Do you have any idea exactly how many aircraft or how many gallons of retardant were dropped on the YHF between the time we hear “Air support down there” and the time of deployment?
As we know, there was no retardant lines placed to protect Glen Isla or Yarnell in that timeframe
———————————————————————————————–
Via the Air Study Videos we have a very good record of the various drops on the fire during all of that time.
I’m writing this off the top of my head, and way past my bedtime, but I think your question is important.
Until the 4;30-ish drop that the SAIR incorrectly (imho) said Eric said ‘that’s where we want it,” the aerial fire-fighting was going on on the northeast and then east flanks of the fire. Firstly defending areas in the Model Creek Road area, and then in the Sickles Road Area.
After that, in the time framework you are speaking of, the aerial fire-fighting then turned it’s attention to the southwest part of the fire. They then managed to put in one line of retardant at around 4:30 (from, I think, about Shrine Road north-eastward), and then while they were lining up the DC-10 for a line continuing that, the Deployment happened.
After the deployment, they continued dropping retardant from the first line they put in all the way towards the northeast, to defend Yarnell.
The line Bravo 3 dropped, earlier in the day, across the bowl was basically in vain.
However, it looks to me that the lines dropped in the Model Creek Road area and across the top of Yarnell were successful, via the aerial photos in this article on this UK-based Daily Mail Website:
—————————————————————————————-
“Devastation left by ‘firestorm’ that killed 19 Arizona firefighters: Shocking aerial images show town burned to the ground by blaze”
You have to scroll down a bit to come to the actually quite interesting collection of aerial photos that show where the retardant lines stopped the fire. I’ve mapped almost all of these photos, by the way. I have absolutely no clue how they managed to obtain these photos.
PS. Given what I’ve seen in these aerial photos, it has always disturbed me that they didn’t start that line above Glen Illah. I don’t know why that was the case. I really don’t and it bothers me.
**
** EXIF METADATA SUMMARY FROM
** ALL OF THE PANEBAKER AIR STUDY VIDEOS
Below is a just a short summary of the EXIF data contained in ALL of the
Panebaker videos sitting in the online Dropbox folder.
You can see clearly below what Marti has been talking about with embedded
time stamps ( and GPS time stamps ) actually bearing no relation to the
time stamp(s) eventually used in the FILENAMES themselves.
The Nikon Coolpix seems to have been set TWO hours ahead of real time
and the filenames used for files coming from the camera were just ‘dialed back’
manually, or something.
The first SEVEN Panebaker videos show below also contain a short NOTE after
the EXIF data that tries to show how both the ‘Creation Dates’ OR the GPS
Time Stamp *may* have been used to come up with the actual time stamp
used in the video filename.
As you can see from these NOTES below… something is very strange about
where the time stamps used for the video titles actually came from. None
of them appear to be an exact match for either the ‘Creation Time’ or
the ‘GPS Time’ embedded in the movie itself.
Also note… MOST of the videos taken with the Nikon Coolpix P520 do, in fact,
have UTC based GPS timestamps… but SOME videos from the (same?)
Nikon do NOT. It is almost as if the GPS was being turned OFF on the Nikon
for only SOME of the videos shot that day.
File Name: 20130630_144226_VLAT_EP.MOV
Creation Date: 2013:06:30 16:40:52
Duration: 0:01:32
Make: NIKON COOLPIX P520
GPS Time Stamp: 21:40:46.57 UTC ( AZ 14:40:46.57 PM )
GPS Date Stamp: 2013:06:30
GPS Position: 34 deg 16′ 19.85″, 112 deg 43′ 51.89″
NOTE: GPS time stamp of 14:40:46 AZ time plus 1:32
equals 1442.18, but that is still 8 seconds shy of 1442.26.
16:40:52 plus 1:32 equals 1642.24, but subtracting two
hours manually still only gives 1442.24, which is still
two seconds shy of filename time stamp 1442.26.
File Name: 20130630_144508_EP.MOV
Creation Date: 2013:06:30 16:44:27
Duration: 0:00:40
Make: NIKON COOLPIX P520
GPS Time Stamp: 21:44:22.11 UTC ( AZ 14:44:22.11 PM )
GPS Date Stamp: 2013:06:30
GPS Position: 34 deg 16′ 19.85″, 112 deg 43′ 51.94″
NOTE: GPS time stamp of 14:44:22 AZ time plus 40 seconds
gives 1445.02, but that is still 6 seconds shy of 1445.08.
16:44:27 plus 40 seconds equals 1645.7, but subtracting two
hours manually still only gives 1445.7, which is still
ONE second shy of filename time stamp 1445.08.
File Name: 20130630_144756_SEAT_EP.MOV
Creation Date: 2013:06:30 16:45:37
Duration: 0:02:17
Make: NIKON COOLPIX P520
GPS Time Stamp: 21:45:31.97 UTC ( AZ 14:45:31.97 PM )
GPS Date Stamp: 2013:06:30
GPS Position: 34 deg 16′ 19.85″, 112 deg 43′ 51.95″
NOTE: GPS time stamp of 14:45:31 AZ time plus 2:17
gives 1447.48, but that is still 8 seconds shy of 1447.56.
16:45:37 plus 2:30 equals 1647.54, but subtracting two
hours manually still only gives 1447.54, which is still
TWO seconds shy of filename time stamp of 1447.56.
File Name: 20130630_150016_EP.MOV
Creation Date: 2013:06:30 16:59:44
Duration: 0:00:29.66
Make: NIKON COOLPIX P520
GPS Time Stamp: 21:59:39.17 UTC ( AZ 14:59:39.17 PM )
GPS Date Stamp: 2013:06:30
GPS Position: 34 deg 16′ 20.99″, 112 deg 43′ 51.82″
NOTE: GPS time stamp of 14:59:39 AZ time plus 29 seconds
gives 1500.08, but that is still 8 seconds shy of 1500.16.
16:59:44 plus 29 seconds equals 1700.13, but subtracting two
hours manually still only gives 1500.13, which is still
THREE seconds shy of filename time stamp of 1500.16.
File Name: 20130630_150530_fire_behavior_EP.MOV
Creation Date: 2013:06:30 17:05:10
Duration: 0:00:17.55
Make: NIKON COOLPIX P520
GPS Time Stamp: 22:05:05.95 UTC ( AZ 15:05:05.95 PM )
GPS Date Stamp: 2013:06:30
GPS Position: 34 deg 16′ 20.99″, 112 deg 43′ 51.82″
NOTE: GPS time stamp of 15:05:05 AZ time plus 17 seconds
gives 1505.22, but that is still 8 seconds shy of 1505.30.
17:05:10 plus 17 seconds equals 1705.27, but subtracting two
hours manually still only gives 1505.27, which is still
THREE seconds shy of filename time stamp of 1505.30.
File Name: 20130630_150822_VLAT_EP.MOV
Creation Date: 2013:06:30 17:06:28
Duration: 0:01:52
Make: NIKON COOLPIX P520
GPS Time Stamp: 22:06:23.3 UTC ( AZ 15:06:23.3 PM )
GPS Date Stamp: 2013:06:30
GPS Position: 34 deg 16′ 20.99″, 112 deg 43′ 51.82″
NOTE: GPS time stamp of 15:06:23 AZ time plus 1:52
gives 1508.15, but that is still 7 seconds shy of 1508.22.
17:06:20 plus 1:52 equals 1708.12, but subtracting two
hours manuall still only gives 1518.12, which is still
TEN seconds shy of filename time stamp of 1508.22.
File Name: 20130630_151842_fire_behavior_EP.MOV
Creation Date: 2013:06:30 17:16:50
Duration: 0:01:49
Make: NIKON COOLPIX P520
NOTE: 17:16:50 plus 1:49 equals 1718.39, but
subtracting two hours manually still only gives 1518.39,
which is still THREE seconds shy of filename time
stamp of 1518.42.
File Name: 20130630_152406_SEAT_EP.MOV
Creation Date: 2013:06:30 17:21:07
Duration: 0:02:56
Make: NIKON COOLPIX P520
GPS Time Stamp: 22:21:01.4 UTC ( AZ 15:21:01.4 PM )
GPS Date Stamp: 2013:06:30
GPS Position: 34 deg 16′ 20.18″, 112 deg 43′ 51.71″
File Name: 20130630_153014_SEAT_EP.MOV
Creation Date: 2013:06:30 17:29:02
Duration: 0:01:10
Make: NIKON COOLPIX P520
GPS Time Stamp: 22:28:57.45 UTC ( AZ 15:28:57.45 PM )
GPS Date Stamp: 2013:06:30
GPS Position: 34 deg 16′ 20.14″, 112 deg 43′ 51.73″
File Name: 20130630_153414_EP.MOV
Creation Date: 2013:06:30 17:34:01
Duration: 12.38 s
Make: NIKON COOLPIX P520
GPS Time Stamp: 22:33:56.38 UTC ( AZ 15:33:56.38 PM )
GPS Date Stamp: 2013:06:30
GPS Position: 34 deg 16′ 19.98″, 112 deg 43′ 51.79″
File Name: 20130630_153510_EP.MOV
Creation Date: 2013:06:30 17:34:42
Duration: 23.62 s
Make: NIKON COOLPIX P520
GPS Time Stamp: 22:34:37.65 UTC ( AZ 15:34:37.65 PM )
GPS Date Stamp: 2013:06:30
GPS Position: 34 deg 16′ 19.96″, 112 deg 43′ 51.79″
File Name: 20130630_153532_EP.MOV
Creation Date: 2013:06:30 17:35:13
Duration: 1.17 s
Make: NIKON COOLPIX P520
GPS Time Stamp: 22:35:07.87 UTC ( AZ 15:35:07.87 PM )
GPS Date Stamp: 2013:06:30
GPS Position: 34 deg 16′ 19.95″, 112 deg 43′ 51.80″
File Name: 20130630_153622_5KA_EP.MOV
Creation Date: 2013:06:30 17:35:38
Duration: 0:00:43
Make: NIKON COOLPIX P520
GPS Time Stamp: 22:35:33.09 UTC ( AZ 15:35:33.09 PM )
GPS Date Stamp: 2013:06:30
GPS Position: 34 deg 16′ 19.94″, 112 deg 43′ 51.80″
File Name: 20130630_154138_fire_behavior_EP.MOV
Creation Date: 2013:06:30 17:41:06
Duration: 0:00:31
Make: NIKON COOLPIX P520
GPS Time Stamp: 22:41:01.07 UTC ( AZ 15:41:01.07 PM )
GPS Date Stamp: 2013:06:30
GPS Position: 34 deg 16′ 19.84″, 112 deg 43′ 51.83″
File Name: 20130630_154940_SEAT_EP.MOV
Creation Date: 2013:06:30 17:48:21
Duration: 0:01:18
Make: NIKON COOLPIX P520
GPS Time Stamp: 22:48:15.97 UTC ( AZ 15:48:15.97 PM )
GPS Date Stamp: 2013:06:30
GPS Position: 34 deg 16′ 19.76″, 112 deg 43′ 51.84″
File Name: 20130630_161620_VLAT_split_1_EP.MOV
Creation Date: 2013:06:30 18:12:48
Duration: 0:03:31
Make: NIKON COOLPIX P520
GPS Time Stamp: 23:12:43.83 UTC ( AZ 16:12:43.83 PM )
GPS Date Stamp: 2013:06:30
GPS Position: 34 deg 16′ 19.92″, 112 deg 43′ 50.16″
File Name: 20130630_161658_EP.MOV
Creation Date: 2013:06:30 18:16:41
Duration: 15.75 s
Make: NIKON COOLPIX P520
GPS Time Stamp: 23:16:36.24 UTC ( AZ 16:16:36.24 PM )
GPS Date Stamp: 2013:06:30
GPS Position: 34 deg 16′ 19.90″, 112 deg 43′ 50.35″
File Name: 20130630_161858_VLAT_split_2_EP.MOV
Creation Date: 2013:06:30 18:17:07
Duration: 0:01:49
Make: NIKON COOLPIX P520
GPS Time Stamp: 23:17:02.62 UTC ( AZ 16:17:02.62 PM )
GPS Date Stamp: 2013:06:30
GPS Position: 34 deg 16′ 19.88″, 112 deg 43′ 50.40″
File Name: 20130630_162300_SEAT_drop_EP.MOV
Make: Canon EOS REBEL T3i
Lens Type: Canon EF-S 15-85mm f/3.5-5.6 IS USM
Creation Date: 2013:06:30 16:23:34
Internal Serial Number: ZA2261150
Serial Number: 152066061038
Lens Info: 15-85mm f/?
Lens Serial Number: 000013b95c
** WHY IS THIS TIME DIFFERENT FROM 16:23:34?
Create Date: 2013:06:30 16:23:01
Creation Date: 2013:06:30 16:23:01
Duration: 11.78 s
Create Date: 2013:06:30 16:23:34.00
Date/Time Original: 2013:06:30 16:23:34.00
Creation Date: 2013:06:30 16:23:34.00
File Name: 20130630_162508_2SEATS_EP.MOV
Creation Date: 2013:06:30 18:23:17
Duration: 0:01:50
Make: NIKON COOLPIX P520
GPS Time Stamp: 23:23:11.9 UTC ( AZ 16:23:11.9 PM )
GPS Date Stamp: 2013:06:30
GPS Position: 34 deg 16′ 19.82″, 112 deg 43′ 50.86″
Wait, what?? I’m not sure you explained that right.
Panebaker’s Nikon and Canon t3i are one hour ahead of Arizona time, because Arizona time is not Mountain Daylight Savings Time, the time Panebaker set his cameras to.
If anybody working on these files, unless they were in a serious hurry, or didn’t care whether it made sense dealing with an Arizona fire, should have known how to do this. Somebody apparently didn’t.
So first you have to set the camera’s timestamp back one hour, in order to sync to other Arizona-set cameras (like the one used on the Air2Air videos, and just about every other camera used on that fire).
Then you have to translate that to the military time — (the 24 hour clock) format they’re using on these filenames.
It seems crazy complicated, for people who don’t understand it. But it’s not really.
So, for example, a photo or video, taken by Panebaker, who lives in Montana and had set his two cameras to Mountain Daylight Savings Time, should have been re-timestamped, by whoever was preparing these files for this, back one hour. Say from 4:16:24 PM to 3:16:24 PM. Then, in order to accurately translate that into the “military 24-hour” format they chose to use to name these files for this kind of important publication, they would then “add” 12 hours to it (to count from midnight of the beginning of that day), to get to 151624. That’s how you do this. That’s what everybody does when they do this, That’s what I’ve been doing all along. For people hired/payed to do it, I would think it would been a “no-brainer.”
They could have absolutely cleanly and quickly and accurately renamed these files without confusion. I have no clue why they didn’t.
Marti… yes… this confused me as well when I finally
did an EXIF dump on ALL of Panebaker Apple Quicktime
movies and then looked at the dates coming OUT of
the movie files themselves. ( EXIF metadata ).
You ALREADY said the Nikon Coolpix P250 was set
ONE hour ahead of time… but the ‘Creation Date’ being
stamped into the movies themselves says that it was
TWO hours behind the ‘real Arizona time’ that day.
Let me take just ONE of the EXIF metadata dumps
from above and see if I can show you what I mean…
Let’s take just THIS one ( since it also has GPS data )…
_______________________________________________
File Name: 20130630_144226_VLAT_EP.MOV
Creation Date: 2013:06:30 16:40:52
Duration: 0:01:32
Make: NIKON COOLPIX P520
GPS Time Stamp: 21:40:46.57 UTC ( AZ 14:40:46.57 PM )
GPS Date Stamp: 2013:06:30
GPS Position: 34 deg 16′ 19.85″, 112 deg 43′ 51.89″
NOTE: GPS time stamp of 14:40:46 AZ time plus 1:32
equals 1442.18, but that is still 8 seconds shy of 1442.26.
16:40:52 plus 1:32 equals 1642.24, but subtracting two
hours manually still only gives 1442.24, which is still
two seconds shy of filename time stamp 1442.26.
_______________________________________________
The FILENAME ended up in the ‘1400’ timerange… but
the ‘Creation Date’ ( according to the Nikon ) was TWO
HOURS ahead of that… in the ‘1600’ hour.
Now there is this…
GPS Time Stamp: 21:40:46.57 UTC ( AZ 14:40:46.57 PM )
That is actually CORRECT.
Timestamp that went into the movie itself was in the
‘1400’ hour ALREADY… and not TWO HOURS ahead
in the ‘1600’ hour as the Nikon’s own timeclock thought.
Well… when I say CORRECT… I mean the HOUR was
correct according to UTC time. ( 1400 hour ).
As explained above, however… I don’t think this is simply
a case where they ended up just taking the GPS time
and using that for the FILENAME itself.
The GPS time stamp of 14:40:46 AZ time plus the
1:32 media duration time embedded in the movie
itself equals 1442.18, but that is still 8 seconds shy of 1442.26 ( which is what they actually NAMED it ).
So ‘eight seconds’ are ‘missing’, even if they were
just referring to the embedded GPS time for filenames…
…but my point is that the HOUR is CORRECT ( according
to the GPS stamp )… and it is TWO hours ahead of the
‘Creation date’ stamped by the Nikon’s own clock setting.
UPDATE: The ‘EXIF metadata’ dump for the Panebaker videos
posted above in this Chapter 6 has been updated and
re-posted at the bottom ( the START ) of the new Chapter 7.
The list above actually has a couple of Panebaker videos
missing. The new list over in Chapter 7 is complete and
has all 31 Panebaker videos listed.
Here is a direct link to the *new* Chapter VII ( SEVEN ) of this ongoing discussion where the *new* EXIF report is posted…
**
** USING AN ONLINE EXIF METADATA EXTRACTOR WITH AIR STUDY
** VIDEOS WITHOUT HAVING TO DOWNLOAD THE VIDEOS
The same ‘online’ tool that can be used to easily extract EXIF metatdata from
any photograph can ALSO be used to pull a ton of metadata out of Apple
Quicktime movie format ( MOV ) files… ( like the Panebaker Air Study videos
in the online DropBox )… but it’s a little trickier to do than just analyzing
a ‘photograph’ in Mr. Dougherty’s online Drobox.
To analyze any PHOTOGRAPH in the online Dropbox… all you have to do
is select the photo… let it appear… then use the ‘View Original’ option by
either right-clicking the image or from the little ‘three dot’ menu option that
is always in the lower right corner when a photo is being displayed.
When the original photo appears… you just ‘cut and paste’ the URL that is now
showing in your browser’s address bar into the ‘View Image at URL’ input
box over in the EXIF online tool page.
You have to do this ‘View Original’ thing because the online Dropbox page
that normally (first) shows a photo to you is just an HTML ‘container’ and
that URL is NOT a ‘direct link’ to the photo itself.
In order for the online EXIF extractor to work… it simply needs a URL that
represents the location of the ACTUAL image ( and not a web page URL ).
Okay… all well and good… but here come the problem with trying to do the
same thing with the online Apple Quicktime movies ( like the Panebaker Air
Study videos ) that are also sitting in the online Dropbox.
When you choose to ‘play a movie’ up there in the Dropbox… right-clicking
the movie player when it appears does NOT give you the same ‘View original’
option as when viewing a still photo. Likewise… when it’s a movie being shown
in the online Dropbox… there is no ‘View original’ menu option if you click the
little ‘three dot’ menu in the lower right corner.
So if you just ‘cut and paste’ the URL of the Dropbox movie player into the
online EXIF extractor tool… it simply comes back and says “Invalid URL. This
is a web page and not a direct link to the item.”
Not to worry. Here is how to essentially do the same ‘View original’ option
for MOVIES up at that Dropbox… even though there is no such menu option.
You have to PRETEND as if you want to DOWNLOAD the movie… but
you still don’t have to actually download it.
When the movie you want to pull the EXIF data from is showing on the screen
with the big RIGHT-ARROW ‘Play’ button already showing… just mouse down
to the bottom right of the panel and LEFT-CLICK that little ‘three dot’ menu icon.
Only one option will be on the popup menu… and it says ‘Download’.
Do NOT LEFT-CLICK that option ( that will start the download ).
Do a RIGHT-CLICK instead.
A RIGHT-CLICK will bring up a ‘System menu’ that should have the
following option on it ( among others )…
“Copy Link Location”
Left-click click that option on this second popup menu.
This will copy the ACTUAL URL of where that original movie
file is really located up there at the Dropbox into your clipboard.
Once you have done the “Copy Link Location” operation… just switch right
over to the online EXIF extractor page and then do a ‘paste’ of that Link
into the ‘Image URL’ input box at the top of the page… then just RIGHT-CLICK
the ‘View Image at URL’ option.
That’s all there is to it.
The online tool now knows exactly where to get its OWN copy of the movie from
the Drobox… and will do so ‘in the background’ at backbone speed… and will then
show you the extracted EXIF data for that MOVIE. If it’s one of the larger movie
files you WILL have to ‘wait’ just a bit while the online server obtains its own
copy of the movie to analyze… but it won’t take long.
NOTE: You may see the online EXIF tool ‘loading’ icon just keep ‘spinning’
even after the EXIF data appears because it is still trying to display frames
from the movie on the same page. Once you are done cutting/pasting the
EXIF data into some other place of your own it’s probably best to CLOSE
that copy of the EXIF tool window so your CPU doesn’t keep spinning.
** GPS TIME STAMPS IN THE PANEBAKER VIDEOS
The Nikon Coolpix P520 camera being used for most of the Panebaker
videos was, in fact, using GPS and MOST of the videos taken with that
camera also have a ‘real time’ GPS time/date stamp. SOME of the same
videos from the same camera do NOT ( almost as if GPS was being
turned OFF at various time ).
If there IS any GPS data in a movie… it WILL be displayed by the online tool
and it will look like this…
Target image: /Panebaker/Video/Video/20130630_161658_EP
Date/Time Original 2013:06:30 18:16:41
GPS Time Stamp: 23:16:36.24 UTC
GPS Date Stamp: 2013:06:30
GPS Version ID: 2.3.0.0
GPS Latitude Ref: North
GPS Latitude: 34.272193 degrees
GPS Longitude Ref: West
GPS Longitude: 112.730652 degrees
GPS Altitude Ref: Above Sea Level
GPS Altitude: 1292.1 m
GPS Img Direction Ref: Unknown ()
GPS Img Direction: undef
GPS Map Datum: WGS84
Arizona is -7 ( minus SEVEN ) hours in relation to GPS UTC time.
That means…
When UTC hour is 2100… it is 1400 ( 2:00 PM ) in Arizona
When UTC hour is 2200… it is 1500 ( 3:00 PM ) in Arizona
When UTC hour is 2300… it is 1600 ( 4:00 PM ) in Arizona.
When UTC hour is 0000… it is 1700 ( 5:00 PM ) in Arizona
etc…
>> On May 18, 2014 at 4:48 am, calvin said:
>> The Panebaker VLAT pictures labeled 1715′ish are incorrect. These pictures
>> are actually the split drop from the VLAT from 1617. I am not sure if this is
>> relevant, or if it has already been identified.
It’s VERY relevant.
One of those 1715’ish Panebaker still photos ( the one named 20130630_171528-1_EP ) is the one that is a PERFECT match for the Tom
Story photo that was (supposedly) shot at 1639 ( according to the timestamp
on Story’s Canon 1D with the 300mm zoom lens attached ).
So however *wrong* the Panebaker still photos are ( being shot with his
own Canon EOS REBEL T3i camera )… that is ALSO how ‘wrong’ the
Tom Story Canon EOS 1D photo timestamps are.
So there appear to be TWO ‘wrong offsets’ involved here now…
1) How *wrong* was Panebaker’s Canon EOS REBEL T3i that day?
2) Answer to (1) determines how *wrong* Tom Story’s Canon EOS 1D really was.
As much as there is no evidence that there was a VLAT drop at 1639 that
day ( the moment of Steed’s first MAYDAY ) as suggested by Tom Story’s
photos… there is also now actually no real evidence there was a VLAT drop at
exactly 1715, either ( as indicated by Panebaker’s still photos ).
There is no doubt they were BOTH photographing the ‘same VLAT drop’…
but there is still plenty of doubt as to exactly WHEN that was.
So regardless of how the ‘162300 video mystery’ pans out on the other
thread… this thread needs to ‘revisit’ the Panebaker 1715 series and
find out what the ‘wrong time offset’ for THAT camera really was.
More on this later.
Back to looking at video stillframes and comparing them to still photos.
**
** PROBLEM SOLVED?
**
** NEW TIME OFFSETS FOR BOTH…
**
** PANEBAKER’S CANON EOS REBEL T3i
** TOM STORY’S CANON EOS 1D ( WITH 300mm LENS )
As it turns out… thanks to the fact that the audio tracks of the
Panebaker Air Study Videos were capturing ‘shutter clicks’…
this wasn’t all that hard to figure out.
As calvin pointed out… the Panebaker 1715’ish photo series
( regardless of timestamp ) are ACTUALLY photos of the FIRST
VLAT PASS that was part of that ‘VLAT split’ sequence taken
almost an HOUR earlier than 1715.
The Panebaker Air Study video that captures the ACTUAL (correct)
VLAT drop which corresponds to BOTH the Tom Story 7093 photo
( with an incorrect timestamp of 1639.21 ) AND the Panebaker
20130630_171528-1_EP photo ( with an incorrect timestamp of
1715.28 ) is this one…
20130630_161620_VLAT_split_1_EP
This video is 3 minutes and 30 seconds long.
VIDEO 161620 STARTS AT 1612.50 ( 4:12.50 PM )
+2:27 ( 16:15.17 / 4:15.17 PM )
Shutter click that matches Panebaker still photo 20130630_171528-1_EP *and* Tom Story’s 7093 still photo.
VIDEO 161620 ENDS AT 1616.20 ( 4:16.20 PM )
So that means the TIME setting on Panebaker’s Canon EOS
REBEL T3i was actually 1 hour and 11 seconds AHEAD of the
time of the video camera that was recording the 161620 video
that day.
( 1715.28 minus 1615.17 equals 1 hour and 11 seconds ).
So… how does that now affect the ‘time offset’ for Story’s
Canon EOS 1D?
Well… since we NOW know that the actual EVENT being
photographed by Tom Story’s 7093 photo with his Canon
EOS 1D took place at exactly 1615.17 that day… and Story’s
Canon EOS 1D put a *wrong* timestamp of 1639.21 on that
photo… the ‘difference’ between those times would be…
24 minutes and 4 seconds.
( 1639.21 minus 1615.17 equals 24 minutes and 4 seconds ).
So Tom Story’s Canon EOS 1D appears to have been set
24 minutes and 4 seconds AHEAD of the ‘real’ time that day
( if we accept that the video camera on the tripod shooting Air
Study videos was, itself, set close to the ACTUAL time that day ).
SUMMARY…
** Panebaker’s Canon EOS REBEL T3i camera was timestamping
photos 1 hour and 11 second AHEAD of ‘real time’ that day.
** Tom Story’s Canon EOS 1D camera was timestamping
photos 24 minutes and 4 seconds AHEAD of ‘real time’ that day.
See what I wrote below about syncing 152406_SEAT with the 1544 Air2Air video.
Now thinking about that 162300_SEAT_drop video. I couldn’t figure out where it came from. It’s not from any of the cameras we’re seeing most of the video from. It’s totally different. I had been wondering “Where did Panebeker get that video from??”
Now that all makes sense. He was shooting stills with the t3i, with a, as you have found, camera set ahead one hour (which actually would be correct in any Mountain Time place other than Arizona — which doesn’t observe Daylight Savings Time), and he decided to shoot that drop as a video.
So whoever was file-naming Panebeker’s t3i’s photos/video didn’t know that and thus incorrectly named the files.
It really makes me wonder who was naming these files. They made so many mistakes it makes it hard to believe it was someone on “their team.” I think if it was somebody on “their team” they would have been going more for syncing accuracy and would have been more clued in.
Just my somewhat brain dead at this pont opinion.
I think here’s still a lot of timestamp wonkiness on the Nikon videos. Bit I have somewhat of a killer day in front of me, so I don’t know when I’ll be able to get back to it.
We are still putting a lot of ‘trust’ into the existing
filename time/date stamps of the Panebaker
Air Study videos… but I still think it’s OK to do
that ( given exceptions like the 162300 video ).
Example… even for the NEW ‘time offsets’ for
Panebaker’s Canon REBEL and Story’s EOS 1D,
I am obviously ‘trusting’ the fact that the following
Panebaker video is ( at least ) CLOSE to the
REAL time that day…
20130630_161620_VLAT_split_1_EP
As you just pointed out… events in these Panebaker
videos *ARE* ‘traceable’ back into the long-running
Air-To-Air channel videos… and usually ( at least )
these TWO video cameras match up pretty
well, time wise.
So what are the odds that BOTH the camera on
the tripod recording the Panebaker videos *AND*
the camera on the tripod that was recording the
long-running Air-To-Air channel traffic are *BOTH*
set incorrectly… but still within a few seconds
of each other?
I don’t know… but I would say ‘slim to none’.
The fact that the Air-To-Air traffic captures
eventually ‘line up’ ( timewise ) with the actual
MAYDAY calls and the deployment events seems
to indicate that the camera doing the Air-To-Air
channel captures that day was pretty much set to
the ‘right time’ that day… so anything from
Panebaker that ‘matches’ up with dialogue in an
Air-To-Air capture can/should also be considered
‘the right time’ that day.
At one point… I tried to match up an event in either
a Panebaker video OR the Air-To-Air videos with
something from the Blue Ridge GPS unit ( which
was using satellite real-time that day )…
…but that turned out to be pretty much like putting
a square peg into a round hole. I can’t find any
DIRECT correlation between a GPS stamped
event in the Blue Ridge data with an Air-To-Air
channel transmission and/or a Panebaker video
radio capture. Close… but still guesswork.
When I set out on THAT quest… I was hoping to
actually find a TAC channel capture in an Air
Study video that matched the moment when
Frisby told Brown to ‘get some drivers to move
vehicles’. That is still, of course, the EXACT
moment when Brown did his ‘about face’ on
his hike on the Cutover Trail… which was
captured by his GPS unit.
No such luck. None of that ‘rescuing Brendan’ and
the immediate ‘moving vehicles’ radio traffic seems
to have been captured in any Air Study video.
The only line we NOW have to the Blue Ridge GPS
unit and the Panebaker videos is this ‘indirect’ line…
1) Blue Ridge GPS event ( ATV leaving parking lot )
was used to verify that Story’s Canon 3D was
‘accurate’ that day ( within 45 to 50 seconds of
real time ).
2) Story’s photos can be used to ‘match’ events
in Panebaker videos to determine ‘accuracy’
as related to Blue Ridge GPS unit.
So any Tom Story Canon 3D photo that matches
a moment in a Panebaker video almost exactly
is a good ‘indirect’ line of proof back to the
GPS based satellite time that day.
But as we have already discovered… ANYTHING
within 60 seconds or so is going to have to be
considered ‘accurate’ for this day in Yarnell.
Even the GPS unit was only ‘updating’ every
60 seconds that day.
Interestingly, tho, the camera timestamp on the first of those three videos says 6:12:48 PM.
So now I’m thinking the the Panebaker Nikon (source of these videos) is also one hour ahead, just like the Panebaker t3i. And that would make perfect sense, all things considered. The must both be Panebaker’s cameras, and he must live outside of Arizona,with his cameras synced to Mountain Daylight Savings time.
Still, however, I’m seeing quite a few of my representative samples of this videos, in which the File Namer, both not realizing those two cameras were “off” by an hour and getting confused as to how to translate the stamps from “4:30 PM” to “1630” goes back and forth between translating them correctly and translating them incorrectly.
I think the “Air2Air” Contour +2 videocam is accurate, both in names and timestamps, essentially.
I’m looking at 20130630_1628_EP.MOV. The timestamp says 3:47:58 PM. Which would relatively accurately indicate the video was started at 3:47 PM (1547) and end at 4:28 PM (1628), and it’s a 40-minute video. So that works.
Reply to Marti Reed post on
May 19, 2014 at 12:06 pm
>> Marti said…
>> I think the “Air2Air” Contour +2
>> videocam is accurate, both in
>> names and timestamps,
>> essentially.
Totally agree… it is ‘consistent’ with
its own timestamps and filenames
*AND* it *ALSO* seems to have
been set pretty close to the ‘real
time’ ( well, as close as anything
was that day, anyway ).
That video is actually 40 minutes and 14 seconds long… but that didn’t
throw anything off as far as the file
naming went.
1547.58 plus 40 minutes and 14
seconds is 1628.12.
Still ‘right on the money’ and still means the ‘1628’ in the filename is
CORRECT.
I think *all* of the Air-To-Air channel
videos are just as ‘tickety-boo’ with
regards to start times, durations, end
times ( and resulting filename stamp ).
The Panebaker videos… well… ( as
you pointed out already )… that’s
a whole ‘nother story.
It’s like ‘follow the bouncing timestamps’ for those puppies.
More later.
PS: A number of the Nikon Panebaker videos DO, in fact, have UTC GPS time and date stamps embedded in them… and I’m currently trying to see how that factors into things here.
Something is ‘strange’ about even these UTC GPS timestamps, however, and there seems to be a ‘pattern’ there but can’t quite explain it yet. They are always about 8 to 10 seconds BEHIND the other timestamps but its not totally consistent from video to video.
OK I’m back from driving, with a swollen sprained foot, clear across town and back in heavy traffic. I had some time to think.
I DON’T think it’s OK to be “putting a lot of ‘trust’ into the filename time/date stamps” on those videos.
I didn’t have time nor drive space to download all those videos, but of the eight I did, they were ALL incorrectly labeled. The five that are kinda sorta right, like 152406 and 150530 is only right because the renamer just read 5:21:07 PM and just stuck a 1 in front of that, not knowing the camera stamp was an hour ahead. So, purely by mistake those ended up with the “right” filenames.
The other three of those eight, are misnamed, because the renamer, while getting the translation right, didn’t now the camera stamp was off by an hour. So anybody that doesn’t know that camera is off by an hour, is gonna either misinterpret or misunderstand what they’re looking at.
If I could download all those files, which I can’t, I could easily and quickly make a list of those videos with correct filenames. I think it would be well worth doing, now that we know what the problem is.
And I think they should be corrected for Arizona time, which Panebeker didn’t, so they can be synced more “trustworthily” with all the other stuff people are comparing them to.
Can you do that with your online file metadata reader?
I’ve used a lot of Jeffrey’s Lightroom Plugin. His stuff is quite good. I think I’m gonna download and try out this, and also his Exif Viewer for Lightroom.
It actually SAYS it supports MOV Quicktime… but I haven’t been able to get it to successfully analyze any of the Panebaker videos.
Problem with the online tool and using it with the YFH Dropbox is that you have to do ‘View Original’ on any photo and use THAT URL for the EXIF viewer.
If you just call up an Apple Quicktime movie via the dropbox and try to use that URL… it just says “Invalid URL… this is just a web page”.
There is no ‘View original’ option for the movies in the online Drobox, as there is with photos.
You can also try to analyze any ‘downloaded’ videos… but problem there is that the online tool then has to UPLOAD the entire frickin’ thing before it can ‘analyze’ it. Not workable with some of these Air Study videos.
So a desktop tool like exiftool v9.6 is what I’ve been using to analyze the Apple Quicktime movies.
Scratch my comment
above. I just figured out HOW to use that ‘online tool’ to analyze the Apple Quicktime MOV files that are actually sitting in the online YHF Dropbox.
You have to sort of ‘fool’ it and pretend to ‘download’ the video… without actually downloading it.
See a new parent comment up above about how to actually do this.
Ha Ha remember when we spent several days syncing Tom’s D1????
I said I thought it was 22 minutes ahead and you estimated somewhere around 30 minutes ahead?
I had reasons to not want you to be right because of how that would skew my syncing of Tom’s photo of the VLAT after Blue Ridge McCord’s “almost fiasco with the helicopter” video!!
WTKTT: I hate to ask too much of you, and I know we’re all breathlessly waiting/hoping/praying for a Chapter VII, but…
I think it would be enormously useful if you could write up a summary of this whole Panebaker exploration. I can’t do it because I don’t know what all is in your head. I’ve pretty much written/thunk out loud what’s been in mine.
I think it’s really important for folks coming here to understand this, and I don’t think they will by trying to read/comprehend these four days of complicated/convoluted threads.
Marti… I did a ‘dump’ up above of the EXIF data ( including
GPS time stamps ) from the Panebaker videos… but that
was before I read your comment above.
That ‘dump’ is NOT my idea of a ‘summary’ as to where
we reallly stand with these Panebaker videos.
I will do that additional ‘summary’ and post it as well.
It’s actually looking pretty clear.
I no longer think ( at the moment ) that 162300 video
was ‘replacing’ anything at all. It was just a ‘screw up’.
What amazes me is that these guys were getting PAID
to do this ‘Aerial Firefighting Study’ ( With taxpayer dollars
from USDA? )… but they didn’t even bother to make sure
their equipment was all ‘good to go’ with correct timestamps
and whatnot that day.
**
** UPDATE: MORE ABOUT THE 162300 AIR STUDY VIDEO
**
** MYSTERY SOLVED?
>> Marti wrote…
>> Was the Nikon’s timestamper generally off? I don’t know.
>> Periodically, a photo was taken on that camera. The photos
>> are in the Schultz folder.
>> 20130630_1616_AZ-A1S-000688_T911___7_G_RS.JPG
>> (Please dear Universe, don’t ever compel me to type that out
>> on my iPad ever again…) is of the T11 coming out of one of the
>> split drops and has a time stamp of 4:16:36 PM. Boom!
>> As in that’s pretty accurate, relatively speaking, given that we
>> don’t have any absolute time stamps on any of these files, because
>> it just doesn’t work that way in the real world, unless somebody
>> decides to make it do that.
Marti…
Couple of things.
You are right. There is no doubt that even though they DO capture the same
SINGLE SEAT drop… the 152406 video and the 162300 video were shot with
TWO different video cameras.
The 152406 video was shot with a video camera on a TRIPOD… while the
162300 video was shot with a ‘handheld’ video camera.
So which one has the *REAL* timestamp?
I believe it’s the 152406 video.
The following photo in the Swartz folder DOES, in fact, appear to be a still photo
of the EXACT SAME DROP that we see happening in BOTH the 152406 video
*and* the 162300 video.
/AerialFirefightingstudy/Swartz/Pictures/Nikon/North of Fire/Seat Drop 3/
20130630_1524_AZ-A1S-000688_T874___1_G_RS.JPG
Camera: Nikon COOLPIX P520
Lens: 107 mm (Max aperture f/3)
Exposure: Auto exposure, Program AE, 1/250 sec, f/4.9, ISO 160
Flash: Off, Did not fire
Focus: AF-S, Mid-left
Focus 2: AF Area Mode: Dynamic Area
Date: June 30, 2013 – 3:24:31 PM
Location: Latitude/longitude: 34° 16′ 19.7″ North, 112° 43′ 51.9″ West
Location decimal: ( 34.272152, -112.731085 )
Altitude: 1,375.3 m
File: 3,672 × 4,896 JPEG (18.0 megapixels)
If we are going to trust the timestamps on the Swartz photos… then this simply
CONFIRMS that the drop actually did take place in the 1524 timeframe… and
*NOT*( in the 1623 timeframe as the 162300 video seems to suggest.
Things are *still* just a ‘little wonky’ timewise, however, but ( I believe ) fully
explainable now.
The timestamp on Swartz’s photo showing the actual moment of ‘retardant
dropping’ from this single SEAT is 1524.31.
That does NOT match the actual ‘drop time’ for this single SEAT drop as
shown in the 152406 video… but it may be ‘close enough’.
Here is the actual ‘moment of the drop’ as recorded starting at the +2:05
second mark in the 152406 video…
__________________________________________________________________
+2:05 ( 1523.15 / 3:23.15 PM )
(Foreground person 1 – Panebaker?): Here he comes.
+2:19 ( 1523.29 / 3:23.29 PM )
( RETARDANT DROP STARTS FROM THE SINGLE SEAT )
+2:19 ( 1523.29 / 3:23.29 PM )
(AA – Rory Collins): Okay… Ahhhh… we’ll probly be around there
in about five. Umm… What’s your plan on the ground?
+2:20 ( 1523.30 / 3:23.30 PM )
( RETARDANT IS NOW FULLY DROPPING FROM THE SINGLE SEAT )
+2:27 ( 1523.37 / 3:23.37 PM )
(OPS1 Todd Abel): What I’d like to do… ah… is… ah… tie into ( that court here? ) where ya
see the whole ??. If we can tag onto the road up here and then just run it… ah… you know…
( transmission breaks up and cuts off ).
FOREGROUND OVERLAP…
+2:27 ( 1523.37 / 3:23.37 PM )
(Tanker 810): Eight one zero OFF… hard right.
(B33 – French): Lookin’ like you already got me in sight…
looks like your drop went in there good. Thank you.
(Tanker 810): ( Back to ?? )
__________________________________________________________________
So… according to the 152406 video… the ‘moment of the drop’ appears to have
been from a START time of +2:19 ( 1523.29 / 3:23.29 PM ) to ‘fully dropping
retardant’ ( as seen in the Swartz photo ) at +2:20 ( 1523.30 / 3:23.30 PM ).
However… the timestamp on Swartz’s photo for that same ‘fully dropping
retardant’ moment is 1524.31 ( 3:24.31 PM ).
That’s pretty much a full 61 seconds different ( ahead of the video )… but it IS
definitely *within* 61 seconds… which we might have to simply accept as
‘accurate enough to be the same moment’.
I believe this Swartz photo IS of the same exact ‘single SEAT drop’ moment
as seen in the 152406 video… but Swartz’s camera was simply *about* 61
seconds AHEAD of that camera on the tripod that day.
The other reason I believe that Swartz’s photo MUST be of the same drop being
shown in the 152406 video is that even if that SEAT was making MULTIPLE drops
at that location… the simple 61 second time difference is NOT enough time for
his photo to have been of a full ‘go around’ and/or ANOTHER drop by the same
SEAT at the same location.
Not only is there no indication of that happening in the audio or the Air-To-Air
channel traffic… 61 seconds is NOT enough time for them to have made a
complete ‘circle around’ for another pass… either BEFORE or AFTER this
drop captured in the 152606 video.
Also note…
At +2:14 in the 152406 video a white SUV passes the camera heading
west on Hays Ranch Road. The same white SUV is also seen in the
162300 video just a few hundred feet further west on Hays Ranch Road.
No big additional revelation there… just more proof that the 152406 video
and the 162300 video are ‘of the same event happening at the same time’.
So what does all this now mean?
I believe it means the following…
1) There is no doubt that the Swartz photo, the +2:18 second mark in the
152406 video, and the contents of the 162300 video are all THE SAME
SINGLE SEAT DROP being photographed/videoed with 1 digital camera
( Swartz’s ) and TWO different video cameras ( one on tripod, one handheld ).
2) The Swartz photo verifies that the drop really did take place right around
1523.30 that day… and NOT in the 1623 timeframe as the mysterious 162300
video seems to suggest. Swartz’s digitial camera was simply +61 seconds
ahead of the time set on the video camera that was on the tripod that day.
3) The 162300 video *could* just simply be a ‘renaming error’ on Panebaker’s
( or someone else’s? ) part and he really did just mean it to have a filename
of 152300 instead ( even though even that timestamp would not be totally
accurate ). It was NOT an ‘extraction’ from the actual 152406 video that was
then ‘saved to disk’ with a wrong filename… it was the 11.7 seconds from the
OTHER handheld video camera that was (somehow) saved/named with
*WRONG* timestamp about 1 hour into the future.
So… mystery solved?
There WAS no *original* 162300 video at all? ( or at least not one that got
‘replaced’ with 11.7 seconds from another video? ).
This was just some kind of RENAMING error on TWO (different) videos from
TWO different cameras that DO show the same SEAT drop event happening
circa 1523.30 that day?
>> Marti…
>> At exactly +4 seconds in the 11.7 second 162300 video… a
>> shutter click is heard. It comes right after OPS1 Todd Abel
>> says “Go ahead” and then Air Attack Rory Collins starts his
>> “Okay… uh… we’ll probly be around there in about five”
>> response.
>>
>> The ‘shutter click’ also comes at the exact moment that the
>> retardant flow was turned on during this SEAT drop captured
>> in the 162300 video.
>>
>> The SAME EXACT ‘shutter click’ is also heard at the SAME
>> EXACT moment at the +2:20 mark in the 152406 video ( an
>> hour earlier? ) and is part of the same 11 seconds from
>> 152406 ‘duplicated’ as the content of 162300.
>>
>> I can’t seem to find a match for this still photo in ANY of the
>> folders up in the ‘Aerial Firefighting Study’ folder.
>> Not even in Panebaker’s specific ‘SEAT drops’ folder. ( Which
>> is what the 162300 video is showing… a SEAT drop ). Pity.
>> Maybe THAT still camera would have had a correct setting in
>> order to verify 162300 itself.
There DOES appear to be such a ‘photo’ in the folder(s).
Apparently I just ‘missed it’ on a first pass.
I believe the Swartz photo being referenced above IS the one
that corresponds to this ‘shutter click’ heard at the same
exact moment in BOTH the 152406 and 162300 video(s),
and it DOES help verify the TIME when this single SEAT
drop *actually* took place.
That photo filename (thank you swartz for doing this consistently in your photos!!) has the name of the plane in it, It’s T874. The plane being directed in the two videos by Bravo 33 is three-one-zero. You can hear that in 162406.
Unfortunately Swartz doesn’t have any photos of 310 making this drop. That’s because, in my opinion, he’s NOT using a different camera, he’s using the same one and only Nikon Coolpix that they are using to shoot the videos.
It’s because people are using the Panebaker videos to establish when things are being said. IMHO, after today, I don’t believe the “times” being used in the filenames are accurate, for a variety of reasons.
One, because I’m finding that the timestamps on these videos don’t appear accurate and two….
Because whoever was translating them into the filenames seems to have also been confused as to how to translate them.
Reply to Marti Reed post on
May 18, 2014 at 11:36 pm
>> Marti said…
>> And I ask myself, what is the importance
>> of this?
>> It’s because people are using the
>> Panebaker videos to establish when
>> things are being said.
Yes… that’s one BIG reason… but with
regards to this one single ‘mystery’
of the 162300 video… it’s also all about
just establishing if things that are now
permanently in the public evidence record
really ARE what they SAY they are.
*OR*
…whether there is any ‘evidence’ that things
are MISSING which OUGHT to be there.
The 162300 video ‘mystery’ really did look,
at first, as if something that OUGHT to be
there ( an Air Study video capturing events
and/or radio traffic circa 1623 ) *might*
have been ‘replaced’ with something ELSE.
That is looking much less likely now… but
it is still worth verifying as much as possible.
>> Marti also said…
>> IMHO, after today, I don’t believe the
>> “times” being used in the filenames are
>> accurate, for a variety of reasons.
Your ‘points one and two’ up above are
valid… but in *general* I still think MOST
of the Panebaker video timestamps
*CAN* be trusted.
There are a LOT of ‘overlapping’ radio
transmits between these Panebaker
videos and the other ( long running )
Air-To-Air channell videos that DO
sort of prove that at least the timestamps
between those TWO video cameras were
perhaps only SECONDS apart…
…but I agree there appear to be exceptions.
SOME of the Panebaker Air Study video
timestamps ( even other than the
mysterious 162300 one ) appear to still
be a little ‘wonky’.
>> Marti said…
>>
>> Hate to say it but.
>> That photo filename (thank you swartz for doing
>> this consistently in your photos!!) has the name
>> of the plane in it, It’s T874. The plane being
>> directed in the two videos by Bravo 33 is three-
>> one-zero. You can hear that in 162406.
Actually… it is 810 ( Eight one zero ), not 310, but
you are still RIGHT. It is Tanker 810 making the
drop in BOTH videos and he says so himself as
he finishes that drop and is heard ( in BOTH of
the videos ) completing the drop by announcing…
“Eight one zero OUT… hard RIGHT”.
As far as whether or not the ‘title’ on that Swartz
photo actually matches reality… it’s hard to say.
We now have a situation where either the TIME
on Swartz’s camera was WILDLY wrong… and
could not possibly have been a mere 61 seconds
off… OR… the time on Swartz’s camera really
was ‘reasonably accurate’ ( within, say 60 seconds ),
and he is just totally mistaken about what the
number of the SEAT was that he was photographing
at 1524.
A super-enhancement of that Swartz photo SEEMS
to indicate that the actual number on the TAIL of
that plane making that drop is, in fact, 810.
It’s pretty hard to make out because of the smoke
but I would put money on 810 and not 874. The
last digit of the 3-digit tail number seems to most
definitely be a ZERO and not a FOUR.
Also… even though T874 looks VERY similar to
810 ( same type of plane )… Air Tanker 874 also
has the word FIRE ( in big black letters ) on the tail
under the 874 tail number… which I can almost say
for certain is NOT present under the 3 digit tail
number of that SEAT in Swartz’s 1524 photograph.
Tanker 874 apparently has a registration number of
N174ML.
The registration number for Air Tanker 810 is
apparently N187LA… and here is a ‘close-up’
photo of it ( matches Swartz photo exactly )…
Here’s a link to a corresponding ‘photo’ of
Tanker 874. Notice the word FIRE in big
black letters on the tail under the ‘874’
tail number.
I can say pretty much for certain that there
is NO such word FIRE under the tail number
of that SEAT in the 1524 Swartz photo.
Just the 3 digit number that DOES, in fact,
appear to at least end with ZERO.
Nothing else UNDER the tail number.
Firefighting Tankers and Support Aircraft…
Tanker 874 – Registration number N174MLK
The sequence which begins with Bravo 33 saying “eight-one-zero how we lookin?” at 00:31 in 152406_SEAT is right there at 5:18 in the 1544 Air2Air video.
Of course, we don’t know how accurate the timestamping is on the Contour +2 videocam, but I’m guessing it at least isn’t as wonky as the Nikon!
I think you’re right about the cameras, also, now. There’s no way that still and that video could have been shot on the same camera. They were both Nikon Coolpix P520’s. What threw me off was the wording in the “Panebeker Photo and Video Information” docx.
It says:
“Photos were taken primarily with a Canon EOS Rebel T3I, a couple were taken with a Nikon P520. Video in the video folder was also taken with the Nikon Coolpix P520.”
Sounds like they’re describing on camera, right?
Lightroom doesn’t show camera metadata, except the timestamp, for videos. So there is no camera name, much less Camera Serial Numbers. So I wasn’t “seeing” anything to tell me those were two different “versions” of the same camera.
So now I can quit wondering how the camera was stamping the stills “accurately” but not the videos.
The Moore folder includes some photos of that drop, too, and they sequence right in that framework, also. Starting with 20130630_Loc1_seat (20).jpg at 3:23.23 PM. Also Swartz shot the scene before the drop on his iPad at 3:20:42 PM.
**
** MORE ABOUT THE MYSTERIOUS 162300 AIR STUDY VIDEO
**
** WHAT WAS *REALLY* HAPPENING CIRCA 1623 ( 4:23 PM )?
Since we don’t know if there ever even WAS an ‘original 162300’ Air Study
Video ( of any length ) that was then ‘replaced’ with the 11.7 clip from another
video taken almost an HOUR earlier… it’s impossible to say how much ‘radio
traffic’ that original 162300 video *might* have captured ( if it existed ).
For the sake of argument… let’s assume that it DID exist and that it WAS much
more than 11.7 seconds… and that it actually ‘covered’ the time period that
stretched all the way back to the Air Study video that immediately preceded it.
All that means is that it couldn’t have been more than FOUR minutes
long, since the Air Study Video that immediately precedes the
20130630_162300_SEAT_drop_EP Air Study video was the 20130630_161858_VLAT_split_2_EP one.
( 162300 minus 161858 equals 4 minutes and 2 seconds )
It is doubtful that even if the original 162300 video was MUCH longer than 11.7
seconds that it would have been this full FOUR minutes long ( since no other
Panebaker video was that long and never really exceeded 3 minutes in length )…
…but again… just for the sake of completeness… here are the full FOUR minutes
of captured Air-To-Air channel traffic that would cover the entire time in-between
the 161858 video and the 162300 one… just to see what was *really*
happening ( on Air-To-Air, anyway ) during that timeframe.
The timeframe that actually covers the 11.7 seconds of the existing 162300
video is marked in the transcript below.
As the transcript below shows… NO ACTUAL DROPS took place during this
1618.58 and 1623.00 time period ( as the 162300 video seems to suggest )…
and B33 Thomas French was simply just still in the planning stages for the
upcoming ‘two seat’ drop with Tankers 874 and 830 ( captured in a completely
separate video from the 162300 one ).
** VIDEO 20130630_1628_EP STARTS AT 1547.46 ( 3:47.46 PM )
Length of video: 40 minutes and 14 seconds.
NOTE: The first 30 minutes and 42 seconds omitted from this posting to save
space. Only the FOUR minutes that covers the gap between the 161858 and
162300 videos is included.
+30:43 ( 1618.29 / 4:18.29 PM )
(Tanker 830): I gotcha… am I comin’ in too, Rusty?
+30:48 ( 1618.34 / 4:18.34 PM )
(Tanker 830): Is eight three zero comin’ in with eight seven four?
+30:51 ( 1618.37 / 4:18.37 PM )
(B33 – French): Afirmative. Eight seven four and eight three zero you’re
both cleared in. Two nine eight zero… come in at fifty-five.
+31:10 ( 1618.56 / 4:18.56 PM )
(5KA): Five Kilo Alpha’s out of the dip.
+31:12 ( 1618.58 / 4:18.58 PM )
(B33 – French): Kilo Alpha you’re clear to the drop.
+31:14 ( 1619.00 / 4:19.00 PM )
(5KA): Kilo Alpha
+31:23 ( 1619.09 / 4:19.09 PM )
(B33 – French): Eight seven four… set me up a coverage level 4… whole load… okay?
+31:26 ( 1619.12 / 4:19.12 PM )
(874): Okay.
( 40 SECOND PAUSE – NO RADIO TRAFFIC )
+32:06 ( 1619.52 / 4:19.52 PM )
(5KA): Five Kilo Alpha’s off the drop
+32:07 ( 1619.53 / 4:19.53 PM )
(B33 – French): Kilo Alpha Bravo 33 copy… Hey… I gotcha in sight
so I’ll be low level on this flight but I DO have you in sight… give me a call off the dip.
+32:14 ( 1620.00 / 4:20.00 PM )
(5KA): Will do.
( 42 SECOND PAUSE – NO RADIO TRAFFIC )
+32:56 ( 1620.42 / 4:20.42 PM )
(Unknown): And Bravo 33 eight ?? comin’ around on the east side…
lookin’ for ya… oh… I gotcha.
+33:00 ( 1620.46 / 4:20.46 PM )
(B33 – French): Follow me around… we’re gonna take ya right to
work… allright?
+33:04 ( 1620.50 / 4:20.50 PM )
(B33 – French): You’re clear down to five… and… uh… I’m gonna start my
turn to the left… I’m outta one sixty for one twenty.
+33:11 ( 1620.57 / 4:20.57 PM )
(Unknown): Okay.
+33:13 ( 1620.59 / 4:20.59 PM )
(B33 – French): Puttin’ on the brakes.
+33:17 ( 1621.03 / 4:21.03 PM )
(5KA): Kilo Alpha’s outta the dip.
+33:20 ( 1621.06 / 4:21.06 PM )
(B33 – French): Kilo Alpha gimme a call off the drop.
+33:22 ( 1621.08 / 4:21.08 PM )
(5KA): Will do.
+33:38 ( 1621.24 / 4:21.24 PM )
(B33 – French): Eight seven four… that’s you in the front of the line, right?
+33:42 ( 1621.28 / 4:21.28 PM )
(B33 – French): Okay… what we’re gonna do is… we’re gonna build line
backwards. I need to extend my… uh… pattern just a little bit we’re gonna
get a helicopter in and out… kind of at the… uh… north end of that flank.
Gimmee a good left turn on the exit, okay?
+34:08 ( 1621.54 / 4:21.54 PM )
(B33 – French): Okay… we ah.. we just put in a whole bunch of retardant in with the DC10 we’re gonna build line backwards… you’re gonna be starting in a light fuel patch taking it TO existing retardant… how copy?
+34:21 ( 1622.07 / 4:22.07 PM )
(B33 – French): What I’d look to do is… ah… yea… level 4… star… and I’m… I’ll pop smoke at the start… it’s even gonna be before that light… ah… fuel patch.
+34.56 ( 1622.42 / 4:22.42 PM )
(B33 – French): Allright… I’m gonna start my descent… you’re gonna see the
existing retardant put in by… ah… by nine one one so we’ll be taking retardant
TO that.
*****************************************************************************
** NOTE: 1622.49 is supposedly the START of the 11 second long
** Air Study Video 20130630_162300_SEAT_drop_EP.MOV
*****************************************************************************
+35:06 ( 16:22.52 / 4:22.52 PM )
(B33 – French): Little bit hard to see here… so basically their retardant
started in the flats. We’re gonna be kind of up in the foothill portion.
I’ll pop smoke at the start. Gimme about a wingspan left for ah… drift
Drop heading’s gonna be about zero eight five.
****************************************************************************
** NOTE: 1623.00 is supposedly the END of the 11 second long
** Air Study Video 20130630_162300_SEAT_drop_EP.MOV
****************************************************************************
VIDEO 20130630_1628_EP ENDS AT 1628.00 ( 4:28.00 PM )
Length of video: 40 minutes and 14 seconds.
The Panebaker VLAT pictures labeled 1715’ish are incorrect. These pictures are actually the split drop from the VLAT from 1617. I am not sure if this is relevant, or if it has already been identified.
Reply to calvin post on May 18, 2014 at 4:48 am said:
>> calvin said…
>> The Panebaker VLAT pictures labeled 1715′ish are
>> incorrect. These pictures are actually the split drop from
>> the VLAT from 1617. I am not sure if this is relevant,
>> or if it has already been identified.
calvin… yes… it’s very relevant for a number of reasons.
You just pointed out that we have been *assuming* that
the both the filename and EXIF timestamps on the Panakebaker STILL photos are ‘correct’.
You are right… that doesn’t really appear to be the case.
The Panebaker 20130630_171528-1_EP photo in the
‘VLAT drops’ still photos folder is also the one that is a
‘perfect match’ for Tom Story’s 7093 photo of the same
drop… which Story’s Canon 1D said took place at 1639.
So however ‘wrong’ these Panebaker STILL images are is also directly related to how ‘wrong’ Tom Story’s Canon 1D was set that day.
We were assuming a +36 minute error there, but if the Panebaker still photos ALSO have ‘bogus’ timestamps
then that is no longer correct.
So now we need to figure out just how *wrong* BOTH
Panebaker’s Canon EOS REBEL T3i *AND* Story’s Canon EOS 1D were that day.
Geez. what a mess.
Reminder to anyone getting paid to take pictures of a fire in the future… please make sure the time/date settings on the cameras you are using are CORRECT. Thanks in advance.
So……. I downloaded (and am still downloading) a representative smattering of the Panebaker et al photos and videos.
The File-naming of the videos is all over the boards, compared to the time-stamping. A bunch of the mis-file-naming appears to be typos. For example, 143844 has a time stamp of 4:38:41 PM. Ahem. And 150530 is time stamped 5:05:30 PM. Buyer Beware!
Which leads to our favorite mysterious pair. 162300 is stamped 4:23:01 PM. Accurate? Quite possibly, relatively speaking. 152406 is stamped 5:21:07 PM. Think about THEM apples! There is no way, given what’s going on, that what is happening in that video is happening at 5:21:07 PM!!! So I would be more likely to trust 162300 than 152406.
And speaking of these two videos, the short one is not an edit out of the long one. They’re two completely different videos, captured by two different cameras.
152406_SEAT, with a most likely wrong filename and timestamp, and 162300, with its possibly more accurate timestamp and filemame, were both recorded on the Nikon Coolpix P520. It was on a tripod. It can record up to 24 minutes of video at a time.
Which leads me to my theory. Panebaker et al shot the main videos (except for the ones w/air2air capture, which were recorded on a Contour +2 videocam) on the Nikon in much longer chunks than we see here. Then, probably soon after, they had to sit down and split those videos into smaller chunks. Because…that’s what you have to do. As they were splitting them, they were exporting them out, and had to give them names. Some of them they may have been naming correctly. Some of them they clearly weren’t.
And I don’t know, when you split videos like these up, in something like QuickTime, what happens to the time stamps in the course of doing that. I’ve so far never had to pay attention to that, but then, I’m just learning how to shoot video.
Was the Nikon’s timestamper generally off? I don’t know. Periodically, a photo was taken on that camera. The photos are in the Schultz folder. 20130630_1616_AZ-A1S-000688_T911___7_G_RS.JPG (Please dear Universe, don’t ever compel me to type that out on my iPad ever again…) is of the T11 coming out of one of the split drops and has a time stamp of 4:16:36 PM. Boom! As in that’s pretty accurate, relatively speaking, given that we don’t have any absolute time stamps on any of these files, because it just doesn’t work that way in the real world, unless somebody decides to make it do that.
So that’s what I’ve discovered so far. When I first started looking at those files and their metadata in Lightroom, I wrote in my notes, “Marti starts slowly backing out of THIS particular project…….”
Also. One of my first thoughts as WTKTT (thankfully) starting posting his concerns about these videos was that I have no problem imagining a four-minute lapse in recording. Sometimes, yah know, you have to change out things like batteries and memory cards. And, now that I’ve per used this thing a little bit, maybe we DON’T have a lapse at all. Maybe 162300 WAS shot at that time and so was 152406!!
At exactly +4 seconds in the 11.7 second 162300 video… a shutter click is heard. It comes right after OPS1 Todd Abel says “Go ahead” and then Air Attack Rory Collins starts his “Okay… uh… we’ll probly be around there in about five” response.
The ‘shutter click’ also comes at the exact moment that the retardant flow was turned on during this SEAT drop captured in the 162300 video.
The SAME EXACT ‘shutter click’ is also heard at the SAME EXACT moment at the +2:20 mark in the 152406 video ( an hour earlier? ) and is part of the same 11 seconds from 152406 ‘duplicated’ as the content of 162300.
I can’t seem to find a match for this still photo in ANY of the folders up in the ‘Aerial Firefighting Study’ folder. Not even in Panebaker’s specific ‘SEAT drops’ folder. ( Which is what the 162300 video is showing… a SEAT drop ). Pity. Maybe THAT still camera would have had a correct setting in order to verify 162300 itself.
So… just to be clear…
Despite what you said above… I still don’t think there is *ANY* question that the entire 162300 video is not an exact duplicate of the 11.7 seconds seen at the +2:18 mark in the 152406 video. The ‘mystery’ is why this is so…
…but I hear you up above with your ‘potential’ explanation.
Are you saying that it could just possibly be that this same SEAT drop was captured with TWO different video cameras at the same time… but the one that was running longer and captured the full 2+ minutes ( that includes this SEAT DROP ) was simply mis-named into the 152406 timerange and should have ACTUALLY been named 162406 instead?
Okay… bad typo above.
The word ‘not’ slipped in there which
changed the intent of what I was trying
to say, I think.
Should have read like this…
Despite what you said above… I still don’t think there is *ANY* question that the entire 162300 video is, in fact, an exact duplicate of the 11.7 seconds seen at the +2:18 mark in the 152406 video. The ‘mystery’ is why this is so”.
So just to be cystal clear…
I still think that 162300 video IS an EXACT DUPLICATE of the 11 seconds at the +2:18 mark in the 152606 video.
Hmmm… I think I need to scratch this
comment of my own from above…
“Are you saying that it could just possibly be that this same SEAT drop was captured with TWO different video cameras at the same time… but the one that was running longer and captured the full 2+ minutes ( that includes this SEAT DROP ) was simply mis-named into the 152406 timerange and should have ACTUALLY been named 162406 instead?”
Even this isn’t really a possible explanation.
The 1624 timeframe *IS* covered by the
Panebaker video
20130630_162508_2SEATS_EP, which is 1
minute and 49 seconds long, and ( according to THAT filename timestamp ) starts capturing events at 1623.19 ( 4:23.19 PM ) and ENDS at 1625.08 ( 4:25.08 PM ).
So even if someone ‘misnamed’ the
152406 video and really meant it to
say 162406… everything is still ‘wonky’.
The TWO SEAT drop ( 830 following 874 )
is what is really happening at 162406, and
NOT the SINGLE seat drop shown in both
the 152406 and 162300 videos.
And I’m also saying, these videos, recorded on the Nikon Coolpix are a bloody mess that I’m still trying to sort out.So it’s no surprise they tripped,you up.
Fortunately, I’m pretty sure the photos from it (in the Swartz folder — and they are actually quite astonishing) are accurately time stamped. And I have NO IDEA how that could happen.
So I’m currently downloading some more videos to see if the camera (or whatever) started out accurate, and went gonzo, or if it was that way all day (or thru what ever editor they put the videos through).
Reply to Marti Reed post
on May 18, 2014 at 7:53 pm
>> Marti said…
>> Fortunately, I’m pretty sure
>> the photos from it (in the
>> Swartz folder — and they
>> are actually quite
>> astonishing) are accurately
>> time stamped.
Well.. I hope so.
See new post above entiteld…
** MYSTERY SOLVED
I was wrong just above about
saying there didn’t seem to
be a still photo that matches
the ‘shutter click’ heard in
BOTH the 152406 and 162300
videos at the moment that
single SEAT was ‘dropping’.
There IS such a photograph.
I just missed it at first.
It’s in the Swartz folder(s).
I have NO IDEA which of these
Air Study devices actually had
the RIGHT time that day… but
if we assume ( as we have
been doing for a while now )
that the tripod-mounted video
cameras DID have the ‘correct
time’ that day… then Swartz’s
camera still falls into the
‘accurate enough’ category but
still appears to have been
about 61 seconds ahead of
the time on the tripod
mounted camera(s).
I would still call +/- 60 seconds
‘close enough for accuracy’
on a day like this.
Reply to Marti Reed post on
May 18, 2014 at 7:44 pm
>> Marti said…
>> Yes, It’s exactly what I’m saying.
>> Those are completely different
>> videos.
Yes. You are right.
They are simply TWO *different*
video cameras ( one on a tripod and
one handheld ) recording the same
exact ‘event’ ( the same SEAT drop ).
See new posting above entiteld
** MYSTERY SOLVED?
The Swartz photo I found that appears
to also be the EXACT same SEAT
drop seems to prove that ALL of
this did, in fact, happen in the 1524
timeframe and nowhere near 162300.
Somehow… that 162300 Air Study video is just the 11.7 seconds from the ‘handheld’ being used at that time was meant to be named 152300 ( even though that isn’t even totally accurate, timewise ).
So looking more at what’s coming out of that Nikon. Trying to sync to the VLAT split. The photo of it, which I referenced above, and won’t type again, has an accurate timestamp, and the timestamp is shown on the image. The video, however, is time stamped two hours “late — 6:12:48 PM, and somebody renamed the file 161620. I don’t know where and when and how the Nikon video timestamps are going wacky. And it looks like whoever is splitting out or renaming or what those videos is having a big struggle trying to do it. Maybe in a hurry?
And now I’m not sure my earlier theory — that they videos were shot in big chunks and then split — is correct. Swartz’s folder of the photos taken with the Nikon has a lot of photos in it. I’m not sure exactly what he was doing.
Marti… FWIW… that last photo in the Swartz folder…
20130630_1716_AZ
-A1S-000688___FB_1_G_RS.JPG
has an EXIF timestamp of… 5:16:58 PM and shows
them basically ‘packing up and leaving’ that location
by the helibase where they had the tripods set up
most of the afternoon.
This does appear to be accurate.
The final video taken from the tripod actually ENDS
just before we now see him with that tripod in
his hand and about to put it into the truck.
Have you looked at the Town of Yarnell Folder? YIKES!!
They drove into town. He has photos in the Ranch House Cafe parking lot from 6:38 PM til 6:44 PM. I think the last two include Brian and Trew and their UTV. he wins my gold prize today! He was also shooting on an iPad.
I’m going after 150822_VLAT_EP. It’s the first VLAT drop they shot, both photos and video, of a VLAT drop that day. I didn’t download it right, so I’m waiting. I’ll see if the Nikon was timestamping the video correctly then.
I just don’t know where the screw-up came. I really think 162300 (snot om a different camrea) is both stamped and file named correctly, and 152406, shot on the Nikon, clearly isn’t
The next thing to do would be to go into the Air2Air videos, and see if there’s a match somewhere. But I’m not gonna have time anytime soon to do it…..
Reply to Marti Reed post
on May 18, 2014 at 8:13 pm
>> Marti said…
>> Have you looked at the Town of
>> Yarnell Folder? YIKES!!
Yes. It really was a disaster.
It’s an absolute MIRACLE that more
people were not killed that day.
One of the things I can’t figure out
about that sequence of Swartz
photos is that if you look carefully…
he is approaching the Ranch House
Restaurant ( and taking pictures out
the window of his vehicle ) from the
SOUTH ( not the NORTH, where
he was taking pictures earlier ).
So, somehow Swartz worked his
way further SOUTH than the Ranch
House Restaurant following the
deployment and now we simply
see him coming back NORTH
to it… and pulling into the parking lot.
It would also be nice if someone could
identify all those fire guys in THESE
photos standing in the parking lot,
including the one who is GLARING
at Swartz as he takes photos, even
though the other guy to the right with
the red helmet is obviously freely
shooting photos or video with an
iPhone at that same time.
The guy who is GLARING at Swartz
has a BLUE Helmet… but the Blue
Ridge Hotshots had already
evacuated the Ranch House parking
lot by this time.
Could that be BR Hotshot Ball who
have been ‘left behind’ at the parking
lot that day?
When Frisby and Brown drove out
from the deployment area in the
UTV Ranger… the GPS tracker
shows them going straight up NORTH
towards the ICP command center,
so I don’t think it’s either Frisby
or Brown in that photo.
>> Marti also wrote…
>> They drove into town. He has
>> photos in the Ranch House Cafe
>> parking lot from 6:38 PM til 6:44
>> PM. I think the last two include
>> Brian and Trew and their UTV.
>> he wins my gold prize today!
>> He was also shooting on an iPad.
See above. I believe the BR GPS
tracker shows Frisby and Brown
driving straight up to the ICP after
they came out of the deployment
area… and the rest of BR evacuated
the parking lot shortly after that
in the vehicles. So the guy in the
Blue Helmet seems to have been
a BR Hotshot that was ‘left behind’.
Ball?
>> Marti also said…
>> I just don’t know where the
>> screw-up came. I really think
>> 162300 (shot on a different
>> camera) is both stamped and file
>> named correctly, and 152406,
>> shot on the Nikon, clearly isn’t.
See new post above.
I believe the Swartz photo of the
same SEAT drop puts things the
other way around. That SEAT drop
was in the 1524 timeframe and
NOT the 1623 timeframe.
>> Marti also said…
>> The next thing to do would be to
>> go into the Air2Air videos, and see
>> if there’s a match somewhere. But
>> I’m not gonna have time anytime
>> soon to do it…..
Probably no need.
See new post above with title
** MYSTERY SOLVED?
There IS a Swartz photo that IS most
likely that same exact SEAT drop
seen in BOTH the 152406 and 162300
videos ( shot with different video
cameras ).
Swartz’s digital camera was only
61 seconds ahead of whatever video
camera was sitting on the TRIPOD
that day and capturing drops.
So I believe the ‘proof’ is there that
Swartz’s photo, the 152406 video
( shot on tripod ) and the 162300
video ( handheld video camera )
are all capturing the SAME SEAT
drop… and it was in the 1524
timeframe ( not 1623 ).
Whether that means the handheld
used to shoot the 11.7 seconds was
just a full HOUR off ( timezone error? )
or it was a ‘file renaming’ error is the
only thing that still needs to be
figured out, IMHO.
What I’m kinda sorta generally seeing is that Swartz, who seems to have been in charge of the Nikon (while Panebaker was actually photographing with a Canon t3i ( which is the camera I use)) was taking photos every 10-20-30 minutes.
So I think he was shooting, say, a bit of video, then stopping and shooting some photos, and then switching back to video.
So I no longer think these videos were split out from longer ones. I think the videos were started, recorded, then stopped in camera.
So no-one was splitting them later in QuickTime or such. That means whatever mis-time-stamping was happening must have been happening in camera. Problem is, I’ve never heard of that happening, with a camera correctly stamping its photos and incorrectly stamping its videos. That’s where I’m stumped.
It’s now pretty obvious that in those 11.7 seconds that ended up being ‘named’ the 162300 video… whoever shot that was HURRYING to grab the camera and record that SEAT drop.
The first few seconds show the operator fumbling to point the camera… and then fumbling to ZOOM and catch the SEAT drop in the nick of time… with retardant dropping.
So YES… these 11.7 seconds now just look like a ‘quick opportunity’ to get ADDITIONAL video of the same SEAT drop ( circa 1523.30 ) that was already being captured by the OTHER video camera on the tripod.
How it ended up with a filename of 162300?… that’s still a mystery.
Followup to the original parent comment above that has
the ‘transcript’ in it.
What I should have made clear(er) in the original parent comment
was that the ‘2 SEAT drop’ with 830 following 874 DOES, in fact,
take place very soon after that transcript above ends…
…and that ‘2 SEAT drop’ is fully captured in the Panebaker
video 20130630_162508_2SEATS_EP, which is 1 minute and
49 seconds long, and ( according to the filename timestamp )
starts capturing events at 1623.19 ( 4:23.19 PM ) and ENDS
at 1625.08 ( 4:25.08 PM ).
French, in B33, starts ‘poppin’ smoke right at +21 seconds
( 1623.40 ) in that video ( just as he says he does in the audio )… and then 874 is seen ‘dropping’ at exactly +35 seconds
( 1623.54 ) and 830 then follows him right away dropping
retardant at exactly +57 seconds ( 1624.16 ).
The point here is that this is a TWO SEAT drop and it happens AFTER the 162300 video ENDS… whereas the 11 seconds of the 162300 video (supposedly) shows a completely different SINGLE seat drop with a completely different SEAT happening just a few seconds for the TWO seat drop…
…and BOTH drops (supposedly) being ‘guided’ by the same lead plane. Not possible.
Typo in last sentence above.
I left out the word BEFORE.
Should have read like this…
The point here is that this is a TWO SEAT drop and it happens AFTER the 162300 video ENDS… whereas the 11 seconds of the 162300 video (supposedly) shows a completely different SINGLE seat drop with a completely different SEAT happening just a few seconds BEFORE
the TWO seat drop…
…and BOTH drops (supposedly) being ‘guided’ by the same lead plane. Not possible.
I disagree. Right when whoever (of course we now agree that’s probably Cordes) says “We’ll probably be there about five,” the tanker drops in both videos.
Reply to Marti Reed post on
May 18, 2014 at 9:20 pm
>> Marti said…
>> I disagree. Right when whoever (of
>> course we now agree that’s probably
>> Cordes) says “We’ll probably be there
>> about five,”
The only way it could be SPGS1 Gary Cordes ‘responding’ to Air Attack Rory Collins there is if Cordes was ‘authorized’ to be responding to direct callouts for ‘Operations’.
Just before the ‘Go ahead’ transmit… we hear Air Attack Rory Collins specifically ASK for ‘Operations’ to talk to him over ‘Air to Ground’.
The ‘responder’ to a request for ‘Operations’
( at that point in the day ) *would* have logically been OPS1 Todd Abel… and it even SOUNDS just like Todd Abel, and not Musser or Cordes.
This is all captured in the 152406 video…
____________________________________
+2:13 ( 1523.23 / 3:23.23 PM )
(AA – Rory Collins): Operations, Air Attack, Air-To-Ground
+2:19 ( 1523.29 / 3:23.29 PM )
(AA – Rory Collins): Okay… Ahhhh… we’ll probly be around there in about five. Umm… What’s your plan on the ground?
+2:27 ( 1523.37 / 3:23.37 PM )
(OPS1 Todd Abel): What I’d like to do… ah… is… ah… tie into ( that court here? ) where ya see the whole ??. If we can tag onto the road up here and then just run it… ah… you know… ( transmission breaks up / cuts off ).
____________________________________
>> Marti also said…
>> …the tanker drops in both videos.
Yes… but I believe the proof is now there that this ‘drop’ ( and the audio capture with Air Attack Rory Collins talking to ‘Operations’ ) is definitely in the 1524 timeframe and not the 1623 timeframe.
If that really is a capture of a SINGLE SEAT
drop at 1623… some 1/4 mile off to the
east there of where they were using the
VLAT and the SEATS in most of the other videos…
…then French would have then only had about 25 seconds to completely set up the upcoming TWO SEAT drop with Tanker 874 leading and Tanker 830 following… which is captured in the next Air Study video.
Not possible.
Not enough time for French to have come off that single SEAT drop and then go through all the preparation we hear in the Air-To-Air captures for that upcoming TWO SEAT drop.
It is NOT anyone from ‘Operations’
at all that says “We’ll probably be
around there in about five.”
That is actually Air Attack Rory Collins himself talking TO ‘Operations’ after someone in Operations ( sounds just like OPS1 Todd Abel ) responded to HIS “Operations, Air Attack, Air To Ground” callout with “Go ahead”.
At this point in time ( 1524 ish )… it is Air Attack Rory Collins himself who wants to know what ‘Operations’ plans to do ‘on the ground’… and he gets a full answer from what appears to be OPS1 Todd Abel regarding what ‘roads’ they want retardant to try and ‘tie into’.
OPS1 Todd Abel is still on the NORTH end of the fire at this point and actually ‘on the ground’ back there with SPGS2 Darrell Willis in the Model Creek Road area and the ‘tying into roads’ response to Air Attack Rory Collins is still all about the NORTH side of the fire.
Here are the ‘transcripts’ from the two Air Study Videos which prove that
the 162300 Panebaker Air Study video is simply 11.7 seconds of video that
was simply ‘extracted’ from the much longer 152406 video ( taken almost an
HOUR earlier ) and was either created as a *new* 162300 video OR was
used to REPLACE the contents of the *original* 162300 video.
Whether or not this 11.7 seconds of video simply replaced a much LONGER
video capture of what was *really* transpiring circa 1623 is still not known.
Only a comparison with the actual original 162300 video ( if it ever even existed )
could prove any difference in time lengths.
Here is the transcript of the 11.7 seconds that is the content of Air Study Video
20130630_162300_SEAT_drop_EP as included in the SAIT FOIA/FOIL release…
** PANEBAKER AIR STUDY VIDEO
** 20130630_162300_SEAT_drop_EP.MOV
Transcript of both the foreground and background radio conversation captured
by Panebaker Air Study Video 20130630_162300_SEAT_drop_EP.MOV.
ECITW ( Every Caveat In The World )
This is what I ( me, personally ) believe is being said in the background of this
video. Your mileage may, of course, vary.
This video is 11 seconds long, so given the small note in the README.TXT file
that accompanies these Air Study videos which states that they all use the
VIDEO END time as the timestamp in the TITLE… then that means this
particular video STARTED at 1622.49 ( 4:22.49 PM )
+0:03 ( 1622.52 / 4:22.52 PM )
(AA – Rory Collins): Okay… Ahhhh… we’ll probly be around there
in about five. Umm… What’s your plan on the ground?
FOREGROUND
(Tanker 810): Eight one zero OFF… hard RIGHT.
BACKGROUND
+0:10 ( 1622.59 / 4:22.59 PM )
(OPS1 Todd Abel): What I’d like… ( VIDEO ENDS )
NOTE: Video ends and cuts off right after the word ‘like’.
VIDEO 162300 ENDS AT 1623.00 ( 4:23.00 PM )
*** NOW… Here is the transcript from the 11 seconds of video at the +2:18 mark
*** in the Air Study Video 201300630_152406_SEAT_EP taken an HOUR earlier…
***
*** The KEY part is the duplication of the following exact query from
*** Air Attack Rory Collins to OPS1 Todd Abel… ( which is now in BOTH
*** of these Air Study Videos… but at different TIMES and almost a
*** full HOUR apart from each other…
***
*** (AA – Rory Collins): Okay… Ahhhh… we’ll probly be around there
*** in about five. Umm… What’s your plan on the ground?
This transcript includes both the FOREGROUND radio traffic ( mostly Air-To-Air
channel captures ) and the BACKGROUND ( TAC channels ) captures.
You can see clearly that the audio at the +2:18 second mark in THIS video
is identical to the audio supposedly captured almost an HOUR later
in the 162300 video.
Also… the 11 second clip from this video being used as the content for
the 162300 video only starts with the ‘Go ahead’ response from OPS1 Todd
Abel… but this ‘Go ahead’ from Abel is a direct response from Air Attack
Rory Collins having just called out to HIM with a “Operations, Air Attack on
Air To Ground” radio call at the +2:13 mark in THIS video.
Also… the ‘What I’d like to do’ phrase that also ENDS the 11 second clip used
as the content for the 162300 video is NOT ‘cut off’ in THIS video and we can
hear OPS1 Todd Abel’s full response to Air Attack Rory Collins.
VIDEO 152406 STARTS AT 1521.10 ( 3:21.10 PM )
+1:30 ( 1522.40 / 3:22.40 PM )
(B33 – French): Okay… what we’re gonna do is… uh… it’s kinda…
like I said the farthest north house… and… pretty close to the house, okay?
This one with the red engine. There’s actually two with red engines it’s
the one furthest north. Now I’m online.
+1:44 ( 1522.54 / 3:22.54 PM )
(Tanker 810): Okay. Gotcha… and… and we’re pretty much goin’ for the heavy smoke?
+1:47 ( 1522.57 / 3:22.57 PM )
(B33 – French): Yea… it’s… it’s a bead on the heavy smoke and I’m on line now
poppin’ smoke just so ya can see me. I want your line to start and bring it right
through HERE… right turn on the exit… ya got that?
** NOTE: Here is the START of the 11.7 seconds from THIS video
** that is duplicated as the content for Air Study Video 162300
_________________________________________________________________
+2:18 ( 1523.28 / 3:23.28 PM )
(OPS1 Todd Abel): Go ahead.
+2:19 ( 1523.29 / 3:23.29 PM )
(AA – Rory Collins): Okay… Ahhhh… we’ll probly be around there
in about five. Umm… What’s your plan on the ground?
+2:27 ( 1523.37 / 3:23.37 PM )
(OPS1 Todd Abel): What I’d like to do… ah… is… ah… tie into ( that court here? ) where ya
see the whole ??. If we can tag onto the road up here and then just run it… ah… you know…
( transmission breaks up and cuts off ).
FOREGROUND OVERLAP…
+2:27 ( 1523.37 / 3:23.37 PM )
(Tanker 810): Eight one zero OFF… hard right.
(B33 – French): Lookin’ like you already got me in sight…
looks like your drop went in there good. Thank you.
(Tanker 810): ( Back to ?? )
_________________________________________________________________
** NOTE: Here is the END of the 11.7 seconds from THIS video
** that is duplicated as the content for Air Study Video 162300
** but 162300 cuts off early up above right after the phrase
** “What I’d like…” in the BACKGROUND capture and the
** phrase “Eight one zero OFF…” in the FOREGROUND capture
**
** The 152406 video simply continues for another half-minute or so
** with a response from Air Attack Rory Collins…
+2:39
(B33 – French): Load and return.
(Tanker 810): Load and return… eight one zero.
+2:43 ( 1523.53 / 3:23.53 PM )
(B33 – French): Five Kilo Alpha… you’re cleared direct to the
helibase if you’re not already headed there.
+2:43 ( 1523.53 / 3:23.53 PM )
(AA – Rory Collins?): Ah.. Okay… I’ll come around once they’re… ah…
( road? )… ahm… on… ahhh… those fire spots (under ?).
+2:53 ( 1524.03 / 3:24.03 PM )
(OPS1 Todd Abel): (Responding to last transmit from AA but words not clear).
Reply to Bob Powers post on May 12, 2014 at 2:43 pm
>> Mr. Powers wrote…
>>…If the Helicopters were dropping water in the same area trying to hold the fire
>> down, then they definitely would have commented on the tanker drop helping
>> them out at a critical location.
Mr. Powers…
In an effort here to try and figure out what is really going on with that now
known-to-be-bogus 162300 Air Study Video ( and to see if any of these ‘other’
Air Study videos are equally bogus )… I now have full transcripts of ALL of the
other USDA Air Study videos that were on fixed tripods and capturing ALL of
the Air-To-Air channel traffic which ‘overlaps’ with these Panebaker and Moore
Air Study videos.
I will post ALL of these transcripts at some point… but since this Chapter 6
is already bigger than it should be ( and failing to load already on mobile
devices )… I am going to wait a bit and see if a new Chapter 7 starts before
attempting to do that. They are not *small* transcripts.
In the meantime… I just thought I would point out that the helicopters
‘commenting’ on the ‘goodness’ of retardant drops ( if they were in a
position to see it ) appears to be *common practice* in that ‘other world’
of WFF Air Support and this is now perfectly evident in the full transcripts
of the Air-To-Air channel traffic that day.
In just ONE of the USDA Air Study videos capturing the complete Air-To-Air
traffic… EVERY TIME the pilot of Helicopter 5KA ( Five Kilo Alpha ) saw
a retardant drop… he IMMEDIATELY would add his own unsolicited comments
to the conversation like “That was spot on!” and “Right on! Perfect!” and
sometimes even lengthier ‘Attaboy!’ style comments.
And MOST of the time… these ‘confirming goodness’ transmits right after a
retardant drop would take place WITHOUT any ‘call signs’. They would just
come out of ‘nowhere’.
So YES… if ANY of the helicopters operating on the south side of the fire
circa 1633 ( we know there were at least TWO in the air there at that
time ) saw that 1633 SEAT drop that went right between the fireline and
a house… it is VERY likely one ( or both? ) of those helicopter pilots might have
been the ones offering the unsolicited. “That’s exactly what we want” and/or
“That’s exactly right” comment(s) over the radio following that drop and
Burfiend was simply mistaken to think those comments were coming
from DIVSA Eric Marsh.
Two things:
FIRST: In a post below, WTKTT suggests that EP (one of the guys conducting the “air study” on the day of the Yarnell Hill Fire) might somehow be withholding or concealing video. I suppose that it is possible that EP is deliberately participating in a scheme to withhold information, or that the AZ Forestry folks withheld some of EP’s video, or that the SAIT is withholding some of the video, but it is equally (if not more) likely that EP just made a misstep in labeling and keeping straight all of his videos, pictures, etc.
Specifically: On June 30th, three folks (EP, SM, and Sw) were on the fire to take pictures and videos regarding the use of RETARDANT (and general air support with water drops) on fire – this is the “air study” folks keep referencing. These folks set up a main, stationary camera on a tripod that was recording from a stationary position almost non-stop, with audio coming exclusively from the air-to-air frequency (such that you can hear pilots such as Tom French, Rory Collins, “Jack,” “Kevin,” etc. talking to each other on these LONGGGGG main videos). In addition to that main camera, however, there were three people on the ground – EP, SM, and Sw – taking individual video clips and photos with various small hand-held devices. My impression is that at least one of them or maybe two had MULTIPLE hand-held devices that they were using.
Here’s the KEY: My impression is that these three folks were SPECIFICALLY interested in capturing videos/photos of the air drops (water, retardant) in action, such that, before you conclude that they are HIDING a video, consider whether there was an actual DROP from a SEAT or a VLAT during the time window in question. If not, it is entirely possible that there WAS no video from a hand-held device at exactly that moment, and NOTHING is being hidden or withheld.
To wit: At roughly 4:15 and 4:17, VLAT 911 dropped its massive load of retardant (split into two drops), and then there were two SEAT drops (one right after the other – they were in a line) at about 4:24 p.m., and then tanker 413 dropped at roughly 4:33, and then VLAT 910 was lining up for a drop when the shit hit the fan with GM. Which brings me to my second point….
SECOND: For reasons not worth getting into (given that I do not have the time or ability to provide links at this point), allow me to say again that I am pretty sure that Marsh did indeed comment to B33 about where he was hoping for some air support (e.g. a VLAT line), but Marsh made the comment WELL before 16:37. Meaning, I am fairly comfortable believing based on the way that I have been tying together all of the same materials that all of you have access to at this point that the 16:37 comment alleged to have been made by Marsh was indeed made by Marsh, but (a) it was likely uttered well before 16:37 AND (b) the words might have been slightly different than what B33 recalls (although the gist was likely the same).
This, by the way, ties into my previously-articulated view that the SAIT, ADOSH, and Wildland Fire Associate timelines are all wrong. I have no “links” to anything to support this, because my support for this is the timeline that I am slowly piecing together on my laptop and in my notebooks. There is nothing – other than my brain and notes – for me to “link” to…. 🙂
Reply to Elizabeth post on May 15, 2014 at 11:16 am
Elizabeth…
First off… let me say that whatever that noise was down below
about some kind of ‘boycott’ on responding to any more of your
posts… I did not comment on it because that’s not something
I personally believe in on a PUBLIC forum.
Yes… this is a PUBLIC forum.
If a post simply meets the acceptable criteria for ‘allowable’
commentary on the part of the person hosting this PUBLIC
discussion… then whatever someone has to say is OK with me.
But… ( likewise )… since this is a PUBLIC forum… people are then
also allowed to ‘freely comment’ ( and SHOULD ) on what anyone
else has to say… even if that comment was not ‘addressed’ to them.
That’s how this works.
If people don’t like your posts… they don’t have to respond to them.
It’s that simple.
I think folks laid out pretty well down below what they find ‘annoying’ about most of your PUBLIC posts and your ‘style’ of commenting.
You are free to either take whatever ‘advice’ was posted… or
ignore it altogether. Freedom of choice, as they say.
Ok… back to business…
>> Elizabeth said…
>> FIRST: In a post below, WTKTT suggests that EP (one of
>> the guys conducting the “air study” on the day of the Yarnell
>> Hill Fire) might somehow be withholding or concealing video.
>> I suppose that it is possible that EP is deliberately participating
>> in a scheme to withhold information, or that the AZ Forestry
>> folks withheld some of EP’s video, or that the SAIT is
>> withholding some of the video…
Correction: I did NOT say that Eric Panebaker (himself) has
‘withheld’ ( or tampered with ) information/evidence. All I said
was (quote)…
“If the 20130630_162300_SEAT_drop_EP video ( as released by the SAIT in response to FOIA/FOIL requests ) does NOT contain the same content as the original… then HE would certainly know.”
That is simply a TRUE statement.
He would be in the *best* position to know whether or not that video that ended up as part of the FOIA/FOIL package coming from the SAIT actually contains the same things he *gave* them.
He probably still has the *originals*.
I ( me, personally ) do NOT KNOW what the ‘story’ is here.
All I know is that one of these Air Study videos is NOT what it is supposed to be… and that there MUST be SOME kind of *story*
that would explain it.
>> …but it is equally (if not more) likely that EP just made a
>> misstep in labeling and keeping straight all of his videos,
>> pictures, etc.
See my original post. I ( me, personally ) do *NOT* think it
is ‘more likely’ this is the case.
I would be the first to tell you that I have ‘mis-named’ files on a
computer when assembling collections of things… but that is
*NOT* the simple explanation for what is seen in THIS case.
If two of these Air Study videos ended up being just ‘duplicates’
of each other ( completely )… then YES… I would say the likelihood
was high that a copy / naming operation went sideways.
In this case, however, we are talking about a much more
complicated scenario.
Someone ( Repeat: I do NOT know WHO ) took the time to
EXTRACT 11.7 seconds of video from the +2:18 second mark
of a PREVIOUS video… and then SAVE that video back to disk
with a totally differnent TIME on it… just short of an HOUR later
than when it was actually taken.
That’s a little more complicated than just accidentally hitting
the wrong key at some point, or screwing up a drag-and-drop
with a mouse.
>> Elizabeth also said…
>> Here’s the KEY: My impression is that these three folks were
>> SPECIFICALLY interested in capturing videos/photos of the air
>> drops (water, retardant) in action,
That is a valid impression to have. That is what they were
getting PAID to do…
…however… you are WRONG to assume that that is the only
reason they ever shot any VIDEO.
SOME of the Panebaker / Moore videos have nothing to do with
any actual ‘retardant’ drops. The most noticeable of these are
the ones that simply have ‘fire-behavior’ in the video TITLE(S).
>> Elizabeth also said
>> such that, before you conclude that they are HIDING a video,
>> consider whether there was an actual DROP from a SEAT or
>> a VLAT during the time window in question.
See above. There did NOT have to be any kind of ‘drop’ in progress
for Panebaker or Moore to be shooting video that day.
The *mystery* surrounding the particular video in question is
that its title DOES seem to inidicate that it is SUPPOSED to be a
video of a SEAT drop at 1623… but that is NOT what it *REALLY*
is at all.
>> Elizabeth
>> SECOND: For reasons not worth getting into (given that I do
>> not have the time or ability to provide links at this point), allow
>> me to say again that I am pretty sure that Marsh did indeed
>> comment to B33 about where he was hoping for some air
>> support (e.g. a VLAT line), but Marsh made the comment
>> WELL before 16:37.
Please provide evidence if you are going to make these
kinds of statements ( or just re-read the comments below about
what people find most annoying about your posting here ).
I have certainly made some ‘leaps’ myself in an effort to try and
help us ALL decipher some mysteries in this ongoing disscusion
(mostly before there was really no evidence to go on but the stupid
SAIR report and the only thing to DO was ‘guess’ about things )…
but I believe if I have ever gotten even close to saying “I’m pretty
sure this is what happened”… there was ( at least ) extensive
explanation as to WHY I was making such a claim.
I could tell YOU right now that MY *extensive notes* seem to indicate that Darrell Willis left the north side of the fire, drove to Yarnell, borrowed an ATV from the Yarnell Fire Station… and then personally drove all the way out to where Steed and Marsh were and told them face-to-face… “You get your asses over there to town and do something that gets your name in the newspapers because I’ve got a City Council Budget meeting next week”…
…but I would NOT expect ANYONE to believe me unless I showed some ‘evidence’ to back it up.
Not much to add to that. I think the evidence you have gone thru the past 2 days pretty well sums up the discussion.
On another note I will be gone for a week and have a lot to catch up on here so keep on looking.
Will be at my Oak Grove Hot Shot reunion reliving the great old days. Have a good week.
Signal boost to WTKTT’s earlier request for a new chapter. My mobile device crashes whenever I try to load this page now. Thanks, Mr. Dougherty, for continuing to host this discussion!
**
** WHERE IS THE *REAL* 20130630_162300_SEAT_drop_EP
** AIR STUDY VIDEO?
After checking the Panebaker 163700 Air Study video again for ANY evidence of ANYONE saying anything like “That’s what we want” circa 1637 ( and finding no such evidence )… I started working BACKWARDS from 1637 and re-checking the other Air Study videos.
There is no Panebaker or Moore Air Study Video that actually covers the 1637 to 1639 timeframe… so if there was any chance of finding evidence of this (supposed) “That’s what we want” transmission reported ONLY by John Burfiend of Bravo 33… then I thought perhaps that even if anyone did say any such thing… he might have simply been mistaken that it came (quote) “within 5 minutes of them going into shelters” ( as he said in his SAIT interview ).
1642 ( Marsh’s final transmissions ) minus 5 minutes is 1637 and so that must have been the ‘guesstimate’ the SAIT investigators were applyiing to this ‘recollection’ on Burfiend’s part.
I STILL believe it is MUCH more likey that if ANYONE said anything to Bravo 33 like “That’s exactly what we want”… that it was SOMEONE ( but NOT Marsh ) confirming the ‘goodness’ of the 1633 SEAT drop that was ‘spot on’ ( according to Burfiend and French ) and got laid down RIGHT between a house and the fireline at exactly 1633. If anyone said “That’s exactly what we want”… it MUST have been someone who saw that actual ‘spot-on’ drop right between the house and the fireline… ( like a chopper pilot ) and NOT someone who would have just seen some plane circling around in the air on some kind of ‘line-up’ flight.
It was MOST LIKELY one of the chopper pilots known to have been in the air and also working that same exact area circa 1637. They would have seen that drop be ‘spot on’ and would have immediately been ‘confirming the goodness’ of it.
Anyway… my plan was to work BACKWARDS through the Panebaker videos again listening carefully for ANY evidence of ANYONE saying anything like “That’s what we want” or other ‘confirming goodness’ opinions on the 1633 SEAT drop at ANY time that day.
Well… here comes the new MYSTERY.
The Panebaker video that immediately precedes the 163700 one is named…
20130630_162300_SEAT_drop_EP
That (supposedly) means it ENDED at 1623 and would also mean there was no Panebaker video prior to the 163700 one that covered the time of that 1633 SEAT drop down in Yarnell…
…but what the heck… I re-checked the 162300 Air Study video, anway.
That is when I discovered that this entire 162300 Air Study video is BOGUS.
It is NOT what it says it is ( A video taken by Panebaker that ENDS at 1623 ).
The entire Panebaker video 20130630_162300_SEAT_drop_EP is simply a reproduction of 11.7 seconds from the 2:18 second mark ( near the end ) of a much EARLIER Panebaker video 201300630_152406_SEAT_EP.
Someone just LIFTED 11.7 seconds out of a previous video shot around
1524 ( 3:24 PM ) that day… and is trying to pretend that it is the contents of
an Air Study Video shot an hour later at 1623 ( 4:23 PM ).
Everything from those 11.7 seconds at the +2:18 mark in the 152406 Air
Study Video is a *PERFECT MATCH* for the entire content of the 162300 video.
So where is the *REAL* Panebaker 20130630_162300_SEAT_drop_EP video?
How long was the ORIGINAL video?… before someone just (manually) REPLACED it with an 11.7 second clip from a video taken an HOUR earlier?
There was a LOT of critical stuff going at circa 1623 that day and so the original Panebaker 162300 video may have captured some of that.
Example: It has NOT been completely verified that the YARNELL-GAMBLE video was actually shot at 1627. That APPEARS to be the time as supported by the sirens heard in the Jerry Thompson videos… but I still wouldn’t call that 100 percent verification.
If Jerry Thompson himself was just a few minutes off on the times he reported for HIS videos… then the YARNELL-GAMBLE video *MIGHT* have actually been shot a few minutes earlier… like in the 1622-1624 timeframe.
If that is the case… then that means this ‘missing’ 162300 Panebaker Air Study video had a good chance of ALSO capturing that TAC 1 channel conversation where SOMEONE in fire command *seems* to be urging Marsh to ‘hurry up and get to town’ and Eric Marsh ( totally confirmed ) then immediately reports Granite Mountain’s STATUS as… “They’re comin’ from the heel of the fire” ( as in… on the MOVE and NOT in the ‘safe black’ at all ).
So the ‘missing’ Panebaker 162300 video might have ALSO captured that
YARNELL-GAMBLE conversation on TAC 1… complete with the actual
CALL SIGN of whoever it was that was having that conversation with
Eric Marsh at that time and *seemed* to be urging him to hurry up.
Even if the YARNELL-GAMBLE conversation was NOT also captured in this
Panebaker 162300 video… there might have been *other* radio traffic relevant
to Granite Mountain that WAS captured circa 1623.
It really is not possible this was just a screw-up.
Someone seems to have purposely preserved the 20130630_162300 filename
and timestamp for this video… but then also PURPOSELY made an effort
to replace the content with something else from ANOTHER (earlier) video.
More on this later.
I’m now going back and re-checking ALL the Air Study videos to see if this
kind of ‘money business’ was going on with any OTHER Air Study videos.
The 20130630_162300_SEAT_drop_EP video that is now known
to be BOGUS is just ONE of the Panebaker Air study videos that
‘precedes’ the 163700 one. It does not IMMEDIATELY precede it.
There are actually TWO others that come in-between 162300
and 163700… and they both appear to be exactly what they
say they are.
These are the actual ( Eric ) Panebaker Air Study videos
that cover the crucial 4:00 PM to 5:00 PM timeframe that day…
20130630_161858_VLAT_split_2_EP
20130630_162300_SEAT_drop_EP **** This is the BOGUS one
20130630_162508_2SEATS_EP
20130630_163338_fire_behavior_EP
20130630_163700_fire_behavior_EP
20130630_164544_fire_behavior_EP
20130630_170634_VLAT_EP
NOTE: The 20130630_161858_VLAT_split_2_EP video that precedes the one that is now know to be BOGUS is the one that captured the 4:16 PM “Granite Mountain… what’s your status right now?” query from from someone in fire command and Eric Marsh’s response about Granite Mountain “makin’ their way out the same escape route from this morning” and Marsh’s “just checkin’ it out to see where we gonna jump out at” transmission.
ALSO NOTE: The ‘EP’ initials in these Air Study video filenames all stand for ‘Eric Panebaker’.
If the 20130630_162300_SEAT_drop_EP video ( as released by the SAIT in response to FOIA/FOIL requests ) does NOT contain the same content as the original… then HE would certainly know.
**
** PANEBAKER AIR STUDY VIDEO
** 20130630_163700_fire_behavior_EP.MOV
Reply to calvin post on May 9, 2014 at 3:04 am
>> calvin said…
>> At the 23 second mark of the 1637 Panebaker video there is a background
>> transmission that I cannot make out. This video is only 39 seconds long and
>> would put the 23 second mark near 1637. If you do not mind reviewing,
>> I would appreciate it.
calvin…
I went back and reviewed the 163700 Panebaker video again looking for ANY evidence that ANYONE said anything like “That’s exactly what we want” as reported by the SAIR as Marsh talking to Bravo 33 at that time ( circa 1637 ).
This video (supposedly) ENDS at exactly 1637 and ( as you pointed out )
only covers the 39 seconds prior to that… so if anyone did say anything
of the sort circa 1637… it must have come AFTER 1637 and there is no
Panebaker or Moore Air Study video that covers the 1637-1638 timeframe.
Anyway… after listening carefully again… there is NOTHING in the 163700
video that resembles ANYONE saying anything like “That’s what we want”
or “That’s exactly what we want”.
The mysterious background transmit in the +21 to +23 second mark that you mention APPEARS to be someone saying something about a ‘horse’ that needs to be taken care of. This would match other reports around that time of ‘horses’ being seen running down the middle of Highway 89.
Here is my full transcript of that 163700 Panebaker video…
Transcript of BOTH the foreground AND background radio conversation captured
by Panebaker Air Study Video 20130630_163700_fire_behavior_EP.MOV.
ECITW ( Every Caveat In The World )
This is what I ( me, personally ) believe is being said in both the foreground AND the background of this video. Your mileage may, of course, vary.
This video is 39 seconds long.
Since the text notes accompanying these videos states that the timestamp in the title represents the END time…that makes the actual START time for this video 1636.21
NOTE: The air-to-air conversation in this video is ALSO captured even MORE
clearly in the corresponding USDA AIR STUDY VIDEO – DISC 4 folder.
+0:05 ( 1636.26 / 4:36.26 PM )
(Unknown): Five-O-Eleven… you sure of that helibase… in that green circle here?
+0:09 ( 1636.30 / 4:36.30 PM )
(Unknown – Sounds like French in B33?): Okay, copy that… are you gonna drop your bucket and have to lift back somewhere else?
+0:13 ( 1636.34 / 4:36.34 PM )
(Unknown): Yea… I’ll have to drop ( the bucket? ) then I’ll head for Wickenburg for fuel.
+0:16 ( 1636.37 / 4:36.37 PM )
(Unkown – Sounds like French in B33?): Oh… okay… gotcha… okay… gimme a call… uh… ready to lift.
+0:21 ( 1636.42 / 4:36.42 PM )
(Unknown): Will do.
BACKGROUND
+0:22 ( 1636.43 / 4:36.43 PM )
(Unknown): I’ve got a (horse?) left (to take care of?)
+0:25 ( 1636.46 / 4:36.46 PM )
(Unknown): You’re all clued in. No need to act… just write it down on a piece a paper.
FOREGROUND
+0:34 ( 1636.55 / 4:36.55 PM )
(Unknown – Sounds like French in B33?): And I’ve got a project for you.
+0:37 ( 1636.58 / 4:36.58 PM )
(Unknown): When ya have… ???
BACKGROUND
+0:37 ( 1636.58 / 4:36.58 PM )
(Unknown): (Someone’s NAME here is FIRST word? Boleba/Boleeba? Buliba?) What’s goin’ on back there?
Update: Wherever it says ‘Unknown – Sounds like French in B33’ up above should have just said ‘Thomas French in B33’. It is confirmed.
Since this Panebaker video ‘overlaps’ with DVD DISC 4 of the USDA Air Study Videos… the Air-To-Air traffic captured in that USDA video confirms most of the FOREGROUND communications captured in this Panebaker video.
WTKTT
Discussion above—-
Helicopter Pilot talking to French’
Has a water Bucket for drops.
he is going to drop it off at the heliport and go for fuel.
I’ve got a hose lift to take care of — not horse—would have been moving hose to some location. Generally they bag it Nets and drop it at some location for use.
5011 might be the call sign of the Helicopter? Just thoughts.
Reply to Bob Powers post on May 14, 2014 at 7:06 am
>> Mr. Powers wrote…
>> Helicopter Pilot talking to French’
>> Has a water Bucket for drops.
>> he is going to drop it off at the heliport and go for fuel.
Yes. That is definitely French talking to helicopter
5KA ( Five Kilo Alpha ) at that point. 5KA is the one that needed to ‘drop his bucket’ and go refuel, at this time.
The ‘other’ USDA audio captures of Air-To-Ground with
no ‘walk overs’ on the Air-To-Air channel proves that.
5KA would always identify himself using the full
‘Five Kilo Alpha’ but whenever French was hailing him
he would simply abbreviate it as ‘Kilo Alpha’.
>> I’ve got a hose lift to take care of — not horse—
>> would have been moving hose to some location.
>> Generally they bag it Nets and drop it at some location
>> for use.
Perfectly possible. That’s a very hard section to hear
in this particular video. Could be ‘horse’ *OR* ‘hose’.
The KEY thing there was that this transmission is definitely NOT anyone saying anything like “That’s what we want” in response to any line-up flights.
>> 5011 might be the call sign of the Helicopter?
>> Just thoughts.
I listened to it again. This is definitely a capture of Burfiend in Bravo 33 talking on the Air-To-Ground channel… because in the USDA DVD there is more Air-To-Air talk right underneath this transmit from Burfiend… so the capture in THIS Panebaker video MUST have been ‘Air-To-Ground’ instead.
It still definitely sounds like ‘Five-O-Eleven’ there, but since the chopper call signs all tend to be just THREE digits/numbers ( and there is no chopper with call sign 5011 listed as having been in Yarnell ) it’s unclear who Burfiend is really talking to about the ‘Helibase’.
I could believe he really meant to say ‘Nine-Eleven’, but since they were not dropping in Yarnell now, and the DC10 VLAT 911 was still returning from a refuel and wasn’t even really back in the area yet… I’m not sure what sense that would make at this moment.
Again… the KEY takeaway there is that THIS transmission was definitely Burfiend and it was definitely on the Air-To-Ground channel… so that means this Panebaker video WAS capturing ‘Air-To-Ground’ transmissions…
…but there is still nothing in the capture with anyone ever coming onto the A2G channel and saying anything resembling “That’s exactly what we want”.
This capture ENDS exactly at 1637… so if anyone said something like that circa 1637 over A2G channel… then it must have happened AFTER 1637.
Unfortunately… there is no Panebaker or Moore Air Study video that then goes on to capture the A2G traffic in the 1637 to 1639 timeframe.
The only NEXT ‘capture’ ( in the public record, anyway ) of the A2G channel after this Panebaker video is the Helmet-Cam video itself… which starts just prior to 1639 and begins with Burfiend on A2G talking to ?? someone ?? about how it’s going to be hard for them to hit some target being discussed because of the ‘smoke’. A moment later we hear Steed’s first “We are in front of the flaming front” MAYDAY transmit.
The only reason I might be hearing a little ‘more’ than you
have is that even though this particular video didn’t need
any ‘audio forensics’ or ‘noise filtering’… I STILL found that
I needed to really BOOST THE GAIN on the audio to have
a chance at hearing some of the background.
Does whatever you are using to ‘listen’ to the videos
have that ‘GAIN BOOST’ capability?
“Audio forensics” INCLUDES boosting the gain, WTKTT. When you BOOST the gain, you distort the audio. Sorry if I was not clear on that with you earlier.
WTKTT – it absolutely CAN distort the audio! If you doubt me, the actual Audacity disclosures make this clear. If in doubt, READ the relevant info. If you have something that suggests otherwise, “post your sources.” (Tongue in cheek, obviously.)
Reply to
Elizabeth post
on May 17,
2014 at 11:59
____________
WTKTT – it absolutely CAN distort the audio!
_____________
Oh… so NOW you are backing
off your carte-blanche “When you BOOST the gain, it distorts the audio” statement and have arrived at simply the ‘possibility’ that can happen.
.
Good for you.
You’re learning.
Yes. If you boost the gain some RIDICULOUS amount and your speakers or headphones are now shaking and your eardrums are getting blown out… or if you exceed the SOFTWARE limits as to ‘maximum volume’ allowed for a track… most software ( including Audacity ) has a ‘safety catch’ where it will then start applying ‘clipping’ to the waveform in order to not destroy your equipment.
What I said above was ‘the kind of gain boost I am talking about does NOT ( in ANY way ) distort that audio.
That is simply a TRUE statement.
Incremental boosts of +3db do NOT cause any loss of the waveform and no DISTORTION is taking place… and certainly nothing that would cause anything that anyone might be SAYING to be changed in any way.
_____________
If in doubt, READ the relevant info.
_____________
I have.
I wish YOU would do the same.
_____________
If you have something that suggests otherwise, “post your sources.” (Tongue in cheek, obviously.)
_____________
Okay.
From Audacity’s own user manual…
****************
The top slider is the gain control – it affects the relative volume of the track. By default it only lets you select multiples of 3 dB, but if you hold down shift you can choose any level. Be careful not to set it too high, or you can exceed the maximum volume of a track, which results in clipping.
****************
By the way… the ‘too high’ being referred to would probably be blowing out your ear drums even before the ‘safety catch’ clipping starts to kick in.
Don’t do that.
Just use low increments and all the GAIN boost does it make it EASIER to hear what is being said.
I’ve got Audacity (such a sweet program), and can boost the gain in general and specifically boost the 200-400 Hz range. While it tends to lower interference, I still have the same issues on the brain side of the ear (alas!), and don’t seem to parse the language any better. I’ll give it another try, though.
I think you were spot on about the “Wickenberg to fuel” part. I don’t hear “no need to act” or “write it down on a piece of paper.”
It would be interesting to know if EP still has access to the original files, and how they differ from what we have.
Sitta… yes… the (free) Audacity software is amazing. I have sound software here that costs thousands and thousands of dollars… but I still use Audacity for most things.
It is even BETTER at some things than anything money can (currently) buy.
Disclaimer: I am in no way associated with ‘Audacity’ or any of its software products. I am just a ‘user’.
My only other advice to try and ‘hear’ things that are ‘hard to hear’ is to simply set yourself up a ‘loop’ on that specific phrase… and then let it play over and over and over and over.
**
** Reply to Bob Powers post on May 11, 2014 at 7:49 am
>> Mr. Powers wrote…
>> When Fires Like this in WUI start running at structures the first thing
>> is to thro Air Tankers at the Fire.
>> The problem most times they don’t do any good except make
>> everybody feel like they at least did something.
>> It looks good to the public at least some one is doing something.
There is no doubt ( and we can now hear it for ourselves ) that the Air Support in Yarnell that day knew that most of the drops they were making weren’t doing much good and that it was just like (quote) “spittin’ at it”.
Just like ‘Hotshots’ ( and any FFs building line ) know about the ‘hauling chart’ which says that if flame-lengths are more than about three and one-hal feet they are basically ‘out of it’ and ‘wasting their time’… the AIR people know full well what their own ‘limitations’ are and when THEY are also, basically ‘out of it’.
But… that being said…
If you look at the AFTERMATH photos ( mostly the aerial ones ) following Sunday, June 30, 2013… there is also no doubt that in SOME places… that line of red stuff on the ground IS what ‘stopped’ or ‘diverted’ the fireline near some pretty critical areas of the town.
So I guess it’s really like that old adage that is often attributed to someone in the advertising industry…
“Half of what we do doesn’t do a damn bit of good.
The problem is knowing WHICH half.”
>> Mr. Powers also said…
>> Helicopters – When Fixed wing plains are on a fire Helicopter pilots
>> Monitor there Freq. And stay out of the way. They fly lower and are
>> assigned to specific areas. They maintain contact Air to Air.
>> That is why I said the 1 Helicopter flying that is mentioned may have
>> had an overhead in it that could have made the comment, and could
>> have over keyed Marsh DIV A call.
Since I don’t believe we have even near fully wrapped up the ‘discussion’ about whether the 1637 “That’s what we want!” transmission ever happened at all… or that if it did… whether it really was DIVSA Eric Marsh saying it…
…then this is a very important point.
It’s pretty much a given that there WAS no YHF fire overhead ‘in the air’ at the time this (supposed) 1637 transmission took place… but it really doesn’t matter if there was any ‘fire command’ in a chopper, or not.
Any chopper pilot could have made that transmission… and we KNOW there were at least TWO in the air right there around Yarnell at both 1633, when that ‘spot-on’ SEAT drop happened… and in the 1637 to 1639 timeframe when Steed’s first MADAY appeared. We can even HEAR these 2 choppers flying overhead in the Helmet-Cam video itself.
The recent ‘sidetrack’ of proving that Tom Story’s Canon EOS 1D was 36 minutes and 7 seconds BEHIND the REAL time that day is actually related to this 1637 transmission discussion… which is why it was good to ‘sidetrack’ and take care of that. Tom Story’s 7093 photos series seemed to show a VLAT drop at exactly 1639… the moment of Steed’s first MAYDAY. It was worth it to go off and verify that for no other reason than to prove that that is NOT the case… and that we CAN trust the Air-To-Air traffic completely for figuring out what Bravo 33 was REALLY doing in the 1637-1639 timeframe.
In the course of basically re-viewing and re-listening to EVERY Panebaker Air-Study video in order to nail down that Tom Story camera time offset… I happened to HEAR some things I hadn’t really heard before regarding HELICOPTERS and RETARDANT DROPS.
If you listen to all of the Panebaker Air Study videos… it is *NOT* unusual at all to hear someone in a helicopter ‘commenting’ on a retardant drop right after it happens.
You actually DO hear a lot of ‘unsolicited’ comments ( over Air-To-Ground channel ) such as “Spot-on!” or “Right on target!” or even one lengthy response from a chopper pilot after one of the VLAT drops on the NORTH end where he jumps in on Air-To-Ground right afterwards and says something like…
“This is 5Q Alpha in the hotbird’s seat with a front row view… and that was right on the money! Nice work!.”
So YES… it is actually MORE than likely that when Burfiend thought he heard DIVSA say “That’s exactly what we want”… that really just might have been one of the chopper pilots already in the air down there jumping in on Air-To-Ground and ‘confirming’ the ‘goodness’ of that spot-on 1633 SEAT drop.
So something like “That’s exactly what we want!” probably WAS actually said on the Air-To-Ground channel ( by SOMEONE who saw the spot-on 1633 SEAT drop )… but Burfiend was simply mis-remembering ( during his SAIT interview ) who said that around that time.
No definite PROOF ( yet )… but we’re getting closer.
I’d still love to know what Clint Clauson ( the THIRD guy onboard that Bravo 33 plane that afternoon ) actually thinks he did ( or didn’t ) hear.
While it is NOT unusual at ALL to hear these chopper pilots ‘commenting’ on a retardant drop… the KEY seems to always be that these ‘unsolicited’ verifying-goodness comments ONLY come AFTER a REAL DROP.
In other words… if you listen carefully to all of these sorts of ‘unsolicted’ verifying-goodness comments from the chopper pilots in the Panebaker videos… they NEVER comment on a ‘show me’ or on a ‘line up’ drop…
…and there’s a GOOD reason for that.
These guys are flying ‘show me’ and ‘go-around’ and ‘line-up’ flights basically ALL the time… and unless you are totally GLUED to the Air-To-Air channel yourself then you really can’t ever be sure when they are actually going to DROP… or NOT.
So the ONLY thing that warrants an unsolicited “That was spot-on!” or “That’s exactly what we want!” comment is when you have actually just SEEN them drop… and you are verifying the ‘goodness’ of that location for even MORE drops.
So that, I think, is even more ‘indirect’ proof that Marsh would NOT have just jumped onto the radio and come out of nowhere with an unsolicited “That’s exactly what we want!” transmission JUST because he *might* have accidentally saw ANYONE doing a ‘show me’ or a ‘practice run’.
Those kind of ‘unsolicited’ comments over Air-To-Ground usually ONLY happen AFTER a REAL DROP… and are simply meant to encourage ‘more of the same’ at that location.
So ( perhaps? ) just one more reason why if anyone really did say “That’s exactly what we want!” over the Air-To-Ground channel in the 1634 to 1637 timeframe… it really was just a ‘confirming goodness’ comment regarding the spot-on 1633 SEAT drop right there on the outskirts of Yarnell ( which Marsh himself could NOT have seen due to the smoke cloud between him and Yarnell in that timeframe ).
WTKTT I think you are right on with the above.
Also if the Helicopters were dropping water in the same area trying to hold the fire down, then they definitely would have commented on the tanker drop helping them out at a critical location.
The reason I keep referring to the 1633 SEAT drop there right on the outskirts of Yarnell is because that, in fact, seems to be exactly what everyone who saw it seemed to think. Burfiend and French seemed to think so and said so in their SAIT interview.
The drop went ‘right between the ‘fire’ and a ‘home’… which at THAT point is time is what was *really* needed.
This ‘cut’ from Bravo 33’s SAIT interview seems to be describing that exact drop… and the fact that it was just after this 1633 drop when Burfiend then turned his attention to Kevin in the DC10 VLAT and told him to ‘come on in now’ ( circa 1636 )…
__________________________________________
We decided we were going to go here (pointed to Div Z) and go direct. Took the single SEAT. Brand new pilot (830) went right between spot and the home. We brought the DC10 in…
___________________________________________
Sidenote: They obviously had MAPS at these SAIT interviews and there are several references in the interviews where people are said to have been ‘pointing at the map’.
It SURE would have been nice if copies of that maps ( with notations of where people were pointing ) were included in the SAIT FOIA/FOIL releases…
…but they weren’t.
If these ‘Interview notated maps’ even exist… then they are just even more documents that Arizona Forestry either just neglected to include in the FOIA/FOIL requests… or they ( for some reason ) decided to specifically ‘withhold’ them.
The ADOSH investigation did the RIGHT thing.
They had fresh copies of ‘maps’ at each and every interview and they were freely letting the interviewees ‘mark them up’ during their interviews to make locations and movements more clear…
…and ADOSH did INCLUDE those ‘interviewee notated maps’ in their FOIA/FOIL release(s).
You can listen ( or read ) along with the interviewee AND see the exact notes they were making DURING the interview on real maps.
I’d still love to know exactly WHERE Burfiend was pointing when his own SAIT interview notes say he was ‘pointing at a spot in Division Z’ and said “We went HERE”.
Whoops. I left the phrase “as SPOT-ON” out of the first paragraph above, which was really intended to be the whole point of the statement.
Here is how paragraph 1 above SHOULD have read…
“The reason I keep referring to the 1633 SEAT drop there right on the outskirts of Yarnell as SPOT-ON is because that, in fact, seems to be exactly what everyone who saw it seemed to think. Burfiend and French seemed to think so and said so in their SAIT interview.”
Glad you caught that. TBH I haven’t had much of a chance to even look at the Panebakers. And I’ve definitely been wondering how the helicopters communicated and with whom.
When I read the Interagency Fire Aviation Manual, it said there was supposed to be a “Helico,” a Helitanker Coordinator, somehow in communication with both Air Attack and Incident Command.
The 20130630_162300_SEAT_drop_EP video that is now known
to be BOGUS is just ONE of the Panebaker Air study videos that
‘precedes’ the 163700 one. It does not IMMEDIATELY precede it.
There are actually TWO others that come in-between 162300
and 163700… and they both appear to be exactly what they
say they are.
These are the actual ( Eric ) Panebaker Air Study videos
that cover the crucial 4:00 PM to 5:00 PM timeframe that day…
20130630_161858_VLAT_split_2_EP
20130630_162300_SEAT_drop_EP **** This is the BOGUS one
20130630_162508_2SEATS_EP
20130630_163338_fire_behavior_EP
20130630_163700_fire_behavior_EP
20130630_164544_fire_behavior_EP
20130630_170634_VLAT_EP
NOTE: The 20130630_161858_VLAT_split_2_EP video that precedes the one that is now know to be BOGUS is the one that captured the 4:16 PM “Granite Mountain… what’s your status right now?” query from from someone in fire command and Eric Marsh’s response about Granite Mountain “makin’ their way out the same escape route from this morning” and Marsh’s “just checkin’ it out to see where we gonna jump out at” transmission.
ALSO NOTE: The ‘EP’ initials in these Air Study video filenames all stand for ‘Eric Panebaker’.
If the 20130630_162300_SEAT_drop_EP video ( as released by the SAIT in response to FOIA/FOIL requests ) does NOT contain the same content as the original… then HE would certainly know.
The Az Republic ran another piece on the Yarnell evacuations yesterday. Turns out only 1 in 8 persons received an automated call, and most of those involved no human-to-human contact, i.e. just left a message. Also the article says there was a 21 minute delay in sending out the notifications (I am assuming from the time the decision was made sometime after 3:30). May account for why people said they were notified around 4:08. Also there was no one hour notice, just “get out now”. In a disaster nothing ever works as it supposed to, but the evacuations that day seemed particularly bad. I still wonder the extent to which the flawed evacuations that day affected firefighting decisions in the time after 3:30.
I can imagine it might have had something to do with Abel, Cordes, et al, not paying enough attention to what Granite Mountain was doing until it was too late……
Maybe their attention was diverted. But I was asking more in how it might have affected tactical decisions.
One thing struck me recently. GM was aware of the evacuations situation. When the fire started running at Yarnell, I believe it was Scott Norris who texted “the fire is running right at Yarnell”. Yet I also think it was he (I’m pretty sure, maybe it was someone else) who texted “and the evacuations have just started”. Maybe it was a throwaway comment, not something they were making decisions based on. But it shows, that even for an experienced crew member, it was on their minds.
The evacuation situation should not have impacted safety considerations. But human nature being what it is, I wonder if it colored the way people looked at risk that afternoon.
Actually… it was Wade Parker’s final text message sent to his mother with a network timestamp of 4:04 PM that had those references in it.
Wade’s complete text message was…
“This thing is running straight for yarnel. jus starting to evac. you can see fire on the left town on right. DO NOT POST THIS ON FACEBOOK OR ANY OTHER SOCIAL MEDIA DEAL!!!!”
There was some discussion, early on ( even on this forum ) about what Wade really meant when he said “jus starting to evac”.
The discussion(s) were addressing the possibility that Wade’s statement could be taken one of two ways…
1) He was telling his mother that HE ( and the other Granite Mountain fellas ) were ‘just starting’ THEIR ‘evacuation’ of their position. As in… just now leaving the safe black.
2) He was telling his mother that YARNELL was only now starting to evacuate.
I believe the consensus back then was that Wade probably meant number 2… mostly because the people with WFF experience were in agreement that Parker probably wouldn’t even use the word ‘evacuation’ to describe their OWN movements or ‘relocation’ efforts.
So if it really was number 2 above… then YES… that is full proof that even the line crew up there ( and not just management like Marsh/Steed ) were fully aware that ‘get out now’ evacuations had been ordered down there in town… but they were also NOT aware that they had been ‘ordered’ by SPGS1 Gary Cordes some 24 mnutes BEFORE that… at 1540.
With regard to how this ‘knowledge’ affected their own decision making… I’m SURE it had SOMETHING to do with either of the following…
1) Management putting pressure on them to get to town as fast as they could ( Sic: Someone in management appears to actually be telling them to HURRY in the YARNELL-GAMBLE video ).
2) If there was no management pressure at all… then it still probably made them ‘rethink’ their already stated plan to remain in the safe black. They ( Steed and/or Marsh ) just didn’t want to accept the fact that they were ‘out of the game’ and weren’t going to be able to be ‘where the action was’… and this urge on their part made them totally forget that their PRIMARY responsibility was the *SAFETY* of ALL of the employees in their charge.
SIDENOTE: A lot has been discussed about what GOOD anyone might have even thought 19 guys with hand tools and no actual structural firefighting equipment could have even been able to do that day… or what their ‘assignment’ might have been even if they made it down there.
It is perfectly possible that even if management requested them to ‘come down’… that no one really had anything specific in mind for them to do at all… at least not at the time the request was made.
Management might have just ‘wanted them to be there’ and was going to figure out what to do with them AFTER they arrived.
This would actually match OPS1 Todd Abel’s thinking with regards to Type 1 Hotshots.
In his ADOSH interview… the ADOSH investigators went over the situation with the Blue Ridge Hotshots with OPS1 Todd Abel and how they just bounced around most of the morning with nothing to do and only being told to ‘stage’ at 3 different places before anyone even gave them any kind of ‘assignment’.
Todd Abel’s OWN explanation for all of that was that he was ‘busy’ that morning… but knew that he just wanted to have a Type 1 Hotshot crew in (quote) “My back pocket in case I needed them”.
Actual (full) quote from Abel about this in his ADOSH interview was…
__________________________________________
So we went down there, uh, after the briefing ran into, um, Blue Ridge out there, um, and they said hey, what would you like us to do? I said hey, why don’t you guys go stage at the school. I’m not sure exactly where I wanna put you guys yet. But I wanted that hotshot crew in my back pocket.
__________________________________________
Granted… that was ‘start of work day’, pretty much, and Abel really *was* ‘very busy’ at that point. It then took Abel almost an HOUR to get all the various engines and crews that were showing up assigned to various places.
However… I’m sure the ‘evacuation cycle’ was just as busy ( and confusing ) when it hit later on… and there might have been no other reason for asking GM to ‘come down’ ( and to HURRY ) than the same sort of “I just wanted Hotshots in my back pocket” mentality.
I would really hate to think that that is the reason why 19 good men died… just because someone wanted them ‘in their back pocket’ but would have ended up just letting them stand around in a parking lot like they did with the OTHER Type 1 Hotshot crew that was ALREADY THERE… .and totally available.
Mike, I absolutely believe that it does. Absolutely. 100%.
(I made a comment on IM long ago about this point and about the demographics of Yarnell/Glen Ilah, and, not surprisingly, I took a fair amount of pushback. It is clear from at least one ADOSH interview that leaps readily to mind that Dave Larson (or someone…) was on the same wavelength, for whatever that is worth. I’m not suggesting the GM guys SHOULD have tried to go to the BSR or wherever, but I am saying that they strike me as a bunch of men who were likely to want to try (if safely possible) help a vulnerable population. Human nature is what it is, and a lot of guys become wildfire professionals because they CARE.)
Elizabeth… I don’t think there is any question in the world that these were men who were ‘likely to try’ to help people. The pay wasn’t good enough to stick with that kind of work for any other reason…
…but ( as I think we have seen )… it is, in fact, possible to care TOO MUCH… if those urges make you forget the rules of your profession and take unnecessary risks with the very LIVES of the employees you are responsible for.
This applies to MANY professions… and not just firefighting.
Yes… they CARED.
But why did TWO of those men care SO much that they forgot the ‘rules’ of their profession *AND* what their PRIMARY responsibilities were… and it ended up
killing all 19?
This is the primary question that still remains to be answered.
The Republic, which I gather takes a fair amount of grief at times, continues to write on this story. This is at least the second significant piece they have done on the evacuations, both well after the incident. They have never tried to link the evacuations to the deaths of the GMHS, but I do think the delayed evacuation impacted some decision-making.
The Yavapai sheriff’s office basically said the evacuations were not perfect, but were good enough as no residents died or were seriously injured. I have a lot of problems with that thinking. First of all, there were near misses with residents. Second, I think some firefighters were left too long at the head of the fire west of town and there were apparently near misses there too. I think there was some reluctance to pull them out because they were trying to buy time. And finally, we may never know for sure the degree to which knowledge of the tardy evacuations impacted Granite Mountain’s actions. Maybe it played no role, but they knew of it and then they did something inexplicable. The questions about what could they have done, about what actions they thought they could do, are good ones. Maybe though they just felt the need to be “available”, to help if needed. Yes, they needed to say put, but am trying to fathom their thought process.
Anyways, those in charge of evacuations should not conclude the process was “adequate”, just because no residents were killed or injured.
>> mike said…
>> The Republic, which I gather
>> takes a fair amount of grief at
>> times, continues to write on
>> this story.
As well they should ( continue to write about this historic, tragic incident ).
>> mike also said…
>> They have never tried to link the
>> evacuations to the deaths of the
>> GMHS, but I do think the delayed
>> evacuation impacted some
>> decision-making.
Of course it did.
Suddenly… EVERYTHING was an EMERGENCY.
That affects EVERYONE involved *and* their decision making.
It ( the total chaos which created this sense of total EMERGENCY in a very short span of time ) could have been AVOIDED. No question.
The moment that thing marched right through that heavy retardant line like it wasn’t even THERE ( hundreds of yards north of even Cordes’ FIRST trigger point )… it didn’t take a genius to figure out there wasn’t much that was going to stop it. The Big Dog was going to just EAT. Get everyone OUT OF THE WAY. Like RIGHT NOW.
>> mike also said…
>> The questions about what could
>> they have done, about what
>> actions they thought they could
>> do, are good ones. Maybe though
>> they just felt the need to be
>> “available”, to help if needed.
Yes. Maybe having some Type 1 Hotshots in Yarnell in/around the time the ONLY thing to be doing was a total evacuation *might* have helped… and maybe that *was* what they were ‘thinking’…
…but just ONE quick call on the radio to discover that there were ALREADY 20 Elite Type 1 Hotshots right there ‘in the middle of the action’… with NO ONE giving them *ANY* assignment(s) whatsoever would have answered that question in their minds… toot-sweet.
That radio call never happened.
IMHO… It should have.
Even if they were half-way there… if they had discovered there wasn’t anything they were even going to be ALLOWED to do if they got all the way there ( just like Blue Ridge wasn’t being allowed to do anything at that time but *be safe* )… they could have TURNED BACK. There would still have been TIME to do that.
>> mike also said…
>> Anyways, those in charge of
>> evacuations should not conclude
>> the process was “adequate”, just
>> because no residents were killed
>> or injured.
No, they most certainly should NOT.
That’s just more ‘establishment of normalcy’ and ‘prior bad decisions with good outcomes’ crap.
Own it. Learn from it.
Find out what OTHER small Arizona towns don’t have a working siren at the fire station because the rats have chewed through the wires….
…then FIX it. ASAP.
Find out what OTHER small Arizona towns have never done a ‘reverse 911’ test to see if it is even going to work when the time comes…
…and do a TEST.
See if it IS going to work.
This is NOT rocket science.
** Regarding INJURIES…
There has ALWAYS been confusion and mis-reporting about that.
The LA Times and USA Today BOTH initially reported that in addition to the 19 fatalities… 22 other ‘firefighters and civilians’ were injured that afternoon.
Their own articles even stated that some of the ‘injured’ had to be flown to burn units because the nearby Congress hospital couldn’t handle them.
2 days later… the AP press was then reporting that there were NO serious injuries other than the 19 fatalities.
To this day, however, the Wikipedia page for the Yarnell Hill Fill is still ‘sticking to the story’ that there were MANY ‘others’ injured that day and they upped the number to 23.
The current ( active ) Wikipedia Page for the Yarnell Hill Fire is basically an absolute JOKE… but this is what their very OFFICIAL looking ‘information box’ about the Yarnell Hill Fire has said from day one and it has NEVER been ‘corrected’ by anyone…
Wikipedia
The Yarnell Hill Fire http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yarnell_Hill_Fire
______________________________
Location: Yarnell, Yavapai County, Arizona, U.S.
Coord: 34°14′54″N, 112°45′29″W
Date(s): June 28, 2013 – July 10, 2013
Burned area: 8,400 acres
Ignition source: Lightning
Land use: Mixed (residential/wildlands)
Buildings destroyed: 129
Fatalities: 19
Injuries (non-fatal): 23
______________________________
There are also (apparently) claims of ‘personal injuries’ in MANY of the 100+ claims that have been filed by property owners… but no one has done an actual ‘tally’ on that number.
Gary Cordes himself ( according to his own ADOSH interview ) was putting people into the backs of ambulances that afternoon… but there was no good followup on any of that, either.
So whether there *really* were any ‘injuries’ other than the 19 fatalities still remains a bit a mystery… but what else is new when it comes to YHF.
From the article…
________________________
Eight of the 22 firefighters injured were taken to Wickenburg Community Hospital, some were airlifted to a burn unit in Pheonix, and others were transported to Yavapai Regional Medical Center, Glover said. The 19 firefighters who perished were part of the Granite Mountain Hot Shot Crew.
_________________________
This article lists ( and has links to ) what they say are their TWO sources for the article…
Roxie Glover. Wow, have not seen that name for awhile. Fine woman. Amazing mother. Wow. I am looking at the link now: http://guardianlv.com/2013/06/arizona-19-firefighters-dead-and-22-injured-battling-the-yarnell-hill-fire/
That photo is a picture of Bob Kramer’s place off highway 89 that the only thing that survived in his burnt fridge was a case of beer. You can see Bob on my photo area-
Who was injured in that fire?
Tex and I were just skimming and Joy saw Roxie’s name and that photo of Bob’s place and we are out hiking Zion country- God’s country for a bit and away from civilization but it was nice to see the forum going strong. Tex wondered has anyone looked into the ACTUAL DATE that restricted map was made for state land restriction for that area that is currently restricted (340 acres) beyond the Helm’s spot. Anyone know how to find that out? That lady in the red cross showed us a map that matched the map we got in an email mid July 2013. It is not being looked into much but we are wondering as time went by that Tex (Sonny) awoke at 3am this morning thinking of the 19 and that map and other areas. Has anyone new come out on photos/videos locally to help? I guess I will know when I keep skimming. Short on time. Skim for 10 minutes then off I have to go- Hope all you are well.
~Joy A. Collura
From the article…
________________________
Roxie Glover, a spokeswoman for Wickenburg Community Hospital, said officials had told her to expect injured firefighters — but then she was told they weren’t coming.
“It became clear that the firefighters had been deceased,” Glover told The LA Times. “We were told that we were not getting firefighters.”
Glover said officials told her that the 19 firefighters who had perished were part of the Granite Mountain Hot Shot Crew.
At least two (other) firefighters were evacuated by helicopter to a burn center in Phoenix, she said.
Glover said homeowners had flooded into the hospital, suffering from smoke inhalation and shock after losing their homes.
________________________
From the article…
________________________
Wickenburg Community Hospital is expecting to treat about eight firefighters who were among about 22 injured battling the fast-moving, 2,000-acre Yarnell Hill Fire that has burned through have the town, officials said Sunday evening.
The spokeswoman for Wickenburg hospital, Roxie Glover, said there are reports of as many as 22 firefighters being injured. About eight from that group were headed to the Wickenberg facility, some were being air lifted to a Phoenix burn unit and others were being transported to Yavapai Regional Medical Center, Glover said.
Jim Tavary, CEO of Wickenburg hospital, said his facility was put on alert to expect several injured firefighters but did not know their conditions or the extent of their injuries.
“We are setting up an incident command,” Tavary said.
Homes have burned and hospitals have reported injuries from the blaze that had reached Yarnell.
_________________________
And the SAIT and some others still think the Type II team did a good job. When a Cluster F*** starts it just acts like a rolling snow ball it gets bigger and bigger.
Poor planning, poor Safety and poor execution total lack of situation awareness.
Also why would any one think they could through a crew at the head of a running fire and do any thing? That includes Marsh and GM. Why would they think they could do something that no other Hand Crew has ever been able to do.
For all of you who have never fought fire….Direct attack starts by flanking the fire not taking it head on and pinching the head off. The running fire that afternoon was just plain get out of the way. To much fire and no place to make a stand, or no defensible space to protect structures. Evidenced by Fire Fighters Injuries (burns).
** TOM STORY’S CANON EOS 1D CAMERA WAS
** 36 MINUTES AND 7 SECONDS BEHIND THE
** REAL TIME ON JUNE 30, 2013.
Tom Story’s ‘Canon EOS 1D Mark II N’ camera had an incorrect time setting on June 30, 2013 that was always 36 minutes and 7 seconds BEHIND the REAL time.
The proof of this comes from comparing the following two images of the same VLAT drop ( One that Tom Story took and one that Panebaker took ) which took place circa 1715.28 on the NORTH side of the fire, along Hays Ranch Road in Peeples Valley.
Tom Story’s 201303_Yarnell_Hill_7093
*and*
Panebaker’s 20130630_171528-1_EP
BOTH of these photos show the same exact VLAT drop and were taken no more than 1 second apart, so the *known* correct timestamp on the Panebaker photo can simply be applied to the Tom Story photo, and used to compute the ‘time offset’ for Story’s ‘Canon EOS 1D’ that day.
Here is a VIDEO CROSSFADE between these two photos which PROVES that they are of the same VLAT drop and taken within 1 second of each other…
YouTube About Information
_________________________________________________________________
This is a video crossfade between the following two photographs…
Tom Story’s 201303_Yarnell_Hill_7093 *and*
Panebaker’s 20130630_171528-1_EP
They are BOTH still photos of the same DC10 VLAT drop that took place circa 1715.27 ( 5:15.27 PM ) up on the NORTH side of the fire along Hays Ranch Road in Peeples Valley.
Tom Story shot his photo with a ‘Canon EOS 1D Mark II N’ camera with a 300mm f/2.8L Lens attached.
Panebaker shot his photo with a ‘Canon EOS REBEL T3i’ camera with a 15-85mm f/3.5-5.6 Lens attached.
The TIME on Tom Story’s ‘Canon EOS 1D’ was set incorrectly that day and it put an EXIF metadata timestamp on his 7093 photo of 4:39.21 PM. The actual time it was taken ( based on this comparison with the correctly-timestamped Panebaker photo ) is 5:15.28 PM.
That means that Story’s ‘Canon EOS 1D’ was always 36 minutes and 7 seconds BEHIND the REAL time on June 30, 2013.
The absolute proof that these are two photos of the same VLAT drop is really in the SMOKE cloud on the left side of both photos. It remains absolutely identical during the ‘crossfade’ between the two photos.
__________________________________________________________________
** MORE DETAIL…
Panebaker wasn’t just shooting videos that day.
Every time there was a VLAT drop… Panebaker also used his ‘Canon EOS REBEL T3i’ digital camera to shoot the drops ( these are all the ‘shutter clicks’ being heard in the Panebaker VIDEOS.
Those photos are in the online Dropbox in this folder…
Photos and Video / AerialFirefightingstudy / Panebaker / Photo / VLAT Drops
ONE of Panebaker’s photos of that 5:15.27 PM VLAT drop on the NORTH side of the fire is an almost perfect match for Tom Story’s 7093 photo.
Filename: 20130630_171528-1_EP
EXIF metadata for this Panebaker still image…
Camera: Canon EOS REBEL T3i
Lens: Canon EF-S 15-85mm f/3.5-5.6 IS USM
Lens 2: Shot at 85 mm
Exposure: Auto exposure, Program AE, 1/128 sec, f/5.6, ISO 320
Flash: Off, Did not fire
Focus: AI Servo AF, with a depth of field of from 59.7 m to 15.84 m.
Focus 2: AF Area Mode: Multi-point AF or AI AF
Date: June 30, 2013 – 5:15:27 PM
File: 3,456 × 5,184 JPEG (17.9 megapixels)
The EXIF timestamp of 5:15.27 PM ( 1715.27 ) matches the filename title of 171528 ( filename title is 1 second ahead of EXIF timestamp ).
Tom Story took 3 photos of this same moment of the same drop with his Canon EOS 1D.
All THREE have the same exact timestamp so he must have had his ‘auto-shutter’ motor on, leaned on the shutter button, and just took three photos as fast as the camera would take them.
NOTE: The 4:39.21 timestamps are according to HIS Canon EOS 1D but that is the issue. We know these timestamps are not correct. The KEY was finding out what the real ‘time offset’ was that day.
NOTE: His Canon EOS 1D was not ‘stuck’ on 4:39.21. His photos of the rest of this VLAT drop are stamped with the correct incremental seconds values like 4:39.22 and 4:39.23, etc. He really did take these 3 photos all in the same ‘second’ at 4:39.21.
The FIRST one ( 7093 ) is the best ‘exact match’ for the same photo in the Panebaker Air Study Video ‘Photos’ folder.
In-between the Panebaker and Tom Story photo, the DC10 has, in fact, advanced about 1 plane length.
That means that while both of these photos were taken at almost the same moment… the Panebaker image was actually shot FIRST.
Given the rate of movement as seen and timestamped in other photos/videos of this VLAT drop… I would say that only 1 second has elapsed between when Panebaker pressed his shutter button and then Tom Story pressed his.
So.. since the actual EXIF timestamp for this photo is 1715.27… that puts a REAL timestamp on Story’s 7093 photo of…
1715.28 ( 5:15.28 PM ).
The difference, then, between the ACTUAL time Tom Story’s 7093 photo was taken and the incorrect 4:39.21 PM that his Canon 1D ‘stamped’ it would be…
+36 minutes and 7 seconds. ( 1715.28 minus 1639.21 ).
BOTTOM LINE: This PROVES that there was NO VLAT DROP on the SOUTH side of the fire at 4:39 PM that day, which is what Tom Story’s photos seemed to suggest. That would have meant there was a DC10 VLAT drop taking place at the exact moment that Captain Jesse Steed was making his first MAYDAY call.
That is why it was IMPORTANT to figure out WHY Tom Story’s photos might have been suggesting such a drop at that time.
It didn’t happen.
He ( Tom Story ) simply had the TIME set WRONG on his Canon EOS 1D.
You sent me to the Google to do a little Canon 1D History!! Shows how much I pay attention to cameras that cost five times more than I can even contemplate affording!
That is NOT a new camera!! The 1D Mark ii n came out in 2005!! It was about $4000 then. Google shows one on ebay today for $790.
HOWEVER the 1D’s have always been considered the fastest cameras on the market. They’re the supreme sports photography cameras. It wasn’t STUCK on a second. It could shoot 8.5 frames per second. The current 1D Mark iv can shoot 10 frames per second. Tom’s 5D Mark ii’s can only shoot 4 frames per second. And the 1D is a 1.3 crop frame, a little smaller than full frame, which gives it more “reach.”
That’s why when you watch the Olympics the 1D is what most of the photographers are using. So when Tom wanted a combination of speed and reach, that’s when he went for the relatively ancient but still awesome 1D.
Actually Tom shot 21 frames of that whole drop. The first being at x:xx:18. The last being at x:xx:29. There are at least nine frames that he shot that he didn’t put into that folder.
So now that means possibly having to go back to McCord’s VLAT-helicopter-almost-fiasco video and seeing if that possibly changes its timing (and thus the rest of his coolpix images). It might and it might not. And it may not matter in the general scheme of things.
And PS. I’ve been using Canon Rebels since 2007. I currently use the t3i. It’s the most popular “non-professional” dslr on the planet. I have a three-day “how to shoot video with your dslr” class beginning today. So I may not be around too much.
Have you seen the Tom Story photos that DO actually have some GPS information in them?… but that GPS data is totally screwed up?
I find that very unusual. Usually these GPS chipsets in these devices either WORK… or they don’t.
There is always a ‘startup time’ for GPS if you have just turned the device on and sometimes you won’t be getting truly ACCURATE GPS coordinates until you have acquired at least 4 or 5 of the LEO ( Low Earth Orbit ) satellites…
…but Tom Story’s GPS capable device ( I have no idea what camera that really was ) just seems BROKEN.
It’s also VERY unusual that, in the EXIF data for these GPS stamped photos of his, there is no CAMERA or DEVICE information whatsoever.
Very unusual.
Sometimes the CAMERA or DEVICE Model number or ID is one of the ONLY things a cheap camera will add as EXIF data… but I’ve never seen a device that is adding other sophisticated EXIF data ( like GPS )… but also seems to be REFUSING to add any actual CAMERA or DEVICE information.
So it wasn’t a Canon…
and it wasn’t an iPhone or an iPad.
I have NO IDEA what camera he was using for those (incorrectly) stamped GPS photos.
It was some kind of smartphone pic that he was posting to Instagram. I’m such a bozo re smartphones.
But I’ve looked at LOTS of various smartphone pix from this fire, and the way they get tagged and time stamped is all over the boards. And we had a discussion way back when about how the geotagging etc could be easily way off. It takes awhile for that to set itself up.
I’ve seen LOTS of smartphone geotagging from this fire that is also all over the boards. I haven’t come to expect any kind of accuracy on any of this stuff at all.
**
** MORE ON THE TOM STORY CANON EOS 1D PHOTO TIMESTAMPS
** AND THE (SUPPOSED) VLAT DROP AT 1639
Reply to Marti Reed post on May 11, 2014 at 8:54 am said:
>> Marti said…
>> I had downloaded a smattering of photos from both folders, but
>> just kinda randomly. Just downloaded a bunch more,
>> more strategically. Looks like he photographed three VLAT drops.
Yes, it does.
>> Marti also said…
>> I’m starting to think he set up that camera quickly, just setting the
>> date, and not the time. Thus the stamp when first shot a frame on
>> it would have been 00:00:00. I don’t know if I have the time to figure
>> out what to synch on. But if I can pin one of those VLATs, it might
>> be possible to nail it.
>>
>> That being said, I’m currently thinking that drop might be the 1707ish
>> one. I just don’t know where he took it from. I don’t know where that
>> drop was, exactly. Do you?
I’ve been hard working on that here ( the actual LOCATION of that VLAT drop in
the Tom Story Canon EOS 1D photos ) and I can almost say with little doubt
that regardless of he 4:39 timestamp(s)… that is actually EXACTLY where
we see the Air Study people filming those earlier VLAT drops off on that
small ridge at the NORTH end of the fire… up in Peeples Valley.
So YES… regardless of device timestamp… it looks like that 4:39 series
of photos coming from Ton Story’s ‘Canon EOS 1D Mark II N’ are of the
SAME VLAT DROPS captured in the Panebaker videos… much earlier.
Exactly WHICH Panebaker video is a match?
I am on that right now… taking stillframes from Panebaker videos and
comparing them to the Tom Story photo(s).
>> Marti also wrote…
>> If it was visible from the RHR parking lot, he could have caught
>> it w/that 300mm easily.
Yes… but see above. It looks like those photos were taken all the
way up NORTH of the same VLAT drop(s) seen in the Panebaker
Air Study videos.
It even looks like Tom Story might have been standing almost exactly
where the Air Study group was and using his 300mm lens from there.
>> Marti Reed also said ( on May 11, 2014 at 9:19 am )…
>>
>> Hah! I just found what looks like a tight sequence of the same event,
>> using both a Mark D and the 1D! It’s the red and white helicopter
>> picking up a bucket at the helispot and heading into the smoke…
>> Looks good…more later….
Bingo! I agree. That looks like the ‘moment’ when he decided to
actually switch between the 5D and the 1D.
>> Marti also said…
>> OK, if this helicopter sequence shows the 1D is set about 20 minutes
>> late, that would put the problematic VLAT drop at 4:17– the split drop.
Yes. This is starting to fall into place now.
That VLAT drop (supposedly) photographed by Tom Story with his
Canon 1D at 4:39 PM ( the exact minute of Steed’s first MAYDAY )
looks more and more like simply one of the same VLAT drops that
happened much earlier and captured by one of the Panebaker videos.
Still not *EXACTLY* sure it was the 4:17 ‘split drop’ video… but I am
all over that and will have some results of my own soon about that.
Bcuz, I wrote mistakenly below that he shot the second T 911 sequence (the one Blue Ridge was capturing with the almost helicopter snafu) on on the Mark D II. He actually shot it on the D1. And the first image is stamped 2:00:23. If you pull that stamp back 22 minutes (like I think you need to with the long two-camera helicopter and the third sequence) that puts it at 1:38:23. Right when it would be flying out of that drop. I think we’ve got it. At least good enough for well, what we need. If some overpaid lawyer’s crew wants to get more exact, that’s fine with me!!!!
That Tom Story VLAT sequence which *appears* to have been taken at 4:39 PM ( according to his Canon 1D ) was definitely shot almost exactly where the Panebaker Air Study videos were being taken up on Hays Ranch Road some time earlier and looking WEST at the SEAT / VLAT drops.
** Panebaker Air Study video
** 20130630_161858_VLAT_split_2_EP
The ‘focus’ starts out fine in this video, but at about +7 seconds, when the ZOOM starts to capture the actual VLAT drop, the focus goes blurry, recovers a little, but never really returns to ‘sharp’ focus the whole time it is ZOOMED…
…EXCEPT for a brief moment at exactly +20 seconds. He recovers ‘sharp’ focus while ZOOMED for just a split second, but then loses it again.
A freeze-frame of that split-second when it is both ZOOMED and in ‘sharp focus’ proves that the terrain matches the Tom Story photos exactly… right down to the trees on the ridge in the foreground.
The ‘terrain’ in both the foreground and the background is, in fact, an ‘exact match’ for the Tom Story Canon EOS 1D photo sequence.
Now… is Tom’s photo sequence simply ‘stillframes’ of this same exact VLAT drop shown in this Panebaker video?
Not 100 percent on that yet.
There are similarities… but not seeing an ‘exact match’ yet.
Stay tuned. Tom was apparently in a slightly different spot on the side of Hays Ranch road than the Air Study fellas so the ‘perspective’ on the drop is slightly different. The ‘retardant’ in the Panebaker video seems to fall much farther ‘into the smoke’ than is shown in Tom’s photo sequence…
…but the DC10’s ‘hard left on exit’ is a MATCH in both the video and Tom’s photo sequence.
I’m still comparing stillframes from this Panebaker video to the Tom Story photo(s) to see if we can get this down to an EXACT time offset for Story’s Canon 1D.
The one thing we know for SURE now… is that Story’s Canon 1D photo is *NOT* a photograph of any VLAT drop that was happening at 1639, at the same exact time Steed’s first MAYDAY went out.
I actually accidentally downloaded the USDA 1640 Air Study video yesterday, intending to download the later one. So I sat and watched it three times, just to get familiar with the jargon, the planes, the kind of communication going on. It’s a really helpful one to watch, because there is a LOT of stuff going on right in front of the camera. The one after it with the air 2 air of the 1633 drop and the 1647 whatever is not as good, because they don’t zoom in so you can’t really see anything, like the Panebaker does with that 1633 drop.
So, yeah, I watched the VLAT split drop quite handily three times over. So when I went to recheck those photos I instantly recognized the spot. That smoke to the left is over the helicopter “horseshoe dip.”
I think he’s at a different angle from the videos, although I haven’t watched the Panebakers, they’re still……..down…..loading.
With that 300 mm lens, it’s hard to tell, but when the plane lifts, it’s right over his head. And I don’t know whether this is the first or second drop, and i’m not sure it’s possible to tell. The plane was flying the exact same path, just dropping at the “front” end (which is actually called the “tail” because its the last part dropped) and extending it.
You can really get a much better grasp on it by watching the USDA video with the air 2 air. Very detailed conversation going on.
Finding that overlapping helicopter sequence was like a HAPPY Mother’s Day Gift, believe me. Thanks Tom Story!!
It also confirmed that my re-time-stamping of McCord’s camera was not terribly off, which I wasn’t sure of. Things could be several minutes off, but it looks like I’ve got all of this basically synced.
Update: It appears that the VLAT drop captured
in the Panebaker Air Study video titled…
20130630_161858_VLAT_split_2_EP
…is NOT the VLAT drop in Tom Story’s Volume 2
photo sequence.
In Tom’s photo sequence… we see the VLAT in ‘level flight’ at the peak of retardant output.
In the Panebaker 161858 video… pretty much at NO TIME during the drop is the DC10 actually in ‘level flight’. That video basically shows him dropping in a ‘constant curve’ and already heading to his left before the ‘cutoff’ moment.
The VLAT drop Tom Story photographed makes the same kind of ‘hard left on exit’ after drop… but definitely came in straighter ( and lower ) than the drop seen in the Panebaker video.
So on to the USDA videos.
Probably a more likely ‘match’ there…
…but we are still NOT WRONG about LOCATION.
Tom Story definitely photographed a VLAT drop at that same location as these Air Study videos… onto that ridge up there off Hays Ranch Road in Peeples Valley.
Thanks. It has to be one of those drops. Because there aren’t that many VLAT drops, and ONLY drop in that location is the split drop. So it’s the other drop. It has to be.
Yeah, go watch the USDA video. And actually the entire Panebaker 3-part sequence.
Marti… just an FYI… see posts below about helicopters. In the course of watching these Air Study videos all over again I’ve found at least one more ( so far ) very *NEAR MISS* between a fixed-wing and a helicopter.
This one looked even CLOSER than the skycrane versus DC10 one earlier in the day.
It’s in Panebaker Air Study video
20130630_153414_EP at the
+11 second mark.
Lead plane is on a line-up from east to west parallel to Hays Ranch Road… but a chopper with a bucket is coming up on a south to north line on the OTHER side of the smoke cloud.
Chopper crosses RIGHT in front of the lead plane at exact same altitude with only a few seconds to spare.
Reply to Marti Reed post
on May 11, 2014 at 9:04 pm
>> Marti said…
>> It has to be one of those drops.
>> Because there aren’t that many
>> VLAT drops, and ONLY drop in
>> that location is the split drop.
>> So it’s the other drop. It has to be.
It is. ( the 5:15 VLAT drop up along Hays Ranch Road on the NORTH side of the fire ).
Totally confirmed.
See new post above including a new
VIDEO CROSSFADE on YouTube
that proves it.
Story’s Canon EOS 1D was always 36 minutes and 7 seconds BEHIND the REAL time that day.
**
** CLINT CLAUSON ( ATS TRAINEE FLYING IN BRAVO 33 )
** RECORDED THE TIME OF STEED’S FIRST MAYDAY?
As long as we are still sort of ‘focused’ on these *VERY* confusing SAIT interview notes with Bravo 33… I think it’s worth pointing out something else.
When the SAIR came out… it was astounding how *LITTLE* information they were providing with regards to ‘sources’ for the narrative timeline and other (supposedly) ‘factual’ statements they were making.
ONE of those things has always been…
How did they arrive at a time of 1639 for Steed’s first MAYDAY call?
They just published that time as FACT… and there wasn’t even a ‘footnote’ to indicate how they arrived at that (specific) time.
Sure… a LOT of people HEARD this call… but no one seemed to be SURE what TIME it really was.
The SAIT also already knew about Aaron Hulburd’s Helmet-Cam video and this is obviously where they were taking a lot of what was then SAID and ‘paraphrasing’ it in their SAIR report…. but they also knew they were NOT going to release that Helmet-Cam video to the public along with the report…
…but ( as we know now )… the TIMESTAMPS on Aaron Hulburd’s Helmet-Cam device were also a little ‘wonky’ that day and not entirely accurate.
So how did the SAIT really ‘nail down’ the 1639 time for Steed’s Mayday?
The answer might be the SECOND SENTENCE of their later-released interview with Bravo 33 in their SAIT Investigation Notes .
__________________________________________________________________
SAIT INTERVIEW WITH BRAVO 33 – July 9, 2013 – 1700
Interviewees: Bravo 33
John Burfiend – ATS Specialist ( Air Attack duties / Monitoring Air-To-Ground )
Clint Clauson – ATS Trainee
Thomas French – AT Specialist ( Pilot, Lead Plane / Monitoring Air-To-Air )
SAIT Interviewers: Dudley, Mayhew, Foley, Kurth, Rocha
We were ordered as lead air attack to relieve Bravo 3.
Clint did record a few times on air tankers departing and
when the frantic call was made.
_________________________________________________________________
This mysterious ‘Clint Clauson’ person is never “quoted” at all in the interview ( or never even asked any questions? )…. but this SECOND sentence in the interview notes DOES establish that he seemed to be ‘writing some TIMES down’ that day… INCLUDING the moment of Steed’s first (frantic) MAYDAY call.
I would also say this one sentence in the SAIT notes also pretty much
establishes all of the following…
1) Clint Clauson was onboard as an ‘ATS Trainee’. Burfiend is listed as ‘ATS’ and French is only listed as ‘AT’… so that means Clauson was most probably ‘mentoring’ with Burfiend that day and NOT French.
2) If Clauson was ‘mentoring’ with only Burfiend… then that means Clauson would probably ALSO have been listening to the same radio channel Burfiend was. That means Clauson was listening exclusively to the ‘Air-To-Ground’ channel and was hearing everything that Burfiend was (including Steed’s first MAYDAY in real time).
3) Clauson apparently WROTE DOWN the TIME they heard Steed’s first MAYDAY call ( described in SAIT notes as ‘the frantic call’ ). As in… on a piece of PAPER.
4) Even though Clauson apparently was never asked anything by the SAIT investigators and there is no record of him ever SAYING anything in the interview… the notes still imply that Clauson might have given them a ‘document’ or a ‘piece of paper’ that had these TIMES that he recorded written on it. If so… that document was NOT included in the SAIT FOIA/FOIL package and ( if it exists ) is just one more document that would seem to have been *withheld* by Arizona Forestry from legitimate ( legal ) FOIA/FOIL requests. We already KNOW that Arizona Forestry *DID* withhold any number of documents. Maybe this ‘piece of paper’ from Clauson is simply one of those ‘withheld’ documents.
So… REGARDLESS of whether there was an actual DOCUMENT ( or copy of
one ) handed by Clauson to the SAIT investigators that had ‘1639’ written down for the time they heard the first ‘frantic call’… SOMEHOW that ‘1639’ time was COMMUNICATED to the SAIT investigators ( but is also never mentioned in the interview notes ).
So THIS *might* be how the SAIT was so SURE that Steed’s first MAYDAY actually took place at 1639, despite poor recollections and a wonky timestamps on the Aaron Hulburd Helmet-Cam video.
They might have been totally trusting what this mysterious ATS Trainee Clint Clauson had actually WRITTEN DOWN ( or, perhaps, just TOLD them verbally during the interview, according to his recollection ) as the TIME for Steed’s first ‘frantic call’… and they ‘adjusted’ all the other times/events based on that.
There has always been a folder in Mr. Dougherty’s online Dropbox that says it contains ‘Pre-Fire images from Boulder Springs Ranch’, but there has also always been a ‘glitch’ in the linking that was sending clicks to another ( different ) folder.
That ‘glitch’ is GONE… and now we can see the full set of pre-fire images taken at the Boulder Springs Ranch ‘safety zone’.
There are even some ‘post-fire’ images included for a ‘before/after’ glimpse of some parts of the compound.
The following link now takes you right to the correct folder…
There are at least TWO photos there which verify what Joy Collura reported about the FENCING on the western side of the compound ( The direction Granite Mountain was approaching from ). It does, in fact, appear to simply be 3 strands
of barbed wire. Nothing substantial.
There are also TWO photos of an antique pickup truck that was parked well INSIDE the ‘safety zone’ up in the northwest part of the compound.
One photo of the antique pickup truck is pre-fire.
Another is post-fire.
You can see the ‘before/after’ for this vehicle. It got fried.
The entire back-half and wooden bed of the pickup burned
up completely, along with both back tires ( completely melted ).
This ‘antique pickup truck’ was exactly here ( INSIDE ) the ‘safety zone’…
34.219495, -112.771250
It was sitting 98 feet INSIDE the ‘safety zone’ from the fence that established the western edge of the compound and only 46 feet from the northwest corner of the Llama barn next to the house.
The last photo in the set ( with a name of vegetation-on-hills-.jpg ) actually shows how FAR inside the perimeter of the ‘safety zone’ this burned pickup truck was… and how CLOSE it was to the Llama pens and the barn.
NOTE: The actual NAME of the post-fire photo of the burned pickup truck is ‘truck Yarnall 15 June 001.JPG’ but the date indicated in this hand-modified title is INCORRECT.
The post-fire photo of the burned pickup truck was ACTUALLY taken well AFTER the fire on September 14, 2013.
The ACTUAL EXIF data embedded in the ‘after fire’ photo of the
pickup truck is as follows…
Camera: Canon PowerShot A4000 IS
Date: September 14, 2013 – 11:56:39 AM
Lens: 5 – 40 mm – Shot at 15.1 mm (shot wide open)
Exposure: Auto exposure, 1/1,002 sec, f/4, ISO 125
Flash: Auto, Did not fire
Focus: Single, Face Detect, with a depth of field of from 18.2 m to infinity.
Focus 2: AF Area Mode: Multi-point AF or AI AF
File: 3,456 × 4,608 JPEG (15.9 megapixels)
I would say the truck burned because of the straw in the back of it
possibly by direct flame but more likely by sparks that ignited the straw and burnt the truck. Sill interesting….
Reply to Bob Powers post on May 11, 2014 at 10:45 am
>> Mr. Powers said…
>> I would say the truck burned because of the straw in
>> the back of it… possibly by direct flame but more likely
>> by sparks that ignited the straw and burnt the truck.
Agree. That was a LOT of ‘straw’ piled in the back of the thing and you can even see a burned-up gasoline can there in pile in the aftermath photo.
It’s also possible that the ’embers’ ignited that small tree that was near it first… then the ‘open flame’ from the tree nailed the straw.
>> Mr. Powers wrote…
>> Still interesting….
Yes. Definite proof that even though the structures didn’t appear to suffer any damage at all… the ‘open area’ of the ‘safety zone’ was no picnic that afternoon.
It definitely wasn’t one of those ‘sit in the middle in a lawn chair and drink a beer and watch the fire go by’ kind of ‘safety zones’. More like ‘you better be inside one of the bulidings’ kind of ‘safety zone’.
Probably also a good lesson there for anyone trying to ‘fire proof’ their own compounds. These pictures prove that regardless of how far INSIDE your compound there are ‘small trees’ or other ‘combustibles’ ( like bales of hay )… they probably ARE going to IGNITE under similar circumstances… so BEWARE.
Even if you have a 600 foot wide ‘clearing’ around your house… make sure you haven’t kept ‘trees’ right next to your house and make sure all ‘combustibles’ are INSIDE or… at least… out on the PERIMETER and not near a structure.
Confession time. My urban backyard is full of dead stuff. I don’t live in the WUI, but the wind is blowing, we’re in endless drought here in N Mexico, and I’ve spent inordinate amounts of time reading about fire lately. Tomorrow morning I intend to make an appointment to get rid of the dead stuff in my backyard. Now that it’s finally possible to tell the dead stuff from the live stuff.
Every fifth post in my New Mexico Twitter Stream is about Wildfire Preparedness. We shall see……..
I’m dreading this wildfire season in New Mexico……..
I spent eight years living in the forest outside of Flagstaff. You couldn’t pay me enough to live in the forest now, or in the East Sandia Mountains, although I’d love to….
By the way… that ‘pile of crap’ on the left-hand side of the ‘post-fire’ photo with the fried pickup truck is the burned-up remnants of a wooden wagon that was also there INSIDE the ‘safety zone’.
You can see what that wagon looked like BEFORE it got fried to nothing in the ‘pre-fire’ photo of the pickup truck.
It did NOT have any ‘hay’ or ‘straw’ in it… but it burned to the ground, anyway.
If you look at the last photo on that page ( which shows the pickup truck and the wooden wagon pre-fire ) you will see that there was ALSO actually a STRUCTURE there in-between them pre-fire.
Some kind of storage shed? Looks to be wooden.
That STRUCTURE is TOTALLY GONE in the post-fire pictures and only that 50-gallon drum is left standing there.
Not too surprising. That STRUCTURE appears to have been sitting right BETWEEN the two small trees that were there INSIDE the ‘safety zone’.
When those two trees ‘lit up’… it must have been quite a BLAZE going there INSIDE the ‘safety zone’ and just 46 feet from the Llama barn.
Amazing job on the supposed 16:37 Marsh transmission. That is some impressive collective work! It’s not easy to prove the absence of a thing, yet I think you’ve pretty much wrapped that one up.
I’m still confused about how you are using VHF vs. UHF to refer to radio traffic. Here is how I understand frequencies:
All(?) radio communications on non-military incidents (including fire, Search and Rescue, police, etc.) take place over VHF. This includes air-to-air, air-to-ground, dispatch, and all ground crews.
Air-to-air tends to span from 121.x Mhz to 123.x Mhz. Fire/police/EMS in my area use frequencies in the range of 154.x – 173.x Mhz. (This may differ in areas near large bodies of water, as this overlaps with Marine VHF). Bendix King handheld and mobile (vehicle) radios used on fire generally transmit and receive in the 136 – 174 Mhz range. Dispatchers and repeater stations transmit and receive larger parts of the spectrum. Airguard and air-to-ground frequencies are in the 160s, so ground crews can monitor and transmit on them. For obvious reasons, transmissions on the airband range are more tightly controlled (non-pilot radio operators get permitted, and base stations are licensed).
In summary, all of these Yarnell radio communications are VHF, though air-to-air and air-to-tower transmissions are on a lower frequency of VHF than air-to-ground and ground-to-ground. Do I have this right?
>> Sitta said…
>> Amazing job on the supposed 16:37 Marsh transmission.
>> That is some impressive collective work!
>> It’s not easy to prove the absence of a thing,
No. It most certainly is NOT ( easy ).
>> Sitta also said…
>> yet I think you’ve pretty much wrapped that one up.
Well… perhaps not yet. Still needs another few passes.
There is some other evidence in the public record that is
relevant. Still ‘looking’ at all that. Stay tuned.
>> Sitta also said…
>> In summary, all of these Yarnell radio communications are
>> VHF, though air-to-air and air-to-tower transmissions are on
>> a lower frequency of VHF than air-to-ground and ground-
>> to-ground. Do I have this right?
Well… YES… you probably do.
Probably should have done this yesterday ( before all the VHF/UHF lingo entered the picture )… but here are the channels that were
actually ‘in use’ that weekend ( along with exact frequencies )…
From PDF page 22 of the Arizona Forestry SAIR report itself…
______________________________________________________
Radio Frequencies
The Yarnell Hill Fire was assigned Group 1 A1S PHX District
channels on June 28. On June 30 at 1022, the communications
plan was as follows:
Channel No., Channel Name, Assignment
1, AZSF1, Command
5, VFIRE21, Optional Tactical, Unassigned
6, AZSFTAC1, Tactical 1, Div A and Div Z
7, AZSFTAC2, Tactical 3, Structure Protection Group 1
8, AZSFTAC3, Tactical 2, Structure Protection Group 2
10, AZSFTAC5, Air-Ground
16, AIRGUARD, Air Guard Channel
Early in the day on June 30, there was limited use of AZSFTAC3
Tactical 3 by Granite Mountain IHC, Blue Ridge IHC, and heavy
equipment boss. Tactical 3 was assigned to Structure Protection
Group 1 at 1200 that day.
___________________________________________________
The exact frequencies assigned to Arizona’s
“Group 1 A1S PHX District Channels” are as follows…
Channel, Function, Frequency, Tone, Mode, Assignment
1, TAC 1, RX: 168.0500, TX: 168.0500, 123.0, N, OPS / DIV
2, TAC 2, RX: 168.2000, TX: 168.2000, 123.0, N, OPS / DIV
3, TAC 3, RX: 168.6000, TX: 168.6000, 123.0, N, OPS / DIV
4, TAC 4, RX: 166.7250, TX: 166.7250, 123.0, N, OPS / DIV
5, TAC 5, RX: 166.7750, TX: 166.7750, 123.0, N, OPS / DIV
6, TAC 6, RX: 168.2500, TX: 168.2500, 123.0, N, Unassigned
7, CMD C-2, RX: 168.1000, TX: 170.4500, 123.0, N, Command
8, CMD C-9, RX: 160.0125, TX: 165.2500, 123.0, N, Command
9, AZ State Fire, RX: 151.4000, TX: 159.4050, 162.2, N, AZ State Fire RPTR
10, Prescott NF Fire Net, RX: 164.3525, TX: 172.6125, 103.5, N, Forest Fire Net RPTR
11, Blank
12, MUTL AID, RX: 154.2800, TX: 154.2800, 0.0, N, Mutual Aid
13, AIR/GND, RX: 169.2000, TX: 169.2000, 0.0, N, Primary A/G
14, AIRGUARD, RX: 168.6250, TX: 168.250, 0.0, N, Air Guard
15, WEATHER, RX: 162.4000, TX: 0.0, 0.0, N, Weather Broadcast
16, AIRGUARD, RX: 168.6250, TX: 168.6250, 110.9, N, Air Guard
ALL of the frequencies assigned to this Arizona
“Group 1 A1S PHX District Channels” are in the
range from ( low/high )…
154.2800 ( Mutual Aid ) up to 170.4500 ( Command 2 )
That matches what you said is used in YOUR area…
>> Sitta said…
>> Fire/police/EMS in my area use frequencies in
>> the range of 154.x – 173.x Mhz.
The most IMPORTANT thing to notice is that there is NO
PUBLISHED ‘Air-To-Air’ channel in this frequency group.
Only an ‘Air-To-Ground’ channel.
Even if you CLONED your radio off of someone else that day… you would still have had to specifically ‘punch in’ an Air-To-Air frequency and add it manually to the bank to talk on the ‘Air-To-Air’ channel.
Good reason for that.
The Air guys will not ( and SHOULD not ) tolerate just anyone
transmitting on whatever Air-To-Air channel they are using.
That would be a nightmare ( for them ).
So you are saying that the Bendix-King radios could not be programed for Air to Air at the lower freq. of 121-123 ?
As I have tough although the newer Radios are different than the ones I used 20 years ago. So there would be a separate radio for
the air to air and special separate Freq.? would certain fire officials and others have those radios in their vehicles? I know we did back when. Like the helitack truck and dispatch both FS & BLM as well as some county and city as well as State rigs.
One of the newer ( and more expensive ) Bendix Kings
on sale (today) at Amazon.
This is what they choose to call their COMMAND VERSION
of even the more basic ( and cheaper ) BK GPH5102… and even this COMMAND version doesn’t have the 121-123 frequency range.
This puppy is $1,325 smackeroos… and it STILL won’t give you an Air-To-Air Channel if it’s down in the 120’s.
500 Channels, 25 User Groups, 20 Channels per Group
136-174 MHz Frequency Range
5/1.5 watts RF Power
MIL-STD 810
Programmable Soft Switches
1 new from $1,325.00
_______________________________________________
I can’t quote them at the moment… but I’m SURE there ARE tight regulations about who is ever ‘allowed’ to even be transmitting on ‘Air-To-Air’ channels.
Could you imagine if anyone could just walk out of a Radio Shack and immediately start transmitting on ‘Air-To-Air’ channels.
“Hey!… Delta Airlines!… I see you up there! How’s it goin’!… where ya headed!”
It has a lot of stuff about radio frequencies. I don’t really understand it because I don’t understand radio frequencies.
But somebody like you might want to peruse it. It’s more complicated than we think. I think there was more going on than we’re currently aware of. And I think you might find it quite useful for getting a finer understanding of what the possibilities/probabilities might be.
Including possible helicopter stuff. And a few other things.
Also I asked somewhere below, “What is Air Guard?” Now I know.
I just what to say to you Sitta, thanks for coming back and helping out. I’ve missed your voice.
I think what we’re doing now is an example of what we can do when we work together at solving problema, even when we disagree/see things differently, respectfully with each other, communicating back and forth, knowing none of us is exactly “right,” we’re all seeing different things at different times, from different perspectives and different knowledge bases. We all have different things/skills/perspectives to offer.
**
** Reply to calvin post on May 10, 2014 at 2:49 am
>> calvin said…
>>
>> WTKTT… The slash across the throat sign has always bothered me.
>> How could he ( John Burfiend ) be so certain that they were dead?
>> Really, how?? How did he know they were dead when he didn’t
>> even know where they were??
>> WTF
calvin…
The SAIT interview notes with Bravo 33 are an absolute MESS… but if you read them *very* carefully it would appear that John Burfiend ( who was the right-seat guy, not flying the airplane, and the one who was monitoring Air-To-Ground channel ) did his ‘slash across his throat’ gesture just AFTER Marsh’s final transmission when Marsh ‘affirmed’ that they were on the ‘SOUTH side of the fire’.
Even if they couldn’t see them… I think Burfiend could tell looking downward at that moment that anyone deploying on the SOUTH side of that exploding fireline was a goner. Hence… ‘slash across the throat’ gesture over to Thomas French.
Here is the exact ‘context’ of that testimony from Thomas French in the SAIT interview notes. It seems to confirm that Burfiend’s ‘slash across his throat’ gesture to French did, in fact, come right after Marsh’s *final* transmission…
__________________________________________________________________
We were right here (pointed at map) when Granite Mountain 7 called screaming in the radio. Ops said “are you getting this? I told Granite Mountain 7 “you need to calm down. I can’t understand you”. Immediately Division A called and said “we are starting a burn out, we are getting in our shelters. I said we got pople in trouble. Tanker called and said I got you in sight. I claimed out – the DC10 swung wide. I looked at John and he did this (slash across the throat). I told Kevin to stand by copy, taking it around. We have a crew in trouble. We are going to go look.
__________________________________________________________________
Let me also say that while I (personally) have always found this ‘slash across the throat’ gesture from Burfiend to be quite ‘uncalled for’… I do *NOT* believe for one second that this obvious assumption on his part that they were ‘goners’, even at that point in time, had *ANY* effect on him then proceeding to do his job.
I can also criticize them ( and, indeed, the WFF radio protocols themselves for apparently NOT having a good, established MAYDAY protocol ) for NOT taking the transmissions from Steed and Caldwell seriously for more than TWO MINUTES… but that still doesn’t mean I think they didn’t do all they possibly could to try and save those men that day… when they finally did realize this was a *REAL* emergency.
As soon as OPS1 Todd Abel contacted French and Burfiend and *TOLD* them to get their heads out of their asses and RESPOND to these men… they did.
And once they did ( finally stop ignoring them )… they obviously kicked into their own highly-rehearsed and professional procedures for such a situation.
I also happen to believe that if there had been *ANY* indication in those final radio exchanges of where they REALLY were ( such as… if Marsh had only taken 2 seconds to say… “we are 600 yards due WEST of Boulder Springs Ranch” )…
…I believe Thomas French in B33 and Kevin in the DC10 VLAT would have actually attempted a retardant drop ( whether they really believed it would do any good or not ) at GREAT risk to their own lives.
To have flown the jet-engine DC10 right through that thick ASH cloud would have been absolute suicide for Kevin… so I don’t think THAT would have happened… but if there was ANY way to get at their location ( if they knew where it was ) OTHER than flying blindly directly THROUGH the smoke/ash cloud…
I think they would have tried it.
For the rest of my life… I will always wonder WHY, when Marsh was directly asked by Burfiend…. “So, you’re on the south side of the fire, then?”…
…all Eric Marsh said was… “Affirm”.
Obtuse communications. Right to the end.
Even if French or Burfiend didn’t know where the heck the ‘Boulder Springs Ranch’ was… there were MANY people listening to the final MAYDAY calls who DID and they would have jumped right into the conversation and TOLD French and Burfiend *EXACTLY* where that was.
If Marsh had just added ANY amount of OTHER information… they at least *MIGHT* have been able to KNOW or GOOD-GUESS their exact location.
He didn’t… and I will ALWAYS wonder WHY he didn’t avail himself of that
one last chance to identify their exact location.
We ( in this ongoing discussion ) are not the only ones to wonder from day one WHY there was so much ‘confusion’ and ‘delay’ in realizing that the transmissions from Granite Mountain constituted a *REAL* emergency… or to wonder WHY it was that Burfiend in Bravo 33 basically IGNORED them for almost 2 minutes ( and even told them to get OFF the channel ) until OPS1 Todd Abel called him directly and *TOLD* him to stop ignoring these men.
Back in December of 2013 even… Wildfire Today published an article about this specific thing and about the new *YoLo* proposal which was a DIRECT reaction ( coming from the ground level ) to what happened in Yarnell.
Wildfire Today
Published December 23, 2013 by Bill Gabbert
Suggested protocol for firefighters when declaring an emergency
______________________________________________________
After reading about the deaths of the 19 firefighters on the Yarnell Hill Fire, Mr. Joseph Berto ( WFF Helicopter pilot ) had some thoughts about the crucial need for clear, descriptive radio communications when there is a firefighter emergency that requires immediate assistance. Below is his proposal, and following that my initial reaction and his response:
( See original article for full proposal )
______________________________________________________
There has ALSO been this ONGOING forum discussion about
this over at ‘Wildland Fire’.
Wildland Fire
Home of the Wildland Firefighter
Thread: More Yarnell Hill discussion: Mayday, Mayday, Mayday!
The first comment that ‘kicked off’ this (ongoing) discussion
over there at ‘Wildland Fire’ is as follows…
______________________________________________________
From Wildland Fire member: D Powers
Join Date: Oct 2013
Location: New Mexico
Mayday, Mayday, Mayday!
I have read the official reports about the Yarnell Hill fire, but the transcription of the radio traffic does not do justice to listening to them.
One thing that stood out to me was the lack of an emergency declaration. B-33 did not pick up on the tone of voice (possibly because he was trying to do three jobs at once), but everyone else did.
In the military, civilian aviation, and the structural fire service that is one of the first things to be drilled into new recruits: recognize when you are in trouble, and call for help. Make sure others know you are calling for help.
I am not saying GM did anything improper (I have never heard of Mayday being used in a wildland setting) but perhaps it is something to be considered for the future?
______________________________________________________
This ‘Wildland Fire’ Forum Thread is heavily commented and goes on with many ‘ideas’ such as just adopting what WFF people use in Australia ( Emergency, Emergency, Emergency ) or other ‘already used’ standards.
Since it still appears that the WFF management in the United States doesn’t intend to DO or RECOMMEND ANYTHING new in this regard… I certainly hope the ‘folks on the ground’ just go ahead and decide on something amongst themselves… ASAP… since whether their own management gives a crap about their safety, or not, it is THEIR LIVES that might depend on such an established protocol in the future.
Marti and WTKTT
A couple of thoughts one I listed below.
1. If the transmission was on air to air Marsh would not have made it.
The portable radios do not Carrie that Freq. because of the Radio Ban it is on.
2. If a OPS or the IC was in the helicopter they could have made that statement over Air to Air. If the Helicopter was in the area then it could have been re-conning the fire with 1 of the overhead.
3. A vehicle with that Radio Ban on a separate radio from the National fire Freq. Ban Radio could have also made the comment. That statement could have come without a call sign.
At this point with out verifiable radio traffic that was copied we are right now chasing shadows. If it was not copied on air to ground it could not have been Marsh. WTKTT if you have a way to check the freq. you could probably show the Problem of different Bans Low and High They should be listed some where.
Reply to Bob Powers post on May 10, 2014 at 10:58 am
>> Mr. Powers said…
>>
>> 1. If the transmission was on air to air Marsh would not
>> have made it.
Yes… and also IAOI ( If And Only If ) it went out on ‘Air-to-Air’…
then WE should be hearing it, too, captured in that video
which was CLEARLY recording the A2A traffic around that time.
It’s not there. Didn’t happen.
>> The portable radios do not Carrie that Freq. because of
>> the Radio Ban it is on.
No, they don’t. Not normally, anyway.
It’s the whole VHF ( Highband ) versus UHF ( LowBand ) thing.
Handhelds that have BOTH capability are VERY expensive.
>> 2. If a OPS or the IC was in the helicopter they could have
>> made that statement over Air to Air. If the Helicopter was in
>> the area then it could have been re-conning the fire with 1
>> of the overhead.
True… but there is certainly NO evidence that any OPS or IC
was flying in anything in Yarnell that late in the day. Everyone
was ‘on the ground’.
>> 3. A vehicle with that Radio Ban on a separate radio from the
>> National fire Freq. Ban Radio could have also made the
>> comment. That statement could have come without a call sign.
Also possible. Heck… we can even hear with our own ears in the video capture(s) that someone way back in Prescott Air Operations was ‘hearing’ all the traffic and was ALSO able to just press TRANSMIT at any moment and ‘insert’ themselves into the Air-To-Air conversations all the way down there in Yarnell.
This is all kind of ‘moot’, however, because with regards to this (supposed) “That’s exactly what we want” retardant-related transmission (supposedly) from DIVSA Marsh… it is John Burfiend ALONE who is testifying he ‘heard that’ and he is also testifying it was over the ‘Air-To-Ground’ ( UHF / LowBand ) channel.
That’s *another* reason the ‘Air-To-Ground’ channel is always one of the most popular and most-listened-to channels on ANY fire. It’s ‘where the action is’ and its accessible to the ‘cheaper’ radios because it is a UHF frequency and not a VHF one.
>> At this point with out verifiable radio traffic that was copied we
>> are right now chasing shadows.
I’m still looking at some ‘other’ things in the public evidence record and I’m not sure more still can’t be ‘figured out’ from it about this (supposed) transmission from Marsh… so I’m not ready to call it ‘shadow chasing’ just yet. Stay tuned.
>> If it was not copied on air to ground it could not have
>> been Marsh.
Agree. It really is a shame that the Air-Study folks didn’t ALSO have another video camera running that day with a direct inline feed on the A2G channel like they had one going with a direct inline feed on the A2A channel. That would have been REALLY helpful here.
>> WTKTT if you have a way to check the freq. you could probably
>> show the Problem of different Bans Low and High They should
>> be listed some where.
I’m sure they are… but I’m not sure it matters.
Air-To-Air was VHF and Air-To-Ground was UHF.
Only a VERY expensive handheld can do both and those are
NOT usually the Bendix Kings carried by WFF ground men.
We also DO have a full VHF A2A channel capture covering
the timeframe in question.
Marsh is nowhere on it.
If that transmission of his happened at all… it had to be on A2G.
I actually started this comment way earlier this morning, while doing other stuff and watching an over-my-head class on how to use InDesign, while continuing to read all the comments, and letting things sink in and re-arrange themselves. And then I wandered off to check on some facts and re-read some interviews, and then try to figure out when that VLAT drop was that Blue Ridge Hotshot McCord videod as it dangerously flew right over a helicopter so that maybe if there was any info on that (which there isn’t, but I think it happened about 1:37 PM, which means under Bravo 3’s watch), and now I’m back to finishing/editing this.
OK so now you know why it wasn’t on air 2 air. So I can delete the rest of the paragraphs that I wrote for you about that. I basically agree with all WTKTT has written about that. Including the part about maybe Marsh started to try to contact Air Attack but got overstepped by someone else saying “that’s where we want it” from down below, even the parking lot. That also makes sense, from a possibility level, since Eric Div A had been in earlier contact with Air Attack, and AA had indicated v/A2G uneasiness with where he saw that crew (that he didn’t know who they were).
At this point, who knows? Who even knows if that SAIT interview report was even accurate/truthful about anything either French or Burfiend even said. I agree w/WTK that it’s pretty evident the SAIT pretty heavily massaged that whole process to make it fit their pre-established narrative.
And note to WTKTT here, bcuz it’s easier to do this than scroll down while I’m downloading a bunch more of both sets of Air Study videos, thanks for clarifying the “show me” directions. I confess, when I wrote that question, it was a short-cut, bcuz I hadn’t had time to go try to “translate” the numbers and I was guessing you probably had. I also confess, I’m still a bit “bowl-challenged,” and thus my confusion about that. When somebody says “bowl” I have no idea what they mean. Thus, when Burfiend apparently (or not) spoke of test-flying “the bowl” “from west to east,” it definitely created a certain picture in my head, that apparently didn’t correspond to the facts. And, hey, maybe it didn’t even correspond to what he said!
And, hey, as long as we’re being left to lots of gaps and thus room for speculating, could it be that Burfiend and French didn’t take that Forest Service SAIT interview all that seriously, either? Maybe they had already figured the AFS was gonna, all things considered, bend the “facts to their narrative” based on their at-that-time recently published investigative process model. Which is in fact exactly what they did.
And to TTWARE — and Bob — and WTKTT — etal:
About the ASM thing. As I was on again off again over the past few months, trying to make sense of the Air command structure and terminology, including reading Fire Aviation, the sister site of Wildfire Today, I saw quite a bit of grumpiness about this new Module thing. And it may be one of the Lessons to be Learned from Yarnell.
And somewhat related to the above, I’ve been really thinking about my possible “overly glowing” assessment of French. It may be just that. Or it may be that I’m just translating him a little differently. I’ve been around air and balloon pilots and meteorologists and tornado-chasers a lot. They do what they do because they enjoy it, even when it gets dangerous and difficult — and, hey so do fire/wildfire fighters (who we all know are actually pyromaniacs in disguise!!), so I’m not so offended by what some of you all are upset about. And maybe that gesture across the throat was not in jest. It could have been dead serious. I could envision my dad doing that if he heard a report of a balloon hitting a power line. And he wouldn’t have meant it to be funny.
Bravo 33’s job was (as per the Air Support YouTube video) to get wet stuff on the ground without bending metal along with, when necessary and possible, adding situational awareness, but NOT managing the ground crews (as opposed to what Rory Collins was/wasn’t doing, ahem. I can’t imagine, after watching/listening to French for hours, ever doing what Collins did.). That was somebody else’s job. They were doing just that, and it wasn’t all that easy, and they had lives on their hands, too. Plane crashes on fires are not that uncommon.
So when that SEAT flew through that fire at 4:33, to make that drop that apparently took a few set-ups to get, French essentially thanked him, and the pilot, possibly with some relief, indicated he was happy too, even tho they both knew, it was quite possibly a fool’s errand, but one they were hired to do.
And now that I’ve read what you wrote, WTKTT, about what they would have done, and DID do, after they abandoned that VLAT drop, I really appreciate that. Not only that, but they were running out of fuel, and still managed a 5:07 VLAT drop in the middle of it all. And, as they said, they were just barely able to do it because it was in such heavy smoke and ash they could hardly even see.
That being said, I’m sensing something of a cognitive dissonance. Might it, again, have to do with this thing we have called “Culture”?
Could it be that “Fire Aviation” has something of a different “culture” than on-the-ground “Fire Fighting”? And is that maybe something else that’s adding to the confusion? And furthermore, I definitely see, and have read about, regional differences, especially in the complaints about Collins. As in, in the northwest forests they fight fires differently than in the southwest, and thus the big conflicts between Marsh and Collins.
OK a final thing, before I go on a last-minute quest for Mother’s Day Flowers. Regarding that 1:37ish PM VLAT drop. Once I figured out that that’s when it happened, I went back to Bravo 3’s interview. Collins had had to leave (out of fuel) so Bravo 3 was Air Attack. They say nothing about that drop in their SAIT interview. And that’s what leads me to the next thing.
Helicopters. I have absolutely NO IDEA who was mostly directing helicopters. I was wondering that as I watched the Air-to-Air 1628 video. French WAS paying careful attention to helicopters, but it was all about keeping them out of the way of the fixed wing tankers, because they were dropping really close to the helispot and the “horseshoe dip” location. Since there’s no air-to-air video earlier than 2pm-ish, there’s no record of how Bravo 3 was communicating. I don’t even know if B3 was even aware there was a helicopter right under that VLAT. So I have no clue who was directing the helicopter drops. Maybe just another little unimportant detail in the general scheme of things?
Which leads to my seriously final point. Having those Air Study videos really HAS been critical, given the jumbling of everything else. And yes, it would have been even more helpful if they had set up the same kind of video camera with the Air to Ground channel included. Without all the wind and stuff that the Panebakers have. We’d still be fifty miles behind where we are if somebody hadn’t thought, “Gee, lets go set up some video cameras up on that fire and document the Fire Aviation!!”
Great Job Marti
When Fires Like this in WUI start running at structures
The first thing is to thro Air Tankers at the Fire. The problem most times they don’t do any good except make every body feel like they at least did something. It looks good to the public at least some one is doing something.
Helicopters–When Fixed wing plains are on a fire Helicopter pilots Monitor there Freq. And stay out of the way. They fly lower and are assigned to specific areas.
They maintain contact Air to Air.
That is why I said the 1 Helicopter flying that is mentioned may have had an overhead in it that could have made the comment, and could have over keyed Marsh DIV A call.
From what I am reading there is no radio verification that DIV A broke into any Air conversation except the statement from AA. At this point we have a personnel recollection with no solid proof it actually happened.
Again good work on the info.
Marti—–Yes there are 2 different cultures good catch Ground and air, not sure where those Smoke Jumpers fit? We always liked the Helicopters when they gave us a ride.
Also we all love Fire, Fire Fighting and even starting them like Back Fires Project burns Etc.
If you didn’t you would not stick with it.
So you found us out as well.
Actually, to be honest, I “go to school” online regarding photography, media, design, business at an online “place” called CreativeLIVE, which is based in Seattle. When we have classes, we also have chatrooms.
One of my pals in the chatrooms is a female firefighter relative/supporter in southern California. She’s actually VERY interested in this fire and is probably reading this site, which I have linked her to regularly.
We chuckle a lot about how people who fight fires and people who pay attention to fires (like me) are actually fascinated by fire. I’ve always been fascinated by fire, loved/miss my 10 years of surviving via wood-stoves in Flagstaff, always have candles burning, and about every 4 years get really intensively interested in a wildfire.
I started tracking/observing wildfires online in about 1996. I was really interested in how communities used the Internet to deal with how a wildfire was impacting them and to connect to each other to deal with it.
That lead to my watching the Los Alamos Cerro Grande Fire online in 2000. Given that a bunch of geeks were affected by it, and I had family/friends ties to it, they really used the Internet to connect, respond, get the word out. I followed that carefully.
I was really interested in the interface between wildfires and the Internet. Why? Because I, too am a lover of fire.
The other big one for me was 2001, the Hayman Fire near Colorado Springs. My daughter was a competitive figure skater, and we were there when that fire was burning. I actually photographed it, and, of course, I followed all of it online.
Oh and then the 2002 Rodeo-Chedeski Fire in Arizona, a HUGE fire. We ate and inhaled the smoke from it for weeks here in Albuquerque. I followed it online. And cried. A lot. I FELT it. And was AWED by it. Because I spent ten years living in the forest in Flagstaff. I felt those trees burning.
Fire. I majored BA in Anthropology/Archaeology from Prescott College. (When we had the crew that gave birth to the Prescott Hotshots that, in turn gave birth to the Granite Mountain Hotshots. And I had a horse, and I rode that horse all over Granite Mountain). The harnessing of fire by humans is considered a benchmark in human evolution. But fire can still overpower us.
So, yes. We love fire!!! And we fear it! And we have to deal with it. And it kills. And it renews. So yeah, I found you out. Because I, and a number of others, are just like you.
There WERE helicopters already down in Yarnell and also doing whatever they could to ‘save things’ in this 4:15 to 4:45 timeframe.
We actually can HEAR at least TWO of them actually ‘fly over’ Aaron Hulburd as he was filming the ‘Helmet-Cam’ video there in the St. Joseph Shrine parking lot… and AS he was capturing those ‘final transmits’ from Steed, Caldwell and Marsh.
It actually could have been ANY helicopter pilot working the fire down there at this time that just jumped onto the Air-To-Ground channel and said…
“That’s exactly what we want”
…right after the 1633 SEAT drop there on the EAST side of the fire. That SEAT drop probably DID hit the same outlying areas that THEY ( the choppers ) were focusing on as well.
Burfiend said this call came ‘5 minutes before they went into shelter’… but given their *general* confusion about TIME throughout their recollections to the SAIT investigators… it’s pretty doubtful they could have been *THAT* sure that *EXACTLY* 5 minutes had transpired between ANY two events that afternoon.
If the “That’s what we want” confirmation ( from someone in/near or ‘flying over’ Yarnell… but not Marsh ) was a direct response to the spot-on 1633 SEAT drop… then it’s possible that Burfiend was simply 4 minutes off on his recollection… and it was really about 9 minutes between when he heard that and when it all started hitting the fan.
Mistaking a 9 minute elapsed time period for 5 minutes would have been perfectly understandable that afternoon… coming from ANYONE.
I still think the most important point about all of this is that the SAIT investigators obviously did *NOT* even lift a finger to try and *VERIFY* the TIME and the SOURCE of this “That’s what we want” recollection on Burfiend’s part.
They just trusted what (only) Burfiend was recalling, didn’t care that no one else seemed to have heard it, called it an ‘absolutely verified communication from Eric Marsh’… and used it was the defacto END of their own self-imposed ‘verifiable communications’ blackout period.
Even Eric’s voice in the YARNELL-GAMBLE video TEN MINUTES earlier ( at 1627 ) is much more ‘verifiable’ than this ‘recollection’ on Burfiend’s part… yet they (apparently) chose to ignore what they were hearing in the YARNELL-GAMBLE video altogether.
Perhaps the SAIT understood that if they were going to pretend there was a ‘blackout’ ( with no verifiable communications )… then they couldn’t END that blackout ‘too early’.
In other words…. it was OK to take a dubious transmission/recollection that happened just 2 minutes before the MAYDAY… because 2 minutes wasn’t enough time for management to be accused of neglecting to do something…
…but TEN MINUTES was too much… hence… they had to IGNORE Eric’s obvious reporting of GM’s ‘status’ ( to someone in command ) at 1627.
Once they decided to officially report that there was a ‘verifiable communications’ BLACKOUT… and that that is why management didn’t know where they were… they could not END it too early before the deployment… so the 1637 ‘recollection’ from Burfiend simply looked like a good place to do that.
The VLAT/helicopter incident I’m describing is not about the in-question call we’re talking about. It happened about 12:35 PM. There was a VLAT drop just northish of where the Blue Ridge hotshots were waiting with their buggies for an asignment. There was one test flight then the VLAT made it’s drop. The BR guys were photographing and video-ing it.
When the VLAT was coming down to make the drop, there was a helicopter right underneath it. Bravo 3 was in charge, as Rory Collins was off getting re-fueled. Unfortunately we don’t have the air 2 air so I don’t know what kind of communication was going on.
Interestingly enough, as I’ve been working on jockeying Tom Story’s photos into submission, it looks like his first VLAT set, which he took on the relatively accurate Mark D II, is of that T 911 coming out of that drop. With, I think, Bravo 3 just ahead of him.
I confess, I’m still a little mystified re helicopter communications. They were on air-to-air, but during the air-to-air video I watched yesterday, from a bit before 4:00 pm to about 4:20, French was just keeping them out of the way of the tankers. That’s all.
I would think the helicopters must have been in communication with some kind of overhead. I haven’t had time to “go there” but I’m sure there must have been some kind of crew organizing them?????? It definitely wasn’t Bravo 33. And I don’t know if Bravo 3 was doing it either. It just seems weird.
Also, that leads me to ask, “What is Air Guard? What is that channel used for?”
Reply to Marti Reed post on
May 11, 2014 at 5:10 pm
>> Marti said…
>> I confess, I’m still a little mystified re
>> helicopter communications. They were
>> on air-to-air, but during the air-to-air
>> video I watched yesterday, from a bit
>> before 4:00 pm to about 4:20, French
>> was just keeping them out of the way
>> of the tankers. That’s all.
Correct. There are never any ‘instructions’ to them from Bravo 33 ( acting as both Lead Plane and Air Attack ) about what they should actually be DOING ( drop-wise ).
The ONLY thing French was concerned about was them staying out of HIS way.
Only conversations are about who is heading to helibase… or who is leaving the fire… and what direction they should take to do that.
This also confuses me from the ‘Air Attack’ standpoint. It is French ( performing Lead Plane duties ) we hear ‘directing’ this Air Traffic around him… even though the SAIT notes say it was French who turned to Burfiend and said “You’re Air Attack!”.
____________________________________
From SAIT interview with Bravo 33…
Paragraph 4…
I knew there was 2 structural groups.
I wrote down 2.
Tom said “hey dude, you are the air attack”.
____________________________________
So it really is very, very confusing.
I’m not even sure the Air people fully understand it all… much less the ground folks.
Anyone on the ground in a command position could obviously ASK the choppers to do things without going through Air Attack… which is what makes it all the more confusing.
In one of the Air Study videos… right after the spot-overs were happening up on Model Creek road… SPGS2 Darrell Willis just tells his subordinate, Gary Moser, to ‘get one of those choopers to take care of that spillover’.
So even line personnel could just make requests of the choppers any time they wanted to?
It’s a wonder there weren’t MORE near-fatal
crashes that day other than the incredible near-miss out over that middle bowl earlier that day.
Another near Fixed-Wing / Chopper
near miss I hadn’t seen before…
In Panebaker Air study video
20130630_153414_EP, at +11 seconds, there is another *NEAR MISS* between a helicopter and the lead plane flying a line-up flight in that same location where the VLATS were dumping up there off Hays Ranch Road.
The lead plane is flying the line-up flight from west to east, parallel to Hays Ranch Road… but a chopper is coming up on a south to north line over in the same location but on the ‘blind’ side of the smoke cloud… and the lead plane seems to have NO IDEA he is there.
Hard to tell how close it was because the ZOOM is active on the camera… but it looks WAAAY too close for comfort as the chopper crosses right in front of the lead plane at what looks like the same altitude.
Looks like a few seconds in time made all the difference here.
Somebody has to be directing the helicopters, and it’s not really Air Attack/Bravo. That’s just not their responsibility from what i’ve read. Like it’s not also their responsibility to direct the ground crews, basically.
Their responsibility, it seems to me, in general and on this fire, is more about directing the fixed wing tankers and clearing the space around them.
I’m getting pretty brain-dead at this point, but tomorrow I’ll go look.
I do find myself wondering about the cost-effectiveness of the whole Fire Aviation thing. I’m hoping maybe the fact that those video cameras were set down that afternoon to do Air Study means something.
There is actually, I think, a TON of stuff to be learned from this fire, including the effectiveness of Fire Aviation. Where, and under what conditions, did it really help, and where did it not, and at what cost.
The problem is, as I have sensed all along, and even more so when I spent some hours today reading the Interagency Aerial Supervision Guide, they said over and over again how Aerial Support has to be integrated with overall Incident Command Strategy and Tactics.
And, as we know, since there was no actual “as-required” thought-out and written-out Plan for this day, there was nothing, strategically speaking, for Fire Aviation to tie into, other than various ad-hoc ongoing “let’s try this” tactics.
How do you effectively evaluate Aerial Fire-fighting on a fire in which there was no coherent over-all strategy/tactics in play in the first place?
So I’m not willing to dump the possible value of intelligent Fire Aviation, all things considered, but I do believe it’s time for a serious analysis of it, all things considered.
First, kudos to WTKTT and Marti, for digging into and getting the “that’s where we want it” conversation as analyzed as can possibly be done without some additional ‘outside’ input. I’m in agreement with Bob that, with all the chaos in the sky and on the ground that day, it would have been easy to mix-up that ‘recollection’ attributed to Marsh with another parties transmission.
The troubling part of the whole deal is that MANY people heard A/G radio traffic during the time in question, but we don’t have any of those ‘other’ recollections.
As has been stated before, A/G is one of the most listened-to channels on the fireground, as the most up-to-date reports on fire activity and other significant events usually comes across that channel in a prompt fashion. While earlier in the day people might have been only paying a cursory listen, later in the afternoon, with the fire getting ready to burn up an entire town, you can bet many, many people were glued to it (as evidenced by the background traffic videos).
On another note regarding possible takeaways, in my opinion two glaring ones seemingly related to BUDGET concerns are:
1) The states calling out a Type II Short Team (which was never even able to assemble all of it’s critical team members) for a fire that was already deemed a threat to a community.
2) The feds determination that they could save money by having less aircraft and personnel on fires by jamming two critical and busy functions inside of one aircraft (ASM). There may be times on slower, less active fires when that could be appropriate, but NEVER on Type I or Type II fires, and NEVER on Type III fires that are deemed to have a strong potential to rapidly escalate and threaten communties. Personally, I think the ASM ‘experiment’ should be ended and the duties returned to the Air Attack and Lead planes, but hey, that’s just me.
>> TTWARE said…
>> First, kudos to WTKTT and Marti, for digging into and getting
>> the “that’s where we want it” conversation as analyzed as can
>> possibly be done without some additional ‘outside’ input.
Two quick things here…
1) calvin is the one that has been focused like a laser-beam on this 1637 transmission from day one. It has deserved more focus and attention for quite some time… and deserves even MORE. It is ( and will remain ) IMPORTANT to know whether this ‘fact’ being reported by Arizona Forestry ever actually happened at all… and if it did… what the FULL story is on it.
2) I’m looking at some other things in the public evidence record that might shed a little more light on this… so I wouldn’t say that nothing more can be learned *without* some new interviews.
It is, in fact, still perfectly possible there is *GOING* to be ANOTHER official Yarnell Hill Investigation sometime soon.
At this point ( and with everything even WE have proved is totally WRONG with the original SAIT work )… I would think the right thing for Arizona Forestry to do at this point is just admit their mistakes and do it all over again… but THIS time try to get it RIGHT.
The families deserve nothing less ( and have, indeed, been ASKING for a better investigation since day one ).
Indeed… a ‘proper investigation’ is even one of the ‘stipulated’ action items in most of the wrongful death claims… which means that even if ALL the parties involved try to ‘settle out of court’…. the settlement(s) themselves might still REQUIRE a new ( proper ) investigation be done.
>> TTWARE also said…
>> I’m in agreement with Bob that, with all the chaos in the
>> sky and on the ground that day, it would have been easy to
>> mix-up that ‘recollection’ attributed to Marsh with another
>> parties transmission.
It actually could have been a COMPLETE walk-over.
Bravo 33 has already testified that because of the piss-poor handoff from Rory Collins… they basically had NO IDEA who was even ‘working the fire’ down there underneath them… and they also freely admit they had NO IDEA what anyone’s VOICES sounded like as they got all this dumped onto them. They didn’t even know what Field OPS1 Todd Abel’s voice sounded like as they suddenly started doing this Lead Plane / Air Attack double-duty.
So it is ACTUALLY possible that Marsh might have hit ‘transmit’ on the A2G channel… and only got the words “Bravo 33, Division A” out before SOMEONE ELSE totally walked all over him and then said something like “That’s exactly what we want”.
Maybe Marsh WAS trying to ‘say something’ to Bravo 33 at that point… but got totally ‘walked on’ and Burfiend just thought all that was coming from the same person ( since they admit they had
no idea who anyone was down there or what their voices
sounded like ).
Don’t forget that we NOW know that by the time Steed made his FIRST MAYDAY call… that call is NOT ‘filled with over-modulation’
as the SAIR reported. Steed is ACTUALLY YELLING into his microphone at the top of his voice and its because there are ACTUALLY at least two chainsaws running right next to him already. He was YELLING as much to hear himself as to make sure Bravo 33 could hear him over the saw noise right next to him.
That means that they DID realize the trouble they were in some span of time BEFORE Steed’s first MAYDAY. They had ALREADY decided to deploy BEFORE Steed’s first MAYDAY… and had (apparently) ALREADY found the deployment site, pulled the ropes on the saws, and gotten to work.
It could very well be that whatever Marsh was trying to say to Bravo 33 when he then got ‘walked on’ was either related to them suddenly realizing the trouble they were in ( as early as 1637? )… OR it was simply Marsh getting walked on at 1637 but not having the time to RETRY because it was suddenly time to help find the deployment site or just simply ‘run forward’ to catch the men.
All guesswork… but it’s possible.
My feeling is that there were no CALL SIGNS involved here at
all regarding what Burfiend was ‘recalling’.
I believe that Burfiend is just simply MISTAKEN about it being
DIVSA Marsh saying anything ( at any time ) about “That’s exactly what we want”. It was probably someone else who had a VHF radio with them there in Yarnell and they were ‘confirming’ the ‘goodness’ of the 1633 SEAT drop that had just taken place within sight of the Ranch House Restaurant.
>> TTWARE also said…
>> The troubling part of the whole deal is that MANY people heard
>> A/G radio traffic during the time in question, but we don’t have
>> any of those ‘other’ recollections.
Correct. Even the SAIT should have realized this alone was reason to re-interview Burfiend and try to CONFIRM what he reported.
Not only did the SAIT *NOT* do that…. they took as ‘gospel’ Burfiend’s recollection(s)… and even totally trusted his ‘guess’
that it was ‘5 minutes later when they deployed’… so they just
subtracted 5 minutes from 1642 and put a timestamp of 1637
on Burfiend’s “That’s what we want” recollection…
…and they went ‘out the door’ with it
The SAIT just published it as FACT, and even called this
non-verified reported transmission the ‘official’ end of their own
self-imposed ‘non-verifiable communications’ blackout.
Go figure.
>> TTWARE also said…
>>
>> As has been stated before, A/G is one of the most listened-to
>> channels on the fireground, as the most up-to-date reports on
>> fire activity and other significant events usually comes across
>> that channel in a prompt fashion. While earlier in the day people
>> might have been only paying a cursory listen, later in the
>> afternoon, with the fire getting ready to burn up an entire town,
>> you can bet many, many people were glued to it (as evidenced
>> by the background traffic videos).
Totally agree. If there was EVER a time for anyone with a cheap
UHF handheld ( capable of listening to Air-To-Ground UHF ) to be
monitoring that channel for transmissions… it was circa 4 to 5 PM in Yarnell.
Everybody WAS… but only ONE guy up in an airplane who admits he had no idea who was even on the ground or what they sounded like is the one reporting a ‘crucial’ transmission?
It doesn’t ‘add up’.
>> TTWARE also said…
>>
>> On another note regarding possible takeaways, in my opinion
>> two glaring ones seemingly related to BUDGET concerns are:
>>
>> 1) The states calling out a Type II Short Team (which was
>> never even able to assemble all of it’s critical team members)
>> for a fire that was already deemed a threat to a community.
>>
>> 2) The feds determination that they could save money by
>> having less aircraft and personnel on fires by jamming two
>> critical and busy functions inside of one aircraft (ASM). There
>> may be times on slower, less active fires when that could be
>> appropriate, but NEVER on Type I or Type II fires, and NEVER
>> on Type III fires that are deemed to have a strong potential to
>> rapidly escalate and threaten communties. Personally, I think
>> the ASM ‘experiment’ should be ended and the duties returned
>> to the Air Attack and Lead planes, but hey, that’s just me.
Not sure myself about necessary/needed changes to the whole Air Support thing… but with regards to BUDGET…
If ICT4 Russ Shumate had only just spent the money on Saturday for day-long chopper support and bucket drops… that thing would have been dead-as-a-doornail before 4:00 PM on Saturday.
If ‘Arizona Forestry’ just adds up what the cost for that chopper support on Saturday would have been and THEN compares it to
the *other* costs that resulted by NOT spending that money
on Saturday…
…well… you don’t need a whole lot of batteries in your calculator to realize what a ‘budget buster’ that mistake was.
If the whole Yarnell Incident ( and the loss of 19 good men ) isn’t enough to teach Arizona Forestry ( and SWCC ) that using the ‘IA with overwhelming force’ approach isn’t ( ultimately ) the most cost-effective way to fight wildland fires in that region…
The (supposed) “That’s what we want” transmission came over the UHF Air-To-Ground channel and NOT the VHF Air-To-Air channel.
Nobody needed an expensive VHF piece of kit to have been the one making that call to Burfiend in B33 on A2G.
It could have been ANYONE on the ground in Yarnell who saw that 1633 SEAT drop and might have been trying to confirm the ‘goodness’ of it.
So that one paragraph above SHOULD have read…
“It was probably someone else who had a UHF radio with them there in Yarnell and they were just ‘confirming’ ( over the A2G channel ) the ‘goodness’ of the 1633 SEAT drop that had just taken place within sight of the Ranch House Restaurant.”
So……I’ve been watching and listening to the Air Study 30130630_1628_EP.MOV video three times through. Since I mistakenly downloaded it, instead of the next one that I’m now downloading. I figured I might as well, since it would help me see and hear what was going on. Quite interesting.
This one includes the impressive 4:16-4:18 two-minute VLAT 911 split-drop. Quite interesting and quite educational to watch/hear. Most of it features Tom French as Bravo 33 Lead Plane , leading, instructing the other pilots of both air tankers and helicopters, checking things out, communicating with media planes, really polite, respectful, supportive, calm and cool. Totally impressive all things considered. This video spans from about 1558 til 1628. Forty minutes. I highly recommend watching it. I don’t have the link for it at the moment, unfortunately. But you can find it. Just go to WTKTT’s link for the Air Study video he posts above, and download/watch the 1628 video instead!
What really strikes me is the truly calm, professional, supportive, positive, specific, clear communications happening all around. No sign of stress, pressure, conflict, frustration, anything negative at all. You really get a sense that everybody actually enjoys what they’re doing.
This also includes the communication between Rory Collins, as Air Attack, as he leaves the fire to head to Deer Valley, because his pilot has run out of fly-time, and his, I would say, disappointment that he still hasn’t been able to secure his relif pilot, who is grounded at Stafford because, I would guess, of the same weather that was grounding other planes all around.
I hate to say this, because I have a beef with Rory Collins, but over the course of about fifteen minutes during this, on again off again, he did have something of a leisurely conversation with Tom French. And, as Tom French says towards the end of it, (re Burfiend who would become Air Attack) “my right-seater’s been copying everything.”
Collins told him quite a bit of stuff, about the weather, about IC, about go ahead and finish what you’re doing and then get over to the other side of the fire with the DC 10’s, about Div A being the ground contact ( I guess not forecasting that Div A was about to head out to the bleak unknown, which, to be fair, he didn’t know at that time). He asked for questions, concerns, and French back-and-forthed with him, and didn’t sound the least like this was weird or strange or hectic or insufficient in any way. He sounded confident that they were completely ready to assume the responsibility they were being handed.
And then he kept on doing what he was doing. Being Bravo33 (which is pronounced Bravo Three Three) Lead Plane. Calm and confident and positive in the midst of what we perceive as being chaos.
Marti
I am confident after every thing I have been reading that you guys have found, that the statement.
That’s where we want it,– is from OPS or a ground person
with the structure protection group in the area of the drop, and has absolutely nothing to do with March.
It has never made science that Marsh would have popped out of no where with that statement.
Based on experience call it a educated guess it was not Marsh. People near the drop site would be much more plausible. They were trying to save structures at that point and that is what they were focused on.
Yes, I’m thinking more and more in line with you (see my comment below in response to yours). I’m still wondering how it could have been that this call from someone (who decreasingly looks like it would have been Marsh) (and I’m trusting Burfiend who says he heard it) wouldn’t have been heard on the AirToGround channel that A WHOLE LOT OF PEOPLE heard at the time, including the crew doing that “Last MInutes” video. That’s what stumps me.
Is there possibly some other channel that Air Attack Burfiend could have been interacting with that could have signaled to him, at 4:37-4:39-ish, as they were circle-ing then flying a test flight “west to east over the bowl” that “that’s exactly what we want”?
Marti… not only am I not sure we can really
trust either Burfiend’s or French’s statements
in the SAIT investigations notes about the
“that’s what we want” statement… I think
their recollection in *general* is kinda wonky.
For example…
Here is the exact ‘infamous’ paragraph from
their SAIT interview that has that one and
only reference in the *entire* evidence
record in it about “that’s what we want”…
…but look at the REST of the paragraph
that precedes that ‘recollection’.
It’s all pretty ‘skewed’ unto itself regarding
what ELSE they ‘think’ they heard from
Marsh… and WHEN…
TIME NOW = 1630
:: We needed to go back to the right flank
:: ( 1630 AZ time ).
:: Made 3 practice runs. Painted 2.
:: We came around.
TIME NOW = However long it take to make
‘3 practices runs’ and then ‘come around’.
Let’s call that FIVE minutes, at least.
TIME NOW = 1635
:: Got a call from Division A stating they
:: were going down their escape
:: route to the safety zone.
WTF? At 1635? Not a chance.
:: Didn’t know Division A was the
:: superintendent of the Granite Mountain
:: hot shots. Asked him “is everything OK?”
:: He replied “everything is ok, just heading
:: to the safety zone”.
Again… WTF?? Not possible ( at 1635 ).
There ARE video captures that cover this
timeframe AND were capturing the A2G
radio channel and there are no such
transmissions recorded.
:: We came around,
:: made a practice run through the bowl,
:: west to east.
TIME NOW = ??
We really have no idea. Their testimony
above about hearing from Marsh at ‘this
time’ already proves the SAIT notes are
out in left field already… so there is no
telling WHEN this ‘practice run’ they are
now referring to happened… if it even
happened at all.
:: I was talking to Tom
:: about the rising terrain on exit.
:: Division A clad and said “that is what
:: we are looking for, that is exactly right”.
:: Within 5 minutes of that, they went in
:: shelter.
So this LAST STATEMENT about them ‘going into shelter’ within 5 minutes of the “that is what we are looking for” transmission
( according to their recollection ) MUST be
what the SAIT used to actually come up with the 1637 timestamp for Marsh’s (supposed)
transmission.
French and Burfiend had no frickin’ idea what
time it *really* might have been… but
somehow they also seemed to be SURE
that ‘within 5 minutes’ is when Eric
announced they were ‘deploying’.
So the SAIT just took their ‘recollection’ about
the previous transmission from Marsh being
‘within 5 minutes’… and then they just
counted BACKWARDS from 1642… when
the Helmet Cam captured Marsh’s final
statement(s).
1642 minus 5 minutes = 1637
Voila!… The SAIT was now SURE that 1637
is when Marsh MUST have said “That is what
we are looking for”… and they frickin’ PUBLISHED that in the SAIR as if it was fact.
They were taking these ‘unverified’ random recollections of French / Burfiend as ‘gospel truth’… even though ( as shown above ) they were completely mis-remembering Marsh’s OTHER statements ( on A2G channel ) about
‘going down their escape route’.
So the SAIT didn’t question the FIRST half of
even that one section ( paragraph ) of their
interview ( which is obviously an inaccurate
recollection ) but then the SAIT took the
SECOND half as ‘gospel truth’… and
PUBLISHED the ‘statements’ as FACT…
even though NO ONE ELSE was reporting
that transmission from Marsh on the *VERY*
popular A2G radio channel.
Go figure.
As I have said before… something about
Marsh ‘asking’ for retardant must have
seemed *really* attractive to THEIR ‘version
of events’ and fit nicely with THEIR ‘agenda’
in order for them to not have either
questioned this one statement from them
*OR* made sure it fit the criteria of ‘verified
transmission’ which they seemed to be so picky about for the previous 30+ ‘blackout’
minutes.
Bob:
Do you think this is important, all things considered?
To be honest, I’m less and less thinking it is, all things considered. To be honest, I’m kind of hanging onto it because the SAIT made a big deal of it, using Burfiend, who I really respect, and his narrative of it to further their own narrative, in what I agree with WTKTT to be a really irresponsible manner.
Do you think it’s really all that important, in the general scheme of things on this totally mismanaged fire, that Burfiend says he heard, while they were flying a “show me,” someone tell him (and possibly mistakenly thinking it was Div A Eric Marsh) that ‘this is exactly where we want that” ?
Or is it time for all of us to just admit we can’t figure this out, all things considered, and move on?
I really respect your hard-won experience-based sense of what is truly important in wildland fire-fighting.
I would say with out other identified radio traffic its a guess as to who made the statement. Maybe an assumption after the fact by Burfiend that he recollects something
during a show me run. What is very strange is there was no prior conversation asking for a drop by March. It would be un conceivable for Marsh to think his discussion with OPS about we’ll get a drop down there would have any thing to do with a 30 min. later statement. Where is location and discussion of need?
The only thing this adds to is some how thinking Marsh asked for a drop to save the crew and no one was listening. Which I think is BS. It could have been any one with an Air to Air Freq. on the ground. Thought they said DIV. A. It dose not make science that Marsh would have jumped in and said that with all the smoke at that time he could not have seen air craft and gave no other direction prior.
With out verifiable evidence it will just hang hot there as something to talk about– Had the air tanker dropped where DIV A ask they would have been saved,–Wishful thinking. Where they were dropping had no connection to where Marsh was. I am still of the belief it was not Marsh, I am still betting on the Structure Group. Air to Air would have a very limited number of people on it. That same statement could have been used several times during the day by ?????
Also if it was air to air Marsh would not have had that on his hand held radio. Only air to ground.
Any air to air radios would have been in Vehicles like City or county Engines or Supervisors trucks. If I am not mistaken Air is on a totally different Ban than the Fire freq. Bans. High Ban and Low Ban you cannot run them both on the same radio. Air to ground is in the same ban area as crewnet, and the other fire freq. Another little added info on air attack. 2 different radios in air craft to talk to air and ground.
A air tanker would have Air to air, if they IA a fire some one on the ground would have air to air to talk to them till Air Attack arrived. Clear as mud again ….
Reply to Marti Reed post on May 9, 2014 at 5:20 pm
>> Marti wrote…
>> What really strikes me is the truly calm, professional,
>> supportive, positive, specific, clear communications
>> happening all around. No sign of stress, pressure, conflict,
>> frustration, anything negative at all.
Yes. Right down to Burfiend doing the ‘slash across his throat’
gesture as soon as he knew 19 good men were deploying.
Very positive. Very professional.
>> You really get a sense that everybody actually enjoys
>> what they’re doing.
Yes. Flying airplanes is FUN!
>> This also includes the communication between Rory Collins,
>> as Air Attack. He asked for questions, concerns, and French
>> back-and-forthed with him, and didn’t sound the least like this
>> was weird or strange or hectic or insufficient in any way. He
>> sounded confident that they were completely ready to assume
>> the responsibility they were being handed.
Yes. It all sounds very ‘nicey-nicey’ and polite, doesn’t it?
You would hardly be able to tell that just a few hours earlier,
Collins was dumping retardant all over a Division Supervisor’s
plan of action and not giving a shit whether he liked it or not…
…or that while he was ‘Air Attack’… a helicopter almost crashed
straight into a DC10 and the resulting explosion would have lit
that middle bowl up like a Christmas tree long before wind
change…
…or that while he was ‘Air Attack’… numerous people on the
fire commented how ‘disorganized’ the helicopters were that
day and seemed ‘totally unsupervised’ and ‘doing whatever the
hell they wanted’… to the point where Blue Ridge Hotshots would
later say that the ‘split’ in the fireline was actually caused by
this ‘unsupervised’ helicopter activity that day.
…or that he only gave them 10 minutes notice about having
to leave the fire… and then left Bravo 33 with a laundry list of
‘cluelessness’ that they would then recount to SAIT investigators…
…or that this same guy, following the incident, would refuse to
return phone calls and make it almost impossible for anyone
to interview him.
Sorry, Marti.
Yes… I agree that these guys know how to talk on the radio and
‘get a job done’… but I’m not ready to give any of them the glowing
‘points’ you are granting.
In MANY ways… ( from Friday night through Sunday )… the AIR
operations at Yarnell left a LOT to be desired.
I actually, truly hope the overall ‘picture’ that has emerged
from the Yarnell Hill Fire regarding this ‘Air Support’ stuff ( and the
interaction with ground forces ) is not NORMAL or ‘business as
usual’.
WTKTT… The slash across the throat sign has always bothered me. How could he be so certain that they were dead? Really, how?? How did he know they were dead when he didn’t even know where they were??
calvin… the SAIT interview notes with Bravo 33 are an absolute MESS… but if you read them *very* carefully it would appear that John Burfiend ( who was the right-seat guy, not flying the airplane, and the one who was monitoring Air-To-Ground channel ) did his ‘slash across his throat’ gesture just AFTER Marsh’s final transmission when Marsh ‘affirmed’ that they were on the ‘SOUTH side of the fire’.
Even if they couldn’t see them… I think Burfiend could tell looking downward at that moment that anyone deploying on the SOUTH side of that exploding fireline was a goner. Hence… ‘slash across the throat’ gesture over to Thomas French.
Here is the exact ‘context’ of that testimony from
Thomas French in the SAIT interview notes.
It seems to confirm that Burfiend’s ‘slash across
his throat’ gesture to French did, in fact, come
right after Marsh’s *final* transmission…
_________________________________________
We were right here (pointed at map) when Granite Mountain 7 called screaming in the radio. Ops said “are you getting this? I told Granite Mountain 7 “you need to calm down. I can’t understand you”. Immediately Division A called and said “we are starting a burn out, we are getting in our shelters. I said we got pople in trouble. Tanker called and said I got you in sight. I claimed out – the DC10 swung wide. I looked at John and he did this (slash across the throat). I told Kevin to stand by copy, taking it around. We have a crew in trouble. We are going to go look.
__________________________________________
Let me also say that while I have always found this ‘slash across the throat’ gesture from Burfiend to be quite ‘uncalled for’… I do *NOT* believe for one second that this obvious assumption on his part that they were ‘goners’, even at that point in time, had *ANY* effect on him then proceeding to do his job.
I can also criticize them ( and, indeed, the WFF radio protocols themselves for apparently NOT having a good, established MAYDAY protocol ) for NOT taking the transmissions from Steed and Caldwell seriously for more than TWO MINUTES… but that still doesn’t mean I think they didn’t do all they possibly could to try and save those men that day… when they finally did realize this was a REAL emergency.
As soon as OPS1 Todd Abel contacted French and Burfiend and *TOLD* them to get their heads out of their asses and RESPOND to these men… they did.
And once they did ( finally stop ignoring them )… they obviously kicked into their own highly-rehearsed and professional procedures for such a situation.
I also happen to believe that if there had been *ANY* indication in the next few moments of where they REALLY were ( such as… if Marsh had only taken
2 seconds to tell them… “we are 600 yards due WEST of Boulder Springs Ranch” )…
…I believe Thomas French in B33 and Kevin in the DC10 VLAT would have actually attempted a retardant drop… at GREAT risk to their own lives.
To have flown the jet-engine DC10 through that thick smoke-ass cloud would have been absolute suicide for Kevin… so I don’t think THAT would have happened… but if there was ANY way to get at their location ( if they knew where it was ) OTHER than flying blindly directly THROUGH the smoke/ash cloud…
I think they would have tried it.
For the rest of my life… I will always wonder WHY, when Marsh was directly asked by Burfiend…. “So, you’re on the south side of the fire, then?”…
…all Eric Marsh said was… “Affirm”.
Obtuse communications. Right to the end.
If he had just added ANY amount of OTHER information… they at least *MIGHT* have been able to KNOW or GOOD-GUESS their exact location.
He didn’t… and I will ALWAYS wonder WHY he
didn’t take that one last chance to identify their
exact location.
**
** DID DIVSA ERIC MARSH REALLY CALL BRAVO 33
** AT 1637 ABOUT ‘RETARDANT’?
Reply to calvin post on May 8, 2014 at 2:34 am
>> calvin said…
>> I am not sure exactly where Marsh was when he called Bravo33 and said
>> that is exactly where we want the retardant.
calvin… see below. I am personally ( and honestly ) still not convinced this
1637 radio ‘callout’ from Marsh actually took place… or ( if it did ) that it really
was Eric Marsh that said anything of the sort.
>> But if he was walking downslope toward the canyon floor, I do not think he
>> would have been able to see the flight path.
Assuming this transmission DID take place just as the SAIR reported…
It’s really not possible. He might have been able to HEAR some planes flying
over there on the other side of that smoke column… but it’s really not
credible that he could have SEEN them, at that point. It was almost
‘dark as night’ at that point, as well ( as the Glen Ilah resident video proves ).
>> Because of the short period of time between that call out and the call
>> announcing the entrapment, we know he HAD to be close.
Yes. If it happened at all… and at the TIME it supposedly happened… then
Marsh had to be VERY close to the rest of the men. No question.
>> There is a small mound between the entrapment/ deployment site and BSR
>> that is just north of the dozered road (created to remove GM’s bodies).
>> I think it is possible he was on that mound where he would have had
>> more visibility.
Perhaps… and I know exactly the ‘mound’ you are referring to… but that would create the UNBELIEVABLE scenario that Marsh could see exactly what was happening with the fire out ahead of the men still over in the canyon… and he still let them walk right into a deathtrap, anyway.
There are a LOT of ‘unbelievable’ moments that happened that weekend… ( too many ) but I really can’t get my head around THIS possibility ( that Marsh really might have been ‘out ahead of them’ and in a good ‘forward lookout’ position up on that mound… but he let them all die anyway rather than ‘abort the mission’ ).
>> calvin also wrote…
>> I do not believe the GMH were only counting on their speed to outrun
>> the fire. I do believe they were expecting retardant to be dropped on the
>> south side of the fire. But as far as I can tell (from post burn pictures),
>> that never happened.
I hear ya… but ‘as far as I can tell’… there is still the distinct possibility that this “That’s where we want retardant” transmission from DIVSA Eric Marsh never really happened at all… or that it wasn’t actually Eric that said it.
Stick with me for a moment while I try to ‘document my confusion’ about
this (supposed) callout from Marsh to Bravo 33.
This Air Study video actually covers the 1637 timerame…
This video is only recording the Air-To-Air channel but it does provide a CLEAR accounting of *EXACTLY* what Air Attack was doing from 1630 and right up through the deployment ( and beyond ).
There really is nothing in these captured Air Attack conversations that even remotely backs up what the SAIR says was happening at 1637… much less
Marsh making any “that’s where we want retardant” call(s).
Hence my ‘confusion’.
Air Attack ( Bravo 33 ) had the VLAT DC10 910 ( Pilot Kevin ) in a HOLDING
pattern a full SEVEN MILES OUT from the fire and didn’t even ASK Kevin
to start to ‘come into the area’ until 14 seconds before 1637. It took almost
another 2 minutes for the VLAT to even get close to the fire and only then
BEGIN talking to Air Attack about a ‘show me’ run on the EAST side of
the fire… and even this initial conversation about a possible ‘show me’ run
with Air Attack didn’t start until just 24 seconds prior to Steeds first MAYDAY.
The FULL 12 minute and 22 second transcript of this video has already
been posted down below in this ‘Chapter 6’. The following is just a
SUMMARY of that full transcript describing (generally) what Air Attack
was actually DOING during this timeframe…
** USDA AIR STUDY – DISC 4 VIDEO STARTS AT 1630.48 ( 4:30.48 PM )
NOTE: When the video STARTS… we hear Air Attack (B33) actively lining up
a REAL drop ( not a practice run ) with a SEAT from NORTH to SOUTH on
the EAST side of the fire… down near Yarnell. At this point… Air Attack has
the DC10 VLAT 910 ( Pilot Kevin ) in a ‘holding pattern’ SEVEN MILES OUT
and away from the fire… and isn’t even STARTING to deal with him yet.
( 1631.36 4:31.36 PM ) – AA tells SEAT to follow him for DROP.
( 1633.20 4:33.20 PM ) – SEAT drop takes place.
( 1633.24 4:33.24 PM ) – SEAT says “Off the drop now”.
( 1633.26 4:33.26 PM ) – AA tells SEAT to ‘load and return’.
( 1634.11 4:34.11 PM ) – AA tells 910 to set level 4 drop but to still HOLD.
( 1634.12 4:34.12 PM ) – AA tells 910 he’ll get back to him.
( 1634.40 4:34.40 PM ) – AA tells SEAT Wickenburg is out of retardant.
( 1634.42 4:34.42 PM ) – SEAT tells AA he’ll try ‘private club’ for retardant.
( 1635.37 4:35.37 PM ) – Chopper 5Q Alpha reports needing to refuel.
( 1636.10 4:36.10 PM ) – DOZER AND TRANSPORT go by camera.
( 1636.25 4:36.25 PM ) – Chopper 5QA reports landing at Helibase.
( 1636.27 4:36.27 PM ) – AA tells 5QA to let him know when he’s back.
( 1636.46 4:36.46 PM ) – AA only now tells VLAT 910 to ‘come on in’ to the area.
( 1637.05 4:37.05 PM ) – AA tells VLAT 910 target will be flames on EAST side.
( 1638.12 4:38.12 PM ) – Chopper 5QA departs to Wickenburg.
( 1638.15 4:38.15 PM ) – AA asks 5QA to depart on WEST side of fire.
( 1638.42 4:38.42 PM ) – VLAT 910 only now reports ‘approaching area’.
( 1639.03 4:39.03 PM ) – AA only now starts talking to 910 about ‘show me’
( 1639.27 4:39.27 PM ) – Captain Jesse Steed’s first MAYDAY.
( 1639.47 4:39.47 PM ) – Prescott Air Operations (PAO) heard MAYDAY.
( 1639.48 4:39.48 PM ) – PAO tells AA ‘get with OPS… something wrong’.
( 1639.53 4:39.53 PM ) – AA ignores OPS. Sticks with 901 ‘show me’ talk.
( 1641.18 4:41.18 PM ) – AA only now realizes something is happening.
( 1641.20 4:41.20 PM ) – AA tells VLAT 910 ‘folks in trouble… just standby’.
( 1641.25 4:41.25 PM ) – VLAT 910 copies… tells AA he’ll stage out northeast.
( 1641.31 4:41.31 PM ) – AA tells VLAT 910 looks like ‘deployment in progress’.
( 1641.33 4:41.33 PM ) – AA asks VLAT 910 for coverage lvl 6 and to ‘standby’.
( 1641.39 4:41.39 PM ) – VLAT 910 copies… says he’ll watch AA and standby.
( 1643.33 4:43.33 PM ) – USDA AIR STUDY – DISC 4 VIDEO ENDS
So ( from what I can tell ?? )… there is NOTHING there that supports what the
SAIR has reported about Marsh ‘seeing a VLAT drop lineup’ fly OVER him
at 1637 and making ANY kind of radio call like “That’s where we want retardant”.
Unless it’s the SEAT drop at 1633 that the SAIR was talking about ( which DID
actually take place and so the time of 1637 is totally wrong )… but even that was
a SOUTH to NORTH lineup on the EAST side of the fire and never ‘flew over
Marsh’ at all.
The most IMPORTANT thing to remember here is that this one single ‘transmission’ from Marsh is based on just ONE SINGLE person’s recollection,
was NOT captured in any background recordings, and it has not been ‘verified’
by ANYONE else ( even though it supposedly happened on the *very* popular
and well-listened-to Air-To-Ground channel ).
From page 15 of the SAIT Yarnell Investigation Notes ( YIN )…
**************************************************************************************
INTERVIEW WITH BRAVO 33
Interviewees: Bravo 33
John Burfiend-ATS Specialist
Clint Clauson – ATS Trainee
Thomas French – AT Specialist
Interviewers: Mike Dudley, Brad Mayhew, Tim Foley, Jay Kurth, Jimmy Rocha
We needed to go back to the right flank ( 1630 AZ time ).
Made 3 practice runs. Painted 2. We came around.
Got a call from Division A stating they were going down their escape
route to the safety zone. Didn’t know Division A was the superintendent
of the Granite Mountain hot shots. Asked him “is everything OK?” He
replied “everything is ok, just heading to the safety zone”. We came around,
made a practice run through the bowl, west to east. I was talking to Tom
about the rising terrain on exit. Division A clad and said “that is what we are
looking for, that is exactly right”. Within 5 minutes of that, they went in shelter.
************************************************************************************
So there it is.
That is the ONLY reference to this (supposed) transmission by (supposedly)
DIVSA Eric Marsh in the ENTIRE evidence record… and there isn’t even any
specific TIME reported for it at all.
Here are the things to ‘consider’ about this ‘testimony’.
1) This is the ONLY place this transmission from (supposedly) DIVSA
Eric Marsh is EVER mentioned… even though it (supposedly) took place
on the well-listened-to Air-To-Ground channel. TWO completely separate
investigations interviewing MANY people who were constantly monitoring
that Air-To-Ground channel all day… and this quick blurb in the SAIT
investigator’s notes recounting just ONE person’s recollection is still the
ONLY mention of this (supposed) transmission.
2) There is NOTHING (recorded in the SAIT notes) about this (supposed)
transmission taking place at 1637, as published in the SAIR. Zero. Zip. Nada.
It is still a complete mystery how the SAIT actually ‘assigned’ a time of 1637
to this (supposed) transmission from Eric Marsh to B33 on the Air-To-Ground
channel. Bravo 33 was even not really ‘sure’ about any of the actual times…
so how did the SAIT come up with 1637 for this (supposed) transmission?
3) The interview notes DO say that Bravo 33 reports this as ‘Division A called’…
but they also do NOT specifically say whether Bravo 33 ALSO said there were
actual CALL SIGNS involved with this transmission such as “Bravo 33, Division
Alpha’. Other notes from the Bravo 33 interview establish that they were not only
‘unfamiliar’ with who was even working the fire ( because of the piss-poor handoff
from ATGS / ASM1 / Rory Collins )… they were also not familiar with anyone’s
VOICES yet. Bravo 33 specifically says they had no idea what OPS1 Todd Abel
sounded like yet… so UNLESS there were specific CALL SIGNS involved on this
transmission from Marsh it is doubtful they would have been able to tell it was
DIVSA Marsh just from the voice. It is still POSSIBLE that this transmission came
from ‘someone else’ at that time and Bravo 33 is simply mistaken that it was
actually ‘Division A’ ( Marsh ).
4) This one single ‘supposed’ transmission from Marsh played a critical
role in the published SAIR document since they are using this one single
transmission as the defacto END of the (supposed) ‘blackout period’ where
they say they had ‘no direct verifiable transmissions’ from either Marsh
or Granite Mountain… yet it (actually) remains one of the most ‘unverified’
transmissions on record that day.
It is ONLY being ‘recalled’ by one single source ( ONE person ) and even
though others SHOULD have heard this transmission over the well-listened-to
Air-To-Ground channel… NO ONE ELSE in ANY interview or testimony spanning
TWO separate investigations recalls hearing it at all.
I still think it is ‘suspicious’ that the SAIT gave absolute ‘verified transmission’
status to this one (supposed) unrecorded radio callout from Marsh with only
ONE person seeming to ‘recall’ it ( when many others SHOULD have also
heard it… but apparently did NOT ).
There are still MANY other ‘transmissions’ that were actually captured in videos
and in audio tracks that the SAIT chose to call ‘not verifiable’, yet they chose
THIS (unrecorded) moment as so ‘verifiable’ that it ‘officially’ represents the
END of the (supposed) ‘blackout’.
It still almost seems like they were going to great lengths to make sure
this one (supposed) statement about a ‘retardant drop’ made it into the
‘official narrative’ and the ‘official public report’.. regardless of how thin
its ‘verifiableness’ really was.
We can OBVIOUSLY hear ( with our own ears in the Air Study video ) that ‘Air
Attack’ himself NEVER got this transmission at all.
So the ONLY possibility is that the other guy in the plane who was listening to
any ‘Air to Ground’ traffic was the ONLY one who actually heard this.
I am not saying he is WRONG or ‘imagining things’… but our ability to actually
VERIFY this ( as to caller ID and TIME, and what was actually said ) is seriously
non-existent.
I just wish there was an equivalent ADOSH interview transcript with Bravo 33
( French and Burfiend ) to ‘compare’ the SAIT (YIN) notes to and be SURE that
this ONE person’s recollection isn’t flawed, or that he simply was mistaken
about WHO was ‘calling that in’ to him.
There isn’t ( an equivalent ADOSH or other ‘independent’ interview with B33
French/Burfiend ).
At the 23 second mark of the 1637 Panebaker video there is a background transmission that I cannot make out. This video is only 39 seconds long and would put the 23 second mark near 1637. If you do not mind reviewing, I would appreciate it.
Otherwise, I hear you. I also want to know how the SAIT came up with this “quote.”
How does the 4490 red video that was taken around deployment time fit into all of this?
I know the +23 transmission in the 163700 Panebaker video that you speak of. I checked my Air Study notes and what I have for that is someone simply saying something about a “horse in the road” that they need to “take care of”.
I will re-listen to this 39 second video and get back.
As for the 4490red video… I don’t know.
Makes about as much sense ( time-wise ) as the Tom Story photo showing a full VLAT DC10 dump at exactly the moment of Steed’s first MAYDAY ( which is also not supported by any other evidence for being at that time ).
It could be that the 1633 SEAT DROP ( which definitely happened and is captured in that video ) is what Marsh MAY have seen and was reacting to THAT.
The ‘recollection’ might simply be wrong about what they were doing when they heard the transmission. Maybe Marsh had seen the actualy 1633 drop and THAT is what he meant by “That’s where we want retardant”… and it wasn’t a response to any ‘line up’ flight at all.
I decided to walk away from that, because the pain of picking my way thru it was greater than desperation to figure it out….
However, now that I found your posting of the list of the drops, I’ve been thinking hmmmmm is it possible he’s photographing the 1706 T910 drop? Of course the problem with that is that at about the same time (I think?) he was photographing the Blue Ridge UTV leaving the Ranch House Parking Lot…..
I don’t have Lightroom open, so I’m not looking at the photos, just doing this off the top of my head…….
One with id 552301203 with a 70-200 mm f/2.8 L lens (major everybody’s favorite workhorse zoom lens), and another with id 720306928 with a 16-34 mm f/2.8 L lens for wide angle shots.
They both seem to be accurately time-stamped.
On the 1D Mark II id 401063, his most state-of-the-art camera, with which he shot the VLAT drop that I may be getting closer to time-stamping (he was so far off that I think maybe he hadn’t bothered to set the time, just the date–perhaps it was brand new??), he was using a 300 mm f/2.8 L lens. That’s a pretty big honkin’ lens. And heavy.
Marti… in folder ONE of Tom Story’s online photos ( the folder that does NOT have any Ranch House Restaurant photos )… he shot a LOT of ‘retardant drop’ sequences and they appear to have ALL been shot with this same ‘Canon EOS-1D Mark II N’ camera that was then later used for the (supposed) 1639 VLAT drop.
I suppose if we can just match ANY of these ‘drops’ that he photographed with THAT camera we will know if the that 1639 VLAT drop photo has an accurate timestamp or not.
I’m looking at it from this end as well. There is NO EVIDENCE that ANY VLAT drop took place ANYWHERE on that fire at 1639… when Tom Story’s photo seems to say it did.
I was hoping for just a 1 hour (incorrect) time zone setting… but that doesn’t seem to be the case.
I had downloaded a smattering of photos from both folders, but just kinda randomly. Just downloaded a bunch more, more strategically. Looks like he photographed three VLAT drops. Will look at them much more closely after Mothers Day Lunch!
I’m starting to think he set up that camera quickly, just setting the date, and not the time. Thus the stamp when first shot a frame on it would have been 00:00:00. I don’t know if I have the time to figure out what to synch on. But if I can pin one of those VLATs, it might be possible to nail it.
That being said, I’m currently thinking that drop might be the 1707ish one. I just don’t know where he took it from. I don’t know where that drop was, exactly. Do you? If it was visible from the RHR parking lot, he could have caught it w/that 300mm easily.
Plus, I’m not sure that folder just has the 1Ds. But I’ll examine them later today for sure!
Hah! I just found what looks like a tight sequence of the same event, using both a Mark D and the 1D! It’s the red and white helicopter picking up a bucket at the helispot and heading into the smoke…
The voice in the video is that of French, who is in the role of Lead Plane, not Air Attack. That’s why he is on Air-to-Air. He’s not listening to Air-to-Ground.
When you hear the voice/callout of Air Attack, on Air-to-Ground, that is Burfiend. He’s not listening to Air-to-Air.
The only way each one knows what’s going on on the other’s channel is via their communication with each other.
So the person telling the story of their recollection of the communication with Div A would have been Burfiend.
Other than that, yep, copy. So now that I’ve downloaded that video, I’ll go watch it.
They were obviously able to just ‘talk’ to each other in
the plane but each one was ONLY listening to the one
frequency, apparently.
Don’t forget that the 163338 Panebaker video actually
SHOWS the ‘real time’ SEAT drop that actually happens
in the other video detailed above.
They come in from the SOUTH ( lined up on that radio tower as the conversation says ) and they drop on the EAST side of the fire.
There is no ‘West to East’ flyover as described in the SAIR and there was no chance of it flying OVER Marsh… but that doesn’t mean he might not have ‘seen it’… and THIS 1633 SEAT drop is what he might have actually been referring to with his “That’s where we want retardant” message.
A public copy of this Air Study video is in Mr. Dougherty’s online Dropbox at…
LOL I’m still downloading the 20130630_1628_ER.MOV file that I’ve been downloading for the past hour and a half, having slowed it down exponentially by trying to watch a bunch of other videos at the same time…..
But as soon as it finally finishes, I’ll take a look at that one. I still haven’t actually been able to play anythng in any manner that lets me actually SEE what’s going on……
Also WTKTT and Marti
Bothe of the drops on the Video were to far out in front of the fire to do any good. The did not fly into the smoke to hit the flames.
Again it is hard to use air tankers at the front of a running fire. Smoke wind and no visibility reduce accuracy of drops. If GM was under the smoke they would not have seen them to make an accurate drop. Only in the movies. OLD SAYING— Never expect an air drop to save your ass, if they can’t see you they can’t hit you…
Looking back over the transcript of Bravo Lead Pilot talking to the VLAT 910 while they’re setting up for the drop.
I can’t tell if Bravo is actually flying a “show me” or they’re just circling. It kinda reads like Bravo is actually flying the show me, which would mean he would have been flying over the bowl.
What do you think?
And also I’m asking this of Bob Powers, who seems to be the one of us with the most experience of this stuff……
Yes very likely the fir was not that big to circle and make runs and keep all the plains apart would cover a lot of air space. circling the fire at different altitudes or even locations. as I said earlier the plains could have flown over Marsh and crew at any time
in a 8 mile square area. Setting up to make a run takes a lot of maneuvering. Dose that help?
“If you need more altitude let me know… you should be okay at sixty five, only other aircraft I’ve seen is a media ship at this time (at) niner-thousand five hundred.”
Right after the 1633 SEAT drop… it was ‘load and return’ time for that SEAT. French didn’t get back to Kevin ( DC10 ) right away because he had to take a moment to inform the now departing SEAT that Wickenburg was ‘out of retardant’. Departing SEAT says he will try a ‘private club’ in Wickenburg. French gives him permission to do that… and only then begins to turn his attention to Kevin… SEVEN miles out and ‘holding’.
As Kevin is ‘coming in’… French tells him “we’re pretty much alone on the fire now”.
So YES… the space was cleared out. The other DC10 was ‘on approach’ to Yarnell but still quite a ways out.
Except for the choppers, that is. They ( apparently ) just continued to do pretty much whatever they wanted to… just as they had been doing all day.
Marti… yes. Probably so. See my other post about the ‘plan’ apparently being to just try to get ‘in position’ to be in FRONT of Kevin ( DC10 910 ) as he came into the area from the SOUTH and be ready to just ‘angle in front of him’ for a quick ‘show me’ as soon as he entered the area.
This ‘jockeying for position’ while waiting for Kevin to arrive on the fire and ‘acquire a visual’ on them might be the ‘practice runs’ mentioned in the B33 YIN notes.
I think, now, after going over the transcripts, they did fly the show me, but it was exactly when Jesse made the mayday, bcuz the call from Prescott (who heard Jesse’s mayday) came right while Bravo was flying over the bowl west to east.
Chilling.
So, to get out of stun mode and back to analytical mode, if Eric made any call on air to ground about “that’s where we want it,” it had to have been about an earlier flight. So that would mean the actual SEAT drop.
It’s possible Eric is watching the Bravo Lead Plane and VLAT 910 circling around the bowl, which is what they were doing, before the show me, at 3:47, and that’s when he Air2Grounds “that’s it that’s where we want it.” And that’s what Burfiend would have heard.
Is that impossible?
I’m thinking out loud so thanks for your patience, every one…..
Marti… the way I read that transcript in the 1630 to 1643 timeframe… my take is that when French ( Lead Plane Duty ) finally turned his attention to Kevin ( VLAT DC10 910 ) circa 1636.46 ( just 14 seconds before 1637 )… and told him to ‘come on in’ from his ‘holding pattern’ SEVEN MILES away… and said “Have I got a project for you!”… what he wanted to have happen at that point was to be ‘in position’ to do a ‘show me’ for Kevin as soon as he ‘entered the area’.
So YES… there must have been a lot of ‘circling’ going on at that moment as he waited for Kevin to ‘come on in’ and get a VISUAL on him.
We can even hear the two of them struggling to ‘acquire’ that visual as Kevin brought the DC10 in. It isn’t until Kevin says “Okay… I see your beacon” that he actually DID ‘acquire that visual’.
But now we are just seconds BEFORE Steed’s first MAYDAY.
So I guess it is ‘possible’ that as French was ‘circling around’ in anticipation of getting in FRONT of Kevin as he came in from the SOUTH… French could have been
literally ‘all over the place’ down there.
Maybe he did circle WAAAY out over that middle bowl doing some kind of ‘practice run’ to get in front of Kevin as he came in from the SOUTH… and Marsh simply just ‘saw’ French ‘jockeying for position’ as Kevin approached…
…but that still doesn’t warrant Marsh’s (unsolicited) “That’s exactly what we want!” radio call.
That ‘circling around’ to get into position to lead Kevin on a SOUTH to NORTH ‘show me’ on the far EAST side of the fire as Kevin ‘arrived’ in the area would have had nothing to do with where they actually planned to drop any retardant.
So we’re supposed to believe Marsh just saw some small plane wildly circling around up in the air down there and somehow thought that was an indication of where retardant was going to be dropped?
Fer cryin’ out loud.
If Marsh really was all that concerned about ‘helping’ get retardant dropped somewhere… then why isn’t there MORE radio traffic to that effect where we at least hear Marsh trying to CONFIRM where they planned on dropping ANYTHING?
Do I still confused about all this?
You damn betcha.
Marti… I am on a ‘learning curve’ here with all this information myself… but that is simply what it SOUNDS like is happening from the transcript(s) of the audio conversations.
Yes… something about ‘west to east’ practice is runs is mentioned in SAIT interview notes… but I am focused more at the moment on what the AUDIO captures ACTUALLY tell us about what they were REALLY doing.
Even though the ‘show me’ is long past 1637 and just moments before Steed’s first MAYDAY… French has obviously started the ‘show me’ and is explaining what he wants to Kevin in the DC10… and he uses compass headings.
French says “…and my heading starting out was three six zero and ended up about three three five’.
Flying a ‘heading’ of ‘three six zero’ means you are flying DUE NORTH.
There is no ZERO compass heading in aviation. True north is always referred to by pilots as ‘three six zero’.
So flying a heading of ‘three six zero’ for the start of the drop and ending up with a heading of ‘three three five’ means flying a due SOUTH TO NORTH flight path and then banking a little to your LEFT and ending up with a heading of 335 degrees ( sorta north/northwest ).
There are OTHER clues in that transcript such as French specifically asking the chopper that is leaving the area to fly down the WEST side of the fire to stay ‘out of the way’.
Why would he be ASKING the chopper to exit the area to the WEST if that’s where he was planning on flying with Kevin?
I posted this video a few weeks ago. I don’t know if anybody watched it. It’s REALLY REALLY helpful, about the most helpful thing I’ve come across regarding how Air Attack actually works.
I think there’s a TON of CONFUSION in our discussion about Air Attack. And that’s NOT helping us figure things out or communicate accurately to whomever may be reading this.
In this really well made BLM National Incident Fire Center video, called “Firefighting Airspace (2012 Refresher),” Steve Price, Aerial Supervisor, BLM Boise District, clearly describes and illustrates how Air Attack works. Then, at 6:16, he clearly describes how the Aerial Supervision Module, i.e. BRAVO, works, and, then, how the communications system is organized.
The pilot of the plane (i.e. for Bravo 33 at Yarnell being FRENCH, not Burfiend) functions as a lead plane pilot, and communicates primarily over Air-to-Air with the other pilots. That is his job. That’s why I’m saying to you, WTKTT, that you are incorrect in ascribing that voice/role to Burfiend.
The not-pilot of the plane (i.e. for Bravo 33 at Yarnell being BURFIEND, not French) functions as Air Attack, and communicates primarily over Air-to-Ground with the crews and overhead and whoever else on the ground. Again, WTKTT, when you say that, in the interview, it’s French speaking, that, also, is not accurate.
When one needs to let the other know something, they tell each other. French, as overheard in the Air Study videos, was functioning as lead plane, and being heard in the videos, communicating over air-to-air. He didn’t hear the Steed Mayday. He was trying to line up the VLAT T910 drop, a challenging job in itself, all things considered. How that Prescott notification got picked up in that video I have no idea. I don’t think French probably even heard it.
Burfiend is the one speaking in the interview. He’s the one who would have been busy doing other things when Steed did his Air to Ground “MayDay.” He’s the one who would have been in communication with Div A. I’m guessing he would have heard the Prescott call. Probly about the same time OPS got his attention, also. He’s the one who would have told French, we’ve got a problem on the ground, at which point French notified T910 of the problem and told him to go on standby.
In order to even begin to accurately understand what we are seeing/hearing in these videos, and what we are reading in these reports, interviews, etc., we really need to clear up our confusion about this stuff.
Also, since I’ve spent the morning reading all your Air Study posts, WTKTT, yes that 4:16/4:18 T-911 pair of videos was a split-drop in which, as the list indicates, the first drop was “at” 1615 and the second was “at” 1617. So, as unbelievable as it may sound, those two drops came two minutes apart.
And thanks for all the heavy lifting you did getting those videos transcribed and analyzed. It wasn’t until I stumbled across that Firefighting Airspace video, that my own confusion started lifting enough for me to even begin to comprehend what we are encountering. Because it really is……..CONFUSING!
And now that I just wrote all that, it also means that whether or not that 4:37 Marsh communication with BURFIEND happened, it WOULDN’T have shown up on the Air Study video, because it wasn’t Air-to-Air. And it wasn’t with FRENCH, who wasn’t AIR ATTACK.
So the only way it will emerge is if it’s via a video that has Air to Ground at that time overheard, or if someone who was listening, as you have said WTKTT, that VERY MUCH listened to Air to Ground frequency overheard it and would like to speak up about that somewhere sometime somehow.
Burfiend’s a pretty awesome guy. I don’t think he would be making something up. I think both of them were doing a SPECTACULAR job, all things considered. Including the fact that they were left clueless about what was happening in the midst of total chaos and had to figure out a whole lot of things on the fly.
Marti as you explained above you rang a bell.
The that’s exactly were we want it came fro the Air attack boss telling the lead plane he was right on.
some times no one answers as he was expecting to hear that or hear he was not in the right place.
Happens all the time between lead and air.
I am saying it never was Marsh.
If it was not Air Attack
It would have been some one close to the drop zone talking on air to ground. have to figure this out. Maybe one of the OPS.
I am still betting it was not Marsh.
If there was to much smoke he may have heard the Plains but never would have seen them. I am in agreement with WTKTT that the smoke was to thick to see the plains at that time. Marsh would have wanted a drop on his head and the crews at that point not dropping on the flames would not even slow that fire down.
I think I’m agreeing with you here. I kind of put this idea out, trying to wrestle the timeline together, this being the last straw.
Watching the Air Study Video of the VLAT split drop some 20 minutes earlier, I could see Bravo33 flying and leading the VLAT 911, but only just barely. And that’s when they were both coming down much lower to actually do the drops.
I think if Eric was watching when Bravo 33 did the practice run from west to east over the bowl, he might have been able to see it, if the smoke wasn’t too thick, or maybe hear it. But, unfortunately, that didn’t happen until 4:39 while Steed was making his mayday call and, alas, it was too late for any meaningful signal from Eric saying “yes that’s where we want it.”
So since I don’t think Burfiend made that up, and he’s saying it happened while they were flying “show me” from west to east over the bowl, in the midst of all that smoke and whatever (which they WERE IN FACT DOING over on the other side of the fire before they came to this side), the only thing I can think of is that somebody else must have said that. It’s really a stumper.
And if Eric, or anybody else, had said it over AirToGround, at 4:39, while Bravo 33 was flying (I think, but I could be wrong) a “show me” from west to east over the bowl, everybody that was listening to Air to Ground then, which included a WHOLE LOT OF PEOPLE (including us watching/listening to the “Last Minutes” video, would have heard it, also
So at this point, I, personally admit I can’t figure this one out, based on the data we currently have, and am willing to admit defeat, given that I’m not all that sure what difference it ultimately makes in the general scheme of things, anyway.
At this time, “Air Attack” was Burfiend, sitting in Bravo 33 with French, who was flying as Lead Plane. It was fully functioning as an Air Support Module, with both Lead Plane and Air Attack bundled into one vehicle. So what you are saying here doesn’t work.
Reply to Marti Reed post on May 9, 2014 at 11:50 am
>> Marti said…
>> Because it really is……..CONFUSING!
Yes… it is… and the SAIT interview notes with Bravo 33 are
really such a MESS that it just compounds things.
For example…
>> Marti also said…
>> Burfiend is the one speaking in the interview.
No… not exclusively. There are ‘quotes’ in these interview
notes from BOTH of them… but since it is all written as
‘first person perspective’ it is NEVER clear in those SAIT
interview notes ( at any particular moment ) WHO is really
being ‘quoted’ ( Burfiend or French ).
The SAIT interview notes with Bravo 33 contain specific
references for BOTH Burfiend AND French being the ones
‘quoted’… but it keeps CHANGING.
Examples from the YIN interview notes…
( See if you can ‘follow the bouncing ball’ here as to
who is suddenly ‘speaking’ to the SAIT interviewers )…
________________________________________________
Paragraph 4…
I knew there was 2 structural groups. I wrote down 2.
Tom said “hey dude, you are the air attack”.
Paragraph 13…
I was talking to Tom about the rising terrain on exit.
Paragraph 17…
I told Tom “lets fly something further down”.
Same Paragraph (17)… but only 8 sentences later…
I looked at John and he did this (slash across the throat).
I told Kevin to stand by copy, taking it around.
Same Paragraph (17)… just 4 sentences later…
At first KA wanted to get the bucket but John said “no,
we need to find these guys”.
Last paragraph…
Because of the attitude, I was working hard trying to
stay 3 drops in front of Tom.
_______________________________________________
So not only is the TIME all distorted in this ‘interview’ with
them jumping back and forth all over the place…
…one moment it is (apparently) Burfiend speaking in the
‘first person’… then suddenly it’s French speaking in the
‘first person’… then it’s (apparently) back to Burfiend again.
I could almost understand them ‘splitting’ the interview notes into ‘top-half’ and ‘bottom-half’ with one or the other being
French or Burfiend then speaking from the first-person…
…but there’s no indication that’s what they were doing, either. It’s all just a jumbled MESS.
By the way…
There were THREE people in that airplane.
SAIT INTERVIEW WITH BRAVO 33 – July 9, 2013 – 1700
Interviewees: Bravo 33
John Burfiend-ATS Specialist
Clint Clauson – ATS Trainee
Thomas French – AT Specialist
What RADIO CHANNEL does anyone think the 3rd guy
in the plane ( Clauson ) was ‘listening to’ that day?
Since he is listed as an ATS Trainee… and French is
only listed as an ‘AT’… does that automatically mean
this mysterious Clauson guy was only interested in
what Burfiend ( ATS Specialist ) was doing… and so
was only listening to ‘Air-To-Ground’ like Burfiend?
If that is the case… then that means this Clauson guy
would have heard EVERYTHING Burfiend did… including
this (supposed) “That’s what we want” transmission from
DIVSA Eric Marsh.
But ( apparently ) even though the SAIT had this Clauson
guy sitting right there in the interview… they never asked
him anything and he is (apparently?) not quoted anywhere
in that interview. Very strange.
Also… now that I have re-read the SAIT Bravo 33 notes
to grab the ‘follow the bouncing ball’ quotes… I just realized
that this Bravo 33 interview ALSO proves without a
shadow of a doubt that OPS1 Todd Abel was ‘fully engaged’
with Bravo 33 throughout the entire ‘swtich to the south
side of the fire’ Air Operations shift… and right on up
through the deployment.
There are quotes in the B33 YIN interview which indicate
OPS1 Todd Abel was VERY ‘focused’ on the Air-To-Ground
channel and conversing directly with Burfiend right up
to Steed’s first MAYDAY call ( and beyond ).
So that means if Eric Marsh really did suddenly come
onto the Air-To-Ground channel at 1637 with his
( unsolicited ) “That’s what we want” transmission…
…that OPS Todd Abel MUST have heard it right along
with Burfiend ( and the Clauson guy )… along with ALL
the other people who were no-doubt listening to that
‘popular’ Air-To-Ground channel.
But NOWHERE in ANY of his interviews with two separate
investigations does Todd Abel say he ever heard any
such transmission.
It really is important to figure this out.
Not only because the SAIT chose to label this one single
‘transmission’ as ‘totally verified’ and THEN use it as the
defacto ‘end’ of the (supposed) ‘verifiable communications’
blackout period…
…but also because it’s simply important to KNOW if
DIVSA Eric Marsh ever really did say any such thing.
So….. I’ve spent the day downloading and watching and trying to learn from the videos. And trying to be unbiased about it. And still struggling with that Marsh call that Burfiend (who I really respect) notes. And being seriously impressed by French’s behavior, even tho you diss him for the chuckles. I see him as doing a really good job of a really complicated task and the chuckles are to support the pilots, and I think they’re doing a better and more professional job than a whole bunch of other people on that clusterf*ck fiasco of a fire.
But reading what you are writing here, and yeah. The SAIT was a joke. Not an investigation. This is totally unprofessional. But I don’t blame Burfiend and French for it.
I sit here thinking maybe sometime I should head down to Silver City to have a conversation. If I can find the time. Which I maybe can’t. All things considered. Hopefully whoever is in charge of the lawsuits will.
>> calvin said…
>>
>> Div A tells Rory Collins the other crew is in the black and they were
>> headed back to the rigs.
>>
>> Questions.
>> 1. What other crew? Is he referring to a squad of GMH? No?
>> 2. Who is the “They”, that were headed back to the rigs??
>> 3. Does this indicate that Marsh was not in the black circa 1530?
calvin… I knew you were going to ‘catch’ that.
This statement from Air Attack Rory Collins has always been there ( in his SAIT interview notes ) and has always been sort of just laying there like a turd on the table.
It’s never really been fully discussed.
The elusive Mr. Collins was (apparently) NEVER interviewed by ADOSH but it was not for lack of them trying to.
Once again… here is that ‘cut’ from the SAIT investigators’ NOTES from their ( apparent ) interview with Air Attack Rory Collins…
_________________________________________________________________
** SAIT interview with Rory Collins…
Air Attack – LDF – Roseburg
Interview took place at 11:00 a.m. 7/13/2013
Interviewers: Rocha, Kurth, Mike Dudley, Jim Karels.
15:30 Experienced wind shift and the flank turned and became the
head going SOUTH to Yarnell. I let B(?) know prior to the shift to
move to that side and start drops.
15:30 – 15:45 The fire was headed for Yarnell moving FAST to the SOUTH.
They were getting retardant drops. Contacted Division A to tell them of fire
condition and that they needed to move their rigs to a better location.
Q: Did he say he was in good black?
A: NO, he said the other crew was in a good location in the black and
they were headed back to the rigs.
__________________________________________________________________
As for your questions…
>> 1. What other crew? Is he referring to a squad of GMH? No?
It’s hard to tell… but the way I have always read that confusing note from the SAIT investigator(s) is that Marsh might have been referring to ‘Blue Ridge’ as the ‘other crew’ ( or specifically Frisby and Brendan in the UTV ) and that ‘they’ were ‘headed back to the rigs’ ( Even though the ‘in the black’ part of that statement would then make no sense at all ).
>> 2. Who is the “They”, that were headed back to the rigs??
See above. My mind wants to say it was a reference to Blue Ridge ( or just Frisby and Brendan ) since they really were ‘headed back to the rigs’ at that time… but is it possible that at that moment Marsh talked to Collins Marsh really did think there was time for Granite Mountain to ‘head back to the rigs’?
Is it possible that was the ‘plan’ that Marsh actually was referring to in other documented conversations around this time?
>> 3. Does this indicate that Marsh was not in the black circa 1530?
If Marsh was actually on the VERY top of the ‘Weaver Mountains’… then yes… I don’t think it can be said that he was technically ‘in the black’ at that point. Even now… with Google Maps defaulting to post-fire imagery, there are places up there where Marsh could have been that never really burned at all.
These aren’t the *only* notes from the SAIT’s (supposed) interview with Rory Collins that are totally mystifying and unexplained.
That entire SAIT Investigation Notes page for Collins’ interview is basically a joke.
ADOSH tried and tried to interview the elusive Mr. Collins… but (apparently) never succeeded since there is NOTHING in the ADOSH FOIA/FOIL documentation package that represents either an in-person or a telephone interview with ATGS / ASM1 / Rory Collins.
Strangely enough, however… the ADOSH contracted WFAR report makes DIRECT references to ‘our interview with ATGS / ASM1 / Rory Collins’…
Example 1… page 37 of WFAR.
NOTE: This is where the WFAR is using the known incident of Rory Collins dropping retardant on Marsh’s (planned) burnouts as an example of the MANY ‘mis-communications’ that were happening on that fire pretty much all day long. The WFAR specifically says that it interviewed ATGS / ASM1 / Rory Collins about this and it is QUOTING him…
_________________________________________________________________
A good example of the lack of communication from the briefing that occurred on June 30 was the test fire that GMIHC was igniting. During the morning at the top of the ridge, GMIHC was planning to burnout a small section of line to create the fire perimeter down to a two-track road. While they were igniting the test fire, two SEAT retardant drops extinguished their test fire between 1130 and 1145. The Air Tactical Group Supervisor (ATGS) did not know the purpose of the burning and dropped retardant on it, forcing GMIHC to go to direct attack on the fires perimeter. Planning OSC failed to inform ATGS of the tactics for the fire. During our interview with the ATGS on ASM1, he stated that they did not have a firm understanding of where the division breaks were. He stated that they could see the dozer, but did not understand its mission. The dozer was constructing a contingency line from west to east, which when complete, would allow a firing operation to be conducted when conditions were favorable. If ATGS had known this, they could have reinforced the dozer line with retardant instead of picking a location just to the north.
__________________________________________________________________
Again… there is NO DOCUMENTATION in the ADOSH FOIA/FOIL package that supports these statements in the WFAR report, or establishes ( for sure and certain ) that ADOSH ( or anyone associated with WFA ) was able to ever interview Rory Collins.
There are specific memos in the ADOSH ’emails and correspondence’ part of the FOIA/FOIL release that show ADOSH reminding the Wildland Firefighting Associates contractors that NO INTERVIEWS could take place WITHOUT an ADOSH representative present, so it is unlikely that WFA ever interviewed Collins on their own and that might be why the transcript of such and interview never made it into the ADOSH FOIA/FOIL release.
It’s still a BIG MYSTERY.
ATGS / ASM1 / Rory Collins was/is a KEY PLAYER in what was happening on the Yarnell Hill Fire on BOTH Saturday AND Sunday…
…but he still really doesn’t seem to have been properly interviewed
by any competent investigator(s).
This whole air support organization/terminology thing has been some of the most mind-boggling and confusing stuff I’ve been struggling to understand this whole time. Apparently the SAIT didn’t understand it either!
The only two small plains should have been.
Air Attack Boss– Ground to air coordination.
Lead Plane—-Takes orders from Air Attack and leads the Air tankers thru the drops. also may make first run to set up drop and show where to drop.
Some times Air Attack can also serve as Lead plane as needed.
Normally the lead plane is a 1 person contract or employee Pilot, who is dispatched with the Air Tankers. Clear as mud right.
Also the call numbers B33 would have been the numbers on the Plane unless they were assigned call numbers. ASM1 is there working ID. but not use normally as a call sign.
Exactly. (See my post above with the video that explains this stuff).
I think a big part of the confusion is the shifting relationships with Rory Collins being Air Attack when he’s there and Bravo 3 or 33 being Lead Plane, and Bravo 3 or 33 being both Air Attack and Lead Plane when he isn’t.
We-who-are-not-familiar-with-this-stuff are getting really confused by the way we’re encountering it. And it doesn’t help that both SAIT and ADOSH inaccurately communicate it, also. It just gets bewildering.
But I think I’m getting a WHOLE lot clearer about it.
And to make matters worse ( but still
something that is totally relevant to
figuring out what happened THAT
DAY in Yarnell )…
What is the damn ‘procedure’ for ‘notifying OPS and/or ground forces’ when these guys are playing “musical AA, ATGS, LP” all day up above them?
Is there no ‘procedure’ at ALL for this?
One minute you are pressing your microphone button on Channel 10 and/or 16 and you are talking to one guy… and seconds later you can press the microphone button again and you are now talking to a completely different guy who MAY or MAY NOT now even know who the hell YOU are? ( Depending on whether the changeover was piss-poor Collins style or not? )
When ( and HOW? ) were even OPS people like Abel or Musser even being ‘officially notified’ that these guys were changing jobs like tag-team wrestlers up above them that day?
I am not hearing ANYTHING that resembles ‘notifications’ about any of this in ANY of the captured radio traffic from that day.
Elizabeth has been chastised a few times in the past for multiple accusations against several different people who have posted here, that they were all actually one person, using different names. Myself, WTKTT, RTS, RS, Fire20+, and probably some others are included in that group. Despite the chastizing, she has continued to accuse others of this, without a shread of evidence
There is a recent on-going discussion down below, where she once again accused SEVERAL posters of being one person. She was called-out by several people, who said she owed RTS an apology.
She out-snarked everyone with her ridiculous response, stating she would apologize, ‘if only it weren’t true’.
I then called her out again, myself, and since the only person I actually know here IS myself, and I’M NOT WTKTT as she has alleged, I told her that at the very least she owed WTKTT and myself an apology, and if she didn’t, I was done with her, period.
FINALLY, she has revealed what stellar investigative skills she used to expose us all to the light of day.
Elizabeth on May 8, 2014 at 1:48 pm said:
TTWARE, as you might recall, it was “Observer” and I who both noticed the same thing a while ago. Specifically, when a question was asked of YOU, it was WTKTT who replies. Presumably that means that you and he are the same person or are speaking for each other? Or am I missing something?
Sorry Elizabeth, but it was ‘Observer’ who ran with the BULLSHIT that you had previously put out there, quite some time prior. The same WORTHLESS SHIT you have also been repeating about others. AND NOW, in your comment above, we are able to see your stellar investigative skills in action, ALONG WITH YOUR SOUND EVIDENCE.
What’s even more amazing is your obsession with this SHIT, and the fact that you continually put it out there like it’s VERY IMPORTANT, apparently to somehow denegrate the targets.
What you haven’t been able to grasp due to your obsession, is that it doesn’t matter one whit in the grand scheme of things, if someone WERE posting with a hundred different names. IT’S JUST INFORMATION, TO ALWAYS TAKE WITH A GRAIN OF SALT!
In case you haven’t noticed during your obsession, WTKTT POSTS TO EVERYTHING, no matter who the post was directed to. THERE’S NOTHING WRONG WITH THAT, AND I AM NOT HIM!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
As I said in my comment down below, which I posted above your comment copied above, since you choose not to apologize to WTKTT and myself, I am done with you, PERMANENTLY. I hope others on here follow-suit, as well!
I’ve been trying to take Elizabeth seriously about the weather. But I’m feeling used. And I just don’t have the time or energy. She hasn’t returned the favor. She hasn’t added anything. That doesn’t bother me personally, because I was genuinely interested in the weather at this point, anyway.
There are a number of people here who, I believe, have genuinely given of their time and energy to pick apart the evidence we can find in our own various ways, and share what we find, and question each other, in a relatively respectful way, in order to drill down into this whole mess, in order to discern the truth. I include you in that. And WTK, whose intense work has been so helpful so often, even when I’ve sometimes thought, OK you may be pushing too far….. And Calvin, who just keeps asking hard and challenging questions that I hadn’t even thought of…….. And Bob Powers, with so much hard-learned experience……. And Mike in his honesty…. And SR who sometimes aggravates people but I also think knows way more than he sometimes lets onto…
I hate to say this, Elizabeth, but I don’t trust you. I wish I could. Sometimes it seems like you are really trying to figure things out, and sometimes it seems like you are baiting and switching and using us all. And I don’t know why. We are not here……for your purposes.
And this whole current deal about who is who that you are pushing relentlessly, is pretty much the last straw with me. I refuse to play those kind of games. And I refuse to play with people who do.
Than You Marti what else can I say. Bring us back on subject. I have no problem with those that wish to stay anonymous. I have no reason to and I guess that just me I have always owned every thing I have said win lose or draw.
I’m like you. I’m pretty much “out there” on the Internet. My Facebook says who I am. My Twitter says who I am. My Flickr says who I am. If I ever finally get my website back up, it will, again, say who I am.
On the other hand, there are things I don’t say on the Internet. Because I’m “out there.”
I was once under investigation by the FBI. Not because of what I did, but because of what I knew. It was the most terrifying experience of my life. I had to rethink everybody in my life, as to exactly who they were, and exactly how much I trusted their judgement. I had to re-think TRUST.
And that is why I don’t expect anybody to ipso facto say who they are on the Internet. I am totally fine with Internet anonymity. it’s everybody’s right. I’m totally fine with it.
And I have had absolutely no problem distinguishing people in this forum. I have been perfectly capable of distinguishing the various voices here. I can’t even fathom anybody conflating TTWARE with WTKTT. Or RTS with SR.
This whole thing has been a huge waste of time and energy, IMHO.
Not long ago someone perused that Elizabeth is writing a book about this and using this forum to gather data. At the time I thought that was very far-fetched. Since then, considering how her posts have been worded, it certainly sounds like she might be gathering data for a book and using all of us to do the investigative leg-work.
OK I’m going to bare my soul here, after what I just wrote in response to Bob Powers.
Because I think this is a great time to just get real. As I just told my 94-year-old mom over the telephone, we’re ten months into this fiasco and we can still not figure out why they did what they did.
At one time, I thought I admired Elizabeth. I thought she was really concerned about and trying to gather information needed by the families in their quest to know the truth.
This was about the time I decided I was trying “to work” for Amanda Marsh, whether she ever knew it or not, because, at that time I was so seriously seeing how the Prescott Fire Department (as I wrote, “Here’s looking at you Daryll Willis”) was with-holding evidence, about a) the options conversation and what possible pressure was possibly being applied onto the crew, and b) the cellphones and gps units that have never surfaced. To be honest, I’m still asking those questions. That’s my “tin-foil hat conspiracy theory” and today I’ll proudly continue to stand by it. I still don’t know if “overhead” managed to screw over Eric Marsh (with all his foibles and strengths) and his crew or not.
However, as things progressed, even as I announced my retirement, but still kept reading this every day, and thinking every day, I found myself thinking, “Ya know, if I was looking to hire an investigative lawyer to drill down to the bottom of this whole affair, the last one I would hire would be Elizabeth, because of her lack of open-mindedness and, thus, her obtuseness.” Kind of the opposite of Sherlock Holmes.
And now I have to say, in response to your post, the last person I would hire to write a book about this is Elizabeth, because of her lack of respect for her sources. The best writers respect their sources. Which, in this case, Elizabeth hasn’t done. Not to mention her complete inability to communicate herself out of a paper bag. As we have, exasperatingly, all experienced.
Honestly, I have no idea why she is continuing to be here.
Elizabeth, exactly and honestly, why is it that you continue to invest yourself in being here, again?? I truly and honestly would like to know.
Marti. I totally disagree with you regarding Elizabeth.
Elizabeth has been in this conversation starting September 2013.She has put herself out there. She has secured a lot of the information we have to review. I realize fireman20 (or whom ever) says anyone can request records through the FOIA/FOIL (and that may be true) BUT, no one else has done this (and then shared the records publicly) except ELIZABETH, DOUGHERTY, and GABBERT.
Marti. I am not asking you to agree with everything Elizabeth does or says. But I am asking you to weigh the positive effects Elizabeth has brought to IM and the Yarnell incident before making personal attacks against her.
We all have different backgrounds which makes this discussion interesting and (IMHO) helps explore different angles that may have been overlooked.
I really value and appreciate what you are saying here. And that’s because I really respect and trust your voice here.
In general I mostly avoid making negative comments about other people. I really do. And I’ve mostly done that here. Because I agree with you that various voices, even when I disagree with something they say, are REALLY REALLY valuable.
My beef has to do with two things.
1. I feel that in a number of instances, from recently to back aways, she has been perfectly comfortable interrogating us without expressing any genuine respect for us, or responding to our questions of her. I’ve personally experienced that, and I’ve seen her do that to others.
2. Trashing/distorting other peoples’ identities. This whole thing has been really disturbing to me, and genuinely hurtful to others. I can’t fathom any need to do that and it damages her credibility and I have no idea why she has continued to do it.
I appreciate the many things she has positively offered, but I am no longer willing to just sit back and be OK with the damage she has done.
>> SR said…
>> I hadn’t known about the McDonough statements as regards what Marsh,
>> Steed and he knew and discussed about the weather. I think it’s glaringly
>> clear that they did know that a full 180 windshift, complete with 50 mph
>> gusts, was coming.
Of course it is.
It was ALREADY HAPPENING even by the time Byron Kimball got around
to forwarding the official NWS and SWCC spot forecast over the radio
at 1530. Just moments later… it was so OBVIOUSLY happening that that
is what threatened Brendan McDonough’s safety and was forcing him to
abandon his lookout position circa 1536 or 1537 ( and to have all of those
radio conversations with Steed/Marsh about why he had to leave ).
In the course of just 5 minutes… Marsh thought it was ‘safe’ to ask Brian Frisby to schlep all the way out to the ridge just to have some kind of ‘secret’ conversation that Marsh (somehow) didn’t feel comfortable having over open radio… then moments later ( while Frisby is only halfway out there ) the fireline up right near them has REVERSED DIRECTION and is now threatening Brendan’s life.
So even if Marsh didn’t realize the predicted 180 FULL WIND REVERSAL was just about to happen when he called Frisby out to meet with him… he certainly realized it just minutes later when his own 20th man’s life is now in danger and Frisby himself realized it was ‘too dangerous’ to even still try to fulfill the request for the face-to-face with Marsh… and CALLED OFF THE MEETING for that very reason.
There is actually plenty of ‘other’ evidence that Marsh and Steed were FULLY aware of ( and EXPECTING ) the FULL 180 degreee wind shift such as other statements Brendan ( and others ) have made in public interviews and press
conferences following the incident.
Here’s just another ‘sampling’ of those statements…
__________________________________________________________________
** From the Kyle Dickman ( former Hotshot ) article entitled…
** “19: The True Story of the Yarnell Hill Fire” published September 17, 2013,
** and completely based on face-to-face interviews with Brendan McDonough…
NOTE: This matches Brendan’s ADOSH testimony where Brendan says it was
Steed himself who now reporting the predicted 180 degree wind shift and 50-60
mile per hour wind gusts to HIM, over the radio…
Donut was less than a minute into slinging his 4 P.M. weather when Steed
came back over the radio.
“Donut, you up?”
“Go, Steed.”
“They’re calling for a 180-degree wind shift and gusts of up to 60 miles per hour out of the northeast.”
“Copy that.”
He looked up at the approaching wall of flames and blinked. For the first time that afternoon, the wind was blowing at his face instead of his back. The flank that had been slowly backing down the valley had suddenly jumped to life. Two-foot flames had grown to twelve, and within moments the fire was running up a ridge on the east side of the valley and then south, directly at Donut.
“Steed, Donut. It hit my trigger point.” The fire had crossed the drainage on the valley floor only a quarter of a mile away. “I’m bumping back to the dozer push.”
“Alright, let me know when you get there. We’ve got eyes on you.”
Donut tossed on his pack and grabbed his gear as he started wading down
through the brush field and boulders toward the safety of the clearing the
bulldozer had created that morning
__________________________________________________________________
** From Brendan McDonough’s exclusive ABC news interview with
** Brian Ross, August 7, 2013
“Everything seemed normal, not threatening. Just — a typical day, going direct
on a fire,” he ( Brendan McDonough ) told ABC News.
Around 4:00 in the afternoon, however, everything changed. The winds that had
been driving the fire away from the Hotshots began to turn 180 degrees, propelled
by what some fire officials call a “perfect storm” of gusts up to 50 miles per hour.
Instead of moving NORTH, it started moving SOUTH as the flame front leapt
from 25 to 50 feet high.
McDonough says the team could now see what was happening — contradicting
some accounts that they were unaware the fire was heading toward them.
“From where they were, they could see it picking up. So they kind of relayed to
me, ‘Hey, Donut, we got eyes on it,'” McDonough remembers his captain telling
him. “They said, ‘If you need to get out of there, go ahead and get out of there…
we want you to be safe too,’ you know?”
__________________________________________________________________
** From Darrell Willis’ press conference at the deployment site, July 23, 2013…
( Question From A Reporter ) : Is there a confirmation that they did receive…
uh… information concerning the outflows from the thunderstorms?
( Darell Willis ): Yes. There is confirmation of that.
There’s no question about it.
They saw that the… uh… fire activity was picking up. There was a line of fire
from the ridge top… beyond where they where down lower into the valley
probly a mile or two… mile and a half line of.. uh.. fire… and it’s chaparral
that started to move to the SOUTH.
__________________________________________________________________
>> SR also wrote…
>>
>> It is convenient for those claiming that everything at YHF was perfectly
>> reasonable that, hey, the wind shifted, and no one could see further shifts
>> coming. Crazy outflow boundary, something you couldn’t see and that no
>> one had heard of. Almost as if GM got hit by an asteroid — tragic, but
>> nothing anyone could have done anything to prevent. Of course, that is
>> all completely nonfactual.
Some people never let the FACTS get in the way. It’s just annoying to them.
Something that needs to be remembered here is what any lawyer knows, and
that is what the real ‘legal’ *definition* of NEGLIGENCE is… and how lawyers
go about either proving it… or DEFENDING AGAINST IT, in open court.
Here is the ACTUAL (legal) definition of NEGLIGENCE…
_________________________________________________________________
1) Failure to exercise the care that a reasonably prudent person would
exercise in like circumstances.
2) Lack of normal care or attention
_________________________________________________________________
Two IMPORTANT things to notice about the ‘definition(s)’…
“reasonably prudent person” AND “normal care or attention”.
What lawyers will ALWAYS do to DEFEND against accusations of NEGLIGENCE
is to FIRST simply try to establish that ‘anybody else’ ( Sic: reasonably prudent
person ) would have probably ‘done the same thing’ AND/OR that nothing
regarding the circumstances surrounding the decision making was really
‘out of the normal’ at all.
Sounds close to some recent posts here, doesn’t it?
Don’t forget that Elizabeth is also the one who has now stated at least FOUR
or FIVE times on this public discussion thread that there was ‘nothing out of
the ordinary’ with regards to the piss-poor handoff that Air Attack Rory Collins
had with Bravo 33 before he abruptly left the fire at 1558… EVEN THOUGH
there is signed testimony from Bravo 33 themselves about what a ‘strange
handoff’ Collins performed that day and their own testimony about how
absolutely CLUELESS they were following that piss-poor handoff.
She continues to maintain that it was ‘nothing out of the ordinary’ and that
the next handoff later on was ‘just as quick’. ( I.E. – establish ‘normalcy’ ).
What a lawyer often hopes to establish when trying to defend against
NEGLIGENCE is this exact ‘establishment of normalcy’ and/or ‘establishment
of a pattern of decision making or behavior’ that doesn’t lead to ‘bad outcomes’
which can then be construed as ‘reasonably prudent behavior’… hence…
NO NEGLIGENCE.
So…… I’ve just spent 45 minutes trying to get to the weather documents via both Dougherty’s live links and the ones you have to copy and paste and EVERYTHING is landing on a page with a message that says: “Disabled link
Access to this link has been disabled. Please ask the owner of the shared link to send a new link to access the file or the folder.”
Could somebody else please try this and tell me if they’re getting it, too, or am I doing something wrong>
You could still pull the historic Stanton RAWS data from somewhere, for sure.
But as great that it is that you are looking to do this, since all the data, radar, forecasts, etc. seem to align with contemporaneous accounts, I don’t think there’s any legit question as regards the weather.
Yes. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qwIB9RQY3zE There are all sorts of other sources, such as this blending of Flagstaff Doppler images. I can’t access from where I am, but for a weather-lite view, people can even go to something like Weather Underground and check the Alamanac for Flagstaff for 6/30/13 just to see that it more or less corresponds to other accounts.
The real story here is that a couple posters are simply floating the proposition that Marsh relied on some unique and personal definition of weather and of the weather forecast he had just heard, and reasonably so, and/or that weather associated with thunderstorms is unheard of in AZ and couldn’t have been expected…even if the forecasts of that weather had been received and were correct.
Amidst all this sound and fury it seems the GM overhead misread something – weather, fire etc. Even if there was an order (which at the present time appears to be the triumph of hope over facts), Marsh must have misread something in order to comply with it. Otherwise, if he complied knowing how dangerous it was, well I certainly hope that was not the case. He not only had a right, but a responsibility, to turn down an unsafe order. He was responsible for his crew. And if he knew it was unsafe, but relied on the promise of a retardant drop, many WFF have already indicated that would have been firefighting malpractice.
It seems too much effort is going into making sense of Marsh’s decision, when in the end I believe it will not make sense.
Hah! That video is a true brain-challenger!!! I like the sound of the wind and the birds chirping!
But yes.
It definitely shows what a thunderstorm bearing down on a fire that’s burning in high-risk fuels can do. Is it unique? No. Is it radical? Depends on one’s definition. Is it why Chuck Maxwell, the SWCC Meteorologist, was agonizing in Albuquerque about whether to get more pro-active about strategy? You betcha!
Well, I was finally able to access the files, by turning on my Dropbox account and downloading them to there. Spent the day reading and re-reading the weather stuff, and then had turned to the Google for more, then a storm hit and blew out my power. But yay Safari remembers….
So now I know what was reported by whom and when. And now I know what the radar images and the satellite images look like. And I can see how easy it would be for someone like Elizabeth, who doesn’t know how to interpret this stuff, to get bogged down.
And there was an article in USA Today on October 13 (am looking at it on my computer but can’t provide the link cuz I’m typing on my iPad cuz of the storm), that speculated that Granite Mtn may have misinterpreted what they were seeing, thinking that the wind-shift the forecast predicted had peaked when Brendan had to be evacuated, and that they could hence proceed. Thus missing the fact that it hadn’t and the worst was yet to come.
It goes on to say, “But the stronger winds — the outflow boundary from the thunderstorm — moved across the area about 40 minutes later. By then, the crew was in a position it could not escape.”
I actually don’t believe it. What I see in what I’ve seen is more along the lines of what Bob Powers described a few miles down below. The meta-weather cell was slowly turning in a clockwise direction and the lower winds were, also, just in a more erratic terrain-related manner. Maybe GM was fooled by that… and maybe they weren’t. I happen to think they shouldn’t have been.
The other thing Elizabeth keeps saying that I don’t get is that that line of thunderstorms was just sitting there for hours some 60 miles from the fire going nowhere and doing nothing. I haven’t seen ANYTHING that indicates that. If she is looking at the same “above the clouds” images I am (I.e.the gifs which are in fact the satellite images), they show that thunderstorm line bearing right down over the fire and engulfing it, until the pyro-cumulus column forces it’s way up above it. At least, that’s what I see.
And I’d highly recommend reading Chuck Maxwell’s report in the FireBehaviorAndWeather PDF. He was in Albuquerque, watching that whole thing unfold on radar/satellite monitors, very much in touch w/IncidentCommand, and agonizing about whether he should/should not take a more pro-active stance in terms of getting everybody off that fire NOW. Kinda like my dad (who he probably knew) praying when Overhead didn’t listen to him.
And sitting here after reading all this, and your comments, and thinking. The reason I don’t believe this theory is because they were still up above it all, seeing it all happening until 4:20-ish. And it hadn’t quit happening. And it was increasingly heading right where they were increasingly going.
I increasingly agree with WTK, when he wrote a couple of miles below, that the REALLY critical decision was the one to enter the bowl, not the one to leave the black. I think they didn’t know where the two-track actually went, or trust it, and saw the ranch right below them, and maybe were cardinally-directionally-disoriented or something? (That can actually happen even to the best of us) They must have thought they were flanking the fire and not heading right into where it was going. They absolutely should have kept a lookout above them.
WEATHER:
My view (with all due respect) is that the SAIT and Wildland Fire Associates reports do not always most accurately describe or emphasize the relevant facts as they existed between roughly 3:40-ish and 4:22-ish p.m. on June 30th in terms of what GM was likely seeing or perceiving (or mis-perceiving) or relying upon that would make GM believe that it made sense to move when they did down to the Boulder Springs Ranch. With respect to the WEATHER, this is certainly my view.
TTWARE referenced either the radar or satellite images (I cannot remember which parlance he used), and I am pretty sure that I have 30 or more of those images, which, in my view, seem to confirm my understanding of the weather as GM was seeing it or perceiving it or understanding it that day. The SAIT either did not review these images or they did not publish/release them to the media/Dougherty.
Marti seems to suggest below that she views the radar/satellite images as irrelevant to this discussion, which suggests to me that perhaps she is instead focusing on the weather materials in the 147 pages released by the SAIT. (Hopefully everyone who is opining on the weather who does not have the WFF background that folks like Bob Powers or xxfullsailxx seem to have has at least given the 147 pages a read, to get up to speed on some of the raw materials rather than what the SAIR and other reports are saying about the raw materials. The overachievers among you have probably already pulled the *raw* NWS or other data for the past few years to confirm that not a whole lot of WFF work would get done in AZ between mid-June and the end of July if everyone stopped working and stood down in a safety zone the moment a static thunder cell appeared in the sky, even if it was 80 miles away and totally static for hours.) Either way, my tentative conclusions previously suggested remain.
I would be curious to know what those of you who disagree are pinpointing in the 147 pages or with the radar/satellite images (referenced by TTWARE) as the basis for disagreement. It is entirely possible that I am wrong about the weather and what GM was perceiving (or mis-perceiving), and, if so, it would be useful for me to understand what – other than the SAIT’s conclusions – form the basis for disagreement, so that I can do more research and hopefully come to a more accurate conclusion, assuming mine is inaccurate.
Uhh…as WTKTT very helpful laid out, Steed and Marsh heard the forecast and discussed it among themselves, including the fact that S/SW winds would shift 180 to N/NE. They could see the storm front. The forecast weather appeared. Marsh noted squirelly winds.
SR, if you honestly fail to see the confusion, then perhaps you underestimate the complexity of weather as it pertains to (a) fire behavior and (b) fire behavior in topography of the sort that existed near Yarnell/Glen Ilah. To respond to some of your points:
1. My understanding is that there was conversation AFTER the 3:26/3:30 p.m. forecast about whether any predicted weather changes had actually already occurred or were in the process of occurring. WTKTT seems to be ignoring this fact. If the NWS or FBAN or whatever weather-specific person indicates that the weather change predicted is either already here or has already impacted the fire, why would Marsh and Steed IGNORE this input?
2. When you say “they could see the storm front,” what storm front are you talking about? As I understand it, there had been one particular cell (or more) that had been around for multiple hours and was going NOWHERE. Marti gives a very good explanation below about how the weather in AZ this time of year can often be predicted in one way and play out in entirely another. Bob Powers himself notes that men who are experienced with wildfires and who pay attention can often see things in front of them or feel things or see things manifest in fire behavior that people who are arm-chair quarterbacking or sitting in an NWS office or on another side of the fire do not perceive.
3. “The forecast weather” (whatever that means) seems to have appeared either AFTER the men were dead or fatally compromised. The forecast weather did not CAUSE the shift in the fire that killed the men, as I understand it. So you are saying that the men got trapped and killed by “the forecast weather” (whatever you mean by that) that occurred AFTER they were trapped and likely already dead? Really? REALLY??
4. “Squirrelly winds” – Did *you* hear Marsh say such a thing? Me neither. It was either you or RTS or whomever who pointed out (correctly) that there are multiple things alleged in the SAIR/SAIT materials to have been said that people who are still living seem to indicate were NEVER said. So, it is *not* an established fact that Marsh commented on “squirrelly winds” no more than it is an established fact (as you or RTS or whomever like to allege) that Marsh had a pattern of reckless or needlessly risky/dishonest/covert/whatever behavior. That said, even if Marsh said “squirelly winds,” so what? Squirrelly winds does not equate with “a huge wind gust is about to occur and impact the fire behavior in a way that will trap and then kill you,” at least according to Bob Powers. Bob tells us – correctly, as I understand it – that FLAT air (e.g. no wind) can often be the warning sign of an impending major wind event. Then again, FLAT air (e.g. no wind) can sometimes indicate… no wind and no prospect of wind and there will be no wind for a while such that it is safe to move.
You are quick to criticize me, SR, for my alleged deficiencies in understanding weather as it pertains to fire, but, with all due respect, it appears that perhaps you also have some gaps in your knowledge. I suggest you and I work together to constructively figure out the relevant weather (as opposed to what folks have been alleging about the relevant weather).
I really don’t understand what you are saying here.
On the one hand, you say:
“1. My understanding is that there was conversation AFTER the 3:26/3:30 p.m. forecast about whether any predicted weather changes had actually already occurred or were in the process of occurring. WTKTT seems to be ignoring this fact. If the NWS or FBAN or whatever weather-specific person indicates that the weather change predicted is either already here or has already impacted the fire, why would Marsh and Steed IGNORE this input? …”
What CONVERSATION are you, AGAIN, referring to and among whom? And are you saying you are aware of NWS/FBAN/whatever indicating the predicted change (which was a half-hour prediction, but that doesn’t mean it predicted that weather event would END in a half hour, it was just the start) had already happened and was done at 4 PM??
And on the other hand, you say:
“3. “The forecast weather” (whatever that means) seems to have appeared either AFTER the men were dead or fatally compromised. The forecast weather did not CAUSE the shift in the fire that killed the men, as I understand it. So you are saying that the men got trapped and killed by “the forecast weather” (whatever you mean by that) that occurred AFTER they were trapped and likely already dead? Really? REALLY??”
What in the world are you talking about? How can you say here that the forecast weather happened after the burnover? The weather forecast was for the half an hour after 3:30. (and it was actually a spot forecast, and I’ll bet there were other forecasts/reports put out as the fire blew up, but I don’t feel like going to look for them ATM).
That doesn’t mean it ENDED a half an hour after the forecast. He was forecasting a major weather shift that was beginning at 3:30 and signified the major shift in the “winds aloft” so to speak, and wouldn’t be over until it was over, and the forecast didn’t say when it would be over. And there’s nothing I can see anywhere where anyone said ever that the forecast weather began after the crew was dead.
Do you understand what a forecast is?
Reminder: This is the forecast we are discussing:
WantsToKnowTheTruth
on May 6, 2014 at 9:36 pm said:
“Byron Kimball: Within the half-hour, (pause) EAST winds. (pause) Possibility of as high as 50 miles an hour or likely 25 (pause) definitely 25, 35 gusting 40 (pause) east / northeast within the half hour. Um… the outpoint to outflow line also ( will be ) located…”
These forecasts come from the national or state agency fire centers (Dispatch) offices relayed directly to the Fire. They are not some off the wall forecast.
Also I believe the squarely wind statement by Marsh was recorded on a video phone while taking a video of the fire. Refer back to one of WTKTT info.
Marti, you said the following: “I have not seen the 30 photographs you are referring to, but I can imagine that if they were taken from above the cloud cover, they probably aren’t particularly meaningful as to what is going on below that cloud cover.”
I took your words, Marti, to mean that you did not think the photos were, uhm, “particularly meaningful.” 🙂
Having looked at what I think you are talking about. The images I think you are talking about, if they’re the gifs that are the satellite images. It depends on what you are asking of them.
In re to what I was saying, they’re still not that meaningful, in terms of what was going on on the ground. They’re not going to tell you any more than what GM was photographing, or people were saying, on the ground, in real time.
They are, however, meaningful, in terms of meta. The big system. They show that line of thunderstorms moving southwest and dynamically interacting with the fire. Which is why I can’t understand why you keep saying that that thunderstorm/system was sitting statically 60 miles away doing nothing and going nowhere. Maybe I now take those images more seriously than you do?
Elizabeth
Your throwing a can of worms again…..
I do not know where you are getting the stand down theory?
Fire Fighters do not stand down from Weather forecasts.
They adjust to the forecast and continue working.
making sure they are safe and following all the safety procedures.
Including LCES. The Weather Forecast that afternoon was what the people on the Fire were going by and based on our hind site it is what happened. The forecast is right there in front of you word for word. Standard Firefighting Orders #1 and #3, I do not think any body here knows exactly what GM was thinking when they moved. we do know they had NO LCES in place, No identified or scouted escape route and no personal knowledge of the BSR SZ. What worm would you like us to pick up. Your not in a court room quit acting like an Attorney trying to get a statement out of a defendant.
As a Law Enforcement Officer I was trained on Court trials and have been in the chair a lot for testimony and how questions are ask, enough said.
Elizabeth on May 8, 2014 at 6:18 am said:
“Marti seems to suggest below that she views the radar/satellite images as irrelevant to this discussion, which suggests to me that perhaps she is instead focusing on the weather materials in the 147 pages released by the SAIT.”
There is nothing I wrote that suggested that I view radar/satellite images as irrelevant. Just because I wasn’t referring to them, doesn’t mean I dismiss them.
And it was not based on the weather pages in any of the reports.
I was describing what you, in fact were asking for, i.e. what the crew was experiencing, based on the accurate forecast they had received, the photos they were taking, and what everybody else was saying, as WTKTT laid out so clearly down below, oh and also what we’ve been slowly conversing about for months.
The crew was not looking at radar/satellite images, most likely.
My father (RIP) forecasted/tracked the weather for the Albuquerque International Balloon Fiesta for 16 years. I assisted him for the last ten of them. The lives of thousands of crew depended on his expertise. They loved having him fly with them, because “he could see the winds,” as they said.
At 3:00 every morning, we packed my daughter into the back seat of the car, and headed to the National Weather Service in Albuquerque, and looked at the most current satellite, radar, and wind maps for about an hour. So we knew what, in general, was happening and was going to happen and why. But that’s not the most important thing we did.
We then drove out to the field and started flying and tracking weather balloons. Up until the 6 AM pilot briefing and then until the launch. And then my dad would keep watching what was going on through the whole launch of as many as 1000 balloons, and throughout the hours until they were all safely landed. And he kept communicating to the pilots through “the overhead” the entire time. Situational Awareness, in other words.
And if the winds aloft “in real time” based on our weather balloon observations started running over 15 mph, my dad would warn the “Overhead” that they should shut the whole thing down, because it was too dangerous. And that decision could cost the Balloon Fiesta millions of dollars. So they didn’t like hearing that. And there was absolutely nothing he could do if they decided to launch against his recommendations. Except pray nobody got killed, which sometimes they did.
There’s a dynamic relationship between radar/satellite/weather maps and “in real time” observations. What I was describing was what people “in real time” were observing, and that those observations corresponded to the forecast, which was based on radar/satellite/imagery mapped onto a weather map, and sent out as a forecast at 3:30 PM.
calvin on May 6, 2014 at 3:32 am said:
“It does appear (to me) that after Marsh tells Bravo 33, that is exactly where we want the retardant (1637?), and it wasn’t dropped,; then Marsh didn’t transmit again until he was with the crew. However, I am not convinced he was behind the crew. If so, there is no way (in my opinion) he could have saw Bravo 33 flying through the middle bowl west to east.”
I am really curious, and a bit confused, about what you are saying here. Where do you think Marsh was? And could you clarify, in more detail, why?
Marti. I am not sure exactly where Marsh was when he called Bravo33 and said that is exactly where we want the retardant. But if he was walking downslope toward the canyon floor, I do not think he would have been able to see the flight path.
Because of the short period of time between that call out and the call announcing the entrapment, we know he HAD to be close. There is a small mound between the entrapment/ deployment site and BSR that is just north of the dozered road (created to remove GM’s bodies). I think it is possible he was on that mound where he would have had more visibility.
I do not believe the GMH were only counting on their speed to outrun the fire. I do believe they were expecting retardant to be dropped on the south side of the fire. But as far as I can tell (from post burn pictures), that never happened.
Calvin hopefully to clear up some confusion.
The Lead plain B33 would have been 500 ft. or more above the terrain which would have given the people on the ground in the canyon the ability to see the plain for some distance barring any smoke. I was not there but that is my assumption. The higher the plain was the longer it would have been in view if that helps.
Calvin.
When you say “the middle bowl” are you referring to the bowl GM walked down into, or the big bowl that most of the days activities were taking place in?
I.e. I’m still not sure exactly where the drop path flight happened. And I currently have in my head WTKTT’s analysis of that flight (and I haven’t looked at the video and maybe I should), in which he was saying it shows it happening more on the east side of the smoke column, and thus questions whether Eric could have seen it.
I still think this is a pretty muddy part of the story.
calvin… I am with you. That 1637 transmission from Marsh is still quite a mystery.
See a longer post I just made up above about this and it is
really just an attempt for me to try and ‘document my continuing confusion’ about this ‘transmission’.
The *new* post above is mostly just based on that recent transcript of the USDA Air Study video that DOES, in fact, cover the time period from 1630 to 1643… and gives a CLEAR picture of *exactly* what Air Attack ( B33 ) was *actually* doing during this time… and especially what they were ( or, more importantly, were NOT ) doing at 1637.
I am not seeing the ‘proof’ there, in that Air Study transcript, that this ‘line up flight’ ever took place at all around the time that the SAIR says Marsh ‘saw it’… and ‘responded’ to it.
Something is still ‘wonky’ with this whole 1637 event.
Maybe it’s just the TIME is wrong, or something.
WEATHER: TTWARE, you made a point below about “the timed-stamped radar images of the weather-event progression.” Would you mind explaining more about what you are driving at with your comment?
Specifically, I have copies of all 30 or so relevant images from *above* the cloud cover (not sure what the parlance is), and I am not understanding how your comment ties in with them. My understanding of those images is that they are consistent with the point that xxfullsailxx and I are making, no?
Thank you in advance. (I, personally, think the weather-related take-away from the Yarnell Hill Fire is still grossly under-discussed.)
The time-stamped radar images I am referring to, are the same ones I referenced from the SAIR report in response to one of your earlier comments about the weather down below a ways.
Specifically, they show that the storm system originated in the Flagstaff area, proceeded to the Yarnell area, and then, became responsible for the outflow boundary.
Nothing more, nothing less.
I think you’re getting too hung-up with the weather aspect. The predictions (long and short term) predicted the weather could go ape-shit (my term), and it actually came to pass. One wind shift does not equate to ‘well, ape-shit’s all over now, we shouldn’t expect any other significant changes.’
Elizabeth on April 20, 2014 at 3:55 pm said:
…”I think I am just seeing the weather differently, in part because there was a CONVERSATION that followed the 3:30 p.m. weather reading, and it seems that folks thought that the winds warned about were already THERE at 3:30 p.m., such that they were well OVER by 4:04 p.m. or later. I hear you, though, Bob. I do.”
I understand that you are trying to get a bead on, not what we know now, but what whoever was making GM’s decisions was seeing and thinking then.
To be honest, as someone born and raised in New Mexico, the daughter of a meteorologist raised in New Mexico (for whom intense conversations about southwest weather were everyday dinner conversations the whole time i was growing up), and a Girl Scout Leader, Camp Counselor, and later as a Group Guide in the Grand Canyon for ten years, I’m in deep agreement with those who say that any kind of thinking on the part of Granite Mountain that the wind change had stabilized by 3:50-ish (which is what I read you and xxfullsailxx saying) would have been insane.
However I also agree with you that IT SEEMS (via the consequences) that that may have exactly been what they decided/thought. Even after the 3:30 severe weather warning which said basically a seriously different thing. And even though, as they gathered there observing that fire and that weather, they were seeing that fire pick up steam and do exactly what that forecast said it was going to do. Why did they hear that, and then see that, and then decide that it had stabilized when it so seriously hadn’t?? Anybody that is from here, that has spent time HUNKERING DOWN during thunderstorms, which is VERY common, knows it ain’t over til it’s OVER.
As a lowly Girl Scout Leader, as a lowly Camp Counselor, as a lowly Grand Canyon Guide, as the lowly daughter of a southwestern meteorologist, I just have to say I would NEVER have done what they did. I am painfully mystified. I really struggle with this one.
Maybe, even in spite of that clear and accurate and severe 3:30 forecast, and in spite of what they must have HAD to have known from years and years of actual experience, something cut across all of that. And the only thing I possibly can think of is Rory Collins telling them at 3:50ish (iirc) that the fire would hit Yarnell in one to two hours.
But I still don’t know. Which is why I am bringing your comment from way below to here. What CONVERSATION are you truly aware of that took place after the 3:30 forecast that was about the weather?? And how is it that you are aware of it? Because, I truly have no idea what you are referring to, and I would really like to know.
And PS. I have not seen the 30 photographs you are referring to, but I can imagine that if they were taken from above the cloud cover, they probably aren’t particularly meaningful as to what is going on below that cloud cover.
Right on Marti. It’s dangerous for individuals to claim they know something about YHF without being able to back it up. I asked this question regarding the 1526 Wx and GM’s SA of it to EN a while back as well with no response…I would really like to know.
It’s not just dangerous, not to minimize that at all, it gets to be very disrespectful of the issues involved. Part of the game seems to be make whimsical statements, and then continually ask for more and more information (and therefore more time and energy) from people like Marti and WTKTT and TWARE who have just painstakingly laid out why your (EN’s or FullSail’s in this case) inane claims don’t hold water.
I mean, I personally still think GM saw prairie dogs and was concerned about exposure to plague if they remained in the black. I am relying on my notes for that statement. Anyone who disagrees with me, please state with specificity the sources you are relying on to show that there were no prairie dogs in the black and that GM wasn’t concerned about the plague. Have you exhaustively researched the NIH and CDC plague data in reaching your conclusions? I am always open to discussing this further…
Put differently, if EN has any evidence at all that suggests that all the weather forecasts, radar images, contemporaneous accounts, and fire behavior — which all seem quite consistent with on another — are wrong, and that the storm coming out of the N/NE was really expected by Marsh and Steed to be a steady wind straight from CA, then she should do the work and state with specificity what on earth makes her think that. Simply making that type of claim, in the fact of overwhelming evidence to the contrary, without putting forward any proof oneself, only creates confusion.
I don’t know shite about reading smoke. Sometimes I wish you would all get into some kind of conversation about what you are seeing in the smoke, so I could learn more about it. But, that being said, I thus don’t say anything about smoke.
What I do know about is camera angles, handling cameras, fixing time-stamps on images, how photographers do stuff, and also weather in the southwest (except smoke).
So I try to use what I do know to fill in gaps and ask questions of others in order to further all of our understanding. That’s what I am here for, and think others are, too. I have no other agenda.
Reply to Elizabeth post on May 7, 2014 at 10:35 am
>> Elizabeth said…
>> My understanding of those images is that they are consistent
>> with the point that xxfullsailxx and I are making, no?
Elizabeth… I am going to echo TTWARE’s comment above and say I, also ( respectfully and truthfully ) have no idea what the ‘point’ is that you ( together with xxfullsailxx? ) think you have somehow *already* (recently) made…
…but let me take a guess at a ‘summary’.
You ( and xxfullsailxx? ) are trying to resurrect the theory that Marsh and Steed were NEVER fully ‘expecting’ or ‘anticipating’ a full 180 degree wind shift ( despite what any carded/qualified FBAN predicted or anything they were told over the radio )… and that they somehow convinced themselves ( without bothering to consult with anyone else ) that the ‘expected wind shift(s)’ were OVER by the time they left the safe black and that they would *always* be traveling on ‘their new mission’ in a direction that was simply ‘parallel’ to the fire.
Well… if that’s the case… let’s ‘break it down’…
1) Marsh and Steed were never really ‘expecting’ or ‘anticipating’ a full 180 degree wind shift.
Horse manure.
See Brendan McDonough’s interview transcript with ADOSH reprinted below.
In short… Brendan CONFIRMS to ADOSH ( multiple times ) that just after Byron Kimball’s 1530 weather broadcast… EVERY conversation he had with GM Captain Jesse Steed contained FULL acknowledgement between them that the winds were GOING to shift a FULL 180 degrees ( Not 45, not 90… a FULL 180 ) and that this TOTAL REVERSAL of wind direction was going to be backed by 40 to 50 mile per hour winds gusts. Brendan said both he and Steed knew that was going to be (quote) “a phenomenal change”. Brendan ALSO confirms that Marsh was also ‘copying’ these conversations about the upcoming FULL 180 degree wind shift.
2) Steed and Marsh somehow convinced themselves ( without bothering to consult with anyone else ) that the ‘expected wind shift(s)’ were OVER by the time they left the safe black and that they would *always* be traveling on ‘their new mission’ in a direction that was simply ‘parallel’ to the fire.
Well… Brendan still won’t talk about anything he might have heard AFTER he left his lookout position… so there is no direct evidence to fully negate such a claim/belief… but based on (1) above and what they BOTH KNEW was coming they would have both had to pretty much have suffered a sudden case of ‘ridge blindness’ and/or both hit their heads on rocks to forget what they knew just moments before and could still *see* happening with their own eyes out there in front of them.
Look carefully at all the photos taken while they were doing nothing but ‘watching the fire’ ( and the recent crossfades between them ).
Forget about the smoke. Look at the FIRE… especially where it was CLOSER to them and mattered the MOST as far as their own decision making.
At NO TIME is the FIRELINE doing anything but continuing to head SOUTH and TOWARDS the mouth of that box canyon just some 4,000 feet away from the fire BEFORE they even started their ‘new mission’.
Also… ( again ) see Brendan’s testimony to ADOSH (reprinted below) where even circa 4:00 PM when the GM vehicles were being moved ( and supposedly before GM even left the safe black ) the FIRE was heading in a direct SOUTHERLY direction and ( according to Brendan ) was ALSO making those ‘easterly’ pushes simply because of a trick of geography with the terrain on the east side.
>> Elizabeth also wrote…
>> Specifically, I have copies of all 30 or so relevant images from
>> *above* the cloud cover (not sure what the parlance is), and I
>> am not understanding how your comment ties in with them.
>> My understanding of those images is that they are consistent
>> with the point that xxfullsailxx and I are making, no?
I really don’t see how you can think that some photos taken from way ABOVE the ‘cloud cover’ are going to tell you what was happening at ground level around that time, under such ‘squirrely’ conditions.
Even in the photos we can see with our own eyes… the winds were doing ‘strange things’ at GROUND LEVEL ( and at various heights ) and just because a wisp of smoke/cloud is suddenly blowing one way as it rose out of the middle bowl and was being hit by ‘crosswinds’ doesn’t automatically mean that’s the way the fire down on the GROUND was actually headed.
Smoke/clouds didn’t kill them. The FIRELINE did.
Again… LOOK AT THE FIRELINE in all the known photos/videos and in the ‘crossfades’ between them.
The FIRELINE was (consistently and steadily ) headed SOUTH
and TOWARDS the mouth of that box canyon from the time Brendan left his lookout post until the time that they all died.
The only thing that really changed during that entire time period is that it just kept picking up SPEED and INTENSITY as it headed to the SOUTH and filled that entire ‘explosive’ area.
>> Elizabeth also said…
>> I, personally, think the weather-related take-away from the
>> Yarnell Hill Fire is still grossly under-discussed.
So do I, actually… but probably for reasons that are as much the polar opposite of yours as that full (predicted) 180 degree wind shift was that day.
Now that we have the ‘video crossfades’ between pretty much ALL of the ‘photos’ taken from up on that ridge that afternoon and we can truly ‘see exactly what they saw’ during that time they were doing nothing BUT ‘watching the fire behavior’…
…it is even more inconceivable than it has ever been that men who were *supposed* to be ‘fire experts’ would have STILL decided to do what they did that afternoon.
As Brendan himself said to the ADOSH investigators regarding
his own impressions circa 4:00 PM that day…
“You knew that it was coming… ‘cause that wind…
a 180 degree wind shift… that’s a phenomenal change.
I’d never seen anything like it.”
** THE LONG STORY
For the sake of completeness… the following has all been posted before ( at least once )… but here is exactly what Brendan McDonough had to say to the ADOSH investigators about all this.
Several times during his ADOSH interview… Brendan confirms that BOTH he and Jesse Steed FULLY understood that the expected wind shift was going to be a FULL 180 degress. ( Not 45 degrees, not 90… a FULL 180 degress )… and was going to be backed with 40-50 mph wind gusts.
Brendan also states that this ‘expected’ 180 degree wind shift BEGAN just moments after Byron Kimball’s 1530 weather update.
Brendan also explains carefully to the ADOSH investigators that by the time they were moving the GM and Blue Ridge vehicles ( circa 3:59 PM and (supposedly) BEFORE Granite Mountain even left the safe black )… the FIRE was ALREADY moving through that middle bowl (quote) “straight up and down as NORTH / SOUTH”.
Brendan also carefully explains that at that point… the winds were definitely (quote) “out of the north, northeast”… but the fire was ALSO moving some to the EAST not as its ‘primary direction’… but simply due to a trick in the geography there and (quote) “primarily due to the terrain of that ridge”.
ADOSH INTERVIEW (1 of 2) WITH BRENDAN MCDONOUGH
August 20, 2013 – 1:00 PM
______________________________________________________
Q = Bruce Hanna
Q1 = Barry Hicks
Q2 = Dave Larsen ( Rest in Peace )
A = Brendan McDonough
A1 = Brendan’s Attorney Emily Dolan
______________________________________________________
Q1: Yeah. Okay. Were you noticing any – did you notice any change in the winds as the day progressed, ah, either direction or strength, um, or?
A: I’d say we had winds between five and ten. Consistently out of south, southwest and they didn’t shift until moments after the weather came over the radio.
…
Q1: So, ah, at the, ah, ah, when you – when your trigger point was reached, did you make that decision or did someone else make that decision?
A: Me and Steed had come to the conclusion.
Q1: Steve?
A: Steed. Jesse Steed.
Q1: Oh Jesse Steed.
A: It was time for me to…
Q1: Gotcha.
A: …to evaluate where I was.
Q1: Okay.
A: ‘Cause they could see – they could see me. They could see.
Q1: They could see you. And they could see that. Okay.
A: They could see the fire and what was going on after we had heard the – the weather transmission.
Q1: Right.
A: Of the storm coming in where — 50 to 60 mile per hour gusts and 180 degree wind shift.
Q1: Right. So you knew things weren’t gonna be good at that point.
A: Mm-hm.
…
Q2: Would you – would you take a minute and tell me about what you heard on the r- radio about the weather? As much of that as you can remember. How – who said it?
…
A: Steed called me and said there’s a radio – weather coming over. Cause’ this was at that time that I needed to spin my – and he said, “Spin your weather. Listen to crew so I can tell you what’s going’ on. I’ll listen to it.” So I did not directly hear…
Q2: Did not hear the – the – the weather transmission?
A: The weather transmission — not directly.
Q2: Okay.
A: That was relayed from my captain to me.
Q2: Okay.
A: That there was a thunderstorm coming in, expect gusts up to 50 to 60 miles per hour.
Q2: That’s what he’s told you while (unintelligible).
A: Yes, sir.
Q2: Could you…
A: No this is right after it came across.
…
Q2: At that time you got a wind shift. The wind is definitely shifted, were you picked up?
A: Yeah the wind has shifted. The wind has shifted but it didn’t make a tremendous push. You knew that it was coming up. Just ‘cause that wind – a 180 degree wind shift…
Q1: Right.
A: …that’s a phenomenal change.
…
Q1: And so you guys moved if I understand right, all four of y’all’s vehicles.
A: Yes, sir.
Q1: Okay. And, ah…
Q2: And can you remember what time that was?
A: No.
Q2: Four? Okay.
A: At this point, the fire is moving straight up and down as north South. It’s moving – it’s starting to come out of the north but it’s really moving east so that my way out is getting cut off sooner than theirs. They had more concern at that point for me and my safety.
Q1: Right.
A: Just because of the direction of the fire.
Q2: Right
A: So it was – the winds were out of the north, northeast but primarily due to the terrain of that ridge, it’s moving to the east.
…
Q1: So the weather was – and the fire activity was changing dramatically?
A: Oh yeah. Very rapid, um, like nothing I’ve ever seen before.
_____________________________________________________
Followup… just a few other ‘quotes’ about the ‘wind shift(s)’
from various other places in the evidence record…
________________________________________________
** From SPGS2 Darrell Willis himself… during his ADOSH interview and also reprinted as a SIDEBAR on page 14 of the official WFAR report…
“…it wasn’t like an outflow. It was pushing the fire in this (southerly) direction. It wasn’t a ten-minute bust and things got back to normal. It was two solid hours…”
________________________________________________
** From Rob Berry ( in his SAIT interview )…
4. Robb said that the fire did a U-turn on that day.
5. He said that the wind turn northerly (outflows) but didn’t know exact time although compared favorably with the Stanton RAWS when he later looked at the data. He said he could feel higher humidity with the outflow wind and actually felt a couple of drops of rain.
6. Robb said that the wind was “ripping” when it hit and remained very constant for awhile. It just didn’t stop. He said the duration of the stronger wind was also consistent with what the RAWS showed.
________________________________________________
** From SAIT interview with Blue Ridge Hotshots Frisby, Trueheart (Trew) Brown, Fueller and Ball…
NOTE: Documents all kinds of ‘crazy’ wind shifts going on at GROUND LEVEL after the 1530 weather update and Captain Brown reports soon after being able to feel the fire itself already PULLING IN THE WINDS ( and apparently already starting to create its OWN ‘weather’ )…
…there’s a wx update. Trew hears T-storms developing over the fire outflow winds up to 50mph. Brian hears NNE outflow winds up to 50mph, Travis hears outflow winds N NW up to 50mph all happening within 30min. Trew calls the 3 guys with the wx update. There’s a shift out of the west fire is going east and the column is starting to develop and then lays over. When the shift out of the west the column collapsed after the wx update only minutes later. When there’s a wind shift from the west, it then goes SW for 10 minutes and the smoke drifts off to the sth, Travis can feel the column PULLING IN THE WINDS. During this time Travis is on the dozer line. That’s when Travis tells Trew, I don’t think this plan is going to work, this is the 3rd wind shift.
Column starts to lay down, smoky, the split the helicopter did earlier, is now evident. Extreme fire behavior spot fire to the NW of them. Winds are howling, embers falling, instant spot fires 10 x 10 in seconds, homes going up, fire leap frogging.
________________________________________________
** SAIT interview with Rory Collins…
Air Attack – LDF – Roseburg
Interview took place at 11:00 a.m. 7/13/2013
Interviewers: Rocha, Kurth, Mike Dudley, Jim Karels.
15:30 Experienced wind shift and the flank turned and became the head going SOUTH to Yarnell. I let B(?) know prior to the shift to move to that side and start drops.
15:30 – 15:45 The fire was headed for Yarnell moving FAST to the SOUTH. They were getting retardant drops. Contacted Division A to tell them of fire condition and that they needed to move their rigs to a better location.
Q: Did he say he was in good black?
A: NO, he said the other crew was in a good location in the black and they were headed back to the rigs.
________________________________________________
** From SAIT interview with SPGS1 Gary Cordes…
1530 ( 3:30 PM )
– Wind event – collapse of column – fire shifted from flanking fire and turned to a head fire going SOUTH.
– Place evacuation order
– Heard of storm to the north
1540 ( 3:40 PM )
– Trigger point was 1 mile north of town. It was 5-7 minutes before the fire the next trigger point to get my people out.
– Spot 1/2 mile.
– Covered a mile in 15 minutes.
– Building a column in front of us.
1600 ( 4:00 PM )
– I watched the wind change directions 5 times.
_______________________________________________
** From SAIT interview with
** SWCC Meteorologist Chuck Maxwell
“I informed them that this was going to be mainly an outflow WIND REVERSAL issue on the Yarnell fire and not a rainfall issue. I pulled up the updated radar images and showed the gust front and explained its implications. Dugger checked in again with the Incident Commander Roy Hall who said they could SEE IT COMING.”
_______________________________________________
** From SAIT interview with Daniel Kight, DPS officer
NOTE: Daniel Kight was the Yavapai County DPS officer that was assigned to Yarnell with the YCSO Emergency Mobile Trailer Unit.
…wind shifted wall of flames headed to Yarnell.
PREDICTED winds, pant legs were Whipping.
1550 call to supt Yarnell was going to burn…
all hell is breaking lose.
Div A tells Rory Collins the other crew is in the black and they were headed back to the rigs.
Questions.
1. What other crew? Is he referring to a squad of GMH? No?
2. Who is the “They”, that were headed back to the rigs??
3. Does this indicate that Marsh was not in the black circa 1530?
Thanks very much for taking the time to find and assemble all of this. I hadn’t known about the McDonough statements as regards what Marsh, Steed and he knew and discussed about the weather. I think it’s glaringly clear that they did know that a full 180 windshift, complete with 50 mph gusts, was coming.
I also think some of your excerpts help underscore as well that an outflow boundary is not only not a rare or freaky thing that no one could see coming, but that it is also specifically mentioned (referred to both as an outflow and as a gust front).
It is convenient for those claiming that everything at YHF was perfectly reasonable that, hey, the wind shifted, and no one could see further shifts coming. Crazy outflow boundary, something you couldn’t see and that no one had heard of. Almost as if GM got hit by an asteroid — tragic, but nothing anyone could have done anything to prevent. Of course, that is all completely nonfactual.
Reply to Bob Powers post on May 6, 2014 at 4:47 pm said:
>> Mr. Powers said…
>>
>> As a division boss I reported to the OPSC
>> If things started going to hell I talked to OPS and they talked to me.
>> As a Type 2 OPS or IC I kept track of my resources and made sure they
>> were not in harms way.
>> If the fire started going nuts that is your main responsibility
>> with the plan for the day.
>> The line OPS should have checked with each one of his divisions and
>> discussed options. That did not happen
>> Marsh evidently was OPS only Division Boss.
>> WTF?
No. There really WERE ‘two paid Division Supervisors’ on active payroll
for the SOUTH end of the fire and reporting to Field OPS1 Todd Abel that day.
Rance Marquez was *hired* and *assigned* as ‘Division Z’ that day early
in the morning but simply didn’t arrive on the fire until late in the morning.
He was not sent down to Yarnell to ASK Eric Marsh if he COULD
( pretty please? ) be DIVSZ. He had already ‘checked in’ up at the ICP
and already WAS DIVSZ ( and was now on the clock and getting paid for it ).
DIVSA Eric Marsh got into an *argument* with him right off the bat.
Marquez was having radio problems when he first arrived down there
in Yarnell and so ( according to his own testimony ) he did the only thing
he could at the moment… he called up to AA Rory Collins just to try and
get an ‘update’ on what was happening down there on the south end of
the fire where he was supposed to now be DIVSZ.
Marsh heard this ‘conversation’ between Marquez and Rory Collins and got
pissed off. Marsh thought Marquez and Collins were just trying to ‘take away
real estate’ from him without consulting with him.
So when Marquez finally got through to Marsh ( following that ‘update me’ call
with Rory Collins )… Marsh had already mis-understood what he heard and
what was really going on and was already pre-pissed-off.
Everyone heard these exchanges.
Everyone used various adjectives to describe what they heard like ‘mad’, or
‘angry’, or ‘argument’ but regardless of adjectives… it was obvious that this
‘first meeting’ between DIVSA and DIVSZ did not go well that day.
Things calmed down once Marsh realized Marquez was not ‘dictating terms’
to him or anything of the sort… and all Marquez wanted to know is where the
western end of his (already assigned) ‘Division Z’ was going to be.
They decided on the ‘old-grader’ as the dividing line between Division A and
Division Z… and then Marsh actually calmly ( and constructively ) told Marquez
that it would be good if he could find *another* way to get to the fireline in that
maze of dirt roads and two-tracks down there.
So that is what Marquez did. He left the Sesame area to ‘scout that out’.
Marsh then called OPS1 Todd Abel with ( one of his two? ) cellphones that
Marsh had with him that day… and reported both the ‘argument’ and the
‘results’ to Abel. All OPS1 Todd Abel wanted to know ( according to his own
ADOSH testimony ) is if the issue had been ‘resolved’… and he was told
( by Marsh ) that it HAD.
So now we have OPS1 Todd Abel (supposedly) understanding that he had
TWO active (paid) Division Supervisors working ‘together’ down there on
that south end of the fire… with defined ( and agreed upon ) Division boundaries.
But then DIVSZ Rance Marquez basically DISAPPEARED.
At NO TIME during all of this consternation was DIVSZ Marquez either
RELIEVED of his job OR assigned another one.
Marquez remained ‘on the payroll’ for the rest of the day as the OTHER
official ‘Division Z Supervisor’ under OPS1 Todd Abel… and supposedly
responsible for the entire Yarnell / Glen Ilah side of the south end of
the fire ( with SPGS1 Cordes as a primary DIVSZ resource ).
Problem was… no one knew where he went, or what he was doing, or even
really made any attempts to FIND OUT.
After that (private) cellphone conversation with DIVSA Marsh… OPS1 Abel
didn’t even make any attempt to FIND OUT where his (paid) ‘DIVSZ’
Supervisor was. OPS1 Todd Abel just continued to treat SPGS1 Gary
Cordes as his ‘Division Z Supervisor’ for the rest of the day and really couldn’t
have cared less where his actual (paid) DIVSZ was.
In his ADOSH interview… OPS1 Todd Abel said he never knew where his
DIVSZ Marquez hire was the entire rest of the day until he ran into him
face-to-face at the Ranch House Restaurant… AFTER the deployment.
So OPS1 Todd Abel DID have ‘more than one line DIVS’ under him that
day and actively ‘on the payroll’ all day… but he didn’t seem to care.
OPS1 Todd Abel also didn’t even seem to be the least bit concerned about the
confusion that might be causing down there on the south end of the fire.
Even when the evacuations started… Neither OPS1 Abel or OPS2 Musser
made any attempt to ( as Mr. Powers describes above SHOULD have been
done ) ‘find DIVSZ and make sure all his resources were getting off the fire’.
This is ALL fully documented in the ADOSH reports, including the detail
pages for ‘infractions/fines imposed’ against the employer(s).
This absolute MESS when it came to whether or not there really WERE two
‘defined Divisions’ and two ‘assigned (paid) Division Supervisors’ for the SOUTH
end of the fire that day was a BIG DEAL, according to ADOSH ( from a
workplace management *and* safety control standpoint ) and they said so.
As I said only 1 DIV. Boss The other was not active and it seemed that Frisby was covering that though not assigned.
They had contact both radio and phone Responsibility runs both ways….Right.
And I agree the organization was a total mess.
also without a Safety Officer the job fell to Both of the OPS to cover. Some blame belongs to Overhead in this mess and they should be held accountable in this mess.
Bob, I am thinking that your pal RTS/SR/Fire20+/Robert-the-2nd/whatever-he-is-calling-himself-here-nowadays can vouch for the fact that, with wildfires being dealt with in the WUI these days, it is *not* abnormal or unheard of for a WFF crew to go out to start their assignment WITHOUT a Safety Officer already “clocked-in,” on scene, and fully up-to-speed on the relevant fire and allocation of resources. Obviously, that is not the IDEAL way (or maybe even not the “right way”) to do things, but it seems to happen often enough. Is your position that nobody should be out in the field on a fire UNTIL the Safety Officer is on scene and FULLY up-to-speed on the relevant fire and resource assignments? (I am asking for your honest opinion – not trying to argue with you….)
I think everyone here can see that I am neither RTS nor Fire20+. You have a tendency to accuse posters whose views you find inconvenient of being other people, having accused TWARE and WTKTT of being one and the same, for instance. Pretty lame, but a good way to disrupt accurate dialog.
What’s with your obsession regarding this RTS thing?
ONCE AGAIN, you are negating the value of your commentary by putting forth non-factual, incorrect suppositions about people.
For you to start-off what presumably, is supposed to be serious commentary with this absolute BS, makes a lot of people not want to pay attention to the portion of the commentary that was the purpose of your post.
I presume myself and WTKTT will be getting another turn on your ‘hot-seat’ very soon, as well.
Elizabeth
You ask me about Safety Officers.
Safety officers are assigned to type II Short teams.
WUI has nothing to do with weather a SO is assigned to the fire. Teams are assigned according to complexity and number of resources from short teams to Type I full teams.
If the Type II team is a on call fully organized they come with a SO.
Type I teams also have a SO as part of the team.
Initial Attack fires do not have a SO also unless ordered Type III teams do not normally have a SO.
A SO is for the whole fire and not for an individual crew.
The problem with the Yarnell Hill Fire, the State slapped together a Type II team that was short several members. The entire team should have been fully functional at 0600. They should have had Maps and a written plan. Division Bosses and Safety Officer, Plans, Service and Finance.
The State cut to many corners I assume to save costs.
Again you can fight Fires with out a Safety Officer but the responsibility falls to the IC and to his OPS. SO is a position under direct command of the IC.
If a Type I or Type II fully implemented Team is on duty. They will have a SO. The SO will provide safety to plans for each shift and identify problems during each shift to the IC, and work hand in hand with OPS.
Dose that explain what you asked?
Also RTS’s fire season is in full swing so you probably will not hear mush from him for awhile and he is none of the other above mentioned people. Robert is Robert and I won’t divulge his last name as he requested.
He actually went to Robert The Second because when I first started I signed in as……
Robert (Bob) Powers which I changed about the same time RTS came on. He worked for me I know him and we communicate on E-Mail
He goes by no other name on here and he is busy hiring ,training and getting ready for this fire season in R3, He may not be on for awhile and I am sure we will miss his solid input. If someone wants him to jump in for input let me know…….
Ms. Marti (or Miss Marti 🙂 ):
What am I supposed to be apologizing to you for? I am happy to give you an apology, but I am unclear about what I need to apologize to you for…. Please advise.
While I can’t speak for Marti, I believe she is refering to this whole RTS fiasco discussed above. If that’s indeed the case, the apology should be going to RTS.
You are right and because I know him I am getting emails accusing me of a cover up of his true name. she will not apologize its not her nature.
Have you ever known a Lawyer to apologize?
After the attacks 2 months ago I gave up on Elizabeth.
I’m waiting for an apology to those whom you, for some reason, decided to publicly (and irresponsibly, and wrongfully, and thus unprofessionally as bespeaks a lawyer) accuse of being deceitful in their identities here.
Ohhhhh, Ms. Marti, if I were wrong, I would absolutely apologize to RTS! 🙂
In unrelated news, I am so glad that you are out of your “retirement” from IM, Marti. When you announced in February that you were leaving, because you could not afford to give up any more lucrative work to instead spent your time here, I was surprised. It is good that your retirement did not stick! 🙂
While you have ALMOST NEVER provided any of the proof and documentation that others have repeatedly, over time, asked you for, I’m sure you have the goods on RTS, but as per usual, you won’t be providing any proof!!
I’M ISSUING A CHALLENGE TO YOU RIGHT NOW TO PUBLICLY STATE ONCE MORE, THAT YOU KNOW THAT WTKTT AND MYSELF ARE THE SAME PERSON, AS YOU HAVE DONE BEFORE, WHILE CONTINUALLY BAD-MOUTHING RTS .
Since you aren’t willing to give RTS his well-deserved apology, you can instead give one to WTKTT and myself. If you don’t, I’m done with you, PERMANENTLY!
TTWARE, as you might recall, it was “Observer” and I who both noticed the same thing a while ago. Specifically, when a question was asked of YOU, it was WTKTT who replies. Presumably that means that you and he are the same person or are speaking for each other? Or am I missing something?
Based on what I read from TTWARE and WTKTT they are defiantly 2 different people
TTWARE Is a wild land Fire Fighter or a retired one totally based on his knowledge and statements here. WTKTT is
not a Fire fighter and has learned from us and his research If you have been here awhile you can tell the difference in their stiles.
since any discussion of weather found down below detracts from mike’s original points i felt the need to start a new comment… i am by no means any sort of weather expert. but like all wff’s worth their salt, weather plays an important part in what we do and it is important to be a “student” of wildfire, and therefore, the weather… and i recently spoke to a couple of NOAA guys about this very thing…
there was a distinct weather event that occurred called an “outflow boundary.” here is a link that describes it pretty well:
the nearest t-cells that day were miles away, and there is a distinction between t-cell “downdrafts” and an “outflow boundary” which can occur miles away from any t-cells and can effect a much greater area than a t-storm downdraft. in fact, a outflow boundary can be picked up by radar (as it was in the case of Yarnell Hill Fire) not unlike a cold front…
there is also a distinction between fire behavior associated with an unstable atmosphere, which is what i feel like Bob Powers is talking about down below. downdrafts, fire whirls, pyro-cumulus, etc. are all very localized events and certainly occurred that day. but what caught GM was the outflow boundary turning the fire 90 degrees from east to south with 40+ mph winds that they didn’t anticipate. and quite possibly, as the SAIR points out, they interpreted the previous windshift that changed fire spread from NE (which they had been watching all day) to due East as the predicted wind shift and then mistakenly thought that it was safe to flank the fire to BSR…
Since FullSail completely got wrong the SZ requirements, doesn’t seem to understand local conditions and vegetation even though he claims to be from AZ, has blown multiple other issues, and now seems to not know that outflow boundaries are not unusual byproducts of thunderstorms…well I have to wonder.
You get thunderstorms during that time of year in the southwest, and winds are likely to shift and be erratic. It is typical. For purposes of thinking about fire behavior, the key is that winds are likely to shift and strong gusts should be anticipated. All of that was known at the time Marsh noted squirrely winds.
As fullsail said fire fighters become students of fire and weather its in your sole. You cant always predict the wind or local changes in the weather by looking at the sky. But if you pay attention to the fire it will tell you a lot. When a fire becomes active and exhibits different flame activity its telling you that weather forces heat, humidity, and wind are changing the normal to increased activity. If the fire starts laying down then it reverses activity. cooling, higher, humidity’s some times less wind or a change in direction. You learn to observe those changes and adjust accordingly. If you are observant you don’t need a weather forecast to let you know what you are already seeing. Its something we learn from many, many days of wild land fire fighting. As fullsail has learned. The little indicators are there we just need to use them in decision making.
Reply to xxfullsailxx post on May 6, 2014 at 8:04 pm
>> xxfullsailxx said…
>>…what caught GM was the outflow boundary turning the fire
>> 90 degrees from east to south with 40+ mph winds that they
>> didn’t anticipate.
Wrong.
They had EVERY REASON to ‘anticipate’ what was GOING to happen and were specifically TOLD that this is what was GOING to happen when Byron Kimball made his 1530 PM ‘weather announcement’. ( See below ).
>> xxfullsailxx also said…
>> and quite possibly, as the SAIR points out, they interpreted the
>> previous windshift that changed fire spread from NE (which
>> they had been watching all day) to due East as the predicted
>> wind shift
Wrong again.
Your description does NOT match the ‘predicted wind shift’ that
actually went from FBAN Byron Kimball on the radio that afternoon.
( See below ).
For whatever amount of time the fire ‘appeared’ to just be heading ‘due east’ was simply the period of time when it was still just ‘rotating around’ due to the wind shifts actually announced by FBAN Byron Kimball circa 1530. ( Again… see below ).
>> xxfullsailxx said…
>> and then mistakenly thought that it was safe to flank
>> the fire to BSR…
Yes… that part of what you are saying seems to be true. They most certainly DID (inexplicably?) think if was ‘safe’ ( or at least acceptable risk ) to go on a cross-country hike through unburned ‘gasoline on a stick’ within 4,600 feet of an actively ROTATING flame front… but that decision cannot be construed to have been based on ‘incorrect weather information’.
The fire/weather did pretty much EXACTLY what FBAN Byron Kimball SAID it would do… in pretty much the EXACT timeframe he said it would happen… and they ( Marsh/Steed ) DID hear this (accurate) weather forecast on the radio circa 1530 ( 3:30 PM ).
Here is a a full reprint from a previously posted message that contains what Fire Behavior Analyst (FBAN) Byron Kimball *actually* announced over the TAC 1 channel that day at exactly 1529.52 ( 3:29.52 PM )…
**
** FULL TRANSCRIPT OF BACKGROUND RADIO TRAFFIC
** IN AIR STUDY VIDEO 20130630_153014_SEAT_EP.MOV
**
** CONTAINS BYRON KIMBALL’S 1529.52 WEATHER REPORT
** GOING OUT ( LOUD AND CLEAR ) ON TAC 1
This Air Study video is 1 minute and 10 seconds long.
Since the text notes that accompanied these Air Study videos say that the timestamps in the filenames actually represents the END times for the videos ( 1530.14 ) then that means this particular video STARTS at…
1529.04 ( 3:29.04 PM )
Since the VIDEO starts at exactly 1529 plus 4 seconds, and Byron’s weather report is at exactly +0:48 seconds into the video… that makes the EXACT time his crucial weather report actually began over the radio…
1529.52 ( 3:29.52 PM )
Here is the actual FULL transcript of the background radio conversation in this AIR STUDY video that captured Byron Kimball’s detailed weather report going out ( loud and clear ) over TAC 1 at 3:29.52 PM.
NOTE: There is no need for any ‘audio forensics’ here. The background conversation in this AIR STUDY video is CLEARLY heard by anyone with even normal hearing… and Byron Kimball himself is speaking especially LOUDLY and CLEARLY as he gives his weather report over the TAC 1 radio channel.
ALSO NOTE: This probably goes without saying… but when someone ( anyone ) says ‘EAST winds’ ( like Byron did )… that always means what direction the winds will be COMING FROM. This is industry standard practice when referring to ‘wind direction’.
Also notice in the transcript below that when Byron was giving his weather report and was CLEARLY warning everyone of the wind change and HIGH wind speeds to be expected… he was ALSO giving detailed information about the expected outpoint to outflow location(s). The video cuts off before we hear the rest of his detailed weather report… but anyone who was hearing it DID hear those specific ‘outpoint to outflow’ details from Byron.
AIR STUDY VIDEO – 20130630_153014_SEAT_EP.MOV
NOTE: This AIR STUDY video has been made public and is still
available in either Mr. Dougherty’s online Dropbox OR at the following YouTube link…
+0.02 ( 1529.06 / 3:29.06 PM )
(Unknown): (?) is gonna be with me (?) has to do and get
(torches?) out.
+0:14 ( 1529.18 / 3:29.18 PM )
(Unknown): Copy
+0:30 ( 1529.34 / 3:29.34 PM )
(Unknown): Task Force (common?) to Task Force Six.
+0:37 ( 1529.41 / 3:29.41 PM )
Byron Kimball: Operations Abel, Fire Behavior, on TAC 1.
NOTE: The responder to this callout sounds more like
OPS2 Paul Musser than OPS1 Todd Abel.
+0:43 ( 1529.47 / 3:29.47 PM )
( OPS1 Todd Abel or OPS2 Paul Musser ): Go ahead, Byron
+0:48 ( 1529.52 / 3:29.52 PM )
Byron Kimball: Within the half-hour, (pause) EAST winds. (pause)
Possibility of as high as 50 miles an hour or likely 25 (pause)
definitely 25, 35 gusting 40 (pause) east / northeast within the half
hour. Um… the outpoint to outflow line also ( will be ) located…
( At this point… both a Helicopter and a fixed-wing make a loud
flyover and the background conversation in the last few seconds
of the video cannot be heard. )
umm, i wasn’t saying that GM wasn’t informed of the weather event… nor was i saying that GM was erroneously MIS-informed of the weather event.
the point is, that there were no direct thunder-cells that influenced the fire behavior with down-drafts that day. nor was it a pyro-cumulus collapse that influenced the fire behavior. what influenced the fire behavior, was an “outflow boundary” which is very different than a t-cell downdraft.
nice ad-lib and speculation based on an incomplete conversation though… nothing you say above really negates my point. just because they “had every reason to anticipate” something, doesn’t mean they actually did anticipate (or interpret it) correctly. my description does not match the predicted wind shift? so… you seem to be indicating that you think weather forecasters are 100% accurate in their predictions? i would rather base my opinions on the resultant fire behavior (as shown on fire progression maps) as to what the winds actually did that day, rather than the “prediction.”
Reply to xxfullsailxx post on May 6, 2014 at 10:10 pm
>> xxfullsailxx said…
>> just because they “had every reason to anticipate”
>> something, doesn’t mean they actually did
>> anticipate (or interpret it) correctly.
Fair enough. You may be right.
Their behavior that afternoon seems to be far
enough ‘off the reservation’ that it appears it really
doesn’t seem to have mattered what ANYONE
thought or what ‘intel’ they received.
They ( Marsh and Steed only ) made up THEIR
minds about what THEY wanted to do… and to hell
with what anyone else might have been telling them.
I just thought I would balance out YOUR ‘ad-libbing’
up above by reminding anyone reading of what was
ACTUALLY said that day by FBAN Bryon Kimball.
He WAS right. Things pretty much happened just
the way he said they would over the open TAC
channels that day.
It’s important to recognize that a couple posters continually try to normalize every aspect of the decision to go through that bowl. Whether claiming they were going to be making good time on switchbacks and game trails, or implying that it’s reasonable to think one shift in wind is THE sole shift in weather with a thunderstorm blowing in.
In the real world, as regards storms, it’s not only not the WFFs think, it’s not the experience of normal people, or the way normal everyday people think. I believe everyone here has been in or near a thunderstorm and not been amazed when winds gusted and changed direction. I actually believe many people here have had storms blow through in places like AZ and experienced wind events more severe than those that occurred during a storm that was expected that day. Whether looking after the safety of your crew, or planning a picnic, betting on one single change of wind direction (even if that change had occurred as FullSail claimed it to have) would be a very unusual thing for people normal exposure those storms.
Likewise, attempts to divert focus onto the specific source of the specific winds encountered at that time can be very misleading. This was not a day with winds forecast for 2-3 mph and gust as high as 6 or 6, that got real breezy through some unanticipated, highly unusual weather event that no one expected or would have reasonably been asked to expect. There was a forecast that more or less showed up as expected. Marsh himself knew and said that the winds were getting “squirrely” up top. He didn’t say “the wind shift seems to have come, and it looks like it is now stable and to the east.”
3 or 4 posts on the web to implying that GM was relying on THE wind shift that already occurred (and implying that this was normal, and that subsequent winds were freaks of nature) can create a false idea that supports the nothing-to-see-here mantra of some. But, not what happened, and if people reflect on what to expect with that type of front coming through, they should ask how surprising it is that winds shifted in that kind of weather.
Hey – xxFullsailxx – thanks. I’ve been beating the weather drum here for a while, but I don’t know nearly enough (while you and Bob Powers obviously know tons). So, thank you – your explanation was incredibly helpful. (In return, here’s some help for you: Don’t rely with 100% confidence on the SAIT fire progression maps (or the SAIT/Wildland-Fire-Associates/ADOSH timeline or other random details (including the SAIT interview notes)). They are just not 100% accurate. I meant to mention this earlier to Bob Powers, but I forgot…. 🙂 )
EN, beating the weather drum doesn’t add anything but confusion if the weather drum you are beating has no basis in fact. The reality is, shifting winds given the forecast weather, that did materialize, are a normal thing.
What would be highly unusual and not founded on either experience or even the ability of short-range forecasts to predict specifics is taking the view that a singular wind shift was expected, and had already occurred, and that no further wind shifts were going to happen. Typing the idea, that GM reasonably relied on A wind shift being the SOLE wind shift, multiple times doesn’t make that idea hold water.
While some of the details in the various investigative reports certainly are questionable, the one thing that is not in question, are the timed-stamped radar images of the weather-event progression.
Yes. The SAIT contains a pretty good weather summary in this regard, starting roughly on p. 70 if I recall, and the ADOSH report does as well.
I also note that both discuss the outflow boundary pretty matter-of-factly, as is appropriate as it was not a rare component of the expected weather for that day. Likewise there is a discussion of plume dynamics and the terrain channeling that Bob mentioned. Thunder cell development was visible from the area of YHF. Other indicators are noted after 1600.
In terms of whether this anticipated weather was a rare event, it’s relevant that on the 28th, two days earlier, there was a thunderstorm that passed through with similar wind speeds. There’s just no “rare” there.
TTWARE, thanks for your reply – I made a new post for this discussion up above. If you don’t yet have all 30 images of the clouds, I can e-mail them to you. In my view, they are misleading if you watch them in a GIF (which is exactly the same with another progression video related to the YHF – it is hard to get a good sense of the relevant progression when you are dealing with a GIF, in my experience).
Whatever the reason behind this directed, purposeful effort, I would encourage anyone with questions about the weather caused by this discussion to do two things. 1) Read the weather discussion in the SAIT and ADSOH reports. 2) Think about the times they watched a front of thunderstorms approach from one direction, and ask whether they would assume a partial wind shift as a front approaches would be the ONLY wind shift, given what their experience has been with past fronts blowing in.
Actually, I should have added a 3) ask themselves, if they’d been told 30 minutes before that N/NE front arrived that the front would bring E/NE winds, would they assume that a partial shift to W winds was going to be the final change in wind brought by that storm front that was itself blow in from N/NE?
During his ADOSH interview
and also reprinted as a
SIDEBAR on page 14 of
the official WFAR report…
“…it wasn’t like an outflow. It was pushing the fire in this (southerly) direction. It wasn’t a ten-minute bust and things got back to normal. It was two solid hours…”
Moved this up here as I can’t type 1 letter to a line.
Bob,
I agree with the delayed evacuations being part of the story and that they could have been handled better. I really wonder how different the Yarnell evacuations were from the usual case, reading about other fires leaves the impression that late evacuations are not rare. Others could probably add input on this. I do think it was part of the general theme, they underestimated the fire and played catch-up all day. However, their underestimating the fire still should not have resulted in the GMHS getting killed. The firefighters most in danger from this were the ones on the edge of Glen Ilah, at the head of the fire that afternoon. GM was out in left field – in the black – and walked into the path of the fire. Yes they could have pulled out GM earlier, feeling that their work was futile, but was there any urgency to do so? In the black, they should have been safe.
SR –
My questions are not meant to be either tricky or even argumentative. You have been looking at this fire for months. Catch phrases from the report such as lack of risk management or operational oversight really do not add understanding. In your own words, what did the fire command do that they should not have done or what did they not do that they should have done? If you believe their decisions were a major factor in the deaths of the GMHS (as ADOSH does) you should be able to answer those questions. I do believe there has been a tendency to say fire command should have made sure that the GMHS were safe. But who was better able to assess the safety implications of any actions on the part of the crew – the GM overhead or the fire command?
what some people in this commentary don’t seem to understand (and especially those with no first hand experience of wildland fire operations over the last ten years in and around WUI) is that the Yarnell Fire was the perfect shit-storm of complicating factors…
-extremely dry fuel conditions with heavy fuel loading…
-a lightning start fire within close proximity to three communities…
-three communities who hadn’t prepared for the inevitable…
-a weather event that occurred (as was expected) in the middle of the burn period…
-an incoming IMT trying to transition…
…all happening within a 12 hour period. i am not saying that this event was unprecedented, but it is a situation that is nearly impossible to manage well. and easy, in hindsight, to hyper-analyze what could have been done better.
what is ironic about the ADOSH fines (and i think this is what mike is saying) is that the very people it says were actually put in harms way will in no way be “compensated” (nor do i think they should be. they were just doing their jobs and had the same choice GM did to refuse risk, i am just explaining one example of why the ADOSH report is out of touch with reality)… GM was in the safest position of anyone that day. as mike said, they made the conscious decision to leave their assignment and try to walk out. i think the ADOSH fines are simply an attempt to “right the wrong” for the City of Prescott, who failed to properly cover their employees with appropriate death benefits.
xxFullsailxx – one small point: You make reference above to “a weather event that occurred (as was expected) in the middle of the burn period…”
My understanding is that the weather event that was “expected… in the middle of the burn period” did not actually occur “as was expected.” My current-and-still-grossly-incomplete impression (based on the research I am currently doing) is that GM got screwed by fire induced weather far more than any predicted outflow from the thunder cells (that, according to the IMET, fell apart). This weather business is difficult for me to research, so anyone who knows anything about fire-induced-weather is welcome to e-mail me at [email protected]. That said, I have done enough research to date to feel comfortable sharing my above comment.
(In case WTKTT or whomever wants “links” or sources, allow me to state up-front that my sources are my pages and pages and pages of notes, largely hand-written.)
EN, you again would do well to get competent sources instead of the ones you seem to be relying on. Unless there is something I don’t full understand. GM themselves noted squirelly winds. Wind shifts and gust during forecast thunderstorms are a fact of life. 50 mph gusts in the southwest that time of year aren’t particularly newsworthy.
On top of that the fire had fire swirls or wind devils which are directly related to down draft winds and heat. It takes a good sized area of fire to create its own weather. Around 10,000 acres plus igniting rapidly to create fire induced weather or wind. It may have happened in the canyon the crew was in based on the way the fire hit it and spread rapidly with extreme heat like a blow torch.
There was a natural chimney, heavy fuels, a large fire head pushed by wind, with a upslope condition. Any fire above the crew would be sucked down to the fire at the mouth of the canyon causing area combustion. A large combination of factors fell into place where they were. At that point similar to the Loope Fire in 1966 in California. The Chimney effect can be devastating. It also is predictable if you pay attention.
Bob, I am with you. Are you saying, Bob, that if the fire ran up the two-track to the saddle and reached the “descent point” on the ridge, that *THAT* fire could then PULL a spot up through the valley, essentially like a funnel or chimney? (I am sure I am articulating this poorly, but hopefully you can envision what I am saying.)
Not sure what you meant by valley. The canyon the crew was caught in if the fire actually was above them as the fire spread map showed it would have been affected by the fire at the mouth of the canyon that the crew was faced with. Thus creating its own force pulling the fire from both directions. It is a possible scenario based on the way the fire burned. The map showed fire above the crew before the fire below them exploded into the canyon it did not run around them and up to the saddle first
if that was what you were asking. Take a look at the progression charts if they can be believed or are accurate the fire was also burning above them near the heal of the fire while the fire covered the mouth of the canyon. It is like a backfire being pulled to the main fire. Make science?
I have to agree with you on the above, My only concern was the lack of direction by the OPS in not talking to Marsh About the situation and make a clearer decision on staying in the black. I do think the Overhead had some blame in supervision how much is debatable. The Fire had 2 OPS that seemed to cause some confusion as to who was working for who. When the fire broke loose and compromised GM line at around 1530 the crew should have been pulled from there assignment by the OPS or IC. Some one should have been talking to them, They were safe in the Black no dought about that. So simply tell them to stay until we can get you off the mountain. We being the fire command. No less responsible were the crew leaders, and communication with the overhead before moving off the fire.
As in the past and for years the problem with compensation for seasonal’s is terrible. $25,000 is not going to sustain a wife and 4 kids, so you will see lawsuits in this day and age.
Bob- the reason why IHC’s are ordered for a situation like Yarnell Hill Fire is because they are expected to make smart decisions, independently, without having to be “looked upon” when shit goes wonky.
the OSC’s had their bases covered by assigning Marsh as Div. Sup. OSC’s don’t provide for LCES, the line overhead does… in this case, Div Sup Marsh. the whole point of the ICS system is that Command positions don’t have to account for every single resource on the fire… because that would be unreasonable.
I totally agree with you except OSC and Division Boss’s should always be in direct contact with those under them to discuss changes and set up new plans if the original plan is failing. Superintendents like to work closely with good Div. Boss’s and OPS always likes to keep updated with their Divisions. At least it worked that way in my time, It never hurt to double check on safety when things started going south, you made sure your guys were good and aware.
xxfullsalexx
The OSC position under Incident Command System Is in fact the old Line boss position he is in fact responsible for and part of the line overhead and is as responsible for LCES as any one on the line and without a SO he is directly responsible for safety to the IC or Old Fire Boss There job descriptions have never changed just there names. IHC’s still answer to there supervisors, Division and OPS’s if there is 1 or 3 crews on a Division they answer to their line overhead.
Chain of command dose not go away because you are a Hot Shot Crew.
Risk management is not a catch-phrase. If you have read the report accompanying the ADOSH findings, you have already seen a detailed discussion of risk management. Basically, if it’s clear all day that the tactics you started the day with will not be successful given fire behavior, and you never reevaluate those tactics and continue to expose people to risk, it’s a problem. With poor risk management, you leave everyone more susceptible to stupid things happening.
Part of management is understanding that everyone underneath you will not always make perfect decisions. It is almost a given that if managers don’t stay mindful of what their resources are up to, or worse commit them in ways bound to not work, and then don’t pay much attention after that, that sooner or later bad things will happen. GM’s lookout is a good example of this that happened before the burnover, though fortunately with a happy ending.
I’d suggest you go back and re-read the report and state with specificity which part of the risk management discussion and discussions of operational oversight and communications you feel are in error. For instance, I note for communications that management has the ability to cause communication to happen. The fact that GM may have had a history of being close-mouthed as to crew movements and did not specifically reach out to disclose what they were doing clearly was an issue, but operations could have stepped in and asked for communication. If you get only partial communication, as a manager you’re fully able to ask for full communication.
This actually is a good example of what Putnam talks about in saying the 10 are used to put all blame on crews. Yes, GM could have communicated better. And should have. But, it’s a two-way street.
Managers get fired in business all the time for mistakes made by employees that the manager didn’t know about, if the manager didn’t show sufficient oversight.
In regards to your comment ot SR above, one management specific I can point to is the (State budget influenced?) call for a Type II Short Team after the fire had already been deemed a threat to Yarnell.
The negative effects of that decision were immediately compounded by the Short Team’s inability to bring to the table the necessary critical components of a ‘Short Team’, which included no Safety Officer or Planning Chief (who were both scheduled to arrived long after the fire had gone Type I).
It can certainly be argued as to whether or not having these key indivduals on-scene might have changed the outcome of the tragedy. One thing is certain though, having a full team there in a timely manner, would have produced a more positive impact on the firefight that day.
One further example along these lines is taking the time — about 30 seconds — to discuss with each crew whether they have LCES in place. Saying “we’ll escape by bushwhacking down the unscouted bowl to the BSR” likely wouldn’t have been viewed as acceptable. But that conversation never happened, either earlier when it should have, or when people heard that GM was moving and some became concerned that where they were made no sense.
Likewise, TWARE accurately pointed out that the BSR was a fail as an SZ. It seems no one, throughout the day, had a conversation with GM where they formally discussed the black qualifying as a SZ. It did, and they should have stayed committed to it. Failure to have that conversation earlier may not have been a central cause of what happened next. But, when a crew says it’s abandoning its SZ and proceeding down its escape route to another SZ, that would have been a logical moment for 15 seconds of mindful conversation as to the what and why and where implied by that statement. As in, Why did the black become unsafe? Why are you moving? Where is your escape route? Which SZ are you moving to, and do you know it’s a good SZ?
Again the crew is responsible for there safety.
If they are ask to do something that is unsafe they have the right to refuse. When Crew fail to use the 10 SO then they don’t follow the rules so yes as Putnam says the crews are blamed which they should be.
We go back and back again the crews safety is the responsibility of ????? “their crew supervisors.”
Let’s suppose there HAD been a clear statement by GM that they were going to bushwhack down to the BSR, for instance.
Should ops be off the hook in that case, because, well, GM is responsible for their safety, so people are free to sit back and let them do something they clearly shouldn’t be doing? To be clear, this is a hypothetical. What happened seems on evidence more to be a failure to supervise include a failure to force communication that wasn’t really sought by GM. But, it is part of management and a failure that management can and should be accountable for.
Again this is the perspective of a non-WFF. Much of what is suggested above could have been done in theory, but just does not sound real world to me. With the fire blowing up and fire command worrying about citizens in Yarnell, moving resources. coordinating firefighting efforts (including air) and worrying about getting additional resources to Yarnell, the idea that fire command would be asking any group of hotshots if they have a lookout or any escape route seems to be a little hard to expect. Maybe this would have been the role of a safety officer (my lack of knowledge) and if so would argue that the Type 2 short crew was an issue. But I have to believe it is generally assumed that hotshot crews take care of those matters. They are highly trained and Granite Mountain’s overhead was not green (at least Marsh and Steed). I do not think that fire command really sees its role as a mother hen.
Yes managers do get fired AT TIMES for the actions of their employees. But the fire command – hotshot crew relationship is not a typical employer-employee relationship. They are thrown together for a few hours or days on a fire, each with specific, defined roles. The fire command is not responsible for the crew’s training, providing their equipment etc – all the things that exist in a normal manager-employee relationship. Most importantly, hotshot crews are taught and expected to accept that their safety is THEIR responsibility. They choose their SZ’s, they choose their escape routes, they can turn down risk etc. Fire command does not have the “eyes” to make those decisions for a hotshot crew, which is why safety is a crew responsibility. So while it may seem that “blaming the crew” is what fire managers do to escape responsibility, it really just flows from the nature of the job. It sucks, but it is what it is.
The responsibility rests solely with the crew line is just that, a line. Not the way it works. FWIW many people can and do require crews to report on LCES, which is a helpful and reasonable thing to do. And, not a meaningful time intrusion. It does force mindfulness of LCES.
Let’s look at part of the hidden aspect of “blame the crew.” Lowly paid seasonal employees are a dime a dozen — they may be integral parts of their communities, and great people, but it’s easy to hire more. And, they tend to not be that influential. Kind of like ski patrollers in the winter. If an accident happens to one of them, to take the view the responsibility must stay at the crew level, and not go up the line the way it always does in quality organizations, is very convenient. More-senior people do have decent salaries, other perks, and a good number of social and professional chits that they’ve accumulated. Are they really supposed to enjoy all those perks, and then if they don’t perform well in a management role, bear none of the responsibility for accidents that result? That seems to be what people are asserting.
Steed and Marsh were not seasonal -they were full time. Management should be held accountable if they are at fault, not because they get “perks”. Management clearly could have done things better on this fire, that is why you go back and review what you did. But the case to blame fire command as the primary cause for the deaths of the GMHS I think is really quite weak. They did not pull them out (could have, but not necessary for safety). They did not tell them to stay put (actually Abel did it appears). No safety officer (yes they serve a role, but should the GMHS have needed a safety officer to tell them not to go into the canyon).
Simple fact is the GMHS made a mistake. If they had announced to the world their plan, including the route, yes fire command should have aborted it. But it appears that even if fire command was aware of their movement (and this remains very uncertain), they were not aware of the route. I suspect they never dreamed they would go through the canyon. So really were they obligated to tell them not to do so?
13 of the GM dead were seasonal. 6 in total were full-time. It is a tad convenient to say all responsibility stops at the crew level. Many of the crew were not even in a position, necessarily, to know that some things weren’t in place safety-wise that needed to be. You have a medical background it seems, would you put it solely on a junior nurse to stand up to a surgeon who was doing something unsafe, or would you ask hospital administrators to also have a few check and balances in place? Including bearing some responsibility if a major case of malpractice happens?
Lax management creates an environment that allows safety violations. Again, had someone asked Marsh in the morning what his escape route and SZ were, the whole bushwhack and burnover may have been avoided. Lax management was not a sufficient cause for the burnover, for sure, but that simple conversation could have nipped it in the bud.
As a division boss I reported to the OPSC if things started going to hell I talked to OPS and they talked to me As a Type 2 OPS or IC I kept track of my resources and made sure they were not in harms way if the fire started going nuts that is your main responsibility with the plan for the day. the line OPS should have checked with each one of his divisions and discussed options. That did not happen
Marsh evidently was OPS only Division Boss. WTF
Not going to make light of communication, it is usually a good thing. But the leap about having a conversation about a SZ and escape route in the morning and preventing the burnover in the afternoon is mighty large. The walk through the canyon apparently was adlibbed, so how in the heck would the morning talk changed that. Even ADOSH does not suggest fire command knew anything about the walk through the canyon, we have no idea if Marsh had even thought about that route in the morning.
Marsh said he was going down his escape route. It’s possible he had id’d it earlier, and yes it is possible he was ad-libbing. Whichever the answer, if he’d committed to another escape route in the morning, he would have been less likely to identify another route as an escape route, as it would’ve then been an outright dishonest statement to do so. If he truly thought that a bushwhack of that nature was a legit escape route (which he may well have thought) ops could either have cosigned on that, or, more likely, suggested to Marsh another escape route.
None of the mistakes here are something like sexual harassment where someone may from the get-go have known they were doing something wrong and taken intentional steps to be deceptive. It is troubling to here that Marsh was big on crew secrecy, so he may have been aware that his tactics were often at best unorthodox, but that doesn’t mean he would have actively distorted information if a conversation were to have been pressed. That’s one good reason for people to manage by asking questions until they feel they are reasonably getting straight answers back.
For instance, if someone says they are abandoning an SZ, in essence, and going down an escape route to another SZ, a reasonable set of questions is 1) why abandon the first SZ at a time of escalating fire behavior, and 2) what’s your escape route, and 3) what’s your next SZ, and why is it preferable? None of those questions seem to have been asked. Not malice, but not reasonable care of a concerned manager, either.
While ‘everybody is responsible for their own safety’ is a true statement, enough is known about human nature to require having Safety Officers on IMT fires.
Safety Officers certainly can, and do, perform a certain amount of mother-henning when it comes to 10/18, LCES, and other proper safety practices.
If you ask, most fire managers would admit that they’re among the most important people out there.
Checks and balances help minimize the effects of human error.
mike- your perspective is a worthy one. i am sorry you’ve fallen into this futile argument with the yappy-dog.
the ADOSH report and associated fines are out of touch with reality. had the IMT evacuated all the personnel off of YHF at 1530 as it suggests, and allowed the fire to roll through Glen Illah, or whichever community it was pointed toward, with all the folks there who had refused to evacuate, there would be ten times as many lawsuits.
the only reason more homes weren’t lost, and civilian causalities didn’t transpire, is because of the efforts of the wff’s. again, as far as GM goes, they had the safest assignment of nearly any other resource on the fire that day. anchor, flank and pinch from the black.
>> xxfullsailxx said…
>> as far as GM goes, they had the safest
>> assignment of nearly any other resource
>> on the fire that day.
Until they didn’t.
The anchor point ‘assignment’ isn’t what killed them.
It was the ‘next assignment’.
Whether that was a *totally* self-imposed ‘new assignment’ or a response to the requests/urgings/directives of management is what remains to be fully discovered and documented.
Well, we know that there was a request for GM to come down, so TOTALLY self-imposed seems an unlikely scenario. There’s no sign yet that there was an order or veiled order for them to come down. Regardless, at multiple points during the day but certainly around the time GM made the decision to move and for a few minutes after, 30 seconds of communication that didn’t happen could have resulted in GM ultimately making different decisions. There are obviously large vested interests (financial but also professional) that are strongly committed to saying that all responsibility rests on people who aren’t here anymore. But, if the transition from IA and thereafter had been handled better — in line with what standards would suggest — there is a reasonable likelihood that the bushwhack never would have happened.
I still think critical evidence is being with-held. It could be that that evidence is not so critical. It could be that Granite Mountain made the decision completely internally, wanting to push their odds on their own, as they sometimes had done in the past. But there are chunks of that that still don’t make sense to me.
But if that were the case, if there is “nothing to hide,” if it is just them making a truly stupid and dangerous decision on their own, why was a camera that contained a critical conversation hidden from the chain of evidence, why are cellphones still missing, why are gps units still missing, and why are the critical conversations GM had over their crew radio frequency–obviously listened to by Brendan, and likely listened to by various Blue Ridge Hotshots, and maybe listened to by Daryll Willis, still missing?
WTKTT
Just reread your post on the 3rd.
the extra 9 or 10 min. could be attributed to the crew waiting for Marsh to drop off the top and catching up with the crew. Just another possibility. No evidence for proof but very plausible.
Reply to Bob Powers post on May 5, 2014 at 5:39 pm
>> Mr. Powers wrote…
>> WTKTT… Just reread your post on the 3rd.
>> The extra 9 or 10 min. could be attributed to the crew waiting for
>> Marsh to drop off the top and catching up with the crew. Just
>> another possibility. No evidence for proof but very plausible.
Yes. Still perfectly possible.
It’s GOOD to have an accurate timeline now for all the photographic evidence from up on that ridge that afternoon… but it DOES throw some new mysteries into the works.
When everyone ( SAIT included ) just thought that Wade Parker’s photo that he texted to his mother was *actually* taken from that ‘Rest Location’ at 4:04 PM ( and that that could be assumed to be the LAST photo taken at that location ) it seemed to nail down a time when they MUST have left that location to head SOUTH ( SAIR ended up saying 4:05 PM ).
The SAIT must have just done some kind of ‘test walk’ from that ‘Rest Location’ to the ‘Descent Point’ ( they never said HOW they arrived at ANY of their time estimates ) and it came out around 15 minutes, so 4:20 PM then just became their logical ‘guesstimate’ as to when Steed/Crew (plus Marsh?) made it to the ‘Descent Point’… and that is the time they ‘published’ in the SAIR.
Now that the ONLY *actual* proof as to the what TIME they were STILL at that ‘Rest Location’ and taking all those photos/videos is Christopher’s final cellphone image ( IMG_2738 taken at exactly 3:55.31 PM )… there are now 9 to 10 minutes ‘unaccounted for’ and we really have no proof WHAT was happening during that time.
Personally?… I think if they HAD just sat there at that ‘Rest Location’ for 9 or 10 more minutes just waiting for Marsh to ‘arrive’ there BEFORE heading SOUTH…
…I simply think we would be seeing MORE PHOTOS with timestamps in the 3:55 to 4:04 PM timeframe.
They would have had nothing else to do for those extra 9 or 10 minutes ( waiting for Marsh ) than to just keep doing exactly what they had been doing ( taking lots of pictures of the fire ).
Somehow… I believe the fact that all the ‘picture taking’ abruptly ENDS with Christopher’s IMG_2738 at exactly 3:55.31 PM means something.
I believe it *means* ( at the very least ) that 3:56 PM is then about the time Steed ‘announced’ something like “gaggle up, boys… we’re leaving”… and they did, in fact, leave that ‘Rest Location’ then.
Now… whether they just moved those few hundred feet to the
southwest to the ‘two-track’ and began ‘assembling’ there on the two-track ( but still ended up waiting THERE for Marsh to catch up from behind )… we simply don’t know.
But the ‘picture taking’ DID abruptly ended at 3:55.31 PM, and I think that means something.
I still think Marsh was at the ‘end of the line’ of 19 men, even if they did wait for him… and that still has to be the ultimate explanation for Steed being the one to come on the radio FIRST with the initial MAYDAY… and only 3 minutes later do we then hear Marsh ( out of breath from running ) come on the radio saying “This is DIVSA… and I’m here NOW with Granite Mountain”…
…but when they actually left to head SOUTH ( and at what point Marsh really was finally ‘with them’ ) we still don’t know.
WTKTT… I agree with the point that it appears GM left the location where all the pictures and videos were taken circa 1556. And it appears that the SAIT was basing their timeline on the text sent by Parker and the incorrect timestamp (thanks ASAIT) on the power shot camera.
Could it be that the SAIT used the GPS information from Caldwell to determine not only the times, but also the route GM chose?
It does appear (to me) that after Marsh tells Bravo 33, that is exactly where we want the retardant (1637?), and it wasn’t dropped,; then Marsh didn’t transmit again until he was with the crew. However, I am not convinced he was behind the crew. If so, there is no way (in my opinion) he could have saw Bravo 33 flying through the middle bowl west to east.
BTW… Blue Ridge YIN says the first radio traffic they heard regarding GM in trouble came on Tac1, not A/G (tac 5)
YIN P 44 David Morgan Pilot 215KA….. he heard GM trying to contact AA prior to deployment.
Regarding the link to the Facebook comment. I hope the person that actually made the comment will speak up and share the information.
Calvin, I don’t know a lot about Hotshots, but I would bet my LEFT arm based on what I have learned over the past many months that Wade Parker was *NOT* texting and moving at the same time. Therefore, regardless of the time that he TOOK his picture, we can assume with some relative level of certainty that he SENT it at 4:04 p.m., such that the GM guys were NOT on the move at 4:04 p.m. They left AFTER 4:04 p.m. No?
Elizabeth. I agree, most people do not text while hiking on uneven terrain. And I agree, with a fair amount of certainty that Wade Parker did send the text at 1604
You know what doesn’t make sense? To accept as fact that GMH took a minimum of 10 photos and 3 videos between 1549 and 1556 and suddenly turned off their cameras while continuing to sit for another 8 or nine minutes and then suddenly Wade Parker pulls up a picture that is approaching 20 minutes old and texts it, when he could have easily snapped a current photo and sent it.
I think it is much more likely that Wade Parker actually sent the photo after leaving the spot where the picture was taken.
Regarding the facebook comment I have referenced (and the one YOU liked). It *seems* that there was a pause by GM (before descending) and a photo was taken. Wade Parker could have texted his picture at this point. No?
Elizabeth, follow up. It hasn’t been discussed (yet), but I would put the Parker Photo as happening before any Mackenzie picture. And also before the CALDWELL video.
In the very bottom right corner of the Parker picture, you can see a small portion of black helmet. I believe this is the helmet of Robert Caldwell, and he is moving down to the location where he takes his video.
>> calvin said…
>> It hasn’t been discussed
>> (yet), but I would put the
>> Parker Photo as happening
>> before any Mackenzie
>> picture. And also before
>> the CALDWELL video.
calvin… it HAS been discussed, even recently, and there is a video that pretty much PROVES that Parker actually *took* his ‘texted photo’ just BEFORE Caldwell shot his video.
That ‘video crossfade’ between Parker’s photo and a stillframe from the start of Caldwell’s video is here…
The only thing that has NOT been resolved about the TIME on the Parker photo ( texted out some 14 minutes AFTER he took it ) is exactly HOW MUCH sooner he took it before Caldwell started shooting his video there.
It’s hard to venture a guess just from looking at the ‘crossfade’… but I would say it had to be no sooner than about 60 seconds before the video… but not anything less than 15 or 20 seconds.
Do you see any better way to nail that down other than ‘guessing’ about the fire progression seen in the ‘crossfade’?
Reply to Elizabeth post on
May 6, 2014 at 10:56 am said:
>> Elizabeth said…
>> I would bet my LEFT arm based on what
>> I have learned over the past many months
>> that Wade Parker was *NOT* texting and
>> moving at the same time.
Elizabeth… I don’t know if the loss of any extremities depends on it… but that is a
fair assumption to make.
You are RIGHT to point out that the 4:04 PM
network timestamp on Wade Parker’s ‘transmission’ DOES exist… and will always need to be ‘factored in’.
I agree with you.
It is NOT LIKELY that Wade Parker was ‘sneaking in a text transmit’ while he was
ACTUALLY ‘hiking’ in-line with the rest of the men. It was not the ‘policy’ of this Granite Mountain organization for ANYONE to be using their electronic devices WHILE they were hiking.
Indeed… except for the odd ‘opportunistic’ shot like a retardant drop happening ( everyone gets their cameras out for those ) the ‘policy’ seems to have been ‘no picture taking, texting, or phone calls unless on a break’.
So is the 4:04 PM network timestamp on the text message enough PROOF that they didn’t actually DEPART that ‘Rest Location’ and head SOUTH until 4:04 PM?
Maybe. Maybe not.
As I said above… it is GOOD to (finally) have an accurate timeline for ALL of that photographic evidence from out on that ridge that afternoon… but the new *accuracy* calls into question previous *assumptions* like when they actually did LEAVE that area.
It is perfectly possible they DID *leave* that photo-taking location right at 1556 ( when the picture taking stops )… but it was not possible to ‘form a line’ in those ROCKS.
Their next ‘move’ would have been over to the two-track to start ‘assembling’ into a single file line… and I’m sure that’s what they did next.
It’s possible they THEN just waited THERE on the two-track for another 8-9 minutes for Marsh to ‘catch up’ to where they were.
Whether he ( Marsh ) did or not… or whether they got tired of waiting for him and took off SOUTH without him is still unknown…
…but it is possible that if that is what they were doing ( waiting for Marsh while lined up on the two-track ) that they would have still been in ‘break mode’ and it would have been OK for Parker to still be fooling with his smartphone and sending his text message at 4:04 PM… BEFORE starting the ‘hike’ SOUTH.
I’m afraid it is going to remain debatable, however.
Parker COULD have ‘snuck in a text transmit’ as they were hiking south… even if he wasn’t supposed to.
Regarding the time issue, the more I think about it as I try to put myself in their shoes, I think there must have been a brief period at the top of the bowl (1-5 minutes) where they were contemplating the “Now what?” moment.
As they trudged along the 2-track, they had no idea what the direct route to the ranch was going to look like from the top of the bowl. All of a sudden, they were facing a transition from an open path, to a brush-choked bowl. There had to have been some ‘oh shit, now what?’ thoughts and comments as they contemplated their next move.
My speculation is that they discussed it, and thought about it for a brief period of time as noted above, before actually committing themselves, which may account for some of the ‘travel minutes’.
>> TTWARE said…
>> Regarding the time issue, the more I think about it as
>> I try to put myself in their shoes, I think there must have
>> been a brief period at the top of the bowl (1-5 minutes)
>> where they were contemplating the “Now what?”
>> moment.
Yes. It’s hard to picture that ‘decision’ happening any other way. There have been times when it seems like Steed might have just put his ‘left blinker on’ and down they went… but given the circumstances that afternoon that would almost surely represent some kind of ‘heat stroke’ moment.
I’m sure, when Steed humped over that final rise in the two-track and the Ranch actually came into view ( and the rest of the two-track heading SOUTH essentially ‘disappeared from view’ )… he was probably shocked.
>> TTWARE also said…
>> As they trudged along the 2-track, they had no idea
>> what the direct route to the ranch was going to look like
>> from the top of the bowl. All of a sudden, they were
>> facing a transition from an open path, to a brush-choked
>> bowl. There had to have been some ‘oh shit, now what?’
>> thoughts and comments as they contemplated their
>> next move.
Most likely. I would even say the “oh shit, now what?” moment was (briefly) preceded by a few seconds of
“Are you f**king KIDDING ME?”.
Whether or not Steed actually got right on the radio and expressed either of those sentiments to his boss ( Eric Marsh )… we do not know.
>> TTWARE also said…
>> My speculation is that they discussed it, and thought
>> about it for a brief period of time as noted above, before
>> actually committing themselves, which may account for
>> some of the ‘travel minutes.
Your ‘they’ and ‘themselves’ obviously just refers to Steed and Marsh. The other 17 were just ‘along for the ride’ at that point.
If Marsh was not physically with Steed at this point… then ANY conversations about this ‘decision’ pretty much MUST have taken place on the intra-crew channel… and anyone who was listening to that channel at that time ( like Brendan McDonough, Darrell Willis, and perhaps up to 3 Blue Ridge Hot Shots sitting in the other 3 GM vehicles ) probably heard some/all of this ‘decision making’.
There is still one background radio capture right around this exact time that APPEARS to be Marsh telling someone ( like Steed? ) to ‘not be upset’ and Marsh then seems to say he’s ‘coming off the slope’ in an effort to get ‘catch up’ quicker…
…but that background capture has NOT been verified yet.
Even if that background capture ends up being verified it is obvious it was taking place on one of the open TAC channels, which itself would then be another mystery.
If Steed really was ‘upset’ about the decision that now lay in front of him and was expressing that to Eric Marsh… WHY would he be doing that on an open TAC 1 or 2 channel and NOT on the GM intra-crew?
Reply to Elizabeth post on April 30, 2014 at 7:53 pm
>> Elizabeth said…
>> There absolutely 100% *are* text messages and photos
>> ( from GM Hotshots ) that the SAIT was never given. The
>> SAIT never ASKED for them (to this day).
>>
>> WantsToKnowTheTruth on April 30, 2014 at 8:40 pm said:
>> I honestly hadn’t heard that.
>> My turn to ask…
>> What are YOU basing THAT statement on?
>>
>> calvin on May 1, 2014 at 3:17 am said:
>> Elizabeth. How many? Did the ADOSH investigators ask for
>> other pictures and texts that were sent?
>> ScottNorrisPhotoAndText.pdf says……(in an email from Randy
>> Okon to Richa Wilson)on August 8 2013……..
>> I believe we have received all text and photos from the families that
>> we are going to see.
>>
>> Marti Reed on May 1, 2014 at 8:43 pm said:
>> So….. evidence? Links? How do you KNOW that??
Elizabeth…
We are ALL still waiting for an answer here.
Did you just ‘make that up’… or do you *actually* have evidence to support your statement that there are other texts and/or emails from the Granite Mountain Hotshots on Sunday, June 30, 2013 that have never seen the light of day?
calvin… what makes YOU think she is correct? I honestly hadn’t heard anything about this so just wondering what makes you think she even *might* be correct?
Did someone say something in a media article?
Rumors?
…OR… just ( perhaps ) a *feeling* and/or *assuming* that
some family members *might* have had things they didn’t
want to share with investigators?
I don’t actually have that *feeling* or *assumption* myself.
I would find it very hard to believe that any family member
might have been *refusing* to cooperate with investigators,
which is why I’m simply wondering what this *claim* is
really based on.
Reply to Elizabeth post on May 5, 2014 at 10:35 am
NOTE: This is a ‘continuation’ of a discussion that was taking place down below
regarding Rory Collins ‘abruptly’ leaving the fire at 1558… but the ‘reply’ comment
space got filled up to the right-side. New parent comment started to make
room for more comment.
>> Elizabeth asked…
>> What makes you think the briefing Rory gave (as compared to the one
>> Bravo3 gave, for example) was NOT a proper briefing?
I can’t believe we are going over this one again.
You, yourself, have already asked for ‘opinions’ about this a number of times
before and below is simply a ‘reprint’ of ONE of the answers from March 12…
>> WantsToKnowTheTruth on March 12, 2014 at 6:52 pm said:
>> Reply to Elizabeth post on March 12, 2014 at 4:29 pm
>>
>> Elizabeth said…
>> Rory left the fire at 3:59 p.m. because the PILOT who was
>> FLYING the plane for him RAN out of time and had to return
>> to Deer Creek (or Deer Valley or whatever it was). That pilot
>> could NO longer be in the air, according to the relevant
>> regulations/rules.
>>
>> WTKTT responded…
Correct. ( Deer Valley is where the airstrip was ).
I also agree with your opinion that the ‘official’ reports ( the SAIR in particular ) did Rory Collins a huge disservice by not making it clear that it was not HIS decision to ‘abrupty leave the fire’ at 1558 ( timestamp according to SAIR report ).
That being said… there is STILL the following documented testimony from Bravo 33 regarding the ‘briefing’ ( or lack thereof ) from Mr. Collins that day.
Does THIS sound like Mr. Rory Collins gave them any kind of “proper briefing”?
SAIT Interview Notes ( page 15 )…
_____________________________________________________
INTERVIEW WITH BRAVO 33
July 9, 2013 – 1700
Interviewees:
John Burfiend-ATS Specialist
Clint Clauson – ATS Trainee
Thomas French – AT Specialist
Interviewers:
Mike Dudley, Brad Mayhew, Tim Foley, Jay Kurth, Jimmy Rocha
__________________________________________________________________
We had been there about 1 ½ hours when air attack on the scene told us he had
to leave. (1700 NM time). It was a strange change out. He just said “you have the
fire, I’m leaving”. Not sure if I was talking to structure group 1 or 2. I remember
looking up. Talking to ops structural group 1, 2 and ops.
I knew there was 2 structural groups. I wrote down 2. Tom said “hey dude, you
are the air attack”.
Didn’t know Division A was the superintendent of the Granite Mountain hot shots.
Air attack didn’t tell me there were resources in the area.
I never got divisions from the briefing. Didn’t know there were divisions. Thought it
was a Type 3 incident. I didn’t recognize Todd’s voice. I didn’t know anybody was
taking any action on the fire.
I didn’t know that Blue Ridge was there until we were home watching the news.
__________________________________________________________________
So, given these statements from Bravo 33, how can ANYONE say that
Rory Collins did a ‘proper transition briefing’ with these guys before just
bailing off the fire? Even B33 testified it was (quote) “a strange changeout”.
Bravo 33 ended up essentially CLUELESS.
If that is actually ‘standard practice’… then guess what (else) needs to
CHANGE (toot-sweet) in the WFF business.
fire20+
I hear what you were saying and you picked up on mine.
My problem with Putnam is that he did not spend time explaining his theory.
In other words many Fire Fighters not talking to him directly have formed the opinion that the 10 Standard Orders are old and not current for todays fires.
Like his question which one of the Orders is the most important or number one?
As I have said and trained for years no one by its self stands out they are all interactive and have a place at different times on a Fire.
Fight Fire aggressively but provide for safety first—The other 9 are the Safety Rules. That seems to have got lost somewhere with Putnam, at least that’s my take. LCES is good but it is only 3 of the 10 you should always be aware and use the other 7. I hope that makes science. Because of human nature I dought we will ever eliminate Fire Fatalities. Most Fire Fighters will learn and use the rules and that is a good thing.
Reference WTKTT’s 4/30/14 comment regarding Google Earth images, all previous satelite images are still available on Google Earth simply by clicking on the ‘historic images’ (1997) button under the picture. Any placemarks you had imprinted previously, will show up on each of the ‘historic’ images there as well, beginning in 1997.
Followup… ONLY ‘Google Earth’ ( the desktop application ) has the
ability to use ‘previous satellite image sets’. ‘Google Maps’ will still
just ‘default’ to using the ‘latest’ production set of satellite images
which are now ‘post-fire’ ( Dated January 4, 2014 ).
‘Google Earth’ is FREE!
There IS a ‘professional’ ( paid ) version available that has more
capability than the FREE version… but ALL versions of ‘Google
Earth’ can, in fact, show ‘previous satellite images set’ if that’s
what you need to see.
If you still need the pre-fire images… just download/install
the FREE version of ‘Google Earth’.
Just returned from 10 days in Arizona (mainly for a medical conference). Was able to spend a couple of days in Prescott and drive up from Phoenix to Yarnell one afternoon. Also did some hiking in a # of spots.
Couple of observations from Yarnell. First, any suggestion that the men could have dropped packs and “run like hell” is completely nuts. You do not “run” up those steep rock formations. A hike up Camelback Mountain in Phoenix will give you a good idea what climbing up a steep pile of rocks is like. There was no outrunning that fire. Second, driving up to Yarnell, even at the base of the hill, the vegetation did not seem particularly dense. But when you got near the town, it was much denser, even on the Congress side of the ridge. Finally, it has been mentioned that running off to the Congress side was an option. It clearly was, but the rock walls lining Rte 89 were so steep, it did not seem you could have gotten to the highway without going all the way to the bottom of the hill, which is 5 miles down the road (not as the crow flies). Maybe 89 could have been reached higher up in places, maybe Joy or Sonny can shed light on this. Still preferable to dying, but maybe that was why they did not want to fall off to the Congress side.
Yarnell just seemed grim and sad (made worse by the weather, it was cloudy and in the 40s). I did not spend much time there. There really needs to be a proper memorial there (the state is working on this).
Agreed on escape all the way back uphill. GM quickly crossed a line where this became a non-option, as going back uphill would have been even slower than their painfully slow pace down through the bowl. Steep slope, difficult soil, and brush were all issues. This is part of why I’ve urged some posters not familiar with local conditions to get that familiarity.
As regards options once entrapment and burnover seemed imminent, GM still had the choice to drop packs and try to escape to at least a better place to hunker down and deploy, among other possibilities. Unfortunately, burning out, which is the option they chose, would have required light fuels which they didn’t have. It should be stressed that none of the options in front of them at that point were good options. But, in terms of making good decisions, Putnam among others has looked at fatality fires and concluded that many would have been survivable had better decisions, and earlier decisions, been made. Given the terrain trap, GM may not have been one of those cases, but given their lookout’s seeming acceptance of deployment earlier, maybe GM had undue emphasis on deployment ingrained. The next crew in a position similar to theirs, where there is not a survivable deployment site, hopefully will be thinking about other options and seeking them.
>> SR said…
>> It should be stressed that none of the options in front
>> of them at that point were good options.
No, they weren’t. The only *real* cure was prevention ( to not have gotten themselves into that situation at all ).
That being said…
>> SR also said…
>> As regards options once entrapment and burnover
>> seemed imminent, GM still had the choice to drop
>> packs and try to escape to at least a better place to
>> hunker down and deploy, among other possibilities.
In general… it should be noted that to this day… NONE of the actual ‘fire progression’ charts produced by any investigative body ( SAIT or ADOSH ) actually shows that even a full minute after Steed’s first MAYDAY ( circa 1640 )… that their path FORWARD had actually been fully ‘cut off’ when Steed’s first MAYDAY went out at 1639.
To the contrary. All the ‘official’ fireline progression charts show that while the fireline was certainly advancing rapidly at 1640… it had *not yet* actually ‘cut them off’ from making more forward progress in an ‘eastward’ direction either in a mad attempt to reach the ranch OR try to cut more to the south across the floor of the canyon and make it into that draw south of the Ranch which exits out towards the Candy Cane Lane.
We also know now that at 1639… some time had ALREADY transpired between the time when they first realized the trouble they were in… then took the time to find a deployment site… and only THEN did Steed make his first MAYDAY call at 1639.
We know now that isn’t ‘over-modulation’ on Steed’s first 1639 MAYDAY call. Steed is actually YELLING into the microphone because there are ( at least ) TWO chainsaws fully running right there near him and he was ‘yellling’ as much to be able to hear himself talking as to make sure Bravo 33 could hear him over the saws.
So that really does mean a certain amount of time ( several minutes, even? ) had ALREADY passed between making all the decisions to deploy, find a good place, and pull ropes on saws to improve the site BEFORE there was any attempt to contact Bravo 33.
The electricity didn’t go off at the Boulder Springs Ranch until 1653 ( Page 70 of SAIR ) and that timeframe for the fireline actually ‘reaching’ the Boulder Springs Ranch is now supported by the Security Camera Videos.
Steed only said ( at 1639 ) “We are in front of the flaming front”… but even at 1640 none of the ‘official’ fireline progression charts show that to actually have been the case.
It would Marsh who would then say ( almost 3 minutes later circa 1642 ) that their “escape route has been cut-off”.
Again… even at 1642… no officially published fire progression chart shows that to *actually* be fully the case.
It was now (probably) DARK AS NIGHT at that location… and the smoke would have been reducing visibility in ANY direction to almost ZERO… so I’m not saying they could actually ‘see’ that they might have had other ‘chances’ at that point… but it’s still curious to note that the officially published fireline progressions do not fully support their own (recorded) perceptions of the situation circa 1639 / 1640.
>> SR also wrote…
>> given their lookout’s seeming acceptance of deployment
>> earlier, maybe GM had undue emphasis on deployment
>> ingrained.
If Frisby had not ‘accidentally’ come across Brendan when he did… OR whoever he had called on the radio to come get him blew two tires halfway there… then YES… it appears that Brendan is saying he would have ‘deployed’ as a ‘first choice’.
If he had then died… we would simply be here now scratching out heads about ‘situational awareness’ again but this time it would be about why Brendan didn’t really ‘consider his other options’. Just 1 or 2 hundred yards east on that trail was an ‘intersection’ with a Jeep trail that heads directly SOUTH to the Boulder Springs Ranch itself. Brendan could have easily ‘dropped packs and run’ to that intersection and then headed SOUTH and AWAY from the fire…
…but ( even according to his own interviews ) Brendan was totally unaware of that ‘option’. He had NO MAP… and no full ‘situational awareness’ of even his own location that day.
When your own ‘Wildland Division Chief’ ( Darrell Willis ) stands in front of cameras at the same deployment site where he just lost (almost) ALL of his men and says he has no idea what the ‘upper limit’ is for a fire shelter… you DO have to wonder if ANYONE in this organization really had a full understanding of the capabilities of their own equipment or ( worse yet ) were actually ‘teaching’ people to rely on it under totally inappropriate circumstances.
>> SR also said…
>> The next crew in a position similar to theirs, where
>> there is not a survivable deployment site, hopefully
>> will be thinking about other options and seeking them.
It is still worth discussing ( what the other options *might* have been ) and the ‘training’ should focus on that.
SR, your reference to Dr. Putnam is spot on. Fighting fire is easy, its the human factors that can get you in trouble. Better decisions & earlier decisions–BY HUMANS–should/could/would save lives. Unfortunately fatality investigations look at the ‘science’ (sorry FBA’s), 10&18 (essentially blame FF’s themselves), and continue to downplay managements role (go pick an entrapment lessons learned & read for yourselves) more intently than the human side of things. If you haven’t read Dr. Putnam’s essay ‘Up In Smoke’ from 2000–do!
Fire 20+
While I understand what Putnam is trying to put forth he is causing havoc in the Safety rules.
First there are the 10 standard orders. They are to give directions for safety. If you do not follow them then evidently you will asses fault according to each one that was not used that caused fatalities.
It is like any Industry accident there are safety rules trained and posted. If you put your body or extremities where they don’t belong and Die then the finding will be that you violated one or more of the rules. So the 10 Standard FFO keep you safe they also show what went wrong. To list the orders that weren’t followed will make fire fighters aware of the need to follow the Orders. Wild Fire burn over fatalities are not that common, that’s because Fire Fighters follow and use the rules. Accidents happen because humans cut corners and forget or ignore the rules. Train– Situation Awareness and use the 10 and 18 and you will stay safe like thousands who are and have gone before you.
If you read Putnam’s piece on the 10 orders, including his listing of the “Real,” i.e. unspoken, fire orders, together with his “Up in Smoke,” I think what he is getting at makes sense. Basically, recognizing that there needs to be some priority, and actual accountability. Certainly many symptoms of the “real orders” seemed to be on display at the YHF.
Key to me is Putnam really does want accountability. Some of his points are used by some people to argue for no accountability. Bob I think in part is saying he want there to be accountability as well. Some of the “nothing-to-see-here” comments in this forum reflect the no-accountability (and above all no financial liability) viewpoint, both as regards the obvious problems with GM but also issues like SZs.
Bob (and wtktt below),
I understand what you are saying about the 10 SFFO (which if they aren’t met–NO engagement) and not EVER getting into a situation where a shelter is needed/used, please know this, including researching and learning from other’s mistakes.
What I grabbed ahold of in your post was your Putnam reference and ‘survivable with better decisions’ — decisions being a human factor…Putnam’s essay’s are applicable from 2000 to now, no? And your reply ‘Accidents happen because humans cut corners and forget or ignore the rules.’…HUMANS..that’s all I’m saying, and again, the 10 SFFO, when followed, saves lives.
Also look at Putnam’s reference to Management when questioned regarding the 10 SFFO…when do we break them and when do we bend them? Could it be there is a possible disconnect between Management and real, attainable goals accomplished by FF’s in the current fire environment, particularly T1 FF’s? Absolutely, and/but please prove me wrong. Accountability is where it’s at, and Management doesn’t care for that word, trust me.
The 10 SFFO, are mentally checked by the Supt/Asst Supt, mitigated, followed, and the 18 are different, more flexible. Perhaps a flaw w/i the 10 SFFO are people’s (w/ different experience levels) perceptions of what they mean at extremely different situations/circumstances?
It’s a scary time…yes, like you said SA, train, talk, and don’t be afraid to speak up.
If you don’t mind, please expand on Putnam causing havoc in safety rules? All I have read isn’t current…and have you been on an IHC that has practiced mindfulness?
—-Reference to WTKTT reply—-
I’m sorry, I have read all YHF evidence…what I was speaking of was historical entrapment lessons learned, not YHF. You are right, Management’s failings ARE scathing, if only they’d of told the truth from the beginning…
I do think there were problems with the management of this fire, especially as related to failure to evacuate citizens, as well as the firefighters in close to town in a timely matter, coming from not appreciating how fast this fire was moving. There may also have been some mixed messages. But, specifically as relates to the GMHS ON THAT DAY (not discussing Willis’ relationship with Marsh or their feelings about structure protection), tell me what was fire management’s great sin? Fire management obviously cannot know exactly what is happening with the fire everywhere at all times. So was asking for possible assistance a real sin? If it is judged to be so, worthy of a giant fine, how will fire commands operate in the future? Will they be afraid to make requests, if they can be punished for doing so? Whereas the SAIT was unwilling to explicitly point out errors, I think ADOSH was an overreaction. I think they went in with the idea of hanging the fire command, no matter what the facts were. They criticized and fined fire command for not pulling the GMHS out. But they were safe were they were, so why was not pulling them out worthy of condemnation? But ADOSH took the view that 19 men died, so someone was going to take the hit and it was not going to be the crew. As I have said, ADOSH did contribute by helping to understand the timeline better, but I do not think their conclusions were any more supported by the facts than those of the SAIT.
Did you read the actual ADOSH report? They lay out the multiple balls that got dropped pretty clearly. Not all of those dropped balls even related to GM.
Given what happened that day, the fine wasn’t that big, btw. $25k per death, for instance, doesn’t pay for much these days.
I read the report. I also acknowledged above the problems not related directly to the GMHS. The main finding of the report as relates to the GMHS was they were not pulled out. As I asked above, given that the GMHS were safe in place, why is this criticism valid? Yes, the fire command failed to appreciate the speed of the fire that afternoon and they were lucky people did not die in Yarnell. But that should not have killed the GMHS. The critical failing there was that the crew did not ensure its own safety. Don’t refer back to the report. In your own words, tell me what was the “sin” of the fire command as relates to the GMHS that day – i.e. don’t say the IA was inadequate – that is said about every big fire.
I think it was Musser who once asked in an interview – given the situation that afternoon with people still in Yarnell, what were they supposed to do? Were they supposed to pull out and leave people to whatever fate befell them? We probably could argue a long time about that, but that was the dilemma fire command was facing late that day.
Mike a good team in place can make good decisions.
1. OPS could have been more aggressive with GM, Realized they were hung out to dry and pulled them out early. As there line supervisor specificly told them to pull back into the old black and Waite until it was clear to move that is his job.
2. Also a evack plan should have been in place and implemented earlier working with local Sheriff’s office Overhead cut that way to close or not at all a real plan.
I have said before this was a overhead nightmare that never got better. The type 2 team was never organized or really in control.
Failure to pull GM out early is far from the only issue in the report relating to GM. Serious shortcomings in risk management, and serious problems with operational oversight, are some of the standout issues.
>> FIRE20+ wrote…
>> Unfortunately fatality investigations look at the
>> ‘science’ (sorry FBA’s), 10&18 (essentially
>> blame FF’s themselves), and continue to
>> downplay managements role
Only if you (apparently) let ‘Forestry’ people do it.
The ADOSH investigation *VERY* much found that ‘management’ was ‘at fault’ here. No question.
The ‘summaries’ state that… but if you actually read the full ADOSH release and the ‘detail pages’ behind each and every ‘assigned infraction’… the opinions about management’s ‘failings’ are scathing… all the way through Friday night, Saturday, and all day Sunday.
It was not ADOSH’s job to ‘name names’. From their perspective… it was a ‘workplace environment’ that was SUPPOSED to be run ‘according to the rules’ by the EMPLOYER(S)… to provide ( and ENSURE ) *safety* for the EMPLOYEES in that workplace… but ADOSH found that was simply ‘way off the charts’.
mike- i continue to appreciate the fact that you try to gain more perspective, both by remaining open minded and relatively non-judgmental and not to mention the fact that you traveled to the site to gain first hand insights…
that’s worth ten-fold more than all the pages of judgmental speculation from the non-experts on this commentary. and much more meaningful and respectful to the deceased and their loved ones.
Sonny: From where we dropped off, yes, you could have continued to highway 89 without much difficulty. We could have reached hwy 89 as quickly or sooner than we reached Foothill Dr. where my car was parked. We did a hike right off the plateau that has a rocky and steep drop off for about appx. 200 yards so that could have been an option for sure.
Joy: Shed light. Hmmm. I am the one that wanted to go to remain on the 2 track ridge road towards the cattle pond near the Helm’s spot that was nearer to the car’s location so I never really gave the Congress side much thought until Sonny came back for me and stated this was a situation we had to get the hell outta—In knowing Sonny as my hiking partner and I am the desert walker—one true lesson in this is the value in his expertise and raw knowledge in knowing the terrain even if he had not hiked it or lived that area as long as I did. That man has a rare quality that you either get by “living” it all your life that you never learn in any school. I wonder what they have as part of the training for wildland firefighters because I am always going to be bewildered as to WHY 19 men stuck together to die while we SURVIVED that fire and WHY they went down the very area Sonny/I disagreed early that morning on the hike up. The area they died is the same gps coordinates to where we argued because I was not going up that steep terrain when it was still dark out knowing that tight maze like manzanita terrain in snake country and I was not going to crawl at dark time under it so he appeased me and went my way that morning scaling boulders around the base to the old grader road but it saddens me that there is no reason 19 men should have perished. I had the sheriff dept find me with their great gps program yet 19 men died and it is labeled due to heavy smoke and not able to fly in the area or we heard it was a chaotic afternoon and a bad thing happened. Sure did. A very bad thing! I hope clarity is reached in this mystery—that is all. As far as shedding light on the topic—what Sonny says is GOLD! enough said.
WTKTT….Can you take a look at image p0260 and help me find the Rest spot #2?
We do know that the group of GMH in image 0885,0886 and 0887 made it to the rest spot #2, however, at this point it doesn’t make sense to me that they are walking away from the Black, walking away from rest spot #2. It also doesn’t make sense that they would have stopped only a couple minutes away from rest spot #2 if that was the destination, at that point. And, if they didn’t access the two track to achieve the move to rest spot #2, they would have been moving through brush, right?
And I think it should be noted again, that all 19 GMH are not accounted for in any of the images taken from the rest spot #2. But I think it is now certain that Neil and Maclean got it wrong when they say a group of sawyers left the black at 1553 (referencing 0885,0886,0887), we now know Ashcraft, Norris and another hotshot/ sawyer (seen in movie 0888 holding a chainsaw) are at rest are #2 circa 1555.
>> calvin said…
>> WTKTT….Can you take a look at image p0260 and help
>> me find the Rest spot #2?
Yes. I will do so. Actually… I’m working on a VIDEO that explains
all this complete with maps and crossfades of relevant photos.
Stay tuned.
In the meantime…
>> calvin also said…
>> We do know that the group of GMH in image 0885,0886 and
>> 0887 made it to the rest spot #2,
Yes. Confirmed.
>> calvin also said…
>> however, at this point it doesn’t make sense to me that they
>> are walking away from the Black, walking away from rest
>> spot #2.
They are not walking AWAY from ‘rest spot #2’. That’s where
they are GOING. It was a steep slope… and there were other
rock formations to their LEFT that would have been blocking
a direct walk directly UP the slope to where the others were
gathering. It makes perfect sense that they just walked to
RIGHT at first and exited the camera frame to the RIGHT.
They were simply circling AROUND the point where
MacKenzie was standing there shooting pictures.
Pre-fire Google images show there was a ‘better’ walking
path UP the slope there BEHIND that point where Christopher
was standing.
>> calvin also wrote…
>> It also doesn’t make sense that they would have stopped
>> only a couple minutes away from rest spot #2 if that was
>> the destination, at that point.
You make it sound like you think they were somewhere
else when the ‘tools up’ order came just minutes before
that ( when Brendan left his lookout post ).
I believe that place where we see them in the MacKenzine
0085, 0086 photos IS the place where they were ‘working’
when that ‘tools up’ order came… but they were told to
‘standby’ because Marsh/Steed were busy with conversations
with Frisby about the vehicles… so it just became a “smoke ’em
if ya got ’em” moment… which these translates to “Photo time!”.
As soon as Marsh finished talking to OPS2 Paul Musser circa
1542 to 1543… that’s when ‘breaktime’ was over and then
Steed told them to ‘come up the slope now’ and join the others.
Steed didn’t even need a radio to do that at that point since
there were so close by.
If Steed was already right above them there at ‘Rest Spot 2’
he could have just waved his arm and called them up the slope
or he could have just shouted down to then, sans radio.
>> calvin also asked
>> And, if they didn’t access the two track to achieve the move
>> to rest spot #2, they would have been moving through
>> brush, right?
Yes. Probably… but the BLACK was right there and it extended
straight UP the slope and encompassed ‘Rest Spot 2’ itself.
It appears they just basically ‘walked the retardant line’ up
the slope a ways and ( in this case, almost literally ) had
‘one foot in the black’.
>> calvin also said…
>> And I think it should be noted again, that all 19 GMH are not
>> accounted for in any of the images taken from the rest spot #2.
Correct. There are a LOT of fella missing from all of these
photos ( and they always have been ).
Now that we know that Christopher’s last cellphone image
IMG_2738.JPG ( taken at 3:55.31 PM ) is the LAST photo taken
by any Hotshot that day from that ‘Rest spot 2’… we still have
to answer these questions…
1) Why did the picture taking STOP at 3:55? Is that when Steed
turned to them all and suddenly said something like ‘gaggle up,
boys, we’re leaving’?
2) If the picture taking session just STOPPED of its own accord,
and they DID, in fact, just stay there until 4:04 or 4:05 before
heading SOUTH… then why did they even wait those 9 minutes
before leaving? Could it be they were simply waiting for the
OTHER fellas ( not seen in any photos ) to arrive there from
wherever THEY has been working ( 1 or even 2 squads
from other ‘work spots’, or something? ).
3) Did Steed and the fellas we CAN see at the ‘Rest Spot 2’
actually take off SOUTH at 3:55 or 3:56 ( and that really is
why the photo taking session ends abruptly at 3:55 )… and
the OTHER ‘squads’ that weren’t even there yet were told
to simply ‘catch up’… and it really didn’t become a full line
of 19 men headed SOUTH until they actually did ‘catch them’?
>> calvin also said…
>> But I think it is now certain that Neil and Maclean got it
>> wrong when they say a group of sawyers left the black at
>> 1553 (referencing 0885,0886,0887), we now know Ashcraft,
>> Norris and another hotshot/ sawyer (seen in movie 0888
>> holding a chainsaw) are at rest are #2 circa 1555.
If Maclean is actually writing a book about all this… I certainly
hope he does his homework better in the long run than he
did regarding THAT “Marsh was at the ranch!” fiasco.
**
** THE ‘CUTOUT’ ROCK IN MACKENZIE IMAGES
** IMG_0085, IMG_0086 and IMG_0087 IS ONLY
** 80 FEET IN FRONT OF ‘REST LOCATION 2’
For all intents and purposes… what has long been referred to as ‘Rest Location 1’ and ‘Rest Location 2’ with regards to the MacKenzie Canon Powershot images are, essentially, the same place.
** THE SHORT STORY
The basic ‘center’ of that ‘Rest Location 2’ area where MacKenzie shot his two 9 seconds videos ( and his other photos ) has been confirmed to be here…
34.227515, -112.789960
The ‘confirmation’ of that comes from the absolute on-site verification of where Wade Parker took his photo and the fact that the ‘same cactus’ seen in all the photos is right there where it should be. That ‘cactus’ actually survived the firestorm that afternoon and can STILL be seen in even the current post-fire Google Maps imagery. MacKenzie was only standing a few feet to the right of this ‘Wade Parker Photo’ GPS coordinate when he shot his videos. Not even enough to cause a ‘bump’ in these GPS coordinates.
That ‘cutout’ rock seen in the MacKenzie 0885, 0886 and 0887 images ( taken in the 3:44-3:45 PM timeframe ) seems to be right here…
34.227698, -112.789829
That is just 80 feet ‘down the slope’ from the ‘Rest Location 2’ spot where Christopher MacKenzie shot his Canon VIDEOS.
So the Hotshots seen in the 0885, 0886 and 0887 images really did just have a ‘short walk up the hill’ when they left that ‘Rest Location 1’ to simply join the others a little farther up the slope at ‘Rest Location 2’.
Apparently… the only reason we see them exiting the camera to the RIGHT ( and seeming to head DOWN the slope and AWAY from ‘Rest Location 2’ ) is that was the way to go back UP because of the steep slope there and some other rock formations that are out-of-frame to Christopher’s LEFT.
They basically just exited to Christopher’s RIGHT… but then just ‘circled around’ where he was standing and headed to Christopher’s LEFT the few hundred feet it took to go UP the slope, around those rocks, and join the others at the ‘Rest 2′ location’.
** THE LONG STORY
Calvin… you are right about ALL of the photos you have cited already that contain images of this ‘cutout rock’ seen in the MacKenzie Canon 0885, 0886 and 0887 images.
There are also many others like 8 or 9 in Joy Collura’s Folder… the Dean Fernandez aerial photos, etc. etc. Many other Folders.
You are ALSO right that that ‘cutout’ rock is the same one seen in the ‘dead center’ of MacKenzie’s 8090 images taken from the ‘Rest 2’ location.
The following ADOSH photo proves that.
NOTE: It is NOT in the ADOSH GPS stamped folder… it’s in the OTHER one.
The ‘cutout rock’ is seen in this photo face-on at the top-center of the photograph… along with those 2 other ‘unique’ (large) rocks to the LEFT of it.
There is NO QUESTION that those are the same 3 rocks in BOTH the P9180060 photo *AND* Christopher’s IMG_0890 photo.
In the P9180060 photo… look at the top left side of the ‘chunked rock’ that is facing the camera. There is what almost looks like a man-made ‘chisled out’ indentation about 2 inches deep that when viewed in P9180060 almost looks like the little ’round balloon coming to a point’ that you see in Google Maps. The inside of this ‘balloon coming to a point’ shape also has a different COLOR than the rest of the surface of that ‘chunked rock’.
Now look at that ‘pointy rock’ in the exact center of MacKenzie’s IMG_0890 ( the one you mentioned ).
It’s the same rock.
We can’t actually SEE the ‘chunkout’ in the IMG_0890 image of it because of the new angle on it. The side of that rock with the ‘chunkout’ is now facing AWAY from the camera… BUT!… that same ‘balloon coming to a point’ chiseled out indentation is also clearly visibile on the side of that ‘pointy rock’ that we CAN still see in IMG_0890.
It’s also obvious in IMG_0890 that the side that is now facing away from the camera ( that has the chunkout ) is perfectly flat-faced… and this matches all other images of that rock perfectly.
* THE OTHER TWO TALL ROCKS THERE…
Now also look at P9180060 again and notice the OTHER two ‘tall rocks’ to the LEFT of the ‘chunked rock’.
The one just to the left of it has its own ‘notch’ on end facing the camera. That ‘cutout’ makes the east facing side of the rock sort of look like a ‘dog’s head’ in profile ( a dog with a flat snout facing the camera, anyway )… and that ‘crack’ that runs in that rock from top left to bottom right ALSO makes that top half of the EAST rock face look lke a ‘dog’s ear’…
…so I’ve been calling THIS rock ‘Dog’s Head Rock’.
In IMG_0890 the other two ‘pointy rocks’ to the left of the one in the center are those SAME ‘other two tall rocks’ seen in P9180060, just viewed from that different angle farther up the hill where they were taking their photos.
In IMG_0890… the other ‘pointy’ rock just to the left of the ‘cutout’ rock with the ‘ballon shaped indentation’ is simply another angle on ‘Dog’s Head Rock’… and the one to the left of THAT is simply the more ‘dome’ shaped rock ( also with a distinct crack ) that is also seen to the left of ‘Dog’s Head Rock’ in the P9180060 photo.
Those THREE rocks seen in P9180060 are just close enough in front of that ‘rest area 2’ location… and just TALL ENOUGH… that that is why they are seen ‘peeking up’ in the foreground in MOST of the photos and videos taken from that ‘Rest Area 2’ location ( including IMG_0890 ).
>> calvin asked…
>> Many thanks. Are the group of GMH (seen in
>> 0885,0886,0887) returning to the two track to
>> move to rest area 2?
They COULD have… but they didn’t have to.
All they were doing was ‘coming up the slope’ to reach
that ‘Rest Location 2’.
Look at the satellite photos ( or the Dean Fernandez
aerial shots ).
They MAY have just circled around behind Christopher
after exiting the camera to his RIGHT… and then just
walked up the slope directly AT the ‘Rest 2 Location’
and entered it that way…
…or they may have gone straight up the slope, caught
the two-track NORTH for only about 100 feet, and
then cut over to the ‘Rest Location 2’ area and entered
it from the BACK.
My guess would be the former. they just came up the
slope a little… cut over to where the others were
already gathering… and never set foot on the two-track
at all.
The interesting part of all of this is not really that they
were all still very close together circa 1543… it’s that
they were already ‘at rest’ and taking photos… and
the sawyers already had their SHEATHS on their
saws… as if they ALREADY knew ( at 1543 ) that the
work was over there.
That means the ‘tools up’ moment for ALL of them
probably came circa 1536 or 1537… when Brendan
left his lookout position.
The same ‘advancing fireline’ that drove Brendan off
his lookout mound and caused Steed to tell Brendan…
“Yeah… I know Brendan… I can see what’s happening
down there” appears to be the same moment Steed
knew to tell his OWN crew ‘tools up’ and that there
was no point in continuing that ‘anchor point’ work.
Followup… I’m still ‘checking it out’ and trying to verify… but I believe that particular ADOSH photo linked above might actually show the ‘orange rock’ that MacKenzie shows Ashcraft actually SITTING on in his 0085, 0086 photos.
If it’s not one of those ‘retardant covered’ rocks in the ADOSH photo… then it’s probably one just out-of-frame to the LEFT.
Actually… it’s pretty much verified ( for MacKenzie image 0086, anyway ).
Most of the ‘retardant covered rocks’ in the
fore-to-middle ground of MacKenzie’s 0086
Canon Powershot image are, in fact, sitting
right there in the same fore-middle ground
in the ADOSH photo.
Actually… whoever took that ADOSH photo
was pretty much just about 20 feet to the
right ( and a little farther down the slope ) of where MacKenzie took his 0086 Canon photo.
**
** GOOGLE EARTH AND GOOGLE MAPS NOW USING
** JANUARY 1, 2014 SATELLITE IMAGERY FOR YARNELL
This is just a ‘heads up’. It was bound to happen sooner or later… and a few
days ago Google switched to now using ‘post-fire’ satellite imagery for the
entire Yarnell area. The ‘pre-fire’ ground images are no longer available and
all you see now is the post-fire ‘moonscape’ with just some vegetation returning.
If you have any ‘Google Earth’ tours recorded… they will still show the same
waypoints and whatnot but the 3D imagery is now ‘post-fire’.
Actually… if you have a paid/professional Google Earth account there IS a
way to ‘dial back’ to previous sets of images… but it is complicated and
requires communicating with Google.
So if anyone has any sets of pre-fire screen snapshots from Google Maps
in ‘satellite view’ or any Google Earth tours recorded as movies using pre-fire
imagery… you should hang on to those for posterity’s sake since they are now
pretty valuable.
The DOWN side is that it is now basically impossible to ‘match up’ any
pre-fire ( or weekend of ) photos with satellite images based on anything
involving the vegetation.
The UP side is that it is also *now* easier to actually match up *some*
images based on the ‘rocks’ that might be showing. The rock formations
are now clearly visible in both Google Maps and Google Earth… whereas
some of them were being ‘hidden’ from the satellite views because of
the vegetation in the pre-fire aerial imagery.
The new January 1, 2014 set of satellite images also show something
very interesting. They were taken very LATE in the afternoon on a sunny
day ( almost near sundown? ) and this means the SHADOWS on the
ground are VERY prominent and can easily be used to tell the HEIGHT of
certain objects on the ground.
Example: There are some ROCK formations that can now be easily identified
because of these SHADOWS. If a rock was standing about 6-10 feet tall then
the new imagery shows a shadow on the ground of up to 20 feet out from
that object. So just by looking at the SHADOWS near some of these rock
formations it is easier to tell if they match the ‘height’ and ‘shape’ of a lot
of things seen in the photo collections(s) from Yarnell.
In Google Earth ( in 3D mode ) these new ‘shadows’ also supply a dramatic
effect showing just how DEEP those ‘blind canyons’ really were down there
to the SOUTH towards the Boulder Springs ranch.
There are actually THREE ‘canyons’ down there.
The one they died in, another one just SOUTH of that ( which appears to ALSO
have had its own sort of ‘hiking trail’ down inside it )… and then the final
one that actually contains the now-famous ‘alternate escape route’.
The TRAILS ( two-track / one-track / hiking path, etc. ) are also now actually
much more clearly visible than they were in the pre-fire imagery.
It is now EASY to see that the ‘alternate escape’ route WAS clearly ‘contiguous’
and visible at ground level all the way EAST to where it then actually turned
SOUTH towards the Candy-Cany Lane area.
There was a WAY to then turn NORTH and get to the Boulder Springs Ranch
through that ‘draw’ at the end of the EASTWARD leg of the alternate escape
route… but it is NOT ( nor ever was? ) nearly as clearly defined as the other
trail that simply headed SOUTH towards Candy Cane Lane after that
EASTWARD leg of the alternate escape route met that large clearing.
**
** UPDATE
** ONLY GOOGLE HAS SWITCHED TO POST-FIRE
** SATELLITE IMAGERY OF YARNELL
Forgot to mention this up above. As of today… ONLY Google has
switched to using post-fire satellite imagery for Yarnell.
Other popular ‘maps’ services with optional ‘satellite’ views
are STILL using the pre-fire satellite imagery sets for Yarnell.
Those would include…
Microsoft Virtual Earth ( Just go to bing.com and click Maps ).
Yahoo Maps ( Same deal. Go to yahoo.com and click Maps ).
So if anyone was working on anything that really could use more
of the pre-fire imagery from Yarnell complete with vegetation…
I would be sure to take your own ‘screen shots’ that you need
before these other services roll over to the latest satellite
imagery.
All of these NAVSAT satellite images for public use basically
come from the same company… so sooner or later all these
online services ‘get around’ to updating their production-level
data sets with the latest data…
…so the clock is ticking. Google has done their ‘roll over’ first
but the other online services probably will as well in short order.
As is the case with ‘Google Earth’… if you are using Microsoft’s
Virtual Earth and you have created any files that use ‘waypoints’…
unless you do the option of ‘playing the waypoints’ and recording
the whole thing as an actual ‘video’… then you won’t lose your
valid waypoints but you WILL lose the pre-fire background(s)
unless you SAVE everything as an actual VIDEO sometime soon.
The Google Earth view also now illustrates a bit more starkly why staying high also would have preserved several other options. Claims that staying on the 2-track would have inevitably led to the same result in the end are big reaches at best.
Yes. You can also see even *more* clearly now that if they had simply kept heading SOUTH after reaching that point where it would have been time to decide whether or not to take the EASTBOUND leg of the ‘alternate escape route’… there IS, in fact, a ‘hiking trail’ coming down off the other (Congress) side of the ridge that then ‘cuts over’ to the EAST where you would then eventually pick up the ‘continuation’ of the ‘alternate escape route’ trail as it heads over to the Candy Cane Lane area.
This is exactly the way the hikers Joy Collura and Tex (Sonny) Gilligan got out of there safely that afternoon.
Situational awareness.
It’s important.
Sometimes… it’s the difference between life or death.
WTKTT—
If some of you have learned nothing else that is the one thing that always stands out on every fire where lives are lost—-Situation awareness
Its the main ingredient of the 18 STSWO…..
It also illustrates more clearly that the idea that there were switchbacks and game trails that GM was going to be making good time on is patently false. As anyone familiar with local conditions would know already. GM’s decision to drop down into that bowl would have involved, for anyone reasonably familiar with conditions at the time GM made the decision, assuming they were in for a slow slog through that bowl.
Agree. We also know now that Christopher MacKenzie’s last cellphone photo IMG_2738 ( which he took at exactly 3:55.31 PM ) is the LAST KNOWN solid proof of when they were still at the ‘Rest Location 2’ point prior to embarking on ‘the mission’.
It can no longer be assumed that they ‘left’ that location at 4:05 PM, as the SAIR ‘suggested’ they did.
Unless the SAIT knows something that has never been made public, or unless Brendan McDonough ( or anyone else listening to the intra-crew around that time ) knows something different… we have to now assume they *might* have left on ‘the mission’ as early as 3:56 PM or so.
So if they really did leave that area circa 3:55.50 or 3:56.xx ( which is why the photo taking abruptly ends )… then that simply ADDS 9 to 10 minutes to the ‘assumed’ travel time and DECREASES their overall ‘rate of travel’ significantly.
The SAIT has never said how in the heck they came up with those 4:05 ( departure time ) and the 4:20 ‘estimated’ time for reaching the ‘Descent Point’ and then dropping into the fuel-filled box canyon.
We have to ‘assume’ two things, I guess.
1) They really did think that Wade Parker actually took his ‘photo’ that he texted to his mother at 4:04 PM… and/or that there was no possibility he HAD taken it ‘earlier’ and simply ‘texted’ it out to her while they were ALREADY hiking south.
2) They must have done some kind of ‘timed walk’ themselves from where they THOUGHT they left from to that ‘Descent Point’… and THEIR ‘guesstimate’ came out to be 15 minutes ( hence, the 4:20 PM arrival time at the ‘Descent Point’ ). If they ‘timed’ that walk from the other known ‘lunch spot’… then even that ‘test walk’ was totally WRONG.
Maybe they did ‘get that part right’.
Maybe they did a good ‘test walk’ from the right departure point to the right ‘Descent Point’.
If that is the case… then the ‘extra 9 to 10’ minutes that now *might* need to be added to the overall ‘travel time’ all had to be wasted either pausing at the ‘Descent Point’ and taking a long time to decide what to do… OR just add those 9-10 minutes to the ‘Descent Time’ itself.
If we add those 9 or 10 minutes to the ‘Descent Time’… then not only were they ‘bogged down’… they were literally ‘crawling’ their way down to the bottom of that canyon… excruciatingly slowly.
Maybe someone actually got HURT on the way down… and they had to STOP, or something. Very few people have ever seen the actual autopsy reports. I wonder if there was, in fact, any evidence that one ( or more? ) of the men had sprained, twisted, or even (perhaps) broken an ankle during that ‘descent’.
I think that has been ‘discussed’ before and IIRC the ‘consensus’ was something like…
1) Not likely. Good boots. Trained hikers.
2) If it was a serious injury ( enought to STOP them )… there would (should?) probably have been some radio traffic about it.
3) Even if autopsy reports showed such an injury… the SAIT would/should have know about it ( since they had access to the autopsy reports ) and why would they be hesitant, in ANY way, to publish that information, or include it in their report narrative? They didn’t… so I guess we can *assume* there is no evidence there was any hiking injury during that descent.
So even adding 9 or 10 minutes to the ‘travel time’ and trying to account for it just comes down to either ‘more hesitation’ and/or even a SLOWER rate of descent and ‘bog down’ than was previously thought.
This is the last in the recent series of ‘crossfades’ for ALL of Christopher MacKenzie’s cellphone pictures plus his 4 Canon photos and videos that were taken in-between cellphone images 2737 and 2737.
This final MacKenzie cellphone photo ( IMG_2738 ) is now the LAST KNOWN photograph from anyone up on that ridge that afternoon.
The Wade Parker photo that he texted to his mother has never actually been the ‘last GM photo’. It has a network timestamp of 4:04 PM for when he finally got around to ‘texting’ that photo… but it has ALWAYS been the case that he actually took that photo long before that… even BEFORE Robert Caldwell shot his 3:50 PM video.
As for this last crossfade in this particular series…
Cellphone IMG_2737 was taken in ‘Portrait’ mode.
Cellphone IMG_2738 was taken in ‘Landscape’ mode.
11 seconds after Christopher took his IMG_2377 he turned to his RIGHT and faced more EAST than in any prior cellphone photo, so IMG_2738 doesn’t show much of the close-to-them fireline like all the other cellphone photos… but it DOES show what the rest of the smoke column looked like at that point. The full ‘panorama’ shot from their location with both images ‘blended’ together is striking. The small (apparent) ‘spot ahead’ of the fireline seen in IMG_2737 also remains visible in about the center of the fade.
YouTube About Information
__________________________________________________________________
This is the last in the series of terrain-aligned crossfades covering ALL of
Christopher MacKenzie’s cellphone photos AND the four Canon Powershot
items ( 1 video, then 2 still shots, then his second video ) that he took during the
3 minute and 22 second time ‘window’ in-between cellphone photos 2736 and
2737. This last crossfade in this particular series is between his final two
cellphone photos IMG_2737 ( taken at 3:55.20 PM ) and IMG_2738 ( taken 11
seconds later 3:55.31 PM ).
Christopher turned to his RIGHT after taking IMG_2737 so this final IMG_2738
is more of a ‘panorama’ when terrain-aligned with the previous image 2737 from
11 seconds earlier… but there is still ‘some’ terrain overlap between the images
as seen in the ‘crossfade’. The (apparent) ‘spot ahead’ flame seen in the previous
IMG_2737 also remains visible during the crossfade.
IMG_2738 represents the last known photograph taken by any of the Hotshots at
this location before they left the safe black and headed south on the two-track
road. The Wade Parker photo was NOT taken at 4:04 PM, as the initial
investigation(s) seemed to believe. That was only the network timestamp for
when it was ‘texted’ by Wade Parker. The actual Wade Parker photo was taken
much earlier than 4:04 PM and either right before or right around the time that
Robert Caldwell was shooting his second ( of only two ) videos that day circa
3:50 PM.
__________________________________________________________________
So that’s it for this “You can see what they saw” series of crossfades, and sinc we now know that Christopher’s Canon Powershot was at least 9 minutes AHEAD of the real time that day… we are left with some NEW mysteries.
This final cellphone photo of Christpher’s, taken at exactly 3:55.31 PM, now represents the LAST KNOWN photo from this last ‘rest’ location before they left the safe black and started heading SOUTH on the two track.
There appears to be some ‘movement’ in the final IMG_2738 photo as compared to 11 seconds earlier in the IMG_2737 photo… but that could have just been the men ‘moving around’ at that location as we see them doing throughout this series of photographs and videos.
IMG_2738 does NOT offer any real proof that 3:55 or 3:56 PM would be the time they actually did ‘gaggle up’ from that resting location and leave the safe black.
The SAIT investigators put the ‘departure’ time at 4:05 PM… but that seemed to be solely based on the network timestamp for Wade Parker’s 4:04 PM ‘textout’ to his mother, with picture attached. We know now that the picture he ‘texted’ was NOT actually taken at 4:04 PM and he also could have easily sent that text message AFTER they had left that location and were already walking SOUTH.
So… unless the SAIT investigators had some OTHER reason or evidence to put the departure time at 4:05 PM… such as testimony from Brendan McDonough,
or someone else who was listening to the Crew intra-net frequency… there is no reason to believe anymore that Steed and the Crew actually DID wait until 4:05 PM to leave that location.
They could have left any time after Christopher’s final cellphone photo IMG_2738, taken at exactly 3:55.31 PM.
Maybe they spent 9 to 10 *more* minutes at that location ‘making up their minds’ before finally ‘gaggling up’ and leaving circa 4:05 PM… but maybe NOT.
If the ‘deicison to leave’ had, in fact, already been made by 3:55 or 3:56 PM, and the men left the safe black just shortly after Christopher took his final IMG_2738 cellphone photo… then that does NOT bode well for their ‘travel time estimates’.
It adds another 9 ( or even 10 minutes ) to their ‘hiking’ time and SLOWS DOWN their estimated ‘rate of travel’ that afternoon considerably.
If they did leave that much earlier… but still maintained the same ‘brisk’ hiking pace from this last photo location to the ‘Descent Point’ in about the same amount of time the SAIT investigators ‘calculated’… then now there is a 9 to 10 minute ‘gap’ to account for at the ‘Descent Point’ itself before they finally decided to drop into that fuel-filled box canyon.
It means Steed and the Crew might have reached that second critical ‘Descent Point’ 9 or 10 minutes earlier than 4:20 PM ( as the SAIT investigators seemed to think )… and then they just ‘stood there’ wondering what to do next for as much as 9 or 10 minutes… or making ‘consultation’ calls with someone ( presumably DIVSA Eric Marsh? ) about what they should do at that point.
Christopher MacKenzie took his 48 second contiguous sequence of Canon Powershot videos and still photos in-between cellphone images IMG_2736 and IMG_2737.
The first paragraph above should have read…
This is the last in the recent series of ‘crossfades’ for ALL of Christopher MacKenzie’s cellphone pictures plus his 4 Canon photos and videos that were taken in-between cellphone images 2736 and 2737.
Thanks for all the follow up and it appears we finally have an accurate timeline for all the Mackenzie photos/ videos, as well as the Parker picture and the Caldwell video.
In the period of time between 1550 and 1555 there are up to 9 photos and 3 videos (and possibly more?) that were captured by the GMIHC. It would seem that if they were still in the same location, there would be more pictures after 2738 on Mackenzie’s cell phone. Right?
So now we know. 1. The GMIHC moved out of the Discussing options sometime soon/ possibly immediately after the promise of air support “down there”, and, 2.It appears that Rory Collins abruptly/unexpectedly leaves the fire about the same time GM started moving from their last known location that can be confirmed from photos. Someone (not Elizabeth) called Collin’s actions COWARDLY and the same person described the retardant drop that Collins used to extinguish the GM burnout as SOP from Collins. The comment was something to the effect of Collins and his fellow state foresters do not use indirect line building and prefer direct attack.
So, IF, GMIHC and DIV A were, in fact, repositioning to try to create another indirect line, burnout operation in the timeframe of 1555ish. Maybe Rory Collins showed his disapproval by leaving the fire.
BTW, I think it is getting harder and harder to deny the theory that the air support ASAP comment is pertinent to the discussion when trying to understand what made GMIHC think they were safe in their attempt to reposition.
WTKTT… Can you assign a time to images 0885, 0886 and 0887?
I believe that I have properly described these images as showing this group of GMIHC actually leaving the black prior to returning to the black for the final pictures/videos currently being discussed.
Mr Powers. I agree based on what I have read. I am just applying the comments from a commenter and trying to figure out why he/she (not Elizabeth) would have called Collins actions cowardly?
I believe that ‘moment’ happened ( people applying adjectives to Collins’ decision to abruptly leave the fire ) just BEFORE any evidence was discovered that it was his PILOT who was supposedly ‘needing to leave’ because he was hitting some ‘hours’ limit.
Before there was any evidence to the effect… it was a total mystery why Collins just ‘disappeared’ from the fire at a very critical time.
That being said… there are still ‘mysteries’ regarding this Mr. Collins.
The WFAR report contracted by ADOSH has a footnote in it that says something in the report was ‘based on ADOSH interview with Rory Collins’.
There is NO SUCH INTERVIEW in any of the FOIA/FOIL documents released by ADOSH… so either WFAR/ ADOSH never really did interview Rory Collins… or the DID… but then did NOT include any kind of transcript of telephone interview notes with him in their FOIA/FOIL release.
A LOT of people heard the ‘arguments’ between Marsh and Collins over the morning retardant drops over the TAC channels… and have testified as such.
What we still don’t know is what OTHER ‘interactions’ either Marsh/Steed had with Rory Collins that day ( if any )… or whether there were even MORE ‘arguments’ that afternoon after the morning retardant drop
snafu.
Pilots aren’t notified at the last minute that they’ve just timed-out, “gotta go, see ya!!”
The aircraft crew knew throughout the entire day how much time they had left. Knowing that detail, gives them PLENTY of time to interact and brief their replacements properly. That radio briefing could (and should) have occurred, continuing on for as long as necessary while Collins and pilot flew back to their base.
THERE IS ABSOLUTELY NO EXCUSE for what happened at the transition that day!
TTWARE – I have said this before and I will say it again: The transition between Air Attack (as run by Rory Collins) and Bravo33 was consistent with the way that the transitions were being conducted throughout that day (e.g. when Bravo3 left, when Bravo33 left, when Air Attack left earlier in the day). Rory *DID* give Bravo33 the heads-up in advance that he was leaving. The SAIR misrepresented it, and the Wildland Fire Associates report then “cut-and-pasted” from the SAIR, rather than doing their own research.
If you are going to criticize Collins, then you need to criticize Bravo3 and Bravo33 as well, because they ALL did their exits the same way on June 30th. The reality is that all three leadership teams in the air (Collins/AA, Bravo3, and Bravo33) had their hands full for every single minute that they were in the sky, such that leisurely briefings and exits were going to be a pipe dream that day. Poor Rory Collins. I have to believe that this is part of the reason why he never returned phone calls from ADOSH…. I am not blaming you, Mike, but my view is that we need to be cautious about criticizing folks who were on the YHF without first researching in FULL (rather than relying on the SAIT, ADOSH, Holly Neill, John Maclean, or the Wildland Fire Associates) what the relevant facts actually show….
Whoops – meant “TTWARE,” not “Mike.” Sorry. And, FYI, it was Robert-the-Second (RTS), who is now posting here under multiple other anonymous names, who called Rory Collins a “coward” or “cowardly” or some such nonsense.
Elizabeth,
“leisurely briefings”, huh? Get a clue. It’s called doing your job.
Wildland firefighters get paid to perform under difficult and stressful conditions. The higher up the food chain one gets, the higher the expectations of performance.
If they can’t perform their jobs properly under those conditions, then they should get new jobs. This wasn’t their first rodeo, and it certainly wasn’t the first one that had gone to crap.
You allude that they were just ‘too busy’ to attempt a proper briefing with the incoming forces. So I guess what you’re saying is that since they gave the incoming forces a ‘heads-up, we’re leaving’, that excuses them from leaving the incoming forces with the critical information on who, was where, on the fire, and what the aerial and ground forces current tactics and strategies were, along with not supplying current fire and weather conditions.
Come to think of it, all of that information could have easily been passed-on as they flew off to their base, but it sounds as you are expounding the theory that if someone gets a bad briefing, they are then justified in doing the same to others.
Do unto others as they have done unto you! I’m not buying into that one!
Certainly, since you have cautioned me, infering that I don’t have all the facts here, you will be able to provide me with specific references to the ‘relevant facts’ you say I am lacking. I’m anxiously awaiting that info. Thank you.
WOW, TTWARE, I did not intend for my post to be so provocative. Sorry.
What makes you think the briefing Rory gave (as compared to the one Bravo3 gave, for example) was NOT a proper briefing? You are mis-reading me – they DID more than just leave the fire. Rory gave notice as soon as he knew his relief pilot had bailed!!
OK, I’ll stop and take a breath here and admit, not for the first time, that I haven’t got the time to dig as deep as some others here. Having said that, the things I can recall right now off of the top of my head from some of the interviews are, “didn’t know where the division breaks were or who was working where,” “didn’t get critical weather updates,”AND, “poor briefing”. The reason I asked for references for the relevant facts is that I would rather know the truth and admit I was wrong than not. So, if you have info that the air hand-offs were proper, then please put it out there so I can refer to it and shut my trap. Thank you.
WantsToKnowTheTruthsays
See
NEW
parent
comment
above
that
extends
this
thread.
Bravo 33
did NOT
receive
a proper
briefing
from
Rory
Collins.
SRsays
“BTW, I think it is getting harder and harder to deny the theory that the air support ASAP comment is pertinent to the discussion when trying to understand what made GMIHC think they were safe in their attempt to reposition.”
I doubt this very much, simply because of the great limitations here. It isn’t like infantry close air support, and for that matter hand crews don’t have the capabilities relative to fire that our infantry has relative to enemy soldiers. Namely, even if air support could have gotten that fire to stand still (it couldn’t) GM wouldn’t have been able to do anything with the fire. GM relying on air to do something that given conditions wasn’t possible would have been unconventional in the extreme.
Regarding Air Attack/Air Support:
I found two youtube videos this weekend that I wish I had found a lot sooner. They’re on the Bureau of Land Management Incident Fire Center channel.
The most useful one is called “Firefighting Airspace (2012 Refresher). “An Air Attack describes how the aircraft above your fire are organized. How they can help you, and how you can help them, with effective communication for a smooth operation.
(HD update, 8/6/2013).”
It really helped me understand better how this all works. Interestingly, the Air Attack guy in the video, Steve Price from BLM Boise District, says, “I’m not dictating tactics at all, and I don’t like to do that unless they ask…It’s not my job to run the fire…It’s my job to put red stuff and wet stuff on the ground and give them situational awareness.” http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9fjF2KQ75TY&feature=share&list=PLTErVrHH6uJja-ljtn7z9Q5Sz9WtCPGw1&index=142
Also these two videos very helpfully describe the relationships between the whole Air Attack, Lead Plane, and ASM Aerial Supervision Module, i.e. Bravo, which is a combination of Air Attack and Lead Plane.
Also, another related item I found is “The DC-10 Air Tanker.”
“The DC-10 Air Tanker is an American wide-body jet air tanker, which has been in service as an aerial firefighting unit since 2006. The aircraft, operated by the joint technical venture 10 Tanker Air Carrier, is a converted McDonnell Douglas DC-10 airliner, and is primarily used to fight wildfires, typically in rural areas. The turbofan-powered aircraft carries up to 12,000 US gallons (45,000 liters) of water or fire retardant in an exterior belly-mounted tank, the contents of which can be released in eight seconds. Two air tankers are currently in operation, with the call-signs Tanker 910 and Tanker 911.”
And now those two DC-10s are stationed in Albuquerque, so…… http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WG06xAbBf3Q&list=PLTErVrHH6uJja-ljtn7z9Q5Sz9WtCPGw1&feature=share&index=130
>> calvin said…
>> Thanks for all the follow up and appears we finally
>> have an accurate timeline for all the Mackenzie
>> photos/ videos, as well as the Parker picture and the
>> Caldwell video.
Yes. I think so.
One of the reasons I just did that whole ‘crossfade’ series
was to try to see if these ‘crossfades’ would indicate
clearly exactly WHEN ( inside that 3 minute and 22 second
gap between 2736 and 2737 ) Christopher began his 48
second ‘session’ with the Canon Powershot.
Alas… while very revealing and informative ( the fire was
ALWAYS progressing SOUTH during and in-between
all of these photos/videos )… I don’t see any definitive
proof that MacKenzie’s 48 second Canon Powershot
session in-between 2736 and 2737 was ‘leaning’ more
towards 2736 or 2737… or vice-versa.
Indeed… the ‘crossfades’ prove that the 48 second session
with the Canon probably *WAS* about right in the middle
of the 3 minute and 22 second ‘window’.
I also have been factoring in your (important) observations
about the gloves… but I don’t see that helping to narrow
down the exact time either ( unless you are seeing
something else that I haven’t seen there ).
So if we just accept that Christopher *probably* did take
the same amount of time to switch from using the cellphone
to the Canon as he then did to switch BACK from using
the canon to the cellphone… we still have this…
1 minute 17 seconds – Switch from cellphone to Canon.
48 seconds – The 4 item session with the Canon.
1 minute 17 seconds – Switch from Canon to cellphone.
Total time = Exactly 3 minutes and 22 seconds.
That’s the exact ‘gap’ between IMG_2736 and IMG_2737.
So that means we have a ‘workable/accurate’ OFFSET
for ALL of MacKenzie’s Canon Powershot images.
Even if there is more evidence to prove that 48 second
‘session’ can be ‘left’ or ‘right’ shifted away from that
center point and more towards either the 2736 or 2737
cellphone images… then that just means the ‘center
point’ assumption is still only off by however many
seconds you ‘left’ or ‘right’ shift it. I still don’t think he
could have ‘switched’ from one device to another in
less than 30 seconds or so… so the ‘center point’
assumption still remains accurate to within +/- 30 sec.
+/- 30 seconds for ANY timestamp for ANY event on
a day like this can be considered ‘pretty damn accurate’.
So, using the ‘center point’ assumption… just take ONE of
Christopher’s Canon images, like IMG_0889…
His Canon Powershot put this timestamp on it…
1601:52 ( 4:01.53 PM )
But it now seems to have been taken at ( exactly? )…
1553.36 ( 3:53.36 PM )
That is a TIME DIFFERENCE of 8 minutes 13 seconds.
The TIME on Christopher’s Canon Powershot was
8 minutes and 13 seconds AHEAD of ‘real time’ that day.
>> calvin also said…
>> WTKTT… Can you assign a time to images
>> 0885, 0886 and 0887?
Yep.
Since Christopher’s Canon Powershot was 8 minutes
and 13 seconds AHEAD of the ‘real time’ that day…
* IMG_0885
Canon says…
EXIF File Number: 110-0885
EXIF Date: June 30, 2013, 1552.07 ( 3:52:07 PM )
EXIF Camera: Canon PowerShot SD1400 IS
EXIF Screen Capture Type: Landscape
EXIF Camera Temperature: 34 C ( 93 F )
Actual time taken = 1543.54 ( 3:43.54 PM )
* IMG_0886
Canon says…
EXIF File Number: 110-0886
EXIF Date: June 30, 2013, 1552.18 ( 3:52:18 PM )
EXIF Camera: Canon PowerShot SD1400 IS
EXIF Camera Orientation: Portrait
EXIF Camera Temperature: 35 C ( 95 F )
Actual time taken = 1544.05 ( 3:44.05 PM )
* IMG_0887
Canon says…
EXIF File Number: 110-0887
EXIF Date: June 30, 2013, 1552.24 ( 3:52:24 PM )
EXIF Camera: Canon PowerShot SD1400 IS
EXIF Camera Orientation: Portrait
EXIF Camera Temperature: 35 C ( 95 F )
Actual time taken = 1544.11 ( 3:44.11 PM )
>> calvin also said…
>> I believe that I have properly described these images
>> as showing this group of GMIHC actually leaving
>> the black prior to returning to the black for the final
>> pictures/videos currently being discussed.
I’m not sure that ‘small move’ from the one ‘resting’
spot to the next can/should be described as ‘leaving
the black’… but the photos definitely show them
entering ‘unburned fuel’ to get to that next rest stop.
What is interesting to note is that since the *NEW*
( real ) times for 0885, 0886 and 0887 seem to be…
That means this ‘move out’ moment from that previous
location came just moments AFTER Marsh had his
1542 – 1543 conversation with OPS2 Paul Musser.
Musser ‘called’ Marsh at 1542… but as we can hear in
the radio capture… Marsh did not respond to him right
away. We have already determined the reason Marsh
did not answer Musser ‘right away’ is because Marsh
was still ‘finishing’ his conversation(s) with Brian Frisby
over the GM intra-crew frequency at that time.
So circa 1542 to 1543…. Marsh finishes his documented
conversations about moving the vehicles with Firsby,
then Marsh must have ‘answered’ OPS2 Musser and
they had the ‘availability check’ conversation…
…and IMMEDIATELY after that conversation ended
with Musser ( circa 1543 )… they MOVED OUT ( from
this first location to the next one ).
WTKTT said….I’m not sure that ‘small move’ from the one ‘resting’
spot to the next can/should be described as ‘leaving
the black’… but the photos definitely show them
entering ‘unburned fuel’ to get to that next rest stop.
1. Where is the one “resting” spot?
2. I do not think they were en route to the Second resting spot in image 0885, 0886, 0887. It appears to me that they are leaving the black and crossing the retardant line (as they left the black) that was dropped on GM bournout operation from earlier in the day that was also photographed by Mackenzie. There is a odd shaped rock that looks like it is missing a chunk (in image 0880 0881 0882 005 0886 0887) that seems to assign the location for 0885, 0886, and 0887 that is south/east of Discussing options spot. This same rock and area can be seen in ADOSH post burn photos. So it appears (to me) that after 0885- 0887 were taken, these men (Ashcraft, Parker, Norris) actually changed course, and returned to a safe location in the black before leaving.
Regarding Air Attack/Air Support: I found two youtube videos this weekend that I wish I had found a lot sooner. They’re on the Bureau of Land Management Incident Fire Center channel.
The most useful one is called “Firefighting Airspace (2012 Refresher). “An Air Attack describes how the aircraft above your fire are organized. How they can help you, and how you can help them, with effective communication for a smooth operation. (HD update, 8/6/2013).”
It really helped me understand better how this all works. Interestingly, the Air Attack guy in the video, Steve Price from BLM Boise District, says, “I’m not dictating tactics at all, and I don’t like to do that unless they ask…It’s not my job to run the fire…It’s my job to put red stuff and wet stuff on the ground and give them situational awareness.”
The second video is called “Communication With Aviattion Resources.” It really illustrates how complicated the communications can get for Air Attack over an active fire.
Also these two videos very helpfully describe the relationships between the whole Air Attack, Lead Plane, and ASM Aerial Supervision Module, i.e. Bravo, which is a combination of Air Attack and Lead Plane.
Also, another related item I found is “The DC-10 Air Tanker.”
“The DC-10 Air Tanker is an American wide-body jet air tanker, which has been in service as an aerial firefighting unit since 2006. The aircraft, operated by the joint technical venture 10 Tanker Air Carrier, is a converted McDonnell Douglas DC-10 airliner, and is primarily used to fight wildfires, typically in rural areas. The turbofan-powered aircraft carries up to 12,000 US gallons (45,000 liters) of water or fire retardant in an exterior belly-mounted tank, the contents of which can be released in eight seconds. Two air tankers are currently in operation, with the call-signs Tanker 910 and Tanker 911.” And now those two DC-10s are stationed in Albuquerque, so……
This is a crossfade between that stillframe from the very end of Christopher’s
MacKenzie’s SECOND video that he took with his Canon Powershot and the
next photo he would take ( approximately 1 minute and 17 seconds later )
with his cellphone… which is IMG_2737 with a KNOWN timestamp of 3:55.20 PM.
The ‘smoke curtain’ right along the fireline has increased ( and thickened )
dramatically and there appears to be a distinct ‘spot ahead’ appearing in about
the right-center of the crossfade where the two-track trail leads away from
the old-grader location.
YouTube About Information
__________________________________________________________________
This is a crossfade between a stillframe from Christopher MacKenzie’s second
video that he took with his Canon Powershot ( MVI_0891 circa 3:54.03 ) and the
next image he took approximately 1 minute and 17 seconds later, at 3:55.20.
After Christopher finished shooting his second video with the Canon he switched
back to using his cellphone and then he took the next sequential image on that
device ( IMG_2737 at exactly 3:55.20 PM ). As the crossfade shows… the ‘smoke
curtain’ right at the fireline has increased ( and thickened ) dramatically during the
estimated 1 minute and 17 seconds between these two images and there also
appears to be a distinct ‘spotting event’ taking place about right-center in the fade
at the point where the two-track road leading away from the old-grader location
approaches the fireline.
__________________________________________________________________
10 seconds after Christopher MacKenzie took his second ( of only two ) still
photos in-between videos… he shot his second video. That second video
was only 9 seconds long, just like his first video.
This is a crossfade between that second Canon still image and a captured frame
from the END of his second movie ( with Canon filename MVI_0891 )… so that
makes the time between images in this crossfade 19 seconds.
The reason a stillframe from the END of the second MVI_0891 movie is used for
comparison here is because that is the point in the 9 second video that provides
the best ‘terrain match’ with the previous still photo… AND using an image from
the END of the second movie also provides the best comparison for the next
(upcoming) cellphone image comparison after the second movie was shot with
the Canon Powershot.
IMG_0890 from the Canon was taken in ‘Portrait’ mode by Christopher so that
he could ( apparently ) be sure to capture that enormous smoke column
building up into the sky prior to shooting his second video. The MV_0891 video
was shot in ‘Landscape’ mode.
Once again ( even though only 19 seconds have elapsed between images )
even MORE visible progression of the fireline to the SOUTH can be observed
in the crossfade.
This frame taken from movie MVI_0891 is also the exact moment when Captain
Jesse Steed had just finished telling Eric Marsh… “I copy… and it’s almost made
it to that two-track road we walked in on.”
YouTube About Information
__________________________________________________________________
This is a crossfade between the second still image that Christopher MacKenzie
took with his Canon Powershot in-between his two movie clips ( IMG_0890 circa
3:53.44 PM ) and a stillframe from the next thing he would shoot just 10 seconds
later… which was his second VIDEO from that location ( MVI_0891 circa 3:53.54
PM ). The stillframe from the VIDEO was taken from the very END of that second
video so that means there are 19 seconds expiring in this crossfade. Even with
just these 19 seconds of time expiring in the crossfade there still seem to be
clear indications of the fireline pushing more to the SOUTH with each passing
moment.
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As I have pondered, various times, why Chris did what he did here, capturing more stills than video, when we all would wish he would have kept doing the video because of the conversations captured with it, I have sensed that he was more interested in capturing the fire behavior than anything else.
I keep struggling to intuit/reason why he was switching back and forth so much between his cellphone and his Powershot. I still haven’t gotten there. Maybe he was having some kind of trouble with his cellphone for capturing video. So he switched to the Powershot. But the quick switch from video to stills to video hints to me that what he was really trying to capture was not so much the conversations we hear from the radios as the visuals of the fire progression.
Reply to Marti Reed post on April 28, 2014 at 10:25 pm
>> Marti said…
>> As I have pondered, various times, why Chris did what
>> he did here, capturing more stills than video, when we
>> all would wish he would have kept doing the video
>> because of the conversations captured with it, I have
>> sensed that he was more interested in capturing the
>> fire behavior than anything else.
Yes. Probably so. I just now noticed myself the times
when he ( quickly ) took BOTH a ‘Landscape’ shot and
then quickly ( in no more time than it takes to turn the
camera ) took another shot in ‘Portrait’ mode… and also
tilted the camera UP for the ‘Portrait’ shot.
He did this with BOTH his cellphone and his Powershot.
He was trying to make sure he captured the enormous
( and dramatic ) smoke column that was building overhead.
He just wanted to be SURE he ‘caught all that’… from
ground up into the sky.
It truly was DRAMATIC… and worth capturing (fully).
>> Marti also said…
>> I keep struggling to intuit/reason why he was switching
>> back and forth so much between his cellphone and his
>> Powershot. I still haven’t gotten there.
Have you considered ‘battery levels’?
Maybe one ( or both ) devices were ‘flashing’ at him that
they were BOTH low on battery so it was time to
switch between the two just to make sure he was
capturing all of the dramatic scene that was unfolding
down there in front of him. He didn’t want to miss
any of it.
>> Marti also said…
>> Maybe he was having some kind of trouble with his
>> cellphone for capturing video. So he switched to the
>> Powershot.
See above. He might have made a move to just start
shooting video with the cellphone, noticed that his
battery indicator was about out… and knew that nothing
kills a smartphone battery like shooting video.
So he went for the Canon… only to discover ( after 2
videos and 2 still shots )… that now his Canon was
bitching at him about battery level(s) as well… so he
went BACK to the cellphone for 2 more quick shots
( which, as my last crossfade shows, seem to have
purposely been a final ‘panorama’ of the entire scene
out there in front of him ).
>> Marti also said…
>> But the quick switch from video to stills to video hints
>> to me that what he was really trying to capture was not
>> so much the conversations we hear from the radios
>> as the visuals of the fire progression.
I agree. There was a time when it almost *seemed* like
Christopher was ‘trying to tell us something’ because of
the exact time he suddenly decided to start shooting
video ( with AUDIO )… but I don’t believe that anymore.
It was all just ‘management chit-chat’ at that point.
The scene unfolding BEFORE him down in that valley
was so dramatic… as a photographer he just wanted
to be SURE he got enough good pictures of it ( and
a little motion video, too, to show that dramatic smoke
development ).
I think it was a complete accident that he happened to
capture Marsh and Steed talking about ‘comfort levels’
and ‘discussing their options’ and other management
chit-chat.
That’s also why I don’t believe the actual DECISION to
leave the safe black came until AFTER Christopher
finished shooting his Canon videos.
I don’t think Christopher had a CLUE ( at that point ) that
within a minute or two… Steed was going to say
‘gaggle up boys… we’re leaving’.
I don’t think ANY of them knew that was going to happen,
when you really look at them in ALL of these photos.
It just suddenly happened.
One moment they’re resting… taking photos.
The next moment… Steed says ‘gaggle up’… and
they were leaving. Simple as that.
I’m not even sure any of them had ANY frickin’ idea
WHERE the hell they were going ( or even WHY )
when Steed suddenly told them to ‘gaggle up’.
Steed said ‘jump’… and they all said ‘How HIGH!!’.
Calvin, do you, personally, think that somebody told Steed/Marsh to “jump” as opposed to Steed/GM simply wanting to get to the east-ish side of the fire to re-engage and misjudging how quickly they could get there as compared to how quickly the fire was moving? If so, why is that your view? (I am not suggesting that you are WRONG – I just want to understand your thinking, because I have not yet found any evidence that would suggest that that is why they moved, but it is certainly an option….)
Elizabeth. Yes, I personally believe that.
Mankenzie pictures 0885, 0886, and 0887 show Ashcraft, Norris and Parker (and others) leaving the black and heading away from the discussing options location (and toward Helms Ranch) and into the green. SOMETHING HAPPENED, they returned to the black before moving out a second time. This delay in leave time could account for Cordes saying, BS they had plenty of time (following his hearing of the deployment)
Cordes was deploying resources in and around Glen Isla and Helms Ranch after 1630.
Justin Hernandez and his bulldozer were somewhere around Glen Isla and Cory Ball was somewhere (in Glen Isla) looking for a place to build indirect line at Cordes request.
I think if Granite Mountain were intending to go very far beyond Helms Ranch, they would have had transportation lined up.
I have seen no evidence that any retardant was placed between the Fireline shown in Mackenzie, Norris, and Ashcraft photos and the community of Glen Isla. Have you?
Calvin~
Do you have a google map/earth geotag for that place they were in? I put them in a different place, but that had to do with what I thought was going on and the inaccurate timestamps I was using. I think you have located it more carefully. I’d really appreciate it if I could correct it in my Google Earth. Thanks!
Marti, I cannot. I would appreciate it if you or WTK could.
I think a couple other pictures that help are the ADOSH 7/18 photos with gps p0250, p0253, p0257, p0260, and p0262. (they all show the rock I mentioned before, and you can see the remnants of the retardant line)
I also believe the rock is visible in Mackenzie image 0890. Dead center of the picture, below the group.
>> Marti asked…
>> Calvin… Do
>> you have a
>> google
>> map/earth
>> geotag for
>> that place
>> they were
>> in?
>>
>> Calving said
>> Marti, I
>> cannot. I
>> would
>> appreciate it
>> if you or
>> WTK could.
Standy-by.
Coming tonight.
I’ve been on this since yesterday and since the new Google satellite images came online which make it much easier to ‘find that rock’ there on that slope.
Calvin… YES… this ROCK is in MANY photos including 8 or 9 taken by hiker Joy Collura that morning.
It was NOT very
far away from
the ‘second’
rest spot at all
where all the
other photos
and videos
were shot 10
minutes later.
Appears to have been just a few hundred yards DOWN the slope ( and due EAST ) from that ‘second’ rest spot.
All they did after leaving that spot was come UP the slope to join the others at the HIGHER location.
Calvin, my impression was the the sawyers (e.g. Ashcraft et al) were coming OFF of the line that they were building, and THAT is why we see them moving in those pictures with their saws. No?
Remember, Steed told Blue Ridge somewhere in this time frame (I don’t have my notes in front of me) that GM had at least another HOUR of cutting/line work left. However, shortly thereafter, it became clear that they were going to lose the retardant line, which was part of their tying-in plan, such that it no longer made sense to keep the sawyers trying to build line. Hence, Steed presumably instructed them to stop, and we see them coming OFF the line they were building. No? Otherwise, why would Steed have told Blue Ridge that GM had at least another hour of work left (with their SAWS)?
By the way, I do NOT have my notes in front of me, so WTKTT should NOT parse every single word that I am typing. If you want exact words, go back to the raw sources (e.g. unit logs, audio-recorded interviews).
Calvin… see a report coming later this evening on EXACTLY where that ‘cut rock’ was located. I’ve been on this since yesterday when the new Google post-fire satellite imagery came online.
It is now much easier to find that ‘cut rock’ there on that slope.
That location appears to have simply been DOWN the slope and due EAST of the ‘second rest spot’ where all the other photos were taken.
It may APPEAR they were headed ‘away’ from the others since they are exiting the camera to the right… but the reality appears to be that all they were doing was making their way due WEST and UP the slope to join the others at the ‘second rest spot’ where all the other photos/videos would be taken.
I’m thinking you may be right on the limitations Chris may have been sensing regarding battery levels. Maybe. OTOH he hadn’t taken all that many photos on his Powershot that day. I keep a pretty good eye on my batteries and have always carried a spare. But maybe he didn’t and found himself running out of steam. So he switched back to his cellphone. Which may have been running low, too.
Or maybe, as soon as he finished this sequence, he was told it was time to hustle and go.
Texting or e-mailing pictures – if you intend to text or e-mail your pictures FROM the fire, you are likely to take them WITH your smartphone. However, if you want better-quality shots, and you don’t care about texting or e-mailing them right that minute, you take them with your CAMERA (and not your smartphone), and you download them to your computer (and then e-mail them to whereever you want or print them or upload them to Facebook or whatever) when you get home.
I’m assuming that that is the obvious explanation for why Chris was working with both his smartphone and his camera, no? What am I missing, Marti?
Elizabeth… sometimes assumptions *CAN* be made not because of the existence of evidence…
…but because of the LACK of it.
There is NO EVIDENCE ( that ANYONE seems to be aware of ) that Christopher ever sent ANY text messages with attached photos to ANYONE on June 30, 2013.
The only ‘assumption’ that can be made, then, is that that is because he didn’t actually DO it.
Christopher’s Canon Powershot was
simply a *better* camera. It was the ‘professional’ piece of kit he had with him versus the ‘amateur’ iPhone 4s.
His iPhone 4s only had an 8 megapixel maximum resolution.
The Canon Powershot went all the way up to 14.1 megapixels ( almost TWICE the resolution ) with MUCH better ZOOM and focal length options.
Even on the Doce fire… Christopher was ‘switching back and forth’ and the common denominator seems to be that he would do that when he sensed ( as a photographer ) that something very DRAMATIC was happening.
On the Doce fire… it was VLAT Air Drops ( when they happened ). At Yarnell… same interest in VLATS and I’m sure he realized ( as a photographer ) what a DRAMATIC scene was unfolding before him there circa 3:55 PM. He just wanted to be sure he got some ultra-highres shots with the Canon as well as the cellphone.
It might have had nothing to do with ‘battery levels’ at all, really. That is just one possibility.
I now think it just had more to do with Christopher’s sense ( as a photographer ) of when something IMPORTANT was happening… like that dramatic fire behavior and smoke cloud developing right in front of his eyes circa 3:55 PM on June 30, 2013.
He wanted to be SURE he ‘captured it all’… which also explains the multiple switching from ‘Landscape’ to ‘Portrait’ mode. That smoke column was getting HUGE ( even before their decision to leave the safe black ) and he also wanted to be sure he captured that as well.
That was my point, friend.
Also, there absolutely 100% *are* text messages and photos that the SAIT was never given. The SAIT never ASKED for them (to this day).
Elizabeth. How many? Did the ADOSH investigators ask for other pictures and texts that were sent?
ScottNorrisPhotoAndText.pdf says……(in an email from Randy Okon to Richa Wilson)on August 8 2013……..
I believe we have received all text and photos from the families that we are going to see.
Another related question. Immediately following the Yarnell incident, Wade Ward, from PFD said something to the effect of. Marsh reported they were in a tight spot and everyone knew this was going to be a bitch, were deploying.
I have always wondered where this statement came from? Did Eric Marsh say something to that effect to someone? Or did Wade Ward make that up?
This is a crossfade between the two ‘still photos’ that Christopher Mackenzie
shot with his Canon Powershot in-between his two 9 second videos.
IMG_0889 was taken in ‘Landscape’ mode.
IMG_0890 was taken 8 seconds later in ‘Portrait’ mode and shows more of the
immense smoke column building in the sky. It would appear the reason Christopher quickly switched to ‘Portrait’ mode at this point was to be SURE
he captured that moment and more of that HUGE ‘smoke cloud building’ than
he did in his previous ‘Landscape’ photo, 8 seconds earlier.
There are places where ( even in just 8 seconds ) the fireline itself seems to
have made some quick ‘pushouts’ to the SOUTH as compared to the photo
taken just 8 seconds earlier.
YouTube About Information…
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This is a crossfade between the two ‘still’ images that Christopher MacKenzie
took circa 3:53 PM with his Canon Powershot. BOTH of these ‘still’ images were
taken in-between his two 9 second videos that day. IMG_0889 was taken circa
3:53.36 PM and IMG_0890 was taken just 8 seconds later circa 3:53.44.
IMG_0889 was taken in ‘Landscape’ mode and then Christopher apparently
just flipped the camera to ‘Portrait’ mode in order to capture MORE of the
DRAMATIC smoke column buildup than he did in the ‘Landscape’ shot just 8
seconds before that. Even though only 8 seconds transpire between these two
photos the FIRELINE seems to show places where it has sudden ‘pushouts’ to
the SOUTH, especially around the area where Brendan’s lookout mound can
be seen in the distance.
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Continuing on with this ‘see what they say’ crossfade series…
This is a crossfade between the stillframe from +4 seconds into Christopher
MacKenzie’s first 9 second video ( MVI_0888 ) and the NEXT (still) image he
took with his Canon Powershot 17 seconds later.
Canon Powershot image IMG_0889 was taken just 12 seconds after the END of
the 9 second long Canon Movie MVI_0888. Since the still frame used for the MVI_0888 image above was from the +4 second mark into that video… then we
add 5 seconds to get an ‘elapsed’ time between these two images of 17 seconds
and an approximate ‘real’ time for IMG_0889 of 3:53.36 PM.
After these 17 seconds… the FIRELINE can now be seen becoming clearly
visible again after that big ‘smoke push’ to the SOUTH that was seen in the
previous crossfade between cellphone image 2736 and the stillframe from
the 0888 movie.
YouTube About Information
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This is a crossfade between a stillframe from +4 seconds into Christopher
MacKenzie’s first Canon Powershot movie MVI_0888 ( circa 3:53.19 PM ) and
a still photo he took 17 seconds after that with the same Canon Powershot
camera ( Image IMG_0889 circa 3:53.36 PM ). The fireline has now become
visible again after the significant smoke ‘push’ SOUTH that was seen between
cellphone IMG_2736 and the stillframe from MVI_0888.
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As a reminder… here are the original Canon Powershot timestamps ( which are
NOW known to be WRONG and at least 9 minutes AHEAD of the ‘real time’
that day ) showing the 4 items that Christopher shot with his Canon for a total
of a 48 second ‘session’ with that camera which we NOW know took place
in-between his cellphone image(s) IMG_2736 and IMG_2735…
1601:31 – 110-0888 – First VIDEO – Duration: 9.24 sec.
1601:52 – 110-0889 – First still photo 12 seconds after video
1602:00 – 110-0890 – Second still photo 8 seconds later.
1602:10 – 110-0891 – Second VIDEO, 10 seconds later – Duration: 9.14 sec
THIS crossfade is between those first TWO items above.
The next ‘photographic’ evidence in this 3:49 to 4:00 PM sequence after
MacKenzie’s cellphone image IMG_2736 at 3:51.58 would be the first frame(s)
of MacKenzie’s first VIDEO… MVI_0888.
We still do NOT know exactly how long it took MacKenzie to switch from using his
cellphone to take IMG_2736 to when he first started recording his first MVI_0888
movie with the Canon Powershot… but the best estimate at this time seems
to be approximately 1 minute and 17 seconds, based on a 3 minute and 22
second ‘window’, with a 48 second Canon Powershot sequence, and the
assumption that it took him just as long to switch from the cellphone to the
Canon as it then did for him to switch BACK from the Canon to using the
cellphone again ( 1 minute 17 seconds… both times ).
NOTE: One of the reasons for this particular ‘crossfade’ is to simply establish
with a ‘visual’ how much time MIGHT have transpired… based on fireline
and smoke cloud movements during the time MacKenzie was switching from
his cellphone to his Canon Powershot.
The still frame from MVI_0888 used for this ‘crossfade’ was taken from the 4
second mark into that first movie because anything earlier would have created
too much distortion for a crossfade due to ‘camera angle’… so if we add those 4
seconds to the estimated 1 minute and 17 seconds then this crossfade comes 1
minute and 21 seconds after IMG_2736 was taken.
IMG_2736 was taken in ‘Landscape’ mode with the cellphone.
MVI_0888 was also taken in ‘Landscape ‘ mode and the still frame from +4
seconds had to be rotated a few degrees clockwise in order for the terrain to
match as the images crossfade.
YouTube About Information
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This is a crossfade between Christopher MacKenzie’s cellphone image
IMG_2736 ( taken at 3:51.58 PM ) and a stillframe from the very next
photographic moment that MacKenzie performed after that… which was
to shoot his first 9 second video at that location using his Canon Powershot.
This first movie was only 9 seconds long and had a Canon filename
of MVI_0888. It is still not known exactly how long it took Christopher
to switch from using his cellphone to the Canon… but the best estimate
at this time is that this first VIDEO was shot approximately 1 minute
and 17 seconds after cellphone image IMG_2736. This crossfade
shows that during that time delay following IMG_2736, while he switched
from his cellphone to the Canon Powershot, the SMOKE has moved
dramatically SOUTH and towards their location to the extent that it is
now ‘blocking’ their view of the fireline itself.
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NOTE: If a better way is found to establish the exact time offset between
cellphone image IMG_2736 and the start of MVI_0888 then the timestamps
used above will obviously change.
Looking at the progression of the SMOKE cloud, however, I would say there
had to be at *least* 60 seconds between IMG_2736 and the start of MVI_0888.
A full 1 minute and 39 seconds transpire between these two MacKenzie
cell phone images.
IMG_2735 was taken in ‘Landscape’ mode.
IMG_2736 was also taken in ‘Landscape ‘ mode and had to be rotated 1 degree
counter-clockwise in order for the terrain to match as the images crossfade.
YouTube About Information
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This is a crossfade between Christopher MacKenzie’s cellphone photo IMG_2735
( taken at 3:50.19 PM ) and the very next photo he took with his cellphone 1 minute
and 39 seconds later ( IMG_2736 at 3:51.58 PM ). The crossfade shows a pretty
significant advancement of the fireline to the SOUTH during those 99 seconds and
a dramatic change in the smoke cloud(s).
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NOTE: Right after Christopher took this IMG_2736 with his cellphone is when he
then switched to using his Canon Powershot. Somewhere during the next 3
minutes and 22 seconds is when he used the Canon to shoot his first 9 second
video, then he took 2 still pictures with the Canon… and then he finished this 4
item sequence with the Canon by shooting the second 9 second video.
After shooting these 4 items with the Canon ( in a 48 second contiguous
timespan somewhere in the 3 minute and 22 second window )… Christopher
then switched back to his cellphone to take his next IMG_2737 cellphone image
at 3:55.20.
It has yet to be determined EXACTLY when, in this 3 minute and 22 second
‘window’ between cellphone images 2736 and 2737 Christopher actually
began his 48 second ‘session’ with the Canon Powershot, but if he took the
same amount of time to switch from using his cellphone to using the Canon
as he did to then switch BACK from the Canon to the cellphone… then it
would appear that the first Canon Powershot video ( and the first item in
the 48 second Canon session ) came 1 minute and 17 seconds after
he took cellphone image IMG_2736.
That would put the ‘start’ time for MacKenzie’s FIRST video at 3:51.36 PM.
This represents an approximate 11 minute time difference between what his
Canon Powershot device *thought* the time was that day versus what it
really was. His Canon Powershot was ( apparently ) set about 11 minutes
AHEAD of what the real time was that day.
I added the 1 minute and 17 seconds to the time for IMG_2735
instead of IMG_2736.
That last part of the original post above *SHOULD* have read
like this…
That would put the ‘start’ time for MacKenzie’s FIRST video
at 3:53.15 PM.
This represents an approximate 9 (NINE) minute time difference
between what his Canon Powershot device *thought* the time
was that day versus what it really was. His Canon Powershot
was ( apparently ) set about 9 (NINE) minutes AHEAD of what
the real time was that day.
Only 13 seconds elapse between these two MacKenzie cell phone images.
IMG_2734 was taken in ‘Portrait’ mode and shows more of the sky and
smoke cloud.
IMG_2735 was taken in ‘Landscape’ mode had to be rotated a few degrees
clockwise in order for the terrain to match as the images crossfade.
NOTE: In-between these two images is when Christopher changed his position
and moved from standing directly behind Captain Jesse Steed to a point a little
further back on the rocks and to the LEFT of where Steed was sitting. Steed’s
knee can still be seen on the right side of IMG_2735.
YouTube About Information…
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This is a crossfade between Christopher MacKenzie’s cellphone image
IMG_2734 ( taken at 3:50.06 ) and the very next one that he took 13 seconds
later ( IMG_2735 at 3:50.19 ) AFTER changing positions from standing directly
behind Captain Jesse Steed ( with the red helmet on ) to a position further to the
left and back up on the rocks slightly.
Even though only 13 seconds elapse between the images… the crossfade still
shows a slight increase in the fireline to the SOUTH… and a significant change
in the smoke cloud(s).
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Only 7 seconds transpire between these two MacKenzie cell phone images
but the crossfade still shows some noticeable fireline advancement to the
SOUTH… AND ( considering only 7 seconds elapse ) there is a DRAMATIC
difference in the SMOKE cloud(s).
IMG_2733 was taken in ‘Landscape’ mode.
IMG_2734 was taken in ‘Portrait’ mode and shows more of the sky and the
smoke column. It had to be rotated a few degrees counter-clockwise in order
for the terrain to match as the images crossfade.
YouTube About Information…
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This is a terrain-aligned crossfade between Christopher MacKenzie’s cellphone
image IMG_2733 ( taken at 3:49.59 PM ) and the very next image he took with
his cellphone just 7 seconds later… IMG_2734 ( taken at 3:50.06 PM ).
Even though only 7 seconds have transpired between the two images the
crossfade still shows there has been some advancement of the fireline to the
SOUTH… and the difference between the SMOKE cloud(s) is DRAMATIC.
__________________________________________________________________
ALSO NOTE: At the time Christopher MacKenzie was taking these two
cellphone images… Brendan McDonough had already been dropped off
by Brian Frisby where the GM Superintendent and GM Chase truck(s) were
located… and Brendan was, at this same moment, taking his own cellphone
photos of the fire/smoke whirl he was seeing down where the trucks were parked.
Also… IMG_2734 ( taken at 3:50.06 ) also appears to be the photo that captures
Robert Caldwell shooting his second of (only) two videos that day which captured
the following background radio conversation going on at this exact moment…
__________________________________________________________________
Eric Marsh (DIVS A): Yea… I’m tryin’ to work my way off the top.
Todd Abel ( OPS1 ): Okay… I copy… ah… just keep me updated…
ah… ya know… you guys hunker and be safe and then… ah…
we’ll get some air support down there ASAP.
_________________________________________________________________
WTKTT and xxFullsailxx: Regarding your recent exchange about where Todd Abel was located at the time of the deployment and burn-over…. Presumably, if Todd Abel had made it over to the east side of the fire by the time of the 4:27 “Yarnell Gamble” video (which I doubt that he had), we would see him in the Tom Story photos where some of the guys are congregating around the white pick-up trucks in the Ranch Restaurant parking lot immediately after hearing that GM was in trouble. WTKTT, do you see Abel there?
There appear to be two Central Yavapai trucks in several of the Tom Story photos. Able and Cordes? One truck actually heads into the adjacent street and is also seen coming back toward the ranch house. Cordes, right?
ultimately it doesn’t really matter where Abel was… the fact is, that there is no substantive evidence that it is Abel’s voice…AND, there is no substantive evidence that the conversation is addressing Marsh.
what IS substantive, is that WTKTT continues to peddle the nefarious mystery person ordering-GM-off-the-hill (oh, and hurry up doing it) conspiracy theory. what else is substantive, is that WTKTT continues to ad-lib conversations, and then call it “evidence” from which to speculate further.
noone had reason to “order” GM anywhere, let alone tell them to “hurry up.”
as WTKTT has already acknowledged… there was an IHC within arms reach of that end of the fire already… so if there was a specific task for an IHC then Blue Ridge could have just as well been utilized.
xxfullsailxx
I will have to agree with you that I have not seen substantial evidence to indicate GM was ordered or told to hurry up that has not been tied together in my assessment.
Something you said down below dose bother me.
As a Lookout and I was talking a highly qualified lookout.
A Foreman on a crew. I ask you would that person concerned about there crew not have got in the Superintendents truck. Driven to any location necessary to get eyes on their crew and the fire and continue to inform them of the fire activity, even if the crew could see the Fire?
We still do not fully know if McDonough actually knew what the crew was doing or where they were going.
Absent that a qualified Foreman (lookout) would have been in contact and asking for the information on the crew and giving their advice on fire spread. Do you not agree with that? I think on this fire there were places for a while that person could have been useful. I do not think that is BS. McDonough was seeing fire activity as he drove out and took pictures that he could have relayed to the crew if he had been more qualified. That was what I was trying to get across, maybe you misread my intent.
bob, while i completely agree with you about the competencies and experience level of a lookout in general, i do not agree that McDonough had any obligation or reason to go try to post up else where, unless Steed or Marsh asked him to…
a. i don’t think there was any where else to get a vantage on the crew and their relation to fire behavior…
b. Marsh & Steed both had the best vantage point point of EVERYTHING going on with the fire… if anything (and again, this is total hindsight bias) what they should have done, was post a new lookout at that exact spot where they were before they hike toward BSR…
the lookout qualification thing is something that we seem to have to revisit every fire years or so. it’s been addressed in multiple fire refreshers. i think that in general, and especially with IHC’s, that the lookout position is taken seriously… and even if you’re sending a squad boss trainee up to be lookout, you should also be sending up a qualified individual to train them up on the importance of the task.
but again, i don’t believe that ANYONE knew or understood the route that GM was taking… if they knew that GM was travelling around the fire to the south, through the green, SOMEONE (probably ops. Musser or Blue Ridge overhead) would have told them about the second wind shift that ultimately got them entrapped.
I completely agree re the lookout not just cranking up the AC and effectively quitting work. But, the same is true about not putting your lookout where they put him, and not simply letting him hang out and nearly get burned over. Both to me are symptomatic of broader issues. Everything from an undue tolerance for risk, to an undue tolerance of no real communication.
There is a catch-22 involved, though. If you don’t want people to know where you are going, it’s tough to ask McDonough to keep working as a lookout in a way that’s likely to be useful.
I believe looking at pictures that some one could have gone out of town on the highway and been able to look back up the ridge to the heal of the fire where the crew was. If they had binoculars they may have been able to see them start down the ridge before the smoke layed over and covered the area. Again a well qualified lookout attached to the crew would have at least tried to maintain contact. after the trucks were safe they had there crew freq. to talk on all they wanted with out interference from other traffic. It is a within 2 to 4 mile line of site personal radio channel.
Yes actually not that different from glassing deer in some ways. But you’ve got to know to try to do it, and/or have someone direct you to do it. One of many opportunities where both the intended route could have been disclosed, and they could have gotten better information on fire and weather in turn. I strongly suspect that most people would have been asking their lookout to do this, but that again gets back to disclosing their route.
Reply to Bob Powers post
on April 27, 2014 at 3:14 pm
>> Mr. Powers said…
>> I believe looking at pictures that
>> some one could have gone out of
>> town on the highway and been
>> able to look back up the ridge to
>> the heal of the fire where the crew
>> was.
You didn’t need to go ‘out of town’
at all. There were any number of
places where that ‘anchor spot’
could be clearly seen from in
town itself. The Yarnell Fire Station
was up on its own ‘hill’ and had an
absolute CLEAR ( and direct )
view of that area. That’s where
OPS1 Todd Abel and Eric Marsh
first had their ‘chat’ that morning,
with a CLEAR view of that anchor
point location… and both agreed to
send GM up there in the first place.
>> Mr. Powers also wrote…
>> If they had binoculars they may
>> have been able to see them start
>> down the ridge before the smoke
>> layed over and covered the area.
Yes…. and there was (apparently)
no shortage of binocluars that day.
In his ADOSH interview…
SPGS1 Gary Cordes said he ‘glassed
them up ‘ any number of times that
day ( from various locations in town )
and was able to see exactly what they
were doing up on the ridge.
Page 45 of Cordes’ ADOSH interview
Q = Bruce Hanna
A = SPGS1 Gary Cordes
______________________________
Q: Okay.
A: …and I did glass them up throughout the day and they were up on the switchback right in here. They had…
Q: Mm-hmm.
A: …a squad uh, just staged out over here and then they had been, they had some doing some work in here.
( Points to map ).
______________________________
Also… in his first ADOSH interview…
Brendan McDonough was asked if
HE had his own binoculars that day
while serving as lookout… and
he said YES…
Page 27…
Q1 = Barry Hicks
A = Brendan McDonough
______________________________
Q1: Did you have any binoculars
with you?
A: Yeah.
Q1: You did?
A: Mm-hm.
______________________________
Seems reasonable with the right person trained in fuels, weather, and responsibilities as a lookout. Could have made a huge difference. One of those learning things that need discussed.
Reply to Elizabeth post on April 27, 2014 at 8:31 am said:
>> Elizabeth wrote
>> WTKTT and xxFullsailxx: Regarding your recent exchange
>> about where Todd Abel was located at the time of the
>> deployment and burn-over…. Presumably, if Todd Abel had
>> made it over to the east side of the fire by the time of the 4:27
>> “Yarnell Gamble” video (which I doubt that he had), we would
>> see him in the Tom Story photos where some of the guys are
>> congregating around the white pick-up trucks in the Ranch
>> Restaurant parking lot immediately after hearing that GM
>> was in trouble. WTKTT, do you see Abel there?
The first Tom Story photo available in the public folder that
shows anything from the Ranch House Restaurant parking
lot ( his image number 1677 ) has a timestamp of 5:06.10 PM.
It was taken with his Canon EOS, which has already been
determined to be ‘accurate’ with timestamping that day to
within 45 to 50 seconds of ‘true’ time.
His ‘previous’ sequential image ( 1676 ) was taken up near the
helibase on Hays Ranch Road ( with the same Canon EOS )
and has a timestamp of 3:18.48 PM.
So, apparently, Tom Story himself was ‘moving around’ a lot
that day and didn’t take any picutures with his Canon EOS
at all between 3:18 and 5:06 PM ( Almost a 2 hour gap ).
So even the Tom Story photos from the RHR were not taken
( as you suggested ) “immediately after hearing GM was
in trouble”. His first photo from that location seems to be
almost a half-hour AFTER the ‘deployment’ message(s).
We KNOW that Todd Abel WAS at the Ranch House
Restaurant sometime after the deployment… because Paul
Musser says ( in his ADOSH interview ) that that is where
he suggested to Abel ( face to face ) that Abel become the
IC for the ‘Incident within an Incident’ and that Musser would
continue on as ‘Field OPS’ for the fire itself.
But I’m glad you brought this up… because even as xxfullsailxx
and I were having that exchange I remembered that there really
has never seemed to be any definite proof of WHEN Field OPS1
Todd Abel really worked his way down to Yarnell that day.
So, again… we KNOW that pretty much ‘everyone’ ended up
at the Ranch House Restaurant, at some point ( Musser, Cordes,
Willis, Abel, etc. )… but EXACTLY when they all arrived there
has never been fully researched or documented, AFAIK.
Musser says ( in his ADOSH interview ) that after he dropped
the ‘Planning OPS’ duties and jumped in as the second fully
functional ‘Field OPS’ on the fire that afternoon… he pulled
some resources to himself and then first tackled the problem
that had developed in the Sickles Road area. After he dealt
with that… he worked his way down towards Yarnell.
Apparently… he FIRST met up with SPGS1 Gary Cordes at
that ‘other’ staging area up by the Shrine Road ( I believe
it was referred to as ‘the gas station’ ). Whether he made his
1542 ‘availability check’ out to DIVSA Marsh just BEFORE
he arrived there or not has still not been definitely determined,
but that ‘near the Shrine road’ staging point IS where he
first met Cordes face-to-face and got ‘briefed’ on the situation
as Cordes knew it at that time. ( Evacuations already in progress ).
So we know when Musser got to Yarnell… and where he first
‘staged’ ( up near Shrine road and 89 )… but we still don’t know
when either he or Cordes went down to the RHR.
Likewise… we can (*apparently) hear Field OPS1 Todd Abel telling
SOMEONE in an Air Study video circa 4:10 or so that he thought he
was going to ‘be down there’ ( in Yarnell ) in (quote) “About FIVE”
( minutes )… but I also realized in that recent exchange that there
doesn’t seem to be any real proof that he actually did that ( made it
down there in 5 minutes ).
So I went digging.
I agree with xxfullsailxx that it “doesn’t really matter where
Abel was” with regards to radio transmissions that day… but
I was just curious myself whether there really is any documented
evidence of WHERE Field OPS1 Todd Abel actually WAS when
we hear him breaking into Steed’s MAYDAY sequence and
telling Air Attack “Granite Mountain is trying to get a hold of you,
let’s see what we’ve got goin’ on.”
Wherever he was at the time of the MAYDAYS… it is obvious
he was hearing that MAYDAY traffic in real time and HE was
the one trying to get Bravo 33 to ‘wake up and pay attention’
and RESPOND to these men… ( recorded in the Helmet-Cam
video ) which they (eventually) did.
I’ve checked all the Tom Story photos and the Michelle Lee
photos and the Blue Ridge photos from the Ranch House
Restaurant. I really don’t see either Musser OR Abel there in
pretty much ANY timeframe ( even though we know they were ).
I don’t see Darrell Willis in any of the photos either.. and we ALSO
know fer sure he was there at some point ( unless that
is him just sitting in that white pickup truck listening to radio ),
so I guess it’s possible ANY of these guys could have been there
at just about any time but just never got caught in a photo.
So I went back to Todd Abel’s own ADOSH interview.
Sure enough… there DOES seem to be a quick moment there
in that interview when they are looking at maps and Abel is
pointing to where he was out workinig on the NORTH end
of the fire.
As he was doing that… he happened to mention something.
On page 50 of his ADOSH interview… OPS1 Todd Abel
actually DOES describe how it was he got down to Yarnell,
and WHEN he did that.
It starts with them trying to work through the ‘unit log’ that Abel
supplied to the SAIT investigators… with him (Abel) pointing at the
map they were working with during the interview and him pointing
at the spot where he was working up on the north end. Then he
starts ‘pointing’ at ‘other spots’ and adding some explanation…
Q1 = Dave Larsen ( Rest in Peace )
A = Field OPS1 Todd Abel
______________________________________________________
Q1: Um, do you remember the timeframe? Do you remember
when you heard the word deploy?
A: I remember looking at my watching and thinking it was probably
around, uh, 1645ish.
Q1: Okay that seems to be – okay. All right. Uh, structures are
burning in Yarnell, heavy smoke, fire crosses 89, propane tanks
exploding, all-out search began for Granite Mountain, that’s the
next entry ( in Abel’s log ).
A: All right. Uh, I’m gonna – let me, uh – I’ll – let me back up a little
bit with you guys just to make sure we got the full picture here.
Q1: Please.
A: So I’m still upon this north end when all this happens down
here. Um, we had the wind – the wind had shifted, structures
weren’t threatened anymore. Um, I – about the time this happens,
Darrell Willis calls me and – just to update me on how they were
doing over there. I say are you copying this on air on to ground?
And he says no. I said Granite Mountain just deployed. And he’s
like well okay. You know and we hung up the phone – uh, it was
either phone or radio, I can’t remember, ‘cause I had talked to him
a couple of times on the phone. But, um, I called – Todd Foster
said hold up any burning, we didn’t need to do it anymore because
the wind had shifted. I moved myself back around to the – to Yarnell.
All right? Um, and – and I know Darrell did too and I know he made
arrangements to leave his chunk with the task force leader there.
So I come back around here to the – there’s a restaurant that sits,
uh – it’s gotta be right in here somewhere. A restaurant sits right in
there. Um, I came back around there. In transit over here I called
our alarm room here, started ordering Medevac helicopters and
ambulances, ‘cause I didn’t know what we were dealing with.
…
Q1: Okay.
A: So I come down to here. Paul Musser comes up to me and
says I’m gonna – we need to make you the IC of the incident within
the incident. I said I copy that. He goes I’m gonna keep on – I’m
gonna hold on to tactical – I’ll take tactical ops for the fire, so we
can still try to save some of this stuff in Yarnell.
______________________________________________________
So ( according to Abel himself ) he did NOT ‘make it down
there in FIVE minutes’ as he seemed to say he was going to
do in an Air Study video circa 4:10. According to Abel’s testimony
to ADOSH… he was still up on the north end even when the
MAYDAY calls first appeared on the radio at 1639… and he
jumped on the Air-to-ground channel to tell Bravo 33 to stop ignoring them from UP THERE… which is also where he
then had that cellphone call with Darrell Willis. Willis has always
said he got that cellphone call FROM Todd Abel to notify Willis
about the deployment ( and that it WAS, in fact, a phone call
and not a radio transmission ) but now Abel says it was the
other way around ( that Willis called HIM right after deployment).
So we still don’t have an exact TIME for when OPS1 Todd Abel
made it down to Yarnell… but it does SOUND like he only
headed down there because of the deployment situation and
that he DID go straight to the Ranch House Restaurant…
…and whenever he DID finally get there… that is when Musser
asked him to be IC for the ‘Incident within an Incident’.
Reply to xxfullsailxx on April 27, 2014 at 3:26 pm
>> xxfullsailxx said…
>> hmm, so even less credibility to the voice in the
>> “Yarnell Gamble” video being attributed to Abel…
>> interesting.
How so?
>> xxfullsailxx also said…
>> ultimately it doesn’t really matter where Abel was
I agree. IAOI ( If And Only If ) that really is him
speaking to Marsh in the YARNELL-GAMBLE
video and IAOI Marsh is actually responding
directly to whoever that is saying ‘appreciate if
you could get to town a little faster’…
…then YOU are right. It truly doesn’t matter where
Field OPS1 Todd Abel was. Radios are an
amazing tool.
You can maintain all you want that Marsh is
NOT ‘finishing’ an ongoing conversation with
speaker 1 in the YARNELL-GAMBLE video…
…but it is not possible to maintain that Eric Marsh
was NOT reporting Granite Mountain’s ‘status’
and/or ‘progress’ to SOMEONE at exactly that
moment in time… just 15 minutes before
deployment.
So WHO do YOU think Marsh was ‘reporting’ to,
at that moment, if not speaker 1 in the video?
It’s a finite (short) list of names, don’t you think?
Go re-read the interviews and the alleged interview notes/unit logs. Make a chart of who says they heard from or spoke with GM, regarding *what.* Presumably that chart will answer your questions (or at least point you in the right direction), no?
Elizabeth… it sounds like you might
have already done that yourself.
So same question goes out to YOU.
Regardless of the apparent ‘context’
of the YARNELL-GAMBLE video… and
the *apparent* response of Marsh to
what speaker 1 says… just take the
4:27 PM ‘report’ by Marsh all by itself.
WHO do YOU think he was ‘reporting
Granite Mountain’s status/progress
to at that moment… just 15 minutes
before deployment?
Do YOU, in fact, have some idea of WHO Marsh was obviously ‘reporting’ Granite Mountain’s status/progress to at 4:27 PM?
I have already stated a number of times what I believe is actually happening in the YARNELL-GAMBLE video and WHO Marsh
*seems* to be answering/reporting to.
I am seeking other opinions.
He was ‘reporting’ to SOMEONE ( with only 15 minutes to go before deployment ) and it’s a ‘short list’ of names.
>> Reply to Marti Reed post on April 25, 2014 at 6:52 pm
>>
>> Marti said…
>> I still haven’t managed to ever figure out Brendan’s trail.
>> I find it still REALLY confusing.
It’s not you, Marti. It really is quite confusing what ACTUALLY
happened there with that CONVOY circa 1600 ( 4:00 PM ).
>> WTKTT on April 26, 2014 at 12:22 am replied…
>>
>> Since the additional unit logs surfaced in February… it’s pretty clear that
>> Brendan DID just ‘convoy’ out with the Blue Ridge guys and they all drove
>> south through the Sesame area, then through Glen Ilah, then turned north
>> on Highway 89 at 4:02 PM ( when Brendan shot those pics out the window
>> of the Sup truck )… and then they all headed over to the Youth Camp at end
>> of Shrine road.
>>
>> So even if the new TIME for the ‘discussing their options’ conversations
>> moves BACK to the 3:53 PM timeframe… Brendan was ( supposedly ) still in
>> the GM Supervisor truck with ( in his own testimony ) the intra-crew radio
>> volume ‘cranked up’
>>
>> Marti Reed on April 26, 2014 at 7:07 am replied…
>>
>> But what does that do to the photos he took from Hiway 89 in
>> Yarnell at 4:05ish?
Nothing, really. The new TIME for the MacKenzie videos doesn’t change
that event. It just means that he had heard them ‘discussing their options’
BEFORE those photos were taken… and not (perhaps) DURING, as
was previously thought might be the case when it *seemed* that the
MacKenzie videos were also being shot at that same (4:02) moment.
If the time on Brendan’s own device was ‘right’ ( and it seemed to be
a network-connected smartphone so we ARE assuming that )… the
exact TIME for his 4 photos was 4:02 PM. He took all four of them
out the driver window just 2 seconds apart from each other.
>> Did he drive down Sesame to 89 and then up Shrine to where Blue Ridge
>> was and then help “bump” the rest of the trucks, which is what it looks like
>> to me?
I don’t believe Brendan did anything but sit in the GM Supervisor Truck from
the time he got in it after Frisby dropped him off until it finally reached the
Ranch House Restaurant circa 1639. That was now his only ‘job’.
The Blue Ridge guys had been told where all the ‘keys’ were in the trucks
long before they even tried to move them and back during the time when
Frisby was evacuating Brendan… so they did not NEED Brendan to help
them ‘bump’ anything.
Brendan’s JOB was simple… at that point…
Drive that GM Supervisor truck… keep track of ALL the GM vehicles…
and listen closely to that intra-crew frequency for instructions that
could come at ANY moment.
After 1549 and all the way to 1639, when all the vehicles were finally
arriving at the Ranch House Restaurant… I actually don’t think Brendan
even exited the GM Supervisor Truck at all…. not even once… unless
he had to take a piss, or something.
>> Marti also said…
>> When I read the Unit Logs, I find them very confusing as to who went
>> where and when.
It’s not you, Marti. It IS, in fact, very confusing.
When reading some of the unit logs… it even seems like some of the people who
were actually DRIVING the vehicles aren’t even sure exactly which way they
went that day.
The generally accepted theory is that ALL of the vehicles that were leaving
that Sesame Area that day ( GM Sup Truck, GM Chase, GM Crew Carriers,
1 or more Blue Ridge support vehicles, etc. ) ALL exited the Sesame area
the way they all came in that morning.
South through the Sesame area, onto the pavement where Lakewood and
Manazanita end in west Glen Ilah… EAST on Lakewood to Highway 89,
then NORTH on Highway 89 to Shrine Road, then WEST / NORTHWEST
on Shrine Road to where the pavement ends at the parking lot of the
St. Joseph Shrine itself ( where Aarron Hulburd shot the Helmet Cam
video along with Jason Clawson and KC (Bucky) Yowell later on )…
then WEST on Shrine road some more to that Youth Camp clearing.
I really don’t think that any ‘vehicle’ other than the BR ATV ever ‘cut across’
that ‘cutover trail’ between the Sesame area and the Youth Camp, even after
the dozer was done improving it. It was still a nasty, winding sandy-soft-dirt
road with a downhill descent through that rock pile just before reaching the
Youth Camp area.
I think all the ‘real vehicles’ just stayed with legit ROADS that day and
‘going all the way around’ through Yarnell was the safe bet… so that’s
what they all did.
It was NOT the time to get any expensive vehicle STUCK out there on one of
those dirt roads. That would have been a BIG problem, at that time.
One of the things to remember is that Brendan McDonough, himself, had
NO IDEA where this ‘Shrine Road’ was, much less that obscure Youth Camp
off by itself after the pavement of Shrine Road ends.
GM never went down Shrine Road that morning… or anywhere near it.
Cordes took GM out to the Sesame area that morning via that known
Lakewood Drive access route… and Brendan wasn’t even driving that
morning.
So Brendan, himself, MUST have ‘followed’ someone from the Blue Ridge Crew
out of that area to even know how to get out of there, much less all the way over
to this ‘Youth Camp’ at that time.
If Brendan had turned his camera just a little farther north for one of those
four photos he took looking west from Highway 89 at 4:02 PM, I am sure we
would have seen one of the Blue Ridge vehicles in front of him ‘showing him
where to go’.
>> Marti also wrote…
>> Whatever whenever, I think it may have been quite difficult for him to
>> have been paying complete attention to what was coming over the
>> radio, given all that was going on.
I’m going to disagree there, Marti.
On the contrary… it was now ( more than ever that day ) Brendan’s
‘prime directive’ to be ‘listening to the intra-crew radio’.
He had already TOLD his Captain ( Steed ) as he left his assigned lookout
position and was being ‘picked up’ by another Hotshot supervisor ( Frisby )
that that is EXACTLY what he would be doing while he was absent from them.
Brendan was now the one who was responsible for ALL of the GM vehicles
and, at some point, seeing to it that they were re-united with the rest of
HIS team.
At any moment… he could be receiving instructions… and he BETTER
be listening to the intra-crew and not MISS those instructions… and
he knew that.
If Brendan had MISSED a callout from Steed or Marsh ( at any moment )
with ‘instructions’ about where to try and rotate the GM vehicles… there
would have been hell to pay… and I think Brendan knew THAT, too.
Brendan has said in his ADOSH interviews that his own handheld had
the GM intra-crew set as his PRIORITY channel all day that day… which
means that even if you are in general *scan* mode… any transmissions
that begin to take place on that pre-set PRIORITY channel will ‘break through’
to the top and now be the active conversation coming over the radio so
that no important conversations on the PRIORITY channel are ‘missed’.
The onboard radios in the GM Superintendent and GM Chase truck
probably also had this PRIORITY channel preference set to GM’s own
intra-crew frequency.
So… because of the circumstances… it was IMPERATIVE that Brendan
be listening closely to the intra-crew while he was separated from the
others… and I believe that is exactly what he was doing.
Besides… despite any consternation about all of this… the FACT remains
that ALL of the ‘official’ reports about this incident all state (unequivocally)
that Brendan McDonough DID hear them ‘discussing their options’,
whenever that actually took place.
Brendan has never denied ( or even qualified ) these statements.
The only thing we do NOT know is WHAT he might have heard.
THAT is what he has always ( and still ) refuses to talk about.
Yeah, now I think you’re right. Thanks for helping clear this up.
The other thing this scenario implies, is that as soon as someone from Blue Ridge was driving Jesse Steed’s chase truck, they could have listened in on that channel, also. At least if, in fact, it had an on-board radio, and if it was set to that channel as Priority.
Reply to Marti Reed post on April 28, 2014 at 8:55 am
>> Marti said…
>> The other thing this scenario implies, is that as
>> soon as someone from Blue Ridge was driving
>> Jesse Steed’s chase truck, they could have listened
>> in on that channel, also. At least if, in fact, it had an
>> on-board radio, and if it was set to that channel
>> as Priority.
Exactly.
That has actually *always* been a possibility even when
we thought the MacKenzie videos were shot at 4:02 PM.
There is even *some* evidence in those (redacted)
unit logs that one ( or more? ) of the THREE Blue
Ridge personnel who ended up driving those THREE
other GM vehicles actually USED the onboard radio(s)
to speak with Marsh and/or Steed WHILE they were
driving the GM vehicles ( reporting progress and
whatnot ).
So there might actually be THREE Blue Ridge Hotshots
who had a good chance of hearing Marsh and Steed
talking to each other at any time after 3:49 or 3:50 PM.
It all depends when everyone actually got into those
trucks… and when all of these ‘comfort level’ and
‘discussing their options’ conversations actually took
place.
ADOSH was never able to interview ANY of the
Blue Ridge Hotshots. Zero. Zip. Nada.
>> calvin said…
>>
>> Mcdonough 154944 image.
>> How does this image align with the Mackenzie, Parker photos?
>> Where is the anchor point on the ridge?
>> Where is the Mackenzie, Parker, Norris photo spot?
>>
>> It appears that the ridge is clearly visible on the south side of the fire.
>> Possibly photographing the area GM were taking pictures from at
>> the same time?
Close… but no cigar.
The actual point where all these photos were being taken up on that ridge appears
to be *just* ‘out of frame’ on the left side of McDonough’s 1549 image(s).
That small ‘knob’ seen up on the ridge at the very left edge of 154944 appears
to be the north part of the actual ‘helispot’… where the entire DOC Lewis crew
was ‘airlifted’ out of that location just hours earlier that day…
…but even that ‘helispot’ was some hundreds of yards NORTH of where those
late-day ‘resting spots’ and the spot where the MacKenzie cellphone and Canon
photos/videos were taken.
However… looking back in the OTHER direction…
* IMG_2736.JPG – 3:51.58 PM
This MacKenzie cellphone image ( taken just 2 minutes and 14 seconds AFTER McDonough’s 154844 image ) has a clear view back from the ridge to the ‘Sesame area’… but the view to that EXACT spot where BOTH the GM Supervisor Truck AND the CM Chase truck had been parked that day is blocked by a ‘ridge’ in the distance.
That spot where they were ACTUALLY parked was a few hundred yards west of the point where that east/west two-track actually meets the more open ‘Sesame area’.
HOWEVER… in this photo… you CAN see that exact ‘intersection’ of the east/west two-track leading out to the ridge and where it meets the Sesame area… and there DO appear to be a group of vehicles captured there in this 3:51.58 PM photo.
I count at least TWO vehicles there.
They appear as small WHITE dots against the tan background of the
clearing at that point.
This is, in fact, known to be point where Blue Ridge had left at least ONE of their vehicles that day… which also needed to be evacuated along with the GM vehicles around this time.
So it looks like it is POSSIBLE that this cellphone photo of MacKenzie’s ( at 3:51.58 ) has captured the moment when that ‘evacuation’ convoy was assembling and actually heading out of the Sesame area.
It could very well be that moments after Brendan shot his 1549 photos… the ‘extra driver’ for the GM Chase Truck arrived at his location and then they both drove these WHITE vehicles the few hundred yards east to the Sesame area… and now Christopher’s 3:51.58 cellphone photo is capturing them ‘pausing’ at that intersection to pick up the other Blue Ridge vehicle that also needed to be evacuated.
* IMG_2738.JPG – 3:55.31 PM
3 minutes and 33 seconds later… those WHITE DOTS are GONE from that intersection where the east/west two-track meets the Sesame area… but NOW we see what appears to be an even LARGER group of vehicles in the distance at the exact point where the two GM Crew Carriers had been parked all day.
The 2 GM Crew Carriers had actually been visible there as 2 ‘white dots’ in various other photos taken throughout the day, but NOW ( at 3:55.31 PM ) there appear to be MORE than just the 2 Crew Carriers assembled at that location.
So THIS MacKenzie cellphone photo could now be showing the actual ‘progression’ of the evacuation convoy as it stopped where the GM Crew Carriers were to ‘fire them up’ and add them to the convoy…
…which was then going to keep heading SOUTH in the Sesame area and exit out to Highway 89 via Lakewood Drive in Glen Ilah ( the way they all came in that day in the first place ).
That ‘convoy’ would, of course, then head all the way around on Highway 89 and Shrine road to ‘re-stage’ out at the Youth Camp at the west end of Shrine road.
The timing pretty much matches here.
Christopher’s cellphone photos might actually have been capturing the ‘progess’ of this vehicle evacuation down there in the Sesame Area clearings.
** THE MACKENZIE VIDEOS AND ‘THE CONVOY’…
The only chance of seeing this same ‘activity’ in the distance in the MacKenzie videos comes after the 4 or 5 second mark in Chrisopher’s FIRST video… when he pans the camera to the right and we first see Jesse Steed sitting there.
In the distance… over Steed’s red helmet… you CAN see the same ‘clearing’ where the GM Crew Carriers were parked.
However… at this moment in the first MacKenzie video… there does NOT appear to be the same large ‘group of vehicles’ at that spot as can be seen in the (upcoming) 2738 cellphone photo. You can still ( apparently ) only see the two GM Crew Carriers there.
Since we NOW know that these MacKenzie videos HAD to have been taken
in-between MacKenzie cellphone photos 2736 and 2737… this would still make sense.
That means the ‘convoy’ may have still been working its way down south from the northern end of the Sesame area at that moment in the first video… but is still hidden behind that ridge in the distance.
It would only be a few minutes later ( when MacKenzie would return to shooting photos with his cellphone ( with image 2738 at 3:55.31 ) that we NOW see the convoy ‘arriving’ where the GM Crew Carriers are.
Followup… cellphone photo 2737 is the FIRST one that MacKenzie
took AFTER using his Canon Powershot to shoot the videos…
but that 2737 photo is of the fireline and is NOT pointed EAST
where we could see any ‘convoy’ activity.
It is only 11 seconds AFTER 2737 when Christopher then
turned more to the EAST and took his next 2738 photo which
DOES show the Sesame area in the distance.
WTKTT. So you are saying the Discussing options spot is more to the south or left of the 154944 image? Do I understand you correctly that the helispot/ anchor point is visible in this photo? Meaning that if Marsh was north of the discussing options spot, he would have had a clear line of sight to where Mcdonough was in this picture?
>> calvin said…
>> WTKTT. So you are saying the Discussing options
>> spot is more to the south or left of the 154944 image?
Yes. That is what Google Earth ‘ground level’ lookbacks
from Brendan’s location seem to indicate. If Brendan
has just pointed the camera a *little* more to HIS
left before taking that picture… it would have PROBABLY
captured that spot where the men were at 1549 up
in the ridge at the very left edge of his photo.
Now… whether we could have ACTUALLY ‘seen’ them
up there on the ridge or not is still debatable. The
resolution on Brendan’s camera was not so hot.
>> calvin also said…
>> Do I understand you correctly that the helispot/ anchor
>> point is visible in this photo?
Yes. It seems to be. That ‘knob’ on the ridge at the
extreme left of the photo seems to be the NORTHERN
edge of that area where the helispot was… and the spot
where the entire Lewis DOC Crew had been evacuated
from that same ‘anchor point’ location via helicopter
just hours earlier that day.
>> calvin also wrote…
>> Meaning that if Marsh was north of the discussing
>> options spot,
There is no ‘if’ about it. He was ‘north’ of that spot,
at that point. Probably still almost all the way on the
top of Weaver Mountain itself and ( as he had just
told OPS1 Todd Abel )… “Workin’ my way off the top.”
>> calvin also wrote…
>> he (Marsh) would have had a clear line of sight to
>> where Mcdonough was in this picture?
Well… I don’t know about a CLEAR line of sigth… but
YES… Marsh probably could have seen this area where
the GM Supervisor AND the GM Chase Trucks were
parked from where he was at that time.
It all depends on the ‘smoke curtain’… and what it looked
like from the ‘other side’. I still ascribe to your theory that
the reason Steed felt the need to tell Marsh ( in the
second MacKenzie video ) that the fire had “Almost made
it to that two-track road we walked in on” is because
Steed KNEW Marsh was pretty far NORTH of where
they were… and would now have been looking BACK
‘through’ the south-headed ‘smoke curtain’… and Steed
was just telling Marsh what HE was seeing in case
Marsh couldn’t really see through that ‘smoke curtain’
too well at that point.
There are also various other reported ‘comments’ from
Eric Marsh in this timeframe about him saying he could
‘see’ certain things… but those reports are spotty ( and
not even verified? ) so it’s really hard to say what Marsh
could ACTUALLY see from up there on the Weaver
Mountain, in this general timeframe ( after wind shift ).
**
** TOM STORY CANON EOS 5D MARK II CAMERA
** WAS 1 TO 2 MINUTES OFF THE CORRECT TIME THAT DAY?
This is the Tom Story photograph that show the Blue Ridge ATV actually
LEAVING the Ranch House Restaurant parking lot…
Tom Story photo: 201303_Yarnell_Hill_1682
It is ‘leaving’ the lot via the southern driveway opening and its hard to see… but if
you zoom in over the open driver-side door of the white pickup with the red stripe
on the LEFT SIDE of the photo… you can see the Blue Ridge ATV there ‘pausing’
at the driveway just before pulling out onto Highway 89.
And here is the EXIF metadata for this particular Tom Story photo…
_________________________________________________________________
Caption: A thunderstorm to the north of Peeples (cq) Valley during the
Yarnell Hill Fire caused the blaze to reverse directions and burn through the
town of Yarnell.
Artist: TOM STORY
Address: Post Office Box 7936, Tempe, AZ, 85281, USA
Copyright: Copyright Tom Story – All Rights Reserved
Camera: Canon EOS 5D Mark II
Lens: Canon EF 16-35mm f/2.8L – Shot at 35 mm
Exposure: Auto exposure, Shutter priority AE, 1/166 sec, f/4.5, ISO 800, Compensation: -1
Flash: Off, Did not fire
Focus: One-shot AF, with a depth of field of from inf to 2.14 m.
Focus 2: AF Area Mode: Multi-point AF or AI AF
Keywords: Airtankers, VLAT, SEATS, Type II helicopters, Type 1 Helicopters. Structures lost.
Date: June 30, 2013 – 5:08:18 PM
Location: Peeples Valley, AZ, USA
File: 2,720 × 4,080 JPEG (11.1 megapixels)
__________________________________________________________________
So, according to the timestamp on Tom Story’s Canon EOS 5D Mark II camera,
the Blue Ridge ATV was leaving the Ranch House Restaurant parking lot at
exactly 1708.18 ( 5:08.18 PM ).
This does NOT match the Blue Ridge GPS tracking data, which was taking
the TIME value directly from information contained in packets coming from
the satellites themselves.
At about +6:05 in the Blue Ridge GPS tracking video itself is the 1707 to 1710
GPS tracking data… which looks like this…
__________________________________________________________________
1707 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary at the Ranch House Restaurant
1708 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1709 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary ( slight movement south in the Ranch House Restaurant parking lot )
1710 – 34.216118, -112.758758 – 1839.480 – 20.90 – Heading northwest through Glen Ilah on Lakewood Drive
1711 – 34.218611, -112.760239 – 1000.710 – 11.37 – At intersection of Westward/Lakewood and Manzanita Drive
__________________________________________________________________
At 1709 ( 48 seconds AFTER Tom Story’s photo 1708.18 timestamp ),
the Blue Ridge GPS tracker shows that it has, in fact, moved just slightly
SOUTH in the parking lot ( which would match the move shown in the Tom
Story photo towards the southern driveway entrance/exit ) but it STILL has
NOT actually LEFT the Ranch House Restaurant parking lot yet.
60 seconds LATER… at 1710… the GPS tracking DOES show the ATV having
left the parking lot and is now heading west on Lakwood Drive in the
Glen Ilah sub-division.
It has ( by 1710 ) traveled 1,839 feet which represents a speed of 20.90 mph
in relation to its previous 1709 location, still back in the RHR parking lot.
Since the GPS unit was ONLY updating every 60 seconds… it is not telling us
the EXACT MOMENT when the Ranger did leave the parking lot… but it IS
telling us that at 1709… it had not YET left the lot.
So Tom Story’s Canon EOS could NOT have been more than about 2 minutes
off the ‘actual’ clock time that day… but it DOES look it MIGHT have been
anywhere from a minimum of 48 seconds up to 1 minute off.
** BLUE RIDGE TRACKING DATA FOR THIS TIMEFRAME
Here is the actual Blue Ridge GPS tracking data that covers the time period from
the tracker ( in Captain Brown’s possession ) actually evacuating the Shrine
Road Youth Camp.. through the time at the Ranch House Restaurant and then
the start of the ‘ground rescue mission’.
It also shows their exact movements on that ‘rescue mission’ as they first scouted
various roads in Glen Ilah, then moved north to the Shrine road where they would
then ‘break through’ and head west out to the ridge…
1635 – 34.228414, -112.754134 – 0644.378 – 07.32 – Heading EAST out the driveway of the Youth Camp (YC)
1636 – 34.227183, -112.752758 – 0624.010 – 07.09 – At the St. Joseph Shrine (SJS) parking lot now
1637 – 34.227183, -112.752758 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary at SJS parking lot
1638 – 34.227183, -112.752758 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary at SJS parking lot
1639 – 34.224803, -112.749746 – 1342.030 – 15.25 – Suddenly all the way EAST on Shrine Rd, almost to Highway 89
1640 – 34.222603, -112.746935 – 1188.170 – 13.50 – At the intersection of Shrine road and Highway 89 now
1641 – 34.217985, -112.750025 – 1966.140 – 22.34 – Heading SOUTH on Highway 89 to the Ranch House Restaurant
1642 – 34.213532, -112.755497 – 2468.580 – 28.05 – Heading SOUTH on Highway 89 to the Ranch House Restaurant
1643 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0167.099 – 01.90 – Arrival at the Ranch House Restaurant
NOTE: 1643 is one of the estimated times of the burnover in the box canyon.
1644 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary in parking lot
1645 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1646 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1647 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary ( slight movement west )
1648 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1649 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1650 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1651 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1652 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1653 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1654 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary ( slight movement east )
1655 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary ( slight movement west )
1656 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1657 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary ( slight movement east )
1658 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1659 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1700 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1701 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary ( slight movement west )
1702 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1703 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1704 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1705 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1706 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1707 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1708 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1709 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary ( slight movement south in the parking lot )
1710 – 34.216118, -112.758758 – 1839.480 – 20.90 – Heading northwest through Glen Ilah on Lakewood Drive
1711 – 34.218611, -112.760239 – 1000.710 – 11.37 – At intersection of Westward/Lakewood and Manzanita Drive
1712 – 34.215772, -112.758640 – 1183.450 – 13.45 – Back east on Lakewood Drive
1713 – 34.218611, -112.760239 – 1183.550 – 13.45 – Back west again to same 1711 spot. Intersection of Westward/Lakewood and Manzanita
1714 – 34.215471, -112.758082 – 1352.120 – 15.36 – Back east on Lakewood again. To intersection of Lakewood and Mountainaire Drive
1715 – 34.215471, -112.758082 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1716 – 34.215471, -112.758082 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1717 – 34.215304, -112.759219 – 0405.336 – 04.61 – Southwest on Mountainaire, then west on Foothill Drive
1718 – 34.216544, -112.762223 – 1043.210 – 11.85 – Heading west on Foothill Drive
1719 – 34.215746, -112.760561 – 0612.670 – 06.96 – Heading back east on Foothill Drive to Mountainaire Drive
1720 – 34.212534, -112.760646 – 1646.220 – 18.71 – South on Mountainaire Drive
1721 – 34.210502, -112.762266 – 1149.650 – 13.06 – South on Mountainaire, west on Las Tiendas Dr., then south on Candy Cane Ln.
1722 – 34.215346, -112.758458 – 2457.170 – 27.82 – All the way back north (fast) to intersection of Mountainaire and Lakewood
1723 – 34.215967, -112.754134 – 2607.150 – 29.63 – Exited Glen Ilah via Lakewood east, now heading north on Highway 89 (fast)
1724 – 34.222581, -112.746828 – 3413.380 – 38.79 – North (fast) on Highway 89, now at intersection of 89 and Shrine Road
1725 – 34.223610, -112.748051 – 0542.768 – 06.17 – West on Shrine Road. Now at intersection of Shrine Road and Willow Lane
1726 – 34.228307, -112.753844 – 2538.890 – 28.85 – West on Shrine Road all the way to Youth Camp entrance
1727 – 34.227225, -112.752782 – 0544.510 – 06.19 – Back east on Shrine Road to St. Joseph Shrine parking lot
1728 – 34.228502, -112.754166 – 0650.764 – 07.39 – Back west to near Youth Camp entrance again
1729 – 34.228502, -112.754166 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1730 – 34.228502, -112.754166 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
A few moments later… they would ( according to the Blue Ridge notes )
decide to (quote) “F**k it… let’s go for it”… and break through the Shrine
area and then head west out to the ridge where GM had been working.
Awesome catch, thanks! I was disappointed Tom didn’t catch the UTV after it “disappeared” from it’s spot, but thanks to your keen eye seeing that, he apparently did!
So that would mean, given that this camera was, if not EXACTLY correct (which is understandable), quite realistically reliably time-stamped, either the Canon EOS-1D Mark II N (the best, most state-of-the-art and expensive camera he had that day, with the most expensive telephohoto lens, with which he shot the “4:39” VLAT drop was seriously not synced to it (which becomes, to me, harder to imagine, all things considered, but then who knows for sure), or……….
As a photographer, I’m sitting here having a really hard time conceiving of going out to a shoot with three cameras (one of them being the current state-of-the-art), a bunch of top quality glass, I.e. thousands of dollars worth of equipment, to professionally shoot a major event, with one lesser camera being basically accurately set time-wise and the best one not even remotely.
But then, I’m also still not really grasping why Chris did what he did.
I’m partly tempted to write to Tom Story, whose PO Box is in his metadata. But I retired from this at the beginning of February………
Reply to Marti Reed post on April 26, 2014 at 7:31 pm
>> Marti said…
>> So that would mean, given that this camera was, if not
>> EXACTLY correct (which is understandable), quite
>> realistically reliably time-stamped,
Yes. I goofed with the math above and ADDED 3
seconds instead of subtracting… so instead of his
Caonon EOS timestamp of 1708.18 ( 5:08.18 PM ).
being 48 seconds ‘away’ from the 1709… it was
really only 42 seconds ‘off’.
In order for them to have traveled 1,839 west by the time
the 1710 GPS update recorded… then that really does
mean they HAD to have ‘launched’ away from the Ranch
House Restaurant just a few seconds after the 1709
update showed them still sitting there.
So just add those few seconds to the 43 seconds and
it really means Story’s Canon EOS was off by only
45 to 50 seconds ( under a minute off ).
On a day like this… when it seems that NO ONE knew
what frickin’ time it was all day… and people’s devices
all wildly inaccurate… I’d say we have to call this
( now proven ) ‘less than a minute’ offset pretty darn
accurate.
So at least that takes care of ONE of Story’s cameras.
It can be said that ANY picture coming from his
Canon EOS was never more than 45 or 50 seconds
away from an atomic timestamp that was coming
from orbiting satellites that day. Not too shabby.
Just to be clear, though… what I believe we
just proved is that while *accurate*… any
Tom Story photo taken with his Canon EOS
must be considered to be 45 to 50 seconds
BEHIND the *real* atomic time ( and not
AHEAD of it ).
If a Tom Story Canon EOS photo has a
timestamp of, say, 1508.10… then the
REAL (atomic) clock time is about 50
seconds AHEAD of that and it might
already actually be 1509.00.
For anybody that doesn’t know what the relevance of this conversation might be, it shows that Tom Story’s photos from one of his cameras, capturing images from the Ranch House Restaurant after news of the deployment had been reported to everybody but, seemingly him, are basically accurate time wise, but his images of a VLAT drop, from another camera, at the time of Jesse Steed’s Mayday radio call, are problematic, because we have no other evidence that drop happened when his state-of-the-art camera seems to have recorded it. So we are wondering “what happened here and when??”
**
** TOM STORY CANON EOS 5D MARK II CAMERA
** WAS 1 TO 2 MINUTES OFF THE CORRECT TIME THAT DAY?
This is the Tom Story photograph that show the Blue Ridge ATV actually
LEAVING the Ranch House Restaurant parking lot…
Tom Story photo: 201303_Yarnell_Hill_1682
It is ‘leaving’ the lot via the southern driveway opening and its hard to see… but if
you zoom in over the open driver-side door of the white pickup with the red stripe
on the LEFT SIDE of the photo… you can see the Blue Ridge ATV there ‘pausing’
at the driveway just before pulling out onto Highway 89.
And here is the EXIF metadata for this particular Tom Story photo…
_________________________________________________________________
Caption: A thunderstorm to the north of Peeples (cq) Valley during the
Yarnell Hill Fire caused the blaze to reverse directions and burn through the
town of Yarnell.
Artist: TOM STORY
Address: Post Office Box 7936, Tempe, AZ, 85281, USA
Contact: [email protected][email protected], 480 966 6134 602 549 4094, tomstory.com
Copyright: Copyright Tom Story – All Rights Reserved
Camera: Canon EOS 5D Mark II
Lens: Canon EF 16-35mm f/2.8L – Shot at 35 mm
Exposure: Auto exposure, Shutter priority AE, 1/166 sec, f/4.5, ISO 800, Compensation: -1
Flash: Off, Did not fire
Focus: One-shot AF, with a depth of field of from inf to 2.14 m.
Focus 2: AF Area Mode: Multi-point AF or AI AF
Keywords: Airtankers, VLAT, SEATS, Type II helicopters, Type 1 Helicopters. Structures lost.
Date: June 30, 2013 – 5:08:18 PM
Location: Peeples Valley, AZ, USA
File: 2,720 × 4,080 JPEG (11.1 megapixels)
__________________________________________________________________
So, according to the timestamp on Tom Story’s Canon EOS 5D Mark II camera,
the Blue Ridge ATV was leaving the Ranch House Restaurant parking lot at
exactly 1708.18 ( 5:08.18 PM ).
This does NOT match the Blue Ridge GPS tracking data, which was taking
the TIME value directly from information contained in packets coming from
the satellites themselves.
At about +6:05 in the Blue Ridge GPS tracking video itself is the 1707 to 1710
GPS tracking data… which looks like this…
__________________________________________________________________
1707 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary at the Ranch House Restaurant
1708 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1709 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary ( slight movement south in the Ranch House Restaurant parking lot )
1710 – 34.216118, -112.758758 – 1839.480 – 20.90 – Heading northwest through Glen Ilah on Lakewood Drive
1711 – 34.218611, -112.760239 – 1000.710 – 11.37 – At intersection of Westward/Lakewood and Manzanita Drive
__________________________________________________________________
At 1709 ( 48 seconds AFTER Tom Story’s photo 1708.18 timestamp ),
the Blue Ridge GPS tracker shows that it has, in fact, moved just slightly
SOUTH in the parking lot ( which would match the move shown in the Tom
Story photo towards the southern driveway entrance/exit ) but it STILL has
NOT actually LEFT the Ranch House Restaurant parking lot yet.
60 seconds LATER… at 1710… the GPS tracking DOES show the ATV having
left the parking lot and is now heading west on Lakwood Drive in the
Glen Ilah sub-division.
It has ( by 1710 ) traveled 1,839 feet which represents a speed of 20.90 mph
in relation to its previous 1709 location, still back in the RHR parking lot.
Since the GPS unit was ONLY updating every 60 seconds… it is not telling us
the EXACT MOMENT when the Ranger did leave the parking lot… but it IS
telling us that at 1709… it had not YET left the lot.
So Tom Story’s Canon EOS could NOT have been more than about 2 minutes
off the ‘actual’ clock time that day… but it DOES look it MIGHT have been
anywhere from a minimum of 48 seconds up to 1 minute off.
** BLUE RIDGE TRACKING DATA FOR THIS TIMEFRAME
Here is the actual Blue Ridge GPS tracking data that covers the time period from
the tracker ( in Captain Brown’s possession ) actually evacuating the Shrine
Road Youth Camp.. through the time at the Ranch House Restaurant and then
the start of the ‘ground rescue mission’.
It also shows their exact movements on that ‘rescue mission’ as they first scouted
various roads in Glen Ilah, then moved north to the Shrine road where they would
then ‘break through’ and head west out to the ridge…
1635 – 34.228414, -112.754134 – 0644.378 – 07.32 – Heading EAST out the driveway of the Youth Camp (YC)
1636 – 34.227183, -112.752758 – 0624.010 – 07.09 – At the St. Joseph Shrine (SJS) parking lot now
1637 – 34.227183, -112.752758 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary at SJS parking lot
1638 – 34.227183, -112.752758 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary at SJS parking lot
1639 – 34.224803, -112.749746 – 1342.030 – 15.25 – Suddenly all the way EAST on Shrine Rd, almost to Highway 89
1640 – 34.222603, -112.746935 – 1188.170 – 13.50 – At the intersection of Shrine road and Highway 89 now
1641 – 34.217985, -112.750025 – 1966.140 – 22.34 – Heading SOUTH on Highway 89 to the Ranch House Restaurant
1642 – 34.213532, -112.755497 – 2468.580 – 28.05 – Heading SOUTH on Highway 89 to the Ranch House Restaurant
1643 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0167.099 – 01.90 – Arrival at the Ranch House Restaurant
NOTE: 1643 is one of the estimated times of the burnover in the box canyon.
1644 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary in parking lot
1645 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1646 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1647 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary ( slight movement west )
1648 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1649 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1650 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1651 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1652 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1653 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1654 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary ( slight movement east )
1655 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary ( slight movement west )
1656 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1657 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary ( slight movement east )
1658 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1659 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1700 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1701 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary ( slight movement west )
1702 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1703 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1704 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1705 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1706 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1707 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1708 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1709 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary ( slight movement south in the parking lot )
1710 – 34.216118, -112.758758 – 1839.480 – 20.90 – Heading northwest through Glen Ilah on Lakewood Drive
1711 – 34.218611, -112.760239 – 1000.710 – 11.37 – At intersection of Westward/Lakewood and Manzanita Drive
1712 – 34.215772, -112.758640 – 1183.450 – 13.45 – Back east on Lakewood Drive
1713 – 34.218611, -112.760239 – 1183.550 – 13.45 – Back west again to same 1711 spot. Intersection of Westward/Lakewood and Manzanita
1714 – 34.215471, -112.758082 – 1352.120 – 15.36 – Back east on Lakewood again. To intersection of Lakewood and Mountainaire Drive
1715 – 34.215471, -112.758082 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1716 – 34.215471, -112.758082 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1717 – 34.215304, -112.759219 – 0405.336 – 04.61 – Southwest on Mountainaire, then west on Foothill Drive
1718 – 34.216544, -112.762223 – 1043.210 – 11.85 – Heading west on Foothill Drive
1719 – 34.215746, -112.760561 – 0612.670 – 06.96 – Heading back east on Foothill Drive to Mountainaire Drive
1720 – 34.212534, -112.760646 – 1646.220 – 18.71 – South on Mountainaire Drive
1721 – 34.210502, -112.762266 – 1149.650 – 13.06 – South on Mountainaire, west on Las Tiendas Dr., then south on Candy Cane Ln.
1722 – 34.215346, -112.758458 – 2457.170 – 27.82 – All the way back north (fast) to intersection of Mountainaire and Lakewood
1723 – 34.215967, -112.754134 – 2607.150 – 29.63 – Exited Glen Ilah via Lakewood east, now heading north on Highway 89 (fast)
1724 – 34.222581, -112.746828 – 3413.380 – 38.79 – North (fast) on Highway 89, now at intersection of 89 and Shrine Road
1725 – 34.223610, -112.748051 – 0542.768 – 06.17 – West on Shrine Road. Now at intersection of Shrine Road and Willow Lane
1726 – 34.228307, -112.753844 – 2538.890 – 28.85 – West on Shrine Road all the way to Youth Camp entrance
1727 – 34.227225, -112.752782 – 0544.510 – 06.19 – Back east on Shrine Road to St. Joseph Shrine parking lot
1728 – 34.228502, -112.754166 – 0650.764 – 07.39 – Back west to near Youth Camp entrance again
1729 – 34.228502, -112.754166 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1730 – 34.228502, -112.754166 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
A few moments later… they would ( according to the Blue Ridge notes )
decide to (quote) “F**k it… let’s go for it”… and break through the Shrine
area and then head west out to the ridge where GM had been working.
Reply to Marti Reed post on April 24, 2014 at 12:45 pm
>> Marti said…
>>
>> Well. I just picked my way thru Tom’s photos. At first I wrote, up above,
>> that I never trust camera time stamps becuz most ppl don’t need to pay
>> attention to them.
>>
>> But Tom was using three cameras that day, switching back and forth
>> depending on which lens he needed.
Yes.. he was… and he was *most probably* using that beast with the large
telephoto lens when he was shooting the distant DC10 VLAT drops.
>> Marti also wrote…
>> So that would lead me to think he probably must have had to sync them,
>> thus at least vaguely getting them accurate.
>> So the 3:49 photos are mystifying.
Yes, they are… but see above. Maybe *ONLY* that beast with the telephoto
lens had an ‘inaccurate’ time stamp and seemed to be showing that VLAT
drop at 4:39… exactly when Captain Jesse Steed was actually MAKING
his first MAYDAY call.
>> Marti also said…
>> I think his photos at the Ranch House Parking Lot seem about right, though.
Yes, they do. Some of them even seem to match exactly with the
Michelle Lee photos from the parking lot… but SOME of them still seem
a little ‘wonky’ as to timestamp(s).
>> They would definitely have been later than McCord’s.
>> I think McCord jumped out of the Blue Ridge Buggy and started shooting
>> relatively immediately.
Agree. Despite some of the unit log notes… it would definitely seem that
that they were aware of the MAYDAY tracking either just BEFORE or
AS they were pulling into the RHR parking lot itself.
>> Tom’s photos start with the Blue Ridge ATV near the trucks, and then
>> the ATV vanishes, and I think that happening around 5 seems reasonable.
In one of Tom’s photos… he captures the moment when the BR ATV was
actually *leaving* the lot. It’s hidden behind one of the white pickups… but
you can see it there just pulling OUT of the RHR and onto Highway 89 for
that first trip that would take them down Lakewood Drive and to the west
end of the Glen Ilah subdivision.
>> And, yes, the fire has gotten much closer by then as the parking lot,
>> itself would eventually no longer be considered a “safe zone.”
>> So I’m stumped. It would be helpful if there was a timed list of the
>> VLAT drops, for sure.
There is still no captured “Air-to-Air” traffic in the USDA Air Study videos
that would support *any* DC10 VLAT actually ‘dropping’ at 1639 itself.
Yes… Air Attack can be heard ‘discussing’ a drop with VLAT pilot ‘Kevin
at that exact time… but that drop they are discussing was still in the
planning stage and they hadn’t even done the ‘show me’ run yet.
Almost more than 40 minutes earlier… SPGS1 Gary Cordes had directly
requested that the Air resources start ‘dropping at will’ and to try and
‘save whatever town they could’… but I don’t think for one minute that
actually meant the airplanes started doing whatever the hell they wanted.
It still all had to go through ‘Air Attack’… or there would have just been
complete and utter chaos ( and perhaps more fatal incidents that day ).
I wanted to go back a minuet to the April 25 @4:43 posting of Marti Reed.
Scott Noris Photo
This picture alone says a thousand words to a knowledgeable Fire Fighter.
Fuels and weather before GM left the black.
Note the flame lengths from that location 20 to 40 Ft. based on est. 10 to 15 FT. Brush.
There are at least 3 or maybe 4 fire swirls (wind educed).
This is an extreme indicator of unpredictable fire behavior.
GM was looking right at that, What or who could have possibly convinced them to move out of the black and into the unburned and head to BSR?
That was one of the biggest indicators, they were looking right at it and taking pictures of the flame front. They ignored it and moved down into unburned fuel.
Its hard for me to believe. But then I just read over on WFToday a fire fighter saying they do not train in the 10 and 18 or use it on fires a statement on redoing the 10 & 18. WTF I would like to have used the entire F-word.
Mir. Powers… yes… that’s really quite a frightening picture… given
that ‘green carpet’ of ‘gasoline on a stick’ sitting right in front of
it ( and continuing for over 4,000 yards… right to the mouth of
that box canyon they decided to drop into.
Ditto for the MacKenzie Canon high-res photos. Huge wind-bent
flame lengths clearly seen.
Something to keep in mind, however, is what Calvin astutely
observed in the evidence some time ago… and that is what
Jesse Steed is captured saying back to Marsh in the second
MacKenzie video.
Steed reports… ( back to Marsh )… “I copy… and it’s almost
made it to the two-track road we walked in on.”
As Calvin originally asked… you have to wonder WHY Steed
felt the need to report that ‘visual’ back to Marsh.
It is VERY possible that Eric Marsh was so far north on that
two-track road and all the way up on the top of Weaver
Mountain that he was now BEHIND the smoke curtain and
unable to see what was actually happening in FRONT of it.
So Steed was reporting to Marsh what HE ( and now WE ) can
see in the videos… but the actual reality of the flame front
( size, speed, direction(s) ) was now hidden from view from
Marsh because of his distance north, and the now southern
direction of the flame front.
So it very well could be that ( for whatever reasons… radio call,
cell phone call, his own DIVSA initiative ) Marsh just WANTED
to try ‘the mission’… but was now relying solely on Steed to
tell him his ‘comfort level’ since Marsh couldn’t really see
the south-headed flamefront at the time he wanted them to
start ‘the mission’.
So maybe it really was just Captain Jesse Steed reporting back
to Marsh something like…
“Yea… what the hell… I think we can make it… but if there’s
any chance we need to leave RIGHT NOW.”
Mcdonough 154944 image. How does this image align with the Mackenzie, Parker photos? Where is the anchor point on the ridge? Where is the Mackenzie, Parker, Norris photo spot?
It appears that the ridge is clearly visible on the south side of the fire. Possibly photographing the area GM were taking pictures from at the same time?
calvin… see a new ‘parent’ comment about this
just above. It looks like the exact spot where the
‘men’ were up on the ridge is *just* out-of-frame
to the left in McDonough’s 1549 image(s)…
…However… it also now appears that MacKenzie
cellphone photos and his Canon videos ( now known
to ALL be in the 3:50 to 3:55 timerange ) appear
to show the ‘progress’ of the possible vehicle
convoy off in the distance as the GM and Blue
Ridge trucks were being ‘driven out’.
>> Reply to Marti Reed post on April 25, 2014 at 4:43 pm
>>
>> Marti said…
>> Another important visual for this sequence (that I had forgotten about until
>> going back to redo it) is Scott Norris’. That’s Scott standing up on that rock
>> taking his photo in most of these Caldwell photos and videos.
Yes. It most certainly IS… and you are RIGHT. That photo texted at 3:54 PM by Scott Norris ( along with Calvin’s observations concerning the gloves ) could help nail down the exact TIME where that 48 second time block for the 4 MacKenzie Canon items fits into that 3 minute and 22 second ‘window’ where we now know it belongs.
>> Marti also wrote…
>> PS I think you can see Scott shooting that photo 1 second into Chris’
>> second video, MVI_0891
Yes. It’s possible. I did a preliminary SUPER enhancement on the fireline at that
point in the 0891 video and compared it with the Scott Norris photo and I’m not
really seeing a match at this point… but more work needs to be done there.
There MIGHT be a better ‘fireline/smoke’ match somewhere else in that
video or even in the FIRST video. More about that later.
>> Marti also wrote…
>> And, by the way, looking at my ancient notes regarding the whereabouts of the
>> cellphones, I have no indication of Scott’s cellphone ever entering into the
>> chain of evidence.
It would, of course, be nice to have a copy of that original photo Norris took, complete with EXIF metadata and timestamp… but alas… I think you are right.
The reason that Scott Norris photo that was supplied to the SAIT investigators has basically NO EXIF information at all is because that’s what usually happens these days when you elect to ‘attach’ a photo to a TEXT message on one of these Smartphones.
The Smartphone doesn’t even send the ‘original’ ( which could be up to 8 megapixels on an iPhone 4 ). It makes a ‘cropped’ sort of ‘square’ copy of the photo you want to TEXT out and also reduces the resolution. It does NOT preserve the original metadata when it does this. Likewise for the RECEIVER. Depending on what software RECEIVES it… sometimes it is reformatted on reception even AGAIN and whatever metadata was in it can then be even FURTHER lost.
So the REAL question is ( as you said )…
Whatever happened to Scott Norris’ Smartphone?
Well… I think I just FOUND it.
**************************************************************************************
WARNING – GRAPHIC CONTENT AHEAD
**************************************************************************************
The REST of this message has descriptions and LINKS to some of the original YCSO Police reports and photographs of the personal items and the clothing of some of the Granite Mountain firefighters. If you do not wish to read about such things or accidentally view the (graphic) photos… do NOT continue reading this message. END OF WARNING.
**************************************************************************************
From the YCSO Yarnell Hill Case Report…
Document Name: 13 021744 Yarnell Hill Case Rpt
By YCSO Detective J. McDormett.
Page 7…
——————————————————————————————————
The following day, 7/02/13, I, along with ET ( Evidence Technician ) Waldock,
went to the medical examiner’s office in Phoenix, arriving at about 0800.
Lt. Boelts was there when we arrived. Honor guards were also in place.
Honor guards had also been in place throughout the night. All the firefighters
were identified on this day largely through either dental records by forensic
odontologist Dr. John Piakis or through distinguishing tattoos or other identifiers
that left no doubt as to the individual identity of each man. Photographs were
taken by the ME staff. I was advised that a disk of the photos would not be
ready for a few days. I was later advised that the cause of death was accidental
and that the manner of death was a combination of thermal injuries and smoke
and carbon monoxide inhalation. As of the writing of this report I have not
received the autopsy reports.
Personal property and shelters were separated into a corresponding body bag
and were transported to the YCSO evidence unit.
What follows is an accounting of the numbers assigned to the decedents while
on the hill, the Maricopa Medical Examiner number, and the name of the
firefighter associated with each:
1 / 13-04442 / Wade Parker
2 / 13-04425 / Sean Misner
3 / 13-04443 / Travis Turbyfill
4 / 13-04428 / Kevin Justin Woyjeck
5 / 13-04427 / Clayton Whitted
6 / 13-04426 / Christopher MacKenzie
7 / 13-04431 / Dustin DeFord
8 / 13-04430 / William Warneke
9 / 13-04435 / Eric Marsh
10 / 13-04429 / John Percin Jr
11 / 13-04434 / Andrew Ashcraft
12 / 13-04433 / Travis Carter
13 / 13-04438 / Anthony Rose
14 / 13-04432 / Joe Thurston
15 / 13-04436 / Jesse Steed
16 / 13-04437 / Grant McKee
17 / 13-04441 / Scott Norris
18 / 13-04440 / Garret Zuppiger
19 / 13-04439 / Robert Caldwell
—————————————————————————————————-
From the YCOS report above…
“Personal property and shelters were separated into a corresponding body bag and were transported to the YCSO evidence unit.”
What that also means is that any clothing that was removed by the Medical Examiner was ALSO added back to the orange ‘transport’ bags, along with personal effects, and then these bags were transported to the YCSO evidence unit for safekeeping and further examination.
The YCSO took pictures of the contents of these bags once they got them over to their own YCSO evidence unit ( clothing included ).
As they examined the contents of each ( ORANGE ) bag… they left the bag in the top of the photo(s) so the NUMBERS on the bag ( as per the YCSO list above ) could still be seen in the photo(s) in order to associate the contents with certain firefighters.
In the FIRST FOUR photos in that folder… the number on the bag whose contents are being photographed was written with a black Sharpie and it says 17.
Bag 17 corresponds to Scott Norris ( according to YCSO list above ).
The Microsoft Word Doc file that is also present in this folder indicates which photos belong to which firefighter. This is the actual document that the SAIR used when they inserted their own report about the ‘damage’ to shelters in the their own SAIR report.
The following ‘cut’ from that document concerning these first FOUR images
in the folder also confirms that they are of the personal effects ( and clothing )
of Scott Norris…
——————————————————————————————————–
Bag 17 – Medical Examiner Number 13-4441 ( FF Scott Norris )
DSCN0002 – Fire shelter exterior – 98 percent of Aluminum foil burned away.
DSCN0003 – Fire shelter interior – 75 percent of fiberglass burned away.
DSCN0004 – PPE – shirt (front) and pants.
DSCN0005 – Pants (back)
———————————————————————————————————
The BLACK writing on the ORANGE bag in these photos also says the following and the Medical Examiner number 13-4441 also matches the number in the list above that the ME assigned to firefighter Scott Norris…
13-4441 ( Large black magic marker )
17 ( Smaller black sharpie )
NOTE:
They
PI ON MON
Still Accurate
And Working
( With Personal Affects )
The first two images in the folder are of the mostly intact fire shelter that came out of bag 17. Photo 1 is topside. Photo 2 is bottom side.
The SECOND two photos are of the CLOTHING that was also in that bag 17.
The shirt and pants were laid out and photographed first lying face up… and then flipped over and the backs of the shirt and pants were photographed.
The name of that FOURTH photo in the folder showing the BACK of the pants that came out of bag 17 ( Scott Norris ) is DSCN0005.
This photo seems to CLEARLY show that there is STILL an ELECTRONIC DEVICE in the bottom of the right-pants side pocket. It has the CLEAR shape of an iPhone or one of the Android smartphones that also has ’rounded corners’… or any smartphone that has one of the durable rubber ’rounded corner’ casings on it.
NOTE: When I say CLEARLY… I really mean it. You can’t miss it sitting there pressed against the material of the side pants pocket.
In this BACK view of the pants… the RIGHT pants leg is at the TOP of the photo and the ELECTRONIC DEVICE ( in the right side pocket ) can be seen in the top-center of the photograph.
This SAME DEVICE also appears to be seen almost as clearly in that right-side pants pocket in the FRONT photo of the pants which is the THIRD photo in the first row named DSCN0004.
In BOTH of these photos… the DEVICE itself seems to be totally undamaged. The pants pocket is burned ABOVE the DEVICE, but not around the bottom of the side pocket where the device is located.
I would say the SIZE of that ELECTRONIC DEVICE appears to be just a little bit large for an iPhone… unless it has one of those large rubber protective cases on it.
It is also actually possible that this could be a handheld GPS unit.
It also has the right ‘size’ for some of the newer, smaller Garmin GPS portable units ( which also have rounded corners ).
So… obviously the MYSTERY is…
WHAT HAPPENED to whatever it is that seems to be sitting there in
Scott Norris’ side pants pocket?
Was it ever REMOVED from the pants and entered into evidence?…
or was it just ‘left in the pants’ and just became another ‘personal
effect’ that never entered the ‘evidence chain’ at all and just ended up
being returned to the family?
To be honest, when those photos came out, I was so sick of all things related to the deployment site (which I had spent the entire Christmas-New Year Holidays examining), that I just skimmed through them.
I also don’t remember what you came up with awhile back regarding whether the time-stamp of a video gets attached to the beginning or the end of it, and couldn’t find that info via the Google Tool yesterday.
Tom Story’s two cellphone images that he also Instagrammed don’t have any metadata left in them except the originals are geo-coded. It really gets quite random!
Come to think of it (I’m just waking up), since Scott’s mother generously sent that photo to the investigative team, I’m thinking if she had access to the cellphone, she might have sent more images in, along with a different note than the one she did send,
Reply to Marti Reed post on April 26, 2014 at 6:52 am
>> Marti said…
>> To be honest, when those photos came out, I was so
>> sick of all things related to the deployment site (which I
>> had spent the entire Christmas-New Year Holidays
>> examining), that I just skimmed through them.
I hear ya. Ditto on this end. I DO remember looking at ALL
of those photos… but I still missed seeing that (possible)
electronic device in Norris’ side pants pocket, at first.
I also started re-examining every other photo, to see if
there are similar ‘shapes’ showing in other pairs of
pants ( like Eric Marsh’s )… but only got about halfway
through the ‘extreme closeup’ phase of that last night.
They are really, really tough to look at.
Some of the burn marks and patterns are, well, quite
disturbing to view and/or contemplate.
>> Marti also said…
>> I also don’t remember what you came up with awhile
>> back regarding whether the time-stamp of a video gets
>> attached to the beginning or the end of it, and couldn’t
>> find that info via the Google Tool yesterday.
Marti… keep in mind…
The Panebaker Air Study videos are *unique* in that
the titles that someone chose for them include the
ENDING time of the video and not the START time.
That is *NOT* normal and I still really don’t understand
why they chose to actually NAME the videos that way.
For any of these digital devices using either a FAT or
an HPFS file system ( those really are the only two
choices these days )… the actual recorded filename
date/timestamp will ALWAYS be the ‘creation date’
( the START ) of that digital recording… whether its
a photo or a movie. If you have access to the original
HPFS or FAT file system… you can see these stamps
clearing just doing a directory listing on the files.
As far was what actually gets *embedded* in the images
themselves… the whole EXIF metadata standard really
only applies to JPEG images. There actually are no real
‘standards’, even now, for metadata getting *embedded*
into either MP4 or Apple Quicktime MOV movie files.
The only ‘standard’ that has evolved there ( for smartphones ) is that in both the MP4 and the MOV cases… a THUMBNAIL
image will be created using the FIRST FRAME of the
movie… and it will be saved to the file system with the
same name as the MOVIE itself but with a .THM file
extension. ( THM = THUMBNAIL image ).
That THM image of the first frame of the movie is what
shows up on your device when you are looking at the
folder that contains your photos / movies.
This THM thumbnail has, in fact, been somewhat
standardized and is actually just a JPEG image and,
therefore, can contain all the same standard EXIF
JPEG metadata already standardized for JPEGS.
NOTE: A THM thumbnail image is, in fact, just a JPEG
image with THM as a file extension insted of JPG. If
you RENAME any THM file and give it a filename extension
of JPG instead… then Voila!… you can ‘view’ that JPEG
thumbnail in ANY standard JPEG image viewer.
So that THM thumbnail image of the first frame of the
movie is what ACTUALLY contains all the IMPORTANT
metadata about that movie such as creation date/time,
modification date/time ( if any ), GPS data ( if any ),
frames per second, total frames in movie, etc. etc.
This is why we STILL do NOT know the exact TIME for
the YARNELL-GAMBLE video shot by Blue Ridge
Hotshot McCord. McCord EDITED his original movie
and renamed whatever the original filename from the
device was to YARNELL-GAMBLE.MOV… and then he
gave that edited copy of the movie to the SAIT investigators,
but he did NOT give them the corresponding THM thumbnail
file from his device that had all the metadata for that
YARNELL-GAMBLE movie… and the SAIT investigators
never bothered to follow up with him and obtain it.
McCord might still actually have that ORIGINAL (unedited)
Apple Quicktime MOV file AND the corresponding THM
thumbnail ( JPEG) from whatever he was using that
day to shoot that YARNELL-GAMBLE video. It was
probably an iPhone… but we are still also not sure
about that, either.
>> Marti also wrote…
>> Tom Story’s two cellphone images that he also
>> Instagrammed don’t have any metadata left in them
>> except the originals are geo-coded. It really gets quite
>> random!
Yes, it is. Android based Google phones will usually
ALWAYS try to keep GPS data in photos because
Google uses that information ( unbeknownst to you and
*without* your permission ) to update its own ‘Street View’
databases. Flickr, Facebook, Twitter and others…
same deal. It’s pretty much SOP these days so beware.
>> Marti also said…
>> Come to think of it (I’m just waking up), since Scott’s
>> mother generously sent that photo to the investigative
>> team, I’m thinking if she had access to the cellphone,
>> she might have sent more images in, along with a
>> different note than the one she did send,
Possible. I would also believe that even if Scott’s mother
DID receive a fully functioning device back… that
she would have no idea how to even check and see
if there WAS anything else ‘on it’.
Unless you actually USE one of these puppies these
days… it’s like voodoo and people have no idea how
to look at the actual ‘file system’ and/or walk through
all the FOLDERS on the device.
The reason we DO have the exact TIME/DATE
stamps (according to the Canon device, anyway)
and frame length count and frames per second
values… etc… for Christopher MacKenzie’s
two Canon Powershot VIDEOS is because
we DO also have the corresponding THM
(JPEG) thumbnail images for those two Apple
Quicktime format MOV movie files.
Those two THM files WERE included on the
CD that mysteriously made its way to the SAIT
investigators and they ARE sitting in Mr.
Dougherty’s public online Dropbox along with
Christopher’s movie files.
I just wish the SAIT investigators had had the
brain cells to get the same THM thumbnails
from Blue Ridge Hotshot McCord ( and everyone
else who was handing them ‘movies’ ).
**
** VIDEO FADE BETWEEN…
** MACKENZIE 3:51.58 PM CELLPHONE PHOTO IMG_2836.JPG AND
** MACKENZIE VIDEO MVI_0888.MOV AT +6 SECONDS
Well… here is the ‘other piece of the puzzle’ as far as confirming that the
MacKenzie MVI_0888.MOV video MUST have been taken during that 3 minute
and 22 second ‘time gap’ between MacKenzie cellphone photos IMG_2836
( taken at 3:51.58 ) and IMG_2837 ( taken at 3:55.20 ).
It’s another ‘video-fade’ that uses the exact same ‘stillframe’ from +6 seconds into the MVI_0888 video… but this time it compares it to the ‘earlier’ IMG_2836 cellphone photo.
Just as there is really no doubt that the MVI_0888 video had to have been shot
BEFORE cellphone photos IMG_2837 and IMG_2838… THIS ‘crossfade’ proves
that it ALSO had to have been shot AFTER cellphone photo IMG_2836.
In other words… somewhere in that known 3 minute and 22 second ‘time gap’ between cellphone photos IMG_2636 and IMG_2637.
YouTube About Information for this video…
__________________________________________________________________
This video is a ‘comparison’ between MacKenzie cellphone photo IMG_2736.JPG, taken at 3:51.58 PM… and a still frame from +6 seconds into MacKenzie’s first Canon Powershot video MVI_0888.MOV shot at the same location as the cellphone photo.
As the images ‘fade in/out’… it is clear that the MVI_0888.MOV video was shot AFTER the IMG_2736.JPG ( 3:51.58 PM ) cellphone photo. There is a significant ‘forward push’ of the smoke cloud in a due SOUTH direction into the ‘middle bowl’ which is not seen in the cellphone photo.
So this is the ‘other half’ to the proof that MacKenzie’s first 9 second long MVI_0888.MOV video was shot sometime between MacKenzie cellphone photos IMG_2736 ( taken at 3:51.58 PM ) and IMG_2737 ( taken at 3:55.20 PM ).
__________________________________________________________________
OTHER NOTES ABOUT THIS ‘VIDEO FADE’…
This time… instead of ‘clockwise’ as with IMG_2738, this IMG_2736 cellphone image had to be rotated a few degrees COUNTER-CLOCKWISE in order for the terrain to match up exactly as the images fade in and out of each other.
Notice the old-grader location in the distance in about the center of the ‘collage’.
It remains stationary as the images fade in and out.
Also.. as with the other IMG_0888 ‘video fade’ comparison with IMG_2738, this ‘panorama’ also has the rock outcrop on the RIGHT side of the frame which is where the northern ridge of the fuel-filled box canyon actually meets the floor of the middle bowl.
You can see clearly how CLOSE that advancing fireline really was ( even at 3:51 PM ), to the mouth of that box canyon. The fireline is only about 4600 feet away with nothing but explosive (manzanita, etc.) fuel in-between it and the mouth of the box canyon.
** THE ‘WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY’ FOR CANON VIDEOS / PHOTOS
So we have now nailed down a 3 minute and 22 second ‘window of opportunity’ between 3:51.58 and 3:55.20 in which MacKenzie must have put his iPhone away for a moment… and then shot the following FOUR things with his Canon…
__________________________________________________________________
MVI_0888.MOV – The first 9 second video which contains…
(Eric Marsh): Ah… I jus… I was just sayin’ I knew this was comin’ when I called ya
and asked how… what your comfort level was. I could just feel it… ya know.
(FF (Misner?) standing next to Ashcraft): We’ve been feelin’ it all day.
( Ashcraft laughs in response and then FF (Misner?) spits on the ground ).
IMG_0889 – First of two still photos taken in-between the 2 videos
IMG_0890 – Second of two still photos taken between the 2 videos
MVI_0891 – The second 9 second video which contains…
(Eric Marsh): …strange, ya know.
(Unknown 3rd person OR Marsh finishing his previous statement): You bet.
(Jesse Steed): I copy… and it’s almost made it to that two-track road we
walked in on.
__________________________________________________________________
To get the ‘total time’ it took to take these 4 items all we have to do is look at the original Canon timestamps for these items and ( even though we know the time offset is wrong ) we still get the ‘duration’ for all four items…
1601:31 – 110-0888 – First VIDEO – Duration: 9.24 sec.
1601:52 – 110-0889 – First still photo 12 seconds after video
1602:00 – 110-0890 – Second still photo 8 seconds later.
1602:10 – 110-0891 – Second VIDEO, 10 seconds later – Duration: 9.14 sec.
SIDENOTE: The ‘numbers’ just above still also mean for certain that the TOTAL time ( and possible maximum total missing conversation length ) BETWEEN the two videos is exactly 30 seconds… since the first video ended at 1601:40 and the second one actually started at 16:02:10 ( according to the Canon Powershot’s own timestamps ). That means that whatever ‘conversation’ MacKenzie FAILED to catch… it wasn’t much. It took Marsh and Steed a total of 18 seconds to say just the few things they did… so there was only time for less than twice as much similar ‘conversation’ in-between the two videos. No more than a few quick sentences can be ‘missing’ in-between the two videos.
So… based on the Canon’s own timestamps shown above… the TOTAL time it took for these four shots to have happened ( start to finish ) equals…
48 seconds. ( 1602:19 minus 1601:31 ).
Take 48 seconds ‘away’ from our ‘known’ 3 minute and 22 second ‘window of opportunity’ and that leaves…
2 minutes and 34 seconds.
Divide that right in half and we get the following…
1 minute and 17 seconds for MacKenzie to switch from using his iPhone to
take cellphone photo IMG_2736 to the start of the first Canon Powershot VIDEO.
Then 48 seconds to take all FOUR Canon Powershot items in a row.
Then another 1 minute and 17 seconds for MacKenzie to switch BACK from
using his Canon to his iPhone again to take cellphone photo IMG_2737.
Perfectly possible.
So the only thing left to determine is to which END of this 3 minute and 22 second ‘sliding window’ those 48 seconds of Canon activity belong… and we have the exact TIME OFFSET for ALL of the Canon powershot images that day.
I think that can be accomplished with just a few more COMPARISONS of
stillframes from the absolute START of video 1 and the absolute END of
video 2… and see whether this 48 second contiguous sequence is closer to
the 3:51.58 window START time… or has to be more towards
the 3:55.20 window END time.
Maybe I am just a crazy old fire fighter—-But
with out all the fading that is what I saw way back when we started this and my brain went click.
Why would they move out of the black and walk down in front of that?
The Fire its self should be telling them that’s a really bad idea.
My education of brush fires tells me that fire front is getting ready to romp and eat up the landscape.
The laying down of the column on to the brush is actually sucking the fire to it as the winds lay the smoke over it is like a giant vacuum pulling oxygen in to the burning process. That kind of burning can get so radical as to sound like a jet flying low over the fire.
The only conclusion I have is they felt they could beat the fire to the BSR. Calculated risk? They wanted off the mountain before they got stuck up there until the fire laid down. Again my thoughts with out proof.
Reply to Bob Powers post on April 25, 2014 at 7:39 am
Mr. Powers…
Yes. I believe THIS one ( the dramatic difference
between the two photos ) is EASY to see… even
without all the digital gymnastics… but I did the
‘crossfade’ video anyway just to show how
DRAMATIC the difference really is in just that
short passage of time.
Tex (Sonny) Gilligan had never taken a WFF course
in his life… and even HE knew it was time to
‘get the hell out of there’ more than an HOUR
before these moments.
That ‘green carpet’ spread out in front of that
thing is mostly bone-dry manzanita.
‘Gasoline on a stick’… as some call it.
As we know now… there was about to be a
very large EXPLOSION.
It really is inconceivable that Marsh and Steed
would *NOT* have anticipated what was about
to happen down there… or that any of the other
(supposedly) trained men wouldn’t have said…
What I wrote below, but wanted to repeat it in response to your comment, Bob:
The biggest reason, ala Bob Powers and his student RTS, for making sure there is a recognized and supported “what if” person on every crew!!
“What if” someone on this crew had said, looking at the fire behavior and the wind and knowing how wacky this can all get underneath a typical southwestern thunderstorm cell, and seeing how close this fire was moving toward that bowl-canyon’s entrance, “I don’t think we should go there. What if that fire turns and starts burning up that bowl?”
I learned that from you two, and I think it’s really Importent.
Mr. Powers – I am thankful that you are an OLD fire fighter. BUT GMIHS did not leave the black because they were ignorant of what was around them. They were ordered off the ridge -period. What needs to be discussed is who would have the power to insist they leave the black. Who would call them and require this movement? What are the human factors that these men worked under (City of Prescott & Forest Service)? They knew the last time they turned a directive down they were punished. They had eyes on the fire (Eric). They were told by someone that they had enough time to get to the ranch. Who possibly started a back burn that whipped up the canyon? Who is not talking that knows the truth? Who is being haunted by the memories of knowing a mistake was made? Who will finally step up and talk – standing up for the Granite Mountain Hotshots – finally stopping those voices that say it was them being cowboys? These men may have been young wildland firefighters but they knew the rules, they knew fire, they knew the fuels, they had their eyes on the fire, they would not take risks with their lives. I think a lot of good conversations are happening here – but – pressure needs to be placed on the so called leaders who do not accept the responsibility of leadership: “honesty”, “strength”,”courage”.
Only as an Old WFF and my past will I go here and it is not to assign Blame as much as responsibility.
The safety of the crew was Steed and Marsh’s they had that responsibility as all of us in the past have had.
Safety out weighs orders. One Foreman on that crew could have voiced a concern none evidently did but we don’t know that.
The real problem is simple–
No evaluation of the 10 Standard Orders…..
No LCES when they moved……
No scouted escape route…..
Those are the basics no matter who orders you to move……..
Some would say the entire crew is also responsible for their safety…..
Or each individual. I believed that my whole carrier SAFETY IS EVERYBODYS RESPONSIBILITY.
I agree with both of you. And thank you so much, Deborah, for contributing to this quest for the truth.
Where to begin.
I first joined this in December because, as a photographer, I saw Chris’ camera sitting in the middle of the deployment site, when no-one else did. I wanted to know what happened to it.
After a great deal of analysis, research, and connecting-the-dots, I discovered that it, and a bunch of cellphones had been with-held by the Prescott Fire Department from the “chain of evidence.” I discovered that that didn’t “matter” because, once the Yavapai County Sheriff signed off on a piece of paper that “no foul play” was involved, there would be no legally accountable investigation. I discovered that Darryl Willis was twisting his story into all kinds of pretzels to make sure nobody knew what actually happened to Chris’ camera. “Why would he do that?” I wondered.
I believe things are being withheld. I believe that is for a reason. Otherwise, why would that still be the case, now, nine months later. Somebody is being “protected,” I believe, and I still have no clue who that somebody is.
My brother, when he was a 15-year old Eagle Scout, got himself killed and almost got some other people killed, when he was ordered to get his patrol down off a ridge as quickly as possible. He was only fifteen. I always wondered why he did what he did. I could never figure it out, except that he was responding to that voice of authority. All I could do was decide to never do what he did. No matter what. No matter what pressure I felt was on me to do it.
This “incident” has not been seriously investigated. All we have done is try to pick away at what we are being ALLOWED to see. That’s not good enough.
I wish my very very best to you, Deborah. What happened to your son, and all these fine young men, has broken my heart over and over again. I’m a graduate of Prescott College, by the way. With all that that entails.
Based on the way things are being don now the only answers will come from a court hearing which may or may not happen, based on settlements. No body else will identify mistakes, decisions or orders made. Its a new world out there and has nothing to do with preventing the next one. Say a prayer and be safe….
SFFO # 10 should be #1……..
Mr. Powers… if you read ALL of the ‘wrongful death’ claims that have been filed so far… it is perfectly clear that as far at the families are concerned… ANY possible ‘settlement’ must ALSO include what are called ‘action items’ that have NOTHING to do with MONEY.
The families WANT the TRUTH to come out… and they WANT to know that the WFF industry is taking steps to make sure ( as MUCH as they possible can ) that something like this can be prevented from happening again ).
So even a ‘settlement’ might *REQUIRE* another investigation be held… and/or public admissions about what they ALREADY might know… but are refusing to release publicly.
Civil lawsuits CAN require that the defendant(s) take certain ACTIONS as part of any ‘settlement offer’… and these claims do just that.
WTKTT. The two firefighters you referenced above (from video0888), Ashcraft and possibly Misner is not correct. Ashcraft is sitting between Parker and Deford. I think the FF standing beside Mackenzie in 0888 (the one who spits) could possibly be Joe Thurston. This appears to be the same FF in image 0878, 0879, 0883, 0884. The same person is in Ashcraft’s photo.
At the 7-8 second mark of the 0888 video (Thurston’s?) red chainsaw chaps come into view.
The other FF standing to the right of (Thurston?), I believe, could be Anthony Rose, but not very certain about that.
Andrew Ashcraft is sitting – his shirt has a circle stain on the (R) shoulder. Yes he is between Wade Parker and Dustin DeFord. I had the opportunity to sit on the that same rock (thank you to the one who took me there). The view was panoramic – plus aggravating. They worked hard all morning to have it all for not because of a retardant drop – nice work put out the back burn. This is why they re-positioned.
Again, thanks for doing this, WTK and Calvin. I think it’s really important to have tightened this image sequence up in order to see what they were seeing, and when.
Another important visual for this sequence (that I had forgotten about until going back to redo it) is Scott Norris’. That’s Scott standing up on that rock taking his photo in most of these Caldwell photos and videos. The link is: https://www.dropbox.com/sh/p78do502dflii7b/fhrel76c3A#/ .
According to the ReadMe that accompanies the photo:
“Karen Norris, Scott Norris’s mother, provided this photo to Randy Okon, a member of the accident investigation team. In her email, she wrote “The following text, along with this photo was sent from Granite Mtn Hot shot, Scott Norris to me, his mother, on June 30 at 3:54 pm : ‘This fire is running at Yarnell!!!’ This was the last text I received from him. Thank you, Karen Norris.”
PS I think you can see Scott shooting that photo 1 second into Chris’ second video, MVI_0891.MOV.
In IMG_2735, while Caldwell is shooting his video, Scott has what looks like his cellphone to his ear. In 2736 he seems to be looking down onto it. In MVI_0888, he is still holding it, in IMG_IMG_0889 he is holding it and looking out over the fire, and in MVI_0891 you see him shoot it, then lower it, and then then look down onto it! By IMG_2737, he is sitting down on that rock he was standing on.
So. depending on how accurate that 3:54 stamp on that message he sent to his mother is, this would pin that second video pretty closely to 3:54 PM, and also underpin this re-ordering of the whole sequence.
Since I’m still the last photographer on the planet without a smartphone, I’m not sure how all these details I just described translate.
And, by the way, looking at my ancient notes regarding The whereabouts of the cellphones, I have no indication of Scott’s cellphone ever entering into the chain of evidence.
See below (I think–I can never quite tell where comments in threads land before I post them) for why/how I have (based on Scott Norris’ photo) currently placed the beginning of Chris’ second vide at 3:54 PM.
The MacKenzie IMG_2837.JPG photo had to be ‘rotated’ clockwise a few degrees
in order for the terrain to match as it ‘overlays’ the MVI_0888.MOV video stillframe.
I used the +6 second mark for the ‘still frame’ from the MacKenzie video instead of
the +7 second mark just because that retains just a ‘bit’ of the fireline in the bottom
left corner of the photo ( similar to the Wade Parker texted photo ).
If we are going to now ASSUME that Christopher MacKenzie’s iPhone photo
timestamps are true and accurate ( and there really is no reason to NOT believe
that, at this point )… then I believe this ‘video fade’ between these two photos
PROVES that the first MacKenzie MVI_0888.MOV video was shot BEFORE the
3:55.31 PM IMG_2837.JPG cell phone photo was taken.
If you look at the CENTER of the video as these images fade in and out of each
other you will see that there is MUCH more SMOKE in the 3:55.31 PM cell phone
photo than can be seen in the 0888 video… AND the smoke has traveled much
farther SOUTH in the cell phone photo than is seen in the video stillframe.
You can clearly see that the smoke column ( and the fireline ) was still in the
process of ‘rotating around’ to the SOUTH at this point in time… and ( as we now
know ) would continue to do so for the next 30 to 40 minutes
Other interesting things to notice in this ‘video fade’…
1) Obviously Jesse Steed ‘disappears’ from where he was captured sitting
on that rock in the MacKenzie video and by 3:55.31, when the cell phone
photo was taken. ( Well… at least his red-helmet disappears but I believe if he
had still been sitting there it would ALSO be in the cell phone photo. )
2) Look to the RIGHT SIDE of BOTH of the photographs. That little ‘rock
outcrop’ that appears in the lower right is, in fact, the northern ridge of
the fuel-filled box canyon as it meets the floor of the middle bowl.
So you can see ( from left to right ) in this photos how SHORT the
distance really was from the fireline to the mouth of the box canyon
before they even left the safe black. The fireline was only about 4,600
feet from the mouth of the box canyon at the time the 3:55.31 PM
cell phone photo was taken.
2735 Second of Chris’s cellphone pix of Robert Caldwell shooting his video down below where Chris is. 3:50:19
2736 Chris shoots the fire on his cellphone with Caldwell right in front of him. 3:51:58. Pretty much just barely time enuff for Caldwell to get there.
2737 Chris shoots the fire on his cellphone: 3:55:20. About 3 1/2 minutes after shooting 2736.
2738 Chris shoots the fire on his cellphone again. 3:55:31. 11 seconds after shooting 2737. This is the photo WTK is comparing to the look of the fire in the 0888 video, saying that in the 2737 photo the the fire looks more intense and more turning to the south, and thus later than the 0888 video.
If the 0888 video was shot before the 2738 cellphone photo, it would have had to be taken between the 2736 and 2737 photos, in order for there to have been time to do that, and definitely not before 2736.
And even then there would have just been barely time for him to have done that.
I’m now remembering this was where we began to get hung up when we last tried to sequence this. It was hard to imagine then, and still hard to imagine now, Chris switching back and forth so quickly between all of this in this short frame of time. Unless he passed off either his camera or his cellphone to somebody else. Which is not impossible.
If indeed the fire progression seems to you and Calvin to indicate that the video + two photos + video quick sequence happened before IMG_2738, which was taken on Chris’s cellphone at 3:55:31 (and most likely at least a vaguely accurate timestamp), it had to have happened during that 3 1/2 minute gap between 2736 and 2737.
The more I think about this, the more I don’t find it reasonable unless someone other than Chris was shooting either with his canon powershot camera or his cellphone. As a photographer, switching back and forth like this doesn’t make physical or mental sense.
On the other hand, if there were two people doing this, it would, but they would have to have been very close together given the angles seen in the images.
Marti. You are exactly right. The 088 (and probably the 0891) video was taken between images 2736 and 2737
As I stated before. The proof is in the pair of safety glasses Dustin Deford has in his hand in image 2735 and appear inside his work gloves in image 2737. I believe that Dustin Deford can be seen in video 0888 tucking the safety glasses inside his work glove.
Yes, I remember that conversation between us.
And it makes sense.
But, dang, it’s hard to fathom Chris switching back and forth so quickly between the powershot and the cellphone unless he had a reason (maybe I’m just too lazy as a photographer to feel my way into this?) .
So apparently he took several photos with the powershot of the sawyers shooting a photo and then heading up to the “convo” site, then shot several photos via his cellphone of Caldwell capturing his video–which also captured Abel saying “hunker down and be safe”– then shot Caldwell after he landed in front of him with his cellphone, then switched to his canon powershot to capture the first video of the “discussing the options” video, then switched to capturing two photos, then switched to capturing his second video of that conversation, and then switched to his cellphone to shoot two more photos of the fire advancing rapidly toward the fuel-filled bowl they were about to descend into.
This is all making about as much highly refined sense to me as a photographer as Tom Story’s 4:39 photos of a VLAT drop over the fire.
And a massively whole-hearted thank you to Chris MacKenzie for working his butt off as both a fire-fighter and a photographer/videographer for capturing all of this so we can, after his death (RIP) try to figure out what the Granite Mountain Hotshots were seeing and, thus, trying to figure out what to do. Love to you Chris and your powershot which I saw on that deployment site when nobody else did!
And now that we have refined all of this (even tho, as a photographer,
Chris’s choice of ways to get his images don’t totally make sense to me), I am wondering. Can anybody tell me what difference/significance all of this makes?
Reply to Marti Reed post on April 24, 2014 at 6:28 pm
>> Marti said…
>> If indeed the fire progression seems to you and
>> Calvin to indicate that the video + two photos + video
>> quick sequence happened before IMG_2738, which was
>> taken on Chris’s cellphone at 3:55:31 (and most likely at
>> least a vaguely accurate timestamp), it had to have
>> happened during that 3 1/2 minute gap between 2736
>> and 2737.
>>
>> Does that seem reasonable?
Certainly does, Marti. Thank you.
See a new ‘crossfade’ video link post above that pretty
much supplies the ‘other piece’ to this puzzle and
PROVES that the MVI_0888 video HAD to have been
taken inside this 3 minute and 22 second ‘window’
you have identified.
And yes, I see that very short distance. At 3:55 PM. And I want to say to those awesome beautiful firefighters, whose memorial videos I have had to watch in order to identify them in all those photos and videos, please don’t go there.
The biggest reason, ala Bob Powers and his student RTS, for making sure there is a recognized and supported “what if” person on every crew!!
“What if” someone on this crew had said, looking at the fire behavior and the wind and knowing how wacky this can all get underneath a typical southwestern thunderstorm cell, and seeing how close this fire was moving toward that bowl-canyon’s entrance, “I don’t think we should go there. What if that fire turns and starts burning up that bowl?”
Maybe Brendan McDonough just reflected
the view of ALL of those 17 men with
regards to why no one said anything.
In his mainstream media ABC interview,
filmed with him sitting in a chair inside
Granite Mountain Station 7 and in front of
the team’s tool bench… Brendan said
was describing his moments of decision
to leave his lookout and summarized
those decisions saying…
“I knew fer sure it was time to get out of there”.
The interviewer then deftly asked…
“And what about them? Couldn’t they see
what you were seeing? Should THEY have
been ‘getting out of there’ at that same
moment?”
Brendan was caught off guard… leaned
back and put his hands behind his head
and obviously thinking carefully about
what to say next. All he finally said was…
“I’d never questioned any of their decisions
before… so why should I question them now?”
I might be paraphrasing some above… but
that was the ‘gist’ of the ABC interview at
that point. Brendan says he NEVER
questioned ANY of ‘their’ decisions
( Marsh and Steed ).
That probably generally applied to the rest of
that crew as well.
There were 17 other men up there
(supposedly) experts in fire behavior… and
not one of them seemed to say… “This
is NOT a good idea.”
WTKTT
I doubt that I would say all 17 were supposedly experts in fire behavior. 2, 3, 4 and maybe even 5 year WFF are not experts in fire behavior.
that is why most Superintendents and Asst. have 10 to 15 years experience in wild land fire. However they were or should have been trained every year with refreshers in the 10 and 18, fire weather, and fuels. It takes a lot of fires and a lot of different fires to understand fire behavior. The other foreman below Steed should have had some grasp of FB.
Way back I said a crewmen with 21/2 years was not the person to put as a lookout. Before I left California SAFTY FIRST had been signed off on which required a minimum Sector Boss or now Strike Team Leader for look out. It is very important to understand FB, Fuels and weather to give accurate reports to the crew. The safety of the entire crew depends on the Lookout. The ability to stay ahead of any threats and the complete trust of his supervisor.
A good lookout never stops McDonough could have and should have continued to notify the crew of the fire changes and what was happening after he got in the truck. He should have found a vantage point and continued to look out for the crew. A foreman or higher would have done just that until they could not be of service.
“McDonough could have and should have continued to notify the crew of the fire changes and what was happening after he got in the truck. He should have found a vantage point and continued to look out for the crew. A foreman or higher would have done just that until they could not be of service.”
I never would have known enough to have thought of that. Thank you.
It seems that McDonough was there be cause he was sick and all he did was take weather. Another lack of training and what a true Lookout dose? He was just hanging out taking weather not advising of the increased fire activity. So lackadaisical that the fire almost got him.
Sorry but that has always bothered me.
i’m calling BS about McDonough continuing to be lookout for GM…
there was no better vantage point than what GM had. there was no where else he could have gone to be an effective lookout.
besides the fact, he was assisting in the movement of vehicles…
i think the fact that neither BR nor McDonough seemingly felt the need to report the windshift to GM lends credibility to the fact that NONE of them thought GM was moving through the green. they all thought GM was “picking their way through the black” down the two track they had been trying to tie together and that they had originally walked up.
Thanks WTKTT. It appears that the 0888 video was taken between the 2736 and 2737 video (to me). If this is the case, this would mean the discussing options conversation heard in the 0888 video comes only moments after the promise of air support, down there, ASAP by Todd Able. BTW, I do not think for a minute that the IMT were planning to use an expensive load of retardant to facilitate a safe passage of GMIHC. It would , however, seem realistic that retardant would be placed on the south side of the active fire front, hopefully delaying the fires advance into Yarnell and Glen Isla. And could have influenced the decision to move toward Yarnell. And if the combination of fire retardant, increasing RH, decreasing temperature at the end of the burn period slowed the fire progression. Maybe, just maybe, GM (and others) could have worked with the dozer to create a line to burn out from before the next burn period.
>> calvin said…
>> Thanks WTKTT. It appears that the 0888 video was
>> taken between the 2736 and 2737 video (to me).
There is no ‘appears’ about it (anymore), calvin.
It’s a fact.
See the new ‘crossfade’ video between IMG_2736
and the stillframe from MVI_0888 ( posted as a new
parent comment above ) and there is no doubt about it.
>> calvin also wrote…
>> If this is the case, this would mean the discussing
>> options conversation heard in the 0888 video comes
>> only moments after the promise of air support, down
>> there, ASAP by Todd Able.
That is exactly what it means… and it means a number
of other things, too… such as…
1) This ‘discussing their options’ and/or ‘comfort level’
discussion took place up to 5 minutes BEFORE ASM2
Rory Collins left the fire at 1558.
2) Something made them WAIT at least 10 minutes
AFTER this video-captured ‘comfort level’ discussion
before actually ‘leaving’ at 4:04 ( unless it can be
established that the carrier network timestamp on
Parker’s text message is now also WRONG… OR
that Parker somehow texted that message out
WHILE they were already walking south. )
3) It puts Brendan McDonough in a completely different
place in time when he might have been ‘overhearing’
these conversations other than the moment he was
taking his own 4:02 photos over on Highway 89.
Etc… etc. A LOT of things need to be ‘re-evaluated’.
Since the additional unit logs surfaced in
February… it’s pretty clear that Brendan
DID just ‘convoy’ out with the Blue Ridge
guys and they all drove south through
the Sesame area, then through Glen Ilah,
then turned north on Highway 89 at
4:02 PM ( when Brendan shot those pics
out the window of the Sup truck )… and
then they all headed over to the Youth
Camp at end of Shrine road.
So even if the TIME for the ‘discussing their options’ conversations moves BACK to the
3:53 PM timeframe… Brendan was
( supposedly ) still in the GM Supervisor
truck with ( in his own testimony ) the
intra-crew radio volume ‘cranked up’.
But what does that do to the photos he took from Hiway 89 in Yarnell at 4:05ish? Did he drive down Sesame to 89 and then up Shrine to where Blue Ridge was and then help “bump” the rest of the trucks, which is what it looks like to me?
When I read the Unit Logs, I find them very confusing as to who went where and when.
Whatever whenever, I think it may have been quite difficult for him to have been paying complete attention to what was coming over the radio, given all that was going on.
Sorry, I misread what you wrote. What I’m finding confusing is exactly that “bumping” route. Some make it sound like they just drove across that newly scraped dozer line directly from Sesame to Shrine Road (which makes sense time-wise) and others sound like they went all the way down Sesame and back up Shrine just to get to the Youth Camp which, to me, doesn’t seem to make sense. But maybe that’s what they had to do. But I find the notes and logs are kind of jumbled about this.
Sorry folks to take away from YHF information sharing, but I posted this last night, reconsidered and reposted.
EN wrote:
“Fire20+ who leapt on ME for things that *I* did not say (and do not believe) while he simultaneously IGNORED the fact that it was BOB and WTKTT who said the things that Fire20+ is accusing ME of saying. This utter BULLSHIT has gone on for MONTHS, and it continues…”
—OK, so you were quoting somebody else, why not just quote them then? Folks would then understand the idiotic words you (you statements are appropriate here) DID put in that list weren’t yours, which raises another question. Why would you put things on a blog entry that appears to be coming out of your mouth then when your ‘jumped on’ you just can’t handle it and blame other people?—
“I had to WASTE my time defending myself on that, rather than doing the things that are far more valuable and unique, such as getting public records to guys like Gabbert or JD, who can then post them. Why am I not surprised that now Fire20+ has done the SAME fucking thing, in terms of accusing me of stuff that I NEVER said…”
—Don’t waste your time on my account, stop writing what you didn’t say or know about then you wouldn’t have to defend yourself Elizabeth and work yourself into a tissy. As far as what you say about ‘getting public records to guys…’ well, there you go again. ANYBODY can get public records by doing a records request, it is not special or generous or important, it is something ANYONE can do. You behave as if your “role” is exclusive and proprietary, your generous public service efforts, your selfless generosity to “give” this information to JD and Gabbert. They could have clearly gotten it themselves or gotten it from any other number of people who have the records also. I sure hope nobody has pointed this out to you before me, I’d hate to upset you.—
Oh, one more thing, I’m curious how the families like seeing F-bombs all over the place accompanied by victimized, crazy talk? Do you care about that at all? I cuss like a logger, but not here.
I’d encourage people to also scroll down maybe 70 or so comments to see Fire20+ original comments. All he did is substantively engage a post by EN — no curse words, no personal invective beyond noting that on a substantive level EN clearly doesn’t understand very basic WFF issues. Trying to marginalize substantive responses by using emotional language including curse words, “conspiracy theorist” and the like can be effective for people not following the substantive dialogue, but is actually very harmful to advancing substantive understanding.
On a substantive level, unless and until EN first grasps some basics relating to wildland fire, and also some basics of local conditions, and begins making comments based on those facts of life, pointing out when she is speaking without support is a classic and useful function of this type of comment forum. A while back, we had a similar exchange involving another poster who, though claiming to be a WFF, was talking rot about SZ guidelines in a very misleading way. We were able to show with specificity what those guidelines actually are, and the underlying reasons for them, and for people who care to read the full exchange who didn’t have that info before, this is useful. Interestingly, the guy who was making the very odd SZ statements is one EN now seems to rely on as a supporter. It is helpful to clear up some of these misstatements.
I have no problem with either people not having a background in something, or simply making either misstatement or differences in opinion. People claiming that others voicing their informed views represents an attack or trolling or stalking should be a big red flag, though.
I’ve disagreed with most people here, including you, WTKTT, just this morning, yet you aren’t dropping F-bombs and blaming me for wasting your time. I’m going to respectfully disagree with you on GPS and air, for instance, which for fire behavior like that the afternoon of the YHF is extremely limited in what it can do. That’s all good. Differing points of view are good, and frankly truly “smart” delivery might in future be able to make what’s pretty ineffective now work better.
>> SR said…
>> I have no problem with either people not
>> having a background in something, or
>> simply making either misstatement or
>> differences in opinion. People claiming
>> that others voicing their informed views
>> represents an attack or trolling or stalking
>> should be a big red flag, though.
Yes. Agreed. I wasn’t trying to soften your
original message/intent. Civil (public)
discussion pretty much *requires* tolerance
for disagreement and not automatically
assuming someone is ‘attacking’ or all
the other adverbs you quoted.
Totally agree.
>> SR also wrote…
>> I’ve disagreed with most people here,
>> including you, WTKTT, just this morning,
>> yet you aren’t dropping F-bombs and
>> blaming me for wasting your time.
Nope. Not my style.
I am someone who WELCOMES debate.
It’s always the chance to learn something.
>> SR also wrote…
>> I’m going to respectfully disagree with
>> you on GPS and air, for instance,
And I respectfully *accept* your opinion.
It’s a ‘touchy’ ( and complicated ) subject.
>> which for fire behavior like that the
>> afternoon of the YHF is extremely limited
>> in what it can do.
Yes. Most likely. Marsh could have had a
Navy-Seal style laser-location receptor
on his helmet and Air Attack could have
had the corresponding equipment onboard…
…that still doesn’t mean they would have
ACTUALLY been able to fly to that spot
to dump any retardant. It could still have
been a suicide mission for the Air Resources
and they would have been hauling pieces of
airplanes out of the canyon as well as well
as bodies.
>> SR also wrote…
>> That’s all good. Differing points of view
>> are good, and frankly truly “smart” delivery
>> might in future be able to make what’s
>> pretty ineffective now work better.
Yes. There is a LOT that technology can
contribute to the WFF effort in the future.
Someday… Hotshots themselves will
probably just be replaced with robots for
just pure ‘line building’… but certainly not
in OUR lifetime(s).
wait, what? SR, you’re going to try to drag me into this BS?
SR, you’re like one of those little yappy ankle-biter dogs (like a chihuahua or miniature doberman pincer…) you just yap-yap-yap and don’t really have a clue what you’re yapping at but you just can’t seem to control yourself.
but let’s go ahead and have another talk, because you seem to like to portray yourself as some sort of expert about wff’ing, but i’ll bet you have little to *0* actual on the ground experience… did you want to qualify your experience level? no, i didn’t think so.
regarding your continually ridiculous assertion that distance and time traveled should be measured on a straight line, or, as the crow flies, or, as your “back to the future” hover-board seems to work for you:
so, when you’re at a TSA turn-style security check, do you measure the time you spend walking around the maze in terms of the 50 foot straight line distance from the security inspector?
when you’re walking down a switchback trail, and the actual “as the crow flies distance” down the hill is less than a mile, but you have three miles worth of switch backs, do you time yourself based on the mile?
why don’t you walk down to your local fire department, and tell them that from now on, you’re going to measure their response time in terms of straight lines on google earth instead of the actual roads system they have to travel.
more related yet, you seem to put a lot of value in the speculation about the two track that GM could have utilized all the way to the ranch… but by your math, if you measure a straight line from lunch spot (or descent point) to the BSR… then their rate of travel would still be something closer to your previous ill-conceived logic after they walked around the very indirect two-track route.
regarding SZ’s: i don’t think you’ve ever even dealt with having to size up a safety zone, let alone take account for the safety of a squad or crew. so i would suggest you stop trying to make yourself sound like the expert you’re not.
I.e., FullSail is trying to shout to distract attention from the fact that he was speaking in complete ignorance of what SZ guidelines actually are. This is very relevant in assessing his overall credibility, and likewise relevant when EN uses references to FullSail to try to buttress her own (often quite fanciful) assertions.
FWIW, while I wasn’t following the comments actively at the time, apparently FullSail had some real doozies that were perhaps even worse earlier on. If he is a real person in the vocation he claims to have, I would strongly advise him to recognize that, since he doesn’t seem to know what he is talking about when it comes to nuts and bolts, he should go back starting at basics and re-train himself.
As regards rate of travel, yes, absolute time in terms of exposure to risk is the key variable. Just as with SZ guidelines, this is real basic stuff. There is no “A” for effort. You can have a crew running 6 minute miles and, if the course they are running is a loop in the middle of dense, dry, unburned brush, and they get burned over, there is no extra credit for the fact that as regard the loop they were making good speed, though not good time as regards forward progress.
Basically, FullSail often seems, well, not quite up to speed. The SZ guidelines are a good example, but only one of many. Since technically he is so consistently wrong, readers should bear this in mind as regards any of his posts. What technical details is he blowing? should be the main question.
how much practical experience do you have applying the 10 & 18?
how much practical experience do you have assessing safety zones?
simple questions really. and very applicable, since you seem so prepared to judge my technical expertise.
me? i’ve worked for both the FS and NPS for the last 13 years. i’ve worked on IHC’s, Helitack Rappel crews, Engines, Fuels Crew… i’ve worked in Region 3, Region 2, Region 4…
so please, continue trying to talk yourself up by attempting to belittle others. i’ll just roll your little yappy ass over and scratch your belly till your hind leg starts twitching.
You are killing me here. You’ve worked here, there, and everywhere…but still don’t know what a SZ is, still don’t know local conditions, still don’t know basically anything else in terms of the actual nuts and bolts of the realities of wildland fire? And, seem to be trying to distract attention from those awkward, to you, facts.
In my case? Well, I was the first person to call you directly on the SZ bs you were stating (to be fair, another poster initially raised the general issue, and gave fuller and more comprehensive responses that were far better than mine), the first poster to call you as to local conditions…basically, none of that is that meaningful insofar as this is real basic stuff to most people. But, it’s real basic stuff that you’ve been persistently been getting wrong. It is what it is. If you are what you claim to be, get more educated. In the practical sense.
**
** THE WADE PARKER PHOTO WAS NOT TAKEN AT 1604 ( 4:04 PM )
Reply to calvin post on April 22, 2014 at 4:49 pm
>> calvin said…
>>
>> I suggest everyone compare (for themselves) the smoke progression from
>> the Wade Parker Picture with image 2738 from Mackenzie’s cell and decide
>> for yourself which is taken first.
There is now a VIDEO sitting up at YouTube that pretty much proves that the
Wade Parker photo ( the one he texted out ) was NOT taken at 4:04 PM that day.
That is simply the time when he actually TEXTED the photo, and NOT when the
photo was actually taken.
The Wade Parker photo that was given to the SAIT investigators had ALL of the
EXIF metadata removed and was simply a copy of the cropped version of the
original photo that accompanied the ‘text’ message from Parker’s iPhone
at 4:04 PM.
There is still little doubt that 4:04 PM is the moment when Wade Parker actually
DID accomplish the ‘text’ sendout ( give or take some seconds of latency on the
CARRIER network ). That still appears to be the actual CARRIER network
timestamp applied to the text message, and so that still means the men were
not quite ‘gaggled up’ and heading south on the first leg of their ‘mission’ yet circa
4:04 PM… but it’s still important to note that 4:04 PM is NOT the time for the
texted photo itself. It was taken much earlier than that.
So EXACTLY when WAS the Wade Parker photo taken?
It’s still hard to say… but, as Calvin says, it CAN be compared to other photos
to see if it was taken BEFORE or AFTER something else.
This new VIDEO is, in fact, a COMPARISON between that Wade Parker photo
and a ‘still frame’ from +6 seconds into the Robert Caldwell video.
There has only ever been a small amount of ‘flame’ visible at the extreme left
edge of the Wade Parker photo… but it’s just enough to COMPARE with other
photos or ( as in this case ) ‘still frames’ from one of the videos.
At +6 seconds into the Robert Caldwell video… the view and perspective into the
distance is ( at that moment ) almost identical to the Wade Parker photo so a
‘still frame’ from the Caldwell video at that point makes a good comparison view
for the Parker photo.
It is pretty clear, when comparing THESE two photos, that the Wade Parker photo
MUST have been taken some minutes BEFORE Robert Caldwell shot his video.
In the ‘still frame’ from the Caldwell video… the FLAMES can clearly see to have
ADVANCED to the SOUTH versus where they are seen in the Wade Parker photo.
I would say the flames have advanced at least 20+ feet (south) from where they
are seen in the Parker photo to where they are then seen at +6 seconds into
Robert Caldwell’s video. One part of the flamefront seems to have advanced
much further SOUTH than the other parts, at that point. It is not an ‘even’
advance of the flames… but a *general* advancement is clearly seen.
YouTube ABOUT text for this video…
________________________________________________________________
This video FADES between the Wade Parker texted photo and a
still frame from +6 seconds into the Robert Caldwell video. Notice
the FLAMES on the left hand side of the video as it fades between
the two photos. The FLAMES ADVANCE in the Caldwell video
photo and would appear to prove that the Wade Parker photo was
taken BEFORE Robert Caldwell shot his video.
__________________________________________________________________
More about all this later.
Calvin is right… there is STILL an unresolved problem with the Christopher
MacKenzie Canon Powershot timestamps ( ALL of them ). People cannot be
in two places at the same time and it is VERY unlikely that the timestamps on
Christopher’s iPhone photos are NOT accurate. It would be MUCH more likely
the time on his Canon Powershot ( used to take the two 9 second videos ) was
simply set WRONG that day.
How wrong? Still unknown.
I still believe that the timestamp on the Wade Parker ‘textout’ at 4:04 is valid
proof ( because it is an external CARRIER network timestamp ) that the men did
NOT leave that rest area and head south until circa 4:05 ( as even the SAIR
originally suggested ), but ALL of the other ‘accepted’ times for things like the
Christopher MacKenzie videos are still very much in doubt.
Calvin… I can easily do another ‘fade video’ for these
two things just like I did above with the Parker photo and
the +6 second mark in the Caldwell video…
…but just to be clear ( since you have typos above )…
You are talking about…
MacKenzie cell phone photo IMG_2738.JPG
and…
+7/8 second mark in MacKenzie video MVI_0888.MOV
Correct?
Are you SURE you want to use cell phone image
IMG_2738.JPG?
The ‘fireline’ is NOT visible on the left edge of that
photo as it is with the Wade Parker photo. IMG_2738
has no fireline visible at all. It is being BLOCKED
by a firefighter’s pack in the bottom left corner.
Sitting here remembering the four days Calvin and I spent working on that timeline at the end of January. I kept saying the only people (including professionals) who bother checking the time settings on their cameras are mostly wedding photographers who often have to sync images from multiple cameras all the time.
Chris’s powershot was not only +/- 20 minutes off, it was a full MONTH off. That’s why I struggled to find a cellphone image or video to sync his powershot stuff with. We wrestled this timeline down enough to prove that what was being written about Chris’s pix of the sawyers “leaving” after the conversation was incorrect and those images were taken before the conversation.
We were still having some questions about fine-tuning this sequence, and Calvin was looking more at the fire-behavior than I was, and then, because it was approaching my “retirement” date, I didn’t do any more with them.
I was looking at those images last night again. Here are the timestamps I ended up with in January:
I don’t remember, at this point in time exactly what I synched Chris’s powershot videos/photos with, but I’m thinking I synched them to a combination of his cellphone images and Caldwell’s video. We were also conversing at the time that even cellphone timestamps and gps data can be off a bit under those circumstances.
So……a reminder, I would NEVER expect a not-connected-to-the-internet-or-a-network camera’s timestamps to even remotely be accurate. People just don’t pay attention to them unless they have a serious reason to.
So, now I’ll go look at Tom Story’s images and see if I can figure out what’s going on with them. I again have no reason to believe even he paid that much attention to the camera timestamps. But I’ll see what I can find.
I do think trying to get a more refined timeline of these images is important at this point in order to see what GM was seeing in the fire progression. So thank you!
I may have to eat my words regarding Tom Story paying attention to his time stamps. He was shooting with three cameras and a cellphone, so…..he probably was paying attention.
I was in the act of pointing that out to you just
as you were seeing that photo he took of his
own ‘pieces of kit’ lying on the ground.
I still would find it hard to believe he wouldn’t have
those puppies SYNCED so he could make sure
and get chronological order later… but maybe
he just knows himself what the ‘offsets/difference’
are and can do it that way if he ever needs to.
Reply to Marti Reed post on April 24, 2014 at 9:50 am said:
>> Marti said…
>> We were still having some questions about fine-tuning
>> this sequence, and Calvin was looking more at the
>> fire-behavior than I was, and then, because it was
>> approaching my “retirement” date, I didn’t do any more
>> with them.
It was quite some time before the MacKenzie cell phone
photos finally emerged on a public link… and at the same
time a TON of other information came online… so the
discovery about MacKenzie’s cell phone photos proving
his Canon Powershot time was wonky sort of got lost
in the noise. I remember, myself, just letting you and
Calvin hash that out because my ears were falling off
just listening to the hours of video/audio that also
came online at the same time.
So yes… this issue has been ‘laying on the table’ since
the MacKenzie cell phone photos were finally available.
>> Marti also said…
>> Chris’s powershot was not only +/- 20 minutes off,
>> it was a full MONTH off.
Yes, it’s possible. I would believe +20 minutes easily.
If you look at ALL of the Christopher MacKenzie photos
( both Canon Powershot and iPhone ) you will see that
he had the same ‘timestamp’ problem(s) even on
Doce fire just a week or so before on June 19, 2013.
He was doing the same thing on the Doce fire.
He would take some pictures with his iPhone, and
then take some pictures with his Canon Powershot.
In one sequence from the Doce fire… he takes pictures
of a Non-VLAT retardant drop with his iPhone, and then
( according to the Canon Powershot timestamps ) he
is taking ANOTHER sequence of photos of a full DC10
VLAT Air Drop in the EXACT same location… and
according to the Canon timestamps this SECOND
DC10 VLAT drop was only 1 minutes 45 seconds
after the drop he captured with his iPhone.
Not possible. Look at the SMOKE filling the entire valley
in the background of both photos. It is NOT POSSIBLE
there could have only been 1 minute 45 seconds between
those 2 retardant drops. It really does look ( just from
the dramatic smoke difference at Doce ) that there had
to be a LEAST 20 minutes of separation… perhaps
much more.
The most ‘dramatic’ shift in understanding about what
these men did when that afternoon is going to come from
the change in the actual TIMES for the 2 MacKenzie
videos.
It could turn out that this particular ‘discussing their options’
conversation ( one of several? ) captured in the MacKenzie
videos actually took place MUCH earlier than everyone
( the SAIT and ADOSH investigators included )
has been assuming.
It actually doesn’t bode well for their ( Marsh’s and Steed’s )
‘decision making’, either.
If the ‘fire progression’ captured in the MacKenzie
photos videos actually represents the situation up
to 20+ minutes PRIOR to them actually leaving on
their ‘mission’ circa 4:05 PM… then that means the fire
HAD to have progressed much farther than seen in those
photos before they ACTUALLY left the safe black… but
they STILL decided to leave, anyway.
>> Marti also said…
>> So, now I’ll go look at Tom Story’s images and see if
>> I can figure out what’s going on with them. I again have
>> no reason to believe even he paid that much attention
>> to the camera timestamps. But I’ll see what I can find.
Thanks, Marti!
One of the Tom Story photographs shows him
photographing his OWN cameras that he had with
him that day. There are THREE serious pieces of
kit on the ground at his feet ( which means he had
at least FOUR cameras ) with him that day.
As you said… if you are using MULTIPLE cameras
to document and event ( like a wedding ), it only stands
to reason you would make SURE that ALL the times
are correct on all the devices or you might have a
helluva time later ‘organizing’ all the photos into exact
chronological order…
…but then again… (as you said)… never ASSUME anything.
Maybe even professional photographer/reporter
Tom Story wasn’t even bothering to do that.
If ANY of the Tom Story cameras had incorrect time
settings… I don’t think they were very far off. His sequence
of photos at the Ranch House Restaurant before, during,
and after the deployment look pretty *close*… it’s just
that SOME of them don’t seem to be ‘jiving’ with other
known photos ( as calvin said ) like Blue Ridge
photos, the Russ Reason video, etc.
Is there a time given anywhere for Caldwell’s video? It’s showing, in Lightroom, a stamp of 8/13/13 at 11:05:46. Do you know of anything more accurate?
I think I vaguely remember wishing I could sync Chris’s photos to that video, but I couldn’t. I think.
Also, what I’m noticing looking at this stuff is that, in some of Chris’s pix (the ones taken with his cellphone), Caldwell is down below the rest of the group when he is taking the video. Then, in the rest of the pix and the video that Chris took on the canon powershot, Caldwell is up with the group, just right in front of Chris. So I’m not sure when Caldwell was in which position.
I currently have Chris’s two cellphone pics of Caldwell taking the video at 2734 – 3:50:06 and 2735 – 3:50:19. But I don’t know whether Caldwell took that video either before or after Chris’s powershot sequence which shows Caldwell up withe group instead of just below it. I know this is just another nagging detail, but it might help get these images in a better sequence to help see the fire movement etc.
I’m getting closer. Caldwell was down a bit below the group when he took the video and Chris took pics of him doing that. Then, about a minute and a half after he finished, he was in front of Chris when Chris took one more pic with his cellphone, and then started his two videos with the two photos in between them on the powershot. I’m gonna resequence these, tying them to Chris’s cellphone pix a bit better than I did before.
Marti… I haven’t uploaded it yet… but I’ve done a
‘video fade’ of the two items Calvin seemed to
be requesting be ‘compared’ up above…
MacKenzie cell phone photo IMG_2738
and a still frame from +7 seconds in the
9 second long MacKenzie video MVI_0888.MOV.
The time stamp on that IMG_2738 iPhone image
is 3:55.31 PM… and it now *definitely* looks like
that first MacKenzie MVI_0888.MOV video was
taken BEFORE that 3:55.31 IMG_2738. Looks
like it might have been even 3-4 minutes BEFORE.
There is MUCH more ‘smoke’ evident in the
3:55.31 PM cell phone photo than in the
MVI_0888 video… and the smoke is definitely
farther SOUTH and still ‘coming around’ as the
storm was still ‘rotating’ to the SOUTH at
that point.
>> Marti… I haven’t uploaded it yet…
>> but I’ve done a ‘video fade’ of the two
>> items Calvin seemed to be requesting
>> be ‘compared’ up above…
>>
>> MacKenzie cell phone photo IMG_2738
>> and a still frame from +7 seconds in the
>> 9 second long MacKenzie video
>> MVI_0888.MOV.
Seems to be PROOF that the first
MacKenzie video HAD to have been
shot BEFORE the 3:55.31 PM cell phone
photo IMG_2837.JPG.
How much time ‘before’?
Still hard to say. If we can’t trust the times
in the original MacKenzine Canon Powershot
items ( until we find the absolute real
‘offset’ and can apply that to all the items ),
then a lot of this is going to come down to
‘smoke/fireline analysis’…
Whoops… the link in the comment
just above didn’t survive the
cut-and-paste and seems to be
broken. See the full ‘posting’ above
or try this link instead…
Sorry to put this “down in the weeds” but if I put this at the top somewhere, I’d have to scroll miles on my iPad. I’m looking Chris’s first video. Wade Parker is scrolling on his cellphone at the very start. I now think this first video is around 3:52. This is after Caldwell comes up to join the group after shooting his video. I was thinking there was something capturing Wade shooting that photo, but I guess not. But it would make sense that he could have shot it (and maybe a couple of others) before this and was now looking to see what he wanted to send out.
Reply to Marti Reed post on April 25, 2014 at 7:22 pm
>> Marti said…
>> I’m looking Chris’s first video. Wade Parker is scrolling
>> on his cellphone at the very start.
Yes. All of these ‘child comments’ right here are actually
attached to the ‘parent’ comment I posted which pretty
much proves that even though Parker apparently didn’t
get around to actually ‘texting’ that photo to his mother
until 4:04 PM… that photo he actually sent out HAD to
have been taken BEFORE Robert Caldwell shot his
video in the 3:50-ish timeframe.
It would only make sense that he shot himself some
photos, then sat down and was NOT using this ‘break’
time to select the one he was going to text to his mother.
>> I now think this first video is around 3:52.
Very well could be. We KNOW it was shot right
AFTER his 2736 cellphone image at 3:51.58
( 2 seconds before 3:52 PM )… so depending on how
FAST Christopher was able to stow the iPhone and
start shooting with the Canon… the first video COULD
be starting within 1 minute of IMG_2736 and in the
3:52 timeframe.
>> Marti also wrote…
>> This is after Caldwell comes up to join the group after
>> shooting his video.
Yes. Caldwell’s video ( and his capture of OP1 Todd
Abel telliing Marsh to ‘hunker and be safe’ ) was ‘in the can’
at this point.
>> I was thinking there was something capturing Wade
>> shooting that photo, but I guess not.
Apparently not. Parker shot the photo he would eventually
text out to his mother at 4:04 BEFORE Caldwell shot
his video. MacKenzie captured Caldwell shooting that
video ( with his cellphone ) but apparently didn’t shoot
Parker taking HIS photo just before that.
>> But it would make sense that he could have shot it
>> (and maybe a couple of others) before this and was
>> now looking to see what he wanted to send out.
Yes. Makes perfect sense.
What is still a little ‘mysterious’ is the actual 4:04 PM
‘sendout’ time for Parker’s text + photo.
Either they all sat there for another 10 minutes or so
WITHOUT really taking any other pictures… and Parker
hit ‘send’ on his final ‘assembled’ text message + photo
at 4:04 just as they WERE about to leave…
…or they really did ‘gaggle up’ and leave BEFORE
4:04 and Parker accomplished the text sendout
WHILE they were already hiking south.
By the way… here is that link to that video again that
compares the Parker photo with the Caldwell video…
so you don’t even have to ‘scroll up’ to find it…
Video ‘crossfade’ comparison between Parker photo
and a stillframe from Caldwell’s movie…
“It would only make sense that he shot himself
some photos, then sat down and was NOW using
this ‘break’ time to select the one he was going to
text to his mother.”
As it turns out… the IMG_1134 VIDEO in the ‘Jerry Thompson’ Dropbox folder
does, in fact, contain the same exact SIREN ‘cutoff’ that is heard coming from
one of Tyson Esquibel’s engines in the YARNELL-GAMBLE video.
Jerry Thompson was assigned to a brush truck working under SPGS1
Gary Cordes and they were working just several hundred yards to the
due south of the Shrine area… so when Tyson Esquibel started using
one of the engine sirens to ‘recall’ his men from Harper Canyon area
back to the Shrine Youth Camp so they could evacuate… Jerry Thompson’s
video captured those same sirens heard in the YARNELL-GAMBLE video.
There are actually TWO sirens going at the start of the YARNELL-GAMBLE
video and the ‘cutoff’ sequence for both is unique and identifiable.
The Jerry Thompson video starts at exactly 4:27 PM ( according to
documentation supplied by Thompson to the SAIT investigators when
he gave them his photos and videos ).
In the Thompson video… this first ‘siren’ heard coming from the Youth Camp
‘cuts off’ abruptly at exactly +30 seconds. The SECOND siren then simply
‘trails off’ on a 6 second countdown right after that before it, too, goes silent.
This same exact siren 1 ‘cutoff’ and siren 2 ‘6 second trailoff’ happens
in the YARNELL-GAMBLE video at exactly +4 seconds.
So ( assuming Jerry Thompson’s timestamp is correct for his video )…
here are the actual timestamps for the YARNELL-GAMBLE video and the transmission(s) captured inside of it…
_________________________________________________________________
YARNELL-GAMBLE VIDEO STARTS AT 1627.26 ( 4:27.26 PM )
+0:01 ( 1627.27 / 4:27.27 PM )
(OPS1 Todd Abel?): Copy… uh… uh… come down and appreciate if ya could
come a little faster but (you’ll) figure it out.
+0:12 ( 1627.38 / 4:27.38 PM )
(Eric Marsh): Ah… they’re comin’ from the heel of the fire.
+0:15 ( 1627.41 / 4:27.41 PM )
(Brian Frisby): Structue Group core, Blue Ridge Hotshots, on TAC 1.
YARNELL-GAMBLE VIDEO ENDS AT 1627.44 ( 4:27.44 PM )
_________________________________________________________________
It was once assumed that the YARNELL-GAMBLE video was actually shot circa
4:19 or 4:20 ( which would have been the exact moment the SAIR says that GM
was ‘deciding’ to drop down into the fuel-filled box canyon ) but if the information
above is correct then the person ( OPS1 Todd Abel? ) telling Eric Marsh he would
‘appreciate it if he could get to town a little faster’ didn’t make that request until
4:27, when ( supposedly ) Steed and the crew had ALREADY decided to drop
into the canyon and, indeed, were already +7 minutes into their descent.
So it no longer appears as if this ‘request’ for them to ‘hurry up’ actually
influenced their decision to take the shortcut through the fuel-filled box canyon.
Steed/Crew had already decided to do that before this ‘can you hurry?’
request from someone in fire command (OPS1 Todd Abel? ) even took place.
Reply to Deborah Pfingston post
on April 23, 2014 at 7:27 am
>> Deborah said…
>>
>> Could someone please let me know who was at this
>> GPS location: 13.579′ W 11245.839′.
>> Thank you for your help.
Deborah…
Not quite sure about the first ‘Latitude’ component there.
You seem to be missing the ‘Degrees WEST’ part at
the front… but since pretty much ALL of Yarnell is at
the 34 degree latitude… when I interpret those
coordinates as…
34 degrees, 13 minutes, 5.79 seconds NORTH Latitude
112 degrees, 45 minutes, 8.39 seconds WEST Longitude
…I get the following DECIMAL Lat/Long location…
34.218275, -112.752331
That point is EXACTLY the area just WEST of Highway 89
where Jerry Thompson’s BRUSH truck was working that
day to ‘prep’ those outlying homes back in there, due
south of the St. Joseph Shrine area.
To check this for yourself…
1) Call up Google Maps in your Browser
2) Then just ‘cut-and-paste’ the following line ( comma
included ) into the ‘search bar’ of Google Maps…
34.218275, -112.752331
3) Now just hit ENTER and Google Maps will display
a map of Yarnell with a large GREEN ARROW pointing
at that exact location, just WEST of Highway 89 and
NORTHWEST of the Ranch House Restaurant.
Does this point match your expectations?
By the way… this ‘Jerry Thompson’ location is the same
exact one referenced above in the ‘YARNELL-GAMBLE’
video timestamp update. Mr. Thompson’s full folder of
pictures and videos he took while working at this location
is online publicly at the following link… so maybe these
photos/videos might help you match what you are
looking for?
Reply to Deborah Pfingston post
on April 24, 2014 at 10:35 am
>> Deborah said…
>> Thank you for your help. Do you know if
>> there were any other trucks or crew along
>> this line/road?
Deborah…
Didn’t want you to think this was missed.
Offhand… no… I haven’t seen that
information since there was no IAP
( Incident Action Plan ) ever recorded
for June 30, 2013… but I am looking into it.
At one point in one of the Jerry Thompson
videos he calls out to a co-worker whose
first name is ‘Matt’. I’m trying to identify
HIM and see if he was running another
brush truck or was part of Thompson’s.
It matches Thompson’s own description of
where they were working that accompanies
his photos/videos… and a Google Earth
comparison of his photos/videos and the
location coordinates above seems to confirm.
They were doing ‘prep’ work on those houses
that you can see back there to the west
of Highway 89 and northwest of the
Ranch House Restaurant.
WTKTT, don’t his pictures match the OTHER side of 89 (the side closer to the fire when it hits the Shrine area) better? Why are you thinking that he was not on the OTHER side of 89, helping clear over there?
Thanks.
I am not following you. I DO believe Thompson and others were working that area WEST of 89 and the coordinates are pretty accurate… so what are you talking about?
Are you sure you are not mistaking the Google Maps red balloon for the GPS point? It’s not. It’s the GREEN ARROW.
If you are talking about the references to OPS1 Todd
Abel most likely being the one who is ‘urging’ them
to ‘come to town faster’… please notice the question
mark by all the references.
It has NOT been *absolutely* confirmed that it is him…
but at the same time… it pretty much HAS been
absolutely confirmed who it is NOT.
It is NOT Darrell Willis urging GM to ‘hurry up’.
It is NOT OPS2 Paul Musser.
It is NOT SPGS1 Gary Cordes.
It is NOT Tony Sciacca ( Safety officer who arrived late )
So who does that leave that would be talking to Marsh
on the TAC 1 frequency that day, at that exact time, in
such an authoritative/supervisory way?
I will bet money that the one who is ‘urging’ them to
‘come to town a little’ faster is, in fact, OPS1 Todd Abel.
It really does sound just like his voice.
BTW: Both of the other voices in this video HAVE been
absolutely confirmed to be Eric Marsh and Brian
Frisby, by people who KNOW them ( RTS, etc. ).
#1. no one is saying, “appreciate if you could come a little faster…”
they’re saying, “come down and help us get this {whatever} a little faster…”
#2. there is no reason to think that person is talking to E. Marsh… obviously shit is hitting the fan and radio traffic is chaos… (hence BR walking on [presumably] GM’s traffic)
#3. you have no frame of reference for what “help” is being asked for or for what or who it is or the full context of the sentence, etc. etc. etc.
#4. it’s not “Structure Group *core*” it’s Structure Group *Cordes* who BR is asking for…
Reply to xxfullsailxx post
on April 24, 2014 at 4:32 pm
>> xxfullsailxx said…
>> #1. no one is saying, “appreciate if you
>> could come a little faster…”
>>
>> they’re saying, “come down and help us
>> get this {whatever} a little faster…”
Disagree. ( See my transcript up above ).
Either way… even your own ‘interpretation’
doesn’t change the meaning or the intent
of the transmission. Someone ( I believe
it is OPS1 Todd Abel ) was urging
Marsh and Granite Mountain to ‘hurry’.
>> xxfullsailxx also said…
>> #2. there is no reason to think that
>> person is talking to E. Marsh…
>> obviously shit is hitting the fan and
>> radio traffic is chaos… (hence BR
>> walking on [presumably] GM’s traffic)
It’s possible… but I really, really, really
doubt it. Not in this case, at this time.
Again… even YOUR interpretation ( even it
happens to be true ) doesn’t change what is
*actually* happening. Marsh is responding to
SOMEONE who just asked him either where
Granite Mountain *really* is at 4:27 PM ( just
15 minutes before deployment ) *OR*
someone who just asked for some kind of
explanation why it’s taking them so long
to ‘get to town’.
The most important part of this still remains
WHO that SOMEONE is… how much ‘else’
did they know about this ‘mission’ GM was
on… and why the SAIR said there were no
‘verified direct communications with Marsh
or GM’ in this time period.
>> xxfullsailxx also said…
>> #3. you have no frame of reference for
>> what “help” is being asked for or for what
>> or who it is or the full context of the
>> sentence, etc. etc. etc.
See above. Even if it was a ‘walkover’
Marsh is telling SOMEONE what GM’s
status is… and providing an explanation
for someone who didn’t seem to understand
how far they had to travel and/or why they
haven’t arrived somewhere yet. There is no
other explanation for Marsh’s response to
WHOEVER he was talking to.
>> xxfullsailxx also said…
>> #4. it’s not “Structure Group *core*” it’s
>> Structure Group *Cordes* who BR is
>> asking for…
>> really? you can’t even get that right?
Listen to the video again ( or get someone
with better ears to help you out ).
Frisby himself does appear to simply say
‘core’ instead of ‘corDES’.
I am sure that he meant ‘Cordes’… but
for accuracy I only included in my
transcript what seems to ACTUALLY
be in the captured recording.
WantsToKnowTheTruth
on April 24, 2014 at 5:51 pm said:
“See above. Even if it was a ‘walkover’
Marsh is telling SOMEONE what GM’s
status is… and providing an explanation for someone who didn’t seem to understand how far they had to travel and/or why they haven’t arrived somewhere yet. There is no other explanation for Marsh’s response to WHOEVER he was talking to.”
THAT’S your bullshit ad-libbing… again, there is no reason to think those two pieces of conversation are related. there were a hundred resources working in and around the fire on a few different tac channels. you have no evidence to substantiate any connection and MORE reason to doubt there was one…
as most of us recognize, even once GM had made it to BSR it would have taken a long time for BR to bump GM’s rigs around to them at BSR. no one was expecting them to “hurry up” anywhere. and they weren’t going to walk to Yarnell.
also, Todd Abel wasn’t even down at that end of the fire, right? Musser was dealing with things down there because Abel was busy on the north end… why would Abel be asking GM to “hurry up” to get to an area he had no idea what was going on in?
the fact is, your ad-libbing always seems to point in the same direction… in support of some nefarious, unidentifiable person who is ordering GM off the hill. i think this fact is more telling about you than the Yarnell Hill tragedy.
Reply to xxfullsailxx post
on April 26, 2014 at 8:40 am
“See above. Even if it was a ‘walkover’
Marsh is telling SOMEONE what GM’s
status is… and providing an explanation for someone who didn’t seem to understand how far they had to travel and/or why they haven’t arrived somewhere yet. There is no other explanation for Marsh’s response to WHOEVER he was talking to.”
>> xxfullsailxx wrote…
>>
>> WTKTT said…
>> Marsh is telling SOMEONE
>> what GM’s status is…
>>
>> xxfullsailxx said…
>> THAT’S your bullshit
>> ad-libbing… again.
You are deluding yourself.
It *is* Marsh speaking (verified).
He is telling SOMEONE ( who obviously wanted to know ) what is happening with Granite Mountain circa 4:27 PM, just 15 minutes before deployment.
It is a RESPONSE to SOMEONE and a continuation/end of an existing ‘conversation’ with SOMEONE.
Who do YOU think that
SOMEONE was?
>> xxfullsailxx also said…
>> there is no reason to think
>> those two pieces of
>> conversation are related.
Again… more self delusion
on your part. There is EVERY
*reason* in the world to think
that they ARE… give the time,
the context, and the circumstances.
It is POSSIBLE that Marsh’s
response is not directly
related to the person talking
at the start of the capture… but
the chances are very, very,
slim, in this case.
>> xxfullsailxx also said…
>> you have no evidence to
>> substantiate connection
Yes. I (we) do.
It’s an actual captured
recording… and the LOGICAL
explanation is that caller 2
was finishing his conversation
with caller 1.
YOU are the one who is
‘groping’ for reasons to
NOT believe it.
>> and MORE reason to
>> doubt there was one…
No, I don’t ( have MORE
reasons to doubt the 2
captures are related than
to accept that they ARE ).
See above.
YOU are the one peddling
‘doubt’… because… well…
that’s what YOU do because
you don’t even want any of
this examination of the
evidence to even be taking
place.
>> xxfullsailxx said
>> no one was expecting them
>> to “hurry up” anywhere.
Disagree.
I ( me, personally ) think the
YARNELL-GAMBLE video is
just one piece of positive
proof that someone WAS
doing EXACTLY THAT.
Your mileage may vary.
>> xxfullsailxx also said…
>> also, Todd Abel wasn’t
>> even down at that end of
>> the fire, right?
At 4:27… YES… he most
probably WAS… and this would
be further explanation why
he WAS making that radio
call we hear in the video.
It is perfectly possible that
Able HAD just actually
‘arrived’ in Yarnell… now seeing
the situation for himself… and
THAT is EXACTLY why he was
on the radio urging GM to
‘hurry’.
Todd Able WAS ‘busy on the
north end’ circa 1542 ( almost an hour earlier ) when Musser
made his ‘availability check’ radio call ( on Abel’s behalf? ),
but even by 4:10 PM things were ‘under control’ on the north end because of the complete wind reversal and
Able was then ‘free’ to get
down to Yarnell.
See the Air Study video
capture circa 4:10 PM when
Todd Abel is clearly heard
saying he will be ‘down there’
in about 5 minutes ( 4:15 ).
>> Musser was dealing with
>> things down there because
>> Abel was busy on the north
>> end.
See above. You are wrong.
You are thinking of a time
circa 1542… at least 45
minutes BEFORE the
YARNELL-GAMBLE video.
>> xxfullsailxx said
>> why would Abel be asking
>> GM to “hurry up” to get to
>> an area he had no idea
>> what was going on in?
See above.
Because it is *MORE* than
likely he *WAS* now ‘in that
area’ and *DID* have an
exact picture of what was
*going on*.
If that is the case… then it is
even *MORE* reason to
believe that *IS* Todd Abel
on the radio telling Marsh he
would ‘appreciate it if you
could get to town a little faster’.
So what are we doing looking for the why GM-Marsh-Steed violated the 10 and 18? We can identify those that they did violate+ or – some, not the why unless some one heard something or advised something we currently have no proof of
As with this fire no survivors causes a lot of guessing. The $100.00 question is dose any one know what and why the decisions were made. I will tell you that as a Hot Shot we would always protect our crew as I believe McDonough will always do no matter what he knows no one else will ever here it from him…
Just my thoughts if they were my brothers, my crew and I am the only one that knows what ever. IT IS WHAT IT IS….
Reply to Bob Powers post on April 22, 2014 at 4:31 pm
>> Mr. Powers wrote…
>> The $100.00 question is does any one know what and why the
>> decisions were made.
Remains to be seen. All the evidence is (still) actually pointing to
the good chance that there are *more* than just a few people still
alive who know a LOT more about those very questions and
what the answers might be ( and I’m not talking about just
people who were actually in Yarnell that weekend ).
>> Mr. Powers also wrote…
>> I will tell you that as a Hot Shot we would always protect our
>> crew as I believe McDonough will always do no matter what
>> he knows no one else will ever hear it from him.
Even if it means some of his ‘other’ fire brothers could be
at risk ( even THIS fire season ) of dying?
So how far does this ‘fire brother’ thing go?
It is only your OWN crew that you are supposed to worry about
or be ‘loyal’ to? The hell with everyone else?
Is it REALLY that ‘tribal’?
We DO NOT KNOW if McDonough knows anything at all other
than what he has already talked about either in interviews or in
public.
For all we know… Brendan might have ‘missed’ one of the
first ‘discussing their options’ conversations while he was
standing on the gunwale of the GM Supervisor Truck at
1549 and was taking those pictures across the roof… or
even missed the ‘second’ or ‘third’ ( or however many iterations
there were on the same topic ) because of similar distractions.
Regardless… what hasn’t seem to fully sunk in to Mr. McDonough
himself is that ALL of the ‘official reports SAY ( unequivocally )
that he DID ‘hear them discussing their options’.
It’s a PUBLISHED fact.
So either it is TRUE… or it’s not.
Mr. McDonough has had every opportunity to DENY that claim
that appears in (all) the official reports… and to say that they are
‘mistaken’… but ( AFAIK ) he has declined every opportunity
to do that.
So if Mr. McDonough himself is willing to let ‘official’ reports
claim he knows things he’s not talking about… and is willing
to let THOSE statements stand… then he’s got a hard road
ahead of him.
Forget (for a moment) about the adults who have suffered great
loss and really do want to know all they can about ‘what happened’…
There are (many) CHILDREN of these dead men who are going
to grow up and STILL want to know what he knows ( if anything )
and they will be ASKING him every chance they get… for the
rest of HIS life.
Mr. Powers… you learned a lot about what really happened to
YOUR father from a well-written book… but what if that book
never had (complete) answers BUT you also knew ( from official
reports ) that someone who was THERE that day freely admitted
to ‘knowing more’ but simply ‘didn’t want to talk about it’?
How would you feel about that?
Would YOU still have wanted to know what he knows
and ‘fill in some truths’ about why YOUR father died?
I sure would.
Bottom line: If Mr. McDonough really doesn’t know anything or
didn’t HEAR anything other than what he has already told
investigators… and they were badly MISTAKEN to publish the
(unequivocal) statement that he DID ‘hear them discussing their
options with regards to leaving the safe black’…
…then I wish ( for his own’s sake ) he would issue a press
release to that effect, and just get it over with.
If he CANNOT issue a ‘press release’ to that effect because he
thinks that would be lying ( because he knows the statements in
ALL the official reports IS actually TRUE )… then I also wish he
would just find a way (somehow) to tell what he knows and be
‘done with it’ that (alternative) way.
I really worry about this ‘haunting’ him for the rest of his life…
unless he exercises one of the two options mentioned above.
There’s no need for it ( to haunt him ).
But perhaps he really is still just too young to realize that.
First there was no cover-up of the Rattle Snake fire because there were 9 survivors all pickup fire fighters.
only a brotherhood in the science they were from the same church camp. The fire that caught them was a back fire that got caught in a down canyon wind which was local and actually blows every night during the summer. Not hard to figure out what happened. 9 survived 15 died, In 1953 no portable radios, no fire shelters, no 10 &13, The only escape route was back up the trail they cut to the spot fire, which was the way the head of the fire was coming. Easy to figure what happened.
A Hot Shot Crew is a brother hood not just a crew. Would what McDonough says make any difference? Only in their discussion the decisions that violated Rules are easy to see. They were the responsible party any outside influence should never have dictated there safety. I dought that McDonough actually knows why they made the decision they did or if it was safe or not. His Bosses made the decision he believes they were right, in his mind he will never say they were wrong or make them look bad at least not for along time. I can say with out dought this years training will discuss the facts the 10 and 18 and move on. All the training facts are there the rest is a curiosity to know WHY. Am I wrong?
For McDonough himself, given what he’s been through he shouldn’t be expected to be able to say a whole lot, anyway. Not just a traumatic event, but then all sorts of inevitable social pressure afterwards. And, then the new job that I am sure may in some ways be viewed as a good thing now, but quickly can become isolating and lock him in to an identity with this one event as opposed to getting him back in the saddle, or in another vocation altogether. Basically I don’t think the PC response of creating an identity around these things serves anyone well.
>> SR
>>
>> For McDonough himself, given what he’s
>> been through he shouldn’t be expected to
>> be able to say a whole lot, anyway.
Something tells me you haven’t read the
transcript for McDonough’s SECOND
interview with the ADOSH investigators.
They basically ‘recalled’ him for some
specific ‘followup’ questions… and they
actually played the MacKenzie video(s)
in his presence and asked him to ‘identify’
the voices. ( Oddly enough, though, even
in that second interview, they still NEVER
asked what ‘else’ he might have heard ).
McDonough’s ‘attitude’ during this second
ADOSH interview was COMPLETELY
different than his first ADOSH interview.
All of a sudden… he’s a motor-mouth.
He actually launches into his OWN
(usolicited) ‘evaluations’ of what happened
that day but places the emphasis on
‘change for the future’ towards tech stuff
like ‘linking GPS units’ together and having
fire command be able to SEE where
people are at all times, and whatnot.
That’s when McDonough goes into great
detail about Granite Mountain having at
least FOUR handheld GPS units with
them that day… but complaining that
while you could exchange coordinates
with ‘each other’… that somehow fire
command still doesn’t know where
anyone is in real time.
NOTE: Not even the Garmin Oregon 450
GPS that we can see on Caldwell’s pack
strap, and (possibly) lying face-down
right there in the dirt in the YCSO site
photos was ever actually ‘found’ or
entered the official evidence chain…
much less the other THREE that
McDonough says were ‘onboard’ that day.
Even Eric Marsh had a ‘GPS rating’ and
had taken special ‘GPS classes’… according
to his personnel file… so it seems highly
likely that even Eric Marsh had one of the
FOUR GPS unit that McDonough is now
talking about with HIM that day.
I digress…
You really should read that SECOND
ADOSH interview with Brendan McDonough.
He even talks about what a ‘good place’
he was in and didn’t seem reluctant to talk
about any aspect of the incident for that
SECOND interview. He even said to
the investigators… “Someone needs to
hear this stuff”.
Problem is… even with his willingness to
talk for the SECOND interview… no one
even ASKED him any important/lingering
questions.
I think the point is, whatever his memories and recollections are now, they may well be very different from what they were the day after the event. We are all susceptible to this, even for events that aren’t highly stressful and emotional. Even beliefs that he may hold very strongly, like GPS somehow being important, may not hold up at all when looked at. (Re: GPS, leaving to one side the shortcomings and strengths of GPS vs. telemetry, simply use of the radio by Marsh and Steed could have let people know exactly their route and exactly their intentions, had there been a desire to keep people in the loop — and within the crew, they all knew where each other were — so why even mention GPS? A: Because someone else got his ear and told him it was important — perfectly natural, anyone in his situation would experience much the same.) So, by this point, he shouldn’t be expected to say much and, to the extent he does add more info, you have to assume that it may have been hugely influenced by events and pressures that occurred after the day of the fire.
I am not going to ‘discount’ Brendan’s comments in his second interview about the WFF industry thinking harder about coming into the ’21st century’. I think everything Brendan was suggesting be ‘done’ are valid points.
But if you actually LISTEN to the audio of that entire interview, I think it’s possible that what Brendan was really trying to say there was that regardless of whether Marsh and Steed were practicing some kind of ‘planned obtuseness’ with their BK radio communications… Brendan seems to be holding onto the thought that if fire command had simply been able to AUTOMATICALLY know exactly where they were… then maybe the Air resources COULD have dumped on them in time to save them.
He actually might not be wrong about that.
It MIGHT have been possible… if the following two things had been true…
1) They didn’t waste 2 minutes and 20 seconds even realzing the first radio call from Steed was an actual MAYDAY call and an actual EMERGENCY.
2) Air Attack had known EXACTLY where they were ( or could glance at a screen on-demand and know instantly ) and then Kevin in the VLAT could have just followed him right to that exact spot.
Maybe someday in the future… something like the scenario(s) Brendan is talking about in his interview WILL be possible.
The technology to do exactly what Brendan was ‘imagineering’ inn his ADOSH interview already exists, and can be accomplished RIGHT NOW even with FREE public domain software.
The only thing preventing it is cooperation and the establishment of the correct standards and adoption of the correct protocols.
Mr. Powers. Thanks for the thoughtful reply.
You are right… your own situation/experience with
this sort of thing ( while different circumstances )
seems to indicate that even if the ‘example’ I was
making was true ( 1 survivor who didn’t want to
talk about it )… the actual ‘factual’ evidence pretty
much explained what happened, once known.
Yarnell is pretty much the same.
We DO ‘know what happened’.
We really do.
Just look at all the evidence that has emerged
and it really is pretty clear what happened.
So to answer your question about ‘would anything
McDonough still knows make any difference?’…
I think we all know the answer there.
Probably not. It would (most likely) only CONFIRM
what is already known. They *decided* to disregard
the rules of engagement in favor of ‘the mission’,
and as far as ‘training takeways’ goes… well…
what else needs to be said?
The rules are there for a reason.
Break the rules… and you can (easily) DIE.
>> Mr. Powers also wrote…
>> I doubt that McDonough actually knows why
>> they made the decision they did
You might be exactly right.
For all we know… even though ALL the officially
published reports seem to CONFIRM that he
did overhear them ‘discussing their options’… the
actual conversation on the RADIO ( which is all
McDonough had any chance of hearing ) might
have been just as ‘obtuse’ as pretty much all
the other radio conversations we can now hear.
McDonough might have ONLY heard scant ‘pieces’
of the ‘why’ part or the actual ‘decision making’.
We simply don’t know ( what he did or didn’t hear ).
What bothers me ( and the point I was simply
trying to make above ) is that Mr. McDonough
seems content to let those statements in
ALL the published report about him DEFINITELY
hearing them ‘discussing their options’ stand, with
no rebuttal ( if the statements are wrong ) or
clarification ( if the statements are correct ).
That just leaves a significant ‘mystery’ hanging
out there that might follow him around for the
rest of his life… with a lot of people still/always
wanting to ‘know what he knows’…
My only real thought here is simple if you think about it.
He dose not want to say something that might hurt one of his (Brothers) family members by assigning some kind of guilt to one of his Bosses. If that makes him happy and content with that choice then he will stay in that realm so to speak. Dose that make science?
Another thought on brotherhood protection.
My Steap dad was on the fire that my dad died on he was on an Engine. He never told me or any one else that my dad had made a mistake by not putting a lookout at the top of the trail to let the crew know if the fire started there way. My dad was his friend and they worked together. It is hard to admit that a friend made a mistake or even tell your friends son that happened after he became my father and even after I went to work for the Forest Service. McDonough will only talk if he choses to, I think he is OK with were he is at.
>> Mr. Powers wrote…
>> McDonough will only talk
>> if he choses to.
OR… if he is called to testify.
He can’t take the 5th on this.
I think he should just ‘chose’
to say what he knows… OR
( at the very least ) issue a
press statement that rebuts
what all the official PUBLIC
reports are saying about him.
That he ‘knows more than he
will say’. If that really isn’t
true then it was totally
irresponsible ( and unfair to
Brendan ) for the Arizona
Forestry department to EVER
make those statements they
did about him ‘hearing them
discussing their options’.
If Brendan simply has ‘more
of the story’ from that day,
I think he should just
CHOOSE to talk about it…
and I don’t just mean about
the ‘their decision to leave the
black’, either.
For all we know… if Brian
Frisby hadn’t either suggested
( or demanded ) there be
a ‘lookout’ in place up there
that day… Brendan would
have simply DIED right along
with the rest of them.
That’s a ‘part of the story’
that hasn’t been told yet, either.
Is that what happened?
Did Brian Frisby himself
pretty much save Brendan’s
life TWICE that day?
Yes… it makes sense in the context
of the immediate aftermath of such
a horrific event ( and the grieving
process that follows )…
…but even at the press conference
when the SAIR was first released it
was perfectly obvious that a LOT of
‘family members’ just want to know
the TRUTH ( ALL of it ).
They had had a chance to read
the SAIR report BEFORE the press
conference.
A lot of them were ANGRY that
it was such a namby-pamby report
about the incident that took their
loved ones away from them…
and said so. LOUDLY.
In the ‘wrongful death’ lawsuits… it
is CLEAR that what is MOST
IMPORTANT to these family members
is knowing as much as possible
about what happened that day so at
least they can be sure the WFF
industry is RESPONDING to this
historic event and at least TRYING
to make sure it doesn’t happen
again… as much as possible.
So for Brendan to still believe that he
is ‘protecting the families’ ( if that’s
what he thinks he’s doing ) just
means he really, really hasn’t
been paying attention.
The families have spoken.
They WANT to know as much as
possible about what happened that
day ( and still intend to FIND OUT ).
Brendan has maintained ( at all times )
that it was just an ‘accident’… that
‘no one did anything wrong’… yet
he has also maintained ( at all times )
that there are some things about
what happened that day that he will
not talk about.
He simply doesn’t realize that those
two ‘stances’ are incompatible, and
just further the sense of ‘mystery’
surrounding this incident.
If he really, truly believes it was just
an ‘accident’… then there should be
NOTHING that he is ‘reluctant’ to
talk about.
That’s what
makes the
families
of those
men who
were lost
too soon
want to
KNOW.
SRsays
Subjective motivation is always hard to assess accurately, anyway. Even self-reported motivations can be very unreliable, for obvious reasons in some cases, but also because we’re not good at perceiving things. We know that, at YHF, there was a pattern even that day of being a bit fast and loose with the 10 and 18. This was on display before GM ever dropped off the 2-track.
Particularly for emotionally highly charged events, even discussing subjective motivations can be problematic. But, whatever the motivations, we do know that persistently being in situations where the 10 aren’t taken seriously and lots of Watch Outs are present is not a good practice. You can look at the 10 and 18 applied to the lookout, and stop the clock there, and say, whatever the motivation or even simple lack of attention, not best practice.
Likewise for a culture of secrecy about something like crew movements. Whatever the motivations for not wanting someone to discuss those, it is not a healthy thing.
TTWARE – thanks for your comment about the weather (and thanks also to Bob Powers for explaining in more detail what he was thinking regarding the weather). I will respond to both of you hopefully later today, after I finish a project with a deadline of today. Sorry for the delay – I just want you to know that I am not ignoring you, after you took the time to respond to me.
(Yet again, rather than using my LIMITED free time to respond productively to both of you this morning, and thereby advancing this discussion (hopefully), I ended up yet again wasting TWO HOURS drafting a reply to Fire20+ who leapt on ME for things that *I* did not say (and do not believe) while he simultaneously IGNORED the fact that it was BOB and WTKTT who said the things that Fire20+ is accusing ME of saying. This utter BULLSHIT has gone on for MONTHS, and it continues to make me want to throw up my hands and walk away from these efforts, despite people like Gabbert and JD making clear my important role in these discussions. For example, does anyone ELSE remember folks accusing ME of calling Rory Collins a coward when it was actually FRED who did it? I had to WASTE my time defending myself on that, rather than doing the things that are far more valuable and unique, such as getting public records to guys like Gabbert or JD, who can then post them. Why am I not surprised that now Fire20+ has done the SAME fucking thing, in terms of accusing me of stuff that I NEVER said, such that I have to WASTE my limited time defending myself? Huge fucking pain in the ass, but the worse option, in my mind, is my leaving IM and letting conspiracy theorist WTKTT and SR and whomever remain here unchecked, such that people actually BELIEVE all of the things that WTKTT says and states (incorrectly) as fact. I suppose that now that xxfullsailxx is back, there will be less unchecked, inaccurate rambling, but, at some point, xxfullsailxx has to leave IM and go start…fighting fires. He, unlike Fire20+ and Bob Powers and Fred and others, is presumably STILL working forty-plus-hour weeks on the fire front lines (presumably like WFF, who also seems to now be on here less and less, presumably in anticipation of the start of fire season in a week or so).)
Looks like Fire20+, with his reasonable and informed post, got someone riled up. He didn’t feel the need to drop F-bombs or to play the victim, though.
EN wrote:
“Fire20+ who leapt on ME for things that *I* did not say (and do not believe) while he simultaneously IGNORED the fact that it was BOB and WTKTT who said the things that Fire20+ is accusing ME of saying. This utter BULLSHIT has gone on for MONTHS, and it continues…”
—OK, so you were quoting somebody else, why not just quote them then? Folks would then understand the idiotic words you (you statements are appropriate here) DID put in that list weren’t yours, which raises another question. Why would you put things on a blog entry that appears to be coming out of your mouth then when your ‘jumped on’ you just can’t handle it and blame other people?—
“I had to WASTE my time defending myself on that, rather than doing the things that are far more valuable and unique, such as getting public records to guys like Gabbert or JD, who can then post them. Why am I not surprised that now Fire20+ has done the SAME fucking thing, in terms of accusing me of stuff that I NEVER said…”
—Don’t waste your time on my account, stop writing what you didn’t say or know about then you wouldn’t have to defend yourself Elizabeth and work yourself into a tissy. As far as what you say about ‘getting public records to guys…’ well, there you go again. ANYBODY can get public records by doing a records request, it is not special or generous or important, it is something ANYONE can do. You behave as if your “role” is exclusive and proprietary, your generous public service efforts, your selfless generosity to “give” this information to JD and Gabbert. They could have clearly gotten it themselves or gotten it from any other number of people who have the records also. I sure hope nobody has pointed this out to you before me, I’d hate to upset you.—
Oh, one more thing, I’m curious how the families like seeing F-bombs all over the place accompanied by victimized, crazy talk? Do you care about that at all? I cuss like a logger, but not here.
They were all taken by Jerry Thompson, who was working with a Structure
Protection Group under SPGS1 Gary Cordes on Sunday, June 30, 2013.
That ‘crew’ was working right there in Yarnell, about 1/2 to 3/4 mile due
south of the Shrine Youth Camp, to the west of Yarnell where some ‘outlying’
homes were. As one of the videos proves… they were close enough to
the Shrine Youth Camp to actually capture the siren going off on Tyson
Esquibel’s lead engine that was parked there as he was using it to ‘recall’
the fellas working in Harper Canyon.
This is the SAME SIREN heard in the YARNELL-GAMBLE video.
There are actually FOUR videos in this folder… and some of them have
some pretty interesting ‘background radio’ traffic.
Those Jerry Thompson photos/videos are publicly available HERE…
A pretty interesting ‘background radio’ exchange captured in this
one right at the start. There is little doubt that this is OPS1 Todd Abel
talking to OPS2 Paul Musser at exactly 1524 ( 3:24 PM ).
(OPS1 Todd Abel): I think they’ll probly be a mess in or out.
(OPS2 Paul Musser): What can I tell ’em, then?
NOTE: I have no idea what that exchange means. Any guesses?
* IMG_1134 – 1630 – 4:30 PM
This is the one that captures the siren going off on Tyson Esquibel’s
lead engine as he was using it to ‘recall’ his crew from down in the
Harper Canyon west of the Shrine Youth Camp.
Jerry Thompson’s crew was close enough to they Shrine area to
capture this siren clearly. It is a ‘steady’ tone with no Doppler effect
so that means it was, in fact, a siren being sounded on a stationary
vehicle over at the Shrine Youth Camp.
It is the SAME SIREN being heard in the background of Blue Ridge
Hotshot McCord’s YARNELL-GAMBLE video which contains the
background capture of someone in fire command ( Musser?,
Abel?, Cordes? ) speaking directly to Eric Marsh and saying
they would ‘appreciate it if they could get to town a little faster’
and Eric Marsh responding “They’re comin’ from the heel of the fire”.
This might help narrow down ( even further ) the exact time of that
YARNELL-GAMBLE video since that still hasn’t been exactly determined.
We already KNOW it was no earlier than about 4:20 and no later than 4:32 PM.
* IMG_1136 – Also 1530 4:30 ( plus 45 seconds ).
Taken right after the previous one… but the siren has STOPPED, which
helps to even further narrow down the time for the YARNELL-GAMBLE video.
This one has another interesting radio capture that also appears to
be OPS1 Todd Able ( with little doubt ).
(OPS1 Todd Abel): Ah… down in Yarnell… ah… it should be pushin’ hard
right now into Yarnell… and south of Yarnell.
It is not known who OPS1 Todd Abel is talking to at that point.
This video ends with a firefighter in the foreground saying pretty excitedly…
“We got a LOTTA ASH!… It’s comin’ RIGHT AT US!… We gotta…”
The video cuts off his last few words.
Even MORE firefighters that almost waited too long that day to evacuate
and almost got ‘caught’?
Any, of course. But definitely the ones from the Ranch House. And his statement that he had left the Ranch House before he heard of deployment. I had always assumed that he was aware of the circumstances when he took the photos. I remember Tom Story commented over at Wildfire Today many months ago.
I haven’t compared them against the Russ Reason video yet. But it appears (to me) that the McCord photo 106 was taken before the Tom Story 1677. photo. Also, The McCord photo 106 seems to show some clear sky in the southern (or left) part of the pic. I mention that as it could relate to the mysterious quote by Marsh saying “that is exactly where we want the retardant”. Meaning, the sky looks more clear in this photo than in ones taken later by Tom Story.
If you were asking for my *general* opinion
of the Tom Story photos I would say that
I actually *do* have some similar concerns
about the TIMESTAMPS.
It is almost inconceivable that a professional
reporter/photographer might not have the
TIME set exactly correctly on his cameras
and/or devices… but I am still scratching
my head about the TIMESTAMPS on
some of his photos.
Example: He has a full sequence of pictures
of an extensive DC10 VLAT drop right there
down around Yarnell. ALL of the these photos
seem to have a timestamp of 1639.
Yet… NOWHERE in any of the Air Study
videos ( especially the USDA folder ones
that ONLY capture the actual Air to Air
conversations ) is there ANY radio traffic
that would support that this VLAT drop was
taking place at THAT exact time ( 1639 ).
1639 is the minute Steed’s first MAYDAY
supposedly took place as well… and here
is this DC10 VLAT (supposedly) dropping
TONS of retardant right near Yarnell at
the same moment Steed is sending his
MAYDAY.
Something just isn’t quite right about all
that… and I have to suspect that however
improbable it might seem… this professional
photographer did NOT have the TIME
set correctly on one ( or more ) of his
digital cameras.
Well. I just picked my way thru Tom’s photos. At first I wrote, up above, that I never trust camera time stamps becuz most ppl don’t need to pay attention to them.
But Tom was using three cameras that day, switching back and forth depending on which lens he needed. So that would lead me to think he probably must have had to sync them, thus at least vaguely getting them accurate. So the 3:49 photos are mystifying.
I think his photos at the Ranch House Parking Lot seem about right, though. They would definitely have been later than McCord’s. I think McCord jumped out of the Blue Ridge Buggy and started shooting relatively immediately. Tom’s photos start with the Blue Ridge ATV near the trucks, and then the ATV vanishes, and I think that happening around 5 seems reasonable. And, yes, the fire has gotten much closer by then as the parking lot, itself would eventually no longer be considered a “safe zone.”
So I’m stumped. It would be helpful if there was a timed list of the VLAT drops, for sure.
**
** DID OPS1 TODD ABEL REALLY SAY “HUNKER AND BE SAFE”?
>> On April 18, 2014 at 4:47 pm, Elizabeth said:
>>
>> 6. Just because the SAIT claims that somebody said
>> something does NOT actually mean that the things at issue
>> were actually said. For example, do I believe that the Blue Ridge
>> guys said exactly some of the things that the SAIT claims they
>> said? Nope. Abel did not recall saying “hunker,” presumably b/c
>> he never SAID “hunker,” even though the SAIT said he said “hunker.”
>> Do I think Marsh said the winds were “squirrely”? Well, I wouldn’t
>> bet my first child on it.
This is just another response to one more ‘point’ from Elizabeth’s recent
bullet-list of what she chose to call ‘clarifications’.
Since she keeps obsessing about the Todd Abel ‘hunker’ quote and seems to
keep asking us all not to believe our OWN EARS…
…I thought I’d do just (hopefully) one more ’round up’ on this.
Every time she brings this up… I have asked Elizabeth to please supply an
‘alternative word’ ( other than the word ‘hunker’ ) for that sentence clearly heard
in the Caldwell video… but there’s never an answer.
* The Robert Caldwell VIDEO…
First and foremost… here is the radio traffic that is CLEARLY heard in the
Robert Caldwell video…
__________________________________________________________________
Eric Marsh (DIVS A): Yea… I’m tryin’ to work my way off the top.
Todd Abel ( OPS1 ): Okay… I copy… ah… just keep me updated…
ah… ya know… you guys hunker and be safe and then… ah…
we’ll get some air support down there ASAP.
_________________________________________________________________
And ( once again ) here is the ’roundup’ on how that clear conversation went through the investigation process and ended up in PUBLISHED report(s)…
* The Arizona Forestry SAIT investigators heard ‘hunker’ and
* were sure enough about it to PUBLISH it in their official report…
From the OFFICIAL SAIR Document – Page 22
OPS1 is listening on the radio to make sure everyone received the most recent
weather announcement. At about 1550, he radios DIVS A directly to ask if he got
the weather update and if he is “in a good spot.” DIVS A affirms that he received
the update, and he tells OPS1 the winds are starting to get “squirrely” up on the
ridge. He says he is working his way off the top and OPS1 closes by advising
DIVS A to hunker and be safe.
* Lead SAIT investigator Jim Karels is sure he heard ‘hunker’…
Page 1 of the SAIT Yarnell Investigation Notes (YIN)
Interview with OPS1 Todd Abel by Jim Karels (alone) on 8/14/13
NOTE: OPS1 Todd Abel told the SAIT investigator Jim Karels that he doesn’t
recall this ENTIRE conversation with Marsh… much less any particular words
or sentences he might have used like ‘hunker and be safe’. That is really still
hard to believe… but Jim Karels had already heard the Caldwell video prior to
the interview and he was SURE that he had heard Abel tell Marsh to “hunker”.
Karels made a note to himself to be sure and ask Abel about it during the
interview… and he did. We see both Karels’ ‘note to himself’ AND a note
about Abel’s response in the investigation document(s)…
– (Ask Abel about) the ~1555 radio conversation that we have on the
(Caldwell) video, (which includes the phrase okay, you hunker down in
the black) – Abel did not recal having this conversation with marsh.
* OPS1 Todd Able uses the same ‘hunkered’ word in his ADOSH interview…
Oddly enough… even though OPS1 Todd Abel told Lead SAIT investigator Jim
Karels that he ‘doesn’t recall’ any/all of his conversation with Marsh captured by
the Caldwell video… all of a sudden he ( Abel ) seems to be recalling it pretty
well in his ADOSH interview. He gets the TIME right… recalls Eric’s ‘squirrely
winds’ statement… and while the ADOSH investigators do not specifically even
ask Abel about the Caldwell video ( even though they knew it existed )… Abel
even uses the same word ‘hunkered’ while talking to THEM and describing that
conversation with Marsh…
Page 43 of OPS1 Todd Abel’s ADOSH interview…
Q1 = Dave Larsen ( Rest in Peace )
A = OPS1 Todd Abel
__________________________________________________________________
Q1: 3:45. This all was about in the same timeframe of wind shifts, the
conversation with Eric. He was the first one to feel those squirrely winds
start, right?
A: Yeah.
Q1: And he’s talking to you about he’s got wind issues?
A: Mm-hm.
Q1: Let me ask you this, you say you’re nervous, um, because of this…
A: This cell building over here.
Q1: …this cell – what does that mean to you?
A: That means outflows, possible lightning strikes, all that stuff.
Q1: Okay.
A: So that’s why I wanted to make sure that he had eyes on it to make sure he
watches that thing and make sure that if it’s getting too – if he gets to really
start feeling those winds changing and everything that they can get hunkered
in that black – that 250 acres of safety zone there.
Q1: Mm-hm.
A: And – and stay out of harm’s way. You know they could even drop down off
the ridge for lightning purposes if they had to.
Q1: Sure.
A: Was my thought process.
_________________________________________________________________
So Abel proves ( all on his own during the interview ) that he is someone who
DOES use the words ‘hunker’ and ‘hunkered’ as part of his usual/regular
vocabulary.
So for anyone to really doubt that OPS1 Todd Abel was NOT captured saying
“hunker and be safe” to Eric Marsh in the Caldwell video… the only real
question would be…
What OTHER word is being said?
Just because you might think he didn’t actually use the word ‘hunker’ to start
that one sentence doesn’t mean the sentence itself doesn’t exist.
So for anyone who does NOT think the first word of that sentence is ‘hunker’
( from a man known to use that word freely )…then please ‘fill in the blank’ below.
What OTHER word could possibly be used that would match the full CONTEXT
of this conversation and would start a sentence/statement that is KNOWN
to be this…
“_______ and be safe.”
Remember… it has to at least SOUND like ‘hunker’… because this entire
statement ( and context ) IS, in fact, captured in the video.
Amen WTKTT. I hope EN answers you because I am curious. She hasn’t answered me either about her doubts of the use ‘hunker’ in WFF. I can tell you WTKTT, we use this word on the regular to describe taking shelter, getting down off a ridge, literally sitting on your butts and watching Wx, fire behavior, etc. from a safe spot.
WTKTT, you think maybe Able read the SAIT report before his interview with ADOSH and just filled in the blanks in his ‘memory’? I do. The thing is, when your fighting fire they weren’t thinking ‘oh, maybe I’m being recorded’…It was perhaps after the audio/video recordings came out when some OH started worrying about statements they had previously made.
Also, just a point, Dave Larsen (RIP) uses the word squirrely and he was a T1IC, and it didn’t throw him off. Squirrely is as common a description for Wx as unstable is for FF’s on the ground.
WTKTT– You also have statements here of 2 very clear things.
1. there was a forecast on winds and a concern that they were going to get worse and the statement of squarely winds.
2. the discussion of a cell at around 1545. the fact that they had 250 plus acres of black SZ and they could hunker there and incase of lighting drop off the ridge in to safe areas.
No mention by Todd Able of going down to the bomb proof SZ.
so every thing we have been discussing is simply stated here, with or with out any pictures of support which we also Identified yesterday and which I am sure there are more.
Why is there a question about the cell and winds? Before 1600 Ops Able was concerned about the cells affect on the winds.
Why was marsh then not concerned about the same thing?
Did Marsh see something that no one else saw?
Did Marsh decide to do something that no one else thought he would do?
Your above Able interview says a lot the fire was in fact being influenced buy a cell with winds and OPS was concerned about the 1 crew on the mountain. Marsh ignored that warning sign and move the entire crew into a brush field in front of a volatile situation and did not heed the warning signs.
I could say more but I do not wish to hurt or be insensitive to any one the decisions made were not founded on Safety.
Bob, am I correct that it is not RARE to have thunder cells in the area of an Arizona wildfire between mid-June and the end of July, and that the mere presence of these cells does not suggest that everything should stop and everyone should sit in the black until every possible thunder cell (regardless of its distance away) is gone?
I am NOT trying to defend anyone or make things up or whatever nonsense you often accuse me of. I am trying to figure out if you HONESTLY take the position that the fact that someone can see a thunder cell (even as far away as Prescott with respect to the Yarnell Hill Fire) means that everyone needs to retreat to the black immediately.
Thunder cells are common through out the west.
there are safe places to work on a fire. If Lighting moves over you then you find a safe place till it passes. Depending on the location on the fire and the wind you may continue to work or back off and sit it out. It is hard to make a general statement here. If your line is containing the fire then it might be safe to continue work. If the fire has escaped containment then a lot depends on where you are on the fire. Quitting work has a great deal to do with your safety and location, every cell that passes over a fire dose not Carry the same threats for each different fire. Complicated YES.
The Yarnell Hill Fire had escaped containment or it was not fully contained because of open line. The cell created that. Where GM was they had no place to build line because all of there line was compromised due to the fire below and to the left of their break site. so they could not continue to build line back to the fire as it would move under them and burn back up to there line. Becoming unsafe and unproductive.
To state the obvious: Elizabeth is pushing yet another “false dichotomy.” There is not necessarily a binary choice between 1) quit at the first sign of a thunderstorm, and 2) take a long, slow bushwhack with the fire getting blown towards you. It does not normalize GM’s decision to say, well, depending on conditions you may or may not keep working. There is a huge range of possibility that falls under “keeping working,” and virtually none of those possible actions have killing your whole crew as a likely outcome if the timing is just a bit off.
You really don’t get it. Elizabeth is not approving of or trying to justify GMs decisions, she is trying to come up with what they might have been thinking that leads them to make the critical errors that they did.
Stop spending all your effort trying to discredit her and try and really read what she is saying.
No, I do get it. She’s starting with the premise that GM acted reasonably. And floating various theories that she thinks explain why the decisions made were reasonable. Her theories may contradict each other — GM could have been scared down by lightning, or, alternatively, could have reasonably concluded in EN’s view that bushwhacking through dense fuel down into a terrain trap with the fire being blown towards you in the midst of a thunderstorm was a reasonable thing to do — because, hey, if you stop fighting fire every time there’s a thunderstorm on the horizon, you’ll stop work a lot. There is basically zero support for any of these theories, many of which show no regard for the realities of either the southwest, or wildland fire.
We have heard from RTS that, not only were others aware that GM was using unconventional tactics and sticking their necks out while doing it, but they had spoken to GM about it. And, that there had been a culture of secrecy over crew movements. So, EN is making a few logical errors when she supposes that GM had to think that what they were doing was reasonable and safe from a conventional perspective.
Maybe they did. But, maybe a crew that doesn’t want others to know where they are and what they are doing realizes that some of their tactics may be viewed as unconventional, even risky. Maybe they were well aware that they were taking a risk. The reality is that when insular groups deviate from accepted safety norms, there often is an escalating pattern of risk-taking. And often at least some of the group is aware of that fact.
EN’s approach, which takes the fact that GM thought that their actions were reasonable and prudent at the time as a given, simply assumes away many possible realities. And so is a lousy way to conduct an inquiry, unless you decided from the get-go that the answer to that inquiry will always be that all safety norms were followed, this was a reasonable and ordinary day with simply a fluke outcome.
I’m pretty sure EN never said GM acted reasonably, if I’m wrong, show me. Same could be said for “bushwhacking into a terrain trap”.
Why is it a “logical error” to suppose that GM thought what they were doing was reasonable and safe? Why the hell would they have done it? Do you think they wanted to die?
People take outsized risks all the time. There is a difference between a suicide attempt and assuming risks that carry a high likelihood over time of resulting in death. People climb rock cliffs unroped, go boating without life jackets, fill gas cans without lifting them out of truck beds, and do all sorts of things that they may be aware aren’t great ideas. When looking at an accident, it’s a real bad idea to prejudge it as “safe people, just one of those things.”
In this case, given what we have heard in terms of the possibility of prior risk-taking, it is all the less wise to start with the assumption that there was no awareness of risk.
BTW, EN did say she thought it looked reasonable to GM when they started their bushwhack. So, yeah, she’s saying she thought based on information in front of them that they acted reasonably, without seeing undue risk. Or, alternatively, that a reasonable person would have seen undue risk, but GM didn’t and simply not competent to see those risks. But, somehow I don’t think that 2d idea is the one EN is trying to plant the seeds of when she say they thought it was reasonable to drop down.
So you say that GM stood there ready to drop into the bowl and said” this is not reasonable but lets go”
I disagree, I think they said” their is some risk, but I think its reasonable lets go”.
I think EN agrees with me and she is trying to put together what info they had that lead them to decide this way.
calvin said JANUARY 13, 2016 AT 3:49 AM
Do you have any idea exactly how many aircraft or how many gallons of retardant were dropped on the YHF between the time we hear “Air support down there” and the time of deployment?
As we know, there was no retardant lines placed to protect Glen Isla or Yarnell in that timeframe
———————————————————————————————–
Via the Air Study Videos we have a very good record of the various drops on the fire during all of that time.
I’m writing this off the top of my head, and way past my bedtime, but I think your question is important.
Until the 4;30-ish drop that the SAIR incorrectly (imho) said Eric said ‘that’s where we want it,” the aerial fire-fighting was going on on the northeast and then east flanks of the fire. Firstly defending areas in the Model Creek Road area, and then in the Sickles Road Area.
After that, in the time framework you are speaking of, the aerial fire-fighting then turned it’s attention to the southwest part of the fire. They then managed to put in one line of retardant at around 4:30 (from, I think, about Shrine Road north-eastward), and then while they were lining up the DC-10 for a line continuing that, the Deployment happened.
After the deployment, they continued dropping retardant from the first line they put in all the way towards the northeast, to defend Yarnell.
The line Bravo 3 dropped, earlier in the day, across the bowl was basically in vain.
However, it looks to me that the lines dropped in the Model Creek Road area and across the top of Yarnell were successful, via the aerial photos in this article on this UK-based Daily Mail Website:
—————————————————————————————-
“Devastation left by ‘firestorm’ that killed 19 Arizona firefighters: Shocking aerial images show town burned to the ground by blaze”
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2353353/Arizona-wild-fires-pictures-Shocking-aerial-images-utter-devastation.html
You have to scroll down a bit to come to the actually quite interesting collection of aerial photos that show where the retardant lines stopped the fire. I’ve mapped almost all of these photos, by the way. I have absolutely no clue how they managed to obtain these photos.
So, imho, the story is…………complicated.
OK its more than past my bedtime. Goodnight.
PS. Given what I’ve seen in these aerial photos, it has always disturbed me that they didn’t start that line above Glen Illah. I don’t know why that was the case. I really don’t and it bothers me.
Yikes! San Bernardino!
I spent a bunch of time “there” yesterday reading about the whole WUI thing.
I guess what’s going on right now there might be comparable to Initial Attack on a quickly expanding wildfire in the Wildland Urban Interface?
Ok, for some strange reason I posted this in the wrong place. Will move it to the right place.
I have no idea why or how this happened.
**
** NEW CHAPTER VII ( SEVEN ) STARTED
Here is a direct link to the *new* Chapter VII ( SEVEN ) of this ongoing discussion.
http://www.investigativemedia.com/yarnell-hill-fire-chapter-vii/
Thanks once gain to Mr. John Dougherty for all his support and his
extraordinary patience with ALL of us.
Thanks WTKTT!
I guess I’ll have to repost my comment regarding San Bernardino there.
**
** EXIF METADATA SUMMARY FROM
** ALL OF THE PANEBAKER AIR STUDY VIDEOS
Below is a just a short summary of the EXIF data contained in ALL of the
Panebaker videos sitting in the online Dropbox folder.
You can see clearly below what Marti has been talking about with embedded
time stamps ( and GPS time stamps ) actually bearing no relation to the
time stamp(s) eventually used in the FILENAMES themselves.
The Nikon Coolpix seems to have been set TWO hours ahead of real time
and the filenames used for files coming from the camera were just ‘dialed back’
manually, or something.
The first SEVEN Panebaker videos show below also contain a short NOTE after
the EXIF data that tries to show how both the ‘Creation Dates’ OR the GPS
Time Stamp *may* have been used to come up with the actual time stamp
used in the video filename.
As you can see from these NOTES below… something is very strange about
where the time stamps used for the video titles actually came from. None
of them appear to be an exact match for either the ‘Creation Time’ or
the ‘GPS Time’ embedded in the movie itself.
Also note… MOST of the videos taken with the Nikon Coolpix P520 do, in fact,
have UTC based GPS timestamps… but SOME videos from the (same?)
Nikon do NOT. It is almost as if the GPS was being turned OFF on the Nikon
for only SOME of the videos shot that day.
** PANEBAKER AIR STUDY VIDEOS
File Name: 20130630_143844_EP.MOV
Creation Date: 2013:06:30 16:38:41
Duration: 2.24 s
Make: NIKON COOLPIX P520
File Name: 20130630_144226_VLAT_EP.MOV
Creation Date: 2013:06:30 16:40:52
Duration: 0:01:32
Make: NIKON COOLPIX P520
GPS Time Stamp: 21:40:46.57 UTC ( AZ 14:40:46.57 PM )
GPS Date Stamp: 2013:06:30
GPS Position: 34 deg 16′ 19.85″, 112 deg 43′ 51.89″
NOTE: GPS time stamp of 14:40:46 AZ time plus 1:32
equals 1442.18, but that is still 8 seconds shy of 1442.26.
16:40:52 plus 1:32 equals 1642.24, but subtracting two
hours manually still only gives 1442.24, which is still
two seconds shy of filename time stamp 1442.26.
File Name: 20130630_144508_EP.MOV
Creation Date: 2013:06:30 16:44:27
Duration: 0:00:40
Make: NIKON COOLPIX P520
GPS Time Stamp: 21:44:22.11 UTC ( AZ 14:44:22.11 PM )
GPS Date Stamp: 2013:06:30
GPS Position: 34 deg 16′ 19.85″, 112 deg 43′ 51.94″
NOTE: GPS time stamp of 14:44:22 AZ time plus 40 seconds
gives 1445.02, but that is still 6 seconds shy of 1445.08.
16:44:27 plus 40 seconds equals 1645.7, but subtracting two
hours manually still only gives 1445.7, which is still
ONE second shy of filename time stamp 1445.08.
File Name: 20130630_144756_SEAT_EP.MOV
Creation Date: 2013:06:30 16:45:37
Duration: 0:02:17
Make: NIKON COOLPIX P520
GPS Time Stamp: 21:45:31.97 UTC ( AZ 14:45:31.97 PM )
GPS Date Stamp: 2013:06:30
GPS Position: 34 deg 16′ 19.85″, 112 deg 43′ 51.95″
NOTE: GPS time stamp of 14:45:31 AZ time plus 2:17
gives 1447.48, but that is still 8 seconds shy of 1447.56.
16:45:37 plus 2:30 equals 1647.54, but subtracting two
hours manually still only gives 1447.54, which is still
TWO seconds shy of filename time stamp of 1447.56.
File Name: 20130630_150016_EP.MOV
Creation Date: 2013:06:30 16:59:44
Duration: 0:00:29.66
Make: NIKON COOLPIX P520
GPS Time Stamp: 21:59:39.17 UTC ( AZ 14:59:39.17 PM )
GPS Date Stamp: 2013:06:30
GPS Position: 34 deg 16′ 20.99″, 112 deg 43′ 51.82″
NOTE: GPS time stamp of 14:59:39 AZ time plus 29 seconds
gives 1500.08, but that is still 8 seconds shy of 1500.16.
16:59:44 plus 29 seconds equals 1700.13, but subtracting two
hours manually still only gives 1500.13, which is still
THREE seconds shy of filename time stamp of 1500.16.
File Name: 20130630_150530_fire_behavior_EP.MOV
Creation Date: 2013:06:30 17:05:10
Duration: 0:00:17.55
Make: NIKON COOLPIX P520
GPS Time Stamp: 22:05:05.95 UTC ( AZ 15:05:05.95 PM )
GPS Date Stamp: 2013:06:30
GPS Position: 34 deg 16′ 20.99″, 112 deg 43′ 51.82″
NOTE: GPS time stamp of 15:05:05 AZ time plus 17 seconds
gives 1505.22, but that is still 8 seconds shy of 1505.30.
17:05:10 plus 17 seconds equals 1705.27, but subtracting two
hours manually still only gives 1505.27, which is still
THREE seconds shy of filename time stamp of 1505.30.
File Name: 20130630_150822_VLAT_EP.MOV
Creation Date: 2013:06:30 17:06:28
Duration: 0:01:52
Make: NIKON COOLPIX P520
GPS Time Stamp: 22:06:23.3 UTC ( AZ 15:06:23.3 PM )
GPS Date Stamp: 2013:06:30
GPS Position: 34 deg 16′ 20.99″, 112 deg 43′ 51.82″
NOTE: GPS time stamp of 15:06:23 AZ time plus 1:52
gives 1508.15, but that is still 7 seconds shy of 1508.22.
17:06:20 plus 1:52 equals 1708.12, but subtracting two
hours manuall still only gives 1518.12, which is still
TEN seconds shy of filename time stamp of 1508.22.
File Name: 20130630_151842_fire_behavior_EP.MOV
Creation Date: 2013:06:30 17:16:50
Duration: 0:01:49
Make: NIKON COOLPIX P520
NOTE: 17:16:50 plus 1:49 equals 1718.39, but
subtracting two hours manually still only gives 1518.39,
which is still THREE seconds shy of filename time
stamp of 1518.42.
File Name: 20130630_152406_SEAT_EP.MOV
Creation Date: 2013:06:30 17:21:07
Duration: 0:02:56
Make: NIKON COOLPIX P520
GPS Time Stamp: 22:21:01.4 UTC ( AZ 15:21:01.4 PM )
GPS Date Stamp: 2013:06:30
GPS Position: 34 deg 16′ 20.18″, 112 deg 43′ 51.71″
File Name: 20130630_153014_SEAT_EP.MOV
Creation Date: 2013:06:30 17:29:02
Duration: 0:01:10
Make: NIKON COOLPIX P520
GPS Time Stamp: 22:28:57.45 UTC ( AZ 15:28:57.45 PM )
GPS Date Stamp: 2013:06:30
GPS Position: 34 deg 16′ 20.14″, 112 deg 43′ 51.73″
File Name: 20130630_153414_EP.MOV
Creation Date: 2013:06:30 17:34:01
Duration: 12.38 s
Make: NIKON COOLPIX P520
GPS Time Stamp: 22:33:56.38 UTC ( AZ 15:33:56.38 PM )
GPS Date Stamp: 2013:06:30
GPS Position: 34 deg 16′ 19.98″, 112 deg 43′ 51.79″
File Name: 20130630_153510_EP.MOV
Creation Date: 2013:06:30 17:34:42
Duration: 23.62 s
Make: NIKON COOLPIX P520
GPS Time Stamp: 22:34:37.65 UTC ( AZ 15:34:37.65 PM )
GPS Date Stamp: 2013:06:30
GPS Position: 34 deg 16′ 19.96″, 112 deg 43′ 51.79″
File Name: 20130630_153532_EP.MOV
Creation Date: 2013:06:30 17:35:13
Duration: 1.17 s
Make: NIKON COOLPIX P520
GPS Time Stamp: 22:35:07.87 UTC ( AZ 15:35:07.87 PM )
GPS Date Stamp: 2013:06:30
GPS Position: 34 deg 16′ 19.95″, 112 deg 43′ 51.80″
File Name: 20130630_153622_5KA_EP.MOV
Creation Date: 2013:06:30 17:35:38
Duration: 0:00:43
Make: NIKON COOLPIX P520
GPS Time Stamp: 22:35:33.09 UTC ( AZ 15:35:33.09 PM )
GPS Date Stamp: 2013:06:30
GPS Position: 34 deg 16′ 19.94″, 112 deg 43′ 51.80″
File Name: 20130630_154138_fire_behavior_EP.MOV
Creation Date: 2013:06:30 17:41:06
Duration: 0:00:31
Make: NIKON COOLPIX P520
GPS Time Stamp: 22:41:01.07 UTC ( AZ 15:41:01.07 PM )
GPS Date Stamp: 2013:06:30
GPS Position: 34 deg 16′ 19.84″, 112 deg 43′ 51.83″
File Name: 20130630_154940_SEAT_EP.MOV
Creation Date: 2013:06:30 17:48:21
Duration: 0:01:18
Make: NIKON COOLPIX P520
GPS Time Stamp: 22:48:15.97 UTC ( AZ 15:48:15.97 PM )
GPS Date Stamp: 2013:06:30
GPS Position: 34 deg 16′ 19.76″, 112 deg 43′ 51.84″
File Name: 20130630_161620_VLAT_split_1_EP.MOV
Creation Date: 2013:06:30 18:12:48
Duration: 0:03:31
Make: NIKON COOLPIX P520
GPS Time Stamp: 23:12:43.83 UTC ( AZ 16:12:43.83 PM )
GPS Date Stamp: 2013:06:30
GPS Position: 34 deg 16′ 19.92″, 112 deg 43′ 50.16″
File Name: 20130630_161658_EP.MOV
Creation Date: 2013:06:30 18:16:41
Duration: 15.75 s
Make: NIKON COOLPIX P520
GPS Time Stamp: 23:16:36.24 UTC ( AZ 16:16:36.24 PM )
GPS Date Stamp: 2013:06:30
GPS Position: 34 deg 16′ 19.90″, 112 deg 43′ 50.35″
File Name: 20130630_161858_VLAT_split_2_EP.MOV
Creation Date: 2013:06:30 18:17:07
Duration: 0:01:49
Make: NIKON COOLPIX P520
GPS Time Stamp: 23:17:02.62 UTC ( AZ 16:17:02.62 PM )
GPS Date Stamp: 2013:06:30
GPS Position: 34 deg 16′ 19.88″, 112 deg 43′ 50.40″
File Name: 20130630_162300_SEAT_drop_EP.MOV
Make: Canon EOS REBEL T3i
Lens Type: Canon EF-S 15-85mm f/3.5-5.6 IS USM
Creation Date: 2013:06:30 16:23:34
Internal Serial Number: ZA2261150
Serial Number: 152066061038
Lens Info: 15-85mm f/?
Lens Serial Number: 000013b95c
** WHY IS THIS TIME DIFFERENT FROM 16:23:34?
Create Date: 2013:06:30 16:23:01
Creation Date: 2013:06:30 16:23:01
Duration: 11.78 s
Create Date: 2013:06:30 16:23:34.00
Date/Time Original: 2013:06:30 16:23:34.00
Creation Date: 2013:06:30 16:23:34.00
File Name: 20130630_162508_2SEATS_EP.MOV
Creation Date: 2013:06:30 18:23:17
Duration: 0:01:50
Make: NIKON COOLPIX P520
GPS Time Stamp: 23:23:11.9 UTC ( AZ 16:23:11.9 PM )
GPS Date Stamp: 2013:06:30
GPS Position: 34 deg 16′ 19.82″, 112 deg 43′ 50.86″
File Name: 20130630_163338_fire_behavior_EP.MOV
Creation Date: 2013:06:30 18:31:26
Duration: 0:02:09
Make: NIKON COOLPIX P520
File Name: 20130630_163700_fire_behavior_EP.MOV
Creation Date: 2013:06:30 18:36:17
Duration: 0:00:39
Make: NIKON COOLPIX P520
File Name: 20130630_164544_fire_behavior_EP.MOV
Creation Date: 2013:06:30 18:43:43
Duration: 0:01:59
Make: NIKON COOLPIX P520
GPS Time Stamp: 23:43:38.25 UTC ( AZ 16:43:38.25 PM )
GPS Date Stamp: 2013:06:30
GPS Position: 34 deg 16′ 19.64″, 112 deg 43′ 51.87″
File Name: 20130630_170634_VLAT_EP.MOV
Creation Date: 2013:06:30 19:05:42
Duration: 0:00:49
Make: NIKON COOLPIX P520
GPS Time Stamp: 00:05:37.3 UTC ( AZ 17:05:37.3 PM )
GPS Date Stamp: 2013:07:01
GPS Position: 34 deg 16′ 19.63″, 112 deg 43′ 51.90″
END OF LISTING
Wait, what?? I’m not sure you explained that right.
Panebaker’s Nikon and Canon t3i are one hour ahead of Arizona time, because Arizona time is not Mountain Daylight Savings Time, the time Panebaker set his cameras to.
If anybody working on these files, unless they were in a serious hurry, or didn’t care whether it made sense dealing with an Arizona fire, should have known how to do this. Somebody apparently didn’t.
So first you have to set the camera’s timestamp back one hour, in order to sync to other Arizona-set cameras (like the one used on the Air2Air videos, and just about every other camera used on that fire).
Then you have to translate that to the military time — (the 24 hour clock) format they’re using on these filenames.
It seems crazy complicated, for people who don’t understand it. But it’s not really.
So, for example, a photo or video, taken by Panebaker, who lives in Montana and had set his two cameras to Mountain Daylight Savings Time, should have been re-timestamped, by whoever was preparing these files for this, back one hour. Say from 4:16:24 PM to 3:16:24 PM. Then, in order to accurately translate that into the “military 24-hour” format they chose to use to name these files for this kind of important publication, they would then “add” 12 hours to it (to count from midnight of the beginning of that day), to get to 151624. That’s how you do this. That’s what everybody does when they do this, That’s what I’ve been doing all along. For people hired/payed to do it, I would think it would been a “no-brainer.”
They could have absolutely cleanly and quickly and accurately renamed these files without confusion. I have no clue why they didn’t.
But thank you for doing it!
Marti… yes… this confused me as well when I finally
did an EXIF dump on ALL of Panebaker Apple Quicktime
movies and then looked at the dates coming OUT of
the movie files themselves. ( EXIF metadata ).
You ALREADY said the Nikon Coolpix P250 was set
ONE hour ahead of time… but the ‘Creation Date’ being
stamped into the movies themselves says that it was
TWO hours behind the ‘real Arizona time’ that day.
Let me take just ONE of the EXIF metadata dumps
from above and see if I can show you what I mean…
Let’s take just THIS one ( since it also has GPS data )…
_______________________________________________
File Name: 20130630_144226_VLAT_EP.MOV
Creation Date: 2013:06:30 16:40:52
Duration: 0:01:32
Make: NIKON COOLPIX P520
GPS Time Stamp: 21:40:46.57 UTC ( AZ 14:40:46.57 PM )
GPS Date Stamp: 2013:06:30
GPS Position: 34 deg 16′ 19.85″, 112 deg 43′ 51.89″
NOTE: GPS time stamp of 14:40:46 AZ time plus 1:32
equals 1442.18, but that is still 8 seconds shy of 1442.26.
16:40:52 plus 1:32 equals 1642.24, but subtracting two
hours manually still only gives 1442.24, which is still
two seconds shy of filename time stamp 1442.26.
_______________________________________________
Here’s what I am seeing above…
>> File Name: 20130630_144226_VLAT_EP.MOV
>> Creation Date: 2013:06:30 16:40:52
The FILENAME ended up in the ‘1400’ timerange… but
the ‘Creation Date’ ( according to the Nikon ) was TWO
HOURS ahead of that… in the ‘1600’ hour.
Now there is this…
GPS Time Stamp: 21:40:46.57 UTC ( AZ 14:40:46.57 PM )
That is actually CORRECT.
Timestamp that went into the movie itself was in the
‘1400’ hour ALREADY… and not TWO HOURS ahead
in the ‘1600’ hour as the Nikon’s own timeclock thought.
Well… when I say CORRECT… I mean the HOUR was
correct according to UTC time. ( 1400 hour ).
As explained above, however… I don’t think this is simply
a case where they ended up just taking the GPS time
and using that for the FILENAME itself.
The GPS time stamp of 14:40:46 AZ time plus the
1:32 media duration time embedded in the movie
itself equals 1442.18, but that is still 8 seconds shy of 1442.26 ( which is what they actually NAMED it ).
So ‘eight seconds’ are ‘missing’, even if they were
just referring to the embedded GPS time for filenames…
…but my point is that the HOUR is CORRECT ( according
to the GPS stamp )… and it is TWO hours ahead of the
‘Creation date’ stamped by the Nikon’s own clock setting.
UPDATE: The ‘EXIF metadata’ dump for the Panebaker videos
posted above in this Chapter 6 has been updated and
re-posted at the bottom ( the START ) of the new Chapter 7.
The list above actually has a couple of Panebaker videos
missing. The new list over in Chapter 7 is complete and
has all 31 Panebaker videos listed.
Here is a direct link to the *new* Chapter VII ( SEVEN ) of this ongoing discussion where the *new* EXIF report is posted…
http://www.investigativemedia.com/yarnell-hill-fire-chapter-vii/
**
** USING AN ONLINE EXIF METADATA EXTRACTOR WITH AIR STUDY
** VIDEOS WITHOUT HAVING TO DOWNLOAD THE VIDEOS
The same ‘online’ tool that can be used to easily extract EXIF metatdata from
any photograph can ALSO be used to pull a ton of metadata out of Apple
Quicktime movie format ( MOV ) files… ( like the Panebaker Air Study videos
in the online DropBox )… but it’s a little trickier to do than just analyzing
a ‘photograph’ in Mr. Dougherty’s online Drobox.
That online tool is here…
http://regex.info/exif.cgi
To analyze any PHOTOGRAPH in the online Dropbox… all you have to do
is select the photo… let it appear… then use the ‘View Original’ option by
either right-clicking the image or from the little ‘three dot’ menu option that
is always in the lower right corner when a photo is being displayed.
When the original photo appears… you just ‘cut and paste’ the URL that is now
showing in your browser’s address bar into the ‘View Image at URL’ input
box over in the EXIF online tool page.
You have to do this ‘View Original’ thing because the online Dropbox page
that normally (first) shows a photo to you is just an HTML ‘container’ and
that URL is NOT a ‘direct link’ to the photo itself.
In order for the online EXIF extractor to work… it simply needs a URL that
represents the location of the ACTUAL image ( and not a web page URL ).
Okay… all well and good… but here come the problem with trying to do the
same thing with the online Apple Quicktime movies ( like the Panebaker Air
Study videos ) that are also sitting in the online Dropbox.
When you choose to ‘play a movie’ up there in the Dropbox… right-clicking
the movie player when it appears does NOT give you the same ‘View original’
option as when viewing a still photo. Likewise… when it’s a movie being shown
in the online Dropbox… there is no ‘View original’ menu option if you click the
little ‘three dot’ menu in the lower right corner.
So if you just ‘cut and paste’ the URL of the Dropbox movie player into the
online EXIF extractor tool… it simply comes back and says “Invalid URL. This
is a web page and not a direct link to the item.”
Not to worry. Here is how to essentially do the same ‘View original’ option
for MOVIES up at that Dropbox… even though there is no such menu option.
You have to PRETEND as if you want to DOWNLOAD the movie… but
you still don’t have to actually download it.
When the movie you want to pull the EXIF data from is showing on the screen
with the big RIGHT-ARROW ‘Play’ button already showing… just mouse down
to the bottom right of the panel and LEFT-CLICK that little ‘three dot’ menu icon.
Only one option will be on the popup menu… and it says ‘Download’.
Do NOT LEFT-CLICK that option ( that will start the download ).
Do a RIGHT-CLICK instead.
A RIGHT-CLICK will bring up a ‘System menu’ that should have the
following option on it ( among others )…
“Copy Link Location”
Left-click click that option on this second popup menu.
This will copy the ACTUAL URL of where that original movie
file is really located up there at the Dropbox into your clipboard.
Once you have done the “Copy Link Location” operation… just switch right
over to the online EXIF extractor page and then do a ‘paste’ of that Link
into the ‘Image URL’ input box at the top of the page… then just RIGHT-CLICK
the ‘View Image at URL’ option.
That’s all there is to it.
The online tool now knows exactly where to get its OWN copy of the movie from
the Drobox… and will do so ‘in the background’ at backbone speed… and will then
show you the extracted EXIF data for that MOVIE. If it’s one of the larger movie
files you WILL have to ‘wait’ just a bit while the online server obtains its own
copy of the movie to analyze… but it won’t take long.
NOTE: You may see the online EXIF tool ‘loading’ icon just keep ‘spinning’
even after the EXIF data appears because it is still trying to display frames
from the movie on the same page. Once you are done cutting/pasting the
EXIF data into some other place of your own it’s probably best to CLOSE
that copy of the EXIF tool window so your CPU doesn’t keep spinning.
** GPS TIME STAMPS IN THE PANEBAKER VIDEOS
The Nikon Coolpix P520 camera being used for most of the Panebaker
videos was, in fact, using GPS and MOST of the videos taken with that
camera also have a ‘real time’ GPS time/date stamp. SOME of the same
videos from the same camera do NOT ( almost as if GPS was being
turned OFF at various time ).
If there IS any GPS data in a movie… it WILL be displayed by the online tool
and it will look like this…
Target image: /Panebaker/Video/Video/20130630_161658_EP
Date/Time Original 2013:06:30 18:16:41
GPS Time Stamp: 23:16:36.24 UTC
GPS Date Stamp: 2013:06:30
GPS Version ID: 2.3.0.0
GPS Latitude Ref: North
GPS Latitude: 34.272193 degrees
GPS Longitude Ref: West
GPS Longitude: 112.730652 degrees
GPS Altitude Ref: Above Sea Level
GPS Altitude: 1292.1 m
GPS Img Direction Ref: Unknown ()
GPS Img Direction: undef
GPS Map Datum: WGS84
Arizona is -7 ( minus SEVEN ) hours in relation to GPS UTC time.
That means…
When UTC hour is 2100… it is 1400 ( 2:00 PM ) in Arizona
When UTC hour is 2200… it is 1500 ( 3:00 PM ) in Arizona
When UTC hour is 2300… it is 1600 ( 4:00 PM ) in Arizona.
When UTC hour is 0000… it is 1700 ( 5:00 PM ) in Arizona
etc…
Thank you !
When I’m not brain dead, which I am right now, I’ll experiment with this!
**
** REVISITING THE 1715 PANEBAKER STILL PHOTOS
>> On May 18, 2014 at 4:48 am, calvin said:
>> The Panebaker VLAT pictures labeled 1715′ish are incorrect. These pictures
>> are actually the split drop from the VLAT from 1617. I am not sure if this is
>> relevant, or if it has already been identified.
It’s VERY relevant.
One of those 1715’ish Panebaker still photos ( the one named 20130630_171528-1_EP ) is the one that is a PERFECT match for the Tom
Story photo that was (supposedly) shot at 1639 ( according to the timestamp
on Story’s Canon 1D with the 300mm zoom lens attached ).
So however *wrong* the Panebaker still photos are ( being shot with his
own Canon EOS REBEL T3i camera )… that is ALSO how ‘wrong’ the
Tom Story Canon EOS 1D photo timestamps are.
So there appear to be TWO ‘wrong offsets’ involved here now…
1) How *wrong* was Panebaker’s Canon EOS REBEL T3i that day?
2) Answer to (1) determines how *wrong* Tom Story’s Canon EOS 1D really was.
As much as there is no evidence that there was a VLAT drop at 1639 that
day ( the moment of Steed’s first MAYDAY ) as suggested by Tom Story’s
photos… there is also now actually no real evidence there was a VLAT drop at
exactly 1715, either ( as indicated by Panebaker’s still photos ).
There is no doubt they were BOTH photographing the ‘same VLAT drop’…
but there is still plenty of doubt as to exactly WHEN that was.
So regardless of how the ‘162300 video mystery’ pans out on the other
thread… this thread needs to ‘revisit’ the Panebaker 1715 series and
find out what the ‘wrong time offset’ for THAT camera really was.
More on this later.
Back to looking at video stillframes and comparing them to still photos.
**
** PROBLEM SOLVED?
**
** NEW TIME OFFSETS FOR BOTH…
**
** PANEBAKER’S CANON EOS REBEL T3i
** TOM STORY’S CANON EOS 1D ( WITH 300mm LENS )
As it turns out… thanks to the fact that the audio tracks of the
Panebaker Air Study Videos were capturing ‘shutter clicks’…
this wasn’t all that hard to figure out.
As calvin pointed out… the Panebaker 1715’ish photo series
( regardless of timestamp ) are ACTUALLY photos of the FIRST
VLAT PASS that was part of that ‘VLAT split’ sequence taken
almost an HOUR earlier than 1715.
The Panebaker Air Study video that captures the ACTUAL (correct)
VLAT drop which corresponds to BOTH the Tom Story 7093 photo
( with an incorrect timestamp of 1639.21 ) AND the Panebaker
20130630_171528-1_EP photo ( with an incorrect timestamp of
1715.28 ) is this one…
20130630_161620_VLAT_split_1_EP
This video is 3 minutes and 30 seconds long.
VIDEO 161620 STARTS AT 1612.50 ( 4:12.50 PM )
+2:27 ( 16:15.17 / 4:15.17 PM )
Shutter click that matches Panebaker still photo 20130630_171528-1_EP *and* Tom Story’s 7093 still photo.
VIDEO 161620 ENDS AT 1616.20 ( 4:16.20 PM )
So that means the TIME setting on Panebaker’s Canon EOS
REBEL T3i was actually 1 hour and 11 seconds AHEAD of the
time of the video camera that was recording the 161620 video
that day.
( 1715.28 minus 1615.17 equals 1 hour and 11 seconds ).
So… how does that now affect the ‘time offset’ for Story’s
Canon EOS 1D?
Well… since we NOW know that the actual EVENT being
photographed by Tom Story’s 7093 photo with his Canon
EOS 1D took place at exactly 1615.17 that day… and Story’s
Canon EOS 1D put a *wrong* timestamp of 1639.21 on that
photo… the ‘difference’ between those times would be…
24 minutes and 4 seconds.
( 1639.21 minus 1615.17 equals 24 minutes and 4 seconds ).
So Tom Story’s Canon EOS 1D appears to have been set
24 minutes and 4 seconds AHEAD of the ‘real’ time that day
( if we accept that the video camera on the tripod shooting Air
Study videos was, itself, set close to the ACTUAL time that day ).
SUMMARY…
** Panebaker’s Canon EOS REBEL T3i camera was timestamping
photos 1 hour and 11 second AHEAD of ‘real time’ that day.
** Tom Story’s Canon EOS 1D camera was timestamping
photos 24 minutes and 4 seconds AHEAD of ‘real time’ that day.
See what I wrote below about syncing 152406_SEAT with the 1544 Air2Air video.
Now thinking about that 162300_SEAT_drop video. I couldn’t figure out where it came from. It’s not from any of the cameras we’re seeing most of the video from. It’s totally different. I had been wondering “Where did Panebeker get that video from??”
Now that all makes sense. He was shooting stills with the t3i, with a, as you have found, camera set ahead one hour (which actually would be correct in any Mountain Time place other than Arizona — which doesn’t observe Daylight Savings Time), and he decided to shoot that drop as a video.
So whoever was file-naming Panebeker’s t3i’s photos/video didn’t know that and thus incorrectly named the files.
It really makes me wonder who was naming these files. They made so many mistakes it makes it hard to believe it was someone on “their team.” I think if it was somebody on “their team” they would have been going more for syncing accuracy and would have been more clued in.
Just my somewhat brain dead at this pont opinion.
I think here’s still a lot of timestamp wonkiness on the Nikon videos. Bit I have somewhat of a killer day in front of me, so I don’t know when I’ll be able to get back to it.
We are still putting a lot of ‘trust’ into the existing
filename time/date stamps of the Panebaker
Air Study videos… but I still think it’s OK to do
that ( given exceptions like the 162300 video ).
Example… even for the NEW ‘time offsets’ for
Panebaker’s Canon REBEL and Story’s EOS 1D,
I am obviously ‘trusting’ the fact that the following
Panebaker video is ( at least ) CLOSE to the
REAL time that day…
20130630_161620_VLAT_split_1_EP
As you just pointed out… events in these Panebaker
videos *ARE* ‘traceable’ back into the long-running
Air-To-Air channel videos… and usually ( at least )
these TWO video cameras match up pretty
well, time wise.
So what are the odds that BOTH the camera on
the tripod recording the Panebaker videos *AND*
the camera on the tripod that was recording the
long-running Air-To-Air channel traffic are *BOTH*
set incorrectly… but still within a few seconds
of each other?
I don’t know… but I would say ‘slim to none’.
The fact that the Air-To-Air traffic captures
eventually ‘line up’ ( timewise ) with the actual
MAYDAY calls and the deployment events seems
to indicate that the camera doing the Air-To-Air
channel captures that day was pretty much set to
the ‘right time’ that day… so anything from
Panebaker that ‘matches’ up with dialogue in an
Air-To-Air capture can/should also be considered
‘the right time’ that day.
At one point… I tried to match up an event in either
a Panebaker video OR the Air-To-Air videos with
something from the Blue Ridge GPS unit ( which
was using satellite real-time that day )…
…but that turned out to be pretty much like putting
a square peg into a round hole. I can’t find any
DIRECT correlation between a GPS stamped
event in the Blue Ridge data with an Air-To-Air
channel transmission and/or a Panebaker video
radio capture. Close… but still guesswork.
When I set out on THAT quest… I was hoping to
actually find a TAC channel capture in an Air
Study video that matched the moment when
Frisby told Brown to ‘get some drivers to move
vehicles’. That is still, of course, the EXACT
moment when Brown did his ‘about face’ on
his hike on the Cutover Trail… which was
captured by his GPS unit.
No such luck. None of that ‘rescuing Brendan’ and
the immediate ‘moving vehicles’ radio traffic seems
to have been captured in any Air Study video.
The only line we NOW have to the Blue Ridge GPS
unit and the Panebaker videos is this ‘indirect’ line…
1) Blue Ridge GPS event ( ATV leaving parking lot )
was used to verify that Story’s Canon 3D was
‘accurate’ that day ( within 45 to 50 seconds of
real time ).
2) Story’s photos can be used to ‘match’ events
in Panebaker videos to determine ‘accuracy’
as related to Blue Ridge GPS unit.
So any Tom Story Canon 3D photo that matches
a moment in a Panebaker video almost exactly
is a good ‘indirect’ line of proof back to the
GPS based satellite time that day.
But as we have already discovered… ANYTHING
within 60 seconds or so is going to have to be
considered ‘accurate’ for this day in Yarnell.
Even the GPS unit was only ‘updating’ every
60 seconds that day.
Interestingly, tho, the camera timestamp on the first of those three videos says 6:12:48 PM.
So now I’m thinking the the Panebaker Nikon (source of these videos) is also one hour ahead, just like the Panebaker t3i. And that would make perfect sense, all things considered. The must both be Panebaker’s cameras, and he must live outside of Arizona,with his cameras synced to Mountain Daylight Savings time.
Still, however, I’m seeing quite a few of my representative samples of this videos, in which the File Namer, both not realizing those two cameras were “off” by an hour and getting confused as to how to translate the stamps from “4:30 PM” to “1630” goes back and forth between translating them correctly and translating them incorrectly.
Actually, Eric lives in Jackson, Wyoming, I think.
I think the “Air2Air” Contour +2 videocam is accurate, both in names and timestamps, essentially.
I’m looking at 20130630_1628_EP.MOV. The timestamp says 3:47:58 PM. Which would relatively accurately indicate the video was started at 3:47 PM (1547) and end at 4:28 PM (1628), and it’s a 40-minute video. So that works.
So the person who owns THAT camera probably lives in Arizona.
Reply to Marti Reed post on
May 19, 2014 at 12:06 pm
>> Marti said…
>> I think the “Air2Air” Contour +2
>> videocam is accurate, both in
>> names and timestamps,
>> essentially.
Totally agree… it is ‘consistent’ with
its own timestamps and filenames
*AND* it *ALSO* seems to have
been set pretty close to the ‘real
time’ ( well, as close as anything
was that day, anyway ).
That video is actually 40 minutes and 14 seconds long… but that didn’t
throw anything off as far as the file
naming went.
1547.58 plus 40 minutes and 14
seconds is 1628.12.
Still ‘right on the money’ and still means the ‘1628’ in the filename is
CORRECT.
I think *all* of the Air-To-Air channel
videos are just as ‘tickety-boo’ with
regards to start times, durations, end
times ( and resulting filename stamp ).
The Panebaker videos… well… ( as
you pointed out already )… that’s
a whole ‘nother story.
It’s like ‘follow the bouncing timestamps’ for those puppies.
More later.
PS: A number of the Nikon Panebaker videos DO, in fact, have UTC GPS time and date stamps embedded in them… and I’m currently trying to see how that factors into things here.
Something is ‘strange’ about even these UTC GPS timestamps, however, and there seems to be a ‘pattern’ there but can’t quite explain it yet. They are always about 8 to 10 seconds BEHIND the other timestamps but its not totally consistent from video to video.
OK I’m back from driving, with a swollen sprained foot, clear across town and back in heavy traffic. I had some time to think.
I DON’T think it’s OK to be “putting a lot of ‘trust’ into the filename time/date stamps” on those videos.
I didn’t have time nor drive space to download all those videos, but of the eight I did, they were ALL incorrectly labeled. The five that are kinda sorta right, like 152406 and 150530 is only right because the renamer just read 5:21:07 PM and just stuck a 1 in front of that, not knowing the camera stamp was an hour ahead. So, purely by mistake those ended up with the “right” filenames.
The other three of those eight, are misnamed, because the renamer, while getting the translation right, didn’t now the camera stamp was off by an hour. So anybody that doesn’t know that camera is off by an hour, is gonna either misinterpret or misunderstand what they’re looking at.
If I could download all those files, which I can’t, I could easily and quickly make a list of those videos with correct filenames. I think it would be well worth doing, now that we know what the problem is.
And I think they should be corrected for Arizona time, which Panebeker didn’t, so they can be synced more “trustworthily” with all the other stuff people are comparing them to.
Can you do that with your online file metadata reader?
The (free) online tool won’t pull any
metadata from Apple Quicktime
format MOV files.
Need something like exiftool v.9.61
for that.
…but I hear ya on the filenames.
At some point… they SHOULD all
be ‘correct’ and ‘reflect reality’.
Working on that here as well.
More later.
Great! Thank you!
Just found something. Jeffrey Friedl’s “Online Exif (Image Data) Viewer:
http://regex.info/blog/other-writings/online-exif-image-data-viewer
I’ve used a lot of Jeffrey’s Lightroom Plugin. His stuff is quite good. I think I’m gonna download and try out this, and also his Exif Viewer for Lightroom.
That’s the same ‘online’ tool I’ve been recommending and that I was commenting about above… but this is the URL I’ve been using…
http://regex.info/exif.cgi
It actually SAYS it supports MOV Quicktime… but I haven’t been able to get it to successfully analyze any of the Panebaker videos.
Problem with the online tool and using it with the YFH Dropbox is that you have to do ‘View Original’ on any photo and use THAT URL for the EXIF viewer.
If you just call up an Apple Quicktime movie via the dropbox and try to use that URL… it just says “Invalid URL… this is just a web page”.
There is no ‘View original’ option for the movies in the online Drobox, as there is with photos.
You can also try to analyze any ‘downloaded’ videos… but problem there is that the online tool then has to UPLOAD the entire frickin’ thing before it can ‘analyze’ it. Not workable with some of these Air Study videos.
So a desktop tool like exiftool v9.6 is what I’ve been using to analyze the Apple Quicktime movies.
Marti… hold the phone…
Scratch my comment
above. I just figured out HOW to use that ‘online tool’ to analyze the Apple Quicktime MOV files that are actually sitting in the online YHF Dropbox.
You have to sort of ‘fool’ it and pretend to ‘download’ the video… without actually downloading it.
See a new parent comment up above about how to actually do this.
Ha Ha remember when we spent several days syncing Tom’s D1????
I said I thought it was 22 minutes ahead and you estimated somewhere around 30 minutes ahead?
I had reasons to not want you to be right because of how that would skew my syncing of Tom’s photo of the VLAT after Blue Ridge McCord’s “almost fiasco with the helicopter” video!!
WTKTT: I hate to ask too much of you, and I know we’re all breathlessly waiting/hoping/praying for a Chapter VII, but…
I think it would be enormously useful if you could write up a summary of this whole Panebaker exploration. I can’t do it because I don’t know what all is in your head. I’ve pretty much written/thunk out loud what’s been in mine.
I think it’s really important for folks coming here to understand this, and I don’t think they will by trying to read/comprehend these four days of complicated/convoluted threads.
Thanks!!
John has started a Chapter 7. Put the summary in there. Loading this comment thread is a challenge for some computers.
Yes… a *new* Chapter VII ( SEVEN ) has started.
Here is a direct link to the *new* Chapter VII ( SEVEN )
of this ongoing discussion…
http://www.investigativemedia.com/yarnell-hill-fire-chapter-vii/
Marti… I did a ‘dump’ up above of the EXIF data ( including
GPS time stamps ) from the Panebaker videos… but that
was before I read your comment above.
That ‘dump’ is NOT my idea of a ‘summary’ as to where
we reallly stand with these Panebaker videos.
I will do that additional ‘summary’ and post it as well.
It’s actually looking pretty clear.
I no longer think ( at the moment ) that 162300 video
was ‘replacing’ anything at all. It was just a ‘screw up’.
What amazes me is that these guys were getting PAID
to do this ‘Aerial Firefighting Study’ ( With taxpayer dollars
from USDA? )… but they didn’t even bother to make sure
their equipment was all ‘good to go’ with correct timestamps
and whatnot that day.
**
** UPDATE: MORE ABOUT THE 162300 AIR STUDY VIDEO
**
** MYSTERY SOLVED?
>> Marti wrote…
>> Was the Nikon’s timestamper generally off? I don’t know.
>> Periodically, a photo was taken on that camera. The photos
>> are in the Schultz folder.
>> 20130630_1616_AZ-A1S-000688_T911___7_G_RS.JPG
>> (Please dear Universe, don’t ever compel me to type that out
>> on my iPad ever again…) is of the T11 coming out of one of the
>> split drops and has a time stamp of 4:16:36 PM. Boom!
>> As in that’s pretty accurate, relatively speaking, given that we
>> don’t have any absolute time stamps on any of these files, because
>> it just doesn’t work that way in the real world, unless somebody
>> decides to make it do that.
Marti…
Couple of things.
You are right. There is no doubt that even though they DO capture the same
SINGLE SEAT drop… the 152406 video and the 162300 video were shot with
TWO different video cameras.
The 152406 video was shot with a video camera on a TRIPOD… while the
162300 video was shot with a ‘handheld’ video camera.
So which one has the *REAL* timestamp?
I believe it’s the 152406 video.
The following photo in the Swartz folder DOES, in fact, appear to be a still photo
of the EXACT SAME DROP that we see happening in BOTH the 152406 video
*and* the 162300 video.
/AerialFirefightingstudy/Swartz/Pictures/Nikon/North of Fire/Seat Drop 3/
20130630_1524_AZ-A1S-000688_T874___1_G_RS.JPG
Camera: Nikon COOLPIX P520
Lens: 107 mm (Max aperture f/3)
Exposure: Auto exposure, Program AE, 1/250 sec, f/4.9, ISO 160
Flash: Off, Did not fire
Focus: AF-S, Mid-left
Focus 2: AF Area Mode: Dynamic Area
Date: June 30, 2013 – 3:24:31 PM
Location: Latitude/longitude: 34° 16′ 19.7″ North, 112° 43′ 51.9″ West
Location decimal: ( 34.272152, -112.731085 )
Altitude: 1,375.3 m
File: 3,672 × 4,896 JPEG (18.0 megapixels)
If we are going to trust the timestamps on the Swartz photos… then this simply
CONFIRMS that the drop actually did take place in the 1524 timeframe… and
*NOT*( in the 1623 timeframe as the 162300 video seems to suggest.
Things are *still* just a ‘little wonky’ timewise, however, but ( I believe ) fully
explainable now.
The timestamp on Swartz’s photo showing the actual moment of ‘retardant
dropping’ from this single SEAT is 1524.31.
That does NOT match the actual ‘drop time’ for this single SEAT drop as
shown in the 152406 video… but it may be ‘close enough’.
Here is the actual ‘moment of the drop’ as recorded starting at the +2:05
second mark in the 152406 video…
__________________________________________________________________
+2:05 ( 1523.15 / 3:23.15 PM )
(Foreground person 1 – Panebaker?): Here he comes.
+2:13 ( 1523.23 / 3:23.23 PM )
(AA – Rory Collins): Operations, Air Attack, Air-To-Ground
+2:18 ( 1523.28 / 3:23.28 PM )
(OPS1 Todd Abel): Go ahead.
+2:19 ( 1523.29 / 3:23.29 PM )
( RETARDANT DROP STARTS FROM THE SINGLE SEAT )
+2:19 ( 1523.29 / 3:23.29 PM )
(AA – Rory Collins): Okay… Ahhhh… we’ll probly be around there
in about five. Umm… What’s your plan on the ground?
+2:20 ( 1523.30 / 3:23.30 PM )
( RETARDANT IS NOW FULLY DROPPING FROM THE SINGLE SEAT )
+2:27 ( 1523.37 / 3:23.37 PM )
(OPS1 Todd Abel): What I’d like to do… ah… is… ah… tie into ( that court here? ) where ya
see the whole ??. If we can tag onto the road up here and then just run it… ah… you know…
( transmission breaks up and cuts off ).
FOREGROUND OVERLAP…
+2:27 ( 1523.37 / 3:23.37 PM )
(Tanker 810): Eight one zero OFF… hard right.
(B33 – French): Lookin’ like you already got me in sight…
looks like your drop went in there good. Thank you.
(Tanker 810): ( Back to ?? )
__________________________________________________________________
So… according to the 152406 video… the ‘moment of the drop’ appears to have
been from a START time of +2:19 ( 1523.29 / 3:23.29 PM ) to ‘fully dropping
retardant’ ( as seen in the Swartz photo ) at +2:20 ( 1523.30 / 3:23.30 PM ).
However… the timestamp on Swartz’s photo for that same ‘fully dropping
retardant’ moment is 1524.31 ( 3:24.31 PM ).
That’s pretty much a full 61 seconds different ( ahead of the video )… but it IS
definitely *within* 61 seconds… which we might have to simply accept as
‘accurate enough to be the same moment’.
I believe this Swartz photo IS of the same exact ‘single SEAT drop’ moment
as seen in the 152406 video… but Swartz’s camera was simply *about* 61
seconds AHEAD of that camera on the tripod that day.
The other reason I believe that Swartz’s photo MUST be of the same drop being
shown in the 152406 video is that even if that SEAT was making MULTIPLE drops
at that location… the simple 61 second time difference is NOT enough time for
his photo to have been of a full ‘go around’ and/or ANOTHER drop by the same
SEAT at the same location.
Not only is there no indication of that happening in the audio or the Air-To-Air
channel traffic… 61 seconds is NOT enough time for them to have made a
complete ‘circle around’ for another pass… either BEFORE or AFTER this
drop captured in the 152606 video.
Also note…
At +2:14 in the 152406 video a white SUV passes the camera heading
west on Hays Ranch Road. The same white SUV is also seen in the
162300 video just a few hundred feet further west on Hays Ranch Road.
No big additional revelation there… just more proof that the 152406 video
and the 162300 video are ‘of the same event happening at the same time’.
So what does all this now mean?
I believe it means the following…
1) There is no doubt that the Swartz photo, the +2:18 second mark in the
152406 video, and the contents of the 162300 video are all THE SAME
SINGLE SEAT DROP being photographed/videoed with 1 digital camera
( Swartz’s ) and TWO different video cameras ( one on tripod, one handheld ).
2) The Swartz photo verifies that the drop really did take place right around
1523.30 that day… and NOT in the 1623 timeframe as the mysterious 162300
video seems to suggest. Swartz’s digitial camera was simply +61 seconds
ahead of the time set on the video camera that was on the tripod that day.
3) The 162300 video *could* just simply be a ‘renaming error’ on Panebaker’s
( or someone else’s? ) part and he really did just mean it to have a filename
of 152300 instead ( even though even that timestamp would not be totally
accurate ). It was NOT an ‘extraction’ from the actual 152406 video that was
then ‘saved to disk’ with a wrong filename… it was the 11.7 seconds from the
OTHER handheld video camera that was (somehow) saved/named with
*WRONG* timestamp about 1 hour into the future.
So… mystery solved?
There WAS no *original* 162300 video at all? ( or at least not one that got
‘replaced’ with 11.7 seconds from another video? ).
This was just some kind of RENAMING error on TWO (different) videos from
TWO different cameras that DO show the same SEAT drop event happening
circa 1523.30 that day?
Followup…
In a previous post ( down below ) I wrote…
>> Marti…
>> At exactly +4 seconds in the 11.7 second 162300 video… a
>> shutter click is heard. It comes right after OPS1 Todd Abel
>> says “Go ahead” and then Air Attack Rory Collins starts his
>> “Okay… uh… we’ll probly be around there in about five”
>> response.
>>
>> The ‘shutter click’ also comes at the exact moment that the
>> retardant flow was turned on during this SEAT drop captured
>> in the 162300 video.
>>
>> The SAME EXACT ‘shutter click’ is also heard at the SAME
>> EXACT moment at the +2:20 mark in the 152406 video ( an
>> hour earlier? ) and is part of the same 11 seconds from
>> 152406 ‘duplicated’ as the content of 162300.
>>
>> I can’t seem to find a match for this still photo in ANY of the
>> folders up in the ‘Aerial Firefighting Study’ folder.
>> Not even in Panebaker’s specific ‘SEAT drops’ folder. ( Which
>> is what the 162300 video is showing… a SEAT drop ). Pity.
>> Maybe THAT still camera would have had a correct setting in
>> order to verify 162300 itself.
There DOES appear to be such a ‘photo’ in the folder(s).
Apparently I just ‘missed it’ on a first pass.
I believe the Swartz photo being referenced above IS the one
that corresponds to this ‘shutter click’ heard at the same
exact moment in BOTH the 152406 and 162300 video(s),
and it DOES help verify the TIME when this single SEAT
drop *actually* took place.
Hate to say it but.
That photo filename (thank you swartz for doing this consistently in your photos!!) has the name of the plane in it, It’s T874. The plane being directed in the two videos by Bravo 33 is three-one-zero. You can hear that in 162406.
Unfortunately Swartz doesn’t have any photos of 310 making this drop. That’s because, in my opinion, he’s NOT using a different camera, he’s using the same one and only Nikon Coolpix that they are using to shoot the videos.
Typo. you can hear
French Bravo 33 saying that on 152406.
And I ask myself, what is the importance of this?
It’s because people are using the Panebaker videos to establish when things are being said. IMHO, after today, I don’t believe the “times” being used in the filenames are accurate, for a variety of reasons.
One, because I’m finding that the timestamps on these videos don’t appear accurate and two….
Because whoever was translating them into the filenames seems to have also been confused as to how to translate them.
Reply to Marti Reed post on
May 18, 2014 at 11:36 pm
>> Marti said…
>> And I ask myself, what is the importance
>> of this?
>> It’s because people are using the
>> Panebaker videos to establish when
>> things are being said.
Yes… that’s one BIG reason… but with
regards to this one single ‘mystery’
of the 162300 video… it’s also all about
just establishing if things that are now
permanently in the public evidence record
really ARE what they SAY they are.
*OR*
…whether there is any ‘evidence’ that things
are MISSING which OUGHT to be there.
The 162300 video ‘mystery’ really did look,
at first, as if something that OUGHT to be
there ( an Air Study video capturing events
and/or radio traffic circa 1623 ) *might*
have been ‘replaced’ with something ELSE.
That is looking much less likely now… but
it is still worth verifying as much as possible.
>> Marti also said…
>> IMHO, after today, I don’t believe the
>> “times” being used in the filenames are
>> accurate, for a variety of reasons.
Your ‘points one and two’ up above are
valid… but in *general* I still think MOST
of the Panebaker video timestamps
*CAN* be trusted.
There are a LOT of ‘overlapping’ radio
transmits between these Panebaker
videos and the other ( long running )
Air-To-Air channell videos that DO
sort of prove that at least the timestamps
between those TWO video cameras were
perhaps only SECONDS apart…
…but I agree there appear to be exceptions.
SOME of the Panebaker Air Study video
timestamps ( even other than the
mysterious 162300 one ) appear to still
be a little ‘wonky’.
Reply Marti Reed post on May 18, 2014 at 10:57 pm
>> Marti said…
>>
>> Hate to say it but.
>> That photo filename (thank you swartz for doing
>> this consistently in your photos!!) has the name
>> of the plane in it, It’s T874. The plane being
>> directed in the two videos by Bravo 33 is three-
>> one-zero. You can hear that in 162406.
Actually… it is 810 ( Eight one zero ), not 310, but
you are still RIGHT. It is Tanker 810 making the
drop in BOTH videos and he says so himself as
he finishes that drop and is heard ( in BOTH of
the videos ) completing the drop by announcing…
“Eight one zero OUT… hard RIGHT”.
As far as whether or not the ‘title’ on that Swartz
photo actually matches reality… it’s hard to say.
We now have a situation where either the TIME
on Swartz’s camera was WILDLY wrong… and
could not possibly have been a mere 61 seconds
off… OR… the time on Swartz’s camera really
was ‘reasonably accurate’ ( within, say 60 seconds ),
and he is just totally mistaken about what the
number of the SEAT was that he was photographing
at 1524.
A super-enhancement of that Swartz photo SEEMS
to indicate that the actual number on the TAIL of
that plane making that drop is, in fact, 810.
It’s pretty hard to make out because of the smoke
but I would put money on 810 and not 874. The
last digit of the 3-digit tail number seems to most
definitely be a ZERO and not a FOUR.
Also… even though T874 looks VERY similar to
810 ( same type of plane )… Air Tanker 874 also
has the word FIRE ( in big black letters ) on the tail
under the 874 tail number… which I can almost say
for certain is NOT present under the 3 digit tail
number of that SEAT in Swartz’s 1524 photograph.
Tanker 874 apparently has a registration number of
N174ML.
The registration number for Air Tanker 810 is
apparently N187LA… and here is a ‘close-up’
photo of it ( matches Swartz photo exactly )…
http://highsierraspotters.com/forum/gallery/showimage.php?s=2421e773c8f3bbd7b5d3eeadf75181ba&i=4633&c=6
BTW: The GPS information on that Swartz photo
is actually accurate. That IS exactly where he
was standing when he took this photo of that
SEAT drop.
More on this later.
The KEY will be that regardless of what it says
in Swartz’s photo title… exactly WHERE was
T874 at exactly 1524?
If it was off on a ‘load and return’ at that time, then
Swartz simply was mistaken about which plane
he was taking a picture of at 1524.
Followup…
Here’s a link to a corresponding ‘photo’ of
Tanker 874. Notice the word FIRE in big
black letters on the tail under the ‘874’
tail number.
I can say pretty much for certain that there
is NO such word FIRE under the tail number
of that SEAT in the 1524 Swartz photo.
Just the 3 digit number that DOES, in fact,
appear to at least end with ZERO.
Nothing else UNDER the tail number.
Firefighting Tankers and Support Aircraft…
Tanker 874 – Registration number N174MLK
http://azaerophoto.com/forum/index.php?topic=234.60
OK, WTKTT, I think you’re right.
The sequence which begins with Bravo 33 saying “eight-one-zero how we lookin?” at 00:31 in 152406_SEAT is right there at 5:18 in the 1544 Air2Air video.
Of course, we don’t know how accurate the timestamping is on the Contour +2 videocam, but I’m guessing it at least isn’t as wonky as the Nikon!
Kudos!
I think you’re right about the cameras, also, now. There’s no way that still and that video could have been shot on the same camera. They were both Nikon Coolpix P520’s. What threw me off was the wording in the “Panebeker Photo and Video Information” docx.
It says:
“Photos were taken primarily with a Canon EOS Rebel T3I, a couple were taken with a Nikon P520. Video in the video folder was also taken with the Nikon Coolpix P520.”
Sounds like they’re describing on camera, right?
Lightroom doesn’t show camera metadata, except the timestamp, for videos. So there is no camera name, much less Camera Serial Numbers. So I wasn’t “seeing” anything to tell me those were two different “versions” of the same camera.
So now I can quit wondering how the camera was stamping the stills “accurately” but not the videos.
The Moore folder includes some photos of that drop, too, and they sequence right in that framework, also. Starting with 20130630_Loc1_seat (20).jpg at 3:23.23 PM. Also Swartz shot the scene before the drop on his iPad at 3:20:42 PM.
**
** MORE ABOUT THE MYSTERIOUS 162300 AIR STUDY VIDEO
**
** WHAT WAS *REALLY* HAPPENING CIRCA 1623 ( 4:23 PM )?
Since we don’t know if there ever even WAS an ‘original 162300’ Air Study
Video ( of any length ) that was then ‘replaced’ with the 11.7 clip from another
video taken almost an HOUR earlier… it’s impossible to say how much ‘radio
traffic’ that original 162300 video *might* have captured ( if it existed ).
For the sake of argument… let’s assume that it DID exist and that it WAS much
more than 11.7 seconds… and that it actually ‘covered’ the time period that
stretched all the way back to the Air Study video that immediately preceded it.
All that means is that it couldn’t have been more than FOUR minutes
long, since the Air Study Video that immediately precedes the
20130630_162300_SEAT_drop_EP Air Study video was the 20130630_161858_VLAT_split_2_EP one.
( 162300 minus 161858 equals 4 minutes and 2 seconds )
It is doubtful that even if the original 162300 video was MUCH longer than 11.7
seconds that it would have been this full FOUR minutes long ( since no other
Panebaker video was that long and never really exceeded 3 minutes in length )…
…but again… just for the sake of completeness… here are the full FOUR minutes
of captured Air-To-Air channel traffic that would cover the entire time in-between
the 161858 video and the 162300 one… just to see what was *really*
happening ( on Air-To-Air, anyway ) during that timeframe.
The timeframe that actually covers the 11.7 seconds of the existing 162300
video is marked in the transcript below.
As the transcript below shows… NO ACTUAL DROPS took place during this
1618.58 and 1623.00 time period ( as the 162300 video seems to suggest )…
and B33 Thomas French was simply just still in the planning stages for the
upcoming ‘two seat’ drop with Tankers 874 and 830 ( captured in a completely
separate video from the 162300 one ).
** VIDEO 20130630_1628_EP STARTS AT 1547.46 ( 3:47.46 PM )
Length of video: 40 minutes and 14 seconds.
NOTE: The first 30 minutes and 42 seconds omitted from this posting to save
space. Only the FOUR minutes that covers the gap between the 161858 and
162300 videos is included.
+30:43 ( 1618.29 / 4:18.29 PM )
(Tanker 830): I gotcha… am I comin’ in too, Rusty?
+30:48 ( 1618.34 / 4:18.34 PM )
(Tanker 830): Is eight three zero comin’ in with eight seven four?
+30:51 ( 1618.37 / 4:18.37 PM )
(B33 – French): Afirmative. Eight seven four and eight three zero you’re
both cleared in. Two nine eight zero… come in at fifty-five.
+30:57 ( 1618.43 / 4:18.42 PM )
(Tanker 830): Roger.
+31:00 ( 1618.46 / 4:18.46 PM )
(B33 – French): Nine one one… ya still up?
+31:02 ( 1618.48 / 4:18.48 PM )
(VLAT 911): Yes sir.
+31:03 ( 1618.49 / 4:18.49 PM )
(B33 – French): That was absolutely right on… both drops… thank you.
+31:06 ( 1618.52 / 4:18.52 PM )
(VLAT 911): Thank you. ‘preciate it.
+31:10 ( 1618.56 / 4:18.56 PM )
(5KA): Five Kilo Alpha’s out of the dip.
+31:12 ( 1618.58 / 4:18.58 PM )
(B33 – French): Kilo Alpha you’re clear to the drop.
+31:14 ( 1619.00 / 4:19.00 PM )
(5KA): Kilo Alpha
+31:23 ( 1619.09 / 4:19.09 PM )
(B33 – French): Eight seven four… set me up a coverage level 4… whole load… okay?
+31:26 ( 1619.12 / 4:19.12 PM )
(874): Okay.
( 40 SECOND PAUSE – NO RADIO TRAFFIC )
+32:06 ( 1619.52 / 4:19.52 PM )
(5KA): Five Kilo Alpha’s off the drop
+32:07 ( 1619.53 / 4:19.53 PM )
(B33 – French): Kilo Alpha Bravo 33 copy… Hey… I gotcha in sight
so I’ll be low level on this flight but I DO have you in sight… give me a call off the dip.
+32:14 ( 1620.00 / 4:20.00 PM )
(5KA): Will do.
( 42 SECOND PAUSE – NO RADIO TRAFFIC )
+32:56 ( 1620.42 / 4:20.42 PM )
(Unknown): And Bravo 33 eight ?? comin’ around on the east side…
lookin’ for ya… oh… I gotcha.
+33:00 ( 1620.46 / 4:20.46 PM )
(B33 – French): Follow me around… we’re gonna take ya right to
work… allright?
+33:03 ( 1620.49 / 4:20.49 PM )
(Unknown): Allright.
+33:04 ( 1620.50 / 4:20.50 PM )
(B33 – French): You’re clear down to five… and… uh… I’m gonna start my
turn to the left… I’m outta one sixty for one twenty.
+33:11 ( 1620.57 / 4:20.57 PM )
(Unknown): Okay.
+33:13 ( 1620.59 / 4:20.59 PM )
(B33 – French): Puttin’ on the brakes.
+33:17 ( 1621.03 / 4:21.03 PM )
(5KA): Kilo Alpha’s outta the dip.
+33:20 ( 1621.06 / 4:21.06 PM )
(B33 – French): Kilo Alpha gimme a call off the drop.
+33:22 ( 1621.08 / 4:21.08 PM )
(5KA): Will do.
+33:38 ( 1621.24 / 4:21.24 PM )
(B33 – French): Eight seven four… that’s you in the front of the line, right?
+33:41 ( 1621.27 / 4:21.27 PM )
(Tanker 874): Affirm
+33:42 ( 1621.28 / 4:21.28 PM )
(B33 – French): Okay… what we’re gonna do is… we’re gonna build line
backwards. I need to extend my… uh… pattern just a little bit we’re gonna
get a helicopter in and out… kind of at the… uh… north end of that flank.
Gimmee a good left turn on the exit, okay?
+33:52 ( 1621.38 / 4:21.38 PM )
(Tanker 874): Okay
+34:08 ( 1621.54 / 4:21.54 PM )
(B33 – French): Okay… we ah.. we just put in a whole bunch of retardant in with the DC10 we’re gonna build line backwards… you’re gonna be starting in a light fuel patch taking it TO existing retardant… how copy?
+34:20 ( 1622.06 / 4:22.06 PM )
(Tanker 874): Sounds good.
+34:21 ( 1622.07 / 4:22.07 PM )
(B33 – French): What I’d look to do is… ah… yea… level 4… star… and I’m… I’ll pop smoke at the start… it’s even gonna be before that light… ah… fuel patch.
+34:30 ( 1622.16 / 4:22.16 PM )
(Tanker 874): Allright.
+34:31 ( 1622.17 / 4:22.17 PM )
(B33 – French): Have I got a DC10 holdin’ out there?
+34:37 ( 1622.23 / 4:22.23 PM )
(VLAT 911): That’s nine one… ah… one to the… ah… south.
+34:40 ( 1622.26 / 4:22.26 PM )
(B33 – French): Okay… copy that… ah… looks like you were just motionless… er… okay… thanks a lot… we’ll see ya in bit.
+34:44 ( 1622.30 / 4:22.30 PM )
(VLAT 911): Yea… just stayin’ close but out of the area.
+34:46 ( 1622.32 / 4:22.32 PM )
(B33 – French): Yea… you got it.
+34:48 ( 1622.34 / 4:22.34 PM )
(Helicopter 5KA): Kilo Alpha’s off the drop.
+34:51 ( 1622.37 / 4:22.37 )
(B33 – French): Kilo Alpha’s off the drop… break eight seven four… you ready to go?
+34.54 ( 1622.40 / 4:22.40 PM )
(Tanker 874): I’m ready to go.
+34.56 ( 1622.42 / 4:22.42 PM )
(B33 – French): Allright… I’m gonna start my descent… you’re gonna see the
existing retardant put in by… ah… by nine one one so we’ll be taking retardant
TO that.
*****************************************************************************
** NOTE: 1622.49 is supposedly the START of the 11 second long
** Air Study Video 20130630_162300_SEAT_drop_EP.MOV
*****************************************************************************
+35:05 ( 1622.51 / 4:22.51 PM )
(Tanker 874): Copy
+35:06 ( 16:22.52 / 4:22.52 PM )
(B33 – French): Little bit hard to see here… so basically their retardant
started in the flats. We’re gonna be kind of up in the foothill portion.
I’ll pop smoke at the start. Gimme about a wingspan left for ah… drift
Drop heading’s gonna be about zero eight five.
****************************************************************************
** NOTE: 1623.00 is supposedly the END of the 11 second long
** Air Study Video 20130630_162300_SEAT_drop_EP.MOV
****************************************************************************
VIDEO 20130630_1628_EP ENDS AT 1628.00 ( 4:28.00 PM )
Length of video: 40 minutes and 14 seconds.
The Panebaker VLAT pictures labeled 1715’ish are incorrect. These pictures are actually the split drop from the VLAT from 1617. I am not sure if this is relevant, or if it has already been identified.
Hey, Calvin, which particular photos of the split drop are you referring to? I’m seeing a variety of them in the various folders.
Reply to calvin post on May 18, 2014 at 4:48 am said:
>> calvin said…
>> The Panebaker VLAT pictures labeled 1715′ish are
>> incorrect. These pictures are actually the split drop from
>> the VLAT from 1617. I am not sure if this is relevant,
>> or if it has already been identified.
calvin… yes… it’s very relevant for a number of reasons.
You just pointed out that we have been *assuming* that
the both the filename and EXIF timestamps on the Panakebaker STILL photos are ‘correct’.
You are right… that doesn’t really appear to be the case.
The Panebaker 20130630_171528-1_EP photo in the
‘VLAT drops’ still photos folder is also the one that is a
‘perfect match’ for Tom Story’s 7093 photo of the same
drop… which Story’s Canon 1D said took place at 1639.
So however ‘wrong’ these Panebaker STILL images are is also directly related to how ‘wrong’ Tom Story’s Canon 1D was set that day.
We were assuming a +36 minute error there, but if the Panebaker still photos ALSO have ‘bogus’ timestamps
then that is no longer correct.
So now we need to figure out just how *wrong* BOTH
Panebaker’s Canon EOS REBEL T3i *AND* Story’s Canon EOS 1D were that day.
Geez. what a mess.
Reminder to anyone getting paid to take pictures of a fire in the future… please make sure the time/date settings on the cameras you are using are CORRECT. Thanks in advance.
So……. I downloaded (and am still downloading) a representative smattering of the Panebaker et al photos and videos.
The File-naming of the videos is all over the boards, compared to the time-stamping. A bunch of the mis-file-naming appears to be typos. For example, 143844 has a time stamp of 4:38:41 PM. Ahem. And 150530 is time stamped 5:05:30 PM. Buyer Beware!
Which leads to our favorite mysterious pair. 162300 is stamped 4:23:01 PM. Accurate? Quite possibly, relatively speaking. 152406 is stamped 5:21:07 PM. Think about THEM apples! There is no way, given what’s going on, that what is happening in that video is happening at 5:21:07 PM!!! So I would be more likely to trust 162300 than 152406.
And speaking of these two videos, the short one is not an edit out of the long one. They’re two completely different videos, captured by two different cameras.
152406_SEAT, with a most likely wrong filename and timestamp, and 162300, with its possibly more accurate timestamp and filemame, were both recorded on the Nikon Coolpix P520. It was on a tripod. It can record up to 24 minutes of video at a time.
Which leads me to my theory. Panebaker et al shot the main videos (except for the ones w/air2air capture, which were recorded on a Contour +2 videocam) on the Nikon in much longer chunks than we see here. Then, probably soon after, they had to sit down and split those videos into smaller chunks. Because…that’s what you have to do. As they were splitting them, they were exporting them out, and had to give them names. Some of them they may have been naming correctly. Some of them they clearly weren’t.
And I don’t know, when you split videos like these up, in something like QuickTime, what happens to the time stamps in the course of doing that. I’ve so far never had to pay attention to that, but then, I’m just learning how to shoot video.
Was the Nikon’s timestamper generally off? I don’t know. Periodically, a photo was taken on that camera. The photos are in the Schultz folder. 20130630_1616_AZ-A1S-000688_T911___7_G_RS.JPG (Please dear Universe, don’t ever compel me to type that out on my iPad ever again…) is of the T11 coming out of one of the split drops and has a time stamp of 4:16:36 PM. Boom! As in that’s pretty accurate, relatively speaking, given that we don’t have any absolute time stamps on any of these files, because it just doesn’t work that way in the real world, unless somebody decides to make it do that.
So that’s what I’ve discovered so far. When I first started looking at those files and their metadata in Lightroom, I wrote in my notes, “Marti starts slowly backing out of THIS particular project…….”
So this is a reminder to people analyzing video. Sometimes it helps to watch them while you’re listening to them.
Also. One of my first thoughts as WTKTT (thankfully) starting posting his concerns about these videos was that I have no problem imagining a four-minute lapse in recording. Sometimes, yah know, you have to change out things like batteries and memory cards. And, now that I’ve per used this thing a little bit, maybe we DON’T have a lapse at all. Maybe 162300 WAS shot at that time and so was 152406!!
Marti…
At exactly +4 seconds in the 11.7 second 162300 video… a shutter click is heard. It comes right after OPS1 Todd Abel says “Go ahead” and then Air Attack Rory Collins starts his “Okay… uh… we’ll probly be around there in about five” response.
The ‘shutter click’ also comes at the exact moment that the retardant flow was turned on during this SEAT drop captured in the 162300 video.
The SAME EXACT ‘shutter click’ is also heard at the SAME EXACT moment at the +2:20 mark in the 152406 video ( an hour earlier? ) and is part of the same 11 seconds from 152406 ‘duplicated’ as the content of 162300.
I can’t seem to find a match for this still photo in ANY of the folders up in the ‘Aerial Firefighting Study’ folder. Not even in Panebaker’s specific ‘SEAT drops’ folder. ( Which is what the 162300 video is showing… a SEAT drop ). Pity. Maybe THAT still camera would have had a correct setting in order to verify 162300 itself.
So… just to be clear…
Despite what you said above… I still don’t think there is *ANY* question that the entire 162300 video is not an exact duplicate of the 11.7 seconds seen at the +2:18 mark in the 152406 video. The ‘mystery’ is why this is so…
…but I hear you up above with your ‘potential’ explanation.
Are you saying that it could just possibly be that this same SEAT drop was captured with TWO different video cameras at the same time… but the one that was running longer and captured the full 2+ minutes ( that includes this SEAT DROP ) was simply mis-named into the 152406 timerange and should have ACTUALLY been named 162406 instead?
Okay… bad typo above.
The word ‘not’ slipped in there which
changed the intent of what I was trying
to say, I think.
Should have read like this…
Despite what you said above… I still don’t think there is *ANY* question that the entire 162300 video is, in fact, an exact duplicate of the 11.7 seconds seen at the +2:18 mark in the 152406 video. The ‘mystery’ is why this is so”.
So just to be cystal clear…
I still think that 162300 video IS an EXACT DUPLICATE of the 11 seconds at the +2:18 mark in the 152606 video.
Hmmm… I think I need to scratch this
comment of my own from above…
“Are you saying that it could just possibly be that this same SEAT drop was captured with TWO different video cameras at the same time… but the one that was running longer and captured the full 2+ minutes ( that includes this SEAT DROP ) was simply mis-named into the 152406 timerange and should have ACTUALLY been named 162406 instead?”
Even this isn’t really a possible explanation.
The 1624 timeframe *IS* covered by the
Panebaker video
20130630_162508_2SEATS_EP, which is 1
minute and 49 seconds long, and ( according to THAT filename timestamp ) starts capturing events at 1623.19 ( 4:23.19 PM ) and ENDS at 1625.08 ( 4:25.08 PM ).
So even if someone ‘misnamed’ the
152406 video and really meant it to
say 162406… everything is still ‘wonky’.
The TWO SEAT drop ( 830 following 874 )
is what is really happening at 162406, and
NOT the SINGLE seat drop shown in both
the 152406 and 162300 videos.
Yes, It’s exactly what I’m saying. Those are completely different videos. WATCH THEM!!!!!
And I’m also saying, these videos, recorded on the Nikon Coolpix are a bloody mess that I’m still trying to sort out.So it’s no surprise they tripped,you up.
Fortunately, I’m pretty sure the photos from it (in the Swartz folder — and they are actually quite astonishing) are accurately time stamped. And I have NO IDEA how that could happen.
So I’m currently downloading some more videos to see if the camera (or whatever) started out accurate, and went gonzo, or if it was that way all day (or thru what ever editor they put the videos through).
SOMETHING went wrong.
Reply to Marti Reed post
on May 18, 2014 at 7:53 pm
>> Marti said…
>> Fortunately, I’m pretty sure
>> the photos from it (in the
>> Swartz folder — and they
>> are actually quite
>> astonishing) are accurately
>> time stamped.
Well.. I hope so.
See new post above entiteld…
** MYSTERY SOLVED
I was wrong just above about
saying there didn’t seem to
be a still photo that matches
the ‘shutter click’ heard in
BOTH the 152406 and 162300
videos at the moment that
single SEAT was ‘dropping’.
There IS such a photograph.
I just missed it at first.
It’s in the Swartz folder(s).
I have NO IDEA which of these
Air Study devices actually had
the RIGHT time that day… but
if we assume ( as we have
been doing for a while now )
that the tripod-mounted video
cameras DID have the ‘correct
time’ that day… then Swartz’s
camera still falls into the
‘accurate enough’ category but
still appears to have been
about 61 seconds ahead of
the time on the tripod
mounted camera(s).
I would still call +/- 60 seconds
‘close enough for accuracy’
on a day like this.
Reply to Marti Reed post on
May 18, 2014 at 7:44 pm
>> Marti said…
>> Yes, It’s exactly what I’m saying.
>> Those are completely different
>> videos.
Yes. You are right.
They are simply TWO *different*
video cameras ( one on a tripod and
one handheld ) recording the same
exact ‘event’ ( the same SEAT drop ).
See new posting above entiteld
** MYSTERY SOLVED?
The Swartz photo I found that appears
to also be the EXACT same SEAT
drop seems to prove that ALL of
this did, in fact, happen in the 1524
timeframe and nowhere near 162300.
Somehow… that 162300 Air Study video is just the 11.7 seconds from the ‘handheld’ being used at that time was meant to be named 152300 ( even though that isn’t even totally accurate, timewise ).
So looking more at what’s coming out of that Nikon. Trying to sync to the VLAT split. The photo of it, which I referenced above, and won’t type again, has an accurate timestamp, and the timestamp is shown on the image. The video, however, is time stamped two hours “late — 6:12:48 PM, and somebody renamed the file 161620. I don’t know where and when and how the Nikon video timestamps are going wacky. And it looks like whoever is splitting out or renaming or what those videos is having a big struggle trying to do it. Maybe in a hurry?
And now I’m not sure my earlier theory — that they videos were shot in big chunks and then split — is correct. Swartz’s folder of the photos taken with the Nikon has a lot of photos in it. I’m not sure exactly what he was doing.
Marti… FWIW… that last photo in the Swartz folder…
20130630_1716_AZ
-A1S-000688___FB_1_G_RS.JPG
has an EXIF timestamp of… 5:16:58 PM and shows
them basically ‘packing up and leaving’ that location
by the helibase where they had the tripods set up
most of the afternoon.
This does appear to be accurate.
The final video taken from the tripod actually ENDS
just before we now see him with that tripod in
his hand and about to put it into the truck.
Good catch!!
Have you looked at the Town of Yarnell Folder? YIKES!!
They drove into town. He has photos in the Ranch House Cafe parking lot from 6:38 PM til 6:44 PM. I think the last two include Brian and Trew and their UTV. he wins my gold prize today! He was also shooting on an iPad.
I’m going after 150822_VLAT_EP. It’s the first VLAT drop they shot, both photos and video, of a VLAT drop that day. I didn’t download it right, so I’m waiting. I’ll see if the Nikon was timestamping the video correctly then.
I just don’t know where the screw-up came. I really think 162300 (snot om a different camrea) is both stamped and file named correctly, and 152406, shot on the Nikon, clearly isn’t
The next thing to do would be to go into the Air2Air videos, and see if there’s a match somewhere. But I’m not gonna have time anytime soon to do it…..
Yikes, typing too fast on the iPad again! Sorry for the typos!
Reply to Marti Reed post
on May 18, 2014 at 8:13 pm
>> Marti said…
>> Have you looked at the Town of
>> Yarnell Folder? YIKES!!
Yes. It really was a disaster.
It’s an absolute MIRACLE that more
people were not killed that day.
One of the things I can’t figure out
about that sequence of Swartz
photos is that if you look carefully…
he is approaching the Ranch House
Restaurant ( and taking pictures out
the window of his vehicle ) from the
SOUTH ( not the NORTH, where
he was taking pictures earlier ).
So, somehow Swartz worked his
way further SOUTH than the Ranch
House Restaurant following the
deployment and now we simply
see him coming back NORTH
to it… and pulling into the parking lot.
It would also be nice if someone could
identify all those fire guys in THESE
photos standing in the parking lot,
including the one who is GLARING
at Swartz as he takes photos, even
though the other guy to the right with
the red helmet is obviously freely
shooting photos or video with an
iPhone at that same time.
The guy who is GLARING at Swartz
has a BLUE Helmet… but the Blue
Ridge Hotshots had already
evacuated the Ranch House parking
lot by this time.
Could that be BR Hotshot Ball who
have been ‘left behind’ at the parking
lot that day?
When Frisby and Brown drove out
from the deployment area in the
UTV Ranger… the GPS tracker
shows them going straight up NORTH
towards the ICP command center,
so I don’t think it’s either Frisby
or Brown in that photo.
>> Marti also wrote…
>> They drove into town. He has
>> photos in the Ranch House Cafe
>> parking lot from 6:38 PM til 6:44
>> PM. I think the last two include
>> Brian and Trew and their UTV.
>> he wins my gold prize today!
>> He was also shooting on an iPad.
See above. I believe the BR GPS
tracker shows Frisby and Brown
driving straight up to the ICP after
they came out of the deployment
area… and the rest of BR evacuated
the parking lot shortly after that
in the vehicles. So the guy in the
Blue Helmet seems to have been
a BR Hotshot that was ‘left behind’.
Ball?
>> Marti also said…
>> I just don’t know where the
>> screw-up came. I really think
>> 162300 (shot on a different
>> camera) is both stamped and file
>> named correctly, and 152406,
>> shot on the Nikon, clearly isn’t.
See new post above.
I believe the Swartz photo of the
same SEAT drop puts things the
other way around. That SEAT drop
was in the 1524 timeframe and
NOT the 1623 timeframe.
>> Marti also said…
>> The next thing to do would be to
>> go into the Air2Air videos, and see
>> if there’s a match somewhere. But
>> I’m not gonna have time anytime
>> soon to do it…..
Probably no need.
See new post above with title
** MYSTERY SOLVED?
There IS a Swartz photo that IS most
likely that same exact SEAT drop
seen in BOTH the 152406 and 162300
videos ( shot with different video
cameras ).
Swartz’s digital camera was only
61 seconds ahead of whatever video
camera was sitting on the TRIPOD
that day and capturing drops.
So I believe the ‘proof’ is there that
Swartz’s photo, the 152406 video
( shot on tripod ) and the 162300
video ( handheld video camera )
are all capturing the SAME SEAT
drop… and it was in the 1524
timeframe ( not 1623 ).
Whether that means the handheld
used to shoot the 11.7 seconds was
just a full HOUR off ( timezone error? )
or it was a ‘file renaming’ error is the
only thing that still needs to be
figured out, IMHO.
What I’m kinda sorta generally seeing is that Swartz, who seems to have been in charge of the Nikon (while Panebaker was actually photographing with a Canon t3i ( which is the camera I use)) was taking photos every 10-20-30 minutes.
So I think he was shooting, say, a bit of video, then stopping and shooting some photos, and then switching back to video.
So I no longer think these videos were split out from longer ones. I think the videos were started, recorded, then stopped in camera.
So no-one was splitting them later in QuickTime or such. That means whatever mis-time-stamping was happening must have been happening in camera. Problem is, I’ve never heard of that happening, with a camera correctly stamping its photos and incorrectly stamping its videos. That’s where I’m stumped.
It’s now pretty obvious that in those 11.7 seconds that ended up being ‘named’ the 162300 video… whoever shot that was HURRYING to grab the camera and record that SEAT drop.
The first few seconds show the operator fumbling to point the camera… and then fumbling to ZOOM and catch the SEAT drop in the nick of time… with retardant dropping.
So YES… these 11.7 seconds now just look like a ‘quick opportunity’ to get ADDITIONAL video of the same SEAT drop ( circa 1523.30 ) that was already being captured by the OTHER video camera on the tripod.
How it ended up with a filename of 162300?… that’s still a mystery.
Followup to the original parent comment above that has
the ‘transcript’ in it.
What I should have made clear(er) in the original parent comment
was that the ‘2 SEAT drop’ with 830 following 874 DOES, in fact,
take place very soon after that transcript above ends…
…and that ‘2 SEAT drop’ is fully captured in the Panebaker
video 20130630_162508_2SEATS_EP, which is 1 minute and
49 seconds long, and ( according to the filename timestamp )
starts capturing events at 1623.19 ( 4:23.19 PM ) and ENDS
at 1625.08 ( 4:25.08 PM ).
French, in B33, starts ‘poppin’ smoke right at +21 seconds
( 1623.40 ) in that video ( just as he says he does in the audio )… and then 874 is seen ‘dropping’ at exactly +35 seconds
( 1623.54 ) and 830 then follows him right away dropping
retardant at exactly +57 seconds ( 1624.16 ).
The point here is that this is a TWO SEAT drop and it happens AFTER the 162300 video ENDS… whereas the 11 seconds of the 162300 video (supposedly) shows a completely different SINGLE seat drop with a completely different SEAT happening just a few seconds for the TWO seat drop…
…and BOTH drops (supposedly) being ‘guided’ by the same lead plane. Not possible.
Typo in last sentence above.
I left out the word BEFORE.
Should have read like this…
The point here is that this is a TWO SEAT drop and it happens AFTER the 162300 video ENDS… whereas the 11 seconds of the 162300 video (supposedly) shows a completely different SINGLE seat drop with a completely different SEAT happening just a few seconds BEFORE
the TWO seat drop…
…and BOTH drops (supposedly) being ‘guided’ by the same lead plane. Not possible.
Hmmmmmm I just saw this. Will check it out.
I disagree. Right when whoever (of course we now agree that’s probably Cordes) says “We’ll probably be there about five,” the tanker drops in both videos.
Reply to Marti Reed post on
May 18, 2014 at 9:20 pm
>> Marti said…
>> I disagree. Right when whoever (of
>> course we now agree that’s probably
>> Cordes) says “We’ll probably be there
>> about five,”
The only way it could be SPGS1 Gary Cordes ‘responding’ to Air Attack Rory Collins there is if Cordes was ‘authorized’ to be responding to direct callouts for ‘Operations’.
Just before the ‘Go ahead’ transmit… we hear Air Attack Rory Collins specifically ASK for ‘Operations’ to talk to him over ‘Air to Ground’.
The ‘responder’ to a request for ‘Operations’
( at that point in the day ) *would* have logically been OPS1 Todd Abel… and it even SOUNDS just like Todd Abel, and not Musser or Cordes.
This is all captured in the 152406 video…
____________________________________
+2:13 ( 1523.23 / 3:23.23 PM )
(AA – Rory Collins): Operations, Air Attack, Air-To-Ground
+2:18 ( 1523.28 / 3:23.28 PM )
(OPS1 Todd Abel): Go ahead.
+2:19 ( 1523.29 / 3:23.29 PM )
(AA – Rory Collins): Okay… Ahhhh… we’ll probly be around there in about five. Umm… What’s your plan on the ground?
+2:27 ( 1523.37 / 3:23.37 PM )
(OPS1 Todd Abel): What I’d like to do… ah… is… ah… tie into ( that court here? ) where ya see the whole ??. If we can tag onto the road up here and then just run it… ah… you know… ( transmission breaks up / cuts off ).
____________________________________
>> Marti also said…
>> …the tanker drops in both videos.
Yes… but I believe the proof is now there that this ‘drop’ ( and the audio capture with Air Attack Rory Collins talking to ‘Operations’ ) is definitely in the 1524 timeframe and not the 1623 timeframe.
If that really is a capture of a SINGLE SEAT
drop at 1623… some 1/4 mile off to the
east there of where they were using the
VLAT and the SEATS in most of the other videos…
…then French would have then only had about 25 seconds to completely set up the upcoming TWO SEAT drop with Tanker 874 leading and Tanker 830 following… which is captured in the next Air Study video.
Not possible.
Not enough time for French to have come off that single SEAT drop and then go through all the preparation we hear in the Air-To-Air captures for that upcoming TWO SEAT drop.
Correction for above.
It is NOT anyone from ‘Operations’
at all that says “We’ll probably be
around there in about five.”
That is actually Air Attack Rory Collins himself talking TO ‘Operations’ after someone in Operations ( sounds just like OPS1 Todd Abel ) responded to HIS “Operations, Air Attack, Air To Ground” callout with “Go ahead”.
At this point in time ( 1524 ish )… it is Air Attack Rory Collins himself who wants to know what ‘Operations’ plans to do ‘on the ground’… and he gets a full answer from what appears to be OPS1 Todd Abel regarding what ‘roads’ they want retardant to try and ‘tie into’.
OPS1 Todd Abel is still on the NORTH end of the fire at this point and actually ‘on the ground’ back there with SPGS2 Darrell Willis in the Model Creek Road area and the ‘tying into roads’ response to Air Attack Rory Collins is still all about the NORTH side of the fire.
**
** MORE ABOUT THE 162300 AIR STUDY VIDEO
Here are the ‘transcripts’ from the two Air Study Videos which prove that
the 162300 Panebaker Air Study video is simply 11.7 seconds of video that
was simply ‘extracted’ from the much longer 152406 video ( taken almost an
HOUR earlier ) and was either created as a *new* 162300 video OR was
used to REPLACE the contents of the *original* 162300 video.
Whether or not this 11.7 seconds of video simply replaced a much LONGER
video capture of what was *really* transpiring circa 1623 is still not known.
Only a comparison with the actual original 162300 video ( if it ever even existed )
could prove any difference in time lengths.
Here is the transcript of the 11.7 seconds that is the content of Air Study Video
20130630_162300_SEAT_drop_EP as included in the SAIT FOIA/FOIL release…
** PANEBAKER AIR STUDY VIDEO
** 20130630_162300_SEAT_drop_EP.MOV
Transcript of both the foreground and background radio conversation captured
by Panebaker Air Study Video 20130630_162300_SEAT_drop_EP.MOV.
A public copy of this Air Study video is in Mr. Dougherty’s online Dropbox at…
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/y3jy5opssrcvzb3/S3cCXl9pjr/AerialFirefightingstudy/Panebaker/Video/Video#lh:null-20130630_162300_SEAT_drop_EP.MOV
ECITW ( Every Caveat In The World )
This is what I ( me, personally ) believe is being said in the background of this
video. Your mileage may, of course, vary.
This video is 11 seconds long, so given the small note in the README.TXT file
that accompanies these Air Study videos which states that they all use the
VIDEO END time as the timestamp in the TITLE… then that means this
particular video STARTED at 1622.49 ( 4:22.49 PM )
VIDEO 162300 STARTS AT 1622.49 ( 4:22.49 PM )
BACKGROUND
+0:02 ( 1622.51 / 4:22.51 PM )
(OPS1 Todd Abel): Go ahead.
+0:03 ( 1622.52 / 4:22.52 PM )
(AA – Rory Collins): Okay… Ahhhh… we’ll probly be around there
in about five. Umm… What’s your plan on the ground?
FOREGROUND
(Tanker 810): Eight one zero OFF… hard RIGHT.
BACKGROUND
+0:10 ( 1622.59 / 4:22.59 PM )
(OPS1 Todd Abel): What I’d like… ( VIDEO ENDS )
NOTE: Video ends and cuts off right after the word ‘like’.
VIDEO 162300 ENDS AT 1623.00 ( 4:23.00 PM )
*** NOW… Here is the transcript from the 11 seconds of video at the +2:18 mark
*** in the Air Study Video 201300630_152406_SEAT_EP taken an HOUR earlier…
***
*** The KEY part is the duplication of the following exact query from
*** Air Attack Rory Collins to OPS1 Todd Abel… ( which is now in BOTH
*** of these Air Study Videos… but at different TIMES and almost a
*** full HOUR apart from each other…
***
*** (AA – Rory Collins): Okay… Ahhhh… we’ll probly be around there
*** in about five. Umm… What’s your plan on the ground?
This transcript includes both the FOREGROUND radio traffic ( mostly Air-To-Air
channel captures ) and the BACKGROUND ( TAC channels ) captures.
You can see clearly that the audio at the +2:18 second mark in THIS video
is identical to the audio supposedly captured almost an HOUR later
in the 162300 video.
Also… the 11 second clip from this video being used as the content for
the 162300 video only starts with the ‘Go ahead’ response from OPS1 Todd
Abel… but this ‘Go ahead’ from Abel is a direct response from Air Attack
Rory Collins having just called out to HIM with a “Operations, Air Attack on
Air To Ground” radio call at the +2:13 mark in THIS video.
Also… the ‘What I’d like to do’ phrase that also ENDS the 11 second clip used
as the content for the 162300 video is NOT ‘cut off’ in THIS video and we can
hear OPS1 Todd Abel’s full response to Air Attack Rory Collins.
VIDEO 152406 STARTS AT 1521.10 ( 3:21.10 PM )
+1:30 ( 1522.40 / 3:22.40 PM )
(B33 – French): Okay… what we’re gonna do is… uh… it’s kinda…
like I said the farthest north house… and… pretty close to the house, okay?
This one with the red engine. There’s actually two with red engines it’s
the one furthest north. Now I’m online.
+1:44 ( 1522.54 / 3:22.54 PM )
(Tanker 810): Okay. Gotcha… and… and we’re pretty much goin’ for the heavy smoke?
+1:47 ( 1522.57 / 3:22.57 PM )
(B33 – French): Yea… it’s… it’s a bead on the heavy smoke and I’m on line now
poppin’ smoke just so ya can see me. I want your line to start and bring it right
through HERE… right turn on the exit… ya got that?
+1:58 ( 1523.08 / 3:23.08 PM )
(Tanker 810): Got it.
+2:05 ( 1523.15 / 3:23.15 PM )
(Foreground person 1 – Panebaker?): Here he comes.
+2:13 ( 1523.23 / 3:23.23 PM )
(AA – Rory Collins): Operations, Air Attack, Air-To-Ground
** NOTE: Here is the START of the 11.7 seconds from THIS video
** that is duplicated as the content for Air Study Video 162300
_________________________________________________________________
+2:18 ( 1523.28 / 3:23.28 PM )
(OPS1 Todd Abel): Go ahead.
+2:19 ( 1523.29 / 3:23.29 PM )
(AA – Rory Collins): Okay… Ahhhh… we’ll probly be around there
in about five. Umm… What’s your plan on the ground?
+2:27 ( 1523.37 / 3:23.37 PM )
(OPS1 Todd Abel): What I’d like to do… ah… is… ah… tie into ( that court here? ) where ya
see the whole ??. If we can tag onto the road up here and then just run it… ah… you know…
( transmission breaks up and cuts off ).
FOREGROUND OVERLAP…
+2:27 ( 1523.37 / 3:23.37 PM )
(Tanker 810): Eight one zero OFF… hard right.
(B33 – French): Lookin’ like you already got me in sight…
looks like your drop went in there good. Thank you.
(Tanker 810): ( Back to ?? )
_________________________________________________________________
** NOTE: Here is the END of the 11.7 seconds from THIS video
** that is duplicated as the content for Air Study Video 162300
** but 162300 cuts off early up above right after the phrase
** “What I’d like…” in the BACKGROUND capture and the
** phrase “Eight one zero OFF…” in the FOREGROUND capture
**
** The 152406 video simply continues for another half-minute or so
** with a response from Air Attack Rory Collins…
+2:39
(B33 – French): Load and return.
(Tanker 810): Load and return… eight one zero.
+2:43 ( 1523.53 / 3:23.53 PM )
(B33 – French): Five Kilo Alpha… you’re cleared direct to the
helibase if you’re not already headed there.
+2:43 ( 1523.53 / 3:23.53 PM )
(AA – Rory Collins?): Ah.. Okay… I’ll come around once they’re… ah…
( road? )… ahm… on… ahhh… those fire spots (under ?).
+2:53 ( 1524.03 / 3:24.03 PM )
(OPS1 Todd Abel): (Responding to last transmit from AA but words not clear).
VIDEO 152406 ENDS AT 1524.06 ( 3:24.06 PM )
Reply to Bob Powers post on May 12, 2014 at 2:43 pm
>> Mr. Powers wrote…
>>…If the Helicopters were dropping water in the same area trying to hold the fire
>> down, then they definitely would have commented on the tanker drop helping
>> them out at a critical location.
Mr. Powers…
In an effort here to try and figure out what is really going on with that now
known-to-be-bogus 162300 Air Study Video ( and to see if any of these ‘other’
Air Study videos are equally bogus )… I now have full transcripts of ALL of the
other USDA Air Study videos that were on fixed tripods and capturing ALL of
the Air-To-Air channel traffic which ‘overlaps’ with these Panebaker and Moore
Air Study videos.
I will post ALL of these transcripts at some point… but since this Chapter 6
is already bigger than it should be ( and failing to load already on mobile
devices )… I am going to wait a bit and see if a new Chapter 7 starts before
attempting to do that. They are not *small* transcripts.
In the meantime… I just thought I would point out that the helicopters
‘commenting’ on the ‘goodness’ of retardant drops ( if they were in a
position to see it ) appears to be *common practice* in that ‘other world’
of WFF Air Support and this is now perfectly evident in the full transcripts
of the Air-To-Air channel traffic that day.
In just ONE of the USDA Air Study videos capturing the complete Air-To-Air
traffic… EVERY TIME the pilot of Helicopter 5KA ( Five Kilo Alpha ) saw
a retardant drop… he IMMEDIATELY would add his own unsolicited comments
to the conversation like “That was spot on!” and “Right on! Perfect!” and
sometimes even lengthier ‘Attaboy!’ style comments.
And MOST of the time… these ‘confirming goodness’ transmits right after a
retardant drop would take place WITHOUT any ‘call signs’. They would just
come out of ‘nowhere’.
So YES… if ANY of the helicopters operating on the south side of the fire
circa 1633 ( we know there were at least TWO in the air there at that
time ) saw that 1633 SEAT drop that went right between the fireline and
a house… it is VERY likely one ( or both? ) of those helicopter pilots might have
been the ones offering the unsolicited. “That’s exactly what we want” and/or
“That’s exactly right” comment(s) over the radio following that drop and
Burfiend was simply mistaken to think those comments were coming
from DIVSA Eric Marsh.
Two things:
FIRST: In a post below, WTKTT suggests that EP (one of the guys conducting the “air study” on the day of the Yarnell Hill Fire) might somehow be withholding or concealing video. I suppose that it is possible that EP is deliberately participating in a scheme to withhold information, or that the AZ Forestry folks withheld some of EP’s video, or that the SAIT is withholding some of the video, but it is equally (if not more) likely that EP just made a misstep in labeling and keeping straight all of his videos, pictures, etc.
Specifically: On June 30th, three folks (EP, SM, and Sw) were on the fire to take pictures and videos regarding the use of RETARDANT (and general air support with water drops) on fire – this is the “air study” folks keep referencing. These folks set up a main, stationary camera on a tripod that was recording from a stationary position almost non-stop, with audio coming exclusively from the air-to-air frequency (such that you can hear pilots such as Tom French, Rory Collins, “Jack,” “Kevin,” etc. talking to each other on these LONGGGGG main videos). In addition to that main camera, however, there were three people on the ground – EP, SM, and Sw – taking individual video clips and photos with various small hand-held devices. My impression is that at least one of them or maybe two had MULTIPLE hand-held devices that they were using.
Here’s the KEY: My impression is that these three folks were SPECIFICALLY interested in capturing videos/photos of the air drops (water, retardant) in action, such that, before you conclude that they are HIDING a video, consider whether there was an actual DROP from a SEAT or a VLAT during the time window in question. If not, it is entirely possible that there WAS no video from a hand-held device at exactly that moment, and NOTHING is being hidden or withheld.
To wit: At roughly 4:15 and 4:17, VLAT 911 dropped its massive load of retardant (split into two drops), and then there were two SEAT drops (one right after the other – they were in a line) at about 4:24 p.m., and then tanker 413 dropped at roughly 4:33, and then VLAT 910 was lining up for a drop when the shit hit the fan with GM. Which brings me to my second point….
SECOND: For reasons not worth getting into (given that I do not have the time or ability to provide links at this point), allow me to say again that I am pretty sure that Marsh did indeed comment to B33 about where he was hoping for some air support (e.g. a VLAT line), but Marsh made the comment WELL before 16:37. Meaning, I am fairly comfortable believing based on the way that I have been tying together all of the same materials that all of you have access to at this point that the 16:37 comment alleged to have been made by Marsh was indeed made by Marsh, but (a) it was likely uttered well before 16:37 AND (b) the words might have been slightly different than what B33 recalls (although the gist was likely the same).
This, by the way, ties into my previously-articulated view that the SAIT, ADOSH, and Wildland Fire Associate timelines are all wrong. I have no “links” to anything to support this, because my support for this is the timeline that I am slowly piecing together on my laptop and in my notebooks. There is nothing – other than my brain and notes – for me to “link” to…. 🙂
Reply to Elizabeth post on May 15, 2014 at 11:16 am
Elizabeth…
First off… let me say that whatever that noise was down below
about some kind of ‘boycott’ on responding to any more of your
posts… I did not comment on it because that’s not something
I personally believe in on a PUBLIC forum.
Yes… this is a PUBLIC forum.
If a post simply meets the acceptable criteria for ‘allowable’
commentary on the part of the person hosting this PUBLIC
discussion… then whatever someone has to say is OK with me.
But… ( likewise )… since this is a PUBLIC forum… people are then
also allowed to ‘freely comment’ ( and SHOULD ) on what anyone
else has to say… even if that comment was not ‘addressed’ to them.
That’s how this works.
If people don’t like your posts… they don’t have to respond to them.
It’s that simple.
I think folks laid out pretty well down below what they find ‘annoying’ about most of your PUBLIC posts and your ‘style’ of commenting.
You are free to either take whatever ‘advice’ was posted… or
ignore it altogether. Freedom of choice, as they say.
Ok… back to business…
>> Elizabeth said…
>> FIRST: In a post below, WTKTT suggests that EP (one of
>> the guys conducting the “air study” on the day of the Yarnell
>> Hill Fire) might somehow be withholding or concealing video.
>> I suppose that it is possible that EP is deliberately participating
>> in a scheme to withhold information, or that the AZ Forestry
>> folks withheld some of EP’s video, or that the SAIT is
>> withholding some of the video…
Correction: I did NOT say that Eric Panebaker (himself) has
‘withheld’ ( or tampered with ) information/evidence. All I said
was (quote)…
“If the 20130630_162300_SEAT_drop_EP video ( as released by the SAIT in response to FOIA/FOIL requests ) does NOT contain the same content as the original… then HE would certainly know.”
That is simply a TRUE statement.
He would be in the *best* position to know whether or not that video that ended up as part of the FOIA/FOIL package coming from the SAIT actually contains the same things he *gave* them.
He probably still has the *originals*.
I ( me, personally ) do NOT KNOW what the ‘story’ is here.
All I know is that one of these Air Study videos is NOT what it is supposed to be… and that there MUST be SOME kind of *story*
that would explain it.
>> …but it is equally (if not more) likely that EP just made a
>> misstep in labeling and keeping straight all of his videos,
>> pictures, etc.
See my original post. I ( me, personally ) do *NOT* think it
is ‘more likely’ this is the case.
I would be the first to tell you that I have ‘mis-named’ files on a
computer when assembling collections of things… but that is
*NOT* the simple explanation for what is seen in THIS case.
If two of these Air Study videos ended up being just ‘duplicates’
of each other ( completely )… then YES… I would say the likelihood
was high that a copy / naming operation went sideways.
In this case, however, we are talking about a much more
complicated scenario.
Someone ( Repeat: I do NOT know WHO ) took the time to
EXTRACT 11.7 seconds of video from the +2:18 second mark
of a PREVIOUS video… and then SAVE that video back to disk
with a totally differnent TIME on it… just short of an HOUR later
than when it was actually taken.
That’s a little more complicated than just accidentally hitting
the wrong key at some point, or screwing up a drag-and-drop
with a mouse.
>> Elizabeth also said…
>> Here’s the KEY: My impression is that these three folks were
>> SPECIFICALLY interested in capturing videos/photos of the air
>> drops (water, retardant) in action,
That is a valid impression to have. That is what they were
getting PAID to do…
…however… you are WRONG to assume that that is the only
reason they ever shot any VIDEO.
SOME of the Panebaker / Moore videos have nothing to do with
any actual ‘retardant’ drops. The most noticeable of these are
the ones that simply have ‘fire-behavior’ in the video TITLE(S).
>> Elizabeth also said
>> such that, before you conclude that they are HIDING a video,
>> consider whether there was an actual DROP from a SEAT or
>> a VLAT during the time window in question.
See above. There did NOT have to be any kind of ‘drop’ in progress
for Panebaker or Moore to be shooting video that day.
The *mystery* surrounding the particular video in question is
that its title DOES seem to inidicate that it is SUPPOSED to be a
video of a SEAT drop at 1623… but that is NOT what it *REALLY*
is at all.
>> Elizabeth
>> SECOND: For reasons not worth getting into (given that I do
>> not have the time or ability to provide links at this point), allow
>> me to say again that I am pretty sure that Marsh did indeed
>> comment to B33 about where he was hoping for some air
>> support (e.g. a VLAT line), but Marsh made the comment
>> WELL before 16:37.
Please provide evidence if you are going to make these
kinds of statements ( or just re-read the comments below about
what people find most annoying about your posting here ).
I have certainly made some ‘leaps’ myself in an effort to try and
help us ALL decipher some mysteries in this ongoing disscusion
(mostly before there was really no evidence to go on but the stupid
SAIR report and the only thing to DO was ‘guess’ about things )…
but I believe if I have ever gotten even close to saying “I’m pretty
sure this is what happened”… there was ( at least ) extensive
explanation as to WHY I was making such a claim.
I could tell YOU right now that MY *extensive notes* seem to indicate that Darrell Willis left the north side of the fire, drove to Yarnell, borrowed an ATV from the Yarnell Fire Station… and then personally drove all the way out to where Steed and Marsh were and told them face-to-face… “You get your asses over there to town and do something that gets your name in the newspapers because I’ve got a City Council Budget meeting next week”…
…but I would NOT expect ANYONE to believe me unless I showed some ‘evidence’ to back it up.
Point taken?
Not much to add to that. I think the evidence you have gone thru the past 2 days pretty well sums up the discussion.
On another note I will be gone for a week and have a lot to catch up on here so keep on looking.
Will be at my Oak Grove Hot Shot reunion reliving the great old days. Have a good week.
TIME FOR CHAPTER SEVEN?
Signal boost to WTKTT’s earlier request for a new chapter. My mobile device crashes whenever I try to load this page now. Thanks, Mr. Dougherty, for continuing to host this discussion!
**
** WHERE IS THE *REAL* 20130630_162300_SEAT_drop_EP
** AIR STUDY VIDEO?
After checking the Panebaker 163700 Air Study video again for ANY evidence of ANYONE saying anything like “That’s what we want” circa 1637 ( and finding no such evidence )… I started working BACKWARDS from 1637 and re-checking the other Air Study videos.
There is no Panebaker or Moore Air Study Video that actually covers the 1637 to 1639 timeframe… so if there was any chance of finding evidence of this (supposed) “That’s what we want” transmission reported ONLY by John Burfiend of Bravo 33… then I thought perhaps that even if anyone did say any such thing… he might have simply been mistaken that it came (quote) “within 5 minutes of them going into shelters” ( as he said in his SAIT interview ).
1642 ( Marsh’s final transmissions ) minus 5 minutes is 1637 and so that must have been the ‘guesstimate’ the SAIT investigators were applyiing to this ‘recollection’ on Burfiend’s part.
I STILL believe it is MUCH more likey that if ANYONE said anything to Bravo 33 like “That’s exactly what we want”… that it was SOMEONE ( but NOT Marsh ) confirming the ‘goodness’ of the 1633 SEAT drop that was ‘spot on’ ( according to Burfiend and French ) and got laid down RIGHT between a house and the fireline at exactly 1633. If anyone said “That’s exactly what we want”… it MUST have been someone who saw that actual ‘spot-on’ drop right between the house and the fireline… ( like a chopper pilot ) and NOT someone who would have just seen some plane circling around in the air on some kind of ‘line-up’ flight.
It was MOST LIKELY one of the chopper pilots known to have been in the air and also working that same exact area circa 1637. They would have seen that drop be ‘spot on’ and would have immediately been ‘confirming the goodness’ of it.
Anyway… my plan was to work BACKWARDS through the Panebaker videos again listening carefully for ANY evidence of ANYONE saying anything like “That’s what we want” or other ‘confirming goodness’ opinions on the 1633 SEAT drop at ANY time that day.
Well… here comes the new MYSTERY.
The Panebaker video that immediately precedes the 163700 one is named…
20130630_162300_SEAT_drop_EP
That (supposedly) means it ENDED at 1623 and would also mean there was no Panebaker video prior to the 163700 one that covered the time of that 1633 SEAT drop down in Yarnell…
…but what the heck… I re-checked the 162300 Air Study video, anway.
That is when I discovered that this entire 162300 Air Study video is BOGUS.
It is NOT what it says it is ( A video taken by Panebaker that ENDS at 1623 ).
The entire Panebaker video 20130630_162300_SEAT_drop_EP is simply a reproduction of 11.7 seconds from the 2:18 second mark ( near the end ) of a much EARLIER Panebaker video 201300630_152406_SEAT_EP.
Someone just LIFTED 11.7 seconds out of a previous video shot around
1524 ( 3:24 PM ) that day… and is trying to pretend that it is the contents of
an Air Study Video shot an hour later at 1623 ( 4:23 PM ).
Everything from those 11.7 seconds at the +2:18 mark in the 152406 Air
Study Video is a *PERFECT MATCH* for the entire content of the 162300 video.
So where is the *REAL* Panebaker 20130630_162300_SEAT_drop_EP video?
How long was the ORIGINAL video?… before someone just (manually) REPLACED it with an 11.7 second clip from a video taken an HOUR earlier?
There was a LOT of critical stuff going at circa 1623 that day and so the original Panebaker 162300 video may have captured some of that.
Example: It has NOT been completely verified that the YARNELL-GAMBLE video was actually shot at 1627. That APPEARS to be the time as supported by the sirens heard in the Jerry Thompson videos… but I still wouldn’t call that 100 percent verification.
If Jerry Thompson himself was just a few minutes off on the times he reported for HIS videos… then the YARNELL-GAMBLE video *MIGHT* have actually been shot a few minutes earlier… like in the 1622-1624 timeframe.
If that is the case… then that means this ‘missing’ 162300 Panebaker Air Study video had a good chance of ALSO capturing that TAC 1 channel conversation where SOMEONE in fire command *seems* to be urging Marsh to ‘hurry up and get to town’ and Eric Marsh ( totally confirmed ) then immediately reports Granite Mountain’s STATUS as… “They’re comin’ from the heel of the fire” ( as in… on the MOVE and NOT in the ‘safe black’ at all ).
So the ‘missing’ Panebaker 162300 video might have ALSO captured that
YARNELL-GAMBLE conversation on TAC 1… complete with the actual
CALL SIGN of whoever it was that was having that conversation with
Eric Marsh at that time and *seemed* to be urging him to hurry up.
Even if the YARNELL-GAMBLE conversation was NOT also captured in this
Panebaker 162300 video… there might have been *other* radio traffic relevant
to Granite Mountain that WAS captured circa 1623.
It really is not possible this was just a screw-up.
Someone seems to have purposely preserved the 20130630_162300 filename
and timestamp for this video… but then also PURPOSELY made an effort
to replace the content with something else from ANOTHER (earlier) video.
More on this later.
I’m now going back and re-checking ALL the Air Study videos to see if this
kind of ‘money business’ was going on with any OTHER Air Study videos.
Typo in last sentence.
I meant to say ‘monkey business’.
Last sentence should have read…
“I’m now going back and re-checking ALL the Air Study videos to
see if this kind of ‘monkey business’ was going on with any
OTHER Air Study videos.”
Correction for the above post.
The 20130630_162300_SEAT_drop_EP video that is now known
to be BOGUS is just ONE of the Panebaker Air study videos that
‘precedes’ the 163700 one. It does not IMMEDIATELY precede it.
There are actually TWO others that come in-between 162300
and 163700… and they both appear to be exactly what they
say they are.
These are the actual ( Eric ) Panebaker Air Study videos
that cover the crucial 4:00 PM to 5:00 PM timeframe that day…
20130630_161858_VLAT_split_2_EP
20130630_162300_SEAT_drop_EP **** This is the BOGUS one
20130630_162508_2SEATS_EP
20130630_163338_fire_behavior_EP
20130630_163700_fire_behavior_EP
20130630_164544_fire_behavior_EP
20130630_170634_VLAT_EP
NOTE: The 20130630_161858_VLAT_split_2_EP video that precedes the one that is now know to be BOGUS is the one that captured the 4:16 PM “Granite Mountain… what’s your status right now?” query from from someone in fire command and Eric Marsh’s response about Granite Mountain “makin’ their way out the same escape route from this morning” and Marsh’s “just checkin’ it out to see where we gonna jump out at” transmission.
ALSO NOTE: The ‘EP’ initials in these Air Study video filenames all stand for ‘Eric Panebaker’.
If the 20130630_162300_SEAT_drop_EP video ( as released by the SAIT in response to FOIA/FOIL requests ) does NOT contain the same content as the original… then HE would certainly know.
**
** PANEBAKER AIR STUDY VIDEO
** 20130630_163700_fire_behavior_EP.MOV
Reply to calvin post on May 9, 2014 at 3:04 am
>> calvin said…
>> At the 23 second mark of the 1637 Panebaker video there is a background
>> transmission that I cannot make out. This video is only 39 seconds long and
>> would put the 23 second mark near 1637. If you do not mind reviewing,
>> I would appreciate it.
calvin…
I went back and reviewed the 163700 Panebaker video again looking for ANY evidence that ANYONE said anything like “That’s exactly what we want” as reported by the SAIR as Marsh talking to Bravo 33 at that time ( circa 1637 ).
This video (supposedly) ENDS at exactly 1637 and ( as you pointed out )
only covers the 39 seconds prior to that… so if anyone did say anything
of the sort circa 1637… it must have come AFTER 1637 and there is no
Panebaker or Moore Air Study video that covers the 1637-1638 timeframe.
Anyway… after listening carefully again… there is NOTHING in the 163700
video that resembles ANYONE saying anything like “That’s what we want”
or “That’s exactly what we want”.
The mysterious background transmit in the +21 to +23 second mark that you mention APPEARS to be someone saying something about a ‘horse’ that needs to be taken care of. This would match other reports around that time of ‘horses’ being seen running down the middle of Highway 89.
Here is my full transcript of that 163700 Panebaker video…
Transcript of BOTH the foreground AND background radio conversation captured
by Panebaker Air Study Video 20130630_163700_fire_behavior_EP.MOV.
A public copy of this Air Study video is in Mr. Dougherty’s online Dropbox at…
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/y3jy5opssrcvzb3/S3cCXl9pjr/AerialFirefightingstudy/Panebaker/Video/Video#lh:null-20130630_163700_fire_behavior_EP.MOV
ECITW ( Every Caveat In The World )
This is what I ( me, personally ) believe is being said in both the foreground AND the background of this video. Your mileage may, of course, vary.
This video is 39 seconds long.
Since the text notes accompanying these videos states that the timestamp in the title represents the END time…that makes the actual START time for this video 1636.21
NOTE: The air-to-air conversation in this video is ALSO captured even MORE
clearly in the corresponding USDA AIR STUDY VIDEO – DISC 4 folder.
VIDEO STARTS AT 1636.21 ( 4:36.21 PM )
BACKGROUND
+0:04 ( 1636.25 / 4:36.25 PM )
(Unknown): (On?) short final…
FOREGROUND
+0:05 ( 1636.26 / 4:36.26 PM )
(Unknown): Five-O-Eleven… you sure of that helibase… in that green circle here?
+0:09 ( 1636.30 / 4:36.30 PM )
(Unknown – Sounds like French in B33?): Okay, copy that… are you gonna drop your bucket and have to lift back somewhere else?
+0:13 ( 1636.34 / 4:36.34 PM )
(Unknown): Yea… I’ll have to drop ( the bucket? ) then I’ll head for Wickenburg for fuel.
+0:16 ( 1636.37 / 4:36.37 PM )
(Unkown – Sounds like French in B33?): Oh… okay… gotcha… okay… gimme a call… uh… ready to lift.
+0:21 ( 1636.42 / 4:36.42 PM )
(Unknown): Will do.
BACKGROUND
+0:22 ( 1636.43 / 4:36.43 PM )
(Unknown): I’ve got a (horse?) left (to take care of?)
+0:25 ( 1636.46 / 4:36.46 PM )
(Unknown): You’re all clued in. No need to act… just write it down on a piece a paper.
FOREGROUND
+0:34 ( 1636.55 / 4:36.55 PM )
(Unknown – Sounds like French in B33?): And I’ve got a project for you.
+0:37 ( 1636.58 / 4:36.58 PM )
(Unknown): When ya have… ???
BACKGROUND
+0:37 ( 1636.58 / 4:36.58 PM )
(Unknown): (Someone’s NAME here is FIRST word? Boleba/Boleeba? Buliba?) What’s goin’ on back there?
VIDEO ENDS AT 1637.00 ( 4:37.00 PM )
Update: Wherever it says ‘Unknown – Sounds like French in B33’ up above should have just said ‘Thomas French in B33’. It is confirmed.
Since this Panebaker video ‘overlaps’ with DVD DISC 4 of the USDA Air Study Videos… the Air-To-Air traffic captured in that USDA video confirms most of the FOREGROUND communications captured in this Panebaker video.
WTKTT
Discussion above—-
Helicopter Pilot talking to French’
Has a water Bucket for drops.
he is going to drop it off at the heliport and go for fuel.
I’ve got a hose lift to take care of — not horse—would have been moving hose to some location. Generally they bag it Nets and drop it at some location for use.
5011 might be the call sign of the Helicopter? Just thoughts.
Reply to Bob Powers post on May 14, 2014 at 7:06 am
>> Mr. Powers wrote…
>> Helicopter Pilot talking to French’
>> Has a water Bucket for drops.
>> he is going to drop it off at the heliport and go for fuel.
Yes. That is definitely French talking to helicopter
5KA ( Five Kilo Alpha ) at that point. 5KA is the one that needed to ‘drop his bucket’ and go refuel, at this time.
The ‘other’ USDA audio captures of Air-To-Ground with
no ‘walk overs’ on the Air-To-Air channel proves that.
5KA would always identify himself using the full
‘Five Kilo Alpha’ but whenever French was hailing him
he would simply abbreviate it as ‘Kilo Alpha’.
>> I’ve got a hose lift to take care of — not horse—
>> would have been moving hose to some location.
>> Generally they bag it Nets and drop it at some location
>> for use.
Perfectly possible. That’s a very hard section to hear
in this particular video. Could be ‘horse’ *OR* ‘hose’.
The KEY thing there was that this transmission is definitely NOT anyone saying anything like “That’s what we want” in response to any line-up flights.
>> 5011 might be the call sign of the Helicopter?
>> Just thoughts.
I listened to it again. This is definitely a capture of Burfiend in Bravo 33 talking on the Air-To-Ground channel… because in the USDA DVD there is more Air-To-Air talk right underneath this transmit from Burfiend… so the capture in THIS Panebaker video MUST have been ‘Air-To-Ground’ instead.
It still definitely sounds like ‘Five-O-Eleven’ there, but since the chopper call signs all tend to be just THREE digits/numbers ( and there is no chopper with call sign 5011 listed as having been in Yarnell ) it’s unclear who Burfiend is really talking to about the ‘Helibase’.
I could believe he really meant to say ‘Nine-Eleven’, but since they were not dropping in Yarnell now, and the DC10 VLAT 911 was still returning from a refuel and wasn’t even really back in the area yet… I’m not sure what sense that would make at this moment.
Again… the KEY takeaway there is that THIS transmission was definitely Burfiend and it was definitely on the Air-To-Ground channel… so that means this Panebaker video WAS capturing ‘Air-To-Ground’ transmissions…
…but there is still nothing in the capture with anyone ever coming onto the A2G channel and saying anything resembling “That’s exactly what we want”.
This capture ENDS exactly at 1637… so if anyone said something like that circa 1637 over A2G channel… then it must have happened AFTER 1637.
Unfortunately… there is no Panebaker or Moore Air Study video that then goes on to capture the A2G traffic in the 1637 to 1639 timeframe.
The only NEXT ‘capture’ ( in the public record, anyway ) of the A2G channel after this Panebaker video is the Helmet-Cam video itself… which starts just prior to 1639 and begins with Burfiend on A2G talking to ?? someone ?? about how it’s going to be hard for them to hit some target being discussed because of the ‘smoke’. A moment later we hear Steed’s first “We are in front of the flaming front” MAYDAY transmit.
Followup…
The real ‘mysterious’ transmit in this video is the
following one…
+0:25 ( 1636.46 / 4:36.46 PM )
(Unknown): You’re all clued in. No need to act… just write it down on a piece a paper.
I wonder what THAT was all about?
WHO was now ‘clued in’… about WHAT?… and why was it something that ‘required no action’… just ‘write it down’?
We are only 120 seconds away from Steed’s first MAYDAY when this (strange?) transmit took place.
Here’s a transcript of what I’m hearing in that video:
Panebaker 1637
VOICE 1 0:05 five-oh-eleven […sh…?] at helibase, in the green circle here.
VOICE 2 Okay, copy that. Are you going to drop your bucket and have to lift back somewhere else?
VOICE 1 Yeah, I’ll have to drop the bucket, then I’ll head [over to …?]
VOICE 2 0:18 Oh, okay, gotcha. Okay. Give me a call, uh, when you’re ready to lift.
VOICE 1 0:20 Will do.
[…]
VOICE ? […] [clued in?] [wanted?] at […]
VOICE 2? 0:29 Affirm.
VOICE 2 0:34 And I’ve got a project for you.
VOICE ? 0:36 [What are you? You’re at?]
VOICE 3 0:37 [what’s going on?] back there?
Sitta… Thank you!
The only reason I might be hearing a little ‘more’ than you
have is that even though this particular video didn’t need
any ‘audio forensics’ or ‘noise filtering’… I STILL found that
I needed to really BOOST THE GAIN on the audio to have
a chance at hearing some of the background.
Does whatever you are using to ‘listen’ to the videos
have that ‘GAIN BOOST’ capability?
“Audio forensics” INCLUDES boosting the gain, WTKTT. When you BOOST the gain, you distort the audio. Sorry if I was not clear on that with you earlier.
( Heavy sigh )
Time to remember our Mark Twain again…
“It’s not what (he/she) doesn’t know that
bothers me… it’s what (he/she) knows fer
sure that just ain’t so.”
*and*
“We are ALL ignorant… just about
different things.”
Heavy sigh right back atcha, kiddo! 🙂 Audio forensics – it is not just for the Zimmerman trial any more!
Elizabeth… fer cryin’ out loud.
The ‘gain boost’ I am talking about
does NOT ( in ANY way ) ‘distort
the audio’.
You have no idea what you are even talking about.
WTKTT – it absolutely CAN distort the audio! If you doubt me, the actual Audacity disclosures make this clear. If in doubt, READ the relevant info. If you have something that suggests otherwise, “post your sources.” (Tongue in cheek, obviously.)
Reply to
Elizabeth post
on May 17,
2014 at 11:59
____________
WTKTT – it absolutely CAN distort the audio!
_____________
Oh… so NOW you are backing
off your carte-blanche “When you BOOST the gain, it distorts the audio” statement and have arrived at simply the ‘possibility’ that can happen.
.
Good for you.
You’re learning.
Yes. If you boost the gain some RIDICULOUS amount and your speakers or headphones are now shaking and your eardrums are getting blown out… or if you exceed the SOFTWARE limits as to ‘maximum volume’ allowed for a track… most software ( including Audacity ) has a ‘safety catch’ where it will then start applying ‘clipping’ to the waveform in order to not destroy your equipment.
What I said above was ‘the kind of gain boost I am talking about does NOT ( in ANY way ) distort that audio.
That is simply a TRUE statement.
Incremental boosts of +3db do NOT cause any loss of the waveform and no DISTORTION is taking place… and certainly nothing that would cause anything that anyone might be SAYING to be changed in any way.
_____________
If in doubt, READ the relevant info.
_____________
I have.
I wish YOU would do the same.
_____________
If you have something that suggests otherwise, “post your sources.” (Tongue in cheek, obviously.)
_____________
Okay.
From Audacity’s own user manual…
****************
The top slider is the gain control – it affects the relative volume of the track. By default it only lets you select multiples of 3 dB, but if you hold down shift you can choose any level. Be careful not to set it too high, or you can exceed the maximum volume of a track, which results in clipping.
****************
By the way… the ‘too high’ being referred to would probably be blowing out your ear drums even before the ‘safety catch’ clipping starts to kick in.
Don’t do that.
Just use low increments and all the GAIN boost does it make it EASIER to hear what is being said.
WTKTT,
I’ve got Audacity (such a sweet program), and can boost the gain in general and specifically boost the 200-400 Hz range. While it tends to lower interference, I still have the same issues on the brain side of the ear (alas!), and don’t seem to parse the language any better. I’ll give it another try, though.
I think you were spot on about the “Wickenberg to fuel” part. I don’t hear “no need to act” or “write it down on a piece of paper.”
It would be interesting to know if EP still has access to the original files, and how they differ from what we have.
Sitta… yes… the (free) Audacity software is amazing. I have sound software here that costs thousands and thousands of dollars… but I still use Audacity for most things.
It is even BETTER at some things than anything money can (currently) buy.
Disclaimer: I am in no way associated with ‘Audacity’ or any of its software products. I am just a ‘user’.
My only other advice to try and ‘hear’ things that are ‘hard to hear’ is to simply set yourself up a ‘loop’ on that specific phrase… and then let it play over and over and over and over.
It’s boring as hell… but it works.
**
** Reply to Bob Powers post on May 11, 2014 at 7:49 am
>> Mr. Powers wrote…
>> When Fires Like this in WUI start running at structures the first thing
>> is to thro Air Tankers at the Fire.
>> The problem most times they don’t do any good except make
>> everybody feel like they at least did something.
>> It looks good to the public at least some one is doing something.
There is no doubt ( and we can now hear it for ourselves ) that the Air Support in Yarnell that day knew that most of the drops they were making weren’t doing much good and that it was just like (quote) “spittin’ at it”.
Just like ‘Hotshots’ ( and any FFs building line ) know about the ‘hauling chart’ which says that if flame-lengths are more than about three and one-hal feet they are basically ‘out of it’ and ‘wasting their time’… the AIR people know full well what their own ‘limitations’ are and when THEY are also, basically ‘out of it’.
But… that being said…
If you look at the AFTERMATH photos ( mostly the aerial ones ) following Sunday, June 30, 2013… there is also no doubt that in SOME places… that line of red stuff on the ground IS what ‘stopped’ or ‘diverted’ the fireline near some pretty critical areas of the town.
So I guess it’s really like that old adage that is often attributed to someone in the advertising industry…
“Half of what we do doesn’t do a damn bit of good.
The problem is knowing WHICH half.”
>> Mr. Powers also said…
>> Helicopters – When Fixed wing plains are on a fire Helicopter pilots
>> Monitor there Freq. And stay out of the way. They fly lower and are
>> assigned to specific areas. They maintain contact Air to Air.
>> That is why I said the 1 Helicopter flying that is mentioned may have
>> had an overhead in it that could have made the comment, and could
>> have over keyed Marsh DIV A call.
Since I don’t believe we have even near fully wrapped up the ‘discussion’ about whether the 1637 “That’s what we want!” transmission ever happened at all… or that if it did… whether it really was DIVSA Eric Marsh saying it…
…then this is a very important point.
It’s pretty much a given that there WAS no YHF fire overhead ‘in the air’ at the time this (supposed) 1637 transmission took place… but it really doesn’t matter if there was any ‘fire command’ in a chopper, or not.
Any chopper pilot could have made that transmission… and we KNOW there were at least TWO in the air right there around Yarnell at both 1633, when that ‘spot-on’ SEAT drop happened… and in the 1637 to 1639 timeframe when Steed’s first MADAY appeared. We can even HEAR these 2 choppers flying overhead in the Helmet-Cam video itself.
The recent ‘sidetrack’ of proving that Tom Story’s Canon EOS 1D was 36 minutes and 7 seconds BEHIND the REAL time that day is actually related to this 1637 transmission discussion… which is why it was good to ‘sidetrack’ and take care of that. Tom Story’s 7093 photos series seemed to show a VLAT drop at exactly 1639… the moment of Steed’s first MAYDAY. It was worth it to go off and verify that for no other reason than to prove that that is NOT the case… and that we CAN trust the Air-To-Air traffic completely for figuring out what Bravo 33 was REALLY doing in the 1637-1639 timeframe.
In the course of basically re-viewing and re-listening to EVERY Panebaker Air-Study video in order to nail down that Tom Story camera time offset… I happened to HEAR some things I hadn’t really heard before regarding HELICOPTERS and RETARDANT DROPS.
If you listen to all of the Panebaker Air Study videos… it is *NOT* unusual at all to hear someone in a helicopter ‘commenting’ on a retardant drop right after it happens.
You actually DO hear a lot of ‘unsolicited’ comments ( over Air-To-Ground channel ) such as “Spot-on!” or “Right on target!” or even one lengthy response from a chopper pilot after one of the VLAT drops on the NORTH end where he jumps in on Air-To-Ground right afterwards and says something like…
“This is 5Q Alpha in the hotbird’s seat with a front row view… and that was right on the money! Nice work!.”
So YES… it is actually MORE than likely that when Burfiend thought he heard DIVSA say “That’s exactly what we want”… that really just might have been one of the chopper pilots already in the air down there jumping in on Air-To-Ground and ‘confirming’ the ‘goodness’ of that spot-on 1633 SEAT drop.
So something like “That’s exactly what we want!” probably WAS actually said on the Air-To-Ground channel ( by SOMEONE who saw the spot-on 1633 SEAT drop )… but Burfiend was simply mis-remembering ( during his SAIT interview ) who said that around that time.
No definite PROOF ( yet )… but we’re getting closer.
I’d still love to know what Clint Clauson ( the THIRD guy onboard that Bravo 33 plane that afternoon ) actually thinks he did ( or didn’t ) hear.
Followup… forgot to mention something…
While it is NOT unusual at ALL to hear these chopper pilots ‘commenting’ on a retardant drop… the KEY seems to always be that these ‘unsolicited’ verifying-goodness comments ONLY come AFTER a REAL DROP.
In other words… if you listen carefully to all of these sorts of ‘unsolicted’ verifying-goodness comments from the chopper pilots in the Panebaker videos… they NEVER comment on a ‘show me’ or on a ‘line up’ drop…
…and there’s a GOOD reason for that.
These guys are flying ‘show me’ and ‘go-around’ and ‘line-up’ flights basically ALL the time… and unless you are totally GLUED to the Air-To-Air channel yourself then you really can’t ever be sure when they are actually going to DROP… or NOT.
So the ONLY thing that warrants an unsolicited “That was spot-on!” or “That’s exactly what we want!” comment is when you have actually just SEEN them drop… and you are verifying the ‘goodness’ of that location for even MORE drops.
So that, I think, is even more ‘indirect’ proof that Marsh would NOT have just jumped onto the radio and come out of nowhere with an unsolicited “That’s exactly what we want!” transmission JUST because he *might* have accidentally saw ANYONE doing a ‘show me’ or a ‘practice run’.
Those kind of ‘unsolicited’ comments over Air-To-Ground usually ONLY happen AFTER a REAL DROP… and are simply meant to encourage ‘more of the same’ at that location.
So ( perhaps? ) just one more reason why if anyone really did say “That’s exactly what we want!” over the Air-To-Ground channel in the 1634 to 1637 timeframe… it really was just a ‘confirming goodness’ comment regarding the spot-on 1633 SEAT drop right there on the outskirts of Yarnell ( which Marsh himself could NOT have seen due to the smoke cloud between him and Yarnell in that timeframe ).
WTKTT I think you are right on with the above.
Also if the Helicopters were dropping water in the same area trying to hold the fire down, then they definitely would have commented on the tanker drop helping them out at a critical location.
The reason I keep referring to the 1633 SEAT drop there right on the outskirts of Yarnell is because that, in fact, seems to be exactly what everyone who saw it seemed to think. Burfiend and French seemed to think so and said so in their SAIT interview.
The drop went ‘right between the ‘fire’ and a ‘home’… which at THAT point is time is what was *really* needed.
This ‘cut’ from Bravo 33’s SAIT interview seems to be describing that exact drop… and the fact that it was just after this 1633 drop when Burfiend then turned his attention to Kevin in the DC10 VLAT and told him to ‘come on in now’ ( circa 1636 )…
__________________________________________
We decided we were going to go here (pointed to Div Z) and go direct. Took the single SEAT. Brand new pilot (830) went right between spot and the home. We brought the DC10 in…
___________________________________________
Sidenote: They obviously had MAPS at these SAIT interviews and there are several references in the interviews where people are said to have been ‘pointing at the map’.
It SURE would have been nice if copies of that maps ( with notations of where people were pointing ) were included in the SAIT FOIA/FOIL releases…
…but they weren’t.
If these ‘Interview notated maps’ even exist… then they are just even more documents that Arizona Forestry either just neglected to include in the FOIA/FOIL requests… or they ( for some reason ) decided to specifically ‘withhold’ them.
The ADOSH investigation did the RIGHT thing.
They had fresh copies of ‘maps’ at each and every interview and they were freely letting the interviewees ‘mark them up’ during their interviews to make locations and movements more clear…
…and ADOSH did INCLUDE those ‘interviewee notated maps’ in their FOIA/FOIL release(s).
You can listen ( or read ) along with the interviewee AND see the exact notes they were making DURING the interview on real maps.
I’d still love to know exactly WHERE Burfiend was pointing when his own SAIT interview notes say he was ‘pointing at a spot in Division Z’ and said “We went HERE”.
Where is HERE?
Whoops. I left the phrase “as SPOT-ON” out of the first paragraph above, which was really intended to be the whole point of the statement.
Here is how paragraph 1 above SHOULD have read…
“The reason I keep referring to the 1633 SEAT drop there right on the outskirts of Yarnell as SPOT-ON is because that, in fact, seems to be exactly what everyone who saw it seemed to think. Burfiend and French seemed to think so and said so in their SAIT interview.”
Glad you caught that. TBH I haven’t had much of a chance to even look at the Panebakers. And I’ve definitely been wondering how the helicopters communicated and with whom.
When I read the Interagency Fire Aviation Manual, it said there was supposed to be a “Helico,” a Helitanker Coordinator, somehow in communication with both Air Attack and Incident Command.
Correction for the above post.
The 20130630_162300_SEAT_drop_EP video that is now known
to be BOGUS is just ONE of the Panebaker Air study videos that
‘precedes’ the 163700 one. It does not IMMEDIATELY precede it.
There are actually TWO others that come in-between 162300
and 163700… and they both appear to be exactly what they
say they are.
These are the actual ( Eric ) Panebaker Air Study videos
that cover the crucial 4:00 PM to 5:00 PM timeframe that day…
20130630_161858_VLAT_split_2_EP
20130630_162300_SEAT_drop_EP **** This is the BOGUS one
20130630_162508_2SEATS_EP
20130630_163338_fire_behavior_EP
20130630_163700_fire_behavior_EP
20130630_164544_fire_behavior_EP
20130630_170634_VLAT_EP
NOTE: The 20130630_161858_VLAT_split_2_EP video that precedes the one that is now know to be BOGUS is the one that captured the 4:16 PM “Granite Mountain… what’s your status right now?” query from from someone in fire command and Eric Marsh’s response about Granite Mountain “makin’ their way out the same escape route from this morning” and Marsh’s “just checkin’ it out to see where we gonna jump out at” transmission.
ALSO NOTE: The ‘EP’ initials in these Air Study video filenames all stand for ‘Eric Panebaker’.
If the 20130630_162300_SEAT_drop_EP video ( as released by the SAIT in response to FOIA/FOIL requests ) does NOT contain the same content as the original… then HE would certainly know.
Yikes… this ‘correction for the above post’ was NOT meant for this thread and somehow posted TWICE.
Once up above with the ‘thread’ it belongs to and again down here where it didn’t belong.
I think maybe this ‘Chapter 6’ is starting to cause WordPress
to suffer brain damage… as is know to happen when the
content gets very large.
I think it’s time for a new ‘Chapter 7’.
The Az Republic ran another piece on the Yarnell evacuations yesterday. Turns out only 1 in 8 persons received an automated call, and most of those involved no human-to-human contact, i.e. just left a message. Also the article says there was a 21 minute delay in sending out the notifications (I am assuming from the time the decision was made sometime after 3:30). May account for why people said they were notified around 4:08. Also there was no one hour notice, just “get out now”. In a disaster nothing ever works as it supposed to, but the evacuations that day seemed particularly bad. I still wonder the extent to which the flawed evacuations that day affected firefighting decisions in the time after 3:30.
I can imagine it might have had something to do with Abel, Cordes, et al, not paying enough attention to what Granite Mountain was doing until it was too late……
Maybe their attention was diverted. But I was asking more in how it might have affected tactical decisions.
One thing struck me recently. GM was aware of the evacuations situation. When the fire started running at Yarnell, I believe it was Scott Norris who texted “the fire is running right at Yarnell”. Yet I also think it was he (I’m pretty sure, maybe it was someone else) who texted “and the evacuations have just started”. Maybe it was a throwaway comment, not something they were making decisions based on. But it shows, that even for an experienced crew member, it was on their minds.
The evacuation situation should not have impacted safety considerations. But human nature being what it is, I wonder if it colored the way people looked at risk that afternoon.
Actually… it was Wade Parker’s final text message sent to his mother with a network timestamp of 4:04 PM that had those references in it.
Wade’s complete text message was…
“This thing is running straight for yarnel. jus starting to evac. you can see fire on the left town on right. DO NOT POST THIS ON FACEBOOK OR ANY OTHER SOCIAL MEDIA DEAL!!!!”
There was some discussion, early on ( even on this forum ) about what Wade really meant when he said “jus starting to evac”.
The discussion(s) were addressing the possibility that Wade’s statement could be taken one of two ways…
1) He was telling his mother that HE ( and the other Granite Mountain fellas ) were ‘just starting’ THEIR ‘evacuation’ of their position. As in… just now leaving the safe black.
2) He was telling his mother that YARNELL was only now starting to evacuate.
I believe the consensus back then was that Wade probably meant number 2… mostly because the people with WFF experience were in agreement that Parker probably wouldn’t even use the word ‘evacuation’ to describe their OWN movements or ‘relocation’ efforts.
So if it really was number 2 above… then YES… that is full proof that even the line crew up there ( and not just management like Marsh/Steed ) were fully aware that ‘get out now’ evacuations had been ordered down there in town… but they were also NOT aware that they had been ‘ordered’ by SPGS1 Gary Cordes some 24 mnutes BEFORE that… at 1540.
With regard to how this ‘knowledge’ affected their own decision making… I’m SURE it had SOMETHING to do with either of the following…
1) Management putting pressure on them to get to town as fast as they could ( Sic: Someone in management appears to actually be telling them to HURRY in the YARNELL-GAMBLE video ).
2) If there was no management pressure at all… then it still probably made them ‘rethink’ their already stated plan to remain in the safe black. They ( Steed and/or Marsh ) just didn’t want to accept the fact that they were ‘out of the game’ and weren’t going to be able to be ‘where the action was’… and this urge on their part made them totally forget that their PRIMARY responsibility was the *SAFETY* of ALL of the employees in their charge.
SIDENOTE: A lot has been discussed about what GOOD anyone might have even thought 19 guys with hand tools and no actual structural firefighting equipment could have even been able to do that day… or what their ‘assignment’ might have been even if they made it down there.
It is perfectly possible that even if management requested them to ‘come down’… that no one really had anything specific in mind for them to do at all… at least not at the time the request was made.
Management might have just ‘wanted them to be there’ and was going to figure out what to do with them AFTER they arrived.
This would actually match OPS1 Todd Abel’s thinking with regards to Type 1 Hotshots.
In his ADOSH interview… the ADOSH investigators went over the situation with the Blue Ridge Hotshots with OPS1 Todd Abel and how they just bounced around most of the morning with nothing to do and only being told to ‘stage’ at 3 different places before anyone even gave them any kind of ‘assignment’.
Todd Abel’s OWN explanation for all of that was that he was ‘busy’ that morning… but knew that he just wanted to have a Type 1 Hotshot crew in (quote) “My back pocket in case I needed them”.
Actual (full) quote from Abel about this in his ADOSH interview was…
__________________________________________
So we went down there, uh, after the briefing ran into, um, Blue Ridge out there, um, and they said hey, what would you like us to do? I said hey, why don’t you guys go stage at the school. I’m not sure exactly where I wanna put you guys yet. But I wanted that hotshot crew in my back pocket.
__________________________________________
Granted… that was ‘start of work day’, pretty much, and Abel really *was* ‘very busy’ at that point. It then took Abel almost an HOUR to get all the various engines and crews that were showing up assigned to various places.
However… I’m sure the ‘evacuation cycle’ was just as busy ( and confusing ) when it hit later on… and there might have been no other reason for asking GM to ‘come down’ ( and to HURRY ) than the same sort of “I just wanted Hotshots in my back pocket” mentality.
I would really hate to think that that is the reason why 19 good men died… just because someone wanted them ‘in their back pocket’ but would have ended up just letting them stand around in a parking lot like they did with the OTHER Type 1 Hotshot crew that was ALREADY THERE… .and totally available.
Mike, I absolutely believe that it does. Absolutely. 100%.
(I made a comment on IM long ago about this point and about the demographics of Yarnell/Glen Ilah, and, not surprisingly, I took a fair amount of pushback. It is clear from at least one ADOSH interview that leaps readily to mind that Dave Larson (or someone…) was on the same wavelength, for whatever that is worth. I’m not suggesting the GM guys SHOULD have tried to go to the BSR or wherever, but I am saying that they strike me as a bunch of men who were likely to want to try (if safely possible) help a vulnerable population. Human nature is what it is, and a lot of guys become wildfire professionals because they CARE.)
Elizabeth… I don’t think there is any question in the world that these were men who were ‘likely to try’ to help people. The pay wasn’t good enough to stick with that kind of work for any other reason…
…but ( as I think we have seen )… it is, in fact, possible to care TOO MUCH… if those urges make you forget the rules of your profession and take unnecessary risks with the very LIVES of the employees you are responsible for.
This applies to MANY professions… and not just firefighting.
Yes… they CARED.
But why did TWO of those men care SO much that they forgot the ‘rules’ of their profession *AND* what their PRIMARY responsibilities were… and it ended up
killing all 19?
This is the primary question that still remains to be answered.
Mike made a point or posed a query, and I agreed with his point/query.
That was the only purpose of my post.
…and I was agreeing with *both* of you. They CARED. A LOT…
…but that still doesn’t (fully) explain what happened in Yarnell on June 30, 2013.
The Republic, which I gather takes a fair amount of grief at times, continues to write on this story. This is at least the second significant piece they have done on the evacuations, both well after the incident. They have never tried to link the evacuations to the deaths of the GMHS, but I do think the delayed evacuation impacted some decision-making.
The Yavapai sheriff’s office basically said the evacuations were not perfect, but were good enough as no residents died or were seriously injured. I have a lot of problems with that thinking. First of all, there were near misses with residents. Second, I think some firefighters were left too long at the head of the fire west of town and there were apparently near misses there too. I think there was some reluctance to pull them out because they were trying to buy time. And finally, we may never know for sure the degree to which knowledge of the tardy evacuations impacted Granite Mountain’s actions. Maybe it played no role, but they knew of it and then they did something inexplicable. The questions about what could they have done, about what actions they thought they could do, are good ones. Maybe though they just felt the need to be “available”, to help if needed. Yes, they needed to say put, but am trying to fathom their thought process.
Anyways, those in charge of evacuations should not conclude the process was “adequate”, just because no residents were killed or injured.
Reply to mike post on
May 12, 2014 at 10:04 pm
>> mike said…
>> The Republic, which I gather
>> takes a fair amount of grief at
>> times, continues to write on
>> this story.
As well they should ( continue to write about this historic, tragic incident ).
>> mike also said…
>> They have never tried to link the
>> evacuations to the deaths of the
>> GMHS, but I do think the delayed
>> evacuation impacted some
>> decision-making.
Of course it did.
Suddenly… EVERYTHING was an EMERGENCY.
That affects EVERYONE involved *and* their decision making.
It ( the total chaos which created this sense of total EMERGENCY in a very short span of time ) could have been AVOIDED. No question.
The moment that thing marched right through that heavy retardant line like it wasn’t even THERE ( hundreds of yards north of even Cordes’ FIRST trigger point )… it didn’t take a genius to figure out there wasn’t much that was going to stop it. The Big Dog was going to just EAT. Get everyone OUT OF THE WAY. Like RIGHT NOW.
>> mike also said…
>> The questions about what could
>> they have done, about what
>> actions they thought they could
>> do, are good ones. Maybe though
>> they just felt the need to be
>> “available”, to help if needed.
Yes. Maybe having some Type 1 Hotshots in Yarnell in/around the time the ONLY thing to be doing was a total evacuation *might* have helped… and maybe that *was* what they were ‘thinking’…
…but just ONE quick call on the radio to discover that there were ALREADY 20 Elite Type 1 Hotshots right there ‘in the middle of the action’… with NO ONE giving them *ANY* assignment(s) whatsoever would have answered that question in their minds… toot-sweet.
That radio call never happened.
IMHO… It should have.
Even if they were half-way there… if they had discovered there wasn’t anything they were even going to be ALLOWED to do if they got all the way there ( just like Blue Ridge wasn’t being allowed to do anything at that time but *be safe* )… they could have TURNED BACK. There would still have been TIME to do that.
>> mike also said…
>> Anyways, those in charge of
>> evacuations should not conclude
>> the process was “adequate”, just
>> because no residents were killed
>> or injured.
No, they most certainly should NOT.
That’s just more ‘establishment of normalcy’ and ‘prior bad decisions with good outcomes’ crap.
Own it. Learn from it.
Find out what OTHER small Arizona towns don’t have a working siren at the fire station because the rats have chewed through the wires….
…then FIX it. ASAP.
Find out what OTHER small Arizona towns have never done a ‘reverse 911’ test to see if it is even going to work when the time comes…
…and do a TEST.
See if it IS going to work.
This is NOT rocket science.
** Regarding INJURIES…
There has ALWAYS been confusion and mis-reporting about that.
The LA Times and USA Today BOTH initially reported that in addition to the 19 fatalities… 22 other ‘firefighters and civilians’ were injured that afternoon.
Their own articles even stated that some of the ‘injured’ had to be flown to burn units because the nearby Congress hospital couldn’t handle them.
2 days later… the AP press was then reporting that there were NO serious injuries other than the 19 fatalities.
To this day, however, the Wikipedia page for the Yarnell Hill Fill is still ‘sticking to the story’ that there were MANY ‘others’ injured that day and they upped the number to 23.
The current ( active ) Wikipedia Page for the Yarnell Hill Fire is basically an absolute JOKE… but this is what their very OFFICIAL looking ‘information box’ about the Yarnell Hill Fire has said from day one and it has NEVER been ‘corrected’ by anyone…
Wikipedia
The Yarnell Hill Fire
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yarnell_Hill_Fire
______________________________
Location: Yarnell, Yavapai County, Arizona, U.S.
Coord: 34°14′54″N, 112°45′29″W
Date(s): June 28, 2013 – July 10, 2013
Burned area: 8,400 acres
Ignition source: Lightning
Land use: Mixed (residential/wildlands)
Buildings destroyed: 129
Fatalities: 19
Injuries (non-fatal): 23
______________________________
There are also (apparently) claims of ‘personal injuries’ in MANY of the 100+ claims that have been filed by property owners… but no one has done an actual ‘tally’ on that number.
Gary Cordes himself ( according to his own ADOSH interview ) was putting people into the backs of ambulances that afternoon… but there was no good followup on any of that, either.
So whether there *really* were any ‘injuries’ other than the 19 fatalities still remains a bit a mystery… but what else is new when it comes to YHF.
Followup 1
** ARTICLE CLAIMS 22
** INJURED IN YARNELL
Arizona: 19 Firefighter’s Dead and 22 Injured Battling the Yarnell Hill Fire
http://guardianlv.com/2013/06/arizona-19-firefighters-dead-and-22-injured-battling-the-yarnell-hill-fire/
From the article…
________________________
Eight of the 22 firefighters injured were taken to Wickenburg Community Hospital, some were airlifted to a burn unit in Pheonix, and others were transported to Yavapai Regional Medical Center, Glover said. The 19 firefighters who perished were part of the Granite Mountain Hot Shot Crew.
_________________________
This article lists ( and has links to ) what they say are their TWO sources for the article…
The LA Times and
USA Today.
Roxie Glover. Wow, have not seen that name for awhile. Fine woman. Amazing mother. Wow. I am looking at the link now:
http://guardianlv.com/2013/06/arizona-19-firefighters-dead-and-22-injured-battling-the-yarnell-hill-fire/
That photo is a picture of Bob Kramer’s place off highway 89 that the only thing that survived in his burnt fridge was a case of beer. You can see Bob on my photo area-
Who was injured in that fire?
Tex and I were just skimming and Joy saw Roxie’s name and that photo of Bob’s place and we are out hiking Zion country- God’s country for a bit and away from civilization but it was nice to see the forum going strong. Tex wondered has anyone looked into the ACTUAL DATE that restricted map was made for state land restriction for that area that is currently restricted (340 acres) beyond the Helm’s spot. Anyone know how to find that out? That lady in the red cross showed us a map that matched the map we got in an email mid July 2013. It is not being looked into much but we are wondering as time went by that Tex (Sonny) awoke at 3am this morning thinking of the 19 and that map and other areas. Has anyone new come out on photos/videos locally to help? I guess I will know when I keep skimming. Short on time. Skim for 10 minutes then off I have to go- Hope all you are well.
~Joy A. Collura
Followup 2…
The original LA Times article…
19 firefighters die in
Arizona wildfire
June 30, 2013 – By Matt Pearce and Cindy Carcamo
http://articles.latimes.com/2013/jun/30/nation/la-na-nn-arizona-firefighters-dead-20130630
From the article…
________________________
Roxie Glover, a spokeswoman for Wickenburg Community Hospital, said officials had told her to expect injured firefighters — but then she was told they weren’t coming.
“It became clear that the firefighters had been deceased,” Glover told The LA Times. “We were told that we were not getting firefighters.”
Glover said officials told her that the 19 firefighters who had perished were part of the Granite Mountain Hot Shot Crew.
At least two (other) firefighters were evacuated by helicopter to a burn center in Phoenix, she said.
Glover said homeowners had flooded into the hospital, suffering from smoke inhalation and shock after losing their homes.
________________________
Followup 3…
The original USA Today article
USA Today
Article: 19 firefighters killed battling Arizona blaze
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/06/30/fire-in-arizona-prompts-evacuation-of-120-homes/2477469/
From the article…
________________________
Wickenburg Community Hospital is expecting to treat about eight firefighters who were among about 22 injured battling the fast-moving, 2,000-acre Yarnell Hill Fire that has burned through have the town, officials said Sunday evening.
The spokeswoman for Wickenburg hospital, Roxie Glover, said there are reports of as many as 22 firefighters being injured. About eight from that group were headed to the Wickenberg facility, some were being air lifted to a Phoenix burn unit and others were being transported to Yavapai Regional Medical Center, Glover said.
Jim Tavary, CEO of Wickenburg hospital, said his facility was put on alert to expect several injured firefighters but did not know their conditions or the extent of their injuries.
“We are setting up an incident command,” Tavary said.
Homes have burned and hospitals have reported injuries from the blaze that had reached Yarnell.
_________________________
And the SAIT and some others still think the Type II team did a good job. When a Cluster F*** starts it just acts like a rolling snow ball it gets bigger and bigger.
Poor planning, poor Safety and poor execution total lack of situation awareness.
Also why would any one think they could through a crew at the head of a running fire and do any thing? That includes Marsh and GM. Why would they think they could do something that no other Hand Crew has ever been able to do.
For all of you who have never fought fire….Direct attack starts by flanking the fire not taking it head on and pinching the head off. The running fire that afternoon was just plain get out of the way. To much fire and no place to make a stand, or no defensible space to protect structures. Evidenced by Fire Fighters Injuries (burns).
** TOM STORY’S CANON EOS 1D CAMERA WAS
** 36 MINUTES AND 7 SECONDS BEHIND THE
** REAL TIME ON JUNE 30, 2013.
Tom Story’s ‘Canon EOS 1D Mark II N’ camera had an incorrect time setting on June 30, 2013 that was always 36 minutes and 7 seconds BEHIND the REAL time.
The proof of this comes from comparing the following two images of the same VLAT drop ( One that Tom Story took and one that Panebaker took ) which took place circa 1715.28 on the NORTH side of the fire, along Hays Ranch Road in Peeples Valley.
Tom Story’s 201303_Yarnell_Hill_7093
*and*
Panebaker’s 20130630_171528-1_EP
BOTH of these photos show the same exact VLAT drop and were taken no more than 1 second apart, so the *known* correct timestamp on the Panebaker photo can simply be applied to the Tom Story photo, and used to compute the ‘time offset’ for Story’s ‘Canon EOS 1D’ that day.
Here is a VIDEO CROSSFADE between these two photos which PROVES that they are of the same VLAT drop and taken within 1 second of each other…
Youtube Video Title: Tom-Story-7093
Direct link to this VIDEO…
http://youtu.be/QixH_erZ5cc
YouTube About Information
_________________________________________________________________
This is a video crossfade between the following two photographs…
Tom Story’s 201303_Yarnell_Hill_7093 *and*
Panebaker’s 20130630_171528-1_EP
They are BOTH still photos of the same DC10 VLAT drop that took place circa 1715.27 ( 5:15.27 PM ) up on the NORTH side of the fire along Hays Ranch Road in Peeples Valley.
Tom Story shot his photo with a ‘Canon EOS 1D Mark II N’ camera with a 300mm f/2.8L Lens attached.
Panebaker shot his photo with a ‘Canon EOS REBEL T3i’ camera with a 15-85mm f/3.5-5.6 Lens attached.
The TIME on Tom Story’s ‘Canon EOS 1D’ was set incorrectly that day and it put an EXIF metadata timestamp on his 7093 photo of 4:39.21 PM. The actual time it was taken ( based on this comparison with the correctly-timestamped Panebaker photo ) is 5:15.28 PM.
That means that Story’s ‘Canon EOS 1D’ was always 36 minutes and 7 seconds BEHIND the REAL time on June 30, 2013.
The absolute proof that these are two photos of the same VLAT drop is really in the SMOKE cloud on the left side of both photos. It remains absolutely identical during the ‘crossfade’ between the two photos.
__________________________________________________________________
** MORE DETAIL…
Panebaker wasn’t just shooting videos that day.
Every time there was a VLAT drop… Panebaker also used his ‘Canon EOS REBEL T3i’ digital camera to shoot the drops ( these are all the ‘shutter clicks’ being heard in the Panebaker VIDEOS.
Those photos are in the online Dropbox in this folder…
Photos and Video / AerialFirefightingstudy / Panebaker / Photo / VLAT Drops
ONE of Panebaker’s photos of that 5:15.27 PM VLAT drop on the NORTH side of the fire is an almost perfect match for Tom Story’s 7093 photo.
Filename: 20130630_171528-1_EP
EXIF metadata for this Panebaker still image…
Camera: Canon EOS REBEL T3i
Lens: Canon EF-S 15-85mm f/3.5-5.6 IS USM
Lens 2: Shot at 85 mm
Exposure: Auto exposure, Program AE, 1/128 sec, f/5.6, ISO 320
Flash: Off, Did not fire
Focus: AI Servo AF, with a depth of field of from 59.7 m to 15.84 m.
Focus 2: AF Area Mode: Multi-point AF or AI AF
Date: June 30, 2013 – 5:15:27 PM
File: 3,456 × 5,184 JPEG (17.9 megapixels)
The EXIF timestamp of 5:15.27 PM ( 1715.27 ) matches the filename title of 171528 ( filename title is 1 second ahead of EXIF timestamp ).
Tom Story took 3 photos of this same moment of the same drop with his Canon EOS 1D.
All THREE have the same exact timestamp so he must have had his ‘auto-shutter’ motor on, leaned on the shutter button, and just took three photos as fast as the camera would take them.
NOTE: The 4:39.21 timestamps are according to HIS Canon EOS 1D but that is the issue. We know these timestamps are not correct. The KEY was finding out what the real ‘time offset’ was that day.
NOTE: His Canon EOS 1D was not ‘stuck’ on 4:39.21. His photos of the rest of this VLAT drop are stamped with the correct incremental seconds values like 4:39.22 and 4:39.23, etc. He really did take these 3 photos all in the same ‘second’ at 4:39.21.
201303_Yarnell_Hill_7093 – 4:39:21
201303_Yarnell_Hill_7094 – 4:39:21
201303_Yarnell_Hill_7095 – 4:39.21
The FIRST one ( 7093 ) is the best ‘exact match’ for the same photo in the Panebaker Air Study Video ‘Photos’ folder.
In-between the Panebaker and Tom Story photo, the DC10 has, in fact, advanced about 1 plane length.
That means that while both of these photos were taken at almost the same moment… the Panebaker image was actually shot FIRST.
Given the rate of movement as seen and timestamped in other photos/videos of this VLAT drop… I would say that only 1 second has elapsed between when Panebaker pressed his shutter button and then Tom Story pressed his.
So.. since the actual EXIF timestamp for this photo is 1715.27… that puts a REAL timestamp on Story’s 7093 photo of…
1715.28 ( 5:15.28 PM ).
The difference, then, between the ACTUAL time Tom Story’s 7093 photo was taken and the incorrect 4:39.21 PM that his Canon 1D ‘stamped’ it would be…
+36 minutes and 7 seconds. ( 1715.28 minus 1639.21 ).
BOTTOM LINE: This PROVES that there was NO VLAT DROP on the SOUTH side of the fire at 4:39 PM that day, which is what Tom Story’s photos seemed to suggest. That would have meant there was a DC10 VLAT drop taking place at the exact moment that Captain Jesse Steed was making his first MAYDAY call.
That is why it was IMPORTANT to figure out WHY Tom Story’s photos might have been suggesting such a drop at that time.
It didn’t happen.
He ( Tom Story ) simply had the TIME set WRONG on his Canon EOS 1D.
Heh! Thanks for doing this!!
You sent me to the Google to do a little Canon 1D History!! Shows how much I pay attention to cameras that cost five times more than I can even contemplate affording!
That is NOT a new camera!! The 1D Mark ii n came out in 2005!! It was about $4000 then. Google shows one on ebay today for $790.
HOWEVER the 1D’s have always been considered the fastest cameras on the market. They’re the supreme sports photography cameras. It wasn’t STUCK on a second. It could shoot 8.5 frames per second. The current 1D Mark iv can shoot 10 frames per second. Tom’s 5D Mark ii’s can only shoot 4 frames per second. And the 1D is a 1.3 crop frame, a little smaller than full frame, which gives it more “reach.”
That’s why when you watch the Olympics the 1D is what most of the photographers are using. So when Tom wanted a combination of speed and reach, that’s when he went for the relatively ancient but still awesome 1D.
Actually Tom shot 21 frames of that whole drop. The first being at x:xx:18. The last being at x:xx:29. There are at least nine frames that he shot that he didn’t put into that folder.
So now that means possibly having to go back to McCord’s VLAT-helicopter-almost-fiasco video and seeing if that possibly changes its timing (and thus the rest of his coolpix images). It might and it might not. And it may not matter in the general scheme of things.
So, we have another mystery solved!
Thanks!
And PS. I’ve been using Canon Rebels since 2007. I currently use the t3i. It’s the most popular “non-professional” dslr on the planet. I have a three-day “how to shoot video with your dslr” class beginning today. So I may not be around too much.
Marti… sidenote…
Have you seen the Tom Story photos that DO actually have some GPS information in them?… but that GPS data is totally screwed up?
I find that very unusual. Usually these GPS chipsets in these devices either WORK… or they don’t.
There is always a ‘startup time’ for GPS if you have just turned the device on and sometimes you won’t be getting truly ACCURATE GPS coordinates until you have acquired at least 4 or 5 of the LEO ( Low Earth Orbit ) satellites…
…but Tom Story’s GPS capable device ( I have no idea what camera that really was ) just seems BROKEN.
It’s also VERY unusual that, in the EXIF data for these GPS stamped photos of his, there is no CAMERA or DEVICE information whatsoever.
Very unusual.
Sometimes the CAMERA or DEVICE Model number or ID is one of the ONLY things a cheap camera will add as EXIF data… but I’ve never seen a device that is adding other sophisticated EXIF data ( like GPS )… but also seems to be REFUSING to add any actual CAMERA or DEVICE information.
So it wasn’t a Canon…
and it wasn’t an iPhone or an iPad.
I have NO IDEA what camera he was using for those (incorrectly) stamped GPS photos.
It was some kind of smartphone pic that he was posting to Instagram. I’m such a bozo re smartphones.
But I’ve looked at LOTS of various smartphone pix from this fire, and the way they get tagged and time stamped is all over the boards. And we had a discussion way back when about how the geotagging etc could be easily way off. It takes awhile for that to set itself up.
I’ve seen LOTS of smartphone geotagging from this fire that is also all over the boards. I haven’t come to expect any kind of accuracy on any of this stuff at all.
**
** MORE ON THE TOM STORY CANON EOS 1D PHOTO TIMESTAMPS
** AND THE (SUPPOSED) VLAT DROP AT 1639
Reply to Marti Reed post on May 11, 2014 at 8:54 am said:
>> Marti said…
>> I had downloaded a smattering of photos from both folders, but
>> just kinda randomly. Just downloaded a bunch more,
>> more strategically. Looks like he photographed three VLAT drops.
Yes, it does.
>> Marti also said…
>> I’m starting to think he set up that camera quickly, just setting the
>> date, and not the time. Thus the stamp when first shot a frame on
>> it would have been 00:00:00. I don’t know if I have the time to figure
>> out what to synch on. But if I can pin one of those VLATs, it might
>> be possible to nail it.
>>
>> That being said, I’m currently thinking that drop might be the 1707ish
>> one. I just don’t know where he took it from. I don’t know where that
>> drop was, exactly. Do you?
I’ve been hard working on that here ( the actual LOCATION of that VLAT drop in
the Tom Story Canon EOS 1D photos ) and I can almost say with little doubt
that regardless of he 4:39 timestamp(s)… that is actually EXACTLY where
we see the Air Study people filming those earlier VLAT drops off on that
small ridge at the NORTH end of the fire… up in Peeples Valley.
So YES… regardless of device timestamp… it looks like that 4:39 series
of photos coming from Ton Story’s ‘Canon EOS 1D Mark II N’ are of the
SAME VLAT DROPS captured in the Panebaker videos… much earlier.
Exactly WHICH Panebaker video is a match?
I am on that right now… taking stillframes from Panebaker videos and
comparing them to the Tom Story photo(s).
>> Marti also wrote…
>> If it was visible from the RHR parking lot, he could have caught
>> it w/that 300mm easily.
Yes… but see above. It looks like those photos were taken all the
way up NORTH of the same VLAT drop(s) seen in the Panebaker
Air Study videos.
It even looks like Tom Story might have been standing almost exactly
where the Air Study group was and using his 300mm lens from there.
>> Marti Reed also said ( on May 11, 2014 at 9:19 am )…
>>
>> Hah! I just found what looks like a tight sequence of the same event,
>> using both a Mark D and the 1D! It’s the red and white helicopter
>> picking up a bucket at the helispot and heading into the smoke…
>> Looks good…more later….
Bingo! I agree. That looks like the ‘moment’ when he decided to
actually switch between the 5D and the 1D.
>> Marti also said…
>> OK, if this helicopter sequence shows the 1D is set about 20 minutes
>> late, that would put the problematic VLAT drop at 4:17– the split drop.
Yes. This is starting to fall into place now.
That VLAT drop (supposedly) photographed by Tom Story with his
Canon 1D at 4:39 PM ( the exact minute of Steed’s first MAYDAY )
looks more and more like simply one of the same VLAT drops that
happened much earlier and captured by one of the Panebaker videos.
Still not *EXACTLY* sure it was the 4:17 ‘split drop’ video… but I am
all over that and will have some results of my own soon about that.
I would bet my kittehs on it.
Bcuz, I wrote mistakenly below that he shot the second T 911 sequence (the one Blue Ridge was capturing with the almost helicopter snafu) on on the Mark D II. He actually shot it on the D1. And the first image is stamped 2:00:23. If you pull that stamp back 22 minutes (like I think you need to with the long two-camera helicopter and the third sequence) that puts it at 1:38:23. Right when it would be flying out of that drop. I think we’ve got it. At least good enough for well, what we need. If some overpaid lawyer’s crew wants to get more exact, that’s fine with me!!!!
And thanks for pulling this up out of the weeds!
Oops. It’s the T 910. Haven’t had time to keyword this stuff yet.
Location is *confirmed*.
That Tom Story VLAT sequence which *appears* to have been taken at 4:39 PM ( according to his Canon 1D ) was definitely shot almost exactly where the Panebaker Air Study videos were being taken up on Hays Ranch Road some time earlier and looking WEST at the SEAT / VLAT drops.
** Panebaker Air Study video
** 20130630_161858_VLAT_split_2_EP
The ‘focus’ starts out fine in this video, but at about +7 seconds, when the ZOOM starts to capture the actual VLAT drop, the focus goes blurry, recovers a little, but never really returns to ‘sharp’ focus the whole time it is ZOOMED…
…EXCEPT for a brief moment at exactly +20 seconds. He recovers ‘sharp’ focus while ZOOMED for just a split second, but then loses it again.
A freeze-frame of that split-second when it is both ZOOMED and in ‘sharp focus’ proves that the terrain matches the Tom Story photos exactly… right down to the trees on the ridge in the foreground.
The ‘terrain’ in both the foreground and the background is, in fact, an ‘exact match’ for the Tom Story Canon EOS 1D photo sequence.
Now… is Tom’s photo sequence simply ‘stillframes’ of this same exact VLAT drop shown in this Panebaker video?
Not 100 percent on that yet.
There are similarities… but not seeing an ‘exact match’ yet.
Stay tuned. Tom was apparently in a slightly different spot on the side of Hays Ranch road than the Air Study fellas so the ‘perspective’ on the drop is slightly different. The ‘retardant’ in the Panebaker video seems to fall much farther ‘into the smoke’ than is shown in Tom’s photo sequence…
…but the DC10’s ‘hard left on exit’ is a MATCH in both the video and Tom’s photo sequence.
I’m still comparing stillframes from this Panebaker video to the Tom Story photo(s) to see if we can get this down to an EXACT time offset for Story’s Canon 1D.
The one thing we know for SURE now… is that Story’s Canon 1D photo is *NOT* a photograph of any VLAT drop that was happening at 1639, at the same exact time Steed’s first MAYDAY went out.
That is now *CONFIRMED*.
I actually accidentally downloaded the USDA 1640 Air Study video yesterday, intending to download the later one. So I sat and watched it three times, just to get familiar with the jargon, the planes, the kind of communication going on. It’s a really helpful one to watch, because there is a LOT of stuff going on right in front of the camera. The one after it with the air 2 air of the 1633 drop and the 1647 whatever is not as good, because they don’t zoom in so you can’t really see anything, like the Panebaker does with that 1633 drop.
So, yeah, I watched the VLAT split drop quite handily three times over. So when I went to recheck those photos I instantly recognized the spot. That smoke to the left is over the helicopter “horseshoe dip.”
I think he’s at a different angle from the videos, although I haven’t watched the Panebakers, they’re still……..down…..loading.
With that 300 mm lens, it’s hard to tell, but when the plane lifts, it’s right over his head. And I don’t know whether this is the first or second drop, and i’m not sure it’s possible to tell. The plane was flying the exact same path, just dropping at the “front” end (which is actually called the “tail” because its the last part dropped) and extending it.
You can really get a much better grasp on it by watching the USDA video with the air 2 air. Very detailed conversation going on.
Finding that overlapping helicopter sequence was like a HAPPY Mother’s Day Gift, believe me. Thanks Tom Story!!
It also confirmed that my re-time-stamping of McCord’s camera was not terribly off, which I wasn’t sure of. Things could be several minutes off, but it looks like I’ve got all of this basically synced.
Thanks, Lightroom!
Typo alert: the USDA 1620 Air Study Video
Update: It appears that the VLAT drop captured
in the Panebaker Air Study video titled…
20130630_161858_VLAT_split_2_EP
…is NOT the VLAT drop in Tom Story’s Volume 2
photo sequence.
In Tom’s photo sequence… we see the VLAT in ‘level flight’ at the peak of retardant output.
In the Panebaker 161858 video… pretty much at NO TIME during the drop is the DC10 actually in ‘level flight’. That video basically shows him dropping in a ‘constant curve’ and already heading to his left before the ‘cutoff’ moment.
The VLAT drop Tom Story photographed makes the same kind of ‘hard left on exit’ after drop… but definitely came in straighter ( and lower ) than the drop seen in the Panebaker video.
So on to the USDA videos.
Probably a more likely ‘match’ there…
…but we are still NOT WRONG about LOCATION.
Tom Story definitely photographed a VLAT drop at that same location as these Air Study videos… onto that ridge up there off Hays Ranch Road in Peeples Valley.
Thanks. It has to be one of those drops. Because there aren’t that many VLAT drops, and ONLY drop in that location is the split drop. So it’s the other drop. It has to be.
Yeah, go watch the USDA video. And actually the entire Panebaker 3-part sequence.
Thanks for doing this. I’m too lazy.
Marti… just an FYI… see posts below about helicopters. In the course of watching these Air Study videos all over again I’ve found at least one more ( so far ) very *NEAR MISS* between a fixed-wing and a helicopter.
This one looked even CLOSER than the skycrane versus DC10 one earlier in the day.
It’s in Panebaker Air Study video
20130630_153414_EP at the
+11 second mark.
Lead plane is on a line-up from east to west parallel to Hays Ranch Road… but a chopper with a bucket is coming up on a south to north line on the OTHER side of the smoke cloud.
Chopper crosses RIGHT in front of the lead plane at exact same altitude with only a few seconds to spare.
Thx, will check it out!
That is also why you keep hearing French say “…and I need a HARD LEFT on the exit” whenever they were dropping at that spot up along Hays Ranch Road.
The helicopters were all ‘crossing’ Hays Ranch Road to get to the Helibase as they were doing all that retardant work on that ridge.
I believe French was AWARE of these few close calls and that’s why he then kept emphasizing a ‘hard left turn’ coming out of the drops after that.
Yes, and also the “horseshoe dip was right across from the helibase. Very tight quarters, indeed.
Reply to Marti Reed post
on May 11, 2014 at 9:04 pm
>> Marti said…
>> It has to be one of those drops.
>> Because there aren’t that many
>> VLAT drops, and ONLY drop in
>> that location is the split drop.
>> So it’s the other drop. It has to be.
It is. ( the 5:15 VLAT drop up along Hays Ranch Road on the NORTH side of the fire ).
Totally confirmed.
See new post above including a new
VIDEO CROSSFADE on YouTube
that proves it.
Story’s Canon EOS 1D was always 36 minutes and 7 seconds BEHIND the REAL time that day.
**
** CLINT CLAUSON ( ATS TRAINEE FLYING IN BRAVO 33 )
** RECORDED THE TIME OF STEED’S FIRST MAYDAY?
As long as we are still sort of ‘focused’ on these *VERY* confusing SAIT interview notes with Bravo 33… I think it’s worth pointing out something else.
When the SAIR came out… it was astounding how *LITTLE* information they were providing with regards to ‘sources’ for the narrative timeline and other (supposedly) ‘factual’ statements they were making.
ONE of those things has always been…
How did they arrive at a time of 1639 for Steed’s first MAYDAY call?
They just published that time as FACT… and there wasn’t even a ‘footnote’ to indicate how they arrived at that (specific) time.
Sure… a LOT of people HEARD this call… but no one seemed to be SURE what TIME it really was.
The SAIT also already knew about Aaron Hulburd’s Helmet-Cam video and this is obviously where they were taking a lot of what was then SAID and ‘paraphrasing’ it in their SAIR report…. but they also knew they were NOT going to release that Helmet-Cam video to the public along with the report…
…but ( as we know now )… the TIMESTAMPS on Aaron Hulburd’s Helmet-Cam device were also a little ‘wonky’ that day and not entirely accurate.
So how did the SAIT really ‘nail down’ the 1639 time for Steed’s Mayday?
The answer might be the SECOND SENTENCE of their later-released interview with Bravo 33 in their SAIT Investigation Notes .
__________________________________________________________________
SAIT INTERVIEW WITH BRAVO 33 – July 9, 2013 – 1700
Interviewees: Bravo 33
John Burfiend – ATS Specialist ( Air Attack duties / Monitoring Air-To-Ground )
Clint Clauson – ATS Trainee
Thomas French – AT Specialist ( Pilot, Lead Plane / Monitoring Air-To-Air )
SAIT Interviewers: Dudley, Mayhew, Foley, Kurth, Rocha
We were ordered as lead air attack to relieve Bravo 3.
Clint did record a few times on air tankers departing and
when the frantic call was made.
_________________________________________________________________
This mysterious ‘Clint Clauson’ person is never “quoted” at all in the interview ( or never even asked any questions? )…. but this SECOND sentence in the interview notes DOES establish that he seemed to be ‘writing some TIMES down’ that day… INCLUDING the moment of Steed’s first (frantic) MAYDAY call.
I would also say this one sentence in the SAIT notes also pretty much
establishes all of the following…
1) Clint Clauson was onboard as an ‘ATS Trainee’. Burfiend is listed as ‘ATS’ and French is only listed as ‘AT’… so that means Clauson was most probably ‘mentoring’ with Burfiend that day and NOT French.
2) If Clauson was ‘mentoring’ with only Burfiend… then that means Clauson would probably ALSO have been listening to the same radio channel Burfiend was. That means Clauson was listening exclusively to the ‘Air-To-Ground’ channel and was hearing everything that Burfiend was (including Steed’s first MAYDAY in real time).
3) Clauson apparently WROTE DOWN the TIME they heard Steed’s first MAYDAY call ( described in SAIT notes as ‘the frantic call’ ). As in… on a piece of PAPER.
4) Even though Clauson apparently was never asked anything by the SAIT investigators and there is no record of him ever SAYING anything in the interview… the notes still imply that Clauson might have given them a ‘document’ or a ‘piece of paper’ that had these TIMES that he recorded written on it. If so… that document was NOT included in the SAIT FOIA/FOIL package and ( if it exists ) is just one more document that would seem to have been *withheld* by Arizona Forestry from legitimate ( legal ) FOIA/FOIL requests. We already KNOW that Arizona Forestry *DID* withhold any number of documents. Maybe this ‘piece of paper’ from Clauson is simply one of those ‘withheld’ documents.
So… REGARDLESS of whether there was an actual DOCUMENT ( or copy of
one ) handed by Clauson to the SAIT investigators that had ‘1639’ written down for the time they heard the first ‘frantic call’… SOMEHOW that ‘1639’ time was COMMUNICATED to the SAIT investigators ( but is also never mentioned in the interview notes ).
So THIS *might* be how the SAIT was so SURE that Steed’s first MAYDAY actually took place at 1639, despite poor recollections and a wonky timestamps on the Aaron Hulburd Helmet-Cam video.
They might have been totally trusting what this mysterious ATS Trainee Clint Clauson had actually WRITTEN DOWN ( or, perhaps, just TOLD them verbally during the interview, according to his recollection ) as the TIME for Steed’s first ‘frantic call’… and they ‘adjusted’ all the other times/events based on that.
Great catch! ATS means Air Tactical Supervisor. AT or ATP means Air Tactical Pilot.
I bet that guy knows a whole lot more than he’s letting on to.
PS. Great Resource:
The Interagency Aerial Supervision Guide:
http://www.blm.gov/pgdata/etc/medialib/blm/nifc/aviation/aerial_supervision.Par.58629.File.dat/IASG.pdf
Has quite a bit of stuff (most of which I don’t understand, but might be useful) about radios.
And a bunch of other stuff.
**
** PICKUP TRUCK BURNED INSIDE RANCH ‘SAFETY ZONE’
There has always been a folder in Mr. Dougherty’s online Dropbox that says it contains ‘Pre-Fire images from Boulder Springs Ranch’, but there has also always been a ‘glitch’ in the linking that was sending clicks to another ( different ) folder.
That ‘glitch’ is GONE… and now we can see the full set of pre-fire images taken at the Boulder Springs Ranch ‘safety zone’.
There are even some ‘post-fire’ images included for a ‘before/after’ glimpse of some parts of the compound.
The following link now takes you right to the correct folder…
Folder: Helms Ranch Photos Pre-Fire
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/02ue6bnjp6nazkm/AABhgJJer7PG8OD2IhAwQYZ4a/Photos%20and%20Video/Helm%20Ranch%20Photos%20Pre-Fire#/
There are at least TWO photos there which verify what Joy Collura reported about the FENCING on the western side of the compound ( The direction Granite Mountain was approaching from ). It does, in fact, appear to simply be 3 strands
of barbed wire. Nothing substantial.
There are also TWO photos of an antique pickup truck that was parked well INSIDE the ‘safety zone’ up in the northwest part of the compound.
One photo of the antique pickup truck is pre-fire.
Another is post-fire.
You can see the ‘before/after’ for this vehicle. It got fried.
The entire back-half and wooden bed of the pickup burned
up completely, along with both back tires ( completely melted ).
This ‘antique pickup truck’ was exactly here ( INSIDE ) the ‘safety zone’…
34.219495, -112.771250
It was sitting 98 feet INSIDE the ‘safety zone’ from the fence that established the western edge of the compound and only 46 feet from the northwest corner of the Llama barn next to the house.
The last photo in the set ( with a name of vegetation-on-hills-.jpg ) actually shows how FAR inside the perimeter of the ‘safety zone’ this burned pickup truck was… and how CLOSE it was to the Llama pens and the barn.
NOTE: The actual NAME of the post-fire photo of the burned pickup truck is ‘truck Yarnall 15 June 001.JPG’ but the date indicated in this hand-modified title is INCORRECT.
The post-fire photo of the burned pickup truck was ACTUALLY taken well AFTER the fire on September 14, 2013.
The ACTUAL EXIF data embedded in the ‘after fire’ photo of the
pickup truck is as follows…
Camera: Canon PowerShot A4000 IS
Date: September 14, 2013 – 11:56:39 AM
Lens: 5 – 40 mm – Shot at 15.1 mm (shot wide open)
Exposure: Auto exposure, 1/1,002 sec, f/4, ISO 125
Flash: Auto, Did not fire
Focus: Single, Face Detect, with a depth of field of from 18.2 m to infinity.
Focus 2: AF Area Mode: Multi-point AF or AI AF
File: 3,456 × 4,608 JPEG (15.9 megapixels)
I would say the truck burned because of the straw in the back of it
possibly by direct flame but more likely by sparks that ignited the straw and burnt the truck. Sill interesting….
Reply to Bob Powers post on May 11, 2014 at 10:45 am
>> Mr. Powers said…
>> I would say the truck burned because of the straw in
>> the back of it… possibly by direct flame but more likely
>> by sparks that ignited the straw and burnt the truck.
Agree. That was a LOT of ‘straw’ piled in the back of the thing and you can even see a burned-up gasoline can there in pile in the aftermath photo.
It’s also possible that the ’embers’ ignited that small tree that was near it first… then the ‘open flame’ from the tree nailed the straw.
>> Mr. Powers wrote…
>> Still interesting….
Yes. Definite proof that even though the structures didn’t appear to suffer any damage at all… the ‘open area’ of the ‘safety zone’ was no picnic that afternoon.
It definitely wasn’t one of those ‘sit in the middle in a lawn chair and drink a beer and watch the fire go by’ kind of ‘safety zones’. More like ‘you better be inside one of the bulidings’ kind of ‘safety zone’.
Probably also a good lesson there for anyone trying to ‘fire proof’ their own compounds. These pictures prove that regardless of how far INSIDE your compound there are ‘small trees’ or other ‘combustibles’ ( like bales of hay )… they probably ARE going to IGNITE under similar circumstances… so BEWARE.
Even if you have a 600 foot wide ‘clearing’ around your house… make sure you haven’t kept ‘trees’ right next to your house and make sure all ‘combustibles’ are INSIDE or… at least… out on the PERIMETER and not near a structure.
Confession time. My urban backyard is full of dead stuff. I don’t live in the WUI, but the wind is blowing, we’re in endless drought here in N Mexico, and I’ve spent inordinate amounts of time reading about fire lately. Tomorrow morning I intend to make an appointment to get rid of the dead stuff in my backyard. Now that it’s finally possible to tell the dead stuff from the live stuff.
Every fifth post in my New Mexico Twitter Stream is about Wildfire Preparedness. We shall see……..
I’m dreading this wildfire season in New Mexico……..
I spent eight years living in the forest outside of Flagstaff. You couldn’t pay me enough to live in the forest now, or in the East Sandia Mountains, although I’d love to….
And it’s only gonna get worse….
By the way… that ‘pile of crap’ on the left-hand side of the ‘post-fire’ photo with the fried pickup truck is the burned-up remnants of a wooden wagon that was also there INSIDE the ‘safety zone’.
You can see what that wagon looked like BEFORE it got fried to nothing in the ‘pre-fire’ photo of the pickup truck.
It did NOT have any ‘hay’ or ‘straw’ in it… but it burned to the ground, anyway.
One more followup…
If you look at the last photo on that page ( which shows the pickup truck and the wooden wagon pre-fire ) you will see that there was ALSO actually a STRUCTURE there in-between them pre-fire.
Some kind of storage shed? Looks to be wooden.
That STRUCTURE is TOTALLY GONE in the post-fire pictures and only that 50-gallon drum is left standing there.
Not too surprising. That STRUCTURE appears to have been sitting right BETWEEN the two small trees that were there INSIDE the ‘safety zone’.
When those two trees ‘lit up’… it must have been quite a BLAZE going there INSIDE the ‘safety zone’ and just 46 feet from the Llama barn.
Amazing job on the supposed 16:37 Marsh transmission. That is some impressive collective work! It’s not easy to prove the absence of a thing, yet I think you’ve pretty much wrapped that one up.
I’m still confused about how you are using VHF vs. UHF to refer to radio traffic. Here is how I understand frequencies:
VHF = Very High Frequency = [30 – 300 Mhz]
UHF = Ultra High Frequency = [300 Mhz – 3 Ghz]
Source = http://wiki.radioreference.com/index.php/Spectrum
All(?) radio communications on non-military incidents (including fire, Search and Rescue, police, etc.) take place over VHF. This includes air-to-air, air-to-ground, dispatch, and all ground crews.
Air-to-air tends to span from 121.x Mhz to 123.x Mhz. Fire/police/EMS in my area use frequencies in the range of 154.x – 173.x Mhz. (This may differ in areas near large bodies of water, as this overlaps with Marine VHF). Bendix King handheld and mobile (vehicle) radios used on fire generally transmit and receive in the 136 – 174 Mhz range. Dispatchers and repeater stations transmit and receive larger parts of the spectrum. Airguard and air-to-ground frequencies are in the 160s, so ground crews can monitor and transmit on them. For obvious reasons, transmissions on the airband range are more tightly controlled (non-pilot radio operators get permitted, and base stations are licensed).
In summary, all of these Yarnell radio communications are VHF, though air-to-air and air-to-tower transmissions are on a lower frequency of VHF than air-to-ground and ground-to-ground. Do I have this right?
Reply to Sitta post on May 10, 2014 at 10:44 pm
>> Sitta said…
>> Amazing job on the supposed 16:37 Marsh transmission.
>> That is some impressive collective work!
>> It’s not easy to prove the absence of a thing,
No. It most certainly is NOT ( easy ).
>> Sitta also said…
>> yet I think you’ve pretty much wrapped that one up.
Well… perhaps not yet. Still needs another few passes.
There is some other evidence in the public record that is
relevant. Still ‘looking’ at all that. Stay tuned.
>> Sitta also said…
>> In summary, all of these Yarnell radio communications are
>> VHF, though air-to-air and air-to-tower transmissions are on
>> a lower frequency of VHF than air-to-ground and ground-
>> to-ground. Do I have this right?
Well… YES… you probably do.
Probably should have done this yesterday ( before all the VHF/UHF lingo entered the picture )… but here are the channels that were
actually ‘in use’ that weekend ( along with exact frequencies )…
From PDF page 22 of the Arizona Forestry SAIR report itself…
______________________________________________________
Radio Frequencies
The Yarnell Hill Fire was assigned Group 1 A1S PHX District
channels on June 28. On June 30 at 1022, the communications
plan was as follows:
Channel No., Channel Name, Assignment
1, AZSF1, Command
5, VFIRE21, Optional Tactical, Unassigned
6, AZSFTAC1, Tactical 1, Div A and Div Z
7, AZSFTAC2, Tactical 3, Structure Protection Group 1
8, AZSFTAC3, Tactical 2, Structure Protection Group 2
10, AZSFTAC5, Air-Ground
16, AIRGUARD, Air Guard Channel
Early in the day on June 30, there was limited use of AZSFTAC3
Tactical 3 by Granite Mountain IHC, Blue Ridge IHC, and heavy
equipment boss. Tactical 3 was assigned to Structure Protection
Group 1 at 1200 that day.
___________________________________________________
The exact frequencies assigned to Arizona’s
“Group 1 A1S PHX District Channels” are as follows…
Channel, Function, Frequency, Tone, Mode, Assignment
1, TAC 1, RX: 168.0500, TX: 168.0500, 123.0, N, OPS / DIV
2, TAC 2, RX: 168.2000, TX: 168.2000, 123.0, N, OPS / DIV
3, TAC 3, RX: 168.6000, TX: 168.6000, 123.0, N, OPS / DIV
4, TAC 4, RX: 166.7250, TX: 166.7250, 123.0, N, OPS / DIV
5, TAC 5, RX: 166.7750, TX: 166.7750, 123.0, N, OPS / DIV
6, TAC 6, RX: 168.2500, TX: 168.2500, 123.0, N, Unassigned
7, CMD C-2, RX: 168.1000, TX: 170.4500, 123.0, N, Command
8, CMD C-9, RX: 160.0125, TX: 165.2500, 123.0, N, Command
9, AZ State Fire, RX: 151.4000, TX: 159.4050, 162.2, N, AZ State Fire RPTR
10, Prescott NF Fire Net, RX: 164.3525, TX: 172.6125, 103.5, N, Forest Fire Net RPTR
11, Blank
12, MUTL AID, RX: 154.2800, TX: 154.2800, 0.0, N, Mutual Aid
13, AIR/GND, RX: 169.2000, TX: 169.2000, 0.0, N, Primary A/G
14, AIRGUARD, RX: 168.6250, TX: 168.250, 0.0, N, Air Guard
15, WEATHER, RX: 162.4000, TX: 0.0, 0.0, N, Weather Broadcast
16, AIRGUARD, RX: 168.6250, TX: 168.6250, 110.9, N, Air Guard
ALL of the frequencies assigned to this Arizona
“Group 1 A1S PHX District Channels” are in the
range from ( low/high )…
154.2800 ( Mutual Aid ) up to 170.4500 ( Command 2 )
That matches what you said is used in YOUR area…
>> Sitta said…
>> Fire/police/EMS in my area use frequencies in
>> the range of 154.x – 173.x Mhz.
The most IMPORTANT thing to notice is that there is NO
PUBLISHED ‘Air-To-Air’ channel in this frequency group.
Only an ‘Air-To-Ground’ channel.
Even if you CLONED your radio off of someone else that day… you would still have had to specifically ‘punch in’ an Air-To-Air frequency and add it manually to the bank to talk on the ‘Air-To-Air’ channel.
Good reason for that.
The Air guys will not ( and SHOULD not ) tolerate just anyone
transmitting on whatever Air-To-Air channel they are using.
That would be a nightmare ( for them ).
So you are saying that the Bendix-King radios could not be programed for Air to Air at the lower freq. of 121-123 ?
As I have tough although the newer Radios are different than the ones I used 20 years ago. So there would be a separate radio for
the air to air and special separate Freq.? would certain fire officials and others have those radios in their vehicles? I know we did back when. Like the helitack truck and dispatch both FS & BLM as well as some county and city as well as State rigs.
One of the newer ( and more expensive ) Bendix Kings
on sale (today) at Amazon.
This is what they choose to call their COMMAND VERSION
of even the more basic ( and cheaper ) BK GPH5102… and even this COMMAND version doesn’t have the 121-123 frequency range.
This puppy is $1,325 smackeroos… and it STILL won’t give you an Air-To-Air Channel if it’s down in the 120’s.
http://www.amazon.com/GPH5102X-CMD-Analog-Handheld-Command-Version/dp/B00AA0DIBI
________________________________________________
GPH5102X-CMD Analog Bendix King Handheld
(Command Version)
500 Channels, 25 User Groups, 20 Channels per Group
136-174 MHz Frequency Range
5/1.5 watts RF Power
MIL-STD 810
Programmable Soft Switches
1 new from $1,325.00
_______________________________________________
Maybe there’s a regulation about that?
I can’t quote them at the moment… but I’m SURE there ARE tight regulations about who is ever ‘allowed’ to even be transmitting on ‘Air-To-Air’ channels.
Could you imagine if anyone could just walk out of a Radio Shack and immediately start transmitting on ‘Air-To-Air’ channels.
“Hey!… Delta Airlines!… I see you up there! How’s it goin’!… where ya headed!”
YIKES.
I wrote somewhere else something about this:
Interagency Aerial Supervision Guide:
http://www.blm.gov/pgdata/etc/medialib/blm/nifc/aviation/aerial_supervision.Par.58629.File.dat/IASG.pdf
It has a lot of stuff about radio frequencies. I don’t really understand it because I don’t understand radio frequencies.
But somebody like you might want to peruse it. It’s more complicated than we think. I think there was more going on than we’re currently aware of. And I think you might find it quite useful for getting a finer understanding of what the possibilities/probabilities might be.
Including possible helicopter stuff. And a few other things.
Also I asked somewhere below, “What is Air Guard?” Now I know.
I just what to say to you Sitta, thanks for coming back and helping out. I’ve missed your voice.
I think what we’re doing now is an example of what we can do when we work together at solving problema, even when we disagree/see things differently, respectfully with each other, communicating back and forth, knowing none of us is exactly “right,” we’re all seeing different things at different times, from different perspectives and different knowledge bases. We all have different things/skills/perspectives to offer.
I love it when this happens.
It’s all about respect.
**
** Reply to calvin post on May 10, 2014 at 2:49 am
>> calvin said…
>>
>> WTKTT… The slash across the throat sign has always bothered me.
>> How could he ( John Burfiend ) be so certain that they were dead?
>> Really, how?? How did he know they were dead when he didn’t
>> even know where they were??
>> WTF
calvin…
The SAIT interview notes with Bravo 33 are an absolute MESS… but if you read them *very* carefully it would appear that John Burfiend ( who was the right-seat guy, not flying the airplane, and the one who was monitoring Air-To-Ground channel ) did his ‘slash across his throat’ gesture just AFTER Marsh’s final transmission when Marsh ‘affirmed’ that they were on the ‘SOUTH side of the fire’.
Even if they couldn’t see them… I think Burfiend could tell looking downward at that moment that anyone deploying on the SOUTH side of that exploding fireline was a goner. Hence… ‘slash across the throat’ gesture over to Thomas French.
Here is the exact ‘context’ of that testimony from Thomas French in the SAIT interview notes. It seems to confirm that Burfiend’s ‘slash across his throat’ gesture to French did, in fact, come right after Marsh’s *final* transmission…
__________________________________________________________________
We were right here (pointed at map) when Granite Mountain 7 called screaming in the radio. Ops said “are you getting this? I told Granite Mountain 7 “you need to calm down. I can’t understand you”. Immediately Division A called and said “we are starting a burn out, we are getting in our shelters. I said we got pople in trouble. Tanker called and said I got you in sight. I claimed out – the DC10 swung wide. I looked at John and he did this (slash across the throat). I told Kevin to stand by copy, taking it around. We have a crew in trouble. We are going to go look.
__________________________________________________________________
Let me also say that while I (personally) have always found this ‘slash across the throat’ gesture from Burfiend to be quite ‘uncalled for’… I do *NOT* believe for one second that this obvious assumption on his part that they were ‘goners’, even at that point in time, had *ANY* effect on him then proceeding to do his job.
I can also criticize them ( and, indeed, the WFF radio protocols themselves for apparently NOT having a good, established MAYDAY protocol ) for NOT taking the transmissions from Steed and Caldwell seriously for more than TWO MINUTES… but that still doesn’t mean I think they didn’t do all they possibly could to try and save those men that day… when they finally did realize this was a *REAL* emergency.
As soon as OPS1 Todd Abel contacted French and Burfiend and *TOLD* them to get their heads out of their asses and RESPOND to these men… they did.
And once they did ( finally stop ignoring them )… they obviously kicked into their own highly-rehearsed and professional procedures for such a situation.
I also happen to believe that if there had been *ANY* indication in those final radio exchanges of where they REALLY were ( such as… if Marsh had only taken 2 seconds to say… “we are 600 yards due WEST of Boulder Springs Ranch” )…
…I believe Thomas French in B33 and Kevin in the DC10 VLAT would have actually attempted a retardant drop ( whether they really believed it would do any good or not ) at GREAT risk to their own lives.
To have flown the jet-engine DC10 right through that thick ASH cloud would have been absolute suicide for Kevin… so I don’t think THAT would have happened… but if there was ANY way to get at their location ( if they knew where it was ) OTHER than flying blindly directly THROUGH the smoke/ash cloud…
I think they would have tried it.
For the rest of my life… I will always wonder WHY, when Marsh was directly asked by Burfiend…. “So, you’re on the south side of the fire, then?”…
…all Eric Marsh said was… “Affirm”.
Obtuse communications. Right to the end.
Even if French or Burfiend didn’t know where the heck the ‘Boulder Springs Ranch’ was… there were MANY people listening to the final MAYDAY calls who DID and they would have jumped right into the conversation and TOLD French and Burfiend *EXACTLY* where that was.
If Marsh had just added ANY amount of OTHER information… they at least *MIGHT* have been able to KNOW or GOOD-GUESS their exact location.
He didn’t… and I will ALWAYS wonder WHY he didn’t avail himself of that
one last chance to identify their exact location.
Followup to above…
We ( in this ongoing discussion ) are not the only ones to wonder from day one WHY there was so much ‘confusion’ and ‘delay’ in realizing that the transmissions from Granite Mountain constituted a *REAL* emergency… or to wonder WHY it was that Burfiend in Bravo 33 basically IGNORED them for almost 2 minutes ( and even told them to get OFF the channel ) until OPS1 Todd Abel called him directly and *TOLD* him to stop ignoring these men.
Back in December of 2013 even… Wildfire Today published an article about this specific thing and about the new *YoLo* proposal which was a DIRECT reaction ( coming from the ground level ) to what happened in Yarnell.
Wildfire Today
Published December 23, 2013 by Bill Gabbert
Suggested protocol for firefighters when declaring an emergency
______________________________________________________
After reading about the deaths of the 19 firefighters on the Yarnell Hill Fire, Mr. Joseph Berto ( WFF Helicopter pilot ) had some thoughts about the crucial need for clear, descriptive radio communications when there is a firefighter emergency that requires immediate assistance. Below is his proposal, and following that my initial reaction and his response:
( See original article for full proposal )
______________________________________________________
There has ALSO been this ONGOING forum discussion about
this over at ‘Wildland Fire’.
Wildland Fire
Home of the Wildland Firefighter
Thread: More Yarnell Hill discussion: Mayday, Mayday, Mayday!
http://wlfhotlist.com/threads/38400-More-Yarnell-Hill-discussion-Mayday-Mayday-Mayday!
The first comment that ‘kicked off’ this (ongoing) discussion
over there at ‘Wildland Fire’ is as follows…
______________________________________________________
From Wildland Fire member: D Powers
Join Date: Oct 2013
Location: New Mexico
Mayday, Mayday, Mayday!
I have read the official reports about the Yarnell Hill fire, but the transcription of the radio traffic does not do justice to listening to them.
One thing that stood out to me was the lack of an emergency declaration. B-33 did not pick up on the tone of voice (possibly because he was trying to do three jobs at once), but everyone else did.
In the military, civilian aviation, and the structural fire service that is one of the first things to be drilled into new recruits: recognize when you are in trouble, and call for help. Make sure others know you are calling for help.
I am not saying GM did anything improper (I have never heard of Mayday being used in a wildland setting) but perhaps it is something to be considered for the future?
______________________________________________________
This ‘Wildland Fire’ Forum Thread is heavily commented and goes on with many ‘ideas’ such as just adopting what WFF people use in Australia ( Emergency, Emergency, Emergency ) or other ‘already used’ standards.
Since it still appears that the WFF management in the United States doesn’t intend to DO or RECOMMEND ANYTHING new in this regard… I certainly hope the ‘folks on the ground’ just go ahead and decide on something amongst themselves… ASAP… since whether their own management gives a crap about their safety, or not, it is THEIR LIVES that might depend on such an established protocol in the future.
Marti and WTKTT
A couple of thoughts one I listed below.
1. If the transmission was on air to air Marsh would not have made it.
The portable radios do not Carrie that Freq. because of the Radio Ban it is on.
2. If a OPS or the IC was in the helicopter they could have made that statement over Air to Air. If the Helicopter was in the area then it could have been re-conning the fire with 1 of the overhead.
3. A vehicle with that Radio Ban on a separate radio from the National fire Freq. Ban Radio could have also made the comment. That statement could have come without a call sign.
At this point with out verifiable radio traffic that was copied we are right now chasing shadows. If it was not copied on air to ground it could not have been Marsh. WTKTT if you have a way to check the freq. you could probably show the Problem of different Bans Low and High They should be listed some where.
Reply to Bob Powers post on May 10, 2014 at 10:58 am
>> Mr. Powers said…
>>
>> 1. If the transmission was on air to air Marsh would not
>> have made it.
Yes… and also IAOI ( If And Only If ) it went out on ‘Air-to-Air’…
then WE should be hearing it, too, captured in that video
which was CLEARLY recording the A2A traffic around that time.
It’s not there. Didn’t happen.
>> The portable radios do not Carrie that Freq. because of
>> the Radio Ban it is on.
No, they don’t. Not normally, anyway.
It’s the whole VHF ( Highband ) versus UHF ( LowBand ) thing.
Handhelds that have BOTH capability are VERY expensive.
>> 2. If a OPS or the IC was in the helicopter they could have
>> made that statement over Air to Air. If the Helicopter was in
>> the area then it could have been re-conning the fire with 1
>> of the overhead.
True… but there is certainly NO evidence that any OPS or IC
was flying in anything in Yarnell that late in the day. Everyone
was ‘on the ground’.
>> 3. A vehicle with that Radio Ban on a separate radio from the
>> National fire Freq. Ban Radio could have also made the
>> comment. That statement could have come without a call sign.
Also possible. Heck… we can even hear with our own ears in the video capture(s) that someone way back in Prescott Air Operations was ‘hearing’ all the traffic and was ALSO able to just press TRANSMIT at any moment and ‘insert’ themselves into the Air-To-Air conversations all the way down there in Yarnell.
This is all kind of ‘moot’, however, because with regards to this (supposed) “That’s exactly what we want” retardant-related transmission (supposedly) from DIVSA Marsh… it is John Burfiend ALONE who is testifying he ‘heard that’ and he is also testifying it was over the ‘Air-To-Ground’ ( UHF / LowBand ) channel.
That’s *another* reason the ‘Air-To-Ground’ channel is always one of the most popular and most-listened-to channels on ANY fire. It’s ‘where the action is’ and its accessible to the ‘cheaper’ radios because it is a UHF frequency and not a VHF one.
>> At this point with out verifiable radio traffic that was copied we
>> are right now chasing shadows.
I’m still looking at some ‘other’ things in the public evidence record and I’m not sure more still can’t be ‘figured out’ from it about this (supposed) transmission from Marsh… so I’m not ready to call it ‘shadow chasing’ just yet. Stay tuned.
>> If it was not copied on air to ground it could not have
>> been Marsh.
Agree. It really is a shame that the Air-Study folks didn’t ALSO have another video camera running that day with a direct inline feed on the A2G channel like they had one going with a direct inline feed on the A2A channel. That would have been REALLY helpful here.
>> WTKTT if you have a way to check the freq. you could probably
>> show the Problem of different Bans Low and High They should
>> be listed some where.
I’m sure they are… but I’m not sure it matters.
Air-To-Air was VHF and Air-To-Ground was UHF.
Only a VERY expensive handheld can do both and those are
NOT usually the Bendix Kings carried by WFF ground men.
We also DO have a full VHF A2A channel capture covering
the timeframe in question.
Marsh is nowhere on it.
If that transmission of his happened at all… it had to be on A2G.
Hi Bob! And everybody else!
I actually started this comment way earlier this morning, while doing other stuff and watching an over-my-head class on how to use InDesign, while continuing to read all the comments, and letting things sink in and re-arrange themselves. And then I wandered off to check on some facts and re-read some interviews, and then try to figure out when that VLAT drop was that Blue Ridge Hotshot McCord videod as it dangerously flew right over a helicopter so that maybe if there was any info on that (which there isn’t, but I think it happened about 1:37 PM, which means under Bravo 3’s watch), and now I’m back to finishing/editing this.
OK so now you know why it wasn’t on air 2 air. So I can delete the rest of the paragraphs that I wrote for you about that. I basically agree with all WTKTT has written about that. Including the part about maybe Marsh started to try to contact Air Attack but got overstepped by someone else saying “that’s where we want it” from down below, even the parking lot. That also makes sense, from a possibility level, since Eric Div A had been in earlier contact with Air Attack, and AA had indicated v/A2G uneasiness with where he saw that crew (that he didn’t know who they were).
At this point, who knows? Who even knows if that SAIT interview report was even accurate/truthful about anything either French or Burfiend even said. I agree w/WTK that it’s pretty evident the SAIT pretty heavily massaged that whole process to make it fit their pre-established narrative.
And note to WTKTT here, bcuz it’s easier to do this than scroll down while I’m downloading a bunch more of both sets of Air Study videos, thanks for clarifying the “show me” directions. I confess, when I wrote that question, it was a short-cut, bcuz I hadn’t had time to go try to “translate” the numbers and I was guessing you probably had. I also confess, I’m still a bit “bowl-challenged,” and thus my confusion about that. When somebody says “bowl” I have no idea what they mean. Thus, when Burfiend apparently (or not) spoke of test-flying “the bowl” “from west to east,” it definitely created a certain picture in my head, that apparently didn’t correspond to the facts. And, hey, maybe it didn’t even correspond to what he said!
And, hey, as long as we’re being left to lots of gaps and thus room for speculating, could it be that Burfiend and French didn’t take that Forest Service SAIT interview all that seriously, either? Maybe they had already figured the AFS was gonna, all things considered, bend the “facts to their narrative” based on their at-that-time recently published investigative process model. Which is in fact exactly what they did.
And to TTWARE — and Bob — and WTKTT — etal:
About the ASM thing. As I was on again off again over the past few months, trying to make sense of the Air command structure and terminology, including reading Fire Aviation, the sister site of Wildfire Today, I saw quite a bit of grumpiness about this new Module thing. And it may be one of the Lessons to be Learned from Yarnell.
And somewhat related to the above, I’ve been really thinking about my possible “overly glowing” assessment of French. It may be just that. Or it may be that I’m just translating him a little differently. I’ve been around air and balloon pilots and meteorologists and tornado-chasers a lot. They do what they do because they enjoy it, even when it gets dangerous and difficult — and, hey so do fire/wildfire fighters (who we all know are actually pyromaniacs in disguise!!), so I’m not so offended by what some of you all are upset about. And maybe that gesture across the throat was not in jest. It could have been dead serious. I could envision my dad doing that if he heard a report of a balloon hitting a power line. And he wouldn’t have meant it to be funny.
Bravo 33’s job was (as per the Air Support YouTube video) to get wet stuff on the ground without bending metal along with, when necessary and possible, adding situational awareness, but NOT managing the ground crews (as opposed to what Rory Collins was/wasn’t doing, ahem. I can’t imagine, after watching/listening to French for hours, ever doing what Collins did.). That was somebody else’s job. They were doing just that, and it wasn’t all that easy, and they had lives on their hands, too. Plane crashes on fires are not that uncommon.
So when that SEAT flew through that fire at 4:33, to make that drop that apparently took a few set-ups to get, French essentially thanked him, and the pilot, possibly with some relief, indicated he was happy too, even tho they both knew, it was quite possibly a fool’s errand, but one they were hired to do.
And now that I’ve read what you wrote, WTKTT, about what they would have done, and DID do, after they abandoned that VLAT drop, I really appreciate that. Not only that, but they were running out of fuel, and still managed a 5:07 VLAT drop in the middle of it all. And, as they said, they were just barely able to do it because it was in such heavy smoke and ash they could hardly even see.
That being said, I’m sensing something of a cognitive dissonance. Might it, again, have to do with this thing we have called “Culture”?
Could it be that “Fire Aviation” has something of a different “culture” than on-the-ground “Fire Fighting”? And is that maybe something else that’s adding to the confusion? And furthermore, I definitely see, and have read about, regional differences, especially in the complaints about Collins. As in, in the northwest forests they fight fires differently than in the southwest, and thus the big conflicts between Marsh and Collins.
OK a final thing, before I go on a last-minute quest for Mother’s Day Flowers. Regarding that 1:37ish PM VLAT drop. Once I figured out that that’s when it happened, I went back to Bravo 3’s interview. Collins had had to leave (out of fuel) so Bravo 3 was Air Attack. They say nothing about that drop in their SAIT interview. And that’s what leads me to the next thing.
Helicopters. I have absolutely NO IDEA who was mostly directing helicopters. I was wondering that as I watched the Air-to-Air 1628 video. French WAS paying careful attention to helicopters, but it was all about keeping them out of the way of the fixed wing tankers, because they were dropping really close to the helispot and the “horseshoe dip” location. Since there’s no air-to-air video earlier than 2pm-ish, there’s no record of how Bravo 3 was communicating. I don’t even know if B3 was even aware there was a helicopter right under that VLAT. So I have no clue who was directing the helicopter drops. Maybe just another little unimportant detail in the general scheme of things?
Which leads to my seriously final point. Having those Air Study videos really HAS been critical, given the jumbling of everything else. And yes, it would have been even more helpful if they had set up the same kind of video camera with the Air to Ground channel included. Without all the wind and stuff that the Panebakers have. We’d still be fifty miles behind where we are if somebody hadn’t thought, “Gee, lets go set up some video cameras up on that fire and document the Fire Aviation!!”
Hasta! Thank you all for bearing with me!
Great Job Marti
When Fires Like this in WUI start running at structures
The first thing is to thro Air Tankers at the Fire. The problem most times they don’t do any good except make every body feel like they at least did something. It looks good to the public at least some one is doing something.
Helicopters–When Fixed wing plains are on a fire Helicopter pilots Monitor there Freq. And stay out of the way. They fly lower and are assigned to specific areas.
They maintain contact Air to Air.
That is why I said the 1 Helicopter flying that is mentioned may have had an overhead in it that could have made the comment, and could have over keyed Marsh DIV A call.
From what I am reading there is no radio verification that DIV A broke into any Air conversation except the statement from AA. At this point we have a personnel recollection with no solid proof it actually happened.
Again good work on the info.
Marti—–Yes there are 2 different cultures good catch Ground and air, not sure where those Smoke Jumpers fit? We always liked the Helicopters when they gave us a ride.
Also we all love Fire, Fire Fighting and even starting them like Back Fires Project burns Etc.
If you didn’t you would not stick with it.
So you found us out as well.
Ha Ha, yes I found you out!!
Actually, to be honest, I “go to school” online regarding photography, media, design, business at an online “place” called CreativeLIVE, which is based in Seattle. When we have classes, we also have chatrooms.
One of my pals in the chatrooms is a female firefighter relative/supporter in southern California. She’s actually VERY interested in this fire and is probably reading this site, which I have linked her to regularly.
We chuckle a lot about how people who fight fires and people who pay attention to fires (like me) are actually fascinated by fire. I’ve always been fascinated by fire, loved/miss my 10 years of surviving via wood-stoves in Flagstaff, always have candles burning, and about every 4 years get really intensively interested in a wildfire.
I started tracking/observing wildfires online in about 1996. I was really interested in how communities used the Internet to deal with how a wildfire was impacting them and to connect to each other to deal with it.
That lead to my watching the Los Alamos Cerro Grande Fire online in 2000. Given that a bunch of geeks were affected by it, and I had family/friends ties to it, they really used the Internet to connect, respond, get the word out. I followed that carefully.
I was really interested in the interface between wildfires and the Internet. Why? Because I, too am a lover of fire.
The other big one for me was 2001, the Hayman Fire near Colorado Springs. My daughter was a competitive figure skater, and we were there when that fire was burning. I actually photographed it, and, of course, I followed all of it online.
Oh and then the 2002 Rodeo-Chedeski Fire in Arizona, a HUGE fire. We ate and inhaled the smoke from it for weeks here in Albuquerque. I followed it online. And cried. A lot. I FELT it. And was AWED by it. Because I spent ten years living in the forest in Flagstaff. I felt those trees burning.
Fire. I majored BA in Anthropology/Archaeology from Prescott College. (When we had the crew that gave birth to the Prescott Hotshots that, in turn gave birth to the Granite Mountain Hotshots. And I had a horse, and I rode that horse all over Granite Mountain). The harnessing of fire by humans is considered a benchmark in human evolution. But fire can still overpower us.
So, yes. We love fire!!! And we fear it! And we have to deal with it. And it kills. And it renews. So yeah, I found you out. Because I, and a number of others, are just like you.
Mr. Powers… good point you just made.
There WERE helicopters already down in Yarnell and also doing whatever they could to ‘save things’ in this 4:15 to 4:45 timeframe.
We actually can HEAR at least TWO of them actually ‘fly over’ Aaron Hulburd as he was filming the ‘Helmet-Cam’ video there in the St. Joseph Shrine parking lot… and AS he was capturing those ‘final transmits’ from Steed, Caldwell and Marsh.
It actually could have been ANY helicopter pilot working the fire down there at this time that just jumped onto the Air-To-Ground channel and said…
“That’s exactly what we want”
…right after the 1633 SEAT drop there on the EAST side of the fire. That SEAT drop probably DID hit the same outlying areas that THEY ( the choppers ) were focusing on as well.
Burfiend said this call came ‘5 minutes before they went into shelter’… but given their *general* confusion about TIME throughout their recollections to the SAIT investigators… it’s pretty doubtful they could have been *THAT* sure that *EXACTLY* 5 minutes had transpired between ANY two events that afternoon.
If the “That’s what we want” confirmation ( from someone in/near or ‘flying over’ Yarnell… but not Marsh ) was a direct response to the spot-on 1633 SEAT drop… then it’s possible that Burfiend was simply 4 minutes off on his recollection… and it was really about 9 minutes between when he heard that and when it all started hitting the fan.
Mistaking a 9 minute elapsed time period for 5 minutes would have been perfectly understandable that afternoon… coming from ANYONE.
I still think the most important point about all of this is that the SAIT investigators obviously did *NOT* even lift a finger to try and *VERIFY* the TIME and the SOURCE of this “That’s what we want” recollection on Burfiend’s part.
They just trusted what (only) Burfiend was recalling, didn’t care that no one else seemed to have heard it, called it an ‘absolutely verified communication from Eric Marsh’… and used it was the defacto END of their own self-imposed ‘verifiable communications’ blackout period.
Even Eric’s voice in the YARNELL-GAMBLE video TEN MINUTES earlier ( at 1627 ) is much more ‘verifiable’ than this ‘recollection’ on Burfiend’s part… yet they (apparently) chose to ignore what they were hearing in the YARNELL-GAMBLE video altogether.
Perhaps the SAIT understood that if they were going to pretend there was a ‘blackout’ ( with no verifiable communications )… then they couldn’t END that blackout ‘too early’.
In other words…. it was OK to take a dubious transmission/recollection that happened just 2 minutes before the MAYDAY… because 2 minutes wasn’t enough time for management to be accused of neglecting to do something…
…but TEN MINUTES was too much… hence… they had to IGNORE Eric’s obvious reporting of GM’s ‘status’ ( to someone in command ) at 1627.
Once they decided to officially report that there was a ‘verifiable communications’ BLACKOUT… and that that is why management didn’t know where they were… they could not END it too early before the deployment… so the 1637 ‘recollection’ from Burfiend simply looked like a good place to do that.
The VLAT/helicopter incident I’m describing is not about the in-question call we’re talking about. It happened about 12:35 PM. There was a VLAT drop just northish of where the Blue Ridge hotshots were waiting with their buggies for an asignment. There was one test flight then the VLAT made it’s drop. The BR guys were photographing and video-ing it.
When the VLAT was coming down to make the drop, there was a helicopter right underneath it. Bravo 3 was in charge, as Rory Collins was off getting re-fueled. Unfortunately we don’t have the air 2 air so I don’t know what kind of communication was going on.
Interestingly enough, as I’ve been working on jockeying Tom Story’s photos into submission, it looks like his first VLAT set, which he took on the relatively accurate Mark D II, is of that T 911 coming out of that drop. With, I think, Bravo 3 just ahead of him.
I confess, I’m still a little mystified re helicopter communications. They were on air-to-air, but during the air-to-air video I watched yesterday, from a bit before 4:00 pm to about 4:20, French was just keeping them out of the way of the tankers. That’s all.
I would think the helicopters must have been in communication with some kind of overhead. I haven’t had time to “go there” but I’m sure there must have been some kind of crew organizing them?????? It definitely wasn’t Bravo 33. And I don’t know if Bravo 3 was doing it either. It just seems weird.
Also, that leads me to ask, “What is Air Guard? What is that channel used for?”
Reply to Marti Reed post on
May 11, 2014 at 5:10 pm
>> Marti said…
>> I confess, I’m still a little mystified re
>> helicopter communications. They were
>> on air-to-air, but during the air-to-air
>> video I watched yesterday, from a bit
>> before 4:00 pm to about 4:20, French
>> was just keeping them out of the way
>> of the tankers. That’s all.
Correct. There are never any ‘instructions’ to them from Bravo 33 ( acting as both Lead Plane and Air Attack ) about what they should actually be DOING ( drop-wise ).
The ONLY thing French was concerned about was them staying out of HIS way.
Only conversations are about who is heading to helibase… or who is leaving the fire… and what direction they should take to do that.
This also confuses me from the ‘Air Attack’ standpoint. It is French ( performing Lead Plane duties ) we hear ‘directing’ this Air Traffic around him… even though the SAIT notes say it was French who turned to Burfiend and said “You’re Air Attack!”.
____________________________________
From SAIT interview with Bravo 33…
Paragraph 4…
I knew there was 2 structural groups.
I wrote down 2.
Tom said “hey dude, you are the air attack”.
____________________________________
So it really is very, very confusing.
I’m not even sure the Air people fully understand it all… much less the ground folks.
Anyone on the ground in a command position could obviously ASK the choppers to do things without going through Air Attack… which is what makes it all the more confusing.
In one of the Air Study videos… right after the spot-overs were happening up on Model Creek road… SPGS2 Darrell Willis just tells his subordinate, Gary Moser, to ‘get one of those choopers to take care of that spillover’.
So even line personnel could just make requests of the choppers any time they wanted to?
It’s a wonder there weren’t MORE near-fatal
crashes that day other than the incredible near-miss out over that middle bowl earlier that day.
Another near Fixed-Wing / Chopper
near miss I hadn’t seen before…
In Panebaker Air study video
20130630_153414_EP, at +11 seconds, there is another *NEAR MISS* between a helicopter and the lead plane flying a line-up flight in that same location where the VLATS were dumping up there off Hays Ranch Road.
The lead plane is flying the line-up flight from west to east, parallel to Hays Ranch Road… but a chopper is coming up on a south to north line over in the same location but on the ‘blind’ side of the smoke cloud… and the lead plane seems to have NO IDEA he is there.
Hard to tell how close it was because the ZOOM is active on the camera… but it looks WAAAY too close for comfort as the chopper crosses right in front of the lead plane at what looks like the same altitude.
Looks like a few seconds in time made all the difference here.
Good catch, thanks!
Somebody has to be directing the helicopters, and it’s not really Air Attack/Bravo. That’s just not their responsibility from what i’ve read. Like it’s not also their responsibility to direct the ground crews, basically.
Their responsibility, it seems to me, in general and on this fire, is more about directing the fixed wing tankers and clearing the space around them.
I’m getting pretty brain-dead at this point, but tomorrow I’ll go look.
So, from what I’ve just read, Air Guard is reserved for Air Emergencies, like crashes and such things.
I do find myself wondering about the cost-effectiveness of the whole Fire Aviation thing. I’m hoping maybe the fact that those video cameras were set down that afternoon to do Air Study means something.
There is actually, I think, a TON of stuff to be learned from this fire, including the effectiveness of Fire Aviation. Where, and under what conditions, did it really help, and where did it not, and at what cost.
The problem is, as I have sensed all along, and even more so when I spent some hours today reading the Interagency Aerial Supervision Guide, they said over and over again how Aerial Support has to be integrated with overall Incident Command Strategy and Tactics.
And, as we know, since there was no actual “as-required” thought-out and written-out Plan for this day, there was nothing, strategically speaking, for Fire Aviation to tie into, other than various ad-hoc ongoing “let’s try this” tactics.
How do you effectively evaluate Aerial Fire-fighting on a fire in which there was no coherent over-all strategy/tactics in play in the first place?
So I’m not willing to dump the possible value of intelligent Fire Aviation, all things considered, but I do believe it’s time for a serious analysis of it, all things considered.
First, kudos to WTKTT and Marti, for digging into and getting the “that’s where we want it” conversation as analyzed as can possibly be done without some additional ‘outside’ input. I’m in agreement with Bob that, with all the chaos in the sky and on the ground that day, it would have been easy to mix-up that ‘recollection’ attributed to Marsh with another parties transmission.
The troubling part of the whole deal is that MANY people heard A/G radio traffic during the time in question, but we don’t have any of those ‘other’ recollections.
As has been stated before, A/G is one of the most listened-to channels on the fireground, as the most up-to-date reports on fire activity and other significant events usually comes across that channel in a prompt fashion. While earlier in the day people might have been only paying a cursory listen, later in the afternoon, with the fire getting ready to burn up an entire town, you can bet many, many people were glued to it (as evidenced by the background traffic videos).
On another note regarding possible takeaways, in my opinion two glaring ones seemingly related to BUDGET concerns are:
1) The states calling out a Type II Short Team (which was never even able to assemble all of it’s critical team members) for a fire that was already deemed a threat to a community.
2) The feds determination that they could save money by having less aircraft and personnel on fires by jamming two critical and busy functions inside of one aircraft (ASM). There may be times on slower, less active fires when that could be appropriate, but NEVER on Type I or Type II fires, and NEVER on Type III fires that are deemed to have a strong potential to rapidly escalate and threaten communties. Personally, I think the ASM ‘experiment’ should be ended and the duties returned to the Air Attack and Lead planes, but hey, that’s just me.
Reply to TTWARE on May 10, 2014 at 9:10 am said:
>> TTWARE said…
>> First, kudos to WTKTT and Marti, for digging into and getting
>> the “that’s where we want it” conversation as analyzed as can
>> possibly be done without some additional ‘outside’ input.
Two quick things here…
1) calvin is the one that has been focused like a laser-beam on this 1637 transmission from day one. It has deserved more focus and attention for quite some time… and deserves even MORE. It is ( and will remain ) IMPORTANT to know whether this ‘fact’ being reported by Arizona Forestry ever actually happened at all… and if it did… what the FULL story is on it.
2) I’m looking at some other things in the public evidence record that might shed a little more light on this… so I wouldn’t say that nothing more can be learned *without* some new interviews.
It is, in fact, still perfectly possible there is *GOING* to be ANOTHER official Yarnell Hill Investigation sometime soon.
At this point ( and with everything even WE have proved is totally WRONG with the original SAIT work )… I would think the right thing for Arizona Forestry to do at this point is just admit their mistakes and do it all over again… but THIS time try to get it RIGHT.
The families deserve nothing less ( and have, indeed, been ASKING for a better investigation since day one ).
Indeed… a ‘proper investigation’ is even one of the ‘stipulated’ action items in most of the wrongful death claims… which means that even if ALL the parties involved try to ‘settle out of court’…. the settlement(s) themselves might still REQUIRE a new ( proper ) investigation be done.
>> TTWARE also said…
>> I’m in agreement with Bob that, with all the chaos in the
>> sky and on the ground that day, it would have been easy to
>> mix-up that ‘recollection’ attributed to Marsh with another
>> parties transmission.
It actually could have been a COMPLETE walk-over.
Bravo 33 has already testified that because of the piss-poor handoff from Rory Collins… they basically had NO IDEA who was even ‘working the fire’ down there underneath them… and they also freely admit they had NO IDEA what anyone’s VOICES sounded like as they got all this dumped onto them. They didn’t even know what Field OPS1 Todd Abel’s voice sounded like as they suddenly started doing this Lead Plane / Air Attack double-duty.
So it is ACTUALLY possible that Marsh might have hit ‘transmit’ on the A2G channel… and only got the words “Bravo 33, Division A” out before SOMEONE ELSE totally walked all over him and then said something like “That’s exactly what we want”.
Maybe Marsh WAS trying to ‘say something’ to Bravo 33 at that point… but got totally ‘walked on’ and Burfiend just thought all that was coming from the same person ( since they admit they had
no idea who anyone was down there or what their voices
sounded like ).
Don’t forget that we NOW know that by the time Steed made his FIRST MAYDAY call… that call is NOT ‘filled with over-modulation’
as the SAIR reported. Steed is ACTUALLY YELLING into his microphone at the top of his voice and its because there are ACTUALLY at least two chainsaws running right next to him already. He was YELLING as much to hear himself as to make sure Bravo 33 could hear him over the saw noise right next to him.
That means that they DID realize the trouble they were in some span of time BEFORE Steed’s first MAYDAY. They had ALREADY decided to deploy BEFORE Steed’s first MAYDAY… and had (apparently) ALREADY found the deployment site, pulled the ropes on the saws, and gotten to work.
It could very well be that whatever Marsh was trying to say to Bravo 33 when he then got ‘walked on’ was either related to them suddenly realizing the trouble they were in ( as early as 1637? )… OR it was simply Marsh getting walked on at 1637 but not having the time to RETRY because it was suddenly time to help find the deployment site or just simply ‘run forward’ to catch the men.
All guesswork… but it’s possible.
My feeling is that there were no CALL SIGNS involved here at
all regarding what Burfiend was ‘recalling’.
I believe that Burfiend is just simply MISTAKEN about it being
DIVSA Marsh saying anything ( at any time ) about “That’s exactly what we want”. It was probably someone else who had a VHF radio with them there in Yarnell and they were ‘confirming’ the ‘goodness’ of the 1633 SEAT drop that had just taken place within sight of the Ranch House Restaurant.
>> TTWARE also said…
>> The troubling part of the whole deal is that MANY people heard
>> A/G radio traffic during the time in question, but we don’t have
>> any of those ‘other’ recollections.
Correct. Even the SAIT should have realized this alone was reason to re-interview Burfiend and try to CONFIRM what he reported.
Not only did the SAIT *NOT* do that…. they took as ‘gospel’ Burfiend’s recollection(s)… and even totally trusted his ‘guess’
that it was ‘5 minutes later when they deployed’… so they just
subtracted 5 minutes from 1642 and put a timestamp of 1637
on Burfiend’s “That’s what we want” recollection…
…and they went ‘out the door’ with it
The SAIT just published it as FACT, and even called this
non-verified reported transmission the ‘official’ end of their own
self-imposed ‘non-verifiable communications’ blackout.
Go figure.
>> TTWARE also said…
>>
>> As has been stated before, A/G is one of the most listened-to
>> channels on the fireground, as the most up-to-date reports on
>> fire activity and other significant events usually comes across
>> that channel in a prompt fashion. While earlier in the day people
>> might have been only paying a cursory listen, later in the
>> afternoon, with the fire getting ready to burn up an entire town,
>> you can bet many, many people were glued to it (as evidenced
>> by the background traffic videos).
Totally agree. If there was EVER a time for anyone with a cheap
UHF handheld ( capable of listening to Air-To-Ground UHF ) to be
monitoring that channel for transmissions… it was circa 4 to 5 PM in Yarnell.
Everybody WAS… but only ONE guy up in an airplane who admits he had no idea who was even on the ground or what they sounded like is the one reporting a ‘crucial’ transmission?
It doesn’t ‘add up’.
>> TTWARE also said…
>>
>> On another note regarding possible takeaways, in my opinion
>> two glaring ones seemingly related to BUDGET concerns are:
>>
>> 1) The states calling out a Type II Short Team (which was
>> never even able to assemble all of it’s critical team members)
>> for a fire that was already deemed a threat to a community.
>>
>> 2) The feds determination that they could save money by
>> having less aircraft and personnel on fires by jamming two
>> critical and busy functions inside of one aircraft (ASM). There
>> may be times on slower, less active fires when that could be
>> appropriate, but NEVER on Type I or Type II fires, and NEVER
>> on Type III fires that are deemed to have a strong potential to
>> rapidly escalate and threaten communties. Personally, I think
>> the ASM ‘experiment’ should be ended and the duties returned
>> to the Air Attack and Lead planes, but hey, that’s just me.
Not sure myself about necessary/needed changes to the whole Air Support thing… but with regards to BUDGET…
If ICT4 Russ Shumate had only just spent the money on Saturday for day-long chopper support and bucket drops… that thing would have been dead-as-a-doornail before 4:00 PM on Saturday.
If ‘Arizona Forestry’ just adds up what the cost for that chopper support on Saturday would have been and THEN compares it to
the *other* costs that resulted by NOT spending that money
on Saturday…
…well… you don’t need a whole lot of batteries in your calculator to realize what a ‘budget buster’ that mistake was.
If the whole Yarnell Incident ( and the loss of 19 good men ) isn’t enough to teach Arizona Forestry ( and SWCC ) that using the ‘IA with overwhelming force’ approach isn’t ( ultimately ) the most cost-effective way to fight wildland fires in that region…
…then I don’t know what it will take.
Correction for above.
Accidentally typed ‘VHF’ instead of ‘UHF’.
The (supposed) “That’s what we want” transmission came over the UHF Air-To-Ground channel and NOT the VHF Air-To-Air channel.
Nobody needed an expensive VHF piece of kit to have been the one making that call to Burfiend in B33 on A2G.
It could have been ANYONE on the ground in Yarnell who saw that 1633 SEAT drop and might have been trying to confirm the ‘goodness’ of it.
So that one paragraph above SHOULD have read…
“It was probably someone else who had a UHF radio with them there in Yarnell and they were just ‘confirming’ ( over the A2G channel ) the ‘goodness’ of the 1633 SEAT drop that had just taken place within sight of the Ranch House Restaurant.”
Correction to the correction ( ROFL ).
See Sitta’s post ( and response ) above.
The ACTUAL frequencies in use that weekend all seem to have been in the 154 to 175 mgHZ range.
RE Air Attack Handoff to Bravo 33 at 1558 ish:
So……I’ve been watching and listening to the Air Study 30130630_1628_EP.MOV video three times through. Since I mistakenly downloaded it, instead of the next one that I’m now downloading. I figured I might as well, since it would help me see and hear what was going on. Quite interesting.
This one includes the impressive 4:16-4:18 two-minute VLAT 911 split-drop. Quite interesting and quite educational to watch/hear. Most of it features Tom French as Bravo 33 Lead Plane , leading, instructing the other pilots of both air tankers and helicopters, checking things out, communicating with media planes, really polite, respectful, supportive, calm and cool. Totally impressive all things considered. This video spans from about 1558 til 1628. Forty minutes. I highly recommend watching it. I don’t have the link for it at the moment, unfortunately. But you can find it. Just go to WTKTT’s link for the Air Study video he posts above, and download/watch the 1628 video instead!
What really strikes me is the truly calm, professional, supportive, positive, specific, clear communications happening all around. No sign of stress, pressure, conflict, frustration, anything negative at all. You really get a sense that everybody actually enjoys what they’re doing.
This also includes the communication between Rory Collins, as Air Attack, as he leaves the fire to head to Deer Valley, because his pilot has run out of fly-time, and his, I would say, disappointment that he still hasn’t been able to secure his relif pilot, who is grounded at Stafford because, I would guess, of the same weather that was grounding other planes all around.
I hate to say this, because I have a beef with Rory Collins, but over the course of about fifteen minutes during this, on again off again, he did have something of a leisurely conversation with Tom French. And, as Tom French says towards the end of it, (re Burfiend who would become Air Attack) “my right-seater’s been copying everything.”
Collins told him quite a bit of stuff, about the weather, about IC, about go ahead and finish what you’re doing and then get over to the other side of the fire with the DC 10’s, about Div A being the ground contact ( I guess not forecasting that Div A was about to head out to the bleak unknown, which, to be fair, he didn’t know at that time). He asked for questions, concerns, and French back-and-forthed with him, and didn’t sound the least like this was weird or strange or hectic or insufficient in any way. He sounded confident that they were completely ready to assume the responsibility they were being handed.
And then he kept on doing what he was doing. Being Bravo33 (which is pronounced Bravo Three Three) Lead Plane. Calm and confident and positive in the midst of what we perceive as being chaos.
To be fair and helpful, the later video which covers the Air Support during the time of the burnover is not above, it’s below and it’s https://www.dropbox.com/sh/02ue6bnjp6nazkm/AAA4aB8cuUhL0vwnEy-ja-Ypa/Photos%20and%20Video/AerialFirefightingstudy/Panebaker/Video/Video_with_134175_audio#lh:null-20130630_1643_EP.MOV
Marti
I am confident after every thing I have been reading that you guys have found, that the statement.
That’s where we want it,– is from OPS or a ground person
with the structure protection group in the area of the drop, and has absolutely nothing to do with March.
It has never made science that Marsh would have popped out of no where with that statement.
Based on experience call it a educated guess it was not Marsh. People near the drop site would be much more plausible. They were trying to save structures at that point and that is what they were focused on.
Yes, I’m thinking more and more in line with you (see my comment below in response to yours). I’m still wondering how it could have been that this call from someone (who decreasingly looks like it would have been Marsh) (and I’m trusting Burfiend who says he heard it) wouldn’t have been heard on the AirToGround channel that A WHOLE LOT OF PEOPLE heard at the time, including the crew doing that “Last MInutes” video. That’s what stumps me.
Is there possibly some other channel that Air Attack Burfiend could have been interacting with that could have signaled to him, at 4:37-4:39-ish, as they were circle-ing then flying a test flight “west to east over the bowl” that “that’s exactly what we want”?
I have absolutely no idea.
Marti… not only am I not sure we can really
trust either Burfiend’s or French’s statements
in the SAIT investigations notes about the
“that’s what we want” statement… I think
their recollection in *general* is kinda wonky.
For example…
Here is the exact ‘infamous’ paragraph from
their SAIT interview that has that one and
only reference in the *entire* evidence
record in it about “that’s what we want”…
…but look at the REST of the paragraph
that precedes that ‘recollection’.
It’s all pretty ‘skewed’ unto itself regarding
what ELSE they ‘think’ they heard from
Marsh… and WHEN…
TIME NOW = 1630
:: We needed to go back to the right flank
:: ( 1630 AZ time ).
:: Made 3 practice runs. Painted 2.
:: We came around.
TIME NOW = However long it take to make
‘3 practices runs’ and then ‘come around’.
Let’s call that FIVE minutes, at least.
TIME NOW = 1635
:: Got a call from Division A stating they
:: were going down their escape
:: route to the safety zone.
WTF? At 1635? Not a chance.
:: Didn’t know Division A was the
:: superintendent of the Granite Mountain
:: hot shots. Asked him “is everything OK?”
:: He replied “everything is ok, just heading
:: to the safety zone”.
Again… WTF?? Not possible ( at 1635 ).
There ARE video captures that cover this
timeframe AND were capturing the A2G
radio channel and there are no such
transmissions recorded.
:: We came around,
:: made a practice run through the bowl,
:: west to east.
TIME NOW = ??
We really have no idea. Their testimony
above about hearing from Marsh at ‘this
time’ already proves the SAIT notes are
out in left field already… so there is no
telling WHEN this ‘practice run’ they are
now referring to happened… if it even
happened at all.
:: I was talking to Tom
:: about the rising terrain on exit.
:: Division A clad and said “that is what
:: we are looking for, that is exactly right”.
:: Within 5 minutes of that, they went in
:: shelter.
So this LAST STATEMENT about them ‘going into shelter’ within 5 minutes of the “that is what we are looking for” transmission
( according to their recollection ) MUST be
what the SAIT used to actually come up with the 1637 timestamp for Marsh’s (supposed)
transmission.
French and Burfiend had no frickin’ idea what
time it *really* might have been… but
somehow they also seemed to be SURE
that ‘within 5 minutes’ is when Eric
announced they were ‘deploying’.
So the SAIT just took their ‘recollection’ about
the previous transmission from Marsh being
‘within 5 minutes’… and then they just
counted BACKWARDS from 1642… when
the Helmet Cam captured Marsh’s final
statement(s).
1642 minus 5 minutes = 1637
Voila!… The SAIT was now SURE that 1637
is when Marsh MUST have said “That is what
we are looking for”… and they frickin’ PUBLISHED that in the SAIR as if it was fact.
They were taking these ‘unverified’ random recollections of French / Burfiend as ‘gospel truth’… even though ( as shown above ) they were completely mis-remembering Marsh’s OTHER statements ( on A2G channel ) about
‘going down their escape route’.
So the SAIT didn’t question the FIRST half of
even that one section ( paragraph ) of their
interview ( which is obviously an inaccurate
recollection ) but then the SAIT took the
SECOND half as ‘gospel truth’… and
PUBLISHED the ‘statements’ as FACT…
even though NO ONE ELSE was reporting
that transmission from Marsh on the *VERY*
popular A2G radio channel.
Go figure.
As I have said before… something about
Marsh ‘asking’ for retardant must have
seemed *really* attractive to THEIR ‘version
of events’ and fit nicely with THEIR ‘agenda’
in order for them to not have either
questioned this one statement from them
*OR* made sure it fit the criteria of ‘verified
transmission’ which they seemed to be so picky about for the previous 30+ ‘blackout’
minutes.
Bob:
Do you think this is important, all things considered?
To be honest, I’m less and less thinking it is, all things considered. To be honest, I’m kind of hanging onto it because the SAIT made a big deal of it, using Burfiend, who I really respect, and his narrative of it to further their own narrative, in what I agree with WTKTT to be a really irresponsible manner.
Do you think it’s really all that important, in the general scheme of things on this totally mismanaged fire, that Burfiend says he heard, while they were flying a “show me,” someone tell him (and possibly mistakenly thinking it was Div A Eric Marsh) that ‘this is exactly where we want that” ?
Or is it time for all of us to just admit we can’t figure this out, all things considered, and move on?
I really respect your hard-won experience-based sense of what is truly important in wildland fire-fighting.
I would say with out other identified radio traffic its a guess as to who made the statement. Maybe an assumption after the fact by Burfiend that he recollects something
during a show me run. What is very strange is there was no prior conversation asking for a drop by March. It would be un conceivable for Marsh to think his discussion with OPS about we’ll get a drop down there would have any thing to do with a 30 min. later statement. Where is location and discussion of need?
The only thing this adds to is some how thinking Marsh asked for a drop to save the crew and no one was listening. Which I think is BS. It could have been any one with an Air to Air Freq. on the ground. Thought they said DIV. A. It dose not make science that Marsh would have jumped in and said that with all the smoke at that time he could not have seen air craft and gave no other direction prior.
With out verifiable evidence it will just hang hot there as something to talk about– Had the air tanker dropped where DIV A ask they would have been saved,–Wishful thinking. Where they were dropping had no connection to where Marsh was. I am still of the belief it was not Marsh, I am still betting on the Structure Group. Air to Air would have a very limited number of people on it. That same statement could have been used several times during the day by ?????
Also if it was air to air Marsh would not have had that on his hand held radio. Only air to ground.
Any air to air radios would have been in Vehicles like City or county Engines or Supervisors trucks. If I am not mistaken Air is on a totally different Ban than the Fire freq. Bans. High Ban and Low Ban you cannot run them both on the same radio. Air to ground is in the same ban area as crewnet, and the other fire freq. Another little added info on air attack. 2 different radios in air craft to talk to air and ground.
A air tanker would have Air to air, if they IA a fire some one on the ground would have air to air to talk to them till Air Attack arrived. Clear as mud again ….
Reply to Marti Reed post on May 9, 2014 at 5:20 pm
>> Marti wrote…
>> What really strikes me is the truly calm, professional,
>> supportive, positive, specific, clear communications
>> happening all around. No sign of stress, pressure, conflict,
>> frustration, anything negative at all.
Yes. Right down to Burfiend doing the ‘slash across his throat’
gesture as soon as he knew 19 good men were deploying.
Very positive. Very professional.
>> You really get a sense that everybody actually enjoys
>> what they’re doing.
Yes. Flying airplanes is FUN!
>> This also includes the communication between Rory Collins,
>> as Air Attack. He asked for questions, concerns, and French
>> back-and-forthed with him, and didn’t sound the least like this
>> was weird or strange or hectic or insufficient in any way. He
>> sounded confident that they were completely ready to assume
>> the responsibility they were being handed.
Yes. It all sounds very ‘nicey-nicey’ and polite, doesn’t it?
You would hardly be able to tell that just a few hours earlier,
Collins was dumping retardant all over a Division Supervisor’s
plan of action and not giving a shit whether he liked it or not…
…or that while he was ‘Air Attack’… a helicopter almost crashed
straight into a DC10 and the resulting explosion would have lit
that middle bowl up like a Christmas tree long before wind
change…
…or that while he was ‘Air Attack’… numerous people on the
fire commented how ‘disorganized’ the helicopters were that
day and seemed ‘totally unsupervised’ and ‘doing whatever the
hell they wanted’… to the point where Blue Ridge Hotshots would
later say that the ‘split’ in the fireline was actually caused by
this ‘unsupervised’ helicopter activity that day.
…or that he only gave them 10 minutes notice about having
to leave the fire… and then left Bravo 33 with a laundry list of
‘cluelessness’ that they would then recount to SAIT investigators…
…or that this same guy, following the incident, would refuse to
return phone calls and make it almost impossible for anyone
to interview him.
Sorry, Marti.
Yes… I agree that these guys know how to talk on the radio and
‘get a job done’… but I’m not ready to give any of them the glowing
‘points’ you are granting.
In MANY ways… ( from Friday night through Sunday )… the AIR
operations at Yarnell left a LOT to be desired.
I actually, truly hope the overall ‘picture’ that has emerged
from the Yarnell Hill Fire regarding this ‘Air Support’ stuff ( and the
interaction with ground forces ) is not NORMAL or ‘business as
usual’.
If it really is… all I can say is… YIKES!
WTKTT… The slash across the throat sign has always bothered me. How could he be so certain that they were dead? Really, how?? How did he know they were dead when he didn’t even know where they were??
WTF
calvin… the SAIT interview notes with Bravo 33 are an absolute MESS… but if you read them *very* carefully it would appear that John Burfiend ( who was the right-seat guy, not flying the airplane, and the one who was monitoring Air-To-Ground channel ) did his ‘slash across his throat’ gesture just AFTER Marsh’s final transmission when Marsh ‘affirmed’ that they were on the ‘SOUTH side of the fire’.
Even if they couldn’t see them… I think Burfiend could tell looking downward at that moment that anyone deploying on the SOUTH side of that exploding fireline was a goner. Hence… ‘slash across the throat’ gesture over to Thomas French.
Here is the exact ‘context’ of that testimony from
Thomas French in the SAIT interview notes.
It seems to confirm that Burfiend’s ‘slash across
his throat’ gesture to French did, in fact, come
right after Marsh’s *final* transmission…
_________________________________________
We were right here (pointed at map) when Granite Mountain 7 called screaming in the radio. Ops said “are you getting this? I told Granite Mountain 7 “you need to calm down. I can’t understand you”. Immediately Division A called and said “we are starting a burn out, we are getting in our shelters. I said we got pople in trouble. Tanker called and said I got you in sight. I claimed out – the DC10 swung wide. I looked at John and he did this (slash across the throat). I told Kevin to stand by copy, taking it around. We have a crew in trouble. We are going to go look.
__________________________________________
Let me also say that while I have always found this ‘slash across the throat’ gesture from Burfiend to be quite ‘uncalled for’… I do *NOT* believe for one second that this obvious assumption on his part that they were ‘goners’, even at that point in time, had *ANY* effect on him then proceeding to do his job.
I can also criticize them ( and, indeed, the WFF radio protocols themselves for apparently NOT having a good, established MAYDAY protocol ) for NOT taking the transmissions from Steed and Caldwell seriously for more than TWO MINUTES… but that still doesn’t mean I think they didn’t do all they possibly could to try and save those men that day… when they finally did realize this was a REAL emergency.
As soon as OPS1 Todd Abel contacted French and Burfiend and *TOLD* them to get their heads out of their asses and RESPOND to these men… they did.
And once they did ( finally stop ignoring them )… they obviously kicked into their own highly-rehearsed and professional procedures for such a situation.
I also happen to believe that if there had been *ANY* indication in the next few moments of where they REALLY were ( such as… if Marsh had only taken
2 seconds to tell them… “we are 600 yards due WEST of Boulder Springs Ranch” )…
…I believe Thomas French in B33 and Kevin in the DC10 VLAT would have actually attempted a retardant drop… at GREAT risk to their own lives.
To have flown the jet-engine DC10 through that thick smoke-ass cloud would have been absolute suicide for Kevin… so I don’t think THAT would have happened… but if there was ANY way to get at their location ( if they knew where it was ) OTHER than flying blindly directly THROUGH the smoke/ash cloud…
I think they would have tried it.
For the rest of my life… I will always wonder WHY, when Marsh was directly asked by Burfiend…. “So, you’re on the south side of the fire, then?”…
…all Eric Marsh said was… “Affirm”.
Obtuse communications. Right to the end.
If he had just added ANY amount of OTHER information… they at least *MIGHT* have been able to KNOW or GOOD-GUESS their exact location.
He didn’t… and I will ALWAYS wonder WHY he
didn’t take that one last chance to identify their
exact location.
**
** DID DIVSA ERIC MARSH REALLY CALL BRAVO 33
** AT 1637 ABOUT ‘RETARDANT’?
Reply to calvin post on May 8, 2014 at 2:34 am
>> calvin said…
>> I am not sure exactly where Marsh was when he called Bravo33 and said
>> that is exactly where we want the retardant.
calvin… see below. I am personally ( and honestly ) still not convinced this
1637 radio ‘callout’ from Marsh actually took place… or ( if it did ) that it really
was Eric Marsh that said anything of the sort.
>> But if he was walking downslope toward the canyon floor, I do not think he
>> would have been able to see the flight path.
Assuming this transmission DID take place just as the SAIR reported…
It’s really not possible. He might have been able to HEAR some planes flying
over there on the other side of that smoke column… but it’s really not
credible that he could have SEEN them, at that point. It was almost
‘dark as night’ at that point, as well ( as the Glen Ilah resident video proves ).
>> Because of the short period of time between that call out and the call
>> announcing the entrapment, we know he HAD to be close.
Yes. If it happened at all… and at the TIME it supposedly happened… then
Marsh had to be VERY close to the rest of the men. No question.
>> There is a small mound between the entrapment/ deployment site and BSR
>> that is just north of the dozered road (created to remove GM’s bodies).
>> I think it is possible he was on that mound where he would have had
>> more visibility.
Perhaps… and I know exactly the ‘mound’ you are referring to… but that would create the UNBELIEVABLE scenario that Marsh could see exactly what was happening with the fire out ahead of the men still over in the canyon… and he still let them walk right into a deathtrap, anyway.
There are a LOT of ‘unbelievable’ moments that happened that weekend… ( too many ) but I really can’t get my head around THIS possibility ( that Marsh really might have been ‘out ahead of them’ and in a good ‘forward lookout’ position up on that mound… but he let them all die anyway rather than ‘abort the mission’ ).
>> calvin also wrote…
>> I do not believe the GMH were only counting on their speed to outrun
>> the fire. I do believe they were expecting retardant to be dropped on the
>> south side of the fire. But as far as I can tell (from post burn pictures),
>> that never happened.
I hear ya… but ‘as far as I can tell’… there is still the distinct possibility that this “That’s where we want retardant” transmission from DIVSA Eric Marsh never really happened at all… or that it wasn’t actually Eric that said it.
Stick with me for a moment while I try to ‘document my confusion’ about
this (supposed) callout from Marsh to Bravo 33.
This Air Study video actually covers the 1637 timerame…
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/02ue6bnjp6nazkm/AAA4aB8cuUhL0vwnEy-ja-Ypa/Photos%20and%20Video/AerialFirefightingstudy/Panebaker/Video/Video_with_134175_audio#lh:null-20130630_1643_EP.MOV
This video is only recording the Air-To-Air channel but it does provide a CLEAR accounting of *EXACTLY* what Air Attack was doing from 1630 and right up through the deployment ( and beyond ).
There really is nothing in these captured Air Attack conversations that even remotely backs up what the SAIR says was happening at 1637… much less
Marsh making any “that’s where we want retardant” call(s).
Hence my ‘confusion’.
Air Attack ( Bravo 33 ) had the VLAT DC10 910 ( Pilot Kevin ) in a HOLDING
pattern a full SEVEN MILES OUT from the fire and didn’t even ASK Kevin
to start to ‘come into the area’ until 14 seconds before 1637. It took almost
another 2 minutes for the VLAT to even get close to the fire and only then
BEGIN talking to Air Attack about a ‘show me’ run on the EAST side of
the fire… and even this initial conversation about a possible ‘show me’ run
with Air Attack didn’t start until just 24 seconds prior to Steeds first MAYDAY.
The FULL 12 minute and 22 second transcript of this video has already
been posted down below in this ‘Chapter 6’. The following is just a
SUMMARY of that full transcript describing (generally) what Air Attack
was actually DOING during this timeframe…
** USDA AIR STUDY – DISC 4 VIDEO STARTS AT 1630.48 ( 4:30.48 PM )
NOTE: When the video STARTS… we hear Air Attack (B33) actively lining up
a REAL drop ( not a practice run ) with a SEAT from NORTH to SOUTH on
the EAST side of the fire… down near Yarnell. At this point… Air Attack has
the DC10 VLAT 910 ( Pilot Kevin ) in a ‘holding pattern’ SEVEN MILES OUT
and away from the fire… and isn’t even STARTING to deal with him yet.
( 1631.36 4:31.36 PM ) – AA tells SEAT to follow him for DROP.
( 1633.20 4:33.20 PM ) – SEAT drop takes place.
( 1633.24 4:33.24 PM ) – SEAT says “Off the drop now”.
( 1633.26 4:33.26 PM ) – AA tells SEAT to ‘load and return’.
( 1634.11 4:34.11 PM ) – AA tells 910 to set level 4 drop but to still HOLD.
( 1634.12 4:34.12 PM ) – AA tells 910 he’ll get back to him.
( 1634.40 4:34.40 PM ) – AA tells SEAT Wickenburg is out of retardant.
( 1634.42 4:34.42 PM ) – SEAT tells AA he’ll try ‘private club’ for retardant.
( 1635.37 4:35.37 PM ) – Chopper 5Q Alpha reports needing to refuel.
( 1636.10 4:36.10 PM ) – DOZER AND TRANSPORT go by camera.
( 1636.25 4:36.25 PM ) – Chopper 5QA reports landing at Helibase.
( 1636.27 4:36.27 PM ) – AA tells 5QA to let him know when he’s back.
( 1636.46 4:36.46 PM ) – AA only now tells VLAT 910 to ‘come on in’ to the area.
( 1637.05 4:37.05 PM ) – AA tells VLAT 910 target will be flames on EAST side.
( 1638.12 4:38.12 PM ) – Chopper 5QA departs to Wickenburg.
( 1638.15 4:38.15 PM ) – AA asks 5QA to depart on WEST side of fire.
( 1638.42 4:38.42 PM ) – VLAT 910 only now reports ‘approaching area’.
( 1639.03 4:39.03 PM ) – AA only now starts talking to 910 about ‘show me’
( 1639.27 4:39.27 PM ) – Captain Jesse Steed’s first MAYDAY.
( 1639.47 4:39.47 PM ) – Prescott Air Operations (PAO) heard MAYDAY.
( 1639.48 4:39.48 PM ) – PAO tells AA ‘get with OPS… something wrong’.
( 1639.53 4:39.53 PM ) – AA ignores OPS. Sticks with 901 ‘show me’ talk.
( 1641.18 4:41.18 PM ) – AA only now realizes something is happening.
( 1641.20 4:41.20 PM ) – AA tells VLAT 910 ‘folks in trouble… just standby’.
( 1641.25 4:41.25 PM ) – VLAT 910 copies… tells AA he’ll stage out northeast.
( 1641.31 4:41.31 PM ) – AA tells VLAT 910 looks like ‘deployment in progress’.
( 1641.33 4:41.33 PM ) – AA asks VLAT 910 for coverage lvl 6 and to ‘standby’.
( 1641.39 4:41.39 PM ) – VLAT 910 copies… says he’ll watch AA and standby.
( 1643.33 4:43.33 PM ) – USDA AIR STUDY – DISC 4 VIDEO ENDS
So ( from what I can tell ?? )… there is NOTHING there that supports what the
SAIR has reported about Marsh ‘seeing a VLAT drop lineup’ fly OVER him
at 1637 and making ANY kind of radio call like “That’s where we want retardant”.
Unless it’s the SEAT drop at 1633 that the SAIR was talking about ( which DID
actually take place and so the time of 1637 is totally wrong )… but even that was
a SOUTH to NORTH lineup on the EAST side of the fire and never ‘flew over
Marsh’ at all.
The most IMPORTANT thing to remember here is that this one single ‘transmission’ from Marsh is based on just ONE SINGLE person’s recollection,
was NOT captured in any background recordings, and it has not been ‘verified’
by ANYONE else ( even though it supposedly happened on the *very* popular
and well-listened-to Air-To-Ground channel ).
From page 15 of the SAIT Yarnell Investigation Notes ( YIN )…
**************************************************************************************
INTERVIEW WITH BRAVO 33
Interviewees: Bravo 33
John Burfiend-ATS Specialist
Clint Clauson – ATS Trainee
Thomas French – AT Specialist
Interviewers: Mike Dudley, Brad Mayhew, Tim Foley, Jay Kurth, Jimmy Rocha
We needed to go back to the right flank ( 1630 AZ time ).
Made 3 practice runs. Painted 2. We came around.
Got a call from Division A stating they were going down their escape
route to the safety zone. Didn’t know Division A was the superintendent
of the Granite Mountain hot shots. Asked him “is everything OK?” He
replied “everything is ok, just heading to the safety zone”. We came around,
made a practice run through the bowl, west to east. I was talking to Tom
about the rising terrain on exit. Division A clad and said “that is what we are
looking for, that is exactly right”. Within 5 minutes of that, they went in shelter.
************************************************************************************
So there it is.
That is the ONLY reference to this (supposed) transmission by (supposedly)
DIVSA Eric Marsh in the ENTIRE evidence record… and there isn’t even any
specific TIME reported for it at all.
Here are the things to ‘consider’ about this ‘testimony’.
1) This is the ONLY place this transmission from (supposedly) DIVSA
Eric Marsh is EVER mentioned… even though it (supposedly) took place
on the well-listened-to Air-To-Ground channel. TWO completely separate
investigations interviewing MANY people who were constantly monitoring
that Air-To-Ground channel all day… and this quick blurb in the SAIT
investigator’s notes recounting just ONE person’s recollection is still the
ONLY mention of this (supposed) transmission.
2) There is NOTHING (recorded in the SAIT notes) about this (supposed)
transmission taking place at 1637, as published in the SAIR. Zero. Zip. Nada.
It is still a complete mystery how the SAIT actually ‘assigned’ a time of 1637
to this (supposed) transmission from Eric Marsh to B33 on the Air-To-Ground
channel. Bravo 33 was even not really ‘sure’ about any of the actual times…
so how did the SAIT come up with 1637 for this (supposed) transmission?
3) The interview notes DO say that Bravo 33 reports this as ‘Division A called’…
but they also do NOT specifically say whether Bravo 33 ALSO said there were
actual CALL SIGNS involved with this transmission such as “Bravo 33, Division
Alpha’. Other notes from the Bravo 33 interview establish that they were not only
‘unfamiliar’ with who was even working the fire ( because of the piss-poor handoff
from ATGS / ASM1 / Rory Collins )… they were also not familiar with anyone’s
VOICES yet. Bravo 33 specifically says they had no idea what OPS1 Todd Abel
sounded like yet… so UNLESS there were specific CALL SIGNS involved on this
transmission from Marsh it is doubtful they would have been able to tell it was
DIVSA Marsh just from the voice. It is still POSSIBLE that this transmission came
from ‘someone else’ at that time and Bravo 33 is simply mistaken that it was
actually ‘Division A’ ( Marsh ).
4) This one single ‘supposed’ transmission from Marsh played a critical
role in the published SAIR document since they are using this one single
transmission as the defacto END of the (supposed) ‘blackout period’ where
they say they had ‘no direct verifiable transmissions’ from either Marsh
or Granite Mountain… yet it (actually) remains one of the most ‘unverified’
transmissions on record that day.
It is ONLY being ‘recalled’ by one single source ( ONE person ) and even
though others SHOULD have heard this transmission over the well-listened-to
Air-To-Ground channel… NO ONE ELSE in ANY interview or testimony spanning
TWO separate investigations recalls hearing it at all.
I still think it is ‘suspicious’ that the SAIT gave absolute ‘verified transmission’
status to this one (supposed) unrecorded radio callout from Marsh with only
ONE person seeming to ‘recall’ it ( when many others SHOULD have also
heard it… but apparently did NOT ).
There are still MANY other ‘transmissions’ that were actually captured in videos
and in audio tracks that the SAIT chose to call ‘not verifiable’, yet they chose
THIS (unrecorded) moment as so ‘verifiable’ that it ‘officially’ represents the
END of the (supposed) ‘blackout’.
It still almost seems like they were going to great lengths to make sure
this one (supposed) statement about a ‘retardant drop’ made it into the
‘official narrative’ and the ‘official public report’.. regardless of how thin
its ‘verifiableness’ really was.
We can OBVIOUSLY hear ( with our own ears in the Air Study video ) that ‘Air
Attack’ himself NEVER got this transmission at all.
So the ONLY possibility is that the other guy in the plane who was listening to
any ‘Air to Ground’ traffic was the ONLY one who actually heard this.
I am not saying he is WRONG or ‘imagining things’… but our ability to actually
VERIFY this ( as to caller ID and TIME, and what was actually said ) is seriously
non-existent.
I just wish there was an equivalent ADOSH interview transcript with Bravo 33
( French and Burfiend ) to ‘compare’ the SAIT (YIN) notes to and be SURE that
this ONE person’s recollection isn’t flawed, or that he simply was mistaken
about WHO was ‘calling that in’ to him.
There isn’t ( an equivalent ADOSH or other ‘independent’ interview with B33
French/Burfiend ).
Not yet… anyway.
At the 23 second mark of the 1637 Panebaker video there is a background transmission that I cannot make out. This video is only 39 seconds long and would put the 23 second mark near 1637. If you do not mind reviewing, I would appreciate it.
Otherwise, I hear you. I also want to know how the SAIT came up with this “quote.”
How does the 4490 red video that was taken around deployment time fit into all of this?
I know the +23 transmission in the 163700 Panebaker video that you speak of. I checked my Air Study notes and what I have for that is someone simply saying something about a “horse in the road” that they need to “take care of”.
I will re-listen to this 39 second video and get back.
As for the 4490red video… I don’t know.
Makes about as much sense ( time-wise ) as the Tom Story photo showing a full VLAT DC10 dump at exactly the moment of Steed’s first MAYDAY ( which is also not supported by any other evidence for being at that time ).
It could be that the 1633 SEAT DROP ( which definitely happened and is captured in that video ) is what Marsh MAY have seen and was reacting to THAT.
The ‘recollection’ might simply be wrong about what they were doing when they heard the transmission. Maybe Marsh had seen the actualy 1633 drop and THAT is what he meant by “That’s where we want retardant”… and it wasn’t a response to any ‘line up’ flight at all.
More later…
RE Tom’s VLAT photos:
I decided to walk away from that, because the pain of picking my way thru it was greater than desperation to figure it out….
However, now that I found your posting of the list of the drops, I’ve been thinking hmmmmm is it possible he’s photographing the 1706 T910 drop? Of course the problem with that is that at about the same time (I think?) he was photographing the Blue Ridge UTV leaving the Ranch House Parking Lot…..
I don’t have Lightroom open, so I’m not looking at the photos, just doing this off the top of my head…….
The Tom Story camera that we have narrowed the time offset down on ( the one he was using in the Ranch House Restaurant parking lot ) is this one…
Canon EOS-5D Mark II
The ‘big boy’ with the 300mm lens that seems to show a VLAT drop right at 1639 ( and we haven’t determined the time offset for yet ) is this one…
Canon EOS-1D Mark II N
I already checked the obvious ( 1 hour difference because of timezone set incorrectly ) but that doesn’t appear to be the problem.
BOTH of these cameras were ‘stamping’ using a -07:00 offset from GMT that day.
More later…
Actually, Tom was using two Canon 5D Mark IIs.
One with id 552301203 with a 70-200 mm f/2.8 L lens (major everybody’s favorite workhorse zoom lens), and another with id 720306928 with a 16-34 mm f/2.8 L lens for wide angle shots.
They both seem to be accurately time-stamped.
On the 1D Mark II id 401063, his most state-of-the-art camera, with which he shot the VLAT drop that I may be getting closer to time-stamping (he was so far off that I think maybe he hadn’t bothered to set the time, just the date–perhaps it was brand new??), he was using a 300 mm f/2.8 L lens. That’s a pretty big honkin’ lens. And heavy.
Marti… in folder ONE of Tom Story’s online photos ( the folder that does NOT have any Ranch House Restaurant photos )… he shot a LOT of ‘retardant drop’ sequences and they appear to have ALL been shot with this same ‘Canon EOS-1D Mark II N’ camera that was then later used for the (supposed) 1639 VLAT drop.
I suppose if we can just match ANY of these ‘drops’ that he photographed with THAT camera we will know if the that 1639 VLAT drop photo has an accurate timestamp or not.
I’m looking at it from this end as well. There is NO EVIDENCE that ANY VLAT drop took place ANYWHERE on that fire at 1639… when Tom Story’s photo seems to say it did.
I was hoping for just a 1 hour (incorrect) time zone setting… but that doesn’t seem to be the case.
Thx for this, WTK!
I had downloaded a smattering of photos from both folders, but just kinda randomly. Just downloaded a bunch more, more strategically. Looks like he photographed three VLAT drops. Will look at them much more closely after Mothers Day Lunch!
I’m starting to think he set up that camera quickly, just setting the date, and not the time. Thus the stamp when first shot a frame on it would have been 00:00:00. I don’t know if I have the time to figure out what to synch on. But if I can pin one of those VLATs, it might be possible to nail it.
That being said, I’m currently thinking that drop might be the 1707ish one. I just don’t know where he took it from. I don’t know where that drop was, exactly. Do you? If it was visible from the RHR parking lot, he could have caught it w/that 300mm easily.
Plus, I’m not sure that folder just has the 1Ds. But I’ll examine them later today for sure!
Hah! I just found what looks like a tight sequence of the same event, using both a Mark D and the 1D! It’s the red and white helicopter picking up a bucket at the helispot and heading into the smoke…
Looks good…more later….
OK, if this helicopter sequence shows the 1D is set about 20 minutes late, that would put the problematic VLAT drop at 4:17– the split drop.
OK, really got to get going….
A little note on terminology:
The voice in the video is that of French, who is in the role of Lead Plane, not Air Attack. That’s why he is on Air-to-Air. He’s not listening to Air-to-Ground.
When you hear the voice/callout of Air Attack, on Air-to-Ground, that is Burfiend. He’s not listening to Air-to-Air.
The only way each one knows what’s going on on the other’s channel is via their communication with each other.
So the person telling the story of their recollection of the communication with Div A would have been Burfiend.
Other than that, yep, copy. So now that I’ve downloaded that video, I’ll go watch it.
Marti… thank you.
Yes… that is ‘how it was’ in that timeframe.
They were obviously able to just ‘talk’ to each other in
the plane but each one was ONLY listening to the one
frequency, apparently.
Don’t forget that the 163338 Panebaker video actually
SHOWS the ‘real time’ SEAT drop that actually happens
in the other video detailed above.
They come in from the SOUTH ( lined up on that radio tower as the conversation says ) and they drop on the EAST side of the fire.
There is no ‘West to East’ flyover as described in the SAIR and there was no chance of it flying OVER Marsh… but that doesn’t mean he might not have ‘seen it’… and THIS 1633 SEAT drop is what he might have actually been referring to with his “That’s where we want retardant” message.
A public copy of this Air Study video is in Mr. Dougherty’s online Dropbox at…
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/y3jy5opssrcvzb3/S3cCXl9pjr/AerialFirefightingstudy/Panebaker/Video/Video#lh:null-20130630_163338_fire_behavior_EP.MOV
I’m thinking you may be onto something here.
LOL I’m still downloading the 20130630_1628_ER.MOV file that I’ve been downloading for the past hour and a half, having slowed it down exponentially by trying to watch a bunch of other videos at the same time…..
But as soon as it finally finishes, I’ll take a look at that one. I still haven’t actually been able to play anythng in any manner that lets me actually SEE what’s going on……
Also WTKTT and Marti
Bothe of the drops on the Video were to far out in front of the fire to do any good. The did not fly into the smoke to hit the flames.
Again it is hard to use air tankers at the front of a running fire. Smoke wind and no visibility reduce accuracy of drops. If GM was under the smoke they would not have seen them to make an accurate drop. Only in the movies. OLD SAYING— Never expect an air drop to save your ass, if they can’t see you they can’t hit you…
Reply to Bob Powers post
on May 9, 2014 at 1:39 pm
>> Mr. Powers said…
>> Both of the drops on the Video
>> were too far out in front of the fire
>> to do any good.
Right after the 1633 SEAT drop…
both the Lead Plane Pilot ( B33
French ) and the SEAT pilot are
LAUGHING and this is what is said…
+2:46 ( 1633.34 / 4:33.34 PM )
(French): Yea… we liked your drop…
I know there was a lotta fire in there… but… ah… (laughter) nicely done
+2:50 ( 1633.38 / 4:33.38 )
(Unknown): Yea (laughter)… it’s…
it’s like spittin’ at it.
They both KNEW it wasn’t doing a damn bit of good… but what the heck… they get paid by the ‘hour’ and not by the ‘results’.
Looking back over the transcript of Bravo Lead Pilot talking to the VLAT 910 while they’re setting up for the drop.
I can’t tell if Bravo is actually flying a “show me” or they’re just circling. It kinda reads like Bravo is actually flying the show me, which would mean he would have been flying over the bowl.
What do you think?
And also I’m asking this of Bob Powers, who seems to be the one of us with the most experience of this stuff……
Yes very likely the fir was not that big to circle and make runs and keep all the plains apart would cover a lot of air space. circling the fire at different altitudes or even locations. as I said earlier the plains could have flown over Marsh and crew at any time
in a 8 mile square area. Setting up to make a run takes a lot of maneuvering. Dose that help?
Thanks. Yes.
Lead plane says to VLAT 910:
“If you need more altitude let me know… you should be okay at sixty five, only other aircraft I’ve seen is a media ship at this time (at) niner-thousand five hundred.”
He had that space cleared out completely.
Right after the 1633 SEAT drop… it was ‘load and return’ time for that SEAT. French didn’t get back to Kevin ( DC10 ) right away because he had to take a moment to inform the now departing SEAT that Wickenburg was ‘out of retardant’. Departing SEAT says he will try a ‘private club’ in Wickenburg. French gives him permission to do that… and only then begins to turn his attention to Kevin… SEVEN miles out and ‘holding’.
As Kevin is ‘coming in’… French tells him “we’re pretty much alone on the fire now”.
So YES… the space was cleared out. The other DC10 was ‘on approach’ to Yarnell but still quite a ways out.
Except for the choppers, that is. They ( apparently ) just continued to do pretty much whatever they wanted to… just as they had been doing all day.
Which would also correspond to Burfiend saying in the interview that they made a practice flight over the bowl west to east….
Marti… yes. Probably so. See my other post about the ‘plan’ apparently being to just try to get ‘in position’ to be in FRONT of Kevin ( DC10 910 ) as he came into the area from the SOUTH and be ready to just ‘angle in front of him’ for a quick ‘show me’ as soon as he entered the area.
This ‘jockeying for position’ while waiting for Kevin to arrive on the fire and ‘acquire a visual’ on them might be the ‘practice runs’ mentioned in the B33 YIN notes.
I think, now, after going over the transcripts, they did fly the show me, but it was exactly when Jesse made the mayday, bcuz the call from Prescott (who heard Jesse’s mayday) came right while Bravo was flying over the bowl west to east.
Chilling.
So, to get out of stun mode and back to analytical mode, if Eric made any call on air to ground about “that’s where we want it,” it had to have been about an earlier flight. So that would mean the actual SEAT drop.
This timeline is a beast to pull together.
On the other hand, continuing to think out loud,
It’s possible Eric is watching the Bravo Lead Plane and VLAT 910 circling around the bowl, which is what they were doing, before the show me, at 3:47, and that’s when he Air2Grounds “that’s it that’s where we want it.” And that’s what Burfiend would have heard.
Is that impossible?
I’m thinking out loud so thanks for your patience, every one…..
Marti… the way I read that transcript in the 1630 to 1643 timeframe… my take is that when French ( Lead Plane Duty ) finally turned his attention to Kevin ( VLAT DC10 910 ) circa 1636.46 ( just 14 seconds before 1637 )… and told him to ‘come on in’ from his ‘holding pattern’ SEVEN MILES away… and said “Have I got a project for you!”… what he wanted to have happen at that point was to be ‘in position’ to do a ‘show me’ for Kevin as soon as he ‘entered the area’.
So YES… there must have been a lot of ‘circling’ going on at that moment as he waited for Kevin to ‘come on in’ and get a VISUAL on him.
We can even hear the two of them struggling to ‘acquire’ that visual as Kevin brought the DC10 in. It isn’t until Kevin says “Okay… I see your beacon” that he actually DID ‘acquire that visual’.
But now we are just seconds BEFORE Steed’s first MAYDAY.
So I guess it is ‘possible’ that as French was ‘circling around’ in anticipation of getting in FRONT of Kevin as he came in from the SOUTH… French could have been
literally ‘all over the place’ down there.
Maybe he did circle WAAAY out over that middle bowl doing some kind of ‘practice run’ to get in front of Kevin as he came in from the SOUTH… and Marsh simply just ‘saw’ French ‘jockeying for position’ as Kevin approached…
…but that still doesn’t warrant Marsh’s (unsolicited) “That’s exactly what we want!” radio call.
That ‘circling around’ to get into position to lead Kevin on a SOUTH to NORTH ‘show me’ on the far EAST side of the fire as Kevin ‘arrived’ in the area would have had nothing to do with where they actually planned to drop any retardant.
So we’re supposed to believe Marsh just saw some small plane wildly circling around up in the air down there and somehow thought that was an indication of where retardant was going to be dropped?
Fer cryin’ out loud.
If Marsh really was all that concerned about ‘helping’ get retardant dropped somewhere… then why isn’t there MORE radio traffic to that effect where we at least hear Marsh trying to CONFIRM where they planned on dropping ANYTHING?
Do I still confused about all this?
You damn betcha.
Typo above…
Meant to say…
Do I still SOUND confused?
You damn betcha.
And yes, I can see you may be right here:
“…but that still doesn’t warrant Marsh’s (unsolicited) “That’s exactly what we want!” radio call.”
What makes you say:
“That ‘circling around’ to get into position to lead Kevin on a SOUTH to NORTH ‘show me’ on the far EAST side of the fire”
When Burfiend says it’s a west to east “over the bowl”?
Marti… I am on a ‘learning curve’ here with all this information myself… but that is simply what it SOUNDS like is happening from the transcript(s) of the audio conversations.
Yes… something about ‘west to east’ practice is runs is mentioned in SAIT interview notes… but I am focused more at the moment on what the AUDIO captures ACTUALLY tell us about what they were REALLY doing.
Even though the ‘show me’ is long past 1637 and just moments before Steed’s first MAYDAY… French has obviously started the ‘show me’ and is explaining what he wants to Kevin in the DC10… and he uses compass headings.
French says “…and my heading starting out was three six zero and ended up about three three five’.
Flying a ‘heading’ of ‘three six zero’ means you are flying DUE NORTH.
There is no ZERO compass heading in aviation. True north is always referred to by pilots as ‘three six zero’.
So flying a heading of ‘three six zero’ for the start of the drop and ending up with a heading of ‘three three five’ means flying a due SOUTH TO NORTH flight path and then banking a little to your LEFT and ending up with a heading of 335 degrees ( sorta north/northwest ).
There are OTHER clues in that transcript such as French specifically asking the chopper that is leaving the area to fly down the WEST side of the fire to stay ‘out of the way’.
Why would he be ASKING the chopper to exit the area to the WEST if that’s where he was planning on flying with Kevin?
Nice work, WTKTT.
Another thing about this AIR ATTACK terminology.
I posted this video a few weeks ago. I don’t know if anybody watched it. It’s REALLY REALLY helpful, about the most helpful thing I’ve come across regarding how Air Attack actually works.
I think there’s a TON of CONFUSION in our discussion about Air Attack. And that’s NOT helping us figure things out or communicate accurately to whomever may be reading this.
In this really well made BLM National Incident Fire Center video, called “Firefighting Airspace (2012 Refresher),” Steve Price, Aerial Supervisor, BLM Boise District, clearly describes and illustrates how Air Attack works. Then, at 6:16, he clearly describes how the Aerial Supervision Module, i.e. BRAVO, works, and, then, how the communications system is organized.
The pilot of the plane (i.e. for Bravo 33 at Yarnell being FRENCH, not Burfiend) functions as a lead plane pilot, and communicates primarily over Air-to-Air with the other pilots. That is his job. That’s why I’m saying to you, WTKTT, that you are incorrect in ascribing that voice/role to Burfiend.
The not-pilot of the plane (i.e. for Bravo 33 at Yarnell being BURFIEND, not French) functions as Air Attack, and communicates primarily over Air-to-Ground with the crews and overhead and whoever else on the ground. Again, WTKTT, when you say that, in the interview, it’s French speaking, that, also, is not accurate.
When one needs to let the other know something, they tell each other. French, as overheard in the Air Study videos, was functioning as lead plane, and being heard in the videos, communicating over air-to-air. He didn’t hear the Steed Mayday. He was trying to line up the VLAT T910 drop, a challenging job in itself, all things considered. How that Prescott notification got picked up in that video I have no idea. I don’t think French probably even heard it.
Burfiend is the one speaking in the interview. He’s the one who would have been busy doing other things when Steed did his Air to Ground “MayDay.” He’s the one who would have been in communication with Div A. I’m guessing he would have heard the Prescott call. Probly about the same time OPS got his attention, also. He’s the one who would have told French, we’ve got a problem on the ground, at which point French notified T910 of the problem and told him to go on standby.
In order to even begin to accurately understand what we are seeing/hearing in these videos, and what we are reading in these reports, interviews, etc., we really need to clear up our confusion about this stuff.
Here’s the link:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9fjF2KQ75TY&index=147&list=PLTErVrHH6uJja-ljtn7z9Q5Sz9WtCPGw1
Also, since I’ve spent the morning reading all your Air Study posts, WTKTT, yes that 4:16/4:18 T-911 pair of videos was a split-drop in which, as the list indicates, the first drop was “at” 1615 and the second was “at” 1617. So, as unbelievable as it may sound, those two drops came two minutes apart.
And thanks for all the heavy lifting you did getting those videos transcribed and analyzed. It wasn’t until I stumbled across that Firefighting Airspace video, that my own confusion started lifting enough for me to even begin to comprehend what we are encountering. Because it really is……..CONFUSING!
And now that I just wrote all that, it also means that whether or not that 4:37 Marsh communication with BURFIEND happened, it WOULDN’T have shown up on the Air Study video, because it wasn’t Air-to-Air. And it wasn’t with FRENCH, who wasn’t AIR ATTACK.
So the only way it will emerge is if it’s via a video that has Air to Ground at that time overheard, or if someone who was listening, as you have said WTKTT, that VERY MUCH listened to Air to Ground frequency overheard it and would like to speak up about that somewhere sometime somehow.
Burfiend’s a pretty awesome guy. I don’t think he would be making something up. I think both of them were doing a SPECTACULAR job, all things considered. Including the fact that they were left clueless about what was happening in the midst of total chaos and had to figure out a whole lot of things on the fly.
Marti as you explained above you rang a bell.
The that’s exactly were we want it came fro the Air attack boss telling the lead plane he was right on.
some times no one answers as he was expecting to hear that or hear he was not in the right place.
Happens all the time between lead and air.
I am saying it never was Marsh.
If it was not Air Attack
It would have been some one close to the drop zone talking on air to ground. have to figure this out. Maybe one of the OPS.
I am still betting it was not Marsh.
If there was to much smoke he may have heard the Plains but never would have seen them. I am in agreement with WTKTT that the smoke was to thick to see the plains at that time. Marsh would have wanted a drop on his head and the crews at that point not dropping on the flames would not even slow that fire down.
I think I’m agreeing with you here. I kind of put this idea out, trying to wrestle the timeline together, this being the last straw.
Watching the Air Study Video of the VLAT split drop some 20 minutes earlier, I could see Bravo33 flying and leading the VLAT 911, but only just barely. And that’s when they were both coming down much lower to actually do the drops.
I think if Eric was watching when Bravo 33 did the practice run from west to east over the bowl, he might have been able to see it, if the smoke wasn’t too thick, or maybe hear it. But, unfortunately, that didn’t happen until 4:39 while Steed was making his mayday call and, alas, it was too late for any meaningful signal from Eric saying “yes that’s where we want it.”
So since I don’t think Burfiend made that up, and he’s saying it happened while they were flying “show me” from west to east over the bowl, in the midst of all that smoke and whatever (which they WERE IN FACT DOING over on the other side of the fire before they came to this side), the only thing I can think of is that somebody else must have said that. It’s really a stumper.
Thanks Bob for helping me think this through!
And if Eric, or anybody else, had said it over AirToGround, at 4:39, while Bravo 33 was flying (I think, but I could be wrong) a “show me” from west to east over the bowl, everybody that was listening to Air to Ground then, which included a WHOLE LOT OF PEOPLE (including us watching/listening to the “Last Minutes” video, would have heard it, also
So at this point, I, personally admit I can’t figure this one out, based on the data we currently have, and am willing to admit defeat, given that I’m not all that sure what difference it ultimately makes in the general scheme of things, anyway.
At this time, “Air Attack” was Burfiend, sitting in Bravo 33 with French, who was flying as Lead Plane. It was fully functioning as an Air Support Module, with both Lead Plane and Air Attack bundled into one vehicle. So what you are saying here doesn’t work.
Reply to Marti Reed post on May 9, 2014 at 11:50 am
>> Marti said…
>> Because it really is……..CONFUSING!
Yes… it is… and the SAIT interview notes with Bravo 33 are
really such a MESS that it just compounds things.
For example…
>> Marti also said…
>> Burfiend is the one speaking in the interview.
No… not exclusively. There are ‘quotes’ in these interview
notes from BOTH of them… but since it is all written as
‘first person perspective’ it is NEVER clear in those SAIT
interview notes ( at any particular moment ) WHO is really
being ‘quoted’ ( Burfiend or French ).
The SAIT interview notes with Bravo 33 contain specific
references for BOTH Burfiend AND French being the ones
‘quoted’… but it keeps CHANGING.
Examples from the YIN interview notes…
( See if you can ‘follow the bouncing ball’ here as to
who is suddenly ‘speaking’ to the SAIT interviewers )…
________________________________________________
Paragraph 4…
I knew there was 2 structural groups. I wrote down 2.
Tom said “hey dude, you are the air attack”.
Paragraph 13…
I was talking to Tom about the rising terrain on exit.
Paragraph 17…
I told Tom “lets fly something further down”.
Same Paragraph (17)… but only 8 sentences later…
I looked at John and he did this (slash across the throat).
I told Kevin to stand by copy, taking it around.
Same Paragraph (17)… just 4 sentences later…
At first KA wanted to get the bucket but John said “no,
we need to find these guys”.
Last paragraph…
Because of the attitude, I was working hard trying to
stay 3 drops in front of Tom.
_______________________________________________
So not only is the TIME all distorted in this ‘interview’ with
them jumping back and forth all over the place…
…one moment it is (apparently) Burfiend speaking in the
‘first person’… then suddenly it’s French speaking in the
‘first person’… then it’s (apparently) back to Burfiend again.
I could almost understand them ‘splitting’ the interview notes into ‘top-half’ and ‘bottom-half’ with one or the other being
French or Burfiend then speaking from the first-person…
…but there’s no indication that’s what they were doing, either. It’s all just a jumbled MESS.
By the way…
There were THREE people in that airplane.
SAIT INTERVIEW WITH BRAVO 33 – July 9, 2013 – 1700
Interviewees: Bravo 33
John Burfiend-ATS Specialist
Clint Clauson – ATS Trainee
Thomas French – AT Specialist
What RADIO CHANNEL does anyone think the 3rd guy
in the plane ( Clauson ) was ‘listening to’ that day?
Since he is listed as an ATS Trainee… and French is
only listed as an ‘AT’… does that automatically mean
this mysterious Clauson guy was only interested in
what Burfiend ( ATS Specialist ) was doing… and so
was only listening to ‘Air-To-Ground’ like Burfiend?
If that is the case… then that means this Clauson guy
would have heard EVERYTHING Burfiend did… including
this (supposed) “That’s what we want” transmission from
DIVSA Eric Marsh.
But ( apparently ) even though the SAIT had this Clauson
guy sitting right there in the interview… they never asked
him anything and he is (apparently?) not quoted anywhere
in that interview. Very strange.
Also… now that I have re-read the SAIT Bravo 33 notes
to grab the ‘follow the bouncing ball’ quotes… I just realized
that this Bravo 33 interview ALSO proves without a
shadow of a doubt that OPS1 Todd Abel was ‘fully engaged’
with Bravo 33 throughout the entire ‘swtich to the south
side of the fire’ Air Operations shift… and right on up
through the deployment.
There are quotes in the B33 YIN interview which indicate
OPS1 Todd Abel was VERY ‘focused’ on the Air-To-Ground
channel and conversing directly with Burfiend right up
to Steed’s first MAYDAY call ( and beyond ).
So that means if Eric Marsh really did suddenly come
onto the Air-To-Ground channel at 1637 with his
( unsolicited ) “That’s what we want” transmission…
…that OPS Todd Abel MUST have heard it right along
with Burfiend ( and the Clauson guy )… along with ALL
the other people who were no-doubt listening to that
‘popular’ Air-To-Ground channel.
But NOWHERE in ANY of his interviews with two separate
investigations does Todd Abel say he ever heard any
such transmission.
It really is important to figure this out.
Not only because the SAIT chose to label this one single
‘transmission’ as ‘totally verified’ and THEN use it as the
defacto ‘end’ of the (supposed) ‘verifiable communications’
blackout period…
…but also because it’s simply important to KNOW if
DIVSA Eric Marsh ever really did say any such thing.
So….. I’ve spent the day downloading and watching and trying to learn from the videos. And trying to be unbiased about it. And still struggling with that Marsh call that Burfiend (who I really respect) notes. And being seriously impressed by French’s behavior, even tho you diss him for the chuckles. I see him as doing a really good job of a really complicated task and the chuckles are to support the pilots, and I think they’re doing a better and more professional job than a whole bunch of other people on that clusterf*ck fiasco of a fire.
But reading what you are writing here, and yeah. The SAIT was a joke. Not an investigation. This is totally unprofessional. But I don’t blame Burfiend and French for it.
I sit here thinking maybe sometime I should head down to Silver City to have a conversation. If I can find the time. Which I maybe can’t. All things considered. Hopefully whoever is in charge of the lawsuits will.
Reply to calvin post on May 8, 2014 at 3:08 am
>> calvin said…
>>
>> Div A tells Rory Collins the other crew is in the black and they were
>> headed back to the rigs.
>>
>> Questions.
>> 1. What other crew? Is he referring to a squad of GMH? No?
>> 2. Who is the “They”, that were headed back to the rigs??
>> 3. Does this indicate that Marsh was not in the black circa 1530?
calvin… I knew you were going to ‘catch’ that.
This statement from Air Attack Rory Collins has always been there ( in his SAIT interview notes ) and has always been sort of just laying there like a turd on the table.
It’s never really been fully discussed.
The elusive Mr. Collins was (apparently) NEVER interviewed by ADOSH but it was not for lack of them trying to.
Once again… here is that ‘cut’ from the SAIT investigators’ NOTES from their ( apparent ) interview with Air Attack Rory Collins…
_________________________________________________________________
** SAIT interview with Rory Collins…
Air Attack – LDF – Roseburg
Interview took place at 11:00 a.m. 7/13/2013
Interviewers: Rocha, Kurth, Mike Dudley, Jim Karels.
15:30 Experienced wind shift and the flank turned and became the
head going SOUTH to Yarnell. I let B(?) know prior to the shift to
move to that side and start drops.
15:30 – 15:45 The fire was headed for Yarnell moving FAST to the SOUTH.
They were getting retardant drops. Contacted Division A to tell them of fire
condition and that they needed to move their rigs to a better location.
Q: Did he say he was in good black?
A: NO, he said the other crew was in a good location in the black and
they were headed back to the rigs.
__________________________________________________________________
As for your questions…
>> 1. What other crew? Is he referring to a squad of GMH? No?
It’s hard to tell… but the way I have always read that confusing note from the SAIT investigator(s) is that Marsh might have been referring to ‘Blue Ridge’ as the ‘other crew’ ( or specifically Frisby and Brendan in the UTV ) and that ‘they’ were ‘headed back to the rigs’ ( Even though the ‘in the black’ part of that statement would then make no sense at all ).
>> 2. Who is the “They”, that were headed back to the rigs??
See above. My mind wants to say it was a reference to Blue Ridge ( or just Frisby and Brendan ) since they really were ‘headed back to the rigs’ at that time… but is it possible that at that moment Marsh talked to Collins Marsh really did think there was time for Granite Mountain to ‘head back to the rigs’?
Is it possible that was the ‘plan’ that Marsh actually was referring to in other documented conversations around this time?
>> 3. Does this indicate that Marsh was not in the black circa 1530?
If Marsh was actually on the VERY top of the ‘Weaver Mountains’… then yes… I don’t think it can be said that he was technically ‘in the black’ at that point. Even now… with Google Maps defaulting to post-fire imagery, there are places up there where Marsh could have been that never really burned at all.
These aren’t the *only* notes from the SAIT’s (supposed) interview with Rory Collins that are totally mystifying and unexplained.
That entire SAIT Investigation Notes page for Collins’ interview is basically a joke.
ADOSH tried and tried to interview the elusive Mr. Collins… but (apparently) never succeeded since there is NOTHING in the ADOSH FOIA/FOIL documentation package that represents either an in-person or a telephone interview with ATGS / ASM1 / Rory Collins.
Strangely enough, however… the ADOSH contracted WFAR report makes DIRECT references to ‘our interview with ATGS / ASM1 / Rory Collins’…
Example 1… page 37 of WFAR.
NOTE: This is where the WFAR is using the known incident of Rory Collins dropping retardant on Marsh’s (planned) burnouts as an example of the MANY ‘mis-communications’ that were happening on that fire pretty much all day long. The WFAR specifically says that it interviewed ATGS / ASM1 / Rory Collins about this and it is QUOTING him…
_________________________________________________________________
A good example of the lack of communication from the briefing that occurred on June 30 was the test fire that GMIHC was igniting. During the morning at the top of the ridge, GMIHC was planning to burnout a small section of line to create the fire perimeter down to a two-track road. While they were igniting the test fire, two SEAT retardant drops extinguished their test fire between 1130 and 1145. The Air Tactical Group Supervisor (ATGS) did not know the purpose of the burning and dropped retardant on it, forcing GMIHC to go to direct attack on the fires perimeter. Planning OSC failed to inform ATGS of the tactics for the fire. During our interview with the ATGS on ASM1, he stated that they did not have a firm understanding of where the division breaks were. He stated that they could see the dozer, but did not understand its mission. The dozer was constructing a contingency line from west to east, which when complete, would allow a firing operation to be conducted when conditions were favorable. If ATGS had known this, they could have reinforced the dozer line with retardant instead of picking a location just to the north.
__________________________________________________________________
Again… there is NO DOCUMENTATION in the ADOSH FOIA/FOIL package that supports these statements in the WFAR report, or establishes ( for sure and certain ) that ADOSH ( or anyone associated with WFA ) was able to ever interview Rory Collins.
There are specific memos in the ADOSH ’emails and correspondence’ part of the FOIA/FOIL release that show ADOSH reminding the Wildland Firefighting Associates contractors that NO INTERVIEWS could take place WITHOUT an ADOSH representative present, so it is unlikely that WFA ever interviewed Collins on their own and that might be why the transcript of such and interview never made it into the ADOSH FOIA/FOIL release.
It’s still a BIG MYSTERY.
ATGS / ASM1 / Rory Collins was/is a KEY PLAYER in what was happening on the Yarnell Hill Fire on BOTH Saturday AND Sunday…
…but he still really doesn’t seem to have been properly interviewed
by any competent investigator(s).
More on this later…
I am confused. Rory Collins was not ASM1, right? ASM1 (Bravo33) was Lenmark, Wartis, right?
You’re correct. The SAIR is not.
This whole air support organization/terminology thing has been some of the most mind-boggling and confusing stuff I’ve been struggling to understand this whole time. Apparently the SAIT didn’t understand it either!
The only two small plains should have been.
Air Attack Boss– Ground to air coordination.
Lead Plane—-Takes orders from Air Attack and leads the Air tankers thru the drops. also may make first run to set up drop and show where to drop.
Some times Air Attack can also serve as Lead plane as needed.
Normally the lead plane is a 1 person contract or employee Pilot, who is dispatched with the Air Tankers. Clear as mud right.
Also the call numbers B33 would have been the numbers on the Plane unless they were assigned call numbers. ASM1 is there working ID. but not use normally as a call sign.
Exactly. (See my post above with the video that explains this stuff).
I think a big part of the confusion is the shifting relationships with Rory Collins being Air Attack when he’s there and Bravo 3 or 33 being Lead Plane, and Bravo 3 or 33 being both Air Attack and Lead Plane when he isn’t.
We-who-are-not-familiar-with-this-stuff are getting really confused by the way we’re encountering it. And it doesn’t help that both SAIT and ADOSH inaccurately communicate it, also. It just gets bewildering.
But I think I’m getting a WHOLE lot clearer about it.
And to make matters worse ( but still
something that is totally relevant to
figuring out what happened THAT
DAY in Yarnell )…
What is the damn ‘procedure’ for ‘notifying OPS and/or ground forces’ when these guys are playing “musical AA, ATGS, LP” all day up above them?
Is there no ‘procedure’ at ALL for this?
One minute you are pressing your microphone button on Channel 10 and/or 16 and you are talking to one guy… and seconds later you can press the microphone button again and you are now talking to a completely different guy who MAY or MAY NOT now even know who the hell YOU are? ( Depending on whether the changeover was piss-poor Collins style or not? )
When ( and HOW? ) were even OPS people like Abel or Musser even being ‘officially notified’ that these guys were changing jobs like tag-team wrestlers up above them that day?
I am not hearing ANYTHING that resembles ‘notifications’ about any of this in ANY of the captured radio traffic from that day.
Is that NORMAL?
WOW.
Elizabeth has been chastised a few times in the past for multiple accusations against several different people who have posted here, that they were all actually one person, using different names. Myself, WTKTT, RTS, RS, Fire20+, and probably some others are included in that group. Despite the chastizing, she has continued to accuse others of this, without a shread of evidence
There is a recent on-going discussion down below, where she once again accused SEVERAL posters of being one person. She was called-out by several people, who said she owed RTS an apology.
She out-snarked everyone with her ridiculous response, stating she would apologize, ‘if only it weren’t true’.
I then called her out again, myself, and since the only person I actually know here IS myself, and I’M NOT WTKTT as she has alleged, I told her that at the very least she owed WTKTT and myself an apology, and if she didn’t, I was done with her, period.
FINALLY, she has revealed what stellar investigative skills she used to expose us all to the light of day.
Elizabeth on May 8, 2014 at 1:48 pm said:
TTWARE, as you might recall, it was “Observer” and I who both noticed the same thing a while ago. Specifically, when a question was asked of YOU, it was WTKTT who replies. Presumably that means that you and he are the same person or are speaking for each other? Or am I missing something?
Sorry Elizabeth, but it was ‘Observer’ who ran with the BULLSHIT that you had previously put out there, quite some time prior. The same WORTHLESS SHIT you have also been repeating about others. AND NOW, in your comment above, we are able to see your stellar investigative skills in action, ALONG WITH YOUR SOUND EVIDENCE.
What’s even more amazing is your obsession with this SHIT, and the fact that you continually put it out there like it’s VERY IMPORTANT, apparently to somehow denegrate the targets.
What you haven’t been able to grasp due to your obsession, is that it doesn’t matter one whit in the grand scheme of things, if someone WERE posting with a hundred different names. IT’S JUST INFORMATION, TO ALWAYS TAKE WITH A GRAIN OF SALT!
In case you haven’t noticed during your obsession, WTKTT POSTS TO EVERYTHING, no matter who the post was directed to. THERE’S NOTHING WRONG WITH THAT, AND I AM NOT HIM!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
As I said in my comment down below, which I posted above your comment copied above, since you choose not to apologize to WTKTT and myself, I am done with you, PERMANENTLY. I hope others on here follow-suit, as well!
Agree. I’m ready for a boycott.
I’ve been trying to take Elizabeth seriously about the weather. But I’m feeling used. And I just don’t have the time or energy. She hasn’t returned the favor. She hasn’t added anything. That doesn’t bother me personally, because I was genuinely interested in the weather at this point, anyway.
There are a number of people here who, I believe, have genuinely given of their time and energy to pick apart the evidence we can find in our own various ways, and share what we find, and question each other, in a relatively respectful way, in order to drill down into this whole mess, in order to discern the truth. I include you in that. And WTK, whose intense work has been so helpful so often, even when I’ve sometimes thought, OK you may be pushing too far….. And Calvin, who just keeps asking hard and challenging questions that I hadn’t even thought of…….. And Bob Powers, with so much hard-learned experience……. And Mike in his honesty…. And SR who sometimes aggravates people but I also think knows way more than he sometimes lets onto…
I hate to say this, Elizabeth, but I don’t trust you. I wish I could. Sometimes it seems like you are really trying to figure things out, and sometimes it seems like you are baiting and switching and using us all. And I don’t know why. We are not here……for your purposes.
And this whole current deal about who is who that you are pushing relentlessly, is pretty much the last straw with me. I refuse to play those kind of games. And I refuse to play with people who do.
Than You Marti what else can I say. Bring us back on subject. I have no problem with those that wish to stay anonymous. I have no reason to and I guess that just me I have always owned every thing I have said win lose or draw.
I’m like you. I’m pretty much “out there” on the Internet. My Facebook says who I am. My Twitter says who I am. My Flickr says who I am. If I ever finally get my website back up, it will, again, say who I am.
On the other hand, there are things I don’t say on the Internet. Because I’m “out there.”
I was once under investigation by the FBI. Not because of what I did, but because of what I knew. It was the most terrifying experience of my life. I had to rethink everybody in my life, as to exactly who they were, and exactly how much I trusted their judgement. I had to re-think TRUST.
And that is why I don’t expect anybody to ipso facto say who they are on the Internet. I am totally fine with Internet anonymity. it’s everybody’s right. I’m totally fine with it.
And I have had absolutely no problem distinguishing people in this forum. I have been perfectly capable of distinguishing the various voices here. I can’t even fathom anybody conflating TTWARE with WTKTT. Or RTS with SR.
This whole thing has been a huge waste of time and energy, IMHO.
Not long ago someone perused that Elizabeth is writing a book about this and using this forum to gather data. At the time I thought that was very far-fetched. Since then, considering how her posts have been worded, it certainly sounds like she might be gathering data for a book and using all of us to do the investigative leg-work.
Well if she writes a book from what she says and what we say its going to go around in circles.
OK I’m going to bare my soul here, after what I just wrote in response to Bob Powers.
Because I think this is a great time to just get real. As I just told my 94-year-old mom over the telephone, we’re ten months into this fiasco and we can still not figure out why they did what they did.
At one time, I thought I admired Elizabeth. I thought she was really concerned about and trying to gather information needed by the families in their quest to know the truth.
This was about the time I decided I was trying “to work” for Amanda Marsh, whether she ever knew it or not, because, at that time I was so seriously seeing how the Prescott Fire Department (as I wrote, “Here’s looking at you Daryll Willis”) was with-holding evidence, about a) the options conversation and what possible pressure was possibly being applied onto the crew, and b) the cellphones and gps units that have never surfaced. To be honest, I’m still asking those questions. That’s my “tin-foil hat conspiracy theory” and today I’ll proudly continue to stand by it. I still don’t know if “overhead” managed to screw over Eric Marsh (with all his foibles and strengths) and his crew or not.
However, as things progressed, even as I announced my retirement, but still kept reading this every day, and thinking every day, I found myself thinking, “Ya know, if I was looking to hire an investigative lawyer to drill down to the bottom of this whole affair, the last one I would hire would be Elizabeth, because of her lack of open-mindedness and, thus, her obtuseness.” Kind of the opposite of Sherlock Holmes.
And now I have to say, in response to your post, the last person I would hire to write a book about this is Elizabeth, because of her lack of respect for her sources. The best writers respect their sources. Which, in this case, Elizabeth hasn’t done. Not to mention her complete inability to communicate herself out of a paper bag. As we have, exasperatingly, all experienced.
Honestly, I have no idea why she is continuing to be here.
Elizabeth, exactly and honestly, why is it that you continue to invest yourself in being here, again?? I truly and honestly would like to know.
One doesn’t have to be hired to write a book. Anyone can do that, and then just peddle the manuscript.
Marti. I totally disagree with you regarding Elizabeth.
Elizabeth has been in this conversation starting September 2013.She has put herself out there. She has secured a lot of the information we have to review. I realize fireman20 (or whom ever) says anyone can request records through the FOIA/FOIL (and that may be true) BUT, no one else has done this (and then shared the records publicly) except ELIZABETH, DOUGHERTY, and GABBERT.
Marti. I am not asking you to agree with everything Elizabeth does or says. But I am asking you to weigh the positive effects Elizabeth has brought to IM and the Yarnell incident before making personal attacks against her.
We all have different backgrounds which makes this discussion interesting and (IMHO) helps explore different angles that may have been overlooked.
I really value and appreciate what you are saying here. And that’s because I really respect and trust your voice here.
In general I mostly avoid making negative comments about other people. I really do. And I’ve mostly done that here. Because I agree with you that various voices, even when I disagree with something they say, are REALLY REALLY valuable.
My beef has to do with two things.
1. I feel that in a number of instances, from recently to back aways, she has been perfectly comfortable interrogating us without expressing any genuine respect for us, or responding to our questions of her. I’ve personally experienced that, and I’ve seen her do that to others.
2. Trashing/distorting other peoples’ identities. This whole thing has been really disturbing to me, and genuinely hurtful to others. I can’t fathom any need to do that and it damages her credibility and I have no idea why she has continued to do it.
I appreciate the many things she has positively offered, but I am no longer willing to just sit back and be OK with the damage she has done.
I just don’t trust her any more.
Reply to SR post on May 8, 2014 at 6:31 am
>> SR said…
>> I hadn’t known about the McDonough statements as regards what Marsh,
>> Steed and he knew and discussed about the weather. I think it’s glaringly
>> clear that they did know that a full 180 windshift, complete with 50 mph
>> gusts, was coming.
Of course it is.
It was ALREADY HAPPENING even by the time Byron Kimball got around
to forwarding the official NWS and SWCC spot forecast over the radio
at 1530. Just moments later… it was so OBVIOUSLY happening that that
is what threatened Brendan McDonough’s safety and was forcing him to
abandon his lookout position circa 1536 or 1537 ( and to have all of those
radio conversations with Steed/Marsh about why he had to leave ).
In the course of just 5 minutes… Marsh thought it was ‘safe’ to ask Brian Frisby to schlep all the way out to the ridge just to have some kind of ‘secret’ conversation that Marsh (somehow) didn’t feel comfortable having over open radio… then moments later ( while Frisby is only halfway out there ) the fireline up right near them has REVERSED DIRECTION and is now threatening Brendan’s life.
So even if Marsh didn’t realize the predicted 180 FULL WIND REVERSAL was just about to happen when he called Frisby out to meet with him… he certainly realized it just minutes later when his own 20th man’s life is now in danger and Frisby himself realized it was ‘too dangerous’ to even still try to fulfill the request for the face-to-face with Marsh… and CALLED OFF THE MEETING for that very reason.
There is actually plenty of ‘other’ evidence that Marsh and Steed were FULLY aware of ( and EXPECTING ) the FULL 180 degreee wind shift such as other statements Brendan ( and others ) have made in public interviews and press
conferences following the incident.
Here’s just another ‘sampling’ of those statements…
__________________________________________________________________
** From the Kyle Dickman ( former Hotshot ) article entitled…
** “19: The True Story of the Yarnell Hill Fire” published September 17, 2013,
** and completely based on face-to-face interviews with Brendan McDonough…
NOTE: This matches Brendan’s ADOSH testimony where Brendan says it was
Steed himself who now reporting the predicted 180 degree wind shift and 50-60
mile per hour wind gusts to HIM, over the radio…
Donut was less than a minute into slinging his 4 P.M. weather when Steed
came back over the radio.
“Donut, you up?”
“Go, Steed.”
“They’re calling for a 180-degree wind shift and gusts of up to 60 miles per hour out of the northeast.”
“Copy that.”
He looked up at the approaching wall of flames and blinked. For the first time that afternoon, the wind was blowing at his face instead of his back. The flank that had been slowly backing down the valley had suddenly jumped to life. Two-foot flames had grown to twelve, and within moments the fire was running up a ridge on the east side of the valley and then south, directly at Donut.
“Steed, Donut. It hit my trigger point.” The fire had crossed the drainage on the valley floor only a quarter of a mile away. “I’m bumping back to the dozer push.”
“Alright, let me know when you get there. We’ve got eyes on you.”
Donut tossed on his pack and grabbed his gear as he started wading down
through the brush field and boulders toward the safety of the clearing the
bulldozer had created that morning
__________________________________________________________________
** From Brendan McDonough’s exclusive ABC news interview with
** Brian Ross, August 7, 2013
“Everything seemed normal, not threatening. Just — a typical day, going direct
on a fire,” he ( Brendan McDonough ) told ABC News.
Around 4:00 in the afternoon, however, everything changed. The winds that had
been driving the fire away from the Hotshots began to turn 180 degrees, propelled
by what some fire officials call a “perfect storm” of gusts up to 50 miles per hour.
Instead of moving NORTH, it started moving SOUTH as the flame front leapt
from 25 to 50 feet high.
McDonough says the team could now see what was happening — contradicting
some accounts that they were unaware the fire was heading toward them.
“From where they were, they could see it picking up. So they kind of relayed to
me, ‘Hey, Donut, we got eyes on it,'” McDonough remembers his captain telling
him. “They said, ‘If you need to get out of there, go ahead and get out of there…
we want you to be safe too,’ you know?”
__________________________________________________________________
** From Darrell Willis’ press conference at the deployment site, July 23, 2013…
( Question From A Reporter ) : Is there a confirmation that they did receive…
uh… information concerning the outflows from the thunderstorms?
( Darell Willis ): Yes. There is confirmation of that.
There’s no question about it.
They saw that the… uh… fire activity was picking up. There was a line of fire
from the ridge top… beyond where they where down lower into the valley
probly a mile or two… mile and a half line of.. uh.. fire… and it’s chaparral
that started to move to the SOUTH.
__________________________________________________________________
>> SR also wrote…
>>
>> It is convenient for those claiming that everything at YHF was perfectly
>> reasonable that, hey, the wind shifted, and no one could see further shifts
>> coming. Crazy outflow boundary, something you couldn’t see and that no
>> one had heard of. Almost as if GM got hit by an asteroid — tragic, but
>> nothing anyone could have done anything to prevent. Of course, that is
>> all completely nonfactual.
Some people never let the FACTS get in the way. It’s just annoying to them.
Something that needs to be remembered here is what any lawyer knows, and
that is what the real ‘legal’ *definition* of NEGLIGENCE is… and how lawyers
go about either proving it… or DEFENDING AGAINST IT, in open court.
Here is the ACTUAL (legal) definition of NEGLIGENCE…
_________________________________________________________________
1) Failure to exercise the care that a reasonably prudent person would
exercise in like circumstances.
2) Lack of normal care or attention
_________________________________________________________________
Two IMPORTANT things to notice about the ‘definition(s)’…
“reasonably prudent person” AND “normal care or attention”.
What lawyers will ALWAYS do to DEFEND against accusations of NEGLIGENCE
is to FIRST simply try to establish that ‘anybody else’ ( Sic: reasonably prudent
person ) would have probably ‘done the same thing’ AND/OR that nothing
regarding the circumstances surrounding the decision making was really
‘out of the normal’ at all.
Sounds close to some recent posts here, doesn’t it?
Don’t forget that Elizabeth is also the one who has now stated at least FOUR
or FIVE times on this public discussion thread that there was ‘nothing out of
the ordinary’ with regards to the piss-poor handoff that Air Attack Rory Collins
had with Bravo 33 before he abruptly left the fire at 1558… EVEN THOUGH
there is signed testimony from Bravo 33 themselves about what a ‘strange
handoff’ Collins performed that day and their own testimony about how
absolutely CLUELESS they were following that piss-poor handoff.
She continues to maintain that it was ‘nothing out of the ordinary’ and that
the next handoff later on was ‘just as quick’. ( I.E. – establish ‘normalcy’ ).
What a lawyer often hopes to establish when trying to defend against
NEGLIGENCE is this exact ‘establishment of normalcy’ and/or ‘establishment
of a pattern of decision making or behavior’ that doesn’t lead to ‘bad outcomes’
which can then be construed as ‘reasonably prudent behavior’… hence…
NO NEGLIGENCE.
Sometimes… it even WORKS.
So…… I’ve just spent 45 minutes trying to get to the weather documents via both Dougherty’s live links and the ones you have to copy and paste and EVERYTHING is landing on a page with a message that says: “Disabled link
Access to this link has been disabled. Please ask the owner of the shared link to send a new link to access the file or the folder.”
Could somebody else please try this and tell me if they’re getting it, too, or am I doing something wrong>
Thanks!
I’m not technical in that way, but the AZ site with the sport forecasts is still up, http://azsf.gov/system/files/documents/files/Spot%20Weather%20Forecast%20063013.0945.pdf .
You could still pull the historic Stanton RAWS data from somewhere, for sure.
But as great that it is that you are looking to do this, since all the data, radar, forecasts, etc. seem to align with contemporaneous accounts, I don’t think there’s any legit question as regards the weather.
Spot forecasts, not sport…
The weather forecast was in documents of the SAIT
if I am not mistaken???
Yes. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qwIB9RQY3zE There are all sorts of other sources, such as this blending of Flagstaff Doppler images. I can’t access from where I am, but for a weather-lite view, people can even go to something like Weather Underground and check the Alamanac for Flagstaff for 6/30/13 just to see that it more or less corresponds to other accounts.
The real story here is that a couple posters are simply floating the proposition that Marsh relied on some unique and personal definition of weather and of the weather forecast he had just heard, and reasonably so, and/or that weather associated with thunderstorms is unheard of in AZ and couldn’t have been expected…even if the forecasts of that weather had been received and were correct.
Sorry, WU for Prescott, not Flagstaff.
Amidst all this sound and fury it seems the GM overhead misread something – weather, fire etc. Even if there was an order (which at the present time appears to be the triumph of hope over facts), Marsh must have misread something in order to comply with it. Otherwise, if he complied knowing how dangerous it was, well I certainly hope that was not the case. He not only had a right, but a responsibility, to turn down an unsafe order. He was responsible for his crew. And if he knew it was unsafe, but relied on the promise of a retardant drop, many WFF have already indicated that would have been firefighting malpractice.
It seems too much effort is going into making sense of Marsh’s decision, when in the end I believe it will not make sense.
Hah! That video is a true brain-challenger!!! I like the sound of the wind and the birds chirping!
But yes.
It definitely shows what a thunderstorm bearing down on a fire that’s burning in high-risk fuels can do. Is it unique? No. Is it radical? Depends on one’s definition. Is it why Chuck Maxwell, the SWCC Meteorologist, was agonizing in Albuquerque about whether to get more pro-active about strategy? You betcha!
Well, I was finally able to access the files, by turning on my Dropbox account and downloading them to there. Spent the day reading and re-reading the weather stuff, and then had turned to the Google for more, then a storm hit and blew out my power. But yay Safari remembers….
So now I know what was reported by whom and when. And now I know what the radar images and the satellite images look like. And I can see how easy it would be for someone like Elizabeth, who doesn’t know how to interpret this stuff, to get bogged down.
And there was an article in USA Today on October 13 (am looking at it on my computer but can’t provide the link cuz I’m typing on my iPad cuz of the storm), that speculated that Granite Mtn may have misinterpreted what they were seeing, thinking that the wind-shift the forecast predicted had peaked when Brendan had to be evacuated, and that they could hence proceed. Thus missing the fact that it hadn’t and the worst was yet to come.
It goes on to say, “But the stronger winds — the outflow boundary from the thunderstorm — moved across the area about 40 minutes later. By then, the crew was in a position it could not escape.”
I actually don’t believe it. What I see in what I’ve seen is more along the lines of what Bob Powers described a few miles down below. The meta-weather cell was slowly turning in a clockwise direction and the lower winds were, also, just in a more erratic terrain-related manner. Maybe GM was fooled by that… and maybe they weren’t. I happen to think they shouldn’t have been.
The other thing Elizabeth keeps saying that I don’t get is that that line of thunderstorms was just sitting there for hours some 60 miles from the fire going nowhere and doing nothing. I haven’t seen ANYTHING that indicates that. If she is looking at the same “above the clouds” images I am (I.e.the gifs which are in fact the satellite images), they show that thunderstorm line bearing right down over the fire and engulfing it, until the pyro-cumulus column forces it’s way up above it. At least, that’s what I see.
And I’d highly recommend reading Chuck Maxwell’s report in the FireBehaviorAndWeather PDF. He was in Albuquerque, watching that whole thing unfold on radar/satellite monitors, very much in touch w/IncidentCommand, and agonizing about whether he should/should not take a more pro-active stance in terms of getting everybody off that fire NOW. Kinda like my dad (who he probably knew) praying when Overhead didn’t listen to him.
OK I’m open to questions.
OK here’s the link to the USA Today article. It’s actually pretty good in many ways, but just not quite there. Relying too much on Wade Ward?
Yarnell fire report explores role of weather:
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/10/04/yarnell-fire-report-explores-role-of-weather/2920549/
And sitting here after reading all this, and your comments, and thinking. The reason I don’t believe this theory is because they were still up above it all, seeing it all happening until 4:20-ish. And it hadn’t quit happening. And it was increasingly heading right where they were increasingly going.
I increasingly agree with WTK, when he wrote a couple of miles below, that the REALLY critical decision was the one to enter the bowl, not the one to leave the black. I think they didn’t know where the two-track actually went, or trust it, and saw the ranch right below them, and maybe were cardinally-directionally-disoriented or something? (That can actually happen even to the best of us) They must have thought they were flanking the fire and not heading right into where it was going. They absolutely should have kept a lookout above them.
WEATHER:
My view (with all due respect) is that the SAIT and Wildland Fire Associates reports do not always most accurately describe or emphasize the relevant facts as they existed between roughly 3:40-ish and 4:22-ish p.m. on June 30th in terms of what GM was likely seeing or perceiving (or mis-perceiving) or relying upon that would make GM believe that it made sense to move when they did down to the Boulder Springs Ranch. With respect to the WEATHER, this is certainly my view.
TTWARE referenced either the radar or satellite images (I cannot remember which parlance he used), and I am pretty sure that I have 30 or more of those images, which, in my view, seem to confirm my understanding of the weather as GM was seeing it or perceiving it or understanding it that day. The SAIT either did not review these images or they did not publish/release them to the media/Dougherty.
Marti seems to suggest below that she views the radar/satellite images as irrelevant to this discussion, which suggests to me that perhaps she is instead focusing on the weather materials in the 147 pages released by the SAIT. (Hopefully everyone who is opining on the weather who does not have the WFF background that folks like Bob Powers or xxfullsailxx seem to have has at least given the 147 pages a read, to get up to speed on some of the raw materials rather than what the SAIR and other reports are saying about the raw materials. The overachievers among you have probably already pulled the *raw* NWS or other data for the past few years to confirm that not a whole lot of WFF work would get done in AZ between mid-June and the end of July if everyone stopped working and stood down in a safety zone the moment a static thunder cell appeared in the sky, even if it was 80 miles away and totally static for hours.) Either way, my tentative conclusions previously suggested remain.
I would be curious to know what those of you who disagree are pinpointing in the 147 pages or with the radar/satellite images (referenced by TTWARE) as the basis for disagreement. It is entirely possible that I am wrong about the weather and what GM was perceiving (or mis-perceiving), and, if so, it would be useful for me to understand what – other than the SAIT’s conclusions – form the basis for disagreement, so that I can do more research and hopefully come to a more accurate conclusion, assuming mine is inaccurate.
Uhh…as WTKTT very helpful laid out, Steed and Marsh heard the forecast and discussed it among themselves, including the fact that S/SW winds would shift 180 to N/NE. They could see the storm front. The forecast weather appeared. Marsh noted squirelly winds.
What possibly remains unclear to you.
SR, if you honestly fail to see the confusion, then perhaps you underestimate the complexity of weather as it pertains to (a) fire behavior and (b) fire behavior in topography of the sort that existed near Yarnell/Glen Ilah. To respond to some of your points:
1. My understanding is that there was conversation AFTER the 3:26/3:30 p.m. forecast about whether any predicted weather changes had actually already occurred or were in the process of occurring. WTKTT seems to be ignoring this fact. If the NWS or FBAN or whatever weather-specific person indicates that the weather change predicted is either already here or has already impacted the fire, why would Marsh and Steed IGNORE this input?
2. When you say “they could see the storm front,” what storm front are you talking about? As I understand it, there had been one particular cell (or more) that had been around for multiple hours and was going NOWHERE. Marti gives a very good explanation below about how the weather in AZ this time of year can often be predicted in one way and play out in entirely another. Bob Powers himself notes that men who are experienced with wildfires and who pay attention can often see things in front of them or feel things or see things manifest in fire behavior that people who are arm-chair quarterbacking or sitting in an NWS office or on another side of the fire do not perceive.
3. “The forecast weather” (whatever that means) seems to have appeared either AFTER the men were dead or fatally compromised. The forecast weather did not CAUSE the shift in the fire that killed the men, as I understand it. So you are saying that the men got trapped and killed by “the forecast weather” (whatever you mean by that) that occurred AFTER they were trapped and likely already dead? Really? REALLY??
4. “Squirrelly winds” – Did *you* hear Marsh say such a thing? Me neither. It was either you or RTS or whomever who pointed out (correctly) that there are multiple things alleged in the SAIR/SAIT materials to have been said that people who are still living seem to indicate were NEVER said. So, it is *not* an established fact that Marsh commented on “squirrelly winds” no more than it is an established fact (as you or RTS or whomever like to allege) that Marsh had a pattern of reckless or needlessly risky/dishonest/covert/whatever behavior. That said, even if Marsh said “squirelly winds,” so what? Squirrelly winds does not equate with “a huge wind gust is about to occur and impact the fire behavior in a way that will trap and then kill you,” at least according to Bob Powers. Bob tells us – correctly, as I understand it – that FLAT air (e.g. no wind) can often be the warning sign of an impending major wind event. Then again, FLAT air (e.g. no wind) can sometimes indicate… no wind and no prospect of wind and there will be no wind for a while such that it is safe to move.
You are quick to criticize me, SR, for my alleged deficiencies in understanding weather as it pertains to fire, but, with all due respect, it appears that perhaps you also have some gaps in your knowledge. I suggest you and I work together to constructively figure out the relevant weather (as opposed to what folks have been alleging about the relevant weather).
I really don’t understand what you are saying here.
On the one hand, you say:
“1. My understanding is that there was conversation AFTER the 3:26/3:30 p.m. forecast about whether any predicted weather changes had actually already occurred or were in the process of occurring. WTKTT seems to be ignoring this fact. If the NWS or FBAN or whatever weather-specific person indicates that the weather change predicted is either already here or has already impacted the fire, why would Marsh and Steed IGNORE this input? …”
What CONVERSATION are you, AGAIN, referring to and among whom? And are you saying you are aware of NWS/FBAN/whatever indicating the predicted change (which was a half-hour prediction, but that doesn’t mean it predicted that weather event would END in a half hour, it was just the start) had already happened and was done at 4 PM??
And on the other hand, you say:
“3. “The forecast weather” (whatever that means) seems to have appeared either AFTER the men were dead or fatally compromised. The forecast weather did not CAUSE the shift in the fire that killed the men, as I understand it. So you are saying that the men got trapped and killed by “the forecast weather” (whatever you mean by that) that occurred AFTER they were trapped and likely already dead? Really? REALLY??”
What in the world are you talking about? How can you say here that the forecast weather happened after the burnover? The weather forecast was for the half an hour after 3:30. (and it was actually a spot forecast, and I’ll bet there were other forecasts/reports put out as the fire blew up, but I don’t feel like going to look for them ATM).
That doesn’t mean it ENDED a half an hour after the forecast. He was forecasting a major weather shift that was beginning at 3:30 and signified the major shift in the “winds aloft” so to speak, and wouldn’t be over until it was over, and the forecast didn’t say when it would be over. And there’s nothing I can see anywhere where anyone said ever that the forecast weather began after the crew was dead.
Do you understand what a forecast is?
Reminder: This is the forecast we are discussing:
WantsToKnowTheTruth
on May 6, 2014 at 9:36 pm said:
“Byron Kimball: Within the half-hour, (pause) EAST winds. (pause) Possibility of as high as 50 miles an hour or likely 25 (pause) definitely 25, 35 gusting 40 (pause) east / northeast within the half hour. Um… the outpoint to outflow line also ( will be ) located…”
These forecasts come from the national or state agency fire centers (Dispatch) offices relayed directly to the Fire. They are not some off the wall forecast.
Also I believe the squarely wind statement by Marsh was recorded on a video phone while taking a video of the fire. Refer back to one of WTKTT info.
Marti, you said the following: “I have not seen the 30 photographs you are referring to, but I can imagine that if they were taken from above the cloud cover, they probably aren’t particularly meaningful as to what is going on below that cloud cover.”
I took your words, Marti, to mean that you did not think the photos were, uhm, “particularly meaningful.” 🙂
Having looked at what I think you are talking about. The images I think you are talking about, if they’re the gifs that are the satellite images. It depends on what you are asking of them.
In re to what I was saying, they’re still not that meaningful, in terms of what was going on on the ground. They’re not going to tell you any more than what GM was photographing, or people were saying, on the ground, in real time.
They are, however, meaningful, in terms of meta. The big system. They show that line of thunderstorms moving southwest and dynamically interacting with the fire. Which is why I can’t understand why you keep saying that that thunderstorm/system was sitting statically 60 miles away doing nothing and going nowhere. Maybe I now take those images more seriously than you do?
And, also, Elizabeth, you haven’t answered my very serious questions.
Even though I have, in the best, most honest way I know how, tried to answer yours.
Elizabeth
Your throwing a can of worms again…..
I do not know where you are getting the stand down theory?
Fire Fighters do not stand down from Weather forecasts.
They adjust to the forecast and continue working.
making sure they are safe and following all the safety procedures.
Including LCES. The Weather Forecast that afternoon was what the people on the Fire were going by and based on our hind site it is what happened. The forecast is right there in front of you word for word. Standard Firefighting Orders #1 and #3, I do not think any body here knows exactly what GM was thinking when they moved. we do know they had NO LCES in place, No identified or scouted escape route and no personal knowledge of the BSR SZ. What worm would you like us to pick up. Your not in a court room quit acting like an Attorney trying to get a statement out of a defendant.
As a Law Enforcement Officer I was trained on Court trials and have been in the chair a lot for testimony and how questions are ask, enough said.
The stand down theory is another logical fallacy.
Elizabeth on May 8, 2014 at 6:18 am said:
“Marti seems to suggest below that she views the radar/satellite images as irrelevant to this discussion, which suggests to me that perhaps she is instead focusing on the weather materials in the 147 pages released by the SAIT.”
There is nothing I wrote that suggested that I view radar/satellite images as irrelevant. Just because I wasn’t referring to them, doesn’t mean I dismiss them.
And it was not based on the weather pages in any of the reports.
I was describing what you, in fact were asking for, i.e. what the crew was experiencing, based on the accurate forecast they had received, the photos they were taking, and what everybody else was saying, as WTKTT laid out so clearly down below, oh and also what we’ve been slowly conversing about for months.
The crew was not looking at radar/satellite images, most likely.
My father (RIP) forecasted/tracked the weather for the Albuquerque International Balloon Fiesta for 16 years. I assisted him for the last ten of them. The lives of thousands of crew depended on his expertise. They loved having him fly with them, because “he could see the winds,” as they said.
At 3:00 every morning, we packed my daughter into the back seat of the car, and headed to the National Weather Service in Albuquerque, and looked at the most current satellite, radar, and wind maps for about an hour. So we knew what, in general, was happening and was going to happen and why. But that’s not the most important thing we did.
We then drove out to the field and started flying and tracking weather balloons. Up until the 6 AM pilot briefing and then until the launch. And then my dad would keep watching what was going on through the whole launch of as many as 1000 balloons, and throughout the hours until they were all safely landed. And he kept communicating to the pilots through “the overhead” the entire time. Situational Awareness, in other words.
And if the winds aloft “in real time” based on our weather balloon observations started running over 15 mph, my dad would warn the “Overhead” that they should shut the whole thing down, because it was too dangerous. And that decision could cost the Balloon Fiesta millions of dollars. So they didn’t like hearing that. And there was absolutely nothing he could do if they decided to launch against his recommendations. Except pray nobody got killed, which sometimes they did.
There’s a dynamic relationship between radar/satellite/weather maps and “in real time” observations. What I was describing was what people “in real time” were observing, and that those observations corresponded to the forecast, which was based on radar/satellite/imagery mapped onto a weather map, and sent out as a forecast at 3:30 PM.
calvin on May 6, 2014 at 3:32 am said:
“It does appear (to me) that after Marsh tells Bravo 33, that is exactly where we want the retardant (1637?), and it wasn’t dropped,; then Marsh didn’t transmit again until he was with the crew. However, I am not convinced he was behind the crew. If so, there is no way (in my opinion) he could have saw Bravo 33 flying through the middle bowl west to east.”
I am really curious, and a bit confused, about what you are saying here. Where do you think Marsh was? And could you clarify, in more detail, why?
Marti. I am not sure exactly where Marsh was when he called Bravo33 and said that is exactly where we want the retardant. But if he was walking downslope toward the canyon floor, I do not think he would have been able to see the flight path.
Because of the short period of time between that call out and the call announcing the entrapment, we know he HAD to be close. There is a small mound between the entrapment/ deployment site and BSR that is just north of the dozered road (created to remove GM’s bodies). I think it is possible he was on that mound where he would have had more visibility.
I do not believe the GMH were only counting on their speed to outrun the fire. I do believe they were expecting retardant to be dropped on the south side of the fire. But as far as I can tell (from post burn pictures), that never happened.
Calvin hopefully to clear up some confusion.
The Lead plain B33 would have been 500 ft. or more above the terrain which would have given the people on the ground in the canyon the ability to see the plain for some distance barring any smoke. I was not there but that is my assumption. The higher the plain was the longer it would have been in view if that helps.
Calvin.
When you say “the middle bowl” are you referring to the bowl GM walked down into, or the big bowl that most of the days activities were taking place in?
I.e. I’m still not sure exactly where the drop path flight happened. And I currently have in my head WTKTT’s analysis of that flight (and I haven’t looked at the video and maybe I should), in which he was saying it shows it happening more on the east side of the smoke column, and thus questions whether Eric could have seen it.
I still think this is a pretty muddy part of the story.
calvin… I am with you. That 1637 transmission from Marsh is still quite a mystery.
See a longer post I just made up above about this and it is
really just an attempt for me to try and ‘document my continuing confusion’ about this ‘transmission’.
The *new* post above is mostly just based on that recent transcript of the USDA Air Study video that DOES, in fact, cover the time period from 1630 to 1643… and gives a CLEAR picture of *exactly* what Air Attack ( B33 ) was *actually* doing during this time… and especially what they were ( or, more importantly, were NOT ) doing at 1637.
I am not seeing the ‘proof’ there, in that Air Study transcript, that this ‘line up flight’ ever took place at all around the time that the SAIR says Marsh ‘saw it’… and ‘responded’ to it.
Something is still ‘wonky’ with this whole 1637 event.
Maybe it’s just the TIME is wrong, or something.
WEATHER: TTWARE, you made a point below about “the timed-stamped radar images of the weather-event progression.” Would you mind explaining more about what you are driving at with your comment?
Specifically, I have copies of all 30 or so relevant images from *above* the cloud cover (not sure what the parlance is), and I am not understanding how your comment ties in with them. My understanding of those images is that they are consistent with the point that xxfullsailxx and I are making, no?
Thank you in advance. (I, personally, think the weather-related take-away from the Yarnell Hill Fire is still grossly under-discussed.)
EN has made multiple claims about the weather, and none of her central claims are supported by the radar or other observations.
The time-stamped radar images I am referring to, are the same ones I referenced from the SAIR report in response to one of your earlier comments about the weather down below a ways.
Specifically, they show that the storm system originated in the Flagstaff area, proceeded to the Yarnell area, and then, became responsible for the outflow boundary.
Nothing more, nothing less.
I think you’re getting too hung-up with the weather aspect. The predictions (long and short term) predicted the weather could go ape-shit (my term), and it actually came to pass. One wind shift does not equate to ‘well, ape-shit’s all over now, we shouldn’t expect any other significant changes.’
TTWARE, any time there are thunder cells, the weather could go ape-shit….
Are you disagreeing with my point and that of xxfullsailxx?
Sorry, but I respectfully and truthfully don’t know what your point is.
Elizabeth on April 20, 2014 at 3:55 pm said:
…”I think I am just seeing the weather differently, in part because there was a CONVERSATION that followed the 3:30 p.m. weather reading, and it seems that folks thought that the winds warned about were already THERE at 3:30 p.m., such that they were well OVER by 4:04 p.m. or later. I hear you, though, Bob. I do.”
I understand that you are trying to get a bead on, not what we know now, but what whoever was making GM’s decisions was seeing and thinking then.
To be honest, as someone born and raised in New Mexico, the daughter of a meteorologist raised in New Mexico (for whom intense conversations about southwest weather were everyday dinner conversations the whole time i was growing up), and a Girl Scout Leader, Camp Counselor, and later as a Group Guide in the Grand Canyon for ten years, I’m in deep agreement with those who say that any kind of thinking on the part of Granite Mountain that the wind change had stabilized by 3:50-ish (which is what I read you and xxfullsailxx saying) would have been insane.
However I also agree with you that IT SEEMS (via the consequences) that that may have exactly been what they decided/thought. Even after the 3:30 severe weather warning which said basically a seriously different thing. And even though, as they gathered there observing that fire and that weather, they were seeing that fire pick up steam and do exactly what that forecast said it was going to do. Why did they hear that, and then see that, and then decide that it had stabilized when it so seriously hadn’t?? Anybody that is from here, that has spent time HUNKERING DOWN during thunderstorms, which is VERY common, knows it ain’t over til it’s OVER.
As a lowly Girl Scout Leader, as a lowly Camp Counselor, as a lowly Grand Canyon Guide, as the lowly daughter of a southwestern meteorologist, I just have to say I would NEVER have done what they did. I am painfully mystified. I really struggle with this one.
Maybe, even in spite of that clear and accurate and severe 3:30 forecast, and in spite of what they must have HAD to have known from years and years of actual experience, something cut across all of that. And the only thing I possibly can think of is Rory Collins telling them at 3:50ish (iirc) that the fire would hit Yarnell in one to two hours.
But I still don’t know. Which is why I am bringing your comment from way below to here. What CONVERSATION are you truly aware of that took place after the 3:30 forecast that was about the weather?? And how is it that you are aware of it? Because, I truly have no idea what you are referring to, and I would really like to know.
And PS. I have not seen the 30 photographs you are referring to, but I can imagine that if they were taken from above the cloud cover, they probably aren’t particularly meaningful as to what is going on below that cloud cover.
Well said Marti —Well said.
Thank you, I appreciate that.
Right on Marti. It’s dangerous for individuals to claim they know something about YHF without being able to back it up. I asked this question regarding the 1526 Wx and GM’s SA of it to EN a while back as well with no response…I would really like to know.
It’s not just dangerous, not to minimize that at all, it gets to be very disrespectful of the issues involved. Part of the game seems to be make whimsical statements, and then continually ask for more and more information (and therefore more time and energy) from people like Marti and WTKTT and TWARE who have just painstakingly laid out why your (EN’s or FullSail’s in this case) inane claims don’t hold water.
I mean, I personally still think GM saw prairie dogs and was concerned about exposure to plague if they remained in the black. I am relying on my notes for that statement. Anyone who disagrees with me, please state with specificity the sources you are relying on to show that there were no prairie dogs in the black and that GM wasn’t concerned about the plague. Have you exhaustively researched the NIH and CDC plague data in reaching your conclusions? I am always open to discussing this further…
Put differently, if EN has any evidence at all that suggests that all the weather forecasts, radar images, contemporaneous accounts, and fire behavior — which all seem quite consistent with on another — are wrong, and that the storm coming out of the N/NE was really expected by Marsh and Steed to be a steady wind straight from CA, then she should do the work and state with specificity what on earth makes her think that. Simply making that type of claim, in the fact of overwhelming evidence to the contrary, without putting forward any proof oneself, only creates confusion.
Agree.
I don’t know shite about reading smoke. Sometimes I wish you would all get into some kind of conversation about what you are seeing in the smoke, so I could learn more about it. But, that being said, I thus don’t say anything about smoke.
What I do know about is camera angles, handling cameras, fixing time-stamps on images, how photographers do stuff, and also weather in the southwest (except smoke).
So I try to use what I do know to fill in gaps and ask questions of others in order to further all of our understanding. That’s what I am here for, and think others are, too. I have no other agenda.
Reply to Elizabeth post on May 7, 2014 at 10:35 am
>> Elizabeth said…
>> My understanding of those images is that they are consistent
>> with the point that xxfullsailxx and I are making, no?
Elizabeth… I am going to echo TTWARE’s comment above and say I, also ( respectfully and truthfully ) have no idea what the ‘point’ is that you ( together with xxfullsailxx? ) think you have somehow *already* (recently) made…
…but let me take a guess at a ‘summary’.
You ( and xxfullsailxx? ) are trying to resurrect the theory that Marsh and Steed were NEVER fully ‘expecting’ or ‘anticipating’ a full 180 degree wind shift ( despite what any carded/qualified FBAN predicted or anything they were told over the radio )… and that they somehow convinced themselves ( without bothering to consult with anyone else ) that the ‘expected wind shift(s)’ were OVER by the time they left the safe black and that they would *always* be traveling on ‘their new mission’ in a direction that was simply ‘parallel’ to the fire.
Well… if that’s the case… let’s ‘break it down’…
1) Marsh and Steed were never really ‘expecting’ or ‘anticipating’ a full 180 degree wind shift.
Horse manure.
See Brendan McDonough’s interview transcript with ADOSH reprinted below.
In short… Brendan CONFIRMS to ADOSH ( multiple times ) that just after Byron Kimball’s 1530 weather broadcast… EVERY conversation he had with GM Captain Jesse Steed contained FULL acknowledgement between them that the winds were GOING to shift a FULL 180 degrees ( Not 45, not 90… a FULL 180 ) and that this TOTAL REVERSAL of wind direction was going to be backed by 40 to 50 mile per hour winds gusts. Brendan said both he and Steed knew that was going to be (quote) “a phenomenal change”. Brendan ALSO confirms that Marsh was also ‘copying’ these conversations about the upcoming FULL 180 degree wind shift.
2) Steed and Marsh somehow convinced themselves ( without bothering to consult with anyone else ) that the ‘expected wind shift(s)’ were OVER by the time they left the safe black and that they would *always* be traveling on ‘their new mission’ in a direction that was simply ‘parallel’ to the fire.
Well… Brendan still won’t talk about anything he might have heard AFTER he left his lookout position… so there is no direct evidence to fully negate such a claim/belief… but based on (1) above and what they BOTH KNEW was coming they would have both had to pretty much have suffered a sudden case of ‘ridge blindness’ and/or both hit their heads on rocks to forget what they knew just moments before and could still *see* happening with their own eyes out there in front of them.
Look carefully at all the photos taken while they were doing nothing but ‘watching the fire’ ( and the recent crossfades between them ).
Forget about the smoke. Look at the FIRE… especially where it was CLOSER to them and mattered the MOST as far as their own decision making.
At NO TIME is the FIRELINE doing anything but continuing to head SOUTH and TOWARDS the mouth of that box canyon just some 4,000 feet away from the fire BEFORE they even started their ‘new mission’.
Also… ( again ) see Brendan’s testimony to ADOSH (reprinted below) where even circa 4:00 PM when the GM vehicles were being moved ( and supposedly before GM even left the safe black ) the FIRE was heading in a direct SOUTHERLY direction and ( according to Brendan ) was ALSO making those ‘easterly’ pushes simply because of a trick of geography with the terrain on the east side.
>> Elizabeth also wrote…
>> Specifically, I have copies of all 30 or so relevant images from
>> *above* the cloud cover (not sure what the parlance is), and I
>> am not understanding how your comment ties in with them.
>> My understanding of those images is that they are consistent
>> with the point that xxfullsailxx and I are making, no?
I really don’t see how you can think that some photos taken from way ABOVE the ‘cloud cover’ are going to tell you what was happening at ground level around that time, under such ‘squirrely’ conditions.
Even in the photos we can see with our own eyes… the winds were doing ‘strange things’ at GROUND LEVEL ( and at various heights ) and just because a wisp of smoke/cloud is suddenly blowing one way as it rose out of the middle bowl and was being hit by ‘crosswinds’ doesn’t automatically mean that’s the way the fire down on the GROUND was actually headed.
Smoke/clouds didn’t kill them. The FIRELINE did.
Again… LOOK AT THE FIRELINE in all the known photos/videos and in the ‘crossfades’ between them.
The FIRELINE was (consistently and steadily ) headed SOUTH
and TOWARDS the mouth of that box canyon from the time Brendan left his lookout post until the time that they all died.
The only thing that really changed during that entire time period is that it just kept picking up SPEED and INTENSITY as it headed to the SOUTH and filled that entire ‘explosive’ area.
>> Elizabeth also said…
>> I, personally, think the weather-related take-away from the
>> Yarnell Hill Fire is still grossly under-discussed.
So do I, actually… but probably for reasons that are as much the polar opposite of yours as that full (predicted) 180 degree wind shift was that day.
Now that we have the ‘video crossfades’ between pretty much ALL of the ‘photos’ taken from up on that ridge that afternoon and we can truly ‘see exactly what they saw’ during that time they were doing nothing BUT ‘watching the fire behavior’…
…it is even more inconceivable than it has ever been that men who were *supposed* to be ‘fire experts’ would have STILL decided to do what they did that afternoon.
As Brendan himself said to the ADOSH investigators regarding
his own impressions circa 4:00 PM that day…
“You knew that it was coming… ‘cause that wind…
a 180 degree wind shift… that’s a phenomenal change.
I’d never seen anything like it.”
** THE LONG STORY
For the sake of completeness… the following has all been posted before ( at least once )… but here is exactly what Brendan McDonough had to say to the ADOSH investigators about all this.
Several times during his ADOSH interview… Brendan confirms that BOTH he and Jesse Steed FULLY understood that the expected wind shift was going to be a FULL 180 degress. ( Not 45 degrees, not 90… a FULL 180 degress )… and was going to be backed with 40-50 mph wind gusts.
Brendan also states that this ‘expected’ 180 degree wind shift BEGAN just moments after Byron Kimball’s 1530 weather update.
Brendan also explains carefully to the ADOSH investigators that by the time they were moving the GM and Blue Ridge vehicles ( circa 3:59 PM and (supposedly) BEFORE Granite Mountain even left the safe black )… the FIRE was ALREADY moving through that middle bowl (quote) “straight up and down as NORTH / SOUTH”.
Brendan also carefully explains that at that point… the winds were definitely (quote) “out of the north, northeast”… but the fire was ALSO moving some to the EAST not as its ‘primary direction’… but simply due to a trick in the geography there and (quote) “primarily due to the terrain of that ridge”.
ADOSH INTERVIEW (1 of 2) WITH BRENDAN MCDONOUGH
August 20, 2013 – 1:00 PM
______________________________________________________
Q = Bruce Hanna
Q1 = Barry Hicks
Q2 = Dave Larsen ( Rest in Peace )
A = Brendan McDonough
A1 = Brendan’s Attorney Emily Dolan
______________________________________________________
Q1: Yeah. Okay. Were you noticing any – did you notice any change in the winds as the day progressed, ah, either direction or strength, um, or?
A: I’d say we had winds between five and ten. Consistently out of south, southwest and they didn’t shift until moments after the weather came over the radio.
…
Q1: So, ah, at the, ah, ah, when you – when your trigger point was reached, did you make that decision or did someone else make that decision?
A: Me and Steed had come to the conclusion.
Q1: Steve?
A: Steed. Jesse Steed.
Q1: Oh Jesse Steed.
A: It was time for me to…
Q1: Gotcha.
A: …to evaluate where I was.
Q1: Okay.
A: ‘Cause they could see – they could see me. They could see.
Q1: They could see you. And they could see that. Okay.
A: They could see the fire and what was going on after we had heard the – the weather transmission.
Q1: Right.
A: Of the storm coming in where — 50 to 60 mile per hour gusts and 180 degree wind shift.
Q1: Right. So you knew things weren’t gonna be good at that point.
A: Mm-hm.
…
Q2: Would you – would you take a minute and tell me about what you heard on the r- radio about the weather? As much of that as you can remember. How – who said it?
…
A: Steed called me and said there’s a radio – weather coming over. Cause’ this was at that time that I needed to spin my – and he said, “Spin your weather. Listen to crew so I can tell you what’s going’ on. I’ll listen to it.” So I did not directly hear…
Q2: Did not hear the – the – the weather transmission?
A: The weather transmission — not directly.
Q2: Okay.
A: That was relayed from my captain to me.
Q2: Okay.
A: That there was a thunderstorm coming in, expect gusts up to 50 to 60 miles per hour.
Q2: That’s what he’s told you while (unintelligible).
A: Yes, sir.
Q2: Could you…
A: No this is right after it came across.
…
Q2: At that time you got a wind shift. The wind is definitely shifted, were you picked up?
A: Yeah the wind has shifted. The wind has shifted but it didn’t make a tremendous push. You knew that it was coming up. Just ‘cause that wind – a 180 degree wind shift…
Q1: Right.
A: …that’s a phenomenal change.
…
Q1: And so you guys moved if I understand right, all four of y’all’s vehicles.
A: Yes, sir.
Q1: Okay. And, ah…
Q2: And can you remember what time that was?
A: No.
Q2: Four? Okay.
A: At this point, the fire is moving straight up and down as north South. It’s moving – it’s starting to come out of the north but it’s really moving east so that my way out is getting cut off sooner than theirs. They had more concern at that point for me and my safety.
Q1: Right.
A: Just because of the direction of the fire.
Q2: Right
A: So it was – the winds were out of the north, northeast but primarily due to the terrain of that ridge, it’s moving to the east.
…
Q1: So the weather was – and the fire activity was changing dramatically?
A: Oh yeah. Very rapid, um, like nothing I’ve ever seen before.
_____________________________________________________
Followup… just a few other ‘quotes’ about the ‘wind shift(s)’
from various other places in the evidence record…
________________________________________________
** From SPGS2 Darrell Willis himself… during his ADOSH interview and also reprinted as a SIDEBAR on page 14 of the official WFAR report…
“…it wasn’t like an outflow. It was pushing the fire in this (southerly) direction. It wasn’t a ten-minute bust and things got back to normal. It was two solid hours…”
________________________________________________
** From Rob Berry ( in his SAIT interview )…
4. Robb said that the fire did a U-turn on that day.
5. He said that the wind turn northerly (outflows) but didn’t know exact time although compared favorably with the Stanton RAWS when he later looked at the data. He said he could feel higher humidity with the outflow wind and actually felt a couple of drops of rain.
6. Robb said that the wind was “ripping” when it hit and remained very constant for awhile. It just didn’t stop. He said the duration of the stronger wind was also consistent with what the RAWS showed.
________________________________________________
** From SAIT interview with Blue Ridge Hotshots Frisby, Trueheart (Trew) Brown, Fueller and Ball…
NOTE: Documents all kinds of ‘crazy’ wind shifts going on at GROUND LEVEL after the 1530 weather update and Captain Brown reports soon after being able to feel the fire itself already PULLING IN THE WINDS ( and apparently already starting to create its OWN ‘weather’ )…
…there’s a wx update. Trew hears T-storms developing over the fire outflow winds up to 50mph. Brian hears NNE outflow winds up to 50mph, Travis hears outflow winds N NW up to 50mph all happening within 30min. Trew calls the 3 guys with the wx update. There’s a shift out of the west fire is going east and the column is starting to develop and then lays over. When the shift out of the west the column collapsed after the wx update only minutes later. When there’s a wind shift from the west, it then goes SW for 10 minutes and the smoke drifts off to the sth, Travis can feel the column PULLING IN THE WINDS. During this time Travis is on the dozer line. That’s when Travis tells Trew, I don’t think this plan is going to work, this is the 3rd wind shift.
Column starts to lay down, smoky, the split the helicopter did earlier, is now evident. Extreme fire behavior spot fire to the NW of them. Winds are howling, embers falling, instant spot fires 10 x 10 in seconds, homes going up, fire leap frogging.
________________________________________________
** SAIT interview with Rory Collins…
Air Attack – LDF – Roseburg
Interview took place at 11:00 a.m. 7/13/2013
Interviewers: Rocha, Kurth, Mike Dudley, Jim Karels.
15:30 Experienced wind shift and the flank turned and became the head going SOUTH to Yarnell. I let B(?) know prior to the shift to move to that side and start drops.
15:30 – 15:45 The fire was headed for Yarnell moving FAST to the SOUTH. They were getting retardant drops. Contacted Division A to tell them of fire condition and that they needed to move their rigs to a better location.
Q: Did he say he was in good black?
A: NO, he said the other crew was in a good location in the black and they were headed back to the rigs.
________________________________________________
** From SAIT interview with SPGS1 Gary Cordes…
1530 ( 3:30 PM )
– Wind event – collapse of column – fire shifted from flanking fire and turned to a head fire going SOUTH.
– Place evacuation order
– Heard of storm to the north
1540 ( 3:40 PM )
– Trigger point was 1 mile north of town. It was 5-7 minutes before the fire the next trigger point to get my people out.
– Spot 1/2 mile.
– Covered a mile in 15 minutes.
– Building a column in front of us.
1600 ( 4:00 PM )
– I watched the wind change directions 5 times.
_______________________________________________
** From SAIT interview with
** SWCC Meteorologist Chuck Maxwell
“I informed them that this was going to be mainly an outflow WIND REVERSAL issue on the Yarnell fire and not a rainfall issue. I pulled up the updated radar images and showed the gust front and explained its implications. Dugger checked in again with the Incident Commander Roy Hall who said they could SEE IT COMING.”
_______________________________________________
** From SAIT interview with Daniel Kight, DPS officer
NOTE: Daniel Kight was the Yavapai County DPS officer that was assigned to Yarnell with the YCSO Emergency Mobile Trailer Unit.
…wind shifted wall of flames headed to Yarnell.
PREDICTED winds, pant legs were Whipping.
1550 call to supt Yarnell was going to burn…
all hell is breaking lose.
Div A tells Rory Collins the other crew is in the black and they were headed back to the rigs.
Questions.
1. What other crew? Is he referring to a squad of GMH? No?
2. Who is the “They”, that were headed back to the rigs??
3. Does this indicate that Marsh was not in the black circa 1530?
WTKTT,
Thanks very much for taking the time to find and assemble all of this. I hadn’t known about the McDonough statements as regards what Marsh, Steed and he knew and discussed about the weather. I think it’s glaringly clear that they did know that a full 180 windshift, complete with 50 mph gusts, was coming.
I also think some of your excerpts help underscore as well that an outflow boundary is not only not a rare or freaky thing that no one could see coming, but that it is also specifically mentioned (referred to both as an outflow and as a gust front).
It is convenient for those claiming that everything at YHF was perfectly reasonable that, hey, the wind shifted, and no one could see further shifts coming. Crazy outflow boundary, something you couldn’t see and that no one had heard of. Almost as if GM got hit by an asteroid — tragic, but nothing anyone could have done anything to prevent. Of course, that is all completely nonfactual.
I hadn’t said this earlier, but thanks for rounding all of this up. it really helps!
Reply to Bob Powers post on May 6, 2014 at 4:47 pm said:
>> Mr. Powers said…
>>
>> As a division boss I reported to the OPSC
>> If things started going to hell I talked to OPS and they talked to me.
>> As a Type 2 OPS or IC I kept track of my resources and made sure they
>> were not in harms way.
>> If the fire started going nuts that is your main responsibility
>> with the plan for the day.
>> The line OPS should have checked with each one of his divisions and
>> discussed options. That did not happen
>> Marsh evidently was OPS only Division Boss.
>> WTF?
No. There really WERE ‘two paid Division Supervisors’ on active payroll
for the SOUTH end of the fire and reporting to Field OPS1 Todd Abel that day.
Rance Marquez was *hired* and *assigned* as ‘Division Z’ that day early
in the morning but simply didn’t arrive on the fire until late in the morning.
He was not sent down to Yarnell to ASK Eric Marsh if he COULD
( pretty please? ) be DIVSZ. He had already ‘checked in’ up at the ICP
and already WAS DIVSZ ( and was now on the clock and getting paid for it ).
DIVSA Eric Marsh got into an *argument* with him right off the bat.
Marquez was having radio problems when he first arrived down there
in Yarnell and so ( according to his own testimony ) he did the only thing
he could at the moment… he called up to AA Rory Collins just to try and
get an ‘update’ on what was happening down there on the south end of
the fire where he was supposed to now be DIVSZ.
Marsh heard this ‘conversation’ between Marquez and Rory Collins and got
pissed off. Marsh thought Marquez and Collins were just trying to ‘take away
real estate’ from him without consulting with him.
So when Marquez finally got through to Marsh ( following that ‘update me’ call
with Rory Collins )… Marsh had already mis-understood what he heard and
what was really going on and was already pre-pissed-off.
Everyone heard these exchanges.
Everyone used various adjectives to describe what they heard like ‘mad’, or
‘angry’, or ‘argument’ but regardless of adjectives… it was obvious that this
‘first meeting’ between DIVSA and DIVSZ did not go well that day.
Things calmed down once Marsh realized Marquez was not ‘dictating terms’
to him or anything of the sort… and all Marquez wanted to know is where the
western end of his (already assigned) ‘Division Z’ was going to be.
They decided on the ‘old-grader’ as the dividing line between Division A and
Division Z… and then Marsh actually calmly ( and constructively ) told Marquez
that it would be good if he could find *another* way to get to the fireline in that
maze of dirt roads and two-tracks down there.
So that is what Marquez did. He left the Sesame area to ‘scout that out’.
Marsh then called OPS1 Todd Abel with ( one of his two? ) cellphones that
Marsh had with him that day… and reported both the ‘argument’ and the
‘results’ to Abel. All OPS1 Todd Abel wanted to know ( according to his own
ADOSH testimony ) is if the issue had been ‘resolved’… and he was told
( by Marsh ) that it HAD.
So now we have OPS1 Todd Abel (supposedly) understanding that he had
TWO active (paid) Division Supervisors working ‘together’ down there on
that south end of the fire… with defined ( and agreed upon ) Division boundaries.
But then DIVSZ Rance Marquez basically DISAPPEARED.
At NO TIME during all of this consternation was DIVSZ Marquez either
RELIEVED of his job OR assigned another one.
Marquez remained ‘on the payroll’ for the rest of the day as the OTHER
official ‘Division Z Supervisor’ under OPS1 Todd Abel… and supposedly
responsible for the entire Yarnell / Glen Ilah side of the south end of
the fire ( with SPGS1 Cordes as a primary DIVSZ resource ).
Problem was… no one knew where he went, or what he was doing, or even
really made any attempts to FIND OUT.
After that (private) cellphone conversation with DIVSA Marsh… OPS1 Abel
didn’t even make any attempt to FIND OUT where his (paid) ‘DIVSZ’
Supervisor was. OPS1 Todd Abel just continued to treat SPGS1 Gary
Cordes as his ‘Division Z Supervisor’ for the rest of the day and really couldn’t
have cared less where his actual (paid) DIVSZ was.
In his ADOSH interview… OPS1 Todd Abel said he never knew where his
DIVSZ Marquez hire was the entire rest of the day until he ran into him
face-to-face at the Ranch House Restaurant… AFTER the deployment.
So OPS1 Todd Abel DID have ‘more than one line DIVS’ under him that
day and actively ‘on the payroll’ all day… but he didn’t seem to care.
OPS1 Todd Abel also didn’t even seem to be the least bit concerned about the
confusion that might be causing down there on the south end of the fire.
Even when the evacuations started… Neither OPS1 Abel or OPS2 Musser
made any attempt to ( as Mr. Powers describes above SHOULD have been
done ) ‘find DIVSZ and make sure all his resources were getting off the fire’.
This is ALL fully documented in the ADOSH reports, including the detail
pages for ‘infractions/fines imposed’ against the employer(s).
This absolute MESS when it came to whether or not there really WERE two
‘defined Divisions’ and two ‘assigned (paid) Division Supervisors’ for the SOUTH
end of the fire that day was a BIG DEAL, according to ADOSH ( from a
workplace management *and* safety control standpoint ) and they said so.
As I said only 1 DIV. Boss The other was not active and it seemed that Frisby was covering that though not assigned.
They had contact both radio and phone Responsibility runs both ways….Right.
And I agree the organization was a total mess.
also without a Safety Officer the job fell to Both of the OPS to cover. Some blame belongs to Overhead in this mess and they should be held accountable in this mess.
Bob, I am thinking that your pal RTS/SR/Fire20+/Robert-the-2nd/whatever-he-is-calling-himself-here-nowadays can vouch for the fact that, with wildfires being dealt with in the WUI these days, it is *not* abnormal or unheard of for a WFF crew to go out to start their assignment WITHOUT a Safety Officer already “clocked-in,” on scene, and fully up-to-speed on the relevant fire and allocation of resources. Obviously, that is not the IDEAL way (or maybe even not the “right way”) to do things, but it seems to happen often enough. Is your position that nobody should be out in the field on a fire UNTIL the Safety Officer is on scene and FULLY up-to-speed on the relevant fire and resource assignments? (I am asking for your honest opinion – not trying to argue with you….)
EN,
I think everyone here can see that I am neither RTS nor Fire20+. You have a tendency to accuse posters whose views you find inconvenient of being other people, having accused TWARE and WTKTT of being one and the same, for instance. Pretty lame, but a good way to disrupt accurate dialog.
Elizabeth,
What’s with your obsession regarding this RTS thing?
ONCE AGAIN, you are negating the value of your commentary by putting forth non-factual, incorrect suppositions about people.
For you to start-off what presumably, is supposed to be serious commentary with this absolute BS, makes a lot of people not want to pay attention to the portion of the commentary that was the purpose of your post.
I presume myself and WTKTT will be getting another turn on your ‘hot-seat’ very soon, as well.
Elizabeth
You ask me about Safety Officers.
Safety officers are assigned to type II Short teams.
WUI has nothing to do with weather a SO is assigned to the fire. Teams are assigned according to complexity and number of resources from short teams to Type I full teams.
If the Type II team is a on call fully organized they come with a SO.
Type I teams also have a SO as part of the team.
Initial Attack fires do not have a SO also unless ordered Type III teams do not normally have a SO.
A SO is for the whole fire and not for an individual crew.
The problem with the Yarnell Hill Fire, the State slapped together a Type II team that was short several members. The entire team should have been fully functional at 0600. They should have had Maps and a written plan. Division Bosses and Safety Officer, Plans, Service and Finance.
The State cut to many corners I assume to save costs.
Again you can fight Fires with out a Safety Officer but the responsibility falls to the IC and to his OPS. SO is a position under direct command of the IC.
If a Type I or Type II fully implemented Team is on duty. They will have a SO. The SO will provide safety to plans for each shift and identify problems during each shift to the IC, and work hand in hand with OPS.
Dose that explain what you asked?
Also RTS’s fire season is in full swing so you probably will not hear mush from him for awhile and he is none of the other above mentioned people. Robert is Robert and I won’t divulge his last name as he requested.
Elizabeth,
Refer to Bob’s comment, “Robert is Robert”.
I rest my case.
He actually went to Robert The Second because when I first started I signed in as……
Robert (Bob) Powers which I changed about the same time RTS came on. He worked for me I know him and we communicate on E-Mail
He goes by no other name on here and he is busy hiring ,training and getting ready for this fire season in R3, He may not be on for awhile and I am sure we will miss his solid input. If someone wants him to jump in for input let me know…….
Still waiting for an apology from Elizabeth for this, all thing considered.
Ms. Marti (or Miss Marti 🙂 ):
What am I supposed to be apologizing to you for? I am happy to give you an apology, but I am unclear about what I need to apologize to you for…. Please advise.
While I can’t speak for Marti, I believe she is refering to this whole RTS fiasco discussed above. If that’s indeed the case, the apology should be going to RTS.
You are right and because I know him I am getting emails accusing me of a cover up of his true name. she will not apologize its not her nature.
Have you ever known a Lawyer to apologize?
After the attacks 2 months ago I gave up on Elizabeth.
I’m not waiting for an apology to me.
I’m waiting for an apology to those whom you, for some reason, decided to publicly (and irresponsibly, and wrongfully, and thus unprofessionally as bespeaks a lawyer) accuse of being deceitful in their identities here.
Ohhhhh, Ms. Marti, if I were wrong, I would absolutely apologize to RTS! 🙂
In unrelated news, I am so glad that you are out of your “retirement” from IM, Marti. When you announced in February that you were leaving, because you could not afford to give up any more lucrative work to instead spent your time here, I was surprised. It is good that your retirement did not stick! 🙂
Elizabeth,
While you have ALMOST NEVER provided any of the proof and documentation that others have repeatedly, over time, asked you for, I’m sure you have the goods on RTS, but as per usual, you won’t be providing any proof!!
I’M ISSUING A CHALLENGE TO YOU RIGHT NOW TO PUBLICLY STATE ONCE MORE, THAT YOU KNOW THAT WTKTT AND MYSELF ARE THE SAME PERSON, AS YOU HAVE DONE BEFORE, WHILE CONTINUALLY BAD-MOUTHING RTS .
Since you aren’t willing to give RTS his well-deserved apology, you can instead give one to WTKTT and myself. If you don’t, I’m done with you, PERMANENTLY!
TTWARE, as you might recall, it was “Observer” and I who both noticed the same thing a while ago. Specifically, when a question was asked of YOU, it was WTKTT who replies. Presumably that means that you and he are the same person or are speaking for each other? Or am I missing something?
I never said my work was “lucrative.” It was purely a matter of survival.
I’m only a photographer, not a lawyer.
Based on what I read from TTWARE and WTKTT they are defiantly 2 different people
TTWARE Is a wild land Fire Fighter or a retired one totally based on his knowledge and statements here. WTKTT is
not a Fire fighter and has learned from us and his research If you have been here awhile you can tell the difference in their stiles.
New ‘Chapter’ needed?
There are now 1,285 ( and counting ) comments contained just in this
one Chapter SIX of this ongoing discussion.
The load time on this ‘Chapter SIX’ page is getting pretty long.
It’s probably time for ‘Chapter SEVEN’ of this ongoing discussion.
Just a suggestion.
since any discussion of weather found down below detracts from mike’s original points i felt the need to start a new comment… i am by no means any sort of weather expert. but like all wff’s worth their salt, weather plays an important part in what we do and it is important to be a “student” of wildfire, and therefore, the weather… and i recently spoke to a couple of NOAA guys about this very thing…
there was a distinct weather event that occurred called an “outflow boundary.” here is a link that describes it pretty well:
http://obsweatherguy.blogspot.com/2011/07/outflow-boundary-storms-footprint.html
the nearest t-cells that day were miles away, and there is a distinction between t-cell “downdrafts” and an “outflow boundary” which can occur miles away from any t-cells and can effect a much greater area than a t-storm downdraft. in fact, a outflow boundary can be picked up by radar (as it was in the case of Yarnell Hill Fire) not unlike a cold front…
there is also a distinction between fire behavior associated with an unstable atmosphere, which is what i feel like Bob Powers is talking about down below. downdrafts, fire whirls, pyro-cumulus, etc. are all very localized events and certainly occurred that day. but what caught GM was the outflow boundary turning the fire 90 degrees from east to south with 40+ mph winds that they didn’t anticipate. and quite possibly, as the SAIR points out, they interpreted the previous windshift that changed fire spread from NE (which they had been watching all day) to due East as the predicted wind shift and then mistakenly thought that it was safe to flank the fire to BSR…
Since FullSail completely got wrong the SZ requirements, doesn’t seem to understand local conditions and vegetation even though he claims to be from AZ, has blown multiple other issues, and now seems to not know that outflow boundaries are not unusual byproducts of thunderstorms…well I have to wonder.
You get thunderstorms during that time of year in the southwest, and winds are likely to shift and be erratic. It is typical. For purposes of thinking about fire behavior, the key is that winds are likely to shift and strong gusts should be anticipated. All of that was known at the time Marsh noted squirrely winds.
I.e., relying on one wind shift as being “the” wind shift given weather conditions that afternoon would be pretty reckless.
As fullsail said fire fighters become students of fire and weather its in your sole. You cant always predict the wind or local changes in the weather by looking at the sky. But if you pay attention to the fire it will tell you a lot. When a fire becomes active and exhibits different flame activity its telling you that weather forces heat, humidity, and wind are changing the normal to increased activity. If the fire starts laying down then it reverses activity. cooling, higher, humidity’s some times less wind or a change in direction. You learn to observe those changes and adjust accordingly. If you are observant you don’t need a weather forecast to let you know what you are already seeing. Its something we learn from many, many days of wild land fire fighting. As fullsail has learned. The little indicators are there we just need to use them in decision making.
Reply to xxfullsailxx post on May 6, 2014 at 8:04 pm
>> xxfullsailxx said…
>>…what caught GM was the outflow boundary turning the fire
>> 90 degrees from east to south with 40+ mph winds that they
>> didn’t anticipate.
Wrong.
They had EVERY REASON to ‘anticipate’ what was GOING to happen and were specifically TOLD that this is what was GOING to happen when Byron Kimball made his 1530 PM ‘weather announcement’. ( See below ).
>> xxfullsailxx also said…
>> and quite possibly, as the SAIR points out, they interpreted the
>> previous windshift that changed fire spread from NE (which
>> they had been watching all day) to due East as the predicted
>> wind shift
Wrong again.
Your description does NOT match the ‘predicted wind shift’ that
actually went from FBAN Byron Kimball on the radio that afternoon.
( See below ).
For whatever amount of time the fire ‘appeared’ to just be heading ‘due east’ was simply the period of time when it was still just ‘rotating around’ due to the wind shifts actually announced by FBAN Byron Kimball circa 1530. ( Again… see below ).
>> xxfullsailxx said…
>> and then mistakenly thought that it was safe to flank
>> the fire to BSR…
Yes… that part of what you are saying seems to be true. They most certainly DID (inexplicably?) think if was ‘safe’ ( or at least acceptable risk ) to go on a cross-country hike through unburned ‘gasoline on a stick’ within 4,600 feet of an actively ROTATING flame front… but that decision cannot be construed to have been based on ‘incorrect weather information’.
The fire/weather did pretty much EXACTLY what FBAN Byron Kimball SAID it would do… in pretty much the EXACT timeframe he said it would happen… and they ( Marsh/Steed ) DID hear this (accurate) weather forecast on the radio circa 1530 ( 3:30 PM ).
Here is a a full reprint from a previously posted message that contains what Fire Behavior Analyst (FBAN) Byron Kimball *actually* announced over the TAC 1 channel that day at exactly 1529.52 ( 3:29.52 PM )…
**
** FULL TRANSCRIPT OF BACKGROUND RADIO TRAFFIC
** IN AIR STUDY VIDEO 20130630_153014_SEAT_EP.MOV
**
** CONTAINS BYRON KIMBALL’S 1529.52 WEATHER REPORT
** GOING OUT ( LOUD AND CLEAR ) ON TAC 1
This Air Study video is 1 minute and 10 seconds long.
Since the text notes that accompanied these Air Study videos say that the timestamps in the filenames actually represents the END times for the videos ( 1530.14 ) then that means this particular video STARTS at…
1529.04 ( 3:29.04 PM )
Since the VIDEO starts at exactly 1529 plus 4 seconds, and Byron’s weather report is at exactly +0:48 seconds into the video… that makes the EXACT time his crucial weather report actually began over the radio…
1529.52 ( 3:29.52 PM )
Here is the actual FULL transcript of the background radio conversation in this AIR STUDY video that captured Byron Kimball’s detailed weather report going out ( loud and clear ) over TAC 1 at 3:29.52 PM.
NOTE: There is no need for any ‘audio forensics’ here. The background conversation in this AIR STUDY video is CLEARLY heard by anyone with even normal hearing… and Byron Kimball himself is speaking especially LOUDLY and CLEARLY as he gives his weather report over the TAC 1 radio channel.
ALSO NOTE: This probably goes without saying… but when someone ( anyone ) says ‘EAST winds’ ( like Byron did )… that always means what direction the winds will be COMING FROM. This is industry standard practice when referring to ‘wind direction’.
Also notice in the transcript below that when Byron was giving his weather report and was CLEARLY warning everyone of the wind change and HIGH wind speeds to be expected… he was ALSO giving detailed information about the expected outpoint to outflow location(s). The video cuts off before we hear the rest of his detailed weather report… but anyone who was hearing it DID hear those specific ‘outpoint to outflow’ details from Byron.
AIR STUDY VIDEO – 20130630_153014_SEAT_EP.MOV
NOTE: This AIR STUDY video has been made public and is still
available in either Mr. Dougherty’s online Dropbox OR at the following YouTube link…
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IP8vglS_PPM
VIDEO STARTS AT 1529.04 ( 3:29.04 PM )
+0.02 ( 1529.06 / 3:29.06 PM )
(Unknown): (?) is gonna be with me (?) has to do and get
(torches?) out.
+0:14 ( 1529.18 / 3:29.18 PM )
(Unknown): Copy
+0:30 ( 1529.34 / 3:29.34 PM )
(Unknown): Task Force (common?) to Task Force Six.
+0:37 ( 1529.41 / 3:29.41 PM )
Byron Kimball: Operations Abel, Fire Behavior, on TAC 1.
NOTE: The responder to this callout sounds more like
OPS2 Paul Musser than OPS1 Todd Abel.
+0:43 ( 1529.47 / 3:29.47 PM )
( OPS1 Todd Abel or OPS2 Paul Musser ): Go ahead, Byron
+0:48 ( 1529.52 / 3:29.52 PM )
Byron Kimball: Within the half-hour, (pause) EAST winds. (pause)
Possibility of as high as 50 miles an hour or likely 25 (pause)
definitely 25, 35 gusting 40 (pause) east / northeast within the half
hour. Um… the outpoint to outflow line also ( will be ) located…
( At this point… both a Helicopter and a fixed-wing make a loud
flyover and the background conversation in the last few seconds
of the video cannot be heard. )
VIDEO ENDS AT 1530.14 ( 3:30.14 PM )
umm, i wasn’t saying that GM wasn’t informed of the weather event… nor was i saying that GM was erroneously MIS-informed of the weather event.
the point is, that there were no direct thunder-cells that influenced the fire behavior with down-drafts that day. nor was it a pyro-cumulus collapse that influenced the fire behavior. what influenced the fire behavior, was an “outflow boundary” which is very different than a t-cell downdraft.
nice ad-lib and speculation based on an incomplete conversation though… nothing you say above really negates my point. just because they “had every reason to anticipate” something, doesn’t mean they actually did anticipate (or interpret it) correctly. my description does not match the predicted wind shift? so… you seem to be indicating that you think weather forecasters are 100% accurate in their predictions? i would rather base my opinions on the resultant fire behavior (as shown on fire progression maps) as to what the winds actually did that day, rather than the “prediction.”
Reply to xxfullsailxx post on May 6, 2014 at 10:10 pm
>> xxfullsailxx said…
>> just because they “had every reason to anticipate”
>> something, doesn’t mean they actually did
>> anticipate (or interpret it) correctly.
Fair enough. You may be right.
Their behavior that afternoon seems to be far
enough ‘off the reservation’ that it appears it really
doesn’t seem to have mattered what ANYONE
thought or what ‘intel’ they received.
They ( Marsh and Steed only ) made up THEIR
minds about what THEY wanted to do… and to hell
with what anyone else might have been telling them.
I just thought I would balance out YOUR ‘ad-libbing’
up above by reminding anyone reading of what was
ACTUALLY said that day by FBAN Bryon Kimball.
He WAS right. Things pretty much happened just
the way he said they would over the open TAC
channels that day.
It’s important to recognize that a couple posters continually try to normalize every aspect of the decision to go through that bowl. Whether claiming they were going to be making good time on switchbacks and game trails, or implying that it’s reasonable to think one shift in wind is THE sole shift in weather with a thunderstorm blowing in.
In the real world, as regards storms, it’s not only not the WFFs think, it’s not the experience of normal people, or the way normal everyday people think. I believe everyone here has been in or near a thunderstorm and not been amazed when winds gusted and changed direction. I actually believe many people here have had storms blow through in places like AZ and experienced wind events more severe than those that occurred during a storm that was expected that day. Whether looking after the safety of your crew, or planning a picnic, betting on one single change of wind direction (even if that change had occurred as FullSail claimed it to have) would be a very unusual thing for people normal exposure those storms.
Likewise, attempts to divert focus onto the specific source of the specific winds encountered at that time can be very misleading. This was not a day with winds forecast for 2-3 mph and gust as high as 6 or 6, that got real breezy through some unanticipated, highly unusual weather event that no one expected or would have reasonably been asked to expect. There was a forecast that more or less showed up as expected. Marsh himself knew and said that the winds were getting “squirrely” up top. He didn’t say “the wind shift seems to have come, and it looks like it is now stable and to the east.”
3 or 4 posts on the web to implying that GM was relying on THE wind shift that already occurred (and implying that this was normal, and that subsequent winds were freaks of nature) can create a false idea that supports the nothing-to-see-here mantra of some. But, not what happened, and if people reflect on what to expect with that type of front coming through, they should ask how surprising it is that winds shifted in that kind of weather.
Hey – xxFullsailxx – thanks. I’ve been beating the weather drum here for a while, but I don’t know nearly enough (while you and Bob Powers obviously know tons). So, thank you – your explanation was incredibly helpful. (In return, here’s some help for you: Don’t rely with 100% confidence on the SAIT fire progression maps (or the SAIT/Wildland-Fire-Associates/ADOSH timeline or other random details (including the SAIT interview notes)). They are just not 100% accurate. I meant to mention this earlier to Bob Powers, but I forgot…. 🙂 )
EN, beating the weather drum doesn’t add anything but confusion if the weather drum you are beating has no basis in fact. The reality is, shifting winds given the forecast weather, that did materialize, are a normal thing.
What would be highly unusual and not founded on either experience or even the ability of short-range forecasts to predict specifics is taking the view that a singular wind shift was expected, and had already occurred, and that no further wind shifts were going to happen. Typing the idea, that GM reasonably relied on A wind shift being the SOLE wind shift, multiple times doesn’t make that idea hold water.
Remember what Marsh said? “Squirrely” winds.
While some of the details in the various investigative reports certainly are questionable, the one thing that is not in question, are the timed-stamped radar images of the weather-event progression.
Yes. The SAIT contains a pretty good weather summary in this regard, starting roughly on p. 70 if I recall, and the ADOSH report does as well.
I also note that both discuss the outflow boundary pretty matter-of-factly, as is appropriate as it was not a rare component of the expected weather for that day. Likewise there is a discussion of plume dynamics and the terrain channeling that Bob mentioned. Thunder cell development was visible from the area of YHF. Other indicators are noted after 1600.
In terms of whether this anticipated weather was a rare event, it’s relevant that on the 28th, two days earlier, there was a thunderstorm that passed through with similar wind speeds. There’s just no “rare” there.
TTWARE, thanks for your reply – I made a new post for this discussion up above. If you don’t yet have all 30 images of the clouds, I can e-mail them to you. In my view, they are misleading if you watch them in a GIF (which is exactly the same with another progression video related to the YHF – it is hard to get a good sense of the relevant progression when you are dealing with a GIF, in my experience).
Whatever the reason behind this directed, purposeful effort, I would encourage anyone with questions about the weather caused by this discussion to do two things. 1) Read the weather discussion in the SAIT and ADSOH reports. 2) Think about the times they watched a front of thunderstorms approach from one direction, and ask whether they would assume a partial wind shift as a front approaches would be the ONLY wind shift, given what their experience has been with past fronts blowing in.
Actually, I should have added a 3) ask themselves, if they’d been told 30 minutes before that N/NE front arrived that the front would bring E/NE winds, would they assume that a partial shift to W winds was going to be the final change in wind brought by that storm front that was itself blow in from N/NE?
I completely agree.
From Darrell Willis himself…
During his ADOSH interview
and also reprinted as a
SIDEBAR on page 14 of
the official WFAR report…
“…it wasn’t like an outflow. It was pushing the fire in this (southerly) direction. It wasn’t a ten-minute bust and things got back to normal. It was two solid hours…”
Moved this up here as I can’t type 1 letter to a line.
Bob,
I agree with the delayed evacuations being part of the story and that they could have been handled better. I really wonder how different the Yarnell evacuations were from the usual case, reading about other fires leaves the impression that late evacuations are not rare. Others could probably add input on this. I do think it was part of the general theme, they underestimated the fire and played catch-up all day. However, their underestimating the fire still should not have resulted in the GMHS getting killed. The firefighters most in danger from this were the ones on the edge of Glen Ilah, at the head of the fire that afternoon. GM was out in left field – in the black – and walked into the path of the fire. Yes they could have pulled out GM earlier, feeling that their work was futile, but was there any urgency to do so? In the black, they should have been safe.
SR –
My questions are not meant to be either tricky or even argumentative. You have been looking at this fire for months. Catch phrases from the report such as lack of risk management or operational oversight really do not add understanding. In your own words, what did the fire command do that they should not have done or what did they not do that they should have done? If you believe their decisions were a major factor in the deaths of the GMHS (as ADOSH does) you should be able to answer those questions. I do believe there has been a tendency to say fire command should have made sure that the GMHS were safe. But who was better able to assess the safety implications of any actions on the part of the crew – the GM overhead or the fire command?
what some people in this commentary don’t seem to understand (and especially those with no first hand experience of wildland fire operations over the last ten years in and around WUI) is that the Yarnell Fire was the perfect shit-storm of complicating factors…
-extremely dry fuel conditions with heavy fuel loading…
-a lightning start fire within close proximity to three communities…
-three communities who hadn’t prepared for the inevitable…
-a weather event that occurred (as was expected) in the middle of the burn period…
-an incoming IMT trying to transition…
…all happening within a 12 hour period. i am not saying that this event was unprecedented, but it is a situation that is nearly impossible to manage well. and easy, in hindsight, to hyper-analyze what could have been done better.
what is ironic about the ADOSH fines (and i think this is what mike is saying) is that the very people it says were actually put in harms way will in no way be “compensated” (nor do i think they should be. they were just doing their jobs and had the same choice GM did to refuse risk, i am just explaining one example of why the ADOSH report is out of touch with reality)… GM was in the safest position of anyone that day. as mike said, they made the conscious decision to leave their assignment and try to walk out. i think the ADOSH fines are simply an attempt to “right the wrong” for the City of Prescott, who failed to properly cover their employees with appropriate death benefits.
xxFullsailxx – one small point: You make reference above to “a weather event that occurred (as was expected) in the middle of the burn period…”
My understanding is that the weather event that was “expected… in the middle of the burn period” did not actually occur “as was expected.” My current-and-still-grossly-incomplete impression (based on the research I am currently doing) is that GM got screwed by fire induced weather far more than any predicted outflow from the thunder cells (that, according to the IMET, fell apart). This weather business is difficult for me to research, so anyone who knows anything about fire-induced-weather is welcome to e-mail me at [email protected]. That said, I have done enough research to date to feel comfortable sharing my above comment.
(In case WTKTT or whomever wants “links” or sources, allow me to state up-front that my sources are my pages and pages and pages of notes, largely hand-written.)
EN, you again would do well to get competent sources instead of the ones you seem to be relying on. Unless there is something I don’t full understand. GM themselves noted squirelly winds. Wind shifts and gust during forecast thunderstorms are a fact of life. 50 mph gusts in the southwest that time of year aren’t particularly newsworthy.
On top of that the fire had fire swirls or wind devils which are directly related to down draft winds and heat. It takes a good sized area of fire to create its own weather. Around 10,000 acres plus igniting rapidly to create fire induced weather or wind. It may have happened in the canyon the crew was in based on the way the fire hit it and spread rapidly with extreme heat like a blow torch.
There was a natural chimney, heavy fuels, a large fire head pushed by wind, with a upslope condition. Any fire above the crew would be sucked down to the fire at the mouth of the canyon causing area combustion. A large combination of factors fell into place where they were. At that point similar to the Loope Fire in 1966 in California. The Chimney effect can be devastating. It also is predictable if you pay attention.
Bob, I am with you. Are you saying, Bob, that if the fire ran up the two-track to the saddle and reached the “descent point” on the ridge, that *THAT* fire could then PULL a spot up through the valley, essentially like a funnel or chimney? (I am sure I am articulating this poorly, but hopefully you can envision what I am saying.)
Not sure what you meant by valley. The canyon the crew was caught in if the fire actually was above them as the fire spread map showed it would have been affected by the fire at the mouth of the canyon that the crew was faced with. Thus creating its own force pulling the fire from both directions. It is a possible scenario based on the way the fire burned. The map showed fire above the crew before the fire below them exploded into the canyon it did not run around them and up to the saddle first
if that was what you were asking. Take a look at the progression charts if they can be believed or are accurate the fire was also burning above them near the heal of the fire while the fire covered the mouth of the canyon. It is like a backfire being pulled to the main fire. Make science?
I have to agree with you on the above, My only concern was the lack of direction by the OPS in not talking to Marsh About the situation and make a clearer decision on staying in the black. I do think the Overhead had some blame in supervision how much is debatable. The Fire had 2 OPS that seemed to cause some confusion as to who was working for who. When the fire broke loose and compromised GM line at around 1530 the crew should have been pulled from there assignment by the OPS or IC. Some one should have been talking to them, They were safe in the Black no dought about that. So simply tell them to stay until we can get you off the mountain. We being the fire command. No less responsible were the crew leaders, and communication with the overhead before moving off the fire.
As in the past and for years the problem with compensation for seasonal’s is terrible. $25,000 is not going to sustain a wife and 4 kids, so you will see lawsuits in this day and age.
The above was for fullsail.
Bob- the reason why IHC’s are ordered for a situation like Yarnell Hill Fire is because they are expected to make smart decisions, independently, without having to be “looked upon” when shit goes wonky.
the OSC’s had their bases covered by assigning Marsh as Div. Sup. OSC’s don’t provide for LCES, the line overhead does… in this case, Div Sup Marsh. the whole point of the ICS system is that Command positions don’t have to account for every single resource on the fire… because that would be unreasonable.
I totally agree with you except OSC and Division Boss’s should always be in direct contact with those under them to discuss changes and set up new plans if the original plan is failing. Superintendents like to work closely with good Div. Boss’s and OPS always likes to keep updated with their Divisions. At least it worked that way in my time, It never hurt to double check on safety when things started going south, you made sure your guys were good and aware.
xxfullsalexx
The OSC position under Incident Command System Is in fact the old Line boss position he is in fact responsible for and part of the line overhead and is as responsible for LCES as any one on the line and without a SO he is directly responsible for safety to the IC or Old Fire Boss There job descriptions have never changed just there names. IHC’s still answer to there supervisors, Division and OPS’s if there is 1 or 3 crews on a Division they answer to their line overhead.
Chain of command dose not go away because you are a Hot Shot Crew.
Mike,
Risk management is not a catch-phrase. If you have read the report accompanying the ADOSH findings, you have already seen a detailed discussion of risk management. Basically, if it’s clear all day that the tactics you started the day with will not be successful given fire behavior, and you never reevaluate those tactics and continue to expose people to risk, it’s a problem. With poor risk management, you leave everyone more susceptible to stupid things happening.
Part of management is understanding that everyone underneath you will not always make perfect decisions. It is almost a given that if managers don’t stay mindful of what their resources are up to, or worse commit them in ways bound to not work, and then don’t pay much attention after that, that sooner or later bad things will happen. GM’s lookout is a good example of this that happened before the burnover, though fortunately with a happy ending.
I’d suggest you go back and re-read the report and state with specificity which part of the risk management discussion and discussions of operational oversight and communications you feel are in error. For instance, I note for communications that management has the ability to cause communication to happen. The fact that GM may have had a history of being close-mouthed as to crew movements and did not specifically reach out to disclose what they were doing clearly was an issue, but operations could have stepped in and asked for communication. If you get only partial communication, as a manager you’re fully able to ask for full communication.
This actually is a good example of what Putnam talks about in saying the 10 are used to put all blame on crews. Yes, GM could have communicated better. And should have. But, it’s a two-way street.
Managers get fired in business all the time for mistakes made by employees that the manager didn’t know about, if the manager didn’t show sufficient oversight.
Mike,
In regards to your comment ot SR above, one management specific I can point to is the (State budget influenced?) call for a Type II Short Team after the fire had already been deemed a threat to Yarnell.
The negative effects of that decision were immediately compounded by the Short Team’s inability to bring to the table the necessary critical components of a ‘Short Team’, which included no Safety Officer or Planning Chief (who were both scheduled to arrived long after the fire had gone Type I).
It can certainly be argued as to whether or not having these key indivduals on-scene might have changed the outcome of the tragedy. One thing is certain though, having a full team there in a timely manner, would have produced a more positive impact on the firefight that day.
One further example along these lines is taking the time — about 30 seconds — to discuss with each crew whether they have LCES in place. Saying “we’ll escape by bushwhacking down the unscouted bowl to the BSR” likely wouldn’t have been viewed as acceptable. But that conversation never happened, either earlier when it should have, or when people heard that GM was moving and some became concerned that where they were made no sense.
Likewise, TWARE accurately pointed out that the BSR was a fail as an SZ. It seems no one, throughout the day, had a conversation with GM where they formally discussed the black qualifying as a SZ. It did, and they should have stayed committed to it. Failure to have that conversation earlier may not have been a central cause of what happened next. But, when a crew says it’s abandoning its SZ and proceeding down its escape route to another SZ, that would have been a logical moment for 15 seconds of mindful conversation as to the what and why and where implied by that statement. As in, Why did the black become unsafe? Why are you moving? Where is your escape route? Which SZ are you moving to, and do you know it’s a good SZ?
Again the crew is responsible for there safety.
If they are ask to do something that is unsafe they have the right to refuse. When Crew fail to use the 10 SO then they don’t follow the rules so yes as Putnam says the crews are blamed which they should be.
We go back and back again the crews safety is the responsibility of ????? “their crew supervisors.”
Accountability goes up and down the line.
Let’s suppose there HAD been a clear statement by GM that they were going to bushwhack down to the BSR, for instance.
Should ops be off the hook in that case, because, well, GM is responsible for their safety, so people are free to sit back and let them do something they clearly shouldn’t be doing? To be clear, this is a hypothetical. What happened seems on evidence more to be a failure to supervise include a failure to force communication that wasn’t really sought by GM. But, it is part of management and a failure that management can and should be accountable for.
Agree totally…
Again this is the perspective of a non-WFF. Much of what is suggested above could have been done in theory, but just does not sound real world to me. With the fire blowing up and fire command worrying about citizens in Yarnell, moving resources. coordinating firefighting efforts (including air) and worrying about getting additional resources to Yarnell, the idea that fire command would be asking any group of hotshots if they have a lookout or any escape route seems to be a little hard to expect. Maybe this would have been the role of a safety officer (my lack of knowledge) and if so would argue that the Type 2 short crew was an issue. But I have to believe it is generally assumed that hotshot crews take care of those matters. They are highly trained and Granite Mountain’s overhead was not green (at least Marsh and Steed). I do not think that fire command really sees its role as a mother hen.
Yes managers do get fired AT TIMES for the actions of their employees. But the fire command – hotshot crew relationship is not a typical employer-employee relationship. They are thrown together for a few hours or days on a fire, each with specific, defined roles. The fire command is not responsible for the crew’s training, providing their equipment etc – all the things that exist in a normal manager-employee relationship. Most importantly, hotshot crews are taught and expected to accept that their safety is THEIR responsibility. They choose their SZ’s, they choose their escape routes, they can turn down risk etc. Fire command does not have the “eyes” to make those decisions for a hotshot crew, which is why safety is a crew responsibility. So while it may seem that “blaming the crew” is what fire managers do to escape responsibility, it really just flows from the nature of the job. It sucks, but it is what it is.
The responsibility rests solely with the crew line is just that, a line. Not the way it works. FWIW many people can and do require crews to report on LCES, which is a helpful and reasonable thing to do. And, not a meaningful time intrusion. It does force mindfulness of LCES.
Let’s look at part of the hidden aspect of “blame the crew.” Lowly paid seasonal employees are a dime a dozen — they may be integral parts of their communities, and great people, but it’s easy to hire more. And, they tend to not be that influential. Kind of like ski patrollers in the winter. If an accident happens to one of them, to take the view the responsibility must stay at the crew level, and not go up the line the way it always does in quality organizations, is very convenient. More-senior people do have decent salaries, other perks, and a good number of social and professional chits that they’ve accumulated. Are they really supposed to enjoy all those perks, and then if they don’t perform well in a management role, bear none of the responsibility for accidents that result? That seems to be what people are asserting.
Steed and Marsh were not seasonal -they were full time. Management should be held accountable if they are at fault, not because they get “perks”. Management clearly could have done things better on this fire, that is why you go back and review what you did. But the case to blame fire command as the primary cause for the deaths of the GMHS I think is really quite weak. They did not pull them out (could have, but not necessary for safety). They did not tell them to stay put (actually Abel did it appears). No safety officer (yes they serve a role, but should the GMHS have needed a safety officer to tell them not to go into the canyon).
Simple fact is the GMHS made a mistake. If they had announced to the world their plan, including the route, yes fire command should have aborted it. But it appears that even if fire command was aware of their movement (and this remains very uncertain), they were not aware of the route. I suspect they never dreamed they would go through the canyon. So really were they obligated to tell them not to do so?
13 of the GM dead were seasonal. 6 in total were full-time. It is a tad convenient to say all responsibility stops at the crew level. Many of the crew were not even in a position, necessarily, to know that some things weren’t in place safety-wise that needed to be. You have a medical background it seems, would you put it solely on a junior nurse to stand up to a surgeon who was doing something unsafe, or would you ask hospital administrators to also have a few check and balances in place? Including bearing some responsibility if a major case of malpractice happens?
Lax management creates an environment that allows safety violations. Again, had someone asked Marsh in the morning what his escape route and SZ were, the whole bushwhack and burnover may have been avoided. Lax management was not a sufficient cause for the burnover, for sure, but that simple conversation could have nipped it in the bud.
As a division boss I reported to the OPSC if things started going to hell I talked to OPS and they talked to me As a Type 2 OPS or IC I kept track of my resources and made sure they were not in harms way if the fire started going nuts that is your main responsibility with the plan for the day. the line OPS should have checked with each one of his divisions and discussed options. That did not happen
Marsh evidently was OPS only Division Boss. WTF
SR –
Not going to make light of communication, it is usually a good thing. But the leap about having a conversation about a SZ and escape route in the morning and preventing the burnover in the afternoon is mighty large. The walk through the canyon apparently was adlibbed, so how in the heck would the morning talk changed that. Even ADOSH does not suggest fire command knew anything about the walk through the canyon, we have no idea if Marsh had even thought about that route in the morning.
Marsh said he was going down his escape route. It’s possible he had id’d it earlier, and yes it is possible he was ad-libbing. Whichever the answer, if he’d committed to another escape route in the morning, he would have been less likely to identify another route as an escape route, as it would’ve then been an outright dishonest statement to do so. If he truly thought that a bushwhack of that nature was a legit escape route (which he may well have thought) ops could either have cosigned on that, or, more likely, suggested to Marsh another escape route.
None of the mistakes here are something like sexual harassment where someone may from the get-go have known they were doing something wrong and taken intentional steps to be deceptive. It is troubling to here that Marsh was big on crew secrecy, so he may have been aware that his tactics were often at best unorthodox, but that doesn’t mean he would have actively distorted information if a conversation were to have been pressed. That’s one good reason for people to manage by asking questions until they feel they are reasonably getting straight answers back.
For instance, if someone says they are abandoning an SZ, in essence, and going down an escape route to another SZ, a reasonable set of questions is 1) why abandon the first SZ at a time of escalating fire behavior, and 2) what’s your escape route, and 3) what’s your next SZ, and why is it preferable? None of those questions seem to have been asked. Not malice, but not reasonable care of a concerned manager, either.
While ‘everybody is responsible for their own safety’ is a true statement, enough is known about human nature to require having Safety Officers on IMT fires.
Safety Officers certainly can, and do, perform a certain amount of mother-henning when it comes to 10/18, LCES, and other proper safety practices.
If you ask, most fire managers would admit that they’re among the most important people out there.
Checks and balances help minimize the effects of human error.
TTWARE. You’re comments are always point on, no BS, and well stated. Thank You
Yep, another in a long line of excellent comments from TWARE.
mike- your perspective is a worthy one. i am sorry you’ve fallen into this futile argument with the yappy-dog.
the ADOSH report and associated fines are out of touch with reality. had the IMT evacuated all the personnel off of YHF at 1530 as it suggests, and allowed the fire to roll through Glen Illah, or whichever community it was pointed toward, with all the folks there who had refused to evacuate, there would be ten times as many lawsuits.
the only reason more homes weren’t lost, and civilian causalities didn’t transpire, is because of the efforts of the wff’s. again, as far as GM goes, they had the safest assignment of nearly any other resource on the fire that day. anchor, flank and pinch from the black.
>> xxfullsailxx said…
>> as far as GM goes, they had the safest
>> assignment of nearly any other resource
>> on the fire that day.
Until they didn’t.
The anchor point ‘assignment’ isn’t what killed them.
It was the ‘next assignment’.
Whether that was a *totally* self-imposed ‘new assignment’ or a response to the requests/urgings/directives of management is what remains to be fully discovered and documented.
again, even if there was another request for GM… they had every right, reason and justification to turn it down.
unless you’re an internet conspiracy theorist with nothing better to do, you understand that very basic fact.
Well, we know that there was a request for GM to come down, so TOTALLY self-imposed seems an unlikely scenario. There’s no sign yet that there was an order or veiled order for them to come down. Regardless, at multiple points during the day but certainly around the time GM made the decision to move and for a few minutes after, 30 seconds of communication that didn’t happen could have resulted in GM ultimately making different decisions. There are obviously large vested interests (financial but also professional) that are strongly committed to saying that all responsibility rests on people who aren’t here anymore. But, if the transition from IA and thereafter had been handled better — in line with what standards would suggest — there is a reasonable likelihood that the bushwhack never would have happened.
I still think critical evidence is being with-held. It could be that that evidence is not so critical. It could be that Granite Mountain made the decision completely internally, wanting to push their odds on their own, as they sometimes had done in the past. But there are chunks of that that still don’t make sense to me.
But if that were the case, if there is “nothing to hide,” if it is just them making a truly stupid and dangerous decision on their own, why was a camera that contained a critical conversation hidden from the chain of evidence, why are cellphones still missing, why are gps units still missing, and why are the critical conversations GM had over their crew radio frequency–obviously listened to by Brendan, and likely listened to by various Blue Ridge Hotshots, and maybe listened to by Daryll Willis, still missing?
WTKTT
Just reread your post on the 3rd.
the extra 9 or 10 min. could be attributed to the crew waiting for Marsh to drop off the top and catching up with the crew. Just another possibility. No evidence for proof but very plausible.
Reply to Bob Powers post on May 5, 2014 at 5:39 pm
>> Mr. Powers wrote…
>> WTKTT… Just reread your post on the 3rd.
>> The extra 9 or 10 min. could be attributed to the crew waiting for
>> Marsh to drop off the top and catching up with the crew. Just
>> another possibility. No evidence for proof but very plausible.
Yes. Still perfectly possible.
It’s GOOD to have an accurate timeline now for all the photographic evidence from up on that ridge that afternoon… but it DOES throw some new mysteries into the works.
When everyone ( SAIT included ) just thought that Wade Parker’s photo that he texted to his mother was *actually* taken from that ‘Rest Location’ at 4:04 PM ( and that that could be assumed to be the LAST photo taken at that location ) it seemed to nail down a time when they MUST have left that location to head SOUTH ( SAIR ended up saying 4:05 PM ).
The SAIT must have just done some kind of ‘test walk’ from that ‘Rest Location’ to the ‘Descent Point’ ( they never said HOW they arrived at ANY of their time estimates ) and it came out around 15 minutes, so 4:20 PM then just became their logical ‘guesstimate’ as to when Steed/Crew (plus Marsh?) made it to the ‘Descent Point’… and that is the time they ‘published’ in the SAIR.
Now that the ONLY *actual* proof as to the what TIME they were STILL at that ‘Rest Location’ and taking all those photos/videos is Christopher’s final cellphone image ( IMG_2738 taken at exactly 3:55.31 PM )… there are now 9 to 10 minutes ‘unaccounted for’ and we really have no proof WHAT was happening during that time.
Personally?… I think if they HAD just sat there at that ‘Rest Location’ for 9 or 10 more minutes just waiting for Marsh to ‘arrive’ there BEFORE heading SOUTH…
…I simply think we would be seeing MORE PHOTOS with timestamps in the 3:55 to 4:04 PM timeframe.
They would have had nothing else to do for those extra 9 or 10 minutes ( waiting for Marsh ) than to just keep doing exactly what they had been doing ( taking lots of pictures of the fire ).
Somehow… I believe the fact that all the ‘picture taking’ abruptly ENDS with Christopher’s IMG_2738 at exactly 3:55.31 PM means something.
I believe it *means* ( at the very least ) that 3:56 PM is then about the time Steed ‘announced’ something like “gaggle up, boys… we’re leaving”… and they did, in fact, leave that ‘Rest Location’ then.
Now… whether they just moved those few hundred feet to the
southwest to the ‘two-track’ and began ‘assembling’ there on the two-track ( but still ended up waiting THERE for Marsh to catch up from behind )… we simply don’t know.
But the ‘picture taking’ DID abruptly ended at 3:55.31 PM, and I think that means something.
I still think Marsh was at the ‘end of the line’ of 19 men, even if they did wait for him… and that still has to be the ultimate explanation for Steed being the one to come on the radio FIRST with the initial MAYDAY… and only 3 minutes later do we then hear Marsh ( out of breath from running ) come on the radio saying “This is DIVSA… and I’m here NOW with Granite Mountain”…
…but when they actually left to head SOUTH ( and at what point Marsh really was finally ‘with them’ ) we still don’t know.
WTKTT… I agree with the point that it appears GM left the location where all the pictures and videos were taken circa 1556. And it appears that the SAIT was basing their timeline on the text sent by Parker and the incorrect timestamp (thanks ASAIT) on the power shot camera.
Could it be that the SAIT used the GPS information from Caldwell to determine not only the times, but also the route GM chose?
It does appear (to me) that after Marsh tells Bravo 33, that is exactly where we want the retardant (1637?), and it wasn’t dropped,; then Marsh didn’t transmit again until he was with the crew. However, I am not convinced he was behind the crew. If so, there is no way (in my opinion) he could have saw Bravo 33 flying through the middle bowl west to east.
BTW… Blue Ridge YIN says the first radio traffic they heard regarding GM in trouble came on Tac1, not A/G (tac 5)
YIN P 44 David Morgan Pilot 215KA….. he heard GM trying to contact AA prior to deployment.
Regarding the link to the Facebook comment. I hope the person that actually made the comment will speak up and share the information.
Calvin, I don’t know a lot about Hotshots, but I would bet my LEFT arm based on what I have learned over the past many months that Wade Parker was *NOT* texting and moving at the same time. Therefore, regardless of the time that he TOOK his picture, we can assume with some relative level of certainty that he SENT it at 4:04 p.m., such that the GM guys were NOT on the move at 4:04 p.m. They left AFTER 4:04 p.m. No?
Elizabeth. I agree, most people do not text while hiking on uneven terrain. And I agree, with a fair amount of certainty that Wade Parker did send the text at 1604
You know what doesn’t make sense? To accept as fact that GMH took a minimum of 10 photos and 3 videos between 1549 and 1556 and suddenly turned off their cameras while continuing to sit for another 8 or nine minutes and then suddenly Wade Parker pulls up a picture that is approaching 20 minutes old and texts it, when he could have easily snapped a current photo and sent it.
I think it is much more likely that Wade Parker actually sent the photo after leaving the spot where the picture was taken.
Regarding the facebook comment I have referenced (and the one YOU liked). It *seems* that there was a pause by GM (before descending) and a photo was taken. Wade Parker could have texted his picture at this point. No?
Elizabeth, follow up. It hasn’t been discussed (yet), but I would put the Parker Photo as happening before any Mackenzie picture. And also before the CALDWELL video.
In the very bottom right corner of the Parker picture, you can see a small portion of black helmet. I believe this is the helmet of Robert Caldwell, and he is moving down to the location where he takes his video.
Reply to calvin post
on May 6, 2014 at 1:52 pm
>> calvin said…
>> It hasn’t been discussed
>> (yet), but I would put the
>> Parker Photo as happening
>> before any Mackenzie
>> picture. And also before
>> the CALDWELL video.
calvin… it HAS been discussed, even recently, and there is a video that pretty much PROVES that Parker actually *took* his ‘texted photo’ just BEFORE Caldwell shot his video.
That ‘video crossfade’ between Parker’s photo and a stillframe from the start of Caldwell’s video is here…
Youtube Video Title is…
‘Parker-and-Caldwell’
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B9emH4nY_zs
This ‘video crossfade’ clearly shows that the fireline has progressed some to the SOUTH in-between Parker’s photo and the start of Caldwell’s video.
Sorry WTKTT. Thanks for correcting me.
The only thing that has NOT been resolved about the TIME on the Parker photo ( texted out some 14 minutes AFTER he took it ) is exactly HOW MUCH sooner he took it before Caldwell started shooting his video there.
It’s hard to venture a guess just from looking at the ‘crossfade’… but I would say it had to be no sooner than about 60 seconds before the video… but not anything less than 15 or 20 seconds.
Do you see any better way to nail that down other than ‘guessing’ about the fire progression seen in the ‘crossfade’?
Reply to Elizabeth post on
May 6, 2014 at 10:56 am said:
>> Elizabeth said…
>> I would bet my LEFT arm based on what
>> I have learned over the past many months
>> that Wade Parker was *NOT* texting and
>> moving at the same time.
Elizabeth… I don’t know if the loss of any extremities depends on it… but that is a
fair assumption to make.
You are RIGHT to point out that the 4:04 PM
network timestamp on Wade Parker’s ‘transmission’ DOES exist… and will always need to be ‘factored in’.
I agree with you.
It is NOT LIKELY that Wade Parker was ‘sneaking in a text transmit’ while he was
ACTUALLY ‘hiking’ in-line with the rest of the men. It was not the ‘policy’ of this Granite Mountain organization for ANYONE to be using their electronic devices WHILE they were hiking.
Indeed… except for the odd ‘opportunistic’ shot like a retardant drop happening ( everyone gets their cameras out for those ) the ‘policy’ seems to have been ‘no picture taking, texting, or phone calls unless on a break’.
So is the 4:04 PM network timestamp on the text message enough PROOF that they didn’t actually DEPART that ‘Rest Location’ and head SOUTH until 4:04 PM?
Maybe. Maybe not.
As I said above… it is GOOD to (finally) have an accurate timeline for ALL of that photographic evidence from out on that ridge that afternoon… but the new *accuracy* calls into question previous *assumptions* like when they actually did LEAVE that area.
It is perfectly possible they DID *leave* that photo-taking location right at 1556 ( when the picture taking stops )… but it was not possible to ‘form a line’ in those ROCKS.
Their next ‘move’ would have been over to the two-track to start ‘assembling’ into a single file line… and I’m sure that’s what they did next.
It’s possible they THEN just waited THERE on the two-track for another 8-9 minutes for Marsh to ‘catch up’ to where they were.
Whether he ( Marsh ) did or not… or whether they got tired of waiting for him and took off SOUTH without him is still unknown…
…but it is possible that if that is what they were doing ( waiting for Marsh while lined up on the two-track ) that they would have still been in ‘break mode’ and it would have been OK for Parker to still be fooling with his smartphone and sending his text message at 4:04 PM… BEFORE starting the ‘hike’ SOUTH.
I’m afraid it is going to remain debatable, however.
Parker COULD have ‘snuck in a text transmit’ as they were hiking south… even if he wasn’t supposed to.
Regarding the time issue, the more I think about it as I try to put myself in their shoes, I think there must have been a brief period at the top of the bowl (1-5 minutes) where they were contemplating the “Now what?” moment.
As they trudged along the 2-track, they had no idea what the direct route to the ranch was going to look like from the top of the bowl. All of a sudden, they were facing a transition from an open path, to a brush-choked bowl. There had to have been some ‘oh shit, now what?’ thoughts and comments as they contemplated their next move.
My speculation is that they discussed it, and thought about it for a brief period of time as noted above, before actually committing themselves, which may account for some of the ‘travel minutes’.
Reply to TTWARE post on May 6, 2014 at 9:36 am
>> TTWARE said…
>> Regarding the time issue, the more I think about it as
>> I try to put myself in their shoes, I think there must have
>> been a brief period at the top of the bowl (1-5 minutes)
>> where they were contemplating the “Now what?”
>> moment.
Yes. It’s hard to picture that ‘decision’ happening any other way. There have been times when it seems like Steed might have just put his ‘left blinker on’ and down they went… but given the circumstances that afternoon that would almost surely represent some kind of ‘heat stroke’ moment.
I’m sure, when Steed humped over that final rise in the two-track and the Ranch actually came into view ( and the rest of the two-track heading SOUTH essentially ‘disappeared from view’ )… he was probably shocked.
>> TTWARE also said…
>> As they trudged along the 2-track, they had no idea
>> what the direct route to the ranch was going to look like
>> from the top of the bowl. All of a sudden, they were
>> facing a transition from an open path, to a brush-choked
>> bowl. There had to have been some ‘oh shit, now what?’
>> thoughts and comments as they contemplated their
>> next move.
Most likely. I would even say the “oh shit, now what?” moment was (briefly) preceded by a few seconds of
“Are you f**king KIDDING ME?”.
Whether or not Steed actually got right on the radio and expressed either of those sentiments to his boss ( Eric Marsh )… we do not know.
>> TTWARE also said…
>> My speculation is that they discussed it, and thought
>> about it for a brief period of time as noted above, before
>> actually committing themselves, which may account for
>> some of the ‘travel minutes.
Your ‘they’ and ‘themselves’ obviously just refers to Steed and Marsh. The other 17 were just ‘along for the ride’ at that point.
If Marsh was not physically with Steed at this point… then ANY conversations about this ‘decision’ pretty much MUST have taken place on the intra-crew channel… and anyone who was listening to that channel at that time ( like Brendan McDonough, Darrell Willis, and perhaps up to 3 Blue Ridge Hot Shots sitting in the other 3 GM vehicles ) probably heard some/all of this ‘decision making’.
There is still one background radio capture right around this exact time that APPEARS to be Marsh telling someone ( like Steed? ) to ‘not be upset’ and Marsh then seems to say he’s ‘coming off the slope’ in an effort to get ‘catch up’ quicker…
…but that background capture has NOT been verified yet.
Even if that background capture ends up being verified it is obvious it was taking place on one of the open TAC channels, which itself would then be another mystery.
If Steed really was ‘upset’ about the decision that now lay in front of him and was expressing that to Eric Marsh… WHY would he be doing that on an open TAC 1 or 2 channel and NOT on the GM intra-crew?
Reply to Elizabeth post on April 30, 2014 at 7:53 pm
>> Elizabeth said…
>> There absolutely 100% *are* text messages and photos
>> ( from GM Hotshots ) that the SAIT was never given. The
>> SAIT never ASKED for them (to this day).
>>
>> WantsToKnowTheTruth on April 30, 2014 at 8:40 pm said:
>> I honestly hadn’t heard that.
>> My turn to ask…
>> What are YOU basing THAT statement on?
>>
>> calvin on May 1, 2014 at 3:17 am said:
>> Elizabeth. How many? Did the ADOSH investigators ask for
>> other pictures and texts that were sent?
>> ScottNorrisPhotoAndText.pdf says……(in an email from Randy
>> Okon to Richa Wilson)on August 8 2013……..
>> I believe we have received all text and photos from the families that
>> we are going to see.
>>
>> Marti Reed on May 1, 2014 at 8:43 pm said:
>> So….. evidence? Links? How do you KNOW that??
Elizabeth…
We are ALL still waiting for an answer here.
Did you just ‘make that up’… or do you *actually* have evidence to support your statement that there are other texts and/or emails from the Granite Mountain Hotshots on Sunday, June 30, 2013 that have never seen the light of day?
WTKTT. I believe Elizabeth is correct, but it would be nice if she could be more specific , or give examples. Thanks
calvin… what makes YOU think she is correct? I honestly hadn’t heard anything about this so just wondering what makes you think she even *might* be correct?
Did someone say something in a media article?
Rumors?
…OR… just ( perhaps ) a *feeling* and/or *assuming* that
some family members *might* have had things they didn’t
want to share with investigators?
I don’t actually have that *feeling* or *assumption* myself.
I would find it very hard to believe that any family member
might have been *refusing* to cooperate with investigators,
which is why I’m simply wondering what this *claim* is
really based on.
Facebook comment is what I am referencing.
Link?
Reply to Elizabeth post on May 5, 2014 at 10:35 am
NOTE: This is a ‘continuation’ of a discussion that was taking place down below
regarding Rory Collins ‘abruptly’ leaving the fire at 1558… but the ‘reply’ comment
space got filled up to the right-side. New parent comment started to make
room for more comment.
>> Elizabeth asked…
>> What makes you think the briefing Rory gave (as compared to the one
>> Bravo3 gave, for example) was NOT a proper briefing?
I can’t believe we are going over this one again.
You, yourself, have already asked for ‘opinions’ about this a number of times
before and below is simply a ‘reprint’ of ONE of the answers from March 12…
>> WantsToKnowTheTruth on March 12, 2014 at 6:52 pm said:
>> Reply to Elizabeth post on March 12, 2014 at 4:29 pm
>>
>> Elizabeth said…
>> Rory left the fire at 3:59 p.m. because the PILOT who was
>> FLYING the plane for him RAN out of time and had to return
>> to Deer Creek (or Deer Valley or whatever it was). That pilot
>> could NO longer be in the air, according to the relevant
>> regulations/rules.
>>
>> WTKTT responded…
Correct. ( Deer Valley is where the airstrip was ).
I also agree with your opinion that the ‘official’ reports ( the SAIR in particular ) did Rory Collins a huge disservice by not making it clear that it was not HIS decision to ‘abrupty leave the fire’ at 1558 ( timestamp according to SAIR report ).
That being said… there is STILL the following documented testimony from Bravo 33 regarding the ‘briefing’ ( or lack thereof ) from Mr. Collins that day.
Does THIS sound like Mr. Rory Collins gave them any kind of “proper briefing”?
SAIT Interview Notes ( page 15 )…
_____________________________________________________
INTERVIEW WITH BRAVO 33
July 9, 2013 – 1700
Interviewees:
John Burfiend-ATS Specialist
Clint Clauson – ATS Trainee
Thomas French – AT Specialist
Interviewers:
Mike Dudley, Brad Mayhew, Tim Foley, Jay Kurth, Jimmy Rocha
__________________________________________________________________
We had been there about 1 ½ hours when air attack on the scene told us he had
to leave. (1700 NM time). It was a strange change out. He just said “you have the
fire, I’m leaving”. Not sure if I was talking to structure group 1 or 2. I remember
looking up. Talking to ops structural group 1, 2 and ops.
I knew there was 2 structural groups. I wrote down 2. Tom said “hey dude, you
are the air attack”.
Didn’t know Division A was the superintendent of the Granite Mountain hot shots.
Air attack didn’t tell me there were resources in the area.
I never got divisions from the briefing. Didn’t know there were divisions. Thought it
was a Type 3 incident. I didn’t recognize Todd’s voice. I didn’t know anybody was
taking any action on the fire.
I didn’t know that Blue Ridge was there until we were home watching the news.
__________________________________________________________________
So, given these statements from Bravo 33, how can ANYONE say that
Rory Collins did a ‘proper transition briefing’ with these guys before just
bailing off the fire? Even B33 testified it was (quote) “a strange changeout”.
Bravo 33 ended up essentially CLUELESS.
If that is actually ‘standard practice’… then guess what (else) needs to
CHANGE (toot-sweet) in the WFF business.
fire20+
I hear what you were saying and you picked up on mine.
My problem with Putnam is that he did not spend time explaining his theory.
In other words many Fire Fighters not talking to him directly have formed the opinion that the 10 Standard Orders are old and not current for todays fires.
Like his question which one of the Orders is the most important or number one?
As I have said and trained for years no one by its self stands out they are all interactive and have a place at different times on a Fire.
Fight Fire aggressively but provide for safety first—The other 9 are the Safety Rules. That seems to have got lost somewhere with Putnam, at least that’s my take. LCES is good but it is only 3 of the 10 you should always be aware and use the other 7. I hope that makes science. Because of human nature I dought we will ever eliminate Fire Fatalities. Most Fire Fighters will learn and use the rules and that is a good thing.
Reference WTKTT’s 4/30/14 comment regarding Google Earth images, all previous satelite images are still available on Google Earth simply by clicking on the ‘historic images’ (1997) button under the picture. Any placemarks you had imprinted previously, will show up on each of the ‘historic’ images there as well, beginning in 1997.
Thank You and Calvin! I figured they would do that, but haven’t gone there yet.
Followup… ONLY ‘Google Earth’ ( the desktop application ) has the
ability to use ‘previous satellite image sets’. ‘Google Maps’ will still
just ‘default’ to using the ‘latest’ production set of satellite images
which are now ‘post-fire’ ( Dated January 4, 2014 ).
‘Google Earth’ is FREE!
There IS a ‘professional’ ( paid ) version available that has more
capability than the FREE version… but ALL versions of ‘Google
Earth’ can, in fact, show ‘previous satellite images set’ if that’s
what you need to see.
If you still need the pre-fire images… just download/install
the FREE version of ‘Google Earth’.
Just returned from 10 days in Arizona (mainly for a medical conference). Was able to spend a couple of days in Prescott and drive up from Phoenix to Yarnell one afternoon. Also did some hiking in a # of spots.
Couple of observations from Yarnell. First, any suggestion that the men could have dropped packs and “run like hell” is completely nuts. You do not “run” up those steep rock formations. A hike up Camelback Mountain in Phoenix will give you a good idea what climbing up a steep pile of rocks is like. There was no outrunning that fire. Second, driving up to Yarnell, even at the base of the hill, the vegetation did not seem particularly dense. But when you got near the town, it was much denser, even on the Congress side of the ridge. Finally, it has been mentioned that running off to the Congress side was an option. It clearly was, but the rock walls lining Rte 89 were so steep, it did not seem you could have gotten to the highway without going all the way to the bottom of the hill, which is 5 miles down the road (not as the crow flies). Maybe 89 could have been reached higher up in places, maybe Joy or Sonny can shed light on this. Still preferable to dying, but maybe that was why they did not want to fall off to the Congress side.
Yarnell just seemed grim and sad (made worse by the weather, it was cloudy and in the 40s). I did not spend much time there. There really needs to be a proper memorial there (the state is working on this).
Hi Mike,
Agreed on escape all the way back uphill. GM quickly crossed a line where this became a non-option, as going back uphill would have been even slower than their painfully slow pace down through the bowl. Steep slope, difficult soil, and brush were all issues. This is part of why I’ve urged some posters not familiar with local conditions to get that familiarity.
As regards options once entrapment and burnover seemed imminent, GM still had the choice to drop packs and try to escape to at least a better place to hunker down and deploy, among other possibilities. Unfortunately, burning out, which is the option they chose, would have required light fuels which they didn’t have. It should be stressed that none of the options in front of them at that point were good options. But, in terms of making good decisions, Putnam among others has looked at fatality fires and concluded that many would have been survivable had better decisions, and earlier decisions, been made. Given the terrain trap, GM may not have been one of those cases, but given their lookout’s seeming acceptance of deployment earlier, maybe GM had undue emphasis on deployment ingrained. The next crew in a position similar to theirs, where there is not a survivable deployment site, hopefully will be thinking about other options and seeking them.
Plan to never get into a deployment situation. Once your there you have few options and must depend on a fire shelter 50/50.
Reply to SR post on May 3, 2014 at 7:40 am
>> SR said…
>> It should be stressed that none of the options in front
>> of them at that point were good options.
No, they weren’t. The only *real* cure was prevention ( to not have gotten themselves into that situation at all ).
That being said…
>> SR also said…
>> As regards options once entrapment and burnover
>> seemed imminent, GM still had the choice to drop
>> packs and try to escape to at least a better place to
>> hunker down and deploy, among other possibilities.
In general… it should be noted that to this day… NONE of the actual ‘fire progression’ charts produced by any investigative body ( SAIT or ADOSH ) actually shows that even a full minute after Steed’s first MAYDAY ( circa 1640 )… that their path FORWARD had actually been fully ‘cut off’ when Steed’s first MAYDAY went out at 1639.
To the contrary. All the ‘official’ fireline progression charts show that while the fireline was certainly advancing rapidly at 1640… it had *not yet* actually ‘cut them off’ from making more forward progress in an ‘eastward’ direction either in a mad attempt to reach the ranch OR try to cut more to the south across the floor of the canyon and make it into that draw south of the Ranch which exits out towards the Candy Cane Lane.
We also know now that at 1639… some time had ALREADY transpired between the time when they first realized the trouble they were in… then took the time to find a deployment site… and only THEN did Steed make his first MAYDAY call at 1639.
We know now that isn’t ‘over-modulation’ on Steed’s first 1639 MAYDAY call. Steed is actually YELLING into the microphone because there are ( at least ) TWO chainsaws fully running right there near him and he was ‘yellling’ as much to be able to hear himself talking as to make sure Bravo 33 could hear him over the saws.
So that really does mean a certain amount of time ( several minutes, even? ) had ALREADY passed between making all the decisions to deploy, find a good place, and pull ropes on saws to improve the site BEFORE there was any attempt to contact Bravo 33.
The electricity didn’t go off at the Boulder Springs Ranch until 1653 ( Page 70 of SAIR ) and that timeframe for the fireline actually ‘reaching’ the Boulder Springs Ranch is now supported by the Security Camera Videos.
Steed only said ( at 1639 ) “We are in front of the flaming front”… but even at 1640 none of the ‘official’ fireline progression charts show that to actually have been the case.
It would Marsh who would then say ( almost 3 minutes later circa 1642 ) that their “escape route has been cut-off”.
Again… even at 1642… no officially published fire progression chart shows that to *actually* be fully the case.
It was now (probably) DARK AS NIGHT at that location… and the smoke would have been reducing visibility in ANY direction to almost ZERO… so I’m not saying they could actually ‘see’ that they might have had other ‘chances’ at that point… but it’s still curious to note that the officially published fireline progressions do not fully support their own (recorded) perceptions of the situation circa 1639 / 1640.
>> SR also wrote…
>> given their lookout’s seeming acceptance of deployment
>> earlier, maybe GM had undue emphasis on deployment
>> ingrained.
If Frisby had not ‘accidentally’ come across Brendan when he did… OR whoever he had called on the radio to come get him blew two tires halfway there… then YES… it appears that Brendan is saying he would have ‘deployed’ as a ‘first choice’.
If he had then died… we would simply be here now scratching out heads about ‘situational awareness’ again but this time it would be about why Brendan didn’t really ‘consider his other options’. Just 1 or 2 hundred yards east on that trail was an ‘intersection’ with a Jeep trail that heads directly SOUTH to the Boulder Springs Ranch itself. Brendan could have easily ‘dropped packs and run’ to that intersection and then headed SOUTH and AWAY from the fire…
…but ( even according to his own interviews ) Brendan was totally unaware of that ‘option’. He had NO MAP… and no full ‘situational awareness’ of even his own location that day.
When your own ‘Wildland Division Chief’ ( Darrell Willis ) stands in front of cameras at the same deployment site where he just lost (almost) ALL of his men and says he has no idea what the ‘upper limit’ is for a fire shelter… you DO have to wonder if ANYONE in this organization really had a full understanding of the capabilities of their own equipment or ( worse yet ) were actually ‘teaching’ people to rely on it under totally inappropriate circumstances.
>> SR also said…
>> The next crew in a position similar to theirs, where
>> there is not a survivable deployment site, hopefully
>> will be thinking about other options and seeking them.
It is still worth discussing ( what the other options *might* have been ) and the ‘training’ should focus on that.
SR, your reference to Dr. Putnam is spot on. Fighting fire is easy, its the human factors that can get you in trouble. Better decisions & earlier decisions–BY HUMANS–should/could/would save lives. Unfortunately fatality investigations look at the ‘science’ (sorry FBA’s), 10&18 (essentially blame FF’s themselves), and continue to downplay managements role (go pick an entrapment lessons learned & read for yourselves) more intently than the human side of things. If you haven’t read Dr. Putnam’s essay ‘Up In Smoke’ from 2000–do!
Fire 20+
While I understand what Putnam is trying to put forth he is causing havoc in the Safety rules.
First there are the 10 standard orders. They are to give directions for safety. If you do not follow them then evidently you will asses fault according to each one that was not used that caused fatalities.
It is like any Industry accident there are safety rules trained and posted. If you put your body or extremities where they don’t belong and Die then the finding will be that you violated one or more of the rules. So the 10 Standard FFO keep you safe they also show what went wrong. To list the orders that weren’t followed will make fire fighters aware of the need to follow the Orders. Wild Fire burn over fatalities are not that common, that’s because Fire Fighters follow and use the rules. Accidents happen because humans cut corners and forget or ignore the rules. Train– Situation Awareness and use the 10 and 18 and you will stay safe like thousands who are and have gone before you.
If you read Putnam’s piece on the 10 orders, including his listing of the “Real,” i.e. unspoken, fire orders, together with his “Up in Smoke,” I think what he is getting at makes sense. Basically, recognizing that there needs to be some priority, and actual accountability. Certainly many symptoms of the “real orders” seemed to be on display at the YHF.
Key to me is Putnam really does want accountability. Some of his points are used by some people to argue for no accountability. Bob I think in part is saying he want there to be accountability as well. Some of the “nothing-to-see-here” comments in this forum reflect the no-accountability (and above all no financial liability) viewpoint, both as regards the obvious problems with GM but also issues like SZs.
Bob (and wtktt below),
I understand what you are saying about the 10 SFFO (which if they aren’t met–NO engagement) and not EVER getting into a situation where a shelter is needed/used, please know this, including researching and learning from other’s mistakes.
What I grabbed ahold of in your post was your Putnam reference and ‘survivable with better decisions’ — decisions being a human factor…Putnam’s essay’s are applicable from 2000 to now, no? And your reply ‘Accidents happen because humans cut corners and forget or ignore the rules.’…HUMANS..that’s all I’m saying, and again, the 10 SFFO, when followed, saves lives.
Also look at Putnam’s reference to Management when questioned regarding the 10 SFFO…when do we break them and when do we bend them? Could it be there is a possible disconnect between Management and real, attainable goals accomplished by FF’s in the current fire environment, particularly T1 FF’s? Absolutely, and/but please prove me wrong. Accountability is where it’s at, and Management doesn’t care for that word, trust me.
The 10 SFFO, are mentally checked by the Supt/Asst Supt, mitigated, followed, and the 18 are different, more flexible. Perhaps a flaw w/i the 10 SFFO are people’s (w/ different experience levels) perceptions of what they mean at extremely different situations/circumstances?
It’s a scary time…yes, like you said SA, train, talk, and don’t be afraid to speak up.
If you don’t mind, please expand on Putnam causing havoc in safety rules? All I have read isn’t current…and have you been on an IHC that has practiced mindfulness?
—-Reference to WTKTT reply—-
I’m sorry, I have read all YHF evidence…what I was speaking of was historical entrapment lessons learned, not YHF. You are right, Management’s failings ARE scathing, if only they’d of told the truth from the beginning…
I do think there were problems with the management of this fire, especially as related to failure to evacuate citizens, as well as the firefighters in close to town in a timely matter, coming from not appreciating how fast this fire was moving. There may also have been some mixed messages. But, specifically as relates to the GMHS ON THAT DAY (not discussing Willis’ relationship with Marsh or their feelings about structure protection), tell me what was fire management’s great sin? Fire management obviously cannot know exactly what is happening with the fire everywhere at all times. So was asking for possible assistance a real sin? If it is judged to be so, worthy of a giant fine, how will fire commands operate in the future? Will they be afraid to make requests, if they can be punished for doing so? Whereas the SAIT was unwilling to explicitly point out errors, I think ADOSH was an overreaction. I think they went in with the idea of hanging the fire command, no matter what the facts were. They criticized and fined fire command for not pulling the GMHS out. But they were safe were they were, so why was not pulling them out worthy of condemnation? But ADOSH took the view that 19 men died, so someone was going to take the hit and it was not going to be the crew. As I have said, ADOSH did contribute by helping to understand the timeline better, but I do not think their conclusions were any more supported by the facts than those of the SAIT.
Did you read the actual ADOSH report? They lay out the multiple balls that got dropped pretty clearly. Not all of those dropped balls even related to GM.
Given what happened that day, the fine wasn’t that big, btw. $25k per death, for instance, doesn’t pay for much these days.
I read the report. I also acknowledged above the problems not related directly to the GMHS. The main finding of the report as relates to the GMHS was they were not pulled out. As I asked above, given that the GMHS were safe in place, why is this criticism valid? Yes, the fire command failed to appreciate the speed of the fire that afternoon and they were lucky people did not die in Yarnell. But that should not have killed the GMHS. The critical failing there was that the crew did not ensure its own safety. Don’t refer back to the report. In your own words, tell me what was the “sin” of the fire command as relates to the GMHS that day – i.e. don’t say the IA was inadequate – that is said about every big fire.
I think it was Musser who once asked in an interview – given the situation that afternoon with people still in Yarnell, what were they supposed to do? Were they supposed to pull out and leave people to whatever fate befell them? We probably could argue a long time about that, but that was the dilemma fire command was facing late that day.
Mike a good team in place can make good decisions.
1. OPS could have been more aggressive with GM, Realized they were hung out to dry and pulled them out early. As there line supervisor specificly told them to pull back into the old black and Waite until it was clear to move that is his job.
2. Also a evack plan should have been in place and implemented earlier working with local Sheriff’s office Overhead cut that way to close or not at all a real plan.
I have said before this was a overhead nightmare that never got better. The type 2 team was never organized or really in control.
Failure to pull GM out early is far from the only issue in the report relating to GM. Serious shortcomings in risk management, and serious problems with operational oversight, are some of the standout issues.
Reply to FIRE20+ post on May 4, 2014 at 6:16 am
>> FIRE20+ wrote…
>> Unfortunately fatality investigations look at the
>> ‘science’ (sorry FBA’s), 10&18 (essentially
>> blame FF’s themselves), and continue to
>> downplay managements role
Only if you (apparently) let ‘Forestry’ people do it.
The ADOSH investigation *VERY* much found that ‘management’ was ‘at fault’ here. No question.
The ‘summaries’ state that… but if you actually read the full ADOSH release and the ‘detail pages’ behind each and every ‘assigned infraction’… the opinions about management’s ‘failings’ are scathing… all the way through Friday night, Saturday, and all day Sunday.
It was not ADOSH’s job to ‘name names’. From their perspective… it was a ‘workplace environment’ that was SUPPOSED to be run ‘according to the rules’ by the EMPLOYER(S)… to provide ( and ENSURE ) *safety* for the EMPLOYEES in that workplace… but ADOSH found that was simply ‘way off the charts’.
mike- i continue to appreciate the fact that you try to gain more perspective, both by remaining open minded and relatively non-judgmental and not to mention the fact that you traveled to the site to gain first hand insights…
that’s worth ten-fold more than all the pages of judgmental speculation from the non-experts on this commentary. and much more meaningful and respectful to the deceased and their loved ones.
Sonny: From where we dropped off, yes, you could have continued to highway 89 without much difficulty. We could have reached hwy 89 as quickly or sooner than we reached Foothill Dr. where my car was parked. We did a hike right off the plateau that has a rocky and steep drop off for about appx. 200 yards so that could have been an option for sure.
Joy: Shed light. Hmmm. I am the one that wanted to go to remain on the 2 track ridge road towards the cattle pond near the Helm’s spot that was nearer to the car’s location so I never really gave the Congress side much thought until Sonny came back for me and stated this was a situation we had to get the hell outta—In knowing Sonny as my hiking partner and I am the desert walker—one true lesson in this is the value in his expertise and raw knowledge in knowing the terrain even if he had not hiked it or lived that area as long as I did. That man has a rare quality that you either get by “living” it all your life that you never learn in any school. I wonder what they have as part of the training for wildland firefighters because I am always going to be bewildered as to WHY 19 men stuck together to die while we SURVIVED that fire and WHY they went down the very area Sonny/I disagreed early that morning on the hike up. The area they died is the same gps coordinates to where we argued because I was not going up that steep terrain when it was still dark out knowing that tight maze like manzanita terrain in snake country and I was not going to crawl at dark time under it so he appeased me and went my way that morning scaling boulders around the base to the old grader road but it saddens me that there is no reason 19 men should have perished. I had the sheriff dept find me with their great gps program yet 19 men died and it is labeled due to heavy smoke and not able to fly in the area or we heard it was a chaotic afternoon and a bad thing happened. Sure did. A very bad thing! I hope clarity is reached in this mystery—that is all. As far as shedding light on the topic—what Sonny says is GOLD! enough said.
WTKTT….Can you take a look at image p0260 and help me find the Rest spot #2?
We do know that the group of GMH in image 0885,0886 and 0887 made it to the rest spot #2, however, at this point it doesn’t make sense to me that they are walking away from the Black, walking away from rest spot #2. It also doesn’t make sense that they would have stopped only a couple minutes away from rest spot #2 if that was the destination, at that point. And, if they didn’t access the two track to achieve the move to rest spot #2, they would have been moving through brush, right?
And I think it should be noted again, that all 19 GMH are not accounted for in any of the images taken from the rest spot #2. But I think it is now certain that Neil and Maclean got it wrong when they say a group of sawyers left the black at 1553 (referencing 0885,0886,0887), we now know Ashcraft, Norris and another hotshot/ sawyer (seen in movie 0888 holding a chainsaw) are at rest are #2 circa 1555.
Reply to calvin post on May 2, 2014 at 3:36 am
>> calvin said…
>> WTKTT….Can you take a look at image p0260 and help
>> me find the Rest spot #2?
Yes. I will do so. Actually… I’m working on a VIDEO that explains
all this complete with maps and crossfades of relevant photos.
Stay tuned.
In the meantime…
>> calvin also said…
>> We do know that the group of GMH in image 0885,0886 and
>> 0887 made it to the rest spot #2,
Yes. Confirmed.
>> calvin also said…
>> however, at this point it doesn’t make sense to me that they
>> are walking away from the Black, walking away from rest
>> spot #2.
They are not walking AWAY from ‘rest spot #2’. That’s where
they are GOING. It was a steep slope… and there were other
rock formations to their LEFT that would have been blocking
a direct walk directly UP the slope to where the others were
gathering. It makes perfect sense that they just walked to
RIGHT at first and exited the camera frame to the RIGHT.
They were simply circling AROUND the point where
MacKenzie was standing there shooting pictures.
Pre-fire Google images show there was a ‘better’ walking
path UP the slope there BEHIND that point where Christopher
was standing.
>> calvin also wrote…
>> It also doesn’t make sense that they would have stopped
>> only a couple minutes away from rest spot #2 if that was
>> the destination, at that point.
You make it sound like you think they were somewhere
else when the ‘tools up’ order came just minutes before
that ( when Brendan left his lookout post ).
I believe that place where we see them in the MacKenzine
0085, 0086 photos IS the place where they were ‘working’
when that ‘tools up’ order came… but they were told to
‘standby’ because Marsh/Steed were busy with conversations
with Frisby about the vehicles… so it just became a “smoke ’em
if ya got ’em” moment… which these translates to “Photo time!”.
As soon as Marsh finished talking to OPS2 Paul Musser circa
1542 to 1543… that’s when ‘breaktime’ was over and then
Steed told them to ‘come up the slope now’ and join the others.
Steed didn’t even need a radio to do that at that point since
there were so close by.
If Steed was already right above them there at ‘Rest Spot 2’
he could have just waved his arm and called them up the slope
or he could have just shouted down to then, sans radio.
>> calvin also asked
>> And, if they didn’t access the two track to achieve the move
>> to rest spot #2, they would have been moving through
>> brush, right?
Yes. Probably… but the BLACK was right there and it extended
straight UP the slope and encompassed ‘Rest Spot 2’ itself.
It appears they just basically ‘walked the retardant line’ up
the slope a ways and ( in this case, almost literally ) had
‘one foot in the black’.
>> calvin also said…
>> And I think it should be noted again, that all 19 GMH are not
>> accounted for in any of the images taken from the rest spot #2.
Correct. There are a LOT of fella missing from all of these
photos ( and they always have been ).
Now that we know that Christopher’s last cellphone image
IMG_2738.JPG ( taken at 3:55.31 PM ) is the LAST photo taken
by any Hotshot that day from that ‘Rest spot 2’… we still have
to answer these questions…
1) Why did the picture taking STOP at 3:55? Is that when Steed
turned to them all and suddenly said something like ‘gaggle up,
boys, we’re leaving’?
2) If the picture taking session just STOPPED of its own accord,
and they DID, in fact, just stay there until 4:04 or 4:05 before
heading SOUTH… then why did they even wait those 9 minutes
before leaving? Could it be they were simply waiting for the
OTHER fellas ( not seen in any photos ) to arrive there from
wherever THEY has been working ( 1 or even 2 squads
from other ‘work spots’, or something? ).
3) Did Steed and the fellas we CAN see at the ‘Rest Spot 2’
actually take off SOUTH at 3:55 or 3:56 ( and that really is
why the photo taking session ends abruptly at 3:55 )… and
the OTHER ‘squads’ that weren’t even there yet were told
to simply ‘catch up’… and it really didn’t become a full line
of 19 men headed SOUTH until they actually did ‘catch them’?
>> calvin also said…
>> But I think it is now certain that Neil and Maclean got it
>> wrong when they say a group of sawyers left the black at
>> 1553 (referencing 0885,0886,0887), we now know Ashcraft,
>> Norris and another hotshot/ sawyer (seen in movie 0888
>> holding a chainsaw) are at rest are #2 circa 1555.
If Maclean is actually writing a book about all this… I certainly
hope he does his homework better in the long run than he
did regarding THAT “Marsh was at the ranch!” fiasco.
I would hope so to. Some times he stretches the facts or dose not use them.
**
** THE ‘CUTOUT’ ROCK IN MACKENZIE IMAGES
** IMG_0085, IMG_0086 and IMG_0087 IS ONLY
** 80 FEET IN FRONT OF ‘REST LOCATION 2’
For all intents and purposes… what has long been referred to as ‘Rest Location 1’ and ‘Rest Location 2’ with regards to the MacKenzie Canon Powershot images are, essentially, the same place.
** THE SHORT STORY
The basic ‘center’ of that ‘Rest Location 2’ area where MacKenzie shot his two 9 seconds videos ( and his other photos ) has been confirmed to be here…
34.227515, -112.789960
The ‘confirmation’ of that comes from the absolute on-site verification of where Wade Parker took his photo and the fact that the ‘same cactus’ seen in all the photos is right there where it should be. That ‘cactus’ actually survived the firestorm that afternoon and can STILL be seen in even the current post-fire Google Maps imagery. MacKenzie was only standing a few feet to the right of this ‘Wade Parker Photo’ GPS coordinate when he shot his videos. Not even enough to cause a ‘bump’ in these GPS coordinates.
That ‘cutout’ rock seen in the MacKenzie 0885, 0886 and 0887 images ( taken in the 3:44-3:45 PM timeframe ) seems to be right here…
34.227698, -112.789829
That is just 80 feet ‘down the slope’ from the ‘Rest Location 2’ spot where Christopher MacKenzie shot his Canon VIDEOS.
So the Hotshots seen in the 0885, 0886 and 0887 images really did just have a ‘short walk up the hill’ when they left that ‘Rest Location 1’ to simply join the others a little farther up the slope at ‘Rest Location 2’.
Apparently… the only reason we see them exiting the camera to the RIGHT ( and seeming to head DOWN the slope and AWAY from ‘Rest Location 2’ ) is that was the way to go back UP because of the steep slope there and some other rock formations that are out-of-frame to Christopher’s LEFT.
They basically just exited to Christopher’s RIGHT… but then just ‘circled around’ where he was standing and headed to Christopher’s LEFT the few hundred feet it took to go UP the slope, around those rocks, and join the others at the ‘Rest 2′ location’.
** THE LONG STORY
Calvin… you are right about ALL of the photos you have cited already that contain images of this ‘cutout rock’ seen in the MacKenzie Canon 0885, 0886 and 0887 images.
There are also many others like 8 or 9 in Joy Collura’s Folder… the Dean Fernandez aerial photos, etc. etc. Many other Folders.
You are ALSO right that that ‘cutout’ rock is the same one seen in the ‘dead center’ of MacKenzie’s 8090 images taken from the ‘Rest 2’ location.
The following ADOSH photo proves that.
NOTE: It is NOT in the ADOSH GPS stamped folder… it’s in the OTHER one.
* ADOSH PHOTO P9180060
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/20inrene9tcx74a/EC2oDLR41K/ADOSH%20Yarnell%20Hill%20Investigation/Photos%20and%20Video/ADOSH%20Hiking%20Yarnell%20Hill%209%2018%2013#lh:null-P9180060.JPG
The ‘cutout rock’ is seen in this photo face-on at the top-center of the photograph… along with those 2 other ‘unique’ (large) rocks to the LEFT of it.
There is NO QUESTION that those are the same 3 rocks in BOTH the P9180060 photo *AND* Christopher’s IMG_0890 photo.
In the P9180060 photo… look at the top left side of the ‘chunked rock’ that is facing the camera. There is what almost looks like a man-made ‘chisled out’ indentation about 2 inches deep that when viewed in P9180060 almost looks like the little ’round balloon coming to a point’ that you see in Google Maps. The inside of this ‘balloon coming to a point’ shape also has a different COLOR than the rest of the surface of that ‘chunked rock’.
Now look at that ‘pointy rock’ in the exact center of MacKenzie’s IMG_0890 ( the one you mentioned ).
It’s the same rock.
We can’t actually SEE the ‘chunkout’ in the IMG_0890 image of it because of the new angle on it. The side of that rock with the ‘chunkout’ is now facing AWAY from the camera… BUT!… that same ‘balloon coming to a point’ chiseled out indentation is also clearly visibile on the side of that ‘pointy rock’ that we CAN still see in IMG_0890.
It’s also obvious in IMG_0890 that the side that is now facing away from the camera ( that has the chunkout ) is perfectly flat-faced… and this matches all other images of that rock perfectly.
* THE OTHER TWO TALL ROCKS THERE…
Now also look at P9180060 again and notice the OTHER two ‘tall rocks’ to the LEFT of the ‘chunked rock’.
The one just to the left of it has its own ‘notch’ on end facing the camera. That ‘cutout’ makes the east facing side of the rock sort of look like a ‘dog’s head’ in profile ( a dog with a flat snout facing the camera, anyway )… and that ‘crack’ that runs in that rock from top left to bottom right ALSO makes that top half of the EAST rock face look lke a ‘dog’s ear’…
…so I’ve been calling THIS rock ‘Dog’s Head Rock’.
In IMG_0890 the other two ‘pointy rocks’ to the left of the one in the center are those SAME ‘other two tall rocks’ seen in P9180060, just viewed from that different angle farther up the hill where they were taking their photos.
In IMG_0890… the other ‘pointy’ rock just to the left of the ‘cutout’ rock with the ‘ballon shaped indentation’ is simply another angle on ‘Dog’s Head Rock’… and the one to the left of THAT is simply the more ‘dome’ shaped rock ( also with a distinct crack ) that is also seen to the left of ‘Dog’s Head Rock’ in the P9180060 photo.
Those THREE rocks seen in P9180060 are just close enough in front of that ‘rest area 2’ location… and just TALL ENOUGH… that that is why they are seen ‘peeking up’ in the foreground in MOST of the photos and videos taken from that ‘Rest Area 2’ location ( including IMG_0890 ).
Many thanks. Are the group of GMH (seen in 0885,0886,0887) returning to the two track to move to rest area 2?
Reply to calvin post on May 1, 2014 at 3:25 am
>> calvin asked…
>> Many thanks. Are the group of GMH (seen in
>> 0885,0886,0887) returning to the two track to
>> move to rest area 2?
They COULD have… but they didn’t have to.
All they were doing was ‘coming up the slope’ to reach
that ‘Rest Location 2’.
Look at the satellite photos ( or the Dean Fernandez
aerial shots ).
They MAY have just circled around behind Christopher
after exiting the camera to his RIGHT… and then just
walked up the slope directly AT the ‘Rest 2 Location’
and entered it that way…
…or they may have gone straight up the slope, caught
the two-track NORTH for only about 100 feet, and
then cut over to the ‘Rest Location 2’ area and entered
it from the BACK.
My guess would be the former. they just came up the
slope a little… cut over to where the others were
already gathering… and never set foot on the two-track
at all.
The interesting part of all of this is not really that they
were all still very close together circa 1543… it’s that
they were already ‘at rest’ and taking photos… and
the sawyers already had their SHEATHS on their
saws… as if they ALREADY knew ( at 1543 ) that the
work was over there.
That means the ‘tools up’ moment for ALL of them
probably came circa 1536 or 1537… when Brendan
left his lookout position.
The same ‘advancing fireline’ that drove Brendan off
his lookout mound and caused Steed to tell Brendan…
“Yeah… I know Brendan… I can see what’s happening
down there” appears to be the same moment Steed
knew to tell his OWN crew ‘tools up’ and that there
was no point in continuing that ‘anchor point’ work.
Thanks!
That’s where I had located them.
Followup… I’m still ‘checking it out’ and trying to verify… but I believe that particular ADOSH photo linked above might actually show the ‘orange rock’ that MacKenzie shows Ashcraft actually SITTING on in his 0085, 0086 photos.
If it’s not one of those ‘retardant covered’ rocks in the ADOSH photo… then it’s probably one just out-of-frame to the LEFT.
Here is that ADOSH photo link again…
* ADOSH PHOTO P9180060
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/20inrene9tcx74a/EC2oDLR41K/ADOSH%20Yarnell%20Hill%20Investigation/Photos%20and%20Video/ADOSH%20Hiking%20Yarnell%20Hill%209%2018%2013#lh:null-P9180060.JPG
More later…
Actually… it’s pretty much verified ( for MacKenzie image 0086, anyway ).
Most of the ‘retardant covered rocks’ in the
fore-to-middle ground of MacKenzie’s 0086
Canon Powershot image are, in fact, sitting
right there in the same fore-middle ground
in the ADOSH photo.
Actually… whoever took that ADOSH photo
was pretty much just about 20 feet to the
right ( and a little farther down the slope ) of where MacKenzie took his 0086 Canon photo.
More later…
**
** GOOGLE EARTH AND GOOGLE MAPS NOW USING
** JANUARY 1, 2014 SATELLITE IMAGERY FOR YARNELL
This is just a ‘heads up’. It was bound to happen sooner or later… and a few
days ago Google switched to now using ‘post-fire’ satellite imagery for the
entire Yarnell area. The ‘pre-fire’ ground images are no longer available and
all you see now is the post-fire ‘moonscape’ with just some vegetation returning.
If you have any ‘Google Earth’ tours recorded… they will still show the same
waypoints and whatnot but the 3D imagery is now ‘post-fire’.
Actually… if you have a paid/professional Google Earth account there IS a
way to ‘dial back’ to previous sets of images… but it is complicated and
requires communicating with Google.
So if anyone has any sets of pre-fire screen snapshots from Google Maps
in ‘satellite view’ or any Google Earth tours recorded as movies using pre-fire
imagery… you should hang on to those for posterity’s sake since they are now
pretty valuable.
The DOWN side is that it is now basically impossible to ‘match up’ any
pre-fire ( or weekend of ) photos with satellite images based on anything
involving the vegetation.
The UP side is that it is also *now* easier to actually match up *some*
images based on the ‘rocks’ that might be showing. The rock formations
are now clearly visible in both Google Maps and Google Earth… whereas
some of them were being ‘hidden’ from the satellite views because of
the vegetation in the pre-fire aerial imagery.
The new January 1, 2014 set of satellite images also show something
very interesting. They were taken very LATE in the afternoon on a sunny
day ( almost near sundown? ) and this means the SHADOWS on the
ground are VERY prominent and can easily be used to tell the HEIGHT of
certain objects on the ground.
Example: There are some ROCK formations that can now be easily identified
because of these SHADOWS. If a rock was standing about 6-10 feet tall then
the new imagery shows a shadow on the ground of up to 20 feet out from
that object. So just by looking at the SHADOWS near some of these rock
formations it is easier to tell if they match the ‘height’ and ‘shape’ of a lot
of things seen in the photo collections(s) from Yarnell.
In Google Earth ( in 3D mode ) these new ‘shadows’ also supply a dramatic
effect showing just how DEEP those ‘blind canyons’ really were down there
to the SOUTH towards the Boulder Springs ranch.
There are actually THREE ‘canyons’ down there.
The one they died in, another one just SOUTH of that ( which appears to ALSO
have had its own sort of ‘hiking trail’ down inside it )… and then the final
one that actually contains the now-famous ‘alternate escape route’.
The TRAILS ( two-track / one-track / hiking path, etc. ) are also now actually
much more clearly visible than they were in the pre-fire imagery.
It is now EASY to see that the ‘alternate escape’ route WAS clearly ‘contiguous’
and visible at ground level all the way EAST to where it then actually turned
SOUTH towards the Candy-Cany Lane area.
There was a WAY to then turn NORTH and get to the Boulder Springs Ranch
through that ‘draw’ at the end of the EASTWARD leg of the alternate escape
route… but it is NOT ( nor ever was? ) nearly as clearly defined as the other
trail that simply headed SOUTH towards Candy Cane Lane after that
EASTWARD leg of the alternate escape route met that large clearing.
Correction for ABOVE… the *new* Google Satellite imagery being
used for Yarnell is dated January 4, 2014… and not January 1.
I almost can’t bear to go look.
**
** UPDATE
** ONLY GOOGLE HAS SWITCHED TO POST-FIRE
** SATELLITE IMAGERY OF YARNELL
Forgot to mention this up above. As of today… ONLY Google has
switched to using post-fire satellite imagery for Yarnell.
Other popular ‘maps’ services with optional ‘satellite’ views
are STILL using the pre-fire satellite imagery sets for Yarnell.
Those would include…
Microsoft Virtual Earth ( Just go to bing.com and click Maps ).
Yahoo Maps ( Same deal. Go to yahoo.com and click Maps ).
So if anyone was working on anything that really could use more
of the pre-fire imagery from Yarnell complete with vegetation…
I would be sure to take your own ‘screen shots’ that you need
before these other services roll over to the latest satellite
imagery.
All of these NAVSAT satellite images for public use basically
come from the same company… so sooner or later all these
online services ‘get around’ to updating their production-level
data sets with the latest data…
…so the clock is ticking. Google has done their ‘roll over’ first
but the other online services probably will as well in short order.
As is the case with ‘Google Earth’… if you are using Microsoft’s
Virtual Earth and you have created any files that use ‘waypoints’…
unless you do the option of ‘playing the waypoints’ and recording
the whole thing as an actual ‘video’… then you won’t lose your
valid waypoints but you WILL lose the pre-fire background(s)
unless you SAVE everything as an actual VIDEO sometime soon.
The Google Earth view also now illustrates a bit more starkly why staying high also would have preserved several other options. Claims that staying on the 2-track would have inevitably led to the same result in the end are big reaches at best.
Yes. You can also see even *more* clearly now that if they had simply kept heading SOUTH after reaching that point where it would have been time to decide whether or not to take the EASTBOUND leg of the ‘alternate escape route’… there IS, in fact, a ‘hiking trail’ coming down off the other (Congress) side of the ridge that then ‘cuts over’ to the EAST where you would then eventually pick up the ‘continuation’ of the ‘alternate escape route’ trail as it heads over to the Candy Cane Lane area.
This is exactly the way the hikers Joy Collura and Tex (Sonny) Gilligan got out of there safely that afternoon.
Situational awareness.
It’s important.
Sometimes… it’s the difference between life or death.
WTKTT—
If some of you have learned nothing else that is the one thing that always stands out on every fire where lives are lost—-Situation awareness
Its the main ingredient of the 18 STSWO…..
It also illustrates more clearly that the idea that there were switchbacks and game trails that GM was going to be making good time on is patently false. As anyone familiar with local conditions would know already. GM’s decision to drop down into that bowl would have involved, for anyone reasonably familiar with conditions at the time GM made the decision, assuming they were in for a slow slog through that bowl.
Agree. We also know now that Christopher MacKenzie’s last cellphone photo IMG_2738 ( which he took at exactly 3:55.31 PM ) is the LAST KNOWN solid proof of when they were still at the ‘Rest Location 2’ point prior to embarking on ‘the mission’.
It can no longer be assumed that they ‘left’ that location at 4:05 PM, as the SAIR ‘suggested’ they did.
Unless the SAIT knows something that has never been made public, or unless Brendan McDonough ( or anyone else listening to the intra-crew around that time ) knows something different… we have to now assume they *might* have left on ‘the mission’ as early as 3:56 PM or so.
So if they really did leave that area circa 3:55.50 or 3:56.xx ( which is why the photo taking abruptly ends )… then that simply ADDS 9 to 10 minutes to the ‘assumed’ travel time and DECREASES their overall ‘rate of travel’ significantly.
The SAIT has never said how in the heck they came up with those 4:05 ( departure time ) and the 4:20 ‘estimated’ time for reaching the ‘Descent Point’ and then dropping into the fuel-filled box canyon.
We have to ‘assume’ two things, I guess.
1) They really did think that Wade Parker actually took his ‘photo’ that he texted to his mother at 4:04 PM… and/or that there was no possibility he HAD taken it ‘earlier’ and simply ‘texted’ it out to her while they were ALREADY hiking south.
2) They must have done some kind of ‘timed walk’ themselves from where they THOUGHT they left from to that ‘Descent Point’… and THEIR ‘guesstimate’ came out to be 15 minutes ( hence, the 4:20 PM arrival time at the ‘Descent Point’ ). If they ‘timed’ that walk from the other known ‘lunch spot’… then even that ‘test walk’ was totally WRONG.
Maybe they did ‘get that part right’.
Maybe they did a good ‘test walk’ from the right departure point to the right ‘Descent Point’.
If that is the case… then the ‘extra 9 to 10’ minutes that now *might* need to be added to the overall ‘travel time’ all had to be wasted either pausing at the ‘Descent Point’ and taking a long time to decide what to do… OR just add those 9-10 minutes to the ‘Descent Time’ itself.
If we add those 9 or 10 minutes to the ‘Descent Time’… then not only were they ‘bogged down’… they were literally ‘crawling’ their way down to the bottom of that canyon… excruciatingly slowly.
Maybe someone actually got HURT on the way down… and they had to STOP, or something. Very few people have ever seen the actual autopsy reports. I wonder if there was, in fact, any evidence that one ( or more? ) of the men had sprained, twisted, or even (perhaps) broken an ankle during that ‘descent’.
I think that has been ‘discussed’ before and IIRC the ‘consensus’ was something like…
1) Not likely. Good boots. Trained hikers.
2) If it was a serious injury ( enought to STOP them )… there would (should?) probably have been some radio traffic about it.
3) Even if autopsy reports showed such an injury… the SAIT would/should have know about it ( since they had access to the autopsy reports ) and why would they be hesitant, in ANY way, to publish that information, or include it in their report narrative? They didn’t… so I guess we can *assume* there is no evidence there was any hiking injury during that descent.
So even adding 9 or 10 minutes to the ‘travel time’ and trying to account for it just comes down to either ‘more hesitation’ and/or even a SLOWER rate of descent and ‘bog down’ than was previously thought.
**
** CROSSFADE BETWEEN
** MACKENZIE IMAGES
** CELLPHONE IMG_2737 @ 3:55.20 PM
** CELLPHONE IMG_2738 @ 3:55.31 PM ( +11 seconds )
This is the last in the recent series of ‘crossfades’ for ALL of Christopher MacKenzie’s cellphone pictures plus his 4 Canon photos and videos that were taken in-between cellphone images 2737 and 2737.
This final MacKenzie cellphone photo ( IMG_2738 ) is now the LAST KNOWN photograph from anyone up on that ridge that afternoon.
The Wade Parker photo that he texted to his mother has never actually been the ‘last GM photo’. It has a network timestamp of 4:04 PM for when he finally got around to ‘texting’ that photo… but it has ALWAYS been the case that he actually took that photo long before that… even BEFORE Robert Caldwell shot his 3:50 PM video.
As for this last crossfade in this particular series…
Cellphone IMG_2737 was taken in ‘Portrait’ mode.
Cellphone IMG_2738 was taken in ‘Landscape’ mode.
11 seconds after Christopher took his IMG_2377 he turned to his RIGHT and faced more EAST than in any prior cellphone photo, so IMG_2738 doesn’t show much of the close-to-them fireline like all the other cellphone photos… but it DOES show what the rest of the smoke column looked like at that point. The full ‘panorama’ shot from their location with both images ‘blended’ together is striking. The small (apparent) ‘spot ahead’ of the fireline seen in IMG_2737 also remains visible in about the center of the fade.
YouTube Video Title: IMG-2737-and-IMG-2738
http://youtu.be/lP4te0ingGc
YouTube About Information
__________________________________________________________________
This is the last in the series of terrain-aligned crossfades covering ALL of
Christopher MacKenzie’s cellphone photos AND the four Canon Powershot
items ( 1 video, then 2 still shots, then his second video ) that he took during the
3 minute and 22 second time ‘window’ in-between cellphone photos 2736 and
2737. This last crossfade in this particular series is between his final two
cellphone photos IMG_2737 ( taken at 3:55.20 PM ) and IMG_2738 ( taken 11
seconds later 3:55.31 PM ).
Christopher turned to his RIGHT after taking IMG_2737 so this final IMG_2738
is more of a ‘panorama’ when terrain-aligned with the previous image 2737 from
11 seconds earlier… but there is still ‘some’ terrain overlap between the images
as seen in the ‘crossfade’. The (apparent) ‘spot ahead’ flame seen in the previous
IMG_2737 also remains visible during the crossfade.
IMG_2738 represents the last known photograph taken by any of the Hotshots at
this location before they left the safe black and headed south on the two-track
road. The Wade Parker photo was NOT taken at 4:04 PM, as the initial
investigation(s) seemed to believe. That was only the network timestamp for
when it was ‘texted’ by Wade Parker. The actual Wade Parker photo was taken
much earlier than 4:04 PM and either right before or right around the time that
Robert Caldwell was shooting his second ( of only two ) videos that day circa
3:50 PM.
__________________________________________________________________
So that’s it for this “You can see what they saw” series of crossfades, and sinc we now know that Christopher’s Canon Powershot was at least 9 minutes AHEAD of the real time that day… we are left with some NEW mysteries.
This final cellphone photo of Christpher’s, taken at exactly 3:55.31 PM, now represents the LAST KNOWN photo from this last ‘rest’ location before they left the safe black and started heading SOUTH on the two track.
There appears to be some ‘movement’ in the final IMG_2738 photo as compared to 11 seconds earlier in the IMG_2737 photo… but that could have just been the men ‘moving around’ at that location as we see them doing throughout this series of photographs and videos.
IMG_2738 does NOT offer any real proof that 3:55 or 3:56 PM would be the time they actually did ‘gaggle up’ from that resting location and leave the safe black.
The SAIT investigators put the ‘departure’ time at 4:05 PM… but that seemed to be solely based on the network timestamp for Wade Parker’s 4:04 PM ‘textout’ to his mother, with picture attached. We know now that the picture he ‘texted’ was NOT actually taken at 4:04 PM and he also could have easily sent that text message AFTER they had left that location and were already walking SOUTH.
So… unless the SAIT investigators had some OTHER reason or evidence to put the departure time at 4:05 PM… such as testimony from Brendan McDonough,
or someone else who was listening to the Crew intra-net frequency… there is no reason to believe anymore that Steed and the Crew actually DID wait until 4:05 PM to leave that location.
They could have left any time after Christopher’s final cellphone photo IMG_2738, taken at exactly 3:55.31 PM.
Maybe they spent 9 to 10 *more* minutes at that location ‘making up their minds’ before finally ‘gaggling up’ and leaving circa 4:05 PM… but maybe NOT.
If the ‘deicison to leave’ had, in fact, already been made by 3:55 or 3:56 PM, and the men left the safe black just shortly after Christopher took his final IMG_2738 cellphone photo… then that does NOT bode well for their ‘travel time estimates’.
It adds another 9 ( or even 10 minutes ) to their ‘hiking’ time and SLOWS DOWN their estimated ‘rate of travel’ that afternoon considerably.
If they did leave that much earlier… but still maintained the same ‘brisk’ hiking pace from this last photo location to the ‘Descent Point’ in about the same amount of time the SAIT investigators ‘calculated’… then now there is a 9 to 10 minute ‘gap’ to account for at the ‘Descent Point’ itself before they finally decided to drop into that fuel-filled box canyon.
It means Steed and the Crew might have reached that second critical ‘Descent Point’ 9 or 10 minutes earlier than 4:20 PM ( as the SAIT investigators seemed to think )… and then they just ‘stood there’ wondering what to do next for as much as 9 or 10 minutes… or making ‘consultation’ calls with someone ( presumably DIVSA Eric Marsh? ) about what they should do at that point.
More about all this later…
Typo in the first paragraph above.
Christopher MacKenzie took his 48 second contiguous sequence of Canon Powershot videos and still photos in-between cellphone images IMG_2736 and IMG_2737.
The first paragraph above should have read…
This is the last in the recent series of ‘crossfades’ for ALL of Christopher MacKenzie’s cellphone pictures plus his 4 Canon photos and videos that were taken in-between cellphone images 2736 and 2737.
Thanks for all the follow up and it appears we finally have an accurate timeline for all the Mackenzie photos/ videos, as well as the Parker picture and the Caldwell video.
In the period of time between 1550 and 1555 there are up to 9 photos and 3 videos (and possibly more?) that were captured by the GMIHC. It would seem that if they were still in the same location, there would be more pictures after 2738 on Mackenzie’s cell phone. Right?
So now we know. 1. The GMIHC moved out of the Discussing options sometime soon/ possibly immediately after the promise of air support “down there”, and, 2.It appears that Rory Collins abruptly/unexpectedly leaves the fire about the same time GM started moving from their last known location that can be confirmed from photos. Someone (not Elizabeth) called Collin’s actions COWARDLY and the same person described the retardant drop that Collins used to extinguish the GM burnout as SOP from Collins. The comment was something to the effect of Collins and his fellow state foresters do not use indirect line building and prefer direct attack.
So, IF, GMIHC and DIV A were, in fact, repositioning to try to create another indirect line, burnout operation in the timeframe of 1555ish. Maybe Rory Collins showed his disapproval by leaving the fire.
BTW, I think it is getting harder and harder to deny the theory that the air support ASAP comment is pertinent to the discussion when trying to understand what made GMIHC think they were safe in their attempt to reposition.
WTKTT… Can you assign a time to images 0885, 0886 and 0887?
I believe that I have properly described these images as showing this group of GMIHC actually leaving the black prior to returning to the black for the final pictures/videos currently being discussed.
Collins left the fire because his pilot was out of flight time.
No big tory here————-
Mr Powers. I agree based on what I have read. I am just applying the comments from a commenter and trying to figure out why he/she (not Elizabeth) would have called Collins actions cowardly?
I believe that ‘moment’ happened ( people applying adjectives to Collins’ decision to abruptly leave the fire ) just BEFORE any evidence was discovered that it was his PILOT who was supposedly ‘needing to leave’ because he was hitting some ‘hours’ limit.
Before there was any evidence to the effect… it was a total mystery why Collins just ‘disappeared’ from the fire at a very critical time.
That being said… there are still ‘mysteries’ regarding this Mr. Collins.
The WFAR report contracted by ADOSH has a footnote in it that says something in the report was ‘based on ADOSH interview with Rory Collins’.
There is NO SUCH INTERVIEW in any of the FOIA/FOIL documents released by ADOSH… so either WFAR/ ADOSH never really did interview Rory Collins… or the DID… but then did NOT include any kind of transcript of telephone interview notes with him in their FOIA/FOIL release.
A LOT of people heard the ‘arguments’ between Marsh and Collins over the morning retardant drops over the TAC channels… and have testified as such.
What we still don’t know is what OTHER ‘interactions’ either Marsh/Steed had with Rory Collins that day ( if any )… or whether there were even MORE ‘arguments’ that afternoon after the morning retardant drop
snafu.
Pilots aren’t notified at the last minute that they’ve just timed-out, “gotta go, see ya!!”
The aircraft crew knew throughout the entire day how much time they had left. Knowing that detail, gives them PLENTY of time to interact and brief their replacements properly. That radio briefing could (and should) have occurred, continuing on for as long as necessary while Collins and pilot flew back to their base.
THERE IS ABSOLUTELY NO EXCUSE for what happened at the transition that day!
TTWARE – I have said this before and I will say it again: The transition between Air Attack (as run by Rory Collins) and Bravo33 was consistent with the way that the transitions were being conducted throughout that day (e.g. when Bravo3 left, when Bravo33 left, when Air Attack left earlier in the day). Rory *DID* give Bravo33 the heads-up in advance that he was leaving. The SAIR misrepresented it, and the Wildland Fire Associates report then “cut-and-pasted” from the SAIR, rather than doing their own research.
If you are going to criticize Collins, then you need to criticize Bravo3 and Bravo33 as well, because they ALL did their exits the same way on June 30th. The reality is that all three leadership teams in the air (Collins/AA, Bravo3, and Bravo33) had their hands full for every single minute that they were in the sky, such that leisurely briefings and exits were going to be a pipe dream that day. Poor Rory Collins. I have to believe that this is part of the reason why he never returned phone calls from ADOSH…. I am not blaming you, Mike, but my view is that we need to be cautious about criticizing folks who were on the YHF without first researching in FULL (rather than relying on the SAIT, ADOSH, Holly Neill, John Maclean, or the Wildland Fire Associates) what the relevant facts actually show….
Whoops – meant “TTWARE,” not “Mike.” Sorry. And, FYI, it was Robert-the-Second (RTS), who is now posting here under multiple other anonymous names, who called Rory Collins a “coward” or “cowardly” or some such nonsense.
Elizabeth,
“leisurely briefings”, huh? Get a clue. It’s called doing your job.
Wildland firefighters get paid to perform under difficult and stressful conditions. The higher up the food chain one gets, the higher the expectations of performance.
If they can’t perform their jobs properly under those conditions, then they should get new jobs. This wasn’t their first rodeo, and it certainly wasn’t the first one that had gone to crap.
You allude that they were just ‘too busy’ to attempt a proper briefing with the incoming forces. So I guess what you’re saying is that since they gave the incoming forces a ‘heads-up, we’re leaving’, that excuses them from leaving the incoming forces with the critical information on who, was where, on the fire, and what the aerial and ground forces current tactics and strategies were, along with not supplying current fire and weather conditions.
Come to think of it, all of that information could have easily been passed-on as they flew off to their base, but it sounds as you are expounding the theory that if someone gets a bad briefing, they are then justified in doing the same to others.
Do unto others as they have done unto you! I’m not buying into that one!
Certainly, since you have cautioned me, infering that I don’t have all the facts here, you will be able to provide me with specific references to the ‘relevant facts’ you say I am lacking. I’m anxiously awaiting that info. Thank you.
WOW, TTWARE, I did not intend for my post to be so provocative. Sorry.
What makes you think the briefing Rory gave (as compared to the one Bravo3 gave, for example) was NOT a proper briefing? You are mis-reading me – they DID more than just leave the fire. Rory gave notice as soon as he knew his relief pilot had bailed!!
OK, I’ll stop and take a breath here and admit, not for the first time, that I haven’t got the time to dig as deep as some others here. Having said that, the things I can recall right now off of the top of my head from some of the interviews are, “didn’t know where the division breaks were or who was working where,” “didn’t get critical weather updates,”AND, “poor briefing”. The reason I asked for references for the relevant facts is that I would rather know the truth and admit I was wrong than not. So, if you have info that the air hand-offs were proper, then please put it out there so I can refer to it and shut my trap. Thank you.
See
NEW
parent
comment
above
that
extends
this
thread.
Bravo 33
did NOT
receive
a proper
briefing
from
Rory
Collins.
“BTW, I think it is getting harder and harder to deny the theory that the air support ASAP comment is pertinent to the discussion when trying to understand what made GMIHC think they were safe in their attempt to reposition.”
I doubt this very much, simply because of the great limitations here. It isn’t like infantry close air support, and for that matter hand crews don’t have the capabilities relative to fire that our infantry has relative to enemy soldiers. Namely, even if air support could have gotten that fire to stand still (it couldn’t) GM wouldn’t have been able to do anything with the fire. GM relying on air to do something that given conditions wasn’t possible would have been unconventional in the extreme.
Regarding Air Attack/Air Support:
I found two youtube videos this weekend that I wish I had found a lot sooner. They’re on the Bureau of Land Management Incident Fire Center channel.
The most useful one is called “Firefighting Airspace (2012 Refresher). “An Air Attack describes how the aircraft above your fire are organized. How they can help you, and how you can help them, with effective communication for a smooth operation.
(HD update, 8/6/2013).”
It really helped me understand better how this all works. Interestingly, the Air Attack guy in the video, Steve Price from BLM Boise District, says, “I’m not dictating tactics at all, and I don’t like to do that unless they ask…It’s not my job to run the fire…It’s my job to put red stuff and wet stuff on the ground and give them situational awareness.”
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9fjF2KQ75TY&feature=share&list=PLTErVrHH6uJja-ljtn7z9Q5Sz9WtCPGw1&index=142
The second video is called “Communication With Aviattion Resources.” It really illustrates how complicated the communications can get for Air Attack over an active fire.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GXvP66fCfo0&feature=share&list=PLTErVrHH6uJja-ljtn7z9Q5Sz9WtCPGw1&index=149
Also these two videos very helpfully describe the relationships between the whole Air Attack, Lead Plane, and ASM Aerial Supervision Module, i.e. Bravo, which is a combination of Air Attack and Lead Plane.
Also, another related item I found is “The DC-10 Air Tanker.”
“The DC-10 Air Tanker is an American wide-body jet air tanker, which has been in service as an aerial firefighting unit since 2006. The aircraft, operated by the joint technical venture 10 Tanker Air Carrier, is a converted McDonnell Douglas DC-10 airliner, and is primarily used to fight wildfires, typically in rural areas. The turbofan-powered aircraft carries up to 12,000 US gallons (45,000 liters) of water or fire retardant in an exterior belly-mounted tank, the contents of which can be released in eight seconds. Two air tankers are currently in operation, with the call-signs Tanker 910 and Tanker 911.”
And now those two DC-10s are stationed in Albuquerque, so……
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WG06xAbBf3Q&list=PLTErVrHH6uJja-ljtn7z9Q5Sz9WtCPGw1&feature=share&index=130
John could you delete this comment? I’m going to repost it in three parts so it won’t stay “stuck in customs” Thank you!
Reply to calvin post on April 29, 2014 at 3:17 am
>> calvin said…
>> Thanks for all the follow up and appears we finally
>> have an accurate timeline for all the Mackenzie
>> photos/ videos, as well as the Parker picture and the
>> Caldwell video.
Yes. I think so.
One of the reasons I just did that whole ‘crossfade’ series
was to try to see if these ‘crossfades’ would indicate
clearly exactly WHEN ( inside that 3 minute and 22 second
gap between 2736 and 2737 ) Christopher began his 48
second ‘session’ with the Canon Powershot.
Alas… while very revealing and informative ( the fire was
ALWAYS progressing SOUTH during and in-between
all of these photos/videos )… I don’t see any definitive
proof that MacKenzie’s 48 second Canon Powershot
session in-between 2736 and 2737 was ‘leaning’ more
towards 2736 or 2737… or vice-versa.
Indeed… the ‘crossfades’ prove that the 48 second session
with the Canon probably *WAS* about right in the middle
of the 3 minute and 22 second ‘window’.
I also have been factoring in your (important) observations
about the gloves… but I don’t see that helping to narrow
down the exact time either ( unless you are seeing
something else that I haven’t seen there ).
So if we just accept that Christopher *probably* did take
the same amount of time to switch from using the cellphone
to the Canon as he then did to switch BACK from using
the canon to the cellphone… we still have this…
1 minute 17 seconds – Switch from cellphone to Canon.
48 seconds – The 4 item session with the Canon.
1 minute 17 seconds – Switch from Canon to cellphone.
Total time = Exactly 3 minutes and 22 seconds.
That’s the exact ‘gap’ between IMG_2736 and IMG_2737.
So that means we have a ‘workable/accurate’ OFFSET
for ALL of MacKenzie’s Canon Powershot images.
Even if there is more evidence to prove that 48 second
‘session’ can be ‘left’ or ‘right’ shifted away from that
center point and more towards either the 2736 or 2737
cellphone images… then that just means the ‘center
point’ assumption is still only off by however many
seconds you ‘left’ or ‘right’ shift it. I still don’t think he
could have ‘switched’ from one device to another in
less than 30 seconds or so… so the ‘center point’
assumption still remains accurate to within +/- 30 sec.
+/- 30 seconds for ANY timestamp for ANY event on
a day like this can be considered ‘pretty damn accurate’.
So, using the ‘center point’ assumption… just take ONE of
Christopher’s Canon images, like IMG_0889…
His Canon Powershot put this timestamp on it…
1601:52 ( 4:01.53 PM )
But it now seems to have been taken at ( exactly? )…
1553.36 ( 3:53.36 PM )
That is a TIME DIFFERENCE of 8 minutes 13 seconds.
The TIME on Christopher’s Canon Powershot was
8 minutes and 13 seconds AHEAD of ‘real time’ that day.
>> calvin also said…
>> WTKTT… Can you assign a time to images
>> 0885, 0886 and 0887?
Yep.
Since Christopher’s Canon Powershot was 8 minutes
and 13 seconds AHEAD of the ‘real time’ that day…
* IMG_0885
Canon says…
EXIF File Number: 110-0885
EXIF Date: June 30, 2013, 1552.07 ( 3:52:07 PM )
EXIF Camera: Canon PowerShot SD1400 IS
EXIF Screen Capture Type: Landscape
EXIF Camera Temperature: 34 C ( 93 F )
Actual time taken = 1543.54 ( 3:43.54 PM )
* IMG_0886
Canon says…
EXIF File Number: 110-0886
EXIF Date: June 30, 2013, 1552.18 ( 3:52:18 PM )
EXIF Camera: Canon PowerShot SD1400 IS
EXIF Camera Orientation: Portrait
EXIF Camera Temperature: 35 C ( 95 F )
Actual time taken = 1544.05 ( 3:44.05 PM )
* IMG_0887
Canon says…
EXIF File Number: 110-0887
EXIF Date: June 30, 2013, 1552.24 ( 3:52:24 PM )
EXIF Camera: Canon PowerShot SD1400 IS
EXIF Camera Orientation: Portrait
EXIF Camera Temperature: 35 C ( 95 F )
Actual time taken = 1544.11 ( 3:44.11 PM )
>> calvin also said…
>> I believe that I have properly described these images
>> as showing this group of GMIHC actually leaving
>> the black prior to returning to the black for the final
>> pictures/videos currently being discussed.
I’m not sure that ‘small move’ from the one ‘resting’
spot to the next can/should be described as ‘leaving
the black’… but the photos definitely show them
entering ‘unburned fuel’ to get to that next rest stop.
What is interesting to note is that since the *NEW*
( real ) times for 0885, 0886 and 0887 seem to be…
IMG_0885 = 1543.54 ( 3:43.54 PM )
IMG_0886 = 1544.05 ( 3:44.05 PM )
IMG_0887 = 1544.11 ( 3:44.11 PM )
That means this ‘move out’ moment from that previous
location came just moments AFTER Marsh had his
1542 – 1543 conversation with OPS2 Paul Musser.
Musser ‘called’ Marsh at 1542… but as we can hear in
the radio capture… Marsh did not respond to him right
away. We have already determined the reason Marsh
did not answer Musser ‘right away’ is because Marsh
was still ‘finishing’ his conversation(s) with Brian Frisby
over the GM intra-crew frequency at that time.
So circa 1542 to 1543…. Marsh finishes his documented
conversations about moving the vehicles with Firsby,
then Marsh must have ‘answered’ OPS2 Musser and
they had the ‘availability check’ conversation…
…and IMMEDIATELY after that conversation ended
with Musser ( circa 1543 )… they MOVED OUT ( from
this first location to the next one ).
WTKTT said….I’m not sure that ‘small move’ from the one ‘resting’
spot to the next can/should be described as ‘leaving
the black’… but the photos definitely show them
entering ‘unburned fuel’ to get to that next rest stop.
1. Where is the one “resting” spot?
2. I do not think they were en route to the Second resting spot in image 0885, 0886, 0887. It appears to me that they are leaving the black and crossing the retardant line (as they left the black) that was dropped on GM bournout operation from earlier in the day that was also photographed by Mackenzie. There is a odd shaped rock that looks like it is missing a chunk (in image 0880 0881 0882 005 0886 0887) that seems to assign the location for 0885, 0886, and 0887 that is south/east of Discussing options spot. This same rock and area can be seen in ADOSH post burn photos. So it appears (to me) that after 0885- 0887 were taken, these men (Ashcraft, Parker, Norris) actually changed course, and returned to a safe location in the black before leaving.
Regarding Air Attack/Air Support: I found two youtube videos this weekend that I wish I had found a lot sooner. They’re on the Bureau of Land Management Incident Fire Center channel.
The most useful one is called “Firefighting Airspace (2012 Refresher). “An Air Attack describes how the aircraft above your fire are organized. How they can help you, and how you can help them, with effective communication for a smooth operation. (HD update, 8/6/2013).”
It really helped me understand better how this all works. Interestingly, the Air Attack guy in the video, Steve Price from BLM Boise District, says, “I’m not dictating tactics at all, and I don’t like to do that unless they ask…It’s not my job to run the fire…It’s my job to put red stuff and wet stuff on the ground and give them situational awareness.”
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9fjF2KQ75TY&feature=share&list=PLTErVrHH6uJja-ljtn7z9Q5Sz9WtCPGw1&index=142
The second video is called “Communication With Aviattion Resources.” It really illustrates how complicated the communications can get for Air Attack over an active fire.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GXvP66fCfo0&feature=share&list=PLTErVrHH6uJja-ljtn7z9Q5Sz9WtCPGw1&index=149
Also these two videos very helpfully describe the relationships between the whole Air Attack, Lead Plane, and ASM Aerial Supervision Module, i.e. Bravo, which is a combination of Air Attack and Lead Plane.
That link didn’t go in right. Here it is again:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GXvP66fCfo0&feature=share&list=PLTErVrHH6uJja-ljtn7z9Q5Sz9WtCPGw1&index=149
Also, another related item I found is “The DC-10 Air Tanker.”
“The DC-10 Air Tanker is an American wide-body jet air tanker, which has been in service as an aerial firefighting unit since 2006. The aircraft, operated by the joint technical venture 10 Tanker Air Carrier, is a converted McDonnell Douglas DC-10 airliner, and is primarily used to fight wildfires, typically in rural areas. The turbofan-powered aircraft carries up to 12,000 US gallons (45,000 liters) of water or fire retardant in an exterior belly-mounted tank, the contents of which can be released in eight seconds. Two air tankers are currently in operation, with the call-signs Tanker 910 and Tanker 911.” And now those two DC-10s are stationed in Albuquerque, so……
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WG06xAbBf3Q&list=PLTErVrHH6uJja-ljtn7z9Q5Sz9WtCPGw1&feature=share&index=130
To put some of those limitations in perspective, 12,000 gallons is only a modest backyard pool.
Agree. But it’s a LOT more than the other tankers on that fire could drop.
Which goes to show that, as others have said, air support/suppression is a tool (if used properly and smartly), not an end game.
**
** CROSSFADE BETWEEN
** MACKENZIE IMAGES
** CANON MVI_0891 @ 3:54.03 PM ?
** PHONE IMG_2737 @ 3:55.20 PM ( +1 minute 17 seconds )
This is a crossfade between that stillframe from the very end of Christopher’s
MacKenzie’s SECOND video that he took with his Canon Powershot and the
next photo he would take ( approximately 1 minute and 17 seconds later )
with his cellphone… which is IMG_2737 with a KNOWN timestamp of 3:55.20 PM.
The ‘smoke curtain’ right along the fireline has increased ( and thickened )
dramatically and there appears to be a distinct ‘spot ahead’ appearing in about
the right-center of the crossfade where the two-track trail leads away from
the old-grader location.
YouTube Video Title: MVI-0891-and-IMG-2737
http://youtu.be/0_6Mc2Cz_KU
YouTube About Information
__________________________________________________________________
This is a crossfade between a stillframe from Christopher MacKenzie’s second
video that he took with his Canon Powershot ( MVI_0891 circa 3:54.03 ) and the
next image he took approximately 1 minute and 17 seconds later, at 3:55.20.
After Christopher finished shooting his second video with the Canon he switched
back to using his cellphone and then he took the next sequential image on that
device ( IMG_2737 at exactly 3:55.20 PM ). As the crossfade shows… the ‘smoke
curtain’ right at the fireline has increased ( and thickened ) dramatically during the
estimated 1 minute and 17 seconds between these two images and there also
appears to be a distinct ‘spotting event’ taking place about right-center in the fade
at the point where the two-track road leading away from the old-grader location
approaches the fireline.
__________________________________________________________________
**
** CROSSFADE BETWEEN
** MACKENZIE IMAGES
** CANON IMG_0890 @ 3:53.44 PM ?
** CANON MVI_0891 @ 3:54.03 PM ? ( +19 seconds )
10 seconds after Christopher MacKenzie took his second ( of only two ) still
photos in-between videos… he shot his second video. That second video
was only 9 seconds long, just like his first video.
This is a crossfade between that second Canon still image and a captured frame
from the END of his second movie ( with Canon filename MVI_0891 )… so that
makes the time between images in this crossfade 19 seconds.
The reason a stillframe from the END of the second MVI_0891 movie is used for
comparison here is because that is the point in the 9 second video that provides
the best ‘terrain match’ with the previous still photo… AND using an image from
the END of the second movie also provides the best comparison for the next
(upcoming) cellphone image comparison after the second movie was shot with
the Canon Powershot.
IMG_0890 from the Canon was taken in ‘Portrait’ mode by Christopher so that
he could ( apparently ) be sure to capture that enormous smoke column
building up into the sky prior to shooting his second video. The MV_0891 video
was shot in ‘Landscape’ mode.
Once again ( even though only 19 seconds have elapsed between images )
even MORE visible progression of the fireline to the SOUTH can be observed
in the crossfade.
This frame taken from movie MVI_0891 is also the exact moment when Captain
Jesse Steed had just finished telling Eric Marsh… “I copy… and it’s almost made
it to that two-track road we walked in on.”
YouTube Video Title: IMG-0890-and-MVI-0891
http://youtu.be/TkEp7tYy0ew
YouTube About Information
__________________________________________________________________
This is a crossfade between the second still image that Christopher MacKenzie
took with his Canon Powershot in-between his two movie clips ( IMG_0890 circa
3:53.44 PM ) and a stillframe from the next thing he would shoot just 10 seconds
later… which was his second VIDEO from that location ( MVI_0891 circa 3:53.54
PM ). The stillframe from the VIDEO was taken from the very END of that second
video so that means there are 19 seconds expiring in this crossfade. Even with
just these 19 seconds of time expiring in the crossfade there still seem to be
clear indications of the fireline pushing more to the SOUTH with each passing
moment.
__________________________________________________________________
Thanks for these, WTK!
As I have pondered, various times, why Chris did what he did here, capturing more stills than video, when we all would wish he would have kept doing the video because of the conversations captured with it, I have sensed that he was more interested in capturing the fire behavior than anything else.
I keep struggling to intuit/reason why he was switching back and forth so much between his cellphone and his Powershot. I still haven’t gotten there. Maybe he was having some kind of trouble with his cellphone for capturing video. So he switched to the Powershot. But the quick switch from video to stills to video hints to me that what he was really trying to capture was not so much the conversations we hear from the radios as the visuals of the fire progression.
Does that make sense?
Reply to Marti Reed post on April 28, 2014 at 10:25 pm
>> Marti said…
>> As I have pondered, various times, why Chris did what
>> he did here, capturing more stills than video, when we
>> all would wish he would have kept doing the video
>> because of the conversations captured with it, I have
>> sensed that he was more interested in capturing the
>> fire behavior than anything else.
Yes. Probably so. I just now noticed myself the times
when he ( quickly ) took BOTH a ‘Landscape’ shot and
then quickly ( in no more time than it takes to turn the
camera ) took another shot in ‘Portrait’ mode… and also
tilted the camera UP for the ‘Portrait’ shot.
He did this with BOTH his cellphone and his Powershot.
He was trying to make sure he captured the enormous
( and dramatic ) smoke column that was building overhead.
He just wanted to be SURE he ‘caught all that’… from
ground up into the sky.
It truly was DRAMATIC… and worth capturing (fully).
>> Marti also said…
>> I keep struggling to intuit/reason why he was switching
>> back and forth so much between his cellphone and his
>> Powershot. I still haven’t gotten there.
Have you considered ‘battery levels’?
Maybe one ( or both ) devices were ‘flashing’ at him that
they were BOTH low on battery so it was time to
switch between the two just to make sure he was
capturing all of the dramatic scene that was unfolding
down there in front of him. He didn’t want to miss
any of it.
>> Marti also said…
>> Maybe he was having some kind of trouble with his
>> cellphone for capturing video. So he switched to the
>> Powershot.
See above. He might have made a move to just start
shooting video with the cellphone, noticed that his
battery indicator was about out… and knew that nothing
kills a smartphone battery like shooting video.
So he went for the Canon… only to discover ( after 2
videos and 2 still shots )… that now his Canon was
bitching at him about battery level(s) as well… so he
went BACK to the cellphone for 2 more quick shots
( which, as my last crossfade shows, seem to have
purposely been a final ‘panorama’ of the entire scene
out there in front of him ).
>> Marti also said…
>> But the quick switch from video to stills to video hints
>> to me that what he was really trying to capture was not
>> so much the conversations we hear from the radios
>> as the visuals of the fire progression.
I agree. There was a time when it almost *seemed* like
Christopher was ‘trying to tell us something’ because of
the exact time he suddenly decided to start shooting
video ( with AUDIO )… but I don’t believe that anymore.
It was all just ‘management chit-chat’ at that point.
The scene unfolding BEFORE him down in that valley
was so dramatic… as a photographer he just wanted
to be SURE he got enough good pictures of it ( and
a little motion video, too, to show that dramatic smoke
development ).
I think it was a complete accident that he happened to
capture Marsh and Steed talking about ‘comfort levels’
and ‘discussing their options’ and other management
chit-chat.
That’s also why I don’t believe the actual DECISION to
leave the safe black came until AFTER Christopher
finished shooting his Canon videos.
I don’t think Christopher had a CLUE ( at that point ) that
within a minute or two… Steed was going to say
‘gaggle up boys… we’re leaving’.
I don’t think ANY of them knew that was going to happen,
when you really look at them in ALL of these photos.
It just suddenly happened.
One moment they’re resting… taking photos.
The next moment… Steed says ‘gaggle up’… and
they were leaving. Simple as that.
I’m not even sure any of them had ANY frickin’ idea
WHERE the hell they were going ( or even WHY )
when Steed suddenly told them to ‘gaggle up’.
Steed said ‘jump’… and they all said ‘How HIGH!!’.
Who told Steed and/or Marsh to JUMP? That is the question!
Calvin, do you, personally, think that somebody told Steed/Marsh to “jump” as opposed to Steed/GM simply wanting to get to the east-ish side of the fire to re-engage and misjudging how quickly they could get there as compared to how quickly the fire was moving? If so, why is that your view? (I am not suggesting that you are WRONG – I just want to understand your thinking, because I have not yet found any evidence that would suggest that that is why they moved, but it is certainly an option….)
Elizabeth. Yes, I personally believe that.
Mankenzie pictures 0885, 0886, and 0887 show Ashcraft, Norris and Parker (and others) leaving the black and heading away from the discussing options location (and toward Helms Ranch) and into the green. SOMETHING HAPPENED, they returned to the black before moving out a second time. This delay in leave time could account for Cordes saying, BS they had plenty of time (following his hearing of the deployment)
Cordes was deploying resources in and around Glen Isla and Helms Ranch after 1630.
Justin Hernandez and his bulldozer were somewhere around Glen Isla and Cory Ball was somewhere (in Glen Isla) looking for a place to build indirect line at Cordes request.
I think if Granite Mountain were intending to go very far beyond Helms Ranch, they would have had transportation lined up.
I have seen no evidence that any retardant was placed between the Fireline shown in Mackenzie, Norris, and Ashcraft photos and the community of Glen Isla. Have you?
Calvin~
Do you have a google map/earth geotag for that place they were in? I put them in a different place, but that had to do with what I thought was going on and the inaccurate timestamps I was using. I think you have located it more carefully. I’d really appreciate it if I could correct it in my Google Earth. Thanks!
Marti, I cannot. I would appreciate it if you or WTK could.
I think a couple other pictures that help are the ADOSH 7/18 photos with gps p0250, p0253, p0257, p0260, and p0262. (they all show the rock I mentioned before, and you can see the remnants of the retardant line)
I also believe the rock is visible in Mackenzie image 0890. Dead center of the picture, below the group.
>> Marti asked…
>> Calvin… Do
>> you have a
>> google
>> map/earth
>> geotag for
>> that place
>> they were
>> in?
>>
>> Calving said
>> Marti, I
>> cannot. I
>> would
>> appreciate it
>> if you or
>> WTK could.
Standy-by.
Coming tonight.
I’ve been on this since yesterday and since the new Google satellite images came online which make it much easier to ‘find that rock’ there on that slope.
Calvin… YES… this ROCK is in MANY photos including 8 or 9 taken by hiker Joy Collura that morning.
It was NOT very
far away from
the ‘second’
rest spot at all
where all the
other photos
and videos
were shot 10
minutes later.
Appears to have been just a few hundred yards DOWN the slope ( and due EAST ) from that ‘second’ rest spot.
All they did after leaving that spot was come UP the slope to join the others at the HIGHER location.
And PS thank you for your open-minded always respectful honesty. It really helps.
Calvin, my impression was the the sawyers (e.g. Ashcraft et al) were coming OFF of the line that they were building, and THAT is why we see them moving in those pictures with their saws. No?
Remember, Steed told Blue Ridge somewhere in this time frame (I don’t have my notes in front of me) that GM had at least another HOUR of cutting/line work left. However, shortly thereafter, it became clear that they were going to lose the retardant line, which was part of their tying-in plan, such that it no longer made sense to keep the sawyers trying to build line. Hence, Steed presumably instructed them to stop, and we see them coming OFF the line they were building. No? Otherwise, why would Steed have told Blue Ridge that GM had at least another hour of work left (with their SAWS)?
By the way, I do NOT have my notes in front of me, so WTKTT should NOT parse every single word that I am typing. If you want exact words, go back to the raw sources (e.g. unit logs, audio-recorded interviews).
Elizabeth, in short. Images 0885, 0886, and 0887 show the guys walking away from the Discussing options location. Not toward it.
That is what I am saying.
Calvin… see a report coming later this evening on EXACTLY where that ‘cut rock’ was located. I’ve been on this since yesterday when the new Google post-fire satellite imagery came online.
It is now much easier to find that ‘cut rock’ there on that slope.
That location appears to have simply been DOWN the slope and due EAST of the ‘second rest spot’ where all the other photos were taken.
It may APPEAR they were headed ‘away’ from the others since they are exiting the camera to the right… but the reality appears to be that all they were doing was making their way due WEST and UP the slope to join the others at the ‘second rest spot’ where all the other photos/videos would be taken.
I’m thinking you may be right on the limitations Chris may have been sensing regarding battery levels. Maybe. OTOH he hadn’t taken all that many photos on his Powershot that day. I keep a pretty good eye on my batteries and have always carried a spare. But maybe he didn’t and found himself running out of steam. So he switched back to his cellphone. Which may have been running low, too.
Or maybe, as soon as he finished this sequence, he was told it was time to hustle and go.
Texting or e-mailing pictures – if you intend to text or e-mail your pictures FROM the fire, you are likely to take them WITH your smartphone. However, if you want better-quality shots, and you don’t care about texting or e-mailing them right that minute, you take them with your CAMERA (and not your smartphone), and you download them to your computer (and then e-mail them to whereever you want or print them or upload them to Facebook or whatever) when you get home.
I’m assuming that that is the obvious explanation for why Chris was working with both his smartphone and his camera, no? What am I missing, Marti?
What you’re missing is that Chris never sent out, as far as we know, anything from his cellphone.
Based on what are you saying that, Marti?
Elizabeth… sometimes assumptions *CAN* be made not because of the existence of evidence…
…but because of the LACK of it.
There is NO EVIDENCE ( that ANYONE seems to be aware of ) that Christopher ever sent ANY text messages with attached photos to ANYONE on June 30, 2013.
The only ‘assumption’ that can be made, then, is that that is because he didn’t actually DO it.
Elizabeth…
Christopher’s Canon Powershot was
simply a *better* camera. It was the ‘professional’ piece of kit he had with him versus the ‘amateur’ iPhone 4s.
His iPhone 4s only had an 8 megapixel maximum resolution.
The Canon Powershot went all the way up to 14.1 megapixels ( almost TWICE the resolution ) with MUCH better ZOOM and focal length options.
Even on the Doce fire… Christopher was ‘switching back and forth’ and the common denominator seems to be that he would do that when he sensed ( as a photographer ) that something very DRAMATIC was happening.
On the Doce fire… it was VLAT Air Drops ( when they happened ). At Yarnell… same interest in VLATS and I’m sure he realized ( as a photographer ) what a DRAMATIC scene was unfolding before him there circa 3:55 PM. He just wanted to be sure he got some ultra-highres shots with the Canon as well as the cellphone.
It might have had nothing to do with ‘battery levels’ at all, really. That is just one possibility.
I now think it just had more to do with Christopher’s sense ( as a photographer ) of when something IMPORTANT was happening… like that dramatic fire behavior and smoke cloud developing right in front of his eyes circa 3:55 PM on June 30, 2013.
He wanted to be SURE he ‘captured it all’… which also explains the multiple switching from ‘Landscape’ to ‘Portrait’ mode. That smoke column was getting HUGE ( even before their decision to leave the safe black ) and he also wanted to be sure he captured that as well.
He succeeded.
That was my point, friend.
Also, there absolutely 100% *are* text messages and photos that the SAIT was never given. The SAIT never ASKED for them (to this day).
I honestly hadn’t heard that.
My turn to ask…
What are YOU basing THAT statement on?
Elizabeth. How many? Did the ADOSH investigators ask for other pictures and texts that were sent?
ScottNorrisPhotoAndText.pdf says……(in an email from Randy Okon to Richa Wilson)on August 8 2013……..
I believe we have received all text and photos from the families that we are going to see.
Another related question. Immediately following the Yarnell incident, Wade Ward, from PFD said something to the effect of. Marsh reported they were in a tight spot and everyone knew this was going to be a bitch, were deploying.
I have always wondered where this statement came from? Did Eric Marsh say something to that effect to someone? Or did Wade Ward make that up?
So….. evidence? Links? How do you KNOW that??
**
** CROSSFADE BETWEEN
** MACKENZIE IMAGES
** CANON IMG_0889 @ 3:53.36 PM ?
** CANON IMG_0890 @ 3:53.44 PM ? ( + 8 seconds )
This is a crossfade between the two ‘still photos’ that Christopher Mackenzie
shot with his Canon Powershot in-between his two 9 second videos.
IMG_0889 was taken in ‘Landscape’ mode.
IMG_0890 was taken 8 seconds later in ‘Portrait’ mode and shows more of the
immense smoke column building in the sky. It would appear the reason Christopher quickly switched to ‘Portrait’ mode at this point was to be SURE
he captured that moment and more of that HUGE ‘smoke cloud building’ than
he did in his previous ‘Landscape’ photo, 8 seconds earlier.
There are places where ( even in just 8 seconds ) the fireline itself seems to
have made some quick ‘pushouts’ to the SOUTH as compared to the photo
taken just 8 seconds earlier.
YouTube Video Title: IMG-0889-and-IMG-0890
http://youtu.be/unz_fTnW8zc
YouTube About Information…
_________________________________________________________________
This is a crossfade between the two ‘still’ images that Christopher MacKenzie
took circa 3:53 PM with his Canon Powershot. BOTH of these ‘still’ images were
taken in-between his two 9 second videos that day. IMG_0889 was taken circa
3:53.36 PM and IMG_0890 was taken just 8 seconds later circa 3:53.44.
IMG_0889 was taken in ‘Landscape’ mode and then Christopher apparently
just flipped the camera to ‘Portrait’ mode in order to capture MORE of the
DRAMATIC smoke column buildup than he did in the ‘Landscape’ shot just 8
seconds before that. Even though only 8 seconds transpire between these two
photos the FIRELINE seems to show places where it has sudden ‘pushouts’ to
the SOUTH, especially around the area where Brendan’s lookout mound can
be seen in the distance.
__________________________________________________________________
**
** CROSSFADE BETWEEN
** MACKENZIE IMAGES
** CANON MVI_0888 @ 3:53.19 PM ?
** CANON IMG_0889 @ 3:53.36 PM ? ( + 17 seconds )
Continuing on with this ‘see what they say’ crossfade series…
This is a crossfade between the stillframe from +4 seconds into Christopher
MacKenzie’s first 9 second video ( MVI_0888 ) and the NEXT (still) image he
took with his Canon Powershot 17 seconds later.
Canon Powershot image IMG_0889 was taken just 12 seconds after the END of
the 9 second long Canon Movie MVI_0888. Since the still frame used for the MVI_0888 image above was from the +4 second mark into that video… then we
add 5 seconds to get an ‘elapsed’ time between these two images of 17 seconds
and an approximate ‘real’ time for IMG_0889 of 3:53.36 PM.
After these 17 seconds… the FIRELINE can now be seen becoming clearly
visible again after that big ‘smoke push’ to the SOUTH that was seen in the
previous crossfade between cellphone image 2736 and the stillframe from
the 0888 movie.
YouTube Video Title: MVI-0888-and-IMG-0889
http://youtu.be/ua1Wrx6cj3E
YouTube About Information
_________________________________________________________________
This is a crossfade between a stillframe from +4 seconds into Christopher
MacKenzie’s first Canon Powershot movie MVI_0888 ( circa 3:53.19 PM ) and
a still photo he took 17 seconds after that with the same Canon Powershot
camera ( Image IMG_0889 circa 3:53.36 PM ). The fireline has now become
visible again after the significant smoke ‘push’ SOUTH that was seen between
cellphone IMG_2736 and the stillframe from MVI_0888.
_________________________________________________________________
As a reminder… here are the original Canon Powershot timestamps ( which are
NOW known to be WRONG and at least 9 minutes AHEAD of the ‘real time’
that day ) showing the 4 items that Christopher shot with his Canon for a total
of a 48 second ‘session’ with that camera which we NOW know took place
in-between his cellphone image(s) IMG_2736 and IMG_2735…
1601:31 – 110-0888 – First VIDEO – Duration: 9.24 sec.
1601:52 – 110-0889 – First still photo 12 seconds after video
1602:00 – 110-0890 – Second still photo 8 seconds later.
1602:10 – 110-0891 – Second VIDEO, 10 seconds later – Duration: 9.14 sec
THIS crossfade is between those first TWO items above.
**
** CROSSFADE BETWEEN
** MACKENZIE IMAGES
** PHONE IMG_2736 @ 3:51.58 PM
** CANON MVI_0888 @ 3:53.19 PM ( +1 minute 21 seconds )
The next ‘photographic’ evidence in this 3:49 to 4:00 PM sequence after
MacKenzie’s cellphone image IMG_2736 at 3:51.58 would be the first frame(s)
of MacKenzie’s first VIDEO… MVI_0888.
We still do NOT know exactly how long it took MacKenzie to switch from using his
cellphone to take IMG_2736 to when he first started recording his first MVI_0888
movie with the Canon Powershot… but the best estimate at this time seems
to be approximately 1 minute and 17 seconds, based on a 3 minute and 22
second ‘window’, with a 48 second Canon Powershot sequence, and the
assumption that it took him just as long to switch from the cellphone to the
Canon as it then did for him to switch BACK from the Canon to using the
cellphone again ( 1 minute 17 seconds… both times ).
NOTE: One of the reasons for this particular ‘crossfade’ is to simply establish
with a ‘visual’ how much time MIGHT have transpired… based on fireline
and smoke cloud movements during the time MacKenzie was switching from
his cellphone to his Canon Powershot.
The still frame from MVI_0888 used for this ‘crossfade’ was taken from the 4
second mark into that first movie because anything earlier would have created
too much distortion for a crossfade due to ‘camera angle’… so if we add those 4
seconds to the estimated 1 minute and 17 seconds then this crossfade comes 1
minute and 21 seconds after IMG_2736 was taken.
IMG_2736 was taken in ‘Landscape’ mode with the cellphone.
MVI_0888 was also taken in ‘Landscape ‘ mode and the still frame from +4
seconds had to be rotated a few degrees clockwise in order for the terrain to
match as the images crossfade.
YouTube Video Title: IMG-2736-and-MVI-0888-4
http://youtu.be/pIpsnQf9oQE
YouTube About Information
__________________________________________________________________
This is a crossfade between Christopher MacKenzie’s cellphone image
IMG_2736 ( taken at 3:51.58 PM ) and a stillframe from the very next
photographic moment that MacKenzie performed after that… which was
to shoot his first 9 second video at that location using his Canon Powershot.
This first movie was only 9 seconds long and had a Canon filename
of MVI_0888. It is still not known exactly how long it took Christopher
to switch from using his cellphone to the Canon… but the best estimate
at this time is that this first VIDEO was shot approximately 1 minute
and 17 seconds after cellphone image IMG_2736. This crossfade
shows that during that time delay following IMG_2736, while he switched
from his cellphone to the Canon Powershot, the SMOKE has moved
dramatically SOUTH and towards their location to the extent that it is
now ‘blocking’ their view of the fireline itself.
_________________________________________________________________
NOTE: If a better way is found to establish the exact time offset between
cellphone image IMG_2736 and the start of MVI_0888 then the timestamps
used above will obviously change.
Looking at the progression of the SMOKE cloud, however, I would say there
had to be at *least* 60 seconds between IMG_2736 and the start of MVI_0888.
WTKTT could you please email me – [email protected]. I have a couple of questions for you that I do not want on a discussion thread. Thank you.
**
** CROSSFADE BETWEEN
** MACKENZIE CELL PHONE IMAGES
** IMG_2735 @ 3:50.19 PM
** IMG_2736 @ 3:51.58 PM ( +1 minute 39 seconds )
A full 1 minute and 39 seconds transpire between these two MacKenzie
cell phone images.
IMG_2735 was taken in ‘Landscape’ mode.
IMG_2736 was also taken in ‘Landscape ‘ mode and had to be rotated 1 degree
counter-clockwise in order for the terrain to match as the images crossfade.
YouTube Video Title: IMG-2735-and-IMG-2736
http://youtu.be/p1IX_NTuhhs
YouTube About Information
__________________________________________________________________
This is a crossfade between Christopher MacKenzie’s cellphone photo IMG_2735
( taken at 3:50.19 PM ) and the very next photo he took with his cellphone 1 minute
and 39 seconds later ( IMG_2736 at 3:51.58 PM ). The crossfade shows a pretty
significant advancement of the fireline to the SOUTH during those 99 seconds and
a dramatic change in the smoke cloud(s).
__________________________________________________________________
NOTE: Right after Christopher took this IMG_2736 with his cellphone is when he
then switched to using his Canon Powershot. Somewhere during the next 3
minutes and 22 seconds is when he used the Canon to shoot his first 9 second
video, then he took 2 still pictures with the Canon… and then he finished this 4
item sequence with the Canon by shooting the second 9 second video.
After shooting these 4 items with the Canon ( in a 48 second contiguous
timespan somewhere in the 3 minute and 22 second window )… Christopher
then switched back to his cellphone to take his next IMG_2737 cellphone image
at 3:55.20.
It has yet to be determined EXACTLY when, in this 3 minute and 22 second
‘window’ between cellphone images 2736 and 2737 Christopher actually
began his 48 second ‘session’ with the Canon Powershot, but if he took the
same amount of time to switch from using his cellphone to using the Canon
as he did to then switch BACK from the Canon to the cellphone… then it
would appear that the first Canon Powershot video ( and the first item in
the 48 second Canon session ) came 1 minute and 17 seconds after
he took cellphone image IMG_2736.
That would put the ‘start’ time for MacKenzie’s FIRST video at 3:51.36 PM.
This represents an approximate 11 minute time difference between what his
Canon Powershot device *thought* the time was that day versus what it
really was. His Canon Powershot was ( apparently ) set about 11 minutes
AHEAD of what the real time was that day.
CORRECTION for the post above…
I added the 1 minute and 17 seconds to the time for IMG_2735
instead of IMG_2736.
That last part of the original post above *SHOULD* have read
like this…
That would put the ‘start’ time for MacKenzie’s FIRST video
at 3:53.15 PM.
This represents an approximate 9 (NINE) minute time difference
between what his Canon Powershot device *thought* the time
was that day versus what it really was. His Canon Powershot
was ( apparently ) set about 9 (NINE) minutes AHEAD of what
the real time was that day.
**
** CROSSFADE BETWEEN
** MACKENZIE CELL PHONE IMAGES
** IMG_2734 @ 3:50.06 PM
** IMG_2735 @ 3:50.19 PM ( +13 SECONDS )
Only 13 seconds elapse between these two MacKenzie cell phone images.
IMG_2734 was taken in ‘Portrait’ mode and shows more of the sky and
smoke cloud.
IMG_2735 was taken in ‘Landscape’ mode had to be rotated a few degrees
clockwise in order for the terrain to match as the images crossfade.
NOTE: In-between these two images is when Christopher changed his position
and moved from standing directly behind Captain Jesse Steed to a point a little
further back on the rocks and to the LEFT of where Steed was sitting. Steed’s
knee can still be seen on the right side of IMG_2735.
YouTube Video Title: IMG-2734-and-IMG-2735
http://youtu.be/1aL4aK_pgJs
YouTube About Information…
__________________________________________________________________
This is a crossfade between Christopher MacKenzie’s cellphone image
IMG_2734 ( taken at 3:50.06 ) and the very next one that he took 13 seconds
later ( IMG_2735 at 3:50.19 ) AFTER changing positions from standing directly
behind Captain Jesse Steed ( with the red helmet on ) to a position further to the
left and back up on the rocks slightly.
Even though only 13 seconds elapse between the images… the crossfade still
shows a slight increase in the fireline to the SOUTH… and a significant change
in the smoke cloud(s).
__________________________________________________________________
**
** CROSSFADE BETWEEN
** MACKENZIE CELL PHONE IMAGES
** IMG_2733 @ 3:49.59 PM
** IMG_2734 @ 3:50.06 PM ( +7 SECONDS )
Only 7 seconds transpire between these two MacKenzie cell phone images
but the crossfade still shows some noticeable fireline advancement to the
SOUTH… AND ( considering only 7 seconds elapse ) there is a DRAMATIC
difference in the SMOKE cloud(s).
IMG_2733 was taken in ‘Landscape’ mode.
IMG_2734 was taken in ‘Portrait’ mode and shows more of the sky and the
smoke column. It had to be rotated a few degrees counter-clockwise in order
for the terrain to match as the images crossfade.
YouTube Video Title: IMG_2733-and-IMG_2734
http://youtu.be/mGwZNyPvBZg
YouTube About Information…
__________________________________________________________________
This is a terrain-aligned crossfade between Christopher MacKenzie’s cellphone
image IMG_2733 ( taken at 3:49.59 PM ) and the very next image he took with
his cellphone just 7 seconds later… IMG_2734 ( taken at 3:50.06 PM ).
Even though only 7 seconds have transpired between the two images the
crossfade still shows there has been some advancement of the fireline to the
SOUTH… and the difference between the SMOKE cloud(s) is DRAMATIC.
__________________________________________________________________
ALSO NOTE: At the time Christopher MacKenzie was taking these two
cellphone images… Brendan McDonough had already been dropped off
by Brian Frisby where the GM Superintendent and GM Chase truck(s) were
located… and Brendan was, at this same moment, taking his own cellphone
photos of the fire/smoke whirl he was seeing down where the trucks were parked.
Also… IMG_2734 ( taken at 3:50.06 ) also appears to be the photo that captures
Robert Caldwell shooting his second of (only) two videos that day which captured
the following background radio conversation going on at this exact moment…
__________________________________________________________________
Eric Marsh (DIVS A): Yea… I’m tryin’ to work my way off the top.
Todd Abel ( OPS1 ): Okay… I copy… ah… just keep me updated…
ah… ya know… you guys hunker and be safe and then… ah…
we’ll get some air support down there ASAP.
_________________________________________________________________
WTKTT and xxFullsailxx: Regarding your recent exchange about where Todd Abel was located at the time of the deployment and burn-over…. Presumably, if Todd Abel had made it over to the east side of the fire by the time of the 4:27 “Yarnell Gamble” video (which I doubt that he had), we would see him in the Tom Story photos where some of the guys are congregating around the white pick-up trucks in the Ranch Restaurant parking lot immediately after hearing that GM was in trouble. WTKTT, do you see Abel there?
There appear to be two Central Yavapai trucks in several of the Tom Story photos. Able and Cordes? One truck actually heads into the adjacent street and is also seen coming back toward the ranch house. Cordes, right?
Sorry to butt in. Just wondering myself?
ultimately it doesn’t really matter where Abel was… the fact is, that there is no substantive evidence that it is Abel’s voice…AND, there is no substantive evidence that the conversation is addressing Marsh.
what IS substantive, is that WTKTT continues to peddle the nefarious mystery person ordering-GM-off-the-hill (oh, and hurry up doing it) conspiracy theory. what else is substantive, is that WTKTT continues to ad-lib conversations, and then call it “evidence” from which to speculate further.
noone had reason to “order” GM anywhere, let alone tell them to “hurry up.”
as WTKTT has already acknowledged… there was an IHC within arms reach of that end of the fire already… so if there was a specific task for an IHC then Blue Ridge could have just as well been utilized.
xxfullsailxx
I will have to agree with you that I have not seen substantial evidence to indicate GM was ordered or told to hurry up that has not been tied together in my assessment.
Something you said down below dose bother me.
As a Lookout and I was talking a highly qualified lookout.
A Foreman on a crew. I ask you would that person concerned about there crew not have got in the Superintendents truck. Driven to any location necessary to get eyes on their crew and the fire and continue to inform them of the fire activity, even if the crew could see the Fire?
We still do not fully know if McDonough actually knew what the crew was doing or where they were going.
Absent that a qualified Foreman (lookout) would have been in contact and asking for the information on the crew and giving their advice on fire spread. Do you not agree with that? I think on this fire there were places for a while that person could have been useful. I do not think that is BS. McDonough was seeing fire activity as he drove out and took pictures that he could have relayed to the crew if he had been more qualified. That was what I was trying to get across, maybe you misread my intent.
bob, while i completely agree with you about the competencies and experience level of a lookout in general, i do not agree that McDonough had any obligation or reason to go try to post up else where, unless Steed or Marsh asked him to…
a. i don’t think there was any where else to get a vantage on the crew and their relation to fire behavior…
b. Marsh & Steed both had the best vantage point point of EVERYTHING going on with the fire… if anything (and again, this is total hindsight bias) what they should have done, was post a new lookout at that exact spot where they were before they hike toward BSR…
the lookout qualification thing is something that we seem to have to revisit every fire years or so. it’s been addressed in multiple fire refreshers. i think that in general, and especially with IHC’s, that the lookout position is taken seriously… and even if you’re sending a squad boss trainee up to be lookout, you should also be sending up a qualified individual to train them up on the importance of the task.
but again, i don’t believe that ANYONE knew or understood the route that GM was taking… if they knew that GM was travelling around the fire to the south, through the green, SOMEONE (probably ops. Musser or Blue Ridge overhead) would have told them about the second wind shift that ultimately got them entrapped.
holy typos…
*before they HIKED to BSR*
*every FIVE years or so*
I got that well said it is just something I would have done. as asst. I was always LO.
I completely agree re the lookout not just cranking up the AC and effectively quitting work. But, the same is true about not putting your lookout where they put him, and not simply letting him hang out and nearly get burned over. Both to me are symptomatic of broader issues. Everything from an undue tolerance for risk, to an undue tolerance of no real communication.
There is a catch-22 involved, though. If you don’t want people to know where you are going, it’s tough to ask McDonough to keep working as a lookout in a way that’s likely to be useful.
I believe looking at pictures that some one could have gone out of town on the highway and been able to look back up the ridge to the heal of the fire where the crew was. If they had binoculars they may have been able to see them start down the ridge before the smoke layed over and covered the area. Again a well qualified lookout attached to the crew would have at least tried to maintain contact. after the trucks were safe they had there crew freq. to talk on all they wanted with out interference from other traffic. It is a within 2 to 4 mile line of site personal radio channel.
Yes actually not that different from glassing deer in some ways. But you’ve got to know to try to do it, and/or have someone direct you to do it. One of many opportunities where both the intended route could have been disclosed, and they could have gotten better information on fire and weather in turn. I strongly suspect that most people would have been asking their lookout to do this, but that again gets back to disclosing their route.
Yap ?????
Reply to Bob Powers post
on April 27, 2014 at 3:14 pm
>> Mr. Powers said…
>> I believe looking at pictures that
>> some one could have gone out of
>> town on the highway and been
>> able to look back up the ridge to
>> the heal of the fire where the crew
>> was.
You didn’t need to go ‘out of town’
at all. There were any number of
places where that ‘anchor spot’
could be clearly seen from in
town itself. The Yarnell Fire Station
was up on its own ‘hill’ and had an
absolute CLEAR ( and direct )
view of that area. That’s where
OPS1 Todd Abel and Eric Marsh
first had their ‘chat’ that morning,
with a CLEAR view of that anchor
point location… and both agreed to
send GM up there in the first place.
>> Mr. Powers also wrote…
>> If they had binoculars they may
>> have been able to see them start
>> down the ridge before the smoke
>> layed over and covered the area.
Yes…. and there was (apparently)
no shortage of binocluars that day.
In his ADOSH interview…
SPGS1 Gary Cordes said he ‘glassed
them up ‘ any number of times that
day ( from various locations in town )
and was able to see exactly what they
were doing up on the ridge.
Page 45 of Cordes’ ADOSH interview
Q = Bruce Hanna
A = SPGS1 Gary Cordes
______________________________
Q: Okay.
A: …and I did glass them up throughout the day and they were up on the switchback right in here. They had…
Q: Mm-hmm.
A: …a squad uh, just staged out over here and then they had been, they had some doing some work in here.
( Points to map ).
______________________________
Also… in his first ADOSH interview…
Brendan McDonough was asked if
HE had his own binoculars that day
while serving as lookout… and
he said YES…
Page 27…
Q1 = Barry Hicks
A = Brendan McDonough
______________________________
Q1: Did you have any binoculars
with you?
A: Yeah.
Q1: You did?
A: Mm-hm.
______________________________
Seems reasonable with the right person trained in fuels, weather, and responsibilities as a lookout. Could have made a huge difference. One of those learning things that need discussed.
Reply to Elizabeth post on April 27, 2014 at 8:31 am said:
>> Elizabeth wrote
>> WTKTT and xxFullsailxx: Regarding your recent exchange
>> about where Todd Abel was located at the time of the
>> deployment and burn-over…. Presumably, if Todd Abel had
>> made it over to the east side of the fire by the time of the 4:27
>> “Yarnell Gamble” video (which I doubt that he had), we would
>> see him in the Tom Story photos where some of the guys are
>> congregating around the white pick-up trucks in the Ranch
>> Restaurant parking lot immediately after hearing that GM
>> was in trouble. WTKTT, do you see Abel there?
The first Tom Story photo available in the public folder that
shows anything from the Ranch House Restaurant parking
lot ( his image number 1677 ) has a timestamp of 5:06.10 PM.
It was taken with his Canon EOS, which has already been
determined to be ‘accurate’ with timestamping that day to
within 45 to 50 seconds of ‘true’ time.
His ‘previous’ sequential image ( 1676 ) was taken up near the
helibase on Hays Ranch Road ( with the same Canon EOS )
and has a timestamp of 3:18.48 PM.
So, apparently, Tom Story himself was ‘moving around’ a lot
that day and didn’t take any picutures with his Canon EOS
at all between 3:18 and 5:06 PM ( Almost a 2 hour gap ).
So even the Tom Story photos from the RHR were not taken
( as you suggested ) “immediately after hearing GM was
in trouble”. His first photo from that location seems to be
almost a half-hour AFTER the ‘deployment’ message(s).
We KNOW that Todd Abel WAS at the Ranch House
Restaurant sometime after the deployment… because Paul
Musser says ( in his ADOSH interview ) that that is where
he suggested to Abel ( face to face ) that Abel become the
IC for the ‘Incident within an Incident’ and that Musser would
continue on as ‘Field OPS’ for the fire itself.
But I’m glad you brought this up… because even as xxfullsailxx
and I were having that exchange I remembered that there really
has never seemed to be any definite proof of WHEN Field OPS1
Todd Abel really worked his way down to Yarnell that day.
So, again… we KNOW that pretty much ‘everyone’ ended up
at the Ranch House Restaurant, at some point ( Musser, Cordes,
Willis, Abel, etc. )… but EXACTLY when they all arrived there
has never been fully researched or documented, AFAIK.
Musser says ( in his ADOSH interview ) that after he dropped
the ‘Planning OPS’ duties and jumped in as the second fully
functional ‘Field OPS’ on the fire that afternoon… he pulled
some resources to himself and then first tackled the problem
that had developed in the Sickles Road area. After he dealt
with that… he worked his way down towards Yarnell.
Apparently… he FIRST met up with SPGS1 Gary Cordes at
that ‘other’ staging area up by the Shrine Road ( I believe
it was referred to as ‘the gas station’ ). Whether he made his
1542 ‘availability check’ out to DIVSA Marsh just BEFORE
he arrived there or not has still not been definitely determined,
but that ‘near the Shrine road’ staging point IS where he
first met Cordes face-to-face and got ‘briefed’ on the situation
as Cordes knew it at that time. ( Evacuations already in progress ).
So we know when Musser got to Yarnell… and where he first
‘staged’ ( up near Shrine road and 89 )… but we still don’t know
when either he or Cordes went down to the RHR.
Likewise… we can (*apparently) hear Field OPS1 Todd Abel telling
SOMEONE in an Air Study video circa 4:10 or so that he thought he
was going to ‘be down there’ ( in Yarnell ) in (quote) “About FIVE”
( minutes )… but I also realized in that recent exchange that there
doesn’t seem to be any real proof that he actually did that ( made it
down there in 5 minutes ).
So I went digging.
I agree with xxfullsailxx that it “doesn’t really matter where
Abel was” with regards to radio transmissions that day… but
I was just curious myself whether there really is any documented
evidence of WHERE Field OPS1 Todd Abel actually WAS when
we hear him breaking into Steed’s MAYDAY sequence and
telling Air Attack “Granite Mountain is trying to get a hold of you,
let’s see what we’ve got goin’ on.”
Wherever he was at the time of the MAYDAYS… it is obvious
he was hearing that MAYDAY traffic in real time and HE was
the one trying to get Bravo 33 to ‘wake up and pay attention’
and RESPOND to these men… ( recorded in the Helmet-Cam
video ) which they (eventually) did.
I’ve checked all the Tom Story photos and the Michelle Lee
photos and the Blue Ridge photos from the Ranch House
Restaurant. I really don’t see either Musser OR Abel there in
pretty much ANY timeframe ( even though we know they were ).
I don’t see Darrell Willis in any of the photos either.. and we ALSO
know fer sure he was there at some point ( unless that
is him just sitting in that white pickup truck listening to radio ),
so I guess it’s possible ANY of these guys could have been there
at just about any time but just never got caught in a photo.
So I went back to Todd Abel’s own ADOSH interview.
Sure enough… there DOES seem to be a quick moment there
in that interview when they are looking at maps and Abel is
pointing to where he was out workinig on the NORTH end
of the fire.
As he was doing that… he happened to mention something.
On page 50 of his ADOSH interview… OPS1 Todd Abel
actually DOES describe how it was he got down to Yarnell,
and WHEN he did that.
It starts with them trying to work through the ‘unit log’ that Abel
supplied to the SAIT investigators… with him (Abel) pointing at the
map they were working with during the interview and him pointing
at the spot where he was working up on the north end. Then he
starts ‘pointing’ at ‘other spots’ and adding some explanation…
Q1 = Dave Larsen ( Rest in Peace )
A = Field OPS1 Todd Abel
______________________________________________________
Q1: Um, do you remember the timeframe? Do you remember
when you heard the word deploy?
A: I remember looking at my watching and thinking it was probably
around, uh, 1645ish.
Q1: Okay that seems to be – okay. All right. Uh, structures are
burning in Yarnell, heavy smoke, fire crosses 89, propane tanks
exploding, all-out search began for Granite Mountain, that’s the
next entry ( in Abel’s log ).
A: All right. Uh, I’m gonna – let me, uh – I’ll – let me back up a little
bit with you guys just to make sure we got the full picture here.
Q1: Please.
A: So I’m still upon this north end when all this happens down
here. Um, we had the wind – the wind had shifted, structures
weren’t threatened anymore. Um, I – about the time this happens,
Darrell Willis calls me and – just to update me on how they were
doing over there. I say are you copying this on air on to ground?
And he says no. I said Granite Mountain just deployed. And he’s
like well okay. You know and we hung up the phone – uh, it was
either phone or radio, I can’t remember, ‘cause I had talked to him
a couple of times on the phone. But, um, I called – Todd Foster
said hold up any burning, we didn’t need to do it anymore because
the wind had shifted. I moved myself back around to the – to Yarnell.
All right? Um, and – and I know Darrell did too and I know he made
arrangements to leave his chunk with the task force leader there.
So I come back around here to the – there’s a restaurant that sits,
uh – it’s gotta be right in here somewhere. A restaurant sits right in
there. Um, I came back around there. In transit over here I called
our alarm room here, started ordering Medevac helicopters and
ambulances, ‘cause I didn’t know what we were dealing with.
…
Q1: Okay.
A: So I come down to here. Paul Musser comes up to me and
says I’m gonna – we need to make you the IC of the incident within
the incident. I said I copy that. He goes I’m gonna keep on – I’m
gonna hold on to tactical – I’ll take tactical ops for the fire, so we
can still try to save some of this stuff in Yarnell.
______________________________________________________
So ( according to Abel himself ) he did NOT ‘make it down
there in FIVE minutes’ as he seemed to say he was going to
do in an Air Study video circa 4:10. According to Abel’s testimony
to ADOSH… he was still up on the north end even when the
MAYDAY calls first appeared on the radio at 1639… and he
jumped on the Air-to-ground channel to tell Bravo 33 to stop ignoring them from UP THERE… which is also where he
then had that cellphone call with Darrell Willis. Willis has always
said he got that cellphone call FROM Todd Abel to notify Willis
about the deployment ( and that it WAS, in fact, a phone call
and not a radio transmission ) but now Abel says it was the
other way around ( that Willis called HIM right after deployment).
So we still don’t have an exact TIME for when OPS1 Todd Abel
made it down to Yarnell… but it does SOUND like he only
headed down there because of the deployment situation and
that he DID go straight to the Ranch House Restaurant…
…and whenever he DID finally get there… that is when Musser
asked him to be IC for the ‘Incident within an Incident’.
hmm, so even less credibility to the voice in the “Yarnell Gamble” video being attributed to Abel… interesting.
Reply to xxfullsailxx on April 27, 2014 at 3:26 pm
>> xxfullsailxx said…
>> hmm, so even less credibility to the voice in the
>> “Yarnell Gamble” video being attributed to Abel…
>> interesting.
How so?
>> xxfullsailxx also said…
>> ultimately it doesn’t really matter where Abel was
I agree. IAOI ( If And Only If ) that really is him
speaking to Marsh in the YARNELL-GAMBLE
video and IAOI Marsh is actually responding
directly to whoever that is saying ‘appreciate if
you could get to town a little faster’…
…then YOU are right. It truly doesn’t matter where
Field OPS1 Todd Abel was. Radios are an
amazing tool.
You can maintain all you want that Marsh is
NOT ‘finishing’ an ongoing conversation with
speaker 1 in the YARNELL-GAMBLE video…
…but it is not possible to maintain that Eric Marsh
was NOT reporting Granite Mountain’s ‘status’
and/or ‘progress’ to SOMEONE at exactly that
moment in time… just 15 minutes before
deployment.
So WHO do YOU think Marsh was ‘reporting’ to,
at that moment, if not speaker 1 in the video?
It’s a finite (short) list of names, don’t you think?
Go re-read the interviews and the alleged interview notes/unit logs. Make a chart of who says they heard from or spoke with GM, regarding *what.* Presumably that chart will answer your questions (or at least point you in the right direction), no?
Elizabeth… it sounds like you might
have already done that yourself.
So same question goes out to YOU.
Regardless of the apparent ‘context’
of the YARNELL-GAMBLE video… and
the *apparent* response of Marsh to
what speaker 1 says… just take the
4:27 PM ‘report’ by Marsh all by itself.
WHO do YOU think he was ‘reporting
Granite Mountain’s status/progress
to at that moment… just 15 minutes
before deployment?
WTKTT, thanks for continuing to do good work here.
The YIN are confusing, which is partially why I asked….
What’s the other part of
your ‘partially’?
Do YOU, in fact, have some idea of WHO Marsh was obviously ‘reporting’ Granite Mountain’s status/progress to at 4:27 PM?
I have already stated a number of times what I believe is actually happening in the YARNELL-GAMBLE video and WHO Marsh
*seems* to be answering/reporting to.
I am seeking other opinions.
He was ‘reporting’ to SOMEONE ( with only 15 minutes to go before deployment ) and it’s a ‘short list’ of names.
**
** THE CONVOY THAT LEFT THE SESAME AREA…
>> Reply to Marti Reed post on April 25, 2014 at 6:52 pm
>>
>> Marti said…
>> I still haven’t managed to ever figure out Brendan’s trail.
>> I find it still REALLY confusing.
It’s not you, Marti. It really is quite confusing what ACTUALLY
happened there with that CONVOY circa 1600 ( 4:00 PM ).
>> WTKTT on April 26, 2014 at 12:22 am replied…
>>
>> Since the additional unit logs surfaced in February… it’s pretty clear that
>> Brendan DID just ‘convoy’ out with the Blue Ridge guys and they all drove
>> south through the Sesame area, then through Glen Ilah, then turned north
>> on Highway 89 at 4:02 PM ( when Brendan shot those pics out the window
>> of the Sup truck )… and then they all headed over to the Youth Camp at end
>> of Shrine road.
>>
>> So even if the new TIME for the ‘discussing their options’ conversations
>> moves BACK to the 3:53 PM timeframe… Brendan was ( supposedly ) still in
>> the GM Supervisor truck with ( in his own testimony ) the intra-crew radio
>> volume ‘cranked up’
>>
>> Marti Reed on April 26, 2014 at 7:07 am replied…
>>
>> But what does that do to the photos he took from Hiway 89 in
>> Yarnell at 4:05ish?
Nothing, really. The new TIME for the MacKenzie videos doesn’t change
that event. It just means that he had heard them ‘discussing their options’
BEFORE those photos were taken… and not (perhaps) DURING, as
was previously thought might be the case when it *seemed* that the
MacKenzie videos were also being shot at that same (4:02) moment.
If the time on Brendan’s own device was ‘right’ ( and it seemed to be
a network-connected smartphone so we ARE assuming that )… the
exact TIME for his 4 photos was 4:02 PM. He took all four of them
out the driver window just 2 seconds apart from each other.
>> Did he drive down Sesame to 89 and then up Shrine to where Blue Ridge
>> was and then help “bump” the rest of the trucks, which is what it looks like
>> to me?
I don’t believe Brendan did anything but sit in the GM Supervisor Truck from
the time he got in it after Frisby dropped him off until it finally reached the
Ranch House Restaurant circa 1639. That was now his only ‘job’.
The Blue Ridge guys had been told where all the ‘keys’ were in the trucks
long before they even tried to move them and back during the time when
Frisby was evacuating Brendan… so they did not NEED Brendan to help
them ‘bump’ anything.
Brendan’s JOB was simple… at that point…
Drive that GM Supervisor truck… keep track of ALL the GM vehicles…
and listen closely to that intra-crew frequency for instructions that
could come at ANY moment.
After 1549 and all the way to 1639, when all the vehicles were finally
arriving at the Ranch House Restaurant… I actually don’t think Brendan
even exited the GM Supervisor Truck at all…. not even once… unless
he had to take a piss, or something.
>> Marti also said…
>> When I read the Unit Logs, I find them very confusing as to who went
>> where and when.
It’s not you, Marti. It IS, in fact, very confusing.
When reading some of the unit logs… it even seems like some of the people who
were actually DRIVING the vehicles aren’t even sure exactly which way they
went that day.
The generally accepted theory is that ALL of the vehicles that were leaving
that Sesame Area that day ( GM Sup Truck, GM Chase, GM Crew Carriers,
1 or more Blue Ridge support vehicles, etc. ) ALL exited the Sesame area
the way they all came in that morning.
South through the Sesame area, onto the pavement where Lakewood and
Manazanita end in west Glen Ilah… EAST on Lakewood to Highway 89,
then NORTH on Highway 89 to Shrine Road, then WEST / NORTHWEST
on Shrine Road to where the pavement ends at the parking lot of the
St. Joseph Shrine itself ( where Aarron Hulburd shot the Helmet Cam
video along with Jason Clawson and KC (Bucky) Yowell later on )…
then WEST on Shrine road some more to that Youth Camp clearing.
I really don’t think that any ‘vehicle’ other than the BR ATV ever ‘cut across’
that ‘cutover trail’ between the Sesame area and the Youth Camp, even after
the dozer was done improving it. It was still a nasty, winding sandy-soft-dirt
road with a downhill descent through that rock pile just before reaching the
Youth Camp area.
I think all the ‘real vehicles’ just stayed with legit ROADS that day and
‘going all the way around’ through Yarnell was the safe bet… so that’s
what they all did.
It was NOT the time to get any expensive vehicle STUCK out there on one of
those dirt roads. That would have been a BIG problem, at that time.
One of the things to remember is that Brendan McDonough, himself, had
NO IDEA where this ‘Shrine Road’ was, much less that obscure Youth Camp
off by itself after the pavement of Shrine Road ends.
GM never went down Shrine Road that morning… or anywhere near it.
Cordes took GM out to the Sesame area that morning via that known
Lakewood Drive access route… and Brendan wasn’t even driving that
morning.
So Brendan, himself, MUST have ‘followed’ someone from the Blue Ridge Crew
out of that area to even know how to get out of there, much less all the way over
to this ‘Youth Camp’ at that time.
If Brendan had turned his camera just a little farther north for one of those
four photos he took looking west from Highway 89 at 4:02 PM, I am sure we
would have seen one of the Blue Ridge vehicles in front of him ‘showing him
where to go’.
>> Marti also wrote…
>> Whatever whenever, I think it may have been quite difficult for him to
>> have been paying complete attention to what was coming over the
>> radio, given all that was going on.
I’m going to disagree there, Marti.
On the contrary… it was now ( more than ever that day ) Brendan’s
‘prime directive’ to be ‘listening to the intra-crew radio’.
He had already TOLD his Captain ( Steed ) as he left his assigned lookout
position and was being ‘picked up’ by another Hotshot supervisor ( Frisby )
that that is EXACTLY what he would be doing while he was absent from them.
Brendan was now the one who was responsible for ALL of the GM vehicles
and, at some point, seeing to it that they were re-united with the rest of
HIS team.
At any moment… he could be receiving instructions… and he BETTER
be listening to the intra-crew and not MISS those instructions… and
he knew that.
If Brendan had MISSED a callout from Steed or Marsh ( at any moment )
with ‘instructions’ about where to try and rotate the GM vehicles… there
would have been hell to pay… and I think Brendan knew THAT, too.
Brendan has said in his ADOSH interviews that his own handheld had
the GM intra-crew set as his PRIORITY channel all day that day… which
means that even if you are in general *scan* mode… any transmissions
that begin to take place on that pre-set PRIORITY channel will ‘break through’
to the top and now be the active conversation coming over the radio so
that no important conversations on the PRIORITY channel are ‘missed’.
The onboard radios in the GM Superintendent and GM Chase truck
probably also had this PRIORITY channel preference set to GM’s own
intra-crew frequency.
So… because of the circumstances… it was IMPERATIVE that Brendan
be listening closely to the intra-crew while he was separated from the
others… and I believe that is exactly what he was doing.
Besides… despite any consternation about all of this… the FACT remains
that ALL of the ‘official’ reports about this incident all state (unequivocally)
that Brendan McDonough DID hear them ‘discussing their options’,
whenever that actually took place.
Brendan has never denied ( or even qualified ) these statements.
The only thing we do NOT know is WHAT he might have heard.
THAT is what he has always ( and still ) refuses to talk about.
Yeah, now I think you’re right. Thanks for helping clear this up.
The other thing this scenario implies, is that as soon as someone from Blue Ridge was driving Jesse Steed’s chase truck, they could have listened in on that channel, also. At least if, in fact, it had an on-board radio, and if it was set to that channel as Priority.
Reply to Marti Reed post on April 28, 2014 at 8:55 am
>> Marti said…
>> The other thing this scenario implies, is that as
>> soon as someone from Blue Ridge was driving
>> Jesse Steed’s chase truck, they could have listened
>> in on that channel, also. At least if, in fact, it had an
>> on-board radio, and if it was set to that channel
>> as Priority.
Exactly.
That has actually *always* been a possibility even when
we thought the MacKenzie videos were shot at 4:02 PM.
There is even *some* evidence in those (redacted)
unit logs that one ( or more? ) of the THREE Blue
Ridge personnel who ended up driving those THREE
other GM vehicles actually USED the onboard radio(s)
to speak with Marsh and/or Steed WHILE they were
driving the GM vehicles ( reporting progress and
whatnot ).
So there might actually be THREE Blue Ridge Hotshots
who had a good chance of hearing Marsh and Steed
talking to each other at any time after 3:49 or 3:50 PM.
It all depends when everyone actually got into those
trucks… and when all of these ‘comfort level’ and
‘discussing their options’ conversations actually took
place.
ADOSH was never able to interview ANY of the
Blue Ridge Hotshots. Zero. Zip. Nada.
Thanks. I’m gonna go back and read those logs again. I’ve been wondering if the buggies had this built-in radios, too.
**
** MACKENZIE CELL PHONE PHOTOS CAPTURE CONVOY PROGRESSION?
Reply to calvin post on April 26, 2014 at 3:38 pm
>> calvin said…
>>
>> Mcdonough 154944 image.
>> How does this image align with the Mackenzie, Parker photos?
>> Where is the anchor point on the ridge?
>> Where is the Mackenzie, Parker, Norris photo spot?
>>
>> It appears that the ridge is clearly visible on the south side of the fire.
>> Possibly photographing the area GM were taking pictures from at
>> the same time?
Close… but no cigar.
The actual point where all these photos were being taken up on that ridge appears
to be *just* ‘out of frame’ on the left side of McDonough’s 1549 image(s).
That small ‘knob’ seen up on the ridge at the very left edge of 154944 appears
to be the north part of the actual ‘helispot’… where the entire DOC Lewis crew
was ‘airlifted’ out of that location just hours earlier that day…
…but even that ‘helispot’ was some hundreds of yards NORTH of where those
late-day ‘resting spots’ and the spot where the MacKenzie cellphone and Canon
photos/videos were taken.
However… looking back in the OTHER direction…
* IMG_2736.JPG – 3:51.58 PM
This MacKenzie cellphone image ( taken just 2 minutes and 14 seconds AFTER McDonough’s 154844 image ) has a clear view back from the ridge to the ‘Sesame area’… but the view to that EXACT spot where BOTH the GM Supervisor Truck AND the CM Chase truck had been parked that day is blocked by a ‘ridge’ in the distance.
That spot where they were ACTUALLY parked was a few hundred yards west of the point where that east/west two-track actually meets the more open ‘Sesame area’.
HOWEVER… in this photo… you CAN see that exact ‘intersection’ of the east/west two-track leading out to the ridge and where it meets the Sesame area… and there DO appear to be a group of vehicles captured there in this 3:51.58 PM photo.
I count at least TWO vehicles there.
They appear as small WHITE dots against the tan background of the
clearing at that point.
This is, in fact, known to be point where Blue Ridge had left at least ONE of their vehicles that day… which also needed to be evacuated along with the GM vehicles around this time.
So it looks like it is POSSIBLE that this cellphone photo of MacKenzie’s ( at 3:51.58 ) has captured the moment when that ‘evacuation’ convoy was assembling and actually heading out of the Sesame area.
It could very well be that moments after Brendan shot his 1549 photos… the ‘extra driver’ for the GM Chase Truck arrived at his location and then they both drove these WHITE vehicles the few hundred yards east to the Sesame area… and now Christopher’s 3:51.58 cellphone photo is capturing them ‘pausing’ at that intersection to pick up the other Blue Ridge vehicle that also needed to be evacuated.
* IMG_2738.JPG – 3:55.31 PM
3 minutes and 33 seconds later… those WHITE DOTS are GONE from that intersection where the east/west two-track meets the Sesame area… but NOW we see what appears to be an even LARGER group of vehicles in the distance at the exact point where the two GM Crew Carriers had been parked all day.
The 2 GM Crew Carriers had actually been visible there as 2 ‘white dots’ in various other photos taken throughout the day, but NOW ( at 3:55.31 PM ) there appear to be MORE than just the 2 Crew Carriers assembled at that location.
So THIS MacKenzie cellphone photo could now be showing the actual ‘progression’ of the evacuation convoy as it stopped where the GM Crew Carriers were to ‘fire them up’ and add them to the convoy…
…which was then going to keep heading SOUTH in the Sesame area and exit out to Highway 89 via Lakewood Drive in Glen Ilah ( the way they all came in that day in the first place ).
That ‘convoy’ would, of course, then head all the way around on Highway 89 and Shrine road to ‘re-stage’ out at the Youth Camp at the west end of Shrine road.
The timing pretty much matches here.
Christopher’s cellphone photos might actually have been capturing the ‘progess’ of this vehicle evacuation down there in the Sesame Area clearings.
** THE MACKENZIE VIDEOS AND ‘THE CONVOY’…
The only chance of seeing this same ‘activity’ in the distance in the MacKenzie videos comes after the 4 or 5 second mark in Chrisopher’s FIRST video… when he pans the camera to the right and we first see Jesse Steed sitting there.
In the distance… over Steed’s red helmet… you CAN see the same ‘clearing’ where the GM Crew Carriers were parked.
However… at this moment in the first MacKenzie video… there does NOT appear to be the same large ‘group of vehicles’ at that spot as can be seen in the (upcoming) 2738 cellphone photo. You can still ( apparently ) only see the two GM Crew Carriers there.
Since we NOW know that these MacKenzie videos HAD to have been taken
in-between MacKenzie cellphone photos 2736 and 2737… this would still make sense.
That means the ‘convoy’ may have still been working its way down south from the northern end of the Sesame area at that moment in the first video… but is still hidden behind that ridge in the distance.
It would only be a few minutes later ( when MacKenzie would return to shooting photos with his cellphone ( with image 2738 at 3:55.31 ) that we NOW see the convoy ‘arriving’ where the GM Crew Carriers are.
More on this later…
Followup… cellphone photo 2737 is the FIRST one that MacKenzie
took AFTER using his Canon Powershot to shoot the videos…
but that 2737 photo is of the fireline and is NOT pointed EAST
where we could see any ‘convoy’ activity.
It is only 11 seconds AFTER 2737 when Christopher then
turned more to the EAST and took his next 2738 photo which
DOES show the Sesame area in the distance.
WTKTT. So you are saying the Discussing options spot is more to the south or left of the 154944 image? Do I understand you correctly that the helispot/ anchor point is visible in this photo? Meaning that if Marsh was north of the discussing options spot, he would have had a clear line of sight to where Mcdonough was in this picture?
Reply to calvin post on April 27, 2014 at 3:48 am
>> calvin said…
>> WTKTT. So you are saying the Discussing options
>> spot is more to the south or left of the 154944 image?
Yes. That is what Google Earth ‘ground level’ lookbacks
from Brendan’s location seem to indicate. If Brendan
has just pointed the camera a *little* more to HIS
left before taking that picture… it would have PROBABLY
captured that spot where the men were at 1549 up
in the ridge at the very left edge of his photo.
Now… whether we could have ACTUALLY ‘seen’ them
up there on the ridge or not is still debatable. The
resolution on Brendan’s camera was not so hot.
>> calvin also said…
>> Do I understand you correctly that the helispot/ anchor
>> point is visible in this photo?
Yes. It seems to be. That ‘knob’ on the ridge at the
extreme left of the photo seems to be the NORTHERN
edge of that area where the helispot was… and the spot
where the entire Lewis DOC Crew had been evacuated
from that same ‘anchor point’ location via helicopter
just hours earlier that day.
>> calvin also wrote…
>> Meaning that if Marsh was north of the discussing
>> options spot,
There is no ‘if’ about it. He was ‘north’ of that spot,
at that point. Probably still almost all the way on the
top of Weaver Mountain itself and ( as he had just
told OPS1 Todd Abel )… “Workin’ my way off the top.”
>> calvin also wrote…
>> he (Marsh) would have had a clear line of sight to
>> where Mcdonough was in this picture?
Well… I don’t know about a CLEAR line of sigth… but
YES… Marsh probably could have seen this area where
the GM Supervisor AND the GM Chase Trucks were
parked from where he was at that time.
It all depends on the ‘smoke curtain’… and what it looked
like from the ‘other side’. I still ascribe to your theory that
the reason Steed felt the need to tell Marsh ( in the
second MacKenzie video ) that the fire had “Almost made
it to that two-track road we walked in on” is because
Steed KNEW Marsh was pretty far NORTH of where
they were… and would now have been looking BACK
‘through’ the south-headed ‘smoke curtain’… and Steed
was just telling Marsh what HE was seeing in case
Marsh couldn’t really see through that ‘smoke curtain’
too well at that point.
There are also various other reported ‘comments’ from
Eric Marsh in this timeframe about him saying he could
‘see’ certain things… but those reports are spotty ( and
not even verified? ) so it’s really hard to say what Marsh
could ACTUALLY see from up there on the Weaver
Mountain, in this general timeframe ( after wind shift ).
**
** TOM STORY CANON EOS 5D MARK II CAMERA
** WAS 1 TO 2 MINUTES OFF THE CORRECT TIME THAT DAY?
This is the Tom Story photograph that show the Blue Ridge ATV actually
LEAVING the Ranch House Restaurant parking lot…
Tom Story photo: 201303_Yarnell_Hill_1682
It is ‘leaving’ the lot via the southern driveway opening and its hard to see… but if
you zoom in over the open driver-side door of the white pickup with the red stripe
on the LEFT SIDE of the photo… you can see the Blue Ridge ATV there ‘pausing’
at the driveway just before pulling out onto Highway 89.
Here is that photo…
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/y3jy5opssrcvzb3/x6Vsx-JIw_/Tom%20Story%20Photos/201303_Yarnell_Hill_02#lh:null-201303_Yarnell_Hill_1682.jpg
And here is the EXIF metadata for this particular Tom Story photo…
_________________________________________________________________
Caption: A thunderstorm to the north of Peeples (cq) Valley during the
Yarnell Hill Fire caused the blaze to reverse directions and burn through the
town of Yarnell.
Artist: TOM STORY
Address: Post Office Box 7936, Tempe, AZ, 85281, USA
Copyright: Copyright Tom Story – All Rights Reserved
Camera: Canon EOS 5D Mark II
Lens: Canon EF 16-35mm f/2.8L – Shot at 35 mm
Exposure: Auto exposure, Shutter priority AE, 1/166 sec, f/4.5, ISO 800, Compensation: -1
Flash: Off, Did not fire
Focus: One-shot AF, with a depth of field of from inf to 2.14 m.
Focus 2: AF Area Mode: Multi-point AF or AI AF
Keywords: Airtankers, VLAT, SEATS, Type II helicopters, Type 1 Helicopters. Structures lost.
Date: June 30, 2013 – 5:08:18 PM
Location: Peeples Valley, AZ, USA
File: 2,720 × 4,080 JPEG (11.1 megapixels)
__________________________________________________________________
So, according to the timestamp on Tom Story’s Canon EOS 5D Mark II camera,
the Blue Ridge ATV was leaving the Ranch House Restaurant parking lot at
exactly 1708.18 ( 5:08.18 PM ).
This does NOT match the Blue Ridge GPS tracking data, which was taking
the TIME value directly from information contained in packets coming from
the satellites themselves.
At about +6:05 in the Blue Ridge GPS tracking video itself is the 1707 to 1710
GPS tracking data… which looks like this…
__________________________________________________________________
1707 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary at the Ranch House Restaurant
1708 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1709 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary ( slight movement south in the Ranch House Restaurant parking lot )
1710 – 34.216118, -112.758758 – 1839.480 – 20.90 – Heading northwest through Glen Ilah on Lakewood Drive
1711 – 34.218611, -112.760239 – 1000.710 – 11.37 – At intersection of Westward/Lakewood and Manzanita Drive
__________________________________________________________________
At 1709 ( 48 seconds AFTER Tom Story’s photo 1708.18 timestamp ),
the Blue Ridge GPS tracker shows that it has, in fact, moved just slightly
SOUTH in the parking lot ( which would match the move shown in the Tom
Story photo towards the southern driveway entrance/exit ) but it STILL has
NOT actually LEFT the Ranch House Restaurant parking lot yet.
60 seconds LATER… at 1710… the GPS tracking DOES show the ATV having
left the parking lot and is now heading west on Lakwood Drive in the
Glen Ilah sub-division.
It has ( by 1710 ) traveled 1,839 feet which represents a speed of 20.90 mph
in relation to its previous 1709 location, still back in the RHR parking lot.
Since the GPS unit was ONLY updating every 60 seconds… it is not telling us
the EXACT MOMENT when the Ranger did leave the parking lot… but it IS
telling us that at 1709… it had not YET left the lot.
So Tom Story’s Canon EOS could NOT have been more than about 2 minutes
off the ‘actual’ clock time that day… but it DOES look it MIGHT have been
anywhere from a minimum of 48 seconds up to 1 minute off.
** BLUE RIDGE TRACKING DATA FOR THIS TIMEFRAME
Here is the actual Blue Ridge GPS tracking data that covers the time period from
the tracker ( in Captain Brown’s possession ) actually evacuating the Shrine
Road Youth Camp.. through the time at the Ranch House Restaurant and then
the start of the ‘ground rescue mission’.
It also shows their exact movements on that ‘rescue mission’ as they first scouted
various roads in Glen Ilah, then moved north to the Shrine road where they would
then ‘break through’ and head west out to the ridge…
1635 – 34.228414, -112.754134 – 0644.378 – 07.32 – Heading EAST out the driveway of the Youth Camp (YC)
1636 – 34.227183, -112.752758 – 0624.010 – 07.09 – At the St. Joseph Shrine (SJS) parking lot now
1637 – 34.227183, -112.752758 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary at SJS parking lot
1638 – 34.227183, -112.752758 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary at SJS parking lot
1639 – 34.224803, -112.749746 – 1342.030 – 15.25 – Suddenly all the way EAST on Shrine Rd, almost to Highway 89
1640 – 34.222603, -112.746935 – 1188.170 – 13.50 – At the intersection of Shrine road and Highway 89 now
1641 – 34.217985, -112.750025 – 1966.140 – 22.34 – Heading SOUTH on Highway 89 to the Ranch House Restaurant
1642 – 34.213532, -112.755497 – 2468.580 – 28.05 – Heading SOUTH on Highway 89 to the Ranch House Restaurant
1643 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0167.099 – 01.90 – Arrival at the Ranch House Restaurant
NOTE: 1643 is one of the estimated times of the burnover in the box canyon.
1644 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary in parking lot
1645 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1646 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1647 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary ( slight movement west )
1648 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1649 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1650 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1651 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1652 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1653 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1654 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary ( slight movement east )
1655 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary ( slight movement west )
1656 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1657 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary ( slight movement east )
1658 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1659 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1700 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1701 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary ( slight movement west )
1702 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1703 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1704 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1705 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1706 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1707 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1708 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1709 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary ( slight movement south in the parking lot )
1710 – 34.216118, -112.758758 – 1839.480 – 20.90 – Heading northwest through Glen Ilah on Lakewood Drive
1711 – 34.218611, -112.760239 – 1000.710 – 11.37 – At intersection of Westward/Lakewood and Manzanita Drive
1712 – 34.215772, -112.758640 – 1183.450 – 13.45 – Back east on Lakewood Drive
1713 – 34.218611, -112.760239 – 1183.550 – 13.45 – Back west again to same 1711 spot. Intersection of Westward/Lakewood and Manzanita
1714 – 34.215471, -112.758082 – 1352.120 – 15.36 – Back east on Lakewood again. To intersection of Lakewood and Mountainaire Drive
1715 – 34.215471, -112.758082 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1716 – 34.215471, -112.758082 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1717 – 34.215304, -112.759219 – 0405.336 – 04.61 – Southwest on Mountainaire, then west on Foothill Drive
1718 – 34.216544, -112.762223 – 1043.210 – 11.85 – Heading west on Foothill Drive
1719 – 34.215746, -112.760561 – 0612.670 – 06.96 – Heading back east on Foothill Drive to Mountainaire Drive
1720 – 34.212534, -112.760646 – 1646.220 – 18.71 – South on Mountainaire Drive
1721 – 34.210502, -112.762266 – 1149.650 – 13.06 – South on Mountainaire, west on Las Tiendas Dr., then south on Candy Cane Ln.
1722 – 34.215346, -112.758458 – 2457.170 – 27.82 – All the way back north (fast) to intersection of Mountainaire and Lakewood
1723 – 34.215967, -112.754134 – 2607.150 – 29.63 – Exited Glen Ilah via Lakewood east, now heading north on Highway 89 (fast)
1724 – 34.222581, -112.746828 – 3413.380 – 38.79 – North (fast) on Highway 89, now at intersection of 89 and Shrine Road
1725 – 34.223610, -112.748051 – 0542.768 – 06.17 – West on Shrine Road. Now at intersection of Shrine Road and Willow Lane
1726 – 34.228307, -112.753844 – 2538.890 – 28.85 – West on Shrine Road all the way to Youth Camp entrance
1727 – 34.227225, -112.752782 – 0544.510 – 06.19 – Back east on Shrine Road to St. Joseph Shrine parking lot
1728 – 34.228502, -112.754166 – 0650.764 – 07.39 – Back west to near Youth Camp entrance again
1729 – 34.228502, -112.754166 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1730 – 34.228502, -112.754166 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
A few moments later… they would ( according to the Blue Ridge notes )
decide to (quote) “F**k it… let’s go for it”… and break through the Shrine
area and then head west out to the ridge where GM had been working.
Awesome catch, thanks! I was disappointed Tom didn’t catch the UTV after it “disappeared” from it’s spot, but thanks to your keen eye seeing that, he apparently did!
So that would mean, given that this camera was, if not EXACTLY correct (which is understandable), quite realistically reliably time-stamped, either the Canon EOS-1D Mark II N (the best, most state-of-the-art and expensive camera he had that day, with the most expensive telephohoto lens, with which he shot the “4:39” VLAT drop was seriously not synced to it (which becomes, to me, harder to imagine, all things considered, but then who knows for sure), or……….
As a photographer, I’m sitting here having a really hard time conceiving of going out to a shoot with three cameras (one of them being the current state-of-the-art), a bunch of top quality glass, I.e. thousands of dollars worth of equipment, to professionally shoot a major event, with one lesser camera being basically accurately set time-wise and the best one not even remotely.
But then, I’m also still not really grasping why Chris did what he did.
I’m partly tempted to write to Tom Story, whose PO Box is in his metadata. But I retired from this at the beginning of February………
And also his email addresses are there, too……
Reply to Marti Reed post on April 26, 2014 at 7:31 pm
>> Marti said…
>> So that would mean, given that this camera was, if not
>> EXACTLY correct (which is understandable), quite
>> realistically reliably time-stamped,
Yes. I goofed with the math above and ADDED 3
seconds instead of subtracting… so instead of his
Caonon EOS timestamp of 1708.18 ( 5:08.18 PM ).
being 48 seconds ‘away’ from the 1709… it was
really only 42 seconds ‘off’.
In order for them to have traveled 1,839 west by the time
the 1710 GPS update recorded… then that really does
mean they HAD to have ‘launched’ away from the Ranch
House Restaurant just a few seconds after the 1709
update showed them still sitting there.
So just add those few seconds to the 43 seconds and
it really means Story’s Canon EOS was off by only
45 to 50 seconds ( under a minute off ).
On a day like this… when it seems that NO ONE knew
what frickin’ time it was all day… and people’s devices
all wildly inaccurate… I’d say we have to call this
( now proven ) ‘less than a minute’ offset pretty darn
accurate.
So at least that takes care of ONE of Story’s cameras.
It can be said that ANY picture coming from his
Canon EOS was never more than 45 or 50 seconds
away from an atomic timestamp that was coming
from orbiting satellites that day. Not too shabby.
Yes, that’s by all normal standards “pretty damn accurate.”
Just to be clear, though… what I believe we
just proved is that while *accurate*… any
Tom Story photo taken with his Canon EOS
must be considered to be 45 to 50 seconds
BEHIND the *real* atomic time ( and not
AHEAD of it ).
If a Tom Story Canon EOS photo has a
timestamp of, say, 1508.10… then the
REAL (atomic) clock time is about 50
seconds AHEAD of that and it might
already actually be 1509.00.
For anybody that doesn’t know what the relevance of this conversation might be, it shows that Tom Story’s photos from one of his cameras, capturing images from the Ranch House Restaurant after news of the deployment had been reported to everybody but, seemingly him, are basically accurate time wise, but his images of a VLAT drop, from another camera, at the time of Jesse Steed’s Mayday radio call, are problematic, because we have no other evidence that drop happened when his state-of-the-art camera seems to have recorded it. So we are wondering “what happened here and when??”
So I’m gonna email him tomorrow about this because I think this is very important.
Marti, I would bet Tom Story is monitoring this website. It would be nice if he joined the conversation.
**
** TOM STORY CANON EOS 5D MARK II CAMERA
** WAS 1 TO 2 MINUTES OFF THE CORRECT TIME THAT DAY?
This is the Tom Story photograph that show the Blue Ridge ATV actually
LEAVING the Ranch House Restaurant parking lot…
Tom Story photo: 201303_Yarnell_Hill_1682
It is ‘leaving’ the lot via the southern driveway opening and its hard to see… but if
you zoom in over the open driver-side door of the white pickup with the red stripe
on the LEFT SIDE of the photo… you can see the Blue Ridge ATV there ‘pausing’
at the driveway just before pulling out onto Highway 89.
Here is that photo…
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/y3jy5opssrcvzb3/x6Vsx-JIw_/Tom%20Story%20Photos/201303_Yarnell_Hill_02#lh:null-201303_Yarnell_Hill_1682.jpg
And here is the EXIF metadata for this particular Tom Story photo…
_________________________________________________________________
Caption: A thunderstorm to the north of Peeples (cq) Valley during the
Yarnell Hill Fire caused the blaze to reverse directions and burn through the
town of Yarnell.
Artist: TOM STORY
Address: Post Office Box 7936, Tempe, AZ, 85281, USA
Contact: [email protected] [email protected], 480 966 6134 602 549 4094, tomstory.com
Copyright: Copyright Tom Story – All Rights Reserved
Camera: Canon EOS 5D Mark II
Lens: Canon EF 16-35mm f/2.8L – Shot at 35 mm
Exposure: Auto exposure, Shutter priority AE, 1/166 sec, f/4.5, ISO 800, Compensation: -1
Flash: Off, Did not fire
Focus: One-shot AF, with a depth of field of from inf to 2.14 m.
Focus 2: AF Area Mode: Multi-point AF or AI AF
Keywords: Airtankers, VLAT, SEATS, Type II helicopters, Type 1 Helicopters. Structures lost.
Date: June 30, 2013 – 5:08:18 PM
Location: Peeples Valley, AZ, USA
File: 2,720 × 4,080 JPEG (11.1 megapixels)
__________________________________________________________________
So, according to the timestamp on Tom Story’s Canon EOS 5D Mark II camera,
the Blue Ridge ATV was leaving the Ranch House Restaurant parking lot at
exactly 1708.18 ( 5:08.18 PM ).
This does NOT match the Blue Ridge GPS tracking data, which was taking
the TIME value directly from information contained in packets coming from
the satellites themselves.
At about +6:05 in the Blue Ridge GPS tracking video itself is the 1707 to 1710
GPS tracking data… which looks like this…
__________________________________________________________________
1707 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary at the Ranch House Restaurant
1708 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1709 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary ( slight movement south in the Ranch House Restaurant parking lot )
1710 – 34.216118, -112.758758 – 1839.480 – 20.90 – Heading northwest through Glen Ilah on Lakewood Drive
1711 – 34.218611, -112.760239 – 1000.710 – 11.37 – At intersection of Westward/Lakewood and Manzanita Drive
__________________________________________________________________
At 1709 ( 48 seconds AFTER Tom Story’s photo 1708.18 timestamp ),
the Blue Ridge GPS tracker shows that it has, in fact, moved just slightly
SOUTH in the parking lot ( which would match the move shown in the Tom
Story photo towards the southern driveway entrance/exit ) but it STILL has
NOT actually LEFT the Ranch House Restaurant parking lot yet.
60 seconds LATER… at 1710… the GPS tracking DOES show the ATV having
left the parking lot and is now heading west on Lakwood Drive in the
Glen Ilah sub-division.
It has ( by 1710 ) traveled 1,839 feet which represents a speed of 20.90 mph
in relation to its previous 1709 location, still back in the RHR parking lot.
Since the GPS unit was ONLY updating every 60 seconds… it is not telling us
the EXACT MOMENT when the Ranger did leave the parking lot… but it IS
telling us that at 1709… it had not YET left the lot.
So Tom Story’s Canon EOS could NOT have been more than about 2 minutes
off the ‘actual’ clock time that day… but it DOES look it MIGHT have been
anywhere from a minimum of 48 seconds up to 1 minute off.
** BLUE RIDGE TRACKING DATA FOR THIS TIMEFRAME
Here is the actual Blue Ridge GPS tracking data that covers the time period from
the tracker ( in Captain Brown’s possession ) actually evacuating the Shrine
Road Youth Camp.. through the time at the Ranch House Restaurant and then
the start of the ‘ground rescue mission’.
It also shows their exact movements on that ‘rescue mission’ as they first scouted
various roads in Glen Ilah, then moved north to the Shrine road where they would
then ‘break through’ and head west out to the ridge…
1635 – 34.228414, -112.754134 – 0644.378 – 07.32 – Heading EAST out the driveway of the Youth Camp (YC)
1636 – 34.227183, -112.752758 – 0624.010 – 07.09 – At the St. Joseph Shrine (SJS) parking lot now
1637 – 34.227183, -112.752758 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary at SJS parking lot
1638 – 34.227183, -112.752758 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary at SJS parking lot
1639 – 34.224803, -112.749746 – 1342.030 – 15.25 – Suddenly all the way EAST on Shrine Rd, almost to Highway 89
1640 – 34.222603, -112.746935 – 1188.170 – 13.50 – At the intersection of Shrine road and Highway 89 now
1641 – 34.217985, -112.750025 – 1966.140 – 22.34 – Heading SOUTH on Highway 89 to the Ranch House Restaurant
1642 – 34.213532, -112.755497 – 2468.580 – 28.05 – Heading SOUTH on Highway 89 to the Ranch House Restaurant
1643 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0167.099 – 01.90 – Arrival at the Ranch House Restaurant
NOTE: 1643 is one of the estimated times of the burnover in the box canyon.
1644 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary in parking lot
1645 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1646 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1647 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary ( slight movement west )
1648 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1649 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1650 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1651 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1652 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1653 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1654 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary ( slight movement east )
1655 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary ( slight movement west )
1656 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1657 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary ( slight movement east )
1658 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1659 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1700 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1701 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary ( slight movement west )
1702 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1703 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1704 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1705 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1706 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1707 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1708 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1709 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary ( slight movement south in the parking lot )
1710 – 34.216118, -112.758758 – 1839.480 – 20.90 – Heading northwest through Glen Ilah on Lakewood Drive
1711 – 34.218611, -112.760239 – 1000.710 – 11.37 – At intersection of Westward/Lakewood and Manzanita Drive
1712 – 34.215772, -112.758640 – 1183.450 – 13.45 – Back east on Lakewood Drive
1713 – 34.218611, -112.760239 – 1183.550 – 13.45 – Back west again to same 1711 spot. Intersection of Westward/Lakewood and Manzanita
1714 – 34.215471, -112.758082 – 1352.120 – 15.36 – Back east on Lakewood again. To intersection of Lakewood and Mountainaire Drive
1715 – 34.215471, -112.758082 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1716 – 34.215471, -112.758082 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1717 – 34.215304, -112.759219 – 0405.336 – 04.61 – Southwest on Mountainaire, then west on Foothill Drive
1718 – 34.216544, -112.762223 – 1043.210 – 11.85 – Heading west on Foothill Drive
1719 – 34.215746, -112.760561 – 0612.670 – 06.96 – Heading back east on Foothill Drive to Mountainaire Drive
1720 – 34.212534, -112.760646 – 1646.220 – 18.71 – South on Mountainaire Drive
1721 – 34.210502, -112.762266 – 1149.650 – 13.06 – South on Mountainaire, west on Las Tiendas Dr., then south on Candy Cane Ln.
1722 – 34.215346, -112.758458 – 2457.170 – 27.82 – All the way back north (fast) to intersection of Mountainaire and Lakewood
1723 – 34.215967, -112.754134 – 2607.150 – 29.63 – Exited Glen Ilah via Lakewood east, now heading north on Highway 89 (fast)
1724 – 34.222581, -112.746828 – 3413.380 – 38.79 – North (fast) on Highway 89, now at intersection of 89 and Shrine Road
1725 – 34.223610, -112.748051 – 0542.768 – 06.17 – West on Shrine Road. Now at intersection of Shrine Road and Willow Lane
1726 – 34.228307, -112.753844 – 2538.890 – 28.85 – West on Shrine Road all the way to Youth Camp entrance
1727 – 34.227225, -112.752782 – 0544.510 – 06.19 – Back east on Shrine Road to St. Joseph Shrine parking lot
1728 – 34.228502, -112.754166 – 0650.764 – 07.39 – Back west to near Youth Camp entrance again
1729 – 34.228502, -112.754166 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1730 – 34.228502, -112.754166 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
A few moments later… they would ( according to the Blue Ridge notes )
decide to (quote) “F**k it… let’s go for it”… and break through the Shrine
area and then head west out to the ridge where GM had been working.
Mr. Dougherty… this entire comment can just be DELETED.
It ‘fell into moderation’ because of the multiple email addresses
for Tom Story that were hidden inside the EXIF metadata for
his photograph.
Those email addresses have been DELETED and this entire
comment has already been reposted (successfully).
Reply to Marti Reed post on April 24, 2014 at 12:45 pm
>> Marti said…
>>
>> Well. I just picked my way thru Tom’s photos. At first I wrote, up above,
>> that I never trust camera time stamps becuz most ppl don’t need to pay
>> attention to them.
>>
>> But Tom was using three cameras that day, switching back and forth
>> depending on which lens he needed.
Yes.. he was… and he was *most probably* using that beast with the large
telephoto lens when he was shooting the distant DC10 VLAT drops.
>> Marti also wrote…
>> So that would lead me to think he probably must have had to sync them,
>> thus at least vaguely getting them accurate.
>> So the 3:49 photos are mystifying.
Yes, they are… but see above. Maybe *ONLY* that beast with the telephoto
lens had an ‘inaccurate’ time stamp and seemed to be showing that VLAT
drop at 4:39… exactly when Captain Jesse Steed was actually MAKING
his first MAYDAY call.
>> Marti also said…
>> I think his photos at the Ranch House Parking Lot seem about right, though.
Yes, they do. Some of them even seem to match exactly with the
Michelle Lee photos from the parking lot… but SOME of them still seem
a little ‘wonky’ as to timestamp(s).
>> They would definitely have been later than McCord’s.
>> I think McCord jumped out of the Blue Ridge Buggy and started shooting
>> relatively immediately.
Agree. Despite some of the unit log notes… it would definitely seem that
that they were aware of the MAYDAY tracking either just BEFORE or
AS they were pulling into the RHR parking lot itself.
>> Tom’s photos start with the Blue Ridge ATV near the trucks, and then
>> the ATV vanishes, and I think that happening around 5 seems reasonable.
In one of Tom’s photos… he captures the moment when the BR ATV was
actually *leaving* the lot. It’s hidden behind one of the white pickups… but
you can see it there just pulling OUT of the RHR and onto Highway 89 for
that first trip that would take them down Lakewood Drive and to the west
end of the Glen Ilah subdivision.
>> And, yes, the fire has gotten much closer by then as the parking lot,
>> itself would eventually no longer be considered a “safe zone.”
>> So I’m stumped. It would be helpful if there was a timed list of the
>> VLAT drops, for sure.
There is still no captured “Air-to-Air” traffic in the USDA Air Study videos
that would support *any* DC10 VLAT actually ‘dropping’ at 1639 itself.
Yes… Air Attack can be heard ‘discussing’ a drop with VLAT pilot ‘Kevin
at that exact time… but that drop they are discussing was still in the
planning stage and they hadn’t even done the ‘show me’ run yet.
Almost more than 40 minutes earlier… SPGS1 Gary Cordes had directly
requested that the Air resources start ‘dropping at will’ and to try and
‘save whatever town they could’… but I don’t think for one minute that
actually meant the airplanes started doing whatever the hell they wanted.
It still all had to go through ‘Air Attack’… or there would have just been
complete and utter chaos ( and perhaps more fatal incidents that day ).
More later…
I wanted to go back a minuet to the April 25 @4:43 posting of Marti Reed.
Scott Noris Photo
This picture alone says a thousand words to a knowledgeable Fire Fighter.
Fuels and weather before GM left the black.
Note the flame lengths from that location 20 to 40 Ft. based on est. 10 to 15 FT. Brush.
There are at least 3 or maybe 4 fire swirls (wind educed).
This is an extreme indicator of unpredictable fire behavior.
GM was looking right at that, What or who could have possibly convinced them to move out of the black and into the unburned and head to BSR?
That was one of the biggest indicators, they were looking right at it and taking pictures of the flame front. They ignored it and moved down into unburned fuel.
Its hard for me to believe. But then I just read over on WFToday a fire fighter saying they do not train in the 10 and 18 or use it on fires a statement on redoing the 10 & 18. WTF I would like to have used the entire F-word.
Mir. Powers… yes… that’s really quite a frightening picture… given
that ‘green carpet’ of ‘gasoline on a stick’ sitting right in front of
it ( and continuing for over 4,000 yards… right to the mouth of
that box canyon they decided to drop into.
Ditto for the MacKenzie Canon high-res photos. Huge wind-bent
flame lengths clearly seen.
Something to keep in mind, however, is what Calvin astutely
observed in the evidence some time ago… and that is what
Jesse Steed is captured saying back to Marsh in the second
MacKenzie video.
Steed reports… ( back to Marsh )… “I copy… and it’s almost
made it to the two-track road we walked in on.”
As Calvin originally asked… you have to wonder WHY Steed
felt the need to report that ‘visual’ back to Marsh.
It is VERY possible that Eric Marsh was so far north on that
two-track road and all the way up on the top of Weaver
Mountain that he was now BEHIND the smoke curtain and
unable to see what was actually happening in FRONT of it.
So Steed was reporting to Marsh what HE ( and now WE ) can
see in the videos… but the actual reality of the flame front
( size, speed, direction(s) ) was now hidden from view from
Marsh because of his distance north, and the now southern
direction of the flame front.
So it very well could be that ( for whatever reasons… radio call,
cell phone call, his own DIVSA initiative ) Marsh just WANTED
to try ‘the mission’… but was now relying solely on Steed to
tell him his ‘comfort level’ since Marsh couldn’t really see
the south-headed flamefront at the time he wanted them to
start ‘the mission’.
So maybe it really was just Captain Jesse Steed reporting back
to Marsh something like…
“Yea… what the hell… I think we can make it… but if there’s
any chance we need to leave RIGHT NOW.”
Mcdonough 154944 image. How does this image align with the Mackenzie, Parker photos? Where is the anchor point on the ridge? Where is the Mackenzie, Parker, Norris photo spot?
It appears that the ridge is clearly visible on the south side of the fire. Possibly photographing the area GM were taking pictures from at the same time?
Thanks, WTKTT.
calvin… see a new ‘parent’ comment about this
just above. It looks like the exact spot where the
‘men’ were up on the ridge is *just* out-of-frame
to the left in McDonough’s 1549 image(s)…
…However… it also now appears that MacKenzie
cellphone photos and his Canon videos ( now known
to ALL be in the 3:50 to 3:55 timerange ) appear
to show the ‘progress’ of the possible vehicle
convoy off in the distance as the GM and Blue
Ridge trucks were being ‘driven out’.
**
** SCOTT NORRIS’ SMARTPHONE ( FOUND? )
>> Reply to Marti Reed post on April 25, 2014 at 4:43 pm
>>
>> Marti said…
>> Another important visual for this sequence (that I had forgotten about until
>> going back to redo it) is Scott Norris’. That’s Scott standing up on that rock
>> taking his photo in most of these Caldwell photos and videos.
Yes. It most certainly IS… and you are RIGHT. That photo texted at 3:54 PM by Scott Norris ( along with Calvin’s observations concerning the gloves ) could help nail down the exact TIME where that 48 second time block for the 4 MacKenzie Canon items fits into that 3 minute and 22 second ‘window’ where we now know it belongs.
>> Marti also wrote…
>> PS I think you can see Scott shooting that photo 1 second into Chris’
>> second video, MVI_0891
Yes. It’s possible. I did a preliminary SUPER enhancement on the fireline at that
point in the 0891 video and compared it with the Scott Norris photo and I’m not
really seeing a match at this point… but more work needs to be done there.
There MIGHT be a better ‘fireline/smoke’ match somewhere else in that
video or even in the FIRST video. More about that later.
>> Marti also wrote…
>> And, by the way, looking at my ancient notes regarding the whereabouts of the
>> cellphones, I have no indication of Scott’s cellphone ever entering into the
>> chain of evidence.
It would, of course, be nice to have a copy of that original photo Norris took, complete with EXIF metadata and timestamp… but alas… I think you are right.
The reason that Scott Norris photo that was supplied to the SAIT investigators has basically NO EXIF information at all is because that’s what usually happens these days when you elect to ‘attach’ a photo to a TEXT message on one of these Smartphones.
The Smartphone doesn’t even send the ‘original’ ( which could be up to 8 megapixels on an iPhone 4 ). It makes a ‘cropped’ sort of ‘square’ copy of the photo you want to TEXT out and also reduces the resolution. It does NOT preserve the original metadata when it does this. Likewise for the RECEIVER. Depending on what software RECEIVES it… sometimes it is reformatted on reception even AGAIN and whatever metadata was in it can then be even FURTHER lost.
So the REAL question is ( as you said )…
Whatever happened to Scott Norris’ Smartphone?
Well… I think I just FOUND it.
**************************************************************************************
WARNING – GRAPHIC CONTENT AHEAD
**************************************************************************************
The REST of this message has descriptions and LINKS to some of the original YCSO Police reports and photographs of the personal items and the clothing of some of the Granite Mountain firefighters. If you do not wish to read about such things or accidentally view the (graphic) photos… do NOT continue reading this message. END OF WARNING.
**************************************************************************************
From the YCSO Yarnell Hill Case Report…
Document Name: 13 021744 Yarnell Hill Case Rpt
By YCSO Detective J. McDormett.
Page 7…
——————————————————————————————————
The following day, 7/02/13, I, along with ET ( Evidence Technician ) Waldock,
went to the medical examiner’s office in Phoenix, arriving at about 0800.
Lt. Boelts was there when we arrived. Honor guards were also in place.
Honor guards had also been in place throughout the night. All the firefighters
were identified on this day largely through either dental records by forensic
odontologist Dr. John Piakis or through distinguishing tattoos or other identifiers
that left no doubt as to the individual identity of each man. Photographs were
taken by the ME staff. I was advised that a disk of the photos would not be
ready for a few days. I was later advised that the cause of death was accidental
and that the manner of death was a combination of thermal injuries and smoke
and carbon monoxide inhalation. As of the writing of this report I have not
received the autopsy reports.
Personal property and shelters were separated into a corresponding body bag
and were transported to the YCSO evidence unit.
What follows is an accounting of the numbers assigned to the decedents while
on the hill, the Maricopa Medical Examiner number, and the name of the
firefighter associated with each:
1 / 13-04442 / Wade Parker
2 / 13-04425 / Sean Misner
3 / 13-04443 / Travis Turbyfill
4 / 13-04428 / Kevin Justin Woyjeck
5 / 13-04427 / Clayton Whitted
6 / 13-04426 / Christopher MacKenzie
7 / 13-04431 / Dustin DeFord
8 / 13-04430 / William Warneke
9 / 13-04435 / Eric Marsh
10 / 13-04429 / John Percin Jr
11 / 13-04434 / Andrew Ashcraft
12 / 13-04433 / Travis Carter
13 / 13-04438 / Anthony Rose
14 / 13-04432 / Joe Thurston
15 / 13-04436 / Jesse Steed
16 / 13-04437 / Grant McKee
17 / 13-04441 / Scott Norris
18 / 13-04440 / Garret Zuppiger
19 / 13-04439 / Robert Caldwell
—————————————————————————————————-
From the YCOS report above…
“Personal property and shelters were separated into a corresponding body bag and were transported to the YCSO evidence unit.”
What that also means is that any clothing that was removed by the Medical Examiner was ALSO added back to the orange ‘transport’ bags, along with personal effects, and then these bags were transported to the YCSO evidence unit for safekeeping and further examination.
The YCSO took pictures of the contents of these bags once they got them over to their own YCSO evidence unit ( clothing included ).
Those pictures are in THIS public online folder…
ANOTHER WARNING: These can be construed as GRAPHIC images.
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/fg416vjqt14afu3/zaTuOp4Plu#/
As they examined the contents of each ( ORANGE ) bag… they left the bag in the top of the photo(s) so the NUMBERS on the bag ( as per the YCSO list above ) could still be seen in the photo(s) in order to associate the contents with certain firefighters.
In the FIRST FOUR photos in that folder… the number on the bag whose contents are being photographed was written with a black Sharpie and it says 17.
Bag 17 corresponds to Scott Norris ( according to YCSO list above ).
The Microsoft Word Doc file that is also present in this folder indicates which photos belong to which firefighter. This is the actual document that the SAIR used when they inserted their own report about the ‘damage’ to shelters in the their own SAIR report.
The following ‘cut’ from that document concerning these first FOUR images
in the folder also confirms that they are of the personal effects ( and clothing )
of Scott Norris…
——————————————————————————————————–
Bag 17 – Medical Examiner Number 13-4441 ( FF Scott Norris )
DSCN0002 – Fire shelter exterior – 98 percent of Aluminum foil burned away.
DSCN0003 – Fire shelter interior – 75 percent of fiberglass burned away.
DSCN0004 – PPE – shirt (front) and pants.
DSCN0005 – Pants (back)
———————————————————————————————————
The BLACK writing on the ORANGE bag in these photos also says the following and the Medical Examiner number 13-4441 also matches the number in the list above that the ME assigned to firefighter Scott Norris…
13-4441 ( Large black magic marker )
17 ( Smaller black sharpie )
NOTE:
They
PI ON MON
Still Accurate
And Working
( With Personal Affects )
The first two images in the folder are of the mostly intact fire shelter that came out of bag 17. Photo 1 is topside. Photo 2 is bottom side.
The SECOND two photos are of the CLOTHING that was also in that bag 17.
The shirt and pants were laid out and photographed first lying face up… and then flipped over and the backs of the shirt and pants were photographed.
The name of that FOURTH photo in the folder showing the BACK of the pants that came out of bag 17 ( Scott Norris ) is DSCN0005.
This photo seems to CLEARLY show that there is STILL an ELECTRONIC DEVICE in the bottom of the right-pants side pocket. It has the CLEAR shape of an iPhone or one of the Android smartphones that also has ’rounded corners’… or any smartphone that has one of the durable rubber ’rounded corner’ casings on it.
NOTE: When I say CLEARLY… I really mean it. You can’t miss it sitting there pressed against the material of the side pants pocket.
In this BACK view of the pants… the RIGHT pants leg is at the TOP of the photo and the ELECTRONIC DEVICE ( in the right side pocket ) can be seen in the top-center of the photograph.
This SAME DEVICE also appears to be seen almost as clearly in that right-side pants pocket in the FRONT photo of the pants which is the THIRD photo in the first row named DSCN0004.
In BOTH of these photos… the DEVICE itself seems to be totally undamaged. The pants pocket is burned ABOVE the DEVICE, but not around the bottom of the side pocket where the device is located.
I would say the SIZE of that ELECTRONIC DEVICE appears to be just a little bit large for an iPhone… unless it has one of those large rubber protective cases on it.
It is also actually possible that this could be a handheld GPS unit.
It also has the right ‘size’ for some of the newer, smaller Garmin GPS portable units ( which also have rounded corners ).
So… obviously the MYSTERY is…
WHAT HAPPENED to whatever it is that seems to be sitting there in
Scott Norris’ side pants pocket?
Was it ever REMOVED from the pants and entered into evidence?…
or was it just ‘left in the pants’ and just became another ‘personal
effect’ that never entered the ‘evidence chain’ at all and just ended up
being returned to the family?
More later…
Thanks!
To be honest, when those photos came out, I was so sick of all things related to the deployment site (which I had spent the entire Christmas-New Year Holidays examining), that I just skimmed through them.
I also don’t remember what you came up with awhile back regarding whether the time-stamp of a video gets attached to the beginning or the end of it, and couldn’t find that info via the Google Tool yesterday.
Tom Story’s two cellphone images that he also Instagrammed don’t have any metadata left in them except the originals are geo-coded. It really gets quite random!
Come to think of it (I’m just waking up), since Scott’s mother generously sent that photo to the investigative team, I’m thinking if she had access to the cellphone, she might have sent more images in, along with a different note than the one she did send,
Reply to Marti Reed post on April 26, 2014 at 6:52 am
>> Marti said…
>> To be honest, when those photos came out, I was so
>> sick of all things related to the deployment site (which I
>> had spent the entire Christmas-New Year Holidays
>> examining), that I just skimmed through them.
I hear ya. Ditto on this end. I DO remember looking at ALL
of those photos… but I still missed seeing that (possible)
electronic device in Norris’ side pants pocket, at first.
I also started re-examining every other photo, to see if
there are similar ‘shapes’ showing in other pairs of
pants ( like Eric Marsh’s )… but only got about halfway
through the ‘extreme closeup’ phase of that last night.
They are really, really tough to look at.
Some of the burn marks and patterns are, well, quite
disturbing to view and/or contemplate.
>> Marti also said…
>> I also don’t remember what you came up with awhile
>> back regarding whether the time-stamp of a video gets
>> attached to the beginning or the end of it, and couldn’t
>> find that info via the Google Tool yesterday.
Marti… keep in mind…
The Panebaker Air Study videos are *unique* in that
the titles that someone chose for them include the
ENDING time of the video and not the START time.
That is *NOT* normal and I still really don’t understand
why they chose to actually NAME the videos that way.
For any of these digital devices using either a FAT or
an HPFS file system ( those really are the only two
choices these days )… the actual recorded filename
date/timestamp will ALWAYS be the ‘creation date’
( the START ) of that digital recording… whether its
a photo or a movie. If you have access to the original
HPFS or FAT file system… you can see these stamps
clearing just doing a directory listing on the files.
As far was what actually gets *embedded* in the images
themselves… the whole EXIF metadata standard really
only applies to JPEG images. There actually are no real
‘standards’, even now, for metadata getting *embedded*
into either MP4 or Apple Quicktime MOV movie files.
The only ‘standard’ that has evolved there ( for smartphones ) is that in both the MP4 and the MOV cases… a THUMBNAIL
image will be created using the FIRST FRAME of the
movie… and it will be saved to the file system with the
same name as the MOVIE itself but with a .THM file
extension. ( THM = THUMBNAIL image ).
That THM image of the first frame of the movie is what
shows up on your device when you are looking at the
folder that contains your photos / movies.
This THM thumbnail has, in fact, been somewhat
standardized and is actually just a JPEG image and,
therefore, can contain all the same standard EXIF
JPEG metadata already standardized for JPEGS.
NOTE: A THM thumbnail image is, in fact, just a JPEG
image with THM as a file extension insted of JPG. If
you RENAME any THM file and give it a filename extension
of JPG instead… then Voila!… you can ‘view’ that JPEG
thumbnail in ANY standard JPEG image viewer.
So that THM thumbnail image of the first frame of the
movie is what ACTUALLY contains all the IMPORTANT
metadata about that movie such as creation date/time,
modification date/time ( if any ), GPS data ( if any ),
frames per second, total frames in movie, etc. etc.
This is why we STILL do NOT know the exact TIME for
the YARNELL-GAMBLE video shot by Blue Ridge
Hotshot McCord. McCord EDITED his original movie
and renamed whatever the original filename from the
device was to YARNELL-GAMBLE.MOV… and then he
gave that edited copy of the movie to the SAIT investigators,
but he did NOT give them the corresponding THM thumbnail
file from his device that had all the metadata for that
YARNELL-GAMBLE movie… and the SAIT investigators
never bothered to follow up with him and obtain it.
McCord might still actually have that ORIGINAL (unedited)
Apple Quicktime MOV file AND the corresponding THM
thumbnail ( JPEG) from whatever he was using that
day to shoot that YARNELL-GAMBLE video. It was
probably an iPhone… but we are still also not sure
about that, either.
>> Marti also wrote…
>> Tom Story’s two cellphone images that he also
>> Instagrammed don’t have any metadata left in them
>> except the originals are geo-coded. It really gets quite
>> random!
Yes, it is. Android based Google phones will usually
ALWAYS try to keep GPS data in photos because
Google uses that information ( unbeknownst to you and
*without* your permission ) to update its own ‘Street View’
databases. Flickr, Facebook, Twitter and others…
same deal. It’s pretty much SOP these days so beware.
>> Marti also said…
>> Come to think of it (I’m just waking up), since Scott’s
>> mother generously sent that photo to the investigative
>> team, I’m thinking if she had access to the cellphone,
>> she might have sent more images in, along with a
>> different note than the one she did send,
Possible. I would also believe that even if Scott’s mother
DID receive a fully functioning device back… that
she would have no idea how to even check and see
if there WAS anything else ‘on it’.
Unless you actually USE one of these puppies these
days… it’s like voodoo and people have no idea how
to look at the actual ‘file system’ and/or walk through
all the FOLDERS on the device.
Followup…
The reason we DO have the exact TIME/DATE
stamps (according to the Canon device, anyway)
and frame length count and frames per second
values… etc… for Christopher MacKenzie’s
two Canon Powershot VIDEOS is because
we DO also have the corresponding THM
(JPEG) thumbnail images for those two Apple
Quicktime format MOV movie files.
Those two THM files WERE included on the
CD that mysteriously made its way to the SAIT
investigators and they ARE sitting in Mr.
Dougherty’s public online Dropbox along with
Christopher’s movie files.
I just wish the SAIT investigators had had the
brain cells to get the same THM thumbnails
from Blue Ridge Hotshot McCord ( and everyone
else who was handing them ‘movies’ ).
Thank you!
**
** VIDEO FADE BETWEEN…
** MACKENZIE 3:51.58 PM CELLPHONE PHOTO IMG_2836.JPG AND
** MACKENZIE VIDEO MVI_0888.MOV AT +6 SECONDS
Well… here is the ‘other piece of the puzzle’ as far as confirming that the
MacKenzie MVI_0888.MOV video MUST have been taken during that 3 minute
and 22 second ‘time gap’ between MacKenzie cellphone photos IMG_2836
( taken at 3:51.58 ) and IMG_2837 ( taken at 3:55.20 ).
It’s another ‘video-fade’ that uses the exact same ‘stillframe’ from +6 seconds into the MVI_0888 video… but this time it compares it to the ‘earlier’ IMG_2836 cellphone photo.
Just as there is really no doubt that the MVI_0888 video had to have been shot
BEFORE cellphone photos IMG_2837 and IMG_2838… THIS ‘crossfade’ proves
that it ALSO had to have been shot AFTER cellphone photo IMG_2836.
In other words… somewhere in that known 3 minute and 22 second ‘time gap’ between cellphone photos IMG_2636 and IMG_2637.
Here is that new ‘crossfade’ video…
YouTube Video Title: IMG-2736-and-MVI-0888
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bolQm3uYx2E
YouTube About Information for this video…
__________________________________________________________________
This video is a ‘comparison’ between MacKenzie cellphone photo IMG_2736.JPG, taken at 3:51.58 PM… and a still frame from +6 seconds into MacKenzie’s first Canon Powershot video MVI_0888.MOV shot at the same location as the cellphone photo.
As the images ‘fade in/out’… it is clear that the MVI_0888.MOV video was shot AFTER the IMG_2736.JPG ( 3:51.58 PM ) cellphone photo. There is a significant ‘forward push’ of the smoke cloud in a due SOUTH direction into the ‘middle bowl’ which is not seen in the cellphone photo.
So this is the ‘other half’ to the proof that MacKenzie’s first 9 second long MVI_0888.MOV video was shot sometime between MacKenzie cellphone photos IMG_2736 ( taken at 3:51.58 PM ) and IMG_2737 ( taken at 3:55.20 PM ).
__________________________________________________________________
OTHER NOTES ABOUT THIS ‘VIDEO FADE’…
This time… instead of ‘clockwise’ as with IMG_2738, this IMG_2736 cellphone image had to be rotated a few degrees COUNTER-CLOCKWISE in order for the terrain to match up exactly as the images fade in and out of each other.
Notice the old-grader location in the distance in about the center of the ‘collage’.
It remains stationary as the images fade in and out.
Also.. as with the other IMG_0888 ‘video fade’ comparison with IMG_2738, this ‘panorama’ also has the rock outcrop on the RIGHT side of the frame which is where the northern ridge of the fuel-filled box canyon actually meets the floor of the middle bowl.
You can see clearly how CLOSE that advancing fireline really was ( even at 3:51 PM ), to the mouth of that box canyon. The fireline is only about 4600 feet away with nothing but explosive (manzanita, etc.) fuel in-between it and the mouth of the box canyon.
** THE ‘WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY’ FOR CANON VIDEOS / PHOTOS
So we have now nailed down a 3 minute and 22 second ‘window of opportunity’ between 3:51.58 and 3:55.20 in which MacKenzie must have put his iPhone away for a moment… and then shot the following FOUR things with his Canon…
__________________________________________________________________
MVI_0888.MOV – The first 9 second video which contains…
(Eric Marsh): Ah… I jus… I was just sayin’ I knew this was comin’ when I called ya
and asked how… what your comfort level was. I could just feel it… ya know.
(FF (Misner?) standing next to Ashcraft): We’ve been feelin’ it all day.
( Ashcraft laughs in response and then FF (Misner?) spits on the ground ).
IMG_0889 – First of two still photos taken in-between the 2 videos
IMG_0890 – Second of two still photos taken between the 2 videos
MVI_0891 – The second 9 second video which contains…
(Eric Marsh): …strange, ya know.
(Unknown 3rd person OR Marsh finishing his previous statement): You bet.
(Jesse Steed): I copy… and it’s almost made it to that two-track road we
walked in on.
__________________________________________________________________
To get the ‘total time’ it took to take these 4 items all we have to do is look at the original Canon timestamps for these items and ( even though we know the time offset is wrong ) we still get the ‘duration’ for all four items…
1601:31 – 110-0888 – First VIDEO – Duration: 9.24 sec.
1601:52 – 110-0889 – First still photo 12 seconds after video
1602:00 – 110-0890 – Second still photo 8 seconds later.
1602:10 – 110-0891 – Second VIDEO, 10 seconds later – Duration: 9.14 sec.
SIDENOTE: The ‘numbers’ just above still also mean for certain that the TOTAL time ( and possible maximum total missing conversation length ) BETWEEN the two videos is exactly 30 seconds… since the first video ended at 1601:40 and the second one actually started at 16:02:10 ( according to the Canon Powershot’s own timestamps ). That means that whatever ‘conversation’ MacKenzie FAILED to catch… it wasn’t much. It took Marsh and Steed a total of 18 seconds to say just the few things they did… so there was only time for less than twice as much similar ‘conversation’ in-between the two videos. No more than a few quick sentences can be ‘missing’ in-between the two videos.
So… based on the Canon’s own timestamps shown above… the TOTAL time it took for these four shots to have happened ( start to finish ) equals…
48 seconds. ( 1602:19 minus 1601:31 ).
Take 48 seconds ‘away’ from our ‘known’ 3 minute and 22 second ‘window of opportunity’ and that leaves…
2 minutes and 34 seconds.
Divide that right in half and we get the following…
1 minute and 17 seconds for MacKenzie to switch from using his iPhone to
take cellphone photo IMG_2736 to the start of the first Canon Powershot VIDEO.
Then 48 seconds to take all FOUR Canon Powershot items in a row.
Then another 1 minute and 17 seconds for MacKenzie to switch BACK from
using his Canon to his iPhone again to take cellphone photo IMG_2737.
Perfectly possible.
So the only thing left to determine is to which END of this 3 minute and 22 second ‘sliding window’ those 48 seconds of Canon activity belong… and we have the exact TIME OFFSET for ALL of the Canon powershot images that day.
I think that can be accomplished with just a few more COMPARISONS of
stillframes from the absolute START of video 1 and the absolute END of
video 2… and see whether this 48 second contiguous sequence is closer to
the 3:51.58 window START time… or has to be more towards
the 3:55.20 window END time.
More later…
Followup: Obviously some ‘number’ related typos up above.
The MacKenzie cellphone photos being talked about above
are, in all cases, in the ‘2700’ series.
IMG_2736.JPG
IMG_2737.JPG
IMG_2738.JPG
Anywhere it accidentally says ‘IMG_26xx’ or ‘IMG_28xx’
above is just a typo.
Maybe I am just a crazy old fire fighter—-But
with out all the fading that is what I saw way back when we started this and my brain went click.
Why would they move out of the black and walk down in front of that?
The Fire its self should be telling them that’s a really bad idea.
My education of brush fires tells me that fire front is getting ready to romp and eat up the landscape.
The laying down of the column on to the brush is actually sucking the fire to it as the winds lay the smoke over it is like a giant vacuum pulling oxygen in to the burning process. That kind of burning can get so radical as to sound like a jet flying low over the fire.
The only conclusion I have is they felt they could beat the fire to the BSR. Calculated risk? They wanted off the mountain before they got stuck up there until the fire laid down. Again my thoughts with out proof.
Reply to Bob Powers post on April 25, 2014 at 7:39 am
Mr. Powers…
Yes. I believe THIS one ( the dramatic difference
between the two photos ) is EASY to see… even
without all the digital gymnastics… but I did the
‘crossfade’ video anyway just to show how
DRAMATIC the difference really is in just that
short passage of time.
Tex (Sonny) Gilligan had never taken a WFF course
in his life… and even HE knew it was time to
‘get the hell out of there’ more than an HOUR
before these moments.
That ‘green carpet’ spread out in front of that
thing is mostly bone-dry manzanita.
‘Gasoline on a stick’… as some call it.
As we know now… there was about to be a
very large EXPLOSION.
It really is inconceivable that Marsh and Steed
would *NOT* have anticipated what was about
to happen down there… or that any of the other
(supposedly) trained men wouldn’t have said…
“Walk out in front of that?… are you nuts?”
What I wrote below, but wanted to repeat it in response to your comment, Bob:
The biggest reason, ala Bob Powers and his student RTS, for making sure there is a recognized and supported “what if” person on every crew!!
“What if” someone on this crew had said, looking at the fire behavior and the wind and knowing how wacky this can all get underneath a typical southwestern thunderstorm cell, and seeing how close this fire was moving toward that bowl-canyon’s entrance, “I don’t think we should go there. What if that fire turns and starts burning up that bowl?”
I learned that from you two, and I think it’s really Importent.
Mr. Powers – I am thankful that you are an OLD fire fighter. BUT GMIHS did not leave the black because they were ignorant of what was around them. They were ordered off the ridge -period. What needs to be discussed is who would have the power to insist they leave the black. Who would call them and require this movement? What are the human factors that these men worked under (City of Prescott & Forest Service)? They knew the last time they turned a directive down they were punished. They had eyes on the fire (Eric). They were told by someone that they had enough time to get to the ranch. Who possibly started a back burn that whipped up the canyon? Who is not talking that knows the truth? Who is being haunted by the memories of knowing a mistake was made? Who will finally step up and talk – standing up for the Granite Mountain Hotshots – finally stopping those voices that say it was them being cowboys? These men may have been young wildland firefighters but they knew the rules, they knew fire, they knew the fuels, they had their eyes on the fire, they would not take risks with their lives. I think a lot of good conversations are happening here – but – pressure needs to be placed on the so called leaders who do not accept the responsibility of leadership: “honesty”, “strength”,”courage”.
Only as an Old WFF and my past will I go here and it is not to assign Blame as much as responsibility.
The safety of the crew was Steed and Marsh’s they had that responsibility as all of us in the past have had.
Safety out weighs orders. One Foreman on that crew could have voiced a concern none evidently did but we don’t know that.
The real problem is simple–
No evaluation of the 10 Standard Orders…..
No LCES when they moved……
No scouted escape route…..
Those are the basics no matter who orders you to move……..
Some would say the entire crew is also responsible for their safety…..
Or each individual. I believed that my whole carrier SAFETY IS EVERYBODYS RESPONSIBILITY.
Deborah and Bob~
I agree with both of you. And thank you so much, Deborah, for contributing to this quest for the truth.
Where to begin.
I first joined this in December because, as a photographer, I saw Chris’ camera sitting in the middle of the deployment site, when no-one else did. I wanted to know what happened to it.
After a great deal of analysis, research, and connecting-the-dots, I discovered that it, and a bunch of cellphones had been with-held by the Prescott Fire Department from the “chain of evidence.” I discovered that that didn’t “matter” because, once the Yavapai County Sheriff signed off on a piece of paper that “no foul play” was involved, there would be no legally accountable investigation. I discovered that Darryl Willis was twisting his story into all kinds of pretzels to make sure nobody knew what actually happened to Chris’ camera. “Why would he do that?” I wondered.
I believe things are being withheld. I believe that is for a reason. Otherwise, why would that still be the case, now, nine months later. Somebody is being “protected,” I believe, and I still have no clue who that somebody is.
My brother, when he was a 15-year old Eagle Scout, got himself killed and almost got some other people killed, when he was ordered to get his patrol down off a ridge as quickly as possible. He was only fifteen. I always wondered why he did what he did. I could never figure it out, except that he was responding to that voice of authority. All I could do was decide to never do what he did. No matter what. No matter what pressure I felt was on me to do it.
This “incident” has not been seriously investigated. All we have done is try to pick away at what we are being ALLOWED to see. That’s not good enough.
I wish my very very best to you, Deborah. What happened to your son, and all these fine young men, has broken my heart over and over again. I’m a graduate of Prescott College, by the way. With all that that entails.
Based on the way things are being don now the only answers will come from a court hearing which may or may not happen, based on settlements. No body else will identify mistakes, decisions or orders made. Its a new world out there and has nothing to do with preventing the next one. Say a prayer and be safe….
SFFO # 10 should be #1……..
Mr. Powers… if you read ALL of the ‘wrongful death’ claims that have been filed so far… it is perfectly clear that as far at the families are concerned… ANY possible ‘settlement’ must ALSO include what are called ‘action items’ that have NOTHING to do with MONEY.
The families WANT the TRUTH to come out… and they WANT to know that the WFF industry is taking steps to make sure ( as MUCH as they possible can ) that something like this can be prevented from happening again ).
So even a ‘settlement’ might *REQUIRE* another investigation be held… and/or public admissions about what they ALREADY might know… but are refusing to release publicly.
Civil lawsuits CAN require that the defendant(s) take certain ACTIONS as part of any ‘settlement offer’… and these claims do just that.
Exactly.
WTKTT. The two firefighters you referenced above (from video0888), Ashcraft and possibly Misner is not correct. Ashcraft is sitting between Parker and Deford. I think the FF standing beside Mackenzie in 0888 (the one who spits) could possibly be Joe Thurston. This appears to be the same FF in image 0878, 0879, 0883, 0884. The same person is in Ashcraft’s photo.
At the 7-8 second mark of the 0888 video (Thurston’s?) red chainsaw chaps come into view.
The other FF standing to the right of (Thurston?), I believe, could be Anthony Rose, but not very certain about that.
I disagree. I think, from looking at lots of images and other stuff, that sawyer is Clayton Whitted.
On the other hand, I agree that the one standing to the right of him is Anthony Rose, the youngest of the GM Hotshots.
Andrew Ashcraft is sitting – his shirt has a circle stain on the (R) shoulder. Yes he is between Wade Parker and Dustin DeFord. I had the opportunity to sit on the that same rock (thank you to the one who took me there). The view was panoramic – plus aggravating. They worked hard all morning to have it all for not because of a retardant drop – nice work put out the back burn. This is why they re-positioned.
Again, thanks for doing this, WTK and Calvin. I think it’s really important to have tightened this image sequence up in order to see what they were seeing, and when.
Another important visual for this sequence (that I had forgotten about until going back to redo it) is Scott Norris’. That’s Scott standing up on that rock taking his photo in most of these Caldwell photos and videos. The link is: https://www.dropbox.com/sh/p78do502dflii7b/fhrel76c3A#/ .
According to the ReadMe that accompanies the photo:
“Karen Norris, Scott Norris’s mother, provided this photo to Randy Okon, a member of the accident investigation team. In her email, she wrote “The following text, along with this photo was sent from Granite Mtn Hot shot, Scott Norris to me, his mother, on June 30 at 3:54 pm : ‘This fire is running at Yarnell!!!’ This was the last text I received from him. Thank you, Karen Norris.”
PS I think you can see Scott shooting that photo 1 second into Chris’ second video, MVI_0891.MOV.
In IMG_2735, while Caldwell is shooting his video, Scott has what looks like his cellphone to his ear. In 2736 he seems to be looking down onto it. In MVI_0888, he is still holding it, in IMG_IMG_0889 he is holding it and looking out over the fire, and in MVI_0891 you see him shoot it, then lower it, and then then look down onto it! By IMG_2737, he is sitting down on that rock he was standing on.
So. depending on how accurate that 3:54 stamp on that message he sent to his mother is, this would pin that second video pretty closely to 3:54 PM, and also underpin this re-ordering of the whole sequence.
Since I’m still the last photographer on the planet without a smartphone, I’m not sure how all these details I just described translate.
And, by the way, looking at my ancient notes regarding The whereabouts of the cellphones, I have no indication of Scott’s cellphone ever entering into the chain of evidence.
PS All typos are courtesy my iPad.
See below (I think–I can never quite tell where comments in threads land before I post them) for why/how I have (based on Scott Norris’ photo) currently placed the beginning of Chris’ second vide at 3:54 PM.
LOL!!! I guess it’s above!
**
** VIDEO FADE BETWEEN…
** MACKENZIE 3:55.31 PM CELL PHOTO IMG_2837.JPG AND
** MACKENZIE VIDEO MVI_0888.MOV AT +6 SECONDS
Reply to calvin post on April 24, 2014 at 3:54 am
>> calvin wrote…
>> I believe another comparison can be made between image
>> 2738 and the 7-8 second mark in video 0388.
Here you go…
YouTube Video Title: IMG-2837-and-MVI-0888
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-MC2RQwroQo
The MacKenzie IMG_2837.JPG photo had to be ‘rotated’ clockwise a few degrees
in order for the terrain to match as it ‘overlays’ the MVI_0888.MOV video stillframe.
I used the +6 second mark for the ‘still frame’ from the MacKenzie video instead of
the +7 second mark just because that retains just a ‘bit’ of the fireline in the bottom
left corner of the photo ( similar to the Wade Parker texted photo ).
If we are going to now ASSUME that Christopher MacKenzie’s iPhone photo
timestamps are true and accurate ( and there really is no reason to NOT believe
that, at this point )… then I believe this ‘video fade’ between these two photos
PROVES that the first MacKenzie MVI_0888.MOV video was shot BEFORE the
3:55.31 PM IMG_2837.JPG cell phone photo was taken.
If you look at the CENTER of the video as these images fade in and out of each
other you will see that there is MUCH more SMOKE in the 3:55.31 PM cell phone
photo than can be seen in the 0888 video… AND the smoke has traveled much
farther SOUTH in the cell phone photo than is seen in the video stillframe.
You can clearly see that the smoke column ( and the fireline ) was still in the
process of ‘rotating around’ to the SOUTH at this point in time… and ( as we now
know ) would continue to do so for the next 30 to 40 minutes
Other interesting things to notice in this ‘video fade’…
1) Obviously Jesse Steed ‘disappears’ from where he was captured sitting
on that rock in the MacKenzie video and by 3:55.31, when the cell phone
photo was taken. ( Well… at least his red-helmet disappears but I believe if he
had still been sitting there it would ALSO be in the cell phone photo. )
2) Look to the RIGHT SIDE of BOTH of the photographs. That little ‘rock
outcrop’ that appears in the lower right is, in fact, the northern ridge of
the fuel-filled box canyon as it meets the floor of the middle bowl.
So you can see ( from left to right ) in this photos how SHORT the
distance really was from the fireline to the mouth of the box canyon
before they even left the safe black. The fireline was only about 4,600
feet from the mouth of the box canyon at the time the 3:55.31 PM
cell phone photo was taken.
OK, here’s what I’ve ferreted out so far:
2735 Second of Chris’s cellphone pix of Robert Caldwell shooting his video down below where Chris is. 3:50:19
2736 Chris shoots the fire on his cellphone with Caldwell right in front of him. 3:51:58. Pretty much just barely time enuff for Caldwell to get there.
2737 Chris shoots the fire on his cellphone: 3:55:20. About 3 1/2 minutes after shooting 2736.
2738 Chris shoots the fire on his cellphone again. 3:55:31. 11 seconds after shooting 2737. This is the photo WTK is comparing to the look of the fire in the 0888 video, saying that in the 2737 photo the the fire looks more intense and more turning to the south, and thus later than the 0888 video.
If the 0888 video was shot before the 2738 cellphone photo, it would have had to be taken between the 2736 and 2737 photos, in order for there to have been time to do that, and definitely not before 2736.
And even then there would have just been barely time for him to have done that.
I’m now remembering this was where we began to get hung up when we last tried to sequence this. It was hard to imagine then, and still hard to imagine now, Chris switching back and forth so quickly between all of this in this short frame of time. Unless he passed off either his camera or his cellphone to somebody else. Which is not impossible.
If indeed the fire progression seems to you and Calvin to indicate that the video + two photos + video quick sequence happened before IMG_2738, which was taken on Chris’s cellphone at 3:55:31 (and most likely at least a vaguely accurate timestamp), it had to have happened during that 3 1/2 minute gap between 2736 and 2737.
Does that seem reasonable?
The more I think about this, the more I don’t find it reasonable unless someone other than Chris was shooting either with his canon powershot camera or his cellphone. As a photographer, switching back and forth like this doesn’t make physical or mental sense.
On the other hand, if there were two people doing this, it would, but they would have to have been very close together given the angles seen in the images.
Marti. You are exactly right. The 088 (and probably the 0891) video was taken between images 2736 and 2737
As I stated before. The proof is in the pair of safety glasses Dustin Deford has in his hand in image 2735 and appear inside his work gloves in image 2737. I believe that Dustin Deford can be seen in video 0888 tucking the safety glasses inside his work glove.
Typo… video 0888 not video 088
Yes, I remember that conversation between us.
And it makes sense.
But, dang, it’s hard to fathom Chris switching back and forth so quickly between the powershot and the cellphone unless he had a reason (maybe I’m just too lazy as a photographer to feel my way into this?) .
So apparently he took several photos with the powershot of the sawyers shooting a photo and then heading up to the “convo” site, then shot several photos via his cellphone of Caldwell capturing his video–which also captured Abel saying “hunker down and be safe”– then shot Caldwell after he landed in front of him with his cellphone, then switched to his canon powershot to capture the first video of the “discussing the options” video, then switched to capturing two photos, then switched to capturing his second video of that conversation, and then switched to his cellphone to shoot two more photos of the fire advancing rapidly toward the fuel-filled bowl they were about to descend into.
This is all making about as much highly refined sense to me as a photographer as Tom Story’s 4:39 photos of a VLAT drop over the fire.
But then I maybe a seriously lazy photographer compared to Chris MacKenzie
And a massively whole-hearted thank you to Chris MacKenzie for working his butt off as both a fire-fighter and a photographer/videographer for capturing all of this so we can, after his death (RIP) try to figure out what the Granite Mountain Hotshots were seeing and, thus, trying to figure out what to do. Love to you Chris and your powershot which I saw on that deployment site when nobody else did!
And now that we have refined all of this (even tho, as a photographer,
Chris’s choice of ways to get his images don’t totally make sense to me), I am wondering. Can anybody tell me what difference/significance all of this makes?
Reply to Marti Reed post on April 24, 2014 at 6:28 pm
>> Marti said…
>> If indeed the fire progression seems to you and
>> Calvin to indicate that the video + two photos + video
>> quick sequence happened before IMG_2738, which was
>> taken on Chris’s cellphone at 3:55:31 (and most likely at
>> least a vaguely accurate timestamp), it had to have
>> happened during that 3 1/2 minute gap between 2736
>> and 2737.
>>
>> Does that seem reasonable?
Certainly does, Marti. Thank you.
See a new ‘crossfade’ video link post above that pretty
much supplies the ‘other piece’ to this puzzle and
PROVES that the MVI_0888 video HAD to have been
taken inside this 3 minute and 22 second ‘window’
you have identified.
And yes, I see that very short distance. At 3:55 PM. And I want to say to those awesome beautiful firefighters, whose memorial videos I have had to watch in order to identify them in all those photos and videos, please don’t go there.
I hear ya… but remember… 17 of those men didn’t make
the decision to ‘go there’ at all. Only 2 of them did.
The other 17 were just ‘along for the ride’.
Sad… but true.
The biggest reason, ala Bob Powers and his student RTS, for making sure there is a recognized and supported “what if” person on every crew!!
“What if” someone on this crew had said, looking at the fire behavior and the wind and knowing how wacky this can all get underneath a typical southwestern thunderstorm cell, and seeing how close this fire was moving toward that bowl-canyon’s entrance, “I don’t think we should go there. What if that fire turns and starts burning up that bowl?”
Maybe Brendan McDonough just reflected
the view of ALL of those 17 men with
regards to why no one said anything.
In his mainstream media ABC interview,
filmed with him sitting in a chair inside
Granite Mountain Station 7 and in front of
the team’s tool bench… Brendan said
was describing his moments of decision
to leave his lookout and summarized
those decisions saying…
“I knew fer sure it was time to get out of there”.
The interviewer then deftly asked…
“And what about them? Couldn’t they see
what you were seeing? Should THEY have
been ‘getting out of there’ at that same
moment?”
Brendan was caught off guard… leaned
back and put his hands behind his head
and obviously thinking carefully about
what to say next. All he finally said was…
“I’d never questioned any of their decisions
before… so why should I question them now?”
I might be paraphrasing some above… but
that was the ‘gist’ of the ABC interview at
that point. Brendan says he NEVER
questioned ANY of ‘their’ decisions
( Marsh and Steed ).
That probably generally applied to the rest of
that crew as well.
There were 17 other men up there
(supposedly) experts in fire behavior… and
not one of them seemed to say… “This
is NOT a good idea.”
Great catch, thanks.
Hopefully this might just become a Lesson Learned worthy of the sacrifice required to learn it.
WTKTT
I doubt that I would say all 17 were supposedly experts in fire behavior. 2, 3, 4 and maybe even 5 year WFF are not experts in fire behavior.
that is why most Superintendents and Asst. have 10 to 15 years experience in wild land fire. However they were or should have been trained every year with refreshers in the 10 and 18, fire weather, and fuels. It takes a lot of fires and a lot of different fires to understand fire behavior. The other foreman below Steed should have had some grasp of FB.
Way back I said a crewmen with 21/2 years was not the person to put as a lookout. Before I left California SAFTY FIRST had been signed off on which required a minimum Sector Boss or now Strike Team Leader for look out. It is very important to understand FB, Fuels and weather to give accurate reports to the crew. The safety of the entire crew depends on the Lookout. The ability to stay ahead of any threats and the complete trust of his supervisor.
A good lookout never stops McDonough could have and should have continued to notify the crew of the fire changes and what was happening after he got in the truck. He should have found a vantage point and continued to look out for the crew. A foreman or higher would have done just that until they could not be of service.
“McDonough could have and should have continued to notify the crew of the fire changes and what was happening after he got in the truck. He should have found a vantage point and continued to look out for the crew. A foreman or higher would have done just that until they could not be of service.”
I never would have known enough to have thought of that. Thank you.
It seems that McDonough was there be cause he was sick and all he did was take weather. Another lack of training and what a true Lookout dose? He was just hanging out taking weather not advising of the increased fire activity. So lackadaisical that the fire almost got him.
Sorry but that has always bothered me.
i’m calling BS about McDonough continuing to be lookout for GM…
there was no better vantage point than what GM had. there was no where else he could have gone to be an effective lookout.
besides the fact, he was assisting in the movement of vehicles…
i think the fact that neither BR nor McDonough seemingly felt the need to report the windshift to GM lends credibility to the fact that NONE of them thought GM was moving through the green. they all thought GM was “picking their way through the black” down the two track they had been trying to tie together and that they had originally walked up.
xxfullsailxx, as I am understanding the Blue Ridge unit logs, they KNEW GM was *not* doing that b/c the trail was close to burning over….
Thanks WTKTT. It appears that the 0888 video was taken between the 2736 and 2737 video (to me). If this is the case, this would mean the discussing options conversation heard in the 0888 video comes only moments after the promise of air support, down there, ASAP by Todd Able. BTW, I do not think for a minute that the IMT were planning to use an expensive load of retardant to facilitate a safe passage of GMIHC. It would , however, seem realistic that retardant would be placed on the south side of the active fire front, hopefully delaying the fires advance into Yarnell and Glen Isla. And could have influenced the decision to move toward Yarnell. And if the combination of fire retardant, increasing RH, decreasing temperature at the end of the burn period slowed the fire progression. Maybe, just maybe, GM (and others) could have worked with the dozer to create a line to burn out from before the next burn period.
Reply to calvin post on April 24, 2014 at 7:27 pm
>> calvin said…
>> Thanks WTKTT. It appears that the 0888 video was
>> taken between the 2736 and 2737 video (to me).
There is no ‘appears’ about it (anymore), calvin.
It’s a fact.
See the new ‘crossfade’ video between IMG_2736
and the stillframe from MVI_0888 ( posted as a new
parent comment above ) and there is no doubt about it.
>> calvin also wrote…
>> If this is the case, this would mean the discussing
>> options conversation heard in the 0888 video comes
>> only moments after the promise of air support, down
>> there, ASAP by Todd Able.
That is exactly what it means… and it means a number
of other things, too… such as…
1) This ‘discussing their options’ and/or ‘comfort level’
discussion took place up to 5 minutes BEFORE ASM2
Rory Collins left the fire at 1558.
2) Something made them WAIT at least 10 minutes
AFTER this video-captured ‘comfort level’ discussion
before actually ‘leaving’ at 4:04 ( unless it can be
established that the carrier network timestamp on
Parker’s text message is now also WRONG… OR
that Parker somehow texted that message out
WHILE they were already walking south. )
3) It puts Brendan McDonough in a completely different
place in time when he might have been ‘overhearing’
these conversations other than the moment he was
taking his own 4:02 photos over on Highway 89.
Etc… etc. A LOT of things need to be ‘re-evaluated’.
I still haven’t managed to ever figure out Brendan’s trail. I find it still REALLY confusing.
Since the additional unit logs surfaced in
February… it’s pretty clear that Brendan
DID just ‘convoy’ out with the Blue Ridge
guys and they all drove south through
the Sesame area, then through Glen Ilah,
then turned north on Highway 89 at
4:02 PM ( when Brendan shot those pics
out the window of the Sup truck )… and
then they all headed over to the Youth
Camp at end of Shrine road.
So even if the TIME for the ‘discussing their options’ conversations moves BACK to the
3:53 PM timeframe… Brendan was
( supposedly ) still in the GM Supervisor
truck with ( in his own testimony ) the
intra-crew radio volume ‘cranked up’.
But what does that do to the photos he took from Hiway 89 in Yarnell at 4:05ish? Did he drive down Sesame to 89 and then up Shrine to where Blue Ridge was and then help “bump” the rest of the trucks, which is what it looks like to me?
When I read the Unit Logs, I find them very confusing as to who went where and when.
Whatever whenever, I think it may have been quite difficult for him to have been paying complete attention to what was coming over the radio, given all that was going on.
Sorry, I misread what you wrote. What I’m finding confusing is exactly that “bumping” route. Some make it sound like they just drove across that newly scraped dozer line directly from Sesame to Shrine Road (which makes sense time-wise) and others sound like they went all the way down Sesame and back up Shrine just to get to the Youth Camp which, to me, doesn’t seem to make sense. But maybe that’s what they had to do. But I find the notes and logs are kind of jumbled about this.
Just thinking “out loud.”
Sorry folks to take away from YHF information sharing, but I posted this last night, reconsidered and reposted.
EN wrote:
“Fire20+ who leapt on ME for things that *I* did not say (and do not believe) while he simultaneously IGNORED the fact that it was BOB and WTKTT who said the things that Fire20+ is accusing ME of saying. This utter BULLSHIT has gone on for MONTHS, and it continues…”
—OK, so you were quoting somebody else, why not just quote them then? Folks would then understand the idiotic words you (you statements are appropriate here) DID put in that list weren’t yours, which raises another question. Why would you put things on a blog entry that appears to be coming out of your mouth then when your ‘jumped on’ you just can’t handle it and blame other people?—
“I had to WASTE my time defending myself on that, rather than doing the things that are far more valuable and unique, such as getting public records to guys like Gabbert or JD, who can then post them. Why am I not surprised that now Fire20+ has done the SAME fucking thing, in terms of accusing me of stuff that I NEVER said…”
—Don’t waste your time on my account, stop writing what you didn’t say or know about then you wouldn’t have to defend yourself Elizabeth and work yourself into a tissy. As far as what you say about ‘getting public records to guys…’ well, there you go again. ANYBODY can get public records by doing a records request, it is not special or generous or important, it is something ANYONE can do. You behave as if your “role” is exclusive and proprietary, your generous public service efforts, your selfless generosity to “give” this information to JD and Gabbert. They could have clearly gotten it themselves or gotten it from any other number of people who have the records also. I sure hope nobody has pointed this out to you before me, I’d hate to upset you.—
Oh, one more thing, I’m curious how the families like seeing F-bombs all over the place accompanied by victimized, crazy talk? Do you care about that at all? I cuss like a logger, but not here.
Reply ↓
I’d encourage people to also scroll down maybe 70 or so comments to see Fire20+ original comments. All he did is substantively engage a post by EN — no curse words, no personal invective beyond noting that on a substantive level EN clearly doesn’t understand very basic WFF issues. Trying to marginalize substantive responses by using emotional language including curse words, “conspiracy theorist” and the like can be effective for people not following the substantive dialogue, but is actually very harmful to advancing substantive understanding.
On a substantive level, unless and until EN first grasps some basics relating to wildland fire, and also some basics of local conditions, and begins making comments based on those facts of life, pointing out when she is speaking without support is a classic and useful function of this type of comment forum. A while back, we had a similar exchange involving another poster who, though claiming to be a WFF, was talking rot about SZ guidelines in a very misleading way. We were able to show with specificity what those guidelines actually are, and the underlying reasons for them, and for people who care to read the full exchange who didn’t have that info before, this is useful. Interestingly, the guy who was making the very odd SZ statements is one EN now seems to rely on as a supporter. It is helpful to clear up some of these misstatements.
Every now and then… it’s also useful to remember
our ‘Mark Twain’…
“We are ALL ignorant…
…just about DIFFERENT things.”
I have no problem with either people not having a background in something, or simply making either misstatement or differences in opinion. People claiming that others voicing their informed views represents an attack or trolling or stalking should be a big red flag, though.
I’ve disagreed with most people here, including you, WTKTT, just this morning, yet you aren’t dropping F-bombs and blaming me for wasting your time. I’m going to respectfully disagree with you on GPS and air, for instance, which for fire behavior like that the afternoon of the YHF is extremely limited in what it can do. That’s all good. Differing points of view are good, and frankly truly “smart” delivery might in future be able to make what’s pretty ineffective now work better.
Reply to SR post on April 24, 2014 at 1:11 pm
>> SR said…
>> I have no problem with either people not
>> having a background in something, or
>> simply making either misstatement or
>> differences in opinion. People claiming
>> that others voicing their informed views
>> represents an attack or trolling or stalking
>> should be a big red flag, though.
Yes. Agreed. I wasn’t trying to soften your
original message/intent. Civil (public)
discussion pretty much *requires* tolerance
for disagreement and not automatically
assuming someone is ‘attacking’ or all
the other adverbs you quoted.
Totally agree.
>> SR also wrote…
>> I’ve disagreed with most people here,
>> including you, WTKTT, just this morning,
>> yet you aren’t dropping F-bombs and
>> blaming me for wasting your time.
Nope. Not my style.
I am someone who WELCOMES debate.
It’s always the chance to learn something.
>> SR also wrote…
>> I’m going to respectfully disagree with
>> you on GPS and air, for instance,
And I respectfully *accept* your opinion.
It’s a ‘touchy’ ( and complicated ) subject.
>> which for fire behavior like that the
>> afternoon of the YHF is extremely limited
>> in what it can do.
Yes. Most likely. Marsh could have had a
Navy-Seal style laser-location receptor
on his helmet and Air Attack could have
had the corresponding equipment onboard…
…that still doesn’t mean they would have
ACTUALLY been able to fly to that spot
to dump any retardant. It could still have
been a suicide mission for the Air Resources
and they would have been hauling pieces of
airplanes out of the canyon as well as well
as bodies.
>> SR also wrote…
>> That’s all good. Differing points of view
>> are good, and frankly truly “smart” delivery
>> might in future be able to make what’s
>> pretty ineffective now work better.
Yes. There is a LOT that technology can
contribute to the WFF effort in the future.
Someday… Hotshots themselves will
probably just be replaced with robots for
just pure ‘line building’… but certainly not
in OUR lifetime(s).
wait, what? SR, you’re going to try to drag me into this BS?
SR, you’re like one of those little yappy ankle-biter dogs (like a chihuahua or miniature doberman pincer…) you just yap-yap-yap and don’t really have a clue what you’re yapping at but you just can’t seem to control yourself.
but let’s go ahead and have another talk, because you seem to like to portray yourself as some sort of expert about wff’ing, but i’ll bet you have little to *0* actual on the ground experience… did you want to qualify your experience level? no, i didn’t think so.
regarding your continually ridiculous assertion that distance and time traveled should be measured on a straight line, or, as the crow flies, or, as your “back to the future” hover-board seems to work for you:
so, when you’re at a TSA turn-style security check, do you measure the time you spend walking around the maze in terms of the 50 foot straight line distance from the security inspector?
when you’re walking down a switchback trail, and the actual “as the crow flies distance” down the hill is less than a mile, but you have three miles worth of switch backs, do you time yourself based on the mile?
why don’t you walk down to your local fire department, and tell them that from now on, you’re going to measure their response time in terms of straight lines on google earth instead of the actual roads system they have to travel.
more related yet, you seem to put a lot of value in the speculation about the two track that GM could have utilized all the way to the ranch… but by your math, if you measure a straight line from lunch spot (or descent point) to the BSR… then their rate of travel would still be something closer to your previous ill-conceived logic after they walked around the very indirect two-track route.
regarding SZ’s: i don’t think you’ve ever even dealt with having to size up a safety zone, let alone take account for the safety of a squad or crew. so i would suggest you stop trying to make yourself sound like the expert you’re not.
I.e., FullSail is trying to shout to distract attention from the fact that he was speaking in complete ignorance of what SZ guidelines actually are. This is very relevant in assessing his overall credibility, and likewise relevant when EN uses references to FullSail to try to buttress her own (often quite fanciful) assertions.
FWIW, while I wasn’t following the comments actively at the time, apparently FullSail had some real doozies that were perhaps even worse earlier on. If he is a real person in the vocation he claims to have, I would strongly advise him to recognize that, since he doesn’t seem to know what he is talking about when it comes to nuts and bolts, he should go back starting at basics and re-train himself.
As regards rate of travel, yes, absolute time in terms of exposure to risk is the key variable. Just as with SZ guidelines, this is real basic stuff. There is no “A” for effort. You can have a crew running 6 minute miles and, if the course they are running is a loop in the middle of dense, dry, unburned brush, and they get burned over, there is no extra credit for the fact that as regard the loop they were making good speed, though not good time as regards forward progress.
Basically, FullSail often seems, well, not quite up to speed. The SZ guidelines are a good example, but only one of many. Since technically he is so consistently wrong, readers should bear this in mind as regards any of his posts. What technical details is he blowing? should be the main question.
SR:
how much practical experience do you have applying the 10 & 18?
how much practical experience do you have assessing safety zones?
simple questions really. and very applicable, since you seem so prepared to judge my technical expertise.
me? i’ve worked for both the FS and NPS for the last 13 years. i’ve worked on IHC’s, Helitack Rappel crews, Engines, Fuels Crew… i’ve worked in Region 3, Region 2, Region 4…
so please, continue trying to talk yourself up by attempting to belittle others. i’ll just roll your little yappy ass over and scratch your belly till your hind leg starts twitching.
You are killing me here. You’ve worked here, there, and everywhere…but still don’t know what a SZ is, still don’t know local conditions, still don’t know basically anything else in terms of the actual nuts and bolts of the realities of wildland fire? And, seem to be trying to distract attention from those awkward, to you, facts.
In my case? Well, I was the first person to call you directly on the SZ bs you were stating (to be fair, another poster initially raised the general issue, and gave fuller and more comprehensive responses that were far better than mine), the first poster to call you as to local conditions…basically, none of that is that meaningful insofar as this is real basic stuff to most people. But, it’s real basic stuff that you’ve been persistently been getting wrong. It is what it is. If you are what you claim to be, get more educated. In the practical sense.
way to avoid answering the question… you just keep yap! yap! yapping!
**
** THE WADE PARKER PHOTO WAS NOT TAKEN AT 1604 ( 4:04 PM )
Reply to calvin post on April 22, 2014 at 4:49 pm
>> calvin said…
>>
>> I suggest everyone compare (for themselves) the smoke progression from
>> the Wade Parker Picture with image 2738 from Mackenzie’s cell and decide
>> for yourself which is taken first.
There is now a VIDEO sitting up at YouTube that pretty much proves that the
Wade Parker photo ( the one he texted out ) was NOT taken at 4:04 PM that day.
That is simply the time when he actually TEXTED the photo, and NOT when the
photo was actually taken.
The Wade Parker photo that was given to the SAIT investigators had ALL of the
EXIF metadata removed and was simply a copy of the cropped version of the
original photo that accompanied the ‘text’ message from Parker’s iPhone
at 4:04 PM.
There is still little doubt that 4:04 PM is the moment when Wade Parker actually
DID accomplish the ‘text’ sendout ( give or take some seconds of latency on the
CARRIER network ). That still appears to be the actual CARRIER network
timestamp applied to the text message, and so that still means the men were
not quite ‘gaggled up’ and heading south on the first leg of their ‘mission’ yet circa
4:04 PM… but it’s still important to note that 4:04 PM is NOT the time for the
texted photo itself. It was taken much earlier than that.
So EXACTLY when WAS the Wade Parker photo taken?
It’s still hard to say… but, as Calvin says, it CAN be compared to other photos
to see if it was taken BEFORE or AFTER something else.
This new VIDEO is, in fact, a COMPARISON between that Wade Parker photo
and a ‘still frame’ from +6 seconds into the Robert Caldwell video.
There has only ever been a small amount of ‘flame’ visible at the extreme left
edge of the Wade Parker photo… but it’s just enough to COMPARE with other
photos or ( as in this case ) ‘still frames’ from one of the videos.
At +6 seconds into the Robert Caldwell video… the view and perspective into the
distance is ( at that moment ) almost identical to the Wade Parker photo so a
‘still frame’ from the Caldwell video at that point makes a good comparison view
for the Parker photo.
It is pretty clear, when comparing THESE two photos, that the Wade Parker photo
MUST have been taken some minutes BEFORE Robert Caldwell shot his video.
In the ‘still frame’ from the Caldwell video… the FLAMES can clearly see to have
ADVANCED to the SOUTH versus where they are seen in the Wade Parker photo.
I would say the flames have advanced at least 20+ feet (south) from where they
are seen in the Parker photo to where they are then seen at +6 seconds into
Robert Caldwell’s video. One part of the flamefront seems to have advanced
much further SOUTH than the other parts, at that point. It is not an ‘even’
advance of the flames… but a *general* advancement is clearly seen.
That (new) VIDEO is here…
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B9emH4nY_zs
YouTube Video Title: parker-and-caldwell
YouTube ABOUT text for this video…
________________________________________________________________
This video FADES between the Wade Parker texted photo and a
still frame from +6 seconds into the Robert Caldwell video. Notice
the FLAMES on the left hand side of the video as it fades between
the two photos. The FLAMES ADVANCE in the Caldwell video
photo and would appear to prove that the Wade Parker photo was
taken BEFORE Robert Caldwell shot his video.
__________________________________________________________________
More about all this later.
Calvin is right… there is STILL an unresolved problem with the Christopher
MacKenzie Canon Powershot timestamps ( ALL of them ). People cannot be
in two places at the same time and it is VERY unlikely that the timestamps on
Christopher’s iPhone photos are NOT accurate. It would be MUCH more likely
the time on his Canon Powershot ( used to take the two 9 second videos ) was
simply set WRONG that day.
How wrong? Still unknown.
I still believe that the timestamp on the Wade Parker ‘textout’ at 4:04 is valid
proof ( because it is an external CARRIER network timestamp ) that the men did
NOT leave that rest area and head south until circa 4:05 ( as even the SAIR
originally suggested ), but ALL of the other ‘accepted’ times for things like the
Christopher MacKenzie videos are still very much in doubt.
Thanks WTKTT… I believe another comparison can be made between image 2738 and the 7-8 second mark in video 0388.
Calvin… I can easily do another ‘fade video’ for these
two things just like I did above with the Parker photo and
the +6 second mark in the Caldwell video…
…but just to be clear ( since you have typos above )…
You are talking about…
MacKenzie cell phone photo IMG_2738.JPG
and…
+7/8 second mark in MacKenzie video MVI_0888.MOV
Correct?
Are you SURE you want to use cell phone image
IMG_2738.JPG?
The ‘fireline’ is NOT visible on the left edge of that
photo as it is with the Wade Parker photo. IMG_2738
has no fireline visible at all. It is being BLOCKED
by a firefighter’s pack in the bottom left corner.
Reply to calvin post on April 24, 2014 at 3:54 am
>> calvin said…
>> Thanks WTKTT… I believe another comparison can be
>> made between image 2738 and the 7-8 second mark in
>> video 0388
See new post above.
I went ahead and did a new ‘video fade’ on the following…
MacKenzie 3:55.31 PM cell phone photo IMG_2837
and
MacKenzie MVI_0888.MOV video at +6/7 second mark.
I believe this new ‘video fade’ proves that the first
MacKenzie video HAD to have been taken prior to
3:55.31 PM, when the IMG_2837 photo was taken.
How MUCH earlier?
Still hard to say… but we’re getting close.
Sitting here remembering the four days Calvin and I spent working on that timeline at the end of January. I kept saying the only people (including professionals) who bother checking the time settings on their cameras are mostly wedding photographers who often have to sync images from multiple cameras all the time.
Chris’s powershot was not only +/- 20 minutes off, it was a full MONTH off. That’s why I struggled to find a cellphone image or video to sync his powershot stuff with. We wrestled this timeline down enough to prove that what was being written about Chris’s pix of the sawyers “leaving” after the conversation was incorrect and those images were taken before the conversation.
We were still having some questions about fine-tuning this sequence, and Calvin was looking more at the fire-behavior than I was, and then, because it was approaching my “retirement” date, I didn’t do any more with them.
I was looking at those images last night again. Here are the timestamps I ended up with in January:
0887 – 3:52:24 PM
0888 – 4:01: 31
0889 – 4:01:52
0890 – 4:01:00
0891 – 4:02:10
I don’t remember, at this point in time exactly what I synched Chris’s powershot videos/photos with, but I’m thinking I synched them to a combination of his cellphone images and Caldwell’s video. We were also conversing at the time that even cellphone timestamps and gps data can be off a bit under those circumstances.
So……a reminder, I would NEVER expect a not-connected-to-the-internet-or-a-network camera’s timestamps to even remotely be accurate. People just don’t pay attention to them unless they have a serious reason to.
So, now I’ll go look at Tom Story’s images and see if I can figure out what’s going on with them. I again have no reason to believe even he paid that much attention to the camera timestamps. But I’ll see what I can find.
I do think trying to get a more refined timeline of these images is important at this point in order to see what GM was seeing in the fire progression. So thank you!
I may have to eat my words regarding Tom Story paying attention to his time stamps. He was shooting with three cameras and a cellphone, so…..he probably was paying attention.
But I’m still downloading so……..
OK I’ve just taken a look. I’ll put my comments down below where they belong.
LOL!… messages crossing on the wires.
I was in the act of pointing that out to you just
as you were seeing that photo he took of his
own ‘pieces of kit’ lying on the ground.
I still would find it hard to believe he wouldn’t have
those puppies SYNCED so he could make sure
and get chronological order later… but maybe
he just knows himself what the ‘offsets/difference’
are and can do it that way if he ever needs to.
Reply to Marti Reed post on April 24, 2014 at 9:50 am said:
>> Marti said…
>> We were still having some questions about fine-tuning
>> this sequence, and Calvin was looking more at the
>> fire-behavior than I was, and then, because it was
>> approaching my “retirement” date, I didn’t do any more
>> with them.
It was quite some time before the MacKenzie cell phone
photos finally emerged on a public link… and at the same
time a TON of other information came online… so the
discovery about MacKenzie’s cell phone photos proving
his Canon Powershot time was wonky sort of got lost
in the noise. I remember, myself, just letting you and
Calvin hash that out because my ears were falling off
just listening to the hours of video/audio that also
came online at the same time.
So yes… this issue has been ‘laying on the table’ since
the MacKenzie cell phone photos were finally available.
>> Marti also said…
>> Chris’s powershot was not only +/- 20 minutes off,
>> it was a full MONTH off.
Yes, it’s possible. I would believe +20 minutes easily.
If you look at ALL of the Christopher MacKenzie photos
( both Canon Powershot and iPhone ) you will see that
he had the same ‘timestamp’ problem(s) even on
Doce fire just a week or so before on June 19, 2013.
He was doing the same thing on the Doce fire.
He would take some pictures with his iPhone, and
then take some pictures with his Canon Powershot.
In one sequence from the Doce fire… he takes pictures
of a Non-VLAT retardant drop with his iPhone, and then
( according to the Canon Powershot timestamps ) he
is taking ANOTHER sequence of photos of a full DC10
VLAT Air Drop in the EXACT same location… and
according to the Canon timestamps this SECOND
DC10 VLAT drop was only 1 minutes 45 seconds
after the drop he captured with his iPhone.
Not possible. Look at the SMOKE filling the entire valley
in the background of both photos. It is NOT POSSIBLE
there could have only been 1 minute 45 seconds between
those 2 retardant drops. It really does look ( just from
the dramatic smoke difference at Doce ) that there had
to be a LEAST 20 minutes of separation… perhaps
much more.
The most ‘dramatic’ shift in understanding about what
these men did when that afternoon is going to come from
the change in the actual TIMES for the 2 MacKenzie
videos.
It could turn out that this particular ‘discussing their options’
conversation ( one of several? ) captured in the MacKenzie
videos actually took place MUCH earlier than everyone
( the SAIT and ADOSH investigators included )
has been assuming.
It actually doesn’t bode well for their ( Marsh’s and Steed’s )
‘decision making’, either.
If the ‘fire progression’ captured in the MacKenzie
photos videos actually represents the situation up
to 20+ minutes PRIOR to them actually leaving on
their ‘mission’ circa 4:05 PM… then that means the fire
HAD to have progressed much farther than seen in those
photos before they ACTUALLY left the safe black… but
they STILL decided to leave, anyway.
>> Marti also said…
>> So, now I’ll go look at Tom Story’s images and see if
>> I can figure out what’s going on with them. I again have
>> no reason to believe even he paid that much attention
>> to the camera timestamps. But I’ll see what I can find.
Thanks, Marti!
One of the Tom Story photographs shows him
photographing his OWN cameras that he had with
him that day. There are THREE serious pieces of
kit on the ground at his feet ( which means he had
at least FOUR cameras ) with him that day.
As you said… if you are using MULTIPLE cameras
to document and event ( like a wedding ), it only stands
to reason you would make SURE that ALL the times
are correct on all the devices or you might have a
helluva time later ‘organizing’ all the photos into exact
chronological order…
…but then again… (as you said)… never ASSUME anything.
Maybe even professional photographer/reporter
Tom Story wasn’t even bothering to do that.
If ANY of the Tom Story cameras had incorrect time
settings… I don’t think they were very far off. His sequence
of photos at the Ranch House Restaurant before, during,
and after the deployment look pretty *close*… it’s just
that SOME of them don’t seem to be ‘jiving’ with other
known photos ( as calvin said ) like Blue Ridge
photos, the Russ Reason video, etc.
Is there a time given anywhere for Caldwell’s video? It’s showing, in Lightroom, a stamp of 8/13/13 at 11:05:46. Do you know of anything more accurate?
I think I vaguely remember wishing I could sync Chris’s photos to that video, but I couldn’t. I think.
Also, what I’m noticing looking at this stuff is that, in some of Chris’s pix (the ones taken with his cellphone), Caldwell is down below the rest of the group when he is taking the video. Then, in the rest of the pix and the video that Chris took on the canon powershot, Caldwell is up with the group, just right in front of Chris. So I’m not sure when Caldwell was in which position.
I currently have Chris’s two cellphone pics of Caldwell taking the video at 2734 – 3:50:06 and 2735 – 3:50:19. But I don’t know whether Caldwell took that video either before or after Chris’s powershot sequence which shows Caldwell up withe group instead of just below it. I know this is just another nagging detail, but it might help get these images in a better sequence to help see the fire movement etc.
I’m getting closer. Caldwell was down a bit below the group when he took the video and Chris took pics of him doing that. Then, about a minute and a half after he finished, he was in front of Chris when Chris took one more pic with his cellphone, and then started his two videos with the two photos in between them on the powershot. I’m gonna resequence these, tying them to Chris’s cellphone pix a bit better than I did before.
Marti… I haven’t uploaded it yet… but I’ve done a
‘video fade’ of the two items Calvin seemed to
be requesting be ‘compared’ up above…
MacKenzie cell phone photo IMG_2738
and a still frame from +7 seconds in the
9 second long MacKenzie video MVI_0888.MOV.
The time stamp on that IMG_2738 iPhone image
is 3:55.31 PM… and it now *definitely* looks like
that first MacKenzie MVI_0888.MOV video was
taken BEFORE that 3:55.31 IMG_2738. Looks
like it might have been even 3-4 minutes BEFORE.
There is MUCH more ‘smoke’ evident in the
3:55.31 PM cell phone photo than in the
MVI_0888 video… and the smoke is definitely
farther SOUTH and still ‘coming around’ as the
storm was still ‘rotating’ to the SOUTH at
that point.
Followup… so we are definitely looking at
at least an +8-9 minute error in the MacKenzie
Powershot timestamps.
That’s a minimum, it would seem.
WTKTT on April 24, 2014 at 3:03 pm said:
>> Marti… I haven’t uploaded it yet…
>> but I’ve done a ‘video fade’ of the two
>> items Calvin seemed to be requesting
>> be ‘compared’ up above…
>>
>> MacKenzie cell phone photo IMG_2738
>> and a still frame from +7 seconds in the
>> 9 second long MacKenzie video
>> MVI_0888.MOV.
Upload completed. It is HERE…
YouTube Video Title…
IMG-2837-and-MVI-0888
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-MC2RQwroQ
Seems to be PROOF that the first
MacKenzie video HAD to have been
shot BEFORE the 3:55.31 PM cell phone
photo IMG_2837.JPG.
How much time ‘before’?
Still hard to say. If we can’t trust the times
in the original MacKenzine Canon Powershot
items ( until we find the absolute real
‘offset’ and can apply that to all the items ),
then a lot of this is going to come down to
‘smoke/fireline analysis’…
…but we’re getting close.
Whoops… the link in the comment
just above didn’t survive the
cut-and-paste and seems to be
broken. See the full ‘posting’ above
or try this link instead…
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-MC2RQwroQo
Sorry to put this “down in the weeds” but if I put this at the top somewhere, I’d have to scroll miles on my iPad. I’m looking Chris’s first video. Wade Parker is scrolling on his cellphone at the very start. I now think this first video is around 3:52. This is after Caldwell comes up to join the group after shooting his video. I was thinking there was something capturing Wade shooting that photo, but I guess not. But it would make sense that he could have shot it (and maybe a couple of others) before this and was now looking to see what he wanted to send out.
Reply to Marti Reed post on April 25, 2014 at 7:22 pm
>> Marti said…
>> I’m looking Chris’s first video. Wade Parker is scrolling
>> on his cellphone at the very start.
Yes. All of these ‘child comments’ right here are actually
attached to the ‘parent’ comment I posted which pretty
much proves that even though Parker apparently didn’t
get around to actually ‘texting’ that photo to his mother
until 4:04 PM… that photo he actually sent out HAD to
have been taken BEFORE Robert Caldwell shot his
video in the 3:50-ish timeframe.
It would only make sense that he shot himself some
photos, then sat down and was NOT using this ‘break’
time to select the one he was going to text to his mother.
>> I now think this first video is around 3:52.
Very well could be. We KNOW it was shot right
AFTER his 2736 cellphone image at 3:51.58
( 2 seconds before 3:52 PM )… so depending on how
FAST Christopher was able to stow the iPhone and
start shooting with the Canon… the first video COULD
be starting within 1 minute of IMG_2736 and in the
3:52 timeframe.
>> Marti also wrote…
>> This is after Caldwell comes up to join the group after
>> shooting his video.
Yes. Caldwell’s video ( and his capture of OP1 Todd
Abel telliing Marsh to ‘hunker and be safe’ ) was ‘in the can’
at this point.
>> I was thinking there was something capturing Wade
>> shooting that photo, but I guess not.
Apparently not. Parker shot the photo he would eventually
text out to his mother at 4:04 BEFORE Caldwell shot
his video. MacKenzie captured Caldwell shooting that
video ( with his cellphone ) but apparently didn’t shoot
Parker taking HIS photo just before that.
>> But it would make sense that he could have shot it
>> (and maybe a couple of others) before this and was
>> now looking to see what he wanted to send out.
Yes. Makes perfect sense.
What is still a little ‘mysterious’ is the actual 4:04 PM
‘sendout’ time for Parker’s text + photo.
Either they all sat there for another 10 minutes or so
WITHOUT really taking any other pictures… and Parker
hit ‘send’ on his final ‘assembled’ text message + photo
at 4:04 just as they WERE about to leave…
…or they really did ‘gaggle up’ and leave BEFORE
4:04 and Parker accomplished the text sendout
WHILE they were already hiking south.
By the way… here is that link to that video again that
compares the Parker photo with the Caldwell video…
so you don’t even have to ‘scroll up’ to find it…
Video ‘crossfade’ comparison between Parker photo
and a stillframe from Caldwell’s movie…
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B9emH4nY_zs
Typo above. I said ‘NOT’ instead of ‘NOW’.
Paragraph above SHOULD have read like this…
“It would only make sense that he shot himself
some photos, then sat down and was NOW using
this ‘break’ time to select the one he was going to
text to his mother.”
**
** ACTUAL TIMESTAMP FOR YARNELL-GAMBLE VIDEO?
As it turns out… the IMG_1134 VIDEO in the ‘Jerry Thompson’ Dropbox folder
does, in fact, contain the same exact SIREN ‘cutoff’ that is heard coming from
one of Tyson Esquibel’s engines in the YARNELL-GAMBLE video.
That Thompson IMG_1134 video is publicly available HERE…
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/y3jy5opssrcvzb3/lDTdC5y0-k/Jerry%20Thompson%20Photos%20Videos#/
Jerry Thompson was assigned to a brush truck working under SPGS1
Gary Cordes and they were working just several hundred yards to the
due south of the Shrine area… so when Tyson Esquibel started using
one of the engine sirens to ‘recall’ his men from Harper Canyon area
back to the Shrine Youth Camp so they could evacuate… Jerry Thompson’s
video captured those same sirens heard in the YARNELL-GAMBLE video.
There are actually TWO sirens going at the start of the YARNELL-GAMBLE
video and the ‘cutoff’ sequence for both is unique and identifiable.
The Jerry Thompson video starts at exactly 4:27 PM ( according to
documentation supplied by Thompson to the SAIT investigators when
he gave them his photos and videos ).
In the Thompson video… this first ‘siren’ heard coming from the Youth Camp
‘cuts off’ abruptly at exactly +30 seconds. The SECOND siren then simply
‘trails off’ on a 6 second countdown right after that before it, too, goes silent.
This same exact siren 1 ‘cutoff’ and siren 2 ‘6 second trailoff’ happens
in the YARNELL-GAMBLE video at exactly +4 seconds.
So ( assuming Jerry Thompson’s timestamp is correct for his video )…
here are the actual timestamps for the YARNELL-GAMBLE video and the transmission(s) captured inside of it…
_________________________________________________________________
YARNELL-GAMBLE VIDEO STARTS AT 1627.26 ( 4:27.26 PM )
+0:01 ( 1627.27 / 4:27.27 PM )
(OPS1 Todd Abel?): Copy… uh… uh… come down and appreciate if ya could
come a little faster but (you’ll) figure it out.
+0:12 ( 1627.38 / 4:27.38 PM )
(Eric Marsh): Ah… they’re comin’ from the heel of the fire.
+0:15 ( 1627.41 / 4:27.41 PM )
(Brian Frisby): Structue Group core, Blue Ridge Hotshots, on TAC 1.
YARNELL-GAMBLE VIDEO ENDS AT 1627.44 ( 4:27.44 PM )
_________________________________________________________________
It was once assumed that the YARNELL-GAMBLE video was actually shot circa
4:19 or 4:20 ( which would have been the exact moment the SAIR says that GM
was ‘deciding’ to drop down into the fuel-filled box canyon ) but if the information
above is correct then the person ( OPS1 Todd Abel? ) telling Eric Marsh he would
‘appreciate it if he could get to town a little faster’ didn’t make that request until
4:27, when ( supposedly ) Steed and the crew had ALREADY decided to drop
into the canyon and, indeed, were already +7 minutes into their descent.
So it no longer appears as if this ‘request’ for them to ‘hurry up’ actually
influenced their decision to take the shortcut through the fuel-filled box canyon.
Steed/Crew had already decided to do that before this ‘can you hurry?’
request from someone in fire command (OPS1 Todd Abel? ) even took place.
Could someone please let me know who was at this GPS location: 13.579′ W 11245.839′. Thank you for your help.
Reply to Deborah Pfingston post
on April 23, 2014 at 7:27 am
>> Deborah said…
>>
>> Could someone please let me know who was at this
>> GPS location: 13.579′ W 11245.839′.
>> Thank you for your help.
Deborah…
Not quite sure about the first ‘Latitude’ component there.
You seem to be missing the ‘Degrees WEST’ part at
the front… but since pretty much ALL of Yarnell is at
the 34 degree latitude… when I interpret those
coordinates as…
34 degrees, 13 minutes, 5.79 seconds NORTH Latitude
112 degrees, 45 minutes, 8.39 seconds WEST Longitude
…I get the following DECIMAL Lat/Long location…
34.218275, -112.752331
That point is EXACTLY the area just WEST of Highway 89
where Jerry Thompson’s BRUSH truck was working that
day to ‘prep’ those outlying homes back in there, due
south of the St. Joseph Shrine area.
To check this for yourself…
1) Call up Google Maps in your Browser
2) Then just ‘cut-and-paste’ the following line ( comma
included ) into the ‘search bar’ of Google Maps…
34.218275, -112.752331
3) Now just hit ENTER and Google Maps will display
a map of Yarnell with a large GREEN ARROW pointing
at that exact location, just WEST of Highway 89 and
NORTHWEST of the Ranch House Restaurant.
Does this point match your expectations?
By the way… this ‘Jerry Thompson’ location is the same
exact one referenced above in the ‘YARNELL-GAMBLE’
video timestamp update. Mr. Thompson’s full folder of
pictures and videos he took while working at this location
is online publicly at the following link… so maybe these
photos/videos might help you match what you are
looking for?
Jerry Thompson Photos and Videos…
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/zghqmidyjqbgp1e/7tts4WSLQ1
Thank you for your help. Do you know if there were any other trucks or crew along this line/road?
Reply to Deborah Pfingston post
on April 24, 2014 at 10:35 am
>> Deborah said…
>> Thank you for your help. Do you know if
>> there were any other trucks or crew along
>> this line/road?
Deborah…
Didn’t want you to think this was missed.
Offhand… no… I haven’t seen that
information since there was no IAP
( Incident Action Plan ) ever recorded
for June 30, 2013… but I am looking into it.
At one point in one of the Jerry Thompson
videos he calls out to a co-worker whose
first name is ‘Matt’. I’m trying to identify
HIM and see if he was running another
brush truck or was part of Thompson’s.
More later…
Thank you this is very important. I cannot say exactly why at this point.
WTKTT, how are you figuring out that that is Jerry Thompson’s location? I’m not finding that in the metadata – am I missing something?
Thank you.
It matches Thompson’s own description of
where they were working that accompanies
his photos/videos… and a Google Earth
comparison of his photos/videos and the
location coordinates above seems to confirm.
They were doing ‘prep’ work on those houses
that you can see back there to the west
of Highway 89 and northwest of the
Ranch House Restaurant.
WTKTT, don’t his pictures match the OTHER side of 89 (the side closer to the fire when it hits the Shrine area) better? Why are you thinking that he was not on the OTHER side of 89, helping clear over there?
Thanks.
I am not following you. I DO believe Thompson and others were working that area WEST of 89 and the coordinates are pretty accurate… so what are you talking about?
Are you sure you are not mistaking the Google Maps red balloon for the GPS point? It’s not. It’s the GREEN ARROW.
that is some pretty serious bullshit ad-lib’ing you have going on there.
If you are talking about the references to OPS1 Todd
Abel most likely being the one who is ‘urging’ them
to ‘come to town faster’… please notice the question
mark by all the references.
It has NOT been *absolutely* confirmed that it is him…
but at the same time… it pretty much HAS been
absolutely confirmed who it is NOT.
It is NOT Darrell Willis urging GM to ‘hurry up’.
It is NOT OPS2 Paul Musser.
It is NOT SPGS1 Gary Cordes.
It is NOT Tony Sciacca ( Safety officer who arrived late )
So who does that leave that would be talking to Marsh
on the TAC 1 frequency that day, at that exact time, in
such an authoritative/supervisory way?
I will bet money that the one who is ‘urging’ them to
‘come to town a little’ faster is, in fact, OPS1 Todd Abel.
It really does sound just like his voice.
BTW: Both of the other voices in this video HAVE been
absolutely confirmed to be Eric Marsh and Brian
Frisby, by people who KNOW them ( RTS, etc. ).
#1. no one is saying, “appreciate if you could come a little faster…”
they’re saying, “come down and help us get this {whatever} a little faster…”
#2. there is no reason to think that person is talking to E. Marsh… obviously shit is hitting the fan and radio traffic is chaos… (hence BR walking on [presumably] GM’s traffic)
#3. you have no frame of reference for what “help” is being asked for or for what or who it is or the full context of the sentence, etc. etc. etc.
#4. it’s not “Structure Group *core*” it’s Structure Group *Cordes* who BR is asking for…
really? you can’t even get that right?
Reply to xxfullsailxx post
on April 24, 2014 at 4:32 pm
>> xxfullsailxx said…
>> #1. no one is saying, “appreciate if you
>> could come a little faster…”
>>
>> they’re saying, “come down and help us
>> get this {whatever} a little faster…”
Disagree. ( See my transcript up above ).
Either way… even your own ‘interpretation’
doesn’t change the meaning or the intent
of the transmission. Someone ( I believe
it is OPS1 Todd Abel ) was urging
Marsh and Granite Mountain to ‘hurry’.
>> xxfullsailxx also said…
>> #2. there is no reason to think that
>> person is talking to E. Marsh…
>> obviously shit is hitting the fan and
>> radio traffic is chaos… (hence BR
>> walking on [presumably] GM’s traffic)
It’s possible… but I really, really, really
doubt it. Not in this case, at this time.
Again… even YOUR interpretation ( even it
happens to be true ) doesn’t change what is
*actually* happening. Marsh is responding to
SOMEONE who just asked him either where
Granite Mountain *really* is at 4:27 PM ( just
15 minutes before deployment ) *OR*
someone who just asked for some kind of
explanation why it’s taking them so long
to ‘get to town’.
The most important part of this still remains
WHO that SOMEONE is… how much ‘else’
did they know about this ‘mission’ GM was
on… and why the SAIR said there were no
‘verified direct communications with Marsh
or GM’ in this time period.
>> xxfullsailxx also said…
>> #3. you have no frame of reference for
>> what “help” is being asked for or for what
>> or who it is or the full context of the
>> sentence, etc. etc. etc.
See above. Even if it was a ‘walkover’
Marsh is telling SOMEONE what GM’s
status is… and providing an explanation
for someone who didn’t seem to understand
how far they had to travel and/or why they
haven’t arrived somewhere yet. There is no
other explanation for Marsh’s response to
WHOEVER he was talking to.
>> xxfullsailxx also said…
>> #4. it’s not “Structure Group *core*” it’s
>> Structure Group *Cordes* who BR is
>> asking for…
>> really? you can’t even get that right?
Listen to the video again ( or get someone
with better ears to help you out ).
Frisby himself does appear to simply say
‘core’ instead of ‘corDES’.
I am sure that he meant ‘Cordes’… but
for accuracy I only included in my
transcript what seems to ACTUALLY
be in the captured recording.
WantsToKnowTheTruth
on April 24, 2014 at 5:51 pm said:
“See above. Even if it was a ‘walkover’
Marsh is telling SOMEONE what GM’s
status is… and providing an explanation for someone who didn’t seem to understand how far they had to travel and/or why they haven’t arrived somewhere yet. There is no other explanation for Marsh’s response to WHOEVER he was talking to.”
THAT’S your bullshit ad-libbing… again, there is no reason to think those two pieces of conversation are related. there were a hundred resources working in and around the fire on a few different tac channels. you have no evidence to substantiate any connection and MORE reason to doubt there was one…
as most of us recognize, even once GM had made it to BSR it would have taken a long time for BR to bump GM’s rigs around to them at BSR. no one was expecting them to “hurry up” anywhere. and they weren’t going to walk to Yarnell.
also, Todd Abel wasn’t even down at that end of the fire, right? Musser was dealing with things down there because Abel was busy on the north end… why would Abel be asking GM to “hurry up” to get to an area he had no idea what was going on in?
the fact is, your ad-libbing always seems to point in the same direction… in support of some nefarious, unidentifiable person who is ordering GM off the hill. i think this fact is more telling about you than the Yarnell Hill tragedy.
Reply to xxfullsailxx post
on April 26, 2014 at 8:40 am
“See above. Even if it was a ‘walkover’
Marsh is telling SOMEONE what GM’s
status is… and providing an explanation for someone who didn’t seem to understand how far they had to travel and/or why they haven’t arrived somewhere yet. There is no other explanation for Marsh’s response to WHOEVER he was talking to.”
>> xxfullsailxx wrote…
>>
>> WTKTT said…
>> Marsh is telling SOMEONE
>> what GM’s status is…
>>
>> xxfullsailxx said…
>> THAT’S your bullshit
>> ad-libbing… again.
You are deluding yourself.
It *is* Marsh speaking (verified).
He is telling SOMEONE ( who obviously wanted to know ) what is happening with Granite Mountain circa 4:27 PM, just 15 minutes before deployment.
It is a RESPONSE to SOMEONE and a continuation/end of an existing ‘conversation’ with SOMEONE.
Who do YOU think that
SOMEONE was?
>> xxfullsailxx also said…
>> there is no reason to think
>> those two pieces of
>> conversation are related.
Again… more self delusion
on your part. There is EVERY
*reason* in the world to think
that they ARE… give the time,
the context, and the circumstances.
It is POSSIBLE that Marsh’s
response is not directly
related to the person talking
at the start of the capture… but
the chances are very, very,
slim, in this case.
>> xxfullsailxx also said…
>> you have no evidence to
>> substantiate connection
Yes. I (we) do.
It’s an actual captured
recording… and the LOGICAL
explanation is that caller 2
was finishing his conversation
with caller 1.
YOU are the one who is
‘groping’ for reasons to
NOT believe it.
>> and MORE reason to
>> doubt there was one…
No, I don’t ( have MORE
reasons to doubt the 2
captures are related than
to accept that they ARE ).
See above.
YOU are the one peddling
‘doubt’… because… well…
that’s what YOU do because
you don’t even want any of
this examination of the
evidence to even be taking
place.
>> xxfullsailxx said
>> no one was expecting them
>> to “hurry up” anywhere.
Disagree.
I ( me, personally ) think the
YARNELL-GAMBLE video is
just one piece of positive
proof that someone WAS
doing EXACTLY THAT.
Your mileage may vary.
>> xxfullsailxx also said…
>> also, Todd Abel wasn’t
>> even down at that end of
>> the fire, right?
At 4:27… YES… he most
probably WAS… and this would
be further explanation why
he WAS making that radio
call we hear in the video.
It is perfectly possible that
Able HAD just actually
‘arrived’ in Yarnell… now seeing
the situation for himself… and
THAT is EXACTLY why he was
on the radio urging GM to
‘hurry’.
Todd Able WAS ‘busy on the
north end’ circa 1542 ( almost an hour earlier ) when Musser
made his ‘availability check’ radio call ( on Abel’s behalf? ),
but even by 4:10 PM things were ‘under control’ on the north end because of the complete wind reversal and
Able was then ‘free’ to get
down to Yarnell.
See the Air Study video
capture circa 4:10 PM when
Todd Abel is clearly heard
saying he will be ‘down there’
in about 5 minutes ( 4:15 ).
>> Musser was dealing with
>> things down there because
>> Abel was busy on the north
>> end.
See above. You are wrong.
You are thinking of a time
circa 1542… at least 45
minutes BEFORE the
YARNELL-GAMBLE video.
>> xxfullsailxx said
>> why would Abel be asking
>> GM to “hurry up” to get to
>> an area he had no idea
>> what was going on in?
See above.
Because it is *MORE* than
likely he *WAS* now ‘in that
area’ and *DID* have an
exact picture of what was
*going on*.
If that is the case… then it is
even *MORE* reason to
believe that *IS* Todd Abel
on the radio telling Marsh he
would ‘appreciate it if you
could get to town a little faster’.
all horseshit… but good luck proving your conspiracy theories!
i think you just figure if you say it enough times it will magically become true…
Reply to xxfullsailxx post on April 26, 2014 at 3:58 pm
>> xxfullsailxx
>> said…
>> all
>> horseshit…
>> but good
>> luck proving
>> your
>> conspiracy >> theories!
Nice try up
above, BTW.
>> i think you
>> just figure if
>> you say it
>> enough
>> times it will
>> magically
>> become
>> true…
Yes.. that is
what YOU would
‘figure’.
So what are we doing looking for the why GM-Marsh-Steed violated the 10 and 18? We can identify those that they did violate+ or – some, not the why unless some one heard something or advised something we currently have no proof of
As with this fire no survivors causes a lot of guessing. The $100.00 question is dose any one know what and why the decisions were made. I will tell you that as a Hot Shot we would always protect our crew as I believe McDonough will always do no matter what he knows no one else will ever here it from him…
Just my thoughts if they were my brothers, my crew and I am the only one that knows what ever. IT IS WHAT IT IS….
Reply to Bob Powers post on April 22, 2014 at 4:31 pm
>> Mr. Powers wrote…
>> The $100.00 question is does any one know what and why the
>> decisions were made.
Remains to be seen. All the evidence is (still) actually pointing to
the good chance that there are *more* than just a few people still
alive who know a LOT more about those very questions and
what the answers might be ( and I’m not talking about just
people who were actually in Yarnell that weekend ).
>> Mr. Powers also wrote…
>> I will tell you that as a Hot Shot we would always protect our
>> crew as I believe McDonough will always do no matter what
>> he knows no one else will ever hear it from him.
Even if it means some of his ‘other’ fire brothers could be
at risk ( even THIS fire season ) of dying?
So how far does this ‘fire brother’ thing go?
It is only your OWN crew that you are supposed to worry about
or be ‘loyal’ to? The hell with everyone else?
Is it REALLY that ‘tribal’?
We DO NOT KNOW if McDonough knows anything at all other
than what he has already talked about either in interviews or in
public.
For all we know… Brendan might have ‘missed’ one of the
first ‘discussing their options’ conversations while he was
standing on the gunwale of the GM Supervisor Truck at
1549 and was taking those pictures across the roof… or
even missed the ‘second’ or ‘third’ ( or however many iterations
there were on the same topic ) because of similar distractions.
Regardless… what hasn’t seem to fully sunk in to Mr. McDonough
himself is that ALL of the ‘official reports SAY ( unequivocally )
that he DID ‘hear them discussing their options’.
It’s a PUBLISHED fact.
So either it is TRUE… or it’s not.
Mr. McDonough has had every opportunity to DENY that claim
that appears in (all) the official reports… and to say that they are
‘mistaken’… but ( AFAIK ) he has declined every opportunity
to do that.
So if Mr. McDonough himself is willing to let ‘official’ reports
claim he knows things he’s not talking about… and is willing
to let THOSE statements stand… then he’s got a hard road
ahead of him.
Forget (for a moment) about the adults who have suffered great
loss and really do want to know all they can about ‘what happened’…
There are (many) CHILDREN of these dead men who are going
to grow up and STILL want to know what he knows ( if anything )
and they will be ASKING him every chance they get… for the
rest of HIS life.
Mr. Powers… you learned a lot about what really happened to
YOUR father from a well-written book… but what if that book
never had (complete) answers BUT you also knew ( from official
reports ) that someone who was THERE that day freely admitted
to ‘knowing more’ but simply ‘didn’t want to talk about it’?
How would you feel about that?
Would YOU still have wanted to know what he knows
and ‘fill in some truths’ about why YOUR father died?
I sure would.
Bottom line: If Mr. McDonough really doesn’t know anything or
didn’t HEAR anything other than what he has already told
investigators… and they were badly MISTAKEN to publish the
(unequivocal) statement that he DID ‘hear them discussing their
options with regards to leaving the safe black’…
…then I wish ( for his own’s sake ) he would issue a press
release to that effect, and just get it over with.
If he CANNOT issue a ‘press release’ to that effect because he
thinks that would be lying ( because he knows the statements in
ALL the official reports IS actually TRUE )… then I also wish he
would just find a way (somehow) to tell what he knows and be
‘done with it’ that (alternative) way.
I really worry about this ‘haunting’ him for the rest of his life…
unless he exercises one of the two options mentioned above.
There’s no need for it ( to haunt him ).
But perhaps he really is still just too young to realize that.
First there was no cover-up of the Rattle Snake fire because there were 9 survivors all pickup fire fighters.
only a brotherhood in the science they were from the same church camp. The fire that caught them was a back fire that got caught in a down canyon wind which was local and actually blows every night during the summer. Not hard to figure out what happened. 9 survived 15 died, In 1953 no portable radios, no fire shelters, no 10 &13, The only escape route was back up the trail they cut to the spot fire, which was the way the head of the fire was coming. Easy to figure what happened.
A Hot Shot Crew is a brother hood not just a crew. Would what McDonough says make any difference? Only in their discussion the decisions that violated Rules are easy to see. They were the responsible party any outside influence should never have dictated there safety. I dought that McDonough actually knows why they made the decision they did or if it was safe or not. His Bosses made the decision he believes they were right, in his mind he will never say they were wrong or make them look bad at least not for along time. I can say with out dought this years training will discuss the facts the 10 and 18 and move on. All the training facts are there the rest is a curiosity to know WHY. Am I wrong?
For McDonough himself, given what he’s been through he shouldn’t be expected to be able to say a whole lot, anyway. Not just a traumatic event, but then all sorts of inevitable social pressure afterwards. And, then the new job that I am sure may in some ways be viewed as a good thing now, but quickly can become isolating and lock him in to an identity with this one event as opposed to getting him back in the saddle, or in another vocation altogether. Basically I don’t think the PC response of creating an identity around these things serves anyone well.
Reply to SR on April 23, 2014 at 7:07 am
>> SR
>>
>> For McDonough himself, given what he’s
>> been through he shouldn’t be expected to
>> be able to say a whole lot, anyway.
Something tells me you haven’t read the
transcript for McDonough’s SECOND
interview with the ADOSH investigators.
They basically ‘recalled’ him for some
specific ‘followup’ questions… and they
actually played the MacKenzie video(s)
in his presence and asked him to ‘identify’
the voices. ( Oddly enough, though, even
in that second interview, they still NEVER
asked what ‘else’ he might have heard ).
McDonough’s ‘attitude’ during this second
ADOSH interview was COMPLETELY
different than his first ADOSH interview.
All of a sudden… he’s a motor-mouth.
He actually launches into his OWN
(usolicited) ‘evaluations’ of what happened
that day but places the emphasis on
‘change for the future’ towards tech stuff
like ‘linking GPS units’ together and having
fire command be able to SEE where
people are at all times, and whatnot.
That’s when McDonough goes into great
detail about Granite Mountain having at
least FOUR handheld GPS units with
them that day… but complaining that
while you could exchange coordinates
with ‘each other’… that somehow fire
command still doesn’t know where
anyone is in real time.
NOTE: Not even the Garmin Oregon 450
GPS that we can see on Caldwell’s pack
strap, and (possibly) lying face-down
right there in the dirt in the YCSO site
photos was ever actually ‘found’ or
entered the official evidence chain…
much less the other THREE that
McDonough says were ‘onboard’ that day.
Even Eric Marsh had a ‘GPS rating’ and
had taken special ‘GPS classes’… according
to his personnel file… so it seems highly
likely that even Eric Marsh had one of the
FOUR GPS unit that McDonough is now
talking about with HIM that day.
I digress…
You really should read that SECOND
ADOSH interview with Brendan McDonough.
He even talks about what a ‘good place’
he was in and didn’t seem reluctant to talk
about any aspect of the incident for that
SECOND interview. He even said to
the investigators… “Someone needs to
hear this stuff”.
Problem is… even with his willingness to
talk for the SECOND interview… no one
even ASKED him any important/lingering
questions.
WTKTT,
I think the point is, whatever his memories and recollections are now, they may well be very different from what they were the day after the event. We are all susceptible to this, even for events that aren’t highly stressful and emotional. Even beliefs that he may hold very strongly, like GPS somehow being important, may not hold up at all when looked at. (Re: GPS, leaving to one side the shortcomings and strengths of GPS vs. telemetry, simply use of the radio by Marsh and Steed could have let people know exactly their route and exactly their intentions, had there been a desire to keep people in the loop — and within the crew, they all knew where each other were — so why even mention GPS? A: Because someone else got his ear and told him it was important — perfectly natural, anyone in his situation would experience much the same.) So, by this point, he shouldn’t be expected to say much and, to the extent he does add more info, you have to assume that it may have been hugely influenced by events and pressures that occurred after the day of the fire.
Re: GPS, or of course maybe he researched and himself concluded it was important — only issue being GPS wasn’t needed that day.
I am not going to ‘discount’ Brendan’s comments in his second interview about the WFF industry thinking harder about coming into the ’21st century’. I think everything Brendan was suggesting be ‘done’ are valid points.
But if you actually LISTEN to the audio of that entire interview, I think it’s possible that what Brendan was really trying to say there was that regardless of whether Marsh and Steed were practicing some kind of ‘planned obtuseness’ with their BK radio communications… Brendan seems to be holding onto the thought that if fire command had simply been able to AUTOMATICALLY know exactly where they were… then maybe the Air resources COULD have dumped on them in time to save them.
He actually might not be wrong about that.
It MIGHT have been possible… if the following two things had been true…
1) They didn’t waste 2 minutes and 20 seconds even realzing the first radio call from Steed was an actual MAYDAY call and an actual EMERGENCY.
2) Air Attack had known EXACTLY where they were ( or could glance at a screen on-demand and know instantly ) and then Kevin in the VLAT could have just followed him right to that exact spot.
Maybe someday in the future… something like the scenario(s) Brendan is talking about in his interview WILL be possible.
The technology to do exactly what Brendan was ‘imagineering’ inn his ADOSH interview already exists, and can be accomplished RIGHT NOW even with FREE public domain software.
The only thing preventing it is cooperation and the establishment of the correct standards and adoption of the correct protocols.
Mr. Powers. Thanks for the thoughtful reply.
You are right… your own situation/experience with
this sort of thing ( while different circumstances )
seems to indicate that even if the ‘example’ I was
making was true ( 1 survivor who didn’t want to
talk about it )… the actual ‘factual’ evidence pretty
much explained what happened, once known.
Yarnell is pretty much the same.
We DO ‘know what happened’.
We really do.
Just look at all the evidence that has emerged
and it really is pretty clear what happened.
So to answer your question about ‘would anything
McDonough still knows make any difference?’…
I think we all know the answer there.
Probably not. It would (most likely) only CONFIRM
what is already known. They *decided* to disregard
the rules of engagement in favor of ‘the mission’,
and as far as ‘training takeways’ goes… well…
what else needs to be said?
The rules are there for a reason.
Break the rules… and you can (easily) DIE.
>> Mr. Powers also wrote…
>> I doubt that McDonough actually knows why
>> they made the decision they did
You might be exactly right.
For all we know… even though ALL the officially
published reports seem to CONFIRM that he
did overhear them ‘discussing their options’… the
actual conversation on the RADIO ( which is all
McDonough had any chance of hearing ) might
have been just as ‘obtuse’ as pretty much all
the other radio conversations we can now hear.
McDonough might have ONLY heard scant ‘pieces’
of the ‘why’ part or the actual ‘decision making’.
We simply don’t know ( what he did or didn’t hear ).
What bothers me ( and the point I was simply
trying to make above ) is that Mr. McDonough
seems content to let those statements in
ALL the published report about him DEFINITELY
hearing them ‘discussing their options’ stand, with
no rebuttal ( if the statements are wrong ) or
clarification ( if the statements are correct ).
That just leaves a significant ‘mystery’ hanging
out there that might follow him around for the
rest of his life… with a lot of people still/always
wanting to ‘know what he knows’…
…and there is NO NEED for that.
My only real thought here is simple if you think about it.
He dose not want to say something that might hurt one of his (Brothers) family members by assigning some kind of guilt to one of his Bosses. If that makes him happy and content with that choice then he will stay in that realm so to speak. Dose that make science?
Another thought on brotherhood protection.
My Steap dad was on the fire that my dad died on he was on an Engine. He never told me or any one else that my dad had made a mistake by not putting a lookout at the top of the trail to let the crew know if the fire started there way. My dad was his friend and they worked together. It is hard to admit that a friend made a mistake or even tell your friends son that happened after he became my father and even after I went to work for the Forest Service. McDonough will only talk if he choses to, I think he is OK with were he is at.
>> Mr. Powers wrote…
>> McDonough will only talk
>> if he choses to.
OR… if he is called to testify.
He can’t take the 5th on this.
I think he should just ‘chose’
to say what he knows… OR
( at the very least ) issue a
press statement that rebuts
what all the official PUBLIC
reports are saying about him.
That he ‘knows more than he
will say’. If that really isn’t
true then it was totally
irresponsible ( and unfair to
Brendan ) for the Arizona
Forestry department to EVER
make those statements they
did about him ‘hearing them
discussing their options’.
If Brendan simply has ‘more
of the story’ from that day,
I think he should just
CHOOSE to talk about it…
and I don’t just mean about
the ‘their decision to leave the
black’, either.
For all we know… if Brian
Frisby hadn’t either suggested
( or demanded ) there be
a ‘lookout’ in place up there
that day… Brendan would
have simply DIED right along
with the rest of them.
That’s a ‘part of the story’
that hasn’t been told yet, either.
Is that what happened?
Did Brian Frisby himself
pretty much save Brendan’s
life TWICE that day?
Yes… it makes sense in the context
of the immediate aftermath of such
a horrific event ( and the grieving
process that follows )…
…but even at the press conference
when the SAIR was first released it
was perfectly obvious that a LOT of
‘family members’ just want to know
the TRUTH ( ALL of it ).
They had had a chance to read
the SAIR report BEFORE the press
conference.
A lot of them were ANGRY that
it was such a namby-pamby report
about the incident that took their
loved ones away from them…
and said so. LOUDLY.
In the ‘wrongful death’ lawsuits… it
is CLEAR that what is MOST
IMPORTANT to these family members
is knowing as much as possible
about what happened that day so at
least they can be sure the WFF
industry is RESPONDING to this
historic event and at least TRYING
to make sure it doesn’t happen
again… as much as possible.
So for Brendan to still believe that he
is ‘protecting the families’ ( if that’s
what he thinks he’s doing ) just
means he really, really hasn’t
been paying attention.
The families have spoken.
They WANT to know as much as
possible about what happened that
day ( and still intend to FIND OUT ).
Brendan has maintained ( at all times )
that it was just an ‘accident’… that
‘no one did anything wrong’… yet
he has also maintained ( at all times )
that there are some things about
what happened that day that he will
not talk about.
He simply doesn’t realize that those
two ‘stances’ are incompatible, and
just further the sense of ‘mystery’
surrounding this incident.
If he really, truly believes it was just
an ‘accident’… then there should be
NOTHING that he is ‘reluctant’ to
talk about.
WTKTT
I just do not think you understand. so I will leave it here.
Yes, Mr. Powers.
I do understand.
He thinks he’s helping..
just like your step-dad
thought HE was (helping).
I just wish he (Brendan)
would realize that he
*might* be mistaken
about what ‘helping’
really means.
The families want
to know. They have
said so. They are
ready to hear the
TRUTH, as much
as it can be known.
Its not about helping its about love.
That too.
That’s what
makes the
families
of those
men who
were lost
too soon
want to
KNOW.
Subjective motivation is always hard to assess accurately, anyway. Even self-reported motivations can be very unreliable, for obvious reasons in some cases, but also because we’re not good at perceiving things. We know that, at YHF, there was a pattern even that day of being a bit fast and loose with the 10 and 18. This was on display before GM ever dropped off the 2-track.
Particularly for emotionally highly charged events, even discussing subjective motivations can be problematic. But, whatever the motivations, we do know that persistently being in situations where the 10 aren’t taken seriously and lots of Watch Outs are present is not a good practice. You can look at the 10 and 18 applied to the lookout, and stop the clock there, and say, whatever the motivation or even simple lack of attention, not best practice.
Likewise for a culture of secrecy about something like crew movements. Whatever the motivations for not wanting someone to discuss those, it is not a healthy thing.
TTWARE – thanks for your comment about the weather (and thanks also to Bob Powers for explaining in more detail what he was thinking regarding the weather). I will respond to both of you hopefully later today, after I finish a project with a deadline of today. Sorry for the delay – I just want you to know that I am not ignoring you, after you took the time to respond to me.
(Yet again, rather than using my LIMITED free time to respond productively to both of you this morning, and thereby advancing this discussion (hopefully), I ended up yet again wasting TWO HOURS drafting a reply to Fire20+ who leapt on ME for things that *I* did not say (and do not believe) while he simultaneously IGNORED the fact that it was BOB and WTKTT who said the things that Fire20+ is accusing ME of saying. This utter BULLSHIT has gone on for MONTHS, and it continues to make me want to throw up my hands and walk away from these efforts, despite people like Gabbert and JD making clear my important role in these discussions. For example, does anyone ELSE remember folks accusing ME of calling Rory Collins a coward when it was actually FRED who did it? I had to WASTE my time defending myself on that, rather than doing the things that are far more valuable and unique, such as getting public records to guys like Gabbert or JD, who can then post them. Why am I not surprised that now Fire20+ has done the SAME fucking thing, in terms of accusing me of stuff that I NEVER said, such that I have to WASTE my limited time defending myself? Huge fucking pain in the ass, but the worse option, in my mind, is my leaving IM and letting conspiracy theorist WTKTT and SR and whomever remain here unchecked, such that people actually BELIEVE all of the things that WTKTT says and states (incorrectly) as fact. I suppose that now that xxfullsailxx is back, there will be less unchecked, inaccurate rambling, but, at some point, xxfullsailxx has to leave IM and go start…fighting fires. He, unlike Fire20+ and Bob Powers and Fred and others, is presumably STILL working forty-plus-hour weeks on the fire front lines (presumably like WFF, who also seems to now be on here less and less, presumably in anticipation of the start of fire season in a week or so).)
Looks like Fire20+, with his reasonable and informed post, got someone riled up. He didn’t feel the need to drop F-bombs or to play the victim, though.
EN wrote:
“Fire20+ who leapt on ME for things that *I* did not say (and do not believe) while he simultaneously IGNORED the fact that it was BOB and WTKTT who said the things that Fire20+ is accusing ME of saying. This utter BULLSHIT has gone on for MONTHS, and it continues…”
—OK, so you were quoting somebody else, why not just quote them then? Folks would then understand the idiotic words you (you statements are appropriate here) DID put in that list weren’t yours, which raises another question. Why would you put things on a blog entry that appears to be coming out of your mouth then when your ‘jumped on’ you just can’t handle it and blame other people?—
“I had to WASTE my time defending myself on that, rather than doing the things that are far more valuable and unique, such as getting public records to guys like Gabbert or JD, who can then post them. Why am I not surprised that now Fire20+ has done the SAME fucking thing, in terms of accusing me of stuff that I NEVER said…”
—Don’t waste your time on my account, stop writing what you didn’t say or know about then you wouldn’t have to defend yourself Elizabeth and work yourself into a tissy. As far as what you say about ‘getting public records to guys…’ well, there you go again. ANYBODY can get public records by doing a records request, it is not special or generous or important, it is something ANYONE can do. You behave as if your “role” is exclusive and proprietary, your generous public service efforts, your selfless generosity to “give” this information to JD and Gabbert. They could have clearly gotten it themselves or gotten it from any other number of people who have the records also. I sure hope nobody has pointed this out to you before me, I’d hate to upset you.—
Oh, one more thing, I’m curious how the families like seeing F-bombs all over the place accompanied by victimized, crazy talk? Do you care about that at all? I cuss like a logger, but not here.
**
** THE JERRY THOMPSON PHOTOS / VIDEOS
Not a lot has been said about these.
They were all taken by Jerry Thompson, who was working with a Structure
Protection Group under SPGS1 Gary Cordes on Sunday, June 30, 2013.
That ‘crew’ was working right there in Yarnell, about 1/2 to 3/4 mile due
south of the Shrine Youth Camp, to the west of Yarnell where some ‘outlying’
homes were. As one of the videos proves… they were close enough to
the Shrine Youth Camp to actually capture the siren going off on Tyson
Esquibel’s lead engine that was parked there as he was using it to ‘recall’
the fellas working in Harper Canyon.
This is the SAME SIREN heard in the YARNELL-GAMBLE video.
There are actually FOUR videos in this folder… and some of them have
some pretty interesting ‘background radio’ traffic.
Those Jerry Thompson photos/videos are publicly available HERE…
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/zghqmidyjqbgp1e/7tts4WSLQ1#/
* IMG_1101 – 1524 – 3:24 PM
A pretty interesting ‘background radio’ exchange captured in this
one right at the start. There is little doubt that this is OPS1 Todd Abel
talking to OPS2 Paul Musser at exactly 1524 ( 3:24 PM ).
(OPS1 Todd Abel): I think they’ll probly be a mess in or out.
(OPS2 Paul Musser): What can I tell ’em, then?
NOTE: I have no idea what that exchange means. Any guesses?
* IMG_1134 – 1630 – 4:30 PM
This is the one that captures the siren going off on Tyson Esquibel’s
lead engine as he was using it to ‘recall’ his crew from down in the
Harper Canyon west of the Shrine Youth Camp.
Jerry Thompson’s crew was close enough to they Shrine area to
capture this siren clearly. It is a ‘steady’ tone with no Doppler effect
so that means it was, in fact, a siren being sounded on a stationary
vehicle over at the Shrine Youth Camp.
It is the SAME SIREN being heard in the background of Blue Ridge
Hotshot McCord’s YARNELL-GAMBLE video which contains the
background capture of someone in fire command ( Musser?,
Abel?, Cordes? ) speaking directly to Eric Marsh and saying
they would ‘appreciate it if they could get to town a little faster’
and Eric Marsh responding “They’re comin’ from the heel of the fire”.
This might help narrow down ( even further ) the exact time of that
YARNELL-GAMBLE video since that still hasn’t been exactly determined.
We already KNOW it was no earlier than about 4:20 and no later than 4:32 PM.
* IMG_1136 – Also 1530 4:30 ( plus 45 seconds ).
Taken right after the previous one… but the siren has STOPPED, which
helps to even further narrow down the time for the YARNELL-GAMBLE video.
This one has another interesting radio capture that also appears to
be OPS1 Todd Able ( with little doubt ).
(OPS1 Todd Abel): Ah… down in Yarnell… ah… it should be pushin’ hard
right now into Yarnell… and south of Yarnell.
It is not known who OPS1 Todd Abel is talking to at that point.
This video ends with a firefighter in the foreground saying pretty excitedly…
“We got a LOTTA ASH!… It’s comin’ RIGHT AT US!… We gotta…”
The video cuts off his last few words.
Even MORE firefighters that almost waited too long that day to evacuate
and almost got ‘caught’?
I would like to hear your thoughts on the Tom Story photos.
Which ones?
Any, of course. But definitely the ones from the Ranch House. And his statement that he had left the Ranch House before he heard of deployment. I had always assumed that he was aware of the circumstances when he took the photos. I remember Tom Story commented over at Wildfire Today many months ago.
I haven’t compared them against the Russ Reason video yet. But it appears (to me) that the McCord photo 106 was taken before the Tom Story 1677. photo. Also, The McCord photo 106 seems to show some clear sky in the southern (or left) part of the pic. I mention that as it could relate to the mysterious quote by Marsh saying “that is exactly where we want the retardant”. Meaning, the sky looks more clear in this photo than in ones taken later by Tom Story.
calvin… I hear you.
If you were asking for my *general* opinion
of the Tom Story photos I would say that
I actually *do* have some similar concerns
about the TIMESTAMPS.
It is almost inconceivable that a professional
reporter/photographer might not have the
TIME set exactly correctly on his cameras
and/or devices… but I am still scratching
my head about the TIMESTAMPS on
some of his photos.
Example: He has a full sequence of pictures
of an extensive DC10 VLAT drop right there
down around Yarnell. ALL of the these photos
seem to have a timestamp of 1639.
Yet… NOWHERE in any of the Air Study
videos ( especially the USDA folder ones
that ONLY capture the actual Air to Air
conversations ) is there ANY radio traffic
that would support that this VLAT drop was
taking place at THAT exact time ( 1639 ).
1639 is the minute Steed’s first MAYDAY
supposedly took place as well… and here
is this DC10 VLAT (supposedly) dropping
TONS of retardant right near Yarnell at
the same moment Steed is sending his
MAYDAY.
Something just isn’t quite right about all
that… and I have to suspect that however
improbable it might seem… this professional
photographer did NOT have the TIME
set correctly on one ( or more ) of his
digital cameras.
More later.
Well. I just picked my way thru Tom’s photos. At first I wrote, up above, that I never trust camera time stamps becuz most ppl don’t need to pay attention to them.
But Tom was using three cameras that day, switching back and forth depending on which lens he needed. So that would lead me to think he probably must have had to sync them, thus at least vaguely getting them accurate. So the 3:49 photos are mystifying.
I think his photos at the Ranch House Parking Lot seem about right, though. They would definitely have been later than McCord’s. I think McCord jumped out of the Blue Ridge Buggy and started shooting relatively immediately. Tom’s photos start with the Blue Ridge ATV near the trucks, and then the ATV vanishes, and I think that happening around 5 seems reasonable. And, yes, the fire has gotten much closer by then as the parking lot, itself would eventually no longer be considered a “safe zone.”
So I’m stumped. It would be helpful if there was a timed list of the VLAT drops, for sure.
**
** DID OPS1 TODD ABEL REALLY SAY “HUNKER AND BE SAFE”?
>> On April 18, 2014 at 4:47 pm, Elizabeth said:
>>
>> 6. Just because the SAIT claims that somebody said
>> something does NOT actually mean that the things at issue
>> were actually said. For example, do I believe that the Blue Ridge
>> guys said exactly some of the things that the SAIT claims they
>> said? Nope. Abel did not recall saying “hunker,” presumably b/c
>> he never SAID “hunker,” even though the SAIT said he said “hunker.”
>> Do I think Marsh said the winds were “squirrely”? Well, I wouldn’t
>> bet my first child on it.
This is just another response to one more ‘point’ from Elizabeth’s recent
bullet-list of what she chose to call ‘clarifications’.
Since she keeps obsessing about the Todd Abel ‘hunker’ quote and seems to
keep asking us all not to believe our OWN EARS…
…I thought I’d do just (hopefully) one more ’round up’ on this.
Every time she brings this up… I have asked Elizabeth to please supply an
‘alternative word’ ( other than the word ‘hunker’ ) for that sentence clearly heard
in the Caldwell video… but there’s never an answer.
* The Robert Caldwell VIDEO…
First and foremost… here is the radio traffic that is CLEARLY heard in the
Robert Caldwell video…
__________________________________________________________________
Eric Marsh (DIVS A): Yea… I’m tryin’ to work my way off the top.
Todd Abel ( OPS1 ): Okay… I copy… ah… just keep me updated…
ah… ya know… you guys hunker and be safe and then… ah…
we’ll get some air support down there ASAP.
_________________________________________________________________
And ( once again ) here is the ’roundup’ on how that clear conversation went through the investigation process and ended up in PUBLISHED report(s)…
* The Arizona Forestry SAIT investigators heard ‘hunker’ and
* were sure enough about it to PUBLISH it in their official report…
From the OFFICIAL SAIR Document – Page 22
OPS1 is listening on the radio to make sure everyone received the most recent
weather announcement. At about 1550, he radios DIVS A directly to ask if he got
the weather update and if he is “in a good spot.” DIVS A affirms that he received
the update, and he tells OPS1 the winds are starting to get “squirrely” up on the
ridge. He says he is working his way off the top and OPS1 closes by advising
DIVS A to hunker and be safe.
* Lead SAIT investigator Jim Karels is sure he heard ‘hunker’…
Page 1 of the SAIT Yarnell Investigation Notes (YIN)
Interview with OPS1 Todd Abel by Jim Karels (alone) on 8/14/13
NOTE: OPS1 Todd Abel told the SAIT investigator Jim Karels that he doesn’t
recall this ENTIRE conversation with Marsh… much less any particular words
or sentences he might have used like ‘hunker and be safe’. That is really still
hard to believe… but Jim Karels had already heard the Caldwell video prior to
the interview and he was SURE that he had heard Abel tell Marsh to “hunker”.
Karels made a note to himself to be sure and ask Abel about it during the
interview… and he did. We see both Karels’ ‘note to himself’ AND a note
about Abel’s response in the investigation document(s)…
– (Ask Abel about) the ~1555 radio conversation that we have on the
(Caldwell) video, (which includes the phrase okay, you hunker down in
the black) – Abel did not recal having this conversation with marsh.
* OPS1 Todd Able uses the same ‘hunkered’ word in his ADOSH interview…
Oddly enough… even though OPS1 Todd Abel told Lead SAIT investigator Jim
Karels that he ‘doesn’t recall’ any/all of his conversation with Marsh captured by
the Caldwell video… all of a sudden he ( Abel ) seems to be recalling it pretty
well in his ADOSH interview. He gets the TIME right… recalls Eric’s ‘squirrely
winds’ statement… and while the ADOSH investigators do not specifically even
ask Abel about the Caldwell video ( even though they knew it existed )… Abel
even uses the same word ‘hunkered’ while talking to THEM and describing that
conversation with Marsh…
Page 43 of OPS1 Todd Abel’s ADOSH interview…
Q1 = Dave Larsen ( Rest in Peace )
A = OPS1 Todd Abel
__________________________________________________________________
Q1: 3:45. This all was about in the same timeframe of wind shifts, the
conversation with Eric. He was the first one to feel those squirrely winds
start, right?
A: Yeah.
Q1: And he’s talking to you about he’s got wind issues?
A: Mm-hm.
Q1: Let me ask you this, you say you’re nervous, um, because of this…
A: This cell building over here.
Q1: …this cell – what does that mean to you?
A: That means outflows, possible lightning strikes, all that stuff.
Q1: Okay.
A: So that’s why I wanted to make sure that he had eyes on it to make sure he
watches that thing and make sure that if it’s getting too – if he gets to really
start feeling those winds changing and everything that they can get hunkered
in that black – that 250 acres of safety zone there.
Q1: Mm-hm.
A: And – and stay out of harm’s way. You know they could even drop down off
the ridge for lightning purposes if they had to.
Q1: Sure.
A: Was my thought process.
_________________________________________________________________
So Abel proves ( all on his own during the interview ) that he is someone who
DOES use the words ‘hunker’ and ‘hunkered’ as part of his usual/regular
vocabulary.
So for anyone to really doubt that OPS1 Todd Abel was NOT captured saying
“hunker and be safe” to Eric Marsh in the Caldwell video… the only real
question would be…
What OTHER word is being said?
Just because you might think he didn’t actually use the word ‘hunker’ to start
that one sentence doesn’t mean the sentence itself doesn’t exist.
So for anyone who does NOT think the first word of that sentence is ‘hunker’
( from a man known to use that word freely )…then please ‘fill in the blank’ below.
What OTHER word could possibly be used that would match the full CONTEXT
of this conversation and would start a sentence/statement that is KNOWN
to be this…
“_______ and be safe.”
Remember… it has to at least SOUND like ‘hunker’… because this entire
statement ( and context ) IS, in fact, captured in the video.
Amen WTKTT. I hope EN answers you because I am curious. She hasn’t answered me either about her doubts of the use ‘hunker’ in WFF. I can tell you WTKTT, we use this word on the regular to describe taking shelter, getting down off a ridge, literally sitting on your butts and watching Wx, fire behavior, etc. from a safe spot.
WTKTT, you think maybe Able read the SAIT report before his interview with ADOSH and just filled in the blanks in his ‘memory’? I do. The thing is, when your fighting fire they weren’t thinking ‘oh, maybe I’m being recorded’…It was perhaps after the audio/video recordings came out when some OH started worrying about statements they had previously made.
Also, just a point, Dave Larsen (RIP) uses the word squirrely and he was a T1IC, and it didn’t throw him off. Squirrely is as common a description for Wx as unstable is for FF’s on the ground.
WTKTT– You also have statements here of 2 very clear things.
1. there was a forecast on winds and a concern that they were going to get worse and the statement of squarely winds.
2. the discussion of a cell at around 1545. the fact that they had 250 plus acres of black SZ and they could hunker there and incase of lighting drop off the ridge in to safe areas.
No mention by Todd Able of going down to the bomb proof SZ.
so every thing we have been discussing is simply stated here, with or with out any pictures of support which we also Identified yesterday and which I am sure there are more.
Why is there a question about the cell and winds? Before 1600 Ops Able was concerned about the cells affect on the winds.
Why was marsh then not concerned about the same thing?
Did Marsh see something that no one else saw?
Did Marsh decide to do something that no one else thought he would do?
Your above Able interview says a lot the fire was in fact being influenced buy a cell with winds and OPS was concerned about the 1 crew on the mountain. Marsh ignored that warning sign and move the entire crew into a brush field in front of a volatile situation and did not heed the warning signs.
I could say more but I do not wish to hurt or be insensitive to any one the decisions made were not founded on Safety.
Bob, am I correct that it is not RARE to have thunder cells in the area of an Arizona wildfire between mid-June and the end of July, and that the mere presence of these cells does not suggest that everything should stop and everyone should sit in the black until every possible thunder cell (regardless of its distance away) is gone?
I am NOT trying to defend anyone or make things up or whatever nonsense you often accuse me of. I am trying to figure out if you HONESTLY take the position that the fact that someone can see a thunder cell (even as far away as Prescott with respect to the Yarnell Hill Fire) means that everyone needs to retreat to the black immediately.
Thunder cells are common through out the west.
there are safe places to work on a fire. If Lighting moves over you then you find a safe place till it passes. Depending on the location on the fire and the wind you may continue to work or back off and sit it out. It is hard to make a general statement here. If your line is containing the fire then it might be safe to continue work. If the fire has escaped containment then a lot depends on where you are on the fire. Quitting work has a great deal to do with your safety and location, every cell that passes over a fire dose not Carry the same threats for each different fire. Complicated YES.
The Yarnell Hill Fire had escaped containment or it was not fully contained because of open line. The cell created that. Where GM was they had no place to build line because all of there line was compromised due to the fire below and to the left of their break site. so they could not continue to build line back to the fire as it would move under them and burn back up to there line. Becoming unsafe and unproductive.
To state the obvious: Elizabeth is pushing yet another “false dichotomy.” There is not necessarily a binary choice between 1) quit at the first sign of a thunderstorm, and 2) take a long, slow bushwhack with the fire getting blown towards you. It does not normalize GM’s decision to say, well, depending on conditions you may or may not keep working. There is a huge range of possibility that falls under “keeping working,” and virtually none of those possible actions have killing your whole crew as a likely outcome if the timing is just a bit off.
People don’t “do these things all the time.”
SR,
You really don’t get it. Elizabeth is not approving of or trying to justify GMs decisions, she is trying to come up with what they might have been thinking that leads them to make the critical errors that they did.
Stop spending all your effort trying to discredit her and try and really read what she is saying.
No, I do get it. She’s starting with the premise that GM acted reasonably. And floating various theories that she thinks explain why the decisions made were reasonable. Her theories may contradict each other — GM could have been scared down by lightning, or, alternatively, could have reasonably concluded in EN’s view that bushwhacking through dense fuel down into a terrain trap with the fire being blown towards you in the midst of a thunderstorm was a reasonable thing to do — because, hey, if you stop fighting fire every time there’s a thunderstorm on the horizon, you’ll stop work a lot. There is basically zero support for any of these theories, many of which show no regard for the realities of either the southwest, or wildland fire.
We have heard from RTS that, not only were others aware that GM was using unconventional tactics and sticking their necks out while doing it, but they had spoken to GM about it. And, that there had been a culture of secrecy over crew movements. So, EN is making a few logical errors when she supposes that GM had to think that what they were doing was reasonable and safe from a conventional perspective.
Maybe they did. But, maybe a crew that doesn’t want others to know where they are and what they are doing realizes that some of their tactics may be viewed as unconventional, even risky. Maybe they were well aware that they were taking a risk. The reality is that when insular groups deviate from accepted safety norms, there often is an escalating pattern of risk-taking. And often at least some of the group is aware of that fact.
EN’s approach, which takes the fact that GM thought that their actions were reasonable and prudent at the time as a given, simply assumes away many possible realities. And so is a lousy way to conduct an inquiry, unless you decided from the get-go that the answer to that inquiry will always be that all safety norms were followed, this was a reasonable and ordinary day with simply a fluke outcome.
I’m pretty sure EN never said GM acted reasonably, if I’m wrong, show me. Same could be said for “bushwhacking into a terrain trap”.
Why is it a “logical error” to suppose that GM thought what they were doing was reasonable and safe? Why the hell would they have done it? Do you think they wanted to die?
People take outsized risks all the time. There is a difference between a suicide attempt and assuming risks that carry a high likelihood over time of resulting in death. People climb rock cliffs unroped, go boating without life jackets, fill gas cans without lifting them out of truck beds, and do all sorts of things that they may be aware aren’t great ideas. When looking at an accident, it’s a real bad idea to prejudge it as “safe people, just one of those things.”
In this case, given what we have heard in terms of the possibility of prior risk-taking, it is all the less wise to start with the assumption that there was no awareness of risk.
BTW, EN did say she thought it looked reasonable to GM when they started their bushwhack. So, yeah, she’s saying she thought based on information in front of them that they acted reasonably, without seeing undue risk. Or, alternatively, that a reasonable person would have seen undue risk, but GM didn’t and simply not competent to see those risks. But, somehow I don’t think that 2d idea is the one EN is trying to plant the seeds of when she say they thought it was reasonable to drop down.
So you say that GM stood there ready to drop into the bowl and said” this is not reasonable but lets go”
I disagree, I think they said” their is some risk, but I think its reasonable lets go”.
I think EN agrees with me and she is trying to put together what info they had that lead them to decide this way.