Please begin a new comment section below as Chapter II is filling up. Please keep the dialogue positive and informative. I’m working on upgrading the site to handle the heavy comment load.
And, I’m in the process of uploading the entire Arizona Forestry Division SAIR supplemental data. It’s 58GB of data and is taking considerable time. Thank you for your patience.
© Copyright 2013 John Dougherty, All rights Reserved. Written For: Investigative MEDIA
We are all moving to Chapter IV and started there for you just checking in.
both of us stating the investigators never mention the Helms (Boulder Springs Ranch) in the interview if they stayed behind like we have heard than not only would they know more clarity to this topic but we know for I have hiked that area for many of years and its well known they had surveillance cameras so was Marsh on the footage? Did Marsh talk to the Helms while he was there? Did the Helms warn Marsh of the maze-like terrain (SLOW GOING) and he was at the ranch than was alerted and went to assist his men than got faced with the flames yet it just does not add up because if he did make it there he had to know how difficult that terrain was to maneuver through again TIME CONSUMING as well. Did they believe those shelters would save them if they got caught in that trap? The fact is that Marsh could have gone through that brush alone much faster than probably anyone in his crew that day. Everyone has to remember we had no clue who was who and we have shared the SAME from the moment we came back even as we learned who was who and the fact is the other men were spent and the last man we stated looked ill and Norbert of Stern Magazine confirmed the last man was Donut so that compliments the very accounts we saw. We have no agenda. We are not writing books or getting the next big story or big payroll yet we do share it exactly as we seen it and correct areas over time if we see it reported or narrated differently. CLEAR THIS UP— we know
Y O U can if you just finally share.
OK. I wasn’t gonna do it but I did. Here’s the comment I left on Wildfire Today:
“Holly~
and Bill~
I appreciate your attempt to make sense of what doesn’t make sense. We’re all trying to do that, and for the same reasons.
But your narrative/timeline is just way off and based more on speculation than fact. And what I conceiver to be incorrect speculation at that.
I confess, I’m part of that ASAIT crew, camped out over at JD’s site with our marshmallows and hot chocolate. We’ve been there ever since the SAIR, and some before that. We’ve picked apart, argued over, added to, subtracted from, unconnected and then re-connected dots every time something has surfaced. I play the role of the resident photographer, because I am one.
I’m the one over there who, upon noticing Chris MacKenzie’s camera (the one used for this photograph that you are using for one of your anchors), sitting in the middle of the site as if trying to catch my attention, when it couldn’t seem to catch anybody else’s, said to myself, “I’m gonna find out what happened to that camera.” And I did. It took me a month plus of constant work thru the holidays to do it. As I did it, I took it upon myself to document how that site was investigated, what was on it, where every thing went, and only then was able to keep following the dots on the path Chris’s camera took. What I discovered was that the PFD had removed it from the site after the SAIT “investigation,” kept it out of the chain of evidence, did some tricky maneuvers to get it to Chris’s father so nobody would know about it, but Chris’s dad outsmarted them in the end. Now we are learning there are at least one, if not two, critical cellphones they probably did the same thing with. And, just today, we discovered a GPS unit that fairly cleanly survived that fire, that they probably did the same thing with, also.
Our timelines may have some holes in them but not very many at this point. The big holes are not in the timelines.
I was the one who posted this article over there last night, thanks to being alerted to it by Sonny. It was quite a bombshell. I was speechless. It was like fruitbasket upset.
But as folks discussed it, trying to, as we do, fit it into our existing timelines and try to figure out what needs to be adjusted, a lot of us began coming to the same general conclusion. It can’t be done.
We tend to pound each other over the head a bit when speculation exceeds evidence too much. It’s our informal version of peer review. And yes we do speculate. But we also do a ton of fact-finding.
So. Point 1. Eric Marsh was NOT with the GMHS when this chapter began. From what you have “said,” it seems to me you are one of the many who has been led to believe this by the common narrative. He was a considerable distance above them. There is no evidence he was ever “with the crew” that day. At least until the very bitter end. It was not his job to be with “the crew.” He was the Div A Sup, it was his job to keep his eyes on the larger game and oversee Steed and the crew in relationship to other crews, which included the Blue Ridge Hotshots.
He had called BR Sup Brian Frisbee over for a “meeting” at the anchor point, which was well above where the crew was when this photo was taken. Frisbee, while on his way east to west to meet with Marsh, noticed the fire picking up speed towards them, GM Lookout McDonough with the fire coming down on him, and so grabbed McDonough and got him on the ATV, turned around and headed back to the east. Marsh was still up there when all that happened. He wasn’t with the GM Hotshots.
Point 3. Meanwhile, I don’t know what you mean by a handline, but the crew in this photo was not all that close to where they had been working. They were below it. They were taking a break while Eric and others were having a radio conversation about their “options.”
Point 4. About the sawyers Chris photographed. Before this photo, he had shot this very same Andrew Ashcraft comfortably sitting on a rock down below him, shooting with his cellphone, and sending one of those photos to his wife. Andrew, as far as I know, wasn’t even participating in this conversation. Seventeen seconds later Chris shoots him walking away from this rock with his saw. That’s before even Chris heard–and then decided it was important enough to take the videos he did–Eric, somebody else, and Steed discussing their options. And that’s it. That’s all there is of Andrew and the other sawyer walking. Who can say, from this single still photo, where they were walking, and why they were walking? And what they were thinking, much less planning to do, before or while they were walking. Maybe they were heading out a little tiny bit earlier than the rest of the crew. But maybe they weren’t. Maybe doesn’t make the anchor point of a whole theory such as you are proposing. There is nothing to anchor the theory you are proposing vis a vis the sawyers.
Point 5. Given that Marsh was a significant distance above the crew, I can’t imagine a way he could have, short of Batman powers, made it down past his crew, down to the saddle, and then down through the brush filled bowl, to the Boulder Ranch by the time you are stating he was there. We have played these timelines out over and over again, argued them thoroughly, and always ended up with him being behind the crew, above the crew, until a bit after he stepped over the rim of the bowl, after having seen them in it.
Point 6. Ok, let’s assume Eric had those Batman powers. There’s still no evidence he ever connected up with those sawyers. But let’s say somehow he did got down to the ranch by then. Let’s say he was there at the time you say he had that conversation about being at the “house”–which I agree with others I will only believe it when I hear it and I doubt that was what he was saying. (We’ve had endless arguments about exactly what is being said in these often noisy videos of radio calls).
But anyway. Let’s say he was there. Saying that that was where he was. At that time the winds were shifting further to the NE, causing the fire to press further to the southwest. That was EXACTLY the time the fire was driving right around the bottom of the ridge at the mouth of the canyon, and thus beginning to chimney right up into it. That’s EACTLY what was going on then.
There is no conceivable way I can possibly imagine Eric Marsh, at this point (and yes I agree he made his share of mistakes this day, but NONE of us knows what he decided, or why he decided that; all we know is the consequences) doing ANYTHING but radio-ing the GMHS and telling them to drop EVERYTHING and run, down the bowl ASAP and also stick to the south side of the canyon because the north side is going to get burned faster. Because that was exactly what he would have been seeing at that time.
There’s no way in the Universe he would have, pack and stuff on his back and all, thought “OK. I guess I’ll take a quick hike up there just to die with the rest of my sons, the heroic Granite Mountain Hotshots.” Because if he was down there where you are asserting he was, he would have seen the proof that that was what was going to happen if they didn’t get out of there really fast.
And, I add, if he had time to slog up there with his pack, they certainly would have had time to run down without them.
Namaste
~Marti”
And thanks to all of you, for writing about this today, so I could think it through and then write it. I hope they get it.
BTW My comment is still “waiting moderation.” But I expect it will eventually get through.
Thanks to you Marti you put it together well. I hope you posted the same on wildfire today Ill jump over and check.
John has added Chapter IV for us to start on just saw it.
Thank You!
WTKTT— if you noticed over on the wildfire today threat Holly is saying the crew took 10 min to the saddle drop off into the bowl and they were there at 1602 when the crew was actually at the lunch spot and had not moved yet.
Some bodies on the wrong time frame and I don’t think its us.
IT AIN’T SO!!!
Hollie’s basing that whole timeline on that ONE STILL PHOTO of Ashcraft et al walking away from the rocks down below the crew, after they had been sitting on those rocks while he took a picture. And this is BEFORE Chris’s video. So yeah, I can imagine maybe kinda they might have headed out a little earlier than anybody else. Maybe. But there’s absolutely no PROOF that they did. And no proof whatsoever that they did what she’s insisting they did after that.
And I believe we’re right on here to be pretty much insisting that Eric was a ways above the crew to meet Frisbee, and there’s NO WAY he could’ve gotten to the ranch-house when she’s insisting he did, and even if he had, he wouldn’t have been turning to go back up there when he would have been SEEING the fire wrap around the bottom of the ridge.
Keep up the good fight. I have no time to go over there except just to read. Which I will.
I think she’s gonna regret having thrown this together.
OK, so now where were we???
Now they released a statement on wildfire today that they had the radio message fine tuned and that is what marsh said and they had others listen to it before they released there statement. so has any body found and listened to this clear audio from marsh? I have not found it yet.
WTKTT—They have pictures that bill has in a statement of his listing the Prescott Dailey.
#0887 they say is at 1552 and yet 0889 at 1602 is the same fire spread and smoke there is not a 10 min. change in the fire from those pictures and I think the Sawyers are just moving up to the rest of the crew where Mckinezy takes the next two pictures at 1602. These are the same pictures we have time frames on that you listed some days ago. That’s what they are basing the 1552 sawyers movement on.
I think one of the fundamental ‘wrong’
assumptions that Hollie/Maclean are making
is that they are simply trusting what the
SAIR said about that ‘lunch spot’. They
are taking that for gospel, or something, and
that ALL of these photos that have surfaced
were simply taken from the SAME spot.
So when they see the ‘sawyers’ moving
out the only conclusion that comes to
mind (for them) is that they were now
‘leaving the others’ and headed south
to go vertical cut some canyon.
There were TWO ‘movements’ that
afternoon between 3:50 and 4:05.
They were taking photos at TWO
different locations. We crossed that bridge
over here on this thread about 2 months ago.
The ‘moving out’ photos from 3:50 are
simply everyone moving ‘down’ and
‘south’ a little to the NEXT resting spot
where the MacKenzie videos will be
taken and we hear them ‘discussing their
options’ some more. It’s NOT the same
spot where the 3:50 photos/videos were
taken… and neither spot is ‘the lunch spot’.
There WAS a lunch spot. Tex Gilligan has
even found some of the ‘garbage’ they
left there. That ‘lunch spot’ is, in fact, close
to where the SAIR had it marked.
But that ‘lunch spot’ is NOT the place
where either the 3:50 photos/videos or
the 4:02 photos/videos were taken.
There are really TWO ‘new’ claims being
made here.
1) Eric Marsh must have been at the ranch
ahead of everyone because they believe
they hear the word ‘house’ in a background
radio communication. Maybe. Maybe not.
2) A bunch of the ‘sawyers’ left the ‘lunch
spot’ to go take care of some business
ahead of the crew because there are simply
one or two photos taken at 3:50 which
shows them slinging their saws and leaving
the (supposed) ‘lunch spot’… so they must
have been ‘leaving the others’ at that time
and heading to the ranch ahead of them.
Maybe. Maybe not.
Believing assumption (1) makes it easier
to then believe assumption (2)… but I don’t
think the full evidence is going to support
either one in the end… no matter what
anyone *thinks* they are hearing Marsh
say in the background of some video.
By the way… am I the only one catching
the ‘Die Hard’ connection/reference here
when it comes to Maclean/Hollie?
It doesn’t take me five minutes to re-load the page. But the scrolling and typing are awful. I think we’re reluctant (I know I am) to leave old comments too far behind. Given how much everything can change in a day.
Anyway. Re the SAWYER in the VIDEO and ANDREW ASHCRAFT
I just finally downloaded Chris’s cellphone pix. And looked at them sequenced with his camera pix.
Ashcraft, when he is taking that cellphone pic, is sitting on a red-coated rock (we know what that means) with another guy, much lower down than the rest of the crew. Chris is shooting him from back up at the top with the rest of the crew. He’s shooting at 80 mm. That’s a medium zoom and a quite different from the 35mm cellphone focal length he’s using for the others, mostly, I think.
You can’t see them down there from Chris’s cellphone photos. But in the first one, I think, of this collection, you can see a batch of red coated rocks way down below. Where they’re sitting and walking out of are some big unburned shrubs. It almost looks like another place. Because it actually is.
There’s just no way Ashcraft et al are in the photos/video of the crew at the top. And since there’s another guy with them I think there are three down there where Ashcraft is. Two sawyers and a “swamper”?
That’s what I think. I would think they would put their fastest sawyers on this little project. Which is why I think the other sawyer exiting with him is Travis Carter, the Lead Saw Crew Boss. But maybe that’s just total speculation. But at least it’s based on what I’m looking at.
BTW I think Chris’s camera’s timestamping is pretty accurate after all. I think the reason for the perceived confusion is because the different ways he is photographing this. His cellphone pix are geotagged. No canon powershot can do that. I think the reason he he would use his cellphone at points and not just the canon was mostly for that reason. Otherwise there would be no point that I can think of to go thru the hassle of switching back and forth. I would have just stayed with the camera (better quality pictures and zoom), unless I wanted to get some geotagging in the mix. Which is exactly why I need to get a smartphone, which I don’t have.
And another by the way.
The file numbers on Chris’s cellphone are rather wacky. I don’t know why. I I don’t know how this stuff works. You can’t order them by filenumber and have them make any sense. You have to order them by capture time. Then everything falls into place pretty nice and neat, including with the camera pix, I think.
Back to time frames we have been working with WTKTT.
Marsh was waiting to meet Frisby above the old cat when he picked up McDonough. That time was around 1535 ?
How was he able to get past the crew from where he was and down to the ranch in that time frame?
We know he was to meet Frisby where they meet earlier.
That is why we all felt he was behind the crew in the first place and would make the new location impossible. Frisby came up the same way and picked up McDonough. Relook at the times and I think Marsh could not have possibly made that move in the time frame that is now being shown.
No… it’s really not possible… unless a WHOLE lot of other
things already testified to are now wrong.
ALL the official documents ( SAIR, ADOSH, WFAR, YIN notes )
pretty much agree on the story we have been asked to believe
which is…
At 1550… Brian Frisby was on his way out west for this
‘face-to-face’ that Marsh had just requested all the way out
at the anchor spot… where he and Frisby met before
around NOON.
It was only then that Frisby ‘accidentally’ came across Brendan
evacuating his lookout spot and standing near the old-grader.
Frisby can now see for himself how close the fire is out there
to that old-grader… and moving SOUTH pretty fast.
Frisby decides the only safe thing to do is abandon any plans
to keep heading west for that ‘face-to-face’ and he loads
Brendan into the ATV and heads back east the way he came.
Frisby drops Brendan off back where the GM vehicles were
parked just around 1555.
The only real ‘wrench in the works’ with that story is that ADOSH
published photos taken by Brendan back at the GM vehicles
that had time stamps of 1549 on them. That pushes all the
‘official’ timelines off by 5 minutes.
That still isn’t resolved… but regardless… that means that
Marsh was, in fact, EXPECTING Frisby to show up for this
face-to-face he asked for at the anchor spot… and that means
he would have been right up there on the ridge as late as 1550
just waiting for him to arrive until he heard that Frisby had picked
up Brendan and was evacuating him and wouldn’t be coming up
for that meeting.
So now we are at 1550… Marsh is still up near the anchor point
where he was definitely expecting Frisby to show up…
…and here comes the known 1550 Caldwell video capturing this…
Eric Marsh (DIVS A): Yea… I’m tryin’ to work my way off the top.
Todd Abel ( OPS1 ): Okay… I copy… ah… just keep me updated…
ah… ya know… you guys hunker and be safe and then… ah…
we’ll get some air support down there ASAP.
Is it possible that Marsh’s ‘work my way off the top’ could now
mean he was ‘coming all the way down’?
Perhaps… but I don’t believe that.
I still think Marsh’s “workin’ my way off the top” still meant
exactly what he said. He was simply working his way back
south off the TOP of the Weaver Mountains where he had
been scouting all day and back towards the anchor point.
Now here come the 1602 ‘discussing their options’ and
‘comfort level’ discussions. Why would Marsh be asking
Steed about his ‘comfort level’ if he had already decided
they were all going to leave the black fer sure and he was
now way south and ‘scouting the escape route’ himself?
So even if that is what happened ( Marsh went south to
scout the escape route either alone or with sawyers )
I don’t think that could have happened until AFTER the
MacKenzie videos and the ‘discussing their options’ stuff.
But now we are only 3 minutes away from the entire crew
‘gaggling up’ ( at 1605 ), leaving the spot where Christopher
shot his videos, and heading south, anyway.
So even in the new scenario… that means Marsh would have
had only been just a few minutes ‘ahead’ of them… not
a half hour. No way.
So something is just not right about a new scenario where
Marsh is somehow already all the way at the Boulder Springs
Ranch when that “I’m at the house” transmission is (supposedly)
heard.
Which… by the way… is still not definite.
We still don’t know exactly WHEN Marsh is supposed to
have said “I’m at the house where we’re going to jump out”.
More to come on this… I’m sure.
By the way… if ANY of this ‘new scenario’ is true…
Then both Darrell Willis and Brendan McDonough can
still probably tell us all about it.
**
** ROBERT CALDWELL’S GARMIN OREGON 450 GPS UNIT APPEARS
** TO BE BURIED IN THE DIRT THERE AT THE DEPLOYMENT SITE
Reply to Marti Reed post on January 20, 2014 at 7:38 am
>> Marti said…
>>
>> I “identified” Radio 13 as being Caldwell’s radio, because the closest body
>> (I think) is Caldwell’s. It’s in a pile of stuff I think might be a pack. It’s on
>> the “outside” of the Deployment area.
Thanks Marti.
I think I see the Garmin Oregon 450 GPS unit there in that photo now.
In fact… I’m pretty sure about it.
I’m talking about photo 50 ( or 109 photos ) in this folder…
https://plus.google.com/photos/115249047962550271237/albums/5962242148909920913
Just to the right of the radio is what looks to be a ‘ball’ of fiberglass wadding
or something ( shelter remnants, perhaps ).
Look STRAIGHT UP from that ‘ball of wadding’.
There is some kind of electronic device sort of ‘buried in the dirt’ right there.
It looks VERY much like the BACK of Caldwell’s Garmin Oregon 450 GPS unit.
It has the right color and the right sort of ‘curves’ to it including the slight ‘bulbous’
shape that would be seen on the top-back of an Oregon 450.
It looks to be in pretty good shape. Not burned at all… just BURIED in the dirt.
If that is NOT the Oregon 450 GPS unit… then it certainly is the back of SOME
kind of handheld electronic device and it’s not a radio and it’s not a smartphone.
So it looks like the ‘story’ on Caldwell’s Garmin Oregon 450 GPS unit is going
to be just like Christopher MacKenzie’s camera.
It was THERE ( We can SEE it was there ), just lying on the ground, pretty
much undamaged… but it (apparently) never made it into the real
‘chain of evidence’.
Once again… It’s going to be all about what the Prescott Fire Department
did or didn’t do with these things that THEY removed from the site.
Awesome! I knew you would figure that out.
I remember looking at that thing, thinking, “Ummmm, that’s a THING!!!!”
But I didn’t know what it was, and I had kinda decided to to try to write up all the gazillions of things I had found that I didn’t know what they were. I was sick of crawling around on the deployment site.
But, yeah. There’s no doubt in my mind the PFD has found some very “useful” stuff amidst that haul they took in that evening after the SAIT visit.
typo I had decided to NOT write up all those gazillions of things….
Hmm… if you check out photo 049 (previous one), you can see a couple carabiners in the lower right corner. I think the GPS unit might be down there. In MacKenzie’s IMG_0876 photo, you can see it hanging by a carabiner, and it is pretty small. I think the two grey objects above and to the right of the radio in photos 049 and 050 are actually partially melted water bottles. I could be wrong; this is just my interpretation. But I still think that a carabiner is likely to lead us to the GPS unit.
You need to check the changes in the story now happening in the Wildfire today article. Now she never said the chain saw crew ever got to the ranch but somehow Marsh did and then rejoined the crew in a 40 min. time frame. Not possible, not possible. They are reading something into the radio traffic that is not there. We already know that after the burn someone ran from the top to the Ranch with no brush and took 22 min.
Reply to Bob Powers post on January 20, 2014 at 11:44 am
>> Mr. Powers wrote…
>> They are reading something into the radio traffic
>> that is not there.
I believe that might turn out to be the case.
If this entire ‘new’ theory hinges on someone thinking they hear
the single word ‘house’ in a background radio transmission
accidentally captured in a video shot in a noisy, flying airplane…
…then they better be pretty certain about that one single word.
I still would tend to believe that Marsh MAY have been ‘ahead’
of the crew circa 4:20, instead of lagging way behind… but
I would also be more likely to believe he said ‘jump off’ spot
instead of ‘jump out’ and he may have simply been standing
at the spot where they were going to ‘jump off the two-track’
when that transmission happened. Ahead of the crew, maybe,
but not all the way at the frickin’ ranch.
We still haven’t seen any of the security camera videos shot
at the perimeter of the Boulder Springs Ranch. I would think,
if Marsh ever made it anywhere near there… he would be seen
in one of those videos.
I hope everyone ( Mr. Maclean and Wildfire today as well )
realizes this is NOT a ‘contest’.
At all times… we need to try our best to ‘get this right’.
Theories ( backed by some possible evidence ) are
ALWAYS welcome… but be prepared for revisions.
I have always been ready to put forth ideas that I think are
based on evidence I’m seeing… but ( even despite what
some detractors of mine have said )… I am ALWAYS
ready to be DEAD WRONG.
That’s how this sort of thing goes.
One step at a time… and sometimes that step is ‘backwards’.
While I respect John Maclean do not take every thing he says as fact.
Reference– The Rattle Snake Fire My father died on his best friend and Bob Werner who became my step father. 50 years later my step dad told John that he was on the engine that was at the spot fire and had a hose line to the crew. he went for water and got back in time to try and help the crew out of the brush and managed to get 9 up the hose lay. John did not believe him and did not put that in his book. My step dad told John where to put it. My dad had 35 years in the FS and retired in 1981 he blamed himself for my dad and the other 14 who died had he been on the hose lay they would have all got out.
Another Fire The Saddler Fire 1999. Some friends of mine took blame that was not theirs that john inserted into the book. So I reserve judgment on this new info.
If Marsh was at the ranch, would he have not had “eyes” on the fire and been able to warn the crew? He would have passed through the mouth of the canyon and presumably would have seen that the direction and speed had changed. For those here who have seen the site, is this correct or not? So if in fact he was acting as a scout and a lookout, why no warning? I too am skeptical that this information is what it purports to be. It is such a dramatic change in the facts that Mr. MacLean better be right.
Holly Neill is posting comments at Wildfire Today, so maybe there will be some clarifications and further evidence there.
Finally, it is starting to take about 5 minutes to load this thread. Why do we not move it over to the most recent posting that JD just put up?
What you wrote is pretty much exactly what I wrote just up above. Absolutely.
Like I wrote, my pages don’t take that long to load, but typing really AWFUL.
I think you’re right. Time to get out of the mud.
If Marsh took Sawyers clear to ranch I would dought they would run clear back to the crew impossible with saws and packs 600 Yds.
Also if they had cut a route the crew should have been able to double time down it to the ranch. I do not believe if they decided to go that way at 1555
they could have done much trail work off the hill. My bet jump off spot not house which means he was at the saddle ready to drop into the canyon. as thick as the brush was the crew with the other chain saws would have caught up to them and would account for saws running at first transmission of the flaming front. Also again we have radio communications during the no communications time but what freq. were they on Air or Div. Some body knew exactly where they were. I still dought they got to ranch and came back. If they had Marsh would have had eyes on the fire and been pushing the crew to double time it out. Where the hell was the SAIT on this.
At a more basic level, that type of brush is hard to clear. Just as I believe they are much more likely than not to have used their phones to pull up maps, and simply ignored them by deciding to drop into the bowl, the idea that they thought they’d simply do a little quick pruning for an easy hike down to the ranch is difficult to swallow. But, entirely possible. Obviously they were trying to clear and burn out their deployment site when, likewise, even a bulldozer wouldn’t have had time to do so. So, at deployment, when they should have been running one way or the other since deployment was clearly not survivable and there was no time to improve their site, they were focused on cutting and deploying.
So, given their known decisions, it is very possible they also thought they could cut a clear path down quickly, or that cutting was simply the thing “to do,” just like deploying seems to have been viewed without assessing it. It runs counter to what their past experience had to have told them about that type of brush, of course. Along with all the past bad decisions and risk-taking that’s already been discussed, I wonder (purely speculatively, I have heard nothing from anyone as to this question) if they’d in the past headed down a drainage that was fairly open in the wash itself, with fewer and more mature trees so that they tended to think that was a good bet in a similar area? (It’s not, as those kinds of washes can vary from open to wicked.)
My first thoughts as I read that and some of the earlier comments, and tried to wrap my brain around it was no way!
If Marsh had been at the bottom at that time, at the ranch, he would have seen what they all MISSED.
The wind shift, the fire wrapping around the bottom of the ridge and setting up to blow up the chimney. He would have COMMANDED them to get their butts down (RUN!!!) ASAP and, oh by the way stay on the south side cuz it’s gonna burn the north side first. Which is exactly what it did. Or am I missing something?
guess who? Joy. the part I do not understand as much as I want to believe in my own ideas and thoughts that Marsh was way ahead of the men and that he always had his eyes on the fire and he never led 18 men to their deaths and in what I read from Holly and John last night—I trust if they heard something I cannot yet hear that they would not publicly write or share about something because they base sharing with facts to back it up so Sonny would like to see the photos of the stubs from the sawyers because OSHA scouted it pretty well when we were there and we just hope they have source/documents to make and sense there. Than there is the TIME STAMP. You all here have done an excellent job dissecting it but I just cannot imagine Eric Marsh that GOOD to get from the fire edge to the ranch in what was it Bob Powers- 40 minutes? no, I have hiked the area too long and YES Marsh was stamina and speed but how did the sawyers enter the scenario—how did they come to that conclusion? Just their hunch like we all have expressed our hunches over time? I say EXCELLENT to the video but Elizabeth did it say all that or is Bob Powers right in the questions he asks? We have offered you all purity and if we ever go off on to personal perception- we let you know but you have seen documents from us and videos and now the first photo that actually has accurate time stamp near the fire edge at 9:40am. I wish John M. answers your question even if it was an old one Bob Powers of why your family member was never entered into the book. We have walked with so many authors and a lot thank us for the hiking tour guide moment yet we do not expect nor desire to be in books unless it is to document only things they can factually state—no more bullsh** like S. McKinnon did at the azcentral narrating and saying we will get back to you on the retraction to weeks later pass by and nothing. Really does not matter what he wrote because the TRUTH is the TRUTH and I just figured he wrote true stories not a collaboration of the stories and narrate about us that was not what we even shared like we left from Yarnell not Congress. I hope to hear more unravel from this recent story. I really will read the comment wall and than log out. Thank you for asking me to visit and view-
Could be Helitack with the Helicopter unloading maybe pumps or pumpkin filling. Just a thought.
I’m kinda sorta thinking the videos being referenced may be on their way to JD’s dropbox and into the folder called:
“A05-Aerial Firefighting Study Photos and Videos: Pending”
Yes, Marti. They are the videos I referenced back on January 12th – a full week ago. If WTKTT wants to e-mail me directly, I can help him get the videos, so that he or someone can post them. I have 30 or so videos already posted, but the air-to-air ones are too big. My impression is the John Dougherty might be having the same issue, because he asked me for my copy of the Blue Ridge GPS video, which WTKTT had down-sized me. I believe that John Doughtery ultimately posted my copy, because the original copy from the FOIA was too large to post.
Thx. And yes, he was grumbling in an email to me the other day that uploading was taking him FOREVER.
And he is refusing to e-mail ME because…..?
Weirdest thing. In that same email, he thought I was you.
So I told him I was not, and gave him your email address.
I think he was confused by something. Of course I have no idea how that feels ever. I just can’t imagine. If you want me to forward that email to you I will.
Elizabeth… what FORMAT are these air-videos in?
Are they in AVI format like the Blue Ridge
tracking thing was?
Just look at the last few letters of the filename(s)
following the ‘period’.
That tells you what FORMAT the thing is in…
Examples…
something.mov = An Apple Quicktime video file
something.avi = An AVI video file
something.mp4 = An MP4 video file
something.pdf = An Adobe PDF document
etc.
AVI files can be reduced by 80 to 90 percent with
NO loss of any video or audio quality.
If the files are too big to upload to that dropbox I gave
you for converting the Blue Ridge Tracking video
then email isn’t going to work.
Actually, I want to correct myself – those are NOT the videos that I think Holly is referencing. I asked John Maclean to share with us the labels on the videos, so that I can point you to the right ones in either my dump or JD’s, but I have not heard back from Maclean on that. In his defense, I suppose selling books is easier if you have information in them that you did not share prior, so I’m not sure whether he will want to share it. But I asked, at least.
Regarding the Wildfiretoday piece covering Holly Neil and John Maclean’s new reporting, the team of sawyers heading down first to use “vertical cut and slash” to improve the “escape route” is another WTF moment.
Reply to calvin post on January 19, 2014 at 10:38 am
>> calvin said…
>>
>> WTKTT…. Does that mean image 2733 (p23 SAIR) is also taken
>> at 1550 as the SAIR says?
Yes. It ( finally ) does.
The story on that (pesky) P23 photo now is that it was NEVER actually the
missing sequential MacKenzie Canon Powershot image IMG_0888 as I had
originally thought it might be. It simply wasn’t until the SAIT FOIA stuff started
appearing that we learned how the Canon Powershot was simply continuing
its sequential numbering for BOTH still photos AND movies.
So IMG_0888 was never really ‘missing’ at all from the original ‘MacKenzie’
photos published by Prescott Courier and AZREPUBLIC. They just failed to
mention what the reality of the ‘movie’ file naming was.
So that mystery is OVER.
The photo on P23 of the SAIR is from Christopher’s smartphone ( which
we also didn’t know about ) and it is, in fact, hard-time stamped at 3:50.
So the SAIR caption and time of 3:50 on that photo on page 23 is CORRECT.
Nobody ‘dialed back’ the time on it. That’s exactly when Christopher took it.
>> calvin also wrote…
>> IF that is the case, image 0885, 0886 and 0887 from Mackenzie
>> camera do not fit in with the times. Remember this ongoing discussion?
Yep. Sure do.
Looking at that now ( since we can FINALLY see/analyze Christopher’s
smartphone photos ).
More on that later… I just didn’t want you to think I missed your post.
Also…
KUDOS again on ‘seeing’ Robert Caldwell’s Garmin GPS unit on his shoulder.
Funny how you can stare and stare at something… and suddenly find
something in a photo you’ve never seen before. Diligence counts!
Discovering Caldwell’s Garmin GPS unit, even at this point, is a BIG DEAL.
I checked ALL the deployment site photos that have been made public and it
doesn’t appear to be just ‘lying on the ground’ anywhere like Christopher’s
Canon Powershot clearly was.
It was either actually picked up by the YCSO detectives when they arrived at
sunrise the next morning ( but never, ever mentioned by them or entered into
evidence? )… OR… it was GONE by the time the YCSO police ever even
got there.
I don’t know which of those two scenarios is more disturbing.
It was attached directly ( and firmly ) to Robert’s right pack strap.
If he had to drop his pack and deploy as fast as I think he did…
then it would have still been right there wherever he dropped his pack.
It is not possible for it to have ‘disintegrated’.
Is it possible that Caldwell never got his pack fully off… and the straps
( and what was attached to them like the GPS unit? ) just went into
the shelter with him… which would then mean the GPS unit travelled
in his body bag along with him to the Medical Examiner’s office because
it was still ( somehow ) ATTACHED to him?
I don’t know.
All I know is that you really could not ‘miss’ this thing.
SOMEONE saw it… and knows what happened to it.
I “identified” Radio 13 as being Caldwell’s radio, because the closest body (I think) is Caldwell’s. It’s in a pile of stuff I think might be a pack. It’s on the “outside” of the Deployment area.
And now I’m going back to bed. I woke up way too early, kept trying to figure out Joy’s Mystery Man, but still can’t do it without something to sync the photos to in more real time. Which I still don’t have.
It’s to hard to see, and there’s no “photo enhancement software” out there that will remove the pixelation without removing detail, that I know of.
What I noticed though, is there’s no red helmet there, that I can see. And I think I should be able to see it. The light’s clear.
So I started thinking maybe it’s two GMHSs up there, doing something in relationship to the helicopter, which comes in an hour later, and picks up stuff from the upper peak of that ridge to the right. But the photo of the crew “walking in” is two hours and fifteen minutes later. So I still don’t get it.
By the way it’s file number 134.
Could be Helitack with the Helicopter unloading maybe pumps or pumpkin filling. Just a thought.
Thx. That’s what I was thinking but I didn’t know enough about this particular piece of the operations to say that.
Also it looks like they have back-packs on. Does Helitack wear backpacks?
Marti… thanks for the picture reference.
I believe I just found Caldwell’s Garmin Oregon 450 GPS
unit right there in that photo… just buried in the dirt
up near the top of the photo.
See longer post ( and details ) just below.
Reply to Bob Powers post on January 19, 2014 at 1:05 pm
>> Mr. Powers said…
>> I would say the (cell) number shown for Eric ( on the public NIHC site )
>> is a PFD assigned cell phone since it is public.
I would tend to agree. I can’t really imagine Eric Marsh allowing his own
personal cell phone number to be published PUBLICLY in multiple places
at the NIHC websites.
There is, in fact a PUBLIC website that allows you to do ‘reverse-lookups’
on cell-phone numbers. It is provided by a PUBLIC company called
‘PrivacyStar’ that makes spam-blocker software for cell phones.
Here is the exact link for the PUBLIC PrivacyStar page that does a
‘reverse lookup’ on Eric Marsh’s published cell phone number…
http://www.privacystar.com/lookup/928-237-0508
Clicking on “Owner’s Name” on that PUBLIC results page
only produces the following…
Name: Cell Phone PRESCOTT, AZ (No name associated)
Total Block Count by Privacy Star App Users: 0
Total Complaint Count by Privacy Star App Users: 0
All that means is that it is, in fact, a cell phone registered to someone
in Prescott, Arizona, with no specific NAME being reported by the
carrier, and that PrivacyStar users have registered no ‘spam’
complaints or ‘block this number’ requests against this cell number.
So that doesn’t mean it isn’t just a PFD registered ‘generic’ number,
but it doesn’t mean it isn’t either.
It it really was just Eric’s personal phone… the odds are actually high that
the PrivacyStar site that it WOULD have listed his name in those
search results. The fact that it didn’t would tend to be more proof
( in my opinion ) that this number really is just registered as a ‘generic’
number and is paid for by the Prescott Fire Department.
More to come on this…
“The radio communications, although muffled and difficult to make out, can be heard in the background on several audio/video recordings of pilot radio transmissions during the fire – radio communications that were publicly released in December by the Arizona State Forestry Division.”
Where are these “several audio/video recordings of pilot radio transmissions…”
I haven’t seen them. Mr. Dougherty. do you have them?
This is absolutely stunning.
I’ve been somewhat in shock before this, while working on this. But right now I think I’m REALLY in shock.
Marti… Elizabeth reported hearing these kinds of things in the
background of those ‘videos’ that the airplane guys were
apparently filming that afternoon for their own purposes. They
were doing their own ‘study of retardant drops’, or something.
Elizabeth reported hearing this ‘Musser calling Marsh’ transmission
on those air tapes.
I don’t know if these ‘air tapes’ have ever been posted publicly.
I imagine they will be… if they really do contain captured radio
transmissions as important as the ones being reported.
The scenario being described now almost raises MORE
questions than it answers.
Example: If Marsh ( and some sawyers ) were really all the
way at the ranch… and THEY had time to run due west to
Steed and the crew ( and end up dying with them )…
…then that automatically means Steed and the crew had the
same amount of time to just run due EAST and get safely
to the ranch. End of story. No one dies that day.
If Marsh was at the Boulder Springs Ranch and had been enroute since 3:52 where was the Marsh – Frisby face-to-face supposed to take place at?
Also what does Marsh by “where we are going to jump out at”? Like he’s going to surprise the rest of the crew?
I do have to say I looked at the photo from 3:52 in the Courier and it certainly does look like a couple of sawyers are heading down. You could say they were arriving, but it looks like they were continuing to go down.
If this is in fact true, someone knew this and did not tell the SAIT (why – seems unlikely) or the SAIT just deliberately chose to rewrite history, or more bluntly, they lied. I suppose they might have missed these conversations on the recordings they had, but the person on the other end of them knew what was said.
Would be nice to hear these recordings to see if what is reported seems correct. But to be honest, after the “move faster” video was found, the SAIR became essentially nonoperative. After all, someone knew about that too and either failed to disclose it or the SAIT buried it.
Yes, mike… lots of ‘new’ questions to answer about
what is being reported by Wildfire today.
You just hit on a few important ones that would
‘not support’ their story.
It’s also a fact that some of those ‘sawyers’ seen
‘moving out’ from the 3:52 location are ALSO
seen again just resting in the 4:02 MacKenzie
video. They didn’t go far.
Example: Ashcraft is seen with his saw ‘slung’
for hike in one of the 3:52 photos… but there he
is right there with his saw ‘unslung’ again at
4:02… just to the right of Steed in the first
MacKenzie video. Ashcraft is the one leaning on
his saw who laughs in agreement at the sarcastic
remark made by ( Misner? ) right after Eric says
“I could just feel it… ya know”.
It seems the ‘key’ to the whole ‘new scenario’ of
Marsh having ‘scouted ahead’ all the way to
the Boulder Springs Ranch is just based on
someone ( Maclean? Holly? ) thinking they hear
Marsh say…
” Nah I’m at the house where we’re gonna
jump out at.”
Well… what if what he really said was more like…
“Nah I’m here at the PLACE where we gonna
jump OFF at”.
Maybe Marsh was really ‘ahead’ of them.
All we know so far ( MacKenzie videos ) is
that he was not WITH them.
What if Marsh simply went on ahead down
the two-track… and he was simply now standing
at the spot where they were going to ‘jump off
the two-track’ and drop into the canyon?
That changes the thinking about whether Marsh
was ‘ahead’ or ‘behind’ them prior to 4:20… but
it doesn’t put him all the way at the ranch where
he ( and some sawyers? ) would have had to
run BACK west over 630 yards in 120 seconds
just to die with them.
So it all comes down to what someone thinks they
are hearing on those air-tapes.
Hopefully… those will be publicly available soon.
Are you sure that is Ashcraft in the video? I do not see him with a saw, the one next to him has one. In the 3:52 photo, Ashcraft is not wearing gloves and has glasses on – neither is true for the one in question. Obviously either of those things could be changed in an instant. When looking for Ashcraft, I usually look for tattoos and teeth. Cannot see whether there are tattoos or not, the teeth are there though.
Before he wrote books, John MacLean was a reporter. Reporters live and die by getting their facts right. If he reported what is heard, it really should be (better be) correct. To get this wrong would be a very big miss for him. The article in Wildfire Today does not say this is what it sounds like – the conversation is in quotes with no caution offered on whether it is accurate or not.
I don’t think I see Ashcraft in that video (but get REALLY confused about id-ing them.
What I’m seeing is a guy standing up, leaning on the saw’s sheath, and then as he leans over to spit, you can see the saw sheath lean over a bit with him.
Is that who we’re talking about?
I’ve been on again off again trying to figure out who the sawyers are for awhile. Two of them are photographically distinctive.
Dustan Deford, obviously with his big read beard.
Andrew Ashcroft, not only by his tattoos, but also that white bracelet on his left wrist. That white bracelet has its own story. I can’t remember what they wrote on them, but Andrew and his wife gave them to each other. She complained that he never wore his. So that morning, she was surprised to see that he had taken it and apparently wore it to the fire.
She figured she’d never see it again. So she was quite surprised when it was returned to her. She saw it as a sign that he was watching over her. That was a VERY BIG DEAL for her.
The two other sawyers, who are really hard to tell apart, are Travis Carter, 31, the Lead Saw Boss, and Travis Turbeyfill, 27. They look a lot alike, especially in these fire photos where everybody kinda looks alike under their helmets and with soot all over their faces. In regular photos Turbeyfill looks kinda almost like a ten years younger Carter. Plus, Carter is kinda bald, but you never see that with his helmet on.
So looking at that video, I really can’t tell if that’s Carter or Turbeyfill, but it’s obviously not Ashcraft or Deford (who obviously is in the video).
And I don’t see Ashcraft at all, but then I just may not know how to see him in this video.
In the photo of Aschcraft walking with his saw, the other either Carter/Turbyfill is the one walking beside him. I just really can’t tell. Because they look so much alike in photos. Especially with helmets and soot and dirt.
So we’d need an id from David or somebody that knew them, imo.
So here’s a logic/protocol/culture try. If, in fact, those two were leaving (and Ashcraft isn’t in the video) would it make sense that the one leaving would be Carter the Lead Saw Boss, or the not Lead Saw Boss Turbeyfill.
Which would be most likely to stay with Deford and the rest of the crew, or head out with Ashcraft to cut a trail thru the brush? Any thoughts?
Actually, after writing all that, and going to look at some more photos (I keep telling myself I’m DONE DIGGING), including one with a saw, I’m thinking it looks more like the ones I’ve just seen of Clayton Witted. The beard. And the long nose and more angular face.
So if that’s the case, the one walking out with Ashcraft is still either Carter or Turbyfill. So the question still applies. So it looks like we’ve got four saws and five sawyers.
Any more “seasoned” tips, thoughts, or guesses?
Plus, there’s another guy “walking out” with them too.
**
** ROBERT CALDWELL WAS WEARING A GARMIN
** OREGON 450 PORTABLE GPS UNIT ON JUNE 30, 2013
Reply to calvin post on January 19, 2014 at 7:12 pm
>> calvin wrote…
>>
>> Image 0854 and image 0876 from Mackenzie camera (one taken
>> at Doce and One at Yarnell) appear to show Robert Caldwell wearing
>> a Garmin GPS on his right shoulder strap.
>> Thoughts???
calvin… THANK YOU!
You are a steely-eyed rocket man!
YES!
It’s a Garmin Oregon 450 handheld GPS unit.
Enhancement on IMG_0876 of Caldwell from the Yarnell fire shows that it
actually says ‘Oregon 450’ so on the upper left corner of the unit in the
white ‘sideways’ writing on the front case of the unit.
The Garmin Oregon 450 handheld GPS unit is an older one. It was new
enough to not need that distinctive ‘wide antenna’ on the top like the
REALLY old GPS handhelds but is not obsolete and is no longer manufactured.
It was replaced a few yeas ago by the newer Garmin Colorado and Dakota series.
Here’s a direct link to a ‘side’ photo of the Garmin Oregon 450 showing that same,
unique ‘curved’ side striping/seam as seen on Caldwell’s unit…
https://buy.garmin.com/en-US/US/prod63349.html#gallery-dialog
** IMPORTANT! – WHERE IS THIS GPS UNIT NOW?
This Caldwell Oregon 450 GPS unit is NOT listed in any official evidence
document nor has it ever been mentioned until now. ( Thanks again to calvin! ).
Since this GPS unit is ALSO seen being worn by Captain Jesse Steed at
the Doce fire ( see other MacKenzie photo details below )… then it’s possible
this GPS unit is just like Marsh’s cellphone. It might have simply been
‘Propterty of the Prescott Fire Department’ and ( just like Marsh’s cellphone ),
when they might have ‘found it’ at the deployment site, PFD found no reason
to let either the YCSO police or the SAIT investigators know about it.
The Prescott Fire Department may have just considered it ‘their personal property’
and so they were able to keep it from ever entering the official ‘chain of evidence’.
Even if it did NOT belong to PFD… they may have treated it like they did
Christopher’s Canon Powershot camera and simply found a roundabout way
to return it to Robert Caldwell’s family without it ever entering the hands of
any investigators.
It’s important to establish the ‘chain of possession’ on this Garmin Oregon 450
GPS unit now that we now Robert Caldwell was WEARING it that day.
If found… it most probably will have EXACT TIMES for every single place
Caldwell and GM traveled that day as well as exact GPS coordinates.
The LOGS on this device area always recording data when it’s turned on.
** Christopher MacKenzie photos that all show this Garmin Oregon 450 GPS unit…
IMG_0876 – From the Yarnell Fire – 10:45:37 AM, June 30, 2013
This is the picture taken at 10:45 AM that morning in Yarnell where
Rober Caldwell is posing for Christopher MacKenzie with the ‘lit torch’
in his hand. The Garmin Oregon 450 GPS unit is clearly seen attached
to the upper end of his right front pack strap up near his shoulder.
This is the picture that, if you download the original high-res version and
enhance it some more… shows clearly the ‘Oregon 450’ writing in white
letters ( sideways ) on the upper end of the face of the GPS unit.
Metadata ( partial )
Camera: Canon PowerShot SD1400 IS
Lens: 5 – 20 mm – Shot at 13 mm (shot wide open)
Exposure: Auto exposure, 1/251 sec, f/4.5, ISO 80
Flash: Off, Did not fire
Focus: Single, Face Detect, with a depth of field of from 2.51 m to infinity.
AF Area Mode: Multi-point AF or AI AF
Date: June 30, 2013 – 10:45:37 AM
File: 3,240 × 4,320 JPEG (14.0 megapixels)
Image compression: 97%
IMG_0854 – From Doce Fire
Caldwell is ‘tying his boot’ but the Oregon 450 GPS unit is clearly seen there
( and lit well by the sun ) between his head/chin and his knee and attached to
his right front pack strap.
In this picture, we are looking at the LEFT side of the Oregon 450 unit strapped
to Caldwell’s right front pack strap.
Notice the unique ‘curved’ striping/seam on the side of the GPS unit and the
location of the ‘button’ in one of the ‘curves’ near the top of the unit. That is
unique to the Garmin Oregon 450 GPS device.
See link above for a photo of this unique ‘curved’ striping/seam.
We can also clearly see the big ‘clip’ on the back of the GPS unit that is holding
it to his pack strap. Again… that ‘clip’ is unique to the Garmin Oregon 450.
IMG_0874 – From Doce Fire
Caldwell and Steed in the same photo.
Caldwell now appears to just have the ‘microphone extender’ for his Bendix in
the same location on his right front pack strap where he normally wears the
Oregon 450 GPS unit… but now Jesse Steed seems to have the (same?)
Oregon 450 GPS in the same place Caldwell usually wears it. His right front
pack strap.
Steed is definitely wearing a Garmin GPS Oregon 450 ( you can tell from the
shape and the button on the top curve of the device )… but whether this is the
exact same Garmin Oregon 450 unit that we see Caldwell wearing in other
photos is not certain. Maybe Steed has his own Oregon 450 and was ALSO
wearing his in Yarnell on June 30. If so… where is Jesse Steed’s Oregon 450?
IMG_0875 – From Doce Fire
Caldwell and Steed in the same photo.
Same as IMG_0874. Caldwell has the extended microphone on his right front
pack strap and it’s Steed who has the Oregon 450 GPS unit on his right front
pack strap.
This time… we can see the top of the rounded-edge GPS unit and there appears
to what might be mistaken for a piece of tape across the curved top of the unit
but that’s actually just what the top ‘button’ on the Garmin Oregon series looks
like. It’s a ‘curved button’ embedded into the top curve of the unit.
IMG_0873 – From Doce Fire
Caldwell and Steed in the same photo.
Steed appears to still have the GPS unit on his right front pack strap but
Caldwell is blocking the full view of it in this photo.
** Official GARMIN Oregon 450 Product Information…
Garmin
Oregon 450
Part Number: 010-00697-40
$329.99 USD
Rugged Touchscreen Navigation
– 3″ sunlight-readable touchscreen display.
– Worldwide basemap with shaded relief.
– 3-axis compass with accelerometer and barometric altimeter sensors.
– microSD™ card slot.
Explore More
Oregon 450 comes with a built-in worldwide basemap with shaded
contours. Simply touch the color screen to navigate. Its digital
elevation maps show you shaded contours at higher zoom levels,
giving you a big picture of the surrounding terrain.
Get Your Bearings
Oregon 450 has a built-in 3-axis tilt-compensated electronic compass,
which shows your heading even when you’re standing still, without
holding it level. Its barometric altimeter tracks changes in pressure to
pinpoint your precise altitude, and you can even use it to plot barometric
pressure over time, which can help you keep an eye on changing weather
conditions. See changes in your elevation ahead of you and where you’ve
been with enhanced track navigation. With its high-sensitivity,
WAAS-enabled GPS receiver and HotFix® satellite prediction,
Oregon 450 locates your position quickly and precisely and maintains
its GPS location even in heavy cover and DEEP CANYONS.
Share Wirelessly
With Oregon 450 you can share your waypoints, tracks, routes and
geocaches wirelessly with other compatible Oregon, Colorado and
Dakota devices. Send your favorite hike to your friend to enjoy or the
location of a cache to find. Just touch “send” to transfer your information.
Find Fun
Oregon 450 supports OpenCaching.com GPX files for downloading geocaches
and details straight to your unit. By going paperless, you’re not only helping
the environment but also improving efficiency. Oregon stores and displays
key information, including location, terrain, difficulty, hints and descriptions,
which means no more manually entering coordinates and paper print outs!
Simply upload the GPX file to your unit and start hunting for caches. Show
off photos of your excursions with Oregon’s picture viewer. Slim and lightweight,
Oregon is the perfect companion for all your outdoor pursuits.
Plan Your Next Trip
Take charge of your next adventure with BaseCamp™, software that lets you
view and organize maps, waypoints, routes, and tracks. This free trip-planning
software even allows you to create Garmin Adventures that you can share
with friends, family or fellow explorers. BaseCamp displays topographic
map data in 2-D or 3-D on your computer screen, including contour lines
and elevation profiles. It also can transfer an unlimited amount of satellite
images to your device when paired with a BirdsEye Satellite Imagery
subscription.
Garmin Oregon 450 Technical Specs…
Physical & Performance:
Unit dimensions: WxHxD 2.3″ x 4.5″ x 1.4″ (5.8 x 11.4 x 3.5 cm)
Display size: WxH 1.53″W x 2.55″H (3.8 x 6.3 cm); 3″ diag (7.6 cm)
Display resolution: WxH 240 x 400 pixels
Display type: Transflective color TFT touchscreen
Weight: 6.8 oz (192.7 g) with batteries
Battery: 2 AA batteries (not included); NiMH or Lithium recommended
Battery life: 16 hours
Waterproof : Yes (IPX7)
Floats: No
High-sensitivity receiver: Yes
Interface: High-speed USB and NMEA 0183 compatible
Maps & Memory:
Basemap: Yes
Preloaded maps: No
Ability to add maps: Yes
Built-in memory: 850 MB
Accepts data cards: microSD™ card (not included)
Waypoints/favorites/locations: 2000
Routes: 200
Track log: 10,000 points, 200 saved tracks
Features & Benefits:
Automatic routing (turn by turn routing on roads): Yes (with optional mapping for detailed roads)
Electronic compass: Yes (tilt-compensated 3-axis)
Touchscreen: Yes
Barometric altimeter: Yes
Camera: No
Geocaching-friendly: Yes (Paperless)
Custom maps compatible: Yes
Photo navigation (navigate to geotagged photos): Yes
Hunt/fish calendar: Yes
Sun and moon information: Yes
Tide tables: Yes
Area calculation: Yes
Custom POIs (ability to add additional points of interest): Yes
Unit-to-unit transfer (shares data wirelessly with similar units): Yes
Picture viewer: Yes
Garmin Connect(TM) compatible (online community where you
analyze, categorize and share data): Yes
AND HOLY MALOLY HAS ANYBODY SEEN THIS YET????????
Sonny just emailed me this. OMG
From Wildfire Today, posted today:
Discoveries in Yarnell Hill Fire recordings provide new information about location of Eric Marsh
***Was Eric Marsh at the Ranch When the Hotshots Headed Down the Hill?***
By Holly Neill and John N. Maclean
http://wildfiretoday.com/2014/01/19/discoveries-in-yarnell-hill-fire-recordings-provide-new-information-about-location-of-eric-marsh/
“A series of previously undisclosed radio transmissions by Eric Marsh, superintendent of the Granite Mountain Hotshots, show that he communicated regularly with supervisors about his crew’s position”
“Contrary to assertions in the Serious Accident Investigation Report and elsewhere, and just minutes before the crew was entrapped, Marsh told incident supervisors “I’m at the house” and that his crew was “coming down from the heel of the fire.”
“The radio communications, although muffled and difficult to make out, can be heard in the background on several audio/video recordings of pilot radio transmissions during the fire – radio communications that were publicly released in December by the Arizona State Forestry Division.”
“Voice 1: Division Alpha, what’s your status right now?
Marsh: Ah the guys, ah Granite, is making their way down the escape route from this morning. It’s south, mid-slope, cut vertical.”
Voice 2: “Copy, working their way down into the structures.”
Voice 1: “ … on the escape route with Granite Mountain right now?”
Marsh: “Nah I’m at the house where we’re gonna jump out at.””
“Voice 1: Division Alpha, what’s your status right now?
Marsh: Ah the guys, ah Granite, is making their way down the escape route from this morning. It’s south, mid-slope, cut vertical.”
Voice 2: “Copy, working their way down into the structures.”
Voice 1: “ … on the escape route with Granite Mountain right now?”
Marsh: “Nah I’m at the house where we’re gonna jump out at.””
This whole thing just keeps getting weirder and weirder and then exponentially weirder.
I’m glad I have on a nice soft Pandora Radio playllist right now.
I am just totally dumbfoundedly flabergasted. And I have absolutely no idea, from this article, what/where these videos are.
We’ve known since Elizabeth first told us here that there are/were
radio communications captured in the background of these
‘videos’ being made that day by the air guys. She even reported
that first “Musser calling Marsh” transmission in the background.
It would not surprise me at all if the rest of these ‘conversations’
being reported by author John Maclean are, in fact, also right
there in those air videos.
The supposition in the article (now) is that Marsh took a group
of sawyers with him circa 4:45 PM to ‘improve the route’ to
the ranch ( but still through the fuel-filled box canyon ).
The article also ‘supposes’ that Marsh ( and the sawyers? )
ended up all the way at the Boulder Springs Ranch and
there they were… circa 4:30… just waiting for the rest of GM
to ‘catch up’ and arrive at the ranch.
It’s possible ( Geez… if we haven’t learned anything by now
studying this thing… ANYTHING is possible ).
Some other ‘mysteries’ would actually be explained by this.
1) This DOES explain the roll of pink tape found by Tex Gilligan
at the top of the ridge. Marsh MAY have been ‘marking the
trail’ for GM if he was, indeed, AHEAD of them that day.
2) This could also better explain the mysterious ( calm )
transmission from Marsh about “That’s where we want retardant”
at 1637, 120 seconds before Steed’s first MAYDAY. If Marsh
really WAS already at the Boulder Springs Ranch, in that
clearing, then maybe he really did see that ‘line up flight’ of
ASM2’s and really was in a position to confirm that’s where a
drop should take place at that time.
My big question would then, of course, be… how in the hell did
Marsh and the sawyers he had with them also end up dying
at the deployment site?
The center of the deployment site was 638.33 yards (1,915 feet)
due west of the very outer perimeter of the Boulder Springs
Ranch.
If Marsh really wasn’t aware they were in any danger until he,
himself, heard Steed’s first MAYDAY circa 1639… yet he
( and others? ) still had time to RUN the 638 yards WEST to
where they were ( and then to die with them )…
…that that automatically means that even at 1639, when Steed
sent out they MAYDAY… Steed and the crew, themselves also
had that same ‘plenty of time’ to HAUL ASS due EAST towards
the ranch and make it all the way there in time.
It’s pretty much a given now that at least 2 saws can also
be heard already running right next to Steed when he even
makes his first MAYDAY call at 1639. That’s why Steed
is actually YELLING on that call.
If that is also true… and it means they had already spent some
time finding and getting to work on the deployment site BEFORE
Steed even sent out the MAYDAY… then that just adds even
lots MORE time to the time they needed to just take off running
due EAST and make it all the way to the ranch safely.
Either way this ends up going down ( Marsh straggling behind
them or Marsh already at the ranch and then running BACK
to them over 638 yards in 120 seconds )…
…something is still rotten in the kingdom of Denmark, here.
More to come on this… I’m sure.
Man, no kidding. This, to me, is a real frut-basket upset.
Thanks for being able to be analytical about this when I am just totally speechless.
It seems the ‘key’ to the whole ‘new scenario’ of
Marsh having ‘scouted ahead’ all the way to
the Boulder Springs Ranch is just based on
someone ( Maclean? Holly? ) thinking they hear
Marsh say…
” Nah I’m at the house where we’re gonna
jump out at.”
Well… what if what he really said was more like…
“Nah I’m here at the PLACE where we gonna
jump OFF at”.
What if Marsh simply went on ahead down
the two-track… and he was simply now standing
at the spot where they were going to ‘jump off
the two-track’ and drop into the canyon?
That changes the thinking about whether Marsh
was ‘ahead’ or ‘behind’ them prior to 4:20… but
it doesn’t put him all the way at the ranch where
he ( and some sawyers? ) would have had to
run BACK west over 630 yards in 120 seconds
just to die with them.
So it all comes down to what someone thinks
they have heard on some air-tapes that don’t
even seem to have been made public yet.
As we have seen/heard here ourselves already
with just the already-made-public stuff… hearing
every word on an accidentally captured ‘background’
transmissions is, indeed, a tricky thing.
The more ears the better.
She’s definitely basing her narrative about the sawyers going with him is based on Chris’ photo.
She comments there:
“Holly Neill on January 20, 2014 at 8:44 am said:
The reference to the MacKenzie photo is photo #0887 from the link that Bill posted to the Daily Courier website.”
Image 0854 and image 0876 from Mackenzie camera (one taken at Doce and One at Yarnell) appear to show Robert Caldwell wearing a Garmin GPS on his right shoulder strap.
Thoughts???
Calvin… you, sir, are a steely-eyed rocket man.
You are ABSOLUTELY RIGHT.
It’s a Garmin Oregon 450 handheld GPS unit.
( It says so right on the side of it with photo enhancement ).
See longer post below including tech specs on the Oregon 450.
RE Mystery Man photo
OK I need help here. I’m having WAY more trouble getting these photos correctly time-stamped. I just emailed Joy/Sonny and I’m also throwing it out to you big brains. This is eating up WAY more time than I have to feed it.
Here’s what I just wrote to Joy/Sonny:
“I’m having way more trouble than I thought I was gonna. Somethings not right. You said (or whatever, I looked at it, I think, but I can’t find it right now) that the camera said it was 1:55 AM (i.e. about 2AM to make things easier) when the cellphone said it was 2:33 PM. Did I get that right?
If that’s correct, I figure I need to move the time stamp about 12 hours and 30 minutes forward.
But, when I take that photo of Mystery Man, which says 3:29 AM and move it forward 12 and a half hours, it ends up at about 4 PM. Which can’t possibly be right.”
Any ideas among you alls?
If so, thanks bunches in advance!
PS I do think it has something to do with the helicopter. I may as well go ahead and say what I found with relative timing, not real timing.
Approximately one hour after Mystery Man was photographed with Eric at the top of a ridge (and I still haven’t had time to zoom way in and enhance and try to see MM in more detail), the yellow helicopter “N14HX” was photographed. About 20 minutes later the heli is photographed with a line hanging from it. A minute later it’s shot twice coming close into the ridgetop. A minute later it’s shot flying high with two things hanging down. A minute later Joy zooms way in so you can see the two things hanging down (which I don’t know what they are, but some of you all may).
15 minutes later, Joy photographs Eric walking down in the brush.
So that’s the relative story.
I also haven’t had time to compare the ridgetop with MM and the ridgetop with the helicopter. And I’m running out of time.
So, looks like I was looking at a wrong photo on that or something. We’re conversing now about another photo that could, with some of their help, be more useful for time-stamping this. Keep posted
That’s about right. I subtracted 1:55 from 14:33 and got 12:38.
So 12:38 is the amount of time you need to add to the camera time stamp. Or just 38 minutes, and change the AM/PM designator.
That would make a 3:29 am stamp, a picture taken at 16:07 (4:07 pm). Not sure what to make of that, myself. I thought Sonny and Joy were off the ridge by then.
we were OFF THE RIDGE by then, Sitta.
**
** THE NIHC LISTS PUBLIC CELL PHONE NUMBERS FOR
** ALMOST ALL HOTSHOT CREW STAFF… INCLUDING ERIC MARSH
Not only is/was the NIHC listing a cell phone number of (928) 237-0508 for
Eric Marsh as his primary contact number on their PUBLIC NIHC contact list…
…the NIHC also maintains another PUBLIC document that has that same cell
phone number for Marsh… as well as just about every other NIHC Hotshot
crew leader or boss.
It even has Brian Frisby’s cell phone number and the cell phone numbers
of other crew leaders that were in Yarnell that day like Globe Crew, etc.
THIS IS A PUBLIC DOCUMENT!
No secrets here. Anyone can just ‘Google’ it.
If anyone on this list doesn’t want these cell phone numbers being
published then you need to contact the National Interagency Hotshot Crew
organization.
Here it is…
http://gacc.nifc.gov/swcc/dispatch_logistics/dispatch/mobguide_non_secure/pdf_files/2013/8_Chapter_60_2013.pdf
Chapter 60
Crews, Overhead, and Specialty Positions
Position Code Listing of 1 Overhead Positions
For a complete list of all IQCS recognized position codes,
refer to the following Web site ( website address is listed )
Crews
Type I/Interagency Hotshot Crews
—————————————————————————————-
Crew Name, Unit, Superintendent, Cell Phone Number, Home Base
—————————————————————————————-
Black Mesa AZ-ASF Frank Auza (928) 245-8652 Overgaard, AZ 7
Blue Ridge AZ-COF Brian Frisby (928) 606-1026 Happy Jack, AZ 8
Carson NM-CAF Rich Sack (575) 741-0522 Taos, NM 9
Flagstaff AZ-COF Bill Kuche (928) 606-2438 Flagstaff, AZ 10
Fort Apache AZ-FTA Brian Quintero (928) 205-9459 Whiteriver, AZ 11
Geronimo AZ-SCA Julius Hostetler (928) 961-1451 San Carlos, AZ 12
Gila NM-GNF Dewey Rebbe (575) 574-0468 Reserve, NM 13
Globe AZ-TNF Mark Babieracki (970) 946-4800 Globe, AZ 14
Granite Mountain AZ-AZS Eric Marsh (928) 237-0508 Prescott, AZ 15
Ironwood AZ-AZS Greg Smith (520) 343-0718 Tucson, AZ 16
Mormon Lake AZ-COF Matt Caouette (928) 607-4166 Flagstaff, AZ 17
Mt. Taylor NM-CIF Cathleen Lowe (505) 401-1471 Grants, NM 18
Navajo AZ-NAA Johnson Benallie (928) 205-9989 Fort Defiance, AZ 19
Payson AZ-TNF Mike Schinstock (928) 595-0320 Payson, AZ 20
Pleasant Valley AZ-TNF Patrick Moore (602) 509-8021 Goldfield, AZ 21
Prescott AZ-PNF Darin Fisher (928) 713-1307 Prescott, AZ 22
Sacramento NM-LNF Matt Barone (575) 921-9266 Cloudcroft, NM 23
Santa Fe NM-SNF David Simpson (505) 231-4831 Santa Fe, NM 24
Silver City NM-GNF Pete Valenzuela (575) 313-2114 Silver City, NM 25
Smokey Bear NM-LNF Rich Dolphin (575) 937-4875 Ruidoso, NM 26
Zuni NM-ZUA Myron Sheche (505) 870-8892 Zuni, NM
etc…
etc…
Thx for this both of you. I’m probably not going to pursue it much more any time soon, because I woke up to a main water line break this morning and I’m trying to figure out the MM in Joy’s photo.
I have a question that, given everything else that’s going on in my life right now, my brain just isn’t answering and I think you can give me a quick and dirty faster that I can figure it out.
Joy’s cellphone says it’s 2:33 in the afternoon at the same time her camera says it’s 1:55 in the morning. How many hours and minutes is her camera off? Once I get that I can just plug it in and change the timestamps on her camera photos and sync it all.
BTW Her photos are all on JD’s dropbox now. So they can be downloaded. Much bigger and w/metadata,which I couldn’t do off of her Google + collection.
I think the helicopter clue may be key here, so thx WTKTT! I’ve got the relative times for the pix and I’m ready to write it up, but I want to get the right time stamps into it first.
Actually, I may have just answered my own question down below. Back to the emails to see if she sent me that picture or just told me about it.
And PS for Calvin. This is why I keep saying cellphones have accurate timestamps. Camera’s can easily be anywhere from as wildly off as Joy’s was, or somewhat off as Chris’s was. If you can somehow sync a camera photo to a cellphone photo, that will tell you which way and how far you need to go. Wedding photographers do that all the time when they forget to sync their who knows how many cameras–on which they’ll take thousands of photos–ahead of time. They’ll take a photo of the cellphone, and voila! They just plug that time into that pic and it and sync the rest in lightroom and that gets everything all nice and tidy really quick. That’s essentially what Joy did, thankfully!
Thanks Marti. I am inclined to believe the cell timestamp over the camera timestamp. From my first comments discussing the YHF, the images from Mackenzie camera 0885, 0886, and 0887 have seemed out of place to me.
And, I’ll just add, re Eric’s cellphone. That adds to the list of Impossibles. It is impossible that PFD had any reason to, if they found it, make sure it was returned to Eric’s family.
And another thought. That would also mean that Jesse Steed probably had a PFD-issued cellphone for “business” use, also?
As far as I remember having read, there are no statements indicating that anybody had any cellphone conversations with Jesse Steed. At least any statements by any living people. But only their cellphones/records would hold the answer to the question whether or not Eric and Jesse had any cellphone convos with each other.
Whether or not he used it that day, how likely do you ff’s think it would have been that he would have left his official PFD cellphone in a Buggy?
It is common that career dept.’s like Prescott will issue phones to supervisory line officers. So it is entirely possible that Steed and Marsh would of been issued dept. phones. On duty there would be no reason not to have the phones on them and turned on. It is a back up form of communications to the radio. Would not make sense that they would of been left in the crew vehicle’s. If you are issued a dept. phone and are on a call, your bosses are gonna be upset if they want to talk to you and cannot!
Calvin has also now discovered that
Robert Caldwell was carrying a Garmin
Oregon 450 handheld GPS unit that day
strapped right there to upper part of his
left front pack strap.
It appears this GPS unit might ALSO have
been ‘PFD issue’ since the pictures from
the Doce Fire show Jesse Steed wearing
it at that fire versus Robert Caldwell.
So where is that Garmin Oregon 450 now?
It could be just like Marsh’s cellphone.
If it was ‘PFD issue’ then PFD felt THEY
had every right to ‘pick it up’ and decide
what ( if anything ) to do with it then.
Maybe PFD just decided it was THEIR right
to decide if it should be ‘entered into
evidence’… or ( as is apparently the case ),
NOT ‘enter the evidence chain’.
On the lookout lessons learned—–For many years 60-80’s lookouts were minimum qualified Sector bosses with ICS they became Division Bosses.
Those were suggested and I think should be mandatory Minimum’s after this fire. A lookout fully experienced would have seen the fire behavior notified the crews and command and got people out of the way and into SZ. That is their job. They should be qualified to give orders when things turn critical.
Marti comment on the phone.
I worked as a Part time officer on a Sheriff’s department and a small City Police force. On both the County issued cell phones for the staff officers. Patrol Sargent’s, Captains etc.. On the small city all the full time officers (5) were issued Phones as well as the Fire chief. They were normally in sequence numbers. These would be an internal phone list also noted at the Dispatch office the City council might have the numbers as well as they would be paying for them and insuring they were only used for official business. Also local Sheriff and fire departments may have the list of contact numbers. Some one local might be able to get them.
**
** ERIC MARSH’S ( PUBLIC ) CELL NUMBER WAS
** HIS OFFICIAL GRANITE MOUNTAIN CONTACT NUMBER
Eric Marsh’s cell phone number is/was (928) 237-0508.
As of June 29, 2013, he was using it for his official (public)
contact number as Superintendent of the Granite Mountain
Hotshots.
In other words…
Eric Marsh’s cell phone number was being officially listed as
his primary contact number on the National Interagency Hotshot
Crew Contact list as of June 29, 2013.
You have to use an Internet ‘Wayback’ machine to see the NIHC
list as it was on June 29, 2013. They have updated there website
since the incident and there is no longer any current contact
information for the Granite Mountain Hotshots. All the NIHC has
there now ( today ) is a link to their website.
But here is exactly how the NIHC contact information for
Granite Mountain Hotshots looked on June 29, 2013…
Granite Mountain IHC
Prescott Fire Department
501 6th Street, Prescott AZ 86301
Duty location for crew: Prescott, AZ
Eric Marsh, Superintendent
Email Eric
(928) 237-0508 (Cell)
Jesse Steed, Captain
(928) 777-1707 (Office)
(928 928-777-2483 (Fax)
** WAYBACK
If you want to see the full page for yourself just click on the
link below. What is happening there is that you are using
an Internet WAYBACK machine ( as they are called ) to
look at the NIHC contact list page as it appeared ‘wayback’
on June 29, 2013…
https://web.archive.org/web/20130629015429/http://www.fs.fed.us/fire/people/hotshots/IHC_list.html
WTKTT You get on it fast.
Now can we get Willis number to see if there is a sequence.
I would say the number shown for Eric is a PFD assigned cell phone since it is public.
**
** YARNELL GAMBLE MOVIE CLIP
** NEW AUDIO TRACK WITH BACKGROUND NOISE REMOVED
I have posted a public video to YouTube that has the audio track from the Blue
Ridge Hotshot Mccord video entitle YARNELL_GABLE cleaned up and most
of the background noise has been REMOVED.
There is still a ‘siren’ going off under the ‘MysteryMan’s voice at the start of the
clip which is almost impossible to filter out but I believe it’s now easier to make
out what he is actually saying to Eric Marsh.
NOTE: The ‘high pitched’ beeps, squeaks and clicks are a by-product of one of
the ‘High Pass’ noise filters used to remove most of the background noise.
The full audio clip from the movie plays THREE times in succession in this
cleaned/filtered version.
YouTube Movie Title…
yarnell-gample-audio-cleaned-1
YouTube link…
http://youtu.be/Sd1mjVZk_2c
After listening a number of times to this ‘cleaned up’ audio track… I am actually
going to stand by my original translation of what is being said here.
Here is what I think is being said…
MysteryMan: Copy… uh… uh… come down and appreciate
if ya could come a little faster but you’ll figure it out.
Eric Marsh: Ah… they’re comin’ from the heel of the fire.
Brian Frisby: Structue Group core, Blue Ridge Hotshots, on TAC 1.
All ears on deck.
See what you hear/think now in this ‘cleaned up’ audio.
I can get a “come down” and a “but if” and thats about it. Marsh and Frisby are more clear, but I have better luck with the MM in the unfiltered version.
Thanks, jeff i.
Yea… MM is tough to hear.
Not sure I can filter out that siren underneath
him but I’ll give it a shot.
While spending a serious chunk of time today slowly re-reading through the very long thread of comments on the article in Wildfire Today about the release of the SAIR, and then needing to Google-search the term LODD, because I didn’t know what that meant, I found this article entitled “Why the Fire Service Should Avoid the Term “Line-of-Duty Death””
http://www.firefighternation.com/article/firefighter-safety-and-health/why-fire-service-should-avoid-term-line-duty-death
It really reverberated with me when I read it. I’ve been wondering for some time if the culture of glorifying risking death in wildland fire-fighting (ala Willis’ narrative of heroism) played a part in what happened on Yarnell Hill.
I would really appreciate it if wff folks would tell me what they think about this.
From the article:
Chief Alan Brunacini has noted why this tradition is problematic: “When the fire kills us, our department typically conducts a huge ritualistic funeral ceremony, engraves our name on the honor wall and makes us an eternal hero. Every LODD gets the same terminal ritual regardless if the firefighter was taking an appropriate risk to protect a savable life or was recreationally freelancing in a clearly defensive place. A Fire Chief would commit instant occupational suicide by saying that the reason everyone is here today in their dress blues is because the dearly departed failed to follow the department safety plan. Genuine bravery and terminal stupidity both get the same eulogy. Our young firefighters are motivated and inspired to attack even harder by the ceremonialization of our battleground deaths.”(3)
This culture has been noted among researchers as well. Drs. Kunadharaju, Smith and DeJoy, (2010) from the College of Public Health at the University of Georgia, studied 213 firefighter LODDs. They concluded that:
“Operating with too few resources, compromising certain roles and functions, skipping or short-changing operational steps and safeguards and relying on extreme individual efforts and heroics may reflect the cultural paradigm of firefighting. This should not be construed to be a culture of negligence or incompetence, but rather a culture of longstanding acceptance and tradition. Within many fire service organizations, these operational tenets may be accepted as ‘the way we do things.’ Moreover, this tolerance of risk may be reinforced both externally and internally through the positive public image of firefighters and firefighting and internally through the fire service’s own traditions and member socialization.”(4)
In my opinion glorifying afterwords, or “sugar coating” in the investigation, does nothing to prevent this from happening again. I think they (SAIR) needed to come out in and in as respectful way as they can, with no reading between the lines needed, and say the GM crew overhead made a fatal mistake. Once this is out in the open, then I think lessons can be learned, and work can get underway to prevent a similar tragedy in the future.
You are absolutely right Jeff i. And they could cover some of the 18 and specific 10 standard orders it isn’t very hard to check off. There were mistakes made not only GM but the whole fire.
Some of the survivors tore him a new one in the comments section, but I think his premise is correct. I’m not familiar with Burton Clark, but it sounds like he’s got a history of pushing for good changes (seat belt wearing, for example). I care more about actual lives saved than perpetuating romantic imagery, so I suppose this is a pretty easy one for me.
I think there is a little more grey area than he describes. For example, one survivor responds with her husband’s story: killed by another driver while responding to a call — neither heroic nor taking bad risks, just tragic and unlucky. Would you want to remove the expected, traditional status of the LODD funeral and memorial? That’s a tough one.
The easy part is recognizing that fire fighter deaths should receive a full, thorough investigation. No whitewash. No question about that.
Reply to calvin post on January 18, 2014 at 4:07 pm
>> calvin wrote…
>> Now we have the Mackenzie cell phone photos and I really cant
>> wait to hear your thoughts.
I have just now seen them. Amazing.
I had no idea there were 12 of them.
IMG_2734.JPG
This is the one I’ve been waiting for.
It is hard-time stamped and shows Robert Caldwell shooting his
video that captured OPS1 Abel telling DIVS A Marsh…
1) Keep ME informed ( of your situation and your whereabouts ).
2) Hunker and be safe ( in the black )
3) We’ll get some Air Support down there ASAP.
Looks like it was, in fact, 3:50 PM on the nose when Abel gave
Marsh those suggestions/directives/orders.
1550 ( 3:50 PM ) + 6 seconds.
NOTE: Keep in mind that if the SAIR times are correct about when
Brendan left his lookout post then he is still, theorectically, sitting right
down there on that pile of rocks right near the old-grader location in
the center of the photo… and still right in front of that charging wall
of flames. According to the SAIR… BR Supt Brian Frisby would not
even be picking him up from that ‘clear spot’ in the center of the
photo for even another 5 minutes yet. ( 1555 ).
Something is still not quite right about all that.
IMG_2734.JPG
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/3jgi0g1y6h0fgi3/DT2kuDEKht#lh:null-IMG_2734.JPG
Metadata ( partial )…
Camera: Apple iPhone 4S
Lens: 4.3 mm
Exposure: Auto exposure, Program AE, 1/219 sec, f/2.4, ISO 50
Flash: Off, Did not fire
Date: June 30, 2013 – 3:50:06 PM
File: 3,264 × 2,448 JPEG (8.0 megapixels)
Image compression: 89%
More to come ( about the MacKenzie iPhone photos ).
WTKTT,
GMHS Brendan was “theorectically, sitting right down there on that pile of rocks right near the old-grader location in the center of the photo… and still right in front of that charging wall of flames”
“Something is still not quite right about all that.”
Yes, kinda my point above. ALL DAY LONG, the GMHS had a MUCH BETTER vantage point, they could see it ALL below them AND had more experience to boot to make those necessary, based-on-experience judgement calls. Brendan (or whomever) set his trigger point WAY TOO CLOSE as far as I’m concerned. AND the GMHS overhead apparently did NOT warn him of the impending fire behavior they watched for quite a while, based on their experience, but instead let the 2-3 year WFF decide for himself and then approve of it?. “Okay, it’s cool …” THEY should have been telling HIM about his trigger point, NOT letting him decide.
To me, this suggests more of the ‘prior bad decisions with good outcomes’ attitude. Like, we’ve been through this before kinda thing and everything turned out okay then, so no big deal …. It also suggests a training issue, what with Brendan considering WTF DEPLOYMENT ZONES TWICE instead of using his head and his training to avoid his predicament. TIME was making the decision for him instead of him deciding what to do. That’s a bad predicament to be in under those circumstances.
I agree, something is not quite right about all of that.
I think every now and then I have inserted a ‘fact’ into
the Brendan discussions that, while it does not EXCUSE
anything such as everything you are talking about above…
I still think it has to be factored into why things were the
way they were circa 3:30 ish.
Brendan was still recovering from being SICK for the
previous 48 hours. I don’t think he was really up to
being there at all that day… and probably shouldn’t have
been… but unless they had a full 20 man contingent/roster
for the day they (GM) would have had to pass on the
contract, right?
I think sticking Brendan down BELOW them to act
as some kind of ‘lookout’ ( when it’s questionable
whether he was even qualified to be doing that )
was probably just to give him something to do since
by that time, in the 97 degree heat, he probably just
wasn’t up to the grunt work anymore up at the work spot.
There is no proof that Brendan was feeling really bad
again by about NOON… but I think that has to be
factored in as a possibility why they even sent him
down there to ‘sit on a rock’ in the first place.
All that being said… I agree with you.
Looking now at the MacKenzie cellphone photos and the
absolute timestamps covering this ‘leaving his lookout
position’ you HAVE to ask yourself…
…what the heck took so long?
What were they really thinking?
Are you telling me that the minute they knew the winds
were changing ( some time before the trigger point
was ever met ) the only plan to get Brendan out of there
was to just hope Frisby could make it there in time to
get him… when Frisby was actually working WAY over
in another area?
What if the Blue Ridge ATV had blown some tires or a
piston or two the moment before Brendan needed the
evac or even while Brian was headed out there?
I still think they should have made Tex Gilligan IC
that day. He knew it was time to “get the hell out of
there” 2 hours earlier… and he did just that… and
lived to tell the story.
Besides… am I still the only one who thinks it’s bizarre
that we can now see for ourselves what the fire was
doing down there at what is pretty much the same time
Marsh ( DIVS A ) called Frisby and actually asked him
to COME OUT THERE just for a ‘face-to-face’ meeting?
I still think that’s pretty unrealistic… and was a dangerous
request to even make when they both had radios to
talk about whatever it was Marsh wanted to talk about.
I think it’s pretty clear from all the photos and timestamps
we can now see that even if Frisby had picked up
Brendan and continued up to the ridge for this stupid
‘face-to-face’ wanted so bad… Then BOTH Frisby and
McDonough would have been ‘stuck’ up there along
with the 19. It would have been WAY too dangerous
for Frisby to even try to pump that ATV back down
that two-track again by the time this ‘meeting’ ended.
It’s like Marsh and Steed were staring right down at
what was happening most of that afternoon but it
simply wasn’t really registering in their brains what
the reality was… and was ABOUT to become.
WTKTT,
You only need 18 to accept an assignment, so they were plenty good even without Brendan.
You said “Then BOTH Frisby and McDonough would have been ‘stuck’ up there along with the 19. It would have been WAY too dangerous for Frisby to even try to pump that ATV back down that two-track again by the time this ‘meeting’ ended.”
NO PROBLEM because the GMHS were in perfectly good black remember. So, nobody would really be ‘stuck’ up there. It was a good place to be, because it was ‘WAY too dangerous down below’ ONLY if you had NO SZ. They had A LOT of good black up above,not just the GMHS SZ. Going to a SZ and hanging out in a SZ waiting for the fire behavior to pulse, is OKAY – it’s fighting fire.
I hear ya… but I’ll bet a sawbuck that is NOT
where Brian Frisby would have wanted to
get ‘stuck’ just because Marsh wanted to
have a ‘face-to-face’ about something at a
time when just about everyone else on the
fire ( except Marsh and Steed? ) had realized
it was already time to start evacuating.
I think the timing on the request itself is still
just very, very odd. Lacks awareness of
the unfolding reality… or something like that.
Caveat: Did not mean to suggest for
one moment that ‘evacuating’ ( back
to town ) was a good idea for
Marsh/Steed. Eastern edge… yes.
Western edge… just be safe in the
black and let the big dog eat for 50
minutes.
Ah… heck… you know what I
was trying to say.
WTKTT…. Does that mean image 2733 (p23 SAIR) is also taken at 1550 as the SAIR says? IF that is the case, image 0885, 0886 and 0887 from Mackenzie camera do not fit in with the times. Remember this ongoing discussion?
I know Sonny has been writing some of you but I wanted you all to know the update because we keep all in the loop—Mike Dudley replied to what ‘oh god’ meant and it was nothing but a kind reply; see:
Sat, Jan 18, 2014 at 4:21 PM
Hi Sonny,
I was just reacting to the constant influx of information that continues. On the other hand, it’s not a surprise with something of this scale. However, I appreciate being kept informed of new findings, it continues to add to our collective knowledge.
Thank you.
Mike Dudley
USDA Forest Service
==================
I thought this was information to show you all that there was no ill intent with his reply ‘oh god’—they must have a lot on their plate to have their normal work load than more incoming information on this fire. I really told Sonny due to my health I will peak one last time on this comment wall and there is enough of you here that has Sonny’s email if you ever have any future questions. Due to the SAIR having my personal information and receiving incoming odd text and phone calls; my number was disconnected today. There is no further contact information for me but you can always call Sonny at the 480# some of you have as well. I wish all the best in getting clarity on this fire. I shared all I can on the topic. Happy 2014 to all.
Hello to all, my name is David Turbyfill; I am the father of Travis, One of the Members of the Granite Mountain Hotshot Group Crew. 1st of all I would like to thank John Dougherty for digging hard on this incident that all of you have been voicing your concerns about. I also want you guys to know that I am extremely grateful to John, that he had access to this mountain of data from the Arizona Dept. of Forestry, and could have released this information prior to Christmas. I want you to know that I had asked for him to withhold this until after the New Year’s holiday to give the families time to have some expectation of privacy and normalcy. However, I am very happy that he has also made it public and have a public forum for people to both view the photographs, and debate the information related to the tragedy on Yarnell Hill.
Not that it really matters, but I do want all of you to know that Travis’ mother, Colleen and I are not part of the litigation in any way. We have chosen a different path to honor our son Travis, you could check out our Facebook page here, https://www.facebook.com/TravisTurbyfillWellnessFund
Of course we would love for all of you to like and support the organization that we have chosen to create.
And our work does not stop there. Going forward with plans to encourage our legislative delegation and from encouragement from the general public being outraged by the situation at Yarnell Hill. My goal is to have a legislative spending bill for multiyear strategy of allocating a billion dollars on new firefighter safety equipment and policy changes as it relates to the wildland firefighting community. This will be a monumental task, and take all of our efforts combined to do this.
Is taken me several hours of reading and trying to dig through all of the comments that of been put on since the 1st the year on this forum. There is a huge amount of great work that some of you have done and very thoughtful comments. I have noticed some of the very contentious banter that does but on between some of you as well. It has been very useful to see some of the information that some of the more informed folks about photography about the metadata information that is on the photos I applied your work in your information that you have a posted on this forum.
I think the thing that has gotten to me the most, is how much time all of you guys have spent some of you guys being either retired or X wildland firefighters in some of you also being current fire wildland firefighters. How much time that you guys have spent on trying to figure out what the crew was thinking what they were told and why that they did what they did. But the most glaring thing that I still find most amazing is that you guys have not come to the same conclusion I have is that the fire shelters were a 100% failure to the crew, regardless of how all the crew performed in their activities for that day. Whether or not they should of been where they were really should not have had they been given the radio command that no one has come up with, or a cell phone call to Eric to cause the crew to come off the black. The bottom line is, is the crew was proceeding to the Helms, Boulder Springs Ranch, this was part of the morning brief that was to be their escape route, “bombproof” was a term written about. I will tell all of you that it was somewhat haunting when it 1st came public, of the Blue Ridge helmet cam video with the GM IHC voice communications between air and ground. While it does not seem that that Eric or Jesse had any particular panic in their voices. It does seem clear that both air commanders and the incident command radio officers did not fully recognize the crew was in trouble. I am in full agreement with one of you that came up with the idea that the “MADAY” radio communications should be brought into play.
Is just been today that I was able to download the pictures from Elizabeth’s of the deployment site. While I have not seen the fire shelter and PPE photographs prior to Christmas, I had not seen the deployment site photos. So now I am trying to figure out exactly the position of my son as a relates to the deployment site photos, would appreciate any help that any of you might have on that.
I am sorry that I am a broken record, but I still say FIRE SHELTERS, FIRE SHELTERS, and FIRE SHELTERS.
I’ve always felt from the beginning, that there has been huge misjudgments and mistakes made by the fire management teams. From the time on Friday evening the decision was made that the fire was too difficult to get to, and the lack of a decisive aggressive attack on Saturday, June 29. You have to wonder about the decision-making process of officers that would put the incident command post to the northeast end of the fire to begin with, as a resident of this part of Arizona the normal airflow pattern is from a south westerly to northeast. For us Prescott residents this should be an easy observation, as you only have to think back to the DOCE fire which was only a week or so prior to the Yarnell fire, it quickly gobbled up nearly 8000 acres in one afternoon by high moving winds.
Also it doesn’t take a real rocket scientist to figure out driving down the highway that radio communication would be difficult from Peoples Valley to the ridge line that the crew worked on or any low-lying areas around them.
If you read through the report you will see on June 30, at around 9 AM the Incident Command Post was moved to Model Creek School in Peoples Valley. By 3 PM that same day incident command ordered the dozer be moved to the north end of the fire where the IC P was being threatened by fire at that time. This in itself could show the clear lack of understanding and judgment on the part of incident command of how the fire behavior could act in the area.
But even amongst all this management chaos, and there certainly was that by the fact of the escalation of the type of incident command structure that was being put in place at almost an hourly basis and the decision to move incident command from Yarnell fire station to Peoples Valley. It is absolutely imperative that management not make mistakes and handoffs of management operations from one team to the next.
As weather conditions changed that afternoon, in the fire change direction suddenly and unexpectedly, it should have been the utmost priority of the management team to assess, find, and aide if necessary, all the crews that were on the eastern flank of that fire. These things did not seem to happen from a management perspective.
Having said all this and I’ve said a lot, I have some concerns of the ADOSH findings, and citations. If the Arizona State Forestry Division is found guilty of these citations, it could have real negative impact on wildland firefighting operations throughout the US, and particularly Arizona. ADOSH cited Arizona State forestry not just for losing Granite Mountain Hotshots, but for endangering the lives of other wildland firefighters present at Yarnell fire. Four of incident commanders have to withdraw firefighters any time the wind blows a lot more homes will be lost because of it. Think about that statement and apply it to the DOCE fire.
David Turbyfill
Mr. Turbyfill,
Thank you for your input here, and for your work to help fire fighters in your son’s memory. I’m sorry that I never got to meet Travis. I think we would have found we have a lot of values in common. I deeply appreciate your efforts to improve safety, with PPE, awareness, and legislation.
I admit, I am one of those who were trained that fire shelters will only give you a flip of the coin chance, should all else fail. If their effectiveness can be improved, I think it’s an important area to research. However, I can’t help but wonder if the Canadians have it right, that fire fighters and their managers can rely too much on the shelters, and take risks they shouldn’t. I don’t have any answers, just my wildland background and bias.
I’ve also hoped that in the aftermath of Yarnell, there would be a cultural and financial shift back toward prevention and planning. That is, perhaps some of the cut fuels positions, crews, and funding could be reinstated. Initial attack would be more aggressive, and we’d our work on the ground earlier in the day. Also, that more emphasis would be placed on homeowners taking responsibility for fuel reduction. Maybe insurance companies offering more firewise support.
We are all working toward the goals of safer fire fighters and citizens. Thank you for reminding us who we are here for, and for offering your perspective, and for your activism. I have a feeling that your heart already tells you all you need to know about what Travis would want you to do. If I were your child, I would be incredibly proud. We may not agree on every point. But I’m impressed with what you’ve done with head, heart, and hard work.
I am so deeply grateful that you posted this here. It’s getting really late here in Albuquerque, and I’m really getting sleepy. So this is gonna be a bit briefer than i might post more about some time tomorrow. But I want to respond to you now.
I caught, and posted here , when that Facebook page posted the JD article about how GMHS were asked to go protect the structures in Yarnell, and there were a number of comments, including yours, to the effect of realizing that “we have to get organized” to push for a real accident investigation. And I thought to myself, “No kidding! I hope somebody there is watching this conversation we are having here.” I really think that is the case. And I knew you had posted some comments here in the past and really hoped you, and maybe others, were reading what we are trying to do here.
I’m the one who spent a number of weeks during the holiday season looking at all the YCSO photos of the SAIT investigation of the Deployment Site. I’m the one who reported here about how they did it. I did it because, as a photographer, I first noticed, via the SAIT photograph posted on this site, Christopher MacKenzie’s camera sitting right there in full view. I wanted to know, “What happened to that camera?” So I researched that site via the photographs, and researched what happened to that camera, and documented how the Prescott Fire Department removed that camera from the site, and constructed an elaborate process of returning that camera to Chris’s father while keeping it out of the chain of evidence.
I was, frankly, shocked by the implications of that,
You are asking where your son’s body/shelter is on the photographs. I know this site, via the photographs, probably better than anybody.
I believe your son’s shelter is number 2 in the photographs. I found it quite difficult to absolutely line up the photographs with the body maps. I now think that may be because the helicopter probably may have blown things around. But the CLOSEST I could come was to connect your son’s location on the Body Map with shelter 2. It could also be shelter 3, but I think that’s less probable. But I still could be wrong.
That’s why it frustrates me no end that the SAIT never published a map of the Deployment Site, and I’ve asked periodically how that could be.
JD has posted, among his FOIA collection, a collection of photographs of the shelters. When I first looked at those photos, I didn’t download them because they didn’t include much of anything that identified them with whose shelters they are. I just discovered this evening that he also included a file that identifies them more closely. I haven’t had time to look at that file, and get a bead on this.
If this had been my daughter, who is about the same age as your son, I would also want to know what you want to know. I have come to believe that that the Forest Service, in its somewhat understandable desire to not “pin the blame on anyone” has undercut what it needs to do by making this SAIR not really an investigation. There is NO real investigation of this disaster. I think this is a significant problem that, unfortunately, only the lawsuits, IF they are not settled by the families for dollars, have any chance at all of uncovering the truth of what really happened and why it happened.
Thank you so much for visiting here, reading our comments, and posting. You are exactly who I believe we need to have reading us, paying attention to what we are writing here, and using what we are trying to offer people like you.
My heartfelt sympathies to you on the tragic, and preventable (in many ways) loss of your son. And thank you for making that loss a motivation for trying to change things to make thing less dangerous for all those who go out there with the purpose of corralling wildfires in our great Southwest before they do more damage than they would do otherwise.
Namaste
David God Bless you.
The Fire shelters will never be the whole answer but the need to be improved as has been stated over and over. The R5 California FS safety FIRST program in 1972 stated that the Fire shelters needed improvement the first improvement was almost 20 years later. That’s what they had in 2013 with very little change in the heat they can withstand.
If you need any help let me know and I’ll do what I can.
Reply to Bob Powers on January 17, 2014 at 2:13 pm said:
>> Mr. Powers said…
>>
>> While you may not believe this the SAIT had a non accusatory investigation.
>>
>> They were not looking for actions responsible for the fatality information
>> gathering.
That may have been how they ultimately decided to conduct their investigation
but that is NOT what even they, themselves, said they were going to do even
in their OWN (initial) press releases.
I suppose that’s why people were so mad when the report came out.
It may have ( ultimately ) just been written according to this ‘learning’ approach
thing… but it was NOT what they had actually PROMISED they were going to
do even in their own initial press releases.
From official press release(s) announcing the start of the “Special Accident
Investigation”… just days after the tragedy…
** PRESCOTT NEWS ( full text below )
“We are confident that the investigative team will find lessons to be learned
from this tragedy,”
“We have a responsibility to those lost and their loved ones, as well as to
current and future wildland firefighters, to understand what happened
as COMPLETELY AS POSSIBLE.”
** ASSOCIATED PRESS ( full text below )
PRESCOTT — Investigators from across the U.S. poured into the mountain town
of Yarnell on Tuesday to figure out why 19 elite firefighters perished in an
out-of-control wildfire and whether human error played a role in the tragedy.
A team of fire officials drawn from across the country by Atlanta NIMO,
or National Incident Management Organization, arrived in the area Tuesday
to find out EXACTLY WHAT WENT WRONG.
** DETAILS…
** PRESCOTT NEWS
The full text of one of the official press annoucement from the SAIT itself
about ‘what they were assembled to do’…
NOTE: Notice how they were sure to be affirming the inclusion of Arizona ADOSH
on the SAIT team only just long enough for them to appear in the public press
releases… and THEN ( 48 hours later ) they ‘kicked them off the investigation’.
Prescott News…
Wednesday, 03 July 2013 11:34
Yarnell Hill Fire Investigation Begins
http://www.prescottenews.com/index.php/news/current-news/item/21903-yarnell-hill-fire-investigation-begins
PHOENIX, Ariz. – An official investigation into the deaths of 19 Granite Mountain
Hotshots killed June 30 in the Yarnell Hill Fire began yesterday.
The independent investigation will be led by Florida State Forester Jim Karels.
Mike Dudley, Acting Director of Cooperative Forestry for the USDA Forest
Service, will be the secondary team lead.
Other entities participating in the investigation include the U.S. Forest Service
Missoula Technology and Development Center, the Missoula Fire Department,
and the Bureau of Land Management, and Arizona Division of Occupational Safety
and Health. Team members are technical specialist and fire behavior analysts.
The local liaisons to the nine-member Yarnell Hill Investigation Team are Arizona
State Forester Scott Hunt and Prescott Fire Chief Dan Fraijo.
The last of the team members arrived in Phoenix on Tuesday for an in-briefing
from the Arizona State Forester.
As part of the investigation, the team will review Sunday’s weather conditions,
fire department records, radio logs and any other evidence that may help
determine how to prevent a similar tragedy in the future.
“We are confident that the investigative team will find lessons to be learned
from this tragedy,” Hunt said. “We have a responsibility to those lost and
their loved ones, as well as to current and future wildland firefighters, to
understand what happened as completely as possible.”
The team will release updates from its investigation later this week.
** ASSOCIATED PRESS
Investigation of possible human error underway in Yarnell
Posted: Monday, July 1, 2013 11:26 pm
Updated: 7:53 am, Tue Jul 9, 2013.
The Associated Press
PRESCOTT — Investigators from across the U.S. poured into the mountain town
of Yarnell on Tuesday to figure out why 19 elite firefighters perished in an
out-of-control wildfire and whether human error played a role in the tragedy.
The monthslong investigation into the nation’s biggest loss of firefighters
since 9/11 will look at whether the Hotshot crew paid attention to the
forecast, created an escape route and took other precautions developed
after a similar disaster in Colorado nearly two decades ago.
A team of fire officials drawn from across the country by Atlanta NIMO,
or National Incident Management Organization, arrived in the area Tuesday
to find out EXACTLY WHAT WENT WRONG.
Copy.
**
** ABC NEWS INTERVIEW WITH BRENDAN MCDONOUGH
Reply to calvin post on January 12, 2014 at 9:48 pm
>> WTKTT said…
>>
>> Darrell Willis gave an on-camera interview at some point where he talked
>> about how ‘excited’ they ( GM ) were to be working that day because of the
>> ‘overtime’ they were going to be making.
>>
>> calvin said…
>>
>> Could you provide a link for this interview ( with Darrell Willis )? I saw it once
>> (almost certain) and have never been able to find it again. Thanks
It was part of the ABC News ( Brian Ross ) exclusive interview with Brendan
McDonough that originally aired August 7, 2013.
It’s also the interview where Brian Ross asked McDonough to talk about
and/or comment on the ‘decisons’ made circa 4:00 PM by Marsh and Steed
and Brendan totally dodged the question.
ABC News Exclusive: Sole Survivor of Arizona Hotshot Firefighting
Tragedy Asks Why Not Me?
By BRIAN ROSS, JAMES GORDON MEEK and CINDY GALLI
Originally aired August 7, 2013
http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/brendan-mcdonough-sole-survivor-arizona-hotshot-firefighting-tragedy/story?id=19881553&singlePage=true
+2:12
Brian Ross: ( Narrating )
Their chief, Darrell Willis, says the team was up to the task.
Darrell Willis: ( on-camera, leaning on a fence )
At 6 o’clock in the morning I got a call from the crew.
They’re all excited. Ya know. They’re goin’ to a fire…
uh… it’s their day off… and they’re EXCITED about
workin’ on their day off ‘cus their gonna make some overtime.
+3:15
Brendan McDonough:
At that point I could see the fire already…
instead of moving north, it started moving south.
Brian Ross: Towards you?
Brendan McDonough:
Yea. Instead of BACKING towards us… it was starting to become a head.
Brian Ross: Racing towards you?
Brendan McDonough: Yes.
Brian Ross: So they could see it as well?
Brendan McDonough:
Um hmm… Yes sir.
And… they said… If you need to get outta there… go ahead and get outta there.
We can see what’s goin’ on… we want you to be safe, too, ya know.
I just wanted to keep it short and simple.
If you need anything… call me. I’m on the other end of the fire.
If ya… whatever you need… I’m here… the buggies are parked.
He said “Ok… see ya soon.”
Brian Ross: Who was that?
Brendan McDonough:
Ah… Jesse Steed. My Captain.
He said “Allright… I’ll see ya soon”.
I said “Ok”.
Brian Ross: So when you said “I’m at my trigger point… I’m going… ah?”.
Brendan McDonough: Yea… they could see me getting off my rock. Yea.
Brian Ross: Should THEY have left then, too?
Brendan McDonough:
( Pause )
( McDonough sighs, leans back and clasps both his hands behind his head ).
That’s not something…
( Another pause)
That’s not my decision.
Brian Ross: Do you wonder about that?
Brendan McDonough:
Nah. I never question the decisions they made.
I never questioned ’em before… why should I question ’em now.
It’s not their fault. It wasn’t a bad decision.
…
…
Brian Ross: Do you torment yourself and think… I wish I had done this… or this? Something you could have done?
Brendan McDonough:
There’s nothing I could have done besides have been up on the hill with them.
Had someone else been in my position.
To have been with them and died in my boots with ’em.
There’s nothing else I coulda done.
I did everything that was expected of me.
WTKTT….. thanks… I really cannot express how grateful I am for all of your work.
I was interested in Willis’s description of the crews excitement the crew expressed to be working “overtime” and how they were enthused, like he actually talked to them that morning or something.
Now we have the Mackenzie cell phone photos and I really cant wait to hear your thoughts.
Even in that interview… Willis is sort of ‘making things up’.
He did NOT ‘talk with the crew’ that morning. He is
describing the “We’ve got to get an anchor on this thing”
conversation he says he had only with Eric Marsh at
6:00 AM that morning. At 6:00 AM… Eric was already
just outside of Prescott and headed south on Highway
89 towards Yarnell… so that conversation was most
assuredly on the cell phone that Eric most assuredly
had with him all day that day.
I am with you.
WHERE is Eric Marsh’s cellphone now?
Even if it was left there in the dirt by an incompetent
bunch of people like other personal effects ( watch,
sunglasses, etc. )… the area is still closed to the public
as it has been ever since the incident and it should be
able to be FOUND.
PS: Check your gmail.
My question at this point is, WHO. if anybody, is RESPONSIBLE for finding these things out?
If the YCSO is only responsible for determining whether there was any “foul play” (which they determined there was not), and the SAIT was responsible for creating a narrative which was designed to not lay blame to anybody but only to have a conversation, it seems to me there is a HUGE gap here.
I can’t figure out for the life of me, who is actually RESPONSIBLE for providing the evidence of what actually happened? Including what was on Eric’s cellphone, what were the radio communications, what was the “conversation about the options,” and who knows what else?
“WHATEVER” seems the modus operandi here.
The Forest Service needs to totally re-think its whole approach to catastrophes, in my humble opinion.
WTKTT,
After reading this, I’m compelled to rant for a bit here.
Brendan’s comment regarding a radio tx between him and GMHS: “We can see what’s goin’ on… we want you to be safe, too, ya know.”
Okay, so WHY do they still leave Brendan hanging out down there if that’s the case. They had a much better view of the fire then he did, they were done with their handline, there was no need to leave him there.
Narrator “Brian Ross: Should THEY have left then, too?” (EMPHASIS ADDED) No, dumb-ass, they’re in really good black, much better than I was (GMHS lookout Brendan). That’s kinda what Brendan should have told him.
Brendan waffles, “not my decision … I NEVER question the decisions they made. I NEVER questioned ‘em before… why should I question ‘em now.” (EMPHASIS ADDED). NOT questionning an order, especially the one to move and leave their SZ should have been questionned by SOMEONE; at a bare minimum, how about, why are we leaving our perfectly good SZ without posting a lookout?
NEVER question? Sounds to me like the GMHS trained their people to be sheeple based on these answers.
Brendan then says “It’s NOT their fault. It WASN’T a bad decision.” REALLY? WTF is that supposed to mean? WHOSE fault is it then? IT DIDN’T JUST HAPPEN, NOBODY forced them or made them do what they did. It was THEIR action(s) and decision, NOBODY ELSE’S, to leave the perfectly good black SZ during adverse weather and intense fire behavior resulted in their deaths. Notwithstanding miscalculating the fire’s ROS, direction, intensity, WHATEVER, it was a BAD DECISION WITH A BAD OUTCOME! AND it was not probability that killed them.
Brendan McDonough the says: “There’s NOTHING I could have done besides have been up on the hill with them.” (EMPHASIS ADDED). NOTHING? Frisby said he had to tell the kid TWICE to get in the UTV because he wanted to hike up there to tie in with his Crew. See above for what could have been said, besides nothing.
Brendan further said “To have been with them and died in my boots with ‘em. There’s nothing else I coulda done.” REALLY? NOTHING ELSE? How about speak up and say something based on your training maybe.
And finally, he said, “I did everything that was expected of me.” REALLY? EVERYTHING? To me, this also suggests Groupthink. Is this what the GMHS EXPECTED of their WFF? Is that all, to obey blindly, without question? This actually mirrors a lot of what PFD Wildland Chief Willis said at the deployment site news conference, that he would have followed them “blindly,” that he “would have been right there with them.”
This type of folderol and nonsense is NOT how you keep your WFF’s alive and safe. This IS and was very dangerous to think and talk like that and have that attitude toward a job – wildland firefighting – that is “inherently dangerous.”
RTS… thank you.
You have to remember what the ‘atmosphere’ was like
on August 7, 2013. The SAIR had just come out. The
world was simply told 19 good men died just because
there were some kind of radio problems that day.
Ah. Ok. Explanation provided. They should fix that.
End of story.
Brendan had been given ‘permission’ ( he had his own
personal attorney by then ) to do interviews but its also
perfectly obvious what his ‘guidelines’ were from his
attorney for any/all public interviews. Talk about where
you were and what you did… but say NOTHING about
what you might have heard over a radio and certainly
say NOTHING about any ‘decisions’ that were made that
afternoon.
SAIR was out… but ADOSH was still ‘at work’.
I’m with you. I still think there are PLENTY of things this
20th member of that Hotshot team could have done
after he left his lookout post. The fact that none of those
things occurred to him seems to confirm what other
WFF folks have already said…. was that he was
‘too green’, too ‘inexperienced’ and/or ( most importantly )
‘too timid’ to have thought of those things or followed
through on them.
The fact that he had all the vehicles now and was the
one responsible for matching them back up to the crew
was reason enough to make much of an effort to be
FULLY aware of EXACTLY what their plans were…
which way they were coming… and what could he do to
try and be sure they got mobile again wherever it was they
were going to arrive.
The fact that ( in his own words ) he was ‘on the other
end of the fire’ and could see how it was moving MUCH
faster than ANYONE expected even 30 minutes before
hand… but felt no need to make sure his ‘brothers’
knew that as well is… well… just rather odd, I think.
“I wanted to just keep it short and simple”.
No… I think it was more than that. He was too green and
too timid to tie up the radio with any QUESTIONS of
his own… no matter how important the answers were
that day given the situation he was witnessing himself
on the east end of the fire.
He thought someone might get ‘mad at him’ if he
inserted himself into any conversations. He didn’t
‘think it was his place’ to do that.
Does anyone think if it had been Steed that accidentally
got separated from ‘his brothers’ that Jesse would have
been content to just sit right next to a radio and wait
for someone to ‘tell him something’? No way. Jesse
would have been all over that… finding out EXACTLY
what the crew’s plans were ‘out there’ and where he
needed to anticipate them arriving so he could meet them.
So I think you are right. The situation with Brendan even
believing “there’s nothing else I coulda done” belies some
real training and/or culture issues on the part of the GM
program.
Have to stop here.
Like you… just thinking once again about all the things
that probably SHOULD have happened that afternoon
but just damn didn’t ( like even ASM2 actually volunteering
to go verify where they were at a crucial moment and
being told ‘Ah… don’t worry about it’ ) is pissing me off
all over again.
If this entire Yarnell incident ( all 3 days ) really is the way
people ( at all levels ) behave on Wildland fires I don’t know
why we aren’t carting bodies off the field EVERY single fire
season.
WTKTT,
“like even ASM2 actually volunteering to go verify where they were at a crucial moment and being told ‘Ah… don’t worry about it’ ”
THEY WERE IN A PERFECTLY GOOD SZ. EVERYONE KNEW IT, EVEN THE GUYS IN THE HELMET CAM VIDEO CLIP KNEW IT, THEY ALL KNEW IT. OPS knew it and wasn’t concerned because no experienced WFF, much less a HS Crew, was going to be wandering around in the unburned during that kind of fire behavior ….
Air support, tankers, helicopters, whatever, was NOT going to save them. And besides, it’s NOT their responsibility. It’s the supervisor and FF on the ground at the time that is responsible, following ‘The Rules.’
Absolutely.
Unless something in that conversation about their options, which for whatever mysterious reason just seems, for whatever mysterious reason, rather impossible to publicly document, shifted their brains from “no we are staying in the black,” as ordered/suggested by their superior on this fire, to getting up and moving out on a path that everybody, everywhere, understands as being the stupidest path ever chosen by a wildland fire-fighting team.
There’s a huge black hole in this, in my humble opinion. We are six and a half months into wondering what has been wondered from the very start of this. And if nobody has anything to hide, why are they hiding it?
You would think… that if Brendan and
Willis actually heard them say… “I
don’t care what OPS1 says… OPS2
wants our help… let’s go DO SOME
GOOD!”…
…that they would be ‘gagging’ to
publish that. It makes them look
( to some people ) even more
heroic than those same people
already assume they were.
The lawsuit results following that
kind of admission would be
another story, of course… but
something tells me that isn’t
all this reluctance to tell the
truth is all about.
Maybe it’s the fear of people
discovering the anti-hero.
Maybe the conversation was more
along the lines of “I don’t care if
Yarnell burns to the f**king ground
at this point… let’s just get out of
here and go home.” or something
like that.
It really, truly is a mystery that begs
to be solved.
Geez… I’m not going to go there again. Read
back on the thread if you really want my
opinion on that sort of ‘everyone knew it’
thing. ASM2 did NOT KNOW IT! The poor
guy just arrived on the fire… heard something
about a crew in a safety zone ( or headed
towards one, or something ) and he just
wanted to go check on them. That’s all.
It was a simple request. If he had been
allowed to fulfill it… those men would
probably be with us today. That’s all I
have ever been trying to say about that.
WTKTT,
“‘ASM2 did NOT KNOW IT! … heard something about a crew in a safety zone ( or headed towards one, or something ) and he just wanted to go CHECK ON THEM. That’s all.
It was a simple request. IF HE HAD BEEN ALLOWED TO FULFILL IT … THESE MEN WOULD BE WITH US TODAY.” (emphasis added)
So, it seems you make a bit of a leap here, from ‘checking on them’ to actually saving them. How was it again the ASM2 was going to make a difference or save these guys?
I have a hard time getting the idea that Brendan is REFUSING to answer details about the options conversation from this transcript. I think what he is doing is refusing to second guess the decision, and he is doing this out of respect for his brothers.
Reply to Joy A Collura post on January 17, 2014 at 4:48 pm
>> On January 17, 2014 at 12:34 pm, WantsToKnowTheTruth asked…
>>
>> Joy… A quick question for you…
>>
>> Do you know who actually OWNS the “Double Bar A Ranch” up in
>> Peeples valley? It used to be called the ‘Hays Ranch’ but changed
>> hands in a ‘brokered deal’ circa 2009.
>>
>> Joy Collura responded…
>>
>> Been years since I was up to date so by going on thought… little over a
>> million for appx 150+ acres; Dunlap family from Paradise Valley…
>>
>> …but maybe if you call Christina Cooper the local Yarnell librarian she can
>> better assist this as she has patrons in all the time that CAN answer this
>> (928) 427-3191 or google county assessor and go that route or Buford I
>> mentioned on here knows a lot of people there in Yarnell.
Thank you again, Joy!
That seems to be exactly it. The Dunlaps ( Charles and Barbara ).
** PUBLIC INFORMATION
** Double Bar A Ranch Real Estate Transaction Listing
http://www.zillow.com/homedetails/18000-W-Double-Bar-A-Ranch-R-AZ/8751286_zpid/
PUBLIC ZILLOW Real Estate listing…
18000 W Double Bar A Ranch R, , AZ
Not for Sale
Zestimate: $1,096,895
Rent Zestimate: $2,477/mo
Est. Refi Payment: $4,304/mo
Bedrooms:Contact for details
Bathrooms:Contact for details
Single Family:2,765 sq ft
Lot:153 acres
Year Built:1980
Last Sold:Aug 2009 for $1,100,000
Heating Type:Contact for details
Description…
This is a 2765 square foot, single family home.
It is located at 18000 W DOUBLE BAR A RANCH R , Arizona.
Notes…
18000 W Double Bar A Ranch R, , AZ, is a single family home
of 2,765 sqft on a lot of 6,664,680 sqft (or 153.00 acres). Zillow’s
Zestimate® for 18000 W Double Bar A Ranch R is $1,096,895 and
the Rent Zestimate® is $2,477/mo. This single family home was
built in 1980. Glen Ilah is a nearby neighborhood. The closest ZIP
codes are 86320 and 85362. Packer, Lehman Mill, and Humbug
are the nearest cities.
Purchasers…
Dunlap, Mr. Charles H.
Dunlap, Mrs. Charles H. (Barbara Baur);
Double Bar A Ranch, P.O. Box 338, Yarnell, AZ 85362
** PUBLIC INFORMATION
** Arizona Department of Agriculture – Registered Cattle Brands – 2013
http://www.azda.gov/Docs/BrandsBook2013.pdf
Arizona Cattle Brand#,Owner, Page, Pos.
07899, DOUBLE BAR A LIVESTOCK COMPANY, 266, 7
Details on Arizona Cattle Brand# 07899
07899
DOUBLE BAR A LIVESTOCK COMPANY
P O BOX 338, YARNELL, AZ 85362
H: RS C: RS
Ears: NO
Brand is an EQUALS SIGN over CAPITAL LETTER ‘A’.
** PUBLIC INFORMATION
** FOR CHARLES H. DUNLAP OF PEEPLES VALLEY, ARIZONA
9. DUNLAP, CHARLES H (Age 69)
Associated names and/or aliases…
DUNLAP, CHARLES
DUNLAP, CHARLES HUGH
DUNLAP, CHARLES III
Possible Employment / Business Associations:
DOUBLE BAR A LIVESTOCK COMPANY, INC
DOUBLE BAR A LIVESTOCK COMPANY, INC
CHARLES DUNLAP & COMPANY, INC
CHARLES DUNLAP & COMPANY, INC
CHARLES DUNLAP & COMPANY, INC
CHARLES DUNLAP & COMPANY, INC
BCG HOMES INC
DAWN DEVELOPMENT, INC
Previous places of residence… ( 4 available )…
PARADISE VLY, AZ
CHANDLER, AZ
PARADISE VALLEY, AZ
PHOENIX, AZ
SCOTTSDALE, AZ
Possible Relatives:
DUNLAP, HOLLY NOLAND (Age 41)
DUNLAP, BARBARA BAUR (Age 67)
SNYDERDUNLAP, ROBINS
TRDUNLAP, LIV
DUNLAPSNYDER, ROBIN S
Possible Other Relatives and/or Business Associates:
KEPLINGER, JEAN PATTERSON (Age 81)
DUNLAP, ROBIN SKILES (Age 45)
DUNLAP, LILY C (Age 37)
DUNLAP, JOHN T (Age 63)
DUNLAP, MOLLY (Age 44)
Wow. I only know what I know because I may hike the highways at times but I am strictly the desert walker and so I have to know my areas out there so when I want to explore “new” areas outside Congress, I search for what is private, state and BLM and than I go asking for my written permission papers to cross those private lands as I am always up-to-date on my other permits always. Wow, there it goes to show you—top notch memory—I love when I think I am not sure becomes a certainty—thank you for the update of looking into it.
No… thank YOU again, Joy.
The real-estate transaction was ‘brokered’ ( third party )
so until I had an idea of a name it was not easy to match
the real-estate deal with the purchasers. Thanks.
There is still quite a mystery surrounding certain activities
up there at the “Double Bar A Ranch” that day.
The biggest one, really, is how we got from Darrell Willis
doing structure protection assessments overnight up
in that area and making notes that the “Double Bar A
Ranch” was ‘not defensible’…
…to massive resources being used to try to ‘defend’
it early the next morning ( 30+ firefighters + multiple
engines ).
In the end… Darrell Willis was right… the vegetation was
too thick, too tall, and too close to the structures for the
site to be ‘defensible’… and the ranch was lost… but
that still doesn’t explain WHO decided to spend all
those resources trying to save it when Willis himself,
who was in charge of that area, had decided the night
before that it would NOT be worth it.
Regarding Eric Marsh’s Cellphone
“When you have eliminated the impossible…whatever remains…however improbable…must be the truth” –WTKTE
Impossible
* It just disappeared into the ozone
* He didn’t have one.
* He didn’t use one.
* He was borrowing one.
Possible, but he would have to have borrowed it all day, which is improbable.
Remains Probable
* He was using one, occasionally at least, all day
* He only used it for “business”
I read the GMHS Manual. There were very clear rules for using cellphones.
* He, thus, had one in his possession when he reached the site.
* He could have put it in his pack. Which I have no idea where that landed. However…
* He probably carried it in his shirt pocket. From other photo evidence, and makes sense in regards to availability.
* It was somewhere near him when he died.
* He did not “successfully” deploy.
* It was therefore on the Deployment Site that night.
Improbable that someone found it in the dark that night.
* It was therefore on the Deployment Site the next morning July 1.
See above.
* YCSO didn’t find it directly associated with his body July 1.
* Thusly YCSO didn’t remove it from the site July 1 and take it the Medical Examiners Office in Phoenix.
* Therefore, it would have been on the site until the time of the SAIT Investigation July 3, unless someone had spotted it and had the motive and ability to remove it between July 1 and July 3.
* During the SAIT investigation, it was never numbered and photographed (and neither was Chris MacKenzie’s Powershot Camera which was sitting between two numbered and photographed radios)
* During the SAIT investigation it was never photographed associated with any personal items that were numbered and photographed. (As also was not done with Chris MacKenzie’s camera, since apparently neither the YCSO or the SAIT saw it).
Unless it was the cellphone I noticed looking like a cellphone associated with a numbered and photographed radio associated with what I now think may have been a pack outside the Deployment Area. However that radio was not Eric Marsh’s. I think that cellphone must have been Clayton Witted’s, even tho it doesn’t fit the description PFD gave it as being “burned to a pack.” It wasn’t. It was just lying there.
* Thus, it was not removed from the site by the YCSO after the SAIT investigation.
* Thus it was never entered into “Evidence” by the YCSO.
*Thus, if it hadn’t been removed from the site previously, it must have been left on the site after the SAIT investigation. (As was Chris MacKenzie’s camera, which was picked up by PFD during their later clearing of the site, and never reported to the YCSO, and thus never entered into “Evidence.” And which PFD went to serious lengths to return to Chris MacKenzie’s father while keeping it out of the chain of evidence.)
* Eric’s cellphone has, even though it has been reported that he used one that day, not been reported as existing in this situation by SAIT, PFD or any other agency associated with this investigation.
* The site may have not been completely cleared. In an article (http://www.azcentral.com/news/arizona/articles/20131231yarnell-fire-warneke-baby-part2.html), dated January 2, 2014, on the http://www.azcentral.com website, it is written about Roxanne Warneke, wife of William Warneke:
“It had been two days since Roxanne had buried her husband.”
“She and her father had looked at a topographic map of the area, trying to understand what happened. But Roxanne wanted to go there, to see it for herself. Billy’s brothers, Fred and David; his sister, Melinda; his mother; and his great-aunt came, too.”
“She walked slowly, dragging the toe of her shoe across the ground, turning over the layers of blackened earth.
Tiny rivets.
A screw. A bolt.
A melted watch face.”
“Fred picked up a pair of melted sunglasses and showed them to Roxanne. She shook her head. No, those weren’t Billy’s. He wore black Oakleys.”
* Thus, Eric’s cellphone could have been smushed into the ground or something, and nobody saw it, and might even be there today.
* Or somebody could have seen it during all these days, or when PFD entered the site after the SAIT investigation, and decided to pick it up.
* PFD demonstrated factually that it was willing and capable of going to some lengths to suppress evidence (re. the whereabouts of Chris MacKenzies Canon Powershot camera), when it deemed it in their best interests to do so.
And so there you have my description of the impossible and the possible and whatever remains in the quest to determine the truth.
Late night typo.
WTKTE means WTKTT
Marti –A question
My thoughts were cell phones issued to certain supervisors like Marsh by PFD? There on call and would have PFD numbers to contact each other. The reason I am going there If the phone was found in the clean up like the camera and belonged to PFD they may have Just kept it. Just a little peace of the puzzle. If it was found and was Marsh’s it could have been given to his wife.
Or it may have not survived the Fire……
it truly does not matter if it survives or not-
I just learned from Diamond today who handed me to a Verizon tech kinda guy who knew I was inquiring if there is any possible records kept for my throw away phones from Verizon and guess what he walked me through today on all text, photo texts, incoming and outgoing calls for that 6-30-13 and a phone burnt or not—there IS trackable records for ALL calls and texts made with Verizon throw away phone or not. In our talk he also had to evacuate from a fire where he is from and he really helped me walk through that morning on any information that regarded my Verizon accounts SOOOO this could be done for ANY of the 19 men if it GIVES CLARITY as well as well as phone records to many other areas for that Yarnell fire including Model Creek phone system & etc. We over here strongly believe the phone records would give better clarity.
I hope one day more families do ask the phone company to do what I did today and get the important details to get clarity—
Thank you. I’m gonna get more back to this tomorrow.
That’s an interesting idea. I don’t know. That might have been the case that Eric was using a cellphone not owned by him, but by the PFD.
The GM Hotshots manual is very specific about “rules” for using cellphones. “Personal” usage of cellphones is only allowed during breaks and not during active fire work. There is nothing in their manual about using a cellphone for “professional” usage. I’ve been “assuming” Eric’s usage of a cellphone, whether or not it was “his” or not, and it looks like he was following that protocol during the day of June 30, was “professional,” not “personal.” But I hadn’t even contemplated the possibility that he was using a cellphone not owned by himself. I have no idea how to find out if the cellphone he was using was owned by the PFD or him.
If it was “owned” by PFD, it might make sense that, if they had found it on the site, they may have considered it “their property,” thus justifiably determined by them to do whatever they would decide to do with it.
And, as I have demonstrated, the PFD was willing and capable to withhold evidence.
If it wasn’t their cellphone, and they did find it and remove it from their site, I have no idea whether or not it was given back to Amanda Marsh. I really don’t know what was done with all these cellphones. I haven’t seen any documentation anywhere.
I just spent about an hour doing a google search to see if I could find anything about PFD issuing PFD cellphones. I haven’t found anything. I’m not sure how to go further from here.
It would be in the detailed budget documents
and red sheets for the Prescott Fire Department.
Public documents… but not currently online
at the Prescott Clerk’s office.
I actually really DOUBT that there would be
‘cellphones’, complete with voice and data
contracts, being ‘owned and issued’ by the
Prescott Fire Department.
It would be unusual.
It MIGHT have been part of Marsh’s personal
contract with PFD ( that they would pay for
his cellphone bills )… but I still think the phone
itself would be in HIS name with local carrier.
Gotcha.
In managing a similar program as PFD, we do provide Department cell phones to all supervisory members of our crews, complete with voice and data.
I would say that Jeff was the one that jumped when he should have looked a prior evidence. Brendan has stated he was in the supt. truck listening to the crew and heard the discussion to leave the black. but has not said what he heard. The pictures confirm the time he first got in the truck and the time he was in the truck. He was in a crew carrier at the at the parking lot probably the one he always road in. He was still listening to the radio. plus he had a portable. If your crew was out there you would be keeping up with them the whole time. He was waiting to find out what he needed to do with the trucks.
They were talking on the inter-crew and he heard everything. So what did he hear? is the question not weather he was listening.
What I was saying is “that a photograph is not proof that someone heard anything”. All it is proof of is ” that they where in the position to hear something”
How do you know he has not told all that he heard when he says he heard them discussing their options? Where is he refusing to say more?
I’ve changed my mind about you. Thank you for being here. Your contributions to this conversation are absolutely priceless.
He made the statements in the investigations and to the media but has said nothing else. Or the first investigation did not ask him for the rest of the story. It is some what confusing I agree and as I said the picture puts him in a place after the ATV ride soon enough to back the claim he made.
Reply to jeff i post on January 17, 2014 at 9:08 am
>> jeff i said…
>> What I was saying is “that a photograph is not proof
>> that someone heard anything”. All it is proof of is ”
>> that they where in the position to hear something”
You know what… you are RIGHT. Everyone has their own
ideas about what ‘convincing’ evidence is. In my profession
there are actually many, many levels above ‘absolute’ but
sometimes I forget that when speaking in public… so I
should be more careful when using that word.
The absolute ‘absolute’ proof in the 3 McDonough Highway
89 pictures can, in fact, simply be constrained to what you
and I have both said now. It is only ‘absolute’ proof that he
was in a perfect position to have heard everything he has
already told two sets of investigators he heard.
He was not outdoors and away from a radio.
He was not ‘going to the bathroom’.
He was sitting in a vehicle just driving along with a radio
that was tuned to the exact right channel and with
the volume turned way UP ( His own statements ).
Okay… that being said… moving on…
>> jeff i also said…
>> How do you know he has not told all that he heard
>> when he says he heard them discussing their
>> options?
Umm… because we probably wouldn’t even be here
trying to find out if he had ( or not )… if he had and
it was incorporated into the results of the investigation?
>> Where is he refusing to say more?
Please go watch Brendan’s multiple video interviews
following the release of the SAIR report. Watch what
happens when he is asked to say more about those
moments and the conversations that the SAIR already
says he heard. He refuses.
Your turn to answer a question…
Do you HONESTLY believe a bunch of highly paid
investigators verified that he heard his Supervisor and
his Captain ‘discussing their options’ about leaving
the ‘safe black’ that day…
…and then they simply ‘moved on’ without ASKING him
any other questions or pressing him for details?
Really?
Please be honest.
OK, I watched two videos and neither of them asked Brendan to elaborate on those moments, perhaps you know of one off the top of your head??
Since their are no transcripts of the interviews, only notes, its impossible to say what was asked and answered. Yes, I would assume that they would have delved into that, but maybe not. Or maybe he said he couldn’t recall the details and they left it at what they show in the notes. We don’t know. But if he had REFUSED to answer a question, I think they would have noted that.
While you may not believe this the SAIT had a non accusatory investigation they were not looking for actions responsible for the fatality information gathering. Also if Willis and Brendan had talked prior to the investigation and decided to pull the I don’t remember the radio conversation in any detail. Any thing is possible. The State investigation could have been more through but that also was hindered by refusals to make statements. So the facts are he said he heard the discussion to leave the black. He has not said what that discussion was and who was in it. He also had the opportunity to be listening to the crew as they came off the hill did he hear any thing? No one has asked him and he is not saying.
As an X investigator Deputy Sheriff that leaves a lot of questions I would like to ask that no body else did or was not recorded if they did.
The SAIT was charged with not finding fault and there for avoiding a lawsuit.
That’s why there is no violation of any thing an act of god weather and radio traffic everyone did everything right and 19 Fire Fighters DIED…….
And of course you know as well as I Brendan was “lawyered up” to the gills before he ever said anything to anybody.
Yes
Reply to jeff i post on January 16, 2014 at 5:05 pm
Re: Brendan McDonough’s Highway 89 photos circa 4:02 PM
>> jeff i wrote…
>>
>> How can a still photograph be as you said “absolute proof that
>> Brendan McDonough MUST have heard ALL the critical ‘discussing
>> their options’ and ‘comfort level’ discussions”?
>>
>> Maybe their was other radio traffic
>> Maybe the crew freq was set to low power
>> Maybe the FM radio was blasting Katie Perry
::: and Maybe Brendan McDonough lied to SAIT investigators?…
Page 24 of the SAIR…
BR Supt drops GM Lookout off at the Granite Mountain IHC Supt truck
at about 1555 and then heads around the corner to get some of his
crew to help move the Granite Mountain crew carriers. On the Granite
Mountain intra-crew frequency, GM Lookout hears DIVS A and GM Capt
talking about their options, whether to stay in the black or to come up
with a plan to move.
Page 42 of the SAIT investigation notes…
Blue Ridge Supt advised to Steed fire conditions and asks if they have
good black. Steed says yes they have good black and can see the fire.
Blue Ridge says they will move their trucks and have Brendan with them.
They got back to trucks seem a little more hurried at this point. Blue Ridge
supt is going to get some drivers. I (Brendan) started the truck, turned on the
AC and made sure the truck radios were on the right Channel and VOLUME UP.
::: and Maybe Brendan McDonough lied to the ADOSH investigators AND the
::: Wildland Firefighters Associates group specifically hired by Arizona ADOSH
::: to do their own investigation?…
Page 15 of ADOSH contracted Wildland Firefighters Associates Report (WFAR)
At 1555, fire was burning along the ridge north of Yarnell. The SPGS1 lost
use of an air-to-ground radio frequency, and communication was interrupted.
The BRIHC Superintendent dropped the GM Lookout off at the GMIHC
Superintendents truck. The GMIHC crew carriers were moved. On the GMIHC
intracrew frequency, GM Lookout heard the DIVS A and GMIHC Captain
discussing the options of whether to stay in the black or to move (Footnote 5).
Footnote (5) From ADOSH Interview with GM Lookout ( Brendan McDonough )
So YES… Brendan MUST have heard the conversations because he SAYS
he did ( unless you are saying you think he lied to all these investigators ).
Look… we left ‘absolute proof’ behind on this one a LOOONG time ago.
Brendan McDonough SAYS that he DID hear these crucial conversations.
The only mystery ( even now ) is WHAT he heard and WHY he refuses
to talk about it. What is he trying to hide? Who is he trying to protect?
With regards to the new photographic evidence showing (absolutely) WHERE
Brendan was when he ( by his own admission already ) heard these crucial
conversations… I would think I could have gone a few levels above adjectives
like ‘absolute’… whatever those might be.
>> At any rate a picture does not prove anyone heard anything.
Actually… sometimes it CAN. In this case… even without the photos
proving (absolutely) WHERE he was when he heard these conversations,
we’d have to start using a whole lot of other words in association with
his name to change phrases like “he absolutely heard the conversations.”
>> You should really slow down with the “absolute” tone you so often use.
>> Try the word “may” every once in a while.
Fair enough. I *may* consider doing that in the future when I am not really,
really, really pretty (absolutely) certain about what the evidence is telling me.
**
** THE BRENDAN MCDONOUGH HIGHWAY 89 PHOTOS
Now that we can finally see ALL of Brendan McDonough’s photos
and videos… here’s some breakdown on just the ones that
show him driving the GM Supervisor Truck ( by himself, alone )
north on Highway 89 at exactly 4:02 PM.
I am talking about just photos 19, 20, and 21 in this folder
Dropbox: Brendan McDonough Photos
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/mmb98r3j53s2urp/8NlvN5hDdm#/
These photos alone are pretty much absolute proof that
Brendan McDonough MUST have heard ALL the critical ‘discussing
their options’ and ‘comfort level’ discussions that took place
over the GM intra-crew frequency that afternoon.
He wasn’t outside anywhere. He wasn’t off going to the
bathroom. He was sitting RIGHT THERE in the GM Supervisor
truck, all by himself, and just listening to these conversations
over the onboard radio as they happened.
These ‘Highway 89’ photos ALSO prove that the witness who
saw him leaving the Sesame Area to the south through
Glen Ilah appears to be correct. Brendan did NOT wait for
the BR crew members to come get the Crew Carriers before
he left the Sesame area. He also did NOT ‘follow them over’
to the Shrine area via the cutover trail He left the Sesame area
by himself in the GM Supervisor Truck.
It is not clear where Brendan is actually GOING as he
travels north on Highway 89 at this point. It might be assumed
that he was headed over to the ‘yourth camp’ out west on
Shrine Road where Blue Ridge was ‘staging’ and from where
the BR Convoy would eventually leave… but there is still
no photographic evidence that the GM Supervisor Truck
ever made it over there or was part of the ‘Convoy’ that
left from there. If he really was headed there… then according
to the time on these photos, his location, and his very slow
rate of speed… by the time he got to the ‘youth camp’ Blue
Ridge would have been LEAVING that location already and
Frisby would have just told him to immediately turn around
and go back to the Ranch House Restaurant.
Brendan took THREE photos within 2 seconds of each other
starting at 4:02 PM + 4 seconds out of the driver’s side window
and looking northwest towards the Weaver Mountains and the exact
spot where GM had been working all day.
IMPORTANT: 4:02 PM is the exact time that Christopher
MacKenzie was shooting one of his videos out at the ‘resting spot’
up on the western ridge.
Again… there is NO DOUBT now about EXACTLY where Brendan
was, and what he was actually doing, at the exact moment
the ‘discussing their options’ and ‘comfort level’ discussions
were taking place over the GM intra-crew frequency.
Brendan was right here in the GM Supervisor truck, alone,
heading north on Highway 89 and hearing ALL of those
critical conversations over the onboard radio.
If Brendan had shot a ‘movie’ with his Samsung SCH-1535
instead of taking 3 still photos just seconds apart at
that point… we would probably have a video that either
captures the same radio traffic Christopher MacKenzie
did… OR we would have MORE of that radio traffic captured.
NOTE: Notice that Brendan’s Samsumg SCH-1535
stamps all the photo names like this…
YEAR + MONTH + DAY (underscore) HOUR + MIN + SEC
So there is actually no reason to go the trouble of extracting
the metadata to get the exact TIME. Its already in the name.
** Photo: 20130630_160204 ( 19 of 21 in Dropbox folder )
Metadata ( partial )…
Camera: Samsung SCH-I535
Lens: 3.7 mm (Max aperture f/2.6) (shot wide open)
Exposure: Auto exposure, Aperture-priority AE, 1/310 sec, f/2.6, ISO 80
Flash: none
Date: June 30, 2013 – 4:02:04 PM
File: 2,448 × 3,264 JPEG (8.0 megapixels)
Image compression: 93%
This is the first of three photos of him driving along on
Highway 89 ( alone? ) in the GM Supervisor Truck.
He took the picture while driving out the driver’s side
window looking almost due north towards the Weaver
Mountains where GM had been working all day.
He has (apparently) just exited the Sesame area via
Lakewood Drive in Glen Ilah… and took a left turn
off Lakewood onto Highway 89 and is now heading north
on Highway 89.
He is only about 100 feet south of where Fountainhill
Road meets Highway 89. He would have still been
able to see the Ranch House Restaurant in his
rear view mirror.
He is exactly here…
34.215760, -112.754336
** Photo: 20130630_160206 ( 20 of 21 in Dropbox folder )
Metadata ( partial )…
Camera: Samsung SCH-I535
Lens: 3.7 mm (Max aperture f/2.6) (shot wide open)
Exposure: Auto exposure, Aperture-priority AE, 1/241 sec, f/2.6, ISO 80
Flash: none
Date: June 30, 2013 – 4:02:06 PM
File: 2,448 × 3,264 JPEG (8.0 megapixels)
Image compression: 93%
This was taken just 2 seconds after the previous photo.
He is now at the exact point there Fountainhill Road
meets Highway 89 and still heading north.
He is now exactly here…
34.216033, -112.753974
He has only advanced 42 feet in 2 seconds which would
make his approximate rate of travel since taking the
first picture just 14.3 miles per hour.
** Photo: 20130630_160208 ( 21 of 21 in Dropbox folder )
Metadata ( partial )…
Camera: Samsung SCH-I535
Lens: 3.7 mm (Max aperture f/2.6) (shot wide open)
Exposure: Auto exposure, Aperture-priority AE, 1/219 sec, f/2.6, ISO 80
Flash: none
Date: June 30, 2013 – 4:02:08 PM
File: 2,448 × 3,264 JPEG (8.0 megapixels)
Image compression: 93%
This was (again) taken just 2 seconds after the previous photo.
He is now just beyond the point where Fountainhill Road
meets Highway 89. He is still heading north on Highway 89.
He is now exactly here…
34.216151, -112.753797
He has only traveled 210 feet since he took the first
picture in this sequence which makes his approximate
travel rate during the 6 seconds it took to take all
three of these pictures just 23.86 miles per hour.
WTKTT,
Thanks for the detalied info
How can a still photograph be as you said “absolute proof that
Brendan McDonough MUST have heard ALL the critical ‘discussing
their options’ and ‘comfort level’ discussions”?
Maybe their was other radio traffic
Maybe the crew freq was set to low power
Maybe the FM radio was blasting Katie Perry
At any rate a picture does not prove anyone heard anything. You should really slow down with the “absolute” tone you so often use. Try the word “may” every once in a while.
Reply to jeff i post on January 16, 2014 at 5:05 pm
>> Maybe their was other radio traffic
>> Maybe the crew freq was set to low power
>> Maybe the FM radio was blasting Katie Perry
And maybe someone who had just told both his Captain
and his Supervisor that he would be ‘standing by’
to hear from them and to just “Call me if you need
anything” and who was now solely responsible for the
Crew Vehicles and was going to need to hear at any
moment what he was supposed to do now and how he
would get the vehicles back together with his entire crew
just turned ALL the radios OFF and just popped in the
heavy metal CDs.
I really doubt it.
Don’t you?
I doubt it too, but why say “absolute” when you really can’t prove it? You would gain credibility if you had said “we have some proof that he may have heard”.
When you continue to use the “absolute” tone it just shows your bias.
The investigation is interesting enough, you really don’t need to inset the drama.
You have just fucking got to be kidding me.
There I said it.
This young man’s life stands to be poisoned forever by what he is holding inside. And that’s what you have to say, “Maybe he was listening to Katie Perry”??????
Give me a friggin break.
Marti
I think maybe my point went right over your head. I’m sorry for that.
No, your point didn’t go right over my head. I’m quite a bit more intelligent than that.
I think my point missed your soul.
I know exactly what you’re thinking you’re so cooly intelligent to say.
This young man was out there, essentially alone, wishing above all else that he was with his bros, who had essentially brought him back from the living dead by some stroke of luck, paying attention to his sup’s truck’s radio, because he said he would, and taking pictures in the direction of where they were, waiting to hear next what his sup and crew needed him to do. You bet he heard everything.
And then that world collapsed around him in a ring of fire.
And then somebody, some lawyer, (because the lawyers of course were on him IMMEDIATELY, or are you so innocent to not believe that was the case) probably the next day, or maybe even earlier, HAD to have told him, “Don’t say anything. You didn’t hear anything. Got it?” Because that’s the way this sh*t goes down. And if you don’t know that, you’re not even half as smart as you apparently think you are.
Do you even remotely have the slightest idea what that can do to somebody???
So I say to you Mr. Prove It With Evidence, prove me wrong.
Prescott Fire Department, i.e. here’s looking at you Chief Willis, PROVED itself willing and able to withhold evidence (even when it required turning stories into pretzels) vis a vis the case of Chris MacKenzie’s camera, which I proved with evidence.
You, sir, aren’t as smart as you think you are. And I’m not as dumb as you think I am. Not even remotely.
Thanks! I figured you’d find those pictures as interesting as I did, and would be able to tell me where that sign was a lot faster than I could figure it out, since I really couldn’t read it. And I kinda lolled when you told me that was the Ranch House Cafe. Like, OMG how could I have missed that!
This is also so very sad. I just want to tell him, “Come on Brendan, just tell the truth. Either way is difficult, for sure, but what you aren’t sharing is going to poison your life forever if you keep trying to keep it inside.”
That’s the way it always works. Always.
Marti… just to be clear… the Ranch House Restaurant
is not any of the buildings in the photos. Those buildings
are just on the west side of Highway 89 kind ‘across’
from the Ranch House Restaurant.
The Ranch House Restaurant ( or simply cafe’, as the
even the SAIR has referred to it ) is simply behind him
at that point, on the EAST side of Highway 89.
I also think that Brendan himself thinks he is ‘doing the
right thing’ by not telling all he knows. Joining GM wasn’t
just a job to him. He’s one of those guys that finds the
whole WFF thing a ‘life changing experience’. Brendan
was even baptized by one of the other GM guys just a
few weeks before this incident. He actually thinks he’s
being ‘loyal to his brothers’ ( and has even put it that
way in other interviews ) and ‘loyal to the brotherhood
of WFF’ in general by not telling the whole truth.
He’s young. He’ll learn.
He won’t be able to take the 5th if he’s called to the
stand in any legal proceeding, and the ‘loyal to my
brothers and the brotherhood’ thing won’t go too
far in court, either.
“I don’t remember” is still a valid answer.
Maybe he doesn’t.
The odd thing is that he’s had every opportunity to say
that that is the truth and he won’t say that, either.
Thx for the info on the Ranch House. I periodically thought I should go in in Google Earth and tag it but I hadn’t gotten there, And I had always pictured it in my head on the east side of 89, but when you wrote that and it looked like the building I”d seen in the photos, I thought maybe I’d had it wrong. So thanx for clearing that up.
About Brendan. Yes, I understand his relationship with the crew (see my rant just above). And why he might think he’s protecting their honor by not being more forthright.
The thing is this. The Forest Service Service this spring just put out this awesome video about the South Canyon Fire. The central point of the whole video was that, when crews go through these traumatic events, they need to be able to talk honestly about them. Otherwise, it can really screw them up for a long long time. (Which is why, frankly and obviously, the Forest Service is in a really schizy place right now, as evidenced by this SAIT).
I think it’s really important that we just published the truth about Branden’s whereabouts during that time. And it’s not just that he’s been silent about his whereabouts, he’s actually lied about them. Seriously.
When I saw the interview with the Courier, his eyes were darting around about five miles an hour every time he talked about this time. That’s not what people do when they’re truly remembering things. That’s what people do when they’re trying to remember what they think they need to say.
I know the FS has been putting all kinds of people into this to help them cope with it. I also know the Prescott Fire Department is concealing evidence, including what was said during this conversation.
This has to be putting Brendan under ENORMOUS pressure. When somebody who has contributed nothing to this whole effort here just drops by to belittle what we are revealing here, it just goes to show how little some people and some agencies regard the lives of their people who were lost here, and the seriousness of of our efforts to wrestle the truth of all of the lies that have been told about what happened in this disaster.
Namaste and thanks for all your work!
Marti –
For someone who started out feeling insecure about posting because you were afraid you would be attacked, you seem to have recovered nicely. Somehow I doubt you were ever the shrinking violet type.
Best not to grade the contributions of those posting here. Even those who are just questioning the assertions others are making might be making a very valuable contribution.
Thank you!
I promise to behave myself more appropriately in the future. But what this guy is continuing to insist is really raising my dander.
I’ve heard exactly this kind of stuff before.
While dealing with another catastrophe, almost four years ago, in which 19 people were killed. Off the coast of New Orleans. Remember that one?
I just came across something. I was looking at the page on Wildfire Today that has the Granite Mountain Hotshots 2012 video, which I realized I HAD seen but it hurt so much to watch it (it really is an awesome video) that I hadn’t watched it again.
In the comments section there’s a Joy/Sonny comment that includes this:
“…in the area GMHS crew, Eric Marsh and the mystery man in Joy’s photos with Eric Marsh still never no one has come forward naming themselves they are that person with Eric and not in the reports that I have seen yet…”
Can anybody tell me what this refers to?
The page is here: http://wildfiretoday.com/2013/12/24/granite-mountain-hotshots-in-videos/
Joy Collura has always said that she saw ( and photographed )
Eric Marsh talking with an as-yet unidentified person out on
the ridge. She mentioned this in pretty much the very first
comment she ever posted online the day the SAIR report
came out.
I (personally) have never seen the actual photograph she took
of this ‘mystery person’. It was not part of her public ‘Zazzle’
page where Joy has posted hundreds of other photographs
she has taken relating to this incident.
I don’t think we ever heard of an exact TIME on that photo, either.
I think I asked her if the fellow might have had a BLUE helmet
on ( which might make it part of the face-to-face between
Marsh/Steen Blue Ridge SUP Frisby and BR Capt Brown
that happened from NOON to 12:30 up there )… but I don’t
think I ever heard back about that.
That’s all I know.
Thanks. They had sent me a link to their private Google + account, so, after I read that, I went into it (I actually hadn’t done that til today) and looked around. There are some pictures of Rence etc meeting (I think) with somebody/somebodies near the dozer, and maybe closer to the buggies. But I didn’t see anybody talking with Eric. I may email them and ask them a little bit more. They seemed pretty intense about this.
WantsToKnowTheTruth
on January 16, 2014 at 4:21 pm said:
Joy Collura has always said that she saw ( and photographed )
Eric Marsh talking with an as-yet unidentified person out on
the ridge. She mentioned this in pretty much the very first
comment she ever posted online the day the SAIR report
came out.====REPLY:
SONNY TOLD ME TO TAKE THE PHOTO–IT IS SO DIFFICULT TO FIND THE PHOTO BECAUSE OF SO MANY ON THERE AND IT TAKES FOREVER TO DOWNLOAD BUT I WILL NAME WHAT PHOTO IT IS ON PAGE ONE LINK —362/900 IS THE PHOTO. ALOT OF PEOPLE SKIM THE PHOTOS BUT WHEN YOU CANNOT SLEEP ONE NIGHT TAKE THE TIME AND READ THE CAPTIONS AND LOOK AT PHOTO BECAUSE THE CAPTION ON #362 STATES “there is a mystery man with eric marsh in top left of this photo-anyone have good pixel enhancer to figure it out-“======
I (personally) have never seen the actual photograph she took
of this ‘mystery person’. It was not part of her public ‘Zazzle’====REPLY: ACTUALLY IT IS- ALL PHOTOS YOU SEE ON PRIVATE LINK WERE POSTED ON ZAZZLE BUT IT TAKES THE EYE-WITNESS ACCOUNT (us) TO POINT IT OUT BEING IT IS FAR AWAY ON THE MOUNTAINTOP. IF ANYONE HAS BEEN TO THE PRIVATE LINK THEY CAN SHARE WHY IT IS SET PRIVATE NOT BECAUSE I HIDE A THING ON THE FIRE BECAUSE YOU CAN GO TO ZAZZLE TO SEE FIRE PHOTOS AS YOU HAVE SEEN BUT IT HAS MY LIFE AND FAMILY AND OTHER STUFF ON THERE AND I AM NOT HERE TO SHARE PUBLICLY WHERE AND WHAT I DO ON MY CURRENT HIKING ADVENTURE- THE PAGE WAS ORIGINALLY CREATED FOR MY HUSBAND AND PARENTS TO SEE WHERE I AM AND HOW I AM—YOU HAVE TO REMEMBER I WENT FROM BEING A VERY HEAVY STOUT HOUSEWIFE MAKING YUMMY MEALS FOR THE HUBBY AND LOCALS…I WOULD DO MY LONG HIKES BUT I ALWAYS CAME HOME AT THE END OF THE DAY TO GOBBING FINE FOODS DOWN AS I JOTTED MY HIKE ON ZAZZLE—TO NOW OUT SLEEPING UNDER THE MOONLIT STARS WITH MY SLEEPING BAG NEXT TO A COWBOY CAMPFIRE ALL OVER ARIZONA WE HAVE JOURNEYED AND NOW CLOSER TO HOME SO I CAN SEE MY FAMILY AND FRIENDS MORE DUE TO MY HEALTH- IF I COULD SIT AND TALK “REAL” WITH A PERSON THAT KNOWS THE BODY AND IS NOT A PART OF THE PHARMECUTICAL WORLD AND IS NOT A PRACTICE ON ME AND MAKE ERRORS KIND OF DOCTOR AS I HAVE SEEN AND A NEUROSURGEON WHO HAS A PASSION FOR THEIR PATIENTS FOR LIVING LIFE NOT SEE WHAT I HAVE SEEN—I WATCHED GOOD PEOPLE DIE WHEN IT WAS AVOIDABLE; MUCH LIKE 6-30-13. THAT FIRE HAD GOOD PEOPLE DIE ON AN AVOIDABLE SITUATION NOT LEAVE IT AS OK AS AN ACCIDENT AND IT WAS CHAOTIC AND A BAD THING HAPPENED. WE NEED MORE OUT THERE THAT WANT TO HELP ALL WALKS OF LIFE VERSUS KILLING US OFF AND YOU ARE SO PROGRAMMED TO SLEEP AT NIGHT AND BE OKAY WITH KILLING US OFF. YEAH, MY BIGGEST HOPE ONE DAY IS TO HAVE A RELIABLE PERSON WHO KNOWS EVERY ARTERY, MUSCLE, ETC THAT MAKES US HUMANS AND TREAT ME LIKE ONE. SHOW ME SOMEONE THAT CARES SO MUCH TO SHARE FREELY LIKE WE HAVE TO HELP SAVE HUMAN LIVES AND YOUFIND THAT PERSON FOR ME—YOU WILL HAVE MADE THIS GIRL’S LIFE DREAM A REALITY! ===
page where Joy has posted hundreds of other photographs
she has taken relating to this incident.DID YOU NOTE I POSTED THEM IMMEDIATELY EVEN HEATSTROKED ON 6-30-13 ON ZAZZLE SO PEOPLE COULD DO THEIR OWN ASSESSMENTS IMMEDIATELY.
I don’t think we ever heard of an exact TIME on that photo, either.I COULD NOT TELL YOU BETTER NEWS TODAY- MY VERIZON CELL PHONE HAS ONE PHOTO OF THE FIRE EDGE AND JUST RECENTLY HAD DISCUSSION WITH RETIRED SHERIFF/LOCAL BUSINESS OWNER AT HIS HOME AND WE DISCOVERED IT WHEN I WAS TEXTING A PHOTO TO MY HUSBAND OF THE SUN HITTING MY HAIR AND THE MOON—IT IS THE SOLO PHOTO SO FAR BECAUSE THERE IS STILL THE MISSING SD CARD THAT HAS ACCURATE TIME WHICH COMPLIMENTS EVERY VERBAL THING SONNY AND JOY HAVE SHARED BECAUSE THE PHOTO WAS TAKEN RIGHT AFTER SEEING ERIC MARSH AND THE GMHS CREW AFTER SHE USED THE BATHROOM AT 9:40AM. IT ALSO HELPS BETTER ASSESS THE OTHER PHOTOS NOW- AND WE SO PLEASED TO SEND IT TO OSHA AND SAIR AND THE ONLY REPLY WE RECEIVED WAS FROM MIKE DUDLEY — ‘OH GOD’ HE STATED AND NOTHING ELSE—???? HEY, IF WE WERE MUTE ON THIS LIKE OTHERS HAVE BEEN THE PHOTOS SAY SO MUCH—
I think I asked her if the fellow might have had a BLUE helmet
on ( which might make it part of the face-to-face between
Marsh/Steen Blue Ridge SUP Frisby and BR Capt Brown
that happened from NOON to 12:30 up there )… but I don’t
think I ever heard back about that.I NEVER DID SEE THAT COMMENT. I TRY TO READ ALL THE COMMENTS BUT SOME TIMES I CANNOT BECAUSE SONNY AND I ARE LIMITED WITH OUR ON-TIME USAGE AND AVAILABILITY BUT THE PHOTO IS TOO FAR FOR ME TO ANALYZE BUT ANYONE IS FREE TO DO THEIR OWN PHOTO ENHANCING TO SEE-
That’s all I know.
Thank you SO MUCH JOY!!!!! I’m so glad you caught this here.
I started looking thru your photos yesterday. I even have the pages still open on my imac here. I couldn’t see what you were asking about, so it really helps to know. I would like to download the photo and look at it in detail, and I may be able to enhance it. BUT I need to DOWNLOAD it, not SAVE AS it, because saving a photo from Google + causes it to reduce in size and strip the metadata from it (I learned that the hard way when I was downloading Elizabeth’s YCSO photos of the SAIT investigation of the Deployment Site. And I can’t DOWNLOAD it if the default settings are not changed to make it possible for me. I don’t know how you do that on Google + because I don’t use Google +. But when I told Elizabeth about the problem, she emailed me to tell me she had “changed the settings” so I could DOWNLOAD the photos.
And PS I also saw the verizon phone pictures that you are emaling me this morning about. I have them open also.
I’m guessing what WTKTT is saying about that being Frisbee or Trew is probably correct. But I definitely want to check it out.
Hope you have time to read the conversation going on below about the Brendan McDonough photos and what they are telling us. It’s a blockbuster.
Marti… if the time on the ‘Mystery Man’ photo
is circa 9:40 to 10:00 AM ish… then it could
not be any member of the Blue Ridge
Hotshot crew ( Blue helmets that day with
Frisby wearing a ball cap ).
Only possibility there, I suppose, is if the
BR dozer guy ( Ball? ) actually went all the
way up there to talk to Marsh before he got
to work with the dozer down near the
old-grader location.
I’m working on it. Also in convo w/joy/sunny via email. i have to dash out now and run across town to pick up an insulin prescription I deperately need. They are really really tiny in the photo and I can’t figure out how to download it. Thanks to Google +. Same problem I originally had withe Elizabeth’s photos.
And I’m halfway through figuring out the timestamp problem.
When her cellphone said it was 2:30 pm, her camera said it was 1:55 AM.
But I’ve really got to go.
actually doubt it was Blue Ridge—they came into view later in the morning to us. The yellow and white helicopter possibly flew someone in for a briefing with Marsh or someone was already up there. I just am floored that 2 reports surfaced as investigative but no mention of it even though I question that from day one because WHO ARE YOU with Marsh and how come you have never been discussed anywhere or in the investigative reports—were you not suppose to be there and we just happen to see you—it is stuff like this that bothers us because 100% transparency and time stamping needs to be done- simple as that- on this weekend. Forgetting to mention things —not good because when the time comes if my other sd card is recovered or the people finally share you will feel foolish whoever placed the report as it stands and than strongly accept it and stand by it. You were better off not guesstimating in which is how I saw it in some areas.
copy. will be working on it.
Marti… Sonny/Joy might
be right. The ‘MysteryMan’
might have something
to do with the yellow
helicopter. Joy HAS, in
fact, published a number
of photos of that yellow
chopper ‘lifting’ things
out of the helispot area that morning. So either GM crew were helping to attach things to that tow line… or the chopper landed at some point and a helitack crew person was on the ground there in that area near Marsh for awhile that morning.
Copy
Joy… thank you again! ( ongoing thanks! ).
I will find that picture and I will enhance it as best
as possible to see if that ‘Mystery Man’ can be
identified.
A quick question for you…
Do you know who actually OWNS the “Double Bar
A Ranch” up in Peeples valley?
It used to be called the “Hays Ranch” but changed
hands in a brokered deal around 2009 or so.
WantsToKnowTheTruth
on January 17, 2014 at 12:34 pm said:
Joy… thank you again! ( ongoing thanks! ).
====reply: yes, we know it is as important to come back here every chance we can and skim for our names to see if there is any new questions (never saw anyone complain about how we as we share as we recently read on here but in the end just so you know; don’t care either—if I see an area that needs correcting we do; IF we see the area; a lot we have not read yet.
We have never got involved on the comment wall but maybe write about us to show you all a bit to who we are and what we saw that weekend and how we have a very difficult time with having days go by and everyone we know who could share rather not—that does such an unjust to that fire and to history possibly to be repeated as it will never be too clear when it could be much clearer and a disservice to all affected by the Yarnell Fire. I am really not up to par and struggling right now to even slide myself to do much this day—yet I did travel about throughout the day yesterday a lot; drained. To answer you, you are welcome. If you ever come this way—stop on by our sleeping bags in the desert for some good ol’ Southwest fried rattlesnake and fixens’ on the cowboy campfire—
================
A quick question for you…
Do you know who actually OWNS the “Double Bar
A Ranch” up in Peeples valley? ===reply: been years since I was up to date so by going on thought—little over a million for appx 150+ acres; Dunlap family from Paradise Valley but maybe if you call Christina Cooper the local Yarnell librarian she can better assist this as she has patrons in all the time that CAN answer this- (928) 427-3191 or google county assessor and go that route or Buford I mentioned on here knows a lot of people there in Yarnell.============
Followup: I read all of the comments on that Wildfire today
article and one of the things Joy seemed upset about was
that the Wildfire article is still just regurgitating crap from
the SAIR report that has NEVER been true.
Example: The SAIR report went out of its way to try to use
the meetings/conversations between Marsh and Joy/Sonny
as proof that Marsh had more ‘situational awareness’ up
there than he actually ever did. The SAIR tried hard to make
it sound like Joy and Sonny TOLD them all about the ‘roads
leading to the ranch’ when that actually NEVER happened.
The SAIT felt that had to ‘make these things up’ because
to admit that Marsh/Steed did NOT have that kind of ‘situational
awareness’ as part of their LCES requirements that day
would mean that ‘someone did something wrong that day’…
and the SAIT was committed to avoiding any evidence of that.
From page 34 of the SAIR…
While scouting, DIVS A encountered two local residents, avid
hikers who are familiar with the area. The hikers took a path
down the two-track road along the ridge to the southeast toward
the Boulder Springs Ranch. They discussed their route with
DIVS A prior to leaving.
The only thing that is TRUE about that statement is that Marsh
did meet them up there… and they discussed the way THEY
planned on leaving the area.
There was NEVER any mention of the “Boulder Springs Ranch”
at all… or that the two-track actually ‘led’ to it. Joy has corrected
this misconception MANY times since the SAIR came out.
Thanks for this. I didn’t read all the comments, just the most recent one. And yes I knew they were really upset about being misquoted, among other things.
I’ve been trying to figure out how to disengage a bit, now that I’ve done what I set out to do. I really need to get my life back.
My biggest concern now, and especially after what you posted about the Brendan photos, is two-fold. Where is Eric’s cellphone. And how to get someone to transcribe that “choices conversation” that was, I’m convinced, heard by two living people. Those are the two most important pieces of evidence being withheld from us. And I wouldn’t be at all surprised if Eric’s cellphone doesn’t even exist anymore. But the call records do.
Everybody keeps thinking they “know” what Eric and the crew decided to do. NOBODY KNOWS what those decisions were. (well, not exactly nobody but you get what I mean).
People here are so “concerned” about speculations without evidence???? Give me a break. The biggest speculation that is being accepted without evidence as some kind of a fact here is that we know what they decided. We don’t. We only know the consequences. And the only evidence related to those decisions is being withheld.
But I think we’ve managed to point the way. I don’t know what else we can do. I keep thinking “it’s time to go out and stock up on popcorn and put my feet up and just watch as the chips fall where they may.
Brendan was out there alone in that pick-up truck, trying to use his phonecamera and his radios to stay in touch with his beloved brothers. The ones who had helped him gain his life back. And then somebody told him, “Don’t talk about it. Don’t say what you know.”
Once upon a time, I did that. I kept it under lock and key. I know what doing that does to you.
Only the truth will set you free, even if it’s total agony to look at it.
Namaste and thank you for all you magnificent work here.
For those of you interested in Brendan McDonough’s path that afternoon, you might find some of his photos interesting.
Here’s one on the dozer road, I think: https://www.dropbox.com/sh/mmb98r3j53s2urp/8NlvN5hDdm#lh:null-20130630_154943.jpg
Here’s another driving along in the white truck with no other crew vehicles to be seen anywhere: https://www.dropbox.com/sh/mmb98r3j53s2urp/8NlvN5hDdm#lh:null-20130630_160206.jpg
Here’s the whole folder:
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/mmb98r3j53s2urp/8NlvN5hDdm#/
Have fun!!
Thanks, Marti. See a longer post below about just the
Highway 89 photos alone ( 19, 20 and 21 in that folder ).
These photos alone finally tell us EXACTLY where Brendan
McDonough was, and what he was doing, at the exact moment
the critical ‘discussing their options’ and ‘comfort level’ discussions
were taking place over the GM intra-crew (private) frequency.
Brendan was not ‘outside’ anywhere.
He was not off ‘going to the bathroom’ or something.
He was sitting right there in the GM Supervisor Truck,
all alone, driving it north on Highway 89… and doing nothing
but listening to the onboard radio and hearing ALL of
these critical conversations.
We have always known Brendan most probably heard ALL
of these crucial conversations… but never been quite sure
WHERE he was when he did ( hear them ).
Now we know that, too.
Try this link instead for the above Holloway Fire.
The Holloway Fire Entrapment / Shelter Deployment
BLM Nevada and Oregon
August 12, 2012
http://www.wildfirelessons.net/communities/resources/viewincident/?DocumentKey=8f633e1d-b8ad-4e34-9d6a-5d1c2bd4f1b5
I know you’ll find this one interesting and informative.
The following August 2012 Holloway Fire entrapment report deals with the Zuni HS. Several Southwest Area HS Crews were on this fire, INCLUDING the GMHS. Several Superintendents made the comment that they were convinced her fire shelter definitely saved her life, and the fire shelter performed exceptionally well under the circumstances. In other words, the fire shelter performed better than it was supposed to in that fuel type and in that fire behavior. Fire shelters were originally designed for light, flash fuels like grass or very light brush NOT as on this fire and CERTAINLY NOT as on the YHF.
She was a ‘filler’ on the Crew (not a regular Zuni HS Crewmember) and for whatever reason, she removed her gloves and did NOT wear them during her deployment (She claims she did not know why she removed them). They were performing an afternoon firing operation, had a wind shift, increased fire behavior, spotting, and a dust devil that progressed into fire whirl(s).
Once you see the photo of the deployment site on the cover page, and on p. 22, 26-27 you’ll see that she deployed IN THE BRUSH, in a very small opening. Her deployment site was survivable ONLY because the brush did NOT burn as intensely as on the YHF. This brush was MUCH LESS than the YHF brush.
Marti – there is a good photo of a RHINO on p. 27, upper left photo.
Similar to the YHF? Only in the fact that she deployed in the brush. You’ll notice that the Holloway Fire fuels did NOT consume as much as the YHF fuels. Therefore, the fire behavior was definitely NOT as intense.
“On August 12, 2012, at approximately 1800 hrs, a significant event occurred on the Holloway Incident in Division W. During a burnout operation, a crew member became separated from her crew and walked into an unburned area of the fire. The separation was partially due to a weather event resulting in a 180 degree wind switch along with high winds that spread fire outside of control lines and reduced visibility to near zero. Realizing she was lost, with the fire gaining on her, physical and environmental factors were reducing her ability to stay ahead of the advancing fire. Unable to return to the safety zone, she was forced to deploy her fire shelter and was quickly overrun by the fire. She remained in the fire shelter for approximately 30 minutes and survived. … She received a few minor second degree burns …”
So, it’s VERY POSSIBLE that this incident MAY have convinced at least SOME of the GMHS overhead that fire shelters would perform as well on the YHF as on the Holloway Fire. If they would have continued running towrd The Ranch and lighter fuels, ….
The Holloway Fire Entrapment / Shelter Deployment
BLM Nevada and Oregon
August 12, 2012
https://higherlogicdownload.s3.amazonaws.com/WILDFIRELESSONS/Holloway_Fire_Accident_Investigation.pdf?AWSAccessKeyId=AKIAJH5D4I4FWRALBOUA&Expires=1389897616&Signature=yG5LK5ouPD1rf8V8QXXdo3cHgT0%3D
2 comments from last night discussion.
1. The lookout discussion.
After every thing we have learned something jumped out at me.
First I do not believe they wanted to leave a lookout separated from them as they left the Black area they were headed out.
However the comfort level discussion in a new scenario.
Could Marsh have asked Steed About his comfort level of going down into the unburned paralleling the fire if he Marsh held back acted as Lookout and kept an eye on the fire as they dropped to the ranch. If they determined they were taking a risk to get off the mountain ASAP. This would make since and why Marsh came down behind them. Not a good LO option but plausible. At some point he lost tract of the fire when he followed them into the bowl. And again I say they were in contact on inter-crew freq. the whole time.
If this new vedio traffic is accurate we have the pressure to leave the black.
2. The new Radio evidence discussed above blows the SAIT apart again since this shows Marsh talking on the radio during the time they supposedly had no communications. And I still believe Willis and McDonough Listened to them all the way to the burn over.
Your thoughts?
Maybe I should say discussion not pressure.
I will preface this by saying the video is somewhat thin as evidence – we do not know who is speaking to Marsh and do not know exactly what is being said. But those things might in fact be able to be determined.
I have always felt the Musser “request” was critical – without it I do not think GM moves. That is not the same as blaming Paul Musser – GM was responsible for its own safety. But I think it sounded urgent to Marsh, which is why they did end up moving. I also feel it was a bit more “unusual” than some people have let on here. Asking some portion of GM to hike 1.5 miles quickly with the fire doing what it was smacks of some desperation to me.
The guy who named the video obviously heard the conversation clearly. He named it the “gamble” in retrospect, did he feel the gamble was on the part of the person asking for speed, GM or both?
Asking them to come faster was not part of he story told by SAIT, or part of the story we have been asked to believe. The interpretation above that what was being said was “we don’t really want you to come, but if you come, come quickly” is a real stretch in my opinion. I hope to God the thought process was not “come quickly, otherwise the fire is going to get you”. Most plausibly, it was “come quickly, we need you”. Consistent with a feeling of urgency about the situation in Glen Ilah.
Even after learning of the Musser request, the story was that GM turned them down, changed their mind (for whatever reason) and came really without ever getting back with fire command about their move. This video suggests someone not only knew of it, they condoned it, and in fact said step on the gas. Again, this does not absolve GM of its very serious errors. But it puts the move in a context which frankly is more believable than what has been sold as the truth to date.
As I said above, a clear transcript of this video would likely be very helpful. Until then, we are guessing a bit much, and need to be very careful accusing individuals by name.
True I agree. And we are still trying to nail down the why they moved and why they went were they did. I believe we have already gotten further than the SAIT.
Well stated Mr. Mike, well stated.
If it WAS Musser… then why didn’t he report THIS
conversation with Marsh?
It it was NOT Musser… that almost raises even more
disturbing questions.
Let’s say it was Abel… How do we get from “Keep ME
informed, Hunker and be safe ( in the black ), We’ll
get some Air Support down there ASAP” as captured
in the Caldwell video circa 3:50 PM…
…to “If you can get here any faster that would be great”.
at 4:30 ( this video ).
That means that somewhere in there… BOTH OPS
on this fire knew that GM was ‘coming down’, and
even the guy ( Abel ) who had told them to just
‘hunker and be safe’ is now not only ‘onboard with
that’ decision… he’s actually telling them to “Hurry up”.
It’s VERY important for someone to identify WHO
that is speaking to Marsh in this video… even if the
entire quote can never by fully deciphered.
Your points are all well taken… especially where you point
out that regardless of what was captured in the video…
we now know WHO heard the REST of that exchange.
Mccord himself.
I believe the first word we hear from ‘MysteryMan’ in
that captured radio traffic is the word ‘Copy’.
We all know what that means.
It means there was MORE to this conversation that
had already taken place that was NOT captured
in the video.
But we also now know is that Mccord was sitting right
there in the driver’s seat of one of the BR Crew Carriers
and he was listening to this ENTIRE conversation.
Mccord was NOT interviewed by either SAIT or ADOSH.
No one has ( as yet ) asked him EVERYTHING he
might have heard. Someone should.
Re 1: I think your theory that Steed might have THOUGHT
Marsh was going to be his ‘lookout’ ( since he was straggling
way behind ) is perfectly possible.
Re 2: See a longer post below now that analyzes the newly
released FULL set of Brendan McDonough photos/videos.
The mystery about WHERE Brendan was when the critical
‘discussing their options’ and ‘comfort level’ discussions
took place is now OVER. He was driving along, ALONE
in the GM Supervisor truck, and doing nothing but listening
to the onboard radio and hearing EVERYTHING.
WTKTT,
Regarding the above BRHS video clip. I agree with MOST of your assessment with the exceptions below.
I am TOTALLY convinced that the ‘Mystery Man’ you refer to is DEFINITELY NOT OPS Musser. It’s also NOT Willis. I think it sounds much more like OPS Abel even though you say you don’t think so. I listened to it about 20 times.
The other one is definitely Marsh talking about ‘they’ and ‘they’ being the GMHS.
Another thing, I think you take the slippery slope from “pressure” to “obvious PRESSURE” to “DIRECT PRESSURE” without any real justifiable basis or support. I don’t view any of that transmission as being ‘pressure.’ To me, it just goes along with the earlier suggestion about 1600 from Musser inquiring as to the GMHS availability to go to Yarnell, nothing more. No pressure, just asking. It’s an extension of what was talked about earlier. If there was pressure, there would have been more to the conversation.
Things are definitely a bit hectic at this point, so I think it may come across as pressure, but it’s OPS just doing their respective jobs. OPS Abel andOPS Musser were working together, covering for each other the best they could, and some things definitely fell through the cracks in places.
After reading this and first thinking, “but this doesn’t make any sense,” and then switching the characters around in my head, I’m inclined to agree with you. It does make sense.
Abel has “ordered” them to hunker down and stay safe. He’s still assuming that’s what they’re doing. However, he’s also saying right here, something along the lines of, once you decide not to be committed any more, the sooner you can get down the better.
At which point, Marsh responds in his typical ingenious way of keeping Abel in the dark about what they’re actually doing, tells him they’re coming down off the heel. I think that’s more about where than when. He’s saying that they will be coming down that short way, not a longer way.
Does that make sense?
Marti,
Yes, it makes sense and not just because you’re agreeing.And Marsh is definitery continuing to be sneaky about the whole matter for sure.
I’m not willing to cede, however, that he’s not doing it under pressure. That evidence is still being withheld, imho. We still do not know what Eric and the crew decided. We only know the consequences.
And thx for the rhino id. I’d pretty much figured it out, but I didn’t want to blow it and look stupid.
Reply to RTS post on January 16, 2014 at 10:12 am
>> RTS wrote…
>> If there was pressure, there would have been more
>> to the conversation.
There IS more to THAT conversation.
Listen carefully again. I think it’s unmistakable that the first
thing ‘MysterMan’ says is the word ‘Copy’.
We all know what that means.
It means this was an ONGOING conversation… we just can’t
hear all of it.
Someone did hear all of it… and we know exactly who that was.
Blue Ridge Hotshot Mccord.
The video also captures two other Blue Ridge Hotshots
in the side mirror standing right near the Crew Carrier and
with the volume on the radio set the way it was they
probably heard ALL of that YARNELL_GAMBLE conversation
as well.
Mccord was never interviewed by SAIT or ADOSH.
Aren’t you the one who said you actually know some
of these Blue Ridge guys?
Do you know Mccord?
WTKTT,
I have NOT been able to discern or hear a “copy” in there even listening several more times.
I did hear at the end, Frisby calling or talking with someone, saying “BRHS on Tac 1.”
I don’t know BRHS McCord.
RTS… thank you.
Just to be clear, though… are you saying you
absolutely recognize that voice on the last
transmission as Frisby ( since I think you know,
him, right? )…
…or are you just assuming it’s Frisby.
If that really is him… that would be the first known
capture of his voice that we have heard so far
and that would be good to know.
If it’s not Frisby’s voice it would most likely be
Brown, right? Who else would be pitching those
call signs that day on TAC 1 other than Brown
or Frisby? Fueller? Ball?
WTKTT,
Since you posted this, I listened to the video clip several more times.
In my mind, it’s ABSOLUTELY Marsh talking about the “heel of the fire” and ABSOLUTELY Frisby talking about “BRHS on Tac 1.”
RTS… thank you. ( ongoing thanks ).
I’m pretty much seriously done with the deployment site. If anybody else wants to look at it, especially anybody else who is more familiar with all the wff stuff than I am, Elizabeth has made the photos “public.” So here’s the link:
https://plus.google.com/photos/115249047962550271237/albums/5962242148909920913
p83 SAIR says….A chainsaw gas/oil bottle was found by itself 30 feet from the north corner of the deployment site. This particular bottle was not ruptured, in contrast to most fuel bottles found in and around the deployment site.
When reviewing the DZ pics did you notice if any of the fuel bottles were indeed “ruptured” as in the cap was in place and there was a breech in the bottle walls?
Thanks
No, I didn’t look at the fuel bottles that closely. They’re all over the place in various conditions.
Reply to Marti Reed post on January 16, 2014 at 5:04 am
Thanks to Marti ( and Elizabeth, of course ) for the link.
** THE BILLFOLD
This is the first I’ve seen of these photos including the close-up of
the billfold that clearly shows the “Preston Brewing Company”
membership card… but only burned on the edges.
The billfold most probably belonged to Joe Thurston.
He worked at the Prescott Brewing Company.
Just 18 days after the incident, the Prescott Brewing Company
announced they were creating a special new beer that would
be called “Heroes 19” in honor of Thurston and the entire GM Crew
that perished in the fire.
AZFAMILY online ezine published the original announcement.
azfamily.com
Arizona brews a special batch to honor Granite Mountain Hotshots
Posted on July 18, 2013 at 9:57 PM
by Jared Dillingham
http://www.azfamily.com/news/Arizona-brews-a-sepcial-batch-to-honor-Granite-Mountain-Hotshots-216108231.html
PRESCOTT, Ariz. — A special batch of beer is brewing at the
Prescott Brewing Company.
Members of the Arizona Brewers Guild got together to create
a blend called “Heroes 19,” in honor of the fallen Granite Mountain
Hotshot crew.
Firefighter Joe Thurstson, who died fighting the Yarnell Hill Fire,
worked at the Prescott Brewing Company for several years, while
training to become a Hotshot.
“He was a great guy and a pleasure to work with,” owner John
Nielsen said as he and the other Guild members began mixing
the new beer.
** THE RADIOS
I’ve now looked at all the radios in super-closeup and with
some enhancement but you were right… it’s really impossible
to tell from these photos what any of the ‘channel select’
knobs might have been set to. Only a hand-inspection of
all the radios probably had a chance of figuring that out.
** USB DONGLE(S)
In photo 106 ( the closeup of the keys ) the object in the
bottom right is a completely burned USB ‘dongle’ card.
Looks like it was attached to the keychain that is lying
there right to the left of it. That’s where some people
carry USB dongles that they use a lot.
As bad as it looks… there actually still might have been
some ‘data’ on it. The outer casing of the dongle either
melted or burned away but the circuit board itself looks
OK. The IC chip and capacitor numbering on the circuit
board are still clearly readable.
Photo 108 shows ANOTHER partially melted USB dongle.
This one is sitting under what appears to be a burned
dogtag. It’s about 18 inches to the right of the other dongle.
Similar condition to the other one. Dongle casing melted
away but circuit board still readable and might have
retained whatever data was on it.
I wonder what ever happened to these USB dongle cards?
Did someone just think they were ‘junk’ and throw them away?
Wow, I almost missed this, and thank you!!
I had decided not to go back and “clean up” my “list of numbered personal items and things associated with them” and do some more work on it and post it because, frankly, I didn’t think it would matter that much and I was seriously sick of “crawling around” the Deployment Site any more.
Thank you for making that #6 “personal item,” the wallet, meaningful. I had tagged it “Anthony Rose” because it was at the base of the agave, and that was close to his shelter. But Joe Thurston’s body was just to the “left” of it. Thank you so much for connecting it to that wonderful story. And I really, really mean that. I think it’s important for those of us doing this to find a way to connect what we’re doing to these wonderful human persons we are researching and writing about.
I think you are mistaken about IMG_106.jpg. There’s nothing in the bottom right of it. But IMG_105.jpg does, and what you describe is right there. And it looks like what you are describing in IMG_108.jpg. I didn’t see that, because I have no clue what a USB dongle is. What is it?
And I don’t know how these things were returned to their families. I’m guessing, by the chain of possession, that if they couldn’t be specifically identified to someone, Chino Valley Fire Department had the job of offering them to the families and letting them decide what they recognized.
I had, at least preliminarily, connected that collection of things associated with that key chain (personal item #7) with shelters 3 (Body 20-Sean Misner) or 4 (Body 18-John Percin.) But Body 16-William Warneke was in that area also. What struck me about it all was that the keys were dug down deep in the ground, and that it must have taken some keen eyes to even see them, in the wind and dust, especially given the apparent blindness of the investigators to seeing other things that were so much more obvious to me. This collection really caught me personally. The keys, the dog-tags, the swiss army knife that looked like the one I always carried during the 10 years I back-packed in the Grand Canyon.
Thank you for looking at these photographs. I wish more people in the conversation would.
There is a long and powerful story in Arizona Central, which they are now denying me access to (apparently I’ve overly accessed their site this month) describing the journey of William Warneke’s wife, Roxanne. It’s called “Strength of Love’s Memory.” She gave birth to their baby in December. Here’s a link, although I don’t guaranteed it will work, but if it doesn’t you could probably search their site for it
http://www.azcentral.com/news/arizona/articles/20131231yarnell-fire-warneke-baby-part1.html
I almost posted a link to this story earlier, but I didn’t.
At one point, she tells about going out onto the Deployment Site during a ceremony there. She was digging around with her foot, and she uncovered a watch. She wondered how many other things might have been there. Too small to have been seen and recovered.
Geez. They may have had all the best intentions
starting out but I cannot believe what a botch job
the whole site investigation was. Leaving watches,
sunglasses… who knows what else belonged
to those men… just sitting in the dirt for family
members to find with their feet?
That’s totally inexcusable.
I don’t know if it’s inexcusable or what. I have noticed the difference between stills of something and videos of something. You can look at a still and that gives you no idea of the wind that is going on. Although some of the stills do give a visual hint as to how windy and dusty the conditions were on the site that day. So I can understand they may have missed a few things, although it still totally escapes me that they missed a camera, but that’s maybe because I’m a photographer and would see a camera a mile away.
What happened after that seems to me to be a serious letting go into the realm of “Whatever.” I’ve been somewhat dumbfounded by that. It’s as if both the SAIT and the YCSO decided to just abandon the criticality of that site after they did their “investigation” of it. That has never made any sense to me, until probably you informed me that YCSO’s responsibility only encompassed the decision that no foul play had happened, and thus they no longer had any role in it.
That may also be why they handed off the cellphones to ACTIC and then put away whatever information they got back from them into some file folder.
I’m, in my own head, hypothesizing that PFD, either during their “cleaning up of the site” after the SAIT investigation, discovered Eric’s cellphone. Or some time after. (I haven’t seen anything that indicates what access to the site they may have had.) Or it must be still on that site. I really don’t believe, given what I’ve seen of the cellphones photographed on that site, whether numbered or not, it was totally demolished and vaporized or whatever, by the fire.
And yes, I agree, that leaving all that stuff on the site was totally inexcusable. But who was “required” to get it off? I have absolutely no idea.
It looks to me as if the YCSO was only required to sign it off as “no foul play,” at which point their job was to get the personal items to Chino Valley FD to get to the families, help the SAIT do their “investigation,” and then walk away from the whole thing. I have absolutely no idea what their obligations were regarding the cellphones and the radios after they determined there was “no foul play.”
And I have absolutely no idea who was allowed into the site, or for whatever reasons, after it was “sealed off” from the public (by whom?)
A whole lot of stuff was “left there.” I don’t know who was authorized to go into the site and find stuff. Obviously, if someone was, it was at their discretion to determine what and what not was important to remove from it depending on what they deemed to be “significant.”
And the first thing I thought of, when I read Roxanne’s story, was, “Perhaps did this watch stop at the time the burnover took place?” It is pretty incomprehensible to me that nobody within the YCSO or the SAIT seemed to think that watches were important items to be investigated. But apparently they were not.
This was NOT an investigation of the Deployment Site. With all the huge amount of information it contained. It was a quick and dirty, given the wind and disagreeable circumstances, an “appearance” of an investigation. Without the substance.
WTKKT
I’m gonna post this here becuz I’m guessing most of the action and thus the eyeballs are focused down at the bottom of the page.
I would really like to have a private conversation with you. There’s something I’m thinking that I want your opinion on but there’s no way I can communicated it with you here.
(As I’m writing this I’m getting email notifications that Sonny is telling me pictures are going up)
So here’s my email address
mareed4 at gmail dot com
oh my I can’t believe i did that wrong.
it’s ma4reed at gmail dot come
mareed4 is my old hacked-into hotmail account that’s stuck to my youtube account that for some reason google won’t let me change
Check your email box. Should be a message.
Got it. I will respond tomorrow. Thank you.
**
** ERIC MARSH WAS (APPARENTLY) TOLD TO GET GRANITE MOUNTAIN
** TO YARNELL “AS FAST AS POSSIBLE” AND MARSH ACKNOWLEDGES
** THEY ARE “ALREADY ON THEIR WAY” AT 1632 ( 4:32 PM ).
Hang on to your hats, folks.
It’s possibly ‘smoking gun solved’ time ( or one of them, anyway ).
Also… everybody get your ‘ears’ out.
All you people who think you hear different ‘words’ than I do sometimes in
these video/audio clips… now is your time to (please) pipe up (again).
In the Blue Ridge photos/videos folder that Mr. John Dougherty just created and
filled with SAIT FOIA//FOIL material… there is a short video in the BR Hotshot
‘Mccord’ folder entitled “YARNELL_GAMBLE” that appears to be aptly named.
It appears to record at least one of the moments ( there might still be more to
come ) when Eric Marsh was being DIRECTLY ( and HEAVILY ) PRESSURED
to get his Granite Mountain Hotshots down to Yarnell “as fast as possible” and
Marsh himself responds saying that is already what is happening and they will
be there as soon as they can. He says they are ALREADY on their way and
(quote) “coming from the heel of the fire”.
I’m going to give you just the yarnell_gamble.mov video details first, then ( and
here is where all ears are requested ) the ‘transcription’ of what I believe is
exactly the radio conversation captured in this video.
Dougherty Dropbox parent folder: Blue Ridge Hotshots Photos and Videos
Sub-Folder – Mccord
Filename: yarnell_gamble.mov ( Movie Title: YARNELL_GAMBLE ).
Direct link to this video…
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/dpmmrutwwk4a45b/WmcD_VMFvp/Mccord#lh:null-yarnell_gamble.MOV
Apple QuickTime Movie taken with Mccord’s iPhone 4S.
Basic Metadata…
Format: H.264 Decoder, 1920×1080, Millions
of Colors, AAC, Mono, 44.100 kHz.
FPS: 27.08
Data Size: 47.88 MB
Data Rate: 21.15 mbits/s
Normal Size: 1080 x 1920 pixels.
Current Size: 1080 x 1920 pixels (Actual).
CAVEAT: I am labeling the response below as belonging to Eric Marsh because I
personally believe it really couldn’t be anyone else. No one else out there that day
had that unique, slow North Carolina drawl… but again… here’s where everyone
who thinks they hear things differently than I do needs to pipe up.
I am labeling the speaker who is DIRECTLY PRESSURING him as ‘MysterMan’
but see some other evidence down below. I also personally believe, in this
exchange, it can be no one other than OPS2 Paul Musser.
The only other radio traffic captured in this video other than the exchange
between ‘MysteryMan’ and Eric Marsh is at the end when a Blue Ridge Hotshot
is just trying to raise ‘Structure’ people on TAC 1.
.
VIDEO STARTS
( Siren is heard in background at start )
( First audio is MysteryMan acknowledging something Eric Marsh )
( just said to him with ‘Copy’ and then urging him to get GM to town faster ).
+0:00 – MysteryMan: Copy… ah… ah… come down… and appreciate if
ya could get to town a little faster, but you’ll figure it out.
( No response from Marsh for 10 seconds or so… then… )
+0:12 – Eric Marsh: Ah… they’re comin’ from the heel of the fire.
+0:15 – A Blue Ridge Hotshot: Structure Core, Blue Ridge Hotshots on TAC 1.
VIDEO ENDS
So let’s break it down…
+0:00 – MysteryMan: Copy… ah… ah… come down… and appreciate if
ya could get to town a little faster, but you’ll figure it out.
If that is really what this guy says… then it speaks for itself.
He is DIRECTLY pressuring Eric Marsh to get himself AND
the Granite Mountain Hotshots to Yarnell “as fast as possible”.
+0:12 – Eric Marsh: Ah… they’re comin’ from the heel of the fire.
I think this is unmistakably Eric Marsh ( in his unique, slow NC drawl ).
No question about it MY mind… but everyone with ears please chime in.
What Eric is OBVIOUSLY saying here is (projectively) all of the following in
response to ‘MysteryMan’s PRESSURE…
1) They ( Jesse Steed in command of Granite Mountain Hotshots ) are
ALREADY on their way to Yarnell.
2) They ( GM ) are coming from the ‘heel of the fire’ where they have
been working all day… and that’s a long way from town so be patient.
3) They are ALREADY ‘on the hike’ from the ‘heel of the fire’… so
‘cool your jets’… they will get there as soon as they can.
4) Eric Marsh himself is still nowhere near them ( GM ) even at this point,
and he is still referring to his own Crew as ‘They’ because he is still
DIVS A and is going to remain so until someone tells him he’s not anymore.
5) Eric Marsh makes no attempt to inform the caller that he is actually
‘following’ them ( or anywhere near them )… or actively coming to town
himself. He talks to ‘MysteryMan’ about ‘THEM’ as if they ALREADY took
off on their ‘assignment’ but he is still where fire command thinks he is
being ‘DIVS A’.
I ( personally ) also believe you can hear more than just a bit of frustration
and/or exasperation in Eric’s voice that ( to me ) seems to put a ‘tone’ into his
response in reaction to the obvious PRESSURE from ‘MysteryMan’ as
if what he really wanted to say back to ‘MysteryMan’ was “They’re ALREADY
on their way and they’re gettin’ there as fast as they can, okay?”.
Your mileage may vary, of course. Again. All ears on deck, please.
** ‘MysteryMan’
I really can’t fully identify who is putting this DIRECT PRESSURE on Marsh…
…but I think I am pretty sure who it is NOT.
It does NOT sound like ( to ME, anyway ) either of the following…
OPS1 ( Todd Abel )
SPGS2 ( Darrell Willis )
I’ve compared the ‘MysteryMan’ voice here to other radio captures from that day
known to be those two people and the voice is not a match for either of them.
OPINION WARNING…
I think that means this must be OPS2 Paul Musser speaking to Marsh.
Who ELSE would it be ( that day, at that time )… especially since we
already know OPS2 Paul Musser was the one ASKING them to
“spare resources” ( but now we hear him REALLY pressuring for SPEED ).
** YARNELL_GAMBLE
One of the most curious things about this particular video is the NAME of it.
The iPhone it was taken on did NOT put that name on the original file.
Someone decided to name this video ‘yarnell_gamble.mov’ AFTER
they saw what was ON it.
Either that was Mccord himself just copying stuff off his iPhone to a CD for the
SAIT people and Mccord himself deciding that would be good name for this
video… or it was the SAIT investigators themselves deciding it should be named
‘yarnell_gamble.mov’.
So what ‘gamble’ is the person who NAMED this movie referring to?
I don’t see anything in the video itself that amounts to any kind of
GAMBLE… but the scenario being captured by the AUDIO certainly does.
What could it be other than the fact that this video captures someone telling
Marsh to get GM to Yarnell ‘as fast as possible’ and Marsh telling him that they
are ‘already on their way… but coming from the heel of the fire’.
Given the time and conditions… that certainly sounds like a GAMBLE to me.
This would also mean that the SAIT investigators KNEW they had this and
they KNEW what this captured conversation indicated ( a GAMBLE ) the
entire time they were assembling their SAIR “narrative”.
** THE EXACT TIME AND LOCATION FOR THIS VIDEO
The exact TIME that this video was shot appears to be 1632.
That would match the conversation itself where Marsh is telling the ‘MysteryMan’
who is requesting that Granite Mountain “HURRY UP” that they are “already on
their way”. See below for more evidence on the timestamp evidence.
This video was shot with Mccord already sitting in the driver’s seat of one of the
Blue Ridge Crew Carriers while it was parked in a field over at the ‘youth camp’
on Shrine Road just west of the actual ‘Shrine of St. Joseph’ site. He shot the
video out the window of the vehicle. The Blue Ridge Hosthots are ‘mounting up’
at this moment to evacuate the Shrine area and head over to the Ranch House
Restaurant.
The exact location where Mccord shot this video is here…
34.229764, -112.755511
The BR vehicle from which the video was taken is parked just near ( and just
west of ) the tree at that location which can be seen briefly out the front
windshield at about the +0:12 mark in the video.
The structure in the background of the video with the red and white beams in the
roofing appears to be at the back of a small fenced-in animal containment area
there at the youth camp. There is about a 16 foot tall white circular ‘grain feeder’
at the western edge of this structure.
That white circular ‘feeder’ is exactly here…
34.230268, -112.755390
At about +0:08 in the video the camera accidentally focus on the left-front
Crew Carrier side mirror and we see two Blue Ridge Hotshots standing
on the ground on the left side of the Crew Carrier. Not identifed yet.
At about exact the +0:13 mark in the video a ‘freeze frame’ shows a LOT of
other vehicles ‘staged’ at this location, but I still don’t see the GM Supervisor
Truck there, even though the SAIT says that where it’s supposed to be at
this particular time.
At least TWO photos taken by Blue Ridge Hotshot Papich were taken from this
exact Shrine road ‘youth camp’ location as well and you can clearly the same
animal pen and white grain tower in the background. The first Papich photo
taken at this same spot was taken with his iPhone so you can trust the
timestamp of 4:29:38 on that photo. It also shows the Blue Ridge ATV moving
out from this ‘youth camp’ location at that moment.
The Papich photo(s) taken at this same location were apparently taken just
AFTER the Blue Ridge Convoy had left the youth camp headed directly for the
Ranch House Restaurant. If the Blue Ridge vehicles had still been there where
they are shown in the video from this location taken a few moments earlier then
they would be appearing in the foreground in this still photograph… but they are
not. They had already left this spot by 4:39:38 and were, indeed, already all the
way down at the Ranch House Restaurant ( see previous BR photo metadata
showing Frisby and others already there at the cafe’ circa 4:38 ).
The (partial) metadata for the first Papich iPhone photo is…
Camera: Apple iPhone 4
Lens: 3.9 mm
Exposure: Auto exposure, Program AE, 1/15 sec, f/2.8, ISO 1000
Flash: Off, Did not fire
File: 1,936 × 2,592 JPEG (5.0 megapixels)
Image compression: 86%
Date: June 30, 2013 – 4:29:38 PM
** HEAD ‘EM UP… MOVE ‘EM OUT…
According to Blue Ridge tracking video… this ‘mount up’ moment for the Blue
Ridge Hotshots captured in this video was at exactly 1631 at this exact location…
so that would be right around the moment this video was taken.
Actually, according to the BR tacking video, the moment the vehicles
actually throw it in drive and leave this exact spot would be 1633… but
since at least 2 Blue Ridge Hotshots were captured in the video in
the left-side mirror still just standing on the ground and not in the
vehicles yet… the video does NOT capture the exact 1633 exit moment.
So if the ‘mount up’ moment at the youth camp was 1631 but the vehicles
aren’t ‘on the move’ away from there until 1633 then I would say the
exact time for this video has to be 1632. They are not exactly leaving
at this moment but they are certainly ‘fixing to leave’.
1632 is 12 minutes after GM supposedly had already dropped into the canyon
and only 7 minutes before Steed’s first MAYDAY.
So the conversation in this video is when GM was already on their way to town,
and offers even more proof that even after they had dropped into the box
canyon… Marsh had NOT ‘caught up’ with them yet even 7 minutes before the
Mayday.
Notice in this video that Marsh is still giving ‘fire command’ the impression
that he ( DIVS A ) is still exactly where he knows they THINK he is. Marsh
talks about GM in this conversation like he already “sent them to town” and
that THEY ( but not him ) are “…coming from the heel of the fire”. Marsh
doesn’t say that HE is also ‘with them’ or even ‘following them’ at this
moment along the same route even though he obviously had every
chance to make that clear. Very, very curious behavior on Marsh’s part.
** MORE DETAIL
The ‘youth camp’ location is exactly where the SAIR says they (BR) moved
their vehicles circa 1500.
From page 20 of the SAIR…
The Blue Ridge IHC move their crew carriers toward the Shrine of St. Joseph
(the Shrine) and a youth camp area around 1500 and then start preparing for
burnout along the dozer line.
Page 14 of WFAR talks about the ‘personnel in the youth camp area’…
Between 1530 and 1545, Planning OSC and DIVS A discussed the
thunderstorm cells both to the north and south of the fire. Also at this time,
the wind picked up and shifted direction from the southwest to the
west-northwest. There was spotting and heavy ash fell onto fire personnel
working in the youth camp area. The two-mile flanking fire started to look
like a head fire and was moving to the southeast.
Page 9 of YIN notes.
Interview with Blue Ridge
NOTE: In this interview… the location of the BR vehicles being the youth
camp circa 1630 is verified… as is the moment when we can now see
where a lot of the new BR photos came from. When BR reached the
Restaurant they were all shooting pictures of the fire ( some of which
are now online ). When the news of deployment became common
knowledge… Brian Frisby told all of them to STOP taking pictures.
Excerpt from BR interview confirming Convoy exit from ‘youth camp’
and out Shrine Road to Highway 89 just after this YARNELL_GAMBLE
video was shot…
At manzanita and lockwood fire was already in the subdivision. There in the
buggies and the fire is pushing them out. Tie in with the crew at the ranch house
and hit main rd @ 1640 they make a turn, and hear yelling on Tac 1, a little further
they hear yelling on Tac 5 AA and GM7 yelling multiple times. AA says unit yelling
at AA on A/G stop yelling and stand by. Marsh cuts in and says were cut off there
cutting a deployment site, trying to burn around, cutting a deployment site, there
is panic in his voice. Todd gets on AA and says raise GM on A/G. Focused on
that Trew tries to raise GM on crew. He hears a keyed mic. Trew gets a crew
member and sits him in GM trucks and says listen for anything on the radio.
1 minute later he hears click click. Brendan was w/ BR. B-33 is on scene trying
to make passes calling them. Trying to get GM and pin point their location. Fire
behavior was extreme. 1 helicopter dropped at manzanita and lockwood
intersection then the VLAT dropped in town. NE wind couldn’t see anywhere
near GM location, but no 50mph winds more like 20-30mph. 1645ish is there
best guess at when it all happened. Tied in with the crew at the restaurant
everyone understood what had happened a few guys snapping photos of the fire
not because of the deployment Brian said put them away. Started gathering a
task force of medical people, paramedics, drivers, medical equipment, but
there was no real access. People coming in/out all over. B & T met w/ Ball 2 T6
engines and a WT. They were told to go in and do something.
END OF BLUE RIDGE SAIT INTERVIEW EXCERPT
PS to “Robert the Second” ( RTS )
Aren’t you the one who says you know this Paul Musser guy,
and you have actually SPOKEN to him before?
Any chance you could get this Musser guy to confirm or deny that
that is him speaking in this Blue Ridge Hotshot video?
Correction for above with regards to the ‘Papich’ photos.
I was wrong about them being taken AFTER the video.
They appear to have been taken (just) BEFORE the video.
The reason the BR Carrier from which the video would be shot
moments later doesn’t appear in the Papich photos is because
they appear to be just out of frame to the right of his camera.
There’s just so much noise around that first voice. I don’t even remotely have the video editing skills to do it, but it is possible (and not all that difficult, if you know how to do it) to isolate all that noise and cut it out so as to just hear the voice. Do you have any friends that might know how to do that?
I think this is really important. When I was first going thru all this stuff, I looked at this video several times. I was like “why are you shooting this vertical??????????” Everybody knows you don’t shoot video vertical. So it’s clear the point of capturing this is not the visuals, it’s the audio. And, yes, I think the naming of it as “Gamble” means something. I caught that early on. Like what????? I would bet McCord did that naming.
And, yes, I could hear that second voice being Marsh loud and clear the first time I heard it.
It seems to me like McCord was shooting this because he HEARD something that he thought was important and started just recording, not for the visual but for the audio. Which would mean there was something he thought was important that he heard before he started recording this.
On an aside, but possibly related. I have always wondered what was the reason the Globe Type 2 (and now we know Inmate Hand) Crew was in the Shrine area (fortunately for us) in the first place. Apparently, from this video, they even stayed there after Blue Ridge mostly left. I’ve never understood that. Possibly only a conversation with them could reveal that. Since I don’t have access to the ADOSH interview notes that Elizabeth has, all I know is that “they” were interviewed, but I don’t know what they said when they were.
If you watch the Blue Ridge GPS tracking video…
they ‘put in in gear’ and leave their parking spots at
the youth camp at 1633 and are ‘outta there’… but
suddenly the entire convoy stops for a minute at
the St. Joseph Shrine parking lot on their way out.
That’s exactly where the helmet-cam video was
shot and according to the timing… those guys
must have already been there ( for whatever
reason… because as the video shows… they
had no gear on and weren’t really doing anything ).
The Blue Ridge guys must have just stopped
to talk with them and/or warn them they better
get out of there… then the entire convoy ‘put it
in gear’ again, exited Shrine road ASAP, and
went directly to the Ranch House Restaurant.
It was only just a few minutes after the Convoy
had ‘stopped to talk to them’ and moved on
that the helmet-cam video was about to start.
On another note, before I go back to bed, after letting this sink in a bit. It’s interesting, given this, that Musser isn’t named in the lawsuits but Willis is. Because Musser fessed up that he had asked GM if they could spare resources to help save Yarnell. But, according to his fessing up, he had only asked. If Musser only asked, then, according to this (if we can get a clear transcript of it), apparently Musser may have been doing a slight bit more than just “asking.”
Obviously, it’s time to stock up on popcorn.
Despite any direct/indirect involvement Willis may
( or certainly may not ) have had in the afternoon
decision making which led to fatalities… I think he
SHOULD have been named in the lawsuits simply
because of his title. He was the “Wildland Division
Chief” for Prescott and he was in charge of that
program… and there still a lot of questions to
be asked/answered regarding that entire program.
Willis IS named in the lawsuits, along with Hall, Shumate, and Abel.
Yes. I botched that one up above.
What I was TRYING to say is that
while I know Willis IS named in the
lawsuits ( and I think he SHOULD be
because of his job title )… I don’t
think there is as clear a line for
naming Musser in the suits as well.
Not yet, anyway.
I’m not sure that even if Musser
absolutely ORDERED them to
‘come down ASAP no matter what’
that he could actually be held
personally liable in a wrongful
death suit. The people he was
working for, maybe… but him
personally?… Dunno. That
gets *really* complicated.
Gotcha. Thx.
What I think I can hear:
0:00 – 0:10 MM: “…how many you’ve got, uh, comin’ down here, pretty [good if you could? difficult to?] come a little faster [?] but […] if you’re [? cuts out?] to the community.” [beep]
0:12 – 0:14 EM: “Uh, there comin’ from the heel of the fire.”
Thanks, Sitta. Your ‘brackets’ look just like the ones I
started with regarding what can be CLEARLY heard
and what is DIFFICULT to hear.
That’s when I listened over and over and over and over
and tried to ‘refine the brackets’.
So regardless of how those ‘bracketed’ section refine
to any particular pair of ears… you just demonstrated
that the most IMPORTANT parts of that conversation
are, in fact, understandable.
I also think that despite what others might ‘fill in the
brackets’ with… it doesn’t change the actual
meaning of the conversation we are now hearing.
‘MysteryMan’ was urging Marsh and/or GM to get ‘down’
‘as fast as you can’ and Marsh replies ( somewhat
exasperated ) that what ‘MysteryMan’ is requesting is
ALREADY happening ( circa 1632 ).
Actually… you can throw away everything ‘MysteryMan’
even says there and I don’t think there’s any question
that it is Marsh responding and he says exactly what
he does. It’s CLEAR in the audio.
So even just that ‘response’ captured in this video
is VERY significant given the TIME ( 1632 ).
My guess. The first part is the hardest to understand and I think my guess about this was realized after identifying the second part of MM comment that sounds like…..come down and help us get this to go a little faster but if you are commited I understand.
After hearing this numerous times my WILDEST guess at the very beginning would be …way you could. As in “anyway you could”
So I think MM says Anyway you could come down to help us get this to go a little faster (?) but if you are commited I understand.
If the second voice is Marsh, then he sure doesn’t sound like he is on the move or exerted. If I am correct, what would “help us get this to go a little faster” mean??
I haven’t had my coffee yet, but I did look at the video in lightroom which, unfortunately doesn’t show the metadata all that well and neither does Bridge. I’m definitely gonna have to get that plug-in.
The video was MADE at 11:27 PM on July 30, according to the metadata. Using Apple Quicktime, which means he must have MADE it that night on a computer. So, he would have downloaded the original onto a computer and saved it as “yarnell_gamble” at that time.
And it’s the only one of his videos that he re-named, so he must have thought it was significant.
He must have thought it was significant for at
least 2 reasons…
1) He knew he shot it right NEAR the time of the
first MAYDAY call from Steed ( which came less
than 8 minutes after this video ).
2) He may not have been able to hear anything
clearly in the ‘MysteryMan’ part but he KNEW
that was Eric Marsh saying “ah… they’re
comin’ from the heel of the fire”… and he
knew who THEY were… Granite Mountain.
Everyone does realize that… even if ‘MysteryMan’s
words remain totally debatable… if that really IS
Eric Marsh clearly saying “ah… they’re comin’
from the heel of the fire” at 1632…
…then the SAIR’s claim that that had “no verifiable
communications from them” for 30-37 minutes
is absolute HOGWASH.
That is… unless that is where the ‘lawyer speak’
comes into play in the SAIR. The knew they had
this communication and they knew the time…
but as long as they made no attempt to VERIFY
it… then they could still get away with saying
what they did in the SAIR…
“We have VERIFIED communications”.
Sorry… typo in last post. Should have been…
“We have NO VERIFIED communications.”
WtKtt you are being over dramatic again. You used the word “pressure” in your post at least 7 times. I don’t see this as being that much pressure on Marsh.
I agree with Calvin and I hear a “faster, but if you are committed” phrase in there. I think as soon as he adds “but” it gives Marsh an out. At this point Marsh already knew they were wanted in Yarnell and they had already made the decision to head that way. So after this conversation, he didn’t get in touch with Steed and tell him to march through the green to get there faster, they were likely already in the green at this time.
I think all this new video shows is someone (Musser?) knew they where headed towards town, but not which route. I don’t think it at all played into the decision to cut through the green.
jeff i,
Agreed. See my 10:12 a.m. post below.
It could NOT have played into the decision to drop into
the fuel-filled box canyon. They ( Steed and Crew )
were ALREADY IN IT when this video was shot.
See above. You can toss out everything ‘MysterMan’
says or asks and this captured transmission still
represents proof that PRESSURE was being applied
to Marsh to ‘get those resources to town’.
That makes the SAIR a total lie.
There was no ’30’ minute blackout
There was no ‘We don’t know what they were doing
or what decisions were made’.
Marsh is clearly telling ‘MysterMan’ that the previous
request from him ( and or others ) is currently being
fulfilled… just 8 minutes before those men ran into
a wall of flames.
I still say that this was not pressure on Marsh, he already knew they were needed in town so he got them headed that way. He also knew it was getting critical down there so they would need to move in an expedited way, so someone saying something like this is just reiterating what he already felt. Its not pressure that he felt, just a will to do something useful with his crew.
I don’t think its quite right to call the SAIR a total lie. Clearly they never heard this audio or they would have never mentioned the 30 min gap. They had no reason to hide this no matter how much you would like to believe that they would. At best, this points out a deficiency in reviewing available material.
>> Just a will to do something useful
>> with HIS crew.
>> Clearly they never heard this audio.
>> They had no reason to hide this
>> A deficiency in reviewing available
>> material.
Wow.
It is not very often I am at a loss for words…
…but this is one of those times.
I know where I’ve heard these kinds of words before. Lots of these kinds of words.
It was when I spent seven months, starting almost four years ago, on what could now be called an ASAIT regarding Deepwater Horizon, where 19 other men died awful firey deaths. These are exactly the kinds of words we heard ALL THE TIME.
Forgot to say it’s “yarnell- Papich 006.jpg” folder.
Gotcha. That is definitely a photo of the documented meeting
that took place just after Rance Marquez ( DIVS Z ) finally
showed up that day ( at 12:10 PM )… but according to other
proof that means it can’t be Frisby in this photo. See below.
Metadata ( partial ) for this photo…
Camera: Apple iPhone 4S
Lens: 4.3 mm
Digital Zoom: 2.407487792
Exposure: Auto exposure, Program AE, 1/1,325 sec, f/2.4, ISO 50
Flash: On, Fired
File: 2,448 × 3,264 JPEG (8.0 megapixels)
Image compression: 93%
Date: June 30, 2013 – 12:20:44 PM
Left to right…
Bald guy: Don’t know. BR Dozer guy Cory Ball?
Guy with X radio suspenders on: Don’t know.
Guy in the yellow shirt: I would say has to be Rance Marquez
Guy on far right with ball cap: Looks like Frisby from behind
but unless Frisby got down from his face-to-face meeting with
Marsh out at the anchor point 10 minutes earlier than the
SAIR says then it can’t be him.
BR Hotshot sitting on truck far right of frame: Don’t know.
With an exact timestamp of 12:20 PM then this would be
the Rance Marquez ( DIVS Z ) meeting described in the
on page 21 of the SAIR…
Division Supervisor Zulu (DIVS Z), a single resource ordered
for the Type 3 team, arrives at the Blue Ridge crew carriers
around 1210 and calls DIVS A to discuss a division break and
resource assignments. DIVS Z is having radio problems, so he
uses a Blue Ridge crew radio to talk with DIVS A over the Blue
Ridge intra-crew frequency. DIVS A and DIVS Z cannot agree on
the break location or associated supervisory responsibilities, resulting in uncertainty among some personnel about the physical
break between Divisions Alpha and Zulu.
** Arguments between Marsh and Marquez took place DURING
** the face-to-face meeting between Frisby/Brown + Marsh/Steed.
SAIR says this face-to-face with Frisby / Brown / Marsh / Steed
all the way up at the anchor point was happening from NOON to
12:30 PM. The Blue Ridge GPS tracking video has actually
confirmed this already.
SAIR … page 19.
A little before noon, on the two-track road just below the saddle, BR Supt and BR Capt meet DIVS A and GM Capt at the anchor point. Over the next half hour, they discuss tactics and agree to use a Granite Mountain crewmember as a lookout (GM Lookout). GM Lookout identifies a lookout spot down near the old grader at the bottom of the slope, and GM Capt agrees it will be a good vantage point. BR Supt, BR Capt, DIVS A, and GM Capt also discuss problems with radios on the incident, noting some radios do not
have appropriate tone guards and communication is adversely
affected.
New Blue Ridge Hotshots photo.
In the Mccord folder in Mr. Dougherty’s online dropbox.
https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/sh/dpmmrutwwk4a45b/gRF8ZJYv4b/Mccord/yarnell%20106.jpg?token_hash=AAGuVE3ZIhVfFAC9jz9iEqPzYrufTHs5UuYgyDb2iSBBaQ
Metadata ( partial )…
Camera: Nikon COOLPIX S01
Lens: 4.1 mm (Max aperture f/3.2)
Exposure: Auto exposure, Program AE, 1/125 sec, f/3.3, ISO 80
Flash: Off, Did not fire
Focus: AF-F, Center
AF Area Mode: Single Area
Date: June 30, 2013, 4:38:49 PM
This photo puts the Blue Ridge Hotshots in the parking lot of the Ranch
House Restaurant at 4:38:49 ( 11 seconds before 4:39 ).
They are all already OUT of their vehicles and just standing around.
Some minutes have already elapsed since they got there and got out of
their vehicles so that means their Convoy exit from the Shrine area arrived
earlier than has previously been thought.
This also appears to be a moment right after Captain Jesse Steed’s
first MAYDAY call because they all appear to be pretty concerned
and/or focused on the guy ( Brown? ) with the radio.
If that is the case ( what do others think? ) then Steed’s MAYDAY may
have come even earlier than the SAIR timestamp of 1639.
By the way… that is… in fact… BR Supt Brian Frisby right there in the
center with the ball cap which also means that is definitely him captured
in the Russ Reason video taken at the same location following the
deployment and burnover.
Copy. Thank you!
PS Do you have any idea who anybody else is in this picture?
I’ve been able to maximize it in lightroom, pulling all that darkness out. I keyworded it, so it’s now possible to id him in other photos, if he’s there.
Also in the Papich Folder there is that meeting out there where BR and GM vehicles are parked. Shows the red truck, maybe Marquez and somebody else from Overhead. I’m trying to tag them. What do you think?
Do you think Frisbee is in this? (I can’t imagine he isn’t). Do you have any idea who the bald guy might be?
I really don’t know what the importance of this, in the general overall context of the whole thing. But I do remember there were some conversations about this convocation awhile back, and this is a good image of that.
Forgot to say it’s “yarnell- Papich 006.jpg” in the Papich Folder.
Marti… the importance of the ‘meetings’ that did ( or did
not ) actually take place out at that ‘staging area’ out
on Sesame Trail that day… and exactly WHO was or
wasn’t there for them… dates back to the very first days
of this ongoing discussion.
It’s a little complicated… but let me try a 411 on this.
The SAIR says that a very important ‘meeting’ took place
out there in the MORNING when (supposedly) some very
important things happened with regards to ‘situational
awareness’ for Granite Mountain and whether or not both
Eric Marsh AND Captain Steed ( and his crew ) were fully
informed by management about the ‘Boulder Springs
Ranch’.
The SAIR says all of those people were ‘doubly briefed’
about the ‘ranch’ out there at that time. They even
said that Eric Marsh was there, at the vehicles, for
that briefing when we know now nothing could be
further from the truth. He had been up on the ridge
for almost an hour before that ‘supposed’ meeting
took place.
There is still no definitive evidence that this important
‘situational awareness’ meeting for Granite Mountain
that the SAIR says happened out there that morning
ever really happened at all.
With regards to the ‘meetings’ that took place LATER
out there where the ‘crew buggies were parked’…
that all focuses on these ‘arguments’ that happened
when this guy Rance Marquez shows up at NOON,
hours after a plan was already being worked on, and
only then wants to start talking about him being hired
to be DIVS Z and wanting to start drawing ‘division
lines’ and ‘boundaries’ on an already in-place plan.
Since ADOSH and WFAR came out… and the SAIT
investigation notes became public… when Marquez
actually got there and when these ‘arguments’ with
Eric Marsh took place has been better established…
…but when there was only the SAIR to rely on for this
‘Marquez’ stuff… it was very, very confusing.
I think others have had a lot of OTHER questions about
the actual activity out there ( WHO, WHAT, WHEN )
like Calvin, etc… but I am forgetting myself what all
the various concerns/questions were/are.
p7 YIN BR….Driving up to the saddle is when Eric became Alpha. Driving up to the saddle, Rance called Eric and said I’m Zulu. Just B4 rance showed up, Travis radioed B & T and said there are 2 guys flying your way. It was Rance he tied in w/ Cory w/ the dozer.
P36 YIN Marquez…..I grabbed a lunch and, at the last minute, paired up with Cogan Carothers.
Hmmm… I guess these are the two guys Travis called B&T about?
P36 YIN Marquez…Went past the buggies about a quarter of a mile and tied in with the dozer.
I think there are photos to support this.
p37 YIN Marquez….1400-1415: I got back on the horn with Eric to iron out the plan.
Later same page(no time assigned but not chronologic from above statement) …Eric couldn’t find a way to get to the fire. Blue Ridge was scouting around and asked what I was doing there. I told them I was here to find the division break. The Blue Ridge sups were going down washes etc on the ATV trying to find a way to get to the fire.
I think this “going down washes on the ATV” is documented on the BR capt movement video.
B & T may be Brian (Frisby) and Trueheart (Brown) from Blue Ridge Hotshots.
Thank you!
I think I’ve read that three times over the past 24 hours and still have a hard time translating it. Every time someone complains about how Joy/Sonnie write, I want to say, “Try reading the official interview reports!”
And, yes, Sitta, I agree B + T = Brian and Trueheart (otherwise known as Trew). And then sometimes Travis gets thrown in the convo peridically just to confuse me more.
And people toss around the term “tie in” for just about everything, from face to face, to radio, to cell (texting? talking?), to finding the same parking lot, to what, maybe esp???
It drives me nuts. But, hey, when those interview notes first came out and I read them, I actually put a call out on Twitter for any ff people who would like to help me by translating them. No bites.
I finally decided I might be ready to go back and try reading them again only two days ago. They make 50% more sense now, so I guess that’s progress!
Hmmmmm. Looking thru the ADOSH report called “InspectionNarrativeForASFD.psd” to find the date when Willis told his totally ludicrous story about the camera. And I just found this among the list of people interviewed:
Sergeant Paulson, Structure Group 2 resource (Double Bar A Ranch, Model Creek Subdivision,Peeples Valley) ASPC-Globe inmate hand crew.”
Put that in your pipe and puff on it for awhile.
And then go watch their memorial video:
“Yarnell Hill Fire 6/30/2013 – 7/9/2013. Globe Type II Crew”
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YWkM_2fa4k0
Remember this is the crew that someone in some comment about two miles above this post identified as the crew that shot the “Last Moments” headcam video, which they clearly did. This explains something to me that I’ve been wondering about all along, but hadn’t gotten around to asking.
I had been wondering why the last moments video never showed up on their You Tube stream and just just popped up in the media. I was even gonna ask in a YouTube comment, but never around to it. And now thanks to the FOIA we have the original.
Now that I just discovered they’re a Type 2 Inmate Hand Crew, I have all kinds of total grateful respect for these guys. Massive thank you to them. So this seems to be my time this day to cry.
PS I just invited this guy on youtube to check us out. I don’t know if he will, but I just wanted to inform you all that I did.
For those who are interested, JD posted a bunch of new photos yesterday. Included is a collection from the Blue Ridge crew. In particular, WTKTT, might want to look at them. I downloaded a couple from each of the named folders, so I can see how the metada looks. There’s quite a few from the Shrine area. And the later trip into Yarnell. I really wish someone had snapped a few from the trip to the ridge and then to the Deployment Site. But I guess they had better things to do.
And, regarding that trip, I don’t have time to get into too much detail right now, but as I was reading and re-reading the descriptions of various peoples/agencies reaching and getting into the Deployment site, it all started overlaying in my head. It appears (at least in my head) that the crewmembers mentioned in the reports that were in communication with the folks that had made it into the site, and were led to the top of the ridge, I think, by the plane and told to find the helispot, and then came down into the site and met up with the folks there, were probably Blue Ridge. According to the reports there were 4 atv’s involved in the whole group. So there may have been some others with them. But it pretty much lines up with the Blue Ridge Movements Video.
I forgot to mention. Along with those BR photos and videos, JD has provided a spread sheet identifying what each one is of. So that should be really helpful. Thank you JD!!
Yes… Kudos to our extraordinarily patient host,
Mr. Dougherty.
ALL of this new material is very important.
Even in just the first few clicks and finally being able to
see metadata on some of these photos… a lot of
ongoing mysteries are getting some answers.
More later.
Yeah, I figured you’d find them quite interesting, along with id-ing their locations for us, for which I thank you in advance.
In a recent email convo with JD, I thanked him for patiently hosting our “sometimes exasperating Alternative Serious Accident Investigation Team” campout on his website.
There’s a lot of photos of the crew. My insistent curiosity would love to know the ids of them. At least of a couple key people. JD doesn’t do that.
Marti… there are some other details about the moments you
are now describing in the full Non-redacted testimony from
the DPS Medics… Eric Tarr in particular.
What happened with the ATVs is that Ranger 58 could see
them all ( 3 or 4 ) on the ground but could not communicate
with them. Air Attack asked Ranger 58 to ‘hover’ over the
yellow bladder bags they found and the ATVs were headed
for that spot on a visual. They all had to stop and hike to
the bags ( which is where they thought GM might have been ).
It was only when Ranger 58 was sure they had the bag
location… they left there and actually started the runs that
would actually find the real deployment site.
Later… when DPS medic Tarr had been put on the ground…
he actually describes those moments when he was on the
site… saw some ‘firefighters appear up on the ridge’… and
he ‘waved them down’. The Blue Ridge GPS tracking video
shows us only Trueheart Brown making the full descent
in just 4 minutes but apparently at least 3 or 4 people
descended down to the site at that time.
Medic Tarr then describes the moments when ALL of
them hiked together over to the Ranch… then ALL of
them hiked back to the site again, with even more
firefighters.
So the site was already pretty crowded by that point, and
until Medic Tarr himself tied that ribbon you see in the
photographs onto the burnt tree stubs… there were a
lot of people walking there near the site.
Those Non-redacted DPS Office reports are here
on Mr. Dougherty’s site…
M-Law-Enforcement-No-Redactions
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/1hkbym5oq6duz13/3b8pSRE9Nf
Yes, thank you. That report was part of what I was reading so I have it. I was posting my comment totally out of my head, without all the documents in front of me. So thank you for correcting me.
It was Air Attack doing the communicating and the helicopter pinpointing the point they needed to start the search on the ground. And Blue Ridge plus or minus a few other ATVs on the ground. I don’t know how many ATVs Blue Ridge had, but I haven’t seen anything that shows they had four.
Glad to see that you all recovered from the lack of oxygen as a result of the deterministic versus probablistic model discussion.
I have to address a few questions first, then moving on. Yes, we did always post lookouts, even for mop-up, even when there was no real fire activity threat. He was also good for overall communication, watching for storms and such during lightning season, watching for smoke puffs to direct the Crew, and such. It was a good habit.
The “Mr. Shirt Sleeves Must Be Down At All Times” comment? Nope,not really. ONLY on the firelines. It’s in the Red Book and each Agency’s Safety and Health Code. And it’s merely redeeming your supervisory responsibilities and performing your supervisory duties. If you’re the BOSS, then BE the Boss. You’re not in the position to be everyon’e friend.
“The rules require gloves to be worn at all time is a rule …” NO, they don’t REQUIRE you to wear them all the time, only to HAVE them. Our guys wore them when they needed to. There were only a few REQUIRED times, like building hotline, burning out and/or holding fireline,walking down steep, rocky slopes, really hot mop-up and/orwalking through hot ground, and the like, otherwise FF discretion.
Gary Olson’s not gone, he’s an ex-cop, the’s lurking out there, so these are for you Gary. Blisters were not a big deal, part of the job. I guess our guys were tougher than Gary’s guys. It didn’t seem to bother them and we never had an issue.
One of the main things you all brought up that I just couldn’t accept were the off-the-wall examples of smoking dope and driving, drinking and driving, hauling ass going to the store in a snow or ice storm, and others. Very poor examples and pretty lame actions if you all are doing these things. They certainly did NOT further your cause.
In a nutshell, I cannot and will not accept the probabilistic model for WFF. I probably will do so in things like gambling, and such. Okay, you can stick a fork in me, I’m done. Looks like it’s going to once again be the agree to disagree thing.
Well said RTS. like WTKTT we CANT have a soft outer shell and expect everyone to agree with us every time if we missed the point change the wording and try again. One thing for sure we are all human here. And we are all searching for facts. I am headed out for dinner drinks and a fun night in Jackpot NV. an hour from ITS BIRTHDAY TIME. be back tomorrow.
“Happy Birthday To You!!” –to quote the Beatles
I have sometimes hesitated to post with something I’m not totally sure about, and I really appreciate it when people correct me. It’s the only way I can build my knowledge base. But it was a little scary the first few times.
Regardless of how we all variously orient ourselves regarding calculating probabilities, I think all of us value the conversations about the tight-rope balancing act between risk and safety.
My dad, when he was about 26 years old, flew with pilots flying him, and the team of Air Force meteorologists he was in charge of at the age of 26, in and out of typhoons in the Pacific right after World War II, so that they could do weather observations so that he could create mathematical calculations for flying aircraft into, out of, and around typhoons and hurricanes.
This was before there were any kind of rules about doing this. Because he was the one who, along with his crew, had to do this in order to write the rules in the first place.
My 94-year-old mom told me on Sunday, that he told her about the first few times they did it, that the whole airplane shook and they were all absolutely terrified the whole time.
My next thought was, “My dad was a hot-shot, no wonder I’m pinned to this story.”
My next thought was, “My dad was even more than a hot-shot because he did that before there were any rules, so that he could create the rules, so that he could help save lives.”
Which he did. He was one of those people who took serious risks, in this particular area and others (including the nuclear weapons testing program) in order to save lives.
And you know what? My mother absolutely hated it. She was the one that had to raise his kids when he was out there doing that, taking those risks to save lives, and not ever even remotely sure he would come home alive.
One of the guys that worked under him, in that team, wrote to my mom and said my dad deserved a Medal of Honor for having risked his life to do the work required to create the rules that are still in use today everywhere for flying safely in and around hurricanes and typhoons and other seriously tumultuous weather, probably even the weather around Yarnell.
So, from the daughter of one serious risk-taker to a another serious risk taker (and I’ve taken my share of pretty serious risks in my life, also) ~~
Thank you for being a part of this conversation, and sharing your wealth of knowledge and your passion of caring.
Marti
I have a question I’ve been wondering about a lot. You wrote:
“Yes, we did always post lookouts, even for mop-up, even when there was no real fire activity threat. He was also good for overall communication, watching for storms and such during lightning season, watching for smoke puffs to direct the Crew, and such. It was a good habit.”
It seems to me the case, that even well after GMHS decided, for whatever reason, to leave “the black” and head out on the two-track to that ranch down there somewhere some way, and then for whatever reason blinker to the left and down into that canyon that all of us can’t believe they were dumb enough to head down into, they should have at least posted a look-out.
Having not done THAT has been, to me at least, almost an even “dumber” decision than all the rest of the other “dumb decisions.” It has really bothered me a lot for a while, to be perfectly honest.
I happen to be of the opinion that Eric Marsh, without evidence to the contrary, didn’t intend for them to go down that way.
I really don’t know what to make of this whole point. And I think it may be actually more critical than we have realized. I really have a hard time conceiving of going down into that brush-filled canyon without a lookout, even if they thought they had time and weather conditions on their side of the bet (which they didn’t and Chuck Maxwell was desperately trying to figure out in Albuquerque how to communicate to them).
Marti,
Yes, “they should have at least posted a lookout.” It’s one of the Fire Orders (5) one of the Watch Outs (3), and one of the prongs of LCES. Marsh and the GMHS KNEW these things and yet went into a death trap anyway, without the benefit of a lookout. It was a VERY STUPID thing to do by NOT posting a lookout to at least warn them of the fire’s movements, position, speed, and such. This is one of the dumb moves these guys made where I contend the Groupthink mentality was in force. I trained a lot of those guys, they KNEW better.
When you have an experienced, skilled lookout posted, it’s a very comfortable feeling knowing that someone you trust is watching out for you and your Crew.
If you contact the Albuquerque NWS any more, get in touch with Brent Wachter, since he was the lead meteorologist on the SAIT. [email protected]
Thx for your reply. This has been on my peripheral vision, but bugging me hugely. And thx for the hedzup and email link about Brent.
Marti Reed,
I’m reposting this here because you apparently missed it posted above. It may help with one of your B/K radio questions.
“Marti Reed on January 13, 2014 at 9:04 pm said: My Radio List … “wondering if it was a different kind of radio. It’s a Bendex. Short antenna.”
There is a new Bendix King “P-series radio” now that’s smaller, about half the size of the older B/K handheld radios. Check out the link below and see if that helps any.
http://www.bendixkingradios.com/bk-radio-handhelds/p-series-bendix-king-handhelds/
And as far as the NUMBER of radios used on the Crew, eleven (11) is A LOT of radios to be on the Crew at any one time. TOTALLY, it’s NOT, but to have that many at one time on the Crew is a lot, I think.
Fullsail, Gary, Bob – how many radios did you carry at any one time on the firelines on Flagstaff, Happy Jack or Santa Fe, and Oak Grove? I kinda doubt you carried eleven at a time.
We had that many TOTAL radios but only carried eight (8) on the fireline at any one time, that was plenty. One each for the Supt, Foreman, Squad Bosses, Senior Crewmembers, and a Sawyer or two while on the fireline. The others we carried as ‘spares’ in case any went Tango-Uniform.”
RTS I did see that and responded that, actually, there were TWELVE radios, when you include Brendan’s. And thank you for the link. I’m going to do a little comparison and that definitely will help.
The more I think about it, the more I’m thinking they may have borrowed some radios from PFD. Chris’ radio had a label on it which said “CHRIS.” I didn’t see any more with names on them. But camera direction had a lot to do with that. I was wondering if other folks had that kind of “ownership” of their radios. Some showed a “Prescott Fire Department” label on them. I’m just working off the top of my head here, not looking at the photos. It still seems like 12 is a heck-of-a-lot of radios to be actually hauling around out there in packs.
And also something that shows my non-familiarity with radios. I’ve been trying to get a bead on how they’re used. Sometimes it seems they’re used hand-held, and sometimes (like in that photo/videos of Jesse Steed, he’s using a microphone attached to a radio that is, I guess, clipped to a pack pocket, it looks like. The mic is attached to the radio with a coiled cord. What’s that microphone actually called?
Also. One of the piles with a radio that is probably a pack, has something that is the right size and shape of a radio that looks like some kind of a case. Do folks use cases on their radios?
Actually, it would be really great to have ppl w/hot shot experiece look at those YCSO photos that Elizabeth has provided us with. I see all kinds of things that I have absolutely no idea what they are. It’s pretty much a waste of my time for me to try to figure out and describe what all’s lying around, For example I don’t know what a rhino is. This is just pretty way out of my skills level to say much of anything more about the site.
I just took on the deployment site because I saw Chris’ camera lying there right in the middle of it and decided to try to figure out what happened to it, because cameras and photographs ARE very much in my skills level. And along the way I had to learn/figure out a whole bunch of things I knew nothing about previously. But I’m really trying to wrap up this project. I’m willing to answer questions as I can, but I’m not going to be doing very much more digging, unless something in particular captures my fancy.
Marti,
Some WFF use a radio and/or chest harness, some carry them at their waist and use the microphone cord attched to their collar or shirt (you had it right), some use hard cases that come with each radio, some in a side pouch of their fire pack, several different ways. Usually you want to be able to get to it quickly to switch channels or whatever.
A “RHINO” is a shovel that is cut off at the tip and then the shovel portion is bent over backwards. It kinda looks like a big hoe maybe.
Thank you!!!
P27 SAIR….The aircraft crew is in the middle of a discussion with OPS1 on the air-to-ground frequency and the pilot is talking to the VLAT on the air-to-air frequency when an overmodulated and static-filled transmission comes over the air-to-ground frequency at 1639:
WTKTT and Sitta…. It appears the first part of the helmet camera captures the conversation between B33 and OPS1. The same OPS1 who said something about Air Support, down there, ASAP less than one hour earlier.
Calvin… yes. I don’t think there’s any question those are the
same moments.
Regarding your previous observation about that being Willis
near the later half of this same contiguous video. You are
absolutely right. It IS Willis… just moments after the
deployment… telling someone he is ‘coming down’ from
where he is… near the ICP up at the Model Creek School
in Peeples Valley.
Guess who that is he is speaking with?
I am almost certain it is Brendan McDonough.
See what you think.
The voice matches his public video interviews.
That would mean that Willis most certainly did not ‘first hear
of the deployment’ from OPS1 Todd Abel in a CELLPHONE
call at 4:45 PM ( as he said in his SAIT inverview ).
It means Willis WAS ‘listening’ in real time and just seconds
after the deployment he was trying to verify where Brendan
was and was already ‘heading down there’.
>> calvin also wrote…
>> P27 SAIR
>> …an overmodulated and static-filled transmission comes
>> over the air-to-ground frequency at 1639:
That is the SAIR narrative about to report Captain Jesse
Steed’s first MAYDAY… “We are in front of the flaming front”.
However… I have listened to that moment now over and over
and I believe the SAIR’s description of it is just plain WRONG.
It is NOT “over-modulated” and/or “static filled”.
Jesse Steed is actually YELLING ( almost at the top of his
lungs ) because there are at least TWO chain saws running
full-blast right there next to him. He is YELLING just as much
to hear himself as for the benefit of anyone listening.
Give that moment another close listen yourself and see
what you think.
If the saws were actually running already even on that first
MAYDAY call from Steed then that would actually change
the entire timeline as to when they actually first realized they
were in danger.
It would means a whole bunch of things had ALREADY happened
before that first MAYDAY call from Steed and a fair amount of time
had gone by before we hear from Steed.
Example…
1) They actually realized they were in trouble.
2) The spread-out single line of men had to ‘pull up’ into a group.
3) A terrible decision had to be made.
4) A place to deploy had to be found.
5) Everyone had to assemble into that ‘found’ place.
6) Everyone had to be instructed what to do then.
7) The sawyers had to pull the chain travel sleeves,
pull the ropes, fire up, and get to work.
8) Steed had to ‘select’ Channel 16 on purpose.
( He messes up and actually picks Channel 10 instead…
but perfectly understandable given circumstances ).
9) Steed sends the first MAYDAY call out on Air-To-Ground (Ch 10).
This could actually put the moment they realized they were in
deep trouble all the way back to mere SECONDS after the
moment two minutes before the MAYDAY when we also heard
Marsh casually transmit “That’s where we want retardant” at 1637.
Also… followup… while you are giving another listen
to those points in the video… stop and listen closely
to that first ‘static from the deployment’ site transmission
just after the helmet-cam operator has gotten back
in his truck and is leaving the Shrine parking lot.
It is NOT just static. There is a VOICE in there trying
to SAY something.
I can’t quite make it out. Maybe you can.
Best I can make out is that the caller is saying
something about “the bowl”… like… “We are in
the center of the bowl”… or something like that.
Calvin… scratch last post. I listened to it again
just now and the VOICE in there doesn’t seem
to say enough words for something like…
“We are in the center of the bowl”.
It’s too short…. but I still think last word is ‘bowl’.
Could have only had time to say something like…
“We are in the bowl”.
I believe you are right that the first “screaming” we are in front of the flaming front is because of the roaring chainsaws around him. (great catch)
I do not think Willis is speaking to Mcdonough… I just do not hear his voice there. Also, I am just wondering if Willis could have been referring to coming out by the Store All from the area directly west of 89 and not from the north. Remember, Tony Sciacca parked in that area, and I just do not think he took off walking.
Also, have you seen the McDonough picture after getting in Supt truck and driving (possibly north on 89)? Actually it appears there are three of those pictures.
Calvin… see a long post below about the
McDonough Highway 89 pictures.
Those 3 pics were all taken just 2 seconds apart
as McDonough exited the Sesame area through
Lakewood Drive in Glen Ilah. He had just emerged
from Glen Ilah and turned north on Hwy 89 when
he snapped those pics at 4:02 PM…
That is EXACTLY the same moment Christopher
was filming his videos out west.
So we already knew that Brendan heard all
the crucial conversations. Now we know
EXACTLY where he was when he did.
He was not ‘outside’ somewhere.
He did not ‘go to the bathroom’ or anything.
He was sitting right there (alone) in the GM
Supervisor truck hearing EVERYTHING.
I still think that *may* be him talking to Willis
in the helmet-cam video… but you are right…
that’s going to take some more ‘ear work’.
WTKTT said….This could actually put the moment they realized they were in
deep trouble all the way back to mere SECONDS after the
moment two minutes before the MAYDAY when we also heard
Marsh casually transmit “That’s where we want retardant” at 1637.
I agree 100%
When the helmet camera begins videoing, the camera operator is fully aware of the situation that is unfolding. He didn’t just happen to turn on the camera and catch this ever important sequence, he knew what was happening and turned on the video. (my opinion)
I agree with you, Calvin. I think that was happening
all day long… from why Christopher MacKenzie
would chose the moment he did to shoot the
(apparently) only 2 videos he did… to the new
YARNELL_GAMBLE video, to the only video
that McDonough shot which almost captures
the mid-air collision. Others…
In each case… I think the camera operator just
knew something important was happening or
just about to happen. Something unusual.
Something ‘out of the ordinary’.
**
** SOME SHELTERS MAY HAVE BEEN BLOWN OFF
** FIREFIGHTERS BY THE RANGER 58 HELICOPTER
>> On January 11, 2014 at 9:34 pm, Marti Reed said…
>>
>> According to the SAIR, 11 were found wearing gloves.
>> Of the eight not indicated, five were found outside their shelters…
>> with all that implies… so who can possibly know whether they
>> were wearing gloves or not.
>>
>> On January 12, 2014 at 5:57 pm, Gary Olson responded…
>>
>> Thanks for the info. FYI – I don’t think leather gloves would have
>> been entirely consumed by the fire even on those who were
>> outside their shelters. So…maybe we could mark that one down
>> to a Lesson Learned from the Yarnell Hill Fire? Remind and
>> reemphasize to all wildland firefighters to keep track of their gloves,
>> wear their gloves, and have an extra pair of gloves in their fire
>> shelters pouches?
>>
>> On January 13, 2014 at 8:31 am, Marti Reed responded…
>>
>> I do think the evidence may lean in that direction.
There is, in fact, every reason to believe that for any firefighters NOT wearing
gloves at deployment time there was a greater chance they wouldn’t be able to
hold onto their shelters when the heat at the edges rose…
…but before anyone makes that a direct ‘takeaway’ from the Yarnell Fire I think
an important thing needs to be considered.
Just because the SAIR said certain men were found outside their shelters, or that
their shelters had been ‘blown off’ them because of ‘winds at the deployment site’
( or because they lost their grip ) doesn’t mean that is actually TRUE.
Now that the Non-redacted Police Reports are available there is new evidence
that many/most of the shelters that might have ‘blown off’ the firefighters at the
site didn’t happen because of any fire winds or because they weren’t able to
‘hang on’ to them ( for glove related or whatever reasons )…
…there is now evidence that many/most of them may have been simply
‘blown off’ the firefighters long after the burnover event when the Ranger 58
Rescue Helicopter tried to make TWO separate ‘close’ landings at the
deployment site.
In his testimony… DPS Medic Eric Tarr says that once they found the collection
of shelters from the air they ‘circled the site at LOW altitude’ for a while and then
made at least TWO separate attempts to land close by… but the chopper was
kicking up too much ash and dust to complete the ‘close’ landings.
That’s when the pilot ‘backed off’ and landed at a spot 500 yards away and Tarr
then exited the chopper and hiked over to the deployment site.
The Pilot’s testimony ( see below ) confirms these attempted ‘close’ landings
right near the deployment site and also confirms that he had to ‘abort’ each of
those attempts as the powerful rotor wash started hitting the ground near the
site and kicking up too much ash and dust for a safe landing.
If the rotor wash during the attempted ‘close’ landings was kicking up so much
ash and dust that it made it dangerous to complete the landings then the same
powerful rotor wash could have been blowing things around at the deployment
site itself.
DPS Officer Charles Main was also onboard that Ranger 58 helicopter.
While Ranger 58 was ‘circling at LOW altitude’ and ‘observing the site’, and
BEFORE the Ranger 58 helicopter had made those several attempts to land
right there near the deployment site… Officer Main has now said in HIS testimony
that he only saw ‘2 to 3 identifiable bodies’ ( not under shelters ) down there
at the site.
After these multiple (close) landing attempts ( and then the real landing 500
yards away ) and Officer Tarr arrived at the site on foot… he is then only
reporting ‘about 5’ firefighters inside shelters at all with the rest ( about 14 )
being “outside their shelters and obviously deceased”.
That’s quite a difference in ‘observations’ as to who was or was not
‘inside a shelter’ just a few minutes apart.
It is *possible*, then, that the several attempted ‘close’ landings by the
Ranger 58 helicopter itself is what actually BLEW many/most of the shelters
OFF of the firefighters… and NOT any ‘fire winds’ as reported by the SAIR
or any speculation about who was or wasn’t able to ‘hang onto the sides
of their shelter’ during the burnover for whatever reasons.
** THE LONG STORY AND THE DPS TESTIMONY
From page 89 of the SAIR…
Individual PPE Analysis: ( from SAIT Deployment Site Analysis ).
SUMMARY…
7 firefighters fully deployed, completely in shelters.
4 firefighters mostly deployed, almost completely in shelters.
5 firefighters not fully deployed, shelters found underneath them.
3 firefighters not fully deployed, shelters found beside them.
So according to the SAIR… 11 firefighters would have appeared to have been
‘fully inside’ their shelters from a helicopter circling at LOW altitude and
‘observing the site’… but 8 of them should have appeared to have been
‘outside their shelters’ from the same low-altitude vantage point.
DPS Officer Main, in the chopper at that time, only reported being able to see ONLY ‘2 or 3 bodies’ ( outside shelters ) from the helicopter. Officer Main was
able to see the site clearly enough to only see 2-3 bodies and also clearly
enough to observe that the shelters ‘did not appear to survive the intense fire’,
so they must have been pretty LOW at that time and must have had a pretty
good view of what was below when he made these ‘observations’.
Officer Main’s signed testimony doesn’t match what the SAIR eventually
said about the deployment site ( and fire shelters ) at all.
Ranger 58 did, in fact, take AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHS of the deployment site,
exactly the way it looked just 2 hours after the burnover… but unfortunately
they didn’t take these deployment site photographs until AFTER they had
already tried to make the TWO ‘close landings’ near the site itself.
Below is the actual testimony that talks all about these observations and the ‘low
altitude’ circling and the multiple (aborted) attempts to LAND the helicopter right
there near the deployment site.
These DPS Officer testimony excerpts come from the original document
posted online by Mr. John Dougherty at this link…
M-Law-Enforcement-No-Redactions
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/1hkbym5oq6duz13/3b8pSRE9Nf
Page 10 of the Non-redacted YCSO Police Report…
Testimony of Officer/Paramedic Charles Main #6868,
Arizona Department of Public Safety
Duty Aircraft, Phoenix Ranger N58AZ, Bell 407 Helicopter.
At approximately 1810 hours, the shelters were found in the area of co-ordinates
34 13.22N, 112 46.07W. Officer/Paramedic Tarr spotted the shelters and Ranger
flew over the area to get an initial observation of the situation. Officer/Paramedic
Tarr stated he needed to get down to the scene to be able to verify if there were
any survivors. I was able to see 2-3 bodies outside of the shelters and the
shelters initially did not appear to survive the intense fire.
Page 7 of the Non-redacted YCSO Police Report…
Testimony of Officer/Paramedic Eric Tarr #5569,
Arizona Department of Public Safety
Duty Aircraft, Phoenix Ranger N58AZ, Bell 407 Helicopter.
I saw the ranch house appear through the smoke and knew the Firefighters had
said they were trying to get to a ranch house from their prior radio transmissions.
We began searching towards the Ranch house from the ridgeline when I located
a group of deployed fire shelters off the nose of the aircraft at approximately 1810
hours. I directed the pilot to the location of the fire shelters where we circled at
low altitude. We attempted TWICE to land CLOSER to the scene but the area
was still hot with too much blowing ash and dust to land safely. ( Later, after
landing 500 yards away and hiking to the site…) As I approached the (deployed)
shelters I observed multiple firefighters who were obviously deceased. I had not
seen this from the air, but had been advised by Officer Main that he had seen
what appeared to be ( 2-3 ) bodies at the site from the air. The majority ( 10+ )
of the Firefighters were obviously deceased and lying outside of their shelters in
various positions. There were approximately 5 fire shelters that appeared to be
intact which had Firefighters still under them. (Later) While I was taping off the
south side of the scene, Ranger 58 arrived back over the scene and advised me
they had a Yavapai County Sheriff Deputy on board and were taking aerial
photographs of the scene.
Page 13 of the Non-redacted YCSO Police Report…
Testimony of Pilot Clifford Brunsting #4589,
Arizona Department of Public Safety
Duty Aircraft, Phoenix Ranger N58AZ, Bell 407 Helicopter.
At 1812 hours as I was descending down the ridge towards the ranch Officer
Tarr spotted some shelters to the left of the aircraft down in the flat area.
I made a left hand turn towards the shelters and circled them in a counter
clockwise pattern. There was clearly a cluster of fire shelters in the area but
as we circled we saw no movement or signs of life. Officer Tarr relayed these
coordinates to Air Attack at this time. I attempted several landings in rocky areas
nearby but was unable to land because of the heat and ash that the rotor system
stirred up. I was afraid of possible damage to the engine if I flew in a cloud of ash
for a prolonged period of time but I wanted to find a safe place to land to get a
medic on scene. Turning towards the ranch I realized that it would be impossible
to land there because of obstructions and it also looked very dusty. I located a
small clearing just north of the ranch along a road that I thought I could fit into
with minimal dust which was also about 4 to 5 hundred yards from the scene
and accessible by foot. I made a safe landing there and Officer Tarr exited the
aircraft with his medical bag and a fire shelter and proceeded to the area of the
deployed shelters.
Thank you! This may actually be why some of the shelter locations didn’t make any sense when I tried to sync them to the Body Map. It really stumped me. I had to make what felt to me to be some pretty wild guesses. And it’s hard to describe in sentences what I was trying to figure out, so I just didn’t say anything about it. But what you’re describing here does make those weird shelter locations in the YCSO photos make a lot more sense.
The 5 with shelters underneath them is interesting. Would indicate for sure that they absolutely did not deploy My guess. Which means the hot air or fire hit them fast. A question was Marsh 1 of those 5?
Mr. Powers… you should read the ‘Non-redacted’
police reports posted by Mr. Dougherty at the
link above.
The incident reports from all 3 Ranger 58 officers
( Medic Tarr included ) are very professional and
not ‘gross’ in any way… but there ARE some
details in there about exactly what Medic Tarr
had to do at the site to confirm the condition
of every firefighter. He talks in there about some
rigor and having to have ‘rolled’ and/or ‘turned’
some victims to do his job. He says that he
tried to ‘turn them back over’ as best he could
but that activity might account for why some of
the shelters ended up UNDER some of the
firefighters by the time the SAIT got to inspect
the site.
The shelters might have been just sort of
‘beside’ them or ‘partially blown off’ by either
the fire or helicopter approaches… but in
the course of Tarr ‘turning’ or ‘rolling’ to do his
important job they may have ended up ‘on
top of’ those shelters.
As for Eric Marsh… you may be right.
The report on his ‘Shelter use’ in the SAIR
indicates his deployment position was closer
to the oncoming fire / gases than anyone else
and the evidence suggests he was still in the
act of ‘stepping into’ his shelter when something
prevented him from even finishing that task.
From the SAIR…
Eric Marsh, Granite Mountain #1
4. Shelter Use –The firefighter was not fully
deployed. Feet were through the separated
end cap seam, most of the shelter was found
by the right side of the firefighter.
As the Superintendent he would have been last in making sure the others were deployed or deploying. He was responsible.
Also the way the shelters burned may have disconnected the hold down straps. Wind or the Helicopter would have moved them off the bodies. This is a important part of info for Fire shelter people.
Yes. I honestly don’t think DPS Pilot Clifford Brunsting was
TRYING to ‘disturb the site’ in those moments but I think
we all have to imagine the circumstances.
The had just found 19 firefighters on the ground.
Officer Main said he could only see 2-3 obvious
‘bodies’ outside of shelters.
That means the condition of 16 other men was hidden
from their view and they might have still been alive.
I don’t think they were caring too much about whether
they were going to blow some fire shelters around
at that point. The point was (of course) to get Medic
Tarr onto the ground ASAP.
We have exact lat/long for where the Pilot actually
set down ( a small clearing north of the ranch ) but
we don’t have exact coordinates for the multiple
attempted ‘close landings’.
Regardless… I imagine you have been pretty near some
choppers in your day when they are both landing
AND charging the rotors for ascent.
If you are anywhere near them… you are going to at
least lose your hat… real quick.
**
** ADOSH Transcripts of Darrell Willis Interview(s).
>> WTKTT asked Elizabeth…
>>
>> Elizabeth… exactly where are these ‘transcriptions of the ADOSH
>> interviews with Darrell Willis’ you are quoting from?
>> Are they actually online somewhere?
>> I only just now saw that Mr. Dougherty has now uploaded TONS more stuff
>> but I was wondering what ‘category’ these documents are in?
Elizabeth… apologies… I asked the question above before I found your
other post WAY up above that answers this question.
>> On January 14, 2014 at 2:39 pm, Elizabeth said…
>> Willis says in his interview (transcribed and provided by ADOSH to me)…
So these transcriptions just came directly from ADOSH and are NOT part
of the SAIT FOIA/FOIL package, then, right?
Does that transcript go anywhere near the 3:45 PM to 4:05 PM timeframe?
Is there anything in there to match what Willis has said in a number of
public interviews ( including military.com ) about him “Clicking back
onto GM’s private frequency circa 4:00 PM”?
Willis has said in his SAIT ( YIN ) interview that the first he heard of the
deployment was when OPS1 ( Todd Abel ) called him on the PHONE
circa 4:45 – 4:50 to tell him about it.
In any number of public interviews… he has now admitted that he had
heard the radio transmissions in real time because he had, in fact,
been “listening to their frequency” all along ( and since 4:00 PM ?? ).
What did he have to say to ADOSH about all this?
Reposting this one down here:
NV,
I’m jumping back in here on this probability debacle. As Mike said above “With all due respect, you have it ass backwards.” I have to totally agree with his assessment, and I echo that sentiment because if I use my own, it would be much more crass.
You stated many times now about wearing gloves to avoid callouses and blisters. You don’t get it. We WANT callouses and blisters turn into callouses. The reason we wear gloves is to PREVENT 2ND AND THIRD DEGREE THERMAL RADIANT HEAT BURNS. Wearing gloves has absolutely NOTHING to do with getting callouses.
I think Fullsail was right when he said you have never fought fire before.
There’s more …. do you read your horoscope everyday to decide whether or not to do something? Do you consult a Ouija Board or go for palm readings on a regular basis? How about the Tarot Card route? Those are allbased on probability aren’t they?
I asked you earlier to indicate where, in any of ‘The WFF Rules’ there was any mention of ‘probabilities’ and still haven’t seen any provided yet. Let me help you, since you’ve probably been busy looking for those boulder SZ incidents. Fire Order number “Post lookouts when there is POSSIBLE danger” (EMPHASIS ADDED). Do you consider the word ‘possible’ to be equivalent to, or at least synonomous to ‘probable?’ Probable is the root word of probability, so that’s why I mentioned it.
We post lookouts ALL the time, not just when there is ‘possible’ danger.
You said “They did lose the ATV of course. That’s probability at work.” Are you serious here? NO, it’s NOT “probability at work.” It was STUPIDITY. They lost their ATV for being stupid, doing dumb things (actions). They were told (cautioned) several tmes by line overhead AND other HS Superintendents NOT to continue with their unsafe and unsuccessful actions. The result was a BAD OUTCOME. The burned up ATV had NOTHING to do with probability.
RTS,
With all respect, you’re off the rails here. Anyone can read my comments, and note that I said wearing gloves helps prevent life-changing injuries (burns) and worse. Going gloveless among other things does show your hands have toughened up. Going gloveless does also results in occasional nicks, even on the toughest hands, and depending on the vegetation you’re dealing with, sometimes worse. But, none of those are life-changing, and as long as someone doesn’t complain about discomfort, or get an infected finger from what they thought was a harmless thorn, not a big deal without the more-severe, and more rare, risks.
As for horoscopes being based on probability, or tarot cards, I really don’t know how to respond to that. I believe most thinking people understand that they are based on making people feel good, and not on the actual probability of something happening. As an extreme example, basing any life decisions on the fortune in a fortune cookie would be foolish, even if that cookie claims to tell the future.
Basically, you seem to be ignoring the plain words I’ve written. And completely confused as to what probability actually is as a concept. You don’t even seem to understand that the phrase “bad decisions with good outcomes” relies on odds, probability, whatever you want to call it, to make the point that a good outcome doesn’t show that a safe decision was made. For anyone still a WFF reading this who likewise doesn’t understand that probability underlies this concept, they should be very concerned, and go back and study more on this.
These are simple concepts that we all apply, every day. Is it safe to drive buzzed, even if you get home safe? Safe to smoke a little weed before work, if you’ve never had an issue? Safe to put an inexperienced lookout way out in Mongolia and allow him to wander around looking at deployment sites that likely won’t be survivable, because someone did come by and pick him up?
As for the ATV, the point is there is a recurring pattern of bad decisions. Some, with no consequence. One day, on one fire, their ATV did get burned; could have been worse if they’d been unlucky, and that could have been another day with no ACTUAL consequence. Sooner or later, they were going to have a really bad consequence, which they did. If you don’t understand how repeated unsafe actions will lead to bad results sooner or later, but not necessarily at any given point, and how probability relates to that, then you really should not be speaking on this topic. Period.
Go flip a coin. Treat heads as good, tails as a real bad outcome, let’s say a fatality. Even at 50/50 for each coin flip, if you flip that coin 100 times, you’ll probably have some sequences where you get heads a number of times in a row. It doesn’t make it safe, and though 50/50 are really bad odds relative to what GM was doing, it’s the same concept.
WTF*** are you talking about. The 10 Standard Orders are not probability’s they are out comes that caused Fatalities. Some body or Bodies did not follow 1 or several and died. There is only 1 probability don’t follow them and your out come is death. And yes there are times during containment and mop up that posting a LO is very smart and done for safety.
Again, I don’t know what to say. Don’t follow one of the 10 standing orders and your TYPICAL outcome is that nothing bad happens. Particularly if you ignore only one of the 10. IF you ignore them long enough, though, sooner or later, something bad happens. Plain words used to describe that — “odds are, something bad happens sooner or later”, “chances are, something will catch up with you” — use concepts of probability. As they should. As we have already seen in this thread, GM seems multiple times to have engaged in behavior that carried a high risk (“risk” is another probability-type concept) of a bad outcome. But, they had fatalities on only one fire. Looking at the YHF, I actually would still say their lookout was at a greater likelihood of something bad happening than the rest of the crew — and the lookout is fine. Thankfully, odds of a bad outcome didn’t catch up, there.
So…I guess this means we can’t agree that we are talking about the same thing, just describing it different ways?
Oh…and by the way…do you always post lookouts while mopping up a fire? Since…”We post lookouts ALL the time, not just when there is ‘possible’ danger.”
Because I never did as there was a very low probability of being burned over even though the fire was not technically “controlled” yet. This was part of my “pushing the envelope” strategy I had everybody putting out smokes, including me since we wanted to go to the next fire.
There isn’t anybody in the country who has more wildland firefighting experience than I do as a hotshot (doing the same thing more times does not mean you have more of it) I saw it all and did it all, at least once.
And I agree completely with NV…now what Robert the Second?
I am afraid Gary that RTS will beat you in time as a Hot Shot and I know he has over 20 years and I could not guess the number of fires I think he saw it all and did it all twice over in R3 and R5.
Sorry I do not agree with you on this one.
I did not say lots of people could not beat me on time, I know several myself, but I don’t know and don’t believe anybody has more EXPERIENCE than I do, time on the job does not equal experience since some people can get a lifetime’s worth of experience in one season. But that’s not really the point either Bob, please read my post below, and good luck to you. You had one hell of a ride, I think we all did!
I don’t think we disagree all that much, the hang-up is the idea of “using probability”. To me that means taking calculated risks, I hope everyone thinks that is dumb. NV’s answer above suggested “using probability” to reject those activities that were not safe beyond a reasonable doubt. If that is what NV and Gary mean by “using probability” I can agree with that. If you mean taking calculated risks, you are nuts.
Mike,
I think that says it well. I am sorry if I sound heated up above, but I frankly felt like some people haven’t read what I wrote and actually were somewhat inverting what I was saying. Maybe probability sounds too much like gambling to some people, which I am not at all advocating, and saying that bad decisions tend to catch up with you even if you get away with them at first is a way to express the same concept that may not have the same emotional reaction.
NV
You went around the bush so many times that I forgot where the rabbet was. Your last statement brought me back to what you were trying to say. Which I totally misinterpreted.
Oh…and one more thing Mr. Shirt Sleeves Must Be Down At All Times. The rules require gloves to be worn at all time is a rule, unless things have really, really, really, changed. I never personally wanted, or wanted any of my crew to get blisters so they could get calloused hands because blisters can become infected and lots of other reasons, like you need to know where your gloves are at all time in case you have to deploy one of those ******* turkey roasting bags. And a firefighter cannot possibly be as effective at swinging a tool for countless hours with blisters on their hands.
You know, there is nothing but sadness and grief and controversy on this site and with this topic. And what’s much, much, much, worse, all of those who loved the Granite Mountain Hotshots hate me (us) anyway because they want to believe the leadership of their crew, Marsh, Steed and Willis are heroes and were/are really squared away wildland firefighters and they want to believe all of their loved ones were killed by a monster blaze that suddenly switched directions and cut off their escape route and they all died together…as hero’s, since it couldn’t be helped, and GOD JUST HAD ANOTHER PLAN FOR THOSE 19 MEN! Have it your way, they were all heroes, and God wanted to call them home. You win.
So I say fine…let’s just go with that story and the one all of the liars who were part of the SAIT put together. American needs heroes! We make more almost every day in Afghanistan and we made lots of them in that unfunded war of choice in Iraq. One thing that has come with my age…is my appreciation for life.
So fine…let’s just add the Granite Mountain Hotshots to the list and Chief Willis can keep traveling around the country telling lies, feeling good about himself and handing out Granite Mountain Hotshot pins and patches or whatever he gives out so people can feel sorry for him and shed a tear or two in his glorious presence, since he thinks he is God’s messenger anyway (Sweet Baby Jesus, How ****** Is That ***hole), although I would call that lousy son-of-a-bitch bastard the Angel of Death, who is directly responsible for the deaths of 19 men!
Oh, and if anybody wants to sue me, I’m in the phone book in Flagstaff, Arizona (I’m not really in the phone book, but I’m not that hard to find…just look, I’ll be waiting for you).
For the last time…I am checking out of this disaster, I didn’t cause it and I have already given way to much time to it. Besides, all I have to add is background information and my random thoughts and I am just about out those, so I am not really relevant to figuring out what really happened anyway.
However, I still want to help IF anybody thinks there is anything I can add and since I won’t be checking this site again…please email me your questions at: [email protected]
Thank you and good luck!
What we have here is a failure to communicate. RTS and Bob are reading meaning into the word “probability” that NV does not intend. Sitta did a bang-up job of clarifying up above, and there is also a helpful post with a sports analogy. Go look for both posts – they are worth reading (one of them mentions football and one mentions “game theory” (which is normally viewed as an economics doctrine, I think….).)
Let us be clear on one thing: NV is not saying “go roll your dice, consult the Vegas odds, and then go fight your fire.” NV has NEVER said that.
Either way, maybe it is time for us to agree that we are not having our best discourse on this topic, and we need a time-out or we need to move on to a new topic. Maybe it is time for us to get off this topic and start asking RTS more questions about who he thinks were on cell phones with each other during the fire. Is your real name “Robert,” RTS, or did you make that up? (I am only asking because I have started calling you “Bob” in my own mind, but maybe that is wrong. 🙂 )
No on RTS and I am Bob and my problem is what you already know so I can agree to disagree. But the 10 Standard orders are and will always be the Bible to me. And Gary I thought we agreed to disagree at times you have added some great insight here please check back occasionally.
Elizabeth,
Robert is my Mark Twain name.
Exactly, Gary. Reposting because I think it got missed above:
It seems to me that the two camps are defining “probability” differently. The [Bob Powers, RTS] version seems synonymous with random chance (or taking chances), whereas the [NV, Gary Olson] version refers to the total possible outcomes, and taking into account events that haven’t happened yet. We all agree that WFFs put themselves in danger by disregarding all possible outcomes.
You’re all arguing the SAME THING with regards to fireline safety. Follow the safety rules, because they prepare us for ALL outcomes, not just the most likely ones, or the ones we’ve personally experienced.
Where do you think the safety rules come from, if not from people who consider probability? They look at worst case scenarios, and decide whether probability = 0, or whether it’s high enough (even if incredibly small) that lives/health/livelihood can be saved by modifying behavior across the board.
As Mike said [earlier, above], “You do not base safety decisions on your experience.” Whether we are safe because we are well trained and always follow the rules, or because we recognize that those rules were based on a scrutiny of possible outcomes, doesn’t matter so much as the our treating safety seriously. We’re both getting to the same appropriate behavior, whether by left-brained math, or right-brained intuition and culture.
Oops. Looks like things developed while I was slowly working through my post. I think we’ve all figured it out.
Umm, just to be clear, I agree with Gary’s original response regarding probability. I don’t know, maybe I agree with the part about our culture making way too many “heroes” lately, too. But I also think that GM did a lot of things better than right (for a few examples, they were in super shape, Marsh arranged training for themselves AND many others, and they equipped themselves the best they could with what is shocking lack of support from their city leaders). I’ve been doing some reading about sleep deprivation, and I am convinced that it’s a factor in this and other tragedies. And I’ve yet to see the WFF who isn’t guilty of compromising the safety of alertness in order to keep working. Our work/rest rules virtually ensure this. None of us should be holier-than-thou.
Damm your right glad your here to keep us on tract.
Your FOURTH full paragraph above, Sitta, is key. I tried to say it, and I said it poorly, so I deleted the comment before I posted it. The reality is that the 10 and 18 and LACES and LCES *come* from probability. The rule “Don’t Drink and Drive” is similarly based on PROBABILITIES. Expert realized that the PROBABILITY of people having a fatal or damaging accident INCREASES if you drink and drive, so we came up with the RULE of “Don’t Drink and Drive.” It is based on probabilities. Let’s keep the PROBABILITY of getting into a damaging accident as low as possible.
Thank you, Sitta, for bringing some clarity to this discussion. You and NV are incredibly important to this discussion – as everyone is! – so I personally commend your diligence (both yours and NV’s) in looking for ways to make your points.
One crucial point made by NV and, interestingly, supported by RTS, is that if a Hotshot team cuts corners (e.g. keeps their sleeves rolled UP) and gets away with it (e.g. nobody got burned), that team is likely to become a bit more complacent in the FUTURE (“we never got burned before so obviously rolling down sleeves is not crucial…”). That can lead to ignoring basic, simple rules in the future, because you start to believe that you can get away with it….
But now I am just repeating NV.
Agree Elizabeth. You would have to think that an incident like loosing your UTV/ATV would put a check on the complacency. I wonder if there was any type of disciplinary action for that incident? The video over at Wildfire Today that shows the burned remains of the UTV/ATV and it being loaded into the truck doesn’t seem to be ….how should I say…. a point of shame or embarrassment. It just doesn’t seem appropriate to show in the video. I also wonder if loosing the UTV/ATV had anything to do with the GM crew existence being in question by City Council
I would love to see that video, but haven’t come across it, yet. Do you have a link?
I’ve been reading this discussion but not found it worth responding much. I totally understand and agree with you and Sitta and Gary. This is just a waste of oxygen at this point.
My dad (with me assisting him) did the weather forecasting for the Albuquerque International Balloon Fiesta for 16 years. And you betcha it was all about probabilities, and all the 600 or so pilots and their crews knew exactly that. And that’s exactly where The Rules came from.
My dad couldn’t enforce the rules. He could only issue the forecast and his opinion about what that meant. If the Management decided they will willing to break the rules (which they understand were based on probabilities) becuz they were under pressure by the finances of that operation, there wasn’t a damn thing my dad could do about that. And just about every time they decided they needed a launch that day with iffy weather, becuz it might cost a couple million bucks not to, somebody got injured, and sometimes somebody got killed. And those 600 pilots and crews trusted my dad way more than they did the management. At least the ones that stayed alive.
But, yes, it’s all about probabilities. Beyond that, this is just an argument about semantics.
So where’s Eric Marsh’s cellphone?
Marti, Mr Gabbert, over at Wildfire Today posted two videos December 24 2013 related to the GM Hotshots. The segment I described occurs in the first video at the 12:20 minute mark.
Both of the videos are worth viewing.
I think you have a pretty good idea what happened to Marsh’s cell phone.
I forgot to
Thank You!
And actually, I have NO IDEA what happened to Eric’s cellphone whatsoever. That’s why I keep ASKING.
Sitta
on January 12, 2014 at 1:57 am said:
It made sense to me that the Yarnell Hill SAIRs weakness was in response to the lawsuits after the Thirtymile Fire:
http://seattletimes.com/html/localnews/2003488305_thirtymile21m.html
http://www.fs.fed.us/t-d/lessons/documents/Thirtymile_Reports/Thirtymile-Final-Report-2.pdf
There was some great discussion of this on Wildfire Today:
http://wildfiretoday.com/tag/thirtymile-fire/
I’m curious what the rest of you think.
I think you are exactly right. Which is why they should stop doing them if they can’t do them honestly for the right reasons and let the chips fall where they may. The NWCG or whoever is behind these things, should carefully look at how the National Transportation and Safety Board does theirs and then copy them, or just admit they are cowards, agency hacks and shills and quit even pretending they are anything different, because they are not fooling anyone.
Marti said, According to the SAIR, 11 were found wearing gloves. Of the eight not indicated, five were found outside their shelters–with all that implies–so who can possibly know whether they were wearing gloves or not.
By the way, yesterday I discovered you videos on Youtube. I really appreciate them, and really really love this one:
“The Granite Mountain Hotshots”
http://youtu.be/ZBzZzn_AsLc
Just totally full of soul. Thank you.
Namaste
I just found this comment. Thank you. I made that right after I heard about the Granite Mountain Hotshots when I couldn’t sleep. I have seen others that have inspiring music, but I can’t find anything inspiring about this tragedy, only pain and grief.
Two things:
1. ANCHOR THE FIRE: I am not sure if this is relevant to the discussion about Willis wanting (or not) for GM to “anchor” the fire, but this is what Willis said in his transcribed interview with ADOSH:
“So I thought it was a point protection thing, the whole deal. I mean, it was like – from my perspective, the whole day, this fire – there’s no way you’re gonna get an anchor on it. You gotta wait until night, see where it’s ending up to do anything.”
I take that to mean that Willis claims he did NOT tell them to anchor the fire.
2. The PHONES/CAMERAS: This is what Willis had to say in his now-transcribed ADOSH interview regarding Chris MacKenzie’s camera:
“We got some pictures from a camera that was MacKenzie. The Sheriff picked it up and he thought it was a burned up phone. They sent it home with the parents. Dad took it down to Walgreens. They pulled the sim card out of it and they found a whole bunch of pictures out of it.
Q1: Oh really? Oh.
A: And it was some of these pictures. In fact, there’s some video there of where
the fire was sitting at this time. Almost the exact same as Parker’s.”
Reply to Elizabeth post on January 14, 2014 at 3:19 pm
Re 1: Mendacity.
How does one get…
FROM: “We’ve GOT to get an anchor on this thing.”
TO: “So I thought it was a point protection thing, the whole deal.”
…when you’ve already admitted in public that you told your
employee ( Marsh ) the first thing is what you REALLY thought.
Re 2: Total mendacity.
Even if the “Sheriff” (does he really mean Scott Mascher himself?)
had thought he had just picked up a ‘burned up phone’… he
would NOT have just ‘sent it home to the parents’. No way.
He would have given it to his own investigators, IMMEDIATELY,
and THEY would have, in turn, IMMEDIATELY sent it over
to Arizona Counter Terrorism Information Center ( ACTIC )
for possible data extraction just like they did everything else
that wouldn’t simply ‘power on’.
Besides… how do you get from Willis saying the Sheriff thought
it was a (worthless) ‘burned up phone’ to Christopher’s father
saying he was amazed how it was basically TOTALLY
undamaged and the ‘cloth case wasn’t even burned’.
Was this Sheriff a blind man, or something?
PS: Elizabeth… exactly where are these ‘transcriptions of the
ADOSH interviews’ you are quoting from? Are they actually
online somewhere? I only just now saw that Mr. Dougherty
has now uploaded TONS more stuff but I was wondering
what ‘category’ these documents are in?
“Reference Documents”?
“Investigation Notes”?
Also… how do you get from the boy’s father saying
his stepdaughter put the SD card into her computer
to Willis saying they took it to Walgreen’s?
That’s what’s called ( in official investigative lingo )…
“Not even frickin’ close”.
Someone is ‘making their story up’ there… and somehow
I would have a hard time believing it was a dead boy’s
father.
I totally agree with you. That’s a complete fabrication. But’s a pin I’ll put in my map of dots. Which still leads to my conclusion.
PFD (that’s now clearly YOU Willis) is perfectly willing and able to withhold evidence when it thinks it’s in their best interest to do so.
Including Eric Marsh’s cellphone.
Dang, every time I think I’ve put this baby to bed (at least the part I’m most interested in), it just gets up and starts bouncing on the bed again!
Yesterday, I went thru a lot of what JD was posting, and I didn’t come across this. So, yes, I would like to look at it, as well.
Can you give me a date on that interview? So I can locate the pin on my “connecting the dots” project? Thank you!
And truly, thank you for posting this.
Marti Reed,
Marti Reed on January 13, 2014 at 9:04 pm said: My Radio List … “wondering if it was a different kind of radio. It’s a Bendex. Short antenna.”
There is a new Bendix King “P-series radio” now that’s smaller, about half the size of the older B/K handheld radios. Check out the link below and see if that helps any.
http://www.bendixkingradios.com/bk-radio-handhelds/p-series-bendix-king-handhelds/
And as far as the NUMBER of radios used on the Crew, eleven (11) is A LOT of radios to be on the Crew at any one time. TOTALLY, it’s NOT, but to have that many at one time on the Crew is a lot, I think.
Fullsail, Gary, Bob – how many radios did you carry at any one time on the firelines on Flagstaff, Happy Jack or Santa Fe, and Oak Grove? I kinda doubt you carried eleven at a time.
We had that many TOTAL radios but only carried eight (8) on the fireline at any one time, that was plenty. One each for the Supt, Foreman, Squad Bosses, Senior Crewmembers, and a Sawyer or two while on the fireline. The others we carried as ‘spares’ in case any went Tango-Uniform.
Back in the 70s normally 4 Radios– Superintendent, Asst., 2 Squad Bosses. No programmable the Superintendent would carry the assigned fire radio too. we had some common channels like air net, That started changing by the 80s. Also we had 24 total crew on the Angeles 4 supervisors 20 crewmen, 60s and 70s, there were 5 crews on the Angeles. Some crews were 20 and some were 24 in the Forest Service.
Here is another thought as to why they might have had what
appears to be an ‘unusual’ amount of radios that day.
As with almost everything to do with this incident… you HAVE to
keep in mind that we are talking about the ONLY Type 1 Hotshot
crew in the entire country ( or even EVER in the WFF business? )
to have been ‘wholly owned and operated’ by a Municipal
Fire Department.
GM had it’s own tin-roof ‘station’ back in Prescott and the
address is NOT the same as the Prescott Fire Department
itself… but perhaps we are looking at ‘shared resources’
here. If it was a slow day in Prescott… Marsh might have
had permission to ‘swing by’ the PFD station and simply
‘borrow’ more BK radios than they would normally even
carry with them.
There are, of course, any number of people still alive who
could answer any/all questions about all this.
Did GM ( an outfit known to be on a ‘tight budget’ ) really own
that many ( or even MORE? ) expensive radios… or were
some of them just ‘on loan’ that day from their parent
fire department’s locker room?
Actually it was twelve radios if you add in Brendan’s.
NV
on January 14, 2014 at 11:35 am said:
“With all due respect, you have it ass backwards. You do not base safety decisions on your experience. ” Mike, I’d just said in my comment just above that experience can give a misleading picture of what CAN happen. Let me quote: “Again, look at those gloves. If you can go gloveless for years in a row with just some callouses and small cut, and you don’t take the chance — which is another way of saying probability — of a really bad outcome into account, then based on experience you’d say gloves aren’t needed.” I am saying gloves ARE needed, despite the ability to have lots of experience suggesting they aren’t.
You, Mike, have just expressed why probability DOES need to be taken into account when making decisions. You can do something with a small chance of a catastrophic outcome multiple times with nothing bad happening. Your own experience set therefore shows that the activity seems safe. But, the chance, or odds, or probability, of something bad happening, is still there, and sooner or later that bad event will happen. That is why you make a rule not to do these things. For instance, wear gloves as a rule, even if going gloveless most of the time will be ok.
For GM, they seem to have a persistent pattern of actions that had a slight chance of a catastrophic outcome. Look at McDonough and Willis as regards deployment sites. But, they’d never lost a lookout before YHF — and haven’t lost one yet, now. They did lose the ATV of course. That’s probability at work. You have to take the chance of a negative outcome into account, which they don’t seem to have been doing in several respects.
NV, I really don’t understand why everyone is having such a hard time with this concept. I get it, and I completely agree.
For example – The anology was used earlier in aviation that either something is safe or it is not safe, if it is safe, you do it, if it is not safe you don’t do it.
Well using that same analogy, I would never leave my house and drive around town in my car…because it is SAFE to do that. I can always be killed by getting t-boned backing out of my drive way. Now…if I don’t look carefully backing out of my driveway, well then my odds of getting killed go up. If it is late at night, my odds of getting killed go up even further. If it is even later at night and the bars have just closed, well then my odds of getting killed go up even more. If it is later at night, I don’t look backing out of my driveway, I drive to the area of town where most of the bars are located and it is snowing and the roads are icy and I drive fast without my lights on after smoking some pot and drive with sunglasses on, well then my odds of getting killed go up even more, if I do all of that and then drive to an area of town where minority gang members are present waving a confederate battle flag while yelling racial obscenities out my car window and then keep circling back and doing it all over again, well then my odds of getting killed go up even more. What is so hard to understand about this concept?
Can’t we all just agree that if we do stupid things our chances of having a happy and successful life goes down with every stupid decision we make until we will eventually find the bottom and be dead from STUPID?
Yes , wildland firefighting has inherent risk. If the goal was simply to never have any firefighter deaths we would not fight them. But along with that the goal is for “everyone to come home”. The only really “acceptable” risk is “act of God” types of events that we cannot control and are rare. In addition, it is understood that humans make mistakes and people will die – but those errors are not “acceptable” – we do all we can to eliminate them. The YHF was clearly human error and not an “act of God”.
Doing things that have higher than an “act of God” level of risk IS stupid. The “rules” exist to minimize risk of firefighting activities, and failure to follow them is human error and not an act of God. If people start doing things that are “probably safe”, even “highly probably safe”, there are going to be a lot more of these threads on IM.
This risk analysis applies in many fields, not just firefighting. In medicine (my field) we do things that are risky for the patient because the risk of not acting may be higher. That does not really apply here. The risk of not acting might be losing homes (assuming no civilians are at risk) but not acting means no firefighters die. Doing things that risk the lives of WFF to virtually any degree – beyond an “act of God” – cannot be justified.
Back to what we know and what we have learned.
Granit Mountain in a safe area (in the black)
The fire did not cause them to move or chase them out.
1. Did some one ask them to move
2. did they move to go to the ranch and then to town.
A. to end shift and go home line assignment over could do no work.
B. to go to Yarnell to help, every body else was sitting in a parking lot.
3. Did they have other options off the hill.
A. Back thru the burn in the burn to where they came up and down thru the new burn to where the vehicles had been parked and picked up there.
B. Stay where they were for an hour and then walk out. A. above or
C. walk down thru the black to the ranch.
D. at any time they could have walked off the ridge on the back side and out to the highway.
4. Why did Marsh not call and discuss the move with OPS Able?
A. Able would have known there location
B. could have told them to stay put.
C. could have put eyes in the sky for them as a Look Out.
Marsh should not have moved the crew without notifying OPS of what he was doing . This was a direct violation of fire line protocol and standard order #7
From that point LCES went out the window.
5. At this point the SAIT should have stated some blame for the non communication. Marsh could have called on Cell if the Radio was to busy.
the SAIT never said any thing about communications at that point over a cell phone.
6. Marsh had options for communications and did not use them.
A. did Marsh talk to any one prior to the move on his cell phone.
B. Did Marsh and Steed have Inter-crew radio communications.
C. Did they talk to Willis or McDonough, and did they receive all the crew discussion before and during the move.
D. They evidently had contact to Air Attack and were monitoring them.
E. Could Marsh at any time have contacted any one else on the other Channels? That should have been checked in the investigation.
I would say yes all the way to deployment. on several freq. The Helicopter EMT communicated from the site of deployment to the IC at fire headquarters.
So the no communications was the crew on the move and not the Radio problems as stated by the SAIT.
The weather was a known fact so the weather did not cause the fatality’s and was only a factor because GM did not take it serious.
Ill stop here for any additions or corrections you may have…..
My two cents… that’s pretty damn good, Mr. Powers. Thank you.
Might have more comments on this later but it’s a good list.
I did have another quick question for you and basically all
WFF people.
The more I listen, over and over, to this ‘helmet-cam’ video
there is one thing that just keeps leaping out at me with
regards to the ‘communicate clearly and effectively’ part
of the 10/18/LCES.
Why doesn’t the Wildland Firefighting Industry actually use
an established MAYDAY call like just about everybody else
who uses radios already does?
Every time I listen to the video… it’s excruciating to hear these
people trying to figure out that Granite Mountain really WAS
‘in trouble’… and the TIME they wasted trying to ‘figure that out’,
even though it really was pretty clear what Steed had said.
Why didn’t Captain Steed break right in on Arizona 16 with…
“MAYDAY! MAYDAY! Breaking in on Arizona 16, Granite Mountain Hotshots, we are in front of the flaming front.”
If he had… there would have been NO QUESTION that ( as
is the case in other radio-heavy industries ) the moment
they all heard that word MAYDAY… EVERYONE needed to
STOP what they are doing and pay FULL attention to the transmission that immediately follows that.
It wasn’t ( as the confused B33 guy thought ) some structure
protection group asking for retardant, or something.
It wasn’t ( as the confused OPS1 guy thought ) a case of
“maybe we got somethin’ goin’ on”.
It wasn’t just somebody clicking the wrong transmit channel.
It was an ACTUAL, REAL EMERGENCY.
Yet all we hear for almost a full MINUTE is everybody on the
radio trying to figure out “maybe we got somethin’ going on”.
Maybe one of the the ‘changes’ to the way WFF does things
coming out of this incident would be for WFF to finally institute
and/or adopt their own established MAYDAY radio protocol(s)
like just about everyone else with radios did a long time ago?
I think it might help save some lives in the future.
Mayday Mayday Common to me and we were taught to use it. I do not know why GM did not your asking for an open freq. I thought they still trained that.
Have you seen this?
Suggested protocol for firefighters when declaring an emergency From Wildfire Today, by Bill Gabbert, December 23, 2013
http://wildfiretoday.com/2013/12/23/suggested-protocol-for-firefighters-when-declaring-an-emergency/
Yes and I think Mayday is more universal I do not believe something else will take.
I was never taught to use that and I have never even heard anybody talk about it. Frankly, the thought that something like that is even needed, or missing in any of the hundreds if not thousand of hours of training both in a classroom and on the job I received never even occurred to me.
I believe that if NOTHING else comes out of this discussion, that idea alone, if the NWCG will accept it and implement it immediately into all training and put out immediate bulletins mandating the use of that phrase in all emergencies, will make everything worth it.
If the NWCG doesn’t doe what I just suggested, well then, they can go to hell since I have already told several of their members several times the Battlement Creek Staff Ride contains a great deal non-factual information and they have just ignored me, and therefore I am already very disgusted with them as an organization.
GREAT JOB WTKTT!
or whoever brought it up…Bob? I didn’t even stop to read all of the comments.
Reply to Gary Olson on Jan 14, 2014 at 2:25 pm
I went back and timed the actual raw helmet-cam
video ( as released by SAIT FOIA/FOIL requests )
again just to be sure what the real ‘time lag’ was
for everyone finally realizing this was a
REAL EMERGENCY.
It’s even worse than I thought.
From the moment Captain Steed sends his first
MAYDAY call… it is over 2 minutes before either
OPS1 ( Todd Abel ) or B33 actually even begins
to SUSPECT this might be a real emergency.
It is, in fact, almost 2 minutes into the emergency
when B33 still thinks it is just structure protection
guys transmitting on the wrong channel and
at +1:52 B33 is still just telling them to “quit” and
stop “hollerin’ on the radio.”
It is then OVER 2 minutes and 20 seconds into
the radio exchanges when Eric Marsh finally
comes on the air and informs them it IS a
REAL EMERGENCY!
It is only at the end of Eric’s final transmission
when he says “Affirm” that everyone now
understands what is really happening and also
now have some faint idea where they really are.
That final understanding comes a full 2 minutes
and 43 seconds ( almost 3 minutes ) after Steed’s
first MAYDAY call.
If Steed had simply prefixed his very first call
with “MAYDAY!… MAYDAY!… everyone would
have been ( or SHOULD have been ) IMMEDIATELY
paying attention right at that moment and the next 2
minutes and 43 seconds could have simply been a
much better effort to pinpoint EXACTLY where they
were and decide what ( if anything ) could be done.
I am not saying those 2 minutes and 43 seconds
would have saved lives in Yarnell that day.
I am saying that someday… a similar 2 minutes
and 43 seconds just MIGHT ( save some lives ).
** TIMELINE – FINAL RADIO TRANSMISSIONS
The TIMES below are not atomic times.
They are simply taken from the raw video/audio
and are just relative to the very first moment
that Captain Steed sends his first MAYDAY.
Caveat: This is also just a quick SUMMARY of the
conversations in this timeframe to illustrate
the point being made above and it is NOT meant
to be a full representation of everything that
WAS said during this time period. See the
actual helmet-cam video/audio for that.
+0:00 – Captain Jesse Steed breaks in on
Arizona 16, yelling loudly with the sounds of
multiple chainsaws already running very
close to him ( which is why he’s yelling )…
“Breaking in on Arizona 16, Granite Mountain
Hotshots, we are in front of the flaming front.
NOTE: The fact that chainsaws were ALREADY
running before we even hear Steed’s first
radio call is very significant. It means a certain
amount of TIME had already passed and they
had ALREADY decided to deploy AND found
the place to do that, and got the saws fired
up and the men at work on preparation, etc.
ALSO NOTE: Skipping all the additional attempts
on GM’s part to contact B33 but suffice to say for
the first full 2 minutes after Steed first tried to
announce this EMERGENCY… the radio is full
of nothing but additional attempts to just try
and get either B33 or OPS1 to answer them
and/or pay any attention to them.
NOTE: It does appear that there are THREE voices
in this final sequence now. Steed issued the first
MAYDAY, then the next two “Bravo 33, how do
you read me?” calls are from Robert Caldwell,
then Steed comes back on the radio and tries one
more time to get B33’s attention… and only then we
hear Eric Marsh appear to ‘explain’ the situation.
At NO TIME during these crucial two minutes does
either Caldwell or Steed prefix any of their attempts
to get anyone to pay attention with a “MAYDAY”
prefix. They SHOULD have.
+1:52 – Even almost a full 2 minutes since the
start of the emergency sequence… B33 still thinks
it is just structure protection guys transmitting on
the wrong channel and B33 is still just annoyed
and telling them to “quit” and stop “hollerin’ on the
radio.”
+2:02 – OPS1 Todd Abel only now begins to
believe there MIGHT be an emergency and
tells B33 to “get with Granite Mountain… they
MIGHT be having some trouble”.
+2:20 – Eric Marsh first appears on the radio,
speaking calmly and still not really indicating
how much trouble they are really in. ( No
MAYDAY indication of his own ). Only as he
slowly and calmly explains the situation do
we now find out how serious this is.
Only now ( A full 2 minutes and 40 seconds after
the start of the emergency traffic ) does B33
attempt to actually LOCATE them at all, but too
much time has gone by for this to be fully
successful…
+2:41 – B33: So you’re on the south side of the
fire, then?
+2:43 – Eric Marsh: Affirm!
So only at this point… 2 minutes and 43 seconds
after the emergency sequence was initiated by
Steed, does everyone fully understand it IS an
EMERGENCY and even have a faint idea of where
they really area… but there is now no time left
whatsoever to really even TRY and do anything
about it.
By the way…
One of the ‘static from the deployment site’
transmissions that the SAIR was simply
dismissing as ‘unintelligible’ and not counting
into the time when these men were still alive
actually has a VOICE in it trying to say something.
More about that later.
Good work, WTKTT. That’s a tough read. I haven’t been focusing much on the final transmissions, because I’ve been thinking that they were already lost at that point (and had they been following SOP, their location would have been known).
However, when you organize like you have, it becomes clear to me that this is a very important area where we can improve safety and response times. Even if it couldn’t have saved these men, perhaps it could save lives in the future.
Thanks, WTKTT! Actually after looking more closely at Steed’s and Caldwell’s radios yesterday, I had pretty much concluded Caldwell’s radio wasn’t involved. Because it was located outside the deployment area and was sitting in a pile of stuff I now think was a well-burned pack. So if, as you now think, he was using the radio, he must have dumped the pack a ways away from him and deployed, without his radio.
Happy Almost Anniversary of 70 years of high risk living!!!
(…is probably all I can say at this point!)
(…as I approach the 50th anniversary of the day my brother made the stupidest decision of his entire life, got himself killed, got somebody else’s leg broken, almost got a helicopter crashed, and almost got two other people killed or injured…)
**DRINK**
Bob, thanks for constructing this tree of choices made. I like that you go back to before they left the black (for me, that is the critical decision). I’m trying to figure out lessons learned for spring training, and framing the day in terms of alternate choices seems like a really good tool.
This list is also a good reminder that technical issues with the radios were NOT relevant in that last half hour (rendering one of the SAITs few conclusions incidental).
It hurts to read this and remember how close they all were to making their days off.
I hope you have a wonderful birthday.
**
** ERIC MARSH, DARRELL WILLIS, AND BRENDAN MCDONOUGH
** ALL HAD THEIR OWN CELLPHONES WITH THEM ON JUNE 30, 2013.
Marti’s comment above about refocusing on the cell phones reminded me
of a post I meant to write the other day.
There really is no doubt that Eric Marsh, Darrell Willis, AND even
Brendan McDonough all had their own cellphones that day.
There is documented proof of all three.
In Eric’s case… forget the fact that Todd Abel tells us this directly in his
interview with SAIT investigator and chief Jim Karels. ( Abel says directly
he was having PHONE conversations with Eric out on the ridge that day )…
…there is also other documented proof that Eric had his own cell phone
and that the infamous “We have got to get an anchor on this” discussion
between Marsh and Willis circa 6:00 AM that morning was, in fact,
‘cellphone’ to ‘cellphone’.
See details below.
The only REAL question is… WHERE is Eric Marsh’s cellphone?
What happened to it?
Was it simply ‘missed’ at the deployment site ( or was in his pack ) and
was then just returned to Amanda Marsh in the same surreptitious way
PFD tried to return Christopher MacKenzie’s camera to his father…
bypassing both YCSO and the SAIT?
** ERIC MARSH HAD HIS OWN CELLPHONE
The Arizona News article below details the phone call between Darrell Willis
and Eric Marsh that took place circa 6:00 AM on Sunday morning.
This is the conversation when Willis says he told Marsh ( before he
even showed up in Yarnell )…
“We have got to get an anchor on this thing.”
This Arizona News article came out just 6 days after the incident and is
based on a direct interview with Darrell Willis.
The article actually states that this was NOT Willis calling Marsh.
The article states ( from this interview with Willis ) that is was
the opposite. That Marsh called Willis circa 6:00 AM.
According to the Kyle Dickman ’19: The True Story of the Yarnell Fire’
article based on direct interviews with Brendan McDonough, at 6:00 AM
Eric Marsh was already driving south on Highway 89 towards Yarnell.
Actually, the article says that the entire GM Crew and Marsh left
Prescott at 5:40 or 5:45 AM and headed south towards Prescott
with Marsh leading the way (alone) in the GM Supervisor Truck.
So whether Marsh called Willis or Willis called Marsh at 6:00 AM…
that conversation must have been ‘cellphone’ to ‘cellphone’ with Willis
down in Yarnell already and Marsh now driving the GM Supervisor truck
south from Prescott on Highway 89.
From the Arizona News article…
A brewing storm: How fire turned tragic for 19 men
Source: Arizona News
Originally published: Jul 6, 2013 – 10:39 am
http://ktar.com/22/1646853/How-Yarnell-fire-turned-tragic-for-19-men-
Overnight the blaze grew to 200 acres, and by Sunday morning officials were
transitioning to a larger command team to oversee firefighting efforts and
calling in more personnel.
Around 6 a.m., Darrell Willis, chief of the Prescott Fire Department’s Wildland
Fire Division, was loading his truck with containers of eggs, sausage, potatoes
and fruit for the crews when his phone rang. It was Eric Marsh, superintendent
of the Granite Mountain Hotshots, who were based out of Willis’ department.
“Hey, chief,” Marsh said. “We’re coming down to the fire.”
At 43, the North Carolina native was the oldest member of the Hotshot team
and its founder. Within six years of its beginning as a fuels mitigation unit in
2002, the Granite Mountain group had joined the elite Hotshot community…
the first such crew attached to a municipal department.
Marsh and Willis had worked together for years, and were close friends as
well as colleagues.
Willis gave Marsh the rundown: Active fire. Lots of homes potentially at risk.
“It’s one of those days,” he warned.
Then Willis ended the conversation the way he does anytime he’s speaking
to a firefighter.
“Be safe,” he (Willis) told Marsh.
** DARRELL WILLIS HAD HIS OWN CELLPHONE
From the article…
A brewing storm: How fire turned tragic for 19 men
Source: Arizona News
Originally published: Jul 6, 2013 – 10:39 am
( Immediately during and right after the deployment… )
Willis, the Prescott wildland fire chief, was in his pickup outside Yarnell, listening
to the Hotshots’ tactical frequency, when he heard a garbled message from
Marsh that he couldn’t quite make out. Then his cellphone rang.
“Did you hear that?” a supervisor asked him. All Willis could think was,
“Not those guys.” His guys.Then he began to pray.
As time wore on, Willis got back on the phone.
He called his wife first, and then the head of the Prescott Fire Department.
He asked them to start praying, too.
NOTE: There is also the evidence from above that the conversation
between Willis and Marsh that took place at 6:00 AM that morning
was ‘cellphone’ to ‘cellphone’.
** BRENDAN MCDONOUGH HAD HIS OWN CELLPHONE
In his interview with Kyle Dickman ( actual quotes below ) Brendan
McDonough said that the first thing he did after hearing the news
of the 19 confirmed fatalities was “Call his Mother”.
NOTE: The only cellphone that was in one of the Crew Carriers that
has ever even been tentatively associated with any firefighter
is the one in the cup holder near the front seat of whichever
Crew Carrier Brendan McDonough had taken quiet refuge in
after the deployment. It supposedly belonged to Clayton Whitted.
From the Kyle Dickman article.
Outside Magazine
Tuesday, September 17, 2013
19: The True Story of the Yarnell Fire
( Based on private interviews with Brendan McDonough and others ).
( Right after the fatalities were confirmed )…
Donut was sitting in the passenger seat of Granite Mountain’s
parked buggy, just staring ahead.
He’d called his mother and told her that he was OK, but that’s
all he could say. The details escaped him.
The phones of his dead crewmates started ringing around 9 P.M.
One cell phone rattled in the cup holder by the front seat, where
Clayton had sat. Then it was the phones of the hotshots who’d sat
in the back. The calls were from girlfriends, friends, and family
members. Maybe they caught wind of the tragedy on Facebook.
Maybe they’d heard it second- or thirdhand from somebody else.
It didn’t matter. The word was out. The Granite Mountain hotshots
had deployed. The people were calling without any real hope that
their message would ever be returned. They were calling to say
goodbye.
The calls and texts kept coming, endless rings and vibrations and
senseless jingles. Donut had to leave the buggy.
You do notice the problem with that story, I assume.
But for anybody else who doesn’t, Clayton Whitted’s cellphone is the one PFD identified by its cover as Clayton Whitted’s and turned over to YCSO after they found it “burned into a pack.”
I’m glad I’m sitting here eating some really good lemon pound cake and drinking some really good coffee at this moment. Otherwise I think I would just break down in tears.
Oh, the tangled webs we weave.
Cheer up I am tomorrow is my Birthday a new mile stone in my life I’ve made it 70 years in two different High risk jobs. 33 years a fire fighter and 17 years a deputy sheriff plus I raced stock cars for 7 years on days off. It’s the decisions we make that keep us safe.
Happy Birthday Bob! In case I forget tomorrow, I am getting old.
I’m getting old, too. That’s why I got confused and thought you were in Santa Fe and I could just jump into my Subaru and drive up to see you. Are you in Flagstaff?
Reply to Marti Reed post on January 14, 2014 at 10:01 am.
>> Marti wrote…
>> You do notice the problem with that story, I assume.
Oh yes. That’s why I printed that.
Can we take what former Hotshot Kyle Dickman says
as the total truth?
Nope.
This guy is BS’ing us almost as much as the SAIT did.
But the details of what happened that morning/day with
GM are based ( according to Dickman ) on extensive,
exclusive interviews with Brendan McDonough.
So the ‘story’ there with the Dickman article would be who
is BS’ing who?
Was McDonough ‘making stuff up’ for Dickman?,
or was is it the former Hotshot Dickman trying to BS his readers?,
or is it all actually true?
It’s just like the SAIR.
SOME of it is actually true. SOME of it is actually not.
What’s the old joke?
“I know that half of what I am being told is a lie.
The only problem is… knowing WHICH half.”
I do, in fact, trust the TIMES on when Dickman says the crew
actually left Prescott. I think that’s verifiable from other sources
and that still puts Marsh in his vehicle and on his cellphone
when he had that 6:00 AM ‘conversation’ with Willis.
>> Marti wrote…
>> Oh, the tangled webs we weave.
Not to worry.
Quoting another good English writer…
“Fouls deeds will rise… thou all the earth o’erwhelm them…
to men’s eyes”.
Hamlet (1.2.256)
Translation: When people are tryinig to bulls**t you…
Every little detail counts.
Thank you for making me laugh! I needed that!!
I’m just getting really of trying to unravel all these knots. I guess the best we can do is point to things.
I really am pretty much ready to graduate to just sitting back and watching the chips fall where they may.
The ‘chips’ will be falling for a LOOONG time
on this one.
This isn’t just some bus accident.
It’s historic.
This is, at one and the same tine, the greatest
single-day loss of life AND the greatest blunder
in the history of Wildland Firefighting.
It’s going to be studied… and restudied… over
and over again for YEARS to come.
There are a LOT of children ( and future
grandchildren ) who are going to want to know
EXACTLY what happened to their fathers
and grandfathers that day… and WHY it
might have happened… and WHY they had
to grow up without them around.
I believe the truth will all come out someday.
I believe even this small discussion and attempt
to find (more) facts is at least trying to make that
day come sooner rather than later.
It’s just such a shame that the initial investigation(s)
were such a botch job. It’s always hard to recover
after that ( but not impossible ).
Namaste.
To be perfectly honest. I’m secretly working for Amanda Marsh. She doesn’t know that though. Who didn’t have any kids with Eric, but they considered the crew to be their kids. I’m trying to hand her a silver key.
Reply to calvin post on January 12, 2014 at 9:36 pm said:
>> calvin said…
>>
>> WTKTT…. Have you heard the comment in the last of the helmet
>> cam video after radio contact is lost that says something about
>> coming out a road by the storage center. Is that Willis?
>>
>> WTKTT responded…
>>
>> Yes… I have heard it… and at the moment I don’t
>> think that was Willis. The ‘storage center’ they
>> are referring to is, of course, that U-Store-It
>> facility there on Highway 89 where we see the
>> Globe Type II Crew filming those VLAT drops.
>>
>> The reason I don’t think it’s Willis is because
>> all evidence for the 1639 timeframe points to
>> Willis still being ‘up north’ either at or near the
>> Model Creek School ICP when the actual
>> deployment happened.
>>
>> On January 13, 2014 at 5:55 pm, calvin also said…
>>
>> WTKTT… It sure sounds like Willis to me.
Calvin… you are RIGHT.
I listened to it again… and compared that voice with Willis speaking at the
July 23 deployment site media event.
I am with you now. I would definitely say that is Willis’ voice.
It doesn’t matter ( as I tried to say before ) that Willis was probably up at the
ICP in Model Creek at that moment. That makes no difference as to whether
it’s him on the radio there or not. Willis was about to come ‘down to Yarnell’
anyway.
There is actually another (small) clue that would prove it’s Willis.
The original transcript released with the helmet-cam video appears to be
accurate for that moment.
The radio conversation suddenly captured in that video is as follows….
Person: Two… we are in Yarnell
Willis: Copy, I’ll be coming out to the road, it’s by a mini storage
right at the north end of town.
Person: Great, that’s right where we’re staged.
When that first ‘person’ says ‘Two…’ I think that is just shorthand for SPGS2
( which would have still been Willis at that point in time ).
What I also think what Willis means there when he says he will be ‘coming out
to the road’ is that he is ‘coming down’ from Peeples Valley and down to the
‘Shrine road’ area which is, in fact, sort of ‘by that mini-storage’. It’s just a little
south of there.
Also… Willis suddenly sounds pretty worried. All business. That’s because only
moments before he heard Eric announce the deployment over the radio and
Willis is distracted/worried now at this moment we hear him speaking.
He might have even thought that’s the general area where Marsh just said they
were deploying ( The Shrine road area ) and that’s why we hear him saying he’s
‘coming down’ to that exact ‘road’.
I also just found something that updates what I said up above about this moment
and how/when Willis actually heard of the deployment.
I said ( above )…
Willis says in his YIN notes that the first he heard of a ‘deployment’ was when
Abel called him on the phone circa 4:40 – 4:45 and told him about it.
That doesn’t match what he has said in other inverviews at all.
In even just his military.com interview he says he had actively ‘clicked back onto
their frequency’ circa 4:00 PM… and was listening to it the whole time they were
moving and right up to Marsh’s “We are deploying’ transmission”.
So maybe Abel did call Willis at 4:45 to ‘tell him about it’… but according to other
interviews… that’s a full 3-4 minutes after Willis had already heard it himself over
the radio.
** UPDATE…
As it turns out… ANOTHER interview Willis gave to the press just six days after
the incident seems to confirm that BOTH of these things are true.
Willis WAS listening to GM’s ‘private frequency’ right up until the actual time of
deployment AND he did receive that phone call from Abel asking if he’d heard
about the deployment.
** The following article came out just 6 days after the incident and is obviously
** based on a direct interview with Darrell Willis.
A brewing storm: How fire turned tragic for 19 men
Source: Arizona News
Originally published: Jul 6, 2013 – 10:39 am
http://ktar.com/22/1646853/How-Yarnell-fire-turned-tragic-for-19-men-
** NOTE: This version of events from Willis does NOT match his recounting
** in the deployment site press conference that would take place a little
** over 2 weeks later on July 23. In that press conference… Willis gives
** the impression that he did not personally hear any of the final
** transmissions or the actual deployment announcement.
**
** NOTE ALSO: The 4:47 PM time quoted below in this article is possibly
** right for burnover moment but not for Eric’s transmission(s) but since
** this Willis interview was only 6 days after the incident… there was still
** a LOT of confusion on everyone’s part about ‘times’ at that early stage.
At 4:47 p.m., Eric Marsh did radio to fire commanders, and his message was
utterly terrifying. The 19 remaining Hotshots were deploying their emergency fire
shelters- lightweight cocoons made of reflective material intended as a
firefighter’s last resort.
Willis, the Prescott wildland fire chief, was in his pickup outside Yarnell,
listening to the Hotshots’ tactical frequency, when he heard a garbled
message from Marsh that he couldn’t quite make out. Then his cellphone rang.
“Did you hear that?” a supervisor asked him. All Willis could think was,
“Not those guys.” His guys.
Then he began to pray.
Over and over again, the radio crackled with a constant, heartbreaking summons:
“Are you there Granite Mountain? Are you there Granite Mountain?”
Maybe, thought Willis, they’re just out of radio contact. Maybe, he hoped, his
friends would walk out of that smoke at any minute.
Helicopters circled the area in an attempt to douse the flames.
But the smoke was so thick crews could only guess at where to drop their loads.
As time wore on, Willis got back on the phone. He called his wife first, and then
the head of the Prescott Fire Department.
He asked them to start praying, too.
To WTKTT in particular because I’m guessing you have awesome timelines and stuff, but to anybody else, also:
I’m really shifting my focus to the question of cellphones.
I know there’s been conversation about Eric’s use of a cellphone. But I don’t have it in my notes. Can anybody tell me if/when Eric communicated/was communicated with via cellphone? Thank you in advance.
The first anyone had ever heard that Eric Marsh was out there
on that ridge sending/receiving PHONE CALLS that day was when
the SAIT Yarnell Investigation Notes ( YIN ) were finally made public.
It surfaced in the notes for the SAIT interview with OPS1 Todd Abel.
Abel says that after Marsh had those documented arguments
with Rance Marquez ( DIVS Z )… Marsh called Abel ON THE
PHONE to talk about what happened.
Abel also says he believed that was the ‘LAST PHONE CALL’
he got from Marsh that day… which automatically implies that
there were a number of others BEFORE that one.
Marsh was off by himself almost the whole day.
The only time Marsh was known to have been anywhere near
Steed and the crew all day that day is when both Marsh and
Steed were meeting with BR Supt ( Frisby ) and BR Capt
( Brown ) up there near the anchor point for about 30 minutes.
Page 1 of the YIN.
Interview with Todd Abel by J Karels on 8/14/2013
Sent Rance in, to contact Div a and decide div break. Marsh’s phone call, they talked about resources and division break between z and alpha (Marsh said somewhat heated discussion, but they worked out the break, which abel understood to be: down off hill near the grader spot was where the break was going to be. rest of line to the east is zulu. (Believes this was last cell call, other convos were over radio).
Thanks for finding this. That adds another item to the ‘phones to be accounted for’ list.
Reply to Marti Reed post on January 14, 2014 at 12:50 am
>> Marti said…
>> I’m really shifting my focus to the question of cellphones.
See a longer post I just made down below that confirms
Eric Marsh, Darrell Willis, and even Brendan McDonough
ALL had their OWN cellphones with them that day.
There really is no doubt about it.
Only question in Eric Marsh’s case is…
WHERE IS IT?
Did it remain ‘undiscovered’ just like Christopher MacKenzie’s
camera ( or was hidden in his pack )… and then PFD found
it but did NOT report it?… just like they did with Chris’ camera?
Did they ‘surreptitiously’ just get it back to Amanda Marsh like
they tried to get Chris’ camera back to his father… and succeed
in bypassing both the YCSO police and the SAIT investigators?
**
** SAWS ALREADY RUNNING EVEN ON FIRST MAYDAY?
I have been re-listening to the audio from the helmet-cam video that captures
the final radio transmissions that day and have discovered that I believe you
can clearly hear chainsaws ( more than one ) running in the background even
during the very first MAYDAY from Captain Jesse Steed when he says…
“Breaking in on Arizona 16, Granite Mountain Hotshots, We are in front of
the flaming front.”
If the saws really were ALREADY running… then that would significant.
It would actually change the entire timeline as to when they actually first
realized they were in danger and when we finally hear that first MAYDAY.
If the saws were already running before we even hear that first MAYDAY
it means a whole bunch of things had ALREADY happened and a fair
amount of time had gone by before that first MAYDAY actually goes out.
Example…
1) They actually realized they were in trouble.
2) The spread-out single line of men had to ‘pull up’ into a group.
3) A terrible decision had to be made.
4) A place to deploy had to be found.
5) Everyone had to assemble into that ‘found’ place.
6) Everyone had to be instructed what to do then.
7) The sawyers had to pull the chain travel sleeves, pull the ropes, and fire up.
8) Steed had to ‘select’ Channel 16 on purpose. ( He messes up and actually
picks Channel 10 instead… but perfectly understandable given circumstances ).
9) Steed sends the first MAYDAY call out on Air-To-Ground ( Channel 10 ).
This could actually put the moment they realized they were in deep trouble all
the way back to mere SECONDS after the moment two minutes before the
MAYDAY when we also heard Marsh casually transmit “That’s where we want
retardant” at 1637.
If those are NOT chainsaws running there in the background ( and its
definitely not just wind noise )… then why would Captain Steed have
been YELLING like that? He doesn’t sound terrified in the least… he
just sounds like he is YELLING because he wants to be sure he
can be HEARD over all that noise that is close to him there at that moment.
In other words… he sounds like he’s YELLING just as much to hear what
he is saying himself as for anyone who might be listening.
I don’t believe it can all be explained away as just ‘over modulation’.
Steed is not actually ‘over-modulating’ himself… at all.
He is actually YELLING locally ( almost at the top of his lungs ).
Some kind of really, really loud machine-type noise is RIGHT THERE next
to him as he’s trying to transmit that first MAYDAY over the radio.
Thoughts?
Followup: You also have to COMPARE Jesse’s first MAYDAY
call to the final one from Marsh from ( obviously ) the same
location where they are deploying. There is now a little bit of
wind noise locally in Eric’s mike… but all LOUD ‘machine’ noises
are totally absent now. This would make sense. They had
already finished all the saw work they had time to do and it was
time to ( as Eric himself says at that moment ) try to do some
‘burning out around ourselves’ and start getting into shelters.
So if it was just WIND that Steed had to ‘shout at the top of his
lungs’ to be sure he could be heard over in HIS transmission…
then why wouldn’t Marsh have had to do the same YELLING
to be sure he could be heard?
Marsh is not YELLING at all. He’s out of breath from having to
have RUN some distance very quickly to catch up with all of
them… but other than that his VOLUME level is quite normal
( because there are no saws running anymore ).
Best example of what I am saying is at the moment Marsh
says the phrase “in the brush”, and the ‘pause’ that immediately
follows it. It is actually very, very QUIET out there at that site at
that particular moment.
No saws. No wind noises. Just Eric’s (calm) voice.
Thanks again, Marti. Amazing work.
Has this obvious question already been asked/answered, though?
How ‘usual’ is it for EVERY frickin’ member of a Hotshot crew to actually
be carrying their own ( expensive ) Bendix/King radio?
Why would that even be remotely necessary?
Average price for a Bendix/King GPH/CMD ( which is what they appear to be )
portable WITH recharging station seems to be around $1300 bucks ( and
that’s just the analog version. Digitial is more ).
Example: 49er Communications
http://www.49ercommunications.com/bk-radio-handhelds/gph-analog-bendix-king-handheld-command-version/
Price: $1,325.00
Times nineteen equals $25,175 bucks worth of radios out there that day.
For a department that kept saying it didn’t have the money to provide any
benefits for the seasonals… and that also was forcing all the crew to buy
their own $400 boots… that seems like a lot of ‘extra’ ( and unnecessary? )
hardware in the station rack(s).
Thoughts?
Good question. Not only that but, again I ask, “What is an Investigation of radios?” $25K, at least, worth of radios, photographed, which is all I’ve seen? What’s the point??
Marti… see above. If it could be determined that Robert
Caldwell’s BK radio was last set to transmit on Channel
10… then that’s one more step to proving that we DO
hear his voice in those final radio transmissions.
SIDENOTE: I still can’t believe you would have to shell out
$1300 bucks for a radio and it still would NOT have some
kind of transmit/receive log that was timestamping
things… or better yet… even RECORDING some things
like… say… the last 90 minutes of conversation.
Heck… you can walk into Wal-Mart these days and buy
a digital voice recorder for $20 bucks that is capable
of recording conversation ALL DAY LONG at the lower
quality audio settings.
The people who make BK radios just can’t put this
same $20 chipset and EPROM into their $1300 radio?
Unbelievable.
Copy.
Most BK radios have the size, weight, and special features of a brick. We use them because they are (almost) indestructible. And, I suppose, they’re kind of grandfathered in.
They actually have a fair bit of programmable features, but most people don’t know how to access them, which is probably just as well. Sometimes lack of complexity is a REALLY good thing.
And yes I agree with the question you are asking. Is eleven radios (PLUS the one Brendan McDonough obviously had) typical for a hotshot crew? In asking this I’m actually not being judgmental, just curious.
Apologies ( It’s late here as well ). I thought you, yourself,
had actually found evidence of up to 19 radios there at
the site… since the highest incremental number you
reported was ’19’. I guess that’s just the numbers that
were being used by YCSO. They started their numbering
at NINE ( not ONE ).
So the math above is obviously wrong.
Total for 12 of those radios would run about $15,900.
All questions posed still stand, however.
That’s a lot of radios… and a lot of money ( and we still
don’t know how many others might have been in charging
racks back in Prescott or even back in the Crew Carriers. )
How USUAL is that?
Yes, I should have maybe more appropriately have written at the beginning that the numbers started in sequence after the shelters. I guess I was assuming that everybody can count.
My Radio List
During the removal of the bodies, radios that were located inside shelters were removed from the shelters and left on the Deployment Site, so they could be “Investigated.” I’m going to include the name of a photo from the YCSO collection (which I obtained by asking for it from Elizabeth and then downloading the photos from her online collection obtained via her FOIA Request) for each of them. This photo will be from a medium distance to show both some location and some detail.
Radio 9. IMG_0039. Located in the general vicinity of either Shelter 3/Body 30-Sean Misner or Body 17-Kevin Woyjeck. Bendex. Short antenna. Somewhat burned.
Radio 10. IMG_0039. This one has really stumped me. It’s Chris’s radio, as it has a name tag on the side that is really easily readable. It’s in the best condition of any radio on the site. It’s also practically in the middle of the site, at least a foot or so from where I think Chris’s head was (sans a decent site map) and also about a foot from his camera/canteen. Bendex. Long antenna. It’s what WTKTT originally thought, upon looking at the SAIT photo, was Jesse Steed’s radio. (There are quite a few long-antenna radios among the collection, so Jesse wasn’t the only one with one). The only way it could be both in excellent condition and located where it was, was if, as was documented, it was removed from his shelter and placed pretty far away from his head, in my opinion. Or at least away. Or maybe I’m still not quite oriented, sans a decent site map.
Radio 11. IMG_0043. Near shelter 4/Body 18-John Percin. (There are three other bodies on the Body Map near him so……., the next closest being Dustin Deford). Bendex. Long antenna that’s twisted into a U-shape. Partially burned. Camera/canteen is almost pointing toward it. Cellphone 405 (which I have determined is Andrew Ashcroft’s by location and by the fact that he was using one that day) is really close to it. So this shows how confusing this can be.
Radio 12. IMG_0045. Near Body 2-Jesse Steed. Definitely his radio. Label on it saying “Prescott Fire Department.” Long antenna. Bendex. Good condition, even though it’s in a pile of stuff that’s somewhat burned/melted. I think it was pulled from his shelter and set there.
Radio 13. IMG_0059. On the NW perimeter of the site. Closest body on the Body Map is Body 4-Robert Caldwell. But the radio is quite far away from the body and quite burned. Bendex. Short antenna, I think. I’m right now thinking it may be in a pack.
Radio 14. IMG_0052. Near Shelter 7/Body 1-Eric Marsh. Bendex. Long antenna. Definitely burned. This is the radio being looked at in the SAIT photo. But its location in the YCSO photos is relatively far away from where they are squatting near the agave in the SAIT photo, shortly before the YCSO photos were taken, in my opinion.
Radio 15. IMG_0062. Located to the “right” of the camera/canteen. Quite near Shelter 8/Body 16-William Warneke. I’m pretty sure it’s a Bendex, but it’s seriously burned. Long antenna-broken, with the end wedged between a burned rock and the canteen frame around the camera.
Radio 16. IMG_0062. Located to the “left” of the camera/canteen. Under a big black blob of something burned and melted. Burned, I think. You can’t see much of it. This is the other radio WTKTT spotted in the SAIT photo and was wondering if it was a different kind of radio. It’s a Bendex. Short antenna. On one side is a melted plastic bottle and near it on the other is the saw-blade cover from Dustin Deford’s chainsaw.
Radio 17. IMG_0070. Located outside site to the east, but somewhat close to Shelter 3/Body 20-Sean Misner and Shelter 4/Body 18-John Percin. In a collection with two white metal bottles, the aluminum frame of a canteen, and a whole lot of AA batteries. Totally burned. Long antenna. Looks shorter than a Bendex. But if it’s not a Bendex, it is the only one of the bunch that isn’t. Probably a pack, I’m thinking now.
Radio 18. IMG_0072. Located outside of the site, to the east between the site and one of the chainsaws. Close to the white handle of a pulasky (sp?). I’m thinking this is a burned pack. (I haven’t been specifically looking for packs, but right now it makes sense). Radio is deep in crud/soil/whatever. Wedged between two aluminum canteen frames. Can’t tell if it’s a Bendex, it’s really burned, but it looks similar to the bottoms of the other Bendexes. There’s something that looks like a long antenna, but the photos don’t show if it’s attached to the radio. Also, there’s something that looks like it might be a case the size of a radio, as well as something that looks like that speaker thing they use. (I’ve been thinking of looking for more of these speakers, but haven’t gotten there yet.)
Radio 19. IMG_0007. Located the furthest away from the site, I think, and to the northish-east. I think it’s a pack. Really burned. I think it’s a Bendex. Can’t tell the length of the antenna because of the photo framing. Grouped with the frame of an aluminum canteen, a brown thing that I can’t tell whether it’s a notebook or a wallet, some fuel bottles, and something I early on keyworded with “cellphone?” Right now I’m thinking, “Maybe this might be Clayton Witted’s pack?” If so, I can’t believe they photographed the radio and didn’t see the cellphone. It’s not really burned into anything. It’s just lying there.
So there you have it. My awesome list of the radios. And I put “Investigated” in quotes for a reason.
The reason I put Investigation in quotes is because I have a question. What is considered to be an investigation of radios? All I’ve so far seen is a bunch of photographs of radios. Is that considered to be an investigation of radios?
It’s getting late for me here. That’s why there’s a couple of typos in that. But I think the meaning is clear in spite of them.
Marti… there was quite a discussion along these lines in
some of the earlier ‘chapters’ of this ongoing public
dicussion. The focus on was whether or not it would be
possible to tell exactly which radios had a final ‘transmit’
setting of ‘Arizona 10’.
Remember… Jesse Steed broke onto the Air To Ground
channel that day by saying “Breaking in on Arizona 16″…
but even the SAIR says this was a mistake and that
the transmissions were actually appearing on the
official Air To Ground channel ‘Arizona 10’.
I believe it was decided that the only way you could really
tell what transmit channel was the last one selected for
any particular BK is if they were using them in one of
the ‘modes’ that REQUIRED them to ‘hand-select’
the current transmit channel by using the rotary knob
on the top of the radio.
There is no documentation anywhere, that I have seen,
that ANYONE even ever tried to document even this
basic information about the recovered radios.
So to answer your question… the SAIT people specifically
asked YCSO to carefully collect all the radios for
‘later inspection’… but there is nothing to indicate they
ever tried to ‘inspect’ them at all other than just observing
how burned they might ( or definitely might not, as we
now know ) have been.
The jury is still actually out as to whether that is Robert
Caldwell’s voice being heard on any of those final
captured radio transmissions. His relatives say it IS him.
If Caldwell’s radio could be determined to have been
last set to transmit on Channel 10… then that would
be pretty good proof that it IS him we can hear in
those final transmissions.
Copy.
OK, I went back and looked, after I woke up enough to re-read what you wrote and understand it. Unfortunately. Robert’s radio is really burned and especially at the top you can’t see much of anything. And the photo angle is not adequate.
Steed’s radio is in great condition, but there are only two photos in which you see the top of the radio, but they’re not close enough and not at quite the right angle to see the kind of information you’re describing. It would be a snap if you had it in your hands though. Actually, you could probably get that info off Robert’s radio, too, in a physical inspection.
What were these SAIT people doing?????
What do you want to see a REAL (and realistic) investigation of the radios (knowing what you know, since I don’t really know anything about them) tell us?
Marti… see above. I am probably dreaming but
is there, in fact, ANY way to tell what the
rotary channel select knob on the tops of any
of these radios is actually set to?
I still haven’t seen these photos you are
working with. How ‘close-up’ are they?
What you are talking about about rotary dials on radios is way beyond my expertise. I think maybe you should tell Elizabeth you would like the link to her folder of the YCSO photos of the SAiT investigation. Until JD publishes a link to his folder of the actual high rez SAIT photos. Which actually probably will tell you even more, if he ever publishes that.
I’m assuming that GM used Bendix King DPH radios (they almost ubiquitous in wildland fire).
A REAL investigation of radios would note the positions of the channel knob and the switches for Priority, Hi/Lo, and Scan. It would also examine the programming on the radios (if they were still functioning, they could be attached to something like DPH-Edit on a computer, via a cable, and their program settings downloaded).
This is important because there were reports of difficulties communicating due to mismatched frequencies or tone guards. This would also help us figure out who was transmitting on which channel. Even if the plastic knobs had melted, the little metal piece underneath would remain in place, showing which channel the radio was tuned to.
The three switches: PRI (Priority) is usually programmed such that while a radio is scanning multiple channels, any traffic on priority will break through above the rest. It can also be used such that, no matter which channel the knob is set to, the user can call out on their programmed priority channel.
HI/LO generally switches the power of transmissions between 5 watts and 1 watt. It can be reprogrammed to do other things.
SCAN tells the radio to listen to all channels programmed to scan, and lets the user listen to whatever traffic is picked up from multiple channels.
We don’t know if GM were using a pre-programmed set of channels and settings, or something they cloned their radios to when they arrived on the incident.
Brendan McDonough does (know).
What I really want to know is, from all you wildland firefighters who are here among us, within the protocols of a SAiR, what is considered an investigation of radios in a situation where 19 firefighters have died leaving behind 11 radios on a deployment site plus one on a lookout who survived (not to mention what is the protocol regarding making a map of that kind of a site)?
I just really don’t know.
See above about what I think should be included in an investigation of radios.
Realize that the vast majority of firefighters don’t know what’s involved in an investigation like this, because these things are extremely rare. The lack of response to this question and the PFD withholding evidence question has more to do with us not knowing, rather than us not caring.
Thank you! I really appreciate your comments on this. It sounds like you’re a bit more familiar with this stuff. I’ve been downloading SAITs I think might be helpful for me to scan. But I’m kinda running out of time for working on this.
I really think the best we can do here at this point, is to point other eyes and minds that are being actually paid to do this and have subpoena power, where they most likely need to go.
Yes. Like you, I’ve had a fair bit of employment doing maps (mine ranged from surveying to digitizing). I was very tempted to try making maps of the incident. But frustration won over, because what ought to take one hour would take ten (no exaggeration), and I *still* wouldn’t feel secure that I’d done it right.
My feelings exactly.
Reply to Marti Reed post on January 13, 2014 at 4:51 pm
>> Marti said…
>> I’m working off the top of my head, and memories, right now. One thing
>> I’ve been aware of being confused about is who, actually, was on the site
>> that night. I’m remembering (possibly in error) Darryl Willis saying he was
>> on the site that night.
You are right… Willis has said on a number of occasions that he was right
there, nearby the fallen men that night ( ALL night ), even though he had
arrived at the Yarnell fire at 11:45 PM Saturday evening and had been up all
night the previous night as well.
From Willis’ press conference at the deployment site held July 23, 2013…
The other aspect was we had some folks back in Yarnell on ATVs and when this
area cooled off enough they came up on ATVs… uh… three of our brothers from
the Prescott National Forest… and actually confirmed again that we had lost 19
firefighters. And… uhm… at that point… the few of us that were here that were
with the Prescott Fire Department determined that we weren’t gonna leave these
guys here so when it cooled off and stuff… we stayed back a little bit and spent t
the night up here with them… in this vicinity. ( He gestures to an area on the
ground not too far from where the bodies were ).
So Willis was definitely one of the ones who was there by the men all night.
He doesn’t name the ‘other members’ of the PFD he is referring to but we
know at least the following three additional PFD employees were there in
Yarnell, working the fire, at the time of deployment ( excluding Brendan
McDonough, of course )…
Tony Sciacca, Conrad Jackson and his partner Mark Matthews.
By morning, when the YCSO invetigators were done, there were ( according
to Willis himself ) 11 members of PFD there by then to assist with the
removal of the bodies. We still don’t know who ALL of them were.
The 12th member of that team was Wade Parker’s dad Danny Parker, a
Chino Valley Fire Captain, who had asked Willis specifically if he could
participate. Willis is the one who told him he could so obviously Willis was
‘in charge’ of this operation that morning.
>> Marti also wrote…
>> I’m also remembering (possibly in error) YCSO saying the site was cleared of
>> all people except a YCSO crew guarding the site. I’ve had moments of
>> thinking, “I need to go back and check all that out. I’m confused.”
I’m sure there was YCSO nearby but it’s unclear if they were ‘spending the
night’ right there by the bodies like Willis says he and some other PFD did
or whether the YCSO was further removed from there like back at the ranch.
What YCSO was VERY concerned about before daylight was keeping the
news helicopters away once daylight came. There are notes in the incident
log about Roy Hall himself trying to make sure that would happen.
Nowhere in Willis’ description of what happened that night does he say
anything about when they placed the ‘tarps’ on the bodies… or who
actually allowed them to do that before police investigators even arrived.
Interesting… I went back and checked the police report myself and it says
that the tarps were placed over the bodies by “the firefighters who found them”,
but I had forgotten that it ALSO says the YCSO detectives first photo-documented
the site WITHOUT removing the tarps… then they removed all the tarps… and
then they photo-documented AGAIN.
So it appears that regardless of who had been ‘walking the site’ the night
before to place all the tarps… the detectives had the good sense to
photo-document what was there EXACTLY they way THEY were now
discovering it… before they did anything else.
Have you seen any photos that match this activity description in the YCSO
package, or are there simply no photos yet available prior to the bodies being
REMOVED from the site?
From page 6 of YCSO Detective J. McDormett’s initial investigation report…
The incident location where the firefighters perished was located past a ranch
and up a hill. A make shift road had been bull dozed to the scene overnight.
At the foot of this hill were numerous members of the Prescott Fire Department
(PFD). I was told that PFD were waiting for us to recover the remains of the
fallen men so they could bring the deceased down the hill for transport to the
medical examiner’s office (ME). Aside from Sgt. Williams, ET Boyle and I, the
following YCSO employees assisted the recovery process: Sheriff Scott Mascher,
Capt. Jeff Newnum, Lt. Boelts, ET Katie Waldock, Det. Todd Swaim and forest
patrol deputies Larry Hooten and Tommy Tieman. On arrival the fallen men were
under tarps that had been placed over them by the fire fighters that had discovered
the bodies. The ET’s took 360 degree photos before removing the tarps. The tarps
were removed, additional photographs were taken, and FARO, which is a 3D
photography system, was employed to further document the scene.
Followup: Last line of police report is important. They did NOT
employ the FARO 3D system until AFTER they had already
photo-documented the site with the TARPS still in place… and
only after removing the TARPS did they do the FARO scan.
One more followup… another article appeared after the incident
which was talking all about how Arizona DPS Paramedic-Officer
Eric Tarr thought he heard ‘voices’ coming from the site as he
approached it and he was ‘calling out’ to them as he approached.
We know now that it was only the ( still fully functioning ) radios
that he heard when approaching the site.
However… that article also quotes a YCSO officer as saying
that later on, a Prescott Fire Official (Marty Cole, I think )
wanted to turn all the radios OFF… but he prevented him from
doing that saying…
“I’ve wanted to turn them off since we got here…
But we have to leave it for the investigators.”
So YCSO was definitely ‘watching the site’ and actually
preventing PFD people from doing whatever they wanted
to do there… but we don’t know the timeframe.
If they weren’t allowed to ‘touch the site’ and the officer who
stopped them from turning off the radios knew that ‘nothing
should be touched’… then when did they actually walk all
over the site placing TARPS… and who let them do that?
One more time… I finally remembered where it was reported
that a PFD person wanted to ‘touch the site’ and turn off all
the radios but a YCOS Sheriff prevented him.
I got the quote from the Sheriff right and it was, in fact, PFD
employee Marty Cole.
Here is where that ‘story’ was actually first told…
SIDENOTE: Notice in this article that PFD employee Marty Cole
is himself quoted saying that Marsh was a “hardhead”…
Outside magazine
19: The True Story of the Yarnell Hill Fire
Published Tuesday, September 17, 2013
By Kyle Dickman
http://www.outsideonline.com/outdoor-adventure/YarnellFire.html
MARTY COLE, the former superintendent of Granite Mountain and
one of the two safety officers on the fire, leaned against the hood
of his truck for a long time before he made up his mind that he
wasn’t going to the site. Then he changed his mind. He needed to
see for himself what had happened.
That first trip, Marty made it only to the gate of the road that led to
the Helms place before he stopped, put it in reverse, and drove
the six miles back to the incident command post. As he did, he
replayed memories from over the years he’d worked with Eric
Marsh. The hardheadedness, their arguments over trivial
things like the color of crew T-shirts…
Four times he made the trip to and from the command post
before arriving at the ranch house a third of a mile from the
site of the tragedy.
Marty walked across the blackened flats toward the basin.
At the site, a sheriff stood guard.
The hotshots’ pants and packs were incinerated. Their saws,
Pulaskis, and Rhinos were now deformed lumps of metal.
Fourteen of their shelters had been vaporized or ripped off by
the wind, and many of the men lay in the fetal position, as if they
were sleeping in the blackened ash. The remaining shelters were
barely recognizable. The aluminum had flaked off; the glue that
held them together had melted when the temperatures hit 1,200
degrees. Five hotshots lay beneath these remnants.
Marty stood in shock and listened. Again and again he heard a
hissing that ended in a crack. What is that? he thought. Then it hit
him. The hotshots’ radios. Somehow they were still on and
functioning. He took a deep breath and went to turn them off, but
the sheriff stopped him.
“You can’t,” the officer told Marty, his hand on the old superintendent’s chest.
For the next three months, state and federal investigators would
have to examine every detail of the crew’s history up to their final
moments. Something needed to be learned from this tragedy.
“I’ve wanted to turn them off since we got here.
But we have to leave it for the investigators.”
I’m getting a bit fuzzy here. What are we asking of this timeline?
The same thing you, yourself, have been so
diligently trying to figure out.
WHY are things ‘where they are’ in the photos?
WHO had access to this site before the only
photos we ( you ) can see were taken… and is
there a chance they ‘moved’ things either
purposely or accidentally.
I really don’t think the PFD guys who walked all
over the site placing TARPS long before the
police even got there were actually picking things
up and putting them back down again… or even
the unthinkable like going through their pockets
looking for and/or removing personal effects
like notebooks or unit logs or whatever…
…but then again.
Was there really a YCSO Sheriff there by
the site all night… making SURE no one
‘disturbed’ things? Might be good to know.
I don’t think anybody was moving things around either, at that time. Mostly I’m guessing everybody was in some form of shock. I’m sort of conjuring, though, that if Willis was on the site all night, as I think he says he was (though I may be mistaken), given all kinds of everything, he may have been carefully scoping it.
Marti… see above. That’s the second
time you have needlessly accused
yourself of being mistaken. You
are NOT. Willis, himself, SAYS that
he ‘spent the night right there’ near
the bodies. He said it right to the
camera in his July 23 public press
conference held at the deployment
site. He even gestured right to the
spot where he ( and some others )
“spent the night” there.
I tend to try to be pretty conservative when I’m speculating from memory and it’s late at night and I’m too tired to go looking for things. Thank you!
Willis says in his interview (transcribed and provided by ADOSH to me) that he spent the night out at the Helms Ranch while a dozer was trying to get a road in to the bodies. I believe Willis, for whatever it is worth. He and law enforcement wanted to get the bodies out privately, before the media helicopters came, so it is entirely possible that law enforcement’s investigation and photos were less… detailed than usual. PLUS the investigation team (I think it was them) said repeatedly that the wind was whipping things around (e.g. the shelters and debris). I personally am not concerned about the chain of evidence and such at this point. I am MORE concerned with what the SAIT did not sufficiently consider, ask for, or probe deeply regarding. But that is just my personal view.
Thanks, Elizabeth.
Everything you have reported
just above matches other
statements in the YCSO
police report itself such
as them being woken up and
called to the site ASAP
instead of the time they were
told the night before… and
the ‘wind’ at the site. Roy
Hall himself discusses
‘keeping the media choppers
away in the morning’ in his
own Incident notes,
etc., etc.
I hear ya about the SAIT.
What a BOTCH job…
but I still think ‘chain of
possession’ on some
critical evidence here
is VERY important.
E.g: Eric Marsh’s cellphone.
WHO found it?
WAS it ever found?
If so… WHO had it?
WHO has it NOW?
Etc…
And I agree with that too. I don’t think they could have found cellphones that night in the dark. But I think they could have a spotted a camera.
Thank you, and I agree. I have found out as much as I need about the chain of evidence. The fact that PFD was quite willing and able to withhold evidence if they thought it was in their best interests to do so.
And, I spent of time yesterday picking thru the dispatch logs, among the documents JD was posting a little bit ahead of me downloading them. Monday morning was a zoo in the air. Nobody local was prepared to deal with it.
Actually, nobody local was prepared to deal with any of this. In it’s entire hundred and something year history, Prescott Fire Department had never had a single fatality.
Bob Powers
on January 13, 2014 at 8:23 am said:
You hit it been a long time since I have been there.
I don’t know if it really matters…but Marana is the name of the town about 5 miles from the Pinal Air Park, which is where the joint USFS and CIA air field is technically located. During the 60’s and early 70’s, it was the headquarters for Air America which in now called Evergreen Air and that is still there. There is also an Apache Helicopter training base located very nearby and a lot of special forces do HALO jump training there. A lot of very big cargo planes fly in and out of there in the middle of the night with air crews who wear strange looking uniforms who are in the chow hall the next morning. NARTC is also co-located there and there is a large Fire Cache located there although FLETC moved to Artesia, New Mexico in the late 90’s, but the whole operation is collectively referred to as “Marana.” All and all, a very interesting place. At least all of that is right the last time I knew, which is now receding further and further into history.
A long time ago I was there in the 80’s twice once for air attack training and once for Type 2 team training we had quite a few old hot shots there and we dried up the Bar one night they weren’t ready for us I guess.
That’s a righteous claim to fame since that bar is used to seeing some pretty heavy drinkers…every night, as there is nothing else to do for a long, long, ways away and lots of reasons not to leave the facility.
You got that right They ran out of whisky or said they did to close the party down we just switched to beer or something else.
jeff i
on January 13, 2014 at 8:25 am said:
So its clear that WTKTT and his followers are back on the Willis witch hunt track again, very sad.
And Gary, you are saying that agency politics would have influenced your fireline decisions? That doesn’t sound like the “push the envelope” kind of guy you profess to be.
I don’t understand your question, so I will take at stab at what I think you could mean and then you can fill in the blanks. Agency politics influenced everything I did in my life from 1974 until 2006. So where to start.
During the entire time I worked for the USFS, 1974-1988, I rode for the brand…period. I bled green when I was cut. Every decision I made on the fireline was dictated by agency politics. Fight fire aggressively but provide for safety first. Which is what I did, period.
I started on the Prescott National Forest (1974) as a very low level initial attack fire fighter (they didn’t come any lower) but I was raised on a Coconino National Forest Hotshot Crew under the leadership of Forest Fire Staff Officer Bill Buck.
If you know anything about USFS Region 3, (I don’t have any idea where you work or what you do), so…they called it the Mighty Coconino for a very good reason, and maybe they still do. Bill Buck ran a hyper fire program on steroids, I was, and still am, a Bill Buck worshipper.
I was hired on the Happy Jack Hotshots at age 20, and I was the CREW BOSS by age 23, I believed at the time and I still do, that I was the youngest hotshot crew boss in the country. If you know of anyone who has ever been a hotshot screw boss younger, please tell me.
EVERYTHING I did was what they wanted me to do, and what they wanted me to do was fight fire aggressively but provide for safety first, with a very strong emphasis on fighting fire aggressively and a little softer emphasis on providing for safety (there is a nuance there, it was very slight, but it was there).
BUT…there was never any question in my mind that my role model, mentor and father-like-figure, a great wildland firefighter and District Fire Management Officer by the name of Richard Allred, EXPECTED me to bring the entire crew home to his District in one piece…and I never wanted to disappoint Richard.
I also received training and mentorship under 2 other great wildland firefighters and Fire Management Officers, Hub Harris and Orlando Romero, I never wanted to disappoint either one of them either…and I don’t think I did.
The USFS fire organization during my years on the line and even later during my 4 years in an office on the Santa Fe National Forest under the great leadership of 2 other great wildland firefighters (are you picking up on a theme here, ALL of the leaders in the USFS FIRE program during that period were great men to my knowledge) and top managers, Les Buchanan (Santa Fe Forest AFMO) and Ray Page (Santa Fe Forest FMO).
It was an organization of men (yes, they were all men back then) of complete honesty and integrity with a very strong work ethic and group loyalty and cohesion.
It was a world full of honor and purpose of the highest values and ideals of public service in pursuit of our primary objective…fight fire aggressively but provide for safety first. Take care of each other, fight fire for the man on your left and the man on your right (although I did receive a Regional Civil Rights Award for hiring the FIRST woman to work on a Coconino Hotshot Crew…so there)
If you interpreted my statement that I pushed the envelope that I was some sort of rebel…than you got it all wrong. I never had a reason or thought to go against my agency’s values, policies or politics…from where I was, there was nothing to rebel against or challenge, those values were pure.
The world was black and white, no grey. There was right and wrong. Good and bad. There was a clearly defined and unified strategy “See wildfire…put it out.” Life was simple…and good.
And none of that prepared me to work for a ******* agency like the BLM…so that is another and very different story and is not relevant to this comment because I was no longer in FIRE at that point in my life and everything changed.
So…exactly what is your question?
whoops, Freudian slip…screw boss.
So I think what you are saying is agency politics influenced your fireline decisions, but not when it came to safety. But apparently you don’t think Marsh and Steed could draw that same line.
I really, really, really, hate to put it to you this way (and to any of those who loved the Granite Mountain Hotshots who may be following this thread) but if you can’t see it for yourself…I WILL SPELL IT OUT FOR YOU since you seem to be rather obtuse!
No…what I am saying is agency politics influenced all of my decisions INCLUDING safety, and I am saying that when I was on the Coconino there was a culture to “Fight fire AGRESSIVELY, but provide for safety first!” There is a nuance there, get it? It was a hyper fire program on steroids!
That philosophy stayed with me after I was hired to start the Santa Fe Hotshots. That is the reason I was hired to create the Santa Fe Hotshots. There was tremendous pressure on Orlando Romero to hire a “local” guy to run that crew, but Orlando wanted a crew with a Coconino like reputation of “Fighting fire AGRESSIVELY but providing for safety first!” So Orlando bucked the system and hired me instead.
And I gave him exactly what he wanted, although I also understood that Orlando EXPECTED me to bring the crew home to his District in one piece and I never wanted to disappoint him. Get it?
You asked, “But apparently you don’t think Marsh and Steed could draw that same line.” No…I don’t. Eric Marsh, Jesse Steed and almost the entire Granite Mountain Hotshots were burned alive, they are DEAD. While I am sitting here fat, dumb and relatively happy after 32 years of service where I was paid to risk my life almost every day I went to work, one or the other.
FYI – The winners get to write the history books! Good, bad, or ugly, my race is over…I won. Get it?
Why else do I think that? The Blue Ridge Hotshots from the Coconino National Forest where they probably still “Fight fire AGRESSIVELY, but provide for safety first!”
Because traditions die very slowly in the United States Forest Service if at all, who were subject to the same fire conditions and requests to go to Yarnell, are now getting ready for the next fire season, while we are still talking about the horrific, inexplicable deaths of almost an entire hotshot crew. Something that has NEVER HAPPENED BEFORE in the history of wildland firefighting.
Oh, and by the way…in case you missed it…the Blue Ridge Hotshot Crew Boss did everything he could to try and save the Granite Mountain Hotshots from themselves…but they fooled him by lying to him in response to a direct question regarding their safety. Sometimes the truth really, really, really, hurts…doesn’t it? Guess what? Most people didn’t like me during my career, but I never cared what most people thought…and I still don’t. Nobody ever paid me to make friends.
Go back and read all of my previous posts describing all of the other fires that resulted in hotshot deaths, the Loop, the Battlement Creek, and the South Canyon fires…if you don’t understand how completely different…as in I can logically explain exactly (and I have done so several times) why those hotshots died on those fires.
Those deaths were tragic, but completely understandable. Nothing about the deaths of the Granite Mountain Hotshots is understandable or explainable, unless you know something no one else knows.
Oh, and as a quick reminder, none of those other hotshot death tallies even came close to the Yarnell Hill Fire alone. In fact, all of the other 3 fires combined is only slightly higher than the hotshot deaths on the Yarnell Hill Fire under the leadership and direction of Eric Marsh and Jesse Steed in a program organized and managed by Darrell Willis. Now what don’t you get?
The Yarnell Hill Fire and the deaths of the Granite Mountain hotshots is an anomaly, an aberration, a CONUNDRUM! Now do you get it? It is very, very, very, hard to argue with results…don’t you think?
Go ahead and call me names, I am used to it and probably deserve it. I’m sure I could have found a better way to express myself if I would have thought about it long enough.
Couple of comments:
First of all, probability is a terrible way to look at safety decisions in wildland firefighting. We certainly do not do that in aviation. Things are either safe or you do not do them. You do not do things that are 70% safe, 90% safe or even 99% safe. If you did, there would be a lot of dead WFFs. You do not choose to do A over B because A is safer than B. Rather you choose A because A is safe. If neither A or B are safe, you do neither. Firefighting has inherent risk that is accepted, but that accepted risk is basically the unforeseeable “act of God”. Things that have quantifiable, predictable risk should be avoided.
I was the one who made the comment about psychoanalyzing Marsh. The way you are all speculating about the relationship between Marsh and Willis, we are going to need Sigmund Freud to write the definitive book about the YHF and not someone like John MacLean.
I don’t think PFD, or the SAIT ever really thought that there was
going to be the amount of video and photographic evidence
emerging that lets us all SEE ( for ourselves ) EXACTLY what
those men were seeing up there just 4 minutes before they
decided to leave the only truly ‘safe’ place to be ( where they
had also been TOLD to stay by an OPS working the fire ).
PFD and the SAIT already knew some photos had gone
public like the ‘texted lunch spot’ thing and whatnot… but
none of those photos compare to the high-res photos
and video and audio and the “you are there” experience that
poor Christopher MacKenzie has ( thankfully ) provided us.
I think… when Christopher’s father Mike MacKenzie saw what
his son had left us all and realized himself ( as a firefighter )
how important that was… it threw PFD and the SAIT for a loop.
I think they had already been working on a narrative that had
a lot more “we will never know” stuff in it before they realized
they WERE going to have to acknowledge the existence of
Christopher’s high-quality photos and videos.
There are a lot of things we still don’t know.
Maybe never will…
…but thanks to Christopher and his father… one of those things
is NOT “maybe they just couldn’t see what the fire was doing”.
They most certainly COULD… and every firefighter who sees
those videos has asked the same question…
“How could they have left where they were at the TIME they did,
and gone the ROUTE they did, when they could SEE what the fire
was doing ( and was GOING to do ) right down there in front of
them?”
I agree. PFD and SAIT are assuming, for the most part, a different world than the one we currently live in, although I think Brad Mayhew, who was in charge of the site investigation on July 3 is pretty internet savvy, imho.
One additional thing, however, that is constantly reverberating in my brain. It’s a two-part thing. On the one hand, the message from Air Attack that the fire would reach Yarnell in one to two hours.
Which I think they believed, and caused them to think they could make it to the ranch in time.
On the other hand, the really serious concern (documented in some article I’ve read) from the meteorologist associated with the Southwest Area Command Center in Albuquerque (the center that had repeatedly denied the Arizona Forest Service the use of the Granite Mountain Hot Shots) that he was contemplating trying to contact the crew DIRECTLY to tell them that the winds WERE SHIFTING to the southwest from the south. You said “when they could SEE what the fire
was doing ( and was GOING to do )” He was really really really concerned that they didn’t know that the winds were shifting from the south, i.e. parallel to where they were planning to go, to the southwest i.e turning and thus wrapping around the ridge to blow up into the canyon/bowl, and was in conflict about whether or not to violate protocol to try to communicate with them directly about that. He’s located in Albuquerque, and I have seriously thought about going over to his office and talking with him, especially since I’m pretty sure he probably knows who my dad was.
I really think the crew dropped down into that canyon thinking the fire was running parallel to them. What they didn’t know, and this meteorologist was in great conflict about how to tell them, was that the fire was shifting in a direction that would wrap it around the ridge below them and turn it into a chimney that they were about to be entrapped in.
Mike,
Under your approach, if GM had pulled off their bushwhack, they would have been able to say it was “totally safe” because nothing happened. Probability is something taken into account in any activity where safety is a big concern. Again, look at those gloves. If you can go gloveless for years in a row with just some callouses and small cut, and you don’t take the chance — which is another way of saying probability — of a really bad outcome into account, then based on experience you’d say gloves aren’t needed. It isn’t gambling or being irresponsible to take probabilities into account. I think several commenters here are reacting emotionally to the concept, but it actually is an important part of safe systems and practices.
NV –
With all due respect, you have it ass backwards. You do not base safety decisions on your experience. That is a set-up for “bad decisions with good outcomes”. You base them on your training, your teaching, the manuals and the RULES!
You wear gloves because it is safe. Not wearing them won’t be a problem most of the time, but do it enough and it will get you. Playing the probability game is a prelude to injury.
Likewise, Eric Marsh went into that canyon banking on the fact that the wind would not shift. But with the thunderstorm present, there was certainly a not tiny chance of that in fact happening. Most of the time he would have gotten away with it. But taking a calculated risk killed him and 18 others. The SAFE course – staying in the black.
Do something with a small risk of a negative outcome enough times and you will experience that negative outcome eventually. Hence, you should not do those sorts of things at all. Calculated risk and playing the odds is not a way to stay safe!
“With all due respect, you have it ass backwards. You do not base safety decisions on your experience. ” Mike, I’d just said in my comment just above that experience can give a misleading picture of what CAN happen. Let me quote: “Again, look at those gloves. If you can go gloveless for years in a row with just some callouses and small cut, and you don’t take the chance — which is another way of saying probability — of a really bad outcome into account, then based on experience you’d say gloves aren’t needed.” I am saying gloves ARE needed, despite the ability to have lots of experience suggesting they aren’t.
You, Mike, have just expressed why probability DOES need to be taken into account when making decisions. You can do something with a small chance of a catastrophic outcome multiple times with nothing bad happening. Your own experience set therefore shows that the activity seems safe. But, the chance, or odds, or probability, of something bad happening, is still there, and sooner or later that bad event will happen. That is why you make a rule not to do these things. For instance, wear gloves as a rule, even if going gloveless most of the time will be ok.
For GM, they seem to have a persistent pattern of actions that had a slight chance of a catastrophic outcome. Look at McDonough and Willis as regards deployment sites. But, they’d never lost a lookout before YHF — and haven’t lost one yet, now. They did lose the ATV of course. That’s probability at work. You have to take the chance of a negative outcome into account, which they don’t seem to have been doing in several respects.
NV,
I’m jumping back in here on this probability debacle. As Mike said above “With all due respect, you have it ass backwards.” I have to totally agree with his assessment, and I echo that sentiment because if I use my own, it would be much more crass.
You stated many times now about wearing gloves to avoid callouses and blisters. You don’t get it. We WANT callouses and blisters turn into callouses. The reason we wear gloves is to PREVENT 2ND AND THIRD DEGREE THERMAL RADIANT HEAT BURNS. Wearing gloves has absolutely NOTHING to do with getting callouses.
I think Fullsail was right when he said you have never fought fire before.
There’s more …. do you read your horoscope everyday to decide whether or not to do something? Do you consult a Ouija Board or go for palm readings on a regular basis? How about the Tarot Card route? Those are allbased on probability aren’t they?
I asked you earlier to indicate where, in any of ‘The WFF Rules’ there was any mention of ‘probabilities’ and still haven’t seen any provided yet. Let me help you, since you’ve probably been busy looking for those boulder SZ incidents. Fire Order number “Post lookouts when there is POSSIBLE danger” (EMPHASIS ADDED). Do you consider the word ‘possible’ to be equivalent to, or at least synonomous to ‘probable?’ Probable is the root word of probability, so that’s why I mentioned it.
We post lookouts ALL the time, not just when there is ‘possible’ danger.
You said “They did lose the ATV of course. That’s probability at work.” Are you serious here? NO, it’s NOT “probability at work.” It was STUPIDITY. They lost their ATV for being stupid, doing dumb things (actions). They were told (cautioned) several tmes by line overhead AND other HS Superintendents NOT to continue with their unsafe and unsuccessful actions. The result was a BAD OUTCOME. The burned up ATV had NOTHING to do with probability.
It seems to me that the two camps are defining “probability” differently. The (primarily)WFF version seems synonymous with random chance (or taking chances), whereas the other version refers to the total possible outcomes, and taking into account events that haven’t happened yet. We all agree that WFFs put themselves in danger by disregarding all possible outcomes.
You’re all arguing the SAME THING with regards to fireline safety. Follow the safety rules, because they prepare us for ALL outcomes, not just the most likely ones, or the ones we’ve personally experienced.
Where do you think the safety rules come from, if not from people who consider probability? They look at worst case scenarios, and decide whether probability = 0, or whether it’s high enough (even if incredibly small) that lives/health/livelihood can be saved by modifying behavior across the board.
As Mike said, “You do not base safety decisions on your experience.” Whether we are safe because we are well trained and always follow the rules, or because we recognize that those rules were based on a scrutiny of possible outcomes, doesn’t matter so much as the our treating safety seriously. We’re both getting to the same appropriate behavior, whether by left-brained math, or right-brained intuition and culture.
I just came across this USA Today interview with a former Payson Hotshot crew member that I think just about powerfully nails it on a number of points that keep getting raised here. (As an aside, about media coverage, this is the fourth USA Today post I’ve watched/read re Yarnell that really gets it right, imho. And I’ve never trusted USA Today. So that means I’m doubly impressed):
“Former Firefighter Tim Wendel talks with USA TODAY’s Hadley Malcolm about his experience as a member of an elite Hotshot firefighting crew”
http://www.wtsp.com/video/default.aspx?bctid=2521314678001
Reply to Marti Reed post on January 12, 2014 at 8:19 am
>> Marti said…
>> Actually the YCSO photos of the SAIT investigation aren’t high resolution,
>> unfortunately. They’re only 2048 pixels by 1365 pixels. And we only have one
>> SAIT photo of the SAIT investigation, the one from JD’s article.
>> Other than that, we DON’T HAVE their photos.
Marti…
I still haven’t seen any of the YCSO photos but I guess I had just been assuming
they were high-res.
The only photo I have still ever seen showing items at the site is still that one
SAIT photo published by Mr. Dougherty.
Might be a little late after all the work you’ve done but the Fernandez photos that
Mr. Dougherty has published also contain some super high-res photos of the
deployment site and the boulder fields just due north of it.
Dean Fernandez was Air Tactical Group Supervisor ( ATGS ) all the way through
July 10, 2013. Lots of aerial photos but some very interesting ground level
deployment site photos as well.
They were taken on July 10, after everything was gone, but they might still help
‘orient’ some of those YCSO photos.
This is probably the best one for that…
https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/sh/02ue6bnjp6nazkm/3n5YxsSr-h/Photos%20and%20Video/Fernandez%20photos/20130710_144741.jpg?token_hash=AAGrVEbWjnR3H0bBTmnBmnp_BJwq8cfsRtEB6XWnCtKVqA
This was taken from almost the same spot as the SAIT photo that Mr. Dougherty
published… but a little farther back west and the lens/focus settings aren’t
creating as much distortion as that other photo. It is ultra-high-res and as sharp
as it can be but even the landscape in the distance looks more like it should.
Fernandez was, apparently, allowed to visit the deployment site by himself on
July 10 and allowed to take these photos. There’s no one else in them. The
deployment site had had its final comb-through by now but you can still see
remnants of fire shelters on the ground in the center of the photo.
He actually ‘stepped back’ a bit to make sure he captured the deployment site
itself, the flagpole, and the north side of the mouth of the box canyon all in the
same photo.
He also appears to be one of the only ones photographing the deployment
site that realized the possible significance of some of the ‘unburned
vegetation’ off in the nearby boulder piles and one of the only ones who
seems to have made an effort to photo-document some of that.
Fernadez’s photos appear to be shot with either an iPad or Samsung
SCH-R530C. His iPad photos are all GEO-stamped but the Samsung photos
are not.
This high-res picture of the deployment site was shot with the
Samsung July 10, 2013 at 2:47:41 PM.
ALSO NOTE: On the very left side of the photo, about 3/4 of the way up
from the bottom, ( right where the scorch line on the boulder pile stops )
there is actually yet another full TREE there in that boulder pile that
appears to be essentially ‘untouched’ by the fire.
Thank you A LOT for this link. I had downloaded his aerials and thought, “wow, these are the best aerials I’ve seen so far of the site,” and they helped me confirm my general orientation. So I’ll look at these with great interest. When I downloaded the aerials, JD hadn’t posted these yet.
Here’s the deal however. I haven’t had the time to go into the site on Google Earth and do a “ground survey” in all the directions, and then sync the YCSO photos to that, and, by doing so, get an exact alignment of the photos to them, and get a more exact alignment of all the pieces to all the pieces relative to that. And you know what? I don’t have time to do that, now.
And you know what else? There are people on the payroll of the YCSO who were out there with all that fancy expensive equipment to make fancy digital images in order to do that stuff, and thus determine if that camera/canteen there were possibly originally inside that shelter that Chris partially successfully deployed.
And you know what else? SAIT took I don’t know how many high rez pictures and had access to all the digital imagery YCSO created the day before. So I start thinking, why is it my unpaid job to create the map that I think it was their job to do?
And you know what else? I think the legal team has people watching this conversation fairly carefully, since we seem to be the only people anywhere on the internet that I can find seriously digging deeply enough to point them to the black holes and possibly smoking guns that they may find very useful in their investigations.
And you know what else? I’m almost at the point of deciding I can’t afford to do much more of the jobs of people who are paid way more than me to do this work, unless it’s something I’m just personally curious about, because I’m a really curious person.
And quite frankly, to be personally honest, I’m actually not all that interested in whether or not the camera/canteen were originally inside Chris’ shelter, which I don’t think they were, because they were quite a distance from Chris and his shelter, in the best I’ve been able to determine sans a decent site map.
What I’m really interested in at this point is whether or not all the cellphones are accounted for, which is why I made the spectacular claim that I made. I think that’s way more important at this point than anything else related to the Deployment Site. I really really want somebody to try to prove me wrong on that. For me, everything else regarding this site is collateral damage.
Reply to Marti Reed post on January 13, 2014 at 5:20 pm
And you know what else?… I just checked the payroll
files for this PUBLIC endeavor and you are RIGHT… you
aren’t getting paid enough. I think you are owed some
day-off overtime for what you have ALREADY done.
LOL.
>> marti also wrote…
>> And you know what else? I think the legal team has
>> people watching this conversation fairly carefully,
>> since we seem to be the only people anywhere on
>> the internet that I can find seriously digging deeply
>> enough to point them to the black holes and possibly
>> smoking guns that they may find very useful in their
>> investigations.
Oh… make no mistake… you can be SURE of that.
The legal teams on BOTH sides are probably watching
this very carefully ( leaps and all )… and well they should.
If you read between the lines in this discussion… I think
we are telling the plaintiff’s team(s) EXACTLY who to call
as witnesses to find out what else they know… as well
as EXACTLY where to possibly find more evidence that
still hasn’t “seen the light of day”…
…and that fact is not lost on the defense team, either.
If they ‘read between the lines’ here as well then they
will be preparing themselves to try and counter the
exact questions those ‘witnesses’ are most probably
going to be asked.
All we have to look at is what is PUBLIC information…
but I think we are telling a whole bunch of people with
a lot more powers than that EXACTLY where to look for
more answers.
At least… I certainly HOPE we are.
So that means I should be careful from here on out where I think the smoking guns are? To be honest, my heart is seriously with Eric’s wife. And actually, I think I’ve said enough about what I think is critical here. Part of me is quite seriously thinking about just kicking back and watching what plays itself out. I know what I think is the most important thing here, and I’ve said it.
And that is that the Prescott Fire Department has proven itself, factually, to be willing and able to withhold evidence.
You know what, Marti? I’ve been feeling SAME frustrations. I don’t think I could have verbalized them as well, though.
And you know what else? Even though we are both very curious people, I think we’re even more stuck because we can’t stop caring. I wish to hell I knew why some people didn’t.
Thank you. Yes, I’m here because I care. And I kinda know how some of this feels. I’ve commented before about my brother’s death. He almost got a number of others maimed or killed, he almost got a helicopter crashed. He was an Eagle Scout in charge of a Patrol. He was under the supervision of a Scoutmaster who wasn’t paying attention. My dad was actually up there above Tent Rocks when it happened, also. The 50th anniversary of that is coming up before the end of this month.
I’m thinking that’s a big reason why I’m still here, digging and posting comments. My family was essentially totally dysfunctional for years after that. My mom and I have only in the past six months begun talking to each other about it. I basically, in my 13-year-old’s wisdom, told myself and the world that it wasn’t that important because my brother and I hated each other. In order to maintain that fabrication, I had to forget all of my childhood memories for the next twelve years, until somebody supervising me discovered I had something hidden away in a box.
I don’t think we’re at the bottom of this at all. I absolutely DON’T KNOW what decision Eric Marsh made. NOBODY does, even though everybody seems to be assuming they do. I only know the consequences of it. The most important evidence that could possibly lead us or the families or anybody else closer to knowing that, is, imho, being withheld by someone who has proven himself willing and able to withhold important information, even if he has to bend his stories into pretzals in order to do that. Gee, I wonder why that would happen???
I’m glad you’re here. Really I am.
I’ve been trying to make myself get to know one of these hotshots–whose body on a body map and stuff in a photograph I’ve been looking at endlessly–every day. That way I can better begin to keep them straight when I mention them in a comment and get their names wrong. I haven’t made my way through the list yet. Maybe I will by Roger’s Anniversary. It’s really really really hard.
Marti– one other question I forgot to add.
Did The EMT’s check all the bodies or move any thing.
They were at the scene before any one else and could have moved things to check each for a pulse. Just a thought They occasionally mess up a crime scene where bodies or survivors are found. I am sure they would have checked all the shelters and bodies normal routine.
Mr. Powers… I agree. I’m sure they did what they needed to do.
There are also documented accounts of the initial investigation
which reveal that even before the YCSO investigators arrived
on the scene circa 5:00 AM… SOMEONE had also put ‘tarps’
over all the bodies. That means people ( PFD / Willis / Conrad? )
had been allowed to be walking all over the site putting these
tarps on them before the police ever go there.
That also means that the first thing YCSO had to do when
they got there was REMOVE those tarps.
There are no published reports so far of what ELSE they might
have been doing other than just covering the bodies with tarps
but I suppose it’s possible they just accidentally moved or
rearranged some things in the course of doing that.
I’m working off the top of my head, and memories, right now. One thing I’ve been aware of being confused about is who, actually, was on the site that night. I’m remembering (possibly in error) Darryl Willis saying he was on the site that night. I’m also remembering (possibly in error) YCSO saying the site was cleared of all people except a YCSO crew guarding the site. I’ve had moments of thinking, “I need to go back and check all that out. I’m confused.”
Did you see my really long comment to you above?
I’m going to repost to here the response I gave to a question by WTKTT about whether or not I think SAIT ever saw the “hidden camera” and/or its sd card. I want everybody to be able to read my response to that. I wrote:
“I’m, after letting this whole thing sink in for awhile, including the relative significance (or lack thereof) of it legally, inclined to think SAIT never saw it. I think that’s the irony at the end of the story. And Mike may know how ironic his end of the story is. PFD seriously underestimated him. But who knows?
I think what’s most significant in my mind at this point is not anything having to do with the camera, other than that I’m pretty 50/50 on whether PFD “did anything” with the sd card, all things considered. It’s more along the lines of “If they went to such great lengths to keep the camera from Evidence, I have absolutely no doubt in my mind they would do that even more with cellphones.” And, since this was not a checkmark crime scene, so the rules of engagement were not enforceable, that solidifies my speculations around this. I think there are missing significant cellphones. Maybe not. But now I know it wouldn’t be beyond PFD’s thinking and acting to make sure they stay that way. And that, to me, is the most important thing I learned this weekend. It will be very interesting to watch and see whether anybody can prove me wrong. Thanks for enlightening me regarding the legal stuff!”
And thanks, also, to all the teachers who painstakingly taught and still teach the Scientific Method.
A scientific theory should be as simple as possible,
but no simpler than that. — Albert Einstein
It’s also possible that since they (PFD) weren’t allowed to
clean up the site until they were told all the official
‘investigators’ were DONE with it… that PFD honestly
believed a lot of other people had already decided that
whatever was left for them to find was totally
irrelevant to the investigation.
However… that ‘simple’ explanation still has one
big flaw that violates Albert’s (fine) quote.
It’s TOO simple.
It doesn’t explain why they would then decide a missed
iPhone melted to a backpack would be important
enough to notify YCSO about… but an actual almost
totally undamaged high-res camera capable of both
photos and video/audio would NOT be equally important.
That’s totally easy. Someone decided Clayton Witted’s cellphone most likely didn’t have the data on it that “they” were concerned about. So by submitting it to YCSO, they would be obviously cooperating with the investigation. Snap.
My dad, for about 60 years, regularly published in Science, the journal of the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS). On such obviously non-controversial things as nuclear weapons testing, fallout, explosives, the behavior of shock waves in the atmosphere, the greenhouse effect and global warming, how to design windmills, oh and also the use of rain-making techniques over Rapid City, South Dakota (which was seriously flooded by that) and elsewhere. Ya know, that kind of stuff. You can imagine what conversations around our dinner table were about. And I worked for/with him on this kind of stuff from 1990 until 2007, when he all of a sudden, up and died. I know how this stuff works. I think my hypothesis is simple enough, and also supported by the facts I have just published. I’m duly waiting for someone to disprove it. That’s how this stuff works. And I think you totally understand what I mean!
“It’s also possible that since they (PFD) weren’t allowed to clean up the site until they were told all the official
‘investigators’ were DONE with it… that PFD honestly
believed a lot of other people had already decided that
whatever was left for them to find was totally
irrelevant to the investigation.”
Absolutely!
I don’t think when they cleaned up the site, anybody was paying much attention to what they were gathering up. I mean, it was probably getting dark, and they were just probably trying to get the job done.
And then “they” started sifting through the stuff. Knowing that, by now, whatever they found was, yes, irrelevant to the investigation. How convenient!
Marti—-After some thought last night with tis old brain of mine a couple of things.
Fire Fighters can and should take water canteens into there shelter. when the shelters started blowing off things could have been scattered a possible only.
Packs could have gone into shelters but I doubt if they were left on. Were all the packs accounted for or were some totally burned? The contents of a totally burned pack might fall out and scatter only being partially burned. The camera is confusing how ever if under a canteen with some water in it the camera bag may have protected it.
I have a hard time with why Mackenzie would leave one of his most valued possessions out side of his shelter and not with him he seemed to have it with him all the time during the day why would it be out side the shelter? This is the bad part the investigators should have taken pictures of each victims as the bags were removed and the contents there with them before they were put in body bags. Deep breath. keep working on it.
Thank you! I hadn’t even thought about the water in the canteen being part of what made it possible for the camera to “survive.”
Going back into the SAIR and the YCSO report.
YCSO:
“On arrival the fallen men were under tarps that had been placed over
them by the fire fighters that had discovered the bodies. The ET’s took 360 degree photos before removing the tarps. The tarps were removed, additional photographs were taken, and FARO, which is a 3D photography system, was employed to further document the scene.”
“Most of the men in their shelters were clothed or partially clothed. It
was decided that any shelters in which a firefighter was obviously in would be sent to the medical examiner’s office along with the body. In these cases the bodies were not separated from the shelter. Any personal belongings or other items attached to the man or the shelter were also sent to the ME.”
“Shelters, radios, firefighting equipment, and any items that could not be readily associated with any particular decedent were left at the scene at this point. One of the reasons behind this was that the state investigative team wanted those items left behind so they could conduct their investigation at a later time. More photographs were taken as the men were being placed into body bags.”
Apparently they did quite a bit of digital imaging of the bodies and what was relatively apparently connected to them.
From the SAIR:
“Christopher MacKenzie, Granite Mountain #6
1. Shelter Condition:
a. Outer Shell: 95% of foil burned away; silica cloth brittle in some areas.
b. Inner Shell: 95% of foil burned away; 50% of fiberglass burned away.
c. Floor: 50% of foil burned away; silica cloth brittle in some areas.
d. Seams: End cap seam has 12-inch separation.
2. PPE Items:
a. Clothing: Back of the shirt was charred and burned away; the collar, front, sleeves and bottom (tucked into pants) were still intact. The front of the pants was still intact and only showed a small amount of discoloration and char. Back of the lower pants legs was burned away. Most of the upper legs and seat of pants was discolored, but still intact.
b. Gloves: Both gloves appear shrunken 10%.
c. Helmet: Back of the helmet was melted.
3. Body Position: The firefighter was found lying prone with feet towards the southeast.
4. Shelter Use: It is unclear if the firefighter was able to fully deploy the shelter. The firefighter was mostly deployed inside the fire shelter; the shelter was not covering the lower legs.”
This is not an answer. It’s just putting us on the same page regarding Evidence.
This is why I really really really wish there was a site map. I have no way of doing anything but sorta kinda estimating where things are, relatively speaking, on the SAIR Body Map, based on a bunch of photos taken at 18mm with lots of distortion. A lot of things still don’t make a lot of sense to me. In your experience, do SAIRs usually come with or without at least a generally detailed site map? Especially when there are 19 deaths involved?
My sorta kinda estimate of where the camera is on the Body Map puts it pretty far away from Chris’ body. The bodies are sorta kinda circled around an open space in the middle. That open space includes a bunch of stuff, including the camera/canteen, Chris’ radio, which is even further from him than his camera, and, I’m inclined to think Clayton Witted’s pack. Oh and a pink strap which says, something like “pull strap to open” (I’m not looking at it right now, just kinda sorta remembering).
It’s beyond my expertise and pay-level to create a serious publishable map. So it’s really hard to figure out where the camera/canteen is exactly relative to Chris’ body/shelter. It just isn’t that close to his body, I think. But I could be wrong.
Thanks for your comment!
And also this. The camera/canteen is close in between two radios which are not Chris’, and they are both very very burned.
Reply to Bob Powers post on January 12, 2014 at 5:03 pm
>> Mr. Powers said…
>>
>> I don’t think they were having a lot of success dropping on structures in
>> Glenela. At that point your just making it look good. Smoke and high wind
>> make air drops useless.
There is full audio proof that that is exactly what the situation was at 1638… just
seconds before Jesse Steed was going to break in on ‘Air to Ground’ with his
first “We are in front of the flaming front’ MAYDAY call.
Most Mainstream Media ( MSM ) outlets just chopped off the whole first 10
seconds of the ‘helmet-cam’ video but those first 10 seconds actually capture
B33 responding directly to SPGS1 ( Cordes ) about a drop that he is
requesting at that moment near Yarnell / Glen Ilah.
At 16:38 ( One minute before Steed’s first MAYDAY call )…
B33 is responding directly to Structure 1 ( Cordes ) on Air to Ground.
He is obviously telling Cordes they will TRY to make the drop that Cordes has
requested but you can hear in his voice he thinks conditions are already
VERY doubtful for any kind of success.
Here is what he actually says at 1638 to SPGS1 Cordes…
B33: ( I’m not sure if we ) can with the valley and all of that smoke, it’s kinda
tough on us… but we’ll give it a shot. Break Structure 1, Bravo 33 on Air to Ground.
WTKTT… I do not follow.
If B33 says “but we’ll give it a shot” to SPGS1, why would he immediately call SPGS1 following the “break”
Thanks
I believe saying ‘Break’ is standard radio lingo
for ‘end of conversation’.
So when we hear B33 say…
“Break Structure 1, Bravo 33 on Air to Ground”.
That means…
“End of conversation between Bravo 33 and
Structure 1 on Air to Ground (channel).”
That’s close, but usually if you hear:
“…Break[,] Structure 1, Bravo 33 on Air to Ground”
–that means end of conversation with whomever Bravo 33 was talking to before, because now they are calling Structure 1 on Air to Ground. I’m guessing we’re missing a conversation B-33 was having with someone else immediately before calling SPGS1.
I agree with Sitta on this one.
Also. P27 SAIR says B33 was on radio with OPS1 when radio (air to ground)transmission from GM comes in at 1639.
i would like to ask all you of the wildland fire fighting community here, what does it mean for the Prescott Fire Department to have with-held evidence from the Yavapai County Sheriff’s Office and the Serious Accident Investigation Team?
Marti… I also would like to hear from WFF people on that but I
can also say that it’s a pretty complicated situation.
No one has been ( or has ever been ) charged with a CRIME here.
Without any official CHARGES pending… it’s difficult for just
a police department to accuse anyone of ‘withholding’ anything.
The only responsibility the YCSO really had was to determine
if they could check any of the ‘foul play suspected’ boxes on
the endless paperwork they had to file on this.
Without being able to check that ‘suspected foul play’ box on
any of those forms… their jurisdiction and responsibility is
limited.
Likewise… although the ‘withholding of evidence’ in an accident
investigation is serious and would have directly affected the
ability of the SAIT to do their job… they, in turn, are not a
‘prosecutorial body’ and have no power of subpoena.
Fast forward to today.
The pending lawsuits put an entire new ‘frame of reference’
on all of this… and even though they are only civil cases the
same (serious) penalties for ‘tampering with evidence’ or
‘withholding information’ or ‘not responding to a subpoena’
that apply to criminal cases also come into play.
Example: If one of the attorneys… NOW… at THIS time…
issues a subpoena for the original MacKenzie camera
and SD card… any attempt to destroy or withhold that
evidence at THIS time is VERY SERIOUS…
…but as for who did or didn’t give it to who they KNEW they
should have back in July… or who may or may not have
tampered with that evidence when there WERE no civil
or criminal charges pending?… not sure you cold touch
them on that one.
Maybe. Dunno. Like I said… it’s complicated.
Example: If PFD knocked anything off that camera… and
there was no criminal investigation in progress when they
did that… they could always say they were simply doing
it out of ‘concern for the family’ before they were going to
return the personal property… and they could probably
end up getting away with that ‘explanation’.
Thank you! I will keep thinking about what you just wrote.
I’m not even remotely suggesting you should NOT
forward any/all observations/discoveries to YCSO…
…but I am just honestly trying to tell you that even
if you do you will probably just get a form letter
back that says…
“Thank you for your information… but that is not
an active YCSO case at this time.”
If the lawyers in the civil suits want to examine that
SD card… they are going to have to subpoena
Mike MacKenzie directly.
What happens if they DO… and then their own
experts find direct evidence that it was tampered
with on or about July 3, 2013?
I don’t know. That gets REALLY complicated.
The best the lawyers could hope for there, I suppose,
is that they simply ARE able to recover more
information from the device and it does provide
more information about exactly what the hell
happened out there that day.
And that’s why I want to know what the wff community thinks about this in general. Regardless of the specific legal aspects of it. Does this matter?
Remember, the Prescott Fire Department didn’t just with-hold evidence, they went to fairly great lengths to with-hold evidence. And they still may be with-holding evidence. Does this matter?
WTKTT,
RE: ANCHOR POINT
You said “Marsh heard that advice/suggestion/directive from his BOSS, Darrell Willis, before he even got to Yarnell to talk to the people who actually hired
him for work that day.”
So what I say. Willis was just passing on ‘the fact’ that anchoring the fire would be a priotity in the morning, NO big deal really. I would’ve taken that in stride as just a ‘heads up’ for the next day, again no big deal. I think the BOSS thing is moot because on the fire, your ‘boss’ back at the office is usually not your boss on the fire and holds no real sway over what you do. So, I don’t think the BOSS thing is a big deal at all.
“Am I the only one who thinks that’s a little odd? When does a Structure Protection guy get to tell an entire Hotshot Crew they should be ‘ANCHORING THE FIRE’? ( Answer: When he OWNS that Hotshot crew and he’s already down there working that same fire and playing BIG DOG ).” (SOME EMPHASIS ADDED).
Yes, in fact I think you MAY be the (or one of the) only one thinking that way. Anchoring a fire is a REALLY important thing to do as you well know by now. Willis had a huge responsibility on the YHF and just wanted to make sure that the point was passed on. Willis was NOT ‘playing BIG DOG’ as you said, he kinda was ONE of the BIG DOGS, and I think Marsh would’ve taken it that way as nothing more than good, professional advice. Good, competent overhead rely heavily on HS Crews, so that’s how I would’ve taken it. NOT as any kind of intimidation, or whatever. And I think Marsh would’ve taken it that way as well.
I think all of your ‘explanations’ are reasonable… but they don’t
negate the fact that what this all adds up to is Eric Marsh being
VERY aware that HIS BOSS was going to be one of the
BIG DOGS on that fire that day ( and was, in fact, already there
and acting as Co-IC since Shumate was almost totally
burned-out by morning ).
The thread this appeared on was part of a discussion after
Calvin posted the information about Willis informing Marsh
that the City Council was thinking of disbanding the entire
WFF thing back in Prescott.
It’s about ‘pressure’ that day… and how much there might
have been on Eric Marsh.
I think the fact that he knew Willis was even there… and was
a ‘BIG DOG’ that day… *might* have had a lot to do with what
happened later in the day.
Whether these ‘advisements’ or ‘information sharing’ or just
plain ‘chit chat’ from Willis to Marsh amounted to any kind of
actual ‘directives’ or could even be contrued as ‘commands’…
we don’t know yet. We’d have to hear more about those ‘conversations’ to really be sure about that one way or the other.
Willis himself has already stated in his SAIR notes that he
felt ‘slightly guilty’ about having even told Marsh… “We’ve
got to get an anchor on this thing.”
Why in the world would Willis even feel the slightest bit
guility if that was ( as YOU say ) ‘just chit-chat’ or ‘just
information sharing’.
To me… Willis admitting he ‘felt slightly guilty about that’ tends
to indicate that in Willis’ mind… it wasn’t just ‘chit chat’ at all.
WTKTT…. Have you heard the comment in the last of the helmet cam video after radio contact is lost that says something about coming out a road by the storage center. Is that Willis?
Yes… I have heard it… and at the moment I don’t
think that was Willis. The ‘storage center’ they
are referring to is, of course, that U-Store-It
facility there on Highway 89 where we see the
Globe Type II Crew filming those VLAT drops.
The reason I don’t think it’s Willis is because
all evidence for the 1639 timeframe points to
Willis still being ‘up north’ either at or near the
Model Creek School ICP when the actual
deployment happened.
In Willis’ YIN notes… he says the first news he
ever got of the deployment was when he got
an actual PHONE call from OPS1 Todd Abel
who told him ( circa 4:40 – 4:45 PM ) there had
apparently been a deployment and it was apparently
Granite Mountain. Willis then says the next thing
he did was “drive around to the Yarnell side of
the fire and pray for the crew”.
That indicates to me that he was up in Peeples
Valley and only then ‘drive around/down to Yarnell’.
I am about to publish something I’ve been
working on with regards to Willis that puts
all of his PUBLIC quotes in one place to see
how he is ‘all over the place’ when it comes
to what he really heard that day.
Example: Willis says in his YIN notes that the
first he heard of a ‘deployment’ was when Abel
called him on the phone circa 4:40 – 4:45 and
told him about it.
That doesn’t match what he has said in other
inverviews at all. In even just his military.com
interview he says he had actively ‘clicked back
onto their frequency’ circa 4:00 PM… and was
listening to it the whole time they were moving
and right up to Marsh’s “We are deploying’
transmission”.
So maybe Abel did call Willis at 4:45 to ‘tell him
about it’… but according to other interviews… that’s
a full 3-4 minutes after Willis had already heard
it himself over the radio.
WTKTT… It sure sounds like Willis to me.
WTKTT,
Regarding the “City Council was thinking of disbanding the entire WFF thing back in Prescott.” I will convcede that it does, or at least COULD have, kinda put a bit of a different light on things. It’s possible but how likely though? Another one of those pesky unanswered questions.
I think it was Gary Olson who said “Eric Marsh and
Jesse Steed are going to become the most
psychoanalyzed firefighters in history”. ( Apologies
to Gary if I am totally botching that quote ).
I think he’s right.
Even if we eventually find out Marsh and/or Steed
were “told it was Easter… and eggs are in Glen
Ilah”… you still would probably have to do the
same amount of wondering why either or both
of them didn’t say back… “…are you out of your
f***king MIND!”.
That’s because it’s not really all about provable
pressure… it’s about PERCEIVED pressure.
Marsh was 43 years old. He’d been doing this
almost his whole life but had only managed to
get to the point where he was a Superintendent
for a Hotshot Crew. He was in great shape for
a guy of 43… but I’ll bet things were taking their
toll and he knew it. He was recently married.
( 3 years previous ). He was trying to have a
‘stable life’ in Prescott. He worked directly for
a guy named Darrell Willis.That same guy was
‘training him to be my replacement’. That same
guy was now BIG DOG on this fire they are working
on their day off and he’d even been Co-IC all
night because the Shumate guy was burning out.
He hears directly from his BOSS and the BIG DOG
down there before he even gets there about what
that BIG DOG thinks needs to be done when he
gets there. Lots of pressure building already.
Then guess what?
He shows up and discovers they have botched
the short team transfer, they are short people
and DIVS… and now for one of the first times
in his entire career this 43 year old who is just
recovering from a bad bike accident is asked if
he will ‘volunteer’ to be DIVS A that day.
What was he gonna say?… No… I don’t want to?
He’s now feeling the pressure so bad he skips
breakfast and heads out there all on his own
before the Crew ever does. He knows he’s
going to be DIVS A momentarily ( the moment
the ink on the transition docs are dry and the
announcement goes out on the radio ) so he
wants to be already well in place and ( quite
literally ) ‘on top of things’ out on that ridge.
In other words… he is already ‘feeling the pressure’
right after getting there and that was only going to
keep mounting/multiplying all day.
Then… arguments with Airplane guys like Collins.
People dumping retardant on his ‘plan’ and forcing
him to do something else.
Guys showing up 4 hours late and suddenly on
the radio with him wanting to talk division bounds.
Winds changing.
Lookouts almost getting killed.
Almost losing $800,000 worth of vehicles.
Other Hotshots on the fire having to stop what
they are doing and help them out.
Then… total failure… Evacuations in progress.
His big day and one of the only chances in his
whole life to be a Division Supervisor is
now totally going to crap.
Geez… I can almost feel the mounting frustration
just typing these lines.
So conversations about PRESSURE on this man
who still has to decide that afternoon whether
his resources ( A Hotshot team called GM ) sit
in the black or try to run to town like the cavalry
are totally relevant.
The pressure was coming from all directions.
Did any of that matter?
That’s going to be discussed for years to come.
I didn’t make that quote, but I remember reading it and I agree with it completely. I also agree with your description above. In spite of what your detractor(s) says…you get it!
And if anybody doesn’t agree with my assessment of your comments…you can tell them I said…FUCK OFF!
I will.
So its clear that WTKTT and his followers are back on the Willis witch hunt track again, very sad.
And Gary, you are saying that agency politics would have influenced your fireline decisions? That doesn’t sound like the “push the envelope” kind of guy you profess to be.
Jeff– My biggest problem is every time we come up with string of information it leads back to Willis. Most investigators will tell you when a lot of roads lead back to one individual more investigation should be done on that person to eliminate him from suspicion or clarify the facts. Not a witch hunt for me just need more info to clear up questions.
I want to add this to that “string,” from something I posted to the bottom of the page:
I think there are missing significant cellphones. Maybe not. But now I know it wouldn’t be beyond PFD’s thinking and acting to make sure they stay that way. And that, to me, is the most important thing I learned this weekend. It will be very interesting to watch and see whether anybody can prove me wrong.”
I want to once again apologize for my uncensored word above, that was unnecessary even though it was very late at night or early in the morning depending on your point of view and I was drunk and high.
THIS. This description – summation – by WTKTT is likely one of the single most valuable things produced here by WTKTT. Good job, WTKTT. Good job.
QUESTION: If I said “Division Alpha, OPS Musser” on the radio, am I DivsA or am I Musser?
ugh.
Elizabeth,
In the WFF world, YOU would be OPS Musser in your example.
However, in the law enforcement world (on many departments) you would be DIVS A, and that’s BECAUSE they want to know WHO is calling first, so just in case, you get shot or there’s trouble and you can’t get back to them, then they know WHO YOU are.
RTS (and WTKTT), thank you. Just so you know, I was pretty clear in my head what the convention was, but I wanted to confirm it, because, in the new audios that I have from the FOIL/FOIA package, you can sometimes hear ground-to-ground transmissions, but it is FAR less clear than in the other videos. So, before I post proclaiming that I found new transmissions from [whomever], I want to be sure I am crystal clear on the convention for communicating, so that I am correct in who I am telling you is trying to speak with whom.
It is ironic, then, that xxfullsailxx aka Darrin was rude to me in response to my question above even though I was ONLY asking the question in order to honor his outraged rantings about people posting “inaccurate” information or “conclusions.” I did not want to enrage Darrin by ultimately misidentifying who is trying to reach whom in these radio communications. Damned if you do, damned if you don’t with him….
Additionally, xxfullsailxx aka Darin’s snark toward me above (“ugh”) verifies exactly what NV (and others) have repeatedly noted: Darrin seems to endeavor to be DISRUPTIVE – actually harmful to this discourse – rather than just ignoring people who annoy him. For example, with my above question, Darrin aka xxfullsailxx could have either (a) ignored me or (b) typed “Musser” in the same amount of time that it took him to type “ugh.” Instead, Darrin aka xxfullsailxx deliberately took the time to type in an answer that was both needlessly insulting and completely unhelpful.
I get it, Darrin, I get it: You (and presumably your colleagues affiliated with the Forest Service out in the Pacific Northwest (Region 6)) have no respect for outsiders and do not want or need any help thinking through things related to a tragedy that took the lives of 19 of their brethren. I get it, Darrin. Duly noted. You can stop snarking at me now.
Elizabeth… xxfullsailxx must have had some problems
transmitting there. Squirrels on the wire?
I think what he meant to say was…
The general format for prefixing your radio transmissions is…
TO ( POSITION / NAME ), FROM ( POSITION / NAME )
So to answer your question… YOU would be Musser
identifying yourself with first your position on the fire
that day AND your name ( since there were TWO OPS
positions active at that time ).
Eric Marsh did the same thing in reverse in the morning
but he was specifically trying to contact Todd Abel. He
knew there was more than one person acting as OPS
that day so in order to be clear he ‘asked’ for ‘OPS Abel’.
At +55 seconds in the Globe Type II video 1 we hear Eric Marsh
come on the radio and all he says is this…
Operations, Abel, Granite Mountain, on TAC 1
There is never any response… but the breakdown there is…
TO: Operations ( in general )
TO: Todd Abel ( specifically )
FROM: Granite Mountain
ON: TAC 1 radio channel
DZ chainsaw opinion. The three chainsaws found off the east side of the DZ appear to be much less damaged than the one found beside Dustin Deford inside the DZ. Do you agree Marti? Thanks
To be perfectly honest, I haven’t had time to even focus on the chainsaw conditions. Thanks for asking, it gives me something to look at. i have only four pictures keyworded chainsaws.
Can someone with WFF certification knowledge/experience
tell me how unusual the following is….
After the media in Prescott submitted an FOIA request for personnel files
for all the GM crew… an article was published.
In that article we learn than any number of GM crew ( Sawyer Andrew Ashcraft,
for example ) received his Wildland Firefighting education AND certification
from the “Arizona Wildfire Academy”.
The home page for the “Arizona Wildfire Academy” is here…
http://www.azwildfireacademy.org/
The mailing address for the “Arizona Wildfire Academy” is…
1700 Iron Springs Rd, Prescott, AZ 86305
That’s also the address of the Prescott Fire Department building.
How unusual is it that the very organization that is actually going to
employ Wildland Firefighters is the same one that is running the
school that is supposed to ‘certify’ them?
The same is true of FS and BLM and some others are trained at The National Interagency Fire Center In Boise. Certifications have to be in training schools who have Wild land Fire instructors. I think southern Arizona has a Federial training center its at an old air center the name eludes me.
NARTC…now let me think if I can remember what that stands for…I couldn’t so I put it in a search engine,
National Advanced Resources Technology Center
or were you trying to think of the joint USFS and CIA joint air base at Marana. I spent several months of my life there over a 30 year period. It has also hosted the Federal Law enforcement Training Center and law enforcement training by several agencies at different periods over the past 20 years.
You hit it been a long time since I have been there.
WTKKT,
As far as I know, the AZ Wildifre and Incident Management Academy is a totally PRIVATE endeavor that gets its funding from donations, grants, and the like. It is NOT a government or quasi-government entity.
One reason the mailing address is the same as PFD is that the Academy administrator or head is Tony Sciacca, a PFD employee and Type I IMT Incident Commander.
AZ Central.com July…… The development of the Granite Mountain Hotshots became a focus and goal of Eric’s and he was an instrumental part of the organization and certification of the team. His passion for wildland firefighting and desire to share his almost 20 years of knowledge and experience put him in a position to help start the Arizona Wildfire Academy (initially operating out of his living room), where he taught basic firefighting, Squad Boss, and leadership classes.
Tony Sciacca YIN P51…..1600-1615 While driving to Yarnell, there was a lot of people and traffic. I felt we needed to close the road. The intensity of the flank was building. The wind was building. I thought all houses were were evacuated and I parked on Shrine rd and followed it back. There was a big wind at 20-25 mph and the column was laying over deep. There was a line of fire from Shrine to 89.
Thanks, calvin. Missed that one. I take that to mean
his parked his car… and then started WALKING
west on Shrine road at that time.
I’m glad he was careful. That was NO place to be
separated from your vehicle ( or your gear or
your fire shelter ) circa 1620. That ‘fire loop’
that had formed around the Shrine area was
closing in on itself really fast.
I’m glad he made it out of there.
It also charges around $1000.00 to get S-130 there, I paid for my son to attend. I think it was founded by Eric Marsh in his living room. In addition FYI, Tony Sciacca is a retired USFS Fire Management Officer (Thumb Butte District) and he was the Prescott Hotshot Crew Boss in my day. Tony and Darrell Willis are real tight.
Current (listed) charges for AWA are $65 per day.
2014 class schedule only runs less than a week
from Saturday, Marsh 8 through the following
Friday. About 30 different clases offered. Most
are just either morning or afternoon things.
I would call these ‘workshops’ more than ‘classes’
but to each his own. I’m not saying anyone is
NOT qualified. I’m not saying this isn’t a legitimate
way to get your ‘certs’ for walking out with a
Hotshot crew. I’m just saying this whole Prescott
‘revolving door’ thing is more than just a little
suspicious.
Sorry… typo above. Marsh on the brain
tonight I guess.
I meant to say 2014 classes begin on
MARCH 8.
There have got to be many dozens of Type I and Type II crews in Arizona, plus all their supervisors, and their supervisors… I’m guessing a whole lot of them put on their own training sessions, or get together, hire an instructor, and put on combined training sessions for the nearest groups that have employees needing training. If anything, the academies (lots of western states offer them) have actually mixed things up.
If you take a look at PMS-310-1 (Wildfire Qualifications and Systems Guide), you will get a sense of just how many positions there are (minus a bunch of specialist para-fire positions, like resource advisor, biologist, archaeologist, etc.) in the fire world. Nearly all of these positions require training from a certified instructor, materials approved by the NWCG, and actual fireline experience as a trainee before a person becomes qualified in that role. It’s one huge merit badge program.
A lot of WFFs get stuck before they can even start on a qualification, because they can’t find a class that’s being offered. On the other side, fire programs (like GMIHC) have to hold some classes yearly, to deal with all the turnover (intro fire behavior, saws, pumps and engines, leadership, aviation, etc., etc.). So you can see how MOST of these places have to train their own as a matter of practicality, or take turns with local cooperating programs, just to get everybody trained up in the most basic and necessary classes. The academies bring in people from out of state, from the structural and search and rescue sides, and can hold more specialized, higher level classes.
In short, it’s a dead end to look for a revolving door here. Instead, it’s a huge credit to the Prescott Fire Department (and the specific people involved) that they had the initiative to get this going and make training available to so many firefighters at a low cost. It helps fill a need for training and experience.
well said.
Sitta,
Agreed, well said on the training issue. I think the AZ Wildfire Academy is one of the best forums in the US for quality training AND the most cost efficient as well.
Thanks. I didn’t meant to imply for one second that the
“Arizona Wildfire Academy” itself might not have been
fully accredited or that Eric ( who started it in his living room )
or Tony ( who was/is now running it out of the Prescott
Fire Station ) were also not fully accredited instructors.
I think even ADOSH made sure that all of that was
‘up to speed’ on paper and whatnot.
I guess I was just wondering how unusual it is that the very
school that is going to teach you about all this is run by
the very same people who are then going to HIRE you.
I know that it’s hard to compare any other Hotshot Crew to
Granite Mountain since they were the ONLY ones fully
owned/operated by a simple municipal City Fire Department,
but how common is it that the same people who are
getting you ‘accredited’ for fighting wildfire are the same
people you are (actively) WORKING for?
It’s not at all uncommon to be trained by your bosses and have that training be funded by your employer or their agency. WFFs do a LOT of training and classwork. Every person on the line takes yearly 8 hour refresher classes, and firefighters in their first few years start taking on the responsibility for running particular modules (though the modules themselves often consist of a video and a few discussion questions — hard to go too wrong on that). Firefighters end up taking turns having each other as students in the refreshers. WFF is a small world, and you tend to run into the same people again and again, all over the country. With the exception of retired instructors (and even retirement is a relative term), students have some likelihood of working for any one of their teachers on an incident, or even at a station or on a crew. The material is kept consistent by the National Wildfire Coordinating Group (NWCG).
how many times can you re-word the question and get the same answer?
i guess we could just count the “Anchor Point” discussion as another example…
but see, it doesn’t matter WHAT answer you get, or who you get it from… you’re going to continue your daytime drama delusion regardless… (that’s called alliteration!… “look it up”)
fyi: most structure departments take care of a lot of in house training too (for their own employees)… have you checked out the only other Type 1 municipality crew? they have a training calender too!:
http://www.northwestfire.org/training/index.html
Bob Powers on January 11, 2014 at 9:12 am said:
If there was an order for the crew to move to Yarnell the perfect reason came up yesterday. The information on a discussion between Willis and Marsh earlier in the year concerning the future of the crew with the County commissioners. The crew needed to prove their usefulness to the County. By phone or Radio could Willis have mentioned that fact to Marsh? A investigative question no facts at this time but this could be the sleeping giant in why they moved from the black and a possible cause factor. I cant find the statement some one made it yesterday and caught my attention.
I strongly agree with these statements.
Gary… Willis was quoted in an interview the very DAY after the
incident saying… “The men were excited to be heading down
there. It was supposed to be their day off but they had an
opportunity to make some good overtime money.”
Question: If the crew itself was going to get ‘overtime’ that day…
does that also mean the billing rate(s) submitted by the
City of Prescott were also going to be considerably higher
than normal?
apparently you haven’t read the newspaper articles that showed GMIHC just barely above water in the City of Prescott budget over the course of five years that they had been available nationally…
so now you’re going to try to insinuate that if they just worked enough days on this fire they might make a couple extra 10K and prove themselves worthwhile to the city council?
so, so dramatic… really, i think you should pitch a mini series to Lifetime Network for women, they love this stuff. AND you’ve already written half the drama! however over-dramatized that might be.
Don’t be so chauvinistic xxfullsailxx, this is a new day. I like to watch the Lifetime Network too.
hey, i wasn’t knocking Lifetime… you retired old men need SOMETHING to do during the day!
i was just saying that the sort of soap opera drama that WTKTT has in his head about the GM tragedy is the stuff that mini-series are made of!
Yes we do…thank you.
Guess what xxfullsailxx…WTKTT hit that ******* NAIL RIGHT ON THE HEAD. But the money involved was a LOT more than what you said it was.
And just as a reminder xxfullsailxx, I was an USFS Assistant District Fire Management Officer before I was THE FOREST DISPATCHER (and for the general public, that means I ran the forest fire operations center, it’s not like being a taxi service dispatcher) and an Interagency Fire Operations Center Coordinator.
Reply to xxfullsailxx post
on January 12, 2014 at 9:39 pm
>> xxfullsailxx said…
>>
>> apparently you haven’t read the newspaper
>> articles that showed GMIHC just barely above
>> water in the City of Prescott budget over the
>> course of five years that they had been
>> available nationally…
Oh yes. I have read that. I’ve also read the
transcripts of the hearings recently in Prescott
about ‘keeping the Hotshot program going’ where
people ( Including Amanda Marsh ) tried to
testify that the Hotshot program was ‘self
sufficient’ because of the ‘billing to the Feds’
process… but the City Council shut that down
and said that wasn’t the point.
>> xxfullsailxx also said…
>> so now you’re going to try to insinuate that
>> if they just worked enough days on this fire
>> they might make a couple extra 10K and
>> prove themselves worthwhile to the city
>> council?
No. I’m not.
You just did that for me.
Thanks.
xxFullsailxx: You are only allowed to be a leaping jackass when you are CORRECT about a fact. Otherwise, you look stupid. The budgeting of this whole debacle and funding crews like GM works exactly as Gary Olson suggested. So, xxfullsailxx, apologize to WTKTT, or NV is going to swoop in and continue kicking your ass and pointing out that you do not know everything.
(Apologies for the vulgarity, but Gary Olson has inspired me. Actually, I have always wanted to cuss at xxfullsailxx, but I have held back until now.)
In an unrelated vein, when this is all over, WTKTT, you and I can invest in a mobile shower, Gatorade, and food business to take on the road for the firefighting season. Gary can come with us and do our PR and marketing, since he can communicate with guys like xxfullsailxx in their own language. Gary is like the “jackass whisperer.”
well, Elizabeth…!? i am SO offended! i am going to report you to Mr. Dougherty at once! i will not tolerate this repeated vulgarity and name calling…
as with the radio commo thing, the budgeting of PFD has already been covered here right? you all are chasing your tail round and round and round and round and round…
glad you’re getting up to speed (again) about how wildland fire is dealt with all across the west. you should really talk with a contract specialist to really see where your tax dollars are going…
Can I join in as the official photographer? I can cuss as well as anybody and I’m a really good photographer, even with my measly little Canon Rebel T3i. I’m also a pyromaniac like them hotshots. But I’m very careful with that wonderful stuff!
right on, count me in…I’m bored out of my mind…which is my excuse…I have earned it, if nothing else (being out of my mint that is)
One of these days I’m gonna drive up to Santa Fe and visit you.
Could you provide a link for this interview. I saw it once (almost certain) and have never been able to find it again. Thanks
I will, Calvin. It’s going to be part of the post I
have been working on regarding “What Darrell
Willis has really admitted to, or not, and to
WHO, and when” that I am finishing up here.
I don’t know how the billing worked between the City of Prescott and the State of Arizona…I know how it is done with the Feds, but that isn’t your question. I can take a guess though.
I read in John Dougherty’s article’s somewhere that the City of Prescott bills the state $39.00 per hour (per hotshot, it would probably be more for Willis or Sciacca) to work on a state fire. So…my guess is under their “contract” or Memorandum of Understanding or Mutual Aide Agreement or whatever they have, things like hazard pay (if the fire is uncontrolled), night time differential, Sunday differential, and holiday pay are already built in so the rate would remain constant to make the billing easier.
I do know however, that the Granite Mountain Hotshots were a money maker for the City of Prescott so that in the end, the Good Citizens of Prescott got their brush disposal crew for pennies on the dollar.
Everyone (all of the federal agencies) use fire billing to augment their budgets. It is SOP. For example…I have used for my example in past comments the USFS Landscape Architect (LA). So say LA Smith works for the Smokey Bear Ranger District (there really is one) and the District Ranger has a budget shortfall, which they always do, especially if they want to do some maintenance or buy some badly needed new equipment…if the Ranger (head honcho) sends LA Smith on a fire assignment for 21 days (a typical assignment) then the Ranger can save 21 days of salary in his budget that otherwise would have gone to pay LA Smith, which can really add up. Plus LA Smith likes to go (usually) because they make extra money overtime etc. and it all comes out of a bottomless pit (for all practical intents and purposes, congress does not want to be seen shorting the FFF when the west is burning on the nightly news) in case they start to run short with the billions that are already in the FFF. So…here is the bottom line…if the Prescott Fire Department can send Darrell Willis, Tony Sciacca, Tom, Dick, Harry, and Sally plus the Granite Mountain Hotshots to a state (or better yet…a federal fire) they can save a ton of money out of their budget.
The mayor and the city council can look really goodt to the Good Citizens of Prescott because they keep their taxes low and they might even get to buy a new big red fire truck at the end of the fiscal year that they either need or want.
If anybody thinks that sending a tired crew on a fire that really needed a day off IS NOT ALL ABOUT THE MONEY…well then…they are out of their ******* (I already used my uncensored word for today, I don’t want anyone to think I have an uncontrollable potty mouth) or if they tell you it wasn’t for the money…well then…they are ******* LIARS.
It’s all about the money. And if I got any of that wrong, it has been a few decades for me, a budget and finance officer can post a comment and straighten me out.
What fascinates me is… who has the Gatorade
contract for all these fires? From the documented
orders on the Yarnell Fire alone… someone is
making a s**tload right there.
WTKTT,
If you’ve got a bit of fluid capital and want a nice retirement someday, I recommend looking into mobile catering or showers. Unless California proves me wrong, you’ll get some winter time off, and make a fortune.
i see WTKTT as more of a “blue room” sort of guy… but, there’s lots of money in that too.
Sooo true.
I’ve seen this financial chess get even more common in the last few years as budgets have been slashed. Tea Party style pressure has resulted in federal budget cuts, and recession (and therefore lower sales and property taxes) has cut the income of many state and local municipalities. Fire can make deals with other departments to get their redcarded seasonals out with Type II crews for a pay period or two. This particular arrangement is not all bad (para-firefighters get experience and stay current, and resources become available).
Financial jujitsu is nothing new, but it has turned into a monster that pits existential risk (the crew, the career) against existential risk (becoming fire food).
Amen! Can I get a halleluiah!
I apologize for underestimating you. You are at a much higher grade and further along in your career than I initially gave you credit for.
My confusion can be easily explained however, you are taking the time and possibly running the risk of posting comments on this thread.
i think i had underestimated sitta too…
Let me give you the Readers Digest version. A “base salary” is self explanatory right?
Well…the “Sending Unit” can save (be paid back)ALL of the base salary for an employee (except for those who are already paid out of the fire budget in the case of a federal employee, but those people are few and far between and not who we are talking about here, that does not include Prescott FIRE Department employees) who go to a fire.
And since we all know that salaries are the BIGGEST part of any business or agencies budget…that can really add up…really fast…into some really big numbers.
Let me repeat. Sending the Granite Mountain Hotshots to the Yarnell Hill Fire the day before they were required to have mandatory days off (to meet federal guidelines) was ALL ABOUT THE MONEY!
And the GLORY to impress the Prescott City Council that the crew was a cheap and effective resource and therefore should be maintained by the city and therefore justify Darrell Willis’ almost $100,000 a year salary on top on his retired Chief’s pension, which is called Double Dipping.
I want to remind everyone of something. The Southwest Coordination SWCC, (where I spent many shifts working) REFUSED TO SEND THE GRANITE MOUNTAIN HOTSHOTS TO THE YARNELL HILL FIRE!
Why? Because they could see on the BIG BOARD that the GMHS were due for mandatory days off, the day after they were first sent to the fire.
And as a practical matter, you would not commit a crew to a fire (that will last several shifts) if you are required to give them a day off, the very next day.
The GMHS has been TAKEN OUT OF ROTATION FOR A VERY GOOD REASON! The rules are in place for a very good reason. The rules are supposed to keep greedy and/or gung ho managers from taking advantage of a crew by overextending them so they are tired and more prone to make mistakes AND DIE, REALLY, REALLY, HORRIBLE DEATHS.
I apologize for some of my words tonight, but I am in a really bad mood right now (more than usual) just thinking about the Yarnell Hill Fire and the Prescott Fire Department.
you got it right… all still works that way. and i think the “free” brush disposal point is a good one, except for the fact that City of Prescott did help fund that crew for a number of years BEFORE they were nationally available as well, though i imagine they had grants and what not to off set costs…
you forgot to mention though that most municipalities charge “portal to portal” (meaning they get paid round the clock) for their structure guys they send to wildland incidents…
(no WTKTT, that did not apply to GMHS.) let me douse that fire while it’s still a smoldering ember…
but i think sending GMHS was as much out of necessity (they obviously needed more resources than they were getting to the fire) as it was a product of their “normal” budget issues…
before the 30th this was just another Doce fire… just another fire day in June and most crews brag all the time about number of over time hours worked and number of paid days… i think it’s disingenuous to say that sending them “that day” was something out of the ordinary… especially to an escalating incident in their local area.
let me qualify the last paragraph above by adding, i agree, they probably needed a day off to “reset.”
Well…Bingo…what are we arguing about then?
Reply to Marti Reed post on January 12, 2014 at 8:54 am
>> Marti wrote…
>> I’m completely dumbfounded that the SD card survived that fire.
>> If the company that manufactured it knew that, they could have an amazing
>> ad campaign, altho I guess it would be in kind of poor taste.
Well… I know this going to rain on a lot of people’s thought parade about
the final moments of the firefighters ( see recent discussion not too far
above ) and how the inhalation of 2000 degree air meant ‘instant death’…
…but if the air temperature around that camera ever got anywhere NEAR
2000 degrees… even for 1 second… then NO… that SD card would NOT
have ‘survived’ and we would have never seen anything from that camera.
Calvin has also already noticed that even the tiny/thin little plastic straps on
some of the water bottles were fully intact after the burnonver.
There is now also a lot of other photographic detail to indicate the air
temperature at that site ( at exact ground level and/or on up to 10 inch
height, anyway ) never got anywhere NEAR 2000 degrees fahrenheit…
not even for 1 or 2 seconds.
There certainly might have been evidence of thermal spalling or spallation
on the rocks or other things near/around the deployment site to support
a 2000 degree estimate… but there is also now an equal amount of
photographic evidence to suggest that NEVER happened right there
at ground level where those men died… or at least that it must have been
very ‘spotty’ and might have only happened in very specific spots there.
The Camera could have been under his body and when they moved the body no one noticed the camera it would have melted in the heat out side the shelter even at 1000 deg. I would say he would have taken the camera into the shelter with him. You would be right that the camera could not have survived outside. But for the shelters to have no foil left on them means some purity intensive direct flame. I believe the camera was under him and that is why it did not melt. also that could be said for some other items like the shelter straps etc. They did not die and burn clothes off with out a lot of heat. At that point 1000 + is sufficient. Also super heated air of 2000 deg. prior to the fire is also possible. I absolutely do not believe the camera was out side the shelter, common scene says no way. WTKTT your scenario says they should have survived since the camera showed no sign of burn or melt marks. And yet the shelters were totally destroyed.
No. I am NOT suggesting that was a survivable area.
I am saying that there is conflicting evidence as to whether
temperatures of 2000 degrees were being applied
equally to that area. It’s complicated. You are right that
the reason ‘not even the cloth case of the camera’ was
burned is because it might have been ‘underneath’ him.
I don’t think that theory could apply to how the tiny/thin
straps on the water bodies didn’t melt… unless someone
was lying on their pack as well or actually went into
their shelter with it on.
By the way… is that even possible?
Is it even possible to ( somehow? ) get your fire shelter
all unfurled WITHOUT actually removing your entire
backpack first?
If he had taken his camera into his shelter, along with the canteen that melted around it, it would have been taken to the ME office in Phoenix along with his body and his shelter. It and the canteen didn’t go there.
So the canteen had actually melted on his camera? I would need to see the picture. Strange things some times happen in fatality areas that leave you wondering.
Yes. The camera is surrounded by the aluminum frame of a plastic canteen.
Bob, to see the photos, tell Elizabeth you want to look at them. She’ll email you a link. These are the 109 photographs taken by YCSO during the SAIT investigation. Eventually I’m sure JD will also post a link to them.
Bob.
I spent some time this evening trying to look at the YCSO pix of the camera as close as possible without them getting all pixelated. I have to say I REALLY wish I could look at the pictures SAIT took at a much higher resolution. I don’t believe the camera was in his shelter because of what I wrote above. What prompted me to do that was the article stating the camera bag was in such great condition. What I see, and I can’t really see well, is two things. The camera is in a bag that’s tethered to the camera just behind the lens. Why that is, I don’t know. The plastic lens cover is in almost normal condition. Which is why I am dumbfounded nobody “saw” it. It’s totally obvious to me. The camera bag looks pretty “messed up.” Not so “in great condition” as Mike said it was. That, to me might mean, the crud on the camera bag is from the melted canteen falling down onto it. But I don’t see that crud on the lens cover. That is saying to me, I think, that the camera was somewhat protected by the canteen over it, which was melting around it. Does this, to you, make any sense?
Yes and the fact that a certified fire fatality team did not do the full investigation is leaving us with some questions that a qualified team would have covered. The YCSO were there only for a work place fatality scene and had no idea what was evidence and how to handle it. The team would have been much more thorough to find what happened totally. Answers that would have told us much more about how the fire burned and the things we could learn from it.
“The YCSO were there only for a work place fatality scene and had no idea what was evidence and how to handle it.”
I’m going to have to think a LOT about this. I think they handled the “evidence” they got/received pretty well. In spite of the fact that PFD with-held evidence from them. But I’m thinking what you’re saying may be crucial. They seem to have been, on this site and at this time, letting the SAIT determine what was important and what was not. And then they let PFD come in and collect whatever SAIT left behind. Which WHO KNOWS what that included (including possibly one to three cell phones?)
On north canyon they brought in a fire fatality investigation team and celled off the area. The team was able to do a through investigation and provide a lot of detail of the site. I am saying that YCSO was not trained for that kind of investigation. Can understand the problem on the phones and camera will think about it.
Got it. Thank you.
Also. I’ve really looked at a lot of details, as closely as I can, given the not-that-high resolution of the YCSO photos. There a number of things lying around, not under bodies as depicted in the Body Map. Wade Parker’s iPhone is lying outside his shelter on the south side of his shelter, which blew south of his body (against the direction of the fire/wind). It’s kind of burned but not terribly. There was NOTHING, according to the body map over it. There is a billfold under the agave in the center of the site almost completely undamaged. There are no bodies on the body map located right there. I spent a LOT of time trying to identify something that one of the SAIT investigators saw, and photographed with his iphone. It turned out to be a piece of small notebook paper with writing on it (that I think was mentioned in some article somewhere) that is not located near any body/shelter. While trying to map the radios, I found a radio associated with what looks to me to be two plastic bottles that are just sitting there, completely undamaged.
This leads me to believe the ground offered some kind of cooling effect. Obviously not enough to save the GMHS’s, but enough to preserve some of the their less vulnerable stuff.
Don’t worry about me Marti…I never believed that anyway…if anybody thinks the Granite Mountain Hotshots did not die really, really, really, no…I mean really painful deaths (that were not quick either) they are living in a rainbow bubble. Which is just one reason why I am so angry about this whole completely avoidable horrific tragedy. I don’t like it when I burn myself because my shower water is too hot, it hurts.
Oh…and by the way…I am really glad you are working on this project, you really have some impressive skills. Thank you for taking the time out of your life to do this.
Thank you. I’ve just been using the fact that I’ve been doing digital photography in some way, shape, or form, since 1999 to just do what I do. I found myself fascinated by my own thought process this weekend. Trying to connect the dots. But I don’t know how much more time I can devote to this at this level. I’m both wishing for and dreading when JD publishes the SAIT photos. If he has them. And I’ve really appreciated your participation in this, also. By the way, I’m a fourth generation scandihoovian native New Mexican. My dad grew up in Santa Fe. His dad designed the Rio Grande Gorge Bridge. His grand-dad was a hermit who managed the Embudo Gauging Station on the Rio Grande just south of Taos.
Fascinating! We spent 18 years in New Mexico. All three of our kids were born in Santa Fe, which usually throws people off because they all look like they came from a Scandinavian cookie cutter. 12 years in Santa Fe, 4 years in Albuquerque and 2 years in Farmington (which I don’t like to think about or mention), with a 5 year and 3 year stints in Phoenix thrown in-between the tours in the Land of Enchantment (I want to forget about the years in Phx was well). I did pick up you are a New Mexican and I was interested, thanks.
And, yeah, if it was 2000 degrees, there wouldn’t be cacti, agaves, and a fairly large tree, either. They still may have died pretty quickly though. Toxic gases including carbon monoxide, so I’ve read. Carbon monoxide poisoning is a favored method of suicide. Because it’s painless.
And I do want to take this opportunity to defend xxfullsailxx’s use of some pretty G-Rated language here. Referring to strip clubs and monkey poop is language a wildland firefighter could use in church or in front of his/her own mother.
Wildland firefighters are normally unable to carry on any conversation where at least every third word is not an expletive…so we need a little slack here to be able to keep it at least a little bit “real.” Like I have said before, the Granite Mountain Hotshots were unique for many reasons.
Guys/Gals running around fighting fires in a more-than-quasi military
culture that also can also resemble professional sports teams
with regards to rivalries and ‘locker room talk’ using cuss words?
I’m shocked.
Don’t be my wife would tell me to watch my cussing around the kids when I came home from fires its a normal thing on crews Men and Women both.
I hear ya… but I have news for you WFF people.
It’s not unique to firefighters.
Not hardly.
Worked any construction lately?
No, it is not unique to wildland firefighters and no, nobody should be surprised, which is why I was surprised when people took xxfullsailxx to task for making a reference to a strip club and monkey poop and so I thought it was necessary to make the comment I did.
Some situations just really do need some emphasis added, and this situation is full of those moments.
There’s a difference between the way people communicate in private, and their public face. If the public face of WFFs is to be one framed by stripper references and monkey “poop” when people are talking about a serious topic, it doesn’t come off as very professional. It also is noteworthy to me that FullSail was using this type of language not to bond with people or to vent, but to try to demean the ideas of a valuable commenter to this thread, which seems to be one of the main goals of FullSail.
I’m sure everyone on here can curse pretty effectively. I also think that some valuable info has already been developed on here. One way to hide that info is to cover it up by throwing a lot of language like monkey poop around.
fair enough
MacKenzie Powershot Chain of Possession/Evidence
According to the Yavapai County Sheriff’s Office Report written July 16, 2013 by Detective John McDormett (Investig-M- Law Enforcement – no redactions.pdf – for which I don’t have a link at hand at the moment), on July 2, while dealing with the bodies from the Deployment Site and their attached items at the Medical Examiner’s Office in Phoenix, “Personal property and shelters were separated into a corresponding body bag and were transported to the YCSO evidence unit.” I’m assuming that’s in or near Prescott.
During the Serious Accident Investigation Team’s investigation of the Deployment Site on July 3, Chris MacKenzie’s Canon Powershot camera was sitting near the middle of the site, surrounded by the aluminum frame of a melted plastic canteen. It was one of the first details I spotted, as I zoomed in on the SAIT photo (which John Dougherty published on December 19) and looked around. In one photo from the YCSO collection of photos they took during the investigation (received by Elizabeth as a result of her FOIA request), the person who I think is Det. McDormett walked right towards it, looking right in its direction. At another point it was photographed in close, sitting right between two numbered radios. It was in 22 photographs. (Remember, we don’t have any other SAIT photographs, and I don’t know how JD acquired the one he published.)
Apparently nobody “saw” it. Which I didn’t believe could have been the case until I read and re-read McDormett’s report, trying to create a timeline of the chain of possession.
There had been an agreement that Prescott Fire Department would enter the site after the SAIT had completed its investigation and YCSO had removed the numbered and photographed items, which it then would transport to YCSO to handle. PFD would then remove all of the items left on the site that were not needed by YCSO or SAIT. “It was my understanding that the fire department or designee would be collecting the remaining items, including indistinguishable back packs, water bottles, axes, remnants of chainsaws, etc.”
PFD, I assume, took all that stuff back to PFD, to deal with as they had time while being extremely busy, in grief, and under a lot of pressure. Six days later, on July 9, they notified YCSO that they had found a cellphone melted into a backpack. On July 10, McDormett went to them and retrieved it. Apparently, they must have also had the Powershot, although they never told YCSO they had it, at least at the time McDormett wrote his report on July 16.
According to McDormett, all the personal possessions from July 2 and July 3 were re-inventoried and re-packaged and on “07/04/13 these items, along with the spread sheet, were presented by myself and Lt. Boelts to Rob Zazueta of the Chino Valley Fire Department, for eventual presentation to the families.” (GMHS Wade Parker’s father, Dan Parker, is a Captain with Chino Valley Fire Department)
Sometime on or before July 9, when he travelled alongside his son in the hearse from Phoenix to Prescott, Mike MacKenzie probably visited the Medical Investigator’s Office in Phoenix.
On September 28 a story entitled “Final photos, videos of Granite Mountain Hotshots come to light,” by Janna Dodder Nellans, appeared in Prescott’s The Daily Courier. In it, Joanna Dodder Nellans and Mike MacKenzie tell how how acquired the camera:
“When his father Mike received Chris’ charred belongings from the medical examiner’s office, one item appeared untouched by fire: a small Canon PowerShot digital camera. Even the cloth cover was unscathed.”
There is no way to connect what this says to what Det. McDormett wrote. The personal items brought to the Medical Examiners Office were taken to YCSO and, combined with the personal items gathered on the site on July 3, were delivered to Chino Valley Fire Department on July 4. No way to connect the dots here. (Unless? What? I don’t know.) I can’t think of any. I also don’t think Mike MacKenzie is the kind of person to just lie about it. I don’t get it. (Unless? What? I don’t know.)
I don’t know who Mike really got it from, since it couldn’t have been from the Medical Examiners Office in Phoenix. (Unless? Unless what? I don’t know)
So…… anyway. On July 10, after the Memorial Service in Prescott the day before, Mike MacKenzie flew with his son’s body and that of Kevin Woyjeck, back to California. Sometime before July 13, Mike’s stepdaughter, pulled the SD memory card from the camera and looked at it on her computer via Microsoft Windows Photo Viewer.
From the article: “He was surprised that authorities didn’t temporarily hold onto the camera and its memory card, as they did Chris’ phone.”
“I can’t explain how I felt,” Mike said. “The first thing was, you know, they’re going to need it for the investigation.”
What I have unearthed, and what he didn’t know, was that “the authorities,” at least the YCSO or the SAIT, didn’t even know the camera existed.
On July 13, at his son’s Memorial Service in California, Mike MacKenzie handed a DVD with the pictures and videos to Darryl Willis.
Again from the article: “Willis didn’t check them out until he returned home to Prescott.
‘It was like, really? Wow. I can’t believe this,” he recalled. He immediately contacted the team investigating the wildfire for the Arizona State Forestry Division, who also talked to Mike MacKenzie.'”
Sure, Darryl Willis!!! Especially since the Prescott Fire Department was the only agency on the planet that knew that camera even existed anymore!!!
So there you have it! The Chain of Possession/Evidence of Christopher MacKenzie’s Canon Powershot Camera, that we’ve all been waiting so long for.
PS So after a little more thinking, I’ve thought of a way to connect the dots a little further. To make both YCSO report true and Mike MacKenzie’s story true. Because I don’t think either of them is “lying.” This is speculation, which it has to be, but I think it’s pretty tight.
One way they could both be true is if someone at PFD decided they wanted to get Chris’s camera to Chris’s dad without letting on to anybody who would consider it “Evidence” that it even existed. Sometime between July 4 and July 9 (the day they notified YCSO they had a cellphone), they could have gotten the “personal items package” from Chino Valley Fire Department, and taken it and the camera to the Medical Examiner’s Office in Phoenix. There, Mike could have received them. Wondering why, indeed, was it not held as “evidence” by the authorities who, in his mind, would have naturally done that.
Thoughts?
I’m seriously considering emailing this to John McDormett. I think it’s that important. Do you?
Marti… I think you are close.
What we know now…
NOTE: “It”, below, means the full Canon Powershot with
the SD card still inside it.
* HOW IT LEFT THE DEPLOYMENT SITE
No one from YCSO or SAIT either ever saw it or thought it
was anything relevant to the investigation. Hard to believe,
but sometimes the improbable is the truth.
Prescott Fire Department ( Willis, et al ) picked it up and
took it back to Prescott along with everything else they
were ‘clearing’ from the site not that SAIT and YCSO
said they were “done” with the site.
* HOW IT GOT TO MIKE MACKENZIE
You are most probably right. They ( PFD and Chino folks )
certainly didn’t want to make multiple deliveries of Christopher’s
personal items to his father, Mike, so some effort was made
to get these all into ‘one place’ so they could be delivered
all at once. That includes (possibly) Christopher’s watch,
which we know he wore but has also never been fully
‘traced’… and I believe he had a pocket knife in one of
his pockets as well. Those items would have come from
the body and been sitting in his ‘personal effects’ bag over
at the ME’s office.
So even though it ( the camera ) was in the possession of
PFD for an extended time… someone made sure it got to
the ME’s office and into the bag along with Christopher’s
other stuff before Mike MacKenzie was allowed to have
all those things.
So it absolutely BYPASSED all official investigatory examination
and ended up just in a bag at the ME’s office waiting for
pickup by Mike MacKenzie.
Even though someone ( Willis, again? ) at PFD felt the need
to inform YCSO of the iPhone they found in a pack they
removed and called the detectives to tell them about it…
they ( PFD / Willis ) knew they ALSO had the camera from
the site but purposely decided to NOT tell the police about that.
Keep in mind here that even if PFD/Willis purposely decided
themselves that it wasn’t something the police needed to know
about… they ( PFD/Willis ) were ALSO obviously deciding
that wasn’t something the SAIT needed to know about,
either, or they would have given it to THEM at that time.
Only they ( PFD/Willis ) knew about it… and they just wanted
it to go back to Mike MacKenzie without any ‘investigator’
ever getting to look at it. So that’s what they tried to do.
The plan ‘backfired’.
They never assumed that Mike MacKenzie himself would take
it upon himself to make sure the evidence from that camera
‘saw the light of day’.
The BIG questions are…
1) How LONG did PFD have that camera in their possession
before getting ( secretly ) over to the ME’s office to just ‘drop
it in the bag’ along with Christopher’s other things?
2) During that time… did PFD/Willis ever ‘examine’ it themselves?
Remember… not only do we know the SD card survived
just fine… we are also being told the ‘cloth cover’ on it had
no damage at all. That would mean the camera most probably
was also simply ‘powering on’ after the deployment and
anyone who just fired it up could see what was on it.
No SD card or ‘computer knowledge’ required.
3) If PFD/Willis DID examine the camera… did they ‘tamper
with the evidence’ and press DELETE on ANY of the items
that were stored on the SD card? It is still possible that
Christopher took more video/audio or still photos higher
than Canon sequence number 0891 in the 2-3 minutes
after the ones we can see… and before those men left
that 4:00 PM ‘at rest’ location.
I believe your ‘story’ also explains what was a BIG question
last night about how/why the Arizona Republic itself was
reporting that ‘Mike received these items from the Medical
Examiner’.
It’s because he DID.
PFD/Willis had ‘secretly’ made sure the camera got over
to the ME’s office themselves and was just ‘dropped in the
bag’ along with Christopher’s other personal effects over
there that had already been collected from his body and
the shelter he was in.
When Mike MacKenzie was handed these things over
at the ME’s office… Mike just assumed that everything
in it had come from the pockets of his clothing, or
something.
The reason the Arizona Republic just claimed in their article
it ‘came from the Medical Examiner’ is because, as far as
Mike MacKenzie knew, it simply did. It was on Christopher’s
person when his body arrived at the ME’s office.
The only thing PFD/Willis didn’t count on was Mike’s sense
of ‘obligation to find out the truth’. They thought the camera
would go back to the family and that would be the end of it.
CAVEAT: All that being said… it is ALSO possible we are simply
looking at more ‘three stooges’ type stuff here. It is improbable
that anyone who first removed that camera from the scene
( PFD/Willis ) would NOT have at least TRIED to see if
anything was on it… but maybe that really was the case.
Maybe nobody at PFD even tried to see if anything was on it.
Sometimes the improbable is actually true…
…but regardless… it was a CAMERA.
PFD/Williis already KNEW that both the police and the SAIT
were intensely interested in anything that even MIGHT have
a photograph or a video on it.
Even if PFD/Willis never bothered to look at it… or edit or
delete anything on the SD card… why would they still
NOT have made sure that device got to ‘investigators’?
It’s a classic ‘Double EYE’ situation.
Either it was Intentional… or it was Incompetence.
By the way… before anyone asks… if anyone had the
chance to simply take a look at that ORIGINAL SD
card from the camera…
Would it be possible to tell just from examining it if
anything on it had been ‘edited’ or ‘deleted’?
The answer is… of course it would.
Absolutely.
I agree with almost everything exactly that you’re saying. Two disagreements.
One of the things I’m trying to communicate very clearly so everybody gets it is that all the “personal items” that were at the Medical Examiner’s office (including Chris MacKenzie’s stuff) were NOT KEPT at the Medical Examiner’s office. They were removed from there on JULY 2, by YCSO and taken to YCSO for further examination and then repackaged and delivered to Chino Valley FD on July 4. PFD had to get those back from Chino Valley FD and take them, along with the Powershot, back to the ME office in Phoenix.
Also the article was not published first by Arizona Republic. It was published by “Daily Courier” out of Prescott.
I’m still sitting here totally wondering why did PFD go to all these lengths to do this. I almost put into this “article” that Chris MacKenzie’s father was a fire-fighter himself and KNEW this type of stuff should be entered into “Evidence.” You may be on to something in your conjecture that PFD may have assumed he would not know that. Thank you for that.
They had the camera for five or six days. That would be enough time for someone to check to see if the sd card worked and had anything on it. Etc. It would also be enough time for them to delete things on it and change file numbers and even time-stamps if they knew how to do that. It would take knowing how to do that, though, and, as I posted above, most people don’t know diddley-squat about that stuff.
But seriously, I’m stumped as to why they would go thru this whole “keep this camera out of the chain of evidence” thing, if there wasn’t some real reason they seriously thought it was important to do exactly that. That’s why I’m thinking of sending this to McDormett. Something’s really fishy here.
And I haven’t even started to conjecture what this thing might possibly mean regarding the possibly one to three MIA cellphones.
Thanks again, Marti.
I’m not getting the why/wherefore of things going
from YCSO to Chino and then to PFD and only
then going BACK to the ME where they came
from in the first place… but that seems to be
exactly what was happening.
What really was Chino’s involvement with any
of this? If all PFD was doing was playing
‘middle man’, picking stuff up FROM them, and
getting it back to ME’s office… then why was
Chino ‘in the loop’ at all?
I wonder… did ALL the members of the family
end up getting ‘effects’ from the ME’s office
or only Mike MacKenzie? In some cases…
was Chino and/or PFD just delivering to some
of the families directly? Dunno.
Speaking of family members and the ME’s office…
I still don’t think we any good information about
who or which family members ever actually
went there at all. In other words… did there ever
come a moment when the ME’s office needed
family members to ‘identify the bodies’… or did
all of that happen in other specific ways?
I’m not sure that would even ever be in the
autopsy reports even if those ever actually
see the light of day.
Your important observation from earlier still
stands. If there is this kind of evidence now that
something as important as MacKenzie’s
camera never left the site until PFD took it
away… and then it stayed OUTSIDE the ‘chain
of evidence’ for both YCSO and the SAIT investigators ( and STAYED outside that chain
until Mike MacKenzie forced it back INTO the
chain )… then what ELSE might have
been ‘left’ there that YCSO and SAIT either
missed or didn’t think mattered?
Other smartphones ( Marsh? Steed? )
Other cameras?
Notebooks?
Watches?
Voice recorder(s)? ( Some guys carry them ).
Other?
“What really was Chino’s involvement with any
of this?’
I’m guessing Chino’s involvement was because Wade Parker’s dad was a Captain in Chino Valley Fire Department. Prescott FD was overwhelmed and it would totally make sense for CVFD to take responsibility for returning the “personal items” to the families.
“What really was Chino’s involvement with any
of this? If all PFD was doing was playing
‘middle man’, picking stuff up FROM them, and
getting it back to ME’s office… then why was
Chino ‘in the loop’ at all?”
Chino wasn’t “in the loop.” They had, because of what I wrote above, taken upon the responsibility of distributing the “personal items” to the families. PFD decided to get those “personal items” of Chris MacKenzies from them, and take them, along with his camera, back to the ME in Phoenix so Mike MacKenzie would innocently pick them up from there.
“I wonder… did ALL the members of the family
end up getting ‘effects’ from the ME’s office
or only Mike MacKenzie?”
No. Everybody else got their GMHS “personal items” from Chino Valley FD, I think, although I haven’t had time to research that, but I think it’s probably true.
“did there ever come a moment when the ME’s office needed
family members to ‘identify the bodies’… or did
all of that happen in other specific ways?”
According to McDormett’s report, “All the firefighters were identified on this day largely
through either dental records by forensic odontologist Dr. John Piakis or
through distinguishing tattoos or other identifiers that left no doubt as to the
individual identity of each man.”
“then what ELSE might have
been ‘left’ there that YCSO and SAIT either
missed or didn’t think mattered?
Other smartphones ( Marsh? Steed? )
Other cameras?
Notebooks?
Watches?
Voice recorder(s)? ( Some guys carry them ).
Other?”
You betcha!!!
The “there” being on the deployment site, after the SAIT investigation and the removal, by YCSO of the items deemed important to number, photograph, and send to YCSO to deal with, before allowing Prescott Fire Department to pick up everything else and take it back to Prescott Fire Department to do what they decided to do with them.
I’m gonna qualify my above statement about Chino Valley’s involvement in this particular loop by saying “Please Read This” — http://rss.ag.org/articles/detail.cfm?RSS_RSSContentID=26611&RSS_OriginatingChannelID=1007&RSS_OriginatingRSSFeedID=1034&RSS_Source=rssFile_1034
(Sorry about the icky long url)
It’s pretty emotionally intense. It’s the story of Wade Parkers father, Danny Parker. He was at the Chino Valley Fire Department Station the night of June 30. He got a call. From his friend. Who told him they had lost radio contact. He basically fainted.
The next morning, he was at the Deployment Site. As a part of the delegation Honorably retrieving the bodies.
I really respect and feel for this guy. This story made me cry. And also, I wouldn’t be surprised if his friend might have called him one day and might have asked him, “Danny, could you do me a favor?”
Actually, the whole story is about Wade, but it includes the story of Danny.
I now have the FOIL/FOIA VLAT videos which include two things: (1) LONG videos showing from the north how the fire is spreading from roughly 3 ’til 5 p.m., and (2) audios all of the Bravo 33 communications. (As I understand it, on the day of the tragedy, there was a study being conducted, which is how we ended up with all of these long videos and verbatim recordings of some of the air traffic.) I will try to post these videos, unless John Dougherty has already gotten to it, but they are BIG, and I need some time to regroup.
To wit, all I can say is that, yet again, the audios choke me up when they reveal how quickly the day changed and how quickly air support tried to jump in to help, however futile it would have been. Specifically, on the video/audio, the Bravo 33 guy is going along, doing his thing, directing a bevy of helicopters and planes, doing various “show me” runs and “live” drop (e.g. leading the planes to the spot where he needs them to drop the retardant). It sounds pretty good, the drops are going well, I am learning a lot, and, then… When Bravo 33 is trying to line “Kevin” (a pilot) up for a drop in order to extend a line, everything changes….
Bravo 33: “Uh, Kevin, situation’s changing, I got [a crew??] in trouble and I don’t know where they’re at. Just, uh, stand by.”
Kevin: “Roger, I’ll just stay here to the North and uh east.”
Bravo 33: “Looks like we might have a deployment in progress, so, uh, dial me up a level 6, and I don’t know what the drop sequence will be yet.”
Kevin: “I’m just gonna tag in behind ya and follow ya, then.”
Kevin’s response made my eyes tear up, because it *sounds* like Kevin is doing exactly the right thing (tailing Bravo 33) so that he can be there, ready to drop retardant when Bravo 33 figures out where GM is deployed, but we know that this is going to be a no-win situation. God bless you, Kevin. Continuing (by the way, I am not a transcriptionist like WTKTT, so don’t count on my accuracy):
Bravo 33 (talking to a pilot who, just before the above exchange, had said “goodnight” to Bravo 33 and “see you in the morning” because he was leaving for the day): Come on back.
Bravo 33: Go get some water!
The video ends here. I am going to take a breather, feed my dog, and then try to at least start uploading the VLAT videos tonight before I go to bed. I make no promises, but I will try.
Following the lead plane is normal procedure if there is a emergency drop the lead plane will bring the tanker in and tip wing and drop here. They had to much smoke to find the location for the drop and a side wind of 30 to 40 would have been to much for accuracy and heat would have dissipated the slurry. Just setting up for the drop would have taken several minutes a lot of variables for an accurate drop in time so help GM a lot of expectation with a very low percentage of out come if the air tanker even had exact coordinates of the crew. no one knew where they were and that’s where I want it is not pin point heavy smoke and the plane movement just no way for accuracy. I don’t think they were having a lot of success dropping on structures in Glenela. at that point your just making it look good. Smoke and high wind make air drops useless.
Reply to Bob Powers post on Jan 12, 2014 at 5:03 pm
>> Mr. Powers said…
>>
>> I don’t think they were having a lot of success dropping
>> on structures in Glenela. at that point your just making
>> it look good. Smoke and high wind make air drops
>> useless.
There is full audio proof that that is exactly what the
situation was at 1638… just seconds before Jesse
Steed was going to break in on ‘Air to Ground’ with
his first “We are in front of the flaming front’ MAYDAY.
Most Mainstream Media ( MSM ) outlets just chopped off
the whole first 10 seconds of the ‘helmet-cam’ video but
those first 10 seconds actually capture B33 responding
directly to SPGS1 ( Cordes ) about a drop that he is
requesting at that moment near Yarnell / Glen Ilah.
At 16:38 ( One minute before Steed’s first MAYDAY call ).
B33 is responding directly to Structure 1 ( Cordes )
on Air to Ground. He is obviously telling Cordes they
will TRY to make the drop that Cordes has requested
but you can hear in his voice he thinks conditions are
already doubtful for success.
B33: ( I’m not sure if we ) can with the valley and all
of that smoke, it’s kinda tough on us… but we’ll give it
a shot. Break Structure 1, Bravo 33 on Air to Ground.
Elizabeth… ongoing thanks, of course.
Question: When you say “all B33 communications”… are we
only talking about “Air to Air” ( what THEY were saying amongst
themselves )… or is their any “Air to Ground” stuff?
In other words… do you ever actually HEAR Marsh call up
to B33 saying “That’s where we want retardant”?
Technically, it is ONLY air-to-air on the “AFUE Group” videos (the FOIA text states that they are “documenting retardant use”). The frequency is “Air-to-Air frequency 134.175.” HOWEVER, the FOIA/FOIL materials also include some videos from the guy’s camera/phone/something that he uses as the formal AFUE Group set-up records, and, on THOSE, we get a bit of background communications, b/c I think the guy monitoring the AFUE Group set-up has a keyed hand-held radio. Or SOMEHOW we now and then get random transmissions, like “DivsA, OPS Musser?”
FYI, I am going to have to abort my upload, b/c it is telling me that 488 minutes remain for the upload. I don’t even know how long that is. What – roughly 8 hours?
P.S. I have not yet heard the “that’s where we want the drop” comment, but let me keep listening and get back to you.
Reply to Elizabeth post on Jan 12, 2014 at 8:14 pm
>> Elizabeth said…
>>
>> Or SOMEHOW we now and then get random
>> transmissions, like “DivsA, OPS Musser?”
Holy cow… really?
That is OPS2 Paul Musser calling DIVS A Marsh.
The ONLY documented communication we know
of right now all day long between OPS2 Musser
and DIVS A Marsh is the actual moment circa
3:45 to 4:00 PM when OPS2 Musser called
DIVS A Marsh to ask him if he could “spare
resources to help protect Yarnell”.
Even if there is no accidental capture of that
actual full conversation the TIME when it took
place is really, really important.
We still don’t know if the OPS2 request for
resources came BEFORE or AFTER the
conflicting OPS1 request to “Keep ME informed,
Hunker and be safe ( in the black ), and We’ll
get Air Support down there ASAP.”
Even what ORDER those obviously CONFLICTING
requests from the two OPS people running
the fire that day arrived up where Marsh and
GM were is obviously important.
>> FYI, I am going to have to abort my upload,
>> b/c it is telling me that 488 minutes remain for
>> the upload. I don’t even know how long that
>> is. What – roughly 8 hours?
Yup. Geez… are these more AVI files?
If they are… the size can usually be reduced
by 80-90 percent with absolutely NO loss in
any video or audio quality.
Also, since I mentioned it above. Regarding WTKTT’s totally understandable confusion about cellphone 320. I’m making a tight list regarding the cellphones. This is my entry into that list:
320- Type Unknown. I have determined Grant McKee. Found during shelter examination (SAIT) at YCSO.
WTKTT wrote on Nov. 10, 2013 at 2:42 in “Yarnell Hill Fire Investigation Ignored…”: “Removed prematurely from shelter bag 305 at the ME by someone from Prescott Fire Dept on 7/10/12”
This is my response:
That’s not true. From the YCSO report, p 24, (edited for brevity): “I was told state investigators had removed some personal items from shelters while inspecting them. Taken from shelters that were collected at scene on 7/3 and have not been associated w/any ff at this point. …From shelter 305 a cellphone was removed. … It should be noted that we did not previously attempt to remove any items attached to the shelters as we left these items in place for the state investigators.
… On 7/11/13 I dropped off phones #320……… to ACTIC.”
YCSO had those shelters at its location. None of the stuff they removed from the site on July 3 went to ME in Phoenix. SAIT was duly authorized to examine them. SAIT was the entity that discovered the cellphone. As you know by now, YCSO did what they needed to do with that cellphone.
From my exhaustive and exhausting examination of the Deployment Site, Shelter 5 is clearly that of Grant McKee.
None of the shelters, radios, cellphones, personal items, anything, collected from the site on July 3 ever went to the Medical Examiners office in Phoenix. They all went to YCSO.
Still…… I have a seriously hard time imagining that Eric Marsh didn’t have a cellphone on that mountain that day.
I’ve been thinking A LOT about this.
We’ve been having this whole conversation about situational awareness. I was originally astonished that the crews weren’t issued maps that morning. Then I read that the person responsible for providing maps hadn’t arrived yet because the Incident Command was still putting itself together. OK. Then I started thinking about the cellphone thing.
My Millenial daughter’s father and I were seriously intentional about teaching her how to use maps and compasses in wildlands and how to orient herself according to the cardinal directions. Then came internet maps and stuff. I never really trusted Google Maps Directions in the field because they constantly didn’t work in the boonies.
But that was awhile ago.
She and I have had some conversations about this stuff. She (who is on home stretch to getting her Masters in Public Planning from the University of Michigan) has complained to me about all her cohorts who can’t read a map or orient themselves because all they know how to do is get directions from Google Maps. It infuriates her. Whenever they go on a field trip, she has to read the real maps and do the navigation, because they can’t.
But they’re not wildland firefighters. I’m guessing that most wildland firefighters of her generation (which includes most of this crew, which makes it hurt even more for me) have figured out how to use the cellphones most of them have to orient themselves in the wildlands; so whether or not Incident Managers provide paper maps, is not that much of a survival issue for them anymore.
Because of all this, and because Eric was a Division Leader, and because Incident Command didn’t issue maps, I just can’t even remotely imagine Eric didn’t have a cellphone on him or wasn’t seriously using it a lot.
But I have no idea where it ended up.
Shelter numer 5 is nowhere near where Eric Marsh’s body was.
Darn good job Detective Reed, darn good work. Thanks.
Thanks, Marti. No one commenting here probably knows more
than I do about the amount of brain damage that can be behind
that kind of detailed work… so thank you.
FYI: I know that you know how hi-res the actual SAIT FOIA/FOIL
stuff is… but after close examination now of the ultra-highres
MacKenzie photos ( ALL of them, not just June 30, 2013 ),
it turns out that the three ultra-high-res photos of Jesse Steed
not only show that he carried what appears to be a notebook
in his upper left shirt pocket ( Unit log? Smaller notebook? ),
on the Doce Fire he was also carrying what is an unmistakable
profile of an iPhone on top of the notebook in that same pocket.
You can even see the ( patented/copyrighted by Apple )
’rounded corners’ of said iPhone pressing against the shirt.
I don’t know if Steed was carrying that iPhone on June 30, but
he sure as hell was at the Doce Fire just a week earlier.
Same for other FOIA/FOIL photos now that we have the
full high-res.
Caldwell carried his Android Droid X, the one he used to
shoot the video capturing the “Keep me informed, Hunker
and be safe, We’ll get Air Support down there ASAP”
directives from Abel to Marsh… in his RIGHT shirt
pocket… no notebook.
Also… for anyone trying to guess who I am… or thinking that
I am any kind of ‘genius’… guess again.
If you don’t think it’s possible these days to simply feed a
photograph taken anywhere, anytime into certain ( shall
we say ) ‘systems’… and then have those ‘systems’ identify
the exact coordinates of the center of that photograph
anywhere on the frickin’ planet…
…then you really haven’t been paying attention.
Forget facial recognition. That’s now kid’s stuff.
You might to have smoke a cigarette while you wait… but trust
me… a lot of what appears to be manual identification work for
that kind of crap is a thing of the past.
The only time you might have to smoke TWO cigarettes is
if no match is found… and then it goes ‘off planet’ and can
do the same location match for up to 7 different planetary
bodies ( and counting ) at this point.
If you end up having to go ‘off earth’… the lat/long for the
center of the photo gets a little funky… but that’s just math.
Actually the YCSO photos of the SAIT investigation aren’t high resolution, unfortunately. They’re only 2048 pixels by 1365 pixels. And we only have one SAIT photo of the SAIT investigation, the one from JD’s article. Other than that, we DON’T HAVE their photos.
Every time I think I’ve figured this investigation of the site out, three more black holes open up in it. Yesterday, after reading that YCSO report about fifteen times and realizing the only stuff that went to the ME in Phoenix was what was brought with the bodies on July 2, all kinds of things finally fell into place, until the implications of that started emerging in my mind. As in why did it take five days for Prescott Fire Department to tell YCSO they had Clayton’s cellphone? And, if they didn’t even ever tell YCSO they had Chris’s camera, gee wiz, doncha know, hmmmmm, is there any kind of slight possibility they might have found a few OTHER things they never told YCSO about? And if, for some reason they had to either engineer or fabricate that whole thing about ME passing Chris’s camera to his dad, I wonder what else they might have decided to engineer or fabricate.
I’m just totally blown away. And I was trying to get finished with this. I’m about two months behind in my real life. I told my 94-year-old mom yesterday that I was about to write my “final report” on this, so I could finally finish working on my Christmas pictures.
PS If anybody here that is looking at the YCSO photos of the SAIT investigation could, off the top of their heads, tell me who are the people in those pictures, that would help me immensely.
And the thing about metadata.
Different software does different things to metadata. I use Lightroom, so I have to import photos into it. I have an import preset that adds my copyright etc metadata to my photos. I discovered the hard way that it was doing that to the photos I downloaded from Elizabeth’s and JD’s collections. I had to stop and create a new import preset that didn’t do anything to the photos, so I could see the original metadata.
People generally don’t know or pay attention to what their software is doing to metadata. Something either Elizabeth or Google is doing is attaching a Picasa tag to all her photos. If there was originally something else in the software tag, it’s getting changed. As in, the one original Chris photo I’ve downloaded was processed in Microsoft Windows Photo Viewer.
Bridge and Photoshop don’t do anything to the metadata unless you tell them to. Date/Time Taken are NEVER changed in the metadata “in file transfer” or anywhere else unless someone actually goes in and changes it or makes a copy using “Save As”. That’s something we who often use multiple cameras on a shoot and forget to exactly sync them beforehand often learn the hard way.
And, remember, people, generally, especially in Arizona, don’t pay that much attention to how accurately their cameras are set up time-wise. But cellphones are accurate.
And thank you, again, WTKTT, for teaching me that my camera records the temperature! I had no idea!!! I had a lot of fun learning more about that!
And, PS, I’m completely dumbfounded that the SD card survived that fire. If the company that manufactured it knew that, they could have an amazing ad campaign, altho I guess it would be in kind of poor taste.
Namaste!
I just re-read and finally understood what you wrote here. LOL!! I’m a cat of many lives. In one of them, I used to hand-scribe finished topographic maps from rough topographic maps drawn using scanners that read aerial photography. It was state of the art at that time. Now I know why Google Earth frustrates me so much. I’m glad it’s not state of the art!
It may have been different with Granite Mountain, but where I work the cell service is so patchy that few people bother with smart phones. Eric was 43, which makes him somewhat less likely to have been on a cell. Still, I’ve been looking through MSM articles for mention of him texting or calling anyone, with no luck so far. Sonny or Joy might remember if they saw him using a phone.
Good point. I’ve been trying to scope that territory also. But Eric WAS in cellphone contact with at least one of the OS’s, and I just don’t think he would have borrowed a cellphone to do that. He was away from the crew almost the entire day. Unless maybe he borrowed Jesse’s (still unaccounted for) or one of the others for most of the entire day?
we aw him use the radio- no cellphone. Does not mean he did not have one on him.
Wonderful work, Marti!
I know you’re keeping track of the phones. How does your list compare to the following? (in alphabetical order by last name):
Andrew Ashcraft — cell phone, text reprinted in LA Times
Robert Caldwell — DroidX cell phone — “hunker down” video
Christopher MacKenzie — cell phone and Canon Powershot (IMG0883-0891)
Grant McKee — cell phone (#320, sent to ACTIC), texts and photos reprinted in GQ article
Scott Norris — cell phone, text reported in Outside article
Wade Parker — cell phone, texts and photos reprinted in GQ and LA Times articles
Jesse Steed? — appeared to have iPhone on Doce fire?
LOL! I was just thinking, “OK, I really oughta at least clean up and post my current cell-phone list now before I go have brunch with my 94-year old mom.” So here it is in all it’s constantly-being-revised and never-finished messiness:
CELLPHONES
320- Type Unknown. I have determined Grant McKee. found during shelter examination (SAIT) at YCSO. To ACTOS.
WTKTT wrote on Nov. 10, 2013 at 2:42 in Yarnell Hill Fire Investigation Ignored: “Removed prematurely from shelter bag 305 at the ME by someone from Prescott Fire Dept on 7/10/12”
That’s not true. From the YCSO report, p 24, (edited for brevity): “I was told state investigators had removed some personal items from shelters while inspecting them. Taken from shelters that were collected at scene on 7/3 and have not been associated w/any ff at this point. …From shelter 305 a cellphone was removed. … It should be noted that we did not previously attempt to remove any items attached to the shelters as we left these items in place for the state investigators.
… On 7/11/13 I dropped off phones #320……… to ACTIC.
(Note shelter 305 is Grant McKee’s.
324- iPhone. Clayton Witted. Found during PFD last combing on July 3. PFD notified YCSO on 7/9 that they had it. (5 days after YCSO had delivered all the rest of the entered-into-evidence personal items to Chino Valley FD for pass-off to families. ACTOS
326- Christopher McKenzie. Type? Found w/him in his shelter. Delivered from ME to YCSO by YCSO. Cellebrated and published.
327- According 2 WTKTT, Caldwell carried/used an Android Droid X. Carried in his right shirt pocket. Robert Caldwell. Found w/him in his shelter. Delivered from ME to YCSO by YCSO. Password protected. That got undone. Cellebrated. Published.
401- Personal item 1. iPhone. Found July 3 during SAIT investigation. Taken to YCSO by YCSO. Found at the north end of Wade Parker’s shelter. It’s his. Wade Parker was using his iphone that day. ACTOS
405. Personal item 5. Android? Found July 3 during SAIT investigation. Taken to YCSO by YCSO. I have determined it is Andrew Ashcroft’s phone, by location. ACTOS
According 2 WTKTT, MacKenzie’s hi-rez photos show Steed, at Doce fire, carrying an iphone in his upper left shirt pocket, along with a small notebook.
And PS
I’ll write up my pretty easy radio list later today AFTER I go have brunch with my 94-year old mom. She’s just gotten word that a book is being published about my deceased dad’s adventures right after WWII at Clark AFB in the Philippines when he was head of a group of AF meteorologists that were flying those big huge I-don’t-remember-their-names airplanes into typhoons to measure them from the inside.
Reply to Marti Reed post on Jan 11, 2014 at 9:02 pm
>> Marti wrote…
>> WTKTT wrote on Nov. 10, 2013 at 2:42 in Yarnell
>> Hill Fire Investigation Ignored: “Removed prematurely
>> from shelter bag 305 at the ME by someone from
>> Prescott Fire Dept on 7/10/12″
>>
>> That’s not true. From the YCSO report, p 24, (edited
>> for brevity): “I was told state investigators had removed
>> some personal items from shelters while inspecting
>> them. Taken from shelters that were collected at scene
>> on 7/3 and have not been associated w/any ff at this
>> point. …From shelter 305 a cellphone was removed.
Good catch! My original assumption was that this
‘removed personal items from shelters’ meant that
SAIT people had removed those items from the ‘loose’
shelters that WERE ‘removed from the site’ and went
to the ME’s office. I missed the 7/3 DATE there.
So that means SOME of the ‘loose shelters’ at the site
WERE removed the morning after and travelled to
the ME’s office with the bodies… but some of them
were NOT… correct?
I understood the police report to say that if there were
any fire shelters on scene the morning after that didn’t
have a firefighter in them… these were ‘bagged up’ in
separate body bags and traveled with the bodies to
the ME office the morning of July 1.
Do the photos you are looking at really not support that?
Do the photos indicate that NO ’empty shelters’ were
EVER removed from the site the morning after
the incident?
No. The shelters that were left after the bodies (with or without their connected shelters) were removed from the site on July 1 to the ME in Phoenix, were taken to the YCSO in Prescott after the SAIT site investigation on July 3. Then from MacDormett’s report:
“On 07/10/13 I went to evidence and I was told that the state investigators had removed some personal items from the shelters while they were inspecting them. The items were taken from the shelters that were collected at the scene on 7/3 and have not been associated with any fire fighter at this point. I assigned
numbers to each item and photographed each item. I gave Lt. Boelts copies of the photos for possible identification purposes. A watch from shelter #304 was
assigned #321. A knife from shelter 306 was assigned #323. From shelter #305 a cell phone (320) and a knife (322) were removed. It should be noted that we did
not previously attempt to remove any items attached to the shelters as we left those items in place for the state investigators.
Marti,
Thanks very much for everything you’ve contributed here.
I’m 48, so am sort of in-between in terms of tech, and would say people between my age and their 70s are all over the place in use of smartphones. Regarding both phones and GPS in general, it’s very true that ability to use them is very iffy in large parts of both the west and, very oddly, some parts of the suburban Northeast, in both cases because of terrain (sorry for saying terrain, but to me it’s a better word than topography…).
But, for the YHF obviously cell reception was good at least before GM headed down. Whether or not Marsh had a personal cell with him, I think it’s reasonable to assume that GM did make use of smartphones to pull up maps. So, the idea that they were simply lost when they headed down via bushwhack I highly question. I believe it much more likely that they simply, for whatever reason, made the judgment that the bushwhack would save time, as hard as it is to understand that someone would make that judgment when familiar with that terrain. From participating in outdoor recreational activities, I have seen people simply shut their brain off when faced with a tempting bushwhack, though, even if their own experience as well as knowledge should tell them it doesn’t make sense.
I believe that at some point a comprehensive cell and other phone record audit really is one key, because I don’t think we yet have the whole communication picture. Certainly there also should be a re-examination of what PFD may have that they haven’t disclosed, even just by something getting lost in the shuffle.
By all over the place in use of cells, I mean some use them like they are in their 20s, and even some younger than me are not full comfortable.
I would say that a couple of the guys that had android or other high-tech Phones could have the ability to have pulled up maps. Like Mackenzie, Ashcroft, Parker.
Mr. Powers… as far as we know already,
ALL of the ‘phones’ out there that day were
‘smartphones’. There were no ‘candy-bar’
phones at all ( the old ones that are only
phones and can’t run programs ).
You actually can’t even by a ‘candy-bar’
phone anymore unless you try really hard.
Every single one of those guys was, at
all times, only 20 seconds away from
viewing their own satellite maps of the
area and seeing that the two-track road
would have taken them all the way to
the Boulder Springs Ranch.
That’s what is still so unbelievable to
comprehend. Forget management’s
failure to supply them with either maps
or make sure they had the situational
awareness of that area to stay alive
that day…
…if any one of those guys had even
bothered to spend 20 seconds on that
themselves… then when it came time to
make the critical decision about whether
to drop into the canyon… any one of them
could have piped up and said… “Hey
Jesse, you know that this road DOES
go all the way to that ranch, right?”
Believe it or not… if we really could see
ALL of the data that was scraped from
those smartphones… it actually WOULD
be possible to tell if any of them had
accessed Google maps that day, at
any time ( or ran other GEO/TOPO
software at any time ).
Deep down in the OS layer… every single
smartphone made/sold today is, in fact,
‘watching’ and ‘logging’ everything you
are doing. They always have.
The Question was on maps and goggle earth I would have to buy those to be on my phone I am assuming they would to. or have a program purchase that has the programs. I never added that to my phone as I did not need it so that is where I was going with the statement. But thanks for the info.
No purchases necessary.
Every smarthphone comes
with a browser. You just
call up Google maps ( not
Google Earth ), enter
Yarnell, AZ… click satellite
view… zoom down only TWICE,
and there is that road they
they were on clearly heading
all the way to the ranch.
Only takes 20 secs, max.
Adds a extra $100 to my cell I don’t know about smart phones I am one of those old people.
No problem.
I think this whole
discussion is
just proving
Mark Twain
right.
We are ALL
ignorant…
…just about
different things.
Actually… quick update.
I am always in satellite
mode in Google maps
so I guess I just thought
that’s the only time that
road shows clearly.
Not true.
So you can even
eliminate of of the steps
above.
Even though that
road has no name,
and even in simple
MAP mode.. it is
CLEARLY marked
on a basic Google
map lookup for
Yarnell, AZ.
Reply to NV post on January 12, 2014 at 8:51 am
NV… see reply to Mr. Powers below. If we really could see
ALL of the data scraped from those phones… it would
be possible to know if any of them actually did ever
access Google Maps or other GEO/TOPO software
at any time ( and at WHAT time ) during that day.
I hear ya above… they could have STILL decided to
bushwhack… but remember that they still could not
actually SEE the full situation ahead of them from
where the decision was made. Up on the saddle… the
start of the drainage might have LOOKED like it was
going to stay relatively ‘clear’… but the further down
they went the worse it got. So it really probably came
down to them incrementally ‘losing time’ but still
never acknowledging how serious it was getting and
not stopping to reevaluate the decision. They just
‘forged ahead’ for 19 minutes… hoping it would
‘clear up’, or something.
Personally ( OPINION WARNING! )… I still believe Jesse
Steed ( leading the men ) had no frickin’ idea that road
went all the way to the ranch… and he chose the canyon
route because he really, truly thought that was the ONLY
way to fulfill his relocation assignment.
I think at the saddle they were looking straight at the ranch and thought it was closer going down thru the canyon to the ranch and that would be the fastest route, not considering the extra time it would take to get thru the brush. Just my thought since they never really had a planed ER.
It still perfectly possible that both Darrell Willis
and Brendan McDonough know the full
answer to this question. If there was any
radio discussion at all on the private GM
frequency about that particular decison
( and whether they knew the road went
all the way there or not )… then there is
every reason to believe that BOTH Willis
and McDonough would have ‘overheard’
that specific ‘decision making’ discussion.
If there WAS no radio traffic at all at that
moment… then Steed ( at the front of
the line ) probably simply put his left
blinker on and took the men down… and
we will never know what was in his head.
Yes, the phones should tell either way, whether they did pull up maps with the (or a) phone(s), or not. Interesting, in that in this day and age, it’s probably negligent to NOT pull up a map, if you don’t have a printed map, when you have good cell and GPS reception and have a number of smartphones in your crew. And, assuming you weren’t negligent on that front, and DID pull up a map like I think you should have, but then decided on the bushwhack anyway, it gets even harder to justify. But, as I said earlier, on the spur of the moment, the visuals of a tempting bushwhack can simply seem to short-circuit decisions sometimes.
“I believe that at some point a comprehensive cell and other phone record audit really is one key, because I don’t think we yet have the whole communication picture. Certainly there also should be a re-examination of what PFD may have that they haven’t disclosed, even just by something getting lost in the shuffle.”
I absolutely totally agree with you on that!
RE POWERSHOT CHAIN OF EVIDENCE
I’ve been combing and re-combing the YCSO report most of today, and comparing it with questions raised in a lot of other threads about Christopher MacKenzie’s Powershot to try to line things up in my understanding of it all, and I just discovered something REALLY IMPORTANT. Like REALLY.
After the SAIT investigation of the Deployment Site, everything they photographed and numbered was removed from the site by the YCSO. Because they were the only ones capable of actually dealing with it. There is no indication, or reason, that ANYTHING removed by them that day was taken to the Medical Examiners office in Phoenix. It was taken to YCSO, and everything subsequently done to it was done there. (which is related to WTKTT’s not getting it right about the cellphone and other things — it’s really confusing and it’s taken me an afternoon of combing to figure it out). There was no reason to take any of this stuff to the Medical Examiner’s office in Phoenix.
After that, BY AGREEMENT AND PLAN, (“It was my understanding that the fire department or designee would be collecting the remaining items, including indistinguishable back packs, water bottles, axes,
remnants of chainsaws, etc.”) Prescott Fire Department, entered the site and removed such things as backpacks, chainsaws, tools, and whatever else they found in the course of that re-combing of the site. Including the Powershot.
Apparently, although it completely amazes me, that included the Powershot. Apparently, NOBODY saw the Powershot during that whole investigation where they photographed it 22 times, including up close and personal between two numbered radios. I’m dumbfounded.
But it gets even better.
So Prescott Fire Department hauled all that leftover stuff back to Prescott Fire Department.
The next thing we read is that on July 9, five days after YCSO had delivered all the evidenced personal items to “Rob Zazueta of the Chino Valley Fire Department, for eventual
presentation to the families,” Prescott Fire Department notified them that they had discovered a cellphone melted to a backpack. So on July 10, YCSO dutifully went to PFD and collected it.
At no time in this did PFD ever notify YCSO that they had ALSO pulled the Powershot off the site. Never. EVER.
That’s why it was NEVER entered into Evidence.
And also, this means the story about the Powershot being delivered to Mike MacKenzie by somebody related to the Medical Examiner is totally fabricated, or some kind of wink-wink.
Medical Examiner never had ANYTHING to do with the Powershot.
There was never any reason for them to. And Prescott FD never told YCSO they had it.
So poor Mike MacKenzie. He gets the camera back, his
stepdaughter probably did put the SD card in her computer,
and they discover something they think no one has seen yet.
Mike makes a copy of that ( thinking he’s discovered something ),
and hands it to Willis at one of the funerals and says (documented),
“I think you might want to see this”.
Willis pretends he’s never seen it before… just to be polite.
The reality is that PFD had the camera all along.
They already had the contents of it ( ALL of that SD card )
before it ever went back to Christopher’s father.
Willis then ‘says’ he hands the copy of the CD that Mike gave
him to Randy Okon of the SAIT.
So here’s the new mystery.
Did they ever see the REAL camera… in PFD’s possession,
and get to examine the REAL SD card from the camera…
or did they really only ever see the CD that Willis gave them?
Isn’t it funny how Willis keeps ‘entering the picture’ here?
I’m, after letting this whole thing sink in for awhile, including the relative significance (or lack thereof) of it legally, inclined to think SAIT never saw it. I think that’s the irony at the end of the story. And Mike may know how ironic his end of the story is. PFD seriously underestimated him. But who knows?
I think what’s most significant in my mind at this point is not anything having to do with the camera, other than that I’m pretty 50/50 on whether PFD “did anything” with the sd card, all things considered. It’s more along the lines of “If they went to such great lengths to keep the camera from Evidence, I have absolutely no doubt in my mind they would do that even more with cellphones.” And, since this was not a checkmark crime scene, so the rules of engagement were not enforceable, that solidifies my speculations around this. I think there are missing significant cellphones. Maybe not. But now I know it wouldn’t be beyond PFD’s thinking and acting to make sure they stay that way. And that, to me, is the most important thing I learned this weekend. It will be very interesting to watch and see whether anybody can prove me wrong. Thanks for enlightening me regarding the legal stuff!
Well…A Publication of the National Wildfire Coordinating Group, Historical Wildland Firefighter Fatalities 1910 – 1996,
http://www.nwcg.gov/pms/docs/fat_pdf.pdf
states under the remarks section, Crew member and others were in helispot when the fire came. Victim succumbed to smoke and hot air inhalation in fire shelter which had been deployed near a pile of gear. He was not ‘wearing
gloves.
The Ship Island Fire, Fire Entrapment Report number 3 states that, “Gloves must be required to be in the possession of all fire suppression personnel who carry the fire shelter. It is impossible to hold down the edges of the fire shelter without good leather gloves. We assume the absence of gloves prevented the crew boss from moving his fire shelter as the line scout was able to do.”
https://higherlogicdownload.s3.amazonaws.com/WILDFIRELESSONS/Ship_Island_1979.pdf?AWSAccessKeyId=AKIAJH5D4I4FWRALBOUA&Expires=1389496023&Signature=D4UYFQMq%2FkccE4Idru4SBXy9wh4%3D
Shortly after the fire, the associated Press reported that the Targhee National Forest Forest Supervisor David Jay, said that, “Without gloves, it’s hard to hold down the shelter properly and to move away from the intense heat. The shelters are designed to reflect 95 percent of the heat, but if they touch the body, the pain may be unbearable.” Could Pattee have been saved if he was wearing gloves [Jack Hougaard was asked]? “He would have been better off. Whether they would have saved his life, I couldn’t say said Jack Hougaard. [Salmon National Forest Fire information Officer].
So…I stand corrected, only one overhead died and although his hands were badly burned there is no definitive proof that gloves would have saved his life.
30 Mile is another where lack of gloves led to severe burns on one surviving crew’s hands.
wow! finally an real example out of NV!?
you might add that the lack of gloves was also a contributing factor found for a couple others that died because they couldn’t hold down their shelters…
how about those all those examples of people surviving entrapments by hiding behind boulders? could you come up with EVEN ONE example?
i really am curious… not being my normal flippant self here…
xxfullsailxx – how about the smokejumper who did not believe in fire shelters (so he wasn’t even carrying one) who survived by going into some rocks on the South Canyon Fire when it blew up and the other 14 died? I don’t know if that was a rock slide or just a bunch of boulders, but it is my understanding from reading the report that he just waited out the fire storm in the rocks. I think he was near the top and those who died were relatively close to him, but below where he was located.
I have always been surrounded by people who were in better shape than I was, smarter than I was, more articulate than I was, and generally just better at everything that I was. The only thing I always had in my favor was my doggedness, tenacity, steadfastness and my perseverance to persevere, so I really admire this characteristic in you…but will you please move on. I think NV has contributed a great deal to this thread and I find myself agreeing with him more than anyone else, (although I always to default to the fact that Bob Powers and Robert the Second are always right about following the rules and I do not want to misquote Dr. Putnam, but I think he would say IF you are not following them, you had damn well better know them good enough to know where you are not, and really, really, really, be head up). Bottom line, I don’t think there is any meat left on that bone and the other ASAIT members are starting to wonder if you need a psychiatric evaluation? Not me though, I can recognize uncontrollable repetitive behavior when I see it, so you do have my sympathies. Please get well.
DING DING DING! Gary, you win the prize for today’s most creative xxfullsailxx smack-down. Congratulations. Your check is in the mail.
thank you, I just hope it works, I got “the can we just move on” from your attempt. xxfullsailxx knows his fire but he is stubborn.
apparently elizabeth is fulfilling some sort of life long cheer leading fantasy…
i assume you’re talking about the jumper Longanecker? i’m pretty sure he just decided to stay low on the hill in the lunch spot… i don’t think he was really faced with the “entrapment” part of south canyon…
NV seems to have made it a point to make very broad statements with little or no evidence to back up anything he says… so sure, if we can agree that he doesn’t have a clue about entrapment survivability in boulder fields, then we can move on…
and, i fired my psychiatrist, he didn’t have a clue what he was talking about either!
You win!
mike on January 10, 2014 at 5:58 pm said:
2) Do you think the ADOSH fines and possible lawsuits will have a chilling effect on wildland firefighting efforts? Since leaving a crew on the fireline inherently entails some risk, will the idea that, if the crew in question messes up, the agency and even the individuals overseeing the fire will be held to account make fire commands very hesitant?
No, I don’t think it will have a significant or long term chilling effect on wildland firefighting. Most wildfires are fought by the federal government and both the federal government and its employees have sovereign immunity from problems like lawsuits from the Yarnell Hill Fire unless those affected can prove that not only what they did a really bad idea, but that those who knew it was a really bad idea, knew it was a really bad idea ahead of time, talked about it, even joked about it and did it anyway. And even then no one will be able to hold them accountable, that is how the system works or doesn’t work depending on your point of view.
The chilling effect will last only until the first telephone calls come in from irate landowners and congressional aides who are complaining the federal government isn’t doing enough to protect their little slices of heaven otherwise known as the Wildland Urban Interface.
Oh, and one more thing, even after the affected party proves all of the above, they will still have to get permission from the federal government to sue the federal government by getting the federal government to in effect waive their sovereign immunity rights because one branch of the federal government thinks that what another branch did was so outrageous that they need to permit a lawsuit to go forward in order to teach themselves a lesson.
You’re awesome. I’m gonna go buy every book you’ve written just for the pleasure of reading it.
It made sense to me that the Yarnell Hill SAIRs weakness was in response to the lawsuits after the Thirtymile Fire:
http://seattletimes.com/html/localnews/2003488305_thirtymile21m.html
http://www.fs.fed.us/t-d/lessons/documents/Thirtymile_Reports/Thirtymile-Final-Report-2.pdf
There was some great discussion of this on Wildfire Today:
http://wildfiretoday.com/tag/thirtymile-fire/
I’m curious what the rest of you think.
xxfullsailxx said, “hey gary! thanks so much for bringing this up…
government conspiracy eh? i missed that! that certainly puts things in perspective for me… you know, there have been times when i’ve thought to myself, “well, what if WTKTT is a family member of one of the 19… ” would that justify (for me) his persistent need to assign blame to someone?… would that explain his constant need to try to save the crew post-mortem with false hypotheticals? … it would certainly explain his obsessive compulsion and seemingly sudden fanatical interest in WFF…”
Your welcome xxfullsailxx…so here is some more insight for you. I believe WTKTT is definitely NOT a family member or related to the GMHS in any way as you have suggested many times.
I think WTKTT is a computer/technical borderline genius who works as an analyst for the CIA, NSA, or one of the dozens of other federal agencies who employ people like that.
Furthermore, I think he is sitting in a dark room somewhere surrounded by lots of blinking lights and he works on this project when he doesn’t have real work to do because he can’t stand it when his mind is not in gear.
I think your comments about him comparing himself to Edward Snowden were funny because Snowden worked at the NSA help desk, whereas WTKTT works way above that level as an analyst. And if I am wrong, it doesn’t make any difference, he is still good and he really should be working for one of the alphabet soup agencies who do that kind of work.
But in any case, thank you for at least considering laying off the new level of name calling you graduated to in my absence.
Just because you do not agree with his assessments does not mean he is lying. I really wish you would go to Wikipedia and look up the definition of “lying”. I don’t think anybody here is meeting the criteria of that word.
And FYI…blame IS going to be assigned to SOMEONE for the Yarnell Hill Fire. That’s the way this kind of thing has always worked and always will work. This is not a situation you get to hit the reset button and go back and start again. 19 men are dead, all of them were relatively young and had great lives in front of them with those they loved.
Somebody IS at fault here. This horrific event did not happen in a vacuum without any casual factors. There is no question that this will go down in history as the fault of Eric Marsh and Jesse Steed…because it was. They had great power and authority over the lives of those who worked under them…but more importantly they had GREAT RESPONSIBLITLY for those lives…and they blew it…bad.
All we are doing now is looking for some reasonable caveats to add to the already existing story line that goes something like this, “Yes, they made the single worst mistake in wildland firefighting history, but they did it because (fill-in-the-blank-here). That is the very best we can hope for at this point to honor their memory.
And yes, I made mistakes at least as bad as the one they made, but I made them on fires that were more forgiving than the Yarnell Hill Fire. Bob Powers is right of course, but that is not the way I fought fire. I pushed the envelope.
I came from a program that promoted and rewarded those who pushed the envelope (and discarded those who did not)…and lucky me, it worked out for me and all of those who worked on my crews over the 7 years I was a hotshot crew boss. And later on, it worked out for everyone who worked for me in my new life as I spent the next 22 years looking for something to replace the camaraderie and adrenaline rush of fighting wildfires with a hotshot crew…but I never found it doing SOG border interdiction work and serving search warrants.
That same philosophy killed 3 Mormon Lake Hotshots, including the crew boss, on the Battlement Creek Fire because he pushed the envelope that day and was really, really, really unlucky. But he would not have been the crew boss of the Mormon Lake Hotshots if he wasn’t willing to push the envelope…kind of a damned if you do…damned if you don’t.
I am a disciple of Dr. Putnam. I did not, and do not, believe you can fight fire aggressively while observing all of the rules, all of the time. But you sure as hell better know when you are bending or breaking any of them, and be ready to make quick adjustments or else really bad things will happen.
Eric Marsh and Jesse Steed were not just wrong on June 30, 2013, that was only the first step…they were mostly just really, really, really, unlucky that day.
And here is just a little side note. For everyone who has made an issue because they had to tell the Granite Mountain Hotshots to put their sleeves down and got attitude back. Nobody ever died from having the sleeves of their fire shirts rolled up on a fire.
But I will share with you a safety violation I noticed they routinely engaged in that has killed men on wildfires. Fighting wildfires without their gloves on. I received a Service Wide Employee Suggestion Award (and big check) for suggesting that fire shelter pouches be made to carry a special pair of gloves (oven mitts) that are designed to wear while holding down the edges of a fire shelter after we were on the Ship Island Creek Fire, and it is believed 2 overhead died because they were not wearing gloves (as dumbass overhead are wont to do).
I said all firefighters should carry an extra pair of gloves in their fire shelter pouches in the meantime (as I always did, even though I did not believe a fire shelter would save me or anyone else) because when the **** is really hitting the fan you are going to drop one of your gloves and then holding down the edge of that fire shelter is going to be like putting your hand on a hot stove and keeping it there, which is why I thought they should make special gloves for that purpose.
If you don’t agree, just put on a pair of regular leather gloves and try to keep you hands on a hot stove. But…I am sure that suggestion is as long gone as the money they gave me for it. In any case, that is what I noticed about the Granite Mountain Hotshots from photographs. Many of them and their supervisors thought “real” firefighters don’t wear gloves. For whatever it is worth.
Actually, the gloves thing is both a great observation, and a great example of probability in a practical situation. I will leave the issue alone after this. But, obviously not wearing gloves can be more comfortable, and also shows your hands have toughened up. The only reason to be concerned one way or the other, assuming someone doesn’t whine about blisters and other minor nicks, is that as Gary notes it can kill you (or result in life-changing injuries in some cases). It most of the time WON’T result in those serious things, and so based solely on observed results, even over a whole season, shouldn’t be a big deal. But, increasing the probability of a very bad outcome by a small amount is enough to mean gloves should be worn.
I know that back in my day, it was actually a safety requirement to wear gloves while working, along the same lines of having your shirt sleeves down. I was always on my crew (I had some habitual offenders) to wear their gloves. I don’t know if that has changed, but with that kind of work, serious injuries to one’s hands is a very real danger and can seriously reduce the effectiveness of a firefighter on the line and lead to filling out a CA-1, which was really bad news for a supervisor back in my day.
Say…my last random thought has brought up another random thought. In addition to all of the other things I would like to know, I would like to know how many Granite Mountain Hotshots were found wearing their gloves?
According to the SAIR, 11 were found wearing gloves. Of the eight not indicated, five were found outside their shelters–with all that implies–so who can possibly know whether they were wearing gloves or not.
By the way, yesterday I discovered you videos on Youtube. I really appreciate them, and really really love this one:
“The Granite Mountain Hotshots”
http://youtu.be/ZBzZzn_AsLc
Just totally full of soul. Thank you.
Namaste
Thanks for the info. FYI – I don’t think leather gloves would have been entirely consumed by the fire even on those who were outside their shelters.
So…maybe we could mark that one down to a Lesson Learned from the Yarnell Hill Fire? Remind and reemphasize to all wildland firefighters to keep track of their gloves, wear their gloves, and have an extra pair of gloves in their fire shelters pouches?
I do think the evidence may lean in that direction.
I want everybody on this thread to watch that video. It’s why we’re all here.
Gary,
I agree with ALMOST all you said above. I am the one that made an issue of the sleeves thing. You said, “Nobody ever died from having the sleeves of their fire shirts rolled up on a fire.” That is correct in that the rolled up sleeves did NOT, in itself, result in their deaths. It was the ATTITUDE toward that safety measure that contributed in the long run, hence the ‘bad decisions with good outcomes.’
And the Ship Island Fire was only one guy that died, and ‘they’said it was because he couldn’t move his shelter around on the helispot/SZ they utilized. Never mind the fact that they stacked all the flubbin’ flammable gear, including gas, all around them.
I agree with almost everything you said, including the part about the shirt sleeves, I did not mean to imply that having your sleeves rolled up was not an indicator of having a poor attitude towards following the rules or thinking you were above the rules, I was only trying to add my example (with emphasis) to what you said about the shirt sleeves.
As far as the Ship Island fire goes, I am going to have to go back and research that further. I know you are right about piling the nylon packs and other things made of highly toxic and flammable things around them in an attempt to build a fire wall (bad idea) around them, but I think I am right about the gloves thing.
Are you saying not having their gloves with them was not a contributing factor or just not as important as the other things? And only one died?
There are other deployments where people without gloves had issues.
Yes, you are correct about the gloves thing on the Ship Island Fire. It WAS a contributing factor for the one that died. AND only one guy died that day because he did NOT have gloves to allow him to move around under the shelter due to the intense heat according to the SAIR. It was BECAUSE of that fire that we had to ensure ALL WFF had gloves at all times. They didn’t have to necessarily wear them, they just had to HAVE them
And you’ll be glad to know that I have carried an extra pair of gloves since you suggested it many moons ago. But they’re real gloves, not ‘oven mittens.’
Wow, I am glad to hear that. Is that from your own common sense, or did you ever hear anything about my employee suggestion.
And I think special gloves or oven mitts is over the top, but I do think everybody should carry extra gloves in their shelter pouches. I think it would be just too easy to lose one in what would be a very, very stressful situation when tunnel vision would be in full force and fine motor skills would be non-existent.
And I am quite sure it is from your own common sense, I don’t really expect anyone to have ever heard of my suggestion at this point.
Although I do give you full literary license to re-submit my idea as though it is for the first time, like I said, it was a Service Wide Award with a decent chunk of money. (You are still working right?)
my bad, I just re-read your post and I guess the rule did come from my employee suggestion. I am stunned.
It was from your employee suggestion because it just made good sense.
i carry an extra pair of gloves too! because i inevitably walk off to take care of some “business in the woods” or some other non-glove activity and set them down and walk off without them…
gary, not sure if you realize (or maybe it’s been covered already), but the “new generation fire shelters” now have left and right hand-holds for shaking your shelter out AND straps in the bottoms, attached to the corners, to help you hold your shelter down…
we’re very high tech about deployment these days… (that’s a joke for those without a sense of humor…)
No I did not know about the improvements in fire shelters, although I have seen photos of the smaller more manageable shape they come in now.
I know those who want better fire shelters mean well, but I know the MEDC people could built a fire shelter that would be better than those worn by oil well fire fighters that could survive anything, but as a former ground pounder who had to hump those and everything else up and down and then back up the mountains, I think it is a better idea to train wildland firefighters to stop working in front of and above uncontrolled wildfires.
Throw me a bone like Robert the Second did. Tell me you carry the extra gloves because of my employee suggestion, with a second, that can become my official legacy to my more than 3 decades of public service.
the new shelters are actually bigger AND heavier that the old ones… and i know you’re a pretty big guy, so you’d be carrying the XL version, even heavier yet…
i don’t want a new shelter either. no matter how much heat you make it withstand on the outside, the human body can only take so much heat on the inside…
and sorry, can’t say i ever heard about your suggestion… but by the looks of the pictures on your website, i’d say you had your fun serving the public…isn’t that enough?
Please see my post below regarding this subject.
i disagree gary… i think he is a fraudulent internet conspiracy theorist with an audience…
(and he did blatantly lie, there’s a few quotes up above to prove it… )
You always refuse to back down or admit you’re wrong. That is just one on the things I admire about you.
FullSail has flubbed several technical points, quoted Wiki without attribution, accused me of misattributing a quote to RTS that was plain as day from RTS… and distinguished himself overall with a very nonprofessional tone and bearing.
It is what it is.
and you continue to talk all sorts of nonsense without really providing any specific examples… so i guess we’re all stuck with the status quo…
Reply to Gary Olson on January 11, 2014 at 5:58 pm
>> Gary Olson said.
>> You always refuse to back down or admit you’re
>> wrong. That is just one on the things I admire
>> about you.
I guess you missed the attempted ‘apology’
somewhere up above.
That was weird.
Maybe he had just bumped his head on the
refrigerator door, or something.
Heck… we all do that sometimes.
I did not miss it, I was in shock. I felt like my world was upside down until I got to the place a few comments below where he retracted his apology, and then my world returned to a normal orientation. And in some strange way, I actually felt better.
wish there was a “like” button for your comment above…
Me too. Totally awesome.
Pretty good video clip below with some interesting, informative, and insightful comments especially by the fireline supervisors, many of whom are municipal/wildland FF’s.
The Fireline: Wildfire in Colorado.
Waldo Canyon, Black Forest and how wildfires are changing Colorado and the American West.
The Denver Post
http://www.denverpost.com/fireline/ci_24638312/watch-denver-post-documentary-fire-line
NV,
I posted this above so reposting it here.
“If you rerun the whole day 10 [times] 19 WFF fatalities is still at least close to high # you’ll get, even with the clusters elsewhere including the tennis court deployment sites that also have a Prescott association, though scarily maybe not the highest. But you’ll imo probably get at least a couple days where 10-30 residents got burned either in their cars or their homes, because evacuation was frigged. That’s right, on a bad day, maybe up to 30.”
WHAT the heck are you talking about here?
Definitely poorly expressed on my part.
Part of what makes a bad decision bad is the higher probability of a bad outcome, over time. Particularly in a case like the YHF where you have a complex situation and many bad decisions, it’s impossible to say whether all those decisions result in no harm, whatsoever, if everyone is really lucky; only the GM lookout getting entrapped (a very possible scenario, as discussed), or something that was probably less likely imo, namely what actually happened. You can have the same basic situation and replay it multiple times, and get very different outcomes each time.
In terms of cutting the evacuation as close as they did, I’d just say I think they were one bad traffic accident or something similar away from a real bad situation there. Where you have the combination of basically no mitigation on the part of many residents, and what given fuel and weather was fairly predictable fire behavior, one takeaway should be, evacuations are part of life and should be done earlier. In many parts of southern CA, people in rural areas more or less expect to be evacuated every 3-4 years, and that is with much better mitigation and related standards there.
I don’t understand, what is the mechanism you are using to “replay it multiple times”?
Like saying if Alabama and Auburn played 10 times, Alabama would win 9. But what actually happened was Auburn won. He is saying that day was like Auburn winning when it came to civilian evacuations. Remember, after it was over, they thought they might find dead bodies in Yarnell.
Mike says it better than me. Maybe not a 90% chance, but given how close things were cut, an unacceptably high chance.
You’re obviously not having a real wildfire multiple times with the same variables, though as noted in GMs case (and in the case of many other accidents) you can potentially see past bad in other fires.
You can simply make a deck of game cards, though, and in a crude way see the range of outcomes. E.g., the lookout: by the time McDonough was looking to deploy, maybe 25% chance of a imo nonsurvivable burnover, if Frisby or someone else hadn’t gotten him out of there? So 3 times out of 4 you have a war story, and only 1 in 4 do you have something that needs to be accounted for. So, even with the endangered lookout “card” being drawn, you may have to play multiple times for a bad outcome.
Take the “bushwhack” card: people can argue about what the probabilities are, but let’s say a one in 3 chance of a real scare, a one in two chance of being viewed in a very good light as the crew that showed initiative in trying to save homes, maybe a one in 10 chance of someone suffering a broken ankle or worse due to the fairly fast descent into the bowl. Basically, you could draw that card multiple times in a role-playing scenario before having a catastrophic outcome.
Because of the way one member of this comment thread has continually tried to distort things and shut down dialogue, let me make clear that by referring to card, I am not at all making light of the magnitude of what DID happen. I am simply saying that decision need to be analyzed not just by what DID happen, but by the range of possible results. The tennis court deployment site id’d elsewhere on the fire, for instance: some will say, well, everyone left that area without injury, so clearly that was a safe decision. But, given the fire and how things were cut, maybe one time in ten, maybe one time in 20, the “tennis court” card ends up really badly, too.
NV,
So it comes down to how you determine the probabilities?
I (think I) understand your whole concept of prior bad decisions argument and I see the value in it, its just that I don’t see a lot of hard evidence. Most of your examples are based on “rumored” situations. But I’m sure their is some social science research out there that deals with your concepts, maybe even some you have done??
Brings me back to the incident to close call to accident to fatality triangle that we use to teach in a safety course. for every # of incidences (exposures) there are close calls # so many close calls creates so many accidents (injuries) so many injuries equals 1 or more fatalities.
Wow. You ARE actually talking about probablities and chance here, like it’s a flubbin’ card game or something. Do I have that right?
If you fight fires with that kind of attitude then it’s only a matter of time before you or someone else dies.
Those kinds of FF’s are bad news and big time Watch Outs in my book.
That’s frankly a pretty emotional response, RTS. What do you suggest WFFs base decisions on, if not probabilities? Religious faith? A feeling? A view as to what will look best in the press?
If you don’t take probabilities into account, and instead just do what feels right, yes, THEN it is only a matter of time until someone dies.
The 10 and 18 are designed to greatly enhance the probability of a safe outcome (or, for the 18, alert you that risk increased so you can be more conservative in other ways).
NV,
“Emotional response”? You bet. Here’s another one for ya.
I TOTALLY base my WFF decisions on several things AND probabilities is MOST DEFINITELY NOT one of them.
I base my decisions on the WFF Rules, my faith in Jesus Christ as guidance, and ‘gut feelings’ based on experience mostly. I encourage WFF to heed their gut feelings and those of others. The WFF Rules, especially the Ten Standard Orders are analytically-based in a progressive manner. They begin with the weather, seeing the fire, actions based on current and expected fire behavior, ER and SZ, lookout(s), re-evaluation, communications, instructions, control, and THEN fight fire. Where do you find probability in the Orders, Watch Outs, LCES, or anywhere else? You don’t and won’t because they are NOT based on probability.
I guess we’re going to have to ‘agree to disagree’ then on this one.
That’s rather an incredible thing to say. The 10 and 18 aren’t based on probability? What, are they fashion-driven?
I’m not saying people should toss the 10 and 18 and simply go with their own individual assessment or own crew-based practices, at all. Far from it. But, the reason for the 10 and 18 is that they give a great chance, if you don’t like probability as a word, of a safe outcome.
The whole concept of past bad decisions with good outcomes, which you have mentioned repeatedly, is again a probabilistic concept. If you don’t understand that, then there is no way to adequately assess decisions with good outcomes to determine whether they were good decisions, or not.
NV,
Yes, “the 10 and 18 aren’t based on probability.”
I don’t believe in luck. Logic, yes. Probabilities, chance, and luck NO FRIGGIN” WAY!
agreed.
Perhaps without consciously quantifying, we weigh probabilities all the time. From determining drought indices, to gauging ERCs, to deciding whether to go direct or indirect, or when triaging after a lightning storm (which starts are likely to cause the most trouble, which are grouped together and easiest to access, which are likely to put themselves out, etc.).
It is not flippant to use game theory to consider probable outcomes, any more that war games and insurance assessments are flippant. We use them to minimize damage and protect lives and property in the future.
What IS egregious is when we break the rules that keep us alive, in real time, because we are in denial that we counting on a winning streak. What game theory helps us do is recognize how we play those odds subconsciously, and how they can bite us in the butt if we’re not self aware.
Wow you found the word I was looking for. Self Aware is following the 10 standard orders they are all speaking specifically to you and eliminates all other probability of out comes.
Well said. I completely agree. I guess that may be because my dad was the chief meteorologist for the entire atmospheric nuclear weapons testing program, with all that that implies. He was also an expert blackjack player. I was raised on probability thinking. You just nailed it. I can’t believe how people have dismissed it in this thread!
i am beginning to think that NV either works in a wildland fire vacuum or has never fought fire a day in his life.
either way, he should take his show to VEGAS!
FullSail, you’ve already been shown to be ignorant of several other basic points in this thread. If you don’t understand that bad decisions with good outcomes is something that requires an understanding of probability, get more educated.
and YOU continually show that written communication skills is not your best asset…
feel free to address any of your concerns about my ignorance. you know i’ll be calling you out about yours…
NV,
I consider myself fairly educated and I must say that I really “don’t understand that bad decisions with good outcomes is something that requires an understanding of probability.”
Probabilities MAY be involved, BUT they are NOT the cause or a main driving force.
Do you live your life based on probabilities? Do you figure the odds of making it to the store and back without getting into an accident? Or choking on some food at a restaraunt? Or any number ofother things?
RTS,
We pretty much all live our life that way. I left with the dog this morning. I locked the door when I did. Even though I live in a fairly safe neighborhood, I know that if I make it a practice to never lock my door, something bad is likely to happen sooner or later. I don’t know exact odds, and don’t need to, but do know that simply locking up helps, a lot. Kind of like wearing gloves.
Do I figure the odds of making it to the store and back? Well, again, any prudent driver does. I won’t drive to the store in an ice storm. How ’bout you, RTS? If it’s sleet and freezing rain on a narrow mountain road between you and the store, are you going to go balls to the wall and make the drive, or wait until you have a much higher chance of a safe trip?
Now let’s take a stupid teenager, who’s proud of making that drive on an icey road because they pulled it off. Or, a crew that just made a bushwhack and thinks they’re cool and pretty hot at structure protection. What makes both the things bad decisions with good outcomes is that, while the bad outcome didn’t bite them THAT time, experience shows that their actions carry a much higher probability of something bad over time.
NV,
I don’t consider any of it based on probabilities.I base them on ACTUAL circumstances, experience, training, and the like, but NOT a throw of the dice or pulling a card.
As I said before, we’re going to have to ‘agree to disagree’ because I just do NOT understand your logic on any of this.
I completely agree. I’m just going to copy/paste what I wrote upstream to Sitta:
Well said. I completely agree. I guess that may be because my dad was the chief meteorologist for the entire atmospheric nuclear weapons testing program, with all that that implies. He was also an expert blackjack player. I was raised on probability thinking. You just nailed it. I can’t believe how people have dismissed it in this thread!
Regarding the GMHS ATV incident –
It occured during the Halstead Complex in Idaho in July or August 2012 on the Salmon-Challis N.F. near friggin’ ice cold Stanley, Idaho. The fuels were mostly pine and mixed conifer with some brush understory and TONS of natural and mechanical slash. The terrain was fairly moderate down low and rose sharply after that. This incident occured lower in fairly moderate terrain.
GMHS (Marsh) and other HS Crews were SUPPOSED to be working indirect fireline for a firing operation along a flank of one of the fires in the complex. The fire activity had been fairly intense during the afternoons once the humidity dropped and the winds picked up. Intense runs with spotting about 1/2 mile or so. Fairly PREDICTABLE and fairly consistent in other words.
GMHS (Marsh) allegedly was NOT satisfied with the indirect straetgy and for a few days decided that he/they could go direct and pick up their piece of line. WRONG! The fire every day kicked their asses and ran them out. One day, they got their ATV “jammed in” somewhere as the fire behavior was increasing and had to make the choice bewtween saving the ATV and maybe getting burned themselves OR abandon the ATV and get out safely. They chose wisely and abandoned the ATV and it burned up.
This was revealed to me by “a Hot Shot” that was on the fire. I also was on the fire. “This Hot Shot” said that this was kind of “typical” for GMHS. I will NOT reveal who “this Hot Shot” is, nor what Region he works, nor what Crew he is on, so please don’t inquire.
I see this as leaning toward the “prior bad decsions with good outcomes” style which I (and others) felt was typical of the GMHS.
So, past record of privateering, in essence, along with past bad decisions. And what may well have been an escalating pattern of bad decisions, with what should have been warning signs ignored or even treated as battle scars.
By privateering,i mean simply actions on private initiative, maybe that wasn’t the right word really to use, let’s just say a past record that makes it less surprising they’d keep quiet or even be a bit disingenuous about what they were doing when they left the SZ at Yarnell.
I think ‘privateering’ describes it pretty well… but if you
really look at all the stuff that went on in Yarnell, as well,
between all the arguments with Collins, Marquez, etc.
etc… it’s pretty clear that despite his good ‘ol southern
boy profile… once Eric Marsh got an idea in his head…
watch out. He would quickly get testy and doesn’t
think he needs to listen to ANYBODY.
Gee… I wonder if we see evidence of that kind of
stubborn-mule mentality elsewhere in the WF
community like…Oh… I don’t know… people who
post to forums where there are non WFF people trying
to have a public discussion about an incident in Yarnell
and they just can’t tolerate those ‘non brothers’
having any opinions that might differ from theirs?
if i were mrs. marsh, i would consider suing you for defamation of character.
and, it’s not your opinions that bother me so much, cause we all know what “they” say about opinions, it’s the noose that you’ve been twirling around since you walked in the room…
but i think it’s already been established what you really are…
you’re right about one thing… most WFF’s are very passionate about what they do and some, like myself, have a low tolerance for unfounded, false allegations.
WTF?
Did I even mention Amanda Marsh?
locus standi
Look it up ( I know you will ).
Besides… I don’t know what planet you live
on but suggesting that someone can be
‘stubborn’ or ‘hard-headed’ ( even when
there IS, in fact, evidence to back it up )
is not ‘defamation of character’.
You can look that up too, while you are at it.
It’s now my turn to think something
is ‘hilarious’.
You… of all people… who wears stubborness
and hard-headedness as some kind of
badge of honor is trying to say that is
some kind of character ‘flaw’?
hilarious.
I would think you would be the kind of person
who just thinks that is always a ‘compliment’.
You don’t get it, do you?
If it turns out there were no ‘orders’ from
superiors that led to the decision to leave
the ‘safe black’ that day… and 2 employees
of the Prescott Fire Department led
17 employees right to their deaths…
…then the character, training and decision
making capabilities of both Eric Marsh and
Jesse Steed and their relation to this VERY
public and VERY tragic event are VERY
much going to be the center of any/all
pending lawsuits… as well they SHOULD be.
Sorry… that’s just the way it is.
oh yeah, and i think you should verify that the lawsuits you’re referring to include any decision beyond leaving the black… if even that one.
i am pretty sure that JD’s reporting talks about the lawsuits covering decisions made from the morning of transition up to around 4pm…
wait, what? i don’t get it? sorry, are you in a court of law here? is that what your delusional internet conspiracy mind thinks?
“If it turns out there were no ‘orders’ from superiors that led to the decision to leave the ‘safe black’ that day… and 2 employees of the Prescott Fire Department led 17 employees right to their deaths…”
YOU still don’t get it… even though you’re finally (and painfully slowly) beginning to understand that there isn’t some great conspiracy here… that it was just a horribly bad decision, with really good and admirable intentions, that led to their deaths.
you all really think that E. Marsh, in that moment, making that decision, was motivated by what the City Council thought? because i’ll tell you, from experience, that he wasn’t.
because ONE REASON that most of us do this job, is that when you are out on the line, with a fire in front of you and a task to do that you feel is a worthy one, all the other bull shit and drama in your life doesn’t matter… all that matters is doing hard work with a bunch of people that you deeply care for, regardless of the office drama or politics.
sorry bud, but YOU’RE the one who “doesn’t get it.”
If there was an order for the crew to move to Yarnell the perfect reason came up yesterday. The information on a discussion between Willis and Marsh earlier in the year concerning the future of the crew with the County commissioners. The crew needed to prove their usefulness to the County. By phone or Radio could Willis have mentioned that fact to Marsh? A investigative question no facts at this time but this could be the sleeping giant in why they moved from the black and a possible cause factor. I cant find the statement some one made it yesterday and caught my attention.
By 4:00 PM… it was a really, really bad day for the Prescott Fire
Department. Willis had been there since 11:30 the night before,
stayed up all night playing Co-IC with the increasingly burned out
Shumate, doing ALL of the structure protection prep-work for
the entire north side of the fire ( which they were sure was going
to be the hot zone come daylight ), and then calling Eric Marsh
circa 6:00 AM to 7:00 AM and telling him what his assignment
was going to be ( Sic: “We’ve got to get an anchor on this thing” )
before Marsh was even in Yarnell.
Willis was already BIG DOG on this fire. He even was the one
telling others what the ‘situation’ was as they arrived in Yarnell.
Then the day goes VERY badly.
His WF crew’s trucks almost get burned up.
His WF crew’s lookout has to be bailed and saved by someone
else ( and you KNOW that kind of thing gets around if you know
any WFF people ).
He almost kills people on the very front-line assignments he
is involved with.
Now evacuations.
Then he learns his entire Hotshot crew might be stuck in the
black and if the fire doesn’t pass by them before dark they
will stuck out there all night.
Not the finest ‘hours’ for the Prescott Fire Department, or
any kind of performance he wants to have to report back
to the City Council when he submits all the billing information.
Oh!… wait a minute… maybe there’s still a chance to make
this day come out better?
What if Granite Mountain gets written up in the papers for
having come in like the cavalry on a charge and suddenly
‘appears’ in Glen Ilah helping to ‘save people’.
That would help.
Hey Eric… what’s your comfort level on an idea I have?
It’s possible.
By the way… anyone seen all the photos of Darrell Willis
visiting all these fire stations on military installations
like Fort Meyers and being asked to ‘give talks’?
He’s on the ‘talk’ circuit now…and everywhere he goes he
hands out memorial coins and pins.
Not making it up. Google “Willis and Fort Meyers” or
“Willis military”.
In WTKTT’s comment above, he states:
“Then the day goes VERY badly.
His WF crew’s trucks almost get burned up.
His WF crew’s lookout has to be bailed and saved by someone
else ( and you KNOW that kind of thing gets around if you know
any WFF people ).”
This comment is given as a possibilty for Willis’ motivation, but whether Willis was involved or not, when taking Willis out of the equation, these very same thoughts were still echoing through the heads of Marsh and Steed all day, combined with the aforementioned knowledge, that only a few months before, they had burned up their ATV.
I think with the already waivering support from the City, burning up all their vehicles on a fire, would absolutely, be the end of the program. What we will never know, is if having that almost happen, rocked their world enough to cause more bad decisions later in the day, which ultimately ended their program anyway.
You are right to point out that even if Willis wasn’t
involved in any of the later-afternoon decision
making… the same exact ‘thoughts’ *might* have
been the motivating factors for Marsh/Steed.
It had been a VERY bad day.
A LOT of hard work… for NOTHING.
Have you LISTENED to the sound of Marsh’s
voice in the recently released Caldwell video
that captures him talking with ‘Abel’ circa 3:50 PM?
He doesn’t just sound totally disgusted.
He sounds really, really PISSED.
So how does a 43 year old guy who has just had
one of the only chances in his life to be BIG DOG
( DIVS A ) try to make a day that has gone to
crap (on his watch) turn out a little better and
make the post-fire reports look better to
the City Council that ‘owns’ his job?
( Insert educated guess ).
All of this is, remember, a week after they are LAUDED as heroes all over the place for having saved lots of homes and a seriously ancient juniper tree during the Doce Fire on their namesake, Granite Mountain. This crew has just proven itself, in the eyes of many in Prescott, and just maybe needs one more big win to prove to the Prescott City Council that they are deserving of a whole lot more support. Which, all things considered, I personally think they already should have been getting.
i definitely think it’s all this pressure, via the City Council, channeled thru Willis, that made Marsh think he should and could (remember the Air Attack announcement that the fire would reach Yarnell in one to two hours) send the crew down to Yarnell. But I don’t think he meant by the box canyon.
Damn.
are you really trying to turn this in to “Wildland Fire, Days of Our Lives?” maybe you’re hoping for a mini series on the Lifetime Network?
you do realize, that this was just another day in the middle of fire season, right? that stuff like this goes on all summer long, all over the western U.S.? that part of Eric Marsh’s job is to scout line and come up with tactics? that on a “normal” Division assignment Eric might have had up to 40 something resources to account for and miles of line to deal with? in terms of “Big Dog” assignments, this was kibble and to try to insinuate that he “was pissed” from clips of radio traffic is a pretty big leap.
we all get frustrated in WFF and people are often not on the same page, especially when plans are still in the development stage and fire behavior and tactics are changing, so stop over dramatizing the situation that day like it’s a TV drama just because it’s novel to you.
and FYI… when i was on a crew we would sometimes park the buggies and then dig line around them before we hiked in to our assignment. i am not saying that GM did that, but buggies get left in “the green” sometimes. you might question that decision in this case, but i don’t really think it’s appropriate to be putting so much emphasis on “they almost burnt up their buggies…” especially since BR was right there in the AM and asking another crew to bump (move) your buggies is no big deal.
WTKTT,
Willis allegedly said “We’ve got to get an anchor on this thing.”
No problem with that and that’s a must. Anchor points are a standard requirement on EVERY fire. That’s where you start. Some WFF add an “A” to LCES for “Anchor.” Watch Out Number 8 cautions you when you are constructing line WITHOUT a safe anchor point.
“Then he learns his entire Hotshot crew might be stuck in the
black and if the fire doesn’t pass by them before dark they
will stuck out there all night.” A little dramatic here. They would NOT have been “stuck out there all night.” They walked up there and they could’ve walked off just as easily. The BRHS said they could have walked the black all the way back to Yarnell.
Reply to RTS on January 11, 2014 at 1:01 pm
Re: Anchor point.
Copy that… but I think the point I was trying to make
is that Marsh heard that advice/suggestion/directive
from his BOSS, Darrell Willis, before he even got
to Yarnell to talk to the people who actually hired
him for work that day. Am I the only one who
thinks that’s a little odd? When does a Structure
Protection guy get to tell an entire Hotshot Crew
they should be ‘anchoring the fire’? ( Answer:
When he OWNS that Hotshot crew and he’s
already down there working that same fire and
playing BIG DOG ).
Re: Going coyote
We know NOW that the fire passed quickly and
they could have ‘walked the black’ all the way
back in the same way Trueheart Brown was
able to ‘break through’ from the east circa 5:20
and get all the way out where they were ( on
an ATV… but regardless ).
My point was… THEY ( and Darrell Willis ) were
not SURE they would be able to do that so
easily circa 4:00 PM. It *might* have stayed
hot down there until dusk/dark.
The helitack crew had spent the night out there
just the night before, but that was just because
they wanted someone to ‘watch’ the fire and they
had been ‘flown’ in anyway… so yea… these guys
would have not hestiated to walk DOWN since
they did, in fact, walk UP…
…but it’s all about the 4:00 PM decision making
and what they did ( or did NOT ) want to do
at THAT time. These guys were EXHAUSTED
before they even GOT there that day.
How do you know that “Marsh heard that advice/suggestion/directive
from his BOSS, Darrell Willis, before he even got
to Yarnell to talk to the people who actually hired
him for work that day”?
Hmm, I thought that at the time Willis told Marsh about needing to anchor the fire, it was Sunday morning, and Willis was working along side the exhausted IC (Shumate). In that case, it wouldn’t be so inappropriate for Willis to suggest or order such a non-controversial tactic. Granted, I really have little grasp of what the overhead looked like at 0800 on Sunday morning.
Re: Anchor point.
yes, IF Willis HAD said, “they should be ‘anchoring the fire’?” then that would just sound sort of dumb… because everyone knows that you should probably establish an anchor point…
but that’s NOT what he said, right?… that’s you changing the dialogue to better suit your agenda… again.
Re: “Going” coyote … that’s hilarious, thanks, i’m going to use that one, “going” coyote…
there is something called “residence time” in WFF… it pertains to fuel types and the amount of residual heat that a given fuel type might retain for ‘x’ number of minutes/hours. in brush and grass fuel types, that “residence time” is much shorter (as in a couple hours, max) than in a timber fuel type which could remain hot for a couple of days…
so i think you should change the phrase:
“We know NOW that the fire passed quickly and
they could have ‘walked the black’”
to:
“We [who are making bad assumptions and don’t have a clue what we’re talking about] know NOW is… yada-yada-yada… ad nauseum”
Thanks for that info, it is far worse than I did/or could have imagine it is.
If this is the sort of thing that determined tactics in the field, it blows my mind (and does make the case for political entities to not run hotshot crews). It would be a shame if Marsh allowed himself to be pressured like that – but he’s already paid with his life. Darrell Willis would still be awaiting his judgment. I am still agnostic as to whether this is what happened. But whatever happened, Willis should stop talking about it publicly. At this point his talking just seems self-serving.
Calvin stated it Jan. 10 “during a review between Willis and Marsh. If that is correct then the pressure on Marsh would be very serious, and could cloud his thinking to assist the county in house protection. And we are back to Willis again. In investigative terms to many roads are leading back to Willis to not merit more investigation. Something not right here.
RTS had mentioned the Aussie doctrine of Stay and defend, or Leave early. I definitely agree this is where the west needs to go. As regards Yarnell, due to the failure to mitigate, the emphasis would have had to have been on the leave early, though. While I’m not a resident of CA, there is increasing sympathy in many parts of CA for Stay and Defend as a doctrine — but only a couple officials willing to publicly say this. CA in those areas also has much more enlightened defensible space standards, codes, and other things in place to make this work.
Takeaways so far seem to be: training for no survivability = don’t deploy, stay on your feet and seek other options; beware the spontaneous bushwhack; defensible space — though more a general fire, code, insurance, homeowner social concern in that case; and, for the decisions earlier in the day, take the 10 and 18 seriously.
on January 8, 2014 at 11:34 pm Sitta said:
“I often find myself agreeing with Bob Powers’ assessments. Looking at the line of fire under the black smoke in the ~1600 photos, I can’t imagine why they’d move out of the black. I think that’s why many of us are still spending hours trying to figure this out, and why we are so dismayed with the SAIR, and why we *do* wish we could have jumped in and shaken them as they were making the decision to leave the black. As RTS said on January 7, this should have been a text book fire. We’re all trying to find evidence that would make sense of their decisions, but it’s difficult because most of us can’t imagine a context in which we’d be following GM’s actions. At the same time, we feel compelled to understand what happened in order to save future lives.”
Obviously, you must have missed my early epiphany where I stated that the primary casual factor in the Granite Mountain Hotshots (Marsh and Steed) disastrous decision to try and reach Yarnell was made because someone they could not say not to asked, suggested, ordered, them to get to Yarnell ASAP to help with the evacuations and engage in structure protection AND the structural fireman culturalization process they had been subjected to (although they were a wildland firefighting crew) caused them to place a higher value on the structures in Yarnell than other hotshot crews would have (I refer you to Chief Willis’ comments about laying down their lives in the military.com article, I don’t have to say anything more about the things Chief Willis has said or what he thinks, at this point, he had dug his own grave much deeper than it needed to be or I ever could have) overrode their own better judgment and prevented them from seeing how risky their maneuver was (once again, I refer you to Dr. Putnam’s article, The Collapse of decision making on Storm King Mountain).
And Bob said, “Then Marsh and Steed left the Black safety zone in a decision no other crew would have ever done leading them to there deaths. To go down in history as one of the most dumbest decisions ever made by a hot shot leadership. That’s all we are left with if there was no outside pressure for them to move. The motive to me is still elusive. If they really believed they could take a calculated risk and beet the fire to the ranch. That is what the SAIT should have said and let the cards fall.
Its hard for wildland fire fighters to accept that as fact with what we know. But if no other evidence surfaces we are stuck at this point. I am at a loss of words right now.”
Which I don’t think it will go down as “one” of the dumbest decisions ever made, I’m pretty sure it will go down as “THE” dumbest!
it should say “could not say NO to”
Gary,
You have a great perspective on the social factors that I lack. I have not worked on a hot shot crew, and only worked my first fire a little over a decade ago. I actually remember reading your early post because it was among the few observations that made any sense at the time.
There are many reasons, both nature- and nurture-related, that I actively avoid situations with absolutist leadership. Neither I, nor my leader, ever seem to do our best when I read them as super confident, having black/white certainty, incurious, godlike. I can’t trust them (and oh, I’ve been burned by the type), and they can’t trust me (I think they see curiosity in my eyes as rebellion, and I make them feel insecure).
While I sometimes wish for a more militaristic environment when I hear 20-year-olds whine about being bored, or hear some first-year spout that “they have to *earn* my respect” BS about their squad bosses, I’m honestly uncomfortable following a Mackey type. People around here had issues with his attitude before South Canyon happened. They could see he wouldn’t take input from anyone he considered Not a Superior (even locals who could have informed him on weather, fuels, and terrain). I’m not trying to knock the guy, as he was amazing in a multitude of ways. It’s just that my instinct tells me to worry about someone who is too self-assured to question themselves or take feedback.
All this is to say that I need reminding that there are functional subcultures out there that are very different from what I’ve chosen. Therefore, possibilities that seemed too crazy to consider may not be out of the realm of possibility. It’s hard for me to imagine breaking most of the Standard Orders. Or to be told by a supervisor to “hunker down and be safe,” and instead go on the move without notifying him. It’s hard to imagine doing things that ought to scream against every instinct. To put other lives in jeopardy. And just because my superior told me to. I suppose I’m too individualistic, or critical, to endure the training that prepares a person to do that.
So while this theoretical circumstance seems fundamentally insane to someone like myself, I have to remember that the culture behind it led to success and accolades in the past.
Truly, we don’t have many alternative theories.
Thank you for your kind words Sitta. If you have many read very many of my posts, you might have trouble knowing when I am being serious and when I am saying something tongue-in-cheek because of my dry and sometimes borderline sarcastic sense of humor (or not). I was only joking about you “obviously” missing my earlier comment.
You are “obviously” a highly intelligent, motivated, intuitive, and dedicated wildland firefighter. I sincerely wish you the very best in your career, I believe you will do very well. They need people like you.
Ha ha! Yeah, I’m admittedly deficient in reading tones, even in real life. But I took absolutely no offense to the “obviously.” Since I’ve been lurking on the forum for months before posting, I just figured I’m still an unknown quantity here, and you had reminded me of something important that you stated earlier.
Gone for a week, eh? Unless you’re a fast reader, it must’ve taken half a day to get caught up here….
I don’t sleep much, I can’t shut my mind off, the only thing worse than being retired would be to still be working.
To xxfullsailxx: You have really evolved in the week I was gone. You have graduated to some really serious name calling regarding our principle investigator (and I said IF this was major league baseball he would be a superstar, which I think he is), as he is right about most things, we have to draw conclusions based on the best evidence we have, the SAIT didn’t leave us any choice.
You look for false conclusions with everything he says and where there are none. And you know how valuable I think your service is to this thread as our loyal opposition. I just think you should reign in the venom towards WTKTT, he has been called on a couple of the wild tangents he started to go down, government conspiracy etc., and he put it in check.
Almost all of us have gone on tangents, because this is an emotional event. Nobody was prepared to lose an entire hotshot crew this way…or any way. Let me give you the bottom line…if WTKTT stops doing what he is doing (and we need Elizabeth too), I think this thread will dry up and blow away, and who will that benefit? I mean, I’m just sayin’…
hey gary! thanks so much for bringing this up…
government conspiracy eh? i missed that! that certainly puts things in perspective for me… you know, there have been times when i’ve thought to myself, “well, what if WTKTT is a family member of one of the 19… ” would that justify (for me) his persistent need to assign blame to someone?… would that explain his constant need to try to save the crew post-mortem with false hypotheticals? … it would certainly explain his obsessive compulsion and seemingly sudden fanatical interest in WFF…
BUT… his constant false allegations, his lack of comprehension about basic wildland fire concepts, the incessant need to make himself sound smart on the internet as well as the need for an audience (both of which inherently lead to his continually evolving god complex) do seem to coincide more with an internet conspiracy theorist than a grieving family member.
thanks again. i do appreciate your perspective.
Reply to Marti Reed post on January 10, 2014 at 9:37 pm
>> Marti said…
>> And PS. I’m still trying to create a narrative of the chain of possession of
>> Christopher MacKenzie’s Canon Powershot Camera. It was practically at
>> the center of the deployment site, it was seen and photographed many
>> times, including in between two numbered evidenced radios, and yet it
>> was never numbered or included in the official tally of personal items or
>> anything. Since you have a better ability to keep these details in you head
>> and/or some probably AWESOME timelines around you, can you briefly
>> remind me of who got the Powershot when and what they did with it?
>> That would save me a whole lot of time picking my way through past threads.
>> Thank You!
Marti…
The ‘story’ about how that MacKenzie camera was found and how the images
and videos surfaced only first came to light when the SAIR report was released.
The SAIT had them all the time but they were coordinating their own ‘media
event’ with the Arizona Republic for September 28, 2013, and didn’t want them
surfacing until the moment the report was made public.
That ‘original’ announcement about even the existence of Christopher’s
photos and videos ( and how they supposedly got all the way to the Arizona
Republic for publication ) is here…
http://dcourier.com/main.asp?SectionID=1&ArticleID=123720
It says that someone from the MEDICAL EXAMINER’S office is the one who first
delivered the camera to Christopher’s father, Mike MacKenzie. Then his
stepdaughter put the SD card in her computer and basically said “Wow… look
at what’s on here!”.
Then ( supposedly ) Mike made a CD of what was on the SD card and simply
handed that to Darrell Willis at one of the funerals.
I still don’t buy it.
As you have been seeing with your own eyes… that camera was STILL THERE
at the deployment site long after anything that had ever gone to the medical
examiner’s office had already gone there or was even ever going to go there.
Besides… that’s not what ME people do… especially not when there are other
agencies involved like Fire or Police departments and its ‘one of their own’.
The AZREPULIC then (recently) accidentally published one of their own copies
of the MacKenzie photos that still had both the original metadata in it… AND
some ‘notes’ they added of their own when it entered their PhotoShop
image management system.
The one they ‘accidentally’ published as a background image for their
article that still had all the metadata in it ( plus their own added notes )
was the MacKenzie IMG_0889, one of the two still images he took
in-between the two videos while at the 4:00 PM ‘at rest’ location on the ridge.
Here are the AZREPUBLIC ‘notes’ that were revealed in that metadata…
File Number: 110-0889
Image Unique ID: 2548ca774be0ab5a80114ba41729a3e5
Caption Writer: ps
Title: Yarnell Reconstruction
Subject: Yarnell Reconstruction
Description: Yarnell Reconstruction
Christopher MacKenzie took these photos and videos of the Doce and
Yarnell Hill fires. It appears the earliest photos date to June 18, 2013.
Some files have modification dates after June 30 which might be attributed
to file transfer dates. Chris’ father, Mike, provided these to Chief Darrell Willis
who gave them to Randy Okon, member of the Accident Investigation Team.
Photos by Christopher MacKenzie
Notice that the ‘hand-off’ between Mike MacKenzie and Darrell Willis is
confirmed…. but we now also learn that Willis had the ‘chain of possession’
for a while until he handed the CD to Randy Okon of the SAIT.
Also notice there is no mention in the AZREPUBLIC notes about anyone
from the MEDICAL EXAMINER’S office being involved… even though that’s
what they ended up saying in their own story when they got around
to finally publishing the stuff.
So the ‘chain of possession’ and/or ‘chain of evidence’ on this Canon
Powershot is really still a complete mystery.
How did it get from where you are seeing it lying on the ground… into
the hands of Christopher’s father?
Who else had it BEFORE that happened?
Is there actually still a chance there were items on that original SD card
( more photos or even more video/audio? ) with a Canon filestamp higher
than 0891?
We still do NOT KNOW.
The YCSO police (apparently?) never entered it into evidence.
It went straight into the hands of Family, Prescott Fire Chief Darrell Willis,
then Arizona Forestry SAIT people (Okon?)… and then the Arizona Republic
newspaper… but we still don’t even know exactly HOW all that went down.
Thank you! I don’t buy anything that says the ME office was in the authorized chain of evidence or possession. See below what I wrote. Something smells here.
Well…I have been gone for almost a week and I know most, if not all of you, have been worried about my absence. Thank you. I have found that missing even one day can mean a lot of catching up, much less almost an entire week.
Elizabeth said, “DING DING DING. Bob Powers gets the prize today for his comment, stating: “[on my crews,] we always had a foreman or asst. assigned as the ‘what if guy.’”
And concluded by saying,
“So, the fact that Bob Powers is telling me that he used to DESIGNATE a “what if guy/gal” on his firefighting teams makes me very very happy. I wish I could convince more boards to do exactly this…. This just confirms that Bob is smarter than most of the world.”
I have always been at odds (complete odds) with Elizabeth on this issue. I respect Bob but…we were raised differently on different hotshot crews. And therefore, using Elizabeth’s logic and standards she would say about me, “This just confirms that GARY is DUMBER than most of the world.”
Which I am okay with, since I am not responsible for a hotshot crew anymore, in fact, I’m not really responsible for anything (except for my own actions) anymore.
When I first started speaking out, I thought I was the only alternative to Darrell Willis’ version of reality, but as it turns out, there was a lot of us speaking out, so now my version no longer matters nearly as much as I thought it did when I was afraid everyone (in the general population) would just swallow Mr. Willis’ line of BS…hook, line and sinker. Now…I’m not sure where we are at, but wherever it is…I don’t think anyone is now accepting his version of events…which is a good thing.
I will however, state for the record, how I think things should be run on a hotshot crew…and if that is not how it is, or how it should be…than so be it. There were 3 crew bosses on the Happy Jack Hotshots from when the crew was founded to when it was in effect abolished and the “slot” and the corresponding funding was reprogrammed from the Coconino National Forest to the Santa Fe National Forest. The Coconino had four hotshot crews (they still have three) and the Santa Fe wanted one, and our barracks was left over from a WWII American Japanese interment camp and had been condemned by the county as unfit for human habitation (BS, what did they know?). I was the last one crew boss and I worked under the other two.
For better or for worse, the second crew boss ran the crew like the first crew boss did, and I ran the crew like both of the others did. At least 3 of the subsequent crew boss’ of the Santa Fe Hotshots ran the crew like I did, since they were “raised” on my crew, just as I was raised from an FNG on Happy Jack crew.
To my knowledge, ALL hotshots crews from the Coconino operated the same way…since we were all crews operating under our…I say famous, others say infamous…but legendary in anybody’s book…principle fire god…BILL BUCK! FYI…Bill brought the word “military” (Marine Corps) to the term “quasi-military”! In other words, there was no “quasi” in Bill’s thinking.
And I think I can sum up that way with just a few words, that I have already used in earlier comments, but I will repeat them here once again. The best way to run a hotshot crew it to select a natural leader, (who others will follow) who has the most experience, training, leadership skills, common sense (as opposed to IQ, but a high IQ would not disqualify you), determination, self confidence (bordering on hubris), command presence, loyalty to the crew (willingness to ride for the brand, come hell or high water) etc. etc. etc., and then you do as much as you can to reinforce and build upon all of those characteristics and traits with more training…more of everything you can squeeze into them…and then you give them 100 percent authority AND MOST IMPORTANTLY, 100 percent of the responsibility to bring the crew home, after getting the maximum fire fighting efforts possible out of that combination of 19 other individuals who all have 100 percent confidence in that leader (anyone who does not, does not stay on the crew for very long, one way or the other).
This is so that when the time comes, (not IF but WHEN) the crew boss says “Today is Easter”, even if the calendar says it is not…all of the other individuals on the crew immediately start looking for Easter eggs, because if they don’t…they die.
There is no discussion, there is no “what if guy”, there is no committee, there are no alternatives, there are no options, there is no voting, there is no consensus, there is no agreement, there is no individualism, there are no “second opinions”…there is just doing…and I mean RIGHT NOW, IF NOT SOONER!
Now that system may not produce the best possible outcome 100 percent of the time, but I believe it will produce the best results more consistently than any other method.
Now IF there is time…of course that same leader consults with those on the crew whose judgment he trusts who have similar backgrounds, training etc., AND that same authority is passed on down to the very lowest level, so that if two crewmen find themselves alone…than the person who best fits the description of the leader I described at the beginning takes charge, just as the crew boss would be in charge.
The idea of standing around for any amount of time and playing the Devils Advocate with your crew boss would be inconceivable to me…all that would tell me is that crew doesn’t know WHAT THE **** HE/SHE IS DOING…WE NEED A NEW CREW BOSS ASAP…OH ****…WE ARE GOING TO DIE!
And the lack of confidence in one’s leaders can really lead to serious problems in serious situations…in that case…you run the risk of having 20 opinions and have the crew go in 20 different directions based on 20 different peoples perception of what they should do.
I suggest you read Fire On The Mountain by John Maclean. And in that scenario…there was only confusion about whether the local BLM firefighter or the Jumper-In-Charge was running the fire as IC…so 14 firefighters died. The leadership role was only going back of forth between 2 guys…not 20 for cryin’ out loud…that is so inconceivable to me…I can’t get past it.
I mean…if this ASAIT can’t even agree on something that BASIC…that FUNDAMENTAL…well then?
The point is this…just think about how Elizabeth thinks a hotshot crew should be run…and I think it should be exactly the opposite, and everybody knows how glad I am that you are contributing to this thread, Elizabeth, I just happen to think you are completely wrong on this issue…and if I am wrong…so be it.
So…to all of the current and former hotshots out there who are following this discussion from the shadows…how are things run now, or were they run, on your crew? Have things changed that dramatically…or were we (The Mighty Coconino) just completely wrong in the first place?
Please weigh in.
And I also should have said in my case in particular, I was already the Senior Squad Boss (squad I of 2) which in my day meant I was the Assistant Superintendent or what they call Captain now.
Which meant “they” already thought I met the criteria to be the acting crew boss in the absence of our crew boss. There was a chain-of-command, and on the Coconino, it was strictly adhered to as gospel in my day, which went with me to Santa Fe.
By all accounts, that is how Granite Mountain was run, I think? And everybody makes mistakes at work, that is not the fault of the system, and does not mean that overall, based on the law of averages, that is not the best system.
I believe that what happened on the Yarnell Hill Fire to the Granite Mountain Hotshots was a “one-off” for them, an anomaly, an aberration. I thought we were just looking for the casual factors in that really, really, really horrific one-off, which (in my humble opinion) I think I nailed on day one, and everything I have read so far on this thread has simply reinforced my belief that I am right.
On a side note, what crew were you with Bob?
Gary– I was asst. supt. on Oak Grove Hot Shots Angeles N.F. 1972 to Early 1974, Also served on details to Chalio HS as relief foreman and a 3 month detail to Oak Grove in 1970 as a foreman under Larry Boggs. While Asst. Forest FMO on the Sawtooth NF I helped train the Sawtooth IR crew and served as a Superintendent detailed on a few occasions. Side note RTS was on Oak Grove As a crewman in1973. I retired in 1994 33 years in wild land fire. Thanks for asking– The Hot Shots were some of the best memories of my carrier.
Right on, thank you.
What I meant to say is that you have some very impressive wildland firefighting credentials that very few people can match.
Gary, Bob, and Robert — thank you for being active in this discussion. I’ve learned a lot from all of you. I expected that a lot of us have seen and made mistakes (I’ve sometimes flashed to the thought, “Oh geez, what would this look like in the report…”). On the other hand, I’d studied a lot of SAIRs in the past few years, having no idea that cover ups were occurring. That’s a real eye opener. I suspected that in some places, “pushing the envelope” would not only be encouraged, but expected if one wanted to move up in the ranks. I had no proof, just a gut feeling that unnerved me (what can I say? I’m pretty risk averse in general life). Thank you for being so open with your experiences. Whatever comes of this particular investigation and discussion, I’m sure there are many readers who are becoming a bit wiser along with me.
I do not believe you were wrong as I saw many different forms of leadership. You may have missed my meaning. The go to guy on Oak Grove was me the Asst. There was never any long discussions and very few with the Supt. He was a Good FF. The rest of the crew was not involved. We just slightly differed from your form of leadership.
I agree they were different styles, as I ‘m sure there are many different styles. And for the record, your style is/was better than my style and should be the default style. I’m not saying I/we were right, I’m just saying it mostly worked out, most of the time. With the most notable exception being the Battlement Creek Fire.
Not that it matters, but I am NOT saying that the empirical research would suggest that Hotshot crews need to sit around and debate everything or vote on everything. Go back and re-read what I posted, Gary.
And, friend, FYI, more than one plane crash – of the type that kills every single person on-board – has occurred b/c the pilot had the sort of attitude that you are suggesting (e.g. “If I say it is Easter, you need to immediately start looking for eggs”). Show me a man who says he is immune to making bad decisions (particularly when deprived of sleep and in a high-stress situation), and I will show you a liar or a man who is delusional.
Also, xxfullsailxx, thank you for the link sometime yesterday, for the Reviews and Investigrations PDF link. That helped me get a bit of a bead on some kind of structure of what a Serious Accident Investigation Report is supposed to include. It’s still a bit too general to tell me if a SAIR should include a more detailed description/map of something as serious as a 19-person deployment site, but at least it’s an “anchor point.”
I have a request. I’m still working on a description of the deployment site investigation. I discovered, unexpectedly, a CHAINSAW yesterday in between two fire shelters. I’m trying to figure out who it was connected to. I have no idea, other than from some comments on a Facebook site and some photos I found today of Wade Ward (whose body was found nowhere near the chainsaw) with a chainsaw on the Doce fire, who were “in command” of the chainsaws used on this fire. Does anybody know how I would go about finding this information? If you can, I’d really appreciate it!!
Marti,
Regarding the chainsaws, I’m thinking you mean Wade Parker, right? Wade Ward is the Public (Dis)information Officer for the PFD.
Ooops! Yes, I mean Wade Parker. I have NO idea why I made that mistake!!! Brain overload!
from the SAIR:
Dustin Deford #15 … “The burned remnants of a chain saw were next to the right side of the firefighter.”
the SAIR reports that three saws were found 20-40 feet to the south east of the deployment site. one saw was left within the deployment site… the one near Dustin, who was also wearing chaps…
and watch out… calvin may try to argue that the SAIR inconsistently counts up to 6? saws… but it’s not his fault. they do some funny math where he comes from.
Got it. Thank you!
Phoenix New Times August 22 Dougherty…..Willis told Marsh in the May review that the city “as a whole is evaluating our performance” and the “Division’s future is in our hands.” The City Council, as recently as 2012, was considering eliminating the crew, according to records in Willis’ personnel file.
In addition, two more things from the FOIA/FOIL Qualifications materials:
1. *JUST* before the Yarnell Hill Fire, Willis put in Steed’s name for some type of higher certification or promotion or something. Obviously that was putting pressure on Steed to make Willis happy.
2. In Marsh’s performance file, there were multiple comments making clear that Willis wanted Marsh to be more… accountable to Willis. The relationship between Marsh and Willis that was documented in that personnel file makes clear that Marsh had to answer to Willis. No question about it.
I am NOT saying that Willis ordered Marsh or Steed to move to Yarnell or the Holmes Ranch, mind you. I mean that sincerely. The only point that I am making is that the personnel documentation makes evident Willis’s authority (in a larger sense) over Steed and Marsh.
Do you use Dropbox? I’d love to see what you’re talking about.
1. we all work on qualifications ALL THE TIME, every year we are working on something… i.e. i am currently working on a TFLD taskbook, but it doesn’t really influence HOW i do or view my job… i would imagine that Willis was their training officer as well, responsible for submitting their completed taskbooks to a red-card committee and giving the final signature…
2. Willis was Marsh’s boss, what else would you expect?
Many, many avenues, still need to be thoroughly investigated, both on this site, and if necessary, through the courts, to get the truth out into the open.
While there is plenty of blame to go around for the crew themselves and others, along with missed opportunities to stop the tragedy by many not even directly responsible, I have been wondering lately about if there were any, key, irreversible, turning points over the course of the whole incident. At this point in time, after reading over a couple thousand comments on here, along with the published reports and other information available, I can think of only two.
The first, and most obvious, AND the last point in time when the crew could have been saved, was when they made the decision to step off of the two-track, and head down into the bowl. I don’t think I need to go into that any further.
The only other one I can think of, and it DOES NOT provide a direct cause for the entrapment, BUT the chaos caused by it certainly set the stage, was the decision to call for the AZ State Type II Short Team, instead of a full-blown, National Type II Team.
There have been many comments on here about how the State of Arizona likes to do things on the cheap. I think anyone who lives in Arizona can vouch for that, whether we’re talking fires, schools, mental health, and so on.
It certainly looks like they wanted to save money by keeping resource and manpower costs down, and I can think of no other reason why, if they NEEDED a Type II TEAM, they wouldn’t have called for a FULL team. Lo and behold, the fire was in the CWZ Type II Team’s area, AND THEY WERE AVAILABLE, AND SOME OF THEIR PEOPLE WERE ALREADY ON THE FIRE, AND MANY OF THE REST OF THE PEOPLE ON THE TEAM LIVED NOT FAR AWAY.
Correct me if I’m wrong, but most national IMT’s have an automatic resource order that get’s triggered on a call out, specifying a minimum amount of shot crews , etc, that get ordered with the team. Plus, they come in with a full compliment of Div Sups, Safety Officers, and Command Staff. It’s sad, not funny, that a lot of that shit DIDN’T happen when the State’s nickle and dime Type II Short Crew got called up. They showed-up with swiss cheeze that had been shot thru and thru with a 44 magnum.
If CWZ Team had been called up instead, almost all of those needs would have been addresed early in the morning, as many of the team members lived in the county.
In his interview, Roy Hall said he didn’t call for a full Type II Team because he didn’t have any faith in the ROSS ordering system. How’s that whole thing workin’ out for ya Roy?? Then he turns around, and starts making personal phone calls to members of the CWZ Team to try and fill the drastic holes in his own short team. In the end, he ends up getting a bunch of CWZ Team members to come to the scene, but ultimately, to late to save any lives.
It would have been one thing if the short team had at least had their command staff, safety officers, and div sups covered, but they didn’t even have that. In addition, their ‘Safety Officer’ was going t be 14 or 17 hours late, or whatever, but that’s not a critical position we need to worry about is it?
The reason I have listed this as the second, irreversible turning point, is because after the decision to go with the short team was made, they spent the entire rest of the time up until entrapment trying to fix it, and they were NEVER able to get it done in time.
Reply to TTWARE post on January 10, 2014 at 9:05 pm.
>> TTWARE said
>>
>> Many, many avenues, still need to be thoroughly investigated,
>> both on this site, and if necessary, through the courts, to
>> get the truth out into the open.
Sadly… yes.
>> TTWARE also said…
>> In his interview, Roy Hall said he didn’t call for a full Type II
>> Team because he didn’t have any faith in the ROSS ordering
>> system. How’s that whole thing workin’ out for ya Roy??
>> Then he turns around, and starts making personal phone
>> calls to members of the CWZ Team to try and fill the drastic
>> holes in his own short team. In the end, he ends up getting a
>> bunch of CWZ Team members to come to the scene, but
>> ultimately, too late to save any lives.
Well… by 11:00 AM the next day he was certainly seeing what
a bad decision that all was.
I’m sure you’ve seen the following ( from his interview with
SAIT investigators )… but it shows him frantically trying to
upgrade to ‘full Type II’ just shortly after he even GOT there…
but when asked right there circa 11:00 AM “How can you be sure
it isn’t a Type 1 already?” Hall just blew that off because he said
he just didn’t have time for “the Computer stuff”.
But sure enough… 120 minutes later he’s ordering the Type 1
team, anyway. Another (confusing) 2 hours lost.
YIN page 30 – SAIT Interview with Roy Hall – 7/8/2013 – 10:30 a.m.
Interviewers: Jay Kurth, John Phipps, Mike Dudley, Jimmy Rocha
Hall: You understand who I am:
1985 Butte Fire training video….that is who I am.
11:00 Placed a call to David Geyer to go forward with the Central
West Type 2 team full blown order. Received a report that the fire
was traveling at 10-15 chains and flame lengths were 10-15 ft.
11:10 Called Jim Downey and strongly urged him to order the
type 2 team. His comment back “how do you know it’s not a type
one incident?” and requested that I do a complexity analysis. I
responded that I was too busy to do that computer stuff and if he
wanted to send it over, I would go over it with him.
12:05 Gathered Command in General Staff for stand up.
Buckhorn ( Road, Peeples Valley ) evacuation had started.
Asked Musser about feelings of help.
Paul Musser said “still type 2, we are alright”.
13:00 Received PDF of complex analysis.
Went over it 8 yes, 12 no and several N/A.
5 minutes after that the Type 1 team was ordered.
>> TTWARE also said…
>> I have been wondering lately about if there were any, key,
>> irreversible, turning points over the course of the whole incident.
I don’t disagree with your analysis above at all… I think it’s spot
on… but there are still a LOT of people who still think that the
‘irreversible’ sequence of events started Friday night, and
then again on Saturday. Sunday was the real circus… but the
circus parade started the Friday before. That is, in fact, what a
WHOLE bunch of lawyers are going to be arguing quite soon on
behalf of a lot of residents of that area.
I was just about to post the following transcript down below
because it answers some questions above about people trying
to figure out why ‘the Sunday plan’ didn’t work… or what could
have been done differently… but it also fits good here as far as
one very experienced firefighter giving his opinion on the
‘irreversible moment(s)’ you are (now) asking about here.
This is that interview with former Yarnell Fire Chief Peter
Andersen where he talks about those ‘roads’ that Granite
Mountain and Blue Ridge were trying so frantically to ‘tie
together’ somehow out there on Sunday.
They were originally ‘pushed out’ as part of a defensive plan
for Yarnell and Glen Ilah… but only as ‘escape routes’. They
were NEVER meant to be used as ‘fire breaks’.
If that really was ‘the plan’… then they were a day late and
more than a dollar ( and a LOT more crews ) short, according
to Chief Andersen.
The following story and videos were produced and reported by
InvestigativeMEDIA and appeared in the Phoenix New Times
and contains the interview with Chief Peter Andersen.
Yarnell Hill Fire Investigation Ignored Major Mistakes by the State
By John Dougherty
Published Wed., Oct. 16 2013 at 12:00 PM
http://www.investigativemedia.com/yarnell-hill-fire-investigation-ignored-major-mistakes-by-the-state/
NOTE: There is also a link to the same story at the bottom of this
page in Mr. Dougherty’s articles section.
The video interview with Chief Peter Andersen is contained in
the article as well as some quotes from it… but I haven’t ever
seen a full transcript of that interview… so here it is now for
the first time… and for future reference.
Andersen was the Fire Chief in Yarnell for a full 12 years.
He resigned just 3 years ago, in 2011, but still lives on Lakewood
Drive in the Glen Ilah district, with a clear view of the Ranch House
Restaurant from his house.
The interview took place on his front porch in Glen Ilah, following
the actual release of the SAIR report, which he also has some
choice comments about.
* START OF VIDEO INTERVIEW WITH CHIEF ANDERSEN
Q: Was the State totally aware of the volatile situation here?
Absolutely.
Q: Did you talk to them personally… here?
Ahm… one of the supervisors for the State, on Fri… Saturday
night when I went up to the fire station… had formerly been a
guard ( Andersen makes quote marks in the air with his fingers
for the next word ) “firefighter” on a prison crew… and then he
wanted to get outta the DOC part… so we hired him here as a
firefighter/EMT. So he was on my department for maybe six
months or longer. Knew him very well. He KNOWS this area.
He KNOWS what this area is all about and the fire danger here.
Q: Who was that?
That was Phil Brullio.
Q: Did you feel like there was sense of urgency.
( Immediately and with emphasis ) NO.
Q: Did you feel like they just wanted to let it burn?
Yea… actually. I did.
Q: Describe that… why did you think they just wanted to let it burn?
Because I told several of the people that our prevailing winds up
here come from the southwest, typically, and they don’t start up
in the morning until between 8:00 and 9:00 o’clock. I said… this
being summertime… that’ll give you three hours free without wind
at your backs to be able to get this thing under control.
My wife and I come out here and have our coffee in the morning.
We’re out here from maybe 6:45 or 7:00 o’clock… and…
At 8:03 Granite Mountain Hotshots’ two buggies went by.
Right after they went by… the leaves started to blow.
I just shook my head.
They ( the State ) didn’t listen to me.
Q: They got here too late?
Too LITTLE, too late.
They got dozers out there… ah…
We built an emergency escape route for Yarnell in case there
was a burnout like this and people were unable to get out.
We had an emergency escape route for either Yarnell to get out
through Glen Ilah or Glen Ilah to get out through Yarnell…
and it was back there… well… it went through that area below
the Shrine… west of the Shrine… and they had dozers back
there widening that so that it would create a fire break.
Too little, too LATE, man.
You shoulda been done doin’ all that Saturday morning.
If they didn’t get that thing out Friday night… which… in my mind
there’s NO reason for that to have not… not been put out.
BLM station down here… the Weaver Mountain station… has
a helicopter. It was there.
When we went to… ah… my wife and I went to Wickenberg at
about… maybe 11 o’clock on Saturday. At the bottom of the hill at
an antique store was where we found out that there’d been a
fire… and… as we drove by the BLM station I saw this helicopter
sittin’ there.
They have a 300 gallon Bambi bucket.
They’ve been given permission to draw out of Hidden Springs
Horse Ranch. They have a horshoe shaped lake that they use
for training… er.. fer ah… like trainin’ their thoroughbreds and
stuff… and… uh… Patrick Barnard has given ’em permission to
draw out of his pond…
…and nobody did.
Q: So they coulda used a chopper to get people up Friday night
or early Saturday morning?
They could have DRIVEN to that on Friday night.
And they weren’t doing anything on Saturday.
They were watching it.
And it was… COOKING.
I mean… the whole ridge.
That’s the reason I went to the Fire Station when I came back
from Prescott. I didn’t come home.
I went to the Fire Station and I said… WHAT… IS… UP???
You TOLD me this afternoon that you guys were on this… that
you had it under control. I said this is… this thing’s over 500
acres now. It’s huge.
Q: By Saturday afternoon?
Saturday afternoon… when we WENT to Prescott… we could
see a column of smoke… and I’d been told in Pres… in Congress
that they’d gotten it OUT Friday night.
So I broke out my cellphone and I called Bruce Olson.
I didn’t know Bruce was on the fire but I knew Bruce was this
area’s BLM guy. Turned out he WAS on the fire… and he told me
“Well… ya know we’ve got it under control, we’re watchin’ it,
we’re keepin’ it… ”
They… they had crews up there on Saturday afternoon
doing somethin’. ??
Course.. it was ineffective… but…
Without AIR in an area like this…you might as well get out
there and piss on it.
Course… that woulda been better than what they were doin’.
Q: So when you read the report and you see ’em talk about
nobody did anything wrong… yet the wildfire rules are pretty
clear about certain things you’re supposed to do.
Right.
Q: Among ’em the LCES… Lookout, Communications,
Escape, Safety Zone…
And where was their lookout?
I guess he was up here at the Ranch House.
( He gestures across the street to the Ranch House Restaurant ).
Q: And no communications for 30 minutes…
Right.
Q: Their escape route was through thick chaparral…
In a BOX canyon? ( Shakes his head in disbelief ).
I mean… anybody that’s EVER taken a wildland class is
WARNED about box canyons… and the chimney effect.
I mean… you might as well be standing in a fireplace…
with the flue OPEN.
( Long pause )
It was tragic.
It really was… ‘cus they shouldn’t have been there.
( About the SAIR report )…
Pat everybody on the back and whitewash any…
There was NO wrongdoing on anybody’s part as far as
that report went.
“Well… we’re not here to point fingers”.
Well… what ARE you here for?
You’re investigators.
Investigators are SUPPOSED to INVESTIGATE.
They’re SUPPOSED to point fingers.
They’re supposed to say… “Hey… WHAT IF this had happened?”
They never said any “What ifs?”.
Well.. WHAT IF they had gotten on that fire Friday night?
* END OF VIDEO INTERVIEW WITH CHIEF ANDERSEN
WTKTT,
There is a lot of valid speculation regarding the things that could have been done better on BOTH, Friday and Saturday. At that point, though,there was still seemingly enough time to recover from any mis-steps that were made, at the very least, to have an accountablity in place which MAY have prevented the entrapment. This still, however, would NOT have prevented Yarnell from burning, only more accountability for those who might be prone to making bad decisions. That’s why, I listed the appointment of the ‘short team’ as an irreversible decision. Once that happened, there was not enough time left to recover.
TTWARE… how do you feel about one other
possible important ‘decision’ that day ( related
to the short team decision ) which may have
affected the whole tragic outcome…
…appointing Marsh as DIVS A.
Do you think… if that had never happened that
day… those men would be alive?
Example: If Marsh was not DIVS A and had not
been off ‘scouting’ all day… he would have been
with that crew at 4:00 PM… and Marsh would
have been leading them south instead of Steed.
Do you think Marsh would have seen the
dangers of the box canyon better than
Steed did ( or, apparently, did not ) that day?
2 unrelated questions for the WFF here:
1) Were you surprised to learn that Paul Musser had requested resources when he did from Granite Mountain? Not whether you think the request was right or not, but were you surprised. And if you were surprised, do you think it was his idea?
2) Do you think the ADOSH fines and possible lawsuits will have a chilling effect on wildland firefighting efforts? Since leaving a crew on the fireline inherently entails some risk, will the idea that, if the crew in question messes up, the agency and even the individuals overseeing the fire will be held to account make fire commands very hesitant?
Mike,
1) Not surprised that OPS Musser made the ‘suggestion.’ It’s fairly common. He was just doing his job. More than likely it was his call, but MAY/MOST LIKELYwould have been in counsel with other OPS and the IC.
2) Maybe a chilling effect, but it depends on the person and on the IMT. Last year, the effects felt on the fires after they YHF were fairly immediate. More IMT’s put on fires that they normally would NOT have been AND line overhead and IMT’s pulling resources off the firelines if there was a threat of thunderstorms. Knee-jerk reactions.
1). What RTS said…
2). i am not quite sure what you mean by “chilling effect?” i think that more IMT’s will be more likely to disengage resources during the burn period, but the number of fires isn’t going down and the homes in WUI aren’t going away so the problem isn’t going away… i would imagine the lawsuits are going to effect the Arizona State Forestry Division budget the most. it will be interesting to see what policy changes come about, but i think any changes will be localized to only that entity (ASF)…
it will be interesting to see how it’s dealt with on a national level as this next season rolls around and how the investigations are addressed (or not) in refresher training.
Mike,
I hope one change for the IMT’s will be to NOT automatically jump in to mitigate structures when we have the time to do so, i.e. not being pushed by the fire. We are SOCIALIZING wildland firefighting to the point that people EXPECT us to ‘save their homes.’ After the YHF, people were quoted in the newpapaers with comments like “I know I can live in the woods because the firefighters will SAVE MY HOUSE.” WTF!
I think we should do like the Australians where if you live in ‘the Bush’ you’re on your own to mitigate your property and (1) leave early if you’re going to leave and (2) ‘shelter in place’ inside your house and once the fire passes, you come outside to extinguish all that you can.
That’s the whole basis of the claims from Yarnell. The firefighters did not save our homes like they were supposed to!!! I know it hurts to lose your home, but to sue over it given the situation takes nerve. I think they figure everyone is mad at the people who ran the fire, so they will piggyback onto that anger and cash in.
you are absolutely correct. those home homeowners certainly should have known about the potential for a catastrophic wildfire in the area around which they either decided to build or bought a home. the onus was on them to prepare their properties for the inevitable, and the general area had already been identified as problematic.
the other issue is that it was a natural ignition. and emergency responders were just trying to deal with it given the parameters and resources available to them, however incompetent someone may feel that response was.
maybe the community of Yarnell should have better funded it’s municipal fire department or fuels mitigation, seeing as how they live in a very volatile wildland fire area with the potential for natural ignitions every season.
NOT saying it is right or wrong, but my impression is that at least some of the litigation is because the municipality waited so LONG to issue the “evacuation” order. People could not grab … their pets, their jewelry, their cash under the mattress, whatever. Also, my impression is that part of the lawsuits might be based on the claim that SOME state/municipality should have fought the fire when it started. I am not saying any of this is right or wrong – it is just my impression.
Agree.
**
** METADATA FROM CHRISTOPHER MACKENZIE’S VIDEOS
Thanks to Mr. John Dougherty… it is now possible to see what
metadata is contained in Christopher MacKenzie’s original
two 9 second video clips shot circa 4:02 PM on June 30, 2013.
The GOOD news: The original metadata is still there.
The BAD news: There ain’t much of it.
The Canon Powershots save movies in the Apple Quicktime MOV format.
It’s an H.264 based video codec which does allow for metadata to be
added to the saved raw video data… but the Canon Powershots
themselves only add what can be considered ‘basic’ information.
In other words… unlike the tons of information a Canon will add to
JPEG still photos… it adds very little to .MOV Quicktime movie output.
There are no ‘original timestamps’ on these movies as are easily seen
in the metadata for Christopher’s still photographs taken that day.
Here is pretty much all the metadata ’embedded’ in Christopher’s
video file(s)…
* MACKENZIE VIDEO 1 – Taken (approximately) 1601 ( 4:01 PM )
Metadata…
Canon File Name: MVI_0888.MOV
Format: H.264 Decoder
Size: 1280 x 720
Colors: Millions
Byet format: 16-bit Integer ( Little Endian )
Audio: Mono, 48.000 kHz
FPS: 29.97
Data Size: 26.17 MB
Data Rate: 23.93 mbits/s
Duration: 0:00:00:09.17
Normal Size: 1280 x 720 pixels
Current Size: 1280 x 720 pixels ( Actual )
* MACKENZIE VIDEO 2 – Taken (approximately) 1602 ( 4:02 PM ) + a few seconds
Metadata…
Canon File Name: MVI_0891.MOV
Format: H.264 Decoder
Size: 1280 x 720
Colors: Millions
Byte format: 16-bit Integer ( Little Endian )
Audio: Mono, 48.000 kHz
FPS: 29.97
Data Size: 26.29 MB
Data Rate: 24.12 mbits/s
Duration: 0:00:00:09.14
Normal Size: 1280 x 720 pixels
Current Size: 1280 x 720 pixels ( Actual )
** SOMETHING ODD
The Arizona Republic reporter who first received these files on a CD from
the SAIT investigators when they were working with AZREPUBLIC and
doing the whole ‘planned media event’ coordinated with the release of
the SAIR report happened to notice something odd right then and there and
took the time to document it when they were adding Christopher’s
photos and videos to their own ‘Photoshop’ photo/video library manager.
He noted that the ‘time/date’ stamps for the files on the CD did NOT
match the original June 30, 2013 time/date stamps for all the JPEG
still photographs. The time/date stamps for the video files were some
time AFTER June 30, 2013. He did not say HOW much time after… but
the key point was that the 2 video file time/date stamps did NOT match
the ‘creation’ date on the same CD for the original June 30 photographs.
He also noted that could be because of how they were copied to the CD
he was handed… but it also could be signs that they were not the original
.MOV files at all and had been ‘edited’… which would be another
explanation for a more recent time/date file stamp than other files
on the same CD.
There is now something additionally ODD that can be seen in the
metadata for these clips as provided with the SAIT FOIA/FOIL packages.
The DURATION of these 2 video clips is almost EXACTLY IDENTICAL.
There are only 3 one-hundreths ( 3/100 ) of a second separation in the
lengths of BOTH of these videos… supposedly taken at different times.
It is VERY odd that if these 2 video clips were actually taken manually by the
same person on the same device and manually pressing/releasing a shutter
button… that the durations would accidentally be within 3/100ths of a second
of each other.
I actually have a Canon Powershot here and I just did a test to see if I
could reproduce that kind of ‘coincidental’ separation even if I was trying.
I could not.
I tried about 30 times.
Best I could do… even using a running metronome to help me time
the duration and tell me when to ‘release’ my finger from the shutter
button was about TEN times that kind of separation ( 1/3 of a sec ).
So at the moment… I’m not sure what that actually means.
The chances of this happening ‘accidentally’ or ‘naturally’ are actually
in the millions of millions.
The chances of it being the result of SOME kind of manual ‘editing’ applied to
these clips are… shall we say… not nearly that high.
Stay tuned on this one.
FYI: Here are the ‘differences’ in the metadata between the two
Christopher MacKenzie clips showing the ‘extremely odd’ 3/100ths sec
separation in actual video length between BOTH clips…
MVI_0888.MOV
Data Size: 26.17 MB
Data Rate: 23.93 mbits/s
Duration: 0:00:00:09.17
MVI_0891.MOV
Data Size: 26.29 MB
Data Rate: 24.12 mbits/s
Duration: 0:00:00:09.14
Duration difference between 9.17 and 9.14 = 3/100ths of one second.
**
** UPDATE ON THE MACKENZIE VIDEO(S)
** SOMETIMES WHAT SEEMS IMPOSSIBLE IS ACTUALLY TRUE
I forgot something about the Canon Powershots.
As it turns out… they DO only write a minimal amount of
metadata into their Apple Quicktime MOV (movie) files on the
device itself… but Canons also do something else.
When you take your finger off the shutter and stop filming the
movie… the Canon automatically creates a ‘Thumbnail’
image ( with a file extension of .THM ) from the first frame of
your movie.
The Canon then also secretly copies LOTS of standard
EXIF metadata related to the movie into that .THM file.
The Canon keeps those .THM files as separate files from
the original Apple Quicktime .MOV file… but it also keeps
them ‘in-sync’ on the device.
If you look at the bottom of Mr. Dougherty’s dropbox page for
Christopher MacKenzie’s photos and videos that he received
from the SAIT investigation you will see that he very diligently
copied EVERYTHING he had in that ‘MacKenzie’ directory
on the CD he got up to the dropbox page.
So there are the original ‘first-movie-frame’ THM files
from Christopher’s Canon Powershot.
They are named exactly the same as the original movie
files only with a .THM extension…
MVI_0888.THM
MVI_0891.THM
A ‘THM’ ( Thumbnail ) format file is really just a JPEG image
in disguise… so you can actually then just run any standard
JPEG EXIF data extractor on those files.
So that’s what I did…and there are no mysteries anymore
about these MacKenzie movie clips.
The exact timestamp the movies were made is, in fact,
inside that first-frame THM EXIF information for each movie.
You still don’t get a ‘duration’ value for the movies… but you
get something just as accurate. For a movie… the Canon
stores the total number of individual frames recorded for
each movie along with the exact ‘frame rate’ for that movie.
So it’s then easy to calculate the ORIGINAL LENGTH
of the movie itself.
As IMPOSSIBLE as it might have seemed at first for two
separate movies made manually to be exactly within
3/100 ths of one second in duration… that appears to be
what actually happened out on that ridge on June 30, 2013.
Here is the actual ( additional ) THM-EXIF metadata for
both of Christopher MacKenzie’s movies…
* MACKENZIE VIDEO 1 – MVI_0888.THM
THM-EXIF Create Date: June 30, 2013, 4:01:31 PM
THM-EXIF Canon Image Size: 1280×720 Movie
THM-EXIF Quality: Normal Movie
THM-EXIF Continuous Drive: Movie
THM-EXIF Record Mode: Video
THM-EXIF Canon Image Type: MVI:PowerShot SD1400 IS Movie
THM-EXIF Canon Model ID: PowerShot SD1400 IS / IXUS 130
THM-EXIF Camera Temperature: 34 C ( 93 F )
THM-EXIF Audio Bitrate: 768 kbps
THM-EXIF Audio Sample Rate: 48,000
THM-EXIF Audio Channels: 1
THM-EXIF Video Codec: avc1
THM-EXIF Image Unique ID: 2248e2774be0ab5a80114ba41729
THM-EXIF Drive Mode: Continuous Shooting
THM-EXIF Frame Rate: 29.97
THM-EXIF Frame Rate: 30
THM-EXIF Frame Count: 275
Duration: ( Frame Count 275 / Frame Rate 29.97 ): 9.2436 sec
* MACKENZIE VIDEO 2
THM-EXIF Create Date: June 30, 2013, 4:02:10 PM
THM-EXIF Canon Image Size: 1280×720 Movie
THM-EXIF Quality: Normal Movie
THM-EXIF Continuous Drive: Movie
THM-EXIF Record Mode: Video
THM-EXIF Canon Image Type: MVI:PowerShot SD1400 IS Movie
THM-EXIF Canon Model ID: PowerShot SD1400 IS / IXUS 130
THM-EXIF Camera Temperature: 34 C ( 93 F )
THM-EXIF Audio Bitrate: 768 kbps
THM-EXIF Audio Sample Rate: 48,000
THM-EXIF Audio Channels: 1
THM-EXIF Video Codec: avc1
THM-EXIF Image Unique ID: 274830764be0ab5a80114ba41729
THM-EXIF Drive Mode: Continuous Shooting
THM-EXIF Frame Rate: 29.97
THM-EXIF Frame Rate: 30
THM-EXIF Frame Count: 274
Duration ( Frame Count 274 / Frame Rate 29.97 ): 9.1424 sec
** SUMMARY
So even though there appears to be a slight discrepancy in
the length of MacKenzie’s first video and it SHOULD actually
be about a tenth of a second longer than what we are
actually seeing/hearing… that is inconsequential and can be
written off to the imperfections of video player software.
The computed duration of the second video matches exactly
other reported lengths and the EXIF data in the .MOV file itself.
It is safe to say now ( finally ) that it appears these Christopher
MacKenzie video clips have NOT been ‘edited’ or ‘cropped’ since
they were copied directly off his Canon and we have always been
seeing ( and hearing ) all there is to see / hear.
So now that we finally know the exact SECONDS intervals
between Christopher’s still photos AND his movies that he
shot at the ‘4:00 PM’ resting location… we can also say for
sure (now) that this is exactly what happened…
1600:xx – 1601:xx – They arrive at this 1600 location after
hiking for just a bit from the previous 1552 location.
1601:31 – MacKenzie 110-0888 – First VIDEO capturing Marsh
saying “I could just feel it, ya know”. Duration: 9.24 sec.
1601:52 – MacKenzie 110-0889 – First still photo at this new location 12 seconds after shooting the first video.
1602:00 – MacKenzie 110-0890 – Second still photo here just 8
seconds later.
1602:10 – MacKenzie 110-0891 – Second VIDEO, 10 seconds
later, capturing Steed saying “I Copy… and it’s almost made it to
that two-track road we walked in on”. Duration: 9.14 sec.
( Only 2-3 more minutes of unknown activity/conversations )
1604:xx – 16:05:xx – They all leave this location and head south
for the box canyon
This also means for certain that the TOTAL time ( and possible
maximum total missing conversation length ) BETWEEN the two
videos is exactly 30 seconds… since the first video ended at
1601:40 and the second one actually started at 16:02:10.
Nice work! You’ve really nailed down some specifics here with your technical wizardry. So do the Caldwell photos match up with these video clips? And does that give us +/- 2 minute range on the time signatures between the two devices?
Not sure yet. I’m still actually focused on some of
the (remaining) MacKenzie issues. There are TWO
other photographs that have appeared in other reports ( ADOSH / WFAR ) that are being attributed
to Christopher MacKenzie… but they are ( so far )
nowhere to be found in the SAIT FOIA/FOIL material.
Elizabeth said something about the CD containing
a different directory for photos they had from
BOTH MacKenzie’s Canon Powershot AND
his smartphone ( iPhone? )… so those other two
photos *might* be ones ( of how many? ) from
that smartphone… but I haven’t seen any of those
come online anywhere yet. Mr. Dougherty’s
MacKenzie DIR is simply the Canon Powershot
and those two attributed photos are NOT there.
Those two ‘missing’ MacKenzie photos are
pretty important. If the Parker photos never appear
and/or there is no metadata in them… then one
of the ‘missing’ MacKenzie photos is the key to
putting the exact TIME on the Robert Caldwell
video where we hear OPS1 Todd Abel tell
Eric Marsh those THREE very important things…
1) Keep ME informed ( of your whereabouts and situation ).
2) Hunker and safe ( in the black ).
3) We’ll get some Air Support down there ASAP.
By the way… the reason we can trust the times
on Christopher’s camera is because his photo
early on in the day of one of Rory Collins retardant
drops right on their head has a time stamp of
1145. That is the EXACT moment attributed to
the second ‘put out their backfires’ drop by
Collins that is documented from several sources.
More later…
By the way… what the exact metadata from
Christopher’s camera material also tells us
now is that if the ACTIC people were able
to recover any ‘call history’ logs from any
of the smartphones… or someone can get
cell phone records for that day…
…we now know the exact atomic times to
be looking for calls. That actually helps
when you are requesting cell phone
network records. Trust me on this.
Your technical skills continue to impress, as does your obviously very thick skin.
Comes from continually walking
out on limbs, falling down, and
scraping bark the whole way.
Famous for it.
Thx for all of this. I’ve been having to think a lot about time stamps. Ever since I was confused about the SAIR photo JD released with his Lawsuits story, since it was seriously not consistent with the YCSO photos.
I have to re-time my cameras every six months, due to switching back and forth between Daylight Savings Time and Normal time. I usually do that using my computer to make sure I’m accurate.
Arizona doesn’t do Daylight Savings time. So people don’t have to change their cameras. It’s easy for a camera to drift off of accurate time. I decided to trust the YCSO time stamps more than the SAIT time stamps, assuming they would have more reasons to maintain accuracy in their cameras.
So, given that, I would also trust a smartphone timestamp over a camera’s timestamp, for obvious reasons. A smartphone is going to get it’s time from the internet, while a camera (especially in Arizona) has a MUCH greater chance of being inaccurate.
And yes about the cellphone logs. I was reading back on the Chapter 2 comments, wanting to refresh my memory on things associated with both the release of the SAIR photo of the deployment site and the conversations about the phones (which I discovered some interesting details about yesterday). You had mentioned that cellphone records would take more authority than this investigation had to acquire. And I looked at my ancient cellphone that I need to replace soon, and, yes, it keeps its own record of calls, both in and out, both answered and not. So if those can be scraped from the phone, no “records” need to be acquired.
Marti… it’s actually more
complicated than that.
The YCSO police only had
the standard ‘Cellibrite’ software
to ‘scrape’ a cellphone. If the
unit would not power on or
was password protected… they
had to send it to ACTIC
( Arizona Counter Terrorism
Information Center ). It’s part
of ‘Homeland Security’.
Anything ACTIC might have
found would have come back
to ‘the police’… and not to
the Forestry people unless
there was a specific request.
As far as we know… no one
involved with either the SAIR
or ADOSH reports actually
requested EVERYTHING
that ACTIC might have
gotten off the phone. They
were only interested in
photos and/or videos.
So whatever ACTIC might
have gotten off the phones
is still probably sitting in
a filing cabinet over at the
YCSO police station.
Thank you. Got it.
And PS. I’m still trying to create a narrative of the chain of possession of Christopher MacKenzie’s Canon Powershot Camera. It was practically at the center of the deployment site, it was seen and photographed many times, including in between two numbered evidenced radios, and yet it was never numbered or included in the official tally of personal items or anything. Since you have a better ability to keep these details in you head and/or some probably AWESOME timelines around you, can you briefly remind me of who got the Powershot when and what they did with it? That would save me a whole lot of time picking my way through past threads. Thank You!
Marti… see below. I created
a new ‘parent’ comment that
answers this one. It’s hard
to provide a lot of information
once this WordPress nesting
level goes a few levels deep.
Thanks WTKTT. I am following closely
Reply to xxfullsailxx post on January 9, 2014 at 8:40 pm
>> xxfullsailxx said…
>> they show fire cresting the knob between 1630 and 1640.
If you are talking about page 20 of the SAIR and…
Figure 7. Southern portion of the Yarnell Hill Fire.
…that ‘fire progression’ map actually has no time stamp on it at all but it also
obviously is meant to support their story of the men seeing “fire in front of them
and fire behind them up where they came from” at the exact same moment in
time… which is what Darrell Willis dutifully ‘announced’ to reporters during his
July 24 press conference at the deployment site.
That ‘fire progression’ map then does NOT match perfectly with the other
‘fancy’ multi-shaded one they published on their page 81. Close, but some
changes…. even in the ‘ridge cresting’ stuff.
They BOTH show the fire encroaching onto the anchor point area and
the two-track road that the men actually walked south on from there…
but even in the 1640 timeframe neither one shows anything ‘cresting’
the ridge directly due southwest of the box canyon or near the point
where Tex Gilligan found the roll of pink tape up on the ridge.
‘Cresting’ in THOSE areas definitely happened… as sure as 19 men died…
but that particular ‘cresting’ isn’t actually shown until the 1650 timeframe,
and even that is pretty much just based on the Matt-Oss time-lapse
video ( See below for more about that puppy ).
What is also interesting about the maps on pages ii, 19 and 20 of the SAIR
is that that is the only place in the SAIR we see evidence of the ‘actual’
topo-map fire progression charts that were actually used to ‘assemble’
the ‘fancier’ map they used on page 81. Instead of publishing ALL of these
individual time-stamped fire-progression topo maps they had in the SAIR
itself… they just opted for the ‘fancier’ multicolored one on page 81.
It is only when the ADOSH report comes out that we actually see ALL
of these base-level topo-map incremental fire progression charts that
the SAIT actually came up with originally.
Apparently… the ADOSH people just ‘borrowed’ all these same base-level
SAIT generated topo-maps for their own report.
I’ve compared each of these individual topo-maps to the ‘fancy chart’
on page 81 of the SAIR and I don’t see where ADOSH ever questioned
any of those original SAIT estimates at all. They just took those baseline
topo-maps as ‘gospel’.
There is no doubt that the Matt Oss time-lapse video taken from Congress
played an important role in trying to establish these ‘when did it reach the
top of the ridge’ moments of fire progression. All published reports say so.
So if ADOSH just simply ‘trusted’ the SAIT on that… it becomes very important
whether the SAIT team got all that right or not.
I happen to think there is a good chance they did NOT ( get it exactly right ).
Maybe the following will help you ( or anyone who is interested ).
The New York times wrote an article on the fire that was pretty much a
joke as far as details go… but someone in their video department did a
pretty interesting thing.
He/She found a way to merge a non-google USDA topographical map
with the actual original Matt Oss time-lapse video.
You have to scroll down about halfway through the article to find this interesting
video. Ignore the non-factual stuff at the start like them trying to say the GM
Hotshots left the Boulder Springs Ranch and headed to the WEST when they
got trapped. Total BS… but then watch what happens in the rest of the video.
The 3D map ‘rolls around’ and then ‘recedes’ all the way back to almost where
the Matt Oss video was shot ( even they are little wrong about that )… and then
the 3D topo ‘fades’ into the actual Matt Oss footage and the while time-lapse
plays. I will give them almost an A+ on lining up ‘the fade’ with the ACTUAL
ridge lines in the distance that surround the box canyon itself. It’s accurate.
As the video ‘rolls around’ and leaves the overhead view of the box canyon…
just put your finger anywhere you want to on that ridge that is due southwest
of the box canyon. Just keep your finger there as the video ‘rolls around’ and
by the time you get to the merge with the Matt Oss footage you can be pretty
sure which ‘ridge point’ of the box canyon you are now watching in the
Matt Oss video.
Watch where the ‘flames’ are then seen in the Matt Oss video as it plays.
The picture used in the SAIR for fire ‘cresting the ridge’ near the deployment
site is NOWHERE NEAR that box canyon.
Also watch the overlaid TIMESTAMP in the upper left corner of the video. Yes…
there are flames cresting some ridges over near the old helispot and the original
anchor point circa 1640… but still not really near the southwest ridge of the box
canyon. If you did the finger thing right you won’t even see any flames cresting
any ridges right there due southwest of the deployment site even in the 1650
timeframe, when the video ends.
Actually… in the last minute or so of the Matt Oss video… the smoke at
the REAL point in the distance that represents the center of the southwest
ridge of the deployment canyon is so obscured by smoke it’s basically
impossible for anyone to be sure what is happening there even by 4:50
when the video fully ends. Not with any total certainty, anyway.
So it simply could be that people ( SAIT investigators? ) have ‘messed up’
their interpretations of the flames they think they see cresting certain places
way in the distance in the Matt Oss video… and the times when they think
those things really happened.
We know that canyon became a ‘chimney’. No question about it.
We know the flames eventually crested ALL around that box canyon area.
EXACTLY ( down to the minute/second ) when that all happened is still
open to some questions, I think.
Here’s that NY Times article and the topo-map-merge with the
Matt Oss time-lapse video…
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/07/us/a-painful-mix-of-fire-wind-and-questions.html?hp&_r=0
and again, your whole premise is that the fire progression map (figure 22) found on page 81 was influenced heavily by a time lapse video taken from afar… and that is a lie.
was that video a piece of evidence cited in the reports? yes it was.
was that video the only piece of evidence used by the FIRE BEHAVIOR ANALYST’s (multiple)? ……………no, it was not.
what other evidence/tools were used? ………..see below:
From the SAIR:
“Fire Behavior Experts created an estimate of the Yarnell Hill Fire behavior using various methods:
1. Eyewitness accounts. Interviews of many personnel assigned to the incident included time and location of significant weather and fire behavior events.
2. Photographic images and videos. Numerous individuals documented fire activity during the Yarnell Hill Fire. Many still
digital images had time stamps. Photographs have varying
degrees of precision in time stamps so experts used images
taken at verifiable times showing a locatable feature on the fire
perimeter to document fire location and activity. Many digital photographs may be geo-referenced if the device that takes them has location tracking enabled. Where possible, the team used geo-referenced information to ascertain locations for photographs. This information was very valuable in determining locations, views, and fire activity and was useful in validating fire perimeter reconstruction. Other images lacking credible time stamps and/or geo-reference information were validated through a comparison with Google Earth pre-fire images, visible landmarks, and known time-stamped photographs to add information about fire perimeters.
3. Remote Sensing. The team modeled fire perimeters and intensities using remote sensing. US Forest Service National Infrared Operations imagery taken from nighttime flights supports daily fire growth documentation. The satellite-based Moderate Resolution Imaging Spectroradiometer system heat imagery helped to verify fire locations at various times.
4. Modeling Rates of Spread and Fire Intensities. The team used the BEHAVE Plus program and the embedded Short Term Fire Behavior Model in the Wildland Fire Decision Support System to model fire behavior. Inputs were from site visits, fuels data, the closest RAWS, fireline weather observations, local fuels information, and wind models. Photographic time-stamped information corroborated fire locations, active flaming fronts, and smoke columns around the fire and pinpointed on the landscape. This verified fire behavior modeling, specifically rate of spread and flame length.”
so your time lapse video THAT YOU SOLELY RELY ON TO MAKE YOUR CASE is one tiny piece of evidence among a background of computer modeling, first hand testimony, other pictures, remote sensing, etc…
and on top of all THAT… is a computer program known as “Wind Wizard” that a user plugs in all sorts of weather info into (probably taken from nearby RAWS and on the ground observations from Brendan and other crews… and what does THAT show?
it shows slope and wind alignment on the windward side of the knob with winds exceeding 50 mph… and what happens when slope and wind align? bad shit happens…. and why does it show that?
BECAUSE THAT’S WHAT HAPPENED… the wind shifted and blew fire all over the hill… the winds were 40-50 mph from the downdrafts for God’s sake… do you have any idea what that does to fire behavior? oh wait, rhetorical question… YOU DON’T!
Got to agree with you its some of the best info on fire progression today.
lmao… and, you’re really going to try to discredit PhD’s from the Forest Service Research Stations and FBAN’s (who analyze fire behavior for a living and write doctoral thesis’s about fire behavior) with what a NYT journalist did in google maps with a time lapse video?
hilarious!
So… did you do the (simple) thing I asked you to do…
and go and use your own eyes and your own brain
cells… even for just a moment?
yep, i looked at it… AGAIN. it makes total sense with what the Wind Wizard program showed… that the winds paralleled the ridgeline probably prior to fire getting established in the bowl… which also coincides with what “my own eyes and brain” think would happen when the winds aligned with the slope.
have you acknowledged that you lied about Chief Willis speaking “word for word from the SAIR?”
have you acknowledged that you’re being disingenuous about the research involved in creating the fire progression map?
(btw… fire progression maps are created all the time, on every fire… most of them WITHOUT any time lapse videos)
have you acknowledged that YOUR agenda overrides any other contrary evidence?
It’s too bad there isn’t an ’emoticon’
for ‘eyes rolling’.
Oh well…
>> have you acknowledged that you lied
>> about Chief Willis speaking “word for
>> word from the SAIR?”
Nope. Because I did not.
Repeating… as early as July 24 he
announced to the press and the world
that “They had fire behind them… and they
had fire in front of them”… and on Sep 28
we finally saw where he was getting a
statement like that. It was exactly what
the 1640 SAIR fire chart was trying to
show to back up the SAIR narrative.
>> have you acknowledged that you’re
>> being disingenuous about the research
>> involved in creating the fire progression
>> map?
Nope. Because I’m not.
I have no problem with MOST of the fire
progression charts. Never said I did.
Weeks ago… I’m the one who took the time
to translate them to 3 dimensions and post
them on YouTube for everyone to see in a
much clearer way. I did not CHANGE one
single thing. If anything is different about them
in the 3 dimensions then that is simply a
mistake on my part. I was trying to reproduce
them EXACTLY the way they were published
and I think I succeeded.
Would I have done all that work if I thought
they were TOTAL crap?
Nope.
I went over every foot of of every fire progression line in the course of doing that.
There are places where I think they got it
spot on… especially where they used a lot
of photographs ( like they said they did )
such as the eastern stretches with plenty
of people taking pictures and whatnot.
There are places where I think they made
some mistakes. The western ridges
in particular. That’s all I’m saying.
That being said…
You DO know that the WindWizard product,
at the time they were using it, was totally
obsolete and totally unsupported by the
people that wrote that software, right?
Missoula Fire Labs abandoned that product
of theirs some time ago and moved on to
something called WindNinja… which is
still listed on their sites as ‘totally experimental’. See a long discussion about
this product weeks ago on this thread.
I’ve used WindNinja. It’s not rocket science.
It seems to do a good job doing what it
says it does… but it’s also very easy to
give it what are called ‘point’ files, bypass
the algorithms, and make it show anything
you WANT it to show.
>> have you acknowledged that YOUR
>> agenda overrides any other contrary
>> evidence?
Right back at ya… but changing a word…
Have you acknowledged that YOUR
agenda overrides any other EXISTING
evidence?
Anyway… thanks for taking a look at what
I simply asked you to take a look at ( if you
actually did ).
Funny, tho… after all your foghorn stuff…
you STILL haven’t answered the question
I asked…
Do YOU think… using YOUR own eyes and
brain cells and looking at some of the same
existing evidence that the SAIT had… that the
SAIR fire progression charts for the western
ridges are 100 percent accurate?
This time… a simple YES or NO will do.
i take back my apology above…
you are pathetic, desperate and a liar.
i’d say most of your research here is pretty questionable at this point… with no one else fact checking it.
especially if your willing to continue lying about a direct quote that is staring you in the face.
Apology withdrawl accepted.
See my response to your
*apology* above.
Say whatever you like.
I’m not *really* paying any
attention to you. Not *really*.
You are fun to banter back
and forth with, though, I’ll
give you that much.
wow, so i was actually just about to call you out on this down below, when i decided to scroll up to see if you actually covered it:
WTKTT:
“Ignore the non-factual stuff at the start like them trying to say the GM Hotshots left the Boulder Springs Ranch and headed to the WEST when they got trapped. Total BS… but then watch what happens in the rest of the video.”
so what you’re saying, is to ignore this one crucial piece of reporting that they got horribly wrong (you call it “total BS”), but go ahead and trust the rest of their work (including more pinpointing of important information) so i can make my point.
“IGNORE THE NON-FACTUAL STUFF” WTKTT says!!!
you’re a joke.
just because i think it’s a crucial point that was brought up about GM being able to RTO back up the route they walked down… and since the integrity of the SAIR fire progression maps was called in to question:
WTKTT said:
“NOTE: At the first press conference from the
deployment site… Darrell Willis was asked
why the men didn’t even TRY to do a ‘full
reverse’ and even Willis ‘answered’ the question
like a robot with this ‘word for word’ stuff from
the SAIR about how “the fire appeared in front
of and behind them at the SAME MOMENT
so that’s why that wasn’t an option”.
The SAIT knew that question was going to be
asked… and they had to have SOME explanation.”
note: that Darryl Willis’s press conference was on July 24th…
the SAIR didn’t come out until September 23rd…
again, the SAIR fire progression maps are a “reasonable estimate.” they show fire cresting the knob between 1630 and 1640. i think that trying to say that GM had time to do anything other than what they did, once they were entrapped in the bowl, is incredulous.
I agree
>> Reply to xxfullsailxx post on January 9, 2014 at 8:40 pm
>>
>> xxfullsailxx said…
>> note: that Darryl Willis’s press conference was on July 24th…
>> the SAIR didn’t come out until September 23rd…
Correct…. but listen carefully to what Willis says on the 24th.
( or just read the full transcript of what he said which has
already been posted to this discussion thread. )
A LOT of what was GOING to eventually appear in the SAIR
report was being quoted… word for word… by Darrell Willis
already… even that early on.
He himself references the ‘fire experts’ and what they thought
any number of times during that interview in almost a way
to suggest all that evaluation was already ‘over and done with’
even months before the report would ever see the light of day.
To save you some time… here are some quotes…
During Darrell Willis’ SPEECH at the site…
( He describes where the fire line was and had progressed
that day and then qualifies what he is saying by telling the
reporters he’s getting all that from ‘information maps’ that
already exist. Implication is that a lot of the fire progression
maps for the SAIR were already done by the 24th… )
Willis: Most of this information I’m… I’m giving you was
information that I’ve gathered uh… based on some of the
information maps and stuff like that.
( A few moments later he is describing to the reporters how
the fire entered the canyon and, again, attributes what he
is saying to what the ‘fire behavior guys’ had apparently
already ‘figured out’ and ‘documented’, even by the 24th… )
Willis: At that point… ( circa 4:00 PM ) um… that’s when things
started to change dynamically with the weather… ya know… we
had some tremendous outflows… and… uh… the… the… ah…
basically on some fire behavior stuff that we’ve looked at the fire
was able to come around here and in this drainage and moved
up this way ( he gestures to where the SAIR report is going
to eventually show the fire entering the canyon at an oblique
angle and then gestures in a sweeping, angular motion towards
the deployment site itself ).
( Two seconds later he is explaining to the reporters with
absolute confidence that they had no other choice that day
because they have fire ‘in front of AND behind them’.
Even as early as July 24… Willis is saying it is an absolute
fact and that he is personally SURE they knew this. )
Willis: They… they probably saw the fire in this area and then…
ah… were looking for a place because they knew that they had
fire on both sides of ‘em… they had fire behind ‘em… and now
they had fire ahead of them… and so at the site that’s fenced
behind me they began to do some work.
( Seconds later… he is still trying to explain to the reporters
with specific hand gestures EXACTLY how the fire came
into the now totally moonscaped canyon and how it specifically
approached the site as if the exact path he is describing was
an already established fact… )
Willis: So the fire came around this drainage ( he gestures )
and came up this way… ( again…more specific gestures ).
( But less than 2 seconds later he is saying that all the other
factors that relate to the fire progression establishment that
day are simply ‘still being studied’… )
There’s… there’s a lot of other things… other factors that are
being considered, ya know, the weather and stuff like that…
that’s being studied… so that we can really piece back together…
( Willis ends his SPEECH with his now famous “God had a
different plan for this crew at that time” quote… and now he
takes questions from the reporters. One of the first questions
was about exactly how the fire overtook these men and
Willis once again admits that even by July 24… they believe
they had that ‘all figured out’… )
Q: Chief… they came down… I mean it all looks black right
now. Is there a way you can tell, you know, did the fire come
down there and around here at the same time… or how did
this area get engulfed in flames?
Willis: The fire behavior… ah… folks have said that it came
around here ( points to mouth of canyon ).. and if ya look…
uh… if ya look at that… uh… little swale here it’s… it basically
would lead you to believe that the fire came up this direction and
up these little drainages here. ( He gestures specifically at points
on the ground ).
( The very next question Willis is asked is about why they didn’t
try to ‘go back up’. Willis seems to forget, at this point, what
he already said in his SPEECH about him being sure they
had fire ‘behind them’ as well as ‘in front’… and instead of
repeating that explanation he tries to come up with another
one that is simply based on TIME and he makes no mention of
the fire being ‘behind them’ as he did in his SPEECH. He
even mentions again where they ‘had fire’ at the time of
decision making but now he ONLY points out in front of him
to the mouth of the canyon and mentions nothing about
anything being ‘behind’ them like he did in his SPEECH )…
Q: And they wouldn’t have been able to get up that way?
( Reporter gestures back up to the point where they descended ).
Willis: No. They couldn’t of… it… ya know… it may have taken
‘em… uh… 20 minutes to get off that… it woulda taken ‘em 45
to get back up… or… or more… to get back up that… so once
you’re committed downhill there’s really no way to make any time
goin’ uphill. So if they had fire here ( he only points out in front
of him at the mouth of the canyon ) and they were tryin’ to climb…
they woulda never made it… their best option was where they
deployed
( There was only one other question from a reporter that
touched on the choice they made and whether they had any
other options… and Willis again forgets what he said in his
SPEECH about him being sure they had fire ‘in front’ and
‘behind’ them. He ONLY mentions the ‘fire in front of them’
and how sure he is they had NO other options. )
Q: Chief… I know they only had a very short time to pick a spot
to deploy their shelters… but can you talk about how optimal a
spot this is for shelter deployment… um… I guess the goal is to
try and get as much of a seal around ya as ya can?
Willis: It was the best they had at the time.
Uh… it… at the time… based.. ya know… on our… uh…
thought that the fire was movin’ up this camon… canyon…
it’s the best they had at the time.
There was NO other options.
There wasn’t an option to escape… uphill.
This is where they had to deploy.
( End of Willis press conference on July 24 )
SUMMARY
So even as early as July 24… the ‘story’ about how the fire
entered the canyon and overtook the deployment site had already
been assembled by the SAIT… and Willis had obviously already
been briefed on exactly what it was going to eventually say…
exactly the way it eventually did.
dude, you are so pathetic and so desperate. you think that typing out the entire interview is going to make your point? or are you hoping that enough screen will pass that people will get bored or lose track of what was said?
YOUR WHOLE POINT was to discredit the SAIR fire progression map based on [THE LIE] that the FBAN’s relied heavily on the time lapse video shot from afar and [THE LIE] that Darryl Willis was speaking directly from the SAIR:
WTKTT:
“Willis ‘answered’ the question
like a robot with this ‘word for word’ stuff from
the SAIR…”
to begin with, i don’t really give too much credence to the Darryl Willis interview but thanks? for typing it out. it was hard to believe that PFD let him conduct it prior to any real investigation… at the time, i was waiting for the SAIR to come out before making any conclusions.
the SAIR fire progression map (Figure 22, Page 81) is the most accurate account that we have. it was well researched and includes a fairly extensive background on how it was created on page 80.
the fact is, that you will make any attempt (apparently to include lying) to try to discredit any piece of information that does not fall in line with your agenda.
WTKTT-
i apologize for beginning the above comment the way i did. i had no reason or right to begin the comment that way. if i could delete the first paragraph, i would.
No problem. I’m not really paying any
attention to you, anyway. Say whatever
you want.
It is 100+ degrees, low RH, extremely low fuel moistures, extremely volatile fuels. I’m not trying by any means to “Monday morning quarterback” anyone but is my thinking flawed? Widen the existing two track roads with dozers, run the dozers from the valley floor up to the ridge line, them burnout the line and do it before noon. Even if your sending head fire into the main fire, with the AM winds, who cares. There would be nothing to burn when the wind shift occurred. Even if the wind shift never occurred you are still good. So what if you burn an extra 1000 acres up during a burnout. Yes, when the burnout meets the flaming front it is going to intensify the fire for a brief period, but then it’s back to it’s original intensity after a few minutes.. At the same time the folks on the north end can be setting a backing fire with the AM winds and minimize the chance that spotting will be an issue. Punch some nice big football field sized safety zones with the dozers and break out the drip torches. I know I don’t have the benefit of their experience or ability to see what they saw that day but why not keep your men off that hill. Am I wrong?
Eric,
I won’t say you’re really wrong, but I do think you’re overlooking the amount of manpower, equipment, time, and timing to accomplish everything. That’s a very optimistic plan that requires ALOT of stuff and A LOT of time. Days!
This would take several dozers and overhead, at least 2-4 more Hot Shot Crews, more Task Force Leaders, 2-3 Safety Officers, and at least 1-2 more Division Supervisors.
LOTS, a few hundred gallons of drip torch fuel and LOTS of drip torches, and other pyro-technics.
And numerous Type 6 4 x 4 Engines plus overhead, and LOTS of hoselays needing porta-tanks, portable pumps, and thousands of feet of hose.
agreed… and IT IS basically what they were trying to do. but there was no chance given the late start, lack of man power, the fore-casted winds and the fuel conditions…
you mentioned the lack of drip torches at one point RTS way back when… and it certainly did strike me as odd that GM was thinking they were going to try to burn off the two track with their sigg bottle drip torch thing-a-ma-jiggers…
I know. It’s just crazy. I’ve scanned through that photo a dozen times and I can locate NO drip torches, not even one. It’s just insane to think they were going to burn off hundreds of acres without them if that was their plan. Of course, there’s SO MANY things about this fire that are just insane.
In terms of past bad decisions with good outcomes, there’s a parallel there in terms of past practices that made no sense. It looks crazy to you now because you’re looking at it now.
At the 30,000 foot level, along with one training point being survivability as a predicate to a decision to deploy, one predicate for just about any decision should be “does it have a reasonable chance of being effective?” The moral hazard here is that you can do anything, effective or not, and work real hard and, assuming the fire at some point is controlled, get clapped on the back, without in most cases any real audit of whether efforts were effective, or not.
That gets to a big safety point, too, which is that since given fuel type and expected, normal weather for the area, GM’s efforts were bound to not work, why were they being asked to do something with a very low probability of being successful, even if they had stayed with good decision-making while doing it?
You are 100% correct in that it would take a large commitment of resources, time and money! So why commit the resources they had (basically not enough) to a similiar plan that day? That indicates to me that the plan that day was doomed from the start? An I wrong in saying this?
You are completely right in saying that.
And yes, committing resources to something fated to be very ineffective at best is always a bad thing. One of the big issues here is in fact no attempt to take chance of success into account that day. Obviously everyone knew at one level that this was a chaparral fire, but then made decisions as if it wasn’t and as if the very normal afternoon storm didn’t exist either.
their only “commitment” that day was to staff that piece of line with a Div Sup and a crew… it is up to the Div Sup to come up with the tactics that will be utilized on a piece of ground. those tactics SHOULD directly correlate with the strategy and objectives set forth by ops and the IC.
the Div Sup is the “eyes on the ground” who determines whether or not a given strategy (which again, SHOULD come from the objectives set forth by the IC) is feasible or not AND THEN what tactics should be involved to implement the strategy AND THEN what resource and logistical needs will be needed to implement the tactics.
there was nothing inherently wrong with GM being up on the hill, nor is there anything wrong with Marsh being the Div Sup… this stuff happens on every big fire, in every region across the west, every year. this is part of the reason why hotshot crews are called, is because they come with the overhead and quals to independently work a piece of ground.
so yes, an “objective” to contain the fire with direct line would be unreasonable, given the fuel conditions and resources available.
And again this comes back to a training and awareness issue. Just for FullSail, because he likes the term, I’ll note that both the chaparral itself and the “terrain” seem not to have been taken account. So, that’s something that likely was a pattern. And maybe a structural bias meant that views of what was feasible weren’t as driven by”topography” and vegetation and weather as they might be for others. Instead, there seems a reflexive, Well, this is just what you do…approach.
it was an IMT trying to transition and this was an active incident IN TRANSITION, with ACTIVE FIRE BEHAVIOR FORECASTED in the same shift, with STRUCTURES THREATENED during the same shift…
you want to talk about how that gets done elsewhere? look at Black Canyon Fire, where they all just got out of the way and let the thing roll through a subdivision, look at Waldo Canyon fire, where they did the same thing, look at High Park fire, where they were all scrambling to stay ahead of the fire just trying to get people out of the way… look at Four Mile Canyon fire, same thing.
All of these fires were rapidly escalating incidents in the first two operational periods in the middle of transitioning to an IMT with limited air resource capabilities and they all sacrificed 100’s of homes and they were ALL lucky that people didn’t die. so i think over all, given the current state of government budgets, WUI, climate change and fuel loading, most places are keeping their heads above water.
you could actually argue that GM was in the safest and MOST logical place for a crew that day. they had everything a crew could ask for: LACES. it was the PERFECT assignment for them… until they decided to leave.
but yes, tell us more how they “should have done things” NV… i’m sure you’ll provide plenty of real world examples like you usually do.
(btw, i deleted half my comment, “kid gloves” because i know how sensitive you are)
Gee, Black Canyon fire…well, stop me if I’m wrong, but the fire rolled through a bunch of homes at Yarnell, too, correct?
By trying to shout and be generally nasty, you seem to be overlooking the fact that you can’t exactly point to Yarnell as an example of success, or a relatively better outcome, than in any of multiple fires in CO. Worse, Yarnell barely missed seeing something similar to the Oakland Hills fire in outcome, in part because the fuel type, weather and expected fire behavior were not taken into account.
yes,… that’s exactly my point… that after the first night of initial attack, there was little more that could be done than stand back and get the hell out of the way. (which is what they ended up doing) and, same as Black Canyon, they lost a bunch of homes.
sure, you can argue that they should have thrown more at it in the first 24 hours… and given the SEASONAL fuel conditions they definitely should have. but the topography and general fuel type are not anything outside of normal for a lot of areas around the western states. and in general, i think fire managers and IMT’s have a pretty good idea of how to deal with fires in those areas.
Fullsail,
Are you talking about the Black Forest Fire in CO in June 2013?
yes, my bad, black forest…
Eric, RTS, and fullsail,
All of you are right, in that given the resources available, the strategy couldn’t succeed, BUT had the necessary resources BEEN available, at say, oh dark thirty, that particular strategy seems to have been the best one to use to try and save Yarnell.
Given the limited resources that were actually available, they still went with the strategy, hoping that some of the crap factors might at some point, not play-out the way they looked destined to, and turn out more in their favor.
This is not a defense of that action, but in hindsight, I’m not sure what else they could have attempted in defense of Yarnell proper.
Doing nothing at all, was not an option.
I’m looking for hindsight thoughts from other’s here, regarding what they could have done differently or better, with the resources they had? Was there anything else even possible?
This all leads back to earlier discussion regarding ‘management’ of the fire in the 2 previous days, where apparently the ‘potential’ was missed and not addressed in time.
I think you must remember that when the decision was made to put GM up there, the fire was backing towards Yarnell and moving towards Peoples Valley. Given this I think it was reasonable to establish an anchor and start building line. Of coarse this all changed soon after they started working, but if the convective weather hadn’t have materialized, DIVA may have had some success that day. So yes, I agree that putting GM up there was a valid move.
they didn’t HAVE a coherent strategy… but that wasn’t entirely the IMT’s fault, there were just trying to assemble around a rapidly escalating incident… though i would agree that they could have and should have come up with some reasonable objectives based on current and expected fire behavior.
i think that you are exactly right TTWARE, that getting a couple crews in there the previous night to bring fire down the hill towards BAR A Ranch, would have been a reasonable tactic… most of the line was already in place and they had good burning conditions throughout the night.
other than that, they were on total defense the following day… (the 30th) structure prep (even as futile as that may have been) and trigger points to evacuate the public and disengage (which is basically what they did) and then go “big box” indirect, with lots of resources for night ops and the following shift.
TWARE,
“Doing nothing at all, was not an option.” Sure it was an option. See Fullsail’s comments above regarding the CO fires, e.g. Waldo Canyon, High Park, and the other two I’m not familiar with. When the Big Dog is eating, when the fire is running doing what it wants, you get out of the way, and ‘anchor and flank’ if you can, otherwise you wait and then go in and ‘pick up the pieces.’ This means putting out the side of the house, the roof, the eaves, the porches, whatever.
And in the case of Yarnell, it sounds like the vast majority of the residents did absolutely NOTHING to Firewise or mitigate their structures. When that’sthe case MOST WFF will not put forth any or much effort to save them. That’s where the questionable strategy and tactics of SOME structure dpeartments and SOME structure/wildland FF comes into play of ‘unneccesary’ risks.
What cold they have done differently? Much more agressive on the IA and Extended Attack. keep the YHF contained within the friggin’ jeep trail (that one still gets me),
The strategy you proposed is noble, but VERY labor intensive. With normal, regular, steady gradient winds it would’ve been much more doable. However, burning out in thunderstorms is VERY, VERY TRICKY because of the outflow and downdraft winds potential. There are many cases in the Lessons Learned Center Incident Reviews where downdrafts and/or resulted in burns, shelters, and deaths. The Dude Fire in 1990 and more recently the Poe Cabin Fire in 2007 readily come to mind.
RTS,
The ‘doing nothing’ comment was more in relation to the various briefings in the morning when the troops were being sent into the field, not later in the day when the big dog must eat.
Everyone here agrees that with the conditions presented and expected, and the resources available, the plan could not succeed. What I was trying to get to was, under THOSE circumstances that morning, was there ANY other plan that if implemented, COULD succeed? I doesn’t seem that there was, so they went ahead and tried to proceed with a plan that WOULD work, but ONLY under the right circumstances, none which were occuring, except that, in the AM, the winds were favorable. Perhaps the Team was hoping that some of the factors (wind shift, thunderstorms, etc.) that were supposed to line up against them that afternoon, would be delayed a bit for whatever reason, buying them enough time to complete the line.
That leads back to my original question, to anyone that has a thought on it in hindsight: If you were given those same resources at that moment in the morning, was there anything other than attempting that flawed plan that could have been done with them??
TTWARE,
I think the only plan(s) that would have succeeded was/were the ‘direct and parallel attack’ that GMHS was doing. I think the only thing that messed them up there was the AA dropping TWICE on DIVS A burnouts because AA was trying to run the show using ODF tactics from Oregon, instead of supporting his plan.
The direct would have only worked though until the winds came up later in the day AND it would have required air support. And air support without ground forces is a complete waste. And there appears to have been a lot of that on the 30th.
The parallel attack could have been successuful as well, just biting off small chunks of line and firing them off and holding them except for the AA retardant drops botching the whole thing.
I agree with you and Fullsail on “getting a couple crews in there the previous night to bring fire down the hill towards BAR A Ranch, would have been a reasonable tactic… most of the line was already in place and they had good burning conditions throughout the night.”
That USUALLY works and has the greatest chance of success IF you have resources to then hang onto it during the day.
Start with more prudent triggers for evacuating Yarnell, and allocating resources sufficient to make this an orderly process. If you rerun the whole day 10 time, 19 WFF fatalities is still at least close to the high # you’ll get, even with the clusters elsewhere including the tennis court deployment sites that also have a Prescott association, though scarily maybe not the highest. But you’ll imo probably get at least a couple days where 10-30 residents got burned either in their cars or their homes, because evacuation was frigged. That’s right, on a bad day, maybe up to 30.
After prudently addressing evacuation, accept that without lots of resources they didn’t have that GM among others were needlessly at risk and wasting time where they were. Run the equivalent of triage — let’s just say that if they’d recognized some of this sooner, a number of homes, and lives, could have been saved.
NV,
“If you rerun the whole day 10 [times] 19 WFF fatalities is still at least close to high # you’ll get, even with the clusters elsewhere including the tennis court deployment sites that also have a Prescott association, though scarily maybe not the highest. But you’ll imo probably get at least a couple days where 10-30 residents got burned either in their cars or their homes, because evacuation was frigged. That’s right, on a bad day, maybe up to 30.”
WHAT the heck are you talking about here?
i was wondering the same thing!?
Me too. Altho I kind of get the general direction you are trying to get us to go to. But this one escaped me.
I think he is saying they just got lucky with the civilians that day. That if you repeated the same evacuation under the same circumstances, more times than not people would have died. From most accounts they waited awfully late, especially given the fact there were a lot of older folks.
If you surveyed that entire scene at 4 PM and tried to figure who was most at risk of dying in the next 45 minutes, the GMHS would have been near the bottom of the list. I look at the pictures of them on the ridge and cannot believe what is about to happen.
It is 100+ degrees=
Joy’s kestrel and temp readings for that day were low 90’s to 107 for 6-30-13 in same area GMHS were and winds up to 43mph in areas we travelled—squirelly winds at that.
———————–
, low RH, extremely low fuel moistures, extremely volatile fuels. I’m not trying by any means to “Monday morning quarterback” anyone but is my thinking flawed? Widen the existing two track roads with dozers, ===
From our view the eyewitness folks here to that day it had the appearance the bulldozer was doing that as it went down the old wash area to towards the 2 track area but from our view we felt it did not like the steepness and rockiness to get there from the old grader area yet we saw that dozer in action a lot through that day.
———————
run the dozers from the valley floor up to the ridge line, them burnout the line and do it before noon.===that dozer did a lot from our view
——
I know I don’t have the benefit of their experience or ability to see what they saw that day but why not keep your men off that hill. Am I wrong?===no, you are not wrong. Sonny said at almost 1pm that no human being or wildlife should remain the area and the point Sonny has is they should of left long before what is being shared—
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LzAvXGxc7sU
any video experts here who can get me the gps for this video
thank you
sonny…
They appear to be on the south side of town, past the Ranch
House Restaurant and Glen Ilah itself… down in that ‘curvy’
part of Highway 89 where it heads down the mountain and
out towards Congress.
They appear to be doing some ‘point protection’ near the
house that sits up on a hill down there as you head
south out of Glen Ilah on Highway 89.
I believe the cameraman is standing right around here and ends
up facing south towards Congress at the end of the video…
34.206379, -112.755910
Just cut-and-paste the line above into the search bar of Google
Maps, then hit ENTER, then zoom down a few times and a
big GREEN ARROW will be pointing right at this exact location.
You can see Highway 89 ‘down there’ below them with guard-rails
at that point and the strange little feature in the upper right corner
of the video is actually Highway 89 ‘bending around’ that hill in
the distance as it heads down towards Congress.
By the way… the actual HOME that they appear to be doing
some ‘point protection’ on is the same exact one that Joy
took a picture of on her way out of town on the afternoon
of June 30, 2013. It’s the photo that she took out the window
of the car from one of the curves in Highway 89 there heading
south out of town.
>> On January 9, 2014 at 9:19 am, xxfullsailxx said…
>>
>> (WTKTT) is going to try to argue that they had minutes more that they
>> wasted when they deployed their shelters that could have been better spent
>> running… and that the time between deploying and the first static
>> transmissions should be counted towards their time running as well.
You are 98 percent correct.
The other 2 percent deductions are simply 1 percent for each time you
specifically use the word ‘running’.
Just replace your use of the word ‘running’ with ‘doing something other
than what they did’ and you are in the end zone.
Now that everyone ( ?? ) seems to accept that fact that a simple Farday
effect COULD have been the reason for SOME ( but not ALL ) of the
‘static’ we can clearly hear in the captured audio… there IS a chance
that there was more time before the fire reached them has been
previously suggested or documented…
…but I’m not going to lay that out right now.
I am still putting together an accurate transcript and timeline on that ENTIRE
( contiguous ) helmet-cam video instead of just the ‘pieces’ of it that showed
up in the MSM. If nothing else… it finally allows us to put exact times and
intervals on the moments captured in that video instead of just the vague
‘a short time after that’ and ‘a moment later’ crap that was in the SAIR.
That timeline is GOING to include all the ‘keyed-mike’ and ‘static’ moments
and the intervals between them as well just so that all of that is finally
documented and timestamped. What that all really means will be debated
for years to come but at least once… it needs to be accurately documented.
I am about half-finished with that.
In the meantime… I’d like to ask a couple of questions that I have asked
before but no one seems to have had any ideas or responses.
When I ask these questions… be advised I already have my own opinions
but that’s not the point. I want to know what everyone else who Mr.
Dougherty is patiently allowing to comment here thinks. That means
everyone. If Mr. Dougherty thinks its OK for you to be commenting here
then so do I. This is his website.
1) How much TIME do you think elapsed between the moment Granite
Mountain realized how much trouble they were in and the first “Breaking
in on Arizona 16 MAYDAY call came from (apparently) Captain Steed”.
Was it instantaneous?
Did they spend X seconds eliminating any other options and then deciding to
deploy before only then deciding to get on the radio?
Did they also find their potential deployment site first before making that call?
2) Regardless of the actual timing of the first MAYDAY call… how much TIME
do you think they spent actually LOCATING their potential deployment site,
even after spending X time making the actual decision to deploy?
Do you think they were already standing in it when they realized they had
a terrible decision to make?
Do you think they had to ‘back up’ or ‘go forward’ to find that site?
If any amount of searching was involved… how long do you think it took?
Followup: There’s actually an important ‘side’ question to all of
this that hasn’t been fully discussed yet.
WHO do you think made the actual decision to even try and
find a place to deploy?
If we accept the fact that Marsh was either way at the back of
this stretched-out line of 19 men… or hadn’t even really caught
up to them yet… then would Steed alone have made the
decision about what to do?
Did he stop and have a radio call with Marsh… back behind him…
about the situation before taking command and making any
decisions of his own?… or would Marsh simply have run up
to the front and discovered the decision had already been made?
Steed had command of the Crew, so I think it would’ve been his call. He may have sought some very quick counsel with Marsh on Crew Net, but I think ultimately it would’ve been Steed’s call. Marsh was fairly close and may have seen the same fire behavior, but he was not with the Crew at the time
I agree with you. I believe the final description of
this incident might be that while Eric Marsh might
have made the actual decision to leave the
black ( after obtaining Steed’s comfort-level )…
…the two crucial decisions after that…
1) Leave the two track road.
2) Deploy versus even trying anything else.
…belong to Captain Jesse Steed.
WTKTT Your climbing out on a very narrow limb to determine times from the flaming front or just before to static I think it would be foolish to even venture a guess. I also believe the static had nothing to do with GM keying any mikes there is absolutely no way to attach this to Marsh or any one. As an investigator my self this is way out side of any provable facts and is speculation. I will say again no one survived the first blast of superheated air in or out of a shelter. Its a proven fact on several other fatality fires. In seconds they were gone. I know you want more answers but no amount of speculation will not get you there.
it took you three months to come up with that revelation?
No just the questions he asked.
my comment above was meant for WTKTT…
i think you’re exactly right, that he has been climbing a narrow limb.
Reply to xxfullsailxx post
on January 9, 2014 at 7:24 pm
>> xxfullsailxx said.
>> it took you three months to come
>> up with that revelation?
Nope… but I believe I was the first
on this particular thread who
‘floated’ the idea that despite
anything the SAIR was trying to
say… there was no way that
Marsh could have been there at
the head of that line of men along
with Steed when the first MAYDAY
went out… and no all you guys seem
to accept that as fact.
That’s good… because I think it is.
Regarding your implication that
‘everybody already knew that Steed
was the one who made those
two crucial decisions’…
…if that is the case… and it’s also
evident from the evidence we can
now finally see the SAIT had all
along…
…let’s hear YOUR explanation for
why the SAIT made no attempt to
make this ‘obvious fact’ clear?
The taxpayers of Arizona paid a
LOT of money for that report.
If these ‘facts’ were ( as YOU
contend now ) ‘all so obvious’…
then why weren’t they IN that
(expensive) report?
Bad typo above.
I meant to type…
“…and NOW all you guys seem
to accept that as fact.”
because it doesn’t matter. the two of them ran that crew. the two of them made the decision to leave the black.
and no amount of “blame” doled out by some amateur wannabe journalist is going to change the fact that they all died.
Simply leaving the
black, is not what
killed them that day.
At least one ( possibly
two ) other crucial
decisions DID.
It doesn’t MATTER who
was making the decisions that caused
19 good employees
of the City of Prescott
Fire Department to die?
Really?
There are a whole bunch of lawsuits pending that beg to differ with you.
No one will EVER be able to answer the question of what they did, immediately before and after the moment that they saw what they saw.
I wasn’t asking for ‘answers’. I was ‘polling the
room’ for educated ( experienced) guesses.
But thanks for your response.
“I don’t want to take a guess” is a valid answer.
I don’t think there’s room in the room for an educated guess on this one. As Bob pointed out above, the limb is thin and there’s no place to go.
Fair enough.
I’m still going to include as much I
can as far as exact time intervals
in the ‘final moments’ timeline.
People will be talking about this for
years to come… but at least they
deserve better than the ‘a moment
later’ and a ‘short time after that’
crap that was in the “Story Assembled
Internally Report” thing.
Fullsail,
This is my response to your January 7th “hard evidence” question about Marsh and the “comfort level” radio transmssion.
“I’m basing my conclusion entirely on just HIS VOICE. So, I’m NOT basing any of this on logic or anything else. Totally, unequivocally based on HIS VOICE ALONE, his NC drawl and “ya know.” That’s my ‘hard’ evidence.
It’s definitely NOT L/O Mcdonaugh or Steed.”
I think you’re putting too much emphasis on who you think it might be based on circumstances. JUST LISTEN and you’ll recognize his voice.
So, if you just LISTEN to Marsh’s voice in this video clip, then rewatch the Mackenzie video clip and just close your eyes AND LISTEN. This video titled ‘2010 Granite Mountain Hotshots train hard’ has Marsh and Steed talk so you hear their voices, obviously calm.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aKT6TnRPMy4
yes, thanks for following up… without any other “hard” evidence, i can’t really argue against it being Marsh. and i certainly value your evaluation of the voice.
that being said, after listening to the two videos, i still can’t pin the voice to Marsh in my own head. and i have a hard time putting the conversation in context between Marsh and Steed. it’s much easier (for me) to visualize a context where Brendan would be saying those words… anyways, i’ll take your word for it.
Okay, fair enough, but how about this angle?
Brendan is just a Crewmember with 2-3 years of experience. I think that conversation was way above his level of experience. And the two guys talking were talking about strategy, above Brendan’s pay grade and experience level as far as I’m concerned. Just a thought.
yeah, that’s what’s funny…
i get the exact opposite impression of the statement. it sounds to me like unnecessary radio traffic all together… to me it sounds like a rookie lookout creating unnecessary radio traffic after he’s gotten a little nervous being chased out by the fire.
i don’t understand why Marsh would be checking on Steed’s comfort level while they’re sitting in the black watching the fire roll away from them…
Fullsail –
We do not have the entire conversation or any prior conversation. As such, it is a bit obtuse for us, but I think all involved understand it. I do not think Marsh is worried about Steed’s comfort where he is, but rather his comfort where he might be going. In that context, it is not superfluous at all. Remember, they pick and move in just a couple of minutes after this, they just have to be discussing moving.
Based on their fairly inexperienced Crew, the comment about “I/we haven’t felt comfortable all day ….” indicates to me that MAYBE Marsh was checking on ‘the boys’ as well. The Crew overhead didn’t seem to have given them any confidence that theIR 400 acre plus black up to their perfectly good SZ WAS FRIGGIN’ BOMB PROOF AND THE FIRE COULD NOT GET TO THEM.
Having heard Marsh’s voice before, I’ll go with Marsh as the one in the ‘ya know’ portion of the conversation.
As long as you guys are focusing on this one… any new opinions
on who owns that THIRD VOICE clearly heard in the second
MacKenzie video clip ( which we now know has a Canon
file name of MVI_0891.MOV ) ?
I am talking about the very start of that clip, when Marsh is
just finishing some other statement he was making with
his usual ‘ya know’ tag ending… and then SOMEONE ELSE
who is on the RADIO says ( in response to whatever Marsh
just said )… “You bet”.
Only after that mysterious third voice responds to Marsh
over the radio ( with modulation ) do we hear Steed say
“I copy… and it’s almost made it to that two-track road that
we walked in on.”
Someone else was participating in that conversation.
Someone who is probably still alive to talk about it.
WTKTT,
I don’t know whose voice that is. Whoever it is was on the GMHS frequency so that narrows it down quite a bit.
As per what someone said above about Brendan’s
‘greenhorn’ status… I would have to agree with that
and say that even though we KNOW Brendan
McDonough was just sitting in the GM Supervisor
truck at this time and listening to this entire
coversation… a two-year greenhorn would not be
the one saying “You bet” to his superior like his
opinion mattered, or something.
So that leaves only 1 of two possibilities…
Darrell Willis ( who has now also admitted he
had ‘clicked back onto there frequency’ at this
exact time ).
OR
It was just one of the other GM crew bosses who
might not have been with the whole group, either,
and felt the need to be chiming into that
conversation over the radio.
I believe that latter option is a non-starter.
So that leaves Darrell Willis.
Wildland Division Chief for the city of Prescott.
Helping ‘advise’ his employees.
You have to consider what was actually said.
The mysterious caller is the one that Marsh
was actually directing the end of his statement
TO. Whatever is was that Marsh said at that
time… it was one of his “I think this… ya know”
statements like we hear more fully in the
first video.
So you have to ask yourself…
WHO would Eric Marsh even be feeling he needs
to EXPLAIN himself to out there in Yarnell that
day over the crew’s own PRIVATE frequency?
When that other person says “You bet” in response
to whatever it was Marsh just said… you can take
that to mean “I agree with you”.
The only other person in Yavapai County that day
that Marsh would even need to obtain any kind
of agreement from over Granite Mountains own
PRIVATE radio channel other than the people we
SEE in the video…
…would have been Darrell Willis.
why are you assuming that radio traffic was over GM’s crew net?
btw, i think it’s the same person saying, “you know” and “you bet”… there’s no break in the traffic and the BK’s don’t deal with radio traffic on top of one another very well.
besides, i know lots of people who say, “you know” at the end of sentences and they’re not all related to E. Marsh or from the south.
I’m familiar with Eric Marsh’s voice and the ‘you know’ portion sounds like him to me.
Are you just as sure, then,
that the “You bet!”
which comes right
after that… is NOT him?
To me, ‘you bet’ sounds similar, but 100% sure, no.
Fullsail,
I COMPLETELY AGREE WITH YOU ON THIS. I’ve listened to it about 50 times and that’s the EXACT conclusion I came to!
Have to part ways with you here though. The “ya know” is definitely Marsh
everybody says “you know” !!!!!!!!!!, but fine, part ways.
Ok, but “you know” and “ya know” are a might different. He says “ya know” jes lak a Suthunah.
I’m assuming it’s on the GMHS Crew Net because it’s so quick after “ya know.” If it was on another channel, just the scan mode alone would take at least 1-2 seconds to respond, don’t you think?.
See below. The other
convincing evidence that we
are, in fact, hearing a ‘private’
conversation on the
GM intra-crew is the fact that
not one single other person
interviewed with regards to
this conversation says that
they heard any part of it.
It also falls in the exact
timerange when even the
SAIR says Brendan
McDonough heard every
word of the ‘discussing their
option’ conversation on the
GM intra-crew… but then
doesn’t say one single word
about anything that was
actually said. One of the
most critical moments of
the day and the SAIR
acknowledged it happened
and that it was all ‘heard’
by someone who had that
private frequency… but then
just went right on their way in
the ‘narrative’.
Well.. I’m not sure what audio you guys are
listening to but I don’t think there is any
possibility the person who ends that
statement and completes their ‘thought’ with
“…ya know” at the very start of that video
could possibly be the same voice then
responding right away with “You bet!”.
Different timbre. Different tonal placement,
even a slightly different volume level than
the previous speaker.
By the way… listen closely… I think we
DO hear the word that Marsh says right
before he ends his statement with ‘ya know’.
I believe he actually says…
“strange… ya know”.
So he was describing something he
thought was ‘strange’… and then the
mysterious third person agrees with
him and says “You bet”.
Also… who in the heck ever says “You bet”
right after they have finished a statement
with “ya know”?
Try it a few times yourself.
That just doesn’t make any sense.
“ya know” is the end of a statement, just
as we hear Eric ending his other statement
in the first video. It means “I’m done now”.
“You bet” is a RESPONSE.
It means “I agree with what you just said.”
and/or “I approve of what you just said”.
Regarding whether or not this conversation
is actually taking place on the Granite
Mountain PRIVATE intra-crew frequency…
I think this was discussed to death early on
and I also don’t think there’s any doubt
about that.
The SAIT interviewed just about anyone who
was there that day and talking on all the
other channels… or at least anyone who
had any business talking to Eric Marsh
directly that day ( and most certainly
around that crucial time ) about anything…
and NOT ONE OF THEM recalls or
recounts any moment of these particular
‘casual’ conversation(s) that we can hear
for ourselves, thanks to poor Chistopher
MacKenzie.
It also just sounds like the kind of ‘casual’
talk that takes place over a private channel
and not the kind of ‘official talk’ with
source/destination identifiers you are more
likely to hear on the command channels.
Notice that after Marsh says “strange… ya
know”… and then someone else just
responds ( conversationally ) with
“You bet”… Steed also responds just
conversationally ( without identifying
himself ) with “I copy… and it’s almost
made it to that two-track road we walked
in on.”
That sure sounds like a casual, private
conversation over a private radio
channel to me and knowing you aren’t
confusing anyone or violating any
established ‘identify yourself first” command
channel protocol(s).
Your mileage may vary ( and obviously
does… but all opinions are relevant. )
I happen to with another group of people this
evening who are also discussing this incident and
I ran the “strange… ya know” and “You bet!’
query/response scenario by them… and one of
them actually came up with a plausible explanation
for when someone would say those two things
together and it would make any sense at all.
Caveat: I still do not believe the voice that says
“You bet” is the same one that says “strange…
ya know”… but I now do believe the following
would make sense.
WARNING: I have to ‘make some conversation
up’ here in order to have this make any sense.
What we MIGHT be hearing is simply a quick
response from Marsh to a query or a statement
that needed acknowledging from Steed himself.
Example…
Steed asks: “Do you think it’s all gone to crap?”
Marsh responds: “Nothing would surprise me today
since it’s all been so strange… ya know. You bet!”
So it’s just a southerner answering a question
that was just put to HIM.
Repeat caveat: I still think there are two different
voices there in that query/response… but if there
is, in fact, only one… then this would make
sense out of what we are actually hearing.
I’m curious as to what tatics Marquez wanted to use?
According to his interview testimony w/ ADOSH, he realized they could not tie the lines in, and they needed more resources. I don’t have the interview in front of me, but I am pretty sure he wanted to get more resources, get an accurate MAP (or first-hand assessment), and then regroup from there.
These ‘roads’ that are now often discussed had
actually always been part of a ‘defensive plan’ for
Yarnell that was developed locally even years before
this incident. One of the local plans had always been
to ‘widen’ that very road they were working on as
part of the firebreak that morning and some of that
work had already been done. That’s why the ‘old-grader’
was there in the first place. It was being used to widen
that very road some years before but it broke down
out there somewhere and just got left there. I believe it
was Chief Andersen ( who lives in Glen Ilah ) who talked
about all of this in one of his interviews. He never saw
that plan as a viable option because of the way those
two-track roads and trails ‘twist and turn’ and change
directions and a strong fire would just be able to ‘jump over’
or ‘jump between/around’ the twists and turns anyway,
especially with a good wind behind it.
Perhaps that is exactly what Marquez saw himself
when he showed up that day. The plan itself just simply
wasn’t all that viable.
Despite whatever else happened between Marsh
and Marquez… there is also evidence that Marsh
AGREED with him on this.
It is Rance Marquez that tells us that as early as 1400
( 2:00 PM ) it was Eric Marsh himself who was already
realizing GM wasn’t doing much good up there at all and
started talking about abandoning the ‘plan’ and start just
thinking more about ‘point protection’ versus any kind of
overall line containment.
Coincidentally… that is the exact time ( 2:00 PM ) that
the hikers who were up there in the same area with
Marsh and Granite Mountain had already realized they
needed to (quote) “get the hell out of there”. They had
already seen the winds starting to change and the fire
starting to run and Tex Gilligan knew instinctively ( even
that early in the afternoon ) that it was ‘no place to be’ anymore.
From page 37 of the YIN document…
SAIT interview with Rance Marquez…
1400-1415: I got back on the horn with Eric to iron out the plan. Eric suggested and I agreed to go back and find another way in; possibly the Shrine Rd. He mentioned, the we need to consider point protection. No division breaks were decided on. I found that a lot of the roads on the maps aren’t actually there. My conversation with Eric led me to believe that he felt he wasn’t going to be effective where they were.
For only-a-short-time-DIVS Z Marquez said “My conversation with Eric led me to believe that he felt he wasn’t going to be effective where they were.”
Yes, they were hanging out in their SZ, that’s what you do. You are effective in being safe, NOT productivity effective. The work is OUTSIDE the SZ.
If you are going to leave said perfectly good SZ, you do it early in the morning when there is NO INTENSE FIRE BEHAVIOR, NOT AT 1630 WHEN THE BIG DOG IS EATING!
This link is for a survey dealing with mobile technologies in Fire and Aviation Management through the Wildland Mobile Technology Working Group, that you may be interested in filling out when you make the time.
https://docs.google.com/a/firenet.gov/forms/d/1xAJNHXIP4AsYXa76NjzTtNNKW5zv9LCBqT7KIeU6OzY/viewform
exactly WHO are you looking to fill this out? was this sent out on the FS mailing list?
because i don’t really want Joe Q. Public’s input on what our technology should look like…
Maybe so. Here’s what I got. There’s SOME of you out there that are WFF.
“All:
This informal request for information is an effort to further evaluate the use of mobile technologies in fire and aviation management. Your feedback and insight will improve the Mobile Technology Working Group’s situational awareness in terms of technology use and needs in the field. This information will assist the working group in determining requirements for the benefit of the fire and aviation community. The Wildland Mobile Technologies Working Group is a newly chartered group under the Wildland Fire Information and Technology Board. For more information on the working group please visit the Forests and Rangelands Website below.
http://www.forestsandrangelands.gov/WFIT/governance/wmtwg.shtml
Your responses to this electronic form are completely confidential. Your name or email address will never be associated with answers you provide.
We appreciate your time and feedback. Please pass this request along to members of your fire and aviation community.
https://docs.google.com/a/firenet.gov/forms/d/1xAJNHXIP4AsYXa76NjzTtNNKW5zv9LCBqT7KIeU6OzY/viewform
Tyler Hackney
Wildland Mobile Technologies Working Group-Chair
Fire, Aviation and Air
US Forest Service Northern Region
office: 406-329-4935
cell: 406-544-0371
email: [email protected]“
RTS or fullsail would you go back and check the Captain question that came up I am not sure on the current designation I was discussing with WTKTT.
Bob,
Several years ago, the Hot Shots decided to follow the lead of the R-5 CA Hot Shots and call their Assistants and/or Foreman, Captains. Some Crews have one Captain and some have two Captains.
This should be reflected in their Standards for IHC Operations. They call it “The SIHCO” for short. That’s right, like sicko.
http://www.fs.fed.us/fire/people/hotshots/ihc_stds.pdf
So, a Captain is the same as an Assistant Superintendent or a Foreman.
OK that makes it clearer, although I would have thought the Super. Would be Captain. Thanks
Something I posted way upthread last night as a reply to WTKTT’s saying it’s been a good 24 hours. I’ll post it again so it doesn’t stay lost:
And I’ll add to that a bit of my day’s progress. I determined that the pink thing you spotted in the SAIT photo is not the iphone. It’s one end of a long pink strap that says “Pull Ring To Open.” That’s the strap from a fire shelter.
I’m still looking for Clayton Whitted’s pack.
I’ve read all the site investigations documents and have found nothing at all written about Chris MacKenzie’s Canon Powershot camera, anywhere, even though it was specifically photographed during that site investigation.
And I have an inventory of the cellphones.
Namaste!
I’m not sure I want to trigger the massive controversy over “should they have run,” But. I was looking, earlier today, at the FOIA aerial photos Elizabeth was posting on her Google + account. I think she was posting them just as I was downloading them. And I was struck by something. Looking at the photo “IMG_0180.jpg” by “MTDC” in her album “Photos from the Air from one of the SAIT Investigators” made me wonder.
The deployment site, just above the white truck in the photo, is all grey, i.e. all burned over. Just a not very long distance above the deployment site is a significantly larger-than-the-deployment-site area that is definitely brown. Not burned at all. Clean dirt. One of those clearings, and, I think the biggest one, that has been mentioned before. I know folks here have argued and argued about “sheltering/hunkering” in the boulders ad nauseum, but is there any possibility that if, instead of trying to clear the site they were in, they had pulled back to that already clear clearing and deployed there, they might have survived? I know this is 20/20 hindsight, but I’m just wondering.
Marti,
The probablity is that the blast of heat estimated at up to 2000 degrees filled the entire bowl, so that every place within the bowl could not sustain life.
Agree. Especially after I read what Bob Powers wrote up above. No way.
It is a hard thing to realize but also a thankful thing for the families, there was no pain or burning to death slowly. Also Marti I hope they do not release the pictures of the bodies. A detective magazine back in 1953 got ahold of the pictures of the bodies of the Rattle Snake fire and put an article out with the pictures. My dads family and my mother were devastated by it some well meaning friend gave it to my aunt. I am sure the coroners report is bad enough. Yes I did look at the Magazine in my 50’s
and then thru it away.
Let’s take a breather here and help Sonny out here on my 1976 jeep wagoneer —no reverse quadra trac— why is my reverse stop working? Any guidance from any of you here? it won’t shift up into high range/gear? Only goes forward in low range. any guidance. Joy tried to google it but not finding any information so hoping one of you know vintage Jeeps—may have to ring up smoke jumper Murray Taylor- maybe he knows.
sonny-
have you heard of pirate4X4.com? i think that would be a more appropriate venue… it’s a 4wd forum with lots of helpful folks where you can ask tech related questions…
http://www.pirate4x4.com/forum/67-jeep-non-hardcore/
but careful, there’s some “snarky” individuals over there!
In the past, the deletion of a comment when a chapter has been this full of comments, has caused the thread to go haywire. I think we’re really close to starting chapter 4, especially if a comment gets hung up on the bottom like it appears one has. Just sayin………..
I should have said ‘coincided with the thread going haywire”, instead of “caused”.
This is a new video from the Globe Type 2 Crew. You are gonna want to watch this!
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YWkM_2fa4k0
I wish the “you tuber” 4490red was in this discussion. His pictures and videos are of great significance…
I totally agree. And I told him so. So did Sonny. And he thanked both of us. I think everybody should see this.
Someone said somewhere he was the source of the “Last Minutes” video. I’m in a bit of confusion about that. I don’t know how we know that for sure. Other than that he was head-camming. And also I think the bearded guy who is riding shot-gun with him in the truck and in some other photos is the bearded guy with the radio at the Shrine. He hasn’t posted those videos on his YouTube channel or on this video. Why would they have gone from Peeples Valley to the Shrine Road spot? How did get those videos out in such an important way??? I would love it if we could get him to talk with us.
Go to YouTube and hook up with him as a comment like author John Macean did.
“John N Maclean1 month ago
4490red, Would very much like to communicate with you regarding the Yarnell videos, which provide outstanding info that needs a bit of explanation. This is a serious inquiry. I can be reached via [email protected]. You can check me out at JohnMacleanBooks.com.”
Yes, I’ve been kinda sorta thinking about doing something like that. Thx!
NV,
“(Marquez certainly is looking better and better in terms of the judgment he exercised, which while intuitive did seem to understand the fire behavior given fuel type and conditions that day),….”
Based on what the guys said that worked for Marquez on the earlier Doce Fire, this guy was “out of his element,” “clueless,” and comments like that.
I think in this case he was those things already mentioned, ANS just plain scared out of his wits and so that is probably more like it that day. NOT good qualities for a DIVS. And I also call into question HOW he left the fire. He just bailed. He didn’t even suggest to anyone to take his place, call OPS, nothing.
Eh, he had what seems to have been words with Marsh (Marsh had given you attitude several times in the past, RTS, so it doesn’t sound too surprising that he and Marquez encountered a difficult moment or two), then concluded, correctly, that the fire was going to roll that day, and that different tactics and more crews were needed.
Again, Marquez is looking better and better off of this. If his advice had been followed, it sounds to me like some of the homes that were lost in Yarnell may have been saved, and that 19 men may have been alive today, that aren’t.
There’s an echo of what Marquez was saying in the ADOSH fine, for that matter.
It doesn’t sound like Marquez disengaged particularly well. But his actions afterward make sense (realizing that things were disorganized and info was lacking, he went to ICP and requested more resources and maps). I would be interested in knowing how many resources he actually had under his control at that point. As bad as it was (apparently) not telling OPS about leaving, I’d be at least as concerned about his forces not being in the loop.
As currently reported, I agree that Marquez may not have disengaged as well as possible. One thing to bear in mind in that kind of situation is among other things a good CYA record, which certainly is not public if he did create it. One moral hazard in all of this is that it looks much more admirable from the outside to have stayed with a suppression strategy and tactics that given fuel type and weather was bound to be ineffective, at best, than it does to have said “this isn’t working” and to have suggested different tactics and requested more resources.
I’m okay with the ‘it’s not working, not effective’ stance, and I’ve done that on many fires. What I have a hard time with is HOW he did it. He simply ABANDONED his supervisory position and that is totally unacceptable to me.
Regarding the “One moral hazard in all of this is that it looks much more admirable from the outside to have stayed with a suppression strategy and tactics [when it] …. was bound to be ineffective ….” comment:
This is actually pretty common UNFORTUNATELY and is part of the Bad Decisions With Good Outcomes chain. They barely get away with it and so why not push it a little further next time and ….. It’s a chain that needs to be recognized as very hazardous and then broken before it’s to late.
This is a great point. We all carry an Incident Response Pocket Guide (IRPG) with us into the field. It’s about the size of a smart phone.
http://www.nwcg.gov/pms/pubs/nfes1077/nfes1077.pdf
Pages 17-18 are specifically about how to turn down an assignment. I think these instructions (released in 2003) were primarily intended to create an option for WFFs to address safety concerns professionally. They smooth the way to saying, “I have issues with this assignment, instead I propose…” Ideally, they keep people from taking on assignments that are unsafe or that they are not ready or equipped for, and also keep *everyone informed* of the situation.
WFFs tend to be the sorts of people who feel uncomfortable when not busy and engaged, and they expect their peers to be the same way. Some of this subcultural pressure is good (it keeps us honest and hardworking), but it also leaves a slight discomfort about disengaging. The weird thing is, hotshots probably have the best records of intelligent disengagement, and news accounts report GMIHS having done just that on previous fires. (Another reason why this incident is so frustrating and sad.)
Marquez would have known all of this, so it’s odd that someone of DIVS qualification wouldn’t have followed protocol, even in such a chaotic environment. I feel I don’t know enough to be sure what he did and didn’t do that day.
Marquez SHOULD have known all this, but he didn’t act like it. So, to me, if he WOULD have know all this then he WOULD have done what was required of his position. He did NOT!
WTKTT has been trying to come to this conclusion for quite some time now:
“that means we CAN assume Marsh ( or others with radios ) were still alive at those times under their shelters and trying to contact B33. That adds MINUTES to the time before the fire might actually have reached them that day”
he’s going to try to “save the day” again…
i guess i’m wondering what anyone else thinks about that?
Fullsail,
I kinda asked the same question above a few days ago. I think it’s possible.
” So then, I think some of those several almost pure static transmissions we hear SEVERAL minutes into the Bravo 33 conversation with DIVS A Marsh and GMHS COULD have been Marsh transmitting his radio from inside his shelter or at least trying to. Maybe.”
yes, i think it’s quite possible those bits of static were possibly someone from GM too…
my question is really:
does that make you think that the time from when Marsh says, “AFFIRM!” to the point he entered his shelter should be added to their possible escape time?
how about the time between entering the fire shelter and the first bit of static we hear after GM goes silent on the radio?
was that time “survivable” ?
(i am just preempting WTKTT’s next leap here)
Maybe several seconds, but no much that would have really mattered.
They certainly would have been better off running toward the Ranch and lighter fuels instead of trying to ‘build’ and burnout a SZ in the chaparral.
yeah, i don’t think that was an option for them at that point… but that’s just my opinion.
I have a problem–Marsh was found outside his shelter dose that tell you any thing? I am going to be as blunt as I can here and it hurts so take it for granted the super heated air fried there lungs with in fractions of a second they died instantly. A hand on a radio mussel contraction from the heat of 2000 degrees. In or outside the shelters your first gasp for oxygen is your last. They died before they ever felt the pain of heat. Any body on the fire could have bumped a mike on the fire. You can research it a 1000+ degrees when you breath it will immediately fry your lungs they were in the worst place they could be. Not survivable the entire bowl was a super heated oven at the first flash over.
i hear what you’re saying bob… and agree. i can’t say that they didn’t die a painful death though, especially those that tried to remain in their shelters.
it’s WTKTT who can’t seem to let go of trying to save the dead.
he is going to try to argue that they had minutes more that they wasted when they deployed their shelters that could have been better spent running… and that the time between deploying and the first static transmissions should be counted towards their time running as well.
I think the Immediate heat that first hit them was to much in a shelter to have survived the snap of a finger. The FF on storm King, The El Cariso crew, several fatality fires where they deployed and died. The fire shelter is not a air seal device you cant hold your breath for ever. Put a 2000 deg. blow torch on a fire shelter (potato backer) how long can it and the person inside who is much more frail with stand that intensity? I do not believe they felt what hit them. My opinion but I have studied it for a long time since I was old enough to study my fathers death, no Fire shelter was immediate no pain instant. I am sure almost the same heat that GM experienced but never stated back then. Super heated air just before the fire hits is instance, then the fire blow torch and then then the burning of every thing to the ground.
Bob, I think you are correct. It happened so fast, I severely doubt that their minds even had time to process the pain. For lack of a better phrase, it was just like a light switch being turned off.
Eric,
I cut-and-pasted this from yesterday’s post regarding the deployment issue and hopefully it clarifies things somewhat and maybe naswers a question or two.
“And why they didn’t they all deploy on the YHF? Here’s a theory based on what occurred on the 1994 South Canyon (Storm King Mountain) Fire.
There’s a research paper by Ted Putnam titled 1994. Analysis of Escape Efforts and Personal Protective or something like that (but I cannot find it online anywhere, only references to it). Anyway, Putnam couldn’t figure out WHY all the PHS, SMJ, and WFF died ON THEIR BACKS and in many cases outside their fire shelters. His theory was that while hiking up the ‘bastard steep’ slope to the ridgeline, the SUPER HOT GASES preceeding the advancing fire front, loudly rustling through the brush below and behind them, startled them – they turned around to see what it was and WHAM, the hot gases bowled them all over onto their backs, killing them.
Just a thought and something I’ve read before. And I think the YHF is very close to the South Canyon Fire.”
I certainly would not dismiss it, especially with so many parallels with Yarnell Hill and The South Canyon fires…..
Thank you.
* *Marti Reed on January 7, 2014 at 8:52 pm
” What else could have caused people who were trained to deploy by sheltering face-down to have been found face-up, on top of or disconnected from their shelters?” **
Marti, I have been putting much though into this question myself for a while now. What I believe is there are several reasons. These reasons may be different for each man or be in combination:
Reason 1: Some men simply ran out of time and were overcome by the hot gases that preceded the flaming front prior to fully deploying there shelters.
You may be able to make a correlation to rank vs. men found in shelters? Higher the rank the last to be in shelters.
Reason 2: Before the shelters actually failed, the consumption of breathing air by the fire itself may have resulted in oxygen deprivation and/or the superheated gases may have displaced oxygen and resulted in hypoxia (suffocation).
Reason 3: In my own mind, If I were alive long enough to realize I was being burnt alive, my instinct would be to escape. Once out of the shelter you would perish immediately. This would not be a fault in training but an involuntary reaction to a stimulus..
Reason 4:(Warning: This may be disturbing for some readers) Some of the shelters may have come off post mortem. Once the men perished they would no longer be actively holding down their shelters from inside. The effects of the intense heat can cause the body to constrict and/or flex. Potentially disturbing the shelter and causing it to come loose. The intense wind and heat could easily rip off an unsecured shelter.
This is something that should be possible to glean from autopsy results. We already have seen documentation that the official cause of death was from thermal injuries and inhalation of superheated gases. YCSO report documents this.
Actual Location of thermal injuries (on the front, back or sides of victim) can indicate if they were prone the entire time or supine the entire time. The position of the victim (Fetal Position, or fully flexed, etc.) would also be crucial clues to reconstruct of actual event. The condition of the airway and lung tissue, blood gases, etc. all can indicate and cohobate a conclusion.
I do not believe we will ever find what the actual autopsy results indicate. From a forensic standpoint this information is important, however this treads into the “very sensitive” arena and anyone can appreciate the privacy concerns of the family’s. The results of this could just add undue pain and suffering to the family’s lives…
Thank you, Eric, for writing this. As gruesome as it all is to contemplate, I found myself wondering. I was wondering if the wind could actually have rolled them over. I had to deal with contemplating the reality that my brother fell head-first off a 300 foot cliff. Someone told me he probably died of shock before he hit the ground. That helped, even if I don’t know if it was true. I’m thinking that might also be true in some of this. Making my job that of combing the site via the photography because I’m a photographer is pretty hard for a lot of reasons. I’m probably not going to stay with it very much longer.
Marti, I can not fault you one bit for withdrawing from any of this. It is just an ugly, dark, depressing and sad situation. At the same time, I believe you are onto something. Correlating shelter location to body location and autopsy results may be a major “human factor” break through…It won’t change the out come of the event but for some, information can be a way of making piece with it….
Thank you Eric. I appreciate your participation in this also.
Reply to Elizabeth post on January 8, 2014 at 7:34 am
>> Elizabeth said…
>>
>> The video that tracks the movements of Blue Ridge Superintendent
>> Brian Frisby is now working at:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j8cEKBzlhws
It certainly is. Thank you, Elizabeth!
Whatever I did to help get this working and viewable by everyone still doesn’t
compare to the work/effort you have put into making these materials available
in the first place… so thanks again!
However… I think it was a mistake to change the title of the video to say
“as amended/edited for uploading”.
When I simply ‘converted’ the video to other formats… nothing was
‘amended’ or ‘edited’ in ANY way. It is a true copy of the original.
If you feel you need to label it as ‘not the AVI original’ then I would just say ‘reformatted for uploading’, or something like that.
No big whoop… but I thought I would just point that out.
>> Elizabeth also said…
>> I am waiting to hear from Frisby about whether the GPS device was on
>> him personally or on someone else, b/c the FOIA/FOIL text says it was
>> on the “BR Capt.” but the BR listing on the internet does not list a captain.
I don’t think the world is ever going to see Brian Frisby voluntarily offer ANY
additional information on that day, or EVER answer any simple questions
ever again ( even if/when his employers give him permission to do so ) unless
he is called to testify as a witness in any/all of the ongoing litigation ( which
is highly likely ).
I think he’s like Brendan McDonough.
It would appear that, even without any employer/employee obligations and/or
directives in place… he simply does not WANT to ‘talk about it’.
Maybe someday… but I don’t think anytime soon.
That’s OK. I think we can pretty much tell now that despite what the title of
this video is… it does NOT specifically track the movements of BR Supt.
that day. It is much more likely that Trueheart ( BR Assistant Sup and/or Cap )
was the one with the tracker on him personally that day… ALL day.
That actually solves some mysteries seen in the video itself such as there
being no evidence that anyone from Blue Ridge ever did go over to the
old-grader to ‘pick up Brendan McDonough’. If that really was just Frisby
by himself on the ATV… and Trueheart still had the tracker… then that
would explain WHY there is no GPS evidence of that ‘pickup’.
It also explains why we see the GPS tracker ‘breaking through’ the firelines and
making it all the way out to the ridge to search for GM… when there is
photographic evidence of Frisby remaining at the Ranch House Restaurant
during that time. It was Trueheart ( and some other BR guys? ) making
those trips, and not Frisby.
It is Trueheart that we see ‘running like heck’ down to the deployment site
from the exact same point GM left the ridge and following the exact same
drainage path the SAIR says GM took that day… all in 4 (FOUR) minutes.
It is Trueheart that we see at the deployment site for 30 minutes.
It is Trueheart that we then see making the ‘ascent’ all the way up from
the deployment site back to the top of the ridge in less than 10 minutes.
Trueheart had the GPS tracker that day… not Frisby.
Until we hear different… I think that’s what we have to assume.
>> Elizabeth also said…
>> b/c the FOIA/FOIL text says it was on the “BR Capt.” but the
>> BR listing on the internet does not list a captain.
Your’re right. It does not. ( See official PUBLIC National Interagency
Hotshot Crew (NIHC) contact list for Blue Ridge shown below ).
That public NIHC contact sheet does, however, list Trueheart as ‘Assistant
Superintendent’ and I think ( not positive ) that means he can/should also
be (automatically?) considered the ‘Captain’ in that group, if there isn’t
another position by that name also listed. See below.
National Interagency Hotshot Crews (NIHC) Contact Information…
Blue Ridge IHC, Coconino NF
Mogollon District, 8738 Ranger Road, Happy Jack, AZ 86024
Duty location for crew: Happy Jack, AZ
Brian Frisby, Superintendent
Email: bfrisby (at) fs.fed.us
(928) 477-5023
Rogers Trueheart Brown, Assistant Superintendent
Email: rtbrown (at) fs.fed.us
(928) 477-5024
Travis Fuller, Squad Boss
Email: tefuller (at) fs.fed.us
(928) 477-5027
Michael Gordon, Squad Boss
Email: mjgordon (at) fs.fed.us
( 928) 477-5027
Cory Ball, Squad Boss
(928) 477-5022
Email: cjball (at) fs.fed.us
Blue Ridge Hotshots FAX number…
(928) 477-5057 (Fax)
No Captain– That is because many Hot Shot Crews still go by Superintendent and Asst. Superintendent. And not the Captain ranking, things are sometimes slow to change In Federal Government nomenclature. Engine foreman have started changing the name over to Captain with new job descriptions and some crews depending on location.
Thanks, Mr. Powers… but just to be clear ( and to clear up
Elizabeth’s original confusion )… when an entire “Special
Accident Investigations Team” sponsored by the Arizona
Forestry Commission ( with Federal WF agency participation as well ) ends up continually referencing
“Blue Ridge Captain” and/or “BR Capt” in their reports for
a Hotshot team that does NOT, itself, list any ‘Captain’
position whatsoever… that report can be assumed to be
referring to the ‘Assistant Superintendent’ instead…
Yes?
WTKTT,
The answer to that would be yes. Note that Steed was the ‘Capt’ of GM, which also would be considered the Asst. Sup. for that crew.
Also, for clarification, it’s the “Serious Accident Investigation Team”.
NO
With GM your looking at the job descriptions of a county fire dept. and pay scale. With BR your looking at a FS Job description and pay scale two different terminologies. Maybe I am wrong and RTS can clarify.
Bob,
The hotshot side of the city of Prescott kept their job descriptions within the terminolgy of the wildland world. For example, there are no Superintendents, Squad Bosses, Sawyers, etc, in the fire department OTHER than on the wildland crew. The Captain designation seems to have come about fairly recently, along with some Forest Service personnel being now being designated ‘Battalion Chiefs’, which is also from the structural world.
Thanks— so Superintendents are Batt. Chiefs and Asst. are captains?
Bob, I can’t answer that question entirely because I don’t know how all the cross-ranking evolved with the feds. I have seen green FS pick-ups (FMO/AFMO?) with designations of DC and BC (Division Chief or Battalion Chief) which are equal in rank in the structural world. I don’t think the Supt. is a BC, he’s still a supt. But now you also have engine captains, crew captains, etc, as opposed to engine bosses, etc. To make it more confusing, there doesn’t seem to uniformity across the board with this within the fed world.
actually, i think the changes in designators started as early as 2005 in some regions… but i’m pretty sure, as with most things in WFF, everyone just followed Region 5’s lead…
“Chiefs” are forest-level FMO’s
“Divisions” are district FMO’s
“Battalion Chiefs” are district AFMO’s (both in fuels and fire suppression) this is what Chief Willis would be considered in the Feds….
“Superintendents” are just that, but on the Fed side they and BC’s are both the same pay grade (GS-9’s)…
“Captains” and “Asst. Sups” are the same thing on crews, i think all are GS-8’s… up to the local forest/region as to how the crew’s are configured.
it is funny all the different configurations for crews. some have a Sup and two Captains, some have three squad bosses, some have four, etc.
i guess maybe Chief Willis could have been called a “Division Chief” in PFD’s wildland division… so he could be considered Marsh’s boss…
fullsail, you are correct about Willis being a Div Chief. That being said, in the structural world, that rank is equal to a Battalion Chief, they just have different areas of responsibility. For those on here that don’t know, Willis retired as the PFD fire chief some years ago.
Thanks fellas… but yikes!… I had no idea the confusion
would spread far beyond the “Story Assembled Internally
Report” itself. I was just trying to help answer Elizabeth’s
( justifiable ) question about who the heck the SAIR is
really talking about when they continually say “BR Capt”.
There is no “BR Capt” listed for Blue Ridge on their
public NIHC crew roster.
Can we at least ASSUME that when the SAIR refers
to a “BR Capt”… that they are ALWAYS talking about
Trueheart Brown ( Assistant Sup ) and there’s no
chance that from time to time they meant anyone
OTHER than him like a “squad boss” or “crew boss”
or “platoon leader” or whatever the heck those guys
are really called?
BTW: Speaking of PAY scales… do any of these
sub-designations like “crew boss” or “sawyer”
entitle you to different PAY than the other guys?
On a crew there would be different pay scales from 1st. year crewman/ 3or4 yr. crewman/ squad boss/maybe sawyer/captain/ superintendent. They are all different pay levels. Forest Service start at GS 3,4,5,6,7 and 9 part time and full time positions and crewman years of experience etc.
And wow I guess I better keep up with better informed, that’s what happens when your retired for to long and don’t pay attention to the changes. Thanks everyone for the info.
regarding pay scales:
are you asking about Feds, States, Counties, or Municipalities? cause i can only really speak about the Feds…
if you’re talking about the Feds are you talking about USDA or DOI? FS or FWS? NPS or BLM or BIA? are you asking about AD hires or GS employees or WG’s?
Reply to Elizabeth post on January 8, 2014 at 7:34 am
>> Elizabeth said…
>>
>> The video that tracks the movements of Blue Ridge Superintendent
>> Brian Frisby is now working at:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j8cEKBzlhws
It certainly is. Thank you, Elizabeth!
Whatever I did to help get this working and viewable by everyone still doesn’t
compare to the work/effort you have put into making these materials available
in the first place… so thanks again!
However… I think it was a mistake to change the title of the video to say
“as amended/edited for uploading”.
When I simply ‘converted’ the video to other formats… nothing was
‘amended’ or ‘edited’ in ANY way. It is a true copy of the original.
If you feel you need to label it as ‘not the AVI original’ then I would just say ‘reformatted for uploading’, or something like that.
No big whoop… but I thought I would just point that out.
>> Elizabeth also said…
>> I am waiting to hear from Frisby about whether the GPS device was on
>> him personally or on someone else, b/c the FOIA/FOIL text says it was
>> on the “BR Capt.” but the BR listing on the internet does not list a captain.
I don’t think the world is ever going to see Brian Frisby voluntarily offer ANY
additional information on that day, or EVER answer any simple questions
ever again ( even if/when his employers give him permission to do so ) unless
he is called to testify as a witness in any/all of the ongoing litigation ( which
is highly likely ).
I think he’s like Brendan McDonough.
It would appear that, even without any employer/employee obligations and/or
directives in place… he simply does not WANT to ‘talk about it’.
Maybe someday… but I don’t think anytime soon.
That’s OK. I think we can pretty much tell now that despite what the title of
this video is… it does NOT specifically track the movements of BR Supt.
that day. It is much more likely that Trueheart ( BR Assistant Sup and/or Cap )
was the one with the tracker on him personally that day… ALL day.
That actually solves some mysteries seen in the video itself such as there
being no evidence that anyone from Blue Ridge ever did go over to the
old-grader to ‘pick up Brendan McDonough’. If that really was just Frisby
by himself on the ATV… and Trueheart still had the tracker… then that
would explain WHY there is no GPS evidence of that ‘pickup’.
It also explains why we see the GPS tracker ‘breaking through’ the firelines and
making it all the way out to the ridge to search for GM… when there is
photographic evidence of Frisby remaining at the Ranch House Restaurant
during that time. It was Trueheart ( and some other BR guys? ) making
those trips, and not Frisby.
It is Trueheart that we see ‘running like heck’ down to the deployment site
from the exact same point GM left the ridge and following the exact same
drainage path the SAIR says GM took that day… all in 4 (FOUR) minutes.
It is Trueheart that we see at the deployment site for 30 minutes.
It is Trueheart that we then see making the ‘ascent’ all the way up from
the deployment site back to the top of the ridge in less than 10 minutes.
Trueheart had the GPS tracker that day… not Frisby.
Until we hear different… I think that’s what we have to assume.
>> Elizabeth also said…
>> b/c the FOIA/FOIL text says it was on the “BR Capt.” but the
>> BR listing on the internet does not list a captain.
Your’re right. It does not. ( See official PUBLIC National Interagency
Hotshot Crew (NIHC) contact list for Blue Ridge shown below ).
That public NIHC contact sheet does, however, list Trueheart as ‘Assistant
Superintendent’ and I think ( not positive ) that means he can/should also
be (automatically?) considered the ‘Captain’ in that group, if there isn’t
another position by that name also listed. See below.
National Interagency Hotshot Crews (NIHC) Contact Information…
Blue Ridge IHC, Coconino NF
Mogollon District, 8738 Ranger Road, Happy Jack, AZ 86024
Duty location for crew: Happy Jack, AZ
Brian Frisby, Superintendent
Email: [email protected]
(928) 477-5023
Rogers Trueheart Brown, Assistant Superintendent
Email: [email protected]
(928) 477-5024
Travis Fuller, Squad Boss
Email: [email protected]
(928) 477-5027
Michael Gordon, Squad Boss
Email: [email protected]
( 928) 477-5027
Cory Ball, Squad Boss
(928) 477-5022
Email: [email protected]
Blue Ridge Hotshots FAX number…
(928) 477-5057 (Fax)
Mr. Dougherty… apologies… you can delete this entire
comment above. I accidentally sent this one TWICE and it
is also appearing directly below.
I will say based on a few specifics like fighting fire with your fire retardant shirt rolled up, becomes a habit of skipping safety rules or ignoring them. Might be interesting to pull some of there previous fire evaluation forms that should be on file at PFD. Just another thing that should have happened during the investigation.
by all accounts that i have read or heard (including one of my bosses, a Type 1 OSC) they had a good reputation and were safety conscious.
and yes, i realize there is evidence in this incident to contradict that.
You know how fire ratings are if the same as in the past always did a good job unless some one takes the ratting serious. It was just a thought on my part all things considered the investigation may have covered it personnel practices and procedures may have blocked it on individuals.
So it’s been an interesting 24 hours or so. FullSail has blown more technical issues, quoted Wikipedia without saying he was doing so, and injected strippers and monkey shit into the comment thread. It’s disrespectful, and frankly an embarrassment to WFFs as a whole. When I suggested up above that people contact John Dougherty, FullSail and people like him are a good part of the sad reason why.
It’s also been a GOOD 24-48 hours as well.
Mr. Dougherty is now uploading what he has.
The Blue Ridge GPS tracking video is
now fully viewable by anyone.
We (apparently?) have been able to put a
time of 3:49 on the Caldwell video that
captured Abel telling Marsh…
1) Keep ME informed ( of your situation ).
2) Hunker and be SAFE ( in the black )
3) We’ll get some Air Sup down there ASAP
We (apparently?) have a GOOD explanation
for the ‘keyed-mike’ and ‘static’ heard in
the last radio transmissions of GM. Looks
like it can be attributed to a simple ‘Faraday
effect’ and that means we CAN assume
Marsh ( or others with radios ) were still
alive at those times under their shelters
and trying to contact B33. That adds
MINUTES to the time before the fire
might actually have reached them that day.
Small things… maybe… but IMPORTANT
things in the overall picture being assembled.
Sometimes you just have to take the bad
along with the good.
And I’ll add to that a bit of my day’s progress. I determined that the pink thing you spotted in the SAIT photo is not the iphone. It’s one end of a long pink strap that says “Pull Ring To Open.” That’s the strap on a fire shelter.
I’m still looking for Clayton Whitted’s pack.
I’ve read all the site investigations documents and have found nothing at all written about Chris MacKenzie’s Canon Powershot camera, even though it was specifically photographed during that site investigation.
And I have an inventory of the cellphones.
Namaste!
wow, more stories and allegations without any specific references… at least you’re consistent!
i said monkey “poop!”
and… what does this have to do with bob’s point about previous GM fire evaluations?
i think you’re just having a hard time explaining your comment from this morning…
(just to be clear, the above statement was aimed at NV…)
xxxfullsailxxx- we agree with what you just stated here- the people who worked with GMHS that are not in harms way of being sued felt the same way as you stated; good reputation and were safety conscious. We have heard that more than once. We agree by the accounts we saw them that day as well. Reason why it bewilders us the being in the black than 19 men died-
Quoting RTS “i have a hard time believing that one of them (marsh or steed) didn’t identify another escape route once it became apparent that they weren’t going back the way they came in.”
TOTAL AGREEMENT HERE!”
This is again where I think people could give very helpful background info to John Dougherty directly. There is a process behind even bad decisions and this was in many ways imo likely not a spontaneous one.
From the moment they took their first step after the decision to move, they were looking at an escape route which was a very accessible, sparely vegetated, down and out to the west off the ridge-line.
Even though Steed was leading them to a place they hadn’t scouted or been to before, during the same time Marsh was apparently behind trying to catch up to them, they probably felt very comfortable walking along, watching the fire off to the east, with their down and out a stones throw or so, to their west.
This scenario all changed when they came to the place where they could see the bowl, and the ranch with no road leading to it. That’s where they wanted to go, and without a map or other infomation available, the two-track they were on looked like it went over the mountain and down to Congress. And the ranch looked SO CLOSE from where they were, and still does today.
Regarding using smartphones to pull up a map or visual of the area, btw, I think a safer assumption is that this was done, than is assuming that it wasn’t done because of the route GM chose. Making the assumption that they did so does further beg the question of why they chose the route they chose, of course. And I think the answer does lie in part with past decisions.
It’s so EASY to do… every fiber of my being tells me they
HAD to have done it… but every one of those same fibers
says that if they knew the road they were on was just
going to take them exactly where they wanted to go… and
allow them to maintain the same rate of travel ALL the
way… and arrive even SOONER than the cross-country
crap they chose… there is no sane explanation for
what they did.
So every time I try to reconcile those two ‘improbabilities’
in my mind I find that the winner is the improbability that
a group with 6 smartphones never even looked up
their location on ANY map that day. Not once.
It’s like they were just a bunch of tourists out on a hike
that had no concept of time or distance, or something.
Not supposed to be the case. If anyone was supposed
to be experts on ‘wildland hiking’ and time/distance
measurements… and NOT get fooled by ‘perspective’
and ‘distance compression’ and ‘proximity relaxation’…
…you would think it would have been WFF people.
I guess that’s why the WFF community is really so
mad about all this. They have ended up looking like
they had no earthly idea what they were doing, even
with all these ‘certifications’ in place.
“I guess that’s why the WFF community is really so
mad about all this. They have ended up looking like
they had no earthly idea what they were doing, even
with all these ‘certifications’ in place.”
wow, that’s an interesting perspective… i think you have a pretty narrow window to be making such broad judgments of the WFF community.
See posts from your ‘brothers’ up above
discussing how big of a 2×4 they would
have like to have used to hit Marsh/Steed
up the side of the head with.
so, your sample size is maybe a half dozen out of thousands? sounds like your kind of scientific “proof”…
So then… enlighten us.
What does your ‘window into
the WFF community’ say?
What’s the ‘two-track talk’
on this one so far?
Over and done?
Nothing to learn?
I often find myself agreeing with Bob Powers’ assessments. Looking at the line of fire under the black smoke in the ~1600 photos, I can’t imagine why they’d move out of the black. I think that’s why many of us are still spending hours trying to figure this out, and why we are so dismayed with the SAIR, and why we *do* wish we could have jumped in and shaken them as they were making the decision to leave the black. As RTS said on January 7, this should have been a text book fire. We’re all trying to find evidence that would make sense of their decisions, but it’s difficult because most of us can’t imagine a context in which we’d be following GM’s actions. At the same time, we feel compelled to understand what happened in order to save future lives.
Thus far, *every* scenario has flaws.
1. GM was expecting air support between them and the fire.
Problem: WFFs know not to rely on air support, and those hypothetical drops were likely to be needed around Yarnell and Glen Ilah. Also, based on DIVS A’s experience with AA earlier (dumping on their attempts to burn out), was their enough trust left that AA or ASM would support their next tactics?
2. GM couldn’t see where the fire front was (blocked by the knob, for example).
Problem: They could still see the black column of smoke, and they could see that it was very dark before they left the lunch spot. Given the fire’s previous rapid growth and the fuels involved, it could have easily turned plume dominated or made a run through that chaparral without the aid of wind. Why put yourself in the fire’s food bowl?
3. GM didn’t know the road went to the ranch.
Problem: While this is thus far the most plausible theory in my mind, fullsail is right about WFFs using apps in the field (and about furnishing them out of their own pockets). Maybe Marsh did have a better idea of the way, and Steed pulled them off the road, but it’s still hard to figure why they’d cross into the unburned fuel.
4. Steed and Marsh would have continued assessing escape routes as they went.
Problem: They weren’t maintaining LCES between 16:00 and 16:30; why expect that to change once they left the dirt road?
The above is just a sampling of the issues I’ve seen with each attempt thus far to determine the factors that led up to the burnover. About the only things that make consistent sense is that they were tired and under supported, and this is true on many fires.
WTKTT has done a lot of terrific parsing of the available materials. I hope WTKTT, Elizabeth, Marti Reed, and NV realize that most of us are grateful for your input here (see my comment from Jan 2). Where I get frustrated is when I realize that people are donating their time to try to make a whole picture out of these scraps, when it was the SAIT’s responsibility (for which they were paid by the taxpayers) to gather this information accurately in the first place. If you look at the investigation of the Tuolumne Fire, the transparency (as contrasted with the Yarnell SAIR) is staggering.
http://www.fire.ca.gov/fire_protection/downloads/404_investigation_whole.pdf
I don’t personally know anyone on either fire or investigative team, but I came away from the Tuolumne report with a much better feel for what happened. Almost as important as learning why GM did what they did, is to figure out why the SAIT conducted themselves as they did, and how to improve on this.
Thank you so much for this, Sitta. I’ve been so frustrated by the lack of a map of the deployment site. I keep thinking I should make one, and I’ve had to make sketches over and over again in order to try to get some alignment of the photographs. I keep thinking, “Am I crazy for thinking there should be a site map in the SAIR? It could take me days to make/publish a site map. Maybe I should waste some more time googling ‘SAIR’ to see if I can figure out what a SAIR is supposed to include.”
I’ve decided not to make/publish a site map. It should have been included in the SAIR.
https://www.nifc.gov/PUBLICATIONS/redbook/2013/Chapter18.pdf
I’m still wondering if a state run fire is subject to interagency standards for investigations. It *ought* to be. If not, couldn’t non-adherence jeopardize their cooperative agreements? I suppose it’s only an issue if federal fire bureaucrats decide to make it one.
i think that once the team took over, it fell under the federal umbrella… plus the SAIT was requested by the state.
I agree with every thing you said…and not because you agree with me. I am dumbfounded at their decision and frustrated with what they did. There are some lessons here but many have been learned in the past. They just weren’t followed here.
man NV, you may have to retract that post… and not just because you mis-attributed it to RTS…
if YOU are SPECULATING that GM leadership had a habit of not scouting escape routes and safety zones… then i think YOU should be the one with some “background” to support such an outlandish allegation. otherwise, you have no reason or right to make that allegation.
Your pattern of attack posting continues to be a good example, in my opinion, of why people don’t want to examine decision-making processes in this type of forum.
way to avoid addressing the problem with your post.
you’re not really “examining decision making” by making the unfounded statement that (in your opinion) there was probably a prior pattern of GM not scouting ER’s and SZ’s… without any “background” to back it up.
and then, you contradict yourself by saying that they probably DID pull up a map and still chose the shortcut… is your next assumption that “maybe GM always took shortcuts…?” and if anyone has “background” about this, they should send it to JD?
You are now misstating my words, again. In a way that in my opinion is clearly aimed at shutting down dialogue. This is part of a long pattern on your part of disruptive posting, including very professional references to things like strip clubs and monkey shit.
what kind of “background info” were you hoping people might give to JD?
Let me also note that I did NOT mis-attribute the post in question. People can scan up a few comments, and see that RTS had quoted FullSail, and then added comments of his own. I lifted all the text involved from RTS’s comments.
The thing with the type of accusation FullSail just made is that it is VERY good at shutting down dialogue. Generally people will believe it when someone is accused of, say, mis-attributing a quote. It is a good way of taking any productive value out of a thread, overall.
ugh…
okay you quoted it correctly, good job, my bad.
now how about addressing your false accusation that GM may have had a pattern of not scouting ER’s and SZ’s?
You are again clearly misstating what I said, in a way designed to shut down dialogue. This is a persistent pattern of yours. When called on your own misstatements, you also then shuck them off as no big deal.
we do not know about prior fires but this fire we saw all through the day Eric Marsh scouting-
I can’t comment on any ‘pattern’ of
‘not scouting’ on the part of Marsh/Steed…
but there is plenty of evidence that no such
thing was EVER done on THAT day ( when
it SHOULD have been done and probably WOULD have saved the lives of 19 good
men. )
Tex Gilligan and Joy Collura were right up
there with them all day… from the moment
they arrived until Tex realized even before
2 PM that was no place to be anymore.
At NO time… did either Marsh or Steed
make any ‘scouting trips’ to the south.
Zero. Zip. Nada.
According to Tex/Joy… Marsh was always
scouting to the NORTH all day and
Steed/Crew were always right there
around the anchor point ALL DAY.
The only time Marsh can actually be
placed WITH Steed ( physically ) is
when they both met with Frisby/Brown
for that ‘face-to-face’.
At all other times… Joy said she never
saw Eric any closer to Steed/crew than
1/4 mile NORTH of them…. and no ever
headed south from the work area to
‘scout’ ANYTHING.
According to Tex/Joy… Marsh was always
scouting to the NORTH all day and
Steed/Crew were always right there
around the anchor point ALL DAY.
—-
reply: this is accurate to that day. We did not see Marsh but that does not mean when we were on ridge after dropping down between 2-3pm that Marsh or Steed could of at that time went South being with hike we had with John MacLean Sonny discovered a burnt pink ribbon roll so someone went south and was there. Also remember our hike with OSHA we saw minor cuttings and the hike with lead fire fatality Ted Putman and Wayne/Holly Neill we saw major cuttings so different angles put us as well in blinder spots that day to see a true account of every move but yes we did see Marsh away from the crew most of .the day yet we did see him a few times with 2 different men and his crew near the lunch area that day. So it is possible after we left the area and dropped between 2-3pm or after any of them could of headed south because we were no longer in the area yet we can state factually from the windmill view the Helms area looked so bad that we were going to rest due to heatstroke for awhile in the wash until we saw the black in the smoke because we had our car near the Helm’s place in front of McNary’s on Foothill rd.
so it seems WTKTT interpreted your OP the way i did…
feel free to elaborate on what you meant to say NV…
Reply to xxfullsailxx post
on January 8, 2014 at 5:15 pm
>> xxfullsailxx said…
>>
>> so it seems WTKTT
>> interpreted your OP the
>> way i did…
Nope. Wrong (again).
I agree 100 percent with
what NV said.
If anyone has information
about ‘past risk taking’ or
a pattern of ‘bad choices
with good outcomes’ for
Willis/Marsh/Steed/Crew
I think they should come
forward. Something tells
me by the time the lawyers
are done doing their jobs
here will WILL know the
answers to those questions
but I think anyone who knows
something should still
come forward.
umm, that’s what i was trying to say, that you interpreted his original post from this morning the same way i did… (in a way that he himself denies)
he was calling for people to come forth to JD with examples of GM not scouting ER’s & SZ’s…
and of course you would agree with him… it’s a false allegation!
regarding the quality/integrity of the SAIR fire progression maps and just so it doesn’t get lost in “the noise”…
WTKTT says,
“You mean… other than the photo(s) they
used from that time-lapse video and the
importance the SAIT attributes to it on
page 77 when they are explaining the
‘fire progression’?…”
yep, my bad…missed that part.
but, why did you fail to mention the FOUR TOOLS THEY ACTUALLY USED TO CREATE THE MAPS?
SAIR:
“Fire Behavior Experts created an estimate of the Yarnell Hill Fire behavior using various methods:
1. EYEWITNESS ACCOUNTS (**hmm, first hand testimony by WFF professionals**) Interviews of many personnel assigned to the incident included time and location of significant weather and fire behavior events.
2. PHOTOGRAPHIC IMAGES AND VIDEOS (**not just the ONE video you mention, NUMEROUS**) Numerous individuals documented fire activity during the Yarnell Hill Fire. Many still digital images had time stamps. Photographs have varying degrees of precision in time stamps so experts used images taken at verifiable times showing a locatable feature on the fire perimeter to document fire location and activity. Many digital photographs may be geo-referenced if the device that takes them has location tracking enabled. Where possible, the team used geo-referenced information to ascertain locations for photographs. This information was very valuable in determining locations, views, and fire activity and was useful in validating fire perimeter reconstruction. Other images lacking credible time stamps and/or geo-reference information were validated through a comparison with Google Earth pre-fire images, visible landmarks, and known time-stamped photographs to add information about fire perimeters.
3. REMOTE SENSING. (**the Forest Service takes a lot of pride in this i think**) The team modeled fire perimeters and intensities using remote sensing. US Forest Service National Infrared Operations imagery taken from nighttime flights supports daily fire growth documentation. The satellite-based Moderate Resolution Imaging Spectroradiometer system heat imagery helped to verify fire locations at various times.
4. MODELING RATES OF SPREAD AND FIRE INTENSITIES. (**hmm, seems like a lot of data here**) The team used the BEHAVE Plus program and the embedded Short Term Fire Behavior Model in the Wildland Fire Decision Support System to model fire behavior. Inputs were from site visits, fuels data, the closest RAWS, fireline weather observations, local fuels information, and wind models. Photographic time-stamped information corroborated fire locations, active flaming fronts, and smoke columns around the fire and pinpointed on the landscape. This verified fire behavior modeling, specifically rate of spread and flame length.”
**BECAUSE THROUGHOUT THIS DIALOGUE HERE ON IM, YOUR MAIN INTENTION, HAS BEEN TO (TRY) TO CREATE CONTROVERSY**
You put a lot of work into that post above so it’s actually
hard to criticize… but I still have to.
You are doing your own ‘leaping’ again.
Read what I originally wrote.
All I was saying ( and focusing on ) was the fact that any
reliance for fire progression time/distance based on the
Matt Osser Congress time-lapse video ( like when the fireline
actually approached/crested the ridges of the Weaver
Mountains ) has to be treated with many, many grains
of salt. Neither the SAIR nor the Wildfire today analysis of
that video even had the right LOCATION for where it
was even taken.
Yes… a LOT of work was done by the SAIR trying to ‘figure out’
where that fire was… and when… but I still believe their
hard-drawn lines for when it crested the ridges around
there is less than totally accurate. Your mileage may vary.
no, actually, this is what you said …
WTKTT:
“This hasn’t been talked about much… but the reality is
that BOTH the SAIR and the ADOSH based a lot of
their 4:30 to 5:00 PM fire progression ‘guesses’ on
the time-lapse video that was shot miles away on
the Congress side showing ‘flames’ cresting the
ridges around there.”
WTKTT continued:
“Nothing fundamentally wrong with that. It’s an amazing
and and important piece of video… but there is a chance
some of their assumptions about when and where they
thought they saw ‘flames’ cresting on certain ridges
is just plain WRONG.”
your whole premise was based ON YOUR VERY FALSE CLAIM that the SAIR’s fire progression maps were based on “guesses” about a time lapse video shot from far away. oh, and “assumptions.”
what’s more hilarious, is you go on to say how you haven’t had a chance yet to critique the findings (all based of course on the time lapse video)…
WTKTT:
“So I hesitate to publish my OWN analysis until I am
really, really sure I can point out exactly where all
the other analysis went south ( so to speak ).”
so now apparently you’re going to show us how YOU would write the fire behavior analysis? you going to produce a fire progression map too?
hilarious.
What in the heck is your POINT?
They ( SAIR and ADOSH ) DID base a lot of their
hard-drawn late-afternoon ridge-cresting fireline
progression ‘guesstimates’ on the Matt Oss
time-lapse video. It’s a fact.
All I said was… it’s possible they got some of
THAT part of their progression wrong ( and that
is ALSO a fact ).
So I will repeat the only point I was trying to
make for anyone who is ‘trying’ to follow
along here…
…don’t automatically believe the SAIT when they
say the fire appeared both in FRONT of and
BEHIND these guys at the same exact moment.
The SAIR was only trying to make their own
pre-determined narrative look good and (perhaps)
try to account for the perplexing decision on the
part of these men to not even TRY and get back
up that ridge.
That’s what I think. Your mileage may vary.
NOTE: At the first press conference from the
deployment site… Darrell Willis was asked
why the men didn’t even TRY to do a ‘full
reverse’ and even Willis ‘answered’ the question
like a robot with this ‘word for word’ stuff from
the SAIR about how “the fire appeared in front
of and behind them at the SAME MOMENT
so that’s why that wasn’t an option”.
The SAIT knew that question was going to be
asked… and they had to have SOME explanation.
They did. Fire cut them off both ways at the same
time. Mission accomplished.
your defensiveness shows your intentions. and i think my point has been made.
oh, yeah, i forgot to mention… i don’t think the SAIR was even out when Willis did that press conference… but nice try.
you are a liar. motivated by your own agenda.
oh and, it didn’t take a lot of work…
i know how to copy and paste…
The video that tracks the movements of Blue Ridge Superintendent Brian Frisby is now working at:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j8cEKBzlhws
I am waiting to hear from Frisby about whether the GPS device was on him personally or on someone else, b/c the FOIA/FOIL text says it was on the “BR Capt.” but the BR listing on the internet does not list a captain.
Reply to Elizabeth post on January 8, 2014 at 7:34 am
>> Elizabeth said…
>>
>> The video that tracks the movements of Blue Ridge
>> Superintendent Brian Frisby is now working at:
>> http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j8cEKBzlhws
It certainly is. Thank you, Elizabeth!
Whatever I did to help get this working still doesn’t compare
to the work/effort you have put into making these materials
available… so thanks again!
However… I think it was a mistake to change the title of
the video to say “as amended/edited for uploading”.
That’s misleading and actually inaccurate.
When I simply ‘converted’ the video to other formats…
nothing was ‘amended’ or ‘edited’ in ANY way.
If you feel you need to label it as ‘not the AVI original’ then
I would just say ‘reformatted for uploading’, or something
like that. That’s more accurate and less misleading.
>> Elizabeth also said…
>> I am waiting to hear from Frisby about whether the
>> GPS device was on him personally or on someone else
Good luck.
I don’t think the world is ever going to see Brian Frisby voluntarily
offer ANY additional information on that day, or EVER answer any
simple questions ever again unless he is called to testify as a
witness in any/all of the ongoing litigation ( which is highly likely ).
I think he’s like Brendan McDonough.
It would appear he simply does not WANT to ‘talk about it’.
>> Elizabeth also said…
>> b/c the FOIA/FOIL text says it was on the “BR Capt.” but the
>> BR listing on the internet does not list a captain.
Your’re right. It does not ( See official PUBLIC NIHC info below ).
It does, however, list Trueheart as ‘Assistant Superintendent’
and I think ( not positive ) that means he can/should also
be considered the ‘Captain’ in that group.
National Interagency Hotshot Crews (NIHC) Contact Information…
http://www.fs.fed.us/fire/people/hotshots/IHC_list.html
Blue Ridge IHC
Coconino NF
Mogollon District
8738 Ranger Road
Happy Jack, AZ 86024
Duty location for crew: Happy Jack, AZ
Brian Frisby, Superintendent
Email: [email protected]
(928) 477-5023
Rogers Trueheart Brown, Assistant Superintendent
Email: [email protected]
(928) 477-5024
Travis Fuller, Squad Boss
Email: [email protected]
(928) 477-5027
Michael Gordon, Squad Boss
Email: [email protected]
( 928) 477-5027
Cory Ball, Squad Boss
(928) 477-5022
Email: [email protected]
Blue Ridge Hotshots FAX number…
(928) 477-5057 (Fax)
**
** TIME OF CALDWELL VIDEO THAT CAPTURES ABEL/MARSH RADIO
** CONVERSATION APPEARS TO BE 1549 ( 3:49 PM ) +/- 30 SEC.
>> On January 5, 2014 at 5:30 am, Calvin wrote…
>>
>> Robert Caldwell video 2….. (my opinion) figure 4 from
>> p13 WFAR shows Robert Caldwell taking that video.
Totally agree, Calvin.
Now that we ( finally ) see what the SAIT had all along…
I don’t think there is any doubt about that.
The key is the cactus plant… just there to Caldwell’s left.
It is in the exact position where it MUST be in order for
the p13 WFAR photo and the video we now actually
see Robert shooting to be ‘one and the same moment’.
The WFAR photo also explains why Caldwell might have
appeared to be ‘alone at that site’ in his video. He was not.
The WFAR photo just proves he was simply the farthest
man down on the rocks at that moment and everyone
else was BEHIND him as he shot his video.
So now I believe just putting a TIME on that WFAR p13
photo will definitely give us the exact time ( +/- some seconds )
when OPS1 Todd Abel TOLD Eric Marsh the following
THREE important things…
1) Keep ME informed ( of your whereabouts and situation ).
2) Hunker and be SAFE ( in the black ).
3) We will get some Air Support down there ASAP.
The remaining problem is… the WFAR made no attempt to
put a TIME on that photo themselves and I still haven’t
seen that WFAR photo appear in any of the SAIT
FOIA/FOIL stuff.
Not to worry.
Turns out there IS a way to ‘timestamp’ that WFAR photo
AND put a time on Caldwell’s video and the captured
radio transmission(s).
Look closely in the p13 WFAR photo.
That is Christopher MacKenzie’s left arm on the right
of the photo ( including a close-up of Christopher’s
wrist-watch which he always wore on his LEFT wrist )
and he is holding his Canon Powershot camera up to
his face and ALSO taking a picture at that same exact
moment. Christopher is shooting just a little more at
the fireline and more directly right over Jesse Steed’s
head ( Steed is the one in the red helmet right in
front of him ).
So where is THAT picture… WITH a timestamp?
Turns out… it showed up in the ADOSH Photo and
Map supplement document released along with the
ADOSH report. Everything matches… including his
perspective as seen in the other WFAR photo and
the fact that Steed’s red helmet appears exactly
where it ought to in THAT photo.
Here is the exact ADOSH information on that photo…
Photo 26 – ADOSH Supporting Photos and Maps
Inspection: 317243683 Date: 6/30/2013 Time: 3:49 PM
Photo Description:
Yarnell Hill Fire, photo by Granite Mountain Hotshot,
Chris MacKenzie, 1549 6/30/13. The red arrow indicates
the approximate location of the Granite Mountain
IHC Lookout.
So here is the 1, 2, 3 on this that leads to a TIME
on the Caldwell video of 1549 ( 3:49 PM )…
1) We now only recently discover that Robert Caldwell
took a video that captures OPS1 Todd Abel telling
Marsh “Keep me informed, Hunker and be SAFE,
We will get Air Support down there ASAP”, but we
are also given no exact TIME for that Caldwell video.
2) The mysterious photo on page 13 of the WFAR
most probably ( definitely? ) shows us the moment when
Caldwell was actually shooting that video… but the WFAR
also put no exact TIME on THAT photo. However… that WFAR
photo DOES show us Christopher MacKenzie standing
just to the right and also taking a ‘photo’ at that same exact moment.
3) THAT photo, being taken by Christopher MacKenzie,
appeared in the ADOSH supplement and it DOES have
a definite timestamp of 1549 ( 3:49 PM ).
So I think it can be finally be said with a high degree
of certainty that Robert Caldwell’s recently released
video with the radio conversation betwee Todd Abel
and Eric Marsh was taken at exactly 3:49 PM, give
or take only 30 seconds or so.
The only reason I add the ‘give or take 30 seconds’ is
that Christopher did not press his shutter button at
the EXACT moment as the WFAR photo which
actually captured Caldwell actaully shooting his
video. In Christopher’s photo… Caldwell is either
just raising his camera… or just lowering it…
which means there are still some seconds to
account for one way or the other.
If that WFAR photo ever surfaces and it still has
the metadata in it… it will cut out the second step
to the MacKenzie photo needed to timestamp the
Caldwell video… but I believe we will still discover
that video with the captured Abel/Marsh radio
conversation was shot right at 1549 ( 3:49 PM ).
>> On January 5, 2014 at 5:37 am, Calvin also wrote…
>>
>> WTKTT… Do you mind re examining the Parker picture?
>> I still think the GM buggies are visible in the pic.
I have done as you asked… with the highest possible
photo enhancement I can muster… and now that the
Caldwell video shows EXACTLY where they were
supposed to be parked in the distance I can say…
YES… you are right.
They are there. Exactly where the Caldwell #2 video
that we just learned about shows they ought to be.
>> On January 5, 2014 at 3:07 pm, Calvin also wrote…
>>
>> MY opinion from BR movement video….. BR Gps unit was near
>> GM buggies (last time) around 1620′ish. (pre burn).
>> Opinions????
Couldn’t respond to this until I got that video converted
and could finally watch it myself. I have done now done so.
Answer: Yes. Absolutely. 1620 is obviously the moment
when some BR crew was delivered over to the GM
vehicles so they could be moved over to the Shrine area.
It is still NOT clear whether Brendan McDonough was still
there waiting for them ( or not ), or whether Brendan had
already exited that area to the south ( alone in the GM
Supervisor Truck ) via Lakewood drive, and just
went straight over to the Ranch House Restaurant at
the end of Lakewood Drive where it meets Highway 89.
There is still a witness who says that’s what happened.
The Tom Story photograph proves that’s where Brendan
and the Supervisor truck ended up… but still no proof
how or when it/he actually got there.
Now that we can see the EXACT moment when the BR
crew finally got over there to fetch the GM Crew Carriers
we know it actually took quite some time for them to
get around to that. Much longer than was previously
suspected.
Page 24 of the SAIR says…
BR Supt drops GM Lookout off at the Granite Mountain
IHC Supt truck at about 1555.
SIDENOTE: There is actually no GPS tracking data that
shows Frisby ever going over to the old grader to ‘fetch’
McDonough at all. Either Frisby wasn’t carrying the
GPS unit for that trip… or it never actually happened.
If Frisby really did fetch McDonough from over by
the old grader about 1552… and then just drop him
at the GM vehicles about 1555… and McDonough
really did just stay there waiting for BR guys to come
back and then follow the Crew Carriers over to the Shrine
area… then we now know that means he was just sitting
there on Sesame for almost a half-hour with nothing to
do but be listening to the radio like he told Marsh and
Steed he would. ( Sic: “Call me if you need anything” ).
That also means he would have been just listening
to the radio not only all throughout the ‘comfort-level’,
‘discussing their options’ AND MacKenzie video
moments… he would have also heard any final
decision making conversation(s) between Marsh
and Steed about whether to drop off the two track
and go into the canyon or not ( at 1618 or 1619 ).
All that being said…
I still don’t think we can trust the SAIR on the times here.
Remember… when the ADOSH report came out along
with its photo supplement… it suddenly contained photos
taken by Brendan McDonough himself standing on the
runner board of the passenger side of the GM Superintendent
truck AFTER having been ‘dropped off’ there by Frisby.
Those would be ADOSH photos 27 and 28.
The TIME on BOTH of these photos taken by Brendan
McDonough back at the GM vehicles is 1549.
That’s a full 6 minutes before the SAIR says Frisby even
picked Brendan up at the grader.
So if the ADOSH photo times are correct… Brendan had
already been ‘dropped off’ there by Frisby ( and Frisby had
already gone on his way ) by 1549… not 1555.
That puts Brendan just waiting there ( if he really did ) and
doing nothing but listening to the radio for MORE than a half-hour
( 31 – 32 minutes ) until 1620 when the BR guys finally showed up.
VERY good paper that will definitely put things more into perspective WHY and WHY actions and decisions were NOT made.
This is the guy who would NOT sign the South Canyon Fire SAIT because of the cover-up, lies, and whitewash.
THE COLLAPSE OF DECISIONMAKING AND ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE ON STORM KING MOUNTAIN
Ted Putnam, Ph.D.
USDA Forest Service
Missoula Technology and Development Center
February 1995
http://leadership.wharton.upenn.edu/l_change/trips/Putnam.pdf
Ted Putnam appears in the Weather Channel documentary and seems like a wise and thoughtful man, the kind that should be involved in fire investigations.
The paper was interesting. We will not really understand mistakes and accidents unless we account for human behavior. He makes the point about the 10 and 18 being too much to process in stressful situations (too many rules) and I guess that led to the creation of LCES. Unfortunately even those 4 things are not always adhered to either. Also he talked about the need for more fire shelter training, something it has been said might be emphasized too much now, to the exclusion of other things.
This shows how much this process is a work in progress, and as one of the Rickover rules says, we have to get better and better.
Ted makes a bad analogy by referring to the 10 and 18 in a stressful situation. This is where I have always disagreed with him. You should use the 10 and 18 to guide your day, not after things go to hell. The 10 and 18 are guides to keep you out of hell. If you have time to reverse your decision and fall back to the 10 you might be able to backtrack and correct your mistake maybe. On the south Canyon fire when the smokejumpers said to each other this dose not look right or feel right they should have reassessed and got back on top. Instead they kept going. GM could have looked at the canyon not under stress and decided that was not the way to go 10 & 18 and gone off the back side or back to the top which they had time to do. I always thought that #10 should have been #1 Always provide for safety first.
That’s why before I knew any thing else the first picture I saw at the lunch spot in the black looking at the fire edge hit the warning bells in my brain that said this is not good stay here or HUNKER IN THE BLACK. I had no thought that I would have gone down into the unburned.
Then after all of the research and time lines. The fire did exactly what my brain said it would do in 45 min. Burning est. 1000 acres every 10 min. Running spotting and moving in several different directions. We keep saying every body thought GM was in the Black. WHY? Because that’s where they would have been. Absolutely no reason to move, no rush to go any place. They had 5 hours of daylight. We have no reason for the move except assumptions. And what McDonough may know that was left out of the SAIT or not stated in his interview for what ever reason. Or there may be nothing there either. One of there options should have been to sit and Waite out the fire. Why Not?
Mike and Bob,
I think Putnam’s research and papers are good, and he brings out a lot good points MOST OF THE TIME. The main reason I put it out there was for others (n0n WFF) to read to show what has already been talked about on tragedy fires.
As far as argument that the “42 rules” to memorize or whatever the number was as being too many, I say HOGWASH!
If someone can’t memorize, remember, and consistently apply 42 things then HOW did they make it out of high school or college or get this far through life? There are people that can spout off sports statistics and “facts” like nothing and similar areas of discussion. Give me a break!
And I totally agree with Bob on knowing them NOW instead of when you’re in trouble. Knowing them and applying them keeps you OUT of trouble.
We trained our folks to know them by heart, in order, word-for-word, know what they mean, and reinforced them on every fire. If they didn’t know them good enough, then they did LOTS of pushups, and then it excalated to 600-800 word essays for the macho BS buff guys that bragged they could do pushups all day. Most of them HATED the essays. And I still teach that way today. We MUST know ‘The WFF Rules.’
WTKT,
So then, I think some of those several almost pure static transmissions we hear SEVERAL minutes into the Bravo 33 conversation with DIVS A Marsh and GMHS COULD have been Marsh transmitting his radio from inside his shelter or at least trying to. Maybe.
To support your point on the radios inside fire shelters, here’s a link to a MTDC ‘Equip-Tip’ It’s ONLY 4-5 pages long but it took near FOREVER to download.
http://www.fs.fed.us/t-d/pubs/pdfpubs/pdf03512342/pdf03512342dpi300.pdf
And why they didn’t they all deploy on the YHF? Here’s a theory based on what occurred on the 1994 South Canyon (Storm King Mountain) Fire.
There’s a research paper by Ted Putnam titled 1994. Analysis of Escape Efforts and Personal Protective or something like that (but I cannot find it online anywhere, only references to it). Anyway, Putnam couldn’t figure out WHY all the PHS, SMJ, and WFF died ON THEIR BACKS and in many cases outside their fire shelters. His theory was that while hiking up the ‘bastard steep’ slope to the ridgeline, the SUPER HOT GASES preceeding the advancing fire front, loudly rustling through the brush below and behind them, startled them – they turned around to see what it was and WHAM, the hot gases bowled them all over onto their backs, killing them.
Just a thought and something I’ve read before. And I think the YHF is very close to the South Canyon Fire.
Reply to RTS post on January 7, 2014 at 10:15 pm
That’s a spot-on study up there on that Federal Fire-Safety site.
Lots of ‘attenuation’ and ‘signal loss in fire shelters’ data
they still don’t say how FAR away you have to get before
the ‘Faraday cage’ effect kicks in. See above about someone
with 2 BKs and a Fire Shelter doing their own test. It would
be good to know at what distance you start to get nothing but
‘keyed-mike’ noises and ‘static’ like we hear in the helmet-cam
audio.
From the report…
The study showed that when firefighters were inside
fire shelters within 50 feet of each other they could
communicate using the VHF (Very High Frequency,
30 to 300 MHz) Bendix-King radios. They could
not communicate using the newer UHF (Ultra High
Frequency, 300 to 3,000 MHz) Motorola Astro XTS
3000 radios. In either case, the radio signals were
significantly weaker when the radio (figure 1) was used
inside the fire shelter, particularly when the radio was
inside the New Generation Fire Shelter.
And what do you say about this from above – “So then, I think some of those several almost pure static transmissions we hear SEVERAL minutes into the Bravo 33 conversation with DIVS A Marsh and GMHS COULD have been Marsh transmitting his radio from inside his shelter or at least trying to. Maybe.”
What do I think? I’m the one who just proposed
that as the reason ( for that static ) up above.
What I *think* is that I might be correct.
So yes… I agree.
We *might* simply be hearing Eric Marsh trying
to fulfill his promise to B33 to “Give him a call
when we are UNDER the shelters”.
I still think it’s an easy TEST.
Anyone have 2 BKs and a fire shelter?
yep, you MIGHT be correct… but we’ll never know for sure… what i think we can take an educated guess about is that:
eric DID NOT feel comfortable using his radio OUTSIDE of his shelter to further explain their predicament. he needed the immediate protection that his shelter would give (however insufficient that may have been) because, at that moment, he didn’t feel he could survive outside his shelter.
surely if Marsh felt he could have safely used his radio OUTSIDE of his shelter to request further assistance or to try to pinpoint the crews location for AA and command staff, he would have.
Wow… now there’s a landmark.
Admitting a ‘leap’ made in this ongoing
discussion MIGHT be right and THEN
making your own ‘leap’.
Attaboy… you’re getting the hang of it.
BTW: I also agree with your ‘leap’.
It’s possible…
…but I do still think you missed the
point of that original post. Marsh
did not KNOW he wasn’t going to
be able to use his radio under his
shelter… because (apparently) no
one in any class he ever took
advised him that was probably going
to be the case. By the time he got
in it… and tried to call B33… he
finally found out the truth. So… given
THAT scenario… he MAY have just
‘turned over’ in his shelter or
something just to try and use the
radio.
i called it an educated guess. it’s also based on a logical conclusion that E. Marsh didn’t want to be outside, talking on the radio at that point, even though the radio was their one chance of receiving any outside help.
“he MAY have just
‘turned over’ in his shelter or
something just to try and use the
radio.”
funny that you’ll site a lack of training on radio use inside shelters… did you know that what all the training DOES SAY? is that once inside your shelter… don’t leave it, don’t break the seal, because the super-heated gases will kill you.
so what i think your post really explains, is your severely deficient knowledge about WFF.
FWIW. Another little detail I have discovered, related to deployment, is that, of the seven who appear to have not “successfully” deployed (including Eric Marsh), and their shelters are the ones we see in the YCSO photos of the SAIT investigation, only two were found prone/face-down and five were supine/face-up (including Eric Marsh). The rest of the crew were found prone/face-down. I’m wondering if massive wind may have played a huge part in this. What else could have caused people who were trained to deploy by sheltering face-down to have been found face-up, on top of or disconnected from their shelters?
Reply to Marti Reed post on January 7, 2014 at 8:52 pm
>> What else could have caused people who were trained to
>> deploy by sheltering face-down to have been found face-up,
>> on top of or disconnected from their shelters?
Well… I will probably get slammed to kingdom come for this one,
but in Eric Marsh’s case there is a plausible scenario other than
winds at the deployment site.
When Eric Marsh actually said to ASM2… “I’ll give you a call
when we are under the shelters”… it represents a lack of understanding of his equipment right there.
His radio was NOT going to work at all the minute he got under
his shelter… and he should have known that.
The shelters themselves ( because of the foil material used
to make them ) become what is called a ‘Faraday cage’.
Neither his radio or his cell phone were going to be fully operational
once he got ‘underneath’ it.
This could, in fact, be the explanation for the ‘static’ we hear
in the final radio transmissions. That, in fact, COULD have
been Marsh trying to accomplish what he had just said he
was going to do ( “Call you when we are under the shelters” )
but Marsh was only now discovering his inability to fulfill
that promise once he was under all that ‘tin foil’.
Those B/K radios are high wattage… and SOME signal might
have been getting through that ‘Faraday cage’ he was now
lying under… but not enough signal to do anything but
indicate a ‘keyed mike’ and associated weak-signal static,
which is exactly what we hear coming from the deployment site.
So after two or three tries from ‘under his shelter’… maybe
Eric realized what the problem was and he tried to at least
‘turn over’ or get his arm and head and radio OUT from
under the foil so he could, in fact, make a radio transmission.
Remember… he not only promised he was going to do that…
the last thing ASM2 said was “We are bringing you the VLAT, ok?”.
So in his last moments… maybe it was important to Eric to try
and make that one last radio call. Maybe he thought that meant
life or death for himself and his men… so he tried to get ‘out
of his shelter’ somewhat to accomplish that.
By the way… that’s something that probably needs to be added
to the WFF manuals if it isn’t already in there regarding
deployment situations.
Your RADIO is NOT going to work once you in that ‘Faraday cage’
called a ‘deployment shelter’. If you have any communicating
to do you MUST do it BEFORE you get into that (foil) shelter.
BTW: This sounds like a pretty easy TEST that could
be done. Anyone have at least 2 BK radios and a fire
shelter?
Those BKs are pretty powerful… so they might still be
able to transmit/receive if you are close to the one that
is under the shelter… but I wonder at what DISTANCE the
‘Faraday cage’ effect might start to kick in?
That would be good to know ( for a LOT of reasons,
present and future ).
Reply to Marti Reed post on January 7, 2014 at 8:52 pm
Marti… I hope you get some more answers to your good
question above about the fire shelters. I didn’t mean for my
suggestion about one possibility for Marsh to turn into a
‘radio attenuation’ or ‘Faraday effect’ discussion.
That might explain the ‘keyed mike’ and ‘static’ noises we
hear in the helmet-cam audio… but it doesn’t really answer
YOUR question.
I believe most WFF people are ascribing to the view that any
‘loose’ shelters were simply caused by the ‘wind’ at the
deployment site itself. There is still no concrete evidence
that anyone tried to ‘run’… as has happened on previous
fatal deployment incidents.
Anyway… I know you are studying the site photos and it’s
an important question you asked so I hope you get more
responses.
i don’t think five of them were “trying to talk on the radio”… do you feel me resisting the urge to “slam” you?
i think they were the last ones trying to pull their shelters over when the flames hit… or worse.
and you sure do toss around the word “promise” WTKTT…
like candy at Halloween… like dollar bills at a strip club… like rice at a wedding… let’s see, what other bad analogies can i come up with… like a monkey flinging poop.
Re: five of them trying to “talk on the radio”
I qualified my statement above by saying it might ONLY
apply to why Eric Marsh ( alone ) might have been
partially outside his shelter.
Re: Promise(s)
So to be clear… now you are trying to say when
Eric Marsh said ( quote )…
“I’ll give you (B33) a call when we are under the shelters.”
…you don’t think anyone can/should describe that as
‘a promise’, either? Please explain.
Re: Attenuation
So… do you think the real point of the post is valid,
or not? Do you think it’s possible the ‘Faraday effect’
might be the reason for the ‘static’ we can hear
in the final moments of Granite Mountain?
to belabor a point, Marsh was under extreme pressure at that point. i don’t think i would try to hold him to anything he was “promising” at that moment. whether or not Marsh knew that he wouldn’t be able to transmit behind the aluminum is moot.
there are no “promises” on the fireline. if someone says to you, “yeah, we’ll get some sack lunches up to your crew on the hill this afternoon…” you damn well better not be counting that as a “promise” and you had better take an MRE just in case, otherwise, you’re setting you self up for failure.
same thing with, “we’ll be right back with a bucket (water from a helicopter) to cool down the base of that tree so you can cut it down…” no one in WFF would view that as a “promise” because shit happens, things break, weather turns bad, pilots don’t hit their targets (most pilots are pretty good though)
same thing with, “we’ll get you some air support down there ASAP…”
as to your “real point” regarding technical details of Bendix King radios on the fireline… there are people a lot smarter than you who have already put out technical bulletins regarding this… as RTS pointed out. so sure, you might have been able to use your google machine and get pretty close… congratulations.
oh yeah, to more directly answer your question…
i think it was more likely a case where the effect is caused by left and right circularly polarized waves propagating at slightly different speeds, a property known as circular birefringence. Since a linear polarization can be decomposed into the superposition of two equal-amplitude circularly polarized components of opposite handedness and different phase, the effect of a relative phase shift, induced by the Faraday effect, is to rotate the orientation of a wave’s linear polarization… but, i don’t know… could be.
Sometimes I cut-and-paste from Wikipedia, too, xxfullsailxx. I don’t do it when I am talking about the things that I tend to know about from my day job, though.
oh no, you got me!
ROTFL!!
glad SOMEBODY saw the humor in that…
I’m not sure Marti
is laughing at
what you think
he is laughing at.
and i don’t think you give him enough credit… but you certainly don’t mind putting words in other people’s mouths, do you?
Marti is lolling again. Marti is a she.
apologies!
No prob! I just think this whole is funny, 4 no particular reason. And I needed something funny about now.
http://wildfiretoday.com/2013/12/24/granite-mountain-hotshots-in-videos/
we updated information here-
A lot of brush fire fighters would tell you looking at that fire at the point they decided to leave the black, that fire was getting ready to rock and roll. Erratic winds, High temps, low humidity, a 2 mile front and thunder cells moving in highly volatile fuels, and your above every thing with classic up hill runs, with spotting. I would not have stepped out of that black for any reason. As noted by a full burn of the area in 50 min.. Paralleling that, was like betting on the through of the dice. Lack of any understanding of Basic fire 101. And Ill say again the 10 and 18 were screaming at them don’t do that stupid stupid stupid. So I have to disagree with you WTKTT and Jeff. But only because it is where I come from and your assessment is yours. With 15 years of southern California Fire and a minimum of 300 fires in that time I relate to my learning curve.
I agree with (many?) others now who believe that when they
actually developed the ‘plan’ ( circa 4:00 PM ) and decided
to ‘set out for the ranch’… they really did think it wasn’t that
dangerous of a decision. They couldn’t have… or they would
have stayed right there.
I also agree with (many?) others who now realize that the
actual FATAL decision that day was the moment they decided
to leave that two-track road.
Sure… they could have been fully aware of ‘what it is like’ to
try to slug through dense brush in that area… but the important
point here is the one the hiker Tex Gilligan has made a
number of times already.
From where they were standing when they decided to take
the ‘short cut’… you could not SEE what lie ahead down
there in that canyon. The area right up near the saddle
where they were indicated the opposite. It was fairly sparse
of vegetation up there where they made the actual decision.
So all in all… the mystery is not why they decided to try
to take a short-cut through an area that might require
bushwhacking ( they really couldn’t see that from where
they were making a decision )…
…the real mystery is why, when they DID realize what a bad
choice that route was and they KNEW they were seriously
losing their imagined rate of forward progress… why didn’t
they TURN AROUND and go back?
Unable to admit they’d made a bad decision?
Hubris? Stubbornness? Too tired to even want to go back up?
I don’t know.
From not understanding how fast the fire was going to move
to not understanding how bad their forward progess was
going to be to not understanding that was all going to add
up to a VERY bad situation…
…I think the issue of fatigue and little sleep and poor decision
making still played a big part here.
what do you mean by those “who now believe” or “who now realize”? most everybody i know has been saying this for months (basically since the SAIR came out.)
you’re the one who “just now” seems to be realizing something… that maybe there isn’t any big story to unravel, let alone any conspiracy.
on a less confrontational note:
i have a hard time believing that it was a total bushwhack… i would SPECULATE that there was some sort of game trail there that they were trying to follow… whether or not it was the “intended” route of Stead and/or Marsh is another question.
and your basic WFF 101 for the day:
“terrain” is different than “fuels”… they do not include each other. the “fire behavior triangle” includes FUELS (organic material that burns), WEATHER (atmospheric conditions) and TOPOGRAPHY (what i would refer to as “the terrain”)
“carry on…”
xxfullsailxx… I agree with you.
To me… a ‘total bushwack’ means you really can’t
make any forward progress at all unless you just
HAVE to ‘cut your way forward’.
The satellite images of that canyon taken just 2+
months before the incident ( April 9, 2013 ) don’t
support that scenario whether they descended in
the drainage ( as the SAIR seems to indicate ) OR
whether they actually found that series of connected
‘clearings’ in the center of the canyon that lined up
due west of the final deployment site.
The key is ‘imagined forward progress’.
When they decided to go that way… they knew
there WAS, in fact, a fire ‘out there’. They must
have had some imagined rate of forward progress
that told them ‘we can do this’… or they wouldn’t
have tried. Nobody WANTED to die that day.
So whether it was ‘some bushwhacking’ or ‘much
steeper than we thought’ or ( as Tex Gilligan
describes that area ) ‘having to back up and
go around things a lot’…
…there must have come a point when they KNEW
they were seriously losing their ‘imagined rate’ of
forward progress. The alarms should have been
clanging in their heads at that point… while there
was still time to reevaluate the (risky) move.
The Blue Ridge GPS video now tells us that
BR Hotshot Trueheart Brown was able to make
the same exact descent… in the same exact
place the SAIR says they did… in only 4 minutes.
That is totally SANS vegetation, and he was
alone and was in double/triple time… but it tells
us something nonetheless.
The SAIR timeline says GM took 19+ minutes
to make that same descent in that same drainage.
So it couldn’t have been all about the slope angle.
It must have been all about the vegetation.
fullsail,
See my response to your other comment further-up, regarding my thoughts on the bushwack. It’s possbile the drainage was washed-out fairly well for a descent, at least perhaps visually, better than other choices they could see.
WTKTT and fullsail,
If you look at the top of the drainage on google earth, you will see the saddle as fairly large area without a lot of elevation differences, with less vegetation, beginning about where that stub-road breaks off to the west, and continuing right to where the drainage begins.
Where that stub-road breaks off, the terrain is about 80′ higher than where the top of the drainage begins across the saddle area. Going a little further south on the two-track, about half-way to that very slight bend to the right, is the first place that the ranch becomes visible. Going a little further, somewhere around the point of the slight bend, is where one could see the ranch, the bowl, and that no roads lead to the ranch. The two-track continues on around the bend to the right, going out of sight, and up in elevation the whole way.
Being that they were already 80′ in elevation above the beginning of the drainage when they could see all of those things, and that the ranch was that-a-way, they probably dropped-down on the relatively flat saddle to probe for a good egress point (drainage?).
They were spent, some of their day had gone real crappy, the fire was on the move, and based on the faulty thought processes that allowed their ultimate decision to head down into the bowl, they probably weren’t real interested in continuing UP the road to look for other egress points.
I don’t think from the two spots I mentioned above, that their elevation was good enough to be able to visualize the more open area’s below that WTKTT has wondered about.
I realize that I’m speculating a bit here, and sometimes I know you don’t care much for that fullsail, but sometimes, the ONLY way I can work through some of this stuff is to try and put myself in their shoes, to see how I might have ended up where they did.
again, i don’t mind speculation, until it leads to false accusations…
i know google maps is a handy tool, but i have a hard time making solid judgments based on what i see there.
the main thing that kills me… and this point is especially for you WTKTT:
that REGARDLESS of who told them there was a bomb proof safety zone down at boulder springs ranch… it is the DIV SUP’s and crew supervisor’s responsibility to verify escape routes and safety zones and continually reassess those escape routes through out the day, especially when the fire is kicking up during the burn period.
i have a hard time believing that one of them (marsh or steed) didn’t identify another escape route once it became apparent that they weren’t going back the way they came in.
“REGARDLESS of who told them there was a bomb proof safety zone down at boulder springs ranch… it is the DIV SUP’s and crew supervisor’s responsibility to verify escape routes and safety zones and continually reassess those escape routes through out the day, especially when the fire is kicking up during the burn period.
i have a hard time believing that one of them (marsh or steed) didn’t identify another escape route once it became apparent that they weren’t going back the way they came in.”
TOTAL AGREEMENT HERE!
>> xxfullsailxx said
>> i have a hard time believing
>> that one of them (marsh or
>> steed) didn’t identify another
>> escape route once it
>> became apparent that they
>> weren’t going back the way
>> they came in.
Me too ( More agreement ).
Regardless of who may or
may not have been supposed
to help them with their
situational awareness that
day ( a map would have
helped, fer sure )…
…it WAS, ultimately, their
job to know where the heck
they were and how the heck
to get out of there if they
needed to. No question.
I’m the one who has pointed
out at least FOUR times now
that they had at least 6
smartphones up there with
them that day… and they
were being USED all day…
but (apparently) no one
ever took the 20 seconds
it takes to look up Yarnell,
AZ in Google maps, zoom
down twice, and see clearly
that the ridge road they
considered their ‘escape route’
did, in fact, just loop right
around to their destination.
That’s just really tragic.
yep, it is tragic for them **IF** none of them utilized that technology…
it’s also too bad that municipal, state and federal budgets are such that getting on the job access to that technology is not more readily available. me and my colleagues are usually using our own devices for intel.
and of all the technology that gets mentioned as “a possible solution” to *our job* (especially in and around urban interface), access to maps and overhead, on the ground intel is, in my opinion, the most useful to increase SA.
to me, “bushwhack” means tromping off the trail with out any path to follow… which we do often.
by “path to follow” i mean a game trail, which seem to be very prevalent in that area according to testimony and google earth.
What ‘testimony’ are you referring to?
According to people who have hiked
that spot for years… even the bears
had to ‘wallow’ it because there was
no clear path.
I’m assuming the ‘testimony’ you say
you know about is NOT this quote
from Tex Gilligan over at Wildfire
Today… right?…
Now I wonder how many of those men actually knew how hard it is to work your way through that manzanita growth. I call it bear wallow material, since the bears often prefer to wallow through it rather than take it at a frontal assault. A human has to crawl under, back up as in a maze often, fight cat claw that likes to rip flesh, and generally enjoy a slow advance that does often have you at a crawl. We know we were at the very spot that morning in the dark working our way up while the fire was still a few acres and in the boulders slowly advancing its way down the mountain.
Mike said “BUT HE HAD TO KNOW the weather was unstable, the direction and speed could change suddenly, the terrain was hard to cross and the whole area was a tinderbox waiting to go. But maybe he focused on what he saw and NOT WHAT HE SHOULD HAVE KNOWN, and as a result he misjudged it. Maybe that was a flaw in the way he assessed fire behavior, I do not know.” (EMPHASIS ADDED)
NV said “I REALIZE THEY WERE A LOCAL CREW AND HAD TO BE VERY FAMILIAR WITH that type of scrub. BUT AT EVERY JUNCTURE DURING THE DAY THEY DON’T SEEM TO HAVE TAKEN THE SCRIB INTO ACCOUNT IN THEIR DECISION-MAKING. That may well be another training issue and relate to some of the PAST DECISIONS that also have been alluded to in this thread.” (EMPHASIS ADDED)
This SHOULD HAVE BEEN basically, a ‘TEXT BOOK’ fire for Marsh and the GMHS in spite of the extreme fire behavior. EVEN EXTREME FIRES TELL YOU WHAT THEY’RE GOING TO DO, EVERY TIME, YOU JUST HAVE TO PAY ATTENTION. They had been through this type of fire behavior in this fuel type MANY times before. The meteorologists I talked with said the weather, e.g. thunderstorms and associated outflow winds, were “JUST A TYPICAL SW THUNDERSTORM.”
As I posted earlier “What’s interesting to me is how WATCH OUT NUMBER 4 came into play for the GMHS on the YHF – ‘UNFAMILIAR WITH WEATHER AND LOCAL FACTORS INFLUENCING FIRE BEHAVIOR.’ They were in THEIR OWN BACKYARD, and it was almost AS IF THEY WERE CLUELESS AS TO WHAT TO EXPECT. So, I guess that’s where the ‘BAD DECISIONS WITH PRIOR BAD OUTCOMES’ has significance for me.” WTF?
“BAD DECISIONS WITH PRIOR GOOD OUTCOMES’ has significance for me.”
Is how it should read.
I had five years as a hotshot and I can say that in year 5 I was a hell of a lot more comfortable being next to an active moving fire that I was in year 1. This type of complacency is a natural thing that can compromise your ability to make safe decisions, hopefully you can combat this with the increased situational awareness that experience can bring, but not always. I say all this because I think it comes into play in the “BAD DECISIONS WITH PRIOR GOOD OUTCOMES’ train of thought. Maybe because this fire was in GM backyard, they had a sense of complacency.
Yes, that’s a big part of it I think.
si!
Before I make this comment, let me preface it, by stating that I KNOW that fire progression maps may not be totally accurate in regards to time and geography. BUT, the possiblity exists, that they COULD be very accurate at certain points in time. I just had to say that before I got slammed too hard on my next thought.
The maps section of the ADOSH files recently uploaded by IM, contains a 1640hrs fire perimeter map, which, if fairly accurate, might explain why GM chose to deploy right there, right now, instead of trying to run for their lives, or head for the boulders. Almost at the same moment that the first radio traffic is heard about the ‘flaming front’, the map not only shows the fire rounding the bend in front of them, it also shows the fire behind them, at the top of the bowl, overtaking the route they just came down on.
If upon seeing the flaming front, they turned around to assess their options and saw the fire overtaking the path they had descended on, they may have immediately concluded there were no other options.
While I totally agree with Bob’s statement above, and others, that the black was the only place to be during that time period, I don’t think that the initial decision to move was that bad. The reason I say that, is that ALL plans and actions should be adjusted as you go, to take into account the 10 &18 and LCES as been mentioned here add nauseum. If they had been adjusting their plans based on conditions, they had all the way up until the moment of descent to adapt and perhaps live.
When GM decided to move, the fire was moving mostly away from them, and for the majority of their travels including up until the point of descent, they DID have easy access to down and out off of the west side of the ridgeline. The aerial photographs released through FOIA and posted by IM showing the western slopes pre-burn, show extremely sparce vegetation which made for a fairly decent down and out escape route for most of their travels along the ridgeline. They were likely thinking that they had their bases covered pretty well (I’m not saying that I agree that they did).
There is a point coming up the two-track, where the ranch first comes into view. Then, as the 2-track rises further, there is a point where you can see into the bowl well enough to see that there is no road going towards the ranch. They had never been here before. They didn’t have a map of the area. The ranch is where they wanted to go and there was no other visible way to get there. THIS is where the fatal decision was made. This is where they left their last potential for a down and out escape route, along with most of the other 10 & 18, on the ridge behind them.
I think the progression maps are a good guess at best and not really meant to be used to the detail that you are asking of them. I imagine their algorithms are less sophisticated than your weather forecasting software, and we all know how well they work at this kind of detail.
As far as the rest of your statement, I think you and I share a lot of the same thoughts. I too believe they thought they were moving parallel fires path and could beat it to where they were headed. I think they failed to imagine how it would hook back around at the bottom of the ridge and head right back up to their route. I don’t believe when they were standing in the saddle prior to dropping off, they could see the end of the ridge where it hooked them. Unfortunately not seeing a danger leads you to not consider it, this I believe was the fatal error. And clearly other factors were clouding their judgment that lead to the oversight.
Reply to jeff i post on January 7, 2014 at 4:05 pm
>> jeff i said…
>> I think the progression maps are a good guess at best
>> and not really meant to be used to the detail that you
>> are asking of them.
While I agree with TTWARE’s thought and possible
scenario… I have to agree with your statement as well.
This hasn’t been talked about much… but the reality is
that BOTH the SAIR and the ADOSH based a lot of
their 4:30 to 5:00 PM fire progression ‘guesses’ on
the time-lapse video that was shot miles away on
the Congress side showing ‘flames’ cresting the
ridges around there.
Nothing fundamentally wrong with that. It’s an amazing
and and important piece of video… but there is a chance
some of their assumptions about when and where they
thought they saw ‘flames’ cresting on certain ridges
is just plain WRONG.
I’ve done some of my own partial analysis on this
including discovering that the video was NOT actually
shot where they say it was. It was shot much farther
west than they thought which changes the perspective
on the Weaver Mountain ridges.
There was also a fundamentally sound extensive
analysis of this ‘time lapse’ video over at Mr. Bill
Gabbert’s Wildfire today site… but I also think they
have some of the TIMES wrong in THAT analysis.
So I hesitate to publish my OWN analysis until I am
really, really sure I can point out exactly where all
the other analysis went south ( so to speak ).
The point is… the hard-drawn firelines in the 4:30
to 5:00 PM timeframes in BOTH of the officially
published reports could be wrong.
As TTWARE says above ( and it is the basis for his
‘thought’ )… the SAIR timeline ( specifically ) shows
the fireline coming around the north side ridge down
in the canyon AND encroaching up onto the two-track
road where they came down from at pretty much
the same time.
I believe that is fiction… and I also believe the ADOSH
people simply ‘borrowed’ that fireline progression for
their own report on that timeframe. They almost
look identical. If ADOSH had done their OWN
independent evaluation of the fireline at that point in
time it might be ‘close’ to what SAIR did… but it
would not look like a ‘cut-and-paste’… which it does.
So TTWARE’s thought is valid based on the evidence
that has been published… but I would still be wary
of taking that as ‘gospel’ as far as what the fire was
really doing back up near the ridges… or when it actually
did crest the ridges there on the Weaver Mountains.
I’m finally going to tell this story, which I think is relevant to this conversation, at least for me.
In January, 50 years ago this month, after President Kennedy was assassinated, and just after my 12th birthday, and just after his 15th birthday, my brother, Roger, died in a dumb, stupid climbing accident in the Jemez, in New Mexico. He was an Eagle Scout and a seasoned backpacker and climber. He was under the supervision of a Scoutmaster, who told him, “You can go up on that mesa but get back down as soon as it starts getting dark.”
He was in supervision over two other younger members of his patrol. After a piece of sandstone under him broke and he fell 300 feet from the cliff ledge that he and his two youngers had hiked down onto in order to get down “as soon as it starts to getting dark,” it took all night to get those two youngers off that cliff ledge. A helicopter almost crashed pulling them off, and a helicopter rescuer broke his leg in the process. It was a major media event here in Albuquerque, and my family went psychotic for the next several years. But we didn’t sue the Scoutmaster. We knew he was in too much pain, and my dad knew my brother made a really bad decision. Today, if that happened, and a different family were involved, the outcome for everybody might be different.
I spent a lot of time wondering why my brother did what he did, lead those two youngers down on a steep sandstone cliff-ledge where they never should have been. I think he thought it was a fast way down. And it was getting dark. I have no idea. He was too smart and too experienced to have done that.
All I could do was make very very sure I didn’t do that EVER, during the ten years I backpacked and led others backpacking in the Grand Canyon. Sure, I loved hanging out on the edges. I actually did it quite a bit. But I never EVER did it when I was “leading” other people. That, for me, was “Lessons Learned”, the hard way.
I agree we may never get access to the rest of that conversation we’d love to get. I don’t like that and that bugs me a lot. I agree the Why’s may remain a mystery. We may never know what caused the crew to change their minds and leave the black. I do believe there was all kinds of systemic failure handling this fire, and that failure may have played a part. I think that systemic failure put a lot more people at risk than these nineteen. I do believe the SAIR is designed to not implicate anybody, and that’s a clear policy directive. I believe the ADOSH is based on a completely different policy directive. Thus the clash.
I also believe, after reading a lot, thinking a lot, and trying to understand a lot, it’s possible to gain “Lessons Learned” without hanging a Scoutmaster, who is probably in major agony, out to dry. Or a Patrol Leader, who is dead, either.
My 94-year-old mom and I had a pretty interesting conversation about this last week. She agrees with me. And it was the greatest, most traumatic loss in her life.
Namaste
This didn’t post where I thought I was posting it. Sorry.
Marti-
thanks for sharing.
Very sorry for your loss, Marti… but thanks
for sharing. You are right. There are
similarities here.
With no disrespect intended, however, let
me just ‘add’ a few factors to the very story
you told that would make it even more
similar ( and mysterious ) in terms of
the YHF incident.
What if there had been a clear, safer,
‘walking path’ available to your brother
instead of the ‘risky’ route he chose?
A path that would have also gotten him
down from there in the timeframe he
was told ( or even sooner than the way
he choose ) but would have presented
MUCH less danger to those in his charge?
What if… following an investigation of your
brother’s accident… it was revealed that
the Scoutmaster himself was fully aware
of that ‘safe’ descent path… but he simply
never told your brother about it or made
any attempt to make sure he knew about it?
What if ( to complicate things ever further ),
the people who were being interviewed
after the incident were swearing that they
told the Scoutmaster AND your brother
about the “roads in that area”… including
the one that would have kept your brother
alive… but then no real evidence can be
found that they actually DID do that?
That’s pretty much where the Yarnell
incident was following the release of the
SAIR… and the ADOSH report hasn’t
done a whole lot to clear this up.
If someone had made SURE your brother
knew about that ‘safe road’ down from
there… he would have probably never been
in that risky situation where he would slip
on shale.
If it ( additionally ) really could be proved
your brother DID know about his ‘safe
alternative’… yet he still ended up on the
dangerous route… then there would still be
some pretty hard questions to answer about
your brother’s decision(s) that day…
…but if it CAN be proven he didn’t even
KNOW he had options ( when protocol
dictates he was SUPPOSED to ) then
even though your brother’s decision was
the direct reason there was a death the
obvious liability stretches far beyond his
own decision that day.
He was responsible for the two…
But others were responsible for all THREE.
Marti,
Thanks for sharing. There’s a lot of wisdom in what you said.
I am very sorry for your loss, what a powerful story. I can relate as I was an Eagle Scout and heavily involved in Scouting activities for many years as a teenager.
Thank you.
My comment wasn’t intended as gospel, only to provide input based on an admittedly ‘suspect’ diagram that was included as evidence. There has been a lot of back and forth on this forum as to why, when encountering the flaming front, they didn’t make choices other than deployment. I was simply using that document to relate a possibllity as to why they might not have been able to.
We may never know the timing of the fire breaching the northwestern corner at the top of the bowl. The fire progression map referenced in my original comment above, DOES however, seem to be quite valid as to the approximate time the flaming front came around the bend at the bottom of the bowl, and was encountered by GM. I base this on recorded map time and radio traffic (1639hrs vs 1640hrs).
Agreed. Unless there is some new evidence
found the 1639 / 1640 time for the fireline
sweeping around that north ridge of the
canyon looks accurate. It’s the other stuff
like when the fire actually crested at any
particular point up on the ridges that
remains a little ‘wonky’.
When the ‘helmet cam’ video hit the
Mainstream Media ( MSM ) some stations
also showed a short video clip taken from
a security camera on the western side
of the Boulder Springs Ranch itself.
The camera is pointing in the exact right
direction to, perhaps, get a much better
idea of how the fire progressed ‘out there’
at that time… but I still have no idea where
they got that video.
There is still no indication it’s in the FOIA
or FOIL packages received by either
Elizabeth or Mr. Dougherty.
Maybe it will emerge.
Maybe it will ‘tell its own story’.
Maybe not.
WTKTT:
“This hasn’t been talked about much… but the reality is that BOTH the SAIR and the ADOSH based a lot of
their 4:30 to 5:00 PM fire progression ‘guesses’ on
the time-lapse video that was shot miles away on
the Congress side showing ‘flames’ cresting the
ridges around there.”
**ARE YOU KIDDING ME?**
your “assessment” of the fire progression maps included in the accident reports is WAY off base. pages 76-81 of the SAIR give a full account of how they came up with fire progression maps which goes way beyond any “time lapse video”. in fact, i don’t even see any time lapse video mentioned in the SAIR fire behavior analysis.
**YET ANOTHER EXAMPLE OF YOU ATTEMPTING TO CREATE CONSPIRACY WHERE THERE IS NONE.**
>> xxfullsailxx said…
>> i don’t even see any time lapse video
>> mentioned in the SAIR fire behavior
>> analysis.
You mean… other than the photo(s) they
used from that time-lapse video and the
importance the SAIT attributes to it on
page 77 when they are explaining the
‘fire progression’?…
( BTW: Page 77 is exactly in the middle of
the page sequence you are quoting above ).
Figure 19 – Congress Time-Lapse Video
SAIR – page 77 – Fire progression
The fire entered the middle bowl and moved southwest. The middle bowl, a natural chimney, funneled the fire at a rapid rate of spread toward the top of the ridge. A professional photographer took a series of time-lapse images from a location near Congress and compressed 20 minutes of images into a 16-second video. The footage captured vortices that developed in the smoke. The fire crested the ridge top and was described as a “dragon’s tongue” by one of the aircrews in orbit over the fire. Estimated flame lengths were 150 to 200 feet above the ridge top (Figure 19).
yep, my bad…
but why did you fail to mention the FOUR TOOLS THEY ACTUALLY USED TO CREATE THE MAPS?
SAIR:
“Fire Behavior Experts created an estimate of the Yarnell Hill Fire behavior using various methods:
1. Eyewitness accounts.
Interviews of many personnel
assigned to the incident included
time and location of significant
weather and fire behavior events.
2. Photographic images and
videos. Numerous individuals
documented fire activity during
the Yarnell Hill Fire. Many still
digital images had time stamps.
Photographs have varying
degrees of precision in time
stamps so experts used images
taken at verifiable times showing
a locatable feature on the fire
perimeter to document fire location and activity. Many digital photographs may be geo-referenced if the device that takes them has location tracking enabled. Where possible, the team used geo-referenced information to ascertain locations for photographs. This information was very valuable in determining locations, views, and fire activity and was useful in validating fire perimeter reconstruction. Other images lacking credible time stamps and/or geo-reference information were validated through a comparison with Google Earth pre-fire images, visible landmarks, and known time-stamped photographs to add information about fire perimeters.
3. Remote Sensing. The team modeled fire perimeters and intensities using remote sensing. US Forest Service National Infrared Operations imagery taken from nighttime flights supports daily fire growth documentation. The satellite-based Moderate Resolution Imaging Spectroradiometer system heat imagery helped to verify fire locations at various times.
4. Modeling Rates of Spread and Fire Intensities. The team used the BEHAVE Plus program and the embedded Short Term Fire Behavior Model in the Wildland Fire Decision Support System to model fire behavior. Inputs were from site visits, fuels data, the closest RAWS, fireline weather observations, local fuels information, and wind models. Photographic time-stamped information corroborated fire locations, active flaming fronts, and smoke columns around the fire and pinpointed on the landscape. This verified fire behavior modeling, specifically rate of spread and flame length.”
because throughout this dialogue here on IM, you’re main intention, has been to *try* to create controversy.
Agreed. Although when I snapped a screenshot of the Descent to the Ranch on Google Earth, you can see the bottom of “the end of the ridge that hooked them.” I think the crunch was that they didn’t know the winds/fire was about to turn to the southwest right about when they started the descent. Plus, they had been told earlier by AA that the fire would reach Yarnell in 1 to 2 hours. I think they thought they had enough time to make it to the ranch, and down the canyon would be the fastest way to get there.
ALSO. Way up above somewhere, there was a conversation about the possibility that Eric’s plan in his head may have assumed that the crew would exit the black via the two-track road all the way to the ranch. He’d been scouting the area from a lot higher and he may have known the road led to the ranch. However, the crew had less “situational awareness” of the two-track road in that direction. By the time they got to the saddle, it was not possible to see that the two-track actually led to the ranch. So that, combined with what looked like a quick sure way to the ranch, combined with thinking they had time to get there, combined with not knowing the winds were shifting more to the southwest, made them think that was the best way to go. I don’t think Eric had any intent for them to get there via the box canyon. I don’t think he knew they were going that way til he got to the descent and must have seen them.
That’s just what’s going thru my head after reading this convo.
Have to agree with you, Marti. I’ve been saying for
some time that, based on evidence, it looks very
much like the ACTUAL decision to drop into the
canyon was made by Captain Jesse Steed, himself,
at the moment his assigned ‘destination’ for his
‘marching orders’ came into view.
I still believe Steed was at the head of that 18 line
of men… and that Marsh was still somewhere north
just trying to ‘catch up’ to the that line of 18 men led
by Captain Steed.
WFF people posting here have basically said that,
according to the WFF culture, it would have been
nearly impossible for Steed to have made that
kind of decision WITHOUT actually STOPPING
and having some kind of ‘consultation conversation’
with Eric Marsh.
There is no evidence that did NOT happen, but
there’s no evidence it did, either. The only chance
of any proof of that particular ‘decision making’
conversation would be if that is also something
Brendan McDonough overhead that afternoon.
I still think the evidence points to a scenario where
that did NOT happen… and that when Captain
Steed reached that decision point… he simply
put his left turn blinker on… and so did every
man behind him… and down they went.
So for Eric Marsh that day… the fatal decision
really was just a “There they go… and I must
follow them… for I am their leader” situation.
I’m also not ‘signing off’ on this.
I still don’t think all the facts are in yet… but
I think it might come down to…
Marsh made the decision to leave the black,
gave Steed his destination and marching orders,
and off they went.
Steed made the decision to leave the road and
drop into the canyon.
Decision to deploy versus any other option?
( Insert educated guess ).
I’m inclined to agree with you. And see what I wrote at 6:44 pm
I did, Marti. See a longer response
above. Similar situation… but add the
possibility that there were ‘safer
routes’ that your brother didn’t know
about that day… when protocol(s)
dictate he SHOULD have known
about them ( and others are saying
they told him but no proof can be
found they really did )… and the
situation gets even closer to what
is being discussed here.
I’m currently of the opinion that Steed made that decision because he maybe didn’t know the two track road was seriously the best way to get to the ranch under the circumstances, he didn’t know the winds were shifting towards the southwest, and he didn’t know the fire was moving as fast as it was in that direction. I think he decided they could get to the ranch by dropping thru the canyon really quickly.
Agreed. It really could not be any other
way ( or any great distance from ) the
way you describe it. No one WANTED
to die that day.
The key is what you said…
“really quickly”.
Tex Gilligan has affirmed a number
of times there was no way to
SEE how tangled the vegetation
was down there from up where
the decision was made to go
that way. You would have to have
KNOWN ( or been told ) it was
nowhere you wanted to be taking
a line of 18 men with packs and gear.
By the way… it’s been discussed
in some detail on other earlier parts
of this ‘thread’ that even if they
had known that road looped all the
way to the ranch… that wouldn’t
have been any kind of ‘cakewalk’
that day, either.
The road turned east towards the
ranch just shortly after the point
where they left the road… but it
did not stay UP on the ridge.
It drops into its own ‘canyon’ and
they would have also lost all
‘eyes on the fire’ for pretty much
the entire eastward trip towards
the ranch. They would have been
able to maintain the same forward
rate of travel they achieved from
the anchor point to the place where
they left the road… but they still
might have been in a heap of
trouble just before they reached
the ranch. They probably would
have had to abandon the ranch
as a destination and charge south,
away from the fire, and towards
the ‘Candy Cane’ lane area… but
they probably would have survived
that day.
i agree with most of what you’re saying, including the fire progression maps showing fire behind them on the knob itself.
when they entered in to the bowl, they not only lost sight of the fire, but also were on the lee-side of the knob which buffered any further wind shifts or increases that would have told them that the fire was moving their direction, until they popped out somewhere along the bottom.
i still have a hard time believing that they were just “bushwhacking” their way through. i guess i’ve always visualized them following some game trail off the two track… whether that was Marsh/Steed’s intent or not is another question… one that won’t ever be answered.
fullsail,
Right before actually getting to the bowl, the two-track starts rising DRAMATICALLY. The crew likely dropped down off of the two-track as soon as they could actually see that there was no road leading to the ranch, rather than climb the steep two-track any further. This would have put them in the drainage that runs along the base of the rocks between the ‘north’ and ‘west’ sides of the bowl, which is also where the SAIR has them decending.
The drainage MAY have provided them with a little easier go, than just about any other spot (depending upon whether it was washed out a bit, without being overgrown), but either way, it was the most direct route.
You are correct that if they followed the edge of the boulders (and this drainage) on the way down, they would have not been able to see the fire, or feel any strong wind shifts, until they popped out at the bottom.
One can follow the drainage down on google earth and where it pops out at the bottom there are some large boulders where they would have probably rounded the bend. The deployment spot is a short distance directly in front of that turn.
regardless of how they found their way down the path off the two track (game trails, drainage’s, etc.) it’s hard to imagine that Steed or Marsh wouldn’t have scouted and marked the route…
also- i think the fire progression maps that you cite are fairly accurate. the SAIR gives a pretty well referenced account of fire behavior and how progression was mapped on pages 76-81. if you think about how the fire made a run up the “box canyon” they were in, then it would only make sense that the fire also made similar run up the windward side first.
RTS noted “CUTTING a SZ in any fuel type is very, very inefficient, especially in chaparral.” Be it a lack of fire behavior modeling (Marquez certainly is looking better and better in terms of the judgment he exercised, which while intuitive did seem to understand the fire behavior given fuel type and conditions that day), or decisions to bushwhack that didn’t seem to account for how tough bushwhacking through that kind of brush can be, to a final decision to try to cut and burn out a SZ in what is some of the hardest kind of chaparral (even within chaparral as a vegetation type) to clear, there just doesn’t seem to have been accounting for the fact that they were not in grassland and not in a forest. I realize they were a local crew and had to be very familiar with that type of scrub. But at each juncture during the day they don’t seem to have taken the scrub itself into account in their decision-making. That may well be another training issue and relate to some of the past decisions that also have been alluded to in this thread.
I totally agree.
Reply to NV on January 7, 2014 at 2:26 pm
>> NV said…
>> I realize they were a local crew and had to be very familiar
>> with that type of scrub. But at each juncture during the day
>> they don’t seem to have taken the scrub itself into account
>> in their decision-making.
A lot of them were ‘transplants’ from other states for this
2013 fire season… but yes… MOST of them were ‘local’,
the fire was in their own backyard, they worked off-season
doing defensive work… and they SHOULD have known all
about that terrain.
Even if they didn’t… there is DOCUMENTED proof that they
were TOLD about all the dangers of that terrain that very
morning while they were eating breakfast.
The proof of that comes from the same proof that they actually did
‘stop for breakfast’ when they first got to Yarnell… and that is where
the 45 to 60 minute separation between Marsh and the rest of them
began that morning ( which was never mentioned in the SAIR. )
That evidence and eyewitness testimony has been reprinted in at
least 3 separate online Mainstream Media ( MSM ) articles and
one of them is linked and quoted below.
While they were eating breakfast up at the ICP at the Model Creek
Elementary School in Peeples Valley from about 8:00 AM to 8:40
AM… a famous local hiker and hunter named Rick McKenzie,
whose family had been in Yarnell for over 150 years, sat down
and talked to them.
He (Rick) was helping out fire command that morning up there at
the ICP and he sat down with the Granite Mountain Hotshot crew
while they were eating breakfast to make SURE they knew how
dangerous and impassable that terrain can be before they ever
even went up there that day.
He spoke to the crew at the table in general… but specifically
to squad boss Travis Carter…
“Y’all be careful up on that mountain,” Rick told him. “That brush
is so thick that you can’t even crawl through it. And that manzanita
burns hot. If the fire comes down off the mountain, man, watch
out. It’ll blow up.”
“Thanks,” Travis said, nodding. “We appreciate that.”
So they were TOLD.
THAT morning… at breakfast.
Did they LISTEN? Did they UNDERSTAND?
Apparently not.
I actually do believe Brendan McDonough in his GQ article
when he basically is telling us now he knows for sure that
‘no one objected’ to ‘the plan’ for the risky move. Brendan
heard all the radio conversations and the ‘decision making’.
Men’s Journal ( Magazine )
Article: The Last Battle of the Granite Mountain Hotshots
By Josh Eells Oct 2013
http://www.mensjournal.com/magazine/the-last-battle-of-the-granite-mountain-hotshots-20130911?page=6
The buggies headed south on Highway 89 for about an hour, then pulled into an elementary school north of Yarnell where the fire’s Incident Command was set up. There were generators, tent camps, showers, and lots of Gatorade.
As the rest of the crew met for weather and safety briefings, Eric went ahead, hiking up to the fireline to mark a trail for the guys to follow. He made his way through the brush, pausing every 50 yards or so to tie a strip of pink flagging tape around a branch. This wasn’t sparse desert scrubland; it was thick chaparral, a four-foot tangle of mountain mahogany, thorny catclaw, manzanita, and Sonoran scrub oak. In some places it was so thick, it was almost impassable. It was also highly flammable; the locals call the oily manzanita “gasoline on a stick.”
Down at Incident Command, the rest of the crew was having breakfast before setting out. A Yarnell man named Rick McKenzie approached with some advice. Rick’s family had been in Yavapai County for 150 years, since his great-grandfather moved from Nova Scotia to prospect for gold on Yarnell Hill. He bow-hunted in these mountains, and he knew the terrain well. He went up to one of the Hotshots, a squad boss named Travis Carter.
“Y’all be careful up on that mountain,” Rick told him. “That brush is so thick that you can’t even crawl through it. And that manzanita burns hot. If the fire comes down off the mountain, man, watch out. It’ll blow up.”
“Thanks,” Travis said, nodding. “We appreciate that.”
After breakfast, the crew packed up and drove down to a subdivision called Glen Ilah, about a mile south of Yarnell. They parked at the end of a dirt road called Sesame Street. Their orders were to hike the hill above Glen Ilah and establish an anchor point on the fire’s southern tip. From there, they could start cutting a line to contain the fire along its eastern flank.
They threw on their packs and started up Eric’s trail. It wasn’t even 9 a.m. yet, but it was already sweltering, the temperature on its way to a high of 103. The desert air was thick and heavy, and there wasn’t much wind.
The crew hiked past a burro path leading to an old gold mine, and through stands of bear grass so thick it could lock up the drive shaft on a Jeep. The mountain lions and bears would have fled by now, but there were still a few mule deer and the occasional cottontail. The lizards and rattlesnakes were deep inside the rocks, trying to escape the heat.
They hiked for about an hour and a half, with Jesse in the lead. They were red and sweaty when they caught up with Eric around 9:30 near the top of the ridge. The fire wasn’t particularly threatening: just a few smoldering bushes, a line so small Eric could literally step across it.
By now the fire had burned about 300 acres, but it didn’t seem dangerous, just routine.
I spent a chunk of this afternoon reading that article, after finding it on one of the Facebook Support Group pages I read for various reasons. Amazing detail, especially about some of the members of the crew, although some errors in the documentation of what happened on the fire, which is understandable. Which makes me really wonder, how did he discover what he wrote? Pretty awesome journalism.
You have to remember that a lot of MSM articles
that have appeared came out in-between the
SAIR and ADOSH reports… so they are a
combination of journalists actually trusting things
the SAIR said, and combining that with interviews
of their own with people that the SAIT never even
bothered talking to.
So yes… a lot of them have details that only came
from family members and eyewitnesses but are
also ‘mixed’ with what we now know were obvious
errors or wrong assumptions in the SAIR.
One thing I am noticing is the confusion between 18 and 19 fire fighters on manifest. Marsh would have not been listed with the crew as he was a (separate resource) and Brendon was accounted for thus the 18. Marsh with them made 19. I believe that is the confession with the crew manifest.
Yes, I agree. That’s pretty much what I figured out.
It was John Pierson, Jr. who was not on the manifest that day.
Page 30 of the SAIT Yarnell Investigation Notes…
SAIT Interview with Roy Hall – 7/8/2013 – 10:30 a.m.
Interviewers: Jay Kurth, John Phipps, Mike Dudley, Jimmy Rocha
19:16 Got Todd Able on the phone to discuss the location for the Critical Stress Management. Got a roster for family notifications. We had a hard time because Prescott Fire Department announced that there were 18 fatalities and we knew there were 19. We had to find out who the 19th was. It was John Pierson, Jr. His name was not on the manifest. Made change to 220/moved late to get air attack over fire by 0600-0630 to chase news helo off. Ordered dozer to build road to be in close proximity to the site to remove the bodies. John Russell/Scott Masher had scene specialist ordered in for scene preservation.
5:45 – 5:50 Yavapai County investigative team on dozer line and began electronic preservation.
NOTE: The SAIT investigators wrote his name down
in their notes ( shown above ) as…
John Pierson, Jr.
At the top of the actual SAIR report… his name is
listed this way…
John J. Percin, Jr.
i went to his memorial… very sad indeed.
Did you know him? I don’t even know any of these guys, but it still hurts.
no, i didn’t know him. i went as USFS representation with my engine and crew. there was a humbling turn out from both WA and OR…
the previous day his remains had been escorted from PDX down to Tualitan, where he was from, by an impressive inter-agency procession… his remains were “guarded” overnight by people who knew him and candlelight vigil.
http://www.kgw.com/news/John-Percin-Jr-honored-by-firefighters-from-across-the-state-215393541.html
Thx for the link. Amidst all of this, I am trying to honor the 19 by finding out more about them as human beings.
Ah, Oregon. My daughter, who is right now trying to get to Ann Arbor, graduated summa cum laud from the University of Oregon, so I follow.
Congratulations to you and your daughter. Safe travels
Reply to calvin post on January 5, 2014 at 4:57 pm
>> Calvin said…
>>
>> Sequence of events listed in no particular order, but all occurring
>> after 1530 (you choose the order)
>> 1. OPS2 asks if GM could spare resources in Yarnell (GM says NO)
>> 2. DIV A says Working way off top, OPS1 Says hunker and be safe,
>> keep me informed, Air support DOWN THERE ASAP
>> 3. Steed/ Marsh have discussion concerning something!
>> (insert educated guess)
Calvin… I pulled this comment down here as a new ‘parent’ comment
because I think it’s important and I didn’t want it to get ‘lost’ up above.
There’s been a lot of ‘new’ in the last few days but some things ( like
the question you are asking here ) are still VERY important.
Ever since we heard about OPS2 Musser’s request for resources and we now
have the ACTUAL suggestions/directives/orders from OPS1 Abel to Marsh on
an AUDIO clip… the ORDER in which these things we now KNOW happened
that day is ( as you are pointing out ) obviously very important.
I’m not ready to ‘re-order’ your list at this moment… but I did want to
acknowledge the important question you asked above and just say
“I’ve been looking hard at that myself… stay tuned”.
I will however… point something out that actually ADDS an important item
( or two? ) to your ‘list’ of events that need to be ‘ordered’ in this VERY tight
timeframe.
Before we learned of Musser and before the audio of Abel emerged… we had
this tendency to just describe the ‘decision making’ up there in this timeframe
as if it was just one single crucial conversation that was alternately being
referred to as either the ‘discussing their options’ conversation OR the ‘comfort
level’ discussion… as if they were one and the same conversation.
I don’t think we can assume that anymore.
Don’t forget that the only reason anyone has been referring to the
captured MacKenzie audio as the ‘comfort-level’ discussion is because
that’s where we first hear Eric Marsh use that phrase… but what we
ACTUALLY hear him saying is…
“…when I called you BEFORE and asked you what your comfort-level was.”
So the actual ‘comfort-level’ discussion Marsh is referring to is NOT the one
we hear pieces of in the MacKenzie video. All we hear in the MacKenzie video
is proof that this ‘comfort-level’ conversation had ALREADY taken place
BEFORE this new conversation being captured by MacKenzie.
So I think it’s time to break the ‘naming’ habit for these (multiple) conversations
and realize that we are talking about ( at least ) TWO different conversations
here ( maybe more )… all happening within this tight timeframe and with
‘outside influences’ like the call ( cell phone? radio? ) from OPS2 Musser and
the ( known radio ) conversation with OPS1 Abel… and maybe even one
or MORE ‘contacts’ that we still don’t even know about.
It’s looking very much like there are THREE ‘conversations’ that might
even had to be ‘ordered’ into this timeframe…
1) The actual FIRST conversation where Marsh called Steed to ‘ask him what
his comfort level was’ ( about something ).
2) The actual ‘discussing their options’ conversation that the SAIR says
Brendan McDonough heard ALL of… and Darrell Willis admits in
his military.com interview that he ‘clicked back on their frequency
and heard some things… WE knew they were heading south’.
3) The MacKenzie video conversation… where Marsh is simply
REMINDING Steed that they had ALREADY had one ‘comfort-level’
discussion…. but now there’s something ELSE to talk about.
So without answering your question (yet)… I think I would just
expand your list of ‘events’ that need to be ordered into this
tight timeframe with something like this…
( Actually.. the numbered list below MIGHT turn out to be the
right order in which these things happened?? Dunno yet. )
Sequence of events listed in no particular order, but all occurring
after 1530 (you choose the order)
1. DIV A says Working way off top, OPS1 Says hunker and be safe,
keep me informed, Air support DOWN THERE ASAP.
2. Steed/ Marsh initial discussion about ‘comfort-level’ concerning
something ?? What Abel told them to do ?? Other ?? (insert educated guess)
3. OPS2 asks if GM could spare resources in Yarnell (GM says NO)
4. Steed’s/ Marsh’s actual ‘discussing their options’ conversation known to
be overheard by both McDonough and Willis.
( Time interval in-between? Something else happens or introduces
itself into the situation? Cell call? Radio call on private freq? )
5. Steed/ Marsh discussion ( captured in MacKenzie videos ) where
Marsh reminds Steed of FIRST ‘comfort-level’ discussion that had
ALREADY taken place and now they have another one concerning
same thing?… or something else? (insert another educated guess)
>> On January 5, 2014 at 5:53 pm mike said…
>> There is no answer to this now other than a guess.
>> The only evidence I know of the Musser request is him telling
>> investigators it occurred. He likely does not know exactly when it occurred.
>> I think he gave an approximate time to investigators (somewhere around
>> 3:50 if I recall). The general feeling is the comfort conversation was
>> last… around 4:00.
Not true. See above. We have only been calling that conversation captured
in the 4:02 MacKenzie video the ‘comfort level’ discussion because
that’s when we simply HEAR Marsh use that phrase… but what Marsh
ACTUALLY said was…
“…when I called you BEFORE and asked you what your comfort-level was.”
So some kind of actual ‘comfort-level’ discussion was not LAST in
the tight sequence of events before they moved south at 4:04…
…it came FIRST ( or at least not LAST ) in a ‘series’ of complicated
events up there circa 3:50 to 4:04 PM.
Whatever the prior conversation, Marsh and Steed are discussing something in the video right around 4 o’clock. Since Marsh said they were staying put to Musser about 10 minutes before and they pick up and leave about 3-5 minutes later (or less), it is not a stretch to say they were discussing moving – it just makes sense – obviously there was a change of heart. It is not hard to believe that Marsh wanted to help, what is hard to believe is that he decided it was safe to do so. But apparently he did, because they did move. Otherwise you are saying Marsh left the ridge knowing he should not – do you really think that Paul Musser, Darrell Willis or even the Lord Almighty himself could have made him do that? I know the answer to that is debatable, but personally I do not think so.
Willis and McDonough may have heard these conversations, but do not seem inclined at all to discuss them. If they do, fine, but otherwise that would seem to be a dead end.
Then Marsh and Steed left the Black safety zone in a decision no other crew would have ever done leading them to there deaths. To go down in history as one of the most dumbest decisions ever made by a hot shot leadership. That’s all we are left with if there was no outside pressure for them to move. The motive to me is still elusive. If they really believed they could take a calculated risk and beet the fire to the ranch. That is what the SAIT should have said and let the cards fall.
Its hard for wildland fire fighters to accept that as fact with what we know. But if no other evidence surfaces we are stuck at this point. I am at a loss of words right now.
Bob,
I think you have summed it up well, and the motive is elusive. I believe it all comes down to them taking the calculated risk and being wrong. The question is why did they see it differently at the time?
So my opinion is looking at the last pictures in the black just before they moved. Looking at the long string of fire across the flats, I would have never chosen to go downhill into unburned fuel, with what the fire activity was at that time. That was my first reaction at the beginning of this and still is. What say the rest of you? Do you see any thing else that would have given them a safe reason to do what they did? Other than a calculated risk which never should fit into the 10 Standard Orders. If you are operating on a calculated risk you are braking the 10 Standard Orders/LCES. to say they were moving to a safety zone 1 1/2 miles away is lunacy.
I am not a WFF, but since you are all stumped, I don’t feel so bad offering something. As I said before, I think he relied too much on what he saw. The pictures are static, so hard to draw definitive conclusions. But I think the fire was running at that time mainly parallel to their planned route, not across it. Maybe the speed looked like it would never catch them enroute. But he had to know the weather was unstable, the direction and speed could change suddenly, the terrain was hard to cross and the whole area was a tinderbox waiting to go. But maybe he focused on what he saw and not what he should have known, and as a result he misjudged it. Maybe that was a flaw in the way he assessed fire behavior, I do not know.
The idea of a calculated risk (70/30, 80/20 or even 99/1) would seem to be crazy to me. If you are not darn certain it is safe, you shouldn’t go, right?
RTS the other day said this made him and others angry. I have got to believe you all look at this, want to pick up a 2×4 and knock him upside the head, saying “What are you DOING???”
You got that right.
Agree. And/but see what I wrote about my brother below.
“…when I called you BEFORE and asked you what your comfort-level was.”
what evidence is there that attributes this quote to Marsh?:
Fullsail,
I base it on his NC accent and him saying “ya know” like always. I’ve listened to and talked with him on the radio many times.
i guess i’m wondering about any “hard” evidence…
why do you think Marsh would have to “check in” with Steed about his “comfort level” again? don’t you think that Steed looks pretty comfortable? they’ve worked together for a few years so to say “i knew this was coming” , “i could just feel it ya know” seems a little (for lack of a better term) rookie-ish. the voice sounds apprehensive.
you don’t think there’s ANY chance it could have been Brendan after leaving his lookout spot? like maybe he checked on the crew’s “comfort level” earlier when the fire activity near him picked up?
Fullsail,
I’m basing my conclusion entirely on just HIS VOICE. So, I’m NOT basing any of this on logic or anything else. Totally, unequivocally based on HIS VOICE ALONE, his NC drawl and “ya know.” That’s my ‘hard’ evidence.
It’s definitely NOT L/O Mcdonaugh or Steed.
**
** BLUE RIDGE HOTSHOTS GPS TRACKING VIDEO
** NEW VIEWABLE COPIES ARE ONLINE
Reply to Elizabeth post on January 6, 2014 at 9:22 am
>> Elizabeth said…
>>
>> WTKTT – when you re-size it ( the video ), can you re-post it to that
>> website where you had me upload it, and then I can download it from
>> there and re-post it on YouTube?
Done. There are TWO conversion files there now.
One is MP4 ( best quality ) and the other is WMV format ( good quality ).
The MP4 version is only 32 meg ( instead of 518 like AVI ) and the
WMV is only 27 meg. I have also already posted both of them to
a public YouTube page but can/should re-post as well ( and just delete that
bad AVI file from your account up there ).
>> Elizabeth also said…
>> And I THINK that the stop with the men picking up Brendan is
>> there — I THINK…
I’m not seeing it. You can definitely see the moment when Brendan
was ‘dropped off’ at the old-grader to begin his lookout duties earlier in
the day… but there is no GPS tracking data that shows the moment
when he was supposedly ‘picked up’ by Blue Ridge in the 1545-1600
timeframe. You might be mistaking the black dot on the map that
says “BR Supt Truck parking” with the one much farther west that actually
says “Old grader, B’s potential deployment site”.
See more details in the 411 section below.
>> Elizabeth also said…
>> …but it seems like Brendan must have run down PAST the
>> grader to meet them, because they do not go back “up” to
>> meet him.
The closest the Blue Ridge GPS tracking gets to the old-grader location in the
timeframe when they ( Frisby only? ) supposedly picked Brendan up is at the
end of the Sesame area where the Blue Ridge Superintendent Truck was
parked… and even then they only stayed at that spot for exactly 60 seconds.
That’s still more than half a mile east of the old-grader location ( 6/10 of a mile ).
Even if Brendan had time to walk that far east after he left his lookout position
and just ‘meet’ them where the GM Superintendent Truck was ( he really did
NOT have that kind of time )… that doesn’t match ANY accounting in any official
documentation of what was supposed to have happened.
>> Elizabeth also said…
>> Someone else like Calvin should verify this so that your eyes (WTKTT)
>> and mine are not the only sets looking at this.
Absolutely. I’m sure someone will.
The whole story about Frisby picking McDonough up on the ATV and (basically)
‘saving his life’ is now ingrained into the entire story of that day. If the Blue Ridge
GPS tracking data doesn’t even show that happening then there must be an
explanation such as Frisby did make the run… but someone ELSE had the GPS
unit around that time and we are seeing their movements in this tracking
data/video… and NOT Frsiby’s movements. I suppose only Frisby and/or other
Blue Ridge people could clear that up at this point.
** New YouTube locations
There are now two new version of this Blue Ridge GPS Tracking video available
on Youtube that should play/show just fine for anyone/everyone. They will also
download easily with any standard YouTube video grabber.
There is now a WMV version and an MP4 version.
The original AVI file ( the one that YouTube messed up ) was 518 megabytes.
The WMV version is only 27 megabytes. Good quality.
The MP4 version is 32 megabytes. Best quality.
The original AVI file was named…
BlueRidgeIHCMovement_20130630.avi
The conversion files are named…
BlueRidgeIHCMovement_20130630_MP4_32meg_best_quality.mp4
On YouTube already at…
http://youtu.be/O8AJSgk2pIQ
BlueRidgeIHCMovement_20130630_WMV_27meg_good_quality.wmv
Also on YouTube already.
Use same link as above and then just click account name for other videos.
** QUICK SUMMARY OF THE GPS MOVEMENTS SEEN IN THIS VIDEO
Here’s the 411 on this video…
The Blue Ridge GPS Tracking data video begins with a time of 1100 on Sunday,
June 30, 2013… but no GPS location dot appears on the map until exactly 1110…
when the GPS locator ‘blue dot’ suddenly comes ‘online’ just near the old-grader
location.
The Blue Ridge GPS unit was only updating every 60 seconds that day… and
this has been converted to 1 second display intervals in the video. So for every
1 second in the video another clock minute has passed. The time values for each
GPS reading display in sequence at the top of the video.
NOTE: The word ‘they’ is used a lot in the descriptions below simply because it
is unknown, at any given time, who was actually carrying the GPS unit or, when
the ATV is moving, how many BR Hotshots may have actually been in it… except
where noted.
Example: We know that only Frisby and Trueheart made the trip up/back to the
anchor point for the first face-to-face with Marsh/Steed… but when they return to
their vehicles, pause, and then head north for a scouting trip, it is unknown if the
GPS unit changed hands or who else may have come ‘aboard’ for that
scouting trip.
** START OF BLUE RIDGE GPS TRACKING VIDEO
1100
Video starts, but GPS locator ‘dot’ does not appear until 1110.
1110
GPS locator dot suddenly appears right near the old-grader location.
1111-1122
GPS locator remains in/around the old-grader location but appears to be
‘scouting’ that location back and forth for 11 minutes.
1123-1132
The GPS locator heads to the northwest on the wide two-track road that was
actually the one the fire jumped over when it ‘escaped’ Saturday afternoon. It
appears they ( Frisby and Brown ) are trying to get up onto the ridge for their
face-to-face meeting with Marsh but this two-track road dead-ends and does
not go up to the anchor point.
1133-1145
They ( Frisby and Brown ) turn around and head back to the old-grader, then
past it without stopping, and up towards the anchor point on the other two-track
road for their face-to-face meeting with Marsh/Steed.
1146
The first time they ( Frisby and Brown ) arrive at the spot on the ridge labelled
‘Mystery Panel’ a few hundred feet south of the anchor point and on the
two-track road.
1153
First arrival at the spot labelled ‘Retardant drop, anchor’ where GM was working
all morning. This is their arrival for the ‘face-to-face’ meeting with Marsh/Steed
that is documented in SAIR, ADOSH, WFAR. The SAIR says: ‘a little before noon’
( correct ) and both ADOSH and WFAR are also correct putting the meeting time
at right around 1154 that day.
1154-1224
Frisby and Brown stay at the anchor point meeting with Marsh/Steed
for 30 minutes. This also matches (exactly) the reported meeting time of
‘half an hour’ in the SAIR, ADOSH and WFAR report(s).
1225
They ( Frisby, Brown and now McDonough with them ) begin to leave the
anchor point and head back east on the two-track road ‘in the bottom’.
1232
The second time that day they are at the exact spot labelled ‘Mystery panel’.
1240
The actual moment they ‘stopped’ near the old-grader location to drop Brendan
McDonough off so he can begin his lookout duties. They only stop for 1 minute.
1249
They arrive back where the BR vehicles are parked. They only stop there for 1
minute before beginning a ‘scouting trip’ north from the Sesame area on what is
marked on the visible map as the ‘Jeep Trail’.
1250-1308
Their ‘scouting trip’ north on the ‘Jeep Trail’. At 1308 they are at the farthest point
north that they would travel and are actually at a point where both the SAIR and
the ADOSH fire progression charts seem to say should have been ‘inside the fire
area’. They may have ‘broken through’ the actual fireline on the ‘Jeep Trail’ itself
as part of this ‘scouting trip’.
1308-1332
A slow trip back doing more ‘scouting’. They arrive back where BR vehicles are
parked at 1332, but only remain there for 7 minutes.
1339-1342
Short trip south on Sesame Trail to the spot where the GM vehicles are parked.
They remain there with the GM vehicles until 1355 ( 13 minutes ).
1355-1401
South on Sesame, crossing over to the St. Joseph Shrine area. About a third of
the way east on the crossover road they stop, turn around, and go back to
Sesame trail the way they came, head south on Sesame, and then stop at the
point where the paved Lakewood Drive in Glen Illah becomes the dirt trail known
as Sesame.
1402-1409
Stationary for 7 minutes near a house which is at the point where Lakewood
drive becomes Sesame trail.
1410-1415
East on the paved part of Lakewood drive and all the way out to Highway 89, then
moving fast going north on Highway 89.
1416-1434
They have left the visible map, last seen heading north on Highway 89, and there
is no tracking data for 18 minutes. This would have been enough time for a trip
all the way up/back to some point just north of the known staging area at the
U-Store-It facility north of Yarnell on Highway 89 but NOT enough time to make
it all the way up/back to the ICP command center at the Model Creek School in
Peeples Valley. The U-Store-It facility location itself ( where the Globe Type 2
crew shot their VLAT videos ) is actually visible on this topographical background
map near the upper right edge of the map where the small letters BM appear.
1435
The tracking dot re-appears on the visible map and they are heading south on
Highway 89. They take a right turn off Highway 89 and head west on Shrine Road.
1436-1439
They travel west on Shrine road, all the way out to the St. Joseph Shrine parking
lot where the pavement of Shrine road ends and the dirt road begins, and they
stop there.
NOTE: This is the exact location where, later in the day, the firefighter with the
helmet cam will capture the final radio transmissions from Granite Mountain.
1440-1443
Stationary for 3 minutes at the St. Joseph Shrine parking lot.
1444-1449
Heading east on Shrine road again. They eventually reach Highway 89 again,
take a left, and head north.
1450-1451
Tracking pointer has disappeared from the visible map again. They were last
seen heading north on Highway 89. This time, the pointer is only ‘off the map’
for 2 minutes. This could have been just another ‘quick’ trip up/back to some
point just beyond the known staging area at the U-Store-It facility north of
Yarnell on Highway 89.
1452
Tracking pointer reappears on the upper right edge of the visible map.
They are heading south again on Highway 89.
1454-1456
A quick side-trip off Highway 89 west on Shady Way and then back east to the
Highway again. Shady Way parallels the Shrine road and is just north of it but
it is a dead-end at its western end.
1457-1501
Very FAST travel south on Highway 89 all the way to Glen Ilah, past the Ranch
House Restaurant, and then west on Lakewood Drive all the way back out to
the Sesame Trail area.
1502-1505
They take a right turn off Sesame trail onto the crossover trail that approaches
the Shrine from the west.
1506
They arrive at the Shrine area again having come in from the west on the
crossover trail from the Sesame area.
1507-1510
Stationary at the Shrine area for 3 minutes.
1511-1516
Some non-stop probing in various directions around the St. Joseph Shrine area.
1517-1519
Heading back west towards Sesame trail on the crossover trail from the
Shrine area.
1520-1528
Stationary on the crossover trail a few hundred yards east of where it meets
Sesame trail. They stayed here for 8 minutes.
1529-1550
Back and forth on the crossover trail just probing or checking on something.
They were doing this for 21 minutes.
1551-1553
Suddenly headed north on Sesame trail towards where the BR Superintendent
truck is still parked. This timeframe matches the one listed in reports as when
Eric Marsh ‘requested’ a second face-to-face meeting all the way out on
the western ridge at the anchor point, and the moment when Brendan
McDonough was abandoning his lookout position.
1554
Arrival where the BR Superintendent truck is parked at the extreme north end of
Sesame, but they only stayed there for 1 minute, then they leave heading south
again for the Shrine area.
NOTE: This is the time when the SAIR says Frisby picked Brendan McDonough
0.6 miles west of there over at the old-grader location… but there is (apparently)
no GPS data to support that pickup. If Frisby was actually carrying the GPS
tracker at this point… then in order for this ‘trip’ to get Brendan to not be
recorded in the data it means Frisby would have had to have been able to get
0.6 miles west to the old-grader, pick up Brendan, and then travel 0.6 miles
back again all the way to where the BR Superintendent truck was parked
in less than 1 minute… before the next sequential GPS update. Not likely.
NOTE: The total ‘road’ distance ( and not as-the-bird-flies ) one-way from where
the BR Superintendent truck was parked out at the north end of the Sesame area
out west to the old-grader location is…
3483.96 feet, 1161.32 yards, 0.65 mile(s)
Round trip total distance would be…
6967.92 feet, 2322.64 yards, 1.31 mile(s)
1555-1605
South on Sesame, left turn on the crossover trail, and back towards the Shrine
area. 1 minute stop on the way in the middle of the crossover trail.
1606
Arrival back at the Shrine area again.
1607-1615
Same pattern as before in the Shrine area. A lot of back and forth, east and west
on the Shrine road, just probing or checking on things or warning other
firefighters in that area that trigger points have been met.
1616-1619
Suddenly headed back west again towards the Sesame area on the crossover
trail. Right on Sesame and north towards where the Granite Mountain vehicles
are parked. This appears to be the ‘drop off’ run when at least 2 BR crew
members were being driven back to move the GM Crew Carriers.
1620
Arrival at the spot where the Granite Mountain Crew Carriers are parked. They
were only here for 1 minute. This would be the last time during the day they are
at this point where the GM vehicles were parked and must have been the moment
when at least 2 BR crew members were dropped there to ‘move’ the GM Crew
Carriers over to the Shrine area. It is still not known for certain whether Brendan
McDonough had been waiting there for them to return and then followed them
over to the Shrine area driving the GM Supervisory truck… or whether Brendan
had already exited the area and gone over to the Ranch House Restaurant
(alone) with the GM Supervisor truck. There are still conflicting stories and
eyewitness testimony about all that.
NOTE: According to the SAIR timeline,1620 is also the exact moment that Steed
and the GM crew dropped off the two-track road and began their descent into the
box canyon with Eric Marsh either already at the ‘back of the line’ or still trying to
catch up with Steed/Crew.
1621-1625
Quickly back to the Shrine area the way they came.
1626-1639
Arrival back at the Shrine area again. For the next 13 minutes… same pattern as
before in the Shrine area. A lot of back and forth, east and west on the Shrine
road, just probing or checking on things. These are the (documented) minutes
when Blue Ridge was simply trying to make sure all the other firefighters there
knew it was time to ‘get out’ and were preparing to evacuate the area themselves
in the convoy we can now see in the new Blue Ridge video. 1639 is also the
moment when the firefighter in the Shrine area with the helmet cam begins to
capture the final radio transmissions from Granite Mountain and we hear Captain
Steed’s first “We are in front of the flaming front” MAYDAY call.
1640-1641
The Blue Ridge convoy with all four BR vehicles and the 2 GM Crew Carriers
following them exits the Shrine area. The convoy travels east on Shrine road all
the way to Highway 89 and then takes a right turn and heads QUICKLY south on
Highway 89 and directly to the Ranch House Restaurant in Glen Ilah.
It is also during these minutes that some of the final radio transmissions from
Granite Mountain were made. In the video we can now see of this convoy
traveling in these exact moments… the Blue Ridge Hotshot filming the video says
“We just pulled out… Yarnell’s blowin’up”. The YIN notes from the BR interview for
this timeframe ( see below ) indicate this is when they, too, heard some of the
frantic radio calls from GM but none of that is captured in the video of the convoy
being taken from the back of the BR Crew Carrier during convoy movement.
1642
The Blue Ridge Convoy, known to contain the 2 GM Crew Carriers ( but no visible
sign of the GM Superintendent Truck ) arrive at the Ranch House Restaurant.
This is also the same minute when Eric Marsh made his final radio transmission
from out at the deployment site. If Brendan McDonough really did exit the Shrine
area along with Blue Ridge, and was part of their convoy to the Ranch House
Restaurant… then this is also the moment when Brendan McDonough says
he made his second radio call to Marsh and Steed to “Tell them the vehicles
were (now) safe at the cafe’… and to call me if they needed anything.”
If that is true, then Marsh and Steed would have actually just been getting into
their shelters out at the deployment site when Brendan made this radio call.
BR YIN NOTES
Here are the notes from the SAIT investigator’s interview with Blue Ridge ( Frisby,
Brown, Fueller, Ball ) that correspond to this ‘leaving the Shrine area’ and ‘arriving
at the Ranch House Restaurant’ timeframe…
Tie in with the crew at the ranch house and hit main rd ( Highway 89 ) at 1640
they make a turn, and hear yelling on Tac 1, a little further they hear yelling on
Tac 5 AA and GM7 yelling multiple times. AA says unit yelling at AA on A/G stop
yelling and stand by. Marsh cuts in and says were cut off there cutting a
deployment site, trying to burn around, cutting a deployment site, there is panic
in his voice. Todd (Abel) (OPS1) gets on AA and says raise GM on A/G.
Focused on that Trew tries to raise GM on crew. He hears a keyed mic.
Trew gets a crew member and sits him in GM trucks and says listen for anything
on the radio. 1 minute later he hears click click. Brendan was w/ BR. B-33 is on
scene trying to make passes calling them. Trying to get GM and pin point their
location. Fire behavior was extreme. 1 helicopter dropped at manzanita and
lockwood intersection then the VLAT dropped in town.
1643-1709
The GPS tracking unit remains there at the Ranch House Restaurant for 26
minutes. It moves slightly during this time as if someone is walking back and forth
in the parking lot but it remains there at the restaurant this entire time.
1710
The GPS tracking unit has suddenly left the Ranch House Restaurant and is
headed west on Lakewood Drive in Glen Ilah.
1711-1722
For 11 minutes… they drive back and forth on various roads in Glen Ilah
apparently probing for a way to get directly west towards the deployment site
and ( according to the SAIT interview notes with BR ) checking for last-minute
stragglers evacuating the Glen Ilah area. They are not successful in ‘breaking
through’ out to the deployment area from Glen Ilah, so they decide to exit the
Glen Ilah area and head north back to the Shrine area.
1723
Now on Highway 89 headed north ( quickly ).
1724
Left turn off HIghway 89 onto the Shrine Road.
1725-1727
Back and forth on the Shrine road, east to west, a few times.
1728-1734
Stationary ( for 6 minutes ) at the west end of Shrine road in the St. Joseph
Shrine parking lot. This is, again, the same location where the start of the
helmet cam video was shot that captured GM’s final radio transmissions.
1735-1748
On the move again… west on the dirt part of Shrine road and over to the cutover
trail to the Sesame area… then they immediately head all the way out west to
GM’s anchor point. This is a non-stop trip all the way from the parking lot of the
St. Joseph Shrine to the same point where Frisby and Brown met with
Marsh/Steed earlier in the day. The whole trip out west on the ATV takes 13
minutes.
1749
The GPS tracker stops ( for the third time that day ) at exactly the place near the
anchor point labeled “Mystery panel” on the visible map.
1750-1758
They head back DOWN the two-track road, past the old-grader location again,
and then take a short trip to the north on the other two-track road that is actually
the one the fire ‘jumped over’ on Saturday afternoon. They only travel about
halfway up the ridge on that road when they turn right around and head back up
towards the GM anchor point again.
1759
They pass directly by the “Mystery panel” location again but do not stop
there this time.
1800
They arrive at the actual original ‘anchor point’ where GM was working.
1801-1814
For 13 minutes they are now simply ‘searching’ around the anchor point area and
they stop at various points up there. They travel all the way up to the ‘helipad’
location and eventually back down to the anchor point location again.
1814-1815
Stationary ( for 2 minutes ) at a point on the two-track road near the original
anchor point again.
1816-1822
On the move again… heading south along the same high-ridge two-track road that
Granite Mountain headed south on circa 1604 ( 4:04 PM ) after the MacKenzie
video was shot. They don’t stop anywhere as they head south and it takes them
6 minutes to reach the point where the GM crew dropped off that two-track road
and began their descent into the box canyon.
1823
The GPS tracker shows them arriving at the point on the visible map labeled
“Bailout point”, which is just off the two-track road from the point where the
SAIR report says the GM crew left the two-track road and began their descent
into the box canyon. The descent that is about to made is going to follow
the same general drainage-area path that is diagrammed in the SAIR.
1824-1828
The GPS tracker is on a descent into the box canyon on the exact same route
the SAIR says the GM crew took. At 1828 the GPS tracker has arrived at the
deployment site itself. So it only took 4 ( FOUR ) minutes to descend all the way
from the “Bailout point” up on the two-track road all the way down to the actual
deployment site.
1829-1856
The GPS tracker is stationary at the deployment site for almost a half-hour ( 27
minutes ). There are some slight ‘wobble’ movements of the pointer during this
time but that only indicates someone was ‘walking around’ the deployment
site itself but not leaving that location.
1857-1907
The GPS tracker is suddenly moving east towards the Boulder Springs Ranch.
It takes 10 minutes to travel the 677 yards to the ranch.
1908
The GPS tracker arrives at the Boulder Springs Ranch.
1909-1923
Stationary at the Boulder Springs Ranch for 14 minutes. As with the deployment
site visit… there are small ‘wobble’ movements of the pointer during this time but
that only indicates some movement in and around the ranch site.
1924-1932
The GPS tracker is now headed back east towards the deployment site. It only
takes 8 minutes to cover the 677 yards this time instead of the previous 10
minutes for the same distance on the inbound trip.
1933
The GPS tracker arrives back at the deployment site.
1934-1935
The GPS tracker is stationary at the deployment site for 2 minutes.
1936
The GPS tracker has left the deployment site and is ‘ascending’ to the west,
back up to the ‘Bailout point’ up on the ridge
1937-1947
The ascent takes 10 minutes. It is not known what kind of a ‘hurry’ ( if any )
the person with the GPS tracker was in at this point.
1948
The GPS tracker arrives back up on two-track road, but a little further south than
where the ‘Bailout point’ is marked on the visible map. A different route was taken
for the ascent versus the descent. The descent followed the drainage area down
but the ascent was back more along the middle of the canyon which, before the
burnover, would have been through the series of ‘clearings’ that lined up just due
west of the deployment site.
1949-2004
Stationary for 15 minutes at the same point up on the high-ridge two-track road
where the ascent ended.
2005
The GPS tracker is now headed back north towards the anchor point on the
high-ridge two-track road.
2006-2007
Still traveling north on the two-track road back towards the anchor point.
2008
The GPS tracker is exactly at the point labeled “Mystery panel” again.
2009-2027
One long, continuous 18 minute trip back east towards the Shrine Road area
and then east on Shrine road out to Highway 89, without stopping. A left turn was
then made onto Highway 89 and the GPS tracker moves off the map heading
north on Highway 89. Possibly headed all the way up to the ICP at the Model
Creek School in Peeples Valley, as BR seemed to suggest in their SAIT
interview notes.
The very end of the SAIT YIN notes of their interview with Blue Ridge ( Frisby,
Brown, Fueller, Ball ) covers the GPS tracking timeframe documented above
and those notes are as follows….
DPS ship was flying around near GM, then he went to the grater and BR couldn’t
talk to the ship. The ship went to where the bladder bags were and BR hiked to
them, they relayed to B33 that wasn’t the site. Then there was traffic about
another site and the ship gave the lat/long and Trew copied it down. Trew started
running down the ridge, and I mean running. He saw where the ship set down and
then bailed off. He says it was all slicked off. There was confusion because DPS
told him 18. At the ranch house restaurant Brendan gave Trew the manifest and
Trew had it and counted 19. Medic said 18, Trew counted 19, Clawson got on
scene and confirmed 19 and then Clawson left to the home owner. Bucky and
Aaron were all pretty quiet. 5 went down then the DPS officer. 6 all together.
They all walked to the house. The other 3 besides Brian and Trew were Prescott
NF guys who were ordered w/ the T2 team they were sent down to help. Went
back to ICP, mentally drained. Talked with IC Roy, whom they never knew was
the IC. They never heard it over the radio.
2028
The GPS tracker leaves the visible map heading north on Highway 89 and
never appears again… even though the video and the time display continues
for another 32 minutes.
2100
The tracking data ( and video ) ENDS.
** END OF BLUE RIDGE GPS TRACKING VIDEO
Thanks for doing this. I haven’t had time, brainpower, or eyeball ability, to look at this yet, but when I do, I will certainly have this timeline at my side.
So….. Now that I have the original YSCO photos of the SAIT Investigation of the Deployment Site. Not actually sure what really matters, other than what I have some interest in. I think I can resolve my earlier issues with how the photographs of the shelters weren’t orienting with the Body Map. So I now think I can map which shelters (left behind because they weren’t successfully deployed) were connected with which firefighters. And, also, maybe can look in more detail into more details. But I don’t really know what you all think is most useful.
So I’m asking. What do you all want me to try to find out from these 109 photographs? What are your questions about the photographic documentation of the SAiT investigation of the Deployment Site? What do you think are the most important questions we can ask from them and then learn?
Well.. I don’t know about anyone else… but one of the ongoing
mysteries surrounding those final moments of those men is
how much TIME they really had… and how much work they
were really able to accomplish ‘preparing’ that deployment site.
We know the saws were running and they were ‘cutting’ the
site as best they could. Those saws are heard in the radio
transmissions.
We know they also attempted to ‘burn out around themselves’
to improve the site. Eric Marsh said so and the empty fuel
containers seen in the SAIT photo Mr. Dougherty already
published proves that as well.
What we do NOT really know is the following…
1) How MUCH of that kind of work did they really do?
2) What evidence is/was left visible of that work.
3) Does that evidence allow us to put a TIME value on the work.
We also do NOT know ( and probably never will? ) how much
TIME had actually elapsed from the moment they first realized
the predicament they were in, decided to deploy rather than
do anything else, find the best place to deploy, and then
‘break in on radio channel Arizona 16’ to make the first
report of their predicament.
Did the radio call go out at the exact moment they realized
they were in trouble?… or did it only go out after a certain
number of seconds/minutes had already transpired and
they had already found the place they were going to deploy.
I certainly don’t expect the photo evidence to answer THOSE
‘how much time before the radio call’ questions… but maybe
they CAN answer the ‘how much time did they spend cutting
and burning the site’ questions.
Example: Hotshot crews work with ‘sawyers’ and ‘swampers’.
The ‘sawyers’ are ( obviously ) the guys with the saws who
do all the cutting. The ‘swampers’ are the ones who clear
that brush behind them and ‘throw it off to the side’.
If these are the actual photos of the actual ‘untouched’
deployment site… I’m just wondering how much ACTUAL
visual evidence there is of this ‘cutting’ and ‘swamping’
left to see. Are these really hi-res photos? Closeups all
over the site? How many ‘cut staubs’ can you count?
Is there any visual evidence of the ‘swamping’ where even
though a manzanita bundle might be burned up… you
can still see the remains of it and tell if it was CUT with
a saw ( a clean cut on the end ) or not?
As a sidenote… one of the other lingering questions is whether
or not these men had gotten themselves into such a mess
on their hike that they were actually having to ‘bushwhack’
their way towards that ranch in order to make forward
progress.
Are any of these photos showing the area OUTSIDE of
the deployment area itself… perhaps with enough detail
to see ‘cuts’ or evidence of ‘bushwhacking’ even before
they had to deploy?
I don’t think the YCSO detectives actually made any
attempt to ‘walk back’ their route down from the ridge
looking for ‘evidence’. They probably SHOULD have…
but I just wonder how far outside the actual deployment
area those photos show detail on.
So again… I think one of the most important things to still
try and nail down ( if possible ) are…
1) How much TIME was there between them first realizing
they were in bad trouble… and the first MAYDAY radio call.
2) How much TIME was spent ‘preparing the site’ after
they decided that’s what they were going to do.
BOTH of those values will end up being a total time value
that might have been better spent on some other option
such as a standard “Drop packs and run” decision.
Thanks, Marti.
Having been on the site itself, I noticed very little evidence of saw cuts, stobs,etc. I can’t tell you how long they cut, but it wasn’t much based on what I saw. Not much help here.
CUTTING a SZ in any fuel type is very, very inefficient, especially in chaparral. You build SZ’s with DOZERS and DRIP TORCHES, NOT with chainsaws. And for them to attempt to fire out around themselves with fusees and chainsaw gas from their SIGG bottles is also very, very inefficient in the chaparral. I didn’t notice any drip torch(es) in the photo with the investigators, not that it made (or would have made) a difference.
As far as efficiently firing out their SZ, it should have been about a half-hour to hour BEFORE they needed it, NOT MERE MINUTES! As I’ve said before, they would have been much better off ESCAPING (RUNNING) toward the Ranch and toward lighter fuels.
I’m glad I could read RTS’s response before responding. I don’t think you can really get that info from the photos. As I was looking at them, I thought, you’d really have to walk around on it.
However, what helped me determine the center of the site on Google Earth is that there’s actually a relatively large tree right to the East and rather close to two of the shelters. It would have been kinda sorta downwind, but….. There are another two smaller trees near it which may have been trimmed off, but it’s hard to tell. There are a lot of little things sticking up all over, so they may have cut the tops of them.
On another note, I think I’ve finally identified the shelters.
#1: Wade Parker, who is #11 on the Body Map.
#2: Travis Turbyfill, #7 on the Map.
#3: Sean Misner, #20 on the Map.
#4: John Percin, Jr., #18 on the Map.
#5: Grant McKee, #19 on the Map.
#6: Anthony Rose, #12 on the Map.
#7: Eric Marsh, #1 on the Map.
#8: William Warneke, #16 on the Map.
Does anybody else find it strange that there was no site map made/published? I don’t know how these things are done, I’m just curious. It would make life a lot easier if they had done it. Then maybe we could add to the lessons learned, “Don’t deploy near a large tree.”
I’m really really braindead after downloading, one at a time, all the high rez pix and then copying all the keywords to them in LR. And then trying to figure out the orientation, which, when I turned the map about 90 degrees from what I thought it was, and figured out some other things, everything finally fell into place. It’s still really hard to orient a lot of the photos, and many are shot at wide angle and there’s lots of distortion.
I think I’m going to back off and work on my own photography for a change for a few days, and then come back to it with fresh eyes. I’m gonna keep reading and maybe commenting, tho, so I really invite people to keep letting me know what questions you would like to ask the photos. That’s really helpful for me.
Copying what I wrote waaaaaay up above re the Deployment Site, the Body Map, and the YCSO photos. I’m finally able to begin downloading the YCSO photos full-rez with metadata intact. Small disappointment, they’re not geo-tagged as I hoped they would be. That would have been really helpful, but oh well.
I’m also waaaaay behind on some real-life work, so I may have to pull back a bit on doing this, I’ll keep at it. My goal is to find out whose stuff is where, and create some kind of inventory. FWIW I don’t want to get morbid about it, but there’s some holes in the current accounting.
On a lighter note, looking at the photos in the collections JD recently published, there are two sets from pilots, and they were both taken with an ipad. You just never know!
On our crew we always had a foreman or asst. assigned as the what if guy. Then every one discussed the what if’.s It is usually the really safety minded supervisor who has a good grasp of the 10 and 18. Does that make scene to all of you? It always helps to stop and consider your plan and Identify problems and solutions.
It makes perfect sense. I would think that happens all the time
even though some other WFF people ( Gary Olson? ) have
said that “the only time you are consulted is maybe about
where you want to have lunch.”
It is NOT the military. It’s a bunch of guys getting paid only $15
to $20 bucks an hour ( but who still have to buy their own $400
boots like the GM guys did ) trying to work together professionally
as best as they possibly can and get a dangerous job done.
Again… NOT (really) the military. Of course you should
‘listen to people’ you are working with and seek their advice.
I have always wondered, myself, whether there was a moment
that afternoon circa 4:00 PM when either Steed or Marsh
DID, in fact, turn to the men and ask for their ‘opinions’
about a risky move… or at least whether they were ALL
actually aware of the ‘plan’ before they moved out.
Oddly enough… Brendan McDonough himself seems to
have provided more evidence there in his exclusive
interview with GQ magazine.
He is suddenly saying more about that ( and what he knows )
than he has apparently said to ANY ‘investigator’.
GQ Magazine: The Yarnell Fire: No Exit
http://www.gq.com/long-form/no-exit
On page 1… subtitle: ‘The Lookout’… Brendan has this
to say about Eric Marsh…
Eric Marsh, is a cautious firefighter, as are most hotshots who want to continue being hotshots. He’ll turn down any assignment he thinks is too risky for his men. He’s always a professional, though, always figures out a safer way to accomplish the same goal. He never says, “No, we’re not gonna do this, go fuck yourself,” Donut knows. He always says, “We won’t do that. But we will do this for you.” Most important: Marsh’s men, all nineteen of them, always make it home.
Then on page 8… subtitle: ‘Blame’… McDonough says this…
Had any man on that crew felt threatened, McDonough said, had one of them doubted the chosen route, he would have spoken up. “Nineteen guys made that decision and took that choice,” he said. “That’s what people have to understand. You can’t force someone to do that.”
So the implication ( and we know McDonough was hearing the
discussing their options conversation ) was that the ‘plan’,
whatever it was, was fully known and understood by ALL those
men BEFORE they moved out… and no one ‘objected’.
Was there a ‘roll call’ vote as Brendan seems to imply and
’19 guys made that decision’ by saying ‘yea’ or ‘nay’?
Of course not. It’s a situation where ‘silence means consent’.
But I don’t think he’s simply ‘guessing’ there.
I think his statement is backed up by what he knows he
heard that afternoon but still won’t fully discuss.
that article also credit’s “we’re in front of the flaming front” to Marsh… i’m not sure how credible it is.
but i realize you’ll use anything that fits in with your narrative…
Just to be clear… you are saying that YOU are
absolutely convinced that first “We are in front
of the flaming front” transmission is NOT Marsh?
listening to the audio of the Globe Type 2 crew @ the shrine video, I don’t believe the “we are in front of the flaming front” is Eric Marsh. (I think it is Steed or one of the Squad Bosses) Eric came across much more calm & composed when calling as DIV A shortly after the “flaming front” transmission.
I also do not believe that the voice in the audio of the “Comfort Level” is Eric Marsh either. Specifically the individual who is saying “I knew this was coming”. I believe that may be Donut or someone outside of the crew. Why? Again that is not the calm & collected voice of Marsh. The reason I say possibly Donut is because around that time he may have very well realized the danger he was in……The tone inflection of the voice sounds to me like someone who is concerned and worried. It’s a little shaky almost….
I
Eric and WTKTT,
It’s definitely Marsh in the Mackenzie clip talking about “comfort level” and all because you can hear his NC accent in there a bit.
The “flaming front” voice? Not sure on that one but kinda leaning toward Steed maybe more than Marsh now after listening to it several more times.
not to throw fuel on some over-zealous, amateur-journalist’s fire, but…
i have never really agreed that Marsh is the “comfort level” voice… the voice doesn’t sound to have lot of “confidence” in what it’s saying and it seems like superfluous radio traffic… plus, i would imagine that Marsh knew where the crew was leading up to that moment… i too, think it is more likely Brendan.
this would also fall in line with a previous “comfort level” discussion with regard to a lookout recognizing increased fire activity and checking in with the crew before he leaves his lookout spot.
and i definitely don’t think that Marsh is saying, “we are in front of the flaming front.” however, listening to it a few more times, i think he may be the calm voice calling as “GM” in the following two transmissions… maybe trying to let AA know of their movement after the fact…
I think there is little doubt it is Marsh in the MacKenzie video. First, he sounds like a boss to me.
Second, he sounds exactly like the guy who says he is Div Alpha in the flaming front video. Finally, Marsh was famous reportedly for saying “you know” except he says “ya know” in the video – just like any good Southerner.
As for the guy on the flaming front video, the first guy is not the same as the one who says Div Alpha. As I mentioned earlier, a relative identified the first voice as that of Robert Caldwell on one of the Granite Mountain Facebook sites. Maybe they are mistaken, but no real reason to doubt it – Caldwell was a squad boss.
DING DING DING. Bob Powers gets the prize today for his comment, stating: “[on my crews,] we always had a foreman or asst. assigned as the ‘what if guy.'”
According to the behavioral research, the “what if guy” is a CRUCIAL guy/gal to have when making important decisions (such as safety decisions on a fire, CEO hiring/firing decisions, decisions regarding sexual harassment investigations, etc.). This person is the hedge against “groupthink” or collective action bias or “cherry-picking” favorable information while ignoring risks. This person – the “what if guy/gal,” the “devil’s advocate” – is the CRUCIAL person to protect against missteps that are a well-researched, well-studied, well-recognized decision-making cognition issues.
Unfortunately, the “what if guy” is usually viewed by the group as the single most annoying guy, such that it becomes hard to speak up as the “what if guy/gal” is supposed to do, UNLESS the group has a really good LEADER (like Bob Powers) who WANTS the “what-if guy” to do his job of playing the “devil’s advocate.” The leader has to be someone who is COMMITTED to the “what-if guy” and not just paying lipservice to him/her. The key is not only to have a “what if guy/gal,” but ALSO to have a leader who is NOT going to roll his or her eyes every time the designated “what if guy/gal” speaks up.
More specifically, one of my areas of expertise pertains to “board governance” – as a professor and expert witness, I advise or review corporate boards of directors (Goldman Sachs, Walt Disney Company) and non-profit boards of administrators (university boards, hospital boards, etc.). I tend to be involving in either asking or answering questions like: Why did the Board of Penn State ignore the red flags that were being raised regarding the university President and/or Sandusky? Why did the Board of Enron ignore the fact that their own financial statements were, for years, baffling? Why did the Board of Tulane University let President Scott Cowen ignore the serious and continuing rape problem on campus?
These questions all boil down to the same thing: Why did *groups* made up of educated, smart, successful people completely drop the ball in a way that ultimately led to a major debacle that was, in hindsight, likely very preventable? In every single recent case that I have looked at, I would not be asking the question if each of the groups (the boards) had had a “what if guy/gal” – a person who I refer to (when I lecture or give board education classes) as the person specifically told by the group to play the role of “devil’s advocate.” In every debacle I reference above, and countless others, I firmly believe that having one person specifically charged with the task of being the devil’s advocate and asking the “what if” questions would have prevented the debacle. It would have forced the group to STOP and second-guess their own decision or decided inaction, and that minimal scrutiny would have quickly revealed things that likely would have altered the plan course of action (or inaction)
The rub is that, in the absence of a “what if guy/gal” who is SPECIFICALLY told by the leader to serve as such and who is specifically SUPPORTED by the leader (even if the leader does not always agree with him/her), groups tend not to like (and thereby tend to suppress) the person who speaks up and says “heyyyyy, should we really be doing this??? Or what about x/y/z….?” The scorn, the annoyance, the eye-rolling, the implicit “why is this new pip-squeak speaking up” all tend to silence the kind of person who might naturally speak-up when she sees the group about to do something stupid. This is PARTICULARLY the case when dealing with groups that value hierarchy, such as military (or perhaps firefighting teams).
So, the fact that Bob Powers is telling me that he used to DESIGNATE a “what if guy/gal” on his firefighting teams makes me very very happy. I wish I could convince more boards to do exactly this…. This just confirms that Bob is smarter than most of the world.
That’s exactly what happened on the Deepwater Horizon, also. It’s what allowed the swiss cheese holes to align. Somebody else added a description to that when they called it a “colossal failure of imagination.” Nobody was willing to first imagine and then ask, “What if?” And then, BOOM!!
Very well said Miss Elizabeth. And the second to last paragraph is basically the premise of the book by Karen A. Cerulo, titled “Never Saw It Coming: Cultural Challenges to Envisioning the Worst.”
RTS, thanks for the tip. I will go get that book.
Elizabeth,
A bit of a difficult read at times. She focuses a lot on how/why we don’t focus more on the NEGATIVE potential, outcomes, etc. because humans in general always seem to want to focus on the positive.
It’s a might pricey unless you go here:
http://www.abebooks.com/servlet/SearchResults?an=cerulo&sts=t&tn=never+saw+it+coming
I drought if I am smarter than the rest of the world. I was assigned as a what if guy Buy my Hot Shot Superintendent In 1972 and learned and took it with me It just works, like RTS said if it is agreed too at the start.
I love this conversation. It rings all kinds of bells for me. So much so that I just emailed it to my daughter, who is on the home stretch of getting her Masters in Public/Urban Planning (probably cum laude, as she usually does) from the University of Michigan.
Thank You!!!!!!!
We did the same. If I said yes for an assignment, he would argue the opposite and vice versa. The guys on the Crew always thought we were fighting, but we were just ‘fleshing out’all the options. It worked well.
NV,
You said “there’s a DISTIINCT CUTURE.” Yes, it is and all the others are as well LIKE SPECIAL FORCES UNITS AND SUCH, which we try and emulate. And they should be distinct. WFF is like NO other job really.
” They simply had a SERIES OF INGRAINED RESPONSES AND PRACTICES WITH A LIKELIHOOD OF BAD OUTCOMES over time. … CHANGING THOSE responses and practices …. are the judgments that are NEEDED, not judgments at the personal level.” In other words, the ‘BAD DECISIONS WITH GOOD OUTCOMES’ syndrome. I agree completely!
All these are LEADERSHIP ISSUES. And there were/are leadership issues on the PFD as well, particularly in the entrapment avoidance, structure protection-attitude, e.g. risking one’s life for structures and/or taking more risks there, and deployment zones versus TRUE safety zones realms. Those DEFINITELY need to be acknowledged first because they DO exist (in spite of comments to the contrary) and then changed.
Regarding the climbing, mountaineering guide analogies, we use those lessons and case studies a lot as they ARE analogous to WFF. They have their own environmental hazards and risks, trigger points, leadership issues, Groupthink dangers, etc. What gets me on these climbing accident/incidents is that they almost always get whacked AFTER their ascents, on their way down. Almost all regularly violate their trigger points to get to the top on ascent day. Ant the ‘go along to get along’ Groupthink trap. One of the big ones though is the fact that their climbers have paid big bucks for the adventure, and these guides are going to deliver no matter what syndrome.
NV,
” I FOR SURE WOULDN’T BE RAISING MY VOICE ABOUT SOMETHING STUPID LIKE HEADING DOWN INTO A TERRAIN TRAP … That makes it all the more IMPORTANT TO BE WILLING TO OPENLY ID BAD DECISIONS, without trying to gloss them over with romanticism BUT ALSO WITHOUT JUDGING.” (EMPHASIS ADDED)
Ok now, if I read this right, you ALMOST contradict yourself. First you say, you would NOT be the one speaking up, then you say that it’s important to speak up. Which one is it? I go with the important to speak up option. Otherwise, one falls into the Groupthink mode.
And WITHOUT JUDGING? We have to do that – judging – on a daily basis no matter what we’re doing, don’t you think? Just like the word, DISCRIMINATE. In the WFF world, we MUST discriminate against the bad ideas and bad decisions bandied about and discussed and proposed. And there is nothing that discrimnates more than the hostile work environment that is the fireline. It discrimantes against all equally, unless you’re in shape and you follow ‘The WFF Rules.’ I do NOT subscribe to the ‘touchy-feely’ attitude when engaged in WFF.
RTS, the explanation is that people act differently as, for instance, junior crew members than they do on their own. In every group situation I’ve been in, particularly when the group spends a lot of time together in difficult conditions, there’s a distinct culture. No one is going to get on well, especially initially, by being “a little bit different,” or, worse, by being a safety Nazi. In the case of GM, let’s say a rookie kept his sleeves down and, when teased about it, said, “Look, it’s a little thing, but you all should have your sleeves down, too.” How do you see that conversation going? How do you see that rookie’s SEASON going?
Outside those small-group dynamics, I’m obviously not afraid to speak my mind. And in a leadership role, I’m not afraid to speak my mind.
In terms of judging, I’m also obviously willing to point out mistakes — Gary Olson and I are the two in this comment thread who, I believe, have been loudest in saying that, along with not putting yourself in the situation GM put themselves in, we also should recognize the mistakes GM made once there, that may well have cost yet more lives. What I mean by saying to do that without judgment is that it doesn’t mean anyone on GM wasn’t caring, committed, or even that they weren’t in terms of their view of themselves passionate about safety. They simply had a series of ingrained responses and practices with a likelihood of bad outcomes over time. Changing those responses and practices — and that includes not endangering your lookout, along with assessing survivability as an integral part of a deploy/don’t deploy decision, as well as all the other issues that have been discussed — are the judgments that are needed, not judgments at the personal level.
NV,
Changing the group dynamic of a shot crew certainly has merit, but it is a tough problem to solve and probably beyond the scope of this group. I could imagine it being the topic of many PhD thesis’s.
I’m not afraid to judge, but only when we have enough information to do so and I say that occurred when they dropped off the ridge. Once at the DZ, I think the situation becomes so dynamic that you can’t say for sure that what they did was a mistake. You just don’t know for sure what they were seeing. How do you know they didn’t assess survivability and conclude that deploy was the best option? Certainly you can point out other options, but you can’t say for certain that what they did was incorrect.
While I have to agree with every thing you say I also believe that there are personal dynamics when faced with a fire about to surround you and run over you. You only have a split second to make a decision. At that point you will live or die with what you do. Thank God many of us never faced that final decision. Not having to ever make it is the best. So you guys that are still fire fighters need to make the deployment training the when, where and how ingrained and positive for survival. That’s not going to be easy when deployment is the last thing you want to plan for. If you always operate under the 10 and 18 you will never have to deploy. You have to train for a known and a unknown. My guess is GM spent to much time planning for deployment and to little time on the 10 and 18. I say this based on statements from Willis and McDonough they jump to deployment in there thoughts to fast. I think GM did the same with out thought, and in some ways NV is correct. At that point reviewing options and making a choice should always be done the choice you make is still 50/50 If you make the right one your a hero the wrong one you wont know until the fire burns over you.
“[too] much time planning for deployment and [too] little time on the 10 and 18.”
So tragically true AND I think that is SOMEWHAT ingrained in SOME of the PFD.
Like it or not, fullsail serves an important purpose on this thread. If we are honest, the whole premise of this thread is that something happened that day other than the fact GM messed up. We may think it is true, we may even want it to be true, but in fact it may not be true. I know the SAIR was poorly done, almost in such a way as to not find out what happened, but if you read between the lines, it IS saying GM messed up, without coming out and saying it. And they may be right. There might in fact be nothing to “cover up”. Fullsail is here to remind us (over and over) to check our assumptions, our biases and our preconceptions. He might be wrong, he might be right, but we would be wise to consider his viewpoint.
thanks mike, i appreciate that.
i agree with your sentiments about the SAIR as well. i think it’s intent was to NOT assign blame, either to the initial attack response, the IMT transition, or GM.
Mike,
You can count me in the GM messed up camp and I didn’t think the premise of this thread was to find that something happened that day other than the fact GM messed up. Maybe I’m naive…
Whats not to like about fullsail? He’s named after a fine brewery in my state.
For the third time… let me say that if anyone thinks fullsail
is bothering ME, personally, with his own ‘rants’… think
again. I’ve participated in MANY discussions like this and
as compared to some… this one is a polite tea party.
As I have said… we are all “guests” here on this forum.
If Mr. John Dougherty allows a comment through ( from
anyone ) and it’s OK with him then it’s OK with me.
None of us probably have ANY idea how many nasty
comments Mr. Dougherty has ALREADY had to filter
away from this discussion. There are some people
who fundamentally believe we shouldn’t be having this
discussion at all… or at least it should only be taking
place between ‘fire brothers’, or something.
The fact that fullsail alternately lambasts… and then tries
to be helpful again… means he really does want to
be here. He got his butt kicked off Mr. Gabbert’s
Wildfire Today site for ‘attacking’ people and that was
his first choice for entry into this ongoing conversation
but has found more leniency and ‘inclusion’ over
here. That’s fine. That just comes down to different
style of moderation between Mr. Gabbert and Mr.
Dougherty. I, myself, prefer inclusion even if it ends
up getting ‘noisy’.
So again… I ( personally ) have no problem with fullsail
commenting on this PUBLIC thread.
As for “what we are doing here”… the events of yesterday
alone… with the beginning of Mr. Dougherty’s FOIA/FOIL
information release… prove there is a LOT more
‘fact finding’ to do. The SAIR was practically a joke
and didn’t deserve to be called a “Special Accident
Investigation Report”. ADOSH wasn’t much better.
So I believe we are still just in the ‘full fact finding’ stage.
There is a long way to go.
Will the fact finding just confirm what is already
suspected and/or imagined by many?
Maybe. Maybe not.
Remember…
“When you have eliminated the impossible… whatever
remains… however improbable… must be the truth.”
Accepting the ‘improbable’ isn’t the hard part.
‘Eliminating the impossible’ is where the WORK is.
you can go ahead and stop comparing yourself to John Dougherty and Edward Snowden… you’re no where close. they both put their names on their work and don’t hide behind the internet making false allegations.
i think this place has been a lynch mob since before WTKTT showed up… he just decided to be the leader.
and fullsail does make good beer!
Send me some I need it after all this and bring along some more Fire Fighters. Ill buy the stakes.
Sifting thru some of the documents JD just posted.
I have a question. One of the packets JD posted is Information Management: https://www.dropbox.com/sh/02ue6bnjp6nazkm/18ko99d_mm/Information%20Managment
One of the documents in that packet is B01-B09 – ASF000009-INV to 41-INV.pdf, a collection of various things. One of those things is, on p. 24, an Arizona State Forestry Division News Release dated July 2, titled “Yarnell Hill Fire Investigation Begins Tuesday.”
In that news release, it says, “As part of the investigation, the team will review Sunday’s weather conditions, fire department records, radio logs and any other evidence that may help determine how to prevent a similar tragedy in the future.”
Can anybody tell me what is meant by “radio logs” here? I’ve been wondering all along if radio conversations just disappear into the ether, as so far it has seemed that they do, or are logged somewhere.
Thank you!
no one is writing down radio conversations in the field.
radio transmissions to and from dispatch centers are recorded and written down by the dispatcher. that information is the “dispatch log” and is usually pretty accurate as to information relayed to and from the incident and dispatch with pretty accurate times… i can only imagine this is what they’re referring to, the dispatch logs.
again, it all comes down to how meticulous employees are at their jobs, and we all know that varies in all fields.
Thank you! While I made a run to the 7-11, I conjectured that maybe radios are like cellphones in that somewhere a timed log is made, electronically, of calls to and from. Of course, for cellphones, that’s for billing purposes. But now we know there are other “investigative” purposes also. I don’t know anything about radios. Which is why I asked the question. That term caught my eye, and I didn’t know what it meant.
Marti,
Fullsail is right on regarding the ‘radio logs.’ And they (and sometimes recordings) are ALMOST always done by Dispatch Centers, Mobilization Centers, Geographic Area Coordination Centers (GACCS), and IMT communications and helicopter operations units.
Just everyday radio conversations, like those that we hear on the video clips and such are generally NOT recorded in ‘radio logs.’
Thank you, also! I did a bit of googling and learned some interesting stuff. And, yes, what you’re saying is what I’m seeing. Including the dispatch logs on 9-11. Whew!
NV,
Glad to see you back again. You said “When RTS and others note with seeming regret that NO ONE HAS COME FORWARD to relate past bad decisions with good outcomes …. to understand why people don’t want to discuss this. …. it’s very easy to understand how past bad decisions may have raised eyebrows but been ALLOWED TO SLIDE.” (EMPHASIS ADDED)
I have come forward as far as I’m willing to go. In the Hot Shot world, it is talked about quite a bit. As far as it being “allowed to slide,” each Crew leader is responsible for their own Crew with SOME oversight. As I posted above somewhere, they each are to follow the Standards for Interagency Hot Shot Crew Operations (link below). This hopefully SHOULD AND WOULD BE supplemented by other training and certainly Lessons Learned stuff.
http://www.fs.fed.us/fire/people/hotshots/ihc_stds.pdf
And I finally reread your posts several times to better understand your position on deployments and leadership (a little hard to follow sometimes), and NOT leading EVERYONE into shelters and possible death, but inadvertently training others to detriment. You said “this is the ‘AT LEAST THEY ALL DIED TOGETHER SENTIMENT’ sentiment. Which is something that the next group IN A BAD WAY hopefully gets trained out of them. Just as the next folks hopefully understand that dropping gear if escape is compromised is one of the FIRST things they should do.” (EMPHASIS ADDED)
“Because …. seem to be embracing the ‘LET’S ALL DIE TOGETHER’ RESPONSE, there may be more of a TRAINING ISSUE here than I thought.”
I agree with you here. You are correct in that we need to NOT endorse that kind of group response, and I think that ties in with what I have said about Groupthink in a lot of ways. Do you at least agree that WFF is a quasi-military operation? Do you at least agree that we have to manage WFF that way, where we have a chain of command and people follow orders unless they are unsafe, illegal, immoral, or unethical?
RTS, in terms of WFF being quasi-military, I’d put the emphasis on the quasi. Probably actually more like accredited mountain guiding in that there is not nearly so much centralized command and little day-to-day oversight.
Actually, you own anecdote on sleeves being rolled up illustrates this pretty well. A military equivalent might be a whole rifle platoon walking around with lousy muzzle control and no muzzle awareness. You can do that for a long time in the civilian world with nothing bad happening, but in the military it just ain’t gonna happen, even if no accidents have resulted YET. If it is a problem that seems persistent, careers will get readjusted as a result. By contrast, you had to tell GM multiple times about the sleeves, caught attitude each time…and nothing changed. This is actually similar to being a mountain guide, where, while there may in that case be fairly strict initial training for the cert process IF someone gets one of the more rigorous certs (which most guides actually don’t), it’s pretty hard to lose your cert for cause assuming you aren’t dealing dope.
How a decentralized structure, like I believe WFFs and guides both are, maintains quality is a difficult question. In the case of YHF, I think Gary Olson summarized well one of the culture-carrying points that should be a take-away. View it as a modification to what you might call the “fire shelter movement” that has been present for at least some. No survivability = don’t deploy = seek other options.
At the crew level, I do agree that crew members do, and need to do, as told unless blatantly unsafe/illegal/unethical. One interesting dynamic: I for sure wouldn’t want to be the ONLY crewmember looking like he was either Amish or trying to hide gruesome tats by keeping his sleeves rolled down, and I for sure wouldn’t be raising my voice about something stupid like heading down into a terrain trap. So the responsibility for things like that ain’t on the crew, and the crew isn’t exactly a full, willing participant in all of those choices. That makes it all the more important to be willing to openly ID bad decisions, without trying to gloss them over with romanticism but also without judging.
FullSail seems determined to continue to actively disrupt constructive comments, which is unfortunate and unprofessional in my opinion. All the more so because, as shown, FullSail himself has not been up to speed on some basic points, and therefore his technical contributions should not be overstated. He may have inadvertently helped ID a broader training issue in terms of awareness of what to do IF things go bad and escape does turn out to be compromised. For instance, his description of what GM would have been doing if they hadn’t deployed where they did:
“again, running uphill through a boulder field with a pack and tools is not really feasible or practical.”
Of course, the first thing that should have happened was that they DROPPED their gear.
When RTS and others note with seeming regret that no one has come forward to relate past bad decisions with good outcomes, in my opinion they don’t have to look farther than FullSail’s posting behavior to understand why people don’t want to discuss this. And, just as people aren’t focusing on the many things (not just seemingly not understanding that GM should have dropped gear) that FullSail has said that AREN’T on the mark, it’s very easy to understand how past bad decisions may have raised eyebrows but been allowed to slide.
Aside from the fact that people shouldn’t give too much weight to anything FullSail says, even on a technical level, the key thing to recognize is that he does seem to want to actively disrupt, even shut down, the whole business of trying to come up with answers. And is doing so in a nasty, unprofessional way, including demanding things like the name of others when he has pointedly NOT posted with his own name.
wow, you sound bitter…
maybe it’s because you’ve tried so hard to unsuccessfully get people to agree that the boulder field may have been survivable?
i agree with you, that if they were going to run, they probably should have dropped their packs, i think that’s a much harder thing to do than you realize… though, thankfully, i’ve never been faced with that situation. have you ever had to deploy?
i have given plenty of specific examples to accompany any issues i have here. i have shared my background and perspective.
you have not shared anything about yourself.
you seem to be dwelling on the one example that you have about my technical expertise (i do not consider myself an expert though, just experienced). with regard to the shedding of a pack when faced with entrapment you are right. i agree with you. if faced with entrapment and you decide to run, do what the textbook says. (but did you forget to mention that you should probably grab your shelter from your pack, a water bottle, your radio, your hand tool, maybe a fusee? … no, you didn’t mention all that)
if you feel like there are other technical details that i’ve been incorrect about, please feel free to address them.
how about those other examples that you can’t seem to come up with? i would especially be interested in those deployments you talked about where people survived near boulders without sheltering? i think it would be very pertinent to this discussion to look at those.
it certainly is not my place to deter anyone from posting on here. i am just trying to keep the conversation real and honest.
thanks for your input NV!
Eric and TWARE,
I believe you are absolutely correct here stating that the USDOJ has no authority or jurisdiction in the YHF matter. As you correctly stated this was an AZ State, the SAIT was requested by AZSF Forester Scott Hunt, the SAIT did have SOME Federal employees on it, and the AZSF reviewed and approved the SAIR. Therefore, ASF took, and kept, the LEAD during the ENTIRE SAIT investigation.
Eric said “A special Incident Management Team under the auspices of the NIFC is coordinating the release of the Yarnell Hill Fire report. Forestry Division
spokeswoman Carrie Dennett is a team member.” This is the final approval and “release” phase they are referring to here.
Yes, true statement even though it’s probably a press release. Once the SAIR was virtually complete, many if not most of the SAIT members travelled to Boise, ID (NIFC) to review, edit, approve, etc. the SAIR.
But I am almost positive that this was still purely an AZ State Forestry matter and NOT Federal. There were Federal people involved however, including the Ass’t. SAIT Leader, a few on the SAIT, MANY of the Subject Matter Experts (SME’s), AND the AZDOSH had some Federal ‘visitors’ and such involved even though that also was primarily an AZ State matter.
So, AZ Forestry took and kept the lead the whole time AND then sent delegates or whatever they called them to NIFC (Boise, ID) to review, edit, and approve it for release.
A lot has been happening lately with regards to the SAIT FOIA/FOIL
material ( as well it should )… but there are still surprises ( and new
mysteries ) being found in the SAIT Yarnell Investigation Notes ( YIN ).
Here is a cut from the SAIT’s interview with Gary Cordis on July 12, 2013…
Page 21 of Yarnell Investigation Notes ( YIN )…
Interview with Gary Cordis @ 1300 on July 12, 2013
Interviewers: Randy Okot, Jimmy Rocha, Jay Kurth
0600
– Reported findings of fire crossing
– T. Abel, P. Musser, D. Fernandez, R. Schumate and Eric discussed plans
– Dozer line to follow E flank of the hill
– Eric wanted to go direct – south heel of fire
– Russ said air support was coming in
– Took the crews in and showed them where to park the buggies
0630-0700
– 1 and a half mile hike in – went in and worked.
– Checked on the crew throughout the day. They were on Tac 1
– Identified Boulder Spring ranch as a bomb proof safety zone.
– There was a pumpkin there. ASF002303-INV
– Returned to tie in.
0800-0900
– Dozer arrived. Took dozer in to put it to work. Didn’t like that it had a 12 ft. blade.
0930
– Blue Ridge (Hotshots) showed up.
Some of this has got to be just plain WRONG.
This testimony puts Eric Marsh into a ‘briefing’ with Able, Musser, Fernandez
and Schumate a full HOUR before any other documentation says Marsh even
arrived in Yarnell or there were any official ‘briefings’ at all that morning.
It also says that Cordis ‘took the crews in and showed them where to park
the buggies’ between 0600 and 0630.
If he is referring to GM there… not even remotely possible.
Marsh definitely got there early and started his hike out onto the ridge ahead
of GM and marking the trail… but not in this timeframe. More like a full hour
later ( SAIR says briefing was at 0700… Marsh meets hikers Collura and
Gilligan up on the ridge at 0807 ).
The GM crew is now known to have stopped up at the Model Creek School ICP
command center and sat down to breakfast there in the 0700 to 0745 timeframe.
They were not seen heading out Lakewood drive to the Sesame area to ‘park the
buggies’ until Chief Andersen saw them drive by his home on Lakewood Drive
at 0803.
>> Cordis says…
>> 0630-0700
>> Identified Boulder Spring ranch as a bomb proof safety zone.
To WHO? The Granite Mountain Crew hadn’t even sat down to breakfast up at
the Model Creek School yet… and this timeframe is even AFTER Cordis says
Marsh was already hiking out to the ridge.
“heavy sigh”
do you think each person was walking around with their own personal biographer? because they weren’t.
do you feel like it is reasonable to think that after each person took some action or made some thought that they stopped to look at there watch and wrote down (in their very neatly organized daily diary or unit log) the exact time and their exact thoughts, feelings and actions? because it’s not reasonable, not even remotely reasonable.
you think that sonny and joy stopped to look at their watch and write down what time they first met Eric Marsh? i highly doubt it.
as with all things, some people are better at keeping unit logs than others. some people are meticulous, others do it after the fact, and yet others don’t do it at all. some people have better memories than others. some people only start unit logs after something has gone terribly wrong and then try to make up for the day. i am not saying that any one of these people, did any one of these things. i don’t know them (neither do you, right?)
when i am out on the line and keeping a unit log, i will usually keep time in generalities, i.e. get it down to +/- 15 minutes, because i am usually NOT paying attention to the exact minute unless something is going very bad (because things are very dynamic and it’s very hard to pinpoint exactly WHEN decisions get made vs. WHEN the action is actually implemented).
see this is a part of the problem with your amateur journalism… you’re view or expectation of how things should look is unfounded because you have no experience dealing with it and therefore, no real basis for the reality of it.
also: Cordes doesn’t necessarily have to “identify the safety zone” to anyone at that moment, maybe he identified it in his own mind to be relayed earlier. OR maybe he identified it to Marsh to be passed on at 0630 (+/- 30 minutes).
relayed *later* i meant to say… oh yeah, and i forgot to ask,
what is your name? your background?
are you related to any of the GM crew or their family?
FullSail, I need to know more about you to get a better sense of how to view your posts. Please give me you SSN and at least one credit card number so that I can run a detailed check to confirm a few things.
This is ONLY to try to assess where you are coming from on here, and is routine to ask for on the internet.
oh, now you’re just being silly NV!
apparently you’re okay with someone making false allegations and posting information about them on the internet anonymously… i guess that’s you’re prerogative.
despite the fact that nowhere else is that considered credible…
xxxfullsailxxx—you think that sonny and joy stopped to look at their watch and write down what time they first met Eric Marsh? i highly doubt it.
====
reply:
On the very first talk I can share to you we did look at the cell at 8:07am because Sonny and Joy argued at the very spot those men died and Sonny wanted to go up the terrain the way they came down but Joy took Sonny around the base—the exact way the fire came around and took their lives. Also, my mother has her phone records so even though I have a toss away phone with no records there is my mom and there was a time my mother was on the phone and she could hear my discussion with Eric Marsh so now there was not just Sonny and Joy but Joy’s mother from back East who heard us speaking with an official we had not known who he was at that moment. So, xxxfullsailxxx YES—oh and to add—Joy is an unusual lady who does time stamp her hikes because in the hikes the travels may be 20 miles or much more so to get to areas plus the walk back she does keep an eye on time. Plus when she is not well she time stamps her tough spots on trails to see if there is a pattern of it. Also, don’t forget Joy GPS certain points to get a mileage travelled for the day as well as she had her kestrel and camera so even if Joy was MUTE—her photos give others that we were there and they can even if camera fell down a 15ft mineshaft; it can tell you an estimate of time—
I am in agreement here on the Unit Log process and generalities on times especially versus exact times.
It is NOT odd to find ( in the YIN notes ) the places where someone
being interviewed qualifies their statements with “I’m not exactly
sure” or “I don’t remember”. That’s what I would expect
( professional ) interviewers to do.
In the case of the Gary Cordis interview… it’s presented in a way
to suggest that he was SURE of those times. That’s what is odd.
Regarding the ‘identfied the Boulder Ranch as a
Regarding the “Identified Boulder Spring ranch as a
bomb proof safety zone.” quote… anything to do with that
is still of high importance because that’s where 19 men
ended up heading when they died that day. It was their
‘destination’… and who told them about it… when… and
whether they knew about the alternate (safe) route(s)
to get there… is still very important.
The SAIR said these men were ‘fully briefed’ on that ranch
( a number of times ) including “the roads leading to it”.
So far… there is only conflicting evidence to support
such an important statement. It might be total fiction.
“””The Truth Will Always Remain Elusive on December 30, 2013 at 1:15 pm said:
On 12/27 at 9:37 pm, Eric stated:
**The USDOJ Office of Inspector General needs to audit the SAIT for the Yarnell Hill Fire. ASF delegated the SAIR to USFS. That brought in the federal involvement directly.**
I think you are mistaken. This was a State run fire (until the Type 1 Team took over after the deployment), under State jurisdiction on State owned land. Scott Hunt, the State Forester, hand-picked the SAIR Team, some of whom were federal employess, and others who were state employees. The AZ DOF never gave up jurisdiction for the investigation, and in fact, the final report was submitted to them, for their review, prior to release.
The feds were never the ‘responsible party’ for this investigation, or officially involved in it’s operation, therefore, the USDOJ has no authority here, as well.
If I am incorrect about this, please set me straight, and cite some sources.
Eric on December 30, 2013 at 7:42 pm said:
I do stand corrected. When the initial delegation of authority was
issued, I thought I recalled reading that the USFS was requested to take the lead on the investigation. As I cannot find the article (due to time constraints) I must retract my above statement.”””
So I finally found the source to the comment that I had retracted above while going through some of the FOIL request documents: p316 of ASF000042: (The documents J.D. recently posted to this site)
“A special Incident Management Team under the auspices of the NIFC is coordinating the release of the Yarnell Hill Fire report. Forestry Division
spokeswoman Carrie Dennett is a team member.”
Eric, Thanks for the follow-up. I’m still tending to believe the non- federal ‘ownership’ of the SAIT, in agreement with the RTS comment down below. One additonal thing, and I think any current and former federal employees out there would agree with it, is that there is no way those responsible for a ‘federal’ investigation, would pick a State Forester as a lead for the team.
Correct. They would NOT pick a State employee.
I read the correspondence page and see the one page between us. Is there any more John Dougherty? We had an incoming call- a phone interview 8/13/13 appx 45 minutes long on my prepaid phone (another out of my pocket expense to assist in getting clarity on this fire) with Tim Foley,incident meteorologist Brent Wachter , Richa Wilson & Wildland Fire Leadership- retired US Forestry- Tom Zimmerman—a lot of inquiries to our view of the helicopters and wind and locations/times/terrain. They stated Joy’s photos are indeed important THE BEFORE ones more so and the initial after before the rains hit- We were also told a Mike Dudley will be interviewing us and that never happened—zero communication from Mike Dudley. I also remember Tex (Sonny) discussing his NM times in the big burro mountains. Tex (Sonny) says when he was about 15 yrs of age in the Big Burro Mtns living in a tent- with his miner father, mother, brother and sister, they had 5 lightning strikes a good mile distance above their camp. Tex and Henry immediately grabbed their shovels and headed up the mountain to clear brush around those burning trees so the fire would not spread. Tex says that forest had a very good chance of burning and was a definite danger to the family in the canyon below. Henry went to the forest service in Silver City, NM to report the actions taken and so they could follow up to make sure flare ups or winds did not cause these contained fires to spread. Tex says why did they not do the same here being firefighters and knowing the danger of manzanita wild fires–why would they not take quick action to contain these on the very day or night these happened? You can bet Tex, now that I know the attitude of these local people and firemen, will himself don a shovel and pack and head quickly to the next lighting strike fire. You saw how even two days later this thing could have been contained and how Sonny and Joy through the toughest brush made it to the fire line in four hours. Had we been able to access that trail they walked up we could have been there in an hour or less. Private land prevented us but firemen have rights to cut locks and pass privacy signs where there is a fire to be put out.
—
Then there was Thu, Aug 15, 2013 at 8:29 AM 299 is an important photo to explain….that photo was in the media with wrong statement stating the hotshots made that fire break and that fire break was there since the 60’s and the guy with shovel Joy witnessed him just tossing rocks with it casually-
====
then there was Thu, Aug 15, 2013 at 1:45 PM Hi Tex and Joy,
Thanks so much for the additional information. At this time, Tim and I don’t have any more questions. Brent, the meteorologist, is continuing to process a lot of data, photos, etc. He may contact you in the future with questions about your photos.
Thanks again for your willingness to help us investigate this accident. We all hope to learn from it so we can avoid a tragedy like this in the future.Best wishes,Richa Wilson
————
==============
That was our communication in full for the SAIR investigation team. We always felt since we were not highway spectators and we were at the fire edge; eye-witness throughout the day that they would want an in-person hike not what we have SEEN; retired feds/cia/smokejumpers/firefighters/ex gmhs/media/etc. because they all had the same gut feeling as us—some area is clouded and is it done due to man factor still alive or WHAT??? Why didn’t any of their team hike it with us to see the very spots we saw the men and the very area we got out alive and again the key thing here reflecting back is Sonny KNEW as early as 12:38pm on 6-30-13 that fire was no longer a fire that human beings should be in the area including him and he left me because I stubbornly took off my snakeboots and my feet were swollen and the awful heat and smoke—I needed a rest. My kestrel had readings that day from 93-107 degrees. That smoke was okay in the morning but not on the mountaintop by afternoon. ALSO people do not know the wildlife like Joy does to Congress, Wickenburg, Yarnell on up heading to all the towns in between there to Prescott. That very area they deployed to the area where the cattle pond is by Candie Cane Lane is a HUGE mountain lion almost like an African female lion and her cubs…there is black bears…badgers…so many and I mean MANY rattlers because I know for I have relocated them from “cookie cutter” subdivisions out to the less travelled areas so they can LIVE because many think out of fear or whatever they say- they kill them and when I say many just in one video alone Thomas Maiden, Frank Serros and I relocated 3 skunks and 48 rattlers in one visit so people would not have to be near the critters. Joy is the only person Sonny knows that can get a skunk without a cage but due to transport and laws she places them in a cage and people are always in awe how calm she is relocating all these scary critters and she just does it to help the wildlife LIVE ON…so in all this tragedy I hope 19 lives can live on if Y O U come forward finally and SHARE—why do I have to google “Yarnell” or “Yarnell Hikers” and see Congress woman Joy always here to share and the old miner Sonny when there is much more to come if Y O U just do it—talk or write or tell someone anonymously like some here write without their real names….just come forward. I grow weary seeing locally our names are the only ones willing to share when we know more do and I am awaiting Jimmy to send me the original lightning strike photo and that is a good start so we can go investigate the area. Does anyone know human body parts; bones? We need to clarify a find on our hike today what it is next to jeans with blood on it. We may have a break in the missing Yarnell suicide hiker Mark Danielson who lost his home—today in the oddest of places we saw activity unusual. Yet we need a professional to look at what we found. Any doctors here?
In case anyone missed this ( today )…
Mr. John Dougherty ( InvestigativeMEDIA ) has now started ‘publishing’
his own copies of the information in the SAIT FOIA/FOIL packages.
Article Title: Yarnell Hill Fire Serious Accident Investigation
Report Supporting Documentation
http://www.investigativemedia.com/yarnell-hill-fire-serious-accident-investigation-report-supporting-documentation/
From the article…
InvestigativeMEDIA is uploading the entire supporting documentation for the Serious Accident Investigation Report released by the Arizona Forestry Division in response to an Arizona Public Records Law request. Below are links to the first set of documents, photographs and videos. Cut and paste the links below into your web browser. Additional records, including additional videos in the folders posted below, will be released in the near future.
NOTE: The link is also down at the bottom of this page in Mr. Dougherty’s
‘Current Investigations’ section.
Thank you for posting this!!!
Reply to Elizabeth post on January 4, 2014 at 9:00 pm
>> Elizabeth said…
>>
>> TWO things:
>> 1. I forgot – I CAN’T e-mail this BR (movement) video, because it is TOO big.
>> 2. It is an “.avi” video. I am playing it just fine in “Windows Media Player.”
>> Is there a different way for me to upload it to share it with all of you?
>> Anyone have suggestions?
>>
>> WTKTT responded…
>>
>> Yes. Standby.
Elizabeth…
I’ve been working with your “Blue Ridge Movement” video showing the GPS
positions of the Blue Ridge guys all day on June 30.
I have a copy of what you uploaded to YouTube here.
Sure enough… at about the 10th frame in the video the color saturation values go
haywire and that’s why the topographic map goes to just black and white and the
video is almost impossible to see.
YouTube tends to do that. It is applying all kinds of formatting and filtering
to the uploads and basically ‘changing’ the actual uploaded content.
That’s why the original metadata disappears and whatnot.
I don’t know exactly what happened to your upload… but it’s really
hard to fix that kind of loss of ‘gamma’ and ‘saturation’ data once it does.
I am still working on that here… and almost have another copy that has some
‘restored’ color saturation but the background still doesn’t fully resemble the
clear topographic map seen in the first few frames, which is what is meant
to be seen throughout the video.
I will continue to try and ‘fix’ that video. I’m close…
…but In the meantime… here is a place where you can upload the original file
and it won’t be ‘touched’ or reformatted or ‘filtered’ in any way.
It’s an online public video storage area called ‘Screencast’ and it’s one of the
only ones that stores the content you upload byte for byte without altering it
in any way… which is what we want here.
Just click on this link…
https://www.screencast.com/signin.aspx
Sign on using the following information…
( Password is the same as the first part of email address )…
Email address: [email protected]
Password: yhf063013
This will ‘log you in’ to that account and now all you have to do is click the
‘Upload Content’ button and send any file.
As soon as you select the file you want to upload on your local computer the
upload begins… and there will be a small orange progress bar showing until
the upload is done.
Once again… thanks for all your help!
Will this thing allow others to see/use it, too? I will go upload it this evening.
WTKTT and Elizabeth,
Downloaded just fine following your instructions. Took awhile bcuz the files was huge.
This one is STILL very hard to listen to.
Thanks.
RTS… that ‘helmet cam’ video that is already there
was just a test upload. The goal was to try and
get the original AVI file for the Blue Ridge GPS
movement video there… and then convert it to
something other than AVI so YouTube won’t
screw it up. I think Elizabeth is uploading the
original AVI but it’s going to be HUGE. Wait just
a few hours after that and there will be a much
smaller download for that particular video.
Reply to Elizabeth post on January 5, 2014 at 6:45 pm
>> Elizabeth aksed…
>> Will this thing allow others to see/use it, too?
Yes… it should… and it can also just be ‘played’ there
like Mr. Dougherty’s ‘dropbox’ that he is now using
to store the material…
…but what I really wanted to do was just get that
original AVI format file… convert it to something
more compatible… and then get THAT version
back up onto your YouTube account ( or somewhere
on YouTube ).
The AVI format is just way too large.
There are better options these days.
FYI – the Blue Ridge GPS thing is uploading now. It might take a while. It *WILL* take a while, I should say.
Thanks, Elizabeth.
I ran into a brick wall trying to ‘fix’ that
same video from YouTube.
The saturation/gamma data in that file
is just too messed up to get back to
the original settings.
That’s OK. We will fix this.
It’s a very important piece of video.
I’m sure Mr. Dougherty will get around to
making this particular video available
at some point… but sooner is better
than later.
Elizabeth… your upload of the entire AVI
file was successful… as was my download
of it. I have it now. All 518 megabytes.
It displays perfectly here. Thank you.
I am converting it now so it can be
re-posted to YouTube but with a smaller
file size so others don’t have to suffer
the same download(s) and it won’t
suffer the same ‘blackout’ on upload.
It’s really quite an amazing thing and
everyone needs to see it… but there are
certainly some puzzling things in here.
Example: There is NO GPS record of
anyone from Blue Ridge ever going to
pick up Brendan McDonough at the
old-grader. We know that happened…
but there is no GPS data for that trip.
Frisby must not have been the one with
the GPS unit when he made that trip
out to get Brendan… or something.
More later…
WTKTT – when you re-size it, can you re-post it to that website where you had me upload it, and then I can download it from there and re-post it on YouTube?
And I THINK that the stop with the men picking up Brendan is there – I THINK – but it seems like Brendan must have run down PAST the grader to meet them, because they do not go back “up” to meet him. Someone else like Calvin should verify this so that your eyes (WTKTT) and mine are not the only sets looking at this.
Reply to Elizabeth post
on January 6, 2014 at 9:22 am
>> Elizabeth said…
>> WTKTT – when you
>> re-size it, can you re-post
>> it to that website where
>> you had me upload it, and
>> then I can download it
>> from there and re-post it
>> on YouTube?
Done.
There is an MP4 format
version there now AND a
WMV format version. The
MP4 version is a little
higher quality than the WMV.
There is a longer post about
all this below… including a
full text timeline/explanation
of all the movements seen
in the video.
I also posted these ‘new’
GOOD (playable) copies
to another public YouTube
page. It is here…
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O8AJSgk2pIQ
Sequence of events listed in no particular order, but all occurring after 1530 (you choose the order)
1. OPS2 asks if GM could spare resources in Yarnell (GM says NO)
2.DIV A says Working way off top, OPS1 Says hunker and be safe, keep me informed, Air support DOWN THERE ASAP
3.Steed/ Marsh have discussion concerning something! (insert educated guess)
There is no answer to this now other than a guess. The only evidence I know of the Musser request is him telling investigators it occurred. He likely does not know exactly when it occurred, I think he gave an approximate time to investigators (somewhere around 3:50 if I recall). The general feeling is the comfort conversation was last – around 4:00. A recording of Musser might be useful, but does not exist as far as I know.
Can somebody please tell me in which direction the SAIT photo of the Deployment site is looking? I’m trying to figure out how to synch the Body Map with the shelter photos and finding it almost impossible.
Also, a correction. Shelter #6 is not Chris MacKenzie’s shelter. He was fully deployed, so his shelter went with him. I’m trying to figure which shelters were whose and nothing is lining up.
Thanks in advance.
Marti,
WTKTT could most likely give you the best answer on the deployment site orientation with all his techo talents.
Do you have an INVENTORY of the GMHS stuff at the deployment / fatality site or can you direct me where to go for that?
I don’t have an inventory so far. I’m keywording stuff I find in the photos in Lightroom. But I’m still finding things, I think. I haven’t gotten the full rez images from Lawyer Elizabeth yet, so I can’t zoom in in detail.
And, yes he did just help me with his technotalents!
Reply to Marti Reed post on January 5, 2014 at 4:20 pm
>> Marti said…
>>
>> Can somebody please tell me in which direction the SAIT
>> photo of the Deployment site is looking?
Marti… the key ( in that picture ) is the line of mountains/ridges
way in the distance and barely visible as just a thin ‘bluish’
profile against the sky in the top of the photo.
They are on the OTHER side of Yarnell and Highway 89.
The camera operator is pretty much exactly here, facing
north/northeast and looking OUT of the northeast side of
the box canyon…
34.220475, -112.777727
If you were standing there with a compass and facing
the same direction as the photo was taken the needle
would be reading about 75 degrees. More east than north.
If the camera was panned to the RIGHT… you would be
seeing the Boulder Springs Ranch about 600 yards due east.
>> Marti also wrote…
>> I’m trying to figure out how to synch the Body Map with the
>> shelter photos and finding it almost impossible.
I believe that actual diagram, showing the positions of the
bodies, was sketched using the original FARO 3D photo
sequence that YCSO was known to have taken at first
light the morning after the incident.
It is known that the SAIT investigators received a copy of
these ultra-high-res 3 dimensional FARO images… but I really
doubt they were part of any FOIA/FOIL release package.
Thank you!! That’s exactly what I need to know.
I’ve been playing around all evening with Google Earth, trying to orient myself and the site. I really didn’t expect these images of the shelters would be so difficult to identify. I know the wind probably moved them around a bit. But I haven’t been able to even get them to sync in terms of groups.
Well… I doubt we will EVER see the actual YCSO
FARO 3-D images that they took on-site before
anything was ever touched.
Way too sensitive… even for an FOIA/FOIL release.
There are, in fact, always some ‘catches’ in
FOIA requests where information deemed
‘highly sensitive’ CAN be legally withheld or
totally redacted. It’s complicated.
Agree. Just reading and rereadiing the SAIT description is bad enough. That’s why I’m not going to pursue this line much longer. I just thought I’d quickly id the shelters. Right.
OK Next progress report. I’m finally able to begin downloading the YCSO photos full-size and w/metadata. Small disappointment. They’re not geo-tagged, as I was hoping they would be. Which actually kind of surprises me, all things considered. I’m waaaaaay behind on some real-life work, so I may back off a little bit on this.
Thx Elizabeth!
Progress (or lack thereof) Report
I put WTKTT’s SAIT camera pin in and BINGO it landed almost just on top of my pin where I had decided I thought the middle of the dep site was. Did some more ground view pix and yes, it lines up. AND the 70 degrees ENE looks exactly right.
AND 70 degrees ENE is almost vertical on the Body Map. Problem is I STILL don’t see the photo and the map aligning. Nothing in the photo lines up to show what’s on the map, so far. But I’ll keep trying. But it’s gonna have to wait, bcuz I have other stuff I’m working on that I need to get done sooner.
Thanks for helping me with that!
xxfullsailxx
on January 5, 2014 at 8:33 am said:
REPLY: I would not be so sure of that xxxfullsailxxx. We were given information we do not know what to do with it but we know the fire community and state and county would frown upon us having hold privately what we have…like I have publicly shared transparent yet by 2 folks we have not yet shared on one’s request due to litigation concerns and the other out of respect to who they are in all this yet we do know there is more than one person who can offer light to this and we do know in His time it will happen. I also know I obtained that information because they read our comments and agree we are spit on how we eye-witnessed that day and weekend. So YES this board could turn up any pertinent information to that weekend- just stick around and wait and see- here and Bill Gabbert’s boards are the best out there on the topic.
He didn’t say anything about speculation, conjecture, or using one’s imagination. Even if incorrectly.
yes! how right you are…
even IF that conjecture leads to horribly false accusation’s about someone you don’t even know… someone you are willing to name and call out on the internet while cowardly hiding behind your computer…
or when that conjecture/speculation is a purposeful attempt to create controversy, where there is no controversy…
you know what else…
this lack of accountability for one’s accusations on the internet also leads certain people who may have some narcissistic tendencies to start comparing themselves to famous people like Edward Snowden or such… not that anyone here would do that…
thanks for bringing this up Marti. i too am glad you’re here. i think you might bring a new level of integrity to the discussion.
I don’t agree with you about a lot of what you are saying about WTKTT. Even though I agree he has leapt too far occasionally. I’m seasoned enough to pretty much take leaps with a grain of salt, until I see or don’t see the ground rise under them.
I really do appreciate the time and effort he has put into documenting details that have helped me orient myself around this. That’s what needs to happen in situations like this IMHO all things considered. And it’s no small effort. How much time have you sacrificed to do the same? I ask that even tho I acknowledge that SOMETIMES you have written posts that have been useful. You have experience on the ground, and we all need that information. Really we do. Please keep it coming.
All that being said, I really hope John will intervene in this. He said he will not tolerate ad hominems but he hasn’t done anything to stop them. He hasn’t said anything about free-ranging speculation, even that which implicates others. He, himself, wrote scathingly about Willis, and was widely attacked for that, but never rescinded his criticisms. And I know there are mixed opinions about that. So I don’t think he is all that opposed to people imagining that other people in power might be doing things really wrong.
Also, you wrote earlier today at 10:56 am “…so you shouldn’t ad-lib conversations that you were not a part of… interesting, thanks!”
My instant response upon reading that was, “Including if you are investigating/publishing a SAIT report??????” Part of the reason we are all here is because the SAIT does not include evidenced conversations but, instead, sloppy narrations of them based on interviews that weren’t even recorded/transcribed. Are you kidding me??? I wouldn’t even be here if I hadn’t discovered that the supposedly “Serious” Accident Incident Investigation Report, which you seem to think is all we need to rest upon, was full of flaws, mis-statements, holes, and freely interpreted so-called “interviews.” And you think WTKTT is the source of major controversy? Hardly. At least in my opinion.
So, yes, I hope John intervenes here and sets some rules about both “being a dick” and “wild speculation that is/isn’t tolerated” and enforces them. If Daily Kos can do it,believe me, so can he. This conversation is, IMHO, too important (and not happening anywhere else on the internet as far as I’ve combed it) to let it be derailed by what is actually an unnecessary conflict about how we engage.
Peace and Truth and Respect
I really mean this from my Mind and Heart
again, documenting details is one thing. i’d even be okay with speculation and conjecture if it didn’t lead to false accusations against people you don’t know, dealing with a situation you don’t understand (not necessarily “you” personally, but the general “you”, actually mainly WTKTT)
most people here ARE just trying to sort out details and creating “what if” scenarios, which i think that we, with the “on the ground” knowledge, can hash out the realities of… but, others take it a step further and try to imply blame or create controversy. (i don’t think WTKTT is “the source of controversy” … hardly, in fact laughable. i said he strives to create controversy) so yes, i will be here to squash that ill-conceived blame or controversy.
ad-hominem? i think i’ve presented plenty of specific examples of some anonymous person making horrible allegations about people and situations based on incomplete or mis-interpreted evidence. here’s another one:
WTKTT:
“Shumate was in charge. There was time to recover and the logs show he blew that, too.”
so sure, you can make allegations like the one above, if you’re willing to put your name and reputation on it, like John Dougherty does.
i do appreciate your perspective Marti.
I just discovered that John Dougherty posted this on December 16, in a post within the “Yarnell Hill Fire” series:
Personal Attacks and Name Calling in Comments Will Not be Tolerated
“Please refrain from ANY personal attacks or nasty comments concerning anyone posting on this site. Please maintain a professional approach to discussing the issues. Disagreement is natural. But name calling will not be tolerated and anyone who continues to post in this manner will be permanently blocked from the site. Thank you, John”
Robert Caldwell video 2….. (my opinion) figure 4 from p13 WFAR shows Robert Caldwell taking the video above. Elizabeth…. The audio from the Caldwell video sounds exactly the same as the audio from the bunny picture, right? The reason I am asking is I am just wondering what the time relationship between the Able comment “Air support ASAP” and the Mackenzie video with Marsh saying “I knew this was coming.”
Many, Many thanks to all the people here who continue to search for THE TRUTH
Calvin, yes – the audio in the bunny video is the audio from the Caldwell video (repeated TWICE – I dubbed it twice into the same video b/c Windows movie maker requires a 30 second video – you cannot make a shorter video….)
On a lighter note, I just want to add that I cringe every time I see those bunny pictures on the video. I honestly do. When I was trying to figure out how to get the *AUDIO* uploaded to YouTube, and YouTube kept indicating that I could not upload an AUDIO without pictures (thereby making it a video), the bunny pictures were the only non-personal pictures (not me, not my family) I had a my fingertips and to which I also owned all rights. I was trying to act quickly, so I used those pictures. I wish I had better, more dignified pictures to insert at the time, but I didn’t. So, again, apologies. I hope, at the very least, that maybe the bunny pictures or the story of why I had to use the stupid bunny pictures makes someone smile during what is otherwise pretty depressing video/audio reviewing.
Elizabeth,
No big deal on your bunnies. They add charactrer.
I think what you did was brilliant. I think we’re all learning quite a bit here about using media and the intertubez. Normally (ie not during holidays when I play around with something else) my twitter avatar is a photo of a ceramic rabbit in Old Town (ABQ) holding red and green chiles. I’m very personally attached to that photo.
** FOIA/FOIL VIDEO
** ROBERT CALDWELL VIDEO 2 – UPDATE
Some updated information about this video…
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R46Y8LKUcNk
This is the Robert Caldwell Video from the FOIA/FOIL release
that was shot at the same location as the MacKenzie video(s)
in the 4:00 PM timeframe.
This is also the video that has the following radio traffic captured
in the background…
Here is the full transcipt of this 35 second audio clip…
Eric Marsh (DIVS A): Yea… I’m tryin’ to work my way off the top.
Todd Abel ( OPS1 ): Okay… I copy… ah… just keep me updated…
ah… ya know… you guys hunker and be safe and then… ah…
we’ll get some air support down there ASAP.
This video clearly shows the fireline approaching Brendan McDonough’s
lookout position… but it ALSO happens to (apparently) show the
Granite Mountain Crew Carriers off in the distance… still parked
in the clearing over by the Sesame Street area.
At exactly +5 seconds… a small ‘tan’ clearing starts to appear
in the exact vertical middle of the right-hand side of the video frame.
That is the Sesame Street clearing coming into view in the distance.
Inside that small ‘tan’ clearing… there are two unmistakable WHITE
( square ) objects reflecting the sun. Those are (apparently) the two
Granite Mountain Crew Carriers parked at the north edge of that clearing
over near Sesame Street.
They remain in view for the remainder of the video and at
about +10.5 seconds they are in the exact ‘center’ of the video.
WTKTT… Do you mind re examining the Parker picture….. I still think the GM buggies are visible in the pic.
I agree, Calvin. I also think they are still ‘there’ at that time,
but, for some reason, just aren’t showing as clearly as
they do in this video. It could be that they are *just* hidden
by the edge of that landscape feature out there in the
middle bowl that I’ve been calling “Little Round Top”.
BTW: I’ve checked a lot of other sites and read hiker blogs
but I can’t find any other common name for those two
‘features’ out there. No topo map puts a name on them,
either.
MY opinion from BR movement video….. BR Gps unit was near GM buggies (last time) around 1620’ish. (pre burn).
Opinions????
I think I agree, Calvin… but even with
some improved color saturation here on
that original YouTube video it’s hard to
say for certain. I think there is going to
be a much better version of that Blue Ridge
GPS movement video available quite
SOON. Stay tuned.
**
** FOIA/FOIL VIDEO
** ROBERT CALDWELL VIDEO 1 – UPDATE
Some updated information about this video…
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wrsL84M4i-8
This is the Robert Caldwell Video from the FOIA/FOIL release
that shows a SEAT retardant drop where they (GM) were working
up near the anchor point.
There is no definite TIME given for this Caldwell video
so is not clear if this is one of the actual Rory Collins (ATGS) drops
documented on page 16 of the ADOSH report ( at either
1130 or 1145 ) but it is highly likely that it is.
>> ADOSH – Page 16
>> Between 1130 and 1145, the GMIHC conducted burnout
>> operations, and Marsh and ATGS (Rory Collins) discussed tactical
>> options. Collins directed two SEAT drops at 1136 and 1145 directly
>> onto the burnout. Marsh indicated to air attack via radio that
>> the drops were not what he wanted. As a result of the drops,
>> GMIHC shifted tactics from building indirect line (to) going direct
>> along the fire edge.
This video of Caldwell’s showing a drop is only 6 seconds long,
but there is, in fact, some captured radio traffic in the background.
At +2.5 seconds… we hear this…
“Okay… I copy… and then… you gave him that word already, correct?”
If you compare this voice with Todd Abel’s ( as heard in Caldwell’s
second video ) it would appear to also be Abel speaking in
this video… but it is unclear who he is speaking TO, at this point.
Maybe Eric Marsh… but maybe not.
Reply to Elizabeth post on January 4, 2014 at 3:18 pm
>> Elizabeth said…
>> Another video for you (and several more on the same Youtube “channel”):
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6_Lw9kCppj4
>> The video linked-to above is taken from a truck, by a member of one of
>> the AZ state crews (“Yuma crew” or “Lewis’s crew,” whatever that means),
>> as the truck is driving, and (a) the truck goes past the street sign for
>> Double A Bar Ranch Road ( you’ll see the street sign in the video ).
>> Marti Reed on January 4, 2014 at 7:25 pm said:
>>
>> They’re definitely going faster than the 15 mph posted speed limit!
>> Which is why I still haven’t found the street sign!
Marti… see below… exact location for this ‘street sign’ is listed.
** FOIA/FOIL VIDEO
** VID 20130630 – 1515
YouTube video title: VID 20130630 151521 240 –
Yarnell Hill Fire video provided by AZSF crew.
Published on Jan 4, 2014
YouTube About Information: The FOIA/FOIL text provided with this video stated:
These photos came from AZSF. Some are from Jake Cardina (foreman of the
Lewis DOC Crew), some are from the Yuma DOC crew.
If the date/time stamp on this video can be trusted… then it was taken at
1515 ( 3:15 PM ) the afternoon of June 30, 2013, up at the Model Creek
School in Peeples Valley.
The video shows that the fire direction had already changed to blowing
southeast even by that time.
When the video starts… the vehicle that the camera operator is in is pulling away
from where it was parked on the east side of the Model Creek School ( which
was the Incident Command Post for fire command ) up in Peeples Valley.
NOTE: As usual… for any of the latitude,longitude values below just
cut-and-paste the line with the two values separated by a comma into
the address bar of Google Maps, then hit ENTER, and a GREEN ARROW
will be pointing to the exact location.
The vehicle starts out exactly here…
34.274450, -112.748969
…and then heads south on Peeples Valley Road, which will become the Hays
Ranch Road as it heads east and then out towards Highway 89.
So from +0:27 through the end of the video, the vehicle is headed due east on
Hays Ranch Road and the camera view is due south towards Yarnell.
At +0:29 there is actually a man in a dark blue shirt and cap standing to the side
of the road and holding what looks like a smartphone up to the sky to take
pictures or measuements.
That actually could be Robb Berry, Division Supervisor F at the Yarnell Hill
Fire on June 30, 2013, who has stated in his YIN interview that he was
occasionally going outside ( around that same time ) to take measurements
and also use use ‘Rainy Day’ app on his iPhone.
There isn’t really a ‘custom sign’ for the ‘Double-Bar-A’ ranch at the point where
Peeples Valley Road and Hays Ranch Road come together… but there is a small
yellow sign with black letters that simply says…
“End of Yavapai County Maintenance”.
That sign is exactly here…
34.273242, -112.747717
…and… at +0:42 there is a standard green/white road sign on top of a stop sign
that says “Double Bar A Ranch Road”. This is, in fact, also “Hays Ranch Road”.
The Ranch changed hands in a multi-million dollar deal circa 2009 and was
renamed from ‘The Hays Ranch’ to the ‘Double Bar A Ranch’ by the new owners.
The local street signs were changed to reflect the new name of the Ranch but
Google maps will still say that road is called “Hays Ranch Road”.
That stop sign with the “Double Bar A Ranch Road” sign is exactly here…
34.273315, -112.747373
At +0:59… the vehicle is heading east on Hays Ranch Road and the ’35 mph’
road sign ( with the piece of red tape on the back ) that ‘flashes’ by is located
exactly here…
34.273331, -112.744780
When the video ends… the vehicle is exactly here, still headed east on Hays
Ranch Road with the camera still looking south towards Yarnell…
34.273171, -112.742873
There are still DOZENS of vehicles visible in this video that can/should be easily
identified. Plenty of logos and license plate numbers visible.
More about that ( the vehicles seen in this video ) later…
I appreciate all of the thoughtful answers to my question up above, since I think that is the most important issue other than not getting into that situation in the first place.
WTKTT proclaims:
“** VIDEO FROM FOIA/FOIL
** RADIO TRAFFIC DIRECTED TO GRANITE MOUNTAIN
** ABOUT RESOURCES AT GAS STATION”
the radio traffic is not “DIRECTED AT GRANITE MOUNTAIN”…
it is one person (#1) talking to someone else (#2) saying that GM was trying to contact #2 but was unable to get a hold of him… #1 says that he could relay if #2 would like and then says that there are resources somewhere waiting to be given an assignment. (para-phrased of course)
so what is false about WTKTT’s announcement is who he thinks is being addressed and what they are addressing. basically his whole premise.
AND THEN, as if that wasn’t enough, WTKTT goes on to state the controversy that isn’t there (this is what i would call a “leap”):
WTKTT:
“the caller is trying telling Granite Mountain there are resources for them at a gas station they might need BEFORE they head out for their hike.”
false allegations based on false evidence from someone hiding behind the internet…
again.
Calvin figured that all out like yesterday.
Do you know WHO that is speaking?
That would be helpful.
false allegations based on shaky evidence by anonymous people hiding behind the internet.
Reply to Elizabeth post on January 4, 2014 at 9:00 pm
Elizabeth… thanks again ( ongoing thanks )!
I took the liberty of moving this last post of yours down here as a new
‘parent’ comment because that previous message compartment was
getting too deeply ‘nested’ and nothing makes this WordPress software
we are all talking to go haywire faster than ‘too much nesting’.
What you just posted is important on a number of levels so I didn’t
want it to vanish into WordPress ether-land.
>> Elizabeth said…
>>
>> TWO things:
>> 1. I forgot – I CAN’T e-mail this BR video, because it is TOO big.
Yes. I remember you saying that when this issue first came up
so that’s why I didn’t just give you an email address. Not gonna work
unless you know how to ‘break’ up the binary file into segments.
>> 2. It is an “.avi” video. I am playing it just fine in “Windows Media Player.”
>> Is there a different way for me to upload it to share it with all of you?
>> Anyone have suggestions?
Yes. Standby.
It’s not important that I receive it personally… it is ( as you said )
important to ‘fix it’ so that EVERYONE can see it.
I’m near some computers with some pretty tight security at the moment
which isn’t easily ‘dropped’… but I can work on a public solution from
here. I’m not Edward Snowden just entertaining myself over here in
Moscow, or anything… but I think you catch my drift.
>> Elizabeth also wrote…
>>
>> NOTE – the video gives a sense of how fast a man can RUN up the hill
>> after all the chapparrell has burned, b/c the UTV did not go down into
>> the valley, I think.
While we are figuring out how to make sure EVERYONE can see what
you are seeing… can you just tell me how many minutes/seconds it
took Trueheart to ‘scramble’ up from the deployment site back up
the ridge? You are right… it’s VERY doubtful he took the UTV down
that steep grade… so this GPS must be showing a man in a big
hurry moving all the way from the deployment site back up to the
ridge. The vegetation was gone… but I still want to know how fast
Trueheart was able to make that move. It’s important.
The rest is just a reproduction of the IMPORANT information you
just provided up above in the ‘nested’ comment and I just wanted
to reproduce it down here for the moment because… well… because
you worked hard on this… it’s important… and I didn’t want it to
‘disappear’ if WordPress goes haywire…
Elizabeth also wrote…
3. At 5:09 p.m., BR starts trying to get to GM. They have been sitting on
Route 89 for a bit before that. They try two or three different ways by Glen
Ilea to get into the deployment site, but they cannot do it, so they drive back
up Route 89 to the Shrine area (I think – no labels on the video) and try a
couple of different paths around there. They ultimately come back in exactly
the way that they did in the a.m., and they get back on that trail or dozer line
where the vehicles were parked in the a.m. at roughly 5:35 p.m. From then
until roughly 6:08 p.m., they are zooming back and forth, looking, up to the
“mystery panel,” back to Brendan’s lookout, back to the lunch spot and where
the backpacks were. At roughly 6:09, they leave the backpack spot, and they
go along the ridge and down into the deployment area, arriving at roughly
6:29 p.m.
At roughly 6:58 p.m., they go to the Helms Ranch, where they stay until roughly
7:25 p.m., whereupon they head back to the deployment site, where they stay
for maybe five minutes or so, and then head out the same way they came in
(on the two-track or the old trail or the dozer line or whatever many names we
are calling all these things). They are back out on Route 89 and out of the
picture by 8:25 pm.
NOTE – the video gives a sense of how fast a man can RUN up the hill
after all the chapparrell has burned, b/c the UTV did not go down into
the valley, I think.
P21 YIN Gary Cordis…..There was a pumpkin there.
Would someone define what a “pumpkin” (referenced above) is?
I believe it is a big portable water container/transport. Maybe someone who knows for sure will chime in.
They are round, collapsible, portable and self supporting (with water) open topped water storage devices of varying sizes (gallons), which are generally orange for visibility (hence pumpkin). The stored water can be used to pump hoselays, refill engines, with the larger ones being used quite often for the filling of helicopter buckets, or allowing the larger Type I helicopters to suck and fill thru a tube/hard suction hose. If there was not a ready water source to keep them filled, there would have to be enough water tenders available to shuttle water to meet the demand.
Typically a “pumpkin” is a portable water container filled by a tender (truck) or a hydrant. Its kind of like an above ground swimming pool. Its used as a dip spot for a helicopter to refill its bucket. They are big and round and orange, hence “pumpkin”.
Thanks Jeff and Elizabeth
Reply to Calvin post on January 4, 2014 at 6:48 am
>> Calvin asked…
>> WTKTT… could you give some OPINION on the BR movement video?
Sorry, Calvin… not yet. I’m still having some kind of problem even trying
to view that video. It starts out with a clear map of the area on which to
watch the movements… but then it immediately turns in a ‘reverse-negative’
black/white mess and it’s almost impossible to see what it’s doing.
I can still see the times changing and, occasionally, SOMETHING moving
down on the scrambled terrain map… but not with enough clarity to make
any real conclusions.
One thing that IS visible in the first second of video, before it ‘scrambles’,
is this strange label on a point up on the high ridge just about 2000 feet
north of where they dropped into the box canyon. It says…
“Mystery panel”
Do you have any idea what that means?
Some piece of evidence we’ve never heard about?
I wonder… if this was originally just some Garmin GPS output
you can usually just ‘import’ those ASCII files directly into
Google maps, no problem.
Elizabeth… was there any such original Garmin ASCII
data in the FOIA release… or just the video itself?
Yes, I think. If you have even a “dummy” anonymous e-mail address, I can e-mail to you the original video that I got in the FOIA/FOIL materials. It is INCREDIBLE. It shows everywhere that Frisby was, minute by minute. I WISH I knew what the “mystery panel” was….. I have no clue.
Ah… OK… so this is just specifically ‘Frisby’
movement… and it states that?
I didn’t know if the GPS unit was in a vehicle
or ‘on a person’.
That would explain why it doesn’t show this
mysterious ‘trip’ that Trueheart seems to have
taken circa 5:00 PM where he was able to break
through the fire encircling Yarnell and somehow
get all the way back up to the anchor point…. and
on to the actual deployment site at or about
the same time the medics actually arrived.
Not enough has been said about this
‘mystery trip’ undertaken by Blue Ridge people.
If Trueheart ( and other BR people? ) really were
able to do that circa 5:00 PM then that is nothing
but more definitive proof of how easily GM could
have survived the day if they had simply stayed
right where they were for only 60 minutes ( or
less ) and just as Trueheart was able to get out
where they had been easily at 5:00 PM… they
( GM ) would have just as easily been able to walk
back to town… alive.
NO!! The video – that *I* can see (meaning, the original, not the lousy copy on YouTube that I could not get to post in color) – shows “them” (BR Capt., according to FOIA text) going to search for GM and getting to the backpack spot and ultimately to the deployment site. It shows them trying two different ways to get in to GM, as I recall.
Wow. Okay. That’s important.
So the GPS unit was NOT attached
to the ATV itself? If I recall the YIN
notes about this mysterious ‘trip’…
Trueheart RAN down to the deployment
site from the anchor point.
So Frisby must have either given him
the GPS unit before he took off on
this mysterious ‘trip’… or it was
Trueheart that simply had it all day.
Elizabeth… what TIME is showing
up on the top of the screen when
Trueheart makes this ‘trip’ out
to find GM?
TWO things:
1. I forgot – I CAN’T e-mail this BR video, because it is TOO big.
2. It is an “.avi” video. I am playing it just fine in “Windows Media Player.” Is there a different way for me to upload it to share it with all of you? Anyone have suggestions?
3. At 5:09 p.m., BR starts trying to get to GM. They have been sitting on Route 89 for a bit before that. They try two or three different ways by Glen Ilea to get into the deployment site, but they cannot do it, so they drive back up Route 89 to the Shrine area (I think – no labels on the video) and try a couple of different paths around there. They ultimately come back in exactly the way that they did in the a.m., and they get back on that trail or dozer line where the vehicles were parked in the a.m. at roughly 5:35 p.m. From then until roughly 6:08 p.m., they are zooming back and forth, looking, up to the “mystery panel,” back to Brendan’s lookout, back to the lunch spot and where the backpacks were. At roughly 6:09, they leave the backpack spot, and they go along the ridge and down into the deployment area, arriving at roughly 6:29 p.m.
At roughly 6:58 p.m., they go to the Helms Ranch, where they stay until roughly 7:25 p.m., whereupon they head back to the deployment site, where they stay for maybe five minutes or so, and then head out the same way they came in (on the two-track or the old trail or the dozer line or whatever many names we are calling all these things). They are back out on Route 89 and out of the picture by 8:25 pm.
NOTE – the video gives a sense of how fast a man can RUN up the hill after all the chapparrell has burned, b/c the UTV did not go down into the valley, I think.
“If Trueheart ( and other BR people? ) really were
able to do that circa 5:00 PM then that is nothing
but more definitive proof of how easily GM could
have survived the day if they had simply stayed
right where they were for only 60 minutes ( or
less ) and just as Trueheart was able to get out
where they had been easily at 5:00 PM… they
( GM ) would have just as easily been able to walk
back to town… alive.”
umm, what do you think a safety zone is? what do you think everyone has been saying since the day this happened? that if only they would have stayed put, they would have walked back to town…alive.
not really any sort of revelation here.
Nope… but ( as I said ) it’s ‘definitive proof’…. and even puts an exact time
on the conjecture as to when that could
have been easily done.
No idea, but interesting. Thanks for responding. I have watched the video repeatedly and completely understand the issue you are having.
Needs to be fixed, somehow… either by obtaining original
Garmin GPS ASCII files or restoring the right color
information to the video. I have some software here
that can do that and will try to give that a shot.
If what I THINK I am seeing is correct… there are some
VERY mysterious moves being made on the part of
whoever was carrying that GPS unit. ( Frisby?
Trueheart? On the dashboard of a vehicle? ).
It’s also interesting what it does NOT show.
It does not seem to show this mysterious ‘trip’ that
Trueheart ( and others? ) undertook shortly after
the deployment when ( according to the YIN notes )
they took off searching for GM even while the fire
was raging around the town. Somehow they ‘broke
through’ and went back up to the anchor point… and
then ( somehow ) Trueheart ended up at the deployment
site about the time the medics got there?
Very strange ( and vaguely documented ).
The important detail that might come out of all that is
if Trueheart was easily able to ‘break through’ the
fire around the town circa 5:00 PM… and was in no
danger the rest of the time… then that is just more proof
that if GM had simply waited up there at the anchor
point they, themselves, would have had no trouble
simply ‘walking back to town’ through ‘safe black’
either circa 5:00 PM.
WTKTT says:
“The important detail that might come out of all that is
if Trueheart was easily able to ‘break through’ the
fire around the town circa 5:00 PM… and was in no
danger the rest of the time… then that is just more proof
that if GM had simply waited up there at the anchor
point they, themselves, would have had no trouble
simply ‘walking back to town’ through ‘safe black’
either circa 5:00 PM.”
that is no kind of revelation, and certainly not yours. everyone has been saying that from the beginning. that’s what a “safety zone” is, a place to wait it out until safe passage is allowed or work can resume…
Of course it’s not ( a revelation )… but it’s
‘definitive proof’ of how early and how easily
they could have just ‘walked back’.
the “definitive proof” was the cold black that GM was sitting in at the lunch spot.
I’ve watched this several times. Thinking of downloading it, altho I don’t really know ATM how to do that, and watching it in slow-motion. My gut reaction is that, if this is related to the BRHS Supt somehow, and he was on his atv, he was all over the place. All the time. Even after the burnover. It would be nice to know how this video was made. The first part, yes, is a map. Then it quickly switches into that B/W thing that is synched to the map. I don’t know how this stuff is done.
Marti… interesting point you just made.
The FOIA material might SAY this is ‘Brian Frisby’
movement… but if the GPS unit was actually just
attached to the ATV itself… then the movements
later in the day MIGHT show Captain Trueheart’s
‘breakthrough’ move circa 5:00 PM when he
( supposedly ) made it all the way back up to
the anchor point where he’d met Marsh earlier
in the day.
Any ‘breakthrough’ at that moment in time just proves
how easily GM themselves could have just ‘walked
the black’ back to town that day instead of doing
what they did.
YES!! The color video that I have (I will have to spend tomorrow figuring out how to get it online in a good form) shows SOMEONE from Blue Ridge looking for GM, going to the backpack pumps, going to the deployment site. I suspect that the GPS was on the UTV, but I do not know. All the FOIA/FOIL explanation referenced was that the GPS tracked the movements of the “BR Capt.”
I agree. And that’s what Sunny and Joy have been saying all along. The 64 quadrillion dollar question is “Why did they do this?” And the answer, possibly, lies in the conversation about the decisions which two living people listened to, and even possibly participated, but aren’t, for whatever reasons, willing to reveal. Everything else here is speculation.
That’s the heart of this whole thing IMO.
Well… here is how it COULD be fixed.
The ‘pointer’ that appears to be moving is the only ‘color’
item in the scrambled B/W background segment(s).
A filter pass that removes all black/white pixels would
just leave the colored pointer movement. The you just make
the resulting filtered pass have a ‘transparent background’
and you ‘play it back’ over the first frame of the video
that DOES have a readable full-color map.
Let me see about that… that will actually be pretty easy.
I definitely get what you’re saying. I’m not sure how to do it in real time, since I’m not much of an expert in doing video editing.
Glad you think it will be easy! Go for it! I think this is important.
Elizabeth –
Interesting you mention telling the truth being associated with less risk of getting sued. I am not sure, but I think that might be taking place in this very case. In addition to the government agencies named in the claims were 4 members of fire command personally named. One who was not however was OPS2, Paul Musser – the man who told investigators that at about 3:50 on 6/30 he contacted Marsh or Steed (he said he was not sure) to inquire if they could send resources to Yarnell. It appears Paul Musser told the truth. It also appears that is what the families may really be interested in.
Mike,
I posted a few things above you may be interested in when you make the time.
Marti,
Thanks. That makes more sense on their numbering system because 19 radios (Radio 19) would mean everyone had one. The chain of possesion thing doesn’t make sense to me either. The cell phones and any records, data, etc. that can possibly be retrieved is pretty imposrtant according to WYKTT. Detailed work for sure. Thanks again. It all helps.
Where are you getting the number of 19 radios?
You posted Radio 19, that’s how.
“One was in the close vicinity of Shelter 5, and the other was in close to Radio 19.”
Radio #19 is how they tagged it, after sequencing their radio tagging in a direct sequence connected to tagging the shelters. They sequenced the radios directly after sequencing the shelters. After tagging the shelters, they tagged the radios in that same sequence.
Radio 19 is actually the eleventh, and last, radio photographed on the site.
I hope I post this right. It’s long and complicated and I do not know very well how to post on this site but here goes:
WantsToKnowTheTruth
on December 26, 2013 at 3:23 pm said:
“Followup: If that really is Christopher MacKenzie’s Canon Powershot just lying on the ground there… then that would explain why it was apparently NEVER entered into evidence by the YCSO police investigators.
The photograph we are talking about was taken during the FIRST VISIT by Brad Mayhew and the other SAIT investigators at the deployment site.
Everything we see in these photographs are things that the YCSO investigators purposely decided to LEAVE there for the SAIT investigators.
YCSO had already combed the site looking for cell/smartphones and had already removed those and entered them into evidence.
They DECIDED to leave backpacks, tools, radios and everything else for the Arizona Forestry SAIT people to ‘find’ and deal with.
So either the YCSO police investigators did not recognize that object as a ‘camera’… or they DID, but still decided it was ‘personal property’ like the backpacks and radios and weren’t interested in it.
I would find that a little hard to believe… but it’s possible.
NOTE: Shortly after this photo was taken… Brad Mayhew himself asked the YCSO investigators who where there with them to take away the ‘radios’ and the ‘loose shelters’ since Mayhew didn’t have any ‘clean’ way to collect them for later inspection… and the YCSO investigators said that they did that…
…but there was still no mention of any camera.
If it still remained there… then it was only removed when Prescott Fire Department was allowed to remove the backpacks and tools and everything that was left after YCSO and SAIT were ‘done’.”
MY Response
After combing thru and key-wording and re-combing thru the YCSO photographs as best I could (given that, when they downloaded off of Elizabeth’s G+ collection, they did so at half-size and w/all the metadata stripped), I have to disagree with the sequence you wrote above.
“The photograph we are talking about was taken during the FIRST VISIT by Brad Mayhew and the other SAIT investigators at the deployment site.
Everything we see in these photographs are things that the YCSO investigators purposely decided to LEAVE there for the SAIT investigators.
YCSO had already combed the site looking for cell/smartphones and had already removed those and entered them into evidence.”
That doesn’t fit what I’m seeing at all.
I believe that photograph was taken at the beginning of the YCSO site investigation, as documented in the YCSO photos Elizabeth received from the FOIA. Those two guys in the photo were present thru the whole sequence of YCSO photos.` I could be wrong on exactly when it taken, but it almost, but not quite, fits into the general scenario of the photos in the beginning of the YCSO collection.
The guy with the notebook is first seen in the first YCSO Investigation photo and last seen right before YCSO started numbering the shelters. The guy w/the radio is first seen in that first photo, also, and last seen just before YCSO removed the shelters.
Here’s the sequence, according to the YCSO photos:
YSCO hadn’t removed anything but the bodies and connected shelters (and maybe some cellphones??) when this photograph (in which the scene is essentially the same as the SAIT photo) was taken. At this point everything is there. They photographed the site in general. Then they numbered the shelters and photographed them. Then they numbered five radios and photographed them. Then they removed the shelters. Just before they did you can see radio-guy walking away from the site. Then they numbered two more radios with the Powershot in between them, which they also photographed at that time, including showing the Powershot in between them. Then they numbered & photographed three more very burned radios.
Then they removed the numbers from the radios (while leaving them in place) and numbered “personal belongings.” They photographed the site in general with the numbered items. Then they photographed the numbered items in sequence. Two of these numbered items were pretty obviously cellphones. I’m the only photographer left on the planet who doesn’t have a smartphone yet, so I can’t identify them specifically. Sometimes they photographed un-numbered personal items also. The collection ends with an un-numbered pocketknife close to a set of numbered keys, for example. There are also two un-numbered items I saw that looked like cellphones. One was in the close vicinity of Shelter 5, and the other was in close to Radio 19.
The other thing I found confusing is that somebody’s time-stamping is off. The first YCSO photo is time-stamped “7/3/13, 6:25 PM.” The last one is time-stamped “7/3/13, 7:10 PM.” The “SAIT” photo (with the shelters all around) is time-stamped “7/3/13 6:50:15 PM.” There is just no way this can be the case, given the sequence of the investigation. Knowing the experience of digital photography, I’d probably bank on the fact that YCSO was pretty meticulous on accurately time-setting the cameras it uses for investigations. The first photograph they have of the site after they removed the shelters is time-stamped “7/3/13, 6:48 PM.”
Also, I have absolutely no idea who anybody in these pictures is, or which agency/investigation they were associated with.
I’m not sure how, then, this collection of photos from the YCSO (“Investigation” or “Assisting SAIT Investigation”?) fits or doesn’t fit in with the narrative you’re describing. I AM sure they saw and photographed the camera, but didn’t number it, like they did all other “personal items” they found.
And now, after spending all afternoon compiling/writing/typing all this, then re-reading your post, I’m beginning to think my confusion is rooted in the possibility that the “YCSO Photos of the Yarnell Hill Fire Deployment Site (Sheriff’s Office Photos)” are of the SAIT Investigation, not the YCSO Investigation?
I had a hand injury last weekend and I’m having trouble typing. I’m also not feeling secure posting comments here, given the tone of the conversation. But I did want to report what I saw going on in the YCSO photographs Elizabeth posted from her FOIA.
Very good information thanks we can work with this for more clarity.
Marti,
Very good, detailed information, thanks. Did I read this right, that the GMHS had 19 portable radios?
I counted eleven radios. Actually, they numbered/photographed six (when I said five above, that was a miscount) before the shelters were removed, then two right after the shelters were removed, then three really burned ones. I don’t know what’s in the reports. I didn’t see nineteen. I did think, “Wow, that’s more than I thought I read that they had found.” They started the count at #9, after they numbered the shelters #1 thru #8. Then they numbered the Personal Items #1 thru #7.
Chris McKenzie’s radio (with his name on it) is #10. His shelter is #6 also (I’m pretty sure), as is his body number on the chart. The rest of the shelters don’t seem to correspond in numbers to the body chart, as I’ve been able to discern. Chris’s radio was not found near his shelter. The radio found near him (and photographed in the SAIR photo) is not his.
I don’t know how helpful this is in the grand scheme of things. I would like to pin down the chain of “possession” (and the reason around it) of the camera. I find it strange. I am also curious about the two cell phones that seem pretty obvious to me that are only incidentally photographed. Also aware the wind was blowing pretty hard, so some things may be obvious in photos that weren’t so obvious on the ground. Still also puzzled by why the YCSO would release these photos as their investigation photos when they seem to have, actually, been the SAIT investigation. Also two photographers on the scene with two Canon Rebels that never seem to have even accidentally photographed each other. There was another guy with a not-Rebel there, and a guy photographing something he was interested in with a cellphone.
Also, I never found the pink thing that WTKTT thought might be another cellphone. I will go back and look, but I really need the original images to see anything in more detail.
Reply to Marti Reed post on January 4, 2014 at 3:26 pm
Marti… the only photograph I have ever seen of the deployment
site, and the objects ‘left’ there after the bodies were removed,
is the one that was published along with Mr. John Dougherty’s
article recently entitled… “Twelve Granite Mountain Hotshot Families File Wrongful Death Claims Seeking $237.5 Million”
which was published on December 19, 2013. The link to that
article ( and that photograph ) are still right down there at the
bottom of this page along with Mr. Dougherty’s other recent
articles.
The ‘caption’ on that photograph simply said…
“Investigators on July 3 inspect the location where the Granite
Mountain Hotshots were entrapped by flames four days earlier.
(Photo: Arizona State Forestry Division)”
Since the date ( July 3 ) matched the date in the YCSO police
report of when they ‘first escorted the SAIT invetigators’ to the
site… it was assumed that the two investigators in the photo
were SAIT… and not YCSO. There does appear to be a
brown-shirted Sheriff’s office person barely visible on the
right side of the photo… but the gentlemen with the notebook
and the standard WFF Bendix/King radio with red clamshell
see in the photo was assumed to be Brad Mayhew, the lead
SAIT investigator, examining one of the loose shelters.
So all of the ‘assumptions’ were based on the original YCSO
police report and the dates and times were matching.
Forgive me if you HAVE seen it… but here is the ‘story’
on that YCSO police report ( the only one we’ve seen so far )…
On November 7, 2013, Mr. John Dougherty, our host here
and the moderator of this discussion, published his own
online article with a link to a public copy of an original
YCSO police report related to the Yarnell Incident.
It was NOT a ‘complete report’ of any kind and was
simply what is known as a ‘statement of participation’
on behalf of YCSO Detective J. McDormott.
It did, however, describe in great detail HIS ( and a few other )
YCSO detectives full involvement and activities related
to the YCSO’s Yarnell Investigation. It covered the period
from when Detective McDormott was first notified about
the incident and on through July 23, 2013, when he
went on vacation.
That original article by Mr. Dougherty, with the link to
the YCSO police report, is still online…
Article: Posted on November 7, 2013 by John Dougherty
Title: Yavapai County Sheriff’s Office report describes Granite
Mountain deployment site
The complete YCSO report describing the Granite Mountain
Hotshots’ deployment site is here…
http://www.investigativemedia.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/13-021744-Yarnell-Hill-Case-Rpt.pdf
So that is the document I was originally referring to and
the source for the ‘summary’ I was giving with regards
to that first photograph of the deployment site.
So the timeframes you are giving for all the photographs
above DO fit into the following description of the ‘first time
the SAIT investigators were escorted to the deployment site’…
No more ‘summary’ this time.
Here is exactly what the report says about what happened
on July 3, 2013 ( 7/3/13 )…
Page 7 of the YCSO police report…
** START OF YCSO POLICE REPORT TEXT
On 7/3/13 I spoke to Jerry Payne (602-771-1416) who is a deputy
state forester with the Arizona State Forestry Division. Jerry
advised that the state investigation would be conducted by
members of the state forestry divisions from other states. He
said the lead investigator would be a Brad Mayhew (831-247-2811)
and that Brad would contact me. I received a call from Brad and
he requested we meet at the Incident Command Center, which is
located in Peeples Valley. Brad wanted me to escort him to the
scene. ET Waldock and I met the team at 1615 hours. We went
to the incident location, which was guarded by YCSO. The
investigative team took photographs and started their examination
of the scene. They were given a disk of the photos that YCSO had
taken as well as a copy of the FARO that was conducted on 7/1/13.
Waldock also showed them the FARO results on a laptop. We
were waiting for the state investigative team to give us the OK to
collect any remaining personal items when Brad asked me if we
could collect the remaining shelters and radios so they could
inspect these items in a controlled environment. I agreed as they
did not have packaging materials, a feasible way to transport or
store the items, or a means to properly inventory the items. It
should be noted that the winds were very fierce at this time and
created a sandstorm affect that made it difficult to operate. Dep.
Brian Kite, Waldock, and I collected the remaining shelters and
portable radios that we located at the scene. These items are
numbered #301-#319. Photos were taken from a perspective that
would hopefully show where these items were in conjunction with
where the individual remains had been. We then went back and
collected the remaining personal items that we could locate
(#401-407). It was my understanding that the fire department or
designee would be collecting the remaining items, including
indistinguishable back packs, water bottles, axes, remnants of
chainsaws, etc. Photos were taken throughout the process.
Refer to photos and evidence submittal forms for further details.
I contacted Lt. Boelts and requested that YCSO guard the
entrance to the incident location until all items are removed from
the scene. I was advised that this was going to be the case.
** END OF YCSO POLICE REPORT TEXT
>> Marti also said…
>> I’m also not feeling secure posting comments here,
>> given the tone of the conversation.
Understand… but please do NOT be intimidated by any of that.
This is actually just an ‘ongoing’ discussion that dates back
months and has moved from thread to thread as Mr. Doughtery
published new articles about the Yarnell Fire.
It’s a controversial topic… with controversial issues involved…
and none of us who are allowed to post here probably have any
real idea of the kind of ‘hate mail’ that Mr. Dougherty has already
been filtering out to keep the discussion civil and informative,
which is HIS stated desire.
I expect he will continue to do so.
Please don’t ever be afraid to ‘jump in’. Your skills are high.
No detail is too small if it helps lead to more answers and
more truth about what really happened on June 30, 2013,
in Yarnell, Arizona.
>> Marti also said…
>> Also, I never found the pink thing that WTKTT thought might be
>> another cellphone. I will go back and look, but I really need the
>> original images to see anything in more detail.
It’s ‘peeking’ out of the fire shelter that is just to the right of
the leg of the investigator who is standing up there in that
only photo I have still ever seen from the deployment site.
The one that accompanied Mr. Dougherty’s published article.
I believe this simply MIGHT be the ‘iPhone with the colored
case’ that was found ‘melted to the side of a backpack’ only
during the final comb-through of the site by the Prescott
Fire Department when the backpacks were finally being
allowed to be removed from the site. This is all mentioned
in that same YCSO report. They did not say WHAT ‘color’
the case was… but if it was pink… then that MIGHT be it
‘peeking out’ from that fire shelter on the side of what
appears to be a backpack.
Thanks again, Marti.
Thank you! (I’m not really awake yet, so this will be short). Yes, the photo you describe is the one I first saw the powershot in. I have it downloaded and keyworded. Thanks for copying the report into this post. My Yarnell Fire folder is packed to the gills and, thanks to the new, NOT improved Safari, it’s harder than ever to pick my way through it. I really appreciate what you’re doing.
I spent seven months in 2010 participating in a similar “citizens investigation” of the DeepwaterHorizon/Macondo intervention. Talk about controversial!!!! Thing was, it was tightly moderated. For a reason. I want more people to want to come here, and they won’t if they don’t feel “safe” putting out their ideas, correct or not. I also really appreciate being corrected by those with the expertise. I know practically nothing about wildland fire-fighting, even tho I went to Prescott College, knew ppl on those crews, and worked for the caterer on nearby fires. My interest, partially, is bcuz I live in Albuquerque. It’s only gonna get worse. Safety needs to be treated much much more seriously. I’ve learned A LOT reading these conversations. And, yes, I’ve read all of them. And I think you’re doing awesome work!
And PS. I think the 64 bazillion dollar question in all of this is, exactly what was said, and by whom, in that “Discussing Their Options” discussion. Without knowing that, we can only speculate and conjecture. We don’t know what ANYBODY was thinking after that conversation. That, to me, is the biggest source of conflict among people here.
Somehow someone needs to figure out how to pry that conversation out of the at least two living people who overheard/participated in it. Until then, we’re just picking our way around the edges of this.
We have been fortunate to get the MacKenzie video and Paul Musser telling the truth. They at least give us some insight into why GM left the black. I think we have to be prepared for the possibility we will never have more than that. And as for why Marsh failed to recognize the risk and decided it was alright to go, that died with him. Whatever answers we have there might be found in the “Human Factors” approach RTS talks about.
Marti, thanks for addressing my question above. I think it would be helpful to know if the OPS1 comment “Air support ASAP” occurred before or after the Discussion between Marsh/Steed.
BTW… Glad your here
Don’t forget that even though Elizabeth only
uploaded the audio first… as a stand-alone
clip… that conversation between Marsh and
Abel is from the second Caldwell video that
we now know exists. It’s just very low-volume
on that actual video clip.
So the key to exactly when that Abel/Marsh
conversation took place is in the video
itself. I’m not ready to put an EXACT time
on that, myself, but my initial impression
is that this conversation between Marsh
and Abel with the THREE separate
statements from Abel ( to Marsh )…
1) Keep ME informed/updated.
2) Hunker down and be safe ( in the black )
3) We’ll get Air Support down there ASAP
…took place BEFORE the infamous
Marsh/Steed ‘discussing their options’
and ‘comfort level’ discussion(s).
SAIR, ADOSH and YIN all have times
ranging from 3:45 to 3:55 PM for this
‘hunker and be safe’ suggestion/directive
from Abel so nothing definite there, either,
but all of times being quoted there are
all BEFORE the 4:02 PM MacKenzie video.
More later.
I’m not sure what exactly you’re thanking me for here. Hope it’s the query about the Powershot camera and the photos.
Another video for you (and several more on the same Youtube “channel”):
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6_Lw9kCppj4
Note, for WTKTT: The video linked-to above is taken from a truck, by a member of one of the AZ state crews (“Yuma crew” or “Lewis’s crew,” whatever that means), as the truck is driving, and (a) the truck goes past the street sign for Double A Bar Ranch Road (you’ll see the street sign in the video – I kept pausing it to try to read it), and (b) the truck goes past a bunch of other official-looking trucks. I mention these two points because, in my view, you have done a STELLAR job in finding small bits of solid factual information that we can then fit into the bigger mosiac. Point “a” and point “b” might strike you as relevant for purposes of your efforts.
For everyone else, has anyone yet figured out why the one Blue Ridge guy says in one of the videos (while the plane is flying by) “that Mother Fucker.” Can you tell, based on what you are seeing in the video?
This video (linked below) captures some transmissions about the bulldozer and where the bulldozer might be. Bonus points to Robert-the-Second or anyone who can identify the two people who are talking about the dozer. I’m not sure that it matters, but it might be helpful to know.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ox9cKHkfA4s
Do you know the time of this video? Thanks
Calvin, I do not. And I ran it through the weak “meta-data” analyzer thing I found on-line, and I still cannot find a time on it (other than the fake time – the time that it was copied, in July or August).
Elizabeth,
I watched and listened to both videos, but I can’t help you out on the extra credit one as to who that might be. Sorry. And thanks.
I replied to you above about one of our former comments when you get the time.
Thank you so much for all you have provided here, especially your mellowing effect. I’ll miss you.
RTS… there are 27 videos
Marti…. can you tell me which photo has the canon camera in it (besides the one in the IM article), I must have missed it) Thanks
I’m talking about the photos Elizabeth obtained from her FOIA request. She has them on a Google+ page that she will send to you if you ask for it. They are provided by the YCSO.
I have the photos, just haven’t seen the camera. Thanks
There are 22 photos that show the Canon Powershot.
I didn’t quite understand your query, sorry. Start with IMG_0064. It shows the camera, surrounded by the canteen frame, in between Radios #15 and #16. That’s the closest picture taken of the camera.
Dozer video….one of the voices also appears in the 4490 red video during the vlat drop (east of Glen isla)
Don’t know if this helps
we can share where the bulldozer was that day= what hour? We watched that dozer in action to inactive-
Do you know where the bulldozer was late in the day 6/30. Do you know where it was during the entrapment and burnover?
I want to say thanks for all you have done. I believe, without you two, this story could have been pushed to the side. I am certain that all the facts from June 30 haven’t surfaced, however, with the efforts from Elizabeth, Dougherty, WTKTT, and Gabbert, I am even more convinced the TRUTH will be revealed.
Thanks Again!
Elizabeth… first and foremost… I can’t thank you enough for
the work you have contributed to this discussion. I KNOW
how tedious it is to even ‘upload’ this kind of material so
thanks VERY much. I don’t know if Mr. Dougherty ( or anyone
else ) is actually ever going to post any of this material so what
you have done already is important.
There is a LOT here to go and ‘study’… and it’s probably time
to just ‘backburn’ a little as when ADOSH was first released.
There are small details in this material that prove some pending
theories (my own included) and (supposed) established facts
are both right AND wrong… and both results are welcome as this
discussion continues.
You are right about the video you are asking me about above.
It’s VERY important. There are DOZENS of vehicles in this
footage… complete with license plate numbers… and it
finally puts a time/place on the whereabouts of a lot of
people involved with this incident.
Ditto for most of your other videos… the devil is in the details
and there is a LOT going on that has never been seen before.
There is nothing easy about any of this.
The ‘noise’ on this forum now is actually just an indication
of success.
What used to be ‘quiet’ is now ‘noisy’… but that’s how these
things go. There are some who would like to turn it into
some kind of ‘Yahoo chatroom’ since that’s the only way
they seem to know how to participate in this kind of thing…
but that’s OK, too.
Our host, Mr. Dougherty, is the one who will ultimately decide
when the discussion has ‘left the rails’… or needs a ‘roster
trimming’… and I trust his judgement implicitly.
Carry on.
They’re definitely going faster than the 15 mph posted speed limit! Which is why I still haven’t found the street sign! How do you know the source?
Marti, is that a question for me? How do *I* know the source of the video? If that is the question, and it is for me, then my answer is: the files that I received pursuant to the FOIA/FOIL request have labels indicating from whom each video came (sometimes it was just a “group” name, like “Yuma DOC group” and sometimes it was a person’s name, like “Darryl Willis”). By the way, Marti, I know that I owe you an e-mail. Apologies for the delay. I actually had a big debacle that I was working on that just settled, so hopefully I can get back to you soon. And hopefully the garbage that I have found so time-consuming and disheartening here is over, such that I can go back to trying to be more useful with my comments.
WTKTT, thanks for your kind words to me, but YOU have been doing the heroic level of work here. That is why I have gotten so worked up about the comments being made to you. You are working hard, devoting HOURS, and rather than a “thank you,” you are getting snark from the very men who might be helped (in terms of safety) by small details that you unearth. It would be one thing if the wildfire fighting community was, uhm, paying you. Then they can snark all they want. But they are not paying you – you are just a person who wants to try to help. So I feel like folks like xxfullsailxx who might someday get a benefit from your work in terms of safety or transparency should just say “thank you” and keep the snark to themselves. Don’t get me wrong – people shouldn’t blindly agree with you – they should challenge and disagree with you all they want, so that *everyone* can refine each other’s workproduct here. But it can be done without calling someone “inane” or other such things.
In short, I am glad that you are being such a good sport – you and NV both. I commend you. I officially ran out of patience today. You and NV have deeper reserves than I do, it seems. (The fact that I am even making these comments actually makes me cringe, because this situation is not about *me* (or you or fullsail etc.). It is about safety and transparency. Here’s to hoping tomorrow is a better day, here on the interwebs.)
Thank you! You totally answered my question. And I agree about the snark. It is what has held me back from participating. And no prob about the email response. I can barely keep up myself.
wow elizabeth… NO thanks…
i don’t think any of you will turn up any pertinent information that wasn’t already brought up in three reports or WILL BE brought up by professional journalists who put their name on their work.
Elizabeth said, (“Yuma crew” or “Lewis’s crew,” whatever that means), those are state prisons where the con crews come from.
In order to hold a discussion on a topic or a sensing of information we need to first agree that we may disagree. second everyone has a right to there ideas information and discussion. Third we never attack the messenger personally but add to the context of the message. In order to find answers all thoughts and information no matter how small just might yield peace’s of information that will add to the whole. You can agree to disagree but don’t take it personal.
That my sermon for the day.
Excellent sentiment, but it needs to be applied evenly. And it has not been applied evenly, and this has been a dynamic that has existed for weeks now. I think my responses to this were quite diplomatic and low-key until two days ago, but enough is enough is enough, all the more so when the attacker himself doesn’t have his stuff stowed away.
I agree completely. I’ve participated in a number of online “citizens’ investigations” of things, including the Deepwater Horizon/Macondo intervention. The most successful were, TBH, carefully moderated. No ad hominems were allowed. The rule: “Don’t be a Dick.”
does “being a dick” include anonymously making false allegations about people you don’t know based on conjecture and assumptions?
This is a link to a really good Forest Service ‘white paper’ titled “FAILURES IN WILDLAND OPERATIONAL LEADERSHIP – 2006 through 2007.” It discusses four wildland fires (including Little Venus Fire) from 2006-2007 where “failures in judgment and faulty application of principles of fire suppression operations have been documented in review findings.” he discusses LCES, human factors, situational awareness (MOSTLY LACK OF), and leadership (or lack of).
http://www.fireleadership.gov/toolbox/staffride/local_staff_rides/alabaugh_canyon_fire/info_sources/r2_fam_entrap_briefing_paper_oct_2007.doc.
Elizabeth,
Wow, a compliment followed by a mild ass chewing. How nice. Thanks for the compliment. Now, my turn to DEFEND myself.
You said “you – at least recently – are among those who seems to be doing his vigorous best to be FLATLY UNHELPFUL (IF NOT ACTUALLY STYMEING PRODUCTIVE D[I]SCUSSION). Why is that?” (EMPASIS ADDED)
I am definitely NOT trying to quell any of the discussion here, so I don’t know what led you to come to that conclusion. Maybe it manifests itself that way to you, don’t know. I guess that I get kinda frustrated, like Fullsail does sometimes, with the SOMETIMES innane NON-WFF comments, questions, assertions, conjecture, and such. And I’m certainly not going to ask any of you to go away or get of this forum.
Now to the Catholic question. NO, I am NOT a Catholic, but I am a FORMER Catholic. Once I learned that Jesus Christ came OFF the cross and that He is the Mediator between God and man, and NOT a priest, and a lot of other issues, then I became a basic Bible believing Christian. I do NOT believe in luck. I trust Jesus implicitly and I ask Him for wisdom, guidance, and safety on every fire decision, every time, and I thank Him for what He has does and has done. I attribute my success in my profession and my life to Him.
I follow ‘the rules’ of WFF because it’s an “inherently dangerous” profession where blunders can be harmful to fatal. I don’t follow them because I used to be a Catholic. Hopefully, those are SATISFACTORY answers to you concerns. Thank you for all your comments and help here.
I think everyone needs to take a “time out”, step awsy from the laptops and reflect on the big picture.
Why are we discussing the incident?
To find out why and how this happened, and how to ptevent it in the future.
Bickering, name calling and being basically disrespectful to each other accomplishes nothing.
Do you think the families of the crew, or even the departed cew itself would approve of these antics?
C’mon people “refocus”. It was a good discussion but has degraded the past few days.
Mike
Mike and Others,
Finally getting back around to you on a few things.
“January 2, 2014 at 11:00 am Mike said:
…. We all have our LITTLE FAILINGS when it comes to the way we do things. But these crew bosses hold the lives of their guys in their hands. Being meticulous about ALL things related to safety is of paramount importance. What you write does imply a DEGREE OF CARELESSNESS, and I suspect there may be more you did not write about.” (EMPHASIS ADDED)
Yes, we all have the LITTLE FAILINGS, and these are the bad outcomes that need acknowledged and corrected. A lot of people won’t even acknowledge them, obviously the first step. Absolutely these supervisors hold the lives of their Crew in their hands, a HUGE responsibility! The “DEGREE OF CARELESSNESS” is always what needs to be recognized as that and corrected and/or mitigated. Otherwise, it’s just more bad decisions with good outcomes, right?
“mike on January 2, 2014 at 10:33 pm said:
…. descending into that box canyon was likely a “ONE OFF”. Unfortunately “ONE OFFS” are HARD TO PREDICT AND HARD TO SEE COMING. The idea that it might have resulted from less-than-good habits and attitudes DEVELOPED OVER TIME THAT CULMINATED IN DISASTER is hard to admit. What hurts is that with PROPER OVERSIGHT, such issues might be corrected. A weakness with the GMHS is that they were TOO MUCH MARSH’S “BABY”– when it came to training and procedures he was running the show. HE SET THE CULTURE, for better or worse. ….([EMPHASIS ADDED
Regarding the “ONE OFF” thing, and it’s being hard to predict and see coming. I think this is just more of the bad decisions with good outcomes prong of that fairly simple matrix. You try something once, you’re “one off” so you adapt, adjust, mitigate, but ONLY IF IT’S THE RIGHT THING TO DO.If it’s NOT the right thing to do, then it clearly fits into the bad decisions category. Absolutely, all these “little failings” and such were “DEVELOPED OVER TIME” and in this particular case “CULMINATED IN DISASTER.” I think it’s easy to admit it. It’s hard to admit it if you’re the one doing it and NOT correcting it. We had a deal on our Crew where the Assitant and I would take sides on a decision, a couse of action. If I said “yes” then he would say “no.” The Crew always thought we were arguing or fighting, but in reality, we were fleshing out the details. It worked very well. But NOT ALL Crews do that for whatever reason{s). We’re working on that one. Focusing them on things like avoiding Groupthink, avoiding ‘blind spot’ pitfalls, and that kind of stuff.
The “PROPER OVERSIGHT” and “MARSH’S ‘BABY'” and “SET[ING] THE CULTURE” issues here. People have to KNOW and ADMIT that something’s wrong to correct them. GMHS KNEW OR SHOULD HAVE KNOWN the proper, safe way to do things. To guide them, they had their Hot Shot Operations Guide, a WEALTH OF LESSONS LEARNED information, and GOOD training sessions (for the most part). I knew several of those men, I helped train them, THEY KNEW BETTER. That’s one reason this whole thing has been so hard to deal with. There are many of us that are MAD, really ANGRY that this happened. And we are all sad, very sad, and especially sad for the family, friends, and loved ones.
“January 2, 2014 at 11:00 am Mike said: I suspect there may be more you did not write about.” Absolutely. There are a lot of things I wish I could go into more detail in, but not here, maybe some other forum some other time.
I have been waiting for some one still a WFF to broach this subject for some time. We have talked around it several times. It is also part of lessons learned. I first can not believe that any one would put a lookout in unburned fuel with no safety zone. The only escape Brendon had was thru Frizby and his ATV. Brendon had no direct contact with BR had a trigger that was only 1/4 mile away. Depending only on an ATV for escape and Frizby to not be busy with his crew is a flimsy plan for safety. Brendon did not have LCES why did any body think it was OK to put him there. I am surprised Frizby let it happen. This is very similar to the Cramer fire with 2 Helitack in unburned fuel above the fire no escape rout no safety zone. This is another case by GM of planning deployment rather than a SZ. Brendon got lucky that’s all I can say. I have not found any thing to indicate why GM needed a lookout at that location as they were on direct line and next to the black. Not seeing the fire was a concern but putting a LOOKOUT at risk is not right, find a better location or change your plan. GM should have realized when Brendon was compromised that going where they went was not a good plan. Frizby surprised me by putting the LOOKOUT there. ATV’s, vehicles, helicopters can not always be relied on and with no direct communication to your ride lives you hanging on a thread with out a good SZ. With poor radio communications on the fire at that time we are lucky the 20th Hot Shot is still with us. A big lesson to remember.
i agree with all that…
it’s also interesting to note that Brendan claims to have had a “Safety Zone” in the Weather Channel weak-umentry… i don’t think he’s a very reliable witness at this point and have continually questioned that based on the fact that he’s really just a 2nd year rookie.
I could be wrong, but I believe when they put Brendon there the fire was moving away from him an was expected to continue that way. I believe it was after the lookout was set that they got the WX report that winds would shift.
From what I have gathered from BRHS, Brendan was there as Lookout for GMHS to watch them during their direct, underslung line construction since the GMHS could not see well directly below them. So, given that, it kinda makes sense where he was.
He DEFINITELY cut his trigger point WAY TOO CLOSE for my liking. And the GMHS in their perfectly good SZ had a MUCH BETTER VIEW of ther situation than he did. THEY should have told HIM that he was going to hit his trigger point and gotten him out of there much sooner.
And it seems to me, and I think a few others, that relying on deployment sites, fire shelters, and the like was some sort of spoken, yet unwritten acceptable practice on the PFD.
I go back to what I said to reemphasize a point. GM had LCES Brendon did not. no matter how far away the fire was He lacked direct communication with his ride out. No safety zone only a deployment site. Frizby by accident happen to be coming to meet with Marsh so no one had called Frizby to pick up Brendon. What I am trying to say to all of you active FF do not put your self or any on else in unburned fuel with an active fire. Again a situation that shouts watch out If you are going to be there cover all the basses LCES and an experienced lookout. This was a near miss that should have never happened.
Mr Powers…. p21 SAIR says….BR Supt and BR Capt depart and drive GM Lookout down to the old grader, dropping him off at 1239. They feel comfortable leaving him at this spot, and BR Supt tells the lookout, “If you need me, call, and I’ll come get you.”
Not only did Frisby “put him there”, according to the SAIR, they felt COMFORTABLE leaving him at this spot.
Also according to the SAIR, Frisby tells Brendan to CALL, if you need me and I’ll come get you. So it would appear as Mcdonough did (or should have) had direct contact. Mr Powers, did you see the vimeo video WTKTT found and posted. It captures part of a conversation about getting someone off the hill. It is a pretty interesting exchange, I do not know who took the video, who is talking in the video, or whom is going to be picked up, but it is possible they were discussing moving Brendan. My opinion of the exchange is that someone is getting teased “maybe I should ummm pick you up? followed by “just get him off the hill”
So its OK to put some one out in the middle of un burned fuel with no escape route or safety zone. And Brendon only had radio contact with GM. He never called Frizby to come pick him up he was planning a deployment spot. March or Steed would have had to call on the DIV freq.
This is one of the biggest problems in todays fire fighting stuck out in the unburned seems to be just fine. When you hang someone out in unburned fuel without a safety zone you violate the rules. Because of that it was a near miss that should never have happened. Plan ahead and be safe.
while Brendan may or may not have felt at liberty to broadcast over the Division Tac frequency, he most definitely would have had the frequency in his radio (as well as A2G, Command, and probably some other Tacs). often times lookouts in that situation are broadcasting weather obs over Tac as well as updates on fire behavior…
i would have hoped that Brendan would have called BR on Tac had he truly recognized how volatile his situation quickly became… whether or not he actually realized how fast things were moving is another thing.
also, it does get difficult to post lookouts in a safe spot in flat-ish terrain and options aren’t always ideal. i don’t think it’s fair to say that:
“This is one of the biggest problems in todays fire fighting stuck out in the unburned seems to be just fine”
that certainly isn’t my experience anyways…
All I am trying to input is cover the what if’s and make sure all the LCES is covered. Because the fire was not headed in his direction at the time he was put there you want to say “what if” is this a good location with a good safety zone and escape rout to it dose the lookout have good communication. This refers back to what I said before I and non of my crews ever deployed. I always planed in advance and always went thru the what if’s the 18 will tell you to watch out and then plan accordingly the 10 will provide the safety and always provide for safety first. If you cant meet that change the plan.
Also according to all the information Brendon did not call any one to have BR pick him up NOR did Marsh. Frizby just happened to be there at the right time and he was not coming to retrieve Brendon, according to all the statements. Had Brendon had his own ATV or a good clear area for a safety zone close, or even direct contact with BR those are the planed safety I am trying to get thru. This is very similar to the Cramer fire. and the esperanza fire to far committed with no good SZ. It was a close call that Fire Fighters should be concerned about. If you want to make good decisions with good out comes you need to follow the rules all the time.
Bob, I absolutely agree with you on this point. I’m never comfortable with relying on technology (batteries, radios, working and available vehicles) to be the saving factor when things go downhill. I think we need to consider the lookout’s ability to safely get *themselves* out of the way of the fire as another important aspect of self-sufficiency of the lookout.
Am I the only one who is ready to check out of this discussion and take down the links and let the wildfire guys deal with their own effing mess? Am I?
Robert-the-Second, you are one of the people on this blog who serves to BENEFIT from any lessons that can be learned or any shred of useful information that can be gleaned (since you actually work on wildfires), and you actually have some CREDIBILITY, such that you can help keep the discussion productive, positive, and on-track, yet you – at least recently – are among those who seems to be doing his vigorous best to be flatly unhelpful (if not actually stymieing productive discussion). Why is that? If you WANT all of us non-wildfire brethren to shut up, please just say it directly, rather than doing things that are counter-productive.
Indeed, at this point, Robert-the-second, I would be pleased for you to say “Elizabeth, we do not need or want your input, because we – the wildfire-fighting community – are handling this just fine all on our own. Please go away, so that I do not have to keep doing or saying unproductive, unhelpful things in an effort to create a comment thread ‘environment’ that is not conducive to productive discussion involving outsiders.”
Check below for my reply before you go
Elizabeth,
Your input, as well everybody’s input is important. Our differing background’s, knowledge and perspectives help bring out a much more well rounded discussion…Folks in here need to knock off the unproductive BULLSHIT and stick to the subject matter. I follow this discussion because I want to know the truth, not what everyone thinks of each other! There has been some really good in-depth factual analysis in here and that is what is productive and gets everyone closer to the TRUTH!
For anyone who is curious to know my background, I have been in a structural fire department for 19 yrs, a wildland firefighter for 3 years and a fire apparatus mechanic for 12 years.
As a Fire Fighter and for 10 years a certified AIR ATTACK BOSS where they were and with the wind and smoke an accurate drop was not feasible and it would have violated air tanker safety. I’ve said this before and I’ll say it again even if promised it could not happen at that time and place. The planes were flying above the smoke and on its out skirts, they would have had to flown thru the smoke to drop unsafe and unpredictable accuracy. NEVER THINK AN AIR DROP IS GOING TO SAVE YOU. when trapped you have high heat possible high wind and smoke covering your location. All you fire fighters tell me how accurate air tanker drops are in that situation, the wind and the heat and the height of the drop negates the retardant.
Air support is always hit and miss due to factors like weather, mechanical, priorities, … Its great when you get it, but it can never be relied on to bail you out of a situation. GMIHC was not counting on a drop when they made the choice to descend into the canyon.
Mike, I haven’t heard or read the word promise anywhere
see above.
see above.
Calvin –
I replied here due to “nesting” problems. On one hand, you could say Marsh misjudged the risk going to Yarnell. Bad mistake, but people are human and make mistakes. But to say he understood the risks, and went because someone promised to drop a load of retardant on his head if all went bad …. I am not a WFF, but I would venture a guess that such a decision would border on being criminally negligent. I do not know, but I do not think the latter was the case.
Complete agreement here.
Great, great, Mike – your comment is EXACTLY what this thread needs. This thread needs people bandying about the phrase “criminally negligent,” because doing THAT is going to make it more likely that folks like Brendan McDonough finally come forward and start sharing the details that they have left out to date.
<>
The fact that you would ENCOURAGE such a reckless comment, Robert-the-Second, slays me. Have either of you – Mike or Robert-the-Second – actually consulted a lawyer to assess whether your allegations would rise to the level of criminal negligence (if true)? I am willing to bet that you have not. So, in my opinion, even MAKING that suggestion is flatly counterproductive when dealing with a comment thread that is supposed to be encouraging discussion and transparency.
Forgive me, Mike and RTS, for being so blunt with you. As I indicated in another comment, I have lost a bit of patience at this point…..
umm, mike was just referring to a false hypothetical that had been brought up by Calvin and WTKTT…
no need to get so emotional.
No I am not a lawyer. But to knowingly put the crew in a risky place relying on a possible air drop would be so out of the realm of accepted wildland firefighting practice (from what I gather) that I have got to believe there would be legal and possibly criminal repercussions. It would not be a simple misjudgment. I do not believe that was what took place, so relax.
Here is why you have gotten a strong response from me, Mike, and here is why I would caution you against invoking words like “criminal negligence” in the future:
I believe that folks who are NOT lawyers (or not good lawyers) might have an overblown fear about getting put in jail, etc. regarding good faith missteps in the context of a fire. I can only imagine that those fears are part of the reason why people like Brendan McDonough have “lawyered-up” and might be reluctant to share every single relevant detail that they witnessed June 30th or thereabouts.
My view – based on the empirical research that I and others have done regarding litigation, settlements, apologies, liability, etc. – is that any such fear is overblown, and that it is therefore TRAGIC that people are likely being silent or withholding information due to liability/legal fears. The empirical research indicates that full candor and transparency actually DECREASE the chances of getting sued (for example). For reasons that escape me, the vast majority of lawyers seem not to be aware of this research, such that it can often be an uphill battle for me to argue in favor of candor and transparency. When I see people reference criminal charges when I am pretty sure that criminal charges are very very very very unlikely, and I know that even just REFERENCING those types of charges can make it far harder to convince people to speak up, I get a bit vehement.
In a related vein, as to xxfullsailxx’s comments about libel and slander and all of that, I will admit that I am not well versed in that area of the law, so I cannot profess to tell you what the law is or is not in any relevant jurisdiction. Off the top of my head, for example, I cannot even remember which (among libel, slander, and defamation) refers to written versus oral communications. That said, my gut instinct is as follows (do NOT take it as legal advice, please): everyone here knows that WTKTT (a) is not an expert, such that everything he says *cannot* be taken at face value, (b) has been flat-out wrong more than once, such that everything he says *cannot* be assumed to be correct, and (c) is only stating his personal, uninformed opinion, which, as noted above, has been proven to be wrong on more than one occasion. Therefore, my impression is that it would be hard for a plaintiff who wanted to sue WTKTT for libel, slander, defamation, invasion of privacy, or whatever to establish that WTKTT did any damage to the plaintiff’s good name, professional standing, etc. That said, my personal view is that WTKTT would be well-served to moderate things down a notch, in terms of jumping to conclusions and offering his theories, particularly when they pertain to individuals making missteps. My impression is that WTKTT has already begun to do so. My further impression is that, when WTKTT posts something in all caps, he is doing so in order to emphasis something so that we all do not have to read every single word in his post, but he is NOT doing so in order to make the representation that he is speaking the absolute truth.
i agree as well, and you would be correct about the “criminal negligence” part.
the only person who used the word “promise” with regard to air resources, was WTKTT… as in:
” ** ERIC MARSH ( AND GRANITE MOUNTAIN ) WERE PROMISED AIR SUPPORT AND/OR AIR EXTRACTION ASAP CIRCA 3:50 PM.**”
and i believe the legal word for that would be either “libel” or “slander.”
The quote ( with audio ) from OPS1, Todd Abel, says…
“We’ll get some air support down there ASAP.”
That’s a promise… fireboy.
I have already said above I have changed my initial
impression on whether that can be construed as a direct
promise to Marsh or Steed or anyone in particular…
…but it’s a promise… nonetheless.
That’s not the way it works and anyone who has been in an overhead role on a fire knows it. Their is no such thing as a promise for air support and that statement never would have been taken that way.
So you are claiming that no one can ever
depend on anything fire command ever
tells them in the midst of an incident with
regards to Air Support?
Instead of saying ( if they are not sure )
“We’ll try to get some Air Support down there”
everyone just always says…
“We’ll get some Air Support down there”
…and you are saying it’s ‘common knowledge’
that you can never, ever depend on that
kind of declarative statement from fire
command… even when it’s important to
know fer sure?
Geez, Louise.
This is worse than I thought.
It’s a wonder we aren’t carrying dozens
of bodies off of fires EVERY summer.
If the plan says there going to use air support at a certain part of the line OK but if you want or need it some place else don’t count on it unless the IC himself orders it for you. They base air support on priorities and availability if the air tankers are refilling it may be a while etc. Its real life on the fire line. They still have to decide if they can drop where you want it. Like you said Geez Louise.
Yep, that’s, how it works, or doesn’t. And the fact that everyone on the ground knows not to depend on air support is the reason dozens aren’t carried off every season.
No it would be hearsay and not admissible in a court of law.
bob- hearsay is repeating information that you heard from someone else like:
“I’ve already talked to a radio expert about that and
he won’t go on record… but HE SAID it IS possible yadayadayada…”
but, what WTKTT did was insert the word “promise” into the conversation to imply that Ops. Abel had some obligation to provide Marsh (he actually insinuated GM crew too) with air support, therefore implying that there was some sort of failure on Ops Abel’s part…
Been in court a long time son as a bailiff when you put words in other peoples mouth that you never heard personally and can not be proven by a witness that is hear say a little more complicated since they weren’t directly involved in the conversation. You can not purer your self in that context and there is no liable or slander in a written or verbal discussion discussion.
ah, excellent points!
so you shouldn’t ad-lib conversations that you were not a part of… interesting, thanks!
It appears to me that a lot of the noise over the past few days could be a deliberate attempt to steer the conversation away from the new videos Elizabeth has posted. Just my OPINION.
Elizabeth, I had to respond to your post about being Catholic above, but could not fit it in the shrinking reply box there. Break the rules as a Catholic and you will be forgiven your sins because Jesus died on the cross. Break the rules of wildland firefighting and there might be no forgiveness, no second chance.
Mike, congratulations. You have never broken a rule or made a misstep at work. Good for you!
(Otherwise, you are missing my point.)
I make plenty of errors. And I am in a profession where if I do, I could kill someone. Because I make errors does not mean I should not strive to eliminate them. You darn well better do that in wildland firefighting, or you might end up dead (and others too).
** VIDEO FROM FOIA/FOIL
** RADIO TRAFFIC DIRECTED TO GRANITE MOUNTAIN
** ABOUT RESOURCES AT GAS STATION
Video Title: yarnell 076
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oFWKxSIRgWk
This video was shot from the parking lot of the Yarnell Hill Fire station around
8:50 AM, July 30, 2013, or a little before that.
The camera operator appears to be standing on top of a vehicle and shooting
over the building in front of him on Highway 89 towards the fire in the distance.
The TIME looks to be about 8:50 AM considering the view of the fire seen in
the video and the fact that the caller is trying telling Granite Mountain there
are resources for them at a gas station they might need BEFORE they
head out for their hike.
This video is not attributed to Blue Ridge Hotshots yet… but that is right about
the time they are documented as having first arrived in Yarnell and were known
to have been ‘staging’ at the Yarnell Hill Fire Station and just waiting for and
assignment.
It also sounds like there are a LOT of fellas standing around near the camera
and talking… such as an entire Hotshot crew. No conversation near the camera
is really identifiable other than…
+0:01: “Yea… we’ll be ready to go and then it will be OFF.”
( Firefighter near him laughs in agreement ).
The camera operator is here… in one of the parking spaces at
the Yarnell Hill Fire station…
34.222514, -112.746177
Radio traffic captured in this video…
+0:10
Yea… Granite Mountain…
Just tryin’ to get a hold of ya… I can relay for ya
but I can also… ah… we’ve got numerous resources for ya
here at the… ah… gas station.
It sounds like this was at a moment in the morning between the time Granite
Mountain was known to have stopped to eat breakfast up at the Model Creek
School ICP and before Chief Andersen saw them passing his house at 9:03 AM
on their way out to the Sesame area to hike out to meet Eric Marsh, who had
been up there near the anchor point already since 8:03 AM, when he first
met Joy Collura and Tex Gilligan up on the ridge.
The caller ( to Granite Mountain ) does NOT identify himself on the radio,
but could have been Cordes who is documented as the one who ‘led them
through Yarnell’ that morning and out to the Sesame staging area.
Correction for above: Joy Collura and Tex Gilligan said they first
met Eric Marsh up near the anchor point at 8:07 AM, not 8:03 AM.
WTKTT…. “At 8:03, [their] two buggies went by,” Andersen says. “Right after they went by, the leaves started to blow. I shook my head. [The state] didn’t listen to me.”
You stated above 0903 was the drive by time.
076 video/ audio to me actually is not a conversation with GM, but about GM.” GM trying to get a hold of ya, I can relay for ya, I have resources here for ya. Able to Cordes maybe?
I think one of the key takeaways in this video clip is the fire behavior that you’re seeing. The BLACK SMOKE in the foreground indicates INTENSE BURNING. It’s 0850 or so in the morning according to WTKTT. THAT and other indicators SHOULD HAVE been key to all there that day that this day would be a rock and roll fire day. Fire Order #3 . Base all actions on current and expected fire behavior, so WATCH OUT.
WTKTT:
“+0:10
Yea… Granite Mountain…
Just tryin’ to get a hold of ya… I can relay for ya
but I can also… ah… we’ve got numerous resources for ya
here at the… ah… gas station.”
ARRRRGGGHHH! you can’t even get THAT right…
what is being said is:
“yea, Granite Mountain’s tryin to get a hold of ya… I can relay for you if you like… and also, we have numerous resources reporting here at the (such and such location)…”
WTKTT:
“the fact that the caller is trying telling Granite Mountain there
are resources for them at a gas station they might need BEFORE they head out for their hike.”
nope, wrong.
see, this is the start of your next false allegation based on shaky evidence. lucky for you, i’m here to keep you grounded before you go leaping again.
What is this… about the TENTH time I have to tell
you this… fireboy?
This is NOT a contest.
It’s not ABOUT me.
It’s not ABOUT you.
At NO time… when I first publish any of this information
do I expect it to be taken as ‘the gospel’. Look back
on the thread. I EXPECT people to ‘correct’ me.
Fer cryin’ out loud.
If you think you hear something different… say so…
just like you did. My turn to say “Glad to see you
are coming around”.
That being said… I disagree with what you think
you have heard… but I DO believe Calvin might
be right that this was not directed AT Granite
Mountain at all… but might be Abel and Cordes
talking to each other.
I think we have just missed the ‘WHO’ which went
over the air just before the video starts which would
have contained more information about who is
‘responding’ to who, here.
I also think it’s significant that the statement from one
of the Blue Ridge Hotshots watching the fire is that
they don’t seem to think what they are looking at in
the distance is any big deal at all and he is wondering
out loud if it might be “called OFF” before they even
get an assignment.
At least… that’s what I think he means.
What do you think about what the BR guy says?
“he is wondering out loud if it might be “called OFF” before they even get an assignment.”
“called off” eh?
yep, cause that happens. and yeah, that fire sure looks like it’s about to put itself out at any second…
you’re wrong about the dialogue.
and i made no indication of any “contest.” my problem with you is your tendency to make false allegations based on shaky evidence. i’ve provided plenty of examples of that. and obviously, you will continue to provide more.
again, who are you? what’s your background? are you related in any way to GM or their families?
WTKTT says
I also think it’s significant that the statement from one
of the Blue Ridge Hotshots watching the fire is that
they don’t seem to think what they are looking at in
the distance is any big deal at all and he is wondering
out loud if it might be “called OFF” before they even
get an assignment.
How can you possibly say this is significant? That guy could have been talking about anything. If you think a hotshot crew standing around is only talking about a fire, you are very wrong.
Like pulling teeth with you fire guys.
So… let’s be clear…
BOTH of you are ‘trying’ to answer the valid question
I asked… and BOTH of you disagree ( -1 ) that the
firefighter in that video is discussing the fire?
Fair enough. Thanks. That’s all I asked for.
I am still +1 on that.
Any other opinions?
my sarcasm is wasted on the obtuse…
i agree with jeff that you are leaping again when you use conjecture to find meaning in the “called off” statement.
My one cent plus one cent.
1. I don’t hear “gas station” at the end, I hear “cafe.”
2. Where is there evidence this is a Blue Ridge Hotshot Crew?
wow, marti, i like you…
i thought i heard “cafe” as well… how about the rest of it? could you translate that too?
(and i think the BR reference is more conjecture)
Yarnell 76 video is INDEED from the Blue Ridge Hotshots. Good call, WTKTT. Sorry I did not label that video.
I’m totally interested in how it’s possible to identify where a video is resourced from.
Marti… even without the confirmation from Elizabeth that the SAIT package attributes the video to Blue Ridge… the time and location of the video match other documented evidence about where the Blue Ridge Hotshots were supposed to be at that time.
i think he means SPECULATE about the time and location of both the video and BR location…
WTKTT:
“** RADIO TRAFFIC DIRECTED TO GRANITE MOUNTAIN
** ABOUT RESOURCES AT GAS STATION”
add this to the list of false statements…
again, WTKTT? what’s your name? can we have a link to your facebook profile? are you related to any of the GM crew?
cause it’s getting harder and harder to take you seriously…
FYI, WTKTT was 100% correct about the video being a Blue Ridge Hotshot video. So, his batting average is still good enough to take him to the majors. Or earn the paycheck that the WFF Association is paying him. Oh, wait – WTKTT is just a nice guy who is trying to HELP y’all. He’s not getting paid.
elizabeth,
the radio traffic is not “DIRECTED AT GRANITE MOUNTAIN”…
it is one person (#1) talking to someone else (#2) saying that GM was trying to contact #2 but was unable to get a hold of him… #1 says that he could relay if #2 would like and then says that there are resources somewhere waiting to be given an assignment. (para-phrased of course)
so what is false about WTKTT’s announcement is who he thinks is being addressed and what they are addressing. basically his whole premise.
AND THEN, as if that wasn’t enough, WTKTT goes on to state the controversy that isn’t there (this is what i would call a “leap”:
“the caller is trying telling Granite Mountain there are resources for them at a gas station they might need BEFORE they head out for their hike.”
false allegations based on shaky evidence… again.
I said “IF THE SPOT YOU ARE CONTEMPLATING LAYING DOWN INSIDE A FIRE SHELTER IS OBVIOUSLY NOT SURVIABLE, DON’T DO IT…RUN TO A BOUDLER FIELD OR ROCK SLIDE OR ANYWHERE ELSE YOU CAN…BUT DON’T LAY DOWN IN FRONT OF AN INFERNO WHERE YOU HAVE NO CHANCE OF SURVIAL (AND IT WASN’T A CLOSE CALL) AND DIE! AT LEAST YOU WILL DIE ON YOUR FEET MOVING FORWARD! And yes…there is CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT THE GRAINTE MOUNTAIN HOTSHOTS DID NOT KNOW THAT, BECAUSE THEY LAID DOWN IN FRONT OF AN INFERNO WHERE THEY HAD NO CHANCE OF SURVIAL AND THEY DIED, REALLY, REALLY HORRIBLE DEATHS!”
xxfullsailxx said, “do you think it is at all disrespectful to the families to be continually second guessing what the crew may or may not have had time to do? do you really think that WTKTT has any idea how long it takes to cut and move eight chaparral bushes? or move 19 people up a hill through vegetation and terrain?”
xxfullsailxx, do you agree with my statement up above or not? Do you think it is disrespectful to the families to suggest a lesson learned from the YHF would be to know the limitations of your fire shelter and if the area you are contemplating is not survivable, you should run anywhere else, regardless of the circumstances? In other words, I think it would be better to did on your feet moving forward rather than laying down?
I would like to know everyone’s opinion on this.
I am already on record about this.
I think they should have not wasted one single second on an
option that was certain death… and to even consider doing
so represents a distinct lack of training and the understanding
of the limits of your equipment.
I’ve been doing the best I can to present all kinds of ‘evidence’
pertaining to their other choices that afternoon… and I will
continue to do so. There is still much to be learned here.
The thing that bothers me the most about the DZ is that it was not cleared of equipment. For someone to take the time to fully deploy in their fire shelter DIRECTLY beside a chainsaw (possibly full of gas and oil) is beyond believable. I will go “on record” and say that I believe these men were not planning on dying when they deployed their shelters. To suggest that no one knew GM location, is not substantiated. Even the SAIR says “few people knew.” The B33 staff knew, their own words “so you are on the south side of the fire then.” I believe GM expected a retardant drop, I believe the fact that GM didn’t throw all their tools/packs away indicates they expected to continue (whatever it was they were doing) momentarily. I mean no disrespect to the families of the GM hotshots, but it seems the YHF has provided a lot of lessons on what NOT to do.
Drawing lessons from this situation (after being trapped) is hard – every future situation will be different. Sometimes you should run, sometimes you should deploy, sometimes you should do both (i.e. a different location). They only had bad options, they might have chosen one that was worse, but none were good. Besides, how any one of us would make decisions in such a situation is hard to predict, it just had to be so damn terrifying and time was so damn short.
The best lessons from the YHF will be how not to be there to begin with. Those errors were made without the pressure of terror and time.
But were their final decisions made because of external pressure?
Maybe, maybe not. Basically I think Marsh went because he wanted to “help”, whatever he understood that to mean. The real error was thinking he could – meaning he could safely go into that box canyon. External pressure or not, he and the others should have seen that as a huge mistake and not done it. Marsh’s #1 responsibility was to do whatever it took to keep those other 19 men safe.
marsh’s responsibility…. really….. Steed was the GM superindendent. He had the right to refuse Marsh’s order, right?
Marsh discussed it with Steed – you hear that in the MacKenzie video. Whatever titles people had that day – Marsh still made that call to go to Yarnell and quite likely, but not as certainly, by the route they took. But Steed also should have known better and had a responsibility to say so to Marsh. Safety is everyone’s job – and not just in wildland firefighting either.
I do not know what is being discussed between Marsh and Steed. Now that we have audio of Able telling Marsh Air support down there ASAP. The conversation between Marsh and Steed could have been about his comfort level traveling through in burned fuel with the notion air support is coming ASAP (my opinion). I do not want to be argumentative, but we just do not know.
mike, i had a hard time arguing with a brick wall too… but i commend your efforts.
I have said that over and over not deploying means not getting in that situation. don’t take an estimated risk it’s not worth the consequences.
Mike, you are right on here. There is little value in second guessing the decision made at the DZ (run, deploy). Each entrapment will have its own circumstances and conditions that outsiders will never know about without being there. So in each case maybe the idea to run, change location, or deploy in place might be the best option. Too many variables for us to be able to make that call now.
I won’t second guess what GM did at the end but I will acknowledge they had options. Unfortunately their circumstances near the end certainly made clear thinking and reasoning difficult. As you say, the big lesson to be learned here is how not to get in this situation in the first place.
There’s some basic stuff here that is trainable and is worth second-guessing. Heavy brush and a certainty of direct flame contact? Not a survivable deployment site, and not one you can turn into a survivable site in a reasonable time. That is what Gary is referring to when he says this one wasn’t even close. Faced with that physical circumstance, do you spend time trying to cut and burn what little you can, because deployment seems to have been an ingrained, trained response without regard to whether it is survivable? Or, do you seek other circumstances in what was minutes’ worth of time to do so? That is exactly the type of thing that should be looked at, so people can be trained to make better decisions in the future. No different from many other things that, if trained correctly, can help make good decisions get made in stressful conditions.
Gary’s question is “Do you think it is disrespectful to the families to suggest a lesson learned from the YHF would be to know the limitations of your fire shelter and if the area you are contemplating is not survivable, you should run anywhere else, regardless of the circumstances? In other words, I think it would be better to did on your feet moving forward rather than laying down?” I think from my posts up above it’s already clear that I think this should be one of the key lessons learned. I do think ANY discussion of the YHF, particularly any discussion suggesting that some of the deceased had a chance at survival if better decisions were made, can be PAINFUL to the families. Painful is different than disrespectful. And, now that the families are seeing that they may need recourse to the courts to see that they are well-taken care of in the wake of the tragedy, this type of analysis can help them as well as help increase safety and improve training in the future.
I believe ALL of the lawsuits from the families already
have provisions in them about ‘learning from this tragedy’
being the MOST IMPORTANT thing about the suits
themselves… and have already assigned ‘conditions’
in the filings to make SURE that happens.
It isn’t just about the money.
The families themselves want to see PROOF that
the WFF industry has learned something ( anything? )
from this tragedy… instead of just sweeping it under
the rug so it’s “business as usual”.
I don’t think a discussion like this is all that ‘painful’
to them at all. They have already suffered the
greatest pain imaginable. Now they want RESULTS…
or at least… the TRUTH.
i am not sure i do agree with you Gary… it’s easy to say now that, “the deployment site was obviously not survivable.”
i try to imagine myself in Steed’s situation, coming around the front of that knob where he could see a wall of fire fast approaching, and then realizing the horrendous mistake they made in walking down into that depression and loosing sight of the fire, and then taking a moment to look around and size up the situation, only to see a line of 17 crew members that you’re responsible for and the look on a few of their faces, who are also understanding how dire their situation is… and then looking around at the options, looking up at the knob with rocks surrounded by vegetation, thinking back on the route they traveled down and whether or not they could RTO back up to the ridge line, looking around at the vegetation… judging by his voice in the audio, i think he made a pretty immediate call for help over the radio…
i don’t think trying to flank and race the fire to the ranch looked like an option given they were looking at rapid ROS and 20-40 foot flame lengths paralleling them the whole way…
i don’t think that scrambling up to the rock knob was an option because hiking through the vegetation alone would have been enough of a deterrent, let alone the elevation gain and let alone getting all 17 crew members up there…
and i don’t think that running back up to the ridge was an option with over a quarter mile to cover uphill, through terrain with fire hot on your heels…
i think that looking around (briefly) and finding a “break” in the continuous vegetation large enough to deploy the crew as a whole looked like their “best” option and Steed put the sawyers to work immediately to cut what they could in the short time they had and then made another panicked call for help, praying for a miracle. and the fire moved in on them so fast and so hot they didn’t have time to ditch all the equipment and not all the sawyers had enough time to finish what they were doing and things got really shitty really fast.
and Marsh came up behind them, and just had to deal with the situation, and he had to have known it was bad.
and the pious part of me that aches when i think about this prays that they passed quickly.
i think, as has already been said, that entrapment avoidance is the key message that the SAIR seems to half-assedly cover with their recommendation for a staff ride. i think all of the people that really matter, whether they admit it aloud or not, whether they are the family of GM, or part of the initial attack or IMT, recognize where mistakes were made, without having to account for every second of every minute.
(which is the “disrespect” i refer to in micro analyzing and second guessing everyone and everything by amateur, wanna-be journalists)
You said it well just forget the last sentence its not needed.
yes bob, in my view, it is very needed.
Very well said.
Clearly they thought the option of improving the current location was the best option, that is why they took it. Think about this, they knew the seriousness of the situation, humans have a will to survive so they went with what they thought was their best chance for survival. Second guessing these decision does little good.
The decision to scrutinize is the one(s) that lead to the entrapment
Jeff,
I don’t see how it follows that one real bad decision, or series of decisions — the ones that put GM in that situation to begin with, including “training scars” in that — are fair game, but somehow it does no good and isn’t fair game to also look at their last really bad decision?
I agree they knew the seriousness of their situation. And, unfortunately, they were somewhat programmed with a tendency to make the WORST choice in that case. Remember, McDonough likewise was looking around at deployment sites, which likewise were probably not survivable.
You want the next guys, and gals, who do end up in a real bad spot to be programmed to be more likely to make good decisions, decisions that give them at least a chance of surviving, the next time around.
NV,
I don’t deny that they had other options, and possibly better ones. What I am saying is that with what we know of the actual site and the conditions at the time, we can’t say for sure the option they choose wasn’t clearly the obvious choice.
You can still program the next batch of WFFs to look at all options available, but I don’t see the value in saying GM made the wrong choice given the information we have available.
Fine, teach the “Rules for Deployment” – that is reasonable. But to say what GM did after entrapment was a “REALLY bad decision” is simply absurd and unfair to the max. Those advocating teaching the “Rules for Deployment” should be arguing as vociferously for teaching the “Rules of Wildland Firefighting”. In the long run, many more lives will be saved by the latter.
And have been
Mike,
Totally in agreement with you here on the “Rules of Wildland Firefighting”. saving more lives
Why is it unfair to the max to say that a decision that by definition had no survivable options associated with it (barring some truly dramatic “act of God” like a sudden 180 degree wind and fire shift that would have made deployment unnecessary) was a really bad decision? They had other options available, and they selected the worst possible one. That is by definition a really bad choice.
NV, I honestly think that some of these guys are just looking to argue with you for the sake of arguing (which makes me wonder if Calvin’s point below is kind of close to the truth).
As to deployment, from the very very beginning, some of the comments made in the context of the Yarnell Hill Fire regarding deployment have caught my attention. For example, Marsh indicated that he planned to call Air Attack back after he was “under [his] shelter.” Even I (non-WFF) know that (a) it is as loud as a freight train under a shelter in the middle of a fire as big as the YHF such that communications on a radio while under a shelter were likely going to be impossible, (b) while under a shelter in an active fire both hands are going to be needed to try to hold the shelter DOWN due to the incredible winds, and (c) any talking (shouting, really) while under a shelter should be directed toward encouraging each other to hang on and gut it out and not LEAVE the shelter (which is apparently what some of the guys/gals did to their detriment at South Canyon or 30mile or whichever).
Anyone who is paying attention and not just looking to bicker is likely pretty clear on a few points:
1. the GM guys (including Willis) had atypical (in the WFF world), sub-optimal views regarding deployment and shelters (particularly with respect to the survivability of being in a shelter in a sub-optimal area in which the fire is going to SIT on you and your shelter for a while)
2. it would be GREAT to train WFFs so well that they do not even need to think about having to deploy and use a fire shelter ever
3. given that point 2, above, is an aspirational goal rather than a current reality, it is important to teach all WFF some of the basics regarding shelters and deployment sites, such as the worst-case-scenario basic facts that, if the only currently-available deployment area on dirt is a FLAT area at the BOTTOM of a valley where the FUEL is THICK (e.g. not just grass) on all other sides of you, such that the fire is going to SIT and burn around you rather than move over you really, really quickly, you might well want to try every other option possible even if they are BAD options that are only a little bit LESS bad than the deployment site referenced earlier in this sentence (other options would include turning and running, getting to boulders, deploying on/in boulders). Deploying in dirt at the floor of a valley that is surrounded on all sides by thick fuel such that the fire is going to SIT around your deployment site and radiate heat and smoke and flames toward you is likely conceding certain death. At least if you turn and run, there is a chance that someone might make it. Then, again, you as a group might collectively have a dynamic that suggests that that is not going to be the option you all will want to pick. But at least HAVING the discussion and having it in an informed way, so that people understand in advance what circumstances MIGHT be survivable and which circumstances are likely NOT to be even remotely survivable, is worthy.
None of this is to blame the GM crew, who were obviously trying to make good decisions under horrifying, stressful circumstances in which they had barely minutes to act. Everything is 20-20 after the fact. All that can be done is try to think of ways to do things better in the future, and that includes education regarding the “worst case scenario,” in case that scenario comes to pass again.
I am not sure that GM did not understand the score when deploying their shelters at all. In the Az Republic article over the weekend, Billy Warneke had told his wife if he ever deployed his shelter, he wasn’t coming home.
to tag on to that…
by all accounts, steed and marsh felt very responsible for “their kids,” and certainly weren’t going to tell them all to scatter and run for it…
which is why they deployed where they did, and why they all stayed in a tight-knit group to the end.
Yes, again, this is the “at least they ALL died together” sentiment. Which is something that the next group in a bad way hopefully gets trained out of them. Just as the next folks hopefully understand that dropping gear if escape is compromised is one of the FIRST things they should do.
Because FullSail and others seem to be embracing the “let’s all die together” response, there may be more of a training issue here than I thought.
As I have said before if there whole training structure was deploy ID deployment sites, then we lost them a long time ago and it caught up with them. If they took the calculated risk to move down that canyon with the thought they could deploy if caught in the canyon Then that was another really bad choice. This seems to be something the crew believed in for what ever reason, training or ingrained thought process.
no NV, i don’t see anything in my statement to claim that i am “embracing” anything about GM’s deployment.
As I have said before deployment is a 50/50 proposition. My main decision would not be to deploy so we all died together but to lose total control of you men in this situation is not acceptable. I look at the situation and say they had no alternatives at that location running was not an option 15 to 20 min back to the top (This was tested by a runner with out brush to contend with) they were all dead half way there. The bolder field I see was not an option. If the fire was coming up the back of the bolder field and the fire was coming up the canyon they were out of choices 2000 degrees of heat in a flash over if the fire never touched them the first breath they took would have fried there lungs. That’s why we have always trained never go into a bowl, canyon, Shute or gorge with unburned fuel its the only thing close to hell you will ever see. So now I will say in other circumstances not in a canyon bolder fields and rock slides are feasible as well as other open areas. In all my years of experience I would never have gone into that canyon with the fire activity doing what it was doing 2 miles or 4 miles away in that fuel type. That what FF need to take from this. You guys are spending to much time training for deployment and to little time training for safety.
reply to xxfullsailxx
on January 4, 2014 at 9:00 am said: —–
reply:
We think of the families and loved ones when we read a theory from any person and what you put out there to run by others ( I think of how one speaks of me and does it best represent who I am so I do the same on talking about that fire and others) —is it something you can back up with documents, source or facts or is one really going to plant seeds in the minds of others that it was a conspiracy or who’s decision it was to even go from the black to where they went- terrible option as it was—fire coming or not; it was a slow-going mazed like terrain in that particular area. This is a place to come to work things out (discussion) yet for us who eye-witness the day it is hard for us to read how one thinks it is this person did this without explaining how they came to that conclusion—for an example the very first time Joy saw Eric Marsh that morning near a boulder puts him at a place near the old grader road (wash area) so was he scouting the area on his way up or did he come up that way & if he did come up that way than he would of known the shortcut; midline to scale the boulders and would let Joy know that Eric Marsh as we saw him all that day and throughout the day he was with a man or his crew at times but for the most part we saw him scouting alone. That could lead our minds that Eric Marsh met up with them or he was already there. Yet after HOW MANY hikes we have taken there is no physical evidence as we searched but the burnt up roll of ribbon from one of the GMHS so again these are eye-witness accounts with theory but without documentation of placing Eric Marsh there with some sort of evidence than why share it was our thinking but now that you see so many writing their thoughts—I want you to know those firefighters knew how to deal with that vegetation because a prior GMHS confirmed they knew that kind of terrain. The only concern Sonny had a problem was that the SAIR team was put together by the one running the show—how does one get to organize their own team on their own fire; this began on state burning state and private and very little BLM and ended with lives lossed on state so how is it they got to pick their own team to share in the manner they have is a true discredit to that weekend’s tragedy; so why (???) and the one the lady in evacuation told us she eye-witness govt folks with maps and her dialogue needs to surface by her not us; she said a lot about this and she was from CA not even any interest to the fire but she shared what she saw and heard to us. Why? So that seed from the start began our questions when we saw the limited information being shown in regards to the fire. We soon will have the proper photo of the original lightning strike and from there we will go to those coordinates and see to the evidence a lightning strike leaves behind…there is many unanswered questions that it takes time and deep research to reach and even then one can hit a dead end. So fullsail you are right yet there are people who now locally love ALL the comments left and if they know a certain name and the base to what they are about the skim it- mainly me they skim because they know our weekend and we stay the same.
In reply to Gary’s question, if I was looking at a site that I KNEW was not survivable, I would run, simply because I would rather go-out taking some kind of action to save myself, than not.
This topic brings up a hypothetical situation I’ve been thinking about for a couple of days. Let’s assume a crew get’s into a situation where they have to deploy, and it just so happens that one of the crew members is new, and fresh out of all the training classes. In this hypothetical, the terrain, vegetation, and fire behavior, combined with the knowledge from his recent training, are all screaming at him that this site is not survivable, so he runs, and is the only one to do so. Even so, in this hypothetical all crew members perish, including the new guy, who is found quite aways away.
In retrospect, I wonder how the new guy would be regarded by the wildland community. Would be recognized as the only person in that moment who utilized common sense based on his training, and chose running as at least, a remote possiblity of survival, or would he be regarded as an un-disciplined newby, who broke crew integrity, and ran when he should have deployed, etc?
I bring up this hypothetical because some of the on-going discussion has been about future shelter training needs regarding deployment areas and shelter capabilities, etc. There’s a fine line somewhere, between crew integrity/discipline, and being responsible for your own safety, and I can’t answer where that is, but I think it’s a worthy topic that should be included with the future training.
Not sure of the value of your hypothetical situation, since no one survived how could you judge that attempting to run was a better decision than staying?
How do we know that all 19 didn’t think staying was their best option since that’s what they chose to do? I think the human desire to survive is so strong that if one or two crew thought running was a better idea, they would have. We can’t make these calls without being there as these decisions were being made.
jeff i,
I tried to keep it in a hypothetical to keep any resulting discussion away from the already expressed differences of opinion regarding boulders/rock screeds and running back up the hill.
Throughout the 3 chapters of comments, the thought has been expressed by several people on here, that when the 18 stepped down off of the two-track, at least one (probably several) of them said to themselves, “what the hell are we doing, going down here”. I think most of us can agree, that that thought was occuring to some percentage of the crew.
I’m certainly not an expert on deployments, but this particular time, orders were given for clearing a significant amount of vegetation to prepare the site, as opposed to just “deploy shelters”. Everybody had a job to do, so anyone thinking that running was a better option, would be abandoning their ‘working’ crewmembers.
Elusive,
my point is that maybe to the crew, it did seem like a survivable site, since no one ran. Many people here have stated that it was obviously not a survivable option and the crew should have seen this. We won’t ever know what it was like at that moment. I submit that given the strong instinct to survive the fact that no one ran, it wasn’t obvious that deploying there was the worst possible option.
You are probably right and in a different scenario the deployment might have worked. I do not believe at that moment anyone thought the heat and flames would have been at that instance. Most of us I drought could estimate temperatures of a flaming front. I truly believe they thought they could survive the deployment.
TWARE,
You may want to go to FullSail’s Venus Fire link and check that one out for a fire scenario CLOSE to what you’re talking about here, however, all survived on that fire.
Long story, short is one female crewmember, very concerned that they should NOT be doing what they were doing, left and deployed on her own in a different location, away from the rest of the Crew. The Crew supervisor did NOT even know she was gone.
Her whole family was firemen – dad, uncles, brothers and so she was raised to speak up and such. Once they all got home, her full-time supervsor proposed some type of disciplinary action against her for leaving the Crew, not informing her supervisor, whatever. This is NOT in the report.
Unfortunately and very tragically, she was killed along with several others in a helicopter crash thus negating the USFS proposed action.
**
** FROM FOIA/FOIL PACKAGE
** VIDEO 1 SHOT BY BLUE RIDGE HOTSHOT
Video title: yarnell 103
One of the videos taken by a Blue Ridge Hotshot on June 30, 2013
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=32849pow1A4
This is the video showing the Blue Ridge and GM vehicles traveling in a ‘convoy’
and headed south on Highway 89 just after having evacuated the Shrine area.
The camera operator is shooting out the back door of Blue Ridge Crew Carrier 2.
When the video starts… the Blue Ridge Crew Carrier is exactly here… heading
south on Highway 89…
34.218879, -112.749415
That’s only 1,555 feet from where the Shrine road actually meets Highway 89,
so they had only turned onto Highway 89 off Shrine road about 20 seconds
before the start of this video.
The only dialogue is at +0:01 when the camera operator ( an unidentified Blue
Ridge Hotshot ) says…
“We just pulled out. Yarnell’s blowin’ up”.
There is no background radio traffic captured in this video.
I do NOT see the GM Supervisor Truck ( which McDonough was driving that
afternoon ) anywhere in the convoy.
This observation doesn’t mean the GM Supervisor truck wasn’t actually in the
convoy since the camera never pans to the front… it simply means it does not
appear that it was with the GM vehicles at the rear of the convoy where you
would expect it to be traveling if it was included in this particular convoy.
OPINION ALERT: I really don’t think Brendan McDonough, even if he was
traveling with this convoy, would have been ‘leading’ it… out ahead of BRIHS
Brian Frisby… or would have been traveling along ‘in-between’ any of the BR
vehicles and the ‘order’ they usually travel in. If he was in it at all… I believe we
would be seeing him ‘back there’ traveling with the other GM vehicles.
At the very end of the video… the convoy hits a curve so it’s easy to see the
trailing vehicles and the distance between them.
There are some headlights within 1 or 2 hundred feet of the rear of the last GM
Crew Carrier in the convoy but it does not appear to be making any attempt to
be close to the last GM Crew Carrier and ‘bringing up the rear’ of the convoy.
It also appears to just be a passenger vehicle and not any kind of truck… and it
is NOT white, like the GM Supervisor truck.
I am going to go with this composition for the Blue Ridge / GM convoy as it left
the Shrine area and traveled down to the Ranch House Restaurant…
From front to back…
Blue Ridge Sup truck 1
Blue Ridge Crew Carrier 1
Blue Ridge Crew Carrier 2 ( with camera operator )
Blue Ridge Sup truck 2
GM Crew Carrier 1
GM Crew Carrier 2
When the video ends… the Blue Ridge Crew Carrier is now exactly here on
Highway 89…
34.217439, -112.750715
…which is just 1,976 feet away from their destination… the parking lot of the
Ranch House Restaurant.
So where was the GM Supervisor truck with McDonough in it, if it was not in
this convoy?
OPINION: It must have already been over at the Ranch House Restaurant before
Blue Ridge ever evacuated the Shrine area because we are about to see it there
in the Tom Story photograph which would be taken just about 2 or 3 minutes after
this ‘convoy’ video was taken.
There is still a witness who claims that ( despite anything the SAIR says ) he saw
Brendan McDonough exiting the Sesame Street area to the SOUTH towards Glen
Ilah, on Lakewood Drive, alone in the GM Supervisor Truck with a (quote) “Very
worried look on his face”. Lakewood drive meets Highway 89 where the Ranch
House Restaurant is located.
There is still also no definitive proof that Brendan ever was over at the Shrine
area that afternoon. There are still only conflicting accounts on that.
WTKTT… could you give some OPINION on the BR movement video?
WTKTT:
“OPINION ALERT: I really don’t think Brendan McDonough, even if he was
traveling with this convoy, would have been ‘leading’ it… out ahead of BRIHS
Brian Frisby… or would have been traveling along ‘in-between’ any of the BR
vehicles and the ‘order’ they usually travel in. If he was in it at all… I believe we
would be seeing him ‘back there’ traveling with the other GM vehicles.”
YIN’s state: (Blue Ridge interview) “Brendan was w/ BR”
“OPINION ALERT:” all of them knew what had happened at that point… i would imagine BR took Brendan under their wing… i doubt they let him drive anything after getting all the vehicles out and realizing the situation the rest of GM was in.
but maybe next you’ll speculate that they took Brendan out for cheeseburgers!?
According to YIN interview notes by Marty Cole (one of the missing Safey officers) Mcdonough was *under his wing*
correction….. Tardy safety officers
yeah, it’s too bad safety officers can’t just “materialize” at every fire that’s transitioning to extended attack…
maybe that should be your recommendation…
tele-porters?
Calvin,
In defense of the safety officers, a more accurate description for them would be, the safety officers who were not normally assigned to the team and who were ordered late due to the chaotic command structure, thus arriving late into a situation where half the people there didn’t know what the plan was. Imagine arriving into THAT scenario. Then shortly after that, deployment.
Point taken. I guess my point was only a counter (based on YIN) to fullsail’s opinion that BR took Mcdonough “under their wing”
oh! so brendan was eating cheeseburgers with Mary Cole… now it all makes sense!
Marty*
Well, it seems like almost all of the oxygen has been sucked out of the room, so I’m going to call it a night. A while back, Bob, or somebody, said something like, ‘we should step back, take a breath, and concentrate on some specifics (I can’t remember his list, but it seemed like a pretty good one at the time)’, and I think that suggestion might be something worth revisiting with the new day.
There have also been a number of MSM articles appearing that
contain some ‘new’ information… or an indication that these
organizations now have their OWN FOIA/FOIL packages
from the SAIT investigation.
I think some of those articles still need to be discussed.
Calvin himself was pointing things out in the GQ article that
need to be looked at but that kind of got ‘lost in the noise’.
Example: The GQ article was based on yet another independent
interview granted by Brendan McDonough… and once again… Brendan says that he did, in fact, hear ALL of the ‘discussing
their options’ conversation between Marsh, Steed, and that
still mysterious ‘third voice’ heard on the MacKenzie video…
…but that’s all he will say.
He still refuses to discuss what he heard and what he knows.
That’s really just one more ‘confirmation’ that Brendan did,
in fact, hear that conversation and knows more than he
will say. The SAIR itself admitted that he heard it ( Page 24 )…
…but there are some interesting ‘new’ things in these MSM
articles as well.
WTKTT,
I have heard that before about the radios and it’s similar to what has occured on other shelter deployments, so I’ll go with you on that issue.
But the escape by the AZ State inmates? It was their blunder, their inattention, whatever, that caused the escape of a CONTAINED FIRE ALONG A JEEP ROAD. We’re not talking a one foot handline here; we’re talking a 10′-12′ road ! WTF, over ! THAT is what started the ball cascading downhill, Shumate’s response notwithstanding.
>> RTS said…
>> But the escape by the AZ State inmates?
>> It was their blunder, their inattention.
…and I, in turn, will defer to YOU on that.
You’re right. They were there with the tools.
It was THEIR job. They blew it.
The lawyers will determine Shumate’s ‘involvement’
( or lack thereof ).
Reply to RTS post on January 3, 2014 at 9:37 pm
>> WTKTT,
>> I have heard that before about the radios and it’s similar
>> to what has occured on other shelter deployments,
>> so I’ll go with you on that issue.
Complicated stuff here… but it has to do with heat and
ionization and magnetic fields and such.
The word to ‘Google’ is…
magnetohydrodynamics
Suffice to say ( for now ) that the standard operating
temperature for just about all models of Bendix/King
portable radios is only…
-30°C ( -22 F ) to +60°C ( +140 F )
RTS,
CORRECTION: It wasn’t a blunder by the inmates, they were all probably working their asses off, and doing what they were told. It WAS, however, their LEADERSHIP that let it get away, along with the leadership above those leaders.
WTKKT,
Shumate didn’t let it jump the road, it was the squad of AZ State inmates that let it jump the road that should have know better. THAT is when it all went downhill, and not talking about the fire here.
Don’t know about the static radio transmission when AA was calling DIVS A. It’s very POSSIBLE that it could have been Marsh. AA does kinda respond though, as if still carrying on a conversation. But we heard exactly what AA heard.
Shumate was in charge. There was time to recover and the
logs show he blew that, too. I’m not going to go there. The
lawsuits filed are going to settle all that and what really went
down on Saturday.
Re: Static. I’ve already talked to a radio expert about that and
he won’t go on record… but he said it IS possible that the
building heat was already affecting the air around them ( and
even the circuitry in the sensitive handhelds ) and when
they pressed transmit… you would get the same ‘pulsing
static’ we now hear in the video.
Caveat for those always read to jump on me: That is what
someone ELSE who calls themselves an ‘expert’ had to
say. I don’t know whether I believe it or not.
Any radio experts out there?
What say ye?
Could the heat buildup at the site have been affecting the
portables on transmit the way we hear in the video?
“Shumate was in charge. There was time to recover and the
logs show he blew that, too.”
i thought we talked about this already… and yet here you go again, making false allegations about something you know nothing about.
and now you’re going to turn yourself into a radio expert too… third party hearsay about Bendix King radios?… fantastic! this should be VERY entertaining…
please provide your radio expert’s name and credentials…
(as well as your own…)
Is there honestly ANYONE who has listened to the entire helmet cam video who doubts that those static-filled transmissions are GM trying to respond? Really?? REALLY???
Come on. The timing is such that it seems like the pilot is just is clear as we are that those squawks/static were GM trying to respond. That is what makes those exchanges (between the pilot and the squawk/static) so friggin’ sad, in my mind.
Yes… it is sad… but it’s evidence. I believe at least
the first 2 audible modulations/static in response
to B33 trying to raise them CAN be included in
the overall ‘time’ estimate from the first MAYDAY
from Steed to when the fire probably was
arriving at the deployment site.
There are barely audible third and fourth
unsolicited modulations even after that which
some MIGHT count… but I don’t know.
Regardless… if you just count the first two then
the total ‘time they had’ as reported by the
SAIR is NOT ‘less than two minutes’. It’s
actually more than DOUBLE that even without
counting the static. Include the static as
‘attempts to respond’ and you are all the way
up to RTS’s rough estimate of almost
4 minutes and 30 seconds.
The SAIT simply LIED. That is equally sad.
the SAIR says approximately three minutes…
1639 to “at about” 1642 when Marsh says, “Affirm!”
let’s see, 42 minus 39… hmm, carry the one…
yep! still three!
and of course YOU would include the two radio modulations, because that fits best with YOUR agenda. but the rest of us have a pretty good idea of what those radio modulations probably mean.
RTS… We only heard what air attack heard, during the video.
B33 YIN…..16:42 Division A radioed that they were going in shelters. Heard a frantic call from Granite Mountain 7 to Air Attack told him to calm down. 20 minutes from that call to when they deployed. There was a period of 10-15 minutes where there were no air tankers in the area. I made a right hand pattern. In my mind Granite Mountain was OK.
Elizabeth and WTKTT,
Good stuff here in this ‘original footage’ video clip. Thank you. At least one of the guys in the video was one that said he heard GMHS talking on the radio much earlier about heading to the “other ranch to the northeast.”
My timing is rather rough, but I timed from when Marsh calls AA about their predicament to when they say they’re going into their shelters was about 2:30 minutes, then no more responses from Marsh to any of AA’s repeated transmissions. Then about 4:20 minutes, there is some static but I’m unable to determine from whom. So,it’s POSSIBLE then that they had that much time to be HAULING ASS getting out of the heavier brush, out of the bowl, to the ranch, and to much better safety.
“…. amidst all the ‘noise’.” What, we don’t get OUR opportunities to banter back and forth and make perceived outlandish claims too?
Thanks again gfor the video.
Reply to RTS post on January 3, 2014 at 8:46 pm
Your ‘rough’ timing appears pretty correct.
So it’s what has been suspected.
There seems to have been MORE time involved here than
has ever been reported by any official report.
BTW: The white pickup towing the ATV is…
Logo on driver side door is standard black/white
USDA Forestry Service ‘shield’ logo.
Forest Service
U ( Picture of a Tree ) S
Department of Agriculture
Number underneath logo appears to be 8038 ( or 2038 ).
License plate number on front is… A387464
Still analyzing… but other interesting things…
At +4:56, the firefighter wearing the helmet cam all
this time takes it off, turns it towards himself, and
we can see exactly who he is.
+5:15 – Helicopter passes right over their location
at low altitude. Can’t tell exact direction of flight.
+6:33 – +6:46 – Another helicopter ( or the same one )
passes right over their location again, a little higher
altitude this time. Can’t tell exact direction of flight.
>> RTS also wrote…
>> “…. amidst all the ‘noise’.” What, we don’t get OUR
>> opportunities to banter back and forth and make perceived
>> outlandish claims too?”
Of course. I was just talking about the occasional ‘over-modulation’
on that frequency. Just use squelch when that happens.
BTW: I think this incident blew past ‘outlandish’ sometime on
Saturday afternoon when Shumate let it jump the road… and
went straight to ‘unbelievable’ after that… so banter away.
i don’t think i would consider that time between them going into their shelters and the next static filled transmission as time counted toward their possible move.
it sounds to me like the “affirm” from Marsh was more than likely in the final moments.
the SAIR shows approximately three minutes… i bet that’s as close as anyone will get without guessing.
RTS, are you really fueling the fire of conjecture here?
do you think it is at all disrespectful to the families to be continually second guessing what the crew may or may not have had time to do? do you really think that WTKTT has any idea how long it takes to cut and move eight chaparral bushes? or move 19 people up a hill through vegetation and terrain?
xxfullsailxx… how much time do YOU think transpired
between the moment they actually realized the
predicament they were in and before Steed’s first
actual MAYDAY call?
Do you think the FIRST thing they did was call out on
Arizona 16… or had they ALREADY spent some time
searching for and/or preparing the deployment site?
P16 YIN B33….16:42 Division A radioed that they were going in shelters. Heard a frantic call from Granite Mountain 7 to Air Attack told him to calm down. 20 minutes from that call to when they deployed. There was a period of 10-15 minutes where there were no air tankers in the area. I made a right hand pattern. In my mind Granite Mountain was OK.
B33 states it was actually 20 minutes from the call from GM7 to AA to when they deployed.
Come on now!
WTKTT… Who said the first time we heard the Mayday call was actually the first time it was verbalized. When the helmet camera video begins, B33 is in mid sentence discussing the GM predicament (my opinion), B33 YIN….16:42 Division A radioed that they were going in shelters. Heard a frantic call from Granite Mountain 7 to Air Attack told him to calm down. 20 minutes from that call to when they deployed. There was a period of 10-15 minutes where there were no air tankers in the area. I made a right hand pattern. In my mind Granite Mountain was OK.
B33 actually says it was a full 20 minutes from the first frantic call until deployment.
Yes… he ( they? ) did.
The “Story Assembled Internally Report”
wrote it up as if that first “Breaking in on
Arizona 16” was, in fact, the first sign of
any trouble. They way they described it…
the Air guys were just going about their
business discussing an upcoming air
drop with no other concerns when
suddenly this MAYDAY fired up.
Is that really what happened that day?
We still don’t really know fer sure.
One of the other mysteries to address is
whether or not they had already searched
around and ‘found’ their deployment site
BEFORE they decided to broadcast any
MAYDAYS on any channel.
I have listened to it over and over and even
though Steed is shouting on that first
MAYDAY and it’s heavily over-modulated,
I believe I can hear chainsaws ALREADY
running in the background on that very
first MAYDAY call.
That would mean a certain amount of
TIME had already expired between the
moment they realized the predicament
they were in, searched around to find
the deployment site, pulled the ropes
and fired up chainsaws, started dumping
fuel… etc. etc… BEFORE they ever even
got on the radio.
How MUCH time elapsed there before
Steed sent the first MAYDAY?
I doubt we will ever know… but we can
still try to figure it out. It’s important.
WTKTT… all I know is what B33 says in their interview notes. 20 minutes
Since it now seems to be a
given that we DO hear multiple
chainsaws running right next
to Jesse Steed even on that
first MAYDAY call from him… I
think it’s even more important
than ever to review ALL of
the times and activities in
the ‘final moments’.
Fullsail said….it sounds to me like the “affirm” from Marsh was more than likely in the final moments.
Remember, these are the kinds of comments you have been expressing disdain for.
The B33 person (French or Burfiend) says “ok, so you are on the SOUTH side of the fire then, to which Marsh replies affirm.
My question is how did B33 know they were on the south side of the fire? I do not hear anyone announce that on the radio.
Calvin… I have always assumed that B33 was very
much aware that this whole MAYDAY sequence
began with “Breaking in on Arizona 16… we are
in FRONT of the flaming front.”
B33 knew what that meant. The ‘flaming front’
at that point was headed south… towards town.
I agree – the way he said “affirm”, it sounded like the end was near. Remember Marsh was not found inside his shelter. What I believe is the reason for that fact is too sad for words.
Reply to Elizabeth post on January 3, 2014 at 10:03 am
>> Elizabeth wrote…
>> FYI, at least one new video on YouTube
>> (there are others on the same “channel”)
Thank you, Elizabeth.
I didn’t want you to think that went by unnoticed amidst all the ‘noise’.
I’ve looked at ALL of them and there is a LOT in these videos
that has never seen the light of day until now… including background
radio transmission captures featuring Abel, Musser, Marsh, others,
and whether or not McDonough really was with the BR crew when
they evacuated the Shrine area ( it appears he was NOT ).
I’m doing a full exam on this one first…
FULL Helmet Camera Video from Yarnell Hill Fire (M2U00265)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6SFzv4YNuWU
It does appear to be the ‘original footage’ from the device and we
only now learn that the TWO different videos shot from the Shrine
location are, in fact, just one long contiguous video.
The crew that evacuates in the nick of time from the Shrine parking
lot is, in fact, the same crew seen in the ‘second’ video out farther
east on Shrine road.
There don’t appear to be any ‘cuts’ or ‘edits’ in this footage so now
we can finally put exact seconds values ( for intervals ) on these radio
transmissions that the “Story Assembled Internally Report” only chose to
vaguely describe with phrases like “sometime after that” and “shortly after that”.
More later…
This boulder thing is kind of a Monday quarter back, or 20/20 hind site. How do you know in an brush covered bolder field where the fuel is not going to burn until after the fire has passed. Where is it safe and where is it not safe? make the choice you got 2 to 4 MIN.
See the ongoing conversation below about the ACTUAL
timeframes that we are only now learning about from
the same evidence the “Story Assembled Internally Report”
had in their possession since day one.
It may have been more like 4 minutes and 30 seconds ( maybe
even FIVE minutes (or more?) ) from the first MAYDAY to when
the fire actually reached their deployment site location.
We still don’t even know ( and probably never will ) how much
time elapsed between them actually first recognizing their
predicament and then making that first MAYDAY call. That
would just add to the ‘total time’.
Also remember… the top of the ridge ( and safety ) was
only 470 yards behind them.
If it can ( now ) be proven that they had at least 5 minutes,
then the ‘rate of travel’ that would have saved them is only…
1.5 yards ( 5 feet 18 inches ) per second.
“It may have been more like 4 minutes and 30 seconds ( maybe
even FIVE minutes (or more?) ) from the first MAYDAY to when
the fire actually reached their deployment site location.”
so, even if your times are correct (which i highly doubt)… you seem to be insinuating that you also understand how GM could have best utilized this extra time…
470 yards? is that “as the crow flies?” is that a distance measured by GPS after you walked their route?
does that account for the super-heated gases that would have been preceding any sort of actual flames? does that account for the gases that would have been funneled up the canyon they walked down?
what about the fire that may have been approaching from the west side of the knob?
can you tell me how fast a group of 19 could have hiked uphill through brush and terrain?
would you recommend that those men drop their packs and grab their shelters and a water bottle and start running back the way they came?
again, who are you and what are your credentials?
>> 470 yards? is that “as the crow flies?” is that
>> a distance measured by GPS after you walked
>> their route?
That is the distance that your ‘fire brothers’ published
in their official report after THEY ‘walked the route’.
See page 20 of the SAIR.
I’m actually going to give them the benefit of the
doubt on that one and trust that measurement.
does that account for the super-heated gases that would have been preceding any sort of actual flames? does that account for the gases that would have been funneled up the canyon they walked down?
what about the fire that may have been approaching from the west side of the knob?
can you tell me how fast a group of 19 could have hiked uphill through brush and terrain?
would you recommend that those men drop their packs and grab their shelters and a water bottle and start running back the way they came?
again, who are you and what are your credentials?
we always assumed they died before the flames arrived—from the gases/smoke/extreme heat. This is awful sad to read about this last moments I am sure for the loved ones but I am sure some are for they laid claims out there and seek clarity just like us.
Horrible way to die. Much horrible way is to live and write about things until you hike it and even then you are left in disbelief/bewilderment. It just does not make sense. Just want the state to offer all information and no narratives, cropping and editing. And if they do explain why they did—otherwise it leaves the door open for the topic “hiding”…cover up…white wash discussions. Think about this—9-11 was a very hard to have lived through and many had their theories there but never anyone showing documents just seeds of their views and YES this world has many levels of corruption and cover-ups but when theorizing include how you cam to that thought. Would that work for you too xxxFullSailxxx?
Excuse me very much… brain fart…
1.5 yards is only 4 feet 6 inches.
Statement above should have read…
If it can ( now ) be proven that they had at least 5 minutes,
then the ‘rate of travel’ that would have saved them is only…
1.5 yards ( 4 feet 6 inches ) per second.
or… if you prefer…
Just 54 inches per second.
Here’s the latest technological gem to come out as a result of the June 2011 Blue Ribbon Fire, where 2 dozer operators were killed and the June 2013 Yarnell Hill Fire.
Blue Ribbon Fire – Wildland Lessons Learned Center http://www.wildfirelessons.net/communities/resources/viewincident/?DocumentKey=1bb4c271-e297-4322-82cc-472c7e8bb664
Wildfire Tracker – Sun Centinel
http://www.sun-sentinel.com/news/palm-beach/os-wildfire-tracker-system-20140101,0,7156214.story
“In short, the 19 hotshots were hiking across rough country as winds whipped up by a storm sent a wall of flames to meet them.” They got that one ALL WRONG. Media histrionics because it SOUNDS so much better. The fire SNUCK up on them instead of them not staying in their perfectly good SZ. The fire did NOT “meet them”- they hiked righ into it, just like the 1994 South Canyon Fire – LESSONS LEARNED.
Here’s two of my favorites. “Supervisors also will know where to direct a helicopter to drop water should trouble occur…. AND … If one of our guys calls in, ‘I’m stuck and about to be burned over,’ we’ll know where to go,” Kerns said.”
This is MOVIE stuuf, not reality as far as I;m concerned. It’s TOO late if you have to have helicopters and airtankers dropping on you to save you. And the “know where to go” thing? At least the supervisors will know where to go to start their investigation. The FF and Fireline Supervisor ON THE GROUND is resposnible for their safety and NOT someone elsewhere. The supervisors’ time would be much better spent, making sure all their WFF’s KNOW AND FOLLOW THE RULES and not rely on some wiz-bang techno device to “save them!”
NV,
“Is it awkward for FullSail that he’s claimed that scree and boulders don’t offer this, and that he also didn’t seem to know that gear should get dropped to increase mobility? Yes, and we all didn’t focus on it initially, but then he continued his abrasive posting. He should be glad that the subject came up here so he can learn, …..”
He’s right, they don’t generally work. Scree does most times, but NOT boulders. Oh, he knows to drop his gear, trust me on that. I do NOT consider his postings ABRASIVE because I work with guys like him, I supervised guys like him, I PROMOTED guys like him, because he says what’s on his mind. He doesn’t weasel word and pussyfoot around.
We ALREADY know all this. He had a good, skookum Supt. when he worked on the Flagstaff HS. We learned all this from OTHER FIRES, from other LESSONS LEARNED just like GMHS SHOULD HAVE known. I haven’t learned anything new from the YHF ‘disaster’. It clealy reinforces my repeated rants about following ‘The Rules.’ You will find NO fatalities on any fires where WFF’s followed ‘The Rules.” None !
God you sound like me RTS. ( its good to know that my ranting and raving produced some good fire fighters) knowing there are guys still out there who believe and follow the 10 and 18 enforces my belief that we can and will still fight fires safely. Its not hard its just a mind set.
Bob,
Check out this technocrap that they think is going to save us in the post below.
@RTS, if FullSail knows his stuff, why the rant from him about how men moving uphill WITH THEIR PACKS would have no ability to seek better options.
You want to know how GM got away with what sounds like some eyebrow raising stuff on a persistent basis, again, look at the group dynamics of this thread. You have someone talking out their ass about how scree doesn’t work and boulders don’t work, and by implication about they wouldn’t be better options than lying down to die passively in thick chaparral where they had ZERO chance of survival, and you, RTS, are trying to rationalize that away because you perceive him as a peer.
Let me break this down further for you. Why is there some unburnt vegetation in those boulders? Why did those 3 survive in the MacKenzie burnover when they pretty clearly would have died if they had not sought shelter in the boulders? Because, boulders, both due to their mass and to the way they can protect you from hot gases and radiant heat, are in fact a much better deployment choice than the one GM chose. Physics supports that, history supports that, even the record after the fire supports that. Training materials support that. An abrasive poster talking out his backside, who doesn’t even know that dropping gear is one way to enhance mobility — and that is a basic part of training — can’t change those facts even if he is a member of a perceived guild or peer group.
And so that’s actually a good real time example, unsafe behavior or in this case rhetoric that is counter to reality and counter to training gets tolerated on social grounds. And it is sad.
At least 99.9% of Granite Mountain’s error was what they did before they ran into the flaming front, not after. And that was when they had time to reason and think, not react in panic. I would think a WFF would mainly be interested in why the hell they ended up there and what do I do so it never happens to me.
That 99.9% is way high. The decisions leading up to the last few minutes probably killed between 10 and 17 of the 19, to be blunt. Good decisions in those last few minutes could have saved maybe 2 to 9, as a rough guess. Bigger errors and bigger training and practices issues for what happened before, for sure. Still a big, and repeated throughout the day, training issue regarding looking at deployment WITHOUT considering whether it is survivable or not. Remember, even that day, this was one of three occasion — Willis, McDonough, GM — not a one-time mistake.
Now that IS serious conjecture. Why do 2 live and 17 die? The point is the men probably had just seconds to formulate a response, as they had to have time to actually carry it out. All the while fighting panic with the flames in their face and suddenly coming face to face with death. And you are beating them up because they might have made the wrong choice. You grade on a tough curve.
I think whatever training errors there were, time would have been better spent so that all 19 men would have recognized dropping into the box canyon was a very, very bad idea.
I’m not beating anyone up, I’m saying there was a training problem here. The go-to response, displayed at several points during the day, seems to have been deployment. Assessing whether a SURVIVABLE site exists is not something I see displayed. Lots of things that take lots of thought if you’ve never been exposed to them before happen very quickly with training, which is the point of training.
Sounds like maybe a Prescott Fire Dept. training and leadership issue to me.
Remember now, Willis kinda promoted these kinds when he stated this and similar statements in news conferences – “They did it always to protect others. Every person there understood and knew that they were gonna protect the community of Yarnell. And if they laid down their life…it’s just like the Marines. They knew what they had to do…and there couldn’t be any more honorable way to die than the way they died.”
This is NOT what you want to teach your WFF’s if you want them to survive.
I strongly agree.
NV not to be critical let me try to explain crew dynamics. Here we are working with 19 FF. You are responsible for all of them. So you want all of them to survive. In the bolder field you are talking about there is not room for 19 Fire Fighters. Your thinking about full survival not maybe some will make it. It was a bad location but maybe survivable if (a big IF I realize) there wasn’t a blow torch effect and very high temperatures. The boulders or the run out were If’y the chance of survival of all would have been low if at all. I am not saying in other places and other circumstances that bolder fields and rockslides would not serve well. As the supervisor of a 20 man crew who screwed up and put them there would you holler run your lives your on your own or head for the boulders and hide in them as best you can knowing there was not enough room for your crew. They had no SZ for 19 men or a big enough area to deploy. Because of where they were they had no survivability. They walked into a death trap. I am not trying to put words in fullsail’s mouth so I will just say he was talking about climbing into a rock pile and not running for your life into one. Just my thoughts.
That’s in essence articulating the “well, at least we will all live or die together” sentiment. That’s an understandable sentiment, one we are in some ways hardwired for, and even a useful one in combat at the squad level. It is however a very harmful sentiment when, as supervisor, you can save some of your crew by making better decisions.
At the extreme, let’s say you think that most of your crew, maybe 15 out of the 18 plus you, can survive one way or the other, but you have a few who you think aren’t as fast. Do you have everybody sit tight with the stragglers, and/or simply deploy there in the middle with direct flame contact and sustained intense heat guaranteed, so that everyone lives or dies together? Leading involves lots of learned behaviors that may not be instinctive, and making good decisions on the basis of odds is one of those cases.
NV,
Wow, fired up are you.
You said – “… because you perceive him as a peer … or [as] a member of a perceived guild.” NO, I know he IS a peer, I don’t PERCEIVE him as one. I do not believe that perception is reality. It sometimes has the ‘force’ of reality but it is NOT reality.
Scree does work, most of the time, but you must be very selective. The 30-Mile Fire fatalities changed the way we look at them now. Boulders ? I wouldn’t use them because the fuels grown right up to them, between them, etc. If I’m fighting fire in boulders, the black is my SZ, NOT the boulders. AND they act as chimneys and chutes between them funneling fire, heat, and deadly gases.
The Mackenzie Fire was VERY unique in that they crawled into an opening in the boulders and used their shelters to shield them. And they still sustained airways burns and if not for oxygen, would have died. I’ve never heard or read of another one like it.
And as far as the physics of using them as a HEAT SINK, sure BUT NOT when you have a full-blown fire storm of that speed and intensity heading at you IN A DEADLY BOWL NO LESS! The fire shelter training brochures have not been edited, adjusted to fit the after-effects of the 30-Mile Fire as far as I know.
You said – “And so that’s actually a good real time example, unsafe behavior or in this case rhetoric that is counter to reality and counter to training gets tolerated on social grounds. And it is sad.”
Unsafe rhetoric? What’s that? Haven’t you alll been ranting about being able to just spew out what you want about things you know nothing or very little about? And it’s DEFINITELY not counter to reality (see above). Counter to training? In the Basic WFF course (S-190) ‘they’ want us to spend 3-4 hours teaching about fire shelters and only 1-2 hours teaching the Basics (10, 18, LCES, i.e. The Rules). That’s counter to logic. Why train on something that is the OUTCOME OF BAD DECISIONS, i.e. fire shelters, when you can train on what we refer to as ‘Entrapment Avoidance’ and stay out of them and use LCES. Either escape by leaving the area or retreat to a SZ.
In the fire shelter training movie, the commentator states that over the years, “fire shelters are responsible for saving hundreds of lives and preventing hundreds of injuries.” Maybe so, but many of them fit into the False Cause Fallacy, in that the shelters really did NOT save them, like those WFF in their 400′ diameter SZ on Tin Cup Hill on the 1985 Butte Fire. By depoying shelters there, they negated its SZ status.
On the other hand, ‘The Rules’ are responsible for saving TENS OF THOUSANDS OF LIVES AND PREVENTING TENS OF THOUSAND OF INJUERIED EVERY YEAR!!!! So, the lesson here? Teach people what to do – avoid entrapment – instead of what NOT to do – deploy your shelter.
And, pleading ignorance here – not sure I understand the “social grounds” thing.
“The social grounds thing” – RTS, it appears that you are trying to defend xxfullsailxx at all costs rather than just rationally dealing with the limited issue NV is raising, to wit, whether, if, when faced with all LOUSY choices, which is what GM had the minute they stuck themselves in the valley, the better option might have been to either try running (which we know from various lessons learned can sometimes be successful for at least a couple out of a group of 15 or 20) or deploying in the boulders. It is a simple concept, worth discussing, even though we realize that we ALL know that it would be better if GM had never gotten themselves into the predicament to begin with.
I will tell you, Robert the Second, that, if I were a man more senior than xxfullsailxx and in the same profession (as you are), I would make clear to him that he reflects poorly on ALL of us (meaning you) when he needlessly speaks like a pompous, nasty puke to members of the public or people who are trying to help.
Amen!
wow, name calling?
your “hypocrisy knows no bounds…”
Elizabeth,
So, the “social grounds” thing is my “trying to defend xxfullsailxx”? Did I get that right? Or is it “rationally dealing with the limited issue NV is raising, to wit, whether, if, when faced with all LOUSY choices, …”? Or is this the “social grounds” issue? Sorry, still a might confused here.
You said – “when [Fullsail] needlessly speaks like a pompous, nasty puke to members of the public or people who are trying to help.” Wow, that bad, really? As I said before, I’m not really seeing that, and you hopefully noticed the few times I’ve asked him to tone it down. He also is “trying to help” in his own way. It’s still a free country and this is an open forum and the First Amendment Freedom of Speech doesn’t apply because it’s NOT the Gov’t. regulating here.
@RTS, Cart Creek actually involved people getting caught in open terrain, albeit open rocky terrain in one case as the photos show. No one took shelters in deep crevices between boulders.
This is actually a good object lesson in group dynamics. It’s a basic fact, and part of training materials, that scree, rock slides and also large boulders can provide either SZs or adequate deployment sites.
It’s also certainly true that not every patch of scree or every boulder is an adequate deployment site. In terms of decisionmaking, when faced with a choice between everyone lying down in dense chaparral and deploying where direct flame contact and intense heat is assured, or seeking other options including the adjacent boulder pile (which as the MacKenzie fire shows, can offer shelter, and the MacKenzie fire photos show some direct similarity in terrain to Yarnell), seeking other options is going to be preferable.
Likewise, if escape is compromised, dropping gear to increase mobility is basic. If escape is compromised, and staying put is certain death, dropping gear and heading in any direction believed to offer something other than certain death is much better than waiting for the fire to roll over you.
While Mann Gulch was not an example I had in mind, the reality is two men survived because they hauled ass and got lucky, and used a rock slide once found to good effect. Had they not done something, and instead just sat there, we can know pretty well that they wouldn’t have made it.
Is it awkward for FullSail that he’s claimed that scree and boulders don’t offer this, and that he also didn’t seem to know that gear should get dropped to increase mobility? Yes, and we all didn’t focus on it initially, but then he continued his abrasive posting. He should be glad that the subject came up here so he can learn, and others should evaluate what else he has to say in that light.
In terms of points of focus to not have history repeat, obviously it is more important to not put yourself in the situation GM found themselves. But, if faced with entrapment, I am going to quote Gary Olson in terms of the lesson to be learned: IF THE SPOT YOU ARE CONTEMPLATING LAYING DOWN INSIDE A FIRE SHELTER IS OBVIOUSLY NOT SURVIABLE, DON’T DO IT…RUN TO A BOUDLER FIELD OR ROCK SLIDE OR ANYWHERE ELSE YOU CAN…BUT DON’T LAY DOWN IN FRONT OF AN INFERNO WHERE YOU HAVE NO CHANCE OF SURVIAL (AND IT WASN’T A CLOSE CALL) AND DIE! AT LEAST YOU WILL DIE ON YOUR FEET MOVING FORWARD! And yes…there is CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT THE GRAINTE MOUNTAIN HOTSHOTS DID NOT KNOW THAT, BECAUSE THEY LAID DOWN IN FRONT OF AN INFERNO WHERE THEY HAD NO CHANCE OF SURVIAL AND THEY DIED, REALLY, REALLY HORRIBLE DEATHS! That is what this is about.”
“Is it awkward for FullSail that he’s claimed that scree and boulders don’t offer this, and that he also didn’t seem to know that gear should get dropped to increase mobility?”
i don’t think “awkward” is the word i would use, i would ask, “is it accurate to say…?”
yep NV, you quote the textbook real good… but when the reality sets in of having to deploy a shelter, odds are the text book isn’t going to help you,
i think that’s pretty evident in GM’s case given the scattering of tools and equipment and a lack of PPE on some individuals. it seems that one poor kid didn’t have time to move his chainsaw out of the deployment area before the fire was on top of him.
so yes, please tell us more about how things “should” look when you deploy your shelter between boulders and heavy vegetation… and please don’t forget your water bottle!
also, i am still very receptive to hearing about all those instances you referred to way back when… please feel free to elaborate!
I think you and I are in agreement that if you are faced with a bad choice a really, bad choice, you should take the bad choice and hope for the best. Although of course, just as RTS and Bob says it would be better not to be there at all because you followed the rules in the first place. So…I guess all of us are in agreement on this one point?
Elizabeth and Fullsail,
Regarding the Mann Gulch Fire and two of the three survivors were Robert Sallee and Walter Rumsey. You said that they “survived in the boulder field.” Actually, it was a “rockslide” and so slightly different. Boulder fields, like on the Yarnell Hill Fire, usually have LOTS of fuel around them, making them NOT good choices for safe areas as Fullsail and others have pointed out. Rockslides, on the other hand are better and GENERALLY devoid of fuel and so make better options as safe areas. One exception, as Fullsail indicated, was the fatal 10 July 2001, 30-Mile Fire in WA.
Quoting from “The Race That Couldn’t Be Won” (TRTCBW) — “One of the fascinating features of the Rocky Mountains is the ROCK FORMATION KNOWN AS “RIMROCK” (figs. 3 and 4). It appears as a WALL OF ROCK along the rims of canyons or around the top of flat mountains known as buttes. Rimrock is nearly perpendicular, varying in height depending on how much MATERIAL HAS SLOUGHED AWAY. In Mann Gulch the rimrock is 6 to 12 ft high, broken occasionally by crevices.” (EMPHASIS added) Hernce, the “sloughed away ,material” would be the rockslides referred to.
” …they (SMJ’s) climbed to the RELATIVE SAFETY of the ridge above. … They took REFUGE IN A ROCKSLIDE NEARBY. The third jumper, who followed the pair to the base of the rimrock, did not go through the crevice to the ridge above; his body was found at the base of the rimrock a few hundred feet away.” (EMPHASIS added)
If you go to the TRTCBW publication, you will KINDA see the difference between this grass/timber fuel tpe and the chaparral of the YHF which played a big role in their survival, because the SMJ’s did NOT have to contend with the intense radiant heat that GMHS did when the chaparral burned like a blow torch.
Another good one to look at that had ROCKS and BOULDERS involved was on the 16 July 1977, Cart Creek Fire on the Flaming Gorge Ranger District, Ashley N.F. in north-eastern Utah. There were 3 FATALITIES IN TWO SEPARATE INCIDENTS within SECONDS of the increased fire behavior. There are fairly good photos in the report below showing the BOULDERS and ROCKY AREAS with SUFFICIENT FUEL between and amongst the rocks, similar to the YHF. The fuels were “EXTREMELY FLASHY GRASS-SAGE … with clumps of BITTERBRUSH and CURLY LEAF MAHOGANY …” Basically analogous to the Southwestern chaparral on the YHF but much LESS radiant heat. Obviously enough to kill you but MUCH less than on the YHF. Again, GOOD photos in the report.
http://www.wildfirelessons.net/communities/resources/viewincident/?DocumentKey=27fea878-2fec-40fb-be3b-87196668dd84
The point is this: All things being equal, if you have to deploy, should you deploy in a crevice in a big honkin’ pile of boulders or are you going to deploy in a small dirt area in the flat of a valley with thick chapparel (sp?) on both sides? Pick one. Don’t debate it – just pick one.
I’d add, where the boulders are a bit to the side and above the “oven” terrain-wise. So will both offer shelter and be out of the worst simply by virtue of location.
NV,
The virtual ‘fire storm’ when area ignition fire behavior went through the bowl where they died would have been more than enough to kill them with the deadly, hot gases. You have NO idea, NONE !
Read your own link to the MacKenzie fire and stop trying to run cover for a perceived union member. It is disappointing. And look at where the boulders were at Yarnell, and look at the unburnt vegetation.
And I have a very good idea, trust me. I am not saying GM had any GOOD options when they realized where things were for them, and I have made that statement repeatedly. I am however saying they chose the course — deployment where they were — that was the worst possible choice, and that basically guaranteed they would all die. If they had sought better options, the outcome wouldn’t have been any worse, and since all other options had better odds, the outcome likely would have been better. Maybe a couple would have survived, maybe several would have survived. Think what difference that would have made to THOSE families.
The training point is assess deployment and understand when it might be survivable and when clearly not. This was an easy call, or should have been — NOT SURVIVABLE. So they should have sought other options. More generally, since their lookout seemed to also be looking at a likely non-survivable deployment, and Willis seemed to have id’d a likely nonsurvivable deployment site as well, there seems a real, persistent issue in terms of how they look to shelter as some sort of “gear savior,” and how they — lookout, Marsh, Willis — didn’t seem to ask earlier where their survivable options were.
Even with all those bad odds, this was still a bad outcome, but there were a lot of bad odds flying around out there that made at least some fatalities likely.
NV,
“perceived union member?” Not following here on the union member thing, so please help me out.
“where the boulders were at Yarnell, and look at the unburnt vegetation.” UNBURNT, yes they are unburnt, but they are COMPLTETELY DRIED OUT, DESSICATED from the DEADLY HOT GASES.
Bad decision with a bad outcome with this choice.
Elizabeth,
I’m going to have to go with the LOGICAL FALLACY reply on this one.
Your question posits the false dichotomy, fallacy of bifurcation, and black-or-white fallacy when two alternative statements are held to be the only possible options, when in reality there are more.
Like NOT being there in the first place because they followed ‘The Rules’ and stayed in their perfectly good SZ among other things.
I don’t know about all the big words but what you said is absolutely right on. Your plan should always have a SZ and a marked and scouted route to it. As one who fought fires without shelters as some others here have also, your #1 priority is an SZ and as you move you identify a new one its a continual thing not one that gets further and further away. When you need a safety zone you need it fast not a mile away. After 1967 in R5 we were required to pack shelters. However many many of us never had to deploy them. Why? because we never put our selves in that position. We always planed escape routes and safety zones (good safety zones) situation awareness was key to fighting fire. As Elizabeth stated above “follow the rules” its easy. For those of you that think its easy to find a deployment site when you need one remember when you put yourself in that situation and the heat is unbearable and the fire is coming at you with 10 to 40+ flame lengths you do not have a lot of time to find a deployment site, they are not preplanned. Not many survive trying to out run a fire. I always trained that a fire shelter was a last chance effort and your chances of survival were 50/50, so always follow the 10 and 13 (18) and never put yourself in that situation. Yes it takes concentration and situation awareness. Back then we always said stay one step ahead of the fire and constantly be aware of the situations that shout watch out. To those that screw up find the quickest and easiest place that offers as much protection as possible and get in it, and hope you are lucky enough you picked the right place.
oops that was RTS quote not Elizabeth sorry.
RTS, it was a question. When you have two lousy options because you are in a situation you should NOT have put yourself in, which option are you going to take?
I get that the goal is NOT to put yourself in bad places. But obviously GM did, or else we would all be discussing poker or something.
Elizabeth,
Okay, fair enough, but I will not take the Logical Fallacy bait. I would choose NEITHER.
The “Logical Fallacy bait” – they sell that in the tractor store, right next to the rat bait, I think.
There is no bait and there is no fallacy. If you are trying to train for the best outcomes, you go with the higher-percentage bets. In this case GM had one bet with an assurance of sustained exposure to direct flame contact and extreme heat, and this was the one they chose. They had a couple other possible bets, actually, that I’d assess as having better odds. Over time, you want people making the better bets because over time you get better results.
NV,
And by following ‘The WFF Rules’ you have the best chances. GMHS put themselves into their deadly predicament by NOT doing that . Otherwise it would have guaranteed their survival.
The thing I like most about you, Robert-the-Second, is that you ALWAYS, ALWAYS follows the Rules and make no mistakes (neither small nor large). Are you Catholic? The Catholics (of which I am one) would very much like you – we are all about the rules, although most people break many of them, often repeatedly.
The Truth Will Always Remain Elusive
on January 3, 2014 at 9:41 am said:
Which link??
http://www.azcentral.com/yarnell-fire/#burn
The article said, Marquez backed off. He suggested using the corner of the dozer line to create a second anchor point. They still couldn’t agree on how to divide the ridge. Finally, Marquez returned to the command post. There, he told chiefs the vegetation was too thick, the terrain too meandering. He couldn’t see a way to make things work. He wanted to request more support, more hotshot crews, three to five of them.
Not to far back most DFMO’s and some ADFMO,s were Type 2 IC’s Type 3’s were basic IA and could have been anyone at least Sector boss qualified (strike team leader). The type 2 IC took over IA until a team was ordered, We did not have type 3’s 20 years ago. At least in R4.
Fullsail,
Yes, I’m well aware of the Little Venus Fire, and I ALWAYS use it whenever I put on refresher classes for emphasizing following ‘The Rules’, paying attention to the weather, fire behavior indicators, what NOT to do in those types of situations. Though, I refer to it as the Little [male appendage] Fire that rymnes with Venus.
One of my favorite sayings by these ‘Fire Use’ morons in the Lessons Learned “Firefighter Perspectives” section is this gem: “Will treat WFU [Wildfire Use] MORE LIKE A SUPPRESSION FIRE AND ASSURE COMPLETE ADHERENCE TO LCES. Will treat WFU NO DIFFERENT THAN SUPPRESSION …” Well NO sh?t Sherlock ! It’s a friggin’ FIRE you idiot ! Can you believe that statment? As you can see, I do NOT have a lot of good vibes with Fire [Mis]Use Modules. Historically, they are responsible for MANY, MANY escaped fires, including structures lost. The classic one was the 2000 Los Alamos disaster, the Cerro Grande Fire that thye LOST wihin 15 minutes of igntion, then CONTNIUED to treat it like an RX Burn for the next several days until a cold front blew it all to heck. Morons!.
To the guy’s credit, the Crew Boss (Nathan) did a good job on this AAR or whatever it;s called and took credit for his screw-ups. By the GRACE OF GOD, nobody was seriously burned or killed on this fire.
hey easy there, i have a quite a few friends on FUM’s… they are an evolving resource and will be more pertinent as time goes on…
regarding cerro grande: i spent 5 days backpacking through Bandelier National Monument in 1999 (before i was in fire)… and even then i could tell it was a tinder box waiting for a match. not sure there is much to blame there but a historic lack of management…
I just KNEW you were gonna have a comeback like that. I’m glad to hear that you had/have the sense NOT to be involved with them.
“Evolving resource?” So, does that mean that they can just recreate themselves and fix what desperately needs fixing in thier program without having to do anything else? It will just evolve?
The Burn Boss NEVER inquired as to any of our RX burns, fires, etc. that Spring. We were in a super drought, dry Spring year, losing RX burns and having regular fires. This whole project was a design for disaster. And that SAIR – a HUGE cover-up and a whitewash and trasnferred the park Superintendent.
Fullsail and others,
There was also the September 4, 1996 Shepard Mountain Fire in the Absaroka-Beartooth Wilderness in Montana. The fire had ben burning for several days when a stronger than anticipated cold front pushed the fire from 800 acres to 8,000 acres in a day (8 miles in 11 hours) !
Thirteen (13) WFF deployed shelters; a Safety Officer and EMT on a helispot because they were dealing with assisting an injured FF and evidently ot paying attention to the fire behavior, ten FF from a Type 2 Crew deployed shelters ON THE EDGE of a BOULDER field and one got burned, and the lookout who had to be instructed over the radio HOW and WHERE to deploy his shelter and then eventually moved into a creek.
This is one of the fires that Human Factors Specialist Ted Putnam talked about in his ‘Up In Smoke’ essay that was cover-up and whitewashed.
https://higherlogicdownload.s3.amazonaws.com/WILDFIRELESSONS/Shepard_Mountain_Entrapment_1996.pdf?AWSAccessKeyId=AKIAJH5D4I4FWRALBOUA&Expires=1388773199&Signature=Dj2bhpZ8LDzUymekFXE2vOjZNLM%3D
thanks! interesting, that does have a lot of similarities to the Yarnell incident…
regarding the deployment: fuel type was timber surrounded by rock screes and “natural barriers,” and they were already in the “large rock slide” they deployed in so they didn’t have to hike up to it with fire chasing their tail.
i’m sure you’re aware of the Little Venus Incident as well?
http://www.wildfirelessons.net/Communities/Resources/ViewIncident/?DocumentKey=e7f0e80b-05fc-4f58-9e88-0f4960e9106c
Bob Powers and Others.
You got it pretty close Bob, however, NOWADAYS there are distinctions for Type 1, 2, and even 3 at the following levels only:
INCIDENT COMMANDER (ICT3, ICT2, ICT1)
PUBLIC (DIS)INFORMATION OFFICER (PIO)
SAFETY OFFICER (SOFR, or SOF2, or SOF1)
OPERATIONS SECTION CHIEF (OPS2, OPS1)
PLANNING SECTION CHIEF (PSC2, PSC1)
FINANCE SECTION CHIEF (FSC2, FSC1)
LOGISTICS SECTION CHIEF (LSC2, LSC1)
Not sure about the LIAISON OFFICER (LOFR)
These are for ALL incidents (mostly wildfire) and/or what they now call All-Hazard Incidents, like hurricanes.
The unsettling one for me is in the Operations Section when there is a Type 3 DIVS that can be filled by a red-carded Single Resource Boss. I’ve had a frustrating and harrowing times working with these guys.
Thanks Mr Powers and Bob2
Ya I didn’t go into the types or short teams. Thanks
i thought you could only work one qual up… ?
i.e. on an initial attack or Type 3 incident a single resource could work as TFLD… a TFLD could work as a Div Sup.
where i work, we get a lot of good experience with this… and it comes in handy for Type 3 incidents that are short on experienced overhead.
Fullsail,
Pretty sure, but the fires I’ve been on allowed Single Resource Bosses, e.g. Engine Bosses, to be Division Supervisors (DIVS) with mixed results. Check it out in the Red Book. So, there’s your chance to shine on the fireline !
I think we are FINALLY getting somewhere. Thank GOD!
xxFullsailxx, thanks for sharing more about your background. FYI, when WTKTT makes comments about the fire or which firefighter made which decision, I, personally, tend to just take those comments with a grain of salt (or, perhaps, even sometimes skim over them), because WTKTT has admitted that he is not a wildfire expert. I don’t need to call him out or whatever because I know – and we all know – that he is not an expert. I focus on the things that we have seen WTKTT excel at, such as explaining how to find photo or video metadata, recalling important details, tracking lat/long, lining up locations, etc. And I have never asked WTKTT for his credentials on those types of things because I have seen firsthand – as we all have – his obvious skill with those things. That is why I asked for your credentials and not his. Now, if I witnessed you and your crew working on a fire right in front of me, I never would have asked about your background.
As to any “inaccurate” conclusions, I do not tend to normally jump all over WTKTT or anyone else with whom I disagree because the nature of brainstorming is to put an idea out there. Everyone KNOWS that brainstorming cannot be taken as the gospel, finally truth. I think it would be TRAGIC if people got embarrassed or nervous and stopped brainstorming. That is not to say that people should DELIBERATELY put inaccurate conclusions out there – that would be bad! – but my impression thus far is that nobody is deliberately trying to put WRONG conclusions out on this blog. Moreover, maybe the fact that people sometimes reach inaccurate conclusions in good faith as part of the process of trying to figure out what went on will put more pressure on folks like Willis and Brendan McDonough to put out more ACCURATE information. Maybe that is a silver lining to this group of commenters sometimes accidentally reaching a bad conclusion.
So, in short, do not take my silence to mean that I am adopting everything that WTKTT or anyone is saying. I am not. But he has proven that he is really good about extracting metadata, lining up photos, tracking details, etc., such that, in my mind, it does not serve the purposes of the ASAIT to try to insult or humiliate him and drive him away.
FYI, at least one new video on YouTube (there are others on the same “channel”):
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KPHwEUaC2YE
Elizabeth and Others,
Check out this publication on the Mann Gulch Fire. It’s titled ‘The Race That Couldn’t Be Won.” It gives a lot more details than MacClean’s book.
http://www.fireleadership.gov/toolbox/staffride/downloads/lsr14/Race_That_Couldnt_Be_Won.pdf
The slope these two guys ran up was super steep, and so they had to have massive adrenalin surging through their veins and super human strength to get up and over that ridge and away from the super heated gases to survive.
“And I have never asked WTKTT for his credentials on those types of things because I have seen firsthand – as we all have – his obvious skill with those things”
that’s called hypocrisy.
WTKTT makes great assertions in big bold letters with asterisks next to them to proclaim such things as:
** ERIC MARSH ( AND GRANITE MOUNTAIN ) WERE PROMISED
** AIR SUPPORT AND/OR AIR EXTRACTION ASAP CIRCA 3:50 PM.
among others.
on multiple occasions he has spoken like he is an expert, like he has found some great evidence that hints at conspiracy…
he has insinuated that Blue Ridge IHC was negligent or complicit in the deaths of GM to the point of posting their names and phone numbers here.
he has said that B. McDonough may have been sitting in a restaurant eating a cheeseburger while his crew was dying.
he has posted pictures from facebook of someone he claims to be Brian Frisby (who i’m pretty sure IS NOT Brian Frisby).
these are just a few of his assertions, all without merit, all with poorly compiled “evidence.”
and i’m not justifying myself to you. like i said before, i will continue to call BS when i see it. i don’t consciously choose to ignore bad assertions.
xxfullsailxx said: ““And I have never asked WTKTT for his credentials on those types of things because I have seen firsthand – as we all have – his obvious skill with those things”
that’s called hypocrisy.”
I will try again, xxfullsailxx: If I had seen you in a huge wildfire doing your job, or if you had professed to be a wildfire fighter and then comported yourself with the decorum that a professional would normally use when discussing matters within his expertise (which is what Rocksteady and NV have done), I never would have asked what your credentials or expertise were. I would have taken your word for it, or I would not have needed to ask.
You did not, so I did.
ah, so you just accept people on the internet for who they say they are as long as they put on a good show…
interesting.
way to avoid the primary issue as well…
false allegations based on shaky evidence by anonymous people hiding behind the internet.
Reply to xxfullsailxx post on Jan 3, 2014 at 11:07 am
( Heavy sigh )
Okay… comin’ at ya, fireboy, since I guess that’s
what you want.
I was waiting for you to iterate your ‘piss off’ list, and
I knew you would get around to it… so thanks
>> xxfullsailxx said
>>
>> WTKTT makes great assertions in big bold letters
>> with asterisks next to them to proclaim such
>> things as:
>>
>> ** ERIC MARSH ( AND GRANITE MOUNTAIN )
>> ** WERE PROMISED AIR SUPPORT AND/OR AIR
>> ** EXTRACTION ASAP CIRCA 3:50 PM.
Here’s where you get taught how to READ.
See the AND/OR in there?
In the King’s English… that means the phrase that
follows is either simply possible ( as an alternative ),
or it might be included in the first set of circumstances.
It can/should be READ in the following ways…
“Eric Marsh ( and Granite Mountain ) were promised
Air Support circa 3:50 PM”
Absolutely TRUE ( we know this now thanks to Elizabeth ).
Here comes the AND/OR part…
AND: “Eric Marsh ( and Granite Mountain ) were promised
BOTH Air Support AND Air Extraction circa 3:50 PM”
Maybe. Maybe not. Consensus seems to be NO.
OR: “Eric Marsh ( and Granite Mountain ) were ONLY
promised Air Extraction circa 3:50 PM”
Maybe. Maybe not. Consensus seems to be NO.
>> xxfullsailxx also said
>> On multiple occasions he has spoken like he
>> is an expert.
I am not a firefighter. Never said I was.
Do you need to hear it AGAIN?
Okay… I am NOT a firefighter.
Ever since you got your butt kicked off of the Wildland
firefighter site I know that is all that matters to you…
whether someone is ‘a brother’ or not… so there
you have it. I am not ‘a brother’ of yours.
Not even vaguely related.
However… when it comes to what happened in Yarnell
that day, I do, in fact, know a LOT more than your
average person…. and I intend to learn even MORE.
Does that make me an ‘expert’ on the events of June
30, 2013? Nope… not yet… but I’m getting there.
>> xxfullsailxx also said
>> like he has found some great evidence that
>> hints at conspiracy.
Your word. Not mine. I have never used that word.
There IS evidence that people involved with this incident
are not telling everything they know OR have purposely
not told the truth. You call that what you want… I am
still trying to find out the TRUTH.
>> xxfullsailxx also said
>> He has insinuated that Blue Ridge IHC was negligent
>> or complicit in the deaths of GM.
Nope. I still think Frisby deserves a medal.
I was actually the FIRST one to say so on this thread.
Are there still some unanswered questions about what
they were doing that day and where they where at
certain times?… you betcha.
>> xxfullsailxx also said
>> to the point of posting their names and phone
>> numbers here.
Those names and phone numbers were/are the
same ones PUBLISHED PUBLICLY on the
National Interagency Hotshot Crew ( NIHC ) website.
http://www.fs.fed.us/fire/people/hotshots/IHC_list.html
If you have a problem with that information being public,
then I suggest you contact Blue Ridge or the NIHC
and ask them to remove that PUBLIC information.
>> xxfullsailxx also said
>> He has said that B. McDonough may have been
>> sitting in a restaurant eating a cheeseburger while
>> his crew was dying.
Who’s leaping now, fireboy?
The comment you are continually referring to was NOT
discussing a ‘timeframe’ that was anywhere near the
time of deployment.
It’s also being taken ‘out of context’ ( of course ) to
suit your own agenda.
Did I suggest that Brendan McDonough did NOT
accompany the Crew Carriers over to the Shrine
area… and instead went ‘somewhere else’ in the
3:50 – 4:00 PM timeframe? You betcha… because
there is ( apparently ) a witness who says that is
what happened.
Here is EXACTLY what I said a MONTH ago…
:: On December 8, 2013 at 10:30 pm WTKTT said:
::
:: Reply to Elizabeth N. post on Dec 8, 2013 at 9:56 pm
::
:: If, as a WITNESS now claims, Brendan really did just
:: EXIT Sesame street by himself ( driving the GM
:: Supervisor truck ) the way GM came in that morning…
:: out Lakewood drive through Glen Ilah and directly to the
:: Ranch House Restaurant… and ONLY the GM Crew
:: Carriers got ‘humped’ over to the Shrine area by some
:: of the BR fellas… then BOTH the SAIR report AND
:: Brendan’s public statements are complete fiction.
:: I suppose this could all be EASILY verified by ANY of
:: the Blue Ridge Mountain Hotshots and not just Brian
:: Frisby ( BR Supt. )
:: Was Brendan McDonough (in the GM Supervisor Truck)
:: EVER really over with them now’ in the Shrine area after
:: he left his lookout position… or did he simply ‘disappear’
:: that afternoon after getting dropped off at the truck by
:: Brian Frisby?
:: Did he just head right over the Ranch House Restaurant
:: and order a burger, or something?
>> xxfullsailxx also said
>> He has posted pictures from facebook of someone he
>> claims to be Brian Frisby (who i’m pretty sure IS NOT
>> Brian Frisby).
Yep… so what? It’s a PUBLIC PICTURE that anyone
can just ‘Google’. That’s how I found it.
By the way… it IS him. No doubt about it.
If you want Brian Frisby to never be identified then I
suggest you contact him and tell him to get his
family to stop taking pictures of him and posting them
to their own totally wide-open public Facebook pages.
Besides… the Facebook page isn’t even needed to
Photo ID Frisby. See the PUBLIC YouTube video from
the Prescott Mud/Bog Rally the entire BR crew
attended just 12 days after the YHF and they gladly
all posed for ‘group shots’.
Frisby is there in the front row, bottom left.
>> xxfullsailxx also said
>> these are just a few of his assertions, all without
>> merit, all with poorly compiled “evidence.”
Yeah. Right. Whatever.
This (thread) is NOT about me.
This (thread) is NOT about you ( as much as you would
like it to be ).
It’s about what happened on June 30, 2013.
Let’s get back to THAT, shall we?
You can post all the ‘heavily-over-modulated’
transmissions you want. It’s a free country.
As I have said before… we are all just ‘guests’ here
at a site hosted by ( the extraordinarily patient ) Mr.
Dougherty. He is the host/moderator. If he thinks
a comment ( from anyone ) is OK… then it’s OK
with me.
Carry on.
>> ** ERIC MARSH ( AND GRANITE MOUNTAIN )
>> ** WERE PROMISED AIR SUPPORT AND/OR AIR
>> ** EXTRACTION ASAP CIRCA 3:50 PM.
they weren’t “promised” anything… i could care less about your “and/or” because the whole “extraction” conversation is just you trying to create controversy where there is none and was never really credible to any of us fire people… “promised” is where you are disingenuous.
>> xxfullsailxx also said
>> On multiple occasions he has spoken like he
>> is an expert.
right, it’s been pretty obvious that you have zero fire experience, so i would suggest you stop making claims of fact like you know something, when you don’t… (the most recent example being the “extraction” one)
and fyi: i have FIRE SISTER’S too, lets not add “chauvinistic” to your list of downfalls.
>> like he has found some great evidence that
>> hints at conspiracy.
your little “announcements” **THAT YOU MAKE WITH ASTERISKS ASSERTING THAT YOU HAVE SOME NEW EVIDENCE** that is going to “break the case” like a news headline is what i was referring to… really just point of style.
your tone often indicates that you’re the leader of a lynch mob looking for someone to hang for what happened that day.
>> xxfullsailxx also said
>> He has insinuated that Blue Ridge IHC was negligent
>> or complicit in the deaths of GM.
i am pretty sure at some point on the last page you were insinuating that BR was somehow neglectful (or worse?) in their actions that day. slanderous.
FACEBOOK/PUBLIC INFORMATION
if you feel at liberty to post people’s information here for purposes of your amateur investigation, then you should go ahead and state your name, so they know who to contact about any false allegations. (since you seem to be all about accountability.)
(stalking his mom’s facebook page for a picture on christmas eve? that’s just weird dude…)
“:: Did he just head right over the Ranch House Restaurant
:: and order a burger, or something?”
thank you for fetching that, i was too lazy. question or not, it’s called conjecture, and i think it is pretty distasteful, regardless of how you feel about B. McDonogh.
>> xxfullsailxx also said
>> these are just a few of his assertions, all without
>> merit, all with poorly compiled “evidence.”
WTKTT: “Yeah. Right. Whatever.”
mmhmmm. so, what is your name and background? are you from the Yavapai County area? are you related to any of the victims in anyway?
(because that’s about the only way that i would excuse your amateur journalistic witch hunt here)
oh goodness… my initial reaction was to “just scroll past the person(s) comments…”
i can’t deal with bad analogies joy… but don’t worry, i’m not going anywhere.
and i am not trying to deny anyone “freedom of speech.” what concerns me is false allegations made based on shaky evidence by anonymous people hiding behind the internet. and thanks for thinking of me!
and just because there have been some really bad assumptions about who i may be (and so no one has the tendency to call me a hypocrite):
i am just a lowly Engine Captain for the Forest Service currently working in Region 6 (Pacific Northwest). I have worked for the feds since 2002 in various capacities (including a brief stint on a hotshot crew) and in various regions (including a couple years in Region 3)… i am not related to anyone directly involved in the Yarnell Hill fire… though, in the fire world, there tends to be less than a few degrees of separation… meaning that everyone knows someone who worked with so and so.
Well, reflect on your own glass house. You’ve made some good points, when commenting on the general subject of the comment thread. And, no one attacked you when you made some technical assertions that were way off-base, even though they were safety-related and even though you made them with an arrogant tone. I don’t see that arrogant tone displayed by others here with for more knowledge than you. It is easy to scan through comments you may not like. You have, though, succeeded in making much of the comments of the last day about you. Just as no one attacked you, consider not attacking others, step out of the attention, and resume making positive posts.
I would like you to stay if you do that. If you do want to continue attacking others, I think it is time for you to go.
NV
i wasn’t really looking for your commentary, but since you’ve inserted yourself into the conversation…
the only thing i’ve asked of you, is some more information about those “many instances” (para-phrased) where people “survived in boulder fields when people who deployed shelters near them did not survive…” (also para-phrased). which you can’t seem to provide.
“technical assertions that were way off base?”
i assume you’re talking about deployment zones? were there other assertions that YOU FEEL were way off base? if so, please feel free to elaborate.
i disagree with the idea that deploying 19 people in a boulder field is a good idea, regardless of what you quote from the NWCG shelter deployment manual. besides the fact that i haven’t really seen any pictures showing any boulder fields in the Yarnell area that weren’t surrounded by heavy vegetation, hiking 19 people uphill through a boulder field, doesn’t really seem like a bright idea, nor very expeditious. sure, in hindsight you can say, “well maybe they should have tried this or that” but i don’t think GM had much time to reflect on all the possible options. maybe you’ve heard of Watchout situation #17? or maybe you’ve heard of 30 mile incident? (and fyi: i already addressed this above)
also: i didn’t make the conversation about me, the other commenter’s did. i was trying to address an issue that is very prevalent in this dialogue:
false allegations based on shaky evidence by anonymous people hiding behind the internet.
and lastly, i ignore PLENTY of irrelevant or inane comments on here. if i commented on all that caught my attention, i would have to make this a full time job.
but thanks so much for your input!
You’re actually doing a good job showing that you don’t know what you don’t know.
wow NV, what a thoughtful, well spoken retort…
xxFullsailxx: MANN GULCH, for the love of GOD!
At Mann Gulch, the two guys (Sallee and whats-his-face) survived in the boulder field while the other guy (and likely others) were within yards and did not make it.
You don’t have to go beyond Mann Gulch – the grandfather of all burn-overs or entrapments or whatever you people call them – to find a general example what NV is referencing. NOW, can we please move on? 🙂
no elizabeth, that’s an example of people trying to run uphill from a fire where only two of 15 made it by scrambling up a rocky ridge and luckily finding a gap in the rocks through which to crawl. no one deployed (there weren’t fire shelters then). if anything, it’s a good example of why trying to run uphill through a boulder field is a bad idea.
and if you keep invoking “God” in all this, i am going to put you in Chief Willis’s camp.
Stay with me on this, xxfullsailxx, and you might learn some stuff:
Fire can burn DOWN A HILL, too. It’s true. Light a match, and hold it upside down *AND* right side up. It burns both ways. So Sallee and what’s-his-name made it through the rocks to the other side of the hill, but the fire… wait for it… kept coming!!! They survived because they were as smart as NV, and they got into a boulder scree on the downside of the hill as the fire passed over them. If they had not gotten into the boulders, they would have burned like a marshmallow in a fire pit, according to their own transcribed testimony. (They didn’t say anything about a marshmallow. That was my own literary flourish.)
The good thing about boulders, as I understand it, is that plant life does not favor them as a medium for rooting, so there is usually not a lot of stuff to burn you to death in a boulder scree. Then again, I am not a biologist or a horticulturist, so what do I know…..
And God bless you, xxfullsailxx.
His name was Rumsey I believe.
The one thing about mann Gulch The guys running up hill did not know where they were going they were trying to get over the ridge, with no Idea what they would do on the other side. The two that ran into the rock pile was a pure accident, or luck.
thanks bob…
hopefully NV will get lucky too!
Bob, if you are saying that the men just RANDOMLY decided to get into the rock field, you would be WRONG. They DELIBERATELY got into the rock scree, rather than, say, laying in the grass NEXT to the rock scree.
Please don’t encourage xxfullsailxx to continue being a puke to NV.
i think you need to revisit your “facts”…
xxxFullSailxxx—this is a message made for you. You have offered some flair many of us comprehend but its the approach or delivery that is distasteful when you go off from that weekend and speak of others. If you do not like a certain person commenting here just scroll past the person(s) comments. I awoke earlier this morning thinking of you. It made me reflect to a time when I was in a fancy hotel foyer and this strikingly beautiful woman was so filled with distaste and anger because she knew the wrong to her mind was in a wheelchair in that foyer; another beautiful woman and this first lady went nuts of expressing her emotions and the lady went running at her in the wheelchair to the point she wanted to take her down. A scene an authority would label them into the “system” with courts and fines and counseling classes and mark on her record yet Jesus holds our journey—what took place was people were coaching this lady’s anger to just do it; hurt her…hit her….even though the lady was in a wheelchair…and anger was growing—yet every fiber of my body had Jesus running through my blood and I was not a church-goer since HS so to see me run up to her EVERYONE assumed I wanted a piece of the action and anger and when people saw I ran at her and hugged her in such an empathetic deep way that I felt her adrenaline and her anger and every hurtful emotion and I saw myself whispering to her- just let your anger pour out of you not into anyone else but let it go—so in that I am strongly believe God is the healer and God will in His time reveal the TRUTH to this horrific tragedy (Yarnell Hill Fire) and why do I feel so confident about it because of the many traumas and tragedy I have already seen or had and I know God has never forsaken me. He knows I need such clarity to that weekend. Azcentral reporter can narrate his views but in this weekend I want it to remain pure and simple as to what happened; no versions or stories. So I get xxxFullSailxxx on the theorizing concern but this is the place for that because people know coming here this is the place to jot your thoughts to hopefully have someone else walk you through it; simple as that. By the way about me being removed from my govt/history class when doing oral report; when I went to principal’s office back in the 80’s—even my own principal agreed with me and the facts I presented but she stated some teachers are narrow minded so please xxxFullSailxxx do not be that narrow minded that you cannot let all have “freedom to speech”—Sonny and I are just very tiny instruments to that weekend but it will take people like Y O U who knows who they are to share more on that weekend. When you start 2014 do not have wishful thinking—have HOPE. We hope you remain here too xxxFullSailxxx sharing yet talk about that weekend not others. Leave “Sparky” at ASU—thank you.
oops, my “reply” (found below) was meant to be here… my bad.
Rance Marquez YIN p36……I was committed to the Doce Fire so I asked if I could go, was told no. But I told him that It wouldn’t be very long because I heard that they had ordered Bea Day’s team so he said OK.
So he was ordered (per YIN) for the type 3 team at Yarnell but committed to the Doce Fire? How does that work?
Who ordered the Bea Day team? Doce or Yarnell?
Roy Hall p28 YIN…..11:00 Placed a call to David Geyer to go forward with the Central West Type 2 team full blown order. Received a report that the fire was traveling at 10-15 chains and flame lengths were 10-15 ft.
11:07 Placed a call to Bea Day and asked her to send, outside of the system, 2-3 of her best logs people and any ops people.
My opinion……Rance Marquez, DivZ, played a significant role in the YHF.
I just read the article from the link up above, and I think the earlier reports that Rance Marquez turned tail and ran as he abandoned his division are wholly without merit. I am starting to really like this guy.
I think Mr. Marquez simply initiated a strategic withdrawal and was advocating fighting the Yarnell Hill Fire from a more sensible and defensible position, like back firing from the CAP canal. Most of Yarnell would still be there today, and the Granite mountain Hotshots could have had a good laugh about the big one that did get away.
I think they should have made Mr. Marquez the IC, at least he was making some sense, “Screw this, haven’t you guys been keeping up on current events, this thing has been kicking our asses and you state of Arizona guys are pinching pennies, let’s get some resources in here and put this ***** down before it kills somebody!”
Rance Marquez YIN p36….I was ordered as Division for the Type 3 team.
Type 3, Type 2 short, type 2 regular. Would someone give me a little insight as to what this really means? If you are type 3 qualified, does that automatically make you qualified to hold the same position in a type 2 or type 2 short? Was Marquez qualified to be Division for a type 2 fire?
Unless things have changed, and I don’t believe so a Division boss is a Division boss there is no type I, II, III. Teams are overhead IC, OPS, Plans, logistics, Finance, also Safety Off., and Information Officer. On the line every thing below OPS is ordered from available resources. The other functions have a few specific people and the rest are ordered from available resources.
Agreed.
Which link??
Ding, ding, ding! I went one step further weeks ago and said that Marquez was actually a bit of an unintended hero, in that HE was the reason that the Blue Ridge guys were not in there, getting killed with the GM guys. Phrased differently, if Marquez had stayed around and tried to work in an unworkable situation, the Blue Ridge guys would have had to stay in that area, too. Who knows where they would have been when the fire blew up and changed course quickly.
I got smacked down for articulating this view, but I am not bitter. (I actually think it was my friend Rocksteady, who appears to be missing these days, who gave me the gentle smackdown…. Where are you, Rocksteady?)
I am here Elizabeth, just have not had anything to comment on.
I will, once I have a suitable thought of wisdom.
Whoa now! Another ‘soft smackdown’ here hopefully.
If the BRHS had been in there with the GMHS on June 30th – NOBODY would have died!
“Who knows where they would have been when the fire belw up …” Come on now. They were the most Situationally Aware bunch of all the WFF’s that day. They would’ve been somewhere safe.
RTS… have you saw the BR movement video Elizabeth posted?
Calvin,
I guess I haven’t seen it. And I sure haven’t seen anything to justify making that claim. I scrolled and looked above for it but could not find it.
RTS – I’m not sure if the below link is the right one – there are SEVERAL on the same YouTube Channel. The one linked below ends with some guy saying “That Mother Fucker.” Is he referring to the plane pilot, do you suppose?
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KPHwEUaC2YE
Elizabeth,
Not this one. Looking for the one that NV says above is the “BR movement” one. The MF comment could’ve been about anything really. No telling without anything preceding it.
RTS, I haven’t made any claim, I simply asked you if you saw a video that actually shows the movement of one element of the BRH.
RTS –
I guess I had thought that Marsh’s failure to properly assess the risk in descending into that box canyon was likely a “one off”. Unfortunately “one offs” are hard to predict and hard to see coming. The idea that it might have resulted from less-than-good habits and attitudes developed over time that culminated in disaster is hard to admit. What hurts is that with proper oversight, such issues might be corrected. A weakness with the GMHS is that they were too much Marsh’s “baby” – when it came to training and procedures he was running the show. He set the culture, for better or worse. I noted that one of Rickover’s “7” was having supervisors that care about those under them. I doubt, from all accounts, that was in any way a problem with the GMHS. What is sad is that did not prevent disaster from occurring, other factors just overrode that fact.
**
** VIDEO SHOT BY GLEN ILAH CITIZEN ON JUNE 30, 2013
** WAS TAKEN AT THE EXACT MOMENT OF BURNOVER
** OUT AT THE DEPLOYMENT SITE.
A few days ago, Eric found some videos on YouTube taken
in Yarnell on June 30, 2013.
BOTH of these videos turned out to be very important.
The ‘Ranch House’ restaurant video was taken later in the evening, after
sundown, and didn’t provide any real ‘new’ visual evidence… but it DID end up
providing the exact needed visual clues to finally identify the original Tom Story
( AZREPUBLIC ) photo as having been taken at the Ranch House Restaurant
circa 4:15. That’s the photo that actually shows the moment the Blue Ridge
Hotshots arrived at the Ranch House Restaurant WITH the Granite Mountain
vehicles.
The OTHER video Eric found, taken by a citizen of Glen Ilah ( which shows him
evacuating his house in the nick of time at the western edge of Glen Ilah that
afternoon ), has also turned out to be quite important.
In this video, at +1:12, right after he says “There goes a neighbor’s f***ing
house… Holy s**t”… the camera pans down for a moment and we see the fully
lighted instrument panel in his car.
An LED panel on the dashboard says…
Time: 4:48 PM
Temperature: 97 degrees F.
4:48 PM is at or about the exact time of the burnover at the deployment site…
and the camera is actually only 1,382 yards away from the deployment site
itself at the moment he is filming himself evacuating. The sky is PITCH BLACK
at that moment and it looks like the middle of the night.
>> On December 28, 2013 at 6:56 pm, Eric said…
>>
>> A couple of good video’s I found on you tube I have not seen before:
>> This is a citizen in Glen Ilah:
>> http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t_AjhL448ZA
Here are the YouTube details on that video…
YouTube title: Yarnell Fire
Published on Jul 19, 2013
By YouTube User: fathomsuperfly ( 5 videos )
YouTube About Information: Yarnell Fire. This is my escape
from Glen Ilah, neighborhood that got the worst of the fire.
The first THREE ‘segments’ in the video appear to have been shot from the
driveway of his home in Glen Ilah sometime just after sundown on Saturday,
June 29, 2013.
The fireline on the Weaver Mountains, in the distance, matches the ADOSH fire
progression for around that time on Saturday evening… and the video shows the
winds were blowing totally from the southwest and pushing the fire to the
northeast, AWAY from Glen Ilah and Yarnell.
The next TWO segments appear to have been shot sometime around 3:45 PM
on Sunday, June 30, 2013. Again… both of these videos are being shot from the
driveway of his home in the western part of Glen Ilah.
The smoke cloud is building fast just to the north.
The SIXTH segment begins the sequence of videos he shot while actually
evacuating from his home at 4:48 PM the afternoon of July 30, 2013.
That is pretty much the exact moment when the burnover was taking ( or had
just taken ) place at the deployment site just 1,382 yards due west of where he
is now shooting video.
It is TOTALLY DARK at that moment, in that area, as if it were the ‘dead of night’.
As usual… with any latitude,longitude values shown below, just cut-and-paste the
line with the comma separating the two values into the address bar of Google
Maps, hit ENTER, and a GREEN ARROW will be pointing to the exact location.
VIDEO STARTS
** Segment: Start: +0:00 End: +0:02
Shot from the driveway of his home in Glen Ilah. The time was ( apparently ) just
after sundown on Saturday evening, June 29, 2013.
The fireline in the distance on the Weaver Mountains matches the ADOSH
progression chart for that day/time. The winds were blowing totally from the
southwest and pushing the fire to the northeast, AWAY from Glen Ilah
and Yarnell.
** Segment: Start: +0:03 End: +0:29
Same location/time as Segment 1.
This is the segment that shows him talking to the two little boys and asking him
what they thought of the fire in the distance.
** Segment: Start: +0:30 End: +0:40
Same location/time as Segments 1 and 2.
Another shot of the fireline in distance right after dusk.
This segment ZOOMS IN on the fireline up on the Weaver Mountain ridge.
** Segment: Start: +0:41 End: +0:43
Late afternoon, Sunday, July 30, 2013. Circa 3:45 PM.
Shot from the end of the driveway of his home, out near Ridgeway drive, and
looking north/northwest down Ridgeway Drive.
The wind is blowing pretty hard.
Camera location is exactly here…
22906 Ridgeway Dr, Yarnell, AZ 85362
34.217616, -112.764221
He is at almost the western edge of Glen Ilah and the distance from where he is
standing ( his house ) to the center of the deployment site itself ( due west ) is…
4147.74 ft
1382.58 yards
0.7 mile(s)
The distance from the camera location, due west, to the center of the Boulder
Springs Ranch is…
2128.38 ft
709.4 yards
0.1 mile(s)
** Segment: Start: +0:44 End: +0:51
Shot from almost the same location as the previous segment, just a few
moments later.
Shows the small white house with a grey roof that appears to be the camera
operator’s actual residence.
He is now standing IN his own yard panning the camera south instead of north.
Camera location is exactly here, near the tree in his yard…
34.217565, -112.764118
** THE START OF HIS EVACUATION FROM GLEN ILLAH
**
** Segment: Start: +0:52 End: +1:10
This is the segment that is later in the afternoon on June 30, 2013, but starts out
completely BLACK because of the smoke cloud now overhead.
He is evacuating now.
We see him pulling out of the driveway of his home and about to head north on
Ridgeway Drive.
** Segment: Start: +1:11 End: +1:17
He has just left his driveway, is heading north on Ridgeway Drive and we see him
taking a right-hand turn onto Westward Drive to head east and out of Glen Ilah.
Visbility is almost ZERO at this point.
At +1:12, right after he says “There goes a neighbor’s f***ing house…
Holy s**t”… the camera pans down for a moment and we see the fully lighted
instrument panel in the car.
An LED panel on the dashboard says…
Time: 4:48 PM
Temperature: 97 degrees fahrenheit
** Segment: Start: +1:18 End: +1:32
Driving out of Glen Ilah east on Westward Drive.
The car has just passed the point where Ridgeway drive intersects with
Westward Drive.
34.217944, -112.764002
The two-story house seen silhouetted against orange sky is exactly here…
17537 Westward Dr., Yarnell, AZ 85362
34.217841, -112.763754
** Segment: Start: +1:33 End: +2:05
At +1:36, on the drive out, the car is exactly here heading east on Westward
Drive and approaching the intersection of Westward Drive and Lakewood Drive…
102 Westward Dr, Yarnell, AZ 85362
34.218467, -112.761829
At +1:47 the vehicle is at the exact spot where Westward Drive and Lakewood
Drive meet and the spot fire seen out in the field to the north is burning exactly
here…
34.219004, -112.761008
The car continues travelling east on Lakewood Drive.
At +1:55 the car is exactly here looking through the tree trunks on the north side
of Lakewood Drive and coming up on the point where Lakewood drive and
Manzanita Drive meet…
34.218414, -112.760971
At +1:58 the car is here…
34.218507, -112.760778
..and the towering flames now seen in the near distance on the right side of the
video are burning in the open field located exactly here…
34.220157, -112.762146
At +2:02 the car is here and looking through the triple tree trunks at the towering
flames just to the north…
34.218569, -112.760585
At +2:06, right when this video segment ends, the car has reached the point
where Lakewood Drive meets Manzanita Drive and is exactly here…
34.218569, -112.760274
** Segment: Start: +2:06 End: +2:20
The car is now traveling east on Lakewood Drive heading out
towards Highway 89.
+2:11: Single story house with the blue roof and the red front-loader
parked in the driveway…
23075 Lakewood Dr., Yarnell, AZ 85362
34.215756, -112.757986
** Segment: Start: +2:21 End: +2:25
Driver took a left off Lakewood Drive and went east on Fountainhill Road
towards Highway 89.
At 2:21 driver is exactly here on Fountainhill Road just about to
reach Highway 89…
34.216133, -112.754456
The house seen at that exact moment with the rocks behind it is exactly here…
100-10916 Fountainhill Rd., Yarnell, AZ 85362 ?
34.216658, -112.754695
** Segment: Start: +2:26 End: +2:32
Driver has taken a left off Fountainhill Road onto Highway 89 and is now headed
north towards the town of Yarnell itself.
Camera is looking west as he drives north on Highway 89. Fires and smoke
cloud clearly seen.
All throughout this segment… the camera is pretty much aimed directly at the
deployment site area off to the west and it is just minutes AFTER the
actual burnover out at the deployment site.
When this segment begins… the car is exactly here on Highway 89, just 661 feet
north of where Fountainhill Drive meets Highway 89…
34.216783, -112.752066
The gate he drives by on Highway 89 is exactly here…
34.217319, -112.751092
When this segment ends… the car is exactly here on Highway 89…
34.217574, -112.750513
** Segment: Start: +2:33 End: +2:41
Still driving into Yarnell proper. Camera is still facing west.
He is only a few feet farther along than the end of the previous segment and
must have just taken his finger off the shutter button for a second or two before
pressing it again.
The green/white road sign that says ‘Congress Jct SR 71 – 10 miles’ and
‘Wickenburg – 24 miles’ that he passes in the middle of this segment on the west
side of Highway 89 is exactly here…
34.217807, -112.750376
** Segment: Start: +2:42 End: 2:48
He has reached the town of Yarnell now. He is still traveling north on Highway 89.
Camera is still facing west.
Segment starts with car located exactly here on Highway 89…
34.219768, -112.748619
** Segment: Start: +2:49 End: 2:51
He has passed through most of Yarnell downtown and stopped the car just past
where Shrine road meets Highway 89.
Camera is still facing west.
** Segment: Start: +2:52 End: +2:53
Very short 1 second clip looking west.
** Segment: Start: +2:54 End: +2:55
Very short 1 second clip looking west.
The white building with the RCA sign is on the north side of Yarnell, just past
where Shrine Road meets Highway 89. The building is exactly here…
34.223346, -112.746431
** Segment: Start: +2:56 End: +2:59
He has now stopped at the Texaco Station on the north side of Yarnell, across
from the RCA building, and has gotten up onto the roof of the Texaco Station
which is exactly here…
22535 Arizona 89, Yarnell, AZ 85362
34.222969, -112.746109
The building with the GROCERY sign on the left that he is ‘shooting over’ on
the other side of the street is here…
34.223147, -112.746581
** Segment: Start: +3:00 End: +3:19
The building roof in the foreground with the small Direct-TV Satellite dish in the
lower right corner of the video frame is here…
22525 Cherry Ln / Arizona 89 / Yarnell, AZ 85362
34.222898, -112.746742
Camera then pans looking south on Highway 89, then zooms in and then
back on some spot fires off to the south.
** Segment: Start: +3:20 End: +3:26
He is still shooting from the roof of the Texaco Station.
Sikorsky-style Orange Helicopter 376 Water Drop 1
Chopper is on approach.
** Segment: Start: +3:27 End: +3:42
Sikorsky-style Orange Helicopter 376 Water Drop 2
Water is dropped right here just across the street in a neighborhood on
the west side of Highway 89…
34.222752, -112.747804
** Segment: Start: +3:43 End: +3:55
He is still on the roof of the Texaco station.
Segment starts with camera shooting north from the roof.
Camera pans around and shows others standing on roofs nearby
also shooting pictures and video at that moment.
END OF VIDEO
A couple of the videos shot by the Blue Ridge crew the day of the Yarnell Hill Fire tragedy are here:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n72OgR2Phvo
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eENxZud4eZk
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KPHwEUaC2YE
That last one – listen closely at the beginning and then at the bitter end. I have an idea on what I am hearing, but I do not want to post it, because then I will be accused of SPECULATING or engaging in conjecture.
Also, I cannot remember if WTKTT already found these videos elsewhere and posted links, so, if he did, I apologize.
Thank you, John Dougherty and Investigative Media, for allowing the public to comment and collaborate here. Thanks to Gary Olson and Bob Powers for encouraging people to speak up, and for your commitment to safety and transparency.
I have no doubt that there are many more like myself, who lurk on this forum. I am motivated to find out more for myself and others in the field. Even though I believe that safety is fundamentally each individual firefighter’s responsibility, if I ever have to hear a supervisor sum up my friends’ and coworkers’ fates with “God had other plans,” I will lose my mind. It frustrated me when the press characterized firefighters as not caring for their own safety. It infuriated me when I heard Darrell Willis say as much on the military.com report. Of all people, he should know that it would have been more honorable for these men to use their experience to manage tomorrow’s fires, mentor younger fire fighters, raise their children, support their spouses, and comfort their aging parents, than it was to die horribly in a mistake. I feel compelled to make a difference, and use everything I can learn this winter during our training sessions in the spring.
The SAIR concludes that these tragedies just happen sometimes, and that would be a self-fullfilling prophecy. I find it imperative that we learn something else, something better.
I think WTKTT and Elizabeth have provided invaluable assistance in understanding these materials. They have both the disadvantages and the benefits of some distance from the wildland fire subculture. Viewing these circumstances with fresh eyes, they provide us within the community with a great opportunity to learn about ourselves. For example, most fire fighters seem to see the work/rest schedule as having become more cushy in the last ten years, and any further changes as tampering with their ability to work fires and make money (which is an important consideration when you work a seasonal job with a base pay of $12/hour). However, Elizabeth is absolutely right on the drunk/sleep connection. Just like in medicine, people still die because because we’ve inherited Thomas Edison’s notion that sleep is “a criminal waste of time.” We don’t consider it as necessary as S-130/190 or physical training to the success and safety of our jobs. This is still controversial within the wildland fire community.
I suggest that those seeking to mold this forum into something strictly productive should kindly inform members when an error is found, and gently correct them. It is not a waste of time, unless the goal of your time here is to shut down alternative ideas and conversation altogether.
Well…here is my 2 cents worth (even if that is all it’s worth) on what xxfullsailxx said, and I have my doubts that is EVEN HIS REAL NAME. The internet is all things to all people. Good where good is. Bad where bad is. I warned the SAIT that this was going to be different than any other disaster fire investigation in history because of the explosion of social media, and then they went ahead and did a worse job than the Battlement Creek or South Canyon investigations anyway.
Dr. Ted Putnam, who I believe has both impeccable wildland firefighter (even if he was a smokejumper) credentials, and wildland firefighter safety credentials, has written (and stated in person, I heard him) that the Battlement Creek Fire Disaster Investigation was a cover-up, and he refused to sign the South Canyon Fire Investigation because it is so flawed (he was a member of both SAIT). Would you prefer it if only “they” got to publish or talk about their findings?
If you want to look for false claims, unsubstantiated and false conjecture, all you have to do is go to the staff ride library put together by the NWCG. I will give you two examples of false claims there, and they put those there after I repeatedly told the Battlement Creek Staff Ride committee they WERE FALSE.
1. The Mormon Lake Hotshots left their fire shelters in camp on the day they were burned over and killed. FALSE…no Coconino National Forest Hotshot Crew were issued or trained in the use of fire shelters until the beginning of the 1977 fire season (the Battlement Creek Fire occurred in 1976).
Why would they lie about that? Maybe they knew before I did that the Chief of the Forest Service had ordered all hotshot crews carry fire shelters on all wildfires almost 10 years earlier. But in that bottom up organization, to many people can choose when to follow directives and when not to.
2. Neither the Mormon Lake Hotshots or the Happy Jack Hotshots knew the location or tasks of the other crew, their situational awareness was nil. FALSE…we knew exactly where they were and exactly what they were doing, we could see them. And they knew exactly where we were and what we were doing, (both crews were following the day shift plan to the letter) they could see us.
Both of our crew bosses had Coconino National Forest frequencies on their crew radios…when are 2 crew bosses from sister crews not going to talk when they have been assigned to work together on a coordinated objective, like when one crew is assigned to ignite a backfire below the other one under extreme fire behavior conditions. Yes it’s true…the Yarnell Hill Fire is not the first wildfire in history to burn under extreme fire conditions!
If they can deliberately publish BULL**** like that with arrogant impunity, guess what? We have every reason to suspect everything else they have written there is BULL****!
Side note: Which brings up a bone I have been meaning to pick with the Yarnell Hill Fire DISASTER SAIT. Why didn’t they challenge the fact that there wasn’t even a shift plan for June 1, 2013, for the Yarnell Hill Fire? I told John Dougherty he needed to get that with a FOIA because that would answer a lot of his questions, I told him there had to be one.
And guess what, they hadn’t bothered to do one (that wasn’t the first shift). Now I know I have been out of fire since 1988, but I could have done a shift plan for that day on the back of a bar napkin (shift plans are never fancy) in ten minutes, they just have some basic information on them like WHO is supposed to where, and what WHO is supposed to be doing that day.
And how about a hand draw map of the fire (it’s not like they hadn’t been flying over the fire for quite some time, (hasn’t anybody ever heard Google Maps and Google Earth other than WTKTT) with just the Division breaks for one thing on it, and they could have gotten it copied over at the library, for cryin’ out loud. No excuses!
Now see…if it wasn’t for John’s experiment on interactive journalism, I would not have been able to do anything other than yell that at the TV, now I get to launch it into cyber space for some insomniac in China to read! It is a Brave New World! Big Brother is not the only one with a bully pulpit now. The internet has leveled the playing field, at least a little bit, for the little guy. That is a good thing.
So back on point, why hold the ASAIT to a higher standard than the NWCG? Yes, there are things that are wrong here (some of them I wrote) and there are some things that are nothing but conjecture and opinion (some of them mine) here, but so what?
What choice did the SAIT leave us with after they wrote up that pile of garbage SAIR. Give me some authority and a brief case full of Garrity warnings and I will find out the whole truth and nothing but the truth, AMEN, for you, but that is one thing “they” don’t want to happen, so they assigned circus clowns to do the job of professional investigators. But that isn’t going to happen, so we will have to be content with what it is, and do the best we can without being able to find out our own facts or do our own interviews, etc.
We have to speculate on some things, and WTKTT (and I did press him for his background and he said if he told me he would have to kill me, so now I don’t even want to know) is as good as he is (I was trained at the best, according to them, law enforcement training facility in the world and trying to follow him makes my head hurt) is right more often than he is wrong, (and the ASAIT has called him on some of his mood swings and BS, we are self regulating, which is better than no regulating like the SAIT) and how about Elizabeth? Just try to find another lawyer, much less than one with her skill set (and yes, the average lawyer is BETTER at analyzing things than the average person is) to work for free, and we will think about replacing her. In the meantime…lighten up!
Oh…and by the way, I have a few more bones to pick with some folks over the Yarnell Hill Fire, when I feel like typing them up. And you know what? You will have a choice when I do…you can ignore them (don’t log on to this silly thread, as you say) or you can read them and ridicule them, or you can agree with some or with all of them, or not…it’s called FREE CHOICE, you have it, but so do I. We can all shift through the information that is presented here and choose what we do with it for ourselves, but I think you should stop trying to censure us and shut this thread down. Just accept your role as the loyal opposition and move forward, or stop logging on.
I personally think it is worthwhile. I think the lives of the Granite Mountain Hotshots and the next crew that is going to be burned over are worth it. How about you? We (the ASAIT) have already done a great service to all wildland firefighters for free, compare that to what the official SAIT did for a whole bunch of money.
We have identified at least one (and counting) lesson learned from the Yarnell Hill Fire. IF THE SPOT YOU ARE CONTEMPLATING LAYING DOWN INSIDE A FIRE SHELTER IS OBVIOUSLY NOT SURVIABLE, DON’T DO IT…RUN TO A BOUDLER FIELD OR ROCK SLIDE OR ANYWHERE ELSE YOU CAN…BUT DON’T LAY DOWN IN FRONT OF AN INFERNO WHERE YOU HAVE NO CHANCE OF SURVIAL (AND IT WASN’T A CLOSE CALL) AND DIE! AT LEAST YOU WILL DIE ON YOUR FEET MOVING FORWARD! And yes…there is CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT THE GRAINTE MOUNTAIN HOTSHOTS DID NOT KNOW THAT, BECAUSE THEY LAID DOWN IN FRONT OF AN INFERNO WHERE THEY HAD NO CHANCE OF SURVIAL AND THEY DIED, REALLY, REALLY HORRIBLE DEATHS! That is what this is about. This is not a theoretical exercise. All wildland firefighters need to be re-trained on the use of fire shelters before next fire season with an emphasis on the limitations of the fire shelter which includes a detailed study of, “How Big Is Big Enough.”
And, as even you have conceded (paraphrase here), the fact that the Granite Mountain Hotshots were built by a structural fire department may have had something to do with fact that they walked in front of an inferno that was predicted to do exactly what it did, exactly when it was predicted to do it, and they had acknowledged they heard the warnings! And furthermore, you wrote that other Type IIA crews who are sponsored by other city fire departments should take heed! Great Job! Thank you.
We have come a long ways since so many people, family members and former GM hotshots attacked me for that concept, those accusations really hurt. But guess what? I was spot on. Sometimes the truth really, really, really, hurts. And you know what? That should now help them with their lawsuits against the state and the city, and they need all of the help they can get, since all of the laws have been written in this country based on the fact that the Crown (British) can do no wrong, otherwise known as Sovereign Immunity.
And “they” have already started retaliating by announcing they are going to withhold the known death benefits until all of the lawsuits are settled. What is the reason for doing that other than retaliation? Is there some chance the lawsuits will reveal that NO death benefits should be paid? Nobody can be as chicken**** as the Empire when it decides to strike back. And I think some of our OTHER work might be able to help them as well. Why not help them? Do you think their lawyers aren’t reading and following this silly thread (and all others) closely?
And…I think there are some current wildland firefighters, other than you, who are following this thread from the shadows as well, and they are picking up some valuable information here, there are a bunch of old fire guys (and some current ones) posting here, and discarding the rest. And on our very worst day, the ASAIT is not going to do as bad a job as the SAIT did with their SAIR. Bottom line.
Your welcome.
Oh…and one more thing. If everyone who participates in this discussion has similar life experiences, training, education, values, etc. we may arrive at the right conclusion, but we also may arrive at the wrong conclusion.
And I have a great deal of empathy for all of those fire guys who were told, “Here sign off on this POS SAIR…or bend over and kiss your careers good bye!”
Gary,
Good points. And it appears that everyone of them signed the YHF SAIR, compared to Ted Putnam who at least had ‘the stones’ to refuse to sign the whitewashed 1994 South Canyon Fire Investigative Report.
Gary, BEST locker-room speech EVER! I am proud to serve the ASAIT (until somebody better comes along….).
One relevant point that I meant to post today but forgot because I was so distracted by the needless snarking was this:
We have now heard an audio from 3:50 p.m. that indicates Abel is telling Marsh that Abel will send some air support.
Remember, however, that, according to the ADOSH and SAIT, at 4:37, ASM2 flies “a drop path for a VLAT north of Yarnell from west to east,” which went over Marsh, whereupon Marsh stated “[ASM2], Division Alpha, That’s exactly what we’re looking for. That’s where we want the retardant.”
I don’t know how these two pieces fit together, but I am pretty sure that they do. And I am pretty sure that at least one member of the wildfire fighting community who was at Yarnell that day can fit those pieces together with relative ease.
And I want to apologize for calling the SAIT circus clowns, they are just men who like their jobs and their life styles and want to keep them. They are victims here as well. They had to surrender their integrity…if they had any left after climbing as high in their respective agencies as they have.
Reply to Elizabeth on January 2, 2014 at 8:00 pm
Elizabeth… there’s been some pretty good prior discussion
( and, of course, the necessary conjecture ) on that
radio transmission from Marsh. Calvin himself has been
studying that one for a while including whether the
Globe Type II Crew videos on Youtube actually show
that planned drop ‘to the north of Yarnell’ at that time.
The real ‘mystery’ is where Marsh might have actually
BEEN when he made his “That’s where we want
retardant” transmission.
Remember… until we have evidence to the contrary… the
‘Story Assembled Internally Report’ ( SAIR ) puts a time
on that transmission from Marsh at 4:37 PM.
That’s only 120 seconds before we hear the first
MAYDAY call from Captain Steed.
We KNOW that Marsh was there at the deployment
site ( out of breath ) at 4:42 when he made his final
transmission. What we still do NOT know is how
far away was he from those men when he made his
4:37 ‘retardant’ transmission and then, 2 minutes later,
Steed made his first MAYDAY call at 4:39.
If Marsh was near the back of the line of men when
he made his 4:37 “That’s where we want retardant”
transmission… then it’s almost a given there was
no way he could have even SEEN a line-up flight
for a VLAT drop all the way to the ‘north of Yarnell’
as the SAIR reports.
So was Marsh really way back up on the ridge and
able to see that ‘line-up’ flight just 120 seconds before
Steed made the MAYDAY call? (doubtful)… or was the
actual line-up flight to the SOUTH of Yarnell ( and not the
north as SAIR states ) and that’s how he really was able
to see that flight through the smoke and down in the box
canyon?
Did Marsh even SEE that line-up flight at all… or did he
just HEAR it through the enormous smoke cloud that
had already built up in that area by 4:37 PM?
Still questions that need to be answered.
really? this is your all-star “ASAIT?”
elizabeth, those pieces fit together because that retardant plane IS THE AIR SUPPORT THAT ABEL SAID HE WOULD GET THEM!!! THE AIR SUPPORT THAT MARSH HAD REQUESTED!!!
it’s pretty simple really… you answered your own question.
Reply to xxfullsailxx post on Jan 2, 2014 at 8:29 pm
>> xxfullsailxx wrote…
>> elizabeth, those pieces fit together because that
>> retardant plane IS THE AIR SUPPORT THAT
>> ABEL SAID HE WOULD GET THEM!!!
Now that we know ( for the first time ) that Abel
even said any such thing… then yes… that
is probably true even though it took almost
50 minutes since Abel said ‘ASAP’ for it to
be actually happening.
>> THE AIR SUPPORT THAT MARSH HAD
>> REQUESTED!!!
AFAIK.. there is still no actual evidence that Eric
Marsh, himself, ever made any such request
at any time following the incidents with Rory
Collins and the (forced) decision to ‘go direct’.
The audio now tells us Abel ‘offered’ some kind
of ‘Air Support’ circa 3:50 PM… but there is still no
real evidence it was (actually) at Eric’s request.
It would be nice if there was ( evidence of that ).
There are some that think that he DID specifically
request a ‘retardant drop’ ( even at some point after
4:00 PM ) and that when he eventually spotted
( or just heard? ) a line-up flight and said “That’s
where WE want retardant” at 4:37… that the
WE meant ‘Me and Granite Mountain’ and that he
was expecting it to be a ‘cover drop’ for THEM and
the risky move they were making.
Personally… I still don’t believe that.
Even though his transmission was only 120
seconds before Steed’s first MAYDAY… I still
believe Marsh was just trying to fulfill his DIVS A
duties even at 4:37, was totally unaware of the
danger he and GM were about to be in, and
his ‘WE’ at that moment simply meant “Me and
fire command” and he was simply trying to ‘guide’
a drop to help the general fire situation off in the
distance somewhere.
What do YOU think about that?
Who do you think Marsh meant when he said
‘WE’ at 4:37?
“There are some that think that he DID specifically request a ‘retardant drop’ … and that he was expecting it to be a ‘cover drop’ for THEM and the risky move they were making.”
something like: “quick! Ops Able! get me a cover drop over here so i can hike my crew out past this flaming front before this whole things blow up like a bomb!”
just like in the movies! anyone who would say that (or repeat it) really doesn’t have a clue, but i am glad you’re not believing it…
“The audio now tells us Abel ‘offered’ some kind of ‘Air Support’ circa 3:50 PM… but there is still no real evidence it was (actually) at Eric’s request.”
yep, you’re right, “offered” by Abel is a much better way to put it.
“I still believe Marsh was just trying to fulfill his DIVS A duties even at 4:37, was totally unaware of the danger he and GM were about to be in, and his ‘WE’ at that moment simply meant “Me and fire command” and he was simply trying to ‘guide’ a drop to help the general fire situation off in the distance somewhere.”
yep, that’s the exact impression that the SAIR gave, glad to see you’ve come around.
?? Come around to what ??
Do I think SOME of the things being
reported in the SAIR are backed up
by evidence?… Yep. We have already
discovered that to be the case.
Have I ‘come around’ to thinking that
the ‘Story Assembled Internally
Report’ wasn’t a complete waste of
taxpayer dollars?
Nope.
Fullsail….. If what you are saying is true ( that retardant plane IS THE AIR SUPPORT THAT ABEL SAID HE WOULD GET THEM!!! THE AIR SUPPORT THAT MARSH HAD REQUESTED!!!); then WHY did the Granite Mountain Hotshots not get the retardant? I am very inclined to believe your statement.
Calvin,
I think the implication now is, that the air support was for something Marsh was seeing off in the distance, just before he and GM started to move-out.
With the info we have now, it looks quite possible, that just before Marsh dropped off of the two-track into the bowl, he saw ASM flying the lead route over the area in question, and said, “that’s where we want the retardant”.
Sometimes, depending upon other needs and lots of variables, it takes a bit of time between the request, and the delivery.
One thing that could either solidify, or de-bunk, my theory above, would be to know the location and specific route that ASM was flying when Marsh uttered that transmission. I don’t recall that having been determined yet.
TTWARE… To me, fullsail’s statement doesn’t imply that at all. Maybe fullsail will address?
Calvin,
This gets convoluted sometimes by various responses to responses, but I was refering to fullsails response to WTKTTs response to fullsails other comment, and so on.
Where I was trying to get to, was their reference to Able’s 3:50 offer of air support, and how Marsh’s later (just before deployment) “that’s where we want it”, could refer to that earlier request, which had been made at approxmately the time they all began to move.
Because Marsh did not tell any body what they were going to do and where they were going. (They were the lost battalion ) They did not take the time to ID there exact location. I do not believe that an air tanker or a helicopter could have dropped on them with any accuracy. To much wind, heat, and smoke. It would have been to hazardous for an air tanker drop thru the smoke. That only happens in the movies. 20 to 40 MPH winds would have grounded the helicopter. The search Helicopter had to wait for the storm cell to pass.
That’s why you should be talking to someone outside your group about what you plan, where your going and how you get there all failures by GM.
Regardless… Calvin’s theory that the
reason they all ‘stayed together’ is
because they all BELIEVED a VLAT
drop was inbound at any moment is
still valid.
The LAST THING Marsh was told by
ASM2 was “We are bringing YOU
the VLAT, okay?”
You can call that ‘movie stuff’ all
you wan’t. That’s what ASM2 said,
and we know that they tried.
So until further evidence to the
contrary arises… it’s still valid to
assume that Marsh/Steed/Crew
all BELIEVED they were about
to get retardant.
>> TTWARE wrote…
>> With the info we have now, it looks quite
>> possible, that just before Marsh
>> dropped off of the two-track into the bowl,
>> he saw ASM flying the lead route over the
>> area in question, and said, “that’s where
>> we want the retardant”.
That would mean it only took Marsh
180 seconds to get all the way from the
top of the ridge down to the deployment
site.
120 seconds after his “That’s where we
want retardant” transmission was Steed’s
first MAYDAY from at or near the final
deployment site.
Just slightly less than 60 seconds after
that we finally hear Marsh ( out of breath )
say “I am here with Granite Mountain.
We are deploying”.
I wouldn’t put that in the ‘quite possible’
category myself… but I actually wouldn’t
rule it out altogether.
Only way to know if that was even possible
would be to get someone to stand at the
point where the roll of pink tape was found
and absoutely haul ass like a madman
down to the deployment site… and time
that ( even without any vegetation to
deal with ). If that 180 second window
isn’t achievable even without vegetation,
then it is NOT possible Marsh could have
been up on the ridge for the 4:37 “That’s
where we want retardant” transmission.
Besides… remember that it appears that
Marsh… straggling behind the others… had
NO IDEA of the trouble they were about
to be in up there until he, himself, heard
Steed’s first MAYDAY call at 4:39… so
he still might have been ‘hurrying to catch
up’… but not absolutely ‘throwing’ himself
down into that box canyon to catch them.
nope, xxfullsailxx is NOT my real name… very astute!
you think any wildland firefighter needs anyone here on this comment thread to tell them that they shouldn’t deploy in chaparral?
i think the SAIR actually did a pretty good job of summing up the effects of deploying where GM did for each firefighter.
the SAIT put there names on that report, for better or worse, they can be held accountable for what they did or did not include. whether or not they should or will be held accountable is another thing…
regardless, i will not let slide anyone coming here and claiming “to know” things that they obviously do not know and then using what “they [don’t] know” to make false allegations and ridiculous assumptions. (and i don’t really subscribe to the whole “batting .500 makes you an all star” argument, in my book it means your guessing). WTKTT is making false statements from behind his computer anonymously. that is pretty weak in my book. so yes, i have free choice, and i choose to point out the B.S. in my very own snarky style till someone with the power to do so hits my mute button.
and no, i don’t think that anyone who really matters is following this thread, there would be way too much conjecture and assumption to sift through.
FULLSAIL— that is not true. We have been led to the people who really matter and YES they do read this.
OK, have it your way.
No, I don’t think anyone should hit your mute button. Truthfully…I think you add a lot to our discussion and I always enjoy reading your comments. You are helping to keep us as honest as can be expected under these circumstances.
i’m not too worried about it, but thanks!
Fullsail and Jeff i,
No problems here gents. You make good points. Work on that delivery and style.
IN MY OPINION the problem with some of the commenter’s here, is that they think they are participating in amateur journalism which is problematic on a number of fronts, one of them being:
**there is no accountability for any accusations made or false conjecture**
professional journalists and researchers put their name behind their work. their work includes some degree of understanding of their subject matter. they collect solid evidence, compile and assemble that evidence into chronological order AND THEN try to come up with conclusions which they publish with their name and credentials and sometimes the backing of their publication.
a few people here have made horrible accusations and false claims and have even presented false evidence based on poor assumptions and haphazard collection of “evidence” about a profession that they have no experience in… even going so far as posting the names and phone numbers of people they don’t know, or posting false pictures from FB that they don’t know, or making horribly false claims (B. Mc Donaghue (sp.?) eating cheeseburgers while his crew is dying).
all with ZERO accountability for what they are saying…
i think it is great that John Dougherty allows conversation about his articles on the Yarnell Hill tragedy. it offers people outside of fire the opportunity to try to understand how such a horrible accident could occur and what fire managers all over the country are dealing with today. it is one thing to come on here and present what you think is relevant evidence and discuss that evidence in great detail, it’s another thing to continually draw false conclusions from that evidence and it is yet another thing to come on here and make false claims or accusations behind the dark veil of the internet based on those false conclusions.
so again Elizabeth, how come you haven’t asked that WTKTT reveal himself, seeing as how he seems to be the one repeatedly drawing false conclusions based on shaky evidence and bad assumptions?
Well said, pretty hard to argue any of the point fullsail makes.
I too am amazed at the statements that are made by WTKTT, clearly he has little knowledge of what it is like on the ground during a fire. Yet he will freely put thoughts in their heads and words in their mouths as if he were there. He may think by doing this he is furthering this discussion, but in my opinion he is only being irresponsible and reckless.
Jeff and fullsail I have about had it with both of you attacking people who are part of this discussion weather you agree or not is not going to work here. If you want to contribute in a positive manor please do so but do not attack the messengers as they have there own questions to answer as we all do. If your not happy with the comments get off the thread. You both have things to input that are positive quit attacking the others here.
My comments are meant not to be personal attack so much as an attack on a “style”. I believe that this discussion would be better served by sticking with the facts and doing away with the fabricated dialog and conjecture. Micro-analyze if you must, but do so to the facts and you will come away with statements that will hold water.
God bless you, Bob Powers. God bless you.
xxFullsailxx, I will reply to the questions that you posed directly to me if you agree to stop with the needless snark toward people like WTKTT, who obviously only want to HELP and who have devoted HOURS toward finding useful information for this group. Is it a deal?
no thanks, i would rather keep calling WTKTT out on his accusatory, unfounded, poorly reasoned assumptions and conjecture.
there is no “answer” you could give (aside from calling for the same credentials you asked of me). you deal with your own hypocrisy however you see fit.
You probably won’t see this (unless you use search to follow the dates, which is about the only way to follow all of this long, complicated conversation), but I’m going to write this, anyway, just in case you do. And it’s pretty clear you don’t take me very seriously. But I am very serious and way more intelligent that you seem to think I am.
I was feeling really really po’d at you for what you said about what WTKTT said about those photos Brendan took. So this evening I went thru all your comments in this particular chapter of this conversation.
I realized you HAVE been contributing important information within this conversation. So I owe you an apology for thinking you were just tail-gating fullsail or maybe just a shill for either PFD or Willis. (Even tho you seem to still think this is just a witch-hunt regarding Willis, even tho various ppl have said, essentially, when a lot of roads lead to Rome, Rome must be a center of something.) I’ve noticed in reading that you don’t seem to share Willis’ narrative that the GM Hotshots were super-heroes and this was all about “God had another plan for them.” So I no longer think you are/were working for him. Which, actually I did for awhile.
I have a question for you. You say WTKTT is being “irresponsible and reckless.”
I would seriously like to know why you make this claim.
Re. the term “irresponsible.” That implies not being “responsible.” This is a public forum, moderated by the person who owns this website. Who do you think WTKTT should be held responsible to/for? I guided back-packers into the Grand Canyon off and on for ten years. I knew I was responsible for the safety of those back-packers. I took that very seriously. For 35 years I was an ordained minister in the United Church of Christ. I was responsible for a certain amount of the spiritual well-being of my parishioners. I took that very seriously. For ten years I was a Girl Scout Leader. I was responsible for the safety and growth of my Girl Scouts. I took that seriously. That’s what responsibility to/for means to me. I have to say, I don’t think WTKTT is responsible to/for anything or anybody here. When you say he’s being “irresponsible,” who do you believe he’s being “irresponsible” to/for?
Now onto the term “reckless.” In my mind, (and I think I’m pretty consistent with the general understanding of this word), “reckless” means disregarding the safety or well-being of self or others. Do you mean that here? If you do, whose safety or well-being are you referring to?
Seven days from now, 50 years ago, my brother, a 15-year-old Eagle Scout, led his Patrol down onto a sandstone cliff edge near Tent Rocks in New Mexico, trying to get to the bottom of a mesa really quickly because it was getting dark. The sandstone broke beneath him, and he fell 300 feet to his death. The rest of the Patrol was trapped on that fragile cliff edge for eight hours, through the night, while a rescue helicopter almost crashed trying to deploy a rescuer who broke his leg while getting down to sling those kids up into that helicopter. It was all over The News. And I was 13 years old when it happened.
That’s how I understand the term “reckless.” I’ve ingested that, seriously, into every fiber of my being. I have no clue “why” he did it. I tried a long time to figure that out, before giving up. But I used those consequences as the bedrock foundation of everything I ever did after that when I was “responsible” for/to others, especially when in the wilderness.
I am of the opinion that sometimes WTKTT speculates a bit more freely than I would/do in a public forum/conversation like this one. But I’m an adult who is perfectly capable of taking words on the internet with whatever grains of salt they need, and I would never describe when he does that as either “irresponsible” or “reckless.” He is responsible to nobody (except the owner of this site who seems satisfied with his words) and he hasn’t put the well-being of anybody at risk.
Or do you think I am I missing something?
professional journalists and researchers put their name behind their work. their work includes some degree of understanding of their subject matter. they collect solid evidence===REPLY:
Really? I don’t think so. Not only have I lived my life around interacting/socializing/friendships with a-listers/celebs/govt folks over my life and seen how they have been ripped apart unfairly and unjustly- last weekend Sonny and I both were treated unjust and unfairly by a guy we liked with a narrative article about us that was not based on stuff we even discussed or he glazed it to the way he felt suited his article best but we share with purity and you can see the article here (http://www.azcentral.com/yarnell-fire/#burn)and than see our corrections here (http://wildfiretoday.com/2013/12/24/granite-mountain-hotshots-in-videos/). So do not believe just because a name is tied to an article or story- that it is WHAT it IS because I remember being in HS standing before a classroom to do my oral report for Government and History class to be asked to be removed immediately because I showed FACTS to how our history books in school are not always sharing exactly HOW things went down in history but you better believe that 6-30-13 day I will make sure it goes down in history factually. Enough of this brushing things under a rug. I hold a deep gratitude to everyone here for sharing because I need clarity to that weekend—the fire I saw up close and if I am taking the time out to share freely to all that are affected or want to find clarity than you better believe these GMHS DESERVE this as well as all prior fire fatalities to prevent this from ever happening again. If we all just stop coming here to talk things out no matter if it is just to work through it—get feedback—this has been a very good place to come—John Dougherty has done EXCELLENT investigative work and is still doing so 6 months later after this tragedy- thank you John. Thank you deeply to Elizabeth because on my days where I cannot make sense of things- she gives me clarity and a shoulder to lean on—a very genuine person with much heart. Please keep posting- it has helped many locals heal that lost everything. We have heard that in the local stores. Do not give up! People are reading here.
Admiral Hyman Rickover : “Father” of U.S. Nuclear Navy Seven Rules of Admiral Rickover by Risk Management Specialist Gordon Graham
1. We have to get better and better at what we do.
2. We need people who know how to think.
3. We need supervisors who care about their subordinates.
4. Practice the basics of risk management (i.e., assessment, prioritize, “act”).
5. Training must be constant and rigorous.
6. Audits and inspections are important (formal and informal).
7. Learn from the mistakes of the past.We have not figured out any new ways to screw things up.
There are better ways to do things. In other words “status quo” is not acceptable.
Things that go wrong in life are predictable and predictable is preventable.
DRUNK & SLEEP: Here’s the rub, Robert the Second. According to the empirical research, if you do not get the appropriate amount of restorative sleep, you will perform tasks and make decisions as if you were DRUNK. It appears that many of the Granite Mountain Hotshots (if not all of them… and perhaps even most hotshots who are on back-to-back fires) were LOW on sleep by early morning on June 30th. For the average person, getting 5 hours of sleep on a crappy surface (sleeping bag, cot, whatever) is NOT sufficient. This is particularly the case when you are beating your body up at work during the day (e.g. hiking and working for hours in the heat doing physical tasks in a smokey environment).
So, you correctly say that there are “better ways to do things,” but it seems to me that the only way to fix the problem is to have a RIGID set of rules that CANNOT be broken that are black-and-white and leave nothing to judgment and discretion, given that the people making the judgments are sleep-deprived. One rigid rule might be: No hotshots out on the fire after 1 p.m. Now, before folks here mock me, let me say that I stole the idea from one of the survivors of one of the other big burn-overs. And, when I checked the weather materials in my FOIA/FOIL packet, it was clear that the winds that day and the prior day (and presumably the days prior) were manageable in the morning, and not manageable later in the day. If there was no wind, there’d be no “unexpected” change in direction or rapid spread.
Just thinking out loud….
Ok old school—Yes we fought fire 24/7 we had rules the superintendent was responsible to see we got R&R after 14 days (2 days off) Not fighting fire at night is stupid un less some parts of the line are extremely hazardous. Every body off the fire at 1300 stupid. You can fight fire 24/7 in shifts and be safe. The biggest problem is being in unburned fuel. Indirect line, extreme burning conditions in the afternoon. Direct attack and SZ access to the black as you move proven effective. Always FF Order 10. Fight Fire Aggressively but provide for safety FIRST.
I really agree with your comment about not fighting fire at night. I was shocked when I first heard that. Much of the best work (direct line, burn outs etc.) can be done at night much more effectively and safely than during the day. They wrote off almost 50 percent of their firefighting time with that rule.
we have more than enough “rigid set of rules”…
we have lots of “work-rest guidelines” in place. they are “the rules”… and can be found in the redbook and include everything from length of assignment, length of shift, number of hours that you can drive, etc:
https://www.nifc.gov/policies/pol_ref_redbook_2013.html
and so you would have been okay with firefighters sitting on their butt after 1pm watching the fire roll through Glen Illah and Yarnell? would the rest of the country be okay with this? cause i am okay with that. as RTS has already stated, when the fire is moving in the middle of the burn period, it’s usually best to sit your ass down in a safety zone.
unfortunately that is not always reality. neither is giving each firefighter a warm dark room with a comfy mattress to get eight hours rest on.
though i agree with your general point, that GM MAY have been overworked and fatigue MAY have played a roll in their decision making process.
well you do remember the 2 hikers on this fire Elizabeth- Sonny stated at 12:38pm “WE NEED TO GET THE HELL OUTTA OF HERE” so you are right— because Sonny came back for me at 1:10pm because he felt if he did not and I roasted- he would be accountable to my death—
Sonny saw it—that no human should of been in that area t that point and we headed on back-
LA Times July 4 article by Cindy Carcamo Storm Cell Spelled Doom for Arizona Firefighters says….They had made substantial progress in getting a fire line in place and had also established a safe zone and an escape route for themselves — a path they had forged between their locations and an area near the homes in Glen Ilah that they had previously cleared with a bulldozer.
Calvin I missed something some place what is this and where are you going with it. Looks like a general statement from a news paper without facts or specific info.
This is an article I read long ago. It seems to have good sources (including Wade Ward). I have been reviewing the bulldozer issue and how Eric Tarr was actually looking for 21 or 22 people as late as 6pm. I am still uncertain where the bulldozer was at the time of the entrapment and subsequent burn over. Also, in pictures taken facing east from the ridge above the deployment site, there is a clear area to the north ( along the old jeep trail) that seems to fit the description in the article above.
Mrs Collura and Mr Gilligan…. how many bulldozers did you see active in the Sesame area? Did you see any activity (UTV, dozer, vehicle) on the old road that connects Sesame to Helms Ranch? Would you describe any additional cuttings around the deployment area? Specifically, how many, what side of the DZ? Also, do you remember if the cleared area I mentioned above was there before the YHF? Thanks
As I remember the Ranch was cleaned around by a dozer when and who? They dozed a road in after the burn over, and to the site for extraction. I do not believe the road was opened prior by a dozer.
that is facts—it happen after fire—we were there.
Mrs Collura and Mr Gilligan…. how many bulldozers did you see active in the Sesame area? THERE WAS ONLY ONE. Did you see any activity (UTV, dozer, vehicle) on the old road that connects Sesame to Helms Ranch? NO-IT IS HARD TO EXPLAIN BUT YOU HAVE BALUCO THAN WHITEHEAD THAN MAUGHAN RANCH AGRICULTURLA LAND THAT COMES OFF SESAME AND TO THE LEFT IS SOME OPEN AREAS AND NOW OVER TO HELMS AREA- THEY HAVE THEIR DRIVEWAY THAT CONNECTS TO THEIR HOME—THE REST WAS CREATED LATER AND WE WALKED IT THAT WEEKEND SO WE CAN ANSWER THAT—NOW WHOEVER DID THE WORK NEEDS TO POST FROM HERE ON WHEN AND HOW AND ETCWould you describe any additional cuttings around the deployment area? WE HEARD SOME HAVE SEEN IT BUT THE DEPLOYMENT IS RESTRICTED FROM ENTERING WITHOUT N OFFICIAL AND SO OUR TIME WITH OSHA SHOWED CUTTINGS BUT MAINLY BY THE LUNCH AREA AND WAYNE & HOLLY NEILL AND TED PUTNAM ARE THE ONES WHO EDUCATED US FROM SEEING MINOR CUTTINGS WHEN WITH OSHA TO MAJOR CUTTINGS WITH THEMSpecifically, how many, what side of the DZ? YOU CAN ASK OSHA THAT QUESTION- GREAT MEN—Also, do you remember if the cleared area I mentioned above was there before the YHF? NO. THAT AREA WAS A MAZE-LIKE TERRAIN VERY DENSE IN AREAS…NO ROAD AT ALL—Thanks
Some have said you cant fight fire and follow the ten standard orders. As you know I totally disagree with that and I always followed them. Before fire shelters and after I never deployed and none I repeat none of the crews under me ever deployed. In California we got Fire Shelters in 1966. My dad died in the rattle snake fire 1953. No Fire shelters, fire retardant clothing, on a 1/4 ac. spot fire in the middle of a brush field. No radio, no lookout could not see the main fire. Those things are part of the 10 Standard orders that fire with others helped create them. A lot of us old school FF lived by them. To call them guides is a critical error (they are orders (rules) do not disobey them) 15 wild land fire fighters died July 9, 1953, That was the biggest wild land fire fatalities until Yarnell. I have said over and over until fire fighters take the 10 and 18 serious this can and will happen again. LCES is only 4 of the 10 use them all.
Mike,
One of the problems, as I see it, is whether or not ‘The Rules’ as I call them; the Ten Standard Fire Orders and LCES (a summation of the Orders) are just that – RULES. So, are they RULES or are they GUIDELINES? I treat the Orders as rules, absolutes. In other words, you can violate them by NOT following them. That’s how I learned them (from Bob Powers) and that’s how I train people. And EVERY TIME there are shelter deployments and/or fatalities, there are CLEAR VIOLATIONS of the Fire Orders, EVERY TIME. There used to be only 13 Watch Outs; now there are 18. I follow the 19 Watch Outs (Death From Above). So, when you flesh them out, you’ll notice there are five contradictions with theFire Orders. The orders tell you to do something and the Watch Outs tell you to ‘watch out’ if you’re not doing them. That’s a contradiction.
On the other hand, I treat (and teach) that the 18 Watch Out Situations are guidelines, in that we see and experience these indicators and situations on every shift (weather hotter and drier, winds, spot fires, etc), and when we do, then we need to WATCH OUT. You CANNOT violate the Watch Outs, you can only fail to know them, recognize them, and mitigate them. How do you violate Watch Out number 13? – On a hillside where rolling material can ignite fuel below you. You can only recognize it and mitigate it. Or W/O number 14, ‘The weather is getting hotter and drier.’ You get the point.
What’s interesting to me is how Watch Out number 5 came into play for the GMHS on the YHF – ‘Unfamiliar with local factors … weather … fire behavior.’ They were in THEIR OWN BACKYARD, and it was almost as if they were clueless as to what to expect. So, I guess that’s where the ‘bad decsions with prior good outcomes’ has significance for me.
There’s an interesting court case from 2000 that’s actually tiled the ‘Backfire 2000’ case from the Sula Complex in Bitterroot Valley, MT. It deals more with the Federal Govt. and the ‘discretionary function’ doctrine. Once you read it, you’ll find that the Govt. attorneys basically emasculated the Fire Orders and declared them as guidelines. So, it’s clear to me that the YHF SAIT followed the same logic.
http://www.coloradofirecamp.com/textdocuments/Backfire-2000-ruling-memo.pdf
See My note above….Also if you have never seen preheated ignition in a canyon from heat and gases (some times canyons blow up like a bomb) it is like a blow torch heats the gases , ignites, and total area ignition. Happens in canyons under extreme conditions its called area ignition by us old fire dogs.
I’d stress that what Bob is describing sometimes can actually be a gas explosion, not simple ignition of individual trees. In terms of tone of posts, I think we all are learning and participating in a collaborative thread. Both the specifics of Yarnell events and some general concepts have had very good discussions, for the most part with no abrasiveness and no effort to put down others.
On the general concept front, I hope the digression is ok to note that I spent some of New Year’s chasing a dog in rough country, which leads to the topic of GPS. In much of the west, one reason why people still run telemetry alongside GPS is that GPS can be very spotty. Robust and affordable tech solutions are probably a few years away yet in terms of the tracking issue talked about.
NV, you and I are clearly reading two different blogs. I am disgusted. Honestly.
@Elizabeth, maybe I should have italicized “for the most part. 🙂
hi elizabeth!
i am curious, since WTKTT makes all sorts of claims and accusations that turn out to be either misleading, false or even verging on slander, have you inquired him as to his real name and background? if you did on another page, i must have missed it. could you fill me in?
he seems to be the “lead investigator” here, so i am sure you would want to know what qualifies him to make so many false claims…
I am not the ‘lead investigator’ on anything.
I am someone posting to a public forum,
just as you are doing.
If the host/moderator of this forum allows
a comment to appear ( from anyone ) and
it’s OK with him… then it’s OK with me.
We are all just ‘guests’ here… and I’d like
to thank Mr. Dougherty once more for
his patience with all of us. It’s extraordinary.
Carry on.
hey NV…
i was curious about those “many instances” (para-phrased) where people “survived in boulder fields when people who deployed shelters near them did not survive…” (also para-phrased).
could you please provide a case study or two to support this idea? thanks!
Mike,
You stated: “The question is – was Yarnell Hill an accident (errors not ingrained) or a disaster (errors were ingrained)?”
As the Baumann puts it, “Was this tragic event simply the result of people not following established beliefs, guidelines, practices and policies? Or was there a subtle accumulation of unnoticed events, which were at odds with accepted beliefs …. and the precautions taken to avoid these hazards? The answer may well be yes to both questions.”
I tend to go more with the “not following established beliefs, guidelines, practices and policies” side. As far as the”unnoticed events” go, they HAD to know what they were doing (or not doing) leading up to all this. And MANY of their peers noticed it, however, nobody has publicly stated as much because of whatever reasons.
Baumann defined Disaster as the “result of the collapse of precautions which had been culturally accepted as adequate. … a series of failures, which become accepted as the “norm” and accumulate slowly over time, ultimately leading individuals or groups toward an unwanted and unexpected event.” And I think that’s what happened on the YHF.
One thing I noticed early on that verifed my beliefs abouth the GMHS was that in ALL the photos and videos of the GMHS, MANY of them, including the SUPERVISORS, have their SLEEVES ROLLED UP while they’re on the firelines. To me, that is a fairly major issue – an ATTITUDE thing. “I know what the rules say, but it’s no big deal and nothing’s going to come of it … nothing has so far … and the Bosses aren;t saying anything about it, so it must be okay” So, when so-called “little things” are ignored or accepted as normal, then that reflects on the overall attitude toward everything, especially safety as far as I’m concerned. And when the supervisors are part of all that, then it’s even worse. I had to tell Marsh to roll down his sleeves more than once during burn-out operations and to tell his Crew the same. I ALWAYS go some attitude from him about it.
And regarding the HELICOPTER EXTRACTION issue, I am going with what Gary Olson said and you alluded to, it’s NOT air support. And a helicopter extraction with a light helicopter was NOT feasible and besides, it would’ve taken a LONG time. And NO need for a lookout either, that’s what the Crews are supposed to provide.
I agree….
I (now) agree as well. I still think ‘extraction’ MAY have been
just one of the things Abel meant… but it’s at the bottom
of the list, fer sure. See above. It wasn’t even any kind
of ‘personal’ promise. He just said WE ( fire command )
will get some Air down there ASAP.
I do, however, still think this new discovery is significant
in that if everyone is now right about it meaning ‘more
retardant drops’ ( and nothing else )… then did this not
create some EXPECTATIONS on Abel’s part for
what Marsh was supposed to be doing the rest of
the afternoon?
Doesn’t this mean that Abel was now EXPECTING
Marsh to STAY right where he was ( high-up, safe
in the black ) and still be his DIVS A and help direct
the ‘Air Support’ he was now sending ASAP?
We also learn now that Abel specfically TOLD
Marsh to keep HIM updated. He said…
“…just keep ME update” ( on YOUR situation ).
Unlike the ‘WE’ in “We’ll send Air Support ASAP’… that
was a PERSONAL directive from Able to Marsh.
Abel was specifically telling Marsh to keep HIM
updated as to his whereabouts and situation.
Marsh didn’t do that.
Not only was Abel expecting Marsh ( and GM ) to
‘hunker and be safe’… we now learn that Abel was
probably also EXPECTING Marsh to stay right where
he was and continue his DIVS A assignment(s) and
help direct the “Air Support we are sending ASAP”.
Marsh didn’t do that either.
Could that be why Marsh was walking along, headed
south, trying to catch up with Steed/Crew… and even
just two minutes before the first MAYDAY he was
still ‘pretending’ he was way back up where Abel
thought he should be and directing Air Support?
Rather than actually TELL Abel he had left that
‘high position’ ( which he was supposed to do ) he
was just simply saying “That’s where we want retardant”
over the radio from all the way down in the box canyon
so Abel would still THINK he was back up on the high
ridge and still doing what he was supposed to?
It’s all even ‘stranger’ now than it even was before.
The ‘air support’ topic is popping up in a couple of different places, so I’m going to repeat my thoughts posted up above aways:
TTWARE on January 2, 2014 at 3:15 pm said:
**If Marsh was a mile or two away from where he suggested he needed ‘air support’, or for that matter, even closer, he would NOT be expected to be directing the air support, UNLESS there were specific needs WITHIN his division. That job would be left up to AA or ASM (or what ever the hell their job description was at that moment in time), in coordination with the on-the-ground person responsible for supervision of the area in question.
With all due respect, I’m thinking this angle is a dead end.**
Additional thoughts…
There is no evidence that ANY ‘air support’, over and above what was already occuring, was needed WITHIN Division A at that time for Marsh to be directing, AND there is no record of anyone who might have been trying to fulfill that request, trying to get additional specifics from Marsh.
And yes, I believe Able expected Marsh and GM, ‘to hunker and be safe’ and ‘keep him advised’ as Able had requested. To bad Able and Musser weren’t communicating when Musser knew GM and Marsh were on the move. But, there was a whole lot of non-communication going on on that fire.
This makes me sad to read. We all have our little failings when it comes to the way we do things. But these crew bosses hold the lives of their guys in their hands. Being meticulous about ALL things related to safety is of paramount importance. What you write does imply a degree of carelessness, and I suspect there may be more you did not write about.
Besides (although current firefighters would know this better than me) air support always referred to slurry bombers. Helicopter extraction or insertion fits in the category of a transportation service, no different really than a bus, van, or military 5 ton truck that takes you close to where you are going to either start work or get back to the fire camp, and therefore, is not “air support” in my mind. To me, that term infers operational support to fight the fire.
Makes sense ( terminology-wise )… but see above.
I guess only Todd Abel really knows what the heck he meant at
that moment.
It’s still astounding they didn’t PLAY that Caldwell video/audio for
him when they had him in for his interview and ASK him what he
meant at that moment.
Did he think Marsh was just going to keep playing DIVS A
from the ‘safe black’ and directing drops over towards
town, or something?
Abel didn’t say…
“I’ll get YOU ( DIVS A ) some Air Support to direct”.
He didn’t even say…
“I’ll get YOU GUYS ( Marsh + all of GM ) some Air Support”.
All he said was…
“….we’ll get some air support down there ASAP.”
Retardant? Extraction? Lookout for your hikeout? Other?…
…another mystery within a mystery that needs to be solved.
This one piece of information that no one seems to have known
about before actually has the potential to go viral.
Discovering that Granite Mountain was PROMISED
‘Air Support ASAP’ circa 3:50 PM by one of the primary OPS
on the fire is a BIG DEAL… no matter WHAT it actually turns
out Abel really meant.
I think you hit on it above. Abel was talking to Marsh as DIVS A in this case. The promise of “Air Support” was not specifically for Granite Mountain. He does not make that clear in the conversation because he knows Marsh knows what he is referring to.
Reply to mike post on January 2, 2014 at 6:01 am
Yes… It actually was a ‘totally generalized’ statement
at the moment. I see that now. It was not really
directed AT anyone nor was it even a promise from
him ( Abel ). He said WE ( fire command ).
“We’ll get some Air Support down there ASAP”
could have meant ( in a most general way )
“We’ll just try to fight the fire with some Air Stuff
down there as soon as we can.”
But the question remains… did Able have other
expectations for Marsh that were ‘not discussed
because they were understood’.
Did Able really expect Marsh to continue to be
DIVS A, even ‘stuck in the black’, when they did
get around to ‘sending some Air Support down
there’?
Does this explain Marsh still walking along the
ridge trying to ‘catch up’ with GM ( who already
had their marching orders ) and even just 2
minutes before the first MAYDAY calling up
to Air Attack with “That’s where WE want
retardant.”?
Either way… it’s astounding that we are only
now learning about these THREE things
that Abel said ( and not just the one thing ).
1) Hunker and be safe ( in the black ).
2) Keep me informed ( about your situation ).
3) We’ll send Air Support ASAP.
All THREE of those things are important, at
that moment in time.
I concur with Gary, Mike, and fullsail, that the term ‘air support’ is utilized for fire control measures. If transport of personnel was going to be involved, Able would have said something along the lines of, ‘we’ll see if we can line-up some transport for you’.
With Marsh sort of being visually at the ‘top of the world’, he was likely able to see places where the moving fire could cause additional problems. An example would be, as the fire pushed hard to the east, there may have been a place where due to fire behavior, vegetation, and terrain, the highway was going to get bumped really hard, with a great risk of the fire jumping the highway at that spot. This, or myriad other tactical reasons, could be why Marsh was asking for air support.
Reply to TTWARE post on Jan 2, 2014 at 9:29 am
>> TTWARE said
>> With Marsh sort of being visually at the ‘top of the
>> world’, he was likely able to see places where the
>> moving fire could cause additional problems.
Yes. See above. I can see the ‘other alternative’
now. Abel was just going to get some ‘Air Stuff’
down there to ‘fight the fire’ in a general way…
…but do you think that now presents a new
scenario into the ‘final half hour’?
Do you think this ALSO meant that Abel was now
EXPECTING Marsh to stay right there where he
understood him to be ( high-up, western-ridge,
safe in the black ) in order to DIRECT the
“Air Support” he was sending ASAP?
In other words… is there even MORE reason now
to wonder why Marsh would ‘abandon his
assignment(s)’?
If Abel was EXPECTING Marsh to be where he
understood him to be… and direct the “Air Support”,
and Abel ALSO told him specifically to “keep him
updated” ( on his siutation up there )…
…then Marsh’s failure to make SURE Abel knew
he was headed down OFF that ‘high point’
becomes even more mysterious than ever.
If Marsh was a mile or two away from where he suggested he needed ‘air support’, or for that matter, even closer, he would NOT be expected to be directing the air support, UNLESS there were specific needs WITHIN his division. That job would be left up to AA or ASM (or what ever the hell their job description was at that moment in time), in coordination with the on-the-ground person responsible for supervision of the area in question.
With all due respect, I’m thinking this angle is a dead end.
Only Abel can really answer these
‘question’ that have popped up now
that we can hear what he ACTUALLY
said to Eric Marsh.
Remember… DIVS Z was long gone
by this time so maybe Abel was just
relying on Marsh to be DIVS for that
ENTIRE southern-end of the fire
at that point in time.
We also still don’t know the full
story on Rory Collins suddenly
leaving right about the time we now
here this audio captured in
the new video. From the way Eric
sounds almost ‘pissed off’ and/or
‘disgusted’… this could be just
moments after he’d had ( another )
argument with Collins. We still don’t
know the full story there.
Maybe we will hear more from
the elusive Mr. Collins one of
these days.
**MORE EVIDENCE THAT WTTKT HAS NO IDEA WHAT HE’S TALKING ABOUT!!!**
“air support” refers to retardant or bucket drops. the logistics involved with an “air extraction” would have gone through heli-base, would have been much more involved and wouldn’t have been referred to as “air support.”
and mike is right, Able is talking to Marsh as DIVA… (because he has a good view of what the fire is doing and it’s relation to the structures at the southeast end). and there’s no need to include it in the interview notes because everyone else knows what they are talking about.
“Discovering that Granite Mountain was
PROMISED ‘Air Support ASAP’ circa
3:50 PM by one of the primary OPS on
the fire is a BIG DEAL…”
i don’t see where they were “promised” anything. air resources are tight on every fire, some can’t operate in high winds, and some just break down at the most inconvenient times… so there is no guarantee that anyone will get air support… and everyone in the fire world knows this.
see, where you leap is when you go from “i believe… yada-yada-yada…”
to: “based on this belief… LEEEEAAAPPP…(insert all sorts of conjecture here)…”
to: falling flat on your face because what you think you know, YOU DON’T REALLY KNOW! most of your “beliefs” aren’t even accurate, they just serve to perpetuate your need to feel useful here.
also FYI: when you use dramatic words like “THE FIRE WAS BLOWING UP LIKE A BOMB” it just makes you sound silly (fires don’t blow up like bombs, they respond to the conditions in the atmosphere and on the ground).
also FYI: Wildfire Today has a great example of “blowing up like a bomb” posted today or yesterday… how convenient for you! please check it out. (because that IS NOT how wildland fires behave)
Elizabeth,
It’s DEFINITELY OPS Abel that Marsh is talking to on the radio and NOT Air Attack. And it just makes sense that if you’re “working [your] way OFF THE TOP” of somewhere, that you’re naturally heading DOWN, right? And “down there” would most likely be The Ranch. I think Abel knew where they were on their SZ ridge and he knew where The Ranch was. As far as he was concerned and knew – they were safe on a ridge in the black in a good SZ.
Abel KNOWS or at least ASSUMES that the GMHS are in a bit of a bind, just based on what he had heard on the radio. And he then tried to get Air Attack’s attention and focused on what Marsh was trying to get across on the radio. You can HEAR it in Marsh’s voice, he’s concerned – fairly calm but defintiely concerned.
I wouldn’t put a lot of weight on what PFD PIO Wade Ward says because nothing but a paid ‘mouthpiece’ for the PFD to get out ‘talking points’ and the Party Line on what they WANT you to know, not what the truth is or what actually happened. So, by him saying they were “killed as they were TRYING TO GET TO their safety zone” fits the PFD storyline that they were doing just that from their line construction assignment or they were on the move attempting to re-engage when in fact THEY WERE ALREADY IN A PERFECTLY GOOD ONE FOR MOST OF THE DAY. In other words, it makes them (GMHS) look more like victims of circumstance (weather and fire behavior) and so it wasn’t their/anybody’s fault (human factors).
I don’t think this is even all that complicated.
Marsh simply meant “I am working my way down from this
higher point where I’ve been scouting closer to the anchor
point where GM is/was working.”
The ADOSH investigators actually established an exact
location for Marsh at that moment in time when he had that
conversation with Abel and said “I’m working my way down”…
ADOSH – Page 18
At approximately 1545 hours, Division A Supervisor Marsh had a
radio conversation with Operations Section Chief I Abel regarding
the weather and the position of Granite Mountain iHC.
Marsh was located near the top of the Weaver Mountains and had
a clear view of the thunderstorm, the fire, and the valley below.
Marsh and Abel had been watching the storm for some time and
discussed their concerns regarding the storms effects.
Marsh reportedly stated that Granite Mountain was safe and in the
black (i.e., previously burned wildland)
>> RTS wrote…
>> Abel KNOWS or at least ASSUMES that the GMHS are in a bit
>> of a bind, just based on what he had heard on the radio.
Correct… and that’s what he meant by ‘Air Support ASAP’.
Abel also KNEW ( from hearing all the prior traffic ) that Brendan
had to evacuate and that Blue Ridge had to move their crew
carriers back to town.
Abel also knew that part of the operations that morning was
an ‘Air Support’ operation to retrieve the Helitack crew that
had ‘spent the night out there’ up at the anchor point.
That was EXACTLY where Marsh and GM were now… so
Abel was simply saying they would “do it again” as soon
as they could and send the same yellow helicopter up there
to ‘extract’ them. That yellow helicopter seats SEVEN and
was used in the morning to retrieve the helitack crew from
the exact same location.
Are we positive that “Air Support” here was referring to extraction? To me, the term suggests dropping retardant. And was Marsh not trying to direct retardant drops around this time – he was communicating on that just before they ran into the flaming front. Something tells me Abel would have used a different term if he meant a pickup, but I am just guessing.
Seems odd if they were told they would be picked up, they would get up and leave right away. Anyway, at this moment,
Marsh gets the request from Musser. Definitely a right hand, left hand situation. I still think that something about that request motivated them to move, I think it must have sounded more urgent than we might think.
Reply to mike post on January 1, 2014 at 11:17 pm
>> Are we positive that “Air Support” here was referring
>> to extraction?
Nope… and this is something that EVERYONE should
chime in on… because it’s IMPORTANT.
I’ve already stated what I believe.
I believe that IS what Abel meant… for reasons already
stated above.
>> mike also wrote…
>> To me, the term suggests dropping retardant.
Sure… maybe… but you HAVE to ask yourself…
Why would a man who knows the people he is talking
to are in the ‘safe black’ be promising them an
(expensive) retardant drop… when those resources are
so sorely needed elsewhere at that moment?
I believe the answer to that one is “he would not”.
They did not NEED any ‘retardant drops’ where they
were… ‘safe in the black’. No way.
Another possibility…
Could it be possible that Abel already knew they had
lost their lookout… and that they were already planning on
hiking out of there… so the “Air Support” he is promising
Marsh is “Lookout”?
Possible… but I (personally) don’t believe that one, either.
>> mike also said…
>> Seems odd if they were told they would be picked up,
>> they would get up and leave right away.
It would be more than just odd… but that is already a
given about what happened in the next 15 minutes.
>> mike also said…
>> Marsh gets the request from Musser.
Yes… and responds “We are committed to the black”.
Did that also mean “We are committed to the black
because Abels promised us an extraction and this
is where he knows we are”. Possible.
>> I still think that something about that request motivated
>> them to move, I think it must have sounded more
>> urgent than we might think.
I agree with you… but it might not have been Musser’s
‘request’ alone. There may have been ‘another’
request/suggestion/directive/order in that timeframe
that we still don’t know about.
Willis has already ADMITTED to military.com that
right around 4:00 PM he ‘”clicked back on their
frequency and heard a couple of things.”
Does anyone think Willis would have been the kind of
guy to ‘just listen’… and not chime in with ‘an opinion’
during the ‘discussing their options’ conversation?
He is already now admitting publicly he was ON ‘that
frequency’ ( the GM private channel ) at that exact
moment in time.
OK, here is my chime. I agree with Mike, the promise of air support was not referring to an extraction by helicopter, but instead referred to retardant drops.
I don’t think “they” would have used valuable helicopter time to extract an entire hotshot crew from where they were safe in the black to just go and stand around and be safe with everybody else at the diner since they were not in any danger and having more “ground troops” just standing around keeping out of the way of the fire would not have made anything any better for anyone.
I keep going back to the fact that the Granite Mountain Hotshots could have either easily walked to town or south to the highway at almost anytime (except when they did) if all they wanted was to get off the ridge.
There would have been a good reason to pick up the helitack crew, they needed those guys to load act as the flight crew and unload the helicopter and to do flight manifests, weight calculations based on elevation and temperature, etc.
Fair enough. Thanks, Gary.
Still… no part of any side of my brain is
grasping why someone would tell a bunch
of guys who he just told to ‘hunker down
and be safe in the black’ was ALSO now
telling them he was going to send them
‘retardant drops’ ASAP… for the same
reasons you just mentioned, really.
The fire was blowing up like a bomb.
Fire command was minutes away from
telling ALL of ‘air support’ on the fire to start
‘dropping at will’ to do they best they
could to save some (any) town… and OPS1
is promising some guys who he knows are
‘completely safe in the black’ they will get
some retardant drops ( ASAP ) too?
I don’t buy it.
I guess only Todd Abel really knows what
the heck he meant at that moment.
It’s still astounding they didn’t PLAY that
Caldwell video/audio for him when they
had him in for his interview and ASK him
what he meant at that moment.
This one piece of information that no one
seems to have known about before
actually has the potential to go viral.
Discovering that Granite Mountain was
PROMISED ‘Air Support ASAP’ circa
3:50 PM by one of the primary OPS on
the fire is a BIG DEAL… no matter WHAT
it actually turns out Abel really meant.
Note—Abel did not mention any thing in the SAIT about sending a Helicopter to pick up GM. That would indicate h was not planning on that. OR they pulled that out of the interview because the extraction was not done and would implicate Abel in a law suit because for some reason he did not extract them. I would say the first but there is now a question. Also why would they be even talking about retardant if they were in the black?
Yes… I’ve been rethinking my
own ‘first pass’ at what Abel
said and have now realized he
totally ‘generalized’ what he said.
It wasn’t even any personal
promise. He said WE.
He also didn’t say…
“We’ll get YOU Air Support”
or
“We’ll get YOU GUYS Air”
It wasn’t directed AT anyone.
He just said…
“We’ll get some Air Support
down there ASAP.”
That actually could have just
meant, in the most general
way possible…
“We’ll try to fight the fire with
some Air stuff down there.”
**
** AUDIO FROM ROBERT CALDWELL VIDEO CIRCA 3:50 PM ON 6/30/13
**
** ERIC MARSH ( AND GRANITE MOUNTAIN ) WERE PROMISED
** AIR SUPPORT AND/OR AIR EXTRACTION ASAP CIRCA 3:50 PM.
This is the new audio clip from a video taken by Robert Caldwell circa
3:50 PM on June 30, 2013.
It captures an actual radio conversation between Eric Marsh ( DIVS A ) and
Todd Abel ( OPS 1 ) at that time.
Todd Abel tells Marsh ( and Granite Mountain ) to “hunker and be safe”… then he
SPECIFICALLY tells Marsh to “keep him updated” ( about their situation up
there )… AND he promises them Air Support ( extraction? ) ASAP.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=87nLmrNE7q0
The first voice we hear is ( in my opinion ) a definite match for Eric Marsh and
NOT Jesse Steed. Your mileage may vary.
Here is the full transcipt of this 35 second audio clip…
Eric Marsh (DIVS A): Yea… I’m tryin’ to work my way off the top.
Todd Abel ( OPS1 ): Okay… I copy… ah… just keep me updated…
ah… ya know… you guys hunker and be safe and then… ah…
we’ll get some air support down there ASAP.
NOTE: Eric Marsh actually sounds pretty ‘disgusted’ with the whole situation as
heard in this audio clip. His voice is definitely not as ‘upbeat’ as usual and his
downward inflection on the end of his statement definitely sounds like he is not
a happy camper. Actually… he sounds pretty pissed off and Abel’s response
seems to be somewhat ‘conciliatory’ in tone in reaction to Eric’s tone.
So there is the documented ‘hunker and be safe’ suggestion/directive/order
from OPS1 ( Todd Abel ) to DIVS A ( and Granite Mountain ) circa 3:50 PM.
AND…
We hear ( for the FIRST time ) a promise of “Air Support ASAP” from OPS1
directly to Eric Marsh ( and all of Granite Mountain ).
Was this Abel telling Marsh to ‘stay there’ and they would be coming to GET
them… just like they did with the Helitack crew at that exact same location?
Does this mean the entire ‘comfort level’ discussion between Marsh and
Steed ( partially captured in the MacKenzie videos ) was really all about
‘helicopter extraction’ versus ‘other options’?
I cannot believe this may be the first moment since the incident that we
might be learning Granite Mountain was promised a ‘air extraction’ from
their ‘safe location’ if they had only just STAYED THERE.
** DOCUMENTATION RELATED TO THIS MOMENT
* SAIR – Page 22
OPS1 is listening on the radio to make sure everyone received
the most recent weather announcement. At about 1550, he radios
DIVS A directly to ask if he got the weather update and if he
is “in a good spot.” DIVS A affirms that he received the update, and
he tells OPS1 the winds are starting to get “squirrely” up on the ridge.
He says he is working his way off the top and OPS1 closes by
advising DIVS A to hunker and be safe.
NOTE: The SAIR mentions NOTHING of the other half of Abel’s statement(s) to
Marsh to specifically ‘keep him updated’ ( on their situation up there ) and that
they would be ‘getting them Air Support ASAP’.
* Wildland Firefighters Association Report ( WFAR ) – Page 14
At 1550, several communications occurred at or near the same
time. Field OSC called DIVS A by radio to make sure that DIVS A
was aware of the latest weather update. DIVS A confirmed the
update and noted that the winds were getting “squirrely” on the
ridge. DIVS A informed Field OSC that GMIHC moving off the top.
NOTE: There is the exact ‘moving off the top’ quote from Marsh heard in
Caldwell’s video… but notice there is NO mention whatsoever of Abel’s
response(s) to Marsh. No mention of ‘you guys hunker and be safe’ or ‘keep me
informed ( about your situation ) or Abel’s promise of “Air support ASAP”.
* ADOSH – Page 18
At approximately 1545 hours, Division A Supervisor Marsh had a radio
conversation with Operations Section Chief I Abel regarding the weather and
the position of Granite Mountain iHC. Marsh was located near the top of the
Weaver Mountains and had a clear view of the thunderstorm, the fire, and the
valley below. Marsh and Abel had been watching the storm for some time and
discussed their concerns regarding the storms effects. Marsh reportedly stated
that Granite Mountain was safe and in the black (i.e., previously burned wildland).
Marsh mentioned that the winds were “squirre|y” at his position and that the
retardant and dozer lines north of Yarnell were being compromised.
Shortly thereafter, Operations Section Chief it Musser radioed GMiHC and
asked if they could spare resources to assist in Yarneil. Either Marsh or GMIHC
Captain Steed responded that they were committed to the black and that Musser
should contact BRIHC working in the vatley (during his interview Musser stated
that he wasn’t sure who he was talking with).
NOTE: In this accounting of the ‘same moment’… the ADOSH investigators have
it taking place 5 minutes earlier at 1545… but there is no direct reference to
the exact ‘moving off the top’ quote from Marsh heard in Caldwell’s video…
and there is ALSO NO mention whatsoever of Abel’s response(s) to Marsh.
No mention of ‘you guys hunker and be safe’ or ‘keep me informed ( about
your situation’ or Abel’s promise of “Air support ASAP”.
* Yarnell Investigation Notes ( YIN ) – Page 1
Interview with Todd Abel by J Karels on 8/14/2013
Just after the later weather forecast (around 1530) was when marsh mentioned
the winds squirrely. The broadcast came out, he’s listening on the radio if
everyone got it. He (Abel) thinks he might have walked over marsh. so he calls
to confirm with marsh that he got it and he did.
Re: The (about) 1555 radio conversation that we have on the video, (which
includes the phrase okay, you hunker down in the black) — Abel did not recall
having this conversation with marsh.
NOTE: We now know exactly what Jim Karels meant here when he says
“The about 1555 radio conversation that we have on the video”.
Jim Karels is referring directly to the Robert Caldwell video that we can
now hear part of the audio of… but in the YIN he is putting the conversation
at 1555 instead of 1550 ( SAIR ) or 1545 ( ADOSH ).
ALSO NOTE: Again, in this accounting of the ‘same moment’… there is no
direct reference to the exact ‘moving off the top’ quote from Marsh heard in
Caldwell’s video… and there is ALSO NO mention whatsoever of Abel’s
response(s) to Marsh. No mention of ‘you guys hunker and be safe’ or ‘keep
me informed ( about your situation’ or Abel’s promise of “Air support ASAP”.
Correction above: In the last paragraph describing the YIN
notes and Jim Karel’s interview with Todd Abel… the YIN
notes DO mention the ‘hunker and be safe’ moment that
they ‘have on the video’ ( The Caldwell video )…
…but there is still no mention in Jim Karel’s interview notes
of anything else that was said on the video such as
‘keep me informed’ and the promise of ‘Air Support ASAP’.
WTKTT,
I find it interesting, that in the WFAR, page 14 quote, referenced in your comment above, it speaks of DIV A telling Field OPS that ‘GM’ is moving off the top. This is the only place that any reference to GM ‘moving off the top’ appears, and it appears to be a mis-statement, simply reflecting someone trying to recall the event.
wow, so it seems this “**NEW EVIDENCE**” is further confirmation that Marsh and GM were “ordered” to “hunker and be safe” by DIV A’s direct supervisor on the fire making it even harder to believe that there is some conspiracy that lead to GM moving down through the green.
oh wait… didn’t the accident investigations already cover that?
Elizabeth,
“I’m working my way off the top.” If Marsh or Steed said this, what would it mean?
I’ll give it a go here FOR SURE, it’s Marsh talking on the radio to OPS Abel. To me, “I’m working my way off the top” means that he’s up high somewhere, like the spur ridge the GMHS Safety Zone is on or possibly the main ridge above and behind them. The SZ is where they all were before they headed down into the unburned bowl. I still think Marsh and the GM HS were separated while he was off scouting or something, and they all came together in the bottom at the deployment site. But it’s very likely that he is refering to himself and his own travel (and not the Crew) as he was “working [his] way off the top.”
RTS, thanks. In the YouTube Audio (of what Caldwell’s video picked-up from Marsh’s communication), it sounds like whoever is responding to Marsh is saying:
“be safe and we’ll get some air support to ya down there ASAP.”
Where is “down there”? The word “down” caught my attention. If I were Abel, and I were on the ground at the middle school or some such, wouldn’t I say “over there” as opposed to “down there.”
This caught my attention because I also read Wade Ward’s quotes again, from right after the tragedy, at the press conference the next day or two days later. He talks about the men getting killed as they were trying to get to their safety zone. Presumably he is referring to the ranch – Helms Ranch. In order to get to the ranch, the GM guys would indeed have to go “down.” I am trying to figure out if the “down” reference really meant anything or if I am just reading into it or if it is actually not Abel we hear but… Air Attack(??) (in the air, such that anyone, relative to Air Attack, is “down”).
Just thinking out loud, I guess.
Elizabeth… I am absolutely sure what Todd Abel meant
at that point was that ‘down there’ simply meant “down
there south of where I am up here in Peeples Valley”.
At that point… from up at the Model Creek School in
Peeples valley… everything happening ‘down’ in
Yarnell would have been ‘down there’ to him.
See below about the audio clip you just released.
The ONLY think Abel’s could have meant by “we will
get you Air Support ASAP” is that he was promising
Marsh a helicopter extraction just like they did with
the helitack crew that morning from Marsh and
Granite Mountain’s exact location.
When you are telling someone to “hunker and be
safe ( in the black )” and also promising them
( in the same sentence ) “Air Support ASAP”…
there’s only one thing that could mean.
You are telling them to just “stay where you are and
we will COME AND GET YOU as soon as we can.”
There is also a ‘recounting’ below of all the official
documentation regarding this moment heard in
Caldwell’s video/audio… and NONE of the official
documents or interview notes say ANYTHING about
what we now hear Todd Abel ‘promising’ Eric Marsh.
I think roughly 3:50. I *THINK*. The date from the FOIA/FOIL package is the date that they copied the audio, so I had to run a metadata extraction tool, and I think it told me 3:50. I’ll go look for it.
“I’m working my way off the top.”
If Marsh or Steed said this, what would it mean?
This language is in a video that was taken by Robert Caldwell, and recovered from his phone or camera after he died. Caldwell was recording the fire, but he accidentally captured audio that included part of an exchange involving Marsh (I think). The audio is uploaded to youtube. The picture that is with the audio has NOTHING to do with the audio, so please ignore it. (A picture was needed in order to have the audio uploaded as a “video.”)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=87nLmrNE7q0
what time is it taken?
Whoops – I replied to you, Joy, in the wrong place. My reply to you said: “I think roughly 3:50. I *THINK*. The date from the FOIA/FOIL package is the date that they copied the audio, so I had to run a metadata extraction tool, and I think it told me 3:50. I’ll go look for it.”
Regarding Christopher McKenzie’s “IMG_0888,” it exists (as “MVI_0888”), and it is actually the FIRST video. Christopher was taking photos and videos with the same recording device, and, after he took photo IMG_0887, he took the first of his two VIDEOS in which we hear Marsh and Steed talking. So that video is numbered “MVI_0888,” such that there is no picture with the number 0888, and the next thing after that is a picture, number “IMG_0089,” then “IMG_0090,” then the second video, which is “MVI_0091.”
I have them in my FOIA/FOIL materials, if you want them.
Is there an explanation of which agency recovered the camera, and when that happened? Thanks
The Text File provided as part of the FOIA/FOIL response says:
Christopher MacKenzie took these photos and videos of the Doce and Yarnell Hill fires. It appears the earliest photos date to June 18, 2013. Some files have modification dates after June 30 which might be attributed to file transfer dates. Chris’s father, Mike, provided these to Chief Darrell Willis who gave them to Randy Okon, member of the Accident Investigation Team.
we figured such that the dates would not be raw. We also never believed in the time stamp. SHOW US THE RAW FOOTAGE as we the eye-witness hikers showed you all the raw footage. There needs to be 100% transparency. This is very sad. Why is this acceptable? Why does it have to reach a court system? I just cannot believe that a person can do this and still never yet come forward even if it is anonymously. I have received private information that people ask me please do not post on your page unless you run it by me how; one is very close the fire community end—and I also for one of the widows kept our communications between just her and I only due to the sensitivity of this weekend that turned tragic and the torn hearts of people wondering why the hiding—why the cropping—why the narratives? Please come forward. I hope to see someone not only investigate and dissect the photos and videos but really look into the work performance and how these men interacted—wish someone who left the GMHS spoke raw why they left and what it meant to them to be a GMHS. I wish the phone records would surface from the fire management team to Model Creek school phone system- any area involved those final hours. I wish we could get CONCRETE answers on the ranchers who were told to stand down. I wish more civilians and firefighters made there videos or shared the photos to help get clarity to this. I wish any loved ones or friends of the GMHS that know more; shares. I wish people stop narrating that fire and sum it up to weather and terrain when everyone locally can tell you how tiny that fire was and how it was allowed to grow into the Gates of Hell changing so many lives and seeing loss of lives- Thank you to Holly Neill for her heart in all this- I shared a dream I had of a woman named Roxanne awhile back and she helped piece it all to one of the GMHS’ wife and we both here decided we are going to take our hikes looking for suicide hiker yet on the hikes we plan to gather glass and odd things and make things to sell to help raise funds so we can do something for Roxanne some day if able—there is too many heart-wrenching stories as we helped the Yarnell community so for that we do understand the claims/suits yet we are not into court rooms is all- We are tiny factor to that weekend yet as many have shared without us sharing this could of easily been brushed under the rug yet the facts are we are just and instrument to that weekend just like everyone who took part in it like the fire management and the many other firefighters that never saw credit for all their hard work- thank you to those many people. Thank you to YCSO- we need to keep this mainstream and not allow this to just rest as it is—I hope all had a loving New Year’s Eve—let’s make this 2014 about HOPE versus wishful thinking and let’s hope the truth prevails this year! Thank you John Dougherty and Bill Gabbert and ALL of you here on the comment walls.
That is the EXACT ‘text’ that can be extracted from
the ‘exact copy’ of Christopher’s IMG_0889 that the
Arizona Republic just ‘accidentally’ used as a
background image for their recent “Alone On The
Hill” story.
If you have that exact ‘text’ in the FOIA/FOIL
package then that text was NOT added by the
Arizona Republic, as I first thought.
That means it was already ‘inserted’ into the
image data ( using Photoshop ) by someone
on the SAIT team and NOT by the Arizona
Republic.
Step by step here… we find out what has really
been going on with this evidence and WHO has
been ‘touching it’.
Ah-ha! MacKenzie took photos and videos with his CAMERA and with his PHONE, it seems. Because I have another file with more photos in the FOIA/FOIL materials that also has the label of “Christopher MacKenzie” (I had spelled it wrong previously). These photos have time stamps from 2:07 p.m. on the 30th through 3:55 p.m.
The text blurb accompanying the photos states:
Christopher MacKenzie, a member of the Granite Mountain IHC, took these photos on June 30, 2013 with his cell phone. The Yavapai County Sheriff’s Office provided them to Randy Okon, member of the Accident Investigation Team.
Elizabeth… this simply proves that when the SAIT
decided to coordinate the ‘media release’ with
the Arizona Republic for the same day as the
SAIR report… they only gave them the contents
of the ‘Canon Powershot’ directory on a CD,
and not their own separate ‘MacKenzie cell
phone’ directory from YCSO Cellibrite data
extraction software pass.
Are there any VIDEOS in the Christopher
MacKenzie cell phone data extraction folder(s)?
Reply to Elizabeth post on January 1, 2014 at 4:52 pm
Elizabeth… Thank You!
This possibly clears up a mystery that’s been going on since
September 28, 2013, when the Arizona Republic first published
the photos and videos.
Just a quick ‘reality check’, however…
Are those just typos in your post above where you label a picture
as ‘IMG_0089’ instead of ‘IMG_0889’ and a video as ‘MVI_0091’
instead of ‘MVI_0891’? I think the ‘8’ is actually there as the second
digit of the names… Yes?
IMG_0887 is the final one that Christopher MacKenzie took at their
PREVIOUS location circa 3:50 PM. It is the one that shows the
crew actually ‘moving out’ from that location with Ashcraft and
another ‘sawyer’ fully ‘slinging their saws’ over their shoulders to
go out ‘on the hike’ for 10 minutes before they would ‘arrive’ at the
next location… which is where we then see the other photos and
the video being taken.
So… that would mean that if MVI_0888 is the next sequenced item
from the Canon Powershot… then the first thing Christopher did at
that NEXT pile-of-boulders rest location ( 4:00 PM thru 4:04 PM )
was shoot that first video.
Then he took 2 ‘still’ pictures after that ( IMG_0889 and IMG_0890 )
at this new location… then he took the SECOND video
( MVI_0891 )… and then that was ( apparently ) the last thing he
did with the Canon Powershot that afternoon ( unless anything
else is actually still ‘missing’ ).
This would actually ‘make sense’.
Both the IMG_0889 and IMG_0890 photos show the red-bearded
firefighter on the left of the frame still ‘facing’ more towards Steed’s
direction ( just as we see him in the FIRST video ) before he finally
‘sits back’ and ‘settles in’ on the rock… which is what we see him
actually doing in the SECOND video.
So the only question has ever been whether IMG_0889 and
IMG_0890 were actually taken BEFORE the first video, or not.
They were obviously not taken AFTER the second video when
is when we see him actually change his position and ‘settle in’
on the rock.
It would still make sense if the images were taken BETWEEN
the first and second video(s).
There are still ( perhaps ) some visual clues that don’t quite match
this scenario ( smoke movement, red-haired-firefighter’s activity
with his equipment, etc. ) but that’s going to take a little more time
to really nail down.
What is also important here is that if IMG_0889 and IMG_0890
were actually taken in-between the two videos… then there is
now LESS reason to believe that there is any significant
amount of video MISSING in-between the two 9 second clips.
Maybe Christopher really did only shoot two 9 second video clips
and even though there still remains evidence of ‘editing’ on those
clips… no content has been ‘removed’ from either the start of end
of either of them… and the videos we see released by the
Arizona Republic is all the video/audio we are ever going to
see/hear. That has ALWAYS been a possible outcome here.
This also means that Calvin is RIGHT in his new post just above.
The picture in the SAIR that now also appears in the GQ
article may NOT have been from Christopher MacKenzie’s
camera at all ( even though the SAIR says it WAS ).
It actually MIGHT have been from McKee… and ( if it was ) we
might now have evidence of another ‘missing’ or ‘uncaccounted
for’ smartphone… but regardless…
The mystery still remains about how the SAIR could have put a
time of 3:50 on that photo when it was obviously shot at the
second location that they didn’t reach until 4:00 or 4:02 PM.
That still makes the SAIR’s (wrong) description of that photo
source and the (wrong) timestamp a ‘double EYE’ situation.
It was wither ‘Incompetence’… or it was ‘Intentional’.
More to come…
Whoops… typo above.. should have been…
“It was EITHER Incompetence OR it was Intentional”
Maybe the photo on p23 of SAIR was from Mackenzie’s phone?
Absolutely ( now that we know they have photos
from BOTH his phone AND his camera )…
…but I still think wherever that photo came from
the SAIT decided to ‘dial back’ the time on it.
It will take another round of close examination to
determine that photo did NOT come from the
‘second rest location’ which they (apparently)
didn’t reach until the 4:00 PM to 4:04 PM timeframe.
This is all going to get nailed down eventually…
but it’s nice to discover there is MORE evidence
available now to help do that.
Here is the metadata of the image/video numbers and the times from June 30th (McKenzie had some from earlier in the 30th; I am posting only the times from the ones starting at 2:50 p.m. and later):
IMG. 0883 – 2:50 p.m.
84 – 2:50 p.m.
85 – 3:52
86 – 3:52
87 – 3:52
88 – Video – 4:01
89 – 4:01
90 – 4:02
91 – Video – 4:02
See above: I now see that there is a SECOND set of Christopher MacKenzie photos. The set I reference above with the missing (but not missing) 88 photo (which is actually a video) was taken with Christopher’s Canon camera, while the photo in the SAIR was taken with his cell phone. Odd that the investigation materials had the two sets of photos (with one set including videos) totally separate. I apologize for the confusion.
Elizabeth… absolutely NO apologies
necessary. This kind of stuff is ALWAYS
confusing… until it’s (finally) not.
You have no idea how much what you have
even told us tonight is helping to solve some
ongoing mysteries surrounding the
Christopher MacKenzie material. Thank you.
As with a lot of things involved with this
incident… the solution to one mystery
usually leads to another… but that’s OK.
That’s how this stuff goes.
Question… though.
Your ‘metadata’ above for the Canon
pictures shows time that are all ’rounded’
either up or down to a ‘minute’ value.
The ACTUAL embedded EXIF metadata
for a Canon Powershot image will also
have a ‘seconds’ value that nails down
the EXACT time.
Is what you just posted above a
‘cut-and-paste’ from some document that
accompanied the material showing
what THEY call ‘metadata’? Is there any
other document showing the ACTUAL
EXIF metadata extractions on this
material from the Canon Powershot?
Truth: I did not run an EXIF viewer on all of them. But, for example, the photo ending in 889 had an EXIF time of:
June 30, 2013 4:01:52PM
And the photo ending in 887 had an EXIF time of:
June 30, 2013 3:52:24PM
(In this photo, it appears that the guys are on the move – this photo is, I think, Andrew Ashcroft up and moving.)
Yes… that 0887 photo of
Ashcraft and the others is
definitely a ‘leaving this
location now’ photo.
BOTH of the ‘sawyers’ in
that photo have ‘slung their
saws’ over their shoulders.
The only time they would all
be doing that at the same
moment is when the entire
group is ‘moving out’ and
headed somewhere else.
Happy New Year!
The image on page 23 of SAIR (attributed to Mackenzie with a timestamp of 1550)that has been the subject of some discussion here has been use in a GQ online article by Sean Flynn (new to me) on p6. The image appears briefly and is attached to a caption that says Grant McKee texted this picture to his girlfriend at 404pm.
WTKTT….. I believe you have mentioned earlier that you believe this picture to be the missing 0388 from the Mackenzie camera. This new (to me) statement that the picture is actually from McKee’s phone (also new detail) could be significant. Also the article in the Daily Courier where the 14 Mackenzie photos and video ( or videos according to this article) were released says that the camera received by Mike Mackenzie had 14 pictures and videos. So this would be further evidence that there was no image 0388, and therefore the image in the SAIR is not from Mackenzie but from McKee. If this is true, there is another cell phone unaccounted for in the YCSO report
Good catch, Calvin.
I am reading the article.
I’m ready to accept any new evidence… but 2 facts remain…
1) The photo was taken at the same exact place where they
were known to be circa 4:00 – 4:04 PM… and not the
previous 3:50 PM location. So even if it was taken by
someone else ( and is not the missing IMG_0888 from
Christopher’s photo sequence )… the SAIR still
“dialed it back” 12 minutes to suit their own ‘narrative’.
2) The Arizona Republic paid meticulous attention when
they published the MacKenzie photos to TAG them with
names like IMG_08xx that match exactly the Canon
sequence file names 110-08xx. So even if someone
other than MacKenzie took that photo used in the SAIR…
then Christoper’s IMG_0888 is STILL MISSING because
it NEVER appeared in the Arizona Republic’s YHF photo
set release.
SIDENOTE: The Arizona Republic said they only had 14
still images from Christopher’s Canon Powershot. We
know now from the ‘notes’ added by an Arizona Reporter
with the initial ‘pr’ that that is not really true. The notes in
the EXIF data now tell us that they had ALL of the pictures
from Christopher’s Canon from day 1… including the ones
from the Doce Fire.
What the Arizona Republic really meant there when they
published their first set of photos is that they were only
CHOOSING to publish those 14 YHF related photos at
that time.
Very soon after that… they made ‘other’ pages on their site
showing selections from all the other pictures they already
had from the Doce fire, etc.
Happy New Year!
Here is a link below for the 2000 IAWF WILDFIRE SAFETY SUMMIT in Edmonton, Canada. It has a WEALTH of information in the articles, particularly the ones we have discussed, e.g Human Factors, Leadership, Escape Routes, Safety Zones, Fire Shelters, and much more.
One to read first dealing with the ‘Bad Decisions With Prior Good Outcomes’ issue is “TURNER’S MODEL TO A DISASTER AS APPLIED TO A DISASTER FIRE” by USFWS Regional RX Fire Specialist Roddy Baumannon (page 30). It’s about a 1979 Canadian RX Burn that went bad “7 minutes after ignition” and killed 7 Junior Foresters. He goes through the various stages leading to a disaster which cover getting to the point of considering bad decisions with good outcomes as acceptable, which then leads to further bad decisions with good outcomes, which leads to disaster. Dianne Vaughn, writing about the Challenger Shuttle Disiaster called it the ‘Normalization of Deviance’
http://cfs.nrcan.gc.ca/pubwarehouse/pdfs/33452.pdf
RTS-
I read the Baumann article. It is an excellent description of how bad decisions with good outcomes can take root and become disasters. The question is – was Yarnell Hill an accident (errors not ingrained) or a disaster (errors were ingrained)? The public record on this does not seem to adequately answer the question.
I freely admit others from outside (i.e. the testimonials I cite) just may not have been aware of any problems. This issue may be subtle and easily overlooked as it is occurring. It does sound that if this was a situation of bad decisions with good outcomes, there are other crews with worse problems – maybe even USFS crews?
So, since the past is done, the real issue is moving forward what is to be done? Just reading a few wildland threads makes it clear there is a big difference of opinion on adhering to the rules at all times. Clearly some are willing to make decisions others would consider bad. If this is going to result in events like Yarnell Hill, how do we stop it? Does wildland firefighter training need to be completely revamped? Do crews need to be subject to more review from above? Or, with over $500 million in claims out there, is wildland firefighting going to end and we treat fires like tornadoes and hurricanes – pick up pieces after it is over?
**
** CHRISTOPHER MACKENZIE’S CANON POWERSHOT
** CAMERA HAD A TEMPERATURE SENSOR.
Some EXIF metadata information from Christopher MacKenzie’s photo
tagged IMG_0889 as published by the Arizona Republic…
Camera: Canon PowerShot SD1400 IS
Lens: 5 – 20 mm
Photo shot at 5 mm (shot wide open).
Creator: Christopher MacKenzie
File Number: 110-0889
Image Unique ID: 2548ca774be0ab5a80114ba41729a3e
Creation Date: 4:01 PM +52 seconds.
Exposure: Auto exposure, 1/251 sec, f/2.8, ISO 80
Flash: Off, Did not fire
Focus: Single, Face Detect, with a depth of field of from 65.53 m to infinity.
Camera Temperature: 34 C ( 93.200 F )
>> On December 30, 2013 at 12:36 am, Marti Reed said…
>>
>> I’m looking at it in Adobe Bridge.
>> I’ve never seen anything to record a camera temperature ever.
Marti… all Canon Powershots built in 2005 or later have onboard ‘temperature
sensors’ and the information is used by the firmware itself to tell whether the
Canon is ‘within the standard temperature operating range’. If it isn’t… you
can get error reports on the screen like “Too Hot” or “Too Cold”. The temperature
sensor is also used to detect when the battery might be overheating ( a known
problem with Canons using lithium batteries ).
In general… this ‘Camera Temperature’ value being stored in the EXIF header
for each and every photo ( or video ) you take is +/- 1 degree of the actual
outside-the-case air temperature… unless you’ve really ‘heated up’ the camera
taking long videos or hundreds of pictures in a row.
Happy New Year’s Eve.
Here is a 15 or so minute video clip from The Weather Channel and Weather Underground on “America Burning: the YHF Tragedy and the Nation’s Wildfire Crisis” (or something like that). A little different angle. NOT buying the Global Warming spew.
http://www.wunderground.com/news/america-burning-yarnell-hill-tragedy-and-nations-wildfire-crisis-20131230
stuff like this is what we need to see out there—please share this video John Dougherty to people that were there that weekend—this is the sharing we need to see-
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YWkM_2fa4k0
Thank you, Joy.
Yes… this is very well done and represents a lot of work
on the part of YouTube user 4490red.
4490red has four other videos from June 30 alone that he
posted back on October 8 and 9 and they are still all there
on his YouTube page. Just click ‘4490red’ near his picture
and you will see all of his YouTube uploads.
The only ‘complete’ video of the four that 4490red posted back
in the first week of October that is totally ‘included’ in this
new video is the first one showing them simply ‘waiting’ for
an assignment in the dirt parking lot of the Yarnell Fire Station
circa 9:30 AM.
It’s the one that has the ‘unanswered’ radio call from Eric Marsh
to Todd Abel and the one where Marsh does NOT identify
himself as DIVS A yet.
There are only ‘pieces’ of the other 3 videos 4490red posted
in October of them doing the structure protection work up
in the Model Creek area… and then ‘staging’ at the U-Store-It
on Highway 89 at the time of deployment… but pieces from
all 3 of those other videos are included at some point.
There is also a segment from a FIFTH video now seen in
this one which was taken later in the day, around the time
of deployment, at the U-Store-It facility just north of
Yarnell. This new video is of the same VLAT drop shown
in 4490red’s other video but this one actually captures the
OTHER firefighter taking the OTHER video over there by the
white truck.
None of these STILL photographs have been seen before,
including the one they took early in the morning of the
Blue Ridge Hotshots standing in the parking lot of the
Yarnell Fire Station, waiting for an assignment.
AT +16:49 there is a photo of the flagpole at the deployment
site similar to the one I posted 2 days ago from a ‘California Fire’
website which looks directly at the boulder field(s) just to the north
of the deployment site ( 116 feet away )… but this one shows
even MORE clearly how much unburned vegetation was still left
there in the boulder field(s).
**
** PHOTOGRAPHS OF BRIAN FRISBY
>> Robert the Second on December 28, 2013 at 9:21 am said:
>>
>> WTKTT and Marti,
>>
>> If you’re talking about the guy in the brown ball cap with the beard
>> talking to the blue hardhat guys, that is definitely NOT Brian Frisby.
>> He doesn’t have a beard.
Right you are. He (Brian) certainly doesn’t ( have a beard ).
Here is a good photo of Brian Frisby taken just 6 days ago in his
Mother’s living room on Christmas Eve…
https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=10201183657290232&set=pb.1134404180.-2207520000.1388462230.&type=3&theater
Now that there is a good public picture of him available… I went back to
‘find him’ in some of the more crucial Yarnell Hill photos and videos.
* Tom Story ( Arizona Republic ) photo 1 – Circa 4:15 PM (?)
This is the photo taken just minutes after Blue Ridge evacuated the Shrine area
and had pulled into the parking lot of the Ranch House Restaurant.
A group of Blue Ridge Hotshots is in the foreground drinking from water bottles.
Now that we know exactly what Frisby looks like… I don’t see him in the photo.
Maybe someone else would.
He MIGHT be the fellow seen ‘walking away’ on the right side of the video.
Same haircut as Frisby.
* Michelle Lee photo 1 – Tweeted at 4:49 PM. June 30, 2013
This is the photo Arizona Republic reporter Michell Lee took in the Ranch
House Restaurant parking lot of the fire burning directly across the street from
the parking lot.
There are Blue Ridge Hotshots near the 4-wheel ATV in the center of the photo…
but I don’t see Frisby standing there. He might be IN the ATV but another
firefighter in the foreground is blocking the view of who is actually sitting in
the ATV.
There are two other Blue Ridge Hotshots in the right side of the photo… but
neither one resembles Frisby.
NOTE: Now that we know that Rogers Trueheart Brown and some others
took off in the ATV to go ‘looking’ for GM after the news of the deployment,
this could actually be the moment when they are ‘saddling up’ to go do that.
* Michelle Lee photo 2 – Tweeted at 5:48 PM, June 30, 2013
This is the close-up photo of the Blue Ridge Hotshots in a ‘huddle’ at the Ranch
House Restaurant.
There are only ( at most ) 9 BR Hotshots in that huddle and three of them are
totally hidden from view.
I don’t see Frisby in the huddle, but I suppose the firefighter on the extreme right
of the huddle COULD be him. Same haircut and about the right size for Frisby…
but face is still obscured.
* Russ Reason Video Interview – Circa 4:55 – 5:00 PM (?)
This is the video that captures the Blue Ridge Hotshots all standing in the Ranch
House Restaurant parking lot staring up at the sky and also shows the Granite
Mountain Supervisor truck with the lights on and someone (McDonough?) sitting
in it listening to the radio.
At +1:55 in this video… when the camera swings back to the parking lot… it most
definitely looks like Frisby standing right there near the rear of the white
extended-cab pickup truck, facing the camera, wearing a baseball-style bill-cap
and with his arms folded.
He is talking to another Blue Ridge Hotshot standing near him… and the rest of
the Blue Ridge fellas are all in the background standing in a group near the front
of the Blue Ridge Utility truck(s) and looking up at the sky to the west.
More to come…
Followup…
There is a VIDEO on YouTube that also has Brian Frisby
in it ( and all the other Blue Ridge Hotshots as well ).
On July 12, 2013, just 12 days after the Yarnell incident,
the entire Blue Ridge Hotshot crew was part of a vehicle
‘Bog/Mud Rally’ held in Prescott. They were there to help
push vehicles out of the Mud Bog when they got stuck.
Video Title: Prescott Valley Mud Bogs 7 12 13
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aVLl-oq-hoo
At +10 seconds into the video… there is a full ‘posed’ shot
of ALL the Blue Ridge Hotshots. Brian Frisby is on the
far left, in the front row, crouched down with his arms
folded across his legs and wearing sunglasses.
At +13 seconds in the same video… he is seen again
in pretty close profile there on the left side of the group.
does anybody else find it slightly disturbing that “WTKTT” is stalking Brian Frisby’s facebook page?
i am really sorry that you have nothing better to do… it’s so sad!
If your on Facebook pretty much any body can find you me included. Those of you using secret names I would not find. When I was in court security the judge always asked people why they were on face book where every body had access to what they said. It’s not a secret place and has no real security.
yeah, thanks bob… but that’s not my point.
and sure, it’s one thing if WTKTT has no life and wants to check out BRHS crewmember facebook profiles, it’s another to be posting links to a public forum anonymously as WTKTT does.
(fyi: you can change your privacy settings in FB to only allow people to see the most basic of information.)
Fullsail,
Happy New Year.
I was wondering about all that myself.The good thing is that the Facebook guy is not Frisby I think.
Facebook is the new ‘Big Brother’ I read somewhere. It just amazing to me how people will just spew out all kinds of personal information for the whole world to see. Former and current totalitarian regimes used to, and still do, have their Secret Police arrest and torture them to get the same information people are willingly spilling out there.
that’s even more hilarious…
i don’t think that’s B. Frisby either… and to make matters worse, WTKTT isn’t just stalking his FB page, he’s stalking his mom’s FB page… ugh.
If your an investigator Law enforcement or otherwise face book is an interesting place for information. I’ve seen lawyers use it in court. It is your words, your pictures and your life. Don’t believe you can hide or stop access you would be amazed.
I think WTKTT is just looking for a Picture of Frisby so he knows what he looks like to ID him in some of the Pictures. Easy place to go unless some one wants to share a PIC.
This continued discussion about “prior bad decisions with good outcomes” is important as it is seen often when major errors occur. However it is not always a factor, some “one off” events do occur. And it is a serious statement to make. In effect it is saying the crew superintendent was not doing his job and was not safe. So to continually invoke it (not just as a possibility but as an implied fact) without offering evidence is really quite unfair. I understand it is a difficult, touchy subject to address – but I think the unfairness of dealing with it like this should be acknowledged. Not saying it is without merit, but a bad event by itself is not proof that it is the case.
In addition, what public statements there have been do not seem to indicate this to be the case. The guy that wrote for “Two More Chains” this summer said he found it hard to believe because “no way was I as good a decisionmaker as Eric Marsh”. The crew boss for the Wyoming Hotshots was quoted in a paper there that while he could see it happening, he could not believe it was THAT crew because they were safe. That would indicate there are a # of crews out there he thought were not safe.
Of course sometimes recognizing bad decisions with good outcomes may not be all that easy. If a pattern is occurring it is important to be aware of it and correct it. Does the current organization of wildland firefighting facilitate that sufficiently, not just with the Prescott crew, but more generally as well?
And try this link for the two MacKenzie Fire Investigation reoprts since my other two were a wash. If not, go to the Wildland Lessons Learned Center (LLC), the Incident reviews, then search for the 1994 MacKenzie Fire.
http://www.wildfirelessons.net/irdb/?executeSearch=true&LibraryKey=b58e5b48-1c09-4f15-ad0d-c26639dab1a2&SearchTerm=mackenzie+fire
WTKTT If you can read between the lines of what I said then you can figure out the rest. Also if STEED had a pocket note book he probably mad notes of the day, which may be information or not. Read what I said earlier about the note book and log.
Mr. Powers… I have ‘heard of’ and ‘seen’ all the evidence I need
to believe that Eric Marsh and Jesse Steed MIGHT have been
keeping standard “Unit Logs” in real time that day.
I want to know WHERE THEY ARE.
They have to be among the evidence gathered from the SAIT. Or the Prescott Fire Department has them. They have got to be listed somewhere. Unless they actually did get burned up. The sheriff’s department or corner would have listed if on them. A good question to pursue.
WTKTT,
Afraid? No. Discerning, yes. Base all actions on the current and expected … ‘The Rules’ apply to everything.
No big deal. Carry on.
…and don’t walk into any box canyons with unburned fuel.
WTKTT,
But the thing is, there are times when you CAN safely do that, like in the mornings (or whenever) with high humidity and no wind, and NO fire behavior, BUT NOT when GMHS decided to do that very same thing.
Just look at ther color of the smoke (BLACK) EARLY IN THE DAY in this AZ Rep article and other photos. That’s basic WFF 101 (S-190) and SHOULD have set the stage for these guys EARLY. Evidently, it didn’t click with those guys.
WTKTT,
Regarding the ‘bad decisions with prior outcomes’ request – I’ve done my part, setting the stage for you; so now it’s up to you all to use your Holmesian Logic to fill in the blanks. It’s elementary.
Thanks ( for nuthin’ ).
Are you simply afraid of something… or someone?
Even that story would be interesting.
RTS… apologies… I missed the following comment
from Mr. Powers before I posted above…
>> On December 30, 2013 at 3:18 pm
>> Mr. Powers wrote…
>>
>> I know RTS personally and I know why he can’t
>> talk about it, the same as fullsail and Rocksteady,
>> NV and a couple of others on here. Just be glad they
>> are here with their input. You will have to take my
>> word on that.
Well.. I most certainly do ( and will ).
I get it now. You guys all KNOW each other.
RTS… ignore my comment above.
Be as secretive as you need to be.
I will figure it out.
umm, no. I don’t know any of these folks outside of this silly comment thread…
Well… they seem to think they know YOU.
I don’t know you personally but I know your a Wild Land Fire Fighter and I think a Past or current Hot Shot Foreman. And I think your a damned good one who speaks his mind. You remind me a lot of me 30 years ago, Black or white never was any gray.
I have never met anyone here in person before.IIhve had email discussions with Bob Powers because of thiinident, and hopefully willbable to meet himtis spring.
Regarding the NOTES that we can now see that were ‘appended’ to
the metadata in Christopher MacKenzie’s 110-0889 photo…
Caption Writer: ps
Title: Yarnell Reconstruction
Subject: Yarnell Reconstruction
Description: Yarnell Reconstruction
Christopher MacKenzie took these photos and videos of the Doce and
Yarnell Hill fires. It appears the earliest photos date to June 18, 2013.
Some files have modification dates after June 30 which might be attributed
to file transfer dates. Chris’ father, Mike, provided these to Chief Darrell Willis
who gave them to Randy Okon, member of the Accident Investigation Team.
Photos by Christopher MacKenzie
As I said above… these NOTES added by an Arizona Republic person
with the initial ‘pr’ DO show us the ‘chain of possession’ ( as understood
by AZREPUBLIC ) on the actual CD with photos/videos on it…
…but I just wanted to point out that we STILL do NOT know the actual
‘chain of possession’ on Christopher’s Canon Powershot itself.
The RUMOR is that “someone from the medical examiner’s office”
actually knocked on Mike MacKenzie’s ( Christopher’s father ) door
and handed it to him… then Mike’s stepdaughter took the SD card
out… stuck it in her computer… and said “Hey Dad… look at this!”.
I’m not sure I believe that story.
First of all… I believe Mr. MacKenzie doesn’t even live in Arizona,
so how would someone from the ME office have been able to
just ‘knock on his door and hand it to him’.
Secondly… it is not normally the job of ANYONE at the Medical Examiner’s
office to do this sort of thing… especially when there are other agencies
involved like Fire Departments and such.
Third ( and perhaps more important )… it is now possible that we see
Christopher’s Camera just lying there on the ground on the first day
the SAIT investigators were examining the deployment site.
That would be days AFTER everything that was headed for the Medical
Examiner’s office had already arrived.
What we DO know…. is that when the YCSO detectives AND the SAIT
investigators said they were ‘done’ with the site… the Prescott Fire
Department ( Sic: Darrell Willis, etc. ) were allowed to remove
whatever was ‘left at the site’.
So how did the actual Camera find its way to Mike MacKenzie… and
where is the original SD card now?
‘Chain of evidence’. Still needs to be determined.
@RTS, re NTSB and the Iron-44 incident, I’ve glanced at them but not had time to read them thoroughly. Headed out, I hope all here enjoy the remaining holiday season with their families and are set for a good and safe ’14.
Fullsail,
Regarding the 30-Mile Fire, I’ve used those types of rocks and rock scree many times as a SZ and done just fine. Supposedly, they could not get a good seal under thier shelters. Partly true. The deal on that fire was the dead-end, reverse box canyon across the creek from where they deployed. The SAIR is NOT to be trusted as their alleged fire progression map is pure feculence. The fire actually went up over the right ridge and then back around through a saddle down into this reverse box canyon that ended about 20-30 feet off the surface. The fire actually ‘blow torched’ down through it, across the creek burning off the tops of the willows, continued to ‘blow torch’ ABOVE and across the road most of them deployed on, and fatally ‘blow troched’ those in their shelters next to the boulders. Two individualls, up in the rocks, blasted by the heat, used their shelters as shield to get down to the road (hid in their van) and into the creek. The small stand of trees and this boulder pile acted as somewhat of a chute and funneled the hot gases. The stand of trees was NOT torched, but dried out like your Christmas tree 2 weeks later; green but bone dry. Those that deployed on the road were fine since the hot gases went right over them burning the citizen’s truck.
Reposting here for the THIRD time!.
Agreed,completely on your above regarding the boulders.
Did you ever get a chance to look through the nefarious NTSB links on the Iron-44 incident?
I have not looked over them… but i strongly disagree with you over the cause of the crash and know several aviation types who would too… but this isn’t the place to discuss that… maybe over a beer sometime!
It’s gotta be REAL beer, not sissy beer like Buttweiser and Coors Light and stuff.
On 12/27 at 9:37 pm, Eric stated:
**The USDOJ Office of Inspector General needs to audit the SAIT for the Yarnell Hill Fire. ASF delegated the SAIR to USFS. That brought in the federal involvement directly.**
I think you are mistaken. This was a State run fire (until the Type 1 Team took over after the deployment), under State jurisdiction on State owned land. Scott Hunt, the State Forester, hand-picked the SAIR Team, some of whom were federal employess, and others who were state employees. The AZ DOF never gave up jurisdiction for the investigation, and in fact, the final report was submitted to them, for their review, prior to release.
The feds were never the ‘responsible party’ for this investigation, or officially involved in it’s operation, therefore, the USDOJ has no authority here, as well.
If I am incorrect about this, please set me straight, and cite some sources.
I do stand corrected. When the initial delegation of authority was
issued, I thought I recalled reading that the USFS was requested to take the lead on the investigation. As I cannot find the article (due to time constraints) I must retract my above statement.
“Large rockslides can be effective
deployment sites, but you must stay
away from brush and trees, and from
fuels scattered in the rocks. Even
though it can be difficult to seal the
edges of the shelter in large, jumbled
rocks, rockslides sometimes offer the
largest area free of fuels and may be the
best option for deployment.”…”Objects such as large rocks,
dozers, or structures such as cabins,
can act as barriers to heat. But, if the
objects themselves ignite, you may
have to move.” http://www.nwcg.gov/pms/pubs/newshelt72.pdf
Please pardon my bad cut and paste skills.
Again, I’m not saying there were any GOOD options available, simply that the fact that better options were ignored while the worst option was chosen was one more in a long chain of bad decisions that led to all getting caught. And that that last decision may well reflect a training problem as survivability of deployment sites didn’t seem to factor heavily, in my view, into three separate decision-making processes that day.
Still waiting to hear about those several instances you mentioned above NV…
I am with FullSail on this one.
RTS… I have every respect in the world for your ( and
any other WTS person’s ) experience and contributions
to this discussion… but that has to be about the fifth
time you have said you “know about these prior incidents”
and the “chain of bad decisions”.
If you can’t elaborate on any of this stuff you keep
“hinting at” ( nod, nod, wink, wink )…
…can you at least tell us WHY you won’t talk about it?
Typo above.. sorry… I meant I have ‘ever respect in
the world for people with WFF experience’ ( not WTS ).
I know RTS personally and I know why he can’t talk about it, the same as fullsail and Rocksteady, NV and a couple of others on here. Just be glad they are here with their input. You will have to take my word on that, and see what else falls. Being retired I can say what I want.
Okay… my bad… typing too fast today.
I really screwed that one up above.
I actually was trying to ask RTS why he won’t talk about
the things that HE keeps ‘hinting at’… but that’s a
misplaced post since FullSail was responding to NV.
Apologies.
Let me turn it into a ‘general question’, then.
Does ANYONE have any information about all these
‘prior bad decisions’ on the part of GM that other
people keep saying the ‘know about’… but won’t
provide any details?
I’m not sure if RTS is saying that the Mckenzie fire shows deployment in a boulder field is possibly a better option than deploying in heavy fuels, as they survived albeit with airway damage? My internet rhetoric interpretation is often very bad.
The fact that those 3 survived doesn’t of course directly mean that any of GM would have, had they sought other options. But, in terms of percentages, unfortunately GM chose the option (deployment where they did) that seems to have had the lowest chance of anyone surviving. The boulders look like they would have offered better odds.
And here’s the other half of the Mackenzie Fire Investigation Report.
https://higherlogicdownload.s3.amazonaws.com/WILDFIRELESSONS/Mackenzie_Investigation_1994.pdf?AWSAccessKeyId=AKIAJH5D4I4FWRALBOUA&Expires=1388433179&Signature=PGcqW7aQ7kjVx2R642UhwzV9TDg%3D
Regarding the sheltering up in the Boulders debate. Consider the analagous June 1, 1994 Mackenzie Fire Shelter Deployment near Kingman, AZ.
https://higherlogicdownload.s3.amazonaws.com/WILDFIRELESSONS/mackenzie_shelter_deployment_1994.pdf?AWSAccessKeyId=AKIAJH5D4I4FWRALBOUA&Expires=1388433179&Signature=BIXVKm735Dw7C%2FSVsVL3YKEvhBs%3D
This was fairly close to the Yarnell Hill Fire in fuels, weather, and togography. HEAVY brush, mostly scrub oak. It was hot and dry BUT without thunderstorms. And it was in a BOWL. “The deployment of shelters occured at approximately 1400 in a GRANITE BOULDER FIELD AT THE BASE OF A VERY STEEP SLOPE IN A DENSE BRUSH FILLED SHALLOW DRAINAGE.” (EMPHASIS ADDED) Sound familiar?
It was the 2nd or 3rd day of the fire, PV HS were already engaged. Prescott HS (PHS) were assigned, then flew a recon, and decided on a plan. They would insert their Crew by helicopter LANDING IN THE BLACK as a SZ. However, once the pilot actually implemented the plan, he changed his mind on landing ‘in the black’ for whatever reason. SO, now it’s later in the day by now, and the pilot drops these guys off IN THE GREEN some distance from the black. The PHS decides to return the one helitack crewmember for whatever reason. So, there stands three PHS IN THE GREEN in the heat of the day and fire behavior is increasing big time. They radio their Supt. and advise him what’s going on and cancel any further PHS shuttle into the fire.
The 3 PHS scramble about searching and scouting for a good SZ since they are in the middle a a sea of UNBURNED green. By divine providence, I say, they find a BOULDER FIELD. Long story, short, they BARELY FIT into this opening and open up the shelters as best they can to cover themselves and seal the openings. The fire hits them hard, maybe three times, and they survive. Inside these boulders, out of the intense radiant, they attempt banging their heads on the rocks to pass out so as to avoid the pain. They get AIRWAY BURNS and must immediately get oxygen from the helitack coming in to retrieve them, and again at the hospital. They said if it wasn’t for the oxygen, they would have survived the burnover, but died from their airways and lungs being burned.
So, I’m agreeing with Bob Powers on the Boulder Spring Ranch boulder field. NO WAY!
i don’t think you have to look back any further than the 30 mile investigation to understand what a bad idea deploying in a rock scree or boulder field is…
i am curious as to what incidents NV is referring to where numerous folks survived around boulders when others who deployed near them didn’t survive?
again, running uphill through a boulder field with a pack and tools is not really feasible or practical. and the whole “deer survived on the rocky knob” is just hilarious!
You are seriously asserting that scree or boulder fields are not better choices than a site in the middle of dense chaparral that guarantees direct flame contact? They are by definition areas of sparser fuel, and in fact are id’d as such in training material.
As far as pack and tools slowing you down, this is relevant :
“As soon as you realize your escape
may be compromised, drop your
gear. Take your fire shelter with you.
Keep your tool if there is a chance
you may need it to clear a
deployment site. Drop packs, chain
saws, or anything else that might
slow you down. Firefighters have
died carrying packs and tools while
climbing a hill to escape fires. You
can move up to 30 percent faster
without your gear.”
Umm, in all the pictures i have seen prior to burning, i don’t remember seeing any rock screes or boulder fields that weren’t surrounded by heavy vegetation in the yarnell fire area.
Agreed,completely.
Did you ever get a chance to look through the nefarious NTSB links on the Iron-44 incident?
Reposting here.
Agreed,completely.
Did you ever get a chance to look through the nefarious NTSB links on the Iron-44 incident?
**
** ARIZONA REPUBLIC PHOTO SHOWS CAPTAIN JESSE STEED
** CARRIED HIS ‘UNIT LOG’ IN HIS FRONT SHIRT POCKET ?
In the same “Alone On The Hill” article published today by the Arizona Republic…
there is another crucial piece of information being revealed by one of the other
photographs.
The SECOND large photograph used in the article also came from Christopher
MacKenzie’s camera. It’s from the Doce fire and it’s the one that shows Captain
Jesse Steed holding his Bendix/King portable radio with the red clamshell
extension and the 16″ antenna extension.
The reporter did the same thing with this photo that he did with the other one. He
copied it directly from wherever the Arizona Republic is keeping their copies of
MacKenzie’s originals into the directory where he was working on his article.
This time, however, he wanted to do something fancy to the image and add the
word FRIDAY in big white letters to the bottom of the image rather than just use
the original as a ‘background image’ for an HTML DIV section like he did with the
other one.
So he ‘edited’ the photo himself using their copy of Adobe Photoshop and when
he saved it… he lost all the original metadata. An EXIF dump of this photo just
reveals the software he used to add his little FRIDAY graphic to the image as he
edited it on his Macintosh…
Adobe XMP Core 5.5-c014 79.151481, 2013/03/13-12:09:15
Original Document ID: ED334D0AD0205F7DDAEC1A8BE0F1C01D
Document ID: xmp.did:D084E3C664BB11E3977CBA69A4B78902
Instance ID: xmp.iid:3E63C1FE647711E3977CBA69A4B78902
Creator Tool: Adobe Photoshop CS5 Macintosh
That’s OK. This photo was of Steed at the Doce fire and the metadata for this
photo is not all that important.
What IS important is that the reporter still didn’t ‘resize’ the MacKenzie original
even after he added his little FRIDAY graphic to it… and so this is, in fact, still
an original ultra-high-res copy of Christopher’s photo.
That means there is MUCH more DETAIL in this photo than has ever been seen
before since when AZREPUBLIC published this photo originally they really
‘chomped it down’ and a lot of resolution was lost.
Look at Captain Steed’s front shirt pocket ( on HIS left ).
There is what appears to be a NOTEBOOK in his left-side front shirt pocket
and a PEN is clipped to the open right side of that pocket. His sunglasses
and holder around his neck is actually opening the flap of his left-side shirt
pocket just slightly so we can see what looks like the top of the black-covered
notebook there in his shirt pocket right against the PEN.
I believe this is photographic evidence that Captain Jesse Steed carried a
standard WFF ‘Unit Log’ book in his left front shirt pocket along with a pen
to make real-time entries when he was in the field.
If that’s where Steed actually carried his ‘Unit Log’… then it most probably
DID survive the burnover in Yarnell since he was PRONE in his shelter
and the SAIR indicates there wasn’t much damage to the FRONT of
any of Steed’s clothing.
That means, if it was in his front shirt pocket on June 30, it would have traveled
untouched along with his body to the Medical Examiner’s office.
Where is that ‘Unit Log’ now?
Did it only leave the medical examiner’s office when ( as is documented )
“representatives from the Prescott Fire Department’ ( E.g. Darell Willis )
were allowed to remove personal effects” ?
Is there an ‘inventory’ somewhere of these ‘personal items’ that the PFD
was allowed to ‘remove’ from the Medical Examiner’s office?
WTKTT,
You did a lot of good Holmesian work here with the photos. Thanks. I am going to take issue with you on Steed carrying a ‘standard WFF unit log.’ You’re not quite “leaping into oblivion again…” as fullsail likes to say, but close maybe.
A ‘standard’ GSA Unit Log is 7 1/4″ X 3 1/4″ so that’s TOO big to fit into a fire shirt pocket. Steed has SOME type of notebook, but I don’t think he had a Unit Log.
RTS… Thanks!
I don’t know where you fireboys all get the idea that looking
at photographic evidence and forming an opinion about
what something MIGHT be… and couching those opinions
with “I believe” or “I think” or “It might be” is “leaping into
oblivion”. Whatever. If “oblivion” is where you think the
formation of conclusions that MIGHT turn out to be true
is the “destination”… so be it… because it is.
Where does one BUY these standard logs?
Can you give me a link so I can see a photograph
of this “standard kit” you are now talking about?
Notice also that the other firefighter in that photo ALSO
has a pen in his pocket… but I don’t see the ‘profile’ of
a similar notebook in his front shirt pocket.
I believe that other firefighter is Caldwell… and he was
a “squad leader”… so perhaps that’s evidence that
he might ( let me repeat for you… MIGHT ) be carrying
a “Unit Log” himself.
Can you verify that is Caldwell?
RTS… a followup on your great reply.
Is it possible that some fellas keep a SMALLER “Unit Log”
in the field ( as in… some personal notebook of their
own that IS ‘smaller’ and WILL fit in their shirt pocket )
and then they simply ‘transfer’ the notes they made
later to this LARGER… ‘official’ log you are now talking
about? Have you known of field supervisory people
approaching this “Unit Log” task in that way?
Way back when we carried a field note book about 3×4 inches FS issue. We used them to make notes in and transferred the notes to the unit or personal daily log. some time in the 70’s we were told to stop keeping the logs. Crews continued to keep daily logs for accomplishment records, for yearend reports.
WTKTT,
For the Unit Log booklets, try the GSA Fire Publications catalog, Ben Meadows, or Forestry Suppliers.
I believe that you just might find them in one of those sources.
**MORE EVIDENCE THAT WTTKT HAS NO IDEA WHAT HE’S TALKING ABOUT!!!**
most wff’s that i know carry their compass in their front shirt pocket. (would be a small rectangular hard object with a black base)… used for orienting yourself, signalling aircraft, checking for nose hairs, etc…
the reason they DON’T carry their unit log in their front shirt pocket (or their front pants pocket) is because they soak their shirt (and upper part of pants around where your pack hip belt sits) in sweat multiple times a day and anything made of paper quickly disintegrates or becomes illegible.
the last time RTS explained to you about where unit logs are kept he said, “pants side pocket” meaning SIDE CARGO POCKET… not shirt pocket, not front pants pocket and not back pants pocket.
and where you leap is when you go from “i believe… yada-yada-yada…” to “based on this belief… LEEEEAAAPPP…(insert all sorts of conjecture here)” to falling flat on your face because what you think you know, YOU DIDN’T REALLY KNOW!
**
** ARIZONA REPUBLIC PUBLISHES AN ORIGINAL CHRISTOPHER
** MACKENZIE PHOTO COMPLETE WITH ORIGINAL CANON METADATA
The Arizona Republic published a ‘retrospective’ article today ( 12/30/13 )
about the Granite Mountain Hotshots and the Yarnell Hill Fire.
That article is entitled “Alone On The Hill” and is here…
http://www.azcentral.com/yarnell-fire/#introduction
What is VERY important here is that the photo this reporter chose to include as
the ‘background image’ for his title banner at the top of the article is, in fact, an
exact ORIGINAL COPY of one of Christopher MacKenzie’s ORIGINAL PHOTOS
from his Canon PowerShot camera… and it still contains ALL of the original EXIF
metadata recorded by Christopher’s camera when he took the picture.
It is a 1.2 megabyte high-res image ( IMG_0889 ) taken directly from Christopher
MacKenzie’s Canon Powershot.
What the Arizona Republic did when they published the original MacKenzie
images on September 28, 2013 ( the same moment the SAIR was released by
Arizona Forestry ) was run them through their own JPEG modification software
to ‘size’ them for publication.
This removed all the metadata from the original copies.
This time… The reporter who created today’s article did NOT do that.
He wanted a very LARGE copy of one of the MacKenzie photos he chose to
make his article look good… so he went back to the actual original copies they
received… then copied one of them ( IMG_0889 ) to the hard drive where he was
working on his article WITHOUT removing the orgininal metadata and without
touching it any further ( other than renaming it to ‘LeadImage.jpg’, which is
what the HTML in his article is loading ). Then he just assigned it as the
‘background’ image for what is called an HTML ‘DIV’ at the top of his article and
had the HTML for his page overlay his title “Along On The Hill” graphic on TOP
of that (unedited and untouched) background image.
So that’s the photo that is actually ‘running’ with the article published today.
An EXACT copy of the original from Christopher MacKenzie’s camera…
complete with the original Canon PowerShot embedded EXIF metadata.
Caveat: The ‘original copy’ that this reporter used does have some information
that was ‘added’ to it by the Arizona Republic after they copied whatever they
were originally given… such as NOTES added by the reporters to the ‘Description’
metadata… but the important thing is that NONE of the original metadata from
Christopher’s original image has been ‘removed’… only ‘amended’. See below.
* WHAT THE ORIGINAL METADATA TELLS US…
We now know EXACTLY what model of Canon Powershot Christopher
MacKenzie had with him that day, what lens he was using, and what it was
set to when he shot his photo number 0889…
Camera: Canon PowerShot SD1400 IS
Lens: 5 – 20 mm
Photo shot at 5 mm (shot wide open).
We can now also finally see where the Arizona Republic was getting the
‘timestamps’ that they put on all the original Christopher MacKenzie photos
they released on September 28, 2013 when the SAIR came out.
They took the TIME right from the metadata embedded in the original copies
of Christopher’s photos.
According to the ‘clock’ that was actually on Christopher’s camera… he took the
photo used in this new article ( 0889 ) at EXACTLY…
4:01 PM +52 seconds.
We can also now see what the Arizona Republic meant when they sometimes
said ‘about’ in association with the time values they published. They just didn’t
want to bother with the fact that Christopher’s original metadata timestamps had
‘seconds’ values in them… so sometimes they were just ’rounding up’ or
’rounding down’ on the published time value(s).
It was exactly 93.2 degrees fahrenheit up on that ridge in that pile of boulders
( at 8 seconds short of 4:02 PM ) when Christopher took this picture…
Camera Temperature: 34 C ( 93.200 F )
NOTE: There is no GPS Latitude/Longitude information in the original metadata.
Either the camera didn’t have GPS onboard or the feature was not turned on.
We also now see that the IMG_XXXX title values on the original published
MacKenzie photos was, in fact, being taken directly from Christopher’s onboard
Canon PowerShot auto-sequencing file stamps.
Here is the internal Canon image sequence number embedded in this
MacKenzie photo…
File Number: 110-0889
Image Unique ID: 2548ca774be0ab5a80114ba41729a3e5
This matches the ‘IMG_0889’ title that the Arizona Republic put on this photo
when they originally published it.
NOTE: I still believe that the original MacKenzie photo with internal sequence
number ‘110-0888’ was REMOVED from the CD that was presented to the
Arizona Republic because that is the image that the SAIT decided to use
in the SAIR report and they never gave it to them. IMG_0888 was then ‘missing’
from the set of 14 photos originally published by Arizona Republic.
This ‘missing’ IMG_0888 was also the one the SAIT just ‘willy-nilly’ dialed
back the TIME on by TWELVE MINUTES ( 4:02 back to 3:50 ) just because
they wanted to use it on a page in their ‘narrative’ that was talking about
the 3:50 timeframe. How’s that for ‘accuracy in your investigation’?… and
how’s that for disrespect for Christopher MacKenzie himself?
I still think Christopher’s family should be outraged that the SAIT just ‘played’
with their dead son’s images ( and timestamps ) that way to suit their own
agenda…. but I have said that before.
* RE: PHOTOSHOP SECTION IN THE METADATA
Since there is now a ‘Photoshop’ information section in the metadata ( see
below ) here is what you can assume…
The ORIGINALS were imported into ‘Photoshop’ by the Arizona Republic and
that’s when they simply ADDED their own ‘Notes’ and ‘Descriptions’ to these
photos for their own (future) internal reference… but Photoshop does NOT
remove any ORIGINAL metadata from the photo unless you ask it to.
This reporter (today) used a copy of one of those photos from their Photoshop
originals and did NOT remove anything… so that’s why this is a GOOD
copy of what came directly off Christopher’s camera.
They ( Arizona Republic ) simply added some general Notes, Caption and Title
information of their own while looking at the originals and they chose the name
“Yarnell Reconstruction” for those metadata additions.
The entries ‘added’ to the metadata by the Arizona Republic appear below in the
full metadata dump and ofter ‘repeat’ but here is the kind of stuff I am talking
about that THEY added…
Caption Writer: ps
Title: Yarnell Reconstruction
Subject: Yarnell Reconstruction
Description: Yarnell Reconstruction
Christopher MacKenzie took these photos and videos of the Doce and
Yarnell Hill fires. It appears the earliest photos date to June 18, 2013.
Some files have modification dates after June 30 which might be attributed
to file transfer dates. Chris’ father, Mike, provided these to Chief Darrell Willis
who gave them to Randy Okon, member of the Accident Investigation Team.
Photos by Christopher MacKenzie
The DESCRIPTION field shown above is exactly what you think it is. It is the
Arizona Republic reporter adding ‘notes’ to the photos after receiving them
that explain the photo ‘set’ and WHERE they are being told the photos
actually came from.
For the first time… we see the REAL ‘chain of possession’ on the Christopher
MacKenzie photos as it was known (told) to the Arizona Republic. This matches
what was actually published in their own article… but we now see ‘Randy Okon’
mentioned specifically as being the SAIT recipient of the MacKenzie photos
and video… which passed THROUGH Darrell Willis’ hands before the SAIT ever
got to see Christopher’s photos or his VIDEOS.
Notice THIS important NOTE that the Arizona Republic reporter made at the
time he received these photos ( and the VIDEO )…
“Some files have modification dates after June 30 which might be
attributed to file transfer dates.”
That’s true… but there might be ANOTHER reason that only SOME of the
‘originals’ ( photos and/or VIDEO files ) the reporter is now looking at might
have ‘modification dates after June 30’…
It could simply be because they WERE ‘modified’ after June 30.
The reporter MAY be talking about the ‘modification dates’ he is seeing on the
(supposed) only 2 VIDEO clips he is being provided.
He might be seeing only two VIDEO files on the material he has just been
handed… each 9 seconds long… but ( unlike the still photos ) they mysteriously
have ‘modification dates’ AFTER June 30 which do NOT match the
system ‘file dates’ for all the other files and it was suspicious enough
for him to make a note of that himself which we can now read.
I believe this is one more piece of evidence that Christopher MacKenzie’s
VIDEOS from his Canon PowerShot WERE ‘edited’ and/or ‘cropped’ by
someone in the ‘chain of possession’ ( Mike MacKenzie? Darrell Willis?
Randy Okon? ) BEFORE the Arizona Republic was handed the CD with the
material that the SAIT wanted to be made ‘public’ in their coordinated media
event on September 28, 2013.
I still believe there is MORE ‘MacKenzie VIDEO’ somewhere.
Nobody shoots just 9 second video clips separated by only a dozen or so
seconds… especially when you are trying to capture a ‘conversation’
or a distinct ‘moment in time’.
And if the next question on the tip of your mind is… “Would VIDEO files
from Christopher’s Canon Powershot have the same kind of complete
metadata information in them?”…
…the answer is YES. Canon PowerShots DO that.
Even if the originals were ‘edited’… unless the initial metadata was
purposely REMOVED the VIDEO metadata would still say exactly how
LONG the ORIGINAL video really was. All you need is access to an
actual ORIGINAL copy of the video file(s) from the Canon Powershot
to extract this information.
** COMPLETE METADATA
This time… I AM going to include ALL of the original metadata extracted from this
Christopher MacKenzie 0889 photo, regardless of how verbose anyone thinks it
might be, because I think ALL the information extracted is important and deserves
to see ‘the light of day’. That online photo might ‘disappear’ at any moment.
The ONLY really verbose metadata that has been removed below are all the
totally redundant Canon Powershot memory register values that look like this…
Canon Camera Info Power Shot 2 0x00a7: 0
There are actually hundreds and hundreds of those ‘memory register values’
listed in the metadata and they don’t really contribute any real information so
I did, in fact, leave that useless information OUT of the metadata ‘dump’ below.
I have all those hundreds of register values here if anyone wants to see them.
So here it is… ALL of the (useful) metadata extracted from this raw copy of one
of Christopher MacKenzie ORIGINAL photos…
** START OF METADATA FROM CHRISTOPHER MACKENZIE PHOTO
* Basic Image Information…
Target image: http://www.azcentral.com/yarnell-fire/assets/images/LeadImage.jpg
Title: Yarnell Reconstruction
Caption: Yarnell Reconstruction
Christopher MacKenzie took these photos and videos of the Doce and
Yarnell Hill fires. It appears the earliest photos date to June 18, 2013. Some
files have modification dates after June 30 which might be attributed to file
transfer dates. Chris’ father, Mike, provided these to Chief Darrell Willis who
gave them to Randy Okon, member of the Accident Investigation Team.
Photos by Christopher MacKenzie.
Description: Yarnell Reconstruction
Christopher MacKenzie took these photos and videos of the Doce and
Yarnell Hill fires. It appears the earliest photos date to June 18, 2013. Some
files have modification dates after June 30 which might be attributed to file
transfer dates. Chris’ father, Mike, provided these to Chief Darrell Willis who
gave them to Randy Okon, member of the Accident Investigation Team.
Photos by Christopher MacKenzie
Creator: Christopher MacKenzie
Camera: Canon PowerShot SD1400 IS
Lens: 5 – 20 mm
Photo Shot at 5 mm (shot wide open)
Exposure: Auto exposure, 1/251 sec, f/2.8, ISO 80
Flash: Off, Did not fire
Focus: Single, Face Detect, with a depth of field of from 65.53 m to infinity.
AF Area Mode: Multi-point AF or AI AF
Keywords: Yarnell Reconstruction
Date: June 30, 2013 – 4:01:52 PM ( Timezone not specified )
File: 3,240 × 4,320 JPEG (14.0 megapixels)
1,258,280 bytes (1.2 megabytes)
Image compression: 97%
* Full embedded data…
XMP
Date Created: 2013:06:30 16:01:52 -07:00 GMT
Credit: Christopher MacKenzie
Headline: Yarnell Reconstruction
Prefs: Tagged:0, ColorClass:0, Rating:0, FrameNum:000889
XMP Toolkit: XMP Core 4.1.1
Caption Writer: ps
Subject: Yarnell Reconstruction
Description: Yarnell Reconstruction
Christopher MacKenzie took these photos and videos of the Doce and
Yarnell Hill fires. It appears the earliest photos date to June 18, 2013. Some
files have modification dates after June 30 which might be attributed to file
transfer dates. Chris’ father, Mike, provided these to Chief Darrell Willis who
gave them to Randy Okon, member of the Accident Investigation Team.
Photos by Christopher MacKenzie
Creator: Christopher MacKenzie
Title: Yarnell Reconstruction
Rating: 0
* EXIF – this group of metadata is encoded in 13,302 bytes (13.0k)…
Exif Image Size: 4,320 × 3,240
Image Description: N/A
Make: Canon
Camera Model Name: Canon PowerShot SD1400 IS
Orientation: Horizontal (normal)
Modify Date: 2013:06:30 16:01:52
Y Cb Cr Positioning: Co-sited
Exif Version: 0221
Date/Time Original: 2013:06:30 16:01:52
Create Date: 2013:06:30 16:01:52
Components Configuration: Y, Cb, Cr
Compressed Bits Per Pixel: 2
Shutter Speed Value: 1/251
Aperture Value: 2.80
Exposure Compensation: 0
Max Aperture Value: 2.8
Metering Mode: Multi-segment
Flash: Off, Did not fire
Focal Length: 5.0 mm
F Number: 2.80
Exposure Time: 1/250
Maker Note: Canon (2,330 bytes binary data)
User Comment: N/A
Flashpix Version: 0100
Color Space: sRGB
Interoperability Index: R98 – DCF basic file (sRGB)
Interoperability Version: 0100
Related Image Width: 4,320
Related Image Height: 3,240
Focal Plane X Resolution: 17777.77778
Focal Plane Y Resolution: 17802.1978
Focal Plane Resolution Unit: inches
Sensing Method: One-chip color area
File Source: Digital Camera
Custom Rendered: Normal
Exposure Mode: Auto
White Balance: Manual
Digital Zoom Ratio: 1
Scene Capture Type: Landscape
Compression: JPEG (old-style)
ISO: 80
Resolution: 180 pixels/inch
Thumbnail Length: 8,192
* Photoshop information…
X Resolution: 200
Displayed Units X: inches
Photoshop Resolution 0x0003: 1
Y Resolution: 200
Displayed Units Y: inches
Photoshop Resolution 0x0007: 1
Copyright Flag: False
* IPTC…
Application Record Version: 3
Date Created: 2013:06:30
Time Created: 16:01:52 – 07:00
Object Name: Yarnell Reconstruction
Keywords: Yarnell Reconstruction
By-line: Christopher MacKenzie
Credit: Christopher MacKenzie
Writer-Editor: ps
Caption-Abstract: Yarnell Reconstruction
Christopher MacKenzie took these photos and videos of the Doce and
Yarnell Hill fires. It appears the earliest photos date to June 18, 2013. Some
files have modification dates after June 30 which might be attributed to file
transfer dates. Chris’ father, Mike, provided these to Chief Darrell Willis who
gave them to Randy Okon, member of the Accident Investigation Team.
Photos by Christopher MacKenzie
Headline: Yarnell Reconstruction
Prefs: Tagged:0, ColorClass:0, Rating:0, FrameNum:000889
* MakerNotes…
Exposure Compensation: 0
Metering Mode: Evaluative
Macro Mode: Normal
Self Timer: Off
Quality: Normal
Canon Flash Mode: Off
Continuous Drive: Single
Canon Camera Settings 0x0006: 0
Focus Mode: Single
Canon Camera Settings 0x0008: -1
Record Mode: JPEG
Canon Image Size: Large
Easy Mode: Foliage
Digital Zoom: None
Contrast: Normal
Saturation: Normal
Sharpness: 0
Camera ISO: Auto
Focus Range: Auto
AF Point: Face Detect
Canon Exposure Mode: Easy
Canon Camera Settings 0x0015: 32,767
Lens Type: Unknown (-1)
Max Focal Length: 20 mm
Min Focal Length: 5 mm
Focal Units: 1000/mm
Max Aperture: 2.8
Min Aperture: 8
Flash Bits: (none)
Canon Camera Settings 0x001e: 0
Canon Camera Settings 0x001f: 0
Focus Continuous: Single
AE Setting: Normal AE
Image Stabilization: On
Zoom Source Width: 4,320
Zoom Target Width: 4,320
Canon Camera Settings 0x0026: 0
Spot Metering Mode: Center
Manual Flash Output: n/a
Canon Camera Settings 0x002b: 32,767
Canon Camera Settings 0x002c: 0
Canon Camera Settings 0x002d: 0
Canon Camera Settings 0x002f: 140
Focal Type: Zoom
Focal Length: 5 mm
Focal Plane X Size: 6.32 mm
Focal Plane Y Size: 4.75 mm
Canon Flash Info: 0 0 0 0
Auto ISO: 75
Base ISO: 100
Measured EV: 12.06
Target Aperture: 2.8
Target Exposure Time: 1/251
Slow Shutter: Off
Shot Number In Continuous Burst: 0
Optical Zoom Code : 0
Canon Shot Info 0x000b: 0
Canon Shot Info 0x000c: 0
Flash Guide Number: 0
Flash Exposure Compensation: 0
Auto Exposure Bracketing: Off
AEB Bracket Value: 0
Control Mode: Camera Local Control
Focus Distance Upper: 65.53 m
Focus Distance Lower: 0 m
F Number: 2.9
Exposure Time: 1/235
Exposure Time: 1/236
Bulb Duration: 0
Canon Shot Info 0x0019: 1
Camera Type: Compact
Auto Rotate: None
ND Filter: Off
Self Timer 2: 0
Canon Shot Info 0x001e: 0
Canon Shot Info 0x001f: 0
Canon Shot Info 0x0020: 0
Flash Output: 0
Canon 0x0000: 0 0 0 0 0 0
Canon Image Type: IMG: PowerShot SD1400 IS JPEG
Canon Firmware Version: Firmware Version 1.00
File Number: 110-0889
Owner Name: Christopher MacKenzie
Rotation: 0
Camera Temperature: 34 C ( 93.200 F )
Canon Model ID: PowerShot SD1400 IS / IXUS 130 / IXY 400F
AF Info Size: 98
AF Area Mode: Multi-point AF or AI AF
Num AF Points: 9
Valid AF Points: 9
Canon Image Width: 4,320
Canon Image Height: 3,240
AF Image Width: 100
AF Image Height: 100
AF Area Widths: 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18
AF Area Heights: 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18
AF Area X Positions: -18 0 18 -18 0 18 -18 0 18
AF Area Y Positions: -18 -18 -18 0 0 0 18 18 18
AF Points In Focus: 3,7
Canon AF Info 2 0x000d: 0 0
Primary AF Point: 3
Thumbnail Image Valid Area: 0 0 0 0
Canon 0x0018: 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Canon 0x0019: 1
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What are you using to read all this? I’m looking at it in Adobe Bridge. I’ve never seen anything to record a camera temperature ever.
Reply to Marti Reed post on Dec 30, 2013 at 12:36 am
Marti… I have some software of my own I use here but
nowadays you don’t even have to download/install
anything. There are some pretty good online APPS
that do it all for you in your browser with ANY image
ANYWHERE on the web or on your hard drive.
The best ‘online APP’ I know of for EXIF extraction on
any image, anywhere on the web, is here…
http://regex.info/exif.cgi
Just go to the Arizona Republic article, right click anywhere
on that title image, choose ‘Copy Image Location’, then
paste that exact address of the URL extractor at the
link above. Click the ‘View Image at URL’ button…
…and Voila!
I just checked the results of that online EXIF extractor
and it shows everything that is listed above.
Followup: There are some typos up above that
might not make it clear to someone who wants
to do the EXIF extraction themselves… so let
me take another crack at that explanation.
Fire up this page in a separate browser window…
http://regex.info/exif.cgi
Then, go to the Arizona Republic article that
appeared yesterday in another browser window.
Right-click anywhere on that title image showing
the GM fellas sitting amongst the boulders.
A ‘menu’ will popup and one of your choices
will be… “Copy Image Location”. Click that.
NOTE: It has to be “Copy Image Location” and
not just the other choice that says “Copy Image”.
What you are after is the exact web address of
just the photograph you want to do the EXIF
extraction on. That’s what ‘Image Location’ is.
Now go back to the EXIF extraction window
you fired up. In the box at the top of the page
under the title “Check an image on the web”,
just right-click inside the input field for
“Image URL”, and then pick “Paste”.
The web address of the photo from the top of
the AZREPUBLIC article should then be
appearing in the input box.
Now just click the “View Image at URL” button
right next to that input box, wait a few seconds,
and all the EXIF metadata for that photograph
will appear on the screen.
WTKTT said, “I think NV has hit on the correct ‘takeaway’ for now, though.
There MAY be a ‘system wide’ problem here in the ‘training’ area as far as fire shelter capability and deployment site survivability goes. I think the industry needs to look at the‘certification process’ there and make sure it’s all up to speed… for EVERYONE… like RIGHT NOW.
I agree one hundred percent.
There is a very long retrospective-type article on the GMHS and the Yarnell Fire in the AZ Republic today. Not sure if any significant new info in there – just skimmed it so far. Seems somewhat like the Outside Magazine article from September, but longer.
This article also provides a few of the pictures or videos from the huge FOIA/FOIL dump. (Caldwell’s video, for example….)
To that end, as I said before, I would be pleased to give any of you access to the photos and videos that I have uploaded thus far from the FOIA/FOIL dump, while we wait for John Dougherty to finish uploading them in full (presumably for “the public” to view from this website or one of the media sources for which he works). If you post your e-mail address in a comment, I can send you a link or e-mail you some of the materials.
I finally read the full weather materials from the FOIA package last night, for example, and I found them disturbing. It appears that the weather folks – or the weather folks who are affiliated with the SWCC – had been REPEATING throughout the week that there were thunderstorms coming in with the accompanying BIG, BIG GUSTS to arrive on the weekend. The point was made that, in briefings throughout the week and into the weekend, the SWCC folks kept mentioning the Dude Fire in their communications, to make clear that they were worried that similar conditions existed with the Doce and then Yarnell fires. (I am paraphrasing, but the references to the Dude Fire tragedy were made repeatedly.)
Reply to mike post on December 29, 2013 at 11:30 am
Thanks for the ‘heads up’ mike.
I don’t see any real ‘new’ information in the text itself.
The author is taking a pretty ‘soft’ approach…
…but there IS some VERY important information in the
PHOTOGRAPHS the author chose to use.
See a longer post below.
For the first time… we can see actual EXIF metadata
information from one of Christopher MacKenzie’s
ACTUAL (raw) images retrieved from his Canon
PowerShot following the burnover.
The second photo in the article also shows POSSIBLE
photographic evidence that Captain Jesse Steed was,
in fact, in the habit of carrying a ‘notebook’ and a ‘pen’
in his front-left shirt pocket. This could be an actual
‘Unit Log’ like some WFF people keep when working
‘in the field’ and might have CRUCIAL information about
that day recorded in it.
I have to redo it John with his statements and break with my reply-
delete other message.
CORRECTIONS SHAUN NEEDS TO MAKE—HE CANNOT SAY HE HAS ME ON RECORDER EVEN SAYING IT BECAUSE I STATE FACTS NOT NARRATIVES—LEAVE THAT TO THE SAIR FOLKS.
-================
I do not have nor am I going to get facebook just to comment corrections but there is areas needing correction to the paper online that my brother-in-law saw-
http://www.azcentral.com/yarnell-fire/#burn
as follows:
Joy Collura and Sonny “Tex” Gilligan set out from Congress before 4 on Sunday morning
=====I never stated that to you Shaun- we came from Oak Park #15 and left and parked and began our hike on Foothill at 3:48am.
******
Joy had moved to Congress 10 years before and bought a house with her husband.======I said I moved from Chandler to here in 2005 so about ten years.****
But as they tried to get a closer look, the chaparral above Yarnell blocked their path at nearly every turn.======that is your narrative because it was the hill itself not vegetation that blocks views. *******
Manzanita reached up 6, 8, sometimes 10 feet.=====again your narrative because we did not go through any tall- just chest high vegetation yet there was some in the distance in areas that height. I did not even talk about this on your sound recorder where you can say out of context- we did not walk through tall vegetation- **************
He was tying ribbons to trees as he walked.=====bushes not trees. *****
“What are you doing up here today?” the man asked.
Joy studied him. He seemed pleasant enough, even though he seemed to be wearing some sort of official insignia.*****====
listen I have no hang ups on any person so EVEN THOUGH he wore any official anything I am respectful and right to all- not liking how this was worded- inappropriate to who I am now Sonny is another story but do not make it out to me. ====****
“I’m a hiker,” she said. “I wanted to see the fire for myself.”
====never said that on first conversation- ever.*******
The man nodded. “So you know the area pretty well?”
The three talked about different routes, paths up the mountain, before parting ways.======never happened. Eric asked me which we planned to head out on all conversations and never was there a talk/discussion about different routes- this is a misleading statement and should be omitted/retracted from article and I may contact a lawyer to have it retracted because that is very shady as it is left. Joy simply said on all talks the way they were headed “south on the mountain top than drop down in Glen Ilah and on first talk Joy never mentioned going to the fire or her intent to the area just that she was the hiker only and once on top she did mention wanting to see the fire since up there out of curiousity and there was no paths discussed just Sonny stated the old fire break- take that to the top to the fire when Eric asked best way to fire from our point”*****************
The third time, he wasn’t alone anymore.=====he was alone when we spoke to Eric though- the men were soon to arrive- again misleading. ******
A full crew of other men in yellow shirts headed up another trail – firefighters, lugging their gear==============.same trail not another trail-misleading again. *****
The man they had first met took Joy and Sonny aside====.you never hiked it and you do not know but again no Eric did not take us aside- ridiculous- Eric commented as he came down the hill the third time as we were already walking away never was pulled aside.*************
“It’s better if I tell you this instead of someone with more authority,” he said. “You’re not geared up and you don’t have uniforms on. We can’t do retardant drops as long as you’re here. You need to get back to town.”======he never stated we had to get back to town ever- you narrated that- he did see we had to leave that area so they could make the drops because they cannot until we got out of that area. ************************
Joy snapped a few photos before turning back. She watched the men as they headed up. To her, they looked tired, worn out.======more so to Sonny and Joy agreed because Sonny said to Joy they had the look that they were on their death march- ****************
It would be more than a day later that Joy would learn she and Sonny had met Eric Marsh and the Granite Mountain Hotshots.====how about Joanna Dodder gets credit here and it was when she did her story when we learned about who they were-*******************
To make headway, they would crawl under the manzanita, against the dirt, and then reach a dead end and have to retrace their steps. They saw evidence of a bear and a mountain lion, which could move easily through the thicket.==========that was in the morning not the afternoon- to save Joy’s life we had to go to the other side where there was huge boulders to slide down into tight vegetation but no crawling to a dead end on the Congress side.********
But for them, the brush was like a maze.=====to anyone- really Shaun- you would of been tucked in bed not even knowing of the maze and you did not even complete the hike to see a sample but ANYONE would of had that same thought because its facts not perception. by the way I liked the original video I saved not the one there-
CORRECTIONS SHAUN NEEDS TO MAKE—HE CANNOT SAY HE HAS ME ON RECORDER EVEN SAYING IT BECAUSE I STATE FACTS NOT NARRATIVES—LEAVE THAT TO THE SAIR FOLKS.
-================
I do not have nor am I going to get facebook just to comment corrections but there is areas needing correction to the paper online that my brother-in-law saw-
http://www.azcentral.com/yarnell-fire/#burn
as follows:
Joy Collura and Sonny “Tex” Gilligan set out from Congress before 4 on Sunday morningI never stated that to you Shaun- we came from Oak Park #15 and left and parked and began our hike on Foothill at 3:48am. Joy had moved to Congress 10 years before and bought a house with her husband.I said I moved from Chandler to here in 2005 so about ten years.But as they tried to get a closer look, the chaparral above Yarnell blocked their path at nearly every turn.that is your narrative because it was the hill itself not vegetation that blocks views. Manzanita reached up 6, 8, sometimes 10 feet.again your narrative because we did not go through any tall- just chest high vegetation yet there was some in the distance in areas that height. I did not even talk about this on your sound recorder where you can say out of context- we did not walk through tall vegetation- He was tying ribbons to trees as he walked.bushes not trees.
“What are you doing up here today?” the man asked.
Joy studied him. He seemed pleasant enough, even though he seemed to be wearing some sort of official insignia.listen I have no hang ups on any person so EVEN THOUGH he wore any official anything I am respectful and right to all- not liking how this was worded- inappropriate to who I am now Sonny is another story.
“I’m a hiker,” she said. “I wanted to see the fire for myself.”never said that on first conversation- ever.
The man nodded. “So you know the area pretty well?”
The three talked about different routes, paths up the mountain, before parting ways.never happened. Eric asked me which we planned to head out on all conversations and never was there a talk/discussion about different routes- this is a misleading statement and should be omitted/retracted from article and I may contact a lawyer to have it retracted because that is very shady as it is left. Joy simply said on all talks the way they were headed “south on the mountain top than drop down in Glen Ilah and on first talk Joy never mentioned going to the fire or her intent to the area just that she was the hiker only and once on top she did mention wanting to see the fire since up there out of curiousity and there was no paths discussed just Sonny stated the old fire break- take that to the top to the fire when Eric asked best way to fire from our point” The third time, he wasn’t alone anymore.he was alone when we spoke to Eric though- the men were soon to arrive- again misleading. A full crew of other men in yellow shirts headed up another trail – firefighters, lugging their gear.same trail not another trail- misleading again. The man they had first met took Joy and Sonny aside.you never hiked it and you do not know but again no Eric did not take us aside- ridiculous- Eric commented as he came down the hill the third time as we were already walking away never was pulled aside. “It’s better if I tell you this instead of someone with more authority,” he said. “You’re not geared up and you don’t have uniforms on. We can’t do retardant drops as long as you’re here. You need to get back to town.”he never stated we had to get back to town ever- you narrated that- he did see we had to leave that area so they could make the drops because they cannot until we got out of that area.
Joy snapped a few photos before turning back. She watched the men as they headed up. To her, they looked tired, worn out.more so to Sonny and Joy agreed because Sonny said to Joy they had the look that they were on their death march-
It would be more than a day later that Joy would learn she and Sonny had met Eric Marsh and the Granite Mountain Hotshots.how about Joanna Dodder gets credit here and it was when she did her story when we learned about who they were- To make headway, they would crawl under the manzanita, against the dirt, and then reach a dead end and have to retrace their steps. They saw evidence of a bear and a mountain lion, which could move easily through the thicket.that was in the morning not the afternoon- to save Joy’s life we had to go to the other side where there was huge boulders to slide down into tight vegetation but no crawling to a dead end on the Congress side. But for them, the brush was like a maze.to anyone- really Shaun- you would of been tucked in bed not even knowing of the maze but ANYONE would of had that same thought because its facts not perception. by the way I liked the original video I saved not the one there-
Definitely going off track here, but the following has been discussed. This excerpt from someone on Wildland Fire.com, They Said may be of interest to you all regarding the some of the Red Book rules and regulations that NON-FEDERAL agencies have to follow, or not.
“Yarnell Jurisdiction
Not to sidetrack from the Yarnell discussion, as we need to learn from it as so many have already said, but having just read the suit and the ADOSH report, I think they both missed the jurisdiction and regulations piece. Looking at it from the point of view of what regulations they were really under, being A CITY OF PRESCOTT FIRE CREW ON A STATE OF ARIZONA WILDFIRE INCIDENT,THEY DID NOT FALL UNDER THE FEDERAL REGULATIONS where the 10 & 8, length of assignment and other key regulations, guidance and policy reside. (EMPHASIS ADDED)
In fact if you read the cover letter in the Red Book you find only the NPS, BLM, FS and FWS signed off on it (the Redbook), and then ONLY AS AN ADVISORY DOCUMENT, NOT POLICY Redbook/ 2013/ CoverLetter.pdf, LEAVING THE STATES and other federal wildland firefighting agencies TO FOLLOW THEIR OWN GUIDANCE, OR NOT. Yes, they would have to have met the guidance if this was a Federal incident, but IT WAS A STATE FIRE SO WHAT WE NEED TO LEARN IS WHAT THE STATE OF AZ FORESTER’S REGULATIONS ARE AND HOW THEY ARE IMPLEMENTED. (EMPHASIS ADDED)
As a follow on, the Interagency Standards for Fire and Fire Aviation Operations, NFES 2724 (Jan. 2013) is cited heavily as the 10 SFO reside on the last page, is again, a Federal standard, AND CAN BE IGNORED BY A STATE or even another Federal ENTITY IF THEY ARE NOT SIGNERS STATING THEY WILL FOLLOW THIS PUBLICATION. Maybe somewhere the State of Arizona has a page signed by the Governor that says they will follow the 10 & 18, duty days, length of assignment, etc. on State incidents and they will follow the Federal guides or again not, that will be the question to be answered as we don’t know the state regulations they were engaged under at this point, only the standard they trained under to meet qualification policy on interagency incidents which was discussed in the first report.
(EMPAHASIS ADDED)
Anyway, maybe some food for thought as one of the lessons to be learned? RS”
At least something to think about, WHEN you make the time.
I’ve been wondering about that thanks for bringing it up interesting.
RTS,
Not to detract too much from your comment, the subject of which, I believe, IS going to play a large part in the legal wrangling, I just couldn’t hold back from saying something about some of the lingo. Specifically;
**Yes, they would have to have met the guidance if this was a Federal incident, but……..**
I guess my bewilderment comes from trying to figure out legally, how one would be REQUIRED to meet guidance, if it was indeed, JUST GUIDANCE!
WTKTT,
I see where you’re going, but NOT MY comment. I cut and pasted it from a ‘They Said’ contributor. Someone had commented on this way back I thought.
RTS,
Sorry, I knew it wasn’t your comment, and I should have stated that more clearly. I guess a better way to put it would have been, ‘the comments you referenced in your post’.
Sometimes (more often than I’d like), I’m prone to being overcome by the ‘I’m know what I mean, so everyone else should too’, syndrome, no matter how I write something, and this was one of those cases.
TTWARE,
No big deal. I think we all have a bit of that syndrome from time-to-time.
Reply to RTS post on December 29, 2013 at 9:31 am.
If you are right… I would think that spells nothing but BAD
news for the City of Prescott and Darrell Willis himself.
Yes… the lawyers for the defendants might be able to ‘knock down’
some of the specific charges of violating the 10 and 18 and all
that other stuff based on ‘jurisdictional’ semantics…
…but 19 employees of the City of Prescott Fire Department
still died that day… and it looks very much like just 2 of
those PFD employees basically ‘ordered’ the other 17
employees into a situation where they lost their lives,
and SHOULD have known better.
Unless they can prove that the 2 supervisory PFD employees
actually ‘called for volunteers’ amongst the other employees
for what looks like a ‘rescue mission’, when they were all
in a safe place already… then the City of Prescott is in a world
of hurt no matter what little rule books applied.
Remember… Willis is now on record in his military.com
interview as saying the fire behavior was ( quote ) “beyond
extreme” already at 4:00 PM… even before the 2 PFD employees
‘ordered’ the other 17 employees to ‘Gaggle up… move out’.
As Wildland Division Chief for PFD who was THERE and
working the fire himself… If Willis really did think the fire situation
was as bad as he says it was WHEN he is now on record as
believing that… then Willis himself should have been the first one
calling out to them on the private channel saying “This thing is
blowing up like a bomb… don’t you DARE move from where you
are for the next hour or so.”
Anything other than that… including actually (perhaps)
ENCOURAGING them to leave their ‘safe place’… is pretty
actionable.
They ( the defendant’s attorneys ) can’t have it both ways.
Either this group was bound to obey ALL the codified ‘rules’
including the more-than-quasi military command style
stuff… or they were not. The defendant’s lawyers will
have a hard time ‘cherry picking’ that in open court.
GM had to be certified as a Type 1 IHC crew to be nationally available and recognized as an INTERAGENCY HOTSHOT CREW. That means that they were vetted by federal agency employees (FMO and superintendent types) with regard to meeting the national standards set forth in the Red Book and had to go through a Readiness Review each year to maintain currency. They had to meet the same federal standards that all IHC’s have to meet.
**
** PHOTOGRAPHIC EVIDENCE OF UNBURNED
** VEGETATION IN THE BOULDER FIELDS
There were a number of good exchanges about the ‘Boulder Fields’ and
their ( possible ) ‘survivability’ at the end of ‘Chapter 2’ of this ongoing
discussion… but a picture is worth a thousand words.
There are actually any number of sources where the condition of the north-side
‘boulder fields’ can be viewed following the ‘burnover’.
One of those is simply the part 2 video of Darrell Willis’ press conference hosted
at the deployment site. In that second video, Willis is asked exactly where
Brendan McDonough was located in relation to where the press conference is
being held… and the camera pans slowly to the right revealing pretty good
closeups of that boulder field just 1 or 2 hundred feet away from where they
deployed. It shows where the ‘scorch line’ actually ended on the boulder field
and if you look close you can see unburned vegetation still there amidst
the boulders.
There are also tons of ‘still photos’ taken at the deployment site that show a
pretty good ‘aftermath’ if you are interested in the condition of the boulder fields
themselves.
Just Google “yarnell deployment site”, then pick “Images”, and you will find
hundreds of photos…
..but I believe I just found a still photograph taken from the deployment site that
shows the situation even far better than anything I have seen so far.
It first appeared on a “California Fire News” website as part of an article about
the Yarnell Incident.
The photo was taken at the deployment site not many days after the incident on
the very day the memorial ‘flagpole’ was erected and the photo was meant to be
of the flagpole itself…
…but it shows much, much more.
This is the only photograph I have seen so far that CLEARLY shows where the
‘scorch line’ ended on the boulder field that was directly to their left ( north )
when they deployed and ( more importantly ) it CLEARLY shows some of the
‘unburned vegetation’ there silhouetted against the overcast sky.
You can’t miss it, in this photo.
It would appear ( from just viewing this photo alone ) that the fire never even
actually ‘crested’ that northern ridge of the box canyon or that boulder field
at all. It simply went ‘around it’.
Here is an important comment that Tex ( Sonny ) Gilligan himself just recently
posted to this discussion concerning this very same north-side boulder field…
>> On December 24, 2013 at 6:47 pm Sonny (Tex) Gilligan wrote…
>>
>> okay- you could not run to the boulders but by the time they ran the chain
>> saws and cleared out what they hoped was a safety deployment area they
>> could of gotten to the boulders. We have heard the heat/gases are what
>> most likely killed the men first than the fire. However, some of these boulders
>> over there are cave-like and you can get under them. Also some of the
>> wildlife survived by being in the boulders. Ted Putnam says they may have
>> perished there anyways simply because they needed a flat spot for nineteen
>> men to deploy their shelters.
Here is a direct link to the photo I just found…
http://www.gannett-cdn.com/-mm-/fe945b46ee7295759c0ee3c532d9bba5bb196c0b/r=343&c=0-0-340-450/local/-/media/USATODAY/USATODAY/2013/07/24/1374675264000-XXX-phxdc5-6b2xwxkasc6r3e3wci2-original-1307241024_3_4.jpg
BTW: The actual distance from the flagpole ( which is right next to the
deployment site ), due north, to the point where the ‘scorchline’ on the
rocks stops is only…
166 feet.
55 yards.
I do not see it as survivable but that is my opinion. The bolder field to the right of the deployment area on top of the ridge near the 2 track would have been a better location had they stayed on the ridge or the 2 track. Would of, could of, should of, where they were with 10 ft. brush they probably could not have seen any alternatives. Wrong place no options, they did not use the knowledge they had and that put them in a never go here dead zone. I doubt if any animals (deer) survived in the box canyon. Possibly on the ridge line rock piles. They may have come back to the area after the fire looking for their fauns. Its pure assumption that they survived in the rocks as no one actually saw that. My personal knowledge of deer says they out ran the fire and over the ridge line, they do not stop when a fire pushes them until they get away or die. There instinct after the fire would bring them back looking for their fauns that did not make it.
There are also several instances where WFFs survived by taking shelter in boulders, while people who deployed near them died.
I have heard, but not seen, numerous credible reports of deer and other animals doing the same. I have seen deer and other animals use boulders for shelter for other reasons (though in general they are prey and avoid these types of nooks where they could be trapped).
For GM, I don’t think it’s possible to know with any certainty where some or all of the crew would or could have survived had they realized deployment was certainly not survivable and therefore avoided it. For purposes of training and decision-making, what I do believe is that the use of deployment as a go-to response or option seems to have been evident with GM, with their lookout, and with Willis in a separate area where Willis id’d a (likely nonsurvivable) deployment site but no safety zone, just as GM’s lookout id’d likely nonsurvivable deployment sites before Frisby picked him up, and just as GM then chose a deployment site guaranteeing sustained direct flame contact.
Where deployment is not survivable, staying on your feet and actively pursuing other options is going to on average produce better results.
One odd idea that some people have voiced, btw, though no one in this comment thread, is that because some members of a given crew might get caught if the crew stays on its feet and seeks a survivable position, that it is better for everyone to stick together and deploy, and all live, or not, together. While the emotions behind that sentiment are understandable and even noble, if the idea is to maximize safety, people need to be trained to make decisions trying to maximize safe outcomes.
Normally with a fire coming at them a deer’s first response is to flee. Being singed is normal as well. I also have seen where people have survived by using rocks and moving around in them but not on a brush fire, only on timber fires where ground fuel is sparse. On the ridge line that may have been possible.
I don’t want to sound argumentative, but also with brush fires, boulders by definition are areas of sparser fuel to no fuel. Rockslides and boulder piles are designated as preferable places to deploy in the new gen fire booklet itself, http://www.nwcg.gov/pms/pubs/newshelt72.pdf , assuming a decision to deploy is made.
In terms of decision tree, it seems that not only did GM end up where they were due in part to a lack of situational awareness, but this extended to not identifying any potential deployment sites even within the confines of the terrain trap that they had entered.
Why try to burn out in heavy fuels when you knew you had rocks nearby?
The prior bad decisions with good outcomes that have been alluded to in comments are not likely to come out through the court system. I believe some of those decisions may help explain how GM, from a systematic perspective, came to looking at deployment as a primary option without in my opinion appearing to analyze survivability. If people would share these with John Dougherty, I believe it’s possible to do so and still preserve confidentiality as a source.
Got you NV. Old school me not looking at deployment sites looking to keep my ass from deploying. If there training to deploy now BAD IDEA…..also if the rock slide is open and bolder piles have no fuel and big enough they can serve as an SZ. I think there was to much fuel in the bolder pile behind the flag in the above photo.
bob is exactly correct… apparently the rest of you haven’t seen a deer run away from danger. to speculate that they (the deer) survived the fire on the rocky knob is one of the more hilarious comments i’ve seen yet…
The only strong opinion I have about the survivability of any
of the boulder piles around there is still a very sad scenario.
I think that SOME of them might have survived… but not all.
I think it would have come down to rock-climbing capability
and experience. Marsh was 43… but in fantastic shape and
both Sonny (Tex) Gilligan and Joy Collura have said he
‘moved like a deer’ every time they saw him that morning.
Steed was 36 and ex-marine. The rest were younger ( 2 other
former marines ) and some were still just kids, really.
And Mr. Powers is right. There WAS some vegetation up there
that burned, even above the visible scorch line. It’s not like
the ‘after’ pictures are identical to the ‘before’ pictures of
those areas… so that still might indicate heat levels up to
the ‘area ignition’ level which would have (probably) killed men
even if they were up there. Dunno.
Could SOME of the men have found the ‘cave-like’ features
that Tex says are there… and burrowed in ‘wrapping’
themselves with their shelters outward-facing… or gotten all
the way to the top of the boulder field where we definitely see
‘unburned’? Maybe.
All I know is that the choice they DID make was a BAD one,
and I believe they should have KNOWN the work they did
on that puny deployment site was just time wasted that
MIGHT have been better used on ‘other options’.
I am even the one who has always believed they should
have immediately known a deployment would not be
survivable and immediately attempted a ‘full reverse’
without wasting one single second there where they died…
but I have also never said I thought they would ALL have
‘made it’ even in that ‘full reverse’ attempt. Again… it would
have come down to physical ability, skill, and pure luck.
If anyone had ‘fallen down’ even just once on the way
through the clearings that lined up due west of the deployment
site, or gotten lost in any of the vegetation, that might have
been it for that particular firefighter. Only the ones who were
able to stay on their feet and maintain the best possible
ascent rate back to the ridge would have even had a chance.
I’m sure this is all going to be talked about for years to come.
I think NV has hit on the correct ‘takeaway’ for now, though.
There MAY be a ‘system wide’ problem here in the ‘training’
area as far as fire shelter capability and deployment site
survivability goes. I think the industry needs to look at the
‘certification process’ there and make sure it’s all up to
speed… for EVERYONE… like RIGHT NOW.
Remember… Willis was in charge of many firefighters that
day in (almost) equally bad situations… and when asked at
the press conference what the upper-end temperature for
survivability in a fire shelter was… he said…
” I don’t know “.
If they would have stayed on the ridge there would have been a lot more options. They left the black and then made a really bad decision dropping into the box canyon where they had no visible safe areas and a steep climb to the ridge on either side. The decision process seemed to have got lost in there, were headed out with no real plan.
when it comes to leaping, you bound like a deer running from a wildfire!
it is truly amazing how far you can stretch your imagination around a two dimensional picture… how often have you tried “running” or even moving quickly through a boulder field or rock scree? seems like you haven’t, so let me tell you, it’s pretty slow going, especially carrying a tool, with a pack on, going up hill…
you have no frame of reference with regard to what the terrain actually looked like or the fuel conditions prior to burning, so it’s easy to sit there and speculate “what could have been.”
I am quite familiar with type of terrain, with the exception of bushwhacks through dense chaparral not being a high point for me, so something I avoid. No question the brush would have impaired mobility and visibility at the same time. Even without the brush, going uphill over that type of terrain is going to be at maybe 12 min/mile at best and likely more like 15 min/mile. Still allows time to seek better options.
I think if anything is very evident in this whole mess, it is that they didnt have a lot of time.
And just to be clear, my “lack of knowledge” comment was more directed at WTKTT…
Reply to xxfullsailxx on Dec 30, 2013 at 12:20 pm
>> xxfullsailxx said…
>>
>> when it comes to leaping, you bound like a
>> deer running from a wildfire!
>>
>> it is truly amazing how far you can stretch your
>> imagination around a two dimensional picture.
Thank you! Regardless of how you intended those
comments… I am going to take BOTH of them
as compliments.
>> how often have you tried “running” or even moving
>> quickly through a boulder field or rock scree?
You’d be surprised ( VERY surprised ).
>> seems like you haven’t, so let me tell you, it’s pretty
>> slow going, especially carrying a tool, with a pack on,
>> going up hill…
Anyone who might still have had their pack on while
scrambling for their lives would have been pretty dumb.
>> you have no frame of reference with regard to what
>> the terrain actually looked like or the fuel conditions
>> prior to burning,
Yes, I do.
>> so it’s easy to sit there and speculate
>> “what could have been.”
There is nothing easy about it. It is, in fact, very, very
difficult to do… but I am damn good at it.
>> On December 27, 2013 at 4:47 am, Calvin said…
>>
>> WTKTT… There appears to be another phone or camera just a few feet to
>> the right of the camera being discussed above ( in the photo of the
>> SAIT investigators at the deployment site ). This phone/camera
>> is on the immediate left of the BK with the broken antenna.
What I am seeing right in that location is definitely a relatively undamaged
smartphone lying on its face. It is NOT an iPhone. Looks like a standard
Android based phone like a Galaxy or a Motorola Droid. It’s black… and you
can still see the camera flash cover plastic ( unmelted ) on the back and
some mini-USB ports on the side of it.
>> Calvin responded…
>>
>> WTKTT… I wasn’t sure if it was a phone or a camera, thanks.
>> Remember the picture that is in the Mackenzie photo (0885 6 or 7)
>> and again in the WFAR. It shows Ashcraft and another hotshot with
>> Ashcraft taking a picture: how does the phone Ashcraft has compare
>> to the one in the DZ picture?
Well… as much as I hate to be definite about anything to do with this fiasco
while we are STILL just ‘collecting the facts’… photo enhancement seems to
indicate an ‘exact match’ for the smartphone you are talking about in BOTH
of the pictures.
>> Calvin also said…
>>
>> Also, the Mackenzie photo was once again time stamped 1552 in the
>> WFAR, remember how you thought the SAIT just changed the time?
>> WTH? WFAR just changed the time too!
Yep. There seems to have been some very strange relationship between the
Arizona Forestry Commission and these “Wildland Firefighting Associates”
people that were HIRED by ADOSH to do an ( independent ) report for THEM
on the incident. There are many places in the WFA report that appear to be
just ‘cut and pastes’ from the SAIR report. I don’t think that’s what the Arizona
ADOSH folks ( and the Arizona taxpayers ) thought they were paying for when
they hired these (supposedly) independent ( and HIGH DOLLAR ) “Wildland
Firefighting Associates” people.
**
** ORIGINAL “TOM STORY” PHOTOGRAPH LOCATION
** VERIFIED AS RANCH HOUSE RESTAURANT.
Eric just posted some links to some pretty important videos he just discovered
and I’m sure there will be more discussion of these videos… but I just wanted
to ‘wrap something up’ that’s been pending for a while which one of those
videos was able to do.
There are some visual clues in one of these new videos shot from the parking
lot of the Ranch House Restaurant that finally put an exact location on the
original ‘Tom Story’ photograph ( circa 4:15 PM ) of the moment the BR
hotshots evacuated the Shrine area that afternoon.
** THE SHORT STORY
The exact location of that Tom Story photograph has never been fully verified
and some have thought it was either taken at the Shrine area itself… or a
‘staging area’ somewhere out where Shrine Road meets Highway 89.
That is NOT the case.
The visual clues in Eric’s newly discovered video prove without a doubt that
the original ‘Tom Story’ photograph was, in fact, taken at the Ranch House
Restaurant, all the way down in Glen Ilah where Lakewood Drive meets
Highway 89.
So that means there is still is no video or photographic evidence that Brendan
McDonough actually did go over to the Shrine area with Blue Ridge when the
GM Carriers were moved, or that he actually exited from the Shrine area along
with Blue Ridge.
There still remains only conflicting testimony about that and a witness in the
Glen Ilah area who says he did NOT exit that way… but was instead seen
exiting the Sesame Area ( alone in the GM Supervisor truck ) to the south
via Glen Ilah, on Lakewood Drive ( with a VERY worried look on his face )…
and then went right to the Ranch House Restaurant instead of over to the
Shrine area with Blue Ridge and the GM Crew Carriers.
The exact TIME on this photo has still to be determined but is still important
because this would represent the moment that Brendan McDonough says
he had his SECOND conversation with Marsh/Steed about the vehicles
after leaving his lookout position that day and the moment he says he finally
told Marsh/Steed that the ” Vehicles are now safe at the cafe’ ‘”.
Now that we know EXACTLY where this photo was taken… the fire progression
as seen in the photo itself would seem to definitely put a timestamp of 4:15 PM
( +/- a few minutes ) on the photo.
If it really was taken at 4:15 PM… then that is right in the middle of what the
SAIR says was a ‘total blackout’ with Granite Mountain and right in the middle
of the 30+ minute time period when the SAIR says no one had spoken to
them or heard from them… and would also mean McDonough may have
spoken to Marsh/Steed when they were already well on their way hiking
south and just moments before they decided to drop into the box canyon.
** THE LONG STORY
This is the exact photograph being discussed…
* Tom Story ( The Arizona Republic / AP )
Tom Story, a professional photographer, was there in Yarnell capturing the
chaos circa 4:00 PM, June 30, 2013.
He took this (important) picture of what appears to be the exact moment
the Blue Ridge and GM vehicles arrived back in Yarnell after evacuating
from the Shrine area…
http://media.outsideonline.com/images/yarnell-arizona-wildfire-deaths_fe.jpg
Kyle Dickman, writing for ‘Outdoor Online’ magazine, wrote an article on the
fire on July 2 which also featured this photograph taken by Tom Story…
That original article ( with Tom’s photo ) is here…
Outside Online
Tuesday, July 2, 2013
Examining the Arizona Wildfire Deaths
Why were 19 experienced firefighters killed when an Arizona
blaze blew out of control? Equally important: Can we prevent
such a disaster from ever happening again?
By: Kyle Dickman
The reason this photograph has been hard to identify as being taken at the
actual Ranch House Restaurant Parking lot is that most of the easy-to-identify
road signs at that point ( like the ones seen in all the Michelle Lee photos ) are
all mostly blocked from sight by the parked vehicles themselves.
A closer look, though, reveals the most important ‘roadsign’ is, in fact, there.
I am talking about the actual “Welcome To Yarnell” sign that has the solar
panel on top of it, just north of the Ranch House Restaurant parking lot.
Look over at Granite Mountain Crew Carrier 7B parked at the extreme right edge
of the photograph. Now look just over the roof of the Crew Carrier and you will
see a small black rectangular object with a silver frame at the point where the
telephone pole in the distance meets the roof of the Carrier.
That rectangular object is, in fact, the solar panel on top of the “Welcome To
Yarnell” sign right there on the north edge of the Ranch House Restaurant
parking lot. The rest of the “Welcome To Yarnell” sign is being blocked by
GM Crew Carrier 7B itself.
The other thing that was confusing was that this photograph seemed to be taken
from an elevated location and with a wide-angle lens, which was distorting the
perspective a little.
Well… as it turns out… there used to be a mobile home installed there at the
back of the Ranch House Restaurant parking lot. It was up on a raised level
from the parking lot and there is a set of wooden stairs that leads to that level.
This mobile home was eventually removed and is no longer visible in the Google
Street Views of the parking lot… but the wooden staircase is still there and was
(apparently) used by Tom Story to help take this photograph. That’s why the
‘raised perspective’ is seen in the photograph.
Tom Story was standing exactly here at the top of that wooden staircase that
leads up to the old mobile-home platform when he took this photo…
Latitude: 34.213288
Longitude: -112.754992
34.213288, -112.754992
That “Welcome To Yarnell” sign with the solar panel on the top is exactly here…
Latitude: 34.213586
Longitude: -112.755260
34.213586, -112.755260
Further proof that this photograph was really taken at the Ranch House
Restaurant is the tan house with the brown roof in the distance directly above
the back right corner of the GM Supervisor Truck.
That house is at 116 Lakewood Drive in Glen Ilah, just across the street from
the Ranch House Restaurant and the house is exactly here…
Latitude: 34.214213
Longitude: -112.757001
34.214213, -112.757001
The truck with its headlights on and the car a little behind it ( also with its
headlights on ) seen in front of that tan house with the brown roof are both
coming east on Lakewood Drive, towards Highway 89 and the Ranch House
Restaurant.
Followup: Google Street View reports the address of the tan
house in the photo as 116 Lakewood Drive but a Google Maps
lookup using the lat/long coordinates above reports an
address of…
23130 Lakewood Dr
Yarnell, AZ 85362 25 ft E
A couple of good video’s I found on you tube I have not seen before:
This is from the restaurant:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-PmZt9N6PpU
This is a citizen in Glen Ilah:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t_AjhL448ZA
Thank you, Eric.
These are important.
They are also proof that ALL of this evidence is ‘connected’
because your first video just provided some ‘visual clues’
that have been missing in order to finally put an exact location
on the original ‘Tom Story’ photograph.
THAT photograph shows the exact moment when the Blue
Ridge Hotshots finally evacuated the Shrine area and
arrived out on Highway 89. That photo also represents the
moment Brendan McDonough says he had his ‘conversation’
with Marsh/Steed about the ‘vehicles are finally safe’.
One of the videos you just discovered has the right ‘visual
clues’ in it to finally identify that Tom Story photograph as
having been taken at the actual Ranch House Restaurant,
and NOT further north near the Shrine area as some
had thought.
See below for a longer ‘wrap-up’ post about the Tom Story photo.
So ALL of this evidence is connected in important ways, and
thanks again for your time and your contribution(s).
Fullsail,
Here’s a link to the NTSB Docket (LAX 08PA259) for the August 5, 2008 Iron-44 Carson Helicopter Crash and Fatalities. LOTS of reading. Remember to read the CARSON HELICOPTER submissions paying particular attention to them PLEADING with the NTSB to look into THE FACTS.
This was CLASSIC establishing the conclusion first …
http://dms.ntsb.gov/pubdms/search/hitlist.cfm?docketID=46774&CFID=166624&CFTOKEN=67300164
I wanted to get back to Roy Hall for a minuet. While I hate to differ with Gary I have more information on the Salmon deployment of 73 WFF. According to Bothe type 1 teams one of which was on my Forest and I worked for the Type 1 IC Jarrell. The deployment in the safety zones was unnecessary as the SZ’s were sufficient to protect them without deployment. Some of the overhead got excited and ordered deployment. Some of the overhead on the fire were surprised at the deployment, the deployment even though unnecessary did not violate any protocol. The fact that they did not need to deploy was not stated in the deployment review. Although this was discussed at length in R4.
I’m going to add A LOT to Gary’s comments above regarding the 1985 Butte Fire and Roy Hall’s “hubris.” Gary unkowingly cites the ‘Party Line’ below:
“On August 29, 1985, 73 firefighters were forced into safety zones, where they took refuge in their fire shelters for 1 to 2 hours while a very severe crown fire burned over them. The incident took place on the Butte Fire on the Salmon National Forest in Idaho. Five firefighters were hospitalized overnight for heat exhaustion, smoke inhalation, and dehydration; the others escaped uninjured. Investigators estimated that without the protection of the escape zones and the fire shelters, at least 60 of the 73 firefighters would have died. Thanks to preparation of safety zones, the effectiveness of the fire shelters, and the sensible behavior of the firefighters themselves, disaster was averted.” FRAMES Resource Cataloging System (RCS), Butte Fire.”
For starters, Hall failed to mention that the Payson Hot Shots (Tonto NF) were also there with the Flagstaff HS that day. So, I consider that more arrogance and conceit than hubris. Continuing, the IMT had “designated SZ’s” for the entire fire, but these two HS Crews decided that a very large clearcut was their ultimate SZ. The plan for the day was to use helitorch aerial ignition all day long down BELOW the Crews to HAND FIRE out the unburned while the Crews utilized hand ignition to fire out the dozer line(s) above. They were told THREE DAYS before this happened that the TRIGGER POINTS for the fire were 1600 OR 20% RELATIVE HUMIDITY (RH), whichever came first; the fire would come roaring ‘out of the hole.’ And it did, for three days prior just like clock-work. On August 29th, these two HS Crews got 20% RH at 1330 that day, and pulled ‘out of the hole’ to the ultimate SZ, the CLEARCUT area. They encouraged the overhead to pull everyone off the line and into the clearcut.
There were three other Crews to the West – Carson HS on Tin Cup Hill plus a Jemez, NM Type 2 Crew and a Utah Type 2 Inmate Crew off to the west along the dozer line. At the morning briefing, they were told something to the effect that these two burns would “come together like a block burn and we can all go home.” Well true to form, at about 1600, the fire came ROARING OUT OF THE HOLE, first as three separate columns, then combined into one long head advancing up the slope toward them. They said the ground was literally shaking.
This was one of my FAVORITE statements regarding fire shelters, as it is used often in other ‘Factual Reports.’ “73 firefighters were FORCED INTO SAFETY ZONES, where they took refuge in the FIRE SHELTERS …” So, there are two BLATANT things WRONG with this statement. One, they were NOT FORCED into SZ’s because their FAILURE TO FOLLOW ‘The Rules’ and total LACK of Situational Awareness caught them unaware and that’s what FORCED them into shelters (“sensible behavior of the firefighters themselves” is how the SAIT refers to it) AND, the two HC Crews had WARNED these other crews numerous times to come down into the clearcut, but they were ignored. The second thing wrong is a SZ is where you go to take refuge WITHOUT A FIRE SHELTER. Using a fire shelter in a SZ basically negates it as a SZ.
Moreover, the Tin Cup Hill SZ was very large (400′) and the Carson HS could have just moved around avoiding the radiant heat rather than use shelters. NO TOOL HANDLES BURNED, THE GRASS DID NOT BURN,AND THE TIN CUP HILL SIGN DID NOT BURN. These are things that normally happen when an area is burned over. So, it’s the ‘False Cause Fallacy’ here because they would have survived even WITHOUT the fire shelters. On the other hand, the two other crews sheltered up to the west along the dozer line and shelters likely DID save their lives. .
One of the HS Supts. stated that members of the SAIT were overheard talking on the phone to their superiors SOMETHING TO THE EFFECT that “there were a lot of f*** ups on this fire BUT WE’LL MAKE SURE THE REPORT SHOWS THE SUPERVISORS PROVIDED GOOD LEADERSHIP, USED SHELTERS, blah, blah, blah. And that’s exactly what’s in the ‘Factual Report.’ And the Crew Boss for the Jemez Crew admitted that this was his FOURTH time in a fire shelter in his statement!
It is my humble opinion that this Butte Fire Shelter video started what I call ‘The Fire Shelter Movement’ since shelters were NEVER designed for these conditions, e.g. heavy fuels and sustained intense fire behavior. Researching these incidents is a hobby of mine since I do NOT trust the ‘Factual Reports,’ so now you know a bit more of the story.
And Robert I just added to it.
OK, I take it all back, no more defending Roy Hall, the guy is indefensible.
That’s OK Gary Its one of those things that’s neither right or wrong its good to have a fire shelter for when it is really needed. If plan keeps you out of them then you did good planning.
P15 YIN for Bravo33…I head something about a crew being in a safety zone. Called ops and asked “do we stop and go look for the crew?” Ops said “no, they are safe, it’s Granite Mountain”.
p47 YIN Able/Musser…..Abel requests Bravo 33 to check on Granite Mountain crew. Bravo 33 confirms that Granite Mountain crew is in the black. Time????
The USDOJ Office of Inspector General needs to audit the SAIT for the Yarnell Hill Fire. ASF delegated the SAIR to USFS. That brought in the federal involvement directly. The I.G. is the entity that would preform a formal inquiry into a federal agency sponsored team report. Federal dollars footed at least some of the bill. With the obvious conflicting statements vs. the factual evidence that is all the justification needed.
I think anyone who paid even a single dollar for that
SAIR ( ‘Story Assembled Internally Report’ ) should at least
be asking for the money back… if not initiating a full
‘misappropriation of funds’ smack-down.
WTF!
“They did it always to protect others. Every person there understood and knew that they were gonna protect the community of Yarnell. And if they laid down their life…it’s just like the Marines.They knew what they had to do…and there couldn’t be any more honorable way to die than the way they died.”
Whoa now! “And IF they LAID DOWN THEIR LIFE … they knew WHAT THEY HAD TO DO …” This WFF sure doesn’t subscribe to those thoughts. We were always trained that “NO BUSH, NO TREE, NO STRUCTURE was worth anyone’s life.” This is the dangerous blending of the structure firefighting attitude/mentality that seems to be ever encroaching into the WFF world. It’s very, VERY dangerous.
And I don’t know any WFF that wants to burn to death. It’s stuff like this that makes me believe this was some sort of a PFD spoken, yet unwritten rule so-to-speak, that MAY have contributed to the fatalites on June 30th.
THIS. THIS THIS THIS…. THIS…….
The essence of your comment is something that was the subject of a status update of mine on Facebook MONTHS ago. That status update had one “like.” From John Maclean.
The way that Willis has repeatedly talked about the Hotshots makes clear that there are some gravely blurred lines in his neck of the woods about what men with saws and shovels are supposed to be doing versus what men with big trucks full o’ water can be doing.
Sometimes I think Chief Willis just talks without really knowing what he is saying. On the other hand, I think that press session at the site was very calculated and designed to be deceptive. Which is it?
Now that he may be sued, I suspect his lawyer wishes he had never said anything.
Amen! That is what I have been preaching from day 1.
So which is it? To be brutally honest to the point of being disrespectful – is he a fool or a liar?
I am now suspicious of anyone who says “nothing was done wrong – it was just an accident”. Anyone saying that knows no one believes that and, moreover, anyone saying that knows that others by default will then focus on the crew and its errors. Saying “nothing was done wrong” is really code for “don’t look deeper, my hands are dirty too”. What is really a crime is that the SAIT went along with this fiction.
No doubt the crew made serious errors, but the whole management of the Yarnell Hill Fire was a clusterf***. And there are more than a few people who want that fact buried.
RTS… I saw the burned UTV from the 2012 season on a video over at Wildfire Today. Thanks for the tip, it probably would have passed by me without a second thought if you hadn’t mentioned that. The WFF standing with the UTV doesn’t arrear upset (seemingly smiling), and they actually put it on the video as sort of a point of pride or something? Could you give any details of this incident if you have any.
Calvin,
Glad you found a photo. No other details, so you’re on your own finding those out.
I agree 110%.
I will not die to save a tree (they can be replanted), nor someones home in the.WUI (buy insurance people).
I will do my best to suppress wildfires that threaten trees, homes, parks, powerlines, etc….BUT I will not die to save them… Sorry, thats how I roll.
Willis said ( to military.com )…
>> Every person there understood and knew that they
>> were gonna protect the community of Yarnell.
Hmmm… how can he sit there in front of a camera and
be so ABSOLUTELY SURE that’s what 19 grown men
were thinking?
Well… let’s see… maybe because he KNOWS ( fer sure )
that he TOLD them that it was Easter and that’s where the
eggs were?
Notice that he uses BOTH the words ‘understood’ and ‘knew’.
One or the other would have made his point… but he chose
to let us know he was THAT sure of what they were thinking.
That really does sound like someone ‘recalling’ the
order ( oops… sorry… I meant ‘suggestion’ ) that he had
given to others under his supervision ( Sic: employees ).
Also, there’s been some convo re where Brandon McDonough went and when. I can’t find it right now, because my bookmarks aren’t organized very well, but there’s a photograph of the vehicles at the Shrine lot, and the GM Sup’s truck is there. So if it’s true that someone saw him coming south on Sesame Street, he must had found his way to the Shrine lot. Just a little detail, but, since we seem to have to put this story together, this is a part of a timeline.
I just found it, the image is here: http://www.outsideonline.com/outdoor-adventure/nature/The-Arizona-Wildfire-Deaths-An-Explainer.html#
There is a firefighter standing with the BR guys in that picture with what looks to be a Granite Mountain cap on. Maybe it is not, but any idea who that is?
Marti – can you please say more about what you are thinking, in terms of how that piece fits together and what you are thinking through?
Marti: That photo is not the ‘Shrine Parking Lot’. It’s never quite
been determined exactly where that photo was taken.
It COULD be the parking lot of the Ranch House Restaurant
itself all the way down in the Glen Ilah part of Yarnell… and the
moment when everyone first arrived there and before all the
vehicles got ‘neatly parked’. Not verified yet… but the photo
is definitely not near the ‘Shrine’ itself nor is it either of the two
dirt lots where Shrine Road meets Highway 89.
mike: If you are talking about the fellow in the baseball cap,
I believe that is Brian Frisby (BR Supt) but still not verified.
There is, however, another firefighter that seems to have a
‘black helmet’ on there at the back of one of the trucks in the
center of the photo… and also another ( so far ) unidentified
firefighter seen ‘walking away’ from BR on the right side of the
photo. He has suspenders on but apparently no helmet or cap.
Either one could be Brendan McDonough.
WTKTT and Marti,
If you’re talking about the guy in the brown ball cap with the beard talking to the blue hardhat guys, that is definitely NOT Brian Frisby. He doesn’t have a beard. The guys with the blue hardhats are BRHS. And those are straps from a radio pouch and not suspenders on the guy with his hands in his pockets, walking away and next to a GMHS crew carrier.
Reply to RTS post on Dec 28, 2013 at 9:21 am
RTS… Thanks!
I’ve tried to find a picture of Frisby somewhere
( anywhere ) but no luck. No real online
presence at all for this guy.
His wife was maintaining a (public) ‘Frisby Family
Blog’ online a few years ago when Brian was
bouncing around between WFF jobs. It covers
the time from March, 2009, when he got the
job in Sierra Vista through the time he took his
first position with Blue Ridge as ‘assistant sup’
and through his purchase of the foreclosure
home in Camp Verde in March, 2010…
…but it’s not the kind of blog that has pictures.
Only text.
So… do you see Frisby anywhere in that photo?
Also… if the guy in the baseball cap with the
beard isn’t Frisby… do you know WHO he is?
I believe he is the same fellow with the baseball
cap and beard that is also seen in the recently
released video that captures the final GM
radio transmissions. It would be helpful to
know who he is so we can finally ID who all
those guys are in that video.
Marti: Update… see below for a long post about the
exact location of the photo you mention finally being
verified. Eric just posted some newly discovered videos
( one taken at the Ranch House Restaurant ) which
had the right ‘visual clues’ to finally identify that
“Tom Story” ( AZREPUBLIC ) photo as having definitely
been taken all the way down south at the Ranch
House Restaurant… and not anywhere near the
Shrine area.
**
** DOES DARRELL WILLIS ADMIT PARTICIPATION
** IN THE ‘DISCUSSING THEIR OPTIONS’ CONVERSATION
** DURING HIS INTERVIEW WITH MILITARY.COM?
Darrell Willis gave an interview with military.com where he seems to admit
being a ‘participant’ in the 1600 ( 4:00 PM ) ‘discussing their options’
conversation between Marsh and Steed on the GM private channel.
This video interview actually focuses on Jesse Steed, who was an ex-marine,
but Darrell Willis is featured talking to the camera at the start and end of the video.
Steed was in the marines from 1996 to 2000 and achieved the rank of Corporal.
Steed was in Bravo 1/4 1st Platoon.
NOTE: There were actually 3 former marines killed that day…
Cpl. Jesse Steed, Lance Cpl. Travis Turbyfill and Cpl. Billy Warneke.
In this interview… Willis admits to at least ‘listening in’ on
the GM private frequency and the infamous ‘discussing their options’
conversation circa 1600 ( 4:00 PM ). He also admits that at that time, before
the men even decided to leave the ‘safe black’, the fire behavior
was ( in his words ) ‘beyond extreme’.
The important ‘quote’ from the interview is this one…
>> Willis says…
>> At about four o’clock the fire behavior was beyond extreme.
>> Because of the fire behavior I clicked back on their
>> frequency… and heard a coupla things.
>> That they needed to move because the fire was coming
>> back on their position and they were gonna burn out
>> around themselves and deploy their shelters.
What is VERY confusing there is Willis first saying “They
needed to move because the fire was coming back on
their position”… and then mixing that possibly overheard
reasoning circa 4:00 PM with the deployment moment
and well-known radio traffic 39 minutes later.
Or did Willis intend the “I heard they needed to move”
and the “fire coming back on their position” dialogue
to apply to the actual moment of deployment? Unclear.
Here’s the link to the video interview and a full transcript
of everything Willis told military.com in case that original
video interview disappears from that site.
NOTE: When Willis first says ‘they immediately deployed’
down below… he is NOT referring to the fatal ‘deployment’ that would
come later in the day. At that point in the interview he is obviously
only talking about the start of the day and Granite Mountain ‘deploying’
out to the anchor point to begin their line work.
http://www.military.com/video/specialties-and-personnel/veterans/marine-vet-killed-fighting-wildfire/2581462564001/
Chief Darrel Willis…
The Hotshots are like the equivalent of the Marines at war.
They’re the first in. The toughest job to take care of.
That’s where they are. They’re the tip of the spear.
They were the first crew there and at that time in the morning the fire
was burnin’ really hot. Very unusual fire behavior for the day.
They immediately deployed and using chainsaws and tools they were
beginning to construct… uh… direct fire line at the time.
At about four o’clock the fire behavior was beyond extreme.
Because of the fire behavior I clicked back on their
frequency… and heard a coupla things.
That they needed to move because the fire was coming
back on their position and they were gonna burn out
around themselves and deploy their shelters.
We were able to get an aircraft up, a couple of uh… ATVS
and they were able to… uh… uh… get it under the smoke
column to where we thought they were….
and while enroute… uh… they came across the deployment site and
confirmed that there were 19 firefighters that lost their lives.
They did it always to protect others.
Every person there understood and knew that they
were gonna protect the community of Yarnell
And if they laid down their life…it’s just like the Marines.
They knew what they had to do…
and there couldn’t be any more honorable way to die than the way they died.
Darrell Willis
Followup…
NOTE that Willis mentioned nothing of what he reports in his
military.com interview to the SAIR investigators ( or at least
there is no record of any it ).
There are only 4 single-line entries from the interview with
Willis covering the entire time period from NOON to
4:40 PM when Todd Abel called to inform him of deployment.
There is nothing at all in there from Willis circa 4:00 PM
about “clicking back on their frequency” and “hearing a
coupla things… that they needed to move because fire
was coming back on their positon…”
Page 59 of the Yarnell Investigation Notes…
Interview with Darrell Willis…
NOTE: The (close to too late??) phrase below is actually
in the YIN notes itself from Willis’ interview.
>> Fire is starting to flank “double bar A” ranch at about 1200
>> and Chief Willis evacuated his suppression forces and the
>> ranch people (close to too late??)
>> Chief Willis was depending on Engine 58 from the Tonto NF
>> to accomplish burnout operations on the north part of the fire
>> Chief Willis got a call from Todd Abbel informing him of the
>> Granite Mtn. shelter deployment (4:40- 4:45).
>> Next thing he does is drive around to Yarnell side of the fire
>> and pray for the crew.
Willis is a liar. PERIOD…
NV,
“there were likely signs of issues in the past…” Bad decsions with prior good outcomes. You are onto something here more than you realize.
from FullSail: “and, like has been said so many times before, deploying is NOT an option that anyone (aside from Prescott FD wildland division apparently) considers when scouting an assignment or committing their crews to working in any given area. we accept work assignments based on LCES, the “S” being a “Safety Zone.” we don’t base our actions on having a “deployment zone.””
This begs the question of what to do in the case of a crew that seems to be deviating significantly from standard protocol. Probably the easiest answer in this case is for Prescott or other similar entities to not be allowed to create wildland divisions that might be prone to insular cultures and mixed mandates. Beyond that, it is to me becoming more clear that there were likely signs of issues in the past…and that no one within GM was culturally or socially going to be in a position to necessarily perceive those signs. So, no near-miss reports or consciousness of near misses. And, no central oversight from outside their broader organization to know or be responsible when a crew might begin to consistently take chances or make decisions that are outside the box.
It may be a problem without a solution. But, to me at least it bears some thought as to any way to get things sorted without pointing fingers before the fact, if other crews are seeing things that suggest undue risk taking or significant departures from the norm.
I want to take this opportunity to defend Roy Hall…again. Yesterday, when I read his now infamous quote, “You understand who I am.” I realized that what I think he is really saying (and his quote is being taking out of context), since his entire quote is, “You understand who I am: 1985 Butte Training Video…that is who I am.” Is that he is a survivor of the Butte Fire near Disaster, and Roy Hall is identifying himself as being a key player in the creation of the 1985 Butte Fire Training Video.
I also take this to mean that Roy Hall (former Flagstaff Hotshot Superintendent) was personally involved in infamous Butte Fire (near) Disaster when, “On August 29, 1985, 73 firefighters were forced into safety zones, where they took refuge in their fire shelters for 1 to 2 hours while a very severe crown fire burned over them. The incident took place on the Butte Fire on the Salmon National Forest in Idaho. Five firefighters were hospitalized overnight for heat exhaustion, smoke inhalation, and dehydration; the others escaped uninjured. Investigators estimated that without the protection of the escape zones and the fire shelters, at least 60 of the 73 firefighters would have died. Thanks to preparation of safety zones, the effectiveness of the fire shelters, and the sensible behavior of the firefighters themselves, disaster was averted.” FRAMES Resource Cataloging System (RCS), Butte Fire.
And by identifying himself as such, he was not pointing out that he was the Yarnell Hill Fire Incident Commander, he was emphasizing the fact that he had been a participant in the Butte Fire near disaster. And as such, since this was a traumatic event in his career, he would be safety conscious and acutely aware that such disasters are always possible and that therefore he is ever vigilante to make sure it doesn’t happen again. Which he probably is and does.
In addition, I want to state once and for all, as I have written variations of this a number of times, if you got rid of all of the wildland firefighters who have oversized egos and excessive confidence, you wouldn’t have very many left. And you for sure would not have any of the good ones left. In other words, I don’t think you can be successful at fighting wildfire without hubris. The real trick is being able to see the “line” and be capable of not crossing the it into the realm of excessive risk taking based on your own perceived capabilities, which can obviously very quickly lead to disaster.
WTKTTand others,
Regarding The Shrine PPE issue, I’m going to side with fullsail on this one. I’m willing to bet they DO have their required PPE in the truck, somewhere in a bin maybe. We used to say that ‘if you can touch the truck you’re okay with it in a bin, but any further and you must wear it.’ It’s okay if they’re NOT wearing it at the time.
And it’s generally not the WFF that are the issue, they’re usually okay. It’s the Supervsors that should be setting the examples that are the worst.
Since training and leadership have been at the forefront lately, here’s a link below to a good article from the Missoulian, MT newspaper on those subjects.
http://missoulian.com/news/local/western-wildfire-fatalities-officials-look-to-training-overhaul/article_d960578a-6dc3-11e3-8649-001a4bcf887a.html
RTS and others…
This isn’t a contest. No one has to ‘side’ with anyone in
that kind of way.
I’m willing to change just about any opinion of my own, at any
moment, if it is based on evidence and sound reasoning.
I said above that if they had shelters, they must have been
in the trucks. That’s all. Looks like that’s two confirmations
now on that possibility. That’s good. I would hate to think they
were in the situation(s) we see them in and they did
NOT have that kind of PPE with them.
The most important thing is still to identify WHO these guys
really are… and only then might we learn what they did or
didn’t have with them that day…
…but that was just a SIDENOTE for the original post.
What do YOU think of the situation(s) they had put themselves
in which are evident in the video(s)?
Do they look ‘comfortable’ to YOU?
Does that look like “all in a day’s work”… or something
totally “off the reservation”… or something “in-between”?
I really would like to hear what ALL the WFF people posting
here have to say about that.
It’s the same with the NTSB. Check out the 2008 ‘Iron 44’ incident on the Shasta-Trinity NF in Northern CA when a helipoter crashed killing the pilot and 6 WFF. They blame it on all kinds of things besides what the true cause was. Same story here – establish a conclusion first and then find the ‘facts’ to fit.
i am not sure i can agree with that… wasn’t it the NTSB report that showed the contractor to have used false power charts that overestimated the ships capabilities in order to win a contract?
and i am pretty sure that the NTSB report was what led to the current civil litigation and a number of people losing their jobs…
that is a tangent, and i fully agree that FS SAIR’s are severely lacking… just look at the report about A. Vesseth that concluded that we all “just perceive risk differently” to justify working around a snag patch (horribly para-phrased of course).
Fullsail,
There’s a WHOLE lot more to the Iron-44 Incident. Read theCarson Helicopter Company submissions to NTSB to get a real clue to what was going on there.CLASSIC, establish a conclusion first on that one!
Yes, there was a disgruntled, former employee that falsified some perfomance charts, and he was fired. The main issue was the Fuel Control Units (FCU) and THAT was what actually caused the crash. One was failing and eventually completely failed on the third and fatal flight. And then there was the Columbia Helicopters issue since they had the exclusive use on rebuilding these FCU’s. Carson turned over two FCU’s to them whole, and got one back whole and one in pieces. And General Electric, who had a big part in the engines, KNEW that there were PROBLEMS with these helicopters and failed to notify the companies that owned them. They lost big time in court.
Elizabeth,
“Robert-the-Second, tell us WHY you believe the at least superficially reputable SAIT members would engage in such a “traveshamockery.”
Because I’ve seen it WAY TOO MANY TIMES, especially when there are fatalities. They just seem to ‘go along to get along’ and do what they’re told, even if it means deception, half truths, and lying.
” But WHY do you suppose reputable men like Karrels (Karels?) would participate in such nonsense, assuming that they did or they do?” See above. These things go ‘all the way to the top’ and they are basically told what to say, what to conclude, etc. Just look back to just before the SAIR came out and all the dispute over the SAIT guidelines.There was a firestorm of controversy over all that.
I have no problem making those assertions because I have worked on fire shelter deployment fires and fatality fires, and so I pretty much know what happened. And when the SAIR is released it’s TOTALLY different! Here’s one example. On the 1990 Dude Fire, the Perryville Inmate Crew Boss ABANDONED his crew, claiming he and another inmate were ‘going for water.’ He took THE ONLY RADIO and left the very inexperienced female guard as the replacement Crew Boss WITHOUT a RADIO and WITHOUT telling her he was leaving. He actually TOTALLY left the fire and went to the store for soda and cigarettes. So, the SAIT knew all this within days after the incident but would NOT include it in the SAIR because they felt it would have had NO SIGNIFICANT IMPACT ON THE FATAL OUTCOME. And of course NONE of this was ever in the final SAIR.
Reply to RTS post on December 27, 2013 at 11:46 am
Well… they should NOT be able to continue to get away with
that crap. It’s a dangerous job… I get it… so is flying an airplane.
Could you imagine the uproar if it was discovered that the
NTSB operated this way… and was just ‘making stuff up’
and ‘hiding the truth’ every time there was a serious accident?
I think everyone needs to take another look at their paystubs
and remember WHO they are really working for.
Elizabeth,
Along the same lines as RTS’s response to you above, I was working on a fire where a severe injury occured. It started out as a routine medical emergency, and almost everyone on the fire was following the event on the command channel. In the convoluted chain that the people on the IMT had to work through in the process of actually ‘getting help’, a grave error was made by someone working the radios and phones back in base camp, substantially delaying the ‘help’. This error was subsequently revealed through queries in follow-up radio traffic, for all to hear.
There was an ‘extensive report’ done regarding this incident, and I was waiting to see how they were going to handle the part about the ‘error’ that was made. I read the entire report, to include all of the communication logs, and there was ABSOLUTELY NO MENTION ANYWHERE that this error had ever occured.
And by the way…………, the outcome was not good.
TTWARE – thank you for sharing. That story is just as horrible as the other one (about the Perryville crew).
I am without appropriate words to respond. Utterly without. Do you have a clue as to WHY the incident report might have said nothing about it?
Elizabeth,
I fully believe RTS’s accounts above, re-affirmed but what I personally witnessed, as the way business is done in regards to investigation reports. Throughout some of the commentaries and articles referencing the Yarnell Hill Incident, numerous people, with MUCH more experience than me, have alluded to the same.
*by* what I…
This is among one of the single worst things I have read in a very very long time.
“No significant impact on the fatal outcome”???
I was thinking long and hard today about why the actual wildfire fighters themselves are not IRATE over such shabby SAIRs, given that such non-disclosure hamstrings the ability to protect oneself moving forward. xxFullsailxx strikes me as a guy who is not afraid to say what he thinks – why are groups of wildfire guys/gals like him NOT organizing and sending scathing missives to relevant agencies, legislators, etc. about these types of whitewashed reports? (I, by the way, am not pointing the finger at my friend xxfullsailxx. I am just using him as an example to show that, if he is the norm, these guys are not shrinking violets….)
P25 YIN DPS Ranger…..Eric was looking for 20-22 ppl he was told it would be the crew, dozer and a DIVS. So they walked the area very well. I have always wondered what became of the dozer being used on Sesame. Eric above is Eric Tarr (the first person to arrive at the DZ. He was looking for the dozer? Really? As late as 1820-1830 the dozer and dozer operator had not been accounted for?
Yep, it seems there were a lot of close calls!
Reply to calvin post on December 27, 2013 at 9:11 am
The only reference I can find to what ‘happened to the dozer’
later that afternoon is on P8 YIN in the interview with Blue Ridge.
All it says is this…
“Around 1500 they want to pull the dozer out to go north for
structure protection.”
The interview notes don’t say who THEY are… but I would
assume it’s fire command up at the Model Creek School
in Peeples Valley. The Double Bar A Ranch had already
burned over up there by 1500 and the fire was threatening
the command post and the school itself.
It also doesn’t say if that really happened or not ( moved
the dozer north )… but I assume it did since he didn’t die.
More confusion.
More “not knowing where people/resources really are.”
**
** AFTERMATH VIDEO OF SHRINE ROAD AREA
>> On December 26, 2013 at 4:02 pm, Gary Olson wrote…
>>
>> When I first heard about the Yarnell Hill Fire, I was in shock and disbelief that
>> 19 hotshots were dead.
>> Now I am in shock and disbelief that 119 wildland firefighters aren’t dead.
You and me both.
Man… as you say… a VERY BAD day could have actually been much,
much, worse.
Speaking of ‘too many close calls’ that whole afternoon… not enough has
been said yet about what we are really witnessing in that video that was
released containing the capture of GM’s final radio transmissions.
What we are REALLY witnessing in that video is a bunch of firefighters that
were only minutes away from death themselves… and waited WAAAY too
long to get the heck out of where they were.
That includes BOTH of the videos released that show firefighters on the Shrine
road. The group in the radio capture video at the St. Joseph Shrine itself AND
the other video showing even more firefighters shot a little further east on
Shrine road at the same time and capturing some of the same radio
transmissions.
The location of the camera operator for that main video released with the radio
captures has already been established as…
Latitude: 34.227234
Longitude: -112.752814
34.227234, -112.752814
What I failed to mention when I posted those coordinates is that this is not only
simply NEAR the St. Joseph Shrine… the firefighter shooting the video is
actually standing IN the Shrine parking lot itself.
If the cameraman had ‘turned around’… we would be looking directly at the
Shrine itself and the famous wooden cross that is there would have been
hidden amongst the vegetation that was directly behind him.
What NONE of those firefighters realized at that moment ( in BOTH of the
Shrine road videos ) was that the fire had surrounded them and, simply through
a trick of geography, had formed a ‘loop’ around the St. Joseph Shrine itself
and much of the Shrine road east of it.
That ‘loop’ was CLOSING on them FAST at the exact moment these
videos were shot.
If they had waited even 1 or 2 more minutes… all of the firefighters seen in
these videos would have probably been, themselves, ‘trapped’.
There is now also video of the ‘aftermath’ of the burnover in the exact spot
where the first video was being shot.
George & Eve DeLange lost their home in the Yarnell Fire.
George is a videographer and was basically shooting video of the fire and the
activity in Yarnell since the afternoon the fire started.
He captures the original crew preparing to be helicoptered out to the fire on
Friday as well as activity in and around the fire all weekend and on into the
‘aftermath’… including a video of his own destroyed neighborhood.
He ALSO went over to the shrine of St. Joseph and took an ‘aftermath’ video.
It shows the destruction that took place there just moments after we see those
firefighters evacuating from there in the nick of time in that other video.
He shot that video from EXACTLY THE SAME SPOT in the Shrine parking
lot where the firefighter shot his video that captured the final radio
transmissions from GM, only Mr. DeLange shot his video look BACK at
the destruction of the Shrine itself. It was a complete ‘burnover’ right
there where that firefighter shot his video.
He has created his own online ‘page’ for all of these videos he was shooting
that weekend.
On this page… all the photographs are large stills from the videos themseves,
and if you click on any of them you will see the full video(s).
The SEVENTH one down on that page is the full ‘aftermath’ at the Shrine and
has this caption under the photo/video…
Shrine Of Saint Joseph.
Burned At Northwest Side In The Yarnell Forest Fire, On June 30, 2013.
Click On This Photo For A Video Of
The Shrine Of Saint Joseph. 11.6 MB.
Here is the link to Mr. DeLange’s Yarnell Hill Fire videos…
http://www.delange.org/Yarnell_Forest_Fire/Yarnell_Forest_Fire.htm
SIDENOTE: I know it has already been stated by WFF people that ALL ‘Wildland
Firefighters’ are required to carry deployment shelters… but these were just
structure protection guys and I see no evidence in either of the videos of any
‘backpacks’ and/or ‘shelters’.
In the first video… the camera pans east and we see two other firefighters
standing near the rear of a white pickup truck. Neither one has any backpack,
or any evidence of any gear on them whatsoever. One of them has a white
helmet on and the other is just wearing a baseball cap. The one with the white
helmet has a BK radio on his belt but he is seen just standing there fooling with
what looks like an iPad or a similar ‘tablet’ device. The firefighter with the actual
helmet cam also has no backpack since we see him simply jump in his truck…
start it up… and drive away. He does not pause to remove any kind of ‘backpack’.
Ditto for the bearded firefighter in the other Shrine road video taken at the same
time but just a little further east of there on Shrine road. He has no pack, no gear,
no obvious fire shelter. He is just standing in the road with his portable radio in
his hand.
If either of the groups of firefighters in these videos had to ‘deploy’… it would
appear they would have had to do it WITHOUT actual ‘fire shelters’… which is
hard to do, I would think.
The only way any of these firefighters could have had actual ‘fire shelters’ to
use would be if they had been stored somewhere in their trucks.
As Gary has said… as BAD as that day was….
…it could have been MUCH worse.
there you go, leaping into oblivion again…
yes, you answered your own question… having a pack on makes it difficult to get into a vehicle… so often times overhead types won’t throw on their line gear (“backpack”) so that they can more readily get in and go.
fire shelters are usually stored in that line gear and if folks are going “out on the line” they will wear their line gear. (like GM did when they hiked out to their assignment). otherwise, it is not necessary to carry your fire shelter with you whenever you get out of your vehicle. guaranteed that those folks in the video had their fire shelters in whatever vehicle they were in and were not considering using them (probably because they had a pretty good idea of exactly how they were going to exit the area when they felt it was necessary and weren’t considering a shelter deployment as a viable option.)
and, like has been said so many times before, deploying is NOT an option that anyone (aside from Prescott FD wildland division apparently) considers when scouting an assignment or committing their crews to working in any given area. we accept work assignments based on LCES, the “S” being a “Safety Zone.” we don’t base our actions on having a “deployment zone.”
sidenote:
it’s really cute when you pretend to know exactly what the conditions were and how much danger those folks were in!
and wow, that website you cited is quality stuff! i really love it when conservative fringe folks “expect” federal assistance.
So… to be clear… you are saying that ( in your opinion )
neither group of firefighters seen in those videos were
in ANY danger whatsoever… OR taking any undue risk…
AND you know for an absolute FACT that all of these
men had fire shelters in the trucks?
That seems to be what you are claiming.
Have you actually looked at either the ADOSH or
the SAIR fire progession charts?
If you know who these guys are ( personally ) and
that is what you are basing your own ‘leaps’ on…
could you tell us their names?
oh, so now you’re putting words in my mouth and not just speaking for the dead…
i didn’t say “any danger whatsoever” or “taking any undue risk”… i wasn’t there so i hesitate to make any proclamations about how they were feeling.
they do look fairly comfortable where they are though, and probably had a better idea of what was going on that you do from your computer, after the fact. though i’m sure you would have probably been crapping your pants sitting there.
those men, whichever agency they work for, have agreed to the guidelines set forth by the NWCG “redbook” that says that all wildland ff’s will carry fire shelters. there is no reason to think they didn’t have shelters…
and certainly no reason to doubt that they had shelters just because WTKTT doesn’t see them wearing their “backpacks.”
@Yavapai and Gary Olson, the fact that McDonough was allowed to casually evaluate those deployment sites and otherwise cut things close, in more or less plain view of others, again to me speaks to big cultural and training issues. It is not at all clear to me that there is a problem system-wide, though. The common link I see is Prescott. That doesn’t mean that the whole leadership there isn’t or wasn’t dedicated and conscientious. But, pushing things particularly when believed to be protecting structures, a high ranking given to deployment as a viable alternative, seem to be sticking out.
One subsidiary training issue is that fact that, until a clear bad outcome happens, people within small groups taking those outsized risks may view themselves as highly safety-conscious. I don’t think anyone was watching McDonough nearly having to deploy in horror, I think everyone thought they were being safe.
I agree with you.
And if you are talking about my reference to the NWCG needs to sit down and write new training manuals from scratch, I still agree with you.
I was referring to “if all fires burn with the explosive intensity as the Yarnell Hill Fire did” and if that is the new normal, which hopefully they won’t and this fire was an anomaly. In any case, I think this entire fire when taken as a whole was an aberration without any question, which I have more or less stated before.
I think the overall wildland firefighting system that has been developed over the past 100 years is fundamentally sound, although I do think the creation of the ICS did weaken it, but there is no question ICS is saving money and doing more with less.
According to BR interview notes p8 YIN…..1530, they briefed the crew there 1st escape route was to the hwy and out, 2nd escape route was back to the junction burn out the grass.
I am just wondering if burning out a safety zone is considered acceptable SOP? Thanks
yes, given the right fuel type, fire conditions and proposed safety zone size… (an minimum area four times expected flame lengths).
xxFullsailxx, you seem to be saying that an acceptable safety route or escape plan or whatever can be the promise that “we will burn ourselves a black zone if we have to.” Correct?
Yet that strikes me as PREPOSTEROUS, particularly for that plan to have been proposed on the Yarnell Hill Fire. To wit: How can it possibly be a good safety/escape “plan” (meaning, established ex ante) to wait until you are in trouble and then, if needed, burn out around yourselves? How can that honestly be considered a legitimate, good faith escape plan? If we use that logic, then the Granite Mountain guys were effectuating a valid escape “plan” at the time that they were burned over, with the “plan” being “try to make it to a ranch with huge defensible space, and, if that fails, try to burn out the stuff around you and deploy.”
I know the Wag Dodge story just like you do, but (a) he was in prairie grass, (b) he was on a super-steep uphill run (76%) such that the fire was going to move over him quickly, and (c) he got lucky. Just looking at the pictures of the grader site (for example), that is not a “Wag Dodge prairie grass” circumstance.
No? Am I misunderstanding?
Elizabeth–Read below it was a backup site if there road was cut off (second site) I am assuming there was no other large site that they could get every body in. The first was to get out before the road was compromised which they did.
I guess my point is BR identified an ER traveling through the green with a safety zone that would have required a burnout to actually have been “safe.” Is that a fair statement?
Calvin– I am assuming that back to the junction would be on the road out. At the junction there was a large open area that was grass. Where they were at was the bottom of the fire and they had to fall back to Yarnell on the road. The Willis tennis court as you remember was to small they did not have a lot of choices for a large open area to ID as a safety zone.
any way they went on the road to Yarnell would have been thru the green. science the fire was chasing them back into town.
the question was:
“I am just wondering if burning out a safety zone is considered acceptable SOP?”
i don’t know what GM or BR were looking at, which is why i qualified my “yes” with a few conditions…
but short grass or sparse fuels are often used as safety zones with the thought that burning out the area will created “black” if necessary.
i’ve also used taller “green” grass that was green enough to only produce flame lengths of one to two feet but would still carry fire… thus, technically your safety zone could burn and still be very comfortable… there’s a lot of factors, more than i am going to explain to you.
No totally different– GM did not have a Scouted route or Identified SZ The were bush whacking got caught and had to do with what they had which was not enough.
They scouted and identified a large area that would make a good SZ. It was a backup SZ only if they were cut off which they weren’t. They could not improve it until the fire dictated it, grass will burn fast in 20 MPH wind. They could not burn it until they needed it again if it became necessary. I hope your now starting to see why if next to the black is available it is the best SZ. Scouting is primary to your safety identify the best possible solutions and a backup if necessary.
I agree and it was a second site if the first got cut off. A large area with dead grass would work if needed as a backup burn it out and get in it would not be high flame lengths.
Sorry, but the Granite Mountain Hotshots *HAD* such a thing, and, uhm, it did not work out too well for them. Specifically, there were a couple of areas in the bottom of the valley that were weird, quasi-barren-ish. They were open-ish spaces. If you look at the stems and trunks and such that were left in the deployment site, there are VERY few stems and trunks. Meaning, the GM Hotshots had made it to one of the more openish areas, such that there was very little for them to clear out, other than to burn out the grass. They burned it out. And it did not work out well.
It appears that the fire was too hot, too big, and it sat too long.
My point: I have NO relevant experience (as my new friend Darin aka fullsail likes to remind), yet I still can intuit that the Yarnell Hill Fire was not the type of fire where you could consider burning out an area for yourself a valid back-up PLAN (e.g. ex ante). (FYI, in one of the videos, one of the fire captains (Thompson?) is saying something like “those flames are at least 200 [or 300??] feet tall” as the fire was crawling out of the valley.)
If we are dealing with shifting winds and “unpredictable” or “bizzarre” fire behavior (which is how all the overheads described the Yarnell fire), it strikes me – a non-expert – as an INSANE idea to have even a “back-up” plan be a burn-out. There is just no time to burn-out if the fire is so unpredictable and fast-moving that it cuts off your FIRST choice of an escape route. Plus, the landscape is not particularly amenable.
Two last things:
1. I would be curious where the BR were that they had a big enough area that was flat and grassy and NOT bogged with shrubbery such that they could burn it out and have enough black space for 200-ish foot flames.
2. Darin (xxfullsailxx), how long have you been a wildfire fighter? I picture you as a 21-year-old guy, but is that totally incorrect? Have you ever actually *needed* to burn out a grassy green space to have safe black? I ask not by way of veiled critique, but to try to contextualize this whole conversation. It is hard to know what to believe when you’ve not shared any background with the group. Again, ,not veiled criticism…..
I would guess if BR thought the area was big enough to not have flame lengths that could reach them then it would have been safe enough to burn out and get into as the grass would burn Farley fast. This would have been a SZ not a deployment site. Because of having to drive out a road they located a backup site. They had to move out early to avoid using that site it was identified if needed. Its been done on fires many times to create an immediate SZ some times prior for use some times for safety but always scouted and identified. Again these are not deployment sites but burned out safety zones. Again I have not seen this area but would think it would be at least 400 to 600 sq. ft. if as I think they were in vehicles they could burn it out and drive in as it burned, can happen very fast. Where they were they had very few choices and probably should have moved out immediately when the fire blew up. get out and get down the road before it cuts you off. I do not know how else to explain it Elizabeth this was not there primary ER or SZ . Also unless they were in large tree stands there would not have been 200 to 300 ft. flame lengths. 10 to 20 ft. brush with wind 60 to 100 ft. flame lengths would be more accurate.
Understood, Bob. Thank you.
Elizabeth — I am sorry I messed that up bad I meant to say 3/4 to 1 Ac. I size 40,000 to 60,000 Sq. ft I went brain dead on that.
it is not worth my time to try to explain it to you, there are a lot of variables and i’m not sure you’re capable of understanding without any sort of understanding about fire behavior. find a local fire station and take S130/190.
GM was not trying to utilize a SZ. SZ’s are pre-planned areas where you do not have to use your shelter.
you sure deal in speculation and conjecture more than i would expect for a “lawyer” type…
“veiled critique” by you? funny!
i’m not giving anymore bio info than i already have. are you asking WTKTT his background? because he is making WAY more assertions about things he admits to having no experience with than i am…
The literally unbelievable SAIT SAIR? Just go back to my former comments regarding the SAIT process of “establishing a conclusion FIRST and THEN finding the “FACTS” to fit the predetermined, foregone conclusion. This includes selective interviews and the like as well. If it matches the SAIT predetermined “storyline” then they’ll use it, and if it does not, then it’s not included. So, the SAIT can just about write anything they desire to make the SAIR sound credible, i.e. “The Factual Report.”
Robert-the-Second, tell us WHY you believe the at least superficially reputable SAIT members would engage in such a “traveshamockery.” (That word is a combination of travesty, sham, and mockery, if it wasn’t obvious.) I am not saying that I disagree with you. I have already made my views known here and elsewhere about the general concept of whitewashing investigations. But WHY do you suppose reputable men like Karrels (Karels?) would participate in such nonsense, assuming that they did or they do?
Reply to RTS post on December 26, 2013 at 8:03 pm
Well… at any moment… I really do expect the Attorney General
of Arizona to file some ‘misuse’ or ‘misappropriation’ of funds
charges against the Arizona State Forestry Commission just
for the SAIR fiasco alone.
The people of Arizona thought they were paying for a…
Special Accident Investigation Report.
…and not a…
Story Assembled Internally Report.
I think it’s actually past time to find out what that turkey
actually COST… including individual salaries.
What did Karels and Dudley really make co-producing
that piece of creative writing?
5 figures? 6 figures?
Memo to Jim Karels and SAIT:
You REALLY SUCK at both interviewing people and writing those interviews up in interview reports. NO ONE SHOULD EVER ALLOW YOU OR ANY OF THE PEOPLE WHO WORKED FOR YOU DO IT AGAIN. When something is important enough to investigate, people who know how to conduct investigations should be used to accomplish the task. Don’t send in a pick up sand lot team when you need professionals…unless you want to screw it up of course. In that case you should do exactly what you did.
It is absolutely unbelievable that they didn’t bother to do a
standard ‘second pass’ of interviews, once they had initial
information, and try to ‘clear up discrepancies’ between
bits and pieces of testimony. Absolutely ‘Investigations 101’.
OK, I just want to throw this out there for the “Whatever it’s worth” category. And I know I haven’t been on the fire line since 1984, or involved with wildfire since 1988, and things have really changed, it’s a brave new world out there, and people like me JUST DON’T GET IT. But.
We (the Happy Jack Hotshots) used to hold all of our staff rides and study our lessons learned at the Mormon Lake Lodge on a Saturday night (our days off were in the middle of the week) which meant Sundays were traditionally light physical training days, yes, we still ran the 1.5 miles through the woods on the dirt road, jumping over the cattle guards, but there were fewer calisthenics, a few volleyball games (which were strictly forbidden because nobody wanted to process a CA-1 on the job injury report, so we engaged in our own version of don’t ask/don’t tell) and it was a “camp day”, which was spent on the USFS compound doing weekly chores, but forgive me, I digress.
We (the Santa Fe Hotshots) held all of our staff rides, and studied our lessons learned at the Green Onion in Santa Fe, New Mexico, on Saturday nights, and immediately after every fire (while still wearing our fire clothes, the management and the waitresses there loved us), and almost every other night in between.
Most wildland firefighters like to tell stories and hear stories, as long as they are about wildfires, the last fire, the next fire, or any other fire. And the relative merits of White’s fire boots versus Nick’s fire boots. And how about those Redwing boots? All the rookies wear them, and they really suck. Danner boots are okay…I guess, but White’s are the best, no question.
You know…your typical and topical stories that can hold the interest of wildland firefighters. Do you think I’m kidding? This video showed up a few weeks ago on my You Tube channel because Google thought I might want to watch it because of other selections I have made, http://youtu.be/qjcJ_LP6zzE, as it turns out, there are a lot more videos just like it. It IS a brave new world.
So…it is safe to say that if you count all of the fires I was on during my ten years as a hotshot and my 4 years in fire coordination/operation centers (all over the country), I think it is safe to say I have been on a LOT OF FIRES. Some in real time…and some vicariously through others.
So…here comes my point. Do you want to know what the craziest story I have ever heard (or virtually experienced) as a wildland firefighter (rhetorical question) is? Excluding what happened to the Granite Mountain Hotshots on the Yarnell Hill Fire, which of course holds all of the records, hands down. If you have read some of my earlier comments, you might take a guess and say it was from the Battlement Creek Fire, but you would be wrong, what happened there was perfectly understandable. No, the craziest story I have ever heard came from the Yarnell Hill Fire.
It seems that there was this second year kid out there wandering around by himself, not sure what to do, almost in the middle of a fire storm of Biblical proportions, causally evaluating places where he could deploy a fire shelter that would most likely not have been survivable given the flame lengths and the temperatures that were being generated by the Yarnell Hill Fire. In case any of you are wondering out there in cyber space…that is really some CRAZY ****!
I have also said in an earlier comment that wildland firefighters do not need better fire shelters, i.e., BULKIER AND HEAVIER fire shelters to hump up and down the mountains along with all of the other stuff they have to carry (you don’t get to put your backpacks down while you are bent over doing endless hours of backbreaking work, they stay on you and water weighs about 8 pounds per gallon). Wildland firefighters need to stop working ABOVE and in front of uncontrolled wildfires. The point of a fire shelter is that it is never, never, never, ever supposed to be used.
Now I know my years (1974 – 1976, no shelters, 1977 – 1988, all fire shelters) were split between no fire shelters and mandatory fire shelters, but…as a reference point, I never personally knew anybody who deployed or even thought about deploying a fire shelter. And in the past few years, there has literally been hundreds of them…I think, jump in here and correct me, any of you current wildland firefighters.
We, the Happy Jack Hotshots, were on the Ship Island Creek Fire of 1979, in Idaho, when 2 overhead were burned over in their fire shelters and killed, but I didn’t know them. And 1976 was a transition year. We were issued them when we went to Region 5 (California), but we threw them in the bushes just after leaving fire camp and put our lunches, ponchos or jackets in their HUGE (the first fire shelters were really heavy and bulky, which firefighters bitched about non-stop) pouches. Some guys kept them to roll up in like space blankets while sleeping on the ground in spike camps (which looked pretty funny in the morning), but you couldn’t let the overhead see that, plus they were really hard to fold up again, so I never tried it, I just threw mine away. I didn’t believe it would save me anyway, and it was REALLY BULKY AND HEAVY!
There was even an “old school” smokejumper on the South Canyon Fire when it blew up who wasn’t carrying a fire shelter, because he didn’t believe in them (WHICH IS A HUGE NO-NO, ALL WILDLAND FIREFIGHTERS MUST CARRY THEM AT ALL TIMES, EVEN AFTER THE FIRE IS OUT AND THEY ARE MOPPING IT UP, INCLUDING CON CREWS, THEY ARE WILDLAND FIREFIGHTERS TOO, 6 OF THEM WERE BURNED OVER AND KILLED ON THE DUDE FIRE HERE IN ARIZONA, 1990) which is probably a common practice among smokejumpers, who I stated in an earlier comment, more or less supervise themselves, more or less most of the time, on their little fires more or less in the middle of nowhere. Plus they are more or less like Gods themselves anyway. So…back to the fire, he just walked over and waited out the fire storm in a big pile of rocks while 14 firefighters who were carrying fire shelters died, more or less in front of him. Life isn’t fair.
So, I want to say again…having a second year kid wandering around like
McDonough was…IS REALLY A CRAZY STORY! Here is another rhetorical question. Do you know what the second wildest story I have ever heard (or experienced) is, once again, excluding what happened to the Granite Mountain Hotshots?
It comes from the Yarnell Hill Fire as well, and the ADOSH report. The ADOSH report states in part, “Cordes reported that two engines working Shrine Road got “pinched.” The crews had hiked in to work the dozer line at Division Z, and when they returned, their vehicles were missing. Cordes believed that a water tender operator had previously moved their vehicles to a safer location without the engine crew’s knowledge.” So…we had engine crews out there wandering around in the MIDDLE OF A FIRE STORM OF BIBLICAL PROPORTIONS ON FOOT, WHO THOUGHT THEIR ENGINES HAD BEEN STOLEN RIGHT WHEN THEY NEEDED TO DI DI MAU, MOST RICKY-TICK!
Truthfully, the ADAOSH report is full of almost unbelievable situations, from crews driving through the ash and smoke, to elderly residents running out of their homes a few minutes before the flaming fire front reached them, to a Division Supervisor who apparently just decided to pull up his pants, leave the fire line, and go somewhere else?
When I first heard about the Yarnell Hill Fire, I was in shock and disbelief that 19 hotshots were dead. Now I am in shock and disbelief that 119 wildland firefighters aren’t dead, plus at least that many more residents of Glen Ilah and Yarnell! WE REALLY GOT LUCKY THAT DAY!
At least now I know why the Serious Accident Investigation Team ruled there was no harm, and therefore no foul on the Yarnell Hill Fire. Every time they tried to plot something on their charts…IT WAS OFF THE CHARTS! They had to go home and to make new charts, and now, they are just hoping everyone will forget about that fire and move on…just like they did!
So…if this is the new “normal”, the National Wildfire Coordinating Group (NWCG) doesn’t need to sit down and develop a staff ride with lessons learned for the Yarnell Hill Fire, they need to sit down and develop entirely new training manuals for all wildland firefighters…from scratch.
Just think about it for a minute. It has been written about somewhere that the Granite Mountain Hotshots had a poster up at their headquarters, which asked something about, “How’s Your Situational Awareness Today?” I think that poster had two extreme examples on it…the Mann Gulch Fire of 1949 with 13 wildland firefighters dead, and the South Canyon Fire of 1994 with 14 wildland firefighters dead. At a minimum, the NWCG is going to have to make new posters showing the Yarnell Hill Fire of 2013…WITH 19 WILDLAND FIREFIGHTERS DEAD, ALL OF THEM HOTSHOTS, YOU KNOW…THE BEST OF THE BEST!
So…eventually, I would like to read some discussion regarding, “What The Hell Happened On The Yarnell Hill Fire?” I mean, I’m the one who said I think Roy Hall has a well deserved reputation as a wildland firefighting Incident Commander (even if is he is a ****), Paul Musser had at least 10 years as a hotshot superintendent, on the forest where I was pumped full of hubris, the Mighty Coconino, and if Mr. Musser was a hotshot superintendent on the Coconino National Forest…well, enough said. I casually know Glen Joki from my time with the BLM, and I know he has many years both fighting and managing fires similar to the Yarnell Hill Fire, and I never heard anything bad about him. And from my experience you always hear the bad stuff about somebody right away, but not necessarily the good things.
And by “discussion”, I meant “official discussion”, from somebody, NWCG perhaps? You like to roll in it on the good days, how about the bad ones?
And furthermore, since this team was assembled by the Arizona State Forestry, who apparently had their pick from current wildland firefighting employees AND retirees (I think Paul Musser is retired, in addition to Roy Hall). I am also going to assume that Mr. Todd Able is good at his job as well. So…if this great team was making all of the primary decisions on the Yarnell Hill Fire, why did it go so horribly wrong, according to the ADOSH report, and all other anecdotal evidence? And that is not even counting what happened to the Granite Mountain Hotshots, who by the way, apparently had extremely experienced, savvy, squared away, highly trained and no nonsense crew leaders.
For example, it appears the evacuation was called very late in the day, which apparently almost directly caused the deaths of area residents, what the hell happened? And just in case anybody thinks I do not have the right to ask such a question or do not need to know that information. YOU ARE WRONG, ALL OF THE CIVIL SERVANTS WHO WORKED ON THE YARENELL HILL FIRE WORKED FOR US, THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, AND IT IS IN OUR BEST INTERESTS TO KNOW WHAT HAPPENED. WE ARE ALSO GOING TO PAY ALL OF THE COSTS FROM THE FIRE, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY! SO…WHAT THE HELL HAPPENED ON THE YARNELL HILL FIRE?
And just in case anybody thinks that is going to come out in court during the lawsuits…it won’t. Neither side is going to let those cases go to a trial court, there will be settlements long before that happens. And the families will get more money than they would have otherwise, but not nearly as much as they want, much less deserve. End of story. Oh, by the way, I hope all of you had a Merry Christmas, I know I did.
Gary, one of the key points you are making is that this WON’T come out at trial. In my mind, there is a 21% chance that this will come out at trial. If even that.
*THAT* is why I care about this matter – otherwise, I would be sitting around, spending my time on other things, and just waiting for the litigation process to unearth all of the relevant facts. It won’t happen. I honestly believe that it will not.
Thank you for taking the time to work on this. I don’t know if everyone understands how lucky we are to have an attorney with your background working on this. Very few people have the skill set you do and none of them are going to the time of trouble to submit FOIA’S on our behalf.
A 2nd WFF wandering around “out there”? Gary, wow. I’m stunned. Did that second young person have a radio or a cell phone? Did anyone know that WFF was there?
Yavapai Co. Residents, you have posted before so I am going to try and address your confusion. The point of this anecdote is that Brendan McDonough is a relatively inexperienced firefighter who should never been assigned to do the job he was and when the situation predictably deteriorated and he was left on his own (and by his own admission) he came very close to meeting the same fate as the rest of his crew had he not be rescued by the Blue Ridge Hotshot Crew Boss.
Yes, someone probably knew he was up there, he probably had a phone, and he did have his radio, but I think the fire would have gotten first, except for Brian Frisby. I really do agree with those who have said that Brian Frisby was a true hero that day and probably saved many lives.
Is it possible that your anger towards me is that you are not only a resident of Yavapai County but you are in fact a resident of what I referred to as that collection of indefensible structures in that ****hole they call Yarnell?
In any case, I wish to apologize for my disrespectful characterization of Yarnell. I should have said that collection of indefensible collection of structures where the desert breeze meets the mountain air. Okay?
Gary I would add –It was not the best lookout spot. He should have not been selected as a lookout. He had no way out with out Frisby and his ATV. This was a bad choice with a bad outcome had Frisby not showed up when he did. Also this should have been a warning to GM to get in the black and stay there. And the cluster **** gets worse.
I agree
we saw it that way too but retired firefighters said it was an okay location but to us he was surrounded but spotty fires and the main fierce one.
Gary, I’m not mad at you…never have been. Not sure what previous comment of mine might have suggested that. It’s hard to convey tone of voice in writing.
My apologies if I ever sounded angry; I’m not and haven’t ever been with you.
I was confused, though, as I thought you were referring to another WFF in addition to Brendan, when I read your words “…this second year kid out there….”
I missed the word “year” and had quickly read your post to say “…this second kid out there….”
That’s all. Confusion due to reading too quickly.
And, no anger. Never has been there.
We don’t live in Yarnell.
I agree. I worked for my father, who was the world’s expert on shock waves in the atmosphere, after having been the chief meteorologist for the atmospheric nuclear weapons testing program. When we did “expert consulting” on a number of explosion-related lawsuits, we couldn’t even talk about it around the dinner table. It has been bothering me that so many people think that the lawsuits will lead to some kind of public revelation of the truth.
Elizabeth… can you do me a quick favor?
There is a VIDEO online at VIMEO that apparently has video footage
( with audio ) of Granite Mountain that has never been seen before.
I was just wondering if you could verify whether any of this video/audio
is part of the FOIA/FOIL package at all… or whether this is newly
discovered footage with audio from an unknown source.
It is a compilation of a number of videos ( with audio ) from the
Yarnell Hill Fire but at least two of the ‘segments’ show the following
( with full audio from GM Crew Members )…
** Rory Collins low-flyover putting out one of Marsh’s backburns.
Not only does he destroy their work… Rory Collins almost takes
their heads off with his airplane. It’s amazing. This is definitely
one of the Rory Collins moments with Granite Mountain that
day because GM crew is definitely seen in the video and they
can’t believe what he is doing to them.
** GM Breakout squad doing the ‘tie to cold black’ work on the
Western side of the ridge. We hear a lot of intra-crew radio
traffic between (apparently) Steed and Marsh discussing
Air Attack ( Rory Collins ) and we ALSO hear GM squad
members talking near the camera. One of them says to
one of the other GM crew…
“Yeah… this thing is really goin’ good now. Looks like
we are going to go coyote ( stay out here all night ) on
this one.”
The video is HERE… and appeared on VIMEO about 4 months ago,
long before any FOIA/FOIL packages went out.
The first clip actually says is was ‘courtesy of AZSF ( Arizona State Forestry ).
http://vimeo.com/72985727
The FOIA/FOIL package includes at least the first and the last videos that are on the clip. The crew in the first clip, FYI, is NOT GM. (Can’t remember which crew it is but pretty sure it came from either a DOC crew or another one.)
The “coyote” reference was new to me. I’ll go back and look. There were probably 30 video clips that I have seen so far, and I still have not received the air study videos.
In the video with the fire raging uphill toward the LEFT corner of your screen, who are they talking about picking up? Are they talking about Brendan?
Reply to Elizabeth on December 26, 2013 at 5:11 pm
>> Elizabeth said…
>>
>> In the video with the fire raging uphill toward the
>> LEFT corner of your screen, who are they talking
>> about picking up? Are they talking about Brendan?
Very good question. I’m trying to put exact times and
latitude/longitude location for the camera operator
in all these ‘new’ video clips.
If the one with the quote from GM crewmember…
“I guess we’re going coyote on this one” is NOT in
the FOIA/FOIL package… then I wonder where the
heck it came from? A family member of one of
the victims?
NO! I found it. “Jake Cardinal’s” DOC crew – that is where some of these videos come from. According to the “ReadMe” text file that was provided along with the videos, the one with the coyote reference is from June 29th, not the 30th. That is why I did not pay attention to it. But, after watching ALL of the ones that I had skipped or skimmed (due to the label of June 29th), they all sort of seem to be likely to be from June 30th, although, again, they are labeled (not on the video but in a text file provided separately) as being from the 29th.
Note, by the way, that, if the date of June 29th is correct, then the fire retardant drops are spot on – the goal that day I thought was to suppress the fire. If the drops are on the 30th, well, then, maybe they are being dropped on poor Eric Marsh’s deliberately-set fire that he was hoping to use to get rid of some of the available fuel at around 11 a.m. on the morning of the 30th.
FYI – there are videos from Caldwell, not that they are particularly helpful, except they might contain the “hunker down” quote bandied about here and there.
Thanks, Elizabeth! It’s the ‘black helmets’
that were confusing me. I thought only
Granite Mountain used those. I’m still
looking at the videos, however.
There’s no question the final one is from
June 30, and not the 29th. It shows the
smoke cloud right around the time of
deployment on June 30 with someone
filming from up at the ICP. That’s the
Model Creek School in the foreground.
Maybe you already know this, but…a Coyote camp is the official slang for “spiking out” in a spike camp with nothing other than what you carry with you. This used to be common practice in my day, hence the reference to rolling up in fire shelters in my comment below. I don’t know how common it is now, nor do I understand why Granite Mountain was worried about that. They could have walked to a road for pick up or to Yarnell almost anytime they wanted to, except for when they did.
Normally a spike camp situation occurs when you can’t hike out and you are so far back in a “wilderness” that vehicles can’t get close and helicopter transportation is not practical or the helicopters go down from some reason, excessive smoke, wind, crash, or unexpected medevac.
Thanks, Gary. Do you happen to know what that
piece of metal flange is in the picture of the SAIT
investigators at the deployment site?
See above. That piece of circular white metal is
surrounding what appears to be Christopher
MacKenzie’s Canon Powershot lying on the
ground.
It doesn’t have anything to do with the camera
but it’s a very curious object.
The bottom part of it is ‘bent’ as if having
been ‘stepped on’… but it doesn’t appear
to be burned or even singed in any way.
WTKTT – are you referencing the photo on this website or what photo are you referencing?
Reply to Elizabeth post
on December 26, 2013 at 8:25 pm
I’m still referencing the high-res shot
of the SAIT investigators first
examination of the deployment site
that accompanied Mr. Dougherty’s
article. The one we were discussing
at the tail end of the last chapter.
It is here…
http://www.investigativemedia.com/twelve-granite-mountain-hotshot-families-file-wrongful-death-claims-seeking-237-5-million/
To see the full hi-res version, just
right-click the photo and then
pick ‘Save Image As’ option and
save it to your own hard drive.
You will have the full high-res
version of it, then.
Kind of at the “foot” of the burned fire shelter right? Next to what appears to be a Pulaski?
If I am looking at the right thing, I think it may be the “frame” of a one gallon canteen commonly carried by firefighters when they need to carry lots of water in addition to their canteens or camelbacks. The “frame” is made out of aluminum with the “body” being bright orange plastic. Similar canteens are sold in sporting goods stores and there you can buy them in the 2 quart size, all of the government ones though are marked on the plastic. There would also have been a strap that goes around the frame to carry it with.
Does it sound like I am looking at the right thing?
Yes… it does. That’s all that I could
imagine it being as well. Some kind
of ‘strap’ for some circular container.
I wonder what happened to
whatever it was ‘strapped around’?
What is interesting is that it appears
unburned and even unsigned. Not
any real damage at all.
If that really is Christopher’s camera
sitting right there with it then that
would explain why the SD card
was not ruined. There simply
doesn’t seem to have been any
direct flame contact at that exact
spot at the site… or the ‘white paint’
on the strap wouldn’t still be ‘white’.
Thanks for taking a look.
The blue Nalgene that has the cap attached and the thin piece of plastic that secures the lid to the bottle is unharmed…..amazing, that totally numbs my brain. The SAIR reports the temperature at 2000 degrees, right?
There are a variety of things that seem to have utterly escaped burn damage. For example, at least two hand-held radios appear to be fine in the YCSO pictures (and we know that they were working when Medic Tarr arrived shortly after the burn-over b/c he heard them squawking). Indeed, the label on one of those radios still reads – crystal clear!! – the name “Chris,” with not a smudge, mar, or burn on the label. Some of the phones (at least two that I can think of) are still almost perfectly preserved in the YCSO pictures. A man’s wallet with a lunch/bar restaurant card in it (e.g. “buy one, get one 10% off”) is preserved. Reading between the lines, I imagine some of things were not burned b/c the men were laying on top of them during the burn-over. Indeed, at least a couple of the men were found with the front side of their clothes relatively intact. For example, one of the Hotshots, God rest his soul, was fully in his deployment shelter when he was found, and pictures or videos from his phone or camera were among those retrieved and released in the FOIA/FOIL materials. (I have left out his name due to the delicate nature – I am unclear about what is appropriate, so I err on the side of privacy.)
More evidence that if Mash or Steed were required to be keeping unit logs that day ( in real time like Willis does ) then they probably survived the burnover. Where are those unit logs, I wonder?
Excuse me. Bad typo above. It’s ‘Marsh’… Eric Marsh.
Without being graphic, Marsh’s log is likely long gone. Steed’s might be around if it was in his front pocket.
FYI, the body, the cap, and the long strap are all made out of plastic that would have melted and burned way before it got to 2000 degree, there also would have been a small chain laying nearby that would have kept the cap attached to the frame. The aluminum on these canteens are always dull and “dirty” but I think the 2000 degrees heat burned all of that away and that is why it is so bright.
can/will anyone identify the three voices that are audible between the 27 and 37 second mark of the video. Also WTKTT.. are the videos from the fireline (above) all from the same camera. Great find!
One more thing: If anyone wants the DPS document, or, perhaps more importantly, a GPS video showing the Blue Ridge guys’ whereabouts throughout the day, I will e-mail them to you if you post your e-mail address. (I imagine these FOIA/FOIL materials will ultimately be in the materials that John Dougherty posts here or elsewhere, but, if you want to see them now, I can e-mail them.)
Elizabeth, could you email me what you have? Thank you -Eric
[email protected]
I would like to look at that video too. I’m at [email protected]. I agree, from some experience, that the legal process may not reveal what many people seem to think it will.
Robert-the-Second:
The way the DPS guys recall the event seems to suggest that the relevant ranch was the Helms Ranch, no?
Specifically: The DPS Report (25 pages) includes statements from all three of the guys on the DPS helicopter that found the deployment site (the pilot, Medic Eric Tarr, and Medic Main). As I recall, all three men indicated in their statements that they were flying around, looking along the ridge line where the pilot had seen Marsh in the morning that day and because it was too smokey and hot to fly down into the valley. They flew over the pump packs, found nothing, and then tried to fly in the valley, but there was too much smoke. As the smoke started to lessen or at least clear in part, Eric Tarr caught a glimpse through the smoke of the Helms Ranch, which triggered him to remember a GM radio transmission indicating that they were now heading toward a ranch. Based on this recollection from Tarr, the pilot began flying a line that lined up with the Helms Ranch, whereupon the deployment site was located relatively quickly.
Now, it could be that there is another ranch out there that lines up nicely with the deployment site and that Tarr and the pilot just got lucky by lining up to fly a path that directed towards the Helms Ranch, but that would be a big coincidence, no? Or am I misunderstanding the ranch that you are referencing? I wish I had visited the area, as it sounds like you did.
Again, this wasn’t just Tarr’s story of how they went from blindly searching for the deployment site to finally finding it – this story was corroborated.
Reply to Elizabeth post on December 26, 2013 at 2:50 pm
>> Elizabeth asked…
>>
>> Now, it could be that there is another ranch out there
>> that lines up nicely with the deployment site and that Tarr
>> and the pilot just got lucky by lining up to fly a path that
>> directed towards the Helms Ranch, but that would be a
>> big coincidence, no?
If you consider the fact that the only reason they were
airborne is because everyone heard those final transmissions
from Marsh, then everyone heard Marsh ‘Affirm’ to ASM2
that they were on the ‘south side of the fire’. That was the
final act of his life, actually.
So in that context of looking where the ‘south side of the fire’
was at the time Marsh sent his ‘Affirm’… there is only ONE
place in that area that could have even been identified as a
bona-fide ‘ranch’… and that was the Boulder Springs Ranch
( known to the the locals as the Helms’ place ).
Farther north… towards Peeples Valley… there were a number
of cattle pens and clearings with some water towers and
other small buildings that COULD be ‘mistaken’ for a ‘ranch’…
…but in that ‘south part of the area’ there was only one
place that would fit that description. The place they were going.
Bravo 33 asks…. So, you are on the South side of the fire then? He is either very perceptive or he had already been advised of GM, DIVA or both GM and DIVA location prior to this statement. Also, at the beginning of the video released by Wildfire Today (final radio transmissions), ASM2 is in mid conversation about dropping retardant in the valley with all the smoke. It appears to me that ASM2 is already aware GM/ DIVA are in trouble.
P9 Yarnell Interview notes with BR says….Brian thought GM would come down the same rd him and Trew went on. B & T went to the rd travis calls and says the winds are in my face the fire is right there so they flip around. Crew heads to buggies drive out to the hwy.
Elizabeth, are there more interview notes from BR in your information that might put this statement in a better context. By better, I mean, is there any explanation for this statement? Is there another way to interpret what is being conveyed above. The BR movement video (I assume specifically Frisby?) does not show any road to the north being traveled/scouted. (my observation anyway)
Calvin – let me go back and look at that video again. There are no further interview materials. The only thing that has interview-type information is the DPS report (25 pages) and an e-mail exchange between the investigators and Joy/Sonny. What makes the situation more confusing, in my mind, is that the maps provided by the investigators and the interviews do not always use the same names (which are confusing themselves) to refer to the same venues – two-track, jeep trail, dirt road…..
Ok – I watched the video again, and it is hard to tell. As you go from the GM buggy parking toward the Lookout spot, it is possible NOT to turn toward the Lookout spot but instead keep going straight (if that makes sense – the BR video has no true north indicated). Maybe that is north. It looks like BR goes out that way a bit, but then turns around and comes back. I tried to post the BR video to YouTube, but it tells me that it is not in a format appropriate for YouTube. It looks like it is a Garmin GPS thing, maybe. Does anyone have a clue how to post such a thing to YouTube? Is that how you saw it, Calvin? Was I successful in getting in on YouTube in a view-able form? I did not think that I was, but I would like to share this video with everyone, while John Dougherty works on posting his materials. Watching what the BR guys are doing (in terms of watching the GPS make a map of their activities) is helpful.
I was able to see it a couple of times, but now it says SORRY, private.
I will try to UNDO that so that you can watch it again. (I’m not sure what I did that I now need to undo, but I will try, bless my technology-impaired-heart….)
I call them “weasal words.”
And regarding the “‘total fiction’ in the SAIR” comment, just go back to my former comments regarding the SAIT process of “establishing a conclusion FIRST and THEN finding the “FACTS” to fit the predetermined, foregone conclusion. This includes selective interviews and the like as well. If it matches the “storyline” then they’ll use it and if not it’s not included.
Yep. There is also the carefully crafted ‘semantics’ issue that
we see throughout the SAIR in order to ‘justify the story’.
Example: They carefully insert ‘modifiers’ like ‘verify’
and ‘almost’ in their claim of ‘blackout period of over 30 minutes’.
Page 1 of the SAIR says…
“There is a gap of over 30 minutes in the information available
for the Granite Mountain IHC. From 1604 until 1637, the Team
cannot VERIFY communications from the crew, and we have
ALMOST no direct information for them.”
So the impression they want to make ( and which was fully
adopted my the MainStream Media )… is that absolutely
NOTHING was heard to/from GM between the MacKenzie
video and Marsh’s “That’s where we want retardant”
unsolicited transmission at 1637, 2 minutes before the
first MAYDAY from Steed.
** Cannot VERIFY communications?
That doesn’t mean they didn’t have them, or evidence of them.
That semantic just means they set some criteria of the their
own for considering including them in ‘the story’ ( narrative ).
Maybe they were using the ‘more than one source’ criteria
and threw out anything that someone else didn’t hear, too.
They may have put McDonough himself in this category.
He MAY have actually told them some other things he
heard during the ‘discussing their options’ intra-crew chat,
but if McDonough was totally alone at the time ( just sitting
in the GM Supervisor truck ) when he heard those things,
and no one else is alive to ‘verify’ hearing the same thing(s)…
maybe they threw those things into their ‘cannot VERIFY’
category no matter how pertinent they might have been.
** ALMOST no direct information?
What the heck does THAT mean?
Having ALMOST no direct information is most certainly NOT
the same as just saying “We have no direct information”.
It means they probably DO have some ( direct information )…
but they ALSO have some criteria set of their own that is
allowing them to ‘exclude’ what they have.
There is also the curious ‘direct’ semantic.
Do they have ‘indirect’ information?
What was their criteria for ‘direct’ versus ‘indirect’ information?
Having “ALMOST no information” is right up there with
instead of Darrell Willis saying “I was not involved with
what they (GM) were doing”… he played the semantic
game himself and said…
“I was not REALLY involved with what they were doing”.
It’s called ‘wiggle room’.
I’m going to stand by what these guys said regarding “a ranch they had in sight” radio transmission since several of the BRHS and misc. overhead (former HS) all heard this June 30th transmission directly that day AND from the perfectly good SZ pointed it out to me. Moreover, Musser told me “about 1630” Marsh transmitted on the radio that he/they were “taking their predetermined route.”
Reply to RTS on December 26, 2013 at 10:03 am
There is NO DOUBT that some of those cattle-pens and
other groups of buildings out there in the distance to the
north/northeast between where they were ( and the Double
Bar AA Ranch itself WAAAAY off in the distance ) must
have LOOKED like ‘ranches’…
…but remember that the entire story about ANYONE thinking
that is what Marsh meant is all based on one single ‘thought’
that the SAIR says Brian Frisby (supposedly) had… yet there
is (still) no documentation or proof that he ever actually HAD
that ‘thought’ at all.
Page 9 of the Yarnell Investigation Notes ( YIN ) from
their interview with BRHS ( Frisby, Brown, Fueller, Ball )
only says this…
>> Eric says “picking our way through the black to the rd in the
>> bottom out towards the ranch” Brian thinks he meant towards
>> the 2 track. To confirm Brian says, “the rd we came on w/
>> the ranger…affirm.”
So BRHS does recall HEARING Eric say ‘towards the ranch’,
but there is nothing there about any of them thinking much
about that, or thinking it was any particular ranch in any
particular direction. According to Brian himself, that moment
was simply all about trying to confirm what ROAD Eric
was talking about ( as in… the same one Frisby and Brown
took when they came up for the face-to-face meeting ).
It was only when the SAIR came out that suddenly there
are all kinds of other ‘thoughts’ being put into Brian Frisby’s
head regarding that statement and that moment.
On page 24 of the SAIR the same moment described
by BRHS in their interview has magically turned into this…
>> DIVS A says, “I want to pass on that we’re going to make
>> our way to our escape route.” BR Supt attempts to clarify,
>> “You guys are in the black, correct?” DIVS A responds,
>> “Yeah, we’re picking our way through the black.” DIVS A
>> then mentions a road in the bottom and “going out toward
>> the ranch.” BR Supt thinks DIVS A is talking about heading
>> northeast, through the black, to one of the ranches in that
>> direction. BR Supt says, “DIVS A, to confirm, you’re talking
>> about the road you saw me on with the UTV earlier, in the
>> bottom.” DIVS A replies, “Yes, the road I saw you on with the
>> Ranger [the UTV].”
Pretty close… but notice the entire ‘thought’ on the part of
Brian Frisby that the author of the SAIR narrative chose to
INSERT into his head and this accounting of that conversation…
>> BR Supt thinks DIVS A is talking about heading northeast,
>> through the black, to one of the ranches in that direction.
Brian Frisby never said he had any such thought.
If he did… there is no documentation of it in his interview notes.
The ADOSH report also ‘caught this’ and they do not insert
the same ‘thoughts’ into Brian Frisby’s head at that moment.
Page 19 of the ADOSH doesn’t ‘assume’ any thoughts on the
part of Brian Frisby and pretty much just reproduced the
same interview notes from BRHS at that point in their own
timeline of events with no one having any ‘thoughts’ about
any ‘ranch to the northeast’.
So that’s where this entire “Someone thought they were headed
to a ranch to the northeast” story got started. It was simply a
thought being reported by the SAIR on the part of Brian Frisby
that he never (actually) said he had.
Having ‘other people’ think that Marsh meant ‘some other ranch
to the northeast’ simply fit the ‘story’ the SAIT had already
decided to tell better… and provided some ‘wiggle room’ for
all the confusion at the command level about which ‘ranch’
Marsh was talking about or why everyone might have been
so confused about where they REALLY were (going)… so
they went with that little piece of ‘fiction’.
Elisabeth,
By the way that the DPS narrative that you posted on 12/25 reads, my gut feeling is that in all of the chaos and confusion, the person being interviewed might have gotten his facts jumbled-up a bit. Granted, the SAIR doesn’t help matters any, by not asking the obvious questions that should accompany such a narrative description.
Here’s why I think that confusion extends onto the narrative:
The narrative, prior to the emergency, leaves the reader to believe that GM was just making random comments over the air, without specifically talking directly to someone. Everyone who has ever worked in a fire situation knows that you are not heard on the radio until someone else acknowledges that they heard you. The narrative states that GM did this at least twice, both times when they were not in any kind of emergency situation. If indeed, they were talking specifically to someone else, DPS DIDN’T relate that half of the conversation.
Also, the statements attributed to GM in the narrative, sound suspiciously like a jumbled-up compilation of statements that were actually made over the air, to different people at various times during that last crucial hour (to BR, Able, & AA).
The assignment of a DPS Ranger to a wildland incident, for use as medical, recon, or other utility resource is a relatively new thing. I suspect that they were monitoring the fire radio traffic with a BK radio (not their usual radio brand), and were probably scaning all of the active divisions (DIV A & Structure Groups) as well as A/G. Some of the radio traffic described in the narrative could have been heard as a “scan”, and just perceived to have been on A/G.
As with everything else, much of this portion of the truth, could be determined with a few follow-up questions to the principles that are still with us today,
Elizabeth, My apologies for mis-spelling your name in the above comment!
TTWARE:
Are you suggesting that Eric Tarr (the DPS Medic, whose statement in the DPS report is the statement from which I am quoting above) mis-remembered what he actually overheard on the radio? (I am just asking to clarify – I’m not sure if I missed your point in your post, and I do not want to do that!)
Elizabeth, yes I am suggesting that is a possiblity. Let’s remember, he had little, if any, wildand experience (relevence to terminology, etc.), and later, he was the one that found and pronounced the 19 (a gut-wrenching and mind-numbing experience for anyone).
Also, his narrative report is very vague as to actual events, only gives one side of all the conversations, AND COMPLETELY LEAVES OUT the parts where ASM DID respond and what was said with Able, ASM, and GM’s responses.
I am confident that under normal circumstances, that Eric Tarr would be very concise and accurate in his narrative documentation. But, with the events that occured that day, and him not realizing the the importance of what seemed to be initially benign radio traffic, I think he might have gotten the sequence and information jumbled a bit.
Let’s also remember, that he is the ONLY one reporting hearing that information, in that sequence, at THAT time.
TTWARE: Thank you for clarifying. Allow me to state the following, not to argue with you, but, rather, just to give you more information. You might be 100% correct, but I just want to share with you what I am seeing:
1. Last night, as I was re-re-reading the DPS report, I very much began to feel that it had been either edited before it was finalized or that the person actually typing it had been given the typical bad-lawyer advice about how to sanitize these things. I say this with no blame on Tarr, but, rather, so that you appreciate my sense about how it read. It had really detailed factual information, of the sort I have to imagine an emergency personnel employee would relate, but the phrasing here and there set off my radar. For example, based on the way that it reads, I suspect that Tarr HAD names that he could have injected. Just FYI.
2. There are THREE witness reports that are part of the 25 page DPS report. The pilot of the Ranger (helicopter?) that was carrying Medic Eric Tarr also gave a statement as did Medic Main, who was also on the flight that found the deployment site. As I recall either one or BOTH of the other two witness statements note that Tarr heard (or claimed from the very beginning to have heard, anyway) these specific transmissions about the location of the GM crew that the OTHER two DPS fellows (the pilot and Medic Main) did NOT hear because they were sitting together in the truck while Tarr was a short distance away near a different radio/communication system. (I might have the facts wrong – Tarr might have been in the truck and the other two were elsewhere – but the gist is the same – the two men did not hear the transmissions b/c they were away from Tarr, but their witness statements very SPECIFICALLY corroborated that Tarr had ALWAYS held a consistent position about what he heard.)
3. The helicopter launched to look for the deployment site at roughly 5:13 (don’t quote me on the exact time – the DPS report is not in front of me), but the deployment site was not found until roughly 6:16 p.m. (again, roughly!) *BECAUSE* it was too smokey to see well and nobody had the exact location of the men. The pilot first looked where he had seen Marsh back in the a.m., then they flew to where the packs were left, THEN, as the smoke in the valley cleared a tiny bit, they started to get into the valley, WHEREUPON Eric Tarr saw a glimpse of the Helms Ranch and *remembered* hearing the GM crew say in their transmission that they were heading toward a ranch, so he had the pilot LINE UP with the ranch and start to fly toward it in the valley, whereupon they flew over the deployment site. My point: Tarr had to have remembered at least PART of the transmissions with spot-on accuracy or it would have been a big fluke that lining up with the Helms Ranch caused them to fly a trajectory that relatively quickly found the deployment site. Again, their search from the air was bootless UNTIL Tarr spotted the Helms Ranch and the pilot got in line with it. I am pretty sure that either two out of the three or THREE out of the three DPS witness statement corroborate this. So Tarr had to be right on the money in remembering at least part of this (if not everything he says he heard).
Again, I am not trying to say that you are wrong. You might be right, 100%. I just want you to have more information or brainstorming.
Elizabeth, Thanks for the additional info. I am always open to new information and ideas. Even if the other two from DPS heard Tarr relate his “hearing about the ranch” earlier (let’s assume they did), it doesn’t negate the possiblity that his timeline for radio transmissions could be jumbled.
And the ranch they are referring to could very well be the very same one (only 2-3 buildings) pointed out to me across the basin from their perfectly good SZ toward Peebles Valley (“advising that they were heading to a ranch they had in sight”) as they all heard it directly on their radios that day).
Very possible… but not in the ‘about 1630’ timeframe.
According to the SAIR… they were already down in the
box canyon headed to the ‘bomb-proof ranch’ ( Boulder
Springs Ranch ) at that time.
I have a feeling that the ‘about 1630’ timeframe on these
newly reported transmissions just has to be ‘way off’…
like maybe by 15 or 20 minutes.
Not like DPS professionals to be THAT wrong on timeframes,
however. They are usually pretty good about stuff like that.
Cutting and pasting the exact language that I reference in my above post, which strikes me as useful in its detail, it reads:
Around 1630 hours I was standing near the aircraft monitoring traffic on channel A/G 16 when I heard a voice come up on the radio with a Call sign of Granite Mountain 7. He advised on the radio that they were moving towards Yarnell in the black. A short time later he came back up on the radio advising that they were heading to a ranch they had in sight.
It was shortly after that Granite Mountain 7 came back up on the radio sounding excited, out of breath, and repeatedly clearing Air Attack with no response. [the exchange advising that they were deploying then ensued. – Eliz.]
Reply to Elizabeth post on December 25, 2013 at 7:59 pm
Thanks, Elizabeth!
Again… we just continue to find out there was more and more
evidence and detail available to the Arizona Forestry’s SAIT
investigators that was never mentioned, or ( evidently ) ever
taken into account in their ‘official’ report.
This one new piece of testimony alone ( like a lot of things )
almost raises more questions than it answers.
The ‘about 1630’ time reference itself being reported here
for this first “we are moving towards Yarnell” transmission
would be quite controversial all by itself.
That is 10 minutes AFTER the SAIR says the men had
already left the two-track road and were descending into
the box canyon… and just 9 minutes before we would
hear the first “we are in front of the flaming front” MAYDAY
call ( from Captain Jesse Steed ).
There was NO black where they were hiking as soon as
they left the anchor point area circa 1605 ( 4:05 PM, according
to the SAIR ) and started hiking south… so that part of the
statement along, in that timeframe, would be totally mysterious.
And that’s just the first ‘overheard’ transmission.
The others are then couched with just ‘short time later’
and ‘shortly after that’ with no good indication of exact
time elapsed for either one.
If they really did hear them say “…a ranch they had in sight”,
that tranmission MUST have taken place at or about the
time they left the two-track road itself… but if that was
any later than 1629… not only would they have been able
to SEE the fire coming around the northern side of the
canyon ridge from their high vantage point… they would
NOT have even had time to even get all the way down
to the (eventual) deployment site in that kind of timeframe.
Also… why they would be making these generic
“announcements” over Channel 16 would be a new
complete mystery unto itself.
Were these “announcements” intended for OPS and they
were accidentally transmitting on the wrong channel?… or
did they really intend for Air Attack to ‘watch them’ and they
already assumed they knew where they were, and what
they were talking about? ( As in… actually TRYING to
re-establish the ‘L’ of LCES and have ‘Lookouts’ in place? ).
Did they ever receive any “Copy that” responses to any
of these “announcements”… or did they just assume
everyone on the radio network heard/understood?
The people reporting these transmissions don’t seem to say.
More mysteries.
Speaking of ‘more mysteries’… I have examined the video
that was released by AZREPUBLIC last week of the final
radio transmissions closely for any DIRECT, in-video
‘timestamp’ evidence.
There is a moment in the video when the camera captures
some electronic devices and dashboard panel displays in
the truck as the helmet-cam operator leaves the scene.
There is what looks like a Garmin GPS unit sitting on the
dashboard with the typical green-folder bars at the top. There
are a few frames in the video where the Garmin screen is in full
view both directly and ‘reflected’ in the windshield above…
and there appears to be a TIME being displayed on the
device but, unfortunately, even with enahancement on those
video frames… the time being shown is too blurry to be
sure about. Maybe the original (raw) video is sharper than
the ‘edited copy’ released by AZREPUBLIC. I hope so.
The camera then pans down to the dashboard of the truck
for a moment and there are some lighted instrument panels
being displayed. One of them looks like it is also showing
a TIME value on the dashboard… but video enhancement
on that frame only reveals it is an ESI ( Engine Status Indicator )
panel that is simply saying “Low Tire Pressure” in bright
blue letters.
So, unfortunately, there doesn’t seem to be any independent
TIME verification visuals in this video. Close… but no cigar.
Is there anything in the FOIA/FOIL package that says where
they actually are getting the TIME stamps we have seen
for this video in the “transcripts” that are associated with it?
There is still up to a 6 minute discrepancy between those
reported times and the ‘final transmissions’ from Granite
Mountain… and that needs to be resolved somehow.
And now there is this discovery of yours.
The entire timeframe from when they left the ‘safe black’
and when they ‘deployed’ probably needs a TOTAL review.
The transmissions you report now also makes absolute
mincemeat of the SAIR’s fundamental claim that “no
transmissions were received from GM for a 37 minute
blackout period”. How they could have had even this
testimony in their possession and still gone ahead with
that ‘total fiction’ in the SAIR is simply beyond me.
Here’s an interesting tidbit from the medics report released with the FOIA/FOIL materials:
The DPS folks heard GM FIRST state that they were heading to Yarnell, and then, later, state that they were heading to the Helms Ranch. These are not direct quotes, but my point is that the DPS folks were clear that GM had first committed to Yarnell, and, then, committed to the Ranch. So these guys were not “hunkering down” in the black, nor were they ambiguously taking some escape route. They were going somewhere specific, and their plan clearly changed, from one very specific place to another.
Elizabeth, thank you for all your efforts on this tragic event. Can I get your email address for additional correspondence?
The e-mail address to use is elizabeth re yarnell which is a gmail account. Take out all of the spaces in “elizabeth re yarnell” before you add @gmail.com at the end of it.
next week on Dec 30th we will be on the Weather Channel. We do not have a time just a date. Let you know more when we know—Shawn did an excellent follow-up yet we were frozen that hike. Brrr…sticker! Merry Christmas Y’all!
Unfortunately Sonny, being North of the 49th, we do not get the Weather Channel… If you can, post a link… Merry X-Mas….
Its a good time to take a break and see what the new year brings. MARRY CHRISTMAS TO ALL. Especially the families of those that lost loved ones to wild land fire. I remember my first Christmas with out my dad to this day, but I also have great memories of those years he was with me. My prayers are with the Granet Mountian Hot Shot families may they find peace.
Well folks, its Christmas eve day. Even though these discussions are extremely important to learn the reasons for 19 young men to perish in a terrible incident. I am pretty sure the families of the victims appreciate the desire and energy to help on these threads.
I will be taking a “time out” myself from the discussions for a few days, to dedicate time to spend precious time with friends and relatives. This incident, especially for the WFF on this board, points out how quickly and tragically things can change, and the opportunity to be with friends and relatives, can be gone forever.
To the families of the lost- Hopes and prayers, as you struggle with your loss of your loved ones, at the most family oriented time of the year. You and your lost loved ones will be in our thoughts, we just have to take a quick break to spend precious times with our families…
To everyone else- Take a break to appreciate how much you and your family mean to each other, and realize that in the nature of our business, situations change extremely quickly, with potentially devestating results.
Merry X-Mas to all, or whatever you celebrate in your particular faith, enjoy friends, families, good times, great food and precious memories.
Mike….
I tried to post this on December 21, but it never made it through “moderation”. It was in response to WTKTT’s description of the photo of the deployment site:
You don’t know me from a hole in the wall, but I’ve been following these threads closely for various reasons (including I went to Prescott College and I photograph climate change stuff in Albuquerque). I’m a semi-professional photographer who uses a Canon T3i, and, before I moved into Rebel DSLRs, used higher-end Canon Powershots.. If you start w/the radio they’re looking at and follow straight right to the end of the shelter, I would bet big money you will see a Canon Powershot.
Reply to Marti Reed on December 24, 2013 at 6:18 am.
I believe you are 100 percent right.
That is most probably Christopher MacKenzie’s
Canon Powershot that would eventually yield all the
crucial still photographs and the video we have all seen.
Just to be clear… we are talking about the black object at the
end of that shelter that also appears to be surrounded by some
kind of ‘circular metal flange’ that is mostly white, has a
notch in it, and is basically ‘bent’ on the bottom side?
SIDENOTE: Does anyone know what that ‘circular white
metal flange’ thing really is/was?
Followup: If that really is Christopher MacKenzie’s
Canon Powershot just lying on the ground there… then
that would explain why it was apparently NEVER
entered into evidence by the YCSO police investigators.
The photograph we are talking about was taken during
the FIRST VISIT by Brad Mayhew and the other SAIT
investigators at the deployment site.
Everything we see in these photographs are things
that the YCSO investigators purposely decided to
LEAVE there for the SAIT investigators.
YCSO had already combed the site looking for
cell/smartphones and had already removed those
and entered them into evidence.
They DECIDED to leave backpacks, tools, radios
and everything else for the Arizona Forestry SAIT
people to ‘find’ and deal with.
So either the YCSO police investigators did not
recognize that object as a ‘camera’… or they DID,
but still decided it was ‘personal property’ like
the backpacks and radios and weren’t interested in it.
I would find that a little hard to believe… but it’s possible.
NOTE: Shortly after this photo was taken… Brad
Mayhew himself asked the YCSO investigators who
where there with them to take away the ‘radios’ and
the ‘loose shelters’ since Mayhew didn’t have any
‘clean’ way to collect them for later inspection… and
the YCSO investigators said that they did that…
…but there was still no mention of any camera.
If it still remained there… then it was only removed
when Prescott Fire Department was allowed to
remove the backpacks and tools and everything
that was left after YCSO and SAIT were ‘done’.
The FOIA/FOIL request has a bunch of YCSO photos that show at least two different camera/phones. Is there an easy way for me to upload those photos so that you can look at them? (There are 100 from the Sheriff alone, and I would prefer not to just throw them out there (although John Dougherty might, since he is “media” and I am not)).)
There appears to be anther phone or camera just a few feet to the right of the camera being discussed above. This phone/camera is on the immediate left of the BK with the broken antenna.
Are you both referencing the circular object located in the center of the flange?
Yes… except I am not immediately seeing
the ‘second’ camera that Calvin is
reporting just out to the right of the first
one, near the BK with the broken antenna.
What I AM seeing right in that location, however,
is definitely a relatively undamaged
smartphone lying on its face. It is NOT an
iPhone. Looks like a standard Android
based phone like a Galaxy or a Motorola
Droid. It’s black… and you can still see
the camera flash cover plastic ( unmelted )
on the back and some mini-USB ports
on the side of it.
I think Elizabeth has already told us that
there are a LOT more pictures like this
available, some with close-ups, so I think
we’ll just have to be patient and wait to
see what Mr. Dougherty is able to make
available. I don’t think it’s fair to overload
Elizabeth with email requests at this point.
WTKTT… I wasn’t sure if it was a phone or a camera, thanks. Remember the picture that is in the Mackenzie photo (0885 6 or 7) and again in the WFAR. It shows Ashcraft and another hotshot with Ashcraft taking a picture: how does the phone Ashcraft has compare to the one in the DZ picture? Also, the Mackenzie photo was once again time stamped 1552 in the WFAR, remember how you thought the SAIT just changed the time? WTH? WAFR just changed the time too!
NOTE: This is simply a ‘carry forward’ of the last comment
from the previous “Chapter 2′ of this ongoing discussion.
On December 23, 2013 at 1:50 pm… Elizabeth said:
>> “Could the GM crew have turned around and RAN when they realized the
>> fire was around the corner?” I have a picture from the investigation files
>> showing that there is no way they would have made it back up the hill to
>> the ridgeline if they had tried to turn and run.. The picture shows how TINY
>> the investigators look in the bottom of that valley. Even WITHOUT vegetation,
>> it looks too steep to get out quickly. (Of course, I am not an expert, so …
>> what do I know. But that is my view.)
>> If you become a “Facebook friend” of mine, you can see the photo posted
>> on Facebook. I will try to find a better way to share that picture here.
On December 23, 2013 at 9:59 pm Elizabeth also said…
>> Sonny/Joy sent me an e-mail after I posted this comment and they advised
>> that it took the OSHA fellow (who was a serious runner) twenty minutes
>> to cover the ground on the hill (without the vegetation being there) when
>> he hiked that area with Joy/Sonny after the fire which suggests that the
>> GM crew had no chance of turning around and running.
Reply to Elizabeth post on Dec 23, 2013 at 9:59 pm
>> Elizabeth said…
>> Sonny/Joy sent me an e-mail after I posted this
>> comment and they advised that it took the OSHA
>> fellow (who was a serious runner) twenty minutes
>> to cover the ground on the hill (without the vegetation
>> being there) when he hiked that area with Joy/Sonny
>> after the fire
Sonny (Tex) Gilligan reported the same OSHA
timed ‘test walk’ event in public back on September 29,
2013, the day after the SAIR report was released… but
in that original description of the event he put a time
of 22 minutes on the OSHA fella’s walk… not 20.
The OSHA ‘runner’ was Brett Steuter.
Here is Tex’s original description of this ‘test walk’…
WildFire Today
Article Title: Yarnell Hill Fire report released
http://wildfiretoday.com/2013/09/28/yarnell-hill-fire-report-released/
>> Tex Gilligan on September 29, 2013 at 6:52 pm said:
>>
>> By the way, OSHA actually timed the walk in the black
>> with us from the saddle where they dropped down to
>> the spot of demise.
>>
>> It took a Marathon Runner Brett Steuter 22 minutes
>> just to get to the spot they perished. That was with no
>> manzanita to fight.
>>
>> Joy took 33 minutes, and I was just ahead of Brett by
>> a couple minutes. Joy was with Bruce Hanna the other
>> OSHA official. Bruce fell and that was easy to do
>> since that grade was above 60%.
So if Brett took 22 minutes, and Tex was (quote)
“just ahead of Brett by a couple minutes”… that would
mean Tex himself is the one that made the trip in 20
minutes that day, not Brett.
If the SAIR times are correct for when GM left the
two-track road ( 4:20 PM ) and when the first
“We are in front of the flaming front” message went
out at 4:39 PM… that would mean the single-file line
of 19 men ( with equipment and packs ) made the
same ‘walk down’ in just 19 minutes… WITH
vegetation to fight.
That’s 1 minute FASTER than Tex… and 3 minutes
faster than Brett Steuter who had no equipment, no
packs, and no vegetation to contend with at all.
Hmm… something isn’t quite right there somewhere.
Either the times being given in the SAIR for the
descent are ‘complete fiction’… or there was
something wonky with the OSHA ‘test walk’.
The OSHA people just did a ‘test walk’ down from
the two-track and were (apparently) not trying to
be ‘on the double’ or anything.
What would have been REALLY interesting is if
Brett ( the runner ) had then turned around at the
deployment site and then timed himself absolutely
HAULING ASS back up to his starting point as
if his very life depended on it. FULL adrenaline.
I wonder what the timing would have been on that?
Sans vegetation, yes… but still would be interesting
to know.
John, thank you for uploading. I have just this morning received the bulk of the FOILA/FOIL information. It helps clarify a few things – such as incorrect times and such, which we all (particularly Wtktt and Calvin, it seems) spotted. If I can be of use to uploading, please let me know. I, quite frankly, was glad to see that you yourself are doing it. I am at a loss on how to do it – physically. Plus, I am concerned about privacy, given the letter from Scott Hunt that came with the materials.
Elizabeth… without risk of violating the ‘privacy of the privacy
letter’ from Hunt… can you give any kind of description of
the limits it is trying to impose on the information obtained
via FOIA/FOIL request(s)?
I can absolutely appreciate privacy concerns. At the same time, material in any form that is required by law to be disclosed under a FOIL act request, is perfectly legal to share. If the information was of a truly sensitive nature, they would not release it (deny request) or would provide redaction obscuring the sensitive “areas” of the document. There are provisions in the law which government can evoke and withhold some or all of the requested materials due to this type of situation.
I have no desire to intrude on the privacy or personal lives of the fallen firefighter’s, there families or anyone involved on the Yarnell Hill incident for that matter. However the obvious discrepancies in the official reports as well as the numerous other information sources has raised the concerns of the fire community and beyond to seek the exact truth of the events of that day. This is one of the reasons the FOIL law was enacted. Checks and Balances between public and government.
Thank you, Elizabeth.
I think what I was asking, though, is that even though
everything you say is known to anyone familiar with
FOIA/FOIL requests…
…I was still wondering what Mr. Hunt was saying in
HIS letter. Was HE trying to impose any artificial
and/or unsupported ‘limits’ on the distribution of the
information?
Correction: Thank you, Eric ( for response above ).