A = Brenand McDonough
        Q1 = Barry Hicks
        Q2 = Dave Larsen ( Rest in Peace )
        _______________________________________________
        Q2: So when you – you went and they picked you up and you moved vehicles and all that stuff that’s going on, do you know what the – what the crew was doing? Were they moving towards the ranch?
        A: That wasn’t relayed to me. I just told – ‘cause I knew – I knew the storm was coming in. I knew they weren’t — I mean, you don’t want to sit there and be a Chatty Cathy on the radio. ‘Cause I told them, “Hey if you guys need anything? I’ll be with Blue Ridge.” 2019 They knew that. “Um, just let me know. And I’ll get ahold of you and I’ll see you guys soon.”
        Q1: Right.
        ________________________________________________

        NOTE: Brendan does NOT say he didn’t hear anything or didn’t know the answer to the question he was just asked.

        All he says is “that wasn’t relayed (specifically) to ME”.

        Inexplicably… the ADOSH investigators just skipped right over even asking Brendan if he heard ANYTHING regarding them ‘discussing their options’ ( even though the SAIR had already publicly reported that he DID )… or anything ELSE along the way like the actual decision to drop into the canyon… and they jumped right ahead in time to the actual deployment…

        ________________________________________________
        Q1: Yeah. Anything else, Dave, that you can think of?
        Q2: Well, did you – we heard that there was some transmissions as th- as they were beginning to deploy, did you hear any of that at any time?
        A: That was over command.
        Q2: Did you hear any of that stuff?
        A: Yeah. Eric had called in saying that they were deploying, ah, preparing a deployment site and trying to give a general location and you could hear chainsaws in the background cutting out an area.
        ________________________________________________

        Once again… Brendan’s first response was not a direct answer to the question of whether he ‘heard’ anything. He just said ‘that was over command’ ( As in… NOT directed at HIM ).

        It was only when Dave Larsen ( Rest in Peace ) asked the SAME question AGAIN that Brendan then answered it and said “Yeah ( I heard it )”.

        Speaking of ‘Chatty Kathy’… Brendan was MUCH more relaxed in his SECOND ADOSH interview two months later ( 10/10/2013 ) and, in contrast to his first interview, was freely volunteering details that the investigators weren’t even asking him about…

        …but, astonishingly, the ADOSH investigators STILL didn’t ever ask Brendan directly about what ‘else’ he might have ‘heard’ over the radio that day.

        The distinct absence of any ‘questions’ in that regard might indicate that it was actually a ‘stipulation’ by Brendan’s attorney as a ‘condition’ for the interview… that no questions about what Brendan might have heard regarding Marsh and Steed ‘discussing their options’ was to even be ASKED…

        …so they ( the ASOSH investigators ) didn’t ( ask ).

        They even had copies of the two 9 second MacKenzie videos there at this second interview… and they PLAYED them for McDonough live right there during the interview…

        …but all they asked him to do was verify whether that really was Eric Marsh talking to Steed over the intra-crew.

        McDonough verified it… and then the ADOSH investigators just ‘moved on’. They didn’t even stop to ask McDonough if he, himself, heard this very conversation ( OR, perhaps, even just the 30 seconds of it missing between the 2 MacKenzie videos ).

        The ONLY reason I can think of why any competent investigator would have NOT even asked about those ‘missing 30 seconds’ between the videos is if they really had been instructed/told ‘NOT to ask’.

        Reply

        • Thanks. That is implied in my cynical comment above. We are totally on the same wavelength.

          I’ve periodically contemplated starting a betting pool on when a lawyer was assigned/attached to Brendan the night of the 30th.

          Did they wait until after the bodies were found, or did they find one as soon as the deployment was announced? Either way, you know that detail was secured ASAP. Brendan was coached every 1/4 inch of the way from that moment forward.

          Reply

          • As well he should have been ( advised ).

            In the hours/days following the incident… the only details that were emerging publicly were that 19 had died primarily because they ‘had no lookout in place’… but the only one on the crew to survive was the one who HAD been designated to BE their ‘lookout’ that day.

            That was a precarious situation for anyone to find themselves in. A lot of people made no bones about the fact that they thought Brendan had a lot of ‘explaining’ to do.

            We ALL know ( now ) that Brendan had absolutely NOTHING to do with why these 19 men really died… but for a while there… and until more details came out… a lot of people were looking ‘sideways’ at Brendan.

            So you really can’t fault Brendan for seeking out all the good ‘legal advice’ he could get.

            To this day… I meet people socially and as ‘wildfires’ appear all over the news… the subject of ‘Yarnell’ still just ‘comes up’ all the time.

            Whenever I demonstrate that I know a little more about YHF than your average person… one of the first questions I still get asked is…

            “Why didn’t the lookout continue his assignment and find another place to be ‘lookout’ for them as they ‘moved’??

            We all know that Brendan had been officially ‘relieved’ of those duties by his own Captain… but for people who only heard some of the initial reports about ‘there was no lookout’…

            It’s still a valid question.

            Also… speaking of what people still do NOT know about the Yarnell Hill Fire…

            Garrison Keilor’s ‘Prarie Home Companion’ radio show that was on a few hours ago was coming LIVE from Flagstaff, Arizona.

            At one point in the show, Keilor had an onstage interview with Cococino National Forest Fuels Crew Captain Aaorn Graeser.
            Graeser had just worked the ‘Slide’ fire and Keilor asked “Were there any homes lost?”.
            Graeser said “Not a one”… and this then led to a multi-minute (wild) standing ovation.

            When the ‘standing ovation’ for ‘no homes lost’ was over.. Keilor then brought up the subject of the ‘Yarnell 19’.

            NOTE: There is no TYPO below. Keilor actually referred to the Yarnell 19 as
            ‘Hotspots’ and not ‘Hotshots’… and Graeser
            did not correct him. It was ‘live radio’.

            Keilor said ( I am paraphrasing since I only heard this on the car radio )…

            “Of course… we can’t help but be in Arizona and think of what happened not long ago here… when those brave 19 Hotspots from Prescott were completely surrounded by the fire they were fighting and there was absolutely nothing they could do.”

            Graeser said…
            “Yes. It was beyond their control. We miss them very much and think about them all the time… but the entire firefighting community of Arizona continues to support their families in every way possible.”

            Another standing ovation.

            “The big-bad fire came and got them.”
            End of story ( for some ).

            Reply

            • Correction for above…

              I ‘misspelled’ the first name of the
              firefighter that was interviewed
              live onstage in Flagstaff this evening by Garrison Keilor.

              His full name was…

              Aaron Graeser.

              This same ‘Aaron Graeser’ is also a former Mormon Lake Hotshot squad leader, and was quoted last year in an article about the on-job deaths of those 3 Mormon Lake Hotshots.
              at the ‘Battlement Creek’ fire, 1976.

              From the article…
              ______________________________
              “There was a communications breakdown, and I think that’s true in a lot of the accidents we look at and a lot of the fatalities we look at,” said Coconino National Forest Crew Captain Aaron Graeser.

              The former Mormon Lake Hotshot was involved in organizing a staff ride of Battlement Creek, where firefighters go to the site, retrace the steps of the incident and study what went wrong.
              ______________________________

              Article Title: Mormon Lake Hotshots’ deaths weren’t in vain.

              July 17, 2013 5:30 am
              By ERIC BETZ Sun Staff Reporter

              http://azdailysun.com/news/local/mormon-lake-hotshots-deaths-weren-t-in-vain/article_75a11fbe-eeb0-11e2-8351-001a4bcf887a.html

              Reply

            • Great that you caught that!!

              I knew, via my mighty Twitter machine and my contacts in Flagstaff, that GK was coming to town. But I was so busy the past two days I forgot. I’ll have to go see if I can find a link.

              The people who ask you questions know more than the people who ask me questions.

              They basically start with not knowing the crew went down into a brush-filled canyon. They’re always surprised when I tell them that. They all have it in their heads that GM was up there where they were, and the fire just surrounded and burned over them.

              It’s gonna be an interesting next few months.

              Reply

              • Reply to Marti Reed post
                on June 1, 2014 at 9:04 am

                >> Marti said…
                >> The people who ask you
                >> questions know more than
                >> the people who ask me
                >> questions.
                >>
                >> They basically start with
                >> not knowing the crew went
                >> down into a brush-filled
                >> canyon. They’re always
                >> surprised when I tell them
                >> that. They all have it in their
                >> heads that GM was up
                >> there where they were,
                >> and the fire just surrounded
                >> and burned over them.

                Yep. The ‘big-bad fire’ just
                ‘came and got them’.

                That’s all a lot of people
                WANT to believe.

                I should have explained above, however, that that question I hear a lot DOES come after people have been curious and ASKED me to explain the circumstances a little better…

                …but even AFTER I make it clear to people that the reason Brendan survived is ONLY because he WAS separated from them as ‘lookout’ and was ‘evacuated’ to the east at a critical moment…

                …I still get the same question.

                Even AFTER I tell people that Brendan was forced to take measures to save his OWN life that afternoon… people still follow that with the same ( to them ) logical question…

                “…but WHY didn’t he still continue his job as ‘lookout’ and try to help all the OTHERS get to safety as well?”

                On a certain level… it is still is a VERY valid question.

                If I even then try to explain that not only did Brendan evacuate to safety… he was also ‘relieved of his lookout duties’ by his Captain…

                I get the NEXT logical question…

                “Why would his Captain do that? Didn’t they STILL need SOMEONE as a lookout?”

                Reply

            • And, as I have said several times, I worked on something kinda like this after the Deepwater Horizon Explosion for eight months. You learned quickly that every time someone “official” opened their mouths, the voice that you heard was that of a lawyer.

              Which didn’t help in the least the myth-making and mis/disinformation and conspiracy-theorizing and all kinds of craziness that ensued.

              Reply

  67. Bob & Marti,
    There are only three (four with the travel freq) IHC frequencies, which are not the same as TAC freqs, (P1, P2, P3 and a travel channel–P standing for Priority) and, somewhere between 50-60 different tones assigned (tones are assigned to crews from different geographic areas, to eliminate bleeding over into each others comms). When crews with the same assigned tones are on the same fire, they work around this issue and communicate who’s using what tone and which Priority IHC freq.

    Depending on the type of radio each crew has, some have 16 Groups and the newer radios have 32 Groups. The more modern radios with the 32 Groups are easily programmable–no knife needed to short anything out, it’s all programmed by hand.

    I see it as not that difficult to have those three IHC freqs pre-programmed into a Group, P1, P2 and P3. And upon arriving at a fire it’s common to kick a freq out if it’s not going to be used and replace with an IHC freq/tone. Considering the Overhead working this fire I say it’s highly LIKELY they had these freqs in their radios already, with the appropriate tones.

    FROM SCIACCA’S ADOSH INTERVIEW:
    “…with Darrell, making sure I had good frequencies. I cloned my radio off of his
    440 radio right then, making sure we had all the quality frequencies so I could, uh,
    441 discuss, uh, uh, what was going on back and forth.”
    OK, if Willis had these freqs I’m talking about then so did Tony Sciacca, whom has a direct relationship with Eric Marsh and Granite Mountain IHC.

    Like I said a mile down I’ve tried repeatedly to get this information and any person I ask has the same answer–we don’t know!!! And their reaction resembles a deer being caught in the headlights, like this information is inconsequential. BS. Considering these freqs were never released in any investigation, sends a red flag to me. The Sheriff took the radios and to my knowledge still has this evidence in their possession (or at least the programmed freqs.) Why???

    Reply

      • Ya, that’s as accurate as I can put it. The P freqs can be named anything really, but Priority makes sense to keep some order to them.

        Reply

        • In his ADOSH interviews ( BOTH of them )… Brendan McDonough made it absolutely clear to the investigators that the radio HE was using had its ‘P’ ( Priority ) channel set to the GM intra-crew frequency.

          Brendan even made a similar attempt to explain to the investigators what that meant… in case they didn’t already know. It meant that WHENEVER any ‘traffic’ was appearing on that ‘P’ ( Priority ) channel… it would ‘bubble to the top’ and replace any other radio captures so that there is no chance of MISSING any transmits on that ‘P’ channel.

          All the more reason to believe that wherever McDonough was… he SHOULD have heard everything that was transpiring out on that ridge over the GM intra-crew channel ( As in… ALL of the ‘discussing their options’ conversations ).

          We also KNOW that Willis was listening to this frequency… but we do NOT know if Willis himself also had that frequency set as his ‘P’ ( Priority )
          channel. I actually really, really doubt that he did.
          Willis was much too involved in his own work to have the GM intra-crew set as his absolute ‘P’ channel.

          Same for the GM trucks, really.
          We KNOW they all had the GM intra-crew frequency programmed into them… but we do NOT know if it was set at the ‘P’ channel in the trucks themselves.

          The only radio we are SURE had the GM intra-crew set as its ‘P’ ( Priority ) channel that day was the handheld that Brendan McDonough had… because he SAID that was that case.

          Reply

    • Thanks a lot!

      I’m still wrapping my brain…..

      (Just a humble photographer, I only understand f-stops, iso’s, lighting ratios, bit depths, color management, focal lengths, monitor/color-space/print profiles, sensor crop ratios, focal lengths, camera profiling, frequency separation, etc), so I appreciate your attempts to explain this radio stuff to me.

      When you say, “Considering the Overhead working this fire I say it’s highly LIKELY they had these freqs in their radios already, with the appropriate tones,” do you mean that, because the overhead and the crews had worked together on fires a lot, and were located in the same geographical area, and also knew each other, they probably had those numbers already programmed in their radios (just like we photographers, when we have to typically do certain things over and over again, create presets and profiles and automation for all of that stuff, so we can do it easily and efficientlya?

      Reply

      • And, I guess, as a corollary, would that possibly mean that someone like Todd Abel (especially ATC) or Paul Musser would, ALL things considered, possibly have had Granite Mountain’s intracrew frequency, at least somewhere in his radio possibilities/”presets” (even if he wasn’t listening to/prioritizing them), available at something like a touch of a button if they decided they wanted to listen in?

        Reply

        • You’re welcome Marti. If it’s a consolation I don’t know the first thing about photography…besides how to hit the button and take a picture.
          The Overhead (Sciacca, Musser, Willis) I’m referring to had a close relationship with GMIHC besides being from the same geographic area. I see the close relationship as a huge indicator of possibilities to the freqs being pre-programmed in their radios. Sciacca and Musser were former hotshots, they each understand this freq/tone I’m talking about. Musser says in his interview there were problems with the tones which is not a new problem, but a relevant one.

          Also please remember Sciacca got a clone from Willis…if Willis had this freq then so did Sciacca. And yes this freq would’ve been available at a touch of a button…either to transmit, receive or both.

          Reply

            • And I don’t, actually, believe Todd Abel or Paul Musser or BRidge or even Daryll Willis were P-ing or listening to that intracrew frequency (Well maybe kinda sorta Daryll Willis? Or kinda sorta Frisbee or Trew?) during the critical moments during the “Options Conversation” or everything that happened after it.

              But it’s important to know what was possible/impossible during this time.

              There really needs to be a real investigation.

              Reply

    • Why???????

      Remember, as soon as YCSO signed off on that little piece of paper that next morning, officially determining that there was no foul play involved, all the “evidence” they had collected was no longer considered “evidence.” Thus all of it — the camera/s, radios, cellphones, GPS units, etc — that they or anybody else had collected, were no longer “relevant” and anyone could do as they pleased with them.

      Reply

      • Why what exactly?

        I remember what you are saying about the Sheriff signing off…what’s your point? That the evidence isn’t evidence anymore because the Sheriff say’s so? Or that the information is out there, it’s just finding it? I’m not understanding your message here.

        Reply

          • As in, “this is why they are looking at you blankly.”

            All that stuff was no longer deemed “evidence,” so YCSO just handed it all over to whomever.

            Reply

            • Wasn’t expecting a two part answer Marti, my bad. My WHY was not explained properly, and I should have went further with it. WHY being directed to the investigators I have spoken to and any person who may know what those frequencies/Group were, that’s the WHY. The blank look I receive is unacceptable and vacant, and the thing is THEY KNOW.

              Reply

              • Gotcha. Thx!

                These threads can really get confusing.

                I don’t know if this relates to your question, but…

                About a million miles ago we had a long convo here about radio logs.

                Now that WTK has brought up those stories about Todd Pederson, in one of them one of the SAIT people says they will be looking at the radio logs.

                We weren’t referencing that statement when we had that convo.

                We were just trying to figure out what would have been done with the radios.

                Someone said that the only “radio logs” that are “recorded” or “kept” are the dispatch order radio logs.

                Do you know if that’s true?

                Reply

                • From what I have found out that is true, the dispatch voice recorders could have captured various conversations. However, the radio voice recorder at the dispatch center was not functional and hadn’t been for a couple weeks. I’d like to believe this isn’t a conspiracy, but what crappy timing. Granted the recorder wouldn’t have caught the TAC comms but who really knows what it didn’t catch?

                  Reply

        • And….. you wrote:

          “what’s your point? That the evidence isn’t evidence anymore because the Sheriff say’s so?”

          That is exactly my point. Which I discovered the hard way. After spending a month trying to follow the trail of Christopher MacKenzie’s camera.

          I was blown away by the fact that Prescott Fire Dept could have been allowed to take whatever they found and wanted from the deployment site after the YCSO did their “investigation” of it.

          And that the cellphones YCSO brought in were shipped off to be “read” and nothing more happened/was reported regarding what was found when they were “read.”

          I was told that once the YCSO signed the certification that no “foul play” was indicated, their “investigation” was essentially over, and any trail or meaningfulness of the evidence they had collected (cameras, cellphones, radios, gps units) was no longer “evidence.”

          So, therefore, after that, it didn’t matter where those things went, or the records of them, or the information gleaned from them. it was like POOF……..GONE…….NO LONGER RELEVANT. PERIOD.

          Reply

          • And YES. THEY KNOW.

            But, apparently, they don’t want YOU to know.

            Hmmmm, kinda sorta makes one wonder Why??????, doesn’t it?

            All that information. POOF!

            Nothing happening here, MOVE ALONG!!

            Reply

            • All the more reason to not stop asking these questions I suppose. I hope important people are reading this blog and they understand we are not going to stop talking about YHF or asking questions!! Everytime I get a blank stare when I ask a question, I will ask it more and more.

              Reply

              • Exactly. I’m still wondering about the gap between your dot “blank stare” and my dot “no longer evidence.”

                It’s an intriguing gap.

                For some reason, someone seems to have decided that that seemingly simple innocuous information — what exactly were the frequencies being used for what and by whom that day — contains something they don’t want you/us to know.

                Not being familiar with radios, I can’t comprehend what that something might be.

                Reply

                • Here’s why: if we knew who had those intracrew freqs or any frequencies at all, then we/investigators/important people/anbody who cares would ask those people what they heard, when they heard it, what was said, what did you say, on and on (and my assumption is these people do not want to be asked). I agree, it’s human nature to suspect wrong doing when information is concealed or downplayed to be un- important.
                  Hadn’t realized the counts for hits to this site was available, thanks.

                  Reply

              • And, every time I get discouraged about whether anybody “important” is reading this blog, I remember something WTKTT once reminded me to do. Look at the big number at the bottom of this page. We’re getting 100k hits a day.

                Even if we subtract the (generous estimate) 4k we might be generating whole writing our comments, that still leaves 96k hits. That’s a pretty respectable number.

                Reply

  68. Marti. Concerning the hat color and whether Marsh was assigned DIVA before departing the morning briefing.

    My point is this. In the photo from the Doce fire Caldwell is wearing the red helmet indicating (I think) that he was the Captain while Marsh was DIVS.

    I do not believe there is any photographic evidence that shows Marsh had actually changed helmets and maybe I confused you with my comments, they were not clear.

    But on 6/30 Caldwell is not wearing a red helmet, which I interpret as he wasn’t made captain until later. Another small clue is in the 4490red video where Marsh identifies himself as Granite Mountain and not DIVA.

    Sorry for the confusion.

    Reply

    • we saw Marsh until late afternoon from a distance and he always had the red helmet on if that helps-
      he was with someone or on his own when we saw him.

      Reply

      • It is so near the anniversary of the 19 who perished on June 30, 2013. I was reminded when I picked up the Helena newspaper a couple days ago honoring firemen in Montana who had lost their lives. It brought tears to my eyes. People never get over the loss of loved ones, I think I mourn this loss because Joy and I were the last civilians to see them alive and I too have lost a son at 29. This brings back his loss, an accident due to faulty equipment when he was an underwater welder. His mom and child benefited from a healthy insurance but nothing can really replace his silence.

        I have thought about this long and hard–Why would these men do what should not have been done. When I left Joy on the very spot they descended, I was adamant that I would not go down into that basin. I knew an hour or so before they went down that the wind could change and what we had been witnessing since it had turned to a wildfire and inferno at about 11 and had taken a mountain side in less than 14 minutes that things were way beyond ground troops doing anything–I knew too that it could turn at any moment with weather conditions as they were. Joy would have dropped down and was still there when I returned about 40 minutes later after topping the ridge and deciding that I best return and try to get her out–she did not perceive the danger. This time by the time we topped the ridge to drop over the Congress side the wind had changed direction–all the more reason to move out fast.

        I have wondered why these men with training–something I have never had–only knowing from living outdoors and instinct I suppose to keep alive. I do believe several factors were involved. As I had told Joy we had no air support, helicopters to move us out or radio contact with people who could save us so we had to move and fast, not hang around to watch the sparks fly. I think these men had been assured they would have air support–there were planes and copters flying all around. I think that like Joy, they felt that they could make the ranch or skirt it and do it easier than climbing the mountain on a steep grade to drop over the other side. I believe that they were trained to do structures as well and someone encouraged them to leave a safe spot to do just that. Willis said three times in his first interview at the site that this is what those men do and he said he felt though he lost contact they tried to do just that. Also I see they wanted to rely on those fire blankets and those things over dashing to the boulders to them had to be a safer way with a burnout. Dr. Ted Putnam informed me that those blankets are almost useless unless you have a flat place to deploy in.

        What can be learned here that future firemen’s lives can be saved. I believe that whoever told two ranchers in the immediate area with planes loaded with retardant and wanting to douse the lighting strike on Friday made a gross mistake. Whoever told two local fire departments to stand down–Congress and Yarnell departments both offered to go up the first day or next and control it, yet someone told them not to go. These are not wild land fighters but brother I and my Dad contained mountain fires caused by lightening and I was only a kid at 15 and he a miner working a claim in the mountains. Shovels and pick were all we had but they did the job because we were on those fires as soon as we could get to them after the strike.

        I think there is one other factor. In the Ward mine years ago we came out and I noticed 12inch by 12 inch stulls mushrooming on their top side. I told the foreman, Bill, that the mine was moving and likely to cave any moment. Well he said he knew it and that he would order more stulls put in, not to worry. However, I had him write my check and I went on to another mine. I later learned that that mine did cave and caught them back in that drift or tunnel in common language. It was about a quarter mile back in but fortunately they did find an air shaft and were able to crawl out. Six other miners were with him. Why did those other six men not see the danger? I think sometimes our minds fool us into believing things we want to believe. It was just like Joy saying she did not perceive the danger of the fire–Those men though wanted to keep their job — believed they could make it in spite of the odds, and took that chance. They are indeed heroes attempting to do the right thing, yet risking it all when it was not the thing to do. They had a job, I did not.–sad this has happened. Thanks to all you firemen, but damn let the big dog eat, those 106 Yarnell homes were not worth one life.

        Reply

    • No prob. This stuff is just inherently confusing for us non-FFs, so thanks for your questions and comments!

      So, something I don’t understand is the relative importance/un-importance of helmet colors. I’ve seen all kinds of helmet colors on that fire.

      Would it be expected that, when Eric assumed the role of DIVS, he would have then worn a different helmet color, and then the two red helmets would have been “passed” to Steed and Caldwell? Do they have all those different helmets with them? Is it possible Caldwell, because he was close to home at the Doce Fire had access to a red helmet that he didn’t have access to on the Yarnell Fire?

      Reply

  69. I have a question for FIRE20+, Bob Powers, anybody else who knows more about Incident Command than I do.

    About a half a mile downstream from here, WTKTT and I have a long convoluted conversation about what’s happening in Tom Story’s big sequence of photos at the Ranch House Cafe parking lot after the deployment. We are trying to create a better timeline/narrative of what happened after the deployment than we currently have.

    Tony Sciacca is in those photos. At one point he is in the driveway to the parking lot. Three minutes later we see him walking to the left from way over in front of the Blue Ridge buggy. We were wondering why he (who had two radios and a cellphone on him, so you know he is well plugged into the IC Todd Abel) would have made that quick journey across and back again.

    WTKTT suggested it could have been related to the fact that there was a Blue Ridge FF sitting in the GM chase truck, just to the right of BR buggy, listening to the GM Intracrew frequency. People are seen in the Russ Reason video, walking by that truck and getting a signal whether or not the guy in the truck has “heard anything yet.”

    I wrote in response:
    “I guess I was assuming the OPS would have been able to gain access to whatever channels they deemed important, including those crew channels.”

    Am I correct in assuming that? I really get confused a lot about all the radio channels. I just don’t do radios.

    What channels could/would OPS most likely be listening to during that uncertain period between the deployment and finding the bodies and learning there are no survivors?

    And now that I wrote that, I’m also thinking about another angle on that. TBH I’m not POSITIVE that’s Tony Sciacca. I started there, because I have lots of photos of him, and the guy in the red helmet looks like those pictures.

    OTOH, I don’t know exactly, by his interview, when Tony got to the parking lot, etc. I do know, via Todd’s interview (I haven’t listened to all of Paul’s interview), that Paul Musser got there a lot sooner than Todd Abel did. I’ve been trying to identify Paul Musser in those photos, but there’s a grand total of one photo of Paul Musser on the Google, and it was taken ten years ago. And Todd says that as soon as he got to the parking lot he tied in with Paul Musser.

    The guy in the red helmet is waiting in the driveway for someone to arrive, and as soon as Todd Abel pulls up, he walks over and talks to him through the window. So it may very well be that the guy in the red helmet is Paul Musser.

    Which doesn’t change the question I asked above. If that is Paul Musser, would he have had to walk all the way over to the Granite Mountain Chase Truck to ask “Have you heard anything yet?”

    Reply

    • Overhead would not have had the individual crew Freq.
      Those are assigned to each crew and not overhead.
      The crew Freq. stays with the crew on their radios.

      Reply

      • Thank you, Bob.

        Does that mean that, in this kind of a situation, OPS couldn’t/wouldn’t have borrowed Brendan McDonough’s radio to listen to that, all things considered?

        Reply

        • Could have I haven’t heard that happened. Also they could have listened on any of the GM truck radios, and as we have said Willis should have had their freq. as well, since he was their Supervisor.
          So I guess that’s a guessing game unless some one made a statement to that affect.

          Reply

      • Sorry Bob, I have to disagree with you. I realize it’s possible overhead may not have had those IHC freqs but without proof (like you said below) I have to disagree. Musser being an ex hotshot, well why not? Willis being tied directly to Granite Mountain and knowing what that freq/tone is? Why not? Sciacca being who he is, including ex hotshot, why not? I see this as important and possible.

        I agree it’s 100% possible that GM’s crew carriers, Supt rig, and Brendan’s radio were all accessible for anybody to receive/transmit. And yes Brian Frisby did borrow Brendan’s radio but the why we don’t know. Maybe Brian didn’t want to either turn his squelch/tone on or off, maybe the intracrew freq assigned to GMIHC was on another bank in his radio, to me there’s many possible scenarios.

        Reply

        • MY only thing is they would have to program in each Hot Shot Freq. on a given Fire. I would say that would be a little difficult but possible. Its a crew Freq. for a reason so the crew can talk at will with each other and not have outside interference.
          Its been like that for a long long time, my knowledge is that’s not changed. As I said earlier Willis would have had there crew net as their Supervisor. There is only so much room on a 16 Ch. Radio. The other 2 would surprise me but you never know??? I accept your possible but I drought it.

          Reply

    • Another related question.

      So is an intracrew frequency related to the tac channel they’re using? Is it like a sub-channel to the tac channel, or is it a different beast altogether? And is an intercrew frequency (like I think Granite Mountain had with Blue Ridge) another different beast? Can somebody explain to me how these things are divided up?

      Various people have said various people “could have” been “listening in to” Granite Mountain’s intracrew frequency during that critical afternoon period. Obviously Brendan and maybe (theoretically) Darryl Willis. Does that “could have” include Brian Frisbee and/or Trew?

      Reply

      • Remember Frisby had to barrow Brendan’s Radio.
        BR has there own crew radio, each crew has an assigned Freq. they are not part of the Tac. Freq.
        although the radio is pre programed with their Freq.
        They are basic short range Freq. so other crews in other states could have the same Freq. but slim chance of them being on same fire. when I was on the Angeles all 5 crews had the same freq. so we could talk to our own crew and each other. We had different call signs for each crew and foreman.

        Reply

    • Marti… just some incidental stuff about the ‘radios’ and
      what people SAID was happening, and what they were doing.

      In the Blue Ridge SAIT investigation notes… there was always
      an indication that the FIRST MAYDAY actually went out over
      the TAC 1 channel ( and NOT Air-To-Ground, as captured in
      the Helmet-Cam video ). Whoever was testifying in that BR
      interview says as that BR ‘evacuation convoy’ was nearing
      the Ranch House Restaurant ( and taking that curve that is
      there just north of the parking lot )… they heard ‘yelling on
      TAC 1’ ( NOT Air-To-Ground ). It is only a few moments
      later ( according to their notes ) that they began to hear the
      ‘yelling’ on TAC 5 ( Air-To-Ground ), as heard in Aaron
      Hulburd’s Helmet-Cam video.

      Problem with that is that Aaron Hulburd’s Helmet Cam WAS
      capturing both A2G and TAC 1 traffic… so if Steed really did
      FIRST try to send out an emergency message on TAC 1… it
      must have come right BEFORE the Helmet-Cam video started.

      Anyway… the same section that has always mentioned this
      FIRST MAYDAY going out on the TAC 1 channel ( and no one
      was responding so that’s why Steed switched to Air-To-Ground? )
      is also where we learn about what they ( BR, anyway ) then
      started doing with the ‘radios’ and how they were trying to
      ‘contact GM’ and also when they ‘put BR crew in the GM trucks
      to listen for traffic’…

      From page 9 of the YIN ( SAIT Yarnell Investigation Notes )…
      Interview with Blue Ridge ( Frisby, Brown, Fueller, Ball )
      _____________________________________________________
      Tie in with the crew at the ranch house and hit main rd @ 1640
      they make a turn, and hear yelling on Tac 1, a little further they
      hear yelling on Tac 5 AA and GM7 yelling multiple times. AA says
      unit yelling at AA on A/G stop yelling and stand by. Marsh cuts in
      and says were cut off there cutting a deployment site, trying
      to burn around, cutting a deployment site, there is panic in his
      voice. Todd gets on AA and says raise GM on A/G. Focused on
      that Trew tries to raise GM on crew. He hears a keyed mic. Trew
      gets a crew member and sits him in GM trucks and says listen for
      anything on the radio. 1 minute later he hears click click. Brendan
      was w/ BR.
      ______________________________________________________

      Interesting things about this ‘testimony’

      1) As mentioned above… the fact that they report first hearing
      ‘yelling’ on the regular TAC 1 ( Not Air-To-Ground )… and only
      ‘moments’ ( minutes? ) later come the now-famous Air-To-Ground
      MAYDAY calls from Steed captured in Helmet-Cam. I wonder if
      that is the explanation for exactly WHY Aaron Hulburd happened
      to turn on his ‘Helmet-Cam’ at the exact moment that he did.
      I wonder if Hulburd also heard this first ‘yelling’ from Steed over
      the TAC 1 channel… and realized something was WRONG… and
      that’s when he quickly turned on his Helmet-Cam and then
      managed to capture Steed switching to the A2G channel for
      his next ( and final ) MAYDAY calls. It’s always been kind of a
      mystery WHY Aaron Hulburd happened to turn on his Helmet-Cam
      for ( apparently ) that one-and-only time he did that day… at the
      exact moment that he did. Aaron Hulburd, Jayson Clawson,
      and KC ‘Bucky’ Yowell have never been interviewed… even though
      they were all KEY players in the events that afternoon.

      2) “Trew tries to raise GM on crew.”

      Does this mean BR Captain Trueheart Brown used one of
      the radios in the GM trucks to try and raise GM on their own
      intra-crew… or even borrowed Brendan’s handheld to do that?…
      or does ‘crew’ simply mean the INTER-crew channel that they
      had also been apparently using that day to talk with GM?

      3) “Trew gets a crew member and sits him in GM trucks and says
      listen for anything on the radio. 1 minute later he hears click click.”

      Again… piss-poor note taking here on the part of the SAIT… so
      since both the plural ‘trucks’ is used but only the singular ‘crew
      member’… we don’t know if that means Trew just put a BR
      guy in ONE of the GM trucks to ‘listen for anything’… of whether
      he put TWO BR guys into both GM Chase and Supt. trucks.
      Also doesn’t say what ‘channel’ he told them to listen on… or
      whether it was a ‘total scan’ of ALL channels at that point.

      With regards to your question about COULD anyone with a
      BK radio have ‘punched in’ the GM private intra-crew into
      their handheld and not have needed to be ‘consulting’ with
      whoever was sitting in the GM Chase Truck… the answer is
      YES ( no technical barriers )… but it would have involved
      GETTING the exact frequency… and then ‘punching it in’.

      That takes time ( and some expertise with the radio ).
      My feeling is that while it might have been possible for
      anyone to do that… they just didn’t stop to take the time.

      Too much going on.

      As long as they had at least ONE person ( that BR crew
      member Trew put in the GM Chase truck? ) dedicated
      to listening to the GM intra-crew… that was good enough.

      They were listening as hard as they could… on EVERY
      channel they could… and the few trips anyone made over
      to the GM Chase truck to ask “Have YOU heard anything?”
      was simply because they weren’t hearing anything on
      the TAC or A2G and they just wanted to know if anything
      was showing up on the inter-crew over in the Chase truck.

      It would also be interesting to find out if either OPS1 Todd Abel
      and/or Darrell Willis were ALSO trying to call Eric Marsh on
      his cellphone during this time. They both had his number.

      Reply

      • Followup…

        Meant to include a (4) up above…

        (4) ” Trew tries to raise GM on crew. He hears a keyed mic.”

        What this could ACTUALLY mean is that the ‘keyed mic’
        and/or ‘static’ we hear in the latter half of Aaron Hulburd’s
        Helmet Cam video is actually these attempts by Marsh
        ( and/or Steed or Caldwell ) to RESPOND to Captain
        Brown making these attempts to contact them via the
        GM intra-crew. So they might have HEARD Captain
        Brown’s calls… but in the chaos not be noticing that
        those calls were coming TO them over the ‘intra-crew’.

        Brown might have also been neglecting to use the
        right ‘call signs’ to TELL them that was the channel
        he was calling them on, as well… so even more confusion.

        They were then trying to RESPOND by just keying the
        mic but it was going OUT on the last channel they
        used for their last TRANSMITS ( the Air-To-Ground
        channel )…

        …and that’s why we ( perhaps ) hear them attempting
        to RESPOND to Captain Brown… but we also don’t
        actually hear Captain Brown’s callouts to THEM.

        Brown was ‘calling out’ to THEM in that timeframe on
        the GM ‘intra-crew’ ( which Aaron Hulburd’s Helmet-Cam
        was NOT capturing )… but we hear the attempts to
        RESPOND on the same Air-To-Ground channel that
        the Helmet-Cam WAS still capturing.

        Again… could be ‘Faraday effect’ in action here.
        Signal blockage not bad enough to prevent them from
        HEARING inbound traffic from Brown… but signal
        blockage because of the ‘foil’ in the shelters was
        strong enough to prevent clear TRANSMITS from
        underneath the shelters.

        Reply

        • 215KA pilot YIN…..AA was talking to the DC10 briefing them on what he wanted at the same time the wind shifted and a radio call came in wanting support from AA. There was a wind shift and the fire behavior increased dramatically. When he landed, his HMGB takes only minutes to remove his bucket. 2-3 minutes after that he hears repeated calls trying to raise AA. He tried to make contact but he was on the nth end and was probably 4-5 miles away. The first call came in, and I would be really estimating: 1630 give or take 10-15 minutes. A lot of stress came over the radio. He was trying to communicate and he couldn’t communicate due to the yelling on the frequency. The intensity of the calls were first calmer and then less and less. At the end of 1-2min lot of yelling and screaming, hysterical.
          David Breaks in and says B33 you need to switch over to A/G

          Questions/ Observations:

          1. All of the above seems to have taken place BEFORE David (215KA pilot?) tells B33 to switch over to A/G.

          2 “He tried to make contact but was on the Nth end and probably 4-5 miles away”
          Who is he? 215Ka or B33?

          3.Could/ does this add time to the 2-3 minute window that GM had to make their final decisions?

          4. As described by 215KA pilot above, “at the end of 1-2 minute a lot of yelling and screaming, hysterical.”
          What channel was this captured on?

          Reply

          • Reply to calvin post on May 31, 2014 at 3:34

            >> calvin said…
            >> 215KA pilot YIN…..AA was talking to the
            >> DC10 briefing them on what he wanted
            >> at the same time the wind shifted and a
            >> radio call came in wanting support from
            >> AA. There was a wind shift and the fire
            >> behavior increased dramatically.

            Regarding this first part of 215KA ( Helicopter Five Kilo Alpha ) note section… I believe this is probably describing that moment shortly after the Caldwell video when Todd Abel DID, in fact, call Air Attack and ‘request’ them to shift their focus to the SOUTH side of the fire. That is when Rory Collins called Bravo 33 and said…

            NOTE: This is the exact transcript from the 40 minute and 14 second long Air-To-Air channel video 20130630_1628_EP which actually begins at 1547.46 ( 3:47.46 PM )…
            ____________________________________
            +2:38 ( 1550.24 / 3:50.24 PM )
            (AA – Rory Collins): Bravo three three… Air Attack.

            +2:40 ( 1550.26 / 3:50.26 PM )
            (B33 – French): Go ahead Air Attack.

            +2:41 ( 1550.27 / 3:50.27 PM )
            (AA – Rory Collins): Okay… if ya haven’t noticed they got a heck of a wind shift here… ah… we’ve got a lot of fire headed over towards… ah… Yarnell. Ya wanna swing around and take a look at that we’re gonna have to check somethin’ there… either… shortly… I think. And also… uh… nine one one, I believe, is off… uh… about 20 minutes out.

            +2:58 ( 1550.44 / 3:50.44 PM )
            (B33 – French): Copy… we’re headed that way.

            +3:00 ( 1550.46 / 3:50.46 PM )
            (AA – Rory Collins): Ground contact out there… ahhhh… I was talkin’ to… Alpha

            +3:05 ( 1550.51 / 3:50.51 PM )
            (B33 – French): Ground contact Alpha.
            ____________________________________

            NOTE: I believe the “we’re gonna have to check somethin’ there” quote from Collins could also be referring to the request from Abel to go ‘check on Granite Mountain’.
            Abel could have asked Air Attack Collins to do BOTH of those things on the same radio call,
            as in…

            (1) We need you to shift Air Support focus
            to the SOUTH because of wind shift.

            (2) I also need you to check on Granite Mountain… see if they really ARE in a ‘good place’ at this time.

            >> calvin also wrote…
            >> Questions/ Observations:
            >>
            >> 1. All of the above seems to have taken
            >> place BEFORE David (215KA pilot?)
            >> tells B33 to switch over to A/G.

            Helicopter T2S-215KA ( Five Kilo Alpha ) is resource order A-9 on page 2 of that ‘J- Resource Orders’ document in the online Dropbox. That resource order then goes on to list no less than ELEVEN ‘sub-resources’ ( like Helicopter Managers and crewmembers ) also ordered up along with 215KA.

            There is no ‘Dave’ listed there… but there is also no one else listed as a ‘pilot’, either.

            >> 2 “He tried to make contact but was on
            >> the Nth end and probably 4-5 miles away”
            >> Who is he? 215Ka or B33?

            I would imagine B33. I don’t think drop-chop Five Kilo Alpha would have been the one primarily trying to jump in and handle what appeared to be an emergency. That’s Air-Attack’s job… and that’s who GM was asking for at that time.

            >> 3.Could/ does this add time to the 2-3
            >> minute window that GM had to make their
            >> final decisions?

            Yes. It’s possible. If there REALLY were some OTHER calls from Steed that went out on TAC 1 channel BEFORE Steed switched to trying to contact Air-Attack… then this most certainly ‘adds time’ to when they first realized they were in trouble… and how much time they had to react to tit.

            >> 4. As described by 215KA pilot above,
            >> “at the end of 1-2 minute a lot of yelling
            >> and screaming, hysterical.”
            >> What channel was this captured on?

            Good question.
            I also wouldn’t really classify what is captured in the Helmet-Cam video as ‘hysterical’. Maybe ‘yelling’, yes… ( because the saws were running in the background and Steed and Caldwell needed to hear themselves talking as well as be sure B33 could hear them )… but no way would I call it ‘hysterical’.

            So maybe the ‘hysterical’ transmissions being referred to are actually the same ones Blue Ridge talked about hearing FIRST… over the TAC 1 channel… then there was a PAUSE ( A full 1-2 minutes as suggested above? )… and only THEN do we hear the next round of MAYDAYS coming over the Air-To-Ground channel.

            If there really was ‘yelling’ on the TAC 1 channel prior to the other Air-To-Ground MAYDAY calls… perhaps it is because Steed was not hearing ANYTHING back from ANYONE in response to that first set of calls on TAC 1… so he figured no one was hearing him on TAC 1 and he better try Air-To-Ground.

            Reply

              • Copy that.

                However… there is no ‘Dave’ or ‘David’ Morgan mentioned anywhere in that comprehensive ‘J- Resource Orders’ document… even though most of the other ‘guys in airplanes’ DO have ‘resource orders’… such as…

                Rory Collins,
                Thomas French,
                John Burfiend,
                Rusty Warbis,
                Paul Lenmark,
                etc.

                Maybe the ‘chopper pilots’ are different and never end up with actual ‘Resource orders’ for them, specifically. Dunno.

                Regarding who ELSE might have been trying to ‘talk’ to GM in those moments after the MAYDAY calls…

                There is also still that mysterious entry in DIVSZ Rance Marquez’s SAIT interview notes where he says that HE was ALSO calling GM after the MAYDAY calls and asking them if they could ‘hear the helicopter(s)’…

                PDF page 37 of YIN…
                Rance Marquez interview…
                ________________________
                1630-1645 – I then asked GM if they could hear the helo. There was no response. I did hear the mike keyed and a loud sound.
                ________________________

                Doesn’t say what CHANNEL Rance Marquez was ( supposedly ) doing this on.

                Reply

                • Helicopter pilots do not get individual resource orders, just the aircraft and the accompanying crew. The vendor and the helicopter manager(s) would be aware of who the pilot was for that time frame. A-9 resource order is for 5KA which is a Type 2 Standard. This aircraft had A-9.13 (dot numbers) through A-9.23 resource orders. A-9.13 is HMGB Todd Pederson and A-9.23 is HMGB Greg Smith and all the other dot numbers are for HECMs. The pilot for this aircraft probably unloaded what he heard to these Managers.

                  Reply

                  • **
                    ** DROP-CHOPPER FIVE KILO ALPHA HAD *ELEVEN*
                    ** SUPPORT CREW ( PLUS PILOT )?

                    >> On June 1, 2014 at 8:13 am, FIRE20+ said:
                    >>
                    >> Helicopter pilots do not get individual resource orders, just the aircraft and the
                    >> accompanying crew. The vendor and the helicopter manager(s) would be
                    >> aware of who the pilot was for that time frame. A-9 resource order is for 5KA
                    >> which is a Type 2 Standard. This aircraft had A-9.13 (dot numbers) through
                    >> A-9.23 resource orders. A-9.13 is HMGB Todd Pederson and A-9.23 is HMGB
                    >> Greg Smith and all the other dot numbers are for HECMs. The pilot for this
                    >> aircraft probably unloaded what he heard to these Managers.

                    FIRE20++… Thank you!

                    Quick question, though…

                    What in the heck were those ELEVEN ‘support’ guys for the single drop-chop
                    Five Kilo Alpha ( other than the pilot ) actually DOING?

                    Do you think they were ALL actually THERE ( in Yarnell )?

                    Five Kilo Alpha didn’t even bring its own fuel truck like DPS Ranger 58 did. 5KA had to return to Wickenburg when it needed fuel… so what the heck were ELEVEN support guys ( other than pilot ) actually doing ( and getting PAID for? ).

                    Does EVERY helicopter ordered up come with ELEVEN other guys?

                    Do they all actually show up or are you ‘buying’ the entire ground crew back at its home base the minute you ‘order up’ one of these puppies?

                    I don’t think 5KA could even HOLD ‘eleven’ people ( plus pilot ).

                    Big reason I ask is that if there really were ELEVEN other guys there in Yarnell that day whose only (paid) job was to support this one, single drop-chop… then there’s ELEVEN more people who were potentially hearing ALL of the radio traffic that day ( on TAC and A2G ) who have never been interviewed by anyone.

                    Reply

      • WTKTT. Why do you think GM did not respond to Abel when he tries to call them in the helmet cam video?

        Reply

        • Reply to calvin post on May 31, 2014 at 3:42 am said:

          >> calvin asked…
          >> WTKTT. Why do you think GM did not respond to
          >> Abel when he tries to call them in the helmet
          >> cam video?

          My guess(es) would be… confusion… chaos… and the fact that they were now focused on talking to Air-Attack, not OPS.

          If there really were those ‘yelling’ calls on TAC 1 sometime BEFORE the Helmet-Cam captures of the Air-To-Ground MAYDAYS… then perhaps that is proof that by the time the Helmet-Cam camera was running… they had already realized their only chance left was to see if Air-Attack could help them.

          The BIG QUESTION to me is still not why GM didn’t repsond to Abel at that point.

          The BIG QUESTION to me is still why Burfiend is Bravo 33 was ‘blowing them off’ for so long.

          WHY did it take OPS Abel TELLING Burfiend ‘sounds like we got something going on… you better take that’ for Burfiend to to ‘wake up’ and realize it probably WAS a real emergency?

          It is still hard to hear Jesse as he comes on with that first MAYDAY to Air-Attack ( but didn’t actually SAY ‘Mayday’ or ’emergency’ or anything ). Jesse was, in fact, yelling into his mic because at least two chainsaws were already running right there next to him… but anyone can tell that SOMETHING was WRONG and that very first radio call needed to be responded to and the situation CLARIFIED.

          Burfiend didn’t do that.

          It was only minutes later when OPS1 Todd Abel
          told him he BETTER ‘take that’… that he even
          bothered to try and respond to them.

          Reply

          • The reason I asked about GM not responding to Abel is in follow up to the discussion being had about the known radio conversation from 1550.

            Is it possible that GM was not hearing Abel as he was transmitting from the North side of the fire? However, Abel’s callout is heard on the helmet camera?

            Reply

            • It’s absolutely possible, if not probable, GMIHC did not hear Abel trying them on TAC. They were in a box canyon with granite boulders to the N, S and W of their location. If Abel was on Tac the line of sight may not have been reachable from his location at Double Bar A. The helmet cam caught that transmission because they were scanning all freqs perhaps. Or GMIHC may not have been scanning and switched to what they thought was Air Guard (what is called Arizona 16 on helmet cam) but was Air to Ground instead. Same with GMIHC trying to reach Air Attack, I believe they were North as well and could’ve been on their Air to Air freq talking to an aircraft.

              All the while GMIHC were focused on a last ditch effort to stay alive and Air Attack was their best bet.

              Reply

                • “My words fly up, my thoughts remain below.”

                  William Shakespeare, Hamlet. Act III. Sc. 3

                  Reply

                    • How the hell do u prefer posts? Filled with I know what they did or I know what happened–it’s all damn conjecture. You want to go there then I will too.

                  • There have always been a LOT of quotes from ‘The Bard’ that have been jumping into my head as I read this evidence… but the one I just quoted above from Hamlet keeps ringing in my ears.

                    It’s unbelievable how much ‘communication’
                    we can actually HEAR… but still not have ANY frickin’ idea why those men died where they did.

                    Their ‘words flew up’ ( on the radio )… but their ‘thoughts remained below’ ( obtuse and unclear ).

                    Reply

                    • I’m with u WTK-TT, & understand your point of view, Marti has no point here. I don’t write here for that crap, u don’t like what I say then don’t read it.

              • I’m sorry, FIRE+20, I truly didn’t mean to offend or cause a long single-letter-per-column-wide kerflufflle.

                It was a late-night powerful gut feeling I was having as I finished reading what you wrote.

                What prompted me to say that was the incredibly tragic climaxing of the combination of complexity and futility in the situation as you were describing it.

                That’s exactly the kind of human circumstances Shakespeare constantly wrote about.

                With Shakespeare, the difference between comedy and tragedy is not that comedy is funny and tragedy is not funny.

                The difference is that, in comedy, the subjects manage to survive and evolve through and because of those complex situations.

                Whereas, in tragedy, they don’t.

                When I was reading what you were describing, that similarity just blew me away.

                The bard himself could have written this fire. Every single little bit of it.

                Reply

            • Reply to calvin post
              on May 31, 2014 at 4:01 pm

              >> calvin asked
              >>
              >> Is it possible that GM was not
              >> hearing Abel as he was
              >> transmitting from the North side
              >> of the fire? However, Abel’s
              >> callout is heard on the helmet
              >> camera?

              ( Echoing FIRE20+)… Yes.

              You are making an important point here, calvin. There is NO REAL PROOF that ANY transmissions on the TAC 1-3 channels from that box canyon were able to reach ANY radios on the north side of the fire that day.

              FIRE20++ is right. For the same reason they could no longer SEE the fire… that ‘northern ridge’ of that box canyon might have been preventing anyone up in Peeples Valley from hearing any TAC transmits from GM once they ‘dropped down’ and lost sight of the fire ( and all view to the north of them ).

              However… there IS evidence that their attempts to transmit on TAC 1 channel WERE heard by people to the EAST of them in Yarnell. ( Blue Ridge testimony about hearing ‘yelling’ on TAC 1 BEFORE they ever started hearing the Air-To-Ground transmissions captured by the Helmet Cam, etc. ).

              As I also pointed out above… it seems perfectly possible that Aaron Hulburd himself heard this same ‘yelling’ on TAC 1 just prior to the start of his Helmet-Cam video… and that is EXACTLY WHY he actually quickly activated his Helmet-Cam.

              Something was WRONG… but GM was NOT hearing back from whoever it was they were calling ( OPS1 Abel? )… nor could they hear OPS1 Abel trying to hail THEM, either, because Abel was still up north and ‘blocked’ by the northern ridge of the box canyon.

              So the MAYDAYS really could have gone down like this…

              1) Steed FIRST tried to raise OPS1 Todd Abel ( or ANYONE? ) on the standard TAC 1 ( or 2 or 3 ? ) channels. These transmissions could be ‘heard’ by anyone to the EAST of him… but not to the NORTH ( because of the northern ridge of the box canyon blocking signals ).

              2) Steed ‘gave up’ on the TAC channels and then resorted to Air-To-Ground when he wasn’t hearing back from anyone on the TAC channels.

              3) Even though WE can then hear OPS1 Todd Abel trying to call them directly from up in Peeples Valley… that doesn’t mean Steed could also hear that. He probably could NOT.

              If this is true.. it adds quite some time ( minutes? ) to the timeframe from when they first realized they were in trouble and when they ended up going into shelters.

              Reply

              • Followup…

                There ARE some ‘statements’ from some people who remained on the NORTH side of the fire that they could, in fact, hear the LATER transmissions from down in the box canyon from Jayson Clawson about ’19 confirmed dead’… but that was long after the burnover and the ASH CLOUD itself had dissipated by then.

                That ASH CLOUD was almost a ‘solid object’ by itself and the kind of cloud that most certainly could have ( all by itself ) been ‘blocking’ radio transmissions to some extent… so add that gigantic ASH CLOUD sitting between GM and Peeples Valley to the fact that they were down in the canyon and the northern ridge was doing its own ‘signal blocking’… and it might make perfect sense that their attempts to contact someone on the NORTH end of the fire around burnover time were simply not ‘making it through’.

                It’s also interesting to note that whatever ‘testimony’ there is which says that some ‘yelling’ was heard on TAC 1 some moments ( minutes? ) PRIOR to the Air-To-Ground MAYDAYS is ONLY being reported by people that were EAST of the open-mouth of the box canyon ( down in Yarnell ).

                No one on the NORTH side of the fire seems to be reporting these same TAC 1 ‘yelling’ transmits PRIOR to the Air-To-Ground MAYDAYS.

                Reply

  70. Bob,
    I noticed down below you inquired on Todd Able’s quals. Todd Able is a qualified OPS2, and is a OPS1 Trainee. Interesting in his interview Todd Able states most of his assignments are Branch or OPS1 as a TRAINEE. Perhaps his quals should be looked at hard to decertify? Ha ha, this just doesn’t happen–agencies give quals but don’t take them away, but the 310-1 states they sure can. I’m of the belief Todd Able was seriously in over his head even as a OPS2 who had been ordered as DIVS for Yarnell.

    Reply

    • You Know they have in the past but its not common actions.
      Sadler Fire 1999 in Nevada They Demoted Several Overhead

      Reply

      • Copy Bob, it’s unfortunate the report doesn’t share that information. You happen to know what OH positions? Planning, Branch? And do you know if those folks went to the next lower level positions? Just curious, thanks.

        Reply

          • The Overhead were IC, OPS, Safety Officer
            not sure about DIV.
            I will say I think R4 thru them under the bus They were unable to reply to the charges or defend them selves. That aside it can happen if a review panel is willing.

            Reply

            • That one is a good example where the mistakes made at the crew level required mistakes further up to create the conditions for the entrapment. Also, because there were no fatalities, probably was easier to write a critical report.

              Reply

    • So……

      If Todd Abel got there Saturday morning and “offered to help” (as he says in his interview) and IC asked him to be the Field OPS, and he accepted, is it his fault (to the point of censure) he was not qualified/experienced enough to handle what happened? I would put the responsibility for that more on the ones above him who placed him in that role.

      Am I missing something?

      Reply

      • No back again to bad decisions with (bad or good outcomes. If the fire had not gone crazy he would have marked it as a training assignment. but both were responsible for that decision.
        If that hand off had not happened would Able as the DIV A have not allowed the hike out by GM? How simple changes affect the roads we go down good or bad.

        Reply

        • According to Abel’s interview, Eric was appointed DivA that morning, during his briefing with him.

          At that point, Abel was still a DIVS, but, I guess, no specific division was assigned him. It wasn’t until after his briefing with Eric, then he offered to Musser to help with operations. Musser asked him if he would be willing to do that. He said yes. They then told Hall that, and Hall agreed to that designation.

          So, I guess in the “what if’s” Abel would not have been named DivAS anyway. I don’t know what it means to come onto a fire assigned as a DivS with no Div assigned to you.

          Reply

          • Meant Musser asked Abel if he would agree to be Field OPS.

            Sorry, doing two things at once…..

            Reply

            • I think we are going in circles—
              Able came as a Division Supervisor
              If he was briefing Marsh I would assume GM was assigned to his DIV.
              what ever that was again maybe DIV A which Marsh took when asked by Able. After Able took OPS.
              Some what confusing but I think that’s how it went.

              Reply

              • Mr. Powers… see post below.
                The only reason Todd Abel ( who was ordered as a DIVS ) was ‘bumped’ up to OPS is because the SECOND Type 2 OSC resource order from the night before ( guy named Robert Arthur )… never showed up.

                So Musser was ‘short an OPS’ and when Abel ‘bumped up’ to replace the no-show Arthur… it made sense to THEN bump Marsh up to replace Abel at the DIVS level.

                You said something above about ‘twists of fate’?

                If this Robert Arthur guy had actually showed up… Todd Abel probably would have remained at his ( hired )
                DIVS position… probably would have been ‘DIVSA’ that day… and Marsh would have just remained GM Supt. that day and stayed with his own crew all day.

                And any decision to move would have had to have gone through Marsh’s DIVSA Todd Abel.

                Reply

                • If Musser was indeed already the OSC, then he WASN”T short an OPS. There is only ONE OSC per shift (except at clusters where people usually start freelancing). What they WERE short on was a Planning Chief and a Safety Officer, and if someone had been designated as Safety instead of a 2nd OPS, then perhaps a good bit of the cluster could have been mitigated, along with some lives saved.

                  Reply

                  • I agree… but see the resource order for the Type 2 short team. It includes orders for TWO ( identical ) OSC/OPS positions… and both orders were FILLED ( one with Musser, the other with Arthur ).

                    Reply

                    • Most I & II teams have 2 OPS. 1 – day shift, 1 – night shift, so nothing unusual about the order, just the way it was all implemented.

                    • Perhaps Arthur had been advised that he was going to be night shift. If so, he shouldn’t be faulted for not arriving in the AM. By the time the night shift occured, a different Team had the fire, using their own OPS people.

                  • Original O-16 order number placed the night before ( 06/29/13
                    2155 PNT ) had 17 sub-resource numbers. TWO of those were identical and were for TWO OPS/OSC positions ( both orders filed ). There WAS a Planning Section Chief ordered ( filled with Brian Lauber ) and ETA was 8:00 am Sunday… but he never showed up, either.

                    There was NO order for a ‘Safety Officer’ at all as part of the original O-16 Type 2 Short Team order itself.

                    Reply