Please begin Chapter IX that is posted at the top of the home page and the Yarnell Hill page. Thanks to everyone for continuing to analyze the Yarnell Hill Fire.
Chapter I, Chapter II, Chapter II supplement, Chapter III, Chapter IV, Chapter V, Chapter VI and Chapter VII.
© Copyright 2014 John Dougherty, All rights Reserved. Written For: Investigative MEDIA
I have not seen much said about two quads that we were told by a reliable source that had been photographed and time stamped at a time shortly before the lighting strike. These were long distance photos according to our source and one individual can be made out to be holding some sort of tool. The quads were of yellow and white like the yellow and white copter we saw on the 30th but Ted says that does not necessarily relate them to that copter. Those fellows, whoever they were must have remained there into the night since one of the local people had informed us that there were lights moving around up there where the fire started Friday night. Joy tells me that another person has a video and other witnesses know of those quads up there. They have plenty of explaining to do if they become identified.
Sadly the lady that told us about the lights died just a few weeks ago. Yarnell has been loosing residents at the rate of about two a month since the fire. I don’t have statistics before the fire but I can assure you many of these are due to the stress of loss–we can name at least one suicide and another attempted suicide due to the circumstances of the fire.
In solid numbers, Joy has discovered 29 deaths since the fire from Glen Islah and Peoples Valley and she has yet to count those from Yarnell proper. There just are not that many people living here and we see a toll of deaths that seems way out of proportion to what ought to be. It looks like that 19 number is going to be surpassed with civilian casualties directly related to this fire.
Personally I believe that settlement will be done as quietly as possible–What will be learned and could be learned might have a gap and would have been a huge one if such people as Norwicki, Putman, Powers, Dougherty, MacLean, and Ashcrofts had not stepped out to get at the truth of matters. I know I have missed many and another I give much credit to is Joy Collura, my hiking companion. I asked her to run for Sheriff of this county–she is so good at investigating and finding evidence.
More will be revealed and neither of us will hold back. Mucho thanks to all you who do what is right in this investigation. As that mayor told me, :”Common sense goes a long ways”.So I say telling the truth in this matter is paramount–those withholding or determining to keep facts from the loved ones are doing an injustice.
I see that John has created a Chapter IX after I made some comments here so I guess we need to switch to the new one.
Marti—I am having a hard time with Calculated Risk.
That was never in my vocabulary or those I worked with or was trained by.
21st century should not change safety. Define calculated risk as it refers to Fire Fighting.
Not Posting a Look Out?
Not Having Escape Routes and Scouted SZ
Not Having Communications with Immediate Supervisors and Adjoining forces?
Not providing for safety First?
No information on Fire weather and forecasts?
No information on Current and expected Fire behavior?
Build indirect line without a plan?
Build line without an anchor point?
Build line down hill with a fire below you?
Terrain and fuels Make escape to safety zones difficult?
Frontal attack on a fire in extreme burning conditions?
I could go on but I think by now you have noticed the 10 and 18 here.
If you are taking a calculated risk you are not following proven safety rules.
So lets be clear Taking a planed strategy providing for the safety to accomplish the missions different than A calculated risk with out a plan.
Yes Fire fighting is a dangerous occupation but it can be done safely with a good safety plan in place.
So what some Fire Fighters are saying to day is absolutely out side of a safe way to fight fires.
Because of the drought conditions and fire spread they should be using the best safety practices known which means the 10 should be rules that should never be broken..
These 21st century fire fighters can fight fire and follow the 10 every body before them did and we built line and controlled fires over and over. You change the tactic and eliminate the risk not just take the risk. Pure and simple GM took a risk with out a plan, with out an evaluation of situational awareness. The Fire shelters had nothing to do with their deaths. Failure to follow safety guide lines put the in a deployment situation. That cost there lives. Back to the old and true safety No LCES– No Lookout, no communications with people who could have been there eyes, no scouted Marked and prepared escape route, also the safety zone was just to far in a extreme situation.
Failure to recognize the black as the best and only place to be walk across it and down and out thru it have a safe plan and use it.
A classic example of a calculated risk and the out come. We can beat the fire before it gets to the ranch. No other plan were Hot Shots and we take chances all the time those old fire fighters are hillbillies old and out dated safety doesn’t work in this modern age. Not much more than I can say with 19 dead men. A prayer and a hope some thing changes and we are not building more memorials with the epitaph (they did not follow the rules) Risk taking is unacceptable.
I would also add if you didn’t follow a rule and people were injured or died you are not immune to blame no matter what the rule, and the lawsuits that follow will identify you failure at what ever level in the organization. Giving lip service to the rules is like saying they are only guide lines written in the sand no longer necessary.
Mr. Powers… BOTH of your comments above are absolutely ‘spot on’.
That’s an AMAZING evaluation and ‘body of advice’ you just posted.
To actually CHOOSE to take ‘calculated risks’ when there are other SAFE choices to be made is the essence of irresponsibility and negligence… in ANY profession… and when people end up injured or killed because of YOUR ‘calculated risks’… then your own death will only be the beginning of the shit hitting the fan.
Remember Brendan TOLD ADOSH investigators he was basically ‘taught’ ( by Eric Marsh? ) that the nature of the ‘job’ was “Risk a lot… save a lot”.
That is absolute BULLSHIT.
That’s just more ‘creeping normalcy’ and “We love being Ranger Danger’ crap.
“It’s better to be a live hillbilly than a dead smart guy”.
Fight Fire. Do it SAFELY. Go home.
To not go home at all or go home injured is FAILURE… not SUCCESS.
Do not FAIL.
You Have told me you worked in an industry that had a lot of risks as well but I bet there were a lot of safety rules that went with your job to help you go home safely and get to a safe and enjoyable retirement.
What would you say to people telling you that your rules were just guide lines and you could take calculated risks to accomplish the job.
Its a long way down from the top of a building. because some one didn’t think they needed a safety harness.
Reply to Bob Powers post September 9, 2014 at 12:46 pm
>> Mr. Powers said…
>>
>> You Have told me you worked in an industry that had
>> a lot of risks as well but I bet there were a lot of safety
>> rules that went with your job to help you go home safely
>> and get to a safe and enjoyable retirement.
My turn to say “You probably have no idea”.
We are talking about an industry that is DIRECTLY answerable to BOTH Federal and State level Occupational Safety and Hazard agencies and has been for DECADES.
In all your time working fires… did you ever have an actual OSHA person just SHOW UP unannounced for an ‘inspection’ who also has the authority to ‘shut you down’ right away if he/she doesn’t like something he/she is seeing?
EVERYTHING has to be tickety-boo… EVERY HOUR of EVERY DAY.
No excuses.
>> Mr. Powers also said
>>
>> What would you say to people telling you that your rules
>> were just guide lines and you could take calculated risks to
>> accomplish the job.
Me, personally?
Well.. it would depend who was saying it to me.
If it was someone who didn’t understand the construction business… I wouldn’t say anything at all because it was coming from someone who didn’t understand the construction business and didn’t know that what they were suggesting was absurd. The RULES are NEVER just GUiDELINES. They are RULES. ( See above about being directly answerable to OSHA… at any moment… any day… any time ).
If it was someone I was working WITH… I would first tell him he is full of shit and if he continued to ‘freelance’ I would report him to the contractor and tell the contractor I don’t ever want to be anywhere NEAR the guy ever again.
If it was someone who worked FOR me… I would just say…
“You’re fired”.
>> Mr. Powers also said…
>>
>> Its a long way down from the top of a building. because
>> some one didn’t think they needed a safety harness.
I never personally witnessed a ‘fatal accident’ even though it was a possibility all day… EVERY day.
I actually credit me not having to ever see that to OSHA itself.
Their constant ‘spot inspections’ and watchful eyes established the atmosphere of ‘safety first’ into EVERYONE’S minds and work habits.
Reply to DAVID TURBYFILL post on September 8, 2014 at 12:18 am
>> DAVID TURBYFILL said…
>>
>> WTKTT …You are somewhat misleading in your statement
>> regarding the YCSO photographs. Since my son is one of the
>> GMHS members I have looked at and studied this set of
>> pictures very closely? I again reviewed them before making
>> this post, While some of the cuffs are up; none are more
>> than one roll up. As for the PPE of those who clearly
>> were “FULLY” deployed as well as others, most all of the
>> cuffs and sleeves are intact, as well as the front of the shirt
>> on a number of them.
Mr. Turbyfill…
Thank you for commenting and yes… you are probably right.
I was not trying to be ‘mis-leading’ but I usually DO provide more ‘detail’ myself when I post links and whatnot but I did cover these ‘Shelter Photos’ in detail in a previous chapter.
I should have reprinted some of that detail and this followup does just that.
See my ‘what I am seeing in the photos’ detail down below.
I definitely should have mentioned in my previous post that out of the 19 firefighters… only 8 of them have any photos in the YCSO folder that make it even possible to determine the condition of their sleeves as of July 5, 2013, when those photos were finally taken on that garage floor of the YCSO evidence unit.
That’s less than HALF of the crew… so any conclusions from the photos that DO exist would still leave more than 50 percent unaccounted for.
Of those 8 ‘possible’ sets of photos, however… I am definitely seeing the ‘majority’ of those 8 having either ONE or BOTH sleeves rolled up.
5 of those 8 firefighters seemed to have one or more sleeves rolled UP, and 1 or 2 of them to at least the mid-forearm and not just ‘1 rollup’.
One of the clearest shots of ‘sleeves being rolled’ up ( and seemingly up to the mid-foream ) was Eric Marsh himself.
Since he was the Superintendent of that Crew and the one who sets the ‘example’ for ALL of them… that, itself, is significant.
So for however many photos of crew members PPE we do NOT have… the fact that their own Superintendent went into Shelter with his sleeves rolled up is telling a story all by itself with regards to ‘following the rules’ and ‘always observing safety rules’.
>> DAVID TURBYFILL also said…
>>
>> Lastly keep in mind that photos were taken days after and
>> removal from the Victim, so I am not sure that you can make
>> fully inform opinion of FACT.
That’s true. I am ASSUMING that whoever actually moved those bodies from their positions at the scene ( Prescott Firemen? ) and the Medical Examiner’s office… and then, in turn, the YCSO police investigators were ALL taking GREAT care not to disturb the condition of ANYTHING…
…but that is, in fact, an assumption on my part.
I doubt anyone will ever actually get to see the photographs ( and the movies ) that the YCSO Captain took of the deployment scene before it got dark on Sunday evening ( from the low-hovering Ranger 58 chopper ) or the FARO 3D imagery shot the next morning at dawn by the YCSO police investigators… so all we have to go on are these publicly released photos taken at the YCSO evidence garage on July 5, 2013.
That being said… I think if you look at the photo of just the remnants of Eric Marsh’s shirt and his ‘rolled up’ sleeves… it is VERY doubtful that we are NOT looking at the shirt in the same condition it was in at the deployment site.
No one could have rolled those sleeves UP like that following the incident… so that must be the way those shirt remnants were when they were found.
>> DAVID TURBYFILL also said…
>>
>> Upon reading JD’s article I am dismayed by the pervasive
>> thread that is wove through this article, in which, quoted by
>> so called EXPERTS, Bob Powers and other unnamed
>> Firefighters stating a “ROUGE” Safety Attitude by GMHS.
>> Admittedly there are plenty of Pictures of the GMHS crew
>> with Cuffs rolled; these same experts don’t seem to notice
>> that Members of the Blue Ridge crew also had Cuffs rolled.
>> All it takes it a look at several Wildland fire videos and you
>> will find at least 50% of crews with rolled cuffs or at the
>> least exposed wrists, this include several of the USFS
>> Shot Crews.
You are right. You can find MANY pictures of Type 1 Hotshots in close proximity to firelines and they do NOT have all their safety equipment properly configured ( Fire retardant shirts fully sleeve-down and gloves on ).
It is, apparently, a lot more ‘usual’ to see that these days than it has been in the past. This speaks to the ‘creeping normalcy’ issues in the WFF industry.
But there is still no doubt ( as Mr. Bob Powers has pointed out many, many times ) that there are ‘risks’ involved whenever you don’t have your sleeves fully down and your gloves on and you are working near a fire.
One sudden ‘flash up’ from a burning bush near you… and you might have severe burns on your hands and forearms.
One bad ‘slip’ or ‘falldown’ into anything burning… same story.
One badly planned hike within less than a mile of a 40 mph wind driven dynamic fireline in extreme fire conditions and highly explosive unburned manzanita fuel… and you might get caught going into shelter with your sleeves still rolled up and your gloves off. Even if the burnover was then going to be otherwise survivable… if your exposed flesh can’t take the heat levels or you can’t take the associated pain and you ‘let go’ of the shelter… you could be the one to die while others might live.
There are already documented Wildland Fireline fatalities where this WAS the actual LODF ( Life or Death Factor ) for some.
In other words… no matter who isn’t following all the ‘safety rules’… they are still just as likely to get bitten in the ass as anyone else could.
It still might sound silly to some… but a ‘lax attitude’ towards even just this one ongoing safety consideration in the workplace CAN be an indication of how that crew feels towards ALL of the ‘safety rules’ and whether they can just be ‘ignored’, or not.
Which brings me to a question I would like to ask you.
Did Travis himself EVER say anything about ‘risk taking’ on that crew he was working for… and whether he, himself, had any concerns in that area?
Actually… that’s a two part question… the second part being…
Even if he DID have such concerns… do you think he would have talked about them to you, or anyone… or would he have been more likely to have just kept stuff like that to himself?
>> DAVID TURBYFILL also said…
>>
>> Lastly on this subject GMHS did NOT perish because they
>> did or didn’t roll cuffs.
That will always be true.
>> DAVID TURBYFILL also said…
>> Many of them simply Burned to death, and why?
>> Because of the POS Fire Shelter they are provide for the
>> last ditch safety gear.
I, for one, support the research and the work you are diligently doing in this area yourself 100 percent.
I have seen your online videos.
It is the year 2014. The advanced materials you were able to easily obtain and the proof that they are far superior to what is being used now ‘in the field’ should be more than enough for a complete redesign as soon as possible. Like YESTERDAY, if not sooner.
There will always be burnovers where a simple ‘fire shelter’ isn’t going to provide survivability… but that doesn’t mean the bar can’t be raised for the times when that shelter and its capabilities are, in fact, the only thing between you and death.
Heck.. since ‘breathing hot gases’ is often the LODF ( Life or Death Factor ) even when INSIDE a fire shelter… I could even imagine a new-age design including some kind of cartridge that automatically ( during deployment ) inflates the FLOOR of the shelter with some amount of ‘breathable air’ ( not pure oxygen… but something breathable ) so that as the FF is lying face down he has at least some ‘other air’ to breath through a nipple in the floor of the shelter right there where his mouth is going to be. It couldn’t be much based on cost and weight factors… but then again… even just a minute or two of ‘good air’ to breathe could make all the difference for some deployments… or at least help prevent debilitating lung injuries.
Have you ever seen ( or held in your hand ) the actual ‘injection cartridges’ that are used to instantly INFLATE the new ‘Skier Avalanche Survival’ neck packs?
It’s hard to believe so much breathable AIR can be injected so instantly into a large container from such a small thing that weighs pretty much nothing at all.
The new ‘MAMMUT Skier Protection Airbag’ units would be just one example of a technology that is ALREADY HERE that could be completely compatible with a ‘new age’ fire shelter design.
I digress. Sorry.
** DETAIL ON THE YCSO SHELTER PHOTOS
This is a reprint of the DETAIL I published regarding the YCSO Shelter and PPE photos in a previous chapter of this ongoing discussion.
This time… I’ve added a ‘SLEEVES:’ component to each FF’s record just to indicate what my own eyes appear to be seeing with regards to that.
Once again.. .the actual online FOLDER that contains the YCSO photos being referenced below is HERE…
WARNING REPEATED: Some may consider the following page of photos to be very ‘graphic’ images. Do not click the link below unless you are prepared for what you might see.
Online Drobox Folder: Shelter Photos
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/fg416vjqt14afu3/zaTuOp4Plu#/
** THE SHORT STORY
There is a document in the YCSO folder that accompanies their ‘Shelter Photos’ which has a description of every photograph in the folder and who or what those photos relate to.
That document is called…
Yarnell Fire Shelter Inspection Photolog – July 5, 2013
Here is a quick SUMMARY of every firefighter and what the photos do ( or do NOT ) reveal about their SLEEVES as of the day these evidence photos were being taken ( July 5, 2013 )
PPE = Personal Protection Equipment and includes clothing.
N/A means there were no PPE photos taken for that firefighter.
Out of the 19 firefighters… only 8 of them had photos taken by the YCSO police that showed enough clothing remaining to make any determination at all with regards to the status of the SLEEVES at time of deployment.
Of those 8 firefighters … 5 of them seemed to have definitely had one or both sleeves rolled UP when they died, including GM SUP Eric Marsh.
Only 2 of them seemed to definitely have had their sleeves rolled DOWN… and 1 of them ( Robert Caldwell ) appears to have had 1 sleeve rolled UP and 1 rolled DOWN.
Here’s a ‘quick list’ of the firefighters and which actual photo(s) in the ‘Shelter Photos’ online folder correspond to which firefighter…
YCSO Number, FF Name, Photo showing PPE, Condition of SLEEVES
—————————————————————————
#09 Eric Marsh, DSCN0031.JPG, Only one sleeve left. Clearly rolled UP.
#06 Christopher Mackenzie, DSCN0019.JPG, Both sleeves rolled UP.
#18 Garret Zuppiger, DSCN0016.JPG, Left sleeve definitely rolled UP.
#04 Kevin Woyjeck, DSCN0010.JPG, Sleeves rolled UP but only slightly ??
#14 Joe Thurston, DSCN0029.JPG, Left sleeve *appears* to be UP 1 fold.
#19 Robert Caldwell, DSCN0036.JPG, Left sleeve DOWN. Right sleeve UP?
#17 Scott Norris, DSCN0004.JPG, Sleeves *appear* to be rolled DOWN.
#07 Dustin Deford, DSCN0013.JPG, Right sleeve DOWN. Left ?? unknown.
#05 Clayton Whitted, DSCN0007.JPG, PPE, Not enough left of shirt to tell.
#15 Jesse Steed, DSCN0024.JPG, Not enough left of shirt to tell.
#10 John Percin Jr., DSCN0030.JPG, Not enough left of shirt to tell.
#13 Anthony Rose, DSCN0008.JPG, Not enough left of clothing to tell.
#16 Grant McKee, DSCN0021.JPG, Not enough left of clothing to tell.
#08 William Warneke, DSCN0026.JPG, Not enough left of clothing to tell.
#12 Travis Carter, DSCN0038.JPG, Not enough left of clothing to tell.
#11 Andrew Ashcraft, DSCN0039.JPG, Not enough left of clothing to tell.
#03 Travis Turbyfill, No photos taken at all, SLEEVES: N/A.
#02 Sean Misner, No PPE photos taken, SLEEVES: N/A
#01 Wade Parker, No PPE photos taken, SLEEVES: N/A
—————————————————————————
NOTE: Last known photo of Jesse Steed taken by Christopher Mackenzie at 3:55 showed Steed sitting on a rock with both his sleeves rolled UP to about mid-forearm.
NOTE: Last known photo of Robert Caldwell taken by Christopher MacKenzie at 3:55 PM shows him with BOTH of his sleeves rolled UP to mid-forearm.
** THE LONG STORY
What follows is an accounting of the numbers assigned to the decedents by the YCSO police investigators while they were still at the deployment site, followed by the Maricopa Medical Examiner number that was assigned, and then the name of the firefighter associated with each YCSO / ME number…
#1/13-04442/ Wade Parker
#2/13-04425/ Sean Misner
#3/13-04443/ Travis Turbyfill
#4/13-04428/ Kevin Justin Woyjeck
#5/13-04427/Clayton Whitted
#6/13-04426/ Christopher MacKenzie
#7/13-04431/ Dustin DeFord
#8/13-04430/ William Warneke
#9/13-04435/ Eric Marsh
#10/13-04429/ John Percin Jr
#11/13-04434/ Andrew Ashcraft
#12/13-04433/ Travis Carter
#13/13-04438/ Anthony Rose
#14/13-04432/ Joe Thurston
#15/13-04436/ Jesse Steed
#16/13-04437/ Grant McKee
#17/13-04441/ Scott Norris
#18/13-04440/ Garret Zuppiger
#19/13-04439/ Robert Caldwell
This is a complete TEXT version of the YCSO document that accompanies their ‘Shelter Photos’ which has a description of every photograph in the folder and who or what those photos relate to.
I have added a SLEEVES description under each FF’s PPE section.
Yarnell Fire Shelter Inspection Photolog – July 5, 2013
13-4441 #17 u.r. ( Scott Norris )
Picture no., Description, Notes
DSCN0002.JPG, Fire shelter exterior, 98 % of Aluminum (AL) foil burned away
DSCN0003.JPG, Fire shelter interior, 75 % of fiberglass burned away
Inside of floor is intact
Melted hardhat
DSCN0004.JPG, PPE – shirt (front) and pants (back)
SLEEVES: Appear to be rolled DOWN
DSCN0005.JPG, Pants (back)
13-4443 #3 Travis Turbyfill
No photos taken
SLEEVES: N/A
13-4427 #5 u.r. ( Clayton Whitted )
DSCN0006.JPG, Fire shelter, 99% AL foil burned away
50% fiberglass burned away
End cap main seam missing (torn open)
Mid-cross seam torn open
DSCN0007.JPG, PPE, Question about hood
SLEEVES: Not enough left of shirt to really tell, but
if that one relatively unburned bit of yellow cloth is
the END of a sleeve… then at least that sleeve appears
to have been rolled DOWN.
13-4438 #13 Anthony Rose
DSCN0008.JPG, PPE
SLEEVES: Not enough left of any clothing to make a determination.
13-4428 #4 Kevin Woyjeck
DSCN0009.JPG, shelter, 40% of fiberglass cloth burned away
100% of AL foil burned
Inside of floor intact
One(1) end cap separated
DSCN0010.JPG, PPE, Hardhat with dust mask
SLEEVES: The only clothing left was the shirt collar and the two sleeves.
Sleeves *appear* to have been rolled UP but only slightly.
13-4442 #1 Wade Parker
DSCN0011.JPG, gloves
SLEEVES: N/A
13-4431 #7 Dustin Deford
DSCN0012.JPG, Fire shelter, 100% of AL foil burned away
4 ft. of shelter floor seam torn
Endcap seam torn
85% fiberglass burned away
Floor mostly intact
DSCN0013.JPG, PPE
SLEEVES: Only the right sleeve seems to be visible and
it appears to have been rolled DOWN.
13-4440 #18 u.r. ( Garret Zuppiger )
DSCN0014.JPG, Fire shelter exterior, 80% of AL foil burned
DSCN0015.JPG, Fire shelter-interior, 90% of fiberglass burned away
One(1) side of floor intact
DSCN0016.JPG, PPE
SLEEVES: Left sleeve definitely rolled UP, but not too far.
Right sleeve also *appears* to be rolled up, but hard to tell.
13-4426 #6 Christopher Mackenzie
DSCN0017.JPG, Fire shelter exterior, 95% of AL foil burned away
DSCN0018.JPG, Fire shelter interior, 50% of fiberglass burned away
Floor mostly intact
Endcap seam, 12 inch tear
DSCN0019.JPG, PPE
SLEEVES: Both sleeves rolled UP, but probably still below elbow.
13-4425 #2 Sean Misner
DSCN0020.JPG, Fire shelter, 99% of AL foil burned away
90% of fiberglass burned away
All tore up
SLEEVES: N/A
13-4437 #16 Grant McKee
DSCN0021.JPG, PPE
SLEEVES: Not enough left of any clothing to make a determination.
13-4436 #15 Jesse Steed
DSCN0022.JPG, Fire shelter exterior, 80% foil burned away
DSCN0023.JPG, Fire shelter interior, Fiberglass 50% burned away
DSCN0024.JPG, PPE front, Including red helmet.
SLEEVES: Not enough left of shirt to make a real determination, but last
known photo of Steed taken by Christopher Mackenzie at 3:55 showed Steed
sitting on a rock with both his sleeves rolled UP to about mid-forearm.
DSCN0025.JPG, Pants -back
13-4430 #8 u.r. ( William Warneke )
DSCN0026.JPG, PPE
SLEEVES: Not enough left of any clothing to make a determination.
13-4432 #14 Joe Thurston
DSCN0027.JPG, Fire shelter exterior, 95% AL foil burned away
DSCN0028.JPG, Fire shelter interior, One(1) side of floor intact
80% of fiber glass burned away
DSCN0029.JPG, PPE
SLEEVES: Right sleeve apparently destroyed. Left sleeve
*appears* to be rolled UP but perhaps only ‘1 fold’.
13-4429 #10 John Percin Jr.
DSCN0030.JPG, PPE
SLEEVES: Not enough left of shirt to make a determination.
13-4435 #9 Eric Marsh
DSCN0031.JPG, PPE
DSCN0032.JPG, PPE (2nd photo)
SLEEVES: Only one sleeve not destroyed. It was clearly rolled UP
pretty far… perhaps up to or above the elbow.
13-4439 #19 Robert Caldwell
DSCN0033.JPG, Fire shelter exterior, 98% of AL foiled burned away
Endcap torn
DSCN0034.JPG, Fire shelter interior, 98% of fiberglass burned away
One(1) side of floor still intact
DSCN0035.JPG, Back of PPE
DSCN0036.JPG, Front of PPE
SLEEVES: Left sleeve rolled DOWN. Right sleeve *appears* to have
also been rolled DOWN but *might* be rolled UP just 1 fold or so.
NOTE: Last known photo of Robert Caldwell taken by Christopher MacKenzie
at 3:55 PM shows him with BOTH of his sleeves rolled UP to mid-forearm.
13-4433 #12 Travis Carter
DSCN0037.JPG, Fire shelter exterior, 100% of foil burned away
DSCN0038.JPG, PPE
SLEEVES: Not enough clothing left to make a determination.
13-4434 #11 Andrew Ashcraft
DSCN0039.JPG, PPE
SLEEVES: Not enough clothing left to make a determination.
13-021744 #308 ( Loose shelter not associated with any Firefighter )
DSCN0040.JPG, Fire shelter exterior, 100% of AL foil burned away
DSCN0041.JPG, Fire shelter interior, 98% fiberglass burned away
10 inch tear on silica cloth
13-021744 #307 ( Loose shelter not associated with any Firefighter )
DSCN0042.JPG, Fire shelter exterior, Outer shell 100% foil burned away
Endcap seam torn
DSCN0043.JPG, Fire shelter interior, 95% of fiberglass burned away
13-021744 #302 ( Loose shelter not associated with any Firefighter )
DSCN0044.JPG, Fire shelter exterior, 98% burned away
Mid seam torn
DSCN0045.JPG, Fire shelter, Seam break – close up
DSCN0046.JPG, Fire shelter interior, 50% fiberglass burned away
One(1) end cap mostly intact, foil in place
13-021744 #301 ( Loose shelter not associated with any Firefighter )
DSCN0047.JPG, Fire shelter exterior, End cap seam broken
100% foil burned away
DSCN0048.JPG, Fire shelter interior
13-027144 #305 ( Loose shelter not associated with any Firefighter )
DSCN0049.JPG, Fire shelter exterior, 99% foil burned away
DSCN0050.JPG, Fire shelter interior, 98% fiberglass burned away
13-021744 #304 ( Loose shelter not associated with any Firefighter )
DSCN0051.JPG, Fire shelter exterior, 100% of AL foil burned
End cap seam torn , both ends
13-021744 #303 ( Loose shelter not associated with any Firefighter )
DSCN0052.JPG, Fire shelter exterior, 100% AL foil burned away
DSCN0053.JPG, Fire shelter –close up, Burned holes in silica cloth
DSCN0054.JPG, Fire shelter interior, 80% of fiberglass burned away
13-021744 #306 ( Loose shelter not associated with any Firefighter )
DSCN0055.JPG, Fire shelter exterior, 100% AL foil burned away
Red helmet melted to exterior of shelter
Mid seam torn
DSCN0056.JPG, Fire shelter interior, 80% of fiberglass burned away
Black hardhat melted in end cap.
END OF YCSO PHOTO DOCUMENTATION
Given that there’s a number of fairly intense and fairly important conversations going on here today, it’s somewhat concerning to me that the “new” formatting does not show us the page hits.
Or am I missing something?
The “hit” counter is at the bottom of the page. Scroll down a bit and you’ll see it.
Thanks for replying, JD.
I’m still not seeing it.
REGARDING:
FATALITY FIRES, investigations, more investigations, settlements, the Yarnell Hill Fire, ADOSH, the 10 and 18 (and all kinds of other things that have been piled on top of them–some of them more useful than others).
AND REGARDING:
Gloves and sleeves and safety vs practicality and thus effectiveness, lawsuits, rules vs principles vs laws, redactions, “safe workplaces,” the USFS and Arizona FIRE, conflict, conflict of interest, more lawsuits, more investigations.
AND REGARDING:
More fatalities, responsibility, accountability, vs the open truthful blame-free conversations required to produce “Lessons Learned” to increase understanding and thus safety, and the history that got us into this muddled and dangerous fuster-clucked mess.
How’s that for a bunch of potential keywords???
I confess to the bias of being a concerned 4th generation (although scandihoovian) native New Mexican citizen who lives in Albuquerque, New Mexico, surrounded by drought and forests that are increasingly burning more extremely, with neighboring citizens living in them and neighboring citizens fighting the fires in them.
I confess to the bias of being someone who went to Prescott College on the slope of Granite Mountain, which gave birth to the crew (including a number of friends) that spawned the Prescott IHC and helped spawn the Granite Mountain Hotshots,
I confess to the bias of being someone who worked on fires at the time for the caterers and saw the faces of those hungry, tired, awesome fire-fighters, some of whom were my friends.
And thus I take this fire very seriously. And that’s why I’m vastly less concerned about heads rolling (unless they really need to roll) than I am about STUFF GETTING FIXED.
Suffice it to say, I decided, several months ago, that I needed to learn about this fire in a MUCH larger context, after having spent months analyzing (since I’m a digital photographer) the photographs and videos that were being released in order to create visual timelines of what happened that day.
Part of that larger context includes the context of the various investigations of the Yarnell Hill Fire. Which are still in progress, all things considered.
There is a HISTORY behind these investigations. We can’t even BEGIN to understand why these investigations are the way they are, much less where they are potentially heading, without understanding the HISTORY behind them.
However, even with that, the Yarnell Fire Investigation path is a HYBRID, in my opinion. Large chunks of it have no precedent whatsoever. Because it is a hybrid, with virtually no precedent, any description of where it may go is, in my humble opinion, possibly premature. This post-fire fire is, just like the fire itself, quite capable of being possibly under-estimated and, thus, potentially inaccurately forecasted.
I really, really hope SOMEBODY, who has more knowledge of all this stuff than I do, writes a book about it or SOMETHING. I have spent a HUMONGOUS amount of time trying to piece together an understanding of this history. I’ve had to piece together an enormous number of very little teeny tiny pieces in order to do that. It has been very frustrating and time-consuming.
In the course of doing this, I stumbled across an article published on December 4, 2013 by Dennis Wagner and Yvonne Wingett Sanchez of AZCentral which I had probably read before, but didn’t realize the significance of it at the time.
It really is a relatively accurate, detailed, well-written, well-sourced analysis of the complex, conflicted, nature of the investigations that were emerging at the time and are still playing themselves out now. And it’s the ONLY description of this investigation process, and the conflicts involved, that I have encountered after all my searching of this whole realm of the history of investigations of fatality fires.
In order for us to move to the same page, as we discuss what is happening, as the lawsuits proceed, and Arizona FIRE attempts to negotiate with ADOSH, and who know what else happens, I highly recommend that we all read this article:
“Yarnell Hill Fire inquiry reflects battle in safety enforcement”
http://www.azcentral.com/news/arizona/articles/20131204yarnell-fire-inquiry-battle-safety-protocol-enforcement.html
Thanks again Marti—I do not fundamentally agree, Lawyers and Philologists reduce the Safety rules to guide lines and destroy what safety is all about.
I am sure you know how I feel.
What I don’t understand is industrial jobs have safety rules that require safety equipment and safe job conditions what is the difference between them and WLF?
I’m not sure what it is that you fundamentally disagree with.
What I’m reading coming from Fire-fighters is that, contrary to “industrial jobs,” they are CONTRACTED and EXPECTED to do things that are inherently risky, i.e. take calculated risks, in order do what is necessary to fight fires. As in, the only guaranteed (which ADOSH/OSHA is looking for) truly “SAFE” way to do this is to not do this.
They describe how this is a huge cognitive dissonance.
OK here’s a hypothetical scenario.
On the Thompson Ridge Fire, just a few weeks prior to the Yarnell Fire.
The Granite Mountain Hotshots, under the direction of Darrell Willis, who served as the Night OPS within Bea Day’s Type Two IMT, conducted a major burn-out operation around a collection of historically significant buildings, in order to protect those, according to the National Park Service which hired them, extremely important buildings.
What if the winds had unexpectedly changed and one of them had been accidentally burned? Would ADOSH/OSHA consider that an “unsafe workplace”? To the extent of legal punishment? Would you? Is that determination justified?
What if one of them, in the dark, had tripped over something and broken a bone and, because of smoke and darkness, his evacuation had been delayed, and his injuries had been magnified. Would ADOSH/OSHA consider that an “unsafe workplace”? To the extent of legal punishment? Would you? Is that determination justified?
What, it appears to me, fire-fighters are saying is that, in order to do the job the public expect/hires them to do, they have to take calculated risks. What ADOSH/OSHA is holding them accountable to is a risk-free workplace.
Thus, the cognitive dissonance.
And, I might add, the reason they did this burn-out at night was because that was the best time to do it, given that the winds and the fire were, relatively, at their best footprint for doing it.
People can bury their head in the sand and say wildland firefighting is dangerous, bad things are going to happen, we have to accept it, yada, yada, yada. Sometimes that is true. But often it is not. The first step in preventing repeat tragedies is to be honest about what mistakes were made, if any. Then go ahead and decide how best to prevent them in the future. Marti is right about that, the second part often involves more than just saying “don’t do so and so”.
Spot on, mike. Totally agree.
I sort of tried to say the same thing below, but you nailed it.
See Mr. Powers new parent comment just above regarding ‘risk taking’. Also ‘spot on’. A ‘calculated risk’ is still just that… a risk… and a conscious choice to deviate from standard safety procedures and ‘planned operations’… and anyone who takes such ‘risks’ has to be prepared to suffer bad consequences ( lawsuits included ).
You can’t just say “It’s a dangerous job… so ALL our decisions are justified. Leave us alone.” Doesn’t work that way.
Reply to Marti Reed post on September 8, 2014 at 7:40 pm
Marti… Kudos on all the ‘research’ you have been doing and the way you are ‘connecting the dots’ to this ongoing discussion about Yarnell…
…but remember that on a certain level it’s not that complicated at all.
19 men died horrible deaths in Yarnell on June 30, 2013… and most of the evidence seems to indicate there was no damn good reason for it to have ever happened.
TWO of those men were primarily responsible for leading the 17 others to their deaths.
ONE of those TWO was, because of his rank, position and level of responsibility… ultimately responsible for what happened out there in ‘Divison A’ that day.
The only ‘piece of the puzzle’ that is really missing is the HOW and WHY these 2 ( supposedly ) experienced firefighters could have been making such a fateful series of bad decisions that day.
And make no mistake… I think Brendan McDonough himself might be the only one still sticking to his own mental-gymnastics style theory that ( as he said in his ADOSH interview ) “They didn’t make any wrong decisions… they just didn’t make the right one”.
Everything else you are talking about up at the 50,000 foot level regarding ‘history of investigations and reports’ and the inability of a multi-billion ( Yes… that’s BILLION with a ‘B’ ) industry to even arrive at a workable way to conduct investigations of itself is important… but the families of the men that died are, I believe, still struggling to fly at a slightly lower altitude.
They stilll just want to know what REALLY happened on June 30, 2013.
So here we ( still ) are… hoping ( at least ) to do what WE can to shed a little more light on the events of that weekend… and then let the chips fall where they may.
I am NOT trying, in any way, to discourage your high altitude approach.
It is absolutely fascinating and you are RIGHT… the ENTIRE story of how an industry that prides itself on ‘taking care of their own’ seems ( historically ) dedicated to doing no such thing seems to have been brought into sharp focus by the Yarnell incident…
…but I still have to believe that in this investigatory realm it is FEAR that is guiding the hearts ( and the ACTIONS ) of these men ( at all levels… from grunt to ‘fire god’ ) who tout themselves as fearless.
FEAR of losing your job.
FEAR of ‘going against your brothers’ ( whatever that really means ).
FEAR of losing grant money if an operation is found to have flaws.
FEAR that if you go against the grain you lose the career path.
FEAR of having to pay money to victim’s families and take care of them.
FEAR of not being able to do something ‘fun’ for a living.
FEAR of NOT being considered a ‘hero’ by all who gaze upon you.
FEAR of Congress cutting budgets if they hear about systemic failures.
etc…. etc…
That’s a whole lot of FEAR for people who are constantly touted as being the FEARLESS ones among us… and LIKE to think of THEMSELVES that way.
There are LOTS of ‘dangerous’ things to do for a living.
Despite what Firefighters think… they do NOT have some kind of ‘monopoly’ on having to ‘suit up’ for a dangerous job.
I’m not even going to start with a ‘list’… because I would be typing all night long. Suffice to say that other industries that are JUST as ‘inherently dangerous’ do NOT seem to have the same ongoing ‘systemic’ issues or trouble taking hard looks at themselves when they NEED to.
Every accident is unique.
Every accident needs to be looked at with its own microscope.
Every accident requires ( and deserves ) COMPETENT investigators.
Every accident has something to teach…
…but you must be WILLING to LEARN!
>> Marti also wrote…
>>
>> What if the winds had unexpectedly changed and one of
>> them had been accidentally burned? Would ADOSH/OSHA
>> consider that an “unsafe workplace”? To the extent of legal
>> punishment?
It depends on what happened… and who might have been responsible for it happening.
What if that same wind change had been FORECASTED ahead of time and ended up happening exactly the way it was supposed to… but men that were in charge of the safety of other men just seemed to ignore the risks and ‘ordered’ them to be places they should never have been?
What I would expect of ANY Fed level OSHA or State Level XDOSH is to FIND OUT ‘what really happened’ and if legal punishment/citation was justified…. to go ahead and do their own jobs and report that.
>> Marti also said…
>>
>> What if one of them, in the dark, had tripped over something
>> and broken a bone and, because of smoke and darkness, his
>> evacuation had been delayed, and his injuries had been magnified.
>> Would ADOSH/OSHA consider that an “unsafe workplace”?
Once again… it depends on what REALLY happened and WHO might have (also) been responsible for what happened.
What if many other firefighters taking a look at pictures of the route and the conditions said that they would have NEVER attempted such a hike at such a time and would have ‘stayed where they were’… but whoever was injured ( or killed ) was simply ORDERED to make that move at that dangerous time on that dangerous route?
Also again… I would expect any Fed OSHA or State XDOSH to find out what REALLY happened in that ‘workplace’ and respond accordingly.
>> Marti also said…
>>
>> What, it appears to me, fire-fighters are saying is that, in
>> order to do the job the public expect/hires them to do,
>> they have to take calculated risks. What ADOSH/OSHA
>> is holding them accountable to is a risk-free workplace.
>>
>> Thus, the cognitive dissonance.
It’s not like working at a lemonade stand. That’s a given… but for firefighters to keep running around pretending they are the only ones who do something inherently dangerous for an EMPLOYER and that makes them above reproach… or NOT subject to standard ‘workplace safety’ reviews… is bullshit.
If it turns out that you are someone who LIKES to take risks… and the reason you are doing the job yourself is because you LIKE the whole ‘Ranger Danger’ thing… that’s fine.
But if you then rise to a position of authority and you are now SUBJECTING other employees in that workplace to ‘unnecessary’ risks… that’s a whole ‘nother story.
They can’t have it both ways.
If they are going to run this more-than-quasi-military style of field management and impose that ’employment’ structure on many young men who are basically just trying to make some bucks over the summer… then there has to be the same sort of strict accountability you would find in the military.
Even in the military… every now and then someone DOES ‘break the rules’ ( even with good intentions ) and then there are some court-martials and people get a closeup view of the Missouri River as it passes by a little town called Leavenworth.
Yarnell just seems to be bringing these ‘attitudes’ all into focus.
19 men die… some of them just the same aforementioned ‘young men just trying to make a few bucks’… and the ‘agency’ that was their employer just wants to issue a namby-pamby ‘Lessons Learned’ report ( that doesn’t even really contain any ‘Lessons Learned’. ) and they then expect everyone to just keep giving them all the money they want and leave them alone because “no one understand us firefighters but us”.
We are all very sad… but please go away and leave us alone because you just don’t ‘understand us’… but don’t forget to pay your taxes!
Even ‘fire god’ Mike Dudley ended his June 20 presentation with this kind of “we’re the only ones who can ever understand what we do” bullshit ‘sign off’ to the men he was just talking to about the incident where 19 of their finest died for no apparent reason and “certainly no one did anything WRONG”. Oh, no. Not possible.
We are ‘above reproach’… above OSHAs… above ADOSHs… because only WE understand US!
We are “Ranger Danger”… stick together!
Mike Dudley, June 20, 2014
—————————————————————
So… after South Canyon we made all these corrections because we assumed this would never happen again… and the problem with Yarnell is… and the shock of Yarnell is… not only could it happen again to a crew that well trained… but the opportunity for it to happen again in the future is still there. It’s always… will be there. We can’t acknowledge that what we operate in is a high risk environment.
What we do need to know is that we maintain our training… we maintain our situational awareness to take care of ourselves and each other as we go through.
Uh… it’s critical work that we do… and only us, really, understand what that means, not everyone else that out.. is outside the system.
( Applause from all the firefighters in the auditorium ).
—————————————————————-
End of rant… back to looking at actual EVIDENCE.
I’m not trying to justify the stage.
I’m just trying to describe it.
Marti—You answered your own question.
You do not do burn outs or back fires without the weather and other factors in your favor. It is always a planed and executed burn generally at night and with a lot of things in your favor.
There should be no surprises with good fire forecasts as your father would have told you.
There was no risk taking here that would have caused injury or death. Your what if holds no water. There were a lot of additional factors that you did not list or may not have known.
Including a safety plan that included areas to fall back to and black areas created by the burn out, water back up or engine crews at the location. No burn out plan is haphazard.
it has a plan with a predicted weather forecast and a no go point for any safety problems. Someone getting burned would be a freak occurrence.
I will speak of this in a expert way I was for 3 years on a California back fire team during that period I served on the team on 4 fires. I have also because of that training back fired several other fires with hotshot crews All pre planed with the weather in our favor and good predicted forecasts from professional fire weather forecasters. Pre planed includes safety objectives and backup plans hose lays and safe zones.
Please don’t take what I am saying to you as negative I am trying to explain things it takes years for Fire fighters to learn.
There is always a risk that the fire might escape but there are many safety procedures in place to protect the people.
To answer your question NO if it happened it would be a freak accident unpredicted and not related to any bad decisions.
for the sake of argument—
On the fire line in several instances a wind created by air craft or a dust delve while crews have been building line have cut off crewman from each other in most cases with no injuries.
Note The one female who was cut off recently from her crew and had to deploy and survived. Those are classed as unusual situations that do occasionally occur but are highly unpredictable. No one in charge or the person is at fault mother nature dose strange things and wind is no different.
In backfiring we learned never to trust a saddle it changed the wind locally at that point and we had to attack backfires different every time we encountered a saddle, wind swirls and wind from your back would go over the saddle and blow back in your face. The same thing goes for just building fire line there are minute and localized factors that affect wind in differing locations. It would take me hours to go thru this so I will stop here.
Another helpful Yarnell thing I found this weekend is the detailed reflections of Jim Whittington, from the Type 1 IMT’s Public Information Team, on the challenging experience of handling the Public Relations after the burnover.
“Fatalities and Information”
https://www.nifc.gov/PIO_bb/Background/FatalitiesInformation.pdf
“There were two places media could go for a story: Yarnell, which is where the fire was, and Prescott, which was where the crew was based. We knew there were stories coming out of the Prescott Fire Department but they were so inundated from media and other demands that it was difficult to reach folks. When you did, you could not help but register what they were going through and you felt guilty demanding even the smallest bit of time. Not having a comfortable level of coordination required more than the usual approach to monitoring related media coverage as one had to be dialed in to what was coming out of Prescott so that nothing contradictory was said. In retrospect, after meeting the members of the Prescott Fire Department during the preparation for the memorial service, I probably should have tried harder to connect and coordinate more. Fortunately, there were no major issues that arose and the minor ones were few.”
“A related concern is the physical space between the incident and the home unit. There is still a fire with major suppression efforts taking place yet the affected families and community are somewhere else. Just from being in camp and attending the briefings, you can come to focus too much on the incident and lapse too much into the comfort zone of regular fires, particularly when giving media briefings or interviews. I tried to mention Granite Mountain and Prescott FD as much as possible to remind myself and others that the fire influenced many people miles away.
That said, there was still an evacuated town with people suffering from the uncertainty and economic hardship that comes with being out of your home and not knowing whether it was damaged. On top of that, they had the knowledge that firefighters died trying to fight the fire that went through their town. You have to respect and honor the evacuation emotions while also being wary of questions that might seem to equate the hardships faced by residents and the families of the fallen.”
“Of course, there were many emotions running through my mind. While I focused on sorrow and resilience and remembrance with the media, it was difficult at times to keep anger and confusion from bubbling to the surface. But those are selfish emotions and when you’re speaking for others, you cannot allow yourself to let those thoughts come out. If you’re in the position Suzanne and I were in, you just have to put yourself out there and trust you’ll be able to do right by everyone you’re speaking for. It is a tough line to walk and I sometimes felt myself getting dangerously close to breaking down. I never quite did, but it was definitely a struggle.”
“Fatalities are tough and stressful and the stress is much different than even the most mega of Type I incidents. On regular incidents (as if there is such a thing), no matter how stressful, you settle into a routine and your stress level evens out, though it may remain at a high level. Not to mention, any group of PIOs tends to be both high energy and fun which helps alleviate the stress. On fatalities like Yarnell, the stress level keeps rising, there is no routine, and the fun of an assignment is greatly diminished. It is different and can be quite a shock if you are not prepared for it or have gone through it before.”
I found it both informative and heart-warming to read Jim’s attempt to share with others who might find themselves in a similar situation.
So, as I was closing the 95k webpages I have open from my weekend’s explorations, I came across what is, to me, the very bestest analysis of the Yarnell Fire I have read, so far.
It’s the first chapter of what appears to be an evolving study. It’s being done by a team that includes Doug Campbell, the guru of gurus of fire behavior, and several other fire officers, current and retired, of Region 3, Arizona and New Mexico.
The gist of the analysis is that the fire behavior was not adequately assessed, from the get-go, and thus, the resourcing was never adequately positioned to fight the fire as it should have been fought, despite the fact that the appropriate tools to adequately assess and resource the fire exist. They just weren’t implemented.
Actually they were implemented, by Chuck Maxwell, in Albuquerque. But, because of protocol, he wasn’t authorized to intervene.
I HIGHLY recommended everybody read this study.
The first chapter was published in the April-June 2014 issue of “Straight Tip,” the “Utah Fire and Rescue Academy Magazine.” It is titled “The Yarnell Fire – Part One: A Cry For Help.” It’s located in about the middle of this pdf:
https://www.uvu.edu/ufra/docs/straight_tip/Straight_Tip_April_June14.pdf
The second chapter, titled “THE YARNELL FIRE – PART TWO: AN EXAMINATION OF WORKLOAD AND TOOLS TO PREDICT FIRE SEVERITY,” published in the July-September 2014 issue of the same magazine, goes into detail regarding the fire behavior prediction tools that are availabe, how they should have been used, what they would have indicated, and how that would have made a major difference.
This issue of the magazine is located here:
http://www.uvu.edu/ufra/docs/straight_tip/straight_tip_jul_sep14.pdf
It includes a note that part 3 will be in the next issue and that these articles are excerpted from the complete, but evolving (it appears to me) report, which I will link below. It is slightly more extensive, and a whole lot easier to read.
The more complete, and much easier to read, report, as it exists today, is located here:
http://www.uvu.edu/ufra/docs/yarnell_fire.pdf
First thanks for the reference.
Second if you were to look back at every thing I have said in layman terms it pretty well follows the some direction and information I have talked about thru out this discussion gust no in official format and in paces. A person with a good solid fire background with or with out the prediction tools would have made the same conclusion. At the first look at the first picture of the fire below the crew it told me all I needed to know STAY IN THE BLACK.
Agree.
However, I think it’s really important to look, not just at what GM did or do but, as I have said periodically, at the stage upon which they were acting, the system that created that stage. and the history of decisions that have created that system.
Otherwise, ALL people are going to see is a crew making a huge and deadly mistake, and will think, “Well WE wouldn’t have done THAT!!!.”
Unfortunately, as fires get bigger and vastly more complex, which is what they are doing, including right around me, if the under-resourced and under-performing systems that created the chaos on the Yarnell Fire from hour one aren’t looked at as critically as the Granite Mountain’s habits and mistakes, more and more crews and individuals are going to be killed in exactly some version of the same way.
And if the investigative process, which is also a product of that same history that created those systems that produced that whole dysfunctional collection of facts on the Yarnell ground, aren’t looked at as critically as all the above, nothing that is crying out in Chuck Maxwell’s and all our and everybody else’s tears is going to be heard.
Yes, it’s about gloves and sleeves, and the personal and team habits that usually work but sometimes fatally don’t, but it’s about a whole lot of bigger complex dynamics that really need to be looked at clearly and seriously. IMHO = In My Humble Opinion.
That’s why I’ve stayed out of the gloves and sleeves types of conversations here. I think we have way bigger fish to fry.
I think you have a lot right Marti
Let me add as I have said before no matter how bad it gets or who has their head up there ass.
You as a Crew boss/ Division supervisor have a responsibility to follow the proven safety practices
and keep you crew or crews safe on the fire line.
The 10 Standard orders are not hard to understand and follow. Fight fire aggressively but provide for safety first. It may be hillbilly but it is fact. LCES is a piece of the 10 and easy to follow. Always have situational awareness.
Last but not least those of us that fought the big fires in Southern California in the 60’s and 70’s can associate with the fires of today. There are droughts that change fire intensities. If you know the drought will change the way the fires burn then it is easy to adjust to what is happening around you. Many Southern California fires ran thru 20 foot brush like a freight train Taking out 10,00 Acers in 10 min.. The only thing we did not always contend with was the Urban Interface.
Fire Fighters with the drought need to go back to the all out IA that was done n those days. During extreme burning conditions they should not even consider managing fire starts wilderness or otherwise. Called let burn policies. Fire fighting has a set of rules weather they are slipping or running.
“You as a Crew boss/ Division supervisor have a responsibility to follow the proven safety practices and keep you crew or crews safe on the fire line.”
I know this is hardly new, and yet I think, as crews confront the fact that they are fighting 21st Century fires with both 21st Century technology and 21st Century distractions — including the currently existent and seriously threatening 21st Century litigious environment — on stages upon which their overhead may be, as was the case here, unprepared and under-resourced, because of their inability to contract sufficient resources (and I’m still trying to figure exactly what was all about for this, but I think it has to do with insufficient BUDGETING)…
I agree that crews and individuals that choose to fight 21st Century wildland fires (including WUI) are going to have to ABSOLUTELY assume that the systems in which they are operating are not necessarily working in their favor (which I think is really hard, given all the culture and tradition), when the rubber hits the road or the sh*t hits the fan.
I think, after reading what I’ve been reading, a lot of wildland fire-fighters increasingly understand this. They already don’t trust the upper echelons. Which is why a lot of them are leaving the field.
Which I don’t see as a solution to the problem.
And others, I think, are realizing they need to even more seriously consider that, if they choose to stay in the game, they need to ramp up their ability to be a “student of fire,” become as truly “smart” as they are “heroic,” and, while honoring and respecting the chain of command, not depend on it when they realize it may be threatening their very survival.
Add one other thing I learned as a Police officer. Carrie liability insurance and have a union that will represent you with lawyers. It is a new time and every one gets sued.
It is frustrating for those who love there jobs and work hard.
Exactly.
The whole issue of liability protection for federal fire-fighters is massive.
And the fact that they have to buy it themselves, while the USFS only protects those “at the top” is one of the causes of experienced fire-fighters leaving the force.
Which is not a solution.
And that’s just federal firefighters.
I have no idea what kind of financial liability protection someone like Todd Abel, who I think is targeted in the lawsuits (and I also think unjustly) is carrying.
This whole real crummy deal IMHO is not supporting getting the best and brightest into fighting the fires we the people need to have fighting those fires.
PS You wrote “A person with a good solid fire background with or with out the prediction tools would have made the same conclusion.”
The point of what the study is learning is that that is precisely what DIDN’T happen. A bunch of folks with a good solid fire background but WITHOUT the prediction tools made EXACTLY the WRONG conclusions. From Day One.
Sorry Marti –I was again talking old school with the knowledge of solid fire experience that is not prevalent to day. no those running this fire were not well versed in wild land fire no matter what any one would say different. This was a total mess and not the best to base expectations on. Prediction tools also come with years of experience which includes training, Fire still burns the same way they just change in intensity rate of spread per hour doesn’t have to be calculated on a computer use your eyes your brain and your experience if you know it is going to be bad don’t get in the way of it Add wind and slope in heavy fuel you do not want to be in front of it the Fire line note book will give you estimated rates of spread close enough to make those decisions with out all the fancy computer BS. It ain’t rocket science.
Funny little irony. I found this gem when I was doing all kinds of google searches to try to find more out about Mike Dudley. Which I couldn’t find much more than WTKTT could, either.
It was worth the search.
I have wanted to say this for a couple of month’s and have got side tracked.
I have been in touch with some of my friends here in Region 4 FMO’s an a Hot Shot foreman.
The basic info I am getting indicates the FS is pretty much in agreement That GM did not follow the basic 10 Standard Orders which caused the fatalities. They were also very concerned with the overall management of the fire.
The FS has decided this was a lack of following the rules as far as the crew was concerned and have Identified the same 10 standard orders as we have that were violated. along with discussions on situational awareness. The HS Crews in Region are again discussing the 10 and 18 and LCES. and how it relates to the Yarnell Fire.
I think based on my information the FS is basically saying, There are no new lessons here, that are not already being used. The Safety directives need to be followed and enforced, Safety Officers are also being more aware of the briefings.
Just to update every one here on some things that are being discussed and implemented in house.
This is sort of the “this was just an AZ state cluster” view, that is similar to the response to the Safety Matters submission. In some respects it is accurate. For instance, the way things were handled after the burnover was not optimal, and the Feds have been much more professional in the past. But, there’s been more than one instance of someone being allowed to continue leading a crew despite sever interpersonal communication issues. So there are other leadership issues out there. There as has been discussed recently are real PPE issues in terms of practices. There is a systemic issue in terms of thinking that it is a sign of education and refinement to just “wing it,” rather than being old-school and following safety guidelines. There is a systemic issue in terms of unsafe behavior not being assessed and reported throughout the system. And, I’m sympathetic to the view that the 10 and 18 often are used to blame crew, rather than provide for safety.
At core, I think the lessons are not in the long series of basic mistakes made that day, or on earlier fires. That’s sort of like a restaurant serving bad meat because it was left in the sun. Yeah, don’t do that. The lessons are in the loose organizational and lax supervision that allowed leaving meat in the sun to be viewed as normal.
I have sorta kinda a different take on things, but I’m pretty close to your assessment.
This is all about systemic stuff coming out of hiding and becoming visible in all it’s confusion..
I came across an awesome re-definition of LCES:
“Let’s confuse everybody simultaneously.”
Systemic stuff ALWAYS shows it’s face, eventually, over time.
The only variable seems to be how much collateral damage is caused when it DOES come out
Marti you hit what we did way back when confuse and keep on talking till the Fire dose what you expected it to when the over head thinks you should do something else that was our way of saying no and still get the job done.
Which is probably even more likely when you have spent the day learning that the overhead hasn’t a clue as to how to fight the fire.
And now Doug Campbell is saying exactly the same thing.
And Chuck Maxwell weeps.
And I know Doug Campbell well another old school FF.
An old school fire-fighter with 21st century fire behavior analysis brilliance.
As I’ve read years full of months full of days full of the Wildfire.com forum archives, it always amazes me when he periodically pops in and describes exactly how the people on the fire being discussed completely mistook what the fire was doing, because, by his analysis, it was obviously doing exactly x, y, and z, and they completely didn’t see, much less comprehend it.
Yes he influenced me in fire training in R5 and Boise IAFC. But you also need the on the ground experience the books do not do it all.
Totally agree about the books.
I totally agree, TTWARE,
And, it seems to me, that the longer the systemic dysfunction continues the potentially greater the destructive consequences may be. (My own systemic dysfunctions excluded, of course).
Which is partially why I’m so concerned about this systemically dysfunctional investigation history/process. I believe IT is creating destructive consequences, and, from what I’ve read, I am not alone in that belief.
Well said My only thought is we could have a long discussion on the 10 being used to blame the use to be to identify mistakes to review what happened. They are rules as in any work environment if you faille to use them accidents and fatalities occur.
it is a what caused the accident or fatality. If it was none of the 10 then it was an outside influence like the 2 hilitack that died because the were put above a fire to build a helispot and forgotten until it was to late to pick them up. There deaths were not of their making but the overheads decision to put them there and then forget them. But I am sure we could go back and forth here with our different beliefs.
From all the expressed agony and anger I’ve read through over the past few weeks regarding investigations, it’s really clear to me that the mistranslation and thus use of the 10 and 18 to not just blame people, but to even criminally prosecute them, is the clear cause of the renaming of them from Orders to Principles.
And that’s a huge part of them getting kind of lost and orphaned in the resulting confusion.
I think you’ll be heartened to read this, by a relatively young helitac firefighter:
Chasing Fire
Reflections on South Canyon
Posted on June 5, 2014
http://chasingfire.wordpress.com/2014/06/05/reflections-on-south-canyon/#comments
…
“It started as I was sitting in the fire cache at the Lowman RD, on the banks of the South Fork of the Payette River, attending a session of the annual fire refresher training. When we got to the section on the Yarnell Hill fire video where Ted Putnam spoke, it occurred to me to ask how many people knew who he was, and why his opinion mattered. In a room with 30 or so people, ranging from first year firefighters to seasoned hands, nobody raised a voice to answer. To me it seems a minor tragedy in its own right that the man who championed human factors after South Canyon was an unknown in that room, on one of the busiest fire forests in the region.
That got me thinking, probably more than I should. Twenty years have passed since South Canyon, and many of the fresh faces on the firelines this year may not have even been alive when that event took place. While fires like South Canyon have made their impression on our policies, our training, and our regulations, it seems that in some places, the personal lessons are not being passed on to our young firefighters. They know “the rules,” and the safety reasons for doing the things we do, but it hasn’t been made personal for them. They know the what, but not necessarily the why, and I think as leaders and followers we should take steps to change that.
… The things I’ve thought most about in the last few weeks as I’ve read and re-read about those events twenty years ago can be summed up in a few lines of thought.
First is the idea of legacy, of remembering what those who came before us learned at great cost. It seems to me, from my experience, that we’re going through a generational shift that puts us in danger of losing touch with our history, and forgetting the lessons of our forebears. In some ways it’s because as our firefighters get younger, and technology and culture change, so do our habits. Storytelling and reading during slow times on the job have shifted to playing games on tablets, and checking the latest gossip on social media. Reading, while never especially popular among the personality types that tend to be attracted to fire jobs, has become more unpopular than ever. How then should we approach the topic? How can we pass on not only the knowledge, but the personal connection to those lessons?”
I’m not gonna quote any more of his post, because you really should read it. His thinking and writing are outstanding. He’s trying to combine the best of 21st thinking with the best of everything that has come before it.
Thank you MartI I will sit down With time and do that tonight.
**
** RE: THE MOST RECENT ARTICLE
The link to Mr. John Dougherty’s most recent article in the Phoenix New Times…
http://blogs.phoenixnewtimes.com/valleyfever/2014/09/families_of_the_fallen_granite_mountain_hotshots_are_not_getting_the_answer.php
>> On September 4, 2014 at 9:49 pm, Marti Reed said…
>>
>> There’s so much in this article I disagree with, I don’t even know where to begin.
>>
>> On the other hand, there are several things I agree with. So I still don’t know where to begin.
>>
>> There’s a lot here I don’t know what the sourcing is. So I can’t say.
>> On September 5, 2014 at 6:39 am, Marti Reed also said…
>>
>> Just for starters, how much time did we spend picking the evidence apart
>> and putting it back together to finally debunk the narrative that Eric was the
>> one that responded to that retardant drop?
Yes… it was a little disappointing to see Mr. Dougherty ‘reverting’ to basically the same TIMES for things as published in the SAIT ( when a lot of those times have been proven to be wrong ) and also referring to certain things published in the SAIT as if they were ‘fact’… like the 1637 “That’s where we want retardant” transmission supposedly from Marsh.
With regards to that particular transmission, however… I don’t think we ever did fully ‘debunk’ it.
That statement has always been a ‘greased watermelon’ and every time something else is discovered it tends to throw things back into question again.
Example: The ‘recently noticed’ IMG_1334 and IMG_1335 pictures taken at exactly 4:30 PM from Highway 89 ( just 7 minutes before Marsh’s supposed ‘That’s where we want retardant’ transmission and just 9 minutes before Steed’s first MAYDAY call ) both show that at 4:30 PM, the ‘smoke column’ hadn’t even started to ‘lay down’ yet.
Both photographs show there was ‘clear sky’ from the point where the photos were taken just north of the Ranch House Restaurant all the way back out to that western ridge where Granite Mountain started their descent into the box canyon.
That actually calls into question any assumptions that it would have been impossible for Marsh to have seen the flights of the aircraft there on the south side of the fire regardless of whether they were flying a ‘west to east’ or a ‘south to north’ pattern.
The truth now is… he probably COULD have seen whatever Bravo 33 was doing in that 4:30 to 4:37 PM timeframe… no matter WHERE he actually was there on the south side of that fire.
Also… it really all still comes down to that one statement from just one guy in just one airplane. ( John Burfiend in Bravo 33 ) that NO ONE else even reports hearing on that very popular A2G channel… but we still don’t know the full details of his own statement to the SAIT.
We still do NOT know if there was any actual CALL SIGN preceding this transmission that he seems to recall hearing.
The SAIT interview notes only said Burfiend seems to remember ‘Division A called’ and then said something about ‘That’s where we want retardant’.
It is STILL unclear how the SAIT actually attributed that reported transmission to Marsh.
Did Burfiend just THINK he recognized Marsh’s voice… or was Burfiend absolutely sure that radio callup to him ( on A2G channel ) was prefixed with a full “This is Division Alpha” call-sign prefix?
We simply still don’t know.
It also still is quite possible that just 90 seconds after that… we might actually be hearing Burfiend discussing the possibility of actually fulfilling a request for retardant for Marsh there at the start of that Helmet-Cam video.
It is still possible that at that moment… just shortly after Marsh’s “That’s where we want retardant” call… and just seconds before Steed’s first MAYDAY was going to hit the radio… Burfiend was talking with SOMEONE there in fire command ( probably not Marsh at that point ) and explaining that they would ‘give it a shot’ but that it was going to be difficult because of (quote) “That valley and all the smoke”.
I still personally believe that the 1637 transmission was just someone making an unsolicited ‘that is goodness’ call up to Bravo 33 with regards to the ‘spot on’ drop that had French had lined up and had taken place just before that transmission ( and that it wasn’t Marsh )…
…but SOMETHING still has to explain what that conversation we can hear with our own ears at the start of the Helmet Cam video was really all about.
It MIGHT have been a discussion about actually trying to fulfill the request that Marsh made at 1637 regarding ‘retardant’.
More to come…
Could it be possible that B33 was talking to Marsh when the helmet camera begins? If it wasn’t Marsh, who could it have been? Not Abel, Musser, or Cordes.
I have been listening to the helmet cam and have some observations.. The GM caller trying to contact air attack sounds pissed off! The calls (from GM7) after the in front of a flaming front call seem to me to be someone who is really mad. The calls do not sound (to me) like a call for help. The calls are angry and continue to get angrier until B33 tells them to QUIT.
There are repeated calls to air attack that go unanswered. Calls that are addressed to Bravo33 from OPS Abel and Div A are answered., promptly.
The background voice (of the Prescott 3) seems to think the GM7 caller is Eric..
Reply to calvin post on September 7, 2014 at 5:43 pm
>> calvin said…
>>
>> Could it be possible that B33 was talking to Marsh when the helmet
>> camera begins?
Well… it that conversation really WAS related to the SAIR’s reported 1637 transmission from Marsh about “That’s where we want retardant”… then YES… it certainly is possible this was Burfiend re-contacting Marsh and trying to clarify what he wanted and then saying “We’ll give it our best shot”.
However… if that really is the case… it’s inconceivable to me that this ‘followup’ conversation with a man who was about to die on the part of Burfiend would NOT have been mentioned by him and ALSO appearing in his notes.
If the SAIT had no problem reporting that Marsh seemed to be ASKING for retardant at 1637… then why would they feel any need to ‘hide’ or ‘coverup’ a followup conversation about that between Marsh and Burfiend.
>> clavin also said…
>>
>> If it wasn’t Marsh, who could it have been? Not Abel, Musser, or Cordes.
I think we have eliminated Cordes… but still not sure Abel and Musser can be crossed off the list. Yes… we hear Musser himself ‘calling out’ to someone in that Helmet Cam video but that was after the end of the other conversation and after Burfiend’s direct callout to SPGS1 Cordes ( who didn’t respond ).
Musser could have been the one talking to Burfiend when that Helmet Cam begins… and it also could have been Todd Abel.
However… same rule as above applies ( in my mind ).
It is inconceivable ( to me ) that neither Musser or Abel wouldn’t have recalled having this discussion with Burfiend and mentioned it in their interviews.
Makes you wonder if, at the time of their interviews, they were even aware that the ‘Helmet Cam’ existed.
If it wasn’t Musser, Abel or Cordes… then I don’t know who it might have been but it has to be a VERY short list.
Burfiend was REPORTING to someone and was already APOLOGIZING for maybe not being able to do a retardant drop that was being requested.
Who, other than Marsh himself or someone high up in fire command, would Burfiend even have felt the need to be doing that kind of apologetic ‘explaining’ to over the radio? Not many people.
It’s not like anyone there on the fire could just call up Air Attack and start making retardant requests and then Burfiend taking the requests seriously enough to feel the need to do that kind of ‘reporting’ back about it.
It had to be someone ‘high up’ in the chain of command that day.
Someone that Burfiend ( Air Attack ) WOULD have to ‘listen’ and ‘respond’ to.
I actually think it is just as important to identify WHO Burfiend was talking to at the start of that Helmet Cam video as it still is to identify WHO Eric Marsh was ‘reporting’ to at exactly 4:27 PM in the YARNELL-GAMBLE video.
And it shouldn’t be hard to find out.
It really is just a matter of talking to the people who were RECORDING those conversations which we can all hear part of… and asking THEM what else they heard and who was actually talking to who.
>> calvin also said
>>
>> I have been listening to the helmet cam and have some observations..
>> The GM caller trying to contact air attack sounds pissed off!
>> The calls (from GM7) after the in front of a flaming front call seem
>> to me to be someone who is really mad.
I would say that THIRD call to Air Attack in that sequence ( from Robert Caldwell ) is the one that obviously display frustration ( and anger ) and could almost be translated as “Goddammit… Air Attack… ANSWER ME!!”
As for Steed’s first MAYDAY… I’m not sure I’m hearing anger as much as just simply someone a little freaked out and trying to YELL over those chainsaws running right next to him just so he can even hear himself talking.
>> calvin also said…
>>
>> The calls do not sound (to me) like a call for help. The calls are angry
>> and continue to get angrier until B33 tells them to QUIT.
That I would agree with, yes.
See above.
By the time Caldwell is calling… and just before Todd Abel is about to jump in and tell John Burfiend to (basically) get his head out of his ass and ANSWER those men… there is an increasing level of frustration in the radio calls.
>> calvin also said…
>>
>> There are repeated calls to air attack that go unanswered.
>> Calls that are addressed to Bravo33 from OPS Abel and
>> Div A are answered., promptly.
Actually… it’s even more dramatic than that.
Listen carefully to Burfiend… and when Todd Abel jumps in and tells him to get his head out his ass and respond to the people who are (repeatedly and frantically) trying to talk to him… Burfiend’s entire tone and speech cadence suddenly ‘hops to’ like a guy who just got caught sleeping on a sofa and then jumps up saying “Yes, sir! Right away, sir!”.
As soon as Burfiend knew it was OPS1 ( Abel ) telling him to do something… he ‘hopped to’ and immediately changed his attitude and vocal tone and then started paying attention.
Those 1 minute and 58 seconds that were lost that day because Burfiend was CHOOSING not to respond to these radio calls from GM was a very critical time loss. The camera was rolling. If Burfiend had started interacting with those men right away ( as he SHOULD have )… then for another 1 minute and 58 seconds we may have learned some very critical things… even from Steed himself.
>> calvin also said…
>> The background voice (of the Prescott 3) seems to think the
>> GM7 caller is Eric..
I believe that is KC ‘Bucky’ Yowell who says ( as a question ) “Is that Eric?”.
I don’t think there was a direct verbal response from either Hulburd or Clawson.
Aaron Hulburd ( who was shooting the video ) may have just shrugged his shoulders at Yowell in response.
My Comment on Retardant—
Normally unless assigned to a Division Air attack would answer to the Ops Sec. Chief. The orders to air attack and conversation on drop location by B33 would be directed at OPS although there seemed to be 2 on this fire.
OPS would have had to turn the Air Attack over to Marsh for any Air Tanker Drops
That would be the only way to manage the Air resource with the demands on it when the Fire took off.
We do not have any confirmation that happened at that time of day.
Div. A was not using air drops after the mess in the morning of the Air Attack dropping on his Burn Out.
So my point Marsh had no authorization to request drops directly with B33.
Until the deployment and Ops asked B33 to hold the air tanker for support to the GM crew which they were then unable to locate or contacted.
At least that is the way it is supposed to work………………
Mr. Powers… thank you.
That is an important ‘summary’.
So… basically… what you are saying is that it would have been highly unusual for Eric Marsh (DIVSA) to have just come out of nowhere ( at 1637 ) with a direct call to Air Attack and suddenly trying to direct retardant drops… unless there had been some prior arrangement for him to be allowed to be doing that?
In the Panebaker Air-To-Air captures… we DO hear Rory Collins telling Thomas French ( just a few minutes before Collins was going to leave the fire and hand-off Air Attack duties to French / Burfiend ) that (quote) “My CONTACT down there was… uh… Division Alpha ).
Would that have normally been enough for Thomas French ( in Bravo 33 ) to then believe that if he got any calls from ‘Division Alpha’ down there on the south end of the fire that DIVSA was already, somehow, authorized to be the one directing retardant drops?
What I mean is… what we hear in the Panebaker Air-To-Air is just the airplane guys deciding for themselves who their ‘contacts’ are in a certain part of the fire and there is no conversation whatsoever about this with OPS.
Is THAT ‘normal’… or just one more place where things were pretty much ‘off the reservation’ that day?
I still believe there was a MASSIVE disconnect going on that day between Air Support and Ground Command.
Example: The near miss between the skycrane helo and the VLAT. Blue Ridge reports in their Unit Logs that it appeared as if the helos on the south end of the fire weren’t being managed by ANYONE and they were just ‘doing their own thing’ all day. Captain Brown’s Unit Log itself blames these ‘freelancing’ helos on the south end for actually ‘splitting’ the fireline as it approached Yarnell… which ended up not a good thing to have happened.
The Panebaker Air-To-Air channel captures seem to verify this complete lack of attention to what was happening on the SOUTH side of the fire.
We can hear Thomas French having a lot of direct interaction with helicopter Five Kilo Alpha ( 5KA ) and the standard “off the dip’ and ‘off the drop’ exchanges… but there is no conversation whatsoever recorded between French and the other TWO helicopters ( the skycrane and one other ) that were still busily ‘dropping’ on the south end.
There are absolutely no ‘off the dip’ or ‘off the drop’ notifications coming to French from those OTHER two helicopters. They were, apparently, just ‘doing whatever the hell they wanted down there’.
We still don’t even know where these other two choppers were actually ‘dipping’ from. Was it the same Horseshoe dip that 5KA was using up north in Peeples Valley… or were they actually using the PUMPKIN that had been set up at the Boulder Springs Ranch the day before?
These would also be the same two helicopters that can be heard passing directly over the St. Joseph Shrine area DURING the Helmet Cam video. Even then… whatever it was those two helos were doing down there on the south side of the fire… there is no recorded interchange between these TWO helicopters and Air Attack ( French on A2A channel ).
The Air guys were obviously competent at what they do ( for the most part )… but I still think that if all these radio captures indicate a ‘normal’ Air-Support operation at an up-level fire… that whole thing needs a good review as well.
There was this distinct lack of awareness as to what the ‘plan’ was on the ground or who was even down there working the fire.
French and Burfiend even admitted they had NO IDEA anyone was doing anything down there on the ground at all on that south side of the fire with regards to fighting the fire at ground level… and they weren’t even aware that the Blue Ridge Hotshots were even working the fire until they heard that on CNN later that night.
Also one more point ( and one more question for you ).
We still really have no idea if it was Eric Marsh ( as DIVSA ) who was ‘coordintating’ or ‘calling’ that retardant line operation out in the bowl that can be seen in the MacKenzie photos.
I’m talking about that LOOONG retardant line that seemed to run all the way from where GM was working and across the ‘valley’ over to a point way east near the base of Boulder Mountain.
That line of retardant was being ‘built’ earlier in the day when Rory Collins was still Air Attack… but it’s never been clear if Eric Marsh was participating in that operation from ground level and from his vantage point up on the ridge.
We have never heard enough from the elusive Mr. Rory Collins about ANYTHING he did that day. HIs SAIT interview notes were a joke.
So let’s say that Eric Marsh WAS actually ‘helping to direct’ the buildup of that retardant line with Collins ( Air Attack ).
Do you think that would have automatically made Marsh ‘think’ ( without any consultation with OPS ) that he was then supposed to also be directing retardant drops on the south side even later that afternoon?
Todd Abel does, in fact, tell Marsh… “We’ll get some Air Support down there ASAP”.
Do you think it’s possible Eric Marsh ( as DIVSA ) took that as more ‘authorization’ from OPS management to be ‘directing’ retardant drops down there on the south side when this ‘Air Support’ finally showed up?
Do you think it’s possible that part of Marsh’s MOTIVATION for ‘getting to town’ is because that’s where the Air Drops now needed to be and Marsh simply felt he was SUPPOSED to get to town ( as DIVSA ) and be the one helping to ‘direct’ those drops?
Remember there is a chain of command.
The 2 OPS were responsible for the requests for drops unless they told air attack to work direct with a line person.
Marsh had not worked with the Air Attack all afternoon so he would have been out of the use authorization until the May day we are in front of the flaming front and B33 was told or stated to OPS he would hold the tanker for the crew in trouble. I am wit Marti I still and have said before that was not a statement made by Marsh. My opinion.
Air Tanker drops are always priority and controlled by the IC or OPS not further down the chain of command un less it is stipulated by either one. A DIV dose not jump in and divert Air Tankers.
WTKTT on Marsh getting to town No that was not his Division or his current assignment. It is like every thing else with the crew it would have been to late any way. It was some one else’s responsibility and not his.
Copy that… but then how do we explain the actual captured radio recording ( circa 3:55 PM ) where we HEAR the departing Air Attack ( Rory Collins ) telling the people who are taking over Air Attack responsibilities specifically WHO the ‘authorized ground contact’ is supposed to be on the south side of the fire?
Rory Collins specifically tells Thomas French…
“MY contact down there was… uh… Alpha”.
Thomas French acknowldeges this with…
“Copy that. Contact is Alpha”.
I hear everything you are saying above… but the more I look at this I get a feeling that a lot of non-standard ‘assumptions’ were in play that day such as who was in CHARGE of what.
OPS1 was actually ‘out in the field’ at this time doing direct structure protection out on Miners’ Camp Road up in Peeples Valley.
SIDENOTE: This was mentioned by ADOSH. The Field OPS on the entire fire was doing direct, personal structure protection work at a time when a town needed to be evacuated, Air Support had shifted to the OPPOSITE end of the fire… and he also should have been the one making SURE that all firefighters were getting OFF the fire and to their safety zones. That became just part of ADOSH’s conclusion that management was too focused on structure protection that day and not paying adequate attention to other things at critical times.
There is NOTHING in OPS1 Todd Abel’s interview about him having ANY conversations with Air Support about who was supposed to be directing retardant drops on the SOUTH side of the fire.
His only concern was what HE was doing.
Structure Protection on Miners Camp Road and checking with Willis about how the work on Model Creek Road was going.
It is almost as if Todd Abel realized the Air Support needed to shift to the SOUTH ( and he told Marsh that was going to happen )… but then Abel was too busy himself to DIRECT that operation and just assumed the Air Guys would ‘figure it out’… or something.
I still think there is a possibility here that DIVSA Marsh somehow thought ( mistakenly or otherwise ) that it might have been HIS job to be ‘directing’ those retardant drops on the SOUTH side.
More to come on this.
I’m rechecking all my notes and all the evidence to see if there really is any indication WHO was supposed to be ‘directing’ Air Support as they shifted their attention to the SOUTH side of the fire… to that Division Z which had a non-existent DIVSZ supervisor that day.
That still actually comes into play here.
We are talking about Air Support now being told to ‘drop at will’ ( by Todd Abel as per request from Cordes )
and try and ‘save what they can’ of an entire town.
ALL of those drops were now going to be happening in the part of the fire designated ‘Division Z’… but the Division Z Supervisor was a ‘missing person’. No one even knew WHERE he was at that point.
Again… perhaps Marsh KNEW this.
Perhaps that contributed to Marsh *maybe* thinking it was ‘up to him’ to be the one to be calling those drops on the SOUTH side and this influenced his motivation and decision making at that critical time.
Again it is to know who are on the Divisions remember there was no written plan or map designating the fire break up or Div. knowing there was 1 Div. on the south side of the fire was important if you needed to contact them and who they were.
Normally just contact info. That’s my take.
Again the fire had burned out of all the divisions and we herd no discussion of where to drop. Marsh was not ordering retardant at that time B33 was advised he was the Div. A person to contact on the south side. That is standard when you have such a spread in the fire assignments.
I’m copying.
I think the questions you are asking are really important.
I don’t know the answers. They could possibly change my opinion of what’s going on here.
I still doubt that, even if Marsh considered himself to be authoritative/responsible regarding the aerial drops, and thus requiring himself to move. that would have influenced him in regard to moving the Granite Mountain crew.
Why do SOOOO many frickin’ threads have to end with what I am about to say.
Brendan McDonough probably knows more about this.
PS: Here’s a wild stab.
We can HEAR Marsh telling Steed…
“I knew this was comin’. I could just FEEL it, ya know?”
We have NEVER fully understood what Marsh was saying there.
What if what Marsh was REALLY referring to was the whole ‘Division Z’ thing?
He argues with a guy on the radio about ‘splitting’ the areas of responsibility down there on the south end of the fire… and after much consternation they seem to both AGREE that the ‘dividing line’ ( north / south ) would be the ‘old grader’ location.
That automatically put Yarnell into ‘Division Z’ and no longer part of ‘Division A’.
Then Marsh becomes aware that this Rance Marquez guy who he spent all that time consternating with is simply back up north somewhere ‘doing other things’ and making no more attempt to actually BE ‘Division Z’ than he was trying to be the man in the moon.
So now the fire shifts… and there is a geographic Division break that puts the threatened target area OUTSIDE of Marsh’s own official ‘Division A’.
But Marsh KNOWS there is no ‘DIVSZ’ looking after ‘Division Z’ at all. He’s a ‘missing person’.
Could that have been what Marsh “felt coming?”
That is wasn’t a good idea to make that ‘Division break’ in the first place just because some guy cards into the fire and needed something to do?
Was Marsh then making too much of ‘what he could feel coming’ and felt he had to DO something about it… like get his own ass over there to Division Z to direct retardant drops?
Again… ( and it still pains me to keep typing this ever-present phrase )…
Brendan McDonough probably knows more about this.
I’ve been following this conversation, but not saying anything. I wanted to see if anybody had anything to convince me that what I think is happening is incorrect.
I haven’t been convinced.
I still think Bravo 33 is, at the video’s beginning, focused on lining up the DC 10 to drop generally above Yarnell, not specifically over the crew. And, all things considered, that was difficult and complicated enough that, at that time, Burfiend didn’t have “his head in his ass,” but just didn’t recognize what he was hearing. I’m not willing to bash him for that. Burfiend and French are considered by everybody in this neck of the woods to be an awesome team.
And, because I think this drop wasn’t, originally, about GM’s predicament, but Yarnell’s, I’m thinking Burfiend would have probably been responding to Musser at the beginning of the video. Musser was the one, even tho he was busy at the Youth Camp area, generally trying to get/coordinate resources/focus to the south side of the fire.
At the time of the video, Musser and Cordes were in different places, not together. Musser was up at the Youth Camp and Cordes was in that area (I’m not looking at the map, just working out of my head so I can’t say the street names) north of the Ranch House Restaurant on the west side of 89 working on the evacuation of that neighborhood.
In that context, Burfiend’s callout to Cordes at the end would have made sense in that Cordes is. as SPG1, most “responsible” for, and most familiar with, that general area. He’s pretty much the official “ground contact.”
He easily could have forgotten that Cordes’ radio was not working properly (that communique about “dropping at will” had happened close to an hour before), or he was “testing” to see if Cordes’ radio was still not transmitting, or he was going to tell Cordes something whether or not Cordes could transmit back.
And I’m not at all surprised this stuff wasn’t included in the SAIT interview notes or report. And I’m not even surprised it didn’t surface in the ADOSH interviews. There’s tons of stuff we’ve been able to ferret out over the past NINE months that hadn’t been ferreted out as both the SAIT and ADOSH were scrambling to get their stuff together and published in VERY short order.
Probably TOO short order. There have been SAIRs that took over a year to publish. Of much less complicated incidents.
My two cents. Your mileage may vary.
Marti.
Are you saying that you do not think B33 was discussing GM’s predicament at the beginning of the helmet cam video?
If a line of retardant from a VLAT had been tied into the existing mounds that made up the North ridge of the deployment canyon, the fire break could have potentially slowed the oncoming fire . This could have potentially slowed the fire progression to the south, and protected GM, Glen Isla and part of Yarnell.. As we have been told, B33 was flying a west to east route when Marsh chimed in with “that is exactly where we want the retardant” Also, Cory Ball and Justin Hernandez were scouting near Glen Isla (with the dozer) to find place for an indirect line.
Yes, I’m saying I don’t think the beginning statement was about Granite Mountain, it was about Yarnell, about lining up something to connect to the 4:33 drop. And, yes, according to the aerial photos taken Monday, I think, there is a long southwestish to northeastish string of retardant drops all across Yarnell on the westish side of 89. They appear to have, essentially, stopped the fire that was burning towards Yarnell.
And one of those lines goes right thru the neighborhood Cordes and others were evacuating at 4:33 pm.
I have no clue atm where I found those photos. I posted the article here way back when. I didn’t get a response, so I didn’t continue trying to analyze them.
But I have the photos on my computer and can put them in my dropbox and post a link, if that’s helpful.
But first I need to close my 80k open webpages and reboot my computer and do a bunch of other irl things.
I have seen those pictures of the retardant along the west side of 89 also. But I do not see any retardant South of the Sesame area going West to East.
Here are two reasons I think B33 was talking about GM at the beginning of the helmet cam video.. The Prescott 3 heard something that made them pull over and begin recording. B33 says at the very beginning of the video “do the best we can,” and is heard again at around the 125 second mark saying the exact same words (this time definitely) concerning trying to help GM.
Why did B33 choose to never address GM7 who was calling him repeatedly except to tell him to quit? And when he told them to QUIT, he didn’t ask for any other information and ended that transmission quickly with BREAK.
It was like he didn’t want to acknowledge GM7!
Calvin I have to agree with Marti. They were in trouble before B33 tried to divert the Air Tanker
That’s where I want it was prior to the we are in front of the flaming front call to B33. They were working the town and B33 had been told GM was in the Black and he did not need to worry about them.
As long as this ‘greased watermelon’ ( The supposed transmission from Marsh about retardant ) is ‘back on the table’… here’s another angle on it.
We still do NOT know what Marsh was actually DOING all day.
The few reported radio captures later in the day certainly don’t account for his whereabouts or his activities for MOST of the morning and afternoon.
But we DO know that during that early afternoon period… Rory Collins ( as Air Attack ) was directing the early afternoon VLAT drops and that’s when they were laying that LOOONG line of retardant out in the valley itself from basically the point where GM was working all the way east to a point near the base of Boulder Mountain itself.
This is the same retardant line that was going to get ‘compromised’ later when the fire turned and Marsh would report this at 3:42 in that fire progress report he was giving directly to OPS1 Todd Abel.
What we still do NOT know is whether Marsh ( as DIVSA ) was actually helping to coordinate these retardant drops and was ‘directing’ the buildup of that retardant line.
Rory Colliins is captured in a Panebaker Air-To-Air channel transmission just minutes before he left the fire and handed ‘Air Attack’ duties off to Bravo 33. In that capture… Collins says to French…
“My CONTACT down there was… uh… Alpha”.
French ACKS this with… “Copy that. Contact is Alpha”.
So without any further discussion with any OPS person… it seems we actually HEAR the Air-To-Air guys deciding for themselves that the person to CONTACT on the SOUTH side of the fire about retardant drops is, in fact, Eric Marsh ( DIVSA ).
Right around the same time that conversation was being captured on the Air-To-Air channel we have the Caldwell video capturing Todd Abel talking to Eric Marsh directly and saying…
“We’ll get some Air Support down there ASAP”.
So I wonder if THIS actually had anything to do with Marsh’s actual MOTIVATION for getting himself ( and everybody else ) back to town ASAP.
I wonder if ( somehow ) Eric Marsh still felt it was his JOB as DIVSA to get into a position where he could be DIRECTING these upcoming retardant drops and the Air Support shifted to the SOUTH side of the fire?
At the time Todd Abel spoke to Marsh… he said nothing about coming down to the south side of the fire himself. He was ‘busy’ up north out on the Miners’ Camp Road area. Abel didn’t even try to come down to the south side until AFTER the deployment.
Marsh had already received that ‘are you still committed to the ridge?’ query from OPS2 Paul Musser… but it is unclear if Marsh actually knew that Musser had now jumped into things with both feet and was now acting as the second fully functioning ‘Field OPS’ on the fire.
So perhaps ( just perhaps ) Marsh had this idea in his head that it was his ongoing RESPONSIBILITY as DIVSA ( and the highest level command person on the south side of the fire ) to get to town ASAP and help DIRECT these upcoming retardant drops.
Maybe that’s where the actual URGENCY was coming from on Marsh’s part. Maybe Marsh felt like that is what he was SUPPOSED to do ( get to town as fast as possible and start directing retardant drops ).
If the SAIT was right about the 1637 transmission.. then that is exactly what we hear Marsh himself THINKING his ‘job’ was at that point.
He was somewhere close to town, probably AHEAD of GM but not all the way to the BSR yet… and he felt the need to start telling ‘Air Attack’ where they should be dropping retardant.
So maybe that explains the ‘shortcut’ through the canyon as well.
If it was MARSH ( himself ) who felt he had this ‘assignment’ to get to town ASAP and be directing retardant drops around a town that was about to burn down… then he WOULD have chosen what he felt was the ‘shortest route possible’… and Steed and the Crew were just ‘along for the ride’.
Tex ( Sonny ) Gilligan and Joy Collura have already said a number of times that a single person on foot trying to traverse that box canyon could ALWAYS make better time than a group of 18 men trying to stay in single file.
Maybe Marsh forgot to consider that.
In his own hurry to get EAST and into a position where he thought he could be ‘doing his job’ and calling out these retardant drops… maybe he just assumed the other 18 men could make the same time through the canyon that he had.
He was wrong. They got bogged down. They died… but perhaps it really was all about Marsh himself thinking that ‘hurrying to town to be the one to help call out retardant drops’ is what he was SUPPOSED to be doing at that time.
Thoughts?
Followup… I have always thought it was more important to establish what Eric Marsh was actually DOING for most of the day ( prior to Brendan leaving his lookout position ) than either the SAIT or ADOSH seemed to think… but perhaps now it’s even more important to know.
DIVSA Marsh only had his own GM Hotshot crew assigned to him.
Blue Ridge was basically working for Cordes most of the day and doing what Cordes wanted them to do.
Steed had things well in hand with GM just working on that anchor thing.
So what was Marsh really even SUPPOSED to be doing up there on that high ridge all day?
Well.. if it turns out that DIVSA Marsh did work with Collins on building that long retardant line… then it certainly could be said that DIVSA Marsh felt it was HIS job that day to be the one directing retardant drops for the SOUTH side of the fire.
He knew Todd Abel was ‘up north’.
We’re not sure what he knew about Musser ‘jumping in’ later.
So if Eric Marsh was convinced ( in his own mind ) that HE was highest level command person on the SOUTH side of the fire that day… and the one who was SUPPOSED to be directing retardant drops down there… then making it to town ASAP to help direct the retardant drops for the very ‘Air Support’ that OPS told him he was sending down there would have been ‘the mission’ he had assigned HIMSELF in the later afternoon.
Marsh might have felt he NEEDED to get to town… or he wouldn’t be ‘doing his job’. Steed and the others were just along for the ride.
But even if that was the case, which I’m not convinced of,
that wouldn’t have required Granite Mountain to reposition with him.
Sadly… you are absolutely correct.
All along we have been assuming that this was all about some desire Marsh and/or Steed might have had to get the whole crew down there ASAP and come charging into Glen Ilah like the cavalry, or something.
What if nothing could be further from the truth?
What if the PRIMARY ‘motivation’ up on that ridge really was just Marsh ( mistakenly? ) believing that ‘he was in charge of the south side of the fire’ and that HE absolutely NEEDED to get over to town ASAP…
…and somehow… GM ended up just straggling along behind him at what turned out to be a deadly pace.
Maybe the ‘final’ argument between Marsh and Steed went something like this…
“Jesse… I understand your comfort level isn’t high about moving… but I NEED to get to town ASAP and start directing those Air Drops because I’m DIVSA and the highest level command guy on this end of the fire.”
And then Jesse just said…
“Well.. okay… whatever. You go ahead then… but I guess we’ll come too so why don’t you mark the route you’re taking on the way and we’ll just bring up the rear.”
Steed might still have had no idea his decision to ‘move’ was going to involve traversing that box canyon… but Marsh simply went that way because HE was the one with this self-imposed urgent NEED to get to town and he didn’t like where the two-track would take him. Too much time to get there and be helping call out retardant drops as DIVSA.
I am not proposing an actual LOCATION for Marsh in the 1637 to 1639 timeframe. We KNOW that must have been with a 2 minute’s hard run from the deployment site.
I am just talking about possible MOTIVATIONS here.
This was one of the only times in Marsh’s life that he was able to be a ‘Division Supervisor’. He had ( supposedly ) just been directing retardant drops with Air Attack for most of the day ( we have no evidence Marsh was ever doing anything BUT talking on the radio that day ).
He may have totally mis-understood what Planning OPS Paul Musser was now doing or that he really was out of the ICP and actually down in Yarnell.
So Marsh might have had this over-eagerness to be a ‘Good DIVSA’ that day and might have mistakenly believed that as the senior commander on the entire SOUTH side of the fire… he had this RESPONSIBILITY to ‘get to town’ and be ‘running the show’.
Somehow… GM just got caught up in that… and died.
This is still just something I’m turning over in my head.
There is no real evidence to say ‘that is what was going down that day’… but it has occurred to me that there isn’t any evidence to prove it was NOT, either.
Again… Brendan McDonough ( or anyone else who knows more about what was being said between Marsh and Steed that afternoon ) could probably clear this up once and for all.
WTK
It sounds to me like there is an answer when the one guy says Is that Eric. I think someone else says “Eric”, like in an acknowledgement sort of way.
Without reading the SAIR, only going on memory,. Is the official story in the SAIR that ASM2/B33 was in discussion with SPGS1 (Cordes) when the call came in from Steed?
Again that is when Marsh said the were building a safety zone and burning out they were in deployment mode when that discussion happened.
Reply to calvin post on September 8, 2014 at 12:32 pm
>> calvin said…
>> It sounds to me like there is an answer when the one guy
>> says Is that Eric. I think someone else says “Eric”, like in
>> an acknowledgement sort of way.
The official transcript released with the Helmet Cam video
just seems to say that the next thing heard after “Is that Eric?”
is someone simply saying “I heard Granite Mountain 7”.
———————————————————
00:57 (16:34:06 hours)
Unseen firefighters on the road: (Talking amongst themselves)
Firefighter: Is that Eric?
Firefighter: I heard Granite Mountain 7.
Firefighter: I hear saws running. That’s not good.
Firefighter: Not when they are in a safety……
01:04 (16:34:12 hours)
Bravo 33: Operations, Bravo 33, I was copying that traffic on air to ground.
——————————————————–
SIDENOTE: I know that Marti finds it difficult to criticize French or Burfiend… but look at what Burfiend does at this point in the MAYDAY calls. OPS1 Todd Abel has called Burfiend asking him if he is ‘copying’ the actual MAYDAY calls and only now Burfiend takes the time to respond to Abel basically says “Yea… I can hear those calls”… but still makes no attempt to actually ANSWER the men who are frantically trying to get in touch with him.
That’s pretty much proof that Burfiend WAS hearing those calls… but he was CHOOSING to ignore them ( until OPS1 Able had to give him a direct ORDER to do so ). Not good.
>> calvin also said…
>>
>> Without reading the SAIR, only going on memory,. Is the official
>> story in the SAIR that ASM2/B33 was in discussion with SPGS1
>> (Cordes) when the call came in from Steed?
No. The SAIR actually seems to say unequivocally that the conversation we hear at the start of the Helmet Cam video
was between John Burfiend and OPS1 Todd Abel.
From the SAIR…
——————————————-
At 1637, ASM2 flies a drop path for a VLAT north of Yarnell west to east and apparently over DIVS A, turning northward to avoid high ground at the end of Yarnell. DIVS A, seeing the flight, calls and calmly says, “[ASM2], Division Alpha, That’s exactly what we’re looking for. That’s where we want the retardant.” ASM2 again circles the south end of the fire above Yarnell to line up a final flight path for a tanker drop. The aircraft crew is in the middle of a discussion with OPS1 on the air-to-ground frequency and the pilot is talking to the VLAT on the air-to-air frequency when an overmodulated and static-filled transmission comes over the air-to-ground frequency at 1639:
“Breaking in on Arizona 16, Granite Mountain Hotshots, we are in front of the flaming front.”
———————————————–
Here is the crucial part…
“The aircraft crew is in the middle of a discussion with OPS1 on the air-to-ground frequency and the pilot is talking to the VLAT on the air-to-air frequency when an overmodulated and static-filled transmission comes over the air-to-ground frequency at 1639:”
So it seems the SAIT was SURE Burfiend was talking to OPS1 Abel when Steed’s first MAYDAY hits the radio.
What they do NOT say is what that conversation was ABOUT.
It STILL could be that Todd Abel had heard Marsh’s call at 1637 and was then following up with Burfiend about whether they were going to be able to do what Marsh was asking.
It’s still possible.
Once again… the SAIT is making ‘declarations’ and assigning conversations to people but then not providing near enough detail to understand exactly what was happening.
Followup… even though the SAIR seems to state unequivocally that the conversation we hear at the start of the Helmet-Cam video was between John Burfiend and OPS1 Todd Abel ( on the A2G channel )…
…OPS1 Todd Abel himself makes no mention of THIS conversation in his interview with ADOSH.
In his ADOSH interview… when there were asking them to just freely report what he was doing leading up to the MAYDAY calls and the ‘we are deploying’ traffic… all Todd Abel says is that
he was working up north on structure protection and all of sudden he hears someone screaming on the radio.
He says NOTHING about actually talking to Air Attack just 9 seconds before the ‘screaming’ actually started.
Again, i don’t even know where to begin. I’ve been slogging through trying to learn the history of these investigations. We can’t look at the Yarnell Hill Fire in isolation, Which is pretty much what we’re doing. Because it doesn’t exist in isolation. Not even remotely.
I am looking at how CONFLICT/potential CONFLICT of interests shapes investigations. Somebody really needs to write a book about this. It’s the stage upon which the whole Yarnell investigations/lawsuits etc are playing themselves out. And it’s excruciatingly complicated and controversial.
What I immediately jumped to, in my mind, when I read your post was the investigation of the Dude Fire, under the Arizona Mogollon Rim, which happened right when I was migrating from Flagstaff to Albuquerque in June of 1990. Five Perryville Inmate crewmembers and one of their crew supervisors were killed there when a fire blew up under a column collapse. Perryville Inmate crewmembers were on the Yarnell Fire.
The USFS SAIR on the Dude Fire was fairly detailed. all things considered, given it’s time and place. It was just a record of events. It was not geared toward “Lessons Learned,” or towards either “protecting” or “blaming” anybody. It was just a narrative of what happened.
Anyway, to get on with this.
I spent yesterday afternoon reading the MINUTELY detailed account of the Dude Fire published by Mike Johns in 2009. Mike Johns was a lawyer who successfully defended the State of Arizona against claims by the families that they should have been compensated for the deaths of their inmate-crew loved ones by the State of Arizona.
Because, in his mind/legal analysis, since the fire was a USFS Fire, the feds/USFS was the dead fire-fighter’s employer, and thus, legally liable for their deaths. He lost that fight.
But his narrative of what happened was so incredibly detailed, in contrast to what we are looking at here. And much more detailed, compared to the SAIR of the Dude Fire. I don’t know how he sourced it. But it’s a Must Read. And it proves it’s possible to gather the evidence and report (including to the public) the details that lead up to a serious multiple fatality burnover.
And, all things considered, I’m sure this report was was a major source (because she cited it) in Jaime Joyce’s recent Wildfire.com article which I stumbled across but don’t have open right now so can’t source it from there.
Jaime Joyce very detailed article “Burn” about the Dude Fire:
http://www.thebigroundtable.com/stories/burn/
Mike John’s excruciating detailed article about Dude Fire:
http://www.fireleadership.gov/toolbox/staffride/downloads/lsr11/lsr11_Dude%20Fire_Mike_Johns_2009.pdf
There is, according to this detailed record, to me, no reason we (including the public, the wildfire-fighters, and their families) shouldn’t have access to, at least, as a start, objective, relatively detailed, accounts of the facts regarding accidents on a wildfire.
If it was possible to gather those facts, in 1990, on the Dude Fire, why is it, seemingly, so difficult to gather those facts on the Yarnell Fire?
Oh yes, I forget. the Original Dude Fire Accidental Report:
http://www.wildlandfire.com/docs/2003_n_before/dude/dude-fire-sai90.pdf
Reply to Marti Reed post on September 7, 2014 at 9:57 pm
>> Marti wrote…
>>
>> Because, in his mind/legal analysis, since the fire was
>> a USFS Fire, the feds/USFS was the dead fire-fighter’s
>> employer, and thus, legally liable for their deaths.
>> He lost that fight.
That’s because he was going after the FEDS.
Totally different story with Yarnell.
It will be a hard road to go for the State of Arizona Forestry Division to try and say they were NOT Granite Mountain’s de-facto ’employer’ that day ( ALL day )…
…especially for Eric Marsh… who was ‘promoted’ to the command position of ‘Division A Supervisor’ for that Arizona State Run fire that day and was going to be able to BILL the State of Arizona for that ‘command position’.
If the ‘fire command’ on an Arizona State Run fire cannot be said to be ’employed’ by the State of Arizona on one of their own fires… then who is?
>> Marti also wrote…
>>
>> But his narrative of what happened was so incredibly detailed, in
>> contrast to what we are looking at here. And much more detailed,
>> compared to the SAIR of the Dude Fire. I don’t know how he
>> sourced it.
>>
>> But it’s a Must Read. And it proves it’s possible to
>> gather the evidence and report (including to the public) the details
>> that lead up to a serious multiple fatality burnover.
If he was an attorney in that civil litigation ‘case’… then he had all kinds of ‘powers’ that no investigator from someting like a SAIT or an ADOSH investigation would have had.
He could COMPEL witnesses to testify ( with court orders ) and/or just issues subpoenas for evidence and/or appearances in court. Failure to comply is ‘contempt of court’ and can result in JAIL time.
If, during discovery, credible information is uncovered that evidence related to the case has been altered, withheld ( or even destroyed )… then the penalties for that are the same as they would be if it was a criminal case. It’s a FELONY.
>> Marti also wrote…
>>
>> What I immediately jumped to, in my mind, when I read your
>> post was the investigation of the Dude Fire, under the Arizona
>> Mogollon Rim, which happened right when I was migrating from
>> Flagstaff to Albuquerque in June of 1990. Five Perryville Inmate
>> crewmembers and one of their crew supervisors were killed there
>> when a fire blew up under a column collapse. Perryville Inmate
>> crewmembers were on the Yarnell Fire.
Funny you should mention the ‘Dude Fire’ and the ‘Perryville’ crew.
So did Mike Dudley ( in relation to Yarnell ).
In Mike Dudley’s ‘speech’ to the Utah firefighters on June 20, 2014, he stopped and made the same ‘reminder/connection’ about the Perryville crew that was there in Yarnell on Saturday being the same organization that lost men in the Dude Fire.
Dudley mispronounced it as ‘Perryview’ instead of ‘Perryville’… but he still wanted to make that ‘connection’ back to the Dude Fire at that point in his ‘speech’.
It was when he was explaining Russ Shumate’s decision to NOT put anyone up in the fire on Friday evening…
Mike Dudley said…
———————————————————————–
His ( Russ Shumate’s ) decision was to wait ’till the next morning
and then make initial attack that first start in the morning. He had
a… uh… BLM helicopter. He had a Department of Corrections
crew… the Lewis crew… uh… that was on site. Uh… keep that in
mind that the Perryview crew… which is also Arizona Department of
Corrections… had been the crew that was burnt over and had fatalities
during the Dude fire… and the Dude fire is a… until Yarnell… was the
huge history for the southwest.
————————————————————————–
** WHAT IS ADOF ACTUALLY CONTESTING?
The Arizona Department of Foresty ( ADOF ) was actually pretty specific in their ‘letter of contest’ with regards to the ADOSH findings.
Arizona Assistant Attorney General Paul A. Katz ( who sent ADOSH the letter ) said the reason the citations were being ‘contested’ is because…
(quote) “the violations, citations and penalties are not supported by substantial evidence”.
So, according to Scott Hunt and ADOF… it really is all about “What do we know and what do we not know”… or ( more specifically )… “We don’t think ADOF knew ENOUGH to issue those citations”.
If ADOF really plans to go down that road… it’s going to start looking pretty bad for them ( and their contracted SAIT team ) when the plaintiff’s attorneys can start proving that whatever ADOSH might not have known is because ADOF itself was not fully complying with LEGAL requests for ALL the evidence they had related to the Yarnell Hill Fire.
You don’t even need to get into the ‘disappearing evidence’ from the Peeples Valley firefighters ( some of whom also almost DIED that day for the same reasons mentioned in the ADOSH citations ).
Just ONE Example: Dudley’s comments alone. He has set ADOF up for a fall by even ever mentioning that they received (written) allegations of the argument between Marsh and Steed but then none of that ‘evidence’ was ever turned over to ADOSH.
Whoops!
Pretty hard to accuse someone of ‘not knowing enough’ when it might turn out
that YOU are actually the reason they didn’t know all that they SHOULD have.
Here is a link to the actual original letter sent to ADOSH from Paul A. Katz, Arizona Assistant Attorney General, contesting the ADOSH findings and requesting an appeal hearing…
http://ftpcontent.worldnow.com/kpho/KPHO%20NEWS/YHF%20AG%20letter%2012-19-13.pdf
Here is a complete ‘text’ version of that actual letter…
———————————————————-
STAMP: Received by ICA ADOSH 13 DEC 19 AM 9:28
Letterhead Logo says: Attorney General Arizona
Letterhead:
Office of the Arizona Attorney General
Civil Division / Natural Resources Section
Tom Horne – Attorney General
Paul A. Katz – Assistant Attorney General
Direct Phone No. (602) 542-7758
Email: Paul.Katz ( at ) AZAG.GOV
Date: December 19, 2013
VIA HAND DELIVERY ( UNDERLINED )
TO: Bill Warren, Director
Arizona Division of Occupational Safety and Health
Industrial Commission of Arizona
800 West Washington Street
Phoenix, AZ 85007
RE: Arizona State Forestry Division’s Notice of Contest of
Citation and Notification of Penalty in Case No. L3419-317242683
Dear Mr. Warren:
I am writing this letter on behalf of the Arizona State Forestry Division and the State Forester, Scott Hunt, in reference to the alleged violations, citations and penalties issued in your case number L3419-317242683. This letter is being written pursuant to A.R.S 23-417, et seq, and R20-5-624, Arizona Administrative Code. On behalf of my clients, we hereby contest each of the three issued citations, including all subparts, the underlying violations, the penalties and abatement dates that are set forth in your Citation and Notification of Penalty formally issued on December 5, 2013, and served upon the Arizona State Forestry Division that same date.
The grounds for the requested hearing are that the violations, citations and penalties are not supported by substantial evidence, are contrary to law, arbitrary, capricious and constitute an abuse of discretion by the Industrial Commission of Arizona. Accordingly, we are requesting that this matter be immediately transmitted to the Hearing Division of the Industrial Commission of Arizona for review pursuant to R20-5-624(A), Arizona Administrative Code.
The State Forestry Division and the State Forester remain amenable to participating in a settlement conference and/or alternative dispute resolution.
Your prompt attention to this matter is greatly appreciated.
Sincerely
( SIGNED ) Paul A. Katz ( Arizona Assistant Attorney General )
PAK:dal
cc: Laura McGrory, Director, Industrial Commission of Arizona
Andrew Wade, Chief Legal Counsel, Industrial Commission of Arizona
Scott Hunt, Forester, Arizona State Forestry Division.
————————————————————-
** WHO’S WHO ( for ADOSH, anyway )…
** BILL WARREN
Bill Warren wasn’t even appointed to be the Director of ADOSH until May 9, 2013… and he didn’t start his job as Director until May 20, 2013… just 1 month and 10 days before the Yarnell tragedy.
He was not voted in by ALL of the commissioners.
It was a CLOSE vote… just 3 to 2 in favor of Warren becoming Director.
At the same time the commission voted to appoint Warren Director, they also allocated a ‘midpoint’ annual salary for him at $88,766.91.
Prior to being appointed the new ADOSH Director… Warren was the Coconino County risk manager.
The Coconino National Forest is in Coconino County… which is the ‘home base’ for the Blue Ridge Hotshots.
Before that, he was the ‘risk manager’ for Maricopa County.
He’s a 30 year Navy man who still works as a Master Chief Petty Officer for the U.S. Navy Reserve.
** LAURA MCGRORY
She is the (current) Director of the Industrial Commission of Arizona.
She’s an attorney.
From Laura McGrory’s PUBLIC ‘BallotPedia’ page.
BallotPedia: An Interactive Almanac of U.S. Politics
——————————————————–
Laura McGrory
Political career
Director of the Industrial Commission 2008-Present
McGrory was hired to the position in November 2008.
As the director is employed at the pleasure of the
commission, she is not subject to reappointment.
Before becoming director, McGrory worked for the industrial
commission as a staff attorney in its legal division; during her
tenure, she also worked as the commission’s chief counsel
and assistant chief counsel.
——————————————————
** ANDREW WADE
Andrew Wade, ADOSH Chief Legal Counsel
Phoenix: 800 W Washington St, Phoenix AZ 85007
Phone: (602) 542-5781
FAX: (602) 542-6783
Andrew Wade heads up an in-house legal staff of 22 people, including seven attorneys. These attorneys represent and provide counsel to the ICA in a variety of legal matters before the ICA and before other Arizona courts (justice, superior, and appellate) including:
Representing the Arizona Division of Occupational Safety and Health (“ADOSH”) regarding contested occupational, safety, and health cases.
** COLLECTION?
What is IRONIC here is that when ADOSH itself is having trouble collecting the fines they have levied in Arizona… they have to request the help of ( you guessed it ) the Arizona State Attorney General’s office ( the very same people who filed the notice of Contest on behalf of Arizona Forestry ).
** SETTLEMENT?
Notice that the letter from Mr. Katz to Mr. Warren offers an ‘alternative’.
Scott Hunt of ADOF is holding out a ‘fig leaf’ and is saying they are willing to consider some kind of ‘settlement’ rather than go to war over the issue that ADOSH didn’t “know enough” to issue the findings they did.
Even if Hunt gets a ‘settlement’ out of ADOSH ( not likely )… that still won’t affect the civil litigation. There’s already enough evidence presented by ADOSH that it was an ‘unsafe workplace’ to rise above the ‘Exclusive Remedy’ clause and the ‘statuatory limitation’ rules of plain vanilla workers comp death benefits.
I still think ADOSH will be able to cut ADOF to pieces ( legally speaking ) just over the fact that there is now all kinds of information about evidence that ADOF had in their possession that they NEVER provided to ADOSH… even though they were legally REQUIRED to.
“Oh what a tangled web we weave… when first we practice to deceive”
Sir Walter Scott (Marmion, 1808)
Followup… CORRECTION for above.
Some ‘acronym dyslexia’ above.
I typed ADOF in a crucial place where I meant to type ADOSH.
Paragraph above should have read like this…
“So, according to Scott Hunt and ADOF… it really is all about “What do we know and what do we not know”… or ( more specifically )… “We don’t think ADOSH knew ENOUGH to issue those citations”.
It will, in fact, be ironic if it turns out that the reason ADOSH didn’t know all they SHOULD have… is because the Arizona Division of Forestry itself was actively PREVENTING that from happening.
Before I read all of your detailed comment, and plunge into the details, I just want to say one thing.
I am hoping to soon write up, in general, what I have been able to put together in my head about the long and winding and rocky road that leads to the Yarnell investigations.
It’s conflicted, complicated, controversial, agonzing, and, for many, not even remotely headed in the direction of ‘A Just Culture.”
And, on top of all that, the Yarnell investigation process is, I suddenly realized, a hybrid. There’s no SOP that exists to guide it. I is being (because it has to be) invented as everybody goes along. It, essentially has no precedent.
The closest thing I could find was the fairly recent (like around 2008) fatality on the Steep Corner Fire in which a USFS firefighter was killed on a fire managed on private land by a cooperative regional team. It was relatively simple, as accidents go. But the complexity/conflict created by the different agencies involved, led to a SAIR that a lot of fire-fighters took great issue to.
I pretty much agree with your assessment.
Another irony — at the time of the Dude Fire Scott Hunt trained the Perryville Crew, according to Jaime Joyce.
Thanks for detailing out the details.
One of the systemic problems with this long and winding road of investigations is that, as fire-fighters relentlessly say, a fire is not a fair equivalent to a standard “workplace.”
And, as they relentlessly say, the only way to provide a “safe workplace” to fire-fighters is to not send them to the fire in the first place.
I don’t think I’ve ever seen a working fire-fighter even remotely expressing relief and happiness with an ADOSH/OSHA review.
I think this could play out in more varieties of ways than what you are seeing. But what you are seeing is the beginning of a good framework to build on for understanding what’s happening as this plays out.
It’s definitely time to buy stock in popcorn.
As I’ve written before, this ain’t gonna get any better anytime soon.
**
** MIKE DUDLEY’S BACKGROUND
Reply to Bob Powers post on September 6, 2014 at 1:52 pm
>> Bob Powers said…
>>
>> OK so here I go again–Mr. Dudley what fire background do really have?
>>
>> My indication is you are a professional collage Forestry graduate.
>> You never worked your way up thru the Wild land Fire Fighting ranks and
>> yet you profess to know it all.
>>
>> One of the biggest problems today with overhead on Wild land Fire they
>> do not have the on the ground experience. THE SCHOOLOF HARD KNOCKS
>> to manage fire on the ground.
>>
>> This is why the federal agencies are picking up old trained WLFF as AD’s
>> to fill positions on overhead teams. I can guarantee the Safety officers that
>> are current AD’s on Fire will not put up with Rolled up sleeves.
>>
>> Back to Mr. Dudley His understanding of crews and wildland fire leaves me
>> a little concerned with his actual qualifications.
>>
>> Maybe I am wrong but the way he talks gives me that feeling.
Mr. Powers…
Not much was said about Mike Dudley when the SAIT was first announced.
The Arizona Republic article that first identified the leaders of the
SAIT in a July 6, 2013 article only said this ( about Karels and Dudley )…
Article Title: 2 investigators into Yarnell fire deaths are experienced
By Craig Harris and Michelle Ye Hee Lee
The (Arizona) Republic – Sat Jul 6, 2013 11:10 AM
http://www.azcentral.com/news/arizona/articles/20130706yarnell-fire-investigators-deaths-experienced.html
From this July 6, 2013 article…
—————————————————————————-
The leader of the team that will investigate the deaths of the 19 Granite Mountain Hotshots who died Sunday in the Yarnell Hill Fire is a forestry professional with more than three decades of experience in wildfire suppression and land management.
Jim Karels, Florida’s state forester, will lead the investigation with Mike Dudley of the U.S. Forest Service acting as his secondary team leader, the Arizona State Forestry Division has announced.
Dudley has served as a director for state and private forestry regions since 2009. Previously, he was the director of fire, aviation and air management for the Forest Service’s Intermountain Region. Dudley still serves on various national fire-training cadres.
The State Forestry Division declined to disclose the identities or professional backgrounds of other team members, citing an interest to not hinder the investigation.
Dan Barr, a Phoenix attorney who specializes in First Amendment issues, called the lack of transparency “nonsense.”
“There is no valid reason not to disclose the names of all nine members of the investigative team. I cannot conceive of how knowing the names of all the members of the investigation team could hinder the investigation in any way,” Barr said.
—————————————————————————
It was pretty hard to find out anything else out about Dudley…
but I did find at least one thing online that resembles a resume’ for him.
On October 18 and 19, 2011, Dudley was one of the speakers at a
conference held at Utah Stage University ( Logan, Utah ).
The TITLE of the conference was…
Restoring the West – 2011
Sustaining Forests, Woodlands, and Communities
Through Biomass Use
At this conference… Dudley gave a 30 minute talk…
Agenda – Tuesday, October 18
USU Eccles Conference Center
8:40 to 9:10 am Biomass Utilization: A Tool for Forest Restoration,
By Mike Dudley, Director of State and Private Forestry, Regions One and Four,
USDA Forest Service, Ogden, Utah
The following PDF document summarized the conference and included
some ‘biographies’ of all the speakers… including Dudley…
( NOTE: Link to document will be posted as a Reply to this message )
On page 5 of this PDF file is a short resume’ for Dudley…
———————————————————————————
Speaker Abstracts – In order of presentation, presenting author in italics
Biomass Utilization: A Tool for Forest Restoration
Mike Dudley,
Director State and Private Forestry,
USDA Forest Service,
Regions One and Four,
Intermountain / Northern Regions,
324 25th St., Ogden, UT 84401
Email: mdudley ( at ) fs.fed.us.
Mike began his Forest Service career as a seasonal firefighter on the Descanso Ranger District of the Cleveland National Forest, CA in 1977. Mike worked seasonally on various national forests in California before receiving his career conditional appointment on the Inyo National Forest, CA in 1980.
In 1981 he moved to the Willamette National Forest, Oregon and worked in various fire/fuel positions including District Fire Management Officer. In 1997 he moved to the National Office, Washington, DC and during his 4 years there filled a number of positions in aviation, planning, and ending as the Assistant Director of Fire Ecology including National Fire Plan Key Point 3 Coordinator (Hazardous Fuels) for the US Forest Service.
He moved to the Intermountain Regional Office as Director Fire, Aviation, Air Management in October, 2001.
In September 2009 he moved into his current position as Director State and Private Forestry for the Northern and Intermountain Regions of the US Forest Service. He recently completed a detail as Acting Director Northeast Area State and Private Forestry in Newtown Square, Pennsylvania.
EDUCATION…
Mike received a B.S. in Forest Management from Oregon State University in 1986.
—————————————————————————————–
Dudley’s LinkedIN page then nails down exactly when he was at Oregon
State University getting his BS in Forest Management. It was from 1983 to 1986.
Mike Dudley’s LinkedIN page…
( NOTE: Actual Link to his LinkedIN page will be posted as a Reply to this message ).
http://www.linkedin.com/pub/mike-dudley/5/8b9/958
———————————————
Mike Dudley:
Occupation: Government Administration
Mike Dudley’s Employment Histroty Overview:
As of 2001: Director; Fire, Aviation, Air Mgnt at US Forest Service
Mike Dudley’s Education
Oregon State University: 1983 – 1986
————————————————————————-
Followup… direct link to the 2011 conference PDF document that contains
the short resume’ mentioned above for Dudley…
http://forestry.usu.edu/files/uploads/RTW2011Media/RTW%20Booklet_FINAL%20Proof.pdf
Looks like I was wrong I’ll have to eat my words on that one.
Thanks WTKTT
All I see is some ‘seasonal employment’ as an FF in a particular District and for a particular National Forest. No real ‘Hotshot’ experience.
He only did the ‘seasonal’ stuff for 3 years in California. ( 1977 – 1980 ).
What does a ‘career conditional appointment’ mean?
That’s what his ‘seasonal work’ led to at some other National Forest in California in 1980.
Is that a desk job… after just 3 years of ‘seasonal work’ as an FF?
From 81 on probably desk jobs with a degree was able to move rapidly thru fire jobs Fire management officer fuels etc. and a lot of training, because of his positions. He would have a lot of background in fire and supervision.
Not a lot of actual crew experience. His regional Fire staff would have given him some insight to HS crews in Region 4. He also was on type 1 teams as I understand. So enough to know some of what he was talking about. Although some things he said were way out in left field. Again I think his positions were gained from education rather than in the field as far as Fire fighting.
One thing as of late The Forest service made it a requirement that Forest Fire Management Officers had to have a Bachelors degree to be promoted to that position. Most in my time were ground pounders who learned fire suppression in the trenchless. They promoted based on knowledge and supervision skills. A lot of Forestry Graduates are moving up fast thru the ranks with out the basic skills which is causing havoc in Fire suppression and the old verses the new.
Or as we discussed the Hillbilly rules verses modern Idealism.
The new way of investigating Fatality Fires.
The 10 standard orders are old and out dated.
There used against fire fighters to find fault.
Its to hot and uncomfortable so we can fight fire with our sleeves rolled up. Old safety rules do not need to be followed.
The ones still following the rules were trained by old school supervisors like me but they are slowly retiring and being replaced so the lord only knows where Safety will be in another 10 years.
Oh forgot to answer your question.
Career Conditional appointment— To a basic full time position.
from a seasonal position.
Followup… direct link to Mike Dudley’s PUBLIC ‘LinkedIN’ page…
http://www.linkedin.com/pub/mike-dudley/5/8b9/958
To the subject of Marsh and not being able to live with himself I can attest to some Fire Fighters I have known.
HS Supt. King El Cariso HS after the loss of half his crew in 1966 he was transferred out of Fire and ended up quitting the FS because of that disaster. A friend of mine watched 5 of his crew die in a helicopter crash before his eyes he switched to Fed. Law enforcement and did not go back to Fire fighting.
I agree with Mike and TTWARE it is something you are never prepared to face You are responsible and you give orders but you are not the Military that accepts causalities. Fire Fighting can be done and is done safely as a supervisor you strive to prevent injuries and any fatality no matter how hazardous the job, every one should go home. The Forest Service dose not prepare you as a supervisor to deal with the deaths of the people who work for you. your fault or not you have to live with what happened. And that is a life time of regret. like a car accident that kills one of your family and you were the driver.
So yes If Marsh or Steed would have survived they would have been devastated by the loss of even one crewman. They were all like there brothers as I have tried to explain before.
I do not know how McDonough is handling this even though he was not in charge he was one of them and they are all gone. That would be a devastating nightmare to go to bed with every night
and wonder why you were chosen to not be with them look their families in the face and realize your alive and there loved ones aren’t. Not a happy ending. I doubt he will ever return to the Fire lines again.
After reading some of the comments on JD news article I have a couple of comments.
They were attacking JD over the rolled up sleeves statement. By they I mean some current Fire Fighters .
Least it be lost—The sleeve thing is simple it is a mandatory safety requirement for all wild land fire fighters. Those that work under the NWLF Agencies have a safety directive that includes Fire Retardant Shirts with sleeves rolled down and fastened, gloves, Fire retardant pants, helmets and 8 inch laced boots with nonskid sole Chain saw chaps for sawyers, goggles or safety glasses, Fire shelters and so on. These are mandatory safety equipment and how they must be used There are no exceptions. Those not meeting the safety requirements should be reprimanded along with a written safety violation. Old school that’s the way it was. You got caught with out you gloves or your sleeves rolled up on a fire you were in for a major ass chewing period.
Again these modern smarter fire fighters are fore getting basic safety or ignoring the safety directives that spell out the requirements. From the statements I read someone needs to start doing some major ass chewing. You are required to follow the safety rules like any other industry job. So those jumping on JD better look up the Safety directives because they are way off base on this one. Be a safe HILLBILLY………………
Some people commenting on Mr. Dougherty’s article are out hunting for any pictures they can find of Granite Mountain working with their sleeves rolled DOWN.
They can find all the pictures like that they want.
Here are all the YCSO Police photos taken of the remnants of the crew’s clothing recovered from the place where they all died.
The photos that show basically nothing left at all but the shirt collar and sleeves still show that the sleeves were all rolled up (apparently) even above the elbow.
WARNING: Some people might consider these photos to be very ‘disturbing’ images.
Do NOT click the link below unless you are prepared to see ‘graphic’ images.
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/02ue6bnjp6nazkm/AABif6a3P6ksNpqYz_Fk9H1Sa/Photos%20and%20Video/shelter%20photos?dl=0#/
@WTKTT …You are somewhat misleading in your statement regarding the YSCO photographs. Since my son is one of the GMHS members I have looked at and studied this set of pictures very closely? I again reviewed them before making this post, while some of the cuffs are up; none are more than one roll up. As for the PPE of those who clearly were “FULLY” deployed as well as others, most all of the cuffs and sleeves are intact, as well as the front of the shirt on a number of them. Lastly keep in mind that photos were taken days after and removal from the Victim, so I am not sure that you can make fully inform opinion of FACT. Upon reading JD’s article I am dismayed by the pervasive thread that is wove through this article, in which, quoted by so called EXPERTS, Bob Powers and other unnamed Firefighters stating a “ROUGE” Safety Attitude by GMHS. Admittedly there are plenty of Pictures of the GMHS crew with Cuffs rolled; these same experts don’t seem to notice that Members of the Blue Ridge crew also had Cuffs rolled. All it takes it a look at several Wildland fire videos and you will find at least 50% of crews with rolled cuffs or at the least exposed wrists, this include several of the USFS Shot Crews. Lastly on this subject GMHS did NOT perish because they did or didn’t roll cuffs. Many of them simply Burned to death, and why? Because of the POS Fire Shelter they are provide for the last ditch safety gear.
David I only address the problem which seems to be ramped in this day and age of not following the safety directives all Fire shirts were designed to have the wearer work with the sleeves down and the Velcro making the shirt sleeve tight.
That is the only way it provides safety.
I fully support the Fire shelter improvement as I have for many years..
We need to first address the Failure of following the Safety rules. Having failed to identify the 10 standard Orders put them in as you say the last ditch safety gear.
How ever remember that even in the use of fire shelters the Fire retardant clothing should be worn to cover the entire body and you should also be wearing gloves to hold the shelter in place. As I said earlier some crews follow the safety directives to the letter some do not those that do not face the possibility of severe burns to there arms and hands. You can fined more crews adhering to the rolled sleeves rolled down and fastened when on the fire line than those that roll them up. I identified 2 crews earlier to look at that were on the happy camp fires.
Safety attitude has a lot to do with situation awareness. McDonough’s
Attitude on the 10 and 18 reflects poorly on GM that is all we are discussing here did it play a roll in what happened I think so. PPE is a part of each individuals over all safety equipment it should always be used properly I did and all of my crews did. Accident Prevention is each individuals responsibility.
Reply to DAVID TURBYFILL post on September 8, 2014 at 12:18 am
>> DAVID TURBYFILL said…
>>
>> WTKTT …You are somewhat misleading in your statement
>> regarding the YCSO photographs. Since my son is one of the
>> GMHS members I have looked at and studied this set of
>> pictures very closely? I again reviewed them before making
>> this post, While some of the cuffs are up; none are more
>> than one roll up. As for the PPE of those who clearly
>> were “FULLY” deployed as well as others, most all of the
>> cuffs and sleeves are intact, as well as the front of the shirt
>> on a number of them.
Mr. Turbyfill…
Thank you for commenting and yes… you are probably right.
I was not trying to be ‘mis-leading’ but I usually DO provide more ‘detail’ myself when I post links and whatnot but I did cover these ‘Shelter Photos’ in detail in a previous chapter.
I should have reprinted some of that detail and this followup does
just that. See my ‘what I am seeing in the photos’ detail down below.
I definitely should have mentioned in my previous post that out of the 19 firefighters… only 8 of them have any photos in the YCSO folder that make it even possible to determine the condition of their sleeves as of July 5, 2013, when those photos were finally taken on that garage floor of the YCSO evidence unit.
That’s less than HALF of the crew… so any conclusions from the photos that DO exist would still leave more than 50 percent unaccounted for.
Of those 8 ‘possible’ sets of photos, however… I am definitely seeing the ‘majority’ of those 8 having either ONE or BOTH sleeves rolled up.
5 of those 8 firefighters seemed to have one or more sleeves rolled UP, and 1 or 2 of them to at least the mid-forearm and not just ‘1 rollup’.
One of the clearest shots of ‘sleeves being rolled’ up ( and seemingly up to the mid-foream ) was Eric Marsh himself.
Since he was the Superintendent of that Crew and the one who sets the ‘example’ for ALL of them… that, itself, is significant.
So for however many photos of crew members PPE we do NOT have… the fact that their own Superintendent went into Shelter with his sleeves rolled up is telling a story all by itself with regards to ‘following the rules’ and ‘always observing safety rules’.
>> DAVID TURBYFILL also said…
>>
>> Lastly keep in mind that photos were taken days after and
>> removal from the Victim, so I am not sure that you can make
>> fully inform opinion of FACT.
That’s true. I am ASSUMING that whoever actually moved those bodies from their positions at the scene ( Prescott Firemen? ) and the Medical Examiner’s office… and then, in turn, the YCSO police investigators were ALL taking GREAT care not to disturb the condition of ANYTHING…
…but that is, in fact, an assumption on my part.
I doubt anyone will ever actually get to see the photographs ( and the movies ) that the YCSO Captain took of the deployment scene before it got dark on Sunday evening ( from the low-hovering Ranger 58 chopper ) or the FARO 3D imagery shot the next morning at down by the YCSO police investigators… so all we have to go on are these publicly released photos taken at the YCSO evidence garage on July 5, 2013.
That being said… I think if you look at the photo of just the remnants of Eric Marsh’s shirt and his ‘rolled up’ sleeves… it is VERY doubtful that we are NOT looking at the shirt in the same condition it was in at the deployment site.
No one could have rolled those sleeves UP like that following the incident… so that must be the way those shirt remnants were when they were found.
>> DAVID TURBYFILL also said…
>>
>> Upon reading JD’s article I am dismayed by the pervasive
>> thread that is wove through this article, in which, quoted by
>> so called EXPERTS, Bob Powers and other unnamed
>> Firefighters stating a “ROUGE” Safety Attitude by GMHS.
>> Admittedly there are plenty of Pictures of the GMHS crew
>> with Cuffs rolled; these same experts don’t seem to notice
>> that Members of the Blue Ridge crew also had Cuffs rolled.
>> All it takes it a look at several Wildland fire videos and you
>> will find at least 50% of crews with rolled cuffs or at the
>> least exposed wrists, this include several of the USFS
>> Shot Crews.
You are right. You can find MANY pictures of Type 1 Hotshots in close proximity to firelines and they do NOT have all their safety equipment properly configured ( Fire retardant shirts fully sleeve-down and gloves on ).
It is, apparently, a lot more ‘usual’ to see that these days than it has been in the past. This speaks to the ‘creeping normalcy’ issues in the WFF industry.
But there is still no doubt ( as Mr. Bob Powers has pointed out many, many times ) that there are ‘risks’ involved whenever you don’t have your sleeves fully down and your gloves on and you are working near a fire.
One sudden ‘flash up’ from a burning bush near you… and you might have severe burns on your hands and forearms.
One bad ‘slip’ or ‘falldown’ into anything burning… same story.
One badly planned hike within less than a mile of a 40 mph wind driven dynamic fireline in extreme fire conditions and highly explosive unburned manzanita fuel… and you might get caught going into shelter with your sleeves still rolled up and your gloves off. Even if the burnover was then going to be otherwise survivable… if your exposed flesh can’t take the heat levels or you can’t take the associated pain and you ‘let go’ of the shelter… you could be the one to die while others might live.
There are already documented Wildland Fireline fatalities where this WAS the actual LODF ( Life or Death Factor ) for some.
In other words… no matter who isn’t following all the ‘safety rules’… they are still just as likely to get bitten in the ass as anyone else could.
It still might sound silly to some… but a ‘lax attitude’ towards even just this one ongoing safety consideration in the workplace CAN be an indication of how that crew feels towards ALL of the ‘safety rules’ and whether they can just be ‘ignored’, or not.
Which brings me to a question I would like to ask you.
Did Travis himself EVER say anything about ‘risk taking’ on that crew he was working for… and whether he, himself, had any concerns in that area?
Actually… that’s a two part question… the second part being…
Even if he DID have such concerns… do you think he would have talked about them to you, or anyone… or would he have been more likely to have just kept stuff like that to himself?
>> DAVID TURBYFILL also said…
>>
>> Lastly on this subject GMHS did NOT perish because they
>> did or didn’t roll cuffs.
That will always be true.
>> DAVID TURBYFILL also said…
>> Many of them simply Burned to death, and why?
>> Because of the POS Fire Shelter they are provide for the
>> last ditch safety gear.
I, for one, support the research and the work you are diligently doing in this area yourself 100 percent.
I have seen your online videos.
It is the year 2014. The advanced materials you were able to easily obtain and the proof that they are far superior to what is being used now ‘in the field’ should be more than enough for a complete redesign as soon as possible. Like YESTERDAY, if not sooner.
There will always be burnovers where a simple ‘fire shelter’ isn’t going to provide survivability… but that doesn’t mean the bar can’t be raised for the times when that shelter and its capabilities are, in fact, the only thing between you and death.
** DETAIL ON THE YCSO SHELTER PHOTOS
This is a reprint of the DETAIL I published regarding the YCSO Shelter and PPE photos in a previous chapter of this ongoing discussion.
This time… I’ve added a ‘SLEEVES:’ component to each FF’s record just to indicate what my own eyes appear to be seeing with regards to that.
Once again.. .the actual online FOLDER that contains the YCSO photos being referenced below is HERE…
WARNING REPEATED: Some may consider the following page of photos to be very ‘graphic’ images. Do not click the link below unless you are prepared for what you might see.
Online Drobox Folder: Shelter Photos
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/fg416vjqt14afu3/zaTuOp4Plu#/
** THE SHORT STORY
There is a document in the YCSO folder that accompanies their ‘Shelter Photos’ which has a description of every photograph in the folder and who or what those photos relate to.
That document is called…
Yarnell Fire Shelter Inspection Photolog – July 5, 2013
Here is a quick SUMMARY of every firefighter and what the photos do ( or do NOT ) reveal about their SLEEVES as of the day these evidence photos were being taken ( July 5, 2013 )
PPE = Personal Protection Equipment and includes clothing.
N/A means there were no PPE photos taken for that firefighter.
Out of the 19 firefighters… only 8 of them had photos taken by the YCSO police that showed enough clothing remaining to make any determination at all with regards to the status of the SLEEVES at time of deployment.
Of those 8 firefighters … 5 of them seemed to have definitely had one or both sleeves rolled UP when they died, including GM SUP Eric Marsh.
Only 2 of them seemed to definitely have had their sleeves rolled DOWN… and 1 of them ( Robert Caldwell ) appears to have had 1 sleeve rolled UP and 1 rolled DOWN.
Here’s a ‘quick list’ of the firefighters and which actual photo(s) in the ‘Shelter Photos’ online folder correspond to which firefighter…
YCSO Number, FF Name, Photo showing PPE, Condition of SLEEVES
—————————————————————————
#09 Eric Marsh, DSCN0031.JPG, Only one sleeve left. Clearly rolled UP.
#06 Christopher Mackenzie, DSCN0019.JPG, Both sleeves rolled UP.
#18 Garret Zuppiger, DSCN0016.JPG, Left sleeve definitely rolled UP.
#04 Kevin Woyjeck, DSCN0010.JPG, Sleeves rolled UP but only slightly ??
#14 Joe Thurston, DSCN0029.JPG, Left sleeve *appears* to be UP 1 fold.
#19 Robert Caldwell, DSCN0036.JPG, Left sleeve DOWN. Right sleeve UP?
#17 Scott Norris, DSCN0004.JPG, Sleeves *appear* to be rolled DOWN.
#07 Dustin Deford, DSCN0013.JPG, Right sleeve DOWN. Left ?? unknown.
#05 Clayton Whitted, DSCN0007.JPG, PPE, Not enough left of shirt to tell.
#15 Jesse Steed, DSCN0024.JPG, Not enough left of shirt to tell.
#10 John Percin Jr., DSCN0030.JPG, Not enough left of shirt to tell.
#13 Anthony Rose, DSCN0008.JPG, Not enough left of clothing to tell.
#16 Grant McKee, DSCN0021.JPG, Not enough left of clothing to tell.
#08 William Warneke, DSCN0026.JPG, Not enough left of clothing to tell.
#12 Travis Carter, DSCN0038.JPG, Not enough left of clothing to tell.
#11 Andrew Ashcraft, DSCN0039.JPG, Not enough left of clothing to tell.
#03 Travis Turbyfill, No photos taken at all, SLEEVES: N/A.
#02 Sean Misner, No PPE photos taken, SLEEVES: N/A
#01 Wade Parker, No PPE photos taken, SLEEVES: N/A
—————————————————————————
NOTE: Last known photo of Jesse Steed taken by Christopher Mackenzie at 3:55 showed Steed sitting on a rock with both his sleeves rolled UP to about mid-forearm.
NOTE: Last known photo of Robert Caldwell taken by Christopher MacKenzie at 3:55 PM shows him with BOTH of his sleeves rolled UP to mid-forearm.
** THE LONG STORY
What follows is an accounting of the numbers assigned to the decedents by the YCSO police investigators while they were still at the deployment site, followed by the Maricopa Medical Examiner number that was assigned, and then the name of the firefighter associated with each YCSO / ME number…
#1/13-04442/ Wade Parker
#2/13-04425/ Sean Misner
#3/13-04443/ Travis Turbyfill
#4/13-04428/ Kevin Justin Woyjeck
#5/13-04427/Clayton Whitted
#6/13-04426/ Christopher MacKenzie
#7/13-04431/ Dustin DeFord
#8/13-04430/ William Warneke
#9/13-04435/ Eric Marsh
#10/13-04429/ John Percin Jr
#11/13-04434/ Andrew Ashcraft
#12/13-04433/ Travis Carter
#13/13-04438/ Anthony Rose
#14/13-04432/ Joe Thurston
#15/13-04436/ Jesse Steed
#16/13-04437/ Grant McKee
#17/13-04441/ Scott Norris
#18/13-04440/ Garret Zuppiger
#19/13-04439/ Robert Caldwell
This is a complete TEXT version of the YCSO document that accompanies their ‘Shelter Photos’ which has a description of every photograph in the folder and who or what those photos relate to.
I have added a SLEEVES description under each FF’s PPE section.
Yarnell Fire Shelter Inspection Photolog – July 5, 2013
13-4441 #17 u.r. ( Scott Norris )
Picture no., Description, Notes
DSCN0002.JPG, Fire shelter exterior, 98 % of Aluminum (AL) foil burned away
DSCN0003.JPG, Fire shelter interior, 75 % of fiberglass burned away
Inside of floor is intact
Melted hardhat
DSCN0004.JPG, PPE – shirt (front) and pants (back)
SLEEVES: Appear to be rolled DOWN
DSCN0005.JPG, Pants (back)
13-4443 #3 Travis Turbyfill
No photos taken
SLEEVES: N/A
13-4427 #5 u.r. ( Clayton Whitted )
DSCN0006.JPG, Fire shelter, 99% AL foil burned away
50% fiberglass burned away
End cap main seam missing (torn open)
Mid-cross seam torn open
DSCN0007.JPG, PPE, Question about hood
SLEEVES: Not enough left of shirt to really tell, but
if that one relatively unburned bit of yellow cloth is
the END of a sleeve… then at least that sleeve appears
to have been rolled DOWN.
13-4438 #13 Anthony Rose
DSCN0008.JPG, PPE
SLEEVES: Not enough left of any clothing to make a determination.
13-4428 #4 Kevin Woyjeck
DSCN0009.JPG, shelter, 40% of fiberglass cloth burned away
100% of AL foil burned
Inside of floor intact
One(1) end cap separated
DSCN0010.JPG, PPE, Hardhat with dust mask
SLEEVES: The only clothing left was the shirt collar and the two sleeves.
Sleeves *appear* to have been rolled UP but only slightly.
13-4442 #1 Wade Parker
DSCN0011.JPG, gloves
SLEEVES: N/A
13-4431 #7 Dustin Deford
DSCN0012.JPG, Fire shelter, 100% of AL foil burned away
4 ft. of shelter floor seam torn
Endcap seam torn
85% fiberglass burned away
Floor mostly intact
DSCN0013.JPG, PPE
SLEEVES: Only the right sleeve seems to be visible and
it appears to have been rolled DOWN.
13-4440 #18 u.r. ( Garret Zuppiger )
DSCN0014.JPG, Fire shelter exterior, 80% of AL foil burned
DSCN0015.JPG, Fire shelter-interior, 90% of fiberglass burned away
One(1) side of floor intact
DSCN0016.JPG, PPE
SLEEVES: Left sleeve definitely rolled UP, but not too far.
Right sleeve also *appears* to be rolled up, but hard to tell.
13-4426 #6 Christopher Mackenzie
DSCN0017.JPG, Fire shelter exterior, 95% of AL foil burned away
DSCN0018.JPG, Fire shelter interior, 50% of fiberglass burned away
Floor mostly intact
Endcap seam, 12 inch tear
DSCN0019.JPG, PPE
SLEEVES: Both sleeves rolled UP, but probably still below elbow.
13-4425 #2 Sean Misner
DSCN0020.JPG, Fire shelter, 99% of AL foil burned away
90% of fiberglass burned away
All tore up
SLEEVES: N/A
13-4437 #16 Grant McKee
DSCN0021.JPG, PPE
SLEEVES: Not enough left of any clothing to make a determination.
13-4436 #15 Jesse Steed
DSCN0022.JPG, Fire shelter exterior, 80% foil burned away
DSCN0023.JPG, Fire shelter interior, Fiberglass 50% burned away
DSCN0024.JPG, PPE front, Including red helmet.
SLEEVES: Not enough left of shirt to make a real determination, but last
known photo of Steed taken by Christopher Mackenzie at 3:55 showed Steed
sitting on a rock with both his sleeves rolled UP to about mid-forearm.
DSCN0025.JPG, Pants -back
13-4430 #8 u.r. ( William Warneke )
DSCN0026.JPG, PPE
SLEEVES: Not enough left of any clothing to make a determination.
13-4432 #14 Joe Thurston
DSCN0027.JPG, Fire shelter exterior, 95% AL foil burned away
DSCN0028.JPG, Fire shelter interior, One(1) side of floor intact
80% of fiber glass burned away
DSCN0029.JPG, PPE
SLEEVES: Right sleeve apparently destroyed. Left sleeve
*appears* to be rolled UP but perhaps only ‘1 fold’.
13-4429 #10 John Percin Jr.
DSCN0030.JPG, PPE
SLEEVES: Not enough left of shirt to make a determination.
13-4435 #9 Eric Marsh
DSCN0031.JPG, PPE
DSCN0032.JPG, PPE (2nd photo)
SLEEVES: Only one sleeve not destroyed. It was clearly rolled UP
pretty far… perhaps up to or above the elbow.
13-4439 #19 Robert Caldwell
DSCN0033.JPG, Fire shelter exterior, 98% of AL foiled burned away
Endcap torn
DSCN0034.JPG, Fire shelter interior, 98% of fiberglass burned away
One(1) side of floor still intact
DSCN0035.JPG, Back of PPE
DSCN0036.JPG, Front of PPE
SLEEVES: Left sleeve rolled DOWN. Right sleeve *appears* to have
also been rolled DOWN but *might* be rolled UP just 1 fold or so.
NOTE: Last known photo of Robert Caldwell taken by Christopher MacKenzie
at 3:55 PM shows him with BOTH of his sleeves rolled UP to mid-forearm.
13-4433 #12 Travis Carter
DSCN0037.JPG, Fire shelter exterior, 100% of foil burned away
DSCN0038.JPG, PPE
SLEEVES: Not enough clothing left to make a determination.
13-4434 #11 Andrew Ashcraft
DSCN0039.JPG, PPE
SLEEVES: Not enough clothing left to make a determination.
13-021744 #308 ( Loose shelter not associated with any Firefighter )
DSCN0040.JPG, Fire shelter exterior, 100% of AL foil burned away
DSCN0041.JPG, Fire shelter interior, 98% fiberglass burned away
10 inch tear on silica cloth
13-021744 #307 ( Loose shelter not associated with any Firefighter )
DSCN0042.JPG, Fire shelter exterior, Outer shell 100% foil burned away
Endcap seam torn
DSCN0043.JPG, Fire shelter interior, 95% of fiberglass burned away
13-021744 #302 ( Loose shelter not associated with any Firefighter )
DSCN0044.JPG, Fire shelter exterior, 98% burned away
Mid seam torn
DSCN0045.JPG, Fire shelter, Seam break – close up
DSCN0046.JPG, Fire shelter interior, 50% fiberglass burned away
One(1) end cap mostly intact, foil in place
13-021744 #301 ( Loose shelter not associated with any Firefighter )
DSCN0047.JPG, Fire shelter exterior, End cap seam broken
100% foil burned away
DSCN0048.JPG, Fire shelter interior
13-027144 #305 ( Loose shelter not associated with any Firefighter )
DSCN0049.JPG, Fire shelter exterior, 99% foil burned away
DSCN0050.JPG, Fire shelter interior, 98% fiberglass burned away
13-021744 #304 ( Loose shelter not associated with any Firefighter )
DSCN0051.JPG, Fire shelter exterior, 100% of AL foil burned
End cap seam torn , both ends
13-021744 #303 ( Loose shelter not associated with any Firefighter )
DSCN0052.JPG, Fire shelter exterior, 100% AL foil burned away
DSCN0053.JPG, Fire shelter –close up, Burned holes in silica cloth
DSCN0054.JPG, Fire shelter interior, 80% of fiberglass burned away
13-021744 #306 ( Loose shelter not associated with any Firefighter )
DSCN0055.JPG, Fire shelter exterior, 100% AL foil burned away
Red helmet melted to exterior of shelter
Mid seam torn
DSCN0056.JPG, Fire shelter interior, 80% of fiberglass burned away
Black hardhat melted in end cap.
END OF YCSO PHOTO DOCUMENTATION
NOTE: This has been brought up from down below in a thread that was running out of room.
The THREAD was the ongoing discussion about whether the person who identified himself
as a Blue Ridge Hotshot who was at Yarnell and still had ‘tons of pictures and videos’ and
was using the commenter name of ‘Robert’ over at Wildfire today is, in fact, the one-and-only
BR Hotshot who was in Yarnell with a first name of Robert. As in… Robert Manry.
>> On September 5, 2014 at 4:51 pm, Bob Powers said…
>>
>> Bob Powers said…
>>
>> That’s right I can tell you last name’s
>> of several people I worked with but
>> would not remember there first
>> name. if you offered me a 10 dollar bill.
>> On September 5, 2014 at 5:27 pm, WTKTT replied…
>>
>> Wow. OK.
>>
>> And would these still be people that you consider ‘as close as brothers’?…
>> or are you now saying there are all kinds of different ‘levels’ to this WFF ‘brotherhood’ thing?
>>
>> Are you now saying that there are people on ‘the crew’ that really are as close
>> as brothers and not only do you have the politeness to at least know their NAMES…
>> you also know as much about them as you would a REAL brother….
>>
>> …but then there are always just ‘other guys on the crew’ that just get called by
>> nicknames and you never really know who the hell they (really) are?
>>
>> I’m not trying to be antagonistic here.
>>
>> You just introduced a ‘component’ into this WFF ‘brotherhood’ thing that
>> I’m simply struggling to understand.
>>
>> When is a ‘fire brother’ really a ‘fire brother’?
>>
>> When you actually take the time to even ask him ( and remember ) both of his names?
>> On September 5, 2014 at 9:20 pm, Bob Powers replied…
>>
>> It is hard to explain when you call some one by there last name or a nick name
>> that sticks in your memory when you run into them a few years later that last
>> name or nick name is prevalent in your memory. Those that you work with
>> for 2 or 3 years generally become closer and you tend to remember there first
>> names. when you become a supervisor most you remember full names because
>> you are filling out time slips and crew lists with full names.
>> It seemed to be on crews you could have more than one person with the same
>> name and so we always used last names. The only time that did not work is
>> if you had brothers on the same crew thus the nick names.
>> While you learned a lot about them and were together a lot you used the last
>> name so much it became the most prevalent when first names are seldom or
>> never used the identity becomes the last name. which is the first recognition that
>> comes to you when you meet again.
>>
>> I guess those that are thought to be formal would have a hard time with this form
>> of recognition but it is common among 20 to 30 man crews. That change in
>> members yearly you could see a 4 to 6 new crewman each year. so some came
>> and went others stayed several years 2 to 5 normally. I don’t know if that explains
>> it I never really thought about it till you asked it may be a fall out from the military
>> not sure it was part of the culture when I started.
Thank you. You explained that VERY well and it does make perfect sense.
‘Fire Brothers’ or not… the reality you have succinctly explained is that there is
a lot of ‘come and go’ on these crews. Always has been… always will be.
So I understand now exactly what you were trying to say and I AGREE.
Robert Manry only joined Blue Ridge for the 2013 season on May 9, 2013.
I suppose it is perfectly possible that whichever Blue Ridge Hotshot was posting over at Wildfire Today ( if it wasn’t actually Robert Manry ) might have had no frickin’ idea that this other guy’s first name was ‘Robert’. Manry might have been given a nickname like “ManBo” or just “The Man” for that short time he had been with them, or something.
That being said… I still believe that the Blue Ridge Hotshot who posted about the ‘tons’ of videos and pictures he has from Yarnell over at Wildfire today under the commenter name ‘Robert’ was, in fact, this Robert Manry who joined Blue Ridge on May 9, 2013.
I could be totally wrong… but I simply believe it WAS him.
And you could be right. I just do not like to identify some one here who has not identified them selves. As we may jump to a conclusion that is not right or fair to the person who does not wont there name known or may be accused of statements they did not make.
It is as unfair as saying WTKTT is so and so with out proof and putting some one else in a position to say that is not me.
It is better to say Robert could be the BR crewman Robert Manry but we have no actual information to verify that it is.
Remember all kinds of people on here have been accused of being RTS.
Some wanted your real name as well.
Again I say what difference dose it make who Robert is Who ever it is they have stated the were on the BR crew.
Reply to Bob Powers post September 6, 2014 at 8:19 am
>> Bob Powers said…
>>
>> Again I say what difference dose it make who Robert is.
>> Who ever it is they have stated the were on the BR crew.
It doesn’t make any difference who he REALLY is… but you
also just answered your own question.
The SIGNIFICANCE of what this ‘poster’ said is that he was, in fact THERE that day ( as part of Blue Ridge ) and he said in PUBLIC that he has ‘tons of pictures and videos’.
That immediately begs the question… did any investigator ever SEE these ‘tons of pictures and videos’ and ( perhaps ) some background radio traffic captures that have never been heard before?
So NO… I really don’t care WHO he is.
I want to know what he KNOWS… and whether these ‘tons of pictures and videos’ he says he has ever entered into the possesion of any investigator.
Agree
**
** THE FULL TRANSCRIPT OF MIKE DUDLEY’S SPEECH ON JUNE 20, 2014
I actually thought I had posted this before… but since ‘Mike Dudley’ is very much ‘back in the news’ these days for comments he made in public on June 20, 2014 I thought I would make sure there is at least one FULL copy of his entire speech somewhere PUBLIC ( like here ).
Dudley said a lot of strange things in this ‘presentation’ he made to the Utah Unified Fire Authority.
The things like Brendan McDonough not ‘hearing’ anything about why Marsh and Steed made the decisions they did because he had handed his radio to Brian Frsiby and then ‘never got it back’ ( which is totally untrue ) and the sudden out-of-nowhere mention that his own SAIT had received evidence about that ‘argument’ between Marsh and Steed were just two of the strange things he let loose with in this ‘speech’ of his.
So here is the WHOLE DEAL… including the Q/A session where Dudley agrees with the Utah firefighter that says it was wrong of Marsh and Steed to be conducting GM SUP to DIVSA ‘secret’ conversations over the PRIVATE GM channel… so that no one else could hear them or fully understand what they were planning to do.
Also.. at +41 minutes below is when Dudley says that no one heard any of the communications between Marsh and Steed… when his own SAIT report stated unequivocally that Brendan McDonough DID hear them ‘discussing their options’ that day.
** Mike Dudley – SAIR Co-Leader – Presentation – June 2014
On June 20, 2014, a YouTube user named Fitz Petersen published the following PUBLIC video of a presentation given by Mike Dudley, the Co-Lead of the Yarnell Hill SAIT Investigation, to a gathering of the Utah Unified Fire Authority…
That PUBLIC video is here…
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iWm3myJdQO4
** FULL TRANSCRIPT OF MIKE DUDLEY’S PRESENTATION AND Q/A SESSION
Speaker: Very good opportunity today to have Mike Dudley here from the Forest Service.
He was the co-lead on the investigation at the Yarnell Hill Incident… and bring us some information
as we see, and, uh, learn from for our own operations… so thanks for taking time out of your day
to come see this and thanks to Mike for spending the morning with us.
Dudley: Yep. My pleasure.
And… is this working? ( Fools with microphone )
You want me… Okay?… we’re good. Allright.
Mornin’
Entire room: Mornin’.
Okay… I can tell the Wildland Division.
And… question… for the Wildland division… who here is also cross-trained in structural program?
Okay… there’s a few of you. So… what I’m gonna do… There’s a question… there’s a reason I bring
that up. So… I’m gonna assume most of you have not seen the briefing video that was associated
with Yarnell. Has anyone seen it? Allright… so there’s a few.
And… who here has worked in the past with Granite Mountain?
Yea… there’s always some folks there because… uh… Hotshot crew.
So… the reason for asking about the structural protection… there’s been some allegations made
in the past… and you still see it pop up every once and a while in the press about Granite Mountain.
So… Granite Mountain was a City Crew… Prescott Fire Department… Prescott Fire Department has a Wildland Division… real similar to the structure set up here under Unified Fire Authority.
Um… there was some implications that Granite Mountain was influenced because of their association with Prescott City to take on more risk when structures were burning within the Yarnell area.
The reason I bring that up is… keep in mind the structure.
You had Granite Mountain IHC under Prescott Fire Department sponsored by Arizona Division of Forestry to meet NWCG Interagency guidelines to be certified as a full IHC Hotshot crew.
The reason that’s important is that people do want to make that allegation… ‘well.. they were influenced by the structural side’.
No member of the Granite Mountain Hotshots, including Eric Marsh, who was the Superintendent and Jesse Steed, his Captain, were cross-trained in structural.
None of them cross-worked on the structural program during the off season. What they were was a pure wildland firefighting organization… and for all the talk about Yarnell… Yarnell was a wildland fire incident… they were a wildland fire crew working on that incident.
And I say that up front because we… we did our check and we did our cross-referencing… you don’t see any allegations that they were unduly inflenced simply because they were part of that… uh… City department.
On the other hand… ah… they were a pretty proud organization of being that wildland division within the Prescott’s… uh… Fire Department. That… don’t take that away. That… that’s something.
Also what I’m gonna do is… I’m gonna go through the briefing video and then I’ll show some key points during the fire itself but this is totally open to questions.
Ah… as a matter of fact… more of that is more dialog than there is anything else.
So… don’t… don’t hesitate to ask questions and we can go as long… the reason I’m here is that I did this for… uh… FFSL… state of Utah… and Tracy Dunford, the fire manager for the state of Utah asked me to come and present to his fire wardens… and it always takes one or two questions and pretty soon things start flowing along and we can get into the meat of what took place.
Uh… I am US Forest Service. Most of my career has been in wildland fire. I’m currently on an area command team. I’ve been on Type 1 teams. Uh… previous to my current position I was the director of fire and aviation for region four out of Ogden… which included the state of Utah.
Uh… I was assigned as the co-lead to the Yarnell Hill investigation along with Jim Karels. Jim Karels is the state forester for the state of Florida, which is a very large organization, much larger than Utah’s, has a very large wildland fire component.
Jim himself has had extensive experience in wildland fire… and for years was the chair of the National Association of State Foresters Fire Committee representing all the states in fire… uh… activities within the NWCG guidelines.
We were assigned on July SECOND.
Obviously we’re coming up… in just a few more days… the one year annniversary of Yarnell… to be followed by… just 6 days later… the 20th anniversary of South Canyon.
In 1994, South Canyon occurred where we lost 14 Hotshots, smokejumpers, helitack.
We lost a total of 34 people that year.
Last year… we lost the Granite Mountain Hotshots… 19 people all at one time… and we lost 34 people.
So the question is… what’s changed between the timeframes?
Ah… and just ironically… last friday I had the opportunity to be in Montana… and Montana State Fire Division… DNRC… they sponsor every year a staff ride at a place called Mann Gulch… ahm… and if you’ve ever read the book “Young Men In Fire”, it’s worth the read… and again… 1949… a group of Missoula smoke jumpers jump on a fire and within… within an hour…they’re running for their lives and you have 13 fatalities that occurred there.
Ah… there’s some similarities… I mean… things don’t change that much… as much as we want to.
So keep all of this in mind… let me go with the briefing video… hopefully that works… and… the briefing video was prepared right before we released the report last Septemer the twenty eigth, and it was to be able to give a consolidated, consistent message.
It gets into some discusson of fire behavior… which is fairly key.
And then we’ll go into the point by point aspects of what we came up with during our review.
And then there’s one other thing that I want to be able to close out with befor… and I’m not gonna do it right now but it’s probably important to cover… IS…
Ya look at Yarnell Hill report… that WE did… and then there’s also an Arizona Department of Safety and Health which is the state OSHA… they did their report.
Two totally different styles. That was deliberate.
Especially on our part… because our part was NOT a compliance review. We weren’t tryin’ to do a 10 and 18. We we’re tryin’ to understand why the crew made the decison that they made that led them to their location.
But… we were not sitting there… under… and… we were delegated by the State of Arizona for this report… but we were not there to specifically point fingers unless we had come up with something that was criminal intent… which was not the case.
Two different styles of the reports… and we can talk a little bit about that… about where the Wildland fire… uh… community… and that’s all of us… including all the Federal, State agencies… uh… under NWCG… where we were tryin’ to head with these kinda documents.
So… let me start this… and see how it rolls.
+7:25
ORIGINAL SEPTEMBER 28, 2013 SAIT BRIEFING VIDEO BEGINS
The entire SAIT video presentation from September 28, 2013 is played
from a laptop onto a large projection screen in the auditorium.
The SAIT video presentation ENDS with these words…
Family members, firefighters and many others will continue to pore over the circumstances of this tragedy for years to come. Much thought and analysis will go into reviewing this accident to understand, to learn, and to make sense of HOW and WHY. This account… the loss of 19 firefighters… our brothers… is not complete… and it never will be.
+28:32
ORIGINAL SEPTEMBER 28, 2013 SAIT BRIEFING VIDEO ENDS
+28:39
Mike Dudley takes the podium again and someone has their hand raised already to ask a question. Dudley acknowledges him and he asks…
* (Question from Audience member): When was the video first viewed?
Dudley: On September the twenty-eigth, when Jim Karels and I were there in Prescott to present it… and we presented it first, that morning, to the families… uh… that room… was… there were eighty some people in that room… and you can imagine… uhm… the angst that was in that room… and that probably the longest three hours of my career… I can assure you of that.
Uhm… so… since then… we have had all three fire chiefs… Chief Fraijo, Prescott Fire Department… he was released in November immediately following the incident. Uh… Chief of Yarnell was terminated… Yarnell Fire… uh… volunteer fire department. Central Yavapai County… which is the county that surrounds Prescott… that Fire Chief was… uh… released. Uhm… all in the fall.
14 of the 19 families have filed suit.
Over a hundred land owners in the Yarnell area have filed suit.
Totalling right now in excess of 700 million dollars.
The suits have been filed against Prescott City, Yavapai County, Arizona State Division of Forestry.
Ah… we released our report on September the twenty eigth.
The ADOSH report… uh… was released the first week of December, which went into a heavy compliance report, pointing fingers. The State is still in the process of preparing a response to the ADOSH… and… negotiating. This thing is going to play out in the courts for just absolutely years.
So before I go into any of the key points… are there any immediate questions I can answer?
( Someone raises their hand ).
Go ahead.
* Question from Audience member:
* How do you approach the investigation when doing something like this?
* Are you… I mean I know you said you weren’t… ADOSH was doing compliance and you were
* not really looking for… for non-compliance… but… uhm… as a… as a lead investigator… how do
* you steer those underneath you uhm… are you looking for nuggets that will lead towards fingers
* being pointed… or are you just trying to understand… uh… the broad story?
Dudley: Thanks… that was a good question… and I’ll repeat it if you’d like me too ( he gestures to the camera itself ). The question is… how did we approach the investigation… especially something of this scale and… trying to accomidate the process.. and especially the new way of thinking with a diverse team… is that a good way of summarizing it?
So… let me tell ya about the team and if ya look at the report you’ll see the team members. Ah… the primary focus was… this was a State report delegated to us by the State of Arizona.
It was not a Federal report even though the Federal component was large because we could bring… uh… tools to the game.
So Jim Karels was appointed as State Forester to lead up a State investigation… that was key.
I came in to represent the Federal side and to back up Jim as we went through it.
First few days we negotiated the delegation of the authority from the State Forester of Arizona as to what he wanted.
As Jim and I travelled to Yarnell… or to Phoenix… to meet with… uh… the team that was… uh… slowly gathering there in place…
One of the key items we had is… What are we gonna do?
What kind of report are we gonna do… and at that time the only process that was available to us through NWCG… If you were to go to the NWCG website… you would see the guide for the Serious Accident Investigation guide… and at that time it was the 2005 version.
Since then… while were in… in August… of our.. while we were completing our report… the 2013 version was posted on the website… but the key emphasis that you’ll see on that 2013… the Forest Service Shield is no longer on the document… because we do not recognize that process.
Nor was the NASF… National Association of State Foresters shield.
They were… they no longer recognize that process.
We knew that we had a process but we didn’t wanna do a compliance.
Why not? Well…
It’s easy to do a 10 and 18.
It’s easy to say the crew lost LCES as they traveled… and… here’s where they violated… here’s where they violated… Does it tell you any new information? No… it does not. Uh… and has it worked so well to improve firefighter safety? If you look at the number of fatalities… we’ve had over 400 fatalities since 1994 when South Canyon occurred.
So… we… Forest Service, NASF and… eventually… DOI… were looking for a new way to try and do that… and within the Forest Service we’ve been doin’ what’s called FLA… Facilitated Learning Analysis. We’re not tryin’ to point blame. We’re tryin’ to gather the truth and try and figure out what happened for people to learn from… and… at the same time… you want people to be able to come and talk to you willingly… and not feel like that whatever they say is gonna lead… lead to any kinda prosecution… that’s a key element.
So when we gathered as a team… we started gathering the facts.
We had a key… core group of interviews… and… ya look at the immediate membership of the type two team and key components and from that… we expanded out who we wanted to interview.
The most critical interview… was the LOOKOUT… because he was there on the site and he could walk us through the area.
The next most critical interview was the Blue Ridge Hotshots because their leadership… they were right there workin’ with Granite Mountain and knew Granite Mountain extremely well ‘cus they’re so close… they spent a lotta time together.
The third critical interview was the ASM… or in this case… because we’re all fire people… it was Bravo 33 that was over the site. They heard communications.
Those were the three most critical interviews and then you expanded it out from there.
Most of the members of the investigation team… which included Forest Service…and included an SME representing the Hotshot community… but we had to find a Non-Federal individual because… again… State investigation… they were trying not to have undue influence from the Federal Hotshots.
We brought in Jimmy Rocha. Jimmy is the superintendent of the Rio Bravo Hotshots which is a current County Hotshot crew under NWCG guidelines. Jimmy was there. We had members from the Boise fire department, Missoula fire department.
We even had two what we call SME sessions… where subject matter experts would come in… they had a chance to review the document and then provide input as we went through the whole process.
So… it was fairly early on that we had a group of people that said…
We don’t wanna do a 30 mile investigation… where we point the blame at everyone and their uncle. We’re just tryin’ to figure out WHY the crew made the decision that they made… and it was a pretty consistent process throughout.
Ah… did we have some… ah.. periods of… ah.. heated discussion as we were coming… trying to come together on conclusions? Yea… you bet. Any group… good group will do that.
I would also point out that some of the members of that team… one in particular… ah… he had gone into fire shelter… he was a smoke jumper at South Canyon… so HE had a taste in his mouth of how the process should work… and how it should NOT work.
So as a team… unlike South Canyon… which had a minority report that refused to sign.
Unlike Esperanza… which had its own group that came in with its minority report… we had no minorit… minority reports.
That was our key goal between Jim and I.
We wanted the team on the same place to be consistent throughout the whole process and in agreement. If we can’t reach agreement on the facts then we need to back off and see what we could do to com(promise?)
Does that help with a response without being too long-winded?
* Person who asked the orginal question responded: Yes, it does. Thank you.
+37:12
Dudley: So… the key element is still… looking at this option… looking at what’s up there ( on the screen )… WHY did the crew make that decison to go that way?
If you leave the lunch spot… especially back then… there’s a two-track. A UTV can ride up on that two-track. That two-track runs south along the ridge… and it’s a very defined ridge… and as you go along that ridge you’ll come to the saddle and that becomes, really, the key decision point when you get to that saddle ‘cus ya got a number of options.
Option one is… ya stay in the lunch spot. Ya don’t need to leave the black… just stay there.
Option two.. when you get to the saddle… is… you can go off the back side to the southwest… and what that does is… that’ll take you down the slope and eventually you’ll hit Highway 89, which is the Highway coming in from Wickenburg, and you can be picked up.
+38:09
Option third is you can stay high and that two-track becomes a trail… and it literally goes around the canyon and drops into Yarnell. The advantage there is… you have full view of everything comin’ at ya.
Or there’s option four.
Option four is when you sit that saddle… and it’s.. .it’s an interesting visual issue.
You hit that saddle and you look out and son of a gun… there’s that ranch.
I mean the ranch is right there.
Member… I’ve heard people say.. ‘God… it looks like you can reach out and touch the ranch’…
and suddenly you’re evaluating options and the crew went the most direct route.
Down that slope… headed toward the ranch.
The problem is… even though it looks like it’s pretty close… it’s still a pretty good distance.
On the other hand… this is a trained Hotshot crew.
Could they cover that in a short order?
Yes, they could.
The problem, though, is… and I’ve walked this slope many a time along with the team… as you drop down… it’s a pretty steep slope to drop down and once ya get to the bottom of the canyon… ya can’t see the… uh… the ranch. You still have a ways to go.
The critical item there though, is, when ya do that… is as soon as you drop off that saddle that prominent ridge that runs out along that box canyon blocks your view to the north, northeast and then before you even go part way down that slope you no longer have a view of anything… except for the ranch… until you drop down to the bottom of the canyon… then you can’t even see the ranch… and it took us a while of meandering down that slope because of the steepness and the loose rock… keep in mind when the crew was doing it… you had 40 year old chaparral brush that were moving through to try and get through that spot.
+39:54
Dudley: So… did they pick that deliberately because they wanted to go direct? We don’t know.
The only surviving member of the crew… the lookout… he could not tell us anything because he was focused on lookout and when he got picked up by the superintendent of the Blue Ridge… he gave the superintendent his radio so the superintendent could communicate with… uh… Granite Mountain.
(Pause)
I will offer ( Dudley then notices someone has a question ).
Go ahead.
* Question from Audience member:
* For what purpose… so he could have access to their crew chief’s channels?
Dudley: BINGO. That’s it.
* Question from Audience member:
* And what was the actual mileage between the… the saddle and the.. the ranch?
Dudley: Ah… from the lunch spot to the saddle… it is… to the deployment site is one point two ( 1.2 ) miles. To go from the deployment site to the… uh… ranch is a point four ( .04 ). So they were pretty close when they hit that spot.
We DO know that there was communications goin’ on… there HAD to be… between the crew… we KNOW that. Uh… internal… but that’s all intra-crew communications.
None of that is recorded.
No one hears that.
Dudley: So… let’s go through some of the critical junctures of the in… of the… uh… whole incident.
+41:09
It was called into dispatch Friday on the twenty eigth and it was logged in at 1736.
It was one of multiple ignitions that had occurred throughout that area.
The ICT4 who was a State of Arizona employee was there to evaluate… but he wasn’t there by himself. He also had the duty officer for the… uh… BLM Phoenix office that was there onsite… because they thought they had multiple fires and so they were evaluating.
Dudley: Toward that evening… the only fire that showed itself was Yarnell Hill. Ah… before darkness showed up they asked the Air Attack from the Doce Fire which was just on the north end of Prescott ‘come on over and give us an evaluation’. Air Attack showed up. He had a hard time seein’ anything and he says… “I… all I see is a puff a smoke. It’s maybe a half-acre to one acre and it’s hanging up on the ridge.”
The ICT4 made the decision NOT to put anyone on the slope that night, on the hill.
He’s been heavily criticized for that decision.
I bring that up because the only resources he had was some BLM engine crews and he had the Yarnell volunteer fire department.
He did not wanna… uh… walk anyone up… and his issue was… even if I could get people up there that night… if someone got hurt… I can’t support them.
His decision was to wait ’till the next morning and then make initial attack that first start in the morning. He had a… uh… BLM helicopter. He had a Department of Corrections crew… the Lewis crew… uh… that was on site. Uh… keep that in mind that the Perryview crew… which is also Arizona Department of Corrections… had been the crew that was burnt over and had fatalities during the Dude fire… and the Dude fire is a… until Yarnell… was the huge history for the southwest.
So… he’s dealing with that fire throughout the day of Saturday, the twenty ninth.
Mid-afternoon he actually releases the aviation resources ‘cus things seemed to be so good… but then late that afternoon… there’s that two-track which continues along… the fire had jumped that two-track… so he orders… uh… Air-Tanker. He wanted a large Air-Tanker coming out of Prescott.
They had two large Air-Tankers in Prescott but there was a weather front over the top of Prescott that… Air-Tankers were grounded.
Another decision point.
He is offered a VLAT. The DC10 Tanker 910. Tanker 910 is sitting in Albuquerque.
Dispatch says we can launch 910 but you got ten minutes in which to tell us your decision because then we won’t have enough duty day for the Air Tanker to make it there and then head down to Williams Gateway in Phoenix… uh… to spend the night
Again… he’s not by himself… he’s with the BLM duty officer.
The fire at this point is about ten acres… has jumped the two track.
But now… ICT4… representing State of Arizona… he’s just been offered a very large air tanker.
Do you want it… do you not?
And… he hemmed and he hawed and he thought about it and… between he and the BLM duty officer they both concluded ‘That’s a little bit of an overkill’.
Dudley: Now… who here knows you can order the VLAT in multiple configurations?
( Very few, if any, hands are raised in the audience ).
Yea. It’s not that well known… and it certainly wasn’t known to that ICT4.
You can order the VLAT as a ‘Large Air Tanker’. You don’t have to take it as a ‘VERY Large Air Tanker’… you don’t have to take all 11,600 gallons… AND… the COST of the VLAT is actually cheaper than (maths?) units because the daily availability is funded up front by the US Forest Service under the contracting rules.
So really… that’s a pretty cost effective… but everyone hears the VLAT and… you know… the hair stands up and they’re going ‘Oh my God… cost’.
So he turned down the VLAT.
But… the fire started growin’ that night.
He put in a resource order for a Type 2 team.
The Type 2 team that was ordered is the Arizona Management Incident team… and… if any… the closest I can get to it is… in Nevada… the Sierra Front team… which is a team of local resources… City of Reno… uh… BLM… Forest Service… Counties… and they’re a team that can come in and ramp up immediately and take it over as a Type 3… or… go up to at Type 2 because they’re all Type 2 qualified. That team showed up the next morning… also ordered with three Hotshot crews.
That order was filled by the Granite Mountain Hotshots, the Blue Ridge Hotshots off the Coconino… and the Arroyo Grande Hotshots outta Region 5. Arroyo Grande never made it. Their… their vehicles… uh… they had a crew buggy break down in Phoenix so they got hung up there.
But the next morning now you’ve got Granite Mountain… and you’ve got Blue Ridge.
* Question from an Audience member: So we… I’m the superintendent of ( ?? ).
Dudley: Okay
* Question: We were on the (??) over in New Mexico.
* Was Arroyo Grande there on precall… or were they comin’ for the fire?
Dudley: No… they were already there. They were there within region.
(Pause)
Dudley: Oh… I’m sorry… the question was about the status of Arroyo Grande. Were they coming out of Region 5 or are they already repositioned within the Region and the answer is… yea… they were already there coming off a different fire and headed there. They coulda gotten there that morning had they not broken down.
So… most of the Type 2 team shows up that morning including the IC. As he goes through his planning process he does a briefing with the ICT4 that takes place at 9:30 at the ICP which is on the north end of… uh… in an area called Peeples Valley.
Dudley: He already has a Structure Group Protection… a Structure Protection Group leader down in Yarnell… who’s been there all night trying to figure out how to best defend Yarnell and set up some kind of defense.
The ICT4 is announced at ten twenty-two ( 10:22 ) that morning I’m sorry… the ICT2… but he already knows he’s behind the power curve.
He has WAY too much fire activity goin’ on and he came in as a short team and not all of his positions were filled.
Again… criticism was that he had no Safety Officers.
He put in an order for Safety Officers.
For some reason it was just one of those things that happened in a busy dispatch center… the order got dropped.
They… they put in the order for it… but at the time that he took over… he had no Safety Officers.
He had both of his OPS people…
…you have a question?
* Question from Audience member: What was the planning level at that time? The national level?
Dudley: Uh… Nationally we were at planning level four… regionally it was planning level five… so they were maxed… and the question is ‘what was the planning level for the southwest at that time’.
Because he knows that he’s behind the power curve… he reaches out to the local Type 2 Incident Management Team… and the IC is Bea Day… and he calls her and says “I’m gonna recommend that your team be ordered… but in the meantime… before the order gets placed… will you please send me all your OPS and all your LOGISTICS… and she complies…. and people start coming down. They… they’re not officially ordered… but he KNOWS that he needs additional help.
The reason he went to her… she’s based in Prescott. So he knows that most of the resources she has can come outta Prescott quickly.
Dudley: So between… after that phone call… between eleven and one o’clock… are a series of phone calls that take place with State management.
And the whole issue is… what is the… uh… we need to go through the checklist to determine what level of incident we’re dealing with… and by one o’clock… he is still pushing for a Type 2 Long team… the State makes the decision… No… we’re gonna go with a Type 1 team.
Fine. That’s a good decision… but now… you’re still a day out before you start getting any resources.
The Type 2 people are still coming in. They don’t know that they have not been ordered.
So now… he’s dealing with all of that… meanwhile up in the hill… ya got Granite Mountain and Blue Ridge… and one of the uniqueness of this whole thing.. the captain of Blue Ridge had a GPS unit that he… by habit… he always carries his own personal GPS and he has it on all day long… so we were able to pull the data from his GPS… and he and his superintendent were in that UTV and they were all over the area… believe me… and what it was was… they we’re tryin’ to figure out how to engage.
Ya had Granite Mountain up on the top… on the ridge… building fireline downhill to hook into what Blue Ridge was gonna do out in the flats… and Blue Ridge was tryin’ to figure out a way to use the road system that would take it out to Highway 89.
They never felt really comfortable with that assignment.
As a matter of fact… they spent… the crew spent a good chunk of its day by its crew buggies because the captain and the superintendent were tryin’ to figure out how safely to engage that crew.
In the meantime… they were talkin’ to Granite Mountain as Granite Mountain is makin’ its way down.
Now… keep in mind… that this is one of the oddities… it’s a rapidly expanding Type 3 into a Type 2 with a Type 1 coming in. They are behind the power curve. Division boundaries aren’t very well set.
Dudley: As a matter of fact… they were pretty well undefined between the two division supervisors… but… you’ve got Granite Mountain sitting there with the superintendent as Division Alpha… the Captain now the acting superintendent within their division… and that’s it. There’s nobody else there.
It’s just (dem?)… and as the day progresses… everything that they had started out with that morning becomes a moot point… because the strategy and tactics that they thought were valid that morning is… no longer.
So they’re sitting up there… and wondering what to do.
I will say this. There is this point where… well… you can see the dialogue… and that’s one of the key components.
A lot of people were talking… very few people were communicating.
And you saw that little snippet of when Blue Ridge and Granite are tryin’ to identify… “Where are you guys? Youre’ in the black?”… “Yea… we’re makin’ our way down the escape route”.
At no point do you see someone finally go… “Okay… WHERE exactly are you HEADED?”.
That was never defined.
It was almost as if Granite Mountain was bein’ deliberately vague.
But the communications are really short.
That’s not to say that Blue Ridge didn’t do their job… because Blue Ridge superintendent… he was drivin’ the UTV… he’s picking up the lookout… he’s getting his crew ready to bail out… he’s gathering them up… and he knows he’s gotta move his buggies and Granite Mountain’s buggies… so he’s multi-tasking through this process as he’s tryin’ to have this communication.
I will also say… that if he had not come around the corner at the time that he did… the lookout woulda been the first fatality. Guaranteed.
There was NO place for that lookout to have safely deployed… and he was WAY too close when he decided to bail out from where the fire was.
* Question from Audience member: Question I have is… were you guys able to
* determine where Division Alpha was? Was he with the crew?
Dudley: No. We’re pretty positive that he was NOT with the crew because ONE… as a Division… he should be out there scouting… TWO… that last comment… and that came directly off an audio… though we did not try to replicate the audio because it’s harsh to listen to… but it’s when the crew suddenly realizes there’s some trouble and it reaches out to Bravo 33 for assistance… and what you hear is Division Alpha say… “This is Division Alpha… I’m with the crew”.
So we knew that they were workin’ their ways… now here’s the key question…
Was Eric on the north end scouting? At one point we know he was.
OR… was he on the south end where the ranch was… scouting that?
* Question from Audience member: And that’s why I asked… I was just tryin’ to figure
* out… (??)… It seems like they got back together somewhere.
Dudley: They did. They hooked up together at SOME point.
I will say this. There is an allegation made… uh… I talked earlier about “Young Men In Fire”… Norman Maclean wrote that book. Well her son in John Maclean who is an investigative reporter and he writes in that style… but he’s done very well… and he’s made it his history… or his career… to write about fatality fires… and he started with South Canyon… the book called “Fire on the Mountain”.
HE has his own investigation goin’ in… and HE has an allegation that says based on a video clip that he… audio clip that he got outta the case files… he can hear that Eric made his way down to the ranch.
( Pause )
+ 53:59
Well… we’ve got that same audio clip. We’ve done our own review including takin’ it through… ah… ( Company Name: ?? Accounience ?? )… uh… in Southern California… they’re the… uh… district attorney’s forensics unit… and they’ve analyzed the clip. We can’t replicate it.
And… and that’s the problem with this.
You go through so much electronic audio manipulation… and eventually you get something that’s left… and people can interpret it however you want to.
People hear ‘ranch’. Other people hear ‘south’. You don’t know what it is.
+54:36
On the other hand… does it really change anything?
If he had actually gone through that canyon… gotten to the ranch… and then gone back with the crew… does that change anything about the decision making of why going that route?
Dudley: It does open up the door that you know that there had to be some type of intra-crew communication between he and the captain about the decision of one… where are you going… and…
( Audience member raises his hand again and Dudley sees it. )
( Dudley actually seems pretty annoyed at having to stop at this point ).
What?…
* Question from Audience member: That’s kinda why I asked you to see if… like… if there
* was intra-crew communications goin’ on that led to that and also I was wonderin’ too
* did he have other resources on his division or whether it was just Granite Mountain.
Dudley: It’s just Granite Mountain.
* Question from Audience member: Then who was Blue Ridge assigned to?
Dudley: Technically… they were working under Division Zulu… but… that was a pretty fuzzy setup as well. In reality they were workin’ much closler… closely with the structure protection group leader for Yarnell.
* Question from Audience member: That’s kinda why I was curious ‘cus it seems like
* that decision woulda been made on a TAC channel versus a Crew
* channel because it was affecting a lot of people.
Dudley: I agree.
* Question from Audience member: So… yea… it just sounds more like there’s intra-crew
* communication goin’ on ( at the Division level ).
Dudley: There are a series of pictures taking from one of the… uh… cameras… uh… of one of the Hotshots… Granite Mountain… and the series of pictures… uh… start at 1550 to 1555… and it’s that prominent point, the lunch spot, where they’re looking down and you can see the fire front and they’re looking down over where the grader is.
+56:06
The key thing with that picture, though, is… those pictures… is that every member of the crew is standing up… and they have their packs on.
( Pause )
For me… that says they’ve already made the decision to move. They’re just waiting for the order to line up and get goin’… ‘cus every one of ’em is standing up… hard hats… full packs… tools in their hands. They’re just watching until they’re giving the direction.
But… prior to that… by like five minutes… there is a discussion that takes place between OPS and Eric Marsh… and all you hear is Eric saying “I’m making my way off the top”. Top a what? Top of that box canyon? Top of to the north end?
And OPS says… “Copy that. You guys hunker and be safe. Let me know if you need air support.”
You don’t hear the front-end of that conversation.
You don’t hear the tail-end of that conversation.
You just hear that clip.
We replayed that audio for OPS and said… “Is this you?”… and he goes “Yup… that’s me.
I do NOT remember that conversation.”
And again… in the height of a major deal… but here’s what DID happen. You can hear a lot of discussion goin’ on between Air Attack because Air Attack hears an issue goin’ on out there and he checks in with OPS and says “I hear there’s a crew… uh… moving”… and he goes… “No… that’s Granite Mountain… they’re fine… they’re up in the black”… and he goes “Do you want me to check on them?”… “Nope… it’s Granite Mountain. They’re OK”.
So OPS… as most OPS would do… I’ve got a Hotshot crew… I know who they are… they’re up in the black… fine… I don’t need to worry about them anymore… I got other issues… because they’ve got heavy structure protection going on right now on the north end… Model Creek… Peeples Valley.
+57:48
For me… a key indicator as the crew made that move was ONE… they did not perceive any risk as they made the crew…as… as they made the move. At no time until it was too late did they reach out to aviation… Air Attack.. or Bravo… and say “Hey… we’re moving. Keep an eye on us”.
They don’t do that. Nor do they TELL anyone that they’re moving other than you hear in little clips… and the reason for that, I would suspect… I don’t know this… but the radio is already heavily impacted, they’re within their own division ‘quote unquote’… so… why tie up more radio traffic if all we’re doin’ is moving.
We do feel very strongly that they were repositioning to the ranch.
Not because they were headed down there to defend Yarnell… Yarnell was already getting hit with fire… but they’d been sitting there on their rear end and they’re a local crew.
+58:37
* Question from Audience member: But… how much of the human factor
* and having a bias for action… particularly being a Shot crew… in your
* backyard… I mean… that… that must… I mean… did you find any evidence
* of that coming into play?… ‘cus they’re not just gonna sit there.
Dudley: They’re not gonna sit there. They’re not gonna sit there… PLUS… their crew buggies have already been moved. A… a Hotshot crew is only good as its transportation… and it knows its buggies have been gone… and… he… it knows that everyone’s bailing outta Yarnell and they’re repositioning waiting for the fire to go through Yarnell and then everyone will re-engage.
Dudley: My… we suspect that that’s what they were intending… is to move down to the ranch, which was a PERFECT spot to hunker in and they’d be in a better position to re-engage with other resources.
( An audience member has had his hand up and Dudley now acknowledges him )
I’m sorry…
* Question from Audience member: That conversation between… when Division Alpha said they
* were comin’ off the top… some of the other audio also said Operations called and asked
* Division Alpha if they could reposition and help in Yarnell… and he basically (said) “No… we’re
* stayin’ in the black”. Was that… was that conversation when he said “comin’ off the
* top” AFTER that?
Dudley: No. It was somewhere in that time period… it’s still right about 1550 dat conversation takes place… but… the other OPS was told “No… we can’t… we can’t do dat”… and the other OPS drops that… uh… discussion.
There’s no… no pressure put on them to get off your rear end and move.
Everything was an INTERNAL discussion that took place.
But… there’s also a little clippet where you can hear Jesse and Eric talking and in that clippet you hear “Yea… you knew that was coming” and then you can hear one of ’em go “Yea… but I feel your confidence”.
So again… that same little discussion of “Well… I guess we are gonna move”, and that discussion of ‘bias for action’… Human factors… do you sit there in your own backyard… especially when you had just been recognized for what you had done on the Doce fire a week and a half ago on the edge of Prescott and Prescott thinks… you know… you’re… uh… your’e the end-all for fire crews… are you gonna stay there even though it’s the best place to stay… OR… or are you gonna just take a look and the fire right now is burning away from us… and by the time you get to that saddle you look out again and the fire is now running parallel… but it’s not comin’ at you… and you hit that saddle and you look over and you go “Ahh… we can make that in just a few minutes. We got it… and then we’ll be in a good position to…”
+1:01:02
* Audience member cuts Dudley off: But I guess that’s really the key point.
* If he had gone that route… and who knows if he did go that route…
* If he did go south to the ranch then he would have known that it was a harder route…
* but I guess that’s obviously just conjecture.
Dudley: It IS conjecture… BUT… that’s the problem that I have with the comment and someone… and the John Maclean clip says “Well… and he had his sawyers cut a P-Line”. Well… it doesn’t fit the timeline… and… if you actually had your sawyers cut a P-Line… why would you have your sawyers go back up and hook up the crew? Would you not just say “you guys hunker here at the ranch… we’ll wait for the rest of the crew to show up”. You, as a superintendent would probably go up and meet the crew… but you wouldn’t have your sawyers go back up… plus… it just doesn’t fit the timeline when you look at… we KNOW that the last picture taken at the lunch spot was at 1604.
And then ya gotta make your way all the way down and into the canyon and they realized… the first callout to… uh… Bravo was at 1637.
+1:02:09
You just don’t have enough time for all that goin’ back and forth. It doesn’t FIT.
I’m not sayin’ it didn’t happen… I’m just sayin’ we can’t validate that.
( Another hand has been up and Dudley now acknowledges it )
I’m sorry…
+1:02:17
* Question from Audience member: No… that’s fine.
* Goin’ along together with personnel and their experience since that’s their area.
* The rate of spread. Fuels. They’re used to that.
* Was this unusual to an extreme that… that they wouldn’t have anticipated that?
* Ah… is it… was it an unusual run… ah… was it something that they… you know…
* thought in the past experience they had the time but this was…
Dudley: The question is… was this a unique or… uh… such a unique situation in terms of fuels and fire behavior. Part of that answer is yes… it was an extreme fire behavior. However… some of our SMEs ( Subject Matter Experts ) made the comment… “Well…”, because they were from out of the area they made the comment… “Well… you had triple digit temperatures and single digit relative humidity with windstorms in the area… why would you… doesn’t that qualify as extreme?”.
And someone else from that area says… “No… that’s just a typical day in the southwest. If you don’t fight fire in those conditions your’re never gonna get off the road”… PLUS, the conditions on that day did NOT meet the National Weather Standards for a Fire Watch. There was no… uh… red flag issued for that day. It was extreme conditions by our standards… but it did not meet the criteria for that.
On the other hand… they were very familiar with the fuels and the conditions and that time of year with cells moving all over the place… what that could mean.
( Pause )
+1:03:43
* Question from Audience member: That lunch spot that they were in… was that
* pretty good solid black that they were… that they were hangin’ out in before
* they decided to move.
Dudley: Yes. It was. Ah… the question was… the lunch spot area… was that in a good black area and yes… it was solid black… it woulda been… our analysis said that it woulda been good enough for them to have just hunkered in there and let the fire blow by.
( Pause )
+1:04:10
* Question from audience member: Do you know of any… uhm… dissension within the crew?
* Did they try and split off at any point prior to or during the deployment?
Dudley: The question is… was there any decision… dissension within the crew and did any folks try to split off. Ah… Blue Ridge made the comment.. a number of those folks… they said “you know what… when they left the lunch spot… they were ALL in lock-step with one other”… because that was a pretty cohesive crew. Uh.. they were very, very close to one another.
+1:04:46
Ahm… so no… there was no indication… now… there’s some allegations that there was an argument between the Captain and the Superintendent about which way to go… from that saddle.
We can’t validate that. Some people made that allegation. We don’t have any evidence of that.
Ya know… probly the most telling thing for me… from my point of view of looking at this… was… ya know every crew has one.. what I call one or two ‘rabbits’… ya know.. speed machines that at time a stress… they’re gonna BOOK.
( Pause )
They deployed in an area smaller than where you guys are sitting.
They deployed as a unit.
They deployed together.
Not one person broke ranks.
They did exactly how they were trained.
That tells me extreme cohesive training and process. They never abandoned one another is the best way of putting it.
Ahm… I found that fascinating because I’ve never seen other shelter deployments that people aren’t spread out and you have one or two people that always try to make a… make it for themselves. They stayed together throughout the whole point.
+1:05:48
So… on the other hand… there’s a part of me that HAS to wonder… as they stood there on that saddle and they started droppin’ down the slope… I would like to think a few members of the crew had that little gnawing ‘pit’ in their stomach sayin’… “Is this a good idea?”.
But… would any one of ’em have spoken up and argued against the superintendent… or the acting? I don’t know.
On the other hand… I can tell ya this. Of the work that we’ve done… there isn’t anything that we found that suggested that Eric Marsh was a risk taker or that he would do anything to put his crew at risk… especially as much as he loved that program and he was in the process a maintaining and defending that program… the Wildland Fire Division… within the Prescott Fire Department. We just don’t have any evidence… of… uh… that takin’ place. So… it does make ya wonder.
+1:06:44
* Question from Audience member: Just a comment on the… ah… the crew… crew nets… the crew
* channels. Uhm… for years we’d show up at fires and they’d say… well.. we don’t want you to use
* your crew net… we want you to use an open channel. Which is… and our… our argument was…
* well… that’s how we communicate with each other. Do you see it coming to the point where that
* crew channel is going to be… uhm… open… and recorded like the other communication on the
* fires?
Dudley: I don’t see that. Uh.. part of the problem is the communications and the tools to do just that… I don’t think we can cover it from that angle. Oh.. and I’m sorry.. that was the question of using the inter-crew radio net… is there ever a point in time where that would become a… uh… tool to be used for recording and I don’t believe so.
BUT… it woulda provided us some pretty dandy information as to the true intent of what they were thinking about if we could’ve heard that discussion take place.
+1:07:43
* Question from Audience member: Do we know whether they were utilizing
* the pre-identified.IHC crew-nets?
Dudley: Yes. Well… no… I can’t.. I can’t guarantee that. I know they were using their own internal… and then at points… there was various communications… at points Blue Ridge and Granite were communicating on the IHC nets… then there were communicating on the assigned frequencies for that incident which was Arizona Division of Forestry. They were also communicating by cellphone because the net was just so packed up.
+1:08:14
One of the things that we did try to look into was… was there any undue influence given by a key member of the Prescott Fire Department by telephone. Not by radio… by telephone… pushing them to get off that spot… and we can validate that there wasn’t. There wasn’t anybody getting in the way of saying “Hey… you guys… get off your ass and get down here”… other than the one suggestion from the OPS “Can you come down?”… and it’s okay to ask that… but it’s also okay to say “No… we can’t… we’re not in a position to do that”.
But SOMETHING triggered their mind.
+1:08:45
* Question from Audience member: I was wonderin’ about the wind shift and the weather
* advisories that they mentioned and they said that they may have perceived something
* prior to the actual wind shift being that event? What… ah… was the timeframe… and…
Dudley: Okay. This is the discussion of… uh… the weather event and the notification of the wind shift and what were the timeframes involved. So… they received the official warning at 1526… and National Weather Service Flagstaff called the fire behavior analyst on the team and said “Heads up… you got a wind shift coming”. The fire behavior analyst then broadcast that out. There is a check-off where the crew acknowledged receiving that… and the crew then… the captain… calls the lookout and says “Did you hear that?”… and the lookout says “Copy. I heard that”. That was at 1526.
At 1600… nuthin’ had happened yet.
At about 1610… there was a change in wind direction… but it was subtle. It wasn’t very… it wasn’t a hard push. Nothing like that outflow boundary that hit them.
So the question is… did they just perceive that to be that… that shift… and when you get a weather warning… how long does it stay valid in your own head? I mean you’re… we’re given warnings all the time out there. How valid does that stay?… and there is no standard for NWS… I mean… they’ll admit that. They… they can’t identify that. So.. the comment that we made on the screen was that probably at some point they just said… “Okay… maybe it’s come through and maybe it’s not gonna happen… we’re gonna move”.
And the other thing to keep in mind is as you’re moving along that ridge… what you can’t see… there’s a heavy smoke layer layin’ across that top… so that outflow boundary from that cell that’s breaking out to the north… you can’t really see that cell anymore. All you can see is that smoke boundary. It’s hiding your point of view of what’s going on out there.
( Pause )
+1:10:44
Ya know… a lot of people have said this and I’ll repeat it too because I do believe this. What they did… ninety-nine out of a hundred times they’d a been fine doin’ it… and no one would have known anything. They just got bit this one time.
Not only that… give me 15 minutes. 15 minutes to the front. 15 minutes to the back… NONE a this would’ve happened. Ahm.. none of us would be here right now.
‘Cus 15 minutes early… they’d have had plenty a time to get to the ranch.
15 minutes to the back they woulda seen the changes goin’ on from the saddle and they would have bailed off the back side.
And… and… that’s what it always comes to is that timeframe.
+1:11:26
* Question from Audience member: So kinda building on that… you mentioned all the lawsuits that
* are going on with this fire… and how does that work legally when there’s many complexities and
* variables like you’re discussing. Weather, decision making.
* How can someone try and stick a pin on… you know… one person?
Dudley: Well… ya know what? Okay… sorry… was gonna make a comment about lawyers.
( Entire room laughs )
Dudley: Uhm… the question is with so many complexities and such a variation of conditions that took place that day… how can anyone pin their hat on just one item to identify.
If you take a look at the ADOSH report… the ADOSH points blame.
They point blame at the ICT4 for not takin’ action the first night.
The residents… that’s why a number of them have filed suit against the State… because they feel it shoulda been put out the first night.
Ah… they take critical… uh… uh… action and criticism of the ICT2 and his team because they showed up and they couldn’t keep up with the pace… even though he recognized right off the bat… man… we’re behind the power curve… we gotta get help here. I… we commended him for acting that way. Most teams wanna hang on to everything.
And then they REALLY criticized the State for not making the decision of pulling people off the entire incident early on.
Well.. that’s a hard one. That’s a REAL hard one. State of Arizona, just like here in the State of Utah, there’s statutes on the books that say you are responsible for putting out all fire within incorporated unincorporated areas especially when… you’re not supposed to put yourself at risk… but you’re supposed to fight fire. You can’t sit back and say… “Nah… this community can’t be defended so were gonna back off from it”.
The Yarnell Ranch… or.. the Boulder Creek Ranch, that we call it… that was a place that was put in and the owners of that ranch had the capability to defend it and build it to a standard that they knew they would never have to worry about leaving it… and they were in place when the fire ran all the way around them… and the only problem they ran into… they lost one air-conditioning unit off of a… uh… warehouse. That’s it. They were totally fine.
She even took a picture from her patio of the whole hillside behind her completely lit up… at one time. No.. no.. no… no other issue for them.
But they had the resources to do that.
Most a Yarnell… it’s a retirement community… it’s an old mining community. Ahm… not a lotta defensible space within the community of Yarnell. So.. can you then make the decision as a Type 2 IC to say.. “Nah… we’re not gonna defend. We’re gonna pull off.”?
Man… you’re getting inta some subjective… but that’s where some of the key legal items are gonna be playin’ out… and… the lawyers are sayin’… No… they shoulda played that out… or the State shoulda put it out on that first night.
Well… that’s easy to say in hindsight… but when you’re the person up there makin’ that decision and you base it on safety… who are you to be criticized?
So… that’s where it… it’s all standing.
+1:14:32
* Question from Audience member: If… if we’re gonna pinpoint it to one decision… it seems like
* the decison that was made to… to leave the spot in the black and re-engage… was… was the
* clincher… that was the last hole in the swiss cheese.
Dudley: It is
* Audience member continues: …and… that’s how we’re programming our firefighters. That’s how
* we… that’s what we program… especially the Hotshots to do is… find a place to engage… and
* re-engage… so… so my question is… what… what’s your thoughts from the investigation
* standpoint of… of that aspect of it?
Dudley: We came up with four recommendations. Unlike South Canyon which has eighty some-odd recommendations… but we made a lot of changes… all for the better, for the most part, since South Canyon. But really… we have a total of seven recommendations outta Yarnell.
Three are specific to the State. Four are inter-agency in scope.
( Pause )
Ah… why not more?
( Pause )
We haven’t found new ways to kill people.
( Pause )
And… when you look at this issue… everyone wants to make this a very complex situation. It’s not. It ends up bein’ a crew decision and leadership to decide what they’re gonna do. It becomes pretty simple when you look at it from that aspect.
But we do have four recommendations.
The families ( pause ) were incensed that we didn’t know where the crew was.
To them… GPS would’ve answered the question. If we knew exactly where they were… that VLAT could’ve landed on them and put retardant. To them, that’s the easy place to go ‘cus you can always improve equipment.
One of the family members… the father of one of the members… ah… to him… it’s all about Hotshots… ah… I’m sorry… fire shelters… and he’s gonna make it his career to push the agencies to improve fire shelters.
I’m sorry… but in my look at that canyon… NOTHING could have prevented anything from happening when that fire came through there. Not the current, not anything new… depending on how much weight you wanna carry with you as a fire shelter.
So really… of all the recommendations the key one that stands out for the Wildland Fire agencies? Decision making. Human factors.
How we train… and how we make decisions and how we process our training… what do we need to do to modify that… because for me… that saddle represents the ultimate swiss-cheese hole.
Here we are… we’ve had a number a things that we could’ve done… including being a little more aggressive on that Saturday… but you’re still not gonna second-guess what an ICT4 is doing unless there’s something of criminal intent… which there was NOT… so finally you end up with that last ‘hole’ lining up and you make that decision. We can stay high and go around… we can go off the back side… we can stay in the black… or we can go direct… but once we go direct… we’re blind.
We can’t see anything coming at us… and all evidence points out they were absolutely shocked when that fire came around that ridge at… the.. uh.. point of that ridge.
+1:17:32
* Question from the Audience member: You’re talkin’ about the decision point
* being from that saddle… but what about from that lunch spot. It seems like…
* uhm… from just looking at what you’ve shown us… would have it been feasible
* to traverse to the north, I guess it woulda been, through the black and follow
* that head out to the ranch and stay in the black the whole time and look for
* a spot to re-engage?
Dudley: The question was… ah… the decision point… what about not the saddle but goin’ back to the lunch spot could he have gone to the north… and the answer is… yes… and Blue Ridge thought that’s exactly what they had done.
You coulda stayed to the north, through the black, and come out at a ranch in Model Creek. It woulda taken a little while… but you coulda done it just fine and you woulda been in black the whole way.
As far as Blue Ridge was concerned… and that’s the first place they went looking for the crew when they were… when they heard all the commotion and they started to search… they went back up to the lunch spot and headed out to the north a little ways. So yes… they coulda done that.
+1:18:27
* Audience member: By foot? They did that by foot?
Dudley: Yes… and we were tryin’ to get helicop… they were tryin’ to get helicopters in there but the smoke was still pretty heavy.
( Pause )
+1:18:37
* Question from Audience member: Can you talk a little bit about… uh…
* ya know… you said Prescott Chief? Did he resign or was he fired?
Dudley: He was fired:
* Audience member continues: Okay…and what were the reasons
* surrounding that?… just… the buck stops there?
Dudley: We suspect so. Well… we do know… and this is regarding why the fire chief of Prescott was… uh.. released from his position. We do know that there was internal tension between… and this is just day to day city politics… there was internal tension between the fire department and the city administrators. There was tension between the fire department in Prescott and Central Yavapai fire district.
Why?… I don’t know… uhm… it’s just things that go on within communities or whatnot.
So… he was let go because the buck does stop there and then the city is under all a these… here’s one little irony, though.
He’s running for mayor of Prescott… AND… he stands a pretty good chance of winning ‘cus he was well-liked within the community.
So… ya know… on… on top of everything else that you’re dealing with now you’re gonna have this play into some of the politics there in the local area. That’s too bad.
+1:19:43
* Question from Audience member: Uh… back to some of the legal stuff… my question has been…
* as far as how their team was set up within their organization… I saw several different reports on
* TV about… uh… certain members not being classified as full time and not getting death benefits
* and things like that. Are they set up so that they are like… a seasonal employee?
* Are they brought in just for… ya know… fire season?
Dudley: ( To the camera operator ) You need me to repeat that? Okay… the question is… the structure of the Granite Mountain Hotshots… ah… based on some of the legatlities… were some of them seasonal?… were they permanent? What was the structure? Ahm… six people on the crew were permanent employees which meant they immediately received… their families… received the full benefits of their position. Pension, medical care, health care, whatnot.
The others members of the crew were seasonal.
Now… I’m not sure how it works within Unified Fire Authority. Within the US Forest Service… and I’ve got a son whose on a sixth year… uh… fire crew… he’s a seasonal employee. What that tells me is that if something happens to him… he gets… there are no benefits. Only permanent employees have the benefits.
However… uh… one of the members of the uh… uh.. families… Juliann Ashcrof… recently petitioned the Merit Systems Board for the City of Prescott and was awarded full benefits. Now… it’s only to her… you can’t help but think that the rest of the families are now gonna go in… but under their structure… six people were permanent… they were the only ones that received benefits.
Everyone else was a seasonal employee who did not receive benefits.
+1:21:25
* Question from Audience member: When you say benefits… do you mean line of duty death
* benefit… or health benefits?
Dudley: Health benefits and pension. Line a duty… everyone… because there’s a Federal law that provides that.
* Question from Audience member: So line of duty has… ah… the National…
Dudley: Yea. That one time payment… they all received that.
* Question from Audience member: …any other benefits beyond that they did not receive
* because they were seasonal?
Dudley: Correct. Anything that would be covered under… uh… State retirement.
+1:21:52
*Question from Audience member: So… um… I read a report from last year
* that said… that’s sayin’ that… that… not… they weren’t up to their qualifications
* like to the standard to actually run as a Hotshot crew. Is THAT true… or not?
Mike Dudley: It’s not. They were a fully certified IHC. We pulled all the records and they met th
Followup… Apparently there is a ‘character limit’ for a single post in this WordPress software so here is the FINAL part of Dudley’s speech transcript starting with the section that got ‘cut off’ in the post above…
+1:21:52
*Question from Audience member: So… um… I read a report from last year
* that said… that’s sayin’ that… that… not… they weren’t up to their qualifications
* like to the standard to actually run as a Hotshot crew. Is THAT true… or not?
Mike Dudley: It’s not. They were a fully certified IHC. We pulled all the records
and they met the criteria. Now… you can quibble about some… because one
of the… because… for the IH… Hotshot sups… Hotshot crews you have to have
so many permanent members… and you has to have certain capabilites with red
card ratings to meet up. What had happened was one of the permanent people
had been turned into a term position… so… but if you look at it on the books… it
still meets the criteria of a certified Hotshot crew. So they… they were fully qualified.
Other people’ve said… ya know… they were at the tail end of their dispatch and they
were tired. Well.. yea. You guys are probly about August… you’re probly a little tired
and you’re not as fresh as you’re starting right now… but again… it’s black or white.
Do you meet the criteria or do you not? They met the criteria.
( Pause )
( Two hands go up and Dudley picks the one behind the first one )
Dudley: Ah… let me catch ya right behind….
+1:23:02
* Question from Audience member: You said the superintendent was somewhat
* defending the program to Prescott? Was there some sorta… tryin’ to cut the
* program or not getting support from the department?
Mike Dudley: Question is… ah… there were some allegations or some discussion that took place that their… the superintendent was tryin’ to support the program. Ah… it was a budget crunch. Prescott City was spending a lot a money to fund the program… especially for a Hotshot crew that a good eighty percent of its time isn’t there… because it had… it was on the road… and they traveled a LOT. They… they did a LOT a rolls… so yes… there was some subtle issues going on within the department. Overall there was support for it, but… the department was stressed with budget… uh… issues and we have a letter that Eric had written a few months prior to the start of the season defending the position and he had wanted another permanent position put in and he was denied… so he was feeling a little frustrated and was just tryin’ to defend the work that they had.
+1:24:08
*Question from Audience member: So for every fatality fire there’s implementation
* of something. Thirty Mile was pocket cards. What… whadda do you see… I know
* you (gave) the four recommendations… but what would be number one thing you
* see implemented fire-wide from this incident.
Mike Dudley: Ah… what are the key recommendations and what would come outta this. So… let me go through the four really quick because… ah… three of ’em… TWO of ’em were easy. VLAT. The fact of the matter is we have a hard time… no matter how you wanna push stuff out from NWCG… by the time it filters down… how many people really know on the ground where it needs to be known… how to order a VLAT and in what configurations.
So NWCG has a check-off that they’re going through the process to make sure that information gets to the ground. It was released last year but 99 percent of us didn’t have a… I knew it… because I’m in aviation. That’s the only reason. But every time I asked someone “Do you know how to order a VLAT?” and they’d go “I dunno… we just wait and the big plane shows up”.
Okay.. so that… that one is in the process. Another one is dealing with… ah… the GPS and equipment. There is a committee through NWCG that is implementing some GPS tracking in the field right now to evaluate. There is also a… uh… another committee that is doin’ a survey of fire shelters and what we as a community… all of us… wanna see in the fire shelters. That process is going through… because they’re gonna be evaluating… that’s done on a five year basis but they’re stepping it up to meet the criteria.
The biggest one… and probly the hardest one… is that human factors. That’s gonna take longer but there’s also an Interagency core that is takin’ a look at what do we need to modify within our training element and to me… that’s the most critical one. Not the tools… not the VLAT… we already know how it flies… not anything else… it’s that subtle aspect… the human factors and decision making.
What do we need to improve in our training to better equip people to make decisions.
That’s the key one for me.
( Another hand goes up and Dudley acknowledges it )
Yes sir…
+1:26:17
* Question from Audience member: On the hardware you mentioned… are they
* going to the APRs… ( ??? ). Are they going to be able to do that or are they
* just going with… with position with just… uh… GPS?
Mike Dudley: So the question is… in terms of the GPS tracking… what kinda tools… and there’s such a broad spectrum of that… one of ’em is… the radio… GP… uh… that special format where you click your radio and immediately you’ve identified your location. They’re also looking at self-tracking ga… uh GPS that you can wear… and then also be used. Now… ironically… Jim Karels… the State Forester?… Two years prior to bein’ on the investigation he had a fatality fire in the state of Florida… and what… and it was with one of his plow units. If you’re in the south… your key IA is a plow unit… and one of his plows on a fire had been hung up on a stump and before they could clear it the fire came over ’em and killed the operator and the swamper. They put in a GPS unit… but it’s ONLY for his plows. It’s not his engines. It’s not his individual firefighters… and if he gets resources in the panhandle from Georgia… they don’t have GPS.
The whole aspect of GPS is size and scale… and how do you develop one standard for Federal… for State… for local resources… to meet that one standard… and who pays for it? That is a huge… AND… how do you get the bandwidth to do that? The US Military uses GPS… only for its Special OPS people. Doesn’t try to cover everybody… but… it’s a process be… uh… that’s gonna take place that we’ll be lookin’ at.
Anything else?
( Pause. No hands go up ).
+1:28:00
So… just a reminder.
June 30th. One year anniversary. 19 people. All at one time.
July 6th. Uh… 14 people. 20th anniversary of South Canyon.
So… after South Canyon we made all these corrections because we assumed this would never happen again… and the problem with Yarnell is… and the shock of Yarnell is… not only could it happen again to a crew that well trained… but the opportunity for it to happen again in the future is still there. It’s always… will be there. We can’t acknowledge that what we operate in is a high risk environment.
What we do need to know is that we maintain our training… we maintain our situational awareness to take care of ourselves and each other as we go through.
Uh… it’s critical work that we do… and only us, really, understand what that means, not everyone else that out.. is outside the system.
So.. from me to you all I just wish you all a good season… and a… more importantly… a safe fire season.
Okay? Thanks.
( Applause )
END OF MIKE DUDLEY’S PRESENTATION / END OF VIDEO
OK so here I go again–Mr. Dudley what fire background do really have?
My indication is you are a professional collage Forestry graduate.
You never worked your way up thru the Wild land Fire Fighting ranks and yet you profess to know it all.
One of the biggest problems today with overhead on Wild land Fire they do not have the on the ground experience. THE SCHOOLOF HARD KNOCKS to manage fire on the ground.
This is why the federal agencies are picking up old trained WLFF as AD’s to fill positions on overhead teams. I can guarantee the Safety officers that are current AD’s on Fire will not put up with Rolled up sleeves.
Back to Mr. Dudley His understanding of crews and wildland fire leaves me a little
concerned with his actual qualifications.
Maybe I am wrong but the way he talks gives me that feeling.
Mr. Powers… see a LONGER post about this up above as a new ‘parent’ comment… but here is the 411 on Dudley.
It was pretty hard to find out anything about Dudley…
but I did find at least one thing online that resembles a resume’ for him.
On October 18 and 19, 2011, Dudley was one of the speakers at a
conference held at Utah Stage University ( Logan, Utah ).
The TITLE of the conference was…
Restoring the West – 2011
Sustaining Forests, Woodlands, and Communities
Through Biomass Use
At this conference… Dudley gave a 30 minute talk…
Agenda – Tuesday, October 18
USU Eccles Conference Center
8:40 to 9:10 am Biomass Utilization: A Tool for Forest Restoration,
By Mike Dudley, Director of State and Private Forestry,
Regions One and Four, USDA Forest Service, Ogden, Utah
The following PDF document summarized the conference and included
some ‘biographies’ of all the speakers… including Dudley…
http://forestry.usu.edu/files/uploads/RTW2011Media/RTW%20Booklet_FINAL%20Proof.pdf
On page 5 of this PDF file is a short resume’ for Dudley…
———————————————————————————
Speaker Abstracts – In order of presentation, presenting author in italics
Biomass Utilization: A Tool for Forest Restoration
Mike Dudley,
Director State and Private Forestry,
USDA Forest Service,
Regions One and Four,
Intermountain / Northern Regions,
324 25th St., Ogden, UT 84401
Email: mdudley ( at ) fs.fed.us.
Mike began his Forest Service career as a seasonal firefighter on the Descanso Ranger District of the Cleveland National Forest, CA in 1977. Mike worked seasonally on various national forests in California before receiving his career conditional appointment on the Inyo National Forest, CA in 1980.
In 1981 he moved to the Willamette National Forest, Oregon and worked in various fire/fuel positions including District Fire Management Officer. In 1997 he moved to the National Office, Washington, DC and during his 4 years there filled a number of positions in aviation, planning, and ending as the Assistant Director of Fire Ecology including National Fire Plan Key Point 3 Coordinator (Hazardous Fuels) for the US Forest Service.
He moved to the Intermountain Regional Office as Director Fire, Aviation, Air Management in October, 2001.
In September 2009 he moved into his current position as Director State and Private Forestry for the Northern and Intermountain Regions of the US Forest Service. He recently completed a detail as Acting Director Northeast Area State and Private Forestry in Newtown Square, Pennsylvania.
EDUCATION…
Mike received a B.S. in Forest Management from Oregon State University in 1986.
—————————————————————————————–
NOTE: Dudley’s PUBLIC ‘LinkedIN’ page verifies when he was at Oregon State University getting his BS in Forestry management.
It was from 1983 to 1986.
Just for a little research—check out wildfire today the Happy Camp Complex.
Note the pictures of the 2 crews fighting fire—Shirt sleeves and gloves?
Any questions on safety???????
Based on what Brendan McDonough has said ( and related to your comments below about Brendan’s ‘HILLBILLY’ and ‘That’s OLD SCHOOL’ and ‘We’re a lot SMARTER now’ comments )…
…maybe a new WFF ‘catch phrase’ that should come out of this incident might be…
“It’s better to be a live hillbilly than a dead smart guy”.
I love it— Safety tip for the day…………………
The link to John’s new article in the Phoenix New Times, is here:
http://blogs.phoenixnewtimes.com/valleyfever/2014/09/families_of_the_fallen_granite_mountain_hotshots_are_not_getting_the_answer.php
After reading the article the first thing that hit me as totally un believable.
McDonough was dismissive of one of the 10 Standard Orders.
Fight Fire Aggressively having provided for safety First………..
He said its HILLBILLY……ITS OLD…….
MODERN WILDLAND FIRE FIGHTERS DON’T NEED TO FOLLOW SUCH RESTRICTIONS…
WE’RE SMARTER …..WE’RE A LOT SMARTER
Now that is coming from his training and Supervisors. If the entire crew was trained in this fashion it is no wonder they did what they did. No reason to question the 10 and 18 they are of no consequence.
One more quote—- THE 10 AND 18—YOU CAN’T ABIDE BY EVERY SINGLE ONE OF THEM.
That was his training that is what he took away from it. Along with the rest of the crew. who were all trained by Marsh and Steed.
As I said along time back the crew ignored the 10 and 18 that were screaming at them. provided no safety and walked into hell.
They were not a “lot smarter” than the old fire fighters that always put safety first.
Hillbilly my ASS.
Explains violating simple rules like shirt sleeves and gloves and jumps to the big ones, like taking huge risks and ignoring basic safety rules. One note on gloves—When you are carrying tools you are required to be wearing gloves. The only time gloves are off is when you take a break.
I guess McDonough purity well summed up Granit Mountain’s Fire Safety Rules— you cant abide by every single one of them—we’re not HILLBILLY’S———REALLY.
Not sure this is totally relevant but in one of his ADOSH interviews Brendan McDonough also talks about his attitude towards ‘risk’ and he seems to be also just regurgitating things he has been ‘taught’.
He tells ADOSH his view of the job in general is “risk a lot… save a lot”… almost as if he believes you can’t do one without doing the other.
From Brendan’s second ADOSH interview on October 10, 2013.
The following exchange took place between ADOSH investigator Bruce Hannah and Brendan right after they were talking about the ‘near miss’ between the helicopter and the VLAT that afternoon and Brendan was saying he saw the whole thing and was almost sure, for a moment, that he was about to have to start picking up bodies from the valley.
Bruce Hannah then was asking McDonough about the ‘general conditions’ that day and how there seemed to have been a number of ‘near-misses’ and/or people nearly getting hurt or burned or otherwise injured.
Hannah was basically asking Brendan if he sensed it had developed into a ‘high-risk’ environment there in Yarnell that afternoon.
Then Brendan basically just shrugged that off and offered his ( taught? ) philosophy that seems to equate ‘save a lot’ with ‘risk a lot’.
Q1 = Bruce Hannah ( ADOSH )
A = Brendan McDonough
831 A: Mm-hm. I think that’s just the job in general. I mean, you know, you want –
832 you risk a lot, you save a lot.
833
834 Q2: Yeah.
835
836 A: You know, risk anything, sometimes don’t get anything out of it. So…
837
838 Q2: And that’s – that’s funny. I mean, I mean, it’s not funny. But I – I mean, to us
839 as – as safety professionals, we have a totally different, uh…
840
841 A: Mm-hm.
842
843 Q2: …perspective of what is a reasonable risk at your workplace.
844
845 A: Yeah. And it’s learning those reasonable risks, you know? Well, we – if you
846 risk a lot, we could save a house, but it’s just a house.
847
848 Q2: Right.
849
850 A: So, I mean, you definitely learn these risks.
There’s so much in this article I disagree with, I don’t even know where to begin.
On the other hand, there are several things I agree with. So I still don’t know where to begin.
There’s a lot here I don’t know what the sourcing is. So I can’t say.
I’ve spent vast amounts of the past week studying investigations of fatality fires. It’s a huge mess. I don’t know who to trust.
I don’t trust the SAIT, I don’t trust the Forest Service, I don’t trust the ADOSH, I don’t trust the Arizona Forestry Department, and I don’t trust the lawyers. And I don’t trust JD either, after this article, I’m seriously sorry to say. I have no clue who fire-fighters or their families should trust. Except themselves and each other.
And, because of that, I don’t see any of this doing anything but getting worse.
Marti,
While I was happy to see an article appear examining the events of 6/30/13, and I want the press to pursue this story, this article bothered me a lot too. At places it seemed to be doing nothing but publishing rumors. And that is flat out wrong. Unnamed sources are fine, as long as you provide some idea of where they are from, and report what was told to you. Publishing simple hearsay or rumors floating through the ether is irresponsible. And some of the sourcing here is abysmal. Much of the article is fine, but the explosive part is not. And that I do not believe is either fair or professional.
Reply to mike post September 4, 2014 at 10:15 pm
>> mike said…
>>
>> Publishing simple hearsay or rumors floating through the ether is
>> irresponsible. And some of the sourcing here is abysmal. Much of
>> the article is fine, but the explosive part is not. And that I do not
>> believe is either fair or professional.
mike… if I understood your previous comment about the article correctly then the ‘explosive part’ that you are referring to is, in your mind, the part about the (supposed) argument between Marsh and Steed.
I believe Mr. Dougherty did a fine job of ‘presenting that’.
When the ACTUAL Co-Lead of the first ‘official’ investigation into this incident gets up in PUBLIC and says…
—————————————-
Mike Dudley: There’s some allegations that there was an argument between the Captain and the Superintendent about which way to go… from that saddle.. Some people made that allegation. We can’t validate that.
—————————————-
…then it is neither ‘hearsay’ nor ‘unprofessional to REPORT on that.
That is from the HORSE’S MOUTH.
Unless this man is lying… then it is NOT ‘hearsay’.
That is a statement coming from the one person who is most likely to KNOW whether those ‘allegations’ were made… or NOT.
That also isn’t ‘floating through the ether’, either.
It was an official statement made by a US Forestry Official in front of a roomful of firefighters who were specifically gathered to hear him talk about the incident and his investigation.
We do not KNOW if this argument actually took place… and even Mr. Dougherty is not saying that it did.
What Mr. Dougherty was reporting is that we can, in fact, be almost certain that more than one person reported that it DID happen to the official agency charged with investigating the fire.
We also now have ‘other evidence’ ( alebeit… currently unnamed ) that what Mr. Dudley has now reported is not only true ( the allegations were officially made ) but that the events themselves being reported did actually take place. It’s only the second part of that that deserves more clarity.
Mr. Dougherty’s article ( and, indeed, his TITLE for it ) was focusing on the fact that even the FAMILIES are not getting the answers they need with regards to the incident that took their loved ones from them.
In that context… it was perfectly appropriate for Mr. Dougherty to mention the public statements of a US Forestry official and the actual Co-Lead of the SAIT investigation to the effect that they ( the official SAIT entity ) were receiving ‘testimony’ and ‘evidence’ that no one ( not even the families ) has ever heard about before or was in any way mentioned in legal, formal FOI requests for information regarding their investigation.
It’s not hearsay when it comes from the HORSE’S MOUTH.
It’s NEWS.
It would be nice if Mike Dudley… or ANYONE from the US Forestry Service and/or Arizona Division of Forestry would comment (officially) on this article.
Mentioning the supposed argument and Dudley’s remarks was fine. Relating “an unconfirmed report circulating among WFFS” about Marsh making 3 requests, being refused, and then giving an order is pure BS. If it is an “unconfirmed report” you DO NOT REPORT IT. Otherwise you are just gossiping. Going on to say it is “unconfirmed” is not an adequate excuse for just spreading rumors. John has done a lot of good concerning Yarnell Hill. IMHO this statement, true or not, was not good.
A U.S. President was brought down in the 70s by reporters using, in part, unconfirmed info being given them by an unnamed source. Part of the game here is that there is a concerted effort to keep any information from being given by those who have info. They could lose their jobs or worse if they speak with attribution. The idea is to defend against the lawsuits, make no changes, and move on.
SR, what you said was not true. Yes, “Deep Throat” was unnamed, but they did not run with what they got from that source until they got independent confirmation. And, if I am not mistaken, they would then attribute the source where they got the confirmation from (also often unnamed) so they did not have to reveal the existence of Deep Throat. Woodward and Bernstein did not spread rumors.
Let me just say that John has other sources that he can not name that are giving him information out side of this discussion. If he has had contact or made contact with other WFF that are adding to the same info I got those people may request they not be identified for several reasons. So while we do not have the actual evidence there are those that have reported the same information. I do not believe JD would have said that without additional input from other sources.
I will say I have herd that this argument information was out in the fire community 2 weeks after the fire. No one then was able to pin point the actual statement and supposed Video. There is information out there and people know about it.
You are right it is still hear say but has some validity based on unnamed sources.
I have always said my information is classed as hearsay until the evidence is released.
My basic first step was to prove that Marsh could have been in front of and below the crew in order to give validity to the information. That coupled with other specific things like the crew moving out fast from a good safety zone that the looked like they were settled down for the duration. The statement about an argument, misc. radio traffic, the possibility of flagging and small pieces of the puzzle made some since to me.
Remember back a few months ago I was one of the first to say Marsh was above the crew and not below them at the ranch because of his meeting with Frisby he could not be in 2 places at once. Now the evidence has changed my mind. All we have left is the solid proof of why the crew moved. We have a totally plausible scenario based on some evidence, times and radio traffic
we will have to wait on the solid evidence to put the pieces together
We said from the beginning some one had to order the crew to move off the mountain. Who else but Marsh he had the right to refuse a order from overhead but could Steed refuse Marsh?????
Well said.
I certainly have said on here that people should contact JD if they have info but can’t speak openly. I’m dumb enough that I doubt it was an original idea.
This may also be a juncture that jars former crew if any to speak about any past bad decision/good outcome instances if those were experienced.
Reply to mike post on September 5, 2014 at 4:41 am
>> mike said…
>>
>> Mentioning the supposed argument and Dudley’s
>> remarks was fine.
Ah… OK… but now you have me really confused.
Next response explains why.
.>> mike also said…
>>
>> If it is an “unconfirmed report” you DO NOT REPORT IT.
>> Otherwise you are just gossiping.
Oh… you mean something like this…
—————————————-
Mike Dudley: There’s some allegations that there was an argument between the Captain and the Superintendent about which way to go… from that saddle.. Some people made that allegation. We can’t validate that.
—————————————-
UNCONFIRMED REPORT being fully REPORTED in PUBLIC to a room full of firefighters by a US Forestry official and the actual Co-Leader of the Special Accident Investigation for they Yarnell tragedy.
>> mike also said…
>>
>> Going on to say it is “unconfirmed” is not an adequate
>> excuse for just spreading rumors. John has done a lot
>> of good concerning Yarnell Hill. IMHO this statement,
>> true or not, was not good.
So here is my confusion…
In one breath you say it was FINE for someone to REPORT on what Mike Dudley himself said in public ( which was basically also just pure gossip… according to your definition )… but then it is NOT OK for that same accomplished, award-winning investigative reporter to talk about what HE now seems to know… when the likelihood of that careful, professional reporter’s statements being FALSE is about ZERO?
I still would like to know what steps the SAIT actually took to try and ‘validate’ these ‘allegations’ that Mike Dudley now admits the SAIT received ( from more than one person ).
These are the same people that couldn’t even get the sequence of the MacKenzie and Parker photos right.
How well did they even TRY to ‘validate’ the now-known-to-exist allegations of ‘the argument’ between Marsh and Steed?
Would LOVE to know the story on that one.
Reporting on Dudley’s comments was perfectly fine, they were made in public with no doubt where they came from (i.e. Dudley’s lips). No matter whether they were true or not, it was news that the leader of the SAIT made that statement. Repeating an unsourced rumor as one “circulating among WFFs” is entirely different. If someone sat down and told John about the requests and orders, it would have been alright to report, as long as he sourced it. Not necessarily named but something like “Forest Service official” or “unnamed hotshot superintendent”. And he really should have tried to confirm it independently before reporting it. Otherwise you can get caught just dishing rumors. In many places in the article he did exactly that. He however did not with that allegation.
I hear ya… but let me put what I was trying to say another way.
BOTH men ( Dudley and Dougherty ) are of high reputation.
BOTH men have reported what they have heard without actually ‘naming’ their sources… but there is no reason to believe either one would just be ‘making something up’.
I am not ‘distinguishing’ any ‘difference’ between these two scenarios.
Until some other evidence emerges to DISPROVE what they have been saying… I believe BOTH men.
The thing to wait and see on is if any official from the SAIT disputes JD’s article, none so far have stepped forward. It is out there now for any evidence that would prove other wise. Some times that is how it works if you think you have good information then put it in a written article and see if there is any proof to dispute it. You might get lucky and get more evidence.
My thoughts.
Agree…. but… unfortunately the parties involved have, at the moment, that ‘get out of commenting free’ card which goes something like this…
“It is not the policy of this agency to comment on matters related to pending litigation.”
Yada… yada.. yada…
That will probably remain true for the duration of the ‘pending litigation’.
After THAT ( and even if court documents get sealed )… is another story.
It really doesn’t matter how the litigation turns out. This is a historic incident. The STORY ( and the search for the full details ) will CONTINUE even AFTER the ‘litigation’ resolves.
I hope the ‘parties involved’ all understand that.
The best thing to do is just tell the truth.
The sooner the better.
That was ALWAYS the ‘best thing to do’.
Just for starters, how much time did we spend picking the evidence apart and putting it back together to finally debunk the narrative that Eric was the one that responded to that retardant drop?
If people want to know what wildland firefighters and their families actually want, I highly recommend the forums and archives of http://www.wildlandfire.com.
Above all, from what I’ve read, they don’t want narratives and hitpieces and presentations and investigations that are not based on accurate, carefully sourced evidence.
They also don’t appreciate taking all the blame, and, thus, all the punishment, for the results of systemic problems that are causing fires to be constantly under-resourced and, thus, poorly managed, and crews and teams to be inadequately funded and, thus, unable to retain their best and most experienced people.
They also don’t appreciate the 10 and 18 being used, by people who are not familiar with how they are actually used in fire-fighting, as “laws” that if you “break,” can hold you criminally/civilly liable.
It was definitely high time for someone with a high profile to write a narrative questioning and holding accountable these so-called “investigations” and the agonizing chaos they have engendered.
But I don’t believe this was the way to do it.
That’s just a start.
There are some wonderful people out there in the realm of wildland fire-fighting with brilliant minds approaching these kinds of fires in 21st century terms. I really, really, really, hope they are applying themselves to this fire.
Marti—Always remember this is a discussion forum we are not here to assign blame or even put evidence in court. We stumble across information that may add to the actual facts and help JD put together a article that has new information in it. Even I have no sway over the current wild land fire people and would not even suggest I do. We have accomplished some good investigation here. Weather any of it shows up in court won’t be up to us. Have we turned investigators loose on new information Maybe.
We are all hearsay witnesses here putting together a story based on other witness testimony, we use the evidence we find to change or enhance the story maybe find the truth in this tragedy. Is that not our common goal here?
I would say JD put together a good story biased on ours and his research who else is doing that on the Yarnell fire. Maclean for a book. Every body else is waiting on the possible court trial. The fire is history now and most people have moved on as I learned from The Rattle Snake fire only the families and a few others will remember as the years slip away.
Well, at least now I know what you look like — in a Hawaiian shirt even!!
And now that you mention it. When I was researching the Rattlesnake Fire I couldn’t remember exactly what you took issue with regarding the investigation and also McLean’s book about it.
Could you refresh my memory?
Thank you in advance!
My step father (Robert Werner) was also on the fire with a engine crew. He was at he trail and helped the 9 that got out he told Maclean some things that he ignored or did not use to fit his story. It hurt my step dad deeply and felt Maclean had manipulated the story to fit his scenario.
My Step dad retired in 1981 after 35 years in the forest service of which 21 years he was a Dist. Ranger on the Sequoia NF. Tule River RD.
He was a well educated man and a WWII Vet.
Not some one that made up stories. He was another big influence in my life.
OH and I thought you had looked up my face book and checked out the pictures there then you would know just how crazy I really am.
Hah! I didn’t look at your pictures! And I bet you didn’t look at mine to see how crazy I am, also!
Thanks for the clarification re. Rattlesnake. Somehow I thought your dad died there.
This whole explosion regarding JD’s article, coming as it does as I’ve spent almost 24/7 reading wildfire forums for the past six days to try to comprehend how they see all this stuff, has me fairly braindead at this point.
I guess I have to say, after all I’ve read, I’m less willing to BROADLY condemn Brendan’s words regarding the 10 and 18 as is being done here. Because a) he’s not all that experienced and b) others (who really do care) seem to be trying to push further past them, also.
What bugs me is that “we” are taking his words to mean that’s how (black and white) Eric Marsh was training the GM Hotshots. That might not be the case at all.
Until I have a LOT more solid substantiated EVIDENCE that Eric, on his own volition (without pressure from anywhere else), singularly pushed the crew to do something he would have SURELY known (think ESPERANZA) to be not possible, I’m currently having a hard time, without knowing the conversations that were happening at the time. pointing as hard of a flaming arrow at Eric as this article is doing.
I’ve calmed down a bit, and i recognize that this article does communicate to the public many of the things we have been saying all along.
There really needs to be an independent investigation of this fire. Unfortunately, I’m pretty sure it’s too late to do that.
**
** BLUE RIDGE HOTSHOT COMMENT – UPDATE
This is being ‘brought up’ from down below in order to answer a question that Mr. Bob Powers asked regarding the comments made by a Blue Ridge Hotshot who would only identify himself as ‘Robert’ over on the Wildfire Today website.
Mr. Powers… your original question and my response are down below following the reprint of the ‘context’ which led to your conclusion / question…
>> On August 29, 2014 at 7:00 pm, WTKTT said…
>>
>> Mr. Powers has already made it clear that the ‘video’ in question that might
>> have recorded the entire ‘argument’ between Marsh and Steed would seem
>> to have come from a GM crewmember…
>>
>> …but here are just some additional thoughts about this Blue Ridge Hotshot
>> Robert’s comment that appeared over on Wildfire today.
>>
>> Blue Ridge Hotshot ‘Robert’ said…
>>
>> “All I can tell you is I was on that fire a year ago
>> and my crew movied there trucks.”
>>
>> What ‘Robert’ seems to be saying there is that while he seems to have been
>> ( still is? ) a Blue Ridge Hotshot… he, himself, was NOT one of the 2 Blue
>> Ridge Hotshots ( in addition to BR Captain Brown ) that was actually moving
>> a GM vehicle that day, or have been one of those THREE additional BR
>> Hotshots ( in addition to Brendan McDonough ) who were definitely in a
>> position to actually hear any Granite Mountain intra-crew radio traffic taking
>> place between Marsh and Steed that afternoon.
>>
>> ‘Robert’ only says “my CREW moved their trucks”.
>>
>> I would think ( if he was one of the 3 Blue Ridge drivers of the GM trucks
>> that day ) that he would have said “I helped move their trucks”.
>>
>> It is pretty obvious from the BR Unit Logs that the other ‘two’ drivers
>> ( in addition to BR Captain Brown ) submitted their own handwritten log notes
>> amongst the 13 BR Unit Logs provided… but we still don’t know WHO those
>> other 2 CR Hotshots actually were.
>>
>> Blue Ridge Hotshot ‘Robert’ also said…
>>
>> “I have many pics.And videos leading up to the incedent.
>> I have spent many days going over my pics and all the
>> events that day. I put all my info together and have went
>> over it to help people understand.”
>>
>> Went over it with WHO?
>> WHO was he ‘helping to understand’?
>>
>> Blue Ridge Hotshot ‘Robert’ also said…
>>
>> “and at first I thought like you. There where many things
>> that you could have said were holes in the cheese.”
>>
>> Such as?
>>
>> Blue Ridge Captain Trueheart Brown himself is on record as having said to
>> the men…”We need a piece of cheese. This is just one BIG HOLE”… but I
>> wonder what ‘many things’ Blue Ridge Hotshot Robert is, himself, suggesting
>> were ‘holes’ that day.
>>‘
>> Blue Ridge Hotshot ‘Robert’ also said…
>>
>> “After talking threw it and knowing several of them
>> as well as going to over a dozen of the funerals.”
>>
>> ‘Talking through it’ with WHO?
>>
>> It appears obvious that ‘Robert’ is not just someone suddenly came out near the
>> one year anniversary and is suddenly ‘revealing’ that he has a lot of evidence.
>>
>> He appears to be saying that a LOT of ‘other people’ knew all about
>> it and he was ‘talking through it’ with them shortly after the incident.
>> On August 30, 2014 at 8:48 am, Bob Powers replied…
>>
>> A possible— Could he have been the main camera man for BR?
>> Going over all his pictures and video with his boss Frisby?
>> and the information is being Shut down by FS and not released to
>> the media? it is how ever in the investigation reports just redacted
>> under freedom of information act to release or additional investigation
>> unless legally done with lawyers.
Mr. Powers…
I actually DOUBT that this Blue Ridge Hotshot who was only identifying himself as ‘Robert’ over at Wildfire Today could have ended up being the ‘main camera man’ for Blue Ridge and the one ‘collecting’ everyone else’s pictures and videos… and then ‘going over them with Frisby’.
Here would be my own personals reasons for ‘doubting’ that.
Once the PUBLIC ‘Resource Order’ document came online for the Yarnell Hill Fire… only then could we finally see all the NAMES of the Blue Ridge Hotshots who had become ‘Arizona Forestry’ 1099 contractors on June 30, 2013.
There is only ONE Blue Ridge Hotshot who was there that day with a first named of ‘Robert’.
That would be ‘Robert Manry’… PUBLIC Resource Order C-3.17
From “J- Resource Orders” document…
Order for Blue Ridge IHC team…
C-3 – 06/29/13 1819 PNT Crew, Type 1 – Blue Ridge IHC –
REPORT TO YARNELL AZ AT 0600 6/30/13
Individual Resource Orders for ALL Blue Ridge crew members…
C-3.01 – CREW BOSS (CRWB) Frisby, Brian Harold Salvatore (AZ-FDC)
C-3.02 – CREW BOSS (CRWB) Brown, Rogers T (AZ-FDC)
C-3.03 – FFT1 ( SQUAD BOSS ) – Fuller, Travis (AZ-FDC)
C-3.04 – FFT1 ( SQUAD BOSS ) – Ball, Cory J (AZFDC)
C-3.05 – FFT1 ( SQUAD BOSS ) – Gordon, Michael (AZ-FDC)
C-3.06 – FFT2 – Schmitt, Greg J (AZ-FDC)
C-3.07 – FFT2 – Jansen, Erik (AZ-FDC)
C-3.08 – FFT2 – DeSoto, Nicholas D (AZ-FDC)
C-3.09 – FFT2 – Gamble, Ronald R (AZ-FDC)
C-3.10 – FFT2 – McCord, Ian (AZFDC)
C-3.11 – FFT2 – Brownlee, Rhys (AZ-FDC)
C-3.12 – FFT2 – Trahin, Erik T (AZ-FDC)
C-3.13 – FFT2 – Hiett, Rory (AZFDC)
C-3.14 – FFT2 – Trahin, William (AZ-FDC)
C-3.15 – FFT2 – Papich, Jonathan (AZ-FDC)
C-3.16 – FFT2 – Feist, Orion (AZFDC)
C-3.17 – FFT2 – MANRY, ROBERT (AZFDC)
C-3.18 – FFT2 – Quiroga, Juan C (AZ-FDC)
C-3.19 – FFT2 – Cancelled UTF
C-3.20 – FFT2 – Ward, Brendan (AZ-FDC)
I believe the ‘commenter’ over at Wildfire Today was ‘most likely’ this Robert Manry fellow. It would be VERY unlikely that if any other Blue Ridge Hotshot was there making that PUBLIC comment and was trying to totally HIDE his real identify… that he would end up using a first-name handle of some one-and-only OTHER Blue Ridge Hotshot crew member whose name happens to be ‘Robert’.
So I think that really WAS Blue Ridge Hotshot ‘Robert Manry’ and he just simply thought that by only using his own first name no one would be able to really identify him.
If THAT is true… then it is VERY unlikely this ‘Robert Manry’ would have been given the important job of ‘collecting’ all the pictures and videos related to the Yarnell tragedy from the other Blue Ridge Hotshot Crew Members.
Robert Manry was a NEWBIE to the ‘Blue Ridge Hotshots’.
Manry appears to have been a firefighter usually based in Texas, ( with a home town listed of Rio Hondo, Texas ) and he only joined the Blue Ridge Hotshots for their 2013 season on May 9, 2013 ( shortly before Yarnell ).
That is just 52 days ( 1 month, 21 days ) before the Yarnell tragedy.
So while it still looks very much like Blue Ridge Hotshot Ian McCord might have been doing some ‘collecting’ from the other Hotshots ( since many of the filenames in his own SAIT folder appear to be items from other BR Hotshots just ‘dumped’ into his own submission to the SAIT )… it is very unlikely that this ‘Robert’ person posting at Wildfire Today about his OWN large ‘collection’ of pictures and videos could have been Ian McCord, for the reasons stated above.
So I think this Blue Ridge Hotshot ‘Robert Manry’ is actually talking about a lot of pictures and videos ( and possibly even more background radio traffic captures? ) that HE has from Sunday, June 30, 2013 that simply haven’t been seen yet. Maybe not even by the SAIT or ADOSH.
There was no ‘Manry’ submissions folder in either the SAIT’s or ADOSH’s FOIA / FOIL release(s).
** MORE ABOUT BLUE RIDGE HOTSHOT ‘ROBERT MANRY’…
The information above about ‘Robert Manry’ still being a NEWBIE to Blue Ridge on June 30, 2013 comes from his own totally PUBLIC postings online.
Robert Manry’s PUBLIC Facebook page is HERE…
https://www.facebook.com/robert.manry
In his own totally PUBLIC Facebook ‘Timeline’ postings… Manry himself talks about leaving Texas on May 3, 2013 and then joining up with the Blue Ridge Hotshots on May 9, 2013 ( shortly before Yarnell ).
Here are just some of Manry’s own totally PUBLIC comments about this…
Robert J Manry – May 3, 2013 near Eustace, TX
So I left for Blue Ridge Arizona for couple months. And well on the way out there A truck passed me with a pair of balls hanging off the back receiver hitch like everyone has seen. And then it hit me. What if I just hang my wife’s purse back there. Bet y’all have not seen that — with Melissa Manry.
Robert J Manry – May 9, 2013
So i made it to blue ridge AZ and well it did not take to long for them to put a hurtting on me. The other morning we went on a crew run that had some good hills in it and it was a bump run… That is where we run in a line and then pass a ball from person to person to the back and when it gets to the last person they sprint it to the front. Not to bad you say, except it was for 12 or so miles. Needless to say everone was hurting for the next few days. I have to say it was very tough specialy when we are at 7000 feet and i just came from 300. Any how they keep saying that pain is weakness leaving the body well if that is the truth then i have a hole lot of weakness stored up
Robert J Manry – May 30, 2013 near Lufkin, TX
So life is full of choices and with ever choice there are reactions and well in one of my most resent choice I decided to be on a hot shot crew for the summer. Now the reasons to go on the crew out weighed the reasons to stay at least at the time. Well it has been almost a month now and it has felt like forever and I miss my wonderful wife more and more every day. I got to face time her today for over an hour and it was freaking awesome. But while talking to her and seeing her face I realized something very important. That I have to be one of the luckiest guy alive to have woman as strong as Melissa who can maintain all the things that I used to do as well work and deal with being home alone. Melissa I love You so Much and I want everyone to know how important you are in my life and what a amazing wife you are. — with Melissa Manry.
NOTE: That was his last TEXT posting to his PUBLIC Facebook ‘wall’ prior to July 1, 2013… the day after the tragedy in Yarnell.Robert Manry then apparently posts two PUBLIC messages WHILE the Blue Ridge Hotshots were being ‘demobbed’ that morning after the tragedy. ( the Facebook locations listed after the message dates are only approximate and cannot be taken as accurate ).
Robert J Manry – July 1, 2013 near Prescott, AZ
As we all wake… Not a word is spoken Just a strong silence that speaks more than words. The dust has settled the sky’s are mostly clear… We all stand staring at the black mountains in disbelief
Robert J Manry – July 1, 2013 near Prescott, AZ
As we head out of town the sound of the tires on the pavement is all we hear… No one speaks. No one smiles… Are emotions are without saying and are hearts are truly broken
NOTE: On July 3 he posted a link to a Granite Mountain Hotshot Memorial page but his next TEXT entry is apparently as the Blue Ridge Hotshots were standing on the side of the road as the GM Hotshots went by in the funeral hearses to the memorial service.
Robert J Manry – July 7, 2013 near Potato Patch, AZ
We stand along the road hats in are hands in silence as the fallen pass. There names on each car as it passes… Words don’t come close to describing the pain this town and the fire community are going threw.
Robert J Manry – July 10, 2013 near Prescott, AZ
The wind blows stiff and strong for a day that is going to be so long. Today we will stand and ponder as we bury the men we honored. For the hot shots this has been the hardest week of our career… it is what we must do to honor our peers.
NOTE: Nowhere on his own Facebook page does Manry mention having any ‘pictures’ or ‘videos’ of his own from Sunday, June 30, 2013 and while there are plenty of totally PUBLIC images of himself fighting Wildfires and at other ‘fires’ in Arizona, there are NO pictures or videos in his PUBLIC Photo Albums there on Facebook
It doesn’t mean they aren’t there… or that he doesn’t have the material he said he did in his Wildfire Today comment. All that means is that he may have set them to ‘totally private’ on Facebook or he never actually posted any of that material to Facebook at all.
NOTE also that while Manry seemed to actually be posting directly to his PUBLIC Facebook Timeline WHILE the Blue Ridge Hotshots were being ‘demobbed’ from Yarnell the morning after the Tragedy… he, himself, makes no mention of anyone telling all of them to sit down and write their own ‘Unit Logs’ about the events of the previous day before ‘leaving’ Yarnell.
So we still don’t know if one of the 13 Blue Ridge Unit logs that were belatedly released by the SAIT on February 27, 2014 actually belongs to Robert Manry.
There are a few more interesting PUBLIC links with more information about Robert Manry. They will be posted as ‘replies’ to this comment in order to observe the ‘one clickable link per posting’ rule.
Followup… more totally PUBLIC information on Blue Ridge Hotshot Robert Manry…
Robert Manry’s PUBLIC PeekYou page…
http://www.peekyou.com/robert_manry/29455125
PeekYou PUBLIC Bio…
31-year-old Robert Joseph Manry lives in Pollok, Texas.
He is a 2001 graduate of Rio Hondo High School and he works
as a Wildland Fire Fighter. His favorite TV shows are Ufc and Csi
Shows. His favorite films are Final Destination and Joe Dirt.
On the web, Robert (also) goes by the (online) alias manry21.
WTKTT–
If you go to Roberts statements something dose not fit if he was a first year HS he dose not sound like that.
He knows the crew and they were not risk takers. HOW?
He would have made the same decisions?
He talks like he has been there before, not like a first year crewman.
Maybe you got the wrong Robert. Not any where near his real name. Being on BR he would have had very little contact with GM They were not risk takers. Where dose he get that from unless it is a more long time crewman with BR?????
I don’t think there’s any doubt that the PUBLIC pages listed above belong to the same ‘Robert Manry’ that joined the Blue Ridge Hotshots for THAT 2013 season on May 9, 2013… and is also the same Robert Manry listed in the BR Crew Manifest for that day.
I also don’t think he was a ‘first year’ WFF. That’s what his job listing was down in Texas and some PUBLIC pictures on both his Facebook and MySpace pages show him in full Hotshot-style Nomex shirt and pants fighting various fires. One of his ‘videos’ also shows him riding back to a base camp in a helicopter.
I think what his comments above are saying is that this was simply his first season with Blue Ridge. That’s all.
By NEWBIE… what I meant was that he was VERY ‘new to THEM’, and so I don’t think after just 51 days with that established Hotshot Crew he would have been given the ‘trusted’ assignment of collecting everyone’s pictures and videos for a fatal accident they were close to on June 30, 2013.
Only Robert Manry can eventually say what his involvement was, what ‘pictures and videos’ he is talking about… and whether that material ever made it to the SAIT or to ADOSH.
My thought was he was new to BR so how well did he know GM and that they were not risk takers. He was only in Arizona for 51 days. Would be hard to make a judgment on any other crew in Arizona..
If Robert knew them that well then I was saying you are maybe Identifying the wrong person as the one that made the statements on Wild Fire Today.
It is like some of the other ID’s that have been made here Robert dose not have to be his real name he could be any of the BR crew.
Don’t put all your apples in one basket.
You will follow Elizabeth down that who’s who road.
Reply to Bob Powers post on September 4, 2014 at 3:56 pm
>> Mr. Powers said…
>>
>> My thought was he was new to BR so how well did he
>> know GM and that they were not risk takers. He was only
>> in Arizona for 51 days. Would be hard to make a judgment
>> on any other crew in Arizona..
That’s a good question ( and good observation ).
If that really is the same ‘Robert Manry’ who was posting on Wildfire Today then all I can think of is that he had been WFF for awhile… and that he HAD worked with them ( or knew a lot about GM ) before coming to that May 9, 2013 sign-up with Blue Ridge… OR… he was just regurgitating what he had heard other Blue Ridge guys say about them either before or after the incident.
>> Mr. Powers also said…
>>
>> If Robert knew them that well then I was saying you are
>> maybe Identifying the wrong person as the one that
>> made the statements on Wild Fire Today.
It doesn’t matter whether either ‘Robert’ knew GM that well or not…
Even without that consideration… I could STILL be mistaken about the Blue Ridge Hotshot ‘Robert Manry’ detailed above being the same ‘Robert’ who said he was a Blue Ridge Hotshot at Wildfire today.
There still is no ‘direct link’ ( at this time )… but I have already stated my reasons up above for believing they ARE one-and-the-same person.
>> Mr. Powers also said…
>>
>> It is like some of the other ID’s that have been made
>> here Robert dose not have to be his real name he
>> could be any of the BR crew.
Maybe you didn’t read what I wrote up above so let me say it again…
Of course ‘Robert’ doesn’t have to be his REAL first name… but if it isn’t… then you would have to accept a situation where someone who is a self-professed Blue Ridge Hotshot who is also saying he was THERE in Yarnell would then be purposely using the actual REAL first-name of one of his fellow Blue Ridge Hotshots instead of his own… knowing full well that there is only one ‘Robert’ on the crew and that HE would then be identified with the comments.
What kind of an asshole would do something like THAT?
As I said above… I just don’t see that happening… so that is why I believe the person commenting on Wildfire Today was, in fact, Robert Manry himself… the one-and-only ‘Robert’ on the Blue Ridge Hotshot crew.
>> Mr. Powers also said…
>>
>> Don’t put all your apples in one basket.
No apples here. No baskets.
I might be right… I might be wrong.
>> Mr. Powers also said…
>>
>> You will follow Elizabeth down that who’s who road.
Huh?
** PHOTOS OF ROBERT MANRY IN YARNELL
** ON JUNE 30, 2013
Regardless of whether the ‘Robert Manry’ detailed above is the same one who posted to Wildfire Today using the name ‘Robert’ and was saying he was a Blue Ridge Hotshot… here are some links to photos in the online Dropbox which further prove that the Robert Manry from Texas detailed above was, in fact, there in Yarnell with the Blue Ridge Hotshots on June 30, 2013.
** SAIT FOIA Dropbox – Photos and Videos /
/ Blue Ridge Photos and Videos / Papich Folder
“IMG_3947.JPG”
The same Robert Manry shown in the PUBLIC Facebook and MySpace pages above appears to be third FF from left, standing on the ground in-between the BR Crew Carriers, facing the camera with his hands in his pockets.
“yarnell- Papich 005.JPG”
That looks like Manry standing on the ground in the bottom left of photo.
** Prescott Valley Mud Bogs Video
** featuring ALL of the Blue Ridge Hotshots.
This video was published to YouTube on July 14, 2013, just 14 days after the tragedy.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aVLl-oq-hoo
+13 seconds.
Robert Manry appears to be in about the center of the front of Hotshots that are ‘kneeling’, fourth from the left ( third FF left of Brian Frisby ) who is kneeling at the extreme left in that front row.
Blue Ridge IHC fought alongside Granite Mountain IHC on both the Thompson Ridge Fire in early June and the Doce Fire in middle June.
So Yarnell wasn’t the first fire Robert would have been on where he would have become familiar with Granite Mountain IHC.
I did not say they did not know them being on the same fire as a crew man does not necessarily give you an insight to a crews behavior. Most crew man do not pay much attention to another crew. except in a competitive manor. Supt. and crew bosses tend to know each other because of winter training and communicating with each other. Most Crewman just know its another HS crew and may have a casual conversation with the other.
I am only saying that Manery might not be the Robert in the statement on wild land Fire. He would have formed a very quick opinion as a first year crewman on BR and in Arizona.
Point taken.
Here’s another possible angle.
The crew did an aar and, I’m sure, talked amongst themselves about it all. That’s how crews deal with stuff. And they probably talked about it, on and off, for a long time.
They created their own collective narrative. That could be how Robert “understood” that GM weren’t risk-takers. It was “passed down.”
I agree with WTKTT that Robert is most likely Robert Manry. If I were a Blue Ridge crew member and posted on Wildfire Today and wanted to not self-identify myself, I would hardly use some other crew member’s identifiable first name.
Of course we could all be wrong about all of this.
Just a thought—Most crew members go by and are referred to by there last name the first name is seldom used or a nickname like Doughnut for McDonough. So some crewman may not have remembered his first name.
Just my thoughts Robert could be the Robert on the BR crew or another BR crewman.
In the end probably does not make a lot of difference as he stated he was a BR crewman.
Reply to Bob Powers post on
September 5, 2014 at 11:49 am
>> Bob Powers said…
>>
>> Just a thought—Most crew members go by
>> and are referred to by there last name the
>> first name is seldom used or a nickname
>> like Doughnut for McDonough.
>>
>> So some crewman may not have
>> remembered his first name.
Sorry. I just can’t ‘buy’ that one.
You, yourself, are the one who has gone on and on here about how CLOSE all these Hotshot guys get because of all the time spent together and all the ‘camping out together’ and whatnot.
Now you are trying to say there’s a good chance that someone on one of these ‘close as brothers’ crews might not even ever really know ( or can’t remember ) one of his own “brother’s” frickin’ FIRST NAME?
‘Robert’ is not hard to remember… on any planet.
That’s right I can tell you last name’s of several people I worked with but would not remember there first name. if you offered me a 10 dollar bill.
Reply to Bob Powers post
on September 5, 2014 at 4:51 pm
>> Bob Powers said…
>>
>> That’s right I can tell you last name’s
>> of several people I worked with but
>> would not remember there first
>> name. if you offered me a 10 dollar bill.
Wow. OK.
And would these still be people that you consider ‘as close as brothers’?… or are you now saying there are all kinds of different ‘levels’ to this WFF ‘brotherhood’ thing?
There are people on ‘the crew’ that really are as close as brothers and not only do you have the politeness to at least know their NAMES… you also know as much about them as you would a REAL brother….
…and then there are always just ‘other guys on the crew’ that just get called by nicknames and you never really know who the hell they (really) are?
I’m not trying to be antagonistic here.
You just introduced a ‘component’ into this WFF ‘brotherhood’ thing that I’m simply struggling to understand.
When is a ‘fire brother’ really a ‘fire brother’?
When you actually take the time to even ask him ( and remember ) both of his names?
It is hard to explain when you call some one by there last name or a nick name that sticks in your memory when you run into them a few years later that last name or nick name is prevalent in your memory. Those that you work with for 2 or 3 years generally become closer and you tend to remember there first names. when you become a supervisor most you remember full names because you are filling out time slips and crew lists with full names.
It seemed to be on crews you could have more than one person with the same name and so we always used last names. The only time that did not work is if you had brothers on the same crew thus the nick names.
While you learned a lot about them and were together a lot you used the last name so much it became the most prevalent when first names are seldom or never used the identity becomes the last name. which is the first recognition that comes to you when you meet again.
I guess those that are thought to be formal would have a hard time with this form of recognition but it is common among 20 to 30 man crews. That change in members yearly you could see a 4 to 6 new crewman each year. so some came and went others stayed several years 2 to 5 normally. I don’t know if that explains it I never really thought about it till you asked it may be a fall out from the military not sure it was part of the culture when I started.
>> Marti wrote…
>>
>> Of course we could all be wrong about all of this.
Yes. It is merely ‘interesting’ that there was only ONE person with a first name of ‘Robert’ who was there with Blue Ridge that day… and that this person who called himself ‘Robert’ at Widlfire Today *seemed* to be admitting he has a LOT of pictures and video ( and background radio captures? ) that might not have been seen or heard by anyone yet.
There is still a chance whoever this ‘Robert’ was that was posting to Wildfire Today could just be bullshitting everyone and he is no more a Blue Ridge Hotshot than I am a Russian astronaut.
Calvin asked him some questions.
He never responded.
IAOI ( If And Only If ) the ‘guess’ is right that the ‘Robert’ that posted to Wildfire Today is, in fact, Robert Manry… all I can say is…
Hey Robert… talk about what you know and find a way to release the evidence you have, buddy.
The FAMILIES of these men whose funerals you say you attended ( and you are so interested in honoring ) WANT you to do that.
Robert Manry’s PUBLIC MySpace page.
NOTE: He uses the same PUBLICLY known ‘online handle’ of ‘manry21’
for himself at MySpace that is noted in his PUBLIC ‘PeekYou’ page…
https://myspace.com/manry21
A DIRECT link to Robert Manry’s PUBLIC MySpace PHOTOS page.
Lots of Wildland Fire photos here with captions / comments… but no photos that are tagged as ‘PUBLIC’ are related to Yarnell or the June 30, 2013 tragedy…
https://myspace.com/manry21/photos
The “news” in John’s article today is clearly the extra detail about the rumored disagreement between Steed and Marsh during the move (Marsh asked Steed to move 3 times, was rebuffed 3 times and then Marsh issued an order). If true, a very explosive revelation. The trouble is this whole “argument” thing right now has no concrete evidence behind it. No one person has come forward to vouch for hearing the audio and identified themselves. We are speculating on something we cannot verify in any way, shape or form at this time. Obviously Bob’s contact is not publicly identified and appears not to have first-hand knowledge of the argument itself, only the existence of some audio/video. I am not saying this is made up out of whole cloth, but until more evidence is seen, the possibility is there. And there are a lot of people out there that would benefit
from Marsh looking as culpable as possible – and showing him to have ordered his crew against their wishes accomplishes that. Multimillion dollar lawsuits can trigger some desperate behavior. I just want to see some more facts before this horrible condemnation of Marsh sticks forever.
I agree I wish I had more and the information would surface from those who have the facts. A bad investigation just gets worse.
Hay Mike where is the article? Like to read it.
Bob,
Phoenix New Times
Sorry, forgot to include that.
First remember I said there were 2 different pieces of information on the argument.
1. The video/audio is in a family members hands.
2. The fire fighter that herd the argument on GM Crew net. They turned in a written statement into the SAIT.
Not McDonough, maybe a BR Crewman or some one else that was monitoring GM?
So there is 2 pieces of info out there that compliment each other one would be enough. If one is already evidence the written statement, then the other would confirm the statement.
An interesting note no one from the family has attacked this info as untrue. Or stated there is a video.
I think ( at this time, anyway ) there is at least a THIRD piece of ‘information’ that this evidence truly exists… and it is, perhaps, the most important ‘piece’.
Mike Dudley’s own PUBLIC statement that allegations of this ‘argument’ between Marsh and Steed DID happen… and that it was reported to the SAIT by more than just one person.
He was the US Forestry Service’s Co-Lead of the actual Arizona State Forestry Division’s Special Accident Investigation.
He had no reason to be ‘making that up’.
So even though no one seems to know the FULL content of these ‘allegations’ or the ‘evidence’ related to them…
…I think it’s a pretty safe bet to believe this evidence DOES exist… and that Arizona Forestry still at least has that original (uredacted) ‘written statement’ sitting in their filing cabinet.
Followup… a slight mis-use of the King’s English up above.
I did NOT mean to imply that Mike Dudley has stated, in PUBLIC, that the argument DID take place.
What I meant was… Mike Dudley has absolutely admitted in PUBLIC that that the ALLEGATIONS regarding that argument WERE made to the SAIT itself… and by more than one person.
Dudley is not saying it ( the argument ) DID happen.
Dudley is only definitely admitting that the ‘allegations WERE made’ ( which now matches the other evidence which has emerged ).
I think that is still a crucial ‘piece of information’ that the evidence itself does, in fact, EXIST.
Dudley just says they ( the SAIT ) couldn’t ‘validate’ these (multiple) ‘allegations’… but don’t forget that Dudley and the SAIT folks are the same ones who couldn’t even get the MacKenzie and Parker photos into the right ‘sequence’ and ‘timeframe’… so their inability to ‘validate’ anything might have still been just a matter of incompetence and not the actual lack of evidence.
For the second in commend to drop allegations that are not justifiable fact is not a good indication of his character or of the quality of the investigation he signed off on. If the allegations lack sufficient evidence then why drop them like a bomb in a general discussion on Yarnell?????? You are right he has a lot more on this topic to revile.
For argument’s sake, let’s grant that the argument took place and also assume that the story of the 3 refusals followed by an order from Marsh is also true. That raises a whole new set of questions.
First, if Steed was so convinced of the danger that he turned Marsh’s request down 3 times, why did he not turn down the order? Not easy to do, but he was responsible for 17 other lives.
Second why was Marsh SO insistent that he continued to badger his captain into doing something Steed thought was risky? Was Marsh being pressured? Or was this some kind of bizarre alpha dog thing between Marsh and Steed bubbling over?
Finally, no matter how much condemnation you might have for Marsh here, no matter how wrong he might have been, when he goes to join the crew, imagine how much pain he felt looking into their faces. In that circumstance, I have to believe death would have been a blessing.
Mike About the only place I can go with this is it is what I was told I felt the person believable and hoped that the evidence would surface.
As far as Marsh I think he felt he was right on what to do and where to move to and wasn’t going to take no for an answer. When the fire was over Steed would have to answer to him was he strong enough to stand up to the boss? I do not know but he did what he was told in this instance. And he to would have been in pain looking into those men’s faces when he could have kept them in the black.
If all this surfaces it will be a mess, and McDonough is stuck in the middle.
Reply to mike post September 4, 2014 at 5:26 pm
>> mike said…
>>
>> For argument’s sake, let’s grant that the
>> argument took place and also assume that
>> the story of the 3 refusals followed by an
>> order from Marsh is also true. That raises
>> a whole new set of questions.
Yes… it does… but in a way they are also the same ‘old’ questions that have been on the table all along.
We have ALWAYS known ( via the MacKenzie videos ) that Marsh was now having a SECOND conversation with Steed and talking about Steed’s ‘comfort level’.
We don’t hear any outright ‘arguing’ in the MacKenzie video… but it’s also been established that in WFF land… when someone starts asking you about your ‘comfort level’ there’s only one thing that can mean.
That person wants you to DO something.
Marsh also says to Steed “That’s why I called you BEFORE… to ask about your comfort level”.
So Christopher MacKenzie gave us that little ‘glimpse’ into the SECOND time that day Marsh was trying to engage in a ‘comfort level’ discussion with Steed.
Maybe this ‘argument’ being generally referred to that might have spanned at least 3 radio calls was not an ‘argument’ on ALL of the radio calls.
Maybe only ONE of them could have been construed as a full blown argument and it happened just AFTER what MacKenzie captured in his video(s).
>> mike also said…
>>
>> First, if Steed was so convinced of the danger
>> that he turned Marsh’s request down 3 times,
>> why did he not turn down the order? Not easy
>> to do, but he was responsible for 17 other lives.
Even if we could someday hear this supposed ‘recording’ of all of that… we will probably still never know the answer to that question…
…but it sure would help to know what was said.
Even without such a recording… I still believe Brendan knows ‘what was actually said’.
>> mike also said…
>>
>> Second why was Marsh SO insistent that he
>> continued to badger his captain into doing
>> something Steed thought was risky?
>> Was Marsh being pressured? Or was this
>> some kind of bizarre alpha dog thing
>> between Marsh and Steed bubbling over?
Again… unless we ever hear something in a recording like “But OPS really wants us down there, Jesse!” or Brendan testifies to hearing anything of that nature… we will also never know those answers, either.
As far as the ‘alpha dog’ thing goes… I don’t believe ANYONE ever took a good look ( or searched for any real testimony or evidence ) at the actual relationship between Marsh and Steed.
Obviously Steed met Marsh’s strict ( almost unusual ) ‘moral requirements’ for Captain since that’s what the whole resignation of the previous GM Captain ( Aaron ) was all about.
When Steed was appointed temporary Superintendent of GM by Darrell Willis following Marsh’s bike accident ( even though Willis knew full well that Steed was not actually fully ‘qualified’ or ‘ready’ to be GM SUP ) and then Steed just signed that ‘certification’ document that Marsh *might* have been wanting to keep in his back pocket to play ‘poker’ with Willis and City of Prescott with over Caldwell’s benefits… that MIGHT have pissed Marsh off. We don’t know. No one really bothered to look into all of that, either.
Marsh had been told specifically by his boss, Darrell Willis, to start ‘phasing himself out’ and to start ‘mentoring’ Steed to become GM SUP. What part that might have played or what damage that directive from Willis might have done to their ‘relationship’… we also don’t know. Again… not enough interviewing done with those that remain alive to be sure about that.
>> mike also said…
>>
>> Finally, no matter how much condemnation
>> you might have for Marsh here, no matter
>> how wrong he might have been, when he goes
>> to join the crew, imagine how much pain he
>> felt looking into their faces. In that
>> circumstance, I have to believe death would
>> have been a blessing.
None of us have any idea whether any of that is true not.
Marsh might have been one of those kinds of individuals we have all met in our lives that never even once ever entertains even the slightest possibility in their minds that they could ever be *wrong* about something.
Besides… I actually don’t think there was even any TIME for anyone to even curse themselves for any decision that had been made leading up to the predicament they got into.
Once that predicament was fully realized… I think the only ‘thoughts’ in anyone’s mind was what needed to be done to survive… right until the last breath.
Bob is right, Jesse Steed would have felt that same pain.
When Amanda Marsh learned there was a single survivor, she prayed it was not her husband, because she knew that he could not have lived with that. Like all of us, Eric Marsh had flaws. And maybe those flaws, in a very real way, contributed to what happened at Yarnell Hill. But Eric Marsh was still a decent man. And I am certain he was utterly devastated when he realized what was happening to his crew.
And I hope no one thinks different.
It was a bad choice based on what ever reasoning.
Who he was personally has nothing to do with the decision made on Yarnell. Leaders can and do make mistakes or errors in judgment. For many reasons some have to live with them.
Reply to Bob Powers post
on September 5, 2014 at 9:50 am
>> Bob Powers said…
>>
>> Leaders can and do make mistakes or
>> errors in judgment. For many reasons
>> some have to live with them.
And good leaders in hostile / dangerous workplaces / environments KNOW that.
For an industry that seems to pride itself on ‘acting just like the military’… you would think they would be following the same guidelines for the appointment of ‘leadership’.
If someone is going to be ‘ordering people around’ in hostile/dangerous environments and even asking them to do very dangerous and risky things… but then turns out to be someone who is unable to stomach the possibility that while they are happily doing that ‘ordering people around’… someone… someday… might get hurt or killed because of their ‘orders’…
…then that person doesn’t have any business ‘ordering people around’ in those dangerous environments in the first place.
As the real military knows… if you are someone who is going to go and eat your gun the first time someone in your platoon dies because of an order you gave… then it is highly unlikely you will ever be promoted to a position where that might happen. You stay a ‘grunt’… and you TAKE orders… not GIVE them.
Maybe even what Amanda Marsh said about Eric is just one more piece of proof about the ‘story’ that seems to emerge from Marsh’s own personnel file.
Eric Marsh might have been great in the classroom ( everyone thought so ) and he might have been the ideal person to help Duane Steinbrink start a Wildland Fire Division for a small municipality…
…but as far as being the actual in-the-field LEADER of a Type 1 Hotshot crew… maybe he just wasn’t really EVER the ‘right choice’ for THAT position of authority.
Just 57 days before the tragedy… Darrell Willis himself seemed to have come to that same conclusion. He specifically asked Marsh to start ‘stepping down’ as GM SUP and to ( right away ) actively train/mentor Ex-marine platoon leader Jesse Steed to REPLACE him.
Both Duane Stenibrink and Darrell Willis had been trying for years to ‘mold’ Marsh into who they felt he needed to be in order to both maintain his position AND eventually move-up-in-rank… and they had both cut Eric a lot of breaks over those years… but maybe Willis finally realized it was time to have someone better qualified as an in-the-field leader-of-men in charge of Granite Mountain.
WTKTT – Are you seriously suggesting that the fact that Marsh would have been effed up by the loss of his entire crew made him unfit to lead? Are you nuts?? This was an UNPRECEDENTED event in hotshot history. Any sane leader would have been screwed up. This is not the military, there you order people to do things KNOWING some will die that very day.
Brian Frisby’s own mother posted on the WFF Foundation page that her son has struggled greatly, and it wasn’t even his crew! And by all accounts he is a squared-away leader.
Reply to mike post on
September 5, 2014 at 3:24 pm
>> mike said…
>> WTKTT – Are you seriously suggesting
>> that the fact that Marsh would have been
>> effed up by the loss of his entire crew
>> made him unfit to lead? Are you nuts??
YOU are the one that went to ‘crazy town’ pretending you knew exactly what Eric Marsh might have been ‘thinking’ or ‘feeling’ in the moments before he died.
THAT, itself, is ‘nuts’.
You have no way of knowing such things.
YOU are also the one who started quoting Amanda Marsh with more ‘crazy talk’ about how a wife might be glad her husband had died because of how ‘badly’ he might have felt if he had lived… and that she had actually been praying to some deity or the other that her own husband was dead, not alive.
The suggestion of him ‘not being able live with that’ also tends to imply that Marsh might have eaten his gun over this, if he had lived.
So YOU brought this particular thread to ‘crazy town’. I’m just on the street-corner there with ya tellin’ what I think.
So to answer your question… YES… I am saying that if Marsh was the kind of guy who might have ‘eaten his gun’ over the fact that people died from orders he was dishing out in a dangerous environment… then he shouldn’t have been giving those orders in the first place.
>> mike also said…
>>
>> This was an UNPRECEDENTED event
>> in hotshot history. Any sane leader
>> would have been screwed up.
I’m wasn’t talking about just ’emotionally devastated’ and/or ‘screwed up’.
YOUR statements up above were implying ( via the man’s own wife ) that he “wouldn’t have been able to live with it” and would have eaten his gun, or something.
THAT is BEYOND ‘effed up’ or ‘screwed up’.
That indicates ( apparently from someone who knew him well ) that he might not have been ever fundamentally prepared to face the consequences of his own actions in his own chosen (dangerous) profession and maybe shouldn’t have been in that position of authority in the first place.
>> mike also said…
>>
>> This is not the military, there you order
>> people to do things KNOWING some
>> will die that very day.
When you chose the routes for the patrols… they haven’t given you a map showing you where the IEDs are. Sometimes they are going to be on the roads YOU chose… sometimes not.
Sometimes people die. Sometimes not.
You are never SURE about it… but your profession demands that you be PREPARED for it to happen at any moment.
In that regard… WFF really isn’t any different from the military.
You are choosing to be a ‘leader’ in a profession with a high mortality rate.
Be PREPARED to deal with that… or find another line of work.
>> mike also said…
>>
>> Brian Frisby’s own mother posted on
>> the WFF Foundation page that her
>> son has struggled greatly, and it
>> wasn’t even his crew! And by all
>> accounts he is a squared-away leader.
I am sure Brian Frisby has been totally affected by what happened in Yarnell.
But something also tells me Brian Frisby is able to ‘live with it’ and isn’t going to be eating his own gun anytime soon… as YOU suggested might have been the case with Marsh…. if he had lived.
Speaking of ‘living with it’…
I honestly hope that Brendan McDonough is OKAY these days. He has chosen a VERY hard path for himself and I certainly hope HE can ‘live with it’.
Even the families of his ‘fire brothers’ are now starting to speak out against him and criticize him for his apparent decision(s) to remain silent about some things he seems to know.
I don’t think that’s the way Brendan thought it was going to ‘go down’ when he made those choice(s).
Those were Ms. Marsh’s words in the PDC June 30th of this year. Not being able to live with it might simply have been a turn of a phrase.
My description of Marsh’s feelings is the same as at least a couple of authors of the narrative articles mentioned. And they were former hotshots or military guys, I believe. You don’t always have to have an audio or a video to know something. And I think his wife probably knew him quite well.
Reply to mike post
on September 5, 2014 at 5:50 pm
>> mike said
>>
>> Those were Ms. Marsh’s words in the
>> PDC June 30th of this year. Not being
>> able to live with it might simply have
>> been a turn of a phrase.
I understand… but if Ms. Marsh meant to say it would have been very, very hard for Eric to ‘live with’ the realization that men had died under his command… I would have expected her to say…
“It would have been very, very hard for Eric to live with that”.
That’s not what she said. She said…
“Eric would NOT have been able to live with that”.
That implies something.
It implies there was a high likelihood he would have ended up eating his gun, or something.
>> mike also said…
>>
>> My description of Marsh’s feelings is the
>> same as at least a couple of authors of
>> the narrative articles mentioned. And
>> they were former hotshots or military
>> guys, I believe. You don’t always have to
>> have an audio or a video to know
>> something. And I think his wife probably
>> knew him quite well.
Okay. Whatever.
I may often speculate about a LOT of things that happened in Yarnell that day in an effort to try and get to more detail about what HAPPENED that day…
…but I cannot ( and will not ) speculate about how any man might have felt or what he might have been thinking in the last moments of his life.
I don’t think anybody can / should… but that’s just me.
Here comes my bus… I’m off this street corner in crazy-town.
WTKTT,
All the ‘reply to comment’ buttons down below in this thread have disappeared, so I’m bring this up to the first one available.
In regards to your assumption about Marsh ‘eating his gun’ below, you are way off base.
Saying someone ‘just couldn’t live with something’ DOESN’T MEAN they are going to eat their gun. It ALSO means that it could be something that’s very, very hard to live with, period, no matter which way it is expressed.
You need to dial it back a ways on this issue, if not all the way.
Reply to TTWARE post on
September 5, 2014 at 8:44 pm
>> TTWARE said…
>>
>> WTKTT,
>>
>> In regards to your assumption about
>> Marsh ‘eating his gun’ below, you are
>> way off base.
>>
>> Saying someone ‘just couldn’t live with
>> something’ DOESN’T MEAN they are
>> going to eat their gun. It ALSO means
>> that it could be something that’s very,
>> very hard to live with, period, no matter
>> which way it is expressed.
>>
>> You need to dial it back a ways on this
>> issue, if not all the way.
Consider me dialed ( ALL the way ).
As I said above… the bus arrived and picked me up on the corner of this ‘crazy town’ discussion.
I have a capacity for speculation that is larger than most… but I’m not going to do what mike did and start guessing what a man might have been feeling and thinking right before burning to death… or what he might or might not have been able to ‘live with’ if he survived.
Back to looking at EVIDENCE.
we already have the video its the one were marsh says ‘ that’s why i asked what ur comfort level was’? plus if marsh and steed disagreed so what does it matter. there is enuf drama without looking 4 more.
Reply to calvin post on August 29, 2014 at 2:30 pm
>> calvin said…
>>
>> Ok. So it appears that B33 was NOT speaking with /to Cordes (SPGS1) at
>> the beginning of the helmet cam.
Yep. That’s pretty much a given now.
As you pointed out… Cordes has testified that he had already LOST his ability to transmit on the A2G channel. He may still have been able to HEAR things being said on that channel in the deployment timeframe but he couldn’t have been ‘conversing’ with Burfiend in Bravo 33.
>> calvin also said…
>> Why would B33 then callout to SPGS1 immediately following the partial
>> conversation we hear?
Good question. There is no doubt that something that took place in that conversation that was only partially captured at the start of the Helmet Cam made Burfiend feel like he needed to talk with Cordes RIGHT AWAY since he ends that transmission with…
“Break. Structure Group One, Bravo 33 on Air-To-Ground”.
He doesn’t even take a breath between ‘”Break” ( the end of the conversation with whoever he was reporting to when the Helmet-Cam video begins ) and then his immediate attempt to talk to Gary Cordes with “Structure Group One, Bravo 33 on Air-To-Ground”.
SIDENOTE: I guess this also proves that when Gary Cordes had already lost the ability to call Bravo 33 directly because his BK radio had taken a dump… and Cordes had to call OPS1 Todd Abel and get HIM to relay the “please drop at will” directive to Air Attack… that Abel did not pass on the information that SPGS1 had lost his ability to transmit over A2G. If he had… then ( theoretically ) John Burfiend in B33 would have known it was even useless ( at 1639 ) to try and talk directly to SPGS1 Cordes. Burfiend would have been looking for someone to act as ‘relay’ for whatever he wanted to talk about with directly to Cordes.
A good guess as to WHY Burfiend suddenly had the need to talk to Cordes might be because whoever Burfiend was having that conversation with at the start of the Helmet-Cam video had already told Burfiend that it was SPGS1 who most probably knew the specific location of this ‘Boulder Springs Ranch’ thing AND ( perhaps ) exactly how to get to it and where Granite Mountain might have really been at that moment.
>> calvin also said…
>> The partial conversation at the beginning of the helmet cam video is
>> concerning Granite Mountain. While we do not know 100%, the evidence
>> strongly suggests that.
Well… YES.. it DOES… considering that the only part we can hear is Burfiend apparently telling someone they will do the best they can to get some retardant dropped into that ‘valley’ but he’s not promising good results because of ‘all the smoke’.
What VALLEY?
What ‘out there’ ( on the south side of the fire ) would have constituted a VALLEY other than ( perhaps ) that fuel-filled box canyon.
There were certainly ‘mounds’ ( and rock-piles ) there near the western edge of town but the closest place to the edge of town that would constitute an actual VALLEY was, in fact, that fuel filled box canyon.
>> calvin also said…
>>
>> Following that conversation, B33 immediately calls to SPGS1. SPGS1 was on the
>> south side of the fire and ultimately admitted to knowing GM’s location.
>> SPGS1 was not the direct supervisor of DIVA., right?
Right… but even OPS1 Todd Abel KNEW that SPGS1 Gary Cordes was the one who had taken Eric Marsh and Granite Mountain out to the Sesame area that morning ( since Cordes knew the roads ) and that Cordes was the one who had ‘briefed’ Marsh about ‘predetermined escape routes’ and ‘safety zones’ that morning.
>> Why would B33 want to contact Cordes?
Because Todd Abel ( or whoever Burfiend is speaking with at the start of that Helmet-CAm video ) might have just TOLD him to?
>> calvin also wrote…
>>
>> The Prescott 3 pulled their trucks to a stop and got out and started videoing
>> with the helmet cam because of what was being transmitted over air to ground,
>> and possibly other channels.
We still don’t know when the off-the-radar ‘Prescott 3’ ( Clawson, Hulburd, Yowell ) first arrived at the St. Joseph Shrine parking lot OR, indeed, WHY they were there and/or WHO had told them to be there… and for WHAT reason?
None of the ‘Prescott 3’ were ever interviewed… as far as we know.
Only Aaron Hulburd can say WHY he chose that exact moment to turn his Helmet-Cam on for ( apparently? ) that one-and-only time that day.
Total coincidence that he happened to capture most of the ‘Granite Mountain is in trouble’ radio traffic… or was there more of that kind of radio traffic preceding the Helmet-Cam video that we still just don’t know about?
>> calvin also said…
>>
>> I really find it interesting that Abel, and Musser (Operations) are heard at the
>> beginning of the helmet cam video, but B33 wanted /needed to talk to SPGS1.
Again… B33 might not have WANTED to talk to SPGS1 Cordes at all… but either Musser or Abel ( or whoever B33 is conversing with at the start of that Helmet-Cam video ) might have TOLD him to because Burfiend MIGHT have been already been trying to pinpoint GM’s location and someone thought that Cordes might be able to help him with that.
Guess who probably knows what the REST of that conversation was about ( including call-signs involved ) just before the Helmet Cam begins?
Aaron Hulburd. The one who shot the damn video in the first place.
His radio was going FULL BLAST when the video starts.
How could Aaron Hulburd NOT have heard the first part of that conversation or have NOT known was was being discussed and why B33 now needed to talk to SPGS1 Gary Cordes?
This just fits into an ongoing theme of mine about WHO really knows a LOT of the answers concerning these ‘partial radio captures’.
In most cases ( Like Aaron Hulburd and his own Helmet-Cam video… and Eric Panebaker and the people standing there with him for all of these Panebaker captures… and Ian McCord and/or Ronald Gamble for the YARNELL-GAMBLE video, etc, etc. )…
… the most likely person to know MORE about some of these ‘partial captures’ heard in some of these videos ( including the CALL SIGNS involved ) is the person who was shooting the video and actually HEARING these ( entire ) transmissions as they were happening.
So.
If (and only if) the person conversing with B33 actually tells/advises him (B33) that he should contact SPGS1, which B33 immediately does. It would not be Abel telling him because Abel knew SPGS1 lost the A/G channel. Right? Is it possible that it was Musser? Was he with SPGS1 at this time?
Also, I am not going to give the link to the Facebook account where the comment was made by one of GM parents. I made a direct inquiry about this picture, but did not get a response. Hopefully, one day we will get to see this image, as it could provide additional information.
Living working and talking about the mountains……
A canyon is a canyon a valley is the bottom of the foot hills that spreads out to the open areas the valley would suggest the area adjacent to the towns possibly including the towns them selves not a Canyon.
Mountain ridges. draws and canyons or drainages feed into the valley’s the flats open areas at the ending of the foothills.
Terminology of people who live near or in the mountain areas of the west.
Valleys —open areas towns cities rural areas near the start of the mountains.
Yes… I suppose anyone in an airplane flying over that area that day who might use the word VALLEY could have been referring to just about any location down there between those two ‘mountain ranges.
There was a pretty high mountain range just EAST of Highway 89 ( where all the radio and microwave towers were ) and then another ‘mountain range/ridge’ out there to the WEST ( where the high-ridge two-track was ).
Jut about anything in-between ( including Yarnell and Glen Ilah ) could have been construed to be ‘in the valley’ between those two ranges.
It is looking less likely that the conversation between Burfiend and SOMEONE ( ?? Who ?? ) captured at the start of the Helmet-Cam video might have been specifically about Granite Mountain’s predicament and more just someone asking for better retardant coverage to protect structures close to town… but it could still go either way, really.
No one ( Not Burfiend, not Abel, not Musser, not even Cordes ) seems to even mention this crucial direct conversation with Burfiend just seconds before Steed’s first MAYDAY was going to hit the radio.
Reply to calvin post on August 31, 2014 at 6:55 am
>> calvin wrote…
>>
>> So. If (and only if) the person conversing with B33 actually
>> tells/advises him (B33) that he should contact SPGS1, which
>> B33 immediately does. It would not be Abel telling him
>> because Abel knew SPGS1 lost the A/G channel. Right?
Correct.. unless Abel has just ‘forgot’ about that by that time, or something.
>> calvin also wrote…
>>
>> Is it possible that it was Musser?
Yes… but come to think of it… wouldn’t Musser have been just as aware that Cordes could not longer TRANSMIT over Air-To-Ground? Musser was WITH Cordes around this time on the side of Highway 89 near Shrine Road.
Why would Musser even tell Burfiend to call Cordes if Musser knew Cordes wasn’t going to be able to answer him?
>> calvin also wrote…
>>
>> Was he ( Musser ) with SPGS1 at this time?
According to all available evidenced… Yes. Right there on the side of Highway 89 near Shrine Road.
So WHO Burfiend was talking to at the start of the Helmet Cam video… about WHAT ( exactly )… and WHY Burfiend wouldn’t even take a breath before ending that conversation and feeling the need to talk immediately ( and directly ) with SPGS1 Gary Cordes remains an important mystery to solve.
As Mr. Powers just pointed out… when a guy in an airplane flying over that area that day uses the word VALLEY… he could have just been generally referring to that entire are ‘down there’ in-between the mountains that are EAST of Highway 89 and the far western high-ridge… and everything in-between including Yarnell and Glen Ilah.
Apart from Burfiend himself ( and whoever he was actually talking to ), Aaron Hulburd is probably the BEST person to know what that entire conversation was about but MANY other people must have heard it as well.
Hulburd’s radio was so loud at the start of the Helmet Cam video that Clawson and KC ‘Bucky’ Yowell must have heard the whole thing, too.
NOTE: Neither Paul Musser nor Todd Abel mention having any kind of conversation like this direct with Burfiend in Bravo 33 just seconds before Steed’s first MAYDAY hit the radio.
Well.. .SOMEONE was.
>> calvin also wrote
>>
>> Also, I am not going to give the link to the Facebook account
>> where the comment was made by one of GM parents. I made a
>> direct inquiry about this picture, but did not get a response.
>> Hopefully, one day we will get to see this image, as it could
>> provide additional information.
Copy that.
A coupla interesting little tiny details I found today.
I was wondering what was the process/status of the AZState Fire contesting the ADOSH charges/fines. So I was googling back in time.
I was remembering that in the earlier reports there was mention made that there could be some kind of “conference” in February or March. Then I came across a couple of references regarding a “hearing” that would take place in August. Then I came across a couple of reference that it would be on August 21.
There hasn’t been any mention of any of this since. Including this month of August. Nothing, nada, nowhere.
So, going back and digging some more, back to the Prescott Daily Courier from 12/19/13:
“State Forestry Contests Hotshot Safety Citation”
http://dcourier55.1upprelaunch.com/main.asp?SectionID=1&subsectionID=1&articleID=126566
Describes the Notice of Contest.
Then says:
“The letter requests a review by the Industrial Commission’s Hearing Division.
Forestry officials said in a news release that they want to present more information to the Industrial Commission Hearing Division, but they didn’t elaborate on what new information they might have.”
So, there you have it!
And a teensy-tiny bit more detail can be found in “Forestry Division Fighting Liability Findings in Yarnell Deaths” on the “East Valley Tribune” website (doesn’t show a date but I’m sure it’s about the same time, December 19-ish)
http://m.eastvalleytribune.com/arizona/capitol_media_services/article_ec9f55b8-68fe-11e3-ab04-001a4bcf887a.html?mode=jqm
“Fire Division spokeswoman Carrie Dennett would not comment, other than to say that the appeal will afford her agency ‘its first opportunity to present additional information to the Industrial Commission Hearing Division.'”
So gosh gee wiz, and all.
Well… even if they want to ‘present more evidence’ that it was, perhaps, Marsh and Marsh alone who was responsible for the ‘move’ that day ( such as heretofore unseen videos or testimony )…
…I don’t think ADOSH is going to change its basic findings.
It was an ‘unsafe workplace’ being run by the primary employer… the Arizona State Forestry Division… and at the time of the tragedy… Marsh was a 1099 contractor for that same employer.
The reason it is KEY for them ( Arizona Forestry ) to try and ‘mitigate’ the ADOSH findings is because those findings themselves allow the ‘wrongful death’ claims to exceed the proper threshold needed in order to go beyond the normal ‘Exclusive Remedy’ and ‘Statutory Limitations’ for worker’s compensation claims.
The POINT I’m trying to MAKE is that way back in December, the SAIT is STATING, publicly, that it has MORE INFORMATION that it has been SITTING ON. FOIAs be DAMMED!
But, “Oh, please, ADOSH, we beg of you, let us please release to you all this stuff we’ve been sitting on (including possibly an argument between Marsh and Steed, and who knows what other things) (to protect our system) in order to convince you that we aren’t to blame, they are!”
Remember this is way back in December.
Yes…. and how much would you like to bet that even now… what they are ‘negotiating’ with ADOSH with is some screwy deal whereby they get to ‘show’ their ‘secret evidence’ to ADOSH… but it doesn’t ever actually enter into their possession so that NO ONE can come after it with from ADOSH, either, with any standard ‘Arizona Open Records’ FOI request OR any kind of FOIL / FOIA.
They want their cake and to eat it too.
They probably want to ‘present this evidence’ and somehow get ADOSH to ‘back off’… but they still don’t want anyone to see what they have and they will still play the “we don’t want to upset the families” card.
Oh… what a tangled web we weave… when first we practice to deceive.
That wasn’t all just sarcasm up above.
There actually IS a legitimate ( legal ) path for them to take to try and get ADOSH to look at ‘other evidence they may have’… but still prevent that evidence from officially ‘entering their possession’ so that it would be immediately subject to an FOI request.
There ARE, in fact, exemptions that agencies are allowed to ‘claim’ for not ever having to release certain things for any Arizona Open Records FOI request…
…but it is complicated… and it has to be DOCUMENTED that that is what might be taking place.
They simply know things they don’t want anyone else to know.
They have always wanted to ‘throw a dance’ but never have to ‘pay the band’.
They want to LIMIT damages to themselves ( AZFS )…
but they still want to CONTROL the ‘information’.
Time will tell if they get their way, or not.
Yes. We’re on the same wavelength.
Love the “throw a dance” without “paying the band” metaphor. Many would, I think, say that’s exactly why, after all the “safety first” public relations, our wildland firefighters are still getting killed at the same rate (very high–compared to structure firefighters and Canadian wildfire fighters) and in all the same ways as ever.
And I’m additionally wondering if the “approaching” August Hearing (which seems to have been lost or forgotten or misplaced or replaced from the perspective of today August 30) had anything to do with Dudley’s seemingly random tossing out there into the intertubes-universe the “unverified” rumors of the argument.
I’m on the verge of tweet-messaging Yvonne Wingette Sanchez of AZCentral to ask her if she (who has written about this stuff) knows what happened to that hearing.
I like to class wild land fire accidents a little different……
Fighting Fire–Fire injuries and death.
Falling snags, rolling rocks. falling down, Chain Saws, All on the Fire line.
Other—-Vehicle accidents, Air craft Accidents, Hart attacks, Snake bites, All non Fire Line.
Wild Land FF have a higher exposure rate, Nation wide– verses local city county state.
Using only Fed statistics is incomplete.
There are State County and City Wild Land FF as well they have to be included in the totals.
So far this year no Fire Line Fatalities
How Many Non Wild Land Fire Fatalities Nation Wide?
Marti,
There are some nuances, which IF they come into play, could explain why certain information has been withheld.
First, it is not the SAIT which may have been sitting on information since December, it’s the State. The SAIT was disbanded after the issuance of the report.
The STATE, could have come into the possession of new information at any time, long after the SAIT had disbanded. ASFS staff could have had casual conversations with any number of people over the past year or so, which could have provided them with details that were not in any of the reports.
IF the FOIA requests were specifically made for all the information which was gathered during the investigations to produce the reports, the State would not have been obligated to release information gathered outside of these investigation processes, including, AFTER those proceses were completed.
Let’s face it, lot’s of information is exchanged during casual conversations over the course of time. For all we know, that specific information may not YET even be in written format. You can’t FOIA information that’s only in someone’s head.
Although, I’m certainly not an expert on FOIA requests, I have a feeling that there has to be a certain amount of specificity involved, which the lack there-of, in this particular instance, would create enough wiggle-room for them not to respond to a request.
Do I think that they released ALL the information they were supposed to with the FOIA requests? NO!!
Do I think that they have accumulated information from outside the investigation process which they have not released? YES!!
>> mike wrote…
>>
>> Although, I’m certainly not an expert on FOIA requests,
>> I have a feeling that there has to be a certain amount of
>> specificity involved,
Yes… but ‘general’ requests can also be made.
It is not possible to make a ‘specific’ request for something when the reason the request is being made is because you don’t even know (yet) what someone may or may not have.
Example: The FOI requests for the SAIT material itself.
That was a ‘specific’ request in terms of it asking for ‘all material used in the Arizona State Forestry sponsored Special Accident INvestigation of the Yarnell Incident”… but also ‘general’ in that no one knew what they had yet.
The GAME that Arizona Forestry then played was to actually then pretend that evidence they might have which didn’t result in any actual entries in the final SAIR report was ‘not used in the investigation’… hence… they didn’t have to release it.
What Mike Dudley revealed in public on June 20, 2014 is a good example of that GAME they were playing.
Mike Dudley admit flat-out that ‘they’ ( the SAIT ) received allegations from ‘more than one source’ that Steed and Marsh had an argument about ( in Dudley’s words ) “which way to go from that saddle”.
Then Dudley says… “But we couldn’t validate that.”
Apparently, then, the SAIT was performing the ‘mental gymnastics’ necessary to think that any evidence that had been submitted to them that was related to these ‘allegations’ which ended up NOT being ‘validated’ and NOT being used in ‘the investigation’ was automatically exempt from any FOI request.
In other words… you asked for everything we have that was USED in the investigation. If we couldn’t validate something… then it was technically ‘not used in the investigation’ so Voila… we don’t have to give you all that kind of stuff.
When someone is fundamentally trying to HIDE things and still attempting to CONTROL the ‘story’ itself… these are the mental gymnastics they will use in the FOI arena.
>> mike also said…
>>
>> which the lack there-of, in this particular
>> instance, would create enough wiggle-room for them not to
>> respond to a request.
You are right. You can’t just submit an FOI request that just says “Tell us everything you know”.
FOI requests ( and Arizona’s Open Records Laws ) are primarily DOCUMENT related.
In other words… if you are after ‘reports’ or ‘internal memos’ or even just ’emails’… they still have to be regarding a particular named ‘subject’ and within certain time constraints.
As much as many people think there SHOULD be… there isn’t going to be another ‘better’ report about the Yarnell Hill Fire coming out of the Arizona State Forestry Division.
They did that already.
No one did anything wrong. Not even US. Period. End of story.
So there certainly isn’t going to be a NEW report from them entitled SAIRU ( Special Accident Investigation Report UPDATE – What We Have Learned Since We Thought We Knew It All ) which, itself, could be the target ‘subject’ for NEW FOI requests.
Not gonna happen.
But YOU just hit on the ‘conundrum’ they now face.
The whole thing didn’t just ‘go away’ once all the bodies were in the ground and all the parades ended… as they planned.
Not by any means.
Arizona Forestry failed to recognize the ‘historic’ significance of this incident and how tenacious people can be when they have the feeling that someone is (fundamentally) bullshitting them… especially parents who have just lost their sons and wifes who have just lost their husbands.
ADOSH found plenty of ‘wrongdoing’… and an ‘unsafe workplace’ being run by AZFS… and FINES were issued accordingly.
The ADOSH findings then sufficiently ‘lowered the bar’ for the families of the victims to now challenge the existing workmen’s comp ‘statutory limitations’ and ‘Exclusive Remedy’ clauses and go straight for ‘wrongful death’ claims.
Now AZFS is kinds screwed.
They now MUST either try to mitgate or defeat the ADOSH findings to again ‘raise the bar’ for any ‘wrongful death’ claims or suits back to the standard ‘stautory limitations’ and ‘Exclusive Remedy’… but that is going to take NEW EVIDENCE.
However… as much as they might like to or even be trying to arrange… you can’t just say to ADOSH…
“Meet us at Dunkin’ Donuts and we will just TELL you some things we now know ( or have known all along ) that should enable you to change YOUR conclusions… and don’t bring any tape recorders, either.”
There will have to be new DOCUMENTS generated… and once those new DOCUMENTS exist… then they CAN be requested with FOI from EITHER Arizona Forestry OR ADOSH ( if they actually allow ADOSH to have copies of them and ‘take possession’
themselves of the new information ).
So they really are kinda screwed here.
If they walk into court with that original ADOSH report still intact and not ‘mitigated’ in any way… they are going to LOSE.
If they try this ‘please let us show you new evidence so will change your minds’ tacit… now they run the risk of ‘showing all their cards’ and being forced to release the very information they never wanted anyone to see.
Their best bet really is to just SETTLE this ‘out of court’.
I still hope that settlement will contain the kind of ‘action items’ that the families have already expressed they would insist on even if a ‘settlement’ is reached… and that would still include the release of more information and a full accounting of not only what happened in Yarnell… but the shenanigans that AZFS was always ‘up to’ in the wake of the tragedy.
Followup… apology.
My ‘reply’ above was to what TTWARE has and not ‘mike’.
Total mis-type up there.
And what happened to that, supposedly, August 21 hearing?
And, as I was digging around, mostly finding a great deal of NOTHING, I stumbled (as one often does while doing strange Google searches) across another fine little detail.
In an article from July 02, 2013 (Tuesday) in the LA Times called “Fire’s Pain is Magnified for Residents of Yarnell, Ariz.”
http://articles.latimes.com/2013/jul/02/nation/la-na-fire-yarnell-20130703
The thing that first stuck out to me was this, regarding Wade Ward:
“Ward said officials were still reviewing radio traffic but it appeared that McDonough did what he was required to do. ‘He left his post based on the protocol,’ Ward said. ‘He was doing his job.'”
Officials were reviewing radio traffic? By Tuesday? What officials? When? Using what?
And, given all the convoluted conversations we’ve had here about radios
and whether or not anything can be “recorded” (or something) enough to be later “reviewed” and have pretty much ended up thinking there’s no there there,
And it’s important to remember those Granite Mountain radios were all still sitting out there on that Deployment Site when this article was written.
OK, thinking out loud. It could easily be the case that the “radio traffic” being “reviewed” was the dispatch logs, which is pretty much the only record that exists (in the public realm) of what could be considered “radio traffic.” Maybe.
But that still begs the question, who was “reviewing” this “radio traffic”?
Above this little tiny detail there are three paragraphs giving a narrative of McDonough. The third being:
“When the fire reached that point, McDonough radioed to the hotshot captain that he planned to leave his position because of the conditions. He headed down the hill, back to a bulldozer line where he met up with a fire captain from a different hotshot team and turned around to reevaluate. The fire was moving so fast that it had tailed him.”
So, obviously a whole lot of “investigating” was going on before the SAIT officially began the investigation on Wednesday July 3. But we aren’t, apparently supposed to know who was doing that investigating. And what they were collecting. Wink Wink.
Oh, except for it does say:
“Federal investigators arrived Tuesday in Prescott to examine such specifics as the direction from which the flames overran the hotshot crew and whether firefighters were following standard protocol.”
Oh yowza!.
(Still thinking out loud here.)
Wade Ward is connecting “reviewing radio traffic” with the McDonough narrative (“Ward said officials were still reviewing radio traffic but it appeared that McDonough did what he was required to do.”). Dispatch logs wouldn’t have anything to do with that narrative.
This has to do with “McDonough radioed to the hotshot captain that he planned to leave his position because of the conditions.”
Riddle Me This. What “radio traffic” would McDonough have been communicating on to his captain about planning to leave his position that would be being reviewed in relationship to this?
OK Maybe these two things don’t have anything to do with each other.
But still, what does it mean that on Tuesday “officials were still reviewing radio traffic”?
The only thing here I can think of was that When McDonough left (Abandoned)
his assigned position.
1. Did he notify his supervisor?
2. Did the crew assign a new look out in another location?
3. Did the crew move without a new lookout.
I think those would be specific things at that point they would be looking for at that point in the investigation. However it was on Crew net and the fire overhead were not coping that frequency so they had to rely on written statements.
Thus following protocol. At least for McDonough ……….
Yes, thank you. That would be the “what.”
There is still nothing nada about the who or the how. What radio investigation had been ongoing and by whom and using what kind of data from what radios in order for him to say what he said on Tuesday July 2, the day before the SAIT investigation officially started?
It’s the same rabbit-hole down which the original Blue Ridge logs and the Peeples Valley Engine Guy’s photos, and who knows what else disappeared.
The ADOSH hearing is now scheduled for Nov. 13.
Ahhhhh, thank you JD! Now Yvonne doesn’t have to respond to the twitter message I now don’t have to wonder whether to send her.
PS Was this publicly announced somewhere, and if so where? I couldn’t find a thing.
Mr Powers.
Thanks for relaying the information that was anonymously given to you. It really helps bring ever increasing clarity to what was happening that day.
It appears to me that the information you received could be related to the comment on the post over at Wildfire Today on June 27,2014, by some FF named Robert.
According to his post he was on the crew that moved the GM buggies and has lots of videos and photos leading up to the tragedy. He even made some other comments and said that GM were not risk takers, and that he might have made the same mistake.
I agree that any picture or video that hasn’t been released to the public should be ASAP in order to get a better understanding of the events that led up to YHF fatalities. It is very important!
Calvin—–
My fear on the video is if a family member has it then the may not release it do to directly naming Marsh as the one that made the crew come down off the hill to him and to the ranch.
That would eliminate as WTKTT has said any responsibility of the overhead or State as the crew acted separate of the fire overhead and violated the safety rules in doing so.
A catch 22 for the families. My take on it any way. Marsh was not named in the suit so some legal mumbo jumbo to deal with.
I am quite sure there is at least one photo being held by a family member. I honestly thougjt the video would be from BR. Robert appears to wanna share. I wonder if his comments have anything to do with the revelation of an argument?
Reply to calvin post on August 29, 2014 at 4:23 pm
>> calvin said…
>>
>> I am quite sure there is at least one photo being
>> held by a family member.
That’s the one that you believe was mentioned on Facebook and was
supposedly taken by a GM crew person at the top of the saddle
above the box canyon… yes?
Do you still have a link to that original Facebook comment?
>> calvin also said…
>>
>> I honestly thought the video would be from BR.
It still might be.
It might simply have been ‘given’ to a family member instead of
to the SAIT or any other investigative body.
The motivation might have been the same as it appears to have been
with the Christopher MacKenzie videos themselves.
Someone wanted a ‘family member’ to have something because it might contain something they would want to see or hear… and keep… but the person who had it didn’t really want investigators to have it.
Someone seemed to have been keeping MacKenzie’s camera ( and
what it contained ) OUTSIDE of the official YCSO Police ‘chain of
evidence’… but they also recognized the need to get that camera back
to a ‘family member’.
The only reason we probably ever saw the MacKenzie Canon camera
photos and videos is because it was Christopher’s father himself who
then, in turn, felt the photos and videos from that camera would be
important to the ‘investigation’ and then he, himself, made the effort
to get the material BACK to investigators.
>> Robert appears to wanna share. I wonder if his comments have
>> anything to do with the revelation of an argument?
I don’t see any direct reference to the ‘argument’ that SAIT Co-Lead
Mike Dudley mentioned in public on June 20, 2014… but it is certainly
fascinating to hear him say…
“My crew ( Blue Ridge ) moved their trucks”.
“I have MANY pics and videos leading up to the incident”.
I suppose that COULD be BR Hotshot Ian McCord speaking… especially
if he really was ‘collecting’ pics and videos from the other BR Hotshots and
thats why his SAIT folder contains material that doesn’t even appear to have
belonged to him… but somehow I doubt it.
It really does sound like he is referring to ‘many pics and videos leading
up to the incident’ that haven’t been seen/heard before.
This is the comment from someone named ‘Robert’ you are
speaking of, correct?…
Wildfire Today
Title: What have we learned from Yarnell Hill?
Posted on June 27, 2014 by Bill Gabbert
http://wildfiretoday.com/2014/06/27/what-have-we-learned-from-yarnell-hill/
Comments…
————————————————————
Robert on June 27, 2014 at 6:18 pm said:
All I can tell you is I was on that fire a year ago and my crew movied there trucks. I have many pics
And videos leading up to the incedent. I have spent many days going over my pics and all the events that day. I put all my info together and have went over it to help people understand and at first I thought like you. There where many things that you could have said were holes in the cheese. After talking threw it and knowing several of them as well as going to over a dozen of the funerals. They were not risk takers and I truly feel that from where they were that it had to look totally reasonable and with little to know risk. Now is this ok NO one life lost is too many but as a fire fighter this job has Curtain risk and it scars me more now that if I was in there shoes I may have made the same decision they did. They are greatly missed and as far as leas sons leaden I feel that we can saftey our what out of doing nothing. It may be ironic but if they just made one more watch out witch it would be #19 I would hope there is a chance that we will see it often enough to make us think how they thought it was doable and how fast thing can change
————————————————————
By the way… ( and for what it is worth )… there is only ONE Blue Ridge Hotshot showing up in the PUBLIC list of crew members that were there that day whose first name is ‘Robert’.
That would be ‘Robert Manry’… PUBLIC Resource Order C-3.17
From “J- Resource Orders” document…
Order for Blue Ridge IHC team…
C-3 – 06/29/13 1819 PNT Crew, Type 1 – Blue Ridge IHC – REPORT TO YARNELL AZ AT 0600 6/30/13
Individual Resource Orders for ALL crew members…
C-3.01 – CREW BOSS (CRWB) Frisby, Brian Harold Salvatore (AZ-FDC)
C-3.02 – CREW BOSS (CRWB) Brown, Rogers T (AZ-FDC)
C-3.03 – FFT1 ( SQUAD BOSS ) – Fuller, Travis (AZ-FDC)
C-3.04 – FFT1 ( SQUAD BOSS ) – Ball, Cory J (AZFDC)
C-3.05 – FFT1 ( SQUAD BOSS ) – Gordon, Michael (AZ-FDC)
C-3.06 – FFT2 – Schmitt, Greg J (AZ-FDC)
C-3.07 – FFT2 – Jansen, Erik (AZ-FDC)
C-3.08 – FFT2 – DeSoto, Nicholas D (AZ-FDC)
C-3.09 – FFT2 – Gamble, Ronald R (AZ-FDC)
C-3.10 – FFT2 – McCord, Ian (AZFDC)
C-3.11 – FFT2 – Brownlee, Rhys (AZ-FDC)
C-3.12 – FFT2 – Trahin, Erik T (AZ-FDC)
C-3.13 – FFT2 – Hiett, Rory (AZFDC)
C-3.14 – FFT2 – Trahin, William (AZ-FDC)
C-3.15 – FFT2 – Papich, Jonathan (AZ-FDC)
C-3.16 – FFT2 – Feist, Orion (AZFDC)
C-3.17 – FFT2 – MANRY, ROBERT (AZFDC)
C-3.18 – FFT2 – Quiroga, Juan C (AZ-FDC)
C-3.19 – FFT2 – Cancelled UTF
C-3.20 – FFT2 – Ward, Brendan (AZ-FDC)
I thought I made it clear but will try again.
I was told the video was taken at the rest area by a member of GM and sent to a family member.
It has the entire radio argument on it.
Question– would that have been taken with a cell phone or would it be a camera only that could e-mail a video like that?
Reply to Bob Powers post August 29, 2014 at 6:12 pm.
>> Bob Powers said…
>>
>> I thought I made it clear but will try again.
>> I was told the video was taken at the rest area by
>> a member of GM and sent to a family member.
>> It has the entire radio argument on it.
Well… that would make it probably the most valuable piece of evidence related to this tragedy that anyone could even possibly hope existed.
For ANYONE to be ‘withholding’ a piece of evidence like that, or to have never made sure it was seen by investigators… is an absolute travesty.
I hope anyone who might be in possession of evidence like that realizes that the penalties for altering, destroying or even withholding evidence like that related to a CIVIL proceeding are the same as they are if it were a CRIMINAL proceeding.
It’s a FELONY.
>> Bob Powers also said…
>>
>> Question– would that have been taken with a cell phone
>> or would it be a camera only that could e-mail a video
>> like that?
Most likely a smartphone.
MOST digitial cameras do NOT have full ‘networking’ chips inside them that would allow you to connect to the Internet in real time.
ALL smartphones do… and there were a BUNCH of those out there on that ridge that day ( at least SIX… probably more counting the ones that don’t seem to have even ever made into the YCSO Police investigator’s hands ).
But here is a problem…
If you are saying you were told that this video captured the ENTIRE ‘argument’ and or the ENTIRE ‘discussing their options’ conversation(s)… and you also seemed to indicate it took FOUR separate radio calls to accomplish all this ‘negotiating’ between Marsh and Steed…
…that that means it must be a pretty LONG video.
A LONG video would have taken a fair amount of time to transfer over the network… but that can also happen as a ‘background task’ on the smartphone.
In other words… if the video was 10 minutes long… it might have taken almost as long to transmit it as an attachment to an email over a 2G cell network… but if the person just initiated the email ‘send with attachment’ and then left their smartphone ON while they were hiking then that ‘upload’ could have been happening WHILE they were hiking along.
Did this person say how LONG the video actually was?
No just that it was out there and a family member had it.
Could be related to the privacy of information act.
If the investigation did not pick it up from private cell phone at the scene. Or they actually have it but did not release it stating unsubstantiated radio traffic.
Then again some Lawyer may be holding it as evidence and part of their case released only to the court in there case file.
A lot of open questions here. There is a copy out there in a private persons hands as I was told. But I got no names.
Dudley knows something. other wise why would he drop a off the wall revelation to his audience that had not been out there before?
Right on all points.
This one is complicated.
If the ‘video’ was successfully offloaded from the smartphone and send to a family member ( before that crewmember died )… and that smartphone then became one of the ones that was basically destroyed and no data could be recovered from it… then it truly is the ‘personal property’ of whoever it was sent to.
If it wasn’t part of evidence ‘at the scene’… then it would not have entered into YCSO possession and, hence, been passed on to the SAIT.
Since the initial YCSO Police investigation ( combined with supposedly both autopsy and toxicology reports ) found insufficient evidence of any ‘foul play’ or ‘wrongdoing’ from a criminal standpoint… whoever ‘owns’ that video had no legal obligation to supply it to either the SAIT or ADOSH.
The CIVIL court proceedings are, however, another story. The attorneys for both sides have more options there than even the SAIT or ADOSH did.
Followup…
Mr. Powers has already made it clear that the ‘video’ in question that might have recorded the entire ‘argument’ between Marsh and Steed would seem to have come from a GM crewmember…
…but here are just some additional thoughts about this Blue Ridge Hotshot ‘Robert’s comment that appeared over on Wildfire today.
>> ‘Robert’ said…
>>
>> All I can tell you is I was on that fire a year ago and my
>> crew movied there trucks.
What ‘Robert’ seems to be saying there is that while he seems to have been ( still is? ) a Blue Ridge Hotshot… he, himself, was NOT one of the 2 Hotshots ( in addition to BR Captain Brown ) that was actually moving a GM vehicle that day.
He says “my CREW moved their trucks”.
I would think ( if he was one of the drivers of the GM trucks ) that he would have said “I helped move their trucks”.
It’s pretty obvious from the BR Unit Logs that the other ‘two’ drivers submitted handwritten log notes amongst the 13 Unit Logs provided… but we still don’t know WHO those other 2 CR Hotshots actually were.
>> ‘Robert’ also said…
>>
>> I have many pics.And videos leading up to the incedent.
>> I have spent many days going over my pics and all the
>> events that day. I put all my info together and have went
>> over it to help people understand
Went over it with WHO?
WHO was he ‘helping to understand’?
>> ‘Robert’ also said…
>>
>> and at first I thought like you. There where many things
>> that you could have said were holes in the cheese.
Such as?
Captain Trueheart Brown himself is on record as having said to the men…”We need a piece of cheese. This is just one BIG HOLE”… but I wonder what ‘many things’ Robert is suggesting were ‘holes’ that day.
‘
>> ‘Robert’ also said…
>>
>> After talking threw it and knowing several of them
>> as well as going to over a dozen of the funerals.
‘Talking through it’ with WHO?
It appears obvious that ‘Robert’ is not just someone suddenly came out near the one year anniversary and is suddenly ‘revealing’ that he has a lot of evidence.
He appears to be saying that a LOT of ‘other people’ knew all about it and he was ‘talking through it’ with them shortly after the incident.
A possible— Could he have been the main camera man for BR?
Going over all his pictures and video with his boss Frisby?
and the information is being Shut down by FS and not released to the media? it is how ever in the investigation reports just redacted under freedom of information act to release or additional investigation unless legally done with lawyers.
Reply to Bob Powers post on August 29, 2014 at 3:48 pm
>> Bob Powers said…
>>
>> My fear on the video is if a family member has it then the may
>> not release it do to directly naming Marsh as the one that made
>> the crew come down off the hill to him and to the ranch.
>> That would eliminate as WTKTT has said any responsibility of
>> the overhead or State as the crew acted separate of the fire
>> overhead and violated the safety rules in doing so.
I don’t believe I ever said that.
If I did… then it was some kind of ‘brain fart’… because that is NOT the case.
Even if it can be proven that Eric Marsh directly ordered Jesse Steed to do what they did that day… it would NOT eliminate any of the named plaintiff’s from ‘responsibility’ for what happened.
The ‘wrongful death’ suits are all about the employer / employee relationship(s) that existed that day. At the moment of the tragedy, Eric Marsh was a 1099 contractor for the State of Arizona. It was THEIR workplace. It was THEIR fire.
If it can be proved that ANY employee ( 1099 or W2 ) was ‘negligent’ that day and that negligence led to the deaths of other workers on that Arizona State run fire… then the State of Arizona is still very much ‘responsible’ for that actions of that employee.
The only reason the City of Prescott was dropped as one of the plaintiffs in the ‘wrongful death’ lawsuits is because the ADOSH report did not specifically find enough evidence of willful ( or unwillfull ) negligence on the part of the City of Prescott itself for things to rise above the City’s built-in ‘statutory immunity’ as part of ‘worker’s compensation’ and the inherent ‘Exclusive Remedy’ clause that goes along with any worker’s compensation claim.
When the ADOSH report was released… the attorney(s) for the family simply advised them that it would be hard road to take to try and overcome these ‘Statutory Immunicty’ and ‘Exclusive Remedy’ provisions of worker’s compensation insurance that the City of Prescott would be claiming in this case.
>> Bob Powers also wrote…
>>
>> A catch 22 for the families.
No, it is not. That’s the wrong way to look at it.
It’s not a ‘contest’ about whether Marsh decided to subject those under his charge to ‘needless’ or ‘reckless’ endangerment resulting in ‘wrongful death’.
It’s going to be about whether ANY employee of the State or Arizona did so and whether the State of Arizona is responsible for the actions of its employees… or not.
ADOSH has ALREADY determined that was an ‘unsafe workplace’ being run and managed by the State of Arizona that day. That what allowed the ‘wrongful death’ suits to proceed and overcome the ‘Exclusive Remedy’ clause of worker’s comp as it relates to Arizona Forestry ( the real employer that day ).
It is just as important for BOTH sides, in this case, to find out the TRUTH about what happened that day. How they ‘present’ it in court is another story… but the TRUTH is going to be essential to both sides of the courtroom.
>> Bob Powers also said…
>>
>> My take on it any way. Marsh was not named in the suit so some
>> legal mumbo jumbo to deal with.
It’s complicated…. but it’s really not looking good for the plaintiffs.
They will probably just settle rather than go to court… unless the families themselves refuse to accept any offers and still want the TRUTH to come out.
A number of them have already said that is the case ( for them ).
The PRIMARY reason they filed the ‘wrongful death’ suits is to find out what really happened that day… and to try to effect some necessary changes so that what happened in Yarnell is less likely to happen AGAIN… and no amount of simple money is going to ‘buy them off’.
I’m sorry…. total mis-type up above.
What I meant was…
“It’s really not looking good for the ‘defendants'”.
The ‘plaintiffs’ are the families themselves.
It’s the DEFENDANTS who will probably try to settle this without going to court… but the ‘plaintiffs’ ( the families ) might not LET them ‘settle’.
I’m getting sorta kinda confused here with all of this.
Are we talking about an argument/discussion that happened at the “Discussing their Options” location or an argument/discussion that happened at the saddle/drop-off into the bowl location?
Marti–My understanding is it happened at the Discussing their Options location.
The black rest area they were settled in. The crew was there and Marsh was below them possibly he was at the saddle. But this again is unsubstantiated.
WTKTT— Sorry you had no brain fart I misread what The Prescott City rule was.
Combined with the Families not naming Marsh or Steed in their Law Suit.
**
** WHO ACTUALLY REDACTED THE BLUE RIDGE UNIT LOGS?
**
** ARIZONA FORESTRY?, US FOREST SERVICE?… OR BOTH?
Reply to Marti Reed post on August 26, 2014 at 7:03 pm
>> Marti said…
>>
>> Re the redactions etc.
>> IIRC (and I don’t have time to go digging) the BR logs were written
>> up around Tuesday night, under the auspices of the SAIT.
Actually… when we finally got to see those 13 ( THIRTEEN ) individual Blue Ridge logs in public around February 27, 2014 ( albeit, heavily redacted )… 11 of the 13 had handwritten dates of Monday, July 1, 2013. One of them ( Captain Brown’s ) had a date 2 days later of July 3 and one of them ( the last one in the PDF file ) had no date whatsoever.
See ( way ) down below for a list of all 13 BR Logs and what ‘date evidence’ is on them.
The SAIT wasn’t even officially formed ( or given any official ‘authority’ to do anything ) until Wednesday, July 3.
From page 8 of the SAIR itself…
———————————————–
The State of Arizona convened a Serious Accident Investigation Team. A delegation of authority letter, signed by the State Forester on July 3, 2013, charged the Team with reviewing and reporting on the circumstances leading to entrapment of the Granite Mountain IHC.
———————————————–
There WAS evidence being gathered prior to the official creation and ‘delegation of authority’ to the SAIT… but we really don’t know WHO was actually doing that or whether all that ‘early’ evidence ever made it to the SAIT itself.
Someone TOLD those Blue Ridge Hotshots to sit down and write their ‘affadavits’ ( sic: Unit Logs ) on the very day following the incident… ( probably just before they were demobbed from Yarnell ) but we really still don’t know WHO that was.
Likewise for the Peeples Valley firefighters who almost burned to death themselves in Harper Canyon. Someone was officially interviewing them and taking photos ( and videos? ) and cell phone records from them right after incident ( and before the SAIT was officially formed ) but we still don’t know WHO that was or WHAT ever happened to all that evidence.
In both cases ( telling Blue Ridge to write their ‘affadavits’ and all the interviewing and evidence collection with Peeples Valley FFs ) I suppose it was probably someone associated with Arizona Forestry… ( maybe even Scott Hunt himself ) but we still don’t know for sure.
It had to have been ‘someone in an identifiable position of authority’ or why would anyone have complied with those early interview requests or be handing them ‘Unit Logs’?
>> Marti also wrote…
>>
>> So I don’t think the USFS would have redacted them before they were given to the SAIT.
The ‘chain of possession’ for those Blue Ridge ‘affadavits’ ( sic: Unit Logs ) that were mostly all written the day AFTER the incident is more like this ( I think )…
1. Someone told them to write those logs just before they were ‘demobbed’ from the Yarnell area itself the morning after the fire. That same someone collected all these handwritten ‘affadavits’ from them. 3 of them were then later retyped by someone else but the rest remained just the ‘handwritten’ originals dated July 1, 2013.
2. Two days later… the SAIT is officially formed ( July 3, 2013 ).
3. Whoever collected those original Blue Ridge ‘affadavits’ then probably handed them over to the SAIT once people started showing up on airplanes… but still with no REDACTIONS at all.
4. The SAIT probably had them in their possession ( unredacted ) for the entire time they were conducting their investigation AND ( unlike ADOSH ) were able to actually INTERVIEW Blue Ridge Hotshots Frisby, Brown, Fueller and Ball. The SAIT may have even been referring to these ( unredacted ) BR Unit Logs WHILE they were interviewing the BR Hotshots.
5. Initially… the ADOSH investigators were supposed to be participating in the SAIT investigation as well but only a few days after Arizona Forestry said that was going to be the case… they then suddenly changed their minds and kicked ADOSH out of the SAIT investigation. If ADOSH had been part of the SAIT investigation they would have had access to the same evidence the SAIT was seeing… including the (unredacted) Blue Ridge ‘Unit Logs’ and they also probably would have been able to be present at the Blue Ridge ‘interviews’.
NOTE: For all we know… this may have been the actual REASON that Arizona Forestry changed its mind so suddenly and then kicked ADOSH out of their investigation. There has never been any real explanation for that ‘flip-flop’ decision from Arizona Forestry. It might have been because of some of this actual early ‘evidence’ and ‘testimony’ ( like the Blue Ridge Unit Logs themselves ) that was quickly appearing. They just didn’t want ADOSH to be able to ‘officially’ see exactly what THEY were already seeing. They wanted more freedom to ‘shape the story’ without ADOSH looking over their shoulders.
6. ADOSH was now ‘on its own’ and had to deal with the US Forestry Service with regards to any interview requests or ‘Unit Logs’ related to the Blue Ridge Hotshots. ADOSH was denied any ability to interview or talk to any of them and only at the last minute did the US Forestry Service supply ADOSH with the ‘heavily redacted’ copies of the Blue Ridge ‘Unit Logs’ collected July 1, 2013.
7. ADOSH specifically states in their report that they were denied the ability to interview any Blue Ridge Hotshots and that the ‘Unit Logs’ supplied by the US Forestry Service were ( by then ) so ‘heavily redacted’ that they were (quote) “useless to the investigation”.
So… it looks very much like it was the SAIT that had the ‘originals’ FIRST ( no redactions at all )… and at some point they handed them over to the US Forestry Service ( and NEVER to ADOSH ) with no redactions, and then it WAS the USFS that did all the ‘redacting’ once Arizona’s ADOSH started asking for them.
Mr. Bill Gabbert of WildfireToday did his own inquiries about this and he actually received some kind of of written response from USFS which pretty much proves THEY were the ones doing the ‘redactions’ for what was ultimately released to ADOSH.
Wildfire Today – December 9, 2013
Article Title: Forest Service’s explanation for their refusal to fully cooperate with Yarnell Hill Fire investigations
http://wildfiretoday.com/2013/12/09/forest-services-explanation-for-their-refusal-to-fully-cooperate-with-yarnell-hill-fire-investigations/
The actual ‘explanation’ to Mr. Gabbert from the USFS as to why they either withheld documents from ADOSH or could only supply REDACTED copies of things they had…
———————————————————–
USDA Forest Service employees are subject to a variety of laws, such as the Privacy Act of 1974, as amended, 5 USC 55a, designed to protect personal and confidential information. We are legally required to withhold certain information due to the requirements of federal law to protect privacy and confidentiality of our employees. At their request, the Forest Service did provide ADOSH some documents for their investigation and offered to provide written response to remaining questions.
———————————————————–
So it really does appear that all the BLACKOUTS in the Blue Ridge ‘Unit Logs’ originally written the very day following the Yarnell incident were done by USFS… and not by the SAIT itself.
It was also the Arizona Republic newspaper ( AZCENTRAL ) that originally obtained these ‘redacted’ Unit Logs that ADOSH talked about in their own report but never published themselves.
That’s how this ‘State’ versus ‘Federal’ level stuff works.
Once AZCENTRAL knew that Arizona’s own ADOSH had these ‘Logs’ from the USFS… AZCENTRAL was able to easily and officially obtain copies via Arizona’s own ‘Open Records’ law(s) and didn’t have to file any more Federal level FOIA / FOIL requests. That only gave them the same REDACTED copies the USFS had given ADOSH… but that was good enough for AZCENTRAL’s purposes which was just to write an article about what ADOSH had.
NOTE: As their own article says… AZCENTRAL did, in fact, make standard Federal level FOIA / FOIL requests for the UNREDACTED versions of the Blue Ridge Unit Logs but they then say the US Forest Service simply ‘failed to comply’. They never followed up with their own Federal level FOIA / FOIL request for the REAL ( unredacted ) Unit Logs.
In that first public article regarding these logs is when AZCENTRAL also said that the REDACTIONS were performed by the US Forestry Service before them gave the BR Logs to ADOSH.
Their own article says (quote) “Federal authorities blacked out key portions of the log”.
From the AZCENTRAL article that first reported on these ‘late releases’ of BR Unit Logs…
NOTE: An actual link to this article will be posted as a reply in order to comply with the ‘only one link per post’ rule.
—————————————————————–
Thousands of pages of records have been publicly released along with videos and photographs.
But until now, there had been scant disclosure from the Blue Ridge Hotshots, a federal hotshot crew that worked on the fire line closest to Granite Mountain. The Blue Ridge crew’s work logs, which contain their recollections of what occurred, were released Thursday by the Arizona Division of Occupational Safety and Health after an inquiry about public records by The Arizona Republic.
The state agency obtained the records from the federal government as a part of its investigation into the June 30 firefighter deaths. They were not included in records previously released as part of the agency’s December report.
The logs, significantly redacted by federal officials, describe a chaotic retreat of civilians and firefighters as the Yarnell Hill Fire reversed direction and became an inferno.
The U.S. Forest Service prohibited interviews with Blue Ridge Hotshots by agents of the Arizona Division of Occupational Safety and Health. Members of the crew also have refused all media invitations to discuss the accident.
Federal officials later released the logs to ADOSH.
The Arizona Republic previously sought those logs from the U.S. government under the Freedom of Information Act. The Forest Service did not comply but provided redacted copies to ADOSH, which turned them over to the newspaper.
Federal authorities blacked out key portions of the log.
An ADOSH investigative report ripped fire commanders and other personnel for ignoring or breaching numerous wildfire protocols.
————————————————————————–
>> Marti also wrote…
>> The USFS (along with the BLM) didn’t formally “step in” until
>> the ADOSH investigation. I’m sure their mindset involving
>> “protecting employees” (for, historically speaking, IMHO, understandable
>> reasons) was quite operative during the SAIT investigation.
Yes. See above. The actual USFS response to Mr. Bill Gabbert says that is EXACTLY what they were doing and they not only the automatic ‘authority’ to do that… they were ‘obligated’ to do that.
However… do you see the GAME that was going on here?
The USFS did not ‘collect’ those written ‘affadavits’ from the Blue Ridge Hotshots on July 1, the day after the tragedy.
Someone else did ( We don’t know who. The SAIT wasn’t even officially formed yet ).
Whoever that was ( probably someone from Arizona Forestry ) then GAVE these handwritten BR ‘affadavits’ to the SAIT once it was up and running.
So at this point… those BR Unit Logs are now ‘evidence’ that belonged to a STATE agency ( Arizona Forestry and its contracted SAIT team ).
But now that means they are a ‘hot potato’.
As long as that evidence is in the possession of any Arizona State Agency… it is subject to Arizona’s own 100 year old ‘Open Records’ law.
So now the SAIT had a problem. They had something they didn’t WANT someone to be able to obtain via an Arizona FOI request OR have to turn over to ADOSH because of other established ‘Arizona State Agency Information Sharing’ Laws. They didn’t want ADOSH ( or any newspaper ) to be able to read these UNREDACTED Blue Ridge Unit Logs.
So they then ( apparently ) just GAVE them to the US Forestry Service.
Problem solved ( for the SAIT, anyway ).
Now… anyone who wanted to see them ( even though the SAIT already had and most probably even retained their own copies of them ) had to deal with the US Forestry Service.
So that’s what ADOSH had to do… and all they got was those copies that were so heavily redacted they were ( quoting ADOSH ) “Useless to the investigation”.
By ‘dumping’ these ‘Unit Logs’ up to the FEDS… it was also then easy for the SAIT to pretend they never had them at all ( including any unredacted copies ) and so they never had to include them with any Arizona ‘Open Records’ FOI requests ( which they KNEW were coming ).
Pretty clever, actually.
THEY ( the SAIT ) got to see/read what THEY wanted totally ‘unredacted’ in those Blue Ridge Unit Logs… and then do whatever interviews with Blue Ridge that THEY wanted to… but before ADOSH really got going and before the Arizona FOI requests started to show up they ‘ditched’ that important evidence off to someone else who had more options for withholding and redacting the information than they did, and all they had to do now was pretend that evidence was never ‘in their possession’ at all.
You can say a lot about Scott Hunt, Jim Karels and Mike Dudley… but ‘not sneaky’ and/or ‘not clever’ would probably NOT be included in the descriptions.
>> Marti also said…
>>
>> But I doubt they were “redacting” things during the SAIT deliberations.
Agree. I think all the ‘redacting’ was on the part of USFS when ADOSH was forced to obtain things from them instead of the SAIT… but I also would bet a sawbuck that the SAIT people ( Mike Dudley was/is a USFS person ) were closely consulting with the USFS about how MUCH to redact before the USFS fulfilled the ADOSH request(s).
>> Marti also said…
>> Which means the SAIT read those logs etc un-redacted.
>> They knew what was in them.
No question. See the ‘chain of possession’ stuff up above.
But all they did then with that ‘hot potato’ was dump it off to someone else and then pretend they never had them so that evidence would not be easily accessible by Arizona ADOSH or any Arizona ‘Open Records’ FOI request from the media ( or anyone else ).
>> Marti also said…
>>
>> And, if Bob Powers’ source is correct, they have a video.
>> Which means Dudley knows the evidence. But, then, the SAIT has
>> called other things we now know are documented “unable to be substantiated.”
To this day… no one from the SAIT has ever explained this all-important ‘validation’ process that they seemed to have in place, or what criteria they were using to call something ‘validated’ or ‘unvalidated’.
What did all that really mean?
They ignore lots of actual clear background recordings and call them ‘unvalidated’ and then they end their own supposed ‘blackout’ with a truly ‘unvalidated’ piece of testimony coming from just one guy in an airplane who also says he had no idea who was beneath him or what their voices sounded like.
>> Marti also said…
>>
>> I don’t know who redacted them. But by the time they were FINALLY
>> released, all things considered, I can imagine someone from both
>> Arizona Fire and the USFS sitting down with those logs and deciding
>> to use their black magic markers on them.
Hmm… I wonder WHO that might have been who was sitting squarely in the driver’s seat for BOTH of those agencies and their ‘involvement’ in the Yarnell Hill Fire investigation.
Someone like… say… a person who ACTUALLY works for the US Forestry Service but had been assigned as a Co-Lead for the Arizona Forestry investigation for this ‘State Run Fire’ where the fatalities took place?
>> Marti also said…
>>
>> Which begs the question:
>> Who were they trying to protect with their black magic markers??
Perhaps it really wasn’t a WHO… in the end.
Perhaps it was more like a WHAT ( The entire ‘SAIT Narrative’ itself ).
Perhaps the black magic markers were flying once they had decided on their ‘narrative’ and that it was going conclude that no one did ANYTHING wrong that day. Zero. Zip. Nada.
At the same time Mike Dudley was helping to write the ‘Narrative’ for the Arizona State Forestry sponsored SAIR document… his own (actual) employer ( the USFS ) could have been asking him to help THEM with fulfilling the ADOSH requests for the Blue Ridge Hotshots Unit Logs and needed his input on ‘what to redact’ so as not to ‘compromise’ the State level ‘work’.
Dudley was wearing ‘both hats’ ( and serving ‘two masters’ ) the whole time.
** ADDITIONAL INFO
**
** WHEN EACH BR UNIT LOG WAS ACTUALLY WRITTEN
From the ( redacted ) Blue Ridge ‘Unit Log’ notes that weren’t released until February 27, 2014…
The FIRST ‘Unit Log’ in the released document is obviously BR Captain Trueheart Brown’s.
Captain Trueheart Brown’s (heavily) redacted Unit Log ( typed ) has no official DATE on it at the top or anything… but Brown himself seems to indicate in his final paragraph that he wrote this Unit Log of his on the night of July 3, 2013… three days after the incident.
Brown’s ‘Unit Log’ ends with this…
————————————–
I have the guys drive Granite mountains rigs to the Yarnell Fire Station and leave them there.
( NEXT TWO LINES REDACTED ).
We grab food for the guys and find a sleeping spot and have a informal AAR/QA.
This is what I remember as of the night of 7/3/13. If there are any questions
or more needs to be elaborated on I can do so.
Sincerely,
( REDACTED )
—————————————
So nothing there after Sunday evening or about being interviewed officially… but he does mention this ‘informal’ AAR ( After Action Review ) and QA ( Question / Answer ) session they had amongst themselves the night of the tragedy. A time for everyone to ‘compare experiences’.
The SECOND ( also typed ) Unit Log is obviously BR Hotshot Ball’s. As with all the other BR Unit Logs… his name / signature was redacted but someone forgot to redact Ball’s handwritten DATE above his signature at the bottom of this ‘typed’ document. It says the document was created 7/1/2013 ( July 1, 2013 )… the day after the tragedy.
The THIRD ( also typed ) Unit Log in the document still isn’t attributed to any BR Hotshot… but it most probably belongs to the other Squad Boss ( Fueller ) since it is also ‘type up’ and is at the TOP of the PDF document. This one DOES have a TITLE and a DATE at the very TOP of the document. It says ( typed ) “Yarnell Hill Fire Notes July 1, 2013”. Same as Ball’s. It was ‘typed up’ the day after the tragedy.
At the bottom of this one it says…
————————————————–
The crew remains in this location for a while, and eventually after dropping off all GMIHC’s vehicles stays in the ranch area ( just NE of ICP ) for the night. The crew ( REDACTED ) beds down around midnight. We get up the next morning and get demobbed.
Signed in good health ( handwritten, not typed )
( REDACTED )
————————————————–
So nothing there, either, about getting ‘interviewed’ before getting ‘demobbed’ from Yarnell the very next day right after they ‘got up’. ( Even though that is when they were most probably all asked to sit down and write up all these handwritten ‘affdavits’ ( sic: Unit Logs ) ).
NOTE: That is it for any ‘typed up’ Unit Logs. All the rest are just scanned copies of handwritten notes.
The FOURTH Unit Log ( now totally handwritten ) is not attributed to any BR Hotshot… but it does have a handwritten date at the top ( in blue ink and not black ink as the notes themselves ) which says 07/01/13 ( July 1, 2013 ). Again… the day after the tragedy.
The FIFTH Unit Log is not attributed to any BR Hotshot and also has a handwritten date ( also in blue ink and not in black ink as the notes themselves ) that says 7/1/13 ( July 1, 2013 ). The day after the tragedy.
The SIXTH Unit Log is unattributed but has a handwritten date at the top ( this time the same black ink color as notes themselves ) which says 7/1/13 ( July 1, 2013 ). The day after the tragedy.
The SEVENTH Unit Log is unattributed but also has a handwritten date at the top ( but now we are back to date written in blue ink with notes themselves written in black ink ) that says 07/01/13 ( July 1, 2013 ).
The EIGHTH Unit Log is unattributed, also has a handwritten date at the top ( but now we are back to black ink for both the date and the notes ) which says 7/1/2013 ( July 1, 2013 ).
The NINTH Unit Log is unattributed and the DATE is now at the bottom of the document, under the redacted signature. It is in blue ink with the notes themselves being in black in. The date is 07-01-2013 ( July 1, 2013 ).
NOTE: Notice that even these handwritten dates that are in BLUE ink instead of BLACK ink like the notes themselves all appear to have been written using different date formats… which means they were not all ‘added’ to the documents by the same person.
The TENTH Unit Log is unattributed but this one is the first one to have been handwritten using a standard ‘pre-ruled’ and lined ‘Log Report’ form sheet that says ‘U.S. Government Printing Office: 2007-679-009 – General Message’ at the top of it. There is a BOX at the top of the form for DATE… but it is BLANK. There is, however, a ‘handwritten’ date at the BOTTOM of this Unit Log which is also in ‘blue’ ink instead of ‘black’ ink like the notes themselves. This handwritten date says 7/1/2013 ( July 1, 2013 ).
The ELEVENTH Unit Log has a handwritten TITLE and DATE at that top saying… “Record of Events – Yarnell Hill Fire – 6/30/15 – written 7/1/13” The ‘2015’ indication for the YHF itself is obviously just a handwritten mistake. The ‘written 7/1/13’ date is in black in just like the rest of the notes. This Unit Log also mentions the AAR ( After Action Review ) and the last part of this log just says…
———————————————–
Later, we arrived at our overnight spot and conducted an AAR.
We ate dinner and I bedded down at 23:16.
( SIGNATURE REDACTED )
———————————————–
The TWELFTH Unit Log only has a handwritten date at the bottom center of its one and only page. It says 7/1/13 ( July 1, 2013 ). This Unit Log also mentions the AAR ( After Action Review ) and the last part of this log just says…
———————————————–
Bosses make it back and we load up and head to ICP to talk to IC.
We all head up to the sleeping area and have an AAR about the
days events. Head to bed.
( SIGNATURE REDACTED )
———————————————–
The THIRTEENTH Unit Log is only 1 handwritten page and it has no DATE anywhere on it.
** END OF BLUE RIDGE UNIT LOGS
** SUMMARY
There are only 13 ( THIRTEEN ) actual BR ‘Unit Logs’ in the document.
Only Captain Trueheart Brown’s Unit Log has a date of July 3 on it.
11 of the other 12 Unit Logs have a date somewhere on them of July 1, 2013.
The last Unit Log has no date whatsoever.
3 of the logs mention they had their own AAR ( After Action Review )
of the day’s events once they got to their ‘sleeping area’ NE of the ICP.
NONE of these logs mention the circumstances under which they were actually being
written such as ‘Someone ??? asked/told us to all sit down and write Unit Logs before being demobbed’ or anything of that nature.
Followup…
Here is a direct link to that AZCENTRAL article that says the USFS were the ones who had ‘redacted’ the Blue Ridge Unit Logs that were supplied to ADOSH.
AZCENTRAL article that first reported on these ‘late releases’ of the BR Unit Logs…
http://www.azcentral.com/news/arizona/articles/20140214federal-crew-hotshots-yarnell-hill.html
Thanks MUCHO for documenting all of this!
I find the lack of documentation of who was collecting this early evidence to be quite troubling, all things considered.
I spent a bunch of time trying to find a 24-hour report. since usually there is one and, according to the Interagency Serious Action Investigation Guide, it’s usually supposed to be done by the Safety Officer. But it doesn’t HAVE to be done. And, after digging thru all my files and bookmarks and stuff, I realized, DOH, there wasn’t one.
The 72-hour report was published by the SAIT. On Friday. I don’t know how that ties into this really murky documentation.
And I was going to go back into everything and look at who from the USFS was on the SAIT, but I had a slight computer melt-down, and no access to my files and stuff until today. The fact that Mike Dudley is USFS explains a WHOLE lot, I think. Thx for pointing that out.
I’m interpreting things a little bit differently than you are. I have done a ton of reading “around” this fire and “around” this investigation. Maybe you have, too. I don’t know. I think we need to look at this whole thing a lot more systemically than we are doing here. Even as we still try to keep ferreting out the details.
The USFS has painted itself/had to paint itself into a corner regarding how it investigates fatality fires (and even non-fatality incidents). The problem is that there needs to be seriously different kinds of investigations, producing seriously different kinds of reports, for seriously different stake-holders.
This is a huge issue facing, not just the USFS, but other fire-fighting entities, also.
In order for the fire-fighting community to honestly understand how mistakes were made, they need to be able to talk about them without fear of incrimination/liability/fault-finding etc. Nobody’s going to be gut-wrenchingly honest about their mistakes if they fear punishment.
However, the larger community (which also includes fire-fighters), who may have suffered/died because of decisions made, needs to be able to hold the decision-makers accountable.
These two (and actually there are more than two, so I’m even over-simplifying) different sets of stake-holders create some real conflicts in terms of what methods are used to investigate and document something like this. It’s a huge dilemma, it’s extremely controversial, it’s really a big ongoing mess, and this fire and its investigations have to be understood in that context.
And the most recent new USFS investigation process (and also the very recent one that preceded it and, I think, played into this investigation) indicates that the USFS (and a whole bunch of other fire-fighting agencies) are still struggling with how to do it.
MIke Dudley came into this SAIT with this mess very much inside his brain to begin with. It wasn’t secondary, it was primary. And, I would guess, it was fairly primary inside a bunch of other peoples’ brains also. This is a huge 20-year-old un-resolved conflict.
IMHO the SAIT swung to far in one direction to protect people/systems. Possibly not realizing the power of the Internet to refute that attempt to protect them.
And, given the current POLICIES of the USFS, in regards to how they (including Mike Dudley) understand/conduct their bi-focal investigations, the exclusion of the Arizona ADOSH team, at that point, to their process is totally understandable, POLICY-wise.
(Their POLICY is to first conduct an AAR-type (no blame) review/investigation in order to get to the “Lessons Learned” stuff, and then, if something emerges that indicates serious obvious NEGLIGENCE on the part of someone, to conduct a separate investigation of that. At least, that’s my current understanding of all of this.
So, yes, this wasn’t a USFS fire. But I think USFS thinking played a huge part in how the Interagency SAIT conducted its investigation.
And, in reaction to that, IMHO, the ADOSH swung equally in the opposite direction to out the mistakes/mistakers. Thus we have the whole “let’s blame Musser” thing. Along with possibly a few others.
And now we have the lawsuits as a result of that investigation. Which may or may not lead to any revelation of any kind of Truth. (Disclosure–I’m pretty much WTF????? regarding why the CYFD is a target, like really????)
So back to the early evidence-gathering, and WHO did that, and who did the redactions (I think you are right) and why (I think this is a story unto itself).
I think this whole protection of people (for some very good but conflicted reasons) was there from the start, and not done just to “protect” the SAIT narrative–but as something that SHAPED the mindsets that produced that narrative from the very beginning.
I don’t know if I’m communicating this effectively. It’s excruciatingly complicated.
And, in case, because of the complexity of what I wrote above, anybody has any question of where I am at in my opinion of all of this, systematically speaking,
I think this fire was woefully and dangerously under-resourced.
Well Stated I agree.
Thank you Bob.
I’m honored that you understand and appreciate this.
Even more news out of Prescott today.
The entire Prescott Wildland Division ( including anything
called the Granite Mountain Hotshots )… is no more.
An $81,000 ‘study’ of the whole Prescott Fire Department setup had been commissioned some months ago and the final report and recommendations were presented to the Prescott City Council just before their regularly scheduled meeting yesterday.
According to the article that appeared this morning in the Prescott Daily Courier… current Wildland Division Chief Darrell Willis will still be able to keep ‘double dipping’ with the Prescott Fire Department and will simply be ‘reassigned’ to some other job ( while he continues to be already retired from PFD and drawing a full pension as he was before he even took over as Wildland Division Chief from Duane Steinbrink ).
Actually… whether or not the City of Prescott still retains anything resembling a ‘Hotshot Crew’ is still up to the Department itself… even if the ‘Wildland Division’ goes away.
There are still people in Prescott who think there should be a fully-restored ‘Hotshot’ operation regardless if there is even a Wildland Division for them to be attached to, or not.
From the article itself…
——————————————-
As far as the future of a city crew of Hotshots (19 of whom died fighting the Yarnell Hill wildfire in June 2013), Light said, “I think we’re still in a year of transition for the Hotshots.”
Ultimately, he said, “The reconvening or re-establishment of the Hotshots will rest with a policy decision of the City Council, and what the community really wants.”
——————————————–
So even without an actual ‘Wildland Division’ in Prescott.. the Prescott City Council COULD still decide to have ‘Hotshots’ somewhere within the Prescott Fire Department.
Probably not likely… but still an outside possibility.
Here’s the entire article that ran this morning…
Prescott Daily Courier – 8/27/2014
Article: Prescott Fire Department report: Consolidate wildland, prevention divisions
http://www.dcourier.com/main.asp?SectionID=1&SubSectionID=1&ArticleID=135444&TM=1490.339
Followups to above.
I was wrong. The independent ‘study’ of the Prescott Fire Department cost $87,900 ( and not just $81,000 ).
The ‘independent study’ also turned up an astounding ‘morale problem’…
From the article above…
—————————————
Anonymous surveys completed by employees turned up morale issues within the ( Prescott Fire ) Department. A question on whether morale is high in the fire department, for instance, elicited a negative reaction of about 91 percent (including “disagree” and “somewhat disagree” responses), and a question about the department’s communication with city hall received a 100-percent total negative response.
—————————————-
A “91 percent negative” and a “100 percent total negative response”.
Yikes.
Thanks for catching this. I spent some time today looking into it.
The $87,900 study wasn’t for just the Fire Department. It was also for the Police Department (which has a lot of issues, but not, according to the study, the seriously low morale).
And it’s not fait accompli.
It took me awhile to discover the process involved.
According to “Analyst to present police dept. findings to City Council Tuesday” (http://dcourier.com/main.asp?FromHome=1&TypeID=1&ArticleID=134082&SectionID=1&SubSectionID=1086&utm_source=&utm_medium=&utm_campaign=):
“Coming discussions will focus on which of the recommended changes the council wants to implement. Then, McConnell said, the city will ‘tailor future-year budgets’ to reflect those changes.
A city memo noted: ‘The findings of a thorough review will serve as a baseline to gauge the effectiveness of the city’s programs, identify options for changes that could enhance efficiency of the city’s programs, and measure the cost/benefit of providing various services in order to enable productive discussion of assured public safety funding at adequate levels.'”
Reply to Marti Reed post August 28, 2014 at 10:04 pm
A city memo noted: ‘The findings of a thorough review will serve as a baseline to gauge the effectiveness of the city’s programs, identify options for changes that could enhance efficiency of the city’s programs, and measure the cost/benefit of providing various services in order to enable productive discussion of assured public safety funding at adequate levels.’”
Absolutely classic.
In other words ( that cost less than $87,900 )…
How do we do what the people who live around here expect us to do with the money we have?
LMFAO
“In other words ( that cost less than $87,900 )…
How do we do what the people who live around here expect us to do with the money we have?
LMFAO”
That’s pretty much the feeling expressed by citizens commenting on the Daily Courier articles about this process. Along with low-level road-rage about not being consulted themselves and not having access to the actual reports being generated by that $88k process.
Some news out of Prescott today.
The Speaker of the House for the Arizona State legislature has appointed Brendan McDonough to be part of the ‘board’ that will oversee the construction of the State funded permanent memorial for the Granite Mountain Hotshots.
Prescott Daily Courier
Article Title: Surviving Hotshot to help oversee firefighter memorial
Posted Wednesday, August 27, 2014
http://www.dcourier.com/main.asp?SectionID=1&SubSectionID=1&ArticleID=135451&TM=75904.27
IMPORTANT NOTE: There is no SALARY involved with serving on this board… but certain ‘advisory’ positions on the board ( including Brendan’s position ) are entitled to full reimbursement for travel expenses and other ‘reasonable expenses’ associated with serving on the board. It is Arizona State proposed law HB ( House Bill ) 2624 that allocates $500,000 to purchase the site for the memorial and establishes the ‘board’ that will oversee the construction. HB 2624 was introduced in the Arizona State Legislature on February 11, 2014. It has NOT actually passed both the House and Senate yet nor has it been signed by the Governor but it’s a pretty safe bet all those things will happen. There is no significant opposition to HB 2624.
From the legislation itself…
B. Members of the Yarnell Hill memorial site board are not eligible to receive compensation, but members appointed pursuant to subsection A, paragraphs 3 through 10 of this section are entitled to reimbursement from the Yarnell Hill Memorial fund established by section 41-519.02 for reasonable expenses in traveling on and attending to official board business.
Brendan’s appointment is part of the ‘subsection A, paragraphs 3 through 10’ section mentioned above which actually looks like this in the legislation itself…
A. The Yarnell Hill memorial site board is established consisting of the following members:
…
…
6. A surviving member of the granite Mountain hotshot crew or a relative of a member of the granite mountain hotshot crew who lost his life fighting the Yarnell Hill fire, who is appointed by the speaker of the house of representatives.
Correction for above ( regarding HB 2624 ).
The Arizona legislation tracking site I was looking at was not ‘up to speed’.
HB 2624 was introduced on February 11, 2014… but has since passed in both the AZ House and Senate. It was ‘amended’ when it passed in the Senate which means it then had to go back to the House for another vote.
House Bill 2624 was amended on March 3, 2014, to give the widows of the firefighters the chance to buy the site themselves. Rep. Karen Fann of Prescott says the women approached her about the proposal and she agreed ( to add this amendment to the bill ).
All the ‘amendments’ passed and it did go to Governor Jan Brewer and she signed it into law back on April 30, 2014.
The $500,000 HAS been officially allocated to purchase the site and the board is now being officially established… but that amendment to the bill still gives the widows of the Granite Mountain firefighters the ‘option’ buy the site themselves instead of Arizona State Parks department.
Still no word on whether the widows are going to exercise that option.
I am very happy to here there will be a memorial. No matter who pays fore it
it is appropriate….
I was able to discover that the ORIGIN of the ‘amendment’ to HB2624 that allows some / all of the Granite Mountain widows the ‘option’ of ‘buying the site’ over the State’s own option to do so apparently came from only ONE of the widows… but no names were given.
ONE of the Granite Mountain widows seems to think no one SHOULD ever be able to go ‘out there’ where the men actually died. Not now. Not ever.
It was another Prescott Daily Courier article that first mentioned this ‘amendment’ to HB2624 and that it was, in fact, Arizona State Representative Karen Fann of Prescott who had been approached by just ONE of the widows asking her to add an ‘option’ for her to buy the land herself ( and prevent any memorial from being built there ).
Prescott Daily Courier – March 6, 2014
http://www.dcourier.com/main.asp?SectionID=1&SubsectionID=1&ArticleID=129222
From the article…
—————————————————————–
PHOENIX – The Arizona House of Representatives has approved a bill setting aside $500,000 to preserve the site where 19 Granite Mountain Hotshots died in the Yarnell Hill wildfire last year.
House Bill 2624 passed Wednesday on a 56-2 vote and now goes to the Senate.
It was amended Monday to give the firefighters’ survivors the chance to buy and own the site themselves. Rep. Karen Fann of Prescott said a widow asked her if that would be possible, and she doesn’t want to exclude options that might come up for consideration. Her amendment also includes the option to leave the site as it is, instead of building a memorial.
“My only primary goal here is to preserve the site,” Fann said. “The thought of somebody putting a water tower up there someday just didn’t seem appropriate.”
The bill would allow the purchase of the state trust land where the firefighters fell. It creates a committee to design the memorial and administer the fund and any donations for the purchase. The committee would include relatives of the firefighters, state representatives and state parks board officials. Fann’s amendment added representatives of the Yarnell Fire Department and chamber of commerce.
————————————————————-
NOTE: According to HB2624 itself… it is now basically up to the memorial management committee that has been formed ( which now officially includes Brendan McDonough ) to decide if the State of Arizona should actually purchase the exact property where the men died… or purchase some other piece of property for State of Arizona’s official memorial site.
WTKTT —I have said before the fire picture taken before the move was enough for me even not being there to tell my crew to get comfortable and watch the Fire activity and learn something.
Dynamite would not have moved me from the black Safety Zone or Lightning or all the threats in the world but that is me and that is the way I was trained.
I will say had Steed stood his ground and not moved we would not be in this conversation or know each other at this time.
With out knowing the exact words in the report I can say Marsh used his authority to get Steed to move the crew down to the Ranch. That is why they picked up and moved so fast at the end of the Radio conversation.
I still think the crew was a little faster getting to the saddle than was stated by the SAIT.
That would explain them not seeing the fire movement at 1620 the crew and Marsh were in the canyon blind to the Fire. That is the only explanation that would keep the crew moving down rather than going back to the black. The 1620 fire activity has never made any since to me as why the crew would have continued off the saddle at that point and into a brush filed canyon .
Reply to Bob Powers post on August 27, 2014 at 4:03 pm
>> Bob Powers said
>>
>> I have said before the fire picture taken before the move was enough
>> for me even not being there to tell my crew to get comfortable and
>> watch the Fire activity and learn something.
Copy that. Regarding the question I just asked you about whether anyone on that ridge might have been even entertaining any thought that the dozer-pushed east-west two track was going to stop any/all of that fireline… I went back and looked at all the photos taken out on that ridge circa 1550 to 1555 myself. It seems perfectly obvious that even the ‘flame lengths’ of the fireline as it was approaching that two-track out there were probably at least TWICE as high as that little two-track was WIDE. Not a good scenario. That ‘Big Dog’ was EATING and was going to just LAUGH at the two-track when it finally reached it… dozer-pushed or not.
It was time to just watch the ‘Big Dog’ EAT.
>> Bob Powers also wrote…
>>
>> Dynamite would not have moved me from the black Safety Zone or Lightning
>> or all the threats in the world but that is me and that is the way I was trained.
If more details emerge about this supposed ‘argument’ between Marsh and Steed… we may discover that it was Marsh himself using ‘verbal dynamite’ to try and get Steed to do what HE ( Marsh ) wanted to do and something that was against Steed’s better judgement. Steed might have been thinking exactly like you would have… but somehow Marsh was able to get him to move, anyway.
It was Steed himself telling Marsh over the radio ( at 1555 ) “I copy… and it has ALMOST made it to that two-track road we walked in on”. That means Steed was telling Marsh that it was really only a matter of minutes before that two-track was going to ‘burn over’… and then just a finite ( short?) amount of time after that when it would be ‘all black’ and have cooled enough for them all to just walk back down the way they came up that day. Everybody goes home alive.
>> Bob Powers also wrote…
>>
>> I will say had Steed stood his ground and not moved we would not be in this
>> conversation or know each other at this time.
If we didn’t have the MacKenzie videos and photos… it would still be a total mystery where Steed himself and the crew themselves were at 1555.
But we DO have that non-debatable photographic evidence. ( Thanks to Christopher, may he Rest in Peace ).
Regardless of where Marsh really was… the scenarios ALL point to it being Marsh as the one who had to convince Steed to ignore all the various SAFE options… and go for the RISKY one.
If Marsh wanted to come charging into Glen Ilah like Captain America…. he was free to do that all by himself. He had been ‘floating around’ by himself all day, anyway.
If he wanted the entire Granite Mountain team to come charging in like the cavalry that day… then Marsh had to convince Steed to ‘move them’. from where they were.
It looks like Marsh wanted ( and accomplished ) the latter… not the former.
>> Bob Powers also said…
>>
>> With out knowing the exact words in the report I can say Marsh used his
>> authority to get Steed to move the crew down to the Ranch. That is why
>> they picked up and moved so fast at the end of the Radio conversation.
I think I hear you saying that, in the end, it wasn’t any of the ‘negotiating’ or ‘be nice’ skills that Duane Steinbrink and Darrell Wills had been teaching Marsh since 2005 that came into play.
Marsh just simply ORDERED Steed to “bring them down here right now”.
I really hope that doesn’t ( ultimately ) turn out to be what happened that day.
>> Bob Powers also said…
>>
>> I still think the crew was a little faster getting to the saddle than was
>> stated by the SAIT. That would explain them not seeing the fire movement
>> at 1620 the crew and Marsh were in the canyon blind to the Fire. That is the
>> only explanation that would keep the crew moving down rather than going
>> back to the black. The 1620 fire activity has never made any since to me as
>> why the crew would have continued off the saddle at that point and into
>> a brush filed canyon .
You may be right about ALL of that.
If Marsh really did ORDER Steed to ‘get them down here RIGHT NOW’… then they would have been making pretty good time on that first part of the hike. Maybe the initial hiking order from Steed was “ON THE DOUBLE, GUYS!” and that does explain the VERY abrupt end to the ‘picture taking’ session.
As the ADOSH panorama ( and some of the recent YouTube videos made from them ) show… they had a ‘good view’ out to the middle bowl for the entire initial hike… but if they missed that SAIT / ADOSH estimated 4:15 to 4:20 fireline progression… then they would have also missed the chance to see how FAST the fire was ‘picking up speed’ out there.
So it may be a matter of them going much FASTER to that ‘top of the saddle’ area than even the SAIT has said… but then getting ‘bogged down’ on the descent to a much worse degree than the SAIT also suggested.
They may have been almost literally CRAWLING down that drainage for that final descent to the place where they would die.
The question still remains… though.
WHERE was Marsh… and WHY was he either unable ( or unwilling? ) to notice the predicament they were getting into and ‘call them off’ before it was too late.
Marsh could not have been very far from the crew when Steed noted the flaming front. Marsh was to the crew quickly which means he saw the flames the same time as Steed. The major mistake no lookout watching the fire activity. Along with several other huge mistakes in situational awareness.
Reply to Bob Powers post on August 27, 2014 at 8:03 pm
>> Bob Powers said…
>>
>> Marsh could not have been very far from the crew when Steed
>> noted the flaming front.
Absolutely true. Since we first heard the ‘Helmet Cam’ audio… there has always been a TIME component and a RADIUS component involved there.
Draw a circle around the deployment site and given those 2 minutes it took for Marsh to appear on the radio saying “I’m here ( now ) with Granite Mountain”… the RADIUS of the furthest edge of the circle indicating where Marsh could have been only extends out but so far from the center in any direction.
>> Marsh was to the crew quickly which
>> means he saw the flames the same time as Steed.
Only if it was the PULL scenario ( Marsh out ahead even circa 1639 ).
In the PUSH scenario… with Marsh still behind them… then Steed had ‘point’ for that hike and Marsh might have only learned of the predicament when he, himself, heard Steed’s first MAYDAY going out on the A2G channel.
Maybe that’s why the PUSH scenario was just ‘assumed’ for so long.
Maybe the fact that it is Steed making the first MAYDAY call that seems to cause the ‘assumption’ that if he was the first one noticing that ‘flaming front’ coming right at them then he MUST have also been farther ahead than anyone else.
To assume that Marsh was up to 2 minutes AHEAD of Steed out there but it ends up being Steed being the first one to sense the danger and making the first MAYDAY call is almost a little harder to accept.
Maybe ( wherever Marsh really was ) it was, as you describe, a ‘simultaneous’ recognition… .or maybe even in those circumstances… Marsh himself didn’t feel the need to even call anyone until AFTER Steed had started doing so.
That actually still leaves a lingering ( big ) question.
Who DECIDED to call Air Attack in the first place?
They had obviously already realized their predicament, decided to deploy, found a place to deploy, got people assembled there, decided it needed to be ‘improved’ ASAP, got at least 2 sawyers to pull the ropes on their saws and get to work… and only THEN do we hear the first radio call from Steed.
Did Steed make that decision to call ‘Air Attack’ himself… or was Marsh already there and TOLD him to do that while Marsh himself remained busy directing the improvement of the deployment site and starting the burnout operations.
Still all part of the mystery of what really happened out there.
>> Bob Powers also said…
>>
>> The major mistake no lookout watching the fire activity.
>> Along with several other huge mistakes in situational awareness.
I think what we are establishing here is that even in the PULL scenario… Marsh could NOT have been acting as ‘forward lookout’ or could have had much better ‘eyes on the fire’ at 1639 than Steed did… or the tragedy might have been averted.
That establishes some pretty tight ‘guidelines’ for even the ‘Get them down here right now” ORDER that possibly came from Marsh circa 1555.
It means that Marsh might not have even started his own descent into the canyon at 1555 and got severely ‘bogged down’ himself as he decided to drop into the canyon still marking bushes with pink tape.
It would mean that the possible ORDER from Marsh came as he was still standing at the top of the saddle and putting some pink tape there at the point where he wanted Steed to leave the two-track.
In other words… Marsh made the final decision they were going down into the canyon WITHOUT actually ever having gone down into it himself.
He simply ‘saw the ranch’… decided it was reachable… and then called Steed and said “get ’em down here… we’re gonna do this.”
Somehow… someway ( however it really went down ) any scenario has to account for that predictable RADIUS that puts Marsh still within 2 minutes of a wild run away from Steed at 1639.
WTK
How do you conclude that Marsh was only a 2 minute wild run from Steed and GM? Do you think Marsh only started moving towards GM after Steed makes the “we are in front of a flaming front” call?
At 1639, Marsh reports that “our escape route has been cut off” It seems to be assumed that the first time Steed sees the fire, he calls in with “we are in front of a flaming front” At the beginning of the helmet cam video, B33 is in mid conversation concerning the valley and doing the “best we can”, before Steed radios in the mayday call.
I am not sure we will ever know at what point Marsh, or GM knew of the trouble they would soon be facing. But I believe it was before the mayday call from Steed. The Papich photos seem to support that GM had visibility of the fire before the call from Steed.
Follow up to my comment.
When the helmet cam video starts, it is undeniable that B33 and the Prescott crew with the go pro are aware of what is going on.
The 3 Prescott guys have made it out f their trucks and one has actually turned on his helmet camera, and when he pans around they (the other 2) appear to be standing at ease. So it appears that you could add additional time onto the known amount of time that GM/ Marsh knew they were in trouble, and also add that amount of time to Marsh’s mad dash toward the crew.
I also think the fact that Marsh announces their escape route has been cut off means that the fire has progressed across their intended (scouted?) route, and not just coming into view or around the corner (little round top?)
After listening to the helmet cam video a few times today a
few things come to mind.
1. Who is B33 talking to when the video begins?
2. Is that Musser at the (app.) 30 second mark?
2. It seems that B33 is pretty sure of the location of GM. He asks directly if they are on the south side of the fire. He verbalizes a VLAT, the heavies, and several aircraft are coming but never asks where they are? He does say the helicopters are going to have a hard time seeing you, but doesn’t voice hesitation concerning their location.
Reply to calvin post on August 28, 2014 at 4:37 pm
>> calvin said…
>>
>> Follow up to my comment.
>>
>> When the helmet cam video starts, it is undeniable
>> that B33 and the Prescott crew with the go pro
>> are aware of what is going on.
Well… I’m not sure I’d push it into the ‘undeniable’ category yet but YES… it sure as hell looks and sounds like they did… or at least Aaron Hulburd did and that’s why he was switching on his Helmet Camera for the first ( and only? ) time that day.
Just a few seconds into the Helmet Cam and right after Steed’s first MAYDAY at +13 seconds… one of the 3 Prescott off-the-radar hires other than Aaron Hulburd is heard asking “Is Granite Mountain still in there?”. It was probably KC ‘Bucky’ Yowell. Didn’t sound like Jason Clawson.
So even though they had already heard Steed’s first MAYDAY… at least one of them didn’t have a clue where they were or what this new radio traffic was all about.
That doesn’t mean the other 2 didn’t know at that point or that it wasn’t obvious by then that ‘something was wrong’. It just means that ONE of them ( the one asking if GM was still ‘in there’ ) was totally confused at that point.
>> calvin also said…
>>
>> The 3 Prescott guys have made it out f their trucks
>> and one has actually turned on his helmet camera,
>> and when he pans around they (the other 2) appear
>> to be standing at ease. So it appears that you could
>> add additional time onto the known amount of time
>> that GM/ Marsh knew they were in trouble, and
>> also add that amount of time to Marsh’s mad dash
>> toward the crew.
Yes… but I think the evidence that GM had already announced they were ‘in trouble’ is stronger in the testimony from Blue Ridge that they FIRST heard something like that on the TAC 1 radio channel BEFORE anything started showing up on the Air-To-Ground Channel 16… AND the fact that we might be hearing Burfiend telling someone at the very start of that Helmet Cam video that even he was already aware that GM was in trouble and his reference to “Not sure what we can do with that valley and all the smoke but we’ll do the best we can” was Burfiend telling this other someone they already KNEW some crew was ‘in trouble’ and ‘out in that valley’ somewhere.
NOTE: This ‘other someone’ that Burfiend is talking to at the start of the Helmet Cam has actually always been ASSUMED to be Structure Protection Group 1 Supervisor Gary Cordes.
The reason for that assumption is that Burfiend clearly ENDS that initial transmission in the video with “Break, Structure 1, Bravo 33, on Air-To-Ground”.
That’s radio lingo for “This is Bravo 33 ending my conversation with Structure 1”.
That still doesn’t mean that the conversation was NOT about Granite Mountain and their predicament. Burfiend MIGHT have been talking to SPGS1 Cordes at that moment but the conversation might still have been about Granite Mountain.
Maybe Cordes heard that same initial MAYDAY that Blue Ridge reports hearing on TAC 1 and it was SPGS1 Gary Cordes that immediately got on the horn with Burfiend in B33 and was already asking him if there was anything he could do about the situation.
The possibility that it was no coincidence whatsoever that Aaron Hulburd switched his Helmet-Cam on at the moment he did and it was because he ALREADY knew something *important* was now happening is just ‘additional’ possible proof that Marsh / Steed were very much aware of the trouble they were in before 1639… and that they HAD made some kind of transmission on TAC 1 before trying the Air-To-Ground frequency.
So YES… anything that puts Marsh / Steed realizing their predicament BEFORE Steed’s first actual radio call at 1639 obviously adds TIME to any theory about what was actually happening out there in that box canyon.
Keep in mind, though, that anything that adds TIME there also adds TIME to the possibility of them doing a ‘full reverse’ and getting the hell out of there and back up that ridge.
One ‘ascent’ study we had here ourselves, based on the official Canadian study of how fast FFs can climb certain slopes actually showed that under ideal conditions ( sustained rate of travel and no one falling down )… they might have only needed another 80 seconds in there somewhere ( even based on all the SAIR time estimates ) to have made it back up and OVER that ridge.
>> calvin also said…
>>
>> I also think the fact that Marsh announces their escape
>> route has been cut off means that the fire has
>> progressed across their intended (scouted?) route,
>> and not just coming into view or around the corner
>> (little round top?)
I don’t think the photographic evidence would support that… not even the 4:35 PM Papich photos. That’s just 240 seconds before Steed’s first MAYDAY.
I am not saying the SAIR / ADOSH estimated firelines are correct either. We STILL don’t know exactly how THEY came up with some of those specific estimates… but I don’t think the fire could have been all the way between them and the BSR at the moment Steed sent his first MAYDAY.
In other words… I am sure their perception was that they were ‘cut off’… but I don’t think the fire had, in fact, physically ‘crossed their intended’ path just yet.
>> calvin also said…
>>
>> After listening to the helmet cam video a few times
>> today a few things come to mind.
>>
>> 1. Who is B33 talking to when the video begins?
See above.
The assumption has always been SPGS1 Gary Cordes because Burfiend clearly ends that transmission with “Break, Structure 1, Bravo 33 on Air-To-Ground” and that is just radio lingo for “This is Bravo 33 ENDING my conversation with Structure 1 on the Air-To-Ground channel”.
If Burfiend was NOT actually just talking to ‘Structure 1’… then it’s a pretty short list of other candidates
It would had to have been someone in a command position on the SOUTH end of the fire who would have been authorized to even be directly ASKING Bravo 33 to do anything… and also someone who would have known what ‘valley’ Burfiend was referring to at that time.
>> calvin also said…
>>
>> 2. Is that Musser at the (app.) 30 second mark?
At +30… that is OPS1 Todd Abel asking Bravo 33 if they ‘copied’ that first MAYDAY from Jesse Steed.
However… I AM hearing Paul Musser in there at +38.
Musser is trying to raise someone on the radio and the first ‘call sign’ ( the person he is calling ) is cut-off in the video by Robert Caldwell’s own “How do you read?” transmission up to Bravo 33. The only part of that first call-sign from Musser that is left seems to suggest he was saying FIVE, or something like that.
However… the second part of his callout where he identifies himself as the ‘caller’ is clearly “Operations”. It definitely SOUNDS like Musser’s voice and that would match him identifying himself as ‘Operations’.
NOTE: This second call-sign of ‘Operations’ captured there in the video at +38 has always been documented as being there in the official transcript released with the Helmet-Cam video.
>> calvin also said…
>>
>> 2. It seems that B33 is pretty sure of the location of GM.
I’m not sure why you would assume that, really.
>> calvin also said…
>>
>> He asks directly if they are on the south side of the fire.
Yes, he does… but still not sure what makes you think that is proof he was ‘pretty sure of their location’ prior to him asking that.
I believe any assumptions on Burfiend’s part that the caller was ‘on the south side of the fire’ at that point goes back to the initial MAYDAY call of “We are in FRONT of the flaming front”.
Burfiend heard that… and that certainly didn’t mean anyone was on the NORTH side of the fire, at that time. The only good guess at that time about someone being “in front of the flaming front” would be that they were, in fact, somewhere on the SOUTH side of the fire at that moment.
>> calvin also said…
>>
>> He verbalizes a VLAT, the heavies, and several
>> aircraft are coming but never asks where they are?
It is still amazing how much time Burfiend WASTED just ignoring all those radio calls ( for 2 minutes ) when that was plenty of time to get an exact fix on their location… but it is equally amazing that once Marsh was asked directly where they were… over a clear and strong radio connection… he also didn’t give more information than just his “Affirm” to that vague guess by Burfiend of “So… you’re on the south side of the fire, then?”.
Totally ‘missed opportunity” on the part of BOTH of those men that day.
>> calvin also said…
>>
>> He does say the helicopters are going to have
>> a hard time seeing you, but doesn’t voice hesitation
>> concerning their location.
Yes… it is rather odd that even though Marsh only gave him an ‘Affirm’ to his “So… you’re on the south side of the fire, then?” guesstimate… that Burfiend wasn’t coming right back with “Copy your Affirm… but WHERE, exactly, are you?”.
At that point… I guess even Burfiend knew that unless he could get a visual on them… there wasn’t going to be anything he could do… and the ‘south side of the fire’ general location was enough for him to go on while he tried to obtain that VISUAL that he desperately needed.
Something tells me that even at that point… Burfiend was going ‘by the book’ but already knew that if they were, indeed, being entrapped on that ‘south side of the fire’ there really wasn’t anything he was going to be able to do. Not at THAT time. Not with the way that smoke column was ‘laying over’ and filling that entire area down there.
Followup…
Don’t forget about the ‘slash across the throat’ gesture from French over to Musser as soon as Marsh did his ‘Affirm’ of them being “on the south side of the fire”.
What that means is that the moment the guy in the airplane knew that someone was deploying anywhere there on the ‘south side of the fire’… he could tell from what he was seeing out his window that they were most probably ‘goners’… and there wasn’t going to be anything they were going to be able to do about it.
Another followup…
Even though that conversation at the start of the Helmet-Cam ( and before Steed’s first MAYDAY ) clearly ends with Burfiend saying “Break, Structure one, Bravo 33, on Air-To-Ground”… and that means Burfiend was officially ending his current conversation with SPGS1 Gary Cordes…
Gary Cordes himself says NOTHING about this conversation with Burfiend in his ADOSH interview.
It that really was Gary Cordes already realizing Granite Mountain was in trouble ‘out there’ ( because he had heard the same initial TAC 1 transmission that the Blue Ridge notes seem to say happened before the A2G calls ) and we are hearing Gary Cordes himself already asking Burfiend if there is anything Air Support can do about the situation…
…you would think Gary Cordes would have mentioned this little ‘event’ to ADOSH investigators.
He didn’t. Not one word. Zero. Zip. Nada.
B33 was Breaking with some one else and calling structure one.
Like—-Bla bla bla 10-4 break. Structure one Bravo 33
on air to ground. That is always used to switch to another contact. Also some times is— Break WITH Structure one.— DIV-? bravo 33 on air to ground. You are breaking with one contact to contact another.
Copy that… I think it appeared ( at first ) as if it WAS the ‘formal’ kind of ‘break’ and you also say who you are breaking WITH ( and off of what channel )… but now that doesn’t appear to be the case.
As Calvin pointed out… Gary Cordes supposedly lost his ability to ‘transmit’ on the A2G channel before this conversation… so it really couldn’t have been ‘B33 talking with Structure 1 on Air-To-Ground’.
That means what Burfiend says IS, in fact, a ‘break with whoever else he was just ‘reporting’ to ( Abel? Musser? ) and then ( for some reasons ) he needed to then speak RIGHT AWAY with SPGS1 Gary Cordes.
According to Cordes… the A2G channel in use that day wasn’t even programmed into his Motorola Unit at all so he probably didn’t even hear Burfiend’s attempt to talk to him mere seconds before Steed’s first MAYDAY.
The primary reason I assume B33 knew the location for GM is because he ” assumed correctly” that they were on the south side. There were other flaming fronts at this time on the East side of the fire. Another appropriate guess would have been “So you are on the EAST side of the fire”.
After Marsh affirms that they are on the south side, B33 repeatedly announces help is on the way. He never once seems unsure of their location or does he follow up with any questions concerning their location. And it appears that he thinks the helicopters are going to get really close, and asks Marsh to listen for them.
A couple of thoughts:
WTKTT, the word ‘BREAK’ in a radio conversation ends THAT conversation,… period. Anything spoken AFTER that word, is a new conversation, spoken to a new party.
Calvin, ‘our escape route has been cut off (or compromised), simply means the fire is already burning it up, OR, that by our observation, ‘by the time we get to that crossing, the train is going to beat us there’.
RE: BREAK
Ah… OK… Thank you ( Copy that )
I thought that all had been settled some time ago… that Burfiend might have been using a more formal ‘break’ where you DO specify WHICH conversation you are actually ‘breaking’ out of so there is no confusion. I guess that wasn’t the case here.
So scratch what I said above about any kind of assumption that Burfiend was reporting to Cordes at the start of that Helmet-Cam video.
It had to be someone else. Maybe Musser. Maybe Abel.
Calvin is also right to remind that Cordes had, in fact, supposedly lost his ability to transmit on A2G before this timeframe.
Ok. So it appears that B33 was NOT speaking with /to Cordes (SPGS1) at the beginning of the helmet cam.
Why would B33 then callout to SPGS1 immediately following the partial conversation we hear?
The partial conversation at the beginning of the helmet cam video is concerning Granite Mountain. While we do not know 100%, the evidence strongly suggests that.
Following that conversation, B33 immediately calls to SPGS1. SPGS1 was on the south side of the fire and ultimately admitted to knowing GM’s location. SPGS1 was not the direct supervisor of DIVA., right?Why would B33 want to contact Cordes?
The Prescott 3 pulled their trucks to a stop and got out and started videoing with the helmet cam because of what was being transmitted over air to ground, and possibly other channels.
I really find it interesting that Abel, and Musser (Operations) are heard at the beginning of the helmet cam video, but B33 wanted /needed to talk to SPGS1.
Reply to calvin post on August 28, 2014 at 2:30 am
>> calvin said…
>>
>> WTK… How do you conclude that Marsh was only a 2
>> minute wild run from Steed and GM?
Well… At +13 seconds in the Helmet-Cam video is when Steed starts his first MAYDAY call saying “We are in front of the flaming front”. That transmission ends at +19 into the video.
At +2:11 into the video the the first moment we hear Eric Marsh coming on the radio saying he is “With Granite Mountain”.
So that’s just 1 minute and 58 seconds between the start of Jesse’s first MAYDAY and Eric appearing on the radio ( or 1 minute 52 seconds from the END of Jesse’s first MAYDAY ).
So I’ve always been just calling it ‘2 minutes’ between Jesse’s first MAYDAY and when Eric comes on the radio.
Eric DOES sound ‘out of breath’ when he comes on the radio.. but not all that bad. It would tend to indicate he had come ‘running’ towards Steed when he heard that first MAYDAY, but any number of other scenarios have always been possible as well.
Examples…
1) Marsh could have been very much aware of the emergency before Steed ever gets on the radio and could have already been ‘running’ towards him even prior to 1639.
2) Marsh might have already been right there the whole time and he, himself, was already organizing the clearing of the deployment site and the ‘burnout’… and Marsh simply just TOLD Steed ( face-to-face ) to call Air Attack. Marsh might have been busy continuing to organize the site improvement and burnout for the entire 2 minutes we hear Steed AND Caldwell trying to raise Air Attack. They were getting nowhere… so Marsh might have then stopped what he was doing and took over the attempts to contact Air Attack as ‘DIVSA’ since Steed and Caldwell weren’t having any luck getting Burfiend to responds to call sign ‘Granite Mountain 7’.
Probably other scenarios have always been possible here as well.
>> calvin also said…
>>
>> Do you think Marsh only started moving towards GM
>> after Steed makes the “we are in front of a flaming front” call?
Well… yes… but ONLY when my mind is tending to favor the PUSH scenario that puts Marsh WEST of Steed and either at the end of the single-file line of men or even still ‘catching up’ to them.
In the PUSH scenario… Marsh would have been even more blind than Steed at 1639 and Steed’s first MAYDAY might have been the first time Marsh even realized there was ‘trouble up ahead’.
In the PULL scenario… with Marsh EAST of Steed and even closer to the Boulder Springs Ranch… I am not really sure WHAT to think.
That scenario seems to imply that Marsh MUST have seen the same ‘flaming front’ BEFORE Steed did… but then why was there no radio traffic?
Marsh COULD have been running BACKWARDS at that point when Steed decided to make that first MAYDAY… but something still really bothers me about any scenario where Marsh might have been farther EAST than Steed… and yet those men still had to find out they were in deep shit by themselves.
Something is still not ‘adding up’ for me in the PULL scenario
and having to explain the Helmet-Cam traffic and the timing there.
>> calvin also said…
>>
>> At 1639, Marsh reports that “our escape route has been
>> cut off” It seems to be assumed that the first time
>> Steed sees the fire, he calls in with “we are in front
>> of a flaming front”
That “out escape route has been cut off” statement from Steed at 1639 has always been a mystery and it remains so ( in my opinion ).
Even the SAIT’s own 1640 fireline progression estimate does NOT support that statement. The fireline was NOT actually ‘bewteen’ them and the BSR at that point. It was coming in from the NORTH and entering the box canyon… yes… but their direct path to the Ranch had not been ‘cut off’.
Truth is… if there had been nothing but flat ground and no brush for those final 640 yards… these men COULD have still taken off hauling ass at 1639 and been able to cover those final 640 yards to the Ranch in time to still be alive today.
So, technically speaking, “our escape route has been cut off” was not totally accurate at 1639. It most certainly was Steed’s *perception* at that moment… but not altogether (technically) true.
>> calvin also said…
>>
>> At the beginning of the helmet cam video, B33 is in mid
>> conversation concerning the valley and doing the
>> “best we can”, before Steed radios in the mayday call.
Yes… and it has ALWAYS been possible that what we are hearing there is Burfiend already being aware that the men are ‘in trouble’ out there ‘in that valley with the smoke’ and he is actually telling someone they are already planning on trying to do something about ‘Granite Mountain’ but it’s going to be (quote) “tough because of that valley and all the smoke”.
>> calvin also said…
>>
>> I am not sure we will ever know at what point Marsh,
>> or GM knew of the trouble they would soon be facing.
>> But I believe it was before the mayday call from Steed.
There has always been that bit of testimony in the Blue Ridge Notes that they FIRST heard Steed ( or Marsh ) issuing some kind of MAYDAY call over the TAC 1 radio channel… BEFORE any of that Channel 16 Air-To-Ground traffic started.
I have always thought THAT might be the reason that Aaron Hulburd suddenly reached up and turned on his Helmet Camera.
There has never been a good explanation WHY Hulburd chose that one moment in time to suddenly start recording video and audio with his Helmet Camera that ( supposedly ) one and only time that day. SOMETHING made him chose that moment to turn that camera on.
NONE of the Prescott off-the-radar hires ( Hulburd, Clawson, or Yowell ) have ever been interviewed, as far as we know.
Combine the testimony about the TAC 1 transmission BEFORE any of the Air-To-Ground traffic with what we actually hear Bravo 33 saying at the start of the Helmet-Cam video PLUS the decision by Hulburd to activate his Helmet-Cam at the moment he did…
…and a VERY good case could be made that everyone WAS aware GM was in trouble BEFORE the Helmet-Cam video ever starts.
>> calvin also said…
>>
>> The Papich photos seem to support that GM had visibility
>> of the fire before the call from Steed.
There are now all kinds of photos that support that.
They SHOULD have been able to see a LOT… .even during their descent.
Followup to above…
Forgot to mention… it really is pretty clear WHO Burfiend was talking to at the very start of the Helmet Cam video.
It appears to definitely have been SPGS1 Gary Cordes.
He is telling someone that other ( air ) resources are entering the area and that they will do the “best they can” ( about something specific? ) given that valley and “all the smoke out there”… and then he ENDS his conversation with…
“Break, Structure one, Bravo 33, on Air-To-Ground”.
Radio lingo for…
“This is Bravo 33 ENDING my current conversation with Structure One on the Air-To-Ground channel”.
That doesn’t mean for one second that the actual conversation might not have been ABOUT Granite Mountain and that Cordes was already aware of their predicament and had already called B33 to ask them if there was anything they were going to be able to do about it.
Maybe it was. Maybe it wasn’t.
SPGS1 Gary Cordes makes no mention whatsoever in his ADOSH interview of this conversation with Burfiend just seconds before Steed’s first MAYDAY hit the radio.
I thought Cordes lost the Air to ground channel prior to deployment?
My interpretation of that callout is . BREAK… as in end of prior conversation followed by a callout from B33 to SPG1 (Cordes)
Cordes doesn’t answer
That is correct
I agree as well. Scratch whatever I said above about ‘assuming’ it was Cordes just because of how Burfiend ends that transmission.
It most likely WAS the end of a ‘report’ by Burfiend to someone else ( Who? Abel? Musser? ) and then ( for some reason ) Burfiend wanted to talk to Gary Cordes immediately after that.
Maybe the part of the conversation that was not recorded was someone ( Abel? Musser? ) ASKING Burfiend to get in touch with Cordes right away because he might know more about this ‘ranch’ thing and/or where GM might really be.
This is a really muddled picture right now. However, in order to understand how Marsh saw things that afternoon, knowing where he was at an given moment really is important. If there was a GPS, it would reveal a lot I am sure. There is a lot we do not know about this supposed argument, and it would be easy to assume things that might not be the case. Remember Musser’s “request” – and I am not sure we yet have the full story on that. Not sure why this tape would come out at trial – the plaintiffs are suing Arizona Forestry and CYFD, not Eric Marsh’s estate or employer. The defense might want to get ahold of it. Seriously, if Marsh ordered his men to move over the strong objections of his captain and possibly crew bosses, that would be just awful for the families to deal with. We do not yet know this to be the case although we do not know it isn’t either.
Reply to mike post on August 27, 2014 at 11:06 pm
>> mike said…
>>
>> This is a really muddled picture right now.
It always has been… thanks to Arizona Forestry.
The opportunity to do the best job possible of finding out EXACTLY what happened out there that day was right after it happened.
>> mike also said…
>>
>> However, in order to understand how Marsh saw things that
>> afternoon, knowing where he was at an given moment really
>> is important.
Yes. It is.
We still haven’t heard enough from the mysterious Mr. Rory Collins.
He didn’t leave the fire until 1558 ( that is even AFTER Christopher MacKenzie’s videos and the now supposed ‘Gaggle up right now’ moment at 1555 and not 1604 like the SAIR thought ).
Did Rory Collins SEE Marsh down there… scouting ahead… at any time after 1542 when Collins was still ‘circling’ around that area?
Where did Bravo 33 actually SEE the men when Todd Abel asked them to go check on them in the 1610 to 1615 timeframe?
Were they really still ‘in the safe black’… even that late?… or were they already standing at the top of the saddle above the box canyon?
Did Bravo 33 see Marsh when they did they ‘check’ for Abel?
>> mike also said…
>>
>> If there was a GPS, it would reveal a lot I am sure.
There is no IF about it. There WAS at least one GPS out there.
It was that Oregon 450 Unit clipped right there to Robert Caldwell’s pack strap that Calvin found ‘hiding in plain sight’ in a photograph taken that very morning.
Marsh listed GPS exptertise on even his application for a job with the Prescott Fire Department.
Brendan McDonough told ADOSH they normally have at least 4 handheld GPS units ‘out there with them’.
If there was even just ONE more handheld GPS out there that day in addition to the KNOWN Orgegon 450 Unit attached to Caldwell… then it was probably Eric Marsh who had it.
WHERE is Caldwell’s Oregon 450?
WHERE is Marsh’s GPS Unit ( if he had one )?
WHERE are the other TWO units Brendan says should have been out there?
>> mike also said…
>>
>> There is a lot we do not know about this supposed argument,
>> and it would be easy to assume things that might not be the case.
Of course… but between Mike Dudley’s public admission that even the SAIT was told about it early on… and now the supposed attempt by someone to get more information about it out into the public arena… my money says it happened… and an ‘argument’ is an ‘argument’.
That means someone wanted someone to do something the other someone didn’t want to do… and they were ARGUING.
We know who those ‘someones’ probably were… and what they were probably arguing about. Sometimes you CAN assume some things until more evidence shows up.
>> mike also said…
>>
>> Remember Musser’s “request” – and I am not sure we yet have
>> the full story on that.
Yes… but we also have to remember Marsh’s response ( at 1542 ).
I now believe that the timing was such here that Marsh had his conversation with Musser just seconds BEFORE Frisby was finally able to raise Marsh on the GM intra-crew and tell Marsh that he wasn’t going to make the face-to-face meeting Marsh requested.
If that is true… then I believe Marsh told Musser he ( and GM ) were still “committed to the ridge” ( Marsh never said “committed to the BLACK” ) only because he was standing up there expecting Frisby to show up at any moment for the ‘face-to-face’ he had requested.
The moment Marsh heard Frisby say he wasn’t coming… it was then all about getting the hell out of there.
Maybe Musser’s call that seemed to say “We could use you guys down here” was ringing in his ears… maybe not.
>> mike also wrote…
>>
>> Not sure why this tape would come out at trial – the plaintiffs
>> are suing Arizona Forestry and CYFD, not Eric Marsh’s estate
>> or employer.
For all intents and purposes… they ARE suing ‘Marsh’s employer’.
From the moment Granite Mountain was HIRED to work that fire… they were now ‘working’ for the Arizona State Forestry Department.
It was THEIR fire… and THEIR ‘workplace’ ( as ADOSH established ).
As it turns out… there IS a law on the books in the City of Prescott which basically says that even if an employee of the City of Prescott goes crazy and takes out a gun and makes 18 other guys walk directly into a fire while he is ‘on the job’… the City of Prescott cannot be held responsible for that employee’s actions.
THAT is why City of Prescott and PFD fell ‘off’ the list of defendants for the wrongful death lawsuits. The lawyer(s) for the families were just being honest with them and saying that would be a hard road to go even if they had a video of everything that happened that day.
However… not the same story for State of Arizona or Arizona Forestry.
While Eric Marsh, Jesse Steed, and the Granite Mountain Hotshots were working that Yarnell Fire and de-facto ’employees’ of the State of Arizona… there IS ‘liability’ involved for ‘their actions as employees of the State’..
So the importance of ‘the tape’ ( if it exists )… or the importance of ANY evidence that might show what REALLY happened that day… has to be viewed in that context.
>> mike also said…
>>
>> The defense might want to get ahold of it.
There are good reasons for BOTH sides of the courtroom to ‘get ahold of it’.
They BOTH have an interest in knowing what REALLY happened.
One of the most interesting things ( if this really ever does go to trial ) will be who amongst the many, many witnesses that are going to be called to the stand can be considered a ‘hostile witness’ by either side.
It’s gonna be confusing in that regard alone.
>> mike also said…
>>
>> Seriously, if Marsh ordered his men to move over the strong
>> objections of his captain and possibly crew bosses, that would
>> be just awful for the families to deal with.
Maybe. Maybe not.
ALL of the families involved in the wrongful death suits have ALL said the same thing at this point.
No matter what else happens… they want to know the TRUTH.
>> mike also said…
>>
>> We do not yet know this to be the case although we do not
>> know it isn’t either.
And the beat goes on…
“Oh what a tangled web we weave… when first we practice to deceive”.
I hope the ‘web’ eventually gets ‘untangled’.
I was only bringing up Musser as an example of something we heard and thought was true, and then the “truth” changed a lot when more facts were released. Not prejudging anything, but I think AZ Forestry really would like to portray Marsh as the driving force behind this – his idea, his motivation, his insistence. Maybe these are all true, but if they are, “defacto employee” or not, I tend to think they will have a really good defense. They would argue that nothing they had done had put the GMHS in any danger, and then Marsh, even against the advice and wishes of his crew, forced them to move and then get killed. I am not a lawyer, but pushing liability for that onto AZ Forestry seems to be a reach.
Reply to mike post on August 28, 2014 at 6:02 am
>> mike said…
>>
>> I was only bringing up Musser as an example of
>> something we heard and thought was true, and then
>> the “truth” changed a lot when more facts were released.
I am still not sure the full word ‘truth’ can be applied to the Musser situation because ( as you also said above ) “we still don’t have the full story on that”. What ADOSH published was just a HYBRID of two different accounts ( Abel’s and Musser’s ) and neither of those ‘storys’ have been backed up by testimony from any of the many people who must have also heard Musser’s 1542 conversation with Marsh.
It’s still sort of amazing to me that we ( and others ) have spent countless hours just trying to hear some things in some background radio conversations ( like finding Musser’s actual radio call directly to DIVSA at 1542 )… yet it seems no one really bothered to interview the people that were STANDING there and hearing the conversations themselves.
Eric Panebaker himself was never really ‘interviewed’ by anyone.
Granted… it wasn’t his job to be monitoring radio traffic… but we also know he was listening intently most of the day. His own ‘Unit Log’ from that day does recall certain specific transmissions and he even wrote down the call sign. Panebaker was sure about the time he heard Marsh’s report to Todd Abel about the fire blowing through the retardant line and he recorded both the time and Marsh’s call sign ( Division Alpha ) accurately in his Unit Log.
So for some of these other radio transmissions that are obviously present in the background of Panebaker’s own videos ( like the 1542 callout from Musser to DIVSA )… what ELSE did Eric Panebaker hear?
The Panebaker video that captures Paul Musser calling directly to Marsh is only 24 seconds long and it cuts off before Marsh even responds to Musser… but Eric Panebaker was still standing right there with the radio on the same channel.
Did Eric Panebaker himself hear what the actual conversation was between Musser and Marsh just a few seconds after that video ended?
I don’t think anyone has even bothered to ASK him ( yet ).
That’s just ONE example.
Perhaps Panebaker himself heard a LOT more that day or heard some of the transmissions that we KNOW took place but we struggle to hear over wind and microphone noise a LOT more clearly… complete with CALL SIGNS.
The minute those videos turned up… he ( and whoever else was standing with him at any time during the day ) SHOULD have been extensively interviewed. They should have been sitting with him and PLAYING the videos during the interview in case that would help him remember the parts of the conversations that were NOT actually captured in the videos themselves.
>> mike also said…
>>
>> Not prejudging anything, but I think AZ Forestry really
>> would like to portray Marsh as the driving force behind
>> this – his idea, his motivation, his insistence. Maybe
>> these are all true, but if they are, “defacto employee”
>> or not, I tend to think they will have a really good defense.
No one was hovering over those men in the helicopters with a machine gun pointed at them and yelling down… “Move to the ranch NOW or we will open fire.”
Even if it turns out there IS proof of someone who was not out there being the one to insist that they ‘come to town’… the move itself is on Eric Marsh and Jesse Steed alone.
That isn’t going to change.
So on a certain level… what you are wondering about above is already KNOWN to be true. It WAS most probably Eric Marsh’s ‘agenda’ that was the driving force behind the ‘move’ once the ‘move’ became ‘the plan’.
That doesn’t change the ‘liability’ issues for the State of Arizona in any way. We are still talking about the decisions made by employees of the State of Arizona ( albeit… 1099 and not W2 ) that led to the ‘wrongful deaths’ of 19 men.
>> mike also wrote…
>>
>> They would argue that nothing they had done had put
>> the GMHS in any danger, and then Marsh, even against
>> the advice and wishes of his crew, forced them to move
>> and then get killed.
See above. Still decisions being made by AZ State employees at the time they were being made. The liability still exists.
ADOSH ( Arizona’s own Occupational Safety and Hazards Agency ) has ALREADY concluded that was an ‘unsafe’ workplace with mis-placed priorities, less than complete and less than competent management in place, and insufficient resources to support plans put into place.
If the lawyers for the defendants still try to float the argument that “nothing anyone did put GMIHS ( or anyone else ) in DANGER that day”… the ship has already sailed on that.
ADOSH has already determined that EVERYONE was being ‘put in DANGER’ that day because of that ‘unsafe workplace’.
That includes the 6 men who also almost lost their lives in Harper Canyon… and many, many civilians who came close to dying as well.
It really is a miracle they weren’t hauling bodies out of that part of Arizona for DAYS following this incident.
>> mike also said…
>>
>> I am not a lawyer, but pushing liability for that onto
>> AZ Forestry seems to be a reach.
So… if either someone who works for an Airline calls out to one of the Airlines’ planes in flight and asks them to fly through a dangerous thunderstorm to make it to an airport they want them to land at ASAP… OR the pilot of that plane decides to take his crew and his passengers through that dangerous thunderstorm all by himself….
…and then the plane crashes and everyone dies…
Are you saying the Airline can just get onto NBC News and announce… “One of our pilots made a terrible decision… that’s not our fault”?
Same deal here.
Every family of every passenger that died in that plane crash would have a valid ‘wrongful death’ suit against the Airline that employed the pilot… regardless if he was 1099 and not W2 at the time of the crash and regardless of whether it could be proved one of the Airline’s other employees TOLD him to do it.
It wasn’t some impromptu gathering of firefighters in Yarnell that day. It was a WORKPLACE. That fire was being RUN by the ‘State of Arizona’… and EVERYONE who was there and getting paid for their time was an employee of the State of Arizona that day.
Several things:
First, the fact that other people might have died if largely irrelevant to the case of the GMHS – unless they want to argue they were pushed to move because others were at risk. It is the GMHS survivors suing, and the actions of AZ Forestry vis-à-vis the GMHS are all that is going to matter.
Second, I would not be so sure the airline analogy is applicable. AZ state law may have a lot to say on this matter. In addition, it was not like AZ Forestry turned over one of their planes to the GMHS. And hotshot crews have a tradition of some freedom of action and independent judgment, especially in matters of safety (the turn-down option etc).
I think a jury would look at the liability of AZ Forestry very differently between these 2 scenarios. First, someone with AZF suggested to Marsh that he move, and he ended up doing so. Yes, Marsh was responsible, but not really the driving force. Or second, he was told to stay put, and then proceeded to basically order his men to move. A jury I think would blame Marsh much more there, and would be less likely to say that AZ Forestry could have reasonably prevented that. Maybe AZ Forestry would be on the hook because they “hired” Marsh, but a jury might not go along with that and might award a lot less in the second instance, if anything at all.
Reply to mike post August 28, 2014 at 8:09 pm
All good points.
No… this wasn’t an actual airplane crash.
Whether the ’employer is always ultimately responsible for actions of employees’ rule will apply is going to be the entire essence of the litigation. I am not completely familiar with Arizona law but something tells me that if the State of Arizona had the same kind of ‘get out of responsibility free’ card that the City of Prescott seems to have… they would have played it by now.
Yes… it will be VERY important to establish whether the audio recording of Abel talking to Marsh constituted a ‘clear order’ or not. Abel was a 1099 contract employee for the State of Arizona that day just like Marsh was. If it can be established that the directive to ‘Hunker and be safe’ was a clear ORDER from one superior 1099 contractor to a subordinate… and the other 1099 contractor just ignored it and ended up killing people… well… now you have one 1099 contractor doing the ‘right’ thing by the State of Arizona and one 1099 contractor doing the absolute ‘wrong’ thing ( directly disobeying an order ).
I’m not sure how that will play with a jury.
Ultimately, though, the jury might be given some pretty strict guidelines that they will have to follow here.
They MIGHT be told that regardless of what any other AZ State employee did that day ( like Abel trying to do the RIGHT thing )… if they, the jury, find that ANY AZ State employee did the WRONG thing and subjected other employees to reckless endangerment… resulting in death… then they must STILL find for the plaintiffs and award accordingly.
Followup…
mike… this might constitute ‘more than you wanted to know’ but here is the actual ‘readers-digest’ version of what that ‘get out of responsibility free’ card really looks like for the City of Prescott… and why that same ‘get out of responsibility free’ card isn’t in the deck for the other plaintiffs named in the wrongful death suit(s).
Believe it or not… it all comes down to the rules and regs of ‘workers comp’ insurance and the inherent ‘statutory immunity’ clauses usually associated with that.
Just about anyone who ever employs anyone has full ‘workers comp’ insurance for those employees. That insurance includes ‘death benefits’ in case of work-related accidents.
NORMALLY… the buck stops there ( as far as the employer’s responsibility goes )… because the death benefits paid out by worker’s comp fall into the legal category called ‘exclusive remedy’.
In other words… we’re sorry the employee died… but we pay lots of money for our worker’s comp insurance and they, in turn, have paid out a death benefit that qualifies as an ‘exclusive remedy’… and so there is no more responsibility on our part.
In order to go anywhere beyond the ‘exclusive remedy’ provided by worker’s comp… and on to ‘wrongful death’ claims against the employer… plaintiffs have to prove that that it wasn’t just a ‘terrible accident’. There has to be evidence of ‘negligence’ ( willful or unwillful ) on the part of the employer.
In the case of Yarnell Hill… it was the ADOSH report itself that pretty much provided for this ‘next step’.
The ADOSH report DID find evidence of BOTH ‘willful’ and ‘unwillful’ negligence in that workplace known as the Yarnell Hill Fire.. .and they issued FINES for these infractions.
However… the ADOSH report did NOT find that the City of Prescott itself was involved in creating that ‘unsafe workplace’ that day. Well… they did ( kinda )… but not to same extent as Arizona Forestry.
So the attorneys for the families KNEW that was going to make it REALLY difficult to pursue ‘wrongful death” suits against the City of Prescott itself… since they still have their ‘statutory immunity’ in place because of ‘worker’s comp’ and the ‘exclusive remedy’ clause.
So they advised the families that it would not be likely that the City of Prescott could be held liable for the deaths of these employees of theirs to any extent beyond the ‘exclusive remedy’ already provided by worker’s comp.
That is ALSO why the SAIR report was so namby-pamby and refused to find any ‘wrongdoing’.
If they had… then they would have ALSO been supplying ‘independent testimony’ that there was more involved here than just a simple ‘accident’ fully covered by the ‘exclusive remedy’ clause of worker’s comp.
So it is the ADOSH report itself that gave the ‘green-light’ for these ‘wrongful death’ suits to proceed because enough evidence of ‘negligence’ was found to rise above the ‘exclusive remedy’ and ‘statutory immunity’ clauses of worker’s comp.
There is no doubt in anyone’s mind that at the time they died… all the members of Granite Mountain were technically employed by BOTH the City of Prescott AND the State of Arizona ( and were also subject to decisions being made by Central Yavapai County employees ).. but since only Arizona Forestry and Central Yavapai were being ‘cited’ in the ADOSH report for both ‘willfull’ and ‘unwillful’ negligence… it would have been tough to pursue anything beyond the ‘exclusive remedy’ worker’s comp coverage already provided by City of Prescott.
Does that make ANY sense at all?
For every ones benefit I had to first prove the possibility that Marsh could have been ahead of the crew to drop my undocumented evidence on this investigation.
I need and this investigation needed enough evidence to put marsh in front of the crew to make what I had been told plausible.
Had I just dropped the info on you guys with out any written facts I would have been hung out to dry and we would have never looked at the new possibility of marsh actually being in front and below the crew.
So we have put together a lot of circumstantial evidence to reach this new scenario
We will have to wait for the hidden evidence to show its self to justify what we now suspect.
If the person who posses the video would release it to John it would solve a lot of our searching and give a clearer picture of what happened that day. As WTKTT said no one can sue Prescott city or there employees so maybe we will see this evidence.
Reply to Bob Powers post on August 28, 2014 at 6:20 am
>> Bob Powers said…
>>
>> For every ones benefit I had to first prove the possibility
>> that Marsh could have been ahead of the crew to drop
>> my undocumented evidence on this investigation.
It has ALWAYS been a ‘possibility’.
As I have said before… I think the only reason(s) the theory that Marsh was BEHIND the crew had been the favored one for some time was because of the following ‘facts’ and ‘assumptions’.
1) Marsh was NOT with the crew in the 1550 to 1555 timeframe. He was ‘somewhere else’ and had to talk with Steed via radio. The MacKenzie videos prove that as fact… but ‘not with the crew’ could mean anything. He COULD have been farther NORTH and trying to ‘catch up’ to their location… or he COULD have already been farther SOUTH and going down to ‘check out’ the ‘predetermined escape route’.
2) Jesse Steed makes the first MAYDAY call at 1639. This just established an ‘assumption’ that Steed must have been the first one to see the fire as they descended towards the Ranch and that would mean Eric Marsh was BEHIND him somewhere and only heard about the emergency when he also heard Steed hit the radio.
3) Eric Marsh ‘appears’ on the radio at 2+ minutes into the MAYDAY calls and he sounds out of breath. That makes for the ‘assumption’ that he had RUN up to Steed as fast as possible when he heard Steed’s 1639 MAYDAY call. Combined with assumption (2) above… that also leads to the assumption Marsh was still ‘catching up’ to the men from behind circa 1639.
As I have also said before… the ONLY thing that would make the ‘PUSH’ scenario ( Marsh to the NORTH and telling Steed to go ahead and he would ‘catch up’ ) more plausible than the ‘PULL’ scenario ( Marsh ahead of Steed to the SOUTH and then, at some point, calling Steed and telling him to bring the crew south ) is some hard evidence that Marsh was so far NORTH ( and perhaps even up on the top of Weaver Mountain ) that he and Steed would have agreed it to be prudent if Steed took off SOUTH with the crew BEFORE Marsh reached their location and that Marsh would simply ‘catch up’ as fast as he could. Basically just a realization on their part that TIME was the enemy and even though that is not the way they normally do a ‘move’… there was no need under those circumstances for Steed to WAIT for Marsh to get there before taking the crew to the SOUTH.
There is no such ‘hard evidence’ of that scenario.
Indeed… the recently noticed testimony from Brendan McDonough that Eric Marsh seemed to be (quote) “Literally right above me” for most of the day would tend to indicate that the PUSH scenario is not plausible at all.
There is no point up on the ridge that would qualify as being ‘right above Brendan’ that day that wasn’t more than just a few minutes hike from the location where we see Steed and the crew circa 1550-1555 in all the photos and videos.
About the farthest point north on the ridge where Marsh could have been that would still qualify as being ‘right above’ Brendan’s lookout mound would be the Helispot itself where the Lewis DOC crew was flown out to the same anchor point the day before and then flown out that Sunday morning. It was still only about 1/4 mile north of that ‘resting location’ where we see Steed and the crew circa 1550-155.
>> Bob Powers also said…
>>
>> Had I just dropped the info on you guys with out any
>> written facts I would have been hung out to dry and
>> we would have never looked at the new possibility of
>> marsh actually being in front and below the crew.
Obviously I can only speak for myself… but that is nonsense.
If you had just come out and said “I got a phone call last night and someone is actually verifying what Mike Dudley said about there being an ‘argument’… but the ‘argument’ was with Steed still back at the anchor point and not down at the saddle”…
I would have believed you… and I would have still pointed out that all of that has always both ‘plausible’ and ‘possible’.
>> Bob Powers also said…
>>
>> We will have to wait for the hidden evidence to
>> show its self to justify what we now suspect.
I suppose so.
I wish someone would just come out and either FIRE anyone who was working the Yarnell Fire that day… OR… issue statements that no one who was there can possibly lose their frickin’ job just because they talk about what happened there.
BOTH of those scenarios would remove this stupid component of people being afraid to lose their jobs for talking about something they heard or witnessed ( or reveal they HAVE something that no one has seen yet… like… say… Caldwell’s Oregon 450 GPS unit? ).
If everyone is either already FIRED or already ‘CANNOT be FIRED’ then maybe people can just stop worrying about their damn job and just do the right thing… fer chrissakes.
WTKTT —My thoughts
I Think the statement might be in those that were almost totally blacked out as there were a few of those that we could not even know what had been said.
So those with the complete documents/copies may have the statement.
I am sure the Lawyers would have the full report.
Otherwise they just edited what they wanted to release and filed the rest.
There task was not to show fault on the fire fighters or overhead. so they were free to edit what they wanted. Glad the FS got away from this form of investigation.
It may just come back to haunt the investigators before it is all said and done.
Mr. Powers… if you are referring to some of those extensive blackouts in the individual Blue Ridge Hotshot unit logs that weren’t even released by the SAIT until February 27, 2014… I hear ya. Redacting a word here or a word there to prevent names, addresses or phone numbers from showing is one thing.
Redacting entire paragraphs of testimony is something else altogether.
It has never even been made clear WHO ( which agency ) did these redactions. Were the documents intact as they reached the SAIT ( from the feds ) and Arizona Forestry freaked out about what they contained… or were the redactions already in the documents as they arrived from the feds?
In other words… WHO felt they had the freedom and the right to just redact whatever the hell they wanted to without even following proper procedure and requesting exemption coverage for the larger redactions?
Also… if you are referring to those redacted Blue Ridge unit logs… did you just admit that you know this ‘friend’ of the person who called you is, in fact, a blue Ridge Hotshot?
No I do Not Know but BR is suspect biased on access to GM vehicles and there crew freq. only saying if it was a BR person that may be where there statement is in all the blackout areas. Just a suggestion as to where the testimony ended up. The only thing I was told was the person was on the fire and heard the crew net for GM and copied the radio traffic it was before they left the rest area if I did not make that clear.
It was also at the same time as the Video that was released So just before or just after, I think Ashcrafts video. at the rest site.
Reply to Bob Powers post on August 26, 2014 at 3:51 pm
>> Bob Powers said…
>>
>> No I do Not Know but BR is suspect biased on access to GM
>> vehicles and there crew freq. only saying if it was a BR person
>> that may be where there statement is in all the blackout areas.
>> Just a suggestion as to where the testimony ended up.
Copy that. Thank you. Yes… IF one of the reports about this ‘argument’ between Marsh and Steed was coming from a BR Hotshot… then it might be in one of those LARGE redactions in the Feburary 27, 2014 Blue Ridge Unit Logs. All of the MAJOR redactions in all of those unit logs ( sometimes entire paragraphs ) come at around the same ‘critical’ time(s)… like when this (supposed) ‘argument’ might have been heard over the radio and on into what these fellas heard shortly before and DURING the deployment.
>> Bob Powers also said…
>>
>> The only thing I was told was the person was on the fire and
>> heard the crew net for GM and copied the radio traffic it was
>> before they left the rest area if I did not make that clear.
I think you did, yes.
The (supposed) ‘argument’ was about whether to LEAVE that ‘rest area’ and the ‘safe black’ or not… unless I misunderstood what you were saying.
>:> Bob Powers also said…
>>
>> It was also at the same time as the Video that was released
>> So just before or just after, I think Ashcrafts video. at the rest site.
I was just wondering… though… based on what you were told was being said ( which I understand you won’t even try to repeat without more proof )… do you think the ‘discussing their options’ conversation we hear in the MacKenzie videos was part of the 4 ( FOUR ) separate radio calls you mentioned as part of this ‘argument’… or do you think the conversation in the MacKenzie video about “Marsh: I knew this was comin’… I could just feel it, ya know” and then “Steed: I copy… and it’s almost made it to that two track we walked in on” was an entire separate exchange either BEFORE or AFTER the ‘argument’.
The reason I ask is that I think the ‘PULL’ theory with Marsh out ahead of the crew and then trying to ‘convince’ Steed to ‘bring the men down here’. presents a new perspective on why Steed might have said “I copy… and it’s almost made it to that two track we walked in on.”
I still believe Calvin has always been right in that one of the only reasons Steed would feel the need to report that to Marsh over the intra-crew is because Steed knew Marsh was not in a good position to see that at the time he was reporting it.
In the ‘PULL’ theory… that would mean that Marsh was SOUTH of Steed at that point and MAY have been able to see that fireline just about to reach that ‘road that we walked in on’… but Steed simply wasn’t sure Marsh could see that with any clarity or not so that’s why he said what he said.
However… Steed’s MOTIVATION for saying that might have been a little different given the report(s) that at some point here they began ‘arguing’ about the ‘move’.
Steed might have ( and rightly so ) realized that ONE of their options at that time was to just LET the fireline overtake the ‘road we walked in on’ and then once it cooled a little just ‘walk back down the way we came’… even though they knew the vehicles had been moved.
So Steed might have been telling Marsh “It’s almost made it to that two-track road we walked in on” in support of HIS idea about just waiting a little bit and then walking back down the way they came up.
In other words… Steed might been ‘reminding’ Marsh, at that time, that this other ‘option’ they had of just heading down the way they came up once it was ‘black’ was about to become a very viable option.
Steed might have been reminding Marsh that it wasn’t going to take an HOUR to have that option. The fire had already ALMOST made it to that two-track they walked in on and it wouldn’t be long before that would become their ‘safest option’ for getting back to town.
If that was part of Steed ‘arguing’ for that option… obviously that didn’t fit with what Marsh wanted to do or that’s what they would have done that day.
Marsh obviously didn’t say “Well if it’s already that close to that two-track then just wait until it is ‘black’ and ‘safe’ to head down that two-track again and go back to town that way.” Marsh wanted to get ‘where the action was’ ASAP and waiting until the fire had simply passed over that two-track ( even if that only meant a 30 minute wait ) and then doing a long walk through the black BEHIND the fire wasn’t ‘cutting the cake’ for Marsh. That ‘option’ didn’t fit Marsh’s agenda that afternoon so he stayed in PULL mode and ended up convincing Steed to bring the men SOUTH instead.
Just a thought.
Here is a ‘followup’ thought to the other ‘thought’ above that maybe Steed was telling Marsh “I copy… and it’s almost made it to that two-track road that we walked in on” because he wanted to inform Marsh that HIS ‘favored option’ was to just WAIT until the fire burned over that road… and that it wasn’t going to take very long at that point.
Here is another ‘what if’ to go along with that ‘thought’.
That two-track road had been ‘dozer pushed’ pretty damn well that morning and on into the afternoon before the dozer was moved over to the Cutover Trail to ‘push’ that stretch of trail as well.
Hernandez and Ball had done a pretty good job of widening that east/west two-track all the way west to the old-grader itself. They had even ‘cleared’ all around that old-grader and supposedly well enough for Marsh and Steed to TELL Brendan that was his ‘safety zone’ from his lookout position.
The only reason Hernandez and Ball didn’t ‘keep pushing line’ to the west with the dozer is because just past the old-grader it started to get very rock, very steep, and the dozer had a 12 foot non-angled blade that proved inadequate for that final push to the west up to the existing black.
Anyway… what I am saying here is that the two-track that Steed and Crew had ‘walked in on’ that morning had been IMPROVED after they passed by on it. It was not WIDER and could supposedly have been considered a FIRE BREAK.
We can even see how WIDE it was after the ‘dozer push’ in Brendan McDonough’s photos that he took after Frisby dropped him off at Marsh’s Superintendent truck.
It wasn’t a 4-lane highway… fer sure… but it had certainly been ‘improved’ along its length from what it was even that morning when Steed and the Crew hiked out to the ridge on it.
Is it possible that when Steed told Marsh “It’s almost made it to that two-track road that we walked in on” that they really might have had all their fingers and toes crossed that this ‘improved’ two-track now qualified as a pretty good ‘fire break’ and it *MIGHT* have had a chance of stopping the advancing fireline that day?
What if Steed was WAITING to simply see if that was going to happen, or not?
Obviously that ‘improved’ east-west two-track didn’t stop the fire.
It was not ENOUGH of a ‘fire break’ to stop that south-advancing fireline out there that day… but in the minutes leading up to the fireline reaching that two-track, when Steed told Marsh “It’s almost made it to that two-track we walked in on”… they didn’t KNOW what was going to happen. Maybe they were still hoping it would stop some or all of the advancing fireline…. and Steed somehow wanted to stay right there where they were to see whether that was going to happen… or not.
That improved two-track MUST have had some effect.
Obviously flame lengths were such that it just ‘burned to the other side of the road’ when it reached that east/west two-track fire-break… but there’s never been any testimony from Air Attack ( or anyone else ) as to whether all that work they did with the dozer had any impact at all that day. Maybe it did… or maybe more people ( like Steed and/or Marsh? ) were HOPING it would and were ‘waiting to see what was going to happen’ around that time.
Bad ‘single word’ typo above that changed the meaning of a paragraph. I typed ‘not’ instead of ‘now’.
Paragraph above should have read like this…
“Anyway… what I am saying here is that the two-track that Steed and Crew had ‘walked in on’ that morning had been IMPROVED after they passed by on it. It was NOW WIDER and could supposedly have been considered a FIRE BREAK.”
You are very close to some of the facts.
Like Bring the crew down to the ranch NOW..
Which put Marsh below the crew in the statement I was given.
Some of the other catches you noted could be part of the 4 radio conversations.
Mr. Powers… I forgot to ask you directly above… but I’d really love to hear your opinion as a professional firefighter about the *possibility* that anyone up on that ridge that afternoon ( Steed, Marsh, anyone ) just *might* have been hoping that the ‘dozer line’ was going to have any effect on the approaching fire.
You’ve seen the MacKenzie photos and videos, including the very moment when Steed is telling Marsh “I copy… and it’s almost made it to that two-track road we walked in on”.
Forget what I said above for a moment about that statement from Steed being any kind of indication that he was favoring the ‘wait until the fire passes and go down the way we came’ option.
What I’d really love to hear is an opinion from a professional FF who has seen those MacKenzie photos and who also knows about the work that was done with the dozer on that two-track road all day.
The whole east/west two-track had already been ‘pushed’ and was no longer just a ‘wildland jeep trail’. It was cleared by a dozer from Brendan’s lookout mound all the way back east to the ‘Sesame area’.
Do you think even the possible ‘expectation’ that the cleared two-track was going to act as a ‘firebreak’ that afternoon factored into any of the decision making?
Do you think they ( Steed, Marsh, etc. ) had all their fingers and toes crossed that the ‘pushed’ dozer line might provide some ‘stoppage’ for parts of the fireline that day… or should it have been perfectly obvious to anyone with WFF experience that it was useless to even entertain that possibility even for one minute?
The Dozer line was dependent on how the fire hit it.
If it backed in it might have held. Indirect line with out backup help from fire fighters is suspect at best. I think it was part of the Firing out plan that never got completed. 1 or 2 blade cat line wasn’t going to hold a running fire and there was hand line above it to the black that was really suspect to any type of containment with out firing it out. The fire basically over ran the indirect lines because the plan to fire them out was not completed. In the burning conditions that afternoon there was no way that dozer line was going to hold flame lengths and spotting were very prevalent in those kind of conditions fires jump highways.
It was useless to entertain that possibility……
also the fie run into Glen Illa was out side the line and with the wind switch would have run back up on the opposite side of the cat line the fire had already compromised the cat line, jumped its containment lines. Indirect lines are only as good as the ability to enforce them.
Thank you. Exactly the kind of ‘professional opinion’ I was looking for about that.
So it’s pretty safe to assume that no one up on that ridge was ‘waiting to see what would happen’ with regards to the fireline reaching the east/west two-track.
They were professionals.
They knew it wasn’t going to stop anything.
Whatever the ‘discussions’ were over the radio circa 1542 to 1604… they most probably didn’t include any kind of “let’s wait and see how well the dozer line does before we decide to go anywhere” component.
That was the reason I asked.
It struck me that there might have been a possibility here that Steed and/or Marsh were NOT really sure that fireline was going to fully threaten Yarnell until they saw what might happen as it hit that dozer line.
If they had been entertaining any ‘hopes’ at all that the pushed dozer line might STOP all or part of that south-advancing fireline… then they might have been ‘wating’ to ‘see what was going to happen’ before fully committing to any ‘mission’ to try and get to town ahead of the fireline.
I guess that really isn’t’ possible.
The minute that fire turned and it blew through that retardant line ( as Marsh reported to Todd Abel at 1542 )… they knew that there was nothing that was going to stop it from reaching town.
So the ‘importance’ of them (perhaps) trying to get to town BEFORE the fire got there was ‘on their minds ( or at least… on Marsh’s mind ) even at 1542 and there was really no other ‘event’ to wait for to ‘see what might happen’.
Re the redactions etc.
(Sorry, I’ve had to invest my time/energy/focus elsewhere lately, and will continue to have to do so, but…..)
IIRC (and I don’t have time to go digging) the BR logs were written up around Tuesday night, under the auspices of the SAIT. So I don’t think the USFS would have redacted them before they were given to the SAIT.
The USFS (along with the BLM) didn’t formally “step in” until the ADOSH investigation. I’m sure their mindset involving “protecting employees” (for, historically speaking, IMHO, understandable reasons) was quite operative during the SAIT investigation. But I doubt they were “redacting” things during the SAIT deliberations.
Which means the SAIT read those logs etc un-redacted. They knew what was in them. And, if Bob Powers’ source is correct, they have a video. Which means Dudley knows the evidence. But, then, the SAIT has called other things we now know are documented “unable to be substantiated.”
I don’t know who redacted them. But by the time they were FINALLY released, all things considered, I can imagine someone from both Arizona Fire and the USFS sitting down with those logs and deciding to use their black magic markers on them.
Which begs the question:
Who were they trying to protect with their black magic markers??
And, btw, remember that Peeples Valley engine guy who said he turned over his photos to the SAIT. Why weren’t they released? Which then begs the question, What else does the SAIT have that hasn’t been released?
Which leads me to the question of how much power/authority the Arizona FOIA laws may/may not have over a Federal Agency i.e. the USFS. That doesn’t explain the with-holding of the Peeples Valley guy’s photos, but it might have to do with the redacting of the Blue Ridge logs (and maybe etc.)
BTW I’m still trying to think about this fire systemically and in a historical context. It’s really complicated because it involves a State Fire (with Federal Resources dispatched to it) rather than a Federal Fire (which can be excruciatingly complicated enough to investigate these days).
I think this fire was woefully under-resourced. I think all this CYA stuff is related to that.
So there’s this otherwise really good but possibly really tired and obviously frustrated IHC crew (sorta kinda federal and sorta kinda not) over here that, while the fire is turning around and overwhelming everybody, including their overhead, goes off on their own mission, without keeping their overhead (who is overly busy with the details of a structure protection operation in a relatively distant area) apprised of what they’re doing.
Within a context of a whole lot of not-very-accurate communication going on a whole lot of that fire.
So much of what did go (and could have also gone) wrong, IMHO, most likely wouldn’t have if there weren’t so many holes in places where more people needed to be.
And thanks, WTKTT, for the vid showing the fire behavior during the time they were approaching around the drop-off point.
The most recent stuff I’ve been studying regarding LCES has, for awhile, emphasized that LCES, all by itself, is NOT enough. It needs to be surrounded by DYNAMIC situational awareness of, not only what the fire is doing, but what it COULD, given a WORST CASE SCENARIO, do.
That tells me that something is not getting from the “best practices” folks to the folks risking their lives on the ground on this fire.
Wow For some one who never fought fire you learned a lot.
Remember the 10 and LCES…….LCES is only 4 of the 10 Situation awareness is covered by the other 5 and they all fallow #10.
Thanks for the black ink info as well
** ANOTHER ‘THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS’ STYLE CROSSFADE VIDEO
**
** CROSSFADES FROM ADOSH PHOTO IMGP0247 TAKEN AT THE DESCENT
** POINT INTO A GOOGLE EARTH 3 DIMENSIONAL GROUND LEVEL VIEW
** COMPLETE WITH VISIBLE SAIT / ADOSH FIRELINE ESTIMATES.
Includes the official SAIT and ADOSH ‘fireline estimates for 4:15, 4:20, 4:30 and 4:40 PM translated to 3 dimensions and transposed onto the ground in Google Earth.
This new video begins with ADOSH photo IMGP0247 ( from the Online ADOSH dropbox folder ) that is the ‘center’ of that ‘panorama’ taken by an ADOSH investigator who was standing directly on the two-track road at the top of the saddle above the box canyon. The photo was taken almost exactly where Tex ‘Sonny’ Gilligan found the ball of PINK flagging tape.
That ADOSH folder ( which also contains the 7 other photos that go with IMGP0247 making up their entire panorama from the Descent Point ) is here…
ADOSH Yarnell Hill Investigation / Photos and Videos / ADOSH 7-18 photos w GPS
At +19 seconds into the video a very slow CROSSFADE begins.
The ADOSH IMGP0247 photo then sorts of ‘melts away’ and reveals the exact Google Earth ‘Ground Level’ viewpoint from the same exact point on the two-track road where the ADOSH photo was taken.
At +30 seconds the CROSSFADE has ended and you will now see all of the SAIT and ADOSH official fireline estimates transposed onto the terrain in full 3 dimensions. The firelines shown are the ones from 4:15, 4:20, 4:30 and 4:40 PM. These are not ‘guesstimates’. They are a careful transposition of all the 2 dimensional SAIT / ADOSH fireline estimates onto the 3 dimensional ‘Google Earth’ ground surface and can be considered highly accurate ( or at least just as accurate as the SAIT / ADOSH estimates themselves ).
The SAIT / ADOSH estimated fireline boundaries themselves are represented by transparent ORANGE firelines and each of the time regions are filled in with some transparent BLACK to show all the areas that had already ‘burned’ as the fireline advanced out there in that ‘middle bowl’.
Contrary to what some may have been believing… both the ADOSH IMGP0247 photo AND this new 3 dimensional look at the fireline visibility from that ‘Descent Point’ location prove that there was, indeed, a HIGH level of VISIBILITY out into that ‘middle bowl’ area from that ‘Descent Point’ location up on the saddle.
The ADOSH photo and this new Google Earth ground level view from the saddle also prove that Granite Mountain both COULD and SHOULD have been acting as their own ‘lookouts’ for the entire hike SOUTH from the anchor-point area and on up the moment they were standing just above that box canyon and ‘deciding’ what to do next. There was, basically, as good a view of that ‘middle bowl’ and the area back towards Glen Ilah and Yarnell from the ‘Descent Point’ itself as any designated ‘lookout’ could have achieved from any other location on that ridge or anywhere along that high-ridge two-track road.
The video ‘pauses’ 10 seconds or so after the crossfade and then just shows the identical Google Earth ground level view from the two-track road and out into the ‘middle bowl’.
The location where the PINK flagging was actually found is marked in with a ‘pink locator balloon’ there in the bottom right corner of the video. It is at the exact GPS coordinates supplied by Tex ‘Sonny’ Gilligan for where he found that PINK flagging tape right there by the side of the high-ridge two-track.
The red pointer balloon marked ‘D’ represents the location of the Deployment site. The actual location for deployment site ‘down there’ is NOT actually fully visible in either the ADOSH photo or the Google Earth ground view display. The actual deployment site is ‘hidden’ by the foreground terrain at that spot on the high-ridge two-track… but in both the ADOSH photo and the ‘Google Earth’ ground level view you can clearly see the ‘dozer line’ that was created coming from the Boulder Springs Ranch and leading out to the deployment site.
Since the ADOSH image was taken post-fire ( on July 18, 2013 ), the Google Earth ground view is also using ‘post-fire’ satellite imagery and that is why the ‘bulldozer road’ coming WEST from the Boulder Springs ranch is clearly visible in both the photo and the Google Earth view.
The red pointer balloon marked ‘B’ is at the center of the Boulder Springs Ranch in the distance.
The red pointer balloon in the distance marked ‘Y’ in the upper-left-center of the video frame is pointing to the center of the Youth Camp at the western end of Shrine Road. This is where all the Blue Ridge and Granite Mountain vehicles were ‘staged’ in the 4:10 PM to 4:20 PM timeframe after having been ‘moved’ from their original parking spot out in the ‘Sesame’ area clearing.
The red pointer balloon marked ‘C’ represents the exact ‘parking’ location for the Granite Mountain Crew Carriers out in the Sesame area when they first arrived that morning. The ORANGE fireline that is right near that pointer is in the 4:20 PM timeframe shows that the SAIT believed the fireline was just about to burn over that original GM ‘parking spot’ at about 4:20 PM.
4:20 PM is also the time that the SAIT has given for when Steed and the Crew actually arrived at the very spot where this ADOSH photo was taken, so they also would have had a clear view of this original Sesame area ‘parking spot’ location from that ‘Descent Point’ in that timeframe.
So… according to this new view from that location ( complete with the SAIT’s own estimated fireline boundaries ) Steed and the Crew COULD and SHOULD have seen ( circa 4:20 ) that the fireline was now ‘thrusting out’ into the Sesame area very quickly and ‘racing’ towards town out there in the distance and, indeed, also advancing very rapidly now on its western edge towards their current location and towards that box canyon.
Even just the ‘difference’ between where the fireline was at 4:15 ( while they were supposedly still hiking south towards the saddle ) and where it could now be seen at 4:20 from that ‘Descent Point’ location represents a ‘dramatic’ difference that SHOULD have been clearly visible at 4:20 PM and should have given them a good idea of how FAST the fire was already moving and was, indeed, still ‘picking up speed’ out there.
NOTE: Obviously this ‘View from the Descent Point’ does NOT show what would happen to the ‘visibility’ once you started a descent from that two-track location, but I still think it is significant to be able to ‘see what they SHOULD have been able to see’ before they started their descent.
If Steed and the crew really were standing at this exact location in the 4:15 to 4:20 PM timeframe, ( as the SAIT says they were ) then they could/should have been able to see a LOT ‘out there’ before making the decision to actually drop into the fuel-filled box canyon.
Also remember that the newly examined IMG_1334 and IMG_1335 photos taken at exactly 4:30 PM looking west from Highway 89 show that even as late as 4:30 ( 9 minutes before Steeds first MAYDAY ) the smoke column had not ‘laid down’ yet… so all of the SAIT / ADOSH fireline estimates being shown in this new Google Earth ‘ground level’ view from the ‘Descent Point’ SHOULD have also been clearly visible from that location circa 4:20 PM.
At +41 seconds the video actually begins to PAN LEFT ( NORTH ) from that same ‘Descent Point’ location where ADOSH image IMGP0247 was taken.
The views that will then appear from this point until the end of video now simply match that other series of ADOSH photos taken at that same ‘Descent Point’ location making up their own ‘panorama’ series… but this time we can see what the ‘visibility’ of all the various firelines should have also been from that same ‘Descent Point’ location.
At about +1:14 into the video… the view from that ‘Descent Point’ is now approaching due NORTH and you can see that while the SAIT / ADOSH fireline 4:30 PM estimates do have the fireline ‘cresting’ that other mound known as ‘Big Round Top’… the 4:15 and 4:20 PM fireline location estimates were still also clearly visible from that ‘Descent Point’. Again… even just the difference between the 4:15 fireline location and the 4:20 PM location when looking in THAT direction was dramatic and should have been telling anyone up on that ridge how FAST the fireline was already moving circa 4:20 PM.
At +1:25 the view from the ‘Descent Point’ is now back at the ‘Old Grader’ location and ( just beyond that ) the location of Brendan McDonough’s lookout mound. The Old Grader location is marked in the distance with a red pointer balloon that says ‘G’ and Brendan’s Lookout mound is marked in the distance with a red pointer balloon that says ‘L’.
The 4:15 PM SAIT fireline estimate is well past Brendan’s prior lookout position and the 4:20 PM SAIT fireline estimate shows the fire well past the old-grader location and beginning to ‘fill’ that ‘upper middle bowl’ area on the western side of ‘Big Round Top’ and basically head ‘right at them’.
At +1:50 in the video the ‘view’ from that ‘Descent Point’ location is now looking back NORTH along the high-ridge two-track and BACK towards the anchor point where the late afternoon ‘hike’ began. The view at this time now matches exactly that same ADOSH photo in their ‘panorama’ sequence when they were also ‘looking back north’ towards the anchor point.
The red pointer balloon marked ‘M’ is the exact location where Christopher MacKenzie shot his photos and videos in the 1555 timeframe, and where the ‘Gaggle up’ took place and the hike to the saddle began.
The red pointer balloon marked ‘R’ represents the location of that ‘Notched Rock that appears in ALL of the GM photos and videos taken between 1550 and 1555.
At this point in the video we now also see ( in the top left corner of the video frame ) that the SAIT / ADOSH 4:40 PM fireline estimate has the fireline already ‘cresting’ the ridge to the north and along the route they had already come. This ‘cresting’ estimate in this location at 4:40 PM was apparently based solely on the Matt Oss time-lapse video footage taken from the Congress side that day… but has still not been completely verified.
The video then ‘pauses’ still looking NORTH from the ‘Descent Point’ back along the two-track road and back towards the ‘anchor point’ area… and then the video ENDS.
Direct link to this new YouTube CROSSFADE / PAN NORTH video…
YouTube Video Title: Descent-point-fade-to-firelines
http://youtu.be/qPRLiWFpFzg
** SUMMARY
This new ‘crossfade’ from ADOSH image IMGP0247 ( taken at the exact place where the PINK flagging tape was found ) into a complete Google Earth ground level view from that same ‘Descent Point’ proves that the ‘visibility’ out into that ‘middle bowl’ in both the EAST and NORTH directions was probably much better than some had previously thought. The smoke column had not even begun to ‘lay down’ even as late as 4:30 PM so the transposed SAIT / ADOSH fireline estimates that are visible out there in that ‘middle bowl’ should have been easily seen by anyone standing there at this ‘Descent Point’.
While the found roll of flagging may represent the actual decent point, it’s also quite possible that it just represents the farthest point south on the two-track they progressed before deciding that it looked like it went to Congress.
There is a relatively flat area that I would call sort of a ‘bench’ just below the two-track and on the east side of the area of the saddle from where the flagging was found, and it lies directly at the top of the drainage where some have speculated the actual descent occurred.
Without anything specific to back it up, I still believe that they descended along this drainage. Descending directly from where the tape was found would have initially been a steep slide and a bit of a cluster for 19 men, whereby, it would have been an easy walk from the tape area down to the top of the drainage, giving them a better look into the bowl for a possible route.
If that indeed was the case, the point I’m referring to at the top of the drainage, sets just enough below the N/NE terrain so that several of the points you refer to in the video would not be visible. Thus, they could have been in this lower area, ready to descend, during the moments the fire behavior intensified. That fire behavior would have been clearly visible from the ‘roll of flagging’ location above, but NOT from the top of the drainage.
An additional comment to the one posted above:
The terrain was steep heading down-hill at the point where the flagging was found, and if 19 men had descended there, there would have been a SIGNIFICANT disturbance to the hill-side. There has never been any suggestion or reports that something like that was found or seen.
Reply to TTWARE post on August 25, 2014 at 8:29 pm
>> TTWARE wrote…
>>
>> The terrain was steep heading down-hill at the point
>> where the flagging was found
Yes. It was. much ‘steeper’ for the initial ‘drop down’ than just heading down that drainage off to the left.
>> …and if 19 men had descended there, there >> would have been a
>> SIGNIFICANT disturbance to the hill-side.
Probably so.
>> There has never been any suggestion or reports that something
>> like that was found or seen.
Correct… and nor have there been any other ‘official’ reports about exactly where they DID leave that two-track… other than that ‘yellow squiggly line’ that was simply showing up in a random PDF graphic in the SAIR.
There is still no question there a lot of ‘IF’s here.
IF Marsh was actually ‘scouting ahead of the men’ and IF Marsh actually marked the two-track at the point where Sonny found the tape remnants and IF Marsh intended for them to descend there… and IF Steed actually reached that tape instead of bailing off the two-track before that….I still think at least one thing is known.
The VIEW of the fire and its progression ‘out there’ from the two-track was pretty damn good.
It was ‘good enough’ for them to be serving as their own ‘lookouts’ right up until the point where they left that road.
Maybe this actually RAISES more questions than it answers… but the ADOSH photo is not debatable. It is what anyone standing at the spot where that pink flagging was found could actually ‘see’ out there in any timeframe.
Reply to The TTWARE post on August 25, 2014 at 8:21 pm
>> TTWARE said…
>>
>> While the found roll of flagging may represent the actual decent
>> point, it’s also quite possible that it just represents the farthest
>> point south on the two-track they progressed before deciding
>> that it looked like it went to Congress.
Absolutely true. In the ‘PULL’ theory that Marsh was ‘ahead’ of the crew scouting and then had to convince Steed and the crew to ‘come south’… we don’t even know if Eric Marsh might have gone much farther south to actually ‘check out’ the alternate escape route, decided it would take too long to suit him, or something, and then came BACK to what is now called the ‘Descent Point’ above the Box Canyon.
The reason the video just published is from the viewpoint of exactly where the pink flagging tape was found is because that is where the ADOSH investigators decided to be standing when their IMGP0247 was shot and then they also decided to take that full ‘panorama’ from THAT spot.
AFAIK… the actual specific point where GM actually left the two-track to descend has still never been pinpointed. According to the SAIR document… it would have been a little NORTH ( to the LEFT in the ADOSH photo ) of where the pink flagging tape was found and their path was more directly down that drainage and up against the boulders.
For the purposes of just trying to ‘see what they could see’ ( circa 4:20 PM or whenever they arrived in that saddle area )… there isn’t much difference.
The view out towards the ‘middle bowl’ would have been pretty much the same from a spot just north of where this pink tape was found as is shown in the ADOSH IMGP0247 photo ( and this Google Earth ground view ).
>> TTWARE also said…
>>
>> There is a relatively flat area that I would call sort of a ‘bench’ just
>> below the two-track and on the east side of the area of the
>> saddle from where the flagging was found, and it lies directly
>> at the top of the drainage where some have speculated the
>> actual descent occurred.
Yes. See above… but until they actually left that high-ridge two-track… their VIEW out into the middle bowl anywhere along that last leg of the hike would have been similar to what ADOSH photo IMGP0247 shows.
>> TTWARE also said…
>>
>> Without anything specific to back it up, I still believe that they
>> descended along this drainage.
Well… there (supposedly) is something ‘specific’ to back it up.
A lot of people got highly paid by the Arizona Division of Forestry to do a ‘Special Accident Investigation Report’ and although no specifics about this are ever really mentioned in the final ‘report’… there is at least one DIAGRAM included that has that ‘yellow squiggly line’ which is (supposedly) these investigators indicating exactly where THEY thought the actual descent took place.
Again… no more information than just a ‘yellow squiggly line’ on a PDF diagram… but I have to believe they had some ‘evidence’ to back this up whether they wanted to talk about it or not. Maybe they found something there in that drainage that made them sure where to draw that ‘yellow squiggle line’ but they didn’t want to talk about ( or admit to even having ) that evidence.
I can’t believe they would just freakin’ GUESS about something so important to understanding how 19 men died and then just ‘call it a day’.
>> TTWARE also said…
>>
>> Descending directly from where the tape was found would have
>> initially been a steep slide and a bit of a cluster for 19 men, whereby,
>> it would have been an easy walk from the tape area down to the
>> top of the drainage, giving them a better look into the bowl for a
>> possible route.
Agree. Even pre-fire satellite imagery shows there was less vegetation to deal with at first on a direct EAST descent line from where that pink flagging was found… but it was also a ‘steeper dropoff’ once you started that way.
Again… if Marsh was ahead of the men ‘scouting’ that one can only assume he knew this. Why he would put the pink tape where it was found is still just part of the mystery if it was, in fact, some of Marsh’s tape and not just something that fell off the pack of one of the other men.
The new video is not attempting to solve any ongoing mysteries other than, perhaps, what kind of VISIBILITY either Marsh, or Steed / crew actually had from that location before deciding to leave that two-track.
I would also still tend to say that the ADOSH photo IMGP0247 and this Google Earth ground view also proves that as far as having an established ‘lookout’ goes that day… that the view from that two-track was such that it can be said they were their OWN ‘lookouts’ right up until they decided to leave that two-track.
It doesn’t appear that there was any better spot to actually BE a ‘lookout’ up there on that ridge that afternoon than the very two-track they were walking south on.
If that indeed was the case, the point I’m referring to at the top of the drainage, sets just enough below the N/NE terrain so that several of the points you refer to in the video would not be visible. Thus, they could have been in this lower area, ready to descend, during the moments the fire behavior intensified. That fire behavior would have been clearly visible from the ‘roll of flagging’ location above, but NOT from the top of the drainage.
Whoops… I forgot to ‘bracket’ the last paragraph above which
was still something TTWARE was saying.
Bottom of post above should have looked like this…
>> TTWARE also said
>>
>> If that indeed was the case, the point I’m referring to at the top of
>> the drainage, sets just enough below the N/NE terrain so that
>> several of the points you refer to in the video would not be visible.
>> Thus, they could have been in this lower area, ready to descend,
>> during the moments the fire behavior intensified. That fire
>> behavior would have been clearly visible from the ‘roll of
>> flagging’ location above, but NOT from the top of the drainage.
Again… I agree.
We still don’t know WHAT they actually did.
As far as we know… no matter what the ‘visibility’ out there was from the two-track itself… they might have been so convinced they had all the time in the world ( or at least 2 hours, as Rory Collins told them circa 1550 ) that they never even bothered to look out there.
But if the ‘PULL’ theory is correct… and Marsh WAS ‘scouting ahead’ and had marked that trail spot with his own pink tape… it’s not a far stretch of the imagination to believe that they at least walked UP to where this tape was… and THEN started making ‘other decisions’.
So maybe ( even if only for a brief moment ) the VIEW from that ADOSH IMGP0247 photo and the new Google Earth ground view would have been a VIEW that they had that day before making any other ‘decisions’.
If Marsh left that tape right there for some specific reason… but Steed / crew never even reached that tape and had already left the two-track at a point of their own choosing farther north of this spot… well… I guess that’s possible but until the moment they left the two-track ( wherever that was ), the VIEW out into the middle bowl would have been as good ( if not even better ) than this VIEW from the ‘pink tape’ location.
Followup…
>> TTWARE said…
>>
>> The point I’m referring to at the top of the drainage, sets just
>> enough below the N/NE terrain so that several of the points
>> you refer to in the video would not be visible.
If you can give me a lattitude / longitude for this exact ‘point’ you are referring to, I can do the same ‘ground level view’ with SAIT / ADOSH firelines as the video above.
A really EASY way to do this is to just use the following online page…
http://itouchmap.com/latlong.html
It’s just like using regular Google Maps… but anywhere you ‘click’ with your mouse on the satellite imagery you will get a precise lat/long showing under the map.
Just go to the page, enter ‘Yarnell, AZ’ into address bar, zoom down in satellite mode onto the ‘Descent Point’ area… and see if you can make out this exact ‘point’ you are referring to.
Then just click it… and the exact lat/long for that point will appear in the boxes underneath the map.
Utilizing the itouchmap tool I got different coordinates for the same location than I did when utilizing google earth.
These are the google earth coordinates:
34 13.308′ N
112 46.860′ W
Thank you. I’m on it.
Getting to deep into the conversations below—-
Calvin and WTKTT—–On Abel I again will say there are reasons with in the radio systems on fires at high activity points where people are on different channels and there for are not coping each others transmissions it is impossible to monitor all frequencies and be talking on another one. Todd Abel had to be very busy at that point in time he was responsible for several different resources. Each supervisor under him were operating on other freq. that day. Air attack could be talking at the same time he was on TAC, or a Eng. Strike team freq. or even a local city or county freq. depending on how the Freq. assignments were set up. Fire camp could have had several different radios monitoring the different freq. on the fire with different operators for each one.
I have reason to believe and some roomer that the Argument between Marsh and Steed happened a little different than Mr. Dudley described it. Marsh was below the crew at the saddle and Steed and crew were still at rest area in the black. The crew was not at the saddle. My understanding is there are two separate pieces of information out there that the SAIT was aware of but not put in there report. Thus Mr. Dudley’s Revelation. The crew did not get to the saddle and have the argument but had it prior to leaving the Black Safety zone.
I wonder if some of this was redacted in statements from FS employees on the fire?
I also have hear say evidence that there is a video out there with the Argument on it from one of the GM crewmen’
I will state here I have no solid proof or factual evidence to support these clams at this time.
I needed to know if there was any possibility that Marsh could have been in front of the crew to tie this in.
I will also say I use argument only because of Mr. Dudley it could as well have been a discussion interpreted as a argument.
You have both hit on some very interesting information in this discussion.
Now we are stuck again with the search for the facts and the information to fill in the facts.
I am sure Dudley knows and that really pisses me off. What else is out there????
Reply to Bob Powers post August 24, 2014 at 8:28 am
>> Bob Powers said…
>>
>> I needed to know if there was any possibility that Marsh could have been
>> in front of the crew to tie this in.
There is more than just ‘any’ possibility… even without the newly noticed testimony from Brendan McDonough that Marsh was ( almost all of the day? ) “Literally right above me” it has always been a possibility.
The ONLY thing that would make it NOT really possible is if there was some definite evidence that even by 1555… Marsh was still so far NORTH of Steed and the Crew that he and Steed would have agreed it to be prudent if Steed took off SOUTH ahead of Marsh and that Marsh would ‘catch up from behind’. It would have been a concern about TIME and a conclusion that if they were going to do this ‘mission’… that Steed and the crew better ‘get going’ even though Marsh hadn’t reached them yet ( from somewhere NORTH of them ).
As you have pointed out… there really IS no concrete evidence that was the case.
The only real reference in the testimony to Marsh being WAAAY ‘up north’ at any point in the day comes from Rance Marquez’s ADOSH interview. Marquez says that somewhere in that ‘argument’ he was having with Marsh he requested a ‘face-to-face’ with him.. .but Marsh’s response was that it wasn’t possible because he was “so FAR up the line”.
Some have taken that to be proof that Marsh did put himself almost all the way to the top of Weaver Mountain itself and was being ‘DIVSA’ from way up there ( and that is what he means later by ‘workin’ my way off the TOP’… but this simple (vague) statement from Marquez cannot be considered absolute proof of that.
Besides… according to the timeframe seemingly being referenced by Marquez for when Marsh said he was “too FAR up the line” to meet with him… it would appear Marquez is talking about somewhere in the NOON to 12:30 PM timeframe when he was still down in the valley talking to Marsh on the radio.
Well… if that is the TIME that Marquez is saying he asked for this ‘face-to-face’ with Marsh then it is perfectly possible that Marsh was just bullshitting him ( and didn’t really WANT to have a face-to-face with Marquez ).
In the NOON to 12:30 PM timeframe… Marsh was NOT ‘way up the line’.
No way.
He was standing right there at the same place where MacKenzie would later shoot his videos and still having that ‘face-to-face’ with Steed, Frisby and Brown.
Followup….
Copy that on why Todd Abel might have been ‘missing’ some of these supposed “to whom it may concern” fly-by ‘announcements’ from Eric Marsh. Abel was pretty much the busiest guy on the radio in that timeframe and even the Panebaker Air-Study videos verify that. He was not only Field OPS for the entire fire… he had put himself out there on Miner’s Camp Road with Todd Foster and was personally trying to take care of the ‘structure protection’ at that location.
I still say that it appears clear that Marsh made no standard ( and normal ) attempt to make SURE his own supervisor knew what he was doing. In the haphazard radio environment you describe… the kind of “to whom it may concern” announcement that people say they heard Marsh making were just a stupid thing for him to be doing if Marsh had any intentions of specific people being SURE they heard ( and understood ) what he was saying.
Unless you call someone directly.. and repeatedly… and make sure they COPY your transmission… then you NEVER have any ‘guarantee’ that they heard it.
Re: The Argument.
If that ‘argument’ now being referred to in public by SAIT Co-Lead Mike Dudley really did happen… then your theory about Steed still being ‘in the black’ when it happened is perfectly possible.
We don’t know enough about this ( supposed ) ‘argument’ to pin down a TIME for it or a LOCATION for any of the participants.
Surely whoever heard it was also remembering some specific DIALOG and what people were SAYING to each other… otherwise… how could they have been characterizing it as an ‘argument’.
I suppose it is still perfectly possible that this alleged ‘argument’ is part of what Brendan McDonough was telling the SAIT he heard but the SAIT just lumped that into the “Brendan heard Marsh and Steed discussing their options” statement that ended up in the SAIT… with no further explanation on that at all.
You need to reread what I said…………..
I have known for the past 4 weeks about the 2 peace’s of witness info.
Neither are in the released statements or are redacted in the testimony.
It is not McDonough I asked that specifically.
Some one else monitoring GM crew net heard the Argument and made a written statement on it…………Possibly BR crewman or some one else that could monitor GM frequency.
We have a plausible time frame that could put Marsh in front of the crew which makes what I was told by a person who would not identify himself or the other two people who have this info and Reported to the SAIT.
I had contact thru a phone # with no name. So again unless some one on here jumps in and adds names we are stuck. Or we wait to find out in court.
Reply to Bob Powers post on August 24, 2014 at 4:31 pm
Mr. Powers… thanks for that followup and that clarification.
That really is getting pretty specific.
If it was NOT Brendan reporting this ‘alleged’ argument and you are now being told it WAS heard over the GM intra-crew ( crew net ) channel… then it’s a pretty short list of who could have been reporting it and the BR guys who were moving the other GM vehicles have always been on that ‘short list’. There were FOUR vehicles that day ( being moved around ) that ALL had the GM intra-crew frequency programmed into the radio. Brendan only drove ONE of them around that afternoon.
>> Bob Powers said…
>> It is not McDonough I asked that specifically.
Super. Thank you.
The reason I thought you might still be including Brendan is because you only said…
>> My understanding is there are two separate pieces
>> of information out there that the SAIT was aware of
>> but not put in there report.
>>
>> I also have hear say evidence that there is a video out there
>> with the Argument on it from one of the GM crewmen’
Neither of those statements were specifically EXCLUDING Bredan as being one of the ‘candidates’ for at least one of the ‘reports’.
We know Brendan had an iPhone. He was able to shoot a video and capture some audio at any time that day.
My bet is that the ‘reports’ were coming from one or more of the THREE Blue Ridge Hotshots who were moving the OTHER vehicles that day.
The alleged ‘argument’ probably fell right within the timeframe when they were either moving the vehicles to the Youth Camp OR had just arrived there and were parking them.
Unless those THREE Blue Ridge Hotshots actually made an effort to turn the radios OFF… then I would imagine they were hearing ALL the GM intra-crew traffic the whole time they were in the vehicles and the key was turned on.
Wouldn’t those onboard radios, themselves, pretty much have the GM private intra-crew frequency set as their PRIORITY channel… because that ‘private’ frequency would be the one they would always use when traveling and communicating between the vehicles themselves?
WTKTT
Yes the truck radios would be on that Freq.
The other info on the Video was not from McDonough either but had been sent to a family member. I got no names including the caller I was surprised with the call and more surprised with the Info.
I gave my word I would not try to track them down as they were very concerned about losing their job.
So while I believe it is correct Info it is still unsubstantiated I hope some one reads this and puts the info on here. It is defiantly a new twist to the story and I believe Karles and Dudley have knowledge of it. Dudley dumped it out there with no back up proof either so what is going on here?
Also Right now I would not single out any one person as we could have several others that could have monitored GM crew net. It could have been BR crewman I don’t know. The caller was not specific. and gave me no names.
Reply to Bob Powers post on August 25, 2014 at 8:25 am
>> Bob Powers wrote…
>>
>> WTKTT
>> Yes the truck radios would be on that Freq.
>> The other info on the Video was not from
>> McDonough either but had been sent to a family
>> member. I got no names including the caller I
>> was surprised with the call and more surprised
>> with the Info.
So… just to be clear… you are saying someone just called YOU ( on the telephone or cellphone ) ‘out of the blue’ with this ‘information’?
If so… do you have any guess as to how they got your actual phone number? Through RTS, perhaps? ( RTS is the one who knows the Blue Ridge Hotshots, correct? ).
>> Bob Powers also wrote…
>> I gave my word I would not try to track them down
>> as they were very concerned about losing their job.
Well.. .it’s really a shame that someone who might have information that would help clear up what really happened on June 30, 2013 AND might help save more firefighter’s lives in the future would have that ‘fear’.
There are no doubt a lot of guys still out on the line who are putting THEIR lives at risk who might appreciate more specific ‘Lessons Learned’ from Yarnell so that every precaution is taken to make sure it doesn’t happen again ( to THEM ).
A job is just a job… fer chrissakes.
Besides… I REALLY doubt that anyone could lose their job just because they reported something they might have heard or they might know about a fatal accident that happened in Yarnell on June 30, 2014. There are laws that cover the release the of that kind of information and whether or not an ’employer’ can ever take ‘revenge’ against you for just ‘telling what you know’ about something.
I think ANYONE who knows more about what happened that day should find a way to get that information out so that it can be vetted and help with the ‘Lessons Learned’ objective that everyone ( US Forestry included ) says is the ‘ultimate’ goal’ here following the incident.
I believe whoever called you is TRYING to do that.
They wouldn’t have told you what they did unless they EXPECT you to ‘do something’ with the information ( which you are obviously trying to figure out yourself ).
Nothing can change what happened that day… but even the smallest detail can still contribute to the EXPLANATION of what happened and help save lives in the future.
>> Bob Powers also said…
>>
>> So while I believe it is correct Info it is still
>> unsubstantiated I hope some one reads this and
>> puts the info on here. It is defiantly a new twist
>> to the story
Yes. It would tend to explain why so much time was lost… and TIME was the ‘enemy’ that day.
It is also still VERY important to find out to know ( even if we never know ALL the details ) whether this was primarily a PUSH or a PULL scenario.
The PUSH scenario is the one that has Marsh north of the crew during the entire ‘discussing their options’ phase and because TIME was a fact… Marsh and Steed decided the crew should head south BEFORE Marsh had rejoined them from the north and ‘working his way off the top’. That puts Steed at the saddle before Marsh and being the one with the ‘visual’ on the next important decision.
The PULL scenario is the one that has Marsh out AHEAD of the crew sometime after 1542 and he found out Frisby was abandoning Marsh’s requested ‘face-to-face’ meeting. It’s still actually the more disturbing scenario in that it really does seem to establish Marsh himself as the ‘forward lookout’ for GM that day ( but he still let them walk into a death trap ) and also seems to suggest that Marsh alone made the decision to cut through the fuel-filled box canyon with no consultation with Steed ( hence… the argument? ).
>> Bob Powers also wrote…
>>
>> …and I believe Karles and Dudley have knowledge of it.
So do I.
>> Bob Powers also wrote…
>>
>> Dudley dumped it out there with no back up proof
>> either so what is going on here?
Sometimes, when someone KNOWS something that they are afraid to talk about it… the catalyst for them doing so is to have someone ELSE sort of ‘put it out there’ first. That way… whatever their fears are about talking… it makes it look like they are just ‘following up’ on what is now already public knowledge and they can’t be accused of being that one that ‘ratted’ on anybody or something like that.
Maybe Dudley knows exactly who is ‘afraid to say something’ and exactly WHY… and perhaps Dudley thought that by ‘breaking the ice’ on this… that person would ‘come forward’ and not be accused of being the first to talk about it.
The phone call you received ( and our discussion of it here ) might be the beginning of the exact result that Dudley himself was ‘hoping’ for.
Some people wonder why we ‘guess’ at things here a lot on this PUBLIC forum. The truth is that sometimes… because of the exact scenario I am describing above… a good GUESS that actually hits on the TRUTH can, itself, be the catalyst for someone who knows something to then come forward.
Once that (correct) GUESS has appeared… some people can feel like that is the ‘trigger event’ to allow them to come forward with something. It allows them to say ( and rightly so ) that they are not RELEASING the information… they are simply backing up what someone ELSE ‘already knows’ and is already ‘out there’ as common knowledge.
That’s just how it works with this stuff, sometimes.
>> Bob Powers also wrote…
>>
>> Also Right now I would not single out any one person
>> as we could have several others that could have
>> monitored GM crew net. It could have been BR
>> crewman I don’t know. The caller was not specific.
>> and gave me no names.
Agree… but it’s still a pretty short list.
Someone from Prescott ( including all the off-the-radar hires from Bea Day’s team who where there )… or someone who was driving a GM vehicle that day.
Followup….
I should have said…
It is PROBABLY still a pretty short list.
Truth is… it could have even been someone who was even just STANDING next to someone from Prescott who happened to have the GM private intra-crew frequency plugged into their radio.
Todd Foster himself includes several crucial pieces of testimony in his ADOSH interview where he says he only heard it because he was STANDING near OPS1 Todd Abel when a radio transmission took place.
Testimony about radio transmissions can go that way.
It doesn’t really matter if the CALL was directed AT you or not… if you were in a position to HEAR the actual transmission itself… then your testimony about what YOU heard is still valid.
If you heard it… then you heard it.
First the call was on my home phone because of what I said about where I live it would be easy to look me up in the phone book. Also I am on Face Book and Have replied to some of the Safety matters postings. So I am Fairley easy to find.
The caller stated he was a friend of the person who gave him the info. He stated his friend filed a statement of what he heard to the SAIT. He also personally knows that a family member of a GM crew member has a copy of the Video and that was also given to the SAIT.
The person told me he was a fire fighter but had not been on the Yarnell Fire. He did not want to get his friend in trouble. But felt this needed to come out.
Marsh was scouting ahead and below Steed. and called Steed to bring the crew. What was said in the argument was recorded and witnessed on the radio by at least one person word for word. Both pieces of evidence compliment each other. No mention of him being a look out. How far did he get?????
With out that transcript I do not want to put out what I was told was said. I am not going to say something I cant prove
It is also a possibility that McDonough herd it as well (the discussion ) as was stated in the interview with him. The SAIT covered what they knew here.
But it goes back again to the failure to use the 10 standard orders.
I drought if there is much in lesions learned here. It is like the 10 and 18 and other directives, you use them or ignore them. They are nothing new.
From what I have said you can probably guess what was said It took some time and 4 radio calls.
If I wasn’t pissed before this really got me really mad.
Reply to Bob Powers post on
August 25, 2014 at 6:09 pm
>> Bob Powers said…
>>
>> He stated his friend filed a statement
>> of what he heard to the SAIT.
Then that matches exactly what the SAIT Co-Lead Mike Dudley chose to say in public on June 20, 2014.
—————————————-
Mike Dudley: There’s some allegations that there was an argument between the Captain and the Superintendent about which way to go… from that saddle.. Some people made that allegation. We can’t validate that.
—————————————-
If even just one of the ‘allegations’ was made in WRITING… and that document was withheld from the numerous FOIA / FOIL and Arizona FOI ( Arizona Public Records Laws ) requests… then that’s pretty serious.
And so are the penalties for doing so.
Arizona has a few special ‘exemptions’ to an Arizona FOI request, but it would still be a stretch for Scott Hunt, Mike Dudley or Jim Karels to think they could get away with withholding an actual document submitted as evidence to them by claiming the information it contains falls under one of standard ‘exemptions’.
We are not talking about Exxon Mobile here.
ALL of these men… their employers… and EVERYTHING they do… and ALL the documents related to what they do are part of totally taxpayer funded operations and subject to ‘open access’ laws with only a very limited set of standard ‘exemptions’.
From the ‘National Freedom of Information Coalition’ website…
http://www.nfoic.org/arizona-foia-laws
—————————————
Arizona FOIA laws – Summary
The Arizona Public Records Law has been in existence for more than 100 years and mandates that all public records be open to inspection by any person at all times during office hours. Public records include books, papers, maps, photographs or other documentary materials. Lake v. City of Phoenix recently established that digital meta-data, attached to files stored in any electronic form are considered part of that document and are thus subject to open records requests.
The Arizona Public Records Law does have some exceptions which include: student records, research records, donor information, or if the release of a record would constitute an invasion of personal privacy and that invasion outweighs the public’s right to know, of if the disclosure of a record is detrimental to the best interests of the state.
—————————————
NOTE: The ‘Best interests of the State’ exemption category is not carte-blanche and does NOT include the ability for any state official ( State Forestry or whoever ) to make the determination themselves. If you try to go for THAT ‘exemption’ there is a shitload of paperwork that has to go with it… including the official statement that you ARE trying to claim that ‘exemption’ for something.
To just ‘pretend you don’t have something’ is the worst possible scenario… legally speaking.
Mike Dudley must have known what he was doing on June 20, 2014. He’s a smart guy.
He MUST have known that his little “Oh… by the way… some people told us ( the SAIT ) that they heard Marsh and Steed arguing” was going to be a tacit admission that evidence which had entered into the SAIT’s possession was NOT released in accordance with legal requests for everything they had related to the Yarnell HIll Investigation.
Dudley seems too ‘politically savvy’ to have just ‘slipped up’ like that in a public speech to some Utah firefighters.
As for the VIDEO that supposedly exists and is now supposedly in the hands of a ‘family member’… that’s another story.
If the SAIT received the written testimony AND they also saw / heard the VIDEO… then even as of June 20, 2014, Mike Dudley’s statement that the information could not be ‘validated’ is a lie.
As for NONE of this even ‘transferring’ from the SAIT to ADOSH during THEIR investigation… that’s another whole set of ‘laws’ that kicks in that were probably violated that go far behind any ‘Arizona FOI’ requests.
There are also governmental agency ‘sharing of information’ laws on the books that kick in there, as well.
There’s more to come on this, I’m sure.
I’m still convinced that only the Eric Marsh of 2005 who was put on probation for his behavior in the workplace would have just been YELLING at his subordinates and just ‘ordering people around’. on June 30, 2014.
Eric had been taught carefully by Duane Steinbrink and Darrell Willis to be a good ‘negotiator’ in order to get what you want.
But if the evidence is there that Marsh simply did a successful ‘sell job’ on Captain Jesse Steed to get those trusting young men to leave a ‘safe’ place and do what HE wanted them to do that fateful day… and against their own better judgement… I would love to hear what he said.
The complete Arizona State Legislature site that covers Arizona ‘Open Records’ law.
It is indexed and hyperlinked for quick access to all the provisions in the existing legislation.
http://www.azleg.gov/ArizonaRevisedStatutes.asp?Title=39
the video is the one from Mckenzie where marsh says ‘ that’s why i asked ya before what your comfortable level was ‘
that is the family video and we have it allready.
only 1 comment I saved in my draft box—here it is:
posted earlier this week—
I am pulling weeds over on Ridgeway and some have come to me and spoke on the fire so you can see 4 people on Manzanita/Foothill/Ridgeway/Lakewood state electricity went out at 4:34pm but one can confirm with APS their time but Barb’s home survived even though other areas to their property burned and her clock said that time and the fire I am hearing reached at 4:15-5pm but not in any glorifying way says one when it reached Ridgeway- low ground fire that could of been put out but instead the owner said a man wearing yellow on atv alerted all to evacuate at 5-5:30pm. He said plus 2 others the cloud of smoke was bright orange. It is very important to anyone properly assessing this fire to get out and learn these things I am hearing—one man watered his home and still he felt the slow going on the ground not high flames could of been put out but not one firefighter tried and he just will not talk to you or reporters or anyone because he feels very wronged in this whole weekend (MANY OTHERS FEEL THE SAME WAY) and he will talk to his lawyer and close knit pals but anyone else—well, they all can wait until this hits the court room…it is that kind of feel I have felt since day one of returning from others so I know now there is photos and videos and accounts but they all prefer to just be quiet—
(8-20-14 2:21pm)
Tue, Aug 19, 2014 at 2:41 PM
someone posted—maybe Bob Powers:
We disagree with this point won’t argue with you.
Each type of crew has their own bonds and special relations.
Try living with a group 24 hours a day 80% of a 6 month work time. Eat Sleep and work, Shower and live on the ground in sleeping bags. You become very close.
YES YOU CAN BECOME VERY CLOSE IN DOING THAT—YET THERE CAN BE A DYSFUNCTIONAL CLOSE AND A WORK FORCE CLOSE AND A HEALTHY CLOSE—OR ALL THE ABOVE AT DIFFERENT MOMENTS AND THAT I LEARNED ON MY JOURNEY AWAY FROM COOKIE CUTTER LIFE SLEEPING IN A SLEEPING BAG UNDER THE MOONLIT STARS KNOWING SONNY—ALSO KNOWING THE KIND OF FOLKS I HAVE IN MY LIFE TIME I ALSO KNOW WHAT APPEARS TO BE DOES NOT NECESSARILY MEAN IT IS WHAT IT IS—HOW MANY TIMES I HUNG OUT ON A PERSONAL NOTE OR WORK OUT WITH A SOAP OPERA STAR/ACTRESS/ACTOR AND THEY LEAD LIFE DIFFERENT—I MEAN ONE GIRL I KNEW AND A GUY TOO THEY HAD 5-6 SERIOUS LONG TERM RELATIONSHIPS AT THE SAME TIME BUT NONE OF THE OTHER GIRLFRIENDS/ETC. EVEN KNEW ABOUT ONE ANOTHER—I DO NOT EVEN WANT TO PUBLICLY THROW OUT DIRECT ASSESSMENT BUT FOR AN ODD EXAMPLE USING ME AS THE LEADER AND SONNY AS MY PERSON I EVALUATE ANNUALLY (HYPOTHETICAL)— THE EVALUATION THESE MEN ARE GIVEN BY AN AUTHORITY IS MY MAIN TOPIC WHEN WRITING MY SCENARIO—IT CAN PAINT IN WORDS A PRETTY SCENARIO WITH A MARK OFF HERE AND THERE TO AREAS BUT SAY I AM YOUR LEADER I AM NOT GOING TO WAIT UNTIL EVALUATION TO DO THIS GRADE I AM GOING TO REDIRECT YOU BEFORE THAT EVALUATION TO IMPROVE BECAUSE I TRULY AS YOUR LEADER DO NOT WANT ANYONE UNDER ME TO FAIL BUT SHINE AND SUCCEED ESPECIALLY IF I WANT YOU TO BE IN MY POSITION SOME DAY AND I AM GROOMING YOU FOR THAT POSITION SO WHAT IF I AM THAT LEADER AND I TELL THE WORLD SONNY IS A GEM AND GENUINE AND THEN IN THE CHECK OFF BOX MARK OFF MY VIEWS OF HIS FLAWS— WHAT DOES THAT SAY ABOUT ME AS A LEADER— I WOULD SAY SONNY IS A GEM AND GENUINE. SUCH AND SUCH DATES I ADDRESSED SONNY ABOUT THE CHECK MARKED CONCERNS AND THEY CONTINUED ON SO I AM TIME STAMPING AND WELL DOCUMENTING HOW I CAME TO THAT FINAL CONCLUSION VERSUS IT BEING SOME GENERAL OPINION AS I AM THE LEADER OF SONNY AND THIS IS WHERE I SEE HIM—I MEAN SHAUN MCKINNON FROM AZCENTRAL LABELED SONNY A BOURBON-HOUND AND I HAVE BEEN WITH HIM 3 YEARS THIS 8-23-11 ALMOST 24/7—FEW OFF TIMES—AND IN IT I CAN FACTUALLY STATE SONNY IS NOT A BOURBON-HOUND BUT WHEN HE DOES…HE SURE DOES KNOW HOW TO ENJOY HIS LIFE…SO SAY I LIKE SONNY AND I WANT SONNY TO THINK I LIKE HIM AND I PUT OUT WORDS LIKE OLD MARRIED COUPLE AND HE IS THINKING “OH…THIS LADY WRITES AND SPEAKS PUBLICLY SO SWEET ABOUT ME BEING THIS GEM…I THINK I COULD HAVE A CHANCE TO BE NEXT IN LINE TO BE THE LEADER HERE…I MEAN I SHOULD BE NEXT IN LINE…I CREATED THE WHOLE THING”…BUT THEN THERE IS JOY WHO IS GROOMED A CERTAIN WAY IN LIFE AS A LEADER AND I AM SEEING MORE POTENTIAL IN ANOTHER MAN TO BECOME THE LEADER BUT I STILL HAVE THE GEM HERE I PUBLICLY STATED WILL BE GROOMED FOR MY JOB SO HOW CAN I GET THE ONE I REALLY WANT GROOMED TO BE THE LEADER WITHOUT ANY PUBLIC SHAKE-UPS ESPECIALLY FROM THIS UNIQUE SOUTHWESTERN SONNY I CREATED THE IMAGE HE WAS NEXT IN LINE…OHHH—OK, THE CHECK MARK AREA—MORE DAMAGING THAN ONE REALLY KNOWS—BECAUSE LOOK AT YOU ALL NOW—YOU AND ONLY YOU THAT WHO DO NOT KNOW THE MEN ARE ON HERE NOT TALKING ABOUT FOLKS WHO KNOW THE MEN BUT THE ONES WHO DON’T—ARE MAKING COMMENTS OF YOUR OWN HYPOTHETICAL WITH NO WAY TO DOCUMENT HOW YOU REACHED TO THIS POINT BUT REMEMBER LIKE THE SUN SET AND RISES THEORY I MENTION ON THIS PAGE OVER TIME—WHAT IS SHOWN IS NOT ALWAYS WHAT IT IS—I TELL PEOPLE STRAIGHT UP I AM MARRIED AND BEEN WITH MY HUSBAND FOR ALMOST ROUNDING UP THE THIRTY YEAR MARK AND FACTS YET DUE TO SEVERE TRAUMA I FACED EARLY IN LIFE THE DYNAMICS TO WHAT MAKES JOY—JOY IS NOT EASILY EXPLAINED BUT PRESCOTT VALLEY COUNSELOR SET COUNSELING GAIL EDWARDS EVALUATED SONNY AND I WAS THE SIDE KICK THERE AND SHE HAS SEEN US AS INDIVIDUALS AND AS OUR HIKING JOURNEY AND SHE JUST SAID THIS WEEK DEEPLY KNOWING US PERSONALLY AND RAW NOT WHAT WE APPEAR TO BE—SHE CAN GIVE YOU THE CORRECT ASSESSMENT AS TO HOW VERY UNIQUE AND WONDERFUL IT IS– OUR JOURNEY AND GAIL HIKED WITH ME AND SHE KNOWS MY HUSBAND AND SHE UNDERSTANDS IT AND APPLAUDS THIS SPECIAL MOMENT—SO PLEASE WHEN READING PEOPLE’S THEORIES AND SOME HAVE SOME GOOD POINTS BUT LIKE I TOLD SONNY DO NOT PUT OUT STUFF PUBLICLY UNLESS WE CAN SHARE HOW WE CAME TO THAT CONCLUSION. LIKE IN THESE EVALUATIONS IF THEY SAID THE REMARKS WITH CO-WORKER CONCERNS—LABEL A FILE # TO REDIRECT IT TO WHERE THEY CAN LEARN ABOUT THE CONCERN IN MORE DEPTH—I GET THE EVALUATION IS LIKE MY SOAP NOTES FOR MY MEDICAL DOCTOR BUT IN THE END THOSE SOAP NOTES CAN BE PROVED WITH MRIS/CAT SCANS/THERMOGRAMS/ETCS —ANYONE FOLLOWING WHAT I MEAN—JUST BOTHERS ME WHEN PEOPLE GUESS ERIC MARSH TO BE AT CERTAIN LOCATIONS AND YET NOT NUMBER ONE NEVER EVEN HIKED IT OR GOT THE GENERAL IDEA NOT ENOUGH DOCUMENTATION TO PROPERLY MAKE ASSESSMENTS—BUT HEY MAYBE SOME LOVED ONE OF THE GMHS HAS DETAILS AND CAN’T SAY AND IT WILL ALL COME OUT IN THE COURT TRIALS—JOHN DOUGHERTY WAS EMAILED A COPY OF THE PHOTOS IN QUESTION THAT SONNY BROUGHT ATTENTION TO HERE WHEN HE WAS IN MONTANA—
I will say if a Div. Sup. that was not attached to the crew had ask them to go off the mountain There may have been a different story. TRUST
OR EVEN A MORE DIFFERENT STORY—AND IT MAY TAKE THE LOVED ONES OF THE GMHS TO FINALLY OPEN UP WITH PURITY IN THE COURT ROOM ON THAT—
While you went around in circles the pay ain’t that bad.
Definitely almost double Min, Wage.
BREAKS MY HEART—THE TOPIC OF PAY—LAST NIGHT I HEARD A YARNELL LOCAL STATE THAT AS WELL AS THESE MEN KNEW THEY HAVE A DANGEROUS JOB BUT WE LOST OUR LIFE IN THAT FIRE AND I RECONFIRM TO THEM “NO, THE 19 MEN DID” AND “WHO KNOWS HOW MUCH THAT BURNING DATURA PLAYED A ROLE IN THE DECISION PROCESS BECAUSE I JOY WAS MAKING POOR CHOICES THAT DAY TOO” BUT SONNY NEVER STAYED IN THE SAME AREA LONG ENOUGH JUST CAME BACK FOR ME BUT I WAS IN AREA OF THAT ABUNDANCE DATURA—”
ALSO NEW NOTE: HOLLY BECKER IS WILLING TO SHARE TO PEOPLE INVESTIGATING THIS–HER SNAIL MAIL IS PO BOX 57 YARNELL ARIZONA 85362. SHE IS NEAR THE HELMS AREA. YOU CAN GO TO THE LOCAL REAL ESTATE OFFICE AND HEAR DORMAN OLSON WHO LOST HIS HOME OR NINABILL OVERMEYER BUT NOT SURE WHAT THEY CAN OR WILL SHARE BUT I CAN SAY IN TALKING TO DORMAN IT WAS MORE LIKE 5PM WHEN HIS AREA WAS ON FIRE SO NOW YOU ARE SEEING TOO MUCH OF A VERBAL GAP OF 3:38PM-5PM AND YET HE DOES HAVE TIME STAMP PHOTOS. I HOPE THAT HELPS PEOPLE IN THEIR ASSESSING PROCESS. I AM PULLING WEEDS BY HANDS AND MEETING ALL KINDS OF LOCALS IN DOING THAT—I RECKON THE OL’ YOU CAN DO MY WEEDS NEXT TALK—BUT CRYSTAL STATED LAST NIGHT MAUGHAN RANCH STILL WANTS TO CATCH UP OUT THERE ON THEIR LAND TO ARREST US AND I AM AGAIN PUBLICLY STATING YCSO TOLD MANY OF US THERE IS NOTHING MAUGHAN RANCH CAN DO LEGALLY OR MAKE AN ARREST WITH OPEN CATTLE GROUND AND NO FENCE OR NOT EVEN POSTING NO TRESPASSING BUT LEGALLY THE OLD GRADER IS ON THEIR LAND AND PARTS OF THE MOUNTAINS SO YOU ALL ARE AWARE SO IF THEY WANT TO ARREST ME THAN I GOT PHOTO PROOF OF MANY WHO VIOLATED IT AND IT WILL NOT STAND UP—HEY I AM NOT THRILL SEEKING PEOPLE OUT THERE—THIS IS TO MAKE SURE ALL AREAS ARE LOOKED AT—LIKE CHEMICAL COMPOUNDS/FULGURITES IN AREA OF THE REPORTED LIGHTNING STRIKE TO HOW THESE MEN MADE SUCH A WRONG DECISION BUT SONNY MADE THE RIGHT ONE BECAUSE WE 2 ARE ALIVE. SIMPLICITY AND PURITY IS ALL I WANT TO SEE FROM THIS—
I WOULD BE GREAT ON THAT JURY FOR COURT BECAUSE I AM NOT A CHEERLEADER TO ANY SIDE, NO AGENDA, NO ANGLE YET I WILL NOT ACCEPT PEOPLE BASH ERIC MARSH, WILLIS OR STEED JUST BECAUSE WHAT YOU READ—AND ASSUME THAT IS WHAT IT IS—
I replied to a few comments this week—some say moderation awaiting and some never posted but says “duplicate” if I try and I emailed John D.
But I did reply to people’s ?s just so you know
**
** ARIZONA STATE ENGINE 151 – UPDATE
This post is an ‘update’ to the research that appeared not long ago regardiing Arizona State ‘Engine 151’.
It will contain links to a new photo of ‘Engine 151’ that was taken when it was ‘staged’ at the Yarnell Fire Station and now shows the entire RIGHT side of the vehicle… as well as some new information about the actual CREW members for ‘Engine 151’.
There is still no positive ID on the FF who was driving ‘Engie 151’ when it was assisting with operations on Model Creek Road and who is obviously wearing his own ‘Go Pro’ Helmet Camera… but it *might* be an FF named Phil Bruglio.
If that Helmet Cam was ‘in use’ that day… there is still a good chance it may have captured some background radio transmissions at crucial times that haven’t been heard yet.
** THE GEORGE DELANGE PHOTO OF ENGINE 151
On Saturday, June 29, 2013, Yarnell resident George Delange was at the Yarnell Hill Fire station just before dark. He climbed the hill to the EAST of the Fire Station and at exactly 8:03 PM he took a photo looking WEST at the fire out on Yarnell Hill.
In the bottom right corner of this photo he captured ASFD Engine 151 ‘staged’ in the dirt parking lot just to the EAST of the Yarnell Fire Station.
THIS time… we can see the DRIVER’S SIDE of Engine 151.
It still doesn’t look much like a ‘real’ Engine ( as compared to others that were there in Yarnell ) but that all-black cylindrical object seen in other photos at the top of the truck bed on the DRIVER’S side does, in fact, look much more like a HOSE REEL than a SPARE TIRE. Also… the official resource order for Engine 151 says it only had a 300 gallon tank onboard so that could easily be it seen in the Delange photo mounted in the CENTER of the ‘flatbed’.
George Delange’s Yarnell Hill Fire page ( photo with Engine 151 is second one from top with Engine 151 seen in bottom right corner ) is located at the following URL…
http://www.delange.org/Yarnell_Forest_Fire/Yarnell_Forest_Fire.htm
Caption under the photo…
Photo Of The Yarnell Hill Forest Fire That Started From A
Lightning Strike On June 28, 2013 In The Evening.
Yarnell Fire Station At The Bottom Of The Photo.
This Photo Taken On June 29 At 8:03 PM.
Click On This Photo For A Video Of
The Yarnell Forest Fire. 31.2 MB.
Here is a corresponding entry in Russ Shumate’s official ‘Unit Logs’ from Yarnell covering Saturday, June 29, 2013. This is the Shumate Unit Log that was released ‘late’ by the SAIT as part of that ‘second’ release of Unit Logs that didn’t take place until February 27, 2014.
This log entry of Shumate’s proves that ‘Engine 151’ was, in fact, staged at the Yarnell Hill Fire station on Saturday evening.
—————————————————————————
Russ Shumate Unit Log for Saturday, June 29, 2013
1530 released VFD and BLM engines back to home units. BLM had their severity engines staged in Yarnell, I released BLM 1660 back to BLM severity. Eng 151 stayed on scene staged at YFD.
—————————————————————————
So Engine 151 ended up ‘staged’ at the Yarnell Hill Fire station later in the afternoon on Saturday and Mr. Delange’s photo captures it still ‘staged’ there at 8:03 PM.
** RESOURCE ORDER FOR ENGINE 151
The actual ‘resource order’ for Engine 151 is the very FIRST Resource Order in the ‘J- Resource Orders’ PDF file sitting in the online Dropbox that contains all the SAIT FOIA / FOIL material.
The ‘Resource Order’ for Engine 151 was not accompanied by any ‘sub-orders’ for the crew members itself… but the ‘Resource Confirmation Notes’ for this ‘order’ end up mentioning at least two of the assigned crew members.
The Resource order for Engine 151 is as follows…
—————————————————————————
Request Number: E-1
Ordered Date/Time: 06/28/13 2118 PNT
From: AZ-ADC (Dispatch) 800-309-7081
To: AZ-ADC
Qty: 1
Resource Requested: Engine, Type 5
Needed Date/Time: 06/29/13 0800 PNT
Deliver To: YARNELL HILL
From Unit: AZ-ADC
To Unit: AZ-ADC
Assigned Date/Time: 06/28/13 2121 PNT
Resource Assigned Unit ID: AZ-A1S ( Arizona Division of Forestry )
Resource Assigned: ENGINE – T5 – AZ-A1S – LIC# G578EG –
PHOENIX – E-151 (2006 INTL 4200 – 300 GAL) (AZ-ADC)
M/D Ind.: D
Estimated Time of Departure: 07/02/13 1400 PNT
Estimated Time of Arrival: 07/02/13 1600 PNT
Released Date: 07/02/13 1400 PNT
Release To: AZSF PREPARED SEVERITY 2
Travel Mode: ( No Entry )
Financial Code: AZ-A1S-130688
Special Needs: ( No Entry )
Reporting Instructions: ( No Entry )
————————————————————————————-
SIDENOTE: Odd things about this resource order…
It says this E-151 Engine was ORDERED late at night on Friday, June 28, 2013… but then the ‘Estimated Time of Departure’ is listed as 1400 ( 2:00 PM ) on July 2, 2013. It then also says it was ‘Released’ at the exact same moment ( 2:00 PM on July 2 ) even though the estimated time of ‘Arrival’ is being listed as 2 hours later at 1600 ( 4:00 PM ) on July 2, 2013.
Ordered Date/Time: 06/28/13 2118 PNT
Estimated Time of Departure: 07/02/13 1400 PNT
Estimated Time of Arrival: 07/02/13 1600 PNT
Released Date: 07/02/13 1400 PNT
So this was obviously just some kind of ‘backfill’ order being created ( or updated ) on July 2 but it doesn’t SAY it is a ‘backfill’ order like others in the same document do if that’s what they really are.
** AZ-A1S Unit ID explained…
In case there was any doubt that this ‘Engine 151’ was dispatched from the ‘Phoenix’ area…
From the official Government list of ‘Unit ID’s….
Geographic Area: SW
State: AZ
Unit_ID: A1S
Unit: Arizona – Phoenix District
Unit Type: US State
Department: AZ
Agency: DVF ( Divisiona of Forestry )
* FULFILLMENT NOTES FOR ORDER E-1 MENTION WILL BREWER, PHIL BRUGLIO
From page 121 ( of 213 pages ) in the official ‘J- Resource Orders’ document…
Req No.: E-1
Documentation: Request E-1 – Engine, Type 5 – [AZ-A1S-130688] YARNELL HILL
has been filled with ENGINE – T5 – AZ-A1S – LIC# G578EG – PHOENIX – E-151
(2006 INTL 4200 – 300 GAL) (AZADC) by NORVAL TYLER@AZ-ADC ROSS.
Entered By: NORVAL TYLER (AZADC) 06/28/2013 2121 PNT
Req No.: E-1
Documentation: WILL BREWER, PHIL BRUGLIO
Entered By: NORVAL TYLER (AZADC) 06/28/2013 2121 PNT
So even though there were no sub-resource orders for the Engine 151 crew itself we now see at least TWO of the assigned CREW members ( Engine bosses? ) named.
Will Brewer ( who we already knew about ) and Phil Bruglio.
** MORE ABOUT STATE ENGINE 151 CREW MEMBERS
We now know about William Brewer and Phil Bruglio.
As shown above… they are both mentioned in the actual E-1 Resource Order fulfillment notes in ‘J- Resource Orders’ document.
Here’s some other evidence of who else was on the State Engine 151 crew…
From Darrell Willis’ own typed ‘Unit Log’ notes ( that weren’t released by
the SAIT until February 27, 2014 )…
——————————————————————–
Incident Name: Yarnell Hill
Date Prepared: 7/22/13
Unit Name/Designators: Structure Group #1
Unit Leader ( Name and Position ): Darrell Willis, DIVS / Group Sup.
SIDENOTE: So here we see Darrell Willis officially saying that he considered
HIMSELF to be BOTH a DIVS and and SPGS at the Yarnell Hill Fire.
Operational Period: Night/Day: 6/29 – 6/30
Prepared By ( Name and Position ): Darrell Willis,
DIVS / Group Supervisor, ( this information was taken from my notes from 6/29/13 ).
Personnel Roster Assigned:
Name – ICS Position – Home Base
——————————————————————–
BLM E-3665, Shawn +3 – Engine
TNF E-58, Sawyer +5 – Engine
BLM E1660, Larwoc + 5 – Engine
AZ State E-151, Phil +5 – Engine
Bruce Olsen BLM – TNSP – Wearver BLM Station
Yuma DOC Crew +20 – Crew – Yuma
Todd Foster AZ-Tempe Fire Department – TFLD TF#1 – Tempe Fire Department
Cory Moser – TFLD(t) – Prescott Fire Department
Groom Creek Structure Protection Trailer +2 – Equipment – Groom Creek Fire Department
WT-1
E-61
E-156
WT-401
Brush 441
WT 304
Other resources assigned to TF#1 unknown.
——————————————————————–
NOTE: Willis’ entry for E-151 is as follows…
AZ State E-151, Phil +5 – Engine
The ‘Phil’ that Willis is referring to must be ‘Phil Bruglio’ who also shows up assigned to E-151 in the official ‘J- Resource Orders’ document but only as a ‘sidenote’ in the ‘fulfillment note’ for E-151.
Willis tended to only list the names of ‘Engine bosses’ so this entry in Willi’s Unit Log would tend to confirm that Phil Bruglio was, in fact, one of the ‘Engine bosses’ for ‘Engine 151’.
NOTE: There is still no actual resource order for either Phil Bruglio or William Brewer in the official ‘J- Resource Orders’ document.
So ( according to Darrell Willis ) the COUNT of individuals that actually accompanied E-151 seems to be FIVE and we KNOW that two of them were Phil Bruglio and William Brewer. If that really is ( Non FF? ) Larz Garcia in E-151 taking those photos then he would be a THIRD identifiable crew member for E-151. That still leaves TWO E-151 crew members unidentified. One of those ‘unidentified’ crew members would seem to be the one who was driving E-151 up on Model Creek Road and the one wearing the ‘Go-Pro’ Helmet-Cam.
** Barry Scott – Former E-151 Crew Member… ( Rest in Peace ).
Back in November of 2012… someone named ‘Barry Scott’ who was a ‘frequent crew member on State Engine 151’ died of a heart attack…
Central Arizona Wildland Response Team Meeting Notes
Date: November 7, 2012
Location: Tempe Fire Training Center
State Fire Updates – Jim Downey & Will Brewer
Jim announced that Barry Scott from ADEM passed away as a result of a heart attack.
Barry was a part of the ADEM/ASFD Type 2 Team organization and was a frequent crew member on State Engine 151 out of the Phoenix District. Barry will be greatly missed.
This post will be continued with some ‘replies’ in order to obey the ‘one link per post’ rule.
Direct link to the photo showing Engine 151 in bottom right corner…
http://www.delange.org/Yarnell_Forest_Fire/Yarnell_Forest_Fire_1.jpg
Phil Bruglio ( who is named as one of the other members of the crew of Engine 151 in both the official resource order fulfillment notes AND in Darrell Willis’ Unit Log’ ) has a PUBLIC Facebook page.
Phil Bruglio’s PUBLIC Facebook page ( Has a Smokey the Bear background image )…
https://www.facebook.com/pdbruglio
Lots of Arizona Forestry Wildland photos and photos of him in Nomex shirts fighting Arizona fires.
He updates fairly regularly and there are lots of PUBLIC entires on his ‘Timeline’ but there is NO mention of Yarnell or of him ever ‘being there’ on his Facebook timeline.
Looks like he used to work for Yarnell Fire Department?
He posts pictures of a Ball Cap with ‘Yarnell Fire’ on it but the date is in May of 2010.
One of his posts in December of 2010 verifies that he was working with ‘Departement of Corrections’ ( DOC ) crews.
In March of 2011 he says he is ‘starting new job with Arizona State Forestry’…
Phil Bruglio said…
——————————————————————————
March 29, 2011
Things r slow but i am looking forward to starting my new job on monday.
State Forestry here i come and hopefully it will be a busy but safe season.
——————————————————————————
There are also plenty of PUBLIC pictures of him there on his Facebook site, including his own PUBLIC Facebook Profile picture… but he still does NOT look like ( to me, anyway ) the FF who was driving Engine 151 and wearing that ‘Go Pro’ Helmet Camera.
William Brewer, the other KNOWN crew member of Engine 151 ( and also an Engine Boss along with Phil Bruglio ) has a PUBLIC Twitter account…
William Brewer’s PUBLIC Twitter page is HERE…
https://twitter.com/WRBrewer
From his own Twitter page banner…
Arizona State Forestry Division
Assistant Fire Management Officer for the Phoenix District
Phoenix, AZ
Joined Twitter April 2012
William Brewer also runs the ‘Fire Wise’ program for Arizona Forestry.
Here is the March 2014 ‘Highlands at the Rim’ Community Newsletter that talks about the program and about William Brewer…
http://nebula.wsimg.com/5b93395cae9d67e947b62bef25aa64d6?AccessKeyId=D977F7DAE68B3035EB7B&disposition=0&alloworigin=1
* Photo of William Brewer
William Brewer was a 2011 graduate of the Northern Arizona State University School of Forestry. A good, clear picture of him in is their PUBLIC ‘Class of 2011’ document.
From Northern Arizona State University School of Forestry – Class of 2011
https://nau.edu/uploadedFiles/Academic/CEFNS/Forestry/News_Events/AnnualYield2011.pdf
William Brewer’s picture is on page 9 of this PDF file.
WARNING: This ‘Annual Yeild’ publication from the NASU School of Forestry is a HUGE PDF file with tons of large pictures in it so it takes a long time to load and will not appear in your browser until the full load has completed. Takes 1 to 2 full minutes over an average speed DSL connection.
NOTE: This is a VERY good picture of William Brewer and he also does NOT appear to resemble whoever was actually driving Engine 151 in the other photos and clearly wearing that ‘Go Pro’ Helmet Camera in Yarnell on Sunday, June 30, 2013.
* William Brewer at ‘Smallwood’, May 1-3, 2012 – Flagstaff, AZ
William Brewer attended this same ‘2012 Smallwood’ event as Larz Garcia and Scott Hunt, ( who is the actual head of Arizona Forestry ).
http://www.forestprod.org/ckfinder/userfiles/files/Final%20Attendee%20List.pdf
From the list of ‘attendees’ for 2012…
William Brewer
Phoenix District Asst.
Fire Management Officer
Arizona State Forestry Divison
1110 W Washington St Ste 100
Phoenix, AZ 85007-2957
(623) 445-0274
[email protected]
Larz Garcia
Arizona State Forestry Divison
1110 W Washington St Ste 100
Phoenix, AZ 85007-2957
(602) 364-1546
[email protected]
Scott Hunt
State Forester
Arizona State Forestry Division
(602) 771-1412
[email protected]
NOTE to Mr. John Dougherty.
I accidentally left ‘AT’ signs in this posting for the email addresses so it got bounced into ‘moderation’. This ‘reply’ can be deleted. It’s already been reposted correctly underneath this one.
* Smallwood, May 1-3, 2012 – Flagstaff, AZ
NOTE: William Brewer attended this same ‘Smallwood’ event as Larz Garcia and
Scott Hunt, head of Arizona Forestry.
http://www.forestprod.org/ckfinder/userfiles/files/Final%20Attendee%20List.pdf
From the list of ‘attendees’ for 2012…
William Brewer
Phoenix District Asst.
Fire Management Officer
Arizona State Forestry Divison
1110 W Washington St Ste 100
Phoenix, AZ 85007-2957
(623) 445-0274
Email: willbrewer ( at ) azsf.gov
Larz Garcia
Arizona State Forestry Divison
1110 W Washington St Ste 100
Phoenix, AZ 85007-2957
(602) 364-1546
Email: larzgarcia ( at ) azsf.gov
Scott Hunt
State Forester
Arizona State Forestry Division
(602) 771-1412
Email: scotthunt ( at ) azsf.gov
On Saturday, June 29, 2013, Yarnell resident George Delange was at the Yarnell Hill Fire station just before dark. He climbed the hill to the EAST of the Fire Station and at exactly 8:03 PM he took a photo looking WEST at the fire out on Yarnell Hill.
—reply from Joy
that photo is taken from the Yarnell Church above the fire station driveway-
I thank George for posting all his accounts online for you all…their website is how I began to extend out my hikes 9 years ago to the surrounding communities—he had some neat stuff on his site that in the Summer time I would hike from Glen Ilah to Congress then each Summer extending it to Yarnell then Peeples Valley then Skull Valley/Wilhoit then Prescott/Prescott Valley…we hiked from Prescott Valley yesterday after my blood labs and Katie picked us up some point going out the windy 89 way South—thank you Katie of B&L flooring…perfect timing…
Sonny went hiking for his pleasure today due to the good rains over near the Radio Tower to Stanton area…we will this week be focused on looking for things more towards Childers Wells area to hwy 89 on Congress side—
Still no new news on the Yarnell suicide hiker Mark Danielson or Glenn Taylor.
I also will be pulling weeds again so any homeowner updates—let you know—
Reply to Joy A Collura post on August 23, 2014 at 7:14 pm
>> WTKTT said…
>>
>> On Saturday, June 29, 2013, Yarnell resident George Delange was at
>> the Yarnell Hill Fire station just before dark. He climbed the hill to
>> the EAST of the Fire Station and at exactly 8:03 PM he took a photo
>> looking WEST at the fire out on Yarnell Hill.
>>
>> Reply from Joy Collura…
>>
>> that photo is taken from the Yarnell Church above the
>> fire station driveway
Yes. Actually… it looks like it is possible that Mr. Delange was all the way up on Crest Way when he shot the photo looking WEST.
It’s also the same location where Dakota Sloan would then shoot one of his EIGHT separate videos on Sunday, June 30, 2013.
This one…
Dakota Sloan – Movie 4 – Sunday, June 30, 2013 – circa 4:30 PM.
Shot from the Presbyterian Church parking lot up on Crest Way
and just above the Yarnell Fire Station…
http://www.facebook.com/video/embed?video_id=483080345107755
Thanks for this.
Have you read William Brewer’s ADOSH interview?
I did several times.
It will add both more clarity and more confusion to what you are documenting here. Which is why I bailed out of spending the time it would take to write my narrative of this engine.
Brewer, although the Engine Boss, wasn’t always with the Engine. That means Phil was.
The night that photo was taken, Brewer was working with Shumate, in the YFD building, which was, at that time, the ICP.
According to Brewer, the Engine then was sent to guard the Horseshoe Dip for the night. Which didn’t even, as far as I know, exist at that time. This really confused me a lot.
The next thing we “know”, Darrell Willis’ log shows the Engine assigned out at Double A Bar Ranch that night. Brewer doesn’t mention this anywhere.
So it appears to me that Brewer wasn’t paying that much attention to where that engine was that night.
So, at some point in time, apparently, the Engine/crew was then directed to head back into the the ICP to “mitigate” i.e. rest/sleep. I can’t tell exactly when that occurred. But I don’t think they were fighting the Double A Bar Ranch fire Sunday morning.
During Sunday morning Brewer was working at the ICP. Apparently still thinking the Engine was at the Horseshoe Dip. Because he never mentions anything about the Engine being out at the Double A Bar Ranch, assigned to Structure Protection Group 2/Darrell Willis.
So then both he and them take a rest break. Until 3:00-ish.
And then a group of several people arrive to help relieve them. I don’t know if that includes what he calls “the chase truck.” But it’s pretty clear both he and his Assistant Engine Boss are somewhat “relieved.”
And then the Engine goes out to assist SPG2/Darrell Willis in the backfire op from the intersection of Model Creek Road/Double A Bar Ranch Road to the west. (Where the photo is taken).
He is not driving the Engine, he’s functioning as a sawyer. I’m guessing that Phil isn’t driving the Engine either, since he is being (according to Brewer’s interview) also relieved by another relief Engine Boss. They’re really pushing their time-limits. I’m totally working out of my brain here, not digging into stuff. So if somebody needs to identify the driver (which I feel no need to do) I would look at the relief crew to identify him.
I totally don’t believe Larz Garcia took these photos. I seriously don’t believe he was authorized to be on that Engine. I think they must have been taken by somebody else who was on that engine, and handed to possibly Brewer, who then handed them to Larz Garcia.
What difference does any of this make? I have no idea.
I have been trying to edumacate myself as to what was going on on the rest of the Yarnell Hill Fire, besides what involved the Granite Mountain Hotshots. For a variety of reasons.
I guess, to me, what this narrative about this Engine tells me (besides helping me learn more about what was going on on that region of the fire) is that Brewer, the official Engine Boss, was, for a chunk of time, not all that situationally aware of what his Engine was doing. I’m not altogether sure what that means.
**
** TIME ESTIMATE CORRECTION
**
** EVEN IF FRISBY HAD CONTINUED ON FOR THE SECOND FACE-TO-FACE
** HE PROBABLY COULD NOT HAVE ARRIVED UNTIL 1549 ( NOT 1546 )…
On August 20, 2014 at 3:04 pm, WTKTT said…
>> Reply to calvin post on August 20, 2014 at 3:18 am
>>
>> calvin said…
>>
>> So if Frisby had not stopped the UTV, picked up Mcdonough,
>> and did a 180, he would have been up to the meeting spot
>> circa 1546.
>>
>> WTKTT responded…
>>
>> Yes. Possibly +- 60 seconds or so.
This post is a CORRECTION for what I said the other day.
I was using the actual Blue Ridge GPS tracking data to estimate how long it took the BR UTV to make that ‘trip’ from the old-grader up to the parking spot for the face-to-face… but I forgot to add something to the overall time.
Even though Frisby didn’t actually continue on from the old-grader circa 1542 when he had just picked up Brendan… Frisby and Brown actually made that SAME ‘trip’ from the old-grader up to the ‘anchor point area’ THREE other times that day and all THREE of these trips were recorded by Brown’s GPS unit.
On the THIRD trip ( during the ground rescue mission ) they were, in fact able to get from the old-grader up to the two-track on the high ridge in just 4 ( FOUR ) minutes… but I forgot to add the additional ‘leg’ of the trip from the ‘T’ intersection NORTH on the two-track to the point where they had ‘parked’ for that first face-to-face.
On that THIRD trip… it took them another 3 ( THREE ) minutes for that additional short trip NORTH on the two-track from the ‘T’ intersection.
So going back to what I said earlier about it perhaps only taking Frisby 4 minutes to have gotten to the same ‘parking spot’ from the old-grader for the second face-to-face… that ‘total time’ looks more like 7 minutes.
So, realistically, if there had been no ‘Brendan’ situation down there by that old-grader and Frisby had just ‘continued on’ for that second face-to-face meeting with Marsh… Frisby could probably NOT have arrived at that same ‘parking spot’ for the first face-to-face anytime before 1549 ( 1542 plus 7 minutes, not just 4 minutes ).
It should be noted, however, that the FIRST time Frisby and Brown made this trip up from the old-grader for the first face-to-face… they were going VERY slowly and the whole trip from the old-grader to that parking spot actually took them 15 ( FIFTEEN ) minutes.
That ‘climb’ up to the high-ridge is known to have been VERY steep and that road was really ROCKY… so the FIRST time they were headed up there in the UTV they were taking it really easy and making sure the UTV wasn’t going to ‘bottom out’ anywhere.
My estimate for how long after 1542 it might have been before Frisby could have made it up for the second face-to-face is actually based on the THIRD recorded trip… because I think that proves that since Frisby was already familiar with ‘the trip route’ and he knew the way already… he would probably have been moving just as quickly up there for the second face-to-face as the GPS data shows him moving on that THIRD trip up there following the deployment.
So scratch 1546 as the ‘earliest possible time’ Frisby could have arrived at the same ‘parking spot’ for the second face-to-face if he had ‘continued on’.
The ‘earliest possible time’ for that arrival now looks like 1549.
I don’t think this changes much in relation to the discussion about where Marsh might have been at 1542… but it does add several MINUTES to the time he would have had to make it to the expected ‘meeting’ location from wherever he might have been crica 1542.
The rest of this ( SHORT STORY and LONG STORY ) are just more detail about all this and a reprint of the actual BR GPS tracking data for all THREE of these recorded trips.
** THE SHORT STORY
There is actually Blue Ridge GPS tracking data that shows Frisby and Brown making that same ‘climb’ up from the old-grader to the high-ridge two-track THREE different times that day.
The FIRST trip was, of course, when they were both headed up there for that initial 11:53 AM to 12:25 PM face-to-face meeting with Steed and Marsh.
Frisby ‘abandonded’ his attempt to make that leg of the trip later in the day for that second face-to-face requested by Marsh.
However… later on… during the ‘ground rescue mission’… they actually made this same ‘climb’ in the UTV from the old-grader to the upper two-track road TWO more times.
So there are THREE separate sets of ‘travel data’ to compare to in order to estimate how long it *might* have taken Frisby to make the same ‘last leg’ of the trip if he HAD decided to continue up for that second face-to-face.
The FIRST time Frisby and Brown made the trip it took them 7 minutes to travel from the old-grader up to that ‘T’ intersection with the high-ridge two-track, and then it took them ANOTHER 8 minutes to work their way NORTH up to that ‘parking spot’ for the face-to-face meeting.
Total ‘trip’ time from old-grader to ‘parking spot’ for the first face-to-face: 15 minutes.
The SECOND time Frisby and Brown made the trip it only took them 5 minutes to travel from the old-grader up to that ‘T’ intersection with the high-ridge two-track. When they reached that ‘T’ intersection this SECOND time they did NOT continue NORTH on the upper two-track like they did for that first face-to-face. This time… they were suddenly told to go right back DOWN the two-track they just came up on to go check out something that Ranger 58 thought was ‘important’ and they were ‘hovering’ over it back down the slope ( which turned out to just be the old-grader itself )… so we don’t have a ‘time’ for this second part of the full trip up to that same ‘parking spot’ where the first face-to-face happened. If we just ‘assume’ that it would have probably taken the same amount of time this time… then it would have taken the same additional 8 minutes to travel from the ‘T’ intersection to the previous face-to-face ‘parking spot’.
Total ‘trip’ time from old-grader to same ‘parking spot’ for this ‘second’ trip: 13 minutes.
The THIRD time Frisby and Brown made the trip it only took them 4 minutes to travel from the old-grader up to that ‘T’ intersection with the high-ridge two-track, and then it only took them ANOTHER 3 minutes to work their way NORTH up to the ‘anchor point’ near that same ‘parking spot’ used for the first face-to-face meeting.
For this THIRD trip all the way up from the old-grader… the UTV hit a spot on the two-track that was only 98 feet beyond where they ‘parked’ it for the first face-to-face, so this THIRD trip was basically identical to the full route taken for that first face-to-face meeting but this time they ‘knew the roads’ so it went much faster.
Total ‘trip’ time from old-grader to ‘parking spot’ for this ‘third’ trip: 7 minutes.
SUMMARY
So based on all the ‘trip information’ above it looks like the ‘earliest possible time’ that Frisby could have made the same trip in the 1542 timeframe and arrived back up at that same ‘parking spot’ used for the first face-to-face would be 1549 ( 1542 plus 7 minutes ).
** THE LONG STORY
This is just even more ‘detail’ about the THREE recorded ‘trips’ in the UTV from the old-grader location on up to the high-ridge two-track.
** THE FIRST TRIP
Here is the full Blue Ridge GPS tracking data that shows how long it took both Frisby and Brown to make it up to the anchor area from the old-grader when they went up for that FIRST face-to face meeting with Marsh and Steed.
This is the ‘full beginning’ of the GPS tracking data which also shows them ‘getting lost’ at first and going up that other northwest jeep trail which was actually a ‘dead end’. It didn’t go all the way up to the high-ridge two-track. Frisby and Brown then had to turn around but now the data shows them just ‘passing’ the old-grader without stopping and then heading up the RIGHT WAY to the face-to-face.
This SECOND part of the start data is then an accurate reflection of how long it took two guys in a UTV to ‘make that climb’ from the old-grader all the way to the ‘parking spot’ for the face-to face.
The only caveat here is that this is the FIRST time they tried to take that UTV up there and this leg of the trip has been reported to be VERY steep and VERY rocky… even for a UTV.
So this FIRST TRIP up there might have been VERY SLOW.
They didn’t want to ‘wreck’ or otherwise ‘bottom out’ that UTV.
———————————————————————
* DATA COLUMNS:
Time – Latitude, Longitude – Distance traveled (feet) – Rate (mph) – Description
* THE FULL TRACKING DATA
1100 – BLUE RIDGE GPS TRACKING VIDEO STARTS
1101 – 1109 – VIDEO is running but tracking pointer doesn’t appear until ten minutes later at 1110
1110 – 34.231428, -112.782608 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Pointer appears near old-grader
1111 – 34.231428, -112.782608 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1112 – 34.231464, -112.782528 – 0023.050 – 00.26 – Slight movement east on two-track
1113 – 34.231464, -112.782528 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1114 – 34.231311, -112.783531 – 0343.066 – 03.90 – Back west to old-grader itself
1115 – 34.231362, -112.783678 – 0054.318 – 00.62 – Slight movement to west of old-grader
1116 – 34.231309, -112.783705 – 0018.698 – 00.21 – Slight movement south in grader clearing
1117 – 34.231309, -112.783705 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1118 – 34.231309, -112.783705 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1119 – 34.231309, -112.783705 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1120 – 34.231309, -112.783705 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1121 – 34.231309, -112.783705 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1122 – 34.231309, -112.783705 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1123 – 34.231367, -112.783689 – 0024.364 – 00.28 – Slight movement back north
1124 – 34.231648, -112.784110 – 0163.805 – 01.85 – Headed NW on jeep trail away from grader
1125 – 34.231955, -112.784979 – 0339.999 – 03.85 – Continuing NW on jeep trail
1126 – 34.232284, -112.785290 – 0143.944 – 01.64 – Still headed NW on jeep trail
1127 – 34.232603, -112.785602 – 0161.395 – 01.83 – Still headed NW on jeep trail
1128 – 34.232603, -112.785602 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1129 – 34.233197, -112.786809 – 0434.956 – 04.94 – Still headed NW on jeep trail
1130 – 34.233255, -112.787624 – 0249.851 – 02.84 – Still on jeep trail, now headed more west
1131 – 34.233091, -112.788166 – 0176.292 – 02.00 – Still on jeep trail, now headed west
1132 – 34.233091, -112.788166 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1133 – 34.233202, -112.787822 – 0115.505 – 01.31 – Now headed back east on jeep trail
1134 – 34.233277, -112.787340 – 0145.492 – 01.65 – Back east on jeep trail
1135 – 34.233140, -112.786701 – 0227.090 – 02.58 – Now headed SE on jeep trail
1136 – 34.232476, -112.785451 – 0439.727 – 05.00 – Still headed SW back towards old-grader
1137 – 34.231348, -112.783676 – 0737.133 – 08.38 – Arrival back at west edge of grader clearing
————————————————————————-
That concludes the first part of the tracking data showing them getting ‘lost’ and having to come BACK to the old-grader.
They have now reached the old-grader and ( without stopping ) immediately start to head up the RIGHT WAY for that face–to-face meeting…
START OF FIRST UTV TRIP FROM OLD-GRADER UP TO ANCHOR POINT
——————————————————————————-
1138 – 34.230780, -112.782903 – 0414.637 – 04.70 – Past grader, back to main two-track, then south
1139 – 34.229727, -112.782962 – 0413.506 – 04.69 – Still headed south on two-track
1140 – 34.228671, -112.782876 – 0395.696 – 04.49 – Still headed south on two-track
1141 – 34.227811, -112.782962 – 0305.242 – 03.47 – Still headed south on two-track
1142 – 34.226398, -112.783456 – 0584.841 – 06.64 – Still headed south on two-track ( to anchor pt.)
1143 – 34.225795, -112.783450 – 0236.614 – 02.68 – Still headed south on two-track
1144 – 34.225107, -112.784395 – 0345.736 – 03.92 – Still headed to anchor point, climbing to west
1145 – 34.225152, -112.785468 – 0373.750 – 04.24 – Still climbing west up to anchor point
1146 – 34.224704, -112.786186 – 0318.112 – 03.61 – At two-track junction ( Mystery panel location )
1147 – 34.225072, -112.786514 – 0178.261 – 02.03 – Heading north on two-track toward anchor point
1148 – 34.225715, -112.787088 – 0331.968 – 03.76 – Heading north on two-track toward anchor point
1149 – 34.225258, -112.787452 – 0195.187 – 02.22 – Heading north on two-track toward anchor point
1150 – 34.224872, -112.787951 – 0240.243 – 02.73 – Heading north on two-track toward anchor point
1151 – 34.225387, -112.788166 – 0210.341 – 02.41 – Heading north on two-track toward anchor point
1152 – 34.226309, -112.788616 – 0395.360 – 04.50 – Heading north on two-track toward anchor point
1153 – 34.226977, -112.789528 – 0401.875 – 04,57 – ARRIVAL at anchor point area for face-to-face with Marsh/Steed. The UTV remained ‘parked’ at this exact spot for the next 32 minutes.
—————————————————————————–
END OF FIRST UTV TRIP FROM OLD-GRADER UP TO ANCHOR POINT
Start time at old-grader: 1138 ( 11:38 AM )
Arrival at ‘T’ intersection with high-ridge two-track: 1146 ( 11:46 PM )
Total travel time from old-grader to ‘T’ intersection: 8 minutes.
Arrival up at anchor point area: 1153 ( 11:53 AM )
Total elapsed time for first trip: 15 minutes ( FIFTEEN minutes ).
** THE SECOND TRIP
Now here is the GPS tracking data from after the deployment when Frisby and Brown were on the ‘ground rescue mission’ and were leading the other two UTVs containing Clawson, Hulburd and Yowell up to that high-ridge two-track.
This is the trip where the moment they reached the ‘T’ intersection they were told to head back DOWN towards the old-grader and they did not continue north on the high-ridge two-track so this DATA is only the part of that ‘ground rescue mission’ when they were just passing the old-grader and then heading up to the anchor point area.
START OF SECOND UTV TRIP FROM OLD-GRADER UP TO ANCHOR POINT
———————————————————————————–
1743 – 34.231226, -112.782823 – 1106.700 – 12.58 – Heading west on Sesame Trail. At intersection where old-grader road meets Sesame Trail
1744 – 34.227997, -112.782780 – 1210.130 – 13.75 – Did not stop near old-grader. Now heading south on part of Sesame trail that winds around up to anchor spot
1745 – 34.226373, -112.783456 – 0639.364 – 07.27 – Climbing up to anchor point
1746 – 34.225167, -112.784207 – 0558.211 – 06.34 – Climbing up to anchor point
1747 – 34.225052, -112.785988 – 0557.149 – 06.33 – Almost at upper two-track junction near anchor.
1748 – 34.224688, -112.786160 – 0166.673 – 01.89 – Arrival at upper two-track junction near anchor. Mystery Panel location.
1749 – 34.225788, -112.783456 – 1054.910 – 11.99 – Suddenly, quickly headed back east down from anchor point on Sesame trail
1750 – 34.227997, -112.782780 – 0859.702 – 09.77 – Heading back towards old-grader location
———————————————————————————
END OF SECOND UTV TRIP FROM OLD-GRADER UP TO ANCHOR POINT
Start time at old-grader: 1743 ( 5:43 PM )
Arrival at ‘T’ intersection with high-ridge two-track: 1748 ( 5:48 PM )
Total travel time from old-grader to ‘T’ intersection: 5 minutes
** THE THIRD TRIP
As soon as they discovered that what Ranger 58 was hovering over was just the old-grader itself and there was no sign of the crew there… they turned right around there at the old-grader and then headed back on up to that ‘T’ intersection with the high-ridge two-track again.
NOTE: This 1749/1750 moment is documented in BR Captain Browns notes…
Page 7 of BR Captain Brown’s (redacted) log notes…
—————————————————————————–
1750 – All three vehicles head up to the upper 2-track junction and then we see that
Ranger 5 is hovering over something down in the flats off the north. We all head
down the hill until we determine that it is a old piece of heavy equipment that was
seen early by (xxxxxxx) This is the area where they would have been had
they been traveling in the Black like we initially thought. ( REDACTED ).
—————————————————————————-
GPS data for this THIRD trip in the UTV from the old-grader up to the ridge two-track…
NOTE: On this THIRD trip… they DO continue on past that ‘T’ intersection and NORTH on the high-ridge two-track exactly the way they did on that FIRST trip for the first face-to-face. They basically return to that same ‘parking spot’ they used for the first face-to-face meeting ( actually, they went just 98 feet past that orignal parking spot ) so this is an accurate ‘reproduction’ of another entire UTV trip from the old-grader all the way to that ‘parking spot’ used for the first face-to-face meeting.
START OF THIRD UTV TRIP FROM OLD-GRADER UP TO RIDGE TWO-TRACK
————————————————————————————
1755 – 34.231108, -112.782823 – 0750.547 – 08.53 – Passed old-grader, now heading back to anchor point
1756 – 34.230523, -112.783048 – 0235.908 – 02.68 – Heading back to anchor point
1757 – 34.227465, -112.783295 – 1191.460 – 13.54 – Heading back to anchor point
1758 – 34.225043, -112.784636 – 1081.180 – 12.29 – Heading back to anchor point
1759 – 34.225513, -112.787093 – 1086.660 – 12.35 – Passed two-track junction, now heading north on ridge two-track
1800 – 34.224901, -112.787962 – 0518.314 – 05.89 – Heading north on ridge two-track
1801 – 34.226719, -112.788906 – 0739.229 – 08.40 – Almost to anchor point
1802 – 34.226888, -112.789797 – 0298.457 – 03.39 – Arrival at anchor point just 98 feet beyond first face-to-face parking spot.
———————————————————————————-
END OF THIRD UTV TRIP FROM OLD-GRADER UP TO RIDGE TWO-TRACK
Start time at old-grader: 1755 ( 5:55 PM )
Arrival at ‘T’ intersection with high-ridge two-track: 1759 ( 5:59 PM )
Total travel time from old-grader up to ‘T’ intersection: 4 minutes
Arrival up at anchor point area: 1802 ( 6:02 PM )
Total elapsed time for this THIRD trip: 7 minutes ( SEVEN minutes ).
Reply to calvin post on August 21, 2014 at 7:05 pm
NOTE: Pulled up from a thread below that was running out of room.
>> calvin said…
>>
>> Todd Abel doesn’t remember what was said during
>> that conversation where he says “air support down there ASAP”,
>> according to what he told Jim Karels on 8/14/2013.
He doesn’t have to remember THAT part of the conversation.
It was RECORDED… and we now also learn from Mike Dudley that they played this recording for Abel DURING his SAIT interview and Abel did confirm that is him speaking to Marsh.
In his ADOSH interview… Todd Abel is suddenly recalling all kinds of detail about his numerous conversations with Marsh… but he still makes no direct admission to remembering the Caldwell conversation.
But Abel does ‘refer’ to that part of the conversation… and uses the exact same words ‘hunkered’ and ‘safety’ when talking to ADOSH.
He tells ADOSH that having Marsh get (quote) ‘hunkered in the black’ and ‘safe’ up there was definitely his ‘thought process’ when speaking with Marsh that afternoon. Abel already knew the Caldwell video existed and while still not admitting to speaking the exact words captured in the Caldwell video he is now telliing ADOSH that was his exact (quote) “thought process”.
Here is that exact ‘part’ of Todd Abel’s ADOSH testimony.
NOTE: Notice the TIME that Able himself confirms for this reported ‘weather/status’ conversation with Marsh.
3:45 PM.
If Marsh had taken off SOUTH to scout the escape route right after the critical 1542 radio calls(s)… then Marsh would have been already out of the black and well on his way SOUTH towards the 7saddle.
Minutes count here as we get into ‘this part of the story’.
If Abel was simply even one or two minutes off on when this conversation took place then his estimate must have been on the ‘low’ side… or else a 2 or 3 minute difference would ‘back this conversation’ up right on top of everything else going on at 1542.
Not likely.
So if Abel is ‘off’ with this estimate by just 2 or 3 minutes then it puts the REAL time right smack up against the 1550 time of the Caldwell video.
Abel COULD be ‘recalling’ ( and suddenly recalling very WELL, I might add ) this ‘weather/status’ conversation with Marsh that ACTUALLY started around 1548 or 1549.
So what we could be hearing in the 1550 Caldwell video is simply the END of this entire ‘weather/status’ conversation that ( inexplicably ) Todd Abel seems to recall in GREAT detail ( versus the END of that same conversation which he says he doesn’t remember at ALL ).
From Todd Abel’s ADOSH interview…
———————————————————————————-
Q1 = Dave Larsen ( Rest in Peace )
A = Field OPS1 Todd Abel
1920 Q1: …3:45. This all was about in the same timeframe of wind shifts, the
1921 conversation with Eric. He was the first one to feel those squirrely winds start,
1922 right?
1923
1924 A: Yeah.
1925
1926 Q1: And he’s talking to you about he’s got wind issues.
1927
1928 A: Mm-hm.
1929
1930 Q1: Let me ask you this, you say you’re nervous, um, because of this…
1931
1932 A: This cell building over here.
1933
1934 Q1: …this cell – what does that mean to you?
1935
1936 A: That means outflows, possible lightning strikes, all that stuff.
1937
1938 Q1: Okay.
1939
1940 A: So that’s why I wanted to make sure that he had eyes on it to make sure he
1941 watches that thing and make sure that if it’s getting too – if he gets to really
1942 start feeling those winds changing and everything that they can get hunkered
1943 in that black – that 250 acres of safety zone there.
1944
1945 Q1: Mm-hm.
1946
1947 A: And – and stay out of harm’s way. You know they could even drop down off
1948 the ridge for lightning purposes if they had to.
1949
1950 Q1: Sure.
1951
1952 A: Was my thought process.
———————————————————————-
So this is as close as Todd Abel gets in his ADOSH interview to actually admitting to what he says he ‘doesn’t remember’ about telling Marsh to “Hunker and be safe”.
Abel even uses the same term ‘hunkered’ when describing what he was ‘thinking’ and the gist of what he was thinking was also ‘safety’.
So without actually admitting to TELLING Marsh to “Hunker and be safe” Abel seems to be establishing ( for ADOSH ) that whether he remembers telling that to Marsh or not… that is, in fact, exactly what his (quote) ‘thought process’ was the (supposedly) last time he talked with him.
>> calvin also said…
>>
>> The beginning of the sentence from Marsh to Abel could have been.
>> “I’m scouting the escape route (followed by, verified audio) trying to
>> work my way off the top”
>> Who knows, Abel doesn’t remember!
Apparently not… but it’s also true that just like no one seems to have ASKED Brendan McDonough what ELSE he might have heard over the intra-crew radio that day… there is also no ‘followup’ with Abel regarding the Caldwell conversation. Apparently… NO ONE even bothered to ask him if he had any recollection at all as to what transpired BEFORE the conversation captured in the Caldewell video OR ( more importantly ) what the gist of Marsh’s RESPONSE was.
Something along the lines of… “Ok… we understand you might not recall those exact words we have you saying on the recording… but do you at least remember the gist of what this guy Marsh said in RESPONSE? Did he AGREE to do what you asked… or did he NOT?”
That kind of ‘followup’ questioning never happened. It should have.
But even if it did… I really doubt that Todd Abel would have said that Marsh mentioned ANYTHING about ‘scouting the escape route’ and here is why.
Todd Abel ALSO testified to ADOSH that the moment he heard Marsh saying on the radio “Our escape route has been cut off” at deployment time… Abel was (quote) “totally confused”.
Abel says he was in ‘total confusion’ on hearing that phrase ‘escape route cut off’ because in HIS mind… there is no such thing as an ‘escape route’ when you are ALREADY sitting in the ‘safe black’. You are already where you need to be and no ‘escape route’ is necessary. Hence… total confusion on Abel’s part. He insists he was SURE they were ‘where they needed to be.. in the safe black already’… no ‘escape route’ even remotely necessary.
If Marsh HAD said anything to Abel prior to deployment about “I’m scouting out the escape route”… then based on Abel’s own testimony and what he says he ‘believed’ you have to assume Todd Abel would have ‘caught’ that little ‘gem’ coming from Marsh and then said something like…
“Whoa… stop the bus. What ‘escape route’?
I thought you said you and the crew were already in the ‘safe black’?
Why do you need to ‘scout out an escape route’ when you are already in the safe black?”
Once more… from Todd Abel’s actual ADOSH testimony…
NOTE: At the start of this section… Abel is describing the ‘ground rescue mission’ and what was happening as Frisby, Brown, Clawson, Hulburd and Yowell ‘broke through’ over in the Youth Camp area and started heading up to the ‘anchor point’ on the high ridge. This is where Abel first confirms to ADOSH that he ( and many others ) were absolutely SURE that Marsh and GM were always up at the anchor point up on that ridge…
——————————————————————————–
2268 …Once they worked their way through, everybody
2269 went up to here. ( Todd Abel points to the anchor point area on a map ).
2270
2271 Q1: Okay.
2272
2273 A: To the ridge.
2274
2275 Q1: Right.
2276
2277 A: That was the last known location. I had no idea they’d left that location. Blue
2278 Ridge Hotshots were working in the same area and thought they were up in
2279 this location.
2280
2281 Q1: Blue Ridge thought they were there?
2282
2283 A: Mm-hm. The helicopters thought they were there, air attack thought they
2284 were there, everybody thought they were right here, including myself.
——————————————————
Then, a little later, Todd Abel talks about when he heard Marsh say his ‘escape route had been cut off’ Abel was then in ‘total confusion’. You don’t even need an ‘escape route’ if you are already safe in the black so how in the hell could you be getting ‘cut off’ from something you don’t even need?
——————————————————
2390 A: When – when he was up here and saying my escape route’s been
2391 comprised, I’m thinking he’s up here. I’m in total confusion, I have no idea.
2392 Two hundred and fifty acres of black, they’re direct, all they gotta do is step
2393 into that. That – that’s where I thought they were at. That’s where everybody
2394 thought they were at.
2395
2396 Q1: When he had – when he had – when he talked to you about my escape route
2397 has, uh, been compromised…
2398
2399 A: They’re – they’re right here when he tells me that.
2400
2401 Q1: You think? You think they…
2402
2403 A: I…
2404
2405 Q1: Think so?
2406
2407 A: Yep, I do.
——————————————————
>> calvin also said…
>>
>> I have stated before and I believe now as much or more than
>> ever that at the beginning of the 2nd Mackenzie video, Marsh
>> says “…change, too bad”
>>
>> As in the PLANS change and that is just TOO BAD!
Possibly.. but I ( me, personally ) still don’t really hear those exact words being said.
>> calvin also said…
>>
>> However the timing seems important (IMO).
>>
>> Now it seems that the GM crew move out of the resting location
>> AFTER Marsh, and immediately after (IMO) Marsh tells Steed
>> something about change and too bad which also appears to have
>> came IMMEDIATELY after the Marsh/Abel exchange Robert Caldwell
>> partially captures on his video.
I hear ya… but I think you lost your train of thought there for a moment.
Even in a ‘scenario’ where Marsh was out AHEAD of Steed and the crew… the MacKenzie videos were shot BEFORE they left that rock pile.
Even if the conversation about ‘change’ and ‘too bad’ is in the audio there… all that still happened before Steed / Crew even got up to go anywhere.
The BOTTOM LINE here is that we know for a fact that regardless of what Todd Abel seems to maintain he ‘doesn’t remember’… that conversation he was having with Marsh partially captured in the Caldwell video was definitely taking place on an OPEN CHANNEL. There is still a good possibility that other people working the fire that day could do a little more ‘remembering’ FOR him.
Likewise… in any possible scenario now that includes Marsh heading SOUTH and being ‘ahead’ of the men… there are now most likely a lot of other critical radio transmissions that must have taken place over the GM intra-crew that Brendan McDonough must have heard.
Example: If the only explanation for Steed and the crew just sitting there playing ‘Tourist’ and watching the fire in that late-day timeframe is that Marsh had TOLD Steed to keep the crew there until he scouted SOUTH and verified the location of the ‘Ranch’… then that now means there must have been a definite GREEN-LIGHT order coming from Marsh which then initiated the ‘Gaggle up’ moment back at the rock pile.
If that happened… Brendan pretty much must have heard it as well.
Sorry about my last paragraph. ” Now it seems that the GM crew move out of the resting location AFTER Marsh, and immediately after (IMO) Marsh tells Steed something about change and too bad which also appears to have came IMMEDIATELY after the Marsh/Abel exchange Robert Caldwell partially captures on his video”
Very hard to follow. Let me try again.
When/if Marsh left the meeting spot at 1542, GM did not go with him as he was just scouting the two track. Then Marsh and Abel have their conversation that includes the phrase “working my way off the top.” It appears that the GM guys sitting at that location should have heard that conversation..
Immediately after that conversation, Mackenzie captures two videos. And it appears they started moving just after that. IMO. And I would think it is possible that Parker texted his picture once they arrived at the saddle, before dropping into the bowl. And I am pretty sure there is another picture taken at that time and texted out that hasn’t been released to the public.
So what I am saying is it appears possible that the reason GM started moving south had something to do with the conversation that occurred between Marsh, Abel. Again, I hear Marsh saying CHANGE, and TOO BAD, at the beginning of the second Mackenzie video.
Again, there were several people on the fire that heard GM were moving south, to their SZ. And my question would be. If everyone else heard this, why didn’t Abel??
Reply to calvin post on August 22, 2014 at 3:45 am
>> calvin said…
>>
>> When/if Marsh left the meeting spot at 1542, GM did not go with
>> him as he was just scouting the two track.
Yes… and that would also mean that if he really WAS there ( circa 1542 ) and waiting for Frisby at that spot where the previous face-to-face with Frisby ( for 32 minutes from 11:53 PM to 12:25 PM ) had taken place… then Marsh was probably, at that time, also face-to-face with Jesse Steed himself.
In other words… the actual initial ‘discussion their options’ conversation probably happened with Marsh and Steed standing right next to each other and NOT over the GM intra-crew radio. I would concede ( in this case ) that even Brendan didn’t hear any of this ‘initial’ talk between Marsh and Steed about what they were going to do next.
In this ‘Marsh was scouting ahead of the crew’ scenario.. the ONLY explanation I can still imagine for why we see ( and hear ) Steed and the crew still just ‘playing Tourist’ at that rock pile more than 13 full minutes AFTER 1542 ( From 1550 to 1555 ) is because either Marsh had TOLD Steed to say right there while Marsh went south to ‘check things out’… OR… Steed was reluctant to move the crew ( as in… his ‘comfort level was low’ ) until he heard more about this supposed ‘escape route’ and ‘ranch’ thing.
In any ‘Marsh was ahead of the crew’ scenario or ‘Marsh took off scouting at 1542’ scenario it’s going to be critical to account for these 13 minutes when Steed and the crew were still just sitting on their asses up there at that rock pile because we know now ( with full 20/20 hindsight, of course ) that those 13 minutes pretty much eventually represented the difference between life or death that day.
>> calvin also said…
>>
>> Then Marsh and Abel have their conversation that includes the phrase
>> “working my way off the top.” It appears that the GM guys sitting at that
>> location should have heard that conversation..
Yes. They pretty much had to have heard it ( because WE can hear it in the Caldwell video ). That background radio traffic in the Caldwell video was being captured from about 20 feet away from Caldwell when he shot that video. In other words… Caldwell was capturing radio traffic from someone else’s BK radio and not his own. That’s why that audio had to be ‘enhanced’. The source was NOT right next to Caldwell as he shot that video.
If the transmission was loud enough to be captured from 20 feet away by Caldwell’s smartphone then surely everyone who was already there at that rock pile location heard every word of that full 1550 exchange between Marsh and Abel. Everyone there heard Abel tell Marsh ( Something BEFORE )… then “Copy… keep ME informed, Hunker and be safe, We’ll get some Air Support down there ASAP” ( and then something AFTER like what Marsh’s actual response to this ‘order’ from OPS1 Todd Abel was.
If Marsh was actually freely bullshitting Abel during that 1550 radio exchange… then pretty much all of Granite Mountain heard him doing it.
>> calvin also said…
>>
>> Immediately after that conversation, Mackenzie captures two videos.
>> And it appears they started moving just after that. IMO.
Well… it wasn’t ‘immediately’ after 1550 when MacKenzie started ‘filming’… it was more like FIVE minutes… but I hear ya. There they were just freely playing ‘Tourist’ at the rock pile right up until 1555 when that ‘picture taking’ session abruptly ENDED. That had to have been the moment ( in the ‘Marsh was scouting ahead’ scenario we are discussing ) that Marsh radioed Steed and said something like… “I can see the Ranch and the way TO it. Gaggle ’em up and get down here.” ( Which Brendan McDonough must have ALSO heard ).
>> calvin also said…
>>
>> And I would think it is possible that Parker texted his picture once
>> they arrived at the saddle, before dropping into the bowl.
I’m going to take issue with that timing.
If Steed and the entire crew were actually already down at the ‘saddle’ at 4:04 PM… then why are they DEAD?
The SAIR itself doesn’t put them in that location until 4:20 PM.
Your scenario is giving them 16 ( SIXTEEN ) more minutes to have progressed further towards the Boulder Springs Ranch. Those 16 minutes might have been just enough to save them that day.
I still think the 19 minutes the SAIR was ‘predicting’ for the actual ‘descent hike’ sounds about right. Anything slower means they must have literally been just crawling on their hands and knees for that ‘descent’ to have not made it any farther than they did.
Are you suggesting that Steed and the men could have been standing at the top of the saddle at 4:04… and it was ‘break time’ again… and now Parker texts the photo he took back at the other rock pile to his mom?… and that then they somehow just STOOD there for another ‘break’ and even though they could see Marsh’s little pink ribbons they did NOT ‘drop down’ right away.
Maybe that IS what happened… and maybe that IS when the (alleged) ARGUMENT took place between Steed and Marsh.
Maybe Steed ( with the crew in tow ) came around that bend in the high-ridge two-track and arrived at that ‘pink tape’ that Marsh had put there at the top of the saddle indicating where Marsh wanted them to LEAVE the two-track and Jesse Steed halted the men, got on the GM intra-crew with Marsh and pretty much said “Hey Eric… I see your tape up here… are you fucking KIDDING ME? You want us to do WHAT?”
Maybe it did then take up to 10 or 13 minutes for Steed to even AGREE to ‘go down there’… and that became the fatal ‘missing amount of time’ that day.
>> calvin also said…
>>
>> And I am pretty sure there is another picture taken at that time
>> and texted out that hasn’t been released to the public.
If there is EVER any picture that surfaces that was taken by ANY of those men from the saddle itself… that would answer a LOT of questions. Even if it had no timestamp that could be trusted or no timestamp whatsoever… the IMG_1334 and IMG_1335 photos show the ‘sun was still shining’ up there at that saddle right on up to 4:35 or so and a huge effort to ‘shadow length timestamp’ the photo could probably still establish an exact TIME for it.
Sure would also be a lot easier to hear from Brendan McDonough if he knows ANYTHING ELSE about how it was really going down out there that day… but I believe I have already pointed that ‘obvious fact’ out MORE than once.
>> calvin also said…
>>
>> So what I am saying is it appears possible that the reason GM
>> started moving south had something to do with the conversation
>> that occurred between Marsh, Abel. Again, I hear Marsh saying
>> CHANGE, and TOO BAD, at the beginning of the second
>> Mackenzie video.
I’m not sure I agree with that evaluation of WHY they suddenly started to move.
If we really are talking about a ‘Marsh was scouting ahead’ scenario… then I think the ONLY ‘signal’ that Steed was waiting for was some kind of GREEN-LIGHT from Marsh over the radio.
I think if the PLAN was already in place circa 1542 when Marsh took off ‘scouting’ then it doesn’t matter a hoot what Abel had to say about ANYTHING.
They ( Marsh and Steed ) already knew what they were going to do circa 1542 and Steed was just waiting for Marsh to call on the radio and say “I can see the Ranch. I think it’s doable. Bring them down here”.
>> calvin also said…
>>
>> Again, there were several people on the fire that heard GM were
>> moving south, their SZ.
Marsh apparently did NOT specifically say anything about SOUTH until we hear him say it circa 4:16 PM as he was responding to that obvious radio query from someone asking “Granite Mountain… what’s your STATUS right now?”.
Gary Cordes knew exactly what Marsh meant much earlier when all he heard was Marsh say “I want to pass on that we’re making our way out our escape route”.
Cordes didn’t need ANY other information. Cordes knew EXACTLY what that meant…. which DIRECTION it was going to take them… and what their actual DSESTINATION was ( The Boulder Springs Ranch ).
4:16 PM also seems like the ONLY time Marsh put a directional component into any radio transmission and actually used the phrase ‘heading SOUTH’.
Even in the YARNELL-GAMBLE video at 4:27 when Marsh is trying to explain to SOMEONE ( who seems to want to know what is taking them so long to get to town ) where the men actually ARE at that point… he doesn’t use the same word SOUTH that he used 11 minutes before at 4:16 PM. This time… Marsh is as vague as he can possibly be and just says “They’re comin’ from the heel of the fire.”
>> calvin also asked…
>>
>> And my question would be. If everyone else heard this, why didn’t Abel?
If you read all this testimony carefully… it almost seems as if the one person who SHOULD have known that GM was NOT still in the safe black but was, in fact, ‘on the move’ ( Field OPS1 Todd Abel ) was about the only one who did NOT know that.
Even just some DPS medic hanging around his helicopter basically ‘knew it’.
DPS medic Eric Tarr just heard the conversation about ‘heading to a ranch’ fly by on the radio and had no reason to even remember hearing it… but he DID.
The fact that even DPS medic Eric Tarr just simply ‘heard’ this fly by on the radio ended up the crucial reason why DPS Ranger 58 helicopter was actually able to find the deployment site later.
So it’s still a good question.
If so many other people heard this ‘we’re on the move’ traffic from Marsh… then what was Todd Abel doing that prevented HIM from hearing it?
Todd Abel—16 channel radios what you set as priority Ch. would make a difference. If Abel was on Tac and not Air to Ground( Example) he would not be hearing other traffic. He could have been talking on another channel and not herd different radio discussions. So it is possible he did not hear some of GM radio traffic. You can not be talking on 1 Freq. and hear what is going on the others unless you are also monitoring another radio.
That pretty much has to be the explanation why Field OPS1 Todd Abel simply didn’t ‘know’ what so many other people seemed to ‘know’.
However… it does illustrate the kind of non-communication communicating that was prevalent that day.
In more that one piece of testimony… people say they just hear Eric Marsh making ‘general announcements’ over various channels ( TAC, Air-To-Ground, etc. ) and neither ‘directing’ those communications AT anyone in particular OR requesting ‘acknowledgement’ from anyone.
Some pretty critical information was just being ‘broadcast into the air’ and Marsh didn’t seem to really care if anyone heard it ( or UNDERSTOOD it ) or not.
Those would be the kind of ‘announcements’ that someone ( like Todd Abel ) would be likely to simply MISS if he was talking on some other channel as these ‘announcements’ flew by.
Those kind of ‘generic announcements’ just ‘fly by’ on the radio and if you missed it ( and no one even knows who it was directed to ) then you have missed it and you don’t even know it.
Even Paul Musser testified that he thought he heard some things but (quote) “had no idea who those radio calls were directed to” in order to even do a followup “Did you copy that?” with anyone.
So that’s all still back to the ‘C’ in LCES.
If you want someone to know something… make SURE they know it and don’t just ASSUME they are hearing your generic ‘to whom it many concern’ radio ‘announcements’.
I am pulling weeds over on Ridgeway and some have come to me and spoke on the fire so you can see 4 people on Manzanita/Foothill/Ridgeway/Lakewood state electricity went out at 4:34pm but one can confirm with APS their time but Barb’s home survived even though other areas to their property burned and her clock said that time and the fire I am hearing reached at 4:15-5pm but not in any glorifying way says one when it reached Ridgeway- low ground fire that could of been put out but instead the owner said a man wearing yellow on atv alerted all to evacuate at 5-5:30pm. He said plus 2 others the cloud of smoke was bright orange. It is very important to anyone properly assessing this fire to get out and learn these things I am hearing—one man watered his home and still he felt the slow going on the ground not high flames could of been put out but not one firefighter tried and he just will not talk to you or reporters or anyone because he feels very wronged in this whole weekend and he will talk to his lawyer and close knit pals but anyone else—well, they all can wait until this hits the court room…it is that kind of feel I have felt since day one of returning from others so I know now there is photos and videos and accounts but they all prefer to just be quiet—
(8-20-14 2:21pm)
Tue, Aug 19, 2014 at 2:41 PM
We disagree with this point won’t argue with you.
Each type of crew has their own bonds and special relations.
Try living with a group 24 hours a day 80% of a 6 month work time. Eat Sleep and work, Shower and live on the ground in sleeping bags. You become very close.
YES YOU CAN BECOME VERY CLOSE IN DOING THAT—YET THERE CAN BE A DYSFUNCTIONAL CLOSE AND A WORK FORCE CLOSE AND A HEALTHY CLOSE—OR ALL THE ABOVE AT DIFFERENT MOMENTS AND THAT I LEARNED ON MY JOURNEY AWAY FROM COOKIE CUTTER LIFE SLEEPING IN A SLEEPING BAG UNDER THE MOONLIT STARS KNOWING SONNY—ALSO KNOWING THE KIND OF FOLKS I HAVE IN MY LIFE TIME I ALSO KNOW WHAT APPEARS TO BE DOES NOT NECESSARILY MEAN IT IS WHAT IT IS—HOW MANY TIMES I HUNG OUT ON A PERSONAL NOTE OR WORK OUT WITH A SOAP OPERA STAR/ACTRESS/ACTOR AND THEY LEAD LIFE DIFFERENT—I MEAN ONE GIRL I KNEW AND A GUY TOO THEY HAD 5-6 SERIOUS LONG TERM RELATIONSHIPS AT THE SAME TIME BUT NONE OF THE OTHER GIRLFRIENDS/ETC. EVEN KNEW ABOUT ONE ANOTHER—I DO NOT EVEN WANT TO PUBLICLY THROW OUT DIRECT ASSESSMENT BUT FOR AN ODD EXAMPLE USING ME AS THE LEADER AND SONNY AS MY PERSON I EVALUATE ANNUALLY (HYPOTHETICAL)— THE EVALUATION THESE MEN ARE GIVEN BY AN AUTHORITY IS MY MAIN TOPIC WHEN WRITING MY SCENARIO—IT CAN PAINT IN WORDS A PRETTY SCENARIO WITH A MARK OFF HERE AND THERE TO AREAS BUT SAY I AM YOUR LEADER I AM NOT GOING TO WAIT UNTIL EVALUATION TO DO THIS GRADE I AM GOING TO REDIRECT YOU BEFORE THAT EVALUATION TO IMPPROVE BECAUSE I TRULY AS YOUR LEADER DO NOT WANT ANYONE UNDER ME TO FAIL BUT SHINE AND SUCCEED ESPECIALLY IF I WANT YOU TO BE IN MY POSITION SOME DAY AND I AM GROOMING YOU FOR THAT POSITION SO WHAT IF I AM THAT LEADER AND I TELL THE WORLD SONNY IS A GEM AND GENUINE AND THEN IN THE CHECK OFF BOX MARK OFF MY VIEWS OF HIS FLAWS— WHAT DOES THAT SAY ABOUT ME AS A LEADER— I WOULD SAY SONNY IS A GEM AND GENUINE. SUCH AND SUCH DATES I ADDRESSED SONNY ABOUT THE CHECK MARKED CONCERNS AND THEY CONTINUED ON SO I AM TIME STAMPING AND WELL DOCUMENTING HOW I CAME TO THAT FINAL CONCLUSION VERSUS IT BEING SOME GENERAL OPINION AS I AM THE LEADER OF SONNY AND THIS IS WHERE I SEE HIM—I MEAN SHAUN MCKINNON FROM AZCENTRAL LABELED SONNY A BOURBON-HOUND AND I HAVE BEEN WITH HIM 3 YEARS THIS 8-23-11 ALMOST 24/7—FEW OFF TIMES—AND IN IT I CAN FACTUALLY STATE SONNY IS NOT A BOURBON-HOUND BUT WHEN HE DOES…HE SURE DOES KNOW HOW TO ENJOY HIS LIFE…SO SAY I LIKE SONNY AND I WANT SONNY TO THINK I LIKE HIM AND I PUT OUT WORDS LIKE OLD MARRIED COUPLE AND HE IS THINKING “OH…THIS LADY WRITES AND SPEAKS PUBLICLY SO SWEET ABOUT ME BEING THIS GEM…I THINK I COULD HAVE A CHANCE TO BE NEXT IN LINE TO BE THE LEADER HERE…I MEAN I SHOULD BE NEXT IN LINE…I CREATED THE WHOLE THING”…BUT THEN THERE IS JOY WHO IS GROOMED A CERTAIN WAY IN LIFE AS A LEADER AND I AM SEEING MORE POTENTIAL IN ANOTHER MAN TO BECOME THE LEADER BUT I STILL HAVE THE GEM HERE I PUBLICLY STATED WILL BE GROOMED FOR MY JOB SO HOW CAN I GET THE ONE I REALLY WANT GROOMED TO BE THE LEADER WITHOUT ANY PUBLIC SHAKE-UPS ESPECIALLY FROM THIS UNIQUE SOUTHWESTERN SONNY I CREATED THE IMAGE HE WAS NEXT IN LINE…OHHH—OK, THE CHECK MARK AREA—MORE DAMAGING THAN ONE REALLY KNOWS—BECAUSE LOOK AT YOU ALL NOW—YOU AND ONLY YOU THAT WHO DO NOT KNOW THE MEN ARE ON HERE NOT TALKING ABOUT FOLKS WHO KNOW THE MEN BUT THE ONES WHO DON’T—ARE MAKING COMMENTS OF YOUR OWN HYPOTHETICALS WITH NO WAY TO DOCUMENT HOW YOU REACHED TO THIS POINT BUT REMEMBER LIKE THE SUN SET AND RISES THEORY I MENTION ON THIS PAGE OVER TIME—WHAT IS SHOWN IS NOT ALWAYS WHAT IT IS—I TELL PEOPLE STRAIGHT UP I AM MARRIED AND BEEN WITH MY HUSBAND FOR ALMOST ROUNDING UP THE THIRTY YEAR MARK AND FACTS YET DUE TO SEVERE TRAUMA I FACED EARLY IN LIFE THE DYNAMICS TO WHAT MAKES JOY—JOY IS NOT EASILY EXPLAINED BUT PRESCOTT VALLEY COUNSELOR SET COUNSELING GAIL EDWARDS EVALUATED SONNY AND I WAS THE SIDE KICK THERE AND SHE HAS SEEN US AS INDIVIDUALS AND AS OUR HIKING JOURNEY AND SHE JUST SAID THIS WEEK DEEPLY KNOWING US PERSONALLY AND RAW NOT WHAT WE APPEAR TO BE—SHE CAN GIVE YOU THE CORRECT ASSESSMENT AS TO HOW VERY UNIQUE AND WONDERFUL IT IS– OUR JOURNEY AND GAIL HIKED WITH ME AND SHE KNOWS MY HUSBAND AND SHE UNDERSTANDS IT AND APPLAUDS THIS SPECIAL MOMENT—SO PLEASE WHEN READING PEOPLE’S THEORIES AND SOME HAVE SOME GOOD POINTS BUT LIKE I TOLD SONNY DO NOT PUT OUT STUFF PUBLICLY UNLESS WE CAN SHARE HOW WE CAME TO THAT CONCLUSION. LIKE IN THESE EVALUATIONS IF THEY SAID THE REMARKS WITH CO-WORKER CONCERNS—LABEL A FILE # TO REDIRECT IT TO WHERE THEY CAN LEARN ABOUT THE CONCERN IN MORE DEPTH—I GET THE EVALUATION IS LIKE MY SOAP NOTES FOR MY MEDICAL DOCTOR BUT IN THE END THOSE SOAP NOTES CAN BE PROVED WITH MRIS/CAT SCANS/THERMOGRAMS/ETCS —ANYONE FOLLOWING WHAT I MEAN—JUST BOTHERS ME WHEN PEOPLE GUESS ERIC MARSH TO BE AT CERTAIN LOCATIONS AND YET NOT NUMBER ONE NEVER EVEN HIKED IT OR GOT THE GENERAL IDEA NOT ENOUGH DOCUMENTATION TO PROPERLY MAKE ASSESSMENTS—BUT HEY MAYBE SOME LOVED ONE OF THE GMHS HAS DETAILS AND CAN’T SAY AND IT WILL ALL COME OUT IN THE COURT TRIALS—JOHN DOUGHERTY WAS EMAILED A COPY OF THE PHOTOS IN QUESTION THAT SONNY BROUGHT ATTENTION TO HERE WHEN HE WAS IN MONTANA—
I will say if a Div. Sup. that was not attached to the crew had ask them to go off the mountain There may have been a different story. TRUST
OR EVEN A MORE DIFFERENT STORY—AND IT MAY TAKE THE LOVED ONES OF THE GMHS TO FINALLY OPEN UP WITH PURITY IN THE COURT ROOM ON THAT—
While you went around in circles the pay ain’t that bad.
Definitely almost double Min, Wage.
BREAKS MY HEART—THE TOPIC OF PAY—LAST NIGHT I HEARD A YARNELL LOCAL STATE THAT AS WELL AS THESE MEN KNEW THEY HAVE A DANGEROUS JOB BUT WE LOST OUR LIFE IN THAT FIRE AND I RECONFIRM TO THEM “NO, THE 19 MEN DID” AND “WHO KNOWS HOW MUCH THAT BURNING DATURA PLAYED A ROLE IN THE DECISION PROCESS BECAUSE I JOY WAS MAKING POOR CHOICES THAT DAY TOO” BUT SONNY NEVER STAYED IN THE SAME AREA LONG ENOUGH JUST CAME BACK FOR ME BUT I WAS IN AREA OF THAT ABUNDANCE DATURA—”
ALSO NEW NOTE: HOLLY BECKER IS WILLING TO SHARE TO PEOPLE INVESTIGATING THIS–HER SNAIL MAIL IS PO BOX 57 YARNELL ARIZONA 85362. SHE IS NEAR THE HELMS AREA. YOU CAN GO TO THE LOCAL REAL ESTATE OFFICE AND HEAR DORMAN OLSON WHO LOST HIS HOME OR NINABILL OVERMEYER BUT NOT SURE WHAT THEY CAN OR WILL SHARE BUT I CAN SAY IN TALKING TO DORMAN IT WAS MORE LIKE 5PM WHEN HIS AREA WAS ON FIRE SO NOW YOU ARE SEEING TOO MUCH OF A VERBAL GAP OF 3:38PM-5PM AND YET HE DOES HAVE TIME STAMP PHOTOS. I HOPE THAT HELPS PEOPLE IN THEIR ASSESSING PROCESS. I AM PULLING WEEDS BY HANDS AND MEETING ALL KINDS OF LOCALS IN DOING THAT—I RECKON THE OL’ YOU CAN DO MY WEEDS NEXT TALK—BUT CRYSTAL STATED LAST NIGHT MAUGHAN RANCH STILL WANTS TO CATCH UP OUT THERE ON THEIR LAND TO ARREST US AND I AM AGAIN PUBLICLY STATING YCSO TOLD MANY OF US THERE IS NOTHING MAUGHAN RANCH CAN DO LEGALLY OR MAKE AN ARREST WITH OPEN CATTLE GROUND AND NO FENCE OR NOT EVEN POSTING NO TRESPASSING BUT LEGALLY THE OLD GRADER IS ON THEIR LAND AND PARTS OF THE MOUNTAINS SO YOU ALL ARE AWARE SO IF THEY WANT TO ARREST ME THAN I GOT PHOTO PROOF OF MANY WHO VIOLATED IT AND IT WILL NOT STAND UP—HEY I AM NOT THRILL SEEKING PEOPLE OUT THERE—THIS IS TO MAKE SURE ALL AREAS ARE LOOKED AT—LIKE CHEMICAL COMPOUNDS/FULGURITES IN AREA OF THE REPORTED LIGHTNING STRIKE TO HOW THESE MEN MADE SUCH A WRONG DECISION BUT SONNY MADE THE RIGHT ONE BECAUSE WE 2 ARE ALIVE. SIMPLICITY AND PURITY IS ALL I WANT TO SEE FROM THIS—
I WOULD BE GREAT ON THAT JURY FOR COURT BECAUSE I AM NOT A CHEERLEADER TO ANY SIDE, NO AGENDA, NO ANGLE YET I WILL NOT ACCEPT PEOPLE BASH ERIC MARSH, WILLIS OR STEED JUST BECAUSE WHAT YOU READ—AND ASSUME THAT IS WHAT IT IS—
Marti, WTK
Can either of you provide information on the image in the Papich folder, image_3957.jpg. It appears to have been taken from the west side of 89 just north of the Ranch House. It also appears to have been taken after they left from the Shrine area. What time was this taken? Did it come before or after the images WTK created a video for that shows the fire about to enter the box canyon? Sorry I cant remember the numbers in those two images. Does the yellow circle in the middle of the image (3957 2 ) show the approximate location of GM?
Reply to calvin post on August 20, 2014 at 3:43 am
>> calvin asked…
>>
>> Marti, WTK
>> Can either of you provide information on the image in the Papich folder,
>> image_3957.jpg.
Yes. See below.
>> calvin also said…
>>
>> It appears to have been taken from the west side of 89
>> just north of the Ranch House.
Yes. There are actually TWO separate images there in that Papich folder ( IMG_3957 and IMG_3958 ) taken just 7 seconds apart from the passenger side of the Blue Ridge Crew Carrier as it was approaching the RHR and just about to turn into the parking lot.
EXIF Data for these TWO Papich images…
IMG_3957
Make: Apple
Camera Model Name: iPhone 4
Date/Time Original: 2013:06:30 16:35:06 ( 4:35.06 PM )
GPS Decimal: 34.213853, -112.755505
140 feet north of where Russ Reason was standing for his video interview at the north edge of the northernmost driveway entrance to the Ranch House Restaurant.
IMG_3958
Make: Apple
Camera Model Name: iPhone 4
Date/Time Original: 2013:06:30 16:35:13 ( 4:35.13 PM )
GPS Decimal: 34.213572, -112.755550
Just 30 feet north of where Russ Reason was standing for his video interview at the north edge of the northernmost driveway entrance to the Ranch House Restaurant.
The Blue Ridge Crew Carrier has traveled 110 feet south on Highway 89 in the 7 seconds between IMG_3957 and IMG_3958 and has pretty much ‘arrived’ at the Ranch House Restaurant and is about to take a left and turn into the parking lot.
In IMG_3958 the same location in the distance as indicated by the ‘yellow circle’ in the previous IMG_3957 photo would be right over that ‘bushy green tree’ in the center of the photo that sticks up above the middle-ground rock-line mound and reaches up to touch the far-distance high-ridge line, just to the left of where the smoke line is touching the tree line.
>> calvin also said…
>>
>> It also appears to have been taken after they left from the Shrine area.
Yes. This is the ‘evacuation’ trip for Blue Ridge and both Papich photos were taken from the passenger side of one of the Blue Ridge Crew Carriers as it was ‘arriving’ down there at the Ranch House Restaurant and about to pull into the parking lot.
>> calvin also asked…
>> What time was this taken?
IMG_3957 – Date/Time Original: 2013:06:30 16:35:06 ( 4:35.06 PM )
IMG_3958 – Date/Time Original: 2013:06:30 16:35:13 ( 4:35.13 PM )
The images were taken just 7 seconds apart.
>> calvin also asked…
>>
>> Before or after the images WTK created a video for that shows the fire
>> about to enter the box canyon? Sorry I cant remember the numbers in
>> those two images.
These two Papich images ( 3957 and 3958 ) were taken FIVE minutes after those other two ASFD photos IMG_1334 and IMG_1335 were taken at 4:30 PM.
>> calvin also asked…
>>
>> Does the yellow circle in the middle of the
>> image (3957 2 ) show the approximate location of GM?
Yes… pretty much… with the caveat that we do NOT know EXACTLY where
GM ( the crew ) was ‘out there’ at 4:35.06 when that photo was taken.
The ‘yellow circle’ is simply ‘approximating’ where the eventual deployment site was ‘out there’.
If I was to ‘quibble’… I would say that the ‘yellow circle’ is just SLIGHTLY off with regards to the location in the distance of the ‘deployment site’. I would have ‘moved’ the ‘yellow circle’ just slightly to the LEFT.
Followup…
Here is a direct link to the Papich IMG_3957 being discussed above..
It’s the ‘annotated’ copy of the original that has the ‘yellow circle’
drawn on it that approximates the location of the deployment site
in the distance…
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/02ue6bnjp6nazkm/AADuqXo3pgQkUJGLvRf_h3yLa/Photos%20and%20Video/BlueRidgeHotshotsPhotosVideos/Papich#lh:null-IMG_3957%202.jpg
Do you think Papich was aware of GM’s location when he took these photos?
Clarification. Papich, or whomever took those photos!
Reply to calvin post on August 21, 2014 at 4:36 pm
>> calvin asked…
>>
>> Do you think Papich was aware of GM’s location
>> when he ( or some other BR Hotshot ) took these photos?
I was about to quickly type “No… I do not”… but then I caught myself and realized how very little we still know about what members of Blue Ridge actually knew or what they didn’t know.
We still can’t even match up a ‘Unit Log’ to most of the BR crew because of all the ‘redactions’ and even then… there are so many passages in the logs that are themselves redacted we have no idea what some of them were even TRYING to say they knew or didn’t know.
So I guess my real answer is… Maybe he did… maybe he didn’t.
I will say this, though… if whoever took this photo knew they were taking a picture of the general location of Granite Mountain ‘out there’… it could not have been based on already hearing the deployment traffic and hearing Eric Marsh say (only) “Affirm” to Bravo 33 John Burfiend’s question “So… you’re on the SOUTH side of the fire, then?”
The photos were taken at 4:35 PM and within 7 seconds of each other.
If the person taking the photos KNEW that Granite was ‘out there’ where that yellow circle would later be drawn then that puts them in the same category as Gary Cordes. Cordes had (quote) “no doubts” about where Marsh was headed when he hear Marsh announce ( earlier ) on the radio that they were ‘heading out our escape route’ and ‘going to the ranch’..
One of the problems there, however, would be that no one in the Blue Ridge crew ( not even Frisby or Brown ) really had any idea WHERE this ‘Boulder Springs Ranch’ thing was located.
It’s one of the anomalies from that day.
Gary Cordes made sure the FIRST Hotshot crew that arrived that day to work on ‘the plan’ of establishing that ‘anchor’ and that ‘dozer line’ for a possible defensive burnout that evening knew ALL about this ‘Boulder Springs Ranch’ thing and that Cordes had decided it was the ‘pre-determined safety zone’ for people working that area he was responsible for.
The SECOND Hotshot crew to show up just an hour or so later and then be working the exact same area got no such briefing.
The way things developed that morning… it was actually MORE important that the SECOND Hotshot crew showing up to work there ( Blue Ridge ) be at least as familiar, if not MORE familiar, with the location of this infamous ‘Boulder Springs Ranch Safety Zone’ thing because THEY ended up being the crew that was working closer to it than anyone ‘out there’ that day.
But they knew NOTHING about it.
That’s why Frisby was so ‘confused’ later when talking to Marsh and was unable to even offer an opinion about this ‘move’ that Marsh seemed to be ‘announcing’ over the radio. Brian Frisby and Trueheart Brown had NO IDEA what Marsh when even talking about when he said ‘ranch’… and they then failed to successfully CLARIFY that with Marsh.
So for there to be so much proof that the LEADERSHIP of Blue Ridge themselves were ‘clueless’ about any kind of ‘ranch’ safety zone out there that day… ( because no one ever even bothered to tell them about it when they showed up to work that same area ) it would be hard to believe that some of the Blue Ridge CREW could have had any more knowledge about this ‘ranch’ thing than their leadership even did…
…but it’s still possible.
Correction for above.
I implied that there is a RECORDING of Marsh actually making this out-of-nowhere announcement about “we are making way out our escape route” and/or “we are headed for the ranch”.
AFAIK no such actual RECORDING exists.
What I should have said is that when we READ all that testimony from various people that THEY heard him say ti… etc. etc.
Paragraph about should have been like this…
Cordes had (quote) “no doubts” about where Marsh was headed when we read his testimony that HE heard Marsh announce ( earlier ) on the radio that they were ‘heading out our escape route’ and ‘going to the ranch’..
Reply to calvin post on August 19, 2014 at 12:10 pm
NOTE: Again… another ‘pull up’ from below because thread was running out of room
>> calvin said…
>>
>> It would seem to me that at precisely 1542, Marsh was in transit to the
>> proposed meeting place with Frisby. And this was 2 minutes after
>> reporting the fires (?) status . Right?
** YES to Marsh really needing to have already been at the same place he met Frisby at NOON for the previous face-to-face OR headed for that same spot circa 1542 when Frisby’s trip out there got ‘short-circuited’ because of Brendan’s predicament. If Marsh was NOT already at that designated ‘meeting’ location ( or almost there ) then if Frisby hadn’t run into Brendan and had just kept truckin’ on up to that meeting location in the UTV… Frisby was going to be there in about 4 minutes after passing the grader ( arrival circa 1546 ). If Marsh wasn’t already there to meet him at that time… Frisby was going to then turn to Steed and say.. “OK… I’m here. Where the hell is Marsh? He’s the one that ASKED for this meeting.”
** NO to ‘this was 2 minutes after reporting the fires (?) status.
To be precise… the 1542 ( 3:42 PM ) Panebaker video that captures the tail end of this ‘fire status report’ from Marsh tells us when Marsh FINISHED that ‘fire status report’. We KNOW that just before that Panebaker video begins is when Marsh ‘announced’ that the fire retardant line was ‘compromised’ because just as the video starts… Eric Panebaker’s partner is reacting to just hearing this from Marsh and exclaims to Eric Panebaker… “It’s blown through the retardant!”.
Eric Panebaker acknowledges his partner’s exclamation with a just a quick “Mm-hmm” but Panebaker is still intently listening to that end of Marsh’s ‘fire status report’ when Marsh also announces that the fire is now “heading SOUTH towards Yarnell”.
So we don’t know how LONG that ‘fire status report’ was from Marsh… we only know that it ENDED right at 1542 ( 3:42 PM ) plus a few seconds.
We also know now ( via Todd Abel’s ADOSH testimony ) that it was Marsh that had called Todd Abel at this time to specifically give him this ‘fire status report’. It is definitely Todd Abel that Marsh is speaking TO when the Panebaker video starts and so it is *most* likely that is Todd Abel simply heard saying “Thank You” to Marsh in the video right after Marsh finished the report.
It is also IMMEDIATELY after Marsh finishes this 1542 ‘fire status report’ and then Todd Abel says a quick “Thank You” that OPS2 Paul Musser begins his ‘availability check’ radio call to Marsh with the callout “Division Alpha, Operations, Musser”.
Marsh could have STARTED that ‘fire status report’ in the 1541 timeframe… but 1540 would probably be a little too early as a timestamp for ‘Marsh’s fire status report’. I don’t think he had been speaking for more than 20 or 30 seconds prior to us hearing him ‘finish’ that ‘report’ at 1542 plus a few seconds.
>> calvin also said…
>>
>> WTK. After Ashcraft texts his photo at 1416, it appears that GM started or
>> continued moving to the south.
You have to remember that Ashcraft sent that text/photo from the actual ‘Lunch Spot’,
which is NOT the same place that all the other Parker / MacKenzie photos / videos
were going to be taken later.
That spot WAS, in fact, just a little SOUTH and WEST of the official “Lunch Spot’ where
investigators apparently actually found some ‘lunch garbage’ there in the black.
So the the fact that the later photos and videos appear to have been taken SOUTH
of where Ashcraft’s photos would make sense… but it wasn’t any kind of ‘far’ distance.
Apparently… some of the crew ( Aschcraft included ) had just gone a little farther
down the slope to another rock pile to actually ‘eat lunch’.. It wasn’t far.
I guess what I am trying to say is that discrepancy between the location for the Aschcraft photo and then the other photos taken later isn’t enough to assume it represented any kind of ‘major move south’ or anything. It was just guys walking around ‘in the black’ up there choosing where to eat lunch but never getting very far away from the ‘work area’ at all.
>> calvin also said…
>>
>> If Marsh called and asked Frisby to head up, it would make sense that he would
>> be near that location, in order to make it to the meeting spot, and not leave
>> Frisby waiting.
Yes. See above. Frisby was REALLY BUSY when Marsh made that request and I still think it is astonishing ( given fire behavior and everything else going on ) that Marsh would even ASK him to haul his ass all the way up to that ridge at that late time in the day just to talk about something that Marsh didn’t want to seem to discuss ( or describe ) over the radio..
Maybe what is more astonishing is that Frisby would even AGREE to ‘eat dust’ all the way up there one more time without just ASKING Marsh what was so all-fired important that they couldn’t just discuss it on the same radio call they were obviously ALREADY having to even ‘arrange’ the meeting in the first place. It was NOT that ‘easy of a drive’ up there… even in a UTV.
There has NEVER been any indication in any Blue Ridge interview or any BR ‘Unit Logs’ what it was that Marsh really wanted to talk ABOUT at that late hour in the day. There are some heavy ‘redactions’ in the Blue Ridge ‘Unit Logs’ right around this time so maybe Frisby ( or Brown ) really did mention in their logs what this second ‘face-to-face’ was supposed to be ABOUT… but that got REDACTED out of the public release of the document(s), for some reason.
This whole ‘second face to face’ thing with Brian Frisby is really ( and always has been ) a pretty critical part of the whole ‘story’ here. Obviously… if Marsh asked Frisby to drop what he was doing and ‘eat dust’ all the way back up to where HE was… Marsh thought there must have been something pretty important to ‘see’ from up on the ridge that he wanted Frisby to ‘see’… or it was something that Marsh just didn’t even want to ‘discuss’ over an open radio channel.
Likewise… it’s pretty important to realize this also meant that UNTIL Frisby ‘accidentally’ came across Brendan… Marsh was still expecting this ‘important meeting’ to take place and that there was still some important ‘work’ to do related to Frisby and Blue Ridge… or something like that.
Keep in mind… Frisby had Brendan in the UTV right around 1542 and was trying to call Marsh. Marsh didn’t respond to Frisby’s FIRST attempt to call him on the radio and tell him he had found Brendan. Frisby testifies that it was only after trying a FEW times to raise Marsh on the radio did he finally get him.
Well… we ALSO know that 1542 is EXACTLY when OPS2 Paul Musser made his ‘availability check’ callout to Marsh… and Marsh responded to Musser’s question (quote) “Are you still committed to the ridge?” with “YES… we are still committed to the ridge”. NOT ‘the black’. Musser was clear on this. Musser never even mentioned ‘the black’ and Marsh NEVER said he/they were ‘committed to the black’. Marsh’s reason for telling Musser GM was ‘not available’ still appeared to reflect a belief on Marsh’s part that their WORK up there was NOT OVER yet and they were still ‘committed to THAT assignment’.
It is also curious to realize that at the exact moment Marsh tells Musser he/they are still “committed to the ridge… try Blue Ridge down there”… Marsh KNEW that Frisby was ( at that same exact moment ) actually headed WEST in the UTV to meet with HIM… but Marsh doesn’t mention ANYTHING about that little reality to OPS2 Paul Musser. Very strange, really.
It is almost as if at the same moment Marsh KNEW that he was about to have this sort of ‘secret’ one-on-one face-to-face with the Superintendent of the Blue Ridge Hotshots… that Marsh didn’t really want Musser to know that ( for some reason ) and Marsh is also telling him to ‘call’ the very guy he is about to actually have this ‘secret’ meeting with. Weird.
We have always assumed that the reason Marsh didn’t answer OPS2 Paul Musser’s 1542 ‘callout’ to him right away ( or before that 24 second Panebaker video ends ) is because THAT is the moment when he was actually ‘finishing’ his conversation with Frisby about him coming across Brendan, cancelling the face-to-face, and then asking Marsh if he wanted BR to move the GM vehicles.
What if that long-held assumption is simply WRONG?
What if it’s the other way around?
What if ‘seconds counted’ here as far as who was calling who and when.
Frisby said he tried to reach Marsh right away after finding Brendan… but he ‘got no response’ from Marsh on that first attempt.
What if the reason Frisby himself didn’t ‘get a response from Marsh’ on that first attempt in the 1542 timeframe is because Marsh was actually still having… or just finishing his 1542 conversation with OPS2 Paul Musser?
That would mean that Marsh would have told Musser they were still ‘committed to the ridge’ because Marsh didn’t even KNOW that Frisby was trying to call him on the radio at that same moment to CANCEL this (supposedly) important ‘face-to-face’.
So Marsh’s report to Musser that they were still ‘committed to the ridge’ might have included Marsh’s knowledge that Frisby was supposed to be ‘up there’ momentarily for this ( important? ) face-to-face Marsh wanted to have… but he did NOT tell Musser anything about that.
Somehow… when talking to Musser…. Marsh still thought that he and Frisby were going to work out some new ‘plan’ in just a few moments and so Marsh still was thinking there was ‘work to do’ and that’s why he told Musser he ( and GM ) were ‘committed to the ridge’.
Seconds later… all that kind of ‘thinking’ or ‘planning’ on Marsh’s part collapsed.
Only now ( AFTER Marsh finishes talking to Musser ) does Frisby finally raises Marsh and only now Marsh learns what is ‘going down’ out there in the middle bowl and that Frisby isn’t going to make it up for this ‘meeting’ Marsh wanted… and the whole day changed right then and there.
Now it’s all about evacuating Brendan and whether Marsh wants Blue Ridge to move vehicles and yada… yada… yada. Whatever Marsh had wanted to ‘discuss’ with Frisby is now ‘off the table’.
The TIMING of these radio calls in this 1542 timeframe is VERY critical when it comes to understanding who might have been saying what to who… and WHY.
In just those few seconds around 1542… we have Marsh somehow believing there is still ‘work to do’ and telling OPS Paul Musser “we are still committed to the ridge” ( but NOT telling Musser he is ABOUT to meet face-to-face with Frisby ) to then discovering all bets are off and there isn’t going to BE any new ‘face-to-face’ with Frisby.
So which happened FIRST ( I think it matters ).
Had Marsh talked with Frisby and learned the face-to-face wasn’t going to happen BEFORE OPS2 Paul Musser’s 1542 ‘availability check’?
OR
Did Marsh talk with OPS2 Paul Musser FIRST in the 1542 timeframe and Frisby was sort of ‘on hold’ or ‘on call waiting’ ( if you will ) and only when Marsh finished talking to OPS Musser did he then respond to Frisby’s calls and discover that whatever ‘plan’ he seemed to still be entertaining that required this crazy late-day face-to-face with Frisby wasn’t going to happen?
THIS is the moment that day ( the crucial 1542 moment ) when everything seemed to change…. and whatever ‘plans’ Marsh still had to do anything had to then get abandoned and now all Marsh could do was begin having his NEW ‘discussing our options’ radio conversations with Steed.
I really would love to know what the second face-to-face
with Frisby was even SUPPOSED to be about.
I mean… is it really possible BR Superintendent Brian Frisby would have agreed to ‘eat dust’ and haul his ass all the way back up to that ridge at such a critical moment in the day without even having any IDEA what Marsh wanted to discuss? Did Marsh just ASK for the meeting and when Frisby asked “What FOR?”… Marsh just said… “I don’t want to talk about it on the radio… but it’s important… so please come up here RIGHT NOW”?
I don’t think so. I think Brian Frisby MUST have had some idea what Marsh thought was so all-fired important at that late hour that Marsh felt it REQUIRED another inconvenient ‘face-to-face’.
>> calvin also said
>>
>> What is that, like a 10 minute UTV drive?
Depends on the staring point.
If you are talking about starting from where the Cutover Trail meets the Sesame area ( which is where Frisby borrowed the UTV from Brown for that second face-to-face and the point he departed from ) then yes… at a not-breakneck pace it was 8-9 minutes from there to the old-grader… and another 4 or 5 minutes from the old-grader up to the exact spot where the UTV had been parked for the NOON face-to-face.
If you are talking about ONLY traveling from the old-grader the rest of the way up to that previous meeting location… that ‘leg’ of the trip was only 4 minutes ( if you were in a hurry ) or 5 minutes ( if you didn’t want to risk bouncing out of the UTV on that very rocky part of the trip ).
A likely reason for Marsh’s request for the second face to face meeting with Frisby, is that Marsh could see that GM’s vehicles and equipment were in eminent peril.
That being the case, he didn’t want to broadcast over ANY channel that due to GM’s poor planning, they were about to lose hundreds of thousands of dollars in vehicles and equipment.
The face to face would at least keep the vehicle rescue request off the air and between the 2 crews.
Reply to TTWARE post on August 20, 2014 at 8:46 am
>> TTWARE said…
>>
>> A likely reason for Marsh’s request for the second face to face
>> meeting with Frisby, is that Marsh could see that GM’s vehicles
>> and equipment were in eminent peril.
A good guess… and I suppose it is possible… but here would be
why I wouldn’t say it was ‘likely’…
1) Marsh’s actual REQUEST to Frisby for the second face to face was in the 1531 timeframe… either just before or just after Byron Kimball’s 1531 weather report on the TAC channels regarding the upcoming 180 degree wind shift. That would be a full 10 minutes before Marsh would make his own ‘fire progress report’ and tell Todd Abel the retardant lines and dozer lines were being compromised and that the fire was now ‘heading south into Yarnell’.
2) I don’t think when Marsh actually MADE that request to Frisby for the second ‘face-to-face’ that he was at all aware the GM vehicles were about to actually be in ‘imminent peril’. That wasn’t until about 10 minutes later.
>> TTWARE also said…
>>
>> That being the case, he didn’t want to broadcast over ANY channel
>> that due to GM’s poor planning, they were about to lose hundreds
>> of thousands of dollars in vehicles and equipment.
It was Blue Ridge’s ‘poor planning’ as well. They had at least one chase vehicle still in harms way in the Sesame area even farther north than the GM carriers when the fire ‘turned’.
Also… I believe when Marsh first contacted Frisby and requested that second face-to-face…. that conversation was taking place over either a semi-private standard Hotshot inter-crew frequency OR over Blue Ridge’s own private intra-crew frequency. Frisby *might* have given Marsh that BR intra-crew frequency when they met earlier during the NOON face-to-face.
There has always been a fair amount of confusion here as to WHICH radio channels a lot of these reported conversations between Marsh and Frisby were taking place on. When Frisby first picked up Brendan… Brendan handed Frisby hs own BK portable so that Frisby could talk direct to Marsh and Steed… but THAT was the “I have Brendan with me… do you want us to move your vehicles along with ours?” conversation.
As for what channel the actual request from Marsh for the second face-to-face took place on… the BR notes didn’t say. The fact that NON ONE ELSE seems to have ‘heard’ this conversation or testified about it would tend to indicate it did NOT take place over one of the open TAC channels.
>> TTWARE also wrote…
>>
>> The face to face would at least keep the vehicle rescue request
>> off the air and between the 2 crews.
Again… close guess… but the timing isn’t quite right on that.
The ‘request’ for the meeting took place earlier than the concern over the vehicles.
However… I think you are right that for whatever reason Marsh wanted to have the inconvenient second face-to-face with Frisby… part of the motivation was to talk about something ( ?? ) that Marsh didn’t feel comfortable talking about over the radio.
I’d still love to know what the second face-to-face at such a critical time was even SUPPOSED to be about… and I think that Frisby knows.
Followup to above…
There really is still no proof what radio channel Marsh and Frisby were using in the 1531 tmeframe when Marsh asked Frisby to drop what he was doing and ‘eat dust’ all the way up to the high ridge just for another (mysterious) face-to-face meeting that late in the afternoon…
However… as far as the “I have Brendan with me and do you want us to move your vehicles for you?” conversation later ( at 1542 )… I think we DO have proof exactly which ‘radio channel’ THAT conversation too place on.
According to Frisby’s own testimony… as soon as he had encountered Brendan and realized the fire was coming SOUTH pretty quick… Frisby tried to contact Marsh… but Frisby says he got NO RESPONSE on that first attempt to call Marsh.
Frisby’s own testimony then just says “then I did get him’.
I think that explains this documented moment ( in Brendan McDonough’s testimony ) when Brendan says he “Handed his portable radio to the Blue Ridge Superintendent so he could speak with Marsh/Steed directly”.
The ‘picture’ that would match both sets of testimony would then go something like this…
1) Frisby accidentally runs into Brendan near the old-grader, observes fire behavior there and immediately tells Brendan to ‘get in the UTV’.
2) Frisby tries to raise Marsh on one of the open TAC channels with a callout something like we hear him doing in the YARNELL-GAMBLE video when Frisby was trying to ‘raise’ SPGS Gary Cordes. Something like…
“Division Alpha, Blue Ridge Hotshots, on TAC 1”.
3) There was NO RESPONSE from Marsh.
4) Frisby might have tried again. Same callout. Same channel.
5) Still NO RESPONSE from Marsh.
6) Frisby looks at Brendan and shrugs his shoulders.
7) Brendan sets his BK to transmit on the GM private intra-crew ( if it wasn’t already set to do that anyway ) and hands his BK to Frisby saying “Here… try the intra-crew”.
8) Frisby makes the same callout again to Marsh on the GM intra-crew.
9) Eric Marsh responds… and THEN Frisby says something like “I have your lookout. Too dangerous to continue on for face-to-face. I’m heading back EAST. I will take Brendan back EAST with me. Do you want us to move your vehicles for you while we are moving ours?”
I think this sort of proves that Brian Frisby most probably did NOT have the GM intra-crew frequency punched into his BK radio that day.
If he did… then why would Brendan have had to hand Frisby HIS radio in order to try and contact Marsh on THAT ( private ) frequency.
So unless Frisby did do the ‘opposite’ during that NOON face-to-face with Marsh and Frsiby gave Marsh BR’s own ‘private’ intra-crew frequency… then it’s safe to say that Marsh’s initial request to Frisby circa 1531 for that second face-to-face meeting pretty much HAD to have taken place on a ‘non-private’ frequency.
It is still a little strange that in ALL of the interviews and testimony… no one other than BR crew ( Frisby, Brown, etc. ) have testified to even hearing this REQUEST from Marsh for that second ‘face-to-face’ with Frisby.
Followup…
In his June 20, 2014 presentation / speech to an open meeting of the Utah Unified Fire Authority… SAIT Co-Lead Mike Dudley described this same ‘scenario’ but he also told this roomful of firefighters that THIS is why Brendan McDonough ‘doesn’t know anything’ about WHY Granite Mountain did what they did after that.
Dudley actually says it was because of this moment when Brendan handed his radio to Blure Ridge Superintendent Brian Frisby.
Dudley then actually tells this room full of firefighters that Brendan never got his own radio back and that’s why he never heard anything else that day.
Forget the fact that Mike Dudley’s own SAIR document ( and the subsequent ADOSH report ) stated unequivocally that “Brendan then heard them ( Marsh and Steed ) discussing their options”.
Forget the fact that just minutes later Brendan would be in Eric Marsh’s own GM Superintendent Truck with the air-conditioner running and the onboard radio ( complete with GM intra-crew frequency ) running at full volume ( as Brendan himself has said ).
The idea that Brian didn’t just hand Brendan his BK portable back after that quick conversation with Marsh is… well… how should I describe it?
A non-starter?
Total fiction?
An easy way to explain why you didn’t ask a crucial witness
in the investigation of the deaths of 19 men any more questions
about what he might have heard that day?
Reply to calvin post on August 19, 2014 at 5:35 pm
NOTE: Continuation of a thread from down below that was running out of room.
>> calvin said…
>>
>> WTK. Thanks for your response, but I am not trying to sell anything.
>> I am only trying to make sense of this. Same as you.
Yes. I know…. and ( likewise ) no offense intended in my response.
I was just reacting to your sort of “Wink… Wink… Nod Nod’ style question that ended with “right?….’ that seemed to be just ‘dismissing’ Brendan’s testimony that Eric Marsh was located ‘right above him’ most of the day and you also seemed to say “And all this is from the guy ( Brendan ) who can’t seem to remember things correctly… right?”
I still think we have to trust SOME of this testimony from Brendan until we can prove ( like we did with the lookout mound exit timing thing ) whether he is ‘off the mark’ or not.
Kind of like Tyson Esquibel’s ‘testimony’. There are parts of it which make you wonder what planet he was on that day ( much less what FIRE he was working ) but there are other parts that pretty much have to be accepted as accurate until proven otherwise.
I still think you are a ‘steely-eyed rocket man’ and only interested in the TRUTH here.
>> calvin also said…
>> I have a few questions, that you can probably help clarify.
>>
>> 1. Exactly how far north of the Parker, Mackenzie, Norris
>> photo location was the Anchor Point/ expected meeting
>> place between Marsh/ Frisby? Are those two places
>> the actual same location?
Yes. Pretty much. Only a 217 foot difference.
Keep in mind that the phrase ‘anchor point’ is a ‘loose’ term that really just generally describes ‘up around where GM was working that day’.
The actual first face-to-face just has to be assumed to have taken place right where the Blue Ridge GPS tracking data shows the UTV ‘parked’ up there for 32 minutes that day ( 11:53 AM to 12:25 PM )… or at least within a very short walking distance from that ‘parking spot’.
When Frisby and Brown drove up there for the FIRST face-to-face with Marsh and Steed late that morning ( the actual face-to-face lasted 32 minutes from 11:53 AM to 12:25 PM ) the Blue Ridge GPS tracking data shows that they ‘parked’ the UTV at this exact location up there…
34.226977, -112.789528
The exact location where Wade Parker took his photo ( as determined by ADOSH on-site investigation and photos ) is here…
34.227515, -112.789960
NOTE: MacKenzie’s videos were also shot right here, give or take a few feet.
That means Frisby and Brown ‘parked’ the UTV on the two-track road just 217 feet ( FEET, not yards ) due southwest of the middle of that ‘rock pile’ where all those photos / videos were going to be taken later in the day.
They could have just ‘tossed a rock’ from the UTV over to that photo / video shoot location once they ‘parked’ the UTV and got out of it.
Since that is where they ‘parked’ the UTV… it was so close to that ‘rock pile’ that I suppose you could assume that’s where Steed already was ( and Marsh? ) even around NOON.
In other words… Steed might have established that same ‘rock pile’ as the best ‘lookout spot’ for HIM to be that day and Steed might have even been just sitting on the same rock we would see him sitting on later in the MacKenzie photos even when Frisby and Brown ‘pulled up’ for that very first NOON face-to-face.
The complete set of GPS data covering that first ‘face-to-face’ from arrival to departure…
————————————————————————————————–
1153 – 34.226977, -112.789528 – 0401.875 – 04,57 – At anchor point.’area’ now for the
first face-to-face with Marsh/Steed. UTV was now ‘parked’ at this spot on the two-track.
1154 – 34.226977, -112.789528 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1155 – 34.226977, -112.789528 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1156 – 34.226977, -112.789528 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1157 – 34.226977, -112.789528 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1158 – 34.226977, -112.789528 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1159 – 34.226977, -112.789528 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1200 – 34.226977, -112.789528 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1201 – 34.226977, -112.789528 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1202 – 34.226977, -112.789528 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1203 – 34.226977, -112.789528 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1204 – 34.226977, -112.789528 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1205 – 34.226977, -112.789528 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1206 – 34.226977, -112.789528 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1207 – 34.226977, -112.789528 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1208 – 34.226977, -112.789528 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1209 – 34.226977, -112.789528 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1210 – 34.226977, -112.789528 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1211 – 34.226977, -112.789528 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1212 – 34.226977, -112.789528 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1213 – 34.226977, -112.789528 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1214 – 34.226977, -112.789528 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1215 – 34.226977, -112.789528 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1216 – 34.226977, -112.789528 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1217 – 34.226977, -112.789528 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1218 – 34.226977, -112.789528 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1219 – 34.226977, -112.789528 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1220 – 34.226977, -112.789528 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1221 – 34.226977, -112.789528 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1222 – 34.226977, -112.789528 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1223 – 34.226977, -112.789528 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1224 – 34.226977, -112.789528 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1225 – 34.227216, -112.790698 – 0448.106 – 05.09 – Slight move north on two-track. ( Turning UTV around? )
1226 – 34.226932, -112.790086 – 0214.886 – 02.44 – Slight move south on two-track ( Turning UTV around? )
1227 – 34.226507, -112.788713 – 0567.084 – 06.44 – Heading south down two-track quickly now. The face-to-face has ENDED.and Frisby and Brown are taking Brendan down to lookout spot.
———————————————————————————————
>> calvin also wrote…
>>
>> 2.What would have been the ETA for Frisby arriving at the meeting
>> spot with Marsh (if he had continued instead of picking up Mcdonough
>> and turning around)?
1546 ( 3:46 PM ).
It was only another 4 ( if you go quickly ) or 5 ( if you take it easy ) minutes from the old-grader to that same GPS coordinate shown above for where the UTV was ‘parked’ for the NOON face-to face.
NOTE: We are obviously ‘assuming’ that when Marsh asked Frisby to come up for that second face-to-face that Frisby was headed for the same place where he met Marsh a few hours earlier. There is no testimony in any Blue Ridge interview or Unit Log that suggests anything different and it would only make sense that Frisby was headed ‘back to the same meeting location’. There was only one way up there in a UTV and it was exactly the same way Frisby got up there for the NOON face-to-face. Past the old-grader and then on up to the ‘anchor point’ area.
>> calvin also wrote…
>> 3. Slightly unrelated question. How far was it from Mcdonough’s lookout
>> spot to the black that he indicated was an escape route (for himself?)
>> He didn’t / couldn’t give an estimate in the follow up ADOSH interview,
>> even after being pressed.
Copy.
In that second ADOSH interview… Brendan said….
——————————————————————————————-
Q3: Brendan, can I – can I ask you – I think I heard, uh, you said s- some of your, uh, you had an escape route or a go, uh, a safety zone that was back into the black; is that correct?
A: Yes.
Q3: How – how far away were you from the black?
A: Mm, I can’t recall. Um…
Q3: Fairly close or…
A: In some areas, yeah. It just depended which way I wanted to go if I wanted to take a road or if I wanted – or not a road but a two-track or if I just wanted to cut through brush ‘cause that wash kinda led up to the black.
———————————————————————————————-
** TRAVEL TO BLACK VIA TWO-TRACK ROAD…
From that ‘rock’ up on the top of his lookout mound ( where he was hanging out most of the time ) and back up the same two-track that Frisby and Brown had driven him down on…
5,166 feet ( just short of a mile ).
Caveat: That is assuming Brendan would have just STAYED on the two-track all the way to where the black started up there near where the Parker / MacKenzie photos were taken and would not have taken any ‘shortcuts’ up any ‘drainages’. If he had been in a real hurry and/or in danger… he certainly could have done that even if he ‘started out’ walking away from that old-grader on the established two-track.
** TRAVEL TO BLACK DIRECTLY THROUGH BRUSH…
Much shorter… but still anywhere from 1,700 to 2,000 feet ( better than 1/4 mile through dense unburned fuel in close proximity to the advancing fireline ).
Caveat: That would be only if he took off from the top of that mount directly west and up towards the black. There are some ‘drainages’ in that area that could have served as ‘shortcuts’ as well… but still ‘rough going’.
>> calvin also wrote…
>> As always, many thanks for all your research, and dedication to this.
>> And I mean no disrespect as we debate this ongoing subject.
Copy.
It’s actually amazing how well people do on this forum given the fact that the printed word can NEVER really fully express ‘tone’, ‘intent’ or even the correct ’emphasis’ most of the time.
Sometimes any/all of that gets easily misunderstood just reading typed words.
Compared to some other similar forums I am engaged in… this one is a polite tea party
( No political references either intended or implied there. Sometimes ‘tea party’ does just mean ‘tea party’ with cups and saucers and whatnot. )
So if Frisby had not stopped the UTV, picked up Mcdonough, and did a 180, he would have been up to the meeting spot circa 1546. If Marsh asked for the meeting, we could assume (correctly?) that Marsh would have been there on time also, 1546. And this position is south of the Mackenzie video location.
So lets say Marsh WAS at the meeting location. As noted before, Marsh does not seem to be exerting himself when he calls to report the fire has blown through the retardant. That could be evidence that he was already at the meeting spot when he makes that call out. Also, telling Musser they were commited to the ridge, not the black. If Marsh was at the meeting place, he would have been out of the black, slightly, right?
Does this scenario make sense?
I had understood that the 2 track went across the top and dropped down past the grader and around the bottom of the ridge back to where Frisby came from.
Actually the 2 track made a start at BSR went to the top into the burn around and dropped back down to the area of the parked trucks and on around and down the road the GM trucks came in on. It was a basic trail if I am not mistaking.
Replyt to Bob Powers post August 20, 2014 at 10:53 am
>> Bob Powers said…
>> I had understood that the 2 track went across the top and
>> dropped down past the grader and around the bottom of
>> the ridge back to where Frisby came from.
That sounds right, yes.
The ‘two-track’ that leads from the old-grader on up to the high-ridge two-track actually exits the old-grader location in a ‘southerly’ direction, and then winds back to the west / southwest in kind of a long ‘curve’ as it heads on up to the high-ridge two-track.
It meets the high-ridge two-track in a ‘T’ intersection at exactly the point on the Blue Ridge Tracking Data topographic background map that is labelled “Mystery Panel”.
There was actually ANOTHER ‘Jeep Trail’ leading away to the northwest from the ‘old-grader’ location that kind of LOOKS like it also goes all the way up to the high-ridge two-track… but that is not the case.
When Frisby and Brown were driving the UTV up there for that first NOONish face-to-face… they mistakenly took this other ‘northwest’ Jeep Trail away from the old-grader, thinking that would get them ‘up there’.
It didn’t. That ‘Jeep Trail’ just kind of ‘terminates’ at the base of the ridge slope and does NOT continue on up to the high-ridge two track. Frisby and Brown had to turn around, at that point, go back to the old-grader, and THEN take the OTHER two-track that leads SOUTH away from the old-grader in order to make it all the way up there for that ‘face-to-face’.
>> Bob Powers also wrote…
>>
>> Actually the 2 track made a start at BSR went to the top into
>> the burn around and dropped back down to the area of the
>> parked trucks and on around and down the road the GM trucks
>> came in on. It was a basic trail if I am not mistaking.
That description is a little confusing… but I *think* your visual map is close to correct. If you are saying those trails out there were basically one big LOOP that covered all of the high-ridge and had ‘descent trails’ back to both the ‘Sesame area’ and the BSR itself… that’s pretty much correct.
The only part of the LOOP I would take issue with is that even though Google Maps appears to show that ‘alternate escape route’ as being some kind of contiguous ‘road’ that came down off the ridge towards the Candy Cane Lane are but ALSO had a ‘north leg road’ that led right to the BSR and then continued on to the Sesame area… that isn’t really the case.
Google maps ( with ‘Label mode’ turned on ) shows the trail as a ‘road’ that comes north off the east leg of the trail, then passes through that ‘draw’ by the BSR and goes right to the ranch… but then passes right by the BSR and then continues north.
Pre-fire satellite imagery doesn’t back this up.
There is no obvious ‘road’ that led directly to the BSR once they would have finished that east leg of the trip and have been standing there in that clearing. The only ‘obvious’ continuation of that ‘trail’ was then to the southeast towards the Candy Cane Lane area.
If they had finished that ‘east leg’ of the ‘alternate escape route’…. I think it would have been obvious they would have now had to work their way due north through that ‘draw’ and those ‘drainages’ to actually GET to the Boulder Springs Ranch…. but there was no obvious ‘road’ through that draw as Google Maps with ‘Label mode’ on seems to indicate.
Followup…
For that ‘alternate escape route flythough’ video I did up at Youtube… the final leg of the journey north ( through that draw and on over the fence of the BSR itself and into the compound ) has a ‘thin white line’ showing… but that is not an actual ‘road’ or trail’.
I was just adding that one or two pixel wide ‘thin line’ to the video itself as part of the instruction set for Google Earth showing it what PATH I wanted the ‘camera’ to follow during the video.
There was actually no such well-defined ‘path’ on the ground out there at all. In order to even ‘guess’ how they might have actually made that final leg of the trip and actually have made it into the Boulder Springs Ranch compound… I had to very carefully examine full-zoom pre-fire images of all that tangled manzanita there on the approach to the Ranch coming out of that draw and just sort of ‘guess’ where they might have been working their way through that mess of manazanita.
** INTERESTING SIDENOTE
**
** CONFUSION ABOUT HOW TO GET UP TO THE
** ANCHOR POINT AREA IS WHAT CAUSED BROWN
** TO TURN HIS GPS UNIT ON.
Up above I said…
>> When Frisby and Brown were driving the UTV up there
>> for that first NOONish face-to-face… they mistakenly
>> took this other ‘northwest’ Jeep Trail away from the
>> old-grader, thinking that would get them ‘up there’.
>>
>> It didn’t.
>>
>> That ‘Jeep Trail’ just kind of ‘terminates’ at the base
>> of the ridge slope and does NOT continue on up to
>> the high-ridge two track. Frisby and Brown had to turn
>> around, at that point, go back to the old-grader, and
>> THEN take the OTHER two-track that leads SOUTH
>> away from the old-grader in order to make it all the
>> way up there for that ‘face-to-face’.
This ‘moment of confusion’ on the part of Frisby and Brown about which trail to take is what actually caused Trueheart Brown to ‘switch on’ his GPS unit for the first time that morning.
Here is the very START of the Blue Ridge GPS tracking data where we see that the unit came ON at 11:00 AM but the little blue ‘tracking pointer’ doesn’t appear for 10 minutes after that.
This really could just mean that when Frisby and Brown arrived at the old-grader on their way up to the anchor point for the first face-to-face… they reached the old-grader and then saw the two different trails leading away from the old-grader and didn’t know which one to take.
So that was the first time that day ( 11:00 AM ) when Brown turned the unit ON. 10 minutes later… he then puts it in ‘track me’ mode and that is when the blue tracking data started to appear in the data log.
The data shows them ‘deciding’ to try the northwest jeep trail leading away from the old-grader first… then it shows them discovering that was a ‘dead end’ and returning to the old-grader to take the OTHER trail on up to the anchor point for the 11:53 to 12:25 PM ( 32 minute ) face-to-face with Marsh and Steed.
———————————————————————–
* DATA COLUMNS:
Time – Latitude, Longitude – Distance traveled (feet) – Rate (mph) – Description
* THE FULL TRACKING DATA
1100 – BLUE RIDGE GPS TRACKING VIDEO STARTS
1101 – 1109 – VIDEO is running but tracking pointer doesn’t appear until ten minutes later at 1110
1110 – 34.231428, -112.782608 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Pointer appears near old-grader
1111 – 34.231428, -112.782608 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1112 – 34.231464, -112.782528 – 0023.050 – 00.26 – Slight movement east on two-track
1113 – 34.231464, -112.782528 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1114 – 34.231311, -112.783531 – 0343.066 – 03.90 – Back west to old-grader itself
1115 – 34.231362, -112.783678 – 0054.318 – 00.62 – Slight movement to west of old-grader
1116 – 34.231309, -112.783705 – 0018.698 – 00.21 – Slight movement south in grader clearing
1117 – 34.231309, -112.783705 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1118 – 34.231309, -112.783705 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1119 – 34.231309, -112.783705 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1120 – 34.231309, -112.783705 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1121 – 34.231309, -112.783705 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1122 – 34.231309, -112.783705 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1123 – 34.231367, -112.783689 – 0024.364 – 00.28 – Slight movement back north
1124 – 34.231648, -112.784110 – 0163.805 – 01.85 – Headed northwest on jeep trail away from grader
1125 – 34.231955, -112.784979 – 0339.999 – 03.85 – Continuing northwest on jeep trail
1126 – 34.232284, -112.785290 – 0143.944 – 01.64 – Still headed northwest on jeep trail
1127 – 34.232603, -112.785602 – 0161.395 – 01.83 – Still headed northwest on jeep trail
1128 – 34.232603, -112.785602 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1129 – 34.233197, -112.786809 – 0434.956 – 04.94 – Still headed northwest on jeep trail
1130 – 34.233255, -112.787624 – 0249.851 – 02.84 – Still on jeep trail, now headed more westerly
1131 – 34.233091, -112.788166 – 0176.292 – 02.00 – Still on jeep trail, now headed west
1132 – 34.233091, -112.788166 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1133 – 34.233202, -112.787822 – 0115.505 – 01.31 – Now headed back east on jeep trail
1134 – 34.233277, -112.787340 – 0145.492 – 01.65 – Back east on jeep trail
1135 – 34.233140, -112.786701 – 0227.090 – 02.58 – Now headed southeast on jeep trail
1136 – 34.232476, -112.785451 – 0439.727 – 05.00 – Still headed southwest back towards old-grader
1137 – 34.231348, -112.783676 – 0737.133 – 08.38 – Arrival back at western edge of grader clearing
1138 – 34.230780, -112.782903 – 0414.637 – 04.70 – Past grader, back to main two-track, then south
1139 – 34.229727, -112.782962 – 0413.506 – 04.69 – Still headed south on two-track
1140 – 34.228671, -112.782876 – 0395.696 – 04.49 – Still headed south on two-track
1141 – 34.227811, -112.782962 – 0305.242 – 03.47 – Still headed south on two-track
1142 – 34.226398, -112.783456 – 0584.841 – 06.64 – Still headed south on two-track ( to anchor pt.)
1143 – 34.225795, -112.783450 – 0236.614 – 02.68 – Still headed south on two-track
1144 – 34.225107, -112.784395 – 0345.736 – 03.92 – Still headed to anchor point, climbing to west
1145 – 34.225152, -112.785468 – 0373.750 – 04.24 – Still climbing west up to anchor point
1146 – 34.224704, -112.786186 – 0318.112 – 03.61 – At two-track junction ( Mystery panel location )
1147 – 34.225072, -112.786514 – 0178.261 – 02.03 – Heading north on two-track toward anchor point
1148 – 34.225715, -112.787088 – 0331.968 – 03.76 – Heading north on two-track toward anchor point
1149 – 34.225258, -112.787452 – 0195.187 – 02.22 – Heading north on two-track toward anchor point
1150 – 34.224872, -112.787951 – 0240.243 – 02.73 – Heading north on two-track toward anchor point
1151 – 34.225387, -112.788166 – 0210.341 – 02.41 – Heading north on two-track toward anchor point
1152 – 34.226309, -112.788616 – 0395.360 – 04.50 – Heading north on two-track toward anchor point
1153 – 34.226977, -112.789528 – 0401.875 – 04,57 – ARRIVAL at anchor point area for face-to-face with Marsh/Steed. The UTV remained ‘parked’ at this exact spot for the next 32 minutes.
————————————————————————
Reply to calvin post on August 20, 2014 at 3:18 am
>> calvin said…
>>
>> So if Frisby had not stopped the UTV, picked up Mcdonough,
>> and did a 180, he would have been up to the meeting spot
>> circa 1546.
Yes. Possibly +- 60 seconds or so.
There is still a part of me that wishes Brian Frisby HAD just continued on up to the two-track and ‘delievered’ Brendan back to GM instead of heading back east.
I believe that he would NOT have been able to come back down in the UTV due to the rapid fire progression towards the two-track and now he would have been ‘stuck’ up there along with the entire GM crew.
I believe that Brian Frisby’s own obviously safety-at-all-time perspective might have changed the result that day if he, himself, had then been directly involved in this ‘planned move’ up there.
Maybe…. maybe not. Marsh / Steed might not have given a damn what Brian Frisby thought about anything and might have still done exactly what they did… but something also tells me Brian Frisby still would NOT have been down with them in that box canyon. I think HE had better sense and a healthy self-preservation instinct.
>> calvin also said…
>>
>> If Marsh asked for the meeting, we could assume (correctly?) that
>> Marsh would have been there on time also, 1546. And this position
>> is south of the Mackenzie video location.
YES to assuming Marsh would have been making every effort to be there when Frisby arrived circa 1546… but NO to ‘this position is south of the MacKenzie location’.
The point where the NOON face-to-face took place was essentially the SAME place the MacKenzie videos were shot. The UTV was parked on the two-track just 217 feet away from that rock pile. It was, in fact, 217 feet ‘south’ of the rock pile but I don’t think that can be construed as any distance away at all. It was, essentially, RIGHT THERE where MacKenzie would shoot his videos.
>> calvin also said….
>>
>> So lets say Marsh WAS at the meeting location. As noted before,
>> Marsh does not seem to be exerting himself when he calls to report
>> the fire has blown through the retardant. That could be evidence that
>> he was already at the meeting spot when he makes that call out.
Yes. It could. In their testimony… people tended to SAY whether they thought Marsh was ‘exerting himself’ when they recalled hearing certain things on the radio and I believe it was because both the SAIT and ADOSH investigators were being very careful about ASKING people about that.
We can hear the difference between a Marsh ‘on the move’ and a Marsh likely ‘at rest’ for ourselves. In the Caldwell video… it is pretty obvious Marsh is actually ‘on the move’ when he says “I’m workin’ my way off the top”. Very ‘breathy’… as if he literally is doing exactly what he says he is doing.
The 1542 fire report from Marsh bears no resemblance to that kind of ‘breathy’ radio transmission. It can be assumed that Marsh was ‘stationary’ when he called Todd Able circa 1542 and told Abel about the fire compromising both the retardant and the dozer lines and that it was now ‘heading south for Yarnell’.
>> calvin also said…
>>
>> Also, telling Musser they were commited to the ridge, not the black.
>> If Marsh was at the meeting place, he would have been out of
>> the black, slightly, right?
Well… not really.
I believe it could be said that the exact spot on the two-track where Frisby and Brown ‘parked’ the UTV for that previous NOON face-to-face could be considered already ‘inside the black’.
>> calvin also said…
>>
>> Does this scenario make sense?
It does to me.
I think I mentioned before that for even just the purposes of determining if Marsh had the TIME to get all the way down to the ‘saddle’… or even down into the ‘box canyon’ BEFORE we hear him talking over the radio to Steed in the MacKenzie videos… a ‘safe bet’ would be to assume that he WAS already there ( circa 1542 ) at that previous face-to-face meeting spot waiting for Frisby to arrive for that second face-to-face.
Question: As long as we are re-examining all this… do you think Eric’s voice in the actual MacKenzie video captures sounds like he is ‘on the move’ ( as it does in the Caldwell video ) or his is ‘at rest’ ( as it sounds during his ‘fire report’ )?
I just listened to those MacKenzie clips again and I would tend to say that wherever Marsh was when talking to Steed over the radio at that time… he was ‘stationary’ and not ‘exerting himself’.
I think Marsh sounds like he moving in both Mackenzie videos. Maybe more so in the second one.
So if we can assume Marsh was standing at the meeting spot, waiting for Frisby at 1542. What made him start moving, south?
If this is actually what happened. 1. Marsh was waiting at the meeting spot at 1542. 2. He began moving south on the two track shortly thereafter. 3. Abel and Marsh are mid- conversation when the Caldwell video starts, circa 1555.
Marsh would have been out of the black, and possibly halfway to the saddle, assuming he left the meeting spot at 1542ish? Right?
calvin… I follow your thinking here and as a ‘possible’ scenario for Marsh that would ‘make sense’. and still fit the existing evidence I would agree.
I am not SURE ( myself ) about Marsh sounding ‘at rest’ in the actual MacKenzie videos. He COULD have been ‘hiking’. It sounds a little ‘breathy’ but not overly so.
1542 is now a ‘critical moment’ as to trying to figure out what Marsh was doing at THAT moment… and what he might have done immediately AFTER that.
1542 is the same moment when any plans that Marsh may have had for more ‘work’ up there ( As in “still committed to the ridge” ) all FELL APART because now the face-to-face with Frisby has been called off, Brendan is evacuating, and their vehicles are going to be moved.
1542 now represents a “total change of plan” moment for Marsh.
So YES… the moment Marsh realized Frisby wasn’t coming up and there would be no face-to-face… it was time for Marsh to think about “what do we do now”.
Marsh MIGHT have then IMMEDIATELY taken off SOUTH ( by himself ) on that two-track and was still hiking south when we hear the converstaion captured in the Caldwell video.
“I’m working my way off the top” would still make sense in this scenario. That would still fit what he was doing then. He had left the anchor point area hiking south ( by himself ) and he was ‘working his way off the top’.
‘Top’ in this case would no longer mean the ‘Top of Weaver Mountain’ way to the north… as has always been a possibility. ‘Top’ would now just be a generic reference to that entire high-ridge area out there.
>> calvin also said…
>>
>> Marsh would have been out of the black, and possibly halfway
>> to the saddle, assuming he left the meeting spot at 1542ish?
>> Right?
Yes. I would even concede ( in this scenario ) that if Marsh had been ‘double time’ he might have even been able to make it ALL the way to the ‘saddle’ location before being captured saying “I’m working my way off the top” in the 1550 ( 4:50 PM ) Caldwell video.
So I see where you are going here and I would be the first to tell you that it still all ‘fits’ the available evidence… but it also raises some ‘red flags’ and some ‘head scratchers’.
I don’t have time to list all of them but some would then be…
1) What the hell was the crew doing sitting and ‘playing Tourist’ for all this time back up at that rock pile if Marsh had ALREADY decided they were going to ‘make their way out the escape route from this morning’ and had already bolted ahead to ‘check it out’?
2) To accept this scenario… we would have to believe that the whole ‘discussing their options’ conversation took place AFTER Marsh had already decided they needed to head SOUTH. In other words… the entire ‘discussing options’ conversation was just Marsh needing to convince Jesse to tell the crew to head south when Marsh had already decided that’s what needed to happen.
3) I am even willing to accept that in THIS scenario… it had to be Marsh who then left the ‘pink tape’ at the top of the saddle and it was because Marsh ( alone… with no consultation with Steed ) made the decision that the ‘escape route’ WOULD be through the fuel-filled box canyon… but I would still have trouble with any ‘timing’ that put Marsh out AHEAD of the mouth of that box canyon and that he would still let his own men walk straight into a death trap.
More later.
Followup…
The ‘scenario’ that Marsh WAS already at the expected ‘meeting place’ for the face-to-face with Frisby when he gave his ‘fire report’, talked to Musser… and only THEN found out Frisby wasn’t going to make the face-to-face… and THEN Marsh immediately ‘took off’ to the south to ‘check out the escape route’ actually FITS the same ‘normal’ activity for this crew that we saw in the morning.
Marsh ‘scouts ahead’ tying PINK ribbons on things to mark the exact PATH he expects Steed and the rest of the crew to take.
The only difference in this ‘afternoon’ repeat of the same ‘hike out to the ridge’ but in the reverse direction is that we can SEE Steed and the crew just ‘at rest’ circa 1550 to 1555 and not doing anything at all.
The mystery now would be… “What were they WAITING for?”.
Could it be that Marsh just ‘took off’ to the south and actually TOLD Steed to keep the crew right where they were until he, himself, made it all the way down to the ‘saddle’ just to verify that this ‘Boulder Springs Ranch’ was actually ‘reachable’ at all?
Could it be that the ‘abrupt’ end to the picture taking represents the moment when Marsh himself finally ’rounded the bend’ down there and got his own ‘visual’ on the BSR there in the distance and then radioed Steed and said something like “I can see the Ranch. It’s actually out there. Gaggle ’em up and get down here.”?
The DISTURBING thing to realize about THIS scenario is that this ‘wait until I call you before you start to come down’ directive from Marsh is what probably killed them.
If they had NOT been ‘hanging around’ playing ‘Tourist’ up there in that rock pile and they had started the hike south as soon as Marsh decided that is what was going to happen ( circa 1542 )… then that adds up to 20 ( TWENTY ) minutes to the time they would have had to actually make it to the Ranch that day.
More than enough to have actually ‘come home alive’.
So forget the fact that this scenario also seems to point towards GM actually HAVING a ‘forward lookout’ that day ( Marsh himself ) and yet they still, inexplicably, walked into a death trap….
…if they had just started heading south when Marsh did they would also probably have lived that day.
WTKTT I think you really answer your own questions.
Two things in reflection.
The crew was waiting for Marsh to scout where they might go.
Once Marsh and crew were in the canyon they were blind to the fire until they reached the mouth of the canyon.
For marsh to have gotten to the crew so fast would mean he was not far ahead of them and he may have seen the flaming front the same time Steed did.
Remember also they had been told they had 2 hours before the fire would get to that area. They felt they could get off the mountain and to town before there would be a problem a total misread of the fire.
Marsh was flagging the route and probably had little view of the fire and was not really acting as a LO.
So we have another possibility of what went down that day, and the time frames fit with slight variations.
Reply to Bob Powers post on August 21, 2014 at 9:55 am
>> Bob Powers said…
>> So we have another possibility of what went down that
>> day, and the time frames fit with slight variations.
I believe so, yes… and my own thinking on this changed pretty much due to discovering that testimony from Brendan that Marsh was ‘virtually right above me’ ( up on the ridge ). I believe him ( at this point ) and I think that can be considered proof that Marsh was NOT way up north on the top of Weaver Mountain itself when the fire started to change direction.
If Marsh was ‘right above Brendan’ for most ( if not ALL ) of the day… then the scenario that Marsh was so far behind the crew that he had to send them on ahead and tell Steed he would ‘catch up with them’ is much less plausible than before.
However… even this ‘other’ scenario that puts Marsh out ahead of Steed and the crew raises a number of other ‘head-scratchers’… and some of them are disturbing.
I listed some above but here’s another one…
In order for this scenario to work… Marsh pretty much had to start heading SOUTH to ‘scout the escape route’ just after he learned that Frisby wasn’t going to make the face-to-face up there.
1542 is now the ‘critical moment’ when Marsh must have realized everything was going sideways and that is the moment he would have turned his attention to what their ‘options were’.
If Marsh took off right at 1542 heading south… then that means 8 minutes later when we hear Marsh talking to Todd Abel in the Caldwell video… something is definitely wrong there.
In the Caldwell video… OPS1 Todd Abel is basically confirming that Marsh and the crew were still ‘in the black’. Marsh apparently ‘confirmed’ that… but that really wasn’t altogether true. Jess and the crew were only just then assembling back at the ‘rock pile’ for that picture taking ‘break’… but Marsh was NOT still ‘in the black’.
Marsh would have had to have been already some distance SOUTH, and OUT of the black, and already intent on checking out the ‘escape route’ so they could LEAVE that area and get back to town.
Apparently… Marsh WAS keeping this a ‘secret’ from Todd Abel, then, at 1550 and during that conversation we hear captured in the Caldwell video.
Todd Abel then seems under they impression they are all ‘safe in the black’ with no plans to leave there and that is when he tells Marsh to “Keep ME informed… Hunker and be safe”.
We still do NOT know what Marsh’s response to that was.
If Marsh said “Copy that. We will”, then that was pretty much a direct LIE to OPS1 Todd Abel. Marsh was already ‘scouting’ the escape route to take the men OFF the ridge and not “Hunker and be safe”.
If Marsh actually didn’t agree with what Abel just told him to do ( “Hunker and be safe” ) and actually told Todd Abel that they had no plans on doing that and that Marsh was ( even at that moment while talking to Abel ) scouting the ‘escape route’ so they could LEAVE that ridge… then pretty much everything Todd Abel has said in HIS testimony about having no idea they were NOT ‘safe in the black’ and going to STAY there becomes a LIE.
I would still tend to support the theory that Marsh just pretended to ‘agree’ to OPS1 Abel’s order to just “Hunker and be safe” even though Marsh knew he already had no plans to do that… and that Todd Abel really is being truthful when he testifies that he had NO IDEA Marsh and Steed and the crew were ‘on the move’ that day…
…but that is still very disturbing.
We would still be looking at a scenario where a Division Supervisor AND the ‘de-facto’ Superintendent of the only resource assigned to his Division was LYING to his direct supervisor… or at least actively practicing the “what he doesn’t know won’t bother him” approach to the ‘C’ in LCES.
The question would still also be WHY.
If Marsh was now actively ‘scouting’ this route that he had already decided Granite was to take… then why ( at 1550 ) would he simply not have just told Todd Abel that is what he was doing and that is what his plan was?
WHY would he be ( seemingly ) trying to HIDE this planned ‘move’ from his own supervisor and the other resources around him?
That part of the ‘story’ still isn’t going to make sense regardless if Marsh was ‘ahead’ or ‘behind’ the crew.
One thought—
He was abandoning his assignment to go to glen Illa
to help out and look like the hero again.
I think he needed to do something big in his home area to impress his supervisors and the city Council to save the crew from disbandment. This was his opportunity
It is a hell of a position to put your self and crew in.
There is more to this story. I hope it comes out. If we have solid facts that a different story is out there.
Then maybe some one will step forward.
Unfortunately… I really can’t argue
with any of that.
More and more ( in any number of different possible scenarios ) the facts keep pointing to these kinds or ‘reasons’. for what happened that day.
That is what I was referring to when I said even the latest possible scenario has some very ‘disturbing’ elements.
That someone’s own personal agenda… based on their own age, career path and personality combined with extraordinary job pressure. coming from his own supervisor would have been a major contributing factor to the deaths of 18 other men.
There’s still a part of me that does NOT want that to be the final ‘base level explanation’ for what happened that day.
Todd Abel doesn’t remember what was said during that conversation where he says “air support down there ASAP”, according to what he told Jim Karels on 8/14/2013.
The beginning of the sentence from Marsh to Abel could have been. “I’m scouting the escape route (followed by, verified audio) trying to work my way off the top”
Who knows, Abel doesn’t remember!
I have stated before and I believe now as much or more than ever that at the beginning of the 2nd Mackenzie video, Marsh says “…change, too bad”
As in the PLANS change and that is just TOO BAD!
However the timing seems important (IMO).
Now it seems that the GM crew move out of the resting location AFTER Marsh, and immediately after (IMO) Marsh tells Steed something about change and too bad which also appears to have came IMMEDIATELY after the Marsh/Abel exchange Robert Caldwell partially captures on his video.
No I have not left yet wife was sick last night.
Responding to Calvin and WTKTT
Your calculations are good WTKTT but your time frame may be off the mark.
If you look back some of us were concerned that the statement—That’s exactly where we won’t it—
May have in fact been some one else and not Marsh as it did not fit the time and location.
Air to ground had a lot of people jumping in and out on the radio directing air attack.
I said and still contend that was not Marsh or Steed but some one near the drop site.
Assuming Marsh was any where near where he was going to meet with Frisby is also open to speculation. We absolutely have no specific location of Marsh from 1530 to 1640 other than a assumption he was at or near the meeting site. All the identified discussions on the radio still do not put him at any specific point. His movement and location are not set in concrete. Even if we would like that to be the case discussions on the Radio do not put Marsh at any specific point at which to mark a start location.
McDonough abandoned his LO site before Frisby ever showed up. Did Marsh decide then that Frisby would pick up McDonough and head to the vehicles long before 1543 ? Marsh abandoned the meeting but could not talk to Frisby as he was in the 4 wheeler and could not hear the radio.
There is no reason that is not possible. We can place everybody but Marsh at a location. The Crew, McDonough and Frisby.
Mr Powers.
Considering Marsh was scouting ahead in the earlier part of the day and Steed was known (photos, video) to be with the crew at 1555, does that lead you to believe Marsh was still acting as a scout circa 1555?
Also, it appears that the crew was/ began moving south after the Ashcraft photo texted at 2:16.
Did you notice that when Marsh is talking in the Mackenzie video that Steed is looking towards the area GM would eventually travel towards? Would it make sense (all things considered) that Steed was concentrating on what was being said, and thus looking towards the one who was speaking?
Hope your wife is feeling better!
The first answer is yes—Scout–Marsh was the Davison Supervisor so he would have been checking out his Division all day why not then. He was also the Super. of the GMHS so he was in a position to direct them in what ever role.
Second question– It is a possibility and another puzzle piece we need to fit somewhere. Good observation or could he have been looking at where the discussion was taking them
I am not sure on your 2:16 time, We were talking of the move around 1600/ 4:00
The reason I mentioned the 2:16 picture is it appears that in the time between 2:16 and the set of images at 3:55 GM were moving to the south. Would that indicate Marsh would have been moving south as they did? Would Marsh had any reason to continue north when the crew moved south?
If they were moving out and off the mountain to the south.
Marsh had no reason to not be going with the crew to the south as well.
He was responsible for no one else on that section of line.
TO WTKTT From a reply down below.
Nonsense —-And—–Shear nonsense. The crew follows there supervisor if they trust them. While the did not question some one would have had to say no on that crew no one was going to do that if Steed did not.
You have no clue and should not think you do— it is not shear nonsense………If Marsh had never let them down and they never had to question him then he was the leader and knew what he was doing in there minds.
Seasonal Fire Fighters are paid at $12.80 per hour plus Hazard pay while fire is not contained of 25% additional = $16.00 plus time and a half over 8hrs. per day plus the 25% = $24.00′
Their are very few summer jobs that pay that kind of money to beginners for 3 to 6 months of work. Even back in my day you could not find a job that paid that well unless you were collage educated and hired higher up in a company.
Oh I forgot to mention they also get paid double time on holidays that the work first 8 and time and a half for the rest of the time over 8, It is not uncommon to work 12 days at 12 to 16 hours per day then 2 off. You do the math. They are defiantly not under underpaid and a lot of high school and collage students apply for these jobs every year, the competition is fierce. 100 applicants for 10 jobs as beginner fire fighter on a 20 man crew. or a 5 man Engine crew. city state and federal FF are paid close to the same.
Some big cities probably pay more.
Reply to Bob Powers post on August 18, 2014 at 3:38 pm
>> Bob Powers said…
>> TO WTKTT From a reply down below.
>> Nonsense —-And—–Shear nonsense.
>> The crew follows there supervisor if they trust them.
>> While the did not question some one would have
>> had to say no on that crew no one was going to do
>> that if Steed did not.
What I was calling ‘nonsense’ on were your (two) similar statements down below that the crew had absolutely NO CHOICE but to follow Eric Marsh wherever he went.
Your ( two ) statements were…
>> If Marsh was ahead of them they had
>> NO CHOICE but to follow.
>>
>> If Marsh was in front he had already committed
>> and they had NO CHOICE even if they didn’t like it.
I repeat… Wildland Firefighting is NOT the military… even as much as it seems to like to PRETEND that it is.
No one was looking at an extended stay in Leavenworth if they had decided to say ‘NO’ to either Marsh or Steed.
It’s a JOB. An unusual and challenging JOB, for sure… but a JOB nonetheless.
I will ‘qualify’ something I said, though.
I said…
>> At XX bucks an hour… there is no requirement to do
>> ANYTHING dangerous… much less insane.
Regardless of what XX is on any given day ( 12.50 straight up or add hazard pay and/or overtime or whatnot )… what I SHOULD have said is…
“there is no requirement to do anything OVERLY DANGEROUS… much less insane.”
Just the word ‘dangerous’ wasn’t enough there.
At any XX amount per hour… it’s a given that anyone who agrees to put on fire retardant clothing and go purposely walking out to scrape ground near an active fireline has obviously already ‘agreed’ to be doing something ‘dangerous’..
Likewise… anytime you agree to get paid to pull a rope on a chainsaw ( under any circumstances ) you are automatically committing to ‘dangerous activity’. With or without the ‘guards’ on…. one break in just one chainlink at full power and the whip-back can ruin your day. I have a few scars on my own arms and one on my leg to prove it. If the whip-back hits you in the wrong place on your wrist… you better be near some transportation and/or someone with a tourniquet or you are going to bleed out pretty quick.
So just ‘dangerous’ wasn’t the right word.
I was talking about saying NO when something is OBVIOUSLY a huge risk no matter WHAT the XX rate per hour is.
That is ALWAYS an option for ANY ’employee’ and the words ‘NO CHOICE’ simply don’t apply.
>> Bob Powers also said…
>> You have no clue and should not think you do
I do get a little tired of this WFF mantra that ‘nobody can ever possibly understand US but US’ stuff. It is as if people who are ( or used to be ) “Hotshots” think that no one else in the world could possibly ever know what it is like to work WITH and alongside a group of people ( and establish some pretty tight bonds with them ) doing something inherently dangerous.
Ever work high-rise construction?
I have.
There is NO DIFFERENCE when it comes to obeying the ‘chain of command’ and never ‘doing your own thing’ or something very, very bad could happen to YOU and OTHERS.
Almost every step you take… hundreds of feet off the ground… could be your last… but you STILL have to do your job… put up with less-than-perfect supervisors and THEIR ‘overhead’… and still try to go home at the end of EVERY day in one piece.
Normally… if everyone follows ‘chain of command’ and doesn’t go ‘freelancing’… everybody goes home alive.
But when being ORDERED by a supervisor ( who SHOULD have known better ) to scale multiple stories of scaffolding and start hauling material up WHILE others are still affixing diagonal bracing to the scaffolding… my answer would always be the same as it was when it happened to me.
Not gonna happen, my friend. Not me. Not now. Not ever.
Wanna go to the construction trailer and ‘talk about it’ with the contractor? ( That’s a polite description of the ACTUAL exchange ).
So yes… despite your protests… I believe I WILL continue to think I ‘know something’ about ‘chain of command’ in ‘dangerous’ work environments… and what my own ( and someone else’s ) OPTIONS always are when asked to do something stupid.
>> Bob Powers also wrote…
>> It is not shear nonsense………If Marsh had never
>> let them down and they never had to question him
>> then he was the leader and knew what he was
>> doing in there minds.
See above. I can quote you chapter and verse about ‘trusting’ someone ( for years, even ) and then discovering, one day ( for whatever reason ) they were making BAD DECISIONS and it was then MY job to say “What the hell is the matter with you?”.
To ALWAYS believe ( in dangerous work environments ) that even someone you usually trust isn’t capable of making GRAVE mistakes at any moment is to simply not be in touch with reality… and if the WFF training process itself doesn’t include that possibility then it, too, is ‘out of touch with reality’.
>> Bob Powers also wrote…
>>
>> Seasonal Fire Fighters are paid at $12.80 per hour
>> plus Hazard pay while fire is not contained of 25%
>> additional = $16.00 plus time and a half over 8hrs.
>> per day plus the 25% = $24.00′
>> Their are very few summer jobs that pay that kind
>> of money to beginners for 3 to 6 months of work.
>> Even back in my day you could not find a job that
>> paid that well unless you were collage educated
>> and hired higher up in a company.
>> Oh I forgot to mention they also get paid double
>> time on holidays that the work first 8 and time and
>> a half for the rest of the time over 8, It is not
>> uncommon to work 12 days at 12 to 16 hours per
>> day then 2 off. You do the math. They are
>> defiantly not under underpaid and a lot of high
>> school and collage students apply for these
>> jobs every year, the competition is fierce. 100
>> applicants for 10 jobs as beginner fire fighter
>> on a 20 man crew. or a 5 man Engine crew. city
>> state and federal FF are paid close to the same.
>> Some big cities probably pay more.
As of January 1, 2014… the established MINIMUM wage
for the State of Arizona is now $7.90 per hour with an
expected increase to near $10.00 per hour in 24 months.
Elsewhere ( such as San Francisco and San Jose, CA )
the minimum wage rate is ALREADY $10.74 and $10.15 per hour.
The median average hourly rate nationwide for the person at McDonald’s who asks you “Ya want fries with that?” is $9.08 per hour. In San Francisco… the same person who’s going to hand you your cheeseburger and fries is making an average of $12..17 per hour.
The FAQ page about Wildland Firefighting pay scales at the Wildfire.com site still says that entry level seasonals ( with no experience and no established GS rating yet ) shouldn’t expect any more than $10.00 per hour for work with a Hotshot crew anywhere in the country.
So what about Granite Mountain itself?
Just 27 days after the tragedy ( July 27, 2013 ), the City of Prescott releasd ALL of the personnel files and ‘work contracts’ related to the Granite Mountain Hotshots.
The Prescott Daily Courier was one of the recipients of those documents and they immediately ran a story about it.
That story is here…
http://dcourier.com/Main.asp?SectionID=1&SubSectionID=1&ArticleID=121702
From the article…
——————————————————–
** Low pay, no benefits
Most of the seasonal workers had hired on in the $12 to $15 per-hour range. In fact, the city’s job description for seasonal wildland crewmember lists a pay range of $12.09 to $14.48 ( depending on entry level experience and GS rating ).
Thirteen of the 19 crewmembers were “seasonal” workers – many of whom had come on board just two months before.
Each seasonal file includes a “temporary employment acknowledgement” form, stating that the employees would not receive benefits such as health insurance, paid sick leave, paid vacation leave, or paid holidays.
The forms, which were signed by the employees, state: “I further understand that, as a temporary employee, I will be paid on an hourly basis, and I will not receive the same benefits nor be afforded the same employee protection as those individuals filling positions in the regular service.”
The forms add that the temporary employees would be ineligible for “the grievance-appeal process unless it involves an allegation of harassment or discrimination in violation of federal, state, or local laws.”
Prescott Fire Department Capt. Dan Bates serves as president of the Prescott chapter of the fire-fighters union.
Looking back, Bates questioned whether the seasonal workers all realized the implications of the temporary employment forms. “They’re young kids, trying to start a career,” he said. “I wonder if they understood the magnitude.”
A city press release states that while permanent full-time employees are eligible for health insurance, life insurance, and annual sick leave benefits, temporary and part-time employees are not.
That means that the survivors of the seasonal workers would not be eligible for health insurance coverage or life insurance and accidental death benefits.
———————————————————
I still say you could double or triple the hourly rates and/or the overtime rates here and you are not anywhere near having ‘NO CHOICE’ when a supervisor is asking you to do something that you feel is ‘overly dangerous’ or even might put your life at risk. Not worth it.
I think I am with US Forestry employee and SAIT Co-Lead Mike Dudley on this when he said to a roomful of firefighters in Utah…
Mike Dudley: There’s a part of me that HAS to wonder… as they stood there on that saddle and they started droppin’ down the slope… I would like to think a few members of the crew had that little gnawing ‘pit’ in their stomach sayin’… “Is this a good idea?”.
I think a LOT of them did… and I only wish they had realized there was NO reason for ANY of them to lose their lives because of a ‘stupid’ decision about where a ‘hike’ should go.
What if some of them HAD realized they most certainly ‘HAD A CHOICE’ up on that saddle that day… and they had lived?
Would ANYONE in their right mind be telling those survivors they should have kept their mouths shut and done the ‘Hotshot’ thing and gone down there and died with the others?
I really, really doubt it.
We disagree with this point won’t argue with you.
Each type of crew has their own bonds and special relations.
Try living with a group 24 hours a day 80% of a 6 month work time. Eat Sleep and work, Shower and live on the ground in sleeping bags. You become very close.
I will say if a Div. Sup. that was not attached to the crew had ask them to go off the mountain There may have been a different story. TRUST
While you went around in circles the pay ain’t that bad.
Definitely almost double Min, Wage.
Fair enough. All points well taken.
Sometimes people being paid to do something do get VERY close… to the point where they trust all decisions being made no matter what.
I understand. I really do.
It can happen.
Reply to Bob Powers post on August 18, 2014 at 6:40 am
>> Bob Powers said…
>> We can place everybody but Marsh at a location. The Crew, McDonough and Frisby.
Actually… that isn’t true.
I DO think this is a very important ‘revisit’ of the prior assumption that Marsh was always NORTH of the crew and always playing ‘catch up from behind’ right up until the time of deplyment… so I’ve launched on some research that can only be called “WHERE was Marsh, really… what EVIDENCE is there”.
I’m very pressed for time and that COMPLETE posting isn’t finished but here is just one thing that will be in that post that establishes an actual LOCATION for Marsh in a critical timeframe.
It comes from Brendan McDonough’s ADOSH testimony.
When they played the MacKenzie videos for Brendan and asked him to identify the speakers ( he did… he confirmed it’s Marsh talking to Steed on the radio )…. Brendan
also explained why he wasn’t ‘saying much’ on the radio himself that day the entire time he was down on that lookout mound.
Brendan says the REASON is because Eric Marsh was ALWAYS just ‘directly above me on the ridge and could see everything that I could.
That establishes ‘location’ for Marsh for MOST of the afternoon and even right up until the moment Brendan had to abandon his lookout mound and was then picked up by Frisby at 3:42 PM.
** FROM BRENDAN’S SECOND ADOSH INTERVIEW 10-10-13
In this part of his testimony, Brendan seems to confirm that Eric
was defintely up on the ridge… but not TOO far NORTH because
Brendan thought BOTH Steed AND Marsh could probably SEE him
down there on his lookout mound pretty much at all times.
Brendan doesn’t even imply that Marsh would have needed binoculars
to ‘see him moving’ down there on lookout mound.
Brendan confirms that Marsh himself was (quote) “kinda above me up on the hill”…
517 Q1: Okay I was just trying to see if it was possible to spot you down in there.
518
519 A: Uh, probably not. I don’t think so. Well, they could…
520
521 Q1: Uh…
522
523 A: …in certain situations. But I think I was just in the place where…
524
525 Q1: Right.
526
527 A: …they knew where I moved to at…
528
529 Q1: Uh-huh.
530
531 A: …that general, like, 30-foot radius. But, um, ‘cause when I was moving
532 towards the dozer push…
533
534 Q1: Okay.
535
536 A: …Steed had said, “Okay I can see you moving.”
537
538 Q1: Steed could you see move?
539
540 A: Yeah.
541
542 Q1: Okay.
543
544 A: And so can Eric ‘cause Eric was kinda above me up on the hill.
Later in the same interview ( page 13 )… Brendan seems to CONFIRM
Marsh’s location for most of the afternoon as DIRECTLY above his
lookout mound and ‘up on the ridge’.
Brendan says (quote) “Cause Eric was, like, literally right above me pretty much”.
In this part of the ADOSH interview… they now play the 3:55 PM MacKenzie videos and Brendan confirms that the voices are that of Eric Marsh and Jesse Steed… but Brendan now seems to confirm that even shortly before that and even as Brendan was being evacuated by Frisby… Eric Marsh was pretty much ‘right above him’ ( and his lookout mound ) up on the ridge.
Brendan says that there was often little point in him trying to tell Steed anything BECAUSE Eric was, in fact, ‘right above him’ and could always see whatever Brendan was seeing.
558 A: It’s the only one I know of. But I can do my best.
559
560 Q2: I know it’s gonna work.
561
562 ((RECORDING))
563
564 A1: Oh I just – I was just saying I knew this was coming when I called you and
565 asked how – what your comfort level was. I could just feel it, you know?
566
567 ((END OF RECORDING))
568
569 A: That’s Eric Marsh and Jesse Steed.
570
571 Q2: Yeah, and who was on the radio talking? That was coming through the radio.
572 Was that you?
573
574 A: No. That’s Eric Marsh.
575
576 Q2: That’s Eric talking to…
577
578 A: Jesse Steed…
579
580 Q2: Okay.
581
582 A: …right there on – sitting down.
583
584 Q2: Who’s got the radio.
585
586 A: The captain and superintendent talking.
587
588 Q2: Got it.
589
590 A: ‘Cause Eric was, like, literally right above me pretty much, I mean,
591 everywhere that I wanted to say, he was telling Jesse. So, I mean, it’s kinda
592 pointless. At that point, it was like, “Eric, I’m seeing the same thing.” He’s
593 like, “Yeah, of course,” you know?
594
595 Q2: Right.
596
597 A: So it was – it would a been dumb for me to be like, “Well, I’m seeing the same
598 exact thing,” and repeating my- you know, exactly what he said.
599
600 Q2: Right.
601
602 A: So that was him and Jesse talking.
There is actually more evidence like this ‘hiding in plain sight’ in the public record.
A longer post is coming but I wanted to at least get this piece of info ‘off my desk’.
WTK.
And of course this is the same Mcdonough who left his lookout at 2:45 – 2:50 (as he repeatedly stated), right?
One question if Marsh was so close to McDonough why was he not worried about him if he could see him. Why would he not be calling for Frisby to come pick him up.
HE WAS NOT THERE——McDonough was on his own frantically looking for a deployment site and no Marsh to help him. He assumed Marsh was above him all day? I doubt it and that is why. When it was time to get McDonough out of there Marsh was no Where to be of use to him. McDonough never called him to let him know Steed is the only one that talked to him until Frisby shows up.
That leaves Marsh unaccounted for and not right there above McDonough.
No site No Radio contact No Marsh.
Reply to Bob Powers post on August 18, 2014 at 7:15 pm
>> Bob Powers wrote…
>> One question if Marsh was so close to McDonough why
>> was he not worried about him if he could see him.
It’s a valid question… but I think there’s a pretty good answer.
Brendan SELF-EVACUATED.
He did not NEED anyone to tell him it was ‘time to do that’.
He made that decision himself ( as he should have ) when the fire hit his pre-established trigger point.
We also don’t know if Marsh ( or Steed ) WERE ‘worried about him’ or not. That’s just more ‘guesswork’.
If Brendan had been actually ‘asleep’ and even a few more minutes passed that day without Brendan, himself, calling Steed to inform him he realized his ‘trigger point’ had just been met and that HE was deciding ( on his own ) to ‘evacuate’… I think Steed and/or Marsh WOULD have been ‘intervening’ toot sweet and trying to raise Brendan to tell him to get the hell out of there.
I have to believe they WERE ‘watching’… but the timing was such that Brendan saw the ‘trigger event’ himself before anyone else’s ALARMS started ringing… so everything SEEMED ‘under control’.
NOTE: Keyword ‘SEEMED. We know now with 20/20 hindsight that Brendan’s situation at 1542 was a little more dire than either he, Marsh or Steed seemed to realize… but that’s not the point. This is about how the ‘evac’ itself went down and whether there was any great sense of emergency on THEIR part at this time. Apparently, there wasn’t. From Brendan’s own testimony and the reported radio traffic just between Brendan and Steed… it was all ‘just another day at work’. No big whoop.
I’m outta here. Catch ya later.
>> Bob Powers also said…
>>
>> Why would he not be calling for Frisby to come pick him up.
Because he didn’t have to.
Brendan did NOT hestitate to ‘self-evacuate’ when he saw his
pre-established trigger point being met and all the details about
who might need to call Frisby to ‘come get him’ if he needed him
to had all been worked out in advance between Brendan himself
and Frisby / Brown.
Frisby and Brown were fully aware that Granite Mountain had no UTV with them ( and no crew member even left ‘down there’ in the valley at their vehicles ) and wouldn’t be able to pick Brendan up in a hurry under any circumstances.
It had already been established between Brendan and Frisby ( and Brown )… even when they first dropped him OFF at his lookout position… that the moment Brendan ( himself ) felt he needed any kind of ‘evac’ or ‘help’ that Brendan was to call them ( Frisby or Brown ) directly.
Acting GMIHC SUPT Jesse Steed was now DIRECTLY responsible for GMIHC crew member Brendan McDonough that day and Steed was, in fact, calmly ‘acknowledging’ Brendan’s decision and his ‘situation’… so what more would DIVSA Marsh have had to say about it?
Steed had the situation well in hand, it would seem ( from the radio traffic on the GM intra-crew ). No need for a DIVSA to interfere.
From DIVSA’s perspective… the situation between (Acting) GMIHC SUP and one of his ‘crew members’ was ( at that time ) fully under control.
No reason for DIVSA to insert himself.
We know NOW ( using 20/20 hindsight ) that Brendan really was in some deep shit around that time but that has more to do with unexpected fire behavior and inadequate pre-established trigger points than it does with how the ‘evac’ actually went down. At the time… it LOOKED like Brendan was making the ‘right decisions’ at the ‘right times’ on his own and the radio traffic remained CALM with Steed fully in communication with his crew member.
>> Bob Powers also said…
>>
>> HE WAS NOT THERE
Can’t say that fer sure. Brendan might be ‘getting this right’ and Marsh really was just up there directly ‘above’ him right up through his departure from his lookout mound and ‘dust off’ at 3:42 PM.
>> Bob Powers also said…
>> McDonough was on his own frantically looking for a deployment site
That is not how Brendan himself describes things at all in his official ADOSH interviews.
Brendan says he was NOT ‘frantically looking for a deployment site’.
Brendan testified that his primary ‘safety zone’ was the ‘old-grader’ location and it had ALREADY been chosen FOR him and Brendan was TOLD that was his ‘safety zone’.
No ‘frantic searching’ or even any ‘decision making’ on his part was required.
It had been ‘expanded’ and ‘cleared’ by the dozer and ( apparently ) Marsh and/or Steed thought it was an ‘adequate’ safety zone and they TOLD Brendan that he should consider it HIS ‘safety zone’.
There is that seeming inability to ‘identify’ adequate safety zones issue cropping up again but even Brendan testifies below that HE thought it would have been ‘fine’. Might have taken a ‘little heat’… but still would have been ‘fine’.
Brendan’s exact quote ( from his ADOSH interview )…
“My safety zone was that dozer push. It was a pretty big enough area. Um, there’s quite a few rocks. And, uh, there’s a wash kinda close by it. So, um, I mean, it would a took some heat. But I don’t – I don’t – that was my safety zone.”
From Brendan’s FIRST ADOSH interview 8-20-13
Starting at line 548…
——————————————————————
Q2: So that’s where you got – that – was that the escape route if you decided that – you de- decided either you were go in it and stay in the black or go to the ranch?
A: From what I was informed, yes. But I had moved to a different position.
Q2: Sure. Right. So you were on your own. You – what was your, um plan?
A: My safety zone what they had established for me was that grader. That was that dozer – had pushed that out.
Q2: Okay.
A: And then just back down the road and Blue Ridge superintendent actually came to meet with Eric and their Captain to talk about what’s going on. And they took me to my lookout position and they said, “We can see what’s going on. If you need, we’ll come pick you up.” That’s exactly what happened.
—————————————————————–
From Brendan’s SECOND ADOSH interview 10-10-13
—————————————————————–
Q2: Um, in, uh, when – when you were, uh, down on the, uh, on – in your lookout spot on that little knoll, um, and the fire reached your trigger point and you decided it was time to bug out…
A: Mm-hm.
Q2: …um, what was your – what was your escape route, and where was your safety zone?
A: My safety zone was that dozer push. It was a pretty big enough area. Um, there’s quite a few rocks. And, uh, there’s a wash kinda close by it. So, um, I mean, it would a took some heat. But I don’t – I don’t – that was my safety zone. And then my escape routes were either back into the black or back out to the vehicles. Mm, both were pretty feasible. I mean, if I moved – if I made correct decisions like I did, they were both feasible…
Q2: Mm-hm.
A: …choices.
Q2: Right. Um, and then the Blue Ridge showed up and…
A: Mm-hm. They picked me up.
Q2: Yeah. It worked out pretty well.
A: Yeah, we talked about it beforehand. Before they dropped me off, they told me…
Q2: They’d come out and pick ya up?
A: Yeah, they said…
Q2: And…
A: …they’ll come pick me up if they see anything. Or if I need a ride, just to call ‘em. So…
Q2: Okay.
A: I was pretty much in the process of calling him when he showed up.
Q: And the dozer push, was that near the old grader?
A: Yeah.
Q: Is there an area that was…
A: Mm-hm.
Q: …cleared out there?
A: Mm-hm.
Q: Okay.
Q3: Brendan, can I – can I ask you – I think I heard, uh, you said s- some of your, uh, you had an escape route or a go, uh, a safety zone that was back into the black; is that correct?
A: Yes.
Q3: How – how far away were you from the black?
A: Mm, I can’t recall. Um…
Q3: Fairly close or…
A: In some areas, yeah. It just depended which way I wanted to go if I wanted to take a road or if I wanted – or not a road but a two-track or if I just wanted to cut through brush ‘cause that wash kinda led up to the black.
—————————————————————–
>> Bob Powers also wrote…
>>
>> and no Marsh to help him.
He didn’t need DIVSA to help him.
He knew the pre-established ‘plan’ was that HE was supposed to call direct to Frisby / Brown if he needed to and he was just in the process of doing that when Frisby showed up.
If Brendan had pressed transmit and discovered he could NOT actually raise Frisby at that time then yes… he would have needed Steed or Marsh to make the call FOR him… but things never got to that point.
>> Bob Powers also wrote…
>>
>> He assumed Marsh was above him all day?
No. In one part of his testimony he was, apparently, just about as sure as he could be.
From Brendan’s SECOND ADOSH interview.
590 A: ‘Cause Eric was, like, literally right above me pretty much.
>> Bob Powers also said…
>> I doubt it and that is why.
>> When it was time to get McDonough out of there Marsh
>> was no Where to be of use to him.
See above. Everything about McDonough leaving his lookout mound and ‘evacuating’ ( if that became necessary ) had already been pre-planned and pre-arranged and it was Brendan himself who set that pre-arranged ‘plan’ into motion.
DIVSA was not involved…. ( and didn’t need to be ) wherever he was physically located at that time.
>> Mr. Powers also wrote…
>> McDonough never called him to let him know
GMIHC crew member McDonough wasn’t told to call DIVSA directly about anything. Brendan was reporting directly to Acting GMIHC SUPT Jesse Steed that afternoon and most certainly at that time.( circa 1542 ).
>> Bob Powers also wrote…
>> Steed is the only one that talked to him until Frisby shows up.
That’s correct… because that’s who McDonough was SUPPOSED to report to directly that day. He was doing what he was told to do.
>> Bob Powers also wrote…
>>
>> That leaves Marsh unaccounted for and not right there above
>> McDonough. No site No Radio contact No Marsh.
So… if you think Brendan is basically just ‘full of it’ in his ADOSH testimony about all this… then WHERE ( physically ) do YOU think Marsh actually was circa 1542?
I am NOT trying to be ‘antagonistic’ in any way here.
I really DO still have an ‘open mind’ about all this.
I think it is VALID to question Brendan’s testimony, now that we know that it exists and it MIGHT actually establish a ‘location’ for Marsh at a given time.
If you think it is IMPOSSIBLE that Brendan could be telling the truth here to ADOSH investigators ( in TWO separate interviews ) then do you have an ‘alternate location’ for Marsh circa 1542?
WTKTT you simply have no physical evidence to place Marsh there
above McDonough. Only that he had been there some times during the day but not at 1530 to 1545.
After all of the above McDonough never says he saw or talked to him when he abandoned his lookout location.
Frisby never mentions he saw him when he picked up McDonough
or if Marsh mentioned where he was at the time he talked to him with McDonough’s Radio.
No solid proof of location to start from at 1542. or even 1530.
He certainly did not stay on the mountain above McDonough all day
watching him. Until we have a starting Marsh could have been any where including the BSR. So we still need solid evidence to calculate his times or even run to the crew.
For got to answer— Headed to the BSR marking a route.
>> Bob Powers said…
>> WTKTT… you simply have no
>> physical evidence.
That’s correct.
I think it is a given at this point that unless we suddenly see more photos that might have been taken from the air by Rory Collins and/or Bravo 33 French/Burfiend that are low enough and highres enough to positively ID Marsh OR someone can finally examine Marsh’s smartphone and discover new time-stamped photos or videos…
…then there just isn’t going to BE any further PHYSICAL evidence to help determine exactly WHERE Marsh was at certain times.
There ARE a few other ‘nuggets’ that have always been hiding ‘in plain site’ in some of the published testimony… but keyword there will still be ‘testimony’. The usefulness of those nuggets will still depend on believing the source is being truthful, trustworthy, and accurate.
Brendan McDonough himself probably still knows more about all this than he has ever before… and he might one day realize the importance of this information and start talking about it… but even that won’t constitute ‘physical’ evidence. That will still just be ‘more testimony’.
So where do we go from here?
If you are only going to accept PHYSICAL evidence to try and figure this out… I think you need to accept the reality that there isn’t going to ever be anything NEW there.
It would seem to me that at precisely 1542, Marsh was in transit to the proposed meeting place with Frisby. And this was 2 minutes after reporting the fires (?) status . Right?
WTK. After Ashcraft texts his photo at 1416, it appears that GM started or continued moving to the south.
If Marsh called and asked Frisby to head up, it would make sense that he would be near that location, in order to make it to the meeting spot, and not leave Frisby waiting. What is that, like a 10 minute UTV drive?
calvin… see a longer ( more detailed ) response up above as a new parent comment.
* THE SHORT STORY….
Yes… Marsh MUST have been very near ( or already at ) the spot where the NOON face-to-face happened circa 1542. If Frisby hadn’t stopped… he would have ‘arrived’ up there at that spot in about 4 minutes ( 1546 ).
As for the ‘fire status report’… that wasn’t at 1540. Best we can tell is that it ENDED at 1542 right at the start of that 1542 Panebaker video. I don’t think Marsh had been speaking ( to Todd Abel there ) for more than 20 or 30 seconds, max.
Reply to calvin post on August 18, 2014 at 3:28 pm
>> calvin said…
>> And of course this is the same Mcdonough who left his lookout
>> at 2:45 – 2:50 (as he repeatedly stated), right?
Right ( + ‘of course’. )… but if you just tried to say that means not a thing that exists in ANY of Brendan McDonough’s testimony can ever be ‘trusted’… I am not buying what you are selling.
We still do NOT know if that ‘discrepancy’ in the timeframe for leaving his lookout post in some of Brendan’s testimony was either just a huge brain fart on his part… or a TYPO in a transcription… or WHAT.
Bottom line is it doesn’t matter if Brendan doesn’t remember the exact time he left his lookout mound and was then picked up by Frisby.
We DO. There is other ‘hard evidence’ to establish those times to within only +- 30 seconds of doubt.
For the time being… and for the sake of the ongoing discussion about whether there is evidence of Marsh’s exact location at various times… I am going to take Brendan’s word on this since he testified to it TWICE in the same interview and did not ‘change his story’ or waffle on that claim.
At some point… SOME of this ‘testimony’ just has to be trusted until there is further evidence to prove it is absolutely FALSE.
WTK. Thanks for your response, but I am not trying to sell anything. I am only trying to make sense of this. Same as you.
I have a few questions, that you can probably help clarify.
1. Exactly how far north of the Parker, Mackenzie, Norris photo location was the Anchor Point/ expected meeting place between Marsh/ Frisby? Are those two places the actual same location?
2.What would have been the ETA for Frisby arriving at the meeting spot with Marsh (if he had continued instead of picking up Mcdonough and turning around)?
3. Slightly unrelated question. How far was it from Mcdonough’s lookout spot to the black that he indicated was an escape route (for himself?)
He didn’t / couldn’t give an estimate in the follow up ADOSH interview, even after being pressed.
As always, many thanks for all your research, and dedication to this. And I mean no disrespect as we debate this ongoing subject.
calvin… see a longer ( more detailed ) response above as a new parent comment.
No worries.
I still think you are a ‘steely eyed rocket man’ who is only interested in the TRUTH here.
Reply to Bob Powers post on August 18, 2014 at 6:40 am
>> Bob Powers wrote…
>>
>> If you look back some of us were concerned that the statement
>> That’s exactly where we want it
>> May have in fact been some one else and not Marsh as it did not
>> fit the time and location. Air to ground had a lot of people jumping in
>> and out on the radio directing air attack. I said and still contend that was
>> not Marsh or Steed but some one near the drop site.
Well.. then ‘at the moment’ we are in total agreement on that.
I still ( currently ) do not believe that the statement about someone coming out of nowhere at 1637 on the A2G channel and saying… “That’s exactly what we’re looking for. That’s where we want the retardant.” ( according to the SAIR ) can be absolutely attributed to Eric Marsh.
There are too many other people that could have seen that 1633 SEAT drop ( which was described by Lead Plane Thomas French himself to the drop pilot as ‘spot on’ ) who could have made that same kind of ‘radio call’ as general encouragement for MORE drops like that and Air-Attack John Burfiend was too unfamiliar with who was even underneath him or what their voices sounded like to not question the source of that ‘out of nowhere’ radio call.
There has always been the fact that Burfiend’s testimony to the SAIT includes the quote “Division A called” with regards to this mysterious out-of-nowhere “That’s where we want the retardant” transmission… but the SAIT notes do NOT say that is because there was an actual CALL SIGN associated with that transmission or whether Burfiend was just ‘assuming’ it was DIVSA calling ( and may have been mistaken ).
>> Bob Powers also wrote…
>>
>> We absolutely have no specific location of Marsh from 1530 to 1640 other than a
>> assumption he was at or near the meeting site.
I already posted a possible exception to this statement… but it requires believing that Brendan McDonough was telling the truth in his ADOSH interviews that Eric Marsh was (quote) “Literally” ‘right above” his lookout mound up there on the ridge on up to the time Brendan was picked up by Frisby at exactly 3:42 PM.
>> Bob Powers also wrote…
>>
>> All the identified discussions on the radio still do not put him at any specific point.
No specific point… but even Todd Abel’s testimony establishes Eric was in a position to ‘see the world from up there’ WHILE they were ‘discussing the weather’ and on into Eric’s ‘report on the fire progress’ circa 1543. Eric was telling Abel ( in the 1543 timeframe ) that the winds were getting ‘squirrely up here’ and he was also verifying to Abel he could physically see BOTH of the thundercells to BOTH the north and the south. So he HAD to be high up on that ridge in THAT timeframe and when having those radio conversations.
>> His movement and location are not set in concrete.
>> Even if we would like that to be the case discussions on the Radio
>> do not put Marsh at any specific point at which to mark a start location.
Again… no specific points… but some pretty good generalizations CAN be made.
Someone who is described as being ‘able to see the world from up there’ and is then telling that same someone ( Marsh telling Abel ) that he can clearly see thundercells in both NORTH and SOUTH directions certainly doesn’t sound like someone who is down in box canyon.
>> Bob Powers also wrote…
>> McDonough abandoned his LO site before Frisby ever showed up.
Yes. At almost exactly 1539. Brendan himself has said it only took him about 2 minutes to get down to where Frisby would come across him and we know he ‘in the UTV’ and being evacuated at 1542.
>> Did Marsh decide then that Frisby would pick up McDonough and
>> head to the vehicles long before 1543 ?
It doesn’t appear that is how it went down. See actual Blue Ridge ( Frisby ) SAIT testimony notes below.
>> Bob Powers also wrote…
>>
>> Marsh abandoned the meeting but could not talk to Frisby as
>> he was in the 4 wheeler and could not hear the radio.
There is actual testimony in the Blue Ridge Hotshot SAIT interview notes about this moment and it DOES establish that Frisby could NOT raise Marsh on the radio at first after he came accidentally across Brendan evacuating… but then the testimony says he WAS able to ‘get through’ to Marsh.
It seems obvious from all the BR testimony that Frisby is the one who has already decided to call off the ‘face-to-face’ before speaking with Marsh and he needs to get Brendan back EAST and start moving Blue Ridge vehicles. He just confirms with Marsh that he better see to moving THEIR vehicles as well. Eric agrees to this. That is when Frisby immediately calls Captain Brown and tells him to ‘get some guys to help move the GM vehicles’ and then Captain Brown also immediately does his ‘about face’ on his hike on the Cutover trail at exactly 1542 ( Recorded by his GPS unit ).
From the SAIT Yarnell Investigation Notes ( YIN )
Interview with Blue Ridge.
————————————————————————————–
He ( Brian Frisby ) comes around the corner fire behavior has shot up. The knob where Brendan is there’s smoke pushing up it. He gets Brendon because the flames were active. Brian calls Eric no response. Then he ( Brian ) gets him ( Eric ) and lets GM know Brendan is leaving his LO post and fire activity is picking up and were moving our rigs, do you want us to move yours…affirm Eric says. Brian tells Trew we need to move our rigs and GM
————————————————————————————–
And Marsh never saw the flames or lookout abandoning his spot
Frisby had to tell him.
He could not have possibly been above McDonough at that time.
He also could have been over and above the saddle when he gave the fire information and talked with Frisby. There are a lot of places he could have been besides above McDonough………..
>> Bob Powers said…
>>
>> He could not possibly have been
>> above McDonough at that time.
Of course he COULD have been.
Just because the testimony establishes that it was Frisby attempting to contact Marsh to tell him ‘Brendan has left his mound and I have him now’ doesn’t mean Marsh didn’t already know Brendan had left his mound. Marsh must have heard all that radio traffic between Brendan and Steed and he certainly MAY have seen it happening with his own eyes just like Jesse did.
Also… if Marsh was ‘down by the saddle’ at this time, as you suggest, then what about the face-to-face with Frisby that Marsh himself had requested back at the anchor point?
If Marsh was all the way down at the saddle at this time… and Frisby had continued on up for the face-to-face instead of evacuating Brendan… then about 4 minutes later Frisby would have arrived up there at the anchor point and would have had to ask Steed…”OK… I’m here. Where the hell is Marsh? He’s the one that asked for this meeting, not me”.
I was a real winner last Fall in an email to Nina Bill OverMeyer— hot over them killing a javelina that everyone around town was like excited and happy to talk about even them—seeing that javelina then hearing it got shot and I had just buried so many wildlife I did vent to her—because as the desert walker; the wildlife is my family…my bond…ask many who hike with me…I have special bond with them…so many unique things shown to me on the trails noone could understand…on highway 89 with Frank Serros he was trying to swat a mojave away from our path and I told Frankie to STOP the poor thing has a jumping cholla stuck in his head so I took my snake stick and it was wanting loose and I took my scissors and cut the cholla off and then I took my tweezers and pulled the pain in butt needles out—one from the mojave’s eye area and it looked at me odd like it knew what I was doing and was okay with it. I than placed it head first into a hole and it went down in it. Just recently on craigslist a woman in Mesa, Arizona had a craigslist ad that she had a very very feral cat needing a barn. She drove that cat here and I let her know immediately the contract I signed to let the feral be in a cage to get use to area is not wise because my perimeter cameras show it being caged—the scent—drew in the wildlife and the cat needed to be free to have a chance—she said there is NO WAY that cat would be able to be held—she had it 2 years and it was very feral and used teeth and paw/nail swipes and much hissing…I told her I gave the cat a bath/blow dry and she came all the way the next day and witnessed the unique ways I have with critters wild or domesticated. I taught her how to touch it and what the cat needed for its life was not a barn but embracing—she could not believe her eyes. She said her life changed with John Bushy the cat—it changed so much that other feral cats saw Bushy different and they softened. You see it begins with simplicity, purity and no fear. Everyone feared that cat and the cat sensed it. So MY POINT IS…FINALLY RIGHT!
We are at Barb’s place the other night and this man spoke about the javelina and that “email” I wrote and I got up and said I am HER—he was shocked—he said I want to kill you—Sonny said I hope not like you did the javelina where you shoot him a few times in the head to suffer more than a few more to put it out of its misery and Chuck described the javelina and we knew what it looked like and we knew it to be a survivor—Chuck said he likes people to know he is killing you than finalize the deal—Well, the OverMeyers head the law suits and I almost was not gonna hike the lawyers because they headed it over the wildlife thing but I figured no I hiked everyone—what is 1 more—-for the people I will do it. I am glad the other night happened to break the ice of hate and division…I enjoyed Chuck…great man. So he is going to talk to his wife who “hates” me—I can name on 1 hand who I ever rub wrong…and she was one. I guess my heart is deeply ingrained to the desert critters deeply—I truly listened to his account and here is the POINT—he said their name is public as one of the FIRST people interviewed 6-30-13 as the fire was happening by channel 3 SOOOO that should help people assess when it Helms because they live directly behind the Helm’s. Their account went public that night of 6-30-13—I hope that helps too in people getting times but he said about 4pm—but channel 3 would have actual time because they video the area…
We have locally been inquiring to people to share their photos of the Baluco/S&P/Whitehead/cattle pond over by Helms/the area/Etc. HELMS/SESAME/SHRINE area out towards Maughan Ranch-
the before photos-
reason being: The vegetation. Okay it was maze-like terrain—dense but in that density contained poisonous toxic plants and we saw an abundance especially one that reads this page noted the sacred datura plant and I have a video mentioning that plant that very day near the Helm’s near the cattle pond area—
is it possible some of the answers lay as simple as in the dense maze like terrain and its very own poisonous plants fueled by flames and fire that had a contributing factor in the end results due to the abundance of it to that area?
It is an extremely potent substance.
* hallucinations, auditory shifting and effects, dizziness, headaches, weak, stupor, sedative, uncoordinated movements, fear, anxiety, panic, confusion, delirium, impaired cognitive function that can lead to reckless dangerous behavior, amnesia, hypertermia, block sweat glands, impair heat dispersal, hard to breath, numbness, cardiac failure—
I know people want to know about the 19 and how it all ended but questions I have from day one is how come before the fire was a 16 ft. boulder on top of the Weaver Mountains but in the after math photo it vanished? I seen many boulders peeled due to the heat but non vanish. Sonny would speak at times his sci-fi theories but I am fact based and no aliens illegal or foreign to Earth came and did this—
I have thought since we saw the black bear that 6-29-13 over by the old mule gate area that maybe the men based decisions due to wildlife but maybe not—rabid wildlife—but nothing came up such as we buried many many wildlife when returning—mainly deer and javelina and rabbits and birds.
Then I thought maybe the storm moving in and the lightning can be fierce on the Weavers and I know as the hiker—I have been caught in it hiding in caves or cave like boulderous areas—
but I would never go in to the box canyon. Snakeman Tommy Maiden and Frank Serros would hike with me and that very 2 track ridge area is where Snakeman relocated ALOT of rattlers—we knew to look for rattlers because Snakeman put them there and so that was a factor to me but it did not fit—there is so many elements missing from the last few hours—
I feel the men deployed with full confidence they would make it through otherwise you would of had more calls/texts/emails/photos/videos documenting that last hours yet in the end did the abundance of the dense terrain contribute to the end results???
Things that are logical—is things I think about but then Sonny is the college degree; religion/psychology/geology and he has his views of the aliens—
A local guy named Shelby use to tell everyone in Yarnell that the boulders were ancestors rocktified and would one day come to life—is that why that boulder vanished?
I mean seriously anyone can theorize or create an angle or agenda or a perception but I am on this for stuff you can document and are fact based that at any angle it remains the pure truth—
that’s all.
It has recently come to my attention that my name is being mentioned on this site. I do not know if you have discussed the following yet or not. I apologize if you have already factored this into your theories on whether Marsh was located behind or ahead of the crew….
From the 1616 audio: Regardless of whether Eric Marsh was located at the house or somewhere else, it is generally understood that he did say “where we’re gonna jump out at”.
This conversation takes place @1614. The crew is already moving south.
How can Eric be BEHIND the crew and also be located somewhere “where we’re gonna jump out at”?
(If “where we are going to jump out at” also means: WE are going to jump out from here in the future).
I’d be interested in any reasonable explanation for how Eric Marsh can be located BEHIND the (already moving) crew and at the same time be either at an area or be scouting out an area “Where we’re gonna jump out at”?
Of course this doesn’t prove exactly where Marsh was. Ask yourself if it does indicate a strong possibility that he was somewhere AHEAD of the crew at this time?
Hope this helps.
Best Regards,
H. Neill
I was reading Calvin’s comment on the possibilty of Marsh dropping or else disposing of a depleted roll of pink tape at the Jeep trail dropping off point. I believe that tape was left there for a reason on afterthought. However those of you that know how tape is used might more consider what that could have been. The tape had burned into a globe shape about 3/4 ” in diameter. It was a marbled light grey to dark grey exterior. I would have never picked it up except for its circular form. It was when I picked it up that a piece of it fell off exposing a bright pink partially hollow interior. If that helps to indicate what it might have been, I will also tell you that it was about the center of the Jeep trail right about where yellow water bags were later discovered and the GMHS crew descended. Down a ways was also a thick walled white boundary marker that had been years earlier placed in the center of the trail. What it marks, I do not know. It was about 4 foot in length and lying parallel to the ground and a small pile of rock that had been made to support it. That thing was about 2 and a half inch in diameter and had melted in several spots along its length so as to distort its form, although it did not collapse. Now we did see and possible there still are small rocks approximately 4″x 4″ x 3/4″ thick wrapped all over with pink tape that Wayne Neil informed me were markers for supply drops. Did Marsh wrap something there to indicate where he would descend and his troops would follow or was it to indicate where those water bags were dropped?
Sonny No one ever noted there were water bags at the saddle drop off spot.
Were they there before the burn over or after? I could understand after for mop up.
The markers pink tape for supply drops could have as well been after the burn over.
You are saying the tape you found was in a melted roll and not a actual tape roller.
so not necessarily dropped roll of tape? If so that would say melted marking tape noting it was used to mark possibly the drop off spot. Can you provide clarity on this?
the actual item Sonny described is on my hiking page somewhere; burnt pink ribbon roll—hard to navigate and also on my private photos not so private photos anymore—that google link posted awhile back on here.
The only bladder bags we turned in to Joanna Dodder who turned into the investigators was found on the Congress side—ONE yellow waterproof material like you kayak or white water raft with to store your items—Away from any area called the 2 track ridge or the helipsot area or the lunch break area—no where near the investigative areas for the YHF—Congress side in the ash and that burnt on Friday, Saturday so WHO KNOWS if that was from earlier in the weekend but I had to use the restroom in a boulderous area due to planes flying above and that it was in that spot—I did not have the gear to gps it and I had nothing to mark area and it was hot wearing a face mask and long pants so I was going to leave it. Than on way back in area we had last passed the GMHS and last seen Eric Marsh…that area there was a few men and women at the “19” spot we made as a memorial and I listened to them ask “who made this?” I turned to Sonny and said first “should I tell them” but at same point I see in Sonny’s backpack the yellow bag and I felt uneased because I saw authority shirts with women and so I said why the bag and he said we will take it to Joanna Dodder showing it was AWAY from the fire area on Congress side. I get uneased because people are about to approach us and here Sonny has a yellow bag that I never gps’d or took photos of it in original spot and it may not have a thing to do with the YHF but that time I did not carry my camera and I prefer to photo it in original spot—HOW I ROLL IN LIFE—ask my neighbors and anyone that I run off fact-base and I will always tell you where I stand but if it cannot be backed up I prefer not to share yet will at times if it means someone else can back it up or bring clarity that I cannot but I know another can. That day they know who they are but they told me the loved ones of the GMHS would be travelling in area and I said that’s fine but he almost gave me the air like respect them as they come up—and to me all I did there was answer the lady’s question of why we made the 19 memorial RIGHT there—that is the area we passed them. That was the area that it had a HIGH breeze yet that very spot was a dead breeze—eery. That is the spot the men were at ease in the photos of mine around the corner from the lunch break where shrimp tails were found. We went down and saw the atvs of theirs as well as the pink ribbon burnt and tied to a bush that on next hike was GONE so someone took it and as you first travel the very areas there were many pink ribbons tied but go today good luck finding one. I know we are always going to have folks who are 50/50 or whatever ratio on the YHF that…
why is the hikers in the SAIR but not this person and that OR why is the hikers in a play from start to end when it is called THE FENCE and why is the reality show that did the Soup Nazi, Pawn Stars, Swamp King, etc. even interested on skyping with the Yarnell Hikers to do a reality show? Why is 4 movie directors interested in us to hike them? Why is a psychic who speaks to the dead interested in hiking the area? We know why the lawyers want to go— but the point is with any tragedy you will feel the togetherness as well as feeling alone or noone is there for you— In my opinion, these organizations that took in peoples’ donations had set up guidelines yet in it from ALL affected by the YHF did not see a proper balanced return. I look at the past annual+ and people can say WHY THE HIKERS IN THE MEDIA SO MUCH…obviously we are free and approachable and transparent and the very eye-witness to the fires from the fire line yet 19 elite men died and we are alive—it is the right thing to do—even knowing how ugly and skeptical this calloused world is we stepped up and we truly have to say this from the depth of who I am— ALL AFFECTED BY THE YHF— we love you so much—we miss your genuine smile that we saw before the YHF— We cannot figure out a way to let this go and we don’t know how to let it go UNTIL we have exhausted ALL areas and if that seems selfish to someone looking in that I want this YHF to stay main stream…it comes from the depth…the pain…The SAIR has to know they did not have a COMPLETE report and to me sometimes not saying something when you know there is answers is a lie too and I guess the lack of details to me is a lie. You cannot take back a lie. I have been fixated since for clarity—I have been spiritually dead even though people think I am so kind and sweet and do all these things freely but from my point of view I wonder if I was of good health would I have done the exact thing over like I did? I mean I was the type of person that I handled my home, my life, my way of stuff & volunteered out where it fit in MY life and Jerry Sutich/Linda McCoy the very first ones that crossed my path here in Congress when I hiked past the Congress laundry mat and petted all their dogs in the truck bed; they will tell you I am a hard case to know because I am like a crab/turtle (July baby). I was a hi/bye gal and I can go out and meet/greet but noone came to my space welcomed…even have a sign on my door that says “All my guests bring me happiness…some by coming…most by going” (something to that nature) I just want people to know I lay at night wondering at times why I do the things I do…pulling weeds by hands makes another relieved of a stress and I enjoy doing it and that I have done since I was a tot. I do not roll to the rhythm of kids (or adults) my age—I spent most my life with the golden generation or folks you watch on tv or govt folks—I have not had common folks to my life until I moved to Congress, Arizona and that decision dissolved the limelight lifestyle that always seem to be shown to me…so if there is a play or a reality show done on Yarnell Hikers—it is never for notoriety or ego or 15 minute of bs fame because I knew that lifestyle already to my life and no desire for me but I do have a DEEP desire to keep this main stream and let me say I make blunders like I wrote a Yarnell local thinking it was another person so letter fell in wrong hands but the guy has not spoken ever publicly but he did to me privately and he lives near the Helms and in all the accounts from that area it seems 3:38pm-4:15pm is when the fire hit that area 6-30-13 and homes and rvs and garages and so on & on instantly destroyed but these people feel everyone wants a story but not many feel the people are there for their loss and their grief and the depth of that. I try to soften the natural divisions that this tragedy created by the unbalanced ways the donations were shared to the people by simple things like pulling weeds by hand. I see lazy ass people play games on the library pc ALL DAY day in and out when they could be helping freely people but no you do not see that—maybe it is because it a part to who I am or maybe it is a repentance part for me because my entire marriage and we are almost to the 30 year mark creeping around the corner in knowing each other but my ENTIRE marriage we had my husband’s wealthy cousin live with us, or his college buddy or his brother so I always had me either work out gal pals/hiking pal or a side kick. I know people who knew me as a kid/teen reading this will say I was always smiling, always giving and very very good at stunts even during my cheer years…my pops favorite memories…I can walk up a wall and flip and I just was just full of energy and unique stunt skits—When most kids hung out—I was in my grandma’s backyard creating the next “wow” stunt skit that seem so natural to me another thought “show off” so I have felt that this past year when it is so natural for me to help the YHF folks I get the whispers back to me “show off” and its never about that for me—kids have no dad, wives have no husband…hell I don’t know the men but how about girlfriends too—you hear widow wives bu not much do you hear the word girlfriends—how about brothers, sisters, friends, parents, grandparents, best friends, etc. FOR THOSE PEOPLE until the day I pass on I do it for them. Someone recently mocked me because I passed a few job opportunities knowing I need to get funds for health stuff and I guess I do not roll that way…I have my life in God’s hands now…if it was in my hands…or even Sonny’s hands…do you really think Sonny would be ALL OF A SUDDEN from in the hospital in MT for heart attack/chest pain concerns to now back in the very state that did him injustice. God needs us both on that hill to share to the people because we both saw the same fire yet we have different perceptions because he is an old mountain man and I am the cookie cutter subdivision gal. Sonny wants me up in Yarnell for a bbq today and I am trying to find that photo from back in July today—because I won’t be around Monday through Saturday—be in Yarnell—you all can find us there for a bit than on to do that Yarnell Hiker reality show after we skype with Demetri. I know we are tiny specks in the whole thing to life but I won’t move on from the YHF until all areas have been explored and exhausted. Let me go spend the day trying to find that photo that had me not ever wanting to be around the pc again because of July’s stuff—dumb technology. I have a way to burn the photos but I also am trying to write on each photo why the photo was taken on every time I have to be near pc which is not much so may be awhile— I will send the 48 dvds out when it is done..I did not imagine 48 to arrive with SASE—some sent it with $2.10 on the package and it cost almost $3.00 so you know who send one in the future—that was for the ones that sent a dvd to see us in play—it was a copy from Ered Matthew to share to my loved ones but I did not want to pass to my brother the original because I’d never see it again…so I burned them copies…so again I leave open invite to mail in due time no rush to send it yet because not near to being done except play I can but not the other…but send to PO BOX 572 Congress Arizona 85332 what you want burned— either photo dvd or play or both and make sure it is already labelled and stamped for me to insert it and in due time it will get back to you—or some have sent 2 sase 1 to get play now and the other for later. If I get any this week for the play than next Sunday I will burn it when its pc time and mail it on Monday the 25th. I had 1 person who knows who they are place $40 in envelope to help with stamps for notes and such (thank you) and I am truly asking people do not send funds…just the sase and blank dvds is all and God will worry about how I get stamps…people reading this we are all here to get the ANSWERS…and well, I am M-Sa up in Yarnell now directly working with the people again and even not feeling well…I hope to get 1 fact base thing for the investigation part—I can tell you this the man I spoke to yesterday lives in the very area the supposed back burn happen—his place was already on fire and burning intensely when he drove away to a friend and he wept. Remember everyone accidents and mother nature are separate than AVOIDABLE situations and as I eye-witness that fire this was an avoidable situation that took 19 lives and many wildlife and homes/cars/rv/etc…okay enough from the desert walker AKA the rambler…
This is a reply to Bob Powers to help clarify the tape that was burned into a ball at the drop off from jeep trail to the death bowl. Joy says what I had before written did not post–a few days ago, so I will post again hoping it is not a repeat. The item in question was a gray/dark grey 3/4″ object I found about the center of the jeep trail at the point it is believed the GMHS crew had left the jeep trail to head down and toward the Helm’s residence. When I picked it up a piece of it fell off exposing a partially hollow interior and revealing a bright pink interior–It had been tape –maybe disposed partial roll, a purposely placed marker- or accidental drop. Those who witnessed the item include Dr. Ted Putnam–11yr,. smoke jumper and past investigator of the Colorado fires, Wayne and Holly Neill–both firefighters of years experience, and John MacLean, popular fire disaster author. Their input would be much better than mine as to what the nature of that thing might have been so my speculation would be low rated–I just now think it must have been a marker since Joy and I remember that Marsh was real handy with marking pink ribbon everywhere he went. Whether that jeep trail would have been at that particular spot a good place for a copter to drop supplies I think Wayne Neill would have the best answer on that since he was right there and noted whether it would have worked or not. The question was never discussed among those elite men to my knowledge.
I hope one of them reads this and gives you a more informative answer, since I too would like to know what they would think.
Thank you, Sonny! Lots of good detail in there.
If that ‘ball of tape’ was, in fact, not a complete ROLL of tape then I would say it is highly unlikely that it was something that might have just accidentally ‘fallen’ off the back of someone’s field pack.
If it was just a ‘stretch’ of tape that had then ‘coiled into a tight ball’ when the flames hit is ( which is what would happen ) then there are really only two possibilities for it having been right there where you found it.
1) Jesse Steed or one of the GM crew ‘marked’ something ( a bush? a rock? the ground? ) right there to show Eric Marsh where they had dropped into the box canyon because Eric Marsh was still ‘catching up’ to them from behind.
2) Eric Marsh ( or someone else ) ‘marked something’ there because they were scouting AHEAD of Jesse Steed and the line of men hiking and it was to indicate where THEY were supposed to leave the two-track and drop into the box canyon.
Actually… I suppose there is a THIRD possibility.
Eric Marsh WAS ‘behind the men’ and still trying to ‘catch up’… but Jesse Steed himself had ‘gone ahead’ of the other 18 men hiking at a faster pace to do his own ‘scouting’ of the road ahead… and Steed had already made the decision that the hikers should drop into the canyon before they reached the saddle.
So the THIRD possibility is that Steed was ‘ahead of everyone’ and put that tape there to signal to BOTH the approaching 18 hikers AND Eric Marsh ( even farther behind them ) that that was where Steed had decided they should all leave the two-track when they hit that spot.
Start with the argument at the saddle over the radio.
Steed was with the crew his responsibility.
If Marsh was behind and not ahead he would not need tape to follow.
Marsh would have had the tracks of 18 men and would know they were dropping off at the saddle.
If Marsh was ahead and scouting the route he would have marked the drop off and flagged all the way down searching the best route.
If we look at the time frame of Frisby not making the meeting and picking up McDonough Marsh could have followed the 2 track back and dropped down it in front of the crew he had the time.
Steeds responsibility was to stay with the crew Marsh was the free person.
We have been stuck with Marsh behind the crew for a long time and that left a lot of unanswered questions. Putting marsh in front of the crew to me makes a lot more since.
Why did they call it an escape route because marsh was flagging it.
Gaggle up and follow me Steed would lead the crew off
It is the HS way one of the leaders stays with the crew. They maintain the leadership.
WTKTT I am just trying to explain to you how the leadership works.
The 2 Foreman are assigned individual squads of 8 men each the foreman answer directly to the Asst./Captain and to the Superintendent.
The Superintendent is in charge when he goes to do something else what ever the assistant is in charge It is always a leadership thing as in the military
One or the other is always in command of the men. The foreman are still in charge of their individual squads.. Steed stayed with the crew running it all day and stayed with them when they headed off the hill.
The responsibility of leadership and control. has never changed.
So that brings me back to Marsh and Marsh only finding the escape route as it was supposedly named.
I ask every one to step out side the box and review the info and see where it leads you. I still maybe way off but I do not think so. I still do not have the information to say with out drought this is what happened. But to me it is making more since than before.
Reply to Bob Powers post on August 16, 2014 at 7:40 pm
I totally understand this ‘revisit’ of the long-held ‘assumption’ that Marsh was ‘behind’ the men and how that has for some time now ‘fit’ the available evidence… but might not actually be the case.
However… I’m still going to play “devil’s advocate” here…
>> Bob Powers said…
>> Start with the argument at the saddle over the radio.
Can’t. We don’t know if that actually happened or not. Not yet.
Even if it did… we don’t know the full circumstances. Not yet.
>> Steed was with the crew his responsibility.
No doubt… but are you saying a Sup never ‘takes off to check something out’? In those reports about when Marsh refused and assignment in the past… his own unit log says that BOTH he and Jesse ‘took off’ to do some scouting. So obviosly neither Steed nor Marsh would hesitate to do that sort of thing and leave the crew alone.
>> If Marsh was behind and not ahead he would not need tape
>> to follow. Marsh would have had the tracks of 18 men and
>> would know they were dropping off at the saddle.
Perhaps… but if the long standing belief that Marsh was still ‘catching up from behind’ is true… I can’t imagine that someone ( Steed, Caldwell, someone? ) wouldn’t have just ‘flagged’ their exit point anyway so Marsh didn’t have to ‘guess’. That would only be polite.
>> If Marsh was ahead and scouting the route he would have marked
>> the drop off and flagged all the way down searching the best route.
Yes to the ‘first’ part… but as far as the second part goes… if you ARE maintaining that Marsh was ‘scouting ahead’… how far do you think he got?
I still have a problem with any scenario that puts anyone from GM out in front of the mouth of that box canyon PRIOR to the first MAYDAY call and not actually WARNING them about ‘something wicked this way comes’. That would almost border on some kind of insanity at play here.. To have actually been AWARE that GM was ‘walking into a trap’ and then choose to NOT tell them about it or ‘warn them off’ while they still had time to escape actually would border on ‘criminal negligence’ and not just plain vanilla ‘negligence’.
>> Mr. Powers also said…
>> If we look at the time frame of Frisby not making the
>> meeting and picking up McDonough Marsh could have
>> followed the 2 track back and dropped down it in front
>> of the crew he had the time.
Perhaps.
Let’s review what is KNOWN…
Frisby had Brendan ‘onboard’ the UTV and was obviously NOT going to continue on up to the anchor point at exactly 1542 ( 3:42 PM ). That is when Frisby knew his ‘new’ mission was now to evacuate Brendan back EAST and also get some fellas to move the GM vehicles and it is the moment he called his captain Brown and told him to do just that. Brown had been walking EAST on the cutover trail when that new ‘directive’ to ’round up people to move vehicles’ came over the radio from Frisby and Brown did an immediate ‘about face’ on his hike and started hurrying back WEST on the Cutover Trail. This moment is specifically recorded by Brown’s GPS unit…
From BR Captain Brown’s GPS data…
————————————————————–
1541 – 34.228449, -112.756543 – 0184.107 – 02.09 – Slight movement EAST on cutover trail. Still on his hike to the EAST.
NOTE: This is as far EAST as Trueheart Brown and the GPS tracker would travel on foot.Captain Brown now does his ‘about face’ at the moment he was requested by Frisby ( over the radio ) to stop what he was doing and get some crew to move the GM and BR vehicles.
1542 – 34.227828, -112.756972 – 0265.927 – 03.02 – Slight movement back WEST on cutover trail. Brown has ‘done his ‘about face’ already.
————————————————————-
So just prior to 1542 ( 3:42 PM ), wherever Marsh was he MUST have still been heading towards that same place where he had the NOON face-to-face with Frisby before just north of the anchor point.
If he had been ‘to the north’… then it depends how FAR to the north he was to predict how close he now was to the expected location for the ‘face-to-face’.
Ditto if he had been ‘south’ of there when he requested the meeting in the first place circa 1531 ( 3:31 PM ) just after Byron Kimball’s weather report about the expected 180 degree wind shift.
For the sake of argument… let’s say it doesn’t matter a hoot whether Marsh was ‘north’ or ‘south’ of the ‘anchor point’ when he requested that face-to-face with Frisby AT the ‘anchor point’.
Let’s just say ( for argument’s sake ) that at 1542 ( 3:42 PM ), when Frisby came across Brendan and realized he needed to get him the hell out of there… that Marsh was simply already AT the anchor point and tapping his foot waiting for Frisby to show up for that face-to-face there.
Just prior to 1542… Marsh had delivered his own ‘fire behavior’ report over the open TAC channels. That is when he said the fire had just blown through that retardant line to the NORTH of the anchor point. This was captured in the Panebaker video and is the one where Eric Panebaker then turns to who he is and reacts to Marsh’s announcement about the fire blowing through the retardant line with his sarcastic remark “Where do we document THAT in the logs?”.
Marsh COULD ( I suppose ) have delivered that same report right there from the anchor-point and been accurately reporting “Fire is heading SOUTH… towards Yarnell”. It’s possible. He still could have been seeing that from the anchor-point without having been any farther NORTH.
1542 is also the exact moment when Paul Musser tries to hail DIVSA on the radio and the start of Musser’s ‘availability check’. That would be the radio conversation where Marsh himself was going to tell Musser that GM was still ‘comitted to the ridge’ and he should ask Blue Ridge if they can help him since they are already ‘down there’ near town.
So we are still at 1542 ( 3:42 PM ) and we are now assuming the following…
1) Marsh had made it to the anchor point already for the expected face-to-face with Frisby.
2) Marsh gives his 1542 ‘Fire has blown through retardant line and is heading south into Yarnell’ report over the radio while standing there at the anchor point ( and NOT any farther NORTH than that ).
3) Immediately after that report… Musser calls Marsh and checks on ‘resource availablity’ Marsh says they ( He and GM ) are ‘committed to the black’ and recommends calling Blue Ridge instead.
Somewhere in this same 1542-1543 moment Marsh also learns that Frisby is evacuating Brendan and that the GM vehicles are going to be moved… and the face-to-face meeting is now OFF.
However… based on what Marsh just told Musser in this 1542 timeframe… Marsh himself had obviously made NO DECISION about ‘leaving the black’. He hadn’t had a chance to talk with Steed about that yet.
So that is what happens next.
Marsh and Steed start ‘discussing their options’ ( but over the radio which means Marsh was still NOT with the men ).
That ‘discussing their options’ conversation continues ( over the radio ) until circa 1555 ( 3:55 PM ). We hear that ‘ongoing’ conversation at that exact time in MacKenzie’s own videos.
We now KNOW that the ‘picture taking’ ends VERY abruptly right around 1555 ( 3:55 PM )… but we also know that Wade Parker then did not get around to texting the picture he took to his mother until 9 minutes later at 1604 ( 4:04 PM ).
Those ‘nine minutes’ are still unexplained.
They had been told to STOP ‘Playing Tourist’ and to ‘Gaggle Up’ circa 3:55 PM… but it’s also pretty much a given that Parker would not have texted anything WHILE he was hiking… so what where they all doing from 3:55 to 4:04 PM? Just ‘standing there’ on the 2 track?… or is that how long it actually took them to just ‘assemble’ into the single formation line in order to head south?
If they were fully assembled in just a minute or two… that still leaves SEVEN minutes of just ‘standing there’ without ‘moving out’.
WHY would they have been doing THAT?
Were they WAITING for someone? Someone like Marsh to still ‘catch up’ from his northern scouting mission all day?
Did they wait as long as they felt comfortable for Marsh to ‘catch up’ and when he still wasn’t appearing Steed felt they better ‘get moving’ and then just told Marsh to ‘catch up’ with them while they were hiking?
In order for Marsh to have transitioned from his documented ‘scouting up north’ to then be ‘scouting down south’… he must have had to have PASSED the GM crew. When would THAT have happened?
If Marsh was ‘passing’ the crew anytime around 1542 and before there was even any decision to do anything other than ‘sit in the black’… why would he have not just had his own ‘face-to-face’ with Steed instead of needing to have that ‘discussing their options’ conversation over the radio?
So yes… ‘by the clock’… Marsh might have had TIME following the realization that there wasn’t going to be a face-to-face with Frisby at the anchor point to then ‘take off’ and head south to start scouting that way… but there had been NO DECISION that was even going to be necessary until 13 minutes after 1542 ( around 1555 ).
Marsh is NOT ‘out of breath’ or even sounds like he is exerting himself when he hear him talking to Steed at 1555. He sounds like he, himself, was ‘stationary’ ( somewhere ).
In order to accept the ‘Marsh was scouting ahead to the south’ scenario we would then have to believe that the moment Marsh told Musser they were ‘committed to the ridge, try Blue Ridge’… mere seconds transpired before Marsh would have ‘taken off south’, walked right by Steed and didn’t even bother to talk to him ‘face-to-face’, and he hustled directly south even BEFORE we hear him having that ‘discussing their options’ conversation over the radio.
It’s just not adding up for me.
The ‘Marsh was still north of the crew during the discussing options conversations over the radio’ still fits the other evidence better at this point in time.
>> Bob Powers also said…
>> Steeds responsibility was to stay with the crew Marsh was
>> the free person.
Free person or not… it all matters WHERE he was at 1542 when he learned there wasn’t going to be a face-to-face.
Had Marsh already ‘arrived’ where the face-to-face was SUPPOSED to take place before it was ‘cancelled’… or was he still some distance away ( either north or south ) from that spot?
We don’t know.
Brendan might.
>> Bob Powers also said…
>> We have been stuck with Marsh behind the crew for a
>> long time and that left a lot of unanswered questions.
>> Putting marsh in front of the crew to me makes a lot
>> more since.
I’m not sure why you are using the word ‘stuck’ in relation to the idea that Marsh was, in fact, ‘behind’ the crew ( to the NORTH ) during the ‘discussing their options’ conversation and the subsequent hike down to the saddle.
Maybe I missed it in this ongoing conversation… but what problems does that theory actually cause? I still think it ‘fits the evidence’ better than anything else does, at this point.
What part of the evidence record do you think ‘makes more sense’ if we accept that Marsh was AHEAD of the crew rather than BEHIND it?
The ‘tape’ thing is still easily explained in EITHER scenario.
If Marsh was BEHIND the men and ‘catching up’… Steed left the tape.
If Marsh was AHEAD of the men and ‘scouting’… Marsh left the tape.
The ‘tape’ thing is no ‘hard evidence’ at all of where Marsh might have been in relation to the crew that afternoon.
>> Bob Powers also wrote…
>> Why did they call it an escape route because
>> marsh was flagging it.
Marsh himself describes it over the radio at exactly 4:16 PM to some still unknown caller who asked “Granite Mountain… what’s your status right now?” as “The (same) escape route from this morning”.
So flagged or not… in the morning it was considered the ‘escape route’ and that’s still what Marsh was calling it that afternoon.
It didn’t need any ‘flagging’ for Marsh to be calling it that.
In his mind… the ‘Ranch’ was the ‘predetermined safety zone’ so ANY route to it could have been referred to as the matching ‘escape route’.
>> Bob Powers also said…
>> Gaggle up and follow me Steed would lead the crew off
>> It is the HS way one of the leaders stays with the crew.
>> They maintain the leadership.
That would be normal… yes… but if this exact discussion is about ‘thinking out of the box’ and ‘revisting assumptions’ then I think what goes along with that is the chance they weren’t ‘following the book’ as you suggest in any way shape or form that afternoon.
Actually… we already KNOW they weren’t ‘following the book’.
If they had… they wouldn’t be dead.
We actually still have no idea whether the SQUADS themselves departed that anchor point at different times… or whether BOTH squads were ever really fully assembled at that final rest location.
There have NEVER been 19 men seen in any combination of the Parker or MacKenzie photos taken at the ‘rest location’. We have also been ASSUMING that the ‘rest of them’ were simply standing BEHIND Christoper MacKenzie when he shot his photos and videos.
What if that isn’t the case?
What if one of the SQUADS was sent ahead to ‘scout the escape route’ and THEY are the ones that were leaving that pink tape?
Is it still possible that NEITHER Steed NOR Marsh actually made that fateful decision to drop into that box canyon and it was, instead, whichever squad leader was sent ahead to ‘scout it out’?
I think it is ( still possible ).
That’s how much we still don’t really know about how it ACTUALLY went down out there on that ridge that afternoon.
>> Bob Powers also said…
>> WTKTT I am just trying to explain to you how the
>> leadership works.
>>
>> The 2 Foreman are assigned individual squads of 8 men
>> each the foreman answer directly to the Asst./Captain
>> and to the Superintendent.
>>
>> The Superintendent is in charge when he goes to do
>> something else what ever the assistant is in charge It
>> is always a leadership thing as in the military
Yes. I get it. Thank you… but see above.
As long as we are revisiting this issue… and coupled with the fact there is still no photographic evidence that ALL of the men were even there at the same ‘final rest spot’ prior to the ‘decision to hike south’…. what’s your feeling that ( as you say and ‘by the book’ ) one of the SQUADS might have been directed to ‘go do the scouting’ and BOTH Steed, the other squad, and Marsh himself were all catching up to THEM circa 4:00 PM to 4:20 PM?
Are you saying that could NEVER happen?
That a SQUAD might be sent ahead to do some recon?
>> Bob Powers also said…
>> One or the other is always in command of the men.
>> The foreman are still in charge of their individual squads..
Again… see above. As long as we are revisiting all of this… what’s your feeling that one of the ‘foreman and his squad’ were tapped to do the ‘forward recon’? Impossible?
>> Bob Powers also said…
>> Steed stayed with the crew running it all day and stayed
>> with them when they headed off the hill.
Probably so… but once again… what about the chance that Steed was ‘staying with the (other) men’ while a ‘squad’ was sent to do some recon?
That kinda happens all the time, doesn’t it?
>> Bob Powers also said…
>> The responsibility of leadership and control. has never changed
.>> So that brings me back to Marsh and Marsh only finding the
>> escape route as it was supposedly named.
>>
>> I ask every one to step out side the box and review the info
>> and see where it leads you. I still maybe way off but I do not
>> think so. I still do not have the information to say with out
>> drought this is what happened. But to me it is making more
>> since than before.
Stepping ‘outside the box’ in cases like this is ALWAYS good… but don’t forget to step ALL the way outside the box and not just halfway.
I repeat my question from above.
What do you think the possibilities are that if anyone was ‘scouting ahead’ that day… that it was NEITHER Eric Marsh NOR Jesse Steed
that was actually doing it?
What if Steed wanted some kind of ‘scouting report’ from someone ELSE before he dared to take ALL of the men on that hike?
If a Captain or a Sup ‘assigns’ someone to ‘go scout something’ they actually never send someone ‘by themselves’, right? Isn’t that verboten?
So if Steed wanted a ‘scouting report’ BEFORE asking those men to leave the safe black he would have sent at least TWO men down that way, right?
Correcting myself above. I made the same ‘mental error’ the SAIT did.
I said…
“Musser calls Marsh and checks on ‘resource availablity’ Marsh says they ( He and GM ) are ‘committed to the black’ and recommends calling Blue Ridge instead.”
That is not true ( according to Musser’s own testimony ).
Marsh NEVER told him he ( and GM ) were ‘committed to the BLACK’ in that radio exchange.
He only told Musser they were still ‘committed to the ridge’.
ADOSH was very specific about this… and so was Musser.
Musser insisted that Marsh NEVER said anything about being ‘committed to the BLACK’. It was all about the ‘assignment’ and whether they were still committed to ‘doing what they were doing’.
Even at 1542 ( 3:42 PM )…. Marsh said ( paraphrasing ) “Yes… we are. Try Blue Ridge if you are looking for some Hotshots. They are already DOWN there.”
The squad leading not going to happen in that scenario.
We are the ones who put Marsh behind the crew catching up
with absolutely no evidence any different than putting him ahead of the crew.
The Superintendent Marsh would have scouted the route.
Only in his total absence would Steed taken his place.
That’s the way it works
You have several holes in your devils advocate and do not understand HS organization.
You have set your mind to your theory but do not have all the background to support it.
The time frame makes it possible to put Marsh in either spot in front or behind. and there is some evidence that could show either. But we still have no solid evidence to say absolutely where Marsh was in relation to the crew.
Ill leave it there for now I have given you some information and personnel knowledge of how HS crews work, I use that to
asses Marsh and Steeds responsibility and movements.
There is no reason to doubt that Marsh made the decision to move. If so he would have taken the responsibility to scout and mark the route, and Steed would have followed and lead the crew off the mountain. That is just the way it works.
We have estimated time lines on Marsh that may be totally false as to his actual location above the crew. We have no Idea if he even got to or near the original meeting spot.
With out knowing his location we have assumed a lot. Such as he was catching up to the crew and behind them. He could have just as well been ahead of the crew and scouted the route to the Ranch.
Did Marsh run to catch the Crew? Or did he run back to the crew to get them to hurry up?
Ill back off and clear my head for a while as I am getting a little hard headed on this subject. I think we are bouncing around in a box without a clear exit.
Mr. Powers…
Good stuff… but two points…
1) Be careful ‘assuming’ that just because some Hotshot crews operate a certain way… most of the time… that that behavior can be counted on to explain anything that happened out on THAT ridge on THAT day. If Marsh was still way too far north of the men to catch them in a reasonable amount of time when the decision was made to ‘leave the safe black’… then all bets are off with regards to what would ‘normally’ happen. TIME was their enemy. I think they knew that. I still think that the moment Steed agreed to ‘the mission’ even he looked out at that fire and added a postscript saying “…but we better go RIGHT NOW” regardless of whether Marsh had ‘caught up’ to them yet or not.
2) You didn’t answer one of the important questions I asked above. If you really believe Marsh was now out AHEAD of the crew and ‘scouting the escape route’… how FAR do you think he got? Do you think he actually got EAST of the mouth of the box canyon where HE could see ‘what was coming’… but then did NOT sense the danger and/or WARN the men behind him and then had to run back WEST to his own death?
OK I have said he saw the fire activity change and went back to hurry the crew out.
He could have very well gotten almost to the ranch or at least out into the open estimating 1625.
He was almost back to the crew when the flaming front appeared. Again my best guess.
There has to be some GPS data he had a unit with him.
How dose that just disappear? Any way I am outta here for a while..
Mr. Powers. Thank you.
I ( me, personally ) have not ‘set my mind to a theory’ on this as you suggested above. I really haven’t. I am still just trying to ‘follow the evidence’.
Also for me, personally, I have to admit that my BIGGEST reluctance to accept the theory that Marsh was out ahead of the crew is what you just ‘surmised’ up above.
If Marsh ( or anyone from GM ) was, in fact, anywhere EAST of the mouth of the box canyon prior to the first 1639 MAYDAY call from Steed… it’s simply inconceivable to me that they would not have been able to see what was happening and have been able to WARN Granite Mountain.
Your theory about Marsh running back to them ( without even issuing a WARNING over the radio first that Brendan and others would have heard if it was over intra-crew or that EVERYONE would have heard if it was TAC ) is just hard to accept ( for me ).
There wasn’t TIME for them to just ‘hurry up’ and make it FORWARD all the way to the Ranch. They were totally bogged down out there. Their only chance at survival was to have been WARNED early enough in the descent to have been able to GO BACK up, and then OVER that ridge.
I think ( for me, anyway, and for what it is worth ) THAT is going to remain the ‘sticking point’ for me on any theory that puts anyone from GM out in front of the crew at any time prior to 1639.
It is inconceivable to me that anyone who even *might* have been in a position to be their ‘forward lookout’ would have just let them walk right into that death trap.
WTK, you asked this to Mr Powers….
2) You didn’t answer one of the important questions I asked above. If you really believe Marsh was now out AHEAD of the crew and ‘scouting the escape route’… how FAR do you think he got? Do you think he actually got EAST of the mouth of the box canyon where HE could see ‘what was coming’… but then did NOT sense the danger and/or WARN the men behind him and then had to run back WEST to his own death?
I am going to reply
I do think it is possible (and maybe probable) that Marsh was ahead of the crew and was being the lookout for GM from the mouth of the canyon. As I have stated before, on that little knoll just to the west of the BSR. I think Marsh was waiting there and expecting a line of fire retardant to be dropped between the fire and his location (Abel promised the retardant, Marsh called B33 and acknowledged that was where he wanted the retardant) When it wasn’t delivered and the plane continued on its flight path, Marsh knew they were in deep shit and ran to be with his men, for better or worse.
This is just the way I see it!
We do not know about radio contact for some reason that may have been scratchy in the canyon
Crew net is line of site. high on the hill much better.
It did not take Marsh long to get to the crew from the flaming front call. In back or in front of the crew.
I’ll be back Friday out of town till then give me some time to digest the info.
Reply to calvin post on
August 17, 2014 at 3:55 pm
NOTE: All remarks below are in no way intended to put the kibosh on any rexamination of whether the long-held assumption that Marsh was ‘behind’ the crew might not be correct. That is a legitimate discussion to be having since a lot of different ‘assumptions’ have always been involved in order to reach that conclusion.
Example: The assumption that just because the first MAYDAY did NOT come from Steed and then, two minutes into the emergency radio traffic, we only then hear Marsh come on the radio and totally out of breath… that this means Marsh came ‘running up from behind. That ‘makes sense’ and ‘fits the evidence’ but there has obviously always been an ‘assumption’ component to even just that ‘piece of evidence’.
That being said…
>> calvin said
>> I do think it is possible (and maybe
>> probable) that Marsh was ahead of the
>> crew and was being the lookout for GM
>> from the mouth of the canyon.
Well… if he was… he pretty much FAILED pretty miserably as far as that assignment goes… wouldn’t you say?
I have always said that it seems it would be much harder to fathom why 19 men had to die that day if it turns out they DID have a ‘forward lookout’ than to continue to try and comprehend why they died because they didn’t have one at all… and I still feel that way.
>> calvin also said…
>> As I have stated before, on that little
>> knoll just to the west of the BSR.
I know the knoll you have always been referring to. The center of the top of that mound / knoll is only 496 feet ( FEET, not YARDS ) northwest of where the road that was bulldozed out to the deployment site actually enters the western edge of the BSR compound. That bulldozed path out to the deployment site even had to go ‘around’ this mound / knoll. That’s how ‘close’ it is to the BSR itself.
The center of the top of that mound / knoll is also 1,458 feet ( as the bird flies and not twisting ground travel ) from the center of the deployment site. That is MORE than 1/4 mile ( 1/4 mile is only 1,320 feet ).
If that’s where Marsh was when Steed’s first MAYDAY hit the radio then Marsh had to cover 1/4 mile plus another 138 feet in about 120 seconds. That’s 12.15 feet per second ( 8.28 miles per hour ). The top ‘sprinting speed’ for an average human on an OPEN TRACK is only in the 10-12 mph range, and only for short distances like 100 to 200 yards ( 300 to 600 feet ). Could Marsh have averaged 8.28 miles per hour for 2 minutes including coming down off a rocky mound and then moving through thick manzanita and then only have been even ‘slightly’ out of breath as he talks over a radio?
You decide.
>> calvin also said…
>> I think Marsh was waiting there and
>> expecting a line of fire retardant to be
>> dropped between the fire and his
>> location.
>>
>> Abel promised the retardant
No, he didn’t. All OPS1 Todd Abel said was… “We’ll get some Air Support down there ASAP”.
There has never been anything to suggest that was going to be specifically FOR Eric Marsh or FOR Granite Mountain. Todd Abel insists he NEVER knew they were going to move from that ‘safe black’… so why would he even suggest to men who he thought were sitting in safe black and were going to stay there that he would get THEM ‘a retardant drop’. All Abel meant was that he was acknowledging the shift in winds and the new threat on the south side of the fire and he would tell the Air Support people to just generally switch their focus to the south side of the fire… which is what he ( and Air Support ) proceeded to do.
>> calvin also said…
>> Marsh called B33 and acknowledged
>> that was where he wanted the retardant)
Only the SAIR reported that Eric Marsh said ‘something lke that’ at 1637… but it’s pretty much been proved that is ONLY based on a vague recollection of just one person in an airplane ( John Burfiend ) who then, in his same interview, admitted he didn’t know who was ‘down on the ground’ or what anyone’s voices sounded like.
The newly discovered photos IMG_1334 and IMG_1335 prove that in that same timeframe… the smoke column had just begun to ‘lay over’ and anyone at the Ranch House Restaurant could have seen that same 1633 retardant drop and gotten on the Air-To-Ground channel to say “That’s exactly what we want” to Bravo 33. Anyone at all.
>> calvin also said…
>> When it wasn’t delivered and the plane
>> continued on its flight path, Marsh knew
>> they were in deep shit and ran to be with
>> his men, for better or worse.
Ah… okay. then scratch what I said above about 12.15 feet per second.
If you are NOW saying that you believe the most critical event for Eric Marsh was NOT seeing some plane drop some retardant at a moment when he thought it should ( even though there is no record of him having any other standard conversations about coordinating such a drop with an airplane overhead ) and that this was the ‘decision maker’ for him ( at 1637 or 1638 ) to start RUNNING west even before Steed’s first MAYDAY call…
…then I guess he wouldn’t have had to have been hitting the 12.15 foot per second travel rate. He would have had another 60 seconds or so to cover that same distance.
With an additional 60 seconds for Marsh to cover the 1,458 feet… we are now down to a sustained THREE minute travel rate for Marsh of 8.1 feet per second. That’s still a sustained 5.52 miles per hour for THREE straight minutes ( no break ) and then be only slightly out of breath at the other end.
>> calvin
>> This is just the way I see it!
Forget that fact that if this really is how it went down that what Marsh SHOULD have been doing is WARNING those men they were walking into a death trap ( even if the retardant had dropped it wasn’t going to do jack shit )…
…it’s still hard to accept the scenario just based on the available evidence.
As I wrote downstream in that much more complicated conversation on August 16, 2013 at 4:27 PM
“Regarding the flagging. Everything I have read has said that the standard recognized way of flagging an escape route is to attach a piece of pink tape to it and write on that “ESCAPE ROUTE.” And this seems to be VERY IMPORTANT.”
And I agree that there’s no indication in our current collection of evidence that the water bags there on June 30 were at that place.
Although this conversation has put a question mark in my head. I have been assuming, mostly based on the narrative of the search, that the water bags were dropped, and left, more in the vicinity of the helispot.
But I don’t think they were near the drop-off into the bowl.
So, if there was mention of water-bags near that location, and pink tape related to them, I would agree they would have most likely been placed there after June 30.
Agreed. There is NO EVIDENCE that any ‘bladder bags’ were found at ANY time at that saddle at the top of the box canyon.
I hope Sonny comes back with just a little more clarity on what he was trying to say there.
I hope it isn’t the case that Sonny found the pink tape farther north there where there WERE bladder bags that had been dropped off by N14HX chopper on Saturday and got ‘burned’ overnight on Saturday.
When Sonny first reported finding the tape is when he published GPS coordinates and those coordinates are, in fact, spot-on there on the side of the two-track at the top of the saddle.
I hope that remains the case ( that that is where he actually found the tape ) or we have chased our tails a lot on the ‘tape’ thing for nothing.
Also… speaking of ‘what we still don’t know’ as far as things being FOUND along that two-track… there has still been no explanation whatsoever for that mysterious LABEL on the TOPO map of the Blue Ridge GPS tracking data which says “Mystery Panel”.
Whatever that is… it was supposedly found right there on that same high ridge two-track at the point where the east-west jeep trail intersects with the high-ridge road.
What could that possible mean? “Mystery Panel”?… and why is it ONLY being identified by the Blue Ridge Hotshots and not any investigator?
Agreed. There is NO EVIDENCE that any ‘bladder bags’ were found at ANY time at that saddle at the top of the box canyon.NO EVIDENCE JUST REPORTED—WE HEARD THAT SINCE WE RETURNED THAT THERE WAS BUT NEVER ANY PHOTOS DOCUMENTING IT—SHOWING IT THERE.
I hope Sonny comes back with just a little more clarity on what he was trying to say there.HE IS AT BBQ BUT WHEN HE CALLED AN WOKE ME UP—I WAS UP UNTIL 5AM LOOKING FOR PHOTO AND FINALLY CRASHED AND HE CALLED 10 SOMETHING AND I TOLD HIM TO PEAK HERE SO PROBABLY TOMORROW HE WILL.
I hope it isn’t the case that Sonny found the pink tape NO IT WAS FOUND AT PAGE 2 THE GPS COORDINATES ARE THERE BUT IT TAKES TOO LONG FOR IT TO SHOW PHOTOS ON MY PC SO YOU CAN TRY ON YOUR PC BUT COORDINATES ARE ON THERE WHERE IT WAS FOUND–IF IT IS NOT ON THERE THAN I CAN ALSO LOOK FOR THAT ON MY PHOTOS SOMEONE SHARED WITH ME SINCE I LOST ALL MY PHOTOS WITH HE KISS OF BLUE SCREEN DEATH—(https://plus.google.com/photos/112068160404980104272/albums/5922175655744920065/https://plus.google.com/photos/112068160404980104272/albums/5911726150683632913?authkey=CMSBuJL2pZXeOg)
farther north there where there WERE bladder bags that had been dropped off by N14HX chopper on Saturday and got ‘burned’ overnight on Saturday.NO IT WAS FOUND BY THE WHITE THING OUT OF THE GROUND ABOVE WHERE THE MEN DIED ON THE 2 TRACK RIDGE—WITH HIKE WITH JOHN MACLEAN AND WOULD OF BEEN FOUND ON HIKE WITH SONNY AND JOY BEFORE THAT BUT JOY TRIPPED OVER STUMP AND FLEW ON TO STUMP HURTING 12 RIBS SO IT HAPPEN ON THE HIKE WITH FIRE AUTHOR JOHN MACLEAN
When Sonny first reported finding the tape is when he published GPS coordinates and those coordinates are, in fact, spot-on there on the side of the two-track at the top of the saddle.RIGHT
I hope that remains the case ( that that is where he actually found the tape ) or we have chased our tails a lot on the ‘tape’ thing for nothing.NO THAT IS CORRECT
SONNY WILL REPLY TOMORROW—BUT HOPE THIS HELPS TOO
Thank you, Joy!
I didn’t really think there was much chance that the pink tape was NOT found exactly where Sonny said it was but it’s good to hear that nothing has changed about that.
>> Joy said…
>>
Whoops… I accidentally his ‘send’ on the comment
above before ‘finishing’ it…
>> Joy said…
>>
>> IT WAS FOUND BY THE WHITE THING OUT OF
>> THE GROUND ABOVE WHERE THE MEN DIED
>> ON THE 2 TRACK RIDGE
Regarding this ‘white thing sticking out of the ground’… do you see it anywhere in the following photo taken by one of the ADOSH investigators?
The following photo was taken right there on the two-track road at almost the exact point where Sonny says he found the pink tape…
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/20inrene9tcx74a/AAAn9-D4c5U9Kbh2BHFt2c7ba/ADOSH%20Yarnell%20Hill%20Investigation/Photos%20and%20Video/ADOSH%207-18%20photos%20w%20GPS#lh:null-IMGP0247.JPG
I believe I *might* be seeing this ‘white thing’ you are referring to there in that bottom center of that photo, but I am not sure.
By the way… that photo is just one of a series of SEVEN photos there in that same ADOSH folder that makes up a ‘panorama view’ taken from that point where Sonny found the tape. If that ‘white thing’ isn’t in the photo linked to above… do you see in any of the photos that show the view on the two-track to either the left or right of the one linked to above?
Concerning the supposed Argument that may have taken place at the saddle, just before dropping into the DV.
As WTK has pointed out many times. Any of the GMIHC crew who were just standing by during this time (30 seconds?), could have pulled up Google earth and looked at the route that would have taken them to the BSR. Even id they didn’t view the IPAD earlier in the day
There is no reason (IMO) to believe that they didn’t. The question I have is , why did they choose this route? Was their a tactical reason for this?
Good one, Calvin!
And I have a hard time imagining they were carrying four gps units just to add weight to their packs.
A couple of more puzzle peace’s at this point.
If Marsh was ahead of them they had no choice but to follow.
The Pink tape–to denote a starting point several strips tied to a bush denoting drop off point. Ran almost out of tape dropped the end of the roll and proceeded down the canyon marking the trail with a new roll. Other than just accidently dropping a roll.
Maybe Marsh did look at GPS and decided it was faster in a strait line than the trail around the ridge.
The only tactical reason it looked faster. Once in the brush finding all those openings seen from above became more difficult and slowed progress.
If marsh was behind them then they had a choice at the saddle.
If Marsh was in front he had already committed and they had no choice even if they didn’t like it.
Again puzzle pieces that fit or don’t fit the story.
Reply to Bob Powers post on August 16, 2014 at 7:57 am
>> Bob Powers said…
>> If Marsh was ahead of them they had no choice but to follow.
Nonsense.
They were grown men with brains and as much as this WFF business likes to PRETEND it is ‘the military’… it is NOT.
It’s just a job ( and not a high paying one, either ).
They ALWAYS ‘had a choice’.
At 10 bucks an hour… there is no requirement to do ANYTHING
dangerous… much less insane.
>> Bob Powers also said…
>> If Marsh was in front he had already committed and they
>> had no choice even if they didn’t like it.
Again… sheer nonsense.
Matter of fact… if what you say is true… then it was now Marsh himself who had ‘dropped down’ before the men reached the ‘saddle’ and it was now ONLY Marsh who was BLIND ‘down there’ as to what was happening
with the fire. ONLY Marsh was now ‘cut off’ from a ‘view of the fire’.
Take another look at that panorama I just uploaded the other day.
What you are saying now is that it is Marsh who would have been down there in that box canyon already when the men arrived at the saddle and had that same ‘panorama’ view I posted at this video location…
http://youtu.be/n9lFwGSKOww
It would NOW have been THEIR ‘responsibility’ to play ‘lookout’ for Marsh and report anything THEY could now see down to HIM.
Marsh was now the one who had gone ahead and put HIMSELF in a very bad spot ‘down there’ if he was, in fact, that far AHEAD of them.
That is what makes the timing all so critical here.
I think the other ‘assumption’ that people have had for a long time now is that ALL of the men somehow lost ‘eyes on the fire’ the moment they decided to leave the safe black.
That has NEVER been the case… and the new ‘panorama’ from the spot where Sonny says he found the tape proves it.
Whether it was Marsh arriving at the saddle BEFORE the men and then descending into the box canyon on his own… OR whether it was Steed deciding to take the men down there himself and Marsh was still ‘catching up from behind’….
WHOEVER got to that saddle LAST had a responsibility to really look into the distance and make an evaluation and then WARN whoever had gone down in the canyon about it… IF there was anything looking ‘not good’ from that saddle at that point.
If there was still ‘all green lights’ even when that LAST person to reach the saddle ‘looked out at the fire’… and nobody thinks they say anything to ‘worry about’ even while standing THERE… then the TIMING had to be within a VERY critical ‘window’ or absolutely nothing about that descent into the box canyon makes any sense at all.
There’s no sound tactical reason to make that decision.
Speed likely would have been the stated reason, though again it should be very troubling, even leaving the terrain trap aspect of their choice out of things, to think they though making that choice was faster than other options. Or even that they thought that choice would give them any margin of safety in terms of time.
I think you need to look at past experiences to have a context where you can see this look like an ok risk to take, not on the grounds of analysis, but because nothing bad had happened in past experience.
SR you are correct
Margin of safety? They already abandoned that when they left the black with no LCES.
Again a puzzle piece–Unless Marsh was down near the ranch where he had eyes on the fire for the crew.
We still don’t know if they had their safety LCES covered when they headed for the ranch. No current proof they did. but some interesting hints at what was going on.
The ‘panorama’ that I posted 48 hours ago which shows the EXACT ‘view’ that they would have had right there where that ‘pink flagging / tape’ was found actually shows they had a much BETTER view of ALL of the terrain ‘out there’ than I believe was previously thought.
It really doesn’t look like ( for all intents and purposes ) that anyone could honestly say they NEEDED a ‘lookout’ for at least that entire hike from the anchor point to this saddle point above the box canyon.
For the 15-20 minutes that they were hiking to that location… they really had a BETTER view of the fire than anyone there that day… except for the guys in the airplanes.
Also… the recently discovered IMG_1334 and IMG_1335 taken at 4:30 PM also proves that ‘smoke’ would NOT have been a problem with their ‘visibility’ from that western side of the fire all the way to at least 4:30 PM. The smoke column had NOT ‘laid down’ yet… and the photographs show they SHOULD have had a clear view of the actual fireline ‘flames’ for the entire time they were hiking south to that saddle above the box canyon.
So it really does appear the the ‘L’ of ‘LCES’ wasn’t really being ‘violated’ at all for at least that ‘first’ part of the mission while they hiked south on that two-track. They were ALL their ‘own’ LOOKOUTS. There was no place they could have even ‘placed’ a lookout prior to that two-track hike where that person could have possibly had a ‘better view of the fire’ than they, themselves, did as they were hiking south.
As many have said many times… this is just more proof that the CRUCIAL decision ( the life or death one ) was when they decided to LEAVE that two-track and THAT is when they really needed a ‘Lookout’ but didn’t bother to establish one.
That panorama taken at the ‘Descent Point’ is here…
Video Title: Descent-Point-Panorama-1
http://youtu.be/n9lFwGSKOww
Caveat for above: As the panorama show… that pile of boulders there in front of them WAS ‘blocking some of their view’ of the floor of the middle bowl at that point… but just 1 or 2 minutes before that, as they were approaching the saddle on the two-track… they would still have had an absolutely CLEAR view of what was ‘out there’ in front of that northern ridge of the box canyon.
In the 4:15 and 4:20 PM timeframe ( which is when the SAIR says they actually ARRIVED at this poinit shown in the panorama ) the SAIR published ‘fire progression’ charts show that the actual fireline was already ‘creeping over’ those two ‘mounds’ out there to the left that ( for lack of better names ) we have always been calling ‘Big Round Top’ and ‘Little Round Top’.
As the panorama shows… even standing exactly where the ‘pink flagging / tape’ was found… there was still a CLEAR VIEW of BOTH of these ‘mounds’ out there and if the fireline was actually ‘cresting’ those mounds in the 4:15 to 4:20 timeframe… they definitely SHOULD have been able to see that.
Reply to calvin post on August 16, 2014 at 4:06 am
>> calvin wrote…
>>
>> Concerning the supposed Argument that may have taken place at the
>> saddle, just before dropping into the DV.
>>
>> As WTK has pointed out many times. Any of the GMIHC crew who were just
>> standing by during this time (30 seconds?), could have pulled up Google
>> earth and looked at the route that would have taken them to the BSR.
>> Even if they didn’t view the IPAD earlier in the day
I believe since the very DAY the SAIR report came out ( September 28, 2013 ) and I have ‘tested’ how fast I could call up that area on my smartphone in Google maps and actually SEE that full two-track heading all the way to the ranch it has NEVER taken me more than 20 seconds to do that simple thing.
>> calvin also said…
>> There is no reason (IMO) to believe that they didn’t.
No… there isn’t… but the astounding thing to me is to think that they would have even waited until REACHING the damn saddle before it would have occurred to anyone out there to just check with Google maps.
They could have also easily done that during the 15-20 minutes there were ‘hiking’ to that location… if they had any doubts at all about where they were going.
That’s not ‘play time’. That’s ‘work related’. No reason not to alllow that WHILE you are hiking along if it’s going to help everyone out.
There were at least SIX ‘smartphones’ in that group out there… with GOOD network signal and connection… and all of them with Browsers and Google Maps.
WTK, In that same distance, as they were hiking to the saddle, Wade Parker could have quickly texted out his picture to his mother.
Honestly, it seems to me that GM left the area just after Parker and others took their photos/ videos.
Is their any other evidence that puts them sitting for another 10 minutes, as the SAIR claims?
Reply to calvin post on August 17, 2014 at 3:44 pm
>> calvin said…
>> WTK, In that same distance, as they were hiking to the saddle, Wade
>> Parker could have quickly texted out his picture to his mother.
Yes… and if anyone tries to say that is ‘hard to do’ I think I will scream.
ANYONE could have done that ( walk and send a text at the same time ).
The one ( very thin? ) ‘assumption’ that is remaining there is that because of the (supposed?) ‘rule’ that you’re not SUPPOSED to be fiddling with your ‘phone toys’ unless you are ‘at rest’… that Wade Parker simply would NOT have been doing that just because he wasn’t SUPPOSED to. Hence… the ‘assumption’ that he must have texted it just before they STARTED actually ‘moving’ and that means they didn’t ( start moving ) until just after 4:04 PM.
>> calvin also said
>> Honestly, it seems to me that GM left the area just after Parker
>> and others took their photos/ videos.
If you look at those men ‘at rest’ and ‘playing tourist’ with all their cameras and videos… there is one thing you can be sure of. When the decision to ‘move’ was finally agreed to between Marsh and Steed ( over the radio )… it happened QUICKLY and the order to ‘Gaggle up’ came almost immediately after it… possibly with even a good hefty “And I mean RIGHT NOW” from Steed if Jesse already realized that TIME was now their enemy for this ‘mission’ he had just agreed to.
But even with an “on the double” command or some sense of URGENCY coming from Steed… it still would have taken a finite amount of TIME for them to comply with the order. They had to ‘hop up’., stow things, then get OUT of those rocks and back to the two-track which was still maybe a couple hundred feet away from there. Then they would have had to reassemble on the two-track and get all ‘lined up’ before any ‘move out’ command was given. That all takes time.
Could all that have taken up to NINE minutes and account for that ‘gap’ between when we know the picture taking abruptly ended ( 1555 ) and when Parker actually texted his photo to his mom ( 1604 )?
I don’t know. Maybe. Maybe not.
If Marsh was still north of them ( not proven but could be assumed ) then maybe Steed really was just ‘giving it a few minutes’ to see if Marsh could ‘catch up’. Maybe after those ‘few minutes’ he realized Marsh was farther north than he thought, and that “time’s a ‘wastin” and gave up ‘waiting’ for Marsh and the ‘move out’ then went ahead at 4:04 PM.
>> Is their any other evidence that puts them sitting for another
>> 10 minutes, as the SAIR claims?
No. The Wade Parker ‘textout time’ has been CRUCIAL in setting any kind of time estimate for when they left that anchor point and for all the other time estimates in-between like when they *might* have actually arrived at the saddle above the box canyon. The SAIR was also ( mistakenly ) assuming all along that 4:04 PM is when Parker actually TOOK the photo and that he then somehow magically was able to type a text and get it sent to his mother with no additional seconds added to the 4:04 timestamp.
Those assumptions were always WRONG on their part.
The ONLY ‘irrefutable’ evidence as to when they were still NOT YET hiking south is that abrupt end to that ‘picture taking session’ at 1555.
The ONLY ‘irrefutable’ proof that they were then in the vicinity of the deployment site is the 1639 MAYDAY call from Steed and you can hear those chainsaws already running right next to him.
EVERYTHING ELSE in-between those points ( including exactly where Parker was when his text message hit the network at 4:04 PM ) still involves a fair amount of ‘guesswork’.
Followup…
Before anyone even tries to say I’m making some kind of ‘case’ that there WAS a ‘blackout’ of any kind between 1555 ( 3:55 PM ) and 1639 ( 4:39 PM )… there is no way.
There were PLENTY of ‘radio communications’ with Granite Mountain between these 1555 and 1639 ‘points’..
But NONE of those radio exchanges provide any real PROOF of anyone’s exact LOCATION during those 44 minutes.
If even just Robert Caldwell’s Oregon 450 handheld GPS unit that was attached to his front pack strap EVER surfaces… and there is, in fact, any valid data on it from that day… that would certainly answer a lot of questions about where HE was for those 44 minutes, anyway.
**
** HELICOPTER WASH – REDUX
I thought I had ‘replied’ to the following post from Marti back on July 17 but I just now discovered my original response never appeared.
I didn’t want Marti to think this got ‘missed’ so here is a ‘resurrection’ of Marti’s post and the comments that I thought had already appeared.
It has some testimony included from Russ Shumate’s own ‘Unit Logs’ that says the infamous EAST pocket ‘flare-up’ on Saturday happened WHILE they were landing a helicopter up on the ridge and near the fire that everyone thought was pretty much ‘dead’.
>> On July 17, 2014 at 6:06 pm, Marti Reed said…
>>
>> Something I came across during my wanderings around that I’m still thinking about
>>.
>> I came across a really interesting and totally relevant June 2003 article on
>> FireEngineering.com titled “Wildland Safety: What is Really Killing Us?” by
>> Michael S. Terwilliger. Unfortunately, the only way to access this article is via
>> Google. Otherwise you have to log in to FireEngineering.com in order to read it.
>>
>> The way to get to this article via Google is to Google “fire engineering” “what is
>> really killing us” and click on the first link that appears. .
>>
>> After writing extremely relevant point after extremely relevant point after extremely
>> relevant point about stuff a firefighter/crew has to pay attention to in order to stay
>> alive, the writer describes the danger of wind backwash from helicopters and
>> air tankers. He writes:
>>
>> ” Some suppression tools, such as helicopters and air tankers, can adversely
>> affect fire behavior. The blasts of air from low-flying helicopters and air tankers
>> have been known to cause flareups. The cushion of air a helicopter rides on from
>> the rotors is surprisingly strong; when it strikes the ground, it can generate wind
>> speeds in excess of 100 miles per hour. The wind vortices developed off the wings
>> of a low-flying aircraft can surface as well and enhance a wildfire. If you are working
>> around aircraft, keep an eye on them at all times.”
>>
>> …During the summer of 1996, I was assigned as the Operations Section chief
>> at the Coleville Fire on U.S. Route 395 south of Reno. It was located on the eastern
>> escarpment of the Sierra. An air tanker was directed to drop from the top of the
>> escarpment, downslope and east, on a piece of hot line in light fuels. A hand
>> crew was working upslope putting in direct line. The drop was too low and too
>> aggressive. The drop missed the target because of the falling-away slope, but the
>> wind from the wings did not. The fire made a sudden push down-slope and forced
>> the firefighters to take refuge in the burn. It was a momentary flareup, but it had
>> the magnitude and intensity to cause harm if you were in the way.
>>
>> …In simpler terms, any firefighter can watch a canyon explode into flame
>> and marvel at the power. A professional will tell you prior to its happening
>> and, if the situation allows, suggest you get your camera ready because
>> ‘the big dawg is gonna eat.’”
>>
>> We have talked here about possible backfires having accelerated the fire
>> up into the canyon Granite Mountain walked down into. And we’ve mostly
>> agreed there’s no evidence so far of that.
>>
>> We have talked here about spot fires that might have advanced the fire faster
>> than maybe Granite Mountain expected.
>>
>> When I read this article, I really stopped. And I’m still stopping and thinking
>> about what he is saying.
>>
>> There was a tanker retardant drop in the “big bowl” at 4:33 pm. I still don’t
>> know exactly the path of that. I think WTKTT has said it was south to north.
>>
>> I find myself wondering if maybe two planes, lead and tanker, flying low enough
>> to do that otherwise successful drop, might have fanned the flames under them
>> enough to have radically accelerated the fire that was, admittedly, already
>> headed to the mouth of the bowl, in such a way that it turned and blew that
>> fire into the bowl much more quickly than Granite Mountain, not knowing
>> about or anticipating that drop, would have anticipated as they decided
>> to/headed into that bowl, thinking the fire was paralleling them.
>>
>> I agree that the decision to head into that bowl without a designated lookout
>> was essentially suicidal, all things considered.
>>
>> But given all our (and others’) wonderings about what might have “pushed” that
>> fire into that canyon faster than Granite Mountain would have anticipated, I’m
>> wondering if what Michael S. Terwilliger is saying can be extremely dangerous
>> may have played a part in what happened.
Marti…
As far as Sunday goes… it’s hard to imagine that the few ‘drops’ that were taking place on the south side of the fire in that last-ditch ‘drop at will’ effort to keep the fire out of Yarnell could have contributed all that much to what was ALREADY happening ‘out there’ in that ‘middle bowl’…
…but it is actually HIGHLY likely what you are talking about here may have ‘played a part in what happened’ on SATURDAY.
And here is WHY…
In those extended ‘Unit Logs’ that SAIT didn’t bother to release until February 27, 2014… we saw ( for the first time ) Russ Shumate’s own detailed ‘Unit Log’ that was submitted to the SAIT.
In those logs… Shumate pretty much details a lot of what we already knew. The fire was practically nothing at all on Saturday morning when the the first helicopter recon was done.
There are PUBLIC photos to support this ( BLM Dean Fernandez folder, etc. ).
The fire even ‘looked’ like it had ‘burned itself out’ overnight.
No flames, not even any smoke to speak of.
Only half of the Lewis DOC crew was ‘choppered out’ to the helispot.around 10:30 AM and their assignment was officially classified as ‘mop up’… and that’s exactly what they were doing ( with supposedly great success ) for the next FIVE+ HOURS. Shumate wanted them DONE and OFF THE RIDGE by 1600 ( 4:00 PM ) because of his (possible) late-afternoon thunder-cell lightning concerns.
Everything appeared to be going fine for those FIVE+ hours with just the resources Shumate had sent up there that morning. So fine that Shumate started releasing engines and other resources back to their ‘home bases’ later in the afternoon.
Even later in the afternoon around 3:00 PM the Lewis DOC crew even reported to Shumate that things were STILL ‘going well’ and that they were still ‘on track’ for the 4:00 PM ‘end of shift’ and ‘dust off’.
Then something happened…
…but it was NOT the now infamous ‘slop-over’ on the EAST side.
Not yet.
Shumate reports that the Lewis crew then called and said the fire was starting to ‘flare up’ a little on the VERY steep WEST side of the fire… down in what are almost ‘cliffs’ there to the WEST of what is now known as the ‘anchor point’.
Russ Shumate says he reacted to THIS reported ‘increase in fire activity on the WEST side’ ( not the EAST side… not yet ) with a decision to fly some supplies and the REST of the Lewis DOC crew out there.
So he proceeded to do that.
So here is the bombshell Shumate drops in his ‘Unit Logs’…
Shumate says that the OTHER ‘flare up’ in the ‘unburned pocket of fuel’ on the EAST side of the fire and right near the helispot happened DURING THIS HELICOPTER OPERATION.
In other words… a fire that had been just in ‘mop up’ mode for FIVE+ HOURS that day suddenly ‘flares up’ in an unburned pocket on the EAST side… near the helispot… and Shumate now says that happened WHILE they were delivering the supplies and the other half of the Lewis Crew out there to the helispot via helicopter.
The WEST side ‘flare up’ ( in the steep rocks ), which is the reason Shumate sent the chopper out there at that time, just petered out on its own but NOW the problem was this OTHER ‘flare up’ on the EAST side that happened WHILE the chopper was delivering the other half of the Lewis Crew.
This EAST side ‘flare up’ went on to become the ‘second Yarnell Hill fire’ and the one that everyone was fighting the rest of Saturday night and on into that tragic Sunday.
So could it really be that simple?
The attempted chopper delivery of the rest of the Lewis crew to help with the WEST side flare-up is what actually caused the EAST side flare-up?
Everything was ‘quiet’ up there on the EAST side near the two-track and near the helispot for up to FIVE+HOURS on Saturday… but ‘all of a sudden’ Shumate sends a chopper up there and ‘all of a sudden’ the EAST flank is ‘flaring up’ right there near the helispot WHILE the chopper is delivering men to it.
What’s (possibly) even MORE important is that Shumate seems to say that as soon as this ‘flare up’ happened… the Lewis Crew that was on the ground already ‘moved to address it’… but now Shumate has the helicopter trying to drop bladder bags ‘right where they were working’.
So there is the Lewis crew trying to ‘catch the slopover’ and Shumate has a helicopter ( and its powerful rotor wash ) hovering right OVER them AND the ‘slopover’ and the helicopter was ‘setting down bladder bags’ right there near them ( and the fire )… like a gigantic FAN hovering RIGHT over the very ‘slop-over’ they were trying to ‘catch’.
To top it all off… Shumate says that the SW winds didn’t even increase that afternoon until AFTER all this had already happened. Shumate attributes the fire ‘jumping the road’ to this increase in the SW winds but also seems to make it clear that that wasn’t what caused the ‘flare up’ in ‘unburned island’ near the helispot in the first place. That happened BEFORE he notes the ‘increase in SW winds’ in his logs.
THAT event ( the actual flare up of the EAST side unburned pocket ) might very likely have been caused by the actual ‘rotor wash’ from the chopper operation that preceded the ‘wind shift’.
Here is the KEY entry from Shumate’s Unit Logs for Saturday, June 29, 2013 where Shumate says the EAST pocket ‘flare up’ happened DURING the helicopter operation and BEFORE the actual SW wind shift…
———————————————————————————-
1530-1630 Lewis crew started to report creeping fire on the WEST side of the fire in the rocks
on the steep slope. I determined that more folks were needed on the hill, and thunderstorm
buildup was not moving our way. The altitude density was going to affect how many folks per
load however. I directed a sling load of bladder bags be sent up, and half the helitack crew
shuttle up. DURING this operation a green island on the EAST side of the fire started to flare up.
The Lewis crew moved to address this and the bladder bags were set down near them. SW
winds increased at this point and the flare up spotted over the road. 7 helitack were delivered
to the helispot, 6 hiked to the fire, one remained at the helispot for helitack duties.
———————————————————————————–
Followup…
Joy Collura has already reported MANY times that what she saw with her own eyes on Sunday out on that ridge was that every time this yellow/white N14HX BLM chopper got anywhere NEAR that ‘helispot’ out on that ridge… the rotor wash was causing an obvious INCREASE in the flame activity… even in places that were ‘down the slope’ from the helispot.
That was on Sunday… and the fire had already burned ‘away’ from that ‘helispot’.
On Saturday… the fire ( or what was left of it ) was even still smoldering much CLOSER to the helispot.
So if Joy was seeing that kind of obvious ‘fanning of the flames’ on Sunday every time that chopper got near that helispot there is no reason to think that the same thing wasn’t also happening on Saturday… at critical times.
Thank you WTKTT for this and your additional comment. I’m still pondering what you wrote about Saturday. In light of what I have written previously that IMHO (give 20/20 hindsight) once it was decided to fight this fire, it should have been done decisively on Saturday, all things considered.
(I personally am not all that upset that it wasn’t fought Friday night. I think there were too many safety considerations in play to have warranted authorizing that).
I’m still not sure about the spacial relationship of things you (via Shumate) are documenting. It is somewhat surprising to me how strongly the actions of the helicopter over the helispot located on the west side of a ridge could have so strongly influenced the flare-up of a fire on the east side over that ridge and downslope of it. Maybe I’m just over-estimating the distance.
But then, I’ve consistently over-estimated the time it took to get from point A to point B on this fire.
Maybe some of that influence could have included the act of flying over the flare-up while heading to the helispot?
Details Details Details
Still, now that you’ve responded to this. I was originally hoping you might have been able–(via some things you wrote regarding this in the complicated conversations regarding the fact that it couldn’t have been that Marsh responded to this flight saying “that’s where we want it”)–to plot the flight pattern of this flight. Something you wrote (and I’m writing this out of my head so I could be wrong) gave me the impression you had figured this out.
Do you know where it was?
Thanks mucho.
And by “this flight” I mean the 4:33 one on Sunday.
There is only one picture of that N14HX BLM chopper actually ‘landed’ out there at the ‘helispot’… and it was taken Saturday morning when one of the DOC Lewis crew members had just exited the chopper and then ‘turned around’ to snap a shot of others exiting N14HX.
It’s actually a VIDEO shot by that Lewis Crew member and it is here
in the “AZFS Photos” folder in the SAIT FOIA / FOIL release…
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/02ue6bnjp6nazkm/AACsLm8p8B-wc-JzgAgGrUNta/Photos%20and%20Video/AZFS%20photos%20videos#lh:null-USB%20YARNELL%20HILL%20003.avi
It shows that the ‘preferred approach vector’ for that chopper pilot actually landing at the helspot appears to have been from the WEST ( for FINAL approach, anyway ).
Also… notice that this is a ‘HOT UNLOAD’ at the helispot. The chopper never turns its engine off. I am sure that was the case ANY time that chopper was out there. It probably never was ‘on the ground’ at that helispot long enough for ‘engines off’ and everything that happened out there on that ridge point was a ‘HOT LOAD’ or a ‘HOT UNLOAD’.
With regards to trying to drop the bladder bags right where the Lewis Crew was trying to catch the slopover… we can see from Joy Collura’s photos that the ‘drop line’ N14HX had was a ‘short haul’ configuration and that means that in order to ‘drop’ anything directly on the ground you have to get VERY close to the ground.
Even if the that chopper delivery to the helispot was NOT the actual cause of the ‘flare-up’ of that ‘unburned pocket of fuel’ near the helispot… this other documented ‘operation’ with N14HX trying to strategically drop bladder bags right where a crew was fighting an active flame fromt was probably major NOT GOOD. Even if the chopper didn’t actually cause the ‘flare-up’…. hovering over the slop-over like that for any amount of time might have been what pushed it ‘down the slope’ and into even MORE ‘unburned fuel’ and the fire then became the ‘fire they couldn’t catch’ on Saturday and on into Saturday evening.
It’s possible. People who REALLY ‘study’ this sort of thing ( like the people you mention in your post above ) probably really need to take a hard look at this.
It might be a ‘classic bad’ situation and lead to very important ‘Lessons Learned’.
With regards to the actual ‘flight path’ for the 4:33 ( Sunday ) drop… I don’t have any kind of detailed ‘flight path’ information like GPS coordinates or anything.
I really still don’t know anything other than what is clearly stated in the Panebaker Air-To-Air channel captures around that time.
If you listen closely… French and the pilot work out EXACTLY what the ‘flight path’ should be for the drop and they use exact ‘heading information’ for both the entrance and the exit phases of the drop.
Just keep in mind when listening that there is no ZERO DEGREE ‘heading’ in aviation. When someone is flying DUE NORTH they will refer to their ‘heading’ as ‘three six zero’ ( 360 ) degrees.
I also went and carefully looked at a lot of ‘post fire’ images in the hopes there would be a clear ‘retardant line’ on the ground right where this 4:30 drop was made… but this was a SEAT and it didn’t drop all that much retardant. I don’t see anything obvious right there ( on a north to south line ) on the outskirts of Yarnell where THIS 4:30 drop we hear happening in Panebaker audio supposedly took place.
So EXACT location of this SEAT drop circa 4:30 on Sunday is still unknown.
Followup…
The recently discovered photos IMG_1334 and IMG_1335 taken at exactly 4:30 PM just a few hundred feet north of the Ranch House Restaurant are also obviously now ‘related’ to this 4:33 PM SEAT drop.
Those photos now prove that the smoke cloud had NOT ‘laid down’ yet in the 4:30 timeframe and basically anyone at the Ranch House Restuarant ‘safety zone’ could have easily SEEN this SEAT drop and been the one to hop on the A2G channel and been saying “That’s exacty right! That’s exactly what we want” as has been attributed to Eric Marsh.
If either of those photos had been taken just 90 seconds later than they were… we might even actually be SEEING that SEAT drop right out there between where the fireline was at 4:30 PM and the ‘edge of town’.
It ( the 4:30 PM SEAT drop ) was right out there somewhere in that ‘edge’ between the flames visible in those photos and the structures in front of it.
Followup to the followup.
Typos above.
IMG_1334 and IMG_1335 were taken just 14 seconds apart in the 4:30 PM timeframe.
The SEAT drop was 180 seconds later ( in roughly the same location out there near the fireline shown in those photos ) at 4:33 PM.
Reply to Bob Powers post on August 14, 2014 at 8:55 pm
>> Bob Powers said…
>>
>> WTKTT—-Probably a dumb question and you are in the know.
>> Can you go back and check what Dudley said?
>> I did not remember him specifically saying the argument was at the saddle.
>> but something about the fact that— he hoped some of the crew questioned
>> going down into the canyon when that decision was made.
>> That there was an argument but not what it was about.
>> Just to clarify it for me. Not sure where to find it again but I did
>> listen to all of it. Thanks
Mike Dudley’s exact words to the Utah firefighters regarding the ‘argument at the SADDLE’…
————————————————————
+1:04:46
Mike Dudley: There’s some allegations that there was an argument between the Captain and the Superintendent about which way to go… from that saddle.. Some people made that allegation. We can’t validate that.
————————————————————
Also… here are Mike Dudley’s exact words to the Utah firefighters about Dudley being sure that at least SOME of the GM crew MUST have had second thoughts about the ‘decision’ to drop into that canyon. Oddly enough… Dudley added that ‘thought’ of his own to his speech just after the got done praising them for ‘sticking together’ ( Darrell Willis style ) and also criticizing what he calls ‘rabbits’….
NOTE; This is just a reprint from down below from a response to one of SR’s posts…
>> Reply to SR post on August 6, 2014 at 3:01 pm
>>
>> SR said…
>>
>> Dudley was very critical of people who physically separate in
>> those conditions, even though there is a formal “book right”
>> that they can do so. Dudley approved of and admired the
>> fact that no one chose to try to think for themselves.
Dudley called them ( with a derisive tone ) “rabbits’.
Oddly enough… Dudley then does his ‘praising’ of ‘how they all stayed together’ just immediately BEFORE he stops and then tells the roomful of Utah firefighters that he believes SOME of the crew MUST have known that this whole trek through that canyon ‘wasn’t a good idea’.
Here is that exact ( contiguous ) sequence from Dudley’s speech to that gathering of Utah firefighters on June 20, 2014…
—————————————————————-
Mike Dudley: Ya know… probly the most telling thing for me… from my point of view of looking at this… was… ya know every crew has one.. what I call one or two ‘rabbits’… ya know.. speed machines that at time a stress… they’re gonna BOOK.
( Pause )
They deployed in an area smaller than where you guys are sitting.
They deployed as a unit.
They deployed together.
Not one person broke ranks.
They did exactly how they were trained.
That tells me extreme cohesive training and process.
They never abandoned one another is the best way of putting it.
Ahm… I found that fascinating because I’ve never seen other shelter deployments that people aren’t
spread out and you have one or two people that always try to make a… make it for themselves.
They stayed together throughout the whole point.
So… on the other hand… there’s a part of me that HAS to wonder… as they stood there on that saddle and they started droppin’ down the slope… I would like to think a few members of the crew had that little gnawing ‘pit’ in their stomach sayin’… “Is this a good idea?”.
But… would any one of ‘em have spoken up and argued against the superintendent… or the acting? I don’t know.
———————————————————————
Thanks–” we cant validate that”, The argument at the saddle or The argument or even there or some where else. was the way it hit me. My interpolation or Dudley’s vagueness missed my connection. Thanks again……….
WTKTT I might also note Dudley was a USFS employee
I believe his talk was to more than Utah I think it included R4 Hot Shot Supt. and Forest FMO’s and Type 1 IC’s from Idaho Utah and Nevada.
Will do some checking on that with the local HS Supt.
That speech / presentation SAIT Co-Lead Mike Dudley gave on June 20, 2014 was actually in front of a group known as the UUFA ( Utah Unified Fire Authority ).
Their website is here…
https://www.unifiedfire.org/
They even have their own ‘Wikipedia’ page which says…
————————————————————————-
The UFA is the largest fire department in the state of Utah.
The Unified Fire Authority is the agency that provides fire protection, emergency medical services, and other emergency responses for the unincorporated Salt Lake County, Utah, and for 8 cities located within the Salt Lake Metropolitan Area. As of January 2013, the UFA provides services to the following cities: Alta, Draper, Herriman, Holladay, Riverton, and Taylorsville.
In 2011-2013, the department expanded with the inclusion of Midvale[1] and the Utah County community of Eagle Mountain.[2]
The operating budget for the 2012-2013 fiscal year is about $61 million, and the department headquarters is located at 3380 South 900 West, Salt Lake city.
————————————————————————-
In his ‘opening remarks’… Mike Dudley also gave a REASON why he was there talking to the UUFA. He says it was because he had just done the SAME speech / presentation for the FFSL Utah and someone named Tracy Dunford ( Fire Manager for the State of Utah ) asked him to give the same speech / presentation to the Utah UUFA…. so he did.
Here are Dudley’s entire ‘opening remarks’ to the UUFA right up to the point where he explains that he just did the same ‘speech / presentation’ for the FFSL as well…
—————————————————————————–
( Mike Dudley is introduced and takes the stage ).
Mike Dudley: Mornin’
Entire room: Mornin’.
Mike Dudley: Okay… I can tell the Wildland Division.
And… question… for the Wildland division… who here is also cross-trained in structural program?
( A number of people raise their hands ).
Okay… there’s a few of you. So… what I’m gonna do… There’s a question… there’s a reason I bring that up. So… I’m gonna assume most of you have not seen the briefing video that was associated with Yarnell. Has anyone seen it?
( More hands go up in the audience ).
Allright… so there’s a few.
And… who here has worked in the past with Granite Mountain?
( Some hands go up in the audience ).
Yea… there’s always some folks there because… uh… Hotshot crew.
So… the reason for asking about the structural protection… there’s been some allegations made in the past… and you still see it pop up every once and a while in the press about Granite Mountain.
So… Granite Mountain was a City Crew… Prescott Fire Department… Prescott Fire Department has a Wildland Division… real similar to the structure set up here under Unified Fire Authority.
Um… there was some implications that Granite Mountain was influenced because of their association with Prescott City to take on more risk when structures were burning within the Yarnell area.
The reason I bring that up is… keep in mind the structure.
You had Granite Mountain IHC under Prescott Fire Department sponsored by Arizona Division of Forestry to meet NWCG Interagency guidelines to be certified as a full IHC Hotshot crew.
The reason that’s important is that people do want to make that allegation… ‘well.. they were influenced by the structural side’.
No member of the Granite Mountain Hotshots, including Eric Marsh, who was the Superintendent and Jesse Steed, his Captain, were cross-trained in structural.
None of them cross-worked on the structural program during the off season.
What they were was a pure wildland firefighting organization… and for all the talk about Yarnell… Yarnell was a wildland fire incident… they were a wildland fire crew working on that incident.
And I say that up front because we… we did our check and we did our cross referencing… you don’t see any allegations that they were unduly influenced simply because they were part of that… uh… City department.
On the other hand… ah… they were a pretty proud organization of being that Wildland Division within the Prescott’s… uh… Fire Department. That… don’t take that away. That… that’s something.
Also what I’m gonna do is… I’m gonna go through the briefing video and then I’ll show some key points during the fire itself but this is totally open to questions.
Ah… as a matter of fact… more of that is more dialog than there is anything else so… don’t… don’t hesitate to ask questions and we can go as long… the reason I’m here is that
I did this for… uh… FFSL… state of Utah… and Tracy Dunford, the fire manager for the state of Utah asked me to come and present to his fire wardens… and it always takes one or two questions and pretty soon things start flowing along and we can get into the meat of what took place.
————————————————————————–
It’s also an ‘odd’ phrasing Dudley chose to use when decribing his wish/hope that at least SOME of the crew realized the drop into the canyon wasn’t a ‘good idea’.
Dudley says….
“I would LIKE to think”
That means at the same moment he seems to be PRAISING them for their ‘cohesive training’ and ‘staying together’ and ‘no one ran’… he ALSO seems to not relish the thought that the price for that kind of ‘cohesiveness’ is that you get a bunch of no-think lemmings who will all go along with anything and never even entertain the ‘thought’ that their supervisors can make mistakes.
Reply to Bob Powers post on August 15, 2014 at 7:34 am
>> Bob Powers said…
>>
>> Thanks–” we cant validate that”, The argument at the saddle or
>> The argument or even there or some where else. was the way it hit me.
>> My interpolation or Dudley’s vagueness missed my connection.
Mr. Powers… I don’t think Dudley was being ‘vague’ at all here.
You have to remember this a transcript of a speech / presentation.
There is ‘context’ involved.
Dudley’s ‘presentation’ was well worked out and after the room was showed the entire video that the SAIT showed the family members on September 28 ( the one with the woman with the sugar-sweet voice as narrator )… then Dudley did a ‘walk thru’ of the SEQUENTIAL events from start-of-workday and then on-through to eventual deployment.
At the point in his speech / presentation when Dudley suddenly ‘slips in’ this ‘bomb’ about people ( more than one ) hearing an ‘argument’ between Marsh and Steed… Dudley had already reached the point in his presentation when he was talking about the DESCENT from the ‘Saddle’ above the box canyon and the eventual DEPLOYMENT.
So Dudley is NOT ‘jumping back in time’ in his presentation to 10 minutes before that when he was talking about the decision to leave the ‘safe black’ or the ‘disussing their options’ conversation(s) pre-hike.
He is NOW, at THIS point in his ‘speech’, ONLY talking about the decision about ‘which way to go’ from the Saddle above the box canyon… and THAT is the ‘context’ regarding him suddenly stopping and ‘inserting’ this ‘news flash’ about a possible ‘argument’ between Marsh and Steed about ‘which way to go’ ( from THAT saddle ).
WTKTT— Have no proof here but I believe if there was a Argument at the saddle. Would there possibly be a more serious argument to get the crew and Steed to leave the black. Was it copied in the video and never released.
Some body had to pry them out of the black. More than just a discussion to move. With the argument at the saddle it seems some one was already pissed off (Steed).
Good point(s). There most certainly MAY have been ‘heated discussions’ in BOTH places.
Brendan McDonough probably knows.
My gut feeling?… the decision to ‘leave the black’ was pretty much the same ‘tone’ we can actually hear in MacKenzie’s videos. Steed sounded tired. Marsh might have had to ‘sell’ the idea to him but from THAT anchor point, at THAT time… Steed might have just had a ‘what the heck’ attitude. He might not have LIKED the idea but couldn’t work up the muster to go toe to toe with Marsh at that juncture.
Something tells me that when Marsh DID start to ask you about your ‘comfort level’ and he was beginning to try to ‘convince’ you to do what HE wanted… then he was a ‘force of nature’ to deal with. Marty Cole himself recalls Marsh’s ‘hardheadedness’ and that he would even turn a discussion about T-Shirts into a full blown argument if he wasn’t ‘getting what he wanted’.
So Steed probably agreed to Marsh’s ‘idea’ to even go on the ‘mission’ itself with a sort of “Ok… whatever… I’m too tired to argue with you’ approach… but Marsh’s ‘sell job’ probably included some kind of suggestion that all Steed had to do was head south on that two-track with the men and that the path all the way to ‘the ranch’ was going to be perfectly obvious and a ‘no brainer’.
When it turned out that it WASN’T just a ‘no brainer’… and that the two-track only seemed to go on a one-way trip to Mexico… then THAT is when the shit may have hit the fan.
Again… that’s just my gut feeling on how it went down.
After all we have learned about Marsh.
Would Marsh have gone authoritative and totally ordered Steed and Crew to leave the black with out question and head to the BSR?
I have wondered for a year how a crew in a perfect safety zone would leave it with out a direct order from some one. Something happened at that break spot that made that happen. If your safe why move to some where else and put your crew at risk in the move. Why and who had that power.
Marsh
Willis
IC.
Abel
Others?
We need to start eliminating names by evidence and current info.
I do not believe Steed would have moved the crew on his own initiative.. As we have seen the crew was relaxed and there to stay in the safe black packs off not just a break spot. a hunker and wait spot.
Reply to Bob Powers post August 15, 2014 at 3:20 pm
>> Bob Powers said…
>>
>> After all we have learned about Marsh.
>> Would Marsh have gone authoritative and totally
>> ordered Steed and Crew to leave the black without
>> question and head to the BSR?
Personally… I don’t think so. No way.
The Eric Marsh of 2005 might have… but not the Eric Marsh 8 years older and who had been constantly been told for years since 2005 in his ‘evaluation’ that he needed to learn to BE NICE and ‘play well with others’.
Marsh was probably ( essentially ) the same 2005 personality that had been constantly YELLING at people when they weren’t performing to HIS satisfaction… but that behavior almost cost him his career and he had LEARNED to not be flying off the handle like that.
Steinbrink and Willis had ‘taught him well’.
The NEW ‘Eric Marsh’ would ‘negotiate’… not YELL.
We can hear the beginnings of this ‘negotiation’ with our own ears. Marsh was beginning to feel out Steed’s ‘comfort level’ in the MacKenzie video. Actually… that captured conversation was the SECOND time Marsh was coming back at Steed and asking about comfort level. Marsh himself says “That’s why I called you BEFORE and asked about your ‘comfort level’.
So we hear Marsh coming ‘back at’ Steed AGAIN and apparently ready to ‘push the argument’ for whatever idea he was trying to ‘sell’ to the obviously HOT and TIRED Jesse Steed.
I think the part that Mackenzie missed recording was the actual ‘sell job’ that Marsh was about to deliver to Jesse Steed.
So no… I don’t think Marsh ORDERED Steed to do anything… but I DO think the Eric Marsh that wouldn’t hesitate to ‘argue about T-Shirts’ was about to do a ‘sell job’ on Steed.
I’ll bet it was a good one, too… and Jesse ended up simply agreeing to the ‘proposal’.
>> Bob. Powers also said…
>>
>> I have wondered for a year how a crew in a perfect
>> safety zone would leave it with out a direct order
>> from some one.
Haven’t you ever been subjected to a ‘sell job’ from a line supervisor on a fire? Haven’t you known people that are experts at passive manipulation and ‘getting what they want’ and getting YOU to ‘agree’ with them?
I think you have.
>> Bob Powers also said…
>>
>> Something happened at that break spot that made
>> that happen.
Yes. My guess is that Eric Marsh was REALLY good at ‘selling his ideas’ to his subordinates after years of being taught how to do that by Steinbrink and Willis.
>> Bob Powers also said…
>>
>> If your safe why move to some where else and put
>> your crew at risk in the move.
I believe there has actually been a consensus that as far as ‘perceived risk’ goes… the situation at 3:55 and from the vantage point of that ridge could have been construed as not all that high… so perhaps Marsh was really ‘pushing’ and ‘selling’ his idea to poor Jesse Steed and Jesse was, at that time, finding it difficult to argue with him.
20 minutes later was a different story… but DURING that ‘discussing their options’ exchange I will bet Steed just basically ( reluctantly ) said… “OK… what the hell… if that two-track goes right to that ranch like you says it does then we’ll give it a shot… but we need to go RIGHT NOW”.
>> Bob Powers also said…
>>
>> I do not believe Steed would have moved the crew
>> on his own initiative..
Neither do I. I think Jesse was content to WAIT until the fire told them more about what their options were.
NONE of those fellas look like they were ready to JUMP UP and go on a 2 mile hike at that point in time.
>> Bob Powers also said.
>>
>> As we have seen the crew was relaxed and there
>> to stay in the safe black packs off not just a break
>> spot. a hunker and wait spot.
What we can SEE in the MacKenzie videos has all the appearances of men who were resigning themselves to just staying where they were for a while. It was END OF DAY and
WORK stop activity. Gloves coming off and getting ‘stowed’. Chaps coming off and getting put away…. etc. etc.
It was also ‘OK to be a Tourist’ time.
Time to just ‘watch the fire’ and ‘take a lot of pictures’.
But something happened.
Something changed.
I believe that ‘something’ is Marsh successfully ‘selling’ HIS idea to Jesse Steed… and he ( reluctantly ) agreed to ‘give it a shot’… but even Jesse then knew there was no time to lose and if they were going to attempt this ‘mission’ they better take off RIGHT NOW.
That would actually explain the very ABRUPT end to the picture taking. Suddenly… Steed put down his radio and said ‘Gaggle up, boys… RIGHT NOW’.
Keep in mind what has been brought up more than once previously. Leaving the black (while we all agree they should have stayed there), was not the dangerous, irreversible decision, that descending into the bowl was.
They were able to see the fire during the entire hike to the saddle, the fire was moving away from them, and they had an easy down and out off the backside if needed.
At the rest spot, obviously they were spent, had watched various things go to crap all day, and had good justification (not-withstanding the safety aspect) for staying put and just watching the show from the black.
While I don’t think any of them were in the mood to leave the rest spot, I don’t believe there was an argument about the move, just some convincing to be done.
They had their bases covered (except for communication) until they reached the saddle, then all bets were off.
We all know there were strong reasons not to head down into the bowl, and I believe that one or more people vocalizing those reasons, instigated the (so far) “un-validated argument”.
I disagree there was strong reason to not leave the black. I would have refused and argued strongly to not move from there into un burned fuel with a uncontrolled fire with in a 3/4 mile distance from me in heavy flammable brush fuel, predicted winds and a mile and a half to a safety zone thru brush no matter which way you went even at the saddle they still had a unburned brush fuel to go thru or down the 2 track to the ranch the black the best bet as all have said. There would have been a hell of a argument from most wild land fire fighters about why they should not and would not move and justifiable under the 10 standard orders…..The dominoes had already started falling by the time they reached the saddle that decision was another nail in their coffin at that point and finished the job when they bailed off into the canyon.
Reply to TTWARE post on August 15, 2014 at 4:05 pm
>> TTWARE said…
>> Keep in mind what has been brought up more than once
>> previously. Leaving the black (while we all agree they
>> should have stayed there), was not the dangerous,
>> irreversible decision, that descending into the bowl was.
Agree… and I think we both just said ‘the same thing’ up above, just in different ways.
The following panorama taken at the top of the saddle where Sonny ( Tex ) Gilligan found that chunk of pink flagging / tape shows clearly that they really were their ‘own lookouts’ for that entire hike down from the anchor point to the saddle.
They had such a ‘good’ view of the fire themselves for those full 15 to 20 minutes that even if they had thought to ‘set a lookout’ there really was nowhere for that person to be and have better ‘eyes on the fire’ than the entire line of 19 men already had while hiking south on that trail.
That panorama from the ‘Descent Point’ is here…
http://youtu.be/n9lFwGSKOww
The ‘death clock’ was only fully ticking AFTER they decided to leave that two track and ‘give up’ that EXCELLENT view of the middle bowl and the fireline that they already had there at the top of that saddle.
I wish they had ‘paused’ there for a longer time.
They might all be alive today.
**
** PANORAMA VIEW FROM THE ACTUAL DESCENT POINT
On July 18, 2013, one of the ADOSH investigators stood at the actual ‘Descent Point’ and carefully took SEVEN photographs while rotating his body and looking from due NORTH to due SOUTH.
All SEVEN of these images were taken with this person standing directly ON the ‘two track road’ at almost EXACTLY the point where Tex ( Sonny ) Gilligan found that roll of ‘pink flagging / tape’.
Whoever took this photos obviously ‘intended’ that they be ‘put together’ into a ‘panorama’ showing the complete view from that location but then ( apparently ) never got around to doing that.
I have simply ‘finished the job’.
I carefully ‘blended’ these SEVEN photos ‘into each other’ to recreate the full 200+ degree view that they provide from that ‘Descent Point’ location… and then I made a smooth-panning VIDEO out of the resulting ‘panorama’ and I have uploaded it to a PUBLIC link on YouTube.
This IS the exact ‘panorama view’ that Granite Mountain would have had standing in the exact same spot and trying to decide whether to continue SOUTH on the two-track or descend into the box canyon.
The images themselves are, of course, post-burn… but as far as ‘seeing exactly what GM could see’ there is really no difference. There would have been some ‘brush’ involved on the day they were there but from that elevated position on the two-track there would have been no difference with regards to how much they could have seen ‘in the distance’.
Here are the SEVEN images that make up this PANORAMA…
IMGP0243.JPG
IMGP0244.JPG
IMGP0245.JPG
IMGP0246.JPG
IMGP0247.JPG
IMGP0248.JPG
IMGP0249.JPG
The FOLDER in the ADOSH Dropbox that contains these photos is…
ADOSH Yarnell Hill Investigation / Photos and Videos / ADOSH 7-18 photos w GPS
The ‘movie’ starts out looking NORTH along the two track and back towards the anchor point ‘from whence they came’.
The ‘movie then pans constantly to the EAST and then to the SOUTH and it ends looking due SOUTH along the two-track. It is perfectly obvious as you are looking SOUTH on the two-track why, if you had not pre-scouted that trail or studied where it goes on a map, you would have NO IDEA where it really goes. The ‘two-track’ is only even visible for another few hundred feet as it heads SOUTH and then ‘disappears’ from view as it begins to ascend the next ‘hill’ along the way.
Likewise… you can see that NONE of the eastward leg of that same two-track is visible at all from that viewpoint because that eastward leg itself ‘drops down’ between the two other ridges seen to the southeast. You would simply have to KNOW that is what it does to even be sure it heads in that easterly direction and towards the Candy Cane Lane area.
All these images were taken from the same exact point on the two-track road on July 18, 2013 between 9:05 and 9:06 AM.
NOTE: The video ‘pans’ from looking NORTH on the two-track until you are looking due SOUTH along the same two-track… then it PAUSES looking SOUTH for a moment and then reverses direction and pans all the way back in the opposite direction again and finishes where it started ( looking due NORTH along the two-track ). It is a SLOW pan in both directions.
Here is a direct link to this new video on YouTube…
Video Title: Descent-Point-Panorama-1
http://youtu.be/n9lFwGSKOww
YouTube ABOUT information for this video…
—————————————————————————————-
This is a panorama compiled from seven different photos taken by an ADOSH investigator on July 18, 2013 as he was standing directly on the two-track road at the same ‘Descent Point’ where Granite Mountain stood on June 30, 2013. The ‘video’ starts out looking NORTH back towards the ‘anchor point’ where Granite had started their hike to THIS location… and the video ends looking due SOUTH along the same two-track they were standing on. It clearly shows that unless they had scouted that trail or had studied it on a map… there was no way to VISUALLY verify that it continued on towards the Boulder Springs Ranch.
This panorama also shows how much of the actual terrain and the actual ‘middle bowl’ they would have been able to see as they were making their decision to drop into the box canyon there in front of them.
——————————————————————————————–
** WHAT THIS PANORAMA SHOWS
I believe this new ‘panorama’ relates directly to the recent discussion regarding the IMG_1334 and IMG_1335 photos taken looking WEST from Highway 89 at exactly 4:30 PM.
This ‘panorama’ shows exactly HOW MUCH of the ‘floor’ of that ‘middle bowl’ ( and on over towards the Glen Ilah area ) could ACTUALLY be seen from that ‘Descent Point’ and I think the panorama proves that at whatever TIME they were actually standing there… they had a much BETTER view of almost that ENTIRE area ‘out there’ than previously thought.
As the ‘movie’ pans from looking directly back to where they came from and on towards the ‘Boulder Springs Ranch’ itself… notice how MUCH of the ‘middle bowl’ can actually be clearly seen from that elevated two-track there at that ‘Descent Point’.
ALL of those ‘mounds’ out in the middle bowl are still in ‘clear view’ at that point and so is the entire area in the distance where the GM Crew Carriers had been parked… and on towards Yarnell and Glen Ilah.
You can ALSO clearly see almost the entire area where the SAIT’s own fireline progression charts show the fire SHOULD have been in both the 4:15 and 4:20 PM timeframe(s)… which is also the exact time that the SAIT says GM had ‘arrived’ at this location.
Obviously this panorama from the ‘Descent Point’ and standing on the two-track does NOT show what was GOING to happen to the general ‘visibility’ into the distance if you began an actual descent down that drainage and close to that rock pile… but regardless… I think this is still an important set of images and an important ‘you are there’ perspective related to the ‘moment of decision’ up on that two-track.
It’s as close as you get to ‘being there’ and seeing exactly how much of the terrain they, themselves, MUST have been able to see as they were making their decision(s) there at that ‘Descent Point’.
Next step… I am going to take this ‘panorama’ and do another ‘through the looking glass’ fade into an identical Google Earth ground level perspective complete with ALL of the actual SAIT estimated ‘fireline progression’ boundaries laid onto the 3D terrain.
That WILL show EXACTLY how much of the ‘fireline’ itself they SHOULD have been able to see as they were actually ‘hiking’ to this location and as they were actually making their ‘decisions’ at this exact spot.
More later.
Followup…
Here is a direct link to that FOLDER in the ADOSH material that contains all SEVEN of the original photographs used to construct the panorama…
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/20inrene9tcx74a/AAAn9-D4c5U9Kbh2BHFt2c7ba/ADOSH%20Yarnell%20Hill%20Investigation/Photos%20and%20Video/ADOSH%207-18%20photos%20w%20GPS
The ‘panorama’ was built using images IMGP0243 through IMGP0249.
I wanted to go back to my statement yesterday to Calvin’
Reflecting on some things—
Several months ago I was of the opinion that Marsh could not have been in 2 places at once and put him on the mountain rather than below the crew. After reviewing some of the information and statements. Elizabeth, Holly, Maclean and a couple of others seemed to have put marsh at or near the ranch when McDonough was picked up by Frisby.
The “you need to hurry up” statement and my questions as to why Steed was telling Marsh about the fire activity was seriously confusing. also why was Marsh not getting some one to pick up McDonough when his trigger was reached if he was on top of the mountain to meet Frisby?
With the Dudley argument information the radio transmissions seemed even stranger but started fitting into a puzzle.
Who could order the crew out of the black as WTKTT said they looked settled in and not expecting to move. Would Steed or for that matter any HS supervisor be willing to move biased on what they were seeing in fire activity. Thus I am going to call it a discussion not a full fledged argument.
Could Marsh see the Fire activity at the time of the discussion. Thus “I could see that coming” stated by Steed not over the radio but behind the Video taker and a Foreman next to him not on the Radio copy that That’s a normal discussion between two people looking at each other.
They would have known where Marsh was. I am going to eat humble pie here. SCOUTTING THE ESCAPE ROUTE TO THE SAFETY ZONE. I am beginning to sound like some I thought were way off base. But some of the questionable statements seem to all of a sudden fit to me or I have gone to grasping at straws to find an answer. I hope its my investigative mind that I learned with the Sheriffs department. When things are not fitting change the approach
WTKTT you have a good ability to search things out Am I way off base here??????
I think it’s great to try to pull ourselves out of the possibly deep ruts our months of thinking may have pulled us in to.
That’s why I’m trying to take various different tacks on it all.
I even find myself, as I read/watch/listen around, taking more seriously Elizabeth’s query way back when about lightning. I don’t think concern about lightning was a major factor in their decision-making, but it often IS a big concern and crews ARE often pulled off a fire because of the threat of it.
You just never know………………..
As I just wrote somewhere below, I think Eric’s communique to Abel that the fire had just over-run the retardant and dozer lines was the beginning of Abel’s brief focus on Granite Mountain while he was busy focusing of something completely different.
I don’t remember when that communique happened. It seems Eric would have had to be up where he could see that when he said that.
Marti.
The audio we have of Marsh reporting “south towards Yarnell” occurred at 1540, a full 15 minutes before Steed is heard “updating” Marsh on the fires progress South.
Thanks, Calvin!
Reply to calvin post on August 14, 2014 at 12:02 pm
>> calvin said…
>>
>> Marti.
>> The audio we have of Marsh reporting “south towards Yarnell”
>> occurred at 1540, a full 15 minutes before Steed is heard
>> “updating” Marsh on the fires progress South.
Well… to be precise… the ‘audio’ that we have capturing that ‘fire progress’ report from Marsh is at 1542… but we are only hearing the END of his full report over the radio. We don’t know when that ‘report’ actually STARTED.
This is the ‘fire progress report’ captured in that Panebaker video where Eric Panebaker himself recorded the call sign of the person making that ‘report’ as ‘DIVSA ( Eric Marsh )… and when Eric Panebaker heard Marsh say the fire had blown through the retardant line we hear him joking about “Where do we record THAT in the logs?”. It’s also the video that contains the beginning of OPS2 Paul Musser’s ‘callout’ directly to Marsh ( “Division Alpha, Operations, Musser ) which was the start of Mussers 1542 ‘availability check’ radio conversation with Marsh.
The following is reprinted from Chapter VII ( 7 ) of this ongoing discussion…
** On May 26, 2014 at 10:02 pm, WTKTT said…
Here is the FULL transcript of Panebaker Air Study video 154232… including BOTH the FOREGROUND *AND* the BACKGROUND conversation(s)…
NOTE: As this video STARTS… Eric Marsh is actually just FINISHING his ‘report’ about what the fire is currently doing… and although we don’t actually hear him informing whoever it is he is ‘reporting to’ at this moment that the fire has “burned through the retardant line”… it is perfectly obvious that that is what he must have said just seconds before the camera was turned on. Marsh is simply ‘finishing’ that ‘report’ by adding his view of the ‘direction’ the fire is currently headed… ( SOUTH… into Yarnell )…
_________________________________________________________________
VIDEO 154232 STARTS AT 1542.08 ( 3:42.08 PM )
+0:00 ( 1542.08 / 3:42.08 PM )
(Eric Marsh?): …towards the structures… uh… (pause) southern… uh…
(pause) into Yarnell.
+0:02: ( 1542.10 / 3:42.10 PM )
(Foreground person 1): (It) burned through the retardant line!
(Foreground person 2 – Eric Panebaker): Um-hmm.
NOTE: As soon as Marsh finished answering whoever he
was talking to… OPS2 Paul Musser calls him directly…
+0:06 ( 1542.14 – 3:42.14 PM )
(Paul Musser): Division Alpha, Operations Musser.
NOTE: Silence for a moment, then someone comes on and appears
to simply say “Thank you” to (Marsh?) for his previous report a
few seconds ago about what the fire is now doing ‘down south’ and
how it is now moving “…towards the structures… southern… into Yarnell”.
+0:13 ( 1542.21 / 3:42.21 PM )
(Unknown): Thank you.
NOTE: We NOW hear the two fellas in the foreground (nervously)
joking about where they ‘document’ this ‘piece of news’ that the
fire has ‘burned through the retardant line’ and is now ‘heading
SOUTH… into the Yarnell structures’…
+0:16 ( 1542.24 / 3:42.24 PM )
(Foreground person 1): Where do we document that at?
(Foreground person 2 – Eric Panebaker): ( Laughs ) Somewhere in the notes?
(Foreground person 1): Which draft?
(Foreground person 2 – Eric Panebaker): ( Laughs again ).
NOTE: There is no other background traffic in the remaining
seconds. ‘Division Alpha’ Eric Marsh does NOT respond to
‘OPS2′ Paul Musser by the time the video ends at 1542.32
VIDEO 154232 ENDS AT 1542.32 ( 3:42.32 PM )
__________________________________________________________________
The ADOSH investigators themselves have ‘notes’ about this 154232
Panebaker Air Study video where they say they were pretty certain this
was DIVSA Eric Marsh ‘speaking’ at the start of the video ( and it DOES
sound exactly like Marsh )… but now Eric Panebaker’s NOTE that HE
added to HIS field log seems to confirm that it was ‘DIVSA’ speaking.
Eric Panebaker specifically wrote ‘Division Alpha’ in his own logs as
the ‘call sign’ for the person that was making this ‘fire progress’ report
at that time.
Mr. Powers.
I have been thinking Marsh was in front of the crew circa 1555 when the Mackenzie videos were taken. Here are some of my reasons for thinking that. Marsh requested a meeting with Frisby say approximately 1530, and supposing he was north of the crew, should have been moving south towards the discussing options spot and presumably past that location before Mackenzie videos the discussion where Steed gives the fire update. Secondly, As we can see in the Mcdonough photos, there was a clear line of sight to the anchor point and even further north so that Marsh wouldn’t have needed a report on the fire’s advancement circa 1550-1555 (if he was North of GM).
Third, in the Gamble video, Marsh says “they are coming from the heel of the fire”, as in TOWARDS him, away from the black, right?
Marsh was reported to have noted the advance of the fire toward the GM buggies, circa 1620, meaning he was back in view of the Sesame Area, where he was reported to be calling for the retardant drop only 2-3 minutes before the first Mayday call from Steed. And it doesn’t seem he could have been on the slope and seen B33 flying through the middle bowl (as they state in their interview)
The only place I can put Marsh, that would afford him a view of the Sesame area (where the crew carriers were parked, is on the mound due west of the BS ranch, which Joy confirmed as having a view toward Sesame. And if that is the case, means he in fact chose to go be with his men instead of racing to the BSR and safety
So that leads to another question. If Marsh was in fact South of the GM discussing options location (out of the black) at 1550 (when Caldwell captures Abel’s “hunker and be safe, air support ASAP). What does that really mean? Without knowing what Abel is answering “copy that” before the “hunker, be safe, air support ASAP, it is all speculation.
And again, if that is indeed Abel’s voice we hear in Caldwell’s video (which he confirms).. I call BS that he doesn’t remember it!
There are several places north of the anchor point, where the terrain causes the two-two track to be out of the line-of-sight of some of the areas in question.
Also, if Marsh WAS in that general vicinity, it’s quite possible that the smoke conditions limited his ability to see what the fire was doing and where it was at.
Regarding the ‘they’re coming from the heel of the fire’ comment’, that certainly sounds like the way one would explain that situation to someone else in both instances, whether the explaining party was in front OR behind the group he was explaining about. For example, if I was behind them and someone ahead of me wanted to know where they were at and why they weren’t there yet?, I guess I could say. Well, they’re coming all the way from the heel of the fire”, even though they were moving away from me.
The only question I have Calvin is I think the buggies were moved before 1620
and that could have been an earlier statement.
Calvin and TTWARE If I copy right you both are saying that Marsh could have well been below the crew even at the mouth of the canyon near BSR based on some things you noted. as well as mine.
Again I think the Argument or Discussion is key here. It was not released in the SAIR for a specific reason.
SAIT was charged with not showing blame or pointing fingers’
Some one or more than one has to know what Dudley was hinting at.
No one from the investigation has come forward to dis credit that statement.
Very strange don’t you think.
If Marsh was at or near BSR and was the unknown voice telling them to hurry it up. Marsh could have then or already been headed back to the crew to get them moving havening seen the fire activity changing which the crew could not. Arriving just as the flaming front came into view at the mouth of the canyon. I am still adlibbing a lot with no solid evidence. But all is plausible if we can put Marsh there rather than behind the crew. The puzzle peace’s then begin to fit which they have not so far.
Reply to Bob Powers post on August 14, 2014 at 1:36 pm
>> Mr. Powers said…
>>
>> If Marsh was at or near BSR and was the unknown voice
>> telling them to hurry it up. Marsh could have then or already
>> been headed back to the crew to get them moving havening
>> seen the fire activity changing which the crew could not.
>> Arriving just as the flaming front came into view at the
>> mouth of the canyon. I am still adlibbing a lot with no solid
>> evidence. But all is plausible if we can put Marsh there rather
>> than behind the crew. The puzzle peace’s then begin to fit
>> which they have not so far.
I understand this ‘puzzle’ that you are referring to and I am NOT trying to put the kibosh on ANY research in this area since the flat truth is that other than Joy Collura’s morning photos, the NOON meetup with Frisby, and ( ultimately ) the location of his dead body… we do NOT know exactly where Marsh was pretty much the rest of the day…
…but I think you can/should take that suggestion that Marsh was the one urging anyone to ‘hurry up’ in the YARNELL-GAMBLE video OFF of the ‘puzzle table’.
It is really NOT possible for that to be Eric Marsh speaking at the very start of that YARNELL-GAMBLE video. Eric Marsh is the SECOND speaker and the one that says ( in response to the first speaker? ) “They’re comin’ from the heel of the fire.”
This has already been VERIFIED by people ( like RTS ) who knew Eric Marsh. Someone ELSE ( other than Marsh ) is the one apparently urging Marsh and/or GM to ‘hurry up’…. wherever they were at 4:27 PM.
TTWARE said “Also, if Marsh WAS in that general vicinity, it’s quite possible that the smoke conditions limited his ability to see what the fire was doing and where it was at.”
Looking at Mcdonough’s pictures from the chase and supt truck at 1554, there is no smoke between there and the anchor point.
TTWARE also said “Regarding the ‘they’re coming from the heel of the fire’ comment’, that certainly sounds like the way one would explain that situation to someone else in both instances, whether the explaining party was in front OR behind the group he was explaining about. For example, if I was behind them and someone ahead of me wanted to know where they were at and why they weren’t there yet?, I guess I could say. Well, they’re coming all the way from the heel of the fire”, even though they were moving away from me.”
If I was coming in the same direction as a crew in front of me, and we were taking the same course from point A to point B, I think I might say….. We are coming from the heel of the fire.
But I understand your point.
Reply to Bob Powers post on August 14, 2014 at 9:48 am
>> Mr. Powers wrote…
>>
>> WTKTT you have a good ability to search things out
>> Am I way off base here??????
Well… kinda… but let me preface everything else I am about to say below with the fact that NONE of us ( here ) have the answers to some of these questions ( yet! ).
In all reality… the best we have been able to do with the public evidence is discover what we do NOT know… but we have ALSO done a pretty good job here figuring out WHY we do NOT know certain things and WHO does ( most likely ) know… and/or how those things COULD probably be determined.
Example: Brendan McDonough himself has testified to ADOSH that Granite Mountain normally has at least FOUR handheld GPS units ‘onboard’ with them when they are out in the field. Calvin found at least ONE of them ( The Oregon 450 unit ) sitting there ‘in plain sight’ strapped to Robert Caldwell’s front pack strap. I then seemed to have found it lying there in the dirt at the deployment site and apparently totally ‘undamaged’. It seems to have VANISHED. Who would KNOW where it went? That’s easy. Whoever ‘cleaned up the deployment site’ and that would be Darrell Willis and others from the Prescott Fire Department. As for the OTHER THREE possible GPS units?… it certainly stands to reason that Eric Marsh would have been wearing one of them. If that is true… and that unit could be found and ANY data retrieved… THAT would most certainly take care of a LOT of these ‘where was Marsh and when’ questions. Same goes for the Caldwell Oregon 450 unit which we KNOW was OUT THERE that day. If it survived undamaged as at least 3 photos of the deployment site seem to indicate… it would at least answer most of these lingering questions about where the CREW was… at what TIME. It is still VERY important to know that.
So where in the HELL is Caldwell’s Oregon 450 GPS unit?
Where are the OTHER THREE that Brendan McDonough suggests were ALSO ‘out there’?
WHO took them away from that site?
WHERE are they NOW?
If ANY of them still exist… and someone still has it/them… they should be fully aware that the penalties for destroying / altering or even just withholding evidence directly related to Civil Litigation are the same as for a Criminal Investigation. It’s a FELONY.
All I can do is take your ‘thoughts’ one by one and ( since you asked ) just tell you what I think, at this point.
I am also ‘away from my notes’ and the Dropbox material at this moment in time so ALL of the following is just coming from memory and I might get some of this slightly wrong myself… but here goes…
>> Mr. Powers also wrote…
>> Several months ago I was of the opinion that Marsh could not have been
>> in 2 places at once.
That isn’t a matter of opinion.
It’s still just as true now as it was when you reminded ALL of us of that FACT.
>> Mr. Powers also wrote…
>>
>> After reviewing some of the information and statements. Elizabeth, Holly,
>> Maclean and a couple of others seemed to have put marsh at or near the
>> ranch when McDonough was picked up by Frisby.
That ‘assumption’ coming from the DIE HARD duo ( Holly MacLean ) was totally based on just TWO things THEY thought they were seeing/hearing in the public evidence record.
1) They thought Marsh was saying “I’m at the house” in the 4:16 Panebaker video.
They then made the leap that ‘house’ meant ‘Boulder Springs Ranch” and that
even if he WAS there Marsh was ( for some reason ) saying ‘house’ instead of ‘ranch’.
2) They looked at the 3:50 Mackenzie photos showing the men getting up, slinging their saws, and exiting to the RIGHT of the camera being held by MacKenzie there at that ‘cut rock’ location. They then simply assumed that anyone exiting the frame of the camera to the right side automatically meant they were heading SOUTH on the two-track on some kind of ‘journey’ and so they ‘made the leap’ that these guys and their saws were going SOUTH to ‘clear the way’ for the others.
BOTH of these ‘assumptions’ have ( I believe ) been proven TOTALLY WRONG
1) Marsh doesn’t even SAY “I’m at the house” in the video. Many people now agree the quote in question from Marsh at 4:16 was when the he dodged the direct question from someone in fire command “Are you WITH Granite Mountain right now?” with a response of “Ahm… just checkin’ it out to see where we’re gonna jump out at”.
2) The 3:50 MacKenzie photos simply show a few of the men who were ‘at rest’ down the slope by the ‘cut rock’ location being told to re-assemble directly UP the slope with the rest of the men. Those photos don’t show anyone really GOING anywhere except to walk directly up the slope a few hundred feet and join the others who were all assembling with Steed up at that NEXT ‘resting spot’… where MacKenzie would then shoot his videos. The fact that they were exiting to MacKenzie’s right ONLY means that was because they had to ‘circle around’ behind Christopher in order to go UP that slight draw that was there to then ascend the few hundred feet to the NEXT ‘rest spot’. Any aerial view of that ‘cut rock’ location where those photos were taken proves that is what they must have done.
Holly / MacLean have since actually ‘recanted’ their original assertions in a followup (public) post at Wildfire today where they postulated these theories in the first place.
You were right there in the thick of all that ‘Holly MacLean’ stuff and repeatedly pointed out ( to them ) that Marsh HAD to be at least headed to the ‘anchor point’ in that timeframe ( regardless of where he was ) because of the requested ‘face-to-face’ with Marsh. You have never been wrong about that and even now that FACT must be accounted for with ANY theory about where Marsh might have been in that timeframe ( 1532 to 1542 ).
That ‘face to face’ was SUPPOSED to take place the exact same spot near the anchor point where Frisby and Brown had met with Marsh and Steed earlier around NOON. That is also a FACT that has been testified to in the parts of the Blue Ridge testimony that remained unredacted. Marsh REQUESTED that face-to-face just AFTER the ‘180 degree wind change expected’ Byron Kimball weather update hit the radio at exactly 1531… and the ‘face-to-face’ was not CALLED OFF by Frisby until 1542 when he was picking Brendan up and evacuating him back east rather than continue his trip up to the anchor point.
So between 1531 and 1542… wherever he was… Marsh MUST have been headed directly for the anchor point for the ‘requested’ face-to-face with BR Supt. Brian Frisby.
>> Mr. Powers also wrote…
>>
>> The “you need to hurry up” statement and my questions as to why Steed was
>> telling Marsh about the fire activity was seriously confusing.
I believe you were suggesting below that the person who seems to be asking the other one to ‘hurry up’ in the 4:27 PM YARNELL-GAMBLE video might actually have been Marsh… and the responder ( The one who says “They’re comin’ from the heel of the fire” ) might have been Steed.
If that is what you were saying… I don’t think that is possible.
There is really NO QUESTION that the person who says “They’re comin’ from the heel of the fire” is, in fact, Eric Marsh. That audio capture is LOUD AND CLEAR and just about ANYONE who knew Marsh has agreed that that is, in fact, him saying those words.
RTS verified both that audio capture and the fact that the last person speaking on the radio in that video is also definitely Brian Frisby ‘calling out’ to Gary Cordes. RTS tried but could not be as sure about the FIRST voice in the video and RTS could not verify who might have been saying “hurry up” there.
SIDENOTE: As with the GPS units above… we absolutely KNOW who could most probably tell us MORE about this YARNELL-GAMBLE video, WHO the speakers were, and what ELSE might have been said before and after the part that was captured. That would be Blue Ridge Hotshot Ian McCord. He was sitting right there in the Crew Cab listening to that radio running FULL BLAST in the background for that ENTIRE conversation. Whatever it was he really heard… ( including the actual CALL SIGN of the person talking to Marsh?? ) his memory of that conversation is what seems to have caused him to actually NAME this video clip of his “The YARNELL-GAMBLE”. Ian McCord has NEVER been interviewed by anyone ( that we know of, anyway ) and we aren’t even sure if any of the fragmented Blue Ridge Unit Log notes are his… or NOT. There is also the fact that this 4:27 PM YARNELL-GAMBLE video proves that Marsh was OPENLY communicating with SOMEONE about Granite Mountain NOT being ‘in the safe black’ over the OPEN TAC CHANNELS. The YARNELL-GAMBLE video is NOT capturing an intra-crew channel transmission that could only be heard over the onboard radio in that Crew Carrier that McCord was sitting in. Even though McCord MIGHT have actually been sitting in one of the GM Crew Carriers at that point ( again, something else investigators never even bothered to find out ) that radio traffic captured in his video was definitely over the OPEN TAC CHANNELS. So WHY has NO ONE ELSE reported hearing this obvious exchange between Marsh and ( someone? ) about Granite Mountain NOT being ‘in the safe black’ at 4:27 PM? Someone else MUST have heard this same radio conversation captured by BR Hotshot Ian McCord. Brian Frisby himself pretty much MUST have heard this same YARNELL-GAMBLE traffic because he, himself, is captured speaking on the same channel in the same video. Frisby’s request to talk with Cordes comes IMMEDIATELY after Marsh finishes his “They’re comin’ from the heel of the fire” statement. There really isn’t even any time interval there between the end of Marsh’s transmission and the start of Frisby’s for the radio McCord was capturing to even have had a chance to ‘scan ahead’ to some other channel. So it really sounds like Brian Frisby was just ‘standing by’ and waiting or Eric to finish his statement before he pressed his own TRANSMIT button ( on the same frequency ) to try and raise Cordes. That means Frisby pretty much MUST have heard this same entire conversation we can hear ourselves in the video. So does Brian Frisby know what CALL SIGN that person talking to Marsh had used to start that conversation? He certainly might.
>> Mr. Powers also wrote…
>>
>> also why was Marsh not getting some one to pick up McDonough when his
>> trigger was reached if he was on top of the mountain to meet Frisby?
Marsh was DIVSA ( that day ). He also had Darrell Willis’ ‘directive’ from his performance evaluation just 48 days before Yarnell ‘ringing in his ears’. Darrell Willis had told Marsh directly that he wanted him to start letting Jesse Steed ‘run the crew’… so that’s what Marsh was doing. He was letting Jesse Steed handle ‘the crew’ AND McDonough’s situation.
Brendan has testified numerous times that ALL the consultations he had about leaving his lookout position ( and why ) were directly with (quote) “My Captain… Jesse Steed”. Marsh was not involved with this. That was all between Steed and McDonough. Marsh only got involved when he heard the traffic from Frisby about “I’ve got your lookout… do you want me to move your vehicles, too?”. The conversation now involved about a million dollars worth of expensive equipment that belonged to the City of Prescott and that’s when BOTH Marsh and Steed were talking to Frisby about what to do about all FOUR of those vehicles.
>> Mr. Powers also wrote…
>>
>> With the Dudley argument information the radio transmissions seemed even
>> stranger but started fitting into a puzzle.
>>
>> Who could order the crew out of the black as WTKTT said they looked settled
>> in and not expecting to move?
Only DIVSA Eric Marsh and/or GMIHC ( Acting ) Superintendent Jesse Steed.
I have joked before about Darrell Willis actually borrowing a UTV and driving out there and saying something like “Get your asses to town and do something to get your names in the paper ‘cus I’ve got a City Council Budget meeting next week”… and that that is why we don’t have any radio captures of that moment… but even if that absurdity had happened ( It certainly did NOT ) I don’t think the fellas themselves would have even twitched if ANYONE was ‘out there’ yelling anything directly at them… until they got the ‘command’ from either Marsh or Steed.
Only Marsh. Only Steed. The fellas would not have moved for ANYONE else.
Actually… I’m not even sure they would have moved on only Marsh’s say-so at that point in the day and under those circumstances. Marsh was NOT with them pretty much all day and was NOT, in fact, their de-facto ‘direct line supervisor’ at that point.
There is still that ‘sarcastic remark’ by one of the ‘fellas’ in the MacKenzie video after Marsh said “I knew this was ‘comin… I could just FEET it, ya know”.
I still believe that FF to the right of Steed then says “We’ve been feelin’ it ALL DAY” and then he spits on the ground ( in mock disgust? ) for ’emphasis’ and that is when the FF next to HIM laughs at the remark.
So I’m not sure the ‘fellas’ were all that enamored with Marsh that day and circa 4:00 PM and it might ONLY have been Captain Jesse Steed himself who could have forced them out of that resting spot for some ‘other mission’.
Marsh probably just ‘sold the idea’ over the intra-crew radio to Steed ( and Brendan McDonough MOST probably heard ALL of that ‘sell job’ )…. and it was only Steed who ‘bought’ the ‘sell job’ and then turned to the fellas and said “Gaggle up, boys…. we’re movin'”.
>> Mr. Powers also wrote…
>>
>> Would Steed or for that matter any HS supervisor be willing to move biased on
>> what they were seeing in fire activity. Thus I am going to call it a discussion not
>> a full fledged argument.
I also think in your earlier comments you were trying to equate the ‘discussing their options’ conversation(s) with the new report from Dudley about people ( more than one ) supposedly hearing Marsh and Steed arguing.
In that ‘bomb’ that Dudley dropped during his PUBLIC speech to those Utah firefighters… Dudley specifically says the ‘argument’ that was ( supposedly ) reported to the SAIT was taking place down there at the SADDLE by the ‘Descent Point’ and that it was specifically about “which way to go”.
I don’t think there was any ‘argument’ at all back at the anchor point.
I believe that was just a series of ‘calm’ exchanges between Marsh and Steed with Marsh attempting to ‘sell the idea’ to Steed and Steed eventually ( but reluctantly? ) AGREEING to the ‘move’ ( Again… I believe Brendan heard ALL of this ‘sell job’ from Marsh and then Steed agreeing to it ).
I also believe the next 15 minutes were ‘uneventful’.
They just ‘line walked’ at brisk pace due south and were trusting Marsh that the two-track was going to take them to this ‘ranch’ thing ( which they had never seen and didn’t truly know where it was ) and/or back to town ( somehow ).
It was only when Steed ’rounded that bend’ down there and reached that saddle and there was absolutely no VISUAL proof that the two-track went anywhere from there but straight due-south to Mexico that the shit probably hit the fan.
I believe that’s when the (supposed) “argument about WHICH WAY TO GO” must have taken place… if it ever happened at all.
SIDENOTE: Certainly the ACTUAL ‘testimony’ that Mike Dudley has referred to in PUBLIC might reveal a lot more information such as WHO ( multiple people ) was reporting this and WHAT radio channel they heard it on. Intra crew? That only means it was Brendan reporting it or Willis or one of the other ‘Prescott’ people ( Sciacca? Cole? Hulburd? Clawson? Yowell? ) that might have had that frequency punched in.. NOT intra crew? Then any NUMBER of people probably heard this ‘argument’ traffic. Is it possible that whoever heard this ‘argument’ also heard the answer to the million dollar question of WHO, exactly, DECIDED to even attempt the shortcut through the canyon in the first place… and/or WHY? Did the two in-cloud LIGHTNING strikes and associated THUNDER that are known to have taken place at the exact moment the SAIR says they happened ( 4:20 PM ) and at the exact moment they were standing there on that high ridge like 19 human lightning rods have ANYTHING to do with their decision to ‘drop down’ off that ridge? Maybe whoever heard this ‘argument’ might have also heard something about WHY the ‘shortcut’ was ‘part of the argument’.
.>> Mr. Powers also wrote…
>>
>> Could Marsh see the Fire activity at the time of the discussion?
That’s part of the ongoing debate. Maybe. Maybe not.
If Marsh could NOT see the actual fireline then any ‘ideas’ he was having about the men attempting a ‘move’ would have been a ‘guess’ on his part as far as the SAFETY factor goes. Without a direct view of the actual fireline and actual fire behavior at that moment in time… Marsh could have thought that all kinds of things were ‘doable’ or a ‘no-brainer’. Only Steed could have kept the complete SAFETY component up front and center in the ‘discussing their options’ and telling Marsh what was ‘possible’ or ‘not possible’ or even ‘advisable’ at that time.
>> Mr. Powers also wrote…
>>
>> Thus “I could see that coming” stated by Steed not over the radio but behind the
>> Video taker and a Foreman next to him not on the Radio copy that That’s a normal
>> discussion between two people looking at each other.
Okay… you lost me there.
First… It was definitely Eric Marsh who said “I just knew this was comin’… I could FEEL it, ya know” and it was definitely ‘over the radio’ ( with modulation on the voice ).
Second… It was also definitely Jesse Steed saying “I copy… and it’s almost made it to that two track road that we walked in on.” ( In proximity to the camera and NOT over the radio ).
In Brendan McDonough’s SECOND ADOSH interview… the ADOSH investigators had these two 9 second MacKenzie video clips preloaded on a device and they made a point of PLAYING them for McDonough.
The ADOSH investigators actually thought ( according to their own pre-interview notes ) that ONE of the voices on the radio there MIGHT have been McDonough himself and they wanted to VERIFY that one way or the other.
McDonough listened to the MacKenzie videos and without hesitation said…
“That’s Eric and Jesse talking”.
SIDENOTE: Astonishingly… the ADOSH investigators then didn’t even ask Brendan a single other question about this crucial audio capture. They just MOVED ON without even ASKING Brendan if he heard any MORE of that ‘discussing their options’ conversation. Both the SAIT and ADOSH reports went on to state unequivocally that ‘Brendan heard them ( Marsh and Steed ) discussing their options’… but even in this SECOND ADOSH interview there isn’t one moment when any investigator even ASKS Brendan that simple question.
>> Mr. Powers also wrote…
>>
>> They would have known where Marsh was. I am going to eat humble pie here.
>> SCOUTTING THE ESCAPE ROUTE TO THE SAFETY ZONE.
I don’t believe that EVER happened.
There really is ( still ) no evidence to support that.
>> Mr. Powers also wrote…
>>
>> I am beginning to sound like some I thought were way off base.
>> But some of the questionable statements seem to all of a sudden
>> fit to me or I have gone to grasping at straws to find an answer.
I wouldn’t call it ‘grasping at straws’. I think you have just tried to hold too many things in your head at once there and have gotten a little confused.
>> Mr. Powers also wrote…
>>
>> I hope its my investigative mind that I learned with the Sheriffs department.
>> When things are not fitting change the approach
I am not, for one second, saying that some ‘fundamental assumptions’ we have all been making about this crucial 3:30 to 4:45 timeframe could not suddenly get ‘turned on their head’… but I don’t believe it’s happened yet and nothing above is convincing me that Eric Marsh was not, at all times, NORTH of the crew and then playing ‘catch up’ from the rear all the way up until the moment of deployment.
But did you notice a THEME up above with my ‘SIDENOTES’?
We have, here in this forum, done a pretty damn good job of identifying EXACTLY what evidence is ‘missing’ and WHO can most likely ‘fill in the gaps’ here.
In other words… we have done a damn good job of figuring out what we do NOT know.
As a former Sheriff’s investigator… you also have to admit that is an IMPORTANT part of the process and CAN, in fact, definitely help lead to the full TRUTH.
If anyone is still interested in that ‘TRUTH’… all they have to do is come here and do a little reading and they will know EXACTLY WHO should be re-interviewed, or even interviewed for the FIRST TIME…. and/or EXACTLY what physical pieces of evidence are KNOWN to exist and should still be located/examined.
Maybe a little humble pie but thank you for the details.
I am still looking hard at Dudley for more info. He pulled a bad twist to the conversation. I am still a little hesitant to put Marsh behind the crew now than I was before.
There is something still out of whack here.
Along with the what we don’t know.
No humble pie — good to entertain things that are out of the box from time to time. This is another case where prior crew members may be able to shed light about past, parallel, decisions, if and when they find a place that feels comfortable and right to do so. WTKTT’s work has amply laid out potential communication and management style issues, and I think past actual actions are often prelude to future actions, too. Sometimes what seems hard to believe simply IS, even if it is hard to put in a normal neat box. A safety officer could have/likely would have, ridden herd well, though.
WTKTT—-Probably a dumb question and you are in the know.
Can you go back and check what Dudley said?
I did not remember him specifically saying the argument was at the saddle.
but something about the fact that— he hoped some of the crew questioned going down into the canyon when that decision was made.
That there was an argument but not what it was about.
Just to clarify it for me. Not sure where to find it again but I did listen to all of it. Thanks
Full ( longer ) response is up above as a new ‘parent’ comment… but here is the ‘short answer’…
Mike Dudley’s exact words to the Utah firefighters regarding the ‘argument at the SADDLE’…
————————————————————
+1:04:46
Mike Dudley: There’s some allegations that there was an argument between the Captain and the Superintendent about which way to go… from that saddle.. Some people made that allegation. We can’t validate that.
————————————————————
A few things in reply to WTKTT.
I agree the missing GPS units are troublesome. They aren’t listed anywhere in YCSO evidence, not a single one. What did happen to those?
WTKTT says: “1) Marsh doesn’t even SAY “I’m at the house” in the video. Many people now agree the quote in question from Marsh at 4:16 was when the he dodged the direct question from someone in fire command “Are you WITH Granite Mountain right now?” with a response of “Ahm… just checkin’ it out to see where we’re gonna jump out at”.”
–How do you know this? Who are the “many people” agreeing with this? Where do you get “Ahm…just checkin’ it out to see where we’re gonna jump out at.”? Too many syllables for the recorded audio. Haven’t we been here before?
Examples of Eric Marsh’s transmissions indicating his possible location, which is below or ahead of the crew:
“I’m trying to work my way off the top”
“The guys, Granite, is making their way down our escape route from this morning…” (Granite is making their way down, not “We’re” making “OUR” way down)
(Are you on the ER with GM right now?) “Nah, I’m at the (whatever) where we’re gonna jump out at” (He is answering no, I am not on the ER with GM right now, I am somewhere else where we’re gonna jump out at).
“They’re coming from the heel of the fire” (Not we are, but they are)
“I’m here with GM hotshots…” He announces that he is with them at this point. GM7 makes the distress calls to Air Attack before this. Eric jumps in at the end and now says that he is with them.” This is how I see it.
WTKTT said: “2) The 3:50 MacKenzie photos simply show a few of the men who were ‘at rest’ down the slope by the ‘cut rock’ location being told to re-assemble directly UP the slope with the rest of the men. Those photos don’t show anyone really GOING anywhere except to walk directly up the slope a few hundred feet and join the others who were all assembling with Steed up at that NEXT ‘resting spot’… where MacKenzie would then shoot his videos. The fact that they were exiting to MacKenzie’s right ONLY means that was because they had to ‘circle around’ behind Christopher in order to go UP that slight draw that was there to then ascend the few hundred feet to the NEXT ‘rest spot’. Any aerial view of that ‘cut rock’ location where those photos were taken proves that is what they must have done.”
–I see no “proof” here as you say. The fact you imply that GMIHC were ‘at rest’ is off. Sure they were sitting, but they were also ready to move at a moments notice. Trust me. Hotshots will sit fully geared like this, and at times a few may have their packs off getting a snack, adjusting, or water, etc.. These guys were ready to move and not just to reassemble up the hill.
WTKTT said: “Holly / MacLean have since actually ‘recanted’ their original assertions in a followup (public) post at Wildfire today where they postulated these theories in the first place.”
–John MacLean recanted his assertions? Where? And I believe MacLean and Neill’s original post focused on the supposed 33 minute communication gap the investigation perpetuated. The focus turned to what was actually said on the audio and not because of their doing, it’s just what people grabbed hold of.
WTKTT said: “SIDENOTE: As with the GPS units above… we absolutely KNOW who could most probably tell us MORE about this YARNELL-GAMBLE video, WHO the speakers were, and what ELSE might have been said before and after the part that was captured. That would be Blue Ridge Hotshot Ian McCord. He was sitting right there in the Crew Cab listening to that radio running FULL BLAST in the background for that ENTIRE conversation. Whatever it was he really heard… ( including the actual CALL SIGN of the person talking to Marsh?? ) his memory of that conversation is what seems to have caused him to actually NAME this video clip of his “The YARNELL-GAMBLE”. Ian McCord has NEVER been interviewed by anyone ( that we know of, anyway ) and we aren’t even sure if any of the fragmented Blue Ridge Unit Log notes are his… or NOT. ”
–Please WTKTT, exaggerate much? In the SAI evidence below is the order and naming for the BRIHC vids/audio. Ronald Gamble (C-3.9 on his resource order) is a firefighter on the BRIHC. Those people were gagged, we are only left to speculate whether they were interviewed, if so hopefully within that critical 24 hr period. Those BRIHC were in their own chaotic event, loading up into their buggies and getting the hell out. Hard saying if they would even remember “hearing” the background radio…looked like he was trying to film the fire behavior and how close they were.
_README.txt
_README.xlsx
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SIDENOTE: I read in a post somewhere recently on here about obtaining evidence and believing Nowicki was a miracle worker for providing it. Maybe Calvin? Sorry I can’t remember. ANYBODY can get evidence! FOIA for both the SAI and ADOSH, send a hard drive and you got all the evidence. The fact it’s on this website and she helped obtain it, ok they’re providing a service. Just like we all are to them, every time a comment is posted. Point is any American can get this stuff who’s wiling to go to a bit of trouble. And it’s free.
WTKTT said: “SIDENOTE: Certainly the ACTUAL ‘testimony’ that Mike Dudley has referred to in PUBLIC might reveal a lot more information such as WHO ( multiple people ) was reporting this and WHAT radio channel they heard it on. Intra crew? That only means it was Brendan reporting it or Willis or one of the other ‘Prescott’ people ( Sciacca? Cole? Hulburd? Clawson? Yowell? ) that might have had that frequency punched in.. NOT intra crew? Then any NUMBER of people probably heard this ‘argument’ traffic.”
–Remember in Dudley’s (who is a current USDA/USFS employee, Director of State & Private Forestry in Ogden, UT. Unless he got a promotion recently) presentation when a firefighter asks him about “pre identified IHC crew nets”, (which are available) and Dudley answers “YES, well NO I can’t guarantee..using their own internal, TAC & cell.” This tells me GM was using their own crew net, what ever that was. There’s different levels of secrecy in the frequency world. Brendan definitely heard on his handheld and/or mobiles in the trucks. Also whomever was with him, I wouldn’t believe Brian would want Brendan alone. The Prescott NF three guys, my guess is at the end of the helmet cam when one of them asks for a clone, this is what they’re doing, trying the IHC freqs they know of from experience? Possibly. Sciacca and Musser, sure those guys are ex hotshots, they know the frequencies and both were staged on HWY 89 with Cordes. Also imagine former hotshots in other positions possibly on the YHF or other IHC’s not on the YHF but were perhaps ‘close’ enough to the fire to overhear things. Mike Dudley says the frequencies can’t be released due to the lawyers, but he has said he knows what they were and the radios are still with YCSO. I sure hope the family lawyers get a hold of them and scan to see frequencies in all the banks. Too late to look at all the resources radios that were in use on the YHF that day though. Also please remember all parties involved cell phones were functioning, including GMIHC crew members and Eric and Jesse’s. There’s possibilities there.. That’s the thing with all this evidence, there is evidence and facts the lawyers know of AND the investigators but people on the outside speculate and go on.
“WTKTT said: “They just ‘line walked’ at brisk pace due south and were trusting Marsh that the two-track was going to take them to this ‘ranch’ thing ( which they had never seen and didn’t truly know where it was ) and/or back to town ( somehow ).
It was only when Steed ’rounded that bend’ down there and reached that saddle and there was absolutely no VISUAL proof that the two-track went anywhere from there but straight due-south to Mexico that the shit probably hit the fan.
I believe that’s when the (supposed) “argument about WHICH WAY TO GO” must have taken place… if it ever happened at all.”
–Did you ever hear of a burned roll of pink flagging being found? Up on the two track where it would’ve made sense for GMIHC to drop into DV. Right where the two track begins to pitch up and climb for a bit, and there’s a small sub ridge with less vegetation that drops down to the Helms and where they deployed. The SAI says they dropped in off the saddle down the drainage, have you looked at Google Earth from before the fire? Who’s to say Eric wasn’t ahead of them and flagged where they should head down the box canyon? Or did the flagging continue along the two track and down and out at the Helms? Was the supposed argument about Jesse not wanting to go all the way around on the 2 track? Or was the argument about Jesse not wanting to move the crew at all? It’s difficult to read between Dudley’s lines. I did notice throughout his presentation he said “there was no pressure on them to move, BUT there was INTERNAL CONVERSATIONS.” He also says it was a “crew decision”. Those are some serious assumptions, tells me Dudley knows more than we do. Why would he say it then?
WTKTT said: “>> SCOUTTING THE ESCAPE ROUTE TO THE SAFETY ZONE. (Bob Powers)
I don’t believe that EVER happened.
There really is ( still ) no evidence to support that.”
–I say why not? This is a DIVS job, to scout and relay what they find. Also flag the route, especially considering, from what we know, GMIHC didn’t see the iPad from the morning briefing that would’ve shown the 2 track around to the Helms. Eric did though. And back to that roll of burned pink flagging, how did that get there? This is what flagging is used for, scouting and flagging routes, hazards, and to catch the attention of those looking for it.
Reply to FIRE20+ post on August 15, 2014 at 6:03 pm
Wow. Lots of well-thought-out comebacks and ‘questions’ in there
that deserve honest answers from ME… so I’m afraid this post
might get a little ‘long in the tooth’… but here goes…
>> FIRE20+ said
>> I agree the missing GPS units are troublesome.
>> They aren’t listed anywhere in YCSO evidence, not a single one.
>> What did happen to those?
I believe Darrell Willis SHOULD know. As far as I know… Prescott Fire Department was charged with the actual ‘cleanup’ of the deployment site and Willis, as Wildland Division Chief, most certainly would have been in charge of THAT operation AND would have ‘taken possession’ of all items recovered.
There has never been much detail on this. We KNOW ( from the YCSO reports ) that PFD found that ‘iPhone melted to a pack’ that had been ‘missed’ by all the investigators and they DID report finding that iPhone to YCSO. The YCSO detectives had to drive to Prescott to ‘pick it up’ from ( someone? ) in PFD.
That means they WERE taking everything they found during the ‘cleanup’ of the site back to Prescott.
We ALSO know that the MacKenzie camera went a similar route. It was ‘missed’ by the detectives there on the ground… and it went back to Prescott. However… THIS time… it appears that no one reported THAT device finding to YCSO. Somehow… MacKenzie’s camera then magically ended up in his ‘personal effects’ bag at the Medical Examiner’s office and went all the way back to Christopher’s father before he, in turn, discovered content on it, made a CD, and then handed THAT CD back to Willis when he saw him at one of the funerals. Willis then (supposedly) passed either that original CD from MacKenzie’s father ( or a copy of it ) on to the SAIT. That’s as much as we still know about the ‘route’ that critical piece of evidence took.
Ditto for Marsh’s cell phone(s). People who knew him said he always carried TWO cellphones. One of them was being paid for with a stipend from PFD. We NOW know that at least ONE of them did, in fact, end up back in Amanda Marsh’s possession ( she has said so herself in an interview around the 1 year anniversary )… but just like the MacKenzie camera… there is NO RECORD of it ever being one of the cellphones entered into evidence by the YCSO police investigators. So what ‘route’ did THAT ‘device’ take to end up back with Amanda but never ‘examined’ by either YCSO ( or even the SAIT investigators? ).
What OTHER ‘devices’ did PFD find at the site… or in the remnants of the field packs? If they didn’t report finding MacKenzie’s camera to YCSO, then it’s pretty conceivable they found OTHER things that never got reported to YCSO, either ( GPS units included ).
This is all still important stuff… and I will say once again just for general consumption that the penalties for destroying / altering or even just withholding evidence related to Civil Litigation are the same as they are for a Criminal Proceedings. It’s a FELONY.
>> FIRE20+
>> WTKTT says: “1) Marsh doesn’t even SAY “I’m at the house” in the video.
>> Many people now agree the quote in question from Marsh at 4:16 was
>> when the he dodged the direct question from someone in fire command
>> “Are you WITH Granite Mountain right now?” with a response of
>> “Ahm… just checkin’ it out to see where we’re gonna jump out at”.”
>>
>> How do you know this?
Because I listened to the recordings and that is what I believe I am hearing.
And I have VERY good hearing.
Just as a general ‘annoucement’… whenever I refer to what I believe is being said in the background of one of these Panebaker videos it is because that is what I believe is being said in the background of one of the Panebaker videos. Of COURSE that is simply what I think and ‘Your mileage may vary’.
I have just gotten sick of typing that phrase over, and over, and over.
For SOME ( and only SOME ) of these background phrases that aren’t as clear as others… does anyone KNOW for 100 percent certainty what ALL the words being said are?
The answer is NO ( not yet, anyway ), but when I am referring to these phrases you can rest assured that I am telling you what I believe is ACTUALLY being said… because I believe that is what is ACTUALLY being said.
One more time… “Your mileage may vary”.
If anyone DOES think they are hearing anything radically different then by all means just ‘raise the issue’ again. With this kind of stuff… you really can’t ‘revist’ it too many times. At any moment… someone with even BETTER hearing might come along and solve a riddle.
>> FIRE20++
>> Who are the “many people” agreeing with this?
Well… first there is ME.
Then, immediately after I posted my translation of that 4:16 PM video on the very same thread at ‘Wildfire Today’ where Holly / Maclean were posting their ‘announcement’ that ‘Marsh made it to the Ranch ahead of the men’ it was SITTA who came back right away and said…
>> Wildfire Today
>> Sitta on January 22, 2014 at 4:24 am said:
>> WTKTT,
>> Thanks for linking to that (audio) clip. It’s still somewhat difficult
>> to hear, but much clearer than before. For what it’s worth, these
>> ears hear the same words that you transcribe.
Then there is AZFirefighter, who we are now almost 100 percent certain is actually Todd Foster, the TFLD who was runninig a Task Force in Yarnell that day and was standing right next to OPS1 Todd Abel when Marsh reported they were ‘in the safe black’ that afternoon.
When I posted my ‘translation’ of that 4:16 Panebaker video on Wildfire Today, where Holly / MacLean were posting there interpretation about Marsh saying “I’m at the house” instead… AZFirefighter jumped in right away over there at ‘Wildfire Today’ and confirmed that HE was hearing the exact same thing I was.
In case you missed it… this was actually discussed just a short while ago down below in this very chapter of this ongoing discussion.
Here is a reprint of that brought up from down below…
————————————————————————-
WTKTT Replied to Marti Reed’s post on August 2, 2014 at 8:39 pm
Thank you, Marti.
So online handle “AZfirefighter” really is Todd Foster.
I have always thought it was SOMEONE on the north end of Yarnell that day.
AZfirefighter ( Todd Foster ) has also made a lot of comments over at Bill Gabbert’s ‘Widlfire Today’ site as well.
He and I had an exchange there back in January of this year and
he basically said the same exact thing you have shown him saying up above.
This was all about Gabbert’s POST about John MaClean and Holly Neill coming out with their ‘sources’ for their claim that Eric Marsh was saying ‘at the house’ in that Panebaker background radio capture and they thought that meant Marsh was at the Boulder Springs Ranch circa 4:16 PM.
AZfirefighter ( Todd Foster ) agreed with me that no one was saying ‘at the house’ at all.
In his post about that… AZfirefighter( Foster ) also said he was ‘with OPS’ that day and heard GM say they were ‘in good black’ and ‘staying put’.
I asked him ( Foster ) to confirm which OPS he was referring to and he came back and confirmed ‘Field’ OPS ( Todd Abel ).
I then asked him if Abel was AWARE ( that day ) that OPS2 Musser had also called GM to see if they were ‘available’ for structure protection work in Yarnell… but AZfirefighter ( Foster ) didn’t answer that question.
Here is that original exchange on Gabbert’s Wildfire Today site back in January…
—————————————————————————————-
AZfirefighter on January 22, 2014 at 10:08 am said:
I would have to agree with WTKTT… its sounds like “just checking it out to see where we’re going to jump out at”. I was on the line that day, and while I did not hear this transmission, his statement and the way he says it makes sense to me. I don’t hear “at the house” at all. Further I never heard any transmissions about GMIHC going to protect structures. In fact, I was with OPS when GMIHC stated they were in good black and staying put.
WantsToKnowTheTruth on January 22, 2014 at 1:50 pm said:
Which OPS?
AZfirefighter on January 24, 2014 at 1:04 pm said:
Field
WantsToKnowTheTruth on January 26, 2014 at 4:45 am said:
Field OPS that day was Todd Abel ( according to all documentation ).
Paul Musser was ‘Planning OPS’.
Was Abel aware that Musser had contacted GM and requested them to send resources to Yarnell?
( No response )
——————————————————————————————
>> FIRE20++
>>
>> Where do you get “Ahm…just checkin’ it out to see where
>> we’re gonna jump out at.”?
From the recording. That is EXACTLY what I believe is being said.
>> FIRE20++ also said…
>> Too many syllables for the recorded audio.
Nope. Not if you know how to talk like a southerner.
>> FIRE20++ also said…
>> Haven’t we been here before?
Yup. That is exactly what Holly said over at Wildfire today when AZFirefighter and SITTA and myself were challenging her ‘I’m at the house” interpretation.
Here is THAT exact exchange between Holly and myself over at Wildfire Today after I published a link to my own enhanced audio clip and my own ‘translation’ of that 4:16 Panebaker video.
She also pulled the ‘not enough syllables’ argument.
I gave her just one example of how southerners can ‘combine words’ and ‘eliminate syllables’ in their speech and then I asked her ( regardless of any ‘syllable counting’ ) if after listening to my own ‘enhanced audio clip’ she still thought she was hearing Eric say “I’m at the house”.
She never replied.
——————————————————–
>> WildFire Today
>> Holly Neill on January 22, 2014 at 10:13 am said:
>>
>> In your ” Uh…just checkin’ it out to see”, you have 8 syllables
>> in this part. There are clearly not 8 syllables in this part of the
>> actual conversation on the audio.
>>
>> WantsToKnowTheTruth on January 22, 2014 at 12:22 pm said:
>>
>> It is possible ( the way Marsh talks ) that the
>> 2 words ‘checkin’ it’ come across as one word.
>> Southerners do that at lot. They eliminate ‘spaces’
>> between words sometimes.
>>
>> Regardless… what do you think of the enhanced audio clip?
>> Are you still hearing “I’m at the house”?
>>
>> ( There was never any response from Holly to this question ).
>> ( but a few days later John Maclean posted a new letter )
>> ( saying that while he and Holly still ‘believe” that is what )
>> ( they are hearing… they no longer believe that there might )
>> ( not be other possibilities. See below for more about that. )
———————————————————————
>> FIRE20++ also said
>> Examples of Eric Marsh’s transmissions indicating his possible
>> location, which is below or ahead of the crew:
>> “I’m trying to work my way off the top”
Personally… I believe what Marsh meant there is that he had, in fact, ‘worked his way’ all the way to the TOP of Weaver Mountain itself and he was now ‘working his way off THAT top’… but that’s just me. His words there are still open to interpretation unless someone will come out and CONFIRM where he was at that point ( if they can ).
Of course there are ‘other’ pieces of evidence that indicate ( as you just said ) Marsh’s ‘possible location’.
That wasn’t the point of what I posted above.
I was only talking about absolutely KNOWN locations that are backed up with either actual photographs or first-hand eye-witness testimony.
I still that that is a ‘short list’ and only includes…
1) Joy Collura’s photographs taken that morning of Eric arriving on the ridge.
2) The NOON F2F meeting that included Marsh, Steed, Frisby Brown.
3) The location of Eric’s body at the deployment site.
That being said… I’ll still take your other ‘examples’ one by one…
>> “The guys, Granite, is making their way down our escape
>> route from this morning…”
>> (Granite is making their way down, not “We’re” making
>> “OUR” way down)
Doesn’t tell us where Marsh was.
>> (Are you on the ER with GM right now?) “Nah, I’m at the
>> (whatever) where we’re gonna jump out at” (He is answering
>> no, I am not on the ER with GM right now, I am somewhere
>> else where we’re gonna jump out at).
Doesn’t tell us where Marsh was.
BTW: I do NOT believe Marsh says ‘Nah’ there. I listened to that part VERY closely. One more time… I believe what he says is “Ahm… jus’ checkin’ it out to see where we’re gonna jump out at”.
At best… the ‘vocalized pause’ of ‘Ahm…’ at the start might be just ‘Uhm…’, but I do NOT believe there is any ‘N’ being pronounced there or that he says ‘Nah’. I believe his response to the question “Are you with Granite Mountain right now?” was totally non-committal and a total ‘dodge’ of the question, for some strange reason.
>> “They’re coming from the heel of the fire” (Not we are, but they are)
Doesn’t tell us where Marsh was.
>> “I’m here with GM hotshots…” He announces that he is with
>> them at this point. GM7 makes the distress calls to Air
>> Attack before this. Eric jumps in at the end
>> and now says that he is with them.” This is how I see it.
This DOES tell us where Marsh was and where his body would be found… but see above. I had that one covered under number (3) as to ‘truly verified locations’ for Marsh.
>> FIRE20++ also said…
>> WTKTT said: “2) The 3:50 MacKenzie photos simply show a
>> few of the men who were ‘at rest’ down the slope by the
>> ‘cut rock’ location being told to re-assemble directly UP
>> the slope with the rest of the men. Those photos don’t show
>> anyone really GOING anywhere except to walk directly up the
>> slope a few hundred feet and join the others who were all
>> assembling with Steed up at that NEXT ‘resting spot’…
>> where MacKenzie would then shoot his videos. The fact that
>> they were exiting to MacKenzie’s right ONLY means that was
>> because they had to ‘circle around’ behind Christopher in order
>> to go UP that slight draw that was there to then ascend the few
>> hundred feet to the NEXT ‘rest spot’. Any aerial view of that
>> ‘cut rock’ location where those photos were taken proves that
>> is what they must have done.”
>>
>> – I see no “proof” here as you say.
Do you know what ‘cut rock’ I am referring to?
It’s the one that is in ALL of those 3:50 Mackenzie photos.
It has what almost looks to be a man-made SQUARE ‘chunk’ cut out of it and it is highly visible… even from far away.
It is exactly HERE…
34.228218, -112.788940
The men were sitting on that group of retardant covered rocks just south and a little up the slope from that ‘cut rock’ and looking out towards the fireline.
If Jesse Steed was already at that ‘next resting spot’ where the MacKenzie videos were about to be taken he could have actually just ‘shouted down’ to these men and told them to ‘come up’ to the same location.
That’s how CLOSE they actually were to that ‘next rest location’ when MacKenzie took those 3:50 photos.
However… as any aerial photos shows… they could not have walked directly AT the next location from those rocks covered with retardant. Best they could do was go SOUTH just a bit ( and circle around behind MacKenzie and his camera ) and then go up that slight ‘draw’ that was there.
>> FIRE20++ also said…
>> The fact you imply that GMIHC were ‘at rest’ is off.
Really? They sure looked ‘at rest’ to me ( and playing Tourist with all their cameras ). See next comment, though… I think what you are trying to say is that ‘at rest’ is ‘relative’.
>> Sure they were sitting, but they were also ready to move at a
>> moments notice. Trust me. Hotshots will sit fully geared like this,
>> and at times a few may have their packs off getting a snack,
>> adjusting, or water, etc..
Okay. I will buy that. They certainly were aware they had to get out of there SOMEHOW so yea… no one was taking their boots off and they weren’t ‘paralyzed’ or anything.
>> These guys were ready to move and not just to
>> reassemble up the hill.
The only ones who were told to ‘reassemble up the hill’ were the ones that had been just down the slope near the ‘cut rock’. A few moments later… they appear in MacKenzie’s photos and videos being taken at that ‘next rest location’ just up the slope from where they were at 3:50 PM.
As I said above… they were so close to that ‘next resting spot’ where MacKenzie would shoot his videos that Steed could have just ‘yelled down’ to them and told them ‘come on up here’ ( Which he probably did ).
>> FIRE20++ also said
>> WTKTT said: “Holly / MacLean have since actually ‘recanted’
>> their original assertions in a followup (public) post at Wildfire
>> today where they postulated these theories in the first place.”
>>
>> – John MacLean recanted his assertions? Where?
The same place he and Holly ‘announced’ that Eric Marsh had made it all the way to the Ranch ahead of the men just because they *thought* they were hearing him say “I’m at the house” in that 4:16 Panebaker video.
Over at Wildfire Today… just a few days after they posted their ‘conclusions’ and people then publicly disagreed with what they thought they were hearing.
They ‘punted’ on their insistence ( and their CERTAINTY ) that Marsh was saying “I’m at the house” ( to the exclusion of anything else ) and they were now requesting that someone ELSE ( Like ADOSH ) do ‘another independent analysis’ and publish THEIR findings.
By the way… the actual DEFINITION of ‘recant’ is as follows…
RECANT ( verb )
To PUBLICLY say that you no longer have an opinion
or belief that you once had.
The ‘belief they once had’ that MacLean was NOW ‘recanting’ just days after publishing his ‘findings’ was that his ( and Holly’s ) interpretation that Marsh was saying “I’m at the house” was the *ONLY* interpretation and that they *MIGHT* actually be wrong.
Actually… RECANT might not be the *right* word here at all.
Maybe the better description would be BACK-PEDALING…
—————————————————————-
Wildfire Today
Posted on January 29, 2014 by Bill Gabbert
Update from John Maclean about Yarnell Hill Fire
Obsessing about a single word, “house,” is appropriate up to a point.
That’s the word Holly and I and many others hear in that one of several
conversations we disclosed; it is not the word everyone hears.
It would be best, perhaps, if investigators for the Arizona Department
of Occupational Safety and Health, who are well alerted to the background
communications, could have the recordings analyzed by some outside
audio expert and themselves make a report.
——————————————————-
NOTE: There were NO COMMENTS ever allowed on this public posting from John Maclean. It was just an ‘announcement’ and no one was ‘allowed’ to say anything in response.
>> FIRE20++ also said…
>> And I believe MacLean and Neill’s original post focused
>> on the supposed 33 minute communication gap the
>> investigation perpetuated. The focus turned to what was
>> actually said on the audio and not because of their
>> doing, it’s just what people grabbed hold of.
Their published findings and ( supposed ) ‘revelations’ were BASED on them believing that Marsh said “I’m at the house” ( to the exclusion of all other interpretations )… so YES… of COURSE the ‘focus turned to to what was on the audio’.
You are right about the ‘other part’, though. They ( Holly / Maclean ) WERE trying to put all of their ‘new findings’ in the context of proof that the ‘supposed 33 minute communication gap’ was FICTION… and Maclean reiterated the importance of this even when he then ‘back-pedaled’ on his entire assumption that Marsh was definitely at the Boulder Springs Ranch AHEAD of Granite Mountain.
And as well he should have.
Regardless of any SPECIFIC words heard in the 4:16 PM Panebaker video… the background audio DOES represent ‘Direct communications with Granite Mountain’ right smack in the middle of when the Arizona Forestry SAIT contractors said there was no such thing.
BTW: It got ‘drowned out in the noise’ back then… but Holly and Maclean DID actually mention the YARNELL-GAMBLE video back then as well and that it represented the SAME THING. Direct Communciations with Eric Marsh ( at 4:27 PM ) at a time when the SAIT said no such thing ever happened.
>> FIRE20++ also said…
>> WTKTT said: “SIDENOTE: As with the GPS units above… we
>> absolutely KNOW who could most probably tell us MORE about
>> this YARNELL-GAMBLE video, WHO the speakers were, and
>> what ELSE might have been said before and after the part that
>> was captured. That would be Blue Ridge Hotshot Ian Mccord.
>> He was sitting right there in the Crew Cab listening to that radio
>> running FULL BLAST in the background for that ENTIRE
>> conversation. Whatever it was he really heard… ( including the
>> actual CALL SIGN of the person talking to Marsh?? ) his
>> memory of that conversation is what seems to have caused
>> him to actually NAME this video clip of his “The YARNELL-GAMBLE”.
>> Ian Mccord has NEVER been interviewed by anyone ( that we
>> know of, anyway ) and we aren’t even sure if any of the fragmented
>> Blue Ridge Unit Log notes are his… or NOT. ”
>>
>> – Please WTKTT, exaggerate much?
>> In the SAI evidence below is the order and naming for the
>> BRIHC vids/audio. Ronald Gamble (C-3.9 on his resource order)
>> is a firefighter on the BRIHC.
Yup. Page 31 of the ‘J- Resource Orders’ document.
C-3 is the order for Blue Ridge
C-3.9 is the order for Crew Member “Gamble, Ronald R. ( AZ-FDC )
There has ALWAYS been a ‘possibility’ that this is the ‘simple’ explanation for why a video in the SAIT evidence record might be called YARNELL-GAMBLE
There is no ‘Gamble’ folder as there is for every other Blue Ridge Hotshot who submitted photos or evidence to the SAIT. The YARNELL-GAMBLE video is in ‘Ian Mccord’s’ folder.
So that pretty much means it was a ‘mistake’ that it was sitting there in this Mccord folder if it really was NOT taken by him.
The EXIF metadata embedded in the YARNELL-GAMBLE movie file itself tells us it was taken with the following device…
“yarnell-gamble.MOV”
Make: Apple
Model: iPhone 4S
Software Version: 5.1.1
There are actually at least THREE different ‘cameras’ used for the photos sitting in that that ‘Mccord’ folder. Two of the others are…
“yarnell 103.MOV”
Make: NIKON
Model: S01
Software: S01 Ver.1.0
“yarnell-mccord 103.JPG”
Make: Apple
Camera Model Name: iPhone 4S
Software: 5.1
I am actually going to ‘punt’ on any more detail for this issue because this is all getting way too long and this possible ‘other explanation’ for the name of this movie deserves another post altogether.
One more thought for now, though…
If that video really was shot by ‘Ronald R. Gamble’ and not ‘Ian Mccord’…
I suppose the other ‘simple’ explanation as to how Ronald R. Gamble’s video that he took in Yarnell ended up in Ian Mccord’s folder in the SAIT material is that perhaps Ronald just RENAMED it himself to ‘yarnell_gamble’ and then just GAVE it to Ian Mccord instead of giving it to the SAIT investigators themselves.
Ian Mccord might have then just ‘dumped’ Ronald’s renamed movie into his OWN submission to the SAIT and never told the SAIT that his ‘submission’ also had a movie in there from ANOTHER guy ( Ronald ).
Either way… only Ian Mccord ( or Ronald Gamble ) could probably clear up this ‘naming mystery’ for that video.
More on this later ( in a separate post that will cover all the different cameras used in that Mccord folder and what that might mean ).
>> FIRE20++
>> Those people were gagged, we are only left to speculate
>> whether they were interviewed, if so hopefully
>> within that critical 24 hr period. Those BRIHC were in their
>> own chaotic event, loading up into their buggies and getting
>> the hell out. Hard saying if they would even remember
>> “hearing” the background radio.
Yes. It’s hard to say. It all depends on how good a memory is involved.
I am still hoping this guy was SHARP and he DOES ‘remember’ the call signs he was hearing at that time ( WHO was talking to WHO ).
>> looked like he was trying to film the fire behavior and how
>> close they were.
Yes. It does… but that doesn’t mean he wouldn’t remember what might have been coming over that radio which was at LOUD VOLUME there in that Crew Carrier. Maybe he does. Only solution is to ASK him.
>> FIRE20++
>> Directory listing for ‘BlueRidgeHotshotsPhotosVideos’ folder
>>
>> _README.txt
>> _README.xlsx
>> ball
>> yarnell -Mccord
>> yarnell 074.jpg
>> yarnell 075.jpg
>> yarnell 076.MOV
>> yarnell 079.jpg
>> yarnell 080.jpg
>> yarnell 081.MOV
>> yarnell 083.jpg
>> yarnell 084.jpg
>> yarnell 085.jpg
>> yarnell 086.jpg
>> yarnell 087.MOV
>> yarnell 088.MOV
>> yarnell 090.MOV
>> yarnell 091.jpg
>> yarnell 092.jpg
>> yarnell 093.jpg
>> yarnell 094.jpg
>> yarnell 095.jpg
>> yarnell 096.jpg
>> yarnell 097.jpg
>> yarnell 098.jpg
>> yarnell 099.jpg
>> yarnell 100.jpg
>> yarnell 101.jpg
>> yarnell 102.jpg
>> yarnell 103.MOV
>> yarnell 105.jpg
>> yarnell 106.jpg
>> yarnell_gamble.MOV
>> yarnell- Papich
>> yarnell-desoto
>> Yarnell-Wardemups
Actually… you missed some.
The ones in the ‘Mccord’ folder that come AFTER ‘yarnell-gamble.MOV’.
Following the file in the Ian Mccord folder that is named ‘yarnell_gamble.MOV, the remaining NINE still images in that folder are actually named like THIS…
yarnell-Mccord 001.JPG
yarnell-Mccord 002.JPG
yarnell-Mccord 003.JPG
yarnell-Mccord 004.JPG
yarnell-Mccord 005.JPG
yarnell-Mccord 006.JPG
yarnell-Mccord 007.JPG
yarnell-Mccord 008.JPG
yarnell-Mccord 009.JPG
Does that departure from the ‘naming convention’ for ALL the other photos in Ian Mccord’s folder provide more credence to the theory that a file named ‘yarnell_gamble.MOV’ ( even though that used an UNDERSCORE and not a HYPHEN ) might have been either ‘submitted by’ or simply just ‘taken by’ someone named ‘gamble’ rather than ‘Mccord’ and it just accidentally ended up in Mccord’s folder?
I don’t know.
As I said above… stay tuned for a separate post about this YARNELL GAMBLE video and where that name might really have come from.
>> FIRE20++ also said…
>> SIDENOTE: I read in a post somewhere recently on here about
>> obtaining evidence and believing Nowicki was a miracle worker for
>> providing it. Maybe Calvin? Sorry I can’t remember. ANYBODY
>> can get evidence! FOIA for both the SAI and ADOSH, send a
>> hard drive and you got all the evidence. The fact it’s on this website
>> and she helped obtain it, ok they’re providing a service. Just like
>> we all are to them, every time a comment is posted. Point is any
>> American can get this stuff who’s wiling to go to a bit of
>> trouble. And it’s free.
You are right… but the fact remains that Elizbeth Nowicki DID, in fact, care enough and was diligent enough early on to be the one to actually DO what you are saying ‘anyone could have done’… so she still deserves MANY ‘kudos’ and ‘thanks’ for that.
>> FIRE20++
>> WTKTT said: “SIDENOTE: Certainly the ACTUAL ‘testimony’ that
>> Mike Dudley has referred to in PUBLIC might reveal a lot more
>> information such as WHO ( multiple people ) was reporting
>> this and WHAT radio channel they heard it on. Intra crew?
>> That only means it was Brendan reporting it or Willis or one of
>> the other ‘Prescott’ people ( Sciacca? Cole? Hulburd? Clawson?
>> Yowell? ) that might have had that frequency punched in.. NOT
>> intra crew? Then any NUMBER of people probably heard this
>> ‘argument’ traffic.”
>>
>> – Remember in Dudley’s (who is a current USDA/USFS
>> employee, Director of State & Private Forestry in Ogden, UT.
>> Unless he got a promotion recently) presentation when a
>> firefighter asks him about “pre identified IHC crew nets”,
>> (which are available) and Dudley answers “YES, well NO
>> I can’t guarantee..using their own internal, TAC & cell.” This
>> tells me GM was using their own crew net, what ever that was.
If you are trying to say that you believe ‘GM was using their own crew net for the supposed ‘argument’ that Dudley referred to’ ( which is what my own original comment was wondering ) then yes… I would tend to agree.
I can’t imagine them getting into an ‘argument’ over the TAC channels for all the world to hear…
…but then again… I believe it is still possible that by the time Steed reached that saddle he might have already been starting to have ‘radio issues’ and maybe that argument ( if it really did happen ) ended up taking place over one of the TAC channels instead.
Until we hear from whoever Mike Dudley is talking about and/or actually see this ‘testimony’ he seems to be referring to… we don’t know WHAT channel they might have heard this ‘alleged’ argument on.
I am still actually MORE interested in WHO these people are and WHAT they actually thought they heard than which radio channel they heard it on… but if they are actually sure it was a TAC channel then that just means there are probably a LOT more people who might have heard all this as well.
>> FIRE20++ also said…
>> There’s different levels of secrecy in the frequency world.
>> Brendan definitely heard on his handheld and/or mobiles
>> in the trucks. Also whomever was with him, I wouldn’t believe
>> Brian would want Brendan alone.
I hear ya… but if you are now trying to say that Brendan was never ‘alone’ after Frisby picked him up… that is NOT the case.
Brendan was most DEFINITELY left ‘alone’ by Frisby after he first dropped him off at the GM Superintendent truck. Brendan then remained ‘alone’ until the BR guys who were being tapped to help ‘move the trucks’ got over that way. I do NOT believe that anyone was then ‘inserted’ into the GM Supt. Truck along with Brendan. There is no evidence that happened and nothing to that effect in ANY of the Blue Ridge interview notes or Unit Logs.
I believe Brendan drove the GM Supt. Truck over to the Shrine area ALONE in the vehicle… and then also remained alone in the same vehicle as they ( almost right away ) started evacuating from the Youth Camp and down to the Restaurant.
That being said… I think you ARE right that from the moment the deployment traffic hit the radio… Frisby ( and others ) WERE making sure that Brendan was not ‘left alone’. If that really is Brendan standing at the back of Mary Cole’s all-white Tacoma pickup in the Russ Reason video then that appears to be photographic evidence that this was the case. That ‘tall FF’ seen with Brendan is not only ‘sticking close’ to him… he actually appears to be ‘comforting’ Brendan at various moments in the Russ Reason video.
>> FIRE20++ also said…
>>The Prescott NF three guys, my guess is at the end of the
>> helmet cam when one of them asks for a clone, this is what
>> they’re doing, trying the IHC freqs they know of from
>> experience? Possibly.
Yes. Very possible. What is actually said there is ( parphrasing )
“We need to do a CLONE so we can hear what’s goin’ on”.
>> FIRE20++ also said…
>> Sciacca and Musser, sure those guys are ex hotshots, they
>> know the frequencies and both were staged on HWY 89 with
>> Cordes. Also imagine former hotshots in other positions
>> possibly on the YHF or other IHC’s not on the YHF but were
>> perhaps ‘close’ enough to the fire to overhear things.
>> Mike Dudley says the frequencies can’t be released due to the
>> lawyers, but he has said he knows what they were and the
>> radios are still with YCSO.
I’m not sure that is actually the case.
Let me check my own notes on that and get back to you.
There actually was a photograph, at one point, that was taken at one of the funerals ( I can’t remember which one. Parker, I think ) where there was a ‘Memorial Table’ set up with ‘personal items’… and sitting right there on the table was a BK radio with the same ‘tape’ and they fella’s NAME on it.
Whether that was his ACTUAL radio from that day suddenly sitting on that ‘memorial table’… I do not know.
If I remember… it was not a ‘pristine BK’ with some tape on it.
It looked pretty ‘beat up’ ( but not totally burned or anything ).
I will try to find that picture again.
>> FIRE20++
>> I sure hope the family lawyers get a hold of them and
>> scan to see frequencies in all the banks. Too late to
>> look at all the resources radios that were in use on
>> the YHF that day though. Also please remember all
>> parties involved cell phones were functioning, including
>> GMIHC crew members and Eric and Jesse’s.
>> There’s possibilities there..
Yes… there are… but I seriously doubt that whoever ( multiple people? ) were ‘reporting’ to Mike Dudley that they supposedly heard Steed and Marsh arguing could have been referring to ‘cellphone’ traffic. They pretty much had to be talking about ‘radio traffic’… and the simplest way to find out which frequency that was ( and WHO these people are ) is to SEE the ‘evidence’ that Mike Dudley was shooting his mouth off about in public.
>> FIRE20++
>> That’s the thing with all this evidence, there is evidence
>> and facts the lawyers know of AND the investigators
>> but people on the outside speculate and go on.
That’s true.
Example: It would not surprise me at all if the attorneys have been able to see/read the actual autopsy and toxicology reports by now. If there is ANYTHING in those reports that relates to the incident… then yes… THEY probably already know about it.
Ditto for the SAIT, really.
They may ALSO have had access to the actual autopsy and toxicology reports but never once dared to mention them.
We also KNOW that ADOSH requested and received ALL of Darrell Willis’ cellphone records. Not a word in any of their FOIA / FOIL release about them, either, other than the fact that they defintely DID ‘receive them’.
>> FIRE20++
>> “WTKTT said: “They just ‘line walked’ at brisk pace
>> due south and were trusting Marsh that the two-track
>> was going to take them to this ‘ranch’ thing ( which
>> they had never seen and didn’t truly know where
>> it was ) and/or back to town ( somehow ).
>> It was only when Steed ’rounded that bend’ down there
>> and reached that saddle and there was absolutely no
>> VISUAL proof that the two-track went anywhere from
>> there but straight due-south to Mexico that the shit
>> probably hit the fan. I believe that’s when the (supposed)
>> ‘argument about WHICH WAY TO GO’ must have taken
>> place… if it ever happened at all.”
>>
>> – Did you ever hear of a burned roll of pink flagging being found?
Of course. The panorama I uploaded to YouTube last night was actually taken pretty much at that exact spot where Tex ( Sonny ) Gilligan found it.
>> FIRE20++ also said…
>> Up on the two track where it would’ve made sense for GMIHC
>> to drop into DV. Right where the two track begins to pitch
>> up and climb for a bit, and there’s a small sub ridge with less
>> vegetation that drops down to the Helms and where they
>> deployed. The SAI says they dropped in off the saddle
>> down the drainage, have you looked at Google Earth
>> from before the fire? Who’s to say Eric wasn’t ahead of
>> them and flagged where they should head down the
>> box canyon?
Who’s to say? Not me.
SOMEBODY dropped’ it accidentally OR actually ‘placed’ it there.
We don’t know who ( or why ).
I still believe all the evidence points to Eric Marsh always being NORTH of the crew and trying to play ‘catch up’ all the way to the time of deployment… but as I said yesterday… many ‘assumptions’ about that time frame could still get ‘turned around’ if even just tiny other bits of evidence appear or are ‘unearthed’ in what is already published.
>> FIRE20++ also said…
>> Or did the flagging continue along the two track and
>> down and out at the Helms? Was the supposed
>> argument about Jesse not wanting to go all the
>> way around on the 2 track? Or was the argument
>> about Jesse not wanting to move the crew at all?
All valid questions.
I would love to know the answers.
If we can find out WHO Mike Dudley was talking about and/or actually SEE this ‘testimony’ he seemed to be shooting his mouth off about in public… then maybe those answers would be readily available.
>> FIRE20++ also said…
>> It’s difficult to read between Dudley’s lines.
>> I did notice throughout his presentation he said
>> “there was no pressure on them to move, BUT
>> there was INTERNAL CONVERSATIONS.” He
>> also says it was a “crew decision”. Those are some
>> serious assumptions, tells me Dudley knows more
>> than we do. Why would he say it then?
There is absolutely NO DOUBT that SAIT Co-Lead Mike Dudley knows ‘more than we do’. Add Jim Karels and any number of other people who were on that team.
What they KNEW… and what they chose to put in a report, are now known to be almost two completely different animals.
I believe, at this point, and after all this consternation… just about anyone who was on the SAIT team is ‘fair game’ for being called as a ‘witness’ in the ongoing Civil Litigation(s).
>> FIRE20++ also said…
>> WTKTT said: “SCOUTTING THE ESCAPE ROUTE
>> TO THE SAFETY ZONE. (Bob Powers)
>> I don’t believe that EVER happened.
>> There really is ( still ) no evidence to support that.”
>>
>> – I say why not? This is a DIVS job, to scout and relay
>> what they find. Also flag the route, especially considering,
>> from what we know, GMIHC didn’t see the iPad from the
>> morning briefing that would’ve shown the 2 track around
>> to the Helms. Eric did though. And back to that roll of
>> burned pink flagging, how did that get there? This is what
>> flagging is used for, scouting and flagging routes, hazards,
>> and to catch the attention of those looking for it.
All valid points… but they are not ‘evidence’.
What I said was…
“There is (still) no EVIDENCE to support that”.
There just isn’t. Not YET, anyway.
It would be fascinating if ‘all of a sudden’ all those Granite Mountain GPS units just ‘magically appeared’ and someone tries to say they fell behind a bench at Station 7 and have only ‘recently been rediscovered’.
If one of them belonged to Marsh… and it still has data… then all of this will (finally) become CLEAR.
Hell of an exchange FIRE20++ and WTK
First off, I never called EN a miracle worker. I only voiced that I held her in high regards for her efforts in obtaining and sharing her FOIA/FOIL material
Next. I agree ( and have thought this for some time) that the Gamble video was related to the BR guys name, that somehow got dumped into McCord’s photo folder. There was a similar issue with the Lars Garcia folder, right? WTK, I look forward to a post concerning this
There is as much hard evidence that Marsh was ahead of the crew as behind them. Right?
Sorry Calvin, you never called Nowicki a miracle worker, I interjected those words, my apologies. This website does provide a service and I’m glad about that
As far as the McCord photo folder goes, there ARE nine of McCords (didn’t believe that was worth mentioning in post above) photos in that file if you click on the name. However, the rest below McCords file (as I posted above) are how they’re listed in the evidence, single photos for some reason not lumped into anyones file, only appearing to lumped into McCords. I may be far off but I believe the investigation did this, intentionally I can’t be sure. Sloppy would be my guess. Anyway, this is my belief that Ronald Gamble took this video/audio and it’s the only evidence he turned in. He probably didn’t even fully realize how important this audio was when he turned it in either… Besides what does it really matter? I just didn’t care for how WTKTT made up naming that video yarnell_gamble because of the riskiness associated with it and the audio caught.
I believe what you said above to be true. There’s as much hard evidence that Eric Marsh was in front of the crew as behind it. Be weary of Mike Dudley’s belief that it wouldn’t matter if we knew if Eric was at the ranch/house/structures/community…he’s wrong. It does matter because it would disprove the SAI’s belief that there was no LCES, no communication by Eric letting anyone know the plan, and most of all, the families and firefighters would know the truth and SOMEHOW LEARN FROM THIS! The SAI needs to stand by that report they produced…it’s getting ready to be heavily scrutinized in the courts and with any new evidence it hurts the States case.
Reply to FIRE20+ post on August 16, 2014 at 8:22 am
>> FIRE20++
>> As far as the McCord photo folder goes, there ARE
>> nine of McCords (didn’t believe that was worth
>> mentioning in post above) photos in that file if you
>> click on the name. However, the rest below
>> McCords file (as I posted above) are how they’re
>> listed in the evidence, single photos for some
>> reason not lumped into anyones file, only appearing
>> to lumped into McCords. I may be far off but I believe
>> the investigation did this, intentionally I can’t be sure
>> Sloppy would be my guess.
If that video in Mccord’s folder really is simply either FROM Ronald R. Gamble or Mccord himself renamed it because he had handed his iPhone to Ronald Gamble and that HE took that particular video and Mccord was somehow trying to document that… I still don’t think it ‘was’ intentional on the part of the SAIT. It may very well be that Mccord was also ‘collecting’ Blue Ridge stuff and then submitted it all under his name just like we now know Larz Garcia was doing with some of the AZFS people.
>> FIRE20++ also wrote…
>> I just didn’t care for how WTKTT made up naming
>> that video yarnell_gamble because of the riskiness
>> associated with it and the audio caught.
The SAIT FOIA / FOIL material came online ‘incrementally’.
The Blue Ridge Hotshot Photos and Videos came online BEFORE the actual ‘J- Resource Orders’ folder appeared.
Until that ‘Resource order’ folder/document appeared… and we were finally able to actually SEE the names of all the Blue Ridge Hotshots… it was an absolute ‘mystery’ why this crucial video with a clear recording of Marsh talking about Granite Mountain ‘coming from the heel of the fire’ would have had this ‘mysterious’ name YARNELL-GAMBLE.
The word ‘gamble’ just seemed to fit what was being captured in the audio and appeared to be what Mccord might have thought was a good description of the conversation recorded in the video.
At the time that ‘guess’ about the name was proposed… no one who knows the Blue Ridge Hotshots said there was, in fact, someone on the crew named ‘Ronald R. Gamble’.
We still had to wait until the “J- Resource Orders’ document came online to even find that out.
I still think only an interview with Ian Mccord and/or Ronald Gamble will fully clear up what happened here.
Did someone named with a last name of ‘Gamble’ on the BR crew just give that one-an-only video he had to Mccord and he just ‘renamed’ it and ‘dumped’ into his own submission to the SAIT… or did the SAIT just ‘accidentally’ dump this one video into Mccord’s folder… OR… did none of that happen and Mccord really did name this video YARNELL-GAMBLE because he thought that matched the radio traffic?
Good stuff WTKTT.
Question for you WTKTT. Why do you believe Eric Marsh was behind or North of the GMIHC? Why does this make sense to you?
The yarnell_gamble video. If you want to spend your time examining the software, phones, etc to identify who took what, I say time wasted. And what’s the point of it? To be right who captured that radio transmission? Thought we were moving on to WHO said what in that audio? If I had to bet I’d say McCord, Gamble, Papich, etc were all in the crew carriers, loading up getting ready to blast out of there. They were all there besides the drivers for the GMIHC rigs, and yes I am not sure who was driving what rig so can’t say who was where exactly. It perhaps wasn’t just one guy sitting there by himself hearing every ominous thing on the radio.
What’s your beef with Maclean/Neill? Seems like it’s about being right or wrong and there’s veiled ego with you on this blog. If people don’t agree on something wouldn’t it be natural to just stop comms? Why go round and round? Are you the unofficial leader here? I just don’t agree when people throw things (perceptions) out there as if it’s absolute when WE all know it’s not. It’s very much how Nowicki is. Or when somebody tries so hard to discredit another person…we’re all here for the same thing. There’s many possibilities and we all see things differently. OTHER people read this blog and they may see something as absolute when it’s presented that way. Dangerous.
A comment about GMIHC sitting and ‘resting’ before they moved.
WTKTT said: “Okay. I will buy that. They certainly were aware they had to get out of there SOMEHOW so yea… no one was taking their boots off and they weren’t ‘paralyzed’ or anything.”
–Not funny, nope ain’t laughing and weird. Getting out of there somehow would involve walking out so I sure hope they weren’t paralyzed in that timeframe. Seriously? My point is not one of those guys looked like they weren’t ready to MOVE and soon. Again, there’s a difference in hotshots resting and what it means, it’s a fact in real firefighting. Playing tourist with their phones is one thing, easy access, the phone could be kept in their accessible pockets. Packs are on, tools are near, saws are chapped, boots are tied. (In Joy’s pics there’s a photo of GM on the line earlier in the day with their hardhats off and packs off–that’s resting) They knew they would be moving any second, again not for a reposition, but because there was a plan.
WTKTT said: “Yes… there are… but I seriously doubt that whoever ( multiple people? ) were ‘reporting’ to Mike Dudley that they supposedly heard Steed and Marsh arguing could have been referring to ‘cellphone’ traffic. They pretty much had to be talking about ‘radio traffic’… and the simplest way to find out which frequency that was ( and WHO these people are ) is to SEE the ‘evidence’ that Mike Dudley was shooting his mouth off about in public.”
–How about this? Did any GMIHC make an outside phone call to anybody not on the YHF? Did somebody not on the YHF call any GMIHC on their cells? It’s not a question per say but a suggestion of a possibility. For Dudley to make a statement like this, there has to be evidence. Curious if he has done any other presentations lately or did the lawyers shut him up.
Great convo here. I’m not sure where’s the best spot to reply, so I’ll do it here. A couple of points. And I’m not digging into files, just working from my brain/memory.
Regarding the naming of the Gamble video. Back in the day when I was studying/organizing/syncing the whole Blue Ridge Collection I had to work through some confusion. I was working off the folders in the original SAIT-released photos and videos.
What confused me was that it was appearing that at least one (and maybe two) of the cellphone’s photos were showing up in various folders. I finally just decided that it appeared to me that it/they were being “passed around.” With most (not all, unfortunately) cameras you have a serial number in the metadata. With a cellphone, you don’t.
That may (or may not) have affected how the file got named and organized.
And yes, Calvin, we pretty much came to the conclusion that the Larz Garcia photos from inside Engine 151 most likely weren’t taken by him (because he wouldn’t have been authorized to be in that engine), but were gathered by him and passed off to ADOSH.
Regarding that Gamble video, as a photographer who also sometimes takes videos, I don’t think that video was taken to record the fire; I think it was taken to record the audio. It’s a total mess, visually. That’s just not how people record, visually, fire behavior. I (me, personally, your mileage may vary) really believe whoever recorded that video, heard something and turned on the camera to record it.
That being said, I don’t find it IMPOSSIBLE that it could have been named, not to record the person taking it, but the subject matter. I have periodically, as I have perused fire-fighters writing about fire-fighting, using the term “gamble” to reference something that appears to them possibly overly risky.
So who knows?????? Obviously, only the person who named it.
Regarding the flagging. Everything I have read has said that the standard recognized way of flagging an escape route is to attach a piece of pink tape to it and write on that “ESCAPE ROUTE.” And this seems to be VERY IMPORTANT.
Regarding radios and the crewnet. Tony Sciacca cloned his radio directly off Darrell Willis’ radio. So he would have had GM’s crewnet frequency on his radio. However, his trajectory doesn’t indicate to me that he was listening to it at the time of whatever “argument” might have been taking place at the top of the bowl.
I really have a hard time believing that, if he had heard it, he would have proceeded to Shrine Road, gotten out of his truck, and focused on trying to get those crazy civilians walking their poodles in their flip-flops to take the evacuation order seriously.
It’s hard to say if Musser had their frequency in his radio or was scanning it. If he had overhead that “argument.” I think what I wrote above about Sciacca also applies.
I think either of them, upon hearing that “argument,” would have stayed put and, most likely, even intervened. Especially Sciacca. That was his assignment. Safety.
I, at this moment, find this whole Dudley thing quite interesting. Especially given the timing.
When I used to work for my dad, when he was called for Expert Testimony on lawsuits related to major big-time explosions, as soon as a suit was in Discovery, it was absolutely “buttoned down.” We couldn’t even talk about it around the dinner table.
And, if it was “settled” that data was absolutely “buttoned down.” We couldn’t publish a molecule of the data related to it.
Which is why, I believe, if these suits are “settled,” we aren’t gonna have access to anything more than we already do. It will be definitely “End Of Story.”
Which leads me to wonder if Dudley, knowing that this “argument” was on the verge of “getting out,” hinted at it in order to alert the lawyers, in order to get it “buttoned down.”
I could be way off the road on this. It just seems really strange.
And you betcha, Mike Dudley knows exponentially light-years more than we do. And has some highly vested interests.
Which is why I’m mostly, at this point, trying to look UP the swiss cheese more than I’m trying to look down it.
I’ve read a LOT of stuff from fire-fighters complaining that the USFS has been, for decades, preaching the Safety Culture rather than enacting it.
I’m pulling something I posted way downstream up here so it gets seen. It has to do with Chain of Command on the Yarnell Hill Fire.
Marti Reed says
AUGUST 14, 2014 AT 9:22 AM
WTKTT I wanted to reply to something you wrote below, but apparently the new software won’t let me do it. And it’s connected to what you said above, so I’ll put it here.
You wrote:
“He was also ( in both cases ) just thinking of himself. That’s the REAL problem.
NEITHER of those things should have been any kind of consideration in his mind at that point in time, on that day, in those circumstances.He was also ( in both cases ) just thinking of himself. That’s the REAL problem.
And you wrote above:
“For a ‘business’ that prides itself on how they adhere to ‘military’ style chain of command… that’s just the ‘way it is’.
Everyone can lose faith in their supervisors or even come to the conclusion their direct line supervisor is a total freakin’ MORON.
You still don’t violate the chain of command and start ‘freelancing’ while the ‘enemy is at hand’.
Here’s the deal, for me.
I’m trying to look UP the swiss cheese layers as well as down.
And, no, in a proper investigation of something like this, from everything I’ve seen and read, the most obvious thing often ISN’T the truth of the matter. It can easily become just another “slide” that can be a detriment to situational awareness.
As I look UP the layers, I see quite a bit of violations of Chain of Command on this fire.
Cougan Carothers was out on the dozer line before Rance Marquez, whom he was later assigned to, even got to the fire. Maybe somebody assigned him to do that. But I don’t see anybody saying that.
I have never seen anything anywhere that indicates that Air Attack has the authority to change the attack plan of a ground crew. They don’t dictate to the crew on the ground what the crew on the ground is supposed to do. When Rory Collins dumped on GM’s test burn, and told them to go direct, that was a violation of Chain of Command, in my eyes. Unless somebody can convince me otherwise.
At 3:50 Gary Cordes ordered his crews to begin the evacuation process from the Youth Camp. They apparently, judging from the disparate narratives, didn’t.
After Rance returned to the ICP and tried to communicate to a distracted overhead what he had determined about DivA/DivZ, he and Cougan went out to work on structure protection. According to him and others, at that point mostly everybody over there was “free-lancing.”
As soon as Bea Day’s team began arriving, they were, in relationship to the established Chain of Command, mostly disregarding it and forming their own Chain of Command. Or so it appears.
It appears to me that that strict “militaristic” Chain of Command culture wasn’t all that operative on various parts of this fire.
I wouldn’t share that assessment, certainly of Bea Day’s team but also of others. View it sort of like good manners when arriving late to an evening cookout with a distracted host. You might do lots of thing of your own volition, without specific direction. Eat, mingle, start a game of volleyball under nighttime lights, whatever. But, if it’s a hilly, brushy property and you had arrived earlier, and had already been asked to look after the young kids for a bit, you probably wouldn’t take the kids for a nighttime walk to a hilltop for stargazing without 1) checking with the host first to make certain that this was consistent with plans, and ok with her,, and 2) knowing where you are going. Even if no one got hurt but for a few scratches, take those kids on a sustained bushwhack and people may feel it was both poor judgment, and rude. Tell your host you’re taking the kids outside for fresh air, but don’t tell her about the stargazing plans, again there is an issue.
I’m not quite sure what you are trying to say here. I kind of get the analogy, but I kind of don’t.
I’m talking about Chain of Command here, not a party.
I was, for five years, a Girl Scout Leader. You wouldn’t believe the kind of Accountability we were held to. Both up and down Chains of Command. Because of exactly what we are seeing here–Liability.
I just don’t see, via the events I wrote about above, that kind of Chain of Command Accountability operating on this fire.
And so the question I am asking is, if Chain of Command is so important to fire-fighters fighting a wildfire, how fuzzy is it allowed to get before it is deemed unacceptable?
I truly don’t know.
Was Eric Marsh to be held more Accountable to Chain of Command Accountability than the other people on this fire?
For the answer to your last sentence, I think it’s a No, simply because what was involved in GM’s case was qualitatively different than any of the other things you mention. Had GM simply moved a bit in the black, without telling anyone, there would have been zero need to give anyone an update, for instance. Had they decided to move, through the black, into town, letting people know would have been the thing to do.. Deciding to move the crew, at the time of greatest hazard, directly through the green into town, with an eye to ??? (I think reengaging, in some vague, undefined way) very clearly required letting people know. Being contacted by Burfiend and then STILL giving vague answers that are nonresponsive, and NOT then making plans clear, is to me more puzzling yet. Not only was this required, but also simply out of prudence, it is something that normally a crew would have wanted. Instead of in essence telling Burfiend they were comfortable and that he could go his own way, they should at very least have been asking if he could serve as lookout, and specifically stated what they intended to do. So, I wouldn’t articulate this solely as a chain of command issue — you could have a completely flat org chart, and STILL not understand why no notice was given of their plans, nor any help asked for.
WTK. I am continuing to listen to the BR Gamble audio that could possibly be Abel encouraging Marsh to “go a little faster”
Would you create an audio loop of Abel’s known radio transmission “copy that, hunker and be safe, and I’ll get air support ASAP” with the Gamble audio to help compare the two voices.? Ongoing thanks
I honestly had not considered that could be Abel until you brought it up again.
Also, starting at the 4 second mark of the Gamble video, it appears there is a white open bed pick up that I have not noticed before. Thoughts on who that truck could belong to?
Calvin I am trying to wrap my head around a couple of things.
This argument on crew net has been running thru my head.
We can say if it took place it was between Marsh and Steed.
So with my fire brain going crazy what could they have argued about,
My one conclusion—Leaving the black
Marsh was their leader and made decisions. Did marsh decide to go to the Ranch and Steed Did not want to leave the Black safety Zone. Argument or not a serious discussion.
What added to my conclusion was your search above.
What if Marsh was below the crew rather than above them and the conversation was actually Steed saying where they were and Marsh the one that made the statement.
Go a little faster, I kept thinking who would have said that in that conversation.
Could it be possible we got who was talking to who confused?
I think –Working down the ridge and cutting vertical (Not exact) could be attributed to Steed about crew location.
Another interesting thing Why was Steed telling Marsh about the Fire activity if Marsh was above him. It seems more reasonable that Marsh could not see the fire where would he have been not to see that–Below the crew below the saddle?
That’s been going around in my head for a few days. So I am putting it out there I have absolutely no proof Just my thoughts.
If you are listing to voice’s be open minded as to who it might be. There is definitely a clue here.
A personal observation from the information below concerning the performance ratings.
I have known many Superintendents and worked for some The e trait’s they all had were Highly motivated individuals and very skilled in communications. They got along well with their supervisors and Overhead on fires. They also were extremely adapt at motivating and supervising their subordinates. They were born leaders and helped their foreman to achieve the same goals. That is why they became successful and moved into higher positions in the FS and BLM.
The information below concerned me deeply WTKTT.
The performance ratings is something you would not have seen in most Asst./Captain That would be promoted to Superintendents. Most in the Forest service were not promoted from within the crew but moved to other locations to become Superintendents. With normally very high recommendations from their supervisors and there performance ratings.
Marsh could have very well been a who I know friend promotion
Not always bad but sometimes not the best decision. Being in a small department didn’t help and fosters that dicission.
Reply to Bob Powers post August 13, 2014 at 9:57 am
>> Mr. Powers wrote…
>> Marsh could have very well been a who I know friend promotion.
Quite honestly… I don’t think there’s any doubt about that.
Prescott, Arizona is not only a municipality… it’s a SMALL one.
The history of the creation of an actual ‘Wildland Division’ attached to this small municipality ( starting with a dedicated Fuels Abatement Crew ) and then the progression to the very RARE Type 1 IHC status for that same municipally sponsored ‘Fuels Crew’ really centers on just a very SMALL group of CORE people. Eric Marsh was one of those persons.
Eric Marsh started the AWA ( Arizona Wildfire Academy ) there in Prescott with his second wife Kori Kirkpatrick ( who was also a firefighter ) in 2003.
That is TWO years BEFORE Steinbrink would write that scathing evaluation of Marsh and put him on probation.
Marsh had already relocated to Arizona from North Carolina and had also already moved his PARENTS there to be with him… so Marsh was obviously now in Arizona to STAY.
It also means that Marsh was actually TEACHING ‘Wildland Firefighting’ to other FFs for TWO years there in Prescott before he, himself, would be put on probation by Steinbrink for ‘Unacceptable behavior’ while ‘on the job’.
It’s a small town.
Since Eric Marsh started the AWA there in Prescott and was already TEACHING Wildland Firefighting… and Darrell Willis pushed through the creation of an actual Wildland Division as part of the (small) Prescott Fire Department… it was a ‘tight group’ there in Prescott that was trying to establish this whole ‘Wildland’ thing ( and get paid for it ).
Was Marsh the right person to help BUILD a program like that in a small town where it was going to take a lot of personal effort to make it happen?
Probably so.
Was Marsh the right person to actually LEAD such a team ‘in the field’?
Probably NOT.
It’s pretty obvious from his multi-year performance evaluations that Marsh did not have some of the NATURAL ‘talents’ that you list above as the ones you want for a Type 1 IHC Superintendent. He was ALWAYS having to work HARD on his own inter-personal communication skills and he also appears to have had to work VERY hard on even just his ability to ‘play nice with others’.
If there was a ‘runs with scissors’ box on those evaluation forms then Steinbrink and Willis might have been ‘checking’ that one, too.
With Steinbrink’s and Willis’s help… Eric Marsh ended up being QUALIFIED to be the Superintendent of a Type 1 IHC Hotshot Crew…
…but was he the BEST person for that job?
Did he have ALL the ‘natural’ leadership, communications and management skills for that position without having to constantly WORK at being that kind of person?
Probably not.
Did ANY of this contribute to what happened in Yarnell on June 30, 2013?
It’s hard to say… but there is no doubt that Marsh’s personality had SOMETHING to do with what happened. MANY other Type 1 IHC’s are already on the record saying they would have never even considered doing what Marsh seemed to have convinced Jesse Steed to do that day.
Marsh was KNOWN to be a ‘hard head’ and ‘difficult to get along with’ and ‘argumentative’. We know that in just the hours before the tragedy, and for only the SECOND time in his life someone was letting him play DIVS that he ended up in ARGUMENTS with just about everyone he was having contact with ( except for Abel and Frisby ). He argued with Air Attack ( Collins ). He argued with DIVSZ ( Marquez ). Now we have reports that he was ARGUING with his own ‘right hand man’ Jesse Steed that day as well.
Is that really the guy you want in charge of the safety of 19 other people?
Someone who always just seemed focused on what HE wants… and never seems to hesitate to start ARGUING about what HE wants even over the radio?
I don’t think so.
I don’t think Darrell Willis actually thought so, either.
I believe Willis did ‘love’ Eric and considered him one of his best friends… but just 48 days before the tragedy Willis made it clear to Marsh that he wanted Marsh to actively begin REPLACING himself as the Superintendent of the Type 1 ICH Granite Mountain Hotshot crew.
I think Willis was going to try and make sure Marsh still had a good job with the Prescott Fire Department…but by the end of 2013 it was NOT going to be as the ongoing Superintendent of the Granite Mountain Hotshots.
Willis had been ‘double dipping’ with both PFD pension and salary for a few years and maybe he WAS going to let Marsh replace HIM as Wildland Division Chief… or something. Who knows…
…but that May, 2013 performance evaluation from Willis made it pretty clear to Marsh that his days as Superintendent of GM were numbered.
BEFORE there was ever a Type 1 IHC Crew attached to Prescott Fire Department.
Not always bad but sometimes not the best decision. Being in a small department didn’t help and fosters that dicission.
Whoops. Typo(s) above..
The last two sentences above were two more additional comments from Mr. Powers and I accidentally hit ‘send’ before ‘bracketing’ them as such. Last part of message above should have looked like this…
>> Mr. Powers also said…
>> BEFORE there was ever a Type 1 IHC Crew attached to
>> Prescott Fire Department.
Yes. See above. It was a ‘progressive dream’ happening there on the part of a VERY tight-knit COR group including Willis and Marsh. They were taking it ‘step by step’. I haven’t seen it documented anywhere but I would bet a sawbuck that the whole IDEA to even go for type 1 IHC status was simply to find a way to establish permanent salaries for some of the ‘top’ people associated with the ‘Fuels Abatement’ program… OR perhaps to try and prove to some still-skeptical Prescott City officials that there WAS a way to make a program like that ‘pay for itself”. It’s always about the money… especially at the ‘City’ level.
>> Mr. Powers also wrote…
>>
>> Not always bad but sometimes not the best decision. Being
>> in a small department didn’t help and fosters that decision.
Yes. Again… see above.
You really get an idea how SMALL a place this was when you realize that Steinbrink himself ( Prescott’s FIRST Wildland Division Chief ) was Marsh’s NEIGHBOR… and the very guy that put Marsh on probation in 2005 for ‘unacceptable behavior’ was the one that is now driving Marsh’s wife to town on the night Marsh died.
It was a SMALL TOWN.
It is tempting to draw a straight line from this personnel file to the events of 6/30/13, but that is a dicey proposition. We do not really know yet what transpired that afternoon or the motivations behind the actions taken. Thus it is hard to give proper weight to the role of Marsh’s “hardheadedness”.
This information has an explosive quality to it. I am also sure that reporters for the Republic, the LA Times, the NYT and even John Dougherty have reviewed this. So far no one has touched this in print. Probably because they too are having a hard time linking it to the actual tragedy. And it is a very sensitive thing to approach.
Maybe it had a lot to do with what happened, maybe virtually nothing at all. Without a better understanding of what happened and what motivated people to action, this information will just be the basis for speculation. Maybe we never get those answers, but the more people that knew what was taking place that day, the more likely we will. If those people exist, we need to identify them.
Reply to mike post on August 13, 2014 at 10:36 pm
All good points… but like I have already stated… this was more just a ‘followup’ to Marti’s line of questioning as to what *might* have made Marsh ‘ignore the established chain of command’ that day in Yarnell and NOT discuss his decision ( with his direct line supervisor OPS1 Todd Abel ) to abandon his Division and his Assignment and ‘move’ away from where he had been TOLD to STAY ( by that same supervisor ).
He should have. It is legitimate to wonder ( as Marti is wondering ) why he did NOT… and whether there is any *evidence* that Marsh was prone to doing that ( ignoring the established chain of command to just do something HE wanted to do ).
Marti said there didn’t seem to be any existing evidence Marsh would ever do something like that.
I believe there IS… and it is right there in that personnel file.
I believe the file contains *evidence* that Eric Marsh WOULD do something like that if he thought it would get HIM what HE wanted… and that someone’s personality does NOT fundamentally change just because they put on a Nomex shirt and go out on a fireline.
Is there even MORE evidence that Marsh was prone to doing that sort of thing ( ignoring chain of command ) when he and the crew were actually ‘out in the field’ and fighting fire?
Brendan ( or any other former GMHS ) might know.
Maybe we will hear from THEM about this, someday.
And I appreciate your bringing this forward.
I don’t know how to evaluate it, contextually, to be honest.
And I appreciate Bob Powers’ input regarding his experiences. It could be that, if Eric had had to build his career via the normal USFS IHC structure/process, he might not have “made it.” Or, conversely, he might have, more successfully, with a different culture around him.
On the other hand, not everybody inside that USFS structure/process is exactly happy with it. From what I’ve read/heard, a lot of them feel pretty screwed over by it, and it’s only their love of the job that keeps them going. And there’s been a significant exit of ICs since the Thirty Mile Fire.
Which has something to do with the USFS mightily struggling with how to do investigations. Which, I think, has something to do with this one. And the new directive.
We can say, from safely inside our comfort zones, “Off With Their Heads!!!!”
But we don’t have to replace them (with shrinking budgets) as the fires get bigger, faster, more complex, and increasingly catastrophic (as this one did) while the public expects wildland fire-fighters to protect them from those fires.
I believe this fire was seriously under-resourced.
I believe that had much to do with how it all turned out. Both specifically regarding the chaos during which Granite Mountain IHC walked into a bowl full of dynamite.
And specifically regarding the chaos during which residents of Glen Ilah were fleeing their homes with minimum warning from the Yavapai County Sheriff’s Department because of a delay in notification on their part and a dysfunctional communications system.
In examining all of this, I believe we need to look at it contextually, not in isolation. Both the fire (and the GM deaths) and the subsequent investigations have a historical and current context.
We need to be able (and humble enough) to continually ask: Why did the decisions made appear to make sense to the people making them?
I don’t believe anybody on this fire wanted/expected to make the wrong decisions.
But, obviously, from our perspective, a number of them did.
Ok I’ve been off watching all kinds of training videos and Lessons Learned videos and “how to do investigations” videos, and reading a lot of stuff about the really conflicted realm of investigations. I’m really trying to think outside our boxes here.
So much conversation here I’m uncertain where to start. So I’ll start here.
I’m not sure from where I got it, but I have a strong perception that Darrell Willis was coaching Eric to take on his job, not to just disappear out of the organization. And during both the Doce fire and the immediately previous Thompson Ridge fire, Eric and the GM Hotshots had succeeded. With acclaim.
I wasn’t aware of what Bob Powers said about IHC Superintendents normally being placed via the larger system from outside the locale. I don’t know how that works.
Granite Mountain IHC is definitely a hybrid. And to a large extent it was working. In spite of the City of Prescott wanting it to work for them, essentially, for free. Which had to do with the conflict that was happening between Eric and Willis.
I agree with MIke that the issue of Eric, in 2013, bypassing the normal chain of command, cuts both ways. There was definitely a conflict going on.
I’m still looking at that disconnect in communications between Eric and Todd Abel. I’m increasingly seeing it as 50/50. Eric decided his overhead wasn’t helping accomplish the plan agreed to (and this is NOT about Eric WANTED, but–re. the conflict with AA and Rance–what the agreed-upon plan was, and needed).
Abel was focused, at the time the break occurred, on Structure Protection in the Model Creek Road area. He, actually (via his ADOSH interview), wasn’t all that Situationally Aware about the area Granite Mountain was working in. In his interview he was very confused about Sesame and Shrine Roads areas. That wasn’t what he was focused on. He was counting on DivS Eric Marsh being Situationally Aware of what was going on in his area. But he wasn’t focussing on that.
I disagree that Todd would have categorically refused the Eric Marsh/Granite Mountain decision to get off the mountain. I think he would have, more likely, all things considered, advised them to go scout out the two-track road and see what the options were, and would possibly have put another lookout on them.
But he didn’t have that opportunity.
I’m still not convinced that’s Todd Abel in the Gamble video. I agree this is something that REALLY needs to be investigated. I have a jumble of thoughts regarding this.
The communications thing has really stuck out for me. From what I’ve observed, a whole lot of communications on the entire fire were pretty extremely vague.
When I worked in a very busy cafe in Flagstaff, if I had communicated the way people on this fire routinely communicated, I would have been fired.
Which is why I am trying to use a combination of “Swiss Cheese” analysis and Brad Mayhew’s methods (to get at why they thought their decision was reasonable, even if really inappropriate) to this point at which both Eric and Todd broke down in their communication responsibilities with each other.
At this point, I think, the swiss cheese started to line up.
Both Eric and Todd seemed to believe their decisions were reasonable. Eric–because he determined overhead was not functional–and Todd–because he was counting on Eric to have the Situational Awareness Todd didn’t have.
In the Swiss Cheese Model of analyzing this stuff, you have to look at Organizational Factors. You have to look up as well as down.
Looking up, it’s easy to see that this fire was under-resourced. By light-years. I really think that was a factor. Eric and Granite Mountain were not supported effectively in the plan that they had agreed to and engaged in.
Todd was put, because of under-resourcing, into the OPS position when he had been dispatched as a DivS. Because of that, he did’t have Situational Awareness of the topography/fire on the southwest side. Nobody “over” Eric did.
Both were totally focussed on whatever they were totally focussed on at that critical point. Tunnel Visiion. And communications, in general, were extremely vague on that fire, given what Training Videos teach, and my training in friggin restaurant required.
I think there’s a huge “Culture” problem here.
How and why was this fire critically under-resourced?
How and why was vague fire communications considered acceptable?
How and why were Chain of Command lapses (not only in this, but other instances on this fire) considered acceptable?
Analyzing a fire incident needs to go not only to the immediate cause of that incident, or even the related causes of it, but UP into the organizational and cultural causes of it.
And it also needs to include why people involved in that thought that the decisions they were making appeared to them at the time to be reasonable.
Often, in the process of investigation, the justifiable fear of what can be perceived as unfair retaliation can be a barrier to uncovering the truth.
Which is why I am not focussed so much on WHO MADE STUPID DECISIONS (IMO) but on why did they think the decisions they were making were reasonable.
Brad Mayhew has been a leader in trying to understand all this stuff. Both in what goes on (both positively and negatively), inside the heads of people actually involved, and in how to more effectively analyze how that impacts fire incidents.
He was on the SAIT team.
I really hope he is still looking at this.
Regarding Brad Mayhew’s study of how things go wrong, and how to look at it, watch this, starting particularly at +2:39:
http://youtu.be/DDbZqHrahlE?list=FLFCD_WSJem5bx8PxAG4gdkw
Let me rephrase something.
Not all the time but a high majority of the time
promotions to Supt were not from within the crew but came from highly qualified people outside the crew. With the FS you applied for jobs or promotions and competed with from 10 to 20 other applicants the pool of Qualified applicants was always high and very competitive in my day and I would assume now. Occasionally the Asst. had a great back ground and beat out the competition. So it does happen just not on a regular basis.
Thank you, Bob. It really helps to know this.
This is coming off the top of my head.
I remember back in the winter, a big hue and cry over the fate of the Ironwood IHC, which, IIRC, the city of Tucson was talking about “dis-banding,” because of the liability problems they perceived after the Yarnell Hill Fire.
That crew was, after all the hue and cry, not disbanded.
So that seems to be an IHC that is more “situated” in a city than a Forest, also.
Marti,
The Ironwood IHC worked out of the Northwest Fire District, (not Tucson, and was not working for a city).
They were not dis-banded this year, BUT this IS their final year. The crew was given this final year of work so that hopefully, they would be able to have enough time to find other jobs for next season.
It seems the non-fed IHC experiment has ended. Smaller entities cannot find affordable insurance to cover their crews liabilities.
Thanks. I had found out more. But not as much as you said.
Just what we need–fewer Type 1 Wildland Firefighters.
I didn’t want your questions to go unresponded to.
I’m no good at all at discerning voices.
And I noticed that white pick-up truck and wondered the same thing as you. And then I decided not to “go there.” I haven’t counted how many white open-bed pickup trucks are on that fire. But there’s a bunch. And I’m still not sure whose the white engine sitting next to the Glendale Fire truck that Tyson Esquibel was using (in one of the Blue Ridge photos) is.
I’ve run through my “list” of people I know were up there at that time. Musser, who I’m currently thinking was driving the white State Fire truck we see in the center of things at the RHR, says he headed up Shrine Road after the “convoy” had already turned on to 89.
Good luck!!
Reply to calvin post on August 13, 2014 at 3:37 am
Calvin said…
——————————————————————————————-
WTK. I am continuing to listen to the BR Gamble audio that could possibly be Abel encouraging Marsh to “go a little faster”
Would you create an audio loop of Abel’s known radio transmission “copy that, hunker and be safe, and I’ll get air support ASAP” with the Gamble audio to help compare the two voices.? Ongoing thanks
I honestly had not considered that could be Abel until you brought it up again.
Also, starting at the 4 second mark of the Gamble video, it appears there is a white open bed pick up that I have not noticed before. Thoughts on who that truck could belong to?
—————————————————————————————–
Calvin… I am not ignoring this posting of yours. Just wanted to let you know.
I am on it.
More later.
Reply to Marti Reed post on August 9, 2014 at 8:59 PM
>> Marti said…
>>
>> And a nod to WTKTT. Thanks for your comments
>> which I’ve taken seriously. BUT there is no evidence
>> that Eric as either a DIVS or a IHC Supervisor had
>> any prior history of disregarding his responsibilities
>> regarding Chain of Command that I know of.
Oh yes there is.
Even in just the weeks leading up to the tragedy… Eric’s personal evaluation from his own direct supervisor ( Prescott Wildland Division Supervisor Darrell Willis ) was ALL about him “disregarding his responsibilities regarding Chain of Command” just prior to that evaluation when Eric had decided to just go ‘outside the chain of command’ and go directly ‘over their heads’ just to try and get something HE wanted. Both Willis AND Willis’s boss Chief Dan Fraijo were maximum pissed about that.
Eric’s work related files in the FOIA / FOIL release contain some other documents and past ‘writeups’ in evaluations that hint at someone with ongoing ‘respect for chain of command’ and ‘personal communications’ issues.
In one early evaluation… when Steinbrink was Wildland Chief prior to Willis… Marsh is being told in no uncertain terms that his ‘communications skills’ MUST improve…ASAP.
The same evaluation also reports that, at that time, Marsh was having many days on the job when he would refuse to speak to ANYONE about ANYTHING… even when being spoken TO.
Apparently Marsh was having days when he was actually borderline catatonic and would even refuse to say a word even to people in the same room with him who were asking him direct questions.
His ‘evaluation’ was stating ( in writing ) that that kind of disrespectful behavior had to STOP. I guess it did… but that still gives a hint about Marsh’s personality.
There are a variety of possible reasons why someone might behave like that (refusing to talk to others at work) and many have nothing to do with having a disrespectful personality. I won’t speculate further on this.
I will say I knew an ER doc who would get like this for weeks at a time. Best dang ER doc I have ever known.
Repy to mike post on August 12, 2014 at 4:44 pm
The annual ’employee’ evaluations for Eric Marsh in the ADOSH FOIA/FOIL release only go back to 2005, when Marsh was just the ‘Captain’ of ‘Fuels Crew 7’… but that was the year he was obviously having some REAL issues.
His ‘evaluation’ for THAT year was scathing and contains the ‘will NOT speak when SPOKEN TO’ references quoted above.
He was put on 6 months PROBATION because of his ‘workplace behavior’ in 2005 and was told in no uncertain terms that if he didn’t ‘shape up’ during the next 6 months he would LOSE his job as ‘Captain of Prescott Wildland Fuels Crew 7’.
One of the ‘recommendations’ in that 2005 employee evaluation ( recommendation 5 of the 6 step plan he had to follow to keep the job ) was that he ‘seek help’ with the Horizon Care Link part of the Employee Assistance Program.
This was all when Duane Steinbrink was the Wildland Division Chief for Prescott.
In the years that followed… each successive evaluation from Steinbrink noted ‘improvements’ in Marsh’s ‘attitude’ and ‘behavior’ but each and every report from Steinbrink ( until he retired in 2010 ) kept asking for more improvements from Marsh in both his relationship to ‘management’ and his own leadership skills and that Marsh still needed to work on keeping a POSITIVE ATTITUDE at work.
In Marsh’s own comments in his 2009 evaluation… he felt he had ‘improved’ enough in these areas and had demonstrated enough talent and ability that he openly expressed his desire to succeed Steinbrink as Wildland Division Chief.
It didn’t happen.
Eric Marsh was ‘passed over’ for that job and Darrell Willis succeeded Marsh as Prescott’s next ‘Wildland Division Chief’.
Here is a link to that online file that contains ALL of Marsh’s employee evaluations going back to 2005…
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/20inrene9tcx74a/AACY0gafJDqleNtPDSlireV4a/ADOSH%20Yarnell%20Hill%20Investigation/City%20of%20Prescott%20Fire%20–%20GMHS/Eric%20Marsh%20Personnel%20File.pdf
In the document above… you can see the ‘progression’ in Marsh’s behavior and for a few years in a row he continues to list as one of his own ‘accomplishments’ his continuing battle(s) with ‘personal issues’ and trying not to let them affect his work.
Steinbrink never fully got over his ‘first impressions’ of Marsh and while he ended up praising Marsh in the evaluations just before he retired… he was never failing to tell Marsh that he still needed to work on having a POSITIVE attitude.
When Darrell Willis became Marsh’s new direct supervisor… things got on a roll and the ‘Steinbrink’ past ( and relationship ) seemed to have been forgotten. Granite Mountain became full IHC and the future was now so bright they needed shades.
Even so… the Willis evaluations continued to express ‘disappointment’ in the areas of ‘interpersonal communications’, respect for ‘chain of command’, and ( just like Stenibrink kept saying ) that Marsh needed to KEEP WORKING on maintaining a POSITIVE ATTITUDE while ‘on the job’. So Marsh seemed to continue to have lingering issues with ALL these things even after the ‘Steinbrink’ era.
I am only going to reprint the 2005 and the 2012 ‘evaluations’ below and skip all the years in-between.
The 2005 one was when Marsh’s behavior was flat-out UNACCEPTABLE and he was put on 6 month probation even for just the ‘Crew 7 Captain’ job.
The 2012 one ( just 48 days before the tragedy in Yarnell ) shows the NEW relationship and respect Marsh had ‘achieved’ with Darrell Willis… but it also reflects how pissed Willis was that Marsh had recently ‘ignored the chain of command’ and went straight over Willis’ head to Prescott Human Services Division with regards to the whole Caldwell ( and others ) ‘full time’ versus ‘part time’ and BENEFITS issue(s). It also shows the ‘tension’ that had developed between these two men in Marsh’s ‘comeback’ comments to Willis’ evaluation.
So even just these TWO ‘evaluations’ go from Marsh being put on ‘probation’ by Steinbrink and him refusing to even recommend Marsh for Superintendent of ‘Crew 7’ to the last ‘evaluation’ of Marsh’s life with Willis’ himself ‘laying down the law’ to Marsh and telling him how Willis wanted Marsh to start ‘replacing himself’ and also telling Marsh how much pressure they were BOTH under just 48 days before Marsh would die.
First 2005 ( Steinbrink ) and then 2012 ( Willis ) will FOLLOW…
————————————————————————————-
** 2005 ( Page 123 of the PDF document )
** Duane Steinbrink’s ‘evaluation’ comments concerning Eric Marsh…
** ( Emphasis mine )
This is Eric’s SIX MONTH evaluation for the position of WILDLAND CAPTAIN.
Eric’s BEHAVIOR is UNACCEPTABLE when REPORTING TO WORK.
He is UN-APPROACHABLE, GRUMPY, and will NOT SPEAK when SPOKEN TO.
On fire assignments the crew SELDOM meets Eric’s work standards.
Eric loses job effectiveness and efficiency by YELLING AT THE CREW and by NOT accepting the crew’s quality of work.
Eric needs to work on BEING NICE.
He needs to learn NOT TO YELL when jobs are NOT performed to HIS standards.
He also needs to learn to ASSIGN TASKS and ALLOW his subordinates to complete the job WITHOUT constantly LOOKING OVER THEIR SHOULDERS.
Paperwork is NOT one of Eric’s strong points. His paperwork on Wildland Fires is BELOW STANDARDS, but with HELP this can be overcome. While on assignments he NEEDS to get BETTER at ALL paperwork associated with Wildland Firefighting.
Eric becomes VERY AGITATED and does NOT ACCEPT POSITIVE CRITICISM well.
Eric BLAMES other people for HIS misgivings.
I do NOT see Eric as being SUPERINTENDENT of Crew 7 at this time,but with listed changes, he will continue to function as the CAPTAIN of Crew 7.
To help you reach your goals… follow the 6 step plan listed ( below ).
If this plan is not followed you will NOT SUCCEED as a Wildland Fire Captain and DEMOTION may follow.
* 6 STEP PLAN ( for Eric Marsh )
1) Be nice!
2) Do not YELL when things don’t meet YOUR expectations.
3) Practice all aspects of “the Prescott Way”.
4) Continue with Wildland Fire Training
5) Contact Employee Assistance Program ( Horizon Care Link at 866-252-4468 ) to help resolve problems that affect your personal and work life.
6) Meet with your direct supervisor on a MONTHLY basis for the NEXT 6 MONTHS for an EVALUATION.
Supervisor Signature: Duane Steinbrink 10/10/05
Department Head Signature: Darrell Willis 10/10/05
** Eric Marsh’s own ‘self-evaluation’ comments in 2005…
I would like to be the Superintendent of Crew 7.
I will continue with fire training ( RX-300, S-339 ) and will concentrate on leadership skills development, remember that I am a teacher, and remember WHY ( to me ) this is the “best job in the world”.
In other words, don’t forget to have FUN DAILY.
Signed: Eric Marsh 10/10/05
————————————————————————————-
Marsh stopped YELLING at everyone, stopped being ‘catatonic’… and he kept his job as ‘Captain of Crew 7’. He DID go on to become Supervisor when Steinbrink was satisfied he was ‘improving’… but Steinbrink would continue to REMIND Marsh in EVERY evaluation from 2006 through 2009 that Marsh still needed to work on his COMMUNICATION skills and his ATTITUDE and needed to try and stay POSITIVE and be a “CAN DO” man.
Marsh thought he was ‘qualified’ to succeed Steinbrink and came right out and said so in his 2009 evaluation… but it didn’t happen.
Marsh got ‘passed over’ for the job and Darrell Willis ( who had now RETIRED from PFD ) became Prescott’s new ‘Wildland Division Chief’.
Willis knew the whole history. Willis’ signature was also on the same 2005 evaluation above that put Marsh on ‘probation’.
Fast forward to the LAST time Darrell Willis would ever ‘evaluate’ employee Eric Marsh just 48 days before the tragedy in Yarnell.
Willis is almost ( essentially but not in a direct way ) putting Marsh on PROBATION again after the frap with Marsh ignoring the ‘chain of command’ and going over both his and Chief Dan Fraijo’s head about the GM staffing issues for 2013. Willis spells out clearly that he STILL thinks Marsh has ‘issues’ with respecting ‘management’ and STILL has ‘communication issues’ that he expects Marsh to KEEP working on. Willis also states, in no uncertain terms, that he wants Marsh to start ‘phasing himself out’ of the GM Superintendent position.
Also notice that even now… SEVEN YEARS after Marsh’s scathing 2005 review… Willis is still emphasizing how Marsh needs to do better at maintaining a POSITIVE ATTITUDE just like Steinbrink pointed out back in 2005 and would then reiterate every year following that.
You can also see in Eric’s own remarks back to Chief Willis that this relationship was now ‘strained’ because of the ongoing personnel issues and claiming to the FEDS ( in the 2013 certification document that only Steed and Willis signed ) that they had 7 full time employees ( as required ) when the City of Prescott had actually DOWN GRADED one of those positions ( on their local books, anyway ) to ‘part-time / no benefits’.
Again… the following was ‘filed’ in Prescott just 48 days before the tragedy…
————————————————————————————-
EMPLOYEE PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL
Filing Date: May 13, 2013 ( 48 days before the tragedy of June 30, 2013 )
NOTE: All of the ‘checkboxes’ in every category for Marsh were the highest of 3 possible choices ( E=Exceeds Standard, M=Meets Standard, I=Improvement Needed )… EXCEPT for the following…
Willis didn’t give Marsh an outright LOW grade ( I = Improvement Needed ) in ANY line item or category but by giving him a ‘less than highest grade’ for only the following items it was pretty clear what Willis thought was ‘less than stellar’ and wanted Marsh to ‘pay more attention to’…
Communicates effectively.
Analyzes decisions before acting.
Willingly cooperates with co-workers and members of management.
Adapts to and supports change in a positive manner.
Communication with staff is timely, clear and continuous.
** Darrell Willis speaking directly ( in writing ) to Eric Marsh ( EMPHASIS mine )…
Eric… I would like you to work on some things that can use improvement this year.
I would like to be involved up front on ALL planned events that the crew is involved in to add MY expertise to ensure that the event goes off in an EXCELLENT manner.
I am requesting that you notify ME anytime you need assistance from HR ( Human Resources ) on hiring issues and that ALL inquiries that are made to HR are run through ME FIRST.
I would also like you to BEGIN the mentoring of Jesse Steed as your replacement giving him opportunities and the freedom to lead the crew and YOU take a more HANDS OFF approach.
I believe it is IMPERATIVE for YOU to maintain a POSITIVE attitude in everthing you do. You have 20 people looking for LEADERSHIP every day. The department is LOOKING at OUR Division EVERY DAY and the CITY as a whole is EVALUATING OUR PERFORMANCE, goals and service. We need to lead up front and realize the Division’s FUTURE is in OUR hands.
Signed: Darrell Willis 05/03/13
——————————————————————————————
One of Eric’s ( written ) responses for his own 2012 ‘evaluation’…
* Greatest workplace challenges over the last year
It is challenging to run a nationally recognized program with minimum
standards and requirements that I am UNABLE TO MEET.
It is FRUSTRATING when I know I have the ANSWERS to anyone’s
questions about the program but CANNOT COMMUNICATE with
the decision makers to engage in an educational dialogue.
I believe things are STARTING to CHANGE, however I STILL have
some BIG QUESTIONS that need ANSWERING about STAFFING.
Signed: Eric Marsh 05/03/13
————————————————————————————-
SUMMARY”
Somewhere in here… this all ties back to Marti’s question about focusing on WHY Eric Marsh might have been prone to ‘ignoring the chain of command’ in Yarnell the afternoon of June 30, 2013.
Apparently… ‘chain of command’ and ‘relationship with management’ issues had been following Eric Marsh ever since he almost never even made the ‘cut’ as the simple Captain of the Prescott ‘Fuels Crew 7’ back in 2005.
For EVERY year after that… his ‘evaluations’ emphasized that Marsh still had a ‘ways to go’ with regards to ‘working with management’ and ‘communicating effectively’ and ‘maintaining a POSITIVE ATTITUDE’.
Marsh’s own personnel records seem to indicate he did, in fact, have the kind of personality that would not hesitate to ‘bypass the chain of command’ if he thought it was starting to FAIL or wasn’t ‘working for him’.
Wow I think I will spend a little time digesting all of that.
It may hold some critical answers.
You are the king of computers, I have no idea how you find this stuff.
There is a ‘narrative’ there in these sequential ‘performance evaluations’ going back to 2005 and spanning TWO different Wildland Division Chiefs evaluating the same employee ‘across the years’.
Let me also say that if you go and read these ‘evaluations’ yourself ( and everyone should to get the full ‘feel’ of them and then make up their own minds what ‘story’ is being told ) you will see that at the same time there were ‘common themes’ from year to year on the NEGATIVE side for Eric Marsh… it is also obvious that there was a lot of RESPECT for his ‘talents’.
While both Steinbrink AND Willis kept pointing out Marsh’s need to improve his ‘interpersonal communications skills’ and his ‘leadership abilities’ and his ATTITUDE… they ALSO kept repeating the same ‘themes’ with regards to his obvious talents as a TEACHER and his ability to ‘lead by example’ when he was ‘flying right’.
But it is still obvious from reading the ‘progress’ in these year by year evaluations that both Steinbrink and Willis felt they needed to keep ‘molding’ this raw material named Eric Marsh into someone that, one day, would be able to rise to a management position ( because no one can stay ‘on the line’ forever ).
Eric Marsh himself knew that is what they were doing and it’s what he wanted too… so he was going along with all of it. In his own words… Marsh said “I’m no spring chicken anymore”. He KNEW he had to listen to these men and follow their advice if there was any chance in hell of him becoming any kind of ‘Chief’ or ‘Division head’ there in Prescott.
Everyone thought Eric was ‘getting there’…. but it’s also obvious they still thought he had a ‘ways to go’.
I still don’t really know what to make of that obvious DIRECTIVE / ORDER from Willis to Marsh ( just 48 days before the tragedy ) about Marsh BEGINNING the process of mentoring Steed to replace him.
Steed had ALREADY ‘replaced him’ because of the bike accident just the month before. So Willis felt Steed was ‘fully qualified’ to be the de-facto Superintendent of the Granite Mountain Hotshots just long enough for him to sign the certification document saying Prescott had 7 full time employees on the GM roster when they only really had 6… but then just two weeks later Willis is telling Marsh he wants him to BEGIN the ‘mentoring’ process with Steed so that he would SOMEDAY be able to be a qualified IHC Superintendent?
Something has never been quite right about all that, either.
Does that mean that if Marsh hadn’t returned to resume being the IHC Superintendent that Willis was going to have to REPLACE Steed immediately because even Willis always knew Steed wasn’t even qualified to be holding that position (yet)… even though he signed the certification doc for the FEDS along with Willis?
On a certain level… it really has always been almost TOO obvious what was really going on there with the way Willis got that certification document signed without Marsh needing to be involved.
It was Marsh’s ‘leverage point’ with regards to the ‘negotiations’ over Caldwell’s benefits. Marsh knew that. Willis knew that.
The ‘bike accident’ was just a ‘window of opportunity’ for Willis to bypass that confrontation with Marsh and get the damn document signed and in the mail.
Duane Steinbrink did the right thing as a boss AND as a friend. As has been alluded to elsewhere, Marsh apparently had a problem for which the EAP was designed. Steinbrink by his actions may have gotten him to face that. He apparently went to great lengths to save Marsh’s career, maybe he thought it was worth saving.
And apparently they remained friends. It was Steinbrink and his wife that drove Amanda Marsh to the middle school on 6/30/13.
In regards to the 2013 dispute, many would applaud Marsh’s actions
when the city was trying to fudge the rules improperly. No doubt he had gone through channels and failed, but he persisted and many would admire that and think he was right. Extrapolating that months-long dispute to violating the chain of command on a fire might be a reach.
On a lighter note, I wonder what is the “Prescott Way”?
Reply to mike post on August 12, 2014 at 10:26 pm
>> mike wrote…
>>
>> Duane Steinbrink did the right thing as a boss AND
>> as a friend. As has been alluded to elsewhere,
>> Marsh apparently had a problem for which the
>> EAP was designed.
Apparently so.
The Kyle Dickman ( former Hotshot turned author ) article is the ONLY place there has ever been a specific reference to Marsh’s alcoholism but according to Dickman, Eric had been sober for 13 years the morning of June 30, 2013, so that can’t really be the ‘problem’ Eric seemed to be struggling with in 2005 when Steinbrink basically was ‘ordering’ him to ‘get some help’. If Dickman is right… then Eric had already been sober for FIVE years before that 2005 evaluation.
Something else was ‘the problem’ at that point.
The Yarnell Hill Fire
Outside Magazine – Tuesday, September 17, 2013
Author: Kyle Dickman ( former Hotshot )
http://www.outsideonline.com/outdoor-adventure/YarnellFire.html
———————————————————-
After rolling out of his sleeping bag that Sunday morning ( June 30, 2013 ), Eric headed to the parking lot, crossing the black tiles he’d helped install in the white floor to spell out “GMIHC—Granite Mountain Interagency Hotshot Crew.” When rookies stepped on the black tiles, they owed the veterans 100 push-ups. He pulled out his JetBoil stove and a Nalgene full of Bisbee’s specialty coffee grounds—both of which he always carried in his fire-line gear—and brewed up a pot of coffee. Eric had been sober for 13 years. Coffee was his only drug, and he took it black. There was no milk or sugar on the fire line, so why get used to it any other way?
———————————————————-
>> mike also said…
>>
>> Steinbrink by his actions may have gotten him to
>> face that.
Yes ( whatever it was ).
But see above. It couldn’t have been the alcoholic thing.
According to Dickman, Marsh beat that demon FIVE years before that scathing evaluation from Steinbrink.
Dickman doesn’t mention any ‘falling off the wagon’ at any interval but I suppose that’s always a possibility.
Marsh’s second DIVORCE ( Amanda was his THIRD wife ) also wasn’t in that timeframe but it was then referenced in evaluations following the 2005 one when Marsh himself says he was proud that some very big personal ‘issue’ he was dealing with didn’t affect his work that much… but when it was happening it certainly affected his behavior. According to Kyle Dickman and the same article… it caused Marsh to revert to his uncommunicative ‘catatonic’ habit at least for a little while…
—————————————————————
The crew called Eric “Papa,” and at home, with Amanda, he referred to the 19 young men as his kids. Until they got to know him, Eric intimidated most of the hotshots. He was quiet, wry, and guarded—in many ways, a typical superintendent. Amanda was his third wife, but he rarely discussed his personal life with the crew. He once drove his men 16 hours from Prescott to a fire in Idaho and didn’t say a word until they reached the flats of the Utah desert. “I’m getting a divorce,” he said, then remained silent until they reached the fire camp.
—————————————————————
>> mike also said…
>>
>> He apparently went to great lengths to save Marsh’s
>> career, maybe he thought it was worth saving.
I’m sure he did.
Based on that 2005 ‘end of year’ evaluation… it’s a wonder Marsh even made it to that point without just getting fired.
>> mike also said…
>>
>> And apparently they remained friends.
>> It was Steinbrink and his wife that drove
>> Amanda Marsh to the middle school on 6/30/13.
Yes, it was… and it was Steinbrink who kept turning to Amanda in the back seat over and over again on the long drive into town and repeatedly saying “It doesn’t look good”.
Not very tactful but from the story Amanda tells it sounds like Steinbrink was even more freaked out that evening than she was.
>> mike also said…
>>
>> In regards to the 2013 dispute, many would applaud
>> Marsh’s actions when the city was trying to fudge
>> the rules improperly. No doubt he had gone through
>> channels and failed, but he persisted and many would
>> admire that and think he was right.
Yes… they would… and I’m absolutely sure that if Marsh hadn’t fallen off that bike and been ‘relieved of his duties’… he was going to ‘play all his cards’ with Willis and use the signing of that certification document to get Caldwell those benefits.
Something tells me Marsh could play a mean game of poker when he wanted to.
>> mike also said…
>>
>> Extrapolating that months-long dispute to violating
>> the chain of command on a fire might be a reach.
Perhaps… but people’s personalities don’t fundamentally change just because they put on a Nomex shirt and go hiking out towards a fire.
BOTH of Marsh’s ARGUMENTS over the radio at Yarnell prior to the ‘fatal mission’ ( with Rory Collins and Rance Marquez ) were for the same reason. Marsh didn’t feel like HE was getting what HE wanted and he wasn’t afraid to argue about it even over the ‘open’ TAC radio channels.
Marsh was a ‘hard head’. That’s a fact and that is exactly how Marty Cole ( Safety officer for Yarnell who didn’t get there until 15 minutes before deployment ) described him.
And he should know.
Again… from the Kyle Dickman article where Cole
describes Marsh as a ‘HARD HEAD’ and someone who would contantly ARGUE about TRIVIAL things…
————————————————————–
Marty Cole was the superintendent of Granite Mountain from 2004 to 2005, when Eric first joined and they were trying to become a hotshot crew.
“When I left ( Granite Mountain ), Eric had something to prove,” says Marty. “He was going to make that crew better than any other out there.”
Marty Cole, the former superintendent of Granite Mountain and one of the two safety officers on the fire, leaned against the hood of his truck for a long time before he made up his mind that he wasn’t going to the site. He’d seen enough burned bodies in his career, and could remember the faces of every one of them. “I didn’t want to remember my friends like that. Not them. Not like that,” he said.
Then he changed his mind. He needed to see for himself what had happened.
That first trip, Marty made it only to the gate of the road that led to the Helms place before he stopped, put it in reverse, and drove the six miles back to the incident command post.
As he did, he replayed memories from over the years he’d worked with Eric Marsh. The HARDHEADEDNESS, their ARGUMENTS over TRIVIAL THINGS like the color of crew T-shirts.
Four times he made the trip to and from the command post before arriving at the ranch house a third of a mile from the site of the tragedy.
Marty walked across the blackened flats toward the basin.
“What the HELL were they doing HERE?”, Marty thought.
At the site, a sheriff stood guard. The hotshots’ pants and packs were incinerated. Their saws, Pulaskis, and Rhinos were now deformed lumps of metal.
Marty stood in shock and listened. Again and again he heard a hissing that ended in a crack. What is that? he thought. Then it hit him. The hotshots’ radios. Somehow they were still on and functioning. He took a deep breath and went to turn them off, but the sheriff stopped him. “You can’t,” the officer told Marty, his hand on the old superintendant’s chest.
“I’ve wanted to turn them off since we got here. But we have to leave it for the investigators.”
—————————————————————
>> mike also said…
>>
>> On a lighter note, I wonder what is the “Prescott Way”?
“The Prescott Way”
Prescott Fire Department Policy and Procedure Manual
ADOSH did not request a copy of this manual and it is NOT anywhere online… not even on the City Of Prescott’s official public documents page.
Apparently… you ONLY get to see that puppy if you actually get hired by the Prescott Fire Department.
Correction for above…
Author ( and former Hotshot ) Kyle Dickman actually doesn’t say specifically that Eric Marsh was an alcoholic.
My mistake.
All Dickman says is that Marsh had been ‘sober’ for 13 years on the morning of June 30, 2013 and that ‘coffee was now his only DRUG’.
So it might NOT have been ‘alcoholism’ that Marsh had to ‘kick’ in the year 2000. Might have been something else.
**
** THE PRESCOTT WAY
This is just a followup regarding this mysterious phrase “The Prescott Way” that is referred to in Eric Marsh’s actual performance evaluations.
I still can’t find a copy of the actual ‘document’ where this “Prescott Way”thing is ( supposedly ) ‘defined’ but the following is PROOF that it is also a term used to refer to the Prescott Fire Department’s Policy and Procedures Manual ( or something that is simply DEFINED in that manual ).
The following PUBLIC document is a PDF file put online by the City of Prescott when they were advertising for a ‘Fire Engineer’…
http://www.arizonachristmascity.net/_d/applications/app_packet_426.pdf
The TITLE of this document is…
CITY OF PRESCOTT
ANNOUNCEMENT OF PROMOTIONAL OPPORTUNITY IN HOUSE FIRE ENGINEER
Step Pay Plan Plus Benefits
FLSA Status: Non exempt – eligible for overtime
The term “The Prescott Way” is then mentioned in the document as something the candidate for the postiion needs to be familiar with for the ORAL BOARDS part of the application process and it seems to suggest the term is fully defined somewhere in the “Prescott Fire Department Policy and Procedure Manual”…
On page 4 ( of 4 pages )…
——————————————————–
Monday & Tuesday October 26-27, 2009
Oral Boards 45%
Oral Board questions may include subjects such as;
* The Essential Functions, Tasks, Knowledge, Skills, and other Characteristics of the Engineer.
This information can be found in the Policy and Procedure Manual Tab 300 –5 “305 Fire Engineer”
* “The Prescott Way”, Prescott Fire Department Policy and Procedure Manual, IFSTA 1st Edition “Pumping Apparatus Driver/Operator Handbook, Prescott Fire Department Training Manual.
———————————————————
Yes, and this is relevant in at least two regards in addition to communications upwards: 1), it relates to the concern over secrecy about crew movements in particular, and 2) suggests that crew members on this crew would feel even less able to raise safety concerns than those on other crews might. If those who left the crew over the last couple years ever feel more able, perhaps after a “decent interval,” to speak about crew experiences, it would be interesting to see if concerns over risk and crew movement on past fires were there. I’d say as well that EM clearly isn’t the first person to have issues with communication style and with delegating effectively, and did seem to have grown in the job. But, from a system perspective, you had a crew primed even by first interview questions along with personal style to defer, and probably in that case more risk of catastrophic mistakes unless there was more active demand for full communication going upwards as to basic issues such as, Where are you now?
To answer all of you I tend to believe that Todd Abel was being honest with his response.
Under the pressure cooker he was talking to and trying to get resources to where they were safe or needed it would be easy to forget what you said to who in all the confusion just my take on Abel.
I think Mike Dudly has something he dose not know quite how to release. It was not released in the investigation for some reason and he may be uncomfortable with that. Time will tell……
It could have been with held to protect the families in their time of grief. My thoughts only.
Reply to Bob Powers post on August 12, 2014 at 7:46 am
>> Mr. Powers said…
>>
>> To answer all of you I tend to believe that Todd Abel was being honest
>> with his response. Under the pressure cooker he was talking to and trying
>> to get resources to where they were safe or needed it would be easy to
>> forget what you said to who in all the confusion.
Well… you sort of just reiterated exactly WHY it would be unusual for OPS1 Todd Abel to NOT recall that conversation ( or at least what the ‘gist’ of it all was ).
You are right. Everything was going SOUTH and his FOCUS now was making
sure to ‘get resources to where they were safe or needed’.
That was, in fact, the ‘gist’ of the conversation we can hear a part of ourselves now in the Caldwell video. Todd Abel WAS telling one of his most valuable resources on the fire to “Keep ME advised… hunker and safe… We’ll get some Air Support down there ASAP”.
So given that it WAS now his ‘focus’ to make sure resources were getting ‘safe’… you would think he WOULD remember what the heck Eric Marsh SAID to him in response.
That is what is still ‘not credible’ to me… that OPS1 Abel would be specifically calling to tell a valuable resource to ‘hunker and be safe’ and then not even seem to recall ever doing it OR what the ‘response’ was.
What did Eric Marsh SAY in response to this ‘order / directive / suggestion’?
Are we supposed to believe OPS1 Abel, to this day, has no idea whether that valuable resource ever even AGREED to do what he was TELLING them to do… even when an actual RECORDING of that same conversation is being PLAYED for him?
Perhaps the fault here lies with the investigators.
We don’t KNOW exactly what Abel was asked when that actual RECORDING of his own conversation was played for him. Maybe be doesn’t remember what ‘exact words’ either preceded or followed the part that was recorded… and that is what he meant by “I don’t remember”… but the FOLLOWUP question(s) should have been… “Okay… we understand you don’t remember exact WORDS… but did the guy AGREE to do what you said… or did he NOT?”
I don’t think anyone even bothered to ask Abel THAT question.
>> Mr. Powers also wrote…
>>
>> I think Mike Dudley has something he does not know quite how to release.
>> It was not released in the investigation for some reason and he may be
>> uncomfortable with that. Time will tell…… It could have been withheld to
>> protect the families in their time of grief. My thoughts only.
There has been ( and is still ) a LOT of actions taken by a lot of people following this incident with their own self-appointed ‘motivation’ of ‘protecting the families’… but from the moment the SAIR report itself was released anyone who is still using that as an ‘excuse’ simply hasn’t been paying attention.
From the morning the SAIR was released… and the ‘families’ were given the first ‘preview’ of it an hour before the ‘public’ release… MOST of the ‘families’ have always been saying they were ‘shocked’ at how incomplete and inconclusive it was… and they WANT to know MORE.
Anyone who might still be ‘hiding’ behind that excuse of “we still want to protect the families” is really just using codespeak for “we still want to protect OURSELVES”.
Mike Dudley and the SAIT waited until February 27, 2014 to provide ‘additional documentation’ ( the extended Unit Logs ) that SHOULD have been released right along with all the other SAIT FOIA / FOIL material.
If they have anything ELSE that they feel SHOULD have been released as part of the original FOIA / FOIL package(s) and they are nervous now about it being discovered they ‘withheld’ things… there is a simple solution.
Just release it.
WTKTT
You wrote:
“So given that it WAS now his ‘focus’ to make sure resources were getting ‘safe’… you would think he WOULD remember what the heck Eric Marsh SAID to him in response.”
I don’t think Todd Abel’s primary FOCUS at the time (3:45ish to 4:15ish) was moving resources around. I think he was FOCUSED on Structure Protection in the Model Creek Subdivision. That was a very complicated operation.
I’m thinking Eric’s callout to him that the fire had over-run the retardant and dozer lines and was headed toward the structures was kind of the beginning of him temporarily shifting his attention to Granite Mountain.
I think he was really depending on Eric and Granite Mountain to be exercising the kind of situational awareness of their piece of the fire that he didn’t have. He was very busy doing something else at the time.
Given that, I think this conversation could easily have been kind of a “blip” on his radar, in terms of remembering it.
Eric’s response could have been simply “Copy” and that may have just been it. Or maybe he didn’t even respond at all.
For those of you who have never been on a transition fire (or haven’t been on one in the WUI since 1995), here are some facts……..
Todd Abel was at the North end of the fire with his hands full. He never ordered GM to do anything, and GM had no obligation to vet any plan with him, particularly if GM thought (as they obviously did) that their move was a relatively uncontroversial move.
Musser and/or Cordes had basically already made clear their view of the plan since they were the ones checking to see what resources DivsA had to begin with.
Radios do not always communicate well on a fire. Radio transmissions can be seriously impeded by the fire, combustion, and heat, plus the dry lightening. Why am I not surprised that Fred or Bob never brought this up yet?????! Go read the Sadler report. The lookouts tried to warn the crew of the approaching fire but the communication couldn’t happen.
When a fire travels at more than 5 chains per minute, even the best can get caught in a tight spot. ”The Rules’ (whatever that means) do not help much in a situation like that.
The rules apply if you follow them.
Like staying in the Black
or LCES–Posting a look out.
Put yourself in unburned fuel with an active fire.
Cant see what your fire is doing.
I could go on and on
P. Benedict You are wrong I bet my 33 years on that
Also what lookouts are you talking about they are not listed on any report I have seen and not directly Identified with Granit Mountain and there move?
Oh by the way we did bring all of that up along time ago…….
Combustion, heat & dry lighting have no affect on on radios.
Line of site on crew net and others are also reliant on transmitters and there location Transmitters and antennas can be put on fires to improve radio contacts.
WUI fires have been around a long time. I was fighting fires on the Angelis Los padres Cleveland etc. in the 60’s and 70’s and on other forests in the 80’s and 90’s what is your point?
Bob, I think he was talking about lookouts on the Sadler fire.
It is not clear if P. Benedict was saying they had no obligation to inform anyone of their move or just Abel (because Abel was on the north end). If the former, there are a lot of WFF here that I think would take issue with that.
I do not think Abel or anyone else ordered them. But I do not think they were acting “rogue” either. I think a # of the overhead knew that they were moving and quite likely where as well. After the fact, for the most part, no one seemed to want to admit to having that knowledge. I think the SAIR tried to portray no one as having that knowledge.
I think more than anything else the families want to know why – as in why did they move when they did. After more than a year, I think many of them are prepared to deal with the idea that the crew made some errors. But they want to know why their loved ones gave up their lives. I have to believe it is a haunting question.
Not only do I believe that some members of the overhead were aware of that move, I think some likely know why it took place as well. It is not because I think there are great lessons here that I am frustrated with this notion of GM’s secrecy. It is because I think the families are owed the truth.
It has always been ‘interesting’ that Todd Abel was freely admitting to investigators that he and Eric Marsh had multiple conversations via cellphone throughout the day right after just about any critical event took place out on that ridge ( Rory Collins’ unwanted retardant drops, the whole run-in with DIVSZ, etc… ) but no investigation team ever even bothered to request Todd Abel’s cellphone records.
Abel even testified that he simply THINKS the last time he got a phone call form Eric Marsh was after the ‘argument’ Marsh had with Marquez.
So ‘I THINK that was the last phone call I got from Marsh’ translates to… “Maybe Marsh called me again, maybe he didn’t.
Abel’s cellphone records would take the ‘maybe’ out of that equation toot sweet… but nobody even bothered to follow up on that.
So mike… maybe the problem you are having with Marsh and/or Steed being described as behaving ‘secretively’ that day can be addressed with a different qualifier added to the mix…
“Selective Secrecy”.
Maybe there were more back-channel phone calls involved here and more ‘private’ conversations involved than previously considered.
Maybe they were, themselves, just being very ‘selective’ about WHO they were sharing their plans and their real status with that day… and what little we can hear in just captured ‘open mike’ TAC radio traffic is what is making it look like they were intentionally ‘skulking around the back country’ and NOT openly reporting their plans, intentions, or true status.
I think you may have hit on something but I believe most of the knew they were moving out of the black was after the fact or 20/20 after they found out where they deployed as most if not all were surprised at where they were.
On my reply to P. Benedict—I thought Sadler was a person making a report on the Yarnell fire my mistake.
But again I will reemphasis There have always been problems with communications thus FO #7 and STSWO #7 Readjust your safety and proceed accordingly do not just put your head down and keep going.
I made that statement way back months ago.
Also you may be surprised by a radical change in fire behavior but it should never affect your safety if LCES and the 10 are always foremost,
Todd Abel was in fact Marsh’s direct supervisor as his OPS Marsh did have the responsibility to vet his plan with Abel, not controversial are you kidding me what have we been talking about for a year?
Musser / Cordes never even discussed the plan with marsh at that time concerning any move.
P. Benedict—-
Where are you getting all of this information? Who are you or what fire background do you have to make these ridicules statements. If you are a wild land fire fighter you had best go back and review not only ICS but the 10 and 18 and memorize them before you are another statistic.
P. Benedict…. are you Elizabeth Nowicki?
That’s what I thought when I answered the statements
has a familiar feel to it right””””’
Mr Powers.
I have a deep respect for Elizabeth Nowicki. However, it has been very bizarre that she has disappeared form this ongoing discussion. I really do not know what that *means* but I do NOT think she has just “moved on” and found another issue to investigate.
Are you there Elizabeth?
Oh she is still involved. She was interviewed on either Arizona or national TV at the time of the one year anniversary, I remember seeing it. Right now cannot remember about exactly what, but she is interested a lot in this matter.
We had a huge discussion last month. She kept pushing a issue on out flow wind and a spot fire at the mouth of the canyon.
She has done this before and ignores the facts and jumps all over me after I give the answers. All on my E-Mail since I was dumb enough to give that to her. Sorry Calvin she is a nut case I am no longer responding to her. She has also come on here accusing RTS of being SR, Fire20+, and Mike. She wants to know who RTS really is and has been head hunting him for several months and trying to get his real name out of me. I would suggest you do not give your E-mail to her. I am a personal friend of RTS and know the 3 names above are not him. because of conversations with you 3 and knowledge of RTS. All I can say she has put the Lawyer cross exam on me when I have given strait up answer’s to her in a cooperative manor.
The reason I hold Elizabeth up is because she obtained most of the information we have to review. I am still not sure of her motivations for doing that, maybe I am too naïve.
And I am going to assume that if P. (Pope?) B. doesn’t answer my simple question, it is because it is actually Elizabeth.
Everybody has the right to there own opinions.
Some one who is obsessed with finding out who people are here and she is obsessed, I have a problem with I could care less who any on here is if they are involved in the conversation and searching for information and the truth.
Ill leave it there—Thanks to every one past and present who are here………..
I am going to try this here as never got a response to a longer post below that got buried. This is in reference to Marsh being secretive. When Marsh calls in to say they are deploying, he gives no indication where they are, like he assumes who he is talking to knows. Bravo 33 does ask, but asks correctly as if he is just verifying (you are on the south side of the fire?). Most notably, OPS, who later claims to not know where they are, never asks where they are located. He states what they are going to do, but never inquires as to GM’s location. Surely he cannot believe they are in the black if they are facing the “flaming front”.
I don’t know if we can draw definitive conclusions from this, but it is curious (at least to me). And the idea that Marsh was being very secretive happens to be very convenient for the leadership of the Yarnell Hill Fire.
Reply to mike post August 10, 2014 at 9:57 pm
mike… I DO believe that Marsh ( and/or Steed ) were making a deliberate attempt to conceal their ‘movements’ prior to the deployment ( or at least provide the absolute minimum information possible so as not to be told to ‘go back’ or to suffer any criticism for the decision they had made totally own their own )… but here are some ‘followup’ comments for you comment above…
>> mike said…
>>
>> When Marsh calls in to say they are deploying, he gives no indication
>> where they are, like he assumes who he is talking to knows.
Yes… but there is absolutely no evidence that Marsh had ANY reason to think that John Burfiend in ‘Bravo 33’ ( who Marsh KNEW he was talking to at that moment ) knew ‘where they were’. He might have thought Cordes had told everyone in ‘fire command’ everything he had told Marsh that morning so that both OPS knew all about his ‘predetermined escape route’ and what ‘ranch’ he meant in connection with that ‘escape route’ ( which they didn’t… because Cordes never relayed that information to either of them )…
…but again… there was NO REASON for Marsh to assume the guy on the airplane who had only recently taken over ‘Air Attack’ duties from the previous AA Rory Collins would have known ANY of that.
It would have only taken Marsh another few SECONDS to say “Affirm… we are 640 yards due west of the Boulder Springs Ranch” instead of just “Affirm”… but he didn’t. I wish he had. There is no reason to assume the outcome might have been any different but it is still unbelievable that even in the last moments of his life… and after being ( finally ) asked DIRECTLY by someone EXACTLY where he was… Eric Marsh still didn’t give a complete answer to the last question anyone would ever ask him.
>> mike also said…
>>
>> Most notably, OPS, who later claims to not know where they are, never asks
>> where they are located. He ( Abel ) states what they are going to do, but
>> never inquires as to GM’s location.
Abel never asked because he was SURE they were still where he TOLD ( ordered? ) them to stay… ‘hunkered down and safe’ up at the anchor point. Todd Abel knew exactly where that location was. He had seen it TWICE from the AIR during BOTH recon missions.
>> mike also said…
>>
>> Surely he cannot believe they are in the black if they are facing the “flaming front”.
That is EXACTLY what Abel thought. He says so in his ADOSH interview…
Abel says he was SO SURE that Marsh and GM were still right at the anchor point where he envisioned them ‘hunkered and safe’ ( as he had told/ordered them ) that when he heard Marsh say ‘our escape route has been cut off’ over the radio… he was then in ‘total confusion’ and his only thought was ( paraphrasing ) “How the HELL can your escape route be cut off when you are already in the BLACK?”
From page 54 of OPS1 Todd Abel’s ADOSH interview on August 22, 2013…
——————————————————————————–
Q1 = Dave Larsen ( Rest in Peace )
A = OPS1 Todd Abel
——————————————————————————–
A: You know? When – when he was up here and saying my escape route’s been comprised, I’m thinking he’s up here. I’m in total confusion, I have no idea. Two hundred and fifty acres of black, they’re direct, all they gotta do is step into that. That – that’s where I thought they were at. That’s where everybody thought they were at.
Q1: When he had – when he had – when he talked to you about my escape route has, uh, been compromised…
A: They’re – they’re right here when he tells me that.
Q1: You think? You think they…
A: I…
Q1: Think so?
A: Yep, I do. Because they had – there was very little – between our escape route’s been comprised, we’re deploying fire shelters and no communications with them at all, was right on top of each other. Right – I mean I was trying to call them. Uh, air attack was trying to call them. Everybody’s trying to call them. You know air attack was trying to get in there to do buck work, when you hear the helicopter let me know, we’ll drop the water. You know that – there – you know that – all that stuff, no answer, no answer, no answer.
Q1: So when did they – when did they move the rigs – was he – did you hear any of that stuff? Uh, decisions made to move the rigs?
A: No. I had no idea – I had no idea that the trigger point from the lookout had
been – sorry, let me get on the right knob here.
((Crosstalk))
A: Yeah, I thinks that’s (unintelligible), yeah, I think it’s – yeah. The trigger
point – I didn’t hear that the trigger point for the lookout had been met – or had
been hit and he came off. This is all stuff I heard afterwards.
———————————————————————————
I find these answers less than convincing. Even if Marsh was being secretive, he was going to stop when he was trying to get help to prevent his crew getting burned up. Yet he does not tell people where they are, again like he thinks they must know. Even Bravo 33, who just showed up, seems to know they are on the south side of the fire (and does Marsh know they switched out?). Abel says he thought they were in the black, even when they say they were trapped – he knows that cannot be true. Reading that transcript, and we cannot hear voice infection, but it almost seems like even Larsen does not believe him, asking repeatedly “You think so?” He says he was confused, but during that prolonged tape we never hear OPS ask Bravo 33 “Where are they?”. He does not testify that he reached out to anyone else to ask either. If you are going to try to help them with water or retardant drops, that would seem to be the very first question you would ask unless you had a pretty good idea where they were. Maybe there is a good explanation for this, but it still seems quite curious to me.
This whole story of Marsh being secretive is very convenient for many people there that day. SAIT pushed that story – the 33 minute communication gap and all that. Are you sure you are not just accepting what SAIT wants you to believe? Is it possible that SAIT just concocted this narrative?
Finally, what if in the immediate aftermath, Abel told someone he did not know where they were – maybe someone like Willis? Very hard to go back and change your story after that.
Mike. I agree that it is very odd that Marsh gives only a brief response of “Affirm” when Bravo 33 correctly assumes which side of the fire GM/Div A. I firmly do not believe he is trying to be secretive, obtuse or anything else. I totally believe he thought the person that he was talking to knew where they were..
I asked this same question some time back and WTK responded at the time that the reason B33 guessed the “South” side of the fire is because that is where the flaming front was. But now that we have more photographic evidence available, we can all see that there were numerous “flaming fronts” on the south and East sides of the fire.
There seems to be a lack of clarity ( and even contradictory statements) between Abel and B33 as to B33 asks if he needs to check on GM and Abel seems to tell him no, after Div A announces they are heading to their SZ via an escape route But the notes also indicate that B33 actually did check on GM and they were safe in the black. It depends on which notes you choose to believe.
There is also evidence that Marsh radioed the southern progress of the fire circa 1540 that would have made it impossible for Mcdonough to have continued his lookout duties at the old grader. Did Abel really believe (at 1640) that Mcdonough was still in his original lookout position? That seems very unlikely! essay?
I also find it very disingenuous that on Aug 14 , Todd Abel does not admit to remembering his conversation that was partially recorded by Caldwell, “Hunker and be safe , air support ASAP. I do not pretend to know what happened on 6/30/13, but I refuse to believe that Able wouldn’t remember that conversation, especially when he can hear his own voice in the recording.
I also cannot understand why GM/Div A totally ignore Abel when he tries to make radio contact, and they continue to callout to B33/ air attack.. But I refuse to believe that it was because they were trying to hide their intentions, route, as they were making emergency announcements, and about to be burned alive. Maybe it was because they HAD been betrayed (by Abel)?
Lastly, Todd Abel was one of the firefighters that spent the night at or near the DZ, and thus was part of the group who vowed to never discuss what took place out there that night, as Corey Moser has said was agreed upon.
One final thought. If the story was really, GM abandoned their assignment and went on a secret mission, I believe that would have been easy to conclude and would have been a very important, and simple lesson to all WFF’s. That didn’t happen, and I do not believe the SAIR was written to protect the GMIHC, as they are not in need of anyone defending or covering up their actions, unlike some of the overhead who are definitely guilty of being secretive. And we KNOW it thanks to Corey Moser.
Calvin, I agree that SAIR was not written to protect the GMIHC. In fact, it was written to point the finger at them, without appearing to do so. Most importantly, it was written to protect the leadership from having any connection with what happened. Thus it was not enough to hint at the mistakes GM made (which they did make), but also there could not be any knowledge of their actions on the part of the overhead. Hence, the talk of obtuse communication, secretive behavior and the 33 minute gap. Whether this was what the SAIR come up with or what was fed to them, this is likely the most dishonest aspect of the report.
As a Fire fighter it is difficult to explain why The Crew had a problem with identifying their location. At that point you did not need secretes.
They may have assumed B33 had seen them thru the air and knew where they were at. They had no Idea of Yards to the Ranch.
Their on the south side of the fire but no land marks the smoke is starting to cover you at that point Latitude and Longitude are about all you could use to note your location. Every one remember after the we are clearing a deployment area and I will call when we go into shelters that was the last contact, no one could get any more info, or critical info on their location.
Whether the move was secretive or not it was done with out notification to
OPS Abel and their intended rout and to where. Marsh had a responsibility to his Supervisor He made a move with the crew that he notified NO ONE of his plan. No one knew where the crew was. They were suppose to be in the BLACK.
Mr Powers.
I totally agree that at some point Marsh did report that GM were in the black.. But then it appears that he (or Steed) reported they were (in the words of DW ” coming in a southerly direction”)
Either Marsh or Steed did announce they were heading down their escape route, to their safety zone. Musser heard it, Cordes heard it, Frisby heard it, B33 heard it and told Abel (although this is still very unclear), Willis heard it, and it appears at least one other BRH heard it.
However, it is not clear WHERE they (GM/Marsh) were when that “report” was made. Were they still in the black, or were they standing at the top of the bowl looking at the ranch?
Also after Marsh indicated that they are preparing to go into shelter, there are multiple radio squelches indicating an attempt to communicate (most likely). The Ash creek video is a real life example of radio failure during close fire activity, I assume similar to what happened with GM.
Along the line of Mike’s thought; Do you believe the SAIR was written to protect the legacy of the GMH?
The first part is way to general to identify where they were or where they were going. As I said they may have tried to communicate or not Squelches could have been any thing there was no more contact as to location.
Yes —They were protecting everybody and GMHS were under their
investigation rainbow. No accusations no information for the Lawyers.
I have already listed several things that were violations not stated in the SAIT.
The top line conclusion of the SAIR was “no errors”. That was bull, the SAIT knew it was bull, and they fully expected no one would swallow it. They knew people would go to the report, look at the evidence, and draw conclusions. So they colored the information in the report in such a way they knew what the conclusions were that would be reached. #1 the GMHS made mistakes and #2 they were secretive and uncommunicative. Bingo! The perfect lawsuit defense. It was the fault of those who were dead and nobody alive knew anything about it. And they don’t even get blamed for dumping on the GMHS. And here we are spreading their gospel.
Then to top it off, Mike Dudley lets drop a mention of a fight between Steed and Marsh, for which there is absolutely NO public evidence. Who is in a position to challenge that story? So Marsh comes off looking like a Captain Queeg, forcing his unwilling men down into a death trap. Surely anyone that would do that would be prone to being secretive.
Is this what happened with the SAIR? I am not sure, but I think it is certainly possible. And I think we should consider that possibility.
INTERESTING The SAIR put out information that more or less allowed us to case our tail in circles . The truth will always remain elusive. Sorry I used some ones handle there.
There is no truth to any thing stated so no one gets hurt.
Mike You may be a lot closer than you think.
Part of a comment from below on this particular thread also seems relevant up here…
>> Marti said…
>>
>> This train-wreck is still in process.
And as the ‘train’ now pulls into the station that has the signpost saying “Civil Court’… I hope Arizona Forestry realizes that you can play games with the public and the media and/or with FOIA/FOIL requests all you want and try to ‘shape the story’ in THOSE arenas…
…but the destruction and/or withholding of evidence in an actual Civil Proceeding carries the same penalties that it would in a Criminal Proceeding.
It’s a FELONY.
Reply to mike post on August 11, 2014 at 6:16 pm
>> mike said…
>>
>> The top line conclusion of the SAIR was “no errors”.
>> That was bull, the SAIT knew it was bull, and they
>> fully expected no one would swallow it. They knew
>> people would go to the report, look at the evidence,
>> and draw conclusions. So they colored the information
>> in the report in such a way they knew what the
>> conclusions were that would be reached.
>> #1 the GMHS made mistakes and
>> #2 they were secretive and uncommunicative.
>> Bingo!
>> The perfect lawsuit defense.
>> It was the fault of those who were dead and nobody
>> alive knew anything about it. And they don’t even get
>> blamed for dumping on the GMHS. And here we are
>> spreading their gospel.
I pretty much ‘buy’ everything you have said above except for the last sentence. I don’t think anyone here on this one particular ongoing discussion about this incident is ( or ever has been ) “spreading anyone’s gospel”.
I have said before that I ( also ) believe the SAIT knew very early into their investigation that they were looking at a ‘worst case scenario’ as far as both what the ‘boots on the ground’ did as well as the ‘management’ situation that day.
That’s when the standard ( detailed ) ‘management report’ that they were also contracted to produce was taken ‘off the table’. Wasn’t gonna happen. No way. The only thing left, then, was a narrative constructed almost exactly the way you describe… and for the same reasons you describe.
Steer the ‘blame’ away from anyone left alive to preserve careers and reputations and let people ‘read between the lines’ and reach their own conclusions without supplying ANY de-facto ‘evidence’ to support law suits or possible legal action against any person, agency, or municipality.
However… the fact remains that the actual EVIDENCE does, in fact, support some of these same ‘conclusions’ that are sitting there ‘in between the lines’ of the SAIR report.
There IS evidence that Eric Marsh ( and/or Jesse Steed ) were being ‘secretive’ ( if not downright deceptive ) about what they were doing that afternoon.
Example: We don’t need the SAIR report or any ‘info between the lines’ to reach that conclusion. We can hear it with our own ears in at least one of the Panebaker videos.
As late as 4:16 PM, when someone in ‘fire command’ was obviously trying to determine Eric Marsh’s EXACT whereabouts and asked him directly…
“Are with WITH Granite Mountain right now?”
Eric Marsh then *obviously* ‘completely ‘dodges the question’ and comes back with only this as his ‘response’…
“Ahm… jus’ checkin’ it out to see where we’re gonna jump out at.”
That in NO WAY was a direct, honest answer to the question he was just asked. He was AVOIDING ‘answering the question’.
Ditto for any number of other ‘transmissions’ that we don’t have recordings of but have been reported by various different sources. They tend to point to someone almost making an EFFORT to make it hard for anyone to understand exactly what he was saying and doing nothing but creating confusion in the minds of people he was speaking with.
The ‘C’ in LCES… “Communicate clearly and effectively”.
Eric Marsh was NOT doing that.
Only people who used to work with/for Granite Mountain could still verify whether that was just plain NORMAL for Eric Marsh… and that he ALWAYS sort of ‘spoke in riddles’. ( some people ARE like that… ALL the time )… but if that hasn’t happened by now then it is not likely it is going to. The SILENCE from former GMHS is still deafening and, itself, tends to just add to the doubt and the mystery about what happened on June 30, 2013. It very much seems like any/all former GMHS are actually AFRAID to say anything at all… ( good, bad or ugly ) and you just have to wonder why that might be so.
With regards to my comments above to your initial post and you finding the cited Todd Abel ‘answers’ as ‘less than convincing… I hear ya.
I was NOT trying to ‘defend’ OPS1 Todd Abel.
I was just citing some references in the evidence record that seemed directly relevant to what you were saying in your initial post.
I have also said this before down below but at all times, when I start quoting Todd Abel from any interview, I ( me, personally ) am still just giving him the benefit of the doubt that he was telling the truth in those interviews… but I am not trying to say there isn’t another possibility.
I ( me, personally ) still seem be ‘standing alone’ in my opinion that it is actually OPS1 Todd Abel’s voice that we hear in the YARNELL-GAMBLE video being the one who is ( apparently ) expressing a wish that Marsh and GM ‘hurry up’ and ‘get to town a little faster’.
If that really is Todd Abel saying that to Eric Marsh in the YARNELL-GAMBLE video… then that makes mincemeat of pretty much *everything* else Todd Abel has said he knew or didn’t know that afternoon.
I also find it ‘less than convincing’ that now that we KNOW that the SAIT actually PLAYED the Caldwell video for Todd Abel in their interview with him… and Todd Abel actually identified his OWN voice in THAT video and admitted “Yep… that’s me”… that Abel would then still be unable to recall at least part of what was said either BEFORE or AFTER that short capture of part of one of his OWN conversation(s).
It is ‘less than credible’ to me that even if he can’t recall the exact words… that he would NOT remember the ‘gist’ of anything such as what DIVSA Eric Marsh actually SAID to Abel AFTER he told ( ordered? ) them to ‘hunker and be safe’.
For all we know even today… Marsh’s response to that suggestion/directive/order to ‘hunker and be safe’ might have actually been…
“The hell we will”.
Did Marsh just say ‘Copy that’ after that suggestion/directive/order from his OPS Supervisor and that was it… or did he say more than that?
Either way… it is ‘less than credible’ to me, even now, that Todd Abel would not at least recall what the *general* response from Marsh was… one way or the other.
So no… I am not ‘defending’ anything Todd Abel has said in any of his interviews just because I might cite him in the record.
I still have my doubts that he is ‘telling the truth’ about what he did or didn’t know that day. Some of his testimony still just doesn’t quite ‘add up’ when cross-referenced to OTHER people’s testimony.
>> mike also wrote…
>>
>> Then to top it off, Mike Dudley lets drop a mention
>> of a fight between Steed and Marsh, for which there
>> is absolutely NO public evidence. Who is in a position
>> to challenge that story? So Marsh comes off looking
>> like a Captain Queeg, forcing his unwilling men down
>> into a death trap. Surely anyone that would do that
>> would be prone to being secretive.
For someone in his position of authority… it was TOTALLY irresponsible for him to just ‘drop that bomb’ in a public speech without either citing sources/references or explaining exactly what was or wasn’t done to try and ‘verify’ such a claim ( from multiple people? ).
We can ‘speculate’ about things here in THIS ongoing public discussion any which way from Sunday ( and often do ) because that is, in fact, the very purpose of a forum such as this and everyone should KNOW to take anything they read HERE with multiple ‘grains of salt’… but the de-facto Co-lead of the official Arizona Forestry sponsored SAIT investigation into the incident and a high-ranking official in the US Forestry Department doesn’t have that luxury.
If it turns out that Mike Dudley was simply making that ‘story’ up out of whole cloth then I would think, given his position of authority, he deserves a pretty good reprimand and ( perhaps ) needs to issue an ‘apology’ like they forced poor Jim Paxon to do early on when he was just ‘speculating’ from a position of authority with regards to him saying “It looks like the GMHS Supervisor violated regulations”.
Jim Paxon was CRUCIFIED back then for saying something like that in public from a ‘position of authority’ without ‘backing it up with evidence’…. so why would Mike Dudley now get a ‘free pass’ for similar off-the-cuff, unsupported statements ( in public ) that are just as ‘suggestive’ about ‘behavior’ as Paxon’s were.
>> mike also wrote…
>>
>> Is this what happened with the SAIR? I am not sure,
>> but I think it is certainly possible. And I think we should
>> consider that possibility.
See above. I agree with your ‘this’ scenario.
It is possible… and it is considered.
They might even ‘think’ they are ( still ) playing both the MSM and the unofficial social media sites like ‘violins’ and they might think they have been ‘oh so clever’ all along.
Radio problems killed 19 of our finest as the ‘big bad fire’ just ‘came and got them’.
Mission accomplished.
I still think the TRUTH will come out… one way or another… and any/all ‘official’ efforts on anyone’s part to ever PREVENT that from happening ( for whatever reasons ) will also, someday, end up as much a part of this ‘story’ as the tragic loss of life itself.
If Todd Abel knew about the move, everything about Marsh being secretive and obtuse becomes inoperative. He had an obligation to be upfront and straight with his supervisor, not necessarily everyone else. It is what we don’t hear and not just what we do that might give a complete picture of the truth.
Why does Todd Abel persist in not recalling the hunker conversation, even when a clip was played for him? Is it because he knows there is more to the story? Is he trying to give the impression that nothing about his conversations with Marsh that afternoon was memorable. Move along – nothing to see. I find it more than curious, but Calvin’s one word description in a post below is a lot more spot on.
At exactly 4:27 PM ( just 12 minutes before Steed’s first MAYDAY ) Marsh WAS freely communicating ( over an open TAC channel ) with SOMEONE about the fact that GM was NOT still back at the anchor point but were clearly ‘on the move’ and coming towards Yarnell ‘from the heel of the fire.
The only mystery remaining there is that we simply don’t know WHO Eric Marsh was talking to at 4:27 PM.
It was still ‘classic Marsh speak’, though. Minimal information.
And YES… if it turns out that OPS1 Abel was, in fact, fully aware of the ‘move’ then that is pretty serious stuff even beyond what would then obviously be all the false testimony issues…
However… there would STILL be at least two parts to that story.
Requesting / Approving and/or just simply knowing about the ‘move’ and the attempt to ‘get to town’ is one thing.
Disregarding regulations and dropping into a fuel filled box canyon in close proximity to a highly active fire line with no lookout or ‘eyes on the fire’ is something else altogether.
Even if it turns out Abel WAS aware of the first part ( the move itself ) that doesn’t mean that even in his wildest dreams would he have thought they would be stupid enough to try the second part.
That also remains true for whoever Marsh was reporting to at 4:27 PM in the YARNELL-GAMBLE video.
Even if that is NOT Todd Abel that Marsh was reporting to at that time… that person just seemed to want to know about results and arrival times versus any details like how the ‘move’ was actually being accomplished.
Of course the SAIT, with most likely more data than we are even aware of in their pocket, would protect the overhead.
And, possibly, given the historical context in which this fire is imbedded, for some fairly legitimate–in their minds–reasons.
This train-wreck is still in process.
Reply to Marti Reed post August 11, 2014 at 10:42 pm
I still would like to know WHO ( multiple people? ) even made these claims of hearing an ‘argument’ between Marsh and Steed over the radio… verified or not.
I would also love to know what happened to all of Bob Brandon’s photos/videos’/audio and his ( and all the other Peeples Valley FFs ) cellphone records.
I really, really doubt that Bob Brandon was ‘making that up’ about being officially ‘interviewed’ after the fire and someone ‘officially’ collecting all that evidence from him and the other Peeples Valley firefighters.
What else was ‘collected’ and/or ‘testified to’ that has never seen the light of day? You have to wonder.
>> Marti said…
>>
>> This train-wreck is still in process.
And as the ‘train’ now pulls into the station that has the signpost saying “Civil Court’… I hope Arizona Forestry realizes that you can play games with the media and/or with FOIA/FOIL requests all you want…
…but the destruction and/or withholding of evidence in an actual Civil Proceeding carriers the same penalties that it would in a Criminal Proceeding.
It’s a FELONY.
I totally agree with everything you write here.
I’m stocking up on popcorn.
See what I wrote downstream:
Marti Reed says
AUGUST 11, 2014 AT 9:35 PM
“So here’s my question:
When a previously successful Division Supervisor incrementally learns, via his experience, that his overhead is not capable of supporting him, how obligated is he to the policy of reporting to, and being subordinate to, that overhead?
Riddle Me This.”
I think Mr. Powers had tried any number of times to make that as clear as possible.
As long as you are ‘on the job’… it’s not YOUR decision.
If you don’t like an assignment… then you protest it with ‘alternative actions’. If you are still being pressed to do something you consider dangerous or even just plain ludicrous…
…you WALK AWAY.
At NO time ( while you are still ON THE JOB ) do you ‘appoint yourself’ to any higher level of command than the workplace is currently granting you. It’s a dangerous place. VERY bad things could happen if you do that. People could DIE.
For a ‘business’ that prides itself on how they adhere to ‘military’ style chain of command… that’s just the ‘way it is’.
Everyone can lose faith in their supervisors or even come to the conclusion their direct line supervisor is a total freakin’ MORON.
You still don’t violate the chain of command and start ‘freelancing’ while the ‘enemy is at hand’.
I’m not trying to get at what Eric should have done.
Obviously, Eric should have (with the benefit of 20/20 hindsight) consulted with Abel about what to do.
And I totally wish he had, believe me.
What I’m trying to get at is why he didn’t do that..
I’ve watched a lot of Lessons Learned videos, and one of the things they STRESS is to recognize “Why what they did made sense at the time.”
Because that’s how you get to the place where you recognize that you could make that mistake, too.
I’m trying to discern why what Eric did made sense to him at that time.
And I’m proposing that it made sense to him at that time that the overhead on this fire was fundamentally not trustworthy. In a very serious way. And, quite frankly, IMHO, it wasn’t.
Really, WTKTT, if you were in that situation, where you had a total day of abject failure on the part of overhead (including with your relatively bestbud supervisor who hasn’t–for no fault of his own–been able to support your efforts to carry out the plan you agreed with him to do) you would still stick to “the rules” and assume that they would work?
Again, I’m not trying to get at what he should have done, because we all know that already.
I’m trying to discern why he didn’t.
Isn’t that what everybody, including us is, WTF, wondering about???
Reply to Marti Reed post on
August 12, 2014 at 12:35 am
>> Marti wrote…
>> I’m not trying to get at what Eric
>> should have done.
>> Obviously, Eric should have (with the
>> benefit of 20/20 hindsight) consulted
>> with Abel about what to do.
>>
>> And I totally wish he had, believe me.
>>
>> What I’m trying to get at is why he
>> didn’t do that..
I understand.
Have you really considered the obvious?
Because whether or not there was any
kind of ‘request’ coming from anyone else
behind the idea or not… there came a
moment when it was now ‘their idea’… and
they ( Marsh and Steed together ) decided
that is what THEY were GOING to do.
To have then ‘followed the proper chain
of command’ and then asked for
PERMISSION to do it more than likely
would have resulted in a “No… just stay
where you are like I told you to.”
So the solution is then simple.
Don’t ask. Just DO it.
>> Marti also said…
>> I’ve watched a lot of Lessons Learned
>> videos, and one of the things they
>> STRESS is to recognize “Why what they
>> did made sense at the time.”
>> Because that’s how you get to the
>> place where you recognize that you
>> could make that mistake, too.
>>
>> I’m trying to discern why what Eric
>> did made sense to him at that time.
Again… consider the obvious first.
It was what he WANTED to do, and at the time the decision was made it seemed possible to do… so why not?
>> Marti also said…
>> And I’m proposing that it made sense
>> to him at that time that the overhead
>> on this fire was fundamentally not
>> trustworthy. In a very serious way.
>> And, quite frankly, IMHO, it wasn’t.
Once again… try the ‘obvious’ hat first
to see if it fits.
It had nothing to do with ‘trust’ except for the fact that Marsh knew he could probably ‘trust’ OPS1 Abel to say NO if he asked for permission to do what he wanted.
So he didn’t.
He WANTED to do it.
He didn’t WANT anyone to say NO.
So he just DID it.
>> Marti also said…
>>
>> Really, WTKTT, if you were in that
>> situation, where you had a total
>> day of abject failure on the part
>> of overhead (including with your
>> relatively bestbud supervisor who
>> hasn’t–for no fault of his own–been
>> able to support your efforts to carry
>> out the plan you agreed with him
>> to do) you would still stick to “the
>> rules” and assume that they
>> would work?
Marsh and/or Steed knew that the rules WOULD work. That’s why they did NOT discuss it with Abel.
There was a 99 percent probability that if they discussed their idea with Abel and/or asked for HIS ‘permission’ to make that move… Abel would have said NO.
So they didn’t.
I HAVE been in a situation exactly like that… complete with potential fatal outcomes if I had made the WRONG decision(s)… but at NO time was I putting anything that I ( personally ) wanted to do ahead of my responsibility to those around me.
>> Marti also said…
>> Again, I’m not trying to get at what
>> he should have done, because we all
>> know that already.
Yes. We do.
>> Marti also said…
>> I’m trying to discern why he didn’t.
>> Isn’t that what everybody, including us
>> is, WTF, wondering about???
I suppose it is… yes… but at the level of decision making you are wondering about I really do think it’s quite simple.
Sitting in the black and watching a town burn down is not the ‘excellent performance at all times’ that Darrell Willis said he was EXPECTING from Marsh just 48 days earlier in his performance evaluation.
So Marsh was either going to have to explain to the man who held the keys to his career path why he did NOT try to get to town…
OR…
Marsh would have to explain to some guy who was his TEMPORARY boss why he violated HIS directive and ‘moved’ when he was told to stay put.
Marsh chose the latter and assumed that ‘forgiveness is easier than permision’.
He did NOT intend on DYING for either ‘boss’.
He was just deciding which one he was going to have to do some ‘explaining’ to later.
He was also ( in both cases ) just thinking of himself. That’s the REAL problem.
NEITHER of those things should have been any kind of consideration in his mind at that point in time, on that day, in those circumstances.
They had gotten themselves too far from town to be of any use to anyone at that time. They were ‘out of the game’. and he should have had the maturity to know that.
He should not have given a damn what ANYONE was going to say later about ANY decision he made just so long as he got those boys home safely.
Even if these ‘gung ho’ kids were staring him in the face and saying… “Aw C’mon, Eric… we can’t just SIT here! Let’s get DOWN THERE!”…
Eric Marsh should have said…
Sit down and shut the fuck up.
We are staying right here until it is totally SAFE to go anywhere at all and that’s just the way it is.
They were just kids.
WTKTT I wanted to reply to something you wrote below, but apparently the new software won’t let me do it. And it’s connected to what you said above, so I’ll put it here.
You wrote:
“He was also ( in both cases ) just thinking of himself. That’s the REAL problem.
NEITHER of those things should have been any kind of consideration in his mind at that point in time, on that day, in those circumstances.He was also ( in both cases ) just thinking of himself. That’s the REAL problem.
NEITHER of those things should have been any kind of consideration in his mind at that point in time, on that day, in those circumstances.”
And you wrote above:
“For a ‘business’ that prides itself on how they adhere to ‘military’ style chain of command… that’s just the ‘way it is’.
Everyone can lose faith in their supervisors or even come to the conclusion their direct line supervisor is a total freakin’ MORON.
You still don’t violate the chain of command and start ‘freelancing’ while the ‘enemy is at hand’.”
Here’s the deal, for me.
I’m trying to look UP the swiss cheese layers as well as down.
And, no, in a proper investigation of something like this, from everything I’ve seen and read, the most obvious thing often ISN’T the truth of the matter. It can easily become just another “slide” that can be a detriment to situational awareness.
As I look UP the layers, I see quite a bit of violations of Chain of Command on this fire.
Cougan Carothers was out on the dozer line before Rance Marquez, whom he was later assigned to, even got to the fire. Maybe somebody assigned him to do that. But I don’t see anybody saying that.
I have never seen anything anywhere that indicates that Air Attack has the authority to change the attack plan of a ground crew. They don’t dictate to the crew on the ground what the crew on the ground is supposed to do. When Rory Collins dumped on GM’s test burn, and told them to go direct, that was a violation of Chain of Command, in my eyes. Unless somebody can convince me otherwise.
At 3:50 Gary Cordes ordered his crews to begin the evacuation process from the Youth Camp. They apparently, judging from the disparate narratives, didn’t.
After Rance returned to the ICP and tried to communicate to a distracted overhead what he had determined about DivA/DivZ, he and Cougan went out to work on structure protection. According to him and others, at that point mostly everybody over there was “free-lancing.”
As soon as Bea Day’s team began arriving, they were, in relationship to the established Chain of Command, mostly disregarding it and forming their own Chain of Command. Or so it appears.
It appears to me that that strict “militaristic” Chain of Command culture wasn’t all that operative on various parts of this fire.
For the want of a nail the shoe was lost……
http://youtu.be/J3H1Njg5eNo?list=PLTErVrHH6uJja-ljtn7z9Q5Sz9WtCPGw1
If you get time go to Wild Fire today. The FS has released a change in procedures for Investigating Fatality and Serious injury Fires and dropping the procedure used for Yarnell.. They still seem to want to protect some.
Since we are discussing Marsh’s responsibilities———
From Occupational Safety & Health AD……….Incident Command System.
Division Group Supervisor — Specific Responsibilities
Ensure The IC and OPS or resources unit is advised of all changes in the Status of resources assigned to the Division/Group.
Report Hazardous situations, special occurrences, or significant events to the immediate Supervisor
OPS/IC
Submit situation and resource status information to Branch Director or OPS.
Along with several other responsibilities.
General Duties—–
Responsible for the implementation of the assigned portion of the Incident Action Plan.
Reporting on the progress of control operations and status of resources with in the Division/Group.
Again you do not make decisions with out notifying your Supervisor OPS Abel—-before implementing them.
So was Marsh truly a qualified Division Group Supervisor and if so he for got his responsibilities along with the 10 & 18. These are undeniable with the information we have.
As a past Division Group Supervisor these are basic responsibilities you are trained in and actually have a book covering each ICS job description that you should be carrying with you to refer to your duties in each function. At least I carried one my entire carrier and referred to it often.
So what happened between Marsh and Abel. Abel made contact, Marsh did not advise on his end of the responsibility as to his plans to move the crew and to where.
Copy. And thank you.
And also thanks to everyone’s comments (which I’ve read) regarding my postings. I’ve spent the day wrestling around with the so-called “Swiss Cheese” mode of accident investigations, trying to sync them with what that “burr under my saddle” is alerting me to
I really wasn’t sure, all things considered, how seriously “Chain of Command” was taken by crews. From a lot of things I’ve read, it may not be taken so seriously by some kinds of crews. But it does seem that IHC’s do (necessarily for a host of reasons–which you have described).
I really appreciate your weighing in on this.
I have read lots and lots of very serious stuff re the reasons firefighters bristle about how the 10 & 18 are both used against them (including in investigations, prosecutions, and lawsuits), and have been added to increasingly impossible lists and such that are completely ineffectual (because they’re impossible to remember) in the actual dynamic realm of wildland firefighting. Thus the re-organization of all of it by Gleason (RIP) into LCES, something easier to calculate in an intense dynamic situation.
And, because of this, I really wasn’t sure how they view Chain of Command. It’s increasingly clear to me (including via your posts) they view that really seriously.
(And, a nod to WTKTT. Thanks for your comments, which I’ve taken seriously. BUT there is no evidence that Eric as either a DIVS or a IHC Supervisor had any prior history of disregarding his responsibilities regarding Chain of Command, that I know of.)
So, that being the case, I’m still trying to dig both higher and deeper. Because this thing really bothers me. As I think it should, all things considered.
Apparently something seems (at least to me) to have caused DIVS Eric Marsh to PERCEIVE that adhering to that POLICY was no longer reliable and thus mandatory (and this is based on reading an Australian study of the results of using HFACS-Human Factors Analysis Classification System–Otherwise known as “Swiss Cheese”–to analyze safety incidents there–that lack of trust seemed to sometimes be an issue).
In the HFACS model of accident investigation (if the DOD and the NTSB can do it why can’t the various versions of the FS??), perceptions are an area in which mistakes can be made. But they are still to be taken seriously, because they can still cause accidents.
It seems to me that DIVS Eric Marsh, after Todd Abel (who he had an otherwise amicable relationship with) told him/them to “hunker down and be safe,” and then into the Options Conversation,, perceived that his otherwise mandatory Chain of Command relationship with his Supervisor Todd Abel was, in spite of all the seriously held Policy, not trustworthy/relevant and thus not applicable.
There is no evidence this was habitual for Eric.
So I wonder, could his perception have been flawed? If so, by what?
Or could there have been something more substantial (in his mind) behind it?
And, by the way, here’s a pretty good–without getting too overly complicated–rundown on HFACS–Human Factors Analysis Classification System (Swiss Cheese) from WildlandFireDotCom:
http://www.wildlandfire.com/docs/2004/hcarson.htm
I started yesterday taking this critical point of a DivS deciding to dis-engage from the norms of Chain of Command as a possible Unsafe Supervisory failure by OPS Abel, in terms of allowing relatively sloppy reporting by a DivS and not intervening in that.
And thinking that, possibly, that could indicate an Organizational Influences failure of not taking Chain of Command policies seriously enough in the organization and the training and accountability.
I was trying to look upstream. Was there something systemic in the Organizational Influences that allowed this sort of thing to become a norm and, thus, allow this to happen.
What I discovered was that it doesn’t seem to be the case that, among IHCs in general, and Eric Marsh in particular. Chain of Command responsibilities are not taken seriously.
So that doesn’t seem to be a hole in the swiss cheese that lines up here.
So that pushes back down to the level of Possible Unsafe Supervisory failure on the part of Todd Abel. (And this is not to assign blame but to discover what might be problems that need to be addressed via a Just Culture examination of what happened–not that the current culture is going to be capable of accomplishing that. Which is why I wrote earlier that the appropriate parties–which are not us–may need to examine this).
Read what I linked to above and you will begin to understand why I am asking the questions I asked above.
Typo:
What I discovered was that it doesn’t seem to be the case that, among IHCs in general, and Eric Marsh in particular. Chain of Command responsibilities are not taken seriously.
Should read:
What I discovered was that it doesn’t seem to be the case that, among IHCs in general, and Eric Marsh in particular, Chain of Command responsibilities are not taken seriously.
I don’t think you have full enough information to make that statement the way you have. Also, what it implies is that, not only did those up the chain get a little imprecise or lax, in part because they were overwhelmed by events, but also that, out of thin air, this specific day, GM began withholding information at multiple instances., not asking for help on some basic issues if they didn’t have the info themselves, failing to observe some basic precautions such as keeping sleeves down, etc. Some acute force such as heat stroke could cause some of those lapses, for sure, but otherwise it is highly unusual for rule-breaking to appear out of nowhere. What we have heard is that it didn’t appear out of nowhere, here. I should stress that, in terms of rulebreaking, we are talking about the equivalent of things like not having enough life jackets in a boat — the Coast Guard takes its rules seriously, as it should, but while it’s good policy to follow those rules, we don’t think less of someone overall who may not have.
Another instance is the fire that Marsh and crew got the bad performance on. Division Supervisor wanted direct line as stated in the attack plan Marsh went indirect and would not compromise stating safety due to snags. The Division Sup. suggested putting Sawyers out in front of crew to drop snags a very common thing on most fires Marsh still refused and went on with his indirect line construction, using safety as his reasoning. Dropping snags along the line ahead of line construction is very common when on side hill direct line in timber fuels. He had no reason to not go along with the suggestion except it took longer to build the line.
Those fire fighters that suggest the over head is using the 10 against them in investigations I suggest they look at the facts.
A rule is a rule If an accident stands out as happening because the rule was violated that’s the facts. The 10 has always been used to identify bad decisions that caused the accident. ” a simple example remove the guard on a saw and then get cut by the saw”
Failing to follow safety guide lines , never operate a saw with out the guard attached. The 10 standard Orders are there for a reason
Those that follow them stay out of trouble. Those that don’t well bad things happen or they escape with close calls.
I’m not exactly sure what you are saying here.
And, yes, I agree I/we don’t have enough information to make any judgements. Which is why I keep saying that the appropriate people, who do, collectively, have that information, should be looking at this break/hole carefully.
And, actually, I don’t think I’m making any judgements. I am making hypotheses in order to ask questions in a systemic way, based on the process a lot of people are trying to insert into the investigation/Lessons Learned atmosphere.
And I’m not saying I’ve reached any conclusions. I have just currently landed at this spot via the process.
I wrote:
“It seems to me that DIVS Eric Marsh, after Todd Abel (who he had an otherwise amicable relationship with) told him/them to “hunker down and be safe,” and then into the Options Conversation,, perceived that his otherwise mandatory Chain of Command relationship with his Supervisor Todd Abel was, in spite of all the seriously held Policy, not trustworthy/relevant and thus not applicable.
There is no evidence this was habitual for Eric.
So I wonder, could his perception have been flawed? If so, by what?
Or could there have been something more substantial (in his mind) behind it?”
Do you think this is an inappropriate line of questioning/analysis?
Marti I think you are asking and searching for some very valid info.
I have on several occasions wondered why Marsh was not more clear with his communications. He was in contact a lot with Abel during the day and then just shut him off……WHY?
I am also not sure why Abel was not more clear with Marsh when he had him on the radio. If you are concerned with safety at that point no matter what the confusion around you make sure you give clear instructions and they are fully understood. Do not assume any thing.
This fire comes out more and more a disaster in supervision, Safety, basic communication’s and trigger points.
The evacuation of the homes should have been don 12 hours prior not an hour. To many close calls.
All of this should have been Discussed in the SAIT.
Yep.
I think, as far as policy goes, it could appear to have been pretty much 50/50.
And, given the significance of this break, the folks concerned foremost about safety, lessons learned, and the fact that a very large percentage of fatalities happen in transition periods and in relationship to breakdowns in cohesion, need to really contemplate why this might have happened.
Including looking upstream, which “swiss cheese” requires doing.
I’m currently circling around the possibility/probability that Eric wasn’t so much breaking with Abel, specifically/personally, as he was breaking with the entire “overhead.”
When I think about the fact that, in the two instances in which he turned to Abel for help–the conflict with Air Attack over the retardant drops and the conflict with Rance over the Division boundaries–Abel actually didn’t help him. Nothing got fixed.
Because nothing was able to get fixed. Because there weren’t enough resources on the fire to fix them.
There weren’t enough resources to succeed at the plan he and Abel had agreed to that morning and he and Blue Ridge had tried to implement.
Eric might have had good reason to think around 4PM he was out there as a DivS with no actual meaningful backup. He knew there wasn’t enough cheese to cover the holes.
He had just come off a fire in which that wasn’t the case–the Doce Fire, managed by Tony Sciacca’s Type 1 IMT (including Todd Abel, who was probably his Supervisor) .
And before that, he had come off the Thompson Ridge Fire (which was a VERY BIG DEAL New Mexico fire).
On that fire, which Bea Day’s Type 2 Team was overseeing, Granite Mountain, under Darrell Willis as Night OPS, conducted a successful night backfire to protect a collection of very important (to New Mexico and the Valle Grande) historic buildings.
(For an account of that see this: “Photographer Remembers Fallen Firefighters,” by National Interagency Fire Center photographer Kristen Honig:
https://www.facebook.com/notes/valles-caldera-national-preserve/photographer-remembers-fallen-firefighters/587053401344979).
So here’s my question:
When a previously successful Division Supervisor incrementally learns, via his experience, that his overhead is not capable of supporting him, how obligated is he to the policy of reporting to, and being subordinate to, that overhead?
Riddle Me This.
Video, probably also taken by Kristen, of that operation:
https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?v=640869839274582
She writes:
“On one occasion, the squad boss stopped me to attach a glow stick to my hard hat so I would not get run over while taking photos in the road. Another time he reminded me of the hazards of working around snags and being aware of one’s surroundings.When dawn broke later that morning and hazard trees were being removed, he provided me a narrated play-by-play of how to properly fell a tree.”
And here’s the video of that felling of that tree:
https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?v=640254719336094
PS.
I cried a lot when I stumbled upon this whole thing last night.
Here is a much larger collection of Kristen’s photos, including many more of GM doing that night backburn:
http://inciweb.nwcg.gov/incident/photographs/3404/
At the 2-3 second mark of the Russ Reason video there appears to be a person walking right to left just above the GM crew carrier 7A.
I see what you are talking about… but it appears to just be the wind blowing the trees and bushes back there.
calvin… have you tried the VLC Media Player?
It has this GREAT option where you can just highlight ANY place in a video and then ZOOM DOWN and play that part of the video in real time in full ZOOM.
The ZOOM is so good you can get down to just a a few dozen pixels if you want.
You can also then easily ‘loop’ on any ZOOMED section of any video.
Very, very useful for this sort of ‘close analysis’ of video(s).
That ‘Dynamic ZOOM’ option in the VLC Media Player is under…
Menu > Tools > Effects and Filters > Video Effects > Geometry > Interactive Zoom.
The ‘white box’ that appears on the video lets you pick WHERE to zoom.
The little ‘triangle’ below that box is ‘clickable/draggable’ and sets how MUCH to zoom.
The VLC Media player is totally FREE and available for all Operating Systems….
You can get it here…
http://www.videolan.org/vlc/index.html
Thanks. If you do not mind, look again; I am almost 100% certain there is a person walking right to left. Pretty sure it is not a tree blowing as it continues moving left.
Woke up too early, scrolling down to see what I might have missed. Came across this:
WTKTT wrote on August 5, 2014 at 3:36 PM:
Quoting Mike:
“>> Decision point 2 >> >> I really now think they just wanted off >> that mountain.
It was 4:00 PM. Everything they had been doing all day was now useless. Sunset was going to be at 7:42 PM that day. That was more than 3 hours away but they also knew it had taken the better part of an HOUR to even get UP there and that was with driving out almost halfway in the Crew Carriers ( which were now gone ) so that brings the maximum ‘hang around’ time down to 2 hours ( or LESS ) before they would have to realize ( and tell the other 17 guys ) they were all ‘spending the night’.
We know they were low on food and water even around NOON-ish because they asked Brian Frisby and Trueheart Brown to give them ‘all the Gatorade and ‘cubies’ they had. Frisby and Brown gave them what they had… but that was probably all gone by later afternoon as well.
So the prospects for telling 17 guys their buggies are more than an hour away somewhere and they might have to spend the night out there with little to no food or water was not a ‘pretty’ option for Marsh and Steed to consider when ‘discussing their options’.
So yes… ALL of that might have factored into the infamous ‘discussing their options’ conversation(s). Go now… and maybe we can make it and have someplace comfortable to sleep tonight… and actually be able to have dinner… or try to wait it out and possibly run out of daylight and end up with 17 very PISSED guys on our hands.”
THIS (which I agree with) is exactly WHEN and WHY they should have been talking with Todd Abel. Those two options weren’t their only options. The more I think about it, the more I’m certain they could have been flown out of there. Not totally easy, but much easier than taking risks that could have, and did, led to them all getting killed, which was a MUCH more difficult option for all involved.
If they had said some shortened version of the above to Todd Abel, like “Things are going south and we don’t want to be stuck out here,” he would have been a useful set of extra eyes/brain for them.
Any combination of the DPS and BLM and 5KA helicopters could have been used to get them off the mountain. They were all capable of doing that. Maybe not instantaneously, but I do believe Todd Abel could have orchestrated that. And I think he would have considered putting that in motion.
And he could have been that more experienced “remote lookout” that Brendan wasn’t. There was a water tender assigned to the RHR parking lot. They could have done that “watching.”
And, because he WAS their BOSS, in the chain of command, if he had been in on the decision to head down the trail, knowing it WASN’T their only option, by the time they got to the saddle, HE would have been in on that discussion. And I’m sure he would have said, “Forget about that, get back in the black and we’ll get you out with helicopters.”
This whole breach between GM and Todd Abel, I really don’t understand it.
And BTW, in thinking through the above, I’m also taking into consideration Bob Powers’ estimate that they could have gotten to the saddle earlier than 3:30.
TYPO alert. I meant 4:30.
Marti
Just for every ones thought process.
Hot Shots have stayed on shift for 16 to 24 hours.
What is in their packs that weigh 40 lbs.
Extra rations and water, they may have been low but they weren’t out.
They also could have requested a sling load of water and rations dropped
at the Heli Spot just above where they were at their rest site.
There was no discussion or request so I take it they had enough.
Crews go prepared to cover a 24 hr. shift and that should not have been a problem no one riots because of low water and food it is as common as extra shift times.
The picture posted by WTKTT taken at 1630 is very radical burning. see whirl wind flame before it fades. No fireman that see’s that ignores it.
Again I say the crew would have seen that if they were in the saddle at that time and had not dropped into the canyon..
I seriously do not believe once in the canyon they could see any thing of the fire activity until it was right in front of them. in many areas they would have been in 6 to 10 foot brush they could maybe see the smoke column but little else until the flames were right in front of them.
They lost site of the fire and control of their situation.
I stick with my belief they were in the canyon by or just after 1615 before the estimated fire change at 1620 to 1625. not in the saddle at that time.
Marti.
Why do you feel so confident that Todd Abel would have considered evacuating 19 men who ( at one point were somewhat safe in the black, excluding the danger posed from lightening strikes) when a whole town was about to burn and there were numerous FF’s and civilians at risk? Seems like a pretty low priority to me. especially knowing that the BLM helicopter was shuttling people off the mountain earlier in the day while GM were hiking their asses up the mountain.
There are several people who have admitted they heard GM was on the move. Eric Tarr, Darrell Willis, Gary Cordes, Brian Frisby, Bravo 33, and another BRH? And according to Roy Hall’s YIN, at 1730 Todd Able reported that the last communication with Eric Marsh was “We are on the west ridge descending a predetermined escape route.” I am not sure that communication was with Abel directly, but it cannot be ruled out.
I do not understand the continual insistence that GM did not indicate their plan. There are testimonies that GM DID announce their move, however, their was a lack of understanding that may or may not be the fault of Marsh/Steed. Or something……
Calvin
All those people assumed but did not know where the crew was or was actually moving to, many thought they were in the black or moving thru the black. This was stated by Marsh. No one believed they were in the brush filled canyon but at some other location. The west ridge was part of the black. and could have also meant they were dropping off the back side very confusing to most after stating they were committed to the black.
They were on the move but nobody knew to where. Lack of specific information relayed.
I’ve read everybody’s comments and thanks for replying!
What I’m saying is more hypothetical. But still based on the facts.
And I’m talking more about around 4:00. And I’m talking about specific, intentional contact between Marsh, GM, and Todd Abel, their overhead. Not something Todd Abel MIGHT have overheard.
And I’m not saying Abel WOULD have, all of a sudden, sent helicopters up there to extract them. But I’m saying that, if, for some justifiable reason, he agreed it was important to come up with a plan to get them down. I believe he could/would have (at least at 4:00) put the use of one or more of those helicopters into that plan.
i.e. at 4:00 they didn’t just have three options–hike out the long way–the way they came in, stay stuck on the ridge all night, or head down the twotrack “toward” the ranch on a route they were unfamiliar with.
But that’s only IF they had, as they SHOULD have, included Abel in their Options Conversation (and thus in their decisions after that). Abel had more “resources in his pocket” (defined loosely) than they did. And he could have included them in that Conversation.
He could have also said “Stay put, that’s an ORDER. We can/will get you down as soon as we can.”
And the possible “dissension in the ranks” at the saddle, it seems to me, would have been avoided also.
If he had agreed to them heading down the two-track to check it out, while putting a lookout on them from the RHR parking lot. when they got to the saddle. as the fire turned around and picked up steam “beyond all their anticipations.” and he learned they were sizing up a bowl full of manzanita between them and the Ranch and the fire, he would have put enough “essay” into the mix to put the kabbosh on it.
And everybody could/would have gone home alive, eventually, with or without one or two or three relatively easily available helicopters.
The burr under my saddle has been increasingly this breach between DiVS Marsh, Granite Mountain, and Todd Abel. I DON’T understand it.
And I’m not going to just handily toss it into the grab-bag called “Hubris.” That’s been done too easily too often after other fires, with destructive consequences.
I’m looking at it in the context of applying the best of “Human Factors” and “Swiss Cheese” analysis. I’ve been reading a lot about that stuff for the past several months. And thinking about this in those contexts. And seeing how, when those are (eventually) applied, they can begin to make things make sense.
(I just spent the week trying to comprehend the Cerro Grande fire. Until there was a sober, clear-headed, rational examination of what decisions were made and why they were made, all the head-rolling in the universe didn’t help understand what actually went wrong on that fire.)
All of those applications look for WHAT (not WHO), in the un-rolling of the complex situation, led to the lining up of the holes in the cheese. Those holes INCLUDE cohesiveness (or lack thereof) in the chain of command and within crews and the crews they’re associated with.
In that context, it has appeared, over and over, to me, that The Decision to actively/passively close Todd Abel out of the loop of conversation/planning about their Options was a really critical point in the lining up of the holes. It really broke the chain. In a really significant way. And the chain kept breaking every step of the way after that.
If I were involved in an After Action Peer Review of this, THIS is where I would want to explore what was/wasn’t happening that led to this breakdown in appropriate communications/cohesiveness/chain-of-command between DIVS Marsh, Granite Mountain, and their immediate overhead, OPS Todd Abel.
I think this break is a proximate cause of the tragic consequences that followed.
I realize this is “nothing new.” I’m just trying to frame it differently. What’s new is just that. I’m tired of going round and round in circles.
And I don’t think we can figure this one out. But I think the appropriate people should be trying to.
AMEN well said…….
One cannot understand the WHAT, without first knowing WHO did WHAT!
Well, obviously, we already know who.
What I think needs to be discerned is (holding to the principles I stated above) what would make a DivS and a crew in his charge decide it was more advantageous than not to not enlist the support/SA/resources/accountability of of the Supervisor they are all assigned to?
I’ve been searching and searching for instances in which “chain of command” is assumed to be ok to be not taken seriously. Especially when things are going south. I can’t find any.
And, as I said, I don’t believe we can solve this riddle. Only the people involved can.
Everything we do here at this point is speculation. Seasoned with a whole lot of conjecture about various actors’ personal characters (which I’m really uncomfortable with). With very little evidence.
But I think it’s an absolutely critical juncture. When and how and why does chain of command seemingly no longer apply?
Reply to Marti Reed post August 8, 2014 at 10:39 pm
>> Marti asked…
>>
>> When and how and why does chain of command
>> seemingly no longer apply?
In keeping with the ‘rule of theory’ that ‘things should be kept as simple as possible… but no simpler than that’… there’s at least one very obvious answer to that question.
When you are pretty sure the ‘chain of command’ will not LET you do something you WANT to do.
That’s when the “What they don’t know won’t bother them” theory of radio communications comes into play.
Very good question.
The only one in the books is—
When you are asked to do an unsafe action,
You can requires an adjustment in the action to make it safe.
or say no and identify the safety rules you base your decision on.
Old school–You work for the line person above you and answer to them maintain contact with them. You wont last long in your job if you do what WTKTT stated.
So back to my main concern with GM and Marsh.
They were assigned to a Division of line the standing order or assignment dose not stop until relieved by another shift or the OPS tells you to abandon your assignment. Even if you get run out by the fire you fall back regroup discuss options with your assigned Overhead and start a new line or attack. The division is still there until a new plan is formulated.
You do not have a choice to abandon your assignment with out IC/OPS approval. That is what Marsh did. From what we know Marsh never discussed his options or decisions with OPS
and left his Division Assignment. Staying in the black or moving to a new location required him to notify OPS and get approval. Yes there is a strict chain of command.
One thing that has not been discussed–
Once the fire hit the main ridge and laid down on the back side if the crew had sat it out in the black they could have started line construction from the heel of the fire on the back side of the ridge until relieved or asked to pull out. The fire line stayed pretty much on the back side of the ridge in lighter fuels. Just my thoughts as I have been their many times. You pull back and reengage in your Sector or Division not some other Division unless requested to by your OPS and it is safe to move to the new location.
Chain of command on Fires is like the military you stand repercussions if you do not follow orders and communicate changes in the plan you are to carry out. You don’t do what they don’t know wont bother them because it always gets back to the overhead. AS stated by some Superintendents that supposedly talked to Marsh about some things he had done. A good way to end your fire courier if you bump heads with the wrong Overhead.
Reply to Bob Powers post on August 9, 2014 at 8:25 am
>> Mr. Powers said…
>>
>> They were assigned to a Division of line the
>> standing order or assignment dose not stop until
>> relieved by another shift or the OPS tells you to
>> abandon your assignment.
Do you think it is possible that when OPS1 Todd Abel told Marsh “Okay… you guys just hunker and be safe”… that Marsh construed that to mean both HE and Granite Mountain had just been ‘relieved of their assignment’ and they didn’t need to answer to OPS anymore?
>> Mr. Powers also said…
>>
>> You do not have a choice to abandon your
>> assignment with out IC/OPS approval.
There is still that documented radio call from Marsh ( the SAIT never quoted the source ) which says that all of sudden Marsh come on the radio and said…
“I want to pass on that we’re making our way out our escape route”.
That was just an ANNOUNCEMENT from Marsh. He alone had made up his mind do do that with no consultation with his direct supervisor’s.
Was Marsh being very, very ‘smart’ here with that announcement?
He did NOT say “We don’t want to be up here anymore… we’re abandoning this assignment and walking to town any way we can” ( Which is more the truth than them actually NEEDING to use any ‘escape route’ at that time ).
Do you think Marsh was being careful to ‘frame’ the decision to ‘just move somewhere else’ in terms of ‘escape route’ and ‘safety zone’ because he knew that was always HIS decision to make and didn’t need to discuss that with anyone… versus just deciding to ‘abandon your assignmen’ and ‘move’ ( which is what they were really, actually doing )?
First question NO— hunker and be safe.
Stay in your location or assignment and wait to see what happens. and stay safe.
None of those relieves you of your assignment.
Marsh should have notified Abel of any change in his and the crews status or location.
Making our way out our escape route—-
The Escape route for all intent and purpose should have been thru the black, across the black as they stated they were in the black. Every one including Abel thought they were in the black so every thing said would reflect that.
What they used or said was an escape route was in no way in any form or imagination an escape route in all the terms I would consider one to be. They just bailed off the mountain escaping from nothing at that time. A safety Zone a mile and a half away thru unburned fuel is also a stretch of the imagination in most Fire fighters minds. A SZ should be close and quickly accessible. The Black always first, least amount of effort and time to pull back to safety.
Even though Marsh could make a decision to move he should have discussed it with his line supervisor Abel. Maintain Prompt communications with your supervisor Prompt means all kinds of things including keeping them informed on your decisions or changes in the plan you were assigned to work on for the shift.
So what was Marsh really doing and saying?
could make a negative statement here or I could say he gust was not being clear enough with the radio and there was no attempt to hide there movement. I think we have been here before so your choice is probably the same as mine.
If you decide to move to a safety zone you always notify your supervisor and its location and what route you are taking. None of that was done.
To much familiarity with the local overhead may have made marsh think he could make his own decisions and there would be no repercussions if the out come was favorable. Who knows……..
I’m still bothered by this assumption that Marsh was being secretive (and a post by Calvin the other day seemed to suggest he is too, I think). First of all, it is very convenient for everyone on that fire if that is the story. Second, when Marsh announces they are deploying, he does not say where they are, as if the people he is talking to know. Bravo 33 does ask, but asks if they are on the south side of the fire, which is correct. In addition, OPS mentions all that is going to be done for them, but never asks where they are. Supposedly he does not know – why would he not ask? Third, it is assumed they were being secretive so as not to be openly disobedient of OPS. Yet we cannot even come up with why they moved for sure. What was so important that would make them take that step?
Reply to Marti Reed post on August 8, 2014 at 12:08 pm
>> Marti said…
>>
>> I’m not saying Abel WOULD have, all of a sudden, sent
>> helicopters up there to extract them. But I’m saying that, if,
>> for some justifiable reason, he agreed it was important to come
>> up with a plan to get them down. I believe he could/would have
>> (at least at 4:00) put the use of one or more of those helicopters
>> into that plan.
Totally agree.
There would have been nothing ‘automatic’ about such an operation given everything else that was happening and the weather / fire behavior… but there is no doubt that if someone really, really felt they NEEDED 19 more guys with Hard Hats and Pulaskis ASAP on the eastern end of the fire… then it probably *COULD* have been worked out pretty quickly.
It was ONLY the yellow/white BLM Helicopter N14HX that had actually ever landed up at that ‘helispot’ that morning… and it looks like ( as helspots go ) to have been a pretty ‘tricky’ landing… but even if only N14HX was able to be used it certainly was still there in Yarnell doing nothing around that time.
The WINDS would have probably been the biggest factor in determining whether the ‘dust off’ could start ASAP or would have to ‘wait’… but even Christopher MacKenzie’s videos seem to indicate that the winds up around that helispot around that time were NOT much of a consideration. That, of course, would have been all up to the pilot of N14HX. He’s not going to do anything stupid with a million dollar chopper that isn’t his.
There is no way Marsh could have been SURE if that chopper was still there in the area or whether this was even ‘one of his options’ around that time unless ( as you say ) he had openly DISCUSSED it with OPS1 Todd Abel.
Marsh didn’t do that. I wish he had.
>> Marti also said…
>>
>> The burr under my saddle has been increasingly this breach
>> between DiVS Marsh, Granite Mountain, and Todd Abel.
>> I DON’T understand it.
I believe I have said this before… but I ALSO have always had this nagging feeling that OPS1 Todd Abel felt, in some way, ‘betrayed’ when he finally realized what had happened that day.
Perhaps ‘betrayed’ is a strong word… but what else do you call the feeling when you discover that someone you had started the work day with and who you were communicating freely with all day in an ‘open’ manner ends up appearing to have been ‘withholding’ important information from you at a critical time?
Example…
In his ADOSH interview… OPS1 Todd Abel tells the investigators that ( even though we know he had at least TWO conversations with Eric Marsh after the following actually happened ) he had no idea that Brendan McDonough had been ‘evacutated’ already OR that the Granite Mountain vehicles also were also being ‘evacuated’ back to town ( empty ) because of the fast south-moving fireline.
Marsh apparently never said anything to Abel about either of these things even though Abel seemed to have spoken to Marsh at least TWICE after those events to check on his ( and Granite Mountain’s ) ‘status’.
If I was stuck out on a ridge and in charge of 19 other guys and my OPS1
calls to check on my ‘status’… I think I would include as part of the report
that my lookout just had to be evacuated due to fire advance and that BOTH
of my crew’s buggies were now being ‘evacuated’ ( empty ) for the same reason. I would think he needed to KNOW that, at that point.
Marsh said NOTHING.
From page 55 of Todd Abel’s ADOSH interview…
Q1 = Dave Larsen ( Rest in Peace )
A = Todd Abel
—————————————————————
Q1: So when did they – when did they move the rigs – was he – did you hear any of that stuff? Uh, decisions made to move the rigs?
A: No. I had no idea – I had no idea that the trigger point from the lookout had
been – sorry, let me get on the right knob here.
((Crosstalk))
A: Yeah, I thinks that’s (unintelligible), yeah, I think it’s – yeah. The trigger point – I didn’t hear that the trigger point for the lookout had been met – or had been hit and he came off. This is all stuff I heard afterwards.
————————————————————-
So unlike earlier in the day when Eric Marsh seemed to be making a lot
of phone calls to Abel and having a lot of contact with him and explaining
exactly what was going on ‘out there’… ( The Rory Collins unwanted retardant drops, the whole Rance Marquez run-in, etc. etc. ) it seems that after Frisby had to call off that ‘face to face’ and evacuate Brendan and then get busy moving Granite’s vehicles so they wouldn’t get fried… Marsh had ALREADY decided to cut back on his ‘information sharing’ with OPS1 Todd Abel.
Eric Marsh and Todd Abel had formed a ‘working bond’ right off the bat that morning at the 7:00 AM briefing at the Yarnell Fire Station. They stood in the lot together looking out at the fire and as ‘one fireman to another’ they formulated Eric’s actual work assignment, his ‘bump’ up to DIVSA, and that Jesse would be ‘taking over’ Granite. They presented THEIR ‘idea’ together to management and it was ‘approved’. We hear Eric Marsh then CALLING Abel at 10:30 AM in the 4490red video taken at the fire station. We know that Marsh was then calling Abel via cellphone throughout the rest of the day and freely ‘reporting’ everything that was going on with him ( the Rory Collins retardant drops, the whole run-in with Marquez, etc. ).
Todd Abel had no reason to believe that he wasn’t getting ‘the whole story’ from DIVSA Eric Marsh every time they talked.
Then, later on, Todd Abel himself is put in charge of the ‘Incident within an Incident’ and had to perform his professional duties in that regard… like having to walk that deployment site himself and count/verify 19 burned bodies.. Eric Marsh’s included.
At some moment while Todd was ‘walking that site’ and ‘counting/identifying’ bodies… I have to believe he was asking himself…
“How in the HELL could these guys be HERE… DEAD… and I didn’t know this ‘move’ was even taking place?”
Again.. .’betrayal’ might be a strong word but Abel still must have been very, very CONFUSED.
** POSTSCRIPT
Obviously ( with the comments above ) I am taking Todd Abel at his word that he NEVER knew they were making that ‘move’ and that he ALWAYS thought they were up there in the ‘safe black’., and that that is NOT his voice in the YARNELL-GAMBLE video taken at 4:27 PM seemingly urging them to ‘hurry to town’ ( even though it actually does sound like him, IMHO ).
Also from Abel’s ADOSH interview. ( page 51 )…
———————————————————————-
A: To the ridge.
Q1: Right.
A: That was the last known location. I had no idea they’d left that location. Blue Ridge Hotshots were working in the same area and thought they were up in this location. ( points to the ‘anchor spot’ and ‘safe black’ on a map ).
.
Q1: Blue Ridge thought they were there?
A: Mm-hm. The helicopters thought they were there, air attack thought they were there, everybody thought they were right here, including myself.
———————————————————————-
I agree with almost all you are saying.
I actually don’t think Abel would have thought seriously of getting them down ASAP to do anything useful in Yarnell at around about 4 PM.
He would have known that IC had sent out the call for the Yarnell evacuation way before then. I’m not sure he knew that Cordes had notified his crews to evacuate.
But he would have known there really wasn’t time for GM to get brought down/get down and get re-engaged in any kind of meaningful “hurry.”
Which underscores what I’m saying. That’s all part of the SA that he would have provided, and that was the reason for him having the authority/resources/scope that he had in the chain of command.
But let’s say Eric said we don’t want to stay up here (for whatever reason), He could have assured him they could be eventually brought down via helicopters (including 5KA which I’ve seen photographed doing some serious extraction work).
He could have also “remotely accompanied” them and had somebody spot them even if he decided to humor them by agreeing to have them head down the trail to see where it went.
Not only had he and Eric worked amicably most of the day, but he and Eric probably had quite a bit of history, via working fires together and via the Academy, which both were a big part of. They had Cohesion.
This isn’t in the same category as Eric and Rance not being able to “create Cohesion” with each other.
I’ve read several times today in various IHC books that it is the responsibility of a DIVS to (and they all say the same thing so it is apparently a policy):
1) Obtain briefing from Supervisor
2) Keep Supervisor informed of situation and resource status
3) Keep Supervisor informed of hazardous situations and significant events.
This isn’t suggestions, it’s IHC policy.
(Actually I think I read it in a FS Incident Command document, but I wanted to see how IHC books handled it. They quoted it verbatim.)
But I don’t want to go into the “WTF was wrong with this guy” path of inquiry because I don’t believe it adds to “Lessons Learned.” It also just goes around in circles.
What I’m asking (in almost complete mystification) is what would cause a DivS to decide that this chain of command policy (including with a Supervisor who, apparently, wasn’t in any kind of conflicted relationship with that DivS). which has plenty of benefits available (as well as some restrictions) was no longer applicable?
And as I’ve said, I don’t think we can figure this out.
But I do believe somebody needs to.
When does Chain of Command policy no longer apply?
Reply to Marti Reed post August 8, 2014 at 11:43 pm
NOTE: Repeating my answer from above down here since it’s the same exact question as above…
>> Marti asked…
>>
>> When does Chain of Command policy no longer apply?
In keeping with the ‘rule of theory’ that ‘things should be kept as simple as possible… but no simpler than that’… there’s at least one very obvious answer to that question.
When you are pretty sure the ‘chain of command’ will not LET you do something you WANT to do.
That’s when the “What they don’t know won’t bother them” theory of radio communications comes into play.
>> Marti also said…
>>
>> But I don’t want to go into the “WTF was wrong with this guy”
>> path of inquiry because I don’t believe it adds to “Lessons
>> Learned.” It also just goes around in circles.
If a preponderance of the evidence in any investigation points to the actions and motivations of ANY single person being a major contributing factor… then trying to determine WHY that person might have been making those decisions does NOT have to be considered just some kind of derisive ‘WTF was wrong with this guy’ approach.
There could, in fact, be MANY ‘Lessons Learned’ in trying to determine WHY this person made the decisions they did… and what the influencing factors ( and pressures real or perceived ) were.
Example: If the evidence reveals that a person in command of others and responsible for their safety was the kind of person that would NOT hesitate to ‘bypass the chain of command’ when it came to just being able to ‘do what they wanted’ without being told NO… then the ‘Lesson Learned’ is to take a CLOSE look at people in similar position(s) and try to determine how many others *might* be out there with the same attitude and constitute another ‘accident waiting to happen’.
That’s valid. That can prevent future ‘accidents’ and loss of life.
Note above statement– Those that go around the Chain Of Command do not last on most fires. And many time they are working for people who do not know them personally Normally you don’t put your head on a chopping block with out cause.
The Chain of Command is real this was an uncommon event and not the norm You do not do what Marsh and crew did and last very long with most Overhead Type 1 and 2 teams.
Mr. Powers… see question above after your other post regarding ‘not making it far in this business if you are a known freelancer’.
Do you think it is possible that Marsh was being VERY clever and always ‘framing’ this decision to simply MOVE as a NEED to ‘make our way out our escape route to our predetermined safety zone’.
Do you think Marsh was well aware ( and, perhaps, had done this before ) that when you describe a simple decision to MOVE as always being a NEED to ‘make our way out an escape route’ that that keeps management from knowing or thinking that you are just ‘freelancing’ at that point?
Wouldn’t management always have a hard time accusing someone of ‘freelancing’ if it always seemed like the ‘moves’ being made were an ’emergency’ and the line supervisor always has the right to make THOSE kinds of decisions on their own with little consultation with anyone?
Don’t forget… as far as the existing evidence record goes… it is ONLY Eric Marsh who ever characterized this ‘move’ they decided to make over the radio as “We are making our way out our escape route”.
Jesse Steed never said anything of the kind… even when it seems like he was ‘chiming in’ in response to ‘status’ requests.
So it does seem like ONLY DIVSA ( Eric Marsh ) was trying to make this look like some kind of ’emergency’ and something they ‘needed to do’ ( which was NOT the case ) in order to deflect any criticism for not consulting with anyone about that decision.
Do you think Todd Abel had access to and did review the images and videos on Mackenzie’s camera BEFORE he gave his interview to ADOSH?
Moreover, how many of these guys had legal representation before the SAIT and ADOSH interviews took place? Were there lawyers present for these interviews? A lot of weight has been given to some of the details of this testimony. How much of it was “lawyered-up” and, if it was, how did that effect it? I think sometimes there has been given too much credibility given to these interviews. Maybe not out-and-out lies, but selective memories and careful shadings of the truth. And this might extend beyond those ultimately sued – nobody knew for sure who that might be until the end of the year. I just think some of this testimony should be looked at with a jaundiced eye.
Basically Todd Abel’s statements indicate he gave no orders to Marsh to move. Marsh was answering directly to Abel. Marsh did not tell him they were moving and where to. Abel did not ask him to move and he was the direct supervisor.
Any other questions?
You do not move to reengage without a request from OPS
Abel gave no order or request. Whatever Marsh was doing he did it on his own taking the crew with him.
Marsh violated basic fire chain of command–As found in the investigation yet no statement of the insubordination in the SAIT.
Then how do we explain the discussion in the yarnell_gamble video? Did anyone figure who Marsh was responding to when he said, “They’re coming from the heel of the fire”? Who is it who seems to be asking for them?
Reply to calvin post on August 9, 2014 at 4:50 am
>> calvin asked…
>>
>> Do you think Todd Abel had access to and did review the
>> images and videos on Mackenzie’s camera BEFORE he
>> gave his interview to ADOSH?
Yes…. and there is evidence that indicates Todd Abel somehow knew ( or had access to ) a whole LOT of ‘evidence’ that wasn’t released publicly until AFTER his ADOSH interview.
When the SAIT Investigation notes mention that they asked Todd Abel about the Caldwell video that captured him telling Marsh “Keep ME informed… Hunker and be safe… we’ll get some Air Support down there ASAP’… and they say he “didn’t recall having that conversation”…
…the SAIT investigation notes also FAIL to mention that they actually PLAYED that Caldwell video ( and their own enhanced audio track ) for Todd Abel DURING his SAIT interview and BEFORE they even asked him about it.
Todd Abel said “Yep… that’s me” and totally acknowledged that it was a valid capture of him saying those things to Marsh… but then Todd Abel still insisted that he “didn’t recall the conversation”.
So it wasn’t just that Abel had absolutely no knowledge of this conversation. They PLAYED it for him. Even then… he acknowledges that it was him speaking but he ‘sticks to his story’ that he doesn’t recall the ENTIRE conversation ever even taking place or what else was said.
Mike Dudley ( SAIT Co-Lead ) admitted this is the way it went down in his June 20 speech to a roomful of firefighters…
————————————————————–
Mike Dudley: But… prior to that… by like five minutes… there is a discussion that takes place between OPS and Eric Marsh… and all you hear is Eric saying “I’m making my way off the top”.
Top a what? Top of that box canyon? Top of to the north end?
And OPS says… “Copy that. You guys hunker and be safe.
Let me know if you need air support.”
You don’t hear the front-end of that conversation.
You don’t hear the tail-end of that conversation.
You just hear that clip.
We replayed that audio for OPS and said… “Is this you?”… and he goes “Yup… that’s me. I do NOT remember that conversation.”
————————————————————
NOTE: Dudley was actually misrepresenting the Caldwell video in his speech to those firefighters. Abel never said “Let me know if you need Air Support” like it was up to Marsh, or something. What Todd Abel ACTUALLY said was “We’ll get some Air Support down there ASAP” and his ‘down there’ did not mean ‘To Marsh and GM’. Abel’s ‘down there’ meant the generic ‘south end of the fire’.
Then… when Abel was being interviewed by ADOSH on August 22, 2013… one of the investigators thought they were ‘breaking the news’ to him about the Prescott off-the-radar hire Aaron Hulburd’s Helmet-Cam having captured the deployment radio traffic…
…but Todd Abel somehow already knew all about it.
From Todd Abel’s August 22, 2013 ADOSH interview…
—————————————————————-
Q1 = Dave Larsen ( Rest in Peace )
A = Todd Abel
—————————————————————-
Q1: Okay. So when you’re hearing the, my escape route has been cut off, can you talk about that?
A: Mm-hm.
Q1: Somebody recorded that.
A: Yep.
—————————————————————-
So it was no ‘surprise’ whatsoever to Todd Abel, as early as August 22, 2013, that the Aaron Hulburd Helmet-Cam existed.
I can’t find any direct reference in his ADOSH interview to him being aware of all the MacKenzie material but it stands to reason that if he was fully aware of all this other ‘evidence’ that he also knew all about ( and had viewed ) the MacKenzie material.
The SAIT probably even showed him all THAT material during THEIR interview with him as well as showing him the Caldwell video.
Copy that.
The interview that was done with Abel by Karels 8/14 also misrepresents the Robert Caldwell audio
p1 YIN the ~1555 radio conversation that we have on the video, (which includes the phrase okay, you hunker down in the black)—Abel did not recal having this conversation with marsh.
The addition of “in the black” changes the meaning of what Abel actually says. And leaving out the first part of that clip where Marsh says that he is actually on the move and not just parked in the black, also changes the meaning of the partial conversation we have available.
So Todd Abel knew Eric Marsh before 6/30/2013. Was his direct supervisor when he was killed in a workplace accident. Had a conversation with him within the hour preceding his death. Heard a recording of part of that conversation, and acknowledges that is actually him speaking. BUT fails to remember that exchange ever happening.
Bullshit!
The assumption that they simp,ly wanted down is to me a search for reasonableness.
The situation they were in is not an unusual one, and one they had been in before. Waiting a little and then walking out the black would have been an obvious choice, if they simply wanted down. Personally, I think WTKTT’s timeline is accurate here, that they did probably have a good view. I see no indication that they simply wanted down and chose this worst of all ways to get there. Wanting to re-engage, and being cryptic about how they were going to get there and do so, seems the more efficient answer, or simplest answer.
People do irrational stuff all the time. It may be disturbing to think that WTKTT’s timeline is accurate, but that’s part of the reason why stressing that crew members shouldn’t simply passively go along is important. As is not criticizing those who may look after their own safety as being rabbits, etc.
Sorry– the moving to reengage is pure BS put there to justify GM decision by Willis and make good press. They are a hand crew like the others they would have ended up at the restaurant you do not attack a fire head on with a hand crew and that is what they would have had to do to assist in the towns. The GM crew already knew this based on what McDonough relayed to them.
No crew is satisfied with sitting in the black—-More BS crews do that all the time and I am sure GM did it on a few fires as well IT is standard procedure when fires jump their lines and run back at the main fire line. Did GM ever make a statement to any one that they were moving to reengage?
The SAIR time line is as well BS if the crew had been in a position to see the Fire they would not have gone into the Canyon. That then would have been suicide.
The actual burn time lines by WTKTT indicate they would have seen the fire if they were at the saddle when it was changing and moving towards them.
I repeat they moved to get off the mountain had they seen the fire activity change they would not have gone where they did. When they moved they assumed the fire was not going to burn across to them That decision changed when the fire changed they then would have not continued on that belief if they saw that change.
Irrational or not. No one walks into a fire burning at them unless they never saw it coming.
As for the argument I think at this point with out fact we are making to much of it.
Show me some facts on all of the above and I am more than willing to discuss them with you.
Well, I agree that the appropriate thing would have been for them to have ended up back at the restaurant, but I don’t think the intent of a crew trying to work back to “the structures” was to go sit at the restaurant. I, personally, think WTKTT’s timeline makes sense. I understand that this is troubling. But, “I think we can pull this off” is a sentiment that can lead people to push envelopes.
Reply to SR post August 8, 2014 at 4:44 pm
>> SR said…
>> I, personally, think WTKTT’s timeline makes sense.
Just to be clear… the TIMES I was talking about earlier with regard to when they SHOULD have been able to see that eastern edge of the fireline as shown by the recently discovered images IMG_1334 and IMG_1335 is not MY timeline.
I am still giving the SAIT the benefit of the doubt with THEIR published timelines.
They actually thought that Wade Parker TOOK his photo at 1604 ( 4:04 PM ). We have proved here that was NOT the case… but the network timestamp for him SENDING it out to his mother is still that same time and it is still valid to assume he would NOT have ‘texted it’ to her WHILE he was hiking.
Mr. Powers was also wrong in a post below when he said that the SAIT was estimating the travel time from the final resting spot to the ‘saddle’ to be 20 minutes. That is not the case. The SAIT’s official estimate for when they started their ‘hike’ was 4:05 PM. They were assuming it was 60 seconds after Wade Parker ‘took and sent’ his photo.
Their official estimated time for ARRIVING at the ‘saddle’ was 4:20 PM.
So even the SAIT thinks the trip only took 15 minutes.
I still have to give them the ‘benefit of the doubt’ there and assume their estimate was based on an actual ‘test walk’ at a fairly brisk Hotshot-style pace.
If their estimate was NOT based on an actual test walk… well… then what can I say. That would represent just even more incompetence on their part.
I looked at the walk down the 2 track and based my time on past experience still estimates not betting the farm on any thing except that if the saw the fire activity change at 1620 to 1625 I do not think they would have ever dropped into the canyon. So my assumption is they were in the canyon before 1620. Ten minuets to the saddle down hill and on a trail is very doable with a crew.
At 1620 the fire was moving across the flats and maybe 1/2 mile from Helms ranch If the were at the saddle they would have surely seen the fire change at 1620 at the saddle per the fire spread charts we are discussing.
My follow-up comment to the discussion down below a ways, regarding Mike Dudley mentioning a possible ‘argument’ at the top of the bowl went into moderation, and never came back, so I’m re-posting it here:
Anyone who has seen one of Mike Dudley’s YH presentations, whether it be of the actual final SAIT report, or one of the subsequent videos of other presentations, knows that he is very measured and deliberate in selecting the information he puts forth.
That is why it puzzled me for quite a while, as I tried to figure out his motivation for injecting the “un-validated argument” info into that one particular presentation.
The only possible reason I can come up with, is, that the SAIT suspected that the information provided to them, WAS EVENTUALLY going to leak out from the original providers, and they (SAIT) needed to provide some pre-emptive damage control as to why they had not mentioned it in their report
This pre-emptive CYA would be absolutely needed if the person or people eventually going public with it, could potentially say, ‘ya, we gave it to the SAIT and that’s the last we heard of it’.
Now, with Dudley having dropped that little tid-bit of info out there, if the providers ever do go public, he can say “oh ya, as I said previously, we knew about that, “WE JUST COULDN’T VALIDATE IT”.
This makes a lot of sense.
If they were arguing about the move, you have to believe that Marsh prevailed. Why would he have been so anxious for them to move? If the reason for the move was wanting to get off the mountain, you have to think that Steed, the guy with them, would have been arguing for that. But it seems it might have been the opposite. So all I can say is I am thoroughly confused.
The reason GM left the spot where Mackenzie took the 2 videos (IMO) was whatever the “THIS” is that Marsh speaks of in Mackenzie’s video. When Marsh says “I knew THIS was coming”, I believe he was indicating the exact reason for the coming action.
Steeds response (IMO), is very telling in that all he says is “Copy That” and then reports the progress of the fire. Which could be interpreted as somewhat passive/ aggressive?
I can totally see there being an argument/ disagreement following this conversation. I can also see the argument,/disagreement being directly related to the decision that was unfolding.
And, I can also imagine a split in the crew at the DZ. Part of the crew deploying shelters while the reaming guys continued to create a SZ until there was no time left.
But ultimately, I guess you can just add these “People” that heard the argument to the growing list of firefighters who were aware that GM were moving. As DW says “in a southerly direction”
And then there was ONE………………Does he hold the key?
There is something else here that we did not have before.
If the investigation found this out and truly removed it from
the interview that is the ultimate cover-up.
I am right now having a hard time with this suggestion/statement or Revelation.
WTF—- and what else was left out?
Bingo.
Mr. Powers,
I think everyone in this discussion understands that we do not have all the available information that may help us understand what actually did happen June 30 2013.
The families deserve the truth! All of it!
I guess we will see if it gets to court but don’t hold your breath.
Lawyers for the families are not going to bring it up and discredit the crew. The new and generic investigation may still win out and leave us still with out answers. We will see……..
Reply to calvin post on August 7, 2014 at 7:55 pm
>> calvin said…
>>
>> The reason GM left the spot where Mackenzie took the 2 videos
>> (IMO) was whatever the “THIS” is that Marsh speaks of in Mackenzie’s
>> video. When Marsh says “I knew THIS was coming”, I believe he was
>> indicating the exact reason for the coming action.
Agree…. and there is still at least ONE person who PROBABLY knows what ‘THIS’ meant in that conversation.
Astonishingly… when ADOSH called Brendan McDonough back for his SECOND interview with them… they had BOTH of the 9 second MacKenzie video clips preloaded on a device and they PLAYED the actual videos for him DURING the interview… but the ONLY question they asked him after playing the video(s) was whether he could identify the voices.
NOTE: ADOSH though there were only TWO voices and were not even wondering in that ‘You bet’ phrase in the captured audio was coming from a THIRD person, or not.
Brendan was happy to oblige them.
He said… “That’s Eric Marsh talking to Jesse Steed.”
Then they just MOVED ON.
NO ONE even bothered to ask Brendan ANY other question about that moment in time such as whether he, himself, had HEARD that conversation and could tell them more about what was being said.
Unbelievable.
>> calvin also said…
>>
>> Steeds response (IMO), is very telling in that all he says is
>> “Copy That” and then reports the progress of the fire.
>> Which could be interpreted as somewhat passive/ aggressive?
Also agree.
If you listen to that video and even watch Steed and the other men at that point… there is NO indication whatsoever that Steed or those men were interested in going ANYWHERE at that point.
They were hot, spent and tired. Steed isn’t even standing up. He’s on a rock with his hands on his knees and obviously showing no sense of ‘urgency’ to jump up and do ANYTHING.
I also still think you have always been absolutely right that even the fact that Steed felt the need to report to Marsh that the fire had (quote) “almost made it to the two-track road that we walked in on” means that Marsh was so far up the line to the north, even at that point, that Steed was pretty Marsh could see NOT through the ‘smoke curtain’ and be able to ‘see what they were seeing’.
If Steed had thought Marsh could really ‘see what they were seeing’… there’s no way he would have even wasted his breath with that statement over the radio.
So it seems pretty obvious that whatever was going to happen next was NOT coming from Jesse Steed.
He was not ‘on his feet’ ready to give orders to anyone.
He was just as much ‘at rest’ ( and just as tired ) as everyone else there.
Whatever happened next was most probably Eric Marsh pushing his own ‘ideas’ at Steed and asking even MORE about Steed’s ‘comfort level(s)’.
That actually raises an important point.
If Steed told Marsh that the fire had “almost made it to that two-track we walked in on” because Marsh really was so far north that he probably couldn’t see that ‘through the smoke’…
…then the actual reality is that Marsh and Steed now entered into this important ‘discussing their options’ conversation when Jesse Steed was, in fact, the ONLY one of the pair that could ACTUALLY see where the fireline was at that point.
Marsh might have been making ‘suggestions’… but ONLY Jesse Steed could actually SEE what the reality was from where all the men were now located.
Typos. Too fast on the keys and left some words OUT.
Paragraph above should have read like this…
I also still think you have always been absolutely right that even the fact that Steed felt the need to report to Marsh that the fire had (quote) “almost made it to the two-track road that we walked in on” means that Marsh was so far up the line to the north, even at that point, that Steed was pretty SURE Marsh could NOT see through the ‘smoke curtain’ and be able to ‘see what they were seeing’.
The pictures taken by Mcdonough appear to show a clear direct view from the two track (GM walked in on) all the way to the anchor point and even further to the North. I have always believed that if Marsh was still to the North of the crew, he would have been able to see the progress the fire had made toward the two track. And Steed would not needed to make the progress report.
Also, minutes before this conversation we can hear Marsh say “south toward Yarnell” as in he was reporting the fire progression and possibly the moment the fire breached the retardant line.
So what happened in those few minutes that put Marsh out of position to determine the advance of the fire, prompting Steed to update him?
I am referring to the pictures Mcdonough took when he arrived at the GM chase and Supt trucks.
As I recall, there are other things that have come out that SAIT alluded to that they couldn’t “confirm.” Right now, off the top of my head, I don’t remember which. If I recall correctly, they were a bit choosey regarding what they chose to confirm and not confirm.
So…….
This means they think something must be on the verge of being divulged. Enough so that they decided to “get ahead of it.”
This wildfire ain’t over.
Marti. I find it interesting that they did include the alleged radio transmission from Marsh “that is exactly where we want the retardant” when there is no audio and only a statement from Bravo 33.
You said…. If I recall correctly, they were a bit choosey regarding what they chose to confirm and not confirm.
I say inconsistent or possibly even misleading is also appropriate.
Reply to calvin post on August 8, 2014 at 7:23 am
Just confirming what calvin said up above.
The most ‘interesting’ part of the SAIT choosing to include this (supposed) 1637 transmission from Marsh about ‘retardant’ is that they are ALSO using it as their own de-facto END of their own ( supposed ) ‘black-out’ during which they say there were ‘no verifiable communications with Marsh, Steed or Granite Mountain’.
So the very END of their own blackout seemed to be a conscious choice to use what appears to be a ‘non-verifiable’ transmission.
As we KNOW now… there are PLENTY of OTHER ‘transmissions’ during this (supposed) ‘blackout’ period that seem to be much more in the ‘verifable’ category than this ONE mysterious report from just ONE person in an airplane ( John Burfiend ) that he ‘thinks’ he heard Eric Marsh say something about retardant….
…even though ( in the same interview ) both Burfiend and French testified they had NO IDEA who was really ‘down there’, or what their voices SOUNDED like.
That 1637 transmission was over the Air-To-Ground channel… one of ( if not THE ) most popular and closely listened-to channels on any fire…
…yet NO ONE ELSE reports even hearing this statement and the ONLY ‘proof’ it happened is coming from someone who admits they had ‘no idea who was down there or what their voices sounded like’.
And THIS is a ‘transmission’ that the SAIT decided was so ‘verified’ that they chose it to represent the de-facto END of their own (supposed) black-out period?
Something has always been ‘not right’ about that.
SOMEBODY just seemed to want very badly to get some statement into the record about Marsh requesting ‘retardant’, or something… and I think the converse is true…
SOMEBODY wanted very badly to NOT include other things that the evidence seemed to be providing.
I wrote the comment below this one.
So WTKTT wrote “HOW could people who consider themselves ‘fire experts’ have been SO wrong remains one of the mysteries. Does that one thing point to a deficiency in training that might be system-wide?”
I have to admit that. after MIke wrote that, after six months we haven’t learned anything new, I was a bit po’d. I have learned A TON in the past six months. As in MASSIVELY. Maybe that’s because I really didn’t know ANYTHING six months ago. Maybe that’s because I decided to pick away at everything I could find and learn as much as I could because of it. I know WAY more than I did six months ago.
I’ve been a bit reticent since I read that, but I’ve been still studying things anyway.
Back to what WTKTT said. (And thank you for the fly-by, I watched that. I have, in my Lightroom database, Brian Lauber as the one who took those photos).
Spiraling in to this . And agreeing with all that the leaders Marsh and Steed made a HUGE mistake on this that should have been challenged by someone on their crew (hair rising on the back of the neck kind of stuff).
What’s still BOTHERING ME is the combination of:
1) the repetitive, and apparently intentional, mis-communication of their plan. There’s just something shouting something about this.
2: The possibile communication with them regarding “it would help if you could get here” — “they’re coming off the heel of the fire.” (I’m writing this from my head and it’s way past bedtime), but, because of this, I’m still not willing to discount the possibility of some kind of “pressure” or something in the mix.
Once upon a time I thought that Willis might have been involved in applying pressure. And once upon a time I believed his “with-holding of evidence” possibly had to do with that. After learning what I’ve learned over the past six months, I no longer believe that.
In December, based on the ADOSH report, the narrative went viral that Musser had asked them to come down from the hill, out of the black. Six months later, after studying the interviews, I don’t believe that.
So, more than six months’ later, because I and others have been digging our fingers and hands into the soil of this, to find the little and big pieces of things that are the evidence, a part of what I have learned is that Eric Marsh and Granite Mountain made a series of decisions that were contrary to the rules of safe fire-fighting, but I am still not convinced by the evidence (that doesn’t appear to include Willis or Musser) that they did this completely without anybody else’s participation.
Yikes!! The constant having to re-sign in is a headache. I wrote the above.
Marti,
It was late July last year when an Arizona Forestry official (so long I have forgotten his name) came out publicly and said that Marsh violated the Fire Orders. He was the first publicly to do so, but certainly not the first. He was crucified at the time, mainly for his timing, as the investigations were just starting. I think we have known about the “come faster” and “heel of the fire” snippets for nearly 6 months, if not more. I agree, those snippets are like a burr, someone appears to have known about their move. Does that mean they were ordered, pressured or encouraged. Not necessarily. We do not even know who they were talking with. We do not know if that knowledge was limited to 1 or 2 people, or was generally known. If someone has wanted to keep this all very murky, they have succeeded so far. I do not think that our ability to look at the hard evidence of that day (pictures, video, audio etc) is going to yield answers at this point. If there is more of a story to tell, it will be because someone there that day decides to tell it.
While the above might shed new light on Granite Mountain’s motivations that day, it does not change the fact they made very serious errors. If there was pressure, maybe the takeaway is to not let “pressure” force you into serious mistakes.
Marti and Mike You both have learned a lot as have I.
But as yet we have and may never learn the reason GM made the decision that they did that day. I have based my what they did on many years on fires I think it is a little more accurate than they moved to reengage but it is still my evaluation alone.
THEY MOVED TO GET OFF THE MOUNTAIN and for no other reason.
In doing so they made several mistakes and failed to follow the rules.
Pressure by overhead—–
Most highly qualified and recognized Superintendents for years have said no to unsafe orders and IC’s, OPS and DIV have accepted that.
So pressure to do something I do not think was a factor.
Remember it was accepted when Marsh said they were in the black.
Marsh could hear what was going on every body was bugging out to the restaurant and safe areas There was no reason to believe they could reengage at that point or have any hope of protecting structures with a hand crew, the Engines could not do much with all the water in the world.
The crew thought they had time and decided to get off the mountain I don’t think they even thought what they would do when they got to the ranch.
In terms of the idea that someone on GM should have challenged Marsh and Steed when it became apparent that they were committing to something really stupid, this ties into the continuing relevance of the Yarnell fire nationally. NIFC has sort of written it off as an AZ cluster — before, during and after the fire and burnover — and in some respects they are correct. Feds would have handled things differently. But, the small group dynamics, and lack of structural concern for managing WFF with an eye to accountability for safety, remain national issues. And, it would be very unusual for a crew member on any crew to pipe up. And, if they do, there are almost always repercussions. Dudley’s video, and his imo extremely derisive comments about people who seek to optimize their safety when burnover seems imminent, inadvertently makes this clear. Likewise, the issue of how to address crews that take on outsized risks is national. The answer from a reform perspective is likely to be Congress, because the current system is comfortable.
Marti, you were a river guide at one point, and I believe have lots of other hiking experience. Leaving to one side issues on past fires, and the relatively calm reception displayed to the news that their lookout was at risk of a burnover, at core what happened here was a real dumb bushwhack. I am sure you have seen multiple times how groups of similar size, even without formal rank, assign within one or two minutes one or two leaders and then defer to them. And, if something happens later in the day and a few people disagree with a group decision and split off, it can not only piss people off that day, it can rupture long-term friendships. That’s without all sorts of prepping for conformity like having to fess up the last time you told a lie (one of the workd’s dumbest questions).
SR–
Many crews allow questions concerning safety and discussion with out fear of blame.
NOTE this was also recommended after the South Canyon Fire.
No repercussions for bringing up safety concerns.
also remember that there were 2 Foreman and several long term crewman on GM
They all had the seniority to speak up and it is not that uncommon any more.
It is a written rule and has been in use for almost 20 years, longer in California.
I do not know why questions were not asked. Maybe they all thought they had the time or just complacency ruled that day.
Bob,
I’m not sure I’d say “many” crews,. As far as GM, honestly how do you think it would have gone for a junior member of the crew to have looked at that bowl and said no? Do you think there would have been no repercussions, formal and informal?
Likewise, at the time the decision was made to try to burnout, in brush where burning out could not be effective, and to therefore then deploy in conditions where sustained direct flame contact was assured — what if a junior member of the crew realized that this decision basically equaled a decision to die together. And that junior crew member tried to make it to the boulders, where as we know a few trees did survive? Dudley was very critical of people who physically separate in those conditions, even though there is a formal “book right” that they can do so. Dudley approved of and admired the fact that no one chose to try to think for themselves.
These are real pressures.
I appreciate that very strong leaders, such as RTS, may in fact encourage strong contributions of opinion from their crew. Hopefully that becomes more widespread in real terms. Certainly someone on GM had to have known that dropping into the bowl would make for a brutal slog, and having people free to offer that type of factual input is valuable if the environment is there for them to do it.
I will say all the old drill sergeants are gone. The changes really took place in the late 80’s and early 90’s the old hot shot crews have evolved as have their supervisors. And they truly changed after 1994 South Canyon..
GM was not different and some times crew people are just acceptable with their leadership and don’t question decisions.
Good crews that are a brotherhood do not have individuals that break and run when things get tight they stick with each other. Being on a Hot Shot crew would give you a better understanding of the tight brotherhood. A all for one and one for all type of thing.
A regular crew does not have that relation ship and some will make their own decisions right or wrong.
Reply to SR post on August 6, 2014 at 3:01 pm
>> SR said…
>>
>> Dudley was very critical of people who physically separate in
>> those conditions, even though there is a formal “book right”
>> that they can do so. Dudley approved of and admired the
>> fact that no one chose to try to think for themselves.
Dudley called them ( with a derisive tone ) “rabbits’.
Oddly enough… Dudley then does his ‘praising’ of ‘how they all stayed together’ just immediately BEFORE he stops and then tells the roomful of Utah firefighters that he believes SOME of the crew MUST have known that this whole trek through that canyon ‘wasn’t a good idea’.
Here is that exact ( contiguous ) sequence from Dudley’s speech to that gathering of Utah firefighters on June 20, 2014…
—————————————————————-
Mike Dudley: Ya know… probly the most telling thing for me… from my point of view of looking at this… was… ya know every crew has one.. what I call one or two ‘rabbits’… ya know.. speed machines that at time a stress… they’re gonna BOOK.
( Pause )
They deployed in an area smaller than where you guys are sitting.
They deployed as a unit.
They deployed together.
Not one person broke ranks.
They did exactly how they were trained.
That tells me extreme cohesive training and process.
They never abandoned one another is the best way of putting it.
Ahm… I found that fascinating because I’ve never seen other shelter deployments that people aren’t
spread out and you have one or two people that always try to make a… make it for themselves.
They stayed together throughout the whole point.
So… on the other hand… there’s a part of me that HAS to wonder… as they stood there on that saddle and they started droppin’ down the slope… I would like to think a few members of the crew had that little gnawing ‘pit’ in their stomach sayin’… “Is this a good idea?”.
But… would any one of ’em have spoken up and argued against the superintendent… or the acting? I don’t know.
———————————————————————
SIDENOTE: Mike Dudley is actually ‘leaving out some crucial details’ when he describes the following moments to those Utah firefighters with a ‘proud’ tone in his voice…
———————————————————————–
They deployed in an area smaller than where you guys are sitting.
They deployed as a unit.
They deployed together.
Not one person broke ranks.
They did exactly how they were trained.
———————————————————————–
No…they didn’t.
That chosen deployment ‘area that was (quote) “smaller than where you are sitting” was totally inadequate for the circumstances they were in and represented a DEATH TRAP and was NOT ‘how they were trained’.
MANY of them didn’t even bother to throw their packs clear of the deployment site… few of them actually made it into their shelters…
MANY of them ( Marsh included ) had their sleeves rolled up as they went into shelter… MANY of them weren’t wearing their gloves.
MOST of them ( even the ones that made it fully into shelters ) did
NOT have their feet pointing at the oncoming fire… etc. etc.
NONE of these ‘departures from training’ were ever mentioned in the SAIR report… OR mentioned by Dudley in his ‘presentation’.
>> SR also said…
>>
>> These are real pressures.
Yes. They are… especially in a standard low-pay workplace environment with both W2 and 1099 employees constantly mixed together that also tries to maintain such a more-than-quasi military style culture.
Yes. So, not hard to understand why going along is a lot easier, particularly when, though Dudley seems to have hoped someone would have recognized the obvious issues and spoken up or acted, people who have in the past done so in one way are disparaged. At least that’s how I take the rabbit reference.
BTW, seeking a good (survivable) place to deploy is an established part of training, and has been for some time. People who do seek this are in fact staying with their training. “Fastest to the front” is in no way inconsistent with current principles, and in situations where a group entrapment is threatened can be an important step in attempting to mitigate for the group as a whole.
I have said it in the past, and I believe it even more strongly today, that there was almost surely some sort of discussion when they arrived at the top of the bowl, looked at where the ranch was, and then looked at what was in-between.
That discussion would have lasted anywhere from 30 seconds, to several minutes. Who chimed-in and what was said we will never know, but looking at that destination, through that terrain, virtually assures a discussion took place.
There is a chance that someone overheard on Tac or Crew channel, something that might provide SOME insight regarding any discussion up there.
Along those lines, there has been a reference made by Dudley in his talks, and apparently by others as well, to people having over-heard an argument, either amongst the crew or between Div & crew??.
Knowing the time frame of that ‘overheard conversation’, might be critical in determining whether or not it took place at the top of the bowl.
If the time frame fits, the argument that those people ‘overheard’ that day over the radio, might have been instigated by cooler-heads not wanting to go into the bowl under those conditions.
Maybe there were several, or more, GM crew-members that DID voice their opposition to the bushwack, and part of this was overheard as “the argument”.
Knowing the answer could potentially provide for a significant ‘teaching moment’. The only one’s that can provide that information, are the one’s that ACTUALLY HEARD whatever it was they heard. I hope THAT information sees the light of day, sooner than later.
Reply to TTWARE post on August 6, 2014 at 4:14 pm
>> TTWARE said…
>>
>> There has been a reference made by Dudley in his talks, and
>> apparently by others as well, to people having over-heard an
>> argument, either amongst the crew or between Div & crew??.
>>
>> Knowing the time frame of that ‘overheard conversation’,
>> might be critical in determining whether or not it took
>> place at the top of the bowl.
That is EXACTLY where this reported ‘argument’ took place.
At the top of the ‘saddle’. ( and near the descent point ).
Mike Dudley himself confirmed this at the same time he talked about this in his speech to that room full of firefighters in Utah on June 20.
From my previous post down below ( in this same chapter )…
————————————————————
+1:04:46
Mike Dudley: There’s some allegations that there was an argument between the Captain and the Superintendent about which way to go… from that saddle.. Some people made that allegation. We can’t validate that.
————————————————————
NOTE: What the hell is Dudley talking about here?
What allegations? ( plural ).
WHO are these ‘some people’ ( definitely MORE than one person, according to Dudley ) he is talking about?
What is the actual SOURCE of this claim he is making in front of rooms full of firefighters?
Dudley MUST be referring to something that ‘more than one person’ believes they heard over the RADIO.
Did someone say they heard something like that over the intra-crew channel ( like Brendan himself? ) but it was not recorded… and that’s why Dudley says ‘We can’t validate that’?
Did this ‘testimony’ arise during official SAIT interviews?
Again… there is no record of any such testimony ( confirmed or not ) in anything released so far.
If there was an argument (regarding the move), before descending into the bushwhack,, as in not 100% agreement with the decision; it makes the decision by all 19 men to deploy into certain death all the more mysterious.
And if they all deployed because there was no other option, that creates more confusion for me. I am saying if you were not really agreeable with the decision and commitment to the bushwhack but go along anyway, it would seem to me that you would have your own “back up plan” if the inevitable happened
IMHO
The fact that Dudley even mentioned this, means someone told him (or SAIT) that THEY heard it.
If THEY heard it, it means it was broadcast over the radio on one of the fire freqs, because, as we know, no one who was actually up there that day, survived to relay the story.
The fact that it was purportedly broadcast over the radio, lends credence to what many have long suspected, that Marsh and Steed were not yet physically at the same location, and Marsh was still trying to catch up with the crew.
Considering what Steed and the crew were seeing from the top of the bowl, and with the only alternative for continuing, the two-track, appearing to go SW over the ridge toward Congress, if the Steed/Marsh conversation did take place, it is not hard to imagine how it might have evolved.
I suppose my first sentence above SHOULD read “… that THEY heard it, or talked to someone else who said they did”.
Reply to TTWARE post on August 6, 2014 at 8:47 pm
>> TTWARE said…
>> The fact that Dudley even mentioned this, means
>> someone told him (or SAIT) that THEY heard it.
Yes. This was NOT some ‘Mitt Romney’ style secret recording of a speech where Dudley thought he could just ‘talk to the room’ and no one would ever hear what he said.
Mike Dudley was FULLY aware this entire ‘presentation’ was being VIDEO TAPED. He even was careful during the entire thing to turn to the ‘cameraman’ at various times and ask him if he ‘needed to repeat that question’ for the camera.
The video itself was also freely uploaded to a PUBLIC Youtube link by the Utah organization that sponsored the ‘presentation’ itself. It’s not a ‘secret’ video by any means.
So this was not a moment for Dudley to just start ‘making shit up’. He’s also too smart of a man and too skilled in public speaking for this to be any kind of ‘slip up’ on his part.
He STOPPED what he was saying… and he CHOSE to INSERT this report of these ‘allegations’ of an ‘argument’ between Steed and Marsh into his presentation for all the world to hear.
He ends his ‘report’ of this ‘alleged argument between Marsh and Steed’ by then ‘dismissing it’ with “WE couldn’t validate that”… but he also fails to mention what he considers ‘validation’ and no one pickup up on that by asking “What DID the SAIT consider ‘validation’? Only actual clear captured recordings of radio transmission? Why would the same report coming from ( apparently ) multiple people not be considered ‘validation’?
It’s also perfectly obvious that Dudley was NOT referring to just some ‘consipracy theorist’ rumors or something some people had said on the InterWeb…. or something.
The fact that he also said “WE couldn’t validate that” means that the entire SAIT process did, in fact, TRY to ‘validate’ these ‘allegations’ which means that they were, in fact, entering into their investigation through official ‘channels’.
This was not ‘something somebody said in a BAR’.
Dudley is talking about some kind of ‘official’ TESTIMONY to the SAIT itself ( who he is representing during this speech and is always the WE he is referring to )… and from MORE than just one person.
>> TTWARE also said…
>>
>> If THEY heard it, it means it was broadcast over the
>> radio on one of the fire freqs, because, as we know,
>> no one who was actually up there that day, survived
>> to relay the story.
If the conversation was over the intra-crew… then it is VERY odd that Dudley would be saying they have heard these ‘allegations’ from ‘more than ONE person’.. If Brendan says he heard it… who is the OTHER person who said they heard it as well over the intra-crew? Willis? Clawson? Sciacca? Some other ‘Prescott’ person who might have had that frequency programmed into their own BK radio?
If the ‘argument/discussion’ was NOT over the intra-crew… ( so that any number of people might be reporting they heard it )… then you would have to wonder why Steed would NOT be using the intra-crew at that point? Maybe he was already having radio reception issues by the time he reached the saddle and he really did have to talk to Marsh on one of the TAC channels at that point in order to raise him at all.
>> TTWARE also said…
>>
>> The fact that it was purportedly broadcast over the
>> radio, lends credence to what many have long
>> suspected, that Marsh and Steed were not yet
>> physically at the same location, and Marsh was still
>> trying to catch up with the crew.
I still think that is an absolute ‘given’ unless some ‘new’ evidence comes to light.
There has ONLY been evidence to prove that was the case right up until Marsh ‘appears’ on the radio 2 minutes AFTER the first MAYDAY from Steed ( out of breath from running ) and says “I’m here ( now ) with Granite Mountain”.
>> TTWARE also said…
>>
>> Considering what Steed and the crew were seeing
>> from the top of the bowl, and with the only alternative
>> for continuing, the two-track, appearing to go SW
>> over the ridge toward Congress, if the Steed/Marsh
>> conversation did take place, it is not hard to imagine
>> how it might have evolved.
Yep. Would not surprise me at all if there were some fairly high octane ‘F’ bombs in there coming from poor Jesse Steed. Marsh might have made it all sound like it was going to be a ‘no brainer’ back at the rest spot when he was ‘asking about Steed’s comfort level’ and trying to ‘sell him the idea’… but the minute Steed reached that saddle and saw the reality he had ‘agreed’ to… it was probably a whole lot of WTF?????
I don’t know if the following will EVER be ‘verified’… but whenever this (supposed) ‘argument between Steed and Marsh’ comes up I still feel the need to point out that I believe there is a video that captures something that SOUNDS like such an ‘argument’ ( or at least the very END of it ) in the same timeframe that even Mike Dudley is now referring to.
It’s the one where it *appears* that we can hear ( in the first 10 seconds of the video ) Eric Marsh telling Jesse Steed not to be ‘upset’ and that he is ( paraphrasing here ) ‘getting there as fast as I can but I have quite a ways to come’.
Folder: AerialFirefightingStudy\Moore\Pictures\2013_Yarnell_SM (22)
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/y3jy5opssrcvzb3/N9ZngvVRbg/AerialFirefightingstudy/Moore/Pictures#lh:null-20130630_Yarnell_SM%20%2823%29.MOV
NOTE: This is the Moore video with a ‘first frame’ showing the fire coming over a ridge and there is a telephone pole in the foreground in the right-center.
ECITW ( Every Caveat In The World )
The following is what I ( me, personally ) believe is being said in the background of this video. Your mileage may, of course, vary.
MOORE VIDEO STARTS AT 1628.56 ( 4:28.56 PM )
+0:00 ( 1628.56 / 4:28.56 PM )
(Eric Marsh): Don’t be upset… I’ve got quite a ways to come.
( slight pause ) I’m headin’ off the slope.
+0:07 ( 1629.03 / 4:29.03 )
(Unknown, but possible voice match for Jesse Steed): Copy… we’re all at the top…
NOTE: This video continues for another 30 seconds, but strong winds come up in the foreground and the noise in the microphone obscures the chance of hearing any other background radio traffic, if any.
MOORE VIDEO ENDS AT 1629.33 ( 4:29.33 PM )
Excellent point. My own gut is that any discussion was between Marsh and Steed in a substantive sense. Which may have been put to others, but with approval expected — but this is a case where anyone who did hear that discussion could certainly provide a teachable moment. Even if they can’t talk with attribution, there certainly are ways to relay info to the press if they think it’s important, without sticking their neck out as much.
Likewise, people who’d left GM over the last few years could address past dynamics and any bad decision/good outcome issues. Again there may be teachable moments there.
Ah, WTTKT beat me to it.
For anyone who did overhear any discussion, I’d also be interested in specifically whether any discussion occurred of the fact that they were going to be moving very slowly. One of the most jarring things about this decision is that people with experience with that kind of vegetation had to know that, and it is tough to see anyone wanting to spend as much time there as they were going to be spending. But, in the discussion we had here in the past, there was one poster who claimed to be from Tucson originally who clearly thought rapid progress was possible. As nonfactual as that idea might be, if one person has it, others could always have shared it.
Reply to SR post on August 6, 2014 at 5:59 pm
>> SR wrote…
>>
>> For anyone who did overhear any discussion, I’d also be interested in specifically
>> whether any discussion occurred of the fact that they were going to be
>> moving very slowly.
Keep in mind that when Steed and the others began their journey south… they were frickin’ clueless as to what really was ‘around that bend’ to the south. All they could see from the departure point was that two-track heading south ‘mid-slope… then cuttin’ over’ exactly the way Eric Marsh described it over the radio in his response to the “Granite Mountain… what’s your status right now?” query from someone at 4:16 PM ( captured in the Panebaker video ).
So there had to be that ‘moment’ AFTER they got around that bend and down to that saddle that the ranch actually came into view… and the line of men MUST have STOPPED.
Decision time.
The very FIRST thing that must have happened at that point is that the acting Superintendent ( Steed ) MUST have had to contact Marsh to even VERIFY that this compound he could now see in the distance was this ‘Ranch’ that had been discussed as his intended target even before they departed on ‘the mission’.
If it wasn’t… then Steed was going to be REALLY confused.
If that wasn’t the ‘Ranch’ he was told to ‘head for’… then where the heck WAS this (supposed) ‘Ranch’? He now HAD to be SURE about this in order to proceed.
Remember… Jesse Steed apparently missed ALL of that official 7:00 AM briefing at the Yarnell Fire Station when it was even first suggested that Marsh bump up to DIVS that day. Steed NEVER saw this infamous ‘iPad with Google maps’ or any kind of ‘aerial view’ of the area or of this ‘Boulder Springs Ranch’ thing he later heard Marsh referring to.
You also could NOT ‘see it’ from the Sesame area where the GM trucks were parked and there was this other ‘supposed’ briefing that morning before they hiked out to the ridge.
So Steed did NOT know what that ‘Boulder Springs Ranch’ actually LOOKED liked.
There MUST have been a moment when Steed simply saw it come into view for the first time and then had to call Marsh on the intra-crew, describe what he was seeing in the distance, and somehow just VERIFY with Marsh that this ‘thing’ he was now SEEING in the distance was, in fact, this ‘Ranch’ he had been told to ‘move to’.
Only then, after Marsh might have said something like… “Yep… that’s the place”, was it time to then decide HOW to proceed.
Again… Steed was clueless because he had missed all the briefings that morning and was never even given a MAP.
Steed probably had NO IDEA the two-track they were standing on would head south a little more and then turn DUE EAST towards the ranch. How would ANYONE have known that unless it had been ‘scouted’ or you had taken the time to eyeball it on an actual MAP. He could NOT see that ‘change in direction’ of the two-track from that saddle where he was now seeing the ranch in the distance. The only thing he could actually SEE at that point was the two-track continuing to head SOUTH off on an apparent one-way trip to Congress, Arizona.
Again… consultation / decision time.
He MUST have then checked with Marsh ( who was the only one out there who ever saw the ‘Google map on an iPad’ that morning ) and asked where that ROAD they were standing on really went.
Marsh might have never even noticed himself that morning that it did, in fact, wind around to a place near the ranch and then on to the Candy Cane lane area. Even Marsh might not have been paying close enough attention that morning to be really SURE about that.
So Marsh may have come back to Steed with…
“I’m not really sure WHERE that trail goes from there, Jesse.”
THAT might have been when the shit hit the fan and an argument ensued.
THAT might have been when Steed threw a few “Are you fucking kidding me?” bombs over the radio.
Marsh might have countered with “But you said you can SEE the place, right? Just head right at it What’s the problem?.”
More complaints from Steed. More back and forth… but ultimately ( since probably NEITHER Marsh NOR Steed had any ‘situational awareness’ about all this or any idea they could actually STAY on the two-track )… it ended up not being a ‘decision’ based on ‘options’ at all. The more they stood there talking on the radio the more time was being lost. It LOOKED like there was only ONE sure way to get to the place and that was ‘right at it’… come “hell or high bushes”.
So that’s what they did.
Who cares about Rules, Regulations and LCES?
Too much hubris to even admit that the ‘plan’ itself was ill conceived, ill planned, and should have been ‘called off’ at that point or that they were about to make a big ‘mistake’ by continuing.
They just walked down into “hell and high bushes”
>> SR also wrote…
>>
>> One of the most jarring things about this decision is that people with experience
>> with that kind of vegetation had to know that, and it is tough to see anyone wanting
>> to spend as much time there as they were going to be spending.
The people with the absolute MOST experience with THAT specific area and THAT ‘kind of vegetation’ right there where the tragedy occurred were, in fact, interviewed by the SAT.
Yarnell hikers Tex ( Sonny ) Gilligan and Joy Collura.
Here is EXACTLY what Joy herself told the SAIT…
————————————————————————–
I understand why they wanted to go the easy way but it was a high fuel area. They could have walked the rim to the cattle pond.
It’s not a HARD terrain. It’s just time-consuming.
You might head in one direction – it’s like a maze though with the big boulders and manzanita – you might have to switch directions, which takes more time. If they’ve never been in the area, they wouldn’t know it. Brush was 5.5 to 6 feet tall but maybe 10 feet wide – intertwined, very dense. “A bear wouldn’t even roll through it.”
—————————————————————————–
>> SR also wrote…
>>
>> But, in the discussion we had here in the past, there was one poster who claimed to
>> be from Tucson originally who clearly thought rapid progress was possible.
>> As nonfactual as that idea might be, if one person has it, others could always
>> have shared it.
I believe that discussion revealed that this person was actually only imagining having to achieve that ‘rapid progress’ in that kind of terrain ALONE and BY THEMSELVES.
A ‘one man’ hike and TRYING to go ‘as fast as possible’.
Both Tex and Joy have also pointed out several times that there IS a big difference between trying to navigate that terrain ‘by yourself’ versus with ‘other people’ ( much less a line of 19 people trying to stay in ‘single file’ ).
We have always been assuming they were attempting to stay ‘single file’ on that descent but we still don’t really know who the ‘point man’ was. It might NOT have been Steed.
When you are ‘by yourself’ and trying to make forward progress through brush like that you will make different ( and faster ) decisions than if even one or more person is ‘following’ you. If you are by yourself… you know you can just ‘forearm it’ through some stuff and keep going without concern for what is ‘behind’ you. If there is even one other person behind you you have to be constantly aware of the ‘branch whipback’ you might be inflicting on them and you will tend to ‘take more time’ and look for ‘clearer’ ways forward than if you were alone.
Besides… you ( as point ) can’t even ‘take off’ and get too far ahead of anyone even if you think you could. You are ‘point’…. you have to set the pace so the ‘line’ doesn’t fall apart and start to develop GAPS. You have to ‘go slow’ and make sure the line is ‘staying together’. No time for sections of the line to ‘get lost’ and lose their way’ and have to ‘reconnect’ again.
So the difficulty of THAT hike in THAT terrain was absolutely geometrically compounded by the fact that you are also trying to maintain this orderly ‘single file’ descent with 19 ( NINETEEN! ) men.
** STEED’S TRANSMISSIONS JUST PRIOR TO HIS MAYDAY CALL(S)…
While we are discussing these ‘moments’ in and around the saddle and the ‘decision making’. and possible ‘transmissions’ from both Steed and Marsh… there hasn’t ever been much discussion about something DPS Officer Eric Tarr said in his signed deposition with regards to OTHER things he says he heard Jesse Steed say just prior to the first MAYDAY calls.
A lot of people were VERY busy that afternoon and even if they had a BK strapped to their chest and scanning all the frequencies that doesn’t mean everything flying by on the radio would have ‘registered’ with them… if it didn’t directly concern them.
Then there DPS Officer/Paramedic Eric Tarr.
After the second recon flight that day in the early afternoon… DPS Helicopter Ranger 58 was ‘idle’ and not doing anything at all. Ranger 58 had come equipped with a ‘Bambi bucket’ and they had been told that morning they *might* be assisting with ‘water drops’… but that never happened. Once they got to Yarnell they were told they were NOT needed for any ‘water drops’ so their only real assignment that day was to be available for ‘recon’ flights, as needed.
DPS officers Eric Tarr, Charles Main, and (pilot) Clifford Brunsting were just ‘hanging around’ the chopper the rest of the afternoon ( after that second recon flight with (only) OPS1 Todd Abel ) with nothing to do but keep one ear glued to the radio in case someone ‘called’ them.
In his signed deposition… Officer Tarr does a pretty good job of ‘remembering’ everything he was hearing over the radio and his testimony about certain radio transmissions and what he heard is mostly backed up pretty well by ‘other’ testimony.
So Eric Tarr really can be considered a ‘reliable witness’ with regards to any radio traffic he says he ‘overheard’ that day since that’s all he was really doing that afternoon was ‘listening to the radio’ there by the chopper, and he also appears to have a VERY good memory.
From DPS Officer/Paramedic Eric Tarr’s signed testimony…
———————————————————————–
Around 1630 hours I was standing near the aircraft ( DPS Helicopter Ranger 58 ) monitoring traffic on channel A/G 16 when I heard a voice come up on the radio with a Call sign of Granite Mountain 7. He advised on the radio that they were moving towards Yarnell in the black. A short time later he came back up on the radio advising they were heading to a ranch they had in sight. It was shortly after that Granite Mountain 7 came back up on the radio sounding excited, out of breath, and repeatedly clearing Air Attack with no response. Someone then came up on the radio and told Granite Mountain 7 to stand by, ( I do not remember the exact verbage ). Right after that another voice came on the radio advising the unit yelling into the radio to go ahead with their traffic. Granite Mountain 7 advised their escape route had been cut off and they were deploying their shelters. I heard numerous attempts byAir Attack trying to contact Granite Mountain 7 after this with no response.
————————————————————————
NOTE: DPS Officer Eric Tarr has always seemed to be describing THREE separate transmission sequences in his signed testimony starting at around 1630 when Granite Mountain was only about halfway through their descent into the box canyon.
For all THREE of these (separate) transmissions, DPS Officer Tarr says the ‘Caller’ was ‘Granite Mountain 7’ ( and not DIVSA ). That would indicate that ALL of these transmissions on A2G Channel 16 were coming directly from Jesse Steed and NOT Eric Marsh. Eric Marsh was using the call prefix of ‘DIVSA’ for himself that afternoon… even up until his final transmission from the deployment site. So it would most likely ONLY have been Jesse Steed ( or acting Captain Robert Caldwell? ) that would have been prefixing radio calls with ‘Granite Mountain 7’ in this timeframe.( 1630+ ).
Here’s a ‘breakout’ of these THREE ‘distinct’ ( and separate ) transmissions Eric Tarr says he heard that afternoon…
Around 1630 ( Granite Mountain was halfway through their descent and still ‘on the slope’ and with an ‘elevated’ view into the distance towards the BSR )…
1) Caller: Granite Mountain 7: (Calm) “We are moving towards Yarnell in the black”.
NOTE: This is different from any other transmission about the ‘ranch’ that other people say they heard. THIS one appears to have come from Jesse Steed himself AFTER they had already started their descent. It is now around 1630 and they are halfway down the slope. If that is the case… then Steed’s statement over the radio about them moving ‘in the black’ at that point is either an outright lie or just an attempt to not admit to their real circumstances for fear of being told they should NOT be ‘moving through green’ anywhere near the advancing fireline. The fact that DPS Officer Tarr seems to specifically recall hearing this on the A2G Channel 16 might also indicate that Jesse Steed had already discovered that the moment they ‘dropped’ into the canyon… the A2G channel was the ONLY one he could now reliably send/receive on. This would be the same A2G channel that Steed would soon be sending his first MAYDAY call out on so that means his radio had already been SET to Channel 16 and he had already been ‘transmitting’ messages on that channel even before he would use it for the MAYDAY call(s).
Shortly after that…
2) Caller: Granite Mountain 7: (Calm) “We are heading to a ranch we have in sight”.
NOTE: If Officer Tarr is right that the transmission (1) from Steed came at 1630… and that he made this second CALM FYI style transmission BEFORE the first MAYDAY call at 1639… then his ‘shortly after that’ could mean this call (2) was happening in the 1634 or 1635 timeframe. That would put Jesse and Granite Mountain still ‘on the slope’ and ‘descending’ and not down in the flats yet so it would make sense that Jesse would still be saying he ‘has the Ranch in sight’ from that elevated position on the slope.
Shortly after that ( 1639 – Start of MAYDAY calls )…
3) Caller: Granite Mountain 7: (Excited,Out of Breath) Start of MAYDAY calls.
It is transmission number (2) that was, apparently, the actual basis for Ranger 58 being able to FIND the deployment site when they were finally in the air and searching for Granite Mountain, so it’s pretty safe to say that Eric Tarr really did hear someone (calmly) say “We are moving towards a ranch we have in sight” PRIOR to the start of the MAYDAY calls as he says in his testimony.
Eric Tarr’s actual quote about that where he references transmission (2)… ( Emphasis is mine )…
———————————————————————-
“I saw the ranch house appear through the smoke and KNEW the Firefighters had SAID they were trying to get to a ranch house from their PRIOR RADIO TRANSMISSIONS.
We began searching toward the Ranch house from the ridgeline when I located a group of deployed shelters off the nose of the aircraft at approximately 1810 hours. I directed the pilot to the location of the fire shelters where we circled at low altitude. We attempted TWICE to land closer to the scene but the area was still hot with too much blowing ash and dust to land safely.”
———————————————————————–
What this seems to prove is that Eric Tarr’s memory was so good about what he had been casually hearing on the radio that afternoon prior to there being any ’emergency’ that the very WORDS he recalled hearing ( “We are moving to a RANCH that we have in SIGHT” ) ended up being the direct reason why Ranger 58 was able to locate the deployment site itself.
So given his ‘good memory’ and his apparent reliability as a witness with regards to things he ‘heard on the radio’… there is no reason to believe he isn’t accurately reporting these THREE separate and distinct transmissions circa 1630+ that all had the call sign prefix ‘Granite Mountain 7’.
So… if we accept Tarr’s recollections as accurate… it would appear that Jesse Steed really WAS trying to tell SOMEONE exactly what they were doing even after they had ‘descended’ into the box canyon and even AFTER the 1627 ( 4:27 PM ) YARNELL-GAMBLE video/audio capture.
These would also then constitute even MORE ‘verifiable communications with Granite Mountain’ during the time the SAIR said there was a total ‘blackout’ and no one was hearing ANYTHING from them ( Marsh and/or Steed ).
The mystery would be whether he was just walking along and descending into the canyon and just making unsolicited ‘announcements’ like this even before sensing any danger… or whether he really was having an ongoing ‘conversation’ with someone.
Someone who ( like whoever might have been urging them to ‘hurry’ in the YARNELL-GAMBLE video ) was still very interested in ‘where they were’ circa 1630+ and ‘what was taking them so long’ to show up in town.
The discussion could have easily been staying on the 2 track or taking the short cut down the canyon. I have always said if you do not like what you see talk about it stall for a while if you are right the fire will make the decision for everyone. even at the break site in the black 20 min. would have changed the whole scenario. I believe they had a good discussion at the break site and some one sold the idea. What they saw at 1605 was not at threat at that time to their eyes.
Reply to Bob Powers post on August 6, 2014 at 6:24 pm
>> Bob Powers said…
>>
>> The discussion could have easily been staying on the
>> 2 track or taking the short cut down the canyon.
I have always believed that if THAT discussion took place… it was a VERY short one. I don’t think either Marsh OR Steed ( or anyone else out on that ridge ) had any frickin’ idea where that two-track went from that ‘decision point’ up on the saddle.
Steed had missed the 7:00 AM briefing at the Yarnell Fire Station when it was even first proposed that Marsh would bump to DIVS and leave Jesse ‘Acting Superintendent’ of GM that day… but WITHOUT having ‘attended’ the same meetings and briefings that would normally have been the case for any IHC Superintendent before starting a day’s work and being responsible for the safety of 19 men all day.
Only Marsh had any chance of looking at this infamous ‘iPad with a Google Map’. at that 7:00 AM briefing… and there still is no evidence that even Marsh was paying good enough attention that morning for the exact path of that trail to have fully ‘registered’ with him while someone was ‘showing him something on an iPad’.
I believe that once that ‘compound’ came into view… FIRST Jesse had to VERIFY with Marsh that what he could now see in the distance was, in fact, this ‘Ranch’ he had been told to ‘head for’.
Steed had no clue what it ‘looked’ like and that is the FIRST thing he would have needed to know. Is that REALLY where we are supposed to be going?
Only after Marsh (probably) confirmed that would there have been any additional ‘conversation’ about… “Ok… so how do we GET there? I can see it now but this road we are on just looks like it doesn’t go anywhere near it? All I can see is this road continuing to head SOUTH. Where does this road really GO?”
If Marsh had NOT been paying full attention that morning… then his only response to Steed at that point might have been something like…
“I have no idea where that trail goes from there, Jesse.”
I think that VERY quickly… these men who were now lacking the situational awareness they really needed to make any GOOD decisions at that point just realized that other than ‘cancelling the mission’… there WERE ‘no options’. If there was an ‘argument’ between Steed and Marsh over the radio in this timeframe… then this may have been the moment.
The ONLY way to get there was the way they could SEE. Just head right at it. So that’s what they ‘decided’ to do… rules be damned.
If they really were that ‘clueless’ about where the road went… the only other alternative was to get on the radio and start talking to OTHER people who know more than you do and get some HELP and some ANSWERS. That appears to be something that none of the leadership of Granite Mountain were ever in the habit of even considering. Too much hubris. Too much inability to seek help from others or even admit to ‘needing help’.
There were PLENTY of people they could have called to help them out with even some simple ‘directions’ at that point. People who DID have maps and DID have better SA that day.
They didn’t do it.
They didn’t feel the need to ‘consult’ with ANYONE about ANYTHING… even if they KNEW they needed ‘information’ that might help them make a better decision.
>> Bob Powers also said…
>>
>> I have always said if you do not like what you see talk
>> about it stall for a while if you are right the fire will make
>> the decision for everyone.
>>
>> Even at the break site in the black 20 min. would have
>> changed the whole scenario. I believe they had a good
>> discussion at the break site and some one sold the idea.
>> What they saw at 1605 was not at threat at that time to
>> their eyes.
Apparently not… but it’s still a total mystery that for the NEXT 20 minutes… while they COULD still observe the fire behavior ‘out there’ during that 20 minute walk to the ‘descent point’… that they didn’t ‘observe’ that everything was ‘exploding’ out there and doing nothing but ‘picking up speed’ versus what they had observed back at the final rest spot.
Also… look again at that video that was posted last night showing the ACTUAL ‘situation’ at exactly 4:30 PM via those REAL photos taken looking out towards the box canyon from Highway 89.
That video is here…
http://youtu.be/99igt4dajvo
At the very end of the video… the ‘camera’ is hovering directly over the actual ‘descent point’ and while it is certainly not a ‘ground level’ view from the box canyon…. it clearly shows what the ‘lines of sight’ were back towards town and back towards the fielines from even a close descent in the drainage.
Even the SAIR’s own ‘estimated fireline’ at exactly 4:30 PM ( when GM would have only been halfway through their descent ) is in a place where they SHOULD have been able to see the eastern edges of it already ‘arriving’ in Yarnell ( even if they were hugging that drainage on the way down ).
The rule of ‘reverse line of sight’ applies here when you look at images IMG_1334 and IMG_1335.
If not for the bushes in IMG_1334 and the brown roof of the ‘Assembly of God’ chruch in IMG_1335… we would probably almost have been able to SEE Granite Mountain on their ‘descent’ out there in the box canyon ( even if they were hugging the drainage ).
So that means the converse is true. They also MUST have had the same ‘line of sight’ and been able to see those FLAMES arriving in Yarnell ( as seen in the photos ) much faster then they had even imagined back at 4:00 PM when they ‘started the mission’.
That should have been a huge RED FLAG.
They most probably could NOT still see ‘around the corner’ at the mouth of the canyon and seen that the fireline was also approaching THAT point very quickly… but they SHOULD have been able to see that EASTERN fireline arriving in town already and that should have sent all their ‘alarm bells’ ringing in their heads about having underestimated the SPEED of this fireline.
They were only halfway down at 4:30.
They still had time to GO BACK… up and over the ridge.
If I am right with my own RED fireline on the ground in this video and that the EAST end of the fire ( as seen in IMG_1334 and IMG_1335 ) was even CLOSER to the outskirts of town than even the SAIR 4:30 fireline estimate shows… then that just INCREASES the chance that they SHOULD have been able to SEE that from out there during their ‘descent’ and realized the fire was progressing MUCH faster than they imagined it would.
WTKTT I have been over all that.
The real time on the decent to the saddle could have been as little as 10 min. which means they were all in the canyon by the time the fire changed its burn pattern and could not see what was going on. On the 2 track they could have made very good progress down to the saddle.
By 1615 they were already in the canyon and had no eyes on the fire. From 1620 to 1640 the fire made its run to the mouth of the canyon 20 min. is not a lot of time. Anyone in the saddle would have seen that change between 1620 and 1625, no one was there they were already in the canyon.
Until we have facts don’t jump on to Dudleys band wagon as they are off hand remarks with no proof at this time.
Make a side note——
Reply to Bob Powers post August 7, 2014 at 7:00 am
I am talking about the ‘times’ that are published in the official Arizona Forestry sponsored SAIT report.
I still have to give them the ‘benefit of the doubt’ that they must have done their own ‘test walks’ ( at various rates of travel ) to come up with those published conclusions. I mean… they couldn’t have been TOTAL morons, right?
Your times don’t match those conclusions.
Until someone does more ‘test walks’ and publishes THOSE results… the SAIR times would appear to be valid for estimating what time they started their descent ( 4:20 PM ).
That being said… you MAY be right about the descent taking LESS than 19 minutes ( 4:20 to 4:39 ).
We now have Mike Dudley himself saying that more than one person seems to have reported hearing Marsh and Steed having an ‘argument’ there at the top of the saddle.
Well… arguments take TIME.
If the SAIR just did their ‘test walk’ at a brisk pace from the final rest spot to where they think GM started their descent and called it ‘4:20 PM’. without factoring in the actual TIME they might have spent just standing up there on the saddle and either ‘arguing’ or just ‘deciding what to do’… then the trip from the saddle to where they were when that first MAYDAY hit the air would have been LESS than 19 minutes.
I am still talking about ‘sight lines’, however, and the now real-world proof in some ACTUAL photographs that the smoke column had NOT ‘laid down’ yet… even just 540 seconds before the first MAYDAY.
Those photographs at least prove that there were moments DURING the descent ( before they got down to the flats ) when they SHOULD have been able to see what we can see in IMG_1334 and IMG_1335.
Smoke was NOT any kind of issue with regards to ‘visibility’ from where they were. It’s all about ‘sight lines’ and whether what they SHOULD have been able to see in the distance was making any impression on them at all.
Apparently ( even if they could see it )… it did not.
They still kept putting one foot in front of the other and walked down to where they would die 540 seconds after IMG_1334 and IMG_1335 were taken.
WTKTT we are not connecting–
From the break spot to the saddle 2 track
down hill easy going and fast even in a line.
If the did not leave the saddle till after 1620 they would have absolutely seen the fire change (bad Sign)
If they were in the canyon between 1620 and 1625
The whole crew, then they would not have seen the fire change and start its run at them.
If you are saying the SAIT said it took 20 min. to get to the saddle and they left the rest area at 1604 that would put them in the saddle at 1624 when the fire was definitely making its change and starting across the brush field at them.
By 1630 the fire was moving at a good rate towards them. The crew would have never dropped into that canyon if they had been in the saddle and saw the fire movement and activity at 1624.
Based on the fire spread they had to be in the canyon where they could not see the fire before 1620 maybe as early as 1615.
The could easily make 1/3 of a mile in 10 min. on a open trail with no obstructions down hill.
If you look close at the pictures you posted from google , there is a good opening from the saddle down into the canyon that would have also been fast going for a few 100 feet putting them out of site of the fire. The smoke column did not lay over till after 1630 or a little later by 1640 they saw the flames..
My personal feeling is they were out of site of the fire when fire activity changed and it turned on them, which would set a different time line into the canyon and they had no eyes on the fire.
My guess 10 min to the saddle, and 25 to 28 min. to the deployment site from the saddle. 38 min. from the rest site to the deployment site 1604 t0 1642.
THEY NEVER SAW THE FIRE CHANGE….They were in the canyon before it happened.
Agree with this. Anything else makes no sense.
** THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS
**
** A NEW FLYTHROUGH / FLYOVER VIDEO FOR ADOSH PHOTO IMG_1334
>> On July 24, 2014 at 9:20 pm, Robert the Second said…
>>
>> WTKTT,
>>
>> Thanks for the drop box links to these two very revealing photographs proximate
>> to the GMHS shelter deployments. It certainly does better put things into a bit
>> more of a perspective for me. Including the fact that I never believed the fire
>> came from the middle bowl over the top and down into the BS Ranch
>> bowl, in the first place.
When those TWO still images of the fireline approaching the mouth of the box canyon at 4:30 PM were recently discovered in the online Dropbox ASFD ‘Miscellaneous Photos’ folder… I was left with this nagging feeling that the officially published SAIR and ADOSH timelines for the fireline circa 4:30 seemed to be ‘way off’.
To satisfy my own curiosity… I created the following ‘through the looking glass’ style VIDEO which is a blend of one of the actual 4:30 photographs ( IMG_1344 ) and a flythrough / flyover using Google Earth.
Those TWO photographs ( IMG_1344 and IMG_1345 ) are in THIS folder in the ADOSH Dropbox…
/Photos and Videos/ASFD Photos/Miscellaneous Photos and Video
The ‘bottom line’ here is that this video I just put together proves I was WRONG.
Yes… there ARE some ‘discrepancies’ between what these photographs show and what both the SAIT and ADOSH published as their ‘estimated fireline’ at 4:30 PM… but in most cases the differences are not all that dramatic. It’s NOT like the published fireline maps were off by 1/4 mile or something. In the places where their firleline estimates DO appear to have been ‘off’… the difference(s) are only in the tens to a few hundred yards range.
ONE of the things that does seem apparent, however, is that even though the general location of the fireline(s) seem to be close between the published versions and what these photographs show… the photographs prove that the fireline was NOT ‘pooching out’ towards the mouth of the box canyon as it advanced towards it circa 4:30, as the SAIT / ADOSH fireline maps suggest.
In IMG_1334, the ‘line of sight’ is such that if that were the case… we would NOT be able to see some of the identifiable features in the background of the photographs.
As far as the ‘background’ goes… BOTH of the newly discovered photographs show clearly that at 4:30 PM… the fire had NOT even started to ‘ascend’ the far ridge slopes around the ‘anchor point’ nor had it even started to ‘ascend’ the northern side of the rock piles that constitute the northern ridge of the box canyon itself. However… the SAIT / ADOSH fireline estimates are also accurate in that regard in the 4:30 timeframe and even they don’t show the fireline ‘ascending’ either of those places quite yet. So there really is no big ‘discrepancy’ there, either, between the 4:30 PM photographs and the published 4:30 PM fireline charts.
All of this is ‘illustrated’ in the VIDEO ( Link to video is down below ).
Here is what actually happens in this ‘through the looking glass’ VIDEO…
It starts with IMG_1334 from the ASFD ‘Miscellaneous Photos’ folder. That is the image that was taken at precisely 4:29.39 PM with a Network connected iPhone 4S. It was taken from a vehicle moving north on Highway 89 just after it had passed the ‘Ranch House Restaurant’ and it looks WEST directly out towards the ‘mouth’ of the box canyon. It is still not known who took this picture or how it came to be in ADOSH’s possession. It is simply ‘there’ in the evidence record in this generic ‘Miscellaneous Photos’ folder.
According to the SAIR… Granite Mountain was about halfway through their descent into the box canyon when this photo was taken ( 4:30 PM ) and if those trees weren’t there on the left side of the photo some super-enhancement of the photograph might even actually SHOW them making their descent out there.
The VIDEO then CROSSFADES between this real 4:30 PM photograph and an exact Google Earth ‘eye level’ view at the same exact location where the photograph was taken. The ‘focus’ is on the terrain in the distance and as the CROSSFADE executes you will see that the resulting Google Earth viewpoint and perspective matches perfectly. The distant ridge lines match exactly and so do the ‘middle features’ such as that ‘triangular shaped’ pile of rocks ‘out there’ which represents the actual north-side entry point of the box canyon.
The ‘small mounds’ where the fire can be seen in the distance also end up matching exactly as the CROSSFADE executes.
When the CROSSFADE has finished… it pauses for a moment at ‘eye-level’ at that exact location where IMG_1334 was taken looking WEST.
Then… the ‘chopper’ takes off.
The VIEW goes STRAIGHT UP from the point where IMG_1334 was taken to a height of about 500 feet off the ground and the ‘chopper’ then begins to FLY due WEST and out towards the mouth of the box canyon.
At this point… here is what you will see ‘from the air’…
The exact published SAIT / ADOSH fireline estimates have been ‘transposed’ onto the 3 dimensional ground surface. They are represented by ORANGE borders on the ground and include the official 4:00, 4:15, 4:30, 4:40 and 4:50 PM fireline estimates.
They are accurate and really do show, in THREE dimensional space, what the SAIT / ADOSH published firelines were trying to show with just TWO dimensions.
Since the TIME of this IMG_1334 photograph was pretty much exactly 4:30 PM, only the 4:00, 4:15 and 4:30 PM fireline estimates are ‘filled in’ with BLACK to represent the surface area that has ALREADY burned ( circa 4:30 PM ).
The ‘estimated’ 4:40 and 4:50 firelines are still represented by thin ORANGE borders on the ground surface and on the tops of the western ride(s) but they are not ‘filled in’ and are still ‘all green’ in this video since that is simply where the fire was GOING to be later on and they hadn’t ‘burned’ yet ( circa 4:30 PM ).
NOTE: This video uses pre-fire Google Satellite imagery. The ground surface and the vegetation shown is what it really looked like ‘out there’ the morning of June 30, 2013.
In addition to the ORANGE borders representing the SAIT / ADOSH published fireline ‘estimates’… you will also see a bright RED border on the ground fairly close to the 4:30 PM fireline border. That RED line represents the fireline as best as I could determine it to be from just the two photographs themselves ( IMG_1334 and IMG_1335 ).
As mentioned… the two ‘firelines’ are really not that far off as far as the 4:30 timeframe goes.
AFAICT… the biggest ‘disrepancies’ would be that the fireline had NOT, as yet, started ‘flowing’ through that draw into the mouth of the box canyon as the SAIT / ADOSH firelines suggest… but the fire as seen in the photographs does appear to be farther EAST and much CLOSER to town than shown in the SAIR / ADOSH fireline estimates.
The VIDEO continues to FLY straight at the mouth of the box canyon from where IMG_1334 was taken and then the ‘chopper’ banks to the left and ‘flies’ straight up the box canyon.
The VIDEO will ‘pause’ for a few seconds at various places during the ‘flight’ in order to better read some of the LABELS that are on the ground.
The ‘flight’ then goes straight up from the deployment site the way Granite Mountain descended and up to where Sonny ( Tex ) Gilligan found that roll of PINK tape on the side of the two-track. This is pretty much assumed to be the spot where Granite Mountain ‘left the two-track’ and started their descent.
The ‘flight’ then goes NORTH to where they started their journey and shows exactly where Christoper MacKenzie shot his videos.
It also shows the exact location of that ‘Notched Rock’ which has been used to determine the exact location of the 1550 ( 4:50 PM ) series of photos. As you will see… that location was just a few hundred feet downslope of where the men would all re-gather at their last ‘rest location’ and where Christopher MacKenzie would then shoot his videos circa 1555 ( 4:55 PM ). Even though these men were ‘slinging their saws’ and exiting to the right side of the camera… they were not going far. They were ONLY circling around BEHIND MacKenzie as he took those photos and simply walking up the slope from that ‘Notched Rock’ area to the next ‘resting spot’.
The ‘chopper’ then rotates EAST for a better view out into the ‘Middle Bowl’ and what the SAIT / ADOSH fireline estimates looked like ‘out there’ at 4:30 PM.
Then the ‘chopper’ heads back SOUTH and finally ‘hovers’ back over the exact ‘descent point’ where the roll of PINK tape was found and ‘looks back’ EAST through the box canyon, across the deployment site and the Boulder Springs Ranch, and back at the exact location of where IMG_1334 was taken and the ‘chopper flight’ began.
It’s sort of a SLOW flight… and all of this takes about 4 minutes and 30 seconds including the places where it ‘hovers’ for a moment at certain critical ‘ground views’.
One more point about the SAIT / ADOSH firelines transposed to 3 dimensions…
We still do NOT know exactly how the SAIT determined the WESTERN edges of their estimated timelines. Yes… there was a lot of ‘summarizing’ of the various sources the SAIT used for their fireline/progression estimates… but there were no SPECIFICS when it came to things like EXACTLY how they determined certain ‘estimates’ or certain ‘locations’.
It is still simply ASSUMED that for most of the ‘western ridge’ location estimates they were relying primarily on the Matt Oss time-lapse video that was taken from the Congress side in the 4:30 to 4:50 PM timeframe.
I have transposed these ‘officially’ published firelines into 3 dimensions exactly the way they are in the SAIT / ADOSH publications and I have not tried to ‘edit’ them in any way. Any discrepancies between the two are purely ‘operator error’ during the transposing.
However… I ( me, personally ) still do NOT believe that the fire was ‘cresting’ at the saddle where the roll of PINK tape was found at the exact same moment that Captain Jesse Steed happened to be making his MAYDAY calls ( 4:40 PM ).
I believe that EVENTUALLY happened… but not at that moment in time.
I believe it was simply convenient for the predetermined SAIR narrative to have them be able to say those men were seeing fire both ‘above and below’ them at the same moment ( 4:40 PM ) in order to make it easier for the SAIT to explain why no attempt was made ( or even considered ) to try and get back up to the two-track.
I am still working with some Arizona 15 television Helicopter footage that I believe can prove what I am saying in this regard… but it is slow going. More on that later.
Here is the ‘new’ video…
NOTE: If this video appears ‘fuzzy’ when you trying to view it via YouTube… it’s not the video. It could mean your connection isn’t quite fast enough to show a 720dp MP4 video and YouTube is trying to ‘compensate’ while playing the video. If you download the video to your hard drive and play it locally you will see that it is in high-res sharp focus at all times.
YouTube Video Title…
IMG-1334-FLYOVER-1
YouTube direct video link…
http://youtu.be/99igt4dajvo
YouTube ‘About’ information for this Video…
This video starts with the 4:30 PM ADOSH ASFD ‘Miscellaneous Photos’ photo named IMG_1334. It was taken just north of the Ranch House Restaurant looking WEST out towards the mouth of the box canyon. It then CROSSFADES into a Google Earth eye-level view at the exact location the photograph was taken. Then it starts a ‘flight’ going straight up and then out towards the mouth of the box canyon ( and around the western ridge ). The ORANGE lines on the ground match all of the officially published SAIT / ADOSH fireline estimates at various times. The RED line on the ground is where the fireline appeared to ACTUALLY be at 4:30 PM as per the IMG_1344 photograph.
One CORRECTION for something in the video.
At the top of the saddle where Tex ( Sonny ) Gilligan found the roll of PINK tape… the ORANGE fireline border that is there on the saddle is incorrectly labeled as ‘4:30 PM’.
That ORANGE border there on the saddle right near where GM started their descent is part of the 4:40 PM SAIT / ADOSH fireline estimate.
That is where the SAIT thought the fire was at 4:40 PM ( not 4:30 ) and was the basis for them saying “they saw fire both above and below them at the same time”.
After getting my mouth to close from this excellent video all I can say is another excellent job WTKTT….AWSOME
Nice work, WTKTT.
I have to believe that with the smoke not yet having laid-over hard in the photos, they were taken just minutes, or even seconds, before the out-flow boundary brought it’s strongest winds.
When that happened, fire behavior would have been intensified to a level almost beyond belief in both, the area at the bottom of the bowl, and toward the saddle at the top.
While they may not have actually seen fire at the top of the bowl at the moment they saw it at the bottom, the smoke was probably laying down hard across the saddle at that time, giving the impression (if not in actuality) that the fire was already burning VERY close to the top, so THAT option was gone.
Reply to TTWARE post on August 6, 2014 at 3:34 pm
>> TTWARE said…
>>
>> I have to believe that with the smoke not yet having laid-over hard in the
>> photos, they were taken just minutes, or even seconds, before the out-flow
>> boundary brought it’s strongest winds.
Yes. That is actually one of the extraordinary things about these two 4:30 PM photos ( IMG_1344 and IMG_1345 ). They show just ‘clear daylight’ to the left of the smoke column with basically no ‘smoke advance’ at all out in the canyon mouth area… and this is just 540 seconds before Steed would make his first MAYDAY” call.
On the other hand… the fact that we can see for ourselves how ‘clear’ a view of the fire there was from ANYWHERE up on that far ridge, even at 4:30, contributes to the ‘mystery’ of why these men could not SEE that the fire had, in fact, advanced much faster than they thought it would by 4:30. These photos almost prove that even if they were ‘hugging the drainage’ out there during their descent… they still SHOULD have been able to see this EAST end of the fireline already coming into Yarnell.
That should have set ALL of their ‘alarm bells’ ringing ‘out there’ and made them realize that they had seriously underestimated the SPEED of that fireline.
At 4:30… they were only halfway down and still had time to get all the way back up to that two-track and then OVER the ridge.
>> TTWARE also said…
>>
>> When that happened, fire behavior would have been intensified to a
>> level almost beyond belief in both, the area at the bottom of the bowl,
>> and toward the saddle at the top.
Well… if you look at those two 4:30 photos ( IMG_1334 and IMG_1335 ) and all that ‘clear sky’ ahead of the fire and all that ‘no fire yet’ area out west… then that is what pretty much HAD to have happened in just the next 9 minutes in order for the next SAIR ‘estimated fireline’ to even be remotely possible.
One thing I will say, however, is that there appears to still be some footage shot in this 4:30 to 4:50 timeframe by the ABC News Sky15 chopper that does NOT support this kind of hellacious advancement between 4:30 and 4:40.
Still working on a report regarding all this Sky15 chopper footage.
The key is identifying WHERE these many images of the fire they took are actually located on the ground itself. Not easy.
>> TTWARE also said…
>>
>> While they may not have actually seen fire at the top of the bowl
>> at the moment they saw it at the bottom, the smoke was probably
>> laying down hard across the saddle at that time, giving the impression
>> (if not in actuality) that the fire was already burning VERY close to the
>> top, so THAT option was gone.
You could be right…. but the reports in the SAIR have always gone much farther than that… and so did Darrell Willis in the first public press conference held at the deployment site.
Both the SAIR and Willis state they could “See FIRE above and below them”.
Not just smoke. Actual FLAMES. BOTH places. 540 seconds after IMG_1334.
I still believe that was NOT the case ( and that the ABC News Sky15 chopper footage can prove that ) and the only reason for saying so is to mitigate having to even TRY to explain why they didn’t even TRY to get back up that ridge.
After reading some different statements by current fire fighters I wanted some clarity.
Wild land fire fighting is inherently dangerous——TRUE
Wild land fire fighters take calculated risks—TRUE but take a long look at calculated…….
Calculated–is assessing the situation. Identifying the risks. Then putting into place the safety plans to accomplish the job.
Fight fire aggressively but provide for safety first.
Check the situations that shout watch out.
Get current weather forecasts.
Base all actions on current and expected fire behavior. Fuels and topography.
Put LCES in place and proceed with caution.
If any leg is or can not be put in place. Find another alternative.
So when Fire fighters say they take calculated risks. They are assessing and providing the safe way to accomplish the job.
Fight Fire aggressively but provide for safety first is not some off the wall statement but a continuing reminder to follow the rules all the time and use them to accomplish your task.
Granit mountain for what ever reason failed to assess their move and put the safety in place.
Not a calculated risk, no assessment. We can get from point A to point B before the fire gets there.
That is risk taking not assessing the other risks involved with the move.
You calculate the risks and medicate them with good safety planning and execution. The plan is always changing as you progress thru your shift and along the fire line. You do not make one plan and not change it, Mother nature, topography, fuels, weather, are always changing as a fire fighter you must keep up and hopefully be ahead of those changes.
That’s what the 10 Standard Orders are all about————–
Medicate should be eliminate.
I think that even before all the evidence had emerged and before they even finished conducting interviews, Mike Dudley, Jim Karels and the rest of the SAIT team realized that they were looking at a ‘worst case scenario’ here.
Regardless of the mounting evidence that the command and control situation was ‘off the charts bad’ that day… I think it was also clear to the SAIT that the actual ‘boots on the ground’ basically did the unimaginable that day.
They stepped right out in front of an oncoming train and they got run over.
From that point on… I think Karels and Dudley realized what their real job was. They had to find a way to ‘mitigate’ this train wreck and somehow keep the ‘narrative’ in the realm of the ‘believable’… or at least the ‘acceptable’.
That’s when the standard detailed ‘Management Report’ that was one of the ‘deliverables’ they were originally contracted to produce got taken ‘off the table’ and the remaining ‘deliverable’ had to be a simple ‘narrative’ that would mitigate the ‘train wreck’.
Enter ‘Facilitated Learning Analysis’ ( FLA ) from stage left combined with all that ‘Here is what they probably knew’ and ‘Here is what they probably didn’t know’ stuff and Voila… mission accomplished.
The SAIR made it sound like they stood carefully by the tracks at each of several key decision points, carefully weighed their options, and carefully decided it was still OK to keep walking on the train tracks. Reasonable decision making at all times. Coulda happened to anyone. Case closed.
I still feel the worst for those 17 young men who were just along for the ride that day. They had every confidence in those other two men who WERE making the decisions that day… and the next thing these other poor 17 young men knew was that they were eyeball to eyeball with an oncoming train.
WTKTT–Well said
The SAIT went further than any thing I have seen in my carrier in an attempt to protect every one from Law Suits. Why not just let the chips fall and tell the truth?
That should be an investigators job.
Their explanation fit the news media frenzy. Communications and extreme weather
easy to identify the culprit to untrained people. Hard to justify to qualified Fire Fighters. Also to those that have been in this group of IM.
Reply to Bob Powers post on August 5, 2014 at 11:38 am
>> Bob Powers said…
>> The SAIT went further than any thing I have seen in my carrier in
>> an attempt to protect every one from Law Suits.
The moment the news about what happened in Yarnell on Sunday, June 30, 2013 got out… ( including news about the total evacuations and the footage of a town on fire ) it was not realistic for anyone to think there would NOT be law suits being filed.
19 (supposedly) experienced firefighters were dead. Many more firefighters almost died. Hundreds of homes burned… and all from a simple lightning strike that took place 2 days earlier with plenty of opportunities to just ‘put it out and be done with it’.
Of course there were going to be ‘law suits’.
I think the SAIT was more concerned about actual ‘prosecutions’ and/or people losing their jobs/careers/pensions, etc.
>> Why not just let the chips fall and tell the truth?
>> That should be an investigators job.
That is ALWAYS a real investigator’s job… unless you are just a ‘paid contractor’ and being told what ‘results’ you are being paid to ‘come up with’.
It was pure folly on the part of Arizona Forestry to think that they could produce a report about this incident that would have stopped the filing of suits.
It is not like they were drinking, smoking dope or playing on the internet. They made a mistake. A very bad mistake that horribly impacted the other 17 guys. And they knew it before they died.
Absolutely Mike
What caused the mistake?
Fatigue
over confidence
We are hiking out don’t need the rules to do that.
situational awareness.
Past Bad chooses with good outcomes.
Several factures that should be looked at and addressed.
Something went wrong in the decision process..
Bob,
Some of those are unknowable. So we are left with the need to observe the rules and to understand that fatigue can lead to very bad decisions.
There is one idea that has been mentioned, but I think should be emphasized. No one is infallible. The only infallible human who ever lived was not a hotshot superintendent. I can imagine that those kids looked up to Marsh like he was bigger than life, as if he knew everything about wildfire there was to know. And it seems as if they were in awe of Steed as well. Just like the kids on Blue Ridge look up to Frisby. And yet all of these guys, good as they are, can make mistakes.
So if something strikes a crew member as wrong, off-kilter or amiss, they need to speak up and say something. It would be a very poor super who would punish a crew member for voicing a concern. If one person speaks up, others who might have the same concern might feel free to do so also. Maybe the planned action is changed or not, but at least it is thought about a bit more.
Mike you are truly right.
My concern is like others over the past what causes highly qualified supervisor or supervisors to make as you have said a major mistake when others under the same situation have not?
It has been out there for a long time and will rise up again, like in all industrial accidents, as you have said no one is infallible and human nature raises up and makes mistakes. Others need to step up and question things when they feel something is not right..
Reply to mike post on August 5, 2014 at 1:32 pm
>> mike said
>> They made a mistake.
>> A very bad mistake that horribly impacted the other 17 guys.
Yes. They did.
Even Mike Dudley is now pretty much ‘admitting’ that to rooms full of firefighters when he makes these ‘presentations’ with Q/A sessions… but he still won’t use the ‘M’ word. He characterizes it as ‘not the greatest idea’ and wonders aloud himself if members of the crew might have actually spoken up about it. He ( Dudley ) says he would ‘like to think’ that at least some of those men ‘thought about it’ ( questioning the decision(s) ).and/or actually DID ‘say something’.
In that June 20 speech to the Utah firefighters… Dudley himself said…
————————————————————————–
+1:05:48
Mike Dudley: So… on the other hand… there’s a part of me that HAS to wonder… as they stood there on that saddle and they started droppin’ down the slope… I would like to think a few members of the crew had that little gnawing ‘pit’ in their stomach sayin’… “Is this a good idea?”. But… would any one of ’em have spoken up and argued against the superintendent… or the acting? I don’t know.
————————————————————————-
>> mike also said…
>>
>> It is not like they were drinking, smoking dope or playing on the internet.
Has anyone ( other than the ME and YCSO ) actually seen the FULL autopsy reports?
The ones with actual toxicology results? ( which I’m sure were done as SOP for an incident such as this ).
There is no (public) evidence the SAIT ever saw them and there is also no (public) evidence that the ADOSH investigators ever even asked to see them.
And………
Another interesting development!
PRIVATE DRONE BANNED FROM FLYING OVER SAND FIRE
http://abc7news.com/technology/drone-banned-from-flying-over-sand-fire/226516/
” Tuesday, July 29, 2014
A private drone recorded footage of the Sand Fire burning in the Sierra foothills east of Sacramento and it caused some controversy. But even as firefighters criticize its use in this case, they think the technology could actually help them in the near future.”
I find myself wishing that that kind of imagery could have been utilized on the Yarnell Hill Fire.
The full video in contention:
http://youtu.be/2yyrwB0vwr8?list=PLTErVrHH6uJja-ljtn7z9Q5Sz9WtCPGw1
**
** TOM STORY PHOTO SHOWS TYSON ESQUIBEL’S FACE
It’s pretty much a given now that TFLD(t) Trainee Tyson Esquibel ( who was in charge of those crews that almost lost their lives over in Harper Canyon ) was driving that special ‘Glendale Fire’ Ford F-350 with the yellow sides that day… but I don’t recall him being positively identified himself in a photo as yet.
Well… there’s a clear shot of him in at least one Tom Story photo.
This is the Tom Story photo that shows Tyson Esquibel’s face…
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/02ue6bnjp6nazkm/AACUc_jX8WNPOrznsNSlYV-ea/Photos%20and%20Video/Tom%20Story%20Photos/201303_Yarnell_Hill_02#lh:null-201303_Yarnell_Hill_1677.jpg
Tyson Esquibel is the tall guy with the ball cap shown in profile in about the right center of the photo, in between the FF with the yellow helmet and neck protector and the FF with the RED Helmet.
He is ‘clean shaven’ and wearing a ‘chest harness’ which holds his radio and his right hand is drawn up to his belt.
Tyson Esquibel has a Facebook page and his own totally PUBLIC ‘Profile’ picture shows him holding one of his kids up inside a Fire Station.
If that isn’t Esquibel in that Tom Story photo above then someone who looks exactly like him was also running around that Ranch House Restaurant parking lot that day.
Tyson Esquibel’s Facebook page with that completely PUBLIC profile picture
of him is here…
https://www.facebook.com/tyson.esquibel
OK. I spent a bit of today wandering studying engines, brush trucks, chase trucks, etc. Discovering that Brush Trucks can look like all sorts of things, including what that one that I think is Engine 151 looks like.
And then I turned back to the Carleson Complex in Washington, which I was posting about a lot on Twitter a week and a half ago on FB and Twitter and had assumed by now was probably fairly well “put to bed.” Apparently it really isn’t, much to my surprise. Over the past four days the combination of low humidity and thunder-lightning storms has popped a lot of that fire back up, even after the three combined Incident Management Teams had been stepped down.
I follow this fire and others on Wildlandfire.com. And I have a whole bunch of pages there that I have bookmarked relevant to past fires, fire investigations, fire investigations debacles, the consequences of fire investigation debacles, the consequences of federal laws produced as a result of and leading to more fire investigation debacles, and discussions related to the Yarnell HIll Fire.
As I was reading tonight, I remembered that Tempe Fire Captain Todd Foster, who is quite active there (especially when it comes to difficult policy issues), and who was the Task Force Leader of Structure Protection Group 2 up in Model Creek Subdivision (I’ve been trying to learn a lot about what happened up in that area) wrote a post in one of the threads devoted to the Yarnell Fire.
When I read that post the first time, I thought, I really need to post that here. But I hadn’t gotten there yet.
So I went back and found his post and re-read it. And I’m posting it now because I think it’s really important to read, since he was never interviewed by ADOSH and he really should have been.
TODD FOSTER (10-20-2013): About What Happened Regarding the Granite Mountain Hotshots Excerpts:
He says, “I was with the Ops Chief and heard the radio conversation when GMIHC confirmed they were in “good black”.”
And then he describes what was going on there in the Model Creek area and how, when Ops Chief Todd Abel received the word about the GM deployment, Todd went down to Yarnell.
And he writes some things about his thoughts about all of that.
It is well worth reading. His last three paragraphs deserve mentioning:
“A crew will typically communicate with a division supervisor if they are making a large geographical move or repositioning for different tactics. In this case, their DIVS was their crew Sup. He obviously was aware and/or a part of that decision process. Getting notification to operations was not made. Had that been the case, we still cannot predict whether Ops would have agreed to this change in location or not. However, clearly GMIHC was not on the “worry plate” for operations as they had indicated they we hunkered down in safe black.
A couple of personal expectations for myself and my resources in the future:
1. Keep my GPS on with constant access to Lat/Long in an emergency.
2. NO large geographical moves without notifying my supervisor for consultation first and agreement.
3. Immediately notify supervision of any need to move through escape routes to safety zones.
4. When pulling a lookout for any reason, crews will stay in safe work areas or safety zones until an alternate lookout(s) can be placed or repositioned.
I have studied the site, the report, the actions, the pictures, talked with IHC sups and SOFs about this alot since I demobed from the fire. I feel strongly that the GMIHC made a choice, one we are often tasked to make. In this case they drew the short stick. I think had any of the four things I just mentioned occurred, they chances would have been at least diminished of the actual outcome. There is always risk in what we do, but minimizing it as much as possible is our goal.”
AZfirefighter”
This is the link (at least I hope it is–they don’t give a perma-link:
http://hotlist.wildlandfire.com/threads/37712-Yarnell-discussion?p=157329#post157329
Based on his experience on that fie and his learnings from it, Foster has been developing training based on the Yarnell Fire.
“Tempe Fire begins training based on Yarnell disaster”
By Sandra Haros KTAR News Originally published: Feb 7, 2014
http://ktar.com/22/1698955/Tempe-Fire-begins-training-based-on-Yarnell-disaster
I hate to say this but Fosters last 4 lines took him where everyone else has gone. He knows and says what went wrong but Lawyered up and would not make the final step to acknowledging what GM did was out side the Fire Fighting rules.
He said all the right things but refused to Identify mistakes made.
The short straw??? Is that what decisions are now? Just a matter of luck. How about training, following the rules no matter what, no calculated risk’s.
This is what happens when The Ten Standard ORDERS become
GUIDE LINES. Guide lines can be bent. Orders must be followed with out question you don’t bend them you don’t break them you don’t ignore them. They have the deaths of hundreds of fire fighters to prove their worth.
They have the lives of thousands of fire fighters to their credit.
My rant for today…. It dose not help to ignore the facts and draw straws………………….
Reply to Marti Reed on August 2, 2014 at 8:39 pm
So online handle “AZfirefighter” really is Todd Foster.
I have always thought it was SOMEONE on the north end of Yarnell that day.
This totally matches what Mike Dudley, the actual co-leader of the Arizona Forestry sponsored SAIT team, has ‘agreed’ to in public back around June 20, right before the first anniversary of the tragedy.
In that SPEECH that Dudley was giving to the ‘Utah’ firefighters… one of the FFs in the audience asked Dudley directly if they had investigated the possibility that the fact that Marsh was both DIVSA *and* still the de-facto Superintendent of ‘Granite Mountain’ contributed to the tragedy.
The Utah FF talking to Dudley pointed out that NORMALLY a move like this would need to be ‘negotiated’ over open TAC radio channels between either a resource and their DIV or a DIV and their OPS… and for good reasons.
Such a move affects ( as the Utah FF said ) ‘everyone around you’ and ‘everyone needs to know something like that is happening’ and even have an opportunity for ‘input’ or at least the right to know it is happening in case it *might* affect them.
The Utah FF suggested ( and rightly so ) that the fact that Steed and Marsh only had to ‘negotiate’ this between THEMSELVES and were able to do it over their regular GM private radio frequency is what contributed directly to the tragedy.
Mike Dudley ( Co-Lead of SAIT and Co-Author of the SAIR report ) said…
“I agree”.
Also… FWIW…
AZfirefighter ( Todd Foster ) has also made a lot of comments over at Bill Gabbert’s ‘Widlfire Today’ site as well.
He and I had an exchange there back in January of this year and
he basically said the same exact thing you have shown him saying up above.
This was all about Gabbert’s POST about John MaClean and Holly Neill coming out with their ‘sources’ for their claim that Eric Marsh was saying ‘at the house’ in that Panebaker background radio capture and they thought that meant Marsh was at the Boulder Springs Ranch circa 4:16 PM.
AZfirefighter ( Todd Foster ) agreed with me that no one was saying ‘at the house’ at all.
In his post about that… AZfirefighter( Foster ) also said he was ‘with OPS’ that day and heard GM say they were ‘in good black’ and ‘staying put’.
I asked him ( Foster ) to confirm which OPS he was referring to and he came back and confirmed ‘Field’ OPS ( Todd Abel ).
I then asked him if Abel was AWARE ( that day ) that OPS2 Musser had also called GM to see if they were ‘available’ for structure protection work in Yarnell… but AZfirefighter ( Foster ) didn’t answer that question.
Here is that original exchange on Gabbert’s Wildfire Today site back in January…
http://wildfiretoday.com/2014/01/21/sources-for-the-neilmaclean-yarnell-hill-fire-analysis/
—————————————————————————————-
AZfirefighter on January 22, 2014 at 10:08 am said:
I would have to agree with WTKTT… its sounds like “just checking it out to see
where we’re going to jump out at”. I was on the line that day, and while I did not
hear this transmission, his statement and the way he says it makes sense to
me. I don’t hear “at the house” at all. Further I never heard any transmissions
about GMIHC going to protect structures. In fact, I was with OPS when GMIHC
stated they were in good black and staying put.
WantsToKnowTheTruth on January 22, 2014 at 1:50 pm said:
Which OPS?
AZfirefighter on January 24, 2014 at 1:04 pm said:
Field
WantsToKnowTheTruth on January 26, 2014 at 4:45 am said:
Field OPS that day was Todd Abel ( according to all documentation ).
Paul Musser was ‘Planning OPS’.
Was Abel aware that Musser had contacted GM and requested them to
send resources to Yarnell?
( No response )
——————————————————————————————
Copy. I’m fading…… I will look at this tomorrow
PS. Regardless of their WHATEVER (and why was that–Who knows??????) reason for NOT communicating to their Overhead (which, by all standards, including Todd Foster’s, they SHOULD have). I really believe, all things considered, they mistakenly thought the fire behavior change had FINISHED and the fire was flanking them as they headed south and into the bowl.
Which corresponds to my thinking that NOBODY on this fire anticipated the possibly disastrous consequences of the typical (and I LIVE in a place where this HAPPENS) pattern of the weather continuing to push this fire in a circle (not a line) that led to it consuming both Glen Ilah and (while exponentially expanding) the Granite Mountain Hotshots.
And I think this has to do with the evacuation chaos, also.
Copy all that… but it was ( and will remain ) an absolutely valid point that the Utah FF was making to SAIR Co-Lead Mike Dudley and which Dudley then AGREED with.
It is IMPERATIVE in ‘Dymamic’ fire situation like that that ALL resources on the fire be aware if NEIGHBORING resources are making any big ‘moves’ and might actually be crossing Division lines.
As we can see for ourselves in all this testimony… a LOT of people considered ‘burning out’ as they left their areas as a last ditch effort to ‘save things’.
What if someone HAD lit a backfire, out of desperation, down there near Glen Ilah or along one of those ‘last lines of defense’ just near the Boulder Springs Ranch?
If they had NOT been aware that Granite Mountain was, in fact, coming due EAST through that fuel-filled box canyon… then they might have killed their own even faster than the real fire did.
I can think of hundreds of reasons why this Utah Firefighter was ‘spot on’ with his question(s) to Mike Dudley and why Dudley had to agree with him.
Resources on a fire NEED to know what is happening AROUND them with OTHER resources… or very, very BAD things could happen.
Regardless of their motivations or whether they were ‘responding to a request’… .the way Marsh and Steed actually went about ‘executing’ this move was ‘off the charts’ and they should have known better.
As I have been saying for some time. A Div. Supervisor in charge of his own crew could be a piece of the Final decision puzzle. Separation between the Superintendent and the Foreman in this situation was not a complete break in authority for the crew.
Both of the fire fighters quoted above were right on and simply restating their own understanding and training that fire fighters use every day. If Dudley knew all of this why cover it up in the SAIT It is coming out any way and will be a black eye to him and others as more is known. It is a disservice to all fire fighters when you don’t let the facts fall where they may and deal with it. Protecting others dose not solve the problems associated with this fire.
I completely agree with both of you, WTKTT and Bob Powers. And thanks for sharing that convo with AZfirefighter. I know I read it at the time, but didn’t know who he was.
That heated conversation/debate we had a while back about whether Todd Abel’s instruction to Eric to “hunker down and stay safe” was an order or a suggestion keeps echoing in my head.
The more I’ve read from other fire-fighters about this kind of stuff, the more I believe it was an order.
In extreme fire behavior (and even in more “normal” operations), if there isn’t cohesion up and down the chain of command, which does include some latitude but not wholesale latitude, the more likely it is that things are gonna fall apart and and the holes are gonna line up.
Ironically, on the Cramer Fire, when the IC told everybody to get down off the rocks and deploy on the road, it was his own crew that did that and the crew he wasn’t supervisor of that didn’t.
So, it seems to me it’s not necessarily the fact that the Crew Supervisor became the Division Supervisor that was the key ingredient for disaster, but that the whole bunch of them, because of their own cohesion, broke the cohesion between them and THEIR overhead–Todd Abel as their Field OPS.
And speaking of letting the facts out. I’m sure you’ve noticed that Blue Ridge ff’s comment on Wildfire Today’s anniversary write-up (and right now off the top of my head I don’t remember what he wrote).
The truth WANTS to get out. Even Mike Dudley can’t resist that, as hard as they tried to mute it.
And the wording of the lawsuits shows exactly why they tried to mute it, and exactly why that strategy is backfiring.
Something’s gotta give in this whole thing. I now more than ever understand the background behind the SAIT’s strategy to protect those they were investigating. It’s a brutal background.
But it also caused ADOSH to swing totally the opposite direction in reaction to it, and now EVERYBODY’s got a potential knife hanging over their heads.
Sadly, other than some details about the close escapes on the west side of town, I do not think we know much more than 6 months ago. At that time we knew the SAIR was purposely avoiding blaming anyone, and it was apparent even then that ADOSH was an overreaction as far as the GMHS were concerned..
Virtually everyone that day, including OPS and the GMHS, underestimated that fire. They knew it was turning bad, but still did not realize how bad. Very hard to see the lesson there, no one wants to misjudge fire behavior, but unfortunately someone will do so again. GM then sealed their fate by failing to follow the 10 Fire Orders.
I do think that if OPS had raised the possibility of the GMHS moving towards Yarnell, even if they were turned down, that they should have made it crystal clear to GM to stay put when the situation changed and everyone was being pulled out of the west side of town. Maybe they relied on the turn down, but they should have made sure that GM did not change its mind. It does not appear that the pulling back was communicated to GM. I understand with all that was going on why it was not, but I’ve got to believe it should have been.
I hear you.
You say:
“I do think that if OPS had raised the possibility of the GMHS moving towards Yarnell, even if they were turned down, that they should have made it crystal clear to GM to stay put when the situation changed and everyone was being pulled out of the west side of town.”
I do believe that OPS (talking about Musser here) was (inside his own mind) looking for resources (as well he SHOULD HAVE) to move down to Yarnell. This is such an extremely tight time line.
I’m “thinking out loud” here.
I wrote somewhere above/below here that, granted my perfect 20/20 hindsight, I believe that AS SOON as that 3:30 weather warning was issued, and the IC called for an immediate evacuation of MountainAire and Yarnell (which the YCSO spent more than a half an hour sending out to Yarnell) that should have been IT.
For everybody, including the Granite Mountain Hotshots. That was the time to realize it was time to disengage everybody.
And yet.
I still have a hard time “blaming” Musser. We’re talking about a fifteen minute framework. IC has called for Mountainaire and Yarnell to be evacuated. He’s trying to determine the availability of resources to do whatever, He’s not asking/expecting/ordering anything. Just finding out where everybody is at.
DivA says GM is committed to the ridge.
After OPS Abel told Eric (and via that, I think, Granite Mountain) to “hunker down and stay safe.
D0es Musser (who has all kinds of resources/issues/complications at play at this point) have a responsibility to double down on this?
I really have to say to you that I don’t think so.
I hate to say it but at this point, all things considered, I have a really hard time holding either Abel or Musser accountable for the breach in communications that happened.
I suppose the key question is whether Musser, implicitly or otherwise was asking for resources, or just checking on their status. We have discussed this before and I am not aware of anything new.
I really do not think there was an obligation on the part of OPS to recheck with GM, but when a fire is going crazy and radio communication has been uncertain, being careful is not a bad thing. I also find it hard to be too critical. Would have jnforming GM of the pullback changed what happened? Hard to know for sure. I wish they had. But I also wish GM had followed the 10 Fire Orders.
Mike you are right on as is Marti.
Checking on the safety of your people is a responsibility. How ever I think Foster hit the nail on the head again by saying he and OPS both herd Marsh say they were in the Black.
The crew still has the responsibility for their safety
as you said. when things go to hell your on your own the first choice of GM was the black and that was the right choice.
I still don’t believe we know why they moved or maybe ever will.
I think Willis was and is trying to protect his guys (make them look good) with the move to reengage and that had nothing to do with their move.
No Heroics here just a bad decision with no plan for safety. We have time to get off the mountain and they headed out…..
Bob,
Although I used to disagree, sometimes we look too hard to avoid the simple and the obvious. There really was not going to be anything they could do with that fire when they came down. I really now think they just wanted off that mountain. And they thought they had time.
Reply to mike post on
August 5, 2014 at 5:21 am
>> mike said…
>> Although I used to disagree, sometimes
>> we look too hard to avoid the simple
>> and the obvious.
Albert Einstein was speaking to a room full of scientists when he spoke these famous words, but they are relevant…
“Everything should be made as simple as possible… but not simpler than that.”
Even your ‘simple’ breakdown involves three separate ‘decision points’…
>> Decision point 1…
>>
>> There really was not going to be
>> anything they could do with that fire
>> when they came down.
Did they know that?… or ( better yet )… did someone ever bother to make SURE they knew that?
Even in multiple ADOSH interview transcripts, Dave Larsen ( Rest in Peace ) wondered out loud if they knew their ‘hauling chart’ and knew that when any flames are above about 3 and 1/2 feet… your ‘Shiny Little Hard Hat’ and your ‘Pulaski’ aren’t going to be accomplishing anything.
Even if they did entertain some idea that they were going to be ‘doing some good’… one simple radio call somewhere in those 45 minutes that they continued to walk straight into disaster would have told them that even if they made it BEYOND the ‘Ranch’… they weren’t going to be ALLOWED to even attempt to do anything. Blue Ridge was ‘totally available’. Twenty other ‘elite’ FFs with their own ‘Shiny Hardhats’ and ‘Pulaskis’ right there in town… and they were not ALLOWED to be doing anything at all at that time but exactly what they WERE doing. Being SAFE.
>> Decision point 2
>>
>> I really now think they just wanted off
>> that mountain.
It was 4:00 PM. Everything they had been doing all day was now useless. Sunset was going to be at 7:42 PM that day. That was more than 3 hours away but they also knew it had taken the better part of an HOUR to even get UP there and that was with driving out almost halfway in the Crew Carriers ( which were now gone ) so that brings the maximum ‘hang around’ time down to 2 hours ( or LESS ) before they would have to realize ( and tell the other 17 guys ) they were all ‘spending the night’.
We know they were low on food and water even around NOON-ish because they asked Brian Frisby and Trueheart Brown to give them ‘all the Gatorade and ‘cubies’ they had. Frisby and Brown gave them what they had… but that was probably all gone by later afternoon as well.
So the prospects for telling 17 guys their buggies are more than an hour away somewhere and they might have to spend the night out there with little to no food or water was not a ‘pretty’ option for Marsh and Steed to consider when ‘discussing their options’.
So yes… ALL of that might have factored into the infamous ‘discussing their options’ conversation(s). Go now… and maybe we can make it and have someplace comfortable to sleep tonight… and actually be able to have dinner… or try to wait it out and possibly run out of daylight and end up with 17 very PISSED guys on our hands.
>> Decision point 3…
>>
>> And they thought they had time.
Yes. They did. They were wrong.
HOW could people who consider themselves ‘fire experts’ have been SO wrong remains one of the mysteries. Does that one thing point to a deficiency in training that might be system-wide?
Even Sonny (Tex) Gilligan knew 2 hours earlier that it was time to ‘get the hell out of there’ if there was any chance of doing so safely.
Sonny could see clearly ‘what was STARTING to happen’. up there and what was GOING to happen. Why couldn’t they?
Ironically, via finally getting over my disgust with Darrell Willis enough to read and then re-read (a whole lot) his interview, I actually think he may have been the ONLY person on that fire to have recognized the extreme danger it posed.
He was hugely concerned that the fire was bigger, hotter, and faster, than anyone he was communicating with was realizing.
But even he, when it happened, didn’t realize the full implications of it continuously TURNING.. Nobody did.
With my 20/20 hindsight firmly in place, it’s clear the one-hour immediate evacuation notice should have gone out via YCSO to Yarnell AS SOON AS that 3:30 weather warning came across and IC called for it. As in IMMEDIATELY. People didn’t get it until after 4:00, and that’s just the ones who got it. And that was too late.
**
** PHOTOS OF THE MYSTERIOUS CLARENCE MCMILLAN
** COMS UNIT LEADER FOR YARNELL
Sometime on Sunday morning, June 30, 2013… around 6:11 AM… someone realized that Roy Hall had also forgotten to order a COMS officer for Yarnell to be part of the Type 2 short team. So that is when someone first ‘ordered’ a COMS officer for Yarnell.
His name was Clarence McMillan.
He was SUPER qualified for this
He was/is the Radio Communications Manager at AZ Department of Corrections
He wasn’t actually ‘ordered’ until Sunday morning around 6:11 AM.
His estimated time of arrival in Yarnell was 11:30 AM but there is no evidence he actually got there at that time.
The photo linked to below was taken at 2:48 PM is the first evidence he was ever there at all.
Clarence Williams has (apparently) NEVER been interviewed by anyone is also (apparently) NEVER mentioned by ANYONE in any of either the SAIT or ADOSH interviews. Like he was never there ( but now we can see that he WAS there ).
The following is photographic evidence of him ( and his truck ) being there at the ICP circa 2:48 PM that day. He wasn’t doing much. For the next half-hour all he appeared to be doing was standing there by his vehicle and talking on his cellphone.
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/20inrene9tcx74a/AACltJPUFfvmZqibRwGSJwWLa/ADOSH%20Yarnell%20Hill%20Investigation/Photos%20and%20Video/ASFD%20Photos/Miscellaneous%20Photos#lh:null-IMG_20130630_144838_008.jpg
This photo was taken with a Network Connected ‘Motorola Droid 4’ so the timestamp of 14:48:37 ( 2:48.37 PM ) can be assumed to be accurate.
EXIF data in this photo…
File Name: IMG_20130630_144838_008.jpg
Make: Motorola
Camera Model Name: DROID4
Creation Date: 2013:06:30 14:48:37
The vehicle ‘by itself’ in the foreground is McMillan’s.
All-white modified truck that says ‘State Fire’ on the back.
License plate clearly visible. “G 312GD”.
Passenger side door is open and someone in a BLACK ball cap standing there between the open door and the vehicle. Appears to be talking on a cellphone which is held in his left hand and up to his ear.
NOTE: There is an even better photo of this guy in the same folder which will be posted as a ‘Reply’ to this message. I would say that pretty much has to be ‘Clarence McMillan’ himself but as of this writing I can’t find any valid public photo to compare with.
Resource order that lists license plate “G 312GD” in the ‘Travel Mode’ field…
It is an ‘Agency Owned Vehicle’ ( AOV )…
————————————————————-
Request Number: O-16.15
Ordered Date/Time: 06/30/13 0611 PNT
From: AZ-ADC (Dispatch) 800-309-7081
To: AZ-ADC
Qty: 1
Resource Requested: COMMUNICATIONS UNIT LEADER
(COML) (McMILLAN, CLARENCE (AZADC))
Needed Date/Time: 06/30/13 0610 PNT
Deliver To: YARNELL HILL
From Unit: AZ-ADC
To Unit: AZ-ADC
Assigned Date/Time: 06/30/13 0615 PNT
Resource Assigned Unit ID: AZ-AZS
Resource Assigned: McMILLAN, CLARENCE (AZADC)
M/D Ind.: M
Estimated Time of Departure: 06/30/13 0630 PNT
Estimated Time of Arrival: 06/30/13 1130 PNT
Travel Mode: AOV ( Agency Owned Vehicle) LIC#: G312GD
Financial Code: AZ-A1S-130688
Special Needs: ( No Entry )
Reporting Instructions: ICP MODEL CREEK SCHOOL IN PEEPLES
VALLEY 18912 HAYS RANCH ROAD, PEEPLES VALLEY AZ.
———————————————————————–
Other links related to this will be posted a ‘Replies’ in order to observe the ‘one link per message’ rule.
Clarence McMillan’s public LinkedIN page…
http://www.linkedin.com/pub/clarence-mcmillan/69/83b/26
Clarence McMillan
Radio Communications Manager at AZ Department of Corrections
Eagar, Arizona (Flagstaff, Arizona Area)
Law Enforcement
Clarence McMillan’s Overview
Current
Radio Communications Manager at AZ Department of Corrections
Past
Radio Communications Specialist at US Forest Service
Electronics Calibration Specialist at US Army
Education
New Mexico State University, Las Cruces, NM
US Air Force Precision Measurement Equipment Laboratory
Clarence McMillan’s Experience
Radio Communications Manager – AZ Department of Corrections
April 2011 – Present (3 years 5 months)
Managed State communications networks for the State of AZ
Radio Communications Specialist – US Forest Service
Government Agency; 10,001+ employees; Government Administration industry
August 1991 – August 2007 (16 years 1 month)
Managed, serviced, repaired communications networks
Electronics Calibration Specialist – US Army
Government Agency; 10,001+ employees; Military industry
December 1972 – May 1985 (12 years 6 months)
Calibrated electronics equipment and worked as an electronic
technician on a fast burst nuclear reactor
Followup…
Here is another picture showing Clarence McMillan’s All-white truck
from the other side. The same person in the BLACK ball cap seen in the
other photo is captured in profile and full-body closeup in this photo.
He has sort of a ‘beer belly’ and is just wearing a black T-shirt and jeans
and holding a water bottle in his left hand.
It was taken 12 minutes after the previous photo of McMillan’s truck.
This photo was taken by the same person who took the other one
of McMillan’s truck with a ‘Motorola Droid 4’ so time of 15:00.50 ( 3:00.50 PM )
on this photo can also be considered accurate.
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/20inrene9tcx74a/AACltJPUFfvmZqibRwGSJwWLa/ADOSH%20Yarnell%20Hill%20Investigation/Photos%20and%20Video/ASFD%20Photos/Miscellaneous%20Photos#lh:null-IMG_20130630_150050_919.jpg
Thanks! I’ve been wondering what that truck was and who that was for some time now.
That job was, because he wasn’t there, taken on by William Brewer (Engine Boss Engine 151), along with a number of other things.
I just keep seeing, in 20/20 armchair hindsight, so many indicators that a Type 2 full Incident Command Team (which was available) should have been ordered Saturday evening.
Reply to Marti Reed post August 2, 2014 at 9:15 pm
>> Marti said…
>>
>> I just keep seeing, in 20/20 armchair hindsight, so many indicators that
>> a Type 2 full Incident Command Team (which was available) should
>> have been ordered Saturday evening.
I forget… has anyone ever actually figured out WHY a ‘regular’ Type 2 was NOT ordered when they knew this fire had ‘escaped’ and was going up-level from Shumate?
Someone decided to call Roy Hall and NOT Bea day.
Do we know who that SOMEONE really was?
That being said… I still think there would have been a ‘trickle in’ effect on Sunday morning just because it was, in fact, Sunday and there would have been short notice for ANY team…
…but there’s also probably no question that the entire management situation would have been ‘much different’ from dawn to dusk that day.
Would Bea Day have been OK with Marsh being a DIVS?
Would they have even been ‘short’ any DIVS so that would have never even had to have happened?
Could that have made all the difference that day? ( Marsh staying with his crew and having to go through ‘normal’ channels to make any big moves that day ).
Was the real reason for the attempt at the ‘short’ team just some bean-counter trying to save some pennies or was there ANOTHER reason why the ‘short’ team seemed preferable to just ordering the ‘totally available’ Type 2 Team?
I don’t think this has all been fully explored/investigated even today.
Yet another photo of McMillan’s truck.
He is now at the back of it talking on a cellphone in his left hand
and held up to his left ear.
Vehicles are being ‘moved’ at this point to around behind the Model Creek School.
Again.. taken by whoever took the other 2 photos above with their
‘Motorla Droid 4’. Timestamp on this one is 15:09:04 ( 3:09.04 PM ).
Nine minutes after the previous photo.
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/20inrene9tcx74a/AACltJPUFfvmZqibRwGSJwWLa/ADOSH%20Yarnell%20Hill%20Investigation/Photos%20and%20Video/ASFD%20Photos/Miscellaneous%20Photos#lh:null-IMG_20130630_150905_166.jpg
SIDENOTE: This photo appears to capture that ‘International’ truck which
might be ‘Engine 151’ as it is LEAVING that grass lot. It is on the extreme
left of the photo and moving towards the ‘paved’ area. It might have been
headed up to Model Creek Road at this point or it may have just been
‘moving’ around to the back of the Model Creek School like all the other
vehicles were at this point.
Yet another photo that shows McMillan standing at the back of his
truck AND also (apparently) shows that ‘International’ truck that might be ‘Engine 151’
leaving the ICP grassy area on the left of the photo.
This photo was taken by someone OTHER than the person with the
‘Motorola Droid 4’ that took the other 3 photos above… but the time on this
photo can also be considered accurate since THIS one was also taken
with a Smartphone. This time… it’s a ‘Motorola Droid RAZR’.
Time on THIS photo is 15:09:22 ( 3:09.22 PM )
That’s just 18 seconds after the previous photo taken with someone’s ‘Motorola Droid 4’.
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/20inrene9tcx74a/AACltJPUFfvmZqibRwGSJwWLa/ADOSH%20Yarnell%20Hill%20Investigation/Photos%20and%20Video/ASFD%20Photos/Miscellaneous%20Photos#lh:null-IMG_20130630_150922_657.jpg
Matter of fact… THIS photo actually captures the other person with the
‘Motorola Droid 4’ who took all the OTHER photos and is closer to McMillan’s truck.
That person would be the one in the Navy-Blue shirt in about the center of the
photo standing right to the LEFT fo the All-white passenger car. He appears to
be still holding his camera and just to HIS left is another person in Khakis and
a Navy-Blue shirt with their hands clasped behind them.
Followup…
It’s pretty much confirmed. That guy in the black T-shirt and ball cap with the beer belly standing by that All-white modified pickup in all of the photos above is, in fact, Clarence McMillan, the COMS guy ordered for Yarnell at 6:11 AM Sunday, June30, 2013.
Clarence McMillan has a PUBLIC Facebook page…
https://www.facebook.com/clarence.mcmillan.56
He also filled out his ‘About’ page on Facebook and confirms he is semi-retired and works as a contractor for Arizona Forestry…
From his ‘About’ page on Facebook…
About Clarence
1970 Graduated Willow Lake High School, Willow Lake, SD
1972- 1985 Joined US Army in 1972 served at FT. Hood, TX and Ft. Carson,
CO Left the Army for 1 year rejoined in January 1977. Then served at Redstone
Arsenal, AL twice, served at Grafenwoehr, Germany 1977 thru 1980. Graduated
from two primary electronics schools one at Redstone Arsenal for Improved
Hawk Missiles in 1977 and one at Lowry AFB, Denver, CO in 1981. Served at
White sands Missile Range, NM November 1981 thru May 1985. Served
11 yrs. 5 months, and 26 days then left the Army.
May 1985 through August 1991 served with the Department of Defense at WSMR.
Transferred to the US Forest Service in August 1991. Served on the Carson NF
in Taos, NM, on the Tongass NF in Petersburg, AK, and on the Apache/ Sitgreaves
NF in Springerville, AZ From 1991 thru 1996 and from 1998 thru 2007. Semi retired
in 2007. Now working for the AZ State Forestry in Eagar, AZ
Marti and WTKTT
Your International truck—Chase truck
A Chase truck is commonalty referred to a Helitack truck with a large enclosed rear box where Helitack gear is stored.
Chase Truck–Helitack crew carrier with all the equipment to manage a Helicopter operation.
The new ones today are very similar looking to the Engines.
I can only say this sounds like that is what it is. I looked but could not find the picture you were referring to.
In the Pictures that WTKTT posted
The Guy standing on the truck Has hose packs on top. May be a chase truck for the Engine.
caring extra hose etc. it looks to be more of a Flat bed conversion.
Pic # 40 is a Chase truck PNF FIRE I am assuming Helitack. But again it could be an Engine with the pump and hose coming off the back. Most Engines have the pump access on the drivers side that is why I think it is a Hilitack chase truck. I saw one last Month from the BLM that looked like this on and it was with Helitack.
I stand corrected after looking at some pictures….
NF & BLM Engines have rear pump and valve access on the newer Equipment.
Mr. Powers…
I found yet another picture of this ‘International’ truck with the 5 person Cab that *might* be ‘Engine 151’.
This is the first one I’ve found that even shows any of the DRIVER’S side of the truck.
There does, in fact, APPEAR to be a ‘water tank’ installed there on the DRIVER’S side of the vehicle which is not visible in the other photos.
It’s a large ‘cylindrical’ object that appears installed at the top of the bed and just behind the rear window. It is ‘sticking out’ a bit from the DRIVER’S side of the vehicle.
I can’t imagine that would be the ‘spare tire’ sticking out like that so only other thing such a ‘cylinder’ might seem to be would be a ‘water tank’.
So this ‘International’ truck may have had ‘water pumping’ capability after all.
The photo is in the ADOSH ASFD Misc folder…
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/20inrene9tcx74a/AACltJPUFfvmZqibRwGSJwWLa/ADOSH%20Yarnell%20Hill%20Investigation/Photos%20and%20Video/ASFD%20Photos/Miscellaneous%20Photos#lh:null-IMG_20130630_145825_952.jpg
Forget to mention… in the photo linked to above… that ‘International’ truck that *might* be ‘Engine 151’ is seen in the very lower left corner of the photograph.
The ‘cylindrical’ object I’m referring to is ‘all black’ and is seen sticking out from the side of the truck.
The more I look at it now, however, it appears that it really just might be the ‘spare tire’ mounted at the top of the truck bed. It’s ALL BLACK.
See what you think. Spare tire… or water tank?
Probably a hose reel WTKTT, a hard line off the 300 gallon tank.
Reply to FIRE20+ post on August 2, 2014 at 6:48 pm
>> FIRE20+ wrote…
>>
>> Probably a hose reel WTKTT, a hard line off
>> the 300 gallon tank.
Probably so. Extreme enhancement on the photo of this ‘International’ truck below also shows Mr. Powers seems to be correct about what is stored in that ‘gather cage’ on the left side of the flatbed part of the truck.
They do, in fact, appear to be HOSE packs and not FIELD packs. They all seem to contain the same ‘yellowish’ flat hoses all coiled up.
So this puppy in no way seems to be configured as other ‘Engines’ of this same 5-person ‘International’ type… but it looks more and more like it could, in fact, pump water and drive hoses.
So Marti could be right here. It really could be the ‘Engine 151’ listed in all the documentation.
What’s really weird ( and contributing to all this back and forth about what it really is or isn’t ) is the fact that it is most definitely an Arizona Forestry owned vehicle because of the logos and the ‘STATE FIRE’ imprint on the red stripe…
…but there is absolutely no visible standard ‘Unit ID’ on this truck. Not even a standard front license plate identifying it like the ‘Engines’ parked right next to it have.
Wish we had a photo of the entire BACK of it.
Maybe the ‘Unit ID’ is ONLY displayed somewhere there on the BACK of the thing.
Whoops… forgot to include the link to the photo I was talking about just above.
This is one of the best ‘views’ of the thing and also the one where extreme enhancement shows that those seem to be HOSE packs there in the ‘gather cage’ on the passenger side of the flatbed….
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/20inrene9tcx74a/AACltJPUFfvmZqibRwGSJwWLa/ADOSH%20Yarnell%20Hill%20Investigation/Photos%20and%20Video/ASFD%20Photos/Miscellaneous%20Photos#lh:null-IMG_20130630_140341_339.jpg
Notice also that there is another ‘gather cage’ running on the right side of the flatbed but it is slightly ‘higher’ than than the ‘gather cage’ on the passenger side.
It could be a little ‘higher’ because it’s actually sitting on that ‘water tank’ on that driver’s side of the flatbed…
…but I’m still failing to see any standard PUMP hardware in the flatbed itself.
A strange bird, this truck.
Yes, it’s strange. But I’ve seen a LOT of strange configurations of Type 6 Engines today. They’re very custom-made, and often even “gerry-built.” I’ve seen a bunch that, by the view on the passenger side, you can’t tell that they are even “Engines.”
What I have seen is that the connectors for the hoses and the controls (I don’t even know what the technically correct terms are) seem to be more likely on the drivers side. So on the passenger side, you can see nothing that indicates this type 6 is even an “Engine”. It can just look like a really big “chase truck.”
They only carry 300 gallons. You can put that in a flat-bed and cover and surround it with “stuff”.
Some have “winches” for the hoses, some just wrap them somewhere.
I found a photo of Darrell Willis’ first truck when he became the Wildland Superintendent of Prescott FD’s new Granite Mountain Hotshot crew. It carried “a portable pump and several thousand feet of hose” You can’t see any of this in the photo.
Totally agree.
If you look at the ‘framing’ alone for this truck.. it just looks like a regular FLATBED truck with a bunch of crap just bolted onto that standard flatbed platform. Custom built.
I don’t think it is worth pursuing any actual PROOF whether this was an ‘Engine’ or a ‘Brush Truck’ or whatever. It obviously had hoses onboard ( in those packs on the visible passenger side ) so its ability to actually ‘pump water’ somehow would seem to be a given.
The REAL question is still whether that is, in fact, this ‘Engine 151’. We can’t even be all that positive even though it is now showing up there by the Boulder Springs Ranch at sundown the day before.
I wish it had a UNIT ID on it like ( according to vehicle marking regulations ) it is SUPPOSED to have.
It’s not just supposed to say ‘STATE FIRE’ there on the front fender. It’s SUPPOSED to be accompanied with the ‘Unit ID Designator’.
I still think it is also important to know ( whether it really is the infamous Engine 151 or not ) WHO was IN this thing… and WHO was obviously wearing that ‘Go-Pro’ Helmet Cam that day.
I agree with hose reel. To save money some locations have jerry rigged fire trucks out of flat beds with a 300 gal. plus tank. and attached all kinds of things to them. considerable change in cost if it functions as a Engine and passes inspection. Those are hose packs you noted on top.
**
** PHOTO OF TODD ABEL’S TRUCK AT RANCH HOUSE RESTAURANT – 1844 ( 6:44 PM )
Hadn’t noticed this before.
It’s in the SAIT Dropbox… Swartz ‘Town of Yarnell’ Folder.
Todd Abel’s Silver 4-door pickup with the square ‘magnetic’ FIRE sign attached to it parked at the Ranch House Restaurant at 1844 ( 6:44 PM ).
He appears to be sitting in it.
Also a better view of that ‘Polaris Ranger’ that was in the RR parking lot at that time and a profile view of that Blue Ridge Hotshot who was just ‘glaring’ at ‘Swartz’ as he took that other picture of him. That CANNOT be the Blue Ridge Polaris Ranger. At this very moment it was sitting up on the ridge out west and Frisby and Brown were on foot at the deployment site.
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/02ue6bnjp6nazkm/AACU1unBtkzIdUt_pw2z0_Iaa/Photos%20and%20Video/AerialFirefightingstudy/Swartz/Pictures/Nikon/North%20of%20Fire/Town%20of%20Yarnell#lh:null-20130630_1844_AZ-A1S-000688__YARNELL_FB_5_G_RS.JPG
At exactly 1844 ( 6:44 PM )… the Blue Ridge GPS tracking data shows Captain Trueheart Brown still ‘walking’ the deployment site with slight movements and ‘checking bodies’. He had been doing that for 14 minutes already since his arrival at the deployment site at 1828 and would continue to do that for another 14 minutes until 1858 ( 6:58 PM ) when all FIVE of the firefighters at the deployment site would then walk east to the Boulder Springs Ranch to actually MEET with Todd Abel and 2 others and then take them out to the deployment site to ‘confirm 19 fatalities’.
At some point while Brown was ‘walking the deployment site’ and checking the bodies is when Abel got the address of the Boulder Springs Ranch so he and the two others could get out there to be taken to the deployment site.
This photo might represent the moment when that was taking place.
I’ve posted that photograph of Abel’s truck several times. So I’m glad you finally found it!
I do have, however, a hard time seeing anybody sitting in it.
Copy that. These photos from Swartz’s ‘Town of Yarnell’ folder ( This one and the previous one showing that Blue Ridge Hotshot ‘glaring’ at the camera ) have been discussed before… but I think that was before we identified Todd Abel’s vehicle so this was the first time I’ve noticed that it is, in fact, in this photograph.
Do you see Todd Abel anywhere else in the photo?
I am also still with you on your statement that in the previous photo, the Blue Ridge Hotshot ‘glaring’ at the camera is very ‘Frisby like’…
…but it can’t be him. At this moment… Frisby is out walking the deployment site and ‘checking the bodies’ along with Brown, Clawson, Hulburd and Yowell.( and DPS Medic Eric Tarr ).
I have scanned that YouTube video taken 12 days later of all the Blue Ridge Hotshots posing for group photos at the ‘Prescott Mud Bog Rally’ and I’m not seeing this BR FF in that ‘group shot’… but it’s hard to tell. Most of them have suglasses on 12 days later at the ‘Prescott Mud Bog Rally’.
It would still fit the ‘context’ that it is Ball… especially since that other Polaris Ranger is sitting right there in the photos which pretty much has to be the one he is known to have ‘borrowed’ from the Yarnell Fire Department.
I have something even more INTERESTING that I will post tomorrow. I just stumbled across it last night.
I don’t see Todd in these photos. I’m still muddled as to who is in these photos. It would really help if people who know people would weigh in on this………………………………..
Given the time this photo was taken and the fact that Frisby, Brown, Hulburd, Clawson and Yowell were, at the same moment, out there walking the deployment site and ‘counting the bodies’… it is possible that Todd Abel had gotten into someone ELSE’s vehicle for that trip out to Boulder Springs Ranch.
The FIVE FFs at the deployment site were about to start walking EAST to the Boulder Springs Ranch where they would then meet up with Abel and the other two ( or three? ) ‘Incident within an Incident’ commanders and take them all out to the deployment site where Todd Abel himself was going to do a final ‘body count’ of his own.
So maybe Abel was already ‘gone’ from the RHR parking lot when this photo was taken and he just left his truck there with his keys in it in case it had to be moved.
Photos of State Fire Engine 151 and its chase truck
OK This is what I’m looking at. Mind you, I’m not looking at them on Dropbox. I’ve downloaded them so I can keyword them and move them around to make them useful. But I think I have the dropbox locations relatively accurate. I’m posting my entire working collection, since I needed to type it all up anyway.
Photos of ASFD Engine 151 and chase truck at ICP and beyond:
IMG_20130630_135432_052.jpg 1:54 PM. ASFD Photos (these are not from the ADOSH collection, but from the pre-ADOSH collection. Also shows the racked ASF truck that I think is Brewer’s Chase Truck. This is while the crew is sleeping, so the crew in the photo is a DOC crew. Probably Lewis, I think, as they were working with Brewer in the morning and were assigned to work around the ICP.
IMG_20130630_140341_339.jpg 2:03:41PM. ASFDPhotos
IMG_20130630_140347_902.jpg 2:03:47P ASFD Photos
IMG_20130630_150050_919.jpg 3:00:50 PM MiscASFD Dropbox Folder Actually shows two ASFD Engines. So there was another one there that isn’t in the Resource Order.
BluesCrew Video VID-20130630_151521_240 shows the Engine and the chase truck at +18 seconds, ie 3:15 PM.
26.JPG 3:22 PM MiscASFDDropbox Justin’s Pano. The Engine has left but the chase truck is still there, loading up.
Picture 009.jpg 3:44 PM Lars Garcia photo. From folder within ADOSH ASFD folder)
28.JPG 3:47 PM Lars Garcia photo. From folder within ADOSH ASFD folder)
Air2Air 1628 +06:23 3:54 Chase Truck heading east.
Air2Air 1628 +35:39 4:23 Chase Truck heading west.
Reply to Marti Reed post on August 1, 2014 at 3:29 pm
Thanks for this ‘list’, Marti!
Some comments…
>> Marti wrote…
>>
>> Photos of ASFD Engine 151 and chase truck at ICP and beyond:
>>
>> IMG_20130630_135432_052.jpg 1:54 PM. ASFD Photos (these are not from the
>> ADOSH collection, but from the pre-ADOSH collection. Also shows the racked
>> ASF truck that I think is Brewer’s Chase Truck. This is while the crew is sleeping,
>> so the crew in the photo is a DOC crew. Probably Lewis, I think, as they were
>> working with Brewer in the morning and were assigned to work around the ICP.
Ah… ok… THAT truck.
I wasn’t ‘seeing it’ in those ICP photos at first because I don’t think it actually qualifies as an ‘Engine’ and I was ‘looking right past it’ when looking for actual ‘Engines’.
Technically… it seems to just be a ‘chase truck’ or a ‘crew truck’. or ‘supply truck’.
It is NOT a Water Tender nor is it an ‘Engine’ in the sense that it does not APPEAR to have any ‘pumping’ capability. I don’t see any hoses or pump hardware or anything else that you would expect to see for it to qualify as an actual ‘Engine’.
The only thing seen in the back is a bunch of standard Field Packs lined up in the ‘gather cages’ on the sides and some Ice Chests and other ‘supplies’.
We can’t see the OTHER side of it so there might, in fact, be some kind of ‘pumping panel’ and some hoses and whatnot only visible form the other side… but I doubt it. It just doesn’t look like it was even meant to be doing that sort of thing.
Not even technically a ‘Crew Carrier’ since it can only carry 5 people.
It’s a strange bird.
Also…
Wouldn’t the ‘chase’ truck for that ‘International’ truck more likely be the other white-with-red-stripe pickup with the Arizona Forestry logos that is actually parked right NEXT to it ( on the western side of the International truck )?
I thing the AZFS white pickup with the ‘rack’ belonged with the ASFS Crew Carriers and the Lewis DOC crew.
>> Marti also wrote…
>>
>> IMG_20130630_140341_339.jpg 2:03:41PM. ASFDPhotos
>> IMG_20130630_140347_902.jpg 2:03:47P ASFD Photos
>> IMG_20130630_150050_919.jpg 3:00:50 PM MiscASFD Dropbox Folder
>> Actually shows two ASFD Engines. So there was another one there
>> that isn’t in the Resource Order.
>> BluesCrew Video VID-20130630_151521_240 shows the Engine and
>> the chase truck at +18 seconds, ie 3:15 PM.
>> 26.JPG 3:22 PM MiscASFDDropbox Justin’s Pano. The Engine has left
>> but the chase truck is still there, loading up.
See above. I think the ‘chase truck’ that belonged to the ‘International’ truck HAS left with it ( the one that was parked right next to it ). The one that is left there in this panorama still ‘loading up’ is the one that was parked farther north and right next to the AZ State Crew Carriers ( with Lewis DOC crew that day ).
>> Picture 009.jpg 3:44 PM Lars Garcia photo. From folder within ADOSH ASFD folder)
Copy that. This is the one showing the driver wearing that ‘Go-Pro’ video camera on his helmet WHILE he is driving this ‘International’ truck up there on Model Creek Road.
>> 28.JPG 3:47 PM Lars Garcia photo. From folder within ADOSH ASFD folder)
Not sure why you included this one?
Just a picture of some burned hillside?
No vehicles in the photo?
It also seems to have been taken at 9:46 AM on July 1, 2013.
EXIF Date/Time Original: 2013:07:01 09:46:03
Am I just looking at the wrong ’28.JPG’? I’m talking about the 28.JPG that
is in the same ‘Larz Garcia’ folder as the 009.JPG photo.
>> Air2Air 1628 +06:23 3:54 Chase Truck heading east.
I see it… but what is also interesting is that about 14 seconds before that ( +6:09 ) the OTHER almost IDENTICAL 4-door white with red AZF pickup with silver chrome toolbox precedes it going east.
The ONLY real cosmetic difference between these two is that the one at +6:09 doesn’t have that ‘black metal rack’ installed wherea the one that heads east at +06:23 does.
Again… see above.
The one with the ‘black metal rack’ was parked there next to the AZ State Crew Carriers in the other ICP photos… but there is another white-with-red-stripe AZFS pickup actually parked right next to the ‘International’ truck.
So maybe the one that passes going east at +6:09 is the ‘chase’ for the ‘International’ and the one that passes at +6:23 ( with the black metal rack’ ) is the ‘chase’ for the AZ State Crew Carriers?
>> Air2Air 1628 +35:39 4:23 Chase Truck heading west.
Yep. Same pickup with the ‘black metal rack’. definitely ‘coming back west’… but I still think this one belonged more to the AZ State Crew Carriers than the ‘International’ truck.
** ANOTHER PHOTO OF THIS ‘INTERNATIONAL’ TRUCK ( ENGINE? )
Now that I’m clear which ‘truck’ you are talking about… there is actually another obscure photo of this truck taken the day BEFORE ( Saturday at dusk ) and near the Boulder Springs Ranch.
ADOSH Dropbox folder location for this photo…
ADOSH Yarnell Hill Investigation / Photos and Videos / ASFD Photos / Miscellaneous Photos and Video
Image 15.JPG
Direct link to the photo…
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/20inrene9tcx74a/AACltJPUFfvmZqibRwGSJwWLa/ADOSH%20Yarnell%20Hill%20Investigation/Photos%20and%20Video/ASFD%20Photos/Miscellaneous%20Photos#lh:null-15.JPG
It is sundown on Saturday evening, June 29, 2013.
Photo was taken with a Network Connected iPhone 4S at 7:12 PM.
EXIF Date/Time Original: 2013:06:29 19:12:30
There is GPS data embedded in the photo.
EXIF GPS Position: 34 deg 13′ 16.20″ N, 112 deg 46′ 7.80″ W
Decimal GPS equivalent: 34.221167, -112.768833
Interestingly… that photo is being taken right there near the Boulder Springs Ranch.
That point is on that ‘service road’ that branches off the main driveway of the Boulder Springs Ranch and the photo is being taken looking northwest just 740 feet due northeast of the main entrance gate to the Boulder Springs Ranch.
A Firefighter is on top of the truck using binoculars and looking out at the fire up on the ridge. I don’t think he’s taking a picture because you can see the thick strap for the binoculars hanging down and whatever he is holding is right up against his eyes and not ‘held away from the face’ like you would with a modern digitial camera or smartphone.
Good closeup of all the ‘field packs’ sitting in the ‘gather cage’ on the back right of the truck. I count at least SIX field packs just on that side of the truck alone. That ‘International’ truck only seats FIVE so it must be ‘supplying’ other people as well.
This is still the same ‘passenger side’ of the truck that is all we can see in the other ICP photos so it’s no real confirmation whether this truck had any actual ‘pumping’ capability or not or whether it was just a ‘supply truck’.
Followup…
Here is an online site that shows a LOT of pictures of what these kind of ‘International’ trucks look like when they actually ARE configured as an ‘Engine’ and have all the pump panels and hardware needed…
http://fire.kovatch.com/info/photo-gallery/wildland/interface
So this ‘International’ truck we are talking about MAY qualify as an actual ‘Engine’… but I’m not seeing any good photo that shows the driver’s side of it well enough to confirm that.
I searched all over for ‘Arizona Forestry Engines’ and there are thousands of photos… but I’m not seeing this puppy showing up anywhere.
LOL So much to go back over! So glad I did this before spending hours trying to write up the whole thing and getting THAT wrong! Actually this is exactly why I decided to go ahead and do this.
FEEDBACK!
I’m just waking up so I’ll start with one that doesn’t require a lot of thinking.The two Lars Garcia’s photos. Lars Garcia’s Picture 009.jpg is from ADOSH Yarnell Hill Investigation > Photo and Video > ASFD Photos > Larz Garcia. It is dated 6/30/13 3:44 PM. It shows the driver of the engine and Mark Sachara’s truck right in front of it. It’s taken just before the other Lars Garcia photo with the other trucks in front of it.
And now I’m seeing that this folder doesn’t include the second Lars Garcia photo. The second Lars Garcia photo 28.jpg (6/30/13 3:47:43 PM) is in the Misc folder! These folders are such a mess! To top it off the file names have been changed, because no original photo file numbers would look like those. Which is another clue to the probability that they weren’t taken by Lars Garcia.
So that clears that up.
Re the Engine. TBH I started putting this Lightroom collection of disparate photos together starting with the ones that didn’t show the rest of the engine/s truck/s. Just the fronts. Which are huge.
Then I added the other ones, thinking, hmmmm, this doesn’t really look like an engine. But I’ve seen a lot of really different-looking engines on this fire. And it’s a type 6, which is what “Brush trucks” are. And they vary wildly.
So, it’s on to waking up some more and going back over Brewer’s interview to see what I can find.
Reply to Marti Reed post on August 2, 2014 at 9:20 am
>> Marti said…
>>
>> And now I’m seeing that this folder doesn’t include the second
>> Lars Garcia photo.
>>
>> The second Lars Garcia photo 28.jpg (6/30/13 3:47:43 PM) is in
>> the Misc folder! These folders are such a mess! To top it off the
>> file names have been changed, because no original photo file
>> numbers would look like those. Which is another clue to the
>> probability that they weren’t taken by Lars Garcia.
>>
>> So that clears that up.
Thanks, Marti. There is a ‘Picture 28.jpg’ in the Larz Garcia folder but I wasn’t catching that difference between full name of ‘Picture 28.jpg’ and just simply ’28.jpg”.
I agree that it is looking more and more like Larz Garcia wasn’t even at this fire and that these pictures ended up in the evidence record under a folder with HIS name on it simply because someone gave HIM the photos and then he, in turn, supplied SOME ( but not ALL? ) of what people had given HIM to the SAIT / ADOSH investigators.
The ‘edits’ to the ‘filenames’ are also interesting. I would, in fact, suggest that Larz Garcia was ‘playing with’ and/or ‘renaming’ this evidence before he passed it on to investigators.
What’s also interesting with these 2 photos is that ‘Picture 009.jpg’ ( in the Larz Garcia folder ) was taken at 3:47 PM and then ’28.jpg’ ( in the Misc folder ) was taken just 90 seconds later at 3:47 PM… but that RED HELMET has DISAPPEARED from on top of the glove box and it also appears that whoever was sitting in the passenger side of the ‘International’ has already exited the vehicle.
At least I believe he has. I think if he had NOT ( and had just put that RED HELMET from the dashboard back on at this point ) we would be seeing just a bit of his shoulder in the photo just like we are still seeing a bit of the driver’s shoulder. The passenger seat simply appears ’empty’ in 28.JPG.
>> Marti also said…
>>
>> Re the Engine. TBH I started putting this Lightroom collection
>> of disparate photos together starting with the ones that didn’t
>> show the rest of the engine/s truck/s. Just the fronts. Which
>> are huge.
>>
>> Then I added the other ones, thinking, hmmmm, this doesn’t really
>> look like an engine. But I’ve seen a lot of really different-looking
>> engines on this fire. And it’s a type 6, which is what “Brush trucks”
>> are. And they vary wildly.
Yes, they do. It’s really just a ‘semantic’ point as to whether or not that ‘International’ actually had ‘pump panels’ and could actually pump water. If that does turn out to be ‘Engine 151’ then obviously everyone considered it to be an ‘Engine’ and that’s about all that matters, really.
I wasn’t trying to through a ‘wrench in the works’ over a simple ‘semantic’. I think my only point above was that I ( me, personally ) wasn’t immediately identifying this puppy as an ‘engine’ in the ICP photos because there’s just no visible proof that it can actually pump water.
I am also still thinking there were some ‘trucks’ around that we don’t even know about yet with resources that might have been being used in various places but never showed up in anyone’s Unit Logs.
Case in Point: The ‘support’ crew of 11 ( ELEVEN! ) that supposedly came with Helicopter ‘Five Kilo Alpha’ What did they ‘come in’? What kind of truck? WHERE were these guys being used to assist that day… if at all? Chopper
5KA couldn’t even hold 11 people… no way… so what TRUCK was the rest of this support crew that all have valid Resource Orders for the Yarnell Hill Fire traveling in that day?
SIDENOTE: Resource order A-9 was for 5KA chopper itself which was just a Type 2 Standard chopper. That resource order is followed by all the other resource orders for the support crew of 11… but there is NO Resource Order that might indicate how they got to Yarnell or what VEHICLE they were in.
From Chapter VII ( 7 )…
————————————————————————–
On June 1, 2014 at 7:02 pm, WTKTT said…
Just for clarity’s sake… HERE are the ELEVEN other people that
were ordered up along with Helicopter ‘Five Kilo Alpha’…
The resource order for Chopper ‘Five Kilo Alpha’ itself
placed at 1824 on Saturday night…
A-9 06/29/13 1824
Helicopter, Type 2 Standard
T2S – 215KA M
06/30/13 0845 MST, 06/30/13 1245 MST
Special Needs: Type 2 with long line capabilities and crew shuttle transport Reporting Instructions
And here are the ELEVEN ‘additional resources’ ALSO ordered up along with helicopter ‘Five Kilo Alpha’. These ‘additional resources’ seem to have been ‘ordered up’ at 8:16 AM on Sunday morning… but they ALL have a required ‘start time’ of just 30 minutes later with an ‘estimated arrival’ time of 12:45 PM Sunday…
A-9.13 06/30/13 0816 MST
HELICOPTER MANAGER, SINGLE RESOURCE (HMGB)
Pederson, Todd (ID-PAC)
06/30/13 0845 MST, 06/30/13 1245 MST
A-9.14 06/30/13 0816 MST
HELICOPTER CREWMEMBER (HECM)
Moy, Marshell (ID-PAC)
06/30/13 0845 MST, 06/30/13 1245 MST
A-9.15 06/30/13 0816 MST
HELICOPTER CREWMEMBER (HECM)
Glaisyer, Preston Dollard (ID-PAC)
06/30/13 0845 MST, 06/30/13 1245 MST
A-9.16 06/30/13 0816 MST
HELICOPTER CREWMEMBER (HECM)
Barrett, Paul J (ID-PAC)
06/30/13 0845 MST, 06/30/13 1245 MST
A-9.17 06/30/13 0816 MST
HELICOPTER CREWMEMBER (HECM)
Lofswold, Ryan (ID-PAC)
06/30/13 0845 MST, 06/30/13 1245 MST
A-9.18 06/30/13 0816 MST
HELICOPTER CREWMEMBER (HECM)
Campbell, Martin (ID-PAC)
06/30/13 0845 MST, 06/30/13 1245 MST
A-9.19 06/30/13 0816 MST
HELICOPTER CREWMEMBER (HECM)
Chamberlain, Travis Ray (IDPAC)
06/30/13 0845 MST, 06/30/13 1245 MST
A-9.20 06/30/13 0816 MST
HELICOPTER CREWMEMBER (HECM)
Meserth, Morgan Alois (ID-PAC)
06/30/13 0845 MST, 06/30/13 1245 MST
A-9.21 06/30/13
HELICOPTER CREWMEMBER (HECM)
Biggerstaff, Jason Allen (IDPAC)
06/30/13 0845 MST, 06/30/13 1245 MST
A-9.22 06/30/13 0816 MST
HELICOPTER CREWMEMBER (HECM)
Becker, Brandon (ID-PAC)
06/30/13 0845 MST, 06/30/13 1245 MST
A-9.23 06/30/13 0816 MST
HELICOPTER MANAGER, SINGLE RESOURCE (HMGB),
Smith, Greg (IDPAC)
06/30/13 0845 MST, 06/30/13 1245 MST
————————————————————————
ANOTHER SIDENOTE: We KNOW that Todd Pederson was there. He was approached by the media near the Helibase the next day ( July 1 ) and that’s when Pederson started telling them he heard all the deployment traffic on the radio and the media rep from Arizona Forestry who was accompanying the press people told Pedersen to basically ‘shut up about that’. Arizona Forestry may have already known about Prescott off-the-radar hire Aaron Hulburd’s Helmet-Cam and what it captured…. but they didn’t want the PRESS to know that people did hear that deployment traffic and/or that it had been captured in Hulburd’s video. Not the day after the tragedy, anyway.
My only point here is that even just the ‘support’ for these 11 guys that came with Chopper 5KA might mean there are ‘other trucks’ floating around that day if/when these guys were assigned to ‘help out’ in either the Model Creek Road and/or the Sickles Road area.
** ‘INTERNATIONAL’ TRUCK WAS DEFINITELY AZFS OWNED…
By the way… if there was ANY lingering doubt that this ‘International’ truck ( whatever Unit ID it turns out to be ) was ‘owned and operated’ by the Arizona Forestry Department… here is another photo of it in the ADOSH ASFD Misc folder showing a close-up of the DOOR and the obvious AZSF logo right there on the door underneath where it says ‘International’…..
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/20inrene9tcx74a/AACltJPUFfvmZqibRwGSJwWLa/ADOSH%20Yarnell%20Hill%20Investigation/Photos%20and%20Video/ASFD%20Photos/Miscellaneous%20Photos#lh:null-23.JPG
Typo above. I hope it was obvious but in case it wasn’t…
I type ‘3:47 PM’ as the time for BOTH the 009.JPG photo and the
28.JPG photo. Incorrect. 009.JPG was taken at 3:44 and 28.JPG was taken 90 seconds later at 3:47 PM.
Paragraph above SHOULD have read like this…
What’s also interesting with these 2 photos is that ‘Picture 009.jpg’ ( in the Larz Garcia folder ) was taken at 3:44 PM and then ’28.jpg’ ( in the Misc folder ) was taken just 90 seconds later at 3:47 PM… but that RED HELMET has DISAPPEARED from on top of the glove box and it also appears that whoever was sitting in the passenger side of the ‘International’ has already exited the vehicle.
Geez… not enough coffee. Typos in the typos.
Obviously 90 second timespan is wrong.
Actual photo times are…
‘Picture 009.jpg” – 3:44.22 PM
’28.jpg’ – 3:47.43
3 mins and 21 secs ( 201 seconds ) between photos.
In photo 28.JPG it looks like the International Truck has come to a stop so the passenger might just now grabbed his RED HELMET off the dashboard and exited the vehicle to find someone to talk to.
If he had only now exited the vehicle then he could be right outside the door but not visible in the photo.
Followup…
Found yet another picture of this ‘International’ Truck parked there near the ICP that is the closest one I’ve seen that shows us anything that is on the DRIVER side of the truck.
There does, in fact, APPEAR to be a ‘water tank’ installed there on the DRIVER side of the vehicle which is not visible in the other photos.
It’s a large ‘cylindrical’ object that appears installed at the top of the bed and just behind the rear window. It is ‘sticking out’ a bit from the DRIVER side of the vehicle.
So this ‘International’ truck may have had ‘water pumping’ capability after all.
The photo is in the ADOSH ASFD Misc folder…
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/20inrene9tcx74a/AACltJPUFfvmZqibRwGSJwWLa/ADOSH%20Yarnell%20Hill%20Investigation/Photos%20and%20Video/ASFD%20Photos/Miscellaneous%20Photos#lh:null-IMG_20130630_145825_952.jpg
So, unfortunately/fortunately, I have finally figured out that the Red Wickenburg truck was not driven by Paul Musser. (Which syncs with the communique from a contact, via a communique from that one’s contact, that Musser wasn’t driving that truck).
It took a LOT of time to re-work all of this.
And that means that the “tall, thin fire-fighter” associated with it is not Paul Musser.
After studying the northeast side of the fire, and mapping all kinds of points/times on it, it finally became clear to me (about this morning), that that red Wickenburg truck wasn’t where Paul Musser was, after all.
So after deciding that, and going back thru the vehicles in the Air2Air videos, I decided Musser’s locations could include that State Fire truck in the middle of all the action in the Ranch House Restaurant parking lot.
Regarding Paul Musser: A New Timeline
Constructed from Musser’s and Todd Abel’s and Willis’ Interviews:
At ICP sometime around Todd’s flight (3:17 to 3:27 via Tom Story’s photo 201303_Yarnell_Hill_0075.jpg and Swartz photos DSCN0062.JPG and DSCN0063.JPG).
3:15-ish Meets Willis crew at intersection of Double A Bar Ranch Road and Model Creek Road to discuss and start firing out south of MCRoad to the west.
3:30 to 3:43-ish. To Sickles Road for Structure Protection. Back to ICP to get more resources. Back to Sickles, was there during suppression drops on Sickles area.
(3:24 Retardant drops on Sickles Road area begin via Air2Air 1544 at 3:24. 3 Tanker drops plus numerous 5KA drops. Last of three is T413, about 3:34 (I didn’t write it down), via Air2Air 1628. Then aerial keeps dropping in order to tie the retardant to Hays Road via the VLAT 911 split drop.)
3:48 Passes A2A videocam heading east (via A2A 1628). Driving the State Forest truck we later see at the RHR Parking Lot with emt panels in it. (They’re not visible in videocam catch.)
Drives 1.25(est) miles at 30(est) mph to reach a vantage point on 89. It’s a vantage point Moore and Kimball have used for photos.
3:50. Stops at vantage point. Calls Eric about “availability.” Stays in truck.
3:52 Gary Cordes pulls up. Walks over to Musser’s truck for face to face. They discuss trigger points.
3:55 Cordes tells his crew their first trigger point for evacuation has been crossed. They continue to talk briefly. Musser decides to head down to Yarnell.
(There’s quite a bit of time between this convo and driving up Shrine Road. Maybe he just watched for awhile).
Drives up Shrine Road about 4:30, after Blue Ridge has gotten out/turned onto 89 towards the RHR.
According to his interview, he leads the last engine out of the Youth Camp (or Shrine area? it’s not clear). He doesn’t say when.
Parks on 89 and then Dan Sullivan (Air Ops) pulls up and says GM deployed. (Sometime after 4:37).
Gets to RHR in time for the truck to be there during RReason video at approx 4:50.
Oops. Forgot to say, I got the approximate landing time of Abel’s helicopter reconnaissance trip from Tom Story’s photo 201303_Yarnell_Hill_0106.jpg, which shows it sitting on the ground in the background as 5KA handles a bucket.
Amazing work, Marti.
I’ve always found it hard to believe that despite the ‘wonky’ times being reported in the ADOSH interviews that the YCSO DPS officers manning that DPS Ranger 58 chopper could have been more than an HOUR off on some of their times… especially when the same logs are ‘spot-on’ later in the day with regards to the deployment and search/rescue events.
There is even another Tom Story photo that seems to ‘back up’ the times they are reporting in their logs.
Right AFTER that second recon flight… DPS Medic Eric Tarr’s log says the next thing they did was a ‘short’ hop over from LZ 2 to the safer LZ 3… and that they landed right next to the BLM yellow and white chopper N14HX. Tom Story caught this exact moment of them LANDING next to N14HX in that ‘other’ photo.
In the ‘M – Law Enforcement – no redactions’ PDF file… this has always been Eric Tarr’s official ‘times’ for that SECOND recon flight…
“At approximately 1345 hours ( 1:45 PM ), Operations from the Incident Management arrived at LZ 2 and requested that we take him on a recon flight over the fire perimeter. Heli-base contacted Air Attack and asked for permission to launch and we were asked to delay for about 10 minutes while air tankers dropped. Air Attack gave us permission to launch at approximately 1400 hours ( 2:00 PM ) and we completed the recon mission as requested. This flight was completed without incident and ended with us landing back at LZ 2 at approximately 1430 hours ( 2:30 PM ). The fire was progressing north towards our Heli-base so we decided to relocate the Heli-base across Hays Ranch Road to LZ 3. Officer Main moved the fuel truck to LZ 3 and Ranger 58 flew over to LX 3 as a crew of 2, we departed at approximately 1518 hours ( 3:18 PM ) and landed at 1520 hours ( 3:20 PM ). While standing by the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) Bell 497 Helicopter, that was staged next to us, they advised us they were departing to their Congress area base because of the thunderstorm approaching from the north.”
NOTE: This BLM Bell 407 is, in fact, the yellow and white N14HX chopper that was used in the morning to ferry the Lewis DOC crew off the same exact spot where Granite Mountain was working the rest of the day. It did NOT ‘depart’ Yarnell in the 3:20 PM timeframe. There is other photographic evidence that proves it was still there at LZ 3 as late as 4:20 PM and could have been used to fly GM anywhere they might have been needed that afternoon if someone really did NEED them all that badly. The same helispot used that morning up on the ridge to get the entire Lewis DOC crew out of that same spot was still in the ‘cold black’ the rest of the day.
With regards to the FIRST recon flight… while I still think Abel and Musser attended ALL of the 9:00 AM briefing at the ICP… I no longer think they bothered to wait until 10:21 AM when the ‘official’ transition to Roy Hall’s team was announced before taking that recon flight.
In the ‘M – Law Enforcement – no redactions’ PDF file… this has always been Eric Tarr’s official ‘times’ for that FIRST recon flight…
“At approximately 0945 hours, the 2 Firefighters arrived at LZ 1 and were cold loaded aboard the aircraft. Ranger 58 departed for this recon flight at approximately 0950 hours.”
It was about 5 minutes from the ICP to where Ranger 58 was ‘staged’ over at the circular crop fields… so that means the 9:00 AM briefing at the ICP must have been over by 9:40 AM.
Perfectly possible for Abel and Musser to have then done BOTH of the following regardless of the fact that the ‘command transfer’ didn’t happen until 10:21…
1) Attend all ( or at least ) 40 minutes of the 9:00 AM briefing at the ICP
2) Make it over to the helipad by 9:45 for the first recon flight.
What Tom Story photo are you referring to?
My photo timelines don’t sync with what you are saying.
Thx!
The photos I’m using for my timeline of the Abel recon flight are the following:
Tom Story photo 201303_Yarnell_Hill_0075.jpg 3;17:18 PM. Helicopter on the ground. Someone getting in–Todd Abel?
Swartz photo DSCN0062.JPG 3:20:26 PM. Helicopter flying in front of Model Creek Road area with Prescott Fire Department truck towing Structure Protection Trailer.
Swartz photo DSCN0063.JPG 3:20:30 PM. Helicopter flying in front of Peeples Valley Area.
Story photo 201303_Yarnell_Hill_0106.jpg 3:27:28 PM. 5KA in the foreground. DPS and BLM helicopters way in the background on the ground.
Am I missing something?
Is it possible this is not the recon flight but the “move the helicopter” flight? I was thinking it was pretty short for a recon.
So the recon flight was earlier? That would actually help my timeline.
Thx!
But I’m not seeing the photo you are referencing.
Are you talking about Eric Panebaker’s photo 20130630_162226_EP.JPG taken at 3:22:25 (factoring in the one hour ahead that his Canon is)?
Marti said…
“Am I missing something?”
No… but apparently I am ( like a brain ).
The photo showing Ranger 58 landing at LZ3 after that short 2 minute hop over from LZ2 right after the second recon flight is not a Tom Story photo after all.
Turns out it is a Swartz photo.
It is in the Panebaker folder under the Swartz folder and then in his Helicopters folder.
Image DSCN0064
It has a timestamp on the photo itself which says 3:20 PM.
Oooo I don’t have that one. When I first downloaded that stuff, I was careful to get all of Swartz’s photos of Yarnell. But I was just getting a smattering of photos showing the various aerial resources. I’ll have to go back and grab it.
And speaking of photos. The Engine 151 photos at ICP are all over the place. I’ll go get some.
Followup…
I posted the message above from a smartphone and was unable to actually post the link to this 3:20 PM photo showing Ranger 58 actually ‘landing’ at LZ3 after the short hop over from LZ2 immediately following the second recon.
So here is the direct link to the photo I was talking about…
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/02ue6bnjp6nazkm/AAC314QnJM-yKYFMeGMVuIILa/Photos%20and%20Video/AerialFirefightingstudy/Swartz/Pictures/Nikon/North%20of%20Fire/Helicopters#lh:null-DSCN0064.JPG
NOTE: The Swartz ‘Helicopters’ folder that this one is in actually has a ‘series’ of Ranger 58 photos that I believe show the ‘takeoff’ for the move from LZ2 to LZ3 as well.
The bottom line here is that there is independent photographic evidence that seems to prove that regardless of when Abel and Musser were telling ADOSH they took these ‘recon’ flights… the TIMES being given for these recon flights by DPS Officer Tarr appear to be ‘accurate’ and backed up with photographic evidence and valid timestamps.
And regarding the first flight, that timing supports my posting way back in Chapter vii that Joy’s camera that morning was time-stamping 4 hours early. And it seems to be doing that consistently until noon, when it started doing something different.
The point of my posting that was that, if her camera is 4 hours early, her photo 1 (40).jpg shows Cougan Carothers’ truck on the dozer line at 10:20:19 AM. Which doesn’t jibe with what Rance Marquez said. Point was, what was he doing up there?
And also that the helicopter flew over right after she shot Granite Mountain hiking in.at 9:55 AM. And then she photographed the helicopter. Joy protested that, but it’s pretty well triangulated.
And I started that whole timeline with her photo of the Blue Ridge buggy driving up at 10:39 AM. Because I knew, from Blue Ridges photos, that that’s when they arrived.
So, now that we’re back there, I ask, What was Cougan doing up there? And I echo FIRE10+ response to that:
“Agree…you also realize that Cougan Carothers was NEVER interviewed by the SAIT? They tried and tried and he just was not cooperating. And considering he was working directly with Rance Marquez who was a DIVS and Cougan was a STEN-Trainee??? Not normal ops, shorthanded or not. Cougan should have been tied to a Strike Team of Engines somewhere yet he was with a DIVS freelancing? Huge Red flag for me.”
I think FIRE20+ meant to say he was never interviewed by ADOSH, despite their attempts.
And now that I mentioned them, I found Swartz’s two photos DSCN0062.JPG and DSCN0063.JPG quite interesting.
Because 0062 (taken at 3:20) shows a Prescott Fire Department truck towing a Structure Protection Group Trailer (which had earlier been located close to the showdown at Double A Bar Ranch and then on Miners Camp Road) down in the lower left corner.
And, because I was trying to learn more about this whole operation, I wanted to figure out where that truck was located.
However, these two photos are taken at a bit of a zoom, and compression can make determining what/where is in the background really difficult.
So I had to start with 0063, which was easier, because the background included structures which were easier to locate in Peeple’s Valley. And, since it was taken a grand 4 seconds after the earlier one (and at the same focal length), I knew the earlier one had to be “close.”
But I really had a heck of a time locating it. I was looking to far. The background compression is really confusing. It took me about three days, on again off again.
But finally I located it. I think the truck is sitting, at 3:20, at 34°16’13.63″N 112°45’12.90″W on Model Creek Road, about half-way between where where Lars Garcia took his photo at 3:44 and where Willis’s truck was photographed by Panebaker at 4:43.
And I think the little silver thing below him is a water tender.
The more I study all the stuff going on on the north-east end of this fire, the more I realize HOW MUCH was going on. And it was actually pretty successful.
Typo. Willis’s truck was photographed by Panebaker at 3:43. The confusion regarding his timestamps keeps muddling me. All the photos taken on the NIkon (including this one) are correct. All the photos taken on the Canon Rebel are one hour ahead.
Aerial Suppression Photos Post
And, speaking of things that worked, I found some really interesting aerial photos (that I hadn’t seen before) of where the retardant drops worked. They were posted on the UK Mail Online Site on July First. I have no idea who took them.
After the aerials, there are lots of photos of all the general grief and tuff. The first five are of Glen Ilah. The next five are of the drop lines.
The first one is along Model Creek Road. It’s here: 34°16’50.28″N 112°46’51.90″W.
The next one is in Yarnell. It’s here: 34°13’30.37″N 112°44’45.43″W.
The next one is also Yarnell. It’s generally here: 34°13’30.37″N 112°44’45.43″W.
The next one I haven’t been able to locate.
The next one is, again, along Model Creek Road. It’s here: 34°16’41.49″N 112°46’34.59″W.
The link is here: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2353353/Arizona-wild-fires-pictures-Shocking-aerial-images-utter-devastation.html
Reply to Marti Reed post on July 31, 2014 at 8:42 pm
>> Marti said…
>>
>> After the aerials, there are lots of photos of all the general
>> grief and tuff. The first five are of Glen Ilah. The next five are
>> of the drop lines.
>>
>> The first one is along Model Creek Road.
>> It’s here: 34°16’50.28″N 112°46’51.90″W.
Confirmed.
>> The next one is in Yarnell. It’s here: 34°13’30.37″N 112°44’45.43″W.
Confirmed.
Shows what the locals have called “The Miracle on Shrine Road”.
Also shows how Frisby, Brown, Clawson, Hulburd and Yowell were able to get back to the Youth Camp so soon and so easily after the fire moved through Yarnell. It basically ‘hopped over’ Shrine Road itself… until that spot where Hulburd shot the Helmet Cam in the Shrine of St. Joseph parking lot. From that point west ( including the entire Youth Camp Area ) everything basically fried.
>> The next one is also Yarnell.
>> It’s generally here: 34°13’30.37″N 112°44’45.43″W.
Confirmed… but chopper was actually ‘hovering’ over a point about 3/4 mile north ( 4,153 feet ) of those GPS points ( which are about in the center of the photo ).
The group of buildings on the right side of Highway 89 at the BOTTOM of this photo ( with maroon roofs ) is, in fact, that ‘U-Store-It’ facility that was being used as a staging area that day.
The point in the very upper left corner where Highway 89 exits the top of the photo is pretty much the spot where Rick Tham took his ‘traffic jam’ photo as he approached the Ranch House Restaurant.
At the very upper RIGHT corner of this photo is the place where Jerry Thompson and the other Sun City guys were staged acting as one of THREE ‘lookouts’ for everyone working in the Youth Camp area. It’s the place where Jerry Thompson shot all his photos and videos. ( The Pat Bernard Compound at the very end of West Way ).
>> The next one I haven’t been able to locate.
You already did.
It’s right there in the same general area as photos 1 and 4.
It’s just a ‘different’ angle looking from almost due north to due south.
The center of the roof of that white building in the lower left corner of the photo is exactly here.
34.280436, -112.781372
There is also a small cylindrical structure with a flat roof just north of the building that looks like a ‘red dot’ because the roof of it got covered with retardant.
The center of that ‘red dot’ ( the roof of the cylinder ) is here…
34.280164, -112.781388
The other ‘key’ is what looks like a ‘stair stepped’ ( terraced ) kitchen garden right there by the building. Easily seen from the air and in Google SATELLITE imagery.
>> The next one is, again, along Model Creek Road.
>> It’s here: 34°16’41.49″N 112°46’34.59″W.
Confirmed.
Basically just another ‘angle’ on the same general area as Photo 1 above.
And, as long as I’m doing some easy stuff, I also found, as I was wandering around trying to find stuff related to the north/northeast side of the fire, this video which shows the fire from Peeple’s Valley around noon, and it’s pretty intense. This was taken by a woman who was, soon after, given the notice to evacuate.
The video is here:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VgIi4kT5aLs
She writes on her blog:
” By noon the fire appeared to be getting seriously out of control. We saw several helicopters and small planes dumping water on the fire but didn’t seem to be having any effect. Then finally we saw the DC10 fly over and dump a massive amount of red fire retardant on the fire line. We were hopeful this would hold the fire back, but instead it appeared that the fire spread sideways and was now surrounding our small community. I took the following video at that time, panning left and right to show the span of the fire.
We knew this was not good and I finished packing for our emergency exit that we knew would soon come. I had my three cats already in the large dog crate, our trucks were loaded, and the grandkids who were visiting had all of their bags already loaded in the truck as well.
Once most of our stuff was packed we were watching the fire to the south and east (two ends of a very wide fire line) of us burning out of control. Then all of a sudden we saw the fire to the south of us flair up and quickly burn towards the school where the fire command center was set up. They were trying to fight that fire while mobilizing their vehicles and pulling them and the school buses out of the parking lot. They moved out to the highway & Hays Ranch Road. Then we got the Code-Red call to evacuate!”
Her blog post is here:
http://backyardchickenlady.blogspot.com/2013/07/yarnell-hills-fire-update-evacutation.html
She has another one several days later describing returning to Peeples Valley. It includes some photos of how things looked from there then.
I just figured out who the “tall thin” man driving the Wickenburg Fire truck is. He’s Wickenburg Fire Department Chief Ed Temerowski.
From the Wickenburg Sun’s Facebook Page:
Firefighters Honored as New Fire Erupts (August 26, 2013)
“Firefighters honored as new fire erupts
By Janet DelTufo, Assistant Editor
The Wickenburg Town Council honored Wickenburg firefighters Monday (Aug. 19) who fought the Yarnell Hill fire in July. Those honored were (left to right) Tyler Macias, Bruce Hansen, Scott Drescher, Chief Ed Temerowski and Richard Savage. ”
I find it interesting Mark Sachara isn’t mentioned.
https://www.facebook.com/TheWickenburgSun/photos/a.163090700523403.1073741828.163086150523858/210657302433409/?type=1
Oh DOH. Sachara is with Ponderosa, not Wickenburg. I still had those two Reds connected in my brain.
So, it looks like a Wickenburg Type 6 Engine was dispatched on July 1. That must be what/who is referenced here.
I guess the Chief was just re-conning on Sunday and wound up in the parking lot. His truck was there in the 6:43 Swartz photos. He’s a pretty major player in Central AZ fire-fighting and in Wickenburg. Who knows, that all being the case, I wouldn’t be surprised if he “stayed the night” all things considered.
I wonder if he knows anything about that ‘meeting’ that seemed to be taking place on the hood of his truck in the Ranch House Restaurant parking lot.
The one where it ‘appears’ a bunch of FFs ( McDonough included? ) are all huddled over a MAP.
If that really is what was happening there… it would be interesting to know what was being SAID during that ‘meeting’.
Just one more person who was never interviewed… but SHOULD have been.
Reply to calvin post on July 28, 2014 at 6:45 pm
>> calvin said…
>>
>> Marti or WTK, In the picture 009.jpg from the Lars Garcia folder, two things
>>
>> 1. who is driving the truck?
That has yet to be determined, I believe.
Obviously ‘Larz Garcia’ was the one sitting behind the passenger seat in that Engine and taking that photo… but unfortunately… there is absolutely no ‘Resource Order’ in the publicly released ‘J – Resource Orders’ document for the Yarnell Fire that lists anyone named ‘Larz Garcia’.
If there was an identifiable ‘Resource Order’ for him… then it would be easy to identify that Engine and the other crew members ( driver included ).
>> calvin also said…
>>
>> 2.It looks like he is wearing a Go Pro camera..
Yep. Totally agree. ( once again… GOOD EYE, Calvin ).
That is EXACTLY what is mounted on his helmet.
Looks like the ‘HD Helmet Hero’ model.
That ‘black knob’ showing on the TOP of his standard ‘Bullard’ WFF helmet appears to be the standard top of the Helmet-Cam strap that goes over the top of the Helmet as well as on the sides.
It COULD be one of the ‘Optrix’ units but there is NO QUESTION the driver of this vehicle has a VIDEO CAMERA mounted on his helmet.
So where is the possible video ( and… more importantly… possible new background RADIO capture ) from this guy’s helmet cam?
Was he using it that day? Why would he NOT be using it from time to time that day if he was ( obviously ) taking all that trouble to be WEARING it.
By the way…
The ‘Larz Garcia’ photo being discussed is this one…
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/20inrene9tcx74a/AADbR2wJoDMODyRNy4GvkhiZa/ADOSH%20Yarnell%20Hill%20Investigation/Photos%20and%20Video/ASFD%20Photos/Larz%20Garcia#lh:null-Picture%20009.jpg
Other things about that photo…
** Blue Cap on dashboard in front of driver
Arizona Forestry logo. Writing on top and bottom says “Arizona Forestry”.
** The RED Helmet on the dashboard
The RED Helmet sitting on the dashboard in front of the firefighter sitting in the passenger seat has the standard YELLOW ( reflective ) tape with the ‘V’ cutout on the sides.
Looks like a standard ‘Bullard(R)’ type WFF helmet complete with the little clear plastic ‘clip’ on the side.
It also has a small blue sticker on it that is the flag of ‘New Zealand’ and it even says ‘New Zealand’ in small white letters at the bottom of it.
This RED helmet is also sitting on top of what appears to be either another full Nomex shirt… or it’s just the standard Nomex neck protector attached to the back of the helmet and folded up underneath it. Probably the latter.
Same RED helmet also has a BLACK strap running under the yellow tape that shows these letters ( in white ) on the visible part of the strap…
…lemon / MA…
It also seems like it might have the same metal ‘side clips’ on it that the driver has for his Helmet-Cam… so it appears this RED helmet sitting on the dashboard *MIGHT* have also had a forward-facing ‘Helmet-Cam’ on it as well.
More later…
OK. I think I’ve FINALLY figured this whole thing out about Arizona State Engine 151, which I’m 99% positive this is. It only took about three days, on again off again, to do it. Because there are two different narratives about it–which didn’t match.
One is from William Brewer’s ADOSH Interview. He was its Engine Boss. The other was from Darrell Willis’ ADOSH interview, etc. He had it in his collection of resources from the middle of the night onward July 30.
The problem was, the two narratives didn’t sync until I did a LOT of mapping and sync-ing and re-sync-ing. I’m gonna write this whole thing up soon, but not just yet. Because I have another block-buster to report on that I HAVE written up.
Suffice it to say, Calvin and WTKTT, the Engine Boss was William Brewer, and I’d guess he was driving it. At least at this time. It was over on the Hays Ranch Road junction with Model Creek Road. They were firing south of Model Creek Road to the west. That was part of the operations where we have seen Willis’ truck in Panebaker’s photos. (And yes, WTKTT) you are right on the photo (and thx for the help getting it more accurately located on Google Earth). I had jumbled up some of those photos and had that photo in my Swartz folder. Next to it is the photo of Willis’s truck and Sciacca’s truck.
And also, the green engine is Tonto E-58. The “Structure Protection Group 1 Unit Log” (which, I guess is a typo, since it’s really SPG2) has a listing of the resources in Darrell Willis’s corral) lists it. Also there’s a “Structure Protection Group 2 Deployment Map” which shows where various resources were, at least at some time, deployed.)
Via “Resource Orders,” I think:
RO E-9 Tonto E-58 Crew: GregSawyer BOSS, CoryHill, JamesBehrens, JordanGuthrie, EmilyChevalier, all from TNF.
>> Marti said…
>>
>> Suffice it to say, Calvin and WTKTT, the Engine Boss was
>> William Brewer, and I’d guess he was driving it.
Thank you, Marti.
So William Brewer would be the one to ask if he was actually USING that ‘Go-Pro’ helmet cam that he was obviously WEARING that day and if he happened to capture any background radio traffic that hasn’t been heard yet.
BTW… not sure it matters at this point but there is no doubt that the Larz Garcia photo was taken from the backseat of an ‘International’ Fire Truck.
Below is a link to some photos of the INTERIOR of a standard ‘International’ Engine. This one was being delivered to the Golden Valley Fire District in Arizona. The interior shots match EXACTLY to what is seen in the Larz Garcia photo…
http://www.firetrucksunlimited.com/2006-ferrara-international-4×4-interface-pumper/
From the article…
“This 2006 Ferrara/International 4×4 Interface Pumper was delivered to the
Golden Valley Fire District in Arizona today. The truck features an
International DT570 engine, Allison automatic transmission, 500 GPM
side mount pump, 500 gallon poly tank, Front Bumper Turret, Booster
Line, LED Emergency Lighting package, Front Brow Light, Winch,
Complete repaint and graphics!! Special thanks to everyone involved
in this delivery and to Chief Tom O’Donohue.”
Also FWIW… here is the only ‘public’ photo of Larz Garcia himself that I have been able to find so far. He is standing on the far right in the photo…
http://www.oraclefire.org/images/grant-miner.pdf
This Larz Garcia guy is a bit of mystery, actually.
It appears that from about 1999 to 2012 he was just working for the Arizona Department of Transportation until he suddenly ‘switched jobs’ and went to work for the Arizona Department of Forestry as a ‘Grant Writer’.
There actually is no evidence this guy was even a ‘carded’ firefighter.
Is it possible he was just riding along in Engine 151 as an ‘observer’ that day?
That could be. That article, however, was written in 2011. So I”m not sure of the accuracy of him switching jobs in 2012. He may be becoming something of a “fuels specialist.” Grant-writing is a noble professional, and you often have to know a lot about what your subject matter is to successfully write grants for it. But, yes, he probably wasn’t red-carded. I doubt he was even with the Engine all that much, maybe just for this operation.
By the way, I figure it will take me several hours to write up Engine 151. And I don’t know when I’m gonna find that several hours.
The Arizona Fire truck that has the back rack on it that we see in the A2A video going first east and then west is, most likely, Brewer’s chase truck. He was swapping back and forth between driving the chase truck and the engine that day.
In the morning, Brewer was working at the ICP checking crews in. The engine was out with Willis’ crew until the morning when, I think, they were released for r&r at ICP. I don’t think the engine was involved in the Double A Bar Ranch operation.
You see both the chase truck and the engine in a lot of photos of the ICP. At noon, Brewer went into nap mode. He went back into active duty at 3 PM, which is when he took the engine out to MCRoad & Double A Bar Ranch Road. I think part of the crew took the chase truck out to get a vantage point for about 20 minutes before driving back into the fire area.
I wouldn’t assume he was go-proing. The “rules” about photo-ing/video-ing seem to be fairly honored by people in charge of resources when they’re actively engaged in fire-fighting. But who knows??????
Reply to Marti Reed post on August 1, 2014 at 9:23 am
>> Marti said…
>> That could be. That article, however, was written in 2011.
>> So I”m not sure of the accuracy of him switching jobs in 2012.
Yep. Even the article above seems to suggest that he had already switched from ADOT job of being a ‘Scenic Highway specialist’ to also being sent out by Arizona Forestry to approve these ‘fuel break’ projects… but I’m not seeing any evidence that he had been officially ‘hired’ by Arizona Forestry. He may have just been on 1099 or a consultant for them at that point.
Larz Garcia has his own one-man company called ‘Greenitupcom’ which he founded way back in 2003. He is the owner and the only employee and was jobbing himself out for that kind of stuff even when he was still working for ADOT.
Larz Garcia’s company is registered in Phoenix, Arizona.
He is listed as the founder and the ONLY employee…
http://companies.findthebest.com/l/11836048/Greenitupcom-in-Phoenix-AZ
Company Information…
This listing is for Greenitupcom’s Single Location in Phoenix, AZ.
The company primarily operates in the ‘All Other Support Services
Companies’ industry.
Greenitupcom:
– Was founded in 2003 and is Privately held.
– Has $66,000 in estimated annual revenue.
– Employs 1 person
– Has 1 employee located here at the Single Location
Office Location:
2718 N 8th St.
Phoenix, Arizona 85006-1010′
First reference I can find of him listing HIMSELF as an ADOF employee is when he attended the Smallwood thing in May of 2012.
Link that shows Larz Garcia now working for ‘Arizona Forestry’ in 2012…
SmallWood 2012 – Final Attendee List – Flagstaff, AZ – May 1-3, 2012
http://www.forestprod.org/ckfinder/userfiles/files/Final%20Attendee%20List.pdf
Larz Garcia
Arizona State Forestry Divison
1110 W Washington St Ste 100
Phoenix, AZ 85007-2957
(602) 364-1546
Email: larzgarcia ( at ) azsf.gov
>> Marti also said…
>> He may be becoming something of a “fuels specialist.”
Probably so. He probably had that as part of his ‘education’ when he was the ‘Scenic Highways Specialist’ for Arizona Department of Transportation for many years.
>> Marti said…
>> But, yes, he probably wasn’t red-carded.
Like I said above… I can (currently) find no evidence that he had any training or experience as a WFF firefighter at all… much less any proof he had the required ‘red card’ to even be in the situation we see him in.
Hard to believe there is no ‘Resource Order’ for him at all.
I wonder how he got paid for being there that day?
>> I doubt he was even with the Engine all that much,
>> maybe just for this operation.
Perhaps… but I would think that even as an observer he would have needed a ‘red card’ to even be in that dangerous situation we actually see him entering in his own photo. Maybe not.
Mr. Powers? Are you there?
Can an ‘observer’ with no red card ever be ‘up front and center’ in these kinds of dangerous situations… or be participating in ‘burn out’ operations without some years of actual WFF and/or structural fire fighting experience?
>> Marti also said…
>> In the morning, Brewer was working at the ICP checking
>> crews in.
I believe he also told ADOSH ( much to their surprise ) that HE was also filling in as the official ‘radio guy’… since Roy Hall forgot to order one of those guys as well. Brewer was the one ‘cloning’ radios for everyone and he deflected a lot of questions about whether they were good clones by repeatedly saying he ‘tested them before them left’.
>> Marti also wrote…
>> You see both the chase truck and the engine in a lot of
>> photos of the ICP.
Which one(s)? Not trying to be obtuse… I just have been off researching a lot of other things and I don’t recall seeing it any of them. Can you just give me the name and/or link of at least one of these ICP photos showing Engine 151 and Chase at ICP?
>> Marti also said…
>> I wouldn’t assume he was go-proing. The “rules” about
>> photo-ing/video-ing seem to be fairly honored by people
>> in charge of resources when they’re actively engaged in
>> fire-fighting. But who knows??????
I think those kind of expensive Helmet-Cams go far beyond any ‘rules’ that apply to just whipping out your iPhone at inappropriate times. I think anyone who is bothering to wear one of THOSE expensive rigs on their head has every intention of using it to film their activity WHILE they are ‘working’.
I think that is what THOSE (expensive) rigs are actually FOR.
Usually owned by the agency and not the individual.
I still actually don’t quite believe that the ONLY time Prescott ‘off the radar’ hire Aaron Hulburd used his own ‘Helmet Cam’ that day was just that one time when he ( accidentally? ) captured the deployment traffic. That certainly was no ‘at rest’ moment for those men. Hulburd was a ‘fuels specialist’ and I believe he was wearing that thing to film exactly what he was filming. Extreme fire behavior.
You can also see from the plethura of photos that are actually available from firefighters for this one incident alone that no one pays all that much attention to the ‘only shoot photos during breaks’ scenario. People whip out their candy-bar or smartphones almost every chance they get… especially when something COOL is happening.
The VLAT thing affects everyone. Almost everyone actually ‘stops what they are doing’ and shoots pics of the BIG AIRPLANE when they can. It’s COOL.
Even when Blue Ridge pulled into the Ranch House Restaurant parking lot and they had already heard the deployment traffic… the cameras came out like tourists at the Grand Canyon. Brian Frisby had to actually make a specific general announcement to all of them to STOP taking pictures in those moments following the deployment.
I would just find it hard to believe that the driver of that engine with that expensive rig on his helmet wasn’t actually USING it that day. If you have no intentions of doing so… they why wear it? It’s not that light and it might get damaged while you are working if you have no intentions of using it WHILE you are working.
Re the GoPro: Good points. I’m not even sure, now, that Brewer was driving, given that he had replaced himself as Engine Boss with a fresh Engine Boss. And once they got where they were going, he became a sawyer. So he could barely hear his radio, much less use the GoPro.
He also says the fire stood down as they were firing out, even as awful as it looks in the photos. By the time Willis left, it was mostly just “keep an eye on it,” which they did until 8 PM.
Re “stuff” that was taken out there. I find an endless stream of things drifting around on the inter tubes. Lots of stuff. More than I have time to post and herd.
I think ADOSH may have been a bit overwhelmed by THEIR task (and probably deadline). I think they were scrambling through every inch of it, judging by their “field notes” and stuff.
And when they started interviewing they had no clue of anything.
Re Larz. I’ve been wondering, maybe Larz didn’t take those photos. Maybe they were supplied to him from someone in the Engine.
I’ve been re-reading Brewer’s ADOSH interview. Since he and some of his crew were pushing too many hours, they rotated out part of the crew. (The Engine crew is big enough to rotate members). So he had a new Engine Boss come in to relieve him and he was doing sawing on the fireline.
Here’s how he describes the crew on that op:
Once we got put back on the line…
864
867 A: …it was, ah, myself, um, engine boss trainee, a firefighter 2 and two new guys that joined us. So a fresh engine boss and a fresh firefighter 2. So there were five of us.
873 A: Um, and my – my engines got a large crew cab, five people. So we just all were, you know, we’re in the truck. In fact, I think I had my chase truck with us as well. Um, the resources we were working with was who was on the line.”
That doesn’t leave room for an additional person who was there to observe fuels behavior. So, I think it possible someone provided those photos to Larz who passed them on to the ADOSH investigation.
BTW My daughter, who just got her Masters in Public Planning with a focus on Transportation (within a framework of Social and Environmental Justice, would probably give her right leg to have a job like his. I think he’s doing pretty cool stuff.
But I don’t think he was “on” this fire.
Reply to Marti Reed post on August 1, 2014 at 1:26 pm
>> Marti said…
>> Re Larz. I’ve been wondering, maybe Larz didn’t
>> take those photos. Maybe they were supplied to
>> him from someone in the Engine.
Perfectly possible.
>> Marti also said…
>>
>> I’ve been re-reading Brewer’s ADOSH interview.
>> Since he and some of his crew were pushing too many
>> hours, they rotated out part of the crew. (The Engine
>> crew is big enough to rotate members). So he had a
>> new Engine Boss come in to relieve him and he was
>> doing sawing on the fireline.
>>
>> Here’s how he describes the crew on that op:
>>
>> Once we got put back on the line…
>> 864
>> 867 A: …it was, ah, myself, um, engine boss trainee,
>> a firefighter 2 and two new guys that joined us. So a
>> fresh engine boss and a fresh firefighter 2.
>> So there were five of us.
>> 873 A: Um, and my – my engines got a large crew cab,
>> five people.
FIVE is the magic number for that ‘International’ Truck.
It would only seat 5. so he’s definitely talking about
THAT ‘truck’ ( Engine? ).
>> So we just all were, you know, we’re in the truck. In fact,
>> I think I had my chase truck with us as well. Um, the
>> resources we were working with was who was
>> on the line.”
He THINKS he had a ‘chase truck’?
I would think you would pretty much either KNOW
you did… or did NOT.
>> That doesn’t leave room for an additional person
>> who was there to observe fuels behavior. So, I think
>> it possible someone provided those photos to Larz
>> who passed them on to the ADOSH investigation.
Again… perfectly possible and would not surprise me.
Just one more case where the documentation of this incident and the investigation itself is really, really bad.
No real indication of some ‘sources’ or ‘evidence’ or how they even came to be into the possession of the investigators.
>> But I don’t think he was “on” this fire.
Well… if he was… and there was no resource order for him… then I sure hope someone other than those in the truck knew he was there.
What if that truck had gotten ‘trapped’ that day and there were five MORE fatalities.
How many days and how many dental records would it have taken to determine WHO was actually in it.
That goes for all these cases where someone is listing an engine and then just saying things like “and 3 guys” or “and 2 guys” and then NONE of these people are showing up in any resource orders.
I sure hope someone knew WHO all these “guys” were for the same reasons stated above. If the trucks had gotten burned up along with any ‘manifests’ that might have been onboard… how long would it have taken to actually identify the bodies?
There was a lot of ‘musical resources’ going on at this incident and I hope someone was keeping track of WHO was actually WITH WHO.
Yes. In the Resource Orders it is listed as an International. Which was the key for me.
Reply to Marti Reed post on July 27, 2014 at 5:58 pm
>> Marti said…
>>
>> And PS a question to WTKTT.
>>
>> I spent a lot of today trying to locate on Google Earth where Willis’s truck/crew
>> was when they were photographed by Panebaker. It turned out to be harder
>> than I anticipated, but that’s mostly because I still haven’t mastered Google Earth.
>>
>> Do you have a location for Willis’s truck in that photograph”
Marti… I wasn’t 100 percent sure WHICH photo(s) you were talking about so below
is the location info for all of the following…
** The Swartz photo showing Willis’ truck and that engine up on Model Creek Road.
** The Panebaker video frame that appears to show the same thing as Swartz photo.
** That ‘smoke filled’ photo taken at intersection of Hays Ranch Road and Model Creek Road.
** THE SWARTZ PHOTO ( AND THE PANEBAKER VIDEO FRAMES )
NOTE: This is information that was posted back in Chapter VII (7) of this ongoing discussion…
There has still been no positive ID on the ‘greenish-blue’ ENGINE that is seen up there on Model Creek Road in these image(s)… but the white-with-red-stripe pickup has definitely been identified as the one Darrell Willis was driving that day ( Chrome Deer Chucker on front, Toolbox in bed, etc. )
Here is my best estimate of EXACTLY where they are up there and what was happening at the time.
They are up on Model Creek Road and this was all about ‘making a stand’ on Model Creek Road around that time. OPS1 Todd Abel and SPGS2 Darrell Willis were fully engaged with this at that time ( 3:58 PM ).
The white pickup with the red stripe ( Darrell Willis’ PFD pickup ) seems to be exactly here….
34.270943, -112.757318
That is up on Model Creek Road, just 2,560 feet SOUTHWEST of the ICP at the Model Creek Elementary School in Peeples Valley.
The Swartz photo was taken at exactly 3:58.26 PM, which is only about 60 seconds after Air Attack Rory Collins said ‘goodbye’ to Thomas French in Bravo 33 and ‘left the fire’.
There is no Panebaker Air Study video that captures any TAC or A2G radio traffic at this exact 3:58.26 PM moment.
However… in the 160808 Panebaker video shot just about 9 minutes after this photo was taken ( Panebaker Air Study video 160808 begins at 1607.00 ), the background radio traffic is all about ‘Model Creek Road’ and (apparently) features both OPS1 Todd Abel and SPGS2 Darrell Willis in the background… so that could easily be either Abel’s or Willis’ white pickup with the red stripe there on Model Creek Road in this Swartz photo. See below for full transcript of video 160808.
NOTE: As the FOREGROUND traffic in the Air Study video below shows… French in B33 *was* ‘lining up a drop’ with Tanker 810 but his instructions were just to go ‘between the fire and the house’ and there is no Air-To-Air talk whatsoever about protecting any firefighters or vehicles on Model Creek Road.
The Swartz photo itself…
Online Dropbox Folder…
Photos and Video / AerialFirefightingstudy /
Swartz / Pictures / Nikon / North of Fire / Seat Drop 4
Last photo in this folder…
20130630_1558_AZ-A1S-000688_T830___8_G_RS.JPG
EXIF Metadata…
Camera: Nikon COOLPIX P520
Lens: 77.5 mm (Max aperture f/3)
Exposure: Auto exposure, Program AE, 1/160 sec, f/4.9, ISO 400
Flash: Off, Did not fire
Focus: AF-S, Lower-right
Focus 2: AF Area Mode: Dynamic Area
Date: June 30, 2013 – 3:58:26 PM
Location: Latitude/longitude: 34° 16′ 19.6″ North, 112° 43′ 52″ West
Location Decimal: ( 34.272103, -112.731100 )
Altitude: 1,374.2 m
File: 3,672 × 4,896 JPEG (18.0 megapixels)
NOTE: The GPS data in this Swartz photo is CORRECT. That is exactly where HE was standing when he took the picture. It was at that same location on Hays Ranch Road where the Panebaker Air Study videos were taken and he was looking WEST.
** PANEBAKER AIR STUDY VIDEO 160808
Contains background radio conversation from just 9 minutes after the Swartz photo was taken. It is all about getting some more retardant drops to help fight the fire where OPS1 Todd Abel and SPGS2 Darrell Willis were at this time ( on Model Creek Road )…
** 20130630_160808_SEAT_EP.MOV
This video is 1 minute and 8 seconds long
NOTE: Here is what French and Tank 810 were discussing about this upcoming drop just BEFORE this video begins. The drop was to be between the fire and a house… and no mention of targeting any firefighters or any vehicles there on Model Creek Road…
(B33 – French): Okay… uh… eight ten.. ya got me in sight? It’s gonna be between the fire and the house right through here… ya got it?
(Tanker 810): Got it.
(B33 – French): Zero eight zero on the heading four thousand six hundred… SHARP left turn on the exit. There’s a helicopter out my twelve so good left on the exit.
(Tanker 810): Okay… understand hard left on the exit and… start the drop?
** AIR STUDY VIDEO 160808 BEGINS AT 1607.00 ( 4:07.00 PM )
FOREGROUND
+0:00
(B33 – French):That’s affirmative… You’re clear to drop. That line’s clear.
BACKGROUND
+0:00
(Unknown): ( Background conversation already in progress. )
( Hard to make out… sounds like…) No… what we need is to find a punch out.
+0:05
(Unknown): Copy that. ???. Be okay to (start?) right behind that ???
FOREGROUND
+0:06
(5KA): Bravo 33… Five Kilo Alpha.
(B33 – French): Go ahead, sir.
(5KA): Uh… was that my mistake? I was off your twelve there. Did you want me a little bit further around the inside?
(B33 – French): No.. no mistake. That’s where I wanted ya. No worries. Yea… we’re gonna do a sharp left on the exit and you continue.
BACKGROUND
+0:11
(Unknown – Sounds like OPS1 Abel?): ( Nooo?? )…
I don’t wantcha out there unless my (Alpha?) is ???
+0:17
(Unknown): Copy that… but we could fire off at a ?? here ??? (on the?) alongside of the road… ??? retardant ??? north side ?? road.
FOREGROUND
+0:28
(B33 – French): Okay… eight seven four… how many miles out?
(B33 – French): Hold at five please at five thousand five hundred. two nine eight zero on the altimeter.
BACKGROUND
+0:34
(Unknown): ( More background conversation here. Hard to make out ).
FOREGROUND
+0:41
(5KA): Five Kilo Alpha off the drop… and I’ll just go sit down and wait for ya to get finished.
(B33 – French): Awesome… thanks a lot Kilo Alpha… and eight one zero… you’re uh… clear to drop, sir.
BACKGROUND
NOTE: At the following point in the video the FOREGROUND conversation dies out and the background can be heard pretty clearly…
+0:44
(Unknown – Sounds like OPS1 Abel?): (?) Lightin’ ??? (Alpha? OPS?) called and he’s tryin’ to do a (visit?)… but uh… I think if we can tell that house’ll be secured then we can be tryin’ to hook back to it.
+0:56
(Unknown): It’s makin’ a push right now.
+1:03
(Unknown – Sounds like SPGS2 Darrell Willis?):
( Foreground talk resumes so this is hard to hear but someone is saying something on TAC channel. Sounds like… ) Yea… we saw the difference ?? ( more conversation, hard to make out ).
FOREGROUND
+1:05
Tanker 810): Eight one zero’s off the drop.
( B33 – French): Perfect, man… that was right on.
** AIR STUDY VIDEO 160808 ENDS AT 1608.08 ( 4:08.08 PM )
** THE ‘SMOKE FILLED’ ASFD ‘MISCELLANEOUS PHOTOS’ PICTURE TAKEN AT
** THE INTERSECTION OF HAYS RANCE ROAD AND MODEL CREEK ROAD.
NOTE: Originally posted back in Chapter VII (7) of this ongoing discussion.
The white-with-red-stripe Prescott Fire Department pickup seen up there in that ‘smoke filled’ photo taken from inside the cab of that Engine ( 151? ) at the intersection of ‘Model Creek Road’ and ‘Double Bar-A ( Hays ) Ranch Road’ is NOT the same white-with-red-stripe PFD pickup that Willis was driving.
It is Cory Moser’s.
Cory Moser is also ‘Prescott Fire Department’ ( PFD ) and was there as a ‘trainee’ that day under SPGS Darrell Willis.
NOTE: For reference… THIS is the photo being discussed. It’s the one that shows all those fire vehicles assembled in the ‘smoke’ and making that ‘last stand’ up there at the intersection of ‘Model Creek Road’ and ‘Double Bar A ( Hays ) Ranch road. The ‘road sign’ for this intersection is clearly seen in the photo as are the license plate numbers of at least TWO of the vehicles… including Cory Moser’s…
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/20inrene9tcx74a/AACltJPUFfvmZqibRwGSJwWLa/ADOSH%20Yarnell%20Hill%20Investigation/Photos%20and%20Video/ASFD%20Photos/Miscellaneous%20Photos#lh:null-28.JPG
All of the official ‘resource orders’ release in the FOIA/FOIL packages have a ‘Travel Mode’ field that may or may not contain the actual license number of the vehicle that the individual filling the order will be traveling in.
Cory Moser’s DOES.
His resource order ‘Travel Mode’ field says this…
Travel Mode: AOV G039EJ ( License plate number )
Moser was Willis’ TFLD trainee that Sunday in Yarnell and is also from Prescott. Moser is actually employed by the Prescott Fire Department itself.
Moser was (apparently) NEVER interviewed by either the SAIT or by ADOSH and never even submitted any ‘Unit Log’ of his own from that day… but Moser IS mentioned in other people’s ‘Unit Logs’ from Yarnell that DID mention Moser… especially in that document with ‘additional unit logs’ released ‘late’ by Arizona Forestry on February 27 2014.
Willis is the one who says ( in his official interviews ) that he handed his DIVISION over to (trainee) Cory Moser so he could haul-ass down to Yarnell after the deployment traffic hit the radio.
NOTE: In his own official interviews… Willis referred to his own resources that day as a DIVISION which means he must have considered himself to be a DIVS that day and not a simpler ‘Structure Protection Group’ or SPGS at all.
For a while… it was NOT known if Cory Moser ever made it to south Yarnell at all after Willis told him to ‘take over the DIVISION’ up north… but on the 1 year anniversary we learned from Cory Moser himself that not only did he make it down to Yarnell later on…. he ended up one of the FFs who ‘spent the night’ near the deployment site.
In an exclusive interview in association with the 1 year anniversary… Cory Moser himself talked for the first time about his own ‘movements’ that evening and night. We also learn from Moser that there were, apparently, upwards of 25 to 30 ( TWENTY-FIVE TO THIRTY ) firefighters that were ‘there’ near the deployment site all night long… but Moser also says that they all made some kind of weird ‘pact’ amongst themselves to NEVER talk about what they all were doing near ( and inside of? ) that deployment site all night long.
Have we petered out?
Marti,I am answering the question you asked below concerning the Russ Reason video and the possibility that there is a FF (possibly a lookout?) seen in this video. I see what appears to be a FF (yellow shirt, white helmet) beginning at the 1 second mark of the video until the 7 second mark. This person is just above the GM crew carrier positioned to the left. The person is just above the cab of that crew carrier.
Calvin… I can verify exactly what you are seeing there ( a white dot with what looks like a yellow-ish Nomex shirt underneath it )… but a super enhancement on that part of the video seems to verify it is NOT actually ‘a person’.
That ‘raised area’ there just at the back of the flat part of the Ranch House Restaurant parking lot used to have a mobile home on it. That why there are those ‘wooden stairs’ back there leading up to that level and those ‘stairs’ are actually where Tom Story was standing when he took his second series of photos looking west from the BACK of the RHR parking lot.
Up at the BACK of that ‘raised area’ where the trailer used to be there is a ‘white spot’ embedded in the face of the ‘rock cut’ that makes up the very back of that raised area. It could be a ‘white colored rock’ or even just a piece of garbage caught in the brush there. This ‘white spot’ is also clearly visible even today via Google ‘Street View’ when standing out on Highway 89 in almost the exact spot where the Russ Reason interview took place. My guess would be that it’s just a whitish-colored rock back there embedded in the dirt.
As for the ‘yellow colored’ part that appears to be right ‘underneath’ that ‘white dot’… that just appears to be either a discoloration in the same ‘back but’ or it could even be a pile of junk there at the back of the raised area.
Enhancement shows that the ‘yellow spot’ underneath the ‘white dot’ is actually ‘square’ or ‘rectangular’ in shape… but is definitely not the torso ( or the Nomex shirt ) of a firefighter.
I can totally see where you might think it is, however.
It really does LOOK like an FF with a white helmet and a Nomex shirt up that on that ‘raised area’ until you do some ‘enhancement’ on that area.
For what it is worth… the Russ Reason video DOES, however, definitely show an FF in an ‘elevated position’ right at the +8 second mark. He is standing on TOP of one of the engines as it begins to come into frame from the RIGHT side of the video.
When he is first seen… his BACK is to the camera and he appears to be walking to the REAR of the engine roof and then crouches down to ( perhaps ) get DOWN off the engine. There is no telling what he was doing on top of that engine before the video began… or which direction he might have been looking in… and/or WHY.
One more FWIW thing about the Russ Reason video…
After we watch the cameraman walk over the road with the camera pointed DOWN at the road in order to get into ‘position’ for the Russ Reason interview itself… he pans the camera UP and to the SOUTH for that brief moment as he ‘swings around’ to start filming the actual interview.
As he does so… we catch another glimpse of the TRAFFIC out there on Highway 89 heading south… and Rick Tham’s dark-red pickup is seen clearly there for a few frames some 50-100 feet farther south than when the Russ Reason video itself started. That means whatever had ‘stopped’ the traffic right there in front of the Ranch House Restaurant was now ‘clearing’ and Rick Tham had made a lot of forward progress from the time the video started to when we seen the cameraman ‘swinging around’ to start the actual Russ Reason interview.
Thanks WTKTT. Also thanks for spotting the guy on top of the fire truck. Brush 103? Also did you notice another FF on top of (I believe CYFD?) truck taking photo/video that is in the Reason video up till it ends?
Reply to calvin post on July 28, 2014 at 6:33 pm
>> calvin said…
>> Also thanks for spotting the guy on top of the fire truck.
>> Brush 103?
Yes. Definitely ‘Brush 103’ back there across the lot off the back corner of one of the Blue Ridge ‘chase’ trucks and you can see the ‘sun’ glinting off the chrome side of ‘Brush 103’.
The guy who had obviously been standing on the top of the truck but is now seen ‘coming down’ appears to be one of those guys with the ‘clean’ shirts and the ‘darker blue’ pants. I would say his shirt is a bright LEMON yellow versus the duller yellow the other FFs are seen wearing.
There is also no question that the the RR video captures him starting to ‘come down’ off the top of that engine. His left foot is stepping OFF that silver-chrome ‘raised’ part of ‘Brush 103’ and he is moving onto the red truck cab roof at that point.
>> calvin also said…
>>
>> Also did you notice another FF on top of (I believe CYFD?) truck
>> taking photo/video that is in the Reason video up till it ends?
Actually… no… I don’t think I’m seeing this.
Can you give any more detail?
Brian Frisby had already caught all of his own crew ‘playing tourist’ at that time and had already ordered them all to ‘put the cameras away’… so that’s why you don’t see any of the BR fellas there in the background with cameras at this point.
But I still say that ‘dejected looking’ firefighter with his head down and his hands in his pockets standing exactly at the back of Marty Cole’s all-white Tacoma at the +28 second mark is Brendan McDonough.
Matches his body shape, haircut, and his ‘stoop shouldered’ normal stance. The circumstances also match. We KNOW that the back window of Marty Cole’s camper has just ‘closed’ seconds before this video starts… and that Marty Cole testified he ‘helped Brendan stow his gear in my truck’. Marty Cole had then stepped over to join that group of command FFs ( lots of white helmets ) standing over there near the UTV Ranger… but the other FF that is there at the back of Cole’s pickup to the left of the one that looks like Brendan is ABOUT to step closer to him and appears to ‘comfort him’. That also makes sense, context wise. Frisby had also stepped over into that ‘command group’ discussion there over by the UTV Ranger and they wouldn’t have wanted to leave Brendan all alone at that point. This ‘other BR FF’ that appears to be ‘sticking close’ to Brendan at the back of Cole’s pickup does NOT appear to be BR Captain Trueheart Brown. I believe Brown was ALSO over with Frisby at this moment in that ‘command group’ discussion. Captain Brown also had SOME amount of ‘hair’ on the nape of his neck and this tall BR FF apparently standing near Brendan has more of a short-short skin-head haircut like Brendan did that day.
The FF that appears to ‘comfort’ Brendan at the back of Cole’s pickup does, however, look exactly like the Blue Ridge FF who is ‘kneeling’ right next to Brian Frisby in that ‘group shot’ of the the entire Blue Ridge Hotshot team in that YouTube ‘Prescott Mud Rally’ video shot just a few weeks after the tragedy in Yarnell. Sort of a skin-head haircut BUT with some short beard stubble.
In the last part of the Russ Reason video… when the cameraman has stepped closer to Cole’s pickup… I believe you can still see Brendan standing there leaning against the back of Cole’s pickup… but all the FFs there are now very much aware the cameraman is drawing closer and that tall BR FF is now actually ‘hiding’ Brendan from the camera.
As that last sequence starts… we actually see Reyes there to the left of the tall FF that is ‘hiding’ Brendan… and he looks right at the approaching cameraman… and then Reyes ‘backs up’ to also HIDE himself from the approaching camera. As he does so… he give sort of a ‘look over there’ thumb gesture to Brian Frisby. That is the moment when Brian Frisby turns RIGHT at the approaching cameraman with his arms folded and a GLARE that seems to be saying “don’t come any closer”.
Just as that last video section ends… I still believe you can see the back of Brendan’s head sort of ‘appear’ to the right of the tall FF’s head. Brendan had a very distinct ‘head shape’ and this ‘head’ that appears in those final frames from out behind the tall BR FF looks just like it.
The FF is visible starting at the 1:40 mark just above the driver door of the BR crew carrier parked closest to the Ranch House.
I agree that it is very possible Mcdonough is standing there. Which BRH is seen walking away from the GM chase truck at the 1:40 mark? Trew?
Reply to calvin post July 28, 2014 at 7:40 pm
>> calvin wrote.
>> The FF is visible starting at the 1:40 mark just above
>> the driver door of the BR crew carrier parked closest
>> to the Ranch House.
Confirmed. Yes. I see him now…. right there ‘framed’ against the sky in the background right where you say he is. ( good eye! ).
Definitely an FF standing on top of that CYFD engine that was parked there next to the BR Carrier… and he is UP there until the video ends.
Best ‘in-focus’ frame of this guy seems to be at the +1:42 second mark. He is about to ‘raise’ whatever he is holding up to eye-level.
At 1:44 he has this thing UP and in front of his face.
At FIRST I thought it looked a lot like he was using a pair of BINOCULARS but after ‘looping’ this section a few times I am now convinced he was shooting a MOVIE.
You can tell from his motions at the WAIST… and the fact that whatever he is holding is a bit out from his face just like you would hold a smartphone to ‘take a movie’.
He holds the smartphone up and then ‘moves from left to right’ from the waist only. Definitely someone shooting a movie.
2 obvious questions…
1) WHO is this?
2) Where is that MOVIE he appears to have been shooting?
>> calvin also wrote…
>> I agree that it is very possible Mcdonough is standing
>> there.
Possibly the best proof that that is Brendan there at the back of Marty Cole’s pickup comes in the very first part of the RR video. At the exact moment that Rick Tham’s dark-red pickup truck moves a few feet south on Highway 89 at the start of the video… the BACK of Marty Cole’s Tacoma comes into view for a few frames.
The tall, lanky FF with his head down standing right there at the back of Cole’s pickup is seen in ‘profile’ and his height and stance and head shape and haircut matches Brendan exactly… including his ‘stoop shouldered’ way of standing.
At that moment… Brendan is to the LEFT of the tall Blue Ridge FF that we are going to (apparently) see ‘sticking with him’ and ‘comforting’ him after the Reason interview. Brendan ( I am assuming it is him ) has only started to drift towards the very back of Cole’s pickup where we will then see him LEANING against it in a few moments in other parts of the RR video.
>> Which BRH is seen walking away from the GM
>> chase truck at the 1:40 mark? Trew?
I don’t believe so.
I believe that throughout this Russ Reason Interview video… BR Captain Trueheart Brown is over there by the BR UTV Ranger and in the middle of that large group of ‘command people’ ( lots of white helmets in this group ) and talking about ‘the plan’. I am not actually SEEING him over there… but I’m not seeing him anywhere else in this video and we KNOW he was there and about to lead the ground rescue mission so it only makes sense he would be over there in that ‘command huddle’ by the UTV Ranger.
Followup… more ‘proof’ that this FF standing on TOP of the CYFD engine was shooting a MOVIE….
Not only is he holding something just a little away from his face and then ONLY moving from the WAIST as he ‘shoots the video’… his ELBOWS are UP and AWAY from his body.
So most probably not binoculars. I don’t know about anyone else… but when I am ‘scoping’ with binoculars the ‘stance’ is much more ‘elbows in’ towards the body.
Having your elbows UP and OUT and then doing the ‘only moving from the waist’ thing while watching the LCD on the back of the phone is pretty much the ‘shooting a movie’ dance.
PLUS… look at the very last few frames of the video. They actually capture this guy FINISHING his movie and the then does what any other smartphone user would do after shooting a movie. He bows his head and is now looking at the device in front of his chest and making sure the movie he just shot got ‘saved’ onto the device.
Again… WHERE is this MOVIE?
It sure looks like Trew to me. Tall, slender, light hair, and the same type front mounted pack we see him with in the Ball photo and in a Story photo taken at the Ranch House.
Was Trew the one who took the GM chase truck when Mcdonough picked up the GM Supt truck circa 1548?
Reply to calvin post on July 29, 2014 at 3:16 am
>> calvin said…
>> It sure looks like Trew to me.
>> Tall, slender, light hair, and the same type
>> front mounted pack we see him with in the
>> Ball photo and in a Story photo taken at
>> the Ranch House.
It very well COULD be. As I said… I am just
not 100 percent SURE it is him. My feeling
is that he should be ‘taller’.
It sure would be nice if someone who knew these
people would help identify them.
>> calvin also said…
>> Was Trew the one who took the GM chase
>> truck when Mcdonough picked up the GM
>> Supt truck circa 1548?
Yes… but then the SAIT notes also say that
after the deployment… Trew ‘put BR crew
members in the GM trucks to ‘listen to
the radios’… so that still might NOT be Trew
we see in the photo.
From the YIN…
———————————————–
Focused on that Trew tries to raise GM on crew. He hears a keyed mic. Trew gets a crew member and sits him in GM trucks and says listen for anything on the radio. 1 minute later he hears click click. Brendan was w/ BR.
———————————————–
To be clear… the segment of the RR video I am talking about as the ‘end segment’ is that part immediately after the interview with Mr. Reason himself ends. There is a quick ‘dissolve’ there and suddenly the cameraman has stepped closer towards the back of Marty Cole’s Tacoma.
It is in the first few frames following this ‘dissolve’ that you can see Charlie Reyes to the LEFT of that tall BR FF closest the camera suddenly ‘noticing’ the approaching cameraman and then Charlie Reyes STEPS BACK to ‘hide’ himself behind the same tall BR FF that Brendan appears to already be ‘hiding’ behind as he leans against the back of Cole’s pickup.
Charlie Reyes ‘retreats’ away from the video camera along the side of Cole’s pickup… but Brendan appears to remain there leaning against the BACK of Marty Cole’s Tacoma for the duration of that final segment… almost ( but not totally ) hidden by that tall BR FF in the foreground.
The tall BR FF in the foreground ( with his back to the camera ) is standing there with his hands on his hips… and if you look closely you can sort of see ‘through’ his arms and see that SOMEONE is there leaning against the back of Cole’s pickup but ‘hidden from the video camera’.
Whoever this is… THAT is the ‘back of the head’ that appears for just a few frames right before the video ends to the right of the tall BR FF’s head.
Followup… Photos of ALL of the Blue Ridge Hotshots
Here is that link referenced above to the YouTube video from the ‘Prescott Valley Mud Bogs’ event on July 12, 2013.
Just 12 days after the Yarnell tragedy… the entire Blue Ridge Hotshots team appeared at this even in Prescott and they posed for ‘Group Pictures’.
Prescott Valley Mud Bogs 7 12 13
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aVLl-oq-hoo
At +8 seconds there is a ‘full-front’ group shot of ALL the Blue Ridge Hotshots.
Brian Frisby at the far LEFT in the photo…. in the front row and down on his ‘haunches’ with his arms folded on his knees. Frisby is wearing sunglasses.
Directly to Frisby’s LEFT… also in the front row… ( but NOT wearing any sunglasses ) is who I believe to be the ‘very tall’ Blue Ridge Hotshot seen in the foreground in the Russ Reason video and ‘blocking’ whoever is leaning against the back of Marty Cole’s Tacoma.
At +13 seconds in this PUBLIC YouTube video the camera gets even closer and you can clearly see ALL of the Blue Ridge Hotshots and their faces.
follow up from Russ Reason video.
At the 3 second mark there is someone walking right to left in the wooded area just above GM crew carrier 7A.
Reply to Marti Reed post on July 27, 2014 at 6:51 pm
>> Marti asked…
>>
>> Have we petered out?
I can’t speak for anyone else… but a definite ‘no’ from me.
I have been on airplanes solid for the last 5 days and just doing ‘research’..
More to come.
So I was reading/re-reading Darell Willis’ second (10-19-2013) ADOSH interview to help me make an Engines List (which I still haven’t finished). And I came across a couple of things he said that I found interesting. The first had to do with the whole intervention:
“I would, uh, worry about your tactics more than whatever. Okay so here’s 1428 my hindsight on this. If we did nothing that day other than prep around some houses, do that, what would the outcome be differently today? That’s – that’s the way I look at it. What did we do to change the outcome on that day?”
“…There was – maybe on the north side, you were able to corral it a little bit after the wind changed. Uh, if the wind hadn’t changed, we wouldn’t a corralled it. It had kept moving north, and we’d a lost some houses in there. On the south side, they could a prepped around there. Um, and that’s about it.”
“…And, you know, you – you can even take it to the cost. How 1447 about – I don’t know what they paid in aviation costs on the 30th. But it didn’t make any difference, may have slowed it down at times just to gi- to – on the north end. It didn’t do anything on the south end.”
“…And had you not gotten the wind change, the outlook on the north end 1452 probably would a been significantly different.”
“1454 A: That’s exa- I – absolutely. The – we could not have hold – held that Model Creek Road. The only reason we held it is it changed.”
“1457 Q5: It wasn’t the actions that – that really made the difference there. It was the – it was the weather and that that changed the wind.”
“1460 A: Right.”
The next very interesting thing he said:
Q “…from that interview and, uh, what the statement about Russ being spent was.”
“1799 A: I think Russ, when I, um, Russ was tired. He had – and I don’t know when he got there. I think he went down there on Friday night. And maybe he came home, he didn’t. But he had worked the fire all day Saturday through Saturday night. And he was looking – he was tired. There’s no question about it. He was spent. He was w- he was hoping that Roy’s team would a got in there earlier than they did. And, uh, he wasn’t – I me- I mean, he was just an IC that needed to be replaced, basically, on Sunday morning.”
“1807 Q5: Okay. I – I – I kinda thought that’s probably what you were talking about, but I wasn’t sure. And, uh, what – what were the indicators that, uh, uh, you were getting that he was, uh, tired or spent or whatever? What – give me a couple of examples of indicators that you were seeing, Darrell, um, that would indicate that.”
“1813 A: Well, I was talking to him about – I – trying to figure out who was coming in. And, uh, I said, “So you got a team coming in. Are they expecting me to work Sunday? What’s going on?” And he says, “I don’t know. I’m going home. I don’t know what you’re doing.” He says, “I’m going to bed.” So…”
“1818 Q5: Pretty good indicator.”
“1820 A: Yeah. Uh, and so that was my g- I guess, my deal was knowing that, you know, he was tired. And I was just trying to get some intel for myself, wondering if they were gonna bring other divisions with ‘em, if they, uh, because I had been up since 10:30 that night, whether I was gonna stay all day and what the plan was. And he didn’t have any idea.”
“1826 Q5: Okay and there was – really, there really is no plan about how that was gonna happen?”
“1829 A: There was no, uh, no, and no – there was no midlevel overhead that came with him. I didn’t know it was a short team.”
And PS a question to WTKTT.
I spent a lot of today trying to locate on Google Earth where Willis’s truck/crew was when they were photographed by Panebaker. It turned out to be harder than I anticipated, but that’s mostly because I still haven’t mastered Google Earth.
Do you have a location for Willis’s truck in that photograph”
Marti… longer answer up above in case I’m having a brain fart regarding which picture you are asking about… but I believe this is the lat/long you asked for…
That Prscott Fire Department white pickup with the red stripe ( Darrell Willis’ PFD pickup ) seems to be exactly here….
34.270943, -112.757318
That is up on Model Creek Road, just 2,560 feet SOUTHWEST of the ICP at the Model Creek Elementary School in Peeples Valley.
The key is the ‘trees’ that were right there behind his vehicle. If you ‘dial back’ to pre-fire imagery in Google Earth it’s easy to see these exact ‘trees’ right there on that spot on Model Creek road which matches the ‘line of sight’ in the photo taken from the distance there at the Panebaker video setup location.
Another PS. For the detail geeks.
In his first interview, Willis references a State Engine 151. He describes this Engine in the intervention at Double A Bar Ranch.
AZ State E-251 is listed in the Resource Order as E-1, ordered 6/28 out of Phoenix. With no crew named.
In his ADOSH Interview ASFD employee William Brewer identifies himself as “Arizona State Forestry Division Assistant Fire Management Officer.” And as “I was a qualified engine boss for State engine 151. Ah, with me I had 67 two engine boss trainees and a firefighter 2.”
Unfortunately, his narrative of what Engine 151 was doing doesn’t correspond to Willis’s narrative of having Engine 151 in his purview. So I don’t think Willis had Engine 151 in his crew.
Another detail geek observation.
I’m currently thinking that Lars Garcia’s two photos (Picture 009.jpg and 28.JPG) might have been taken from inside of Engine 151, Because it was an International (according to its Resource Order),
Picture 009.jpg has a gps location at 34°16’16” N 112°45’2″ W. Which puts it on Model Creek Road just a ways southwest of where Model Creek Road heads out of Hays Ranch Road. At 3:44 PM.
So we have, there, most likely, State Engine 151, along with Mark Sachara’s truck, probably Cory Moser’s truck, and several other trucks.
Ten minutes before the Panebaker photo (20130630_1558_AZ-A1S-000688_T830___1_G_RS.JPG) captures Willis’ truck in the area where an intense fire-fight was about to happen a bit above and to the southwest on Model Creek Road.
They’re totally enshrouded in smoke. And in a time and place where Willis says, later, that only the fact that the winds turned saved the houses they were all trying to protect along Model Creek Road.
The Engine Boss of E-151 spent most of the night before helping Russ Shumate order Resources for June 30. He, also, spent most of the morning of June 30 checking in everybody who gathered at the Incident Command Post while E-151 was, according to him, assigned to the Horse-Shot Dip.
Typo. I’m getting sleepy. Horse-Shot Dip should be Horse-Shoe dip.
I think the importance of all of this that I have posted is that the real fire-fighting on the Yarnell Hill Fire (whether it saved anything or not) was happening on the north-east side of the fire for most of the day. And I think we all know that, I’m just adding some details. To acknowledge and detail the significance of that.
Sometime I wonder if, had the Granite Mountain Hotshots not perished 0n this fire, how would it have been evaluated. Would it have mattered that a number of crews fought that fire in a number of other places?
Marti some interesting Things.
It seems the team may have gone into the 30th with there blinders on.
No plan but most of the suppression seems to be centered on one location.
with most of the planed resources on the north and north east to east areas.
More house protection rented than line construction.
This is interesting in a Plans section the whole fire was not treated with a fully developed plan. No calculation as to how much line needed to be built that day with number of crews needed to accomplish it.
No plan for the indirect line the GM crew was to build and the need for burn out as they went which AA screwed up. Br was trying to tie in both ends of line with cat and them that was to much to accomplish.
What you are showing here is a very open holes in the cheese plan.
There was no real coherency in what they were trying to accomplish.
They were 2 steps behind what was happening and what was going to happen that day. Lack of being prepared for the weather changes, lack of hand crews to accomplish the chains of line to contain the fire, lack of a support plan for the crews, Lack of overhead to accomplish the Plan which was really not a well thought out plan not written up with maps and identified divisions. The cat line as I remember was stopped by a ravine it could not cross. That may have been where they lost the fire on the North end. The overhead should have saw that as well..
My opinion the Overhead Team was a total Chines Fire Drill.
This left the residents and the fire fighters Hanging with out any safety net Decisions made to late for the evacuation of the residents and crews when things changed. They the Overhead were behind the power curve all day and were Very Very Lucky to have not lost civilians and Fire Fighters on the North end.
So did this lack of oversight lose touch with and supervision of the GM crew? Very possible—Their OK their in the BLACK Forget about them concentrate on the Urban Interface were panicked and saving civilians protect the Towns or get out to safety. Was any overhead in charge when the whole thing went to hell? It sounds like it was every man for himself. A lack of early coordination being ahead of the Fire not behind it.
They had resources committed in areas where there was no defensible space and people still in their homes evacuation should have happened that morning. By 1300 the writing was on the wall, by 1400 crews should have moved to defensible areas by 1530 they should have pulled back to safety zones. Urban Interface requires Defensible space for the Safety of Fire Fighters. We continue to loose Fire Fighters for that Simple fact It was a very close call for many on this Fire because they waited to long. Homes Are Not More Important than Lives.
OK I Ranted Enough—–SAIT lack of accountability of Overhead on this Fire and it goes on and on.
Marti or WTK, In the picture 009.jpg from the Lars Garcia folder, two things 1. who is driving the truck? 2.It looks like he is wearing a Go Pro camera..
calvin… see longer post above.
The short story….
1) There is no resource order in the publicly released ‘J – Resource Orders’ folder for anyone named ‘Larz Garcia’ so still hard to even tell which engine that is or who the other crew members were.
2) That is EXACTLY what that is on that guy’s helmet. It’s a video camera.
WHO is that and WHERE is any video he might have shot ( and, more importantly, any background RADIO captures he might have accidentally captured ).
The ball cap on the dashboard in front of this driver with a Helmet-Cam on says “Arizona Forestry’.
WTKTT,
Thanks for the drop box links to these two very revealing photographs proximate to the GMHS shelter deployments. It certainly does better put things into a bit more of a perspective for me. Including the fact that I never believed the fire came from the middle bowl over the top and down into the BS Ranch bowl, in the first place.
Regarding the 2012 Ash Creek Safety Zone video, I agree with Bob Powers. No harm done. That’s just fighting fire, using your Escape Route(s) to Safety Zone(s) where you DO NOT NEED A FIRE SHELTER! This was /is very typical with, especially with all the environmental factors, with the smoke, ember storms, dirt, and rocks whirling about in the strong indraft winds, No one ever said they would be comfortable. That’s why you were you have adequate size based on fire weather and fire behavior *Fighting Fire By The Rules, remember?) you wear your PPE properly, and/or seek refuge in a vehicle. If you deploy your fire shelter, someone messed up.
Yes, they seem to have hesitated a bit too long getting there, probably because they were so drawn to the big flames and erratic fire behavior.
In the second video, they were all parked along a road in a NICE, BIG MEADOW that looked very adequate as a Safety Zone to me. They would have been perfectly fine staying where they were – all of them. And yet – just like GMHS – they left when the fire behavior was getting very active, to go to “THE SAFETY ZONE” – just like GMHS did on June 30, 2013. WTF?
Did you also catch in the second one, the driver (Crew Leader?), was admitting and kinda even bragging about being in a fire shelter on a fire at least once, and maybe even twice? Not good.
There is/was NO need to report this as anything but fighting fire. t was certainly NOT a burnover, NOT a burn-around, NOT a near miss, so there is NOTHING TO SEE HERE but fighting fire. It happens all the time, every year, every fire season. It WILL make a good training video clip.
RTS. Thanks for bringing some clarity to me concerning the Ash Creek Fire videos. Correct me if I am misreading your analysis. Standard Operating Procedure.?
Calvin again SZ are not always a comfortable area they put a lot of resources into a area designed for less but it was still workable. It is safe and SOP. You move around to increase your comfort level and hide behind things to reduce the heat.
Gas is in every vehicle direct flame is the only real concern with Gas in this situation.
It probably looks and sounds worse than it really was.
I’m going to repost here something that I posted downstream in a thread regarding what happened at the Youth Camp. I wrote”
“OK here’s my next point.
I intend to stay out of the “OFF WITH THEIR HEADS” mindset. That’s because I’ve spent a WHOLE lot of time reading stuff on wildlandfire.com over the past couple of weeks.
And, according to the wildland firefighters there, “OFF WITH THEIR HEADS” is exactly the opposite of what they write that they want and need. “OFF WITH THEIR HEADS” is exactly the opposite approach, according to them, of encouraging the kind of conversation that can lead to discovering the absolutely needed TRUTH.
I hope to find the time (my mom’s 95th birthday is fast approaching and I have a project I need to complete for that) to post some links to some of their stuff. It regards the history of fatality fires, their investigations, and their lawsuits, and also Congressional legislation. It’s a history people need to learn about. And, I think, it’s very much alive right now. The Yarnell Hill Fire doesn’t exist in a vacuum.
In that spirit. I’ve been trying to think systemically, not personally, about this stuff. The “what” not the “who”. And trying to, on the one hand, not succumbing to the prejudice of hindsight bias, while using hindsight bias as a tool. It’s a challenge!
The thing I have found myself thinking about, over the past several days is TRAINEES.
I spent a chunk of time re-reading interviews etc regarding Saturday the 29th. I have said, somewhere downstream, that I think (theoretically) this fire should have been nailed on Saturday. I still think (theoretically/with hindsight) that is true.
Having perused the interviews, trying to put my brain inside of Shumate’s brain (without benefit of hindsight), I can see how he could have under-estimated this fire, thus under-resourcing it on Saturday and ordering up a short Type 2 team that under-resourced it for Sunday.
The deal is, he didn’t have HIS more experienced eyes actually on the fire.
He had two surrogate eyes actually on the fire.
One was Nate Peck, the BLM helitack that was dropped on to the fire at 10 in the morning, according to his SAIT interview in the SAIT Interview Notes. He was an ICT4 and FFT1 with Moki Helitack NE Washington. That, to me, says Incident Command Trainee 4 and FireFighter Type 1. In the Interview notes it says “Perfect fire for an ICT5 trainee.” ????
The other was Justin Smith who, according to his ADOSH interview was “I am a qualified uh, IC 4. Um, well I just went through the red card committee
39 but uh – um – uh, and then uh, qualified Crew Boss, Dozer Boss, Engine Boss,
40 um, C sawyer, so.”
Then he says”
“Okay. Uh, I was ordered up as an Incident Commander Type 4 trainee on uh,
56 on Saturday. I got there Saturday morning um, worked all day as a – an IC4
57 Trainee and then uh, the – the following day when it had gone through its
58 transitions I transitioned from an Incident Command Type 4 trainee to a – a
59 heavy equipment boss.
For a chunk of Saturday he was:
“So I was just uh – uh, my – my duty would be uh, I
84 was just um, I was doing what I could as far as uh, logistics with – with meals
85 and – and stuff and trying to coordinate with Russ of a um, another gentleman
86 from BLM and I don’t recall his name um, as far as if there’s anything I could
87 – I could do and – and help out.”
He went up on the hill about 4:00. That, according to him, was after the fire had jumped the two-track.
And that was after Shumate released the air tankers. He was asked by SAIT if he knew why Shumate released the tankers.
He says, ” Yeah but – yeah when that was uh, occurring I was arranging for um, for
227 dinners that evening for the uh, the two crews and the one type 6 State engine
228 that were – were on the fire. I was trying to get meals squared away when –
229 when he made that call.”
SAIT questions him about this:
?Q5: Yeah, okay. Uh, did y’all ever discuss uh, that uh, later as to um, why that –
236 why that happened?
237
238 A: I – I didn’t ever ask Russ why he um, why he had made that – that call. I didn’t
239 uh, I didn’t want to second guess him on – on his decisions um…”
So what I found myself wondering, while trying to balance not-hindsight-prejudicing decision-making while using hindsight as a tool, and also trying to look systematically and not “OFF WITH THEIR HEADS!!” was, is it possible that the losing of control of the fire on Saturday may have had something to do with having trainees in situations where they may not have had the experience and knowledge to handle what the fire was actually throwing at them?
I really don’t know how trainees are deemed qualified to be put in charge of things they are put in charge of. Apparently, if you are a trainee, you are, somehow, deemed qualified to handle situations you may not be “red-carded” to handle.
And now we have Tyson Esquibel, assigned to be a Task Force Leader Trainee within Structure Protection Group 1. So, if I understand correctly, he’s not actually red-carded to be a Task Force Leader. He’s a Trainee.
And I’m having a lot of trouble with both his actions and his statements about a bunch of things.
So, my question is this:
When Trainees are put in charge of things, how is it determined whether or not they are actually qualified to handle those responsibilities and what is required of the overhead who are responsible for them?
When things go (or appear to go) seriously south–or maybe they didn’t but some people say they did–when a Trainee is in charge, where is there, in the system, the location of responsibility for all of this?”
Good Questions—-Not sure what is happening today in this trainee thing.
It use to be you were assigned to a qualified person in the position you are being trained in.
a IC4 is basic Initial Attack IC Strike team leader qualified. So again at this level trainee seem a little strange Most 5+ year fire fighters could fill that position through on the ground training.
Trainee’s should still have direct supervision and not on their own.
Thanks Bob!
I’m still a little confused about Justin, but what you’re saying clicks in regarding Tyson Esquibel.
He was originally (per the SAIT Interview notes) dispatched WITH Task Force Leader Todd Foster, and came with him to the fire. Then they were “split up” and sent to different areas because, of “not enough resources.” Tyson is, actually, quite experienced.
This whole chaotic narrative about the YouthCamp evacuation is mystifying to me. I’ve read stuff over and over again, and every story is different.
WTKTT
when you have time look up the National Wild Land Fire training courses S-130 and S-190
the minimum training for first year Fire Fighters each section is covered.
**
** ADOSH PHOTOS SHOWING FIRE ABOUT TO ENTER THE BOX CANYON
This is a FOLLOWUP to a reply to a question Mr. Powers asked earlier…
>> Reply to Bob Powers post on July 10, 2014 at 1:15 pm
>>
>> Mr. Powers asked…
>>
>> A question for Marti and WTKTT or Calvin in your research?
>> Have you found any smoke pictures that show 2 separate smoke
>> columns the main fire and a spot fire near the mouth of the canyon
>> the crew was trapped in?
I just discovered two photographs in the ADOSH ASFD ‘Miscellaneous Photos’ folder that appear to have been overlooked up to this point but are directly relevant to this question that you asked.
They were BOTH taken at 4:29 PM ( actually… just seconds before 4:30 PM ) and they BOTH show the fireline out in the ‘middle bowl’ almost about to come around the ‘mouth’ of that box canyon and entrap Granite Mountain.
The EXIF timestamps embedded in the photos can be trusted since they were both taken with a Network Connected iPhone 4S.
Here is what I believe BOTH of these photographs show…
1) There appear to be no independent BACKBURNS in progress ‘out there’. These photos appear to show just pure ‘fireline’ advancing naturally out across the middle bowl and headed for the box canyon.
2) IMPORTANT: Look just to the LEFT of the smoke cloud and the fireline in BOTH of these photos. The ‘hazy’ mountain ridge seen in the background is, in fact, the exact ‘southern route’ that Granite Mountain took to reach the saddle and then drop into the box canyon. Even though the fireline out in the middle-bowl is approaching the MOUTH of the box canyon… and there are only 540 seconds before Steed’s first MAYDAY… there is NO EVIDENCE in these photos that the fireline was ALSO simultaneously ‘crawling up’ those back ridges towards the saddle as the SAIR fireline charts suggested was happening at this exact time. It’s just not happening. So that puts a big damper on the ‘theory’ that Granite Mountain saw fire both AHEAD OF and BEHIND them ( up on the saddle they descended from ) at 4:39 PM when the first MAYDAY went out.
*** Here are the photos themselves…
ADOSH ASFD Misc photos taken with an ‘iPhone 4’ June 30, 2013
These pictures show the main fireline as it was approaching the mouth of the box canyon circa 4:29 PM ( actually… just a few seconds shy of 4:30 PM ).
Since these were taken with an iPhone… timestamps can be considered ‘Network times’ and ‘accurate’… but GPS was not turned on so there is no latitude or longitude information in photos. I had to identify the exact locations manually but that wasn’t hard to do. They were all taken from a vehicle that was moving north on Highway 89 and had obviously just passed the Ranch House Restaurant.
NOTE: It is NOT KNOWN who actually took these photos with their iPhone 4S or how ADOSH got them. They are simply ‘there’ in ADOSH’s ‘Miscellaneous Photos’ folder.
*** File Name: IMG_1334.jpg
Directory: ADOSH/Dropbox/Photos and Videos/ASFD Photos/Miscellaneous Photos and Video
Date/Time Original: 2013:06:30 16:29:39 ( 4:29.39 PM )
Direct link to this photo in the online Dropbox…
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/20inrene9tcx74a/AACltJPUFfvmZqibRwGSJwWLa/ADOSH%20Yarnell%20Hill%20Investigation/Photos%20and%20Video/ASFD%20Photos/Miscellaneous%20Photos#lh:null-IMG_1334.jpg
Location: Blue and white sign seen on the west side of HIghway 89 says…. “Yarnell Assembly of God”. The official address of the front entry to this church is… 17125 W Fountain Hill Ln, Yarnell, AZ 85362.
This photo was taken looking WEST from a vehicle moving NORTH on Highway 89 at exactly this point…
34.214795, -112.755137
That is exactly 475 feet north of the north edge northernmost driveway leading into the Ranch House Restaurant.
It is also only 213 feet north of where Rick Tham shot his 4:51 photo looking south at the traffic jam in front of the Ranch House Restaurant.
It shows the fireline out in the ‘middle bowl’ charging south and headed the mouth of the box canyon just about 540 seconds ( 9 minutes ) before Steed’s first MAYDAY was going to hit the radio.
That small ‘boulder triangle’ in the distance, just to the right of the ‘tree/bush’ that occupies the left-center of the photograph and partly obscured by that same ‘tree/bush’ is, in fact, that pile of boulders that represents the MOUTH of the ‘box canyon’. The point up on the high ridge saddle where GM started their ‘descent’ would actually be VISIBLE in this photograph if not for that ‘tree/bush’ occupying the left-center foreground.
At the time this photo was taken ( 4:29.39 PM ), Granite Mountain would probably have been at least halfway through their ‘descent’ down to the floor of that box canyon. According to the SAIR… that ‘descent’ took them 19 minutes… but the photo was taken only 9 minutes away from Steed’s first MAYDAY call. That puts them at least 10 minutes into their ‘descent’ when this photo was taken.
*** File Name: IMG_1335.jpg
Directory: ADOSH/Dropbox/Photos and Videos/ASFD Photos/Miscellaneous Photos and Video
Date/Time Original: 2013:06:30 16:29:53 ( 4:29.53 PM )
Taken just 14 seconds later from a point just 180 feet further north on Highway 89 at exactly this point…
34.215250, -112.754850
That point is still only 655 north of the first driveway of the Ranch House Restaurant parking lot and now only 396 ‘road feet’ south on Highway 89 of the point where Fountainhill Road coming out of Glen Ilah intersects with Highway 89.
NOTE: Because of the ‘one link per post’ rule… a direct link to this photo will be added as a ‘Reply’ to this message.
In this photo.. the ‘driver’ has now passed that ‘Assembly of God’ church, but you can still see out to the mouth of the box canyon.
That small ‘boulder triangle’ in the distance, just to the right of the roof of the brown ‘Assembly of God’ church in the foreground is, in fact, that pile of boulders that represents the MOUTH of the ‘box canyon’. The point up on the high ridge saddle where GM started their ‘descent’ would be JUST out-of-frame to the left and above the roof of that church.
Again… the two most IMPORTANT things being seen in these photos…
1) There is no sign of any independent ‘backburing’ out there just 600 seconds before Steed would transmit his first MAYDAY call.
2) The fireline was NOT ‘simultaneously’ crawling up the other side of the north ridge of that box canyon OR ‘simultaneously’ crawling up to the top of the saddle where they started their descent as the SAIR fireline progressions show. It ( the fireline ) probably EVENTUALLY did both of those things.. but it certainly wasn’t even beginning to happen at 4:30 PM, just 9 minutes before Steed’s first MAYDAY.
Here is the DIRECT LINK to that SECOND photograph referenced above that was taken just 14 seconds after the FIRST one and after the vehicle had passed that ‘Assembly of God’ church there near the Ranch House Restaurant…
*** File Name: IMG_1335.jpg
Directory: ADOSH/Dropbox/Photos and Videos/ASFD Photos/Miscellaneous Photos and Video
Date/Time Original: 2013:06:30 16:29:53 ( 4:29.53 PM )
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/20inrene9tcx74a/AACltJPUFfvmZqibRwGSJwWLa/ADOSH%20Yarnell%20Hill%20Investigation/Photos%20and%20Video/ASFD%20Photos/Miscellaneous%20Photos#lh:null-IMG_1335.jpg
This is the one that shows MORE of the ‘mouth’ of that box canyon out there in the distance than even the first photo does. That small ‘boulder triangle’ out there just to the right of the edge of the brown roof of the church on the left side of the photo is, in fact, that pile of boulders that represents the actual MOUTH of the box canyon where Granite Mountain was entrapped.
WTKTT—Great catch thanks
The progression charts are in 10 min. increments..
At 1630 the fire was crossing the flats as shown in the Pictures wind driven.
in 10 min. at 1640 the progression had reached the top of the ridge and saddle as well as across the mouth of the canyon.
The pictures confirm a couple of things..
1. The progression charts are accurate in a general since.
2. The Fire front was one head no spot fires no back fires.
3. The Fire was being driven by a 20+ MPH wind as seen in the second Picture.
4. at 1630 the fire was within a 3rd of a mile of the crew position ESTIMET.
5. The wind and slope increased the spread and fire intensity as shown in the pictures.
6. The progression charts should not be considered as pinpoint accurate but a general fire line location the fire engulfed the canyon between 1650 and 1655
the fire was on the ridge and above and below the crew between 1640 and 1650
no way to do a minute by minute progression so some what general est.
The smoke column shows a North wind on the fire at 1630 of 15 to 20. The rate of spread would be very high with slope and the fuel it was in. It was definitely making the big run. The entire crew I believe was in the canyon and never saw the direction change or felt the wind till it was to late. and again a posted lookout
as in LCES would have made all the difference. 1620 to 1625 the fire started across the flat or basically changed direction to S SW. Time for the crew to have run back to the saddle and over the back side. Leaving the black without LCES was the Fatal mistake. If they could not post a lookout due to the move they planed then they should have stayed where they were. A simple decision process ignored.
I agree with all of this, with the exception of the crew being able to make it back to the saddle, and the crew not knowing about the wind change. Given how slow their forward progress was, I doubt very much they’d be able to hump back up the way they came in time, though if it had been a clear route like a slide path it would have been doable. The boulders to the north may have allowed them to get all the way to the back side in time, but using them would have required knowledge of local conditions that GM may not have had for whatever reason. The only real way this is relevant, in my view, anyway is that even a lookout may not have been sufficient: the severity of the terrain trap that GM committed to when they dropped down may have meant that the lookout warning them to try to escape may not have been enough. I know Bob knows personally how tough moving through dense chaparral is even if not going uphill. For anyone reading this who hasn’t had the pleasure, this summer consider hitting up a local ski hill. Hike a blue run and time yourself bottom to top. Give yourself an hour rest after hiking back down, then hike the aspen or other dense brush that’s often present to the sides of these runs around the base lodge elevations. That brush is less hard to negotiate than chaparral, and it definitely slows you down. Totally agree that a lookout was critical regardless.
One minor ‘followup’ to what you just said…
For what it is worth… on the day of the 1 year anniversary… there was a scheduled ‘memorial hike’ in Prescott up the Thumb Butte trail which was Granite Mountain’s primary ‘training hike’ when they were ‘at home’..
Eric Marsh’s father participated in this ‘memorial hike’ up this same mountain trail that was GM’s primary training run.
AZCENTRAL article about this ‘Memorial Hike’…
http://www.azcentral.com/story/news/arizona/2014/06/30/yarnell-hill-fire-granite-mountain-hotshots-memories-alive-on-hilltop-hike/11784737/
There are quotes in the article from other Prescott FFs about how ‘scary good’ Granite Mountain was at ‘ascending’ this steep mountain trail and how often they would do it. Basically… every chance they got.
There are also photos associated with this article that show the actual Granite Mountain crew taking turns CARRYING EACH OTHER up this same steep slope just to increase the difficulty to an insane level.
The Thumb Butte trail climb was 2 MILES long and in most places the SLOPE of it exceeds that of the box canyon they were in on June 30, 2013.
My only point here is that if ANY crew could have done as well as could possibly be expected of human beings on any kind of ‘full reversal’ in that box canyon…
…it would have been THIS crew.
SR—Remember we are talking 1620 to 1625 the crew would not have been that far down the bush whack at that time maybe only half way to the deployment site. Just my calculation, you are right it was a bad choice in any stretch of the planed route the further they went the tighter the trap.
WTKTT——Just for your info all Hot Shot crews train just like that
They are some of the fittest crews nation wide. Dailey calisthenics and a run every day unless on a fire. Most have a mountain challenge as well. You can also add the Smoke Jumpers in to that same Physical Fitness.
Bob,
Agreed.
WTKTT, a key difference for Thumb Butte is it’s a trail. Even a simple ski run or slide path is far harder, even without brush. One thing not stressed that much in these discussions is that the boulders to the north would have been a better route choice, though still with lots of problems.
Reply to Bob Powers post on July 24, 2014 at 11:08 am
>> Bob Powers said…
>>
>> WTKTT——Just for your info all Hot Shot crews
>> train just like that.
>> They are some of the fittest crews nation wide.
>> Dailey calisthenics and a run every day unless on
>> a fire. Most have a mountain challenge as well.
>> You can also add the Smoke Jumpers in to that
>> same Physical Fitness.
I hear ya… but the fact remains that someone who knew them well ( Todd Rhines ) is being quoted in the article mentioned above as saying they did, in fact, go ‘above and beyond’ what any NORMAL Type 1 Hotshot crew would do as far as their physical training goes… especially with regards to ASCENDING steep slopes as fast as possible.
From the article linked to up above…
——————————————————
“Any time they were home, Thumb Butte got visited,” said Todd Rhines, a former Prescott fuels management supervisor.
Rhines’ job had been to assign the Granite Mountain Hotshots “defensible space work” clearing brush around Prescott when they weren’t on active wildfire duty – “which they did not like as well,” he noted with a smile.
Still, they knew it was important work, Rhines said. The hotshots were tough, disciplined and spirited. Any workout he remembers going through as a wildland firefighter decades ago, the Granite Mountain crew blew out of the water.
The Granite Mountain Hotshots became a Type 1 elite crew in 2008, the first in the U.S. sponsored by a municipal fire department.
“They knew that they had to prove themselves to all the other hotshot crews in the country,” Rhines said. “They had a little bit different training regimen from most of the (hotshot) crews. Used to scare me some of the things they used to do.”
Their grueling workouts included running to the summit, sometimes stopping to piggyback each other to simulate the weight of the packs they hauled to the fire lines. Other times they would hike to the peak in full gear, carrying chainsaws and up to 65 pounds of firefighting equipment.
——————————————————–
So whether that was a ‘normal’ training regimen for a Type 1 Hotshot Crew or not… the information in the article still suggests that if ANY Type 1 Hotshot Crew had the best chance in the world to make the best possible progress getting back up that steep slope that day ( if they had chosen that option instead of just deploying )…
…it was THIS crew.
Having done the Thumb Butte hike, it is a circular trail with 2 ways up. You can go the longer, less steep way up that is a regular trail. Probably averages 8-9% grade. The shorter, steeper way up is actually mainly paved, but averages around 18-20% for over a half mile. Climbing that with a 170 lb man on your back is pretty darn stout!
Reply to Bob Powers post on July 24, 2014 at 8:04 am
All good points. I think these are VIPs ( Very Important Pictures ).
I forgot to mention what you obviously picked up on and that is the ‘flame lengths’ and the ‘changes’ between the 2 photos taken just 14 seconds apart and how that shows actual ‘wind speeds’ out there in that bowl a that time, just 540 seconds before Steeds first MAYDAY call.
Sadly… the other thing these pictures prove is that it would have been VERY easy for anyone who was there ‘in town’ and yes… even near the ‘safety zone’ of the Ranch House Restaurant to have been ‘keeping an eye’ on Granite Mountain and their planned ‘move’.
I mean… just look at those pictures ( and the TIME ).
If you were standing right there and seeing that… and you knew perfectly well that Granite Mountain was trying to cut through that ‘box canyon’ out there… wouldn’t you get on the radio and WARN them that ‘something wicked your way comes’?… or at least just have checked with them to make damn sure THEY could see it?
They would have been only about ‘halfway’ through the descent at that point with plenty of time for ‘full reverse’ to get back up onto that two-track and over the ridge.
So these photos prove there were PLENTY of ‘lookout’ opportunities for Granite Mountain right there in Yarnell… even for the ‘shortcut’ through the box canyon. All they had to do was tell Brendan to get into a position where he could see even at least what can be seen in these photos and he could have been able to ‘continue’ his lookout duties for them and ‘eye them in’.
There was, in fact, even ‘higher ground’ just behind where these photos were taken that would have then obviously provided an even BETTER view ‘out there’ in this same timeframe.
It is almost additional proof that there WAS some kind of effort being made to HIDE this ‘move’ on Marsh and Steed’s part. If not… then WHY would they have not gotten on the radio and asked Brendan if he could just get into a position to see exactly what we are seeing ourselves now in these photos?
Heck… they still could have done that over intra-crew and asked Brendan to get into SOME useful ‘lookout’ spot there in town without ‘broadcasting’ their decision or their plans. No one would have noticed Brendan just acting as ‘lookout’ there in town. People were too busy evacuating.
I wish that ‘Assembly of God’ church building wasn’t even there in these photos. If it wasn’t… I think a super-enhancement on these photos out in the area of the box canyon might actually SHOW Granite Mountain on their descent.
WTKTT
Again I go back to who should be assigned as a lookout.
A well trained Foreman would have done two things got the trucks safe and found a spot to communicate with the crew and get eyes on them and resume his lookout responsibilities. That is how it works Brenden was not trained or confident enough to do the position he was assigned. He was not one of the supervisors so only took orders and did not make any decisions as a well trained lookout should. As you said no one knew that they took the walk thru the brush last known they were in the black and safe.
Was Gary Cordes at the Ranch House acting as a lookout?
I am asking because at the very beginning of the Russ Reason video, there appears to be a FF with a white helmet above the parking lot( above the GM crew carrier on the left.)
Also, there are several pictures in the ASFD miscellaneous folder that appear to be taken from that location. There are several people in these images and they are zooming very close and taking pictures to the DZ and the route GM took.
I am referencing images 445 -456 of 617 in the miscellaneous folder..
image 445 of 617 is titled Img_20130706_112134_254.jpg
Those are Mike Reichling’s photos. They were taken July 5. They’re not only in the Misc folder, they’re also in a folder under his name. In a subfolder called “Extra Photos Yarnell Hill Fire” which is in a subfolder called “Yarnell Hill Fire Photos.”
Anybody want to make a site map for the Dropbox folders?
Mike Reichling was the Public Information Officer from Sunday on.
And, no, Gary was not Lookouting the Restaurant. He was evacuating people from the Norton Way area while the crews were exiting Shrine Road, then he went down to the RHR and checked in, and then he went into Glen Illah to evacuate that area.
But I’m thinking, all things considered, somebody would have been keeping a lookout over that area.
General eye on the fire and what it was doing, not a specific lookout for individual crews. Any OPS should have been doing that. Again no such statements in the investigations on any one doing lookout duty except the individual crew assigned lookouts.
Thanks Marti.
I read Cordes ADOSH interview and want to note that he said there was a lookout posted above the Ranch House but he thought that happened 7/1. But he said that he was possibly getting that confused.
What was Reicling’s role on the YHF 6/30?
Reichling was Public Information Officer on June 30. And into the next week/IMT.
Just perused the Reason video. I don’t see anybody up there. Knowing that fire was barreling down towards there, I would have wanted someone up high. Heck, I probably would have put them on the roof,
Marti. Thanks again. Take another look, there is a FF in a yellow shirt and a white helmet. I would bet good money on it.
BTW, I am not asserting that this person was acting as a lookout for GM, or that he was aware of GM’s movement. I am simply seeing someone there and a little curious why Reichling would have been right up behind the Ranch House taking that set of photos on 7/5.
Calvin
For some reason (cuz I’ve had Safari open too long or something) there’s no “Reply” button on your comment.
When, time=wise, and where, location-wise, are you seeing that firefighter?
**
** BLUE RIDGE CAPTAIN BROWN SAYS IT WASN’T JUST THAT THERE WERE HOLES IN
** THE SWISS CHEESE… IT WAS ALL ONE BIG HOLE AND THERE WAS NO CHEESE AT ALL.
Followup on an exchange down below and a Reply to Mr. Powers…
>> WTKTT said…
>>
>> So… Esquibel says he felt no responsibility for Blue Ridge whatsoever…. and Esquibel
>> also gets no ‘get out’ order direct from Gary Cordes in either his capacity as one of
>> Esquibel’s lookouts OR as his direct SPGS supervisor… and then there is no evidence,
>> in turn, that Esquibel made any attempt to broadcast any kind of similar ‘get out’ order
>> to ALL of even his OWN resources over the radio…. including the ones that were NOT
>> there with him in the Youth Camp area.
>>
>> Everyone was just ‘on their own’… it seems.
>>
>> It is certainly a good thing that Brian Frisby and Trueheart Brown were ‘on the ball’
>> and totally ‘looking out for themselves’ that day.
>>
>> Blue Ridge had TOTALLY ‘fallen through the cracks’ and it seems NO ONE felt ‘responsible’
>> for them. If they had also been in any kind of ‘blind spot’ that day ( like the fellas in Harper
>> Canyon ) and/or depending on someone to ‘notify’ them about anything… they could have
>> easily all DIED that day as well.
>> On July 23, 2014 at 7:00 am, Bob Powers replied…
>>
>> And Everybody Did EVERY THING RIGHT.
>> The Investigation should have come down on the overhead.
>> It’s happened before they should have been recommended for a
>> down grade in fire positions or removed as type 2 certifications.
>> There should have been more said in both investigations on this matter.
>> We cannot continue to not Identify who made mistakes and what they
>> were for fear of LAW SUITS……….
It really, truly is a GOOD thing that Blue Ridge seemed to be fully aware they had totally ‘fallen through the cracks’ that day and that they needed to be EXTRA careful to ‘watch out for themselves’… because no one else was.
Even around NOON that day… Blue Ridge Captain Trueheart Brown was responding to offhand comments from some of his ‘seasonals’ about the whole thing starting to look like classic ‘Swiss Cheese with HOLES’… and Brown came back and said it was much worse than that.
Captain Brown told his crew members…
“We need a piece of cheese. This is just one big hole.”
From page 8 of the SAIT’s ‘Yarnell Investigation Notes’ ( YIN ) document…
‘B & T’ shorthand below means ‘Brian Frisby and Trueheart Brown’
‘B4’ shorthand means ‘BEFORE’.
‘AA’ shorthand means ‘Air Attack’.
‘True’ and ‘Trew’ shorthand is referring to BR Captain Trueheart Brown
—————————————————————————————————–
SAIT Interview with Blue Ridge IHC Supt: Brian Frisby Foreman: True Brown
Squad Boss: Travis Fueller and Cory Ball
Interviewed by Godot, Jay, Jimmie, Tim, Jim, and Mike 07/10/2013
—————————————————————————————————–
The crew witness’ a near miss with the VLAT and the helitanker.
B4 B & T get back to the buggies, Travis feels that AA sounds overwhelmed,
the air show seemed troublesome. The helos seemed to be free lancing
dropping where they want, no one directing them on tactics.
This is when the helitanker splits the east flank.
The tankers and helo’s aren’t picking up the black and establishing good
black, no solid anchor point. Hit and miss, spotty, unanchored drops of water.
Tankers were going indirect, this is when True says were going defensive around 1200-1215.
This is when the seasonals say, this is like the Swiss cheese effect.
Trew comes back with we need a piece of cheese. This is just one big hole.
—————————————————————————————————–
And as I have said over and over Good Crew leaders are responsible for and look after their crews no matter what else is going on. All Hot Shot Crews are that way.
What was the Granit mountain Crew leaders thinking?
Mr Powers. In my humblest opinion after reading the testimony and pictures from the YHF (and other publicly available information), that is not true.
First, did you see the Ash Creek Fire videos from 2012? There was a hotshot crew (and others) caught with an inadequate SZ that was still being cleared when the fire caught them. Vehicles had to be shifted around in an attempt to avoid direct contact from the flames, while gasoline cans were in the truck beds, unprotected.
Second. There is evidence from the YHF that supports the fact that Cory Ball and Justin Hernandez, who were both reporting to Trew Brown, were somewhere in Glen Isla at the time of the burnover. There is even more evidence that Justin Hernandez (who was not carded) was somewhere with the bulldozer, and could not be located for an extended period of time AFTER GM was found.
No, that does not appear to be true, and it doesn’t appear (IMO) that all the rules are followed all the time.
With all due respect!
The thing is, not all Supt’s and IHC’s are created equal. Not every decision will be the same but coming to an agreement and the same conclusion is the desired outcome. And bottom line is people are different and will make different decisions than the guy on his right or left. Human factors in fire is a real thing and you need to trust the people around you. Those guys in the Ash Cr video, the SZ experience, those poor cows. That was a decision those leaders made and it’s difficult not to look with hindsight and say WTF? Those guys will never forget that. People make different decisions and not every firefighter thinks alike, even when it has to do with bringing your people home alive.
Ash Creek Fire
No body got burned no body died and no body used Fire Shelters. SZ not the best but served its purpose.
Again I say 100 Hot Shot Crews seeing at least 50 fire’s each
per year 50,000 fires How many Fatalities?
Hernandez total story has not been finished But he turned up
And BR seemed to be not concerned about him must have known something.
As I said most crew leaders take care of their crews.
and most have never deployed shelters that’s real statistics.
And I will agree all the rules are not followed all the time.
But With all due respect I have been there on many occasions and I respect the fire fighters that are out there every day Because I know what they face.
I’m with you Bob. That Ash Cr fire was normal ops, the SZ was adequate and that’s why it was chosen and the Supervisors believed they were doing their best. Supts and crew leaders end goal is to bring their people home. Bumping rigs around also is what you do and I understand it. My point was even though this is normal ops in firefighting the people that experienced it won’t forget it and there’s something to be learned from it. I also have been there an occasion or two and have never forgotten it…and I respect the hell out of every firefighter out there.
I also believe with technology and social media the public gets to see exactly what it’s like and it blows their minds. If you haven’t been on the line then you really don’t know.
Well said–Safety zones are very seldom comfortable.
No lawn chairs and Ice cold refreshments. It is always a hot place
with reflected heat, smoke and dirt /ash blowing all over the place
That’s the best I can do to explain it. To first year recruits it can look and be scary. Your in the middle of an inferno and you can feel the heat and see the flames.
From all that has been stated below We do a disservice to the Fire Fighters crew and engine strike teams by not identifying lack of supervision and fire safety by Overhead. If you cant preform your job to the expectations of Fire Managers you need to be removed from Type I, II, III Teams. There should have been write ups on this team for total mismanagement of this fire. The Hell with the Law Suits.
The Wild Land Fire service is Playing with Dynamite. If they do not recognize these failures.
Would a better team of Overhead have stopped what happened to GM and the rest of the Fire Fighters?
MAYBE. Granit Mountain still has responsibility for the decisions they made to put them where they were. No Safety Officer or Quality Overhead could have changed that with out knowledge of what GM intended to do. Hard Facts But True. A crew always has responsibility for its immediate safety.
And The wild Land Fire service still says there first priority is Safety. We need to change our Fire Gods They are failing the Wild Land Fire Fighters Buy allowing these things to not be addressed.
NIFC find some new answers you have a failing grade from me and many other Retired Fire Fighters. A complete Overhaul of the qualifications of your Identified type I, II, III Teams for starters..
Reply to Bob Powers post on July 23, 2014 at 7:34 am
>> Bob Powers said
>> A complete Overhaul of the qualifications of your Identified
>> type I, II, III Teams for starters..
…and a complete REVIEW of the qualifications of existing card holders… Hotshot supervisors, captains and squad bosses included.
It would not have ( and still wouldn’t ) HURT to have official memos go out requiring
these system-wide ‘reviews’ to take place… even now.
Following an incident like this… and the facts and circumstances that can already be proven… it would have been ( and still would be ) the SAFE and the SMART thing to do.
Are the people we are sending out to manage these incidents on behalf of the taxpayers who pay for all of this stuff really, truly capable of doing the work according to ALL accepted rules, regulations and guidelines. Periodic and/or Regular system-wide reviews like this ( done seriously ) can do TWO things. They can PROVE that YES… most of them ARE… and they can also provide the opportunity to discover that NO… some of them are NOT…. and perhaps prevent something bad from happening BEFORE it happens.
Personally.. I also think it’s an ongoing opportunity to take a hard look at this whole concept of the ‘on call’ system and/or using ‘retirees’ for critical management positions on ANY Incident level which, in a way, is the ‘story of Yarnell’.
One problem, however.
Even calling for such system-wide review(s) means admitting that ‘something was wrong’ in Yarnell on June 30, 2013.
That seems to be the ONE thing that management still can’t bring itself to admit, publicly.
I also think there has been an ongoing ‘missed opportunity’ for a complete review of how Air and Ground forces ‘operate’ on these incidents. The subtext of the Yarnell incident ( and the evidence that has emerged ) has always been ‘telling a story’ there, as well…. and it’s not a pretty one. That also seems to be a story about people just “doing their own thing” and not being either fully managed, supervised, or integrated into the ‘overall plan’.
Example: In both the testimony from Air Support people AND the Panebaker Air-to-Air radio channel captures… it is perfectly obvious that Air Support was fully aware of things like serious wind-shifts and new threats emerging on the ground BEFORE anyone on the ground was… but there also isn’t much evidence that Air Support was even vaguely aware of who was ‘down there’ doing anything… or of them passing on what THEY seemed to ‘know’ to the ground forces themselves. They were ‘peripherally’ aware of some of that… but not to any detailed degree. They were just busy ‘doing what they do’ and assuming whoever was ‘down there’ was ‘doing what they do’ as well… but there wasn’t a whole lot of ‘coordination’ or ‘cooperation’ or ‘sharing of information’ going on. There should have been… and I think if that was what ‘normal’ Air Support on and established up-level WFF Incident ‘looks like’… then THAT all needs a pretty serious ‘re-evaluation’ as well.
I just hope the LEGACY description of Yarnell… years from now and after OTHER incidents have taken place… doesn’t become just a story of “the missed opportunity for change / improvements” back in 2013.
I am outside the system as a Retiree and they wont pay much attention to me or you WTKTT.
It will take an inside push from current Fire Fighters and Fire staff to get a review or team assigned to evaluate the problems which have surfaced on this fire.
Because it was not a Federal Fire the FS and BLM are throwing the blame on the Arizona State and not looking in their own back yards.
This seems to be the brush off that Safety Matters got from the National Interagency Fire Center NIFC in Boise after they sent their Safety recommendations to Them.
The big problem is the Political blame game, its your problem not ours, We weren’t in charge you were, Feds vs State, Its not a national issue.
All the above happens and no one works together for change.
The Fire Gods all look like they are cooperating when they all have their own agenda and Fiefdom,
I guess that’s something I have never understood.
Yes… you are right… it was ‘officially’ a ‘State Fire’ and the buck can be then be passed back and forth so fast no one can even see that it’s ‘all green’ anymore….
HOWEVER… for all intents and purposes… it was a precious FEDERAL resource that was lost that day. A fully certified United States Department of Agriculture Forestry Service Division Type 1 Interagency Hotshot crew.
It doesn’t matter who the ‘sponsors’ were ( in this case… a municipal fire department ). Those men were FULLY certified USFS Type 1 IHC. They were part of the FEDERAL pool of those same units.
So while it was easy for some to say it was just a ‘State Run Fire’… I still don’t understand why the FEDS didn’t jump in RIGHT AWAY and say… “Maybe so… but it was OUR guys that just got killed and WE want to make sure WE find out WHY”.
It was ‘legal’ for the State of Arizona to launch that tightly controlled AZFS sponsored SAIT… but I still think the FEDS should have launched their OWN ‘investigation’ running in parallel because THEY are the ones that lost a very precious resource that day under very mysterious circumstances and it was in THEIR best interests ( and in the best interests of ALL the other Type 1 IHC Crews out there ) to make sure the real reasons for the tragedy be known as fully as humanly possible.
GM was not a USFS Hot Shot Crew. They were certified as an Interagency Hot Shot Crew which simply means they were a ‘qualified’ national resource that could respond anywhere in the country.
As such, they weren’t under the feds responsibility in any way, shape, or form, except as a municipal resource that could be ‘accessed’ nationally.
Thanks was about to jump in and say that.
also as a federal crew they would have had some federal life insurance coverage as crewmen.
Different from what GM had.
WTKTT
Reread what I said the Feds Had no jurisdiction on the Yarnell Fire. The team that was put together came from many agencies but never recommended one thing.
It was and will always be Arizona States Fire.
It is where the lines are drawn in the sand you just don’t cross jurisdiction boundaries.
So the Feds will draw their own conclusions and suggested training.
I stand corrected… but one quick question…
>> Mr. Powers said…
>> The Feds Had no jurisdiction on the Yarnell Fire..
What if it was Blue Ridge that had been wiped out… OR if that helicopter actually had taken out that VLAT?
Would the FEDS have just sat back and said “It was a State Run Fire… we have no right to investigate”?
A completely different scenario.
Now the Feds are involved.
But the State would still have the overall responsibility for the Fire. You would have the fire and Federal liability to consider. Federal Rule changes May Or May not be adopted by the State.
Ah… okay… that helps.
So it really is just an ‘ownership’ thing and the fact that the FEDS have to ‘certify’ you to even be able to claim Type 1 IHC status means nothing in this case. It’s all about who is paying for the chainsaws and the radios.
If that ‘near-miss’ between the helicopter and the ( FED OWNED ) VLAT had actually been a total crash that day… the FEDS would have done their OWN investigation and Arizona Forestry wouldn’t have had anything to say about it. Correct?
Reply to TTWARE post on July 23, 2014 at 9:15 pm
>> TTWARE said…
>> GM was not a USFS Hot Shot Crew.
>> They were certified as an Interagency Hot Shot Crew which
>> simply means they were a ‘qualified’ national resource that
>> could respond anywhere in the country.
I stand corrected… but still just a little confused. On a certain level… what you just said simply backs up what I was trying to say up above. They were CERTIFIED to be part of this ‘National Pool’ of Type 1 Hotshots Crews. They could respond ‘anywhere in the country’ just like any other Crew. The distinction seems to be simply who was ‘paying’ for the chainsaws and the radios.
>> TTWARE also wrote…
>> As such, they weren’t under the feds responsibility in
>> any way, shape, or form, except as a municipal resource
>> that could be ‘accessed’ nationally.
Again.. I stand totally corrected… but still scratching my head just a little bit.
If it was the FEDS that had to CERTIFY these guys to ‘act’ just like all the other Hotshot crews that they ARE ‘totally responsible’ for… I’m still just having a little trouble with your statement that the United States Department of Agriculture Forestry Division ( which CERTIFIED them to ‘come and play with everyone else on the FED team ) had ‘no responsibility whatsoever’ for them.
What if it had turned out that they were NOT ‘qualified’ or that the FEDERAL ‘certification’ process itself was all messed up.
Would the FEDS have then been able to shrug their shoulders and just say… “Hey… whadda want from us. They weren’t ours. No way.”?
There IS ‘involvement’ here on the FEDS part… I guess I’m just having trouble getting my head around it.
You are close to the answer—–
State, county Municipal Crews. Equipment –Engines, Cats, Trained pickup crews are all certified Before being used or put up as available by the National Interagency Fire Centers.
Each Fire has a jurisdiction in charge who get resources from all over. That jurisdiction still holds responsibility for the Fire. and Payment for resources used. The certification allows them to become a resource not an ownership of the resource but a contract agreement for use by request.
Also an air craft crash would have been investigated by the FAA as well as the contract Gove or other agency.
separate of the Fire.
I agree with what you are saying on one level.
On the other hand. I’ve been REALLY wondering about how this could possibly actually ultimately eventually play out, all things considered, in light of Public Law 107-203, enacted July 24, 2002, after the Cramer Fire, and then used, very retroactively and very vindictively, to prosecute Elreese Daniels after the 30-Mile Fire. I’m not sure this whole framework might not be eventually used, and it certainly is playing a HUGE part, in the still burning trainwreck in the wake of the Yarnell Hill Fire.
The wording of that law (which the authors of it eventually regretted how they worded it, given the destructive consequences–but it hasn’t been changed) is as follows:
“In the case of each fatality of an officer or employee of the Forest Service that occurs due to wildfire entrapment or burnover, the Inspector General of the Department of Agriculture shall conduct an investigation of the fatality. The investigation shall not
rely on, and shall be completely independent of, any investigation of the fatality that is conducted by the Forest Service.”
Here’s a link to that law:
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-107publ203/pdf/PLAW-107publ203.pdf
One problem of this is that, once the Inspector General conducts that investigation, the Department of Justice can then use those findings to, in turn, indict and try someone for whatever mistakes they may have made.
And furthermore, when Elreese Daniels was indicted, the second sentence of that law was completely ignored. In other words, his testimony in the original USFS investigation, which should have been protected under the 5th Amendment, was used against him.
This whole saga has resulted in many USfS Incident Commanders and others in responsible leadership positions either buying a ton of liability insurance in order to be able to “lawyer up” in case something goes wrong, or just walking away from the whole realm of fire-fighting.
Fire Fighters are seriously not at all happy about all of this.
The non-cooperation of the USFS in the ADOSH investigation, and their gagging of their employees is a direct result of this history. All things considered, I’m sure the Blue Ridge Hotshots and other USFS employees on this fire are totally relieved that their employer did what it did.
And, given what was written after all those wonderful open interviews by ADOSH, and the wording of the resulting lawsuits, I’m seriously willing to bet really big money that a whole lot of other people involved in this fire are really wishing that either their employers could have “gag-ordered” them, also, or that they would have (with the benefit of 50/50 hindsight) gag-ordered themselves.
Is this the way to get to the truth and the necessary Lessons Learned? Apparently, according to a whole lot of actual wildland fire-fighters, it isn’t.
And so, in specific relationship to your post, and in the context of all of the above…….I’m not willing to completely, and, I think, naively, assume that the qualified Superintendent of a qualified Interagency Hotshot Crew might not ever be determined to be an “officer” of the USFS.
This stuff has gotten, in the past, and still can get really viciously crazy.
And this is also why I am choosing to stay out of the “OFF WITH THEIR HEADS!” mindset.
Here’s a response to what happened from a seasoned wildland firefighter:
“My “Take” on the ICT3 Situation Resulting from an OIG Investigation: An Argument for All Federal Fire Managers getting Federal Liability Insurance
3/8/05″
http://www.wildlandfire.com/docs/cramer/cramer-legal2.htm
Start there. Go further.
Well said but remember there is a difference between a
Federal employee and a State or County/City Employee.
A Superintendent of a HS crew that is not a Federal Employee is not covered by the Officer statement.
Interagency HS crews have always BLM or FS until they added this new concept Internally they may drop the certification of non Fed. HS Crews after this. Reverting back to certifying Type 2 crews only of which there are many. They are not Identified as Hot Shots.
GM base funding was not from the Gov. but the City they worked for So if on a non Fed Fire they were a state resource as the Fed crew was a Coop resource.
On a fed Fire The GM crew was a Coop resource from a non Fed agency. Went around in circles there hope that makes since. They are under contract as a specific type of crew but not owned by the Fed’s. All Fed Crews are certified as Interagency HS crews and owned by the feds not under contract to them since they are employees.
How ever those resources are under co-op agreements to States or other municipality agreements.
Thanks Bob. I now understand and that is really helpful.
‘About Joy–yes there is a photo as we were coming out of a man on the boulders —I have not seen it yet but will. You would have thought she would have sent it to me first but did send to Holly and John Daughterly. I understand neither got it or the photo was too blurry. They want the origional. As it is, her PC did crash so now getting to the origional will take some time. I have 100 per cent trust in Joy on this, so please do not antagonize her– she will do her best to get it out. The photo has been there for over a year, investigators have it, since all her photos (except the missing sd card) were turned over to them soon after the incident. I suppose because they never saw the importance of those photos they never searched them–Joy did a few days ago and found this man just per chance.
We discussed it and there is a slim possibility that it was a Saturday photo, the day before the fire since we had hiked toward the fire the day before. Two things had delayed us that day–we started a bit late to fight the manzanita the way we had to go, and then sighting a bear convinced Joy to try another day. However, the day before does not make sense so I think she has a photo of Marsh if that hard hat appears at all red. She says it could be white or else the sun is shining on it.
The alternative, if it truly is a Sunday photo and not Marsh, would be a look out trying to spot the GM crew or else a look out for a back burn. Ted, 11 year smoke jumper, told me he did not see that they would have done a backburn for Yarnell, but they could have to save the Helms place. Those that do these things for a living let me know what you think.
Hey guys be soft with Joy on this. Her PC is down, she had to borrow her brother in laws lap top and it went down as well. They got the lap top working but the photos are on that desk top hard drive that has now a blue screen. She does not have the money at this time to get things back in operation there. When her friends PC went down like that it was $700 to get it back up and get the info. Consider that her husbands hours have been cut at Ruger–I wonder if this is due to her being on the people’s side in the suit–maybe even the pc down since we are talking near a billion in money here–but get the kindness of Ruger–they did give him a 50 cent raise with hours cut. That amounts to a measly $4 a day increase if he worked the full 8 hours–costs me more for a meal at MacDonalds–thanks Ruger for your gracious raise.
Anyhow Joy is considering to go to Mayo Clinic if her mom helps. She has had some bad doctoring (probably why I prefer snakebite medicine to doctor meds). See they once left a knife in her chest (yes i did see the documents) and that left her with a staff infection and a situation no woman or man should have to suffer. She never sued and hates being a part of that sort of thing. What I an saying is that I do not have resources to send her more money at this time. But if any of you are wealthy enough to help them then please do. I am not ashamed to ask and do because Joy would never do so. She indeed has helped many, not only those in Yarnell but outside.
I am here and see the homeless a lot. There is a guy, alcoholic, but I know they stole his sleeping bag. I told Joy and she said then give him yours. I did the next day, and he has thanked me several times. That was exactly what my son was like who is now passed. He came to a camp where we had a mine without a sleeping bag once. I asked him why–he said I gave it away to a homeless guy with a $20 and his jacket–he saw him out of globe without a coat and walking in the cold wind so he turned around and did that. It brings tears to my eyes right now and you can see why this investigation and the truth is so important for the loved ones. I never had closure because the true cause of his death was never revealed. The loved ones deserve the unaltered facts of the case. Future fire fighters need this information as well.
I intend to hike the Mann Gulch area around the first of August. I did find out you can come in by dirt road and it is only a mile and half hike but very steep. A local fire gusy says there are bears in there but Ted Putnam says he saw sign but no bears.. Ted certainly puts different light on things and his four hikes up there, augmented by previous hikes, has him revealing another cover up ofto be the order of the day. Thanks Ted and all others involved in getting the straight story out there. facts in that case. Whew, people have so many agendas so that these cover up situations seem
**
** PEEPLES VALLEY FIREFIGHTER BOB BRANDON’S OWN ACCOUNT,
** ( IN HIS OWN WORDS ) OF HOW HE AND THOSE SEVEN OTHER FIREFIGHTERS
** ALMOST DIED IN THE SHRINE AREA ON JUNE 30, 2013
**
** CONTAINS PROOF THAT THERE IS STILL LOTS OF EVIDENCE BEING ‘WITHHELD’.
It’s only been 21 days since the first anniversary of the Yarnell Hill fire… and I’m still coming across *NEW* information amongst the plethora of interviews and testimonies that ’emerged’ with all the media coverage surrounding the 1 year anniversary.
This post covers that Prescott Daily Courier article that “The Truth Will Always Remain Elusive” ( TTWARE ) posted about on July 1, 2014… the day after the anniversary. It’s the one that contains the interviews with Peeples Valley Firefighters Ron Smith and Bob Brandon and their ‘never heard before’ accounts of how they and 6 other firefighters almost burned to death on Shrine road on June 30, 2013.
It ALSO contains a LINK below to yet ANOTHER newly discovered account of this ‘near fatal’ incident. It is sitting on the ‘Yarnell Recovery Group’ website and is Bob Brandon himself giving a detailed account of this same incident ‘in his own words’ and NOT filtered through a newspaper reporter.
First things first… though.
Regarding the ‘Prescott Daily Courier’ article that appeared July 1, 2014…
It’s the article that reveals they ( Peeples Valley FFs Bob Brandon and Matt Keehner ) didn’t just ‘accidentally’ move the vehicles away from the Youth Camp and ended up stranding the 6 men who were still out working at the west end of Harper Canyon. They now say they were ORDERED to ‘move them’ despite their protests and the fact that they explained about the other 6 men who were STILL OUT THERE to the WEST and depending on those vehicles to be right where they were in that ( as the article itself refers to it ) ‘Youth Camp Safety Zone’. The person who told them to move the vehicles didn’t care. He ORDERED them to basically ABANDON the other 6 men and move their vehicles anyway. All he said was “Those men can’t run that fast” ( Meaning… just let them DEPLOY SHELTERS or something ).
Exact quote(s) from this July 1, 2014 Prescott Daily Courier Article…
“Their group supervisor pulled up and told Brandon and Keehner they had to move their trucks out. Brandon refused, telling the commander that his crew was still in there. The supervisor repeated his order, saying the other guys couldn’t run that fast. Brandon didn’t want to think about what the supervisor meant. Brandon and Keehner followed the order, but tried to move as slowly as possible as they turned on the trucks and headlights.”
NOTE: In my own original reply to TTWARE’s post I said that this ‘supervisor’ probably had to be Tyson Equibel… who was the TFLD(t) (Trainee) under SPGS Cordes that was directly responsible for that Harper Canyon / Shrine Road effort that afternoon.
I am now not so sure about this.
The title ‘Group Supervisor’ would ALSO fit ‘Structure Protection Group Supervisor’ ( SPGS ) Gary Cordes and HIS ‘title’ that day… even though there is nothing in the evidence record that indicates Gary Cordes himself was ever physically present out there at the Youth Camp in this timeframe.
Also… in the NEW account of this incident just found, Bob Brandon says directly that he and the other Peeples Valley Firefighters involved in this near-fatal incident had no frickin’ idea they were even PART of any kind of GROUP that day. No one had ever even TOLD them that. They only found out about that the next day. In the NEW account… Brandon doesn’t ever use the words ‘group’ or ‘supervisor’ to describe this person who was ordering them to abandon the other firefighters. He only ever uses the phrase ‘Incident Commander’ to describe this person. So was the phrase ‘Group Supervisor’ versus ‘Incident Commander’ only appearing in the July 1 Daily Courier article out of ‘hindsight’… and the person giving the order really *might* have been identifying himself to Brandon that day as the ‘Incident Commander’? More about this down below.
Here is TTWARE’s original recent post from Chapter VII about the July 1 Courier article…
>> The Truth Will Always Remain Elusive says
>> July 1, 2014 at 8:24 pm
>> Also, in the recent flurry of articles the Courier published for the one
>> year anniversary, there were some facts provided regarding the rumored,
>> but only very briefly documented story of the crew that was running for
>> their lives in the Shrine area, only to find their vehicles gone from where
>> they parked them.
>>
>> This paricular incident involved members of the Peeples Valley Fire
>> Department, and the article was about them. Their leader was ordered by an
>> overhead supervisor to move the vehicles, and when he resisted because the
>> crew was still out on the line at the time the fire was blowing up, he was then
>> absolutely ordered to move them, there-by abandoning the rest of the crew and
>> leaving them to fend for themselves. The superior giving the order was not
>> identified in the article.
>>
>> That overhead supervisor apparently was not concerned enough to go out and
>> make direct contact with the crew and let them know he was ordering their
>> vehicles be moved, along with assuring that they were going to be indeed, safe.
>> Not a nice suprise to find out when you’re running for your lives to the vehicles
>> you’re hoping will deliver you from death.
>>
>> The link to the article is here:
http://dcourier.com/main.asp?SectionID=1&SubSectionID=1086&ArticleID=133345&TM=83850.59
For the sake of completeness… ( yes… this is going to end up a LONG post )… and in case that original Prescott Daily Courier article actually ‘disappears’… here is the part of the article that contains the details about what happened on Shrine road the afternoon of June 30, 2013…
———————————————————————————————————
The Prescott Daily Courier – 6/30/2014 6:00:00 AM
A Narrow escape: Peeples Valley firefighters recount that frightening day
By: Joanna Dodder Nellans of The Daily Courier
———————————————————————————————————
YARNELL – Bob Brandon and Ron Smith feel lucky to be alive after running for their lives from the Yarnell Hill wildfire.
They were among the Peeples Valley firefighters working in a valley on the west edge of Yarnell, only about three-quarters of a mile from the site where the flames overran 19 Granite Mountain Hotshots and killed them on June 30, 2013.
Four Peeples Valley firefighters, two from Wickenburg and two from Sun City were cutting a line between the wildfire and the town of Yarnell on that fateful day. It was the same line that the Blue Ridge and the Granite Mountain hotshot crews were helping to build.
When Brandon and Smith arrived on the property near the Shrine of St. Joseph that day, the blaze was threatening their own community of Peeples Valley to the north instead of Yarnell. They figured they would just be doing mop-up work.
The Blue Ridge Hotshots and the eight men from Yarnell, Wickenburg and Sun City came together from different directions at about 2:30 p.m. and followed a bulldozer to improve the line behind it.
The dozer apparently was unable to cross a deep ravine and turned around. The eight men from Yarnell, Wickenburg and Sun City had to cut through the last quarter-mile or so of dense oak, catclaw and manzanita on their own.
Brandon said he later found out from the dozer operator that he left not because of the ravine, but because he had been warned that the fire changed course.
The Blue Ridge Hotshots left about the same time, Brandon said.
Capt. Brandon had placed Peeples Valley firefighter Matt Keehner as a lookout on a hill of boulders where the fire line was supposed to end.
The hill was between the firefighters and the fire. About 3 p.m. Keehner came down, telling Brandon he heard on the radio about a change in the weather but he was unclear about the nature of the change.
Smith said he stopped for the hourly weather report at 3 and heard the wind was shifting to the east, but he never heard later that the wind shifted again to the southeast.
“We didn’t think we were in immediate danger, or they wouldn’t put us in there,” Smith said.
Brandon, who was stationed with the vehicles, noticed an air tanker stopped dropping retardant on an east-to-west line and moved to a north-south line.
Brandon and Keehner decided to move their water tender and engine away from the thick brush and closer to the house on the property.
Brandon was in shock when he got out of the water tender and looked up in the sky at about 3:45 p.m.
“The smoke and fire was going straight up and I thought, ‘Holy crap,'” he related. The flames on the other side of the 60-foot to 70-foot-high hill where Keehner had stood were twice as high as the hill, and they were coming toward the firefighters.
“The heat was just tremendous, it was like waves,” he said. “All the tops of the trees just went ‘snap snap snap’ like that on fire.”
Brandon feared his fellow firefighters would have to deploy their shelters. The fire was too loud to talk. In the midst of the chaos, he texted them and they said they were OK.
Their group supervisor pulled up and told Brandon and Keehner they had to move their trucks out. Brandon refused, telling the commander that his crew was still in there. The supervisor repeated his order, saying the other guys couldn’t run that fast.
Brandon didn’t want to think about what the supervisor meant.
Brandon and Keehner followed the order, but tried to move as slowly as possible as they turned on the trucks and headlights.
They went about 100 feet to the shrine parking lot and waited at the end of the ravine, hoping their buddies would run straight to them through the sandy gulch. They decided they wouldn’t go any farther until they saw their buddies. Then they spotted them running down the road, followed by the Wickenburg and Sun City vehicles.
“It happened so fast,” Smith said. He credits fellow Peeples Valley Capt. Jake Moder with saving his life by keeping a close eye on their situation while they were digging and cutting the line.
While they were building the line, Moder saw the hill to the north catching fire. Smith knew it was time to run when he saw Moder’s face as he ran toward him about 4 p.m.
“We felt impending doom,” he recalled. “We were literally running and it was coming at us fast. You could feel it burning the hair on the back of your neck and sizzling your arms.
“I didn’t think we were going to make it.”
They ran down the ravine about 100 yards and were angry when they realized the trucks were gone. But when they cut over to the paved road, they felt like they were going to survive.
“We were probably two minutes from becoming a statistic,” Smith said. “You’d have a memorial here for us.”
They ran down the paved road toward their safety zone at the shrine parking lot. The Wickenburg and Sun City firefighters offered them a ride but they could see their own trucks by then.
Smith said he realized that his buddies might have saved his life by moving the trucks, because that kept him and Moder from trying to stop and get the vehicles. It’s likely they already would have been burned up, Brandon added.
At their shrine safety zone, they heard on their radios that the fire had breached one of the evacuation trigger points but they didn’t know which one. They were supposed to have an hour from one of the trigger points to evacuate; they got about four minutes.
They heard 19 firefighters were unaccounted for, but they didn’t imagine they were dead. They thought their group supervisor might have worried it was them, since he came back up the road.
They were parked at the shrine when the fire blew over the edge of the parking lot and on over the hill to the southeast.
Then they met up with other firefighters at the Ranch House Restaurant on the east side of Highway 89 and saw the flames jump the four-lane highway.
“It was just like being in a war,” Brandon said. Someone wanted to set up a triage for potential burn victims but others figured it couldn’t be a good spot for that because of all the falling embers and smoke.
“It was like trying to breathe through the thickest, rottenest smoke in your life,” Brandon said. “It was just soup.”
Despite covering his nose and mouth with his shirt, Brandon felt his nose and throat burning and knew he had to get away.
On the way from the restaurant parking lot to the incident command post, the firefighters heard that some firefighters were missing. At the IC post, they heard the firefighters died while deploying their shelters, and then later that night they found out it was the Granite Mountain Hotshots.
The next day, Smith and Moder helped put out spot fires on a dozer trail built for investigators to access the site where the hotshots died. Smith later served as an honor guard at the scene, while Brandon and Moder helped close off the area.
Brandon and Keehner helped douse structures and extinguish spot fires in Yarnell, including a burning manzanita right next to his friend’s house. Keehner’s parents lost their home.
Brandon suffered injuries to his nasal passages and throat in the blaze. He couldn’t breathe at night and often ended up trying to sleep in a sitting position. He tried to be tough and use nose drops but that only made it worse. His nose became red and swollen and his voice sounded like gravel.
He tried to deal with the issue on his own while he oversaw the Yarnell Recovery Group’s efforts to rebuild uninsured homes lost in the fire.
He finally gave in and filed a medical claim with the fire department about six months after the fire. He underwent surgery to remove polyps from his nose on May 27.
He still has a sore nose and throat and bowed vocal cords, he has to use a steroid spray, and he has to wash out his sinuses twice daily. But he can breathe.
Smith’s injuries are more psychological. He knew the Granite Mountain Hotshots from various training courses, and GMHS Supt. Eric Marsh was among his instructors.
“These guys will be remembered for lifetimes,” he said. “They’ll change the way fires are fought.
“It really brought a lot of people together. It tore some apart, too.”
For Brandon and Smith, it brought them together.
“I’d follow Bob into a dirty bathroom and mop the floor,” Smith said. “He’s my mentor.”
Brandon, a former Peeples Valley fire chief who helped start the department, hopes that one of the lessons learned from the fire is that fire commanders will listen more to local firefighters.
He said Peeples Valley firefighters wanted to hike in and put out the Yarnell Hill wildfire the day lightning ignited it, but were told to stand down.
Smith said the Yarnell Hill fire taught him to pay much closer attention to the weather on the fire line.
“I will always be on top of it now,” he said, noting he took a weather class at the Arizona Wildfire Academy this year. “We knew the fire was going toward Peeples Valley, and we never thought about it coming back on us.”
———————————————————————————————————
END OF PRESCOTT DAILY COURIER ARTICLE
———————————————————————————————————
** ANOTHER ACCOUNT – IN BOB BRANDON’S OWN WORDS…
Well… as it turns out… there is yet ANOTHER detailed account of what was happening there on Shrine road and this one is NOT ‘filtered’ through an MSM reporter.
Bob Brandon himself has posted his OWN account… in his OWN words… on a PUBLIC website/blog associated with the Yarnell Hill Recovery Effort.
NOTE: Since there is already ONE link included in this post up above… I will post the DIRECT LINK to this Bob Brandon ‘in his own words’ story as a REPLY to this message in order to observe the ‘only one link per message’ rule.
Again… for the sake of completeness… and in case the PUBLIC blog post from Bob Brandon ends up ‘disappearing’… here is ‘his story’ sans the second half where he has finished describing his involvement with the fire itself and then just recounts his involvement with the recovery effort. That, itself, is a fascinating story… and everyone really should go to the link that will be posted as a ‘Reply’ to this message and read that part as well.
———————————————————————————————————
START OF BOB BRANDON’S ACCOUNT IN HIS OWN WORDS
———————————————————————————————————
Bob Brandon
Gets Caught in the Firestorm, Helps Rebuild
On June 30, 7:30 a.m., we all met for a briefing at Model Creek School, which was the Incident Command Post. The commander said we were in a sector, I don’t remember if it was Zulu or not. But we were to go down Shrine as far as we could go to that abandoned house that’s at the end.
Peeples Valley had two trucks. I was the tender driver. We were to go to that ranch house and then into the black area, the burned area west of that house, and we were to start clearing a roadway for a firebreak to connect with a bulldozer that would be coming from Glen Ilah so the fire could not come back into Yarnell.
My job was to map out the safety zone and send a lookout up on top of Boulder Mountain so we would have a zone to get back to and a lookout to tell them if anything starts going bad.
Probably mid-afternoon, the bulldozer came rambling through the woods. It kind of looked like Jurasic Park, knocking down trees, clearing a roadway. When it arrived at our location, I was just sitting by my tanker taking pictures of it because it was just kind of an awesome site.
When he pushed though the woods and got to our location, all of a sudden, he turned around, did a 180 and took off. He never finished the roadway he was supposed to do for us. We were confused because now we had to finish it by ourselves.
As I was waiting for my guys, I could hear the chainsaws. I look up and I’m looking at the slurry bomber that was going from south to north toward Peeples Valley. It would go by at regular intervals and then it would drop its slurry way to the north of us so I wasn’t concerned. I just figured that was his flight path.
Maybe around 3 p.m., or approximately that time, we started noticing that the slurry bomber was not going from north to south, but east to west. It had changed direction.
About that time, the Blue Ridge Hot Shots arrived on our scene and they started to march in. It was actually a two-pronged attack on this road we were supposed to be cutting. We were to the north and they were to the south of us along the bulldozed road.
Then the sky started really looking funny. To that point we never had any smoke or fire to speak of that was threatening us. The fire was quite a ways away, about a mile. My lookout came down off the mountain and said that there was a problem because he just got the weather report and they talked about the changing winds, but he didn’t understand what it meant.
We looked up behind Boulder Mountain and we noticed that the fire was standing straight up, right behind Boulder Mountain about 100 feet high. And we’re thinking, That’s not right. Because the fire was way north of us, clear up to Peeples Valley.
As the sky started to darken, we were getting really nervous about what was going on. Well the Hot Shots from Blue Ridge came running out of the woods, and I mean just as fast as they could go, and this was heavy forest. They just came running out of the woods, jumped in their trucks and left. And I’m thinking, Wait a minute. They’re professionals. We do this on a volunteer basis, so what aren’t we seeing?
I had an alarm that we had set up. I was going to turn the siren on and start pressing the siren so they could hear us, and that meant to abandon and come back and we’ll get out. Well, when I started the alarm, the Incident Commander for our area came pulling up, and he said, “I want you to get these trucks out of here.”
I says, “I can’t do that.”
He said, “You have to do it now.”
And I said, “No. There’s six men still like a mile out into the forest and they need to come back to this safe zone, because this is where they know it is.”
And he said, “No. I’m telling you to leave now.”
I told my lookout, I said, “Go to their trucks and put the keys in the ignition and start the trucks so when they come running out of the woods and they get to their truck they don’t have to look for their keys.”
He said, “We’re not going to leave,” and I said, “Yeah, we’re going to leave but we’re going to drive very slow.”
Well he didn’t want to and I told him, “We have to. This is what we have to do.”
The next instant, the fire dropped right over the top of us like a gigantic hand and everything around us was on fire. It was pitch black. Matt could not even see the hood of the truck. You could see nothing. And there were fires and fireballs and flames in every direction.
And I said, “Start driving very slow.”
I turned on all my lights and started driving very slowly down this little path back to the Shrine. That was approximately 2 ½ miles. So we were just picking our way, really slow hoping that somebody would get to us or see the truck and get in.
Well we drove all the way to the Shrine and about that time the Shrine was on fire. The hills were on fire around us and we met the IC and we told him that we’re not going any further.
We said, “We need to get our six men that are back there.” We didn’t have any radio contact with them because it was so loud. It was like being in the back of a jet aircraft on a runway.
So we were shouting at each other. About that time two Peeples Valley firefighters popped out through the black. And we got them over to the trucks and I said, “There’s still four more.”
So he jumped back up to his truck and went back up the road. And he was met with the ones coming out with their trucks. So we all did meet at the Shrine.
Our next point of deployment was to get to the Ranch House so we could make sure everybody’s safe. So we slowly drove our trucks to the Ranch House and met the congestion and confusion on Highway 89 with all the people being told to get out of town.
We were quite nervous at that. The winds were probably blowing between 40 and 50 mph, and we told them there’s not much for us to do. We made it to the Ranch House just when the fire came over the top of the highway by the Assembly of God Church and went up around the Ranch House.
So we started getting with the guys to fight the fire there. At that time, they were trying to set up a triage for anybody that got burned or suffered any trauma from this at the Ranch House, but the winds were just too great.
So we told them we were going back to the ICP at Peeples Valley, because with everything surrounding us, we couldn’t even see. We had our goggles on just to make sure we didn’t have embers blowing in our face. So we went back to the IC and that’s when we learned there was a problem.
I was fortunate enough that I had a camera in my jumper. So I was taking pictures all the time, any time I had a spare moment. And I took a picture of the slurry bomber that was actually driving right for what we later found out were the fallen firefighters.
About that time, my wife called and said she needed help because she had to get out of there and I said, “We’re in the middle of a fire fight and can’t leave,” so she had to virtually pick her way on her own and get out of there. So it was quite chaotic and probably one of the more frightening days you ever have in your life.
The four of us from Peeples Valley joined back up at the Ranch House and we decided we were going to go back to the Model Creek grade school. So we slowly made our way back.
It was 4-ish, 4:30, in the afternoon and it was pitch black. You’d think it’s nighttime. You think, well you’re going to go back and have supper or get out of this because there’s nothing for you to do there. Because at that time Glen Ilah was virtually on fire and propane tanks were blowing up all around us and we just said, “You know there’s nothing we can do. You can’t go into that. It would be like going into a war zone.”
So we told the IC we were going to go back down that way and that we would return in the morning or in the evening if they needed us, because we were basically on 24-hour duty. And we went back to Peeples Valley and waited out the evening and got ready for the next day.
We got up the next day and went back to the Ranch House, which was our sector, and they told us what they’d like for us to do was to drive down into Glen Ilah. They gave us different roads we were supposed to go in on and put out whatever we could to keep the fire from spreading any farther because there appeared to be some houses that hadn’t burned.
So we drove our trucks down in. I followed Wickenburg, I think it was. I was in a tender, which was a large tanker, and we were water support for their truck, in case they ran out of water, because Yarnell had lost all of its water and there was nothing in the fire hydrants.
So my tender was basically water supply. We spent the day putting out fires all over in the west end of Glen Ilah. And I got to be able to call a few friends, which was nice, because their house didn’t burn. I got to tell a few of them good news. I had to tell a whole bunch of them bad news.
So it was a pretty confusing couple of days. We didn’t know then that we were part of a group. Peeples Valley, Blue Ridge and Granite Mountain were all in a team that we were supposed to join up on that road.
It was funny because the next day it was almost like we had the plague because they didn’t talk to us much and I couldn’t figure out what was going on because we didn’t get an assignment. They had us just kind of sit at our truck and it gets kind of unnerving, because you’re just kind of sitting there all day.
And I come to find out that, since we were burned over, the chance was we could have lost our lives, too. They wanted us to just sit and reflect for the day. So we did.
Our other men, two of the other firefighters from Peeples Valley, went in with the team to where the 19 firefighters passed away. And they were basically fire suppression up to the Helms house so the investigation could go in and take care of it. So they actually had an assignment for that day to put out little trees and bushes and things like that so they could actually get into that location.
The next day they took us in and debriefed us. This was two days after the incident with the 19. They went through and looked at my pictures and took a flash card of them. And I don’t know what they did with them, but it was pretty good because my pictures had timelines on them, so they could see what happened at what time.
Then they took information off our cellphones because that’s how we talked to, texted, each other. And those all had timelines on them, too. What time we were there. What time we were aware that the fire was about to overtake us. What time we got out. And some of the texts about whether we were safe.
I’d stepped down from my active duties at Peeples Valley Fire other than to be a reserve and help them when they needed it. I went to the chief and I said to him, “They want me to do some work up in Yarnell.”
And he said, “Well we’ve got a lot of work down here. So at that time, he didn’t want me to be on the [YHRG] committee.
Then that started to get back to normal business and the Incident Command Center broke up and left, and everything was gone. Basically I was free to help if they still needed me. So I contacted, I think it was Chuck, and said, “I can be a facilities director for you.”
They were looking for somebody who could find places to store things. And I said, “Sure, I’ll do that.”
Well when that finally waned down, the Senior Center opened up again and Scott Shephard said he had to go back to his job there, and they had the opening of Reconstruction Director on the Steering Committee. Chuck and all of them brought me in and asked if I wouldn’t do that I said, “Sure, yeah. Let’s give it a try.”
So it’s been my life for the past six months.
NOTE: The rest of the BLOG entry covers Bob’s past and continuing work with the Yarnell Hill Recovery Group.
———————————————————————————————————
END OF BOB BRANDON’S ACCOUNT IN HIS OWN WORDS
———————————————————————————————————
** DIFFERENCES IN THE TWO ACCOUNTS
In the Prescott Daily Courier ‘article’ that was being ‘filtered’ through a reporter, Bob Brandon
was being quoted as saying that the person who was ordering him to basically ‘abandon’
the other 6 firefighters was some kind of ‘group supervisor’.
In THIS account… Brandon now says that he ( and the others ) had no frickin’ idea they were even part of any kind of GROUP that day. They only learned about this the next day.
In THIS account… Brandon only uses one phrase to describe this person who was ordering them to ‘abandon’ the other firefighters. He says it was the ‘Incident Commander’.
From the account… it seems that this ORDER was NOT coming over the radio. It was coming from someone who was physically right there at the Youth Camp…. so it is not possible that this could been Roy Hall himself. There is no evidence that Roy Hall ever even left the ICP up in Peeples Valley that day.
That also probably leaves out ‘Structure Protection Group Supervisor’ ( SPGS ) Gary Cordes.
Cordes was certainly ‘nearby’ at this time and ‘staged’ right out there ( with OPS2 Paul Musser and others ) on Highway 89 right where Shrine Road meets HIghway 89. There no evidence in the public record that SPGS Gary Cordes was ever physically ‘back there’ at the Youth Camp in the timeframe that would make him the one ORDERING Brandon to ‘move the vehicles’ and basically ‘abandon’ those other 6 men.
So that really only means one of the following…
1) Bob Brandon was under the mistaken impression that this person ‘giving him orders’ in the Youth Camp area was any kind of ‘Incident Commander’. The person might have simply had a WHITE HELMET on, or something, and this was causing Peeples Valley FF Brandon to just make a wrong assumption about ‘who he was’.
2) This person who was giving Brandon ‘orders’ WAS, in fact, actually identifying himself to Brandon ( and others? ) as an ‘Incident Commander’ that day.
If number (2) is true… then who would have been doing that?
WHO would have even been in a position to be actually telling firefighters in the Shrine Road area that day that they were an ‘Incident Commander’?… AND… if someone really did have those kind of delusions ( at that time and in that place )… then what ELSE were they telling people in person and/or over the radio that day?
Could this person who *might* have been telling Brandon ( and others? ) they were an ‘Incident Commander’ also be the one we hear speaking to Eric Marsh in the YARNELL-GAMBLE video and ( apparently ) urging him to “hurry to town” from some self-appointed position of authority?
Brandon is also very specific that this (quote) “Incident Commander” had physically “pulled up” to them in the Youth Camp area and the command for them to move their vehicles and essentially abandon their men was given face-to-face and not over the radio. So this person had to be someone at the command level who is known to have gone all the way back to the Youth Camp in this timeframe.
Both Tony Sciacca’s SAIT and ADOSH interviews say that he DID ‘go all the way back to the Youth Camp in this same timeframe and was there when BR was evacuating… and Tony Sciacca WAS wearing his WHITE HELMET that day… even though he was only ‘hired’ as a ‘Safety Officer’. One of the Blue Ridge photos showing the UTV Ranger at the Youth Camp in this exact timeframe is ALSO showing another firefighter standing NEAR Frisby and Brown in the UTV Ranger… and he has a WHITE HELMET on. Could this be a photograph capturing the moment when Tony Sciacca WAS all the way back there at the Youth Camp during the moments surrounding the ‘evacuation’ of that area?
NOTE: Again… because of the ‘one link per post’ rule… a direct link to that Blue Ridge photo will be posted as a ‘Reply’ to this message.
So the person who gave this ‘order’ to Bob Brandon could be either Tyson Esquibel OR ( perhaps ) Tony Sciacca ( who was wearing his WHITE HELMET that day ).
** IMPORTANT: BOB BRANDON SAYS HE AND THE OTHER PEEPLES VALLEY
** FIREFIGHTERS WERE DEFINITELY INTERVIEWED BY ‘INvESTIGATORS’ JUST
** 2 DAYS AFTER THE INCIDENT.. AND THEY TOOK ‘EVIDENCE’ FROM THEM.
IMPORTANT: Bob Brandon says he and the other FFs from Peeples Valley were
‘debriefed’ by ‘investigators’ just 2 days after the incident. ( July 2, 2013 ).
The SAIT wasn’t even fully ‘formed’ until FOUR days after the incident ( July 4, 2013 ).
HERE is where Bob Brandon tells us they were first ‘debriefed/interviewed’ by some ‘investigators’ just two days after the incident… on July 2. He also says that is when he gave them copies of ALL of his photographs from June 30 and that he and the others also gave these ‘investigators’ copies of their cellphone records…
Bob Brandon said…
————————————————————————————————
The next day they took us in and debriefed us.
This was two days after the incident with the 19. They went through and looked at
my pictures and took a flash card of them. And I don’t know what they did with them,
but it was pretty good because my pictures had timelines on them, so they could
see what happened at what time. Then they took information off our cellphones because
that’s how we talked to, texted, each other. And those all had timelines on them, too.
What time we were there. What time we were aware that the fire was about to overtake us.
What time we got out. And some of the texts about whether we were safe.”
————————————————————————————————
The PROBLEM here is that Bob Brandon says this ‘debriefing/interview’ took place on July 2, just 2 days after the incident… but the SAIT wasn’t fully formed until July 4… and there is no record of this ‘debriefing/interview’ in the SAIT Interview Notes collection.
The interview with the Peeples Valley firefighters that WAS ( supposedly ) conducted by the SAIT has a date on it 6 days ( SIX DAYS ) LATER of July 8, 2013, when there were then ‘interviewed’ by Randy Okon and Jim ( Jim Karels? Jimmy Rocha? Doesn’t say which ‘Jim’ ).
So if the SAIT’s official interview ( according to what they released via FOIA/FOIL ) was dated July 8, 2013… then WHO interviewed them SIX DAYS EARLIER on July 2, and received all of Bob Brandon’s photographs and everyone’s cell phone records?
Was that July 2 ‘debriefing/interview’ sponsored by the SAIT in ANY way…. or was someone
else doing their own ‘debriefing/interviews’ OUTSIDE of the official SAIT investigation?
It that July 2 ‘debriefing/interview’ with Bob Brandon ( and ALL of the Peeples Valley Firefighters ) was NOT ‘sponsored by the SAIT’ in any way… then were Jim Karels and Mike Dudley even aware that it had happened?
It they WERE aware of it… did they ever receive their OWN copies of ALL of Brandons photos/videos and ALL of their cellphone records?
One of Bob Brandon’s pictures taken right around the time someone ordered him to ‘move the vehicles’ and basically ‘abandon’ the other firefighters appeared with the Prescott Daily Courier article… but in Brandon’s OWN account of the incident in his OWN words… we now learn that he was taking LOTS and LOTS of ‘photos’ that day ( and perhaps some VIDEO with possible background radio traffic captures )…
Bob Brandon actually says…
“I was fortunate enough that I had a camera in my jumper. So I was taking pictures all the time, any time I had a spare moment. And I took a picture of the slurry bomber that was actually driving right for what we later found out were the fallen firefighters.”
NOTE: See below. There actually IS some evidence that the SAIT really DID receive this material even if they didn’t conduct the July 2 ‘debriefings/interviews’.
If they did ( and the evidence below seems to suggest they did ) then WHY was this material not included in the SAIT FOIA/FOIL releases which were supposed to contain ‘all material used in the investigation’?
Here is the PROOF that the SAIT says its interview with the Peeples Valley FFs was conducted on July 8, 2013… and NOT 6 days earlier, on July 2…
—————————————————————————————————–
Page 50 of the SAIT Yarnell Investigation Notes ( YIN )…
—————————————————————————————————–
Interviewed Peeples Valley, Jacob Moder, Ronald Smith, Bob Brandon,
Matthew Keehner on E54 and T64 FD units, structure protection working under Tyson TFLD (t)
Interviewed by Randy and Jim, 07/08/2013
Work spot: Area of ops, Shrine, old youth camp. Harper Canyon
—————————————————————————————————–
NOTE: Even in the SAIT notes… we seem to be getting verification from the SAIT investigators that they received ‘new pics’ from Brandon, others. The following NOTE from the July 8 SAIT interview with Bob Brandon and the other Peeples Valley FFs mentions ‘received pics’…
—————————————————————————————————–
Do an assessment not enough man power to do prep.
Dozer shows up then leaves. Heavy fuels (12’ plus) new pics looking over fire f/ ridge.
—————————————————————————————————–
NOTE: And again… SAIT investigators ‘acknowledge’ they received ‘pics’ from Bob Brandon and the other Peeples Valley FFs of the ‘fire rolling towards them’…
—————————————————————————————————–
1500 hear breached trigger pt you have 1hr from Jacob ( Moder ) who was scouting ahead, turned out to be 20min. Jacob ( Moder ) sees flames on top of ridge, grabs his guys tells central Yavapai, makes 2 points to them to leave then leaves. Sun Valley tells them to leave too. He never sees BR.
He bailed out b4 they came out. But their water tender did see BR. At 1632 fire is near shrine 1636 pull out to Ranch house restaurant. Take pics of fire rolling towards them.
—————————————————————————————————–
So there IS evidence that even if the SAIT didn’t conduct that ‘mysterious’ debriefing/interview with these Peeples Valley FFs on July 2… they did, in fact, receive copies of Bob Brandon’s photos/videos and copies of the cellphone records that were ‘collected’ on July 2.
I don’t believe that ADOSH was ever made aware that this kind of evidence even existed.
IMPORTANT: According to THIS account from SAIT interview notes… it was Peeples Valley FF Jacob Moder who was ‘back there’ with the other Peeples Valley FF Ron Smith and the FOUR Sun City fireman who was the one who FIRST noticed they ‘fire coming over the ridge’ and it was Moder who FIRST told people to ‘leave’ that area… NOT Sun City FF Darby Starr who just received the VFW ‘Firefighter of the Year’ award for (supposedly) doing what Jacob Moder did.
Again… for the sake of ‘completeness’. and just in case it happens to ‘disappear’… here is that entire article that just appeared about Sun City fireman Darby Starr winning the VFW ‘Firefighter of the Year’ award for his ( supposed ) actions in the Shrine area on June 30, 2013. This article also contains details from Darby Starr’s own ‘account’ of this near-fatal incident…
————————————————————————————————-
YourWestValley News
Article Title: Sun City West fire captain wins national honor for decision
during Yarnell Hill blaze
Posted in Suncitywest, Topstory, Glendale, Peoria on
Friday, July 18, 2014 7:42 am. Updated: 9:30 am.
By Jeff Grant, DAILY NEWS-SUN
————————————————————————————————-
The spritz of rain was the final warning sign for Darby Starr.
As the Fire District of Sun City West’s engine boss for wildlands fire assignments, Starr and three colleagues — one each from Sun City West, Peoria and Glendale — had seen the late-afternoon winds become terribly erratic as they helped fight the Yarnell Hill blaze on June 30, 2013. Starr noticed what seemed to be fire moving in the opposite direction of where it had been headed all day. He even thought he heard some claps of thunder.
Then came the spritz of rain.
“As soon as I felt that rain, that’s when I decided we needed to pull out,” he said.
It was a decision colleagues believe prevented further loss of firefighter lives in the blaze that claimed 19 members of the Granite Mountain Hotshots in the deadliest day for U.S. Forest Service firefighting since 1933.
It also earned Starr, 42, the Veterans of Foreign Wars’ National Firefighter of the Year Award, one of the VFW’s highest honors bestowed on public safety and public service workers throughout America. The VFW also recognizes police, paramedics and teachers each year, said Post 10695 Commander Jim Katzenberger following a ceremony Thursday honoring Starr at Sun City West Fire District headquarters.
“These people directly serve our communities, and keep us safe and sound. They’re the backbones who hold our country together,” Katzenberger said.
Starr, fellow Sun City West firefighter Coy Boggler and two others — one each from Peoria and Glendale — were part of a 10-member task force called to Yarnell Hill early the morning of June 29, 2013, to join other firefighters from throughout the state, including the Granite Hill team and the Blue Ridge Hotshots, fighting the blaze.
Initially, the team thought it would be there for two days at most. Then, conditions deteriorated rapidly the afternoon of June 30. The unpredictable winds, intense heat and shift in fire movement left the Granite Mountain team with nowhere to go but their deployed fire shelters, where they were overrun by the flames and heat.
Assigned to cut fireline between homes and the flames, the Brush 103 crew worked on, unaware at first of the Granite Mountain team’s plight but with Starr taking note of conditions and becoming increasingly concerned for the men’s safety.
“I was at the front of the line, right against this hill. It was about 200 feet high. I kept watching fire that seemed to be moving in the opposite direction it had been moving all day. I set a ‘trigger point,’ which was when the fire topped the hill, it was time to go. Shortly after that, I heard thunder. I got that spritz in the face, I turned around, looked at the hill, and fire was over the hill. I told my guys, ‘Let’s go.’”
As he led the team away from the scene along a planned escape route to a safety zone, the veteran of 20 years wildlands firefighting recalled conditions he had never seen.
“I’d never experienced that kind of fire heat. I’d never seen fire heat so violent. It was astonishing to see exactly how violent this could be and the rate it was moving at. Even in our safety zone, we were crouching behind our truck because of the heat waves we were getting.”
Another veteran Sun City West firefighter and paramedic, Coy Boggler, recalled his team’s leader’s calm under “immense pressure,” instructing the crew to remain together as it made its way through dense brush toward the truck.
“The fire and smoke bore down on us, creating an incredibly tense trek. Captain Starr remained calm and collected. Had Captain Starr not ordered our expedited retreat to the truck, I believe we may have been trapped and would have to deploy our shelters,” Boggler stated in a written report.
“Both of the other two firefighters and myself feel Captain Starr prevented a second tragedy.”
It was not until the next morning that the Brush 103 crew would learn officially that their colleagues from Granite Mountain had perished, although Starr said a lack of information on their status during the tense late-afternoon hours June 30 raised suspicions that something had gone wrong.
Starr credited experience and training for his decision-making, including a story from a wildfire academy earlier last year, part of the Sun City West’s year-round wildlands-firefighter training.
As the academy director addressed his class, he discussed June 1990’s Dude Fire near Payson, which killed six firefighters and until Yarnell Hill had stood as the worst loss of firefighter life in Arizona wildlands firefighting history.
“He was talking about the weather conditions he was experiencing, the fire behavior he was seeing. He mentioned he got spritzed with rain, and that was just strange enough for him to turn around and go back the other direction. He had been headed right for the guys who were burned over,” Starr recalled. “At the Yarnell Hill fire, I started seeing that strange fire behavior.”
SCW Assistant Fire Chief Tim Van Scoter, another veteran wildlands firefighter, said Starr’s actions reflect on his leadership and recognize the kind of work done by many district members throughout the year.
“Firefighters don’t look for this recognition. It’s nice when it comes. That’s not why they did what they did that day. They didn’t even know it was going to be submitted.”
“I’m very honored,” said Starr. “We were just doing our job. I don’t feel like I did anything extraordinary. But to be recognized by my friends, my co-workers and the VFW is an honor,” he said.
An organization formed 115 years ago to provide social, financial and emotional care to veterans returning from combat, the VFW includes 10,000 posts throughout the world. Each nominates an individual for the organization’s annual awards. Recipients are selected after careful review in a several-step process, said Katzenberger.
————————————————————————————————-
END OF ARTICLE ABOUT DARBY STARR AND NEAR-FATAL YARNELL INCIDENT
————————————————————————————————-
There a LOT of ‘weird’ things in this ‘Darby Starr’ article that just don’t match other people’s accounts of the same incident… or some of the other publicly available evidence.
There is also that mention that some ( perhaps ALL? ) of these Sun City firefighters were required to produce ‘written documents’ about the events of that day in Yarnell.
WHERE are those ‘written documents’?
Is the article just talking about ‘written documents’ being supplied to the VFW people when Darby Starr was ‘nominated’ for their ‘Firefighter of the Year’ Award… or is the article actually referring to official ‘Unit Logs’ from that day?
If ANY of the Sun City firefighters produced standard written ‘Unit Logs’ for that day… then why were they not included in the SAIT’s FOIA/FOIL releases?
And again… if any of this evidence did exist… it would appear that it was ‘withheld’ even from the ADOSH investigators… whose primary job was to examine the ‘workplace environment’ that day.
** TONY SCIACCA WAS AT THE YOUTH CAMP
This last part of this post refers back to the part above regarding WHO might have been the ‘Incident Commander’ person ( as described by Bob Brandon ) that was back there at the Youth Camp and the one who was ORDERING Brandon and Keehner to ‘move those vehicles RIGHT NOW’ and basically ‘abandon’ the other 6 firefighters.
According to Tony Sciacca’s SAIT Interview Notes… there WAS a point when he had gone all the way back to the Youth Camp on Shrine Road and was there at the point when Blue Ridge was evacuating… which is exactly the timeframe when the other firefighters who had been working out at the west end of Harper Canyon were now ‘in trouble’.
Sciacca specifically says he ‘parked on Shrine Road and then FOLLOWED IT BACK’ and he also says he was ‘witnessing’ the Blue Ridge guys ‘loading up’ into their buggies… which specifically places Sciacca all the way back at the Youth Camp in the timeframe in question.
There is also photographic evidence that Tony Sciacca was wearing his WHITE HELMET that day and could have been ‘mistaken’ as some kind of ‘Incident Commander’ for that reason alone.
Sciacca’s SAIT interview notes are also only one page and reproduced here…
—————————————————————————————————–
SAIT Interview with Tony Sciacca – Line Safety Office
N. end (1 hr), E. end (1hr) – 9:10 a.m. July 12
Interviewers: Randy, Jimmy Rocha, Jay Kurth
I was only on scene 2 hours.
I got a call from Peyson dispatch at 13:55 for a Safety Officer.
Arrived at the middle school 50-55 minutes later and tied in with RH and Paul Musser there. Divison Chief, Daryl Willis painted the picture about what was going on.
I suggested that they didn’t have an SO on the N so how about I go there and start the process.
There was a lot of communications between sp groups.
Byron of F band said there was a big thunderstorm and we could get outflow.
Marty Cole also verified.
About an hour into it, the previous SW wind changed and gave us some relief.
It was slow changing at first and I thought “we got this”.
Then I got word that Yarnell was threatened again.
There was a line of fire with 8-10 mph winds.
The fire was flanking then turned ¼ turn to the NE.
Paul called and said it was past the trigger point and to start moving people out.
1600-1615
While driving to Yarnell, there was a lot of people and traffic.
I felt we needed to close the road.
The intensity of the flank was building.
The wind was building.
I thought all houses were were evacuated and I parked on Shrine rd and followed it back.
There was a big wind at 20-25 mph and the column was laying over deep.
There was a line of fire from Shrine to 89.
Got a call from J. Clauson ( PNF off-the-radar hire Jason Clawson ) and tied in with them.
Blue Ridge was milling around and then loaded in the buggies.
The fire clearly was coming into town.
I didn’t hear Eric’s cry for help. Hear later about the deployment.
Jayson Clawson, Yowls (KC ‘Bucky’ Yowell) went looking for Granit Mountain on the two razors.
On the fatalities were confirmed, I stood by Chief Willis
Spent the night with him. He was having a really hard time.
My general feeling about the communications on the fire on the north end was that they were good. There was lots of chatter.
I didn’t know Blue Ridge and Granite Mountain were there.
15:30 There was a weather advisory
Historically chaparral only burns for one operating period.
I had not seen fire fun downhill during the daytime in the this country.
Fire is usually predictable. There is no predictability this year.
—————————————————————————————————–
So while Sciacca’s SAIT interview notes seem to prove that he WAS ‘all the way back there’
at the Youth Camp at the exact time everyone was ‘evacuating’ from there… there is no mention whatsoever in Sciacca’s SAIT interview of him ever having interactions with Bob Brandon or the any of the other Peeples Valley firefighters even though Bob Brandon said the person who had ordered them to ‘move those vehicles right now’ and basically ‘abandon’ the other men was some kind of “Incident Commander’.
In his ADOSH interview… Sciacca has this to say about when he went down to the south end of the fire. He first tied in with Gary Cordes on the side of Highway 89, was told by Cordes that he was ‘pulling everyone off the dozer line and OUT’… and then Sciacca DOES say that he went back himself on Shrine Road all the way to the Youth Camp area…
Page 15 of ADOSH interview with Tony Sciacca…
—————————————————————————————————–
649 A: So when I – yeah, when I came around, trying to figure out who was in
650 Yarnell when that fire was coming there I wanted to see…
651
652 Q1: Right.
653
654 A: I pulled in. Sheriff had some evacuations going on.
655
656 Q1: Right.
657
658 A: And I drove up that canyon, that’s when I saw the Blue Ridge and the Granite
659 Mountain buggies.
660
661 Q1: Yeah.
662
663 Q2: Where were they? Could you – do you…
664
665 A: Uh, they were, uh, they were one canyon over from where the ranch house
666 was.
667
668 Q2: Okay.
669
670 A: That’s, uh…
671
672 ((Crosstalk))
673
674 Q1: Can you point on the map for that?
675
676 A: I don’t know if I can or not on that one.
677
678 Q2: Well if you know, here’s – this is the deployment site. Here’s the ranch
679 houses.
680
681 A: Okay, so it would have been up in the back of this community right – I believe
682 s- I was told by, uh, one of the Engine Captains there was a piece of dozer line
683 that I never saw that was in there some place and they – I saw – when I was up
684 in this little draw here, Blue Ridge came out with, uh, looked like they were
685 three engines, a water tender, Blue Ridge Hotshot buggies and Granite
686 Mountain Hotshot buggies. And everybody was driving out.
687
688 Q1: Coming out?
689
690 A: Coming out. And I was like, well I guess everybody’s in the buggies. You
691 don’t ask those questions.
692
693 Q1: Yeah, yeah.
694
695 Q2: You saw the – the Granite Mountain buggies come out?
696
697 A: Yeah well they were parked and Blue Ridge was bringing them out.
698
699 Q2: Blue Ridge was helping?
700
701 A: Yeah.
702
703 Q1: Yeah.
704
705 Q2: Was, uh, McDonough with…
706
707 A: That I didn’t know until – I didn’t know that until I got out. The buggies got
708 out. We found out what had happened to the Granite Mountain guys.
709
710 Q2: Sure.
711
712 A: Um, Blue Ridge Hotshots Super came – Lieutenant came up to me and said,
713 “Hey, we got a Granite guy in the back of our buggy.”
714
715 Q2: Right. So what time were they moving the rigs?
716
717 A: I’m guessing, you know, it had to be in around that 4:00-4:15, right around
718 that timeframe.
719
720 Q2: Okay. Did you hear and – and I know there’s a lot of area traffic but did you
721 hear, uh, conversations on the radio about, “It’s time to pull out,” or a
722 direction, a command to move everybody out?
723
724 A: No.
725
726 Q2: Did you hear anything about move to a safe zone? Did you hear…
727
728 A: I…
729
730 Q2: …any of those directions?
731
732 A: No.
733
734 Q2: Any commands?
735
736 A: Nope. Didn’t hear any tr- radio traffic.
911 Q1: Yeah. Uh, and Gary Cordes was the – he was the group, uh, structure
912 protection group for the Yarnell end?
913
914 A: I believe. Uh, I never did get my arms fully around that. I ran – I knew Gary
915 because he works in the neighboring…
916
917 Q1: Right.
918
919 A: Got over there, Paul and him were visiting on the side of the road.
920
921 Q1: Oh okay.
922
923 A: Pulled in. I said, “What do you guys got going on?” You know, you’re
924 safety, yadda, yadda, yadda, ya. I introduced myself. The guy says, “Well
925 we’re just pulling out.”
926
—————————————————————————————————–
So in BOTH his SAIT and his ADOSH interviews… Tony Sciacca makes it clear that he DID go ‘all the way back’ on Shrine Road to the Youth Camp area ( with his WHITE HELMET on ) at exactly the same time Bob Brandon says SOMEONE who Brandon thought was an ‘Incident Commander’ was the one who ORDERED he and Keehner to ‘move those vehicles right now’….
…and when Brandon and Keehner told this ‘Incident Commander’ person there were men still ‘out there’ at the west end of the canyon who were depending on those vehicles to be there this ‘Incident Commander’ person didn’t care and said “Those men can’t run that fast” and then ORDERED Brandon and Keehner AGAIN to “get those vehicles out of here right now”.
** SUMMARY
So the Prescott Courier account of this near-fatal incident says it was a ‘Group Supervisor’
that was giving the order to ‘move the vehicles’ and basically ‘abandon’ those men.
That would indicate it was most probably ‘Tyson Esquibel’, the TFLD(t) who Gary Cordes had put in charge of that ‘Shrive Road’ Group work.
Bob Brandon’s own account of this same near-fatal incident only says that someone he was identifying as an ‘Incident Commander’ ( because of his WHITE Helmet? ) gave that order.
That would mean it could very well have been Tony Sciacca.
Last but not least… the Darby Starr article about him just winning the VFW ‘Firefighter of the Year’ award because of his (supposed) ‘actions’ during this same near-fatal incident makes absolutely NO mention of the fact that their vehicles were ‘moved’ away from where they were expecting to them to be and THAT was also another reason why they almost died that day.
This is the first in a series of ‘Replies’ to the long post above which contains references to several ‘articles’. Only the link to the original Prescott Daily Courier article is included in the post above in order to comply with the ‘just one link per post’ rule.
Here is the first of the ‘other’ links referenced above…
Peeples Valley Firefighter Bob Brandon’s own STORY ( in his own words and not filtered through any news reporter ) about almost dying on June 30, 2013, along with those SEVEN other firefighters working the Harper Canyon / Shrive Road area…
http://www.yarnellhillrecoverygroup.org/os_bob_brandon.html
Re Bob Brandon’s account:
I think Bob’s account is absolutely valuable. And I am not seeing him, via his account, as an absolutely reliable witness. I have a lot of problems with his account.
He says he was briefed at 7:30 am at Model Creek School. As far as I know, there was no official 7:30am briefing at Model Creek School. So maybe he was briefed, by someone, but there was no “commander” there to tell him he was in a “sector.” I am not even sure, via his account, that he even apparently knows what a “commander,” in the standard terminology, even means. And nobody, as far as I know, was using the term “sector” that day. So I don’t know what he means by any of that.
Get what I mean? Which doesn’t mean I don’t mean that his account is valuable. It just means I think it’s really fuzzy.
He says he is the driver of the Peeples Valley tender truck. And I’m wondering how much that may have to do with the fuzziness of what he says. And his possible confusion over what a “commander” is. Which leads to his possible fuzziness about what an Incident Commander is–or was, on this fire.
I have no idea how much experience he had on a Type 2 IMT fire. Possibly very little? I’ve been reading around A LOT about a lot of other fires. On smaller fires, various kinds of people with various levels of experience, when they are put in charge of fires can be designated “Incident Commanders.” I’m guessing his experience may have led him to assume who ever was “in charge” of him was some kind of “Incident Commander.” That doesn’t mean it was actually the Incident Commander of this fire. Or even anybody with a “white helmet.” From what I am reading, I don’t perceive him as having a whole lot of Situational Awareness regarding the Incident Command Structure of this fire.
Something I find interesting. I have no idea what the job of a water tender driver is. I would think it would be to be there in support of engines. What he describes as what his job was to do isn’t at all what I would expect. I have no clue as to how to evaluate this.
He says, “Probably mid-afternoon, the bulldozer came rambling through the woods. It kind of looked like Jurasic Park, knocking down trees, clearing a roadway. When it arrived at our location, I was just sitting by my tanker taking pictures of it because it was just kind of an awesome site.”
I don’t know how far east the dozer pushed through. I don’t know how far east he was located at that time. I don’t know where any of this took place. Which means I don’t know where his crew was.
But I do agree that his photographs are terribly valuable and should be in the public record, all things considered. (I will add to that downstream).
He says “My lookout came down off the mountain and said that there was a problem because he just got the weather report and they talked about the changing winds, but he didn’t understand what it meant.”
Apparently, they didn’t have the experience to know what that relatively clear weather report said. What does that say?
He says, “when I started the alarm, the Incident Commander for our area came pulling up, and he said, “I want you to get these trucks out of here.”
I really think, when he says “Incident Commander for our area” he has to mean who ever he thinks, via his experience of the day, is his, relatively speaking, Supervisor. He doesn’t know what “Division” he is in (as if that even matters, given that Div Zulu, relatively speaking, is irrelevant), he thinks he’s in a “section” not a “Division”).
He apparently doesn’t know he’s actually a part of “Structure Protection Group 1” whose actual Supervisor (who he apparently hasn’t even met even though Tyson Esquibel said Gary was acting as a Lookout in that general area) is Gary Cordes.
And absolutely his story is both remarkable and valuable. Even though I don’t think it is totally accurate.
Which leads to my next two thoughts.
1. The fact that his photos were collected by someone and made public by no-one is critical, IMHO.
Right now it’s late and I’m working off the top of my head (because I can’t find them in my downloads–although I’ve read them several times so they have to be somewhere), but there were 24-hour(ish) and 72-hour(ish) preliminary reports made. I’m not sure who was responsible for these reports. I’m guessing, however, that that was the context of his being interviewed and handing off his photos. I think we should dig into this, for both the potential considerable value of his photographs, and the reason why they seem to have disappeared.
2. I have no reason to believe that when he says “Incident Commander,” he is referring to Tony Sciacca and not Tyson Esquibel. He is, in fact, whether he perceives/articulates it as such, formally, in Tyson Esquibel’s Task Force. I believe, given what I have written above, that is who he considers his “boss.”
I also don’t think the person in the Youth Camp photo with Brian and Trew and their UTV is Tony Sciacca. I’ve played around with the white balance of that photo ad nauseum and I think that guy to the right of them has a yellow helmet on and I have no idea who it is.
I also disagree that the photo you are saying is Brush 103 leaving is either leaving or after the one you say is before it. It’s before it, according to its timestamp. But that’s splitting hairs. I think it’s still just sitting there.
Also. One of the reasons I haven’t posted recently is that I have spent most of the past week and a half researching the historical context of this fire and its various investigations/lawsuits/liability-issues in that context. It has been very eye-opening and I will be posting what I have found eventually. I wish someone had written/narrated that history, but they haven’t.
There is no way in H*LL someone like Tony Sciacca, a friggin Type 1 Incident Commander, would be irresponsible/insensitive/heartless-SUICIDAL enough to disregard a crew left out there in harm’s way.
Marti… totally agree that even though Bob Brandon was the former fire chief for Peeples Valley and actually helped START that fire department… there is a distinct lack of boot-level understanding of the whole ‘Type 2’ or ‘Type 1’ thing. I guess it’s possible to know everything there is to know about running a small local fire department in a Wildland Interface area… but still never really getting to go to the ‘big show’ and experience that very often.
See a longer post below. A lot of the DISTANCES in his ‘account’ are also really wonky. If he really did tell this person who was ordering him to ‘move the vehicles’ that those men were ‘about a MILE away in the forest’… then that would have put them almost as far out as the old-grader and Brendan’s lookout mound. Not possible. Best I can tell those men were ‘cutting line’ no more than 1,000 to 1,500 feet west of the center of the Youth Camp.
As for Esquibel versus Sciacca… see same longer post below.
According to Esquibel’s ADOSH testimony about these moments… it is also virtually impossible for Esquibel to have been the one telling Brandon and Keehner to ‘move these vehicles right now’ and, essentially, abandon those men working out west.
But we both know about Esquibel’s ‘reliability’ as a ‘witness’ as well.
In fact… Esquibel’s testimony to both SAIT and ADOSH seem to be completely contradictory.
In his ADOSH testimony… Esquibel seems to say that he was BACK THERE with Captain Darby Starr, the 3 other Sun city guys, and Ron Smith and Jacob Moder from Peeples Valley. Esquibel says he received no ‘call to get out’ from ANY of the THREE lookouts that were supposedly in place ( including Gary Cordes as one of the three )… and then he says the decision to ‘leave’ was sort of ‘calmly agreed upon’ face-to-face with Darby Starr.
Heck… that doesn’t even bear any resemblance to the ‘story’ of what was happening in the article about Darby Starr just winning the VFW ‘Firefighter of the Year’ award.
Then…. in his SAIT interview notes… we seem to hear Esquibel telling the SAIT investigators that even though he considered ‘backburning’ on the way OUT of there… one of the reasons he decided against is because he ( quote ) “Didn’t know where the other crew was”.
How can be be saying in his ADOSH that he was BACK THERE calmly deciding face-to-face with Darby Starr it was ‘time to leave’… and then say he ‘didn’t know where the other crew was’?
I also agree that the person who is apparently on foot in that Papich photo and standing near Frisby and Brown in the UTV could easily be wearing a yellow’ helmet instead of a ‘white’ one ( I did a lot of color balancing and saturation shifts here myself to try and be sure )…
…and that regardless of the color of that guy’s helmet… we don’t have enough information (yet) to know WHO that could be OR if there’s even a chance he was the one ORDERING Brandon and Keehner to ‘move the vehicles’.
As for the ‘Sun City Engine 103’ seen ‘leaving’…. I still believe that is the case.
If not… then it has at least been MOVED between those two photos.
It is not in the same ‘spot’ in both of the photos. It is farther ‘east’ in the photo where it looks like it is leaving and about to disappear behind that ‘tree’.
Marti —-For clarity Sector Boss –Old school no longer used in the New ICS system. So his re ferial was to some one in charge of his section.
Strike Team Leader possibly. I do not believe there were any sector breakdowns on the fire just Divisions.
I totally agree with what you said and with out a written plan and maps it was a total mess with no identified chain of command which would have been in the shift plan for that day had one been made…..
Marti,
A good supervisor recognizes and understands the capabilities and experience of those working under him/her.
Your points above are well taken, BUT those points, are all the more reason that closer attention should have been paid to those particular resources AT ALL TIMES. AND ESPECIALLY, when things are going to hell.
Also, it doesn’t really matter if it’s a Type I, or Type II, or other level of fire or team. the incident management system is the same for all, utilizing the same terminology. One either knows it, or they don’t.
They get that ICS training in the 40 hour basic for all fire fighters
in order to be Red Carded at what ever level.
Mr. Powers… thank you for that. That has been something I’ve been wondering about for a long time but could never seem to find a good answer amidst all the ‘training’ guidelines and documents.
From a LOT of the ‘testimony’ in the public record… it always seems obvious when the person testifying actually DOES understand all this “IC -> OPS -> DIVS -> SPGS / TFLD / IHC” resource ‘chain of command’ stuff… and when they do NOT…
…but I could never quite understand what ‘level’ you have to be at where it is REQUIRED that you understand this ‘acronym soup’ stuff.
So no matter what is listed on your ‘Red Card’ or how many holes it has punched in it… if you have one of those at all you are SUPPOSED to fully understand all of that. Thank you.
Here is the link to the THIRD article referenced above which is the story about Darby Starr winning the VFW ‘Firefighter of the Year’ award for his ( supposed ) ‘actions’ in the Shrine area during that near-fatal incident on June 30, 2011…
YourWestValley News
Article Title: Sun City West fire captain wins national honor for decision
during Yarnell Hill blaze
Posted in Suncitywest, Topstory, Glendale, Peoria on
Friday, July 18, 2014 7:42 am. Updated: 9:30 am.
http://www.yourwestvalley.com/suncitywest/article_469b6ad6-0e89-11e4-954f-0019bb2963f4.html?mode=story
Here is the direct link to that Blue Ridge Hotshot ( Papich ) photo referenced in the post above that appears to show a WHITE helmeted ( or is it yellow? ) standing next to Frisby and Brown in the UTV Ranger in the Youth Camp area right around the same moment that Bob Brandon says someone he identified as an ‘Incident Commander’ was ORDERING them to move their vehicles and didn’t care if there were still men working at the west end of Harper Canyon.
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/02ue6bnjp6nazkm/AADuqXo3pgQkUJGLvRf_h3yLa/Photos%20and%20Video/BlueRidgeHotshotsPhotosVideos/Papich#lh:null-IMG_3955.jpg
If you look at the left side of this photo, and very near Fisby and Brown in the UTV and this ‘other firefighter’ standing in the road near them… you will see the two vehicles that were supporting the 6 men at the west end of Harper Canyon.
In one of Blue Ridge Hotshot McCord’s photos taken at the same location but just moments later… you actually see the Sun City Brush Truck LEAVING the Youth Camp. This matches Bob Brandon’s account of them being ORDERED to get the vehicles out of there even though they at first refused because they other men were depending on them to be there.
And here is Blue Ridge Hotshot McCord’s photo taken at the Youth Camp ( shortly after the Papich one mentioned above ) which actually shows the Sun City Brush Truck as it is LEAVING the Youth Camp and basically ‘abandoning’ the firefighters who were still WEST of that Youth Camp and now ‘in trouble’ out in the Harper Canyon area…
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/02ue6bnjp6nazkm/AAA6NfZNgzsJRCDEtQXdUR-La/Photos%20and%20Video/BlueRidgeHotshotsPhotosVideos/Mccord#lh:null-yarnell-mccord%20008.jpg
This would match the moment being reported by Bob Brandon that even after they REFUSED to move the vehicles because those men still out there in Harper Canyon were ‘depending’ on them to ‘be there’ and the person ORDERING them to ‘get them out of there anyway’ because (quote) “those men can’t run that fast” gave them the ‘move out’ order a SECOND time…
…Brandon and Keehner ended up ‘complying’ with that SECONDS ORDER to ‘move out’… but only as SLOWLY as they could in order to give those poor men running for their lives from out west every chance in the world to catch up with them.
Thank you Bob Brandon. Last Fall you stood on Kimberly’s yard as I was on Jimmy/Kari’s and I remember stating to you when you had a loved one youngen with you and I said I know you are doing the recovery part yet I hope one day you speak about your account 6-30-13 so you see you all in due time people will as I once said people have surgeries and life stuff going on that I am glad to see this finally came out. Joanna told this to us on June 30th as we hung out at the Jersey Lizard—but I was thinking another Bob for some reason—did not connect it to you until here reading it & thank you again for coming out and being another voice of details—
Recently, I name dropped some names on here of people who should speak but there is so MANY other names too—I went into prayer and spoke with Him and also spoke to Sonny and so I feel so much more at ease—it is amazing how much tension the big guy can take off you in prayer—I was pretty much on fire this past weekend but 100% okay now. I guess I know it is time to go to sleep each night yet it is hard because I am always thinking did I do enough for the day to help these 19 men and I was flustered by all the technology obstacles this past week and other areas that I am very sorry for my online behavior. I guess I just wish it was in MY time the details versus His time—
It seems that after Peeples Valley folks left the morning briefing, they were left without adequte overhead supervision for the remainder of the day.
Let’s not forget that they WERE working in a divison, and it certainly WAS NOT Div. A. No matter how much spin Marquez puts forth about ALL the important work he was doing after he left his division un-supervised, what he actually accomplished, was leaving the troops in Zulu in harms way.
NO ONE was there to give notice to all those resources to evacuate when the situation warranted it. People just started making their own decisions, and even then, there was poor, to none, in communication of it to adjoining forces. First the dozer, then BR, then, to each his own.
It’s very obvious by all of the notes and reports that this piece of ground remained a cluster-@$#% all afternoon, right up until the point in time the last few left, running for their lives, as a yet-unknown superior ordered their vehicle life-lines to be removed, stating “They can’t run that fast”.
WELL, APPARENTLY THEY COULD RUN THAT FAST.
Let’s also not forget that the supervisor after ordering those vehicles moved, didn’t have the decency to follow-up and see if those abandoned crew members needed help, OR were ok, OR had even survived.
Damn the torpedos, SAVE THE VEHICLES!!
There are those that are critical of the ADOSH conclusions that fire managers put homes and property ahead of firefighter safety. It would seem by the above noted fiasco, that a fire manager also put vehicle rescue ahead of firefighter safety, as well.
This over-all lack of supervision on this particular piece of ground, led to issues with all 10 of the 10, resulting in near-death to many.
This significant issue hasn’t even ‘offically” referenced or examined.
Perhaps they were too busy handing out awards.
Typo above, should read:
This significant issue hasn’t even been ‘officially’ referenced or examined.
TTWARE,
I agree with too many awards being handed out. Distasteful.
Think of all the near misses on the YHF. The near miss with a VLAT and T1 helicopter, the suggested use of a tennis court for a safety zone for too many people, and now these two separate accounts. I remember right after YHF I heard a rumor of a near miss with a VLAT and wondered how the reports would present it, if said rumor was true. And it was true. The reports downplayed near misses altogether and made no effort to create something firefighters could learn from. Why? None of the above mentioned near misses were treated as if they were important. I blame the investigative process and any delegation by the state to “negotiate” the outcome of the report.
Your comment “It seems that after Peeples Valley folks left the morning briefing, they were left without adequte overhead supervision for the remainder of the day.
Let’s not forget that they WERE working in a divison, and it certainly WAS NOT Div. A. No matter how much spin Marquez puts forth about ALL the important work he was doing after he left his division un-supervised, what he actually accomplished, was leaving the troops in Zulu in harms way.
NO ONE was there to give notice to all those resources to evacuate when the situation warranted it. People just started making their own decisions, and even then, there was poor, to none, in communication of it to adjoining forces. First the dozer, then BR, then, to each his own.”
I agree those resources were left without adequate supervision. I disagree those resources worked for a Division or Marquez. They were Structure Group 1 resources, assigned to Esquibel who worked for Gary Cordes. Esquibel’s Unit Log and Peeples Valley FD interviews tell this. And did you know there were two lookouts? An Engine on Westway Road and Gary Cordes on HWY 89. WTF? I keep saying that over and over. Gary Cordes what were you doing? Wish you’d come forward Cordes and tell us why you weren’t surprised GMIHC was found where they died. You have so much to say and your not even being sued.
Your comment about BRIHC abandoning these guys, I disagree too. Brian and True were screaming at these guys to get the F out, they didn’t order Bob B to abandon the other firefighters, no way. This would need to be somebody more important to give this order and for those guys to follow it.
Reply to FIRE20+ post on July 22, 2014 at 9:10 pm
>> FIRE20+ said…
>>
>> This would need to be somebody more important to give this
>> order and for those guys to follow it.
Totally agree.
What we really need to hear is a ‘description’ of this person who was giving them that ORDER ( twice ) and basically telling them to ‘abandon’ their fellow firefighters and not even try to help them.
If someone comes back and describes him as ‘an older guy with a mustache’ and/or ‘some older guy with a white helmet’… then that means it pretty much had to be Tony Sciacca and not Tyson Esquibel.
** DISTANCES
I thought out would also point out ‘for the record’ that some of the ‘distances’ being quoted in the two accounts of this near-fatal incident are a little ‘wonky’.
From the July 1 Prescott Daily Courier article…
———————————————————————
They ( Bob Brandon and Ron Smith ) were among the Peeples Valley firefighters working in a valley on the west edge of Yarnell, only about three-quarters of a mile from the site where the flames overran 19 Granite Mountain Hotshots and killed them on June 30, 2013.”
———————————————————————
Three-quarters of a mile is wrong. It was further away.
The center of that ‘Youth Camp’ at the end of Shrine Road is actually 1.38 mile(s) due northeast ( as the bird flies ) of the deployment site.
From Bob Brandon’s account of the incident ‘in his own words’…
————————————————————————
Bob Brandon: I had an alarm that we had set up. I was going to turn the siren on and start pressing the siren so they could hear us, and that meant to abandon and come back and we’ll get out.
NOTE: This is the exact ‘alarm’ that we can hear going off with our own ears in Blue Ridge Hotshot McCord’s YARNELL-GAMBLE video, Jerry Thompson’s video shot a half-mile south at the Bernard compound on West Way, and even in the recently discovered Dakota Slone videos shot about three-quarters of a mile east over on ‘Crest Way’.. Those ‘engine sirens’ can be clearly heard going off at exactly 1627 ( 4:27 PM ).
Bob Brandon: Well, when I started the alarm, the Incident Commander for our area came pulling up, and he said, “I want you to get these trucks out of here.”
I says, “I can’t do that.”
He said, “You have to do it now.”
And I said, “No. There’s six men still like a mile out into the forest and they need to come back to this safe zone, because this is where they know it is.”
And he said, “No. I’m telling you to leave now.”
———————————————————————–
Since NONE of the men involved in this near-fatal incident were ever properly interviewed ( as far as we know )… then we still don’t know EXACTLY where the six firefighters were working out there in Harper Canyon… but it could NOT have been ‘a MILE out into the forest’ relative to the Youth Camp where their vehicles were.
It had to be closer than that.
Google Maps, in satellite mode and with ‘street labels’ on, even thinks the ‘Shrine Road’ absolutely terminates at this point ( according to USGS data )…
34.230073, -112.758844
That is where even the ‘dirt’ part of Shrine Road just seems to ‘end’ and what continues WEST from that point looks like it hardly even qualifies as a ‘jeep trail’. It starts to look more like just a ‘dry creek bed’ from that point further west through Harper Canyon.
If you turn the ‘Labels’ feature OFF in Google maps and then just ‘zoom down’ on the Harper Canyon area and look at just the pure post-burn satellite images… you can still ( even right now, today ) see what clearly appears to be two distinct ‘dozer pushes’ into that area.
The first one was along the dirt part of what qualifies as that last little stretch of ‘Shrine Road’ itself out a short ways into Harper Canyon… but even it stops a few hundred feet short of the lat/long point above indicating the official USGS ‘end’ of ‘Shrine Road’.
That ‘dozer push’ on the ground there ENDS at this exact point…
34.229828, -112.758187
Just north of that ‘dozer push’ on the ground appears to be ANOTHER clearly defined ‘dozer push’ coming out of the west end of the Youth Camp area itself and more along the northern part of the ‘flat’ of Harper Canyon. However… it, too, stops about the same distance going west into the canyon as the other ‘dozer push’ does.
That ‘other’ more northern ‘dozer push’ terminates exactly here…
34.230535, -112.758597
So all THREE of these ‘points on the ground’ ( the ‘official’ USGS data ‘end mark’ for Shrine Road and BOTH of the visible ‘dozer pushes’ in the post-fire satellite imagery ) actually terminate right around the same spot going WEST into Harper Canyon… and that ‘spot’ would be only about 1,000 feet ( 996 to 998 feet, actually ) from the spot where the Peeples Valley and Sun City engines had been ‘parked’ in the Youth Camp area.
How MUCH farther ‘west’ those men might have been ‘cutting line’ is what is still not really known… but it still couldn’t have been a MILE.
A point that is ONE MILE almost due WEST of the center of the Youth Camp where the Sun City and Peeples Valley trucks were ‘parked’ would put you nearly to the ‘old grader’ location and Brendan’s lookout mound.
Not possible.
So there is no doubt the six firefighters who were being ‘abandoned’ that afternoon WERE working farther west out into Harper Canyon than either the official ‘end’ of Shrine road ( and the two visible dozer pushes )… but it was only ‘just far enough’ for them to have been able to save themselves when the time came. Wherever they were… if they had been even just another 500 feet west… there WOULD probably be another memorial site there in Yarnell honoring six MORE ‘lost men’ on that day.
My POINT here, though, is that regardless fo the accuracy… if Bob Brandon and/or Matt Keehner really did tell this person Brandon is describing as the ‘Incident Commander’ that those men were ‘a MILE west’ of where the vehicles were… then given the fire conditions at that moment you could almost understand this IC person telling Brandon “Those men can’t run that fast… move these vehicles OUT of here RIGHT NOW”.
If that mystery-IC person really did hear “they are a MILE west”… then he really might have been thinking they were either already dead or had already deployed ‘out there’ a mile west of where this ‘move the vehicles’ discussion was now taking place… and judging from what we can see with our own eyes in all the photos from that location and the fire location and behavior at that moment in time… he would have been pretty much justified in thinking that.
I am NOT excusing this mystery-IC for telling Brandon and Keehner to
basically “forget the men… just save the vehicles”… and I am especially not excusing whoever this idiot was for not even lifting a finger to verify what he was hearing and/or find out EXACTLY where those men really were at that critical time…
…but just based on the “they are a mile away” quote it wouldn’t have surprised me to hear from Brandon that instead of him being told “Those men can’t run that fast” the ACTUAL quote from the mystery-IC could have been more like…
“They must already be dead, then… move the vehicles”.
>> FIRE20+ also wrote…
>>
>> And did you know there were two lookouts?
>> An Engine on Westway Road and Gary Cordes on HWY 89.
>> WTF?
Actually… there were THREE lookouts.
The account(s) above also say that was Matt Keehner’s ‘job’ for a while and they put HIM all the way up there on the top of Boulder Mountain. Brandon seems to be saying that Keehner simply ‘came down’ right after Byron Kimball did his curcual ‘weather update’ about the expected 180 degree wind shift at 1531 ( 3:31 PM ). Brandon says something about Keehner ‘coming down’ right after hearing that because he was ‘confused’ and ‘didn’t know what it all meant’. I’m not sure I understand a lookout coming all the way down from his assigned position just because he doesn’t seem to ‘understand’ a weather report on the radio… but such was the confusion of Yarnell, I suppose.
The other interesting thing here is that we SEEM to only now be learning that Jerry Thompson and the other Sun City guys were not down there at the Bernard Compound at the extreme western end of West Way to do any ‘structure protection’ at all. It seems they were also just sent that half-mile SOUTH to ALSO function as ‘lookouts’ for what was happening north of them on Shrine Road.
Well… if that’s the case… then Thompson’s own photos and videos ( and the talk amongst themselves captured in his videos ) pretty much proves they ALSO failed miserably at this ‘assignment’. By the time they even seemed to have NOTICED that the fire was coming over Boulder Mountain… we already hear the ‘sirens’ going off over in Harper Canyon and everyone over there is already self-evacuating and running for their lives… with no warning from Thompson or any of the other Sun City people down there at the Bernard compound.
It was all Thompson and the other Sun City guys could do to get the hell out of there themselves in time to not get burned over that day and they were getting lots of falling ‘hot ash’ and ’embers’ themselves even as they were ending the last video they shot.
>> FIRE20++
>> I keep saying that over and over.
>> Gary Cordes what were you doing? Wish you’d come forward.
The more we learn about this whole operation on the south side of the fire that day… the more it looks like a miracle they weren’t hauling bodies out of that part of Arizona for DAYS following this fire… both firefighters AND civilians.
Total fail.
What is also mind-boggling here as we learn more and more is that while there are now at least TWO separate and SIGNED testimonies from both Paul Musser and Tony Sciacca that right BEFORE everyone had to start ‘self-evacuating’… both of these guys had ‘tied in’ with Cordes just sitting in his truck there right around the point where the Shrine road comes out onto Highway 89 and they say Cordes ALREADY knew that ‘all trigger points were blown’ and he also said “everyone’s getting out”….
…there is still not ONE shred of evidence that there was ever any official ANNOUNCEMENT to this effect over the RADIO.
Gary Cordes is sitting there on Highway 89 telling Musser and Sciacca “everyone is getting out”… but NO ONE who was out there “running for their lives’ can recall ever hearing any ‘official’ radio transmission telling them it was time to do that.
They were ALL ‘making that decision for themselves’… and some in the very nick of time.
It is known that Cordes’ BK handheld took a dump that afternoon when his ‘transmit’ button ‘broke’ and then he had to rely on the Motorola radio in his truck… but even Cordes has stated that the ONLY important frequency he could then no longer transmit on was the Air-To-Ground frequency. That was the only ‘important’ frequency that was ‘missing’ from his Motorola unit and he was somehow unable to ‘add it’.
So no… this doesn’t have much to do with whether anyone thought there was even a ‘Division Z’ SUP who was SUPPOSED to actually BE there in Division Z and making these kinds of ‘announcements’.
This has to do with Gary Cordes not even seeming to have been making sure that all of his OWN ‘Structure Group’ resources and work groups were being ‘officially notified’ of anything.
Followup… TFLD(t) Esquibel himself never even got a ‘radio call’.
Even Tyson Esquibel testified to ADOSH that although there were, in fact,THREE lookouts in place that were supposed to be watching over that Harper Canyon area where he had those 4 Sun City west firefighters ( Darby Starr, James Flint, Jarrett White, Coy Boggler ) and the 2 Peeples Valley firefighters ( Ron Smith and Jacob Moder ) ‘cutting line’… he received NO official ‘get out’ radio transmissions from ANYONE and that his own decision to evacuate the Harper Canyon / Youth Camp area was simply based on ‘what I could see for myself’.
ONE of Esquibel’s ‘lookouts’ was SUPPOSED to have been Gary Cordes himself.
He never got any word from Cordes about needing to ‘get out’ in either Cordes’ capacity as a lookout for Esquibel OR in his capacity as Esquibel’s direct SPGS supervisor.
Esquibel even states that only after they were self-evacuating did he even then attempt to call Cordes HIMSELF to tell him that’s what was now happening ‘out there’ in the Harper Canyon / Shrine road area.
Esquibel testified to ADOSH that he arrived at this ‘self-evacuation’ decision with a face-to-face meeting with Sun City West Engine Captain Darby Starr and they BOTH ( calmly? ) decided themselves it was ‘time to leave’. This bears no resemblance to the story being told in the article that just appeared about Darby Starr receiving that VFW ‘Firefighter of the Year’ award for his ( supposed ) actions that day.
In his ADOSH interview… Esquibel says that he specifically MET with ‘the captain of engine 103’. That was Darby Starr.
“Esquibel: 1620… I met with the, uh, engine boss or the captain of, uh, engine 103.”
In his interview… Esquibel also says that Engine 103 was definitely ‘Sun City West’…
“Esquibel: Uh, yes, sir. Um, we had, uh, engine 103 which is Sun City West”
Here are the actual resource orders for the ‘Sun City West Engine 103’ and its ‘crew boss / captain’ Darby Starr…
AZ-SCW is the Dispatch ID code for ‘Sun City West’.
E-7 06/29/13 2043 PNT – 1 ENGINE – T6
AZ-SCW – LIC# G264EF – #71936
E-7.4 06/30/13 0035 PNT – 1 ENGINE BOSS (ENGB)
AZ-SCW – STARR, DARBY
NOTE: This resource order doesn’t specifically say Darby’s Engine was number 103, but in the Tom Story Photos where we can read the license plate numbers the one that matches the license plate number in the resource order says this on the side…
“Sun City West Fire – Brush 103”
It’s also definitely the same ‘Engine’ seen out there at the Youth Camp in the Blue Ridge photos.
So this is how Tyson Esquibel describes the ‘moment of decision’ about all of them needing to get OUT of that Harper Canyon / Youth Camp area.
He says he ( calmly? ) ‘discussed’ it with Darby Starr ( Captain of Sun City West Engine 103 ) and they BOTH were ‘on the same page’ and had agreed that it was ‘time to leave’…
——————————————————————-
A: I met with the, uh, engine boss or the captain of, uh, engine 103.
Q: Okay.
A: Um, at that point, that’s when we were talking about leaving. Um, I’d left my area and came down. I was planning on leaving at that point. Um, talked to him and made sure he was feeling the same way, and he was.
——————————————————————-
Again.. this testimony bears NO RESEMBLANCE to the story that just appeared about Darby Starr winning the VFW ‘Firefighter of the Year’ award and its description of the circumstances under which Darby Starr decided when it was ‘time to leave’ that area.
Here are the relevant excerpts from Tyson Esquibel’s ADOSH interview…
Q=Bruce Hanna
Q1=Rick Picard
A = Tyson Esquibel
——————————————————————–
325 Q: Okay. Let me ask you for some other guys. So who was your direct
326 supervisor? Was it – was it Gary Cordes?
327
328 A: Gary Cordes was my direct supervisor, yes.
329
330 Q: Okay. So the chain of the command was, um, I guess Roy Hall, Todd Abel,
331 Paul Musser down to – to Gary Cordes down to – to yourself?
332
333 A: Down to myself and then, uh, the ground resources, the – all the engines.
334
335 Q: You had all of those guys?
336
337 A: Engines and water tenders, yes.
338
339 Q: Did you have any duties with Granite Mountain or Blue Ridge Hotshots?
340
341 A: Um, no, I – I wasn’t supervising either of those.
2017 A: At 1620.
2018
2019 Q: Met with?
2020
2021 A: I met with the, uh, engine boss or the captain of, uh, engine 103.
2022
2023 Q: Okay.
2024
2025 A: Um, at that point, that’s when we were talking about leaving. Um, I’d left my
2026 area and came down. I was planning on leaving at that point. Um, talked to
2027 him and made sure he was feeling the same way, and he was.
2028
2029 Q: So who did – who told you that? Your lookout told you you’re at your trigger
2030 point or you saw or?
2031
2032 A: We could see it from where we were, yeah.
2033
2034 Q: And you notified everybody?
2035
2036 A: And then talking with them and putting all the pieces together, it was looking
2037 like it was about time for us to get out.
2038
2039 Q: The fire was coming directly south at that point?
2040
2041 A: Um, it was, um, moving, uh, south to southeast.
2042
2043 Q: Okay. Could you see big flames, big flame lengths?
2044
2045 A: Yes, sir.
2046
2047 Q: And it was all just coming?
2048
2049 A: Yeah. It was still, uh, behind the ridge, and it’d just reached the top of the
2050 ridge about whenever I was talking to, uh, engine 103.
2051
2052 Q: Okay.
2053
2054 A: Or the captain of 103.
2055
2056 Q: How long did it take you to go from the safe – er, from that area to your safety
2057 zone at the ranch?
2058
2059 A: Um…
2060
2061 Q: Restaurant I guess.
2062
2063 A: I timed it later. Um, it looked like probably about 10 minutes or so.
2064
2065 Q: Okay. And you had talked to Gary Cordes…
2066
2067 A: Maybe a little more than that.
2068
2069 Q: …and said we’re leaving. We’re out of here. Everybody’s out of here.
2070
2071 A: Um, yeah. We headed out, uh, prior to talking to him. But somewhere along
2072 the way I got a hold of him on the radio. There was a lot of traffic at that
2073 point, so you kinda have to wait your turn.
———————————————————————
Esquibel himself says he felt no responsibility for ‘Blue Ridge’ or to be ‘notifying’ them about anything ( Blue Ridge also had to self-evacuate ) but Esquibel also doesn’t even say anything about notifying ALL of his OWN ‘Task Force’ resources they needed to ALL be ‘getting out right now’. It was only the people around him in the Shrine area that he seemed to be talking to directly that knew about ‘the decision’.
So… Esquibel gets no ‘get out’ order direct from Gary Cordes in either his capacity as one of Esquibel’s lookouts OR as his direct SPGS supervisor… and then there is no evidence, in turn, that Esquibel made any attempt to broadcast any kind of similar ‘get out’ order to ALL of even his OWN resources over the radio…. including the ones that were NOT there with him in the Youth Camp area.
Everyone was just ‘on their own’… it seems.
It is certainly a good thing that Brian Frisby and Trueheart Brown were ‘on the ball’ and totally ‘looking out for themselves’ that day.
Blue Ridge had TOTALLY ‘fallen through the cracks’ and it seems NO ONE felt ‘responsible’ for them. If they had also been in any kind of ‘blind spot’ that day and/or depending on someone to ‘notify’ them about anything… they could have easily all DIED that day as well.
And Everybody Did EVERY THING RIGHT.
The Investigation should have come down on the over head.
Its happened before they should have been recommended for a down grade in fire positions or removed as type 2 certifications.
There should have been more said in both investigations on this matter.
We can not continue to not Identify who made mistakes and what they were for fear of LAW SUITS……….
Sigh.
I have so much to say I don’t know where to begin, and way too little time IRL to say all of it.
So I’ll start here cuz it’s relatively simple and quck.
Just got finished re-reading, for about the tenth time, Gary Cordes’ interview.
He was on 89 as a Lookout. He was there so he could see the areas north of Shrine/YouthCamp, which they couldn’t see from that area. Because that’s where all his/their major trigger points were. The trigger point for calling for a Yarnell Evacuation, the trigger point for telling his crew to start packing up and getting out, and the “Shit” trigger point for get the hell out ASAP.
The trigger points piled up faster than he had anticipated.
When the trigger point for calling for the evacuation of Yarnell was hit at 1540, he called that in to Abel.
Then, according to him, “Musser showed up and, and met with me where I was parked
1283 on the road, asked me what I thought and I basically said this thing’s gonna
1284 move, it’s moving pretty aggressively towards town. Um, during…
……that time, within that time frame, as you drop to the next line, the trigger
1289 point for crew rem- uh, removing the crew was met so I, I got on the, uh, told
1290 the guys to start picking up and, and getting ready to get out of the area.
1291
1292 Q2: Uh, and you told that to your guys?
1293
1294 A: To, Tyson and then of course I’m sure all of our guys were – heard that, I got
1295 feedback from the crews the next days after I debriefed ‘em and they had all
1296 heard that order.”
He made that order, according to his unit log, at 1550.
Then, further, he describes this:
=…the engines I had working in uh, Shrine,
1773 doing that work as it turned and started chugging and I was giving them the
1774 orders to get out of there. They were already identifying the line-up of um, the
1775 air was calm on their side of the ridge, smoke was banking down and they
1776 started feeling raindrops. And one Darby Starr, who was the engine boss on
1777 Sun City, he had (unintelligible) Sun City or Sun City West, I believe it’s Sun
1778 City West Engine, um, made the comment that he remembered hearing this
1779 from Tony Shocka about the event that occurred at the, with the Dude Fire
1780 and it was time to get his crews out, so it, it coincided with what we were
1781 doing but it, it also would indicate that we had a column above us um, that
1782 was obviously dropping raindrops because they’re feeling raindrops coming
1783 down on ‘em. So, in, in my mind, we have the, the outflows from the north
1784 um, and then a potential column collapse that was above us, uh, that gave it
1785 the extra kick. I may be wrong, but that was my – we obviously had
1786 something building above us to drop raindrops and our guys heard thunder as
1787 well above ‘em.”
Doesn’t sound to me like Cordes was off somewhere randomly being out of touch with his crew.
Re Blue Ridge he says:
“they had their trigger points. I think everybody was really relying
1350 on that um, that ridge line that’s running um, almost east and west in, in, in the
1351 upper corner of four and in the three. Anybody – if anybody saw any activity
1352 on that, um, they were to get out of there and that was, that was coming, it was
1353 all coming to fruition about the same time. So, my engines actually had trigger
1354 points that were being met at the same time that, that uh, that were farther out.”
He didn’t go up Shrine Road, most likely, because he was probably assuming lots of traffic would be seriously trying to go the opposite direction and he had no reason to get in the way.
So he headed to Norton Way, on the north side of Yarnell and started helping people evacuate from there. And then he headed to the Ranch House Restaurant parking lot to tie in with his crew and everybody else.
Who to believe? I don’t know. But, for a variety of reasons, I’m more likely to believe Gary Cordes than Tyson Esquibel. Which leads to my next point.
And I find it intriguing that no one, including the folks that were up there working near the Youth Camp, filed a safety notice regarding this life-threatening incident on SafeNet, which is where, if you’re serious about a safety incident, you’re supposed to report on it if you want something done about it. As a matter of fact, there are no filings there whatsoever regarding the Yarnell Fire.
OK here’s my next point.
I intend to stay out of the “OFF WITH THEIR HEADS” mindset. That’s because I’ve spent a WHOLE lot of time reading stuff on wildlandfire.com over the past couple of weeks.
And, according to the wildland firefighters there, “OFF WITH THEIR HEADS” is exactly the opposite of what they write that they want and need. “OFF WITH THEIR HEADS” is exactly the opposite approach, according to them, of encouraging the kind of conversation that can lead to discovering the absolutely needed TRUTH.
I hope to find the time (my mom’s 95th birthday is fast approaching and I have a project I need to complete for that) to post some links to some of their stuff. It regards the history of fatality fires, their investigations, and their lawsuits, and also Congressional legislation. It’s a history people need to learn about. And, I think, it’s very much alive right now. The Yarnell Hill Fire doesn’t exist in a vacuum.
In that spirit. I’ve been trying to think systemically, not personally, about this stuff. The “what” not the “who”. And trying to, on the one hand, not succumbing to the prejudice of hindsight bias, while using hindsight bias as a tool. It’s a challenge!
The thing I have found myself thinking about, over the past several days is TRAINEES.
I spent a chunk of time re-reading interviews etc regarding Saturday the 29th. I have said, somewhere downstream, that I think (theoretically) this fire should have been nailed on Saturday. I still think (theoretically/with hindsight) that is true.
Having perused the interviews, trying to put my brain inside of Shumate’s brain (without benefit of hindsight), I can see how he could have under-estimated this fire, thus under-resourcing it on Saturday and ordering up a short Type 2 team that under-resourced it for Sunday.
The deal is, he didn’t have HIS more experienced eyes actually on the fire.
He had two surrogate eyes actually on the fire.
One was Nate Peck, the BLM helitack that was dropped on to the fire at 10 in the morning, according to his SAIT interview in the SAIT Interview Notes. He was an ICT4 and FFT1 with Moki Helitack NE Washington. That, to me, says Incident Command Trainee 4 and FireFighter Type 1. In the Interview notes it says “Perfect fire for an ICT5 trainee.” ????
The other was Justin Smith who, according to his ADOSH interview was “I am a qualified uh, IC 4. Um, well I just went through the red card committee
39 but uh – um – uh, and then uh, qualified Crew Boss, Dozer Boss, Engine Boss,
40 um, C sawyer, so.”
Then he says”
“Okay. Uh, I was ordered up as an Incident Commander Type 4 trainee on uh,
56 on Saturday. I got there Saturday morning um, worked all day as a – an IC4
57 Trainee and then uh, the – the following day when it had gone through its
58 transitions I transitioned from an Incident Command Type 4 trainee to a – a
59 heavy equipment boss.
For a chunk of Saturday he was:
“So I was just uh – uh, my – my duty would be uh, I
84 was just um, I was doing what I could as far as uh, logistics with – with meals
85 and – and stuff and trying to coordinate with Russ of a um, another gentleman
86 from BLM and I don’t recall his name um, as far as if there’s anything I could
87 – I could do and – and help out.”
He went up on the hill about 4:00. That, according to him, was after the fire had jumped the two-track.
And that was after Shumate released the air tankers. He was asked by SAIT if he knew why Shumate released the tankers.
He says, ” Yeah but – yeah when that was uh, occurring I was arranging for um, for
227 dinners that evening for the uh, the two crews and the one type 6 State engine
228 that were – were on the fire. I was trying to get meals squared away when –
229 when he made that call.”
SAIT questions him about this:
?Q5: Yeah, okay. Uh, did y’all ever discuss uh, that uh, later as to um, why that –
236 why that happened?
237
238 A: I – I didn’t ever ask Russ why he um, why he had made that – that call. I didn’t
239 uh, I didn’t want to second guess him on – on his decisions um…”
So what I found myself wondering, while trying to balance not-hindsight-prejudicing decision-making while using hindsight as a tool, and also trying to look systematically and not “OFF WITH THEIR HEADS!!” was, is it possible that the losing of control of the fire on Saturday may have had something to do with having trainees in situations where they may not have had the experience and knowledge to handle what the fire was actually throwing at them?
I really don’t know how trainees are deemed qualified to be put in charge of things they are put in charge of. Apparently, if you are a trainee, you are, somehow, deemed qualified to handle situations you may not be “red-carded” to handle.
And now we have Tyson Esquibel, assigned to be a Task Force Leader Trainee within Structure Protection Group 1. So, if I understand correctly, he’s not actually red-carded to be a Task Force Leader. He’s a Trainee.
And I’m having a lot of trouble with both his actions and his statements about a bunch of things.
So, my question is this:
When Trainees are put in charge of things, how is it determined whether or not they are actually qualified to handle those responsibilities and what is required of the overhead who are responsible for them?
When things go (or appear to go) seriously south–or maybe they didn’t but some people say they did–when a Trainee is in charge, where is there, in the system, the location of responsibility for all of this?
Reply to Fire20+ comments:
July 22, 2014 at 9:10 pm
FIRE20+ said:
>TTWARE,
>I agree with too many awards being handed out. >Distasteful.
>Think of all the near misses on the YHF. The near >miss with a VLAT and T1 helicopter, the suggested >use of a tennis court for a safety zone for too many >people, and now these two separate accounts. I >remember right after YHF I heard a rumor of a near >miss with a VLAT and wondered how the reports >would present it, if said rumor was true. And it was >true. The reports downplayed near misses altogether >and made no effort to create something firefighters >could learn from. Why? None of the above >mentioned near misses were treated as if they were >important. I blame the investigative process and any >delegation by the state to “negotiate” the outcome of >the report.
I agree. Watchout # 19 – Death from above (pertaining to both, air resources & overhead)
>Your comment “It seems that after Peeples Valley >folks left the morning briefing, they were left without >adequte overhead supervision for the remainder of >the day.
>Let’s not forget that they WERE working in a divison, >and it certainly WAS NOT Div. A. No matter how >much spin Marquez puts forth about ALL the i>mportant work he was doing after he left his division >un-supervised, what he actually accomplished, was l>eaving the troops in Zulu in harms way.
>NO ONE was there to give notice to all those >resources to evacuate when the situation warranted >it. People just started making their own decisions, >and even then, there was poor, to none, in >communication of it to adjoining forces. First the >dozer, then BR, then, to each his own.”
>I agree those resources were left without adequate >supervision. I disagree those resources worked for a >Division or Marquez. They were Structure Group 1 >resources, assigned to Esquibel who worked for Gary >Cordes. Esquibel’s Unit Log and Peeples Valley FD >interviews tell this. And did you know there were two >lookouts? An Engine on Westway Road and Gary >Cordes on HWY 89. WTF? I keep saying that over >and over. Gary Cordes what were you doing? Wish >you’d come forward Cordes and tell us why you >weren’t surprised GMIHC was found where they >died. You have so much to say and your not even >being sued.
BR was NOT a part of SPG1, as noted by TFL Esquibel in his interview/notes. They were in Zulu, and thankfully, were able to take care of themselves when Marquez bailed.
In actuality, unless doing remote point protection, SPG’s operate within a Division’s boundaries, in conjuction with, but not under the Div. Sup. (groups a specialty force, and divisions a geographic area.) So they were ALL working “within Zulu” and should have been communicating to each other!
If Marquez had stayed in his division, perhaps his addtional set of eyes could have led to a more orderly evac for Zulu AND SPG1, without the near-death experiences those folks incurred. We’ll never know. But it does seem that they already had enough eyes, just none of them communicating what they were seeing!
>Your comment about BRIHC abandoning these guys, >I disagree too. Brian and True were screaming at >these guys to get the F out, they didn’t order Bob B >to abandon the other firefighters, no way. This would >need to be somebody more important to give this >order and for those guys to follow it.
I never met to imply that BR abandoned the other firefighters in there. My memory (often faulty) of what I thought I read a LONG ways back, was that BR guys after seeing other people had not evacuated, WENT BACK IN and were screaming at them to get out. My comment above, was referencing that INITIALLY, the communication between adjoining forces about leaving, was little to none, I could easily be wrong about when BR gave that “advice”..
I STRONGLY BELIEVE that the actions of the BR crewmembers, saved many lives that day, including Brandon’s.
Ain’t it a b1tch that the people REALLY deserving medals from that day probably won’t get them, while others trip over their own spin in a race to make themselves look good.
Typo above, meant to say;
“I STRONGLY BELIEVE that the actions of the BR crewmembers, saved many lives that day, including Brendan’s (GM lookout).”
STRONGLY AGREE
Yep, agree, that’s what Supt’s do on IHC’s. If there’s a hole to be filled they do what they can.
Reply to TTWARE post on July 23, 2014 at 9:29 am
>> TTWARE said…
>> So they were ALL working “within Zulu” and should have
>> been communicating to each other!
Yes. Not to downgrade Blue Ridge’s actions in any way… but it is also true that Frisby and Brown seemed to ‘know’ it was time to ‘get the hell out of Dodge’ MUCH earlier than anyone else did because of where THEY were ‘working’ and what THEY could ‘see coming’… but (apparently) neither Frisby nor Brown seemed to have ‘communicated’ what they knew directly back to Cordes, or Esquibel, or anyone else in ‘Division Z’ or SPG1 or TFLD, or anyone.
No radio intel about it except amongst THEMSELVES.
The first moment anyone knew that Frisby and Brown had already decided it was time to ‘get the hell out’ was when they all ( according to other testimony from people in the Youth Camp area ) literally came ‘running out of the woods as fast as they could’.
THAT is when Frisby and/or Brown did, in fact, start YELLING across the compound to other people… “GET OUT!”… but my point is that they KNEW the situation many minutes before they even came ‘running out of the woods’… but there had still been no TAC channel radio calls from them to WARN anyone about what they already seemed to know very well.
There was only the ‘shouting across the compound’ to people that were within earshot. No official radio como back to Cordes or any OPS or anyone else from them, either.
I’m not sure what that really means. The Blue Ridge ‘Unit Logs’ that were released by the US Forestry Service to ADOSH were so heavily redacted that they were practically useless. It is still not clear who Frisby and Brown, themselves, thought they were ‘working for’ or what actual ‘Division’ they, themselves thought they ‘belonged’ to… so perhaps they really just did thing they were attached to ‘Division A’ and felt no need to notify anyone in ‘Division Z’ about anything for THAT reason. Dunno. Only a non-redacted copy of their Unit Logs or some better interviews with them would clear that up….
…but the fact remains is that even they ( Blue Ridge ) simply did NOT make any radio calls to ‘anyone else in Division Z’ about ‘getting out’. They just decided to do it themselves and were ‘shouting’ at anyone they accidentally came across to ‘do the same’ as they made their OWN way out.
>> TTWARE also said…
>> If Marquez had stayed in his division, perhaps his
>> addtional set of eyes could have led to a more orderly
>> evac for Zulu AND SPG1, without the near-death
>> experiences those folks incurred. We’ll never know.
Yes… and see above. Blue Ridge themselves seemed to know EARLIER than anyone else in ‘Division Z’ ( Cordes included ) that it was time to ‘get out’… but they also made no attempt to pass this along on any open radio channel to give anyone else in Division Z a better chance ( and more time ) to react and do the same thing they were doing. There was just the ‘shouting across the lawn’ over at the Youth Camp… but even that was ‘late in the game’.
>> TTWARE also said…
>> But it does seem that they already had enough eyes,
>> just none of them communicating what they were seeing!
Exactly… and that INCLUDES ‘Air Support’.
They could see better than anyone what was happening but the evidence record still shows a distinct lack of effort on THEIR part to make sure any ‘ground forces’ were fully aware of what THEY knew…. WHEN they knew it.
Again… it was all just ‘conversation amongst themselves’ about what was ‘happening’ and not much effort to ‘share’ that information with anyone else.
>> TTWARE also said…
>>
>> My memory (often faulty) of what I thought I read a
>> LONG ways back, was that BR guys after seeing
>> other people had not evacuated, WENT BACK IN
>> and were screaming at them to get out.
I believe you are referring to that ‘account’ of what Frisby and Brown did that was actually published in the SAIR report… which was as follows…
From page 25 of the SAIR document…
———————————————————————
By 1622, the firefighters in the Shrine area recognize the fire has reached the second trigger point and they start moving out toward Highway 89. Blue Ridge has left and they try several times to contact SPGS1 about getting the rest of the firefighters out of the area. Some of the firefighters do not share their sense of urgency, so BR Supt and BR Capt drive back in to hurry them, urging them out of the Shrine area. As they follow the last firefighters out, the smoke column above brings darkness. Embers fall and ignite numerous spot fires, which quickly burn
———————————————————————
This ‘story’ from the SAIR does NOT appear to be accurate.
Yes… Frisby and Brown were ‘shouting’ at other firefighters in the Youth Camp area to “GET OUT!” as Blue Ridge was evacuating… but then they just followed their own other vehicles OUT, stopped at the Shrine of St. Joseph parking lot for 2 minutes and spoke with someone there ( probably Jason Clawson )… and then they went straight down to the Ranch House Restaurant and never ‘went back in to warn people again’ as the SAIR suggests.
Agree, and who do you think told the dozer operator and boss to do a 180 and get the hell out of there, without notifying the ground troops?
Yes. That’s a very ‘curious’ report about that from the new ‘Bob Brandon’ accounts.
That obviously sounds like a ‘recall’ moment taking place over the radio… but WHY?
Was that the moment after the dozer was ‘requested up north’ and it resulted in that ‘come back now’ call to Justin in the dozer…
….or was it unrelated to the documented ‘request to move the dozer up north’ and actually represented the moment when Frisby and Brown knew it was ‘time to get out’ and ‘no time to lose’ and they passed that on to Ball and Hernandez ‘right away’ ( but NO ONE ELSE? ).
My kingdom for a good sit-down interview with Justin Hernandez ( and Ball ).
Lots and lots of lingering ‘questions’ THEY could answer.
Thanks Joy for a heartfelt view of how the investigation is going. You had to know that not everyone will be pleased that you have gone so diligently to unveil the real story. You are the best at what you do, and I can testify to that having been the other part of the “old married couple”.
I think you by now know that there are many axes being ground, some of them not revealing their true nature. It is hard to understand why anyone would detest the concerned investigations and input from experienced firemen and investigators of the ilk of people like Dr. Ted Putnam, Wayne and Holly Neil, John Daugherty and numerous other people seeking the answers to this tragedy, One fellow we hiked went there to the fence and he said he would stand before any judge–those were his friends and he was definitely going to pay his respects. To deny him that privilege would be a denial to the dead as well as the bereaved. To deny young firemen the entry to see the actual scene and what went wrong would also be a misdeed. That sort of thing sticks in one’s mind-likely to save a life down the line. Sad the stance some take, yet i think it is just lack of understanding and maybe empathy for those who lost so much.
Thanks to Ted and Gaye Putnam for their hospitality. Ted for those who do not know has his doctorate after being a smoke jumper for 11 years. He became the worlds foremost wildfire inspector for wildfire death and tragedy. He deserves the respect he gets. He might also be feared since we know some did not want him to hike the GMHS routes. He, Wayne and Holly Neil educated us much and their input from their investigations of this tragedy will undoubtedly save future lives. Ted told me that was his foremost reason for going there–and new ways to train firemen are on his agenda. To put it another way, he has no money game to play nor is it a money game for him–he can look at it from an unbiased position. Much good can come from people of his ilk and I have never regretted hiking an one person we have taken there. Every one has had concerns and were seeking to find out as much as possible why we could loose these men. I should think that everyone would welcome and make every effort to help.
Thanks again to all you who have helped Joy and I get through this. It has not been the easiest journey/hike in life. We just happened to be there, maybe by no choice of our own.
You are funny Sonny. I never saw this posting before so I am sorry for not replying sooner—must of been stuck in moderation.
I really do not think State would refuse loved ones of the GMHS to slide down the saddle, Sonny. I just think to put signs up and put restricted state land area keeps for the most part folks out yet we all know many many loved ones and the firefighter community & others have visited that very area—we seen them from our mountain top hikes—
Nice thoughts on the Ted and Gaye—they are just the neatest couple.
Yes, we learned the most from our hike with retired firefighters Wayne and Holly Neill and still they stay strong in our lives in such a wonderful kind way even hearing my rants on here and they must be like “Joy, why not come to me…why say it on JD’s page?” and I guess like Sonny will tell you in HOPES that those very folks who are pissed see the importance of sharing their accounts publicly.
Yes, Sonny—thank you to all not only that hiked with us but remain in our lives to this day—people right here on this sight and all over the world. I mean, I was so touched when Utah’s fire warden John and his wife Marti Eckert called me today—touched my heart.
I just love that family. I learned a lot from them on defensible space and we did just that right on his friend’s property.
Thank you Sonny too. Your knowledge of the terrain and all you know—you forever changed my life.
See you when I see ya-
Whew, Joy has done it again. In my hikes and times with Joy, I have never seen a more observant person. She has found so much the investigators have missed. I have not yet seen the photo but it is an exciting revelation that she has found someone we believe to be Eric Marsh on the boulders just above Helms Ranch and just minutes before all the firemen perished. It would could help verify Holly Neil’s idea that Marsh was at the Helms Ranch, but more than that it would show what we saw that day–Marsh was never near his men. It would also show that he could have saved his own butt by dropping off to the ranch but instead opted to drop down into that death trap.
We have hiked through those boulders many times–and I had always thought those men could have saved themselves by ascending into the boulder area similar to the two who in that 1949 Mann Gulch fire were able to do by dashing over a ridge into boulders. I say that because the Helms stayed at their ranch during the fire, yet survived. Those boulder areas both to the south and north had much greater in clearance than the ranch, so it stands to reason, at least to my way of thinking–that that would have been a place of survival. Joy still complains about our descent through the boulders since at the time I thought that might have to be our alternative, but Dee, her medical massage therapist loved it at $125 an hour. I would have thought a shot of good snake bite medicine would have sufficed–but each to what works for them.
I have not hiked that Mann Gulch site, and sorry I missed Ted Putnam. Joy said that he had again hiked the area in the past week. It is only 25 miles to the north of me, here in Helena, athough I hear you have to take a boat ride up the Missouri to get to it. If anyone knows of another way, let me know–I am not too fond of boats or airplanes.
I plan to hike Mann Gulch on or just after August 1. The guy at Gates of the Mountain tells me it has to be a small boat since their regular tour boat does not stop there. He says rock falls due to that fire have messed up the landing area so it is $50 for the smaller boat. Joy can’t join me since she hates airplane rides as much as I do. Anyhow the boat guy says he can haul up to 3 passengers so if any of you would like to go along, let Joy or me know–I am in contact with her daily–my own email for this is [email protected].
Regarding the boulders, certainly since some vegetation did survive fine, there were some places of much better shelter than where GM was. In some ways a moot point, other than a training point. I do agree that the boulders didn’t offer a guarantee of safety or anything close, and certainly most of the trees in the boulders did also burn.
Regarding a photo of someone on the boulders, I guess both the time of the photo and the question of Where? on the boulders is key. If Marsh were there in the minutes leading up to entrapment and high on the boulders, it would raise the question all the more as to why he didn’t see and react to fire behavior, as in that case GM would have had a lookout.
Reply to SR post July 18, 2014 at 9:09 am
>> SR said…
>>
>> Regarding a photo of someone on the boulders, I guess both the time of the
>> photo and the question of Where? on the boulders is key. If Marsh were there
>> in the minutes leading up to entrapment and high on the boulders, it would
>> raise the question all the more as to why he didn’t see and react to fire
>> behavior, as in that case GM would have had a lookout.
Totally agree.
If some photo ( or ANY other evidence ) emerges that somehow proves that Eric Marsh ( or any member of Granite Mountain ) was anywhere forward and/or east of the mouth of that box canyon before 1639 ( 4:39 PM ) when Steed’s first MAYDAY hit the radio… then the OBVIOUS question will be why that person didn’t WARN them of the DEATH TRAP they were walking into.
It would almost be more disturbing to consider why those men might have died if it turns out they DID have a ‘forward lookout’… then to still ponder why they died because they didn’t have one at all.
SR says
July 18, 2014 at 9:09 am
Regarding a photo of someone on the boulders, I guess both the time of the photo and the question of Where? on the boulders is key. EXACTLYIf Marsh were there in the minutes leading up to entrapment and high on the boulders, THERE IS NO PHYSICAL PROOF EXCEPT I SPOKE TO MY MOM AT 3:33PM 6-30-13 AND IF WE WENT FROM ACRI’S AREA TO AREA PHOTO WAS TAKEN THAT IT HAD TO BE FROM 2:50-3:20PM TIME SPOT PLUS IT IS LIKE THAT MYSTERY MAN PHOTO I HAVE FORM THAT MORNING–IT WILL TAKE PHOTO EXPERT TO PIXEL IT PROPERLY WHICH HOLLY NEILL AND JOHN DOUGHERTY BOTH CAN PLUS DEBRA WANTED TO SEE IT—…it would raise the question all the more as to why he didn’t see and react to fire behavior,WELL I CAN TELL YOU—HIKE IT BEFORE YOU MAKE THAT COMMENT TOO BECAUSE EACH BOULDEROUS HILL SHOWS DECEPTIONS AND ONLY UNTIL YOU ARE THERE YOU CAN UNDERSTAND ONE CANNOT SEE THE FIRE ON CERTAIN AREAS BUT NO WAY IS SONNY CORRECT IN HIS ASSESSMENT THAT IT WAS MINUTES BEFORE THE DEATH BECAUSE I WAS IN THE SHOWER AT THE CABIN #15 HEADING TO YARNELL DINER AT THAT TIME—-MIUNTES BEFORE THEIR ASSESSED TIME OF DEATHS BUT ALL THESE PEOPLE WHO ARE FOR ERIC MARSH BROUGHT HIS MEN DOWN THERE—THERE IS NO PHYSICAL EVIDENCE PUBLICLY SHOWN THAT HE WAS EVEN WITH THE MEN AND WHAT EXACT MOMENT HE MET UP WITH THE MEN SO STOP THEORIZING HE LED THEM TO THEIR DEATH OR THAT STEED DID UNTIL YOU SEE ALL FACTS NOT YET SHOWN BECAUSE I AM NOT SEEING THAT BY WHAT HAS BEEN SHOWN SO PLEASE HOMEOWNERS SHOW THESE PEOPLE THE FACTS YOU HAVE DOCUMENTED— PLEASE! DO THE RIGHT THING!!! I NEVER WILL UNDERSTAND HOW SO MANY PEOPLE HAVE SEEN PAT BERNARD’S EVIDENCE AND WHEN I ASKED SOMEONE HOW COME THE INVESTIGATORS DON’T HAVE THIS AND THEY SAID HE SAID THE INVESTIGATORS NEVER ASKED—MY FREAKING GOD—19 MEN DIED AND SOMEONE HAS TO ASK YOU FOR WHAT YOU GOT—GIVE, GIVE, GIVE SO THIS CAN FINALLY GET PROPERLY ASSESSED—-IF YOU ARE WRITING BOOK, WONDERFUL. I WILL BUY IT BUT GET IT PUBLISHED AND BE RAW AND REAL AND SHOW IT ALL VERSUS SOME BS THING OF WHAT YOU WANT TO PUT OUT THERE—LET’S GET THIS ROLLING—YEAH YOU CAN TELL I AM NOT PLEASED THAT OVER A YEAR LATER THERE IS SO MUCH DETAIL THAT CAN BE SHARED BUT PEOPLE RATHER NOT—WHAT THE HELL—IF I HAD NOT SEEN IT THAN I’D BE OK DETAILS OVER—FIRE ASSESSED BUT MAN I JUST GET FIRED UP KNOWING THESE KIDS DO NOT HAVE A DAD AND LOVED ONES LOST THEM AND I JUST PRAY ONE OF YOU IN THE DEPARTMENT THAT WAS ON THE FIRE HAS A ODD PTSD MOMENT AND FINALLY BREAK DOWN— as in that case GM would have had a lookout. IF THERE WAS A LOOKOUT—COME FORWARD BECAUSE YOU ARE NOT IN THE SAIR—IN THE PHOTO THE HELMET IS EITHER SHINING A GLAZE OF SUN GLARE WHITE OR ITS A RED HELMET BUT I AM NOT EXPERT PLUS OVER TIME I ALWAYS FEEL THERE IS MORE TO THIS THAN SHOWN SO TAKES AN EXPERT TO VIEW PIXELS OF PHOTO
Joy says she was home before the burn over so probably not the location of the deployment site or near it. Maybe an earlier picture up on the mountain.
Lots of boulders in the area.
Some one would have had to be harms way to have taken a picture at that time and place. Probably not an accurate time frame. Not near the deployment site?
As we have found pictures need fact and accurate time to associate with an accurate conversation.
reply to Bob in CAPS:
Joy says she was home I NEVER SAID I WAS HOME EVER—HOME IS CONGRESS, ARIZONA YET I MAY OF STATED HOME IN THE SENSE STATING CABIN #15 EARLY ON AS WELL AS CURRENT BUT I WAS NOT HOME IN CONGRESS UNTIL THE EVENING OF JUNE 30TH, 2013 AFTER WE STOPPED AT PENNY’S TO MAKE SURE SHE HAD A RIDE OUT WITH ALL HER PETS; DOGS, CATS, BIRDS AND LOTS OF THEM THEN WE DROPPED HER OFF TO HER SON IN BETWEEN THE DOLLAR STORE AND COUNTRY CORNER GAS STATION BUT WE DID STOP TO MY HOME BEFORE DROPPING HER OFF TO GET WATER BOTTLES FOR US ALL AND GIVE MY HUSBAND THE UPDATES TO MY DAY IN PERSON. before the burn over ACTUALLY IF YOU GO TO THE HOMEOWNERS IN THAT AREA THE TIMING OF THE REPORTED BURNOVER IS UP FOR DEBATE WITH FOLKS WHO DO HAVE TIME STAMPED SOLID SOURCE PHOTOS/VIDEOS/ACCOUNTS YET IT HAS BEEN STATED THE INVESTIGATORS NEVER ASKED FOR IT SO THEY JUST SHARE TO LOCALS AND WELL, THIS HAS BEEN MY CONCERN FOR HOW LONG—EVERYONE HERE KNOWS I HAVE ASKED FOR THEM TO COME FORWARD—BECAUSE I KNOW SOME LOCALS READ THIS VERY PAGE BUT STILL A YEAR+ AND AS OF JULY 2014 THERE ARE SOME FOLKS STILL VERY UPSET AT ME FOR HIKING FOLKS TO SEEK CLARITY YET THEY THE ONES PISSED AT ME AND SONNY WARMLY WELCOME THE VERY PERSON I HIKED SO MAKES NO SENSE. so probably not the location of the deployment site or near it.
I POSTED THIS ALREADY SO MAYBE YOU SKIMMED OR PAST THAT BUT I STATED:
“revelation photos Sonny mentioned. They fell in the order of the time Sonny and I were past Acri’s spot Parcel 203-15-007D, past the windmill in a wash and not yet nearing the NU_HART LLC area Parcel 203-15-013F/Candie Cane Lane and the view would be State Land 800-20-049E in photo near the boulderous area of Parcel 203-15-009 Cavalier/Parcel 203-05-003MThe Helm’s aka Boulder Springs Ranch.”
Maybe an earlier picture up on the mountain.OR MAYBE A PHOTO FROM SATURDAY—I MEAN I TRIED TO ASCEND/DESCEND AND DO ALL I CAN AND PHOTOS FELL IN WRONG ORDER IN EVEN DOING THAT—BEFORE DIGITAL CAMERAS THERE WAS NO GPS OR TIME STAMP ON PHOTOS AND IF PEOPLE SAW THE PHOTOS LIKE IT IS THEY TOO WOULD ASSUME BECAUSE THE PHOTOS FALL INTO THE ORDER IT DOES THAT IT HAS TO BE RIGHT. SURVEILLANCE CAMERAS BACK IN THE DAY HAD IT BUT NOT COMMON FOLK CAMERAS—MY POINT IS MY PHOTOS ARE NOT TO BE DISREGARDED FOR IT SHARES THE FIRE BEHAVIOR, THE PLACEMENT OF THE EQUIPMENT, THE WEATHER, THE DIRECTION OF THE SMOKE, THE TERRAIN BEFORE AND AFTER THE FIRE, WHERE THE MEN WERE ON THE WEAVER MOUNTAINS, ETC. BUT TO ME IF I WAS AN INVESTIGATOR IN THIS MODERN WORLD WOULD NOT USE THEM IN REGARDS TO TIME STAMPING THE EVENTS OF THAT DAY YET THEY STILL HOLD VALUE. HOWEVER THERE IS FOLKS WITH SOLID CAMERAS WITH TIME STAMPING AND I HAVE MENTIONED IT ALOT ON HERE AND THOSE FOLKS NEED TO BE SHARING THESE ACCOUNTS BUT ALOT ARE LAWYERED UP AND TOLD NOT TO SPEAK OUT SO THERE YOU GO- I WON’T BUY THE RECLUSE PART BECAUSE 19 MEN DIED BUT I COMPREHEND BEING LAWYERED UP.
Lots of boulders in the area.YOU BET AND THEY ALL SERVE A DIFFERENT VIEW AND CAN BE VERY DECEPTIVE
Some one would have had to be harms way to have taken a picture at that time and place. EXACTLYProbably not an accurate time frame.EXACTLY YET TO DEFEND SONNY—HE HAS 13% HEARING SO WHEN WE SPOKE HE COULD OF HEARD MINUTES VERSUS MOMENTS—TIME FRAME WOULD HAVE BEEN BETWEEN 2:50-3:20PM FOR THAT PHOTO TO BE TAKEN— Not near the deployment site?ACTUALLY THE FIREFIGHTER WITH HELMET ON IS ON THE BOULDEROUS HILL LEFT OF THE HELM’S CATTLE POND AND ON THAT HILL YOU CANNOT HAVE THE DZ IN VISUAL.
As we have found pictures need fact and accurate time to associate with an accurate conversation.RIGHT AND I HAVE ALWAYS SHARED EVERY TINY DETAIL EVEN IF IT INVADED MY PERSONAL LIFE
Sorry– Joy by home I meant where you were staying Cabin #15. A miss conception on Home. My stupid…….
The latest the Picture could have been taken was 3:20.
Marsh was on top of the Fire to meet with Frizby at 3:40 which would have been hard to do from the Helms ranch.
This also could have been another Fire Person checking the Ranch and drove in and out by vehicle between 2:30 and 3:30.
Need to really check the picture as to Marsh or not. before making that ID.
.
The entrapment was at about 4:50—-But it dose not hurt to check possible information on Pictures that may be critical evidence or another false lead . keep on digging evidence turns up in the strangest places
Sorry– Joy by home I meant where you were staying Cabin #15. A miss conception on Home. My stupid…….NO PROBLEM JUST WANTED TO CLARIFY WITH THE RECENT HORSE SHIT FLYING AROUND–
The latest the Picture could have been taken was 3:20.CORRECT BUT EVEN THAT IS STRETCHING IT BECAUSE I WALKED AT THE END SLUGGISH AND MY GPS TRACKER SAID 1.8-3MPH FOR ME BUT SONNY WAS AHEAD OF ME.–THE MOUNTAIN GOAT HE IS.
Marsh was on top DOES FRIZBY STATE ON TOP OF EXACT GPS COORDINATES IN ANY REPORT??? WHAT TOP? WHAT HILL OR MOUNTAIN? of the Fire to meet with Frizby at 3:40 which would have been hard to do from the Helms ranch.THE PHOTO SHOWS FURTHER THEN THE HELM’S RANCH—ANYONE WHO HAS HIKED IT KNOWS LEFT OF THE CATTLE POND DOES GIVE A VISUAL TO HELM’S SESAME AREA BUT NOT THE DZ AREA
This also could have been another Fire Person MY OPEN OPTION THOUGHTS TOO OR PHOTO IS ASCENDED WRONG AND ITS A PHOTO FROM SATURDAY AND NOT SUNDAY AND FELL INTO WRONG SPOT GIVING THE DECEPTION AS SOME OTHER PHOTOS DID THE SAME—-AS I ALREADY MENTIONED—IT NEEDS A PHOTO EXPERT—checking the Ranch and drove in and out by vehicle between 2:30 and 3:30.I WOULD LOVE FOR THE CURRENT DEPARTMENT THAT FOUGHT THAT FIRE FINALLY SPEAK UP BUT LIKE I SAID LAWYERED UP NOW AND IT WILL TAKE SOME ODD PTSD MOMENT TO EVER SEE THAT HAPPEN
Need to really check the picture as to Marsh or not. before making that ID. SONNY IS ONLY GOING BY OUR CONVERSATION WE HAD AND HE WAS EXCITED FOR THERE WAS A REVELATION AND THE ONLY PERSON IN THE REPORTS THAT WAS IN THAT AREA WAS MARSH SO LEAVE IT AT THAT FOR THAT—I ALSO STATED TO SONNY WAIT UNTIL I SENT IT OUT SO JD AND HOLLY NEILL COULD GET A BETTER LOOK AT IT TO PIXEL IT—THANK GOD I HAVE THE PHOTO ON MY CELL AND I SENT IT TO BOTH BUT NOTHING YET BACK EXCEPT THEY NEVER GOT IT YET IT SHOWS “SENT” ON MY END AND I SAVED IT TO SHOW THEM IN PERSON AND ALMOST MET WITH JD IN PRESCOTT FRIDAY BUT WE WERE IN DIFFERENT AREAS DOING DIFFERENT THINGS—
.
The entrapment was at about 4:50—WHAT HAS BEEN REPORTED AS THE ASSESSED TIME YET ONCE EVERYONE SAT AND TALK TO ALL THESE HOMEOWNERS THAN COME BACK AND TELL ME WHAT’S UP—WHAT’S THE RIGHT ONE—THE REPORT OR THE HOMEOWNERS? -But it dose not hurt to check possible information on Pictures that may be critical evidence or another false lead . EXACTLYkeep on digging evidence turns up in the strangest placesLIKE I SAID YOU DON’T EVEN HAVE TO DIG TOO DEEP—GO SEE THE ACCOUNTS OF THE LOCALS
Marsh and Frizby Meet in the black where the two track comes up past the lookout spot and the grader to the black and then across the black near the top of the fire as in some ridge area.
Brown used the same two track to get above the saddle and then
down the 2 track that went to the saddle above helms ranch.
That was Frizby and Browns explanation of the meeting spot as I remember. so just referring to what they said. There were water bags and a pumpkin there as well I believe. above and to the right of where the crew was at the rest spot.
That is all absolutely correct.
Captain Brown’s active GPS unit verifies all that.
No reports of a ‘pumpkin’ ever being set up from the day before up there… but there were ‘bladder bags’ left over from the Lewis DOC crew work at that same location the day before which DPS chopper Ranger 58 then mistook for ‘field packs’ when they first started searching for the deployment site.
The other thing that has never been ‘resolved’ is that in the topographic map that appears in Blue Ridge’s own GPS data tracking that was supplied to the SAIT… it has a LABEL on their topo map at the exact point where that east/west two track meets the high ridge north/south two-track which says…
“Mystery Panel”.
There has never been anything to explain what that means.
Due to link(s) in this comment wall I may post like my hiking page link above that has ALL the photos if you scroll down the page it shows links to get to the original day JUNE 30th 2013 where I posted the Yarnell Hill Fire photos I may get locked under WAITING FOR MODERATION. That shows EVERYONE from day one I have never had any shadiness or angle in this fire an it was to show my loved ones that fire AS IT unfolded than Sonny/I hiking google adventures was another way to publicly show again no shadiness or angle as well show everyone who God led to us—
Let me start with June 30th, 2013 and when I recently looked at the photos and videos again as I am burning a disk so that Tex Harold Eldon Gilligan (Sonny) can have it on his adventure in Helena, Montana. Strange huh. First off, he never “planned” Helena even last year when we had spoke on Montana we never spoke of that town but Sonny is very near the Mann Gulch tragedy—that’s God placing him there.
Dr. Ted Putnam was disappointed he just learned Sonny is in area because he was hiking it himself. I am so glad Wayne and Holly Neill’s fellow firefighter friend Diana met Sonny today along with having a lovely meal and conversation with Dr. Ted Putnam. I am sorry Ted when we were talking that I was on the migun bed and we had call lost but thank you for sharing Ered Matthew’s play THE FENCE to your family to see- only 2 shows left; tonight at 7:30pm and tomorrow at 2pm at Stage Too behind Murphey’s Restaurant in Prescott, Arizona. The Arizona Ranger we met last night said she is going Sunday and I know about 1/2 dozen from Yarnell will be there as well. There has been sold out shows but there was not one last night yet I loved the quality audience that was there—I had good time. I did not meet up with JD as we planned and Crystal had all the photos with her to share to him she told me during the play. I did that long ago stored all my info. to a few trusted folks so they can have them in case I pass on-
I have so much to say and I will reply to you Sonny as well send off the photo to the following requests; JD, Holly, Debra and anyone else who emailed Sonny and requested it. Let me explain the photos. First off my photos even though they EXIST do not hold much value due to the time stamping flaw except try to explain some details to the Yarnell Hill Fire as well as we “eye-witnessed” that fire from the fire line not from in town but because I fell down a 15ft mineshaft with me and the camera the internals are screwed up. I know I took a photo on Saturday yet its time stamped Sunday and vice versa so it takes me to state this was taken on this day which matches to Sunday’s views versus Saturday’s—the camera is 100% unreliable YET I never once edited or cropped the images always left them raw—I try to even put the photos in ascending order it was taken and I TOOK the photos so I know some are not in right place for EXAMPLE the revelation photos Sonny mentioned. They fell in the order of the time Sonny and I were past Acri’s spot Parcel 203-15-007D, past the windmill in a wash and not yet nearing the NU_HART LLC area Parcel 203-15-013F/Candie Cane Lane and the view would be State Land 800-20-049E in photo near the boulderous area of Parcel 203-15-009 Cavalier/Parcel 203-05-003MThe Helm’s aka Boulder Springs Ranch. This fire has been so public that no area of my once private life is private so people who like their privacy like me have to get to properly assess this fire you have to become transparent to make it happen. I mean I have people come to my home unannounced and my home is no where near the Yarnell Hill Fire so I get the homeowners there in Yarnell wanting privacy but hello 19 men died and we need to gather every detail to make sure the loved ones know we did all we could as a nation to figure out those last hours not just for the 19 but for the prior fallen ones, the homeowners, all the ones affected by the YHF and as well as the pioneering folks amongst that area. I know this is lengthy yet I have a lot to cover so just SKIM or SCROLL past me if not interested yet I have people asking questions and here are the answers.
Number one, when the 19 died locals who stayed behind stated all resources were pulled off and many homes were lost due to resources being pulled off. I am no expert but the images I have from the aerials shows slurry drops in some areas and fire breaks made and it would take a fire expert to explain those tactics but to me they were pulled off because not much you can do in the dark but maybe someone has more details there—has anyone seen and analyzed those images as I have—that initial July 1st images on the media tells a story in itself and would take sitting down and truly talking about it in depth as we look at images. I do state from day one that any property/homes between the Shrine and Sesame area especially Rex and Ruth Maughan, S&P, Baluco, Helms, and Whitehead, my dear Helen Cleckner, Kenny Headrick, Pat Bernard, Cliff Frederick and the guy Bruce who try to run OSHA and me off his Sesame Street area that hike angrily—those to me ARE the very first folks to not only reach and learn their accounts—see their videos and photos but also donate directly to vs this organization bs of we donate money to help THESE people yet they have not seen a dime some of these people due to organizational guidelines. I have heard since last Summer from so many that Pat Bernard and Flame propane guy Michael Fike? (he’s named in a law suit by Knapp for last name)—anyways I heard their accounts compliment my photos and public statements and I have time to time asked people to tell them to share publicly their videos and photos. You see, I have not yet asked them personally because over time rumors fly that the Helms, Don Glasgow with Maughan Ranch and Pat Bernard feel me hiking the investigators, OSHA, retired feds/cia, firefighters, smokejumpers, loved ones of the GMHS, and some media sources rubbed them VERY wrong as trespassing and invasion of their privacy yet HELLO 19 men died and a SAIR report came out just blaming Mother Nature and had I not been there at the fire line as well with temp. readings and kestrel readings than I may of bought that SAIR because it is facts yet like I tell people—“does the sun set?” and usually people say “you bet, Joy plus it rises too” yet I reply “it APPEARS to rise and set because of the Earth’s rotation on its axis but see it from space then it does not set” and so to me the SAIR appears for the general population ok but if you look at the whole package—no way said with much heart here and it did a great disservice to all affected by the YHF. Look at this Bernard or Don Glasgow of Maughan Ranch or Helm’s—I am DEEPLY sorry for you all feeling the way you do in regards to me even one of you inquiring to the depths I know Tex Harold Eldon Gilligan (Sonny) because I am a married woman. Who does that? I can answer you a woman who has had a lifetime of sharing with the golden generation—the true pioneers of Arizona—God shared those people to me and reading Ann Woodin’s “Home is the Desert”—that generation captured my heart, mind and soul. When Kenny Slomkowski here in Congress has to drag me off hwy 89 or locals who live in North Ranch find me passed out on the side of hwy 89 when I’d walk from Congress to Wickenburg’s Filiberto’s then back home THOSE people plus hundreds more were relieved I found a hiking pal vs hiking it alone due to my brain tumors and health concerns but I am stubborn and I wanted to live the pioneer way in the modern world—that was my goal and I have done it for not just a moment but appx three years and shockingly “still” may do it after I see the brain surgeon and properly assess where I am at. You ask my husband how he was okay with it and he will tell you there is never a dull moment in knowing me yet at times watching Sonny and Joy (the old married couple we were labeled early one—he’s old and I’m married) he would say he felt like he was watching a Twilight Zone episode; the one that had the train ride “next stop…willabee” because it seem we were on his never ending circle ride—not getting the God lessons Sonny and I—now where was I on the fire—oh yeah, you all have been pissed off I hiked these folks because you all think its violation…trespassing yet ask anyone I hiked with—I made sure they all had state land permits and YES YOU ARE WELCOME ARIZONA STATE LAND for I have educated all that without that pass you can face a criminal misdemeanor and yet not many understand that. All the people pissed off at me I have never come to you asking for your accounts or making you meet any of these people yet God has led Holly Neill who hiked with us—we did not do that Helm’s…God led her to the Helm’s and they have invited her in so why is it okay for you to warmly welcome the lady in yet be mad at me or Sonny??? Before the fire I always tucked around past the state land to the left of the cattle pond and went to the 2 track ridge—all legal not on your property and I deeply know that area even hiked it after being struck by a diamondback rattlesnake and was not up to par and I can go that area blind-folded. The only reason we twisted up that weekend behind the Helm’s was due to the fire and the weather of the day yet like I asked thoroughly to many different sheriffs of YCSO and everyone said there is nothing they can do legally for us being on Maughan’s area or other areas without proper fencing and proper no trespassing signs ever so many feet so I felt better because Don was not willing to give us a written permission pass to cross certain areas with the hike with OSHA yet we did not need it walking with OSHA—after all. If you went to Ered’s play and saw it was Ronda Carnes the Congress gas station gal that I had spoke to her Friday, Sat. & Sunday as well as Lois Porowski and Pat Fisher and retired sheriff Dan Jacobs and my mom and husband. I have not publicly talked about it much that weekend yet the people we alerted know and that was enough for us but I never spoke about just in case in the future the same or others wanted to still use that area to camp for their privacy yet the area remains a ghostly area with the 19 very much their spirits are alive and there—you see a lot of folks who normally prospect the Stanton/Congress area were in that terrain blinded by boulderous hills from the fire and if we did not alert them they said they would of perished. I am truly the desert walker not just some cookie cutter trail hiker so I do know every street person, every drifter, prospectors, rancher, geologist, atv enthusiast, runners, mountain bikers, herpetologist, off the grid, rv’ers, etc…What else…I need a break an dpost more later–I have lots more to address…
Part Two. All the scripture I have read indicates that God is incapable of evil. Yet He made the team that put together that SAIR report and to be able to sleep every night and be okay with the SAIR “as is” to me IS an evil. Furthermore watching Mike Dudley—what a fine speaker but like I said a long time ago—fine speaker or not what a disservice you are doing for current firefighters that look up to you and what you have to say as a fine speaker—remember this—these fine 19 men and other fallen ones no longer have a voice to speak—you preach your pretty sermons but they don’t say nothing—you sing a pretty song but you don’t say nothing—you write your stories of your perception of the YHF but it does not say anything. Look here…these are not just names and numbers/ages…they are human beings and if you are PISSED OFF because I am trying to seek clarity because I was AT the fire line and there IS missing pieces and I seen some accounts and you all just need to come forward because IT IS THE RIGHT THING TO DO not because oh shit your space has been invaded—When we met Ered Matthew at the Yarnell library and he said some of the interview may make it to the FENCE play we okayed it thinking it was going to introduce the last pic we took of the GMHS but no—-go see it, we are a significant role in his play from start to end. Not even on the fire on a lot of it but to humanize us I reckon Ered did—I mean at first I saw the play and was star strucked by Smokey (the bear) and really was like is the play on the fence or comedy hour of me and Sonny knowing each other and our challenges—I am for sure certain people on the YH Recovery Group are going to look at it that way. They are going to analyze every scene as “oh my”…500 folks. the exact number is 483—but we helped DIRECTLY not go through their organization—only at times and small times we helped through them because as we helped people directly we learned their concerns and we addressed it in writing to Rowle Simmons and what did Rowle Simmons do but place that very original letter into the hands the homeowners asked me to get investigated so here I am standing in the sanctuary with 2 people looking at me like I am the one with the beef and wanting to resolve it and I am like how is Rowle Simmons handing my ORIGINAL letter for the people to the very people I asked to be looked into—and now that day I had my challenges with Sonny plus helping people so I was very on the spot and bad timing because I was in poor mood even used “G.D.” in the sanctuary as to how come Rowle Simmons felt it was okay to do that on concerns that were addressed yet they wanted to handle it. I use to ask people to donate to that but as time went on I just stated donate DIRECTLY first to the 19 and the people I named above then on to the assessor list folks and others too—you go print that up thinking that is truth that assessor list—-nope—minor adjustments need to be made but hey McCracken’s is marked partial but yet their home is GONE so gone that their liquor cabinet blew a hole in the area it was stored—the list does not have it all and its not all right…so who KNOWS that community and as well as the properties—the desert walker; ME. LOOK at this:
Ashcraft, Andrew – Age: 29, Caldwell, Robert – Age: 23, Carter, Travis – Age: 31, Deford, Dustin – Age: 24, MacKenzie, Christopher – Age: 30, Marsh, Eric – Age: 43, McKee, Grant – Age: 21, Misner, Sean – Age: 26, Norris, Scott – Age: 28, Parker, Wade – Age: 22, Percin, John – Age: 24, Rose, Anthony – Age: 23, Steed, Jesse – Age: 36, Thurston, Joe – Age: 32, Turbyfill, Travis – Age: 27, Warneke, William – Age: 25, Whitted, Clayton – Age: 28, Woyjeck, Kevin – Age: 21,Zuppiger, Garret – Age: 27
Now when I went to both Memorials I wept in Wade Ward’s arms—that was God moment too. You see I am hiking 4 directors God-willing because I don’t feel well but I am going to keep trying but with the photos—they are out there both on my hiking page and google+ so for the ones now asking for the photos IF you only seen the amount of information before me it is NOT go right to this spot and find it—they all blend in and I have to look through thousands of photos just to find it again—I have had a frustrated technology week and went 16+ over my Verizon mifi just to refind the photo and Verizon said my next bill will be $275 in overage and I do not work and my husband’s hours were cut so I have to actually list things to sell and well I ‘d love for my collectables to sell first but they don’t so I have to sell my ammo or even maybe Sonny’s scratched up rifle which because the way someone handled it ruined the resell value but my point is STOP asking me to promptly pronto get things to you asap on a hunch photo that shows number 1 a firefighter on a boulderous hill and number two photo with 2 firefighters because remember my time stamp is broke and all you can go by is my oral account so none of that holds up in this modern lawyered up kind of society—it is all black and white no greys in finding the truth—NO THEORIES needed only documented pristine information should be accepted—mine is not to be disregarded yet it will not hold up in any investigation or court room is all I am saying. Many tell me what Rowle Simmons did was illegal and he could be in trouble but I am much like the Prescott Mayor—old school and we are not into this to cause more confusion or chaos just we all want the TRUTH and I KNOW there is more details. I mean I guess because I am approachable I met many the past few weeks I cannot talk about publicly here because they belong to the current way of system and its their livelihood yet I those people are applauding me for my hikes and efforts I know I am on the right path EVEN if you all want to be pissed off because of the hikes—
Have you hiked with a loved one yet of the GMHS? I have. I do all I do number one for the golden generation then for the 19—I have no clue what tactic is NEEDED for you all to come public but I won’t stop educating people topography-weather-fuel load model usage on fires and I won’t stop educating people on defensible space and I won’t stop educating people SAFETY MATTERS FIRST! It takes us all TOGETHERNESS to get passionate on this and encourage not just the new and old firefighter/smokejumper communities but even takes the simple housewife folks like me to CALL ATTENTION to the deficiencies so OBVIOUS in wildland firefighting safety by the current management systems! TIME TO DEMAND changes in the policy and practices and that is why I cant understand HOW Jim Karels and Mike Dudley and ANYONE who strongly backs that SAIR report as OK. I can tell you this…lessons can only BE LEARNED if we CHANGE OUR BEHAVIORS and I speak from experience in me and Sonny’s well known challenges. Him and I have areas within us we have to change for us to trek again and until then the fires within us will just keep being…Him and I both have to work on ourselves not him work on me and vice versa—man, you never met a better hiking team than him and me 24/7—to learn the desert and forests as I have and for Sonny to unfortunately be educated of the modern rules and regulations by me…we surely made a good match being different! Thank you Sonny. I will keep writing, break time. Veggie juice time.
Reply to Joy A Collura post on July 19, 2014 at 4:26 pm
Wow. Thank you, Joy.
As usual… a lot to digest and it ALL comes straight from the heart.
If no one has said so lately… thank you for your continuing contributions to this one particular ongoing discussion of what happened in Yarnell, Arizona, on June 30, 2013.
There is much to comment here on what you have recently said… but for the moment what stood out for me is this comment….
>> Joy Collura said…
>>
>> Lessons can only BE LEARNED if we CHANGE OUR BEHAVIORS
>> and I speak from experience in me and Sonny’s well known challenges.
I’m not sure you are aware of this… but the home page on the Internet for the actual ‘Wildland Fire Lessons Learned Center’ is here…
http://www.wildfirelessons.net/home
…and at the very TOP of that important online page… in the actual graphics banner itself which remains ever-present on that site no matter what sub-page is visited… it says this…
Wildland Fire Lessons Learned Center
A lesson is learned when we change our behavior.
If that doesn’t prove we are ALL ‘on the same page’ here… I don’t know what would.
thank you—I was logging out and saw this thank you—good timing—I just wish some of the homeowners would stop this glaze of horseshit and see this whole thing for what it is—so many just want to hold on to hope and the truth and MORE details that are indeed out there-
Whew, Joy has done it again. In my hikes and times with Joy, I have never seen a more observant person. YOU BET SONNY—WAS BORN THAT WAY—WOULD HAVE MADE A GOOD 40’S DETECTIVE YET I AM NOT A PART OF THIS MODERN WAY OF LIFE AND THEIR ODD RULES AND REGULATIONS BUT YES IN MY TIME CERTAIN FOLKS READING THIS KNOW I HAVE BEEN KEY TO ANSWERS DUE TO MY OBSERVATIONS—
GOOD OBSERVATION YOURSELF FOR SAVING MY LIFE TWICE THAT 6-30-13
I CANNOT BELIEVE YOU ARE SO FAR IN DISTANCE YET NO TIME OR SPACE CAN SEPARATE THE SIMPLE FACT WE JUST “IS”—RIGHT. WE ARE THE BEST HIKING SYSTEM OUT THERE—
recent inquiries and requests-
I am only working on gathering the pics and a lot I have to do from another wifi sourced area I trust so this will take much time but you can privately email sonny’s email above with your information or better yet if serious as you state then this is for anyone interested—you send me
Joy A Collura
Postal Box 572
Congress, Arizona 85332
the blank dvd disks and proper pre-paid postage self addressed dvd type delivery envelope and only those folks will get a physical copy of any information I have and more in regards to YHF and Sonny/I (it is just going to be a copy of what I will be sending Sonny and the content he wants on his dvd—no customizing for others)—you have permission to use this dvd for viewing yet if any information in it is used make sure you get proper permission from us first for any usage that goes to publication/press/merchandising/any reason other then just viewing it to try and properly assess fire. No information in the dvd should be used to create an income revenue for you—it is just to get the YHF properly assessed. At no time will I orally or publicly share who inquired if you snail mail me…Sonny is Sonny so if you email him he does what he does—so if you need privacy and no one to know you inquired for the dvd; snail mail me the prepaid self addressed dvd delivery envelope and blanks dvds. I have no clue how many yet it will require but I can tell you min. 4 blank disks and if you send more than I will send them all back to you. The dvds will be mailed out in the order I received incoming snail mail. You have plenty of time to send these out. I will post here when dvd is ready and Sonny received his first.
I am suppose to give Holly Neill credit in any media reference I do and yet I do not remember mentioning anything from articles she put out. I went and reread my post and still do not see it. If she means about the behavior stuff that we have been talking about here since ages ago as well as me and Sonny personally have and its on a lot of sites like someone just said and the part about deficiencies in the wildland firefighting and me being a housewife-that is all I can think about because I was on the migun bed and thought about the past year yet in Holly Neill’s Safety Briefing she has content that compliments the very stuff I have said from the start so now I pulled out her recent stuff to see where she felt I did not reference it back to her—and it would be page 2 of her briefing from June 2014 but I did not so you all know write it from her thing—I read it when I got the papers soaking and then placed papers in moth ball banker box labeled “folks I hiked with in regards to the YHF” and stored it and so maybe some stuff stuck in my mind from recent reads yet it was never intentionally posted to make something my own but here is the public credit statement from a forum/group of retired federal wildland firefighter community. I apologize yet again if I was “copying” from an area I would have posted where the source I got it from like I have in the past. I used lines from movies and stated what movie too. So again she read the comment and felt I was using her lines and deserved credit so here it is—and a public apology for I truly did not write when I did with only my current thoughts rolling because I was disturbed how people keep telling me HOW upset the locals like the Helm’s, Bernard, Don Glasglow are for hiking people to seek clarity and yet the very people PISSED AT ME and Sonny warmly welcome in the manner they have someone I took on that hike—-?????????????????—-so yeah I have a right to be disappointed that it is ok to LAY BLAME on me but accept the very ones I hiked…makes no sense!
STUPID COMPUTER!!!
I did not want for this to post but somehow it did the last comment—
my mifi said dormant, I clicked over to gmail…read Holly’s email and was going to cut out the part where I publicly reply on her request for credit on JD’s page and it had nothing to do with what I thought and here I saw the comment posted; ???— it was this statement I made that she was saying give her credit ( her reply to me: You wrote this to me below: ***Can i use the safety first with local kids…i plan to have monthly meetings for kids. Educate them on modern land laws and safety and our local desert …and it was that she was asking credit for)
I did not preview this and then I got an email from Holly clarifying yet as you all can feel my tension for my reckless rash behavior but I am just so very tired of locals locking on to theories and anger towards me when they let the very people I hike are warmly embraced in their home(s)—Holly kindly replied to me “you can use any of the stuff I sent for your teaching, but give credit if I wrote it in print, same as you get photo credit in print, this is all.” I am sorry to all just upset that people do not grasp the whole package here. I mean every detail to my day I think how 19 men could be doing what I am doing yet they cannot and if there is any way we can help them is by sharing every tiny detail to that weekend—I am logging off the net so I can focus JUST to the photos and going through them and label why we took that very photos and create a dvd format for Sonny and whomever else sends for one. Someone asked how much for the labor—it is a labor of love and you just pay for your disks and s.a.s.e. is all—I do not want a dime in doing the right thing—
I am not in good mood so I will stay of here a bit-
STUPID COMPUTER!!!
I did not want for this to post but somehow it did the last comment—
my mifi said dormant, I clicked over to gmail…read Holly’s email and was going to cut out the part where I publicly reply on her request for credit on JD’s page and it had nothing to do with what I thought and here I saw the comment posted; ???— it was this statement I made that she was saying give her credit ( her reply to me: You wrote this to me below: ***Can i use the safety first with local kids…i plan to have monthly meetings for kids. Educate them on modern land laws and safety and our local desert …and it was that she was asking credit for)
I did not preview this and then I got an email from Holly clarifying yet as you all can feel my tension for my reckless rash behavior but I am just so very tired of locals locking on to theories and anger towards me when they let the very people I hike are warmly embraced in their home(s)—Holly kindly replied to me “you can use any of the stuff I sent for your teaching, but give credit if I wrote it in print, same as you get photo credit in print, this is all.” I am sorry to all just upset that people do not grasp the whole package here. I mean every detail to my day I think how 19 men could be doing what I am doing yet they cannot and if there is any way we can help them is by sharing every tiny detail to that weekend—I am logging off the net so I can focus JUST to the photos and going through them and label why we took that very photos and create a dvd format for Sonny and whomever else sends for one. Someone asked how much for the labor—it is a labor of love and you just pay for your disks and s.a.s.e. is all—I do not want a dime in doing the right thing—
I am not in good mood so I will stay off here a bit-
I need people to NOT send any dvds until I say it is complete and burned just in case I cannot get my pc running again and if its some kind of a final virus that took a very good pc out. I will not send back any dvds or s.a.s.e. if they arrive and I am unable to fulfill the dvd request. The 2014 Roxio I was working on it earlier to create the dvd and I took break to watch NEBRASKA and juice some veggies and I placed the pc on “sleep” mode for the movie. I went in other room and when I came back there was a blue screen saying “fatal error” on the pc and my pc is not working. It just cost me almost $400 the past few days with ROXIO update/Verizon mifi overage and as well my bank made an error that takes 5-7 days and so $165 was removed 4 times at once from my account. I am very much upset how some locals view me yet they allow the person in their home in the manner they did—does not make sense to be so pissed off at me yet warmly welcome one of the ones I hiked—???? I am very blessed that even though my times with Sonny on the trails have paused that he is still a part to my days yet my main focus of being here is to have zero stress and address my tumors not just in the head but all throughout my system. I am also focusing to unpacking and packing and reorganizing—then I really want to finish writing the 1784 thank you notes out and I only mailed 21 so far. So I am up against obstacles and well, I am in no mood to want to give it energy. If you email me asking “why you mad at me” or throwing me in the JD comment wall—then all I ever ask from all is let’s all be 100% transparent on finding the truth and if you cannot be transparent and a straight shooter all the way 100% then PLEASE do not write, call or email me. I am fine with it. Hey, I get the loved ones and certain folks currently in the system of this firefighter community and the discernment needed there but the rest of us—oh and do not read this thinking its aimed at any one person this comment—it is general and just meant for everyone to know I am about to LOSE all my years of info. on my pc including recent software purchases and I just tried to restore to earlier point and the last time I was on there was 2011 when I began the hikes and so I tried and it said it could not—just blue screen saying “STOP: C000021A (FATAL SYSTEM ERROR) THE INITIAL STARTUP TERMINATED WITH STATUS OF C0XC0000001, 0X00107B8) THE SYSTEM IS SHUT DOWN) I unplugged it for awhile and retried getting all the same stuff. I do not know what is going on—I know we have had odd things happen on our trails Sonny and even recently its been proven Sonny is still followed but to mess up all the pcs—I mean I am borrowing someone’s just to get this message out. I can use my cell to check on stuff but not easy to read or type for me. I wish my brother lived closer for technology times like this- Okay, again if my pc does not get fixed I lost all the photos I just took off the google which cost me $165 in overage to get that information so if it is kaput—I’m kaput on technology devices—I am too old school for bullshit moments and how many times do I have to lose on all my documents/photos/videos just lost my laptop 6-11-13 to another obstacle—thank God I gave the fire photos to select few so I can ask them for that but what about my life stuff outside the YHF; ugh. Sorry Sonny for not trying to reach out today but laying low because I am in such a mood. Why air the mood? Because I want number one you all to not send dvds until I resolve if possible the pc which even F8 option does not even pop up to do last known configurations and number two because we, the people, need every detail to properly assess the fire so if you are pissed off at me because I hiked people and we never disturbed you or even asked you for your accounts but even Holly Neill can state I edged her more towards Jeff’s area than anyone else because I DO respect folks’ privacy yet I also wanted to get to McCracken’s too—My mother is going to fly me back East to see a surgeon that specializes in systemic tumors and what I have going on—so I also have that area going on. So the next time I will log on to JD’s area is to say SMILES—back up and going good! So everyone take care and again I am sorry for my melt down yet I am not apologizing for asking all that was there 6-30-13 to speak up and share your accounts! My mifi has been saying searching for hours now—click “send” when it says “connected” FINALLY.
You have that right Joy–How could people be angry about the hikers yet welcome at the same time welcome some of those that made the hike? The very people that were making those hikes are at the same time very valuable to getting to the bottom of this tragedy–yet we who know little about the fine points of firefighting were the ones that made it possible for these people to witness the site. I notice most others are antagonistic toward outsiders hiking the area so that the easy way in is blocked with huge signs and threats of prosecution from Sesame Street and of course Helms ranch. Well there are other routes around and if one had to, that person could totally come in from the Congress side. Also for those who do want to hike email me at [email protected]. I will have Joy e-mail me a bemap of how to do the hike and there off Candy Lane are areas without tresspassing signs, also the Flippins, who we helped after they lost everything whom I am certain would be glad to allow you to cross their property. Maybe pay them a small fee of $5 or $10 to show your generosity,, since they need something after the fire. (They would not charge if you mention Joy and Sonny)–but we know their need. You see you can legally get to that two track above the death site, and those people can grumble all they want.
Sonny or Joy
In short, in the photo that you are referencing, is Marsh located on the mound between BSR and the DZ?
That’s the ultimate question Calvin, where’s the picture? Sorry Joy, for you to say you snapped a picture of a firefighter right in the DV area moments before you escaped, I’m not buying it. Prove me wrong! Didn’t you mention in one of your posts that you had time to shower after your hike on the 30th? I don’t understand how you could have time to shower and still snap a picture of this firefighter on one of the ridges in DV. Again, please prove me wrong and don’t just say you have a picture, show us.
The last two articles that have come out about Structure Group 1 resources, I hope it’s obvious to people what Gary Cordes didn’t do. He didn’t warn his resources of the impending weather that was predicted, he didn’t tell his resources to pull out of the area due to the fire changing direction (now didn’t you say you did this in your interviews?), he wasn’t situationally aware. I say WTF Gary Cordes. What exactly were you doing? Didn’t you say yourself that you were acting as lookout for same resources? It’s amazing what comes out after investigations and this is just the beginning.
You are absolutely correct.
I believe that Joy said the picture was taken earlier in the day as you said she was home some one jumped the gun on what the picture was and Time.
THIS IS JOY REPLYING TO:
reply to Bob, Calvin,FIRE20+
Sonny or Joy THIS IS JOY—SEEMS SONNY TRIED TO REPLY AND ITS IN MODERATION—
In short, in the photo that you are referencing, is MarshNOT KNOWN IF IT IS MARSH BUT A PERSON WITH HELMET ON AND ALREADY EXPLAINED THIS—READ MY POSTS FOR I GIVE FULL DETAIL ACCOUNTS. located on the mound between BSR and the DZ?NO; IT IS LEFT OF HELM’S CATTLE POND; THOSE BOULDEROUS HILL
That’s the ultimate question Calvin, where’s the picture?ANYONE WILLING TO FIX MY PC FOR FREE OR GO SEE CRYSTAL BECAUSE SHE HAS ALL MY FIRE PHOTOS OT YOU CAN GO TO MY HIKING PAGE LINK ABOVE OR LOOK ON MY GOOGLE+ PAGE—IT IS NOT A NEW PHOTO—IT IS ONE THAT HAS BEEN THERE FOR OVER A YEAR BUT BECAUSE I HAVE NOT FELT WELL AND AM NOT GO, GO, GO I FINALLY TOOK TIME TO LOOK AT EACH PHOTO AND DISCOVERED 2 PHOTOS THAT HAVE PERSON WITH HELMET- 1 WITH 1 AND THE OTHER PIC WITH 2 PERSONS—- Sorry Joy, YEAH YOU BEST BE SORRYfor you to say you snapped a picture of a firefighter right in the DV area moments before you escaped ,WHAT? ME? ANOTHER ARIZONA CENTRAL SHAUN MCKINNON MOMENT HERE WHERE WHO EVER JUST PUT ME IN THAT SENTENCE TO THOSE WORDS—“NARRATIVE” AND NOT FACTS!!! I HAVE NEVER STATED SUCH. BACK UP! I REMEMBER THE FIREBALLS COMING OFF THOSE WEAVER MOUNTAINS AND I AM ABOUT TO BE ONE OF THEM FIREBALLS HERE—READ WHO WROTE WHAT AND WRITE ACCURATE STATEMENTS BECAUSE I NEVER SAID THAT I’m not buying it. ME EITHER—Prove me wrong!EXCUSE ME. I AM NOT IN THE MOOD FOR TECHNOLOGY OR THIS HORSE SHIT ( I AM IN A BEYOND PISSED MOOD RIGHT NOW—SO BACK OFF AND READ FIRST YET I AM LAUGHING BECAUSE I TOO JUMP THE GUN ON HOLLY NEILL YESTERDAY SO I GET IT—WE ALL CAN HAVE JUMPY TIMES BUT REALLY I AM NOT IN ANY MOOD FOR MUCH RIGHT NOW—NOT FEELING WELL)—CAME HERE TO READ SONNY’S REPLY BECAUSE HE EMAILED ME HE REPLIED ON HERE BUT I DO NOT SEE IT BUT I AM NOT GIVING YOU THE ENERGY—I AM A STRAIGHT SHOOTER—KEEP ME OUT OF THIS PROVE ME WRONG BULLSHIT. YOU GOT A QUALITY DECENT PERSON OUT THERE THAT CAN FIX MY DARN PC FOR FREE THAN LET’S TALK—HORSE SHIT. YOU GOT ME A DECENT QUALITY SURGEON I CAN TRUST WITH MY SYSTEMIC TUMORS THAT WON’T KILL ME LIKE I SAW THOSE FOLKS DO TO MY PALS THE PAST 14 YEARS–THAN LET’S TALK! OTHERWISE, SAY WHATEVER YOU SAY BUT I WILL CORRECT YOU IF YOU SAY SOMETHING THAT DOES NOT MATCH TO ME IF JD ALLOWS ME THAT FREEDOM TO WRITE HERE—SIMPLY SAID! THAT’S ENOUGH. Didn’t you mention in one of your posts that you had time to shower OK, ANOTHER FREAKING LET’S TELL EVERY TINY PERSONAL DETAIL TO JOY’S LIFE—WHY STOP THERE–WHY NOT TALK ABOUT MY SEX LIFE TOO—SINCE THAT SEEMS TO BE A TOPIC OVER THERE IN YARNELL ABOUT HOW WELL DID I OR DO I KNOW SONNY—WHEN WE PARKED AT THE FRONT OF OAK PARK WE ANGLED THE HEAD OF THE 91′ TAURUS TOWARDS HWY 89, WE STEPPED OUT TO A VERY PANICKED DELBERT AS HE SAID YOU GOTTA GO—EVACUATIONS ARE IN ORDER—I TOLD SONNY WE JUST LEFT THAT FIRE AREA—WE KNOW IT IS OKAY—WE DRAG OUR HEAT STROKED BODIES IN TO CABIN #15—SO TIME STAMP IT—WE GOT IN VEHICLE ON FOOTHILL IN FRONT OF SUSAN’S AND I SPOKE TO MY MOM 3:33PM (MIND YOU BUY THE BOOK FROM TRAGEDY TO RECOVERY ON AMAZON AND SEE HOLLY BECKER’S ACCOUNT AND GO GET HER EXACT TIME BECAUSE WHAT WE ARE HEARING IS THE VEHICLE WAS NOT TOO FAR OFF FROM BEING ON FIRE ITSELF AND YOU CAN GET THAT FROM THE ACCOUNTS OF HOLLY BECKER, DAN S, PAUL SILVIA ALL WHO LIVE NEAR WHERE WE PARKED AND THEIR PLACE IS FOREVER GONE—SOME SAY WE WERE 11 MINUTES AWAY FROM THE FIRE) BACK TO VERY CONCERNED DELBERT THAT WE ACTUALLY SPENT TIME LISTENING TO HIS WORRYMENT AND ALL I WANTED TO DO WAS DROP ON THE COUCH OR BED AND UN-GEAR (UNDRESS—WOULD THAT HAVE BEEN IN FRONT OF SONNY??? OH MY. PEOPLE!!!) SONNY WAS ALREADY IN AND IN THE SHOWER BY THE TIME I HIT THE COUCH AREA TO GET TO DO THAT AND HE SAID HE FELT ILL AND WANTED TO EAT AND I TOLD HIM IT WOULD BE A WASTE OF MONEY TO SPLIT A MEAL AT THE DINER BECAUSE I AM HEAT-STROKED AND IT WOULD NOT DIGEST TOO WELL AND WHEN SONNY WANTS TO GO—HE WANTS TO GO SO I SIMPLY WENT IN AND HAD COLD WATER HIT ME AND DID NOT EVEN SOAP UP BECAUSE TOO WEARY AND EXHAUSTED AND ILL AND THEN GRABBED MY PURPLE SHIRT AND GREY SHORTS AND WE WENT TO THE DINER AND SAW PENNY AND EVEN SHE WAS NOT CONCERNED NOR THE DINER AT RIGHT ABOUT THE 5PM HOUR (MIND YOU THIS AFTER THE MEN DIED NOW BY THE CURRENT ASSESSED TIME OF DEATH FOR THE MEN) THE DINER WAS GETTING MIX MESSAGES ON EVACUATIONS—FINALLY AS WE ATE THEY GOT WORD 1 HOUR EVACUATION NOTICE. BUT EVEN THEN NONE OF US WAS CONCERNED IT WOULD HIT TOWN. WE HEADED BACK AND I WAS ON THE THRONE THROWING UP AND THE OTHER—I HAD PUT MY LAPTOP COOLER PAD ON THE BED, THE EXTRA SD CARD WAS RIGHT NEXT TO IT AS WELL AS MY KESTREL AND ALL MY HIKING GEAR SCATTERED BY THE COUCH AND SONNY’S GOOD COWBOY BOOTS OVER BY THE DRESSER—THEN SONNY IS DEAD AS A DOOR NAIL LAYING ON THE BED NEXT TO MY LAPTOP COOLER AND JOY IS IN BAD PAIN ON THE TOILET. YOU WANTED DETAILS—YOU GOT IT. YOU ARE GETTING IT. THE ACTIVE MANAGER KNOCKS ON DOOR AND SAYS WE HAVE TO LEAVE—I AM IN THE BATHROOM—WE SAW THAT FIRE AND I WAS IN NO WAY CONCERNED TO HURRY—-SONNY HAD A CONCERN AND THAT WAS WE WERE DEAD TIRED—WE HAD PLAN AFTER I USED THE BATHROOM AND I WOULD OF TOOK “REAL” SHOWER AND RESTED A BIT TO GO LOOK AT THE FIRE AGAIN; THAT NEVER HAPPENED- THAT SHOWER—THEN THE OTHER INACTIVE MANAGER MARY YOUNG OF OAK PARK BOLDLY COMES INTO THE CABIN #15 AND SCOOTS US OUT A.S.A.P.—LEAVING OUR STUFF BEHIND BUT I DID GRAB JUST A TINY FEW THINGS “THINKING” WE PLAN TO COME RIGHT BACK AFTER SHE DISAPPEARED SO WE SAID TO COOL IT FOR A BIT LET’S GO TO PENNY’S AND SEE THE FIRE STATUS AND THAT IS WHEN WE BOTH SAW THE GATES OF HELL OPEN UP—REALLY, HOW THE HELL DID IT DO THAT? THESE THEORIES OF BACK BURNS THAT I DO NOT SUPPORT UNTIL I SEE PRISTINE EVIDENCE–YEAH YOU SHOWED ME STUFF OUT THERE BUT AGAIN THOSE BOULDEROUS HILLS CAN BE DECEPTIVE—IT WILL TAKE MORE THAN THAT FO RME TO BELIEVE IN THEORIES—I AM A FACT BASED GAL. WELL, OH YEAH I FORGOT—ON THE WAY OUT FROM THE FOOTHILLS WE STOPPED AT BOB KRAMERS HOME AND SPOKE TO HIM AND RITA AND SAW THE FIRE WHICH IS IN THE PHOTOS—THAT PHOTO I THINK IS NOT ON GOOGLE BECAUSE I WAS ON PRIVATE PROPERTY AND I HAVE A RESPECT BUT THAT PHOTO COULD SHOW YOU ALL THE SMOKE AND AREA IT WAS AT 3:45PM BUT AGAIN I NEED SOMEONE FOR FREE WHO I CAN TRUST TO HELP ME FIX THE DARN PC—I DO NOT HAVE THE MONIES TO DO IT NOR PATIENCE FOR TECHNOLOGY RIGHT NOW—I HAVE MORE IMPORTANT THINGS TO ADDRESS RIGHT NOW. after your hike on the 30th? I don’t understand how you could have time to shower and still snap a picture of this firefighter on one of the ridges I ANSWERED THIS AND REPLIED TO SONNY HERE ON JD SO YOU SIMPLY JUMPED THE GUN AND REPLIED TO SONNY’S COMMENT NOT MY OWN BECAUSE I ANSWERED THIS SO THIS SHOWS I AM NOT THE ONLY ONE OUT IN THIS WORLD JUMPING THE GUN—FEELS GOOD TO SEE IT TOO—I DO NOT FEEL ALONE—THANK YOU LORD! in DV. Again, please prove me wrong and don’t just say you have a picture, show us.TO ANSWER THIS YOU MUST OF NOT READ AGAIN WHAT I POSTED THAT MY PC CURRENTLY SAYS “blue screen saying “STOP: C000021A (FATAL SYSTEM ERROR) THE INITIAL STARTUP TERMINATED WITH STATUS OF C0XC0000001, 0X00107B8) THE SYSTEM IS SHUT DOWN)” AND ANY PERSON WANTS TO FOR FREE HELP ME FIX IT—WONDERFUL BUT NO ONLINE TROUBLESHOOTING OPTION WORKED YET AND TODAY DUE TO MY FRUSTRATION I HAD NO INTENTION TO COME TO JD’S PAGE BUT SONNY SAID HE TRIED TO POST ON HERE SO I WAS LOOKING FOR IT BUT I GUESS HIS IS IN MODERATION—???
The last two articles that have come out about Structure Group 1 resources, I hope it’s obvious to people what Gary Cordes didn’t do. He didn’t warn his resources of the impending weather that was predicted, ARE YOU KIDDING ME–THAT YOU DID NOT NEED A WEATHER UPDATE GUY OR CORDES—IT WAS IN PLAIN SIGHT—COMING FROM PRESCOTT TO YARNELL—-YOU COULD SEE IThe didn’t tell his resources to pull out of the area due to the fire changing direction (now didn’t you say you did this in your interviews?)SONNY WAS FULLY AWARE—JOY WAS NOT. I WAS SITTING THERE WITH MY SNAKE BOOTS OFF WATCHING THE FIRE AT A DISTANCE—I WAS SITTING ON THE SAME RIDGE WHERE EVENTUALLY THE MEN DROPPED IN TO GET TO THE HELM’S, he wasn’t situationally aware. I say WTF Gary Cordes. What exactly were you doing?SONNY FROM DAY ONE SAID WHY ARE PEOPLE GIVING AWARD CEREMONIES FOR THE FIRE MANAGEMENT OF THE YHF—THEY ALL SHOULD OF BEEN FIRED BUT I BELIEVE THIS A CASE BY CASE ACCOUNT SITUATION AND I DO FEEL THEY HAVE NOT ALL GAVE THEIR FULL ACCOUNTS AND THERE IS MUCH MORE DETAILS— Didn’t you say yourself that you were acting as lookout for same resources?I DO NOT THINK YOU MEANT US HERE SO LEAVE IT ALONE It’s amazing what comes out after investigations and this is just the beginning.
That’s the ultimate question Calvin, where’s the picture? RIGHT ON MY BROKEN ASS PC—DID I GET SENT A GOVT. VIRUS SOMEONE SAID TO ME AND I HAVE NO CLUE BUT IT IS NOT FUNCTIONAL AT ALL—AND CHARLES CASMIR LIPINSKI SENT THAT FANCY THING TO ME IN THE MAIL BRAND SPANKING NEW A FEW YEARS BACK TO JOURNAL MY HIKES FOR THE LOCALS TO SEE I AM OKAY BEING I DON’T LIKE THE PHONES AND I AM IN PERSON ONLY GAL SO THERE IS NO REASON IT SHOULD BE CRASHING–IT HAS NOT BEEN USED MUCH SINCE I HAVE BEEN GONE ON/OFF FOR 3 YEARS PIONEERING ARIZONA—Sorry Joy, for you to say you snapped a picture of a firefighter right in the DV area moments before you escaped, I’m not buying it.I AM NOT BUYING IT EITHER AND YOU ACTUALLY SLANDERED ME THERE OR REWROTE SOMETHING SOMEONE ELSE SAID BECAUSE I NEVER SAID IT!!! I CAN SEE SONNY SAYING WHAT HE DID MAKING AN ERROR TO TIME BECAUSE HE HAS 13% HEARING THAN YOU REACT ON WHAT HE WROTE BUT I NEVER SAID IT AND TO ME IS SLANDEROUS—FOR SONNY JUST MISCOMMUNICATION—MISHEARD. Prove me wrong! NOT THIS SHIT AGAIN. Didn’t you mention in one of your posts that you had time to shower after your hike on the 30th? I don’t understand how you could have time to shower and still snap a picture of this firefighter on one of the ridges in DV. Again, please prove me wrong and don’t just say you have a picture, show us.SHEW! ENOUGH. I AM GOING OFFLINE…I DID LOOK SONNY BUT ALL I SAW WAS THIS STIR OF HORSESHIT WHERE PEOPLE READ WHAT YOU REPLY AND DISREGARD MY REPLY TO YOURS SONNY AND JUMP THE GUN AND WROTE THIS—-
The last two articles that have come out about Structure Group 1 resources, I hope it’s obvious to people what Gary Cordes didn’t do. He didn’t warn his resources of the impending weather that was predicted, he didn’t tell his resources to pull out of the area due to the fire changing direction (now didn’t you say you did this in your interviews?), he wasn’t situationally aware. I say WTF Gary Cordes. What exactly were you doing? Didn’t you say yourself that you were acting as lookout for same resources? It’s amazing what comes out after investigations and this is just the beginning.
You are absolutely correct.
I believe that Joy said the picture was taken earlier in the day as you said she was home some one jumped the gun on what the picture was and Time.
On JULY 10, 2014 AT 12:31 PM WantsToKnowTheTruth wrote”
“Reply to Bob Powers post on July 9, 2014 at 1:36 pm
>> Mr. Powers said… >> I guess I have some ownership to the Ten Standard Orders. I am proud that those that >> died did not die in vain and gave direction and saved lives of all the wild land fire fighters >> that followed.
…But one year later, few changes have been implemented among the state’s fire crews as a result of the deaths, despite an investigation that uncovered a series of communications breakdowns that doomed the 19 men and a second that blamed fire managers.
……..
I am going to write a counter-story here. It may very well be that, if the lessons from the Yarnell Hill Fire and the demise of the Granite Mountain Hotshots are “only” that all the fundamental lessons learned from the past are still absolutely fundamental, THAT lesson may be exponentially more important than any “new” lessons.
(Except possibly the lesson that, as Gary Olsen has written, the Fire Gods have feet of clay, and will not be on your side, or the truth’s side, if things go to h*ll in a hand-basket and you end up getting either killed or majorly maimed, as a result. And, of course, as everybody knows, that’s not a new lesson either).
But there was this fire, the Slide Fire, this spring in Arizona, in Oak Creek Canyon, just barely north of Sedona.
And I believe that, in spite of what the media says about there being mostly no impact from the Yarnell Hill Fire on how fires are fought, the way the Slide Fire was engaged, fought, communicated, and ultimately contained, strongly belies that narrative.
Despite how fire-fighters and overhead communicated to the press that they were fighting THIS fire and not THAT fire, I believe that how THIS fire was fought is a testament to how they were keeping THAT fire in mind and committing to making sure what COULD easily go south didn’t.
I watched the Slide Fire with great interest, concern, and pain.
When I lived for ten years in Flagstaff, I hiked the West Fork of Oak Creek Canyon practically every two weeks. It was the first place I was introduced to when I moved there. When I had a tiny daughter, I first carried her there in a back-pack and then put her on the ground and taught her how to hike there. We picked apples in the orchard and blackberries in the thorny shrubby vines nearby. It was my sanctuary. And it was smack dab right in the middle of the Slide Fire. And many many people were extremely upset about that.
Oak Creek Canyon is, essentially, a chimney. It leads, essentially, straight up to forested communities south of Flagstaff. Along the way it is home to many homes, special places, camping areas, favorite lookouts on the switchbacks, springs, and lots of Ponderosa pines and maple stands.
There has been a substantial amount of mitigation done in these areas over the past ten years, both in Oak Creek Canyon and in the Ponderosa forests surrounding Flagstaff. But still…..
I’m not sure exactly when, but fairly early on in the game, Tony Sciacca’s Type 1 Incident Management Team was assigned to this fire. The second evening of his command, he started giving public presentations, using Google Earth, to narrate what was happening on the fire, how it was progressing, and how his team was fighting it.
This was a very dangerous and difficult fire. Everything was mostly uphill. Lots of beetle-damaged and dead Ponderosas. Steep side canyons (including West Fork) galore. For several days there were inversions, not only trapping smoke that made it impossible to fly helicopters and tankers, but with the danger that inversions always carry, of suddenly subsiding, leading to blow-ups and even area ignitions.
It was made clear to the public from the get-go that the safety of fire-fighters would not be compromised while engaging this fire. There would be no fire-fighters placed in those special but dangerous side canyons like West Fork. Although a crew did back-fire around the heritage apple orchard at the bottom of it. Which totally freaked out a lot of people who don’t understand back-firing. Those special side canyons were used to chimney and then corral the fire up to the west onto the Ponderosa Pine plateau above them.
That plateau was criss-crossed by some roads. One of which had once led to the back-side of the little trailer I once lived in in the forest on the west side of Flagstaff. Those roads were used, widened, and back-fired as a fire-line around the fire they used the beloved side-canyons to chimney up to them. In order to do that, they had to allow the fire to grow to 30,000 acres. They used those 30,000 acres as a “baseball glove” in which to “catch” the fire.
Lots of people were pretty apoplectic about all of that. They didn’t like the side-canyons burning (especially West Fork), they didn’t like the days and days of smoke, and they didn’t like losing 30,000 acres of Ponderosa Forest. But that’s what it took to fight this fire aggressively while safely.
As I watched this fire evolve, and as I watched Tony and his team (which included the Blue Ridge Hotshots) engage and finally corral it, amid intense media coverage and scrutiny, intense concern because this was, after all Oak Creek Canyon and its nationally beloved West Fork which had to burn in order to channel the fire, intense un-happiness because of all the smoke, intense unhappiness about how they let burn 30,000 acres of Ponderosa forest, I thought to myself, “Brilliant, I tip my hat to you, Tony Sciacca!”
As it turned out, West Fork only sustained relatively low-level burning, which probably, in the long run, is good for it. In my opinion the management of this fire was exceptional.
And, in my opinion, as I observed it from my internet, given what I have learned about things via the demise of the Granite Mountain Hotshots on the Yarnell Hill Fire, I firmly believe Tony Sciacca and a host of other people on his team had the Granite Mountain Hotshots very much in their minds and hearts as they engaged the 2014 Oak Creek Canyon Slide Fire.
Marti, I am sure the primary thought in Tony Sciacca’s mind on the Slide Fire was “no repeat of Yarnell”. In 1995, South Canyon accompanied firefighters to every fire. The problem is the durability of these lessons, they fade after a while. Which is why some say the 10 & the 18 are not enough to keep people safe – the feeling is people will eventually shortcut or compromise them, as the memory of the latest catastrophe fades. But is this inevitable? It is not enough to preach the rules, no matter how often and how loudly. The question is what happens when they are not adhered to? I would bet on Bob’s crew, there were real consequences to non-adherence. But that is likely not the case across the wildland community. If disregarding the 10 & the 18 was dealt with firmly (in an educational way) I think the durability of the lessons might be greater. The cycle of bad decisions with good outcomes (and I do not know at all if this applies to the GMHS) needs to be interrupted and not be allowed to continue. The onus is on the leadership to make this happen, and if the leaders are doing the disregarding, those above them need to take action.
Reply to mike post on July 18, 2014 at 4:58 pm
>> mike said…
>>
>> I am sure the primary thought in Tony Sciacca’s mind on the Slide Fire
>> was “no repeat of Yarnell”.
Good lord… I certainly HOPE so.
If there’s a type 1 Incident commander out there ( anywhere in WFF land ) who is in the “nothing to see here… move along… move along” camp, I would say that’s a BIG red flag.
>> mike also said…
>>
>> If disregarding the 10 & the 18 was dealt with firmly (in an
>> educational way) I think the durability of the lessons might
>> be greater. The cycle of bad decisions with good outcomes
>> (and I do not know at all if this applies to the GMHS) needs to
>> be interrupted and not be allowed to continue. The onus is on
>> the leadership to make this happen, and if the leaders are doing
>> the disregarding, those above them need to take action.
Couldn’t agree more.
Shortly after the SAIR came out… there were some (supposed) off-hand comments being attributed in some MSM articles to both SAIT Leads Jim Karels and Mike Dudley where they were stating what we all know to be true. It wasn’t that there were ‘radio’ problems that day… there were ‘communication’ problems.
People were talking on the radio… but not ‘communicating’.
Now… back on June 20 and right before the annniversary… we hear Mike Dudley admitting to rooms full of firefighters that he is going around giving ‘speeches’ to about Yarnell that that is always EXACTLY what SAIT Co-Lead Mike Dudley thought. He even goes so far now as to say in PUBLIC that he really does think that Marsh was being ‘intentionally vague’ most of that afternoon.
From Dudley’s recent ‘speech’ on June 20 in front of the Utah Unified Fire Authority gathering…
———————————————————————————–
Mike Dudley ( SAIT Co-Lead ) said…
So they’re sitting up there… and wondering what to do.
I will say this. There is this point where… well… you can see the dialogue… and that’s one of the key components.
A lot of people were talking… very few people were communicating.
And you saw that little snippet of when Blue Ridge and Granite are tryin’ to identify… “Where are you guys? Youre’ in the black?”… “Yea… we’re makin’ our way down the escape route”.
At no point do you see someone finally go… “Okay… WHERE exactly are you HEADED?”. That was never defined.
It was almost as if Granite Mountain was bein’ deliberately vague.
——————————————————————————-
So back to your point… in order for management to take any ‘actions’ against crews that are doing the ‘bad decisons with good outcomes’ dance… first they have to KNOW about it.
I believe that Marsh and Steed were FULLY aware they were ‘breaking the rules’ that day and that is why they were ‘staying off the radio’ most of the time they were moving and NOT asking Air Support to help them in any way or NOT checking with someone who could SEE the fire when they knew they could not because that would have meant full disclosure of the ‘move’ the were making and under what conditions.
I really think that Marsh and Steed were playing the “what they don’t know won’t hurt them” game and were convinced that all they had to do was show up in Glen Ilah like the cavalry coming in on a charge… and no one would have asked any questions or given a crap how they actually GOT there ( or whether rules were broken in the process ).
So something WFF management really has to ‘get their head around’ following the Yarnell tragedy is that there ARE probably a lot of crews out there taking a lot of chances… but in order to avoid any reprimands or ‘bad write-ups’… they are also practicing the “what they don’t know won’t hurt them” style of communications and are actually HIDING some of these ‘risky moves’ as best they can. It’s all about RESULTS. Get somewhere and ‘do some good’ and no one is going to ask you HOW you got there.
I don’t even think more advanced GPS is going to help solve this.
If you have crews out there who are going to make an attempt to HIDE their real movements and their real routes out of fear of ‘reprimand’ or ‘bad writeups’ ( as appears to have been what was happening in Yarnell that afternoon )… then they will also just be turning GPS transmitters OFF and then saying later “sorry.. the batteries must have died, or sumthin'”.
The only cure is prevention, really.
Somehow… someway… there needs to be better assurances that crew bosses who would even THINK of doing things like this and/or practicing the “what they don’t know won’t hurt them” approach to radio communications should never be out there on the fireline in the first place.
Have you seen and read the new article featuring Darby Starr titled Sun City West fire Captain wins national honor for decision during Yarnell Hill blaze?
From the article……
As he led the team away from the scene along a planned escape route to a safety zone, the veteran of 20 years wildlands firefighting recalled conditions he had never seen.
“I’d never experienced that kind of fire heat. I’d never seen fire heat so violent. It was astonishing to see exactly how violent this could be and the rate it was moving at. Even in our safety zone, we were crouching behind our truck because of the heat waves we were getting.”
Another veteran Sun City West firefighter and paramedic, Coy Boggler, recalled his team’s leader’s calm under “immense pressure,” instructing the crew to remain together as it made its way through dense brush toward the truck.
“The fire and smoke bore down on us, creating an incredibly tense trek. Captain Starr remained calm and collected. Had Captain Starr not ordered our expedited retreat to the truck, I believe we may have been trapped and would have to deploy our shelters,” Boggler stated in a written report.
Hmmm
Follow up after reading Darby Starr’s YIN.
Is it possible that there were two Darby Starrs on the YHF?
A lot said above Mike, WTKTT, Calvin and Marti.
I tined to agree with all. You have to remember there are a 100 HS crews out there as well as other crews 300 to 350 Nation wide.
There is a whole lot of them doing something right. They follow safety and training and never get burned. So are we looking at a 1in 10 year or 1 in 20 year occurrence. If so are we then faced with complacency over time that sooner or later will catch us again and how can that be dealt with to stop it? Those that do not make safety a priority every day, week and year should find a new profession. 20 0r 30 years latter you should still have the same priority go thru the 10 at the beginning of every shift and check them often during the shift.
The article about Darby Starr winning the VFW ‘Firefighter of the Year’ award for his (supposed) ‘actions’ in Yarnell that calvin is referring to above is right here…
YourWestValley News
Article Title: Sun City West fire captain wins national honor for decision
during Yarnell Hill blaze
Posted in Suncitywest, Topstory, Glendale, Peoria on
Friday, July 18, 2014 7:42 am. Updated: 9:30 am.
http://www.yourwestvalley.com/suncitywest/article_469b6ad6-0e89-11e4-954f-0019bb2963f4.html?mode=story
There is a LOT of ‘bullshit’ in this article which I won’t go into right at this moment because of time constraints on my part… but these two paragraphs ( and especially the last sentence of the second paragraph ) are what really caught my eye…
———————————————————————–
Another veteran Sun City West firefighter and paramedic, Coy Boggler, recalled his team’s leader’s calm under “immense pressure,” instructing the crew to remain together as it made its way through dense brush toward the truck.
“The fire and smoke bore down on us, creating an incredibly tense trek. Captain Starr remained calm and collected. Had Captain Starr not ordered our expedited retreat to the truck, I believe we may have been trapped and would have to deploy our shelters,” Boggler stated in a written report.
————————————————————————-
WHAT ‘written report’?
NONE of these ‘Sun City’ people who almost died that day ( along with the two Peeples Valley Firefighters who were with them… Ron Harris and Jacob Mode ) ever submitted any ‘Unit Logs’ and the notes from their Arizona Forestry SAIT interview are almost worthless.
If they were all required to provide ‘written reports’ to their own supervisors… then those are also PUBLIC documents that should still exist somewhere.
calvin… if your “Hmmm” up above was referencing that same last sentence in that same paragraph from the article regarding ‘written documents’ from the Sun City FFs… then “Copy that”.
WHERE are these ‘written documents’?
Are they standard WFF Unit logs… or something else like
signed ‘depositions’, or something?
Did the SAIT receive these ‘written documents’ from the
Sun City firefighters?
If so… why were they NOT included in the FOIA/FOIL release?
This ‘Darby’ account of this other near-fatal incident that took place in Yarnell in the article above already differs from a lot of other ‘testimony’… and it certainly differs from Mr. Bob Brandon’s and Mr. Ron Smith’s ( Peeples Valley FFs ) recent Prescott Daily Courier article about this near-fatal ‘incident’ involving all SIX of those men working in Harper Canyon.
Then there are these ‘gems’ from the Darby Starr account which are in direct contradiction with other existing testimony AND photographic evidence…
“It was not until the next morning that the Brush 103 crew would learn officially that their colleagues from Granite Mountain had perished.”
Huh? I don’t think so. See the Tom Story photos of ‘Brush 103′.
“As he (Darby) led the team away from the scene along a planned escape route to a safety zone, the veteran of 20 years wildlands firefighting recalled conditions he had never seen.”
If Darby is suggesting for one second that the “Youth Camp’, ( where the vehicles were before someone told Brandon and Keehner to ‘drive off’ and abandon these men ) was a ‘safety zone’… then there’s that apparently ‘common’ inability to adequately identify safety zones rearing its ugly head again.
The ‘Youth Camp’, where all the vehicles were, was NOT anywhere near any kind of ‘safety zone’. At best… it was just a ‘staging area’ and a convenient place to park the vehicles for people working that area. If any of them had actually ‘stayed’ there at the Youth Camp, thinking it was a ‘safety zone’… they most probably would have died.
Just look at the current Google Map post-fire images for that Youth Camp. It was totally destroyed… and everything in and around it totally fried.
And then there is this gem from the Darby article…
“Conditions deteriorated rapidly the afternoon of June 30. The unpredictable winds, intense heat and shift in fire movement left the Granite Mountain team with nowhere to go but their deployed fire shelters, where they were overrun by the flames and heat.”
So even now… more than a year later… some people still want to believe that the only explanation for 19 men dying in Yarnell is that “the big bad fire just came and got them”.
my Hmmm was basically to this whole story.
1. Their “planned” escape route was through dense brush? There is no mention of it being scouted?
2. Had they not made to their safety zone, they would have had to deploy fire shelters in dense brush?
3. They did make it to their SZ, and had to crouch behind their trucks due to the intense heat? Entrapment?
4. Darby Starr’s account of the YHF in the YIN does not match the article above.
5. Basically living through an entrapment qualifies a WFF (captain level with 20 plus years WFF) for a prestigious award and not some sort of report/ disciplinary action for almost getting himself and his subordinates killed?
6. From the above article , how many of the 10’s and 18’s were violated?
7.WTF?
You cant Violate the 18’s only the 10’s but you are right and there should have been a write up and a discipline letter from the Overhead team.
The Arizona State fire organization seems to be very lax in their operating procedures and protocol.
This fire was a catastrophe. as you said WTF?
SZ can still produce intense heat ( uncomfortable heat). With out the vehicles they probably would have had to deploy shelters.
The SZ was probably not as large as it should have been but sufficient with the vehicles.
This new article about Darby Starr become VFW ‘Firefighter of the Year’ for his (supposed) actions in the Shrine area on June 30, 2013 is the first we have heard that ANYONE considered the ‘Youth Camp’ area to be any kind of ‘safety zone’. It wasn’t.
Even in the REDACTED Blue Ridge Unit Log notes… there is more than one confirmation that they all knew it was NOT a ‘safety zone’. More than one person wrote that they understood their ‘escape route’ to be ALL the way east on Shrine Road and out to Highway 89… and that the designated ‘Safety Zone’ was the Ranch House Restaurant.
The new Darby Starr article also totally fails to mention that when those 6 men ( 4 Sun Cilty and Ron Harris and Jacob Moder with Peeples Valley FD ( PVFD ) ) came ‘hauling ass’ out from that western end of Harper Canyon where they had been cutting line and reached the ‘Youth Camp’ area… their vehicles were GONE.
Bob Brandon and Matt Keehner ( PVFD ) had already been told TWICE by some mysterious person to MOVE those vehicles away from the Youth Camp RIGHT NOW. At first they refused… because THEY knew those 6 men were still ‘back there’ and would be depending on the vehicles to be right there… but this mysterious person basically said they didn’t give a shit about that with the statement (quote) “Those men can’t run that fast” and then repeated the ORDER to ‘move those vehicles out of here RIGHT NOW’.
Brandon and Keehner complied… but as SLOWLY as they could.
Sure enough… when these 6 men reached the ‘Youth Camp’… the vehicles were gone. Other accounts now say they had to decide whether to just keep running east… or find a place to deploy there where the vehicles had been.
Through the smoke… they saw the tail lights of Brandon and Keehner still ‘leaving’ out near the east entrance to the Youth Camp… so they hauled ass and caught up to the vehicles just in the nick of time.
In Bob Brandon’s interview with the Prescott Daily Courier… this mysterious person who ORDERED them to move those vehicles and basically ‘abandon’ the other 6 men was described as a ‘Group Supervisor’. That pretty much points to Tyson Esquibel as being the one ‘ordering’ them to move those vehicles.
However… there is ANOTHER account of this incident online and it is NOT filtered through a newspaper reporter. This account is in Bob Brandon’s own words and in that online BLOG post of his he states a number of things that differ from what was in the Daily Courier Article.
1) Bob Brandon, Ron Smith, and the other Peeples Valley FFs had NO IDEA that they were ‘part of any kind of GROUP’ that day. They only found that out the NEXT day… after the incident.
2) In his BLOG post… Brandon only uses the phrase ‘Incident Commander’ to describe this person who was ordering them to move those vehicles and basically ‘abandon’ all those other men. It is NOT made clear why Brandon was ( that day ) considering this person to be the ‘Incident Commander’ or why he would have even thought that… but that’s how he describes him since Brandon was, on that day, totally unaware he was part of any ‘GROUP’ at all.
3) In this same ‘other report’ on this incident… Bob Brandon also states that they were ‘debriefed’ 2 days after the incident by ‘investigators’… and that these ‘investigators’ were given a FLASH card with ALL of the photos/videos that Brandon had been taking all day AND they were given copies of ALL of their ‘cell phone’ records from that day since the Peeples Valley guys had primarily been using their smartphones and text messages to ‘communicate’ that day.
The SAIT wasn’t even fully ‘initiated’ until July 4… so WHO are these ‘investigators’ that took copies of ALL of Brandon’s photos/videos and all of their cellphone records… and what ever happened to all of THAT ‘evidence’?
There is more in this Bob Brandon ‘in his own words’ testimony to contradict BOTH the Daily Courier article AND this new ‘account’ of this near-fatal incident in the Darby Starr ‘award’ article.
That ‘in his own words’ account of this near-fatal incident is sitting at the following PUBLIC URL.
NOTE: This is one of the ‘About’ pages sitting on the PUBLIC ‘Yarnell Recovery Group’ website. After the incident… Bob Brandon was heavily involved with this volunteer group and when they were all asked to do ‘About’ pages about themselves… Bob Brandon ended up posting his OWN account of how he and the other 7 firefighters almost DIED that day…
Page Title: Bob Brandon gets Caught in Firestorm, Helps Rebuild.
http://www.yarnellhillrecoverygroup.org/os_bob_brandon.html
Look for another ( longer ) post on this momentarily. I’m going to dump the entire contents of this Bob Brandon account ‘in his own words’ here in this public place in case it suddenly ‘disappears’, or something.
Something I came across during my wanderings around that I’m still thinking about.
I came across a really interesting and totally relevant June 2003 article on FireEngineering.com titled “Wildland Safety: What is Really Killing Us?” by Michael S. Terwilliger. Unfortunately, the only way to access this article is via Google. Otherwise you have to log in to FireEngineering.com in order to read it.
The way to get to this article via Google is to Google “fire engineering” “what is really killing us” and click on the first link that appears. .
After writing extremely relevant point after extremely relevant point after extremely relevant point about stuff a firefighter/crew has to pay attention to in order to stay alive, the writer describes the danger of wind backwash from helicopters and air tankers. He writes:
” Some suppression tools, such as helicopters and air tankers, can adversely affect fire behavior. The blasts of air from low-flying helicopters and air tankers have been known to cause flareups. The cushion of air a helicopter rides on from the rotors is surprisingly strong; when it strikes the ground, it can generate wind speeds in excess of 100 miles per hour. The wind vortices developed off the wings of a low-flying aircraft can surface as well and enhance a wildfire. If you are working around aircraft, keep an eye on them at all times.
…During the summer of 1996, I was assigned as the Operations Section chief at the Coleville Fire on U.S. Route 395 south of Reno. It was located on the eastern escarpment of the Sierra. An air tanker was directed to drop from the top of the escarpment, downslope and east, on a piece of hot line in light fuels. A hand crew was working upslope putting in direct line. The drop was too low and too aggressive. The drop missed the target because of the falling-away slope, but the wind from the wings did not. The fire made a sudden push down-slope and forced the firefighters to take refuge in the burn. It was a momentary flareup, but it had the magnitude and intensity to cause harm if you were in the way.
…In simpler terms, any firefighter can watch a canyon explode into flame and marvel at the power. A professional will tell you prior to its happening and, if the situation allows, suggest you get your camera ready because ‘the big dawg is gonna eat.'”
We have talked here about possible backfires having accelerated the fire up into the canyon Granite Mountain walked down into. And we’ve mostly agreed there’s no evidence so far of that.
We have talked here about spot fires that might have advanced the fire faster than maybe Granite Mountain expected.
When I read this article, I really stopped. And I’m still stopping and thinking about what he is saying.
There was a tanker retardant drop in the “big bowl” at 4:33 pm. I still don’t know exactly the path of that. I think WTKTT has said it was south to north.
I find myself wondering if maybe two planes, lead and tanker, flying low enough to do that otherwise successful drop, might have fanned the flames under them enough to have radically accelerated the fire that was, admittedly, already headed to the mouth of the bowl, in such a way that it turned and blew that fire into the bowl much more quickly than Granite Mountain, not knowing about or anticipating that drop, would have anticipated as they decided to/headed into that bowl, thinking the fire was paralleling them.
I agree that the decision to head into that bowl without a designated lookout was essentially suicidal, all things considered.
But given all our (and others’) wonderings about what might have “pushed” that fire into that canyon faster than Granite Mountain would have anticipated, I’m wondering if what Michael S. Terwilliger is saying can be extremely dangerous may have played a part in what happened.
Wow, interesting. When Steed calls and reports that they are in front of the flaming front, we hear chainsaws (thanks WTK), the following message from Marsh only says that they are burning out in the brush (not Cutting a DZ).
What you described above would make sense. GM were cutting indirect line (possibly), an aircraft came overhead and caused an acceleration in the fire and subsequent shift in direction. And the only thing GM had time to do was try and burn a buffer between themselves and the flames. As we saw from the Trenton Snyder videos; radios can become non operational during entrapment, so we really do not know how much time GM actually had between the time Marsh calls and death.
Speculation? yes
Very doubtful.
I think it is good to be cautious, too, about assuming that GM made any detailed calculations or assumptions about fire behavior, that may simply have left out one key variable. They already knew the fire was being blown towards them by very strong winds when they dropped into that bowl. They also had a base of experience that should have made clear that very precise timelines for exact fire progression are impossible before the fact. If you use what happened with McDonough earlier as a gauge, they seem to have been making seat of the pants assessments but not involved calculations on a number of things.
Sometimes a gust of wind is just a gust of wind. And with that front, there were plenty of gusts that were known factors.
There is also no indication whatsoever that they dropped into the bowl to cut indirect line. What we do know suggests something very different and more plausible, that they were trying to get to Yarnell, to “structures.”
I totally agree not feasible to cut line it would have had to have been 30 ft wide and in a canyon bottom not ever, would you ever do that, it would never hold.
They were simply in a bush wake travel mode to another location.
**
** Charlie Reyes and Central Yavapai Engine P-59
It’s hard to find a PUBLIC photo of Charlie Reyes… but there is at least one good one.
Reyes is a member of the “Wind and Fire Motorcycle Club Whiskey Row Chapter.”
If you simply Google the following three words…
Charlie Reyes motorcycle
…and then you click the ‘Images’ filter on the first results page… the very first image Google shows you is of Charlie Reyes standing with other members of his Motorcycle club at an event in Prescott. Reyes is standing in the back row, on the right end.
The photo belongs to a Prescott Daily Courier article which is here…
http://www.dcourier.com/main.asp?SectionID=74&SubSectionID=114&ArticleID=120155
Caption (text) underneath the photo that accompanies the article…
—————————————————————————-
Members of the Wind and Fire Motorcycle Club Whiskey Row Chapter, from left, Verde John, Les Roberts, Santa Fe Dave and Charlie Reyes pose with some of the campers at “Camp Courage,” the annual Arizona children’s burn camp, taking place this week at Pine Summit Camp south of Groom Creek.
—————————————————————————-
He actually does NOT look like the FF seen in the Tom Story photos that has the words ‘Central Yavapai Fire’ written on the BACK of his yellow Nomex shirt… but it’s hard to tell. There actually is no real clear photo of that FFs face in the Tom Story photos.
Reyes DOES, however, look EXACTLY like the FF seen in the Russ Reason video near the back of Marty Cole’s all-white Tacoma pickup. He is seen in that THIRD segment of that video when the Russ Reason video itself has just ended and the cameraman steps much CLOSER to Cole’s Tacoma. There is a ‘dissolve’ between the end of the Reason interview itself and this ‘closer’ look at the parking lot and it is exactly after this ‘dissolve’ ends that Charlie Reyes seems to be standing there just to Brian Frisby’s left. Frisby is the one standing there with the ball cap on and his arms folded. What happens in those first few frames is that Charlie Reyes actually now SEES the video camera ‘coming closer’ and Reyes then BACKS UP to put that tall Blue Ridge FF in the foreground between himself and the video camera. As he is doing so… he gives a ‘look over there’ thumb gesture to Frisby himself. Frisby now sees the cameraman approaching as well and that is when Frisby looks right at him and seems concerned about how CLOSE he is getting to them.
By the time Frisby does that… Charlie Reyes has already ‘hidden’ behind the tall BR FF… but he remains there at the back of Cole’s Tacoma for the remainder of the video.
So if the guy with ‘Central Yavapai Fire’ on the back of his shirt isn’t actually Engine 59 Boss Charlie Reyes… perhaps he is one of the other TWO crew members that was ‘ordered up’ along with Reyes and Engine 59.
Once again… From the ‘J- Resource Orders’ (PDF) document…
The order for Central Yavapai Engine P-59 itself…
E-5 Request E-5 – Engine, Type 6 – [AZ-A1S-130688] YARNELL HILL has
been filled with ENGINE – T6 – AZ-CEY – LIC# G682DV –
SHOP# V548 – P-59 (2007 FORD F550 4X4 1.5 TON –
200 GAL – 350 GPM ) (AZ-ADC)
And then the THREE crew members ordered with Engine P-59…
E-5.1 Request E-5.1 – FIRE FIGHTER TYPE 2 (FFT2) – [AZ-A1S-130688] YARNELL HILL
has been filled with Ferris, Ryan
E-5.2 Request E-5.2 – FIRE FIGHTER TYPE 2 (FFT2) – [AZ-A1S-130688] YARNELL HILL
has been filled with EMERY, STEVE
E-5.3 Request E-5.3 – ENGINE BOSS (ENGB) – [AZ-A1S-130688] YARNELL HILL
has been filled with REYES, CHARLIE
So that FF with ‘Central Yavapai’ on the back of his shirt could be either…
Steve Emery
OR
Ryan Ferris
They both have far more PUBLIC pictures of themselves available than Charlie Reyes.
There’s already one clickable link in this post so I will post links to their PUBLIC
pictures as ‘Replies’ to this posting.
** Steve Emery – Crew member ordered with Central Yavapai Engine P-59
This guy was easy. He’s put himself ‘out there’ PUBLICLY all over the place on the Web.
From Steve Emery’s PUBLIC LinkedIN page…
http://www.linkedin.com/pub/steve-emery/73/30b/482
———————————————————————————————
LinkedIN – Steve Emery’s Overview
Current
Fire Fighter/Paramedic at Central Yavapai Fire District
Fire prevention inspector at Central Yavapai Fire District
Education: Yavapai College
Steve Emery’s Summary…
I have lived in Prescott AZ. my whole life. My professional life began in 1889 when i became a reserve firefighter for the Central Yavapai Fire District. In 1990 i became a wild land fire fighter with the Forest Service with one of the best fire fighting crews in the country, the Prescott Hot Shots, under the best leadership around the southwestern United States. In 1994 i became a full time career firefighter. Since that time at CYFD i have had the privilege of working as a Paramedic, Haz-mat Technician, swift water rescue technician, Wild land firefighter, flight paramedic and of all things,.. videographer and video editor. My latest move in the fire service has taken me into Fire prevention, where i act as inspector for businesses, review new building plans public education and fire and explosion investigation.
Steve Emery’s Experience…
Fire Fighter/Paramedic – Central Yavapai Fire District ( Currently holds this position ).
Fire prevention inspector – Central Yavapai Fire District
December 1989 – Present (24 years 8 months) 8555 E. Yavapai Rd.
———————————————————————————————–
Picture(s) of Emery follow as ‘Replies’ to this post…
** PUBLICLY available photo of Steve Emery….
Good headshot in a Prescott Valley Tribune Article that featured him…
Some kid got some kind of plastic toy stuck on his head and the grandmother brought him to a CYFD fire station where Steve Emery was on duty.
http://pvtrib.com/main.asp?SectionID=1&SubSectionID=1&ArticleID=61071
Caption/Text under this photo of Steve Emery…
CYFD Fire Prevention Officer Steve Emery cuts through the plastic toy to release it from Bryce Davis’ head on May 7 after Bryce’s grandmother brought him to the fire station.
** Ryan Ferris – Crew member ordered with Central Yavapai Engine P-59
Same for Ryan Ferris. He was also ‘easy’. He’s all over the place on the PUBLIC Web.
Here’s a good photo of him complete with yellow Nomex shirt and yellow Helmet…
It’s in an article that appeared in the Prescott Daily Courier…
http://www.dcourier.com/main.asp?SectionID=1&subsectionID=1&articleID=66612
NOTE: Right under the picture of Ryan Ferris in this Prescott Daily Courier article is another picture of three other Prescott fireman face-front to the camera and working on a ‘sand table’ scenario….
Jason Clawson
Tony Sciacca
Cory Moser
Caption/Text under this other photo…
Type 2 Incident Commander Tony Sciacca, center, talks strategy at the sand table with Prescott Fire Department Capt. Cory Moser, left, and Prescott National Forest firefighter Jason Clawson Friday morning during the Prescott Basin wildfire drill at the Prescott Fire Center.
** Ryan Ferris – Crew member ordered with Central Yavapai Engine P-59
Here’s an even better PUBLIC photograph of Ryan Ferris.
It also accompanies a Prescott Daily Courier article and shows the moment
in February, 2013 when Ryan Ferris was being ‘sworn in’ as a ‘Central Yavapai Fire District’ firefighter. He’s in dress blues with no helmet on this time.
http://www.dcourier.com/main.asp?SectionID=1&SubsectionID=1&ArticleID=116419
Caption/Text for this photo…
Central Yavapai Fire District Board Chairman John Range, far right, swears in new firefighters Ryan Ferris, left, Josh Mazon, center, and Kellan Eckle, right, at the Feb. 19, 2013 board meeting.
Tom Story’s photos 1700-1702 show this guy standing sideways leaning on the hood of Willis’ truck. He’s definitely stocky. I think it’s Reyes.
Reply to Marti Reed post on July 17, 2014 at 2:53 pm
>> Marti said…
>> He’s definitely stocky. I think it’s Reyes.
I agree. I didn’t quite think so at first but in these Tom Story photos we are finally seeing him in ‘profile’ and he’s definitely ‘short and stocky’. I’d even go so far as to say he seems to have a bit of ‘beer gut’.
That, in fact, matches that external PUBLIC picture of ‘Charlie Reyes’ in his motorcycle group photo… and that ALSO matches the FF seen at the back of Marty Cole’s white Tacoma for that brief moment in the Russ Reason video.
Also a process of elimination. After finding/looking at pictures of the two crew members assigned to CYFD Engine P-59, I would say that there’s no way that guy with ‘Central Yavapai’ on the back of his shirt could be either Steve Emery OR Ryan Ferris. Steve Emery = too thin ( no beer gut ). Ryan Ferris = too tall ( stocky but definitely NOT short ).
There is, however, this discrepancy you found with regards to ‘Engine 59’ and how many crew members were actually assigned to it…
>> On July 16, 2014 at 7:48 pm Marti Reed said…
>> According to Tyson Esquibel’s ADOSH interview he was in charge
>> of Engine 59:
>> “Okay, I have it written down here. I had, uh, engine 59 with four,
>> water 558 tender 755 with two, engine 751 with two.”
So Esquibel seemed to think there were FOUR people attached to CYFD Engine P-59… but the official resource ordering only lists THREE ( Charlie Reyes ( Engine Boss ), Steve Emery and Ryan Ferris ).
So that means either Esquibel was mistaken in his note-taking or the official ‘J- Resource Orders’ document in the FOIA / FOIL release is wrong.
If I had to flip a coin… I’d say it’s more likely Esquibel was simply mistaken in his note taking and the Resource document is correct.
So what does all this mean?
Once again… we may have just identified a VIP ( Very Important Participant ) in everything that was happening up to, during, and immediately following the deployment… who was in a position to know, see and hear everything that was happening in the Shrine area AND in the RHR parking lot…
…who has NEVER been interviewed by ANYONE.
Actually… it’s even more astounding that Charlie Reyes, Boss of Engine 59, apparently wasn’t even asked to submit his own ‘Unit Log’ that day… especially since we also have Cordes’ ADOSH testimony that Charlie Reyes was the one that told HIM about the deployment.
Well, all things considered, I don’t totally trust Tyson Esquibal as a meticulous witness…….
And I don’t really trust, all things considered, ADOSH as a meticulous witness either……
And, to be honest, I make my share of mistakes also…..
So…….
I’ve been basically, for the past week and a half, flying at a bit of a higher altitude and wider perspective, trying to gain more historical and contextual Situational Awareness. (I love how, in Tony Sciacca’s ADOSH interview, whenever he says SA they transcribe it as essay–hello????) So that’s why I have not been here commenting.
As I write this a lightning- and thunder-filled monsoon rainstorm surrounds me, and I’m glad I have also, during this week and a half, increased the defensible space around my house.
I’ve been looking at other fires, other deployments–including the Butte Fire in which 86 people deployed and survived (including Roy Hall, whom I realized I probably waited on at Kathy’s Cafe in downtown Flagstaff at the time), other deaths (including the Rattlesnake Fire–thanks to Bob Powers–and the Battlement Creek Fire–thanks to Gary Olsen), even other successes, and other investigations (an extremely bumpy story which we need to understand in order to understand this one). I just decided pixel-peeping this fire in a vacuum had petered out for me.
Looking at what other people have to say about stuff, (including USFS folks writing about USFS issues), trying to learn about how people actually fight wildfires (which I hadn’t really learned about since we’re not looking at much actual fire-fighting here), reading SafeNet logs (yikes!!!). Also some long telephone conversations with some people (including one in which it was relayed to me that Musser was not driving the red Wickenberg truck that day but who knows???).
This was partially prompted by my discovery that some people who were on this fire are having a really rough time right now. And of course, searching via Google leads into some very interesting detours……..
And doing lots and lots of thinking. Via all these different contexts.
I stumbled across a number of things which I found relevant and thought-provoking which I will post in the next couple of days. And I have some replies to some comments which I will post, but I’ve pretty much decided I need to disengage from vehicle details and get back to my own InRealLife life, while pretty much just watching what unfolds.
That being said, I have to add, after all of this, that if I were one of the Gods of Fire-Fighting (including my Feet of Clay ala Gary Olsen and my 20-20 theoretical hindsight), if I/we had decided to engage the Yarnell Hill Fire somewhere between Friday night and Saturday morning–given the potentially explosive fuels and the most likely weather patterns and the danger to the mostly indefensible realm of Yarnell–I/we theoretically would have nailed it on Saturday. I think it was do-able then if seriously engaged. Somewhere between the Incident Commander and the Gods of Fire-Fighting above him, it was decided to fight that fire in the “Make Do” version of the “Can Do” mode, which is the mode that, apparently, often leads to many mistakes and thus tragedies.
And given that (after the fire escaped control on Saturday afternoon), while calling for a Type 2 team, I believe that the decision to order a “short” Type 2 team instead of Bea Day’s full Type 2 team (which was available and partially ended up there, anyway) is incomprehensible. I totally don’t understand this decision. I believe a lot of the June 30 confusion and un-preparedness would have been by-passed if this short-staffing of the fire hadn’t happened. Would this have prevented Granite Mountain from deciding to head into a potentially explosive fuel-filled bowl for whatever reason they headed into it? Who knows??? All I know is that it seems to me that this fire was seriously under-staffed and under-resourced and the result was that nobody was able to comprehensively get ahead of it, much less stay on top of what all the various crews on it were deciding to do.
I highly recommend looking at the reports on SafeNet. Lots of insane and dangerous stuff is happening out there on fires. Go here and click on “Past SAFENETs” on the upper menu
http://safenet.nifc.gov/index.cfm.
Regarding the extremely dangerous shift between “Can Do” and “Make Do” that I think is so relevant to what happened on the Yarnell Hill Fire.
Watch and listen to Jerry Williams (Assistant Director of Operations USFS) at the 1996 National Fire Fighter Safety Workshop (in the shadow of the South Canyon Fire)
At 7:44 into this YouTube video he speaks:
http://youtu.be/Rgbnmi9KHU0?list=PLTErVrHH6uJja-ljtn7z9Q5Sz9WtCPGw1
Jerry Williams says (and I think this is so relevant regarding the Yarnell Hill Fire):
“”If we come up short Div Sups we”ll rob a hot shot crew of the division of that hotshot sup and put him on that Division and we’ll make do.
We need to quit thinking about making do. Maybe we need to quit thinking about just doing the job. Maybe we need to think about doing it right.”
We’ve accepted the fact that the short Type 2 Incident Management Team made Eric Marsh the Div S. According to Jerry Williams, that’s a form of “robbing.” I hadn’t thought of that until I heard him say that.
To me, that’s another indicator that the Short Type 2 Incident Management Team was seriously under-qualified to handle this fire.
And I wonder what that may have had to do with what happened that day.
Jerry Williams says (and I think this is so relevant regarding the Yarnell Hill Fire):
“”If we come up short Div Sups we”ll rob a hot shot crew of the division of that hotshot sup and put him on that Division and we’ll make do.
We need to quit thinking about making do. Maybe we need to quit thinking about just doing the job. Maybe we need to think about doing it right.”
We’ve accepted the fact that the short Type 2 Incident Management Team made Eric Marsh the Div S. According to Jerry Williams, that’s a form of “robbing.” I hadn’t thought of that until I heard him say that.
To me, that’s another indicator that the Short Type 2 Incident Management Team was seriously under-qualified to handle this fire.
And I wonder what that may have had to do with what happened that day.
Reply to Marti Reed post on July 16, 2014 at 9:39 pm
>> Marti said…
>> And I wonder what that may have had to do with what happened that day.
The actual Co-Leader of the Arizona Forestry Special Accident Investigation Team ( Mike Dudley ) was pretty much asked whether this ‘robbing an ICH for a DIVS’ was ‘part of the problem’ that day during his recent speech in from of a room full of firefighters at the Utah Unified Fire Authority.
A firefighter in the audience made the point that NORMALLY… decisons between a Division Supervisor and a Type 1 Hotshot Crew about either ‘moving’ or ‘taking an escape router’ would be on the more PUBLIC TAC radio channels… so that MORE people ‘hear about it’ and even have a chance to ‘chime in’ about whether it’s a good decison… or not.
This same firefighter was also making the point that in this case… a DIVS was communicating directly with his Type 1 IHC resource over a PRIVATE ( intra-crew ) channel… because he was, in fact, the damn supervisor of that very same crew working in his ‘Division’.
The firefighter saw this as a potential BIG PROBLEM that day.
Mike Dudley ( Co-Lead of the SAIT ) said “I agree”.
From Dudley’s speech…
+54:36
It does open up the door that you know that there had to be some type of
intra-crew communication between he and the captain about the decision
of one… where are you going… and…
( Audience member raises his hand again and Dudley sees it. )
( Dudley actually seems pretty annoyed at having to stop at this point ).
What?…
** Audience member: That’s kinda why I asked you to see if… like… if there
** was intra-crew communications goin’ on that led to that and also I was wonderin’ too
** did he have other resources on his division or whether it was just Granite Mountain.
Dudley: It’s just Granite Mountain.
** Audience member: Then who was Blue Ridge assigned to?
Dudley: Technically… they were working under Division Zulu… but…
that was a pretty fuzzy setup as well. In reality they were workin’ much
closler… closely with the structure protection group leader for Yarnell.
** Audience member: That’s kinda why I was curious ‘cus it seems like
** that decision woulda been made on a TAC channel versus a Crew
** channel because it was affecting a lot of people.
** So… yea… it just sounds more like there was (too much) intra-crew
** communication goin’ on ( at the Division level).
Mike Dudley: I agree.
Thanks!
Todd Abel says repeatedly in his interviews that Blue Ridge was assigned to Div A.
This division superintendent thing is why I keep saying Marsh was still in charge. As Gary and I have said before it is a Hot Shot Culture.
Steed was well aware of it and very use to Marsh running the crew
or the final word on the crew so to speak. The chain of command is well established with in a crew which I have said before if a Div. super not attached to the crew would have been in charge they would not have moved. They were assigned to that Div. You do not up and change assignments with out Div. thru OPS direction. The move was a crew decision not a IC/OPS decision Marsh had no authority to change his assignment with out IC direction.
Also the actual division thing between A and Z is really screwed up.
I think the 2 Hot Shot crews were trying to work together to get the line in and who BR was working for was very confusing.
Yep. In my “reading around” I came across a number of references regarding having a crew sup be that crew’s div sup is a very bad idea. For all the aforementioned reasons.
I don’t know how often that happens or how “acceptable” it’s deemed.
I actually don’t think Blue Ridge was confused about who was their div sup and what was their division. Even though they were working a lot with Gary Cordes. I think Division Zulu was pretty much a non-entity that day, for all practical purposes.
Reply to Marti Reed post on July 17, 2014 at 3:03 pm
>> Marti said…
>> In my “reading around” I came across a number
>> of references regarding having a crew sup be that
>> crew’s div sup is a very bad idea. For all the
>> aforementioned reasons.
>>
>> I don’t know how often that happens or how
>> “acceptable” it’s deemed.
I believe Mr. Powers has already confirmed that it ‘happens a lot’… and even for reasons not related to being ‘short handed’.
What’s interesting is that the Utah firefighter who was asking SAIT Co-Lead Mike Dudley about this wasn’t really saying that the act of promoting a Hotshot SUP to DIV ( but still leaving his own crew as one of his direct resources ) is necessarily a ‘bad’ or ‘dangerous’ thing.
What that Utah firefighter was asking Dudley was whether the SAIT ever really looked hard at the possibility that it was then the extensive use of the PRIVATE RADIO CHANNEL ( The Hotshot intra-crew ) between that DIVS and the new SUP of the Hotshot crew that might have contributed greatly to the Yarnell tragedy.
That Utah firefighter was basically saying that NORMALLY… a move such as the one Granite Mountain was attempting would NORMALLY have either been ‘negotiated’ or ‘authorized’ between the Hotshot SUP and his up-level DIVS over the open TAC channels… and NOT over a ‘private’ frequency that few ( if any ) other people could HEAR.
The Utah firefighter was also saying that such a move ‘affects a lot of other people’ and THAT is why it is NORMALLY ‘negotiated’ or ‘authorized’ over an OPEN channel… so that everyone that decision might affect at least has the chance to KNOW it is happening… if not actually ‘chime in’ with an opinion about it.
That’s what didn’t happen in Yarnell that day.
A DIVS and a Hotshot SUP ‘negotiated’ a critical move in a dynamic fire situation just between THEMSELVES… and the first anyone heard about it on the TAC channels is when Eric Marsh supposedly said to Frisby….
“I want to pass on that we’re making our way out our escape route.”
Period. End of ‘announcement’.
Frisby was confused. That’s when all the “Are you talking about that road I saw you on?” stuff followed on the radio and Marsh’s obtuse-talk just compounded the situation. Even after that ‘follow-up’ conversation… the Superintendent of another Hotshot crew that had been working on an assignment with that same other ‘resource’ had no idea where they were really going… or WHY they were ‘moving’.
If Frisby had HEARD the entire ‘negotiation’ of this ‘resource move’ between the GM Hotshot SUP and his immediate DIV supervisor… maybe Frisby would have known a lot more that day and *MAY* have even had something to say about it.
Ditto for everyone else that ( as the Utah fireghter suggested ) this decision might ‘concerned’.
If they had HEARD the decision process and/or authorization taking place on an open TAC channel, as would normally be the case, then some things might have turned out different that afternoon.
Maybe… maybe not. Maybe Marsh was just bull-headed enough to have gone ahead with the ‘move’ anyway even if some warnings or objections had been raised by others… but at the very least… a LOT of other people would have KNOWN about it… and the reasoning behind it.
The fact that it all went down between a DIVS and a Hotshot SUP over a PRIVATE intra-crew channel was the real ‘problem’ that day… and when this Utah firefighter made it clear to Mike Dudley that is what he thought… SAIT Co-Lead Mike Dudley replied…
“I agree”.
So maybe there’s an ‘action item’ there just short of decreeing that no Hotshot SUP should ever be appointed DIVS and still retain his own Hotshot crew as one of his operating resources.
Maybe the ‘short step’ is to simply create a new RULE which says…
“No Division Supervisor should ever be communicating with any resource over a PRIVATE radio channel that is only known to the DIVS and the resource itself.”
That’s an EASY ‘new rule’ to establish… and it MIGHT make a difference in the future.
I actually don’t think Blue Ridge was confused about who was their div sup and what was their division. Even though they were working a lot with Gary Cordes. I think Division Zulu was pretty much a non-entity that day, for all practical purposes.
Roy Hall says P29 YIN…….Todd Able reported that the last communication with Eric Marsh was “We are on the west ridge descending a predetermined escape route.”
Am I missing something?
Hard to say what Abel is referring to there.
He *MIGHT* be paraphrasing that moment when Eric Marsh ‘announced’ ( over TAC channel )….
“I want to pass on that we are making our way out our escape route”
OR….
Maybe Abel is actually CONFIRMING that entire 4:13 PM exchange captured in the Panebaker video when someone ( still uknown ) called directly to GM and asked….
“Granite Mountain… what’s your STATUS right now?”
…and Marsh replied with ( paraphrasing here )… “Well…. the guys…. Granite… is makin’ their way out the escape route from this mornin’… SOUTH… mid-slope… cuttin’ over.”
OR ( even remotely possible? ) Abel might be even CONFIRMING the YARNELL-GAMBLE video capture at 4:27 PM when Marsh CLEARLY says ( to someone who had asked him a direct question about GM )….
“They’re comin’ from the heel of the fire.”
Surely Abel didn’t mean to say that there had been no ‘deployment’ radio traffic. That’s a given.
We KNOW Todd Abel heard all that.
It was Todd Abel himself who jumped in and was the one who finally TOLD Burfiend in Bravo 33 to get his head out of his ass and RESPOND to those men who had been calling him for almost 2 minutes… but Burfiend had been ignoring them.
Whoops.
The last paragraph of the post above was actually the REST of what ‘Marti’ had said and I meant to ‘bracket’ it and comment on it as well… so here is what the bottom of the post above should have looked like….
>> Marti also said…
>>
>> I actually don’t think Blue Ridge was
>> confused about who was their div sup
>> and what was their division. Even though
>> they were working a lot with Gary Cordes.
>> I think Division Zulu was pretty much a
>> non-entity that day, for all practical purposes
.
Agree. It was all about ‘tasking’… and not ‘musical DIVS’. Hotshot crews are very TASK and GOAL oriented. The most important thing to these specialized teams that get ‘inserted’ into incidents is their ‘current assignment’.
WHAT are we supposed to be DOING.
Marsh and Frisby had ‘worked that out’ for themselves during the NOON face-to-face up on the ridge… just moments before Marquez even showed up down in the valley.
Marsh and Frisby had ‘agreed on a plan’ and that was one Hotshot SUP to another. They both knew what they were supposed to be doing and what the eventual GOAL was and that’s all they really wanted to know.
How do we get the boys busy so they’re not just ‘standing around’.
At the time… it SEEMED like a good plan. Make the best use possible of the existing ‘road system’ out there to get ready for a possible defensive burnout later that evening when the winds died down.
No one had any idea what was going to happen just a few hours later, or that the confusion about who DIVSZ might be was going to matter much the rest of that particular day or evening.
The PLAN that Marsh and Frisby decided on themselves, as one HS SUP to another… seemed like a good day’s work with an attainable GOAL later that evening ( the planned burnout when the winds died down )… so like good Hotshot crews do… they just got busy WORKING on the TASK.
Copy. Yep.
**
** Mike Dudley speech June 2014
On June 20, 2014, just before the first anniversary of the Yarnell Hill Fire, Mike Dudley was asked to give a presentation and a Q/A about the Yarnell Hill Fire to a gathering of fireman in Utah.
Mike Dudley was the Co-Lead, along with Jim Karels, of Arizona Forestry’s infamous Yarnell ‘Special Accident Investigation Team ( SAIT ).
The gathering was the ‘Utah Unified Fire Authority’ ( UUFA ).
The full video of Dudley’s ‘presentation’ is here…
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iWm3myJdQO4
Here is the part when Dudley answers a question from one of the fireman and reveals ( for the first time? ) that the SAIT investigators had received some kind of testimony or reports that Eric Marsh and Jesse Steed were heard ARGUING right around 4:13 to 4:20 PM…
+1:04:10
* Question from audience member: Do you know of any… uhm… dissension
* within the crew… did they try and split off at any point prior to or during
* the deployment?
Dudley: The question is… was there any decision… dissension within the crew and did any folks try to split off. Ah… Blue Ridge made the comment.. a number of those folks… they said “you know what… when they left the lunch spot… they were ALL in lock-step with one other”… because that was a pretty cohesive crew. Uh.. they were very, very close to one another.
NOTE: What does Dudley mean by this? Does he mean that Blue Ridge actually SAW them leaving the lunch spot ( with binoculars, or something )?… or does he mean that Blue Ridge HEARD them ‘deciding’ to leave and didn’t hear any dissension or disagreement? WHEN did a ‘number of them’ actually MAKE these comments? During their SAIT interviews? In a bar somewhere? There is no record of any such comments from any Blue Ridge Hotshot in the official evidence record.
+1:04:46
Ahm… so no… there was no indication… now… there’s some allegations that there was an argument between the Captain and the Superintendent about which way to go… from that saddle.. Some people made that allegation. We can’t validate that.
NOTE: What the hell is Dudley talking about here? What allegations? WHO
are these ‘some people’ ( more than one person ) he is talking about?
What is the actual SOURCE of this claim he is making in front of rooms full of firefighters?
Did someone say they heard something like that over the intra-crew channel but it was not recorded… and that’s why Dudley says ‘We can’t validate that’?
Did this ‘testimony’ arise during official SAIT interviews?
Again… there is no record of any such testimony in anything released so far.
Interesting. I wonder what radio channel this “argument” was overheard on? Crew or tactical?
I have had a suspicion that there was not a full agreement about what the plan was based on the partial conversation we hear from the Mackenzie videos. I believe Marsh is speaking very emotionally in the first video, almost as if he wasn’t convinced of what he was saying. However, I was the first and maybe the only person that thinks the beginning of the second video captures Marsh sayng “to bad” WTK and others hear “you bet”
While the timeframe doesn’t support this being the right time for the “argument” to have happened; I believe it could have been. Steed’s response of “copy that” was followed by a report on how far south the fire had progressed. Kind of like having the last word.
Another long held observation that I have held is concerning the DZ. Steed and several others who were fully deployed were sort of huddled together. I have always thought (only to myself until now) that this in itself was some sign of a split in the crew. But that is only my humble opinion!
Even the existence of the video to me is telling. As far as we know, there is no other video of that day shot by any one of the crew, correct? So the one piece of video that shows up concerns one of the most crucial moments of that day. Discussing “comfort level” in advance of the fatal move. I do not believe in coincidence that much. If there was angst or disagreement, there was probably more than what we see in that video. But we will ever know? I have watched that video so many times, you would think I would be numb to it by now. But I am not, it is almost like someone crying out from the grave.
Someone made the division to move and they discussed it.
My bet is on Marsh and Steed agreed after discussion.
Marsh was the supervisor in 2 ways DIV. and Super.
Steed did what his boss said.
Should have been Decision not division.
Mike. There are other videos taken by Robert Caldwell and McDonough. But I totally agree that when someone picks up a camera/ phone to take a photo or especially a video, there is a motive (not coincidence).
One of the Caldwell videos actually has Todd Abel verbalizing air support, down there, ASAP! Remember that one? And not only is Robert Caldwell videoing that; Mackenzie takes a picture of Caldwell videoing that moment in time.
Also, at circa 1600, Wade Parker, and Scott Norris are taking photographs. As far as we know that was the only time that day they took pictures
And one of the the McDonough videos is taken just after 4pm, and looking back toward the crews location. While the crew was moving south.
Also the other two videos (one from each McDonough and Caldwell), are of fire retardant being dropped. Which from other peoples camera/ phones, was not uncommon.
Of course you are right, Calvin. Early in the morning my mind is jumbled and all these videos begin to run together after a while. But I do think it was MacKenzie’s only video. The basic point is the same, I do not believe the timing of the video was by chance, and its existence likely indicates someone was having reservations.
mike… I am not discounting what you are saying in any way… since that is exactly what I thought myself for a long time… but I eventually reached a different conclusion.
After all the ‘close work’ with the getting that exact sequence of MacKenzie cellphone and Canon photos into the right ‘order’… I suddenly realized that if Christopher really start ‘taking video’ at that exact moment because of the radio conversation he was hearing and he thought that needed to be ‘captured’….
…then why did he only take 9 seconds of video… then take 2 still shots ( with the same camera ) and only then decide to take another 9 seconds of video.
It was the 2 still shots that we finally determined were taken in-between’ the 2 9 second video clips that finally changed my mind about this and here is why.
Christopher was a GOOD photographer. High end equipment and a good ‘eye’ for the dramatic. If you look at his two still photos taken between the videos you get the sense that he decided the video wasn’t fully capturing the dramatic scene that was now laid out before him down in the middle bowl. The first still shot was taken in landscape mode… but then Christopher realized even that wasn’t fully capturing that AMAZING ‘smoke cloud’ that was rising up out there… so he quickly switched to ‘portrait’ mode for the second still picture. I actually believe he had intentions of maybe ‘splicing’ these two photos together later to get a full sense of that dramatic smoke cloud that was building out there.
So all I am saying is that after working closely with these photos I get the sense that Christopher’s primary FOCUS ( as a photographer ) at that moment was just making sure he ‘captured’ the amazing ‘visual’ that was unfolding out there before him.
If his primary FOCUS had been to ‘capture that radio conversation’… I don’t think he would have STOPPED shooting the first video after only 9 seconds. I think he would have held his finger on that button and captured not only what we hear in the second video clip… but all 30 seconds in-between them.
I wish he had.
There wasn’t time to say much in those 30 seconds between those 2 nine second video clips… but something tells me we would know a lot more than we do about the ‘decision’ if Christopher had just held his finger down on that button for that whole time.
Whatever was said in those 30 seconds between the two 9 seconds clips was important. It might have explained a LOT.
All that being said… I also still think that someone HEARD all of that. Someone who had their ear glued to the Granite Mountain intra-crew frequency because that’s what he said he would do after he left his lookout position.
There is also the possibility that whoever the THREE Blue Ridge Hotshots were that were driving the OTHER three Granite Mountain vehicles around that timeframe heard it all as well.
Maybe someday we will find out if they did ( or not ).
Certainly this makes good sense. After all Ashcraft had won a “photo of the year” award, maybe he was trying to do that. But I hate coincidence. Maybe he started recording, decided to snap a couple of pictures, and then went back to recording with 2 different purposes in mind. But you might be completely right.
Reply to calvin post on July 16, 2014 at 3:40 am
>> calvin said…
>> Interesting. I wonder what radio channel this “argument” was
>> overheard on? Crew or tactical?
Well… unless the Co-Lead of the actual Arizona Forestry’s Special Accident Investigation Team ( Dudley ) is just ‘making that all up’… then it HAD to be one or the other. He could ONLY possibly be talking about what ‘some people’ ( as in… MORE than just one person ) were reporting they heard over the RADIO.
Anyone who was within ‘earshot’ of Marsh and Steed ‘arguing’ at that time is now dead… so if it happened at all… it must have been something that happened over the radio in order for multiple people to be saying they ‘heard it’.
If Dudley is talking about something that might have only been heard over the GM intra-crew… it is VERY interesting that he is also saying that MULTIPLE people have reported ‘hearing it’.
As far as we know… here is the ‘short list’ of the ONLY people that might have been able to hear the traffic on GM’s intra-crew channel that afternoon…
Brendan McDonough ( GM intra-crew was the PRIORITY channel on his BK )
Darrell Willis ( Has admitted to listening to ‘some’ of the intra-crew traffic )
Tony Sciacca ( He got his radio clone from Willis and had all the same freq. ).
The THREE other Blue Ridge Hotshots who were, for quite some time that afternoon, driving the OTHER three Granite Mountain vehicles with their own onboard radios containing the GM intra-crew frequency.
If Mike Dudley is NOT referring to the GM intra-crew… and this ‘argument’ supposedly took place on a TAC channel… then just about anyone could have heard it and it would then make more sense that Dudley is saying that ‘multiple’ people reported hearing it ( and not just ONE person ).
I still think I am hearing the following exchange between Marsh and Steed at the very start of one of the Non-Panebaker videos.
It seems to catch the ‘tail end’ of a conversation between Marsh and Steed in the same timeframe Mike Dudley is referring to and it’s the one where we seem to hear Marsh telling Steed to not be ‘upset’.
Could this have been the ‘tail end’ of the possible ‘argument between Marsh and Steed’ that SAIT Co-Lead Mike Dudley is now saying multiple people reported hearing?
NOTE: This is one those ‘Moore’ Air Study Video transcriptions that has, of course, never been officially ‘verified’. Someone else ( I believe it was Sitta? ) made an effort to verify but was unable to do so. I just listened to this Moore Air Study video AGAIN with just a slight boost in the audio GAIN… and I still stand by this transcript of what seems to have been captured in the background of this particular 37 second Moore Air Study Video.
From a previous posting in Chapter IV (4) of this ongoing discussion…
** TRANSCRIPT OF MOORE AIR STUDY VIDEO
** 20130630_Yarnell_SM (23).MOV
**
** POSSIBLE *NEW* RADIO CAPTURE FROM ERIC MARSH CIRCA 1628
The ‘Moore\Pictures’ sub-folder in the ‘Air Study’ parent folder in Mr. Dougherty’s
online dropbox has 45 still pictures in it… but it ALSO happens to have 3 short
Apple Quicktime videos sort of ‘hidden’ in there.
This is a report on the first of those 3 videos in that ‘Moore\Pictures’ folder, which
APPEARS to capture a previously unknown radio transmission from Eric Marsh
( and a response from Jesse Steed? ) circa 1628.56 ( 4:28.56 PM ).
The actual folder name in the Dropbox for these ‘Moore’ photos/videos is…
AerialFirefightingStudy\Moore\Pictures
There are 3 Apple Quicktime Movies in this folder.
Unlike the Panebaker Air Study videos… these ‘Moore’ videos do NOT have
either the START or END time stamped into their filenames, and the usual
Apple Quicktime .THM thumbnails are missing which would normally have
the actual EXIF timestamp metadata in them from which to obtain the
video START time(s).
The 3 ‘Moore’ Air Study Apple Quicktime .MOV movie files are only named…
20130630_Yarnell_SM (23).MOV
20130630_Yarnell_SM (32).MOV
20130630_Yarnell_SM (35).MOV
It is possible, however, to tell exactly when these ‘Moore’ Air Study videos
were taken based on Moore’s STILL photos shot just mere moments before
each video, which DO have proper time/date ( and GPS ) metadata
embedded in them.
The photo taken just moments before this first Moore video ( which shows
the exact same moment when fire was coming over a nearby ridge as the
video does ) is the following…
2013_Yarnell_SM (22): Date taken: 6/30/2013 – 4:28.50 PM
Actually… Moore took 3 still pictures very quickly just before shooting
the video of the same exact ‘fire coming over the ridge’ moment…
2013_Yarnell_SM (20) – Date taken: 6/30/2013 – 4:28.38 PM
2013_Yarnell_SM (21) – Date taken: 6/30/2013 – 4:28.43 PM ( +5 seconds )
2013_Yarnell_SM (22) – Date taken: 6/30/2013 – 4:28.50 PM ( +7 seconds )
These exact ‘time/date’ values come directly from the EXIF metadata
embedded in all the ‘Moore’ photographs. They are also GPS stamped.
The ‘separation’ between the 3 still photos just before shooting the video of the
same scene averages 6 seconds, so assuming the same separation between
the last still photo ( at 4:28.50 ) and the start of the video… that would put the
start time for this first ‘Moore’ Air Study video at exactly… 4:28.56 PM.
This first ‘Moore’ Air Study video is 37 seconds long.
A public copy of this first ‘Moore’ Air Study video is in Mr. Dougherty’s
online Dropbox at…
Folder: AerialFirefightingStudy\Moore\Pictures\2013_Yarnell_SM (22)
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/y3jy5opssrcvzb3/N9ZngvVRbg/AerialFirefightingstudy/Moore/Pictures#lh:null-20130630_Yarnell_SM%20%2823%29.MOV
NOTE: This is the Moore video with a ‘first frame’ showing the fire coming over a ridge and there is a telephone pole in the foreground in the right-center.
ECITW ( Every Caveat In The World )
The following is what I ( me, personally ) believe is being said in the
background of this video. Your mileage may, of course, vary.
NOTE: No ‘audio filtering’ or ‘audio forensics’ required for this one.
There is some ‘wind in the microphone’ noise but ( unlike the Panebaker Air Study
videos ) there is no foreground ‘talk’ or Air-to-Air channel chatter whatsoever and
anyone with normal hearing should be able to hear what has been captured
in the background.
ALSO NOTE: When the video starts… someone is already ‘reporting’ to someone
else on one of the TAC channels in the background. It definitely sounds like the
distinct voice of Eric Marsh. He also definitely sounds like he is exerting himself at
that moment and he is breathing hard as he talks.
ALSO NOTE: This conversation would be shortly AFTER the radio conversation
captured in Blue Ridge Hotshot McCord’s YARNELL-GAMBLE video where we
(apparently) hear someone in fire command ( OPS1 Todd Abel? ) saying he would
‘appreciate it’ if Marsh and Granite Mountain could ‘come to town a little faster’…
and Marsh replied ( with some apparent exasperation in his voice? ) “They’re
comin’ from the heel of the fire”. This ‘can you please hurry up?’ conversation
apparently took place circa 4:20 PM, at or about the same exact moment the
SAIR says Steed and the Crew actually decided to take the ‘shortcut’ and drop
off the two-track road into the fuel-filled box canyon.
MOORE VIDEO STARTS AT 1628.56 ( 4:28.56 PM )
+0:00 ( 1628.56 / 4:28.56 PM )
(Eric Marsh): Don’t be upset… I’ve got quite a ways to come.
( slight pause ) I’m headin’ off the slope.
+0:07 ( 1629.03 / 4:29.03 )
(Unknown, but possible voice match for Jesse Steed): Copy… we’re all at the top…
NOTE: This video continues for another 30 seconds, but strong winds come up
in the foreground and the noise in the microphone obscures the chance of
hearing any other backround radio traffic, if any.
VIDEO ENDS AT 1629.33 ( 4:29.33 PM )
>> calvin also wrote
>>
>> I have had a suspicion that there was not a full agreement about
>> what the plan was based on the partial conversation we hear from
>> the Mackenzie videos. I believe Marsh is speaking very emotionally
>> in the first video, almost as if he wasn’t convinced of what he was
>> saying. However, I was the first and maybe the only person that
>> thinks the beginning of the second video captures Marsh sayng
>> “to bad” WTK and others hear “you bet”
I think even the WFFs agreed that anytime you start hearing the words ‘comfort level’ in a radio conversation you can be pretty sure someone is asking someone to ‘do something’. That’s exactly what we hear in the MacKenzie videos…. but we also hear that this is the SECOND time Marsh seems to be trying to gauge Steed’s ‘comfort level’ about ‘doing something’. Marsh himself says… “That’s why I called you BEFORE to ask you what your comfort level was”. So Marsh’s “called you BEFORE” statement means MacKenzie has captured the SECOND time that Marsh seems to want to know how Steed feels about “doing something” that he is asking him to do.
If you look at those MacKenzie photos and videos… it doesn’t look like anyone there ( including Steed ) was all ‘hot to trot’ to jump up and go ‘do’ anything at all. They are ‘at rest’… and just taking in the scenery.
So yes… whatever it was that Marsh wanted Steed to do… and to know his ‘comfort level’ on… probably took some convincing.
>> calvin also said…
>>
>> While the timeframe doesn’t support this being the right time for the
>> “argument” to have happened; I believe it could have been. Steed’s
>> response of “copy that” was followed by a report on how far south
>> the fire had progressed. Kind of like having the last word.
I have always thought that you were right when you said that the only reason Steed may have even felt the need to add this piece of ‘information’ to the conversation was because he was SURE that Marsh was so far north of them that he probably couldn’t see through the smokeline and be absolutely sure where the flame front really was at that point… and how far it had already progressed.
That has to be correct. If Marsh had the same ‘view’ of the fireline that Steed did ( and Steed knew that he did ) then there would have been no need in the world for Marsh to say what he did at that time.
They were still ‘discussing their options’.
I think if MacKenzie had filmed even just 10 more seconds we would have heard Marsh responding to Steed’s comment about the fire almost reaching the two-track they walked in on with “Well… then there goes THAT option”.
>> calvin also said…
>>
>> Another long held observation that I have held is concerning the DZ.
>> Steed and several others who were fully deployed were sort of huddled
>> together. I have always thought (only to myself until now) that this in
>> itself was some sign of a split in the crew. But that is only my humble
>> opinion!
Unless some new evidence comes to light… there is no telling what really went on in/around that deployment site.. It’s a big enough mystery to ponder why men who are being touted as ‘so well trained’ would have been ‘forgetting’ to even throw their packs clear of the exact spot they deployed. There was never even any good attempt ( or even any good way? ) to determine if they totally mis-calculated the WINDS at that location and perhaps killed themselves with their own backburning ( which Eric Marsh defintely said they were attempting to do ). Maybe their own ‘backburn’ efforts went totally south and that made them lose whatever little time they thought they had left.
It all came down to TIME that day, I suppose.
Followup to the post above…
As it turns out… even though the ‘Moore’ Air Study Apple Quicktime Video being referred to above does NOT have the accompanying Apple JPEG THM thumbnail image that would normally have the movie’s EXIF metadata in it… there IS some ‘metadata’ embedded in the MOV format movie file itself.
It is as follows…
File Name: 20130630_Yarnell_SM (23).MOV
File Size: 56 MB
MIME Type: video/quicktime
Major Brand: Apple QuickTime (.MOV/QT)
Minor Version: 2007.9.4
Create Date: 2013:06:30 16:28:50
Modify Date: 2013:06:30 16:28:50
Time Scale: 30
Duration: 0:00:37
Video Frame Rate: 30
Since this was a Network Connected iPhone… then we can be almost certain the time/date embedded in the video was the correct time that day.
So whether or not that background radio conversation captured at the start of this video is actually the tail end of any kind of ‘argument’ between Marsh and Steed… whoever was talking on the radio there was doing it at exactly 16:28.50 ( 4:28.50 PM ).
NOTE: That is only 6 seconds ‘off’ from the ‘guesstimate’ up above ( 4:28.56 ) that was based on other still photos Moore took just before the video.
4:28.50 PM would be immediately AFTER the YARNELL-GAMBLE video was taken by Blue Ridge Hotshot Ian McCord at 4:27 PM and immediately AFTER we hear Eric Marsh saying “They’re comin’ from the heel of the fire”.
I, too, find this pretty weird, all things considered. He’s tossing in stuff that’s not in the SAIR. not in their FOIA-demanded released documentation, not in the ADOSH report, and not in the FOIA-demanded released ADOSH documentation.
Time for another FOIA???????
>> calvin also said…
>>
>> Marty Cole’s lid of his camper top is open and a Red helmet FF is standing
>> behind that truck, it looks like the same FF that first speaks
>> to Willis in the Story photos..
WTK said…….Agree… and I’m starting to think this almost has to be Marty Cole… except
for the fact that the one good ‘face shot’ of this guy as he is walking out
there along Highway 89 ( with TWO radios ) isn’t that good of a match
for other known photos of Marty Cole’s face
I agree. That almost has to be Marty Cole.
It would also make sense that that is Marty Cole ‘waiting’ for Willis to arrive out on the road and then being the first one to talk to him. Willis’ testimony implies that the first thing he did when arriving was ‘get with OPS Abel’… but we know now that was impossible. Todd Abel wasn’t there when Willis arrived and it would be another 12 minutes or so before he would even get there.
Marty Cole had Willis’ cellphone number… and vice-versa. The Prescott crowd.
Willis may have called him on his way down so Cole knew he was just about to arrive and that is what Cole was actually doing just ‘pacing’ out there on Highway 89.
Cole had also already discovered Brendan was there… and had probably already put Brendan’s gear in the back of his white pickup… so one of the first things Cole was probably telling Willis as he was leaning in his window was that Brendan was right there in the parking lot.
I was still hanging on to my idea that that red-helmeted guy was Tony Sciacca, especially after I discovered that’s his truck on the left edge of the Story panos. Especially since it just LOOKS like Tony Sciacca.
But I think this narrative definitely makes sense. And, actually, I think it may have been that Marty Cole called Darrell Willis as soon as he could after discovering Brendan. If I had been him, that would EASILY have been the very FIRST person I would have called.
follow up
Image 1878 from Tom Story catches that same white helmeted FF that has been linked to the red Wickenberg Ford truck. I believe that Marti thought this was Marty Cole, but this image shows his face and it doesn’t look like Cole (IMO)
This image also shows the approximate perspective as the Lee photo but there are no flames approaching HWY 89.
Actually I thought that one was Byron Kimball. For a variety of reasons. But then that one started looking more and more like the one I find more and more connected to the red Wickenberg truck. But I was still having a hard time with that.
And then when a contact of a contact sent word to me that Paul Musser wasn’t driving the red Wickenberg truck (without disclosing which truck he WAS driving), I basically slowly threw my hands up in the air and gave up.
And that’s pretty much where I’m at now.
>> calvin also said….
>>
>> Also in this picture, The FF with Central Yavapai written on the back of his
>> shirt is there and you can see that he is wearing chaps.
WTK said……I wish we could identify this guy. He’s in MOST of the RHR photos.
No one has been able to figure out who he is, as yet.
McCord’s photo 106.jpg also shows this CYFD shirt guy talking with someone in the white ford truck
Reply to calvin post on July 13, 2014 at 5:01 am
>> calvin said…
>> McCord’s photo 106.jpg also shows this CYFD shirt guy talking with
>> someone in the white ford truck
Yes… which means this guy was THERE in the RHR parking lot BEFORE and DURING the time that all the BR and GM vehicles were ‘arriving’ there… since that 106 photo was taken just moments after they did.
I wonder if that could be ‘Charlie Reyes’… captain of CYFD Engine 59?
Gary Cordes said in his ADOSH interview that THAT is who he heard about the deployments from. Is it possible that this 106 photo is capturing that exact moment and that the white ford truck has Cordes in it?
Gary Cordes was called to Yarnell basically near MIDNIGHT on Saturday… so the fact that he took off from home for Yarnell means that, just like Todd Abel, he was probably driving his own personal vehicle. Perhaps Cordes ‘personal vehicle’ is, in fact, that white pickup.
From Gary Cordes’ ADOSH interview….
1724 Q1: Okay. Um, so uh, at, at some point um, air uh, during all of this, um, um, how
1725 did you uh, how did you hear of the uh, deployments?
1726
1727 A: That was back when I met with the group uh, before I went in to do the
1728 rescues, uh, when I met with Engine 59. It was Engine 59 that told me that
1729 they had transmitted over the radio, over air to ground that they had deployed
1730 and I, and I, it was Charlie Reyes whose the, whose the engine boss down
1731 there and I told him BS, that uh, they didn’t need to deploy ‘cause the safety’s,
1732 they were in their safety zone and it was bomb proof and he said no, they
1733 never got – made it there, they got cut off. And that’s when I knew obviously
1734 something bad had most likely occurred.
1735
1736 Q1: Okay. Um, so there was no, there was no question in your mind though that
1737 when, when Eric indicated he was going to the safety zone, he wasn’t talking
1738 about the black, he was talking about the, the Helm Ranch?
1739
1740 A: Yes, that would, that was my interpretation, yes.
Followup…
That very well might be Charlie Reyes in that 106 photo.with the ‘Central Yavapai’ lettering on the back of his Nomex fire shirt.
Here are the actual ‘Resource Order Fulfillment’ records for
Engine 59 and Charlie Reyes.
The ‘UnitID’ code for Engine 59 was AZ-CEY which means it was, in fact,
from Central Yavapai Fire District. Charlie Reyes was indeed the Engine Boss and he ALSO has a ‘UnitID’ code of AZ-CEY.
From the ‘J- Resource Orders’ (PDF) document…
E-5 Request E-5 – Engine, Type 6 – [AZ-A1S-130688] YARNELL HILL has
been filled with ENGINE – T6 – AZ-CEY – LIC# G682DV –
SHOP# V548 – P-59 (2007 FORD F550 4X4 1.5 TON –
200 GAL – 350 GPM ) (AZ-ADC) by BUCK BLACKETER@AZ-ADC ROSS.
BUCK BLACKETER (AZADC)
06/29/2013 2328 PNT
E-5.1 Request E-5.1 – FIRE FIGHTER TYPE 2 (FFT2) – [AZ-A1S-130688] YARNELL HILL has been filled with Ferris, Ryan (AZ-ADC) by BUCK BLACKETER@AZ-ADC ROSS.BUCK BLACKETER (AZADC) 06/29/2013 2328 PNT
E-5.2 Request E-5.2 – FIRE FIGHTER TYPE 2 (FFT2) – [AZ-A1S-130688] YARNELL HILL has been filled with EMERY, STEVE (AZ-ADC) by BUCK BLACKETER@AZ-ADC ROSS.BUCK BLACKETER (AZADC) 06/29/2013 2328 PNT
E-5.3 Request E-5.3 – ENGINE BOSS (ENGB) – [AZ-A1S-130688] YARNELL HILL has been filled with REYES, CHARLIE (AZ-ADC) by BUCK BLACKETER@AZ-ADC ROSS. BUCK BLACKETER (AZADC) 06/29/2013 2328 PNT
** Additional info from ‘J- Resource Orders’ document about ‘Charlie Reyes’.
** His ‘Unit Code’ is, in fact, AZ-CEY which is ‘Central Yavapai Fire District’…
E-5.3 ENGB ENGINE BOSS AZ-ADC AZ-CEY REYES, CHARLIE (AZADC)
Jun 30, 2013 8:00:00 AM Jul 3, 2013 2:00:00 PM
And Charlie Reyes wasn’t interviewed either. Priceless!!
So would the crew led by Reyes include Ferris and Emery and would this also be the crew that possibly lit the backfire that is alleged in the lawsuits??
According to Tyson Esquibel’s ADOSH interview he was in charge of Engine 59:
“Okay, I have it written down here. I had, uh, engine 59 with four, water
558 tender 755 with two, engine 751 with two.”
They were working at the Youth Camp until everybody evacuated. Engine 59 and Tyson evacuated at the same time Blue Ridge did and they all ended up in the RHR parking lot before the Reason video was recorded.
I have a hard time imagining them involved in any kind of backfires we are “hearing” about.
Reply to Marti Reed post on July 16, 2014 at 7:48 pm
>> Marti said…
>>
>> I have a hard time imagining them involved in any kind of
>> backfires we are “hearing” about.
Well… Tyson Esquibel himself told the SAIT investigators that he definitely ‘thought about it’ as they were evacuating… but then simply ‘decided against it… but only because he felt like there wasn’t enough TIME to pull it off.
Page 57 of the SAIT Yarnell Investigation Notes ( YIN )…
SAIT Interviews with…
Darby Starr (B103 Type 6 Captain)
Tyson Esquibel (Task Force Leader (t))
10:00 a.m.- 7/14/2013
Interviewers: Godot Appuzo, Randy Okon
Also present: Deputy Chief Rick Pickard, Ops Chief (Peoria Fire Department), Gary Bernard
Tyson ( Equibel )…
– When the push happened, we got a spritz of rain and the wind started circling.
– Fuel load too heavy to hike through
– Too much time to organize the burnout on the way out
– No place to tie in
– Thought about laying fire on the way out but decided against it.
– Didn’t know where the other crew was
– We were there to cut line only
– No torches
Followup…
When Tyson says above that he “didn’t know where the other crew was”… he has to be referring to the other SIX firefighters that were at the west end of Harper Canyon and were also almost burned to death that day.
These were the 2 Peeples Valley Firefighters and the 4 Sun City guys who had gone to the far west end of Shrine Road to ‘cut line’. Two of the Peeples Valley FFs ( Bob Brandon and Matt Keehner ) had stayed back in the Youth Camp Area with the vehicles and were the ones who just recently reported that they were ORDERED to ‘move the vehicles’ and basically abandon those other six FFs who were still out west.
At first they ( Brandon and Keehner ) refused to do so… explaining to whoever was giving them that order that the other 6 men were still ‘back there’ and depending on the vehicles to be there in that Youth Camp ‘safety zone’. The person who was giving them the order didn’t care. He told them (quote) “Those men can’t run that fast” (unquote) and then AGAIN ordered Brandon and Keehner to ‘move the vehicles’ and they began to comply… but as slowly as they could. Just as they were about to actually exit the Youth Camp area all six of those men came into sight from the west running for their lives… and they then stopped and waited for them.
( NOTE: All of this is Bob Brandon’s own testimony in that article that appeared on the day of the 1 year anniversary ).
Those six FFs who ended up ‘running for their lives’ were…
Ronald ( Ron ) Smith ( Peeples Valley )
Jacob Moder ( Peeples Valley )
James Flint ( Sun City )
Jarrett C. White ( Sun City )
Coy J. Boggler ( Sun City )
Darby Starr ( Sun City )
Darby Starr, who was the Captain of Sun City Brush Truck B103, was interviewed by the SAIT investigators right alongside Tyson Esquibel and at the same time.
There is NO MENTION of this incident where these 6 firefighters almost lost their lives in the SAIT notes from this interview with both Esquibel and Starr.
Like it never even happened.
NOTE: There are no resource orders for the Peeples Valley engine crews in the ‘J- Resource Orders’ document… only orders for the Peeples Valley engines… but here are the resource order numbers from that document for the four Sun City guys…
E-7.1 – Flint, James
E-7.2 – WHITE, JARRETT C
E-7.3 – BOGGLER, COY J
E-7.4 – STARR, DARBY
Copy.
Which, given the timing, pretty much absolves Tyson Esquibel from doing/ordering any consequential back-firing.
Which doesn’t absolve him from abandoning fire-fighters assigned to him to possibly adding to the fatality statistics of this fire.
Marti… see a new LOOOONG post above that actually reprints all THREE of these ‘accounts’ that have come out in the last few weeks about this near-fatal incident in the Youth Camp area.
The Prescott Courier article published on July 1 with the interviews with Peeples Valley FFs Ron Smith and Bob Brandon says that the person who was ordering Brandon and Keehner to ‘move the vehicles RIGHT NOW’ was a ‘Group Supervisor’.
That would indicate ( given the circumstances ) that it must have been Tyon Esquibel.
HOWEVER… the NEW ‘account’ of this incident from Bob Brandon himself on that ‘Yarnell Recovery Group’ website says that NONE of the Peeples Valley firefighters had any frickin’ idea they were even part of any official GROUP that day. Brandon says they only heard about that the NEXT DAY.
So in his own account of this near-fatal incident, in his own words, Brandon ONLY uses the phrase ‘Incident Commander’ to describe this person who was ORDERING them to move the vehicles despite their objections and concerns.
That raises some pretty big ‘questions’ about who this person might actually have been.
In BOTH his SAIT and ADOSH interviews… Tony Sciacca states that he did, in fact, go ‘all the way back’ on Shrine Road to the Youth Camp in the same timeframe we are talking about here.
Tony Sciacca was wearing a WHITE HELMET that day.
Maybe Bob Brandon was being ORDERED to move the vehicles by someone in a WHITE ( or yellow? ) helmet and he just mistook that for someone being an ‘Incident Commander’.
There is actually a Papich photo taken at the Youth Camp ( you know the one ) that shows Frisby and Brown sort of ‘out of focus’ in the UTV Ranger at the Youth Camp around evacuation time.
Turns out… that photo ALSO shows someone standing right near them ( and the PVFD truck and Sun City Brush Truck ) with a WHITE helmet on ( or is it yellow? Hard to tell… but it’s not BLUE or RED ).
Could that be photographic proof of Tony Sciacca all the way out at the Youth Camp and ORDERING people around?
What would help here is some description from Bob Brandon or Mike Keehner as to what this person that was ORDERING them to leave despite their objections really looked like.
If they say… “an older guy with a mustache”… then it pretty much has to be Tony Sciacca.
Is engine 59 the vehicle behind the Wickenberg red fire truck seen in the Ranch House parking area that left during the series of Story photos??
Yes. License plate matches resource order.
I’ve always connected Gary Cordes with the Central Yavapai Fire pickup truck shown in Papich’s IMG_3952 (which, I think shows Cordes on the left end of the gathering of the four which includes Rance Marquez, Cougan Carothers, and possibly Cory Ball) and Swartz’ photo timestamped on the photo at 18:43.
Copy that.
Somewhere above I think I suggested that if that really is ‘Engine 59’ Boss Charlie Reyes talking through the window of that all-white pickup in the 106 photo taken just after Blue Ridge arrived at the RHR… then maybe that was an accidental capture of the ‘documented’ moment when Gary Cordes says he was informed of the deployment by ‘Engine 59’ Boss Charlie Reyes.
Then I remembered something.
That really can’t be Cordes in that ‘simple’ white, unmarked pickup.
It’s pretty much been proven that Gary Cordes ( alone, and in whatever vehicle he was driving that day ) is the one that basically ‘saved’ Glen Ilah residents Bryan Smith and his 85 year-old cousin Pearl Moore that day. They had received absolutely NO word that they needed to evacuate Glen Ilah and didn’t even realize what was happening until the flames were already at their doorstep. Bryan’s wife was somewhere else with their car and so he tried to ‘carry’ Moore down the street but he has a lung condition himself and couldn’t get very far. He left Moore in the middle of the road and then ran down the road looking for help.
That’s when he says he saw an ’emergency vehicle’ through the smoke.
That ’emergency vehicle’ turned out to be Gary Cordes, who gathered them both up and drove them out of there.
My point here is that for Bryan to say he saw an ’emergency vehicle’ through the smoke and it turned out to be Gary Cordes… then that most probably means Cordes could NOT have been driving that simple, unmarked white pickup truck at that time. It had to look more like a ‘fire vehicle’ and have some kind of light-bar on the top, or something like it.
Here is Bryan’s story followed by ADOSH testimony from Cordes which proves it WAS him ( and his vehicle ) that Bryan ‘flagged down’ that day…
USA TODAY
Reprinted from The Arizona Republic 4:50 p.m. EST November 17, 2013
Yarnell fire evacuation was flawed, chaotic
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/11/17/yarnell-hill-fire-evacuation-flawed/3619999/
—————————————————————–
GLEN ILAH, Ariz. — Bryan Smith had no idea the Yarnell Hill Fire threatened his home until he looked out the window and saw flames near his steps. He grabbed a hose, doused the steps and rushed to get out. He had no car because his wife had taken it for a trip. So Smith, 63, and his 85-year-old cousin, Pearl Moore, walked out. Smith, the Glen Ilah resident who escaped the fire on foot with his 85-year-old cousin, is grateful to be alive.
Embers landed on their arms and hair. Trees caught fire around them. They heard car tires popping from the heat. Moore was too tired to carry on and begged him to leave her. Smith has chronic lung disease and couldn’t carry her. He sat her down and rushed for help.
“I sure didn’t want to die there. That’s what kept me going. I didn’t want to burn up,” he said.
One after another, Glen Ilah, Ariz., residents like Smith tell harrowing accounts of running for their lives as the fast-moving fire bore down on their homes that Sunday, June 30, and as smoke turned day to night.
After he made the agonizing decision to leave his cousin, he rounded a corner and saw an emergency vehicle.
“Thank you, Jesus,” he remembers thinking.
He flagged down the driver and they raced to save his cousin. They were taken to Prescott and treated for smoke inhalation. Smith thanked his rescuer. “He basically saved our lives,” Smith said. He recalls the man said they “would have gotten burnt up or choked to death” if they had stayed in Glen Ilah much longer.
———————————————————————
And here’s the ‘matching’ testimony about this moment from
Cordes’ ADOSH interview. He had already brought several people out of
the Glen Ilah area and decided to make ‘one more run’ back into Glen Ilah…
Q = Bruce Hanna
A = Gary Cordes
—————————————————————————-
A: I decided to make one more run into the Manzanita area up in there uh, which by now most of the structures were burning fairly aggressively in there. Um, just trying to make sure every effort was made to recover anybody. Came across a gentleman waving me down in the smoke, uh, told him to get into the vehicle, he said he could not leave the area. By this time I’m getting a little annoyed because of the, the uh, the responses of why they can’t leave. He informed me he had a, he had a uh, handicapped uh, disabled neighbor, elderly woman who was – he was trying to carry her out and he couldn’t, uh, he was unable to carry her any farther.
Q: You need to take a minute?
A: Uh, just, yeah, if I can take a second.
Q: No problem.
A: It was obviously fairly emotional, during all of this. Um, at this time I asked him where she was, he pointed uh, on a road that was fairly unattainable, all of the structures on the north side were on fire. So I made an attempt to go down that road and uh, he advised me to be careful so I wouldn’t run her over. She was in the road, and she was. I picked her up, got her into the vehicle and, and uh, uh, unfortunately he op- he opened the other side of my vehicle that was full of burning embers, and I probably yelled something unkind to him, but got the vehicle shut up and, and uh, got out of there. So uh, we thought she was burned, he had some blisters to his face, um, got, got her over, put her in an ambulance at the uh, back at the Ranch Restaurant. That was the last uh, I didn’t go any farther back in after that.
We assumed we had fatalities.
———————————————————————
Reply to calvin post on July 10, 2014 at 5:09 am
>> calvin said…
>>
>> Image #272 of 617 ASFD (img 20130624 185415 103.jpg)
>> seems to show the PFD truck Sciacca was driving and it
>> is covered in what appears to be retardant?
>>
>> Is this the correct timestamp?
Well… since the DATE in the timestamp is June 24, 2013 ( 6 days before the tragedy )… I don’t think the exact TIME for this photo is all that relevant… but since the photo was taken with a Network-connected Android based ‘DROID 4’ Smartphone ( see full EXIF data below )… then you CAN be pretty certain both the DATE and the TIME are correct. They certainly match what was recorded in the image’s EXIF data.
There is no GPS data embedded in the photo so it is hard to say exactly where it was taken… but given the DATE of ‘June 24’ it’s a safe bet it wasn’t anywhere in Yarnell.
Direct link to the photo in the Online Dropbox…
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/20inrene9tcx74a/AACltJPUFfvmZqibRwGSJwWLa/ADOSH%20Yarnell%20Hill%20Investigation/Photos%20and%20Video/ASFD%20Photos/Miscellaneous%20Photos#lh:null-IMG_20130624_185415_103.jpg
** PHOTO WAS TAKEN AT SOME KIND OF ‘THANK YOU’
** EVENT ON JUNE 24, 2013. RELATED TO DOCE FIRE?
The FIVE photos that precede it ( sequentially ) are also dated June 24, 2013… so this entire sequence of SIX pictures all seem to have been taken at that same ‘event’ ( whatever that was ) with the guy on stage ( Todd Abel? ) and the photo of the CAKES in the boxes.
The FIRST photo in that sequence of SIX ( IMG_20130624_060444_986 ) all dated June 24, 2013 is the one showing the guy with the white cowboy hat and YACM ( Yet Another Cowboy Mustache ) standing on a temp-riser stage and in front of a large TOPO map and holding a microphone.
He looks just like Todd Abel. Probably is.
The SECOND photo in that June 24 series ( IMG_20130624_060522_695 ) shows the guy with the white hat and YACM on stage in the first photo ( Todd Abel ) handing the microphone off to someone else who’s still climbing the riser stairs. It’s hard to tell who that is coming ‘on stage’. It could be either Tony Sciacca… or an older woman with gray hair. Either way… it’s a SHORT person with gray hair.
What’s really WEIRD about this photo is all the people in HOODIES in the foreground.
I count at least NINE of them in the photo… maybe more off to the right.
It’s an absolutely lovely day with the sun shining… but there’s this WEIRD group standing in the foreground with their HOODIES pulled up over their heads on purpose. Very strange. One of them has turned ‘profile’ in the close foreground and is obviously a woman with BOTH a sun-visor and sunglasses on. Even more strange. So bright a day you need to wear BOTH a sun-visor AND sunglasses but you have your black HOODIE pulled up completely covering your head? On June 24 in Arizona? What is THAT all about?
At first it looked like a bunch of MONKS attending the event.
Only ONE of the HOODIES has any writing on the back. It says…
“Arizona Widlfire FIRE Academy”.
Could that have something to do with all these people feeling the need to look like MONKS while attending this event? Dunno. Some kind of weird ‘cover your head’ ritual for recent Fire Academy people?
The THIRD photo of the CAKES ( IMG_20130624_061847_288 ) taken at this event show them with only a few pieces of cake missing and WRITING on the cakes is still readable.
They both have little pictures of a fireman hooked up to fire hydrant and they both say ( with BLUE icing ) “Thank You For Your Hard Work”.
The FOURTH and FIFTH photos in this June 24 sequence ( IMG_20130624_185401_593 and IMG_20130624_185405_053 ) are both almost identical and just a shot of some vehicles in a parking lot. The big trailer in background says “Pine Ice” on it.
Could this have been some kind of ‘Thank You’ event organized following the Doce Fire? There’s a LOT of people in attendance and with all the maps on the wall behind the stage it looks it might have been the site of the ICP for the Doce fire.
It that’s what these photos are… a ‘Thank You’ event for the Doce fire… what the heck are they doing in the SAIT FOIA/FOIL release package for the Yarnell Hill Fire investigation?
Here’s the full EXIF metadata for that June 24, 2013 photo showing the ‘retardant’ all over the hood of that Prescott Fire Department pickup with the camper back…
————————————————————————-
File Name: IMG_20130624_185415_103.jpg
File Size: 1191 kB
File Type: JPEG
MIME Type: image/jpeg
Exif Byte Order: Big-endian (Motorola, MM)
Y Cb Cr Positioning: Centered
X Resolution: 72
Y Resolution: 72
Resolution Unit: inches
Modify Date: 2013:06:24 18:54:14
Make: Motorola
Camera Model Name: DROID4
Exif Version: 0220
Flashpix Version: 0000
Color Space: sRGB
Components Configuration: Y, Cb, Cr, –
Compressed Bits Per Pixel: 0
Exposure Time: 1/310
F Number: 2.4
Exposure Program: Not Defined
ISO: 100
Shutter Speed Value: 1/512
Aperture Value: 2.8
Brightness Value: 0
Exposure Compensation: 0
Max Aperture Value: 2.8
Subject Distance: 0 m
Metering Mode: Average
Light Source: Cloudy
Flash: Auto, Did not fire
Focal Length: 4.6 mm
Flash Energy: 0
Exposure Index: undef
Scene Type: Directly photographed
Custom Rendered: Custom
Exposure Mode: Auto
White Balance: Auto
Digital Zoom Ratio: 1.000015259
Scene Capture Type: Standard
Gain Control: Unknown (256)
Contrast: Normal
Saturation: Normal
Sharpness: Normal
Subject Distance Range: Unknown
Compression: JPEG (old-style)
Thumbnail Offset: 2040
Thumbnail Length: 7149
Image Width: 3264
Image Height: 1840
Encoding Process: Baseline DCT, Huffman coding
Bits Per Sample: 8
Color Components: 3
Y Cb Cr Sub Sampling: YCbCr4:2:0 (2 2)
Aperture: 2.4
Image Size: 3264×1840
Shutter Speed: 1/310
Thumbnail Image: (Binary data 7149 bytes)
Focal Length: 4.6 mm
Light Value: 10.8
————————————————————————-
END OF EXIF METADATA
Thanks. Yes it does seem weird that these people would be wearing hoodies. Yes, I agree that these pictures appear to be taken of a celebration following the Doce fire. Yes, , I agree that could be Todd Abel on the stage.
My comment concerning this particular truck (Sciacca’s?) came because it appears that it was in the line of a retardant drop, and subsequently covered with the red stuff. Also I am trying to determine if that is the same truck we see heading toward Yarnell in the Panebaker videos., or if it is the same truck partially seen in the Ranch House parking lot in the Story photos.
Tony Sciacca was the Type 1 Incident Commander on the Doce Fire.
And yes it is the same truck.
Reply to Joy A. Collura post on July 12, 2014 at 2:01 am
>> Joy A. Collura says
>>
>> we proved my camera to be too squirrely and that we took
>> photos throughout the day and each time taking photo of
>> cell time and it came off with all kinds of odd times like it
>> was 3pm but it came back 6:13am—it went like that all
>> through the day so my time stamp area is broken due
>> to a 15ft fall in a mine shaft—
Thank you, Joy… but just to be clear…
…are you saying that you took ‘comparitive’ photos of the time
showing on your cellphone ‘all through the day’ on THAT day
( June 30, 2013 )… or are you talking about doing that kind of
test on some OTHER day subsequent to June 30?
If you were taking those kind of cellphone timestamp pictures on
THAT day ( June 30 )… then you DO have a way to put accurate
stamps on at least some of your June 30 photos ( whichever ones
are accompanied/followed by a cellphone shot ).
4th attempt to reply to this one and I still see my reply to Sonny never made it–
frustrating.
I doubt this will post but try again to answer—Joanna Dodder ddid the very 1st time stamp with my pics 3rd week of July 2013 and then others since that I hiked but no it was not done on 6-30-13 because I just was told by Sonny to take this or that photo and I did not even remember the time stamp thing was broke or would be so important —never thought the fire would of affected so many lives as it did—if this goes through—Sonny I will answer after the 17th when my mifi renews—ok.
Reply to User ‘Question’s post July 5, 2014 at 9:47 am
>> User ‘Question’ asked…
>> In the video that John Maclean and Holly Neill point to to say that Marsh
>> is saying “jump out at,” WHO is Marsh communicating with?
>> Who do you guys think he is trying to speak with??
* THE SHORT STORY
No one has come forward to identify any of the voices captured speaking to Marsh and Steed at exactly 4:13 PM in the radio traffic captured in that Panebaker 161620 video
What has actually happed there in that video is that the moment it begins we hear someone on the ground calling to CONFIRM something that ASM2 ( B33/Burfiend ) just told them about him being able to actually SEE Granite Mountain ( right at 4:13 PM ) “behind some hills” there. ASM2 also adds that they are “continuing to say they are comfortable”. ASM2 says he doesn’t believe what they are telling him ( he used the phrase ‘not credible’ ) so he directly ASKS whoever he is speaking to on the ground in fire command to CALL them ( Granite Mountain ) and ASK them if DIVSA Eric Marsh is actually WITH them… or not. ASM2/B33 has just taken over both ‘Lead Plane’ and ‘Air Attack’ duties because of Air-Attack Rory Collins’ departure from the fire at 3:58 PM… so the exact location of DIVSA ( Eric Marsh ) is something ASM2/B33 needs to know at this point.
A few seconds later… whoever ASM2 was talking to on the ground does exactly that and that’s when we hear the direct radio callout to Granite Mountain asking them “What’s your STATUS right now?”… followed by the exact question that ASM2 told them to ASK them regarding whether DIVSA is actually WITH them right now.
Eric Marsh ‘dodges’ the question and never really answers it.
He either didn’t understand the question or was purposely trying to obfuscate his actual whereabouts and choosing not to say whether he was physically WITH Granite Mountain at that time.
So ASM2 ( B33/Burfiend ) never gets an answer to the important question he/they wanted answered at that time ( 4:13 PM ).
It would appear that whoever is the person on the ground in fire command who asked the original “Granite Mountain… what’s your STATUS right now?” question at 4:13 PM is ALSO the one who answers Marsh’s response with the question that ASM2 wanted asked… “Ten four… you WITH Granite Mountain right now?”… but that person still hasn’t been identified.
I still say it sounds like this person on the ground talking to Marsh/Steed has a slight ‘Louisiana Cajun’ accent since his question on the radio of “Granite Mountain… what’s your status right now?” actually seems to sound more like “Granite Montun… wuz yo status rat now?”.
Another key to trying to identify this person has also always been the fact that he appears to answer Marsh’s first response with “Ten Four” instead of just the normal “Copy” or “Copy that”.
It could indicate he is ‘old school’ and still using the ’10-X’ radio responses. If that’s a habit of his then I would think anyone who knows who was there that day should be able to quickly identify him.
** THE LONG STORY
For the sake of completeness… here again is a full transcript of that 161620 Air Study video with what I ( me, personally, your mileage may vary, caveat, caveat ) believe has been captured in the background of that video.
The KEY point here is that regardless if every word of what is being said can be totally deciphered… there is no doubt that the background captures represent DIRECT and VERIFIABLE communications on the part of fire command with Eric Marsh and Granite Mountain circa 4:13 PM.
That’s right smack in the middle of when the SAIR said there was a ‘blackout’ and that there were NO ‘verifiable communications with Granite Mountain’.
There most certainly WERE. Even more proof is contained in the YARNELL-GAMBLE video which captured direct communications with Marsh at 4:27 PM.
** 20130630_161620_VLAT_split_1_EP.MOV
This video is 3 minutes and 31 seconds long.
Since the timestamps used in the filenames for these Panebaker videos actually represents the END time for the clip(s)… that means the actual START time for this 161620 video is 1612.49 ( 4:12.49 PM )
Direct link to this 161620 Air Study video in the online Dropbox…
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/02ue6bnjp6nazkm/AABZHI5bHPGycOVSAZbxff6Ea/Photos%20and%20Video/AerialFirefightingstudy/Panebaker/Video/Video#lh:null-20130630_161620_VLAT_split_1_EP.MOV
** NOTE: This is the video that appears to capture ASM2/B33 (Burfiend) communicating with fire command on the GROUND and saying he can ‘see’ GM and they keep saying they are ‘comfortable’ but he doesn’t find that credible. ASM2/B33 ( Burfiend ) then tells whoever he is speaking to on the GROUND over the A2G channel to CALL Marsh and ASK him if he is WITH Granite Mountain. Someone on the ground then does, in fact, call and asks… “Granite Mountain… what’s your status right now?” That’s when we get the ‘dodgy’ response(s) from BOTH Marsh and Steed.
This is ALSO the video where, at +5 seconds, we see Jason Clawson and his UTV dead-center in the video… heading EAST on Hays Ranch Road and down to Shrine road… and Aaron Hulburd and KC ‘Bucky’ Yowell are right behind him. As Jason Clawson passes the camera in his vehicle he is actively talking on either a cellphone or a handheld radio.
Here is what I believe is the FULL transcript of that video… including the part at the very beginning which is what causes someone to actually call Granite Mountain to ask them what their status was ( at 4:16 ).
What actually seems to be captured at the start of this video is someone on the ground confirming with ASM2/B33 (Burfiend) that he (ASM2/B33) can actually SEE Granite Mountain ‘behind those hills’ and ‘on the corner of the fire’… but ASM2/B33 (Burfiend) is also concerned that they keep saying they are ‘comfortable’ where he can see them.
ASM2/B33 (Burfiend) says that is ‘not credible’ ( based on the fire behavior he is seeing at this time ) and he INSISTS that someone on the ground call Granite Mountain and at least insure that DIVS A (Marsh) is ‘with them’.
ASM2/B33 was being forced to play double duty as Air Attack at this point since Rory Collins abruptly left the area a few minutes earlier because his pilot had ‘timed out’… and ASM2/B33 needs to KNOW if ‘DIVS A’ ( or simply ‘Alpha’, as ASM2 says ) is actually with GM where he can see them down there circa 4:13 PM when this ‘conversation’ is taking place.
NOTE: At this point in time ( 4:13 PM ) ASM2 is ‘Bravo 33’. Thomas French is on the ‘Air-To-Air’ channel fulfilling ‘lead plane’ duties and running all the ‘retardant drops’ and is the voice we hear in all of the Panebaker ‘Air-To-Air’ channel captures. John Burfiend is handling the ‘Air-To-Ground’ channel. In this video, in addition to the background A2G and TAC channel radio capture… we can also here Thomas French talking to other planes on the A2A channel… so he could NOT be the one communicating with fire command in the background at this time.
There is also a Panebaker Air-To-Air channel capture of this same moment in time but the only voice we hear is French continuing to run the ‘drops’. In the following exchange between fire command people and ASM2 that seems to have been captured in this 161620 Panebaker Air Study Video… it must have been John Burfiend being the one telling them that he think he CAN see Granite Mountain ‘over those hills’ and ‘on the corner of the fire’ but that ‘they’ keep saying they are ‘comfortable’ and he says he doesn’t find that ‘credible’… so that’s when he ASKS the ground people to CALL them and find out if DIVSA ( Eric Marsh ) is actually WITH them.
NOTE: This is a transcript of only the BACKGROUND radio traffic on the A2G and TAC channels that seems to have been captured by this video. The foreground traffic on the A2A channel with ASM2/B33 Thomas French talking to other planes is NOT included in this transcript.
HUGE CAVEAT: This is MY best interpretation of the background audio for that entire video. Your mileage may, of course, vary… but I would put money on the following translation for the background captured radio traffic in this Panebaker 161620 Air Study video.
* PANEBAKER VIDEO 161620 STARTS AT 1612.49 ( 4:12.49 PM )
+0:08 ( 1612.57 / 4:12.57 PM )
(Unknown): ASM2, Copy that… behind the hills is where you place Granite Mountain?
+0:12 ( 1613.01 / 4:13.01 PM )
(ASM2 – Burfiend): They’re on the corner just repeatedly saying that they’re comfortable and that’s not credible. ASK him whether Alpha can be placed WITH them.
NOTE: A few seconds later… Someone OTHER than who ASM2 was just talking to ( someone with what sounds like a Cajun accent? ) does exactly what ASM2 just TOLD them to do. He calls Granite Mountain directly and asks them to report their STATUS. It is now 4:12 PM and 8 minutes before the SAIR said they were about to leave the two-track road and drop into the box canyon at approximately 4:20 PM… so if the SAIR is right about the 4:20 PM ‘drop into the canyon’ timeframe then at 4:13 PM Granite Mountain was hiking south single file and about half-way from the point where they left the safe-black to the point where they would ‘drop into the canyon’.
+0:41 ( 1613.30 / 4:13.30 PM )
(Unknown): Granite Mountain ( Five? )… What’s your status right now?
NOTE: A pretty heavy accent on this speaker. Sounds like Louisiana Cajun?
What he says almost sounds like… “Granite Montun… wuz yo status rat now?
ALSO NOTE: Even though the caller asked for ‘Granite Mountain’ specifically, and not ‘DIVS A’… Eric Marsh responds immediately on behalf of Granite Mountain before Jesse Steed even has a chance to say anything. Jesse only appears to ‘chime in’ with his own ‘status’ report about “we’re pushin’ our way down into the structures” when Marsh is done speaking.
+0:52 ( 1613.41 / 4:13.31 PM )
(Eric Marsh): Well the guys… uh… Granite… is makin’ their way out the exact escape route from this mornin’… an’ it heads… ah… (pause) SOUTH. ( slight pause ) mid-slope, cuttin’ over.
+1:07 ( 1613.56 / 4:13.56 PM )
( Another voice immediately adds to what Marsh said but it is )
( NOT Marsh this time. It sounds like Jesse Steed )
(Jesse Steed): We’ll be pushin’ our way down into the structures.
+1:10 ( 1613.59 / 4:13.59 PM )
( Another voice. Very quickly): Copy that.
+1:21 ( 1614.10 / 4:14.10 PM )
(Unknown): Ten four. You with Granite Mountain right now?
NOTE: Whoever is talking with Marsh at this point uses the phrase ‘Ten four’to acknowledge a transmission instead of the usual ‘Copy’ or ‘Copy that’. This, itself, should help to identify the caller.
+1:24 ( 1614.13 / 4:14.13 PM )
(Eric Marsh): Uh… just checkin’ it out to see where we’re gonna jump out at.
NOTE: Marsh seems to completely ‘dodge’ the question he was asked. Either he didn’t hear it correctly or he was purposely deciding NOT to say whether he was actually ‘with’ Granite Mountain at that point in time.
As for the rest of this video…
There appear to be some other background conversations in this video before we hear the 11 ( ELEVEN ) shutter clicks of Eric Panebaker and the others with him in the foreground actually shooting still photos of the VLAT drop… but there is also HEAVY road traffic at this point that will take a lot more work to filter out.
* PANEBAKER VIDEO 161620 ENDS AT 1616.20 ( 4:16.20 PM )
WTKTT
I am still having some reservations that the statement pushing to the structures was in fact Steed. It could have been some one else somewhere else on the fire breaking into the traffic.
with every thing going on at that point any number of people could be talking on the ground and over others that they are not hearing.
Can we say absolutely that is Steed or is it just an assumption. It could have been any number of people on the fire. It is a strange statement Structures/when they were supposedly headed to a SZ. or ranch Structures seems like a strange statement there were structures all over the place where other crews and engines were.
EXACTLY, Bob Powers. Finally somebody is calling WTKTT out on his insannity. If he knew anything about radio communications on fires he would know that there is no way he can be saying what he is saying. This website is a lot of conspiracy theories and it hurts the entire WFF community and the families and Yapavai.
Reply to Exactly post on July 13, 2014 at 7:30 am
>> Exactly said…
>>
>> EXACTLY, Bob Powers. Finally somebody is calling WTKTT out
>> on his insannity. If he knew anything about radio communications
>> on fires he would know that there is no way he can be saying
>> what he is saying.
Always good to hear from ‘experts’.
I am curious, though… what makes you think that any familiarity with ‘radio communications on fires’ makes it ‘impossible’ for the things that seem to have been captured in the Panebaker videos to be exactly what is being said?
If you are not hearing the same things… then what are YOU hearing?
What does YOUR ‘transcript’ of the radio transmissions look like?
The conversations are THERE… captured in the videos… and they are NOT going away. Who do YOU think is speaking to who and what do YOU think is actually being said?
>> Exactly also said…
>>
>> This website is a lot of conspiracy theories and it hurts the entire
>> WFF community and the families and Yapavai.
In what way?
During the recent one year anniversary… a LOT of the ‘family members’ granted interviews and while it seem to be agreed that they were not going to discuss the actual ‘wrongful death’ lawsuits that are now officially proceeding… most of them pretty much had the same thing to say even now… one year later… that they were saying when the Arizona Forestry’s SAIR document was published back in September of 2013.
Their feelings were summarized pretty well by Juliann Ashcraft herself…
Station KESQ published their interview with Juliann Ashcraft.on June 30, 2014, the day of the 1 year anniversary itself…
Article Title: 19 firefighters remembered one year after Yarnell Hill Fire
http://www.kesq.com/news/19-firefighters-remembered-one-year-after-yarnell-hill-fire/26736260
“The thing I need to know most to heal are ANSWERS,” said Juliann Ashcraft, widow of hotshot Andrew Ashcraft. “I need the TRUTH. I need to know WHY my husband didn’t come home. I need to know WHY he died in that fire.”
There was also this article that also appeared on the day of the anniversary itself with a quote from Scott McKee ( Grant McKee’s father ) in it…
WMBF NEWS ( YARNELL, CBS5 )
Article: State keeping Yarnell Hill Fire secrets, say critics
Posted: Jun 30, 2014 7:13 PM CDT – By Morgan Loew
Scott McKee: There’s a lot of things that have been withheld… and lied about… and… ( He shakes his finger at the camera and adds… ) you cannot lie to somebody about how their child died.
Followup… obeying the ‘one link per post’ rule on this forum so here is the actual link to the SECOND article quoted above.along with an actual transcript of the video interview that accompanies that same article…
This video piece got air-time DURING the coverage of the anniversary events from the Prescott Court House.
It contains that quote from Grant McKee’s father… and an on-camera interview with Elizabeth Nowicki.
WMBF NEWS ( YARNELL, CBS5 )
Article: State keeping Yarnell Hill Fire secrets, say critics
Posted: Jun 30, 2014 7:13 PM CDT
Updated: Jul 01, 2014 9:34 AM CDT
By Morgan Loew
http://www.wmbfnews.com/story/25909911/state-keeping-yarnell-hill-fire-secrets-say-critics
The written part of the article does a poor job of reporting what was actually said in the real VIDEO interview(s)… so here is a ‘transcript’ of just the actual VIDEO that accompanies the article…
TRANSCRIPT OF VIDEO PART
——————————————————————-
The video was introduced by CBS5 anchorman Sean McLaughlin who was sitting with co-anchor Catherine Anaya in the Prescott Courthouse Square and covering the actual first anniversary events at that location.
Sean McLaughlin: And a growing number of critics are now saying that part of the blame goes on the investigators themselves.
Investigative reporter Morgan Loew joins us live back at the studio in Phoenix with that part of our story tonight. Morgan?….
Morgan Loew: Sean and Catherine… when the State Forestry division released its investigation it met with some harsh criticism for glossing over some of the biggest questions.
( Audio clip is played of a female dispatcher saying “There are confirmed 19 fatalities.” )
The immediate question after any tragedy is… what went wrong?
The report released by the Forestry Division left that question largely unanswered.
( Video cuts to an on-camera interview with Scott McKee, Grant McKee’s father )…
Scott McKee: There’s a lot of things that have been withheld… and lied about… and… ( He shakes his finger at the camera and adds… ) you cannot lie to somebody about how their child died.
Morgan Loew: Scott McKee’s son Grant was one of the Granite Mountain Hotshots. He and others refer to the State’s report as ‘a whitewash’. It blamed communications problems but did not hold anyone accountable.
One year after the tragedy and the number of people accusing the State of ‘keeping secrets’ is growing.
( Video cuts to an on-camera interview with Elizabeth Nowicki )…
Morgan Loew: How open has this investigation been, in your experience?
Elizabeth Nowicki: The investigation hasn’t been particularly open at all.
Morgan Loew ( narrating ): Elizabeth Nowicki is a law professor who has tried for months to get access to the investigative records that were not included in the State’s report.
EN: The investigation team members, for example, uhm… withheld their notes from uhm… their interviews of key players on the Yarnell Hill Fire.
Morgan Loew ( narrating ): Some of those interview notes allegedly taken during interviews with the Blue Ridge Hotshots working nearest the firefighters who died and among the last to speak to them on the radio. Investigators were also not allowed to interview everyone they wanted to.
Morgan Loew: Why is it important that all of the records that SHOULD be released ARE released… in an investigation like this?
Elizaneth Nowicki: What I have seen is that the withholding of information, the ‘circling… uhm… of the wagons’, can be incredibly damaging.
It’s not the right thing to do. It’s not the way to move on.
It’s not the way to make the fireline safer.
Morgan Loew: Nowicki says in her experience that two of the side-effects of secrecy in an investigation are lawsuits and conspiracy theories.
Last week we saw the first lawsuit arise from neighboring landowners against the State
And there are lots and lots of conspiracy theories making rounds on the Internet about what really happened on the mountain that day.
Sean and Catherine ( back to you )…
————————————————————————–
It’s nice to see even this kind of ‘acknowldegement’ on the part of the MSM of the immense problems that are now ‘common knowledge’ regarding the poor handling of the YHF investigation(s)…
…but all-in-all it’s still really a piss-poor piece of reporting in that despite its title… it doesn’t even get into WHAT information might be being ‘kept secret’ other than some quick comment on Nowicki’s part about about the Blue Ridge interview notes being ‘withheld’.
It is, essentially, just its own brand of ‘conspiracy theory’ because all it does is say there are ‘secrets being kept’… but doesn’t explore the topic in any realistic way.
Reply to Bob Powers post on July 13, 2014 at 7:08 am
>> Bob Powers said…
>> I am still having some reservations that the statement pushing to
>> the structures was in fact Steed. It could have been some one else
>> somewhere else on the fire breaking into the traffic.
Yes. That is always a possibility with these captured transmissions and I’ve never said it wasn’t. Until there is absolute positive ID on a voice and absolute confirmation on the ‘context’ of a conversation and its participants… well… the word ‘absolute’ is still sitting on the shelf.
But that doesn’t mean you throw ‘common sense’ out the window, either.
Sometimes… the ‘assumptions’ you can make do, in fact, fit all the circumstances and even without the ‘absolute’ confirmation… you can be ‘reasonably sure’ what is going on. We have proved this any number of times here on this forum when additional ‘facts’ have eventually emerged that totally support some of the earlier ‘assumptions’.
>> Mr. Powers also said…
>> With every thing going on at that point any number of people could
>> be talking on the ground and over others that they are not hearing.
Yes… but look at what you just wrote yourself. “With everything going on at that point.” Well… take a deep breathe for a moment and ask yourself what you really meant by that. What was ‘going on’ at that point ( 4:13 PM ) was a ‘total evacuation’ and ALL FIREFIGHTERS were now getting OFF the fire. At 4:13 PM… even the 8 firefighters at the west end of Harper Canyon were about to be ‘running for their lives’ and everyone in the Shrine area was just about to ‘get the hell out of there’.
At 4:13 PM… what was GOING ON is that ALL FIREFIGHTERS were now supposed to be EVACUATING… and NOT ‘pushing their way into structures’ in order to re-engage.
Same was true up north in Peeples Valley at this time. The wind had shifted to the SOUTH and there was less danger and the focus was on ‘spot fires’ along that ‘last stand’ made on Model Creek road. No one up there was actively being asked to ‘push their way into structures’, either.
So if we were to ask ourselves… who ELSE on the fire at that moment ( 4:13 PM ) would have been ‘breaking in’ to someone else’s conversation with just some generic announcement about “we’re pushing our way into the structures now”… the list becomes a pretty short one, indeed.
So not only does it just make ‘sense’ ( given the context and circumstances ) that Steed would be the one simply ‘adding to’ what Marsh just said… it also just makes ‘sense’ that that is what Jesse would say. That WAS their ‘plan’. It WAS the ‘mission’ they gave themselves…. and they were totally unaware ( and didn’t care? ) that they were now the ONLY FFs on the entire fire who were even still thinking there was a chance to ‘re-engage’..
I still believe that at this moment ( 4:13 PM )… if those conversations hadn’t been so evasive and obtuse… and Marsh and Steed had been INFORMED that not only was it not possible to re-engage via the Boulder Springs Ranch… that ALL FFs where not being PULLED from the fire and not even being ALLOWED to re-engage… they might have had those extra 26 minutes ( TWENTY SIX! ) to re-consider what they were doing and simply ‘go back’ to the ‘safe black’.
It didn’t happen.
Even with communications taking place at both 4:13 PM and 4:27 PM ( The YARNELL-GAMBLE video )… no one bothered to inform Marsh and Steed that there was no need for their help in town. It was too late for a bunch of guys armed only with some hand-tools to make any difference at all ‘in town’.
>> Mr. Powers also said…
>> Can we say absolutely that is Steed or is it just an assumption.
>> It could have been any number of people on the fire.
Again… the word ‘absolutely’ is still ‘sitting on the shelf’ until someone
comes forward and verifies the conversation, the context, and ALL of these
people that were hear having this extended ‘What’s your status’ conversation…
…so all I can do here is list what I believe are the ‘common sense’ reasons why that ‘most probably’ is Jesse Steed.
1) It sounds like him. It really does. See MacKenzie videos with a clear recording of Steed’s voice. He has a ‘cadence’, a pattern and a placement in his speech that is almost as distinct as Marsh’s if you listen close enough.
2) See above. At a time when EVERYONE ELSE on the fire was EVACUATING ( Including all FFs ) Who ELSE would have still been under the delusion that there was time to ‘push their way into some structures’ in order to protect them? It would have been someone who wasn’t even there in town and couldn’t see for themselves what was really happening at 4:13 PM and how pointless that had now become. Someone like Steed or Marsh who were still ‘out there’ on their ‘mission’ and no one was ‘calling them off’.
3) This one is important. It has to do with ‘context’. The callout from someone in fire command was NOT to DIVSA or Eric Marsh. ASM2/B33 ( Bravo 33 ) had just asked fire command on the ground to call ‘Granite Mountain’ and (quote) “ask them if they can place DIVSA with them”. That is exactly what someone in fire command was now doing. The radio callout was (quote) “Granite Mountain… what’s your status right now?”. What actually happens is that Eric Marsh ‘intercepted’ this query that was meant for Jesse Steed. Marsh ‘jumps in’ before Steed can even answer. I still think that actually probably pissed Steed off. Marsh had been doing that all day and Steed was probably SICK of it… but Steed was known to be a ‘nice guy’ and once again… was giving Marsh the benefit of the doubt and he ALLOWED Marsh to answer the radio call even though it was MEANT for him. But Steed was also no wallflower. I think he politely let Marsh finish what he was saying and only when Marsh was finished did he then jump in with his own ‘add on’ to the response which was “We’re pushin’ our way down into the structures”. Again… he was probably pissed that Marsh ( once again? ) had ‘intercepted’ a call sign that was supposed to be HIS to respond to that day… but he still felt the obligation to just ‘chime in’ on the conversation since the caller did, in fact, request to talk to HIM and not Marsh.
So it just makes ‘sense’ that that would be Steed adding his ‘2 cents’ to the end of that response from Marsh. The radio call was meant for HIM, not Marsh.
>> Mr. Powers also said
>> It is a strange statement Structures/when they were supposedly
>> headed to a SZ. or ranch Structures seems like a strange statement
>> there were structures all over the place where other crews and
>> engines were.
I believe Steed ( and yes… I still believe that is him speaking ) was just accidentally revealing what their own predetermined ‘mission’ was. The PLAN was never to STOP at the Boulder Springs Ranch at all. That was just the closest visible ‘interface’ to the western edge of ‘town’. They had NOT scouted this at all but I don’t think they gave a shit. I think they believed that all they had to do was get to the western edge of ‘the structures’ and there were then bound to be roads and whatnot and they would then be able to ‘push their way into the structures’ and be heroes.
What is astounding is that there was no ‘followup’ to this radio traffic with anyone trying to really UNDERSTAND what both Marsh and Steed had just told them.
If it had occurred to someone ( ANYONE ) that Marsh and Steed really did think they were ‘needed’ in town and that they had time to get there to play ‘hero’…. I think there was still time for an intervention.
There were NOT needed. There WAS no time. There wasn’t going to be ANY ‘hero’ stuff for them to accomplish even if they had made it over that 4-strand barbed wire on the western side of the BSR in time. SOMEONE should have made that CLEAR to them regardless of whether any initial requests or decisions of their own circa 3:50 to 4:00 PM had caused them to launch on that ‘mission’ of theirs.
Bad typo up above that changed the meaning of a sentence.
I typed NOT in a place where I meant to type NOW.
Paragraph above should have read like this…
I still believe that at this moment ( 4:13 PM )… if those conversations hadn’t been so evasive and obtuse… and Marsh and Steed had been INFORMED that not only was it not possible to re-engage via the Boulder Springs Ranch… that ALL FFs where NOW being PULLED from the fire and not even being ALLOWED to re-engage… they might have had those extra 26 minutes ( TWENTY SIX! ) to re-consider what they were doing and simply ‘go back’ to the ‘safe black’.
As always my investigative skills and can you sit in a court of law and say it was so and so? Your scenario is plausible but has some questions unanswered.
Who else could have been talking— any one of several Engine Crews in and around houses checking for people. or attempting to get to a safe location they may have herd or been talking to some one close that they herd but the other traffic did not copy. Pushing our way down into the structures—sounds more like in town than out on a mountain. No reason for Steed to answer his boss did, at that point I think Marsh had taken over the crew again as Superintendent. They left the mountain and there assignment My HS back ground says that’s what happened. a natural hand back of the crew. So I am kind of stuck on that but we wont solve it now without more info.
Reply to Bob Powers post on July 13, 2014 at 7:16 pm
>> Bob Powers wrote…
>> As always my investigative skills and can you sit in
>> a court of law and say it was so and so?
Due to the piss-poor investigations… there are actually VERY few things with regards to this incident that anyone could ‘sit in a court of law’ and say it was ‘so and so’..
Important questions that were never asked, conflicting testimonies that were never resolved… and testimony from critical participants that was never even obtained because they were never even interviewed.
Right up there on that list is the lack of any real attempt to verify these ‘voices’ and these ‘conversations’ that so obviously exist in the recordings. The best people to ‘identify’ the voices in the these conversations would be the ones who were actually HAVING these ( known ) conversations… but no serious effort was ever made to do that.
>> Bob Powers also wrote…
>> Your scenario is plausible but has some questions
>> unanswered.
Yes. See above. The BEST way to have ‘answered’ the questions surrounding these ‘conversations’ would have been to discover exactly WHO was having them and then get THEM to elaborate on exactly what was being said and WHO was saying it. The SAIT made no serious attempt to do that because it would have interfered with their pre-determined ‘narrative’ that for the critical time leading up to the deployment… no one was having ANY ‘conversations’ with Marsh or Steed. Period. End of (their) story.
>> Bob Powers also wrote…
>> Who else could have been talking— any one of several
>> Engine Crews in and around houses checking for people.
If we are talking about just ‘available evidence’ now… then this scenario is even LESS likely than all the others. There is NO EVIDENCE that any ‘Engine Crews’ anywhere on either end of the fire ever attempted to do anything of the sort… not EVER… and certainly not in the timeframe in question ( 4:13 PM ).
To the contrary. There is evidence that even as firefighters were evacuating and seeing people that seemed to be unaware of the immediate danger or that they should be evacuating RIGHT NOW… they weren’t even stopping to make sure they knew that or that even when directly ASKED… some FFs who had, themselves, already been told to evacuate were telling citizens there was ‘no official evacuation’ yet.
See Blue Ridge Unit Log notes where they describe being asked by citizens as THEY were evacuating if they should do the same and being told ‘there is no official evacuation yet’.
Here’s are just TWO of those references from the BR Logs…
Page 15 of ( redacted ) ‘Blue Ridge Unit Logs’
( Unknown BR Hotshot Unit Log )
1555 Crew begins hiking in. ( REDACTED ) get assigned to bump vehicles to the tie-in point.
1600 ( REDACTED ) calls over the radio “who ever is driving Sup. truck return to the unload spot and tie in with crew. ( REDACTED ) returns, ( REDACTED ) park vehicles in neighborhood. Concerned PUBLIC begins approaching vehicles demanding answers about evacuations and asking us why WE are LEAVING. We respond there is no official evacuation in progress but we recommend you be ready.
Page 20 of ( redacted ) ‘Blue Ridge Unit Logs’
( Unknown BR Hotshot Unit Log )
We hiked for two minutes and were told that we were disengaging from the line due to extreme fire behavior. Everyone drove the same vehicles as earlier back out to Hwy 89. The subdivision was NOT completely evacuated at this time. Fire personell were close to the FIRST ones out. We regrouped at a Restaurant south of Yarnell.
>> Bob Powers also wrote…
>> …or attempting to get to a safe location they may have
>> herd or been talking to some one close that they herd
>> but the other traffic did not copy.
It’s possible, I suppose… but at 4:13 PM my question would still be who do you think that could have even been making such a statement? It’s a short (finite) list of candidates… don’t you think?
>> Bob Powers also wrote…
>> Pushing our way down into the structures—sounds
>> more like in town than out on a mountain.
I’m having a hard time fathoming your reasoning there.
I would think it has to be the direct OPPOSITE.
When someone says ‘Pushing our way DOWN’…. how can that imply it is ‘more likely’ they were ‘in town’ than ‘out on a mountain’?
If the word DOWN wasn’t specifically mentioned in that radio transmission I could see what you are saying there… but that is NOT the case. The word DOWN is there… and would tend to automatically support the theory that even if it wasn’t Steed speaking… that it was someone ‘out there’ on that ‘mission’ describing exactly what they were doing. They were coming DOWN ‘into the structures’ from up on the western ridge.
>> Bob Powers also wrote…
>> No reason for Steed to answer his boss did, at that point
I disagree. I think Steed actually ‘sensed’ a ‘reason’ to add ‘more information’ onto the end of Marsh’s ‘report’.
I think all Steed was doing was ‘adding to’ what Marsh said because the caller had specifically asked them “Granite Mountain… what’s your STATUS right now?”… and Steed probably felt that Marsh didn’t fully answer that question. All Marsh supplied the caller was ‘minimal information’ and ‘obtuse talk’ and said they were simply ‘making their way out an escape route from this morning’. That’s not a complete ‘status’ report by any means. I think Steed was just trying to ‘add a little more information’ to the response for the caller and tell him WHY they were ‘making their way out the escape route from this morning’ since Marsh neglected to do that.
>> Bob Powers also wrote…
>> I think Marsh had taken over the crew again as
>> Superintendent.
Then why, on the last radio transmission of his life, would Marsh have said “This is Division Alpha… and I’m here now with Granite Mountain”?
If Marsh had ( even in his own mind ) ‘officially’ taken over the crew again as GM Superintendent… I don’t think he would have been declaring HIMSELF to be ‘Division Alpha’ just before he died.
>> Bob Powers also wrote…
>> we wont solve it now without more info.
No. We won’t.
The only way to ‘solve it’ is to do what any good investigators would have done in the first place. They would have tracked down EVERYONE involved with these radio transmissions… played the recordings for them… and gotten THEM to say WHO was saying what to whose dog here and WHY.
Maybe that will still happen.
We both have different scenarios with out the full information we need you have some good points BUT—–
1. when you state you are on a escape route and headed to a SZ
your escape route has been cut off why would you say you are pushing to the structures when you could simply say safety zone structures means little in that discussion……
2. again Marsh was filling at time 2 separate jobs he was back with the crew having abandoned his DIV assignment.
this happens more than you would think with HS crews and The Superintendent can have a hard time separating his responsibilities and answering radio calls can and dose cause thought processes in the brain there is no hard line to draw from.
Can’t prove it cant disprove it just drawing from my experience.
Reply to Bob Powers post on July 15, 2014 at 5:58 am
>> Bob Powers said…
>>
>> We both have different scenarios with out the
>> full information we need you have some good
>> points BUT—–
>>
>> 1. when you state you are on a escape route and
>> headed to a SZ your escape route has been cut
>> off why would you say you are ‘pushing to the
>> structures’ when you could simply say ‘safety
>> zone’? Structures’ means little in that discussion……
That’s true. In a way… even if that is Jesse Steed ‘adding on’ to Eric Marsh answering that “Granite Mountain… what’s your STATUS right now?” radio callout at exactly 4:13 PM… just adding “we’ll be pushing our way DOWN into the structures” is still pretty vague.
It certainly adds more ‘status’ information than Marsh was giving… ( which is, I believe, all Jesse Steed was trying to do there ) but it still qualifies as ‘obtuse talk’.
I don’t think even BOTH ‘responses’ combined actually gave the caller a proper answer to his question regarding “What’s your STATUS right now?”… but all he did then was say “10-4” and ACK the response(s) and then he asked his second question for Marsh (DIVSA) himself “Are you WITH Granite Mountain right now?”
That question never got properly answered, either.
WTK said… What actually happens is that Eric Marsh ‘intercepted’ this query that was meant for Jesse Steed. Marsh ‘jumps in’ before Steed can even answer. Marsh had been doing that all day and Steed was probably SICK of it
Will you please provide additional instances where Marsh jumped ahead of Steed in radio conversation?
Hay Steed is second in command on the crew even though he was assigned for the day as foreman. Marsh is still his supervisor and that is the normal chain of command. Steed knew his position when Marsh was with the crew and I still believe Marsh was last man on the line as they came off the mountain. Strictly based on my experience. Your a Div. Super. and the only resource you have on your Div. is your own crew. Pretty hard to separate your self from the crew.
Reply to Bob Powers post on July 13, 2014 at 7:26 pm
>> Bob Powers wrote…
>> Strictly based on my experience. Your a Div. Super. and the
>> only resource you have on your Div. is your own crew.
>> Pretty hard to separate your self from the crew.
No question. Marsh must have been feeling a little ‘schizoid’ pretty much all day long…
…but then there are still these ( final ) words out of his own mouth…
“This is Division Alpha… and I’m here ( now ) with Granite Mountain.”
Sounds like… even in the last moments of his life… Marsh was still pretty clear what his ‘role’ was in the workplace.
Not Uncommon
I think what WAS fairly ‘uncommon’ that day is that there ended up being a DIVSA that only had ONE resource officially assigned to him… and it happened to be his own municipally sponsored Type 1 Hotshot crew.
This point was even raised during SAIT Co-Lead Mike Dudley’s recent ‘speech’ in front of the Utah Unified Fire Authority.
One of those firefighters asked if the SAIT investigators ( led by Dudley ) had considered the reality that they had a DIVSA communicating with his resource(s) over a PRIVATE radio channel ( the GM intra-crew ) and that that is why this ‘move’ they were making ended up seeming to be some kind of ‘secret’ and wasn’t fully HEARD or UNDERSTOOD by others on the normal command TAC channels.
The same firefighter then said that NORMALLY… a ‘moving of resources’ like that and the discussions about it between a DIV and that particular resource would have generated more radio traffic than it seemed to that day on the normal Command/TAC channels… and that more people would have ‘understood’ what was happening… if not actually had something to say about it.
Mike Dudley ( Co-lead of the SAIT investigation said )…
“I agree. That was part of the problem that day”.
Bob, where they went off i found a melted ball of pink ribbon–Dr Ted Putnam, Holly and Wayne Neil, all smokejumpers, were hiking with us, It was on that two track above the death basin and indicates someone was at that spot and dropped pink ribbon, also very near the spot they found the discarded water bags. Considering that Marsh passed us tying pink ribbon every 50-100 ft. earlier in the morning, would you think he had went down ahead doing the same and giving them a line to follow? Is that the general procedure ?
Bob, where they went off i found a melted ball of pink ribbon–Dr Ted Putnam, Holly and Wayne Neil, all smokejumpers, were hiking with us,CORRECTION- WE SHOWED THEM ON THAT HIKE BECAUSE IT WAS STILL THERE YET I THOUGHT IT WAS JOHN MACLEAN WE FOUND IT WITH SONNY ORIGINALLY—I THINK SO BECAUSE I IMMEDIATELY DIALED OSHA WITH THE GPS COORDINATES AND JOHN MACLEAN WAS DUE FOR A HIKE WITH WILLIS SO WHEN YOU BOTH WERE SO INTRIGUED TO ITS LOCATION I GPS AND TOLD OSHA IT WAS NEAR UNDER A ROCK AWAY FROM WHERE YOU STORED IT. I WANTED OSHA TO GET IT NOT OTHERS— It was on that two track above the death basin and indicates someone was at that spot and dropped pink ribbon, also very near the spot they found the discarded water bags. Considering that Marsh passed us tying pink ribbon every 50-100 ft. earlier in the morning, would you think he had went down ahead doing the same and giving them a line to follow?NOONE HERE CAN ANSWER BUT FRISBEE MIGHT BE ABLE TO OR BRENDAN “DONUT” Is that the general procedure ?SOMEONE COULD ANSWER THAT
Good correction Joy. Yes was it John McClean that went back a second time to refind it but could not since you had put it under a rock pile–it was not visible Then when we went with Ted, Wayne and Holly you said well I had put it under a pile so OSHA could come see it.
Reply to calvin post on July 13, 2014 at 4:35 pm
>> calvin said…
>>
>> Will you please provide additional instances where Marsh
>> jumped ahead of Steed in radio conversation?
Sure… but keep in mind that the only DIRECT evidence ( actual radio capture ) of this happening is that 4:13 PM conversation being discussed above where the ‘callout’ was definitely aimed at ‘Granite Mountain’ ( and not DIVSA )… and Eric Marsh jumps in BEFORE Steed has a chance to say anything.
The other evidence of the same thing happening at other times that day ( see below ) all qualifies as ‘indirect’ evidence ( testimony, recollections, etc. ).
First off… can’t really count that now well-documented moment when OPS2 Paul Musser wasn’t sure who had responded to him when he did his ‘availability check’ for ‘Granite Mountain’.
The ADOSH report originally said…
“Shortly thereafter, Operations Section Chief II Musser radioed GMIHC ( Granite Mountain Interagency Hotshot Crew ) and asked if they could spare resources to assist in Yarnell. Either Marsh OR GMIHC Captain Steed responded that they were committed to the black and that Musser should contact BRIHC working in the valley ( during his interview Musser stated that he wasn’t sure who he was talking with ).”
So that original ‘summary’ of what Paul Musser said in his ADOSH interview left the impression that Musser ‘called out’ specifically to ‘Granite Mountain’… but then wasn’t sure whether it was the acting Superintendent of GMIHC ( Steed ) that actually responded… or whether this was another moment when Eric Marsh ‘jumped in’ and intercepted a radio callout that was really meant for Jesse Steed.
We ( here on this forum ) have since proved that that statement in the ADOSH report was a ‘merger’ of two separate testimonies about this ‘availability check’. The ADOSH investigators took what Musser told them about it ( first person account ) and then ALSO took what OPS1 Abel told them Musser told HIM about it ( second person removed account )… and they then MERGED these two ‘accounts’ into the statement they ended up printing in their report.
It is TRUE that ( in his interview ) Musser wasn’t exactly sure whether he called out to ‘Granite Mountain’ or to ‘DIVSA’… and that he then wasn’t sure who actually ‘answered’ the call… but if that radio call from Musser at exactly 1542 captured in the Panebaker Air Study video really is that ‘Granite Mountain availability check’ call coming from Musser… then Musser did request to talk with ‘Division Alpha’ and not ‘Granite Mountain’.
Also can’t count the obvious moment in the Helmet-Cam video when it was only Steed and Caldwell repeatedly ( and specifically ) trying to initiate emergency communications between ‘Granite Mountain 7’ and ‘Air Attack’… and then Marsh just ‘jumps in’ and takes over. After repeated attempts from Steed and Caldwell to get Burfiend to respond to them… OPS1 Abel finally came on the radio and told Burfiend to get his head out of his ass and RESPOND to those men trying to contact him… and Burfiend then said “Ok… I’ll do that”. Burfiend was then just about to do that very thing and ‘call back’ to ‘Granite Mountain 7’ but Marsh ‘jumped in’ with his DIVSA call sign before Burfiend had the chance to make his radio call to ‘Granite Mountain 7’. Those were extraordinay circumstances at that moment… and its a good thing Marsh DID finally ‘jump in’ after 2+ minutes of them being ignored by Burfiend.
So what DOES count as ‘indirect evidence’ of other time when Marsh might have been ‘jumping in’ and responding to direct callouts for ‘Granite Mountain’ before Jesse could reply?
It all comes down to that confusing time right around when Brendan was leaving his lookout spot and there were all these ‘radio calls’ out to ( call sign ) Granite Mountain about moving vehicles… and what their plans were… and who was actually answering these radio calls.
In Brendan’s first ( of two ) ADOSH interviews on 8-20-13, he specifically says that when ‘Blue Ridge’ got on the radio to talk about ‘moving the vehicles’…. that conversation was with ‘Steed’ ( Granite Mountain call sign ) and not ‘Marsh’ ( DIVSA call sign )…
—————————————————————-
Q1: Ah, and, ah, so, ah, you and Jesse decided it’s time for you to get out of there and did you all talk about you moving the vehicles at that point in time?
Brendan McDonough: Not clearly at that point in time but Blue Ridge had came over the radio and talked to Steed.
—————————————————————
This testimony from Brendan about that ‘moving the vehicles’ conversation being between Frisby and Steed ( and without Marsh ‘intercepting’ the callout ) is also backed up by what the SAIT published as their ‘notes’ from their interview with Brendan…
From SAIT interview with Brendan McDonough…
————————————————————-
( Brendan ) Advises Steed he is there ( evacuated down to old-grader ).
Steed says he can see him.
( Brendan ) decides at this time if he needs to deploy this is the spot.
Looks at a possible new lookout spot up hill
At about this time Blue Ridge Supt shows up and says he will give him a ride out.
Not in any rush to load up asks the Blue Ridge Supt if wants to talk to Crew on his radio.
Blue Ridge Supt advised to Steed fire conditions and asks if they have good black.
Steed says yes they have good black and can see the fire.
Blue Ridge says they will move there trucks and have Brendan with them.
They got back to trucks seem a little more hurried at this point.
Blue Ridge supt is going to get some drivers.
I ( Brendan ) started the truck turned on the AC and made sure the truck radios were on the right Channel and volume up
————————————————————-
In the ( redacted ) Blue Ridge Unit Logs that weren’t released by the SAIT people until February 27, 2014… Blue Ridge Captain Trueheart Brown’s Unit Log describes this same moment. His log entry begins with describing the moment when Frisby was ‘on his way’ to that second face-to-face meeting with Marsh…
——————————————————————
( REDACTED ) drives in on the 2 track and sees Granite Mountains ( REDACTED ) out to the 2 track and tells him to get in since ( REDACTED ) can see that fire will soon be at their location. ( REDACTED ) and lets him know that we have the ( REDACTED ) then calls me and asks for some drivers to bump back to grab their trucks and buggies because Granite Mountains trucks will be burned over very soon.
—————————————————————–
We can now pretty much ‘fill in the blanks’ here… EXCEPT for that one redaction that would have told us whether Frisby made his radio call to ‘Steed’ ( Call sign Granite Mountain ) or to ‘Marsh’ ( Call sign DIVSA )…
Here is what the ‘fill in the redactions’ version looks look…
—————————————————————–
( Frisby ) drives in on the 2 track and sees Granite Mountains ( lookout hiking ) out to the 2 track and tells him to get in since ( Frisby ) can see that fire will soon be at their location. ( Frisby calls ???? ) and lets him know that we have the ( lookout ) then calls me and asks for some drivers to bump back to grab their trucks and buggies because Granite Mountains trucks will be burned over very soon.
—————————————————————–
So, according to BOTH Brendan’s SAIT and ADOSH testimony, that ( Frisby calls ???? ) moment up above has to be ( Frisby calls GM Acting Superintendent Jesse Steed ).
However…
OTHER ( indirect ) testimony suggests that Marsh might have ‘jumped in’ instead.of letting Jesse Steed ‘answer’ these calls to ‘GM’.
From Roy Hall’s SAIT interview…
NOTE: This entry is AFTER the deployment when Hall is telling the SAIT investigators what he heard from Paul Musser and Todd Abel. Somewhere in there someone tells Hall that it wasn’t Steed that Frisby had the conversation with about ‘moving the vehicles’. That was between Frisby and Marsh…
—————————————————————
17:30 Paul Musser called and advised to organize and incident within an incident called Granite. Todd Able reported that the last communication with Eric Marsh was “We are on the west ridge descending a predetermined escape route.” Their communication prior to between Brian Frisbee Blue Ridge and Eric Marsh “we have your one crew member. Can we use him to move vehicles? Can you see what’s going on, are you in a safe area? We are alright, we are in hard black.”
—————————————————————
There is even more testimony that ‘contradicts’ what Brendan said, and it comes from the SAIT interview with Blue Ridge. As with that entire published SAIT testimony ‘notes’ from their Blue Ridge interview with Frisby, Brown, Fuller and Ball… it’s impossible to say WHO is actually giving the testimony at any given moment… but here is where that same ‘moving the vehicles’ conversation is described…
—————————————————————
“Brian tries to contact GM several times, GM direct 3 or 4x Brian passed on to Jesse there plan of GM securing there piece to the 2 track. Jesse says we have about another hr before we are tied into the 2 track. Eric copy’s and says yes that’s a good plan, head back up here let’s do a face-to-face. B says ok. He comes around the corner fire behavior has shot up. The knob where Brendan is there’s smoke pushing up it. He gets Brendon because the flames were active. Brian calls Eric no response. Then he gets him and lets GM know Brendan is leaving his LO post and fire activity is picking up and were moving our rigs, do you want us to move yours… affirm Eric says. Eric says we have good black.”
————————————————————-
So the actual Blue Ridge testimony to SAIT seems to establish that there was a moment when Frisby was ‘calling out’ directly to ‘Granite Mountain’…and DID get a conversation with Steed with Eric simply jumping in AFTER that with a ‘Copy that’… but then it goes on to say the ‘moving the vehicles’ conversation was with MARSH and not STEED, as Brendan said.
So is all of this just another instance when someone had CALLED ‘Granite Mountain’ and/or ‘Steed’… but Eric Marsh ‘jumped in’ and took over the conversation?
Hard to say, really. Some testimony says the CALL went out to ‘Steed’… but then other testimony says the ‘responder’ was Marsh, not Steed.
There is also evidence of direct callouts to call-sign “Granite Mountain” when it appears that ONLY Jesse Steed ‘responded’ and Marsh did NOT ‘jump in’ and speak for Jesse.
This report from Rance Marquez’s SAIT interview seems to suggest that he heard at least one conversation when ‘Air Attack’ had ‘called out’ to call-sign ‘Granite Mountain’ and did, in fact, hear back from Steed and NOT Marsh…
1530-1600 I heard traffic between AA and Granite Mountain asking Granite Mountain if they were okay. They replied “yes we are hunkered down in the black”.
From SAIT (combined) interview notes with both Paul Musser and Todd Abel… This also suggests that the radio ‘callout’ was specifically to ‘Granite Mountain’ and that the response was, in fact, from ‘Granite Mountain’ ( Steed ) and not ‘DIVSA’ Marsh…
“Abel requests Bravo 33 to check on Granite Mountain crew Bravo 33 confirms that Granite Mountain crew is in the black.”
So even if there were ‘other times’ that day when things got a little schizophrenic and Marsh was ‘answering’ radio calls targetd for call sign ‘Granite Mountain’ and not ‘DIVSA’… he certainly wasn’t doing it ALL day… or EVERY time someone was asking to talk to ‘Granite Mountain’.
Thanks for all the information and attempt to make sense of the conflicting and incomplete “indirect evidence”; however, the fact remains that there is no other direct evidence that “Marsh had been doing that all day and Steed was probably SICK of it”
You are right. I ‘probably’ left out a ‘probably’ in that original statement.
Should have been more like…
“The 4:13 PM ‘jump in’ on Marsh’s part was PROBABLY not the only time that happened that day. Even after he became DIVSA… Marsh had PROBABLY been responding to other callouts with the ‘Granite Mountain’ call sign prefix that day before Steed could answer the call… and if that had been happening… then Steed was PROBABLY getting sick of it.”
Keep in mind that according to the Co-director of the SAIT, Mike Dudley, people testified that they overheard an ARGUMENT between Marsh and Steed late in the afternoon… right around the time they reached the ‘saddle’. or as they were ‘hiking’ there.
That could even have been right around 4:13 PM… the same time Marsh ‘jumped in’ and answered that radio call before Steed had a chance to.
Dudley talked about this supposed ‘argument’ between Marsh and Steed just 2 weeks ago in his ‘speech’ to Idaho firefighters that is on YouTube.
First we have ever heard of that, actually.
Dudley doesn’t name the sources but it must have been ‘people’ that thought that is what they heard on the radio.
Dudley also says they were never able to ‘verify’ it… but also doesn’t say a word about how they even went about trying to ‘verify it’ ( if they even did )… or give any indication what those same sources thought the ‘argument’ might have been ABOUT.
I now have that entire Mike Dudley ‘speech’ transcripted and I still plan on posting it somewhere publicly.
It really bugs me that he just tossed that out there without providing any evidence of that. It’s totally impossible to evaluate that. WTF???????
This is completely irresponsible IMHO.
Between this SAIT and the USFS gagging all their employees, they are painting themselves into a corner while skating on some very thin ice. IMHO.
WTKTT you said this: “What was ‘going on’ at that point ( 4:13 PM ) was a ‘total evacuation’ and ALL FIREFIGHTERS were now getting OFF the fire.”
That’s actually not true.
There were plenty of crews still working on the east and north parts of the fire. Doing structure protection. They weren’t evacuated. Marquez and Carothers were still working with crews there. Willis was working with crews there. Todd Abel was working with crews there. The two Prescott Fire guys that eventually honor-guarded the bodies were protecting structures there. Sachara was still up there.
The only fire-fighters actually “evacuated” were the ones working with Gary Cordes up in the ShrineRoad/YouthCamp area. including Blue Ridge.
I’m with Bob Powers on this one. To me it’s quite possible the “into the structures” and “copy” could easily be a convo related to these other structure protection groups.
oops i just realized I already posted this message.
I tend to agree with you, Bob, on this. As opposed to what WTKTT is saying. It’s not true that all the crews were evacuated from the fire at that time.
A bunch of crews were working on the east/north areas. Doing structure protection. Even after the fire turned toward the south and southwest and headed into Yarnell.
Darrell Willis’s crew was there working even after he got the news and headed down to the Ranch House Restaurant. Todd Abel was up there because crews were up there. Rance Marquez and Cougan Carothers were there, according to Rance’s interview (which doesn’t fit the visual evidence, but, oh well). The two Prescott Fire Department guys who eventually were a part of the honor guard were up there.
In my opinion the “into the structures” and “copy” could easily have come from the folks working structure protection up there. We don’t know what channels are being overheard on these Panebaker videos.
All good points… but there is still the fact that the person who says “We’ll be working our way DOWN into the structures” uses the word DOWN… combined with the fact that it simply SOUNDS like Jesse Steed ( IMHO ).
We have plenty of good recordings of Jesse Steed’s voice.
He has a particular voice ‘placement’, and cadence that is almost as unique and ‘identifiable’ as Eric Marsh’s.
It really doesn’t matter if that is Steed or not.
The most crucial thing about that series of background captures is that it DOES prove that fire command was communicating with ‘Granite Mountain’ ( Marsh and/or Steed ) right smack in the middle of the time when Arizona Forestry said there was a ‘blackout’ and that “no one knew where they were or what they were doing”.
I agree there’s no thirty minute blackout.
This was posted below and is a good question:
In the video that John Maclean and Holly Neill point to to say that Marsh is saying “jump out at,” WHO is Marsh communicating with? Who do you guys think he is trying to speak with??
I responded with my ‘take’ on this in a new ‘parent’ comment up
above with time/date of…
WantsToKnowTheTruth says
July 12, 2014 at 4:41 pm
Reply to User ‘Question’s post July 5, 2014 at 9:47 am
No one has ( as yet ) come forward to identify any of the voices captured speaking to Marsh and Steed at exactly 4:13 PM in the radio traffic captured in that Panebaker 161620 video OR 14 minutes later in the YARNELL-GAMBLE video taken by Blue Ridge Hotshot Ian McCord at 4:27 PM.
Regardless of what some of the specific ‘words’ in these known transmissions are… there is no doubt they represent ‘communication with Granite Mountain’ right smack in the middle of the supposed ’30 minute blackout’ reported by the Arizona Forestry investigators.
Reply to calvin post on July 7, 2014 at 4:25 am
Calvin… I didn’t want you to think this got ‘missed’ down below.
Fascinating Arizona Republic article about their ‘coverage’ of the events.
Everyone should go read it.
>> calvin said
>> I have been reviewing AZ Republics Yarnell Hill Fire Online Exhibit #1.
>> It has some really interesting information and pictures.
Just to be clear… this is the online page you are referring to, yes?
The Arizona Republic – Online Exhibit #1 – Yarnell Hill Fire
http://archive.azcentral.com/ic/contest/pulitzer/yarnell/
From the TOP of the page…
______________________________________________________________________________
The descriptions that follow cannot encompass our entire coverage:
minute-by-minute updates, iPhone videos and photos, livestreamed
news briefings on azcentral.com, tweets and texts. Rather, this timeline
represents the news breaking around us and the extraordinary effort
our staff put into covering it.
______________________________________________________________________________
>> According to this article.
>> At 1:48 there was an iphone alert text, Officials to Yarnell: evacuate
The full entry from the page…
“1:48 p.m.: Several additional subdivisions are evacuated. More reporters and
photographers are dispatched to Yarnell. iPhone alert text: Officials to
Yarnell: Evacuate.”
I’m not sure what that means, really. They don’t elaborate.
The same people ( Arizona Republic ) published a specific article back
on November 16, 2013 entitled…
“Yarnell Hill Fire: Evacuation Timeline” *( Link posted as a ‘Reply’ down below ).
…but this detailed article covering the evacuation makes no mention of
this 1:48 ‘iphone alert text’ that they are NOW mentioning.
Here is what the same outfit ( Arizona Republic ) ALREADY published
as their official ‘evacuation timeline’. No mention of this 1:48 iPhone alert.
————————————————————————-
09:27 a.m.: CodeRED emergency alert by phone, text and email tells people to be prepared to evacuate. They are told that if evacuation becomes mandatory, they will get a second notice. They will then have one hour upon receipt to evacuate.
10:54 a.m.: Fire is estimated at 800 to 1000 acres and moving quickly to the northeast.
11:19 a.m.: CodeRED Alert issued ordering evacuation for Model Creek and Double Bar A Ranch subdivisions.
12:07 p.m.: A Yarnell resident calls 911 to clarify the morning alert and is told her neighborhood is not on the evacuation list and she’ll get a follow-up call if an evacuation is ordered.
12:27 p.m.: Fire officials communicate that mandatory evacuations began at 11 a.m. for Model Creek and Double A Bar Ranch. They report that “578 residences are immediately threatened” by the fire.
01:38 pm.: Peeples Valley resident calls 911 to report sheriff’s deputies drove through the neighborhood without stopping. She was told deputies “definitely will come by and knock door to door.”
01:40 p.m.: Fire crews report Yarnell needs a “heads up” because fire has reached trigger points for pre-evacuation notice.
01:50 p.m.: State Forestry official calls county 911 to report “1-hour trigger point,” but then checks that information and arranges to call back. The official post-fire report says, instead, that State Forestry reported the county has a four-hour pre-evacuation notice for Yarnell at this time.
01:56 p.m.: Fire officials notify the county 911 center to make four- hour pre-alert for entire town of Yarnell.
02:02 p.m.: The National Weather Service calls fire officials about gusts and thunderstorms in the fire area.
02:26 p.m.: CodeRED Alert: “Yarnell is on a four-hour standby notice for a possible evacuation. If evacuation becomes mandatory another message will be sent.”
03:00 p.m.: Dispatcher tells Yarnell resident and volunteer dispatcher Cliff DuPuy that residents will be given one-hour notice to evacuate.
03:26 p.m.: The Weather Service issues a second spot warning about gusts and thunderstorms in the fire area.
03:30 p.m -3:45 p.m.: Wind shifts direction and starts to move southeast.
03:33 p.m.: CodeRED Alert issues mandatory evacuation notice for Peeples Valley, saying “All residents west of highway 89 and north of Yarnell please report to Yavapai College.”
03:55 p.m.: A Granite Mountain Hotshot sends a text message, saying “Fire is running at Yarnell!”
03:59 p.m.: Immediate evacuation of Mountaineer Trailer Park ordered.
04:03 p.m.: Fire officials report wind shift threatening 600 buildings, and that thunderstorms are pushing fire in multiple directions.
04:04 p.m.: A Granite Mountain Hotshot sends a photo text with the message, “This thing is runnin straight for Yarnel jus starting evac.”
04:08 p.m.: CodeRED Alert announces mandatory evacuation for Peeples Valley and Yarnell. “All residents need to evacuate immediately and report to Yavapai College.”
04:22 p.m.: Firefighters near the Shrine of St. Joseph see the fire has reached the second trigger point for starting their evacuation. They start moving out toward Highway 89.
04:40 p.m.: Last firefighters in the Shrine area get out and reach safety.
04:30 p.m.: A woman calls 911 to ask if it’s safe to go into Yarnell. Dispatcher says she has to “double check.”
04:42 p.m.: Granite Mountain Hotshots radio that their escape route has been cut off and they are deploying shelters.
————————————————————————
>> calvin also wrote…
>>
>> At 3:45, Michelle Lee encounters a highway patrol roadblock, on Az89
>> blocking access to Yarnell from the south. She was let through
That’s just 12 minutes after the Arizona Republic’s previously published
‘evacuation timeline’ says the ‘CodeRED’ for mandatory evacuation of
Peeples Valley went out… so I suppose that makes sense. Once they
went for the ‘mandatory’ evacuations I’m sure their biggest fear was a
massive traffic jam and people getting caught ‘on the road’ so it was time
to start keeping those Highway 89 lanes clear.
>> calvin also said…
>>
>> At 4:43 Michelle Lee takes a photo looking west from Ranch House.
>> This photo shows a helicopter (KA215?) flying on the southeast side of the fire.
4:43 PM is pretty much the accepted time of ‘burnover’ out in the box canyon.
That chopper COULD be the one we actually HEAR ( twice ) in the Helmet-Cam
video filmed starting at 4:39 and right up until she took this photo.
>> calvin also said…
>>
>> At 1449 Lee tweets a photo captioned “even the firefighters are evacuating.
I think you have a ‘typo’ there. That Tweet actually says ‘4:49 PM’ on it
which would make it 1549 and not 1449.
But even at 4:49 PM… the problem I have with the TIME on this ‘tweeted’
photo from the RHR parking lot is twofold…
1) That is the ‘Tweet time’… and ( just like the Parker photo ) we really can’t
be totally sure when she actually TOOK the photo. More about this in (2).
1) Since we now know about Rick Tham’s 4:51 PM photo showing the ‘traffic jam’
right there in front of the RHR… and then just 3-5 minutes later we see Rick
Tham pass the RHR at the start of the Russ Reason video and the traffic
is still ‘stop and go’ at THAT point ( 4:54 or 4:56 PM ).
If Michelle Lee really took her photo at 4:49 PM and managed to ‘Tweet it off’
in the same minute… then that’s just 120 seconds before Rick Tham’s
4:51 photo of the ‘traffic jam’ on Highway 89.
Look again at Michelle Lee’s 4:49 ‘Tweeted Photo’.
There is NOT TRAFFIC JAM AT ALL in front of the RHR.
Zero. Zip. Nada.
I find it hard to believe the traffic could have backed up in just 120 seconds
to resemble what it then looked like at 4:51 in Rick Tham’s photo.
So there is a ‘mystery’ here with this 4:49 Michelle Lee Tweet.
If she took it at 4:49 PM… where is the TRAFFIC JAM that should be there?
If she took it EARLIER than 4:49… then I’m not believing that the FIRE
she shows across the road could have been arriving that early. We don’t
see that kind of ‘right across the road’ fire in Rick Tham’s photo OR in
the Russ Reason video.
What do you think about this?
How do we resolve both the proximity of the fire, timewise… along with
there being no traffic at all in front of the RHR?
>> calvin also said…
>>
>> This photo shows the same tall slender .white helmeted FF that is possibly
>> connected to the Wickenberg truck.
Agree.
>> calvin also said….
>>
>> Also in this picture, The FF with Central Yavapai written on the back of his
>> shirt is there and you can see that he is wearing chaps.
I wish we could identify this guy. He’s in MOST of the RHR photos.
No one has been able to figure out who he is, as yet.
>> calvin also said…
>>
>> Marty Cole’s lid of his camper top is open and a Red helmet FF is standing
>> behind that truck, it looks like the same FF that first speaks
>> to Willis in the Story photos..
Agree… and I’m starting to think this almost has to be Marty Cole… except
for the fact that the one good ‘face shot’ of this guy as he is walking out
there along Highway 89 ( with TWO radios ) isn’t that good of a match
for other known photos of Marty Cole’s face.
>> calvin also said….
>>
>> There are 3 FF’s in this picture with clean shirts and BLUE pants. They
>> appear different that any other FF’s due to the different colored pants.
Yes… and there ( again ) is that fellow with the yellow ‘neck protector’ being
blown around by the wind. I wish we could identify ALL these guys as well.
The ‘different’ ( but consistent ) ‘darker blue pants’ means something.
Are these all the ‘Sun City’ guys? ( Jerry Thompson, etc. ). Dunno (yet).
>> calvin also said….
>>
>> At 7:28 the 20th FF is found and is fine. Hernandez?
Could be. Certainly Brendan was ‘found’ long before this but perhaps that
7:28 time simply represents the moment the media ( Arizona Republic
included ) was either first notified about Brendan and/or first able to
confirm that he hadn’t died along with the rest of his crew.
More later…
Obeying the ‘one link per post rule’…. here is the link mentioned in the post above
to that November 2013 Arizona Republic article about the ‘Evacuation Timeline’ that
makes no mention of the 1:48 PM ‘iPhone alert text’ they are only NOW referring to….
“Yarnell Hill Fire: Evacuation Timeline”
http://www.azcentral.com/news/arizona/articles/20131116yarnell-hill-fire-evacuation-timeline.html
WTKTT
One thing I noted on your time frames was exactly what we were seeing from
the pictures the crew took at the rest site.
1603–0403 Thunder storms are pushing fire in multiple directions.
I saw it from their pictures the crew took and yet the crew did not recognize it.
Just another fire behavior warning that did not register with GM.
The fire over ran the lookout spot another warning ignored.
The Active Fire only 3/4 of a mile from there route to Helms Ranch another warning
The weather forecast of strong winds another warning.
Dropping into unburned Fuel another warning.
A crew still has to take some responsibility for their own safety regardless of overhead. And that’s what makes crew leaders responsible for the Safety decisions they make. I guess that is as easy as I can say it. That’s the way is been for 100 years and that’s the way it will always be. All crew bosses know that is where the buck stops. Your crew is your assigned responsibility and you are held accountable for their safety at all times. They actually rate you on that every fire and at the end of the year. I know it is blaming the dead but some times the survivors who were supervisors Carrie the blame as well and never live it down.
Its the nature and responsibility of an immediate supervisor.
No matter what new evidence comes to light… there will still remain the fact that no one was out there with a shotgun pointed at them saying “Move to town and try to be heroes or I’ll shoot you”.
They ( and they alone ) are the ones that put one foot in front of the other for upwards of 40 minutes ( under all the conditions you describe above ) and at each step of the way had the chance to even re-evaluate their decision and ‘do something else’ based on ‘current and expected fire behavior’.
They didn’t. They put one foot in front of the other for 40 minutes… put themselves in a horrible situation… and then they died.
HOWEVER… when you still have a major USFS authority figure and the actual Co-Lead of the ‘investigation’ of this very incident ( Mike Dudley ) getting up in front of rooms full of firefighters and telling them…
“99 times out of hundred… a move like this would have been fine”.
…you’ve got a problem.
100 times out of 100 times… a ‘move like this’ under the same exact conditions is NOT FINE… and people who are still ALIVE and trying to ‘advise’ other firefighters need to STOP saying that.
BINGO!! Of all that WTKTT has written, this is as spot on as anything. Dudley may not have meant it that way, but someone might get the impression he was saying they were just unlucky. No they were not. They did something that had a maybe small, but definite chance of catastrophe, did not mitigate the risk adequately, and got caught. Even if they had made it, it still would have been a bad decision AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED AS SUCH AFTER THE FACT.
Mike. Have you seen the Ash Creek fire videos posted by Trenton Snyder? They were posted a short while back (thanks to WTK). After looking at the Safenet posted by Marti, I conclude that it may be SOP to not report entrapments if there is no deleterious outcome.
Agree, and glad you looked at the SafeNet stuff.
There’s a LOT of really dicey stuff going on out there on fires. From the ground all the way up to Incident Command.
And I agree Dudley should really NOT have said that about 99 times out of 100 it would have worked. That is seriously NOT the message a SAIT member should be saying to fire-fighters these days AT ALL.
Marti, I will assure you, there is not much information that I have not reviewed.. Repeatedly.
Did you see any reports in the safenet stuff that could possibly be reported unsafe actions by Granite Mountain? I am not sure it ( the lack of a report) would be very relevant. As we agree upon, people on the fireline do not (always) report entrapments, etc. But as we keep in mind that allegations have been made that GM were somewhat of an “outsider” when it came to type 1 IHC , it would seem to be a good time to throw them (GM )” under the bus”, so to speak
No, I didn’t see anything that would have related to Granite Mountain. And I looked back as far as the beginning of SafeNet.
The one that just really blew me away had to do with the Wallow Fire in 2011.
To quote (and extra paragraph spacing mine to make it easier to read it here):
“The situations we encountered on the Wallow South can be summed-up in several ways: Poor Decision Making, Poor Leadership and Poor Situational Awareness, Poor Incident management on the part of the Type 2 Incident Management Team (T2) assigned.
This period of time was in the early stages of the what was to become the historical Wallow fire. We spoke with management about our concerns and they agreed to post this SAFENET.
I having forty years of Wildland Firefighting I have never seen such a lack of support. I have been assigned to Type 1 and Type 2 teams for most of my career and qualified as an ICT1, ICT2, OSC1, SOF1, PSC2 and several aviation and RX qualifications……..
Had it not been for the San Carlos Apache Tribe and the San Carlos Agency there would have been NO support on the Wallow South. The Tribe and the Agency need to be commended for their efforts.
1. The crews on the line had little or no direct interface with T2 team members. 2. This lack of communications went on for nearly 10 days, including but not limited lack of face-to-face briefing and written Incident action plans (IAPs).
3. Briefings that were conducted over the radio were chaos, and all the support from this team was confusing and not specific which did not focus on the NUMBER 1 priority (fire fighter safety). 4. The team focused on higher priorities in the north end of the fire and really left the Tribe and Agency hanging to make strategy and tactics without Incident management direction.
5. As mentioned, the Tribe and Agency did a commendable job taking care of strategy and tactics, the biggest concern was the lack of ALL logistical support, food, water, vehicle fuel, spike camps facilities, traffic plans.
6. Crews were commuting 3 hours every day to and from ICP to the fire (6 hours per day). 7. T2 team was overwhelmed and in a complete state of confusion which lead to chaos and mostly compromised our Number 1 priority, FIREFIGHTER SAFETY. 8. This continued through the T2 teams tour of 14 days…….WHY?…
Things did settle down, but only after the Type 1 Incident Management team transitioned..
http://safenet.nifc.gov/view_safenet.cfm?id=25540
thanks Marti
One other thing that really shouted out to me was the TONS of really serious issues related to non-functioning radios/radio frequencies.
Very serious stuff in relation to fire-fighter safety.
How can you be safe if no communication can happen?
Although I do believe that, in the case of the Yarnell Hill disaster, radios weren’t the problem. Lack of communication via them was.
But still, via SafeNet, radios and radio communications seem to be a serious problem generally.
Deployments, however, have to be reported.
WTK… Thanks, as always, for following up with my questions and observations.
Concerning the Lee photo of the advancing fireline and the lack of a traffic back up in her photo.
It almost appears that there was some brief reason (obstruction?)for a traffic back up. The McCord 106.jpg (taken before the Lee photo at 1649?) doesn’t show a traffic issue, and neither does the Story photos.
As for the advancing fireline that is not apparent in the photos taken by Story(1677.jpg). Could it be that the VLAT was dropped between these two photos, dampening the flames??
The VLAT 910 drop was at 1706/5:06. According to Panebaker’s notes. I still have no clue exactly where that drop was. But I’m thinking you might be right that that might explain why the David Kudlubowski photo tweeted by Michelle Lee shows more fire behavior than the Story photos.
Michelle Lee didn’t take the 4:49 tweeted photo. David Kudlubowski did. Michelle Lee just tweeted it. So David would have taken it and beamed it somehow to Michelle who then tweeted it.
That’s exactly what happened with the famous Kudlubowski photo of the Yarnell sign (also linked to somewhere in that AZCentral collection}. He took it at 8:13 pm. It’s the only (unfortunately) Kudlubowski photo that ended up on the internet with its metadata (believe me I have hunted and hunted and hunted). Michelle Lee posted it to AZCentral about 20 minutes (I’m working out of memory here) after he took it.
So that photo was taken before 4:49. Whether that photo makes sense to us or not.
Marti, again, thanks. It may or may not make sense to us right now, but it really could be an important element in this story. The fire retardant that was promised (ASAP) to Marsh and GM by Abel never came to them but was used somewhere, and I would guess as some lifesaving mission (does the image of Sciacca’s truck covered in retardant come to mind?) . Remember that there is some evidence that Ball et al was in Glen Isla when the fire pushed through. And as far as we know, photo 106 by McCord could be BR overhead calling for support for their crew members safety. Speculation? You betcha!
Speculation is a fundamental part of the Scientific Method!
A question for Marti and WTKTT or Calvin in your research?
Have you found any smoke pictures that show 2 separate smoke columns the main fire and a spot fire near the mouth of the canyon the crew was trapped in. had a discussion on E-Mail the past couple of days that a spot fire was what ran into the canyon an burned GM.
I have looked at Marti’s time laps an see no separate columns. These would have to be well defined and separated by a half mile or so. I would have to believe that any picture showing this would be from the air or on the highway out side of town.
Again I was skeptical due to the spread charts, no indication by air attack that a spot fire started that far from the main fire. I also saw nothing from Marti’s time laps to show 2 different smoke column separate from each other but those pictures did not show what was happening in the flats.
I am sure there were spot fires but not that far out or I believe some one would have noted that.
The problem I answered was even a spot fire would not have change the fact that a posted lookout would have noted the change in the fire spots or not and pulled the crew back out of the canyon 25 min. before the burn over. So it is an open discussion but another scenario that may pop up in the near future. If any of you have any suspicious photos you have seen put them on and lets take a look.
I think this is another attempt to say the weather and radical fire behavior trapped GM and not there failure to follow the rules. When you walk into heavy fuel with an out of control fire less than a mile from you spot fires, a look out and a safe route with the knowledge of what the fire is doing at all times, should be part of your safety plan. I don’t believe GM really had a plan except to get from A to B If they got to the ranch where were they going from there?
Reply to Bob Powers post on July 10, 2014 at 1:15 pm
>> Mr. Powers asked…
>>
>> A question for Marti and WTKTT or Calvin in your research?
>> Have you found any smoke pictures that show 2 separate smoke
>> columns the main fire and a spot fire near the mouth of the canyon
>> the crew was trapped in.
Nope. ( Not me, anyway ).
Even the Matt Oss video taken from the Congress side shows no such thing.
That being said… everyone knows that ‘spotting’ covers a pretty wide range of events
from small to medium to large to HUGE.
Example 1: After working for FIVE hours doing ‘mop up’ on a simple 2-4 acre fire that ‘seemed to be fully under control’ on SATURDAY… The Lewis DOC crew watched a ‘spot ahead’ jump over the two-track up on the ridge and then they and ICT4 Russ Shumate were totally unable to stop it or get it under control. The rest is history ( and resulted in 19 fatalities on Sunday ).
Example 2: Even in one of Christopher MacKenzie’s photos taken just before they left the ‘safe black’ on their ‘mission’. ( and the fireline heading DUE SOUTH was already only 4,400 feet from the mouth of the box canyon ) you can see little ‘spot ahead’ events already taking place down there on the visible fireline. They show up as little orange flame spots maybe 15 to 20 feet out ahead of the main fireline and mostly in the CENTER down there around that mound where Brendan’s ‘lookout position’ had been.
So the fireline was already showing a tendency to ‘spot ahead’. DUE SOUTH even before the big outflows hit it… but the MacKenzie photos just prove that they COULD and SHOULD have SEEN all that happening and added it to their ‘current and expected fire behavior’ standing order considerations before they even attempted their ‘mission’. I guess ( if they even bothered to notice it ) they just thought… “No big whoop. Nuthin’ to really worry about”.
A half-hour later… SPGS Gary Cordes told ADOSH investigators the thing was now (quote) “spotting ahead up to a half-mile” as it came into Yarnell.
Half-mile spot-aheads as reported by Cordes are quite a bit different from the 15-20 foot spot-aheads seen in Christopher MacKenzie’s photos.
So… since we can see that it was already starting to SPOT before they even left the safe-black on their ‘mission’… and then 30 minutes later Gary Cordes is reporting ‘half-mile’ spot-aheads into the Glen Ilah area…
…it’s hard to believe that similar ‘spotting’ of various levels ( and distances ) wasn’t also already happening ‘out there’ in that middle bowl where the most unburned ‘gasoline on a stick’ was.
But getting back to your question… NO… I ( personally ) haven’t seen any photos or videos that suggest there was a MAJOR spot-ahead and a visible SECOND smoke column out in advance of the main one prior to the entire area west of Yarnell just ‘going up all at once’.
With one exception.
The newly discovered Dakota Slone videos.
They tend to support what Gary Cordes told ADOSH investigators… that the fire was ‘spotting ahead a half-mile’ as it came into “YARNELL… but the Dakota Slone videos were shot up on Crest Way to the EAST of Yarnell and were focused on the Highway 89 area. They shed no light on what might have been happening ‘out there’ in that ‘middle bowl’ where all the unburned ‘gasoline on a stick’ was.
One more comment about this and it has to do with a ‘body of evidence’ that exists
with regards to ‘fire behavior’ that day that has never really been looked at much.
At exactly5:00 PM on Sunday afternoon, any number of local Arizona TV stations
came ‘on the air’. The LEAD story for all these stations was, of course, what was
happening in Yarnell… but NONE of them had a clue ( yet ) that 19 firefighters had
burned to death just 15 minutes before they all went ‘on the air’.
ABC15 out of Phoenix led with the same sort of ‘Wildfire Watch’ story, of course, but
they had a chopper in the air over Yarnell called ‘Sky15’. AND a reporter and camera
crew ‘live’ on the scene up in Yarnell for their 5:00 PM broadcast.
That original June 30, 2013 ABC15 5:00 PM broadcast is HERE on YouTube…
.http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OV0koML07XU&index=18&list=PLB0zwpPSF3eBTxI0DAN7hiAolWtxNYM1A
Within one minute of the start of the broadcast they are showing what they
say was LIVE FOOTAGE being shot from their ‘Sky15’ chopper over Yarnell.
Mixed with that footage was obviously footage shot by Sky15 in the 20-30 minutes
leading up to the 5:00 PM show and covers the 4:30 to 5:00 PM ‘burnover’ time in Yarnell.
Chopper Sky15 was shooting THROUGH THE SMOKE ( as best they could ) and while NONE of the actual ground locations being seen in the footage have ever been identified…. it is perfectly obvious that SOME of this footage was showing what was happening circa 4:30 to 5:00 PM down in that ‘middle bowl WEST of Yarnell. The FLAMES are HUGE and crawling up ridges and mounds that could only be some of those features seen down there west of Yarnell out in that ‘middle bowl’.
As far as I know… NO investigation team ever requested ANY of this crucial footage taken FROM THE AIR over Yarnell that day… much less done any good examination of it all.
My point here is… from what I can tell looking at this ‘Sky10’ footage that ‘hit the air’ at 5:00 PM that day ( just 15 minutes after they all died )… TWO points could be made…
1) The ‘fire progression’ as reported by the SAIR in their official ‘fire progression charts’ for the 4:30 to 5:00 PM timeframe is probably not totally accurate.
2) There seemed to be ( by my count ) at least FIVE active ‘firelines’ out there in that ‘middle bowl’ as seen from chopper Sky10. I don’t really know what that means… but it seems as if there was NOT just ‘one advancing fireline’ down in that middle bowl in the 4:30 to 5:00 PM timeframe. There were SEVERAL. Perhaps caused by ‘spotting’… but maybe not. Maybe the fireline just ‘broke up’ due to terrain when the outflows hit and charged ahead on MULTIPLE fronts instead of just one… and one of those firelines is the one that curved into the box canyon.
ALSO NOTE: The same ABC15 news broadcast at exactly 5:00 PM on June 30, 2014 cuts to their ‘on site’ reporter in Yarnell at exactly 2 minutes into the broadcast. ( 5:02 PM ). She is filming from the side of the road on Highway 89 with the camera pointed SOUTH and that enormous smoke cloud still roiling behind her. She is using that huge ‘smoke cloud’ as the backdrop for her ‘live’ segment from Yarnell. She has NO IDEA that just 17 minutes earlier… 19 men burned to death almost exactly 1.4 miles directly behind her and underneath that same still-roiling smoke cloud.
Typo on DATE in last paragraph up above.
I typed 2014 instead of 2013.
This ABC15 News broadcast still sitting on YouTube was, in fact, the day
of the tragedy and came ‘on the air’ just 15 minutes after all 19 firefighters
had died.
Sentence above should have read…
“ALSO NOTE: The same ABC15 news broadcast at exactly 5:00 PM on June 30, 2013 cuts to their ‘on site’ reporter in Yarnell at exactly 2 minutes into the broadcast.”
That’s pretty much what I have seen. The SAIR had a map that also showed a split in the Fire head near the crew one ran up the draw and ridge to the left of the crew and the other ran across the mouth of the Canyon the crew was in the flaming front. So when they saw the flaming front the fir was also in the saddle above them. This split was identified by Air Attack but no mention of a spot in the mouth of the canyon although that could have happened at that time 1640 just more normal fire activity. Thanks for all the info knew I could count on you.
What a difference 15 more minuets sitting in the black would have made. Or just waiting out the fire in a safe place.
ALWAYS ASK THE QUESTION———————-
WHAT ARE THE RISKS OF MOVING VERSES STAYING IN THE BLACK OR A GOOD SAFETY ZONE?
Image #272 of 617 ASFD (img 20130624 185415 103.jpg) seems to show the PFD truck Sciacca was driving and it is covered in what appears to be retardant?
Is this the correct timestamp?
calvin… see a longer post about this above with DATE / TITLE…
WantsToKnowTheTruth says
July 13, 2014 at 12:09 am
Reply to calvin post on July 10, 2014 at 5:09 am
The photo you are asking about was taken on June 24, 2013… 6 days BEFORE the
Granite Mountain 19 died.
It APPEARS to have been taken at some kind of ‘Thank You’ celebration that might have been connected to the DOCE fire.
The photo you are talking about is the SIXTH photo in a series of SIX there in that folder that are also dated June 24 and seem to have been taken at the same ‘event’.
The photo of the CAKES shows the writing on them which says…
“Thanks For Your Hard Work”.
The photo you ask about was taken with a Network-connected Android based ‘DROID 4’ Smartphone… so the DATE and the TIME are most probably accurate.
Just a note to my friends out there this is the 61st anniversary of the Rattle Snake Fire that killed my father and 14 other fire fighters leaving 24 children with out a father June 9, 1953.
In 1956 the 10 Standard Orders and 13 Situations that shout watch out 18 now, were established from fire fatality’s 1937 to 1956. Three fires in 49, 53 and 56 35 Fatalities, caused the Forest Service to establish a panel to develop the orders based on the U S Armed Forces “General Orders” The 10 Standard Orders each come from a separate Fatality fire from 1937 to 1956 some fires had more than one order that caused the Fatalities. My Dad fire The Rattle Snake had 3. This panel was also instrumental in the development of Fire retardant clothing and Fire shelters.
I guess I have some ownership to the Ten Standard Orders. I am proud that those that died did not die in vain and gave direction and saved lives of all the wild land fire fighters that followed.
woops–July 9, 1953 and 38 fatalities in the three years listed.
Reading comments made concerning the position of Marsh per Bob, it seems the tape issue has little bearing except that it does show someone with pink ribbon was right there on the two track jeep trial and that was where those men went SE toward the Helm’s place. Its size indicated that it had to be a fair sized mass to burn into a round globe. I would think just a tie ribbon would have been totally consumed and can say this could not have been just a tie ribbon marking a trial. Joy will remember if it was OSHA that told us there were water bags near that point–or who said that. OSHA identified the point near that burned ribbon as the dropping off point and even timed the descent from there to where they perished. Without brush that descent took the Marathon runner 22 minutes due to the steepness of the terrain.
I would be of the opinion that Steed went ahead of Marsh after reading what Bob had to say concerning the decision to drop down. Marsh was fast of foot and would have easily caught up to the others. He had passed us going up when we were near the fire line–that man could move. From where the black was to the north to where they dropped down however was about 3/4 mile on a relatively clear two track, So from that you can estimate the time it would have taken him to catch up. Then if they were descending, you can see that part would have been slow going for the 18, yet not so much for Marsh. In my mind at least, that would have been how it went down. Holly Neil and others believed he would have been ahead of those men. Joy’s picture that she has found lately has no time frame but is a man on a hill above the ranch as we were leaving. That does not show to be a red helmet and I do not believe it could have been any of the GMHS crew after all.
It is definitely a man with a helment and can only be seen by blowing up the photo she took. That is some careful looking on Joy’s part and it is one of the photos that she had turned into investigators a year ago. It took some careful looking at each of the hundreds of photos to find that.
The next mystery I have not seen yet. She tells me there is a before and after photo of an area that has a huge boulder missing — it shows ash all around but no debris or boulder. Well we are busy now that I have found a place to move into here in Yarnell so I suppose it will take some time to get to that one and if indeed the photos are of the same area you can bet we will be headed up the hill to investigate that one,. It comes to mind that boulders do roll and I expect if it is missing then maybe only from that spot.
We had good rain last night and the flora has risen again–new chance for wildfire next season. I hope the local residents get ready for this one. Lets hope this time if a lightening strike happens the state forest service here will allow a rancher or a local fire department to take immediate action. Now that I know their tactics of allowing a simple lightening strike develop into a fire requiring a full scale attack, I will see if there are enough mountain types around here to defend this town with the simple use of shovels, picks and axes to clear brush around those strikes. We did that when I was a kid at 15, I feel a few good locals could have done this one quick enough, that is if those local people would have allowed access the easy way–that two track up Sesame street that is blocked by private land owners.
I do hope private land owners that deny access to those people legitimately seeking truth as well as to the loved ones of those departed who want to visit the scene–well I do hope they take their land to heaven with themselves. I for one like to see happy people, and there has been too much unhappiness in this one. Your possessions can sometimes compress you, don’t let that happen.
Mr. Powers… thank you.
On this day of remembrance… I would just like to express my sincere condolences again for your own personal loss… and may ALL of those men ‘rest in peace’.
In the wake of the Yarnell Incident ( and even now ) NO ONE has done more than you have to keep the tragedy in ‘context’ and stress the absolute importance of the rules and regulations that ( as you say ) so many others had ALREADY given their lives to create and the full observance of which WOULD have prevented the tragedy of June 30, 2013.
I thank you for that as well.
You have ‘done good’ here… and I hope you will continue to ‘keep us on the ground’ as we continue to examine / discuss the Yarnell tragedy.
Your father would be proud of you.
Thank you as you know by now I loved my job even though wildland fire took my father it was a rewarding carrier.
I’m deeply sorry for your loss Bob.
And I know you understand why we fight fire.
Bob that photo with two smoke columns you mentioned–could that one “spot fire” be a back burn started to protect the ranch considering that everyone says they had believed the GMHS were in the black? Another question, would they put out a look out if they did start a back burn in such a situation?
Bob there is one other thing, did you have a time stamp on that dual smoke column?
I had asked Dr. Ted Putnam about a back burn for the town of Yarnell. He did not think that would have been any kind of option.
Also thanks for your input on this thing–I can see why you go the extra mile and my condolences about your father. I had not read that until today.
Reply to Bob Powers post on July 9, 2014 at 1:36 pm
>> Mr. Powers said…
>> I guess I have some ownership to the Ten Standard Orders. I am proud that those that
>> died did not die in vain and gave direction and saved lives of all the wild land fire fighters
>> that followed.
Two days before the 1 year anniversary of the Yarnell Hill Fire… the Associated Press released an article summarizing the ‘changes’ that have been implemented ( or lack thereof ) in the year since the tragedy.
Despite the TITLE of the ariticle… and the way it starts out… it actually ends with some quotes that you might find encouraging.
That Associated Press article can be read here…
Associated Press Article
Posted: Saturday, June 28, 2014 11:10 am on pressofAtlanticCity
Article Title: Deaths of 19 firefighters prompt few changes
http://www.pressofatlanticcity.com/news/ap/nation/deaths-of-firefighters-prompt-few-changes/article_11fe5441-a19e-5588-befe-6082d2bf3c6c.html
** From the BEGINNING of the article…
PHOENIX (AP) — It was the worst loss of life for U.S. wildland firefighters in eight decades, a tragedy that killed 19 members of a Hotshot crew during an out-of-control inferno in a brush-choked canyon.
The fire prompted a strong sense of unity among everyone involved in the days after the blaze as dignitaries traveled to the site to remember the fallen and a promise to learn from the tragedy.
But one year later, few changes have been implemented among the state’s fire crews as a result of the deaths, despite an investigation that uncovered a series of communications breakdowns that doomed the 19 men and a second that blamed fire managers.
Firefighters in other parts of the country have also been unable to incorporate specific changes prompted by the deadly incident into their training, largely because Arizona investigators have been unable to reach any consensus about fault in the deaths.
The Arizona Forestry Division found that fire managers overseeing the Yarnell Hill Fire did not make major mistakes and that it isn’t clear why the Granite Mountain Hotshots left a safe zone and walked into the canyon where they were killed.
A competing report from the state’s occupational safety agency, however, blamed managers for failing to see that the town of Yarnell was essentially doomed and said they should have pulled the crews back hours before the deaths. The agency fined the Forestry Division $559,000 for failing to pull the crew.
The lack of clarity about mistakes — and what lessons might be learned — left firefighters with little to go on as they examined training and policies in the past year.
** From the END of the article…
** The Superintendent of the Lone Peak Hotshots in Idaho pretty much makes it clear
** that the ‘boots on the ground’ all KNOW that this was all about the standing orders
** and LCES… and that a REFOCUS on them might be the ONLY lesson to learn here.
Dugger Hughes, a battalion chief who oversees a Hotshot crew for the Northwest Fire district in southern Arizona, said not much can be learned from the fire because no one knows the thinking of Marsh and Steed.
“The investigation, both of them, I’ve read them and re-read them numerous times. There were some decisions made, and I’m not sure anybody will ever know why,” Hughes said. “A lot of fatality incidents there are some real vivid lessons-learned that come from them. This isn’t one of them.”
Kris Bruington, superintendent of the Lone Peak Hotshots in Utah, says other than reinforcing the need to focus on time-tested basics of lookouts, communication, safety zones, escape routes and every crew member’s right to speak up about safety concerns, there’s little to learn.
But this is not “little” to learn. The lessons are not new, or earth-shattering, or thrilling. But they are still valuable, they need to be taught over and over. You do not get credit for doing it right 99 times out of a hundred. The hundredth time can still bite you.
Agree. I also think that the statement from Dugger Hughes is pretty twisted.
( By the way… Dugger Hughes was the person at the SWCC Center who filed the first official ‘incident report’ on the Yarnell Hill fatalities. He was in direct contact with Darrell Willis and other fire management as soon as the rumors of the deployment showed up on social media prior to any confirmation from those on the scene. See the Yarnell ‘I-Dispatch-Logs’ document in the SAIT FOIA/FOIL release. Dugger Hughes’ name is on documents there. )
Hughes admits himself that the ‘vivid’ lessons learned from OTHER fatality incidents is that without rules like 10/18 and LCES… you will die… and so that’s why those very rules/regs were CREATED following those previous ‘vivid lessons’.
In this case… the ‘vivid’ lesson is that if you don’t then FOLLOW these same hard-wrought ‘lessons learned’… you will die.
The real STORY here… one year later… is that the ‘boots on the ground’ seem to all know very well what the ‘vivid lesson learned’ from Yarnell really is… but their own management continues to refuse to even acknowledge that ANYONE ‘did anything wrong’. that day. Period. End of story.
Very strange.
I still wonder what the ‘staff rides’ for Yarnell are going to look like ( and say ) as the years go by. Will there be a moment on the saddle when someone just points down into the canyon where they died and simply says… “We’re still not sayin’ anybody did anything wrong… but see that situation down there?… Don’t do that. Any questions?”
National Geographic Magazine actually just ran an article on
July 4, 2014, about the anniversary of the South Canyon fire…
and how it relates to Yarnell.
NOTE: The article was actually written by ( you guessed it )
John N. MacLean.
Article: 20 Years Later, Legacy of a Deadly Colorado Wildfire Endures
http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2014/07/140704-south-canyon-wildfire-colorado-wildlands-fire/
From the article…
______________________________________________________________________
The South Canyon Fire killed 14 firefighters and changed how wildfires are fought. Then last year in Arizona, tragedy struck again.
Twenty years ago, at 4 p.m. on July 6, a wave of flame swept along a ridge on Colorado’s Storm King Mountain, killed 14 firefighters, and became a benchmark for wildland firefighting with repercussions that continue to this day.
On Sunday, firefighters from across the nation will gather at the site of what became known as the 1994 South Canyon Fire, about seven miles west of the resort town of Glenwood Springs in central Colorado, to mark the anniversary and take stock of its legacy.
For many of the specially trained crews that battle mountain wildfires in the American West, it was a blaze that made it more acceptable for firefighters to speak up or even decline assignments they consider too dangerous—once a rare occurrence that could result in a firing or ostracism in a profession that requires aggressive, type A personalities. No official report articulated that change, but among many firefighters it was an understood lesson of South Canyon.
The South Canyon blaze, which scorched 2,115 acres, accelerated technical advances in battling wildfires, from a new generation of fire shelters—small, protective “mummy” bags carried by firefighters that can be their defense of last resort from flames—to improved communications. “Immediately, we all had radios,” said one South Canyon survivor, Eric Hipke.
South Canyon also sparked more scrutiny of fire officials’ decision-making and strategies in battling deadly fires, and led to changes in the National Weather Service’s fire weather forecasting division, which doubled its number of fire weather forecasters and found ways to deliver up-to-the-minute weather information—including crucial details about wind, which can fuel a fire and its direction—to forecasters in the field.
After South Canyon, “incident meteorologists became rock stars,” said Chris Cuoco, the meteorologist whose accurate prediction of a dangerous weather shift during the South Canyon Fire never reached the firefighters on the mountain.
The circumstances that led to the deaths on Yarnell Hill were hauntingly similar to those in South Canyon.
Both cases involved well-trained and aggressive firefighters: smoke jumpers, hotshots, and “helitacks” in South Canyon; hotshots on Yarnell Hill. Smoke jumpers parachute into fire zones, helitacks arrive by helicopter, and hotshots most often by bus or on foot. All three categories of firefighters must be prepared to battle rapidly spreading wildland fires wherever they occur.
Both fires were started by lightning, were not fought all-out at first, and threatened homes and towns.
Severe storms that triggered the fatal runs of both fires were accurately predicted, but with only minutes to spare.
The fatal blasts of each fire occurred at the worst time of day for fire: late afternoon on days with high temperatures, low humidity, and tricky winds.
In South Canyon and on Yarnell Hill, firefighters waited too long before trying to escape.
In both cases, supervisory personnel were handing over duties to a more qualified command team, a normal procedure as fires grow more complex, so there was a lack of immediate oversight and firefighters were pretty much on their own.
In both cases, the fire crews were trapped in narrow canyons that magnified the effects of fire.
So why didn’t the lessons from South Canyon prevent the tragedy on Yarnell Hill?
A key lesson… Firefighters in charge “should listen to everyone on the crew,” Eric Hipke ( one of the survivors ) said. “That’s not the way it used to be.”
And fire crews, Hipke said, should be more aggressive in voicing their concerns about dangerous situations. During the South Canyon Fire, he said, he and other firefighters failed to tell Mackey that they were worried about venturing so far into dense brush without a sure way out.
“As workers we want to work, so we shut up,” Hipke said.
Eric Marsh, the supervisor of the Granite Mountain Hotshots crew that was on Yarnell Hill, was known as a strong, magnetic leader, but he tolerated and even encouraged discussion and dissent. Several years ago, after fighting a fire on the Front Range of Colorado, Marsh had made a long detour and led his crew on a visit to the South Canyon Fire memorial.
“We’re going to remember this experience and never let it happen to us,” a member of the crew who was not with Marsh’s team for the Yarnell Hill Fire recalled thinking at the time about the lessons of the 1994 blaze—including the importance of avoiding life-threatening situations while battling a wildfire.
But on Yarnell Hill last year, it did happen to Marsh’s crew.
Despite efforts to educate homeowners with catch-phrase programs such as “Prepare, Stay, and Defend,” “Living With Fire,” “Survivable Space,” and others, there is no consensus regarding how much risk firefighters should take in battling wildfires when homes are present.
“We don’t know what the mission really is,” said Kevin Erickson, another South Canyon Fire survivor and former firefighter.
Today, there is broad agreement in the firefighting community that the Yarnell Hill blaze should have been attacked more vigorously and contained before the fire became so deadly. In the wake of Yarnell Hill, various studies of the tragedy also have cited familiar themes in explaining the damage: drought that made brush particularly dry, communications failures, fire crews that could have been safer if they had been less aggressive.
But to Tom Shepard, who was the superintendent of the Prineville Hotshots crew that lost nine members to the South Canyon Fire, that blaze has left a positive legacy as well.
“It took 15 years for me before I went back up and walked that hill,” Shepard said on Hipke’s video. “I didn’t know how I was going to react to that. Needless to say, it was an emotional time for me.” Of firefighters today, Shepard said, “If they see something they don’t understand, something out of whack, they’re encouraged to speak up. It takes 20 people to run a hotshot crew. Not just one, it takes 20.
“Everybody’s got a voice.”
NOTE: John N. Maclean is the author of Fire on the Mountain: The True Story of the South Canyon Fire and other books on wildland fire.
_______________________________________________________________________________
All good statements. One thing that should be noted is–
when the smoke clears every one slowly forgets.
I think every year all wild land fire fighters should get a E-Mail of each date during the summer that Fire fighters died reminding them it could happen again if you do not stay alert. Maybe that’s what made me so safety conches all my carrier. Your memory can awaken your brain to say wait a minuet, like the danger trigger wakes you up and alerts you.
Just a rambling thought.
That’s a good idea. Easily done and it certainly couldn’t hurt.
That ONE time that you FORGET that all of those other men who have already burned to death reported to work that day thinking nothing other than it was going to be just ‘another day on the job’….
…is the ONE time you might not go home yourself.
**
** CONFIRMED – RICK THAM’S RED TOYOTA PICKUP PASSES THE VIDEO
** CAMERA AT THE VERY START OF THE RUSS REASON VIDEO.
This is just a CONFIRMATION of something calvin said a few days ago…
>> On July 4, 2014 at 1:40 pm, calvin said…
>>
>> Marti. Just in case you missed it. You asked which vehicle I thought Rick Tham
>> was driving and I answered I thought that he was driving the dark red Toyota
>> Tacoma that he captures in several of his own photos and I think it is the same
>> truck that passes by at the very beginning of the Russ Reason video.
Yes. That IS, in fact, Rick Tham’s Dark-red 4-door short bed Toyota Tacoma pickup seen passing the RHR at the very start of the Russ Reason video interview.
It’s CONFIRMED… and not only for the reasons you mention… there is now an ‘additional’ piece of evidence to support this.
Rick Tham lives in Peeples Valley at this known ( PUBLIC ) address…
18437 Pioneer Road, Peeples Valley, AZ
NOTE: Just enter ‘Rick Tham Peeples Valley’ into Google and the entire first page of hit results just gives you this PUBLIC address from ‘white pages’ stored online.
If you ‘cut and paste’ that address line above into Google Maps… and then go into ‘Street View’… there is Rick Tham’s Dark-red Toyota Pickup just parked in the driveway right in front of his house.
Dark-red, 4 door short bed Toyota Pickup with Chrome wheel hubs… says TRD ‘Off Road” in white letters on the side rear near the tail lights. Gray fender cowlings over the wheel wells. Black bed-cover with a black ‘raised’ part at the top of the bed cover. Black rectangular door handles.
SIDENOTE: Looks officially like a ‘2003 Tacoma TRD Double Cab’ model.Clues to year would be the ‘TRD Off Road’ logo horizontal to the ‘TRD’ logo and the gray wheel cowlings.
In Google Street View… it is even conveniently seen from the ‘passenger’ side sitting in front of Rick Tham’s house in the same exact ‘profile’ it will then be seen in passing in front of the video camera in the Russ Reason video interview. ( Front of vehicle to the right, rear to the left ).
It is the exact same Red-Toyota pickup… right down to the black bed cover and the black rectangular ‘raised part’ at the top of the bed cover.
For those who prefer lat/long coordinates… here are the exact coordinates that match the Google ‘address’ search and this point puts you standing in the road right in front of Rick Tham’s house in Peeples Valley Just go into ‘Street View’, look northeast, and you will see his Dark-Red Toyota pickup parked there in front of his house…
34.280420, -112.757062
>> On July 4, 2014 at 5:25 pm, Marti Reed replied to calvin…
>>
>> Thanks Calvin, I had caught that about that red truck. I think you’re right.
>> The reason I said it “didn’t sync” was because I didn’t realize you meant the first
>> truck in the video. You can’t see who comes before it. So his camera says the
>> photo is at 4:51:19 AM. Other than it being AM instead of PM, I think that timestamp
>> is pretty accurate. So this video might be a minute or two (depending on the not-speed
>> of the traffic) later.
Well… even though we now know for SURE that that is Rick Tham’s dark-red Toyota pickup seen passing the RHR at the very start of the Russ Reason video…
Here is what complicates any ‘time estimate’ as to how long it might have taken Rick Tham to traverse the distance between the photo he took and when we see him passing the RHR in the Reason video.
* Rick Tham was NOT actually ‘in the line of traffic’ seen rounding that bend just north of the RHR when he took that picture. He had (apparently) ‘pulled off’ to the ‘shoulder’ of Highway 89 itself before he took the photo looking south at the RHR. It even appears he was ‘slightly elevated’ when he took the photo. He might have exited his vehicle and was standing on the front hood or bumper. So that means we do NOT know how long Rick Tham stayed there on the shoulder of Highway 89 before getting back into his Red Toyota pickup and then proceeded south again.
* Even when Rick Tham got back onto Highway 89 and continued south, it’s hard to say how ‘backed up’ the traffic was at that point and how quickly he covered that short distance down from where he took the photo to where he is seen passing the camera in the Russ Reason video.
But… we can make some ‘assumptions’, here, based on some evidence.
In the Rick Tham photo… there is a ‘driveway’ seen on the very left side of the photo. It has a concrete ‘curb’ and there is about an 8 foot piece of metal guardrail mounted on two posts in the ‘ditch’ just south of the driveway itself. Tham had ‘pulled off’ onto the west-side southbound shoulder of Highway 89 to take his 4:51 PM photo just directly across from the northern edge of that little ‘driveway’ seen in his own photo.
That means Rick Tham was exactly here when he took his 4:51 PM photo looking ‘south’ at that curve in the road and the RHR parking lot…
34.214286, -112.755462
That is only 294 feet away from the northern edge of the first driveway of the Ranch House Restaurant… which is also pretty much right where the Russ Reason interview was going to be taking place… which was exactly here…
34.213503, -112.755475
At the time Rick Tham is seen passing the camera in the Russ Reason video… the southbound traffic lane on Highway 89 is still pretty much ‘stop and go’… and his Red Toyota pickup only manages to move about 10 feet in the 10 or so seconds that it is visible in the video. That’s still about 1 foot per second, overall.
So if we just assume TWO things here…
1) Rick Tham got back in his Red Toyota pickup and got ‘back into traffic’ again heading south right after he took his photo from the side of Highway 89.
2) His rate of travel as seen when he passes the video camera in the Russ Reason video was pretty much the same rate of travel for the entire final 294 feet he had to go to get from the photo spot to in front of the video camera.
Then… it would have taken him 294 seconds to travel that 294 feet, which is 4.9 minutes.
So let’s just call it 5 minutes.
Rick Tham’s photo that he took looking south at the RHR is time-stamped 4:51:19 AM, and Marti has already confirmed that the TIME itself on Tham’s Minolta can be considered accurate… except for the ‘AM’ versus ‘PM’ glitch. ( See Marti’s own comment above about we can consider Rick Tham’s timestamps to be ‘accurate’ ).
So if we simply add the ‘5 minute guesstimate’ about how long it took Tham to cover the final 294 feet heading south on Highway 89 ( based on the 1 foot per second traffic movement rate seen in the Reason video itself ) then that puts a TIME on the very START of the Russ Reason video of… 4:56 PM.
Sounds about right. Might be EXACTLY right.
** MARTY COLE’S WHITE TOYOTA CAMPER TOP IS CLOSED AT START OF REASON VIDEO
One more thing I noticed as Rick Tham’s Dark-red Toyota 4-door pickup is seen passing the video camera at the very start of the Russ Reason video.
If you look at just the first few FRAMES of the Russ Reason video… you can see Marty Cole’s All-white Tacoma pickup right through the windshield of Rick Tham’s pickup.
In Rick Tham’s ‘photo’ taken just 294 feet north of where he is now ( and maybe 5 minutes earlier )… the back window of Marty Cole’s camper top is OPEN ( UP ).
As seen ( 5 minutes later ) right through the windshield of Rick Tham’s pickup at the very start of the Russ Reason video… that back window of the camper top now appears to have been CLOSED ( DOWN ).
It is obviously CLOSED a little later in the Reason video when the video camera starts panning to the Ranch House Restaurant parking lot and there is Brian Frisby front-and-center ( in the ball cap with his arms crossed ) and all the other Blue Ridge Hotshots still grouped in the FRONT of the RHR parking lot and staring up at the sky…
…but I thought it was interesting to note that by looking right through the windshield of Rick Tham’s Dark-red pickup… that camper window seems to have ALREADY been ‘closed’ before the Russ Reason video even started. Someone closed it between the time Rick Tham took his 4:51 photo and when he passed the video camera 2-5 minutes later.
Marty Cole has always said that the first thing he did at the RHR was ‘get with Brendan McDonough’… and that he ‘stowed his gear in my pickup’.
That could be the reason we see that camper-top back window OPEN ( UP ) in the 4:51 PM Rick Tham photo… and by the time Rick Tham traveled that 294 feet south to the parking lot… they were DONE ‘stowing Brendan’s gear’ and that is why the camper back-window is now CLOSED again.
Followup… in the same post from calvin reprinted above… he also said the following
and I wanted to chime in and CONFIRM this as well.
>> On July 4, 2014 at 1:40 pm, calvin said…
>>
>> Also. At the very beginning of the Russ Reason video it appears that the tall slender FF in
>> the white helmet is having a discussion with one or more others behind the Red
>> Wickenberg fire truck. He is then seen walking over to join the others.
Yes. When the Russ Reason video starts ( right at 4:56 PM ? ) there IS some kind of ‘conference’ taking place at the very REAR of the Red Wickenburg pickup.
If you go frame-by-frame… that white-helmeted FF who suddenly ’emerges’ and is now walking back south in the parking lot towards ‘the others’ did NOT come from inside a vehicle of from anywhere NORTH of the Red Wickenburg pickup.
He was standing BEHIND it… talking to what looks like at least one other person… before he then ’emerges’ from behind the Wickenburg pickup walking south in the parking lot.
Something else I just noticed in the Russ Reason video.
None of this is ‘confirmed’… but doing a ‘frame by frame’ again just made me aware of something I hadn’t seen before.
In the Russ Reason video… there are basically THREE times when the video camera turns onto the Ranch House Restaurant parking lot.
The FIRST time it does is when we are seeing Rick Tham’s Dark-red pickup passing by the video camera. The cameraman is still on the WEST side of the highway and shooting back across Highway 89. It only happens for a few frames… but in that brief moment right after Rick Tham’s pickup goes by… the BACK of Marty’Cole’s all-white Toyota Tacoma comes into view. We can now also see that the back camper window is CLOSED… but suddenly there’s a group of 3 FFs there that I hadn’t noticed before.
One of them ( the one in the middle? ) looks just like Brendan McDonough.
If we now look at the evidence of the back window of Marty Cole’s camper being OPEN at 4:51 and then CLOSED again just minutes later as Rick Tham passes the RHR… and you factor in what Marty Cole said about ‘stowing Brendan’s gear in my pickup’… then it would actually make sense that not only might that be Brendan seen ‘talking’ to Marty Cole by the driver’s side door of the Tacoma in the Rick Tham 4:51 photo… that it would also be Brendan there at the BACK of Marty Cole’s vehicle just minutes later when they were ‘done stowing his gear’ and the the camper window is now CLOSED. Perhaps Brendan had just finished putting his gear into the back of Cole’s pickup ( and then closed the window himself ) just seconds before the Russ Reason video started.
It actually gets even more interesting.
The SECOND time the Russ Reason camera ‘pans over’ to the RHR parking lot is after we have seen the camera point at the ground while they walked across the road and the cameraman got into position for the Russ Reason interview itself. As the cameraman is ‘taking his place’ there on the east side of the Highway and getting ready to shoot the interview… he rotates his camera to the SOUTH and we get another ‘angle’ on the RHR parking lot.
Again… this happens very quickly… but if you go frame-by-frame here then this is what appears to be happening at THAT moment.
Those same 3 firefighters still appear to be standing at the left rear of Marty Cole’s Tacoma… and not only is the same FF who looked like Brendan McDonough a moment ago still standing ‘in the middle’… it’s pretty clear that the FF just to the left of him ( as you look at the frame ) is Brian Frisby.
Something else is happening, however.
That FF who looks like Brendan McDonough is now ‘holding BOTH of his hands behind his head’ and he looks somewhat ‘distraught’.
That ‘hands behind the head’ move is EXACTLY what Brendan McDonough did in his interview with ABC’s Brian Ross when Ross asked Brendan if he agreed with the decisions that Marsh and Steed made that day. Brendan stopped during the ABC interview… took a deep breath ( and a long pause )… then he put BOTH his hands behind his head ( just as the FF in the Russ Reason video seems to now be doing ) and Brendan simply answered Brian Ross’s question with “That’s not for me to say”.
Anyway… it ALSO appears at that point as if the FF who looks like Brian Frisby moves closer to the FF ( Brendan? ) who just put his hands behind his head and is ‘comforting him’. It almost looks like he gets closer and puts his hand on his shoulder and is ‘speaking’ to him.
Somehow…. this would also make perfect sense.
The Blue Ridge Hotshot that had the most personal contact with Brendan that day was Brian Frisby himself. He drove Brendan down to his lookout post. He would later save his life and then only the TWO of them were taking that eastbound drive together in the UTV.
It would make SENSE ( and plus I think he’s just that kind of compassionate man ) that Brian Frisby would be ‘sticking close’ to Brendan in this 4:51 to 4:56 PM timeframe… when everyone was now fully aware there was a deployment but no one knew anything and there was no ‘plan’ yet. They were just waiting / hoping for radio traffic at that point and the reality of it all was still just ‘sinking in’ on everyone’s part.
The THIRD time the Russ Reason cameraman turns towards the RHR parking lot is AFTER the interview… and he has stepped a little closer towards the back of Marty Cole’s Tacoma and is now filming from about the center of that north-end driveway itself.
This is now the time when that very TALL ( and BALD or short-hair ) firefighter ( who is NOT Brendan ) turns around and looks straight at the guy shooting the video footage and GLARES at him.
If you look closely… it would appear that Brendan McDonough might STILL be right there at the back corner of Marty’s Cole’s white pickup… it’s just that this other VERY LARGE firefighter with no helmet on is directly between the camera and where Brendan is standing… so it’s hard to tell he is even there.
But it does appear that SOMEONE is ‘directly behind’ that large FF who is now glaring at the video camera… and that someone is still standing where the one who *appears* to resemble McDonough was in the other two ‘glimpses’ of the parking lot.
And Brian Frisby is still ‘close by’… looking concerned… with his arms folded.
Again… it would make sense at this point in time that Frisby would be ‘sticking close’
to wherever Brendan was out of both a sense of responsibility AND compassion.
Another reason Brian Frisby might have been ‘sticking close to Brendan’ there at the back of Marty Cole’s Tacoma at this momen in time is that in that SECOND glimpse of the RHR parking lot… we see that the LARGEST gathering of FFs at that time in that parking lot was NOT the group of Blue Ridge Hotshots standing by their vehicles… there was ANOTHER ‘large’ group of FFs assembled in the middle of the parking lot but more towards the RHR building itself.
THAT ‘large group’ of FFs appears to have all the ‘white helmets’ and probably contained whatever fire command was already there at that time… discussing ‘what to do now’.
If Marty Cole had just finished helping Brendan ‘stow his gear’ in his pickup ( like Cole says he did )… but had then stepped over for a moment to this other ‘command group’ of FFs there in the parking lot… then it would make even MORE sense that Brian Frisby wouldn’t have wanted to leave Brendan standing there ALONE at the back of Marty Cole’s pickup.
There is no ‘ultra clear shot’ of this FF I think I am seeing that looks like McDonough at the back of Cole’s pickup. It’s hard to tell… but he DOES have that moment when he puts both his hands behind his head… looks a little distraught… and it then looks like Brian Frisby purposely ‘comforts’ him for a moment.
So I don’t know who Brian Frisby would have been ‘comforting’ at that moment ( circa 4:51 to 4:56 ) other than Brendan McDonough.
If anyone else can do ‘frame by frame’ on the Russ Reason video and either confirm or debunk what I think I am ‘seeing’ going on there at that back of Marty Cole’s Tacoma… I’d appreciate the extra eyes on this.
Check what I said about Helicopter flight times down below after WTKTT discussion on what was seen of the GM crew.
Saw it. I ( personally ) haven’t seen the kind of detailed ‘flight records’ for the choppers that you speak of… but I may have missed them. From listening to the Panebaker Air-To-Air captures and listening to chopper ‘Five Kilo Alpha’ hard at work doing bucket drops… my impression is that there wouldn’t be those kinds of ‘written records’ for that sort of ‘just doing the job’ kind of activity. It was happening really fast and I don’t imagine 5KA was stopping to write down every ‘off the dip’ and ‘off the drop’ event. He was just ‘at work’.
Recon flights using a DPS Police helicopter ( Ranger 58 ) should be another story.
I would certainly imagine THOSE kinds of ‘flights’ were recorded with ( as you say ) important information like WHO is onboard… was it a ‘cold load’ or a ‘hot load’…. and how much WEIGHT was onboard for that flight.
There ARE those photographs of Joy’s taken within 11-12 minutes of each other that include her now-famous picture of GM ‘finishing’ their hike… and THEN definitely showing Ranger 58 in the air over the south end of the fire… so there *MAY* yet be a way to ‘match these up’ with ACTUAL times that day.
I’ve always said that the key to discovering the EXACT time for Joy’s pictures that day relies on getting an EXACT ‘external’ time from some event that she photographed…. and either Marti’s new timing on the photo of the Blue Ridge Carrier ‘kicking up dust’ in the Sesame area OR those photos of Ranger 58 in the air could still be the ‘key’.
If the Helicopter was doing water drops there would be a start and stop time for the mission. The pilot might have kept notes on number of drops for gallons dropped but not much else. There should be records on the recon flights as I said that is a very strict requirement with names weights and time off and time back. closely monitored in case of a crash. If they are going to land they call and let the Heli base know and times are kept. You would think some one would have been through enough to request those records. Maybe something will turn up.
In their signed depositions.. the pilot and crew of DPS Chopper Ranger 58 said they were told they *might* be needed for ‘bucket drops’ that day… so they took the time to load Ranger 58 with the right Bambi bucket gear ( they put it in the back seat area for the flight to Yarnell ).
After arriving in Yarnell… they unloaded the Bambi bucket at the helibase prior to taking OPS1 Abel and OPS2 Musser up for their first ‘recon’ of the fire after the command of the fire officially transferred to Roy Hall at 10:21 and they officially BECAME OPS1 and OPS2.
After that first recon flight… Ranger 58 was told it would NOT be being used for any ‘bucket drops’ that day.
So there are no records like that… but I still would think they would have been officially ‘logging’ all hot/cold takeoffs ( and for what purpose ) that day.
I have been reviewing AZ Republics Yarnell Hill Fire Online Exhibit #1. It has some really interesting information and pictures.
According to this article.
At 1:48 there was an iphone alert text, Officials to Yarnell: evacuate
At 3:45, Michelle Lee encounters a highway patrol roadblock, on Az89 blocking access to Yarnell from the south. She was let through
At 4:43 Michelle Lee takes a photo looking west from Ranch House. This photo shows a helicopter (KA215?) flying on the southeast side of the fire.
At 1449 Lee tweets a photo captioned “even the firefighters are evacuating. This photo shows the same tall slender .white helmeted FF that is possibly connected to the Wickenberg truck. Also in this picture, The FF with Central Yavapai written on the back of his shirt is there and you can see that he is wearing chaps. Marty Cole’s lid of his camper top is open and a Red helmet FF is standing behind that truck, it looks like the same FF that first speaks to Willis in the Story photos.. There are 3 FF’s in this picture with clean shirts and BLUE pants. They appear different that any other FF’s due to the different colored pants.
At 7:28 the 20th FF is found and is fine. Hernandez?
calvin… I posted a longer response up above. That 1:48 iPhone text alert now being mentioned by Arizona Republic isn’t mentioned at all in their own comprehensive article about the ‘Evacuation Timeline’ they, themselves, previously published back in November.
Also… see post above with regards to some ‘questions’ I still have about Michelle Lee’s 4:49 tweet/photo. Since it’s a ‘Tweet’… we still don’t know exactly when she took the photo… but even if she managed to shoot the photo and ‘Twee it out’ all in the same minute ( 4:49 )… then where is the TRAFFIC JAM that SHOULD be seen there on Highway 89?
If that photo really was taken at 4:49 PM… then it doesn’t match Rick Tham’s photo taken just 120 seconds later at 4:51 PM showing a complete dead-stop traffic pileup right there in front of the Ranch House Restaurant.
I think I’ve found a way to get a relatively accurate time-stamp for Joy’s photos.
Something in her photos has not made any sense. She has two photos of Cougan Carothers’ truck up on the dozer line fairly early in a sequence. The sequence includes the dozer, the BR Sup truck, the two GM chase trucks, two trucks I still can’t identify, the Granite Mountain Buggies, and one Blue Ridge buggy driving in. That sequence wasn’t making sense, because I was assuming Cougan’s truck wouldn’t have been up there earlier than when he and Rance drove in around noonish.
So I was looking thru a bunch of Joy’s photos this morning and came back to this sequence. I realized that it’s very fortunate she shot that photo of the Blue Ridge buggy driving in.
Because, according to Ball’s and Papich’s photos, the Blue Ridge Buggies arrived at their parking spot near the Granite Mountain buggies around 10:30 in the morning.
That would mean at least two important things. I think we can fairly accurately (relatively speaking) finally find an anchor point for Joy’s photos. That photo of the Blue Ridge Buggy could be set to 10:30 AM. Since it reads 6:39:14 AM, we could just shift all her photos four hours forward (or 4 hours and 9 minutes for the exacting — but that might be too exact) and bingo, we have a more accurate framework for all of her photos.
That also means Cougan Carothers was up on the dozer line at 10:20 and 10:50 in the morning. Along with two other trucks I’ve never seen anywhere else. Another place where Rance’s narrative doesn’t correspond with the visual record. And since Cougan wasn’t interviewed by ADOSH, we don’t have a Cougan narrative.
So we can stamp the following photos also:
Two guys on the ridge: 7:29 AM
Helicopter pickup: 7:37 – 7:53 AM
Eric Marsh on the trail: 9:01 and 9:02 AM
Steed and Granite Mountain hiking: 9:55 and 9:57 AM
Granite Mountain working the hand line: 11:14 AM
Happy Belated Birthday, Joy!!!
I’m not sure all of that is correct.
I don’t think there’s any doubt that the picture Joy took of the Blue Ridge buggy ‘in motion’ had to have been it moving somewhere over in the Sesame area… since there is no evidence anyone ever dared take those heavy Crew Carriers out onto the ‘two-track’ that led WEST… but some of the times above still don’t seem quite right.
Remember… Former Yarnell Chief Peter Andersen is SURE that he saw the two GM crew carriers go by his house on Lakewood drive at exactly 8:03 AM that morning… at almost the exact moment Joy Collura says she is sure she first met Marsh out on the ridge ( at 8:07 AM… checked against her watch ).
If the ‘Steed and Granite Mountain hiking’ photo is to be stamped at
9:55 and 9:57 AM… then we are missing an HOUR somewhere.
It the GM buggies passes Andersen’s house at 8:03 then they probably could have arrived at that ‘parking spot’ out on Sesame in only another 5 to 7 minutes which puts them ‘out of the buggies and gearing up for the hike’ at 8:10 AM.
McDonough himself has said the ‘hike’ only took 45-50 minutes… so that would put the PHOTO of them hiking more in the 8:55 to 9:00 AM timeframe and not 9:55 or 9:57.
I really doubt it took them an HOUR to just actually ‘get it together’ to ‘gear up’ for the hike itself.
So I suppose this comes down to ‘who might be wrong’ with the ‘times’ they are ‘remembering’ from that day.
Could Blue Ridge have been an hour off on their esitmate as to when they
actually got out to Sesame ( remember… they ‘staged’ at the YFD parking lot as well and that’s where they actually talked to some of the Lewis DOC crew AS they were getting off the helicopters ).
I tend to trust Chief Andersen’s time of 8:03 because of the circumstances.
He, himself, had told Shumate that he better get people out there EARLY before the winds picked up… and when he didn’t see the GM buggies even heading out Lakewood until 8:03 AM he was sure to check his watch… and he says he shook his head in disgust when he saw the ‘real time’ that was happening. “They didn’t listen”…. was his next thought.
So, all that being taken seriously but put aside for the moment.
If the Blue Ridge Buggies arrived to park near the Granite Mountain Buggies (via BOTH Ball’s and McCord’s photos–I got it wrong, it’s McCord’s photos not Papich’s), no earlier than 10:30 AM, I can’t see how Joy’s photo of the Blue Ridge buggy, which her camera stamped at 6:39:14 AM, can be any earlier than 10:30-ish, unless BOTH Ball’s and McCord’s cameras (an iphone 4s and an iphone 4 respectively), are running an HOUR LATE, which they aren’t, as evidenced by ALL of their photos from the day.
According to Ball’s iphone 4, they didn’t even head into Glen Ilah until 10:22.
So, yeah, there’s a discrepancy somewhere, but I don’t think it’s in Ball’s and McCord’s cameras. They drove in and arrived about 10:30.
Ain’t it fun????
And PS if your interpretation is correct, that means Cougan was up there at 9:20 in the morning!! Hmmmmmmmm. Maybe we should ask him?
I just found a mistake. It’s the helicopter-related photos. I only added three hours instead of four.
So the correct sequence is:
Two guys on the ridge: 7:29 AM
Helicopter pickup: 8:37 – 8:53 AM
Eric Marsh on the trail: 9:01 and 9:02 AM
Steed and Granite Mountain hiking: 9:55 and 9:57 AM
Granite Mountain working the hand line: 11:14 AM
For reference Joy shot Boulder Springs Ranch at (according to my adjustment) 6:31 AM.
Still downloading and looking at more of her photos. Her camera definitely has some wonky patterns in it. Trying to figure them out.
Ok another couple of tidbits before I wrap this and wait for Joy to chime in.
So Anderson says he’s positive he saw the buggies at 8:03. Cordes says he led them in at 7.
Who knows who remembers what?
Joy has a photo of the DPS helicopter flying right over head at “6:08:48 AM.” It’s eleven minutes after her photo of the GM Hotshots hiking at “5:57: 25 AM.”
According to Clifford Brunsting, DPS Helicopter Pilot (via a very brief ADOSH telephone interview):
“At approximately 9:30 am he flew a recon flight around the fire. The fire was moving north and northwest. The wind was from the SE. He observed firefighters on the ground whom he assumed to be GMHS hiking from east to west along a jeep trail just below the ridgeline south of the active fire.”
I’d be willing to bet good money, all things considered, that he was flying over that ridge at about ten, right about when Joy took that photo of Granite Mountain doing, relatively speaking, exactly that.
Reply to Marti Reed post on July 5, 2014 at 7:34 pm
>> Marti said…
>>
>> Joy has a photo of the DPS helicopter flying right over head at
>> “6:08:48 AM.” It’s eleven minutes after her photo of the GM
>> Hotshots hiking at “5:57: 25 AM.”
>>
>> According to Clifford Brunsting, DPS Helicopter Pilot (via a very
>> brief ADOSH telephone interview):
>>
>> “At approximately 9:30 am he flew a recon flight around the fire.
>> The fire was moving north and northwest. The wind was from the
>> SE. He observed firefighters on the ground whom he assumed to
>> be GMHS hiking from east to west along a jeep trail just below the
>> ridgeline south of the active fire.”
>>
>> I’d be willing to bet good money, all things considered, that he was
>> flying over that ridge at about ten, right about when Joy took that
>> photo of Granite Mountain doing, relatively speaking, exactly that.
You might want to hang onto that ‘good money’ if you are going to base anything on those ADOSH Clifford Brunsting ADOSH phone interview notes.
The timeframes in those notes don’t even match what DPS Medic Eric Tarr and Clifford Brunsting said in their SIGNED depositions given to the SAIT… and they bear hardly any resemblance to when both OPS1 Todd Abel and OPS2 Paul Musser say these RECON flights took place.
The TIMES being reported by the parties involved for BOTH of the RECON flights that day has actually always been ‘all over the place’.
Here’s the 411 on that…
—————————————————————————–
** FIRST RECON FLIGHT ( With both Abel and Musser onboard )…
** PAUL MUSSER SAYS…
09:30 AM to a little after 10:00 AM – Briefing at ICP.
10:21 AM – Official fire command transfer from Shumate to Roy Hall.
10:45 AM – Takeoff
11:00 AM – Landing
** TODD ABEL SAYS…
10:45 AM – Takeoff
11:00 AM – Landing
** DPS Ranger 58 Medic Eric Tarr says…
SAIT document ‘M-Law-Enforcement-no-redactions’
08:52 AM – Ranger 58 arrives at LZ1 in Peeples Valley.
09:45 AM – OPS1 Abel and OPS2 Musser arrive for recon flight.
09:50 AM – Takeoff
10:10 AM – Landing
ADOSH Telephone interview ( notes )…
Mr. Tarr did not go on the morning recon flight.
** DPS Ranger 58 Pilot Clfford Brunsting says…
SAIT document ‘M-Law-Enforcement-no-redactions’
09:00 AM – Ranger 58 arrives at LZ1 in Peeples Valley
??:?? AM – Takeoff ( Brunsting only gives a LANDING time for recon 1 )
10:16 AM – Landing
ADOSH Telephone interview ( notes )…
At approximately 9:30 AM he flew a recon flight around the fire.
—————————————————————————–
** SECOND RECON FLIGHT ( WITH OPS1 ABEL ONLY )
** PAUL MUSSER SAYS…
Paul Musser did not go on the second RECON flight… only Abel…
but in his ADOSH interview Musser seems to suggest this SECOND
recon flight around NOON…
977 A: Fire became much more active prior to noon, 11:30 or thereabouts. Todd came
978 back down, said I’m gonna fly do you wanna go and I go no I got too much,
979 you – you take it.
980
981 Q2: Yeah.
982
983 A: And so he jumped in the helicopter, flew up, uh, the Double A Bar Ranch area,
984 Model Creek.
** TODD ABEL SAYS…
From Abel’s ADOSH interview…
Q1: All right. Then you fly for the second time 12:30, 1300. ( 12:30 PM / 1:00 PM )?
Todd Abel: Mm-hm. ( Confirms this 12:30 / 1:00 PM timeframe ).
** DPS Ranger 58 Medic Eric Tarr…
SAIT document ‘M-Law-Enforcement-no-redactions’
01:45 PM OPS1 Abel shows up at LZ2 and requests SECOND recon flight.
01:45 PM to 2:00 PM – AA ‘holds’ Ranger 58 on ground while tankers drop.
02:00 PM – Takeoff
02:30 PM – Landing
ADOSH Telephone interview ( notes )…
At approximately 2:30 pm, Mr. Tarr flew as a passenger during a recon flight with the Operations Chief. They flew around the north and east sides of the fire. He saw numerous firefighters on the north end of the fire near Peeples Valley but didn’t recall seeing anyone working the south side of the fire.
** DPS Ranger 58 Pilot Clfford Brunsting
SAIT document ‘M-Law-Enforcement-no-redactions’
At 1400 hours ( 2:00 PM ) I conducted another aerial recon with Operations occupying the left front seat of the helicopter and Officer Tarr in the right rear.
ADOSH Telephone interview ( notes )…
At approximately 2:30 pm he flew the Operations Chief around the north and east side of the fire to inspect fire progress.
—————————————————————————-
So this has always been a game of ‘follow the bouncing TIMES’ for BOTH of these recon flights.
It is VERY hard to say who is ‘getting this right’ in their testimony.
I would tend to trust the DPS officers… but then again… I believe it’s an absolute given that Abel and Musser didn’t do the FIRST recon until after that meeting at the ICP ( They were both THERE for the whole thing )… and not even until AFTER the ‘official command transfer’ took place at 10:21 AM… so that negates what the DPS guys are saying.
Followup… so not only are the actual TIMES being reported for these ‘recon flights’ basically ‘all over the place’ ( sometimes differing by more than an HOUR )… so is the testimony about what they actually SAW during that first recon flight.
DPS Medic Eric Tarr has the most detailed ‘testimony’ in his signed deposition that is in the SAIT FOIA/FOIL release… but Tarr didn’t fly on that first recon mission. Only DPS Ranger 58 pilot Clifford Brunsting did with OPS1 Todd Abel and OPS2 Paul Musser.
But even between the three of them… there is no real clarity as to what they actually SAW on the ground with regards to GM.
Yes… Brunsting thinks he ‘saw them hiking’… but this is not so clear when it comes to what Abel and Musser said they ‘saw’.
Actually… Musser and Abel are almost in complete agreement about what THEY saw ‘on the ground’… it simply doesn’t match what the pilot ‘thinks he saw.
Both Musser and Abel ( in separate ADOSH interviews ) reported seeing Granite Mountain about the same exact ‘100 to 200’ yards away from the ‘fireline’… but that just matches what we know about where GM was ‘working’ already and neither Abel or Musser say for sure they actually saw them hiking’. The only difference between their ( separate ) testimony about this is that Abel described seeing them ‘about 100 yards from the anchor’ and Musser said ‘about 100 to 200 yards from the fire’s edge’.
Nothing there about ‘actually seeing them hiking’ at that time… as the DPS pilot seems to think.
Matter of fact… in Musser’s ADOSH interview… they actually tried to nail him down about this and Musser seemed to think they had, in fact, already been ‘up there’ for some time before he saw them on the ground. Musser specifically describes how they had been ‘sent up there much earlier’ in order to get a start ‘before the winds picked up’ that day.
So even if the REAL ( EXACT ) time for this first recon flight could be nailed down… it would be hard to say that any of the testimony about ‘seeing Granite Mountain’ DURING that first recon flight could be directly tied to any of Joy’s pictures of them actually ‘finishing their 45-50 minute’ hike that morning.
WTKTT & INVESTIGATIVE MEDIA
May be I should have noted along time ago and have not seen any records mentioned about helicopter flight records.
My past and not knowing how the current things work I can note that helitack crews kept strict flight records on each mission and manifests of people flown and weights of equipment flown in or off the fire and times on a flight record sheet. This has always been Standard operating procedure. Were there any flight records released in the investigation? The Helitack crew for each Helicopter would have those records, as they are filed yearly and used as accomplishment data and part of the hourly pay data for the contract Helicopters. If those are available some where they would have some accurate times, people names and flight info.
Did the investigation even get a copy of those? Were they considered irrelevant to the investigation?
each MISSION WAS NOTED WITH TIME OFF AND TIME BACK AND WHAT THE MISSION WAS, MANAIFESTS OF NAMES AND WEIGHTS ARE ALSO KEPT.
Makes perfect sense ( and also what you would expect )… but I don’t recall seeing any such detailed ‘flight records’ in either the SAIR or ADOSH FOIA/FOIL releases.
Something to keep in mind is that DPS Ranger 58 was NOT a ‘fire chopper’ in the sense that it is owned/managed by YCSO Police… but I would imagine the same flight records ( or similar ) would be kept. Of course you want to know WHEN the chopper was flying, with WHO, and what ‘weight’ was onboard. What if there is a crash? Wouldn’t that be important information? I would think so.
The other thing to note is that the only reason DPS chopper Ranger 58 was tasked for recon when it first arrived in Yarnell was because the BLM chopper N14HX was actively busy at that moment flying the Lewis DOC crew out of the same anchor spot that GM was hiking to.
( Again… why they could not have coordinated these flights and flown Hotshots back OUT while they were flying the Lewis DOC crew OUT is a mystery… but such was the lack of communication that day. )
Whatever time Joy’s camera was stamping onto her photos… it’s pretty safe to say that they all remained ‘relative’ to each other that day ( unless her clock was also losing or gaining time all day )… and there is that ‘short’ time separation between when she shot her now-famous picture of GM actually ‘hiking’…. and then took a shot of DPS Ranger 58 ‘in the air’ shortly after that.
So these photos ( and the recon flight times ) *MAY* eventually match up… especially if those ‘flight records’ you speak of actually turn up.
If 58 was doing fire stuff they should have had helitack assigned. Helitack would have been doing manifests on each flight so there should be records they were probably not ask for by the investigation but I am sure could be requested thru freedom of info if they would shed light on any thing. You are right about flight coordination, why dead head flights? I believe all the helicopters were working out of one base or (Base heliport).
we proved my camera to be too squirrely and that we took photos throughout the day and each time taking photo of cell time and it came off with all kinds of odd times like it was 3pm but it came back 6:13am—it went like that all through the day so my time stamp area is broken due to a 15ft fall in a mine shaft—
On new phone. try. to reply. my mom was talkn on. cell 809am n she heard me talk to marsh. i talked. to pete on that. time ..this is too. difficult.type . Try from PC soon. terrible.
thank you Marti
In the video that John Maclean and Holly Neill point to to say that Marsh is saying “jump out at,” WHO is Marsh communicating with? Who do you guys think he is trying to speak with??
I posted a full reply to this ‘Question’… but it showed up above as a new ‘parent’ comment
instead of down here.
See the post above with timestamp / title…
WantsToKnowTheTruth says
July 12, 2014 at 4:41 pm
Reply to User ‘Question’s post July 5, 2014 at 9:47 am
It contains MY take on this… but others might have a better idea who was speaking to Marsh and Steed and asking them “What’s your status right now?” at exactly 4:13 PM.
Regardless of all the specific ‘words of the radio transmissions at that time… it is perfectly obvious that SOMEONE in ‘fire command’ was speaking directly to Marsh and Steed at 4:13 PM and ‘asking them questions’… which is right smack in the middle of when the SAIR says there was a ‘blackout’ and ‘no communications with the crew’.
And just because I think it’s REALLY important for people to see these overall fire behavior videos, here are the links to both my timelapse video of the fire just before during and after the deployment and WTKTT’s sped-up video “timelapses” of the fire throughout the afternoon, via the Panebaker Air Study Air to Air Channel videos:
My “Yarnell Fire Behavior Timelapse”:
http://youtu.be/6Il4vUrOYHU
WTKTT’s videos:
YouTube Account Page for: WantsToKnowTheTruth…
http://www.youtube.com/channel/UChknok8ZdSi8mPJ9nAK2L7A
Panebaker Air-To-Air Channel videos 6 times faster than normal…
1510-EP-X-6
1544-EP-X-6
1628-EP-X-6
1643-EP-X-6
1716-EP-X-6
Panebaker Air-To-Air Channel videos 35 times faster than normal…
1643-EP-X-35
I’m going to repost my vehicle timeline. I did that the other night, too, but it also vanished into the internet abyss.
VEHICLE TIMELINE
RHR tag indicates visibility in photos/videos of RHR parking lot after deployment.
Air2Air STARTS
1510: 2:48:31 (ends 3:10)
1544: 3:16:14 (ends 3:44)
1628: 3:47:58 (i.e.3:48) (ends 4:28)
1643: 4:30:50 (i.e. 4:31) (ends 4:43)
1716: 4:45:19 (ends 5:16)
SEEN BY AIR2AIR camera:
Red Dbl-cab Wickenberg:
1544+8:30 = 3:24:30 east/out
1544+27:27 = 3:43 west/in goes back into Model Creek area. Right about when Musser was supposedly with Gary Cordes and contacting Granite Mountain about commitment to the ridge.
1628+1752 = 4:06 east/out of Model Creek.
4:30 Minimart v/Rick Thams
RHR: RickTams-4:51, TomGarrigan-4:56 (? Rebel T3), ReasonVid, Story 5:07, Swartz-6:37, 6:38 and 6:44.
(Paul Musser?)
State Fire Panels: 1544+1 = 3:17 east and 1544+10:44 = 3:27 west
(ICP and Blues videos)
White Truck Pulling Big UTV: 1544+5:38 = 3:21:38 west (related to Bea Day?)
Blue Truck: 1628+3:22 = 3:51 east
RHR: Story 5:12:26
(Has to be Rance Marquez but makes almost nada sense to me.)
If Rance is telling the truth, his truck has to be heading east somewhere in the same video same time-ish as Darrell Willis — 1716 + 10 = 4:55, since his truck is in Story’s first pano at 5:12:26, four minutes after Willis appears. If he’s four minutes behind Willis, which fits his narrative, he would pass at 1716+14 = 4:59. And that video runs til 5:16. But there’s no blue Rance truck in that video.
Also, if he’s telling the truth, Cougan’s truck would have to be there/then too, but that wouldn’t work. Cougan’s probably-just-pulled-in truck is in the Reason video, around 4:45-4:50 (actually no earlier than 4:56 via BLM Engine), so Cougan would have had to have passed the video camera about 4:30 the same time as Coles (1643+1:25 = 4:31:20), the Black Ram (1643+2:47 = 4:34), and the BLM Engine and it’s accompanying white pickup (1716+:6 = 4:46). I suppose he could have passed the video before it started. But none of this timeline fits Rance’s story.
I have seen neither of these trucks in either of these required times in the Air2Air video.
StateFire: 1628+6 = 3:54 east
RHR: Rich Tham 4:51, thru Tom Story
(who??)
(another with a rack passes west at 1628+35:39 = 4:24)
(my last comment about this/Byron on June 16 was that I was beginning to think this might be Byron’s truck. doesn’t match his story, tho. but parts of his story don’t make sense anyway).
Prescott FD SUV: 1510 = 2:48:31 west and 1628+9:42 = 3:58 east
RHR Story 1692 5:12:26 just id’d it
(Tony Sciacca)
PrescottThreeTeam: (from PB 1616VLAT split)
ClawsonTowingATV: + 8 sec = 4:13
HulburgTowingATV: +11 sec
Yowell: + 19 sec
BLM Dan Philbin: 1628+36 = 4:14
RHR Story 5:08, Swartz 6:44.
StateFire IncidentManageTeam: 1628+40 = 4:28 east
RHR Story 5:06
(who??)
White Tacoma “Fire”: 1643+1:25 = 4:31:20 east
RHR: Rick Thams 4:51, Reason Video, Story 5:06.
(Marty Cole)
Black Ram Match: 1643+2:47 = 4:34 east
RHR: Swartz 6:38:10 and 6:44:21
(who??)
WhiteTruck BLM Engine Companion 1716+:6 = 4:46 east
BLM Engine: 1716+ :11 = 4:46 east
I just realized if the BLM crew passed the camera at 4:46 they couldn’t possibly have made it to the 89/RHR any earlier than (if it took Willis 12:27 to do it abt the same time-ish at about 23 mph) than 4:58. So Reason video has to be about 4:56-4:58. Ok they could have maybe done it faster than Darrell, but not by a lot, judging by the traffic.
Prescott FD NoLightsOnTop: 1716+10 = 4:55 east
RHR: Story 5:08 Swartz
(Darrell Willis)
So according to WTK on June 8, the time between Willis passing the cam and pulling up to the RHR (at 5:08) is 12:27. At avg 23 mph.
White USFS 1716+23 = 5:08 east
Grey Dbl-cab “Fire”: 1716+25 = 5:10 east
(Todd Abel)
RHR: Swartz 6:44
And then I said:
“The narrative of all of what happened via/out of that Ranch House Restaurant Parking Lot has never been written and I believe it’s extremely important.
And I’m seriously troubled by the fact that Rance Marquez’ narrative, which he so carefully put together for the ADOSH interview, isn’t supported by the visual evidence. Maybe that’s just “the fog of war.” But it’s just not “making science” to me.”
And then WTKTT said he thought the State Fire truck with the EMT panels in the back might be Tyson Esquibel’s.
So I said:
“That white State Fire truck goes east by the videocam at 3:54 PM. So it can’t be Tyson.
I’ve always thought Tyson was driving the big Glendale Special Ops van with the gold stripe. It’s out at the Youth Camp in one of the Blue Ridge photos. And that’s what he meant by “his pickup.” It was extremely specially outfitted for hazardous EMT kinds of stuff.
It was dispatched that morning, and, I think, assigned to him. He had to catch a ride to the fire (don’t have the dispatch stuff open atm) with somebody else.”
So now that we’re gathering back around the new campfire, I have a question that’s been bugging me for awhile. I carefully wrote it up two nights ago and it disappeared into the internet abyss as soon as I posted it. So I”ll try to recreate it.
In two collections of photos there is a TRAILER PARK being evacuated. I can’t figure out where/what this trailer park is.
One set of photos is from the original Forest Service Photos and Videos folder. They’re taken with a DROID RAZR HD. Unfortunately no geocoding attached to them.
IMG_20130630_150521_827.jpg 3:05:21 PM. Incident Command Center/Model Creek School.
IMG_20130630_152323_422.jpg 3:23:23 PM. Trailer Park.
IMG_20130630_152333_400.jpg 3:23:32 PM. Trailer Park
IMG_20130630_152524_456.jpg 3:25:24 PM. Trailer Park
IMG_20130630_152848_948.jpg 3:28:48 PM. Two of the three Bea Day Prescott Three Crew’s trucks. I think it looks pretty much like where the “Blues Video” crew captured them in their video.
Problem is, I can’t find a trailer park anywhere near the ICP that looks like that via Google Earth.
Second set of photos is from Sean Krinner’s collection. And they have no time stamps.
IMAG0604.jpg
IMAG0610.jpg
IMAG0613.jpg (with a VLAT drop overhead)
IMAG0615.jpg
IMAG0616.jpg
Sean provides a ReadMe text in the folder and it labels all these photos “Mountainair.” It doesn’t say when they were taken.
Some people, including the Yarnell/Peeples Valley Chamber of Commerce (I found by googling), call the Mini-Mart on 89 the Mountain Aire Mini Mart. But I didn’t find any trailer parks around it that look like the one in the photos on Google Earth.
And, although the DROID RAZR HD user could have gotten from the ICP over there in order to take his photos in that time framework, how could he have then shot the Prescott Three trucks three minutes later over near the ICP?
So does anybody know where/what that trailer park that was evacuated is?
**
** THE MOUNTAIN AIRE TRAILER / RV PARK
Reply to Marti Reed post on July 4, 2014 at 6:20 pm
>> Marti said…
>> So now that we’re gathering back around the new campfire, I have a question that’s
>> been bugging me for awhile.
>> In two collections of photos there is a TRAILER PARK being evacuated.
>> I can’t figure out where/what this trailer park is.
>>
>> Second set of photos is from Sean Krinner’s collection. And they have no time stamps.
>>
>> IMAG0604.jpg
>> IMAG0610.jpg
>> IMAG0613.jpg (with a VLAT drop overhead)
>> IMAG0615.jpg
>> IMAG0616.jpg
>>
>> Sean provides a ReadMe text in the folder and it labels all these photos “Mountainair.”
>> I*t doesn’t say when they were taken.
>>
>> Some people, including the Yarnell/Peeples Valley Chamber of Commerce (I found
>> by googling), call the Mini-Mart on 89 the Mountain Aire Mini Mart. But I didn’t find any
>> trailer parks around it that look like the one in the photos on Google Earth.
>>
>> So does anybody know where/what that trailer park that was evacuated is?
Didn’t see any ‘replies’ to this so here’s my take on this.
You WERE looking in the right place…. it’s just ‘hard to spot’.
That ‘Mountain Aire Mini Mart’ is also the location of this ‘Mountain Aire RV/Trailer Park’.
Problem is… it’s not much of a ‘trailer park’ at all.
They just let some people park RVs and Trailers behind the Mini-Mart along the western fence of the property…
…but it’s the only thing that could be construed to be a ‘Trailer Park’ around there, as far as I know.
Address is…
19364 Hwy 89, Peeples Valley
It is 1,606 feet south of where Hays Ranch Road meets Highway 89.
GPS coordinates would be…
34.267666, -112.727258
From Yarnell / Peeples Valley Chamber of Commerce site…
http://www.y-pvchamber.com/mountaintown/YarnellShop.htm
Mountain Aire Mini Mart, RV Park & Laundry
19364 Hwy 89, Peeples Valley
928-427-6459
Open Daily 6am to 9pm
Only real mention of this ‘Trailer Park’ by name ( but even then incorrectly spelled ) was in Roy Hall’s interview with SAIT investigators…
Page 29 of YIN document ( of 60 pages )…
16:00 – South Yarnell evacuation began with a focus around Mountainair trailer Park.
That actually doesn’t make all that much sense… since I wouldn’t consider a place that’s only 1,606 feet south of where Hays Ranch Road meets Highway 89 to be ‘South Yarnell’… but maybe Roy Hall did.
Marti. Just in case you missed it. You asked which vehicle I thought Rick Tham was driving and I answered I thought that he was driving the dark red Toyota Tacoma that he captures in several of his own photos and I think it is the same truck that passes by at the very beginning of the Russ Reason video.
Also. At the very beginning of the Russ Reason video it appears that the tall slender FF in the white helmet is having a discussion with one or more others behind the Red Wickenberg fire truck. He is then seen walking over to join the others
I was really hoping some WFF’s (like SR, TTWARE, fullsail, and Mr. Powers) would weigh in with their opinions concerning the safety zone and other things concerning the videos taken by Trenton Snyder at the Ash Creek fire 2012 that WTK created a direct link to earlier this week.
Thanks Calvin, I had caught that about that red truck. I think you’re right. The reason I said it “didn’t sync” was because I didn’t realize you meant the first truck in the video. You can’t see who comes before it. So his camera says the photo is at 4:51:19 AM. Other than it being AM instead of PM, I think that timestamp is pretty accurate. So this video might be a minute or two (depending on the not-speed of the traffic) later.
And I think you may be right about that being Musser walking out from behind the red truck. I don’t know if you caught where I wrote that I didn’t realize Musser was really a tall thin guy until I saw that overhead photo of the procession where the tall thin guy holding his white cowboy hat is standing out in front of the red Wickenburg truck. Perspective can be such a beast.
That throws a few other things I thought I had figured out into the “not figured out” collection. Which is kind of a daily experience!
The following online article is the only place I’ve ever found any actual
pictures of Paul Musser.
The ‘default’ picture that comes up with the article is a ‘head shot’ and Musser definitely has YACM ( Yet Another Cowboy Mustache )… but there is ANOTHER picture of him attached to the articles showing him STANDING next to a fireline down in Australia… which is what the article is about.
That SECOND picture is up at the top of the page above the picture that shows as a default and right under the ‘Like Us On Facebook’ ICON.
I wouldn’t characterize Musser as ‘tall and thin at all’…. but that photo was taken several years ago.
Arizona Daily Sun
March 09, 2003 11:00 pm
Local man fights fire in Australian Outback
By TAYLOE McCONNELL- Sun Staff
http://azdailysun.com/local-man-fights-fire-in-australian-outback/article_09b94202-9c72-5ce6-a92b-acb3d17f5169.html
Default photo that appears at first…
( Photo of Paul Musser with a Red Helmet )
Photo caption…
Courtesy Photo: Hot Shot Firefighter, Paul Musser, stands in front
of the large fire him and his team were fighting in Australia.
Forgot to be clear… that SECOND picture of Musser attached to the article that shows him STANDINDING is CLICKABLE. Just click it to see the LARGE version.
Yes, I’ve seen all of these.
And what I’m finding relatively conclusive (in terms of body size/proportion) is the photo from the original Forest Service Photos folder. IMG_0605.JPG
It’s shot from above the procession in Yarnell on Monday. It’s really a great pano-composition of a number of important elements.
It includes the red Wickenburg truck, with, above it, a tall thin man holding that white cowboy hat. His head is bowed. That has to be the man connected to that truck. And therefore I think it’s Paul Musser.
It also includes Willis’ truck, Rance’s truck, Cougan’s truck, the black chrome-handled truck, and the big engine staged at the Ranch House Restaurant (all day Sunday, I think)
This photo:
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/y3jy5opssrcvzb3/AABYpn4gaMH0ASlDsxVCEdUca/AZFS%20photos%20videos/IMG_0605.JPG
**
** THE BLUE RIDGE GPS TRACKING DATA WITH COMPLETE LAT/LONG COORDINATES
I’ve been looking for a good moment to post the following information so that it is completely PUBLIC and available to all… and this ‘start of a new chapter’ seemed like a good place. It will get ‘pushed down’ as other comments appear and won’t interfere with any active ‘conversations’… but will still be here and available to anyone interested.
One of the problems with the GPS Tracking Data from Blue Ridge Hotshot Trueheart Brown’s GPS unit is that the SAIT only released a VIDEO of the ‘tracking’… and not the ‘raw data’ itself.
Well… here is that video converted BACK to the RAW DATA as if it was downloaded from the GPS unit itself. It contains full Latitude and Longitude coordinates for every 60 second update all day long. For people who know how to do it… this ‘raw data’ can now be easily converted into CSV file and ‘imported’ into any standard tracking software or even directly into ‘Google Earth’ as a TOUR file… so that all the Blue Ridge movements can be seen in full ‘Three Dimensions’.
This ‘raw data’ can also be easily converted into a ‘Google Earth’ KML file… since there are now Lat/Long coordinates available for every 60 second update.
HOW TO CONVERT LAT/LONG DATA TO A GOOGLE EARTH KML DATA FILE
http://batchgeo.com/features/google-earth-kml/
Apologies for the LENGTH of this ‘data dump’… but it’s important information that hasn’t
been available yet and needs to be sitting in a PUBLIC place ( like RIGHT HERE ).
** MASTER LIST – BLUE RIDGE GPS TRACKING DATA – MASTER LIST
Here are the GPS tracking updates with full Latitude and Longitude coordinates for each ‘move’ as well as ‘Distance traveled’ ( in feet ) and the corresponding travel rate between ‘moves’ as ‘Miles Per Hour’.
NOTE: The Blue Ridge GPS tracking video starts at 1100 but the ‘blue dot’ tracking pointer doesn’t actually appear until 1110.
* LEGEND FOR ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THE ‘DESCRIPTION’ FIELD(S)…
YC = Youth Camp
SA = Sesame Area, where GM Crew Vehicles were parked
CR = Cutover Trail, the EAST-WEST trail that connected SA to Shrine Rd.
BR = Blue Ridge ( Hotshots )
GM = Granite Mountain ( Hotshots )
SJS = St. Joseph Shrine (on Shrine Road). Where Helmet-cam video was shot.
BSR = Boulder Springs Ranch
* DATA COLUMNS:
Time – Latitude, Longitude – Distance traveled (feet) – Rate (mph) – Description
* THE FULL TRACKING DATA
1100 – BLUE RIDGE GPS TRACKING VIDEO STARTS
1101 – 1109 – VIDEO is running but tracking pointer doesn’t appear until 1110
1110 – 34.231428, -112.782608 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Pointer appears near old-grader
1111 – 34.231428, -112.782608 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1112 – 34.231464, -112.782528 – 0023.050 – 00.26 – Slight movement east on two-track
1113 – 34.231464, -112.782528 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1114 – 34.231311, -112.783531 – 0343.066 – 03.90 – Back west to old-grader itself
1115 – 34.231362, -112.783678 – 0054.318 – 00.62 – Slight movement to west of old-grader
1116 – 34.231309, -112.783705 – 0018.698 – 00.21 – Slight movement south in grader clearing
1117 – 34.231309, -112.783705 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1118 – 34.231309, -112.783705 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1119 – 34.231309, -112.783705 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1120 – 34.231309, -112.783705 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1121 – 34.231309, -112.783705 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1122 – 34.231309, -112.783705 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1123 – 34.231367, -112.783689 – 0024.364 – 00.28 – Slight movement back north
1124 – 34.231648, -112.784110 – 0163.805 – 01.85 – Headed northwest on jeep trail away from grader
1125 – 34.231955, -112.784979 – 0339.999 – 03.85 – Continuing northwest on jeep trail
1126 – 34.232284, -112.785290 – 0143.944 – 01.64 – Still headed northwest on jeep trail
1127 – 34.232603, -112.785602 – 0161.395 – 01.83 – Still headed northwest on jeep trail
1128 – 34.232603, -112.785602 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1129 – 34.233197, -112.786809 – 0434.956 – 04.94 – Still headed northwest on jeep trail
1130 – 34.233255, -112.787624 – 0249.851 – 02.84 – Still on jeep trail, now headed more westerly
1131 – 34.233091, -112.788166 – 0176.292 – 02.00 – Still on jeep trail, now headed west
1132 – 34.233091, -112.788166 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1133 – 34.233202, -112.787822 – 0115.505 – 01.31 – Now headed back east on jeep trail
1134 – 34.233277, -112.787340 – 0145.492 – 01.65 – Back east on jeep trail
1135 – 34.233140, -112.786701 – 0227.090 – 02.58 – Now headed southeast on jeep trail
1136 – 34.232476, -112.785451 – 0439.727 – 05.00 – Still headed southwest back towards old-grader
1137 – 34.231348, -112.783676 – 0737.133 – 08.38 – Arrival back at western edge of grader clearing
1138 – 34.230780, -112.782903 – 0414.637 – 04.70 – Past grader, back to main two-track, then south
1139 – 34.229727, -112.782962 – 0413.506 – 04.69 – Still headed south on two-track
1140 – 34.228671, -112.782876 – 0395.696 – 04.49 – Still headed south on two-track
1141 – 34.227811, -112.782962 – 0305.242 – 03.47 – Still headed south on two-track
1142 – 34.226398, -112.783456 – 0584.841 – 06.64 – Still headed south on two-track ( to anchor pt.)
1143 – 34.225795, -112.783450 – 0236.614 – 02.68 – Still headed south on two-track
1144 – 34.225107, -112.784395 – 0345.736 – 03.92 – Still headed to anchor point, climbing to west
1145 – 34.225152, -112.785468 – 0373.750 – 04.24 – Still climbing west up to anchor point
1146 – 34.224704, -112.786186 – 0318.112 – 03.61 – At two-track junction ( Mystery panel location )
1147 – 34.225072, -112.786514 – 0178.261 – 02.03 – Heading north on two-track toward anchor point
1148 – 34.225715, -112.787088 – 0331.968 – 03.76 – Heading north on two-track toward anchor point
1149 – 34.225258, -112.787452 – 0195.187 – 02.22 – Heading north on two-track toward anchor point
1150 – 34.224872, -112.787951 – 0240.243 – 02.73 – Heading north on two-track toward anchor point
1151 – 34.225387, -112.788166 – 0210.341 – 02.41 – Heading north on two-track toward anchor point
1152 – 34.226309, -112.788616 – 0395.360 – 04.50 – Heading north on two-track toward anchor point
1153 – 34.226977, -112.789528 – 0401.875 – 04,57 – At anchor point. face-to-face with Marsh/Steed
1154 – 34.226977, -112.789528 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1155 – 34.226977, -112.789528 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1156 – 34.226977, -112.789528 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1157 – 34.226977, -112.789528 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1158 – 34.226977, -112.789528 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1159 – 34.226977, -112.789528 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1200 – 34.226977, -112.789528 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1201 – 34.226977, -112.789528 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1202 – 34.226977, -112.789528 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1203 – 34.226977, -112.789528 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1204 – 34.226977, -112.789528 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1205 – 34.226977, -112.789528 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1206 – 34.226977, -112.789528 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1207 – 34.226977, -112.789528 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1208 – 34.226977, -112.789528 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1209 – 34.226977, -112.789528 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1210 – 34.226977, -112.789528 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1211 – 34.226977, -112.789528 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1212 – 34.226977, -112.789528 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1213 – 34.226977, -112.789528 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1214 – 34.226977, -112.789528 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1215 – 34.226977, -112.789528 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1216 – 34.226977, -112.789528 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1217 – 34.226977, -112.789528 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1218 – 34.226977, -112.789528 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1219 – 34.226977, -112.789528 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1220 – 34.226977, -112.789528 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1221 – 34.226977, -112.789528 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1222 – 34.226977, -112.789528 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1223 – 34.226977, -112.789528 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1224 – 34.226977, -112.789528 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1225 – 34.227216, -112.790698 – 0448.106 – 05.09 – Slight move north on two-track
1226 – 34.226932, -112.790086 – 0214.886 – 02.44 – Slight move south on two-track
1227 – 34.226507, -112.788713 – 0567.084 – 06.44 – Heading south down two-track quickly now
1228 – 34.225460, -112.788144 – 0435.904 – 04.95 – South on two-track
1229 – 34.224830, -112.787833 – 0298.186 – 03.39 – South on two-track
1230 – 34.225717, -112.787104 – 0406.622 – 04.62 – South on two-track
1231 – 34.225185, -112.786546 – 0330.076 – 03.76 – South on two-track
1232 – 34.224704, -112.786186 – 0208.207 – 02.37 – At two-track junction again. ( Mystery panel )
1233 – 34.225025, -112.785001 – 0477.361 – 05.42 – East on two-track back towards old-grader
1234 – 34.225877, -112.783424 – 0585.917 – 06.66 – North on two-track back towards old-grader
1235 – 34.227881, -112.782887 – 0788.222 – 08.96 – North on two-track back towards old-grader
1236 – 34.229185, -112.782823 – 0493.748 – 05.61 – North on two-track back towards old-grader
1237 – 34.230037, -112.783016 – 0315.424 – 03.58 – North on two-track back towards old-grader
1238 – 34.231093, -112.782823 – 0396.879 – 04.51 – North on two-track back towards old-grader
1239 – 34.231255, -112.782807 – 0058.155 – 00.66 – Dropping Brendan off at junction(s) near grader
1240 – 34.231729, -112.782066 – 0289.510 – 03.29 – Headed back east on two-track now
1241 – 34.231729, -112.782066 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary ( Actual Brendan drop-off ? )
1242 – 34.232146, -112.781122 – 0313.797 – 03.57 – Headed back east on two-track again
1243 – 34.232634, -112.779744 – 0542.970 – 06.17 – Headed back east on two-track (quicker now)
1244 – 34.231862, -112.777137 – 0877.644 – 09.97 – Headed back east on two-track (2nd fastest leg)
1245 – 34.231827, -112.775672 – 0454.562 – 05.17 – Headed back east on two-track
1246 – 34.230968, -112.776117 – 0425.362 – 04.83 – Scouting – South on jeep trail that leads to BSR
1247 – 34.231412, -112.776622 – 0222.799 – 02.53 – Scouting – North on jeep trail towards two-track
1248 – 34.231751, -112.774476 – 0997.328 – 11.33 – East on two-track again ( fastest leg back )
1249 – 34.231720, -112.773140 – 0411.440 – 04.68 – At intersection of two-track and Sesame area
1250 – 34.232736, -112.773864 – 0432.462 – 04.91 – Scouting – Heading north now in Sesame area
1251 – 34.233667, -112.774465 – 0400.318 – 04.55 – Scouting – Still heading north in Sesame area
1252 – 34.234736, -112.774202 – 0414.505 – 04.71 – Scouting – Still heading north in Sesame area
1253 – 34.234847, -112.774213 – 0032.757 – 00.37 – Scouting – Sesame area, Harper Canyon trail
1254 – 34.235313, -112.776176 – 0654.938 – 07.44 – Scouting – Heading northwest now
1255 – 34.236776, -112.777587 – 0872.651 – 09.91 – Scouting – At point pack trail intersects road
1256 – 34.236512, -112.779336 – 0534.863 – 06.08 – Scouting – Now where pack trail meets jeep trail
1257 – 34.237470, -112.780935 – 0611.235 – 06.95 – Scouting – Heading northwest now on jeep trail
1258 – 34.238419, -112.781342 – 0374.295 – 04.25 – Scouting – Still heading northwest on jeep trail
1259 – 34.238925, -112.781503 – 0196.041 – 02.23 – Scouting – Still heading northwest on jeep trail
1300 – 34.238925, -112.781503 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Scouting – Stationary
1301 – 34.239297, -112.781653 – 0135.356 – 01.54 – Scouting – Slight movement NW on jeep trail
1302 – 34.241184, -112.783692 – 0940.218 – 10.68 – Scouting – Still heading northwest on jeep trail
1303 – 34.241708, -112.784126 – 0248.019 – 02.82 – Scoutinig – Still heading northwest on jeep trail
1304 – 34.241908, -112.784330 – 0091.059 – 01.03 – Scouting – Still heading northwest on jeep trail
1305 – 34.242077, -112.784427 – 0079.942 – 00.91 – Scouting – Still heading northwest on jeep trail
1306 – 34.242603, -112.784003 – 0214.172 – 02.43 – Scouting – Still heading northwest on jeep trail
1307 – 34.243326, -112.784041 – 0282.383 – 03.21 – Scouting – Still heading northwest on jeep trail
1308 – 34.244351, -112.784277 – 0381.485 – 04.34 – Scouting – Still heading northwest on jeep trail
1309 – 34.244129, -112.784110 – 0094.040 – 01.07 – Scouting – Now heading back SE on jeep trail
1310 – 34.243340, -112.784019 – 0293.513 – 03.34 – Scouting – Heading back southeast on jeep trail
1311 – 34.242284, -112.784266 – 0420.679 – 04.78 – Scouting – Heading back southeast on jeep trail
1312 – 34.242120, -112.784384 – 0079.623 – 00.90 – Scouting – Heading back southeast on jeep trail
1313 – 34.241703, -112.784126 – 0182.734 – 02.19 – Scouting – Heading back southeast on jeep trail
1314 – 34.241450, -112.783885 – 0129.096 – 01.47 – Scouting – Heading back southeast on jeep trail
1315 – 34.241171, -112.783687 – 0105.445 – 01.20 – Scouting – Heading back southeast on jeep trail
1316 – 34.240896, -112.783520 – 0120.376 – 01.37 – Scouting – Heading back southeast on jeep trail
1317 – 34.240896, -112.783520 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Scouting – Stationary
1318 – 34.240896, -112.783520 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Scouting – Stationary
1319 – 34.240896, -112.783520 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Scouting – Stationary
1320 – 34.240896, -112.783520 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Scouting – Stationary
1321 – 34.240896, -112.783520 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Scouting – Stationary
1322 – 34.240701, -112.783322 – 0103.488 – 01.18 – Scouting – Heading back southeast on jeep trail
1323 – 34.240116, -112.782308 – 0369.266 – 04.20 – Scouting – Heading back southeast on jeep trail
1324 – 34.238428, -112.781332 – 0677.421 – 07.70 – Scouting – Heading back southeast on jeep trail
1325 – 34.236761, -112.779733 – 0840.575 – 09.55 – Scouting – At clearing -pack trail meets jeep jail
1326 – 34.236785, -112.777759 – 0636.469 – 07.23 – East on pack trail
1327 – 34.235863, -112.777582 – 0411.755 – 04.68 – Southwest on same road used before
1328 – 34.235233, -112.776021 – 0580.865 – 06.60 – Southwest on same road
1329 – 34.234820, -112.774202 – 0596.741 – 06.78 – Intersect Sesame area and Harper Canyon trail
1330 – 34.233304, -112.774251 – 0601.540 – 06.84 – Heading south in top of Sesame area
1331 – 34.231827, -112.773145 – 0628.907 – 07.15 – South Sesame area few yards north BR SupTruck
1332 – 34.231680, -112.773011 – 0087.664 – 01.00 – Now back where BR Supt Truck is parked
1333 – 34.231809, -112.773172 – 0097.417 – 01.11 – Slight movement back north near BR Supt Truck
1334 – 34.231809, -112.773172 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1335 – 34.231809, -112.773172 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1336 – 34.231809, -112.773172 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1337 – 34.231809, -112.773172 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1338 – 34.231809, -112.773172 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1339 – 34.231809, -112.773172 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1340 – 34.231130, -112.772432 – 0356.524 – 04.05 – Heading south in the Sesame area
1341 – 34.230084, -112.771627 – 0453.155 – 05.15 – Heading south in the Sesame area
1342 – 34.228589, -112.770667 – 0679.493 – 07.72 – Top of clearing, right near GM Crew Carriers
1343 – 34.228589, -112.770667 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1344 – 34.228589, -112.770667 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1345 – 34.228589, -112.770667 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1346 – 34.228589, -112.770667 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1347 – 34.228589, -112.770667 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1348 – 34.228589, -112.770667 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1349 – 34.228589, -112.770667 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1350 – 34.228589, -112.770667 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1351 – 34.228589, -112.770667 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1352 – 34.228589, -112.770667 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1353 – 34.228589, -112.770667 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1354 – 34.228589, -112.770667 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary ( very slight movement north )
1355 – 34.228589, -112.770667 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary ( very slight movement back south )
1356 – 34.228070, -112.769449 – 0419.997 – 04.77 – Heading south again in Sesame area
1357 – 34.226560, -112.765753 – 1297.350 – 14.74 – Heading south in Sesame area ( fastest speed )
1358 – 34.226240, -112.763597 – 0943.254 – 10.72 – Now heading east on cutover trail
1359 – 34.226187, -112.764444 – 0252.592 – 02.87 – Now heading back west on cutover trail
1400 – 34.224342, -112.764616 – 0857.421 – 09.74 – South in Sesame area towards Lakewd/Manza
1401 – 34.221778, -112.763554 – 0998.857 – 11.35 – At residence where BR trucks staged morning
1402 – 34.221778, -112.763554 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1403 – 34.221778, -112.763554 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1404 – 34.221778, -112.763554 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1405 – 34.221778, -112.763554 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1406 – 34.221778, -112.763554 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1407 – 34.221778, -112.763554 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1408 – 34.221778, -112.763554 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1409 – 34.221778, -112.763554 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1410 – 34.221104, -112.760539 – 1062.780 – 12.08 – Heading SE on Manzanita Dr. through Glen Ilah
1411 – 34.215909, -112.758694 – 2082.420 – 23.66 – Heading SE on Manzanita Dr. through Glen Ilah
1412 – 34.213288, -112.755260 – 1784.310 – 20.28 – At the Ranch House Restaurant on Highway 89
1413 – 34.218997, -112.749188 – 2997.450 – 34.06 – Heading north on Highway 89, through Yarnell
1414 – 34.226449, -112.743266 – 3256.900 – 37.01 – Heading north on Highway 89, through Yarnell
1415 – 34.232551, -112.738631 – 2600.630 – 29.55 – Heading north on Highway 89, past Yarnell now
1416 – Off the map
1417 – Off the map
1418 – Off the map
1419 – Off the map
1420 – Off the map
1421 – Off the map
1422 – Off the map
1423 – Off the map
1424 – Off the map
1425 – Off the map
1426 – Off the map
1427 – Off the map
1428 – Off the map
1429 – Off the map
1430 – Off the map
1431 – Off the map
1432 – Off the map
1433 – Off the map
1434 – Off the map
1435 – 34.228436, -112.741292 – ????.??? – ??.?? – Coming back south on Highway 89 now
1436 – 34.222510, -112.746763 – 2870.650 – 32.62 – At intersection of Highway 89 and Shrine Road
1437 – 34.225934, -112.750797 – 1714.000 – 19.48 – Heading northwest on Shrine Road
1438 – 34.228116, -112.753694 – 0833.260 – 09.47 – At the St. Joseph Shrine parking lot.
1439 – 34.229895, -112.755486 – 1327.730 – 15.09 – At vehicle staging area inside Youth Camp
1440 – 34.229895, -112.755486 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1441 – 34.229895, -112.755486 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1442 – 34.229895, -112.755486 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1443 – 34.229895, -112.755486 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1444 – 34.228423, -112.754166 – 0711.038 – 08.08 – Back east at entrance to Youth Camp
1445 – 34.226107, -112.751248 – 1266.020 – 14.39 – Heading SE on Shrine Road towards Hwy 89
1446 – 34.223623, -112.748061 – 1368.490 – 15.55 – Near intersection of Shrine Rd and Willow Lane
1447 – 34.224333, -112.746946 – 0413.101 – 04.68 – Northeast on Willow Ln, at Flora May Park now
1448 – 34.224265, -112.745454 – 0670.989 – 07,62 – At Hwy 89 again having exited via Park area
1449 – 34.229713, -112.740240 – 2601.660 – 29.56 – Heading north on 89, just past Young Ln. now.
1450 – Off the map
1451 – Off the map
1452 – 34.235049, -112.737483 – ????.??? – ??.?? – Coming back south on Highway 89 again
1453 – 34.226715, -112.742987 – 3420.800 – 38.87 – Still heading south on Highway 89
1454 – 34.226240, -112.745851 – 1330.800 – 15.12 – Took right off 89 onto Shady Way. At west end.
1455 – 34.226267, -112.746774 – 0320.260 – 03.64 – Short probe west on Shady Way. Dead end.
1456 – 34.225052, -112.744596 – 0905.486 – 10.29 – Exited Shady Way. Heading south on 89 again.
1457 – 34.217205, -112.751055 – 3482.380 – 39.57 – South on Highway 89, through Yarnell
1458 – 34.213035, -112.755926 – 2397.370 – 27.24 – Took a right off 89 onto Lakewood. West now.
1459 – 34.216562, -112.758801 – 1667.170 – 18.95 – Heading NW on Lakewood through Glen Ilah
1500 – 34.221619, -112.762030 – 2327.180 – 26.44 – At point Lakewood/Manzanita become dirt
1501 – 34.222878, -112.764165 – 0990.488 – 11.26 – Heading north in the Sesame area now
1502 – 34.225903, -112.765335 – 1196.550 – 13.60 – At point Cutover Trail meets Sesame Area
1503 – 34.226631, -112.761794 – 1162.930 – 13.22 – Heading east now on Cutover Trail
1504 – 34.227074, -112.758157 – 1292.340 – 14.69 – Still heading east on Cutover Trail
1505 – 34.228822, -112.756505 – 0973.053 – 11.06 – Still heading east on Cutover Trail
1506 – 34.228981, -112.755700 – 0473.325 – 05.38 – Right on Shrine road, heading to Youth Camp
1507 – 34.228458, -112.754155 – 0457.853 – 05.20 – At entrance to Youth Camp on Shrine Road
1508 – 34.228458, -112.754155 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary at entrance to Youth Camp (YC)
1509 – 34.228458, -112.754155 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary at entrance to YC
1510 – 34.228276, -112.753941 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary at entrance to YC
1511 – 34.228276, -112.753941 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary at entrance to YC
1512 – 34.230263, -112.757267 – 1334.500 – 15.16 – NW corner of YC
1513 – 34.229713, -112.756923 – 0204.331 – 02.32 – SOUTH on YC property.
1514 – 34.229145, -112.756730 – 0359.642 – 04.09 – South across YC field back to Shrine road.
1515 – 34.229944, -112.758640 – 0746.938 – 08.49 – West on Shrine to where YC property ends.
1516 – 34.229163, -112.756859 – 0636.595 – 07.23 – East on Shrine along Youth Camp property line.
1517 – 34.227300, -112.757417 – 0942.079 – 10.71 – Headed west on the cutover trail towards SA
1518 – 34.227216, -112.759042 – 0651.860 – 07.41 – Still heading west on cutover trail
1519 – 34.226480, -112.762883 – 1296.040 – 14.73 – Still heading west on cutover trail
1520 – 34.226187, -112.763903 – 0359.430 – 04.08 – Still heading west on cutover trail
1521 – 34.226187, -112.763903 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Sationary
1522 – 34.226187, -112.763903 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Sationary
1523 – 34.226187, -112.763903 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Sationary
1524 – 34.226187, -112.763903 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Sationary
1525 – 34.226187, -112.763903 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Sationary
1526 – 34.226187, -112.763903 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Sationary
1527 – 34.226187, -112.763903 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Sationary
1528 – 34.226187, -112.763903 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Sationary
1529 – 34.226178, -112.764450 – 0149.672 – 01.70 – On cutover trail, First indication of ‘on foot’.
1530 – 34.226178, -112.764450 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1531 – 34.226178, -112.764450 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1532 – 34.226418, -112.763087 – 0410.240 – 04.66 – Slight movement back EAST on cutover trail
1533 – 34.226498, -112.762465 – 0180.530 – 02.05 – Slight movement back EAST on cutover trail.
1534 – 34.226968, -112.761135 – 0467.143 – 05.31 – Slight movement back EAST on cutover trail.
1535 – 34.226826, -112.759976 – 0374.364 – 04.25 – Slight movement back EAST on cutover trail.
1536 – 34.227216, -112.759139 – 0309.871 – 03.52 – Slight movement back EAST on cutover trail.
1537 – 34.227243, -112.758409 – 0251.268 – 02.86 – Slight movement back EAST on cutover trail.
1538 – 34.226994, -112.757637 – 0224.759 – 02.55 – Slight movement back EAST on cutover trail.
1539 – 34.227562, -112.757444 – 0305.361 – 03.47 – Slight movement back EAST on cutover trail.
1540 – 34.228006, -112.756854 – 0203.820 – 02.32 – Slight movement back EAST on cutover trail.
1541 – 34.228449, -112.756543 – 0184.107 – 02.09 – Slight movement back EAST on cutover trail.
NOTE: This is as far EAST as Trueheart Brown and the GPS tracker would travel on foot.
Captain Brown now does his ‘about face’ at the moment he was requested by Frisby ( over
the radio ) to stop what he was doing and get some crew to move the GM and BR vehicles.
1542 – 34.227828, -112.756972 – 0265.927 – 03.02 – Slight movement back WEST on cutover trail.
1543 – 34.227065, -112.757455 – 0397.723 – 04.52 – Slight movement back WEST on cutover trail
1544 – 34.227314, -112.758581 – 0370.696 – 04.21 – Slight movement back WEST on cutover trail.
1545 – 34.227110, -112.759643 – 0351.847 – 04.00 – Slight movement back WEST on cutover trail.
1546 – 34.226941, -112.760223 – 0226.160 – 02.57 – Slight movement back WEST on cutover trail.
1547 – 34.227003, -112.761177 – 0326.175 – 03.71 – Slight movement back WEST on cutover trail.
1548 – 34.226569, -112.762068 – 0324.763 – 03.69 – Slight movement back WEST on cutover trail.
1549 – 34.226480, -112.763119 – 0322.840 – 03.67 – Slight movement back WEST on cutover trail.
1550 – 34.226187, -112.764471 – 0409.585 – 04.65 – Slight movement back WEST on cutover trail
1551 – 34.227057, -112.766048 – 0788.484 – 08.96 – On cutover trail and north in Sesame Area.
NOTE: Start of the ‘quick trip’ out/back to where the BR Superintendent Truck is parked.
1552 – 34.227021, -112.767336 – 0412.537 – 04.69 – North in SA towards BR Supt truck parking.
1553 – 34.229256, -112.771348 – 1566.380 – 17.80 – In Sesame area. NOTE: Fastest recorded rate
1554 – 34.231782, -112.773124 – 1197.480 – 13.61 – In Sesame area. Arrival where BR Superintendent Truck is parked at the point where east-west Sesame Trail meets the Sesame Area.
1555 – 34.230223, -112.771692 – 0749.953 – 08.52 – In Sesame area. Already on the move back SOUTH through the Sesame area after having stopped where the BR Superintendent Truck was parked for less than 60 seconds.
1556 – 34.228893, -112.771145 – 0628.204 – 07.14 – In Sesame area. Still heading SOUTH in the Sesame Area
1557 – 34.228582, -112.770619 – 0206.368 – 02.35 – In Sesame area. Still heading SOUTH in the Sesame Area passing by the point where the GM Crew Carriers are still parked. Tracker may have stopped there during this leg but it could have only been for a few seconds.
1558 – 34.227216, -112.767636 – 1115.170 – 12.67 – Still heading SOUTH in the Sesame Area. Back to a FAST pace again.
1559 – 34.227012, -112.766038 – 0537.775 – 06.11 – Still heading SOUTH in the Sesame Area. Slowed down some for a big curve in this leg.
1600 – 34.226196, -112.764471 – 0746.553 – 08.48 – More SOUTH travel in Sesame Area, then a left was taken onto the cutover trail and short amount of travel east on cutover trail back to the point where this ‘quick trip’ out to where the BR Superintendent truck began, but tracker does not stop where the trip began… It keeps heading east on the cutover road.
1601 – 34.227101, -112.761027 – 1125.580 – 12.79 – Heading EAST on cutover trail ( quickly ). Seems to STOP at this point. May have been where the dozer and BR crew were at this point in time along the cutover road.
1602 – 34.226977, -112.760587 – 0160.272 – 01.82 – ( NOTE: Slowest movement recorded in this sequence? ) Only a slight movement east on cutover road from previous point.
1603 – 34.226977, -112.760587 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1604 – 34.227340, -112.758602 – 0703.909 – 08.00 – On the move EAST again on cutover road.
1605 – 34.229035, -112.756553 – 1187.240 – 13.49 – Fast push EAST the remainder of the way to just before the point where the cutover road meets Shrine road near the Youth Camp.
1606 – 34.228742, -112.754740 – 0695.706 – 07.91 – Right turn onto Shrine Road, then down to almost to the eastern entrance to the Youth Camp
1607 – 34.229851, -112.755491 – 0507.458 – 05.77 – Up the driveway of the Youth Camp to where all the BR Crew Carriers were parked in a field there at the Youth Camp.
1608 – 34.229851, -112.755491 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1609 – 34.229851, -112.755491 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1610 – 34.227183, -112.752758 – 1360.570 – 15.46 – NOTE: Second fastest rate for this sequence. On Shrine road. All the way EAST on Shrine road from the Youth Camp staging area to the parking lot of the St. Joseph Shrine They are now at the exact same spot that the Helmet-Cam video will be taken from just 29 minutes from now.
1611 – 34.227183, -112.752758 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary at SJS parklot
1612 – 34.228387, -112.754123 – 0607.333 – 06.90 – Back WEST just a bit to where Shrine Rd pavement ends
1613 – 34.230605, -112.756720 – 1182.110 – 13.43 – All the way back to Youth Camp BR vehicle staging area
1614 – 34.229682, -112.757910 – 0498.075 – 05.66 – A little SOUTH in Youth Camp but still on the property
1615 – 34.230392, -112.759573 – 0550.779 – 06.26 – A little WEST in Youth Camp but still on the property
NOTE: START of quick trip WEST to get the GM Crew Carriers.
1616 – 34.227784, -112.757031 – 1573.510 – 17.88 – Headed WEST on CT again. Start of trip to fetch GM Carriers
1617 – 34.227048, -112.759756 – 1087.330 – 12.36 – Still heading WEST on CT towards GM Crew Carrier parking spot
1618 – 34.226498, -112.762395 – 0932.676 – 10.60 – Still heading WEST on CT towards GM Crew Carrier parking spot
1619 – 34.227021, -112.766011 – 1391.570 – 15.81 – Now headed NORTH in SA towards GM Crew Carrier parking spot
1620 – 34.228440, -112.770420 – 1579.230 – 17.95 – ARRIVAL at the GM Crew Carrier parking spot.
1621 – 34.227119, -112.767019 – 1241.040 – 14.10 – Immediately headed back SOUTH again through SA
1622 – 34.226604, -112.761934 – 1864.230 – 21.18 – More travel SOUTH in SA… then headed EAST on CT
1623 – 34.227349, -112.758651 – 1153.780 – 13.11 – Still heading EAST on CT
1624 – 34.229097, -112.756548 – 1280.420 – 14.55 – Arrival back where CT meets Shrine road
1625 – 34.229629, -112.754971 – 1320.340 – 15.00 – Arrival back where BR vehicles are parked at Youth Camp
NOTE: END of quick trip WEST to get the GM Crew Carriers.
ALSO NOTE: During the following time the GPS tracker stays at the
Youth Camp (YC) and there are only small movements in/around the area
where the BR Crew Carriers are parked. The tracker remain right around
the staging area inside the Youth Camp compound during this time…
1626 – 34.229984, -112.755239 – 0130.596 – 01.48 – Still at BR vehicle staging area at Youth Camp
1627 – 34.230126, -112.755518 – 0102.908 – 01.17 – Still at BR vehicle staging area at Youth Camp
1628 – 34.230126, -112.755518 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1629 – 34.230232, -112.755486 – 0052.238 – 00.59 – Still at BR vehicle staging area at Youth Camp
1630 – 34.230436, -112.755765 – 0131.196 – 01.49 – Still at BR vehicle staging area at Youth Camp
1631 – 34.230206, -112.756130 – 0145.208 – 01.65 – Still at BR vehicle staging area at Youth Camp
1632 – 34.230206, -112.755346 – 0239.823 – 02.73 – Still at BR vehicle staging area at Youth Camp
1633 – 34.230108, -112.755175 – 0077.278 – 00.88 – Still at BR vehicle staging area at Youth Camp
1634 – 34.229851, -112.754949 – 0125.806 – 01.43 – Still at BR vehicle staging area at Youth Camp
NOTE: Blue Ridge evacuates the Youth Camp (YC) and Shrine area now and BR convoy heads directly SOUTH to the Ranch House Restaurant. They only stop for 2 minutes on the way out at the parking lot of the St. Joseph Shrine to (apparently) speak to the firefighters who are already there and who, only minutes later, are going to be shooting the Helmet-Cam video that captures GM radio traffic. According to this GPS tracking… The BR GPS unit ( Brown ) was actually still there where the Helmet-Cam video was about to be shot just 60 seconds before GM Captain Steed transmits his first “We are in front of the flaming front” MAYDAY message at 1639.
1635 – 34.228414, -112.754134 – 0644.378 – 07.32 – EAST out the driveway of the Youth Camp (YC)
1636 – 34.227183, -112.752758 – 0624.010 – 07.09 – At the St. Joseph Shrine (SJS) parking lot now
1637 – 34.227183, -112.752758 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary at the SJS parking lot
1638 – 34.227183, -112.752758 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary at the SJS parking lot
1639 – 34.224803, -112.749746 – 1342.030 – 15.25 – Suddenly all the way EAST on Shrine Rd, almost to Highway 89
1640 – 34.222603, -112.746935 – 1188.170 – 13.50 – At intersection of Shrine Rd and Highway 89 now
1641 – 34.217985, -112.750025 – 1966.140 – 22.34 – Heading SOUTH on Highway 89 to the RHR
1642 – 34.213532, -112.755497 – 2468.580 – 28.05 – Heading SOUTH on Highway 89 to the RHR
1643 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0167.099 – 01.90 – Arrival at the Ranch House Restaurant
NOTE: 1643 is one of the estimated times of the actual burnover out in the box canyon.
1644 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1645 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1646 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1647 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary ( slight movement west )
1648 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1649 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1650 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1651 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1652 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1653 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1654 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary ( slight movement east )
1655 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary ( slight movement west )
1656 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1657 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary ( slight movement east )
1658 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1659 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1700 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1701 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary ( slight movement west )
1702 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1703 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1704 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1705 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1706 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1707 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1708 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1709 – 34.213279, -112.755239 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary ( slight movement south )
1710 – 34.216118, -112.758758 – 1839.480 – 20.90 – Heading northwest through Glen Ilah on Lakewood Drive
1711 – 34.218611, -112.760239 – 1000.710 – 11.37 – At intersection of Westward/Lakewood and Manzanita Drive
1712 – 34.215772, -112.758640 – 1183.450 – 13.45 – Back east on Lakewood Drive
1713 – 34.218611, -112.760239 – 1183.550 – 13.45 – Back west again to same 1711 spot. Intersection of Westward/Lakewood and Manzanita
1714 – 34.215471, -112.758082 – 1352.120 – 15.36 – Back east on Lakewood again. To intersection of Lakewood and Mountainaire Drive
1715 – 34.215471, -112.758082 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1716 – 34.215471, -112.758082 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1717 – 34.215304, -112.759219 – 0405.336 – 04.61 – Southwest on Mountainaire, then west on Foothill Drive
1718 – 34.216544, -112.762223 – 1043.210 – 11.85 – Heading west on Foothill Drive
1719 – 34.215746, -112.760561 – 0612.670 – 06.96 – Heading back east on Foothill Drive to Mountainaire Drive
1720 – 34.212534, -112.760646 – 1646.220 – 18.71 – South on Mountainaire Drive
1721 – 34.210502, -112.762266 – 1149.650 – 13.06 – South on Mountainaire, west on Las Tiendas Dr., then south on Candy Cane Ln.
1722 – 34.215346, -112.758458 – 2457.170 – 27.82 – All the way back north (fast) to intersection of Mountainaire and Lakewood
1723 – 34.215967, -112.754134 – 2607.150 – 29.63 – Exited Glen Ilah via Lakewood east, now heading north on Highway 89 (fast)
1724 – 34.222581, -112.746828 – 3413.380 – 38.79 – North (fast) on Highway 89, now at intersection of 89 and Shrine Road
1725 – 34.223610, -112.748051 – 0542.768 – 06.17 – West on Shrine Road. Now at intersection of Shrine Road and Willow Lane
1726 – 34.228307, -112.753844 – 2538.890 – 28.85 – West on Shrine Road all the way to Youth Camp entrance
1727 – 34.227225, -112.752782 – 0544.510 – 06.19 – Back east on Shrine Road to St. Joseph Shrine parking lot
1728 – 34.228502, -112.754166 – 0650.764 – 07.39 – Back west to near Youth Camp entrance again
1729 – 34.228502, -112.754166 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1730 – 34.228502, -112.754166 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1731 – 34.228502, -112.754166 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1732 – 34.228502, -112.754166 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1733 – 34.228502, -112.754166 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1734 – 34.228502, -112.754166 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
1735 – 34.228387, -112.754488 – 0121.864 – 01.38 – Slight movement west on Shrine Road
1736 – 34.229150, -112.756580 – 0683.623 – 07.77 – West on Shrine Road. Now at spot where Cutover Trail meets Shrine Road
1737 – 34.227314, -112.758844 – 1353.550 – 15.38 – Heading west on Cutover Trail
1738 – 34.226338, -112.763339 – 1509.630 – 17.15 – Heading west on Cutover Trail
1739 – 34.227198, -112.767631 – 1616.130 – 18.37 – Now heading northwest through Sesame area
1740 – 34.229700, -112.771858 – 1732.190 – 19.68 – Heading northwest through Sesame area
1741 – 34.231714, -112.775398 – 1590.820 – 18.08 – Now heading west on Sesame Trail
1742 – 34.232760, -112.779894 – 1484.720 – 16.87 – Heading west on Sesame Trail
1743 – 34.231226, -112.782823 – 1106.700 – 12.58 – Heading west on Sesame Trail. At intersection where old-grader road meets Sesame Trail
1744 – 34.227997, -112.782780 – 1210.130 – 13.75 – Did not stop near old-grader. Now heading south on part of Sesame trail that winds around up to anchor spot
1745 – 34.226373, -112.783456 – 0639.364 – 07.27 – Climbing up to anchor point
1746 – 34.225167, -112.784207 – 0558.211 – 06.34 – Climbing up to anchor point
1747 – 34.225052, -112.785988 – 0557.149 – 06.33 – Almost at upper two-track junction near anchor.
1748 – 34.224688, -112.786160 – 0166.673 – 01.89 – Arrival at upper two-track junction near anchor. Mystery Panel location.
1749 – 34.225788, -112.783456 – 1054.910 – 11.99 – Suddenly, quickly headed back east down from anchor point on Sesame trail
1750 – 34.227997, -112.782780 – 0859.702 – 09.77 – Heading back towards old-grader location
NOTE: This 1749/1750 moment is documented in BR Captain Browns notes…
Page 7 of BR Captain Brown’s (redacted) log notes…
____________________________________________________________________________________________
1750 – All three vehicles head up to the upper 2-track junction and then we see that
Ranger 5 is hovering over something down in the flats off the north. We all head
down the hill until we determine that it is a old piece of heavy equipment that was
seen early by (xxxxxxx) This is the area where they would have been had
they been traveling in the Black like we initially thought. ( REDACTED ).
___________________________________________________________________________________________
1751 – 34.231013, -112.782855 – 1139.050 – 12.94 – Heading back towards old-grader location
1752 – 34.231598, -112.784690 – 0692.910 – 07.87 – Passed old-grader and now heading northwest on jeep trail
1753 – 34.233230, -112.786825 – 0924.497 – 10.51 – Now at northwest limit of jeep trail near small clearing
1754 – 34.231793, -112.784904 – 0817.758 – 09.29 – Returning southeast now on jeep trail towards old-grader
1755 – 34.231108, -112.782823 – 0750.547 – 08.53 – Passed old-grader, now heading back to anchor point
1756 – 34.230523, -112.783048 – 0235.908 – 02.68 – Heading back to anchor point
1757 – 34.227465, -112.783295 – 1191.460 – 13.54 – Heading back to anchor point
1758 – 34.225043, -112.784636 – 1081.180 – 12.29 – Heading back to anchor point
1759 – 34.225513, -112.787093 – 1086.660 – 12.35 – Passed two-track junction, now heading north on ridge two-track
1800 – 34.224901, -112.787962 – 0518.314 – 05.89 – Heading north on ridge two-track
1801 – 34.226719, -112.788906 – 0739.229 – 08.40 – Almost to anchor point
1802 – 34.226888, -112.789797 – 0298.457 – 03.39 – Arrival at anchor point
1803 – 34.227057, -112.790601 – 0341.339 – 03.88 – Passed anchor point, now slighty north and west of anchor point
1804 – 34.229061, -112.790945 – 0781.799 – 08.88 – Still proceeding to the north on ridge two-track
1805 – 34.230676, -112.793487 – 1221.360 – 13.88 – Still proceeding north towards helispot
1806 – 34.231403, -112.793541 – 0281.936 – 03.20 – Still proceeding north towards helispot
1807 – 34.232122, -112.793391 – 0228.738 – 02.60 – Arrival at backpack pump cache location
1808 – 34.232193, -112.792597 – 0234.440 – 02.66 – Off two-track now, slight hike due east
1809 – 34.231101, -112.792554 – 0414.785 – 04.71 – Off two-track now, slight hike due south
1810 – 34.230552, -112.792940 – 0229.284 – 02.61 – Another slight move south, back to two-track
1811 – 34.230135, -112.792726 – 0161.612 – 01.84 – Another slight move south on two-track
1812 – 34.229762, -112.791556 – 0511.027 – 05.81 – Another move south on two-track
1813 – 34.228325, -112.791352 – 0619.365 – 07.04 – Another move south on two-track, then off road slightly to west
1814 – 34.226959, -112.790945 – 0519.435 – 05.90 – Another move south slightly west of two-track
1815 – 34.226453, -112.791374 – 0194.091 – 02.21 – Very slight move to the southwest, off two-track
1816 – 34.225939, -112.790097 – 0405.690 – 04.61 – Move to the southeast, off two-track
1817 – 34.224848, -112.787930 – 0780.025 – 08.86 – Move to the southeast, back to two-track
1818 – 34.224457, -112.787372 – 0217.096 – 02.47 – Off two-track again, move to southeast into rock pile
1819 – 34.224053, -112.786202 – 0387.557 – 04.40 – Off two-track, to the southeast through rock pile
1820 – 34.223845, -112.784829 – 0436.998 – 04.97 – Back on two track, heading south to box canyon
1821 – 34.223189, -112.783359 – 0505.706 – 05.75 – Heading south on two-track towards box canyon
1822 – 34.221823, -112.782125 – 0715.249 – 08.13 – At bailout point and already left two-track starting descent
1823 – 34.221024, -112.780913 – 0459.679 – 05.22 – Descending in drainage area
1824 – 34.220944, -112.780441 – 0131.291 – 01.49 – Descending in drainage area
1825 – 34.220760, -112.779878 – 0177.553 – 02.02 – Descending in drainage area
1826 – 34.220570, -112.778891 – 0321.836 – 03.65 – Descending in drainage area
1827 – 34.220503, -112.778188 – 0222.092 – 02.52 – Descending in draingae area, almost to deployment site
1828 – 34.220490, -112.777668 – 0156.980 – 01.78 – At deployment site now
1829 – 34.220539, -112.777550 – 0039.258 – 00.45 – Slight movement northeast at deployment site
1830 – 34.220481, -112.777619 – 0030.950 – 00.35 – Slight movement southwest at deployment site
1831 – 34.220472, -112.777555 – 0021.075 – 00.24 – Slight movement due east at deployment site
1832 – 34.220478, -112.777609 – 0016.220 – 00.18 – Slight movement due west at deployment site
1833 – 34.220478, -112.777609 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary at deployment site
1834 – 34.220478, -112.777609 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary at deployment site
1835 – 34.220478, -112.777609 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary at deployment site
1836 – 34.220527, -112.777599 – 0012.960 – 00.15 – Slight movement due north at deployment site
1837 – 34.220561, -112.777598 – 0013.983 – 00.16 – Another slight movement north at deployment site
1838 – 34.220553, -112.777657 – 0020.250 – 00.23 – Slight movement west at deployment site
1839 – 34.220553, -112.777657 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary at deployment site
1840 – 34.220553, -112.777657 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary at deployment site
1841 – 34.220584, -112.777660 – 0010.021 – 00.11 – Slight movement north at deployment site
1842 – 34.220551, -112.777660 – 0010.125 – 00.11 – Slight movement south at deployment site
1843 – 34.220551, -112.777660 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary at deployment site
1844 – 34.220549, -112.777614 – 0016.205 – 00.18 – Slight movement east at deployment site
1845 – 34.220573, -112.777580 – 0012.600 – 00.14 – Slight movement northeast at deployment site
1846 – 34.220573, -112.777580 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary at deployment site
1847 – 34.220573, -112.777580 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary at deployment site
1848 – 34.220573, -112.777580 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary at deployment site
1849 – 34.220573, -112.777580 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary at deployment site
1850 – 34.220500, -112.777625 – 0031.696 – 00.36 – Slight movement southwest at deployment site
1851 – 34.220559, -112.777622 – 0023.898 – 00.27 – Slight movement north at deployment site
1852 – 34.220594, -112.777623 – 0010.530 – 00.12 – Another slight movement north at deployment site
1853 – 34.220594, -112.777623 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary at deployment site
1854 – 34.220594, -112.777623 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary at deployment site
1855 – 34.220594, -112.777623 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary at deployment site
1856 – 34.220539, -112.777623 – 0021.064 – 00.24 – Slight movement south at deployment site
1857 – 34.220601, -112.777493 – 0043.674 – 00.50 – Slight movement northwest at deployment site
1858 – 34.220546, -112.777129 – 0113.068 – 01.28 – Walking east towards Boulder Springs Ranch now
1859 – 34.220589, -112.776439 – 0212.192 – 02.41 – Walking east towards Boulder Springs Ranch
1900 – 34.220740, -112.775420 – 0301.045 – 03.42 – Walking east towards Boulder Springs Ranch
1901 – 34.221157, -112.774808 – 0264.673 – 03.01 – Walking to the northeast now. Slight Diversion.
1902 – 34.220776, -112.774390 – 0187.278 – 02.13 – Walking southeast towards Ranch again
1903 – 34.220155, -112.774326 – 0224.407 – 02.55 – Walking southeast towards Ranch
1904 – 34.219844, -112.773703 – 0217.471 – 02.47 – Walking southeast towards Ranch
1905 – 34.219578, -112.773188 – 0179.729 – 02.04 – Walking southeast towards Ranch
1906 – 34.219569, -112.772534 – 0152.284 – 01.73 – Walking due east now towards Ranch
1907 – 34.219596, -112.772019 – 0132.883 – 01.51 – Walking due east towards Ranch
1908 – 34.219516, -112.771322 – 0189.704 – 02.16 – Arrival at Boulder Springs Ranch (BSR)
1909 – 34.219516, -112.771322 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary at Boulder Springs Ranch
1910 – 34.219658, -112.771300 – 0042.245 – 00.48 – Slight movement north at Boulder Springs Ranch
1911 – 34.219631, -112.771450 – 0045.361 – 00.52 – Slight movement west at Boulder Springs Ranch
1912 – 34.219525, -112.771322 – 0060.268 – 00.68 – Slight movement southeast at Boulder Springs Ranch
1913 – 34.219392, -112.771032 – 0084.256 – 00.96 – Another slight movement southeast at Boulder Springs Ranch
1914 – 34.219416, -112.770919 – 0056.724 – 00.64 – Another slight movement southeast at BSR
1915 – 34.219363, -112.770967 – 0046.419 – 00.53 – Slight movement south at BSR
1916 – 34.219363, -112.770967 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary at BSR
1917 – 34.219363, -112.770967 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary at BSR
1918 – 34.219363, -112.770967 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary at BSR
1919 – 34.219363, -112.770967 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary at BSR
1920 – 34.219363, -112.770967 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary at BSR
1921 – 34.219363, -112.770967 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary at BSR
1922 – 34.219363, -112.770967 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary at BSR
1923 – 34.219465, -112.771064 – 0049.271 – 00.56 – Slight movement northwest at BSR
1924 – 34.219576, -112.771322 – 0079.183 – 00.90 – Another slight movement northwest at BSR
1925 – 34.219651, -112.772024 – 0215.410 – 02.45 – Walking back west to deployment site now
1926 – 34.219634, -112.772786 – 0226.811 – 02.58 – Walking back west to deployment site
1927 – 34.219800, -112.773618 – 0255.494 – 02.90 – Walking back west to deployment site
1928 – 34.220119, -112.774519 – 0300.366 – 03.41 – Walking back west to deployment site
1929 – 34.220394, -112.775581 – 0336.123 – 03.82 – Walking back west to deployment site
1930 – 34.220536, -112.776386 – 0250.994 – 02.85 – Walking back west to deployment site
1931 – 34.220501, -112.777212 – 0249.504 – 02.84 – Walking back west to deployment site
1932 – 34.220492, -112.777534 – 0110.921 – 01.26 – Walking back west to deployment site
1933 – 34.220499, -112.777694 – 0053.681 – 00.61 – Arrival back at deployment site
1934 – 34.220499, -112.777694 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary at deployment site
1935 – 34.220428, -112.777737 – 0023.195 – 00.26 – Slight movement southwest at deployment site
1936 – 34.220450, -112.777882 – 0048.708 – 00.55 – Slight movement west at deployment site
1937 – 34.220463, -112.778365 – 0149.359 – 01.70 – Heading west back up to ridge now
1938 – 34.220454, -112.778832 – 0139.661 – 01.59 – Heading west back up to ridge
1939 – 34.220459, -112.779234 – 0119.925 – 01.36 – Heading west back up to ridge
1940 – 34.220454, -112.779577 – 0103.732 – 01.18 – Heading west back up to ridge
1941 – 34.220503, -112.780060 – 0145.946 – 01.66 – Heading west back up to ridge
1942 – 34.220539, -112.780441 – 0121.199 – 01.38 – Heading west back up to ridge
1943 – 34.220720, -112.780988 – 0175.711 – 01.90 – Heading northwest back up to ridge
1944 – 34.220978, -112.781412 – 0155.943 – 01.77 – Heading northwest back up to ridge
1945 – 34.221022, -112.781755 – 0101.493 – 01.15 – Heading west back up to ridge
1946 – 34.221279, -112.782115 – 0143.222 – 01.63 – Arrival back on two-track on top of ridge
1947 – 34.221816, -112.782378 – 0209.375 – 02.38 – Heading northwest on two-track now
1948 – 34.222264, -112.782893 – 0224.625 – 02.55 – Heading northwest on two-track
1949 – 34.222637, -112.783054 – 0142.698 – 01.62 – Heading northwest on two-track
1950 – 34.222637, -112.783054 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary on two-track
1951 – 34.222637, -112.783054 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary on two-track
1952 – 34.222637, -112.783054 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary on two-track
1953 – 34.222637, -112.783054 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary on two-track
1954 – 34.222637, -112.783054 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary on two-track
1955 – 34.222637, -112.783054 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary on two-track
1956 – 34.222721, -112.783129 – 0041.301 – 00.47 – Slight movement west
1957 – 34.222637, -112.783054 – 0041.301 – 00.47 – Slight movement back east
1958 – 34.222721, -112.783129 – 0041.301 – 00.47 – Same slight movement west as before
1959 – 34.222721, -112.783129 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
2000 – 34.222916, -112.783188 – 0083.015 – 00.94 – Slight movement north on two-track
2001 – 34.222721, -112.783129 – 0083.015 – 00.94 – Same slight movement back south on two-track
2002 – 34.222721, -112.783129 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
2003 – 34.222721, -112.783129 – 0000.000 – 00.00 – Stationary
2004 – 34.222712, -112.783123 – 0023.363 – 00.27 – Slight movement northwest on two-track
2005 – 34.223125, -112.783311 – 0147.418 – 01.63 – Heading northwest on two-track now
2006 – 34.223426, -112.783628 – 0158.190 – 01.80 – Heading northwest on two-track now
2007 – 34.224194, -112.785859 – 0697.343 – 07.92 – Heading northwest on two-track now
2008 – 34.224717, -112.786186 – 0226.256 – 02.57 – Arrival back at two-track junction, Mystery Panel location
2009 – 34.225045, -112.784647 – 0576.387 – 06.55 – Heading back east down two-track now
2010 – 34.226320, -112.783467 – 0541.882 – 06.16 – Heading back east down two-track
2011 – 34.227979, -112.782791 – 0786.351 – 08.94 – Heading back east down two-track
2012 – 34.229203, -112.782812 – 0452.308 – 05.14 – Heading back east down two-track
2013 – 34.231208, -112.782801 – 0759.406 – 08.63 – Heading back east down two-track. Passing Old-Grader spot now.
2014 – 34.232805, -112.780302 – 0937.499 – 10.65 – Heading east on Sesame Trail two-track
2015 – 34.231847, -112.777737 – 0878.784 – 09.99 – Heading east on Sesame Trail two-track
2016 – 34.231749, -112.775087 – 0835.588 – 09.50 – Heading east on Sesame Trail two-track
2017 – 34.231518, -112.772909 – 0711.681 – 08.09 – Now heading south in the Sesame Area
2018 – 34.228981, -112.771107 – 1177.360 – 13.38 – Heading south in the Sesame Area
2019 – 34.227163, -112.767566 – 1365.920 – 15.52 – Heading south in the Sesame Area
2020 – 34.225930, -112.765378 – 0940.950 – 10.69 – Arrival at intersection of Sesame Area and Cutover Trail
2021 – 34.226861, -112.761322 – 1302.270 – 14.80 – Heading east on Cutover Trail
2022 – 34.227012, -112.757771 – 1227.340 – 13.95 – Heading east on Cutover Trail
2023 – 34.228840, -112.756516 – 0902.834 – 10.26 – Heading east on Cutover Trail
2024 – 34.228440, -112.754166 – 0933.369 – 10.61 – Back at entrance to Youth Camp on Shrine Road
2025 – 34.226648, -112.751838 – 1009.170 – 11.47 – Heading east on Shrine Road towards Hwy 89
2026 – 34.222577, -112.746935 – 2120.900 – 24.10 – Arrival at intersection of Shrine Road and Hwy 89
2027 – 34.229677, -112.740304 – 3273.840 – 37.20 – Heading north on Hwy 89. Just past Young Lane
2028 – Off the map
NOTE: The GPS tracker never reappears even though video continues until 2100.
2100 – BLUE RIDGE GPS TRACKING VIDEO ENDS
Awesome! Excellent work and thank you!!!
Lots of clarifying little details here.
Including the clarification that the BR Hotshot looking at Swartz when he took that 1843 photo is neither Frisbee nor Trew! They never came back to the RHR, I think.
I’m going to email you for a text file version of this. I really want it on my computer, and copy/pasting it from here will be, most likely, really difficult…..
Marti… just RIGHT-CLICK and then pick the Select All’ option.
It will highlight everything… then you can cut/paste and ‘save it’ as TEXT.
That’s not working for me.
Marti came up with the idea that a federal investigation ought to be in order. I think plenty of us would agree to that idea. It is obvious that a system should not be investigating itself when 19 deaths are concerned.
Joy and I have heard and seen too much talk from reliable people that there was plenty of wrong doing going on, There are lives and millions of taxpayer money involved here when we believe that it will prove out that this was not what should have occurred and could have been avoided had the proper actions been taken. Some person or persons are culpable and that needs to be addressed–we certainly do not need to be loosing these heroes that fight the front line fires nor do the taxpayers need to be footing bills needlessly,. I do understand that taxes will be going up and already high fees to live in this county will be grossly increased as a direct result of this fire.
Oddly certain firefighter bosses received recognition for their efforts in this fire. I understand that one is even going to run for mayor of Prescott. We hope Donut has come clean with his lawyer and deposition. And now we have a new Fire Chief. He has no comment when Joy asked if he was trying to get us arrested for hiking people.
Joy did check out his credentials and found him to be from Prescott Valley and previous experience as an EMT. We could not find that he ever before had any fire fighting experience. Maybe it can be found somewhere Joy has not looked, but she usually can find that type of information easily enough.
Well we likely will attend a town meeting with Karen Fann who is our representative. She should have some good information for us. Thanks for you people on this web site. Wow you do some intricate work.
>> Marti Reed said…
>>
>> Lots of clarifying little details here.
>> Including the clarification that the BR Hotshot looking at Swartz when
>> he took that 1843 photo is neither Frisbee nor Trew! They never
>> came back to the RHR, I think.
No, they didn’t. Not Brian Frisby or Trueheart Brown, anway.
At 1843… Brown was standing out at the deployment site.
When they finally walked back up the ridge to their UTVs… all FIVE of those FFs. on the ground rescue mission just worked their way out the way they came in.
Then Frisby and Brown headed up to the ICP in Model Creek.
It is not known if they ever came back down to Yarnell that evening.
Yep. I’ve been really uncertain about this photo.
I still think the BR guy with the collar pulled up might be Ball, because of the earlier Blue Ridge photo. But that’s pretty tenuous, all things considered.
The guy staring at the camera, I have no clue to. It seems so Frisbee-ish. But it can’t be. Back to square one!
This links to me into the question of who was driving the Blue Ridge Utility truck with the trailer towing their UTV. That truck was parked at the “ranch” at the top of Manzanita where Blue Ridge originally staged. It seems their UTV was unloaded there and driven in. While the truck stayed there.
And it’s also unclear when that truck went to the Ranch House Restaurant parking lot. None of this ever has been made clear to me.
It would make sense that that truck, once it got there, would have stayed in the RHR parking lot, regardless of when the rest of the Blue Ridge trucks headed up north because the fire and smoke were overwhelming the parking lot. The driver of that truck either didn’t know when/if Frisbee/Trew would get back there, or would be waiting for Ball to come back with the UTV he got from Yarnell Fire Department and would need to return it and/or need transportation out to catch up with the crew.
My question ( one of many, lol) is who took Cory Ball to get the quad from the YFD?
LOL backatcha!
I spent ages trying to figure that out and finally quit cuz it was giving me too many headaches.
At 3:30 he’s with the dozer on the cutover as the crew is hiking in.
At 3:50 he’s at the gate at the top of Manzanita where the utv and dozer tow trucks had been staged.
At 4:28 he’s riding shotgun in a white/grey truck pulling into the Yarnell Fire Department parking lot.
At 4:43 he’s heading into Glen Ilah. At 4:48 he takes his last shot of that little visit.
At 5:43 he’s heading back in. At 5:50 he takes his last shot of that longer series.
I have no idea who might have driven him to the Yarnell Fire Department at 4:28.
And I’ve never been able to figure out the earlier part of the sequence from anything he seems to have said or written.
Something comes to mind that might concern the attempt to reach that so called Helms ranch house and sometimes called a safe zone. That is not exactly a ranch–there are no horses or cattle that I have ever seen there. I do know it takes numbers to get into a gate and there are plenty of cameras about the place. Someone has told me that the buildings are actually a place where government contracts are filled. If this is true perhaps that would have been a factor in the decision to protect that setup.
I heard from Joy– says there is a play in Prescott, AZ about the fire tonight and maybe a few more nights. I did not get the particulars, but she saw one and said it was well presented.
I’ve always been under the impression that the Helms’ place was considered to be a ‘Llama Ranch’, and there’s some evidence to
support that.
One of the buildings on the property has been referred to in ‘damage reports’ as the ‘Llama barn’.
When author ( and former Hotshot ) Kyle Dickman published his article about the ‘Yanrell 19’… it had this quote in it…
Outside Magazine
Tuesday, September 17, 2013
The Yarnell Hill Fire – By Kyle Dickman
http://www.outsideonline.com/outdoor-adventure/YarnellFire.html
————————————————————
He ( Eric Marsh ) radioed to the plane circling overhead. His transmissions, normally delivered in the deadpan of a true technician, were beginning to betray his stress. Granite Mountain, he told air attack, was moving toward the ranch house they had in sight at the foot of the basin.
Get there and everything would be OK. It didn’t look far. A 15-minute hike tops. Eric would have seen the homeowners outside, panicking as they pushed their llama and miniature donkey into the barn before they prepared to weather the inferno that was ripping toward them.
———————————————————————-
So Kyle Dickman only mentions ONE ‘Llama’… but I do believe
the Helms place certainly had more than just one.
Good to see you here, Sonny. I cannot help it but I’m smiling—tug at the heartstrings I reckon. I want to remind you —-or maybe reminding myself—that even though we are not greeting each morning on the trails—and there is such a stillness when the sun sets and we are greeted each night with the moonlit stars and coast to coast radio,
God took over a bit to help us figure things out—so let’s “keep the faith” and the renewed strength during this time we are on our own—and not trekking together that we keep trying to enlist folks to share their photos and videos publicly to properly assess the YHF. You are right Sonny I did see THE FENCE play by Ered Matthew on 7/8/14 and tonight and they did an excellent job humanizing that fence that had all the items in front of the GMHS station that media covered last year and thank you Ered for sharing your timeline and experience of the YHF aftermath and how the fence meant to you as well as one of the last photos I took of the GMHS yet I “never” imagined me and Sonny to be on some playbill as roles in some play not just a one time mention either—a very significant role as we were in it from start to end many times. You can watch it too everyone— it is Th, Fr, Sa this week 7:30pm and Sunday 2pm until the 20th.
http://www.prescottaz.com/m/Articles.aspx?ArticleID=133559
http://www.changeinthewind.org/
http://www.playbillvip.com/show/vip/Basin_Lake_Theatre_Project/2014/The_Fence_9394/page/3I
I will not name drop but there was loved ones of the GMHS present this week and I got to finally thank one for the special gift I got for my July 1st bday and I explained my missing sd card details as well as the last conversation we had—as well as some insight to the last moment of a video in regards to “tickling” that only she’d get on that. I was STAR STRUCK too as I got my photo taken with SMOKEY—way cool. Love that bear! Watching the play for the 2nd time—the season of the soul of these actors/actress’—my heart was heavy with unfathomable weight; despondently sad. What makes life this way, heart-hurts and tears falling…a sense of feeling frozen with the understanding that this too shall pass and knowledge that everything has its end—looking forward to the spring of joy some day—and to finally assessing the YHF properly and as well do something so grand not just for the 19 but all fallen ones—may it be education or some significant expression to let them know we care and we want it to end—
Good night!
I hope this answered you Sonny.
Joy A. Collura says
July 12, 2014 at 1:43 am
Your comment is awaiting moderation.
Good to see you here, Sonny. I cannot help it but I’m smiling—tug at the heartstrings I reckon. I want to remind you —-or maybe reminding myself—that even though we are not greeting each morning on the trails—and there is such a stillness when the sun sets and we are greeted each night with the moonlit stars and coast to coast radio,
God took over a bit to help us figure things out—so let’s “keep the faith” and the renewed strength during this time we are on our own—and not trekking together that we keep trying to enlist folks to share their photos and videos publicly to properly assess the YHF. You are right Sonny I did see THE FENCE play by Ered Matthew on 7/8/14 and tonight and they did an excellent job humanizing that fence that had all the items in front of the GMHS station that media covered last year and thank you Ered for sharing your timeline and experience of the YHF aftermath and how the fence meant to you as well as one of the last photos I took of the GMHS yet I “never” imagined me and Sonny to be on some playbill as roles in some play not just a one time mention either—a very significant role as we were in it from start to end many times. You can watch it too everyone— it is Th, Fr, Sa this week 7:30pm and Sunday 2pm until the 20th.
prescottaz. c o m/m/Articles.aspx?ArticleID=133559
.changeinthewind. o r g/
playbillvip.c o m/show/vip/Basin_Lake_Theatre_Project/2014/The_Fence_9394/page/3I
I will not name drop but there was loved ones of the GMHS present this week and I got to finally thank one for the special gift I got for my July 1st bday and I explained my missing sd card details as well as the last conversation we had—as well as some insight to the last moment of a video in regards to “tickling” that only she’d get on that. I was STAR STRUCK too as I got my photo taken with SMOKEY—way cool. Love that bear! Watching the play for the 2nd time—the season of the soul of these actors/actress’—my heart was heavy with unfathomable weight; despondently sad. What makes life this way, heart-hurts and tears falling…a sense of feeling frozen with the understanding that this too shall pass and knowledge that everything has its end—looking forward to the spring of joy some day—and to finally assessing the YHF properly and as well do something so grand not just for the 19 but all fallen ones—may it be education or some significant expression to let them know we care and we want it to end—
Good night!
I hope this answered you Sonny.
Apparently, we’re working!! Thanks John!!! Happy Fourth!!!
Testing.
This is a test to see if Chapter VIII is working..