Please begin a new chapter for the Yarnell Hill Fire comments here:
Previous Comments:
Chapter I, Chapter II, Chapter II supplement, Chapter III and Chapter IV.
Thank you, John
© Copyright 2014 John Dougherty, All rights Reserved. Written For: Investigative MEDIA
Joy – I did not call Elizabeth a “fool.” In fact, I did not call anyone a fool. I said I did not argue with fools. That statement implied that I thought Elizabeth’s stable of closet fire experts who are attempting to make a case that the Granite Mountain Hotshots had to leave the black and march in front of a wall of flames were fools, and I was not going to argue with them. Now, if Elizabeth wants to try on that shoe, and if it fits her, that is up to her.
The bottom line is this. Tex instinctively knew to leave the area in the right direction (there were several to choose from) at the right time (other times would have worked as well) but the Granite Mountain Hotshots under the leadership of Eric Marsh as the Division A Supervisor and Jesse Steed as the Acting Crew Boss made a calculated and conscious decision to march their crew in the direction the fire was burning, south by southeast, as it was being driven by very strong outflow winds from a thunder cell that had been predicted to appear by the National Weather Service well in advance. AFTER being strongly advised to remain where they were, SAFE and in the BLACK.
And both Eric Marsh and Jesse Steed acknowledged that they received that warning and in fact observed the weather event in progress, and they clearly observed the fire had in fact reversed direction, and was now putting up a pyro cumulous cloud of ash and smoke that rose several thousand feet in the air, which every firefighter and every other person with any common sense knows means the situation has deteriorated to the point that there is nothing any person, or any equipment invented or built by people, can do to try and control said fire.
I have long been asking the question, “Why did the Granite Mountain Hotshots die?” in an attempt to reconcile what I had heard from others about Eric Marsh with what Eric Marsh did. RTS has now answered that question based on the consensus of the most highly recognized and respected leaders in the field of hotshot crews today…and that was a group of hotshot superintendents who walked the remains of the Yarnell Hill Fire. Eric Marsh made a catastrophic mistake, and he killed himself and his crew.
Although RTS is technically correct, Jesse Steed could have overruled Eric Marsh who was acting as Division Group Supervisor, since Jesse Steed was Acting as the Granite Mountain Hotshot Crew Boss, and refused to follow him…so Jesse Steed does have some responsibility for that decision as well. BUT, I think that we all can acknowledge (or at least I can) that in the real world, Jesse Steed was obligated to follow Eric Marsh once his decision was made.
The crew also had some obligation (according to others, not me) to voice their objections to follow their leaders down such a reckless path, which was a death chute, and that path was obviously a death chute, since similar death chutes have been killing hotshots since 1966, and they have been pointed out in countless training exercises to be death chutes. But I happen to know in the real world of hotshots, that choice was not an option for the crew…so they died as hotshots. Doing exactly what their leaders ordered them to do, which by the way, works almost all of the time, in fact, that method for survival has only failed hotshots 4 times in the history of wildland firefighting, the Loop Fire of 1966 (12 El Cariso Hotshots dead, including the crew boss), the Battlement Creek Fire of 1976 (3 Mormon Lake Hotshots dead, including the crew boss, with a fourth hotshot severely burned), and the South Canyon Fire of 1994 (9 Prineville Hotshots dead)…and the Yarnell Hill Fire of 2013 (19 Granite Mountain Hotshots dead, including the crew boss).
I have reconciled what I heard about the Granite Mountain Hotshots with what Eric Marsh did, because I had heard how good Eric Marsh was from Darrell Willis and his circle of fire buddies. That assessment turned out to be exaggerated or misplaced or something else altogether, other that correct. Eric Marsh decided to break almost all of the rules that have been developed over more than 100 years of widland firefighting in American, specifically to protect wildland firefighters…all at once, and apparently without a backup plan.
So…the big question has been answered for me. There remains however, several unanswered questions which are…exactly what role did everyone else play in contributing or casual factors in the deaths of the Granite Mountain Hotshots? I’m afraid that discussion is going to outlive you, me, and everyone else who is participating in the thread. BUT…I am convinced that there are many others who are also responsible for the deaths of those 19 heroes, and most of them work for the State of Arizona, Division of Forestry, and the City of Prescott, Prescott Fire Department.
HOWEVER, I think the leadership of the both the City of Prescott of and State of Arizona should take a look in the mirror and ask themselves, “What could I have done to prevent this tragedy?”
Now…may God bless both you and Tex in all of your future hikes and endeavors together, and I want to thank both you and Tex for all of your tireless efforts to bring some clarity to what is now the worst disaster (baring the Idaho fires of 1910, which don’t really count) in the history of wildland firefighting in the United States. May you find what we are all searching for…a way to fix our broken hearts, or at least make them feel just a little bit better.
If you have any question as to if Elizabeth is a fool, read https://ams.confex.com/ams/11FIRE/webprogram/Paper273187.html and her discussion of “uber-extreme fire behavior”. Then decide
Please move comments to Chapter VI. Please provide feedback on whether it is easier to have the most recent comments posted at the top of the string or at the end. Thanks, John
I wrote this phrase down yesterday to touch on it today. It’s been bandied about a few times recently. “Speaking ill of the dead.”
We’re NOT ‘speaking ill of the dead’ but we are speaking to and addressing what they DID or DID NOT do that resulted in their deaths. THEY were the ones that made the bad decisions with the bad outcomes. No one else made those fatal decisions for them, no one held a virtual gun to their heads, there was NO Sword of Damocles hanging over their heads threatening them.
So, it’s only fair that I back off Marsh being the one totally responsible for the GMHS fatalities. Marsh was the Division Supervisor of DIV A that day and Jesee Steed was the Acting GMHS Superintendent. Therefore, Steed was fully responsible that day for the GMHS safety and welfare. Even though Marsh may have been tangentially responsible for the fatal outcomes that day, Steed was the one ultimately responsible for what happened June 30th.
Steed and Matrsh knew or should have known better to strictly follow the well established WFF Rules on June 30th.
Please Move the Comments to a new Chapter VI. Thank you, John
**
** DAVE LARSEN, ONE OF THE AUTHORS OF THE
** ADOSH WFAR REPORT, HAS DIED
Apologies if some think this is ‘off topic’ for this ongoing discussion… but if
you read all three sections below you will see that it is not.
It involves Dave Larsen, the infamous Station Fire in California, a chance
meeting and a ‘backfire’ operation between Larsen, the Helena Hotshots, and
Marsh and the Granite Mountain Hotshots on September 1, 2009, at the
infamous Station Fire.
Dave Larsen was the one who was in charge of analyzing the fire operations
and overhead performance on the Yarnell Hill Fire for the ADOSH Wildland Fire
Associates Report ( WFAR ).
The WFAR was contracted by ADOSH and was the basis for most of their own
reported findings and FINE recommendations, and was released at the same
time the ADOSH report was released.
The WFAR never got much press ( or even much attention ). It has a narrative
that reads a lot like the SAIR ( and, indeed, borrowed a lot of timeline verbatim
from the SAIR )… but it really was quite different from the SAIR.
The WFAR ( due in no small part to Mr. Dave Larsen himself ) came to its OWN
conclusions that the organizational aspects and operational performance on the
Yarnell Fire bordered on ‘chaos’ and that there was FAR too much emphasis
being placed on structure protection that day ( but not even doing that very
well or even very safely ).
Mr. Dave Larsen personally felt VERY strongly that Wildland Firefighting and
Structural Firefighting ‘cultures’ should NOT be ‘mixed’ and is quoted ( even in
his own obituary reprinted below ) as saying that he could “Never understand
risking lives to save structures”.
The last paragraph of his actual obituary ( below ) is worth reading. It is all about
how he hoped his work on the ADOSH WFAR report would someday help to
save lives.
Rest in peace… Dave Larsen.
** DAVE LARSEN’S OBITUARY
Dave Larsen’s Obituary ( with a photo of him )…
http://helenair.com/news/local/obituaries/dave-larsen/article_1ab8f7ee-96e3-11e3-89f9-001a4bcf887a.html?comment_form=true
From the Obituary…
_________________________________________________________________
Dave Larsen — the man, the myth, the legend — left us without warning
on Feb. 12, 2014. Dave was born April 6, 1952, in Omaha, Neb., to Delbert
and Frances (Hamon) Larsen. He joined his older brother, Dan, and they
spent their early years in Nebraska, Missouri and Kansas on various
Air Force bases. In 1961, his father got a job in Kalispell, where Dave
lived until moving to Helena in 1968 and graduating from Helena High
School in 1970. Dave went on to earn both a bachelor’s degree in
history and an electrical engineering degree from MSU (Go, Bobcats!).
Dave spent the majority of his career working for the U.S. Forest Service
in fire management, beginning with a job manning Hogback Lookout and,
after more 30 years, retiring as the fire management officer on the Helena
Ranger District. To say Dave’s career was amazing is an understatement.
He became nationally recognized as an expert in all aspects of fire
management. He held numerous positions over the years on incident
command teams, achieving status as one of the few and elite National
Type 1 Incident commanders. He became one of only five IC’s who were
certified in all three genres of firefighting — fire suppression, prescribed fire
and the use of fire in wilderness. (See IR article from June 12, 2009.) In
addition to the numerous fire assignments around the country, Dave also
played a support role in historical events such as Hurricane Katrina and
Columbia Shuttle Recovery efforts.
Utmost in Dave’s philosophy, however, was firefighter safety.
He could never understand risking lives to save structures.
As such, a recent accomplishment he was very proud of was his
work with Wildland Fire Associates on an investigation of the
Yarnell Hill fire in Arizona last summer where 19 firefighters perished.
Dave felt like his contributions would make a difference in keeping
lives safe in the future.
________________________________________________________________
** DAVE LARSEN – WFAR AUTHOR
Page 5 of the WFAR…
DAVE LARSEN, ANALYSIS OF FIRE OPERATIONS & OVERHEAD TEAM
Page 45 of WFAR…
DAVE LARSEN, B.S.
SENIOR CONSULTANT
Mr. Larsen is an expert in fire management and the tactical application of
resources in fire suppression. Mr. Larsen has held the positions of Incident
Commander Type I, Deputy Incident Commander Type I, Incident Commander
Type II, Prescribed Burn Boss Type I, Prescribed Fire Manager Type I, and Fire
Use Manager Type I. Mr. Larsen’s fire management experience includes work
as a fire lookout, district engine foreman and crewmember, district trail
crewmember, district brush disposal crew and a hot shot crew supervisor.
Mr. Larsen was a District Fire Management Officer as well as a Forest Fire
Management Officer for the Helena National Forest. Mr. Larsen’s expertise
includes All-Risk Incident Commander including Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
Operation Section Chief, Type II, and Fire Behavior Analyst, Type II. Additionally,
Mr. Larsen has Instructed S290, S390, S490, S339, S330, I400 and other ICS
courses.
** DAVE LARSEN, THE HELENA HOTSHOTS, THE STATION FIRE,
** AND ERIC MARSH AND GRANITE MOUNTAIN
In a strange twist of fate…
Dave Larsen’s BIO in WFAR says he was a ‘Hot Shot Supervisor’…
but it fails to mention that he was, in fact, the Superintendent of the
Helena Hotshots… who worked with Eric Marsh and the Granite Mountain
Hotshots during the ‘Station Fire’ in California in 2009.
( NOTE: The Station Fire is one of the ones mentioned by both
Elizabeth and RTS just yesterday ).
The Helena Hotshots were mostly assigned to help protect the
historic Mount Wilson Observatory during their time on the Station Fire.
There are public accounts online at the Mount Wilson Observatory itself
of the efforts that were made to protect the observatory and they
mention BOTH the “Helena Hotshots’ AND the “Granite Mountain Hotshots”.
On one particular day… the Granite Mountain Hotshots deployed from
the parking lot of the Mount Wilson Observatory itself and, together
with the Helena Hotshots, were assigned to perform ‘backfires’ near the
observatory for most of that one day they were working together.
There are no ‘revelations’ in these (public) accounts… or any ‘stories’ about
how those ‘backfiring’ operations really went… but I just thought
I would point out this connection between Dave Larsen, Superintendent
of the Helena Hotshots in 2009, Eric Marsh, Granite Mountain, and
then Dave Larsen’s ultimate participation in the very investigation
that tried to find out what really happened to Marsh and Granite
Mountain four years later on June 30, 2013.
Again… RIP Dave Larsen.
We all share your hope that one day, a FULL, complete investigation of what
really happened in Yarnell on June 30, 2013, will help save lives in the future.
Thanks
It sounds to me like Dave Larsen had it all figured out and was right about everything. What a loss to the world of wildland firefighters.
Thanks
I am trying to figure out what’s going on here I knew Larsen He was a Fire management officer and type 1 IC in 2009 not a Superintendent. But still would have been a supervisor on that fire in some capacity, and had both crews under him.
Bob,
You’re correct. According to the Helena HS webpage, Larsen was their Superintendent (Crew Boss in those days) from 1983 through 1988.
Getting old and lazy about looking things up but knew he had promoted before I retired in 94.
WTKTT – Thank you for the detailed post.
I only new Dave for a short time but during that time I learned that he was extremely passionate about his trade, his peers, and his family. He worked hard, thought deeply, and was thoughtful of others.
J. Stout said, “Am glad you spoke up about this, Mr. Powers. Because she is playing her own game here. And it’s the WFF’s who are getting played.”
Spooky, and not something I considered. Although I thought you were going to say she is collecting information on the side for a book she is planning on writing. I strongly agree with WTKTT, and everyone else that no one should be collecting information on the side and privately. This is supposed to be a public forum.
Thanks
For the record, I ( me, personally ) have NO problem with anyone
‘collecting information’ regarding the Yarnell Hill Fire or anything
related to it. I actually wish more people WERE doing just that,
AND sharing it publicly.
We are not talking about Exxon Mobile, here.
ALL of the agencies involved with this incident are PUBLIC
agencies, funded with PUBLIC money, and pretty much every
single person who was ‘working’ that fire that day is, in
fact, a PUBLIC servant ( though I gather now that most of
them hate to ever be reminded of that simple fact ).
ANYONE is allowed to file FOIA ( Freedom of Information Act )
or APRR ( Arizona Public Records Requests ).
What I DO have a problem with is someone continually
‘announcing’ ( on any PUBLIC forum ) that they have ‘all this
information that others don’t have’… and then refusing to
talk about it in an open manner.
To me… that’s just more ‘game playing’… and we’ve certainly
already had enough of THAT regarding this incident.
I am absolutely sure that some people known for writing books
about Wildland Fire also already have a lot of information
that ‘we don’t have’… and I’m sure we will probably see the
results of THEIR efforts one of these days ( because that’s
what they do for a living )…
…but as for ‘other’ people who have gone to great lengths
to obtain the information but still won’t share that information
OR say what they plan to do with it… OR answer any
questions about even what they keep saying they know
that others don’t…
…well… that’s their business, I guess.
It’s all gonna come out (in public) eventually… I guarantee.
I am hoping for sooner rather than later.
Well… agree with you, in fact I said,
Spooky, and not something I considered. Although I thought you were going to say she is collecting information on the side for a book she is planning on writing. I strongly agree with WTKTT, and everyone else that no one should be collecting information on the side and privately. This is supposed to be a public forum.
Thanks
Which part of that do you think disagrees with what you are saying?
Well… I guess what I meant was…. ( I’m gonna
reverse your quote for a second )…
>> This is supposed to be a public forum.
Indeed… it is nothing but that.
This is just ONE place where, as you said…
The GOOD news is that we have a public forum
to share our opinions.
The BAD news is that we have a public forum
to share our opinions.
ROFL
>> no one should be collecting information on the
>> side and privately.
I could care less who is ( or isn’t ) ‘collecting
information on the side’ and/or ‘privately’.
That’s their business.
I wish more people WERE doing that… AND
then ‘sharing’ the information instead of holding
onto it like’s it’s some sort of personal prize.
Well, I was referring to me mostly. The good news is I have a place to put my opinions and thoughts, the bad news is that I have a place to put my opinions and thoughts because obviously I should keep a lot of them to myself.
And as far as collecting information on the side, I am still having no luck with getting my full explanation of that sentence and my explanation to Elizabeth through for some reason and I hope it doesn’t eventually show up 6 times.
You right, I don’t care how much information anybody collects and obviously anybody can have anything I have, including most of my random thoughts on this subject.
BUT, I do think to continually obliquely and coyly referring to information that someone has collected in a teasing manner is not cool when that someone puts forth what I consider to be ridiculous theories which are supposedly substantiated by an unknown stable of experts who have graphs and charts and who knows what else that is being used to support them under the guise of exploring all options, well…I don’t think that how a public forum is supposed to work.
The word “scary” refers to the possibility that WFF are being played for one side or the other, although as I have continually said, I do think the county and the state own a lot of this tragedy as contributing or casual factors. So if Elizabeth is working for them, I would actually help her if I could.
What does ROFL mean?
The Readers Digest version of my comment that won’t go through is that I did not call Elizabeth a “fool”, I implied that I though her stable of experts are fools to try and make a case that Eric Marsh had to leave the black because of anticipated weather conditions or other ridiculous reasons.
Eric Marsh and the Granite Moutian Hotshots were in a SAFE place and they could have gone in almost any direction other than what they did and it would have been safe at almost any time except when they did and they would have been safe.
I also explained in some detail we should be thanking RTS for his inside information and insight and not attacking him.
I also said that RTS answered the big question for me, which is “Why did the Granite Mountain Hotshots die?” And that is the part that is “case closed” for me. It was hard to accept, but I have to.
The discussion can go on forever as far as I’m concerned, there are still a lot of unanswered questions like all of those contributing factors.
I agree totally…..
Copy (all) that…
…and also agree.
There is STILL a lot of
detail to be discovered.
Reply to Gary Olson post on
March 22, 2014 at 4:08 am
>> Gary asked…
>> What does ROFL mean?
Sorry about that.
It’s GEEK talk ( acronyms ).
LOL
Laughing Out Loud
ROFL
Rolling On The Floor Laughing
LMAO
Laughing My Ass Off
LMFAO
Laughing My Fucking Ass Off
ROFLALMFAO
Rolling On the Floor Laughing
AND Laughing My Fucking
Ass Off ( simultaneously )
AFAICT
As Far As I Can Tell
IIRC
If I Recall Correctly
IAOI
If ( And Only If )
Stuff like that.
thank you,
Elizabeth,
I am having trouble getting my response to go through…so here is the short answer while I am waiting for that to happen. Please go back and read my comment, I did not call you a fool.
test
Joy,
Here’s my response to your March 21 at 12:59 post:
“Joy, You posted “how people respect all BUT Elizabeth’s comments…” (I emphasized here)
I think it’s fair to say that I and all others here respect Elizabeth’s comments when they make sense, are not hypocrtical, not logical fallacies, and not contradictory.
If they fall into the above categories, then I and others are going to disagree and comment accordingly – and we do. It’s a PUBLIC FORUM. And yet we are railed on because of that. To disagree is NOT to be intolerant. It’s just a disagreement.
The ‘tolerance’ individuals seem to feel that way though. As long as you agree with them, then you’re tolerant, but once you disagree with them then you’re intolerant. WTF is that all about? Liberal logic as far as I’m concerned.”
Just reading what the page has today. The other day, Joy was reading what Elizabeth wrote and Elizabeth asked how come everyone seem to be getting the respect including Joy but not Elizabeth. So your re-quote of Joy was going off a comment Elizabeth left. Joy is busy today. I was there when she typed it so I know she was not saying others disrespected Elizabeth but she was writing in reply to a comment that Elizabeth commented. You will not meet a more oddly pair as her and I. We may be opposites yet we do have an understanding that we agree to disagree and it works. I respect Joy. Joy respects me. Simple. If anyone felt disrespected from us then we apologize for not acknowledging such action(s). Joy is right in one of her comments. She and I saw the same fire yet I said let’s get the hell out of here and Joy is alive today because I made her leave earlier then the men. How come the fire management or leaders did not see the same dangers as me?
Made it. I am only here to reply here and off I go. I told Sonny (Tex) I am too busy today. Sonny (Tex) seems to think there is a concern that we are not supportive here on the comment wall and to a lady who has been above and beyond yet she feels we have been hurtful to her. Again, I have limited time online. We get a chuckle from Gary’s comments and had no idea Gary was making offensive remarks. We skim. We do not have the online time to read in detail yet I know we like his overall wit. Shit, I really cannot wonder if every word I type is going to be analysed and twisted. Sonny said I said you all disrespected Elizabeth when it was the statement she said she wanted the same respect shown to her as Joy and RTS. That was the comment I was going from—I told Sonny I’d come down and comment but please REST the horse shit you all who seem to think to write privately on it. I won’t feed the fuel. I am not interested in details of such but since Sonny publicly apologized I will here too. I am not mad. I am not angry. I at times get frustrated in regards to the Yarnell Hill fire when I have people show me things but not you all. Other than that I know I am here to help when its needed— Now, as for you all asking Sonny for my email. I have nothing in private I want to discuss with anyone. I have some heavy concerns health-wise that whoever has my personal email; has it already. Sonny aims for smoothing things quickly over and he told me I am on his email more then him and this is not facts. I am not on anywhere as people who know me know that. My focus has not been to emails or hikes. Yes, Michael Kodas wrote us both and Yes I did reply to him that we could not be available this weekend as he is in Yarnell—
Other than that, many peoples’ emails still sit in my inbox unopened. I just have other stuff going on-
I, Joy A Collura, apologize for any person who felt I offended them in ANY comments I posted.
ok, see ya—
**
** HERE WE GO ( AGAIN )…
>> On March 21, 2014 (TODAY) at 12:28 pm, Elizabeth said:
>>
>> Just so you know, I have NOTHING bad to say about Gary Cordes.
>> (The only thing I tried to say was that it was Cordes who was needing
>> help such that Musser reached out to DivsA to get some “resources”
>> (which, at that time, only really included GM, because Blue Ridge was
>> ALREADY working at the direction of Cordes, such that they were already
>> a “resource” that Cordes had at his disposal and already engaged in the
>> way he had directed). Please don’t anyone read into that. If I am being
>> unclear, ask me….)
Elizabeth…
First and foremost ( and I have said this about 3 times already )… I don’t
think there is anyone reading this ongoing discussion who doesn’t know
that you have worked just as hard as anyone at trying to shed more light
on the events of June 30, 2013… so AGAIN ( one more time with
feeling )… thank you for that ( ongoing thanks ). Thank you. Thank you.
Also… nothing that is going to follow can or should be considered me
‘hounding’ you, or ‘attacking’ you, or ‘trying to upset you’, or ‘treating you
unfairly on this (public) forum’ or ‘not reading for comprehension’ or ‘not
being a Christian’ or ‘picking on you’ or anything like that.
Ok. Is that enough hand-holding for you?
Feeling OK now?
Good… now… can we get back to business?
>> Elizabeth said…
>> If I am being unclear, ask me.
Okay. Here it comes.
>> Elizabeth said…
>> …it was Cordes who was needing help such that Musser reached
>> out to DivsA to get some “resources”.
That is certainly a good ‘guess’ that could be floated to support what little
was said about Musser’s ‘request for resources’ in the ADOSH report
( page 18 )… but you are NOT phrasing it as such.
You are stating this as if it was an ABSOLUTE FACT.
What gives YOU the right to do that… at this point?
What DIRECT PROOF do you have that SPGS1 Gary Cordes specifically
requested OPS2 Paul Musser to “Call Granite Mountain and see if they
can spare resources for ME”?
>> Elizabeth also said…
>> (which, at that time, only really included GM, because Blue Ridge was
>> ALREADY working at the direction of Cordes, such that they were already
>> a “resource” that Cordes had at his disposal and already engaged in the
>> way he had directed).
Again… that is presented by you as STATEMENT OF FACT.
What EVIDENCE do you have to support this statement?
There is nothing I can find in the PUBLIC record that supports this
VERY specific assertion you are making.
The only evidence in the public record actually just makes mincemeat
of your assertion that Blue Ridge was either…
A) Officially and specifically working directly for SPGS1 Gary Cordes at
ANY time that day… and that this was Blue Ridge’s understanding.
B) That Gary Cordes was not totally and fully aware that Blue Ridge was
a ‘free resource’ and ALREADY evacuating the Shrine area before he even
‘met with OPS2 Paul Musser’ ( See SAIT Investigation notes and
Blue Ridge unit logs ).
So in order to believe your assertion… you are going to have to provide
some hard evidence that directly CONTRADICTS other evidence
already in the public record.
We have, in fact, been here before… when you came out of nowhere
and made the same ‘assertions of fact’ earlier in this Chapter V ( See below ).
A lot of ‘feedback’ was supplied to you about this and requests were
made for you to supply hard evidence to back up these assertions…
…but you refused to cooperate with those requests.
Please do so now.
Elizabeth,
“Elizabeth on March 20, 2014 at 2:40 pm said:…. evidence that *I* have gathered does not suggest that Jesse Steed or Eric Marsh had a pattern of behaving in a needlessly and excessively risky manner. Marsh was actually commended by an outside fire official for GM’s and his work on the Station Fire.”
Okay then. That means several things to me. Marsh and Steed and the GMHS may have very well done a ‘commendable’ job on the Station Fire. It also means to me that the ‘outside official,’ could have merely been politically correct and given them a commendable rating or merely a boilerplate version like all the other Crews that worked for him. It may have also come from a municipal/wildland fire supervisor that had little or no wildland experience. The ‘commendable’ rating MAY have resulted from Marsh and/or Steed schmoozing the ‘outside official’ and he just thought they were all ‘nice guys.’ And some overhead from some agencies won’t even go up on the firelines, but supervise from their command vehicles in California. I would have to see the rating to see where the ‘outside offical’ was from, what Agency, what position, and what region of the country.
‘Commendable ratings’ in-and-of themselves mean very little to experienced WFF supervisors.
Now, square the above with the RTS post regarding the same Station Fire in California. “February 14, 2014 at 9:46 am RTS said…
“Regarding Marsh and the ALLEGED GMHS bad decsions with good outcomes attitude, the two fires where two separate HS Supts commented on Marsh seemingly always wanting to ‘ONE-UP-YOU’, they were the 2009 Station Fire on the Angeles NF and the 2011 Gladiator Fire on the Prescott NF.
The [California Senior HS] Supt. on the Station Fire said that Marsh and the GMHS was doing some fairly unconventional and unsafe tactics and GETTING AWAY WITH IT. He said they should have known better. He said he counseled Marsh on what he was doing, but it appeared that it did no good because he/they kept at it.”
I even added some qualifying words in the brackets to strengthen and give further credibility to the statement.
So then, given that Marsh and Steed and the GMHS Crew received a glowing ‘commendable rating’ from an ‘outside official’ on the Station Fire, that would mean that they performed their HS duties in a safe manner, and followed all the WFF ‘Rules.’ Right?
This is a link for an NWCG Crew Performance Evaluation. The ‘outside official’ may have used this form or the Individualform. Either way, the point is the same. http://www.fs.fed.us/fire/contracting/crews/crew_performance.pdf
You will notice the “USE OF SAFE PRACTICES” block. There are also blocks for ‘Supervisory Performances.’ Likewise, IF they received ‘commendable ratings’ here, then that means they allfollowed the WFF ‘Rules.’ Right?
Therefore, I give a lot more credence to the Senior CA HS Superintendent’s recollection on the Station Fire and the other SW Senior HS Superintendent’s recollection of the GMHS actions reflecting their need, their.compulsion, their whatever to “ONE-UP” other HS Crews.
Bad decisions with prior good outcomes ….
Elizabeth,
“Elizabeth on March 21, 2014 at 8:23 am said:
Gary, Bob, and RTS: Some of your most recent comments toward me have been needlessly and personally attacking, not to mention completely hurtful and upsetting (e.g. Gary calling me a “fool,” RTS mocking me, …. not needlessly insulting or attacking) …. but you have ignored my pleas.”
Needlessly and personally attcking you? I think NOT. You make statements and I and others respond if/when we disagree or whatever, so therefore they are NOT needless. As far as ‘personally’ goes, I think NOT again. To the best of my knowledge, there have been no ad hominem attacks on you personally. I can’t help it if you got offended by my ‘Queen’ of the Hill or whatever comment awhile back. I have been attacking your ACTIONS, your WORDS, your LOGIC, and the like. Those are NOT personal attacks. And as far as these being “completely hurtful and upsetting” I’m afraid you’re engaging in drama and histrionics here. COMPLETELY? Really? You’re on your own on the hurtful and upsetting prongs because those are entirely YOUR reactions. Nobody caused those but you.
….
Regarding RTS’ claim of Being Christian, you posted “…. , I expect RTS to be honest and kind in his response. Unless he was lying about being a Christian. (Love thy neighbor, RTS, I believe is on the Christian “to-do” list….).”
Nice hypocrtical slam here. You do have a talent for that and logical fallacies as well. Honest? I have been completely HONEST in my posts and my replies to you. But that seems to be what offends you, my HONESTY. So, I am NOT lying about being a Christian. Why would I do that? Yes, I am a Christian and I’m very thankful for that. ‘Love thy neighbor’? Got it. None of this or any other blog has anything to do with that. So then, what’s that comment all about? It’s the words, the actions, the how, why, what, when, where that counts.
“Elizabeth posted on March 21, 2014 at 9:47 am: …. I am trying to figure out what they were THINKING, whether there could have POSSIBLY been a reason why the black did not sit well with them. There is no way to figure that OUT without examining all possible reasons why the black might have been bad, right? …. it seems useful to try to think about why they might have rejected the idea of sitting in the black. ….” And “Elizabeth on March 21, 2014 at 10:21 am said: Where did I make a misleading suggestion that GM got scared down?” I think you pretty much insinuated that above.
What were they thinking? I allege they were thinking about other times they had similar experiences and gotten away with it, and this situation is similar, so …. I’ll tell you what they were NOT thinking – they were NOT thinking about the WFF rules. And “whether there could have POSSIBLY been a reason why the black did not sit well with them?” Among other things, how about the influence of PFD Wildland Chief Willis’ comments at the fatality site news conference that “no wildland firefighter is satisfied sitting in the black, in a SZ watching the fire progress below them” [while they sit there and do nothing]. Thetre was ABSOLUTELY NO GOOD REASON, NONE, to leave their perfectly good SZ when they did. NONE! Get over it, the black was NOT bad. I allege they rejected the idea of sitting in the black because they BLATANTLY violated most of the Fire Orders and LCES. Moreover, they BLATANTLY failed to recognize,heed, or mitigate many of the Watch Outs. And also for the other above stated and quoted comments.
“Elizabeth on March 21, 2014 at 10:21 am said: ….(Do you remember the time that I was falsely accused of calling Rory Collins a coward? I never said it – it wasn’t me.). That’s right it WASN’T you nor was it me. What I said was that he was acting in a COWARDLY manner speaking of his actions (not an ad hominem attack) when he unexpectadely abandoned the YHF.
This is one of my favorites when you posted “Whereas RTS might be the guy that Eric Marsh fired a few years ago, ….” And just where may I ask did you come up with this gem? When did I allegedly work on the GMHS? And was I fired because I stressed the WFF Rules (10 and 18 and LCES). Was that why I was fired? Or was it because I spoke up (against the GMHS Groupthink) about their alleged recurrent pattern of ‘bad decsions with prior good outcomes’? Which one was it? Or was it both of them or maybe some other reasons I was fired from a Crew I never worked for?
I am very thankful for all that you have done on this forum with all the documents and downloads and such that you have posted. Ongoing thanks for all that effort.
Elizabeth–I have at no time called you names. Am I upset with you YES.
I said I believed you were a lawyer for the families to get your attention not to insult you.
You were leading all of us in that direction based on not agreeing with us and continuing to push what I felt were justifying statements to exonerate what GM did. The black was not safe that’s why they moved. They had a lookout for there move thru the brush, Air Attack became there lookout. When they moved it was safe because the fire was not burning in there direction.
When you continue to push those things at the seasoned fire fighters here and they tell you those statements are wrong. You may not know some of them or there names but you know me and I have answered you with all the expert knowledge I have.
Marsh and Granit Mountain took risks known fact. Did they take a risk that day thinking they could make the move even though it was wrong, against all the rules, no LCES, no discussion with OPS or IC. Those things alone tell me yes they made the decision to again take a risk MAYBE HOPEING TO BECOME HEROES. They closed out the idea that it was dangerous and moved out. RTS says Superintendents told him about GM and he also knew what they did. It is one of the few things so far that has made science of what GM did that day. Take it or leave it your choice.
Logging out—now to head to camp—
I came to the library and always seem to want to quickly do 1 thing—like naturally learning to detox the organs—and people start asking me to stuff over here in town on the fire of course but glad to see everyone is having a fresh start kick ass day online here (smiles) and is here to make sure the firefighting community is shown the RESPECT they deserve as well as so many are pleased the professional firefighters have posted here.
I forgot to say THANK YOU before-
thank you.
we appreciate you.
DITTO!! 🙂
Elizabeth,
I don’t need anyone to ‘vouch’ for me. I’m just a citizen making comments on a public forum. At least I’ve got the stones to put my thoughts, ideas, and theories, out there in a public forum, where they can, and have been vetted, by anyone who chooses to do so. Over the course of these chapters, I have been occasionally set straight, by those with either better memories, or a better grasp of the facts than me.
With your criticism of those commenting anonymously on here, apparently you don’t sense the magnitude of the irony created, by you, yourself, in allowing (tens, hundreds, thousands, of?) people to contact you directly, and yet, they, themselves are requesting (or demanding) to remain anonymous, a request which you then, honor. Apparently, you have annointed yourself, as the ONLY ONE QUALIFIED to grant someone anonymity.
Lately, you seem to be putting great stock in those ‘secret’ messages you’ve been receiving, even when those writers aren’t willing to allow their own thoughts, ideas, and theories to be publicly vetted (if even anonymously).
Perhaps even more ironic, is that you haven’t grasped the possibility, that the reasons someone posting publicly may want to remain anonymous, ARE AS IMPORTANT as the reasons that those ‘secretly’ contacting you with their real names have, for also wanting to remain anonymous.
I have appreciated your insight and wisdom in the past, and have agreed, especially, with your thoughts in the past regarding commentary needlessly going off on tangets, along with the impropriety of name-calling, but I find your current status as ‘gatekeeper of secrets and secret identities’ totally unproductive in the ‘public’ search for the truth.
If your email buddies are so confident in their facts or theories, let them put them out here for public critique (if even anonymously).
TTWRE, I am not sure if I am getting your point, so please correct me if I am going off in the wrong direction, but the people who are contacting me are NOT anonymous to me. Meaning, if somebody named “Fred Hernandez” contacts me from his official USFS e-mail account (which he hasn’t!), and he says to me “Elizabeth, I recall that some arrogant prick of a hotshot super actually tried to start shit against Marsh regarding the Station Fire because they had a beef with Marsh, who was kind of an asshole,” I would first figure out who Fred Hernandez was and whether he seemed kind of credible (e.g. not a jailed inmate who had been inside jail for the past 50 years), then I would figure out if the allegation if true was relevant (to ME, in my search for transparency), then, if it was likely to be relevant, I would figure out how to get more INFORMATION of the sort that I could verify (e.g. could I get first-hand interviews with guys who were ON the Station Fire, could I get documentation, etc.). Does that make sense?
As to your comment that the people who feel most comfortable contacting me directly, let me point out the obvious 🙂 : After the VICIOUS way that Bob, Gary, and now SR again are coming after me (“fool,” “Queen,” “clueless,” etc.), do you BLAME others for not wanting to post here? It SUCKS, it is totally upsetting, and I am pretty close to quitting and telling you all to go figure out your own mess. But I’ll wait to hear from RTS, Gary, and Bob first. 🙂
As to SR’s comment about Joy, go research what Joy has to say about me. She sings my praises, because she KNOWS what I am doing behind the scenes in order to get transparency. To that end, why, exactly, is JOY allowed to cite her anonymous sources whom she keeps begging to come forward, why is RTS allowed to cite his own anonymous source, yet *I* get rafts of criticism when *I* do it? (I ask not because I would want you to criticize RTS or Joy the same way that you attack me, but, rather, because I would like to get the same decency that you give RTS and Joy.)
One final thing, for SR: RTS *told* all of us here on InvestigativeMedia.com that he was a Christian. That was not a secret that I revealed. This goes back to my point, SR, about you failing to read things before you attack….
“Given that RTS went so far as to e-mail me directly to pronounce that he is a Christian, I expect RTS to be honest and kind in his response. Unless he was lying about being a Christian.” This is Elizabeth speaking in her comment just below. Elizabeth is talking specifically about what RTS said in a private email to her. And, again, to me the idea that RTS disagreeing with Elizabeth somehow means he would be lying about being a Christian is just over the top. It is not attacking anyone to note that what is said in a private email about private beliefs should remain private.
Read for comprehension:
RTS announced on this website that he was a Christian. That was POSTED on this website. It wasn’t a SECRET, because RTS had SHARED it on this website.
Did you comment, in the text I quoted, about what RTS said to you in a private email?
Yes or no?
Did you raise a question in that comment of yours about RTS possibly having lied about being a Christian?
Yes or no?
It seems Elizabeth can’t answer even those two very simple questions. Her communication style is her choice.
In addition to trying to use a private email to slam RTS, let me also note that Elizabeth has STILL, after days of being asked, not given any indication of what types of sources she IS relying on in making the rather fanciful claim that GM may have not felt safe in the black, and the even more incredible claim that at the time they headed down it would have seemed reasonable, for a reasonable, prudent WFF, to do so via the bushwhack they chose.
As Elizabeth has previously said she has sources only to backtrack, what I’m thinking is that there may not in fact be ANY sources she is relying on for these claims, therefore her refusal to give any answer.
Why does it matter? Astro-turfing some idea that GM had to move from where they were, and that their bushwhack was a reasonable thing to do, would be a horrible precedent for safe practices for current and future crews. And, do no credit to GM and their survivors, either.
Elizabeth,
I have always tried to be repectful on this site, and I try my best to put forth a reasoned thought, or theory, into the commentary, but even with that, my thoughts on a subject have been corrected several times, which I actually relish in the pursuit of truth.
You state in your comment above that I have ‘attacked you’ for wanting to use an anoymous source. I would ask you to reread my post, for there is NO attack anywhere within.
The instigation for my commentary, was several recent comments (and even going back aways, to your demanding that WTKTT demand the identities and bonifides of all the anonymous posters here) by you, questioning the veracity of anonymous posters on this site.
At the same time you were doing that, you repeatedly put forth facts, theories, or ideas, from your mulitple anonymous sources. You can’t have it BOTH WAYS.
I would never have questioned your anonymous ‘sources’, if you had not FIRST questioned the veracity of anonymous posters here, which includes ME.
You ask, why don’t I criticize Joy or RTS, or anyone else who uses anonymous sources, well it’s because THEY NEVER have criticized the people like me on this site, JUST for simply wanting to remain anonymous.
Oh, and I know that you know the real names of the people who contact you, and I said as much in my comments, but you have also stated publicly that you will honor requests for anonymity from any who ask for it. I DON’T have a problem with that, UNTIL, you come along with, what is apparently a problem with the veracity of me (and others) posting publicly on this site, simply due to the desire to remain anonymous.
For what it’s worth, I think a lot of peoples’ commentary that has upset you recently, is directly related to your repeated use of those ‘unrevealed sources’ giving you ‘unvetted information’ and then you running with it. Also, your repeated references to that ‘information’ which no one else out there has, and gives you ‘additional insight’, that, we poor souls, just don’t have, I’m sure has put a burr in some people’s butts. Perhaps if you backed -off on that stuff a bit, others would cool down a bit as well. If you get some info and you’d like to get it vetted, do it publicly. If the provider wants to push back against the vetting on here, they can certainly do it without revealing their name.
Gary, Bob, and RTS:
Some of your most recent comments toward me have been needlessly and personally attacking, not to mention completely hurtful and upsetting (e.g. Gary calling me a “fool,” RTS mocking me, Bob falsely accusing me of working for some unnamed lawyer to fabricate a story). I have repeatedly asked you to please be civil (e.g. not needlessly insulting or attacking) when disagreeing with me, since I am only trying to help and since folks like JD and reporters have made clear that my input *IS* helping, but you have ignored my pleas.
You obviously know how to be civil, since you never once have gone off on Joy, for example, despite Joy sometimes posting things that are just as non-expert as my posts, so I am trying to figure out what it will take to get you three to stop your needlessly insulting comments regarding me. Bob, Gary, and RTS, please tell me:
1. Will your needlessly nasty comments toward me only stop if I shut up and stop posting my views, thoughts, or questions on this website?
2. Will your needlessly insulting comments stop only if I limit my posting to things that agree with you or that strike YOU, personally, as most rational?
Thank you in advance for being honest. Given that RTS went so far as to e-mail me directly to pronounce that he is a Christian, I expect RTS to be honest and kind in his response. Unless he was lying about being a Christian. (Love thy neighbor, RTS, I believe is on the Christian “to-do” list….)
Elizabeth:
The message has been coming out loud and clear in your recent posts. Res ipsa loquitur. (“The thing speaks for itself.”)
Out of all my favorite things about the WFF’s here, at the top of the list is this: They aren’t here because they hope to make money off this someday.
I don’t know what that means, J.Stout. Can you explain?
You know exactly what it means.
I honestly don’t, or I would not have asked.
Well, then, perhaps you just refuse to fathom it.
J.Stout, by definition, I cannot fathom something that I do not understand, but I am WILLING to try to fathom it (if you like that word) if you wanted to try to explain it to me. 🙂
There’s an disturbing pattern here of Elizabeth saying she feels attacked, and then going into attacks or insinuations herself. RTS may have been lying about being a Christian? WTF?
Unless someone emails you something that is newsworthy, I don’t want here about anyone’s private emails to you, unless they specifically told you it was ok to share the contents of the email. This is a basic standard of decency.
Elizabeth, you are commenting in a public comment forum. When you say things, repeatedly, that are clueless, it is not attacking you for people to note this. When you say that you have “sources” for things, and then backtrack, people are entitled to note the backtrack. When you announce that YOU have determined that at 4:04 it was reasonable for GM to have headed down into the bowl, people are entitled to ask what possible sources you have for such a view. When you repeatedly suggest that GM wouldn’t have been safe in the black and needed to descend for that reason, again with no credible sources of any sort to back up that very strange view, people are entitled to note that what you are saying doesn’t hold water. A college education and a law degree don’t magically insulate you, or anyone else, from people noting when comments are made that are not factual.
As far as your trying to drag Joy into your issues, again, WTF? You’ve created, with your persistent posts advancing whatever you are trying to advance, a number of comments noting that you’re off in a number of things you’re saying. The fact that other people haven’t generated similar responses should be valuable information for you to chew on.
Why is RTS allowed to cite anonymous sources, if I am not? Thanks in advance.
You are saying whimsical, fanciful things. And you are not id’ing any attributes of any of these sources that you sometimes claim to have, only to backtrack in some cases when asked to back what you say up.
For instance, I have asked you several times to indicate where you got the idea that GM’s bushwhack looked reasonable at the time they started, given the alternative of staying in good black. I seriously doubt this is from, say, a hs superintendent somewhere, because it’s not credible. So, who in general terms is claiming that at that time, with the option of sitting tight in good black, the bushwhack looked like a reasonable call? Park ranger, someone sitting in an office somewhere, journalist? Just that kind of info. RTS has given enough info to let us know that his sources are what he says they are, and in a position to speak credibly. You have not.
Also, where did I state that GM wouldn’t have been safe in the black? I am trying to figure out what they were THINKING, whether there could have POSSIBLY been a reason why the black did not sit well with them. There is no way to figure that OUT without examining all possible reasons why the black might have been bad, right? Unless we assume that GM *WANTED* to be fried to a crisp, it seems useful to try to think about why they might have rejected the idea of sitting in the black. If I am missing something on that, please tell me.
That’s what some folk would call a false dichotomy. No one thinks malice was involved in terms of GM wanting to have a serious accident. You have had people explain to you many times that GM didn’t have reason to be concerned about staying put. GM’s own communications reflect that they shared this view, themselves.
GM’s assessment that they were in good black, the assessment of others to the same effect that day, and what we now know with hindsight are all congruent.
Raising fanciful ideas that maybe Marsh looked around and decided all of a sudden that the very large amount of black couldn’t work, but announced that to no one, is misleading and a waste of time.
Maybe Marsh saw a prairie dog up there and thought his crew would be exposed to the plague? It gets ridiculous. Particularly when you refuse to listen to the multiple explanations given by multiple highly qualified and experienced commenters, who give you the same feedback that you then ignore only to make the same misleading suggestion that GM got scared down.
Where did I make a misleading suggestion that GM got scared down? I am pretty sure that I never did, but, if you can point me to it, I will certainly try to rectify it.
(Do you remember the time that I was falsely accused of calling Rory Collins a coward? I never said it – it wasn’t me.)
You are killing me here. You made multiple statements about how GM would have faced superheated gases, catastrophic smoke, and dangerous islands of green if they had stayed in the black. The only problem is, those statements make no sense. And, you have still refused to provide any indication of where on earth you got the idea that these were real issues GM was facing.
Nor have you provided any response to multiple requests to back up your assertion that it was reasonable for GM to make their bushwhack at the time they made it.
I seriously doubt you have any support for either of these propositions, at this point.
Just for the record on “rite to state anonymity” comment made by Elizabeth today and how people respect all but Elizabeth’s comments…
Both/all librarians in my town and surrounding areas and many locals will share to you that when people have come to me and Elizabeth was not the only displeased person to see that I jotted on those links every person in 2013 so that OSHA, SAIR, firefighters, smokejumpers, homeowners, my family, my friends, the off the grid folks, the communities, the interested folks in this fire could see EVERY piece of information as it unfolded may it be “in person”, email or phone but NEVER did I get a call or email from Willis saying “why are you posting what I write you on that link?” (in fact Willis had educated me a lot in this whole process along with all I hiked with- it is a journey for all of us so we either stick with it and together because it will take the togetherness to get the end results—it will not take one person) YET I have spoke on the phone awhile back and received emails from Elizabeth her concerns and requests to please do not let people know we email/the contents due to her profession/respect thing and I replied if one is not willing to let me place publicly on that link what is being shown to us then don’t communicate to us because I do not need personally “shhh, whispers, off the record, please due to my profession respect me and do not write about what we talk about on a public forum” and that was NOT said to be taken offensively by me but where I stand in this journey of the people INVESTIGATING it but I for sure have EMPATHY for the disabled/the elders/the community that was indeed affected by that weekend and I can keep their showing me photos and videos as thank you I saw it but NOW give it to the PUBLIC so this fire can be properly assessed…PLUS alot of people are not yet ready to talk about that weekend publicly. They are NOT firefighters and all I want out of this for ME is that 19 men who do not have a voice knew there was folks out here that will be their voice for them and EXHAUST all areas to find the purity in this all. I have much in the body severely in danger and I am doing my hikes and medical massages and eating the right way to knock the crap out of it but I am not at any time going to spend 2014 when I cut off my mifi to wonder who I have to hold a secret or information when my online time is so limited plus I am all for GOOD ENERGY from the fire not the horse shit unfolding-
We need to make sure the Wildland and Firefighting community are shown the respect they deserve and that programs are enhanced by bringing out the purity of it vs. the modern world of claims & suits. We need to show these men who died, the other fallen ones and the current community as well as the future generation this is just a stepping stone to a better tomorrow not the crap I skimmed today-
I can tell you the people are not anonymous in a sense- ANYONE can go to Yarnell and speak to the SAME people that came to me and ask them their accounts. Just go SPEND YOUR TIME AND YOUR ENERGY FREELY to these people—that community.
What they show me I tell you here as I tell them DOES NOT HOLD MUCH GROUND in my book UNTIL they SHOW THE PUBLIC yet again though since the fire you see EVERY step of the way of communication and in doing that I hope it cuts out the people who want to write, talk or whatever to me of their accounts . I want the Yarnell community to know HOW IMPORTANT their footage is to you all. That is it. I have NO shadiness or anonymity holding here. Sonny told me someone emailed me here from the comment wall and I never received it. Yet I will read any email but if its based on the crap I read today you can bet I am not going to reply privately.
Now, I will not be redundant but I wanted to clarify my anonymity on a homeowner is because shit, I cannot control who is coming my way. Have you seen my link as you state you do- then you know I have not seeked out anyone but in this forumn and Bill Gabbert’s I mentined Y O U because I know a select few do read this comment wall and I do feel it is IMPORTANT to explain the fire, explain the vehicles and aircrafts, explain what is a hotshot vs a smokejumper and firefighter and Sonny seems to love Gary’s view but this is what HERE is about—a place for all of us to do our best for the 19. Someone recently received something from us and said you should market it. All the people we sent that item to was a deep respect and if you got one or 2 then you KNOW we deeply respected what you are and have done for this fire and for all your assistance.
I said enough. I like EVERYONE here. Even the ones who challenge our accounts, even the ones that accept they have their views professionally and personally that does not match mine. I love everyone to be FREE thinkers and to live and let live—
have a kick ass day you all.
Thank you, Joy, for the support. That means a lot, to have you publicly support me. I appreciate it. You have always been supportive of me, and it is good to know that I was one of the special ones to whom you sent things. Keep it “pure”….
And I am glad to see that I am not the only one who thinks some of this is just horse shit that distracts from the bigger goals.
Anyone can e-mail Gary Cordes, or Darrell Willis, or whomever they want and ASK the questions if they do not believe me.
Man, I love how well and energetic I feel when my medical massager tries to keep me going— Divine. It’s one of those thing you want for others to experience yet you want her to yourself but if you google Dee Sickles from Flagstaff, Arizona. I am sure you will be glad you did. I only had 2.5 hours sleep and I will get that sleep but I am stoked today—I know when my medical massager peaked over my shoulder and saw me skimming the comments here and she said are you reading about “fire guy” Gary Cordes there? and I said it is a collaboration of comments I am skimming about and she said I have known Gary for 1/2 a decade and whoever is writing negative about him have him pegged wrong. She asked why are people writing such about a fine human like him? I said I did not know I was peaking at other areas not on Gary yet she seem to think to detail him so if anyone wants to know about him; email or call her. I am not on email area to give you contact info. but google her name. Now, that lady worked her butt off to try and assist gtting my bodyworkable so I will see hr aain real soon but after 3:33am she had to say enough and she still had a few areas like my left hand and sorts but I had so much detailed hour after hour needed work done and I even did my in-between homework/exercise and I was still a mess.
Hey, I am all for anonymity—someone thinks I am not but all I am saying is in a nice world it would be great if we all had the freedom and no fear to just be real, raw & genuine with our names tied to our voice and actions yet “welcome to the modern world”…
After seeing the photos/videos I have and my word is solid that I won’t name drop yet for my peace of mind it had been so important for me to encourage all to share their accounts but people have to share in their time and ways and so I have now realized I am not going to keep saying Y O U….
I know, shew. It did give us information in doing it yet now its time to educate the folks that no matter how simple they think their photos were between 1-7pm on June 30th, 2013—just share with someone who is seeking the purity if this tragedy and leave it there as simple as that.
Now for Gary Olsen who Tex (Sonny) seems to always light up or “right on” when he writes—I get the final trgedy that Steed and Marsh laid amongst the other men in the deployment area and people say the leader “f’d up” but until we are no longer blinded by tight ties of narratives and some willing and unwilling deceptions and we see the entire 12-9pm the purity of the ground to aerial photos and videos and hear many accounts of that weekend then and only then will I stand on he wagon with you and Sonny on some areas—Until we see how the leaders went from point a to b and the mystery will be revealed and so in the end all this past few days of comments made on how all of us are doing our healing to this tragedy—
THIS IS A NEW DAY!
fresh start.
Let’s give EVERYONE the respect and freedom to do this without all this whatever it is I am reading WE all are in this together. WE are all the voice these 19 men no longer have—
Keep the faith!
And have a real swell day with loads of smiles.
signing out-
walking back to camp now-
Right back atcha, Joy. Just so you know, I have NOTHING bad to say about Gary Cordes. (The only thing I tried to say was that it was Cordes who was needing help such that Musser reached out to DivsA to get some “resources” (which, at that time, only really included GM, because Blue Ridge was ALREADY working at the direction of Cordes, such that they were already a “resource” that Cordes had at his disposal and already engaged in the way he had directed). Please don’t anyone read into that. If I am being unclear, ask me….)
Elizabeth,
Do you like drama, read a lot of fiction, and watch a lot of movies? It sure seems like it to me based on your postings lately, especially today.
Here’s one of my favorites, actually posted TWICE by you in the very same day. Just amazing. “If I buy into RTS’s theory, then I have to buy into the fact that RTS and his friends deliberately did NOTHING about something that they recognized as a life-threatening problem (“we could see this coming” or something like that is what RTS says his friends said).”
“The fact that men in RTS’s position would stand by without sending an E-MAIL, anonymous note, or anything to Prescott Human Resources, to ADOSH, or to ANYONE (which would then lead to a paper trail that I could sniff out) is something I refuse to fathom.
Period.”
“Deliberately did NOTHING” ? Are you kidding me? “The fact that men in RTS’s position would stand by …” Nope, not buying the guilt trip attempt here, twice even. So then, in typical lawyer fashion, Marsh was a ‘VICTIM’ of his peers, those that tried for years to fix matters to no avail? So, then it’s OUR fault that Marsh was responsible for killing his Crew. No, I don’t think so. He did it all alone. He wouldn’t listen to his peers, his friends, experienced WFF supervisors that helped to train his men. Men that knew or should have known better. Marsh did it all by himself because he felt his way was the right way, in spite of years and years of chastining and advice and counsel and Lessons Learned and tried-and-trued WFF Rules.
To refresh what appears to be a selective memory, it all statrted with this RTS post regarding Bob Powers’ post about a ‘walk-thru’ of the YHF fatality site. RTS posted “Superintendents made comments such as this: ‘This was the final, fatal link in a long chain of bad decisions with good outcomes. We saw this coming for years.” common knowledge that Eric Marsh made well known “prior bad decisions with good outcomes” we all knew it was going to happen.”
Elizabeth,
And one more gem “Whereas RTS might be the guy that Eric Marsh fired a few years ago,” Yup, that’s me alright, you got me, you found me out. Good job. ……. Are you kidding me?
Elizabeth, I don’t have a problem with what Mike said. In fact, if you go back a little further you will see I asked a very similar rhetorical question. My question was rhetorical because I know something neither Mike nor WTKTT knows, in spite of their common sense and logic. And it is something I already said, but I guess you missed it, so I will say it again.
FYI WTKTT – your example of the way construction crews worked was informative (although you are ruining my narrative that you work in a dimly lit room for a federal alphabet soup agency), but it doesn’t apply to the quasi-military world of wildland firefighters. I also enjoyed reading the entertaining and colorful article by the British Telegraph writer, thanks for the link. Entertaining and colorful, but just like the Outdoor article several months ago…devoid of any real facts or useful information.
And FYI to everyone else out there in cyber space, I really like reading that hotshots are the equivalent of Navy SEALS or Special Forces, because it makes me feel powerful about what I used to be, but it’s not true. Hotshots are the equivalent of the Marines, if there is even such a thing as an equivalent at all. After all…everyone expects some Marines to die in a pitched battle, but no one expects some hotshots to die on a wildfire, no matter how big or bad it is.
Hotshots are grunts and ground pounders (and damn proud of it), the best of the best…but that’s it. As I have written in the past, if anyone is the equivalent of SEALS and Special Forces to the fire service in America, it’s the smokejumpers. Although I would rather be FUCKED by a smokejumper (male) than be one (just kidding, it’s that hotshot/smokejumper rivalry thing again, very healthy) because there are very few of them, they generally have more experience and training and they generally go out on small, select, specialized assignments, whereas the hotshots go fight the BIG ones.
Back on point. In the world of the Granite Mountain Hotshots in particular, there was only ONE person (in the case of the U.S Forest Service, there are several them, but not in the case of the Prescott Fire Department) who could have made a correction in Eric Marsh’s behavior and tactics.
That was Darrell Willis. That is because there was nobody above Darrell Willis except for Chief Fraijo…and well, as I have said in the past, Chief Fraijo was probably a really squared away structural FIREMAN who was a good manager, but he was completely CLUELESS about wildland firefighters and hotshots in particular, and he should never have had wildland firefighters under his command. Period.
Sidebar WTKTT – I think Darrell Willis was the CHIEF of the Prescott Fire Department when the Granite Mountain Hotshots were created.
In the case of the U.S. Forest Service, there is NOT ONLY the District Fire Management Officer (or District AFMO) who supervises the hotshot crew boss, but there is the Forest Fire Staff Officer for their home forest, (who is a Fire God) who carefully reviews each and every fire performance record for the crew in general and the crew boss in particular, but there is the Regional Fire Operations Center Coordinator, (the Chief Fire Gods Chief Assistant – SWCC in the case of Arizona and New Mexico) and the Regional Fire Staff Officer (The Chief Fire God).
AND that is before you get to the National Interagency Fire Coordination Center, and all of the other fire gods at the national level. Who were so far up in the Ivory Tower that I don’t even know what their titles were…Supreme Fire Gods I guess.
That is a far cry from the Mayor of Prescott…the CITY MANAGER, or the City Council, clueless…clueless…and even more clueless.
I’m sure it’s the same for NPS, BLM or BIA (other federal) hotshot crews as it is with the USFS, but I can only speak about U.S. Forest Service hotshot crews.
A U.S. Forest Service hotshot crew boss would not survive being sent home with a strongly worded note from fire supervisors – at least a second time. Although keep in mind (if you search back far enough through enough of my ramblings, and in spite of what WFF thinks, there is a point to all of my stories if you read far enough) that I survived being sent home with my crew from the Scott Fire with a sternly worded note from the Incident Commander for insubordination on a specially chartered jet, chartered just to fly us home to Santa Fe, New Mexico from Tucson, Arizona. Expensive. And there was one less hotshot crew on the line the next morning. Bad.
But…being sent home from a fire with a bad performance rating or a note…is the least of a U.S Forest Service hotshot crew bosses worry when it comes to keeping his or her job. As I have said in the past…the details of everything I did on a fire made it home before I did…all of these fire managers, well…they all know one another, and they all go way back…and they all they love to bullshit with each other about everything that happens on every fire. There are no secrets. At least from each other, from the general public…yes, it’s almost all a secret.
BUT…I kept my job only after there was an exhaustive investigation by those fire gods I previously named, interviewing every supervisor and manager who was anywhere near me or the crew, or even close to the incident in question, and they concluded the Scott Fire Boss (Incident Commander) was wrong. But my point is this, had I not been right, and the Incident Commander not been wrong…I would have been immediately removed as a hotshot crew boss, and I would have found myself hosing out outhouses even sooner than I otherwise did due to accumulated smoke inhalation damage to my lungs and larynx.
There were no turn-down protocols in my day, just a “do it now…like I said or else”, IF…that was the personality of the fire manager in question. Which fortunately, was very rare. I only saw it one time (on the Scott Fire) during my ten years as a hotshot, seven years as hotshot crew boss.
That is one of the reasons why the Granite Mountain Hotshots were a blueprint for disaster, just as John Dougherty reported in his very first article.
Oh…and one more thing, just in case anybody hasn’t picked up on this. When it comes to being a hotshot or a hotshot crew boss, there isn’t anyone in the country who can tell me anything (about most other fire stuff yes, I only know about being a hotshot). As I told Bob Powers in the past, there are those who did it longer, but nobody in the country did it better. And I did it all, and saw it all…at least once. And I have the hotshot memorabilia (Happy Jack Hotshots, you know, the crew I ran starting at age 23, and the Santa Fe Hotshots, you know, the crew I FOUNDED) to prove it. Hubris…yes, I have that too.
Gary Olson on March 20, 2014 at 9:22 pm said:
>> Gary Olson said…
>> FYI WTKTT – your example of the way construction crews
>> worked was informative (although you are ruining my
>> narrative that you work in a dimly lit room for a federal
>> alphabet soup agency), but it doesn’t apply to the
>> quasi-military world of wildland firefighters.
You’re right. It really doesn’t. When my crew boss was once
insisting I climb a 4 story scaffold and haul up some windows
without all the diagonal bracing in place yet… all I said was…
“Fuck you”.
When he then said “You’re fired…” I said…
“I don’t think so, asshole”… and I gestured over toward the
contractor’s trailer, in case he wanted to go over there and
talk about what just happened.
That fixed that problem right then and there.
No need for an ‘alternative suggestion’, and certainly no
memos needed.
So yea… not the same… but I believe the only point I was
*trying* to make is that if there is NOT an EASY way for WFF
employees to officially ‘refuse to work’ with people that are
known to be a risk to themselves and others… there SHOULD
be ( without having to lose a career that you love ).
>> Gary also wrote…
>> I also enjoyed reading the entertaining and colorful article by
>> the British Telegraph writer, thanks for the link. Entertaining
>> and colorful, but just like the Outdoor article several months
>> ago…devoid of any real facts or useful information.
Agreed. It was just ‘fluff’… but I DO think the quotes from the
original Prescott Wildland Division Chief ( Duane Steinbrink )
about “what made this crew different” and his verification that
from day one that the “groupthink” of that outfit was “we have to
be better and out-perform everyone else we work with” was
totally relevant… especially given RTS’s recent comments
and findings.
I still believe it all ties together into what happened on
June 30, 2013, and anyone who doesn’t think so is just
kidding themselves, at this point.
You also make it crystal clear that no matter what ‘complaints’
may or may not have been registered about this group in the
months/years preceding the Yarnell incident ( if any )… this
GM group was ‘outside the norm’ and ‘insulated’ from the
‘normal (federal) channels’.
You are absolutely right about ‘the buck stopping’ in
an ‘abnormal’ place for THIS (one) crew.
Even if the emails were flooding into Chief Fraijo’s and Darrell
Willis’ mailbox(es)… if they didn’t give a shit… then nothing
happened.
Lessons to be learned?
You damn betcha.
I absolutely and strongly agree with everything you just said in your post…you get it.
Although I guess my little joke in my post about hotshot and smokejumpers rivalry was homophobic. I apologize for that joke. See…ex hotshots can be taught…even burned-out ones.
Let me try one more time, there is no “guess” about it. Please accept my apology for my crude and completely inappropriate attempt at humor in my comment above regarding hotshot and smokejumper rivalry. WFF is right, I have said to much and I wish I had the willpower to quit commenting on this blog or thread or whatever it is. The good news is that all of us now have a forum to express our opinions. The bad news is that all of us now have a forum to express our opinions.
Bob, I have no idea why you are lashing out at me, but you seem to have missed both *my* post and MIke’s prior post. I will re-post mine for you, in response to your inexplicable vitriol toward me:
Bob, I have avoided saying this, but it seems like you are going to press the point, so here we go…. I am partially echoing what Mike has already said (but everyone ignored), when I make the obvious and grave point as follows:
If I buy into RTS’s theory, then I have to buy into the fact that RTS and his friends deliberately did NOTHING about something that they recognized as a life-threatening problem (“we could see this coming” or something like that is what RTS says his friends said).
The fact that men in RTS’s position would stand by without sending an E-MAIL, anonymous note, or anything to Prescott Human Resources, to ADOSH, or to ANYONE (which would then lead to a paper trail that I could sniff out) is something I refuse to fathom.
Period.
Reply to Elizabeth post on March 20, 2014 at 6:34 pm
Elizabeth… you seem to have answered your own first
sentence query with your own last sentence.
The reason people are getting upset with you is that there
are, apparently, all kinds of things you ‘refuse to fathom’.
That’s ok, counselor.
You have decided to play your own game and I, for one,
still wish you luck.
The truth will be the truth… no matter where it comes from.
Firs Elizabeth You have said earlier that you were relying on 3 highly qualified people including me and a couple of others on the Email questions you have mailed out so what is it thousands or 6 or 10???
All of those that I listed I can state are WFF based on there statements, you might not know there real names but I know the quality of there information.
RTS is a quality Fire Fighter Worked on Hot Shot Crews Most of his Life from his first job on my crew in 1973 so 40 plus years and he never worked for Marsh but was on fires that marsh was on and knew Marsh as he worked up to and took over GM. So he knows Marsh and about Marsh end of statement.
I have com to the conclusion that you are working for one of the Lawyers for the families and trying to prove that the State and the Overhead caused the death of Granit Mountain 19. You have been doing this and force feeding us with all of these assumptions that Marsh and Granit Mountain did every thing right and if you get enough of us to agree then it is part of your case good luck with that. As you can tell by now you do not need to send me any more Email Questions.
When you do not want to listen to the facts there is not much any of us can say.
In closing Thank God you are not a fire fighter.
Am glad you spoke up about this, Mr. Powers. Because she is playing her own game here. And it’s the WFF’s who are getting played.
the experienced firefighter Bob Powers correctly stated those men would have done the right thing staying in the burned out zone they were in.
In fact, one of Marsh’s communications stated “we are safe in the black, can you get the BR…”
we just seek the missing links- the mystery remains as to why he changed his mind.
And we are in search of that mystery as we have been. A combination of several things were at work in this tragedy.
Sonny, you are claiming that one of Marsh’s communications was “can you get the BR…”
What does that claim mean? What does “can you get the BR” mean, Sonny?
Thank you!
Elizabeth…
Fer cryin’ out loud… please check your own
(supposedly) voluminous data.
Sonny is (obviously) referring to the ADOSH report.
Page 18 of ADOSH report…
Shortly thereafter ( circa 1550 ), Operations Section
Chief 2 Musser radioed GMIHC and asked if they could
spare resources to assist in Yarnell. Either Marsh or
GMIHC Captain Steed responded that they were
committed to the black and that Musser should contact
BRIHC working in the valley (during his interview Musser
stated that he wasn’t sure who he was talking with).
**
** GARY CORDES IS THE ONE WHO PERSONALLY
** REQUESTED THAT GRANITE MOUNTAIN LEAVE
** THE ‘SAFE BLACK’ ON JUNE 30, 2013
>> Elizabeth on March 20, 2014 at 1:01 pm said:
>>
>> Just thinking out loud, here, if you are suggesting that they should have
>> gone all the way to Congress, well, it is obvious to me why going to
>> Congress was not appealing, because it would mean they were effectively
>> out of the workday. Meaning, they could have done NOTHING to help Gary
>> Cordes – who had ASKED for their help – and the communities if they had
>> gone over the ridge.
>>
>> WTKTT then asked…
>>
>> Elizabeth… you just said…
>>
>> “they (GM) could have done NOTHING to help Gary Cordes –
>> who had ASKED for their help.”
>>
>> What evidence exists for you to keep making such a statement
>> that it was Gary Cordes himself who ‘asked’ GM to leave the safe black?
>>
>> I want YOU to provide some indication that you are basing your statement
>> about Cordes on evidence… and not speculation.
>>
>> Can you do that for me (us)?
>>
>> It’s important.
>>
>> Elizabeth on March 20, 2014 at 4:07 pm said:
>>
>> If all you wanted was a “yes” or a “no,” the answer
>> is “of COURSE” (e.g. “yes”) I have a source. I actually have THREE.
Elizabeth…
Thank you… and ignore my response to Bob Powers below which was
written BEFORE I saw this statement from you.
So to be CLEAR…
( You only have to answer again if the answer is NO )…
You DO have THREE sources of real evidence that establish, without
a shadow of a doubt, that SPGS1 Gary Cordes, who just received the
Arizona Wildfire Association’s Firefighter of the Year award for his ‘heroic’
actions on the Yarnell hill fire…
…is, in fact, the one who personally asked Granite Mountain to leave
the ‘safe black’ that afternoon and embark on the journey that led
to their deaths.
The obvious NEXT questions ( which you said I was free to ask ) are…
1) WHEN did this request take place?
2) Did Cordes’ request come BEFORE or AFTER similar request from Musser?
2) HOW did the request take place? Direct radio call from Cordes to Marsh?
3) WHAT did Marsh and/or Steed then say to Cordes?
Did Marsh and/or Steed accept Cordes’ request right away instead of telling
him they were ‘committed to the black’ as they did when Musser made a similar
request in the same timeframe?
>> Elizabeth on March 20, 2014 at 4:56 pm said:
>>
>> WTKTT, as I explained elsewhere, Cordes and Musser were
>> talking, Cordes indicated that he needed “resources” to
>> “bump” to his area in light of the fire now moving due east
>> toward his area (as opposed to moving NORTH toward the
>> territory that Willis was working on), apparently Cordes’s radio
>> was not transmitting well, so Musser reached out to DivsA
>> on Cordes’s behalf.
Are you f**king kidding me?
NOW you are BACKING OFF your carte-blanche statement
that it was Gary Cordes who personally requested their help?
For crying out loud…. what is the matter with you?
After the exchange we just went through… where I made
every attempt to carefully get you to VERIFY this DIRECT
statement of YOURS…
>> Elizabeth said…
>> “they (GM) could have done NOTHING to help Gary Cordes –
>> who had ASKED for their help.”
…and you did that… saying you have THREE SOURCES…
…NOW you are ‘backtracking’ and saying it’s really just
something you THINK happened?
What is WRONG with you?
I will make one more attempt to clear up this VERY
important point ( and apologies to any family members
who might be reading this )…
Do you have DIRECT, unequivocal evidence that Gary
Cordes either asked Granite Mountain directly to leave
the safe black… or that he directly asked OPS2 Paul
Musser to make that request on his behalf?
Please be careful what you say next.
WTKTT: I have repeatedly communicated in my prior posts that it was made clear to DivsA that Cordes was looking for help.
…and we still have no idea what you are really
basing your public statements on.
That’s ok, counselor.
You are playing your own game here and obviously
no one is able to tell you anything.
Good luck with whatever it is you are doing.
First let me say there are several highly qualified wild land fire fighters on the discussion as well as myself none have questioned what I have had to say science this discussion but many non fire people here have occasionally questioned myself and others, I can’t speak for the others.
You have all read my forest service carrier and the jobs I was in.
So the following has to do with my actual fire experience which I rely on heavily when responding to question’s or remarks that don’t fit my knowledge of wild land fire.
I fought Fire for 33 years. I also wrote burn plans and managed controlled burns of all types.
I fought fires in every State in the west plus Minnesota and Florida.
in 33 years I was on close to 1000 fires from Fire Fighter to type 2 IC and Air Attack On every kind of fire you can think of. Grass to Timber from 1 tree to 400,000 ac. I understand Wild Land Fire Fighting Safety In those 33 years I can not count the number of people I trained in Safety and different facets of fire fighting.
I also planed and executed fall and spring burn plans for fuel reduction. On 3 different Forests. In Timber clear cuts to brush reduction Pinion Juniper to sage brush.
Those are my collage of wild land fire fighting credentials. I know others here like RTS, SR, Gary, Eric, TTARE, Have a lot if not more than me in background I know by the way they speak. So when we all agree with something or someone it is coming from really reliable people with a heavy background in FIRE. What we are saying come from years and years of experience. WE are not fighting amongst our self’s so we must be stating the facts.
If you do not want to agree with our answers then there’s not much else we can tell you. I think that WTKTT has long science came to that conclusion and he has done a lot of studying and supportive input to our statements.
“WE are not fighting amongst our self’s so we must be stating the facts.”
Bob, with all due respect, you are only FIVE guys, and there are hundreds or thousands of emergency or wildfire professionals who are reading this website and NOT agreeing with you.
The fact that five guys, four of whom are totally anonymous, agree on something does not mean that that “something” is fact, at least according to any investigation standards with which I am familiar. The fact that not more guys are agreeing with you here is telling to me.
Do you want the people who disagree with you to just shut up and go away? Or what would you like us to do?
We may only be “five” guys or whatever the number actually is, but we are the current or ex fire guys participating in this discussion. I can’t be responsible for what “other” current or ex fire guys may be emailing you on the side, but if they are not putting it here, whatever they have to say doesn’t mean anything.
At least WFF put his objections down in writing on this thread. I do have to respect that, so I should not have said he is NOBODY, I should have saved that title for whoever is carrying on sidebar discussions with you.
The people who contact me have all used their REAL names, Gary, which means that I can vet them.
Whereas RTS might be the guy that Eric Marsh fired a few years ago, and SR might be the person who had to leave GM involuntarily due to falling off the wagon.
🙂
I have told you this once already…but I will tell you again. Bob Powers’ fire credentials are above reproach…period. And he has vouched for RTS many times. RTS is still close to the ground…the hotshot crew bosses who walked through of the Yarnell Hill Fire.
That is why I have to believe RTS, and had to finally accept the narrative that I have been fighting. Fighting more than you have I might add, while I tried to put myself in Eric Marsh’s position on the Yarnell Hill Fire, but I finally had to let it go.
Please keep in mind, I was hearing Eric Marsh was a top-notch hotshot crew boss from Darrell Willis and others at his level, those are the few people I know now in fire. Primarily men that used to be hotshot crew bosses who now run the organizations. I don’t know anybody even close to the ground anymore.
Gary, you keep missing my point: Maybe I *will* ultimately rule out every other rational possibility, or maybe I will stumble on a big pile of written statements (or do my own interviews) of the anonymous guys RTS is quoting. But, until then, I have to keep investigating. My goal is closure and every possible lesson learned. That means I keep going until I am done. I have made clear that maybe RTS is 100% correct, but I am not willing to put my name to that position without first continuing my investigation, because the non-anonymous data that I have to date is not consistent with RTS’s position. That does not mean that he is WRONG – that means that I keep looking until I can’t.
I still have no idea why you are attacking me, Gary. What did I do to you, personally?
I would expect any of us to question each other when
assertions are made… and we all have, from time to time.
No one is ‘clean’ in this (public) discussion. We have ALL
( from time to time ) thought we saw things in the evidence
that supported a ‘theory’ or two…
…but Mr. Powers… I assure you… if it was even YOU, at this
point, who was stating that SPGS1 Gary Cordes was the
one who personally requested GM to leave the safe black
that day…
…I would be asking YOU to back that up.
There are a LOT of things about this incident that amount to
just ‘details’ and will be argued about for years to come…
…but for someone to come on here stating that they know
exactly WHO made the ACTUAL request for GM to leave
the safe black… but not give any indication if there is even
any evidence to support such a ‘theory’… that is something
else altogether.
A statement like that goes to the fundamental reasons for
the tragedy itself… and is not to be ‘taken’ or ‘accepted’ lightly.
All I want is for Elizabeth to say whether she has any evidence
to back up a statement like that… or whether she is speculating.
That’s all.
I did below, WTKTT.
I have no fewer than THREE pieces of evidence.
Yes… I saw that just AFTER I wrote the response
to Mr. Powers above… so please IGNORE my
entire comment above.
I DO appreciate your response… and
( as with RTS’s postings ) I have no reason
to doubt you at this time.
So thanks again… and please read the new
top-level posting above where I ask the obvious
*next* questions that you said I was free to ask.
Elizabeth… I take it back.
I do NOT appreciate your response ( since
minutes later we found out you ARE still
just speculating about a whole lot of things ).
I also DO ‘now have reason to doubt you’.
Only took a few minutes.
If you want us to believe what you are
alleging about this whole “It was made
clear to DivsA that Cordes needed his
help” carte-blanche statement…
…then publish the evidence that allows you
to make such a specific statement as if
it was a FACT and let people make up
their own minds about it.
Thanks in advance.
Again, why aren’t you making RTS publish his evidence? (FYI, my evidence is partially already out, and more should be coming out in the next few days, hopefully. But the bigger point is: why are you hounding ME and not RTS?)
No Bob…I do not have more experience than you, not by a long shot, I was a hotshot for 10 years…that’s it, and that is all. I was a pencil pusher (other than my short stint hosing out outhouses) as a dispatcher making guesses about what a fire might be doing based on what color the smoke was and whether it was laying over or not until a ground commander got on scene…and if that ground commander was a GS-3 first year engine crew member…they were in charge and called the shots. Period. If you say it…that is how it is. Period. I also defer to RTS.
I am once again completely baffled by another concept. Is someone really attempting to suggest that somehow the Granite Mountain Hotshots had to leave the safe area they were in, much less had to walk in front of a fire which had reversed direction, and although it may have been primarily moving southeast, that still means it was moving south.
And yes, the GMHS knew the fire had reversed direction, just like the meteorologists said it would, exactly when they said it was going to do it. And burn straight down that big valley full of fuel that was designed to channel the wind just like the banks of a river channel the water – in the direction the GMHS choose to walk? This is just as confusing to me as the suggestion that the GMHS or any firefighter would attempt to move to an objective under the “cover” of circling slurry bombers like they were C-130 gunships.
I am ready for current wildland firefighter out there to jump in and correct me, but except in southern California, and because of the Santa Ana winds, which only occur in southern California, and only at certain times of the year, under specific meteorological conditions that everyone who lives in southern California understands, fires do not burn rapidly burn downhill during the day anywhere that I have ever heard or experienced (excluding some specific area, under specific conditions as a one off).
We taught in any basic intro to firefighter class (S-130?) that because the sun heats the earth during the day, the warmer air flows up the mountains, and therefore fires generally burn uphill during the day. And as the earth cools off at night, the air flows down the mountains, and therefore fires generally “back” down the slope during the night. I used to say a fire is like a grizzly bear (shorter legs in front), it will run after you much faster uphill than it will downhill during the day, so you should always move downhill away from the fire if you can. Pretty simple stuff.
As you are going to a fire, if the column of smoke is going straight up vertically and is white, you know can get away with a lot more (although you should still follow all of the rules just like Bob and RTS say) than if it is black and “laying over” horizontally. So…if smoke is black, and the smoke column is laying over while if points in your direction, you should be CAREFUL and get the hell out of there, especially by not moving in that direction. That is what Sonny instinctively knew even though he has never attended an S-130 class.
And if the fire has turned into a firestorm with a really big impressive pyroclastic cloud as Sitta said in an earlier comment, nobody should be thinking about doing anything in relationship to fighting that fire, (or anything else) everyone should be doing nothing but getting as far away from it as they reasonably can, because everything is about to get real western.
Everyone should have been pulled off the fire line…right then…if not sooner. And if no overhead ordered them to pull back, any crew boss with any common sense would have known that and done it anyway, just as Sonny did. Not complicated stuff.
And after a fire tops out on top of the ridge, it may back down the next slope, but it will back down very slowly because it is now burning against the uphill wind from the other side, rather than with the wind. The only danger will be if the wind throw sparks high enough up so that the fire spotted down below the next slope, and the spot fires are now burning back up that hill with the wind.
So…maybe you don’t want to commit to far going down the hill towards Congress, but just wait a few minutes and then walk back over the ridge towards Yarnell again because now that area is black (a little smoky and hot…but safe, unless there was a dirty burn that left the overstory, so now there could be a reburn, but that is getting ahead of our basic concept here and that is not what happened at Yarnell, that fire wasn’t leaving much behind…overstory, understory or otherwise).
I don’t think anyone should be suggesting that just because the GMHS walked over the ridge while waiting for the fire to top out, the GMHS had to keep walking to Congress and take themselves completely out of the fight. That is ridiculous.
I said a long time ago that the Granite Mountain Hotshots could have in simply stayed where they were at as they were “ordered” to do, and I do think it was an ORDER, or they could have literally walked in any direction except the one they chose to, and they would have been fine. They could have waited a few more minutes, and then simply walked to the backside of Yarnell through all of the new black the fire just created.
No offense to the good citizens of Yarnell, but I would have been very happy to sit on that ridge and watch Mother’s Nature’s Grand Show, no matter how LITTLE taxpayers were paying my crew, and how few benefits they were giving my crew because the taxpayers always want everything as cheap as they can get them, until their little Wildland Urban Interface slice of heaven on a bun is getting burned over (or some other problem they themselves, or their loved ones are experiencing), and then they want everything, and more, done by everybody ASAP. Too late.
Although I do have some sympathy for those residents of Yarnell who were apparently waiting for the fire overhead (who had their heads up their asses) to tell them to start evacuating the area even though the pyroclastic cloud was already looming over their overgrown yards while it was raining sparks down on their unmitigated fire-stupid (as opposed to being fire wise) indefensible structures.
Whoops…there I go again, sounding as bitter as my new friend and loyal opposition WFF has accused me of being.
Elizabeth…I know you and I have a difference of opinion about the status of this investigation, but I think you are using some high powered (and high dollar) talent to look into possibilities that are non-starters. I don’t know who is telling you otherwise (RTS is thinking about getting as caustic as me with his Milk Toast Hotshots comment, but I thought it was funny), but they are telling you completely wrong ideas to investigate or even consider.
Is someone out there seriously trying to make a case that the Granite Mountain Hotshots HAD to do what they did, and that was their only REASONABLE alternative? If that is the case, this thread has really outlived its usefulness, and it’s very reason to exist (now I am starting to sound like our old and banned friend xx-fullsail-xx), maybe I do need to get a life.
You don’t rule out every other option before speaking ill of the dead? I do.
Elizabeth…there is a difference between ruling out other options that have already been ruled out by consensus of the wildland firefighters who have been participating in this discussion months ago, before speaking ill of the dead, and continuing to beat a horse that is already dead, no matter how good it feels. Maybe you should send me your credentials after all.
We can’t (or at least I can’t) rule out every possible angle every nut case in this world can come up with and decide to write about…where would that end. Trying to determine whether or not the Granite Mountain Hotshots died because aliens exercised mind control over Eric Marsh and Jesse Steed and ordered to walk in front of that inferno?
I am going to give you the bottom line here…that has always been the bottom line even when I was trying to put myself in Eric Marsh’s position as best I could, and defend his memory based on what I had “heard” about him.
Eric Marsh ****** up and killed himself and his crew. Period. That is an indisputable fact because Eric Marsh was in charge and his crew is DEAD. A hotshot crew boss has great authority over his crew, complete authority. BUT he or she also have complete RESPONSIBILITY for their crew, and if their crew ends up dead (barring going down in a hard landing in a helicopter for example), they ***** up. Period. No exceptions…no excuses. It is what hotshot crew bosses sign up for when they accept the position. Deal with it.
So, Gary, you want to just leave it at “GM Fucked Up”? Ok. Good for you. Have fun on the “how to decorate your bathroom” website or whatever website you decide to go to next since the Yarnell Hill Fire discussion is over in your eyes.
I am surprised, though, Gary, that you do not care what exactly led the guys to march through that green field, other than them “fucking up.” I guess you are concluding that the actual reason does not matter because no other crew would ever do such a thing.
Also, Gary, just so that we are clear, the fact that a handful of anonymous guys have been debating things in various comment threads on the internet does not rise to the level of an investigation in which anyone should place their confidence, particularly when the guys have been doing it without the benefit of, say, pictures, weather data, accurate timelines, interviews, witness statements, etc., which are still not fully released.
More directly: How can there be a credible and fact-based conclusion (more specific than just “GM Fucked Up”) without the relevant materials? There can’t be. This debacle was a mass tragedy, and the government is trying very hard to withhold materials. Surely you have read John Dougherty’s most recent article on that exact topic? It is going to be a long time before every shred of available relevant information is released, much less considered by the WFF guys on the internet.
For example, the AARs from the Yarnell Hill Fire – have you and Bob read them yet? What about everyone else on this website? Have *they* read them, or do you all think that they are not relevant to this discussion?
Well…I guess I will have to just have to agree to disagree with you on this subject and move on to my how to decorate a bathroom website, although I am thinking about building a how to make bird houses web site…after all tomorrow is Saturday. I have not earned much in life…but I have earned the right not to argue with fools.
In other words, if you or anybody else is keeping score…I don’t have to argue with anybody about anything or care what anybody thinks about anything. I think I have made that clear even if I haven’t made anything else I have said clear…my race is over, it was the same one Eric Marsh was running…I already won. Been there, did that…lived to write about it.
Oh…and one more thing. Living to write about it was no big deal. In the entire history of wildland firefighting, only 3 (?) hotshot crew bosses have not lived to talk about it. Tony Czak (and he really FUCKED up, I was there) the El Cariso crew boss, Bob (and history) has clearly documented he really FUCKED up and well…you know the name of the third hotshot crew boss who really FUCKED up…right?
No…I didn’t say Granite Mountain FUCKED up. The Granite Mountain Hotshots died. I said their leader…their crew boss FUCKED up because they are DEAD. No excuses.
Oh…and one more thing WFF. You are right that nobody can do anything about what happened on the last fire no matter how bitter I am, but maybe somebody can do something about what happens on the next fire. IF…they learn lessons from the last fire, rather than just chalk it up to **** happens, and nobody did anything wrong?
Who “ordered” anyone to stay anywhere, by the way, Gary? I have never seen that established as fact anywhere. Quite the opposite!
Sigh…just like xxfullsail.xx used to do. I consider the “hunker down and be safe” an order, such as orders to hotshot crew bosses go. Or you could call it just really good FUCKING advice, whichever makes you happy. Except to arrogant, stubborn wildland firefighters who don’t think they need to follow any of the rules any of the time (coming from a guy who fought fire AGRESSIVELY but provided for safety first, that is an indictment) and who can challenge the laws of nature and the reality of the situation with immunity.
Oh…and one more thing. I have always said that even if Darrell Willis (which I believe he did) or anybody else ordered Eric Marsh to go to Yarnell…it was invalid because nobody can “order” a hotshot crew boss to do something that was so risky…the result was predictable. Hindsight or not. Eric Marsh still owned that decision.
I don’t think anybody actually GAVE the order to “hunker.” Or maybe you don’t care about audio forensics as part of the investigation. I did; I do.
…and you (typically) never answered
my question when this was discussed
down below.
What is your ALTERNATIVE word
for the first word of a sentence that
reads…
“xxxxxxx and be safe”
…or are you also saying that
there is no ‘and be safe’ quote
in the Caldwell video audio either?
If your answer there is yes… then
I’m afraid to inform you that
‘audio forensics’ has nothing to
do with this.
You need a hearing aid.
We love Gary. Gosh, nothing better to one’s ears than straight talk. Muuray Taylor is smokejumper and straight shooter too. We listen to so many types in the firefighting community and we appreciate everyone’s view but we just light up when we see Gary comment. Excellent post. 9 out of 10 of the people who have walked the area with us agree with Gary and we have walked it alot. Joy has her views that she wants to see proof only but all of us shake our heads and wonder why they would drop down in that overgrown bowl of brush. Thank you Gary. I am gonna vanish as it heats up here in Arizona but I told Joy I would come back to the area to hike it with you if the time ever came and you wanted such hike.
Thank you Tex, from somebody who has seen and done the things you have seen and done in your life…well, that is truly a compliment.
FYI, for those who missed it and for those who have been asking me, I did mention below that the evidence that *I* have gathered does not suggest that Jesse Steed or Eric Marsh had a pattern of behaving in a needlessly and excessively risky manner. Marsh was actually commended by an outside fire official for GM’s and his work on the Station Fire.
For those who want my source documents, please feel free to e-mail me.
It might well end up being that I find a pattern of excessively risky conduct at some point, but, for now, I have gone through over 200 GB of largely not-yet-publicly-available documentation and found nothing. That suggests to me that I am not likely to find anything….
Elizabeth…
Please at least indicate a reference for the following statement
that you have made a number of times now…
>> they (GM) could have done NOTHING to help Gary Cordes –
>> who had ASKED for their help
What evidence exists for you to keep making such a statement
that it was Gary Cordes himself who ‘asked’ GM to leave
the safe black?
See above.
By the way, WTKTT, why don’t you grill the anonymous posters on this site about their sources, rather than only grilling me? You don’t even *know* RTS’s real name (and you know MY real name and my investigation-relevant professional background), yet you take what RTS says that other anonymous sources say as gospel truth, while meanwhile grilling me. Why is that, WTKTT?
Reply to Elizabeth post on
March 20, 2014 at 3:23 pm
>> Elizabeth said…
>>
>> See above.
What is that supposed to mean?
Are you saying you DO have evidence that
Cordes himself personally made the request
for GM to leave the safe black… but I’m
supposed to email you just to get a
‘Yes’ or a ‘No’ on that?
>> Elizabeth also said…
>> By the way, WTKTT, why don’t you grill the
>> anonymous posters on this site about their
>> sources, rather than only grilling me?
Do you even read this thread?
Oftentimes I do just that.
This time… it’s not about anyone else but you.
All I want to know is do YOU have any real
evidence for the claim you keep making that
it was Gary Cordes himself who personally
requested GM to leave the safe black?
>> Elizabeth also said…
>> You don’t even *know* RTS’s real name (and
>> you know MY real name and my investigation
>> relevant professional background), yet you take
>> what RTS says that other anonymous sources
>> say as gospel truth
See above. There have been MANY times when
I have asked RTS to back up things he has
said. He always does… to the extent that I
now understand he is able to.
And I assure you… if RTS was the one currently
stating that Cordes was the one who requested
GM to come down as if it was a FACT…
… I would be ‘grilling’ him about it as well.
This isn’t about RTS.
It’s about YOU.
>> while meanwhile grilling me.
>> Why is that, WTKTT?
Read your own professed ‘approach to
investigations’ above.
TRUST… but VERIFY.
I want YOU to provide some indication that you
are basing your statement about Cordes on
evidence… and not speculation.
Can you do that for me (us)?
It’s important.
If all you wanted was a “yes” or a “no,” the answer is “of COURSE” (e.g. “yes”) I have a source. I actually have THREE.
I have already made clear to you that, for professional reasons, I try very hard not to state anything as a fact unless I have convinced myself to a degree that I ethically believe is appropriate that I have an established fact. So, when I assert things as facts, you can assume that I have a source. Feel free to keep asking, of course.
Elizabeth…
Thank you… and ignore my response
to Bob Powers above which was
written BEFORE I saw this blurb
down here.
So to be CLEAR…
( You only have to answer again
if the answer is NO )…
You DO have THREE sources of
real evidence that establish, without
a shadow of a doubt, that SPGS1
Gary Cordes, who just received the
Arizona Wildfire Association’s
Firefighter of the Year award for
his ‘heroic’ actions on the Yarnell
hill fire…
…is, in fact, the one who personally
asked Granite Mountain to leave
the ‘safe black’ that afternoon.
My only *next* question ( since I
am now free to ask )… is when
and in what format do you plan
to publish whatever it is you
are doing?
WTKTT, as I explained elsewhere, Cordes and Musser were talking, Cordes indicated that he needed “resources” to “bump” to his area in light of the fire now moving due east toward his area (as opposed to moving NORTH toward the territory that Willis was working on), apparently Cordes’s radio was not transmitting well, so Musser reached out to DivsA on Cordes’s behalf.
See above where I call
you out on this ‘backtrack’
of yours.
If you really want us to
believe what you say
here… show us the
evidence. Post it
somewhere public.
Yes. Simply not credible as-is. And this has been going on in multiple comments addressing multiple topics. When pressed, there is then a backtrack. Her confusing Santa Anas as something that happened at YHF become RTS saying that…not good.
Until his pears come forward you probably wont see written statements. I believe RTS came forward with the information if you chose not to believe it then you may miss the very key to unlock this mystery. it has happened before on the Loop fire. almost the same activity except only half the crew died. Do what ever it takes to make a name for yourself. If GM was rewarded for taking chances then they justified the fact they could do more chance taking. Braking the rules justified by the end result. In ten years I am sure they did some good things and received good ratings. They probably averaged 30 big fires per year all over the west.
I think most small groups with a strong leader and a practice of rule-breaking and secrecy even as to things such as their physical location when “on the clock” tend, very rationally, to not keep extensive records of their rulebreaking. So, unless someone outside GM did put notes in a file that got produced via FOIA, there’s no reason to even look for evidence of that sort of thing there.
Bob, I have avoided saying this, but it seems like you are going to press the point, so here we go…. I am partially echoing what Mike has already said (but everyone ignored), when I make the obvious and grave point as follows:
If I buy into RTS’s theory, then I have to buy into the fact that RTS and his friends deliberately did NOTHING about something that they recognized as a life-threatening problem (“we could see this coming” or something like that is what RTS says his friends said). The fact that men in RTS’s position would stand by without sending an E-MAIL, anonymous note, or anything to Prescott Human Resources, to ADOSH, or to ANYONE (which would then lead to a paper trail that I could sniff out) is something I refuse to fathom. Period.
>> On March 20, 2014 at 12:27 pm, Elizabeth said:
>>
>> My investigation motto is (and should always be) “Trust but VERIFY.”
>> If I am going to do an investigation the RIGHT way, then I cannot RELY
>> on what Sonny (for example) claims or what one anonymous guy says
>> another anonymous guy said without VERIFYING things to the
>> extent that I can.
Always a good approach.
So… using your OWN ‘approach’ about not trusting something just
because someone SAYS it…
>> Elizabeth on March 20, 2014 at 1:01 pm said:
>>
>> Just thinking out loud, here, if you are suggesting that they should have
>> gone all the way to Congress, well, it is obvious to me why going to
>> Congress was not appealing, because it would mean they were effectively
>> out of the workday. Meaning, they could have done NOTHING to help Gary
>> Cordes – who had ASKED for their help – and the communities if they had
>> gone over the ridge.
Keyphrase…
>> they (GM) could have done NOTHING to help Gary Cordes –
>> who had ASKED for their help
I believe that’s about the third time you have said that… WITHOUT
providing any reference of any kind.
What gives you the right to keep saying that it was Gary Cordes
himself who ASKED ‘them’ ( Marsh? Steed? who? ) for ‘help’ that day?
What evidence do YOU have that allows you to make such a
specific statement… as if it was a FACT?
Gary Cordes was just awarded this year’s Arizona Wildfire Academy
Firefighter of the Year award for his actions at the Yarnell Hill Fire…
…and you are putting the request for GM to leave the safe black that day
directly into his mouth.
Please provide some PROOF of why you are doing that.
If the big question that I, personally, am examining is “why did the GM guys leave the spot where they were sitting in the photos taken at roughly 4:02 and 4:04 p.m. and go to the Boulder Springs Ranch,” then part of answering that question for ME involves understanding fully the other options that were available at 4:04.
Hiking DOWN the two-track that Blue Ridge came in on for the face-to-face meeting with GM was no longer an option at 4:04 p.m. because the fire was pretty darn close to the two-track at that point. Hiking over to the black up the mountain might have been an option – IF all 19 men could have done it in roughly 22 minutes – although I am still thinking through (me, personally) whether there was anything about the black that would have made it less desirable to GM at that point at 4:04 p.m. The fact that it involved an incredibly steep slope at the top of robust green (raising super-heated gas issues) is not great, particularly since one firefighter on the fire that day believes the flame lengths were in excess of 200 feet when the front unexpectedly pushed at roughly 4:27-ish p.m.
WTKTT’s new revelation that there were HUGE green areas (“the size of soccer fields”) in the black also could have been a thought in GM’s collective mind as they analyzed whether they wanted to get in there (given that they presumably realized that any green areas in the black could have caught fire at any time and put off some, flying embers, and radiant heat). If I am missing anything with that, such that having huge green areas (“the size of soccer fields”) in the black is not actually a problem, please let me know. (To that end, I would be grateful if people like SR, WTKTT, etc. could lay off the snark and needlessly insulting comments toward me, since those comments make me want to throw up my hands and walk away, which would benefit neither the communities impacted by the fire nor the larger wildfire/firefighting/emergency communities generally. Thank you.)
No way in that fuel flame lengths were 200 ft.. I am not trying to be negative to you in any way. The Black even with some islands was safe. The Islands never burned during the 1600 blowup of the fire. That was WTKTT fact that the burned area was safe not that GM could use it as a SZ. Please listen to what we as fire fighters are telling you. I am trying not to be snarky or insulting just answer your questions. RTS was on site several months ago and also said the black was safe and referred to Frisby stating the same thing. Also to clarify if GM would have waited in the black till the fire made its run to the Boulder Springs Ranch. Then they could have walked across the top on the ATV trail and down the trail to the vehicle parking area they had left there trucks in and back into town. That was a real option than going into heavy brush. That option would have taken longer for some reason they were in a hurry. They never had to leave the black because of the fire. That was one thing determined by the Region 3 Hot Shot Superintendent walk thru on the fire. If you read the other statements from the past 2 days you will note that even Tex said the Black was safe on top and over the ridge again 300 ft. to the top of the ridge see map.
Thanks, Bob. Just so you know, however, my investigation motto is (and should always be) “Trust but VERIFY.” If I am going to do an investigation the RIGHT way, then I cannot RELY on what Sonny (for example) claims or what one anonymous guy says another anonymous guy said without VERIFYING things to the extent that I can.
To that end, it doesn’t MATTER if the green *never* burned. That is an “ex post” analysis, and I am doing an “ex ante” analysis. What did GM know at 4:04 p.m. when they made their decision? They knew that there were green areas in the black that were the “size of soccer fields.” Isn’t that kind of dangerous for a black or no? Again, I care about WHY GM did what they did, not what we NOW know didn’t burn.
Thank you, though, for giving me your input (and for doing it without snark)! 🙂
No it is not unsafe unless something like a contentions understory burn where the top of the fuel doesn’t burn a fire creeps thru the ground fuel and the over story could crown and burn. The Islands in question were left after the first 2 days of the burn or first 400 acres. Many fires leave what is called a mosaic burn. Burned area with Islands and strips of unburned inside the burn. Those Islands were to far from the big burn on the 30th to catch fire well inside the burn area. As is evidence that they did not catch fire on the afternoon of the 30th. They were well inside the old burn area not next to the fire line and unburned fuel. There were also some areas referred to by WTNTT near the deployment area I am not talking about those. just the burned area on the 28 to the morning early afternoon of the 30th. Dose that make science to you?
Also what GM knew—–
Marsh and crew knew they had 400 to 1800 acres of burn above them and there fire line.
Marsh walked way up into the area and also met with Frisby on top in the Black. They knew they had a lot of black above them.
To try and add a little additional clarity to the subject, let me provide this example:
An acre is approximately the size of one football field. Let’s say that there were five, separate, one acre unburned areas within the black. That would leave 395 football fields of black for a crew to shelter in, within the 400 acre area.
Yeah, but, uh, have you looked at WHERE those “soccer fields” or football fields are and how fast GM could get to them and around them? I haven’t (which is why I am asking YOU). For me, it is all about verifying the details, as opposed to believing what some anonymous guy said that another anonymous guy said.
That said, what Bob Powers says makes sense to me.
Reply to Elizabeth post on
March 20, 2014 at 1:41 pm
>> Elizabeth said…
>>
>> Yeah, but, uh, have you
>> looked at WHERE those
>> “soccer fields” or football
>> fields are and how fast GM
>> could get to them and
>> around them? I haven’t.
For the third time…
The photos being discussed
at this time are HERE…
A42-Aerial Video and
Photos Mayhew
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/7b7asvh6ptdavbr/FixOl2n6pI
269 super highres aerial
photos taken on July 4, 2013,
just 4 days after the Yarnell tragedy.
I don’t claim anything. I state the day as it happened. What claims are you referring to when using my name, Elizabeth? I have had numerous firefighters hike it with me with extensive background in fires and they are so very proud I shared that day. Do not forget, I had Joy snap photos all through that day. What if I never did. Where would anyone from the Sair to OSHA to media/authors/journalists/investigators be if I had not made her take them in 103-107 degree weather to show the fire at the fire edge. Joy wanted to take a few shots to show locals the area and go. I can speak and you can have no interest in me but we have been nothing but open in sharing that day to all who seek the truth. We do not feel the weather was the final factor until all areas have been exhausted on the human factor area. That is all. Simple. We never made any claims or theories but shared purely our accounts that whole weekend.
What are you talking about, Sonny? I am not disputing anything you said…..
somewhere you mentioned my name Sonny and “claim” to have ???
so I replied.
I just want to clarify I never made theories or claims. I just told my accounts as they happened on the fire with proof (vidoes and photos) and every day since.
I would probably name the people Joy would not but Joy knows the community and respects the sensitivity of the people and their traumas so I will not do that for Joy. Joy just hopes the people in time will come out and tell you all. Some did. Dr. Leroy Anderson and his CBS Morgan Loew piece shares that account. Thank you for not disputing the accounts because its how my day happened. I saved Joy’s life and she to this day does not understand that too well. That’s ok with me. It’s life experience of knowing that terrain and fire. She is a kid. Yet I knew early on to leave that area. Wooten/Morrison compliments our account that weekend. Excellent reading.
I’m not sure what you are talking about, Sonny.
Reply to Bob Powers post on March 20, 2014 at 12:09 pm
>> Mr. Powers said…
>> The Black even with some islands was safe.
>> The Islands never burned during the 1600
>> blowup of the fire.
>> That was WTKTT fact that the burned area was
>> safe not that GM could use it as a SZ.
Correct. The ONLY reason I pointed out those aerial
photos of the ‘safe black’ at the anchor point in the
discussion below was so that if anyone still had any
doubts that the existing ‘safe-black’ was NEVER
‘touched by flame lengths’ or ‘hit by spotting’ that
afternoon… then there is the PROOF.
Besides… even IF they had any ‘concerns’ up there…
they could have turned even that one ‘visible’ unburned
area into a parking lot if they hadn’t wasted 35 minutes
hiking south, dropping into a fuel-filled tangled mess
of a canyon, and eventually walking into a wall of flames.
You can do a LOT of clearing in 35 minutes with 4
chainsaws and 19 guys…. and that one area they
could ‘see’ already right near them and could have
turned into a ‘dirt parking lot’ was 2/3 the size of
the ‘safe-zone’ they ended up wasting time hiking
to, anyway. It didn’t happen. They LEFT ‘the black’.
>> They never had to leave the black because of the fire.
Correct… and anyone who calls themselves a wildland
firefighter would have known that.
>> They were in a hurry.
Yes… they were. Their decisions (apparently) had
NOTHING to do with ‘staying safe’ as OPS1 Todd
Abel TOLD them to do. They were on ‘a mission’.
I just wish that if they were in such a hurry that they
would choose that absurd ‘short-cut’ through that
fuel-filled canyon with no lookout… then why weren’t
they moving at ‘double-time’ on the hike south
before even making that decision? The ‘minutes’ that
would have cut off the trip *might* have made
the difference, in the end.
The SOONER they could have reached the floor
of that canyon and found out they were in deep
tapioca… the more options they would have
had ( RUN forward to ranch or RUN back to ridge ).
Brendan McDonough knows EXACTLY what their
‘mission’ was that afternoon… whose IDEA it was…
and so does anyone else ( Darrell Willis? ) who was
listening to that infamous ‘discussing their options’
conversation..
My view is that there is NO way that they could have made it to the floor of the valley *AND* back up it again before the fire was on them as per the Matt Oss photos. That’s also (one reason) why the suggestion that they should have walked the entire ridge over to the Boulder Springs Ranch was a non-starter.
I should elaborate, to avoid being cryptic: When the assumed descent route was TOTALLY burned out, it still took the fit, average guy roughly 15 or 20-ish minutes to get fully down it. Imagine being one of 19 hiking back UP it with a pack and guys in front of you and behind you. Even if you drop everything and RUN, how likely is it that you can get back up it faster than, say, 12 minutes. So, 20 minutes down, 12 minutes up, we are at 32 minutes total. By then, the fire in the Matt Oss photos would have been on them, it seems.
Reply to Elizabeth post
on March 20, 2014 at 1:09 pm
>> Elizabeth said…
>> When the assumed descent route
>> was TOTALLY burned out, it still
>> took the fit, average guy roughly
>> 15 or 20-ish minutes to get fully
>> down it.
Nope. Blue Ridge Captain Brown
made the same exact descent on
the same exact path assumed
for GM ( the drainage area ) in
only FOUR minutes when he was
‘running’ down from the ridge to
the deployment site following
the burnover. See the Blue Ridge
GPS data records.
>> Imagine being one of 19 hiking
>> back UP it with a pack and guys
>> in front of you and behind you.
It’s absurd to even imagine they
would have still had their packs on,
or to even use the word ‘hiking’ to
describe the kind of ‘scramble for
your life’ moments that would have
been happening there.
>> Even if you drop everything and
>> RUN, how likely is it that you can
>> get back up it faster than, say,
>> 12 minutes.
VERY likely.
Have you EVER felt the kind of
adrenaline, yourself, that would have
been completely in play there?
Life or Death?
It’s awesome what can happen then.
>> So, 20 minutes down, 12 minutes
>> up, we are at 32 minutes total. By
>> then, the fire in the Matt Oss
>> photos would have been on
>> them, it seems.
Someday someone needs to do a
‘full adrenaline’ test… but I believe
the ‘return trip’ could have been
accomplished in 6 minutes, even
with the manzanita to deal with.
That means that if they had
‘dropped packs and run’ at the
exact moment they decided it
was their only option… SOME
of them MIGHT have made it
back up ( and OVER ) the ridge.
Perhaps only half of them ( whoever
was best at maintaining maximum
speed and not falling down at all ).
Don’t forget… we now know that
they had realized their predicament
some moments ( perhaps even
1 or 2 minutes? ) BEFORE Steed
made his first MAYDAY call.
That is not ‘over modulation’ being
heard in Steed’s first MAYDAY call.
It’s CHAINSAWS already RUNNING.
So the fact that they realized their
predicament PRIOR to 1639 and
had already spent time deciding
to deploy, finding the spot, and
pulling the ropes on the chainsaws
just adds even MORE time to
what would have been needed to
get back up the ridge.
If they even just spent 60 seconds
doing all that before the first
MAYDAY call… then even your
(very) conservative ’12 minutes’ up
time means they could have
made it out of there.
Half the time back up pre-burn is simply not credible.
Only a good test will prove it.
Full adrenaline, no pack, life
or death scramble, as fast
as possible back up.
No one has done such a test.
Even if someone does… the
results will ONLY apply to
that third and final ‘fatal
decision’ moment from that
day… but it would still be
interesting to know what
might have been possible.
black that would have made it less desirable to GM at that point at 4:04 p.m.
WHERE IS TOM DOLAN—HE HAS THE WEATHER SCIENTIFIC NAMES—YET IN LAY MEN TERMS HE STATED THE 2000 DEGREE HOT ASH WOULD OF GOT SONNY AND ME AS WELL AS THE GMHS IN CERTAIN AREAS OF THE BLACK WHEN THAT LATE AFTERNOON TORNADO/CLOUD COLLAPSED AND DROPPED THAT “P”-ASH DOWN—SO HE SAYS THAT WOULD MAKE IT LESS DESIRABLE. DO NOT THROW UP YOUR HANDS ELIZABETH. SOME OF THE 2014 FOLKS THAT COME OUR WAY HAVE TRIED TO RE-NARRATE OUR HIKE AND EYE-WITNESS ACCOUNTS AND YOU ARE SPOT ON TO KEEP TREKKING WITH THIS AND TOO MANY HAVE COME TO US AND APPRECIATE EVERY BIT OF ASSISTANCE AND TIME PEOPLE HAVE FOR THIS IS A HARD HEALING PROCESS FOR SO MANY— NOW, TOM DOLAN SAID THE ASH ALONE AT 2000 DEGREES WOULD OF KILLED THEM YET REMEMBER WE ARE ALIVE AND WITH THE SQUIRRELY WINDS THAT DAY AND THE ODD RETARDANT DROPS AND NOONE COMING PUBLIC YET SHOWING THE AERIAL THOSE LAST HOURS BEFORE DARK OR THE HOMEOWNERS NOT POSTING PUBLIC “YET” THEN ALL WE CAN DO IS WAIT—YET AS I TOLD TOM DOLAN THAT HE MADE AN EXCELLENT PRESENTATION FROM A WEATHER SIDE OF IT BUT IN THE END HE THOUGHT MAYBE WE THOUGHT THIS WAS A SMOKE GUN OR HOWEVER THE PHRASE IS BUT NOPE- WE JUST WANT THE FACTS AND FOR DOCUMENTS AND SOURCE TO SHOW TO HOW IT BECAME A FACT IS ALL—I RESPECT ALL THE FOLKS WHO ARE LOCKED IN THAT THE MEN DID WRONG BUT I WON’T SETTLE AS THAT IS THE PURITY OF IT ALL UNTIL ALL AREAS HAVE BEEN LOOKED AT AND THAT IS IMPORTANT. TOM SAYS IT WAS THE WEATHER THAT WAS THE FINAL CONTRIBUTOR FACTOR AND WE TEND TO WANT TO EXHAUST “ALL” ANGLES OF THE HUMAN FACTOR AS WELL AS THE HUMAN PERCEPTIONS AS THIS UNFOLDED—WHAT I SAW WILL NOT BE THE SAME PERCEPTION AS WHAT TEX SAW…HE SAW IT AS DANGEROUS EARLY ON AND I DID NOT SO YOU SEE HOW WE SAW THE SAME FIRE BUT SAW IT DIFFERENT. I HAVE HIKED THE MOUNTAINS AND BEEN KNOWN TO HIKE IT WITH SNAKE BOOTS BUT I DID A LUNDI MOVE AND I WAS BAREFOOT OR WITH SANDALS ON DOING ABOUT 8 MILES AND OF ALL DAYS I HAD A SNAKE CROSS OVER MY ANKLE/FOOT BECAUSE I WAS TALKING TO TEX AND NOT FOCUSED TO THE GROUND AND AROUND SO ON THIS FIRE I WANT TO BE FOCUSED TO WHAT WE SAW ON THE GROUND AND AROUND BUT AS WELL EXHAUST ALL ACCOUNTS FROM ALL AREAS AND PIECE THIS PUZZLE TOGETHER AND THE SAIR DOES NOT MATCH ALOT OF HOMEOWNERS DOCUMENTED WITH PROOF ACCOUNTS AND ALL WE CAN DO IS KEEP PRAYING THE MORE THAT COME FORWARD THE MORE AT EASE MORE FEEL TO COMING FORWARD. SOME WE SPOKE WITH KNOW WITHOUT A DOUBT WE ARE NOT GOING TO SHARE WHO SHOWED US WHAT BUT WE WILL ALWAYS ENCOURAGE IT TO BE MADE PUBLIC AND I DO NOT CARE IF IT SOUNDS REDUNDANT BUT I HAVE TO KEEP IT FRESH IN THE POSTS FOR SOME DO NOT SCROLL TO OLD INFORMATION AND IT HAS BEEN SHOWING RESULTS TO AT LEAST HELP US WHO EYE-WITNESSED UNDERSTAND THE FIRE BETTER FROM OTHERS’ VIEWS AND ANGLES THAT SAW IT TOO.
I would say Mr. Dolan has no idea what he is talking about. 2000 degree hot ash in all my years I have seen no such thing. 2000 degrees hot air and a blow torch fire I have seen but that is centralized in the flaming front. Flame lengths going up hill in that type of fuel wind driven would not reach more than 100 Ft. as soon as the fire ran out of fuel the flame length would vanish as well as the high heat. the high heat would then dissipate some one on or slightly over a ridge 300+ feet from the fire would feel very little heat. Burning embers 400 to 500 Deg. Ignition point of woody fuel.
I have been on timber fires when they have crowned in the black, ash and smoke can be uncomfortable but not life threating and not 2000 degrees. I do not know how else to say it except only direct wind blown flame would carry any where near 2000 Degrees. 300 ft from the flame is safe in the black unless your in a chimney or narrow steep canyon where the heat would be concentrated the top of the mountain was certently not that.
he had scientific names for it but it was the late afternoon fire tornado he stated when the ash collapsed—the presentation may of made it to youtube- he did one here in Yarnell recently-
Much was speculation with out fact and I for one have never seen such an occurrence.
spot on. I actually stated that on the phone to him. I think he felt I was being a lady of debate but I too stated your last comment. Can you view the presentation. I just want facts/proof not speculations-
WTKKT,
I have some questions and comments regarding some of your comments to my post about your link for the Dropbox photos of the burned area around the GMHS SZ.
My point was that dropping off the ridge toward Congress as Tex suggested was a very good idea and commonly used in the WFF world. You’ll notice how the fire more-or-less petered out over the backside of the ridge. Hopping over a ridgetop works as a good SZ unless you have strong gravity winds like Santa Anas that burn downhill as fast and intense as uphill. Gravity winds were not the case on the YHF.
You mentioned how many of the boulders were not scorched and burned. Boulders do not make good SZ’s especially when they are surrounded by heavy fuel – thick brush in this case. So then, just because the boulders in these photos don’t show any/much evidence of scorch seems to be giving you a false sense of them being a safe alternative to a true SZ. Definitely not the case.
The green unburned islands you point out are very common on chaparral fires and should in no way be an indicator that one could either locate thos and/or rely on those as vialbe SZ’s. They’re the result of a number of factors like wind shifts, fire behavior pulses, higher fuel moistures, and the like.
WTKTT,
And the gaps/areas between the boulders act as chimneys, chutes, and saddles that funnel the winds and thus the fire behavior. Therefore, boulders do NOT make good SZ’s. I have never and would never use boulders as SZ’s or even safe areas unless they were devoid of fuel.
RTS, are I to understand that you are stating that all 19 GM Hotshots could have made it through the black and up the steep hike and over the ridge toward Congress, making it PAST the part of the Congress-side of the ridge that burned by no later than 4:27 p.m., even though they would not have departed on that trek sooner than 4:04 p.m.? If so, have you hiked that area? (I have not.) Thank you.
“am I” – whoops!
Elizabeth–Check below for the statements by me and WTNTT about distances from their location before they moved. From the heal of the fire it was 300 FT. to the ridge and the location where the fire started, an easy hike and in the burn. Also I went back to the state report and there is a topo map of the fire at 1300 that shows all the info and ridge line if you have knowledge of topographic maps.
Ok, so, Bob, if I am understanding you correctly, you are saying that the guys should have hiked UP the ridge… and over down to Congress, where they would have been totally out of the fire efforts, yes? If so, how long do you estimate that it would have taken them to get UP the ridge, before THEN turning and hiking all the way down to Congress. We know that the hike to Joy and Sonny – just two people – hours. How long would it have taken 19 GM guys, do you suppose? I am just thinking out loud, here. Trying to think this through….
I dought the hike into the Black would have taken 15 Min. They did not have to go to Congress but could have. The further into the black the more comfortable they would be. But they were always in the black and therefore safe.
REPLY TO—if I am understanding you correctly, you are saying that the guys should have hiked UP the ridge… FROM THE LUNCH BREAK AREA THERE IS HUGE BOULDERS NEAR ON THE MOUNTAINTOP AND YOU COULD EASILY RIDE THE MOUNTAINTOP TO THE AREA ABOVE THE 2 TRACK RIDGE AND SEE ALL FIRES AS WE DID—DROP DOWN ON TO THE 2 TRACK ROAD OR DROP TO THE CONGRESS SIDE BUT WE HAD THE FIRES IN VIEW MOST OF THAT MOUNTAINTOP HIKE AND IF THEY SAW IT TURN LIKE TEX (SONNY) DID AND THE DAY OF SQUIRRELY WINDS THEN THE ORIGINAL SAFETY ZONE OF THE HELM’S SHOULD AT THAT POINT BETWEEN 1-2PM BEEN MARKED AN AREA OF OMITTING AND BEGIN NEW LOCATION—WHICH IS HOW WE WENT AND WE HAD THE FIRE IN SIGHT UNTIL WE DROPPED DOWN WAY PAST ACRI’S CEMENT TRUCK ON THE MOUNTAIN TOP AND WAY PAST THE WINDMILL AREA SO THAT LETS YOU KNOW WE HAD THE FIRE IN VIEW AND WE ONLY DROPPED WHEN IT WAS FAR ENOUGH AWAY FOR TEX’S THINKING— and over down to Congress, where they would have been totally out of the fire efforts, yes?THEY STILL COULD SEE THE FIRE FROM THAT POINT AND THEY STILL COULD OF GOT TO GLEN ILAH ENDING UP NEAR THE HELM’S ON FOOTHILL LIKE WE DID OR PASS BY CANDIE CANE LANE LIKE WE DID—THERE WAS OTHE ROPTIONS. If so, how long do you estimate that it would have taken them to get UP the ridge, before THEN turning and hiking all the way down to Congress.I HIKE IT ALOT AND I AM STOUT AND IT DOES NOT TAKE LONG AT ALL DEPENDING WHICH SLOPE/STEEP TERRAIN/BOULDEROUS AREA. I MEAN IF I BEING STOUT HIKE FROM CONGRESS TO PRESCOTT USING THAT STEEP AREA AS A SHORTCUT AT TIMES VS TRAILING HWY 89 THEN I KNOW THE ELITE GMHS COULD DO IT AND I HIKE ALL YEAR ROUND IN THE HOTTEST TIMES SO YES THEY COULD OF DONE THAT BUT THERE IS A MISSING FACTOR AS TO WHY THEY FELT TO GO FROM THE BLACK TO THAT MOST DENSE MAZE LIKE VEGETATION BUT I FEEL CONFIDENT IN GOD’S TIME THE TRUTH WILL BE REVEALED BUT I STRONGLY FEEL THE SAIR AND OSHA REPORT IS NOT ALL OF IT. We know that the hike to Joy and Sonny – just two people – hours.PLEASE KNOW THAT WAS “THAT” FIRE AND NOT A NORMAL SITUATION BUT PEOPLE DO NOT REALIZE JUST A FEW DAYS BEFORE THAT WE HIKED FROM PRESCOTT DMV TOWARDS YARNELL WHEN MY HUSBAND WAS COMING HOME FROM WORK AND SAW US IN BETWEEN WILHOIT/YARNELL AND TOOK US THE REST OF THE WAY, PLUS WE HIKED THE NEXT DAY, THE DAY OF THE FIRE ON THE 28TH, THE 29TH, AND THE 30TH WITH NO BREAKS AND IT WAS VERY HOT THAT DAY SO YES IT DID TAKE LONGER BECAUSE JOY HAD THIS OLD MINER IN HER EAR SAY “TAKE THIS PHOTO OR THAT ONE” AND I HAD MY CAMERA IN MY BACKPACK ON MY BACK SO THERE WAS DELAYS IN TIME ALSO BECAUSE I TOOK MY SNAKE BOOTS OFF FOR 40 MINUTES MY FEET SWELLED AND I HAD 6 BLISTERS ALREADY FROM THE PRESCOTT HIKE. DIFFERENT DAYS I CAN GO QUICK BUT MY GPS READINGS ON AVERAGE SAYS WITH MY HEIGHT I RANGE FROM 7-9MPH ON MY PACE IN HIKES BUT NOT IN DENSE AREAS IT SHOWS 1-3MPH IF THAT HELPS. YET THAT DAY I WAS 1-3 ALL THE WAY AND ZERO AT TIMES RESTING AWAY FROM THAT DRAINING SUN—THE SMOKE THAT AFFECTED MY LUNGS AND THIS OLD MINER WHO FELT HE KNEW WHAT WAS BEST AND I WAS GRUMPY AS ALL HELL TO LISTEN TO ANYONE AND WANTED TO REST AT EVERY SHADE SPOT. I AM NOT THE GMHS AND I DID NOT WALK IN A FORMAL LINE WITH HEAVY GEAR AND I COULD NOT IMAGINE THEM SCALING 14FT BOULDERS AS TEX HAD ME ON AND MORGAN LOEW IS THE ONLY HIKE THAT WENT THE WAY WE WENT, THE WAY THE MEN WENT AND SAW EVERYTHING AND IT WAS A VERY LENGTHY HIKE BUT I CAN LOOK BACK AND SAY WHATEVER CBS REPORTER MORGAN LOEW REPORTS HE GOES THE DISTANCE NOT SOME FAUX HIKE FOR A QUICK STORY. HE SPENT TIME ASSESSING WHO WE WERE AND LOCALS—HE REALLY SPENT “TIME” ABOVE AND BEYOND ANY REPORTER’S JOB DUTIES— How long would it have taken 19 GM guys, do you suppose? I WOULD LIKE THAT ANSWER TOOI am just thinking out loud, here. Trying to think this through….KEEP AT IT—ELIZABETH IS ALSO ONE OF THE FIRST TO GET GOING ON THIS AND HAS BEEN STRONG IN HELPING ALL AND WE APPRECIATE ALL YOU DO—EVERYONE HERE. THIS IS A TOGETHERNESS THING AND ITS IMPORTANT IT STAYS STRONG SO THANK YOU ALL-
Also, as one looks at the eastern facing photos of the western ridge slopes, taken in the days after the fire had completed it’s push to west, one will see that there has been very little burning DOWN those western slopes. This backs-up what some of us have been saying regarding the usually safe passage of the down and out route, unless, as RTS has noted, it’s a Santa Ana like event.
TTWARE: When you say a Santa Ana-like event, I am assuming that the wind event documented in the Matt Oss photos is of that ilk, but perhaps I am misunderstanding.
My personal view is that we need to be mindful of the terrain and the fact that we had 19 guys traveling in a pack. Could they have realistically gotten up the ridge and OVER the ridge out of the super-heated gasses and the catastrophic smoke within roughly 20-ish minutes? I don’t know.
Santa Anas are downslope winds fed by high pressure air masses that cross into CA and then literally fall downhill. That is very different from what the Oss photos show.
If you mean could the men go from facing the fire and climb that steep sloped GREEN terrain from the deployment area—hell no. Not with it GREEN and that maze-like terrain and the grade/angle of steepness. nope. Ask the local rancher and the local jogger and some off the grid folks who know that exact spot or ask the Helm’s–NOPE. Not even if you were “specially groomed”—maybe one very special elite one but not 19 with all that gear.
Elizabeth,
Yes, that’s what I’m stating. I am “stating that all 19 GM Hotshots could have made it through the black and up the [SHORT] steep hike and [UP] over the ridge [AND DOWN THE OTHER SIDE] toward Congress, making it PAST the part of the Congress-side of the ridge that burned by no later than 4:27 p.m., even though they would not have departed on that trek sooner than 4:04 p.m.” Yes, they could have made it safely. Just look at the Dropbox photos where the fire BARELY burned over the top of the ridge. AND they could have even burned off some of the Congress-side of the slope as they travelled down toward the highway and sought refuge in that black. AND the “Congress-side of the ridge that burned” would have also provided them a SZ and safe refuge.
ANY of these, ALL of these, would have been a much safer alternative to the virtual suicide route they took down into the unburned chute and unburned bowl. Death traps for sure.
I think they would have been very foolish to abandon their perfectly good SZ at that time of the day, during the intense and erratic winds, and coincident extreme fire behavior. However, with the GMHS leaving at or about 4:04 would have easily allowed them to make it safely UP over the top of the ridge and DOWN toward the road to Congress (that may even be visible in some of the Dropbox photos).
Thanks, RTS.
Just thinking out loud, here, if you are suggesting that they should have gone all the way to Congress, well, it is obvious to me why going to Congress was not appealing, because it would mean they were effectively out of the workday. Meaning, they could have done NOTHING to help Gary Cordes – who had ASKED for their help – and the communities if they had gone over the ridge.
Also, I do not agree with you that the trip to the Boulder Springs Ranch was a suicide march, based on the weather and wind data that they had available to them at the time. We all know that it turned out to be a death march, but I am looking at what they KNEW at the time when they started their move (at likely 4:05 p.m.), and, based on what they knew at the time, it seemed that it would be fine.
There are things that just don’t seem to be processing here. I am not sure where Elizabeth gets the idea that, at the time GM committed to descending via the bowl, that conditions suggested this would be safe, at all. Likewise, Elizabeth keeps referring to the superheated gases and catastrophic smoke that they would have been exposed to if they’d stayed in the black.
Elizabeth, what, exactly, are the sources you are relying on for making these assertions, namely 1) your assertion that GM had reason to think that their bushwhack would be “fine,” and 2) your continual assertions that staying committed to the black would have exposed GM to superheated gases and catastrophic smoke and (implicitly) that GM’s decision to move was motivated by this risk?
Do you have ANY credible sources at all that support these views, or are you just saying these things?
SR, did you mean to also type “by the way, sorry for being an asshole to you before?” If so, I am happy to answer you. If not, pound salt.
Never was an asshole, so nothing to be sorry about. When you say things that show you obviously don’t have a grasp of some basics, it is the act of a friend to point that out. Particularly so when you have been looking at this event on a regular basis and still seem clueless as to basics. Even more so when you purport to be conducting a formal “investigation.” Imagine if you write some report talking about the Santa Ana winds at the YHF, and talking about how it would have taken GM at least HALF AS LONG to reverse and ascend the bowl as it did to descend. Let’s say it wouldn’t look good.
Likewise, is does no favors to the families of the deceased to tell them some fiction about how GM prudently retreated from the SZ because of concern over superheated gases. And that, btw, they’ll have to accept whatever lousy compensation Prescott is offering. Maybe emotionally pleasant to say there were no serious, jarring mistakes here, but very cruel to those families.
You realize that RTS brought up the Santa Ana winds, not me, right? So you are calling Robert the Second clueless! Niiiiice.
And you realize that WTKTT is the one making all sorts of absurd claims about how fast someone can run UP a hill, not me, right?
Maybe reading for comprehension is where you might want to spend your time, rather than snarking at me, SR.
No.
RTS said that dropping over a ridge can work as a SZ UNLESS you are dealing with gravity-fed winds like Santa Anas. He clearly knows exactly what they are. And never suggested that YHF involved Santa Anas. YOU however just stated a few minutes ago that you thought the Oss photos did show Santa Ana-like winds.
Likewise, you in fact did say you thought GM could reverse back uphill in half the time of the descent. WTKTT did agree with you, to be sure, but you put the idea out there.
Denying your clear words and claiming that it is my reading comprehension issue does you no credit.
Reading for comprehension, I said: “You realize that RTS brought up the Santa Ana winds, not me, right?”
What I saw and knew at the time and what Marsh said about Squarely winds on top before 1600 says they should have known they could not go down into a killing field with an out of control fire only 1 1/2 miles from where they were going. It is just basic Fire 101 a bad idea period. They should have said absolutely no to Cordes or any one else. It was just totally unsafe to do what they did and I believe they took the risk as they had many times before and this time it caught up with them.
Bob, I disagree with you on all counts, at least at this point in time, based on the materials that I am currently reviewing. A couple of unnamed, anonymous guys saying that Marsh – who might not have even BEEN with the crew at 4:04 – was unsafe does not an investigation make, at least the way that I do investigations. Gary might be different. 🙂
support this comment yet we seek to exhaust all angles as to how come…I mean, it just does not add up. For own peace, we would like clarity as to how come Helm’s remained a bomb proof safety zone and how come people want us to lock on to the weather factor only. We are not seeking blame or cover-up but we are open to show that hike in hopes one fits the puzzle together just right—because the homeowners’ accounts do not match to public reports and media accounts. Simple. No claims like Elizabeth states—we have no stakes or claims just our account that entire weekend. Which too many in the firefighter and smokejumper community who are independent thinkers or not—both sides—thank us for sharing our day because anyone who knows us knows Sonny is a desert isolated man and Joy does her hikes and meets/greets the locals on them and helps some too and ends her day before meeting Sonny jotting her hikes on her hiking page on zazzle. Not a book to be written just 2 live and let live free thinkers who are not programmed to believe what is being fed out there especially when we were THERE at the fire edge where the GMHS were as well watched the others Blue Ridge, Supervisors and other firefighters—and so far the people that were there that came to us say we are spot on AND do not forget we hiked it immediately upon return and our account never changed and alot is in the SAIR which compliments our account but there is some areas we feel there needs to be more said is all—like Sonny said earlier you don’t have to like us or what we say but how about the photos that are missing as well as the ones we shared already—they say it all. How about the homeowners’ accounts and photos. They say much more—so until it is all out there we will not settle on it being just the weather and that’s all.
Reply to RTS post on March 20, 2014 at 9:46 am
>> RTS said…
>> My point was that dropping off the ridge toward Congress as
>> Tex suggested was a very good idea and commonly used in
>> the WFF world.
No question. If they had exited the area the same way that
Tex and Joy did… they would all be alive today.
>> You’ll notice how the fire more-or-less petered out over the
>> backside of the ridge.
Yes. There WERE places where it ‘flared’ over the ridge
before ‘petering’ out ( The Matt Oss video shows these
specific points )… but see above. If they had exited the
area the way Tex and Joy did… ( or just retreated farther
into the cold black ) they would have been out of harm’s way
by that time.
>> Hopping over a ridgetop works as a good SZ unless you
>> have strong gravity winds like Santa Anas that burn downhill
>> as fast and intense as uphill. Gravity winds were not
>> the case on the YHF.
Correct. Didn’t happen.
>> You mentioned how many of the boulders were not scorched
>> and burned. Boulders do not make good SZ’s especially when
>> they are surrounded by heavy fuel – thick brush in this case.
>> So then, just because the boulders in these photos don’t show
>> any/much evidence of scorch seems to be giving you a false
>> sense of them being a safe alternative to a true SZ. Definitely
>> not the case.
Rest assured… I ( me, personally ) have no ‘false sense’ of
the boulder piles being a GOOD ‘safety zone’ that afternoon…
but we are talking about SURVIVABILITY here. I in no way
intended to ‘re-ignite’ the debate about whether they should
have scrambled into the rocks that day. They had NO GOOD
options at 1639… but the one they chose was absurd and
was an immediate death sentence… and they SHOULD
have known that.
All those photos show is that ONE of their only options at
1639 *might* have been ‘survivable’.
Personally… I think if they had scrambled to the rock piles…
about half of them would have died… but (maybe) the other
half would have found the ‘cave-like’ features that Tex himself
has talked about and ( if they could have held their breath long
enough and/or used their shelters as forward-facing shields )
some of them *might* have made it… even with some
pretty serious burns.
There was nothing SAFE about it… but the photos show that
there was a *chance* of ‘survivability’ up in those rocks.
>> The green unburned islands you point out are very common
>> on chaparral fires and should in no way be an indicator that
>> one could either locate those and/or rely on those as vialbe
>> SZ’s.
Yes… but the ‘unique’ thing about those ‘unburned’ areas
up around the anchor point shown in the July 4 aerial photos
is that they were ALREADY ‘inside the black’.
They WOULD have been able to ‘see’ them and ‘locate’ them.
If they really had concerns about being ‘safe’… even in the
middle of that extensive ( cold-black )… then these ‘visible’
unburned areas could/should have presented themselves
as yet ‘another’ option.
There was enough ‘cold black’ up there for ANYONE who
calls themselves a wildland firefighter to have felt ‘safe’
by just utilizing it… so we are already in ‘la-la land’ here
even discussing this… but stick with me for a moment.
If they had NOT wasted 35 minutes ( 4:04 PM to 4:39 PM )
hiking south, into a fuel-filled box canyon, and eventually
right into a wall of flames… then they could have used
those 35 minutes to TOTALLY ‘improve’ any of those
unburned areas in the middle of the black into an
ultimate safety/deployment site. A LOT of ‘clearing’ can
be accomplished with 19 guys, 4 chainsaws, and 35
minutes. If they really were worried that all that ‘black’
wasn’t good enough… they could have turned even just
that one ‘unburned’ area into a parking lot in under
35 minutes… and it was 2/3 the size of the ‘bomb-proof’
area they would ended up trying to hike towards, anyway.
Again… this whole discussion is absurd since there was
NO REASON for anyone who calls themselves a wildland
firefighter NOT to have confidence in that ENORMOUS
safe-black up there… but you made good points and
I wanted to clarify my comments.
I believe the fact that the aerial photos show those areas
in the middle of the safe-black remaining ‘totally unburned’
is just even MORE proof of how ‘safe’ that ‘safe-black’
around the anchor point really was that afternoon.
There was NO ‘flame length’ or ‘spotting’ that touched them,
before, during, or after the 4:15 to 5:15 PM ‘firestorm’.
Just noting for emphasis that RTS clearly (and correctly) states that gravity winds were NOT the case for the YHF.
Just noting for emphasis that RTS clearly and correctly notes that gravity winds were NOT an issue for the YHF. In contrast, here’s Elizabeth: “When you say a Santa Ana-like event, I am assuming that the wind event documented in the Matt Oss photos is of that ilk, but perhaps I am misunderstanding…” I never called RTS clueless, and COMPLETELY AGREE that Santa Anas weren’t involved for the YHF. I need to say that because Elizabeth tried to claim I am somehow disagreeing with RTS, not her, on this point.
Tex and Joy,
I have some questions regarding your March 19th posting. Are you suggesting that someone was doing a burnout operation from or in the vicinity of the Boulder Springs Ranch? I’ve read it several times and can’t seem to pinpoint just wherew you’re talking about.
Also, the “Tim Dolan presentation” Who is the Tim Dolan you’re referring to here? And what, when, where was his “presentation”? And what was it about? Thanks
RTS, the Tom Dolan video was the wind event video to which I provided a link on this thread. I believe I was berated by SR or maybe even you at that point regarding the video, but don’t quote me. It kind of runs together….
RELY TO:Tex and Joy,
I have some questions regarding your March 19th posting. Are you suggesting that someone was doing a burnout operation from or in the vicinity of the Boulder Springs Ranch? WE ARE NOT SUGGESTING IT YET WE ARE STATING THE VIDEO AND PHOTOS SHOWN BY PEOPLE IN THE COMMUNITY DO SHOW THAT AREA ON FIRE EARLIER THAN ANY REPORT OR MEDIA REPORTED YET AND I AM HAVING AN EXPERT CREDIBLE PERSON MAKING SURE THE TIME ON THE PHOTOS AND VIDEOS ARE SPOT ON. YET OUR QUESTION TO THE FIRE MANAGEMENT IF THEY READ THIS IS TO ANSWER THAT—HOW COME WE ARE SEEING AREAS ON FIRE IN AREA THE BURNOUT WAS BEING PREPARED FOR A BURN OUT. DID IT HAPPEN? THAT IS MY DIRECT QUESTION TO THE PEOPLE WHO FOUGHT THE FIRE THAT I KNOW COME HERE. I AM BEING SHOWN INFORMATION AND AT TIMES I SAY I WISH ONLY PEOPLE THAT WILL PUT THEIR NAME TO A DOCUMENT COME TO ME BUT I GET IT THAT PEOPLE HAVE TO DO WHAT THEY HAVE TO DO IN THEIR WAY SO IN THAT–OK BUT IT IS IMPORTANT FOR THE FIRE COMMUNITY TO ACKNOWLEDGE THESE PHOTOS AND VIDEOS DO EXIST OUT THERE AND THEY SHOULD BE TALKING TO THE LOCALS AND EXPLAIN THAT DAY TO THEM—WE WILL DO OUR BEST IN EXPLAINING IT TO THEM BUT WE WILL ALWAYS FEEL WE CAN ONLY SHARE IT AS WE SEE IT—NO CHANGING ANY ACCOUNTS FROM THE DAY OF THE FIRE TO HOW PEOPLE CAME TO OUR LIVES—AND SO ON— I’ve read it several times and can’t seem to pinpoint just wherew you’re talking about.
Also, the “Tim Dolan presentation” Who is the Tim Dolan you’re referring to here?HE DID A WEATHER PRESENTATION RECENTLY IN YARNELL AND HE IS OUT THERE TO EDUCATE THIS FIRE FROM A WEATHER STANDPOINT ONLY—HE HAS ALOT OF FIRE AND WEATHER HISTORY BUT HE TRIED TO SELL ME THAT THE WEATHER WAS THE SEAL ON THIS TRAGEDY AND AS I TELL ALL—I WILL ACCEPT THAT WHEN ALL AREAS HAVE BEEN LOOKED AT AND EXHAUSTED. And what, when, where was his “presentation”? And what was it about? Thanks
I would suggest everyone check PATTERN RECOGNITION article over on wild fire today. And read the two comments at the bottom. ” The Dead Zone” unburned fuel a training video about unburned fuel.
**
** DUANE STEINBRINK – THE FIRST PRESCOTT WILDLAND DIVISION CHIEF
With regards to the (reliable) stories that are ( and have been for some time )
surfacing about this tendency on Granite Mountain’s part to seem to feel the
need to ‘one up’ everyone else around them ( even at their own peril )…
…there is a name that hasn’t surfaced much (yet) that might have had a lot
to do with this ‘mind set’ and/or ‘groupthink’.
Darrell Willis was NOT the first “Wildland Division Chief” for the City of Prescott,
nor was Willis the WDC when the idea to form the Granite Mountain Hotshots
was first presented to the Prescott City Council and the existing ‘PFD Fuels
Crew 7’ applied for ‘training status’ under the name ‘Granite Mountain Hotshots’.
The first “Wildland Division Chief” for the City of Prescott was actually a
fellow named Duane Steinbrink.
Duane is one of those that never had a word to say about Granite Mountain or the
incident for pretty much all of 2013. He was pictured on the left side of Amanda
Marsh ( with Darrell Willis on her right side ) in Amanda’s first public press
conference following the incident… but Duane never had anything to say.
All of a of a sudden ( as of a few weeks ago )… he’s talking to the press.
The article below is basically this UK-based reporter’s attempt to ‘tell the real
story’ ( like Kyle Dickman tried to do last year )… and the story is still based on
a number of false assumptions ( like the lie in the SAIR that everyone thought
Marsh meant a ranch to the north )…
…but there are some interesting parts to this article such as quotes from Duane
Steinbrink about the early ‘culture’ and ‘principles’ behind the Granite Mountain
program and a fascinating (highly detailed) interview with Wade Parker’s parents.
The Telegraph ( Telegraph Media Group – United Kingdom )
Article: How Arizona’s firefighters were outflanked by an inferno
By Mick Brown – 7:00AM GMT 31 Jan 2014
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/10603025/How-Arizonas-firefighters-were-outflanked-by-an-inferno.html
From the article.
________________________________________________________________
‘We’d have a lot of guys who’d come in all excited to get a job ( with Granite
Mountain ), and then when they saw what they had to do they’d just wash out,’
said Duane Steinbrink, a weather-beaten man in his early 60s who, as the
wildland division chief for Prescott, was responsible for assembling the first
Hotshot crew. ‘What made these guys so special was they had it in their mind
that if you were in this crew they were going to be up on the top of the mountain
before anybody else. They had to have better knowledge than any other crew;
be fitter than any other crew; but the number-one priority – you have to be nice,
no rotten apples in the barrel. They loved one another, and they protected one
another. The only time there needed to be any real discipline was if someone
was quitting on them.’
________________________________________________________________
NOTE: It is now a known fact that there was, indeed, a ‘lot’ of ‘quitting on them’
going on with ‘Granite Mountain’ from season to season. I think it’s been
established that the ‘turnover’ rate for GM was higher than average ( for a
Type 1 HS crew ) from season to season… and became critical for 2013 as
they were about to hit the fire season ‘short handed’… and added some ‘quick
hires’ ( Such as McKee and Percin, both total rookies ).
The (possible) real reasons for this (seemingly) high turnover rate still haven’t
been fully revealed.
Followup… another interesting Duane Steinbrick,
Darrell Willis and ‘Eric Marsh’ moment.
The following is the actual moment ( in 2008 ) when
Prescott Wildland Division Chief Duane Steinbrick promoted
Fuels Crew 7 member Eric Marsh to be the Superintendent
of the Granite Mountain Hotshots.
There is a photo of the moment, along with an article.
Darrell Willis is THERE ( in the photo ). He was still just the
Emergency Services Coordinator for the City of Prescott
( hadn’t retired and started double-dipping yet )… but Willis
did the actual ‘swearing in’ for all the new promotions.
NONE of the other 4 firefighters also being ‘promoted’ to
higher level positions within the ‘Granite Mountain Hotshots’
( Lawson, Smith, McCarty, or Kauffman ) stayed with the GM
program for very long after that.
The Prescott Daily Courier – 5/24/2008 9:23:00 PM
Article title: Elite firefighters
http://www.dcourier.com/Main.asp?SectionID=102&ArticleID=55675
From the article…
_____________________________________________________
The Prescott Fire Department held a badge-pinning ceremony
for Granite Mountain Hot Shot crew members who were recently
promoted. Promoted crew members were introduced by Prescott
Fire Department Wildland Division Chief Duane Steinbrink, and
were sworn into their new positions by Prescott Emergency
Services Coordinator Darrel Willis.
Sworn in were, from right to left in the photo,…
Eric Marsh – Superintendent
Aaron Lawson – Captain
Sean Smith – Squad Boss
Dan McCarty – Senior Firefighter
Sean Kauffman – Senior Firefighter.
The Granite Mountain Hot Shot Crew is the first municipal
Type I crew in the nation.
_____________________________________________________
WTKTT,
Ah yes, the high turnover rate of the GMHS. Do NOT discount the GMHS pattern of ‘bad decsions with prior good outcomes’ influencing any of the young WFF’s to not return to the GMHS.
I have not found ANY empirical proof that GM had a higher turnover rate than that of any other crew. My view is that that is merely a rumor that has gotten legs due to people repeating it.
Do you have data documenting comparisons of turnover rates on Hotshot crews so that we can figure out where GM fell on that spectrum? If so, could you tell us more about the data set and the comparisons?
Reply to RTS post on March 20, 2014 at 12:00 pm
>> RTS wrote…
>> Ah yes, the high turnover rate of the GMHS.
>> Do NOT discount the GMHS pattern of ‘bad decsions
>> with prior good outcomes’ influencing any of the young
>> WFF’s to not return to the GMHS.
Rest assured… no ‘discounting’ ( or even coupons )
accepted here.
I believe it ALL ‘ties together’.
Example: On the same night in 2008 when Darrell Willis
‘swore in’ Eric Marsh as the (first and only) Superintendent
for the *new* Granite Mountain Hotshots… he also swore
in Aaron Lawson as the first ‘Captain’.
From what I can discover… this was the same sort of
‘dream come true’ for Lawson as it was for Marsh.
Yet… just two seasons in… Lawson quits.
Aaron Lawson is the one who recruited Christopher
MacKenzie onto the GM squad and the only thing he
has ever had to say publicly about the Yarnell
incident was a quick comment about Christopher
being able to ‘lighten up any situation’ when a reporter
caught him at Christopher’s funeral in California.
Right after Lawson went out of his way to recruit
people he knew ( like Christopher ) onto the GM squad…
…Lawson suddenly walks away from GM ( and his own
dream(s)? )
I’d still like to know what happened there ( with Lawson ).
My understanding is that Marsh had a “betrayal” by one of his captains, who then left, but I have no idea which captain that would be. What a “betrayal” means is not something I looked into, either, in part because, again, I do not care. (Maybe the guy slept with Marsh’s wife or maybe the guy stole Marsh’s puppy – I neither know nor care. I am only sharing this info b/c, if that betrayer was Lawson, then that would suggest that he did not leave for safety issues.)
It is entirely possible that that betrayer was Lawson, or, for all we know, Lawson might have been the guy who left for a better position. Remember that the Hotshot pay was generally sucky, as Marsh and Willis went back-and-forth on, as I recall.
How ’bout you CALL or e-mail Lawson and ask him directly why he left, rather than engage in speculation about the safety practices of a DEAD guy? (It is kind of unfair to speculate about a dead guy or multiple guys if we include Steed, no?)
I offered no ‘speculation’ at all about why
Captain Lawson might have suddenly
left Granite Mountain.
YOU did.
Sleeping with someone’s wife?
Stealing puppies?
Very creative, counselor. VERY creative.
>> Elizabeth also said…
>> How ’bout you CALL or e-mail Lawson
>> and ask him directly why he left,
Got a phone number or an email address?
>> rather than engage in speculation about
>> the safety practices of a DEAD guy?
When that particular DEAD guy appeared
to be violating EVERY established ‘safety’
procedure in the book related to his
profession…
…you damn betcha I’m going to ‘speculate’
about whether that was something he was
in the habit of doing… or NOT.
Am I correct that it is generally not viewed as optimally safe to be on TOP of a hill (perhaps at the edge of a box canyon) with a bunch of dry, robust green below you and pretty tall flame lengths, because you risk being killed by the smoke or inhaling super-heated gasses as the fire burns up towards you, even if it never reaches you? Thank you in advance.
If you are talking about GM then the answer is NO. They were in black and could have moved to the top of the Mountain at any time, to more black SZ Would they have got smoke and heat yes, but they would have only been uncomfortable and could have moved easily to the top and more black and out of the heat.
They were in black and 150 to 200 ft. from the fire line. Again with 400 Acers of burned area behind them.
Elizabeth–By moving back from the edge they would be safe.
Example–Storm King Mountain Those on top moved back and the survivor that got to the top survived, he got some burns before he reached the top.
Bob, “from the edge” of WHAT? The black area was a slope.
Tex: even if they were at the top as we were then had the smoke and heat headed our way we could immediately drop off the ridge into the black on the Congress side or even the green as that is what we did that day.
Joy: My concern lately is the information and documents being shown to me and I appreciate the viewings deeply and I am sorry to many that I used Y O U to have you speak up yet it takes a name and document to properly assess this not me saying this or that and some of you and you do know who you are and the number is growing—have some important information to give this fire clarity. I asked the questions public because in Tom Dolan’s presentation and many have said over time about this “preparing for burnout”—How come it STOPPED there. What happen to that burnout. We watched you do the preparation from the mountain top and we saw all the activity yet we never saw the fire yet that does not mean it did not happen because the GMHS did a burn in a blinded area that day from our view and its possible with all those boulders but to SEE some of these videos and photos in 2014 shown with expectation I do not share who, what, where—got that but it’s heavy to SEE you have a fire evidence between 3:33-4pm that has not been seen in any report or media and for that it is IMPORTANT for people to put their name and stuff out yet I GET the sensitivity of it beyond just your careers and such—I do understand where you are coming from and again sorry for how some felt a guilt when they read it here and came to me out of guilt. Yet I am glad you came. Jimmy, just waiting on that photo of yours and that will seal this and I know you are okay with me stating your name and thank you for gathering your photo(s) so I can finally show one public. So, if the burn out was done. Why? I mean, that was some squirrelly winds that day? I had kestrel readings and temps. and without weather updates like these men got YOU COULD SEE from Prescott the storm as well the cell from the east—I will always want to SEE some more folks from the AIR coming forward with photos to SHOW US the public how that fire went from heading to Peeples Valley with that late day retardant drop even being laid to the least residential area of the Ustow It/Maughan Ranch Feed Store and then have a fierce fire from the Shrine to Sesame area where I have seen photos of that area on fire between 3:33-4:18pm mark spotted—why is it people can whisper, whisper, whisper around these small towns but no one can speak up and really help YOU all everywhere to get this properly assessed.
Elizabeth,
Have you looked at a map yet? Have you given thought to SZ geometry at all yet? It is frustrating when you continually make assertions, or post questions that are implicitly assertions, to the effect that GM had no choice but to move…when it seems you either have not looked at a map or have not done some basic research. If you have done those things and just aren’t getting it, maybe explain what your stumbling block is?
At Storm King, those in adequate SZs survived. Had GM stayed put at the YHF and found that they were at the edge of the SZ as the fire was approaching, they could WALK AWAY from the edge of the SZ and from the flames (and corresponding heat) of the fire.
They traded in the very large area they had to work with as a SZ, for in essence immersing themselves for a long period of time in that dry green that you suggest scared them off the ridge.
……..AND, not that far at all, to hop over the ridge, then DOWN & OUT to safety.
**The comment above, was supposed to go below Bob’s comment below.**
Said what I was trying to say better and with far fewer words! Thx!
The edge or top of the hill was less than 100 yards behind them the Helispot was on top. As marsh said working off the top. Or where Marsh and Frisby met. lots of black. They were above the green by 150 ft. plus, or the hand line. They were safe in my book and not in any danger in the BLACK. There was a top of the mountain with more and more Black.
Went back to check original fire map at 1300 topographic map. from there lunch spot to where the fire started 300 Ft. walk you are then on the ridge line and can move back along the top of the fire witch at that time was 1800 acres in size very large SZ take your choice and sit it out.
Apologies for belaboring the obvious, but also their ability to walk back and forth, and choose where in that very large space they wanted to be at a given point, was basically unencumbered. They were not committed to a small space where the requirements for a SZ might be met for 30 foot flame heights but where 40 foot flame heights, with the flames hot and blowing sideways, would be too much.
I get the sense that Elizabeth is getting contacted directly by people who are putting forth a variety of theories about how Marsh rightly concluded that with the (anticipated) change in weather and extreme fire behavior that the safest thing was to get off the mountain. If that is the case, certainly I understand that a version of one of these theories might be comforting. But, based upon what we do know about Marsh’s own assessment of where GM was, I still have seen nothing to suggest that Marsh even subjectively had a last-minute change of heart about the safety of where he and his crew were.
To further belabor the obvious, WERE Marsh to have had such a subjective change of heart or view, the route he and GM took probably was the most dangerous way down that didn’t involve intentionally walking towards the fire. It would necessarily expose the crew to a sustained period of much higher risk, while they lost the ability to monitor fire behavior, and with the ability to high-tail back up the hill effectively lost once they were far enough down into the bowl. Again, looking at a map, or as RTS rightly points out based on Marsh having had the ability to scout throughout the day, there were other options available if simply getting off of the mountain, but with the least exposure to risk, were the goal.
I totally agree. I go back to my first impression what the hell—Why with the fire activity would you move from the burned area SZ. Then walk down into a brush field with no SZ to get to quickly.
Elizabeth,
You are NOT correct in your generally optimal view. Hilltops and ridges make excellent places to seek refuge.
I think you need to get some new WFF advisors because the one(s) you have are giving you some fairly bogus, off-the-wall leads, advice, etc. to follow. Your former HS Supterintendent? advisor must have been on the Milk Toast HS Crew to be giving this kind of advice OR not on a Crew at all.
Clear and simple – the GMHS was in a perfectly good, black, solid SZ. Only an idiot would take refuge and/or place a SZ at the top of a chute or chimney or bowl. That’s basic WFF training there.
Marsh had solid black all over the top of the Weaver Mountains. Bob Powers, and TTWARE, and evenTex understand all this good ER and/or SZ quite well, including bailing off the ridgetop down toward Congress. Just review the helicopter photos from the dropbox link that WTKTT posted below.
Reply to RTS post on March 19, 2014 at 5:16 pm
>> RTS said…
>>
>> Elizabeth,
>> Just review the helicopter photos from the dropbox
>> link that WTKTT posted below.
Reposting part of that message to save the scrolling
and since it’s directly relevant to THIS message thread.
LARGE PORTIONS OF THE SAFE BLACK
NEVER EVEN BURNED AT ALL THAT DAY.
Look in the following (public) folder on Mr.
Dougherty’s dropbox site…
A42-Aerial Video and Photos Mayhew
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/7b7asvh6ptdavbr/FixOl2n6pI
269 super highres aerial photos taken on
July 4, 2013, just 4 days after the Yarnell tragedy.
Photos in that folder clearly show an area the size
of a SOCCER field… still totally GREEN and totally
unburned… right in the MIDDLE of the ‘previously burned’ area near the anchor point.
That’s how SAFE that SAFETY ZONE really
was that afternoon.
This one photo probably shows it best.
An area the size of a SOCCER field
still totally GREEN and totally unburned…
right in the MIDDLE of the ‘previously burned’
area near the anchor point…
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/7b7asvh6ptdavbr/FixOl2n6pI#lh:null-IMG_1743.JPG
Speaking of ‘options’ and things that ‘never even
burned at all’ that afternoon…
…the same Dropbox full of aerial photos above
has at least 60 or 70 highres closeup photos
that show clearer than anything else I’ve seen
how the tops ( and sides ) of the boulder piles
right near the deployment site never burned at all.
Even on July 4, just 3 days after the burnover,
there is CLEARLY still ‘green vegetation’ ( trees,
bushes, etc. ) still showing on both the SIDES
and the TOP of those boulder piles… and HUGE
areas not even showing any ‘scorch marks’.
Those areas were/are just a few hundred feet
( not yards ) away from the deployment site.
Followup to the post above about the huge
area ( near the anchor point ) in the middle of
the already cold ‘safe’ black that remained totally
UNBURNED that day, even after the firestorm.
The following answers two questions about it…
1) How far away was it from a KNOWN point in
the already cold-safe black, such as, the spot
where Frisby and Brown met with Marsh and
Steed for that first ‘face to face’.
2) How LARGE was that ‘unburned’ area, really?,
and how did it compare with the actual size
of the ‘bomb-proof’ Boulder Springs Ranch
main clearing itself?
** ACTUAL LOCATION AND DIMENSIONS OF
** THE UNBURNED AREA IN THE MIDDLE OF
** THE ALREADY SAFE BLACK
The actual spot where the Blue Ridge UTV Ranger
stopped for 33 minutes while Frisby and Brown
first met with Marsh and Steed up in the already
cold ‘safe black’ that day is here ( according to
Brown’s GPS unit )…
34.226977, -112.789528
The distance from that ‘meeting location’ walking
NORTH on the two-track road to the SOUTH side
of the totally unburned area in the middle of the
safe black was only… 702 feet. ( 2 NFL football
fields + end zones = 720 feet ).
So how BIG was that unburned area, really?
NOTE: 1 acre = 43,560 square foot
UNBURNED AREA COORDINATES
NE corner – 34.228758, -112.791030
SE corner – 34.228212, -112.790816
SW corner – 34.227924, -112.791336
NW corner – 34.228554, -112.791422
UNBURNED AREA SIDES ( FOOTAGE )
NE corner to SE corner = 210.021 feet
SE corner to SW corner = 188.714 feet
SW corner to NW corner = 237.105 feet
NW corner to NE corner = 142.253 feet
Total square footage of the unburned area inside
the ‘safe black’ = 29,897.06 feet ( 0.68 acres )
That’s almost 2/3 the size ( 65 percent ) of the
entire ‘bomb-proof’ Boulder Springs Ranch main
clearing.
BOULDER SPRINGS RANCH
MAIN CLEARING CORNERS
NE – 34.219700, -112.770710
SE – 34.218600, -112.770812
SW – 34.218698, -112.771520
NW – 34.219677, -112.771509
BOULDER SPRINGS RANCH
MAIN CLEARING SIDES ( FOOTAGE )
NE corner to SE corner = 399.719 feet
SE corner to SW corner = 215.827 feet
SW corner to NW corner = 358.122 feet
NW corner to NE corner = 251.127 feet
Total square footage of Boulder Springs
Ranch main clearing = 46,611.63 ( 1.001 acres ).
**
** KORI KIRKPATRICK TALKS ABOUT ERIC MARSH
Kori Kirkpatrick, Eric Marsh’s former wife, has never really spoken in public
since the Yarnell incident… but she is quoted in an article that appeared
last week in the Prescott Daily Courier.
The ‘Arizona Wildfire Academy’ ( AWA ) took place last week in Prescott,
( as it does each year ), with a near-record 708 students from 29 different
states attending the classes this year.
Kori Kirkpatrick and Eric Marsh ( and Don Howard, Darrell Willis and others )
started this ‘Arizona Widlfire Academy’ in Prescott.
Kirkpatrick herself is ‘quoted’ in this article about last week’s AWA, and
she mentions her former-husband, Eric Marsh.
Life-or-death lessons: Hotshots were vital to Wildfire Academy
By Joanna Dodder Nellans – 3/7/2014 6:00:00 AM
The Prescott Daily Courier
http://www.dcourier.com/main.asp?SectionID=1&SubsectionID=1&ArticleID=129272
From the article…
_________________________________________________________________
After talking about the idea of a statewide wildland firefighting academy for
a few years, Don Howard was determined to make it a reality when the
Rodeo-Chediski wildfire struck in 2002 and became the largest wildfire
in Arizona’s history.
Organizers chose Kori Kirkpatrick as the academy’s first coordinator.
Working on a shoestring budget, she conducted business at home with the
frequent help of her husband Eric Marsh. He had landed a job on the Prescott
Fire Department’s new fuels mitigation crew and would go on to help create
the Granite Mountain Hotshot Crew as its first and only superintendent.
“Eric’s passion and contribution to the academy was huge, just huge,” Kirkpatrick said. He also taught the basic wildland firefighting class for several years and later taught advanced courses.
“It was all about teaching them how to do it right, how to do it safely and come home at night,” Kirkpatrick added. She left the academy coordinator position after five years, about the same time she and Marsh divorced.
Tony Sciacca took over the Arizona Wildfire Academy coordinator position.
_________________________________________________________________
NOTE: Tony Sciacca was the ‘line safety officer’ who was ‘clocked in’ and
fully on-duty at the Yarnell Hill Fire as early as 1500 ( 3:00 PM ) on
June 30, 2013. ( One hour and forty minutes before the deployment ).
Followup…
Also ( as usual )… there was the annual Arizona Wildfire
Academy ‘banquet’ at the Prescott Resort last week.
Brendan McDonough was there ( along with Eric’s wife
Amanda ) to accept the annual “Herb McElwee” loyalty
award on behalf of Eric Marsh and the Granite Mountain
Hotshots.
Gary Cordes was also there to receive his AWA “Firefighter
of the Year” award for ‘rescuing residents’ at the Yarnell Fire.
Article: Hotshots Boost Wildfire Academy Banquet
Donations To An All-time High
By Joanna Dodder Nellans – 3/13/2014 6:00:00 AM
The Prescott Daily Courier
http://www.dcourier.com/main.asp?SectionID=1&SubSectionID=1&ArticleID=129485&TM=60610.07
From the article…
_____________________________________________________
The academy’s Firefighter of the Year award went to Central Yavapai Fire District Training Officer Gary Cordes for helping to rescue Yarnell residents from the same Yarnell Hill wildfire June 30 that killed 19 of the Granite Mountain Hotshots. He was the Yarnell structure group supervisor on the blaze, and said he shared the award with others who helped that day.
The banquet opened with a half-hour memorial service for the 36 U.S. wildland firefighters who died in the line of duty in 2013
( including the 19 Granite Mountain Hotshots ). It included an honor guard, reading of the names of the fallen, and the playing of Taps.
Eric Marsh’s wife Amanda and the lone surviving Granite Mountain Hotshot, Brendan McDonough, accepted the 2nd annual Herb McElwee (loyalty) award for all 20 of the Granite Mountain
Hotshots.
“I want to say thank you to this group for loving Eric so much,” Amanda Marsh told the crowd.
“It’s been a great honor to be called a Hotshot,” added McDonough, who now has a job helping other wildland firefighters with PTSD. “Thank you, God bless your families this season and kick some (butt).”
_____________________________________________________
This current thread has got to be absolutely brutal for the families to read or hear, but if it is the truth, it is what it is. Right now, I doubt many would agree with what has been laid out, but in time some might come to accept it. And then they may wonder why more was not done and why their loved one had to die.
So before we hand out kudos and declare victory, I think a question needs to be asked. If what brought to light is true and this “could be seen from a mile away”, why did the fire community allow him to continue in his job and lead a crew? Safety is the #1 priority of the wildland community and everyone is supposed to come home, but a man who was recklessly and serially violating basic safety principles was allowed to lead 19 men. And then get 18 of them killed. I understand about the counseling, which is a good first step, but apparently people knew he would not listen and it wasn’t working. When he continued to do this, maybe some IC should have sent his tail home to Prescott with a very stern note. After all, he led a hotshot crew for 4 years plus. People will say “it wasn’t my job, it wasn’t my crew” and I agree it wasn’t really the place of the other crew bosses to deal with. But there were a lot of others who could have. And 18 good men who didn’t have to die is a pretty steep price for inaction.
Maybe the most important lessons learned from this tragedy will have nothing to do with what took place on Yarnell Hill on June 30, 2013.
Mike,
I assure you what’s being posted here is the truth, and yes, it is what it is. And the truth is often very difficult for many to accept, especially when it involves those close to you. I declare no victory here, and I am quite demure to the kudos. I will always press for the truth, especially in WFF fatalities such as the YHF.
I believe it was Winston Churchill that said “The truth is incontrovertible. Malice may attack it, ignorance may deride it, but in the end, there it is.”
As I posted way back when here, I’m very angry about what happened as are many other WFF supervisors, because it was totally, unequivocally avoidable. I am mad at those responsible and also very sad for the familes, friends, and loved ones of those that died June 30th. We did what we could as peers to head this off, and some may have gone to Marsh’s supervisor(s) with these concerns. But in the long run, it didn’t matter.
But remember, that those GMHS knew, or should have known, what they were doing (or about to do) that day was absolutely wrong, based on the tried-and-trued WFF ‘Rules.’ And yet they apparently conceded to their actions in spite of everything they knew to the contrary. I contend that Groupthink in one form or another was alive and well that day and contributed to the fatal outcome. And this is listed in the IRPG as one of the Hazardous Attitudes in the Leadership section.
Whenever there are ‘talking points’ THEY are trying to hide something. I have asked those in the Public (Dis)information realm how long they are going to continue to deny that Marsh did anything wrong which resulted in the June 30th tragedy. The answers are usually ‘it’s going to take some time.’ Really?
RTS – I think you are a straight shooter and I give great weight to what you have to say. But, given Marsh’s irresponsible nature, the deaths were only preventable if he was corrected or removed. If he couldn’t be corrected, he needed to be removed. The argument might be made that could not be done. The point is it should have. What is going to happen when the next Eric Marsh comes along?
Gary Olsen has already expounded on how hotshot supers are looked on as near deities by their crews. You do what they say. And several of the crew were rookies, in fact I think it was the first fire for one. Yes the squad bosses and Steed should have spoken up, much harder for the new guys.
As I said above, eventually some families might not agree that all was done. But, in the end, nothing will bring those men back. It is for the next time that I think this situation deserves a very hard look.
Reply to mike post on March 17, 2014 at 10:26 pm
>> mike said…
>> It is for the next time that I think this situation
>> deserves a very hard look.
No question. The HARDEST ‘look’ possible.
>> mike also said…
>> And several of the crew were rookies, in fact I
>> think it was the first fire for one.
You may be referring to 21 year old Grant McKee.
It wasn’t his ‘first fire’… but definitely his ‘first
season’ with GM and the first time he’d done
anything of the sort.
Robert Caldwell was Grant’s cousin and got him
onto the GM crew for the 2013 season when
GM ended up short some people right before the
start of the fire season.
Grant only joined GM in April… just 3 months
before the tragedy.
Grant had NO intentions of becoming a career
WFF person. He was only helping out for this
one season, while they were short, and then
he was going to continue to pursue his real
passion of becoming an EMT.
I checked, it was John Percin’s 2nd fire with the GMHS (he was so new he was not even in the tree picture from the Doce fire).
Mike, if you are stating a history account of Marsh; appreciated- fine. Yet on this fire there is no evidence shown YET publicly that Marsh directed Steed and crew to go that way and it there is no proof public YET that even shows Marsh was with the crew or was first there or last. Everyone needs to understand there is no proof publicly shown yet but that does not mean there is not some coming. We are waiting right this second to receive 3 sets of photos as we type this on the fire between 3-5pm. More folks seem to want to come to us privately and we accept that yet we always encourage the IMPORTANCE to putting the documentation with the original sourced names not us posting their accounts. I know as time people are sharing to us because the men dying and many peoples’ lives were affected from that weekend and our character is intact as reliable and we do not gossip and we are straight shooters seeking the truth. I want it to be known Mike anyone can say Marsh was this or that on prior fires— wonderful but no one yet can publicly with proof state Marsh’s actions or Steed’s or the fire managements- and in His time the truth will happen—I think many people who have read this page have been pleased there is a “place to go” to either read or comment. This has helped many heal and we appreciate EVERYONE on here.
I am sorry Joy I wish it were different but Marsh and the crews actions and lake of giving information clear and precise along with breaking every rule in the book fits what we are now being told, and I believe answers the WHY they moved and went down into unburned fuel. It is every Fire Supervisors night mare to have a crew working outside the rules and hiding or canceling there decisions. Past issues explained a lot about that day. I morn the loss of all 19 the decisions made that day cost them there lives and nothing can change that.
Bob Powers-
you coming to Arizona? I will show you some of the folks we have seen photos from—some; a lot are sensitive on topic and do not want to see anyone—and you will see this may not be a label of saying it was the men’s’ final decision to go in the boxed canyon and maybe something not yet brought out—Mike spoke about Marsh’s history but that would be like that silly man Shaun McKinnon who was to work on some retractions to have family concerns to never hearing from again almost 4 months later. He said things about Tex (Sonny) as well as he narrated his own account of our day that day- we never came from Congress and never said that. Also the article was on GMHS so why even talk about Tex being a bourbon hound. Geez, human factor and human perceptions on facts can become narrative at times and all I am stating is HELL YES it is way ODD from a person who hiked it for almost a decade as to WHY did these men even GO THAT WAY versus STAY IN THE BLACK but there may be an element not yet presented so let us not make a judgment of their actions until all facts are presented. I can share as the librarian here in town can too—there is a lot of folks who will come to me or some to vent but will not go public. We need to publicly piece this puzzle and in His time it will-
I understand EVERY point you make from a firefighter stand but keep in mind the report and media has collaborated and gathered and narrated and have not gave it real and raw YET—in due time…many people will not let this be brushed under the rug and MANY people have no agendas too.
Tex thanks for the invite. I live in southern Idaho. and at 70 my knees would play hell with that kind of hike. I use my horses to take me to the high country and an occasional ATV ride. I rely on RTS an old friend to keep me up on what he has seen and learned. It is never easy to accept that your loved ones made mistakes but it will come in time.
Tex and Joy,
I suggest you go back to RTS’ original March 15 and 16 posts and that may help to better understand where Mike is coming from.
I take issue with Safety being the number one priority. It is the number one proiroty at the ground level, but for others it is a disclaimer to avoid liability. We all know that. There are exceptions at each level, but there are plenty examples. I know of a IHC sup right now that has recieved letters from T-1 IC about his conduct and has accousted at least one crewmeber in a drunkin rage and retained his position. Its common knowledge on his forest and in the R3 IHC world. I had someone who worked for me mention it a month ago. I was amazed, but I shouldn’t have been, I’ve known this man and he is a hothead. I have worked with and for teams that have personnel in positions because of longevity or the buddy system who were making strateigc and tactical decisions. And we knew they weren’t strong firefighters. Being supprised that this could have taken place or even be posible means we’ve been fooling ourselves. I, also ,know what happens when you stand up for what is right, I’ve watched people loose careers for having integrity. Everyone of us knows this, I doubt anyone wanted this possibility to be possible. But we have all seen this kind of thing. I argued that there maybe no smoking gun and hoped that was right. I’m greatly saddened for everyone that this could be true.
WFF,
I believe I know of the Superintendent you refer to here. If it’s the same one, and I think it is, he practices ‘Chaos Theory.” As WFF, we are supposed to make order and organization from chaos, not the other way around. I and others consider him a Watch Out.
Reply to mike post on March 17, 2014 at 9:09 pm
>> mike said…
>> This current thread has got to be absolutely brutal for the
>> families to read or hear, but if it is the truth, it is what it is.
Agreed.
There is ( at this time ) no reason to doubt any of the new information that RTS has posted… and that is really, really sad.
>> mike also said…
>> Right now, I doubt many would agree with what has been
>> laid out, but in time some might come to accept it.
Some will NEVER accept that there may have been a *known*
pattern of willful ‘reckless endangerment’ being practiced by an
employee of a municipal fire department ( and being imposed on
part-time, low-paid, seasonal employees ) which *may* be
the primary reason 19 good men died.
And rightly so.
If that is the truth… it IS, in fact, UNACCEPTABLE behavior,
and if there is ANYTHING similar going on ANYWHERE else
in Hotshot crews or the WFF business at large… it needs to be
discovered and SHUT DOWN… RIGHT NOW… before more
good men die.
>> they may wonder why more was not done and why their
>> loved one had to die.
Yes, they may… and rightly so.
>> mike also wrote…
>> So before we hand out kudos and declare victory…
I still think RTS deserves at least simple ‘thanks’ for ‘sticking
with it’ AND having the courage to share information…
…but there is no ‘victory’ here.
There never will be.
There will only ever be the truth, as best as it can be known.
>> mike also wrote…
>> I think a question needs to be asked. If what brought to light
>> is true and this “could be seen from a mile away”, why did the
>> fire community allow him to continue in his job and lead
>> a crew?
Because (obviously) the WFF ‘fire community’ ( and the
‘culture’ itself ) is NOT ( yet ) designed to handle this sort
of thing like other commonn workplace environments.
I have worked construction. Many years.
There were many (similar) times when a certain crew was
trying to make a ‘name’ for themselves and would do reckless
things on the job-site trying to ‘prove’ themselves. Even after
they became ‘accepted’ and would get regular work… the
pattern was already set by the crew boss. They continued
to do risky, out-of-bounds things and remained a danger to
themselves and anyone working with them.
The ‘industry’ had a way to handle that.
We ( the other crews ) filed written complaints to the area
contracting agencies and said that if some action was not
taken we would refuse to work any job site they were working.
That fixed it.
That crew was notified of the complaints…. told they would
no longer get any work if they didn’t ‘get safe’… so they did.
If that process is NOT as easily available to the the WFF
industry… then it’s time it was implemented.
>> mike also wrote
>> Safety is the #1 priority of the wildland community and
>> everyone is supposed to come home, but a man who was
>> recklessly and serially violating basic safety principles was
>> allowed to lead 19 men. And then get 18 of them killed.
>> I understand about the counseling, which is a good first step,
>> but apparently people knew he would not listen and it wasn’t
>> working.
If that wasn’t working… then more action was needed.
See above. Refusal to work fires with them would have
been the next step.
>> mike also wrote…
>> When he continued to do this, maybe some IC should have
>> sent his tail home to Prescott with a very stern note.
Well… at the MOMENT… we don’t actually *know* whether
that DID happen… or not. Maybe it did ( or something similar like
‘performance evaluations/concerns’ being sent on a back-channel
to the Prescott Wildland Division Chief ).
There is much more to learn here.
>> mike also wrote…
>> After all, he led a hotshot crew for 4 years plus. People will
>> say “it wasn’t my job, it wasn’t my crew” and I agree it wasn’t
>> really the place of the other crew bosses to deal with.
That is EXACTLY what ( most ) of their co-workers will say
( and have, indeed, already said so ).
>> But there were a lot of others who could have. And 18 good
>> men who didn’t have to die is a pretty steep price for inaction.
Yes, it is.
See above. The WFF industry needs to take a hard look at
itself at this point.
>> mike also said…
>> Maybe the most important lessons learned from this tragedy
>> will have nothing to do with what took place on Yarnell Hill
>> on June 30, 2013.
I don’t think the WFF ‘business’ is ever going to lose the
more-than-quasi military culture coupled with almost the
same ‘rivalry’ culture as professional sports teams enjoy
( a very BAD combination of ‘cultures’ )…
…but if it is discovered that this kind of *locker room talk* was
NOT making it up to management so they even had a chance
to address what amounts to an (ongoing?) DANGEROUS and
LIFE-THREATENING situation for some of the innocent
‘players’ in ‘the game’…
…that needs to be FIXED toot-sweet.
I used “accept” meaning believing it was the truth, not saying it was alright. Other than that, all I can say is AMEN.
I have got to believe that if GM had ever got sent home early from a fire due to unsafe practices, we would know about it by now. But then again, maybe not???
I would first hope and believe had GM been an FS crew I do not believe that Marsh’s behavior would have lasted as long as it did. The internal grape vine would have caught up with him. I have seen that happen in the past especially with in Regions. Superintendents talk to there supervisors who talk to other supervisors and things change internally. Being a non federal crew stopped that chain. I tend to believe that Willis as there supervisor had to have known some of the problems, just my guess.
This in no way reflects on my hart felt sadness for the deaths of all and my sorrow for the families and friends of those lost.
It was preventable and should have been dealt with inside or outside the crew, That is the real problem.
The other problem is that Steed must have bought into the process through his training under Marsh. No one willing to challenge it when all there lives were at stake. Ingrained behavior of the entire crew that is the sad part.
I have invested so much time in this thread, so I guess I owe it a little more than just unilaterally declaring victory and going home. So here it is…just my opinion on this opinion blog.
Every investigator has to make a judgment call(s) in the course of an investigation right or wrong…and then let the chips fall where they may. Either the U.S. Attorney’s Office takes the case or they don’t, either the opposing counsel cuts a deal or they don’t, and then either the jury finds them guilty or they don’t.
And in this case, we don’t have the ability to gather our own facts, conduct our own interviews (most importantly), examine the evidence we collected first hand, and in general conduct an independent investigation, so we are pretty limited…so I don’t think this investigation is ever going to get any better.
Bob Powers credentials have clearly been established beyond reproach. I believe Bob Powers when he has repeatedly vouched for RTS and that he trained him and they worked together for years. And I believe RTS works on or very near the Prescott National Forest and he may still a hotshot and may have been on the hotshot crew boss staff ride or is very close to the hotshots who were. For example, RTS has a lot of insider information regarding past fires on the Prescott National Forest and the past actions of Division Z (Marquez).
I happen to believe RTS about Eric Marsh and his reckless actions, RTS has had the same theme since the very beginning, he just finally gave up the particulars for whatever reason and it fits the facts in my opinion. I believe RTS when he says the group of hotshot superintendents collectively condemned Eric Marsh’s past behavior and collectively believe Eric Marsh deliberately took such a reckless and knowingly led his crew into harm’s way due to this arrogance, stubbornness, and his desire to one-up everyone else (Blue Ridge this time) and show he had the best hotshot crew.
I also think all of the information about the crews future being on the line and their need to prove their worth in helping to evacuate Yarnell and to engage in structure (if possible) fed into his decision to try and “beat the train.”
And I think Darrell Willis knew all about Eric Marsh’s past tactics and behavior and he not only approved of them, but he encouraged Eric to do those things to prove how good the Granite Mountain Hotshots were on a regular basis to enhance his reputation the glory of the Prescott Fire Department.
Like I said in my post, I think there are some more blanks that can be filled in on some of the details. And I still think Darrell Willis strongly suggested to Eric Marsh he should take the assignment for all of the previous reasons named, but in the end, it was Eric Marsh’s call and his apparent history of reckless behavior and taking excessive risk caught up with him. And as a result, he killed himself and his crew.
I think I have stood by and defended Eric Marsh as much or more so than anyone else, but I have to accept the facts. Eric Marsh was in charge of the Granite Mountain Hotshots either as Division A Supervisor or still acting as the crew boss even though Jesse Steed was officially in that job.
I just happen to now believe, based on my experience, training, and education and the information that has been presented in this thread that the answer to “Why did the Granite Mountain Hotshots die?” is because Eric Marsh killed them with his rash, impulsive, arrogant, and reckless decision to break almost all of the rules at the same time. But…I can still mourn the loss of his life.
Finally, I think we can all agree that I never would have been investigating this case from the beginning. I am to emotionally involved, far from objective, and I reached my own conclusions in the beginning after listening to Darrell Willis say so many stupid things (in my opinion).
I am going to continue to monitor this thread as time allows and I hope I am eventually proven wrong and there are other ways found to “explain the inexplicable.”
Here’s some revelations on GMHS habits regarding radio communications and stealth GMHS movements from a former GMHS.
The former GMHS said that Marsh was adamant about a form of ‘under-the-radar’ radio procedure. He said that Marsh wanted only 3-4 radios to be scanning the TAC channel(s) with only those guys speaking on TAC. All others were to be scanning and talking ONLY on the Crew Net.
Regarding the stealth movements. he said that Marsh did not want anyone (overhead) to know what they were doing or where they were. Marsh made a MAJOR TACTICAL MOVEMENT on June 30th when they all abandoned their perfectly good SZ and never really informed anyone outright. It was always on the sly, partial truths, with little or no details.
Which leads to their (Marsh) June 30th disengenuous (coy) behavior and radio transmissions actions, intentions, location(s), and the like. I allege that Marsh was never forthright that day on any of these subjects.
Consider the radio transmissions with Air Attack and/or Bravo 33. Even though it seemed obvious to me that Marsh wanted them to act as a lookout for the GMHS and/or seek advice and counsel from them, he never once SPECIFICALLY revealed their exact location(s) with a mirror flash or specific details. You never heard things like “do you have my flash” or “do you see me on the ridgetop out your right door, waving my shovel with the pink flagging”?
On June 30th, the radio transmissions we heard were things like “picking our way through the black” or “travelling down our Escape Route” or “coming off the top” or the like. Even when they were in the bowl preparing their alleged SZ, the radio transmissions are pretty vague and lacking detailed information. However, Fire Order #7 states to “maintain prompt communication with your … supervisor, and adjoing forces.” Clearly, Marsh did NOT do this. It’s as if Marsh and the GMHS had their own ‘VERSION(S)” of the ‘The WFF Rules.’
Bad decisions with prior good outcomes. As Risk Management speaker Gordon Graham says, “What’s predictable is preventable.” The fatalities on June 30th were both predictable and preventable.
RTS, regarding stealth movements, are you, or the former GMHS, stating that there were past episodes of the crew needing to NOT discuss where they’d been or what they’d done, sort of like not ever having gone over the border in a different context? Are you saying this was an insular pattern that was an expected mode of [non] communication for the whole crew?
SR,
Yes, that’s exactly what I’m saying. Bad decisions with prior good outcomes. This was NOT the first and only time. I allege that this was GMHS (Marsh) Standard Operating Procedure.
You know I want to make a point here, we worked long and hard to get crew freqs. Not everyone uses their crew freq for sneaking around or getting away with things. I can remember having freqs. that weren’t authorized, but they provided a level of safety for everyone by not having everyday crew ops on the TAC.
I knew they could have stayed in the black and it was obvious they could have moved through the black I was really just hoping it was bad judgement. This is going to be real hard on a few people. Life is a long time to carry a reputation you inherit. Bad news!
I will state here for all. RTS has spent a lot of time talking to people and putting together what he has now released. Most of this information is coming from current employees and if they were known they would be in personal problems with the FS.
I know RTS and his real name and I will personally vouch for his truth and sincerity in what he has said. He as well could at this time lose his job if his real name were released. Accept what has been released for now and hopefully more will step forward with additional information. Maybe the WHY is at least clearer now, It is not what any WFF wanted to hear and should be addressed Thru out the Country.
Reply to Robert the Second post on March 17, 2014 at 10:36 am
>> RTS said
>> The former GMHS said that Marsh was adamant about a
>> form of ‘under-the-radar’ radio procedure.
Regardless of ANY ‘past behavior’… the evidence record for
June 30 certainly backs this up. I know that being ‘concise’ on
the busy ‘shared’ channels is considered SOP and ‘a virtue’…
but that’s not the simple explanation for what was happening on
June 30 with regards to Marsh’s communications.
Almost every one of Marsh’s communications on the ‘open’
channels on that day that we can now hear with our own ears
had this mysterious ‘obtuse’ aspect associated with it. Minimal
information, dodging direct questions, refusing to be specific,
etc. etc.
>> RTS also said…
>> Which leads to their (Marsh) June 30th disengenuous (coy)
>> behavior and radio transmissions actions, intentions,
>> location(s), and the like. I allege that Marsh was never
>> forthright that day on any of these subjects.
Again… the actual evidence record for June 30 supports this.
If you compare the snippets of conversation that we can hear
captured in the MacKenzie video ( when Marsh thought it
was ‘just us’ and nobody was listening or would EVER hear
that conversation ) it’s perfectly obvious that Marsh had a
much different ‘conversational’ style of talking over the radio
when he didn’t think command or OPS was listening than
he did when talking to directly to command/OPS.
Now I know that’s probably true of most field supervisors
( having a more terse speaking style on command channels
versus private channels )… but I’m just pointing out that in
Marsh’s case… the *difference* was *dramatic* and this is
perfectly obvious from even the short moments captured by
Christopher MacKenzie.
People have used the term ‘freelancer’ to describe the kind
of behavior we were seeing from Marsh that day.
I think that IS, in fact, how he approached his job.
Once again… kudos to RTS for the willingness to share
information that might help shed more light on the events
and circumstances that led to the tragedy of June 30, 2013.
Reply to Robert the Second post on March 17, 2014 at 12:47 pm
>> On March 17, 2014 at 12:47 pm, RTS said…
>>
>> SR, Spot-on regarding the GMHS ‘options.’ They were ‘not
>> forced to move’ as some have claimed. Fire behavior and/or
>> the threat of fire behavior wasn’t the deciding factor for
>> GMHS to move. The “GM had no choice” assertion holds
>> no water. They had several good, safe options THROUGH
>> THE BLACK from their perfectly good SZ. BRHS said they
>> could have walked in good black all the way from their
>> SZ to Yarnell, no problem.
And, indeed, did that very thing ( in the opposite direction )
less than 60 minutes after the burnover at the deployment
site. They were on UTV’s… but perfectly safe ‘out there’
near the original anchor point and all the way out there
vai the Sesame Trail two-track ( that GM walked in on
that morning ).
RTS… apologies… that comment above was NOT
supposed to appear on THIS thread… it was a response
to what you said yesterday on the other SAFE BLACK
thread down below. I think WordPress is starting to
go haywire again, or something.
As long as that SAFE BLACK comment appeared
up here instead of down where it was originally
posted… here is the ‘followup’ that never posted
at all.
LARGE PORTIONS OF THE SAFE BLACK
NEVER BURNED AT ALL THAT DAY.
Look in the following (public) folder on Mr.
Dougherty’s dropbox site…
A42-Aerial Video and Photos Mayhew
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/7b7asvh6ptdavbr/FixOl2n6pI
269 super highres aerial photos taken on
July 4, 2013, just 4 days after the Yarnell tragedy.
Photos in that folder clearly show an area the size
of a SOCCER field… still totally GREEN and totally
unburned… right in the MIDDLE of the ‘previously burned’ area near the anchor point.
That’s how SAFE that SAFETY ZONE really
was that afternoon.
Perhaps this one photo shows it best…
An area the size of a SOCCER field
still totally GREEN and totally unburned…
right in the MIDDLE of the ‘previously burned’
area near the anchor point…
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/7b7asvh6ptdavbr/FixOl2n6pI#lh:null-IMG_1743.JPG
The apparent culture of secrecy surrounding even crew movements is, as already noted by many, very troubling.
Was there any suggestion that, along with this, some crew movements suggested trouble reading maps? Where the same decision, even if it had been one other superintendents would have disagreed with and counseled him against, could have been carried out without the same muss and fuss through a better route choice? A culture of secrecy is obviously not compatible with a strong safety culture to begin with, but I don’t believe a full explanation for some of the decisions at YHF.
IF a map had been consulted and Marsh therefore understood that he was taking the crew on a long, slow slog through dense brush, it should have been apparent that this would take roughly an hour or more and not get him where he wanted in a timely fashion, anyway. Likewise, GM’s lookout was in a public position earlier in the day, so there was no secrecy there, but also in my view no thought given to how he got out of there if needed.
Marsh was old enough that he shouldn’t have been in the situation of some young adults who just rely on phone navigation for everything and literally aren’t map-literate. And, perhaps he read maps just fine. But, since to me going into that bowl was such a big “does not compute,” that even if pulled off safely wouldn’t have put GM in town soon enough, it’s worth asking the question.
SR,
I think the map argument is moot and really a non-issue. For one, maps are rare in the intitial stages of almost every fire, and so one must rely on downloaded maps and the like, and scouting. One did not need a map in this case. One needed to SCOUT the area for alternate routes, well covered in LCES, Fire Orders, and Watch Outs (The WFF Rules).
I hear you, though if there is cell reception downloading maps takes only a few seconds. Likewise, you’re completely right that even visually, the route they chose should have on appearances not been a good choice. I guess what I am addressing when I ask if there was an issue with map-reading is the seeming lack of awareness about surroundings and also time. And, it’s noteworthy to me that even afterwards, many commenters seem to make abstract statements that ignore basic facts about location, topography, and time that either a map, or basic knowledge of the area, should have screaming out at them.
You’re right that Marsh had all day to scout, and apparently did so…and still didn’t seem to have awareness of topography and vegetation. On reflection my asking about maps is likely just me grasping at straws to see if there is an “easier” answer to why that specific choice of route was made.
SR,
This was Marsh’s and the GMHS’ turf, so-to-speak. This was basically in their backyard. They knew or should have known better.
Notwithstanding their lack of scouting (watch Out #1), it’s as if Watch Out #4 also applied to them that day as well, on their own turf!
“Unfamiliar with weather and local factors influencing fire behavior.”
And just in case anyone out there is cyber space is wondering, this was how interviewing is done in the real world (FLETC – Interrogation 101). Establish rapport, show your ass if necessary, and talk long enough for someone to finally tell you the truth. Go home.
Actually…I should have said, “Go home, write it up (or preferably have a subordinate write it up), submit it for prosecution, and get ready for the next one, case closed.”
Really that’s what you’ve got your going to try to bait me. Come on man with all the history you’ve got you should be better than that.
Nope, that’s all I got. There are some good reasons why Public Safety employees have mandatory retirement. And, I just happen to believe RTS…based in large part on Bob Powers vouching for him, even though I don’t know who he is.
Well RTS…I guess you have answered the big question, “Why did the Granite Mountain Hotshots die.” There are probably some more blanks to be filled in by WTKTT’s detailed analysis and Elizabeth’s study of the FOIA material she has, but I guess you have answered the big question.
My questions regarding who knew what, and when were rhetorical. I was trying to point out the obvious. If Eric Marsh’s flagrant, (and it sounds like he was way over the line on a regular basis) safety violations were so well known, then his supervisor MUST have known and he MUST have approved of Marsh’s actions.
As far as I know, everything I did as a hotshot crew boss on a fire made it back to my home forest and my supervisor one way or the other…and very quickly. That information always got home before I did.
RTS, I should also say, “thank you”, for telling those of us who have been participating in this discussion what a lot of people obviously already knew, and have known since June 1, 2013.
I have always said it would take a “Source of Information” from the inside to tell us what happened.
And that would be one of the reasons for the FS gag order.
at least in part.
I’d also like to thank RTS for his ongoing help in this discussion.
Regardless of where the discussion heads following the latest
comment(s)… it’s worth it to take a moment and acknowledge
his continuing support of this ongoing discussion and his
willingness to share information. Kudos.
I suppose the latest comment ( and what appear to be a
number of incidents to support it ) sheds even more light
on some of the mysterious comments from Darrell Willis
to Marsh in his employee evaluation just 57 days before
the tragedy in Yarnell.
I believe one of these days ( sooner rather than later? ) Darell
Willis ( Wildland Division Chief for Prescott FD ) is going to
have to elaborate on questions in the “WHAT did he know…
and WHEN did he know it” category.
I don’t know which would be worse…
1) That the Wildland Division Chief supervising GM was
perfectly aware of some patterns of risky behavior on the
part of people he had charge of and did little ( or nothing )
to try and correct the behavior ( vague comments in a
once-a-year employee evaluation don’t count )…
2) OR… such risky behavior was well known to other WFF
supervisors but the PFD Wildland Division Chief was
NOT, himself, aware of it.
I fully expected to get comments on my post regarding: ““Superintendents made comments such as this: ‘This was the final, fatal link in a long chain of bad decisions with good outcomes. We saw this coming for years.” common knowledge that Eric Marsh made well known “prior bad decisions with good outcomes” we all knew it was going to happen.”
Gary Olsen and others asked: “Who knew that? When did they know about it? What exactly did they know? What did they do to correct it? What did they do to stop it? Who did they tell about it?”
Who knew this? Many HS Superintendents from many Regions on many fires over several years knew this. We knew that Marsh took unnecessary chances and risks AND GOT AWAY WITH THEM again and again and again. What did we do about it? We counselled him about it, like WTF are you thinking? And WTF are you doing here? And you know better than this, so do it the right way, the safe way. Who did we tell? Using ‘peer pressure’ we told Marsh on several (most) occasions and of course, we told each other. Surely, some did not interact with him and just chocked it up to, whatever. Marsh seemed to simply not be willing to listen to others, his peers, and especially Senior HS Superintendents. I believe that many (most) WFF supervisors aware of this behavior did the best they could to deal with it, but it was ultimately it up to Marsh.
Marsh never ‘worked his way up’ on a HS Crew, but instead was a ‘filler’ on Crews while working on Engines. This MAY have had something to do with all this, not understanding the HS Crew ethic and all.
I believe I posted earlier somewhere that at least two Superintendents felt that he was ‘always trying to one-up you.’ This was also verified by a former GMHS. Marsh seemed to have the attitude that they (GMHS) were inferior (or whatever) to the Federal HS Crews and always trying to ‘prove themselves’ as better. We all told him he had already accomplished that once he achieved Type I status.
I have listed several (but not all) of these instances where the ‘bad decsions with prior good outcomes’ pathology persisted. This was basically a summation of those instances.
They did it to prove that they could do it all. Ignore the rules and take the chance. This is then the Loop fire all over Making an name as the can do crew. That’s what Superintendent King did two other Crews turned down what the Division Boss wanted in front of King He decided to show those hot shot crews what his crew was made of. That is what both the Superintendents told me and I worked for both. As I said it has happened in the past and it was part of what happened this time, May be all of what happened this time. We have been looking or the why and as RTS said it was there all the time (ego driven crew bad decisions with good outcomes). Not purity but very likely. and it makes me very sad but I understand a little more now.
So, you have a hole in accountability, right? No one’s ass is in a sling up the chain. I imagine many were hoping that Marsh would ultimately get “scared straight” without anything really bad happening. And, some of the time, that does happen.
Agree
RTS did you experience this first hand or get feedback from people you know? I’m sorry to hear this sad outcome for everyone involved.
WFF,
Both
Bob/RTS, Don’t you think there is something wrong with “everybody” standing around out at the deployment site and saying, “Yup, we saw this coming from a mile away, it was bound to happen, it was only a question of when?”
Nobody operates in a vacuum on fires, especially no one who comes with a 20 person hotshot crew. If a group of hotshot crew bosses knew something was wrong, well…then…everybody knew something was wrong. Right?
The wildland firefighting organization (all agencies included) is a very small tight knit world, there is only about 1 degree of separation (instead of 6) between every wildland firefighter in the country, including old retired, former firefighters like me. Right? Everybody knows everybody’s reputation, don’t they?
Maybe that is what has been wrong with the SAIT and the SAIR and everything else since June 2, 2013. Maybe that is why nobody is talking and everybody is covering their asses? Like WTKTT said a long time ago, “there is nothing to see here, move along.”
Regarding people having seen this coming, I would be surprised if they hadn’t seen SOMETHING bad coming for this crew. But, remember, if you drilled down, bad would mean 1-3 crew getting caught, something like that. Look at earlier in the afternoon at the YHF and see that McDonough got lucky that Frisby picked him up. You can see just what was done with their lookout and see that sooner or later, a bad outcome will follow a bad decision. That doesn’t mean anyone expected the whole crew to get caught.
You currently have no real mechanism for either reporting near-misses, or making people feel that their asses are on the line if a superintendent is reckless. While civil lawsuits have resulted here, no one is being court-martialed. The families of the seasonal employees who died may be treated poorly by Prescott, but surviving higher-ups are not to my knowledge having their pensions and retirement status subject to review. And, oddly, I’m not sure that’s wholly wrong under the current system, because with the lack of reporting, I’m not sure how much of this kind of thing ever filtered back to Prescott. Even at Yarnell, had there been no accident, would anyone other than Frisby have a good idea how much risk McDonough was exposed to, and how McDonough’s decision-making implied views of deployment among other things that were troubling? It should have been apparent to GM themselves, and clearly was not.
By reporting near-misses, I mean reporting in a way that realistically might fix the human factor in those near-misses.
I dought if there is any paper work but you never know. Most of those that talked to him probably handled it one on one.
Oh, and one more thing Mr., Ms., Miss, or Mrs. WFF, I did agree with WTKTT when he systematically discredited virtually everything you said and every idea you had down below on March 6.
Bob said , “My take Gary== I dought you really did that. I’ll agree to disagree with you. You never knowingly would have put your crew in harms way……………..”
You’re right Bob, I never did that. There is a fine line between “fighting fire AGRESSIVELY while providing for safety first” and doing what the Granite Mountain Hotshots did. The trick is to know when you are over the line and take extra precautions. Like I have said before I am conflicted.
The main point I was trying to make is that not everyone was/is as safety minded and cautious as you and RTS were. Nor I did not invent the style of firefighting I was accustomed to, it was/is actually quite common. I think the only thing that really set the Yarnell Hill Fire apart from so many other wildfires…is the death toll. The fact that it was a safety deficient cluster ****, no.
I am just trying to explain to those who have never fought wildfire that although what Eric Marsh and Jesse Steed did was an extreme example of the “can do” attitude that permeates the wildland firefighting culture…it is not and will not be the only time it has or will happen. I think that fact is wildland firefighter’s dirty little secret. Hubris and the “can do” attitude has killed more wildland firefighters than anything else.
And I agree with WFF, as I have stated before, I don’t actually have anything to add to this discussion except background material on hotshots and firefighting in general, a kind of 2 plus 2 equals 4 logic. I also agree with WFF (as I have stated before) that I have already said to much and I should keep my mouth shut, although I will still point out that if WFF would have had his way in the beginning…John Dougherty never would have written about this event, and the only ones doing the talking would be Jerry Payne, Jim Paxon (I remembered his name) and Darrell Willis. How sad would that be?
In addition, I continue to be thrown off by this concept that “Superintendents made comments such as this: ‘This was the final, fatal link in a long chain of bad decisions with good outcomes. We saw this coming for years.” common knowledge that Eric Marsh made well known “prior bad decisions with good outcomes” we all knew it was going to happen.
Who knew that? When did they know about it? What exactly did they know? What did they do to correct it? What did they do to stop it? Who did they tell about it? These are just a few of the questions I have…and if I have them, I’m sure there are a few family members of the Granite Mountain Hotshots and their attorney’s who also have a few questions that are very similar.
So…am I wrong because I have talked too much, or are others wrong because they have not talked enough…Mr. WFF? I am still waiting for you to lay your credentials on the table rather than hide behind an internet alias. At least I have the courage to put my name on my ideas. Bob powers have vouched for RTS…that is good enough for me, but nobody has vouched for you Mr. WFF.
I apologize WFF. It could also be Miss WFF or Mrs. WFF.
Gary above you said it all I have no disagreement.
I know R3 is working on safety from this fire lessons learned with there Superintendents which will cover all crews. They are studding the fire and the reports to make there own conclusions. That I am sure will come out in recommendations for all to read. There walk thru on the fire was part of that. BR was included in that walk thru. I hope to see a good message come from them.
Reply to Gary Olson on March 16, 2014 at 12:08 am
>> Gary said…
>> In addition, I continue to be thrown off by this concept that
>> “Superintendents made comments such as this: ‘This was
>> the final, fatal link in a long chain of bad decisions with good
>> outcomes. We saw this coming for years.”
I would describe my own reaction to reading that recent
comment not nearly as mildly as being ‘thrown off’.
I would describe my own reaction more like “WHAAAAT???”.
Previous references to ‘bad decisions with good outcomes’
and the possible one-off baked UTV and a proficiency for
parking your vehicles where others have to bail your ass out,
and the occasional backfire that causes other crews to
have to scramble for safety… are one thing…
…but this *new* statement is something else altogether.
>> Gary, also said…
>> common knowledge that Eric Marsh made well known
>> “prior bad decisions with good outcomes” we all knew
>> it was going to happen.
If, as you aptly describe, that is the “talk on the two-track”
these days ( or even just at some private walk-thrus right
where it all happened )… that is a BIG DEAL.
>> gary also wrote…
>>
>> Who knew that?
>> When did they know about it?
>> What exactly did they know?
>> What did they do to correct it?
>> What did they do to stop it?
>> Who did they tell about it?
>>
>> These are just a few of the questions I have…and if I
>> have them, I’m sure there are a few family members
>> of the Granite Mountain Hotshots and their attorney’s
>> who also have a few questions that are very similar.
You can add me to that list… but I assure you my questions
are not ‘similar’ to your list.
They are IDENTICAL.
This really bothers me. People unfortunately too often take a “head in the sand” approach to situations like the one alleged here, but afterwards are all too willing to start yapping. Whose job would it have been to correct a situation like this? (please, dear God, do not let Darrell Willis be the answer to this question). Should Granite Mountain have gotten Type 1 IHC status? If they were so obviously unsafe, should they have continued to receive assignments? How does/should the fire community handle a situation like alleged here? Are there similar situations out there right now? Was Granite Mountain treated like crap over the years by the federal crews, and was put in the position of having to prove themselves? Did Eric Marsh, who seems as if he might have been a little prickly, make enemies over the years, who are now willing to engage in a whispering campaign? Most importantly, just WHAT IS THE TRUTH?
Mike, What the (expletive deleted) are you asking/implying here? Because whether they (GM) were ‘ever’ treated like crap or not … nobody PUT THEM in a position. Period. End of sentence.
As for suggesting how the current information coming out regarding GM’s superintendent could be nothing more than a case of PAYBACK (?) because Marsh ‘might have been a little prickly’ over the years …
Is THIS what you have to say — after all the time spent here with numerous WFF’s (current and retired) … after all that they have made possible for any reader to learn (and know) … particularly when it comes to not just themselves and their profession, but just how deeply the YHF tragedy concerns them. You think ‘payback’ is what concerned those who were visiting the ridge above the burnover??
Get a grip, Mike, that’s all I can say. Get a grip.
Hell, I don’t know what or who to believe anymore. Some WFF and hotshots have been quoted that Marsh was first-rate, others apparently feel he was an accident waiting to happen. If it was the latter, the system allowed him to continue in a position where he ended up responsible for the deaths of 18 other men. The primary investigation team concludes that the whole affair was essentially bad luck. You have to this day basic facts about this whole event known to senior overhead on the fire that have not been made public, for whatever reason. Everyone wants to talk about lessons, but we first cannot even get an honest accounting of what happened that day. And I think that is not because what actually happened is unknown, it just has not been laid out openly.
People say baring the facts might be harsh for the families. I am sure advancing the idea that the crew super was dangerous (and I honestly am not discounting that possibility, I do respect what RTS has had to say) will go over much better! Let’s get an honest accounting of the facts that day, then we can debate how much Marsh’s prior behavior had to do with the events of June 30.
Finally, no I do not believe people are saying that about Marsh as a matter of getting even. The question was rhetorical. There appear to be real differences of opinion here. Everyone wants to know why they left the black. Almost certainly, no set of facts discovered will ever justify them having done so. But let’s find out what happened first, then we can assign the proper relevance to prior decisions.
Bob Powers posted on March 16th at 1236:
” I will also go back to the walk thru of Arizona hot shots that all felt the black was the best safety zone and they should have stayed there. The walk thru was a training exercise by FS Crews and I am sure will not be released to the public.”
That ‘walk thru’ was basically an informal Staff Ride. Several of the Hot Shot Superintendents made comments such as this: ‘This was the final, fatal link in a long chain of bad decisions with good outcomes. We saw this coming for years.’
Just one more alignment element in the Swiss Cheese model of accident causaion authored by James Reason. http://www.coloradofirecamp.com/swiss-cheese/introduction.htm
Correction – March 15th for Bob Powers post
I would add as Gary well knows Hot Shots are a tight organization in the Forest Service and BLM. If a crew is failing the test they will talk among them self’s and maybe to a trusted IC. The Failings for some reason stay with in the community. It has been that way science the Crews were first formed. Some reasons are supervisors won’t listen, and some say it is just a crew rivalry. One Superintendent won’t tell another what they should do unwritten rule. I run my crew you run yours. If you are not doing the right things you won’t listen to me any way. Simple but very complex.
There is one thing here that concerns me. Joy’s statement of the rumor of a back fire while I don’t believe any fire fighters could have been there to back fire around Boulder Springs Ranch could some one else have set a back fire? Like the owners. That would be a game changer if that happened I have not seen any statement or investigation that looked into that possibility.
If that would have happened it would have been devastating to the crew since it would have puled the main fire and the backfire together much faster. Again we need proof that happened. Some rumors are just that, and the main fire could just have well had multiple spot fires that did the same thing.
Mr. Powers… I actually thought about that myself at some point.
Did the owners of the Helms Ranch put their own ‘burnout’
plan into action somewhere on their own perimeter which
THEN turned into the (totally unexpected) west/southwest-moving
fireline that actually killed GM?
I researched it and never mentioned it because there really
is no evidence to support it.
By all accounts… the owners of the Helms Ranch barely had
time to get their animals under shelter before the STORM
driven fireline swept around their ranch.
I don’t think the Helms Ranch security camera video footage
( if/when we EVER get to actually see any/all of that ) is
going to show anything different.
Followup…
I really should have put the following CAVEAT into
what I said above…
“I researched it and never mentioned it because there
really is no evidence to support it… AT THIS TIME”.
As with a most things regarding this incident… there’s
no telling what new ‘evidence’ might suddenly come
into the light of day.
I would not have mentioned it but Joy brought it up yesterday. Just wanted a little airing on it . Thanks WTNTT.
Elizabeth,
The SZ (the good, solid black) where GMHS hung out for most of the day could NOT burn again. Just look at the photos and video clips. The Joy and Tex photo showed the area in the background above them as the GMHS was hiking up the jeep road. That showed pretty solid black. The MacKenzie video clips indicated the same thing.
And the “weatherman video that Mr. Turbyfill” showed leaves a lot to be desired as far as I’m concerned. Quite a bit of pure speculation in those, I thought. And a lot of histrionics.
The 4:04 SZ could NOT have “ultimately reburned” because there was NOT any fuel to burn. And the Matt Oss video shows flames coming over the ridgetop from the bowl below, but the GMHS SZ was down below that. The fire no doubt burned by them in the unburned areas but there is NO way it could have burned what was already black.
As far as them deploying in the SZ? Then it would not have been a SZ. It would have been comptetely survivable WITHOUT a fire shelter. The good black around their SZ looked to be several hundred acres and so there was NO way for the fire to get to them. Someradiant heat maybe, but not enough to kill them or injure them. I’m sure they could have felt the radiant heat from down below in the basin, just another indicator warning them NOT to leave their prefectly good SZ.
Bottom line – they were perfectly safe where they were and should have NEVER left it, especially without the REQUIRED benefit of a Lookout. Totally predictable and totally preventable.
Totally agree….
I actually liked the “Weatherman video” overall, even if it is a bit over the top. While thunderstorms with extreme downdrafts are common that time of year in that area, for someone who hasn’t experienced them there, or experienced the afternoon lightning shows on the Front Range in CO, etc. the video has some good content to make them aware.
That said, I think Elizabeth is seeing a bit of an optical illusion in the fire progression map in that video. You can do this with dominos — just set a few as a “point of origin,” then have the domino collapse “spread,” and finally set them for the spread to rapidly “envelope” the original fallen dominoes. Your brain will get the sense that the initial area of fallen dominoes sort of got swallowed by a final total collapse. Obviously, this doesn’t really happen.
Because the area that GM was in at 4:04 was as big as it was, the fire burning around it would have been dramatic but nothing more than that. If it had been a little sliver, yes, then in that case that was not the reality, they could have been at risk. Bottom line, they were not forced to move by the fire behavior, based on what they and others knew at that time, based on what their subjective beliefs were at that time as expressed to others (Marsh and Steed subjectively also clearly believed they were in good black), and even based in hindsight (based on what we now know, it is clear they would have been safe if they did stay in the black, as they themselves believed at that time). Had they wanted to move but stay safe, there were also options available to them to do so.
Where is the support for your very last sentence, SR? The single person on the fire that day in terms of overhead who knew the area the best – Gary Cordes – with support from Ops as well has testified *EXACTLY* the opposite. What way would you have had GM go, SR, and what materials do you have as source materials that I do not yet have?
Elizabeth, what were they in, before they struck out? An area that had already burned. With access to much more. Can you see where I’m going with this?
Take a quick look at a map, and tell me what other options you see.
Anyone can take isolated snippets of interviews and twist them to support a theory that “GM had no choice.” But, reality is quite different. Actually look at a map. And then actually try to hike thru the kind of brush they chose to go thru.
That may sound critical, but I really do appreciate all the time you and the others here have put into trying to get clarity on this. I really do think that if you actually look at a map, and look at the options available, you’ll see it. And if I type it here first, you’ll discount it anyway because it doesn’t support a theory that GM had no choice but to move (though they clearly could have stayed put) and if they moved, no other routes to take.
And you are absolutely right SR.
Elizabeth what do you want there is not a fire fighter here that would tell you the black was not safe. move to the top of the hill and more well burned black. Walk back across the top to where BR came up the ATV track and after the Fire burned past it drop back down to where the vehicles were parked and out. That is a lot of option they did not have to go down into unburned fuel to get back to Yarnell. A Fire Fighters best option for safety always is the burn
( the black). Trained that day one of FF101.
Bob,
Is it fair to say that you can sort a good bit of this simply by using Google Earth and a fire progression map? For me, I find that Google Earth still tends to dramatically understate potential tough going in terms of slope, brush, boulders, etc., but it does so pretty equally. A useful and free tool, though other utilities may give more useful info overall.
SR,
Spot-on regarding the GMHS ‘options.’ They were ‘not forced to move’ as some have claimed. Fire behavior and/or the threat of fire behavior wasn’t the deciding factor for GMHS to move. The “GM had no choice” assertion holds no water. They had several good, safe options THROUGH THE BLACK from their perfectly good SZ. BRHS said they could have walked in good black all the way from their SZ to Yarnell, no problem.
From John Dougherty’s August 21, 2013 article: “Just before the final hike in to start battling the fire, one of the firefighters was texting his mother,” Bates said…. “‘Mom, the fire is getting big. There’s a ranch down there. We need to go protect it. We will rest later.’” So, going to Yarnell wasn’t that crew member’s understanding of the mission; they were going to protect the ranch. With that mindset, why detour through the black to Yarnell when they could go directly to the ranch? (It’s truly unbelievable that they were led on that route. I feel so sad for the crew, their families and friends.)
I had assumed based on the commentary of some folks here that GM was perfectly safe where they WERE at roughly 4:04 p.m., but the fire maps from the Yarnell Hill Fire and the weatherman video that Mr. Turbyfill shared with us below, among other things, are making me re-assess and wonder whether I need to do more research. I know Mr. Powers’s view on this matter, but I would like to know if anyone else has researched this issue rather than relying on the SAIR or comments on this blog. If you do not want to respond publicly, you are welcome to e-mail me at [email protected].
Specifically, I am now trying to research or understand whether (a) the area where GM was at 4:04 ultimately re-burned (see the Matt Oss photos) at least to some degree because there was enough fuel still remaining in the area (e.g. charred but not unburnable things), (b) the area where GM was at 4:04 might not have burned directly but was certainly burned around and hit with heat from the fire so hot that it would have been lethal, particularly given the view articulated by some experts cited by Sonny/Joy that that was not a feasible area in which to deploy shelters due to the landscape and relevant factors, and (c) even if the GM guys could have deployed there, they STILL would have been hit with sustained heat beyond the capacity of a fire shelter even properly deployed to withstand.
Has anyone on this comment thread researched the issue and considered (presumably comparing) the pictures and maps from that day of the Yarnell Hill Fire? If you do not want to post publicly, you are welcome to share your thoughts at [email protected]
Reply to Elizabeth post on March 15, 2014 at 9:16 am
From page 18 of the ADOSH report…
_____________________________________________________
At approximately 1545 hours, Division A Supervisor Marsh had
a radio conversation with Operations Section Chief I Abel
regarding the weather and the position of Granite Mountain iHC.
Marsh was located near the top of the Weaver Mountains and had
a clear view of the thunderstorm, the fire, and the valley below.
Marsh and Abel had been watching the storm for some time and
discussed their concerns regarding the storms effects.
Marsh reportedly stated that Granite Mountain was SAFE and in
the BLACK (i.e., previously burned wildland).
Shortly THEREAFTER, Operations Section Chief 2 Musser
radioed GMIHC and asked if they could spare resources to
assist in Yarnell.
Either Marsh or GMIHC Captain Steed responded that they were
COMMITTED to the BLACK and that Musser should contact
BRIHC working in the valley (during his interview Musser stated
that he wasn’t sure who he was talking with).
_____________________________________________________
Key points…
>> Marsh was located near the top of the Weaver Mountains
>> and had a clear view of the thunderstorm, the fire, and
>> the valley below.
Marsh ( and Steed ) could clearly see what the fire was doing,
and SHOULD have known what it was now GOING to do for
the next 60 minutes.
>> Marsh and Abel had been watching the storm for some time
>> and discussed their concerns regarding the storms effects.
The discussion with OPS was all about THE STORM, and the
effect it WAS having ( and would CONTINUE to have ) on
the fire for at least the next 60 minutes.
>> Marsh reportedly stated that Granite Mountain was SAFE
>> and in the BLACK (i.e., previously burned wildland).
Keyword: SAFE
Keyword: “in the BLACK”
Keyword: Previously BURNED wildland.
At 1545-1550… Marsh/Steed had ALREADY determined
they would be perfectly SAFE where they were… and they
were reporting this fact to Operations ( Abel ) over the radio.
>> Shortly THEREAFTER, Operations Section Chief 2 Musser
>> radioed GMIHC and asked if they could spare resources to
>> assist in Yarnell. Either Marsh or GMIHC Captain Steed
>> responded that they were COMMITTED to the BLACK
Matches their thinking at 1545-1550 during conversation with
the OTHER OPS on the fire. They had ALREADY determined
they would be perfectly SAFE where they were… and they
were COMMITTED to that decision, for their own safety.
Then… something really irresponsible and stupid happened.
2 men decided on behalf of 17 others that something was
more important than ALL of them staying totally SAFE.
Agree
WTKTT. The ONLY thing I have heard (personally) is Someone (Able?) speaking at approximately 1550 (in the Caldwell video). Telling Someone (Marsh?), to hunker(?) and be safe, keep me updated and air support ASAP. Does ASAP represent urgency/ priority or maybe emergency? Does to me!
And until WE actually hear and consider what is said/ or not said between Musser and Marsh at approximately 1542 (perhaps?) I do not think we can determine the actual timeline of which came first 1. Musser’s request that was denied, or 2.Able’s Air support ASAP that we know came at 1550
Reply to calvin post on March 15, 2014 at 7:46 pm
>> calvin said…
>> WTKTT. The ONLY thing I have heard
>> (personally) is Someone (Able?) speaking at
>> approximately 1550 (in the Caldwell video).
>> Telling Someone (Marsh?), to hunker(?) and be
>> safe, keep me updated and air support ASAP.
Same here… except I am (personally) as sure as
I can be that the ‘someones’ are, in fact, Todd
Abel and Eric Marsh… and I think anyone who
listens to the Caldwell video audio track
can/should be sure of that as well. No need
for ‘audio forensics’. Those recordings are
clear and easily matched with other clear
recordings of the same two people.
>> Does ASAP represent urgency/ priority or
>> maybe emergency? Does to me!
Well.. me too, I guess. ASAP certainly doesn’t
mean ‘tomorrow’. The shit was hitting the fan
all over the place at that time. Only Todd Abel
can still say what he SPECIFICALLY meant
by that… but SAIT investigation notes already
say he doesn’t even recall this ENTIRE
conversation so I don’t know how we get any
more ‘certainty’ on what his ASAP meant ( unless
Brendan knows ).
>> calvin also said…
>> And until WE actually hear and consider what
>> is said/ or not said between Musser and Marsh
>> at approximately 1542 (perhaps?) I do not think
>> we can determine the actual timeline of which
>> came first …
>>
>> 1. Musser’s request that was denied, or
>> 2. Able’s Air support ASAP that we know
>> came at 1550
I agree… but there is also no doubt that the
ADOSH investigators had SOME basis for being
sure enough ‘which came first’ to say that
Musser’s request came ‘shortly THEREAFTER’
that conversation with OPS1 Abel.
Problem is… we don’t even know about that.
We do NOT know why ADOSH could be so sure
that they used the specific ‘shortly THEREAFTER’
reference. Did they NOT get any specific TIME
from their interview with Musser where he finally
admitted that he ‘requested resources’… but
somehow Musser was also SURE that it came
AFTER the Marsh/Abel conversation?
…or was Musser totally clueless about that but
ADOSH had some OTHER information available
to them to support their own ‘THEREAFTER’
claim?
A lot of stuff has recently been released by
ADOSH and a lot of people have it… but I haven’t
seen/heard of anything that would answer this
particular question ( such as some actual
transcript of their interview with Musser? ).
WHY was ADOSH so SURE that Musser’s
‘request for resources’ came ‘AFTER’ the
Marsh/Abel conversation?
Perhaps we will at least find that out soon.
As far as (possibly) HEARING more… I still
haven’t seen that Air Study video that (supposedly)
has Musser calling out to Marsh in it.
Mr. Dougherty said he was actively ‘uploading’ it
and it would be available ‘the next day’… but that
was MORE than a week ago and there’s still
no sign of it.
I still would just like to know at what OFFSET into
the video this ‘supposed’ callout from Musser to
Abel took place. At least then we could put a
time on when Musser was TRYING to get hold
of Marsh. Whether there is ANY more discernible
conversation at that point still remains to be
seen/heard ( if there’s anything there at all ).
Sorry… bad typo in last paragraph above.
I said ‘this callout from Musser to Abel’.
I obviously meant to say ‘this callout from
Musser to Marsh’ ( in the Air Study video ).
THAT is the one where I still want anyone
who has that particular Air Study video to
just at least say at what OFFSET into
the video this ‘callout’ (supposedly) takes
place.
First we have been thru this before. Second I looked at the area from the pictures that were made public in the SAIT. Third there was no chance of reburn where they were, how ever they could easily back up the hill and into 400 + acres of burn on top of the fire. Forth there was not enough fuel ground or aerial in the burn to sustain a forward moving fire.
There is just no way that notion will hold water. They could have moved to the top at any time and been in total black, That is where they should have been and stayed, everybody on the fire thought so.
Where they were sitting was on the slope and would sustain some heat but flame lengths would have been reduced and there was not enough unburned fuel to carry the fire moving to the top would have kept them comfortable and they would not have had to deploy. Again they were safe where they were and had options to move to a more comfortable location if needed. I will also go back to the walk thru of Arizona hot shots that all felt the black was the best safety zone and they should have stayed there. The walk thru was a training exercise by FS Crews and I am sure will not be released to the public.
The best place for a crew to fight fire is with one foot in the black. Why? because your safety zone is always next to you and you bring it with you as you go. If you end up in over story fuel you cut line back into the full burned area ESCAPE ROUT.
My last Question. Which is more safe staying in a 400 Ac. burned area or going down hill into unburned fuel, with an out of control fire within a mile and a half of you?
is there anyone from the fire that day that can answer my questions—I have asked some on my hikes but no one yet will put a public name or statement.
QUESTION- to this date I call this not a tip but rumor since person who told me will not publicly come forward; statement made from someone near the Helm’s home- “The firefighters burned the terrain out near the Helms”…is there anyone that will answer if that is a true statement because we saw a fire go SUPERFAST at great heights late afternoon and the reason we never rested in 107 degree weather and kept on going until we got out. If this is a factual statement and there was a fire made outside the fire that was already burning—this needs to be shared. The person who shared it to me is credible. It is just some people are not bold to speak sources or how they come to their conclusions because of their career or lifestyles. Yet that IS one of my questions plus WHY they dropped retardant where they did that day? I know Y O U can come forward and give this day so much clarity and I still hope you do— I see some of Y O U did and for that— HUGE THANK YOU!
What’s the address, street name, and town/subdivision on the Helm’s home?
What’s the address, street name, and town/subdivision on the Helm’s home?
17875 W Boulder Springs Trail (Helms=Boulder Springs label), next to the Boulder Mesa/Glen Ilah ext. 3 subdivision in Glen Ilah.
**
** CLEAR RECORDING OF OPS2 PAUL MUSSER’S VOICE
FYI – If anyone wants to know what Paul Musser’s voice sounds like over
the radio… calvin actually found a CLEAR captured recording of
OPS2 ( Planning OPS ) Paul Musser calling OPS1 ( Field OPS ) Todd Abel
over the radio in the background of Air Study video…
“20130630 144756 SEAT EP”
I extracted that CLEAR recording of Musser’s voice, put it on a ‘loop’… and
uploaded that video/audio to YouTube.
That CLEAR recording of Musser’s voice is HERE…
http://youtu.be/5doIOFpP5SY
Also.. here is the actual FULL transcript of the ‘background’ audio captured
in that particular Air Study video.
No ‘audio forensics’ required. What is being said in the background in this
particular Air Study video is easily heard by anyone with normal hearing.
*** Air Study Video: 20130630 144756 SEAT EP
NOTE: This is a transcript of the BACKGROUND radio conversations only.
The foreground ‘Air to Air’ radio conversations are not transcibed here.
Todd Abel = OPS1 Field OPS on June 30, 2013.
Paul Musser = OPS2 Planning OPS on June 30, 2013.
Rob Berry= Division Supervisor for Foxtrot on June 30, 2013.
VIDEO STARTS ( 1447 + 56 seconds ) ( 2:47.56 PM )
+0:00
(Todd Abel): Yea, Rob… I’m out here drivin’ around tryin’ to get some of this
road stuff figured out… uh… all the… all the houses you’re on has to be
accessed off the pavement behind the school, correct?
+0:14
(Rob Berry:) Uh… yea… that’s affirmative. There’s a tie-in back here
between us and… uh… Model Creek road but, uh… it’s not very good one.
+1:22
(Paul Musser): Operations Abel, Musser, on TAC 1.
+1:29
(Todd Abel): Yea… I’m tryin’ to work my way back into those structures.
( Next section of background conversation is completely covered by loud
foreground Air to Air channel conversation ).
+1:51
(Todd Abel): Yea, negative. ( Key is to ) know where Darrell’s main access
( is to ) try to pick the most structures up and that might cover it.
(Unknown): Okay.
VIDEO ENDS
Followup… A public copy of the full “20130630 144756 SEAT EP”
Air Study video transcribed above is still available here…
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TmDjJdoynbw
I have always thought that Paul Musser had not given any public comments on the events of that day. Turns out I was quite wrong. In the October 5th, 2013 article from the USA Today that was about what Roy Hall had to say, Musser was also quoted at length. Maybe someone can post the link – I’m stuck in the 19th century. Anyway, the relevant passages I found somewhat stunning.
“Musser said uninformed critiques have been quite cruel, especially with regard to the Granite Mountain crew. Though he struggles to understand why they abandoned a safe area, he said ‘I wasn’t on that ridge, so I cannot and will not second guess. …It’s not like they were trying to die that day.’ Even if misjudgments occurred, Musser stressed they were not intentional. ‘Everybody there was trying to do the best job they could. And it just didn’t work out. …There were things throughout the day that could have changed the outcome, and they just didn’t happen. I don’t think they (missteps) will ever be identified. …I don’t know what it will help doing that.’ ”
“His voice quavering, Musser said months of self-questioning, official investigations and public scrutiny have left him with just one certainty: ‘This will be part of my life forever.’ ”
This interview was on October 5th, just after the SAIT came out. His answers were very careful, the part about him not knowing why they left the safe zone was not a quote, but came from the reporter. He sounds like a tortured man. Could he have not told the SAIT about the request, but then told ADOSH?
Reply to mike post on March 13, 2014 at 8:25 pm
>> mike said…
>> In the October 5th, 2013 article from the USA Today that
>> was about what Roy Hall had to say, Musser was also
>> quoted at length. Maybe someone can post the link
Commander reflects on Yarnell fire tragedy
Dennis Wagner, USA TODAY 5:55 p.m. EDT October 5, 2013
( With VIDEO of Roy Hall part of the interview )…
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/10/04/commander-reflects-on-yarnell-fire-tragedy/2926419/
Here are the ‘other’ things OPS2 Paul Musser said in that
USA Today interview BEFORE the quotes included by
mike up above…
_____________________________________________________
Paul Musser, one of two operations section chiefs on the incident command team, said he doesn’t believe in blaming deaths on a “perfect storm” because firefighters are trained to anticipate worst-possible conditions, but — without using the benefit of hindsight — he struggles to see how the tragedy could have been averted.
“We did everything according to our training and experience,” said Musser, who has fought fires for more than three decades, including 22 years as a hotshot. “If I thought there was anything that any of us could have done to change the outcome, I’d do it. But I don’t think there was. … Accidents will always happen.”
_____________________________________________________
Musser said some who were not on the fire have questioned the 30-minute span when there was no communication with Granite Mountain Hotshots, relying on retrospective knowledge and a limited awareness of the circumstances.
He said outsiders also have suggested that all suppression efforts should have been abandoned as the fire blew up and changed direction. If that strategy had been adopted, he asked, “How many people — civilians — would we have lost in Yarnell and Peeples Valley?”
_____________________________________________________
>> mike also said…
>> This interview was on October 5th, just after the SAIT
>> came out. His answers were very careful.
Yes. They were.
In addition to his ‘dance around’ on his ‘struggle to understand
why they abandonded a safe area’… there is also this gem…
“Musser said some who were not on the fire have questioned the 30-minute span when there was no communication with Granite Mountain Hotshots, relying on retrospective knowledge and a limited awareness of the circumstances.”
That is what is called “Asked… but NOT answered”.
Musser acknowledges that some people are DOUBTING the
reported ‘blackout’… but carefully doesn’t say whether they
have a right to or not… only that they ARE.
By the way… if anyone wants to know what Paul Musser’s
voice sounds like over the radio…
…calvin actually found a CLEAR captured recording of Paul
Musser calling Todd Abel over the radio in the background
of Air Study video “20130630 144756 SEAT EP”
I extracted that CLEAR recording of Musser’s voice, put it
on a ‘loop’… and uploaded that video/audio to YouTube.
That CLEAR recording of Musser’s voice is HERE…
http://youtu.be/5doIOFpP5SY
Here is ANOTHER ( different ) USA Today article where
Paul Musser is publicly “quoted”.
It was ‘picked up’ by USA Today after being originally
published by the Arizona Republic the day AFTER the
one above.
Fire experts: Yarnell report fails to provide lessons
Original article by Mary Jo Pitzl, The Arizona Republic
3:54 p.m. EDT October 6, 2013
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/10/06/yarnell-fire-lessons-future/2932335/
From the article…
______________________________________________________
Paul Musser, one of two operations section chiefs on the Yarnell Hill Fire, said he sees no way to determine specific misjudgments made by firefighters who lost their lives. “I don’t think they will ever be identified,” he said. “And I don’t know what it will help doing that.”
Asked what lessons have been learned from the tragedy, Musser paused, then said: “I wish I knew.”
_____________________________________________________
We have ample evidence suggesting that Eric Marsh and/or the Granite Mountain Hotshots *WERE* disclosing where they were going as they were heading to the Boulder Springs Ranch, which Gary Cordes advised them should be viewed as a bomb-proof safety zone. It is entirely possible (although I am not yet certain either way) that Marsh as DivsA was trying to keep Air Attack in the loop regarding GM’s movements, and it is entirely possible that DivsA or GM did not realize that Rory Collins (with whom DivsA had been communicating and who was well-aware of GM’s location) had left at 3:59 p.m. such that the new Air Attack (e.g. Bravo33) had no idea where GM was or what their target safety zone was. The following “facts,” loosely paraphrased given that I do not have time to both DO the research and then recreate it here in full, come from both the publicly-released SAIT notes, the newly-released unit logs (see John Dougherty’s most recent post), and a few other first-hand sources that apparently have not yet been released by the media. If you go back and read the SAIT interview notes and the newly-released unit logs, I believe you will see all or most of the following:
* Bravo 33 admits that they “[g]ot a call from Division A stating that they were going down their escape route to the safety zone.” Bravo 33 continues to say “We came around, made a practice run through the bowl, west to east,” and, then, “Division A [called] and said ‘that is what we are looking for, that is exactly right.’”
* The fact that DivsA states “that is exactly right” implies that DivsA had communicated a LOCATION to Bravo33, such that DivsA was expressing satisfaction that Bravo33 got the message and found the area correctly.
* How would Bravo33 have known which line to fly if they had not gotten communications from DivsA?
* Bravo33 knew roughly where GM was when they deployed, but they just could not GET to it because of the smoke, as did Ranger58 Eric Tarr, who said he remembered hearing the location toward the Ranch communicated on the radio from Marsh/GM previously, as they were making their way toward the Ranch.
* Tarr and Ranger 58 only FOUND DivsA and GM because, when the smoke lifted, Tarr *SAW* the Ranch and explicitly remembered hearing DivsA say that they were heading toward it.
* In the Caldwell audio/video, it appears that someone is telling DivsA that they will soon be sending air support DOWN to DivsA/GM, as in “down in the valley,” toward the Boulder Springs Ranch. (FYI: We do not know for sure who is speaking in the raw Robert Caldwell audio (not the rabbit video one), nor do we know how the story about the word being “hunker” developed. I am not sure that the word really is hunker, nor I am convinced that the speaker is Abel.)
* Cordes has admitted repeatedly that he knew GM was heading to the Boulder Springs Ranch, he believed (based on when DivsA/GM announced on the radio that they were headed out there) that they had plenty of time to get there, and he was not surprised at where GM was ultimately located.
* Rory Collins, who was Air Attack basically all day but who unfortunately left at 3:59, has attested that he and DivsA spoke sometime between roughly 3:35 and 3:45, and he knew that DivsA was not in the black. My understanding is that he and DivsA and Collins communicated about, among other things, the fact that the retardant line 3/8ths of a mile NW of the dozer line had been compromised.
I, unlike SR, WTKTT, etc., have been candid with people about WHO I am, such that (a) I have put my professional reputation on the line and (b) you can assess for yourself whether I have a dog in the fight. I have no reason to skew the facts in FAVOR of GM, nor do I have any reason to skew the facts AGAINST GM. I just want to know exactly what happened, so that I can help folks get some closure and move on.
Elizabeth, what you are showing is that there is zero evidence anyone knew specifically where GM was. Likewise there is no indication anyone was ever asked to keep eyes on them. Economy in communication is a virtue, but communications are not expected to be a guessing game, and if Marsh had been asking for a lookout, he would have asked for a lookout. 5 seconds of extra communication. Or maybe not 5 EXTRA seconds, if he had been specific rather than vague in the communication that did occur.
When doing things like citing the SAIT notes for B33, p. 15 of 60, you would also do well to note what the actual dialogue between B33 and Marsh/GM seems to have been.
Right at the last communications between B33 and Marsh, B33 also still had to confirm that GM was on the south side of the fire. Because B33 didn’t know exactly where they were.
Neither do you seem to think through what B33 what have done if he WERE to have been acting as a lookout, and DID know where GM was. If the idea is that he was the lookout who didn’t know he was a lookout, because Marsh wanted a lookout but didn’t quite want to say so, but was hoping B33 guessed correctly, and that people all the time kind of hint at wanting AA to be a lookout and assume that AA knows more or less where they are….well: no. That is not how it works. And if B33 were to have been a lookout, he would have been screaming at GM to get out of where they were.
Again you are right nothing I can add. With other things that happened with Marsh and GM the conversation with B33 is something that we have no information as to why.
A possible air tanker drop location? Not specific enough to say that was why Marsh said what he said.
Agreed.
I do feel strongly, though, that one thing we can rule out is that Marsh was acting, in that conversation, in a way that suggests he was asking for a lookout. For me, it can be helpful to think about what someone would actually say if they wanted a lookout. Something like “we are on the shoulder south of the fire, about to drop off into the bowled drainage down to the ranch. Can you see us?” “Yes.” “Can you keep eyes on us while we work down to the ranch?” “Granite Mountain, you need to reverse. Go south, do not drop into the bowl.” “No, we feel comfortable, we can make the ranch.” “Granite Mountain, …”
There is no evidence that Marsh himself THOUGHT he had a lookout. I understand the emotional appeal of the theory, but in reality it seriously calls into question the judgment of someone in Marsh’s position, if people are trying to suggest that he believed he could give vague statements and then simply assume that everyone would intuit from those vague statements that he really meant “please keep eyes on us while we descend into the bowl towards the ranch.”
I have been on both sides of the radio in a conversation like that. Air attack first needs eyes on the crew. The radio person on the crew needs to make a very specific request. On IA fires air attack can and dose assets ground crews. And in an emergency can assist ground crews but again being very specific is essential. I have yet to see that between Marsh and B33.
SR and Bob, I think you are missing the broader discussion in which I was participating, so I will try again:
Various commenters on this website have repeatedly intimated that maybe Eric Marsh was trying to HIDE what GM was doing when they left the black to go down to what Gary Cordes had stated was a bomb-proof safety zone at the Boulder Springs Ranch. I have not yet uncovered any materials in my stacks of materials that would suggest this theory (re “hiding” or “sneaking” around or whatever) to have merit. Based solely on the publicly-available materials, as opposed to the stacks of additional materials that I currently have that the media has not yet released or might not even have, it is clear to me that DivsA communicated (at least to some degree, which might have been a lousy degree) that they were making their way to the Boulder Springs Ranch.
I am NOT saying that DivsA asked Bravo33 to be GM’s lookout, although I am currently chewing on whether or not DivsA mistakenly took inappropriate comfort in the presumably mistaken belief that Rory Collins was still Air Attack and would give GM the heads-up on any changes in fire the EXACT same way that Air Attack seems to have done roughly 30 minutes before.
The only conclusion we can come to—–
1. Marsh and crew left the fire and did not communicate with OPS or IC what they were doing.
2. Marsh and crew were not clear to any one as to what they were doing. Frisby, OPS, and Air Attack.
3. What they said to every body left a lot of information out.
My only option they took a calculated risk and did not want people to know what they were doing.
Why else would you break the 10 and 18 and LCES
to do what no one thought they would do.
Again they were safe in the black why move.
Two things, first evasiveness, and second the “Lifeguard/Close Air Support” idea.
As far as evasiveness, if I tell my life partner I’m heading down to the end of the road, and maybe do, maybe don’t specifically mention the church we attend at the end of the road, I’m not that clear to begin with about where I’m going. But, if she gleans from that, that I’m going to church, and I fail to mention that I’m detouring through a dangerous neighborhood on the way there, she may well feel I was evasive and misleading, even if nothing I expressly said was false.
Lifeguards/Close Air Support. People are used to going to the pool or beach and simply taking the lifeguard for granted, without having to check in with them. So, I think the idea that Marsh might have been relying on B33 as a “lifeguard,” and that this was prudent and reasonable for someone in his position, sells well to people on the basis of their experience, even if it is a crock in terms of how things actually work. To be clear, just thinking that B33 was a lifeguard/Big Brother watching over GM and that therefore they had things covered would have been grossly irresponsible. And there is no suggestion, based on what we know, that this did occur.
Likewise, close air support is cool. In the movies, in everything from John Wayne’s Vietnam flick to Saving Private Ryan, it makes for some great scenes. Even in the military, it doesn’t magically make resistance melt away in the real world. And wildland fire is not infantry combat. Marsh relying on B33 to be his Lifeguard (without asking for it) and also thinking that his lifeguard could call down “death from above” onto the fire if needed would be even worse, as a choice of tactic as opposed to a last-ditch effort a few minutes later, than simply relying on Lifeguarding.
Good points all. If there really had been any
chance of some guy in an airplane even
having any chance of doing them any good…
…then that would be the time to give the
guy all the information you possibly could,
instead of just some vague, obtuse info.
It didn’t happen.
Bravo 33 had NO IDEA where they were
once they left the anchor point safe black.
Even in the last moments of his life…
when Bravo 33 (finally) asks him
DIRECTLY where he might be located…
…Marsh remained obtuse until the end.
Just responding with “Affirm” to a
DIRECT locational query like “So you’re
on the south side of the fire then?” means
Marsh was being obtuse right to the end.
He COULD have said ( very quickly )…
“Affirm. 600 yards west of Boulder Springs
Ranch.”
He didn’t even do that… right at the end.
Agree.
Yesterday at Wickenburg’s Carls Junior, business owners Jerry and Judy to Congress Depot stated that a Yarnell homeowner saw the GMHS come out of the high desert terrain into the community and then went back in—I have never heard that from any of the hundreds of folks we have come in contact with in that community but I believe misinformation and what the homeowner saw was the Blue Ridge boys—but see how people STICK with what they hear first hand from a homeowner and think that is what it is- We, the eyewitness accounts from the fire edge, never saw the GMHS leave that area yet we did see Blue Ridge and other non-blue helmet fire folks over by Sesame/Shrine area from the mountain top. If you are the homeowner that told Jerry and Judy that information that you saw GMHS leave that area and go back in- please come forward and NOTE that they had BLACK helmets. I mean even us 2 did not know who was WHO that day but we did KNOW the helmet colors and where they were located and it took Joanna Dodder to interpret my photos to identify that the men in my photos were actually the GMHS with black helmets. Lets keep the information straight. SMALL TOWNS over here and it seems it can be fed and stretched to great lengths—kind of reminds of the narrative of the SAIR. It has facts in it indeed but sure lacks the details as well. Much missing from it. Sonny says the 1976 Jeep Wagoneer is finally together now with new tires and we are hitting the trails again. Who knows where??? Seems this fire tragedy/mess will take a long time to untangle. Likely, years.
There were, in fact, at least THREE documented times when
members of the Blue Ridge Hotshots appeared to ‘come into
town’ and then ‘go back out west’ again before the final
evacuations to the Ranch House Restaurant circa 4:30 PM.
At least one of those times… the ‘black-helmeted’ Brendan
McDonough was with with driving the GM Supervisor Truck.
Those times would be…
** 1410 – 1439 ( 29 minute period from 2:10 PM to 2:39 PM )
A 29 minute ( half-hour ) period when BR Supervisor Brian Frisby
and BR Captain Trueheart Brown exited the Sesame area
in one of their vehicles ( not the UTV Ranger ) to go on a
‘scouting’ trip north on Highway 89. They exited Sesame
via Lakewood drive, passed through Glen Ilah, turned
north on Highway 89 at the Ranch House Restaurant, and
then drove north through Yarnell and ‘off the map’ that was
tracking their GPS movements at this point. According to
their notes… they went almost all the way to Peeples Valley
on Highway 89 to try and assess where the fireline was. They
were ‘off the GPS map’ for 18 minues ( 1416 – 1434 ). At 1434
they ‘appear’ on the GPS map again heading back south
towards Yarnell, then they took a RIGHT onto Shrine road and
drove all the way west/northwest on Shrine road out to the Old Youth Camp and parked there for 5 minutes.
** 1444 – 1508 ( 24 minute period from 2:44 PM to 3:08 PM )
Blue Ridge Hotshots Brian Frisb and Trueheart Brown exit
the Old Youth Camp ( still in a vehicle and not the UTV Ranger )
to go on another ‘scouting’ trip back in town. The exit via
Shrine road but turn north onto Willow Lane and then scout
the Flora May Park area for a few minutes. Then they exit to
Highway 89 and head north again. This time… they only go
‘off the GPS map’ for TWO minutes and are seen heading
back into Yarnell again… but THIS time they take a right
turn onto Shady Way and head west. Shady Way is a
‘dead end’ but they went all the way back ‘scouting’ that
area for a few minutes. They the exit Shady Way back to
Highway 89, head ALL the way south to Lakewood drive,
and then they drive west through Glen Ilah out Lakewood
( then Manzanita ) back to the Sesame area where they
started these ‘scouting trips’.
During these ‘excursions’ through Glen Ilah and Yarnell…
Captain Brown may have been wearing his ‘blue’ helmet
( but maybe not )… and Brian Frisby never really had a
blue helmet on at all that day. He was wearing a black
‘ball cap’ that day. The actual ‘vehicle’ they were driving
through town for these trips was PROBABLY one of their
own ‘utility’ trucks and the same ‘aquamarine’ greenish color
as the two big Blue Ridge Crew Carriers, but that hasn’t
been confirmed.
** 1541 – 1610 ( 29 minute period from 3:41 PM to 4:10 PM )
It is now known that the REAL moment when Brian Frisby
‘accidentally’ came across Brendan evacuating his lookout
post and Frisby ‘picked him up’ was at 1541 ( 3:41 PM ) that
afternoon. This immediately started the ‘evacuation’ of all
the Blue Ridge and Granite Mountain vehicles from the
Sesame area. Frisby dropped Brendan off where BOTH
GM ‘utility’ vehicles were, then dashed east to pick up Captain
Brown and brought him back to where Brendan had
already started BOTH the GM Superintendent Supervisor
Truck AND the GM Chase truck. Captain Brown got in
the GM Chase truck and that started a ‘convoy’ of vehicles
that left the Sesame area and exited SOUTH through
Glen Ilah. That convoy went east through Glen Ilah via
Manzanita, then Lakewood… but did NOT stop at the
Ranch House Restaurant. That convoy PASSED the
Ranch House Restaurant headed north on Highway
89 at exactly 4:02 PM and the convoy went THROUGH
town ( Yarnell ), and then WEST on Shrine road all the
way out to the Old Youth Camp.
Brendan McDonough was WITH this convoy headed through
town towards Shrine road and if he was still wearing his
Granite Mountain helmet… it was BLACK.
So yes… there were a number of times that day when regular
people could have claimed they were seeing firefighters
‘coming out of’ the Sesame area, heading through town, and
then ‘going back in again’… but at NO time were these any
of the Granite Mountain 19 who were out working on that
western Weaver mountain ridge.
There is also the fact that the Blue Ridge Hotshots had ‘staged’
their utility vehicle with the UTV Ranger trailer at a residence
right there where Manzanita and Lakewood pavement ends,
( just west of that gated white fence ) and at various times during
the day they were ‘returning’ to that spot ( mostly to just refuel the
UTV Ranger )… and that also would have ‘looked’ like
firefighters ‘coming out and going back in again’ to the owners
of the residences right around that spot.
Rory Collins: Rory Collins was the guy serving up in the sky as Air Attack on the fire up until about 3:59 p.m., and Rory Collins has been a bit maligned here and in one or both of the official “investigation” reports. I want to take up a bit of the defense for poor Rory, who was portrayed (wrongly, in my view) in at least one of the reports as inappropriately and abruptly just leaving, disappearing at 3:59 p.m.
Rory left the fire at 3:59 p.m. because the PILOT who was FLYING the plane for him RAN out of time and had to return to Deer Creek (or Deer Valley or whatever it was). That pilot could NO longer be in the air, according to the relevant regulations/rules. Because of the weather, the relief pilot who was supposed to then meet Rory at Deer Creek at roughly 4 p.m. and take over flying Rory around as Air Attack was GROUNDED. So Rory HAD to leave the fire due to his pilot “timing out,” and, when he and his pilot returned to Deer Creek (or whatever it was), Rory’s relief pilot had not been able to get to Deer Creek to pick Rory UP and go back to the Yarnell Hill Fire to again serve as Air Attack.
For the record, Rory’s change-out briefing with Bravo33 was just as long as Bravo3’s change-out briefing with Bravo33, so my impression is that, on the Yarnell Hill Fire, the air guys just didn’t spend a whole lot of time briefing each other and instead were working hard together until close to the minute they left.
For the record, my impression is that Marsh had no idea that Rory Collins left and that Bravo 33 took over the lead plane, air attack role.
Reply to Elizabeth post on March 12, 2014 at 4:29 pm
>> Elizabeth said…
>> Rory left the fire at 3:59 p.m. because the PILOT who was
>> FLYING the plane for him RAN out of time and had to return
>> to Deer Creek (or Deer Valley or whatever it was). That pilot
>> could NO longer be in the air, according to the relevant
>> regulations/rules.
Correct. ( Deer Valley is where the airstrip was ).
I also agree with your opinion that the ‘official’ reports ( the
SAIR in particular ) did Rory Collins a huge disservice by
not making it clear that it was not HIS decision to ‘abrupty
leave the fire’ at 1558 ( timestamp according to SAIR report ).
That being said… there is STILL the following documented
testimony from Bravo 33 regarding the ‘briefing’ ( or lack thereof )
from Mr. Collins that day. I will leave it up to WFF people to decide
for themselves whether the following represents a ‘normal’
handoff between Air Attacks ( I hope not… but maybe this
really is how clueless one Air Attack can be when they
take over from another one in the middle of a fire )…
SAIT Interview Notes ( page 15 )…
_____________________________________________________
INTERVIEW WITH BRAVO 33
July 9, 2013 – 1700
Interviewees:
John Burfiend-ATS Specialist
Clint Clauson – ATS Trainee
Thomas French – AT Specialist
Interviewers:
Mike Dudley, Brad Mayhew, Tim Foley, Jay Kurth, Jimmy Rocha
_____________________________________________________
We had been there about 1 ½ hours when air attack on the scene told us he had to leave. (1700 NM time). It was a strange change out. He just said “you have the fire, I’m leaving”. Not sure if I was talking to structure group 1 or 2. I remember looking up. Talking to ops structural group 1, 2 and ops.
I knew there was 2 structural groups. I wrote down 2. Tom said “hey dude, you are the air attack”.
Didn’t know Division A was the superintendent of the Granite Mountain hot shots.
Air attack didn’t tell me there were resources in the area.
I never got divisions from the briefing. Didn’t know there were divisions. Thought it was a Type 3 incident. I didn’t recognize Todd’s voice. I didn’t know anybody was taking any action on
the fire.
I didn’t know that Blue Ridge was there until we were home watching the news.
_____________________________________________________
Bravo33 has attested that DivsA (Eric Marsh) *specifically* called Bravo33 to tell Bravo33 where Granite Mountain was going.
My question to those of you with Hotshot, WFF, or general firefighting experience is this:
WHY (or “for what possible reasons”) would DivsA (Eric Marsh) specifically call Bravo33 to tell Bravo33 where GM was going? To be clear, DivsA did NOT call Bravo33 in response to Bravo33 first reaching out to DivsA. Rather, DivsA decided to reach out to Bravo33. WHY would he have done that? What are possible reasons?
You can normally hit AA by radio without a problem because they’re overhead. He may have called because AA would be able to see them or give a fly over. He may have called because he couldn’t get through to others. AA may have seemed like the lest busy.
I don’t know the context or timing during the event. When Eric called what did he ask or say?
The only thing I have read on the statement from Marsh to B33 was WE ARE GOING DOWN OUR ESCAPE ROUTE TO OUR SAFETY ZONE. that’s it. No leaving the black to go down our escape route to Bolder creek ranch or Helms Ranch— just safety zone. There is no detailed location and that keeps bothering me when you say B33 knew where GM was.
Bob, I don’t say in my immediately above post that I believe that Bravo33 knew where GM was going. I am trying to figure out WHY DivsA was TELLING Bravo33 what GM/DivsA was doing (e.g. going down their predetermined escape route toward the Boulder Springs Ranch). What was DivsA trying to accomplish by telling Air Attack (some time between 4:04 and 4:24) that GM was going down their predetermined escape route?
Elizabeth– I am concerned you are adding words to what was said. Where are the words predetermined and Bolder Springs Ranch. I have never read that in the B33 statement. Marsh contacted B33 and did a very poor job of telling him where they were
having said that if his only contact was Air then that was why he contacted him. My concern is what is being assumed in the contact message. and not the actual content. Also I believe if I am not mistaken that B33 and OPS were discussing GM safety and Marsh jumped in with what they were doing. But very ambiguous.
Bob, if you can come up with a better reason why DivsA reached out to Bravo33, I will listen. That is why I have been repeatedly reaching out to folks on this, but, thus far, nothing fits with the materials that I have.
Elizabeth, perhaps simply tell people the answer you want?
Or, better, disclose what you “have,” and let people with the background to interpret it have their say.
You in the past have been very critical of journalists for NOT disclosing what they have. I strongly suspect that what you do have is entirely consistent with Marsh being intentionally ambiguous because he knew he was about to be a bit of a cowboy. I also suspect that you have a compelling need to try to put what is very unusual behavior throughout the day back into a “usual” box, as opposed to confronting that there may be a near-miss and eval problem that needs fixing.
1. Air was the only frequency Marsh could get out on.
That is the only reason I can think of. Not enough information to know why.
Marsh was not specific in his description of where he was and where he was going unless you have a direct statement from B33 that he was told that Marsh and GM left the black the route they were on and where they were headed. I have not seen that any where. That is a need to know statement in B33 interview if it is there I have missed it.
Elizabeth seems to be assuming that because Bravo33 “attested” to something, that B33’s recall is 100% accurate. No one remembers everything accurately, particularly in stressful situations that become more stressful after the fact. IF B33’s recollection as reported by Elizabeth IS accurate, then, unless I’ve missed something, or Elizabeth is not disclosing something, I haven’t seen anything that has Marsh saying they were headed to the Boulder Springs Ranch. Nor was the specific “escape” route identified, except by mention of the route they came in on that morning. And this was not the route they took down.
Based upon what is public — and if Elizabeth has further information, she should understand that by fishing for answers as she is, without providing context, she is undermining the usefulness of any response given without having full context — it does seem that B33 was concerned about GM being comfortable where they were, with Marsh then jumping in to explain. Whether GM or Marsh were first contacted by B33 seems unclear. Whichever order of contact occurred, Marsh still did not supply information specific enough for them to know where GM was going or, critically, that GM was about to jump into a bushwhack at a very slow pace, with reversal very difficult, etc.
Why would Marsh do this? To head off further inquiry, most likely. People all the time give partial answers to avoid fully declaring their plans. I think the answer that Elizabeth WANTS is that Marsh was calling so that B33 knew to keep eyes on GM. Normally, that would require indicating the actual route they were taking and where they were actually headed. Even if Marsh did say that they were headed to the ranch, given the lack of a prepared escape route (even if theories that he was planning on having sawyers clear the route a bit were to be correct, there was no prepared escape route and sawyers could not be much help in that brush), indicating what their route was and asking for assistance would be the normal prerequisites to expecting, or asking for, a lookout.
Exactly what I have been saying. If you want you ass dropped on by retardant you get dam specific. If that is why he said where he was that was not a lot to go on.
I do not believe the air tanker dropped where marsh said if that was even what he meant.
**
** SIDE BY SIDE COMPARISON OF
** PAUL MUSSER AND TODD ABEL ARIZONA FORESTRY ‘UNIT LOG’ WITH
** PAUL MUSSER AND TODD ABEL ‘SAIT INVESTIGATION NOTES’.
It is perfectly obvious that what the Arizona Forestry Division just released and
is trying to pawn off as the ‘Paul Musser and Todd Abel combined Unit Log’ is
actually the same document used by the SAIT investigators in their own
( supposed ) ‘Combined Interview with Musser and Abel’ investigation notes
that they released (earlier) as part of their SAIT FOIA/FOIL package.
However… something is REALLY STRANGE with regards to the ‘differences’
between these two ‘almost identical’ documents.
Remember… the Arizona Forestry Commission has just said that the reason the
recently released ‘Unit Logs’ ( released on Feb 27, 2014 ) were never included as
part of the SAIT FOIA/FOIL package release is because ( and this is a direct
QUOTE from Arizona Forestry Division spokeswoman Carrie Dennett )…
“These unit logs were NOT part of the official SAIT (Serious Accident
Investigation Team) investigation.”
Horseshit.
It is NOT POSSIBLE for this same Abel/Musser combined ‘Unit Log’ to also be
appearing as the (supposed) Abel/Musser SAIT interview notes WITHOUT the
SAIT having had FULL access to it ( and ALL the other unit logs just published…
whether they, themselves, published any of the content or not ).
Conversely… if there never really were any Musser/Abel ‘Unit Logs’ and what has
just been included in this ‘Unit Log’ release package from Arizona Forestry
Division is nothing but an ‘edited’ version of the SAIT Musser/Abel interview
notes… then it is a total misrepresentation of fact on the part of Arizona Forestry
Division.
If there never really were any Paul Musser or Todd Able Unit Logs, then they
certainly didn’t need to ‘pretend’ that there were by ‘copying’ the SAIT Interview
Notes ( but also editing/changing them at the same time ).
All they had to do was NOT include any ‘Unit Logs’ for Musser or Abel
at all ( if that really is the truth ).
So here is the ‘side by side’ comparison of this SAME Paul Musser / Todd Abel
document now being released under TWO different ‘identities’…
‘SAIT Interview Notes’ AND ‘Arizona Forestry Division Unit Log’…
** THE SHORT STORY
The ‘Unit Log’ version has 21 separate ‘bullet item’ entries.
The ‘SAIT Notes’ version has 28 separate ‘bullet item’ entries.
So that’s SEVEN ‘extra bullet items’ that appear in the ‘SAIT Notes’ version that
are nowhere to be found in the ‘Unit Log’ version of the same document.
Of the 21 entries that BOTH documents have in common, all 21 bullet entries
from the ‘Unit Log’ version are present in the ‘SAIT Notes’ version, but most of
those have been EDITED either slightly… or complete rewrites trying to impart
the same information.
In other words… there are no ‘bullet entries’ from the ‘Unit Log’ version that do
NOT appear in the ‘SAIT log’ version of the same document. Only the ‘SAIT log’
version has ADDITIONAL entries that don’t exist in the ‘Unit Log’ version of
same document.
Of those 21 entries that BOTH documents have in common… 10 entries are
ABSOLUTELY IDENTICAL… *including* grammar and spelling mistakes…
which is absolute proof that at some point there were both the SAME
DOCUMENT.
The remaining 11 entries ( almost half the entries ) show significant
REWRITES ( NOT standard/legal redactions ) on the part of whoever was
EDITING these documents. SOME of the rewrites are ‘minor’ and just grammar
is being changed, and MOST of the rewrites are still actually meant to impart
the SAME information as the original entry…
…but SOME of the rewrites significantly change ‘the facts’, or the ORDER in
which events happened.
Also… SOME of the ‘rewrites’ specifically REMOVE the names of
“Paul Musser” and “Eric Marsh”.
NOTE: These are NOT standard/legal REDACTIONS. They are REWRITES
specifically intended to HIDE the fact that Musser’s or Marsh’s name was
EVER used in the OTHER version of the document.
It is hard to say WHICH document is the actual ORIGINAL, since they are both
*almost* identical.
IF the ‘Unit Log’ version came FIRST… then the ‘SAIT Notes’ version represents
significant ‘additions to the story’ with 8 entire new entries added to the original
‘Unit Log’ version and MANY ‘rewrites’ ( NOT redactions ) of the original entries.
IF the ‘SAIT Notes’ version came FIRST… then the ‘Unit Log’ version represents
a severely ‘cut down’ version of the original which was achieved NOT via
standard/legal ‘redactions’… but by significant DELETIONS and (also) MANY
‘rewrites’ of the original entries.
** THE LONG STORY
Here is the actual ‘merge’ of the ‘Unit Log’ and ‘SAIT Notes’
version of the same document.
( Don’t worry… it’s not all that long, really ).
This is what is known as a standard DIFF presentation between two documents.
Lawyers and Patent Attorneys and Business people who are used to dealing with
documents that are essentially the same… but with minor changes between
them ( like contracts and whatnot ) use DIFF runs all the time just to look at
the ‘changes’ between versions of documents.
In this DIFF presentation… the documents are compared line-by-line
( bullet-item by bullet-item ).
Basically… every line of the document(s) becomes a separate
‘paragraph’ below detailing that ‘line’ from BOTH documents.
The FIRST line of each paragraph begins with ‘S:’ and
that means that is the ‘SAIT Notes’ version of that entry.
The SECOND line of each paragraph begins with ‘U:’ and
that stands for the equivalent ‘Unit Log’ version that same entry.
The THIRD ( and subsequent) line(s) of each paragraph begin with ‘D:’ and
that means ‘DIFFERENCE’. Each of the ‘D:’ lines is just notating what is
DIFFERENT about each ‘S: SAIT Notes’ entry versus the corresponding
‘U: Unit Log’ entry.
If the S: and U: entries are, in fact, IDENTICAL, then the
D: note says ‘D: Identical’.
Once again… the ‘legend’ to use for reading what follows is…
S: = SAIT Interview Notes entry
U: = Corresponding Unit log entry
D: = Difference ( if any ) between the two entries
And away we go…
DOCUMENT TITLE(S)…
S: Yarnell Hill Fire Accident Investigation
Interviews with Paul Musser OSC and Todd Abel OSC 7/6/13
U: Yarnell Hill Opps 214
D: Different titles for (essentially) the same document.
D: No DATE given for (U) Unit Log version of same document.
DOCUMENT CONTENT…
S: Paul Musser and Todd Abel were first called for Type 3
(unclear as type 3 or type 2 short team) assignment on evening
of June 29, (6 acres at call time)
U: Paul Musser and Todd Abel were first called for Type 3
assignment on evening of June 29, (6 acres at call time)
D: SAIT added… “unclear as type 3 or type 2 short team”
S: T. Abel arrived 0600 at Yarnell Fire Station
U: T. Abel arrived 0600 at Yarnell Fire Station
D: Identical
S: Abel began resource tracking
U: Abel began resource tracking
D: Identical
S: 0700 Paul Musser arrived
U: 0700 Paul Musser arrived
D: Identical
S: Discussion with Type 4 IC
U: Discussion with Type 4 IC
D: Identical
S: Granite MTN on scene, in briefed with Abel and E. Marsh. Talked
about spot weather forecast, current monsoon weather, frequencies, and
tactics with OSC Abel. Abel and Marsh discussed and agreed that
Marsh would take Division Supervisor on Division A. J. Steed would
be the Granite Mountain crew boss. Establish an anchor point was
their first mission.
U: Granite MTN on scene, in briefed with Abel and E. Marsh. Talked
about spot weather forecast, current monsoon weather, frequencies, and
tactics with OSC Abel. Abel and Marsh discussed and agreed that
Marsh would take Division Supervisor on Division A. J. Steed would
be the Granite Mountain crew boss. Establish an anchor point was
their first mission.
D: Identical
S: Gary Cordis was doing structure protection at time.
U: Gary Cordis is running structure protection on the south end.
D: Someone rewrote this. Odd minor grammar changes only.
S: Gary led Granite Mtn. up through dozer line up mtn
U: Gary led Granite Mtn. to dozer line and old road to access ridge.
D: Someone rewrote this. Words added/subtracted.
S: T. Abel staged Blue Ridge at Yarnell Fire Station and then assigned
Blue Ridge crew to E. March in Division A.
U: T. Abel staged Blue Ridge at Yarnell Fire Station and then assigned
Blue Ridge crew to Division A.
D: Eric Marsh’s name is in SAIT version but NOT in Unit Log version.
S: T. Abel set up two Structure Protection task forces for structure protection
U: T. Abel set up two Structure Protection task forces.
D: Someone added ( or subtracted ) ‘for structure protection’.
S: Dozer worked road down in the flats.
U: Dozer worked road down in the flats.
D: Identical
S: At about 10:20 am team was assumed command of the fire.
OSC Abel and Musser flew fire at 1045-1100 am and at that time fire
was moving to the N – NE. SEATS were working on fire. Around 1200
first of large air tankers and VLAT arrived.
U: At about 10:20 am team assumed command of the fire.
OSC Abel and Musser flew fire at 1045-1100 am and at that time fire
was moving to the N – NE. SEATS were working on fire. Around 1200
first VLAT arrived.
D: Rewrite. SAIT added “was assumed” and “first of large air tankers and”
S: T. Abel flew fire for the second time, around 1230-1300. At that time, fire
was active on east flank and head of fire was pushing to the north with a
horseshoe shape. Fire was pushing towards Model Creek and threatening
structures.
U: T. Abel flew fire for the second time, around 1230-1300. At that time, fire
was active on east flank and head of fire was pushing to the north with a
horseshoe shape. Fire was pushing towards Model Creek and threatening
structures.
D: Identical
S: Rance Marquez was assigned Division Z and briefed by OSC Abel.
He was informed to contact Div A and decide on a division break.
U: Rance Marquez was assigned Division Z and briefed by OSC Abel.
He was informed to contact Div A and decide on a division break.
D: Identical
S: Radio communication with E. Marsh, Division A, on anchor point.
Marsh stated that he had a good anchor point. T Abel asked Marsh if
he could see the thunder storms to the south and north of the fire’s
location, Marsh said yes he could see both of them and said he would
watch their movement. Marsh called Abel on the cell phone and
mentioned there was some intense communication between himself
and Marquez on the Division break between Alpha and Zula. They
worked it out and the Blue Ridge hotshot crew was assigned to
Division Alpha. Marsh described Division break to Abel.
U: Missing
D: This statement in SAIT Notes is totally missing from Unit Log.
S: Paul Musser spoke with the IC about the fire threatening the ICP.
They moved vehicle to the back of the school to better protect the school.
The fire was slowed Model Creek road and held at that location.
U: Paul Musser and the IC talked about the fire threatening the ICP.
They moved vehicle to the back of the school to better protect the school.
The fire slowed at Model Creek road and was held at that location.
Bravo 33 is working air tankers and SEATS including a VLAT
D: SAIT changed “Musser and the IC talked” to “Musser spoke with the IC”.
D: SAIT also changed “fire slowed” to “fire was slowed” and “was held”
D: to just “held”.
D: Unit log has “Bravo 33 working” sentence here but SAIT does not.
S: Eric Marsh, Division A, calls Abel on radio and informed OSC that
winds were starting to get squirrely on top of the ridge. At about this
same time a Weather Warning was broadcast on Tach 1 from Byron
Kimball of wind shifts and strong winds.
U: Missing
D: This statement in SAIT Notes is totally missing from Unit Log.
S: Abel contacted Marsh by radio and asked him if got weather warning
information and was he in a good spot. Eric responded by saying everyone
was in the black, Granite and everything was good. At this time Abel held
up on any further ignition around structures along model creek.
Bravo 33 is working air tankers and SEATS including a VLAT.
U: Missing
D: This statement in SAIT Notes is totally missing from Unit Log.
D: AND… only now the SAIT shows the “Bravo 33 is working” sentence.
S: Abel requests Bravo 33 to check on Granite Mountain crew.
Bravo 33 confirms that Granite Mountain crew is in the black. Time????
U: Abel requests Bravo 33 to check on Granite Mountain crew.
Bravo 33 confirms that Granite Mountain crew is in the black.
D: Identical… EXCEPT… SAIT added the extra note “Time????” to the end.
S: Paul Musser states that fire has now turned and running due east,
acquired a type 6 engine to protect structures, fire now running south.
Air attack asked about evacuation of Yarnell. Checked on Blue Ridge
crew, they were on dozer line. Blue Ridge crews and equipment and
Granite Mountain equipment were evacuated off the fire.
U: The fire turned and is and running due east, acquired a type 6 engine
and other personnel to protect structures on sickles road. The fire
turned to the south. Air attack asked about evacuation of Yarnell.
Checked on Blue Ridge crew, they were on dozer line.
D: Someone rewrote this paragraph.
D: Paul Musser’s name starts SAIT entry but is MISSING from Unit Log.
D: SAIT added this to the end… “Blue Ridge crews and equipment and
D: Granite Mountain equipment were evacuated off the fire.”
S: Musser hears radio traffic from Eric Marsh, Granite Mountain, that
said “they were going to pre-determined route to the structures”. Musser
was not sure who that radio traffic was sent to?
U: Missing
D: This statement in SAIT Notes is totally missing from Unit Log.
S: LB33 to Todd Abel:
LB33: Do we need to stop operations and check on guys [GM] in black
Todd: Yes, they’re in black
LB-33: Confirm they are good
Todd: Yes
U: Missing
D: This statement in SAIT Notes is totally missing from Unit Log.
S: Both Abel and Musser hear very excited radio traffic that was not
understandable from Granite 7 or a Granite Mountain member on air to
ground radio frequency. Eric Marsh then came on the radio saying
“our escape route is compromised and we are deploying shelters”
on air to ground radio frequencies.
U: Both Abel and Musser hear very excited radio traffic that was not
understandable from Granite 7 or a Granite Mountain member on air to
ground radio frequency.
D: Identical… EXCEPT entire last sentence in SAIT version which
D: mentions Marsh is missing from the same Unit Log entry.
S: Structures were burning in Yarnell, heavy smoke, fire crossed
highway 89, propane tanks exploding all as search began for the
Granite Mountain crew.
U: Structures were burning in Yarnell, heavy smoke, fire crossed
highway 89, propane tanks exploding all as search began for the
Granite Mountain crew.
D: Identical… INCLUDING grammar and spelling mistakes
S: Abel moved from north end of fire to Yarnell where and incident
within an incident was set up at the restaurant with Abel acting as
IC for the burn-over response and set up a medical group with
triage, treatment and transport. Bravo 33 and other aircraft made
attempts to get into area of last reported locations of Granite
mountain crew on high ridge anchor point. Blue Ridge and Prescott
NF personnel began looking for Granite Mountain crew by ground
search. Department of Public Safety helicopter first located Granite
Mountain crew deployment site lower on the mountain and helped
direct crews on the ground into the site. OSC Abel estimated the
deployment site was 1 mile from where he thought the Granite
Mountain Crew was holding up in the black high on the ridge.
U: Abel moved from north end of fire to Yarnell where and incident
within an incident was set up at the restaurant with Abel as Granit
IC for the burn-over response and Musser running all operations
for the fire. Gary Cortis continued with structure protection with
the resources not committed to the Granit Incident. Bravo 33 and
other aircraft made attempts to get into area of last reported
locations of Granite mountain crew. Blue Ridge and Prescott
NF personnell began looking for Granite Mountain crew by
ground search.
D: “with Abel as Granit IC” in (U) becomes “with Abel acting as IC” in (S).
D: Basically a total rewrite between (U) and (S), but some same info.
S: OSC Musser or Abel did not know of the predetermined route
mentioned by Marsh to the ranch structures of the Granite
Mountain crew.
U: Missing
D: This statement in SAIT Notes is totally missing from Unit Log.
S: Some trouble with Command channel radio equipment after incident
occurred when the resources assembled at restaurant below repeater
tower. Did not have radio communication problems on fire
U: Missing
D: This statement in SAIT Notes is totally missing from Unit Log.
S: A dust storm warning came again about 2400 that evening after
the deployments and at 0300 to 0300 winds again shifted and pushed
the fire to the northeast again burning a few additional structures.
U: A dust storm warning came again about 2400 that evening after
the deployments the wind shifted and pushed the fire to the northeast
again burning a few additional structures.
D: Someone rewrote this paragraph. ‘0300’ times added by (S).
END OF ‘SAIT NOTES’ AND ‘UNIT LOG’ DOCUMENT COMPARISON
I’ve got a couple of questions. Are you taking all the documentation, video, coummunication records and using it side by side to create a total timeline? That seems to be what you’re doing. Would you mind saying what you’re overall view is as to what happened. Just a short brief so I could catch up. I can’t figure it because you’re answering questions and pointing out specifics. You and E seem to have done the most work.
Did anyone ever track down the dispute between Marsh and DIVZ that occurred on the previous fire? I have heard that they didn’t trust each other and had a personal dislike. I have assumed that is what happened with the division break thing. That may not even have any play anymore, just wondering.
If this has been gone over sorry I’ve been gone for awhile.
Reply to:
“calvin
on March 9, 2014 at 5:54 pm said:
Which truck was Cory Ball riding in (when he took photo(s))? GM Supt truck or GM chase truck? Neither?
Thoughts??”
From doing my visual timeline at the beginning of February, (and I’m doing this out of memory, not looking at anything), Cory Ball walked from where the dozer was working on the cutover between the Sesame area and Shrine Road, west and then south on Sesame where he took a picture of the gate north of the Glen Illah subdivision (where, according to what we have of Blue Ridge notes, Blue Ridge had left their green utility vehicle with the utv trailer attached).
Then he, according to his notes (which I’m not looking at), connected up with Cordis, I would assume at the Ranch House Restaurant. I’m still wondering if he drove the Blue Ride utility vehicle there. I still don’t know who drove that vehicle to the Ranch House Restaurant, where there is a photo of it in the parking lot.
His next two photos show him riding shotgun in what I think is a white pickup truck (NOT the Blue Ridge utility vehicle) at the Yarnell Fire Department, where, according to his notes, he went to get a “quad.”
I originally thought that meant a map, since most of my adult life, a “quad” has meant a map. But WTKTT was right when he theorized that meant a utv. I’m not sure where I found it, but, somewhere in the documentation, it is written that Ball was on a UTV when he went up into Glen Illah. His first shots there (until he photographed the Manzanita street sign) were taken early, but the rest were taken quite a bit later. Apparently it was too dangerous. So he headed back to, I assume, the Ranch House Restaurant. All of the photos he later took started about an hour later. He was on the utv. He was actually there, according to his notes, not to take photos, but to help with the evacuation. This was also taking place when, iirc, Trew was also in that area, trying to find a way in, before Trew gave up and went over to Shrine Road to find access.
WFF said “OK maybe it hasn’t toned down for some. Sorry I brought it to the surface. Nice rant sorry you’re bitter. It won’t help or change anything.”
Bitter? 19 Granite Mountain Hotshots are DEAD. In 2013. The next highest death toll was 12 hotshots on the Loop Fire. You know…back (if it was not the stone ages of wildland firefighters, it sure was BC, old testament time) in 1966. The biggest difference between the El Cariso Hotshots of 1966 and the Granite Mountain Hotshots of 2013? We know exactly how and why the El Cariso Hotshots died.
OK, I am bitter. BUT…I have gone to great lengths to explain I am not bitter about my own career. Just a quick reminder. I was a hotshot crew boss (I like the old title) at 23. I founded a hotshot crew. I was a District AFMO. I was a Forest Dispatcher and Coordinator of an Interagency Fire Operations Center at 30. I was a Supervisory Criminal Investigator at 35 after being given a choice of retiring on a medical disability retirement at 29 or taking a job as a Recreation Technician who cleans out outhouses for a living. I retired at 54 with almost 80% of a GS-13 Step 8 Senior Special Agent with 25% LEAP pay (Google it) factored into my retirement working for the Washington Office of my agency with 30 years of Public Safety Retirement status. I still carry a big gold badge and a gun. I helped raise 3 kids (except I was almost always gone) and still have the same wife after 40 years (because I was always gone). I was a frickin’ rock star by USFS Recreation Technician (outhouse cleaner, someone has to do it) standards. I am an obnoxious BRAGGART about my career, not a bitter employee or person. I am a really lucky person (although I have noticed that the harder I fish, the luckier I get).
Yes, I am bitter about what happened to the Granite Mountain Hotshots, but not for me personally or professionally, don’t you get that? I have my ass hanging out here. This is not about me. This is about the Granite Mountain Hotshots and the kids they are not going raise (my father was killed when I was 3 and my mother never remarried) or will ever have now. The sweethearts they will never be able to marry. The wives they will never grow old with. The parents, siblings and other family they left behind…so abruptly and tragically. The accomplishments this group of men, who by all standards were exceptional is so many ways, will now never be able to accomplish. The outstanding careers so many of them will now never have. The retirements and the old age they will never enjoy…yes, every day is a Saturday. Now, they will never experience that.
I started on the Prescott National Forest. Prescott is my home town. I wanted my son to be on the Granite Mountain Hotshots last year and this year (good thing he doesn’t listen to me). Yes, I have survivor guilt. I did a lot of stupid things. I broke a lot of rules. Yes…I am bitter. The Granite Mountain Hotshots should not have died. Yes…I know, no one should ever die prematurely, but…the Granite Mountain Hotshots really should not have died, especially in the horrible way they did, and we still don’t know why. This disaster is unprecedented in the history of wildand firefighting. Don’t you get that? Yes…WFF…we have clearly established that I am bitter. I know I am. NOW…WHAT ARE YOU?
Oh, and one more thing. Not only did I break a lot of rules. The system rewarded me for it. An old friend reminded me the other day that on the fires we fought…breaking the 10 and the 18 was built into the fire plan.
So you’re a hypocrite who likes to bragg and you feel guilty. That’s fine that’s up to you. You’re frustrated that this isn’t black and white. Their are allot of us who would like to know more but we’re not ranting or showing our ass to people who don’t agree with us.
I’m a current firefighter who realizes this isn’t about me or my creds. So what about we stop taking up space and distracting this conversation with this side bar to nowhere.
I said a long time ago that I think that one or several of the OH on GM made a terrible decision. I think that there was an incredible amount to pressure on everyone making decisions. I know almost every team OH who has been named in this investigation. As a supervisor I know that no one tells me to do anything, I just simply say nope can’t do that, and offer alternatives. Supervisors may have asked GM to do things but they made the decision to engage. Even if there was pressure, they still had the option. I don’t think for a second that either Eric or Jesse would have knowingly edangered their crews lives because they felt their job was on the line. Don’t believe that. They thought they could get in position to assist and that’s what they did.
I’m interested in the timeline that several are working on because in the end I think it will turn to be what I think it is. Supervisors asking for anyavailable resources to assit, a IHC that tired to get in position, and a unanticipated mistake that cost lives.
The unanticipated mistake—-
They underestimated the severity of the fire situation.
Weather fuel and intensity of the blowup at the most critical burn time of the day.
They then put there selves in unburned fuel at the worst time for fire behavior.
with forecasted high erratic winds, High temp. and low humidity.
All the line built that day was totally compromised.
The fire had turned to a blowup condition, and they decided to take a hike thru unburned fuel.
SITUATION AWARNESS??????????
Right so what about lack of SA could not be considered an unanticapated mistake?
Lack of SA is a accident or fatality waiting to happen on a fire out of control its time to change your job and never fight fire again. When you don’t have “situation awareness” you are in the wrong occupation…..
Hey no kidding. When you ‘re unaware of the potential, right. How many people have you ever encountered that were shocked by what happened to them. That is what I’m pointing out.
WFF, the phrase “unanticipated mistake” skips over a whole lot. Among other things, finding ways of dealing with patterns of near-misses and reckless behavior more proactively so that similar clusters are less likely to occur in the future, and ensuring better training in the first place. And, the question of whether the survivors of the 19 get taken care of decently after these men were asked to take on hugely outsized risks that are not part of the deal, or whether these mostly lowly compensated seasonal workers are in financial terms treated as disposable. I don’t think anyone believe malice was involved. But, between malice and a completely unforeseeable fluke event like a meteor, there’s a lot of ground to cover. http://vimeo.com/48411010
Right I agree with all that. I think FF should have to the best support. No issue with that. Not all accidents are preventable, because we’re human.
I’m not urging anyone to not try to learn or find out the details. I don’t believe that fatalities are acceptable.
My take Gary== I dought you really did that. I’ll agree to disagree with you. You never knowingly would have put your crew in harms way……………..
we agree with all you said Gary. Sonny had a son too. Killed by a “freak accident” that turned out to be caused by careless maintenance machinery/equipment. We have dedicated our time freely to help anyone that seeks the “truth” of the Yarnell Fire. We have zero agenda. Yes, Sonny has a granddaughter that had to grow up with out a dad and that’s sad. Sonny’s son was the best kid you could ever have-
under water welder. after his time in the Navy. so full of life and so happy. Well loved and liked by all. So we understand those heroes and they put their lives on the line. They deserve every person to come forward that can help properly assess this so the families can know the truth not narratives or theories—and so that future firefighters have a better chance of surviving.
WTKTT asked about Musser’s request for resources, and I am pretty sure I answered WTKTT on this before, but, maybe not, so here we go. WTKTT asked:
“WHAT resources was he ASKING for?” He was asking – on behalf of GARY CORDES – for the only TWO resources that Marsh as DivsA had (e.g. the Granite Mountain Hotshots and the Blue Ridge IHC)
“WHY? What was his stated REASON?” Musser was asking for these “resources” to be bumped to Yarnell or Glen Ilah to help prepare for the eastward marching fire. Presumably burn-outs and such.
“Did he ask Blue Ridge to fulfill same request?” Yes, but Cordes chimed in to note that he (Cordes) already HAD control over Blue Ridge (and he had them doing the dozer line and some dozer work).
“Did they refuse?” See above.
“Did he call Marsh back when they did (IF they did)?” No idea. Presumably Marsh overheard the transmissions/communications noted above.
“Is that really Musser in the YARNELL-GAMBLE?” I CANNOT believe you are even asking this question. Have you HONESTLY not even tried to do a bit of research regarding audio forensics? Really? Do you know what every other possibly relevant person on the fire sounded like? Otherwise, how (assuming the appropriate audio forensics exist, which they do not) could you rule out everyone else and rule in Musser?
“At what moment did Musser learn that they really WERE coming?” At the very latest when he overheard Marsh ANNOUNCING this on the radio.
Reply to Elizabeth post on March 11, 2014 at 7:03 pm
For someone who does a lot of ‘cautioning’ to others about
making statements without backing them up…
…that’s a mouthful, counselor.
Please provide specific references to back up the specific
claims you are making above.
What evidence do YOU have that allows you to be so specific?
As for your continual rants about ‘audio forensics’… the quote
in question in the Yarnell Gamble video is one that anyone
with normal hearing who might be familiar with the speaker’s
voice ( whoever that might be ) SHOULD be able to identify it.
No one has done so (yet)… but it should be possible.
Based on the *very* specific claims you yourself are now
making… my question to YOU would be… who else might
it have been other than Musser ( or Cordes ) who would
have been encouraging them to “hurry up” like that, at
that time?
It’s a finite list of people, don’t you think?
Remember that RTS said Musser was upset because the SAIT left out I believe it was 80 things that were left out that he had stated in the investigation. Maybe so.
Bob,
Musser said it was “80 innaccuracies in the AZDOSH report” and NOT the SAIR.
Has Musser stated or written that reason anywhere that we know of? Has he said exactly what mission he had for GM? It is easy to surmise the reason and it does make some sense, but has he come out and actually said it? With what happened, both he and Cordes (as well as Abel), as key overhead in the worst fatality fire for WFF in 80 years, should be expected to provide investigators with a detailed accounting of the events that afternoon, including a full accounting of any and all conversations they had with GM. As I said earlier, maybe that has happened and it has been withheld from the public. In fact, although I might be totally nuts given the legal situation, there is a part of me that thinks Musser may have already met with the families to provide details not made public.
Reply to mike post on March 11, 2014 at 9:46 pm
>> mike asked…
>>
>> Has Musser stated or written that reason anywhere
>> that we know of?
No. Nothing that’s been released publicly, anyway.
>> Has he said exactly what mission he had for GM?
Nope. ( Again, nothing I know of in the public record ).
>> It is easy to surmise the reason and it does make some
>> some sense, but has he come out and actually said it?
Nope. Nothing I’m aware of.
>> With what happened, both he and Cordes (as well as
>> Abel), as key overhead in the worst fatality fire for
>> WFF in 80 years, should be expected to provide
>> investigators with a detailed accounting of the events
>> that afternoon, including a full accounting of any and
>> all conversations they had with GM.
It is still inconceivable ( for the reasons you state ) that
this did NOT happen. Knowing about it is another story.
>> As I said earlier, maybe that has happened and it has
>> been withheld from the public.
…and maybe Elizabeth DOES have this ( evidence ).
There’s no telling unless she comes out and says so.
>> In fact, although I might be totally nuts given the legal
>> situation, there is a part of me that thinks Musser may
>> have already met with the families to provide details
>> not made public.
It’s possible.
“to help prepare for the eastward marching fire.” ??? When, at this point, was the fire marching eastward???
“Yes, but Cordes chimed in to note that he (Cordes) already HAD control over Blue Ridge (and he had them doing the dozer line and some dozer work).” Source??
Something about this time line doesn’t seem right to me.
I was leaving the area about 2000 feet to the east of where they are said to have deployed.
I checked the time it was 4:03 PM.
The area, west of me, where they are said to have deployed was already burned.
I had to drive east to leave the area and the flames were already about 200 feet northeast of me and moving southwest toward me as I left.
Can anyone explain this to me?
Reply to George DeLange post on March 11, 2014 at 1:55 pm
>> Mr. Delange wrote…
>>
>> Something about this time line doesn’t seem right to me.
>> I was leaving the area about 2000 feet to the east of where
>> they are said to have deployed.
>> I checked the time it was 4:03 PM.
>> The area, west of me, where they are said to have deployed
>> was already burned.
>> I had to drive east to leave the area and the flames were
>> already about 200 feet northeast of me and moving southwest
>> toward me as I left.
>>
>> Can anyone explain this to me?
I will try.
When you say you were ‘leaving the area’ I’m going to assume
you mean your home in Glen Ilah… which is exactly here…
Latitude: 34.218639
Longitude: -112.762250
34.218639, -112.762250
105 Westward Drive, Glen Ilah, Arizona.
That is actually 4695 feet ( as the bird flies ) from the
exact center of the actual deployment site. ( 8/10ths of a mile ).
>> I checked the time it was 4:03 PM.
>> The area, west of me, where they are said to have deployed
>> was already burned.
Then whatever you were checking the time on was not correct.
The actual time had to have been much later than 4:03 PM.
There is an abundance of photographic and VIDEO evidence
to prove this.
Brendan McDonough’s complete photos from that day are here…
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/mmb98r3j53s2urp/8NlvN5hDdm
The LAST THREE photos on that page were all taken at exactly
4:02 PM that day, looking WEST from Highway 89 at the exact
point where Fountainhill Road in Glen Ilah meets Highway 89.
( Just a little north of the Ranch House Restaurant ).
Those THREE photos are…
20130630_160204.jpg – ( Taken at 4:02 PM + 4 seconds )
20130630_160206.jpg – ( Taken at 4:02 PM + 6 seconds )
20130630_160208.jpg – ( Taken at 4:02 PM + 8 seconds )
The photos were taken with Brendan Mcdonough’s
Samsung SCH-I535 Smartphone, which was automatically (digitally) time-stamping his photos. The timestamps on
Brendan’s photos have already been determined to be
accurate that day.
Brendan’s photos CLEARLY show the fire ‘approaching’ Yarnell
and Glen Ilah at 4:02… but actually still quite some hundreds of
yards away, perhaps even more than 1000+ yards away.
The general ‘area’ where the deployment took pace ( 638 yards
west of the Boulder Springs Ranch ) is actually somewhat
visible on the left side of Brendan’s photos and the sky is actually
still mostly ‘clear’ over that area at 4:02 PM… though the fire is
most definitely ‘advancing’ in that direction.
There are also the Christopher MacKenzie VIDEOS themselves,
which clearly show where the ‘fireline’ was in the 4:02 PM
timeframe.
The MacKenzie videos definitely show the fire was now heading
to the southeast, towards Yarnell and Glen Ilah in the 4:02 PM
timeframe… but it had not YET even crossed the ‘Sesame Trail’
two-track road that runs east to west out there to the northwest
of Yarnell.
The Christopher MacKenzie videos are at the link below.
There are only two of them and they are at the bottom of
the page. They were both shot at 4:02 PM that afternoon
and they both show the location of the fireline at that time…
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/02ue6bnjp6nazkm/mJJ_cejFm4/Photos%20and%20Video/MacKenzie%20Photos%20Video
Thanks for the information.
The timeline just didn’t make sense to me.
I must agree with you that I most likely made a mistake when I looked at my phone’s time.
I was in a hurry to get out, as I had no notice that there was an evacuation until the sheriff deputy told me to get out. We left in less than 5 minutes, & had to drive toward the flames and eventually within about 15 feet of the flames to get out.
So the time was not the most pressing thing on our minds.
I have to agree with you that I must have gotten it wrong.
Thanks for your help.
Reply to George DeLange post
on March 11, 2014 at 8:56 pm
Mr. DeLange… based on your descriptions
of your evacuation and the conditions on
Westward drive at that time… it is perfectly
possible that it may have been 4:43 PM.
Easily mistaken for 4:03 PM.
A neighbor of yours from a little farther west
in Glen Ilah was evacuating right at 4:43 PM
and he videoed his own exit from Glen Ilah.
The conditions YOU describe match exactly
what is seen in his video as he exited Glen
Ilah and even passed by your home.
That video is here…
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t_AjhL448ZA
His actual evacuation from the west side
of Glen Ilah begins at +58 seconds into
this video. The time is 4:43 PM but it is
completely DARK because of the smoke
cloud over the west part of Glen Ilah.
He is evacuating from this exact address…
22906 Ridgeway Dr, Yarnell, AZ 85362
Latitude: 34.217616
Longitude: -112.764221
34.217616, -112.764221
WARNING: Strong language in this video.
Yup!
That’s just about the same thing I saw. He must have been just a little bit behind me in the line going out.
It’s hard to explain how hot the smoke filled air was. It even burned my lungs when breathing it. And then the darkness was really strange.
In fact, the electricity went out as I went into the house to yell at my wife to get out. It was so dark I had trouble finding the few things I grabbed to take with me.
My dog was smarter than me, she kept looking at me like, when are we getting out!
I want to thank all of you who have helped me to understand the time line.
Regards
George DeLange
George-
others have shown us with documents a similar time you shared—if you made calls to anyone and you remember where you were when the call was or any photos/video—this is the stuff the public needs. Accounts are fine yet it needs to be backed-up with documents to make it straight/spot on facts.
George DeLange is not the only homeowners with documentation as well that has a different time line for that day. It is coming out that there is more folks that show a different life account of that 3-5pm hours and that the fire reached before so those folks are the ones for I have seen photos in person and George is very credible and as well as others with their documents. I just wish there was a link they can send the PUBLIC so they the public can view their documents/photos/videos and that has been my Y O U comments I post time to time. Those people have key information to better help the PUBLIC properly assess that day. I hope as time unfolds more folks share what they shared to me. It takes documentation I told them all along. Words do not lay too heavy with me especially after Jerry and Judy from Congress Depot were told GMHS came out and went back in by a homeowner—we need to SHOW the PUBLIC the information that for some reason you felt at ease to show the eye-witness account folks; us.
WTKTT…..P30 Dan Philbin unit log …. Tied in with Div (Rance) and headed to Yarnell. Talked with Clawson and headed to Shrine Rd. Helped get citizens out. Heard emergency traffic on A/G.
This is a follow up to an earlier conversation. It doesn’t appear that Marquez/Philbin were at the IC shortly after 1630. They were on Shrine Rd.
There is a pretty long list of people on Shrine Rd during this period of time, even Tony Sciacca.
Reply to calvin post on March 11, 2014 at 3:42 am
>> calvin said…
>>
>> WTKTT…..P30 Dan Philbin unit log …. Tied in with Div
>> (Rance) and headed to Yarnell. Talked with Clawson and
>> headed to Shrine Rd. Helped get citizens out. Heard
>> emergency traffic on A/G.
>>
>> This is a follow up to an earlier conversation. It doesn’t appear
>> that Marquez/Philbin were at the IC shortly after 1630. They
>> were on Shrine Rd.
Well… it says they ‘headed to Shrine Rd.’ ( from all the way
up at the ICP ), but I’m not so sure they ever made it there.
If they were with Clawson, Hulburd and Yowell on the
Shrine road when they say the ‘heard emergency traffic
on A/G’… then why aren’t we actually SEEING them in
the Helmet-Cam video?
Maybe they HAD been there ( moments before ), but then
just followed the Blue Ridge convoy out of there just
moments before the Helmet-Cam video was shot.
>> There is a pretty long list of people on Shrine Rd during
>> this period of time, even Tony Sciacca.
Yes. It was a busy place. I’m still surprised that we ONLY
see Clawson, Hulburd and Yowell in that Helmet-Cam
video. Everyone else who had been there must have moved
on just moments before Hulburd started shooting that video.
Which actually has always raised an interesting question.
Why did Hulburd begin shooting his Helmet-Cam video
at that exact moment… just seconds before he was
about to capture GM’s final transmissions?
Was that totally, purely coincidence?…
…or is there really MORE to the START of that video
such as more captured conversation between ground
and Bravo 33 leading up to Steeds first MAYDAY?
It would be interesting to hear Hulburd himself simply
explain why he chose that one moment ( and only
moment? ) all day to use his Helmet-Cam.
Also… was that really the ONLY time Hulburd used
his Helmet-Cam that day? Just that one time?
Hulburd was a participant in the ground rescue mission
along with Clawson, Yowell, BR Supt Frisby and BR
Captain Brown.
Did he ever turn that Helmet-Cam on during the full
hour they were out there searching for GM?
>> Reply to calvin post on March 11, 2014 at 3:42 am
>>
>> This is a follow up to an earlier conversation.
Yes… it was about Marquez’s new unit logs and some of the
things he says he did like “Calling Eric to ask if he could hear
the helicopter”.
I went back and listened to the entire Helmet-Cam video.
Radio traffic heard in that video seems to indicate that
Hulburd’s radio was ‘scanning’ and capturing at least all
of the following frequencies at that moment…
Air to Ground
TAC 2
TAC 3
The ONLY person heard in that entire video ‘asking’ Eric
if he could ‘hear the helicopters’ ( on any channel Hulburd
was scanning ) is Bravo 33.
If Marquez really did ‘jump in’ and was asking Eric if he could
hear the chopper… either he did it AFTER the Helmet-Cam
video ended or it was on some channel that Hulburd wasn’t
scanning.
I doubt that Marquez had GM’s intra-crew frequency, since
his whole problem earlier in the day was that he had to
borrow other people’s radios just to talk to Marsh… but maybe
he had their intra-crew frequency by this time ( 1640 ).
**
** THINGS TO NOTE FROM THE NEWLY RELEASED UNIT LOGS
** PART 1
Those new ‘unit logs’ are available here…
http://www.investigativemedia.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/Unit_Logs-provided-on-2-27.pdf
——————————————————————————————————-
** There WAS a ‘Line Safety Officer’ on duty before GM moved…
——————————————————————————————————-
Tony Sciacca ( from Prescott ) who was hired as ‘Line Safety Officer’,
had, in fact, ‘checked in’ and was working the Yarnell Hill Fire in that
capacity as early as 1500 ( 3:00 PM ) on Sunday, June 30, 2013.
( It was Mary Cole, the other ‘safety officer’ who didn’t even arrive in
Yarnell until just before the deployment because he had been waiting
in Prescott most of the day for his ‘order’ to arrive before he ever
left Prescott for Yarnell ).
——————————————————————————————————-
** More detail ( but more confusion ) about what happened Saturday…
——————————————————————————————————-
From Russ Shumates ‘narrative’ style unit log for Saturday, June 29, 2013…
1530-1630 – Lewis crew started to report creeping fire on the west side of the
fire in the rocks on the steep slope. I determined that more folks were needed
on the hill, and thunderstorm buildup was not moving our way. The altitude
density was going to affect how many folks per load however. I directed a
sling load of bladder bags be sent up, and half the helitack crew shuttle up.
During this operation a green island on the east side of the fire started to flare
up. The Lewis crew moved to address this and the bladder bags were set
down near them. SW winds increased at this point and the flare up spotted
over the road.
NOTE: If the bladder bags really were set down right where the ‘flare up’
was taking place then I imagine the rotor wash from the chopper didn’t help
much, either. Nothing like a good rotor wash to help cool down a flare-up.
1600 – Spot across the road was established and crews were having a difficult
time hooking it. Slop was (now) approximately 1-2 acres. Ordered AA and
SEATS to launch. Ordered Yarnell Fire Department ( YFD ) Water Tender to
utilize for creation of a dip site for potential bucker work.
NOTE: So only AFTER the slopover had reached 1-2 acres did Shumate
make his first move that day to even try and prepare for some bucket drops.
Chief Dan Andersen ( former YFD Fire Chief ) had already told them on Friday
night that’s what they should have been doing first thing that morning and be
done with it.
1800 – send Justin Smith ( ICT4 Traineee ) up to the fire, and prep the rest of
Lewis crew to fly up as well. Change command structure to the following:
Justin Smith no longer ICT4(t), he will be DIV A on the hill. Peck, a carded ICT4
from helicopter 4HX helitack, will be Operations on the hill. Phone call with Peck
explains what I want as the command structure. I indicate my strategy is anchor
and flank the east flank working with aviation. Stay direct and the black is the
safety zone. I am now expecting the forces on the hill to stay up all night, and
ask Peck to get a supply list together so supplies can be delievered as the rest
of the Lewis crew is shuttled up.
1730 – 1830 – Shuttle up supplies, but fire is below helispot so helitack person
at helispot is picked up, and crew shuttle cancelled. Operations continue on
the hill, anchor and flank east flank with a total of 14 folks on the hill. Start
ordering up forces for tomorrow. Operations expected to last all night, so a
replacement ICT3 is ordered. Paul Musser was going to be the one to fill this
order.
NOTE: So, somehow, Shumate KNEW he needed more crew up there and
was then somehow able to get Justin Smith ( and supplies ) flown up there at
1800… but in the same timeframe he says he had to cancel the additional crew
shuttle(s) and couldn’t find a way to get the additional crew up there some other
way?
ALSO NOTE: Nowhere in Shumate’s ‘unit log’ narrative does he EVER
mention that the crew that was up there trying to catch that slopover totally
ran out of chainsaw gas and became almost ‘useless’ at that point.
He also says he was able to ‘shuttle up supplies’ in the 1730-1830 timeframe
but was then somehow unable to even get these guys any chainsaw gas
while they are trying to ‘catch’ the slopover in that same timeframe?
He was able to get the Gatorade and MREs up there… but not chainsaw gas?
WTF?
——————————————————————————————————-
** Darell Willis was with Brendan Mcdonough shortly after deployment
——————————————————————————————————-
This is also the first we have heard that Darrell Willis…
1) Specifically ‘heard’ the deployment transmissions in ‘real time’.
2) Specifically ‘tied in with’ Brendan Mcdonough right after the deployment
and was talking to him even at the point where the ‘search’ was taking
place and no one knew where GM really was.
The only mention in Willis’ SAIR interview notes of what he did in this
same timeframe is that he only heard about the deployment when
Todd Abel called him to tell him, and that the only thing he did then was
‘drive around to Yarnell side of fire’ to ‘pray for the crew’. There is no
mention of anything he did or didn’t do after that.
Actually, the ONLY thing that is (now) mentioned in his own unit log
notes that ended up in his SAIT interview notes is the blub about
Abel calling him on his cell phone AFTER the deployment.
** From Darrell Willis’ SAIT interview notes…
– Chief Willis got a call from Todd Abbel informing him of the Granite Mtn.
shelter deployment (4:40- 4:45).
– Next thing he does is drive around to Yarnell side of the
fire and pray for the crew
** From Darrell Willis’ typewritten table-style unit log…
1640: Heard radio conversation about deployment.
1647: Operations Able calls me on my cell phone and asks if I heard what is
going on, he told me what he knew.
1655: I called TF Moser and informed him that I wanted him to take the Division,
to hold the fire with the resources on Model Creek Road and to pick up slop overs.
1715: I responded to Yarnell and tied in with Operations Able and monitored radio
traffic on Incident within an Incident.
1745: Tied in with GMIHC lookout McDonough to determine his welfare.
NOTE: Willis doesn’t say WHERE he ‘tied in with McDonough’, how much
time he spent with Brendan at that point… or what they talked about.
At 1745, both DPS helicopter Ranger 58 AND the 5 person ground rescue team
were still frantically searching for Granite Mountain and were still uncertain where
they might be. More specifically… at 1745, Ranger 58 was actively just still
searching over near the anchor point and at that same moment the ground
rescue team was also just ascending the ridge over near the anchor point,
also totally confused about where to even begin looking for them.
1745 was still the time that if ANYONE had any *real* idea where Granite
Mountain might have actually deployed… or what route they had really been
taking when they did… they should have been saying so.
It would not be for another half-hour ( around 1815 ) that Ranger 58 would even
‘accidentally’ find them down in the box canyon and radio out the coordinates.
The fatalities were only then eventually confirmed another 25 minutes later
circa 1835.
The impression I have been left with concerning the delay in finding GM was that there was simply too much smoke to get into the area where they were. Plain and simple.
You are correct, Calvin (as I understand it).
Remember the Holloway fire, where a crew member became separated from the crew “partially due to a weather event resulting in a 180 degree wind switch along with high winds that spread fire outside of control lines and reduced visibility to near zero.” Reduced VISIBILITY to near ZERO.
On the Yarnell Hill Fire, even when the visibility in the deployment valley improved enough to finally allow the helicopter to get in and start looking *there* for GM, the smoke and ash was so *still* so bad that the aircraft was ultimately damaged.
calvin ( and Elizabeth )…
There is a BIG difference between being ABLE to get to
where they were… and KNOWING where they were.
In this case… lack of knowledge for the the latter still
seems to precede the former.
There is no real evidence that ANYONE actively involved
in searching for Granite Mountain for more than an
hour and a half ( 1700 to 1815, when Ranger 58
‘accidentally’ found them ) had ANY *real* idea where
they might be. Best they could do was go back to the
anchor point and just hope that’s where they were.
Yes… the burnover zone remained ‘hot’ and GETTING
to their exact location was/would have been problematic
even if they DID know where they deployed…
…but again… KNOWING where they were came first.
Even when Eric Tarr was ‘let down’ by Ranger 58
( after two failed attempts to land right near the deployed
shelters ) in that little clearing just north of the Boulder
Springs Ranch… Eric Tarr said he had to stick his
‘camel pack’ in his mouth just to be able to breathe…
SAIT Interview Notes ( YIN ) – Page 25
Interview with Ranger 58
“At 1812 they saw clusters of shelters. No movement. Chip did see some bodies outside of the shelters. 2-3 shelters weren’t on at all. It was moon scaped. Pilot wanted to sit Eric down but had a hard time figuring out where. Landed 300-400yds north of the ranch. 1815 Eric jumped out of the ship. Looking back it was too soon, very hot had to stick my camel pack in my mouth in order to breathe.”
Also… when they first started searching at 7:15,
Eric Tarr also says the ONLY clue they had where
to start searching was the spot where the pilot,
Clifford Brunsting, was pretty sure he had seen
them working much earlier in the day on a recon flight.
The anchor point ( WEST side of the fire ).
No one else was giving them any other clue ( or
reminding them that Marsh had ‘affirmed’ they
were on the SOUTH side of the fire, and NOT at
the original anchor point ).
Both Eric Tarr and pilot Clifford Brunsting said that the
anchor point area was also still ‘covered with heavy
smoke’ when they arrived there… but that didn’t stop
them at all. They still started searching that (wrong)
area as best they could despite the ‘heavy smoke’.
What is still astounding is that at 7:15, Ranger
58 was given clearance to launch by Air Attack (Bravo 33),
but apparently even Air Attack didn’t even try to make
it clear to Ranger 58 that the last thing these men ever
said was that they were ‘on the SOUTH side of the fire’.
At 1641.30…
B33: Okay, copy that. So, you’re on the SOUTH side
of the fire, then?
Eric Marsh( his last known word ): Affirm!
B33: K… we’re gonna bring you the VLAT, okay?
So forget about anyone on the GROUND trying to make
it clear where anyone should be searching…
…for more than an hour ( after Ranger 58 launched
at 7:15 ) Air Attack itself didn’t even make any attempt to
make sure Ranger 58 or the ground rescue team knew
what they knew back around 1641.30?
That they should PRIMARILY be looking on what would
have been the SOUTH side of the fire circa 1641.30?
That’s still hard to believe.
Correction ( typos ) above.
Ranger 58 was given clearance to launch and
begin searching for GM at 1715 ( 5:15 PM)…
…and not ‘7:15’ as I was accidentally typing above.
Ranger 58 actually ‘lifted off’ the ground at
1716 ( 5:16 PM )… a full 31 minutes after the
actual burnover at the deployment site.
Typo in original (parent) posting above.
The other person hired to be a ‘safety officer’ that day, other
than Tony Sciacca ( who is now known to have been there
and ‘on duty’ in a ‘line safety officer’ capacity as early as
1500 ( 3:00 PM ) that day )…
was Marty Cole ( not ‘Mary’ Cole as I accidentally type above ).
Marty Cole was the ‘safety officer’ who didn’t even arrive in
Yarnell until just before the deployment because he had simply
been waiting to leave Prescott for Yarnell until his ‘work order’
showed up ( via email, I assume ).
**
** NEW UNIT LOGS
A few days ago, Mr. John Dougherty published the ‘new’ unit logs that have
(finally) been released by the Arizona Forestry Division in accordance with
Arizona law.
They are now (publicly) available here…
http://www.investigativemedia.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/Unit_Logs-provided-on-2-27.pdf
These are (apparently) the originals from any number of people that
were working the Yarnell Hill Fire that day including the actual original ‘unit
logs’ from people like Darrell Willis, Paul Musser, Todd Abel, Gary Cordes,
Corey Mosser, Tyson Esquibel, Byron Kimball, Tony Sciacca, Marty Cole, Brad
Zeitler, Dan Philbin, Russ Shumate, Rob Beery, etc.
The astounding thing(s) about these ‘unit logs’ only now appearing, and NOT
having been part of the original FOIA/FOIL request for ALL the information
the SAIT used in their investigation comes in two parts…
1) AFD says that these original personnel ‘unit logs’ were NOT part of the SAIT
investigation at all… yet any number of these ‘unit logs’ were reproduced
word-for-word in the SAIT’s own ‘Investigative Notes’… which WERE part of
the FOIA/FOIL release.
Example: AFD says that none of these ‘unit logs’ were part of the SAIT
investigation… and therefore not subject to that FOIA/FOIL release… but the
(combined) ‘unit log’ for OPS1 Todd Abel and OPS2 Paul Musser are simply
reprinted in full as their own (supposed) ‘Interview notes’ with Musser and Abel.
So that means the SAIT investigators most probably DID see/read all of
these ‘unit logs’ ( which means they WERE all ‘part of their investigation ), but
they only ‘cherry picked’ the ones they wanted to ‘officially’ use such as the
Abel/Musser log.
2) AFD says the reason the release of these personnel ‘unit logs’ took so long is
because of the ‘redaction work’ that was needed. In fact… it doesn’t appear that
any of this ‘redaction work’ they say was ‘taking so long’ was ever done at all
since they managed to still leave a bunch of PHONE NUMBERS in the released
material itself. So even if the ‘redaction work’ is what was taking so long… they
did a pretty piss-poor job no matter how much time they were taking. There are
also no ‘blacked out’ sections in this recent release at all so either that means
the work was never done at all or their idea of ‘redactions’ was to simply
REMOVE entire documents from the release.
Mr. Dougherty himself has now asked AFD for a full ‘accounting’ of what
documents and/or information is still being ‘withheld’ from valid Arizona Public
Document Requests…but the Arizona Forestry Division has ( so far ) not even
responded to his request.
There is a LOT of new ( and previously unknown ) information in these new ‘unit
logs’ and I’m sure there’s more to come on all of this.
Forgot to include the link to the actual article published by
Mr. John Dougherty regarding these new unit logs.
It is here…
InvestigativeMEDIA
Arizona Forestry Division belatedly releases key Yarnell Hill records
by John Dougherty – March 6, 2014
http://www.investigativemedia.com/arizona-forestry-division-belatedly-releases-key-yarnell-hill-records/
I am sorry, when I first looked at those logs, I did not even recognize the Musser/Abel one as being their “unit logs”. It is a combined document, written in the 3rd person, typed, and missing so many crucial details that it would almost appear for certain that huge swaths of the original were “redacted” without us being able to see that fact. In other words, I believe it is not an original document or anything close to the original documents, but something the SAIT created on its own from the originals. I am beginning to believe some of these people I/we have been criticizing as not being forthcoming may have been much more so then we have realized, and then the SAIT just buried what it did not want known. So when it comes to the Musser/Abel log, I think one should realize that what we do read is exactly what the SAIT wanted us to.
Specifically, I am completely convinced the SAIT knew of the Musser request and redacted it.
I saw WTKTT’s comment that the “logs” were their reprinted interview notes, which is true. I thought I had seen them before. But no doubt there were written unit logs. That just means they completely withheld them and substituted those interview notes, which frankly are an absolute joke.
Reply to mike post on March 11, 2014 at 5:41 am
mike… you are absolutely right.
The fact that the (supposed) ‘unit logs’ for Musser
and Abel are identical to the (supposed) interview
notes for Musser and Abel makes this one little
mystery work BOTH ways. It means…
EITHER…
There never really were any proper ( separate )
‘unit logs’ from either Musser and Abel… and
the SAIT just ‘interviewed them’ together and
came up with those obtuse ‘SAIT interview
notes’ for them… and those ‘interview notes’
are now being pawned off as their ‘unit logs’…
OR…
Musser and Abel really did submit proper (separate)
unit logs… and those are still being ‘withheld’
by Arizona Forestry Division and they are just
‘faking’ it by borrowing the SAIT notes.
More and more… the ‘missing pieces’ really
do come down to Musser.
It’s still an absolute mystery why that one little
quote that he ‘asked if they could spare resources’
ONLY appeared in the ADOSH report… but that
there isn’t even more to that.
– WHAT resources was he ASKING for?
– WHY? What was his stated REASON?
– Did he ask Blue Ridge to fulfill same request?
– Did they refuse?
– Did he call Marsh back when they did (IF they did)?
– Is that really Musser in the YARNELL-GAMBLE
video urging them to “please hurry”?
– If that really is Musser urging them to “hurry”
circa 1620… then how did we get from him
being turned down to him KNOWING they
were coming now and he wants them to hurry?
– At what moment did Musser learn that they
really WERE coming?
– Etc… etc…
WTKTT:
You stated in your post at 12:55 a.m. the following: “The ‘C’ in LCES – Communicating clearly and effectively. It didn’t happen … and when it doesn’t … people can DIE.
Absolutely.
Something else has been coming into focus for me recently. Doesn’t have to do with LCES or the 10 & 18, however, it does seem (at least to me, anyhow) to fall into the same type of category … where “if it doesn’t happen, people can die.”
What I am speaking of specifically is this:
It’s the apparent lack of regard/respect that some personnel on the YHF had for what their Air Support people were telling them.
I can recall, a couple of Chapters ago here, finding it rather uncharacteristic and odd that something of this nature occurred, involving a certain top level fire commander no less. Now, however, it seems that the actions of a particular ground crew (being GM) indicates one more example of this as well.
It is air support who has those ‘eyes in the sky’ with a view of the fire no one else has. And yet, astounding as it seems to be, on the YHF, when one of them contacted a certain OPS with a question about taking a time out so he could go check on GM because he had concerns, he was quite promptly told it wasn’t necessary. This is where I’d like very much if current and retired WFF’s could swiftly correct me if I am wrong on this, but hasn’t it generally been the case that when one of your air support people calls a fire boss or fire commander and says something like, “Would you like me to do (this-or-that),” … what they are really doing is saying, politely, “I think you need to take action on this, because I think this is something that needs to be done.” And when he called OPS he knew just how busy everything was at that time and how critical every single second devoted to what was going on happened to be, hell yes, of course. Which means THAT should have raised a red flag about his call, and what he was saying, right there. It’s utterly mystifying why the response he got was nowhere close to something akin to, “If it looks TO YOU like that is what needs to be done …”
Now, as I am understanding it, along comes more info showing that, with regards to GM, it seems that B33 said he could see them there on ‘the corner’ (of the fire) and they (quote) “kept saying they were comfortable” … but B33 then said that (to him) that was (quote) “NOT CREDIBLE.”
IF the “kept saying they were comfortable” is what GM was communicating to B33 (please correct me if I happen to be misunderstanding this) it indicates B33 had questions about it … sounds like more than one concern. And yet, in spite of it (and it’s almost too gut-wrenching to contemplate or talk about, so I’m hoping perhaps I am wrong on this) here is an entire HS crew with absolutely no one serving as “L” in LCES and their conversation sounds like they’re discounting and ignoring the concerns of not only a highly qualified professional in this business but one who was able to see what they could NOT. During a time of extreme fire conditions/behavior … during a time when they were planning to move out of the black or had already begun to do so.
It is all beyond being ‘unfathomable’ to me. However, I am becoming more convinced with each passing day that, along with the LCES and the 10 & 18, if you don’t pay attention to the professionals who are your Air Support, people can die.
Reply to J. Stout post on March 10, 2014 at 9:57 pm
First off… let me save other people who might be reaching for
their keyboards (again) to remind everyone about things like
‘the state of audio forensics’ and whatnot that I would be the
first one to admit that what I am SURE I ( me, personally )
am hearing at the start of that AIR STUDY video has not
been ‘confirmed’. I don’t know what is even going to constitute
‘confirmation’ on that… ( other than re-interviewing ASM2 and
ALL those other people who WERE talking on the radio at 1616 )
but I am equally sure that I am accurately reporting what I
( me, personally ) am hearing.
So I ( me, personally ) accept your ‘quotes’ above because
that is what I am hearing… and I ( me, personally ) already
believe fully those ‘conversations’ ( or something just like
them ) actually took place around that time.
I DO believe that ( circa 1616 ) ASM2 was ‘asked to check’ on GM.
I DO believe they did that, saw them ( in their words ) “behind
those hills’ and “on the corner of the fire”, and reported back.
I DO believe that ASM2 then expressed their ‘concern’ about
them and ASKED ground to check on them themselves RIGHT
AWAY and see if this DIVS A person who ASM2 was hearing
from was actually WITH them or not, because he wasn’t sure.
I DO believe that ground did that, and got nothing but more
obtuse and ineffective communications from both Marsh
and Steed.
I am not only sure what I am hearing ASM2 say about how
he doesn’t BELIEVE they could keep saying they are
‘comfortable’ down there based on the fire behavior he is
now seeing… my hearing is good enough that I am also sure
I can also actually hear his frustration ( almost anger ) with
them but he is way overloaded at this point and that’s why he
TELLS them to go check on them… RIGHT NOW. He really
WAS concerned ( but damn busy ).
You don’t even need this stupid AIR STUDY video to put that
puzzle together, either. There are, in fact, OTHER documented
exchanges that indicate the same thing was happening right
around that time.
Like this one from Bravo 33’s own SAIT interview…
Got a call from Division A stating they were going down their escape route to the safety zone. Didn’t know Division A was the superintendent of the Granite Mountain hot shots. Asked him “is everything OK?” He replied “everything is ok, just heading to the safety zone”.
Yea, right.
“Everything is OK… we’re just so concerned ourselves about
our situation that we feel we need to ‘escape’ to some ‘safety
zone’ that we’re not even going to tell you where it is… but
other than that… yea… everything is fine… how are YOU?”
I believe that is just part of the “continually saying they are
comfortable” comment that ASM2 (seems) to say around 1616,
and contributed to HIS mounting ‘frustration’ with ‘these guys’.
That might have been the first one… and when he ‘checked’
on them again he got the same sort of “Oh yeah… everything’s
fine down here… how are you?” crap from Marsh.
To make a long story short ( forget the AIR STUDY video )…
I agree with your comments above.
I believe there was an ASTOUNDING ‘disconnect’ between
ground forces and Air Attack that day… ALL DAY LONG.
I don’t know how usual or unusual that is… but on a day that
19 people died… I would think that aspect of the operations
would be under the microscope just as much as ANYTHING
ELSE.
When, do you suppose, we will ever hear more from the
mysterious ASM1 ( Rory Collins )?
Absolutely ……………
Bravo 33 SAIT interview says that they didn’t even have
a clue that the Blue Ridge Hotshots were even THERE
that day…
…until they heard it on CNN.
Whether that was because of the piss-poor handoff by
ASM1 Rory Collins or just a general lack on ground
command’s part to make sure Air Attack was aware
of even who was or wasn’t underneath them trying
to fight the same fire they were is irrelevant.
It means the whole ‘situational awareness’ on
EVERYONE’S part that day was somewhere off
the charts on the ‘bad’ side.
Followup… references for statements above…
SAIT Interview Notes ( page 15 )…
_________________________________________
INTERVIEW WITH BRAVO 33
July 9, 2013 – 1700
Interviewees:
John Burfiend-ATS Specialist
Clint Clauson – ATS Trainee
Thomas French – AT Specialist
Interviewers:
Mike Dudley, Brad Mayhew, Tim Foley, Jay Kurth, Jimmy Rocha
__________________________________________
We had been there about 1 ½ hours when air attack on the scene told us he had to leave. (1700 NM time). It was a strange change out. He just said “you have the fire, I’m leaving”. Not sure if I was talking to structure group 1 or 2. I remember looking up. Talking to ops structural group 1, 2 and ops.
I knew there was 2 structural groups. I wrote down 2. Tom said “hey dude, you are the air attack”.
Didn’t know Division A was the superintendent of the Granite Mountain hot shots.
Air attack didn’t tell me there were resources
in the area.
I never got divisions from the briefing. Didn’t know there were divisions. Thought it was a Type 3 incident. I didn’t recognize Todd’s voice. I didn’t know anybody was taking any action on the fire.
I didn’t know that Blue Ridge was there until we were home watching the news.
__________________________________________
WTKTT:
As for the “piss-poor hand off “by ASM1 Rory Collins which you spoke of …
Perhaps the comments made by Rocksteady back on Dec 9 at 11:59 a.m. may ‘possibly’ offer some insights on this. Rocksteady talked about how:
“If you have ever been in a small fixed wing aircraft, on a 100 degree day over a very active forest fire, doing continuous orbits, it is POSSIBLE that Colllins was air sick. It does happen frequently. When you get this sort of airsick, you are out of the game. PERIOD. You land, the pilot helps you to the lounge area and you lay there feeling like warmed over death.”
Of course that is ‘possible’. Could happen
to anyone…and there would also be no
shame in admitting it. No one has.
That’s NOT the documented reason
“Air Attack” ATGS ASM1 B3 Rory Collins
left the fire at 1558.
The SAIT says it was simply that his PILOT
was reaching ( or had already reached )
his ‘flying time limit’.
I actually don’t care if either ( or BOTH )
of them were ready to puke their guts out.
When you are airsick… it’s better if you
stick your finger in your mouth and MAKE
the ‘glory’ moment(s) happen ( multiple
times, if necessary ) just to get that over
with… especially when you still have to take
care of business such as actually LANDING
the plane.
( Trust me on this ).
With ALL of the things Bravo 33 has said
they did NOT know following the ‘handoff’…
I would still say that’s evidence of a pretty
bad ‘handoff’ over a VERY active ( and
now dangerous ) fire.
It did NOTHING but add an unnecessary
amount of confusion to an ALREADY
confusing situation that ultimately resulted
in the loss of 19 lives.
Would the tragedy that happened at
4:45 PM have been avoided even if Mr.
Collins performed the best, most complete
‘mid-fire’ Air Attack handoff in the history
of WFF?…
Maybe not… who can say…
…but that ‘confusing’ handoff at such a
critical time sure as heck didn’t help.
OK I don’t have the time that 6 or 7 of you have, but you’re covering allot of ground. There was a lynch mob in the first month or so. Several people were convenced that GM was ordered to structure protection which led to their death. I’m glad that has faded and toned down. You’re not at the sup or asst sup position and believe you can’t refuse risk. I’m also glad that you’ve gotten to the point where people doing the best they can and making the best decisions they can with the info they had has become OK. That wasn’t the case in the beginning either.
I’m trying to get a feel for the attitude right now, because seems this has become a conversation about details and who has the better judgement of them. Which I think is good, you’re testing out the speculation.
One thing that I’m hearing (or I think I’m hearing) is that firefighters shouldn’t be protecting lives and property. And that they shouldn’t be involved in evacuation. Is that a general consensus or individual? Another is that maybe you’re (the group) beginning to think that GM leadership is responsible for what happened. That is interesting becuase usually when there is speculation that the deceased caused or are partially responsible for their tragedy that gets some pretty bad back lash. Just asking.
Just in case, I’m not a mysterious WFF or mysterious anything else. Not having conversations either. Just catching up.
WFF–In the beginning—No I wont go that far back. There had been questions or speculation that GM was asked or ordered to help in town and that why they left the Black. Much of that has not been proven, how ever there has been some info surface that OPS did ask them to go to the town to help which is still sketchy.
We have been digging details for some time since the investigation and written statements have been released.
As an old WFF I don’t believe that saving lives and private property has ever our primary purpose. That may change some day but I do not believe hand crews could ever do that during a wild fire. Pre preparation of protection areas around property has to be done long before the fire to allow access for engine crews to save structures. Wild land crews are trained to fight wild land fire.
I don’t know from my perspective how you can come to any other conclusion than the crew did not follow the 10 and 18 and by so doing put there selves in the situation they ended up in. In all the past fatality fires the portions of the 10 standard orders that were not followed caused the fatality. I only ask for proof otherwise the final responsibility for your crew always lies with you and the decisions you make. It is easy at this point to Identify the individual 10 standard orders they did not follow. Had they checked and followed them I do not believe they would have left the black for any reason. If it would have been my crew with what I have seen in just the pictures alone, we would have sit and watched the show till it was over, then walked out.
For your info I spent 33 years in wild land fire from FF to Asst. Forest FMO. from crew boss to a type II IC. Supervised 3 Hot Shot Crews In Southern Calif. and Idaho. My father also died fighting Wild Land Fire.
I have no problem with the fact that he made a bad decision that cost his life and 14 others. DID NOT POST A LOOKOUT that could see the main fire. His fire was one that helped create the 10 standard orders.
Yea Bob, I’m well aware of who you are. I don’t think there is anyone who isn’t sorry for what happened to your father. From what I’ve read a lookout could have called out the spot fires but no one would have anticipated that kind of down hill push from the wind. Eating in the drainage is an easy arm chair call, but they’d cleaned up what they were doing and did’nt see any hazards.
I think that you guys are past the 10/18 thing that’s obvious. You guys are pieceing the decision process together. I think that is where the lessons are and where some people will find peace, but some won’t. No one can make anyone be unsafe. They may order but you just say “no”.
I do think that wildland firefighters (and hand crews) are responsible for the public and can be very effective in defense and evacuation. They pay our salaries and have the right to the expectation that we perform. I think that we’ve been negligent in recognizing the development of WUI and it’s hazards over the years and preparing ourselves for the responsibility.
Well said we all know the problem and the need to address it. Its been there a long time.
I don’t believe that theory has faded or been toned down because it has lost believers, at least not with me. I believe it even stronger today than the first day I explained it to John Dougherty. It IS hard to track everything that is going on here, and the tide ebbs and flows, but I think that theory has been generally accepted as true by most people who participate in this effort.
I remember commenting back on several of your comments at the very beginning of this controversy, and I can sum it up by saying I haven’t agreed with anything you have ever said, or the way you have said it.
If it had been up to you in the beginning, John Dougherty never would have written about this tragedy and the only people commenting on it would have been Willis, Payne and that drawling idiot cowboy poet wantabe, talk but never did, retired USFS paid stooge and current schiill for Arizona Game and Fish what’s-his-name? It doesn’t even matter.
Since you are so busy, you can make it short and to the point, but I am still waiting for YOU to explain the inexplicable since you are a knowledgeable WFF. I am also waiting for you to put your credentials on the table.
And calling what’s-his-name it-doesn’t-even-matter a drawling idiot cowboy poet wantabe, talk but never did, retired USFS paid stooge and current schill for Arizona Game and Fish what’s-his-name is NOT name calling, it’s stating a fact. Go back and listen to what he said at the very first interview with the media out at the deployment site.
He was a Public Information Officer for the USFS for god’s sake! Do you know what it takes to be a PIO for wildland fire organizations? No, I don’t either, but it has nothing to do with being a wildland firefighter, it has to do with being able to competently repeat (while looking reasonably professional) what others have written down for you to say in front of cameras.
PIO’S are NOBODY’S. PIO’S are coffee sippin’, bullshitin’ salamander hugging camp slugs of the worst kind who use up perfectly good oxygen wildland firefighters could breathe, since they THINK they are somebody, who spend most of their time filling up the porta potty’s so firefighters have to take a crap while standing up when they finally make it back to fire camp.
I can agree to disagree with Bob Powers, RTS and our old banned contrarian and loyal opposition friend xx-full-sail-xx on certain specifics of this conversation…but you…you are nobody.
I wore a respirator while mopping up due to extensive problems I had with smoke inhalation in my later years as a hotshot. Although I could not wear it most of the time because I would have hyperventilated (like breathing into a paper bag while running or working out) BUT it really did come in most handy for using to breath in porta potties after all of the coffee sippin’, bullshittin’, salamander huggin’ camp slugs got done with them. Just one of my many fond memories of being a ground pounder and a grunt.
Dam Gary I missed you. Glad you stopped by. Improved my attitude.
Thanks Bob, I really brought back some memories of those porta potties you would rather forget…right?
OK maybe it hasn’t toned down for some. Sorry I brought it to the surface. Nice rant sorry you’re bitter. It won’t help or change anything.
Bitter? 19 Granite Mountain Hotshots are DEAD. In 2013. The next highest death toll was 12 hotshots on the Loop Fire. You know, basically back, if not in the stone ages of wildland firefighters, it sure was BC, old testament time. OK, I am bitter (not. What are you
whoops, operator error.
see reply at the top of the thread.
Question for Bob Powers:
According to Bravo 33, Eric Marsh (DivsA) specifically contacted Bravo 33 some time after 4 p.m. to tell Bravo 33 that “they were going down their escape route to the safety zone.” WHY would Eric Marsh have made that call to Bravo 33? What would be the likely PURPOSE of Eric making that call to Bravo 33?
(I am asking sincerely.)
He told Frisby where they were going as well. Where is this statement and what time? Was the statement with any other discussion? It is really not specific enough for B33 to know exactly what Marsh was talking about. I don’t see any assumption that B33 was or had eyes on GM or Marsh. Just a general discussion. If you want a Air Craft to know where you are you get them over you and you get specific. Do you see me do you see the crew we are going down the mountain here to the Ranch do you see the Ranch. If the fire changes in this direction let us know immediately. None of those things were discussed hence B33 had no idea of what GM was doing. You need a whole lot more info from B33 to tie the dots together it is just way to lose for me.
Reply to Bob Powers post on March 10, 2014 at 11:41 am
>> Mr. Powers asked..
>> Where is this statement and what time?
I believe this “Marsh called Bravo 33 and told him they
were going down their escape route to their saftey
zone” statement that Elizabeth ( and these mysterious
WFF people she is talking with ) are basing their
“Marsh set a lookout” belief on is the one on page 15
of the SAIT’s Yarnell Investigation Notes (YIN) document.
There is no specific TIME given for this statement but
we do know it had to have happened after Rory
Collins abruptly left the fire circa 4:00 PM because
that’s when Bravo 33 actually first became ‘Air Attack’.
NOTE: There were, apparently, THREE individuals
onboard Bravo 33 that afternoon, and not just French
and Burfiend. A Trainee named Clint Clauson was
also (apparently) onboard that afternoon.
_______________________________________________
BRAVO 33 INTERVIEW July 9, 2013 – 1700
Interviewees:
John Burfiend-ATS Specialist
Clint Clauson – ATS Trainee
Thomas French – AT Specialist
Interviewers: Mike Dudley, Brad Mayhew, Tim Foley,
Jay Kurth, Jimmy Rocha
_______________________________________________
Got a call from Division A stating they were going down their escape route to the safety zone. Didn’t know Division A was the superintendent of the Granite Mountain hot shots. Asked him “is everything OK?” He replied “everything is ok, just heading to the safety zone”. We came around, made a practice run through the bowl, west to east. I was talking to Tom about the rising terrain on exit. Division A clad and said “that is what we are looking for, that is exactly right”. Within 5 minutes of that, they went in shelter.
_______________________________________________
>> Mr. Powers also asked…
>> Was the statement with any other discussion?
No. See above. According to Bravo 33, this ‘call from
Marsh’ just ‘came out of nowhere’. Elizabeth said she
also has evidence of ‘other calls from Marsh’ but unless
she’s just talking about the known “That’s where we
want retardant” call at 1637 there’s no telling what
‘additional calls’ she might be referring to.
>> Mr. Powers also said…
>> It is really not specific enough for B33 to know
>> exactly what Marsh was talking about
Not even close. If Marsh even remotely thought that was
some sort of adequate “set Bravo 33 as lookout” moment
then I would say that the only thing that proves is that
Marsh was *already* suffering from heatstroke.
What if marsh was answering someone else but hadn’t changed the channel.
At 1637 or just before he was already way to far committed where they were then. and B33 did not know what he was talking about from his statement.
I do not believe we will ever be able to understand exactly what risk Marsh saw and appreciated when it came to the fateful move. I do not believe that McDonough, even if he heard everything, could really offer insight on that.
Elizabeth asked why it would be worse if Marsh took precautions such as having AA as “eyes” for him. Normally taking precautions is a good thing. In this case, the precautions would have been inadequate, either because AA did not get the message or because of all the reasons listed before as to why people in the air cannot do that job well (visibility, other tasks etc). Certainly the precautions taken did not work, if that is what Marsh’s intent was. The reason it might be worse is it might be a clue to his state of mind. If Marsh thought the move was safe and was wrong, then it is a horrible, if well-intentioned, mistake. The more he might be found to taking precautions MIGHT indicate he knew the move was very risky (no LCES etc), and was trying to lessen the risk. And that MIGHT indicate that he knowingly put 18 other lives at risk. And that would be worse. For the record, I do not believe that.
Reply to mike post on March 9, 2014 at 9:25 pm
>> mike said…
>>
>> I do not believe we will ever be able to understand exactly
>> what risk Marsh saw and appreciated when it came to the
>> fateful move. I do not believe that McDonough, even if he
>> heard everything, could really offer insight on that.
I would LOVE to hear Brendan’s insights on any of that…
…but FIRST… I would like to just hear what he heard.
All of it.
>> mike also said…
>>
>> Certainly the precautions taken did not work,
>> if that is what Marsh’s intent was.
MOST certainly.
Until I see some very specific discussions by Marsh and B33 in a report stated by B33 with time frames every thing I am seeing are assumed discussions. No place has there been any specific discussion between Marsh and B33 about him keeping even an eye on GM. Until I see that there is no proof of being a look out much less even having eyes on the Crew for that purpose. As stated earlier B33 had a view of the fire no one else had if he even slightly knew where the crew was in the canyon he would have been hollering at them to get out of there and diverted every air tanker he had to drop on them. B33 never had a clue on where they were or where they were going.
Fire Fighting Orders—-
#7 Maintain prompt communications with your forces, YOUR SUPERVISOR, and adjoining forces.
#8 Give CLEAR instructions and INSURE they are understood.
Two very critical elements missing by both Granit Mountain and Fire Overhead.
#4 IDENTIFY escape routes and safety zones and MAKE THEM KNOWN.
GM was in the safety ZONE the black. every body asked them if they were in the black Marsh said working our way thru the black to our safety zone. BR said they thought based on what Marsh said they working there way across the ATV route they had taken and down that route to the South in the black.
With out following any of the rules and regulations they took off thru the brush and told no one specifically where they were or where they were headed.
I am truly sorry but they took the quickest exit off the fire with out a plan thinking they had time. There was no hero plan only to get to there rigs and off the fire. They flipped a coin took a chance without a plan and it failed. The simple facts are sometimes hardest to accept. I am sure there are as we have found some other factors involved.
But the out come will never change, They forgot to use the basics and many good fireman have paid the price for doing just that.
According to multiple sources – including Bravo 33 – DivsA (Eric Marsh) contacted Bravo 33 (e.g. Air Attack) directly at some time after 4 p.m. to tell Bravo 33 that GM was moving down their escape route to their safety zone. According to Bravo 33, there was further communication even after that from Eric Marsh.
This refutes the notion that Marsh was trying to “hide” or avoid communicating where GM was. Marsh was communicating directly and voluntarily with Bravo 33.
This is one of the many reasons why I do not agree with either WTKTT’s claimed transcript for the 161620 video or Maclean’s transcript and that of his female friend. And this is one of the many reasons why I am wondering if Marsh was thinking Bravo 33 would give him the heads-up as needed ala a lookout. Otherwise, *WHY* would Marsh take it upon himself to call Bravo 33 and tell them specifically where GM was going? What other purpose would he have for calling Bravo 33 (according to Bravo 33) and TELLING them where GM was HEADED?
Elizabeth, from what you are seeing. Did Marsh call B33 and tell B33 they were going DOWN their escape route and TO their safety zone before or after Rory Collins left. Also, Rory Collins reports in the YIN that he departed the fire at 1617 (presumably after the brief handoff with B33)
According to my records, Rory Collins left at 3:59. His hand-off, by the way, was largely consistent with the type of hand-off that B-33 then gave when they left the fire under two hours later (and then handed-off to B-3 (e.g. Warbis and Lenmark)).
Elizabeth. According to Roy Hall YIN…”when Paul Musser called and said they are descending a predetermined escape route . I assumed it had been scouted.
It seems this is additional confirmation that Marsh wasn’t taking independent action, and that in fact, he had communicated his/ their intentions to the appropriate overhead.
Calvin, thanks for the tip. Good catch! I’ll go back and see what I have from Roy Hall.
I just looked, and I’ve found nothing else from Hall, FYI, that adds to what you caught and shared. Thanks, again, Calvin.
Reply to calvin post on March 9, 2014 at 7:26 pm
>> calvin said…
>>
>> According to Roy Hall YIN…”when Paul Musser called
>> and said they are descending a predetermined escape
>> route . I assumed it had been scouted.
>>
>> It seems this is additional confirmation that Marsh
>> wasn’t taking independent action, and that in fact, he
>> had communicated his / their intentions to the
>> appropriate overhead.
Good catch, calvin. This matches the entry in Musser’s
own SAIT interview where he says he heard that ( after
4:00 PM ). Both of these YIN note entries have always
made mincemeat of the SAIR’s claim that management
had no idea they were ‘moving’…
…but I think you just made the same mistake that
Elizabeth made up above.
Just because Marsh said something to someone that
day does NOT mean he ‘successfully communicated’.
In their YIN interviews… both OPS1 Abel and OPS2
Musser admitted that regardless of Marsh saying
something like that… they still had NO FRICKIN’ IDEA
what he really meant.
So now we have proof positive that the top level Incident
Commander ( Roy Hall ) and BOTH Field OPS 1 Todd
Abel AND Planning OPS 2 Paul Musser were ALL fully
‘informed’ that Granite Mountain was ‘moving’ via a
‘predetermined escape route’ that afternoon…
But NONE of these highly paid, top level fire commanders
had ANY FRICKIN’ IDEA what that meant and they didn’t
even feel it was their responsibility to educate themselves
and FIND OUT what that meant.
Same for whatever Marsh may have said to Bravo 33.
Bravo 33 had NO FRICKIN’ IDEA what some guy on the
ground meant about a ‘predetermined escape route’ or
what his idea of a ‘safety zone’ was ( or WHERE it was )
unless it had been CLEARLY explained. ( It wasn’t ).
The ‘C’ in LCES – Communicate clearly and effectively.
It didn’t happen… and when it doesn’t… people can DIE.
Yarnell Hill Fire Accident Investigation Notes
Interviews with Paul Musser OSC
and Todd Abel OSC – 7/6/13
OSC Musser or Abel did NOT know of the predetermined
route mentioned by Marsh to the ranch structures.
SIDENOTE…
The very fact that both OPS1 Abel and OPS2
Musser admitted AFTER the incident ( in their
SAIT interviews ) that they had NO IDEA what
Marsh meant by a ‘predetermined escape route’
to any sort of ‘ranch’ means that when the
SAIR says they were ALL ( Marsh, Abel and
Musser ) ‘shown’ all of that via ‘Google Maps on
an iPad’ at the 7:00 AM briefing… that isn’t just
more creative writing on the SAIT’s part…
…it is an absolute, bald-faced LIE.
Page 21 of the SAIR…
At the 0700 briefing on June 30, ICT4 and others
from the previous shift meet at the Yarnell Fire
Station with incoming personnel including…
ICT2, two Operations Section Chiefs…
OPS1 ( Todd Abel ) and OPS2 (Paul Musser),
SPGS1 ( Gary Cordes ), a fire behavior analyst (FBAN), YCSO deputies, and the Granite Mountain
IHC Superintendent ( Eric Marsh ).
They review the area using Google Maps on an
iPad, and they note Boulder Springs Ranch as
an excellent safety zone.
SAIR – Page 41…
The Granite Mountain IHC heard the Boulder
Springs Ranch was a “bomb proof safety zone”
that morning ( at the 7:00 AM briefing also
attended by OPS1 Abel and OPS2 Musser ).
Using Google Maps and an iPad, they had seen the
Ranch, as well as potential trails and roads leading
to it ( along with everyone else at that morning
briefing including OPS1 Abel and OPS2 Musser ).
P23 YIN Gary Cordis…
Q Were you surprised where they were?
A NO
I am not sure this question was referring to GM. Maybe?
If all of that “They looked at the ranch and
the roads leading to it on an iPad” crap in
the SAIR isn’t just a total lie…
…I’d still like to know WHOSE iPad it was,
who was running Google Maps, and exactly
what was SAID about ‘the roads leading
to the ranch’.
Did someone REALLY just draw their
finger across a box canyon and everyone
nodded their heads and agreed that
would then be referred to the rest of
the day as the ‘predetermined escape
route’?
I really, really doubt it ( even if there even
was an iPad at that meeting ).
Elizabeth,
There are a couple of HUGE things you are missing here. There was NO escape route. An escape route is marked, scouted, and cleared if necessary, path to safety. NONE of these things were done, thus NO escape route.
By saying they WERE in an escape route, it provided the illusion to others that they were safe, and had all their bases covered. NOT SO!
GM repeatedly told BR and others that they were in their escape route and heading to their safety zone, providing MANY others with a false sense of GM’s security and safety.
Marsh or GM NEVER told anyone their routing, OR their destination, which in hindsite, almost appears to be by design. If fact, when BR specifically asked, the reply was vague and non-responsive.
You say Marsh repeated spoke with B33, but in reality, he never really told them anything of value. After all of those supposed conversations, they still, NEVER KNEW where GM was, what their routing was, or what their destination was. This information (ALONG WITH WHAT THE FIRE WAS DOING), was the ONLY information of value, and it NEVER got exchanged.
You also say Marsh “specifically” told B33 where GM was going, but he told them nothing of the kind!! B33 NEVER had any idea of where the escape route was, or went, and no idea WHERE the safety zone was, even AFTER all those conversations where Marsh supposedly told them ‘specifically where they were going’.
ALSO: At the only point in time that we know B33 actually saw GM, when “they were over there on the corner of the fire”, the conversation expresses B33’s extreme concern for their location and safety, and then B33 being subsequently put off, by what had at that point, had become a somewhat standard ‘we are heading down our escape route to our safety zone’ response.
WTKTT = TTWARE? Same person?
If not, you would know that there has been NO confirmation of any sort of “corner” discussion.
Thousands of folks are viewing this website. If thousands of folks were either disagreeing with me or agreeing with you, we would know it.
Elizabeth, I’ll give you that point. Perhaps there are thousands of people on this website that are better able than me to keep track of all these thousands of comments, and continuously remember what someone might have heard, what someone actually heard, versus what someone is totally speculating about. I do my best to keep up.
Reply to Elizabeth post
on March 9, 2014 at 8:28 pm
>> Elizabeth said…
>>
>> there has been NO confirmation of
>> any sort of “corner” discussion.
Absolutely correct… but there HAS been
definite confirmation that something
exactly LIKE what appears to be the
“I see them (GM) on the corner of the fire”
background conversation of that 4:16 PM
Air Study video DID take place right around
that same time ( 4:16 PM ).
Yarnell Hill Fire Accident Investigation Notes
Interviews with Paul Musser OSC
and Todd Abel OSC – 7/6/13
– Bravo 33 is (now) working air tankers and
SEATS including a VLAT.
NOTE: This puts the sequential timing of
this SAIT interview at some point AFTER
4:00 PM ( Perhaps 4:16 PM? Same time
as Air Study video? ) The very next SAIT
interview entry AFTER this one says…
– Abel requests Bravo 33 (ASM2) to check
on Granite Mountain crew. Bravo 33 (ASM2)
CONFIRMS that Granite Mountain crew is in
the black.
No mention of the word ‘corner’… but that
is, in fact, the same event in what is
probably the same timeframe ( 4:16 PM )
as the conversation that can be heard
in the background of the 4:16 PM Air
Study video.
“Bravo 33 (ASM2) CONFIRMS that Granite Mountain crew is in the black”, makes one think that means B33 saw them there. I’d be curious as to if that was actually the case, or they just contacted GM via radio and GM ‘confirmed’ it via radio, without actual visual contact.
My feeling there was if that is
all that OPS1 Todd Abel
wanted… he could have done
that himself.
To even ask a ( very busy )
ASM2 to ‘check on them’
seems to automatically
imply Abel wanted ‘a visual’.
IAOI ( If And Only If ) I am
right about the background
conversation at the very
start of that Air Study video…
…then that is EXACTLY
what happened at 4:16 PM.
The only problem there is
that if those ‘moment match’,
then ASM2 was actually
(technically) wrong about
his confirmation. At 4:16,
Steed and Crew would have
been almost at the point
where they were going to
drop into the canyon.
Maybe at 140 miles per hour
with a lot of smoke… they
still just looked close
enough to all that black
for ASM2 to ‘confirm’ they
were, in fact, in ( or near )
‘the black’.
ASM2 (apparently) used
the phrase “They’re on
the corner of the fire”.
IAOI ( If And Only If ) that is
what he really said… I
would say ‘corner’ means
‘anchor point’. From way
up in the air… even their
hike south away from that
point would still look pretty
close to all that black.
The escape route and safety zone parlance is not mine, TTWRE. I am just repeating what the first-hand documentation suggests. I am not attempting to maintain that anything was or was not a valid safety zone or escape route.
Elizabeth,
My comment was not alluding to the fact that you were maintaining that anything was, or was not, “a valid safety zone or escape route”. More specifically, it was directed at a certain premise that you appeared to be supporting.
Elizabeth stated:
**This refutes the notion that Marsh was trying to “hide” or avoid communicating where GM was. Marsh was communicating directly and voluntarily with Bravo 33.**
I countered that with these statements:
**By saying they WERE in an escape route, it provided the illusion to others that they were safe, and had all their bases covered. NOT SO!
GM repeatedly told BR and others that they were in their escape route and heading to their safety zone, providing MANY others with a false sense of GM’s security and safety
Marsh or GM NEVER told anyone their routing, OR their destination, which in hindsite, almost appears to be by design. If fact, when BR specifically asked, the reply was vague and non-responsive.**
Elizabeth also said this:
**Otherwise, *WHY* would Marsh take it upon himself to call Bravo 33 and tell them specifically where GM was going?**
To which I stated:
**You also say Marsh “specifically” told B33 where GM was going, but he told them nothing of the kind!! B33 NEVER had any idea of where the escape route was, or went, and no idea WHERE the safety zone was, even AFTER all those conversations where Marsh supposedly told them ‘specifically where they were going’.**
I’m not sure how these comments or any of the additional commentary added-up to my suggesting you were attempting to validate the legitimacy of an escape route or safety zone.
p37 YIN. Rance Marquez…..1630 Dan could hear Eric asking Granite Mountain if they could see the helo.
1.Who is Dan?
2. Eric Marsh was asking GM if they could see the helo??
Reply to calvin post on March 9, 2014 at 4:44 am
>> calvin said…
>> p37 YIN. Rance Marquez…..1630 Dan could hear Eric asking
>> Granite Mountain if they could see the helo.
>> 1.Who is Dan?
My guess would be Daniel Knight, DPS officer… and the ‘Eric’
being referred to would be fellow DPS officer Eric Tarr who
was the DPS medic flying in DPS chopper Ranger 58 at that time.
Daniel Knight would have definitely had the DPS Ranger 58
frequency and would have been listening to the Ranger 58
traffic at that time… which had to ACTUALLY be AFTER
the deployment and Ranger 58 was already ‘searching for
them’ and calling down to them in case they could hear
the helicopter.
>> calvin also wrote.
>> 2. Eric Marsh was asking GM if they could see the helo??
Don’t think so. ‘Eric’ must be DPS medic Eric Tarr ( in Ranger 58 )
I think the 1630 time entry there is just plain wrong ( as well
as the time on some of those other entries in that section ).
You have to look at that whole section in context.
Not only is that 1630 entry totally ‘out of sequence’, there is
another 1630-1645 entry even after that which ALSO appears
to be wrong ( timewise ).
Here is that entire section from the Marquez interview.
NOTE that even in the ‘out of place’ 1630 entry he starts
that entry by saying “the fire front had passed and we were
mopping up” so it really couldn’t have been 1630. Had to be
later, AFTER deployment.
From page 37 of the Yarnell Investigation Notes ( YIN )…
Interview with Rance Marquez
1600 – The fire turned into a head fire and was coming direct at us. A little bit after that it got a hard -push. People were spraying water on their houses. After about 15-20 minutes, it got real dark under the column.
1630 – By the time fire front had passed and we were mopping up. I could see the VLAT orbiting s from my position. I didn’t hear anyone say they were going to deploy. Dan could hear Eric asking Granite Mountain if they could see the helo.
1615 – Came on ATV’s Casey, Jayson Clausen and Bea were at the ICP and were worried that the pickups would burn.
1630-1645 – I then asked GM if they could hear the helo. There was no response. I did hear the mike keyed and a loud sound. I heard air attack say “whoever is screaming in the mike, you need to stop”. The column was still laying over. I walked out to the pickup to get some air.
1700-1730 – After that, things got pretty bad. Cougin created a medical group. I became part of it. We were order to Yarnell and rally at the restaurant. Cougin was working with Todd. I didn’t hear a lot of chatter. Triage groups were ordered. A recovery group was organized. I didn’t know where they were.
Typos above. I had ‘Knight’ stuck in my head.
DPS Officer’s name is actually ‘Daniel Kight’.
It seems from Dan Philbin’s “unit log” that he was with Rance Marquez at the time around deployment.
It is possible Rance Marquez is referring to Dan Philbin. Later that evening Dan Philbin also assisted in untangling the dozer from powerline.
That sounds like a better candidate for the ‘Dan’
mentioned by Marquez… but I still think the 1630
timestamp on that Marquez not is just wrong and
the ‘Eric’ that is mentioned is DPS medic
‘Eric Tarr’ and they were hearing Ranger 58 trying
to ‘call down’ to Granite Mountain as they were
searching for them.
Not sure this is relevant to this particular question…
but don’t forget that TWO Helicopters ARE, in fact,
clearly ( and loudly ) heard passing over the
Shrine area DURING the Helmet-Cam video
and while we are hearing the final transmissions
of Granite Mountain.
Typo above ( not having a good keyboard day)
Meant to say…
“I still think the 1630 timestamp on that
Marquez NOTE is just wrong”
Well, according to Marquez, After Dan hears Eric asking GM if they can see helo. At 1630-1645 Marquez (himself) asks if GM can hear the helo. He (Marquez) says there was no response, only a keyed mic and a loud sound. According to Marquez, this happened before AA tells tells GM to stop yelling .
Yea… those Marquez notes are
quite cryptic ( and messy ). Not
sure what to make of any of that.
He was up at the ICP, so what would
he know about helicopters in the
air 4 miles south?… unless he was
just repeating what B33 was also
asking GM at that time ( basically
DURING the deployment/burnover )
only HE was calling them on some
OTHER frequency ( because we
don’t even HEAR him doing what
he says he did in the Helmet-Cam
video which was capturing both Air
and TAC frequencies at the same
time ).
What other frequency, then?
How would Marquez have had GM’s
private frequency to talk to them on
at THAT time when his whole problem
all day was that he couldn’t talk
directly to Marsh or Steed at all and
had to borrow other radios to do it?
He’s also wrong in remembering
the ‘keyed mike’ and ‘static’ noises,
which came AFTER B33 told
Caldwell to stop yelling on the radio
( not BEFORE ).
No reason to believe that Marquez
didn’t do some of the things he says
he did around that time… but his
own timestamps in his own
SAIT interview notes seem to be
just really wonky.
Just one more classic case of the
SAIT investigators needing to
re-interview someone to clear
things up… but FAILED to do so.
What other frequency?
BR YIN p4…Tie in with the crew at the ranch house and hit main rd @ 1640 they make a turn, and hear yelling on Tac 1, a little further they hear yelling on Tac 5 AA and GM7 yelling multiple times. AA says unit yelling at AA on A/G stop yelling and stand by.
So it seems GM was transmitting on tac1 and tac5 according to these notes.
It seems like tac 5 is A/G. right?
p34 & 35 YIN…. Daniel Kight DPS officer (last few sentences) “Eric being into the helms ranch….. Cortez pat was talking to individual. Crew was wking towards us Eric heard on crew net and left.
Thoughts??
I believe that is referencing Eric Tarr DPS Officer/Medic
Reply to calvin post on March 9, 2014 at 4:34 am
>> calvin said…
>> p34 & 35 YIN…. Daniel Kight DPS officer (last few sentences)
>> “Eric being into the helms ranch….. Cortez pat was talking to
>> individual. Crew was wking towards us Eric heard on crew
>> net and left.
>>
>> Thoughts??
You left out the 4 words preceding that quote from Knight’s
interview where he was ‘timestamping’ things (supposedly)
sequentially.
That sentence actually starts with…
“1900 notified of fatalities”.
1900 is 7:00 PM and the words that then follow would match
what was happening around the deployment site. DPS medic
Eric Tarr did, in fact, hike over to the Helms ranch himself
at that point and met up with ( I believe ) both Cordes and
Abel there. He ( Eric Tarr ) also talked on the radio some
from there ( the reference to crew net? ) and then LEFT the
ranch to go back to deployment site.
That would be my guess about those (confusing)
Daniel Knight YIN notes, anyway.
Full ‘cut’ from that page 35 of YIN…
1900 notified of fatalities. “Eric being into the helm ranch…Cortez pat was talking to individual. Crew was wking towards us Eric heard on crew net and left.
Typos above. I had ‘Knight’ stuck in my head.
DPS Officer’s name is actually ‘Daniel Kight’.
**
** MORE EVIDENCE OF AN ADDITIONAL GM CHASE TRUCK
In Blue Ridge Superintendent Brian Frisby’s (redacted) unit log notes there is
even MORE evidence that there were, in fact, FOUR Granite Mountain vehicles
that had to be ‘moved’ that day.
Brian Frisby SPECIFICALLY says ( in his notes ) that there was, in fact,
BOTH a “GM Superintendent Truck” AND a “GM Chase Truck”.
So here is what that means…
1 GM Superintendent truck ( driven out by Brendan McDonough )
1 GM Chase truck ( driven out by BR Captain Trueheart Brown )
2 GM Crew Carrires ( driven out by unknown BR crew members )
Brian Frisby’s complete notes regarding Brendan’s evacuation and the ‘dust off’
of the vehicles is below but here is the critical section where Brian describes the
moment ( right about 1545 ) when he was evacuating Brendan in the UTV Ranger
and the two of them ‘arrived’ at the GM Superintendent truck…
Brian Frisby: “As we got to the Supt truck AND Chase truck ( Brendan )
got out and started BOTH vehicles while we waited for the other drivers.”
He goes on to say that he then observed the fire behavior at that location and
realized there was no time to lose… so Frisby left Brendan there with BOTH the
GM Supt truck AND the GM Chase truck and Brian took off east in the ranger
to ‘go and get’ the drivers instead of just waiting for them to show up. Frisby
now knew there wasn’t time for that.
So here is Frisby describing what he did next…
Brian Frisby: “I noticed that the fire was approaching quickly so I drove the ranger
out to meet the drivers and quickly grabbed (Brown) and headed for the trucks.
(Brown) got in the truck and him and (Brendan) headed out along with the
other trucks.”
That now matches EXACTLY BR Captain Trueheart Brown’s
redacted unit log notes where he describes the same moment…
Trueheart Brown: “I jump in THEIR chase and the ( GM lookout follows ? )
me and we pick up our guys in their buggies who fall into the convoy.
I have the front and (xxxx)s bring up the rear.”
So it looks like there is still a very real possibility that Captain Brown might have
heard the entire Marsh/Steed ‘disussing their options’ conversations that the
SAIR has always said Brendan heard… because Captain Brown might have
*also* been travelling in a vehicle with a radio tuned to GM’s private frequency
during the timeframe in question.
It also leaves open the possibility that IAOI ( If And Only If ) there is actually
a ‘third voice’ heard in the second MacKenzie video clip… that it *might*
have been Captain Trueheart Brown since it now appears he had full
access to a GM Crew Radio in the GM Chase truck.
The huge QUESTION about all this ( that Mr. Powers has pointed out )
still remains the fact that if Captain Brown himself also heard this
Marsh/Steed ‘discussing their options’ conversation over the GM
private intra-crew frequency, then…
1) Why is there no mention of him hearing it in any of his own interview notes or
unit log notes? Could it be that he DOES mention it… but that is one the
HEAVILY redacted sections?
2) If Captain Brown really did hear that private ‘discussing their options’
conversation… then why all the confusion on his part later when he became
part of the actual ground rescue mission and ( like the others ) didn’t seem
to have a clue where to actually even start looking for Granite Mountain.
More to come on this… but for now… here is the complete section from Brian
Frisby’s handwritten unit log notes that covers the 1530 timeframe on through
him delivering Brendan back to the GM vehicles and then expediting Brown out
to Brendan’s location so they could both drive vehicles out of there…
* Page 3 of Brian Frisby’s redacted unit log notes…
15:30 (xxxx) had four of our guys bring our trucks around
and the rest geared up and headed to the dozer
line preping towards Shrine. I tried to call (xxxx) a few
times on tac1 (DIVA) without any luck so I call (xxxxxx)
(xxxxxx) and was able to talk to ( Jesse Steed ) I told him
that we were going to start preping the dozer line to
be able to burn if our hand was forced We would
* Page 4 of Brian Frisby’s redacted unit log notes…
at least be able to protect some of the structures
he agreed that our time was best spent down towards
the structures and that it was slow going and they
would probably be another hour before they tied into
the two track to the north. ( Eric Marsh ) called me
right after that to let me know he had copied direct
and agreed with the plan he also said he would like
to meet up when I get the chance. I told him
I would head his way with the ranger. ( Brown ) grabbed
his gear to go and look at a rocky area to see
if could (hang?) up fire if we had to burn. I
headed up toward Granite Mountain. As I headed west
towards them I noticed fire activitie picking up
close to were (xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx) and as I
got closer I looked back to the east and
notice the whole flank had gone from a backing fire to
a running fire with 50 foot flame lengths. I was just
about to call (xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx)
to the two track I pulled up (xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx)
(xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx)
(xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx)
(xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx)
(xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx)
(xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx) I that we needed to
move there vehicles due to the fire behavior. I didn’t have
any luck on tac 1 so ( Brendan ) let me use his radio
to talk on there Crew net. I talked to ( Steed? )
and he agreed that with the increased fire behavior they should
move there trucks and they all called out were the keys
were for each truck. I also asked (xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx)
(xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx) I then
called ( Brown ) to let him know that I needed (some?)
drivers to help move the Granite Mountains vehicles
* Page 5 of Brian Frisby’s redacted unit log notes…
due to the increased fire behavior. He said they were
heading around to help. As we got to the Supt truck and
Chase truck ( Brendan ) got out and started both vehicles
while we waited for the other drivers. I noticed that the fire was
approaching quickly so I drove the ranger out to meet
the drivers and quickly grabbed (Brown) and
headed for the trucks. (Brown) got in the truck and him
and (Brendan) headed out along with the other trucks.
Followup… this one sentence from Brian Frisby’s notes…
“I then called ( Brown ) to let him know that I needed (some?)
drivers to help move the Granite Mountains vehicles.”
…also matches EXACTLY Captain Brown’s log notes where
he says that radio request from Frisby is the exact moment
he did his ‘about face’ during his hike on the Cutover trail.
That moment WAS recorded by Brown’s GPS unit and is exactly…
1541.30 ( 3:41 PM + 30 seconds ).
So that is, without a doubt, the moment when Frisby had
just picked up Brendan, and Frisby was making these
various radio calls before dashing back east to drop
Brendan off at the GM Supt Truck and GM Chase Truck.
This puts an EARLIER timeframe on when Brendan ACTUALLY
left his lookout post than any official report has done so far.
He would have needed at least 4 minutes to hike down from
where he was to the spot where Frisby would find him and
with all the other things that were known have happened in
that timeframe before he actually began his hike ( conversations
with Steed about it, etc. ) it means Brendan might have left his
lookout position as early as 1533 ( 3:33 PM ) that afternoon.
Mcdonough himself has repeatedly said he left his lookout at 1445.
Which truck was Cory Ball riding in (when he took photo(s))? GM Supt truck or GM chase truck? Neither?
Thoughts??
>> calvin on March 8, 2014 at 5:22 pm said:
>>
>> Great questions. Which came first?
>> 1. Musser’s request or
>> 2. Abel’s Air support ASAP
>>
>> Elizabeth on March 8, 2014 at 5:50 pm said:
>>
>> DING, DING, DING. Good job, Calvin.
>>
>> Mike says we don’t have any evidence of what made the guys
>> change their minds, but, actually, we do.
Do we?
>> Elizabeth also wrote…
>> The reason why they didn’t go initially is not because they were
>> “hunkered” – that is a figment. The reason why they did not go is
>> because they were still building line.
Nope. The ‘tools up’ moment for these men came long before the Caldwell video,
the “Hunker and be safe” order from Abel AND the Musser ‘can you spare
resources?’ request.
See below.
>> Elizabeth also wrote…
>> Calvin is asking the right questions to get us there.
>> To wit, remember the timeline:
>>
>> At roughly 3:42 p.m., when Musser first called to ask DivsA to
>> “bump resources” over to Cordes (e.g. in Yarnell or Glen Ilah),
Nope. ADOSH says this initial “can you spare resources?” request from Musser
came about 9-10 minutes later than that… long AFTER the ‘tools up’ moment
for these men and also AFTER the Marsh/Abel conversation captured circa 3:50
in the Caldwell video.
>> Elizabeth also said…
>> GM was still *actively* working on constructing line out where they were
Not at 3:50. The ‘tools up’ moment for them came BEFORE the Caldwell video
itself… and BEFORE the Musser request.
>> Elizabeth also wrote…
>> At 3:50-ish, Steed tells Blue Ridge that they have roughly another hour or
>> so to go before they will be able to tie into the line.
Nope. You are about 20 minutes off there.
That moment when Steed told Frisby that it was ‘slow going’ and that he ( Steed )
would probably need another hour to finish took place right around 1530 ( 3:30
PM )… BEFORE Marsh even requested that Frisby come up to the anchor point
for the second face-to-face.
This moment is fully timestamped and documented in Frisby’s own unit log.
From Page 3 of Brian Frisby’s handwritten unit log notes…
Page 3
15:30 (xxxx) had four of our guys bring our truck around around and the rest
geared up (strikeout) and headed to the dozer line preping towards Shrine.
I tried to call ( Eric Marsh ) a few times on tac1 (DIVA) without any luck so I
call (xxxxxx) (xxxxxx) and was able to talk to ( Jesse Steed ) I told him that we
were going to start preping the dozer line to be able to burn if our hand was
forced. We would at least be able to protect some of the structures he agreed
that our time was best spent down towards the structures and that it was slow
going and they would probably be another hour before they tied into the two track
to the north. ( Eric Marsh ) called me right after that to let me know he had copied
direct and agreed with the plan he also said he would like to meet up when I get
the chance. I told him I would head his way with the ranger.
>> Elizabeth also wrote…
>> In roughly that time frame, Marsh speaks with Abel.
If you mean 1550 ( 3:50 PM )… then yes… the Marsh/Abel “Workin’ my way
off the top” followed by Abel’s “Keep ME informed, Hunker and be safe, We’ll
get Air Support down there ASAP” conversation DID take place right around
1550 ( 3:50 PM… in the Caldwell video )… but see above. That conversation
was about 20 minutes AFTER Steed told Frisby they needed another hour to
complete the ‘tie-in’ and it came some minutes AFTER the ‘tools up’ moment
up there for Steed and the crew.
>> Elizabeth also wrote..
>> But, shortly thereafter and as confirmed in the 4:02 Mackenzie
>> video, we see and hear that the plan of tying into the line unexpectedly
>> has become a non-starter, because the WIND shifted, and it became
>> clear that they were likely to lose the line.
Frisby knew that the line burnout was NOT going to be an option as soon as he
came across Brendan evacuating his lookout position, saw the extreme fire
behavior, cancelled the face-to-face with Marsh, and immediately changed his
entire focus to moving ALL of the vehicles that were now in harms way and
getting his own ( and other ) crews evacuated from the Sesame and
Shrine areas.
That moment has now been GPS timestamped and took place at 1541.30.
( The moment when BR Captain Brown did his about-face on his Cutover trail
hike because Frisby just called him and told him he was now evacuating
Brendan and to get drivers to move all the vehicles ASAP ).
That’s a full 8 minutes and 30 seconds before the Caldwell video and the
captured conversation between Marsh and Abel and at least 9 minutes before
OPS2 Musser made his infamous ‘can you spare resources’ request to
Marsh/Steed.
>> Elizabeth also wrote…
>> (And THAT, by the way, is why we saw in one of the photos just before
>> 4 p.m. that Ashcraft was moving with his saw on his shoulder – he was
>> giving up the effort to build line (on the instruction of Marsh) because the
>> plan of building the line to tie into line from the morning was no longer an
>> option. He wasn’t going to the ranch – he was going to join the rest of the
>> guys sitting where we see them in the 4:02 p.m. MacKenzie video.)
MOST of that is true… except the part where you claim that the circa 3:50 PM
MacKenzie photos are somehow showing the exact ‘tools up’ moment for
Steed and the crew. That had already happened prior to them even ‘relaxing’
at that location. The chainsaw sheaths were already in place before they
even gathered at that location and started taking photos so the actual ‘tools
up’ moment had taken place sometime before any of those photos were taken.
Actually I should have said, see: the Loop Fire, the Battlement Creek, the South Canyon Fire as far as hotshot deaths go, AND see the YANELL HILL FIRE.
FYI,
1. As I already stated, I don’t believe there is any way GM was relying on air-attack as their lookout… and it is absurd when people try to assert that GM was hoping for a retardant drop to provide them “cover” while they made their escape to the ranch. That may happen in a war movie with a Spectre Gunship overhead, but that’s about it.
2. I hate to think of anyone wasting their time trying to make a “better shelter.” People’s efforts would be better served to getting rid of shelters all together and keeping wildland out of harm’s way during the burn period. In the meantime, I think wildland firefighters should stop working in front of and above uncontrolled wildfires. See; the Loop Fire, the Battlement Creek Fire and the South Canyon Fire.
Actually, I guess I should have said that is the kind of thing that might very well be happening tonight (or today) in Afghanistan somewhere, but as Mike has pointed out, wildland commanders NEVER have to faced with ordering their subordinated to certain death. Everyone is SUPPOSED to come home after a wildfire.
Gary you are absolutely right. Current drought is forcing Wild Land Fire to reevaluate how we fight Fire, and change tactics.
Is there any evidence of Musser contacting BR for “spare resources” after GM (Marsh or Steed)reportedly “turned down” the request and advised Musser to ask BR?
I do not think I have seen this in any interview notes, unit logs or other.
Yes, Calvin. Just so you appreciate the context, let me say this:
Remember that the wind had been moving the fire NORTH for the entire day up until it abruptly shifted EAST. When the wind began to look like it was going to shift hard to the east, Todd Abel was still tied up on the NORTH end of the fire, dealing with the Model Creek sort of stuff (or wherever the north end was). MUSSER, therefore, was the guy available to be on the EAST side of the fire, and he got with Gary Cordes, who indicated that they needed to do their damndest to keep the fire out of Yarnell. Cordes indicated that he needed “resources” to be bumped to him in order to achieve this goal.
Musser then got in contact with Marsh, since Marsh, as DivsA, had allegedly been assigned control/leadership over two resources (Blue Ridge and Granite Mountain), to ask if Marsh could afford to “bump” some of “his” resources to Cordes (who was running structure protection in Yarnell and Glen Ilah). GM was still trying to tie into the dozer/retardant line from the morning, which is why they were not available to be “bumped” and which is why DivsA suggested that Musser contact Blue Ridge.
But CORDES apparently piped up and indicated that he already HAD Blue Ridge working for tasks under his direction (and thereby presumably making clear that he needed *other* resources).
I am paraphrasing, by the way, so forgive me for that.
Elizabeth… there’s something wonky with the TIMING
on the whole ‘contextual situation’ you just tried to describe.
According to ADOSH, Musser made his infamous intial
‘request for resources’ out to Marsh/Steed AFTER the
1545-1550 conversation between OPS1 Abel and
DIVSA Marsh. ( ADOSH page 18 says it happened ‘shortly
thereafter’ that conversation ).
So let’s say that call from Musser came not just
‘shortly thereafter’ that conversation but, indeed,
IMMEDIATELY after that Marsh/Abel conversation.
That would put it right around 1552, right after the
Caldwell video ended.
By the time the Caldwell video even ended, Brian
Frisby had ALREADY dropped Brendan off all the
way back at the east end of Sesame Trail, at the
GM Supervisor truck, and had ( according to the
SAIR ) ALREADY been contacted by Cordes about
whether ‘burning out that line’ was still an option.
Frisby said NO… and Marsh AGREED ( over the radio ).
So by the time Musser would have made that call out
to Marsh/Steed to ‘ask for resources’… Cordes ( and
Musser ) would have KNOWN that the line burnout
just wasn’t going to happen… and that both Blue Ridge
AND Granite Mountain were now ‘free resources’.
Indeed… by the time Frisby got back to the Sesame area
after dropping Brendan off… Frisby knew that it was all
going sideways and his entire focus was now getting
everyone ‘evacuated’ from the Sesame and Shrine
area(s). This is fully supported by all reports and all
versions of the Blue Ridge SAIT inteviews and their
own redacted notes.
According to the SAIR… at the same time Cordes was
told by Frisby that the ‘line burnout’ was no longer an
option is when Marsh also ‘announced’ that they were
going to ‘make their way out their escape route’. That
represents DIVSA Marsh already deciding that the work
they were doing was useless and it was ‘tools up’ out
there on that ridge.
Page 24 of the SAIR…
As BR Supt is en route to pick up drivers to move the Granite Mountain crew carriers, SPGS1 contacts him to ask if they still have the option to burn out from the dozer line. BR Supt tells him no. DIVS A, hearing the transmission, agrees and says he believes the fire is almost as far as the Granite Mountain vehicles. A moment later, DIVS A says, “I want to pass on that we’re going to make our way to our escape route.” BR Supt attempts to clarify, “You guys are in the black, correct?” DIVS A responds, “Yeah, we’re picking our way through the black.” DIVS A then mentions a road in the bottom and “going out toward the ranch.”
Elizabeth,
It is refreshing that you are finally getting specific and concrete about where you disagree with other forum members. I think this is going to help sort out the fuzzy areas much faster (even if our source materials still contradict each other sometimes).
Does it make sense that GM gave up on line construction before taking a break at the “lunch spot”? I’m still trying to figure out when they would have stopped for a lunch break. I’m not expecting 30 minutes, but more than five. As it is now, we have photos of the sawyers moving at 15:52 (Mackenzie and Caldwell cameras), and at 16:13 Marsh saying they are already on their way down (Yarnell_gamble video). I’m asking because the lunch stop seems a time when they may have reassessed tactics, and therefore worth looking into.
Reply to calvin post on March 8, 2014 at 5:28 pm
>> calvin asked…
>>
>> Is there any evidence of Musser contacting BR for “spare
>> resources” after GM (Marsh or Steed) reportedly “turned down”
>> the request and advised Musser to ask BR?
There is no ‘direct evidence’ that I know of ( no captured radio
calls, testimony, etc. ) that Musser ever called them BACK and
either repeated the same request or had a *new* one.
There is only ‘indirect evidence’ such as as the fact that we
KNOW they ended up trying to get to town, anyway… and that
someone ( Musser himself? ) was then urging them to ‘hurry up’
in that YARNELL-GAMBLE video circa 1620.
NOTE: There is also no evidence that Musser ever actually did
what Steed ( or Marsh ) TOLD him to do regarding ‘contact
Blue Ridge’… unless that evidence is what has been totally
redacted from the Blue Ridge notes.
According to ADOSH… the ORIGINAL ‘request for resources’
from Musser came AFTER OPS1 Todd Abel had told them
to 1) Keep him informed and 2) Hunker and be safe… and
there was no ‘subsequent request’ on Musser’s part.
According to ADOSH…
The Marsh / Abel conversation came FIRST ( circa
1545 – 1550 ), and then ( “shortly thereafter”, according
to ADOSH ) came OPS2 Paul Musser’s infamous
‘request for resources’.
NOTE: The ADOSH report never actually mentions
the “Keep me informed, hunker and be safe, and
we’ll get Air Support down there ASAP” quotes from
OPS1 Abel… but the 1545 conversation they describe
below does contain the “winds are getting squirrely”
statement from Marsh which other reports attribute
to that same “hunker and be safe” conversation.
It is still POSSIBLE there was yet another conversation
with Abel following Musser’s request… but as far as
*documented* evidence of which came first… ( the chicken
or the egg ) this really is the best ‘documented’ evidence
that we have ( so far, anyway )…
Page 18 of ADOSH report…
At approximately 1545 hours, Division A Supervisor Marsh
had a radio conversation with Operations Section Chief 1
Abel regarding the weather and the position of Granite
Mountain iHC. Marsh was located near the top of the
Weaver Mountains and had a clear view of the
thunderstorm, the fire, and the valley below. Marsh and
Abel had been watching the storm for some time and
discussed their concerns regarding the storms effects.
Marsh reportedly stated that Granite Mountain
was safe and in the black (i.e., previously burned wildland).
Marsh mentioned that the winds were “squirre|y” at his
position and that the retardant and dozer lines north of
Yarnell were being compromised.
Shortly thereafter, Operations Section Chief 2 Musser
radioed GMIHC and asked if they could spare resources
to assist in Yarnell. Either Marsh or GMIHC Captain Steed
responded that they were committed to the black and that
Musser should contact BRIHC working in the valley (during
his interview Musser stated that he wasn’t sure who he was
talking with).
I find it very hard to believe any hand crew supervisor would ever ask somebody flying around in airplane above a fire (at 140 plus miles per hour?) whose view is often obscured by smoke, terrain, or vegetation, etc., to be a “lookout” for their crew, especially when that someone who has another job they are currently doing and who has other priorities.
There is a great deal you can’t see, feel, hear, or experience from the air. I wouldn’t do that even if my assistant crew boss was in the plane and that was his only job. Of course I realize things have changed…but changed that much?
I would take whatever they have to say and factor it into the equation, but I would never rely on what they have to say to determine what is best for my crew. I am finally commenting on this because I have been completely baffled by the suggestion since it first appeared.
Yes. There is no way it makes sense to ask an over-stretched ASM to be a lookout. But then, this fire had already gone pyrocumulonimbus, which seems like it should have been plenty sign for ground crews to disengage to a safe area, lookout or no. By the time the fire is plume dominated, you can’t reliably predict its speed or direction, and the aerial resources could get grounded at any moment for their own safety. By 16:00, I don’t think any lookout, ground or aerial, could mitigate the danger of being in unburned fuel. And everybody should have been able to see that from where they were, no specialist required. The plume was huge, black, went tens of thousands of feet into the air, and contained fire whorls.
I’m not trying to MQB (Monday Quarterback) here, just attempting (as I think Gary Olson is) to shepherd the conversation back into the realm of meaningful tactics.
Unless, of course, that IS the point — that someone on the line DID consider the ASM an appropriate lookout? This, too, I doubt. But if it happened, then it SHOULD be discussed. I just haven’t seen any evidence of it. Maybe someone else has.
The only reason I can think of for Bravo 33 and the VLAT dropping retardant in DIV A was to slow the fire spread enough for GM to squeak through. Every moment they were on DIV A was a moment that they weren’t dropping over Glen Ilah or Yarnell, which should have been the priorities.
But there isn’t any real evidence that this is what B-33 were asked to do (Musser’s message to Marsh to hunker down while they try to get air support down there suggests it as a possibility, but most definitely does not prove anything). And with the fire as active as it was at 16:30, retardant wasn’t even going to slow down the front. So what were they doing there?
Hmm.
Or was that Abel who told them to hunker down while he worked on air support? I’m confused now.
There is absolutely no evidence that anyone ever ASKED
either the original ASM ( Rory Collins ) or the *new* AMS2
circa 4:00 PM ( French / Burfiend ) to act as ‘lookout’ for
ANYONE.
Elizabeth’s original comments that started this whole
current discussion regarding ‘airplane as lookout’ was
simply based on her saying that ( according to new
evidence she seems to have ) she would be inclined
to believe that GM simply *thought* that some airplane
was going to be their lookout and ( thereby ) it could
be said they were actually ‘following the rules’ that day.
Unless this *thought* on their part was ever verbalized
during the ‘discussing their options’ conversation and
we (someday) discover that Brendan McDonough
heard them say that was what they were *thinking*…
…then we will never know for sure.
Yes… it is ABSURD to even think that’s what they *might*
have been thinking… but this whole Yarnell Incident
became theater of the absurd on Saturday when a
puny 2 acre fire that was quiet all day with 14 guys
just doing ‘mop up’ work for 6 frickin’ hours suddenly became an out-of-control 113 acre fire.
>> Sitta also wrote…
>> The plume was huge, black, went tens of thousands
>> of feet into the air, and contained fire whorls.
Yes, it did… and for GM to not have LOOKED UP and
seen what was happening even BEFORE they stepped
off that two-track goes beyond theatre-of-the-absurd
into the realm of theatre-of-the-incredulous.
They did not NEED a frickin’ lookout to point out to them
what was happening when they still had time to make
sane decisions and survive what was about to happen.
All they had to do was LOOK UP.
Apparently… they never did.
WTKTT—pretty much what I said but you added the detail. If a crew just assumed (thought) Air attack was there lookout with out any real discussion with them or the Air Attack actually knowing (pinpoint) location of the crew then that is a nonstarter. GM had NO LCES They thru safety out the window period it is sad but true.
Copy that. Elizabeth is still saying she is
inclined to “believe* that is what they *thought*
and she keeps saying it is based on evidence
that *she* has. I wonder what that ‘evidence’
is ( that we don’t know about? ) that might
be reinforcing her thinking. Maybe she’ll
say more about it someday.
>> Elizabeth said…
>> …in lining up all of the evidence that I
>> currently have available to ME, this is
>> the view that I am developing
The only statement by B33 is about the crew looked uncomfortable where they were or something like that. But I saw nothing that B33 or Marsh discussed any movement or plan of the crew. B33 was really busy with air tankers trying to save the town. science there was no lead plane he really had no time to look for a crew Air attack usually flies around above or out of the way of the Lead Plane and Air Tankers and directs the operation, if he was only doing that then he may have been able to work with the crew, But he was not free to do that as the lead plane had left and he took over both jobs.
The ‘uncomfortable’ report
from B33 is only true IAOI
( If And Only If ) I am right
about the captured radio
traffic at the start of that
AIR STUDY video.
What B33 said was that he
could ‘see them’ there on
‘the corner’ ( of the fire ) and
they (quote) “kept saying
they were comfortable”…
…but B33 then said that
( to him ) that was
(quote) “NOT CREDIBLE”.
But let’s say that moment
never even happened.
In the Bravo 33 SAIT interview
they specifically say they
had NO IDEA that DIVSA
was actually the supervisor
for Granite Mountain.
I would say that is ALSO
defacto proof that there was
never any specific request
from Marsh or Steed for
B33 to ‘watch out for them’
or that B33 had actually
talked to either Steed or
Marsh at all about any such
thing.
There is also the fact that
at NO time does B33 ever
mention that were ‘acting
as lookout’ for anyone.
If they had been… it’s not
credible that they would have
‘left that out’ of their interview.
WTKTT:
Can you please help clarify for me the matter of the Musser request? I consider it critical for me to have a clear understanding as to what is “established fact.” (As it’s known to be at the present time, of course.) I cannot emphasize enough here just how ‘critical’ accuracy on this particular event is.
Lately, comments in recent discussions, whenever they happen to address the Musser request, have become confusing at the very least.
Up until now my understanding about it was this: That about 4 p.m., Musser asked if GM “could spare resources to assist in Yarnell.” (Mr. Musser has stated he does not know if he was talking to Marsh or Steed.) However, the response to his inquiry was a “no” and that he (Musser) should contact BR HS.
Has new evidence surfaced which shows that Mr. Musser later — officially — ‘requested’ that the entire GM crew and the Division Supervisor move? I am asking this question as I have been seeing comments which, for example, detail how GM was “quickly trying to get to the Boulder Springs Ranch to which Musser had asked DivA to divert resources (including a crew).”
Or comments saying that GM “moved because they were asked to … another member of the fire command asked them to move.”
Other statements have been made about how ‘another’ fire overhead wanted “Marsh” to move and “ultimately he (Marsh) went with Musser’s request.”
Obviously, as has been discussed more than once, something transpired after the conversation at 4 pm wherein GM told Musser there were no resources to spare, that they were committed to staying where they were, didn’t offer Musser any alternative course of action involving any or all of GM crewmembers, and suggested he contact BR. (Or, perhaps it would be more accurate to say that something, somehow, came about to change the mind of that particular person who had spoken to Mr. Musser.)
However, and this is a seriously important point, where is there, at the present time, any evidence and/or testimony which shows it was Mr. Musser who came back a second time with a request for all of GM and the Division Supervisor to move — whether it was to the Ranch, Yarnell or wherever — and that the answer given to Mr. Musser’s expanded request was a “yes, we all can do that.”
What is presently known to be fact regarding the Musser request and what is speculation?
Since I made a fair # of those comments, I’ll give my answer. I have always said it was a theory of what happened. No new evidence surfaced about Musser asking for the entire crew. In fact, Musser has never elaborated on exactly what his request was, what it was for etc. Not sure why he has not done so, it obviously might be critical to the investigation (or if he has, it has never been released). Since GM was basically doing jack at the time of the move, I believe the crew just moved as a unit, no matter what Musser asked for.
Obviously in the absence of any other plausible explanation for the move, the Musser request stands out. We do know the situation in Yarnell was very dicey. Yes they did initially turn it down. What else in 10-15 minutes could have caused them to change their mind? We do not know for certain. Some say they was a 3rd party call, but we have NO evidence to support that occurring, just speculation. I think the nature of Musser’s request, the bad situation in Yarnell etc caused them to rethink it. No proof, but no one else has any evidence for anything else causing the change of heart in that very few minutes.
Finally, enroute it appears someone told them to hurry up and Marsh said they were coming from the heel of the fire. So it appears they were expected to arrive to do something.
The nature of the Musser request is murky. He did volunteer that it had in fact taken place. Not sure why the details have not been made known. There is an element of Kabuki theater to all of this. Mr. Musser is alive and presumably could clear this up.
Great questions. Which came first?
1. Musser’s request or
2. Abel’s Air support ASAP
DING, DING, DING. Good job, Calvin.
Mike says we don’t have any evidence of what made the guys change their minds, but, actually, we do. The reason why they didn’t go initially is not because they were “hunkered” – that is a figment. The reason why they did not go is because they were still building line. Calvin is asking the right questions to get us there. To wit, remember the timeline:
At roughly 3:42 p.m., when Musser first called to ask DivsA to “bump resources” over to Cordes (e.g. in Yarnell or Glen Ilah), GM was still *actively* working on constructing line out where they were, with the goal of tying the LINE into the dozer/retardant line that the SEATS and Blue Ridge tried to establish earlier in the day.
At 3:50-ish, Steed tells Blue Ridge that they have roughly another hour or so to go before they will be able to tie into the line. In roughly that time frame, Marsh speaks with Abel.
But, shortly thereafter and as confirmed in the 4:02 Mackenzie video, we see and hear that the plan of tying into the line unexpectedly has become a non-starter, because the WIND shifted, and it became clear that they were likely to lose the line. (And THAT, by the way, is why we saw in one of the photos just before 4 p.m. that Ashcraft was moving with his saw on his shoulder – he was giving up the effort to build line (on the instruction of Marsh) because the plan of building the line to tie into line from the morning was no longer an option. He wasn’t going to the ranch – he was going to join the rest of the guys sitting where we see them in the 4:02 p.m. MacKenzie video.)
According to ADOSH…
The Marsh / Abel conversation came FIRST ( circa
1545 – 1550 ), and then ( “shortly thereafter”, according
to ADOSH ) came OPS2 Paul Musser’s infamous
‘request for resources’.
NOTE: The ADOSH report never actually mentions
the “Keep me informed, hunker and be safe, and
we’ll get Air Support down there ASAP” quotes from
OPS1 Abel… but the 1545 conversation they describe
below does contain the “winds are getting squirrely”
statement from Marsh which other reports attribute
to that same “hunker and be safe” conversation.
It is still POSSIBLE there was yet another conversation
with Abel following Musser’s request… but as far as
*documented* evidence of which came first… ( the chicken
or the egg ) this really is the best ‘documented’ evidence
that we have ( so far, anyway )…
Page 18 of ADOSH report…
At approximately 1545 hours, Division A Supervisor Marsh
had a radio conversation with Operations Section Chief 1
Abel regarding the weather and the position of Granite
Mountain iHC. Marsh was located near the top of the
Weaver Mountains and had a clear view of the
thunderstorm, the fire, and the valley below. Marsh and
Abel had been watching the storm for some time and
discussed their concerns regarding the storms effects.
Marsh reportedly stated that Granite Mountain
was safe and in the black (i.e., previously burned wildland).
Marsh mentioned that the winds were “squirre|y” at his
position and that the retardant and dozer lines north of
Yarnell were being compromised.
Shortly thereafter, Operations Section Chief 2 Musser
radioed GMIHC and asked if they could spare resources
to assist in Yarnell. Either Marsh or GMIHC Captain Steed
responded that they were committed to the black and that
Musser should contact BRIHC working in the valley (during
his interview Musser stated that he wasn’t sure who he was
talking with).
**
** REVISITING THE ABEL / MARSH RADIO COMMUNICATION
I was going to add some multiple ‘replies’ down below to yesterday’s discussion
about the Abel / Marsh ‘Hunker and be safe’ radio conversation but I realized
that was going to get ‘messy’ ( format-wise )… so I thought it better to just
continue the discussion with this new top-level post, some new information,
and some replies to things people had to say yesterday.
Here is what happened yesterday…
Elizabeth suddenly posted a comment *warning* people that ( in her opinion )
the actual ‘Hunker and be safe’ (order/directive/suggestion/advice?) from Abel
to Marsh could *NOT* be considered ‘factual’ and no one should be saying
that it is.
See just below for her full post but here is the gist of what she posted…
>> On March 7, 2014, at 7:53 am, Elizabeth said…
>>
>> FACTUAL CORRECTION:
>> Someone in these comments said (regarding the Granite Mountain Hotshots
>> leaving the black): “Yes they were told by fire command to stay put….”
>>
>> This is NOT an established fact.
>>
>> If you are referring to Todd Abel and the alleged “hunker” statement.
>> The RAW video (as opposed to the extracted and thereby modified
>> audio posted with the rabbit pictures) does NOT clearly state “hunker,”
>> and Todd Abel himself attested that he did not recall saying “hunker.”
>> Moreover, the senior-most WFF guy with whom I am in contact, who has
>> roughly an Abel-esque position within a different hotshot structure, indicated
>> that he would view it as odd for Abel to have said “hunker” in the way it is
>> being alleged. Apparently Ops guys do not go around telling people to
>> just… hunker.
>>
>> I do not believe that Abel said “hunker,” and I caution all of you commenters
>> *again* to be very careful about giving things that have not yet been proven
>> the assumption of truth. If any of us here repeat a lie or an unconfirmed,
>> alleged “fact” frequently enough, people start to believe it, and that is a
>> BAD thing in this case.
My original ‘response’ to Elizabeth ( down below ) pointed out all the reasons
why I (respectfully) believe she is wrong to make this claim so I won’t go over
all that again… but I did forget to add some things.
The “Hunker and be safe” (order/directive/suggestion/advice?) from Abel to
Marsh was first mentioned in the SAIR itself.
Page 28 of the SAIR…
____________________________________________________________
OPS1 is listening on the radio to make sure everyone received the most
recent weather announcement. At about 1550, he radios DIVS A directly
to ask if he got the weather update and if he is “in a good spot.” DIVS A
affirms that he received the update, and he tells OPS1 the winds are
starting to get “squirrely” up on the ridge. He says he is working his way
off the top and OPS1 closes by advising DIVS A to hunker and be safe.
____________________________________________________________
There was no ‘source’ given for these statements in the SAIR and, at the
time it was published, no one had any idea that both of the “quotes” from
both Marsh and Abel in the last sentence of this paragraph in the SAIR
were being taken DIRECTLY from the audio track of a video they already
had from Robert Caldwell’s camera.
The SAIT’s Investigative Notes were the first things to appear in public
that gave any indication where the ‘source’ of that ‘Hunker and be safe’
statement published in the SAIR was actually coming from. It was a short
entry in Jim Karels’ own notes from his own interview with Todd Abel where
Karel made a ‘note to himself’ to ask Abel (during the interview) about
this ‘Hunker and be safe’ moment because of the (quote) “radio
conversation we have on the video”.
SAIT – Yarnell Investigation Notes – Page 1
Interview with Todd Abel by J Karels on 8/14/2013
( Ask Abel about ) the ~1555 radio conversation that we have on the
video, (which includes the phrase okay, you hunker down in the black)
Abel did not recall having this conversation with marsh.
I was the one who first noticed this ‘reference’ to a ‘video’ in Karels’ own
notes and it being the source of those statements in the SAIR… and that
it MUST be some video other than the only ones known about at that time
( the MacKenzie videos ).
Sure enough… when the full SAIT FOIA/FOIL packages were finally released…
there was the ‘video’ that Jim Karels was referring to in his Todd Abel interview
notes and only then we discovered it was actually retrieved from Robert
Caldwell’s camera and accidentally captured even MORE conversation between
Abel and Marsh than even the original SAIR reported.
So from day one… ( or, at least, for some time BEFORE Jim Karels even
interviewed OPS1 Todd Abel on August 14 last year )… the SAIT had already
listened to this Robert Caldwell video and were already accepting ( as FACT )
that one of the things that Abel said to Marsh circa 1550 was “Hunker and
be safe”, regardless of whether Abel recalled saying it or not.
Once the FULL SAIT FOIA/FOIL materials were released, of course, is when
we discovered that “Hunker and be safe” isn’t the ONLY thing Abel said to Marsh.
The actual captured conversation was…
Eric Marsh (DIVS A): Yea… I’m tryin’ to work my way off the top.
Todd Abel ( OPS1 ): Okay… I copy… ah… just keep me updated…
ah… ya know… you guys hunker and be safe and then… ah…
we’ll get some air support down there ASAP.
So OPS1 Todd Abel actually gave DIVSA Eric Marsh TWO
separate (orders/directives/suggestions/advice?)…
1) Keep ME updated ( as to your situation and whereabouts )
2) Hunker and be safe ( in the black )
It is not really reasonable for anyone with even average hearing to listen to the
Caldwell video ( and the SAIT’s own enhanced audio track ) and claim that this
is NOT what Todd Abel was saying to Eric Marsh circa 1550. Even the SAIT
was at least sure of the “Hunker and be safe” part of the audio BEFORE
they even interviewed Todd Abel and ALSO sure enough of the quote to actually
publish it verbatim in their official SAIR regardless of whether Abel himself
recalled saying it or not. That’s how *sure* the SAIT itself was that this is
EXACTLY what is being heard in the Caldwell video.
So… moving on…
** (orders/directives/suggestions/advice?)
The reason I have been putting all those things in brackets above is because
this quickly became the *other* part of the conversation yesterday.
Can those ‘statements’ from OPS1 Todd Abel to DIVSA Eric Marsh be
considered valid ORDERS coming down the ‘chain of command’ from the
OPS level to the DIVS level… or were they something ‘lesser’ such as a simpler
(optional) ‘directive?’… just a ‘suggestion?’ or even just ‘friendly advice from
one dude to another?’.
I then made a statement regarding how confusing the ‘quasi-military’ style of
communication can be in WFF culture that was, admittedly, too broad… and
Mr. Powers then called me out on that.
That exchange was…
>> WantsToKnowTheTruth on March 7, 2014 at 2:47 pm said:
>>
>> The only ‘caveat’ would be ( as we have learned in these
>> discussions ) is that even despite the ‘more-than-quasi’
>> military leanings in this WFF culture… the ‘reality’ is that
>> no one ever ACTUALLY ‘orders’ or ‘commands’ anyone
>> to do anything ( and, actually, maybe that’s part of the overall
>> problem but that’s for another post ).
>>
>> But in this case… I still think the suggestion(s)/directive(s) that
>> we can actually HEAR OPS1 Todd Abel ‘giving’ DIVSA Eric Marsh
>> are about as close as this ‘culture’ gets to ‘direct orders’ from a
>> superior officer on the fire.
>>
>> Bob Powers on March 7, 2014 at 4:01 pm said:
>>
>> WTKTT – Let me just say you lost the point on your quasi military
>> approach is strictly Hot Shots Not Overhead. A type 1 management team
>> and a Type 2. Give orders and direction down the chain of command to DIV.
>> and from there to crews. It was really sloppy on Yarnell. You are way off base
>> to state that some how OPS or IC do not give direct orders to the line
>> personnel. They do it all the time past and present. What the hell else dose
>> OPS have to say but hunker and be safe Marsh said they were in the
>> black. You can still throw rocks at me but make sure they carry facts not
>> assumptions.
>>
>> Gary Olson on March 7, 2014 at 8:49 pm said:
>>
>> I strongly agree.
Fair enough. I agree with both Mr. Powers and Gary Olson.
Even though absolutely no ‘rocks’ were being ‘thrown at anyone… that was
still ‘too broad’ of a statement I made regarding the WFF ‘culture’ to say that
no one ever really seems to give anyone any ‘direct orders’.
The real discussion at the moment is simply whether or not the things
that OPS1 Todd Abel said to DIVSA Eric Marsh circa 1550 on June 30,
2013, can be construed as ‘orders’ or not. What happens elsewhere and
at other times in the WFF world is not the subject of the debate.
I still stand by what I said yesterday.
I believe these WERE about as ‘close as it gets’ to actual ORDERS
from a WFF OPS level to the DIVS level circa 1550 on June 30, 2013.
In my own defense, however, let me say that this topic HAS been
talked about before in the ‘broader’ scope ( in Chapter 2 of this ongoing
discussion thread ) and I really was left with the impression ( from the
comments of others ) that whether it is the ‘Hotshot’ level or the ‘Overhead’
level… there really is quite a bit of ongoing confusion in the WFF business
about when someone is actually TELLING ( Sic: ordering ) someone to do
anything at all.
Gary Olson himself had the ‘spot-on’ contribution to this discussion when it took
place before so what Gary had to say is definitely worth repeating here now that
the question of whether OPS1 Todd Abel was actually giving DIVSA Eric Marsh
‘orders’ or not has come back onto the table.
Here is a reprint of Gary’s “When is a suggestion an order?” post
back in Chapter 2…
Gary Olson on December 17, 2013 at 6:54 am said:
Like so much in the wildland firefighting culture, this topic is very nuanced
that requires a lot of explanation to those who are not familiar with that
culture. So…my short response to your comment is that I agree with you
most of the time, in fact On December 5, I said, “We have discussed the
wildland fire culture quite a bit, but there is at least one difference with the
military. I think It is very, very, rare for someone to say, “I order you to do
such and such.” I think “orders” are given more like ordinary people would
do in a conversation, a lot like WTKTT say’s above, so Marsh and Steed
would hear a request, “Hey can you guy’s get down here ASAP to help
us here?” That would be more like how an order is given, more like a
request to do what the requester thinks is right. And of course I think
they would not have a problem telling just anybody “no” but would have
a problem telling somebody special “no”.”
However, I think there are sometimes that orders are orders and orders
are in fact given. For example, I consider, “That was when he (OPS1)
told his DIVS A and the GMHS under his command to “Just hunker
down (there) and be safe”.” that was in fact an “order” and should have
been followed. And if that order had been followed…all of the Granite
Mountain Hotshots would be alive today.
In addition, in an earlier comment I also stated, “I think they were moving
to the backside of Yarnell to work ASAP per their orders from a higher
authority they could not say “no” to.”
So…if the higher authority (Darrell Willis, for example) they could not
say “no” to would have said,
I would like you to go
I wish you would go
Can you go
Will you go
It would be best if you go
Can you possibly go
Please go
I think you should go
If I were you, I would go
etc. well…even though none of those are technically an order in the strict
sense of a military order, but if Eric Marsh would have heard any of those
from the right person, I believe he would have interpreted it as
an “order” to go.
Furthermore, the reason I always tried to say “they had been asked
(ordered) to do” is to try and make the distinction between the two
ways of telling somebody you want them to do something. This attempt
at making the distinction was for the sake of both the people who are
reading this thread and contributing to it who do not have a background
in wildland firefighting, and there is a lot of this discussion that is very
depended on the interpretation of semantics.
Yes, WTKTT, this quasi military culture where no one gives orders but only
suggestions that can be turned down is very confusing.
One huge difference from the military is that military leaders give orders where soldiers are going to be killed, yet they are expected to be obeyed. That is not the case with wildland firefighting. That is the basis of the turn down concept, and recognizes the preeminent role of the crew superintendent in matters of safety.
Obviously not following Abel’s “order” did not fall in this category. But Marsh was getting mixed messages from fire overhead. One wanted him to stay, one wanted him to move. Ultimately he went with Musser’s request because he felt it was the right thing to do, that he was needed there to do whatever Musser had asked. He may have thought that Abel did not yet completely know the situation in Yarnell as described to Marsh. Or maybe, as alleged, someone else got on the horn and told him to go.
Fair enough In my time though the Overhead gave orders, and unless you felt they were unsafe you followed them. or found a safer way to do what they asked. I still know IC’s that work that way and expect there team to follow the plan. When it comes to safety they are quite vocal. When a fire starts going to hell they check with every one on the line to make sure they are safe and in a good location.
Did GM Break the “Rules” Regarding the Need to Have a Lookout? No.
My impression is that Granite Mountain believed that “Air Attack” was acting as GM’s short-term lookout as GM descended into the valley and temporarily lost their “eyes” on the fire. This, according to people who seem to be expert on the relevant wildfire fighting practices, would have been a legitimate (while admittedly unfavored) way to have a lookout while quickly trying to get to the Boulder Springs Ranch to which Musser had asked DivsA to divert resources (including a crew). This is only my impression, and I have not yet finished my research, such that I could be totally wrong, but, in lining up all of the evidence that I currently have available to me, this is the view that I am developing. This does NOT mean that “Air Attack” dropped the ball or left GM hanging, by the way. I have said privately, and I will say publicly here, that the way that the pilot of Bravo 33 (then considered by GM to be “Air Attack”) performed was incredible.
I am still looking for radio evidence that Bravo 33 actually had eyes on the crew during there decent and if so why did he not tell them the fire was moving in there direction. As a past air attack boss I would have had a defiant knowledge of there location and there movement and would have notified them immediately of a change in direction of the fire. I just don’t see any evidence that B33 knew where the crew was if he did there would have been retardant all over them Just way to many variables.
Also Bravo 33 asked to check on the crew and was tolled they were safe in the black, there was no other discussion by him about the crew. The look out theory is very week at that point. Why would he ask if he should check on the crew when as you say he was there lookout no rime or reason here.
I strongly agree.
Reply to Elizabeth post on March 7, 2014 at 11:09 am
>> Elizabeth said…
>>
>> My impression is that Granite Mountain believed that
>> “Air Attack” was acting as GM’s short-term lookout as GM
>> descended into the valley and temporarily lost their “eyes”
>> on the fire.
It’s (still) possible that was the case.
Elizabeth… you have more information than *we* do… so we
have to take your word for it that there *may* be things you
are seeing that provide more detail about all these questions.
One of the things that has ALWAYS confused me is whether or
not Marsh and/or Steed really had ANY idea that the ASM they
had been dealing with pretty much ALL DAY ( Rory Collins )
had suddenly ‘left the fire’ and handed all his responsibilities
off to French/Burfiend right around 4:00 PM ( the exact moment
that Marsh/Steed were ‘discussing their options’.
The last communication Marsh/Steed had with Rory Collins
is just prior to that when Collins actually told those men that
the fire was still “1 to 2 hours away from town”.
But did Collins ALSO tell them ( in that conversation ) that
he would be LEAVING the fire just moments later?
Did Marsh and Steed still just think he was up there, and
watching them?
I can’t find ANY evidence in what is PUBLICLY available that
Marsh/Steed had any idea that Rory Collins had just bailed
off the fire and handed everything over to Bravo 33 during
that VERY critical 4:00 PM timeframe, as they were deciding
what they were going to do.
So as you look at the evidence YOU have ( that we don’t ), try
and see if there is ANY mention of that crazy ‘hand off’ Collins
did to Bravo 33 and whether that changeout really was
‘common knowledge’ over the general TAC frequencies.
Example: Did Roy Hall, Paul Musser and Todd Abel themselves
all really know this happened… or were they just as ‘surprised’ to
discover that Rory Collins was suddenly no longer there
sometime after 4:00 PM?
The SAIT investigation notes and the interview with Bravo 33
detail how ‘confusing’ that ‘handover’ was and how inadequate
Collins’ briefing was… but even their notes are just detailing the
conversation that the ‘Air guys’ had amonst THEMSELVES
when that happened. There is no real mention that this crazy
‘handover’ actually was fully communicated to fire command
itself ( when it happened ) or to any resources on the ground.
My second point on this is that IAOF ( If And Only If ) I am
actually RIGHT about what I ( me, personally ) am hearing in
the background on that AIR STUDY video… then you are
even more correct than you think.
IF I am RIGHT about what I am hearing… then Bravo 33 WAS
‘fully aware’ of where they were AND ALSO fully aware they
were in a ‘dangerous spot’ and that’s why they radioed down
to fire command and ASKED them to contact Granite Mountain
to make sure they were OK.
ASM2 ( Bravo 33 ) said that they COULD ‘see them there on
the corner of the fire’ and that they HAD been asking them if
they were OK… and they kept responding that they were… but
ASM2 also says that even THEY did not (quote) “find that
credible” based on the fire behavior they were seeing.
So if that really is what is being said on the radio at that time…
then that means Bravo 33 really was trying to fulfill a ‘lookout’
responsibility at that exact moment in time.
They were calling down to fire command saying they think
they see a unit in a ‘dangerous situation’ down there and ASM2
was insisting that fire command now do its JOB and check on
them and their whereabouts and their plans.
And ( according to the AIR STUDY video ) fire command then
proceeded to do just that ( Sic: Granite Mountain… what’s your
status right now? )… but even that attempt to check on them
just turned into more obtuse communications and the fire
behavior itself wasn’t even mentioned in those radio calls.
So, just for the sake of argument about this, here is that
FULL transcript of the background radio conversations from
that AIR STUDY video that I ( personally ) am hearing.
As Mr. Powers has said… you can ‘throw rocks at me’ but
after my own audio enhancements and hours and hours of
listening to them… this is still what I ( me, only me, personally )
believe is actually being said in the background of that
AIR STUDY video.
It actually BEGINS with ASM2 doing exactly what you have
just imagined they *might* have been doing. They have
checked on GM… they say they CAN ‘see them’… and they
are concerned enough about them to call down and ask
fire command to CHECK ON THEM right away ( which
they then proceed to do )…
NOTE: ASM2 = Bravo 33 = French / Burfiend
AIR STUDY VIDEO STARTS
+0:08.23
(Unknown): ASM2, Copy that… behind the hills is where you
place Granite Mountain?
+12.726
(ASM2): They’re on the corner just repeatedly saying that they’re
comfortable and that’s not credible. ASK him whether Alpha can
be placed WITH them.
NOTE: A few seconds later… Someone OTHER than who
ASM2 was just talking to ( someone with what sounds like a
Cajun accent? ) does exactly what ASM2 just TOLD them to do.
He calls Granite Mountain directly and asks them to report their STATUS. If the time stamp on the AIR STUDY video can be
trusted then it is now about 4:17 PM, just before the SAIR says
they are about to leave the two-track road and drop into the box
canyon at approximately 4:20 PM.
+0:40.52
(Unknown): Granite Mountain ( Five? )…
What’s your status right now?
NOTE: A pretty heavy accent on this speaker. Sounds like
Louisiana Cajun? What he says almost sounds like…
“Granite Montun… wuz yo status rat now?
ALSO NOTE: Even though the caller asked for ‘Granite
Mountain’ specifically, and not ‘DIVS A’… Eric Marsh responds
immediately on behalf of Granite Mountain before Jesse Steed
even has a chance to say anything. Jesse only ‘chimes’ in with
his own ‘status’ report about “we’re pushin’ our way down into
the structures” when Marsh is done speaking.
+0:54.09 to +1:03.81
Eric Marsh: Well the guys… uh… Granite… is makin’ their
way out the exact escape route from this mornin’… an’ it
heads… ah… (pause) SOUTH. ( slight pause )
mid-slope, cuttin’ over.
+1:07.18
( Another voice immediately adds to what Marsh said but it is )
( NOT Marsh this time. It sounds like Jesse Steed )
Jesse Steed: We’ll be pushin’ our way down into the structures.
+1:10.16 ( Another voice. Very quickly )
Copy that.
+1:21.17
( Unknown): Ten four. You with Granite Mountain right now?
+1:24.68
(Eric Marsh?): Uh… just checkin’ it out to see where we’re gonna
jump out at.
There appear to be some other background conversations
in this video before we hear the 11 ( ELEVEN ) shutter
clicks of the fellas in the foreground actually shooting photos
of the VLAT drop… but there is also HEAVY road traffic
at this point that will take a lot more work to filter out.
AIR STUDY VIDEO ENDS
And, yet again, I am forced to remind all of us that the state of audio forensics does not support claims that anyone can really tell who exactly is saying what exactly in the clip that WTKTT is providing his own personal “transcript” regarding. Google the George Zimmerman murder trial, which involved one person (either George, who was an adult Latino or Trayvon Martin, a young black fellow) calling for help in the background of an audio-recorded 911 call. Three of the nation’s top audio forensic experts were called in as experts AND the parents of both Zimmerman and Martin were asked to opine on WHOSE voice was in the background of the 911 calls and what the voice was saying. Not surprisingly, NOBODY could agree on who was saying what in the background of the 911 calls, AND the judge ultimately issued a relatively damning opinion on the state of audio forensics.
Once again… your points ( and continual cautionary
tales ) are well taken.
I don’t care what the ‘state of audio forensics’ is.
I am telling you what I ( me, personally ) am hearing
in the background of one particular AIR STUDY
video… and I have VERY good hearing.
That’s all.
You ( and the whole world ) can simply make
up your own minds…
…but a simple fact remains…
I might actually be RIGHT.
Knowing where they were at some point and being there lookout is way two different things. I do not here or believe B33 is acting as a lookout at any time during any conversation and that’s what I am stuck on. You can not be a look out and not be talking with and knowing the exact location of GM at any given point, especially when you are in the air and could check on them every 5 or so minuets that would have been done if he was there lookout. He also had a good fire background to know that. I do not believe B33 was ever ask to be GM lookout.
I totally agree with Bob. First of all, the lookout rule was not the only one violated. How about no escape route and no safety zone? Second, asking someone how they are is not functioning as a lookout. If they cannot see the fire, of course they will say they are fine. You need to be saying “Stop – danger ahead” or whatever. Finally I have a hunch that most veteran WFF would take a very dim view of this whole idea of AA as lookout. If they were, it sure as **** did not work out too well, did it?
I strongly agree.
Sadly…I believe WTKTT’s transcript and assessment of what happened. It fits the facts. VERY sadly..I believe WTKTT’s transcript and assessment of what happened.
Elizabeth,
With all due respect, I think that you and your so-called ‘wildland firefighting expert’s are way off-base on this one.
There is absolutely NO WAY an ASM would have accepted this task in addition to their already over-loaded assignments as Air Attack AND Lead Plane. They were acting as lead for VLATs and had responsibility for all air assets over the fire, as well as, air attack responsibilities for operations
Sorry, but they didn’t have ANY time to act as eyes for a crew heading down into a brush-choked bowl, at the same time the fire was blowing-up the way it was. If GM HAD asked them to do just that, I’m sure ASMs response would have been, ‘You’re going WHERE?’ ‘DO NOT, I SAY DO NOT, enter that bowl.’
‘Exit down and out, NOW!’
Correction to my above comment. The last sentence should have read; …….’Escape over the ridge, down and out, NOW!’.
I am not saying that Bravo 33 “accepted” the assignment. I am saying that I might end up believing that GM *thought* they could descend b/c Bravo 33 was coming around and could essentially serve as their eyes while they did it (and obviously simultaneously start drops in that area).
According to the hotshots who have given me feedback, getting “lookout” support from a plane is an acceptable (albeit disfavored and last-ditch effort) type option. Do you disagree?
Elizabeth… as I already said in response to your
original comment… it is *possible* that is what
Marsh/Steed *thought*… regardless of whether
it was based in reality or not.
Your original comment DID say…
>> My impression is that Granite Mountain
>> BELIEVED that “Air Attack” was acting as
>> GM’s short-term lookout
Keyword: BELIEVED
There were a LOT of things that day that hinged
on what people were *believing* versus what
was actually true. ( That GM was ‘safe in the
black’, that the fire was going to remain heading
southeast and parallel to them, that they had
TIME to make it all the way to Glen Ilah, and
even that they were going to be able to do
anything useful even if they made it there,
etc., etc… )
So yea… it is *possible* Marsh/Steed simply
*thought* that if there was anything to worry
about during their trek cross-country that someone
in an airplane would (probably) warn them about it.
They MAY have even mentioned this ‘assumption’
to each other in the actual ‘discussing their options’
conversation before they even left the black.
If they did… Brendan McDonough heard it.
As I also said above… it’s still *possible*
Steed/Marsh had no frickin’ idea that the ASM
that had been flying over them all day ( Rory
Collins ) wasn’t even up there anymore. I still
can’t find any evidence that people on the ground
really had any idea that Rory Collins suddenly
bailed off the fire circa 4:00 PM.
But NONE of those ‘assumptions’ amount to
‘following the rules’. They were STILL ‘breaking’
almost EVERY rule in the book.
If I am right about what I hear in the background
of that AIR STUDY video… all the ‘new’ ASM2
did was ‘check on them’ as they were asked
to do… and they DID report that it was ‘not
credible’ to them that GM could keep saying
they were ‘comfortable down there’ given where
ASM2 was ‘seeing them on the corner of the fire’
coupled with the fire behavior that ASM2 was
also now seeing ( at 4:17 PM ) from the air…
…but the radio captures then also indicated that
ASM2 simply ‘passed that information’ on to
fire command and told THEM to ‘check on
GM’ at that point. That’s all ASM2 had time
to do. It was then up to fire command to verify
whether GM was getting into deep tapioca or
not… and ( as we can hear with our own ears
now ) fire command failed THAT assignment
miserably.
No one even mentioned the ‘fire behavior’ at
4:17 PM when they actually had direct contact
with Marsh AND Steed. Like the fire wasn’t
even there or anything to even worry about.
Marsh/Steed didn’t even ASK… and no one else
on the radio even bothered to mention to THEM
what the fire was NOW doing ( at 4:17 PM ).
That’s really, really tragic.
Elizabeth,
I have made tried to make two comments in response, but they have both disappeared. I’ll try one more time.
I respectfully disagree again with your above statement. No hotshot worth his salt is going to rely on a VERY BUSY ASM to be their ONLY lookout. A very busy ASM would NEVER except the task. The hotshots you quote mention ‘lookout support’. That is NOT a lookout, but maybe a brief look-see to pass on current information, and it DOES NOT take the place of an actual lookout.
There is no current information to support ASM being asked, or accepting the task as GMs lookout. One CAN’T be a lookout, without having been asked,and then accepting the task, period. No hotshot worth their salt would EVER make that blind assumption.
To allude that this is what GM did, in my opinion, tends to make the developing story worse than it probably actually is.
TTWARE: Are you saying that it would be WORSE if GM went blindly down into the valley without even reaching out to Air Attack (at that time Bravo 33)? If that is what you are saying, I strongly disagree.
FACTUAL CORRECTION:
Someone in these comments said (regarding the Granite Mountain Hotshots leaving the black):
“Yes they were told by fire command to stay put….”
This is NOT an established fact, if you are referring to Todd Abel and the alleged “hunker” statement. The RAW video (as opposed to the extracted and thereby modified audio posted with the rabbit pictures) does NOT clearly state “hunker,” and Todd Abel himself attested that he did not recall saying “hunker.” Moreover, the senior-most WFF guy with whom I am in contact, who has roughly an Abel-esque position within a different hotshot structure, indicated that he would view it as odd for Abel to have said “hunker” in the way it is being alleged. Apparently Ops guys do not go around telling people to just… hunker.
I do not believe that Abel said “hunker,” and I caution all of you commenters *again* to be very careful about giving things that have not yet been proven the assumption of truth. If any of us here repeat a lie or an unconfirmed, alleged “fact” frequently enough, people start to believe it, and that is a BAD thing in this case.
Sorry but they do when a fire is blowing up it is the responsibility of OPS to check there people and make it clear what they need to do. AND MAKE SURE THEY ARE DOING IT. Been there done that. If you are not taking responsibility for your people you do not belong in that position or any other. I also believe had there been a Division Boss separate from the Crew not Marsh that person would have kept them in the Black. Marsh connected to the crew was still part of the crew thus decision making was not separate. As for the hunker and be safe maybe maybe not its been stated but not in black and white. Its what they should have done and its what someone should have told them to do. Responsibility at every level and every action.
WTKTT–Let me just say you lost the point on your quasi military approach is strictly Hot Shots Not Overhead. A type 1 management team and a Type 2. Give orders and direction down the chain of command to DIV. and from there to crews. It was really sloppy on Yarnell. You are way off base to state that some how OPS or IC do not give direct orders to the line personnel. They do it all the time past and present. What the hell else dose OPS have to say but hunker and be safe Marsh said they were in the black. You can still throw rocks at me but make sure they carry facts not assumptions.
I strongly agree.
Mr Powers, With all due respect. You said…. What the hell else dose OPS have to say but hunker and be safe Marsh said they were in the black.
Ops Able actually says Hunker(?) and be safe AFTER Marsh says “I am trying to work my way off the top”
To my knowledge that is all we can hear from the Caldwell video. I do not hear the word BLACK in that video.
Ops Able had something else to say also.” Keep me updated and Air support ASAP”
Page 28 of the SAIR fails to use the complete sentence (thought/order/promise) from Ops Able “Keep me updated,Air support ASAP”
WHY?
Calvin–Able knew that the crew was next to the black doing line construction. working off the top (top of the fire old burn area). They were in the black or next to the black that was there assignment. safest place in there area was in the black (hunker and be safe). Stay in the black and be safe, simple words with a lot of meaning. The air support statement is still confusing and it was before they started off the rest area they were in near the heal of the Fire.
Air drops down there could have been referring to there vehicles we, I don’t believe were privy to the entire conversation. And the time was about when they were trying to get the vehicles moved and Marsh could have been asking for air drop to keep the vehicles safe. Just my thought on that.
Reply to Elizabeth post on March 7, 2014 at 7:53 am
>> Elizabeth said…
>> FACTUAL CORRECTION:
>> Someone in these comments said (regarding the Granite
>> Mountain Hotshots leaving the black):
>> “Yes they were told by fire command to stay put….”
>>
>> This is NOT an established fact
With all due respect… I believe that it IS ( a fact ).
The only ‘caveat’ would be ( as we have learned in these
discussions ) is that even despite the ‘more-than-quasi’
military leanings in this WFF culture… the ‘reality’ is that
no one ever ACTUALLY ‘orders’ or ‘commands’ anyone
to do anything ( and, actually, maybe that’s part of the overall
problem but that’s for another post ).
But in this case… I still think the suggestion(s)/directive(s) that
we can actually HEAR OPS1 Todd Abel ‘giving’ DIVSA Eric Marsh
are about as close as this ‘culture’ gets to ‘direct orders’ from a
superior officer on the fire.
>> Elizabeth also said…
>> if you are referring to Todd Abel and the alleged “hunker”
>> statement. The RAW video (as opposed to the extracted and
>> thereby modified audio posted with the rabbit pictures) does
>> NOT clearly state “hunker,”
Again… with the utmost of respect… I think you are wrong.
Anyone with even just average hearing can/should reasonably
conclude that that is EXACTLY what Todd Abel said to Eric
Marsh… regardless of whether you listen to the original RAW
video, your online ‘rabbit’ clip, or the actual audio extraction clip
that the SAIT investigators themselves supplied with their
own FOIA/FOIL package.
By the way… that ACTUAL audio extraction of the Caldwell
video that the SAIT investigators themselves were using
has always been available right along with the original
Caldwell video in Mr. Dougherty’s dropbox at this address…
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/yk9b5e7l7mj1z91/D6tD5efYVZ/RobertCaldwellAudio.wav
Pesonally… I believe the only reasonable argument that could
be made for any alternative to the word ‘hunker’ being spoken
there would be the word ‘bunker’ ( With a ‘B’ instead of an ‘H’ ),
but that is even less likely and would make even less sense
( given the context of the whole statement ) than to just accept
that he simply said “hunker and be safe”.
NOTE: For people that don’t even know what that word means,
“hunker” is simply short for “hunker down” and is totally
familiar to firefighters and military people alike. It’s a VERY
common expression.
>> Elizabeth also said…
>> and Todd Abel himself attested that he did not recall
>> saying “hunker.”
Well, IIRC ( If I Recall Correctly )… Todd Abel doesn’t remember
the ENTIRE conversation, much less any specific words.
I still find that a little hard to believe… but there it is.
>> Elizabeth also wrote…
>> Moreover, the senior-most WFF guy with whom I am in
>> contact, who has roughly an Abel-esque position within a
>> different hotshot structure, indicated that he would view it
>> as odd for Abel to have said “hunker” in the way it is being
>> alleged. Apparently Ops guys do not go around telling
>> people to just… hunker.
I don’t know who this guy you are talking to is… but I have
heard those very words from my own local Fire Chief
when there have been tornado warnings in our area.
Sometimes… “hunker and be safe” is all you can (and should) do.
It’s a VERY common phrase.
>> Elizabeth also said…
>> I do not believe that Abel said “hunker,”
Then offer an alternative.
If it wasn’t “hunker” ( or “bunker” )… then please let us all
know what YOU think he really did say there as the first
word of a sentence that reads ” xxxxxxx and be safe”.
He said SOMETHING there. You can’t just dismiss that fact
because you don’t agree with what others are hearing.
>> Elizabeth also said…
>> and I caution all of you commenters *again* to be very careful
>> about giving things that have not yet been proven the
>> assumption of truth. If any of us here repeat a lie or an
>> unconfirmed, alleged “fact” frequently enough, people start to
>> believe it, and that is a BAD thing in this case.
Your point is well taken… but in some cases the horses left
the barn on that the moment the SAIR report came out.
I actually ran into my own Fire Chief about a week ago during
the terrible ice storm that ravaged most of the country. Anyone
with a chainsaw was called out here in this county to help clear
the roads around here so I showed up with the FOUR
working chainsaws I have at the moment.
As we were working… I actually told him there were ongoing
public discussions about the Yarnell Incident and that a lot
of new information had recently been released.
My own Fire Chief’s only comment was this…
“Have they fixed those radio problems yet so no more of
those poor fellas have to die?”
All this speculation about what Granite Mountain was trying to do is just nuts. They did not come up with the idea, they weren’t looking to get involved, they were not on some mission to be heroes. They moved BECAUSE THEY WERE ASKED TO. They were given a mission. And there are people alive who know exactly what that mission was. Yes they were told by fire command to stay put, at virtually the same time another member of fire command asked them to move. Their mistake was thinking they could do what they were asked safely. And they paid the price. But the idea that their motivation died with them is flat out wrong.
Cordes’ unit log contains the entry – 1545 Met with Musser. discussed options. Now we may just accept that at face value and may never learn the details. But is there anyone here who does not believe that discussion quite likely was the basis for what happened during the next hour? Not in an accusatory manner, everyone was trying to do their best. Everyone was trying to deal with a situation turned desperate. But we are trying to find out what happened. There are cold, hard facts behind statements like “discussed options”. Those facts, painful as they might be, need to be known.
Agreed.
Ignoring the issue of overhead pressure (especially in the WUI) will make for continued and increased exposure to risk (crews agreeing to do dangerous assignments), and the natural outcome of increased exposure is increased accidents.
I think what shocked a lot of veteran WFFs is that GM didn’t turn down the request and stay in the black, not so much that the request was made. Overhead doesn’t and shouldn’t get held liable for requesting assignments with flaws. Only a god could have complete knowledge of fire and weather, and that’s what it would take to come up with perfect tactics every single time (though some fire managers are obviously closer to the gods than others). The crew leaders (and theoretically, every individual fire fighter) have the right and responsibility to turn down any assignment that is either too dangerous or that they are not qualified for. That’s why the cover up is so confusing.
But then, this is the first time we’ve heard of a crew potentially taking risks because they perceived that their very organization was threatened. I want WFSTAR, NIFC, NWCG, and the like to seriously consider whether the pressure to save lives and property and the pressure to carry out orders might be just as important a risk factor as fatigue or faulty radio programming. These pressures will not be going away in our world of increasing WUI and fewer fuels reduction dollars.
I should be more precise and say that overhead *usually* and *theoretically* doesn’t get held liable for flawed assignments. Thirtymile may have changed that. I can see how the SAIT my have responded in a reactionary manner, but I can’t figure out how *everyone* (except Musser) kept mum until the videos came out.
Sitta said,
“I want WFSTAR, NIFC, NWCG, and the like to seriously consider whether the pressure to save lives and property and the pressure to carry out orders might be just as important a risk factor as fatigue or faulty radio programming.”
Nicely stated Sitta.
This same thing has been stated in several different ways by myself and several others in comments on here, but I’m not sure many people are ‘getting it’.
There needs to be serious consideration of external factors that may cause normally conscientious firefighters to get tunnel vision, effecting their ability to properly adhere to the 10 & 18 and LCES.
absolutely right I agree.
I strongly agree.
I strongly agree.
I’m not clear on what you all are after anymore. Are you still looking for a smoking gun or an explanation of what led to the decision to drop down into the drainage? It seems that maybe some of you still think that someone is hiding something. I’ve been through the chaos of days like that and no two srories will ever be the same and people won’t remember accurately what they said, heard, or happened to them. Some may never talk after the way a linch mob formed a couple months ago.
I’ve believed a version of what I started believing now all along. That GM moved to get themselves in a position to assist. That they dropped off the road because when they did the fire was still moving east and there was no indication that the outflow was imminent. Marsh was catching up with the crew because he started from out farther in the black. I tend to think that he saw the crew drop off from above and behind, that he shortly after that saw the fire spread change, and that the crew being over the edge from him kept him from calling them right way because the rim and/or that north ridge of the drainage was between them.
I believe that the simplest answer will be that they made a mistake that couldn’t be corrected. I don’t think that any one of them thought there was a risk, IHCs don’t work that way, not with their lives. Their too close for that. I don’t think that anyone knew that they were moving with intent to drop into the drainage. That could have been a last minute decision of opportunity. “Hey it’s still good we’re going to drop off here it’s shorter” and then the outflow hit. That the move wasn’t communicated specifically because they could hear how busy it was and they knew what to do. The ops guys weren’t tracking the crew because you don’t have to track Hotshots. Having a IHC is always good because their dependable, except this time it was different.
Except this time they violated the 10 and 18 when they left the black there is no LCES or situation awareness. If you don’t have all the information stay where you are. That’s my old Safety plan and it served me well for 33 years. There are some things that we found but no smoking guns.
Reply to WFF post on March 6, 2014 at 9:08 am
>> WFF wrote…
>> I’m not clear on what you all are after anymore.
Well… after reading your entire message above I get the
feeling that you answered your own question without
even realizing it. People want ‘the truth’… as well as that
can be obtained. There are too many ‘guesses’ and ‘opinions’
( like your own ) still floating around surrounding an historic
event that CAN and SHOULD be cleared up. A LOT of the
evidence to do that is now sitting ‘in plain sight’ and what is
still ‘missing’ can/should be easily obtained with some
new interviews or ( if need be ) in-court, under-oath testimony.
This is not the *only* public place where the same kinds of
discussions are still going on. People want to know what
*really* happened that day. Period. End of story.
>> WFF also wrote…
>> Are you still looking for a smoking gun?
I (personally) have never used the term ‘smoking gun’ with
regards to this incident, and I wish others wouldn’t as well.
It implies criminal intent… and there is absolutely no evidence
anything like that was in play that day.
>> WFF also wrote…
>> …or an explanation of what led to the decision to drop
>> down into the drainage?
Sure. That would help. We KNOW that ( at least ) Brendan
Mcdonough heard ALL of the ‘discussing their options’
conversation(s) ( Even the SAIT investigators SAY that he
did )… but whether or not there was any intra-crew radio
traffic for him to hear regarding the specific ‘fatal decision’
to leave the two-track is still unknown.
There’s only a finite set of possibilities there…
1) ‘Cutting through’ the box canyon ( versus taking the safer
two-track all the way, IF they even knew that was an option )
WAS discussed between Marsh and Steed in the 4:02
timeframe, before Steed/Crew left the black ( and McDonough
heard all of this decision making as well ).
2) That specific ‘route’ was NOT discussed between Marsh
and Steed circa 4:02 PM and Steed/Crew just took off south
planning to ‘figure out the real route’ on the fly as they went.
3) When the ranch came ‘into sight’… Steed made the
‘cut through the canyon’ decision all on his own and Marsh
only found out about it as he came up from behind and
then just ‘followed’ them down in a “There they go… and I
must follow them… for I am their leader” type scenario.
4) Steed DID stop and consult with Marsh over the intra-crew
radio when that ‘decision’ moment came… and Brendan DID
hear that additional ‘decision making’ traffic.
5) Marsh was already with Steed at that point and they made
the decision together, in-person, and there was no intra-crew
radio traffic for anyone to hear regarding that decision.
>> WFF also wrote…
>> It seems that maybe some of you still think that someone
>> is hiding something.
See above. I wouldn’t even call it ‘hiding’ something. I would
describe it more like “It is still perfectly possible that not all the
facts are known even at this time… and it is also probably still
perfectly possible to learn them.”
>> WFF also wrote…
>> I’ve been through the chaos of days like that and no two
>> srories will ever be the same and people won’t remember
>> accurately what they said, heard, or happened to them.
That’s true even when there’s a simple car accident.
This was no ‘simple car accident’.
That’s what ( good ) investigators are supposed to handle.
They know how to interview, re-interview, re-re-interview
until all the pieces fall into place. It’s doable. Happens all
the time. I just wish it had happened already in this case.
It’s an historic event and what happened that day still needs to
be known as accurately as possible.
>> WFF also wrote…
>> Some may never talk after the way a linch mob formed a
>> couple months ago.
AFAICT… no one involved in this discussion is ( or has ever
been ) interested in ‘lynching’ anyone. It’s about looking at
the evidence, trying to figure out *exactly* what happened
out there that day ( if possible )… and then letting the chips
fall where they may.
>> WFF also wrote…
>> I’ve believed a version of what I started believing now all along.
>> That GM moved to get themselves in a position to assist.
At this point… I don’t think anyone would disagree.
That WAS what they were trying to do… and despite what
life-long structural firefighters like Darrell Willis had to say
in public press conferences at the deployment site… it
had nothing to do with ‘protecting the Boulder Springs Ranch’
or any other pile of wood, drywall and shingles. It had to
do with the ‘evacuations’ in progress and the thought in
their heads ( whether their own or put in their heads by someone
else ) that they were needed to do something to help with that.
>> WFF also wrote…
>> That they dropped off the road because when they did the
>> fire was still moving east and there was no indication that
>> the outflow was imminent.
There WAS ‘every indication’ that event was ‘imminent’ ( and
was, indeed, already happening even as they were leaving
the black ). The only question would by why what was already
common knowledge to other people engaging that fire was NOT
also ‘their’ common knowledge.
‘Situational Awareness’ + the ‘C’ in LCES. Communication.
>> WFF also wrote…
>> Marsh was catching up with the crew because he started
>> from out farther in the black.
I think that is a given, at this point, unless some major new
evidence surfaces.
>> WFF also wrote…
>> I tend to think that he saw the crew drop off from above and
>> behind, that he shortly after that saw the fire spread change,
>> and that the crew being over the edge from him kept him
>> from calling them right way because the rim and/or that north
>> ridge of the drainage was between them.
Whoa. Full stop. You honestly believe that those men might
have died because their own supervisor was somehow
unable to use his own Bendix King to warn them about
something he knew he should… and then didn’t even try
to get someone to ‘relay’ that warning even IF his own
radio was going sideways?
Sorry… that’s just not possible.
There is no evidence whatsoever that there were those kinds
of ‘technical’ problems transmitting to/from down in the box
canyon. Even at the critical moment… Steed was easily able
to contact Bravo 33… and his transmissions from the box
canyon were captured as far as 4 miles away up in Peeples
Valley by regular B/K handhelds.
>> WFF also wrote…
>> I believe that the simplest answer will be that they made a
>> mistake that couldn’t be corrected.
A simple ‘mistake’ is when you land your airplane at the
wrong airport ( happened as recently as Jan 17 in Missouri ).
When you fly your airplane into the ground and kill all 19
onboard… in broad daylight… that’s something else altogether.
Regardless… there is all the evidence in the world that even
the ( final/fatal ) ‘mistake’ of dropping into that fuel-filled
box-canyon COULD have been ‘corrected’… if only more
people simply knew where they were and what they were
really doing ( or even trying to do ) that afternoon.
They could have simply abandoned their ‘mission’ and just
gone back to safety… if only a ‘safety officer’ ( or ANYONE )
had been aware of what they were doing and doing what
‘safety officers’ are SUPPOSED to do.
>> WFF
>> I don’t think that any one of them thought there was a risk,
>> IHCs don’t work that way, not with their lives. Their too
>> close for that.
No one WANTED to die that day… that’s a given…
…but as for ‘risk’?
It’s still perfectly possible they DID know fully well there were
*real* risks… but it was the ‘GM way’ to just ‘laugh in the
face of danger’, or some such nonsense. There is now other
evidence appearing that that IS, in fact, the way this group
operated out in the field.
>> WFF also wrote…
>> I don’t think that anyone knew that they were moving with
>> intent to drop into the drainage. That could have been a last
>> minute decision of opportunity. “Hey it’s still good we’re going
>> to drop off here it’s shorter”
See above. That’s the problem. They were ‘breaking the rules’
ALREADY and calling an ‘unscouted/unimproved’ route an ‘escape
route’ over the radio… but they really, truly, were just ‘making it
up as they went along’.
>> WFF also wrote…
>> and then the outflow hit.
It certainly did.
SA ( Situational Awareness ).
One of the rules.
>> WFF also wrote…
>> That the move wasn’t communicated specifically because
>> they could hear how busy it was and they knew what to do.
So… you’re saying they stayed off the radio and were ‘skulking
through the back country’ feeling no need to inform anyone
of their whereabouts just because they were being ‘polite’
and didn’t want to ‘bother’ anyone?
Then how does that explain Marsh, at 1637, just voluntarily
‘inserting’ himself and his (unsolicited) opinions into a VERY
busy Air Attack conversation just to tell them that’s where
HE thought they ought to drop the retardant ( even though
they already had even higher level orders to use their own
discretion and ‘drop at will’ ).
Sorry. Not buying it.
Whatever the reason they were not fully communicating their
whereabouts and their decision making at that time had
nothing to do with whether any radio channels were perceived
to be ‘busy’ or not. Probably had more to do with the fact that
a Division Supervisor was leaving his assigned line position
on the fire and (secretly?) trying to move a valuable resource
off their assigned line position as well WITHOUT the FULL
permission of ALL of fire command.
That’s a big no-no… and Marsh KNEW it.
>> WFF also wrote…
>> The ops guys weren’t tracking the crew because you don’t
>> have to track Hotshots. Having a IHC is always good because
>> their dependable, except this time it was different.
You can say THAT again ( that it was different THIS time ).
One of the ‘legacy’ things to come out of this incident is probably
that from now on… it actually WOULD behoove fire management
to NEVER assume that Hotshot crews are where you think
they are. All it takes is one ‘freelancer’ out there who’s actually
just doing whatever the heck he wants and is *purposely* trying
to hide his movements and this could all (easily) happen again.
In the future… when you talk to someone on the radio
and ASK them a DIRECT question something like…
“Are you with Granite Mountain right now?”
…and they dodge your question with a response like…
“Just checkin’ it out to see where we’re gonna jump out at”.
Don’t respond with just ‘Copy that’, like you got an answer
to your question. ASK IT AGAIN…
“Roger that on ‘checking it out’… but you did NOT answer
my question. Repeat: ARE YOU WITH GRANITE MOUNTAIN
RIGHT NOW? If NOT… then EXACTLY WHERE ARE YOU
and WHAT ARE YOU DOING?”
Pretty darn good WTKTT, pretty darn good.
In a comment on this website, the following was said: “no one can argue [that the Granite Mountain Hotshots] were following the “rules” with their fateful move.”
I might actually make that argument at some point down the road, based on what I have been uncovering over the past three weeks. To wit: People like Holly Neill and John Maclean spouted off PRIOR to DOING the necessary time-consuming background legwork, getting the relevant information, going through it carefully, making tables/charts of what fits and what does not fit, and then asking for MORE information. I am still in the midst of this process, I have been working on it every day for months, I have been waging a very time-consuming battle with multiple unrelated governmental agencies to get the relevant information, and I believe it would be grossly irresponsible to pontificate before having the information that I need… unlike folks like reporter Dennis Wagner, John Maclean, Holly Neill, and others who have repeatedly pontificated without having the necessary background information.
My point? There is a chance that, when this is all said and done, I might well be able to argue that GM *did* follow the relevant rules.
(As yourself why Fernanda Santos, who is viewed by many as a really really good reporter, has said relatively little about the Yarnell Hill Fire since initially writing about it in June/July. Presumably she is being silent because she, like I, am unwilling to spout off and thereby further hurt people like Mr. Turybyfill, the Ashcraft family, and others without doing the necessary legwork first. And doing the necessary legwork on this multi-governmental debacle has proven INCREDIBLY time-consuming.)
Elizabeth–There is nothing they did that followed the 10 standard orders and 18 situations that shout watch out. No LCES. No discussion on decision making with the OSC before they moved. No Division Boss or crew abandons the line with out an ok from the IC or OSC. I do not see nor ever will see any justification that they followed the rules. No one knew what they were doing or where they were, They had no LCES, They did not follow the rules and they lost. You can not change the facts to justify what they did. Long time wild land Fire Fighters will tell you that as we have over and over. Simply stay in the Black where they were and go home to fight another fire. Nothing was worth moving from where they were. Any good IC with a crew out on a line in that situation should have specifically contacted the Crew and told the to get in the black and wait out the blowup. BR, OPS, IC, Air Attack all believed GM would move to the black and stay put. Why because 99.9% of all fire fighters would do just that.
Elizabeth… I don’t think anyone who has been involved with
this particular (public) discussion thread for any length of time
is not aware that you, yourself, have put in as much time and
effort as anyone to try and find out what *really* happened
out there that day.
So (ongoing) ‘thanks’ for everything.
I hope you DO reach a point where instead of just continually
‘hinting’ at things you can actually publish some results.
Be prepared to discover, though ( as Mr. Powers has already
pointed out up above ) that whether or not Granite Mountain was
‘following the rules’ that day ( or not ) is a ship that has
already sailed.
If they HAD ( really, truly ) been ‘following the rules’…
…they wouldn’t be dead.
WTKTT—AMEN That has been a fact for the past several months. The rules are like you will cut your hand off in a saw if you don’t follow the correct procedures and safety directions. Fire Fighting rules were learned and implemented thru Fatalities. They weren’t pulled from thin air………………..
Folks here is a video that all of you should look at and consider.
David Turbyfill
David
I have been doing severe weather research and modeling in the central plains States each year since 2009 making 2 to 3 trips a year. As time permits, updates on my research are constantly being added to my website outdoorstorms.com and videos added to my YouTube channel outdoorstorms. My focus is on 3D visualization of the storm structure, putting the models into motion, and working towards making it run real time. I had sent a short video to the investigators in August after doing some initial radar reviews. After the Yarnell Hill Report was published went further with the analysis to add additional field photos from an onsite assessment before the overgrowth occurs and to provide a different insight into the weather role in the event. Nature tends to run in patterns and a re-review of past events based on the knowledge gained from this tragic event may modify past assumptions. Hopefully some if not all of the recommendations could be put into practice.
http://youtu.be/IP_2wWqTisU
I watched this video and not being a weather expert, hard for me to judge. I suppose the point is to say that, although the T-storm was usual, how it interacted with that fire was not. In fact, maybe he is saying it was almost freaky. We have not had a lot of discussion about the weather that day here, probably because we are not weather experts. For those who argue that unforeseen weather/fire behavior was the real culprit, this video would seem to make that argument. Clearly GM did not appear to foresee this fire behavior. But, on the other hand, no one can argue they were following the “rules” with their fateful move. And when you follow the “rules” you protect yourself against “freaky” events. But I guess I would still like to have a better feel whether this was just a bit unusual, or a true “one in a million” event.
In Fire Fighting the weather is always a factor. That’s why its one of the 10. Thunderstorms and down drafts create all kinds of freaky wind and fire behavior I have seen some really scary fire behavior in my years fighting fire. That’s why you want a good safety zone close or be in one when they hit.
You can throw rocks at me but again I say with an active fire less than 2 miles away and the weather prediction and what you can see you don’t take a 1 and1/2 mile hike thru dense brush and never down a canyon. Stay in the black or a really good safety zone even 15 minuets is to far to run pure and simple.
I think all the safety recommendations were worth considering (and some were extremely important, like having a working siren during extreme fire danger). However, the entire message loses something by not iterating the 10 and 18. They are absolutely key, and have been missing in Yarnell’s lessons learned publications from the very beginning. That said, I did learn things about the weather, fire behavior, and extremely large area of high intensity that I did not know or realize before. I will be adjusting my mental models of plume dominated fires with the info about tornadoes and collapse at hand.
Reply to Marti Reed post on March 5, 2014 at 12:21 am
>> Marti said…
>>
>> I think you are adding a vehicle that doesn’t exist anywhere in any other
>> reality/pix/vids re the GM trucks. AND I have been trying to figure this out
>> and it’s very confusing. I don’t think there’s any other GM “chase truck”.
>> I think it’s the Sup truck. But there’s a lot of looseness in the lingo.
Marti…
I’ve been having trouble with this (supposed) ’4th truck’ myself, ever since I first
read BR Captain Brown’s (redacted) recollections.
Like you… I DO find it hard to believe it could have been ‘missed’ for this length
of time in all the all other documents, photos and notes ( or never even
mentioned ).
But Captain Brown’s notes say what they say and his descriptions of what
happened around that time ( while more than just a little confusing ) seem to
support that new theory that there was a FOURTH GM vehicle that had to be
‘dealt with’ that day ( and that HE was driving it at some point ).
The original ‘Granite Mountain Station 7′ page is still fully online on the City of
Prescott website and it is hasn’t been touched since before the incident. There
isn’t even any ‘memorial’ on that page or even any mention that anything at all
has happened to them, even now.
That page has both an ‘equipment’ list for ‘Station 7′ and a PHOTO of the
vehicles assigned to it.
There is only a Superintendent truck, and 2 Crew Carriers in both the ‘equipment
list’ and the ‘photo’ on that page ( although no date for photo is given ).
There is no separate ‘Chase’ truck listed or seen there.
That ‘Granite Mountain Station 7′ home page is here…
http://www.cityofprescott.net/services/fire/stations/77.php
So… ( as you point out )… it really all comes down to this statement from
Captain Brown…
“I jump in THEIR chase and the ( GM lookout follows ? ) me and we pick up our
guys in their buggies who fall into the convoy. I have the front and (xxxx)s bring
up the rear.”
There is also no doubt that when Brendan took those 3 photographs of his at
4:02 PM, looking west from Highway 89, as he was driving ( whatever he was
driving ) around to the Shrine Youth Camp… those photos were taken from
the driver’s seat.
Is it possible Captain Brown really was with him, and driving that ( only )
Supt/Chase truck… and Brendan handed him his camera from the passenger
side so Brown could take those photos?
Well… yea… sure… I guess that’s possible ( but not all that likely ).
I don’t know if any of this will eventually lead to discovering the most important
thing… this is who ( if anyone ) other than Brendan might have been hearing
any/all private conversations over the GM intra-crew frequency… or even a
possible participant… but at the very least these ‘redacted’ notes are supplying
new mysteries of their own that need to be ‘solved’ just for the sake of accuracy.
Example: There are (now) actions that Brown says he took after the deployment
trying to find a way to ‘break through’ out west that are in no way even
represented by his own GPS unit. So either he handed his GPS unit to someone
else for a few minutes at that time while he went off to ‘check the Shrine road
first, but realized that was impossible’, and then took it back again after that…
or he is simply not remembering correctly what he actually did that afternoon.
More on that later ( things he says he did that do not even appear in his
own GPS data records ).
>> Marti also wrote…
>>
>> It is so essentially incomprehensible to me that ANYBODY who even came
>> close to knowing that they had communicated that they were heading to the
>> Boulder Springs Ranch during that “Options Conversation” (or anything later)
>> would not have said ANYTHING about that when the rescue crews were
>> assembling.
>>
>> The question that totally haunts me is this. How could it be that Brendan, who
>> seemingly heard all of that “Options Conversation,” didn’t say ANYTHING to
>> ANYONE, about the fact the GM was, in fact, heading (and cutting down into)
>> to the Boulder Springs Ranch???
I agree with you totally.
It is equally inconceivable to me that Brendan ( or ANYONE standing in that
Ranch House Restaurant parking lot circa 1645+ ) who might have had
even that slightest *real* idea of where those poor men might have been when
the deployed would NOT have spoken up and said something…
…but even the SAIT said that Brendan DID hear ALL of that “discussing
their options conversation”… only minutes before they actually left the
black and were headed south to the Boulder Springs Ranch.
Even if fire command was totally confused about what they had heard
(only) on the TAC channels… there stood Brendan in the Ranch House
Parking lot having heard all the ‘private’ conversations as well… and apparently
not saying anything. It is ( as you say ) totally inconceivable and remains
just one more conundrum associated with that tragic loss of life that day.
The fact that no one did ( either know or speak up ) just adds to the
astonishing and inexplicable ‘secrecy’ that still seems to have been almost
PURPOSELY in place that afternoon and eventually allowed 2 men to
lead 17 others to their deaths.
After Marsh affirms his and GMIHC crew location as being on the South side of the fire (in front of the flaming front) at 1642, why would anyone (who heard the radio transmission) think they were anywhere near the two track road they walked in on. That just does not make sense.
calvin… we have the hindsight and audio recordings to
be sure that’s what Steed said at first. According to
the recordings… Bravo 33 DID ‘understand’ that’s where
they were… but maybe that all got lost in the confusion
that followed. I’m not sure anyone at the Ranch House
Restaurant was actually remembering exactly what
they heard over the radio at that time…
…but the SAIR still says that (at least) Brendan had
heard all there was to hear about their plans… BEFORE
they even left the black.
Marti’s comment has disappeared from my feed.
Regarding the ‘chase truck’, they are used in certain situations by local, state, and fed agencies. I’ve seen USFS Type III engine crews use chase vehicles in their home areas, most likely to save wear and tear on their expensive equipment when preforming routine errands, and scouting fires, etc., locally. I’m not sure if they take these chase vehicles on their long-haul fires. I don’t think it’s unheard of for a hotshot crew to have an addtional chase vehicle in certain circumstances, but ‘shots’ out there, please correct me if I’m wrong.
Therefore, I believe that in the semi-local area of Yarnell, GM may have chosen to take an additional ‘chase’ vehicle along for any number of reasons. WTKTT, if you look a little deeper into the GM wildland webpage, you will notice that it states ‘numerous other wildland vehicles.’
Yes… I did see that. Also mentions some ‘brush trucks’.
I am currently still ‘matching up’ all of the recently released
BR ‘redacted’ notes with the GPS tracking data to see
what shakes out. Still not sure if there was a fourth GM
vehicle that day or not. Even if there was… who would
have driven it down from Prescott? Steed, I assume.
What about Marsh if he thought he might be a DIVS?
There is ( so far ) no evidence whatsoever
that Eric Marsh had any earthly idea he was
going to be asked to be DIVSA until he walked
into that 7:00 AM briefing at that Yarnell Hill
Fire Station.
It is still not absolutely certain that Marsh was
even there. SAIR says he was… but ADOSH
report would only go so far as to say that
Marsh was ‘reported’ to have been there.
ADOSH couldn’t seem to even find the
absolute ‘proof’ that Marsh was at this
briefing or ever ‘looked at any Google
Maps on an iPad’ as the SAIR reported.
The whole ‘Marsh becoming DIVSA’ thing
( which may, itself, have actually contributed
to the tragic events later in the day ) is
actually still quite a mystery.
No one seems to really know…
1) WHY were they short a DIVS person
on Sunday morning when the resource
ordering for Sunday had been going on
since early evening the previous day?
2) WHO first decided that separating a
Type 1 Hotshot Crew from their regular
supervisor by making him DIVSA was
going to be a good idea that day?
3) Did Darrell Willis have anything to do
with suggesting Marsh be DIVSA that day?
4) Other questions surrounding this whole
“make Marsh DIVSA” that day.
It appears that the Yarnell Hill Fire has claimed another victim. It appears that as soon as tomorrow (reported in the Tuscon newspaper) the Northwest Fire District may disband the Ironwood Hotshots. This crew, analogous to the GMHS, was run by a fire district and not the state or the feds. The reason appears to be the same liability issues that have surfaced following the loss of the GMHS. So with a seemingly difficult fire season looming, Arizona will have lost 2 hotshot crews. The devastation wreaked by the YHF goes on and on.
The Funds and insurance needed to run a full crew is more attune to the Government. Even with government grants it just dose not cover the extras unless you are a large department. I think California lost the El Cariso Hot Shots as well. Hot Shot Crews have fluctuated in numbers over the years up and down.
Those that are good Fire Fighters will land on another Crew.
You well may be right, Bob. The real difference is that it is virtually impossible, if not impossible, to sue the Federal government. Hence, liability insurance is not an issue. So maybe all crews will soon have to be from the Federal government. What about all the lesser, non-hotshot crews? I understand the desire of everyone to have answers about what happened, but I do not think the effect of the sheer amount of the claims has been fully appreciated yet. I think the families really just wanted to know what happened that day and why. The failure so far to give an honest accounting of the events of that day I think encouraged the claims. Maybe some of them would have occurred anyway, but obfuscating the truth almost certainly made claims inevitable.
There are too few jobs anymore where people really seem to have a passion for what they do. Maybe that is why a bunch of hotshots losing their jobs seems more painful than usual.
Type 2 crews and other non federal crews when on a federal fire are covered under Government liability. As well as Medical treatment etc. The State should be the same. GM seasonal did not have Death benefit coverage A little confusing. None of the benefits are very big as far as any seasonal goes. Federal full time and appointed over half year employees are well covered for there families to receive benefits for wife and children. Plus life insurance policy. If you sue and collect you lose those benefits. Very simple explanation its a lot more complicated based on pay etcetera.
this is all I know new.
Another one comes forward:
http://www.kpho.com/story/24835120/firefighter-we-could-have-put-out-yarnell-hill-fire-on-day-one#.Uw-fR3Zg-iM.email
probably old news here. This is one of the (you)s that Joy spoke about so this was nice for us to see this person share publicly. We know its difficult to share the accounts for that weekend yet we cannot properly assess it until more like this share. Thank you to all that did that article piece.
I just had to pop on here to share we hiked with this top notch person. First one for 2014 to that area we hiked. His name Brian Frank. Top notch hike and he is contracted out from an Atlantic Coast Magazine and he is tied to the very first person who hunted Joy down in her town and gave his contact information to her old hiking pal and the original source who saw the lightning strike/fire; Ronda Carnes (Congress Country Store cashier). Brian Mockenhaupt. When his article surfaces I know its going to be great. Brian Frank kicked butt in time and length of his hike. Joy has not kept me up to speed since she dropped her mifi. Anything new I should know about?
Reply to Bob Powers post on March 3, 2014 at 8:46 am
>> Mr. Powers wrote…
>>
>> My back thoughts are Brown went searching for the crew after deployment
>> and he was all over the place because he did not know where they were
>> had he been part of there conversation wouldn’t he have known where they
>> went . he only says he heard they were walking thru the black.
Absolutely correct.
We already knew for certain that both Frisby and Brown only had ONE
thought about how they might have been ‘coming down from there’ ( if
they really were coming down ) and that was that they would be coming
down the same two-track road they hiked in on that morning and the same
one that Brown and Frisby used to go up there for that NOON face-to-face.
But now we have even MORE ‘confirmation’ that Frisby and Brown only
had this one thought and no reason to believe anything else.
Here’s another ‘cut’ from BR Captain Brown’s recently released (redacted)
recollections where he is now recalling the ‘ground rescue mission’ itself
and how they were not surprised at all when they first headed west to find
the Ranger 58 helicopter ‘hovering’ over the old-grader location. That
old-grader location had been totally cleared earlier with the dozer and it
made perfect sense to them as they headed west that that might be
where they deployed… because even then, as they charged out there
on the UTVs, that location matched the ONLY way they believed they would
have been heading down from that anchor point that day…
Page 7 of BR Captain Brown’s (redacted) log notes…
________________________________________________________________
1750 – All three vehicles head up to the upper 2-track junction and then we see that
Ranger 5 is hovering over something down in the flats off the north. We all head
down the hill until we determine that it is a old piece of heavy equipment that was
seen early by (xxxxxxx) This is the area where they would have been had
they been traveling in the Black like we initially thought. (xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx)
(xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx)
________________________________________________________________
>> Mr. Powers also wrote
>> I don’t think he was privy to the options conversation.
Neither do I… but GIVEN the *new* information that Brown was driving the ‘GM
Chase truck’ ( alone ) at the same time Brendan has always been known
to have been driving the ‘GM Superintendent truck’ (alone)… and BOTH
those trucks had onboard radios tuned the same frequency the 4:02
‘discussing their options’ conversation took place on…
…the possibility that BR Captain Brown now may at least ‘overheard’ that
entire ‘discussing their options’ conversation ( just like the SAIR has always
said Brendan did ) is very real.
Why we aren’t hearing anything specific about it in Captain Brown’s obvious
sincere and professional attempts to supply complete recollections from that
afternoon really only come down to a finite set of possibilities…
1) Brown was in the ‘GM Chase Truck’ only long enough to move it
and was ‘out’ of that truck ( and away from the GM Crew radio ) by 4:02 PM.
2) Brown DID overhear that ‘discussing their options’ conversation at
4:02 PM ( over the GM Chase Truck radio ), he DID say something about it
in his notes… but that is now one of the HEAVILY REDACTED sections.
3) Brown was in a position to hear that 4:02 conversation… but wasn’t really
paying attention by then and just truly doesn’t remember any of that conversation
that we can all now hear taking place in the MacKenzie videos.
Or there was really no body outside the crew that heard that conversation caught on video. It was by chance in-house between Marsh and Steed and no one else involved. The other voice was not another voice but Marsh. I think we are stuck here unless some one else comes forward or some other information turns up which keeps happening.
**
** NEW TIMELINE FOR WHEN BRENDAN LEFT HIS LOOKOUT POST?
This relates to the message below about trying to match some of the NEW
statements we now have in the Blue Ridge (redacted) documents with
real events recorded by BR Captain Brown’s GPS tracking data.
As it turns out… there is now one simple ‘new’ statement from Captain
Brown that puts a new timestamp on when things were actually
happening out west with regards to Frisby picking up McDonough, and
how that relates to when Brendan must have first decided to leave
his lookout position.
We KNOW that Frisby simply ‘borrowed’ the BR UTV to go (alone) and try
and make that ‘face-to-face’ meeting that Marsh was requesting at that
critical time… but that trip turned into him ‘accidentally’ coming across
Brendan evacuating from his lookout post.
We also KNOW that right after Frisby borrowed the UTV for that trip… Captain
Brown simply began ‘walking’ east on that cutover road ( with the GPS unit )
and continued to do so the whole time Frisby was gone with Ranger.
We also know the time that Brown stopped walking east and then just
suddenly turned around to walk back west again. ( 1541 +/- 30 sec ).
In Captain Brown’s newly released (redacted) logs, we now learn
that Brown’s ‘decision’ to turn around on that GPS timestamped hike
he was taking was a purposed ‘about face’ that he did at the exact
moment he ( Brown ) got a radio directive from Frisby, who had ( at that
moment ) just picked up Brendan.
From Captain Brown’s (redacted) notes… ( NOTE where he describes
the moment he did his ‘about face’ on his hike… and WHY… )
________________________________________________________________
( Brian ) drives in on the 2 track and sees Granite Mountains ( lookout hiking )
out to the 2 track and tells him to get in since (Brian) can see that fire will soon
be at their location. ( Brian calls Eric ) and lets him know that we have the
( lookout ) then calls me and asks for some drivers to bump back to grab their
trucks and buggies because Granite Mountains trucks will be burned over very
soon. ( Brian ) also calls Granite Mountain and lets them know that we will move
their trucks. I do an about face and hike through the crew that is now prepping
the dozer line.
_________________________________________________________________
That ‘moment’ ( when Brown did his ‘about face’ ) is definitely captured
by his GPS tracking unit and is THIS moment…
Time – Distance traveled in feet – Miles per hour – Description
1541 – 0184.107 – 02.09 – End of EASTWARD hike on Cutover Trail
1542 – 0265.927 – 03.02 – Start of WESTWARD return hike on Cutover Trail
The GPS unit was only updating every 60 seconds so given the recorded
‘change in direction’ it is safe to say that the exact ‘moment’ when Brown
received the request from Frisby to ‘grab some drivers to help move the GM
trucks’ and he IMMEDIATELY did his ‘about face’ on the Cutover trail would be…
1541.30 ( +/- 30 seconds )
So… working BACKWARDS from that absolute KNOWN time, and accounting
for all the things Brown says were happening at ( and leading UP to ) that
moment… ( and other things we know happened in that timeframe ) we get
something close to this ‘new’ timeframe for Brendan deciding to leave
his lookout position…
NOTE: Most of the ‘back timing’ from the KNOWN ( GPS recorded ) 1541
‘about face’ moment are obviously just ‘estimates’… but I think they are
good ‘estimates’. The time of 4 minutes for Brendan’s ‘hike down’ from his
lookout position is based on his ADOSH reported lookout location of
34.232856, -112.783032, which put him exactly 928.847 feet ( 309.615 yards )
away from the spot where he would be picked up by Frisby. So a comfortable
( but brisk ) hiking pace of about 3 mph means he could have covered that
distance in just 4 minutes once he started hiking down from there.
1533.00 – Brendan first realizes he needs to leave his lookout position.
1533.30 – Brendan has his documented radio call with Steed about leaving.
1534.00 – Brendan starts hiking down from his lookout spot.
1538.00 – Brendan finishes his short ( 4 minute ) hike down from his lookout spot.
1538.30 – Brendan checks out deployment options, gets ready to call Frisby.
1539.00 – Frisby, on UTV, comes across Brendan on two-track near old grader.
1539:30 – Frisby decides face-to-face with Marsh is OFF and to evac Brendan.
1540.00 – Brendan loads up into Frisby’s UTV Ranger.
1540.30 – Brendan hands Frisby his crew radio to talk directly to Marsh/Steed.
1540.45 – Frisby calls Marsh/Steed and tells them he now has Brendan with him.
1541.00 – Frisby calls Brown and requests drivers to help move GM trucks.
1541.15 – Frisby calls Marsh/Steed and tells them BR will be moving GM vehicles.
1541.30 – Brown does his ‘about face’ on the Cutover trail ( Recorded by GPS ).
1545.00 – Frisby drops Brendan off back east at the GM Supt truck.
1549.43 – ADOSH photo 27 – Taken by Brendan standing back by GM Supt truck.
1549.44 – ADOSH photo 28 – Taken by Brendan standing back by GM Supt truck.
Reply to Elizabeth post on March 2, 2014 at 4:49 pm
>> Elizabeth said…
>> If there was a “third voice” in the Chris Mackenzie video clips at roughly
>> 4:01 and 4:02, the voice is very likely to be the voice of ( Blue Ridge
>> Captain ) Trueheart Brown, because he was WITH Brendan McDonough
>> at that point, riding in the GM chase truck (if I recall correctly)
Actually… you MAY be right.
There is NEW evidence in the recently released Blue Ridge ‘unit logs’ that
changes a number of assumptions such as… how many vehicles Granite
Mountain really had with them that day… and who ended up DRIVING them.
These new BR (redacted) documents now establish that in addition to
the two GM Crew Carriers and the GM Superintendent truck… there was
ALSO a ‘GM Chase/Utility truck’ that had to be dealt with that day.
There is no doubt that the first 8 pages of the BR ‘redacted documents’ is
actually BR Captain Trueheart Brown’s ‘recollections’ of June 30.
We already knew that Brendan McDonough drove the GM Superintendent
truck ‘out of there’ that afternoon… but only NOW do we learn that it appears
to be BR Captain Trueheart Brown who drove this (previously unknown) ‘GM
Chase truck’ out there as well around the same time, as part of a ‘convoy’.
>> Elizabeth wrote…
>> …because he (Brown) was WITH Brendan McDonough at that point,
>> riding in the GM chase truck (if I recall correctly).
You have recalled that part of Brown’s redacted logs ALMOST correctly.
He was only WITH Brendan in the sense that Brendan was driving the
GM Superintendent truck ( alone ) and Brown now seems to have been
driving the other ( previously unknown ) GM Chase truck… but they
were, in fact, driving them out TOGETHER ( in convoy ).. so YES…
you could say that Brown was WITH McDonough ( but in separate vehicles ).
>> Elizabeth also wrote…
>> and True himself stated that he was USING Brendan’s radio to communicate
>> with GM on their crew frequency.
Again… ALMOST correct, according to the newly released BR redacted logs.
Trueheart Brown DOES say that he ‘communicated with GM on their frequency’
but he was doing it by himself just using the onboard radio in the GM Chase
truck that he was now driving ( alone ).
This is really good NEW information and still needs to be looked into some
more… but with regards to whether that still *might* be Captain Brown
participating in the 4:02 ‘discussing their options’ conversation or not… it
all comes down to TIMING.
It’s already been well established that at the time Brendan had to be
‘evacuated’ and everything starting going ‘sideways’… there were any
number of direct communications with both Steed and Marsh about
Frisby successfully ‘evacuating’ Brendan and that he was going to
abandon the planned face-to-face with Marsh, take Brendan back
east with him, and that Blue Ridge would also ‘move the GM vehicles’.
The recently released BR redacted logs just tell us more about HOW
all that happened and who was really informing who about what.
>> Elizabeth also wrote…
>> To that end, I believe the partial sentence in those ( 4:02 video ) clips
>> might well include the word “stage” or “staged,” which would make
>> sense, b/c that conversation was at the same time GM and Blue Ridge
>> were discussing Blue Ridge moving and re-staging GM’s vehicles.
Again… you might be absolutely right… but as far as those conversations
( about moving the BR vehicles ) extending right into the 4:02 ‘discussing
their options’ conversation… I think that still remains to be seen/determined.
Yes… that MIGHT be Trueheart Brown actually captured in the MacKenzie
video talking to Marsh/Steed over the onboard radio in the GM Chase
truck ( now that we finally learn that was even a possibility )… but those
‘moving the vehicles’ conversations *might* have also been all over and
done with by the time we hear Marsh/Steed ‘discussing their options’
in the MacKenzie videos… and there really is no ‘third voice’ there at all.
If that really ends up being Brown saying anything at all to Marsh/Steed
in the 4:02 timeframe the real head-scratcher would be why Brown, with all his
detailed notes and recollections, doesn’t say he heard any of the other real
content of that 4:02 conversation ( such as the things that WE can hear being
said thanks to Christopher MacKenzie ).
If Brown really had been a participant in that 4:02 PM conversation and he
really did hear them say that they were going to ‘leave that black’ in 120
seconds and try to get to town… I would think Captain Brown would have
already reported hearing that. ( Maybe he DOES? Maybe that’s one of
the REDACTIONS? )
More about the TIMING here…
According to Captain Brown’s logs… he actually had a lot more to do with
the moving of all FOUR of the GM vehicles ( and the communicating back
to Marsh/Steed about all that ) than was previously thought… including these
‘moments’ he talks about now when he seems to have been using the
actual onboard GM crew radio in the GM Chase truck to do just that.
In order to really understand the exact TIMING of all these ‘new’ actions
and events we are only now learning about from the redacted BR logs,
the claims now being made by Brown need to be matched up with
the actual BR GPS tracking data.
I am in the process of doing that exact thing here, myself.
Some of the things Captain Brown is ‘recalling’ in his redacted logs
actually match the data from his own GPS unit exactly… but some other
things do NOT… so there are now even some NEW ‘mysteries’ here.
More about all that later.
In the meantime… here is exactly what BR Captain Trueheart Brown says
about his participation in the ‘dust off’ of both the GM Superintendent truck
AND the ( previously unknown ) GM Chase truck…
NOTE: The only mention of any TIME at all previous to this section is back
on his page 3 at 11:15 AM. He then turns to just straight narrative for the rest
of the day and doesn’t put one single TIME stamp on any other even until
AFTER the following section when he finally mentions the TIME again
at 1615 ( 4:15 PM ) on page FIVE.
That why the GPS data is going to be needed to really put any kind of TIME
stamps on any event/action he is reporting between 11:15 AM and 4:15 PM.
From pages 4 and 5 of Captain Trueheart Brown’s (redacted) recollection(s)…
________________________________________________________________
I get out of the ranger and tie in with the crew as they are hiking in I get the
crew lined out and ( xxxxx ) remains lookout from the dozer line, I continue
hiking as the crew begins working, my intent was to get to high point on a
rocky area to the north of the Dozer line/youth camp and see if there was a
way to get fire around the structures and out to 89 off the dozer line. This was
our current thinking at the time to bring fire down the original 2 track to the north
and then herd it around the town and out to the highway. ( Brian ) drives in on
the 2 track and sees Granite Mountains ( lookout hiking ? ) out to the 2 track
and tells him to get in since ( Brian ) can see that fire will soon be at their location.
( Brian calls Eric ? ) and lets him know that we have the ( lookout ? ) then calls
me and asks for some drivers to bump back to grab their trucks and buggies because Granite Mountains trucks will be burned over very soon. ( Brian ) also
calls Granite Mountain and lets them know that we will move their trucks.
I do an about face and hike through the crew that is now prepping the dozer line.
I grab the last (xxxxx) and send the (xxxxxxxx) up with the rest of the crew and
(xxxx) plus myself and (xxxx) head to the main 2 track. (Brian) is heading to the
Granite trucks at this time too. I call the driver that is bumping the supt truck
and have him turn around and meet us at the location where the crew unloaded.
We tie in with him quickly and head up the road. (xxx) drops off the (xxxxx) off
at the trucks and comes back for me and grabs me and with the ranger and
we head up to the supt and chase trucks. I instruct our guys to grab their buggies
and wait until we get back to them I jump in their chase and the ( GM lookout
follows ? ) me and we pick up our guys in their buggies who fall into the convoy.
I have the front and (xxxx)s bring up the rear. I then get conformation that our
trucks are at the youth camp from (xxxxx) At this time I jump on their crew radio
and talk with (xxxxxxxx) about where we are taking the buggies and the situation
down here. I explain about what we are doing and what the fire behavior is doing.
(xxxxxxxx) (xxxxxxxxxx). I also reiterate that we are going to keep their ( lookout? )
with us until we tie in with them later, I explain that we will keep their rigs
with us too because things are very dynamic now, and ( Eric? ) mentions that
they are trying to come down off the hill. he mentions traveling through the black.
I also get positive conformation that ( Eric? ) understands where the trucks will
be parked because he can see the trucks driving out and I orient him to the
rocky area north along the dozer line ( end of shrine rd ) that we are taking
them to. (xxxxxxxx) (xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx)
(xxxxxxxxxxx) (xxxxxxxxxxx) We drive around to the youth camp and park their
rigs with ours. We then get positive conformation that the area that the Granite
Mountain trucks were just in was burned, from (xxxxx) via the radio. I jump back
in the ranger and ( Brian? ) and I drive back up via the dozer line to the main two
track we pass (xxxx) and then we head west towards the fire to see exactly what
the situation is. I have the drivers get geared up to assist the rest of the crew.
_________________________________________________________________
I just want to say, thanks for continuing to work on this, and, even tho I had to “retire” I’ve still been reading everyday.
I think you are adding a vehicle that doesn’t exist anywhere in any other reality/pix/vids re the GM trucks. AND I have been trying to figure this out and it’s very confusing. I don’t think there’s any other GM “chase truck” — I think it’s the Sup truck. But there’s a lot of looseness in the lingo.
Where you are reading “I jump in their chase and the (GM lookout follows?) me” could be read all kinds of other ways such as “I jump in their chase and the (lookout trades places with) me.” As in Trew starts driving, which would sync with him saying “I have the front…” Also, I think there’s some confusion in his notes, because I think the Blue Ridge Sup Truck is also included in this “bumping.”
Thinking about this, and Elizabeth’s question. Given what we “know” of the timeline, it still seems to me ( and I could be wrong) that the “Options Convo” came earlier than this bumping of the vehicles, given that Brendan drove the GM Sup truck down thru Yarnell and back up to the Youth Camp before Blue Ridge bumped the GM Buggies.
So that would mean that if Trew was driving the GM Sup Truck (w/Brendan in it and radios on), he would be hearing/communicating w/GM after the “Options Convo.” But also between that and their descent into the chimney canyon. So that is noteworthy.
But this timeline doesn’t put Trew into it early enough for him to have interacted in the “Options Convo” to have said anything. Unless…….?
The thing that all these conversations have relentlessly spiralled around into (and the above is tantalizing but still doesn’t get there) for me has been this:
The attempt, after the communique of the deployment, to go in and find them, including the at-the-time very real hope that they might be alive (which is easy to forget because we know the outcome).
It is so essentially incomprehensible to me that ANYBODY who even came close to knowing that they had communicated that they were heading to the Boulder Springs Ranch during that “Options Conversation” (or anything later) would not have said ANYTHING about that when the rescue crews were assembling.
(I’m writing this on an iPad, which is more of a pita to do this on that I anticipated,not my computer, so my typing is clumsy, so forgive me for that).
So, I’m thinking right now that Trew didn’t hear that conversation, and didn’t make that comment, because he EVENTUALLY may have been driving/in the GM Sup truck, but it was LATER ( which raises other possibilities, but I still think he thought GM was leaving via the lower two-track).
And everything looks to me that when he went in with the ranger, he still thought that.
The question that totally haunts me is this. How could it be that Brendan, who seemingly heard all of that “Options Conversation,” didn’t say ANYTHING to ANYONE, about the fact the GM was, in fact, heading (and cutting down into) to the Boulder Springs Ranch???
WTK says the difficult/essential thing is to determine what is impossible. Is it impossible that, even though Brendan overheard all the GM intra-crew coms, and Trew seems to have been able to hear some of them, neither of them knew that GM had actually headed down in a shortcut in the direction of the Boulder Springs Ranch, and, thus, that’s the direction where all the rescue efforts needed to be focused on?
Because that’s the information that seems to have been lacking in the almost two hours which the attempt to locate them consumed. Which, all things considered, even given the fact that we after-the-fact know there was no hope, seems to me to be profoundly troubling.
OK Doing this on an iPad is a mess but I hope you get the message, v
because this is how I had to do it.
And PS I’m having trouble following this upside-down format big time, but I’m seeing others are addressing my concerns also while I typed it.
Marti…
I’ve been having trouble with this (supposed) ‘4th truck’
myself, ever since I first read BR Captain Brown’s
(redacted) recollections.
Like you… I DO find it hard to believe it could have been
‘missed’ for this length of time in all the all other documents,
photos and notes ( or never even mentioned ).
But Captain Brown’s notes say what they say and
his descriptions of what happened around that time
( while more than just a little confusing ) seem to support
that new theory that there was a FOURTH GM vehicle
that had to be ‘dealt with’ that day ( and that HE was
driving it at some point ).
The original ‘Granite Mountain Station 7’ page is still fully
online on the City of Prescott website and it is hasn’t
been touched since before the incident. There isn’t even
any ‘memorial’ on that page or even any mention that
anything at all has happened to them, even now.
That page has both an ‘equipment’ list for ‘Station 7’
and a PHOTO of the vehicles assigned to it.
There is only a Superintendent truck, and 2 Crew
Carriers in both the ‘equipment list’ and the ‘photo’
on that page ( although no date for photo is given ).
There is no separate ‘Chase’ truck listed or seen there.
That ‘Granite Mountain Station 7’ home page is here…
http://www.cityofprescott.net/services/fire/stations/77.php
So… ( as you point out )… it really all comes down to
this statement from Captain Brown…
“I jump in THEIR chase and the ( GM lookout follows ? )
me and we pick up our guys in their buggies who fall into
the convoy. I have the front and (xxxx)s bring up the rear.”
There is also no doubt that when Brendan took those
3 photographs of his at 4:02 PM, looking west from
Highway 89, as he was driving ( whatever he was
driving ) around to the Shrine Youth Camp… those
photos were taken from the driver’s seat.
Is it possible Captain Brown really was with him, and
driving that ( only ) Supt/Chase truck… and Brendan
handed him his camera from the passenger side
so Brown could take those photos?
Well… yea… sure… I guess that’s possible ( but not
all that likely ).
I don’t know if any of this will eventually lead to discovering
who ( if anyone ) other than Brendan might have been
hearing any/all private conversations over the GM
intra-crew frequency… or even a possible participant…
but at the very least these ‘redacted’ notes are supplying
new mysteries of their own that need to be ‘solved’ just for
the sake of accuracy.
Example: There are actions that Brown says he took
after the deployment trying to find a way to ‘break through’
out west that are in no way even represented by his
own GPS unit. So either he handed his GPS unit to
someone else for a few minutes at that time while he
went off to ‘check the Shrine road first, but realized
that was impossible’, and then took it back again
after that… or he is simply not remembering correctly
what he actually did that afternoon.
More on that later ( things he says he did that do not
even appear in his own GPS data records ).
Re: No one really knowing where to look for them
I agree with you totally. It is equally inconceivable to me
that Brendan ( or ANYONE standing in that Ranch House
Restaurant parking lot circa 1645+ ) who might have had
even that slightest *real* idea of where those poor men
might have been when the deployed would NOT have
spoken up and said something.
The fact that no one did ( either know or speak up ) just
adds to the astonishing ‘secrecy’ that still seems to have
been almost PURPOSELY in place that afternoon and
eventually allowed 2 men to lead 17 others to their deaths.
Blue Ridge IHC Captain “True Brown.”
If there was a “third voice” in the Chris Mackenzie video clips at roughly 4:01 and 4:02, the voice is very likely to be the voice of True Brown, because he was WITH Brendan McDonough at that point, riding in the GM chase truck (if I recall correctly), and True himself stated that he was USING Brendan’s radio to communicate with GM on their crew frequency. Again, Brendan claimed after listening to those clips (or at least one of them) that the voices were *not* his. They still could be, and maybe he is just forgetting, but the more likely options are either (a) there is no “third voice” or (b) there is a “third voice” and the voice is that of True Brown.
To that end, I believe the partial sentence in those clips might well include the word “stage” or “staged,” which would make sense, b/c that conversation was at the same time GM and Blue Ridge were discussing Blue Ridge moving and re-staging GM’s vehicles. Again, however, all of this is conjecture, because the top audio forensics experts in the nation seem pretty united on the fact that trying to “definitively” reach conclusions based on these types of messy, tenuous, uber-short audios is dicey.
I did not see any statement by Brown about that conversation He seemed to give the info he had. Might want to recheck his statements. Could have been one of the GM foreman.
It’s in True’s unit log, Bob.
Bob,
There was a whole batch of documents, etc released by ADOSH 2 weeks ago. So Elizabeth likely has some info we do not. Obviously do not know if this was in there or not. The only mention in the press so far was a report from abc 15 the first night and likely that kpho report about putting the fire out the first night. So either the release was not much, or the sheer volume of info has slowed the writing of news stories. Time will tell.
Elizabeth is correct. There IS ‘new’ information in the
recently released BR (redacted) logs from Captain
Brown about him having ‘access’ to a radio that had
the GM private frequency.
As it turns out… we only now learn ( from these redacted
notes ) that there was a FOURTH Granite Mountain
vehicle there that day that Blue Ridge had to deal with.
Brendan ended up driving the GM Supervisor truck ‘out
of harms way’ but now we learn there was also a
‘GM Chase Truck’ and Captain Brown (apparently)
had to drive that one ‘out of there’.
Captain Brown also reports ( in the recently released
logs ) that while he was driving that ‘GM Chase truck’,
he was using the onboard radio to communicate with Marsh/Steed over their own crew frequency.
See a longer post just above about this.
My back thoughts are Brown went searching for the crew after deployment and he was all over the place because he did not know where they were had he been part of there conversation wouldn’t he have known where they went . he only says he heard they were walking thru the burn. I don’t think he was privy to the options conversation.
That should have been black not burn.
Mr. Powers… see a longer reply to what
you just said just above. There is even MORE
proof now of what you just said in Captain
Brown’s recently released (redacted) notes.
When Brown is describing the ground rescue
mission itself… the Ranger 58 helicopter was
( at first ) hovering over the old-grader
location and as they were charging out
there to check it out that made perfect
sense to them ( Frisby and Brown ) since
that’s the ONLY direction/area they had any
reason to believe they would have been
using coming down from the saddle.
If either Brown or Frisby really did have any
earthly idea how far away the deployment
really had taken place… I doubt they would
have been wasting even one moment
searching around the old-grader.
p14 BR notes made 7/1 and Titled Yarnell Hills Fire Notes, says…..
After the fire front continues south,——— eventually head into GMIHC’s last known whereabouts and comes upon the scene and finds packs and shelters being deployed.
Who said this?
Thinking out loud….. was it the same guy filming the VLAT and says something like…….That Mother Fucker??
Reply to calvin post on March 2, 2014 at 7:07 am
>> calvin said…
>>
>> p14 BR notes made 7/1 and Titled Yarnell Hills Fire Notes,
>> says….. After the fire front continues south,——— eventually
>> head into GMIHC’s last known whereabouts and comes
>> upon the scene and finds packs and shelters being deployed.
>>
>> Who said this?
It’s very hard to tell. This ‘recollection’ is totally ‘third person’.
There is not one sentence in there where he uses the first
person and describes anything HE did ( personally ) so it’s
hard to identify this writer.
I would say definitely just a ‘crew’ member and definitely
one of the fellas who did nothing but ‘stage’ all day waiting
for something to do.
Even his short description of the ‘assignment’ the BR crew
actually (finally) got later in the day pretty much sums up
what happened. By the the time anyone came up with
an ‘assignment’ for the BR crew itself… and they got around
to moving all their Crew Carriers all the way over to the
Youth Camp on Shrine road… and then they got ‘spread out’
on that cutover road to start trying to ‘improve’ the dozer
work there… it was time to evacuate back to the Youth Camp.
So the BR crew itself really got nothing constructive done that
day at all. It was basically just Brian Frisby and Trueheart Brown
who were running around all over the place that day just
scouting, meeting with Marsh, scouting some more, trying
to get the men ‘spread out’ on the cutover road, then making
sure everyone just got the heck OUT of there… and then
eventually playing a role in the ‘ground rescue mission’ after
the deployment.
The BR CREW itself did nothing but ‘stage’ at various places all
day and never really did much of anything.
>> calvin also wrote…
>> Thinking out loud….. was it the same guy filming the VLAT
>> and says something like…….That Mother Fucker??
Very well could be. These notes were definitely written by
someone who was just ‘part of the crew’ and hanging around
by the BR Crew Carriers when that video was taken, waiting
for someone to give them something to do.
Reply to calvin post on March 1, 2014 at 8:41 pm
>> calvin said…
>> Wtktt… correct me if I am wrong, but isn’t their a brief gap between
>> the first Mackenzie video and the second video (like 9 seconds)?
Yep… but it’s more than 9 seconds.
First MacKenzie video ENDS at exactly………… 16:01:40.24
Second MacKenzie video STARTS at exactly… 16:02:10.00
That’s exactly 29.76 secs between the end of the first video and the
start of the second one.
So with each of the videos only capturing 9 seconds of conversation the
gap is enough time for at least 3 times as much ‘talk’ as is heard in either
of the videos… but still only enough time for someone to say 1 or two
complete sentences.
The SECOND video starts by capturing the END of a statement Marsh was
making to either Steed ( or to the mysterious 3rd person, if involved ).
That’s the statement that Marsh either just ‘ends’ with “ya know” and the
3rd person answers right away with “You bet!”
OR…
It’s just Marsh just ending that same sentence himself with
BOTH phrases “ya know… you bet”.
0888 is the first video, then still images 0889 and 0890 were taken
BETWEEN the two videos, and 0891 is the second video.
More detail…
1601:31 – MacKenzie 110-0888 – First VIDEO capturing (only) Marsh saying
“I could just feel it, ya know”. Duration: 9.24 sec.
1601:52 – MacKenzie 110-0889 – First still photo at this new location 12
seconds after shooting the first video.
1602:00 – MacKenzie 110-0890 – Second still photo here just 8 seconds later.
1602:10 – MacKenzie 110-0891 – Second VIDEO, 10 seconds later.
Duration: 9.14 sec.
SECOND video just captures just the END of a statement from Marsh, then
Marsh either adding “You bet” to the end of of his OWN statement OR someone
else ( other than Steed ) adding “You bet” with modulation over the radio, then
Steed says “I copy” and adds his statement about the fire being near the two-track.
Actual audio capture in the SECOND MacKenzie video is…
Marsh: “strange… ya know”
Marsh ( or someone else): “You bet!”
Steed: “I copy… and it’s almost made it to that two-track road we walked in on.”
Sorry for the confusion. I was posting from memory and thinking (incorrectly) that the “ya know” came at the end of the first video.
After reviewing, this is what I hear at the beginning of the second video.
Marsh …. “change…. ya know” (pause)
Marsh (?)… Too Bad
Ongoing thanks to Elizabeth, Dougherty, and WTKTT
I’m definitely hearing “too bad” as well.
Received this email this week:
Let the people decide for themselves—but let them decide upon the truth and the facts as they really are. HERE IS THE LINK:
http://www.kpho.com/story/24835120/firefighter-we-could-have-put-out-yarnell-hill-fire-day-one
Should have been put put night one by local crews …contractors are never used for initial attack they are to much of a liability.
Good article. Thank you, Joy.
The Yarnell Hill Fire officially became an ‘incident’ as early as
1736 ( 5:36 PM ) on Friday which is when Arizona Dispatch
started making log entries for this ‘incident’ and as it was
determined to be on ‘State land’, Russ Shumate immediately
started ‘handling’ it ( from Prescott ) and then officially became
the Type 4 Incident Commander ( ICT4 ) at around
1940 ( 7:40 PM ).
There were even hours of ‘daylight’ left on Friday to just
‘snuff it out’ and be done with it… but it didn’t happen.
The Yarnell Fire Department volunteer LeRoy Anderson
being quoted in the article must be the same LeRoy Anderson
who also reported just days after the incident that the second
(promised) mandatory evacuation notices never really
made it out to most people.
He reported about that in this other article…
http://www.azcentral.com/news/arizona/articles/20131116yarnell-fire-evacuations-chaotic-flawed.html
From the article…
___________________________________________________
Not everybody got the alerts.
That’s because only published landlines are automatically in the
system, officials said. To get e-mails and texts, people had to
sign up online. Some had unpublished numbers to avoid
telemarketers, but thought they would get the alerts.
Yarnell resident LeRoy Anderson said he signed up to receive
alerts but didn’t get them.
“Some people really did get missed,” said the 67-year-old retiree.
“They had no clue what was about to happen, especially in Glen
Ilah. Some of them just got out with the clothes on their back.”
___________________________________________________
By the way… this article actually answers another question
I’ve been asking for some time and that is whether or not
Yarnell Fire Chief Jim Koile was ever actually in Yarnell
that weekend at all… or, specifically, whether he was there
on Sunday to help with the evacuations.
Apparently… he was.
So that probably IS the “Chief Jim ?” that Roy Hall is referring
to in his interview with the SAIT investigators.
Also from the same article…
____________________________________________________
Sometime in early afternoon, a Yarnell evacuation was being
discussed at incident command, recalled Jim Koile, who recently
resigned as fire chief there.
“There was a concern we didn’t want to alarm people,” Koile told
The Arizona Republic in July. “And then it seemed like all at once
it became an urgency.”
____________________________________________________
READ page 27 of the SAIR – it basically helps explain the communications regarding the Granite Mountain Hotshots that you all are debating here (e.g. the 161620 video clip).
( Same reply to your same post from below )…
Okay. Did that. Those pages reference other (known) exchanges
at 1600 and then skip ahead to the other (known) 1637
transmission from Marsh regarding “That’s where we want
retardant”.
The only timestamped transmissions those pages refer to
just simply ‘bracket’ the start/stop of the (supposed) 37
minute blackout ( 1600 – 1637 ) with ‘no verifiable
communications with GM’ that the SAIR is claiming.
What, exactly, on those page(s) are you saying is any kind
of reference to the ( now known ) 1616 radio transmission(s)?
When Jessie Steed says….. copy, and it has almost made it to the two track that we walked in on.
It has been assumed this comment was to Eric marsh. Is he telling Marsh this information because Marsh cannot see the fire himself at this particular time?
Immediately following the “We are in front of the flaming front” radio transmission, Granite mountain tries to radio “Air Attack.” Who is Air Attack? Bravo33 or Rory Collins?
Interesting question about Marsh and Steed. I suppose it does not mean that Marsh could not see the fire, but makes you think it might be the case. What if the decision to go to Yarnell was made at a time when Marsh could not see the fire??? I understand all the arguments made against being at the ranch, but Marsh’s exact whereabouts do remain a mystery.
Mike, I think if we can find out how much time elapsed (precisely) between the radio call from marsh saying “That is exactly where we want the retardant” until he comes on the radio announcing that “I am with GM…”, then we can eliminate where Eric Marsh could not have been.
How much time really elapsed between those two statements?? 3 minutes, 4, 5, or more?
Brendan McDonough ( or anyone else who had been
listening to GM’s private channel that day ) knows where Marsh really was in the timeframe in question.
Good question, Calvin.
Why would Steed be informing Marsh of something he
could probably see even better than Steed at that moment,
if Marsh really was still just ‘working his way off the top’
at that point and was still a little north and on even higher
ground than Steed?
There are even some documented transmissions from
Marsh around that time ( not captured in any videos ) where
Marsh was saying things like “I can see the buggies”.
If Marsh could ‘see the buggies’ in that timeframe, why would
Steed feel the need to be informing Marsh about the fire
position in relation to the two-track road in that timeframe?
There is still that mysterious ‘third voice’ in the MacKenzie
video(s) that says “You bet” ( over the radio ) in response
to Marsh.
Steed MAY have simply felt the need to be ‘informing’ THAT
(third) person how close the fire was to the two-track,
during that three-way radio conversation.
Could that still actually just be Darrell Willis participating in
that MacKenzie video radio capture and the one saying
“You bet” to Marsh?
Not Willis – Frisby or Brown.
I should have added “Or Cordes….”
This goes back to my prior point about voices sounding DIFFERENT. According to the audio forensics experts, it is dicey to try to ascertain who is speaking for sure when you have short, noisy clips like those. The key players at that point in time were Cordes, the Blue Ridge guys, Steed, Marsh, Burfiend, and maybe Musser.
And also McDonough would have been on radio, may never know unless someone comes forward.
He did come forward, Bob. He claims it wasn’t him.
It probably wasn’t McDonough ( if it really was anyone else at
all saying “You bet” )… but
see post just below.
Elizabeth…. you have missed
the point about the radio
capture in question. If there
really is a ‘3rd person’ heard
in the clip then it HAD to be
someone who had a radio
tuned to GMs private
frequency. That elimnates
the people you listed and
only leaves Darrell Willis
or one of the other GM
squad leaders.
Or…one of the other PFD folks that were on the fire also that day in other positions. They would also have access to radios with the private channel..
Reply to Elizabeth post on
March 1, 2014 at 4:56 pm
>> Elizabeth said…
>>
>> Not Willis – Frisby or Brown.
>>
>> I should have added “Or Cordes….”
>>
>> The key players at that point in time
>> were Cordes, the Blue Ridge guys,
>> Steed, Marsh, Burfiend, and maybe
>> Musser.
Elizabeth… you are forgetting something
very important.
It doesn’t matter who might have been
‘available’ to be participating in that 4:02
conversation ( if, indeed, anybody other
than Steed or Marsh actually was ).
What matters is… “Who had the frequency?”
If you accept as fact that this captured
conversation was taking place on the
GM (private) intra-crew frequency… then
there is only a finite set of people who
even COULD have been on that channel
with them at that time.
That ‘finite’ list would be…
1) Brendan McDonough
2) Darrell Willis
3) One of the other GM squad leaders who
was, like Marsh, not there with Steed but
asked to participate in the ‘options’ talk.
Personally… I think option (3) is a non-starter
so that really just leaves TWO people…
Darrell Willis and Brendan McDonough.
If, however, you maintain that the captured
conversation was NOT taking place on the
GM private channel… then the obvious
question then would be why NO ONE ( and
certainly none of the people you just listed )
has reported even HEARING any of that
crucial ‘discussing their options’ conversation.
If that conversation we hear in the MacKenzie
video really was just taking place on one
of the open TAC channels at 4:02… then
it’s really inconceivable that NO ONE
( of all the people you just listed plus all
the other people interviewed ) would be
able to report hearing either all or even just
part of it.
So that’s why I said “Could it really be Willis?”
We KNOW that Brendan actually ‘heard’
ALL of this conversation ( the SAIR says
he did )… but I still don’t think even if that
is a ‘third person’ saying “You bet” in
response to Marsh that it could have been
Brendan. Brendan was a two-year
greenhorn and it wouldn’t have been his
place to be participating in that command
level ‘options’ discussion.
So ( in my opinion ) that only leaves Darrel
Willis as the ‘other’ possibility ( IF there was
a third person talking there ).
WTKTT…. with all due respect. I do not hear a third voice. And the phrase “you bet” sounds like “too bad” to me. And it sounds like Eric marsh (to me). (BTW, we have already had this conversation.)
Additional opinions on what is being said??
I listened again. I clearly thing it sounds like “you bet”, but not sure if Marsh or a 3rd party that says it. Being a Southerner, we say “ya know” but also “you bet” – 2 different pronunciations of the word “you”. It actually sounds like Marsh, not sure why he would use both phrases though.
I actually (personally) think there WAS a
‘third person’ participating in that 4:02
‘discussing their options’ conversation… but
with regards to what you just said…
…I also think it’s absolutely true that even
if it was just Marsh ending his statement
with BOTH ‘ya know… you bet’… that that
is the way any southerner would have.
I actually had this conversation about two
weeks ago regarding this very video clip.
My question to someone who was touting
themselves as an ‘expert’ on ‘southerners’
was this…
Why would a southerner be used to saying…
ya know
ya think?
ya don’t say?
…but then NOT say…
ya bet ( instead of ‘you bet’ ).
He scratched his head for a minute and
then said ( in his best drawl )…
“Ya know… that’s a gud question.
Alls I know is… ‘ya bet’ jus woudln sound rat.”
So if that really is just ‘all Marsh’ in that
captured audio… then ‘ya know… you bet’
would have been the way any southerner
would have put those two together.
Your friend is right, as long as he realizes “right” is a 2 syllable word.
Actually… in his case… it’s
about 4 syllables. I wrote that
out as best I could and still
have it be readable.
Reply to calvin post on March 1, 2014 at 5:26 pm
>> calvin said…
>> WTKTT…. with all due respect. I do not hear a
>> third voice. And the phrase “you bet” sounds like >> “too bad” to me. And it sounds like Eric marsh
>> (to me).
Fair enough.
>> calvin also said…
>> (BTW, we have already had this conversation.)
We certainly have… and I believe the way that
all ended was that in order to believe that there
is NOT a ‘third person’ responding to Marsh’s
statement with “You bet” means you MUST believe
that Marsh would end one of his own statements
with BOTH phrases “ya know… you bet”.
Not impossible or even implausible… but
certainly unusual.
I, personally, have NEVER heard anyone do that.
>> calvin also said…
>> Additional opinions on what is being said??
The only reason I was reminding everyone that
there still IS a possibility there is a ‘third voice’
there was in response to your own question.
It certainly would explain why Steed MIGHT be
saying “and it’s almost made it to that two-track
road that we walked in on” over the radio. He
was simply sure he was informing someone
of something he knew they could not see.
The only other answer I could propose to your
(good) question would be that Steed had absolutely
NO idea where Marsh was, but he knew he was
NORTH and maybe thought he was so FAR
NORTH of him that ( with the wind change )
Marsh could no longer see that road through
the smoke and so Steed was just making sure
Marsh knew how close it was whether he
could see clearly from where he was, or not.
What would be your own answer for your
own proposed question?
It’s a good question… and deserves an answer.
Wtktt… correct me if I am wrong, but isn’t their a brief gap between the first Mackenzie video and the second video (like 9 seconds)?
Meaning there is missing words or maybe a sentence or two between the two videos.
Reply to calvin post on
March 1, 2014 at 8:41 pm
>> calvin said…
>> Wtktt… correct me if I am wrong,
>> but isn’t their a brief gap between
>> the first Mackenzie video and the
>> second video (like 9 seconds)?
Yep… but it’s more than 9 seconds.
First video ENDS at exactly…
16:01:40.24
Second video STARTS at exactly…
16:02:10.00
That’s exactly 29.76 secs between
the end of the first video and the
start of the second one.
So with each of the videos only
capturing 9 seconds of conversation
the gap is enough time for at least
3 times as much ‘talk’ as is heard
in either of the videos.
… but still only enough time for
someone to say 1 or two complete
sentences.
The SECOND video starts by
capturing the END of a statement
Marsh was making to either Steed
( or to the mysterious 3rd person,
if involved ). That’s the statement
that Marsh either just ‘ends’ with
“ya know” and the 3rd person
answers with “You bet!” OR it’s
Marsh just ending that same
sentence himself with BOTH
phrases “ya know… you bet”.
0888 is the first video, then still
images 0889 and 0890 were taken
BETWEEN the two videos, and
0891 is the second video.
More detail…
1601:31 – MacKenzie 110-0888 – First VIDEO capturing (only) Marsh
saying “I could just feel it, ya know”.
Duration: 9.24 sec.
1601:52 – MacKenzie 110-0889 – First still photo at this new location 12 seconds after shooting the first video.
1602:00 – MacKenzie 110-0890 – Second still photo here just 8
seconds later.
1602:10 – MacKenzie 110-0891 – Second VIDEO, 10 seconds
later. Duration: 9.14 sec.
It captures just the END of a
statement from Marsh, then
Marsh either adding “You bet” to
the end of of his OWN statement
OR someone else ( other than
Steed ) adding “You bet” with
modulation over the radio, then
Steed says “I copy” and adds his
statement about the fire being near
the two-track.
Actual audio capture is…
Marsh: “strange… ya know”
Marsh or some else: “You bet!”
Steed: “I copy… and it’s almost
made it to that two-track road we walked in on.”
Calvin… sidenote…
Have you seen the additional folder added to Mr. Dougherty’s
online Dropbox?
It is labelled the ‘Stewart Turner’ photos but has the following
two sub-folders in it…
Ashcraft Photo Location
Parker Photo Location
They actually found the EXACT spot where those photos
were taken. It appears they were not even aware of the
existence of any of the MacKenzie photos yet or they probably
would have done the same thing for those photos.
They took GEO-STAMPED photos at those exact locations
for the Ashcraft 2:16 ‘lunch spot’ photo and the 4:04 PM
Parker photo… and the GEO stamps are accurate.
Here is that folder…
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/j0n13974nlb6xxp/470HDybJDQ
Followup… exact location of 2:16 PM Ashcraft photo…
34.228509, -112.788897
…and here is a direct link to the GEO stamped photo
already called up in an online EXIF extractor and
showing the exact location…
http://regex.info/exif.cgi?imgurl=https%3A%2F%2Fdl.dropboxusercontent.com%2Fsh%2Fj0n13974nlb6xxp%2FT11F-v2ixa%2FAshcraft%2520Photo%2520Location%2FAshcraft_photo_3.jpg%3Ftoken_hash%3DAAFQZd9SiWQEB4X_HTUOmBxJyIJyFtaiBiceUtjZdC5a3Q
Followup… exact location of 4:04 PM Wade Parker photo…
34.227511, -112.789962
…and another direct link to the GEO stamped photo
already called up in an online EXIF extractor and
showing the exact location…
http://regex.info/exif.cgi?imgurl=https%3A%2F%2Fdl.dropboxusercontent.com%2Fsh%2Fj0n13974nlb6xxp%2FYdG2A2H6VM%2FWade%2520Photo%2520Location%2FWade_photo_2.jpg%3Ftoken_hash%3DAAFQZd9SiWQEB4X_HTUOmBxJyIJyFtaiBiceUtjZdC5a3Q
Yes I have seen. I would guess Stewart Turner was made aware of those two photos by the family members that received the text messages and pictures from Ashcraft and Parker. From memory, those two locations were found by members of the Clay Templin Type 1 team immediately following June 30. I guess the Mackenzie photos/ videos (or possibly either device) had yet to be recovered .
Reply to calvin post on March 1, 2014 at 4:12 pm said:
>> calvin asked…
>> Immediately following the “We are in front of the flaming front”
>> radio transmission, Granite mountain tries to radio “Air Attack.”
>> Who is Air Attack? Bravo33 or Rory Collins?
Rory Collins left the fire ( abruptly – real reason still unknown )
circa 4:00 PM.
He was ‘long gone’ by the time Steed’s first MAYDAY went out.
Collins dumped the ‘Air Attack’ duties onto Bravo 33 when he
bolted from the fire so B33 was now trying to do both lead
plane duties AND be ‘Air Attack’ at the same time.
WTKTT… for my clarity….. Once Rory Collins gave a brief report to Bravo 33 and left due to time restrictions, , Burfiend or French became Air Attack and was identified as such on the radio?
Page 27 of the SAIR. Go re-read it. And maybe re-read page 26. That should help you understand the communications regarding the Granite Mountain Hotshots that you all are debating here (e.g. the 161620 video clip).
Okay. Did that. Those pages reference other (known) exchanges
at 1600 and then skip ahead to the other (known) 1637
transmission from Marsh regarding “That’s where we want
retardant”.
The only timestamped transmissions those pages refer to
just simply ‘bracket’ the start/stop of the (supposed) 37
minute blackout ( 1600 – 1637 ) with ‘no verifiable
communications with GM’ that the SAIR is claiming.
What, exactly, on those page(s) are you saying is any kind
of reference to the ( now known ) 1616 radio transmission(s)?
WTKTT,
You posted this above and hit on something without maybe realizing it. “The SAIT was ‘full of it’ when THEY PUT THOUGHTS IN Brian Frisby’s head
about him thinking Marsh meant ‘some ranch to the north’. There is no real
evidence that Brian Frisby ever had any such thought. … it is still not known if they,
themselves, even knew about something called the ‘Boulder Springs Ranch’, much less any ‘ranches to the north’. They had their own designated ‘escape
routes’ and ‘safety zones’ that day and none of them were ‘The Boulder Springs Ranch.” EMPHASIS ADDED.
There is an insidious ‘communication tool’ called Neuro-Linguistic-Programming (NLP) that proposes just that, putting ‘thoughts into peoples’ heads.’ They use it in Law Enforcement and even in Sales by ‘injecting knowledge’ and accomplishing it through very subtle biofeedback with breathing, eyes, actions, etc. It includes things like ‘mirroring’ by mimicking whatever they are doing. VERY, VERY INSIDIOUS AND DANGEROUS. I have seen it used before in SEVERAL wildfire investigations.
Reply to RTS post on February 28, 2014 at 8:10 pm
RTS… everything you said *might* be true… but I don’t think
anything even near stuff like that happened in this case.
( I could be wrong… but if they waved watches in front of
Brian during his interview and said “You’re getting ranchy…
VERY ranchy…”, there is no evidence of it. Frisby himself
would have to come out and say how that interview went
and whether anyone was trying to put thoughts in his head.)
We have the SAIT notes from their ‘interviews’ with Blue
Ridge personnel. We now have the written reports that
most ( but not all? ) Blue Ridge personnel were required
( by who ?? ) to ‘write down’.
There is no question what they ( Frisby and Brown ) *thought*.
Their ONLY *thought* was that Marsh meant they were coming
back down that same two-track road they hiked in on.
Period. End of story…
…but not ‘End of Narrative’.
I really think that when it came time to actually ‘write up’ the
SAIR Narrative… whoever was actually at the keyboard felt
free to just ‘put thoughts’ in Brian Frisby’s head about ‘some
ranch to the north’… simply because that ‘sounded better’
in that particular paragraph.
We are talking about simple ‘creative writing’ here… with no real
regard for the facts or for what professionals have (already)
testified to.
Notice that the SAIR does NOT say ( in writing ) that…
“BR Supt SAID he thought DIVS A was talking about heading
northeast, through the black, to one of the ranches in
that direction”.
There is no ‘SAID’ in there. It’s just a ‘mind read’…
“BR Supt thinks DIVS A is talking about heading northeast,
through the black, to one of the ranches in that direction.”
Very clever. There is, in fact, a legal difference between
actually putting words in someone’s mouth versus just
saying what YOU think THEY were ‘thinking’ ( which is
what the SAIT carefully did ).
The SAIT actually got THREE different ‘messages’ across
to the reader in this one line of fiction.
1) At least one trusted officer on the fireline ( other than IC
or OPS level ) thought Marsh was going to head ‘northeast’.
2) At least one trusted officer on the fireline ( other than IC
or OPS level ) thought any travel they did would be ‘in the black’.
3) At least one trusted officer on the fireline ( other than IC
or OPS level ) thought they were headed to some other ranch
( ANY other ranch ) rather than the one SOUTH and about
to be in harm’s way itself.
So you see what they did for the ‘reader’, there?
They make it sound like it wasn’t JUST the command level
people who were totally confused about where they were
going… they brought their ‘ranch confusion’ down to the working
fireline itself and into the brain of a co-worker that day.
Here’s the FULL QUOTE from Page 24 of the SAIR, complete
with their own FICTIONAL account of what Brian Frisby
was ‘thinking’ to make it all fit the ‘Narrative’ better…
A moment later, DIVS A says, “I want to pass on that we’re going to make our way to our escape route.” BR Supt attempts to clarify, “You guys are in the black, correct?” DIVS A responds, “Yeah, we’re picking our way through the black.” DIVS A then mentions a road in the bottom and “going out toward the ranch.” BR Supt thinks DIVS A is talking about heading northeast, through the black, to one of the ranches in that direction. BR Supt says, “DIVS A, to confirm, you’re talking about the road you saw me on with the UTV earlier, in the bottom.” DIVS A replies, “Yes, the road I saw you on with the Ranger [the UTV].”
** SIDENOTE
Getting back to what I just said above…
The heavily redacted ‘reports’ from most ( but not all? ) of the
Blue Ridge personnel that were recently released publicy
were ALL written the day ( morning? ) after the incident.
They redacted a LOT… but they forgot to redact the DATES
on all these typed and handwritten notes.
All the reports are dated… July 1, 2013.
So that means Blue Ridge finished their day on June 30
like this ( according to all their own notes )…
– They moved the (empty) GM Crew Carriers to the Yarnell
Hill Fire station and that’s where they remained until there
was an honor escort removing them from Yarnell some
days later ( July 3, I believe ).
– They went up to the Model Creek School ICP and were
‘de-briefed’. They don’t say by WHO.
– They grabbed some meals up there, ate them, and then
found a campspot up there and spent the night in Peeples Valley.
When they woke up… SOMEONE was standing there already
with instructions. Please WRITE DOWN everything that you
can recall about yesterday.
So that’s what they did less than 24 hours after the incident.
They all sat down and wrote out these ‘recollections’.
There is no evidence whether they were ‘isolated’ for this or
whether they were all allowed to freely compare notes and
check ‘times’ with each other while they wrote all this up.
My only question is… WHO was standing there when they
woke up wanting this to be the FIRST thing they all did
the very morning after the incident?
I want a NAME.
It wasn’t anyone from the SAIT. It wasn’t even formed yet and
the SAIT FOIA/FOIL releases did NOT contain these recent
notes released so even THEY didn’t have them for their report,
even though we know they were written the day after. Even
the SAIT ended up having to do their own ‘interviews’ with
Blue Ridge to get this (same) information.
It wasn’t anyone from ADOSH. They were already involved
but we also know now that they had to jump through hoops
later just to even get these ‘redacted’ copies of these reports
BR wrote the morning after the incident.
So that leaves the Feds.
Someone from BR’s ‘front office’ ( The USFS ), standing right
there when they woke up telling them to hand-write these reports,
and then walking away with them.
I wonder WHO that ‘someone’ was?
Followup…
>> WTKTT wrote…
>> There is no evidence whether they were ‘isolated’ for
>> this or whether they were all allowed to freely compare
>> notes and check ‘times’ with each other while they wrote
>> all this up.
Actually… there IS some ‘evidence’ as to what
happened there.
The TIMES for some of the ‘common’ events that these
men all experienced together that day are so WILDLY
different in a lot of their hand-written reports that you
almost have to assume they WERE all ‘isolated’ when
they were told to write these reports.
If they had been able to talk freely with each other at all
while writing up their notes… you would expect to NOT
see such WILD differences in the TIMES being
reported for certain things.
My guess would be that whoever was demanding these
written reports the very morning after the incident just
found an empty classroom at the Model Creek School
ICP itself… and all the BR guys were sitting in their
own ‘desks’ writing up these reports but not allowed
to talk to each other.
In the below-linked video clip from the Yarnell Hill Fire, which starts at 4:12.49 p.m. and runs until 4:16.20 p.m., listen carefully from 1:28 minutes into the video until 1:31 minutes into the video. Do you hear two different voices, with one guy speaking and another guy chiming in to cut the first guy off when you hear them saying:
You’re gonna see a little bit of smoke off your left side….
Disregard that….
Or do you think that it is ONE voice speaking and basically cutting himself off? It would be useful if someone *other* than WTKTT chimed in on this (I don’t have anything against WTKTT, of course, but I am curious to hear from others). Many thanks.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2WgErgCiYoo
It sounds like the same person to me. Either the lead plane or air attack talking to the VLAT. Sounds like he briefly let off pressure on the transmission button
I agree with Connor.
It is all one contiguous statement by the same person, telling
him ( the tanker? ) to ‘disregard’ that ‘little bit of smoke’ he’s
going to see on his left side ( as he makes his drop run ).
This video has ( at least ) TWO different handhelds on in
the background. One is tuned to the ‘Air’ channel(s) and is
capturing the planes preparing for the drop that’s about
to be captured in the video. The other handheld is tuned to
the command/TAC frequencies and capturing OTHER
conversations. Sometimes they overlap.
The keyed mic quick ‘squelch’ that is heard right in the middle
of the sentence you are asking about is coming from the
OTHER handheld that was tuned to the command/TAC channels.
This is the AIR STUDY video that captures the query
from someone at the ‘fire command’ level direct to
Granite Mountain ( on the TAC channel )…
+0:40.52
(Unknown): Granite Mountain ( Five? )…
What’s your status right now?
…and then BOTH Eric Marsh AND Jesse Steed respond
to that direct ‘what’s your status?’ query with…
+0:54.09 to +1:03.81
Eric Marsh: Well the guys… uh… Granite… is makin’ their
way out the exact escape route from this mornin’… an’ it
heads… ah… (pause) SOUTH. ( slight pause )
mid-slope, cuttin’ over.
+1:07.18
Jesse Steed: We’ll be pushin’ our way down into the
structures.
+1:10.16 ( Another voice. Very quickly )
Copy that.
Elizabeth,
I agree with everyone above. It’s the same guy making the statement and then cancelling it with whomever to “disregard.” It happens a lot.
Wtktt,
What do you think about this statement in the transmission.
“+0:54.09 to +1:03.81
Eric Marsh: Well the guys… uh… Granite… is makin’ their
way out the exact escape route from this mornin’… an’ it
heads… ah… (pause) SOUTH. ( slight pause )
mid-slope, cuttin’ over.”
He makes it sound that it should of “cut over” at mid slope so they would be moving with the contour, which never happened. He also sounds a little confused, almost as if he wasn’t exactly sure if the route. Unless the crew somehow missed the clearer path that ran mid slope? This is where it should of been flagged escape route if there was one at all.
Hopefully you have some facts that could shed some light as you have been doing.
Again thanks
Connor…
First of all… huge caveat here.
That transcript above is what I ( personally ) am
convinced is being said there. I have done my
OWN audio enhancement and had any number
of ‘other ears’ help me verify it. There are SOME
words in there that remain debatable… but
MOST of them are NOT.
Especially the key phrases such as…
“The guys”
“Granite”
“SOUTH”
“mid-slope”
I believe those are unmistakable and evidence
enough that fire command was having a direct
communication with Eric Marsh at 4:16 PM,
right smack in the middle of when the SAIR
says there was nothing ‘verifiable’ for a
30+ minute ‘blackout’ period.
Matter of fact… if anyone can’t hear the word
SOUTH in that transmission then they really need
to get a hearing aid. Marsh paused to ‘think about
it’ for a second… and then came back loudly and
forcefully with the word SOUTH just to be SURE
fire command ‘got that’.
I believe his ‘pause’ there means he was just
taking that moment to be SURE he ‘got it right’
and that it was, in fact, ‘due SOUTH’ and he
didn’t need to qualify it as ‘SOUTHEAST’ or
‘SOUTHWEST’. Marsh did ‘get it right’. The
two-track he was informing them about that
led to the box-canyon did, in fact, run due
SOUTH from the anchor point.
As for ‘mid-slope, cuttin’ over’…
I also think Marsh got at least the ‘mid-slope’
part of that description right.
From where Marsh was probably standing when
this 4:16 PM transmission took place… he was
probably still just ‘catching up’ to Steed and the
line of 18 men who had left the MacKenzie video
site ahead of him at 4:04 PM.
He would have actually been ‘walking south’ on
that two-track himself and simply describing
the route that lay ahead of him.
That two-track that headed south WAS ‘mid-slope’.
It was NOT on top of the actual ridge. It curled
around the hills there headed south at about the
‘mid-slope’ point… so that’s an accurate description
of that southerly route. ( Google Earth is the best
way to see this ‘mid-slope’ orientation on that
southerly two-track ).
As for “cuttin’ over”… your guess is basically as
good as mine. Marsh either simply meant they
were going to follow that ‘mid-slope’ southerly
two-track until they just ‘found’ a place to ‘cut
over’ to the ranch ( which, unfortunately, they
thought they did )… or Marsh really did know that
the two-track would eventually ‘cut over’ heading
east towards the Ranch… but forgot to tell Steed
that little detail and Steed took the crew ‘the wrong
way’ once that ranch came into sight.
I still maintain that Steed himself could have made
that fatal decision on his own and by the time
Marsh reached the descent point himself and
realized the others had dropped into the canyon…
for Marsh it then simply became a “there they go…
and I must follow them… for I am their leader”
situation.
>> Connor said…
>> He (Marsh) also sounds a little confused,
>> almost as if he wasn’t exactly sure if the route.
Yes, he does. I think the fact that he didn’t describe
it more accurately than he did, even when being
ASKED to ( at this point ) is part-proof that he
had never ‘checked it out’ and he was sort of
just ‘guessing’ about some things ( like where
to ‘cut over’ towards the Ranch ).
Whether ( as you point out ) that was actually
the first moment Marsh even thought about that
‘escape route’ long enough to even be sure what
compass direction it even headed in is debatable,
but it wouldn’t surprise me if that really was the
first time he thought about it all that much.
Somebody had just pointed to this ‘ranch’ thing
on a map in the morning, called it ‘bomb-proof’,
and that was that. Marsh had a general idea
where it was and that was good enough. They
thought they could just ‘figure the rest out on
the fly’ if they had to. It never occurred to them
all day ( with the fire heading north ) that they
would really actually have to think about that ranch
at some point that day. Whoops.
Also… there is other evidence that the SAIT was
fully aware of this transmission and exactly what
was said there even though they NEVER mentioned
it in their final SAIR report.
It really is the ONLY communication anyone has
ever seen or heard of where the actual word
SOUTH is even mentioned coming from either
Marsh’s or Steed’s lips. There are all kinds
of documented vague phrases people thought
they heard like “makin’ our way out escape route”,
or “heading to the ranch”, or “pickin’ our way
through the black” and whatnot… but this is the
only definitive transmission that clearly has
the word SOUTH in it.
So fast forward to Darrell Willis standing at the
Deployment Site on July 23 and being allowed
to conduct the first public press conference
from the actual deployment site.
Darrell Willis first gave his ‘speech’ that ends
with his (now) infamous quote…
“uh… ya can call it an accident… I just say…
God had a different plan for that crew at this time.”
…but about 30 seconds into his ‘speech’ he also
said something very curious… which was…
“I happened to be on the fire… on the north end of
the fire that day…doing structure protection… so I
wasn’t really involved with what they (GM) were
doing… but we are able to monitor the, ah… radio
frequencies that they were on… and WE heard
that… ah… they were gonna move out and… ah…
start coming in a… a SOUTHERLY direction
based on the fire behavior.”
This is the ONLY time anyone involved with the
investigation in any way actually admits that
they KNEW Granite Mountain was ‘heading
SOUTH’. When the SAIR finally came out… it
never mentions the word SOUTH in any way
and tries to establish that fire command thought
that if Marsh and the men were moving at all
that it was ‘to the northeast’ and ‘in the black’.
So, on July 23, did Darrell Willis actually let it
slip that the SAIT investigation really was already
aware of this clear transmission of Marsh saying
“SOUTH” in the AIR STUDY video?
…or that people who had been listening on the
TAC channels at that time ( 4:16 ), did, in fact
clearly hear Marsh say it and had already said so
by July 23 when Willis held his press conference?
I believe it is BOTH cases.
I believe some people who heard this conversation
fully remembered Marsh saying SOUTH ( loudly )
during that 4:16 exchange AND the SAIT knew
that it had been captured in the AIR STUDY.
At some other point, then, the fact that command
level people had knowledge that GM was heading
SOUTH became ( shall we say ) ‘problematic’
for the “no one really knew where they were or
what they were doing and no one is at fault”
Narrative the SAIT was now fully composing so
any individual recollections of Marsh saying that,
or any audio proof of it, just got thrown into the
“we have no verifiable communications during
that time” waste basket.
The statement mid slope cutting over.
I think that meant at mid slope on the 2 track they were moving over and down the canyon to the Ranch. Cutting over ( leaving the 2 track ) Some what short terminology for what they did.
Just my thought’s
If you are talking to some one you think knows where you are short statements on the radio can be understood by the other party. This is 20/20 hind site on my part knowing there location now.
Coming down the 2 track at mid slope (saddle) moving off the 2 track (over) and following a different route (canyon) to the ranch.
**
** Reply to Connor post on February 26, 2014 at 2:10 pm
Connor, as promised, here is some feedback on the rest of your long
post from yesterday.
Apologies in advance for this, itself, being a LONG post… but you asked some
really good questions and made some really good points and I wanted you to
at least have SOME feedback on all of them.
>> Connor said…
>>
>> Couple of points I have gathered from this site and wildfire today:
>>
>> 1. There seems to be confusion as to whether or not DIVSA was at
>> the ranch or not.
Actually ( in all honesty ) I think there WAS some confusion about that
when the theory was first presented by Holly Neill and John N. Maclean over
at Wildfire today back on January 19… but in the course of discussions spanning
at least two public websites and a lot of examination of other evidence… I believe
the consensus on that theory was that, while not totally absurd based on what
they THOUGHT they were hearing in just one background radio capture… that the
theory itself is simply a ‘dog that won’t hunt’ ( unless some other evidence
surfaces to support it ).
>> Connor also said…
>> Wildfire today has published an article by John Maclean in
>> which he is positive through audio analysis that Marsh was indeed at
>> the house. I think I read somewhere here that the audio he is referring to
>> might say something different.
Yes. Any number of people have now listened carefully to that same AIR
STUDY video and have reported that while it might not be totally clear
what is being said there… a lot of other people never hear the word
‘house’ being spoken at all.
John Maclean himself has subsequently posted what amounts to a ‘retraction’
for his original theory over at Wildfire today. He does not specifically refute hearing
the word ‘house’ in the AIR STUDY video ( which was the basis for the entire
theory ), but he, himself, simply admits that might not be what was said at all.
He goes on to say ( and rightly so ) that the most important thing about some of
these background radio captures is not even what some of the specific words
might be… but the fact that the ‘communications’ were, in fact, taking place.
SOME of them are EASILY ‘verifiable’, and in some cases DO represent
‘direct communication with GM’ during a timeframe when the SAIR said there
was a (supposed) ‘blackout’ and NO ‘verifiable’ communications with them.
>> Connor also said…
>> 2. I think it makes the most sense that Marsh left the hill and made it to the
>> ranch when he said he was working his way off the hill in the Caldwell video.
What Marsh ACTUALLY said ( to Field OPS1 Todd Abel ) at 3:50 PM is
“I’m working my way off the TOP”. He actually never uses the word ‘Hill’.
It is KNOWN that Marsh wasn’t really physically with Jesse Steed and the
rest of the GM crew for most of the day. It is also known that Marsh was off
being DIVSA and ‘scouting’ the fire NORTH of where GM was working for most
of the day since he was helping to coordinate the laying of that line of retardant
from west to east about 3/4 mile NORTH of the anchor point, across that
valley floor.
The hikers Tex (Sonny) Gilligan and Joy Collura, who were up on that same
ridge that day BEFORE Marsh or Granite Mountain ever even got up there,
and who were still up there well into the afternoon ( circa 2:00 PM ) say
they never saw Marsh within even 1/4 mile of Steed and the Crew. They
certainly didn’t have ‘eyes on Marsh’ for ALL of that time… but they never
report seeing him SOUTH of the anchor point at any time.
There is still no real evidence that Marsh was EVER anywhere SOUTH of
the anchor point that day… not even when Steed and the Crew finally started
to head south at 4:04 PM.
I think it’s pretty much accepted, based on available evidence, that at 3:50 PM,
when Marsh said he was ‘working his way off the top’, what he really meant was
that he had been NORTH of the anchor point, near the TOP of the Weaver
Mountains, and was simply now just working his way back ‘down’ towards
where Steed and crew had been working ( back to the anchor point which
was still up on the ridge but at a lower elevation than where Marsh was ).
This 3:50 conversation with Abel took place at a time when Marsh had already
requested that second face-to-face meeting with Brian Frisby at the same
place where they had met at NOON, and Marsh was simply (most probably)
already working his way back towards that anchor-point location for the
expected meeting with Brian Frisby when he had this conversation with Abel.
OR… that is exactly what he HAD been doing… but already learned by
3:50 PM that the meeting was being abandoned by Frisby because of
Fire behavior and Frisby had already picked up Brendan McDonough
and headed back east.
Either way… Marsh WOULD have been making his way to that expected
meeting ( at the anchor point ) in the minutes BEFORE the conversation
with Abel when he said “I’m workin’ my way off the TOP”.
>> Connor also wrote…
>> 3. So if Marsh was with the crew:
>> Marsh states they were using the same escape route from the morning.
Yes… that appears to be exactly what he says ( whether he was with them
or not at the moment he said that ).
So the question is… what did Marsh REALLY mean by that?
Keep in mind that it DOES appear to be a fact that the ‘Boulder Springs Ranch’
was pointed out to Marsh at early briefings ( before he was even asked to become
DIVSA ), but whether or not any exact ‘escape route’ to it had also been pointed
out that morning ( such as the two-track road that curled around to it ) remains
a mystery. Some reports say it happened, others say it did NOT (happen), and
then others don’t mention it at all.
So in Marsh’s mind, even at that moment, his ‘idea’ of the ‘escape route from this
morning’ might have been ‘to the Boulder Springs Ranch’ and not ‘back down
the other two-track to the Carriers’ at all.
>> Connor also said…
>> What is interesting is that BR talked with GM and it seemed they were sure
>> that GM was using that same two track from the morning.
Yes. There really is no doubt about that now that we can see the Blue Ridge
SAIT interview notes and even a fair amount of their own ‘unit logs’
and handwritten recollections from that day.
The SAIT was ‘full of it’ when they put both thoughts in Brian Frisby’s head
about him thinking Marsh meant ‘some ranch to the north’. There is no real
evidence that Brian Frisby ever had any such thought. Frisby and Blue Ridge
missed all the important briefings in the morning and it is still not known if they,
themselves, even knew about something called the ‘Boulder Springs Ranch’,
much less any ‘ranches to the north’. They had their own designated ‘escape
routes’ and ‘safety zones’ that day and none of them were ‘The Boulder
Springs Ranch’.
So YES… Brian Frisby and Captain Trueheart Brown both state the same
thing in their interviews and their notes.
They (both) THOUGHT that the ‘escape route’ Marsh was referring to was that
same two-track road that GM hiked in on that morning and that they also
took the trip on with the Polaris Ranger UTV for that NOON face-to-face
meeting with Marsh.
>> Connor also said…
>> The two track would have been a valid escape route back to their
>> vehicles before the blow up of course. (New to the site so still working on
>> my own timeline).
Yes. It would have. If GM ( up on the high ridge ) would have realized that
the fire was GOING to force Brendan to abandon his lookout post even
just 10 minutes before Brendan had to realize it for himself… then there
MAY have been plenty of time for them to hike ‘on the double’ all the
way back down the same road they walked up in the morning, and been
able to make it back to the vehicles ahead of the advancing fire.
That same ingress route had even been mostly ‘bulldozed’ and ‘widened’
all the way back to their vehicles by that time so it would have been even
‘easier’ going on the egress as it was when hiking in that morning.
It’s not a given, and it would not have been a pleasant ‘evac’ for them…
but they made the hike UP there all the way from where their vehicles
were parked in about 45 minutes at a normal pace so ( theoretically )
‘double time’ would have only taken about 22 minutes.
If they had gone ‘double time’ circa 1540 ( when Gary Cordes announced
the official mandatory evacuations for Yarnell and Glen Ilah ) they
would probably have been able to escape all the way back to their vehicles
down that same two-track they hiked in on that morning, no problem.
They didn’t. They waited too long. By the time we hear Jesse Steed say
“and it’s ( the fire has ) almost made it to that two-track road we walked in
on” at 4:02 PM in the MacKenzie video, it really WAS too late to go that way.
If they had left ‘on the double’ at 3:40 when then evacuations were ordered…
then at 4:02 PM ( 22 minutes later ) the fire was STILL not all the way to
the two-track and they would have still been in the clear down there and
almost all the way back to their vehicles.
It didn’t happen. I wish it had.
>> Connor also wrote…
>> So we have BR and GM confirming using an escape route from the morning.
Yes…. even though we also NOW know this was a total miscommunication.
Marsh didn’t make it clear to BR what he really meant and BR’s assumption was
wrong.
The ‘C’ in LCES… “Communicate clearly and effectively”.
>> Connor also wrote…
>> Is it possible that GM took off in the wrong direction thinking that they were
>> actually going the way they came in that morning, realized their
>> mistake and instead of back tracking just made the decision to rally to the
>> ranch since it seemed close? Eh not likely, but totally possible.
>> Or they started that way, realized it was a no go and went the other way
>> (probably more likely)
Sorry… I (personally) have to go strongly with ‘not likely’ there… but
it’s an interesting theory, nonetheless.
Throw in a HUGE amount of ‘heat exhaustion’ ( already to the ‘confusion’
symptom level ) on someone’s part and such a blunder becomes possibly
more ‘likely’… but we DO have some video of Steed’s ‘condition’ circa
4:02 PM in the MacKenzie video and while we are certainly seeing some
hot, tired men… there is no real evidence of THAT kind of ‘heat exhaustion’
or ‘confusion’ setting in.
I think you actually have to spend some time with Google Maps or
Google Earth to realize how unlikely the ‘went the wrong way’ theory
would really be.
The trek south from the ‘anchor point’ to where they decided to descend
into the box canyon was about a 15 or 16 minute brisk walk… and all
‘up on the ridge’… so it’s hard to imagine they would be walking south on a
ridge for 15 minutes and not realize that wasn’t the way they came up that
morning…
…but for the sake of (your) theory… add a GOOD amount of heat exhaustion
into the equation and I don’t think it can be called ‘impossible’, either.
>> Connor also said…
>> 4. What I’m pretty sure happened based on the radio transmissions,
>> knowledge of GM crew attitudes, as well as (my) own experience is this…
>> Marsh did indeed make it to the ranch well before GM left the black.
I (personally) really don’t think so.
Based on other evidence… and the timeframes involved… he would have to have
been ‘Captain America’, or something, to actually even physically pull that off.
Don’t forget that the entire original theory on that was based on what someone
thought they heard someone saying right around 4:16 PM. That’s the time
on that AIR STUDY video where Maclean thought he heard Marsh say
“I’m at the house” and he was ALSO assuming “house = ranch”.
We also can HEAR Marsh speaking to Steed at 4:02 PM, just 14 minutes
before 4:16 PM ( The MacKenzie video(s) ). Granted… Marsh is NOT there
with Steed and the crew and we really don’t know where he was… but he
was not ‘huffing or puffing’ or audibly exerting himself in any way during
those conversations. Even if Marsh had ‘just passed them’ at 4:02 and
was ‘on his way’ to the ranch… he only had 14 minutes to make the full
trip before he would (supposedly) be saying “I’m at the house (now)”.
Not likely… even if he WAS ‘Captain America’.
Also don’t forget that regardless of when Marsh found out for sure that Frisby
wasn’t going to make that second face-to-face Marsh requested up at the anchor
point… Marsh believed that meeting WAS going to take place so that’s where
he would have been headed when he said ( at 3:50 PM ) he was “making his
way off the top ( of the Weaver Mountains, back to the anchor point”.
He is also KNOWN to have been on the radio AFTER that saying things like
he could ‘see the buggies’ over in the Sesame area. That means he still would
have had to have been on high ground out near the anchor point for him to
even be saying things like that circa 4:00 PM.
Now he only has 15 minutes to get from that ‘high ground’ near the anchor point
all the way to the Ranch for it to be possible for him to then be saying
( at 4:16 PM ) “I’m here at the house” ( Which is what Maclean thought he
heard him say on that 4:16 PM AIR STUDY video ).
That’s all really just not possible… unless he had a magic carpet that day.
But let’s say… for argument’s sake… that Marsh really did ‘make it all the
way to the ranch’ by 4:16 PM.
What that might mean is even almost more impossible to contemplate.
That means that Marsh COULD see the approaching fire from that vantage
point and he did NOTHING to warn the approaching men ( HIS own men )
about it.
That means that Marsh would NOT have learned how much trouble the men
were in ( west of him ) until he heard Steed’s first MAYDAY call at 1639.
That means that Marsh would have had to cover 638 yards due west through
thick Manazanita on a suicide run just to rejoin GM, show up on the radio
saying he was ‘now with them’… and then die with them.
Last but not least… it would also mean that even if Marsh was able to cover
that 638 yard distance due WEST in 120-150 seconds… through the thickest of
manzanita… then that, itself, is automatic proof that there was time for all the other
18 men to haul ass due EAST like their lives depended on it and cover the same
ground to safety in the same amount of time… and no one dies at all that day.
>> Connor also wrote…
>> I have a really hard time believing that a hotshot sup or division would not have
>> scouted that two track and found that it led to to ranch.
There are a LOT of things about that day that are truly ‘unbelievable’… and
I’m afraid this is just one of them.
I don’t know which is MORE unbelievable here…
That they would NOT have ‘scouted the route’ and been aware that the very
two-track they were already making good progress on just went a little
further south and then curled due east and right on to where they wanted to go…
OR… that they DID know this… but they decided to cut through the
box-canyon anyway.
>> Connor also wrote…
>> It even shows up the most standard maps.
It most certainly does.
So add to the ‘unbelievable’ part here the fact that they had at least
SIX ‘smartphones’ out there and good cell signal… and that no one would
have taken the 20 seconds it takes to call up Google maps in the
browser, enter ‘Yarnell, AZ’, zoom down twice, and see clearly that
the two-track goes all the way to the ranch.
Robert Caldwell even had the Garmin Oregon 450 GPS clipped to his
top-right pack strap all day. That two-track road would have been showing
itself as a valid route on his background TOPO map all the way to the
ranch. Did they never even consult with their own GPS device that day?
>> Connor also wrote…
>> I think Marsh was pushing the crew to get back to the ranch as quick as
>> possible and told them from the ranch to drop down in the canyon for a
>> straight shot, and seemingly quicker route to the ranch. I think he was at
>> the ranch or somewhere in the vicinity when fire started to make a run.
>> He knew the quickest and easiest route through that box canyon and went
>> to meet the crew.
So… you are saying you believe Marsh DID see the fire behavior change
from the ranch itself… and THAT is when he ‘took off’ back WEST again
to try and meet up with them and ‘guide them in faster’, or something?
Let’s say you are right… what kind of ‘poor judgment’ does THAT represent?
All he had to do was call them on the radio and tell them to ‘go back’, if
things were obviously getting that dangerous in that area.
For him to have actually KNOWN that the fire direction change was dangerous
enough to require him to run back west and try and help them ‘get in’ as fast
as possible or they were going to DIE… and he did just that ( instead of just
calling them off at that point )… well… I wouldn’t want to be on the receiving end
of THAT ‘reckless endangerment’ and/or ‘wrongful death’ litigation.
>> Connor also wrote…
>> It is easy to come to this conclusion when hearing he wanted retardant east
>> to west. It doesn’t make sense to waste retardant in that area when you have
>> communities in the path. If he didn’t know the crew was in trouble I think a north
>> south line would have made much more sense.
Marsh’s radio call about “That’s where we want retardant” came at 1637.
That is 47 ( FORTY SEVEN ) minutes after Air Attack had already just been
told to ‘drop at will’ and do whatever THEY thought was best to try and
protect both towns ( Yarnell and Glen Ilah ).
From the Yarnell Investigation Notes ( YIN ) document.
Page 22 – Interview with SPGS1 Gary Cordes
15:50 – Told air attack to drop at will and to do what you can.
It might not ‘normally’ have made sense to be dropping retardant in some
places at that time… but this was obviously no normal day.
Also… don’t forget the audio capture in the Helmet-Cam video that comes
just seconds before we hear Steed’s first MAYDAY at 1639. What is going
on THERE is B33 is responding to some other request for retardant just
about 100 seconds AFTER Marsh’s 1637 “That’s where we want retardant”
transmission… but now B33 is telling someone on the ground that it
might be IMPOSSIBLE for them to even get the retardant in the spot
being requested because of all the smoke.
Sounds like they were being asked to drop ON the structures, or
something, at that point just seconds before Steed’s first MAYDAY.
>> Connor also wrote…
>> Did B33 try and make another run after the dry run where Marsh
>> confirms that’s where he wants the retardant or was it too late?
Apparently… YES. See page 17 of the Yarnell Investigation Notes
where Bravo 33 says they did, in fact, come around and were lining
up for the real drop. That is the moment when they are captured in the
Helmet-Cam video saying they were ‘making no promises’ for this
upcoming drop because of the ‘smoke’… and Steed then busted in on
the radio with his first MAYDAY.
>> Connor also said…
>> He definitely could have told B33 to drop on the first run. Perhaps he didn’t
>> want everyone listening to know that GM was indeed doing a very dumb thing
>> and hoping for a good outcome.
Perhaps. Personally… I still just think that at 1637, Marsh was just
walking along ( he had to be already down in the box canyon ) and trying to
catch up with Steed and the rest of the men who had descended ahead of him.
He accidentally saw the B33 ‘line up’ flight through the smoke ( it wasn’t as far
north as described in the SAIR ) and Marsh just still had his DIVSA hat on
and he thought he was helping out with the general fire situation and the ‘drop at
will’ directive that Air Attack had been under for more than 40 minutes.
I still believe Marsh was clueless about what Steed was about to confront
just moments later… and that he was close enough behind them to have
to RUN forward to ‘find them’ after the first MAYDAY… but not so far behind
them that he couldn’t have made the run in less that the two minutes it
took for him to finally come on the radio ( out of breath ) and say “This
is DIVSA and I’m here with Granite Mountain (now)”.
>> Connor also said…
>> GM is known to be super aggressive in everything they do. They had a great
>> reputation for getting the job done in the GM way. I think this stemmed from
>> being so closely attached to a municipal fire department. Hell, half the crew
>> wanted to be structure guys, in which machismo and being a hero seemed to
>> be valued more than in WFF.
I think you are right. Combine that with what went on with Marsh and his
’employee evaluation’ from Darrell Willis just 57 days before the incident and
Willis informing Marsh that the City was considering disbanding the whole
Type 1 Hotshot thing and that ‘the future of the program is in our hands’
( Willis and Marsh )… and you really have a ‘Watch Out’ situation that
might actually need to be ADDED to the list of official ones.
It’s always a ‘Watch out’ situation when you suddenly realize that you
LIKE being in the ‘Hero’ business. You have to make sure you don’t
LIKE it ‘a little too much’… because you might just take some other
innocent people with you who aren’t as much ‘in love’ with the whole
hero thing as you are if you screw up bad enough.
>> Connor also wrote…
>> Oh and about marsh answering the radio for GM even though he was divs.
>> It is very hard to get out of that mindset after answering for Gm all season.
>> I’m sure he wasn’t even thinking about it to be honest.
I think you are right.
Hard habit to break especially since when you left for work in the morning you
didn’t know you were going to be DIVSA for one of the only times in your life.
He might have even ‘apologized’ for this ‘jumping in’ to Jesse once or twice that
day over the intra-crew radio frequency. Brendan McDonough would know.
>> Connor also wrote…
>> That ranch video will be key. Although I don’t see how the report wouldn’t have
>> mentioned something if he indeed was there :-/
Yes… it will still be fascinating to see what that Helms Ranch Security
camera(s) actually captured that afternoon… but I really don’t think we are
going to see any firefighters.
The owners of the Helms Ranch were also THERE during this whole
timeframe and were outside trying to get their own business in order before
the fire showed up. They never mention seeing any firefighter appear out of the
west on their property… and certainly no one ever just standing there saying
“I’m at the house” over the radio.
If he really was there at 4:16 PM ( as he would have to have been to be the
one saying “I’m at the house” in an AIR STUDY video )… then that’s a full 23
( TWENTY THREE ) minutes BEFORE Steed’s first MAYDAY at 4:39.
So what would Marsh have been doing ‘on the property’ there for 23 minutes
without the OWNERS either noticing him… or even being aware that he was
there… especially since they were ‘outside’ on their own property trying
to get everything in order at that time?
Simple answer: Nothing. He WASN’T (ever) really there.
Thanks for clearing that up. I tried to read through all of the other chapters but it became rather overwhelming. All your conclusions make perfect sense. I’ve noticed in one of the hiker photos that you can see a lone firefighter standing atop the mountain, chances are its Marsh.
Just another point. In the ashcrafttextmessage photo sent at 2:16 it appears as if they have just committed to the black (chaps still on and tight). This means they were likely there for almost two hours. Plenty of time for seasoned hotshot crews to recover, water, and food up. I doubt heat exhaustion played any role, especially from a crew that lives and trains in that kind of heat. 2 hours is a long time for hotshot crews to sit and do nothing. They hate it in fact.
Reply to Connor post on February 28, 2014 at 1:21 pm
Connor… you actually raise an interesting question.
WHEN did Steed and the crew actually (finally) ‘give up’
on what they were doing that day?
The Ashcraft photo/text you refer to was actually taken
during the (supposed ) ‘Lunch break’ ( at 2:16 PM )
and it was taken at what has, in fact, since been
referred to as ‘the lunch spot’. This is NOT the same
place where the MacKenzie photo sets ( and videos )
were taken later on ( circa 3:50 and 4:02 – 4:04 PM ).
The ‘text’ that accompanied the photo did, in fact,
say this where he ( Ashcraft ) was ‘having lunch’…
It said…
“This is my lunch spot…to bad lunch was an MRE.”
The ‘lunch spot’ was actually a little farther north and
‘down’ the slope versus where the later photos/videos
would be taken.
This wasn’t the ‘end of work’ at that location.
There is no doubt they went ‘back to work’ after
this ‘lunch break’ and continued trying to connect the
existing black to that two-track road for the eventual
( planned ) burn-off.
They were (apparently) still working on that right up
until the time Brendan McDonough had to abandon
his lookout position and was being ‘picked up’ by
BR Supt Brian Frisby at 1541 ( 3:41 PM ).
It was shortly after Frisby ‘evacuated’ Brendan back
to the east when Frisby was asked by fire command
if that planned ‘two-track burnout’ was still a possibility.
Frisby checked with Steed and Steed said they would
still need another HOUR to finish what they were
doing up there. That’s when Frisby informed fire
command that the burnout was NOT an option.
They didn’t have an hour to wait for Steed/Crew to
finish the ‘tie-in’.
So that really must have been the moment when it
was ‘tools up’.
As soon as Marsh / Steed / Crew learned that Blue
Ridge was simply evacuating now and that the
‘line burnout’ wasn’t going to happen at all is when
they must have finally stopped what they were doing.
This would match timing of the next set of photos
and videos that have surfaced taken starting around
3:50 PM. ( First set of MacKenzie photos, Caldwell
video, etc. ).
In the MacKenzie 4:02 video(s)… we DO see some
of the Sawyers ‘putting their chaps up’ and doing
other things that indicate they knew they were
(now) actually ‘done for the day’.
So when was the actual ‘tools up’ moment for them?
It must have been somewhere between 1541 ( when
Frisby picked Brendan up ) and 1550 ( when we start
to see more ‘at rest’ photos and videos ).
Somewhere in those NINE minutes… they learned that
the burnout just wasn’t going to happen and that
the entire focus back in town was now ‘evacuations’.
Thanks wtktt,
You are a wealth of information, I’m starting to get a better idea of the events that unfolded from 2ish until the deployment.
I just don’t understand how they would be calling the route they took an escape route without doing some saw work BEFORE they called it an escape route. I’ve never known a hotshot crew to label an escape route with flagging, timing, and improving the route. They knew the fuel type and had to know its nearly impossible to move at any speed through that crap. It’s just very frustrating that 19 men had to die over vegetation that will be grown back in a couple of years. We may never know, and that’s really shitty.
Thanks for all your knowledge
WTKTT
You wrote:
Robert Caldwell even had the Garmin Oregon 450 GPS clipped to his
top-right pack strap all day. That two-track road would have been showing
itself as a valid route on his background TOPO map all the way to the
ranch. Did they never even consult with their own GPS device that day?
Has the GPS info been completely confirmed? I know that you and Marti thought you had evidence via photography, but has that been confirmed for absolutely certain?
The GPS data is currently lost until the unit is recovered it was seen in the deployment site and may still be there unless some one went and got it. It would answer a lot of time frame questions.
**
** Reply John Dougherty post on February 27, 2014 at 9:53 am
>> John said…
>>
>> I have the the videos/audio from the aerial study. They are huge files
>> of 2GB or more. I do not have immediate access to a T1 line but will
>> in the near future. At that time, I will upload them. Thanks for your
>> patience. John
Thank YOU, John ( ongoing thanks for YOUR patience ).
With regards to this particular AIR STUDY video…
1. “DivA-Ops Musser” ( Radio call from OPS2 Musser to DIVSA Marsh )
SAIT Investigation Record:AO5-20130630:
AerialFirefightingStudyPhotosVideos F:
PhotosAndVideos: Panebaker: Video:
20130630_154232_fire_behavior_EP.MOV
Have you, yourself, heard the part of this video that John MaClean has
absolutely (publicly) confirmed contains the clearly heard transmission with
OPS2 Paul Musser trying to contact DIVS Eric Marsh on the radio?
If so… could you at least just give us an idea of the following…
1) At what TIME OFFSET into that video does this radio callout take place?
2) How LONG is that particular AIR STUDY video?
I’m assuming that ( like all the other AIR STUDY videos ) the timestamp
in the video title of 1542 ( 3:42 PM ) plus 32 seconds is simply the time
when the video STARTS.
So all we need for the moment to put a timestamp on the actual radio call
from Musser to Marsh is to know exactly where ( what time offset ) in that
video the background radio conversation is heard.
By the way… since these seem to be Apple Quicktime ( .MOV ) movies…
if you have a Mac it’s really easy to just ‘split’ these movies into smaller
segments to facilitate uploading… or to just pull out a section that has
important content in it.
From this link…
Split large movie files quickly on 10.6 with QuickTime Player 7
http://www.tuaw.com/2011/11/15/split-large-movie-files-quickly-with-quicktime-player-7/
_______________________________________________________________
QuickTime Player 7 can do a LOT to save you time and aggravation.
Here’s one example: splitting a long & large movie into segments for easier
uploading or emailing. If you’re running 10.7 Lion, you have access to QuickTime
X’s new Split Clip command; if you’re running 10.6 you don’t
In QuickTime X on 10.6, we’ve got a visual and very fast Trim tool; it shows
exactly where the video will be truncated with an easy, iMovie-esque scrubber
bar, and it does indeed save wicked fast once you trim your clip. Nice and handy.
_______________________________________________________________
I’m uploading it now and it will be available in AerialFirefightingStudy>Panebaker>Video folder shortly. Please identify any other specific videos to speed this process up. Thanks, John
John, up above you, WTKTT is asking for the Helms Ranch videos…. Thank you.
Helm’s Ranch Videos are huge files as well taken from security cameras. Those will be uploaded as time and funds permit. Thanks!
The TRUTH….
I continue to be astounded by the rubbish being asserted as fact by many. Here is an example: Regarding the SAIR, many people keep claiming that the SAIR somehow asserts that there are NO communications from the Granite Mountain Hotshots between 4:04 and 4:37. When people were recently trying to “analyze” the background voices in the 161620 video, for example, people were claiming to have “uncovered” conversations that refuted the SAIR. These claims ignored the fact that the SAIR states clearly on page 1:
“From 1604 until 1637, the [SAIT] cannot verify communications from the crew, and we have almost no direct information from them.”
This is a TRUE statement. They are not fabricating any gap – there IS a gap in VERIFIABLE communications. We can GUESS about the communications, but there is a gap in terms of VERIFIABLE communications. There are no CLEAR, direct, irrefutably verifiable communications from GM from roughly 1603-1636-ish that can be corroborated and confirmed with 100% certainty. The science of audio forensics regarding background conversations such as the ones on the 161620 video clip do not ALLOW anything to be said “with certainty” or “conclusively” or in a credible, 100% objective, verifiable manner regarding those faint background conversations. So the SAIR was right on the money with the above-quoted statement.
It blows my mind that people continue to try to state as fact what they are GUESSING is being said in those background communications on the video clips without offering the disclaimer that the state of audio forensics does not allow for strong assertions of certainty in that regard. If you don’t believe me, go track down the FBI’s audio experts.
This is why the SAIR is so infuriating. MAYBE technically true, but fundamentally dishonest. The SAIR, by saying “no verifiable communications” left the impression there was no communication between GM and fire command for those 33 minutes. This was the story the press latched on to, and the SAIT did nothing to correct it. They did not say in plain English “there were communications but we do not know what they were”. Perhaps they knew that one party of each of those communications was still alive and they would have to try and find out what transpired. Instead they were “cute” about the whole thing, and those 19 men and their families do not deserve “cute”. Likewise there was the canard “we do not know why they moved”. Probably technically true, but oh so misleading. Ask OPS Musser why he asked GM for help, and you almost certainly have a very clear idea why GM moved.
When your primary goal is to avoid pointing the finger anywhere, you put yourself in a situation where you cannot be honest about what actually happened. And that is why the SAIR is an absolute crime.
Now that we know how MUCH ‘background traffic’ there
really was during the ( supposed ) ‘blackout’… the fact
that the SAIT did NOT ‘verify the communications’ by
re-interviewing anyone/everyone who might have been
able to shed light on the parts that are ‘hard to hear’
( while it was still the freshest in their minds ) is really
just a classic ‘Double Eye’ situation.
It was either Intentional… or it was Incompetence.
These ‘background radio captures’ that we can now
hear with our own ears were ( and are STILL )
absolutely ‘verifiable’.
All you have to do is get all the people that might
possibly have been speaking and/or listening to these
communications ( it’s a finite list ) to listen to some
cleaned-up versions of the captures and get THEM
to ‘fill in the blanks’ for the parts that are hard to hear.
The best time to have done that would have been when
you were (supposedly) doing the initial investigation…
but it could still be done at any time.
When people hear recordings of themselves speaking,
even long after the event, they tend to recall pretty
well exactly what they were saying and exactly what was
said in response.
Elizabeth…
Even when all we had to read was the SAIR report itself ( No
ASODH yet, no FOAI/FOIL releases ) I was the one who pointed
out that same line you are referencing now…
“From 1604 until 1637, the [SAIT] cannot verify communications from the crew, and we have almost no direct information from them.”
Keywords: VERIFY and ALMOST.
I am also the one who first pointed out the ‘doublespeak’ there
where in the first sentence they are absolutely trying to make
the reader believe there was a ‘mysterious blackout’… but then
they contradict themselves right away by saying they have
ALMOST no direct information about them for that same time
period.
ALMOST only counts in horseshoes and hand grenades.
If they had ANY ‘direct information’ about them during that
1604 to 1637 timeframe ( and we know now they always did ),
then that makes the first sentence of the paragraph a
FALSE ( or at the very least, purposely MISLEADING ) statement.
You don’t have to be a lawyer yourself to admire the ‘legalese’
at work there in that very carefully constructed sentences.
Regardless…
You are RIGHT to say that there are some PARTS of some
of the captured radio transmissions that will probably forever
be debated… but for you to say that ANY of the captured
radio transmissions are not ‘verifiable’ is also a FALSE
statement.
SOME of these captured background radio communications
in that timeframe are CLEARLY HEARD. For SOME of them,
there is absolutely NO QUESTION what is being said and
WHO is saying it.
Example: There is absolutely NO QUESTION that it is Eric
Marsh saying “They’re comin’ from the heel of the fire” in
the Blue Ridge Hotshot Mccord video shot right about
1625 from the seat of one of the Crew Carriers staged
at the Shrine Road Youth Camp.
You can debate some of the words just prior to that… but
not the response. It is clearly Eric Marsh… and that is
clearly what he says.
That one video alone makes mincemeat of the SAIR
‘legalese’ on page 1 of their public release.
That is at least ONE ‘absolutely verifiable direct communication’
with Eric Marsh right smack in the middle of the time they say
there was no such thing.
There are others.
Even in that AIR STUDY video where John Maclean mistakenly
thought he heard Marsh say he was ‘at the house’… there are
moments when what is being said is not debatable.
There is NO QUESTION that someone says ( on the radio )…
“Granite Mountain… what’s your status right now?”
…and there is NO QUESTION there was a DIRECT RESPONSE
from at least Eric Marsh ( right away ) and perhaps Jesse
Steed as well who may be the one who added “we’re pushin’ our
way down into the structures”.
That exchange is REAL. It’s VERIFIABLE by anyone who
knows those men’s voices.
So let the debate continue about SOME parts of SOME of
these captured radio conversations.
The fact also remains that SOME parts of SOME of these
captured radio conversations are CLEAR… and don’t even
need any FBI experts to chime in.
What is sorely missing at this point, now that we have these
captured radio conversations, is a re-interview process to
‘fill in the blanks’ and get the people who might have actually
been speaking ( or hearing ) these exchanges to listen
the recordings and RECALL exactly what the ‘debatable’
items are in those exchanges.
I hope that happens, at some point.
The SAIT COULD have done all this ( verify the communications ).
THEY had the authority to follow-up on ALL of this, once these
‘need to be clarified/verified’ moments were discovered in
the evidence.
They simply CHOSE to NOT do it ( verify the communications ).
By the way… for anyone who still might need a primer
for what Eric Marsh’s and Jesse Steed’s voices really
sounded like… there is still this ‘Granite Mountain training
video’ up on YouTube.
Both Marsh and Steed are ‘front and center’ in this
video and they take turns speaking calmly and directly
to the camera for an extended amount of time.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aKT6TnRPMy4&feature=youtu.be
Both Marsh and Steed have very ‘recognizable’ voices.
**
** Reply to Connor post on February 26, 2014 at 2:10 pm
>> Connor asked ( WTKTT )
>> Do you have the air study videos? I still have yet to see those.
The ONLY ‘Air Study’ videos I know of ( or have ever seen/heard myself ) that have
ever been released publicly are still just the ones that Elizabeth has posted on
the following YouTube site…
http://www.youtube.com/channel/UC_-A47xgyIvRC3FoQGv3w4A
I believe all the videos that actually START with ‘20130630’ prefix, followed
by a SPACE character, and then an HH:MM:SS timestamp are all official
AIR STUDY videos that she obtained via FOIA/FOIL request. The video
uploads are not commented as to what they really are so it has to be
inferred they are AIR STUDY videos just based on the video TITLE (format).
There has never actually been any kind of ‘manifest’ or ‘inventory’ list published
with regards to these AIR STUDY videos so it is still uncertain whether the
ones sitting on that YouTube page are just SOME of the AIR STUDY videos
from June 30, 2013, or whether that set of videos sitting there really is the totality
of what the SAIT released to any/all FOIA/FOIL requestors.
All I know is that one of the crucial AIR STUDY videos that supposedly captures
a radio callout from OPS2 Paul Musser to DIVSA Eric Marsh does NOT seem
to have been released by anyone. That transmission isn’t in the background
of any of the videos on that YouTube page.
Actually… John McClean himself is the one who reports that this conversation
between Musser and Marsh is definitely on one of the AIR STUDY videos
and he even put a TITLE on it.
When John MaClean originally published his ‘new findings’ about Yarnell
over at Wildfire today on January 19, 2013, he definitely said that this
evidence of a radio callout from OPS2 Musser to DIVSA Marsh was
captured in the background of one of the Air Study videos.
Two days later ( January 21, 2014 ), MaClean published links to the ‘sources’
for all the claims he made to Widlfire Today in a BLOG post entitled…
Sources for the Neill/Maclean Yarnell Hill Fire analysis
In THAT post… Mr. MaClean then gave the actual TITLE of this AIR STUDY
video that (supposedly) captures this important radio traffic…
1. “DivA-Ops Musser” ( Radio call from OPS2 Musser to DIVSA Marsh )
SAIT Investigation Record:AO5-20130630:
AerialFirefightingStudyPhotosVideos F:
PhotosAndVideos: Panebaker: Video:
20130630_154232_fire_behavior_EP.MOV
However… unlike the other ‘sources’ being quoted on that BLOG post,
MaClean did not provide a public ‘link’ to this video. He only just
published the (supposed) title of it.
That video ( 20130630_154232_fire_behavior_EP.MOV ) is definitely
also NOT published on Elizabeth’s public Youtube sight… so a public
copy of that crucial video is still ‘missing’ even now.
MaClean also did not put an EXACT ‘time’ on the radio call from
OPS2 Musser to DIVSA Marsh. MaClean just says it happened at
1542 ( 3:42 PM ) but that is simply the timestamp for the START
of the video in the video title itself, and MaClean did not provide
an ‘offset time’ into the video for the radio call. If it really did take
place right at the start of the video ( 3:42 PM ), he failed to make
that clear. He also never said how LONG this particular video is.
I don’t think that crucial video shot starting at 1542 + 32 seconds actually
has any more discernible conversation on it than what MaClean is originally
reporting… but I also believe it’s still very important to know at least the
following two things…
1) How LONG is that video?
2) At what ‘offset’ into the 154232 video does that radio call take place?
In other words… if that video is actually 8 minutes long and the radio
call actually wasn’t captured until near the END of the video… then
that puts the direct radio call from OPS2 Musser to DIVSA Marsh
into the 1550 ( 3:50 PM ) timeframe, at or about the same moment
that Todd Abel was telling Marsh and Steed to ‘Hunker and be safe ( in
the black )’.
Here is the other important reason to know how LONG that video is.
If there really is no other OPS2 Musser to DIVSA Marsh conversation
captured in the background of that video ( or no one has had good
enough ears yet to hear it )… then however long that video is would
still ( supposedly ) represent ‘blank time’ BEFORE Marsh actually
got around to RESPONDING to Musser and was then ( supposedly )
“asked to spare resources for Yarnell”.
Again… using the example above…
Even if that radio call from OPS2 Musser just trying to ‘call’ DIVSA
Marsh came at the START of the 1542 video… if the video is 8
minutes long and we still don’t hear Marsh responding and then
Musser issuing his infamous “Can you spare resources for Yarnell?”
request and either Steed or Marsh’s reply ( OPS2 says he was never
sure who replied to his request ) of “We are committed to
the black, try Blue Ridge”…
…then that means that exchange still didn’t happen until the 3:50 PM
timeframe.
So it’s still all about ‘timestamping’ these two critical events that
we KNOW happened…
3:?? PM – OPS2 Paul Musser to Marsh…
“Can you spare resources for Yarnell?”
Standard TDWA ( Turn Down With Alternative ) reply from either
Steed or Marsh…
“No. We are committed to the black. Try Blue Ridge.”
3:50 PM – OPS1 Todd Abel to Marsh…
Keep ME informed of your status ( and whereabouts ).
Hunker and be safe ( in the black ).
We’ll get some Air Support down there ASAP.
It is, in fact, still looking like the OPS2 Paul Musser request
came BEFORE Robert Caldwell’s video ( shot at 3:50 PM ?? )
where he captures the OPS1 Todd Abel conversation with
Marsh/Steed… but that has still never been proven for sure and certain.
Having a public copy of this AIR STUDY video available…
20130630_154232_fire_behavior_EP.MOV
…with the chance of some ‘better ears’ maybe hearing things
no one has been able to make out yet… or at least just being able
to verify exactly when that radio callout takes place… would go a
long way towards nailing down these critical event time(s).
>> Connor also said…
>>
>> Couple of points I have gathered from this site and wildfire today:
The rest of your original post was amazingly well-thought out and
detailed… with some very interesting NEW theories about what might
have happened that day… but time doesn’t permit me to answer the
rest of your questions and/or comment on your theories right now.
I ( and, I hope, others ) WILL do that ASAP because some of your
points ( and theories ) are IMPORTANT and should be discussed.
Even if *some* of your well-formed ideas prove to be ‘impossible’… you
have just reminded everyone that “this isn’t over by a long shot” and
that there could still very well be some huge *surprises* just lurking
in plain sight there in the available evidence.
I’ll probably have a response post on the rest of your original comment
sometime tomorrow.
I have the the videos/audio from the aerial study. They are huge files of 2GB or more. I do not have immediate access to a T1 line but will in the near future. At that time, I will upload them. Thanks for you patience. John
Thanks John.
I need help clearing this part up from the ADOSH report.
“At 1637, ASM2 flew a drop path for a VLAT north of Yarnell from west to east. This drop went over
DIVS A location at the time. DIVS A communicated with ASM2 confirming the drop path. ASM2 circled
the south end of the fire above Yarnell to line up a final flight path for a tanker drop.”
Is this referring to the transmission we have been speculating on?
If so how could DIVSA have possibly seen the drop path if it was north of Yarnell and he was with the crew? Besides that drop would have been coordinated by someone much close to Yarnell than DIVSA. I originally thought the East to West line he was talking about would have started at the ranch and extended west essentially putting a barrier of retardant between the fire and the descent point.
If this is referring to the air study audio then my theories earlier are probably mute. It sounds like ASM2 did the practice run without the VLAT with the intent of swinging around and picking up the VLAT on the next run. Regardless it would have been North of Yarnell, some 2 miles away with no impact on GMIHC
UNLESS DIVS A was still on the hill and ASM2 flew over him as it headed West before circling back around. Could DIVSA have even seen Yarnell from that vantage point?
Sorry Im rambling.
OK, nevermind. found the post from WTKTT on Feb 21.
WTKTT says that DIVSA was likely behind GMIHC possibly still up on the hill? If he was still on the hill behind GM A.) could he have seen Yarnell through the Column? and B.) How did he get down to the crew so fast. it took BR 4 min to get down the descent point with no vegetation obstacles
I think my theory of DIVSA being CLOSER to the ranch than the crew still might be valid if someone can confirm that Yarnell can indeed be seen from the Ranch
** REPOST FROM BELOW WITH NEW COMMENTS
>> On February 21, 2014 at 10:47 am, Robert The Second said…
>>
>> I posted this last night but it does not appear today, so reposting.
>> Those are most definitely the GMHS Crew Carriers ( seen in the video
>> from the Holloway fire ) with 7A and 7B and the following caption ” Got to
>> see some extreme fire behavior and we saved the Granite Mt. Hotshot
>> buggies from burning up!”
>>
>> Had it not been for that alert Engine Crew taking suppression action on the
>> slop-over, it would have definitely burned at least one of the Crew Carriers.
>> Very careless parking of the buggies in ‘the green’ right across the road from
>> active fire. In many way, very similar to how and where the GMHS parked
>> their buggies on the YHF.
>>
>> This strongly suggests to me a PATTERN of bad decisions with good
>> outcomes by this Crew. The Engine Crew bailed them out on the Holloway
>> Fire and the BRHS bailed them out on the YHF. Bad decsions with prior
>> good outcomes seemed to have been a standard practice with the GMHS.
>> It seems fairly easy to draw that conclusion and make that inference.
>> Connor replied to RTS on February 25, 2014 at 2:46 pm…
>>
>> Connor said…
>> Agreed. Look into the Thompson Ridge fire, and a burnout held in a
>> saddle (GM Burning). Crews had to bail off either sides of the saddle.
>> super sketchy.
Well… as it turns out… Granite Mountain’s participation in the Thompson
Ridge fire was acknowledged publicly by the Arizona Forestry Commission
just 48 hours after they all ( save one ) lost their lives in Yarnell due to
‘risky’ and/or ‘sketchy’ behavior.
…but, as you can imagine just 48 hours after the incident, there is no mention
of what they were REALLY doing on the Thompson Ridge fire or any mention
of any ‘risky’ and/or ‘sketchy’ behavior. It’s all just more HERO stuff.
The sort of SCARY part of that ‘announcement’, however, is when
Santa Fe Fire Chief Erik Litzenberg not only has nothing but words of
praise for GM… he actually goes so far as to say they were ‘learning from
them’ and “following their safety and program TACTICS” in their own
department… and that ‘leaders within Granite Mountain’ were actually
‘training and mentoring’ a lot of their own firefighters.
Yikes.
I certainly hope one of the courses ( for credit? ) wasn’t entitled…
“How to take risks and get away with it.”
That article is still HERE…
________________________________________________________________
Hotshot firefighters killed in AZ helped battle NM fire
Posted at: 07/01/2013 7:46 AM | Updated at: 07/01/2013 11:06 AM
By: Elizabeth Reed, KOB.com
http://www.kob.com/article/stories/s3084795.shtml
The elite hot shot crew that lost 19 firefighters in Arizona also helped fight a
fire in New Mexico, according to the state forestry’s Facebook page.
Santa Fe Fire Chief Erik Litzenberg confirmed that the Granite Mountain
Hot Shots helped battle the Thompson Ridge Fire last month in Jemez.
He said leaders within the Hot Shots also helped train and mentor many
members of the City of Santa Fe’s Fire Department.
“They’ve been a big support to us, and this hits very close to home,” Chief
Litzenberg wrote in a statement. “A lot of what we do, locally, is thanks to
what we’ve learned from these valiant individuals, and from what they have
done with their program.”
Chief Litzenberg explained his department uses SAFETY, program development
and even budgeting TACTICS cultivated by the Granite Mountain Hot Shots.
________________________________________________________________
**
** WAS YARNELL FIRE CHIEF JIM KOILE EVEN THERE ON JUNE 30?
Speaking of the ‘mandatory evacuations’ and who might actually have
been notified about them and was pitching in to help on June 30, 2013…
…I finally found at least ONE shred of evidence that Yarnell Fire Chief
Jim Koile was actually even THERE that day ( Sunday, June 30, 2013 ).
If anyone could/should have been helping with the evacuation of a town you
would think the actual Fire Chief for that town would be playing an important
role ( since he knows the town itself ) but there is still no real evidence that
actually happened on Sunday, June 30, 2013.
The only evidence that Koile might actually have even BEEN there that day
is just a one-liner in Roy Hall’s interview with SAIT investigators with
a timestamp of 16:11…
YIN – Page 29
SAIT Interview with Roy Hall – Incident Commander – 7/8/2013 – 10:30 a.m.
Interviewers: Jay Kurth, John Phipps, Mike Dudley, Jimmy Rocha
13:40 There is concern from the Yarnell side. There is a push on the east end
south of Moddle Creek. Bea Day called and said several ops people were on the
road including Jayson Clawson. Bea Day sent a list of members that moved with
no O numbers.
14:20 Received word that the structural group was retreating. 8 structures
were affected. Jim Downey and Geyer were notified.
14:37 George Cummons and 4 logs folks are in route. ETA, later this evening.
16:00 South Yarnell evacuation began with a focus around Mountainair trailer Park.
16:11 Chief Jim ? serving as Medical Unit Leader transitioned to Darrin Osborn.
16:48 Paul Musser notified me that Granite Mountain had deployed shelters.
I am assuming that Hall’s reference to a ‘Chief Jim ?’ is actually a reference
to Jim Koile, Yarnell Hill Fire Chief.
Chief Jim Koile is conspicuously absent from any/all official documentation
for that entire weekend. There isn’t even really a good accounting of his
decision making on Friday, June 28, 2013… before BLM and Russ Shumate
were even called in. The SAIR does have a one-paragraph summary of what
happened on Friday and does mention that Russ Shumate became the
Type 4 Incident Commander ( ICT4 ) at 1920 ( 7:20 PM ) on Friday
evening… but there is not one mention of Yarnell Fire Chief Jim Koile or
any involvement with the fire on his part at any time Friday or after that.
Same for the ADOSH report. It ‘mentions’ what happened on Friday and
it also says… on page 13…
“On June 28, 2013 at approximately 1700, lightning started a wildland
fire in the Weaver Mountains, Arizona, near the town of Yarnel. The fire
was formally named the Yarnell Hill Fire. The initial report was made to
the Arizona Dispatch Center (ADC) at approximately 1740 by the
volunteer fire department in Congress, Arizona.”
So not only does ADOSH never mention Yarnell Fire Chief Jim Koile… it
says the fire wasn’t even reported by him but was, instead, called in
by the volunteer fire department in Congress ( not even Yarnell ).
The WFAR report confirms what ADOSH says and reports that the fire
was NOT even called in by Yarnell Fire Chief Jim Koile or the Yarnell
fire department…
WFAR – Page 6…
June 28, 2013
On June 28 at approximately 1700 hours, the Yarnell Hill Fire was started by a
lightning strike. The initial report was made to the Arizona Dispatch Center
(ADC) at approximately 1740 by the volunteer fire department in Congress,
Arizona (10 miles southwest of Yarnell, Arizona).
So if Roy Hall, in his SAIT interview, really was referring to ‘Chief Jim Koile’
then that would be the only evidence I can find that Chief Jim Koile was even
there at all that weekend following the Initial Attack ( or lack thereof ) the
previous Friday night.
There is also no other reference anywhere in any official documentation as
to who ‘Darrin Osborn’ was, or what his involvement was with anything that
day, or why the function of ‘Medical Unit Leader’ suddenly ‘transitioned’ from
Chief Jim Kroile to Darrin Osborn at the odd time of 1611 ( 1 minute after
the official evacuation notices finally appeared in the Dispatch Logs ).
There is, however, a Facebook page which belongs to someone named
‘Darrin Osborn’ who says he “worked for the Prescott Fire Department”.
A simple ‘Google’ for ‘Darrin Osborn’ returns this PUBLIC link…
Darrin Osborn Profiles | Facebook
https://www.facebook.com/public/Darrin-Osborn
Worked at Prescott Fire Department
Studied at Yavapai College
Lives in Prescott, Arizona.
Does anyone out there have any actual ‘visual sightings’ of Chief Jim Koile
helping with any evacuations on Sunday… or, indeed, even being seen
anywhere in Yarnell that day?
Ditto for ‘Darrin Osborn’.
Does anyone know who he really is/was and whether he was involved with
evacuating Yarnell that day?
Just because he is the Chief, that does not automatically default to him being the Incident Commander. It could have been a subordinate (Capt,, Lt., Deputy). As the fire grew, they went to Hall being the Incident Commander, I am sure he did have close ties to any Fire Department representative. For all you know the Chief was sick, out of town, on holidays, at another incident, who knows.
An organization like a fire department (as well wildland fire) have numerous people who can step in to fill a role in a command position, the Chief does not have to be involved.
Reply to Rocksteady post on Feb 25, 2014 at 8:30 am said:
>> Rocksteady said…
>> Just because he is the Chief, that does not
>> automatically default to him being the Incident
>> Commander.
Absolutely. There is no doubt that Yarnell Fire Chief
Jim Koile was never the ‘Incident Commander’ of
anything that weekend… even if he WAS ever there.
It ( the Yarnell Hill Fire ) didn’t even officially become an
‘incident’ until 1736 ( 5:36 PM ) on Friday which is when
Arizona Dispatch started making log entries for this
‘incident’ and as it was determined to be on ‘State land’,
Russ Shumate immediately started ‘handling’ it and
then officially became the Type 4 Incident Commander
( ICT4 ) at around 1940 ( 7:40 PM ).
It’s actually already known that Yarnell Hill Fire Chief
Jim Koile was NOT there in Yarnell at all on Friday,
June 28, 2013.
Yarnell Fire Chief Jim Koile didn’t even live in Yarnell.
This wasn’t mentioned in any ‘official’ report but
independent journalists like our host, Mr. John Dougherty,
did a pretty good job of finding that out months ago.
From the article published back in October, 2013…
Yarnell Hill Fire Investigation Ignored Major Mistakes
by the State
By John Dougherty
Published Wed., Oct. 16 2013 at 12:00 PM
http://www.investigativemedia.com/yarnell-hill-fire-investigation-ignored-major-mistakes-by-the-state/
_______________________________________________
There still was more than two hours of daylight after the
fire first was reported at 5:41 p.m. on Friday, June 28,
more than enough time for a quick strike by firefighters
before nightfall, wildfire experts say.
Former Yarnell Fire Chief Andersen is convinced that the
fire could’ve been extinguished the evening it started if the
Yarnell Hill Fire Department and the state had quickly
responded.
“There’s a jeep road that goes up there to it,” he says.
“There’s no reason for that [fire] not to have been put out.”
But Yarnell had only two firefighters, including a volunteer
more than 70 years old, on duty that evening. Dispatch
records suggest that the department gave no serious
consideration to going up the mountain to fight the fire.
No one even answered a state dispatcher’s 6:09 p.m.
phone call to the Yarnell department.
Yarnell’s fire chief at the time, Jim Koile, isn’t a Yarnell
resident and wasn’t in town the night the fire started.
_____________________________________________
So ‘Friday’ night isn’t really what I’m still curious about.
The conversation on this thread had just turned to
‘evacuations on Sunday’ and given the importance of
the timing surrounding all that on Sunday and how it
directly relates to Granite Mountain ( and what happened
to them ) I am still just curious whether the person who
you would think would be the one to help most with the
evacuation of his own town was actually even THERE
on THAT day ( Sunday, June 30, 2013 ).
>> Rocksteady also wrote…
>> It could have been a subordinate (Capt,, Lt., Deputy).
In the case of the Yarnell Hill Fire department, I don’t
believe there WERE any such ‘subordinates’. Just
some volunteers. Only two of them were on duty
in Yarnell on Friday afternoon and one was 70 years
of age. None of their names appear anywhere at all.
We KNOW that the Yarnell Hill Fire station was being
actively used as the ‘Incident Command Post’ on
Saturday and on through Sunday morning… and that
it remained ‘open’ on Sunday. We also know that is
where Brian Frisby had his crew park the Granite
Mountain Crew Carriers on Sunday night after the
bodies were all discovered and before Blue Ridge
went up to Peeples Creek to debrief at the other
ICP and then go to sleep up there.
So who was ‘manning that store’ on Saturday
and Sunday? Who had the keys? Was it really Koile
on either Saturday or Sunday… or just ‘volunteers’?
>> Rocksteady also wrote…
>> As the fire grew, they went to Hall being the Incident
>> Commander, I am sure he did have close ties
>> to any Fire Department representative.
Actually, that’s part of what I am NOT sure of, even now.
Even if that is ‘Jim Kroile’ being mentioned in Roy Hall’s
SAIT interview notes… ( and, perhaps, the only proof
that Koile WAS there at all on Sunday )… apparently Hall
hadn’t even bothered to find out what his last name was
since he just says “Chief Jim ?” in his SAIT interview.
I wouldn’t characterize that as taking the time to have
any kind of ‘close relationship’ with local authorities.
>> For all you know the Chief was sick, out of town, on
>> holidays, at another incident, who knows.
Yes.
Heck… for all I ( personally ) know… Koile might have
either been in Bermuda OR was personally making
peanut butter sandwiches for everyone at the actual
Yarnell Fire Station all weekend.
That’s my point.
I ( personally ) don’t know… and I can’t find anyone
who DOES know ( where he was and what he was
actually doing that entire weekend ).
The Yarnell Hill Fire station was actively used all
weekend. If Koile was in Bermuda… then WHO was
filling in for him all weekend?
>> The Chief does not have to be involved.
Of course not… the YHF had gone state and was also
in the process of going federal ( Type 1 )… but when it
comes to having to evacuate a town you are not all that
familiar with… wouldn’t you think it would have HELPED
if the actual (paid) Fire Chief of the town was around
that day?
>> Rocksteady also wrote…
>> who knows.
Exactly. WHO knows ( where Koile was that weekend ).
Anyone?
Is that “Chief Jim ?” person mentioned directly by
Roy Hall in his SAIT interview actually ‘Koile’… or
is it some OTHER “Chief Jim ?” who Hall didn’t seem
to have a clue what his last name was that day?
Found an answer to my own question about whether
Yarnell Fire Chief Jim Koile really was ever in Yarnell
at all on Sunday, June 30.
Apparently, he was.
So that probably IS the “Chief Jim ?” that Roy Hall is referring
to in his interview with the SAIT investigators.
Finally found an article that quotes Chief Jim Koile about
what he was doing on Sunday…
http://www.azcentral.com/news/arizona/articles/20131116yarnell-fire-evacuations-chaotic-flawed.html
From the article…
____________________________________________________
Sometime in early afternoon, a Yarnell evacuation was being
discussed at incident command, recalled Jim Koile, who recently
resigned as fire chief there.
“There was a concern we didn’t want to alarm people,” Koile told
The Arizona Republic in July. “And then it seemed like all at once
it became an urgency.”
____________________________________________________
WTKTT,
Thanks for the clarification on the YHF ‘evacuation’ fiasco. I want to clarify a bit on something you posted: “Failure to comply with a duly issued mandatory evacuation
order can result in arrest. Tazers and handcuffs can come in
handy under such circumstances.’
It’s not that draconian. Actually, you do NOT have to leave, even when there is a ‘manadatory’ evacuation. You can stay, but IF/WHEN the LE personnel establish a closure, then you are not allowed to return. The LE personnel often ‘bluff’ the residents using things like “who is your dentist so we can find the dental records to ID your body or who are you next of kin” to do the same.
Reply to RTS post on February 24, 2014 at 9:32 am
>> RTS said…
>> It’s not that draconian.
>> Actually, you do NOT have to leave, even when there is a
>> ‘manadatory’ evacuation.
Ah. Ok. Thanks for correcting me.
I actually thought that DID give LEOs the authority to use
some ‘failure to cooperate with a law enforcement operation’
arrest powers if you were refusing to cooperate.
>> RTS also said…
>> The LE personnel often ‘bluff’ the residents
So that would explain what I witnessed one time ( and the
cause for my incorrect belief ).
I guess I did witness a clever ‘bluff’ once.
I’ve been through FIVE major hurricanes, THREE of which
called for ‘mandatory evacuations’.
I watched a drunk neighbor ‘refusing to leave’ once and the
police officer took his handcuffs out and shoved them in
his face and say… “Fine… you’re coming with ME then, whether
you like it or not”.
The neighbor backed down and said “Ok… take it easy. I’ll go.”
WTKTT,
RTS, is correct, BUT, it is a state by state thing. What you witnessed may not have been a bluff in your state.
Mike,
You are correct that the YCSO had control of the evacuations as Law Enforcement personnel are the only ones that can enforce that edict. The evacuation order would have come from the IC and/or Liaison Officer (Command and General Staff), most likely recommended by OPS and/or in counsel with OPS. The timing definitely was not good and in fact their rate of spread (ROS) estimates for that day were off by large margins on a regular basis that day. So, yes, their inactions and/or untimely actions definitely set things in motion that day.
When you don’t make timely, critical decisions then time makes the decsions for you. By the grace of God, more people (WFF and civilians) were not injured and/or killed that day.
Reply to RTS post on February 22, 2014 at 7:33 pm
>> RTS said…
>>
>> Mike,
>> You are correct that the YCSO had control of the evacuations
>> as Law Enforcement personnel are the only ones that can
>> enforce that edict.
Yes. Failure to comply with a duly issued mandatory evacuation
order can result in arrest. Tazers and handcuffs can come in
handy under such circumstances.
>> mike also said…
>> The evacuation order would have come from the IC and/or
>> Liaison Officer (Command and General Staff), most likely
>> recommended by OPS and/or in counsel with OPS.
Well… as with almost everything to do with this Yarnell Hill
Fire fiasco… there is quite some confusion about whether
that’s the way it really went down that day.
Short story: All the official documentation seems to agree that
is was simply SPGS1 Gary Cordes who ultimately issued
the ‘mandatory evacuation’ order for Yarnell and Glen Ilah…
and he did it straight to YCSO Police. IC Hall, OPS1 Abel and
OPS2 Musser weren’t even involved… and Cordes requested
those mandatory evacuations at 1530… not 1610. That would
be FORTY MINUTES earlier than any entries in the Incident
Dispatch Logs or other notes say that YCSO got around
to actually issuing the real order.
The Long story…
Mike is totally correct that the original ‘initial SAIR report’
released on July 15, 2013, puts the time of the ‘official’
Yarnell / Glen Ilah evacuation notice at 1610 ( 4:10 PM ).
Here is that exact entry from the initial SAIR report, incuding
the time the ‘pre evacuation’ notices also went out. ( Those
are the ones that used the YCSO CodeRED software to
make phone calls, emails and text messages… but half the
residents of Yarnell hadn’t even ‘signed up’ for the service ).
SAIT – First Preliminary Report – June 15, 2013
Compiled July 15, 2013 (Revised July 18, 2013)
Page 4
-Yavapai County Sheriff’s Office initiated a four hour
pre-evacuation notification at 1:50 p.m. ( CodeRED software ).
-Yavapai County Sheriff’s Office ordered mandatory evacuation
of Yarnell and Glen Ilah at 4:10 p.m.
NOTE: That the initial SAIR report says that 4:10 is when
YCSO finally got around to issuing the ‘official’ evacuation
notice… even though other evidence ( see below ) establishes
that SPGS1 Gary Cordes ‘ordered’ the evacuations FORTY
MINUTES earlier than that at 1530 ( 3:30 PM ).
That intial SAIR report time of 4:10 PM actually matches
information in other ‘official’ reports and also matches exactly
the following entry in the Incident Dispatch Log…
06/30/2013 – 16:10:41 – From: PMB – To: DANA
NOTIFIED ABOUT CONTACT WITH YAV 911, PER DANA,
STARTED MANDATORY EVAC OF YARNELL ABOUT 30
MINUTES AGO, PEEPLES VALLEY WAS NOTIFIED
ABOUT 4 HOURS AGO.
So the TIME here matches ( 4:10 PM )… but TWO things
to note about this dispatch log entry.
1) It does NOT represent any kind of official message from
either ‘Roy Hall’ or the initials IC. It is simply an entry being
made from PMB to DANA that day.
2) It says that the evacuations STARTED 30 minutes prior
to this log entry, but there are NO log entries going back
30 minutes that say anything about ‘evacuations’ being
either officially requested or issued.
So where are they getting this ’30 minutes prior’ statement?
Well… as it turns out… there IS documented evidence that
the ACTUAL ‘mandatory evacuations’ for Yarnell and Glen
Ilah were officially ‘requested’ NOT by Roy Hall ( IC ) or
any OPS person ( Abel/Field OPS or Musser Planning/OPS ).
Turns out the ACTUAL ‘mandatory evacuations’ were requested
directly to either ‘Arizona Dispatch’ center and/or direct to YCSO
by SPGS1 Gary Cordis.
From the SAIT interview notes with SPGS1 Gary Cordis where
he says he first REQUESTED ( placed an order ) for the
‘mandatory evacuations’ at 1530 ( 3:30 PM )… a full FORTY
MINUTES before anything ‘official’ appears in the Incident
Dispatch Logs…
YIN – Page 22
Interview with SPGS1 Gary Cordis – July 12, 2013 – 1300
Interviewers: Randy Okot, Jimmy Rocha, Jay Kurth
1400
– Came across the YCSO officer who said they were running
pre-evacuation. I didn’t know about that because the fire had
not hit the trigger points.
15:30
– Wind event – collapse of column – fire shifted from flanking fire
and turned to a head fire going south.
– Placed evacuation order
This 1530 ( 3:30 PM ) time for Cordis’ intial ‘request’ that
‘mandatory evacuation’ notices go out is backed up by other
documentation.
The ADOSH report gets really specific about ‘Cordis’ being
the one to have done the ‘requesting’ and that he DID make
the ‘request’ for the ‘mandatory evacuations’ at 1530 ( 3:30 PM ),
ADOSH then goes right on to the 1600 ( 4:00 PM ) timeframe
and documents Cordis making the same request AGAIN.
ADOSH says that later, at 1600, Cordis was now just ‘informing’
OPS1 Abel that the evacuations were needed ( what happened
to Cordis’ original request at 1530 ?? ) and this time it was Abel
who then made the actual call (direct) to Arizona Dispatch
without Roy Hall’s participation…
.
ADOSH – Page 18
At approximately 1530 hours, Cordes placed an evacuation
order for Yarnell and Glen llah.
ADOSH – Page 19
At approximately 1600 hours, Cordes notified Abel that trigger
points for Structure Protection Group 1 had been met
indicating a one-hour evacuation time. Shortly thereafter,
Abel was notified that Structure Protection Group 1 trigger
point #2 had been reached… it was time to evacuate
Yarnell. Abel radioed AZ Dispatch the evacuation notice.
The WFAR report pretty much says the same thing… but
they put Cordes original ‘request that the town be evacuated’
at 1540 versus 1530. ( Ten minutes later than ADOSH but
still 30 minutes before the ‘official’ notices appear in logs )…
…and in an odd twist… the WFAR report goes on to say that
OPS2 Musser was physically standing next to Cordes when
he made this ‘request to evacuate the town’ at 1540.
Cordes was in Yarnell pretty much ALL day. That means at
1540, when Cordes requested that the town be evacuated,
OPS2 Paul Musser was right there with him down in
Yarnell and seeing for himself what was going on. It might
have been just minutes after this, while he was still standing
next to Cordes, that Musser made his infamous “can you
spare resources for Yarnell?” radio ( or cell call? ) out to
‘Granite Mountain’.
WFAR – Page 38
By 1540, the first trigger point in Yarnell was breached and
STPS1 ( Gary Cordes ) called for an evacuation of the town.
A short time later, the fire reached the second established
trigger point and was breached which called for all structure protection personnel to retreat to their pre-identified safety
zones. Planning OSC ( Musser ) was standing with STPS1
( Cordes ) when these commands were made.
Last but not least…
The official (second) SAIR report also confirms that it was
SPGS1 Gary Cordes who made the actual ‘mandatory
evacuation’ request… but TWO things to note about what
the SAIR says about it…
1) The SAIR also puts the time of Cordes’ ‘request’ for
‘mandatory evacuation’ in the 1530 to 1545 timeframe.
2) The SAIR says that Gary Cordes went straight to YCSO
and ‘requested’ the ‘mandatory evacuations’ as early as
1530 and he didn’t even go through Musser or Abel or Hall
( or anyone else ). He just went straight to the Police
and ‘ordered’ and ‘immediate evacuation for Yarnell’…
SAIR – Page 25
Between 1530 and 1545, winds pick up and gradually shift
direction from the southwest to the west-northwest, and the fire
becomes very active. There is some spotting, and heavy
ash is falling onto fire personnel working in the youth camp
area. By this time, the two-mile flanking fire looks more like a
head fire and is starting to move southeasterly. Fire reaches
SPGS1’s ( Gary Cordes’ ) first trigger point, and he requests
YCSO to order an immediate resident evacuation for Yarnell.
So pretty much ALL of the ‘official documentation’ AGREES
that it was SPGS1 Gary Cordes himself who ‘decided’ when
the ‘mandatory evacuations’ were needed… and he made
that decision as early as 1530 but no later than 1545.
The only discrepancies in the reports is whether he just
called YCSO directly and ‘ordered the evacuations’… or
whether he ran it through OPS1 Abel 20 minutes later
at 1600 and Abel is the one who actually called Arizona
Dispatch circa 1610 ( FORTY minutes after Cordes
decided the evacuations were necessary ).
In one more strange twist… the SAIT interview with the
Arizona Dispatch people themselves say that it was
ATGS ( Rory Collins? ) who actually first ‘ordered’ the
‘mandatory evactuations’, but there are no TIMES at all
listed in this official interview with ‘Arizona Dispatch’…
YIN – Page 2
Interview with Arizona Dispatch Center
Interviewed AZ-ADC By: Richa, Lance, Jennifer on 07/07/2013
Saturday night 1800, they developed evacuation plans with
local 911.
They did get a slop over/run sat night and pulled everyone
off the fire and watched it.
Fire went from T4 to T2 incident.
Sun 8-1000 ordered T2 short team, no T3 team ordered transitioned from T4 to T2 incident.
ATGS informed dispatch to start evac based on trigger points.
This sounds a little bit like the SAIR is trying to rewrite history. It sounds like Cordes made a “request” somewhere around 1530, is entirely believable. However he could have ordered the sun to set, but unless he has the power to carry it out it really doesn’t matter much.
Results here are what matter. No doubt people were evacuating even before 1530. But many were not, and many were not aware of an order to do so even after 1600 or even later. And I still think that without the second wind shift, folks in Yarnell might have been dead before 1700. One of the BR notes talks about the wind shifting at 1620.
Finally, not being a firefighter, I am beginning to wonder what this IC job entails. If one of his critical jobs is not making sure civilians in the path of the fire get out in a timely fashion, then the job description needs a rewrite. He does not get to just delegate that job, and then wash his hands of it.
Reply to mike post on February 24, 2014 at 5:59 am
>> mike said…
>> However he ( Gary Cordes ) could have ordered
>> the sun to set, but unless he has the power to
>> carry it out it really doesn’t matter much.
That’s still the confusing part.
There is all the evidence in the world that Cordes
himself saw that first ‘1 hour evacuation notice’
trigger point get met down there just outside
of Yarnell… and he then ‘ordered mandatory
evacuations’ at 1530… but what ACTUALLY
happened at that point still remains sort of
a mystery.
Which ‘official’ report is correct, I wonder?
Did Cordes actually call YCSO Police directly
at that point and he DID have the ‘horsepower’
to just tell them “We are evacuating Yarnell and
Glen Ilah now”… and YCSO jumped into action…
…or did it take another 30 or 40 minutes for
that to actually even start happening, as some
other ‘official’ reports seem to suggest?
>> mike also wrote…
>> No doubt people were evacuating even before
>> 1530. But many were not, and many were not
>> aware of an order to do so even after 1600 or
>> even later.
Exactly.
I know this wasn’t a ‘light switch’ or anything.
People HAD actually been evacuating on their
own for most of the afternoon… but this is all
about the details of the OFFICIAL evacuation
order(s)… when that ‘really’ happened… and
when it became ‘common knowledge’ for all
personnel involved with the incident ( and all
citizens ) that full blown evacuations had been
‘ordered’ and needed to happen RIGHT NOW.
You are still absolutely correct that the first
‘documented’ official notice didn’t come until
1610 ( 4:10 PM ) when that simple blurb appeared
in the Incident Dispatch Log… but even that
blurb mentioned that the ‘evacuations’ had been
‘in progress’ for more than 30 minutes. That seems
to confirm that whatever Cordes did in the
1530 to 1540 timeframe WAS the ‘official evacuation
notice’… but how that was disseminated down
to the citizens of Yarnell and Glen Ilah is still
a mystery.
The Yarnell Hill Fire station emergency siren was
non-functional. It had been stolen recently, then
recovered, but rats had then chewed through the
wiring so it wasn’t working.
So no ‘Warning Siren’ went off. Not ever.
The mysterious ‘volunteers’ that had (according
to DPS Officer Kight ) been used to help notify
people of evacuations up north in the Peeples
Valley area earlier in the day aren’t mentioned
anywhere in conjunction with the major
evacuation effort later down in Yarnell.
In pretty much EVERYONE’s SAIT interview notes
there is evidence that at various times in the 1530
to 1630 timeframe everyone ( somehow ) became
AWARE that total evacuations had been ordered
and should now be the ‘focus’ of the operation…
…but NO ONE ever reports exactly how they
heard about it. There are NO reports in any of the
personal interviews of anyone hearing any kind
of ‘official’ announcement about it over ANY of
the TAC or command frequencies.
When YCSO ( headquarters in Prescott ) sent out
the pre-evacuation notices earlier in the day… the
’emails’ and ‘text messages’ they sent all said that
there would be ANOTHER notification when
evacuations were now mandatory…
…but I can’t find any evidence that their own
codeRED software was fired up at any specific
point later in the day to provide those ‘second
notices’.
I suppose the moment they pushed the ‘Go’ button
on their CodeRED software later in the day ( if
they ever really did ) would represent the actual
‘moment’ that YCSO had just been ‘informed’
that the mandatory evacuations were now
‘official’ and ‘required’…
…but I still can’t find any direct evidence of when
that actually happened.
>> mike also wrote…
>> Finally, not being a firefighter, I am beginning to
>> wonder what this IC job entails. If one of his
>> critical jobs is not making sure civilians in the
>> path of the fire get out in a timely fashion, then
>> the job description needs a rewrite. He does
>> not get to just delegate that job, and then
>> wash his hands of it.
Well… if you read all the documentation, dispatch
logs, and SAIT interview notes carefully… there
isn’t much evidence that this Roy Hall guy was
doing much of anything that afternoon other than
working on the NEXT DAY and making sure the
Type 1 Team ordering was moving ahead for
Monday, July 1.
Sometime around 2:00 PM… when someone
finally convinced him the Type 1 team was
necessary… that seemed to become his primary
focus and EVERYTHING to do with actually
‘fighting the fire’ that was burning outside his door
seems to have been delegated to OTHER
people ( that afternoon ).
If you read Roy Hall’s own SAIT interview notes
and how he ‘learned about things’ all day long
that day ( including the deployment ) it really just
sounds like he was (almost) a complete bystander
that day and was distracted with completing
the Type 1 Resource ordering for the NEXT day.
The initial State Forestry report from 7/16/13 says evacuations of Glen Ilah and Yarnell were ordered at 4:10 PM. Now my understanding is evacuations were under the control of the Yavapai County Sheriff’s Office, so presumably it was up to them to order them. However, their decision to do so had to be based on knowledge of the fire, so I assume they would be in contact with fire personnel about such a decision. Am I wrong to assume that their contact person for this would be the IC (in this case, Roy Hall)? The OPS control the activities of the firefighters, but I assume they could not order evacuations. So their activities before 4:10 would have been dealing with a situation where a raging wildfire had Yarnell in its sites with townspeople still present, and no evacuation ordered. So they were doing what they could to prevent a civilian disaster. Even after 4:10, communicating and implementing the evacuation order was going to take significant time.
Whatever GM’s exact mission was (and as I said before, this is not at all unknown, just unspoken by those who know) I think it can be safely said it had to do with the fact there were significant numbers of civilians in Glen Ilah and Yarnell. OPS Musser apparently was the one tasked (or he took it on) with dealing with that situation. He was in a terrible position. He needed to get people out, including firefighters, while trying to buy some time for that to occur. But there was no stopping or slowing that fire. The only thing that slowed it going towards Yarnell was the 2nd wind shift that drove the head to the south and not the southeast.
I admit I have not thought much of Roy Hall after the “no smoking gun” remark. And as the IC, he by definition bears some responsibility for the events that day. But it now appears the failure of Hall and the YC sheriff to order evacuations in anything close to a timely matter was the sentinel event that set this tragedy in motion.
Mike I think we have all come to the conclusion that this fire was a Chinese fire drill from beginning to end. When those things happen your lucky if people don’t die. 19 did and it could have been a real catastrophe. For the SAIR to say every thing was done correctly is the biggest cover-up ever. There are some people out there with some real responsibility for this from top to bottom.
There are also some people ‘out there’ who, at the very least,
should never be allowed to ‘manage a fire’ ever again…
unless some hard check is made on their qualifications
and whether or not they should have ever been dispatched
to Yarnell in the first place.
exactly. spot on, WWTKTT
Just to add, and some people should never be able to participate in a SAIR again, if this is the quality of their work on such a tragedy..
Reply to Rocksteady post
on February 25, 2014 at 2:00 pm
Actually… since this incident is now
‘historic’ and is ‘not going away’
like Jim Karels and Mike Dudley
just hoped it would…
…it will be interesting to someday
hear from ALL of those other people
who worked on that ‘investigation’.
We’ve seen the same evidence
they had to work with.
I am sure there were any number
of people on that team who were
actually trying to do the job they
were getting paid to do, and provide
as much detail about what really
happened as they could… and they
really did have ‘enough’ evidence to
do that AND the ability to re-contact
witnesses for more questions…
… but at some point… Karels and
Dudley just ‘shut them down’.
It will be interesting to someday hear
all of their individual reactions when
they finally realized the ‘investigation’
was going to be no such thing.
Their names are on it.
I will bet any number of them are
actually not happy about that.
Thats why i said “SOME” people should never be allowed to participate…
Reply to mike post on February 22, 2014 at 12:10 pm
>> mike said…
>> The initial State Forestry report from 7/16/13 says
>> evacuations of Glen Ilah and Yarnell were ordered at 4:10 PM.
>> Now my understanding is evacuations were under the control
>> of the Yavapai County Sheriff’s Office, so presumably it was
>> up to them to order them.
Well… if that really happened ( Roy Hall issuing official evacuation
notices at 4:10 PM )… then someone FORGOT to inform the
actual YCSO DPS officer ( Daniel Kight ) who was actually
there with the DPS motor-home command center to handle
such evacuation orders.
The SAIT interviewed DPS officer Daniel Kight, the Yavapai County
DPS officer who was there all day Saturday because ( as the
dispatch logs from Saturday night indicate ) the YCSO was
adivised the night before, after the fire ‘escaped’ its original 2-4
acre containment area, that there MIGHT be a possibility of
some evacuations needed the next day ( on Sunday ).
Officer Kight was there early in the morning with the actual
YCSO motor home ‘command’ unit, and was moving it around
that day. He says he WAS told early that morning that if/when
evacuation notices were issued that day they might only come
on a 1 hour notice basis.
There WERE some evacuation ‘officially’ ordered at various
points early in the afternoon, BEFORE the wind shift to the
south, but they were all focused on areas to the NORTH such
as the Double Bar A Ranch area, the mobile-home park in
Peeples valley, and eventually Model Creek Road there near
the ICP command center. He, himself, even moved the
motor-home command center from the ICP east to the
circlular-crop-field helibase as the fire approached the
Elementary School and got with ( his estimate ) 1000 feet
of the School.
Officer Daniel Kight says that VOLUNTEERS were being used
to help notify people of these early-afternoon evacuations, when
they were actually issued. He doesn’t say WHO these
VOLUNTEERS actually were or how many there were.
Where it all completely fell apart is when the wind shifted, and
issuing ANY ‘official evacuation notices’ for the SOUTH end like
Yarnell and Glen Ilah. According to Officer Kight’s interview
notes… that actually never even happened ( or at least no
one bothered to tell HIM about it ).
Officer Kight himself notes in his interview that even as early
as 1430 ( 2:30 PM ) he, himself, could easily see that a ‘wall
of flames’ was now headed SOUTH towards Yarnell and
that his (quote) “pants legs where whipping” because of
the (quote) “predicted winds”.
To repeat: Officer Kight says even HE could easily see that
the fire was now heading SOUTH with strong winds behind it
as early as 2:30 PM that day.
What is curiously lacking from Officer Kight’s interview is ANY
statement from him that he was EVER ‘notified’ of ANY actual
evacuation orders for Yarnell or Glen Ilah.
The ONLY entry in his interview notes following his report of the
knowledge of the fire “headed to Yarnell” at 2:30 PM comes
a full ONE HOUR and 20 minutes later at 1550 ( 3:50 PM ) when
he says he “called his Superintendent” and told him “Yarnell
was going to burn and all hell is breaking loose”.
Even after that… for the next FORTY MINUTES… there is no
mention on Officer Kight’s part of him being ASKED to do
ANYTHING. His only entry after that says that at 1630 he was
back at the ICP ( In Model Creek, not Yarnell ) and then his
only other entry is TWO and a half hours later ( 1900 ) when
he says he learned of the ‘fatalities’.
Officer Kight’s interview in the SAIT notes is the ONLY one
attributed to anyone from ‘law enforcement’ ( other than the
Ranger 58 DPS Helicopter crew ) and at NO time
does he say that HE was ever informed that evacuations
had been ‘officially ordered’ for Yarnell and Glen Ilah, or that
the same VOLUNTEERS that had been utilized earlier in the
day to help notify people up NORTH about evacuations were
ever requested and/or used for Yarnell and Glen Ilah.
He ( and however many YCSO DPS people were also there
that day ) certainly became AWARE that the ‘evacuations
were happening’ ( Pretty hard to miss when the HIghway
starts to clog up and horses are running down the highway )…
…but as far as YCSO DPS being actually ‘officially told’ the
evacuations were in progress ( at ANY time )… there is no
evidence of that in his report.
Zero. Zip. Nada.
Here is Officer Kight’s entire SAIT interview ( very short )…
SAIT Interview notes… page 34…
Lance met with Daniel Kight, DPS officer on 07/08/2013.
He was at Yav County SO across from FD 2030 reverse 911 advised 1hr evac on the next call. Potential evacs…the am briefing was 0700. 0930 going to Peoples valley fire going ne wind
driven 1012 volunteer Fire Department for potential evacuations, 1100 volunteers start at AA Ranch not long after crossed the rd. Fire was w/ in 1000ft from school. Over that ridge 1115-1130 very close to school. 1130-1145 fire at peoples valley school, when VLAT shows up. Moved motor home command form school to helibase. 1430-1500 there was large cell over spruce mtn, to the nth wind shifted wall of flames headed to Yarnell. Predicted winds, pant legs were Whipping. 1550 call to supt Yarnell was going to burn all hell is braking lose. 1630 he was at ICP AA Prescott fire truck hit that rd sideways 1900 notified of fatalities. “Eric being into the helm ranch…Cortez pat was talking to individual. Crew was wking towards us Eric heard on crew net and left.
Followup…
Just wanted to be sure an important point from above
doesn’t get lost…
At 1550 ( 3:50 ) PM we have the actual YCSO DPS Officer
who was sent to Yarnell with the motor-home command
unit calling his OWN Supervisor to tell him… “Yarnell is
GOING to burn and all hell is breaking loose”…
…but Roy Hall still doesn’t issue any evacuation orders for
Yarnell and/or Glen Ilah for another TWENTY MINUTES
( Supposedly at 4:10 PM ).
As we have already tragically discovered… 20 minutes
can make a huge difference between people living or
dying that day.
Followup to the followup.
After going through ALL of the ‘public’ records… there
really is no evidence that Roy Hall ever issued the
Yarnell/Glen Ilah ‘mandatory evacuation’ notices
at ANY time… and ( perhaps more importantly )
that he was ever actually SUPPOSED to.
ALL of the ‘official reports’ say that it was SPGS1
Gary Cordes himself who ‘requested’ the
evacuations when the fire hit the first ‘one hour
evacuation time’ trigger point just northwest
of Shrine road. Some reports use the word
‘ordered’ and some reports say Cordes called
YCSO directly while others say he made the
‘request’ to Field OPS1 Abel and Abel then
called Arizona Dispatch.
Regardless of how that actually went down, there
is certainly no documented evidence that Roy
Hall was even in the loop at that point.
Whether he SHOULD have been, or whether
the ‘official’ notice should have already been
appearing at AZ dispatch at 3:50 when Officer
Kight was already telling his Supervisor that
“all hell was breaking loose” is still a question
that probably needs to be answered.
I posted this last night but it does not appear today, so reposting. Those are most definitely the GMHS Crew Carriers with 7A and 7B and the following caption ” Got to see some extreme fire behavior and we saved the Granite Mt. Hotshot buggies from burning up!”
Had it not been for that alert Engine Crew taking suppression action on the slop-over, it would have definitely burned at least one of the Crew Carriers. Very careless parking of the buggies in ‘the green’ right across the road from active fire. In many way, very similar to how and where the GMHS parked their buggies on the YHF.
This strongly suggests to me a PATTERN of bad decisions with good outcomes by this Crew. The Engine Crew bailed them out on the Holloway Fire and the BRHS bailed them out on the YHF. Bad decsions with prior good outcomes seemed to have been a standard practice with the GMHS. It seems fairly easy to draw that conclusion and make that inference.
What I still wonder is if even this incident was just one of many that Darrell Willis himself might have been referring to in his May 2013 written employee evaluation report for Marsh when Willis specifically mentions “less than excellent performance.”
Was Willis really just talking only about Marsh going over his head about the ongoing staffing/funding/benefits issues… or was this a reminder to Marsh that Willis had been “hearing the stories” about things like this continuing to happen?
I wonder what Willis really meant when he was telling Marsh in May that he now wanted to be included in all the decision making from now on to avoid (quote) “less than excellent performance”?
my question is to you WWTKTT —
this question in regards to Mr. Willis-
have you directed it out on here in hopes he reads this because a lot of folks do not read this area as well as a lot of folks do so do not go on the assumption “advertising” the thought or question will be read to by him or to him so here is his contact information-
ask the person directly and I have always got direct replies and promptly and courteous and professional as well with empathy from every person I have questioned to date—well I still never heard back from azcentral’s oops/errors on the Alone on the Hill article by Shaun McKinnon (so not everyone) yet he stated he had personal stuff going on so I let it alone because people who know me know I am upfront and pure and I publicly already corrected him with the facts but here you go to reach Mr. Willis–
Darrell Willis, Division Chief
Prescott Fire Department
333 White Spar Road
Prescott, AZ 86303
(928)777-1701 Office
(928)776-1890 Fax
(928)925-7311 Cell
Notice: new e-mail address is [email protected]
——————————–
Now, I am not online very much at all. I got rid of my mifi. I am trying to curve bills to pay a medical debt as well as save up for 2 future surgeries and I am dealing with the brain tumors this 2014 so a lot of you can relax there; I am addressing it. Now for the locals who I know come here—a slice of what I am about includes you in the Y O U but it is aimed at a certain other areas as well. Gosh, thank you again without encouragement for George D. for coming here and sharing that horrible day to you all. Yes, I am having a hard phase health-wise and yes my medical massager stated I need to focus to doing some focus to that area and yes I have been hiking but no one for 2014 to the 19 area but Sonny (Tex) and the dogs.
Y O U made your choice—my hope is Y O U use your voice!
The beauty of living life is the diverse people with their perceptions and views
even the ones different then my own.
I know as the clock keeps ticking—we go forward…
We will soon enough reach the one year anniversary of the Yarnell Fire weekend.
Yet it seems like every single night when it is time to go to sleep
it just seems difficult because Tex and I eye-witnessed those spotted fires as
containable and we watched it turn into a controlled fire then the same spotted fires
taking nineteen lives as well as changing lives in that community all in the same day. We have heard so many homeowners/renters/off the grid folks of their horrific moment that 6-30-13 and thank you for sharing to us but I hope some day you come here like George D. and share here— We, the people, need Y O U to properly assess that weekend. We saw what you have and I believe it can help others and please do not wait until claims/suits come about to share your testimony or footage/evidence; share here and now.
My photos show that late afternoon as “the gates of hell”—that tragedy has not only
loved ones of those phenomenal brave nineteen Granite Mountain Hotshots, a community
and extended communities of the 19 and Yarnell/Glen Ilah and the firefighter/smokejumper
community and so many people who thought their lives ended that last weekend of June 2013.
We go up there and celebrate their lives even though without them others’ lives are lil’ less sparkley-
My parents/husband and loved ones will share to you all that I am not a lawyer- not here to win or
lose yet I have a zeal to partner up with anyone in standing strong that only facts be shared about that weekend.
I have the innate need to know the facts that still have been denied. I do not think it is fair that people do know more
yet they feel at ease to let so many go forward thinking “what ifs” when they carry clarity.
I look back at my own life and I have learned so many lessons and in knowing my husband I learned not
only how to be the woman for him but for Him and as well as strangers. Morgan Loew said it spot on
when he labeled a description to me and my hiking partner as “unlikely pair” and in our journey pioneering
Arizona out amongst the desert and mountain/forest terrains we have had to learn to understand
areas that we still do not comprehend about one another. Yet the time I have spent not in the same spot as I did for decades
day in and out with my husband and now embarked on this unusual journey I can state I do understand
every day these wives and children must go forward and I know many of us are seeking clarity to help
them understand as well as ourselves yet they too are in a spot they cannot comprehend of how this could of happened to their sweetheart—
their son—their father—their grandson–their dear friend or co-worker, etc…
I wish all errors made that weekend could be undone—if anyone speaks the truth and they are sent to prison—the justice
system would be making a monumental error that can’t be undone just like that weekend. I just seek clarity not court confusions.
If there was a way people could speak
and not worry about losing it all. I just do not know the modern world. Lawyers and such. I in recent times got to have a slice
due to another’s actions and I comprehend the run tactics or do not share or fear; I get it how one can think that way—not my style but I have empathy for those feeling such way. I also get no one has the right
to tell you how to live your life. Let’s not deny ourselves from this extraordinary weekend with thinking we really should
accept the SAIR and what people say and just move forward. BE GOOD—that what needs to be fed not shed and locked away forever—
be good and speak up.
Anyone who has known me when I humanly have blundered–they also know I am about rectifying and getting to the root and core
of the most powerful weapon out there—the truth; it tells the reality not what you choose to make it to be—the truth
helps us not get caught up in our own illusions. I prefer to look at that weekend at the facts that can be objectively verified versus
theories.
To Y O U who has more clarity—I love life every minute yet the moment I see the night fall and I have to sleep. I am sure needing
a decent bed time story—one with the knowledge that life here is short and my heart feels it did not have to be that short for those
19 men—can you help? Even better, I am working during the day on this puzzle—you may have the piece I need…You see, at any time
our lives can end. You could have the most important information that could help so many lives. That information should never go to the grave with Y O U—
what a burden you must carry or maybe you do not because you can compartmentalize this out—I just hope more share their day that from the common folks to the people who were there that day to fight the fire from the ground to the air—
I hope Willis gives you the answer to your questions WWTKKT.
oh and if Y O U share—my only request is keep it real and raw not edited or cropped or what you feel we should hear to make a decent bed time stories because I am not looking for a Once Upon Time…fairy tale ending, just the truth and no more edited photos or narrations or collaborated old information. I gave all my photos pure and I will not accept anything else from Y O U. Keep it pure!
Agreed. Look into the Thompson Ridge fire, and a burnout held in a saddle (GM Burning). Crews had to bail off either sides of the saddle. super sketchy.
Still going through all of the recently released Blue Ridge (redacted)
documents. There are a LOT of details that answer some ongoing
mysteries about what happened that day but there are also some ‘new’
mysteries being introduced by this documentation.
More about the ‘new mysteries’ later… but here are some previously
unheard ‘details’ regarding the YARNELL_GAMBLE video where we hear
fire management ( OPS2 Musser? ) still urging GM to ‘Hurry up’…
Page 28…
Blue Ridge Hotshot ( Name not determined yet. Stay tuned ).
1630 – Crew instructed to disengage and move back to Buggies.
This takes no more than 10 minutes to complete w/ wheels moving [BLACKOUT].
[BLACKOUT] accounted for. [BLACKOUT]. Begin to make our way back
to Hwy 89 + Restaurant in Yarnell.
NOTE: Either the times here are just a few minutes off, or it couldn’t have
taken more than 7 or 8 minutes ‘disengage and move out from Shrine
area’. PNF hires Jason Clawson, Aaron Hulburd, and KC (Casey) ‘Bucky’
Yowell were already in the parking lot of the St. Joseph Shrine just 200
yards east of the ‘Youth Camp’ and were about to start shooting the
‘Helmet Cam’ video that would capture the final radio transmissions
from Steed, Caldwell and Marsh. We KNOW that the entire Blue Ridge
convoy had just ‘stopped to talk with Clawson, Hulburd and Yowell as
they passed them on their way out… but the Blue Ridge convoy had
gone on its way east just moments before the Helmet-Cam video
actually starts at just about 16:38.50.
Either way… what this means is that the YARNELL_GAMBLE video
that was shot by Blue Ridge Hotshot Mccord as he was sitting in the
driver’s seat of one of the Crew Carriers at the Youth Camp may
have been shot about 10 minutes LATER than originally thought.
The YARNELL_GAMBLE video is the one that captures someone at
the command level ( OPS 2 Musser? ) talking to Eric Marsh and asking
if Granite Mountain can ‘Hurry up’ and reach town ASAP. It’s also the
video that captures Marsh responding ( with what sounds like exasperation
in his voice ) “They’re comin’ from the heel of the fire”.
What all this means is that it now appears that the command level request
for Granite Mountain to ‘hurry up’ may have actually taken place just
MINUTES before Captain Jesse Steed was about to break in on
the radio with his MAYDAY call “We are in front of the flaming front”.
We also NOW know that there is no ‘over-modulation’ on that first MAYDAY
from Steed, as reported by the SAIR. The noise in the background is actually
chainsaws ALREADY running at that point ( 1639 ) and Captain Steed is
simply having to SHOUT over the noise of the saws running right near him
and ALREADY ‘preparing the deployment site’.
This also means that the moment when they all realized/decided they were
going to deploy came some moments BEFORE the first MAYDAY call was
made and they had to actually locate the deployment site, pull the ropes on
the saws, and were already ‘at work’ before that first MAYDAY hit the radio.
Confused? Don’t be. Let me make it simpler…
It is obvious from the YARNELL_GAMBLE audio track that Eric Marsh was,
at that moment, still totally unaware of the danger they were ALREADY in
but would actually ‘realize’ in just a few moments since Marsh calmly says
( in the video ) “They’re comin’ from the heel of the fire”.
The more the EXACT time of that YARNELL_GAMBLE video can be
nailed down… and it gets closer and closer to the first MAYDAY… is
more proof that Marsh was some distance BEHIND the other 18 men
at the moment the first MAYDAY came from Steed.
They were ALL already down in the box canyon, at this point, or Marsh
would not have had time to run up to them and say “I’m here with
Granite Mountain (now)”… but EXACTLY how far behind the other 18
men he was prior to the first MAYDAY from Steed still needs to be determined.
I also propose that if Marsh had actually been WITH them… he would have
responded in the YARNELL_GAMBLE video with “WE’RE comin’ from the heel
of the fire”. His use of the word ‘they’ means he was either still some distance
away from them that he felt the need to use the ‘third person’ THEY reference…
or he was purposely trying to make it sound like he was NOT with them… even
though he actually *might* have been ( right there with them ).
Here is another ‘note’ from the recent Blue Ridge documents release that
might put even more of an exact timestamp on Mccord’s YARNELL_GAMBLE
video, once compared with some other evidence.
It’s the first proof we have of what that SIREN is being heard in the video…
Page 40 ( Blue Ridge Hotshot Brian Frisby’s handwritten notes )
I headed east on the dozer line to check on our guys and see how far the fire had
progressed. As we headed down I noticed a taskforce of resources at the Old
Youth Camp at the end of Shrine rd. As we (passed) our guys we noticed the
fire running at a very rapid rate to the South. [BLACKOUT] also updated us and
we decided to push our guys out to the Old Youth Camp. When we got there a
member of the taskforce asked if they needed to go. We told him yes and he
started calling on the radio and hitting the SIREN on his truck. His crew came out
and they left. I tried multiple times to call ( Eric Marsh ) on Tac 1, 2 & 3 without
luck. I then told (Trew) we needed to drive up the draw and push those guys out.
Our crew had loaded up and left.
NOTE: Unfortunately… Brian Frisby didn’t even attempt to put any exact
timestamps in his own handwritten notes… but the SIREN that he mentions
coming from what must have been Esquibel’s truck must ALSO be the same
SIREN that is heard in the background in Blue Ridge Hotshot Mccord’s
YARNELL_GAMBLE video. This will help put an EXACT timestamp on that
moment when fire command is still urging Granite Mountain to ‘hurry up’.
More later…
I’m still trying to get a sense of timeline, particularly when Marsh is talking to ASM2, and how it fits in with the GMHS movement reports (to OPS1 and BRHS).
From page 27 of the SAIR, we have Marsh’s feedback on a retardant drop:
________________________________________
At 1637, ASM2 flies a drop path for a VLAT north of Yarnell west to east and apparently over DIVS A, turning northward to avoid high ground at the end of Yarnell. DIVS A, seeing the flight, calls and calmly says, “[ASM2], Division Alpha, That’s exactly what we’re looking for. That’s where we want the retardant.” ASM2 again circles the south end of the fire above Yarnell to line up a final flight path for a tanker drop. The aircraft crew is in the middle of a discussion with OPS1 on the air-to-ground frequency and the pilot is talking to the VLAT on the air-to-air frequency when an overmodulated and static-filled transmission comes over the air-to-ground frequency at 1639:
“Breaking in on Arizona 16, Granite Mountain Hotshots, we are in front of the flaming front.”
_______________________________________________
The quote “That’s where we want the retardant” is repeated in the GQ and AZ Central articles. I’m guessing the quote is real, and that it took place around 16:37. Do you have any sense of where it fits in with the videos we have? Before or after McCord’s Yarnell Gamble video? Could it have been during the Helmet-Cam video (just not transmitted on any of the frequencies that the PNF guys were scanning)? And does it fit into any of the tanker videos?
Thanks in advance. 😉
The SAIR has NEVER given any indication where the ‘proof’
of that transmission from Marsh is coming from, and ( so
far ) it hasn’t turned up in anything made public, including
the SAIT interview notes with Bravo 33 themselves ( French
and Burfiend ).
So if the ‘quote’ didn’t come from Bravo 33… then where
did it come from and how could the SAIT be so sure it
was 1637?
I believe there are at least 2 possibilities there…
1) Aaron Hulburd really did start filming his ‘Helmet Cam’
video earlier than the footage the SAIT released has
shown and that ‘callout’ from Marsh to B33 really was
captured about one minute before the only part of the
Helmet-Cam video we are allowed to see actually starts.
2) That ‘callout’ from Marsh really was captured in one
of the AIR STUDY videos.
As for the latter… there is still something weird going on
with the AIR STUDY videos. The people that are known
to have them have still, so far, not released an actual
‘manifest’ or ‘list’ of all the ones that exist and they also
still have not even publicly released the one that has
the captured radio callout from OPS2 Musser to Marsh
circa 3:50 PM… even though we know they have it.
I have no idea what’s going on there.
I have asked Elizabeth, specifically, over 12 times
whether she has any plans to release any more AIR
STUDY videos ( including the crucial Musser to Marsh
one ) but she refuses to even answer any simple
questions about her intentions there.
So ( for the moment ) we are left to believing the SAIR
and that there really is some solid source for this
‘callout’ from Marsh to B33 at 1637.
So let’s say it actually happened… here is what I believe
the ‘order’ of things to be…
1625? – 1635? – The YARNELL_GAMBLE video is shot
by Blue Ridge Hotshot Mccord as he is sitting in one
of the Crew Carriers at the Youth Camp and just about
to evacuate that area. They are not leaving right at that
moment because in the video… two Blue Ridge hotshots
are caught for a moment in the side mirror of the
Carrier and they are still just ‘milling about’ on the ground
alongside the Carrier and just watching the fire up on the
ridge. They are still not ‘scrambling’ to load up yet so this
is still at least a few minutes before departure. The video
also captures the SIREN on Esquibel’s truck which we
now know was his attempt to ‘recall’ his crew from the
area just west of the youth camp.
The exact time of this YARNELL_GAMBLE video that
has fire command still urging GM to ‘Hurry up’ still has
to be nailed down… but we’re getting close… and it could
end up that command was still urging GM to ‘hurry up’
less than 3 or 4 minutes before the first MAYDAY
from Captain Steed.
1637 – Marsh identifies himself as DIVSA to B33 and
tells them ‘that’s where we want retardant’. Some think
this has something to do with wanting a retardant drop
for GM but I have always believed it was still just Marsh
walking along, still just playing DIVSA, and believing he
was still just making a command-level effort to help with
the overall fire situation. He has absolutely NO IDEA
what trouble they are all about to be in minutes later,
because he is lagging BEHIND Steed and the crew.
1638 – Somewhere right after Marsh’s ‘That’s where we
want retardant’ transmission is the moment that Steed
first realizes the deep tapioca they are in. Steed and
Caldwell immediately decide to deploy and immediately
try to locate good place to do that.
16:38.50 Deployment site has been found by Steed and
Caldwell, the line of 18 men ( minus Marsh ) has been
‘pulled up’ to a group, the ropes have been pulled on
the saws and they are already ‘preparing the site’.
1639 – Only now Steed gets around to making the first
MAYDAY call. The saws are already hard at work right
next to him so that’s why he has to SHOUT when he
says “We are in front of the flaming front”. Whether or
not Steed called Marsh on the intra-crew to tell him
what was now happening up ahead or whether Marsh’s
first indication of the trouble was hearing this same
first MAYDAY call from Steed is still currently unknown.
Brendan would know the answer to this one. He was
still hearing EVERYTHING on the intra-crew at that point.
1640 – 1641 – Steed has gotten busy directing the
preparations/burnout and has told Robert Caldwell
( acting Captain that day ) to keep trying to contact
Bravo 33. It is now HIS voice we hear on the Helmet
Cam video trying to do just that. Steed either handed
Caldwell his radio set to the WRONG channel… or
Caldwell took the time to also set HIS radio to the
same ‘wrong’ channel to keep trying to contact B33.
1642 – Marsh has finally ‘caught up’ to Steed and the
other 17 men and we hear him ( totally out of breath
from running forward to catch them ) come on the radio
saying “This is DIVSA and I’m here (now) with Granite
Mountain”. Deployment message follows.
1643 – They are under the shelters, still trying to contact
Bravo 33, but the Faraday effect has kicked in and all
we hear is static and keyed mikes because the foil of
the shelters is interfering with their ability to use radios
even though they are still TRYING to communicate.
1644 – ?? Burnover ??
SIDENOTE: If you accept all of the following…
1) Steed first realized the trouble they were in
just moments after Marsh’s “That’s where we
want retardant” transmission
2) Steed searched for, located, and directed
start of deployment site preparation BEFORE
making the first MAYDAY call.
3) The series of ‘static’ transmissions and
‘keyed mikes’ we hear after Marsh’s final
“Affirm” were valid attempts to communicate
being blocked by the Faraday effect because
of the foil in the shelters.
Then that actually means from the time of
first realizing their predicament to the burnover
amounts to MORE than SIX MINUTES.
Possibly EIGHT minutes if the ‘burnover’ didn’t
happen until 1646.
When Blue Ridge Captain Brown reached the
same point where they began their descent
and hauled ass down the same exact
drainage path… he made the same entire trip
from the high ridge all the way to the actual
deployment site in just FOUR minutes.
CORRECTION FOR MY POST ABOVE
I was wrong about Marsh’s “That’s where we
want retardant” transmission not being mentioned
by Bravo 33 in their SAIT interview.
It WAS mentioned.
Nevertheless… I still think this transmission
MAY have been captured in one of the AIR
STUDY videos since the quote that appeared
in the SAIR doesn’t match what the YIN notes say
Marsh actually said there.
Page 15 of the Yarnell investigation notes…
________________________________________
INTERVIEW July 9, 2013 1700
Interviewees: Bravo 33
John Burfiend-ATS Specialist
Clint Clauson – ATS Trainee
Thomas French – AT Specialist
Interviewers: Mike Dudley, Brad Mayhew, Tim Foley, Jay Kurth, Jimmy Rocha
________________________________________
Got a call from Division A stating they were going down their escape route to the safety zone. Didn’t know Division A was the superintendent of the Granite Mountain hot shots. Asked him “is everything OK?” He replied “everything is ok, just heading to the safety zone”. We came around, made a practice run through the bowl, west to east. I was talking to Tom about the rising terrain on exit. Division A called and said “that is what we are looking for, that is exactly right”. Within 5 minutes of that, they went in shelter.
________________________________________
Thanks, WTKTT. That anchors the conversation in time better than anything I had.
Don’t forget about the other known conversations between fire management and Marsh and Steed just PRIOR to the “Can you please hurry up?” YARNELL-GAMBLE video. Those were just minutes before and the ones captured in one of the only AIR STUDY videos that has been made public. That’s the one where some OTHER subset of management ( still not identified ) was directly asking “What’s your status right now?” and ( directly to Marsh ) “Are you with Granite Mountain right now?”. Those management queries are at 1616 and 1617… just moments before Steed and his 17 men dropped off the two track road.
So the reality is so far away from what the SAIR said it isn’t even funny. Not only was there no 30 minute blackout… fire management was basically talking directly TO them throughout the entire ‘death march’.
And that’s only what we know so far. There may well be other radio conversations on some of these other AIR STUDY videos if they ever appear publicly… and possibly some cell calls in this same timeframe as well.
Stay tuned.
Just one point. If Marsh was DIV A he would have been a different resource than GMIHC. I think the fact that he referred to GM as “they” because as Division he is a different entity all together. This doesnt prove he was with or not with the crew at the time of the transmission.
Reply to Connor post on February 25, 2014 at 2:02 pm
>> Connor wrote…
>> Just one point. If Marsh was DIV A he would have
>> been a different resource than GMIHC.
Absolutely. For Marsh to be sticking with that call sign
right up until about 180 seconds before he died even
though he WAS ( at that time ) finally just standing right
there with his own men proves that Marsh wasn’t hesitating
to identify himself as ‘DIVS A’ even if/when he was standing
right there with them…
…but as for his using the word ‘they’… I just think it’s
a little weird that he would say THAT ( in the third
person ) if he was standing with them, especially
given the context of the question at the time. He (Marsh)
was doing the same thing ‘they’ were at the moment
and it just seems like if he WAS with them, he would
have said “We’re (all) comin’ from the heel of the fire.”
>> Connor also wrote…
>> I think the fact that he referred to GM as “they” because
>> as Division he is a different entity all together. This
>> doesnt prove he was with or not with the crew at the
>> time of the transmission.
You are absolutely right. I was just talking about my own
impression of his word choice there. It represents
no solid proof of his ACTUAL whereabouts.
Probably only Brendan McDonough knows the real
truth there about whether Marsh was ‘bringing up the
rear’ and/or how far away he really was from them
prior to the first MAYDAY.
What’s also ODD about that day is that even with
Marsh’s obvious ‘respect’ for position levels and
call signs… the number of times that day when
someone was directly calling out to ‘Granite Mountain’
on the radio… ( Supervisor = Jesse Steed ) but Marsh
( DIVS A ) jumped right in before Steed could respond
as if the call was for him ( even when it wasn’t ).
Clearest example of that is captured in the background
of that AIR STUDY video after ASM2 requests that
someone on the ground call Granite Mountain to
get their status AND to specifically ASK them if
DIVS A was ‘with them’.
NOTE: ASM2 ( Bravo 33 ) said in their SAIT interview
that they had NO IDEA that ‘DIVS A’ was actually
the normal ‘Superintendent’ of the GM Hotshots.
About 15 seconds after ASM2 makes that request,
someone from fire command DOES initiate the
request(s) that ASM2 just asked for and says…
VIDEO STARTS AT 1616 ( 4:16 PM )
+0:40.52
(Unknown): Granite Mountain ( Five? )…
What’s your status right now?
Before Jesse Steed can even answer ( the call was
for HIM, not Marsh ), Marsh jumps in to speak FOR
him and says…
+0:54.09 to +1:03.81
Eric Marsh: Well the guys… uh… Granite… is makin’ their
way out the exact escape route from this mornin’… an’ it
heads… ah… (pause) SOUTH. ( slight pause )
mid-slope, cuttin’ over.
Jesse Steed ( the one who was actually asked the
question since he was designated GM Sup that day )
only chimes in AFTER Marsh jumped in and
responded before he (Steed) could.
Steed simply adds…
+1:07.18
Jesse Steed: We’ll be pushin’ our way down into the
structures.
+1:10.16 ( Another voice. Very quickly )
Copy that.
There is no evidence ( and probably never will be ) of
whether or not that kind of thing was ‘pissing Steed
off’ that day ( having Marsh respond to radio calls
for BOTH Granite Mountain AND DIVSA at his
discretion when Steed was supposed to be running
GM that day )… but I’ll bet Steed was going to have
some words to say about it if they had only made it off
the fire that day.
So yes… you are right… Eric Marsh was a ‘different
resource’ called DIVSA that day… but there is also
documented proof that at various moments during
the day he still considered himself GMIHC on that
fire and was responding to some radio calls for
THAT resource as well. It was sort of ‘whenever he
felt like it’.
Do you have the air study videos? I still have yet to see those.
Couple of points I have gathered from this site and wildfire today:
1. There seems to be confusion as to whether or not DIVSA was at the ranch or not. Wildfire today has published an article by John McClean in which he is positive through audio analysis that Marsh was indeed at the house. I think I read somewhere here that the audio he is referring to might say something different.
2. I think it makes the most sense that Marsh left the hill and made it to the ranch when he said he was working his way off the hill in th Caldwell video. Hopefully we can get the video from the ranch.
3. So if Marsh was with the crew:
Marsh states they were using the same escape route from the morning. What is interesting is that BR talked with GM and it seemed they were sure that GM was using that same two track from the morning. The two track would have been a valid escape route back to their vehicles before the blow up of course. (New to the site so still working on my own timeline). So we have BR and GM confirming using an escape route from the morning. Is it possible that GM took off in the wrong direction thinking that they were actually going the way they came in that morning, realized their mistake and instead of back tracking just made the decision to rally to the ranch since it seemed close? Eh not likely, but totally possible. Or they started that way, realized it was a no go and went the other way (probably more likely)
4. What I’m pretty sure happened based on the radio transmissions, knowledge of GM crew attitudes, as well as own experience is this
Marsh did indeed make it to the ranch well before GM left the black. I have a really hard time believing that a hotshot sup or division would not have scouted that two track and found that it led to to ranch. It even shows up the most standard maps.
I think Marsh was pushing the crew to get back to the ranch as quick as possible and told them from the ranch to drop down in the canyon for a straight shot, and seemingly quicker route to the ranch. I think he was at the ranch or somewhere in the vicinity when fire started to make a run. He knew the quickest and easiest route through that box canyon and went to meet the crew. It is easy to come to this conclusion when hearing he wanted retardant east to west. It doesn’t make sense to waste retardant in that area when you have communities in the path. If he didn’t know the crew was in trouble I think a north south line would have made much more sense. Did B33 try and make another run after the dry run where Marsh confirms that’s where he wants the retardant or was it to late? He definitely could have told B33 to drop on the first run. Perhaps he didn’t want everyone listening to know that GM was indeed doing a very dumb thing and hoping for a good outcome.
GM is known to be super aggressive in everything they do. They had a great reputation for getting the job done in the GM way. I think this stemmed from being so closely attached to a municipal fire department. Hell, half the crew wanted to be structure guys, in which machismo and being a hero seemed to be valued more than in WFF
Oh and about marsh answering the radio for GM even though he was divs. It is very hard to get out of that mindset after answering for Gm all season. I’m sure he wasn’t even thinking about it to be honest.
That ranch video will be key. Although I don’t see how the report wouldn’t have mentioned something if he indeed was there :-/
Remember Jim Karels, lead investigator of the Yarnell SAIT? He earned the rare “idiot” tag at Wildfire Today for his remarks about saving money by sending firefighters alone to small fires (why use two when one can do?).
I know we’re missing a lot of context here, but I can’t think of one in which this DOES make sense, safety-wise. Seems like the extreme opposite of “order everything and send it back if you don’t need it,” or even “fight fire aggressively, having provided for safety first.”
http://news.wfsu.org/post/firefighter-union-lawmakers-dont-make-us-fight-solo
http://wildfiretoday.com/2014/02/18/leader-of-yarnell-hill-fire-investigation-says-one-firefighter-should-be-able-to-attack-a-fire/
Funny. One of the ‘online learning courses’ for Firefighting
and what NOT TO DO covers the incident where Florida
firefighter Timber Weller was fighting a fire ALONE with
a dozer… and ended up in a burnover because there wasn’t
even anyone to serve as ‘lookout’. His only safety zone
was the cab of the dozer. Only reason he survived is he
was able to hold his breath during the entire burnover…
…but he lost half his face.
That official ‘Firefighter Safety learning video’ is here…
http://learningcenter.firewise.org/Firefighter-Safety/3-1.php
Wow, thanks for finding that. A good one to share.
Two months in intensive care and 13 surgeries
later… he was at least able to walk again and
he got most of his face back.
A lookout would have been easier.
Sorry for the late response, but I just happened to find this comment. The REASON I got burned over was because a downdraft (unpredictable, invisible chunk of air) came down on the small (one acre) wildfire I was fighting and caused it to blow-up and expand at 55 miles per hour.
100 look outs would not have made any difference – they couldn’t see the invisible chunk of air until it began affecting the fire behavior, i.e., the same time I saw it. Ergo, they could not have warned me any sooner. Tractor top speed = 4 mph. On foot in that terrain a person might move 5-7 mph. Fire moving 55 mph … Now do you see the reason I was overrun?
That training course is excellent and it was the first one directed at the “new battleground” of wildland interface fires. But the film makers learned about WFF out west – where 20 man hand crews are the norm & posting lookouts is SOP. Then they came to Florida and were mortified at the very idea of sending a single individual to fight a wildfire. I believe this led them to overemphasize the “failure to post lookout” as a causal factor. They were taught that posting lookouts was a “cardinal rule” so they assumed that not following the rule caused or contributed to my burnover. Think about it – flat land, light to moderate vegetation, one acre fire = you can see the whole fire from the seat of my tractor. What could a lookout see sooner or better than me?
PS: Not only did I walk again – I came back to work for Fl Div of Forestry as a Wildfire Mitigation Specialist where I continue to work for greater safety for both our citizens and our firefighters (setting a few world records in the process.)
What can I say – some people just don’t know when to quit 🙂
WTKTT,
Regarding the Lewis Crew blunder, you posted that “….losing the ability to use their primary tool ( chainsaw ) MUST have had a lot to do with what happened that day. …. their assignment was just being described by the SAIT investigators themselves as ‘mopping up’.”
Absolutely, losing the ability to use their chainsaws in thick scrub oak brush was most likely very detrimental to their mopping up operation. Fire in the brush smolders around on the surface in the dead leaves and twigs below the brush, so you must have a saw to open it up, so as to get in there to mop it up properly with water using bladder bags and/or hose. This may very well have contributed to the flare-up because they didn’t get in there to mop up the hot duff in the surface leaves and twigs under the thick brush. All it would have taken that day, was reduced humdity and a little wind once it heated up, and that seems to be just what happened.
Reply to Robert the Second post on February 14, 2014 at 9:46 am
RTS said…
Regarding Marsh and the ALLEGED GMHS bad decsions with good outcomes attitude, the two fires where two separate HS Supts commented on Marsh seemingly always wanting to ‘ONE-UP-YOU’, they were the 2009 Station Fire on the Angeles NF and the 2011 Gladiator Fire on the Prescott NF.
The Supt. on the Station Fire said that Marsh and the GMHS was doing some fairly unconventional and unsafe tactics and GETTING AWAY WITH IT. He said they should have known better. He said he counseled Marsh on what he was doing, but it appeared that it did no good because he/they kept at it.
RTS… I ‘copied’ this message over from the end of Chapter IV because…
…well… because it’s IMPORTANT… and I didn’t want you to think it was
getting ‘lost in the noise’.
If a full understanding of what happened ( and WHY ) on June 30, 2013, is
ever to be achieved… then these are the kinds of things that NEED to be
talked about. ‘Past behavior’ and ‘Prior decision making’ could not possibly
be more relevant. It might just explain why 2 men were able to lead 17 others
to their deaths… and provide more ‘lessons’ that need to be learned so it
never happens again.
At any moment… I think the DOZENS of former GM Hotshots who ‘decided’
not to stick with this crew and its leadership ( all the way back to
Division Chief ) are going to start talking… and they SHOULD.
If you watch this video, starting at the 2:43 point, tell me who’s buggies those are that almost got burnt up?
http://vimeo.com/48411010
Granite Mountain Crew Carriers 7A and 7B.
Any closer and you could smell rubber burning.
So… was there already a ‘betting pool’ going on when GM
would show up on a fire as to exactly WHEN someone
would have to either save their buggies or move them?
Would a fiver get you a twenty if you hit the time within
a half-hour or so?
I could not agree more, “past behavior” and “prior decision making” is very relevant
Did you all notice the HEAVY REDACTIONS in the BRHS notes? Not just names here-and-there, but WHOLE sentences and small paragraphs. Some of them you can almost complete inductively based on the context. DEFINITELY some whitewash and coverup going on there.
Elizabeth,
Thank you so much for all your diligent work and all the materials you have provided us. No need for an apology but I’ll accept it all the same. I think we’ve all gotten a bit short at times. I railed on you.
I do not think I would violate the Fire Orders to ‘save my grandmother’ I think you put it. You cannot violate the Watch Outs, but I would maybe have hedged those a bit.
WTKTT,
Did you notice in the BRHS notes the EARLY, increased fire behavior notations contrary to others’ reports saying benign and such? And the photos they had that I saw indicated the same thing.
Regarding the Lewis Crew blunder, the fact that they ran out of chainsaw gas could most definitely contributed to the ‘unburned pocket’ flareup. I still say that’s all it was – a flare-up – and not the result of them burning out and losing it.
David Crain,
Welcome. You are spot on to question the performances of DIVS Rance Marquez and AA Rory Collins for them just abandoning their positions, unheard of in the WFF world.
Reply to RTS post on February 17, 2014 at 9:30 pm
>> RTS said…
>> Did you all notice the HEAVY REDACTIONS in the BRHS notes?
Yep. I also noticed it was PDF file so the first thing I did was
check to see HOW the redactions were actually carried out.
They (?? whoever did all this ??) were very CAREFUL.
They put a LOT of work into it.
Sometimes… when people go to do ‘redactions’ in an Adobe
PDF file they just call up some ‘blanking’ tool and wave it
over that parts they don’t want people to see. What they don’t
realize is that isn’t actually ‘removing’ the stuff they want to
keep secret at all. You can still ‘separate’ the elements of the
PDF file and Voila… there is the original text… unredacted.
Not the case with these. They were careful and they
did it the HARD ( and time consuming ) way.
Every page of the 40 page BR document is actually just an
‘image’. Someone called up each and every page image in
a ‘photo editor’ and actually inserted ‘black rectangles’ into
the image itself… before it was ‘imported’ into Adobe PDF.
You can see this for yourself.
Each and every ‘black square’ has slightly different height
and width dimensions which means they were all ‘hand-drawn’
by someone using a mouse over the original page image.
Sometimes they actually ‘missed’ a little and you can see the
bottom serifs or punctation of what they were trying to redact
‘peeking out’ from the badly drawn rectangle and in some
places that actually makes the redacted text ‘readable’.
More on that later.
>> RTS also said…
>> Not just names here-and-there, but WHOLE sentences
>> and small paragraphs. Some of them you can almost
>> complete inductively based on the context.
Yes, you can.
They really kind of ‘blew it’ in THAT respect, even as careful
as they were with drawing little black rectangles.
If you read some sections over and over… the ‘missing’ names
and words actually become clear based on the ‘context’.
>> RTS also said…
>> DEFINITELY some whitewash and coverup going on there.
I can’t, for the life of me, figure out what ‘they’ were/are so
afraid of. What was the CRITERIA for all the redactions?
If they wanted to obscure all the names involved… they really
blew it. It’s perfectly obvious what most of the ‘names’ are
based on the context of each section.
As for the ‘entire paragraphs’ deleted… it must have something
to do with any ‘requests’ that Blue Ridge were getting from
fire management… like helping with evacuations and whatnot.
Maybe they were aksed by Musser.
Maybe they said “No… that’s not what we do.”
Maybe the USFS people don’t want to burst people’s bubble
and admit that most firefighters are NOT going to risk their
OWN lives that easily… or maybe the USFS lawyers just
still see heavy liability there for admitting that firefighters
CAN, in fact, turn down requests from management.
Who knows. I wish the USFS would just let the people that
were THERE that day tell their own stories, in their own way,
without any employment repercussions… and just stay out of it.
>> RTS also wrote
>> WTKTT, Did you notice in the BRHS notes the EARLY,
>> increased fire behavior notations contrary to others’ reports
>> saying benign and such?
Yes. I’ll have more to say about that soon but right now I’m
just astounded at some of the discrepancies between the
SAIT interview notes with Blue Ridge and what’s in the
recently released ADOSH interview material.
I’m still ‘comparing’ those documents but will have more later.
>> RTS also wrote…
>> Regarding the Lewis Crew blunder, the fact that they ran
>> out of chainsaw gas could most definitely contributed to
>> the ‘unburned pocket’ flareup. I still say that’s all it was – a
>> flare-up – and not the result of them burning out and losing it.
Copy that. Even if that ‘pocket’ wasn’t a ‘burnoff gone bad’
then losing the ability to use their primary tool ( chainsaw )
MUST have had a lot to do with what happened that day.
We still need to learn more about what those 14 men were
ACTUALLY doing up there all day ( 5+ hours ) when even
at 10:30 AM their assignment was just being described
by the SAIT investigators themselves as ‘mopping up’.
There’s actually even a LITTLE more detail about the day/night
before June 30 in these recent BR notes. The Blue Ridge crew
was ‘staged’ in the Yarnell Hill Fire Station parking lot at the
exact time the remainder of the DOC Lewis crew was being
choppered off the ridge… and as the BR documents now
say… the BR guys were the first ones the Lewis crew were
talking to as they got off the chopper.
First we learn that all their food got burned up as well.
They must have been pretty hungry out there all night.
More later…
Elizabeth,
I think you are operating very emotionally and not analytically with the grandmother question and analogy. First of all, it is a known fact that we are all primed to risk more to save blood relatives. So, one’s blood relatives are qualitatively different to people than a number of civilians that one doesn’t even know personally.
Second, I am straining to think of an equivalent to the decision tree that we are contemplating here. I believe you are a law professor? Let’s say you are at a law convention somewhere with your teaching assistant and maybe your daughter or niece. You take you kid to the zoo, and lo and behold your kid jumps into the swim tank with the polar bear. Do you turn to your TA and say “We can pull this off?” and then direct her to jump in the tank WITH YOU to try to save the kid, because sometimes you’ve just go to “go for it?” Part of the problem with the analogy is that, of course, it would be more understandable for you to do that, because you are a lawyer and no doubt very cool in boardroom or potentially courtroom situations, but not used to retaining great cool and executive function in moments of physical peril. And, not really expected to do so. Suppose you have near-20 TAs or a law class — do you have them all jump into the tank to pursue some crazy human-ladder scenario?
I also urge you to go hike some dense chaparral to understand more the physical realities that are being discussed. Continuing the admittedly bad analogy, we are talking closer to having to climb multiple levels of barbed wire to get in with the polar bear, in a lengthy slow process, rather than simply communicating with zookeepers. I don’t suggest that to criticize you at all, I simply find that most people have been exposed to a little thorns and brush in their day, and assume that chaparral is no different. It is different, and living that for an hour or so’s hike can help drive that home.
In response to David Crain’s question, the materials that ADOSH will be releasing to the media this week include upwards of 40 transcribed interviews, one of which was with the Division Z fellow. His transcribed interview suggests that he left the “flats” (the initial dozer line/buggy/sup.truck staging area) after speaking with Marsh to go look for other access from which to try to build line or tie in with Marsh and also to go get more resources. While he was gone, he ended up getting pulled into other efforts in the chaos of the day (e.g. evacuation or structure-related efforts).
Divs Z indicated – and others confirmed – that there was no good way to tie together or build line (particularly as the day progressed), and that Marsh seems to have come to the conclusion ultimately that those efforts were ineffective.
Elizabeth… just in case no one has said ‘thank you’ enough
for the efforts you have ( and are still making ) to bring some
of these documents into the light of day…
…thank you.
From the report, ” There was confusion as to who had responsibility for DIV Z and where the break between DIV A and DIV Z would be located. Air attack overheard this conversation and radioed COMMAND instructions for Frisby, Marsh, and Marquez. However, Marsh DISAGEED and radioed back the original plan developed by him and Frisby. Marquez DECIDED TO LEAVE and drove to the incident command post. He NEVER RETURNED to Division Z”. If that’s not a red flag I don’t know what would be. Doesn’t matter what Marquez says now. When Air attack overhears your conversation and says no, that’s not what you were told to do, and you say I’m doing it anyway, those of us who work for Federal agencies don’t have to guess what happened that afternoon. We’ve all seen it, those attitudes, even in coworkers. Freelancers have no place in this business. There’s no room for DISAGREEMENT with overhead. If 19 people hadn’t died, and it was just a shelter deployment, the mistakes would have been made known, lessons could have been learned and we would have moved on, instead it has to be second guessed to death. Enough of that, please.
This is a direct quote from Marquez’s ADOSH interview. I think it is important to bring to the table because the guy has been getting really beat up for leaving the line. In reality his assignment was to assess the needs for the following day on div z and he was not assigned any resources on 6/30.
“Uh, I was designated as Division Zulu at that time. Was not assigned any
resources because – well, there weren’t any resources to assign and um, my orders
were basically to go tie in with Division Alpha who was Eric Marsh and um,
figure out an anchor point and resources. Kind of a break point between the two
do- between Division Alpha and Zulu. See if there’s something logical and then
um, I was – I was to get back with them with resources feeds for the following
day.”
InvestigativeMEDIA reported in December that Musser asked Granite Mountain Hotshot commanders if the crew could assist in Yarnell.
http://www.investigativemedia.com/granite-mountain-hotshots-were-asked-if-they-could-protect-yarnell/
This story also notes that Incident Commander Roy Hall stated shortly after 2 p.m. that the fire fighting efforts were going well and that loss of homes in Yarnell would be kept under 100 homes.
Despite Hall’s bleak assessment, mandatory evacuations were not immediately ordered. The statements by Blue Ridge crew members confirm that civilians were still in Yarnell after 5 p.m.
The failure to immediately evacuate Yarnell much earlier in the day appears to be a contributing factor in the disaster that later occurred.
For the actual top-level ‘Incident Commander’ to be admitting
( in writing on the dispatch log ) to his peers and superiors
at 2:00 PM that he KNOWS ‘at least 100 homes are going
to burn’… but then not issue any evacuation orders for
HOURS following that… is just…
…well… I don’t know what to call it.
Astounding?
Totally Irresponsible?
Stupid?
Negligent?
Actionable?
All of the above?
If the actual ‘evacuations’ had officially started even 30 minutes
earlier that day… then everything else might/could have taken
place the same way it all did ( GM skulking in the back-country
trying to make it to town, etc. )… but those poor 19 men would
probably still be alive to talk about what a mess the whole
Yarnell Hill Fire was.
As I read these BR notes, I feel like this whole thing has been staring us in the face the whole time. The GMHS did not come up with this move on their own, they moved because they were asked. First by Musser, perhaps after that as well (or not). The REASON they moved was not their idea, the reason came from the requester. So this whole notion that “we don’t know why they moved” is patently absurd – at least Musser and maybe others know EXACTLY why they moved. It was either evacuations or structure protection, that is it. Now you may think that evacuations makes little sense, but we know the request occurred, and I maintain structure protection makes even less sense!
Imagine you are Paul Musser about 3:40 PM on 6/30. The fire is headed right at Yarnell (no 2nd wind shift yet). You have an unknown but sizeable # of people still in Yarnell who have not even been told they need to go. You are going to have to go door to door to do so. These people are in serious danger of dying! Unlike firefighters, you cannot radio them. Do you honestly believe that anywhere on his priority list is calling the GMHS to help with structure protection??? To me, that is beyond ludicrous. Houses burning is the least of his worries, houses burning with people in them is his main thought.
Now you may say that there was no time, it was too far for GM to move, could others have helped. A 4:04 PM, there was not enough time, but at the time of the request (? 3:42) there may have been. He probably underestimated the difficulty of the move, probably thought they could do it in under 30 minutes. The others were either disengaging or about to (was that a decision of the crew bosses or of OPS?). I do not know why others were not either asked to help to declined to do so. I suspect some of the secrecy and unwillingness to talk stems from that very issue. However, GM was asked, we know that.
I’ve always felt evacuations played a major role in this disaster, and the BR notes just crystallize it for me. Right now it is just a theory, although I think a good one. But I know this, if you want to know the truth, don’t go asking Brendan McDonough. Go ask Paul Musser!
In the Weather Channel video, at the end Claire Caldwell says her husband would not have risked his life to save someone’s house. But she says he would have if it meant preventing someone experiencing what ended up happening to him. Maybe you all think this is just trying to make them look like heroes. But, I’m sorry, if you just think about it logically, it is the only damn thing that comes close to making any sense. And there are probably several people alive who could clear this up in less than 5 minutes.
Mike, as you know, my view based on the more than 200 GB of information to which I have access (which dwarfs what the media, bloggers, authors, untrained civilian “investigators,” etc. currently have) is that the Granite Mountain Hotshots wanted to get to the Boulder Springs Ranch or the Helms Ranch because on the other side of that ranch were communities of elderly or vulnerable people who had not yet been able to escape, evacuate, or protect themselves, such that a crew like the GM Hotshots building line or doing point protect *right there* (closer to those communities) was viewed as an urgent need. I cannot overstate how clear this point has become to me after spending hundreds of hours aggregating information and analyzing it *together,* collectively (rather than looking at pieces in isolation).
In terms of available materials, this week might well be a big week, though it depends on how responsible the media is with their work. Specifically, THIS week, ADOSH, which has been herculean in their efforts to be transparent, will start releasing to the media full collections of the materials that ADOSH reviewed for their Yarnell Hill Fire investigation. The ADOSH collection is *massive* – far bigger than the SAIR collection, in part because ADOSH was looking at more than the SAIT was obligated to consider. (Meaning, the goal of the SAIT investigation and the goal of the ADOSH investigation were not the same.)
My hope is that the media, authors, and bloggers spend time going through the materials that they will be receiving and organizing those materials prior to writing about them or releasing them, so that they do not end up putting out misinformation, misleading information, or snippets of information with no context as they did last week with the Blue Ridge Unit Logs and the non-existent “jump out at” video clip before that, but I am not optimistic. So, it is entirely possible that, starting late this week, you will start seeing more raw materials that will help all of us develop a better picture of what was going on that could have led those 19 Granite Mountain Hotshots to their deaths.
As everyone starts carefully going through those materials what you might well conclude is that the SAIR was not a deceitful or inaccurate document as much as it was a needlessly vague, overly-(or inappropriately-) simplified, or “overly-lawyered” document (not that lawyers wrote the document…).
Building Fire line and protecting homes was basically abandoned when the Fire was running at Yarnell and into the houses all fire fighting equipment evacuated the area
Hand crews would not have been able to do any thing at that point. If Granit Mountain was asked to come to do line construction it was way to late. A good IC with wild land fire fighting background would have never put a hand crew in front of that fire. So what else would Musser use them for? Even the engine crews were getting out of the way before they were trapped. Things are getting really crazy here with what did or did not take place. Hopefully it will get cleared up.
Reading some of the handwritten BR notes, it appears there was a briefing at about 1545-1550 and the plan was to improve the dozer line. This it seems would be consistent with an overall plan of building a line west of town to try and buy some time. The notes say it was abandoned, although the time given for that decision in the notes seems to vary from just after 1600 to about 1640. So maybe GM was to be part of this line building as Elizabeth said. It was not abandoned as hopeless until after they started moving.
I have to say though, if this was the plan it seems both dangerous and desperate. Would it not constitute building line at the head of the fire?
Nearly every one of the narratives talks about people still there, not being aware of a need or an order to go. One guy says at 1555 he told a resident there was not an evacuation order, but they needed to be ready. Another note talks about people there at 1710. Another one talks about evacuations beginning at 1645. This surely cannot be the way things are usually handled. This just seems horribly negligent. And it seems to have set in motion a series of events that ended with 19 men dying. To be blunt, what the hell were the people in charge of this thinking??
I was told to evacuate at 4:03 PM.
I could see the fire had already burned the area where it is said the firefighters died.
It is said they died later than 4:03.
Something is not correct about that statement.
BTW, the flames were about 200 feet from me when I was notified.
That was the only notice that I ever received about the evacuation.
If I had been notified about 5 minutes later, we would have died.
The official statements are just full of lies.
thank you, thank you, thank you George for coming here and posting- Thank you. These are the folks I hope more come and share-
Between 3:09pm and 3:40pm where we were still in Glen Ilah area then went to the stuff room of Oak Park #15 from that point and we have heard peoples’ accounts right there but we did not want to speak for you all so thank you for coming here and writing—I dearly appreciate you for doing that. That whole Shrine and Sesame and Glen Ilah folks are so important to speak your last hours and share your photos “raw” not edited like we have seen out there to properly assess that weekend. I smiled when I saw your post George. thumbs up!
Reply to George DeLange post
on February 19, 2014 at 3:34 pm
>> Mr. DeLange said…
>> I was told to evacuate at 4:03 PM.
Mr. Delange… thanks for posting!
Couple of questions for you…
1) HOW were you ‘told to evacuate’
when it finally happened? If it was
in person… do you recall WHO it
was?
2) Do you know if Yarnell Fire Chief
Jim Kroile was even in town that
Sunday? The ONLY mention of
Kroile in ANY of the official reports
talks about his decision making on
Friday night. He is never mentioned
again as having anything to do with
this situation either all day Saturday
or Sunday. If Yarnell Fire Chief
Kroile wasn’t even THERE on
Saturday or Sunday… then WHO
was manning the Yarnell Fire
Station that weekend?
The thought came back to me a few nights ago concerning the restricted area where the men perished. Joy and I had viewed on line where that area had been restricted on June 16 before their deaths. There was a signature with that date but I could not recollect who restricted the area and for what reason. So Joy and I went back a few days later to copy the restriction document but could by no means find that document at the time. I had commented that it must have been someone who had written the date wrong, but Joy said no, she saw the stamp as well and the date was correct. So apparently the GMHS had died in an area that was previously restricted–maybe again restricted due to the tragedy. Maybe someone out there is able to procure those documents that seem to have disappeared into cyberspace. Whether they have significance or not I do not know yet it would be interesting to have a close look at their content.
Joy and I are in some high country right now. Happy to have four wheel drive, we were snowed in twice this month with over a foot of snow both times. Fires
Reply to mike post on February 16, 2014 at 10:03 pm
>> mike said…
>> He probably underestimated the difficulty of the move,
>> probably thought they could do it in under 30 minutes.
I’m not sure if your ‘He’ there meant Marsh, Steed, Musser, or
anyone else who might have ‘requested’ GM get to town…
…but in all cases… I think you are right.
There is evidence that ALL of those people ‘underestimated
the difficulty of the move’ and that led to the tragedy.
As Gary Olson has said many times… there was not just
ONE thing that caused this terrible accident… there were
MANY mistakes being made in the chain of events.
Just from the audio captured in the Blue Ridge Hotshot
Mccord’s YARNELL_GAMBLE video… it’s obvious ( I think )
that whoever was asking Marsh if GM could please ‘hurry up’
had NO IDEA how far away they really were from town in
the first place.
I still think you can hear ‘exasperation’ in Marsh’s voice when
he replies… “They’re comin’ from the heel of the fire.”
What I still hear in Marsh’s response there is him wanting to
say “Do you have any idea how far they have to go? They’re
comin’ as fast as they can.”
I’m not sure ANYONE up at that Model Creek Elementary
School way up north in Peeples Valley really had ANY idea
of the ‘distances’ involved down south and certainly no real
idea of how ‘separated’ GM was from everyone else down there.
I think ‘management’ had some vague idea that the two Hotshot
crews were just ‘working on a possible line burnout’ down there
but they had NO IDEA how far away and how separated GM
was from Blue Ridge all the way out there west and all the
way up on the high ridge.
They should have.
This all comes back to ‘situational awareness’ on EVERYONE’s
part that day. It was truly, sorely lacking.
As a firefighter with USFWS for 14 years my foremost question is why won’t someone ask the other DIVS that met with Marsh twice, and apparently had a disagreement on tactics, ask what that was all about. Would that not give some insight on Marsh’s mindset that day, was he making bad decisions, safety issues, inexperienced, we need to know what the disagreement was. For a DIVS to leave the fireline and go back to IC and not return is unheard of. What was the conflict? That’s where this investigation should have started.
Reply to David Crain post on February 16, 2014 at 8:00 pm
I agree, David.
There are any number of times that day when Eric Marsh
ended up ‘arguing’ with people and we still don’t really know
the full details.
Example: Apparently Marsh also did NOTHING but ‘argue’
with Air Attack Rory Collins most of the day. We still don’t
even have any good explanation why Rory Collins ‘abruptly
left the fire’ circa 4:00 PM. This contributed more than just
a fair amount of ‘confusion’ to the situation at a time when
the whole thing was already going sideways.
Could it be that he had one more blow-out argument with
Marsh around that time and Rory Collins just got ‘fed up’
and bailed out of the whole situation… leaving poor Bravo 33
to do ‘double-duty’ with no real briefing and no real
understanding of who was doing what ‘down there’?
Bravo 33 has admitted that after Collins just ‘bailed out’ and
dumped everything in their lap… they had no idea where
ANY division lines were… or who was even really working
down there on the ground doing what.
Marsh was having a very, very bad day.
There really is no question about it.
From the time they discovered the dozer had the wrong blade
and wouldn’t be able to ‘connect the line’ all the way to the
ridge like the orginal plan called for… to Rory Collins purposely
dumping retardant on their indirect attack(s)…. to arguments
with DIVS guys who don’t even show up until NOON or so…
to then realizing that the entire original plan wasn’t going to
work at all…
…Marsh must have been ‘fed up’ with the whole situation
( and you can hear it in his voice even in the few audio
captures we have so far ).
This was one of the only times in his life he was being a
‘Division Supervisor’ on a fire… and nothing was going
right that day.
I would be ‘testy’, too.
ALL of these ‘arguments’ Marsh might have had that day are
important to understand in the overall context of what happened
later that afternoon.
Did it all come down to putting just too much emphasis on
one last chance to ‘do some good’ that day when everything
else had already gone sideways?
Yes, and the answer is simple, we’re going to try to get to where the action is, and that’s the time we should pull out our little IRPG, hopefully in our radio harness, and go over the 10 & 18. They seem so trivial to read, common sense but when you are required to apply them to an incedent/investigation, which I’ve been through, it’s amazing how many you can list on the report.